böhlau
Germans and Hungarians in Southeast Europe
Identity Management and Ethnomanagement

Translated from German by Klara Stephanie Szlezák
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Foreword

The multifaceted field of minority research, which has been one of my primary research interests for more than fifteen years, is thriving and thus keeps offering new challenges. By changing perspectives and angles or by focusing on a particular aspect, new findings that lay hidden beneath the surface like precious metals may be unearthed.

My first major contribution to the research literature in the field was to develop, together with two other historians at the University of Graz, the concept of (hidden) minorities. In this context I published a monograph on the Styrian Slovenes on the Soboth in 2007. Ever since, and particularly so during an extended research trip to Slovenia (2004-2005), I have regularly been in direct contact with minority societies. Based on these experiences I developed the idea to research the identity management of Germans and Hungarians in Southeast Central Europe and wrote the respective application for a FWF Stand-alone Project.¹ This allowed me to conduct most of the basic research for this book (2007-2010); Eduard G. Staudinger, contemporary historian at the University of Graz, took over the project lead. Therefore I would like to extend my gratitude both to him and to the research assistants working on the project thanks to temporary FWF contracts for all their suggestions and input.

I further thank Karl Kaser, who not only provided me with an academic affiliation in the department of Southeast European History at the University of Graz as of 2001, but who also became a personal example to me in the way in which he approaches the history of Southeast Europe. The discipline of Southeast European History at the University of Graz, to me, is inconceivable without him. In addition, I would like to thank him in his role as series editor for accepting my manuscript into the series “Zur Kunde Südosteuropas.”

As this monograph is the revised version of my habilitation, I would further like to thank the three reviewers for their close reading of the manuscript and for their suggestions on how to further optimize the original manuscript. I worked on these revisions while already having taken up my diverse responsibilities at the Zentrum für Kulturwissenschaften at the University of Graz, where I not only had access to the necessary resources but where I also found the necessary work atmosphere. This book could be published with Böhlau publishers thanks to the FWF funding in support of the publication costs (PUB 282-G28) and the reviewer’s most positive scholarly assessment. I am grateful for both.

Finally, I would like to especially thank my wife Zsuzsa Barbarics-Hermanik, who patiently supported me throughout the many years of my research and writing and who accompanied me on some of my numerous field research trips.

¹ The basic research as well as the field research for this book were largely conducted in the context of the FWF-funded research project P 20 060 g08.
Introduction

Heracleitus’s ontological insight of πάντα ῥεῖ (= everything flows) implicitly lives on in the anthropological concept of flows, which denote the seemingly accelerating socio-cultural phenomena and effects of globalisation, transnationalism, or media networks. According to Hannerz, the term cultural flows describes a marked-out spatial dimension, yet also points into at least one, or several directions.\(^1\) This is relevant for the following theoretical reflections as well as for the analysis for a variety of reasons: Firstly, this draws to our attention the constant variability of cultural flows and with it the viewpoint of Heracleitus, who believed that one could not step into the same river twice\(^2\); secondly, the aforementioned directedness can denote a linear routing just as much as a meandering forward movement; and thirdly, the space can be expanded at will, as for instance in Appadurai’s model of global cultural flows.\(^3\) All agents\(^4\) act within what Appadurai called ethnoscapes,\(^5\) which implicitly refer to group identities or multiple identities since this model also demonstrates which powers of inner cohesion manage to hold a group together despite constant movement and the global expansion of space. Further comparable bonds include, for example, loyalty felt toward one or several nation states, financial support through a collectivity, or simply the personal relation to a specific region for which one feels some sense of belonging. In this process, so-called “medial experiences” become increasingly important as they impact more and more the individual’s relations to his social environment as well as local and supra-local social networks.\(^6\) This has also affected the view of transnational field of inquiry. No longer can we start from the assumption that ethnic or national minorities or groups are bi-local only\(^7\); rather, as Stuart Hall pointed out two decades ago, we need to consider the ever growing significance of an imaginary coherence,\(^8\) which finds expression above all in a group’s shared ideas of identity-creating characteristics and ethnic markers.

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\(^1\) Cf. Ulf Hannerz. “Flows, Boundaries and Hybrids: Keywords in Transnational Anthropology.” Department of Social Anthropology, Stockholm University. 5.

See: [http://www.transcomm.ox.ac.uk/working%20papers/hannerz.pdf](http://www.transcomm.ox.ac.uk/working%20papers/hannerz.pdf) (30 August 2011).


\(^4\) In this monograph I aim in principle at using gender neutral referents. If, for lack of space, I use the male form only, the female form is always implied.

\(^5\) Cf. Arjun Appadurai. *Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization*. Minneapolis: UMP, 1993. 33 ff. Besides ethnoscapes, it is mediascapes, technoscapes, financescapes, and ideoscapes that constitute global cultural flows; however, according to Appadurai, these scapes are constantly drifting apart.


\(^7\) The term “minority” is in this context also understood as a legal term, like the terms “national group” and “ethnic group.” Just like Marie-Janine Calic, I regret that these terms, like “minority,” which can be perceived as pejorative and which denotes primarily a quantitative relation, or “ethnic group,” which is burdened with historical and ideological implications, have not yet been replaced by value-free terms. See Marie-Janine Calic. “Zur Sozialgeschichte ethnischer Gruppen: Fragestellungen und Methoden.” *Aspekte ethnischer Identität: Ergebnisse der Forschungsprojekte „Deutsche und Magyaren als nationale Minderheiten im Donauraum.“* Ed. E. Hösch and G. Seewann. München: Oldenbourg, 1991, 17 (= Südostdeutschen Historischen Kommission 35). The terms “ethnic group” or “national group” are also used as they appear frequently in the pertinent, mostly Slavic-language literature.

Another central feature that can be observed when studying groups that are spread over a transnational area, as is regularly the case in minority research, is their triadic nature, from which derive further connections. These three aspects are: i) globally dispersed, collectively referring to themselves as an ethnic group; ii) the territorial states and circumstances in which these groups reside; iii) the homeland and circumstances from which the groups themselves or their ancestors originated.

Since both the terms global cultural flows and transnationalism indicate the global dimension of the subject matter, it seems warranted to discuss at this point that pivotal issue on which, in the interplay between the global and the local, hinge all other aspects of the collective constructions of identity and ethnicity: So far globalization has not resulted in the dissolution of national identities or of national and ethnic groups. Rather, globalization has in very many cases led to new global or new local identifications, which have subsequently been integrated into the respective collective system of a group. Minority and migration research has in the past decades examined the “old” locations and loyalties as well as the “new” identifications above all based on the theories and methods of identity and ethnicity research. This did bring forth prolific results, yet has increasingly been subject to criticism whenever these theories and methods proved to be no longer entirely suitable for the correct description of new forms of social interaction.

Since the onset of the 1990s, historical and anthropological research has explored the phenomena of globalization and the global flows as well as of transnationalism and migration with growing intensity. This has resulted in an ongoing rethinking of these terms by scholars in the field of identity and ethnicity research and of their adaptations specifically with regard to their applicability to multiethnic contexts, which is essential to the subdiscipline of Southeast European History. Surely, some emphases have shifted mostly due to changes in ethnicity research. Sharing with minority research central areas of investigation such as group formations and collective identities, including ethnic politics, and therefore since the 1980s considered a key theoretical realm of minority research, ethnicity research has expanded so as to include, for instance, the subject matter of transnationalism and migration, gender as well as creolization and hybridity. Ethnicity and group formation are thus regarded as too rigid concepts to help describe these flows. However, I see the links to ethnicity research not so much in terms of a dichotomy, as for example Steve Vertovec does, since the basic questions of ethnicity have remained quotidian and topical in minority research.

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Similarly to the aforementioned cultural flows, Ulf Hannerz introduced the term creolization as early as 1987 to better describe and analyze flowing, dynamic, and not least also multiple affiliations. After a short while the concept of hybridity was added to the field. As representative of the then protagonists, only Homi Bhabha shall be called to mind here, who generally characterizes cultures as hybrid in nature. The term hybridity was slow to enter the practice of minority research, mostly because hybrid forms of everyday culture are often superseded, concealed, or consciously dismissed as they run counter to the required preservation of traditions. At the same time, representatives of minorities regard hybridity as a preliminary stage of acculturation or even associate it with the specter of assimilation. In this context, Bhabha attributes to these processes a polarizing effect that, on the one hand, could point towards cultural sympathy or, on the other, could lead to cultural clash.

Ethnic groups’ internal and external ascriptions lead to “bounded and fixed understandings of groups,” another thorny issue that is discussed controversially. Rogers Brubaker therefore demands that a notion be developed which is no longer delimited by the conventional conception of groups, which he perceives as “tangible, bounded, and enduring”; instead, such a notion should describe a group in “relational, processual, dynamic, eventfull and disaggregated terms,” which cannot be achieved without thoroughly reconsidering the established parameters of ethnicity. This, according to Brubaker, would entail an equally thorough reconsideration of the term “identity,” not only because this term represents simultaneously a category of social and political practice and a category of scholarly analysis, but also because it adopted over the past few decades vastly different applications that spanned the entire spectrum from “very weak” to “very strong.” Anil Bhattis, too, urged for the cautious usage of the term “identity” and got to the heart of the matter when he said during a discussion: “The term identity prejudices the problem that is being debated.” The notion of identity has doubtlessly been overloaded in the past few decades. With all critical distance to the term “identity,” it is worth noting that it is quite vigorously embraced in minority politics as minority representatives use it to formulate their ethnopolitical causes.

In principle I do not regard as a “fixed” minority any group that is constituted as such through self-perception and outside perception and that therefore formulates for itself a collective identity superior to the individual group members; I rather see them as snapshots—metaphorically speaking, in analogy to photographic analysis in visual anthropology—in the context of the cultural flows men-

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16 Even today there are still efforts in some ethnic groups to “protect” themselves through strict endogamy.
18 Vertovec, Anthropology of Migration and Multiculturalism, 5.
21 This refers to the conference “The Turks Remember,” which took place October 15-16, 2010 at Bad Radkersburg.
tioned above. To go one step further, the realm of myths and belief plays a significant role in the historical-anthropological investigation of collectives and their genesis, if the goal is to determine the value of historical or religious myths integrated into the group construction for constituting and preserving the collective, to reveal their instrumentality, and to formulate related questions such as: Does the mythically glorified self-ascription serve above all the purpose of positioning oneself above other groups and thereby claiming more power? How are a minority’s historical or religious myths—especially if they are meant to suggest historical truths—employed in the sense of a belief in shared origins and ancestry that fosters collectivity? I will conclude these considerations with the following question that shall also segue into the key terms identity management and ethnomanagement: would it be possible at all to imagine an ethnic or national group without at least vaguely defined ethnic markers shared by its member and without active identity management and ethnomanagement that refers to several or at least one marker? Pondering on this triggers the question formulated by Katherine Verdery, which may be at the bottom of this issue: “How are ‘identities’ socially constructed, and how are people who ‘have’ ‘identities’ made?” Subsequently, one conducts a “search for the identical,” and when one includes its opposite, the “non-identical,” one has arrived at the heart of processes of inclusion and exclusion. The terms identity management and ethnomanagement relate to the management of inclusionary and exclusionary processes. This constant runs like a red thread through the text.

With regard to the aforementioned cultural flows, my experiences with the identity management and ethnomanagement of Germans and Hungarians in southeastern Europe show the attempt to direct the cultural flow in such a way as to decelerate it or, if necessary, give it a different direction, since at its mouth there are prophecies of the minority’s assimilation. It is impossible to either obstruct the cultural flow entirely or to reverse it towards its source and thereby to return to a mythically glorified past. Therefore, a central research question refers to the oft-uttered phrase of the “the preservations of one’s own identity,” which the respective identity managers and ethnomanagers in their social practice uphold as dogma and use to legitimize their actions.

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22 The motto of the FM4-science-busters, “Those who know nothing must believe everything!”, triggers the question as to why these historical myths, which scholars of course interpret as narratives in the sense of narrative texts and far less as historical events, are still consciously employed. Why is creed given primacy over knowledge? Or put differently: why is a shared belief in the collective valued higher than individual knowledge?

23 I would like to point out at this point that positions within social entities are generally made visible by markers; sociologist Anthony Giddens summarizes this as follows: “Social identities, and the position-practice relations associated with them, are ‘markers’ in the virtual time-space of structure. They are associated with normative rights, obligations and sanctions which, within specific collectives, form roles. The use of standardized markers, especially to do with the bodily attributes of age and gender is fundamental in all societies, notwithstanding large cross-cultural variations which can be noted.” Anthony Giddens. The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984. 282-283. On ethnic markers in general, see: Richard McElreath et al. “Shared Norms and the Evolution of Ethnic Markers.” Current Anthropology 44.1 (2003): 122-129.

24 Verdery, Ethnicity, Nationalism and State-making, 47.

25 I will do without a state-of-the-art block on the terms identity management and ethnomanagement in this introductory passage since its entire development and contextualization will be presented in the introduction to the theory. In the introduction, I provide only selected bibliographical references to the topics discussed in the text, as I will elaborate on these topics in more detail in the chapters to come.
The close alignment with ethnicity and ethnic markers as its constituents emerged above all from the circumstance that since the transformation ethnicity has grown more influential for political decision-making in those regions in southeastern Europe where I conducted my field research; last but not least, differentiating groups first and foremost based on their ethnicity is common practice in the multicultural countries and regions of Southeast Europe. Even if ascriptions are external, the search for difference is not only the search for comparability or competitiveness but above all a foundation for the exercise and retention of power. In the multicultural countries and regions of Southeast Europe, the formation of collective identities flits between a peaceful coexistence of the individual ethnic groups and a potential for conflict, which is also based on different markers. The collapse of the socialist systems helped some of these conflicts turn virulent and culminated in the disintegration of federalist Yugoslavia, and it was possible to observe how the nationstate model, which is used in most European states and which builds on a majority-minority relation, was reduced to the following formula: “Why should I be your minority if you could be my minority?”

Such a reduction of political decision-making to each group’s own nation building, which since the 19th century has been understood mainly as a monoethnic nation, already emerged from the collapse of the great empires, the Ottoman Empire and the Hapsburg Empire. The ideological roots in the sense of nations with a single linguistic population, an increasingly ethnically motivated national symbolism, and the corresponding discourses arose during the same period. Groups gradually created their own traditions, which were embedded in the notion of the nation, and thereby tried to leave behind the centuries-old era of multiethnic great empires. The actual new state borders are interpreted diversely in the countries and regions of southeastern Europe still today. The dissection of settlement areas by borders created new realities of coexistence, which the first-time formulation of minority rights in international law and in the new states’ constitutions were supposed to help regulate. Yet, the rise of fascism and National Socialism prevented the legal practice relating to minority rights, which by then had not gone beyond political discourse, from developing into an aspiring civil society or into the lifeworlds of workers and farmers; its ideological foundations, which were based on the notion of ethnic purity, also flourished in Southeast Europe. World War II then climaxed all these

27 Well-known minority researchers working in Southeast Europe therefore use the concept of ethnicity; as representative for other works, I’d like to point out here an essay collection that is dedicated in its entirety to this topic and that discusses the concept of ethnicity in various contexts: Margit Feischmidt, ed. Etnicitás: Különbségtérről társadalom. Budapest: Gondolat, 2010.
28 Joseph Marko in his talk titled Constitutional Engineering in Divided Societies, 25 February 2011. This formula can be traced back to Balkan expert Vladimir Grigorov.
31 From among the abundance of pertinent literature, see e.g. Endre Kiss and Justin Stangl, eds. Nation und Nationenbildung in Österreich-Ungarn, 1848-1938: Prinzipien und Methoden. Wien/Münster: Lit, 2006.
ethnically motivated acts of war and expulsions. After Socialist systems were set up in Southeast Europe, these systems tried either to conceal the diversity of multiethnic regions under the ideological cloak of Communism or to adjust the recognition of minorities to the respective conditions, like for example in Yugoslavia, where the terms narod and narodnost were used. The collapse of these systems eventually triggered the most recent phase of transformation. All the transformations since the mid-19th century have in common that they consumed considerable resources of social and cultural capital in Southeast Europe.

All the national orientations resulting from this most recent transformation resulted in a stronger consciousness of what is “one’s own,” both among majority populations and among the members of minorities. “One’s own,” then, refers to people’s own regional traditions as well as a stronger allegiance to the respective kin states. Minorities are very slow to become aware of those options that provide for pluralistic constructions of identity and ethnicity, which signifies a positively connotated side-by-side within multiethnic societies. This raises the following questions: Can these new patterns of thinking at some point replace the structure of either/or—in the sense of “either majority” “or minority”—that is shaped and legally fortified by nations? Which shifts can be observed with regard to this, particularly among the Germans and Hungarians in southeastern Europe?

The reverberations of globalisation on the transformation in southeastern Europe can be described as ambivalent: On the one hand, the expanding markets seemed to gradually neutralize the contrasts between east and west, which subsequently was perceived as an act of casting off the Eastern bloc past or as an act of distancing oneself increasingly from Balkan stereotypes on the part of the regional population. On the other hand, there is a widespread disenchantment as the globalized markets rather amplified social inequalities and offered fewer opportunities to participate in the global labor market. The effects of this frustration are manifold, although it is especially the escape into national ideas, which have clear ethnic undertones, that crystallizes as a striking political phenomenon of the transformation that lasts to this day. This affects mainly multicultural microregions and minorities. A comparative view, however, shows that these developments are by no means typical of the region of Southeast Europe only: studies on the interethnic coexistence in other countries of the former Eastern bloc, as for example about the Sorbs in East Germany, the Moravians in the Czech Republic, or on the Roma population presented results similar to the ones stemming from my minority research in southeastern Europe. It is moreover noticeable that national politics are also increasingly ethnically charged in multiethnic states of Western Europe, above all with respect to the problem of partition in Belgium. Besides the political, legal, social, and cultural debates surrounding minorities, there has now evolved in all European states a discourse of segregation, which is fueled by the effects of globalization, directed against migrants, guest workers or asylum seekers, and which is conducted with ethnic-

nationalist arguments. Alongside these partly alarmingly radicalizing developments, which clearly showed a racist dimension, also emerged positive tendencies of a local countermovement against globalization, in the sense of the so-called glocalization. This comprises diverse regional concepts such as regional product lines, cultural initiatives including alternative parts of the traditions, as well as an ecologically sustainable treatment of the environment. The phenomena of glocalization also contribute considerably to rendering hybridization, creolization, or syncretization more dynamic, and thereby generate new mixtures of global trends and regional cultural heritage. They can also advance the preservation of the “traditional” in a new form of everyday cultures instead of depositing it in museums. One may generally ask in this context: How are values preserved and which canon of values do the respective identity management and ethnomanagement establish when the “preservation of one’s own tradition” or “the “preservation of one’s own identity” are at stake?

Even the minority research on southeastern Europe conducted in the fields of history, historical anthropology, sociology, ethnology or political science hardly ever answers these questions explicitly. Instead, much of what pertains to it is considered “historically grown” or subsumed in the canon of research literature under the categories of multiculturalism, minority rights, or border regions. This is much more blatant in those studies that could well be called a sort of “commissioned research,” for example when they are funded by the minority itself or when the respective researchers are themselves, more or less immediately, actively engaged in the identity management and ethnomanagement of the same ethnic group they are doing research on. The study at hand makes an effort to deviate from such patterns. Both in its conceptual considerations and in its usage of concrete results gained from field research, this study aims to engage in minority research in Southeast Europe in more depth by taking a closer look at the agents of identity management and ethnomanagement. Further, this study aims at demonstrating whether and, if so, how the terms identity management and ethnomanagement are similarly suitable as tools as their terminological bases identity and ethnicity. It will be shown in
particular how the role of ethnopolitical agents, besides the various forms of collective identity/ies, can be integrated aptly and smoothly into minority research.

**On the Individual Parts of the Book**

Since my goal was to formulate the development of theory on the terms *identity management* and *ethnomanagement* as concisely as possible, I decided to divide the monograph into one part that introduces the theories and one part that provides examples from the identity management and ethnomanagement of Germans and Hungarians in southeastern Europe. The second part will elucidate the role of agents in its manifold facets.\(^{38}\) Another goal was to make the development of theoretical approaches and questions as well as the rethinking of these terms transparent. The theory and particularly the concept that underlies these terms were adjusted, broadened, or narrowed according to my empirical research findings.\(^{39}\) The field research on the Germans and Hungarians in southeastern Europe was conducted from 2005 through 2011, and the findings are compiled from many individual research trips\(^{40}\) to the research regions Transylvania/Transilvania/Erdély, Slavonia/Slavonija/Szlavónia, Slovenia/Slovenija/Szlovénia, Southern Transdanubia/Dél-Dunántúl, and Vojvodina/Vajdaság. Not only were the diverse interviewees\(^{41}\) supposed to lend a voice to all regions, but also the processes of implementation in the identity management and ethnomanagement can thus be rendered and analyzed more clearly. In order for the transition between the theoretical and the empirical part to be smoother, theoretical-conceptual and methodological considerations of identity management and ethnomanagement will be joined together with the practical parameters—or at least their thought patterns will be compared—in the first chapter of the empirical part, titled “Research Framework.” The *theoretical introduction* will begin by making transparent and presenting some developments surrounding the key terms I chose (identity, ethnicity, and ethnic group) so that it can become transparent how the two terms identity management and ethnomanagement relate to each other or how they differ from each other. This reaches all the way from their roots in the history of science to their application in empirical research. These key terms are indispensable in this context since the terms identity management and ethnomanagement could not be comprehended without the theoretical concepts at their bases or the modifications of these terms derived from practical experience. These origins further imply that the term identity management and its connotations also preceded the term ethnomanagement, which de-

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\(^{39}\) It is possible to compare this dialogical structure of theory formation and empirical research with grounded theory. See Barney G. Glaser and Anselm L. Strauss. *Grounded Theory: Strategien qualitativer Forschung*. Bern: Huber, 2008.

\(^{40}\) The duration of each research trip varied, from several days to a few weeks, as for instance in Transylvania. Due to the large number of research regions appointments needed to be made on a tight schedule, also with regard to the framework of the research project (see fn 1). At the same time, my then secondary residence at Pécs proved advantageous because Pécs is not only itself located in one of the research regions, but it facilitated the access to the research regions in Slavonia and Vojvodina.

\(^{41}\) As a rule, I chose the method of the free interview because the wide range of the practical research areas relating to identity management and ethnomanagement (ethnic societies, ethnic political parties, ethnic schools, ethnic media, ethnic art initiatives, and others) made a fixed interview format or a standardized questionnaire unsuitable, if not impossible to realize.
veloped later on and which is to be understood as a logical continuation of the term identity management, without trying to completely replace it. The second half of the theoretical part then offers conceptual reflections on identity management and ethnomanagement that establish links to other areas of synergy: first, there are links to historical anthropology as well as ethnohistory, which are themselves an assemblage of elements from historiography and ethnography with those from recent ethnicity research. In addition, phenomena of globalization/glocalization have influenced my thoughts on identity management and ethnomanagement, as they are not only present in all the research regions; the interrelations between globalization and localization are also used, as pointed out before, by the respective identity managers and ethnomanagers in order to guide the individuals’ positioning within their own ethnic group accordingly. For identity management and ethnomanagement, all forms of cultural hybridity, however, appear mostly as a threat, and engaging with hybridity primarily serves the purpose of better representing and interpreting the flows on the margins of collective identities (of ethnic and national groups). I have developed the idea for the part on ethnic group branding from the term nation branding, on the one hand, because the structures are similar, and on the other hand, because the activities within identity management and ethnomanagement aim at positioning one’s own minority as a cultural brand. Identity management and ethnomanagement, I posit, basically take over the same tasks within ethnic group branding that are accorded to brand management in the economy. I have limited myself to the research region of Transylvania in my empirical examples of this. These examples are drawn from the identity management and ethnomanagement of the Hungarians in Transylvania (= Erdélyi Magyarok), of the Transylvanian Saxons, and of the Székelys, who consciously shape their self-designation as a brand in order to prevent being absorbed by the Hungarians and, as a consequence, to be able to articulate their specific political demands.

The empirical examples from the identity management and ethnomanagement of Germans and Hungarians in all their diversity shall do justice to the multifaceted field of minority research as well as to the cultural coexistence and cooperation in southeastern Europe: the role of ethnicity in nation states in general will be explored at the beginning of this part. The next passage is dedicated to the ethnopolitical dimension of identity management, and more so, of ethnomanagement. I will first discuss the possibilities of practically applying this concept in current questions of ethnic politics. The semantic relationship between ethnicity and ethnic politics shall serve as the pivotal element here. Such a linkage of micro- and macrolevel via (ethno)political or economic conditions is in fact a common approach in historical and historical-anthropological research, not least because theory formation in particular depends on such contextualizations. As a next step I will explain what I mean by the

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42 Bilingualism, for example, in my opinion produces a cultural added value, which allows speakers to transcend cultural boundaries in many other ways besides the linguistic code-switching in everyday communication; agents of identity management and ethnomanagement in bilingual research regions often disagree over this issue. See esp. the chapter Schools.
44 In English, the terms ethnic politics, ethnopolitics and ethnopolices are mostly used synonymously.
45 See e.g. Vertovec, “Introduction: Migration-related topics,” 8.
two terms that I coined, *identity management and ethnomanagement from the inside* as well as *identity management and ethnomanagement from the outside*, and why this distinction became necessary in the overall context. The two terms serve as umbrella terms under which are subsumed further topics: in the case of identity management and ethnomanagement from the inside, for example, the various minority organizations and the minority representation of the respective ethnic group are at the center of attention, whereas identity management and ethnomanagement from the outside cover such areas as loyalty towards the kin state or identity management and ethnomanagement as practiced by the kin state, but also by the host state.

In the next chapter, the Germans and Hungarians in the research regions of Transylvania, Slavonia, Slovenia, Southern Transdanubia, and Vojvodina will be presented especially with regard to their self-designations and markers. I selected these two minorities in these regions because it allowed me to research the identity management and ethnomanagement of very small minorities (e.g. Germans in Croatia, Slovenia, or Serbia); of minorities of average size in proportion to the majority population in the respective host state (e.g. Germans in Hungary, Hungarians in Slovenia or Serbian); and of comparatively large minorities (e.g. Hungarians in Transylvania). The notion of a collective “we-group-identity” is thereby created, on the one hand, through self-designations—among the Germans, this includes for example the well-known names “Danube Swabians” or “Transylvanian Saxons”—and, on the other hand, through ethnic markers such as ancestry/origins, language, religion, customs, and others. Both the discourse of name-giving and the one of ethnic markers are subject to the cultural flows. For that reason, identity management and ethnomanagement attempt in different ways to control the respective group’s orientation as effectively as possible. Thus, for example, the Hungarian-German identity management and ethnomanagement instigated the substitution of “Germans in Hungary” for “Danube Swabians.” Among Hungarians, however, there is no variety of self-designations, they simply attach a regional attribute to the designation “Magyarok” (= Hungarians): For example “Erdélyi Magyarok” (= Transylvanian Hungarians) or “Muravidéki Magyarok” (= Hungarians in the Slovenian Prekmurje).

The chapter “Host State – Kin State – Loyalty”\(^46\) is supposed to demonstrate how the concepts of identity management and ethnomanagement fit into larger structures of patronage, like those of nation states. The respective identity management and ethnomanagement act as mediators between the client (= minority) and the patron (= Germany and Austria for the German minority, Hungary for the Hungarian minority). In the case of such a relation of patronage, it can be presumed that the relation is grounded in mutual loyalty, which prompted me to include the theory formation on loyalty into my study at this point. But the respective host states in which Germans and Hungarians live also demand

\(^{46}\) I am fully aware in the context of this choice of terminology, which is based in minority research, that it can be challenged in some aspects: the terms “host state” and “kin state,” for instance, were borrowed from the theory on the concept of loyalty; the term “mother country,” which now is frequently challenged, however comes up only in few of my examples, even though identity managers and ethnomanagers use it in practice—one can find “anyaország” (= mother country) in Hungarian-language texts and speeches as well.
loyalty from the ethnic groups, mainly for the sake of national unity, and in turn grant them constitutionally fixed minority rights. The following part on the protection of minorities, which materializes differently in the host states, ties thematically in with this. The protection of minorities provides a legal and political framework for the respective identity management and ethnomanagement, permitting certain liberties as to legal decision-making and political participation. Germans and Hungarians in the research areas in Southeast Europe differ considerably in their efforts; these range from questions of legal recognition, as in the case of the Germans in Slovenia, to questions of cultural autonomy, as in the case of the Hungarians in Romania or Serbia or of the Germans in Hungary. Apart from an overview of the various minority rights in the host states, which I tried to keep as brief as possible, I will also examine those objectives relating to minority rights that are at present the most salient for the Germans and the Hungarians. When it comes to the implementation of these rights, some questions are still unanswered, such as: What is the benefit of a minority’s representation in parliament or many minorities’ self-governance on a municipal level, if the members of an ethnic group do not experience an improvement of their situation in their everyday lives or if there are simply not enough funds to realize minority projects? I will present some recent examples of identity management and ethnomanagement from without, taken from the kin states Germany, Austria, and Hungary, in the part “Organizations in the Kin States.” In Germany and Austria, some non-governmental organizations have developed above all out of expellees’ organizations, which are thus connected to the German minorities in the research regions. The variety of my examples shall provide an insight into the diversity of this field of research. I will delve into further contexts relating to this in the parts on minority societies, cultures of memory, media, and arts.

The umbrella organizations, minority societies or forms of minority self-government named in the chapter “Orientations” count among the immediate cristallizations of identity management and ethnomanagement. The individual minority organizations of the German and Hungarian minorities and their activities have been pointing the way for my research. They can vary considerably in size and sphere of influence as they range from the (ethno)political umbrella organizations of ethnic groups to the smallest forms of minority self-government on the municipal level. The examples used in this chapter shall serve as representative selection that illustrates both the goals and the daily tasks of the Germans’ and the Hungarians’ various minority societies. This entire part was conceptualized both in deductive terms, as providing a descriptive overview, and in inductive terms, providing examples from interviews with influential activists in the societies. The degree to which my overview of and insight

47 [ad the Hungarian language:] For this research, literature in Hungarian was used and interviews were conducted in Hungarian and subsequently analyzed: I would like to remark that my main goal was to make possible a rendition that would be comprehensible for German-speaking readers, without the ambition to master all well-known problems of translation. Seeing as there are partly large linguistic differences in both languages especially when it comes to addressing the topics of national identity, ethnicity, or identity management and ethnomanagement, I have resorted to adding either the original or vice versa a loan rendition in parantheses in order to make clear what I meant. Giving the gist, especially with the interviews, in most cases was closer to the original meaning than a word-by-word translation, in which central nuances of meaning were at risk of getting lost.
into the infrastructure of the organizations is complete depends on the number of societies in the research regions: in practical terms, this means that it is, for example, possible to almost completely portray on just a few pages the society structure of the Germans in Slovenia, Slavonia and Vojvodina; yet, describing in detail the more than one hundred cases of minority self-government of the Germans in Hungary in Southern Transdanubia would have by far exceeded the limits of this research project. I therefore restricted myself to a representative selection.\textsuperscript{48} With respect to the number and variety of organizations within the Hungarian minority, the microregions in Slovenia and Slavonia contrast strongly with those in Vojvodina and Transylvania. Once again, I could aim for a largely comprehensive portrayal of the former research region, while this was not possible for the latter. To solve the problem, I decided to present my findings for Transylvania in the form of tables. Many ethnic societies or forms of self-government also implement their political agenda in the realm of their cultures of memory or ethnic schooling. They further run different minority media and “support” minority arts. However, as these aspects will be addressed in separate parts, this part is primarily concerned with political identity management and ethnomanagement. Some of the political agents get a chance to comment on this themselves, in the interviews. The chapter “Cultures of Memory” is also part of the orientations of identity management and ethnomanagement—the term “sites of memory” makes this even clearer. The control devices of collective memory are integral parts of identity management and ethnomanagement. My research in this field revolves both around the object of memory and the various ways in which ethnopoltics intrumentalize commemorative festivities.

In the last chapter, I will present the most important mediators and instruments of identity management and ethnomanagement: I call those agents “mediators” who act, either independently or on an ethnic group’s commission, within the realms of minority media, minority school systems, minority literature, and minority arts, all of which I interpret as “instruments.” These instruments contribute to generating a sense of collectivity within an ethnic group. This shows in part explicitly: for example, I have noticed that in the research regions in Southeast Europe the members of a minority categorize these instruments as “our newspaper,” “our TV show,” or “our school.” The examples I selected shall demonstrate in which ways and to which degrees identity management and ethnomanagement can directly and indirectly play into this. The connections and overlaps between the agents of identity management and ethnomanagement and the mediators in the media, schools, literature, and arts will be of particular interest, as will be the ways in which this produces mutual dependencies in everyday practice. In minority media, “the medium itself is not yet the message”; it is rather a crucial instrument for directing the attention of members of an ethnic group toward the political and cultural ideas and goals of identity management and ethnomanagement. With the spread of media through all layers of society in the past century, the importance of minority media—be it print media, radio, or television—was constantly growing. Therefore, identity management and ethnomanagement strive to

\textsuperscript{48} It was not a goal within this research project to create databases of societies, or the like; rather, what is at the center of attention in the context of ethnic societies are the respective shapes that identity management and ethnomanagement take.
systematically expand their presence in the media. However, I will not use the examples of media usage in the research regions to do a content-oriented media analysis; rather, I will reveal structural connections between minority media and the respective identity management and ethnomanagement. If the editors of a medium are influenced directly (= minority society as proprietor) or indirectly (= via a foundation) by the identity management and ethnomanagement, this will necessarily reverberate on the editorial policy. Interviews with editors from the minority press, minority radio, and minority television supplement these and other considerations that arise from the daily business of minority media. Both the Germans and the Hungarians are so-called linguistic minorities, among which, from the viewpoint of identity management and ethnomanagement, the acquisition of and proficiency in the minority language is often considered a *sine qua non* for the survival of the ethnic group. This inevitably entails that the role of schooling as an instrument of identity management and ethnomanagement is overestimated. At the same time, the ethnic marker *language* in some research regions no longer ranks first in the daily life of the German and Hungarian adolescents who belong to a minority. This has such tangible consequences for minority schooling that identity management and ethnomanagement cannot disregard them. I therefore selected the examples taken from the everyday school life of minorities in such a way as to present minority schooling, which is still to a large degree symbolically charged, in a somewhat less tense manner.49 The number of minority schools or of students was not the main selection criterion; I rather chose examples that could be considered to have a model function in many respects: on the one hand, with respect to a pedagogic approach through which schooling can in fact be perceived as a positive instrument; on the other hand, all those cases in which minority school tracks serve as a kind of supererogation within the mainstream education in the respective host state. For these reasons, I put an emphasis on bilingual school models in Southeast Europe. Such institutions have achieved remarkable success with children and adolescents, no matter whether they belong to the respective minority, to another ethnic or national minority, or to the majority population. Often, this still happens in spite of the prophecies of doom voiced by the identity management and ethnomanagement, from whose perspective the “fusion” practiced in bilingual teaching models is already a form of linguistic-cultural assimilation. In addition, little is known in Central Europe about the fact that a high percentage of students from the respective majority population are already attending German-language minority school tracks and that these attendances essentially secure the survival of the German-language school track. 

The last part addresses the interdependency of minority arts and identity management and ethnomanagement.50 Philological studies, for instance, that have explored minority literatures have dealt

49 The combative rhetoric that sometimes goes along with this is in most cases part of political mock fights. The framework for minority education is usually clearly set by the corresponding legislation. But since the preservation of one’s “own” minority schools has a considerable symbolic value, this aspect still plays a central role in identity management and ethnomanagement.

50 On this topic see esp. the article published by the author: “Arts and Artists as Intermediaries in Identity- and Ethnomanagement: Examples from the German Minority in Hungary and the Hungarian and German Minorities in Transylvania.” *Hungarian Historical Review* 2/3 (2013): 512-537.
with questions of identity\textsuperscript{51} as they have delved into the biographies of authors, the themes of literary works as well as the conditions under which they were created; yet, I do not know of any studies that have specifically explored the effects of identity management and ethnomanagement on minority literatures. Each of the forms of artistic expression included here—literature, performing arts as well as painting and sculpture—has according to my observations its own distinctive connections to the identity management and ethnomanagement of an ethnic group. In the case of writers, the minority language as the medium is already the key to the German or Hungarian identity management and ethnomanagement, and vice versa it is writers that are declared the saviors of minority languages by identity management and ethnomanagement. This creates an interdependence that ranges from reciprocal recognition to (mostly financial) dependence, which is particularly pronounced in the case of minority theaters. The visual arts, by comparison, have the advantage of being a universally functional and comprehensible medium, whereas literature requires its recipients to understand the language. Painting and sculpture can thus unfold their effects beyond the limits of the minority audience more easily. Sculpture is particularly suitable for representing the minority and its history in monuments, sculptures, busts, or plaques placed in public spaces. This, in turn, is closely related to cultures of memory and the themes of their discourses, which my selection of examples shall underline. The issues raised in the context of minority arts steer mainly towards the questions of to what extent a minority’s creation of art becomes itself part of the identity management and ethnomanagement and which functions it then fulfills in the context of collective memory. Given the respectable number of German and Hungarian minority writers and artists living in the research regions in Southeast Europe I have restricted myself to the following selection: In the case of the Germans, I have only chosen examples from the literature, performing arts, and sculpture of the Germans of Hungary; in the case of the Hungarians, the selection includes the Hungarian-language literature produced in Transylvania/Erdély, Slovenia/Szlovénia and Vojvodina/Vajdaság. Besides the specificities of minority arts and their close ties to the respective ethnic groups and local living environments, these examples shall emphasize the structural conditions, including literary magazines as well as writers’ and artists’ associations, since these aspects are most likely to be decisive for the links with the respective identity management and ethnomanagement. I will treat the contents and forms of literatures and arts only in their relation to cultures of memory.

1.

A Theoretical Introduction

to

Identity Management and Ethnomanagement
1.1 Keyterms

The study of ethnicity has become arguably the major industry, not just in anthropology but in the social sciences as the whole. (Katherine Verdery, 1994)

Ethnicity—Notion, Ascription and Tool

The term *ethnos* – ἔθνος occurs in Greek literature in the sense of “(a) people, tribe, flock, crowd, (social) class,” but is mostly translated into other languages in the sense of “(a) people.”¹ The exiled Russian ethnographer Sergej Mikhailowitsch Shirokogoroff (1887-1939) describes the term ethnos in his groundbreaking work “Ethnical unit and milieu; a summary of the ethnos”² (published in 1923) as follows:

[…] a group of people, speaking the same language, who recognize their shared heritage, and have a shared complex of social mores, mode of life, retained and sanctified traditions which differentiate them from other groups.³

Fifty-five years later, Ina-Maria Greverus interprets this approach as follows:

The constitutive factors of ethnos according to Shirokogoroff were: the similarity of the cultural adaptation, the similarity of language, continuity as conviction and transmission of traditions, a consciousness of “we” and a mutual identification as well as the biological unity achieved through endogamous passing on of the heredity […] Whereas, in view of the pronounced geographic and social mobility, the criteria of biological homogeneity, shared language, and shared living space are today considered to be possible, but not longer always necessary criteria, the factors of shared history, shared culture and ethnic self-ascription as “we-consciousness” take center stage in the discussion.⁴

As early as 1934, Shirokogoroff pointed out the link between kinship and ethnic group and already used the term *endogamy*.⁵ In the 1970s, the Russian ethnographer Yulian V. Bromley established a connection between the term *narod*—then and now frequently used within the Russian terminology—and the semantic contexts of the term ethnos:⁶

It is quite obvious, however, that the amplitude of semantic divergences in these cases is much smaller than in the case of the common usage of the word narod and its analogues in other West European languages. This fact once again points to the advisability of having a specialized ethnic terminology. […] The problem is to establish the most typical intrinsic features, i.e., the essence of ethnos, people.⁷

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¹ Gerhard Wahrig. *Deutsches Wörterbuch*. Gütersloh et al: Bertelsmann, 1991. 441; the term ethnos served as a basis for both ethnology and ethnohistory.
² S. M. Shirokogoroff. *Ethnical unit and milieu; a summary of ethnos*.
⁶ The Slavic-language word *narod* means both “(a) people” and “nation.”
Bromley, after many years of exploring the interdependencies between ethnus and people/nation, eventually arrives at the conclusion that in order to more precisely explicate the matter a more narrow term, besides the broader “ethnos,” was needed. He calls this term *ethnikos*:

Thus, ethnus […] may be defined as historically formed community of people characterized by common, relatively stable cultural features, certain distinctive psychological traits, and the consciousness of their unity as distinguished from other similar communities.8

At the same time it is necessary to take account of the fact that ethnus in the narrow sense of the word, i.e., “ethnikos”, is not connected with its environment unilaterally but interacts with it. Owing to their close interconnections “ethnikos” and environment constitute a complex formation of peculiar kind. In addition to “ethnikos”, two main spheres manifest themselves distinctly. The first could conditionally be called the “internal” sphere. It consists of all “non-ethnic” social phenomena that are conjugated with ethnikos. The natural environment may in turn be regarded as an “external” sphere. “Ethnikos” is in effect a social phenomenon.9

It was precisely the connection to the social context mentioned in the last sentence that prompted Bromley to coin a new term, which was not only supposed to expand the Russian canon, but also to develop the full range of instrumentality of ethnikos. From today’s perspective it seems safe to posit that the very connection of ethnikos with the social institutions at the time anticipates a constellation that resembles those institution that are responsible for identity management and ethnomanagement as we understand it. In the pertinent research of the Soviet Union, this was referred to as “social organism.”10 Bromley proceeded to call his expansion of the terminology *Ethnosocial Organisms* (or ESOs), whose meaning he describes in an article published in 1974:

The special formations that originated as a result of the intersection of “ethnikos” and the social organism enjoyed relative independence which made possible reproduction. Such “synthetic” formations, which have been an important and widespread form of existence of “ethnikos”, can, in our view, be defined as ETHNOSOCIAL ORGANISMS (or “ESO’s”). In addition to ethnic oneness, such organisms are usually characterized by common economic, social, territorial, and political factors (the maximum version, so to speak). The socioeconomic factor is the most essential component of the “ESO.”11

According to Marcus Banks, Bromley thus markedly influenced the perspectives on the term ethnus that were common in the Soviet Union at the time.12 The Viennese ethnologist and cultural anthropologist Karl R. Wernhart, looking at it from the angle of the history of science, even detects a basis of ethnohistory in Bromley’s thoughts on “Ethnosocial Organisms (ESO)” since Bromley’s theory al-

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8 Bromley, *The Term Ethnos and its Definition*, 66.
9 Ibid., 67.
11 Bromley, *The Term Ethnos and its Definition*, 69.
ready explicitly combines ethnic and socio-economic factors. Wernhart in this context also mentions, among other things, Bromley’s discussion of endogamy and its role in the preservation of the ethnos; Bromley, Wernhart observes, did not hold the discontinuity of endogamy responsible for the advent of intermarriage. Instead, he saw intermarriage as the germ of the emergence of new ethnicities.

Briefly summarized, these explanations thus show that there was a distinction in the Soviet Union between ethnos and ESO, that is, an ethnos can, through its social contact, be part of different socio-political groups. This interplay of ethnos and ESO can be observed in the factors that contribute to the stabilization of the ethnos. Besides psyche and culture, Soviet researchers considered endogamy a decisive factor for stabilization.

These theoretical considerations are particularly useful for minority research since research practice in many cases revolves around the question of how an ethnic group acts and develops under different societal, social, and political circumstances or even in different nation-states. The question of intermarriage and the related formation of hybrid cultural structures are still unduly neglected as the focus lies on traditions and their preservation so that research suggests a continuation of those traditions.

The following example of the Western view on ethnos from the 1960s can be seen as another foundational thought of identity management, but even more so of ethnomanagement within the frameworks of my theoretical parameters; it presents the sociological point of view of Wilhelm E. Mühlmann:

Ethnos thus is always a political concept. The purely material understanding of the *Volkstum* that originated in Romanticism is according to the findings of contemporary ethnographic sociology no longer adequate. *Volkstum* is never a given fact but is always the result of political effort, that is, of decision-making; this holds true already for the clan, and more so for more complex ethnic entities.

This insight by Mühlmann already implies that “ethnos”, or “*Volkstum,*” are subject to decision-making and controlling factors. Mühlmann also warns against a singular consideration of only one ethnos isolated from its social, political, and cultural contexts and calls for a comparative approach: “Ethnology can never view an ethnos in isolation (as does the Romanticist ‘*Volkskunde*’) but only ever the historical connections between ethnic entities.” I concur with this thesis since the research on identity management and ethnomanagement should by no means follow an isolated procedure, which can lead to hermetic views. A comparison to at least one, or more ethnic groups living in the research regions should be aimed for. This will reveal congruences and interdependences on the most diverse levels and according to the patterns and effects of inclusion and exclusion. Mühlmann’s hint at historicity is also crucial for dealing with identity management and ethnomanagement because identity

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14 Cf. ibid., 84.
15 Ibid., 85.
16 It should be added at this point that minority research is partly commissioned research, whose goal it is to codify traditions of ethnic or national groups and thereby help continue them. This research is then at bottom part of identity management and ethnomanagement.
18 Mühlmann uses the terms “ethnos” and “*Volkstum*” synonymously in his definitions.
19 Mühlmann, *Geschichte der Anthropologie,* 236.
management and ethnomanagement constantly refer to historical events and draw on cultures of memory as projection surfaces for political ideas.\(^{20}\)

The following thought formulated by Mühlmann provides another link to the present insights surrounding the concepts of ethnicity and ethnic identity:

> It will be necessary to start from this point, namely to understand “ethnos” methodologically first and foremost as a hypothesis, as a “void” that needs to be animated by historical-sociological individual research […]\(^{21}\)

This premise could well be read in such a way as to signify that ethnos should be treated neither in terms of a pattern nor of a fixed meaning but that it should be filled with content only through concrete observations. At the same time it is a reminder of how the discourse of ethnicity increasingly changed structurally. The reason for this was that a priori formulated, rigid, or overly restrictive concepts, which for example emerged from the primordial, the essentialist, or the objectivist definition of ethnicity, were used less and less.

If we now call back to mind the definitions of ethnos by the two Russian anthropologists Shirokogoroff and Bromley and compare them with the term *ethnicity*,\(^{22}\) as described for example by Friedrich Heckmann in 1992, the similarities are impossible to miss:

> Ethnicity denotes the circumstance, which impacts individuals’ and collectives’ actions, that a relatively large group of people is bound together by the belief in a shared heritage, by a shared culture, history and contemporary experience and has a specific sense of identity and solidarity.\(^{23}\)

Marcus Banks in 1996 emphasized his thoughts on the constructed nature of ethnicity in the context of what he called basic positions:

> [Ethnicity is] a collection of rather simplistic and obvious statements about boundaries, otherness, goals and achievements, being and identity, descent and classification, that has been constructed as much by the anthropologist as by the subject.\(^{24}\)

Banks, on the one hand, shows the breadth and diversity of approaches to the concept of ethnicity; on the other hand, he not only brings to our attention its artificial character but also mentions that researchers play a prominent part in it.

The concept that Frederik Barth presented in the book *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organisation of Cultural Difference*,\(^{25}\) edited by him in 1969 doubtlessly proved groundbreak-

\(^{20}\) Um diesem geschichtlichen Aspekt gebührend Rechnung zu tragen, wurde das identity management and ethnomanagement in seinen Kontextualisierungen mit dem Konzept der *Ethnohistorie* und jenem der *Historischen Anthropologie* verknüpft. Siehe dazu den Abschnitt *Historische Anthropologie sowie Ethnohistorie*.

\(^{21}\) Mühlmann, *Geschichte der Anthropologie*, 235-236.


\(^{25}\) Frederik Barth, ed. *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organisation of Cultural Difference*. Oslo: University Press, 1969. Further questions on the interdependence of “ethnicity” and “ethnic group” will be addressed in the next part, *From the “I” (Subject/Object) to the Ethnic Group*.
ing for the further development of the term ethnicity and the research areas related to it: This concept significantly facilitated the description of ethnicity. I will dwell on it a bit more extensively since it is central to the research on identity management and ethnomangement in the following respects: i) in the sense of the agents’ self-perception; ii) when observing the self- and external perceptions of different ethnic groups; iii) with regard to the groups’ relations with each other and the establishment of boundaries between the respective ethnic groups. The principle that was new at the time was that ethnicity was capable of adapting to new conditions whenever socio-cultural changes occurred. Ethnicity itself—similar to the concept of identity—is thus characterized by a certain fluidum or shifting. This may be easier to observe in microstructures but even macrostructures are constantly changing, starting on their margins. The ascribed values of ethnic markers shift in the process, for example due to acculturation, assimilation, language change, or due to inclusionary phenomena of migrant groups; concomitantly, the determinants of the exclusion by the respective others change as well. Boundaries often form subconsciously rather than consciously as the process is to a large extent based on symbolic interaction that in turn fosters a symbolic behavior of demarcation. Also according to Anthony P. Cohen, for instance, group identity and community grow mainly out of symbolic acts: “People construct community symbolically, making it a resource and repository of meaning, and a referent of their identity.” This aspect is very significant for identity management and ethnomangement because it is not only dependent on these symbolic acts but also tries to actively operate through them.

Unlike in Barth’s egalitarian approach, it is vital, when studying identity management and ethnomangement in multiethnic nation-states, to put more emphasis on the diverse power structures governing the interaction between the individual ethnic groups;—in the case of the present empirical studies from different countries in Southeast Europe, this would include, for example, the power relations—individually molded in every nation-state—between the majority population and the minorities, on the one hand, and among the respective minorities, on the other.

Following North American sociologists, Abner Cohen, who is classified as belonging in the “Manchester School’s middle period,” also employed the concept of ethnicity as early as the late 1960s and at the time used it mainly as an operative instrument: “Cohen’s main thesis is that ethnicity

26 Ulf Brunnbauer summarizes the reorientation proposed by Barth as follows: “Barth and anthropologists inspired by him regarded ethnicity as the result of concrete social processes and shifted the research focus away from cultural or symbolic manifestations of ethnicity toward boundaries of ethnicity and the manipulation of ethnic identities. This conceptual reorientation resulted, among other things, in the insight that ethnic groups are situational social entities that claim a shared identity in order to pursue certain interests as a collective; yet in other contexts, other entities can form by drawing the boundaries of ethnicity differently.” Ulf Brunnbauer, ed. Umstrittene Identitäten: Ethnizität und Nationalität in Südosteuropa. Frankfurt/M et al: Lang, 2002. 15.
27 Barth treats this under the heading “categories of ascription and identification”; cf. Barth, Ethnic Groups, 10.
is instrumental; that is, there are reasons for a group asserting and maintaining an ethnic identity and these reasons are economic and political rather than psychological."32 This reveals the close affinity between ethnicity and ethnomanagement: both are essentially thought of and used as instruments.

The 1976 essay collection *Ethnicity: Theory and Experience*, edited by Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan, ranges as one of the central works about the concept of “ethnicity” dating from the 1970s. It is marked by the objective viewpoint of the two authors, who argue that the phenomenon of ethnicity was a “social fact” rather than an abstract conceptual tool and at the same time a relatively recent phenomenon.33 From today’s perspective, and particularly with view to the agents of ethnomanagement, this approach makes a lot of sense, as it is in this context that ethnicity emerges as a social fact. The very ease with which it can be used to describe, or rather to define, complex socio-cultural configurations within ethnic groups should render researcher cautious, however, since the *cultural flows* mentioned above must at present not be overlooked in the overall coverage of the concept of ethnicity. In contrast to what Glazer and Moynihan postulate, I further claim that ethnicity in its essence can be *both* a social fact *and* a conceptual tool. Ronald Cohen in his essay “Ethnicity: Problem and Focus in Anthropology” of 1978 expanded the term ethnicity by a discursive component which then proved essential for the further later understanding of ethnicity. In Ronald Cohen’s view, ethnicity meant above all ambiguous boundaries between groups, multiple identities, and a focus on interaction between groups,34 which he condensed into this brief summarizing statement: “Ethnicity has no existence apart from interethnic relations.”35

Viewed retrospectively, there was a period in the discourse of ethnicity as conducted towards the end of the 20th century that could well be called *status quo post* as far as the developments and tendencies of the ethnicity discourse since the introduction of Barth’s model are concerned. Yet it could also be called *status quo ante* in so far as it highlighted issues that would take center stage in the first decades of the new millenium. Steven Vertovec notes this in his retrospective view on the anthropology of ethnicity of the 1980s:

Yet when anthropology of ethnicity was the most thriving around the 1980s, the field was usually comprised of studies of identity and social organization among one or another distinct ethnic group within a particular multi-ethnic (of post-migration, ethnic majority-minority) setting.36 In the German-language evolution of the term ethnicity (“Ethnizität”), Christian Giordano for instance related it to the term ethnos in 1981 while at the same time setting it apart from the English-language term *ethnicity*: “To put it in succinct terms, *ethnicity* signifies the total of the characteristics of ethnos. The term *Ethnizität*—it. *eticismo*—in contrast is neither synonymous with *ethnicity* nor with ethnos,  

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34 Pascht, *Ethnizität*, 45.
Ethnie, or ethnic group.” Following the two researchers Vittorio Lanternari and Georges Devereux, Giordano rather understood Ethnizität as a “movement toward ethnos” and subsequently separates this “movement” from the then still much cited class struggle, in which he calls Ethnizität a “social movement” founded on the following characteristic: “Ethnizität on the other hand implies the search of certain marginalized groups for an identity that itself […] is characterized by ethnic markers.” It should be added that the German-language term Ethnizität depended on the development of the English-language term ethnicity in the academic discourse at the time and that therefore the two terms were by no means as distinctly separated from each other as Giordano’s statement suggests.

In the German-language research, Erwin Orywal and Katharina Hackstein in 1993 used the term traditions (“Traditionen”) instead of the otherwise customary term ethnic markers. They used it mainly to describe ethnic boundaries—in Barth’s sense—in the context of self- and external ascriptions:

[Next to a shared history] members [of an ethnic group] perceive other traditions in the shared everyday life such as language, religion, descent, economy, physiognomy, location, or also factors rather neglected by researchers such as clothing, types of domestic architecture, naming, foodways, manners, music, stereotypes, oral and literary traditions.

When using the term traditions in relation to the history of an ethnic group, both authors explicitly reference Eric Hobsbawm, whose book The Invention of Tradition first appeared in 1983.

Uttmost importance has been bestowed on the links between ethnicity and culture since the onset of ethnicity research, and they have since been at the center of all theorists’ attention. In the course of the 1970s, the term ethnicity even competed increasingly with the term culture—at least that is what Ronald Cohen’s statement suggests:

Quite suddenly, with little comment or ceremony, ethnicity is a ubiquitous presence. Even a brief glance through titles of books and monographs over the past few years indicates a steadily accelerating acceptance and application of the terms “ethnicity” and “ethnic” to refer to what was before often subsumed under “culture”, “cultural”, or “tribal”. […] Is it simply old wine (culture) in new bottles?

Such notions contrast with the ideas of Fredrik Barth, who had underlined earlier that culture and ethnicity were not identical and that shared cultural features were only the result of shared features of the ethnic group. It would take decades until the discourse of ethnicity would be further opened up, for example by Thomas Hylland Eriksen, towards theoretical reflection in the context of social relationships and cultural complexity.

He [Thomas Hylland Eriksen] discusses three ways of conceiving complexity within social science – as a matter of social relationships, individual human attributes or ways of looking at the

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37 Giordano, Ethnizität, 183.
38 Ibid., 184.
41 R. Cohen, Ethnicity, 379.
42 Cf. Barth, Ethnic Groups, 11 and 14; cf. also Pascht, Ethnizität, 53.
world. Further, Eriksen distinguishes between social and cultural dimensions of axes relating to exclusion and inclusion, ideas of openness and closure, enforcement and choice under conditions of complexity.44

Arno Pascht wraps up the polysemantic network of relations binding ethnicity and culture together:

In summary, scholars participating in the ethnological debate can take different or even contrasting stances on the question of to what extent ‘culture’ is relevant, as well. Representatives of the formalist approach hold that a common or similar culture is not a marker of ethnic groups; rather, one could observe a wide range of cultural variation within ethnic groups. […] Earlier approached, which explicitly used ‘culture’ as an important criterion for determining an ethnic entity, […] were strongly criticized.45

In 1994, Hans Vermeulen and Cora Govers published The Anthropology of Ethnicity46 on the occasion of a conference organized to commemorate the 25th anniversary of the publication of Fredrik Barth’s Ethnic Groups and Boundaries. Vermeulen and Govers no longer only refer to connections between ethnicity and culture, but also to the changes in the connections between these central terms:

More and more it is realized that the shift from a static to an interactional approach to ethnicity implies a similar shift in the study of culture.

The relation between ethnicity and culture can, in our opinion, best be viewed as being three-fold: ethnicity refers to the consciousness of (ethnic) culture, to the use of culture, and at the same time is part of culture. […] Ethnic identities are products of classification, ascription and self-ascription and bound up with ideologies of descent. From this point of view the study of ethnicity is related to the study of ideology and of cognitive systems. In this sense ethnicity is part of culture. It is also meta-cultural in the sense that it is a reflection on what ‘our’ and ‘their’ culture is about. Thirdly ethnicity refers to the subjective, symbolic or emblematic use by a group of people […]47

Frederik Barth, in a contribution to this collection, looks back onto his own reflections, which were first published in 1969:

The cultural differences of primary significance for ethnicity are those that people use to mark the distinction, the boundary, and not the analyst’s ideas of what is most aboriginal or characteristic in their culture. I overstated this point in the formulation that people’s choice of diacritica appeared arbitrary. But I also explored the boundary-construction effects of cultural standards used to evaluate and judge ethnic co-members, implying that they are ‘playing the same game’ – a point that has been too frequently overlooked.

[…] we should continue to make use of every advance in the analysis and deconstruction of ‘culture’: rethinking culture provides a useful, no, necessary basis for rethinking ethnicity. This must be so: if ethnicity is the social organization of cultural difference, we need to transcendent habitual conceptions of this thing ‘culture’. What we subsume under the concept of culture no doubt has empirical properties which will be relevant to an understanding of ethnicity […]48

45 Pascht, Ethnizität, 58.
47 Vermeulen and Govers, eds., The Anthropology of Ethnicity, 3-4.
Barth in his summary primarily warns against exaggerating the depiction of cultural difference, when the description of ethnicity via cultural aspects is at stake, and rendering only the “pernicious myths of deep cultural cleavages”\(^49\): “We need to recognize that the dichotomized cultural differences thus produced are vastly overstated in ethnic discourse [...]”\(^50\) Anthony P. Cohen underscores this fact by criticizing the study of the boundaries between the cultures at the expense of the study of the boundaries between the levels of consciousness.\(^51\) Hans Vermeulen and Cora Govers deepened these and other reflections in their 1997 volume *The Politics of Ethnic Consciousness*.\(^52\)

In the following, I will briefly present how the different theories of the term ethnicity are categorized:\(^53\) from among the by now numerous and diverse definitions of ethnicity, one can distinguish a *primordialist*, an *objectivist*, and an *essentialist* direction, which refer more or less to the central markers of descent and culture. More recent definitions include a *constructivist*, a *subjectivist*, as well as a *formalist* approach and mostly take self- and external ascriptions as their point of departure.\(^54\)

From the perspective of the *primordialist* theory of ethnicity, ethnic groups are considered universal, permanent groups, which entails that “ethnicity is viewed as a complex of basic traits that are ‘natural’ (self-evident) and therefore never questioned.”\(^55\) Another definition originating from German-language research views “primordialism as a quasi-natural phenomenon that exists independently of the specific contexts of interaction and the historical-political situation.”\(^56\) As early as 1994, Anthony D. Smith, in the *Companion Encyclopedia of Anthropology*, called this basic constant “‘primordial’ and even ‘natural’” and differentiates further between a ‘strong’ and a ‘weak’ primordialism.\(^57\) Representatives of the primordialist theory of ethnicity tend to believe that, when conflicts between ethnicities occur, “these can only be solved by separating people into ethnically homogenous political entities.”\(^58\) This goal was pursued, for example, during and after the collapse of the former Yugoslavia. Anthony D. Smith subsumes an approach that runs counter to *primordialism* under the term *instru-

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\(^49\) Barth, “Enduring and emerging issues in the analysis of ethnicity,” 30.
\(^50\) Ibid.
\(^53\) I would like to include as a pointer a statement by Christian Giordano at this point: “To think that there was such a thing as a congruent and unified theory of ethnicity, however, would be misleading.” Giordano, Ethnizität aus sozialanthropologischer Sicht, 125.
\(^56\) Pascht, *Ethnizität*, 37.
\(^57\) “The strong version holds that the ties themselves are universal, natural and given in all human association, as much as are speech or kinship. […] The weak version of primordialism claims that ethnic ties and sentiments are deep-seated and non-rational so far as the participants are concerned; members of ethnic communities feel that their community has existed ‘from time immemorial’, and that its symbols and traditions possess a ‘deep antiquity’, which gives them a unique power.” Anthony D. Smith, “The Politics of Culture: Ethnicity and Nationalism.” *Companion Encyclopedia of Anthropology*. Ed. T. Ingold. Humanity, Culture and Social Life. London/New York: Routledge, 1994, 707.
mentalismand: “Opposed to the primordialists are theorists who tend to view ethnicity as a resource to be mobilized, or an instrument to be employed […] usually of a political or economic nature.”

The constructivist direction, on the other hand, underlines the malleable quality of ethnicity, which manages to adapt to changing social and political contexts:

Constructivists mainly emphasize that ethnicity does not signify a transhistorical and quasi-natural belonging to a group, but rather a social identity constructed in specific historical-political constellations […] Constructivists emphasize the potential of ethnicity to be subjectively manipulated, to be used flexibly as well as strategically […]

Christian Giordano also opposed these two points of view with regard to this discourse, which he calls the “Continental European discussion surrounding ethnicity”:

The essentialist or primordialist approach underlines above all the stability of the traits of an ethnic group. The constructivist or interpretative approach, however, focuses on the procedural and situational dimension of ethnicity, which defines ethnicity as a process in which groups of people are consciously ascribed ethnic characteristics […] as criteria meant to separate them from other groups in order for them to reach certain goals in their societal framework.

In accordance with this quotation, the following can be established when looking at the developments of the term identity management and ethnomanagement: The agents of identity management and ethnomanagement try to stress the ‘stability,’ as Giordano called it, of the respective ethnic group they manage. Therefore the ethnic markers relating to customs and traditions (vernacular poetry, folk dance, traditional costumes, etc.), for example, at times are accorded a degree of attention that seems out of proportion. Scholars on the other hand at times put too much emphasis on the processual and malleable character of ethnicity: This bears the risk that the meaningfulness and the analytic potential of the data becomes overly blurry—as Rogers Brubaker has warned with respect to what he called the "weak conceptions of identity." It should also be mentioned that within the category of the so-called traditional definitions there is further an essentialist direction and, among the more recent definitions, a formalist direction:

The representatives of the essentialist approach within ethnicity research try to find an ‘essence’ of common traits within the individual ethnicities; this can be, for instance, a ‘common culture’ or ‘common ancestry.’

In contrast, the representatives of the formalist approach aim to create a general, ethical term constructed for scholarly investigation—usually the formal act of separating or creating, of maintaining and changing the ethnic boundary is central in this endeavor.

Thomas Hylland Eriksen has further tried to connect these two different approaches.

To put it in just a few summarizing words, the discourse of ethnicity has spread throughout many academic disciplines since the 1970s; likewise, the individual disciplines have continuously

62 Cf. Brubaker, Ethnicity without groups, 38.
64 Ibid.
65 Cf. Eriksen, Ethnicity and Nationalism.
fed new angles and insights into the respectively current debate. The entirety of angles and insights in the context of the discourse of ethnicity has become an integral part of the current research on identity management and ethnomanagement—or put differently, it is already an integral part of the semantic connotation of the term ethnomanagement.

From the “I” (Subject/Object) to the Ethnic Group

I would like to begin with a comparison taken from anthropology, in which the quest for the I, for the ‘self’ and the quest for the ‘we’ are related—a quest in which the human being is at the same time the subject and the object of inquiring, of recognizing, and of knowing.

Wir wollen wissen, was wir sind. Es gilt aber ebenso: Wir wollen wissen, was wir sind. Und es gilt auch: Wir wollen wissen, was wir sind. Das heißt: Indem er sich selbst zur Frage wird, rückt der Mensch für sich in die Ferne eines allererst im Wissen zu bestimmenden Objekts, mit dem er dann sich zu identifizieren hat.67

In the following, I will briefly outline some basic considerations originating in neighboring disciplines that deal with the subject character and the object character of the I: The psychoanalytical term ‘self,’68 which already sees the I as an object, was developed according to Sigmund Freud’s theories. Ultimately, such descriptions of the I primarily revolve around the question of “how the self, especially the ‘I’ of the reflexive agent, should best be conceptualized.”69

The duality of the I recurs in another terminology in the philosophy of theology, for example. One perspective of human self-perception leads to the ‘subject,’ while the object character of the ‘I’ is tied to the term ‘person’: “The dual perspective of human self-description, which implies self-consciousness qua pre-reflexive being-familiar-with-oneself, makes possible a consistent explication of the notions of subject and person including their inseparable cohesion.”70

The next step of abstraction takes us from the I as the one who is to the basic concepts of being and existence. Martin Heidegger, among others, addresses these questions in the context of what he himself called fundamental ontolo-

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66 “Yet ethnicity continues to fascinate and perplex, particularly students of anthropology who sometimes feel bewildered by the vast and disjointed range of possible reading recommended to them. […] A number of disciplines have contributed to our understanding of ethnicity – anthropology, sociology and social geography are the major ones, but there have also been contributions from social psychology, socio-biology, social work and educational theory, and even literary studies.” Banks, Ethnicity: anthropological constructions, 1.
67 Gerd Haeffner, Philosophische Anthropologie, 20.
68 “The full libido cathexis of the ‘I’ or ‘charging of the ‘I’ with libido, as primary narcissism, is an original state of being; the libido is sent from there to the objects […] In the process, Freud, however, gets caught up in terminological difficulties since he designates as ‘I’ two different factors: the one from which originates the libido cathexis, but also the potential object of this investment. Psychoanalytical authors nowadays use the term ‘self’ to describe the ‘I’ as a potential object.” Leonhard Schlegel. Grundriß der Tiefenpsychologie 2. UTB 371. München: Francke, 1975. 106. The French philosopher Jacques Derrida strikes a blow for such an integration of psychoanalytical knowledge into ethical, legal, or political issues, when he postulates: “[…] to be sure, psychoanalysis as such does not produce or procure any ethics, any law, any politics, but it belongs to responsibility, in these three domains, to take account of psychoanalytic knowledge.” Jacques Derrida. “Psychoanalysis Searches the States of Its Soul: The Impossible Beyond a Sovereign Cruelty.” Stanford: SUP, 2002. 273.
69 Giddens, The Constitution of Society, 41. A. Giddens’s thoughts on “consciousness, self and social encounters” (cf. ibid, pp. 41-109) are also based in many aspects on Sigmund Freud’s theory of psychoanalysis.
gy. His aim therein was to gain fundamental insights into the *essence of being* (das Wesen des (Da-)Seins):

The ‘essence’ of Dasein lies in its existence. Accordingly those characteristics which can be exhibited in this entity are not ‘properties’ present-at-hand of some entity which ‘looks’ so and so and is itself present-at-hand. They are in each case possible ways for it to be, and no more than that. All the Being-as-it-is [So-sein] which this entity possesses is primarily Being. So when we designate this entity with the term ‘Dasein’, we are expressing not its “what” (as if it were a table, house or tree) but its Being.\(^{71}\)

The catchy sentence “The ‘essence’ of Dasein lies in its existence” describes the fact that Dasein is primarily concerned with its Being. […] The existence of Dasein thus signifies something fundamentally different than the existence of any given object.\(^{72}\)

Heidegger inserts another level in between the Dasein in the world and the duality of I versus the Other,\(^{73}\) which describes the Nebeneinander der ‘Mitseienden’\(^{74}\) without however raising a claim to intersubjectivity:


The end of Dasein in fundamental ontology is “Nonbeing—such as death is commonly presented” and it can therefore “in principle not be grasped from the position of Dasein.” The word “grasp” can in this context be linked to meaning, but one’s Nonbeing would elude this very meaning. For precisely this reason all religions are provided with meaningful allegories of an ‘I’ whose Being reaches beyond the time after death. While it would be possible, Heidegger wrote, to experience the end of Dasein in the death of the Others, the dying of the Other, however, would not be accessible to experience.\(^{77}\) Following this example, there shall now no longer be talk of death as a fact or as the end of Dasein or of the ‘I’ but rather of the dissolution of Being in its scientific-allegorical form. It occurs in the postulate of the ‘death of the subject,’ which has found its way into postmodern philosophy and poststructuralism: The subject, accordingly, is taken to lack origin and coherence, but rather exists as a product of signs. Jacques Derrida’s treatment of the subject can be condensed as follows:

Derrida’s texts do not distance themselves from the authority of the subject by localizing it historically or reifying it as “truth.” They do not distance themselves from the subject with the help


\(^{73}\) See esp. the following part in this subchapter.


\(^{76}\) Ibid., 104.

of theory by making it ultimately the topic and object of description. Derrida’s texts demand, as it were, the explicit absence of the subject and orchestrate the confession of anonymity […].

Any attempt to apply these philosophical insights to some extent to the so-called ‘everyday experiences of the subject’ will most likely lead to an expression of “ontological bottomlessness,” as the sociologist Friedrich Heckmann calls it. Ontological bottomlessness similarly manifests itself in “a radical break with traditions, in the loss of undisputedly accepted concepts of life, of adoptable identity patterns and of normative coordinates.”

By recognizing the ‘death of the subject’ and deducing therefrom the consequent deconstruction of the subject, postmodern philosophers have created the basic foundations for reaching radically new perspectives on the ‘subject’ in times of post-postmodern thinking. This not only reverberates on all those scholarly disciplines that deal with the ‘subject,’ but also, reflexively, on the ‘subject’ itself: “The manifold attempts to deconstruct ideas of the subject and to ‘de-center the subject’ aim at opening up the view to those risky and at the same time indispensable processes that orientate the subject in its world.”

The “processes that orientate the subject” mentioned in the quotation transition, as it were, into the ideas discussed in the second part of this subchapter, in which the embedment of the ‘I’ into the ‘we’ of the group via the other(s) will be presented.

When presenting Heidegger’s thoughts above, I have mentioned the intersections between Dasein and the coexistence with the other(s). The following quotation also shall demonstrate their significance:


In comparison to that, the philosophical anthropologist Gerd Haeffner formulates the intersection between the relation to oneself and to the other as follows:

Der Bezug zum Anderen und der Selbstbezug sind untrennbar miteinander verbunden. In Bezug zu anderem liegt eine Art von Einheit mit dem Anderen, die aber die Unterschiedenheit nicht aufhebt, sondern gerade als Unterschied von Wesen setzt, die eine innere Einheit (Identität) haben. […] In der engen Verflechtung des Selbstbezugs mit den Bezügen zum Anderen, die zur Subjektivität gehören, liegt eine Einheit von Einheit und Unterschiedenheit.

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81 Heckmann, Ethnische Minderheiten, Volk und Nation, 53.
82 Quoted in Luckner, Martin Heidegger: ‘Sein und Zeit,’ 56. These basic thoughts of Heidegger’s on the research area he called “difference” were later taken up by poststructuralist philosophy. See e.g. the excursus “The Mobilization of the ‘Now’” (Die Differenz der Zeit) in Gehring, Innen des Außen – Außen des Innen, 176-201.
83 Haeffner, Philosophische Anthropologie, 46.
Socio-psychological and socio-pedagogical research speaks of “man’s dialogic form of existence,” among others, from which one can derive the simplified formula “from the I to the You and from the You back to the I”:

I ↔ You ↔ I

In historical anthropology, too, the ‘I’ is set in relation to the others and its reflexivity onto the social environment is described and analyzed. This approach was already formulated during the period between the world wars by the social psychologist George H. Mead, when he stated that the perception of the self thereby would approximately correspond to the relation between the self and the social community.84 Different approaches to how the ‘I’ is integrated range next to each other in social research to date. Anthony Giddens, for instance, establishes a direct connection between the “reflexive awareness” of the ‘I,’ which he describes as a kind of stratification model, and the life forms of modernity: “Reflexive awareness in this sense is characteristic of all human action, and is the specific condition of that massively developed institutional reflexivity spoken of in the preceding chapter as an intrinsic component of modernity.”85 Paul du Gay’s approach already reveals a semantic connection to identity management and ethnomanagement when he speaks of the “conception of the individual as an ‘entrepreneur of the self.’”86 From this I conclude that the individual can draw just as much from the experiences of self-governance as from the role of an identity manager and ethnomanager because it is precisely from this connection between self-governance and identity management and ethnomanagement that new insights both for the self and for the (ethnic) group emerge. As the formation of an ‘I’-identity takes place, this process interacts with the social environment, with the ‘You’-position, as represented in the simple formula above, possibly occupied by media just as well, particularly so when the social networks are also taken into consideration.87 When dealing with the relationship individual ⇆ group, one soon arrives at the peripheries of what is one’s own and encounters the foreign.88 The opposites of ‘one’s own—the foreign’ have come to occupy a central role in the considerations of cultural anthropology. According to the view of the ethnopsychoanalyst Mario Erdheim, it is always the fears resulting from the foreign—or from the idea and the contemplation of the foreign—that govern this duality.

84 Cf. George H. Mead. Mind Self, and Society from the Standpoint of a Social Behaviourist. Ed. Charles W. Morris. Chicago: Chicago UP, 1934. 136-137. It is important to mention at this point that a large number of other disciplines, such as developmental psychology, explore the orientation of the individual as well as questions of how the inside and the outside relate to each other. It is equally important to mention that these questions are also omnipresent in the context of psychoanalysis. For reasons of topical constraints and focus, I cannot delve into all these perspectives and academic disciplines.
88 In its imagination, the singular ‘I’ can always encounter the foreign. It is therefore not easy to draw a clear border between the empirically experienceable foreign and the imagined foreign. The so-called practice of ethnic engineering takes advantage of the negative or threatening idea of the foreign in order to stereotype an encounter with the foreign in advance.
Fear will always remain more or less associated with the foreign, and one always needs to overcome fear in order to turn towards the foreign. [...] Our relationship to the foreign is always ambivalent: we are afraid of it and at the same time it is also capable of fascinating us. Based on this, as well as following Sigmund Freud’s thesis of the antagonism between family and civilization, Erdheim subsequently transfers this image onto the relationship between one’s own civilization or culture and foreign civilization/culture:

It is therefore worthwhile to contemplate the concept of culture from the angle of the foreign. Instead of equating culture with the known, the accustomed, the perennially familiar, one should relate it to the foreign: culture is what emerges from the engagement with the foreign; it is the product of the modification of one’s own through the absorption of the foreign. For Erdheim, this fear of the foreign also means that ‘something uncanny’ inheres in every culture since the others, whenever they encounter another culture, perceive it as a foreign culture.

Anthony Giddens also sees fear as the trigger for the search for “ontological security and trust.” In his understanding of the term ‘dread’ Giddens follows, among others, the ideas and conceptions of the Danish existential philosopher Søren Kierkegaard. It is this dread that needed to be overcome, Giddens writes, so that the individual could build up basic trust and consequently interpersonal organization. The next logical step would then be the step from interpersonal organization to social organization. According to Giddens, this was triggered by anxiety, which again makes evident some overlaps with Sigmund Freud’s theories.

When relating the opposites of ‘one’s own—the foreign,’ mentioned above, to the concept of ‘identity,’ it very soon becomes apparent to what extent the individual’s constructions of identity already rely on such strategies of demarcation. Supported by the inclusionary and exclusionary qualities of ethnicity mentioned above, this provides a point of departure for the description and interpretation of the structures of identity management and ethnomangement. Within these structures, the relationship between the individual and the we-group suggests above all a win-win-situation since the recognition of the we-group presupposes the individual’s recognition of the ethnomangement just as much as the identity management’s and ethnomangement’s recognition of the individual in the sense of inclusion. The interpretation of an individual’s ties to place, which have grown just like its social ties, can be observed to the same degree for the identity constructions of both the individual and the we-group: Anthony P. Cohen, for example, explored this phenomenon as early as the first half of the 1980s in rural communities in Great Britain and, even at that early point in

90 Ibid., 734.
91 Cf. ibid., 736.
95 Cf. ibid., 42-47.
time, he already used the term local identities. Yet he defines the term primarily as a form of self-
perception.96

Another essential question is geared towards the development, shape and localization of cultural identity,97 which implies the proportionality between the individual and ‘its cultural environment.’ In simplified terms, it could at first be seen merely as a manifestation or influence98 of the group surrounding the individual since culture is not understood to be a single individual’s expression, but rather the expression of shared cultural values:

It has by now been acknowledged that, on the one hand, humans are shaped as individuals and personalities by their culture and become members of a cultural community in the process of enculturation (socialization), i.e. by growing into the cultural environment. On the other hand, they influence their environment and thereby contribute to cultural change. Individuals simultaneously belong to a whole range of different groups and categories of people, and, accordingly, bear within themselves various layers of their identity: national, ethnic, religious, social, cultural, and so on.99

In the 1990s, the term cultural identity—as one of the formulations used to describe a collective of identity/ies—ranged as a prominent topic in the English-speaking world, especially in the work of Stuart Hall. His criteria manifestly overlap to some extent with the ethnic markers that are taken to be constituents of ‘ethnic groups’:

Nor – if we translate this essentializing conception to the stage of cultural identity – is that ‘collective or true self hiding inside the many other, more superficial or artificially imposed “selves” which a people with a shared history and ancestry hold in common’ and which can stabilize, fix or guarantee an unchanging ‘oneness’ or cultural belongingness underlying all the other superficial differences. It accepts that identities are never unified and, in late modern times, increasingly fragmented and fractured; never singular but multiply constructed across different, often intersecting and antagonistic, discourses, practices and positions. They are subject to a radical historicization, and are constantly in the process of change and transformation. We need to situate the debates about identity within all those historically specific developments and practices which have disturbed the relatively ‘settled’ character of many populations and cultures, above all in relation to the processes of globalization […] and the processes of forced and ‘free’ migration […].100

In the German-language world, the sociologist Heiner Keupp repeatedly refers to Stuart Hall’s concept in his considerations of cultural identity and thereby addresses the deviations from cultural norms, which are already articulated in Hall’s concept and which are currently becoming more and more pronounced due to the effects of globalization and the global migration flows: according to Keupp, this

97 Rene John in this context describes identity as a concept of order: “Identity is always the result of reflexive processes of discourse, at whose preliminary close one finds relevant self- concepts that always represent an order of experiences and expectations. In this way, continuity and consistency are realized, in a specific way, through identity, as the result of communication, e.g. of regional discourse.” Rene John. “Regionale Identität: Strategie und Diskurs im Raum Berlin-Brandenburg.” BISS-public 25.1 (1998): 18.
98 Similarly to the ‘I’/self-, subject/object duality, there is in this case, too, a simultaneity of actively shaping culture and passively being shaped by culture (in the sense of the term reflexivity).
99 Anderl-Motea, Ethnizität – Raum, Funktion und Bedeutungs wandel, 78.
entailed an increased valorization of experiences shared by individuals, but eventually would lead to a stronger interdependence of identity and group belonging.\textsuperscript{101}

This insight, too, confirms the individual’s inclination to position itself within a group, since mainly fear, insecurity and uncertainty as well as the notion of its own inadequacy urge it to do so. Henry E. Hale, for example, also sees the reduction of this uncertainty as a core issue to describe the individual’s positioning:

Not surprisingly, then, many social psychologists have found a great deal of experimental confirmation for the proposition that uncertainty reduction is a fundamental human motivation driving the near-universal tendency for humans to divide themselves into groups. People tend to categorize themselves and others in ways that help them make sense of the social world they inhabit. This facilitates recognition and response to members and nonmembers of these categorizations.\textsuperscript{102}

This behaviorist interpretation implicitly already holds the key to understanding and interpreting the development of ethnic groups, or more specifically humans’ tendency to join an/their ethnic group; at this point, no further explanations that would complicate matters shall be added. The basic assumption shall be that the subject considers itself, or at least wants to consider itself, an ethnic subject.\textsuperscript{103} The reasons for this shall be briefly summarized at this point: i) The self-ascription of an ethnic identity or ethnicity is regulated both consciously and unconsciously by the individual itself, but also by others, for instance via the group’s identity management and ethnomanagement or via external ascriptions from without; ii) the underlying strategy serves to escape one’s own fears and to simultaneously meet the need to position oneself, which the support of that group with which one feels affiliated promises and is supposed to accomplish; iii) in times of transition, transformation and globalization particularly, ethnic identity or local identity seem to enable individuals to anchor themselves within the protecting walls that the cultural traditions established by identity management and ethnomanagement provide.

Marcus Banks formulates the following question concerning the relation of ethnicity to the attributive usage of ethnic: “[…] the former is what the latter has or expresses?”\textsuperscript{104} The term ethnicity includes and suggests a whole range of qualities that find application in the attribute ethnic. Since many scholars are guided in their approaches to the term ethnic group by Max Weber, among others, his approach shall be referenced at this point:

We shall call ‘ethnic groups’ those human groups that entertain a subjective belief in their common descent because of similarities of physical type or of customs or both, or because of memories of colonization and migration; this belief must be important for the propagation of

\begin{thebibliography}{99}

\bibitem{102} This tendency can be observed very clearly in the political arena in the growing support for rightwing populist movements and parties as they build quite simply on a positively reinforced “we-are-we”-awareness, which casts “the others” as the enemy; this black-and-white thinking is further bolstered by an exaggerated “love for our country,” for which regional ancestry plays a central role explicitly, yet ethnic ancestry does so implicitly.


\bibitem{104} On the connections between “uncertainty, identity, ethnicity” see esp. ch. 2.1/subchapter \textit{Ethnic Politics}.\textsuperscript{103}

\bibitem{105} On the usage of ethnic subject, see DeHart, \textit{Ethnic Entrepreneurs}, 18.

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group formation [...] This artificial origin of the belief in common ethnicity follows the previously described pattern of rational association turning into personal relationships. If rationally regulated action is not widespread, almost any association, even the most rational one, creates in overarching communal consciousness; this takes the form of brotherhood on the basis of the belief in common ethnicity.  

When one advances a step further in the history of science towards identity management and ethno-management, the importance of Ronald Cohen’s observations published in 1978 becomes evident, in my view, because they present an understanding of the *ethnic groups* as ‘entities’:

This was, in effect, to understand assumedly homogeneous sociocultural units as entities, the relation of their parts to one another and to the whole, and the relation of the whole and its parts to their physical and sociocultural environments.  

Ronald Cohen added that these studies in anthropological research had had minority status, given the preponderance of ethnography with its isolation of “non-Western societies” and of transcultural comparative analysis. Ronald Cohen already pointed out that it wouldn’t be sufficient to examine an ethnic group as an isolated entity; instead, the respective scientific investigations should, or rather had to take into consideration the interactions both among the different ethnic groups within a region and among the nations themselves:

But the study of contemporary peoples in a complex world has now clearly shifted from ethnic isolates, “tribes” if you will, to one in which the interrelations between such groups in rural, urban, and industrial settings within and between nation-states is a key, possibly the key element in their lives.  

From among the abundance of contributions on the term “ethnic group,” I will present two further interpretations as examples: One of them, recalling F. Barth, originates with Georg Elwert and dates back to 1989; the second one, by James G. Kellas, dating to 1991, already moves in a somewhat different direction:

*Ethnien* are groups that reach beyond and embrace families and that attribute to themselves a (possibly exclusive) collective identity.

‘Ethnic group’ and ‘ethnocentrism’ are comparable with ‘nation’ and ‘nationalism’. The difference between them is that ‘ethnic group’ is more narrowly defined than ‘nation’, and ‘ethnocentrism’ is more rooted in social psychology than is ‘nationalism’, which has explicitly ideological and political dimensions. [...] Ethnic groups are essentially exclusive or ascriptive, meaning that membership in such groups is confined to those who share certain in born attributes.

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106 Cohen, “Ethnicity,” 381.
107 Cf. ibid.
108 Ibid., 384.
109 Cohen understands the term “tribes” to mean the following: “In ideological terms, ‘tribes’ are a fundamentally colonial concept derived from the Latin term *tribus* meaning barbarians are the border of the empire. This etymology reflects and explains the significance of the word in Western culture, its link to imperialist expansionism and the associated and overgeneralized dichotomization of the world’s peoples into civilized and uncivilized – the ‘raw’ and the ‘cooked’ of human historical experience.” Ibid.
Georg Elwert clings to the self-ascription of ethnic groups, as apparent in the cited passage, but concedes that it is malleable in the sense of “the criteria for ascription that draw the external border,”111 Elwert, however, rejects the notion that ethnic groups are constituted based solely on the ethnic marker ‘language’ or on common descent112; rather, he described “the awareness of belonging to an Ethnie […] as ‘ethnicity,”113 according to Pascht. In my view, this does signify a gradual further development of Barth’s conceptual model; yet such approaches, which give overly much weight to the individual belonging and orientation, are by now also being criticized.114 Even though there are specific constellations of a regional environment where such a strategy can almost be viewed as an expedient solution: An example for this is the ethnic group of Albanian-speaking ‘Egyptians’ in the Balkans, among whom count Roma people who live in Serbia, but mostly in Kosovo. The current self-reference ‘Egyptians’ essentially originated as a name imposed by others and was only legitimized, as it were, by Serbians and Albanians. The word Magjup, which probably originates from Egypt, in Albanian functions as a collective term for Roma people, Egyptians and Ashkali and has certainly prompted this semantic shift. In Serbia, the Romany group of Egyptians (Egipčani in the Serbian original) is recognized according to minority rights as an autonomous Volksgruppe.115

James G. Kellas, in the passage cited above, already distances himself from Barth’s tradition insofar as he compares the process of constituting an ethnic group with the process of nation building. He describes the group belonging linked to it in very active terms as: “the state of being ethnic, of belonging to an ethnic group.”116 It is striking that Kellas subsequently combines the term ethnic group with the term ethnocentrism since, to him, it represents a sort of psychological basis for an individual’s connection to and integration into an ethnic group;117 and yet it is precisely ethnocentrism that creates barriers for any interethnic and intercultural dialogue, which are hard to bypass:118

[…] The contemplation and evaluation of the other from the viewpoint of the we-group or the naturalness of one’s own culture, mentioned above, characterize an attitude that scholars refer to as ethnocentrism and that plays an important part in interethnic relations in that it is functionalized in interethnic contact situations.119

When one considers the normative aspect of ethnocentrism, the process, in the sense of Kellas’s notions, eventually leads into the monoethnic nation state, in which all other ethnic groups living in it are granted no more than the status of an ethnic or national minority. The term ethnicity is linked in these

112 Cf. ibid.
113 Pascht, Ethnizität, 30.
114 “Approaches that claim to adopt a ‘subjective’ perspective and that focus on people’s self-designation as the most important criterion for the delimitation of ethnic groups often refer to Ethnien as ‘fictions’ or as ‘invented.’ This is a consequence of the constructivist approach, which understands ethnicity as a flexible, subjectively manipulable variable that can be employed as a strategy and thus represents a constructed social reality.” Ibid., 64.
117 Cf. ibid., 11-27.
119 Anderl-Motea, Ethnizität – Raum, Funktion und Bedeutungswandel, 77.
contexts to its primordial basic constants such as common history and culture as well as ancestry or
kinship, and it thus suggests the (seeming) stability of an ethnic group. In response to this, the scholars
working in the field no longer merely asked, “How does the past create the present,” but began to ad-
dress the inversion of this question as well: “How does the present create the past?”

Erwin Orywal and Katharina Hackstein, in turn, link the term ethnic group with endogamy,
which already played a decisive role for the Russian anthropologists Shirokogoroff and Bromley:
“Ethnic groups are endogamous groups, which postulate a self-conception that via selected traditions
separates them off from one another.” For the two authors, endogamy ranges as a synonym for the
“relational aspect of ethnicity,” which also removes them from Barth’s traditions. Henry E. Hale
formulated a topical and somewhat broader definition of “ethnic group” that is indeed reminiscent of
Weber:

 [...] an “ethnic group” is defined broadly, as a set of people who (a) have in common point of
reference to at least one ethnic dimension of the social world; (b) share the view that they in-
deed have this in common; and (c) capture this similarity in a label, the ethnic group’s name.

This makes transparent why a group formation that takes place according to the laws of ethnicity ap-
pears to be effortless and simple, and the socio-psychological trick seems to work according to the
following principle: all categorizations and ascriptions are simply interpreted and presented as some-
thing “naturally grown” and are thus sooner or later also perceived as such. Be it ancestry, language,
religion or customs: these ethnic markers are hardly questioned but are regarded as elements immanent
in groups, even though they were fabricated in the recent or distant past through self- and external
ascriptions. Their dynamics and processual qualities take center stage in minority research and these
ascriptions are at the same time understood as promoting all inclusionary and exclusionary processes:

Ethnic groups, including minorities and majorities, are not organic communities, which can be
viewed as natural. They are made, i.e., socially produced, in specific historical constellations by
elites and social movements. Ethnicity, i.e., the application of ethnic categories by social group-
ings, must not be seen as a given but rather as an integral part of processes of demarcation.

Barth’s approach already made obvious the negotiability of such processes of demarcation in the fol-
lowing sense: “Ethnic groups and their dividing lines are [...] negotiated both among the members of
the groups and between them and outsiders.” This can be projected onto the concept of identity
management and ethnomanagement in this sense, yet needs to be qualified in the sense that the diffe-
rent groups do not find themselves in the same starting position and have a different identity manage-
ment and ethnomanagement. External parameters that reside above all in the realms of the nation state,
of minority rights and of the (transnational) politics of Volksgruppen related to them complement the
picture. The interpenetration of the terms ethnicity and ethnic group, by today’s standards, indeed

121 Orywal and Hackstein, Ethnizität: Die Konstruktion ethnischer Wirklichkeiten, 598.
122 Pascht, Ethnizität, 35.
123 Hale, The Foundation of Ethnic Politics, 47.
124 Giordano, Ethnizität aus sozialanthropologischer Sicht, 138.
125 Heller, Ethnizität in der Globalisierung, 15.
needs to be recognized as a fact: in keeping with its size and importance, the ethnic group is classified in between family and nation since the markers ascribed to them overlap in many respects. At the heart of the discussion and of the negotiation of ethnic groups mentioned above lies a constituting we-feeling that determines the boundaries and thus the differentiation we—the others.

When the topic area “family” is viewed from the perspective of the so-called ethnic markers, shared ancestry and origins—and oftentimes this includes myths of origin—emerge as the most striking markers. Only then follow language, religion, clothing and further such markers. They can quite easily be compared with the ethnic markers of one’s own or of a different group. Just like with the description of the markers of a “shared culture,” there is no set number or an established canon because they could “include almost any number of individual characteristics, like a container.” In Burkhard Ganzer’s article “Zur Bestimmung des Begriffs der Ethnischen Gruppe” of 1990, too, the axiom of a common ancestry was still crucial and for Ganzer this entailed the problem of how to distinguish the ethnic group from kin. Manning Nash encountered a similar overlap a year earlier already, although he regards the ‘presumed kinship’ as a central criterion for delimitating ethnicity. It should be added to this issue in general and to the considerations of Nash in particular that the subsequent publications generally do no longer start from an actual common descent community but from a community that is presumed by the members of the ethnic group.

Since the two ethnic groups treated in the present study, Germans and Hungarians, are considered so-called linguistic minorities, a passage shall be added at this point to outline the consolidation and the interpenetration—desired, not least, by identity management and ethnomanagement—of the two ethnic markers descent and language: Since the development of nation states, language has assumed a dominant role “in determining criteria for inclusion and exclusion.” In the German-speaking area, this primacy of language was highlighted above all by what I have labeled the “Herder-Fichte-Construction”:

Johann Gottfried Herder’s German notion of Volk or Johann Gottlieb Fichte’s conceptions of language and linguistics could serve as examples here. They succeeded, with the help of a national historiography, in designing a construction built on philology and history that supports it-

126 Cf. Martine Segalen. Historical anthropology of the family. Cambridge et al: CUP, 1986. One of the many possibilities to conceptually link the characteristics of ethnicity with the constitutive qualities of nation will be described in more detail in chapter 2.1, in the section Ethnicity and Nation.

127 The discussion surrounding “othering” always plays into this; until/throughout the 1990s it yielded the following insights, for instance: “The ‘object’ of ethnography is no longer considered to be simply given; the others emerge as subject matter only in the process of research, or, more generally, in the process of interaction itself: ‘othering’ becomes a key phrase which bundles the problems of ethnographic knowledge.” Martin Fuchs and Eberhard Berg. “Phänomenologie der Differenz: Reflexionsstufen ethnoraphischer Repräsentation.” Kultur, soziale Praxis, Text: Die Krise der ethnographischen Repräsentation. Ed. Martin Fuchs and Eberhard Berg. s.t.w. 1051. Frankfurt/M: Suhrkamp, 1993. 72-73.

128 Heller, Ethnizität in der Globalisierung, 15.


Previous research mostly adhered to this unity, as the following example dating to the year 2004 evidences:

One has to concur with Nelu Bredean-Ebinger when he hints at the following fact: “Without its most important distinguishing feature, the mother tongue, a Volksgruppe cannot persist as a linguistic minority.”\footnote{Erzsébet Forgács. “Zum Status des Deutschen als Nationalitäts- und Fremdsprache in Ungarn.” \textit{Österreichische Osthefte} 4 (2004): 482. The quotation by Bradean-Ebinger was taken from: Nelu Bradean-Ebinger. “Kann eine Volksgruppe ohne Muttersprache bestehen?” \textit{Suevi Pannonica: Archiv der Deutschen aus Ungarn} 17 (1999): 23.}

This implies that it seems rather tautologous when a minority is a priori referred to as a linguistic minority so that it can be insinuated, in the potential case of the decline or even loss of the mother tongue, that it has lost its identity as a minority altogether. In spite of this postulate, the German minority in Southeast Europe by no means vanished, even though the German language lost its dominant position among the ethnic markers due to processes of assimilation and acculturation: The commitment to one’s German descent has now taken over first place from proficiency in the German language or in a German-language dialect; the two markers descent and language have swapped places, so to speak.

\textbf{The Term \textit{Identity Management} as Antecessor}

Also in the second literal sense contained in the composite, the examination of the term \textit{identity management} leads us towards ethnomangement as a ‘management of the ethnic group,’ or of the Volksgruppe or minority, without dispensing with the tool character of ethnicity, which I consider to be equally paramount. The German term \textit{Identitätsmanagement} (identity management) was introduced against this semantic backdrop in 1981 by the two scholars Ina Maria Greverus—who already established the connection between ethnicity and identity management with an “and”—and Christian Giordano, who primarily addressed the question of whether ethnicity was a social movement or an identity management.\footnote{See Ina-Maria Greverus. “Ethnizität und Identitätsmanagement.” \textit{Schweizer Zeitschrift für Soziologie} 7 (1981): 223-232; as well as Christian Giordano. “Ethnizität: Soziale Bewegung oder Identitätsmanagement?” \textit{Schweizer Zeitschrift für Soziologie} 7 (1981): 179-198.} I call these first steps back to mind in such detail because many basic ideas of both identity management and ethnomangement were contained in this discourse, or because I eventually returned to some of these basic thoughts and characteristics. Even though three decades have already passed since the German-language term \textit{Identitätsmanagement} was introduced into cultural studies and the social sciences, and even though, driven by the agents and scholars, the understanding and sense of ethnicity have since developed and changed, as outlined above, both the theoreti-
ical introduction to identity management and ethnomanagement at hand and my empirical research refer in many aspects to the actions described in the initial discourse.

I already mentioned in the introduction that identity management, the English-language equivalent to *Identitätsmanagement*, has by now been co-opted by the IT sector, and it currently refers mostly to the administration of personal data. The IT sector thus actually gave the term a new meaning.\(^\text{136}\) Rather few authors in cultural studies and the social sciences, such as Christian Giordano,\(^\text{137}\) still hold on to it. One can currently find a more or less lively discourse involving *Identitätsmanagement*/identity management, especially in empirical social psychology; without taking into account strict borders between disciplines, this discourse will be presented at this point to round off this passage.

In her article “Ethnizität und Identitätsmanagement,”\(^\text{138}\) published in 1981, Ina Maria Greverus links up the two terms named in the title; together with the article by Christian Giordano discussed below—both articles were published back then in the same issue of the *Schweizer Zeitschrift für Soziologie*—this initiates a serious scholarly discussion in the German-language world, in which ethnicity and identity management are analyzed jointly. It therefore seems logical to me in this context not to disconnect the term *Identitätsmanagement*/identity management from its semantic connections to the term ethnicity, which Greverus determines as follows:

Ethnicity is understood here as a process in which groups of people consciously use ethnic characteristics as criteria for separating themselves off from other groups in order to achieve certain goals in their social existence. Ethnicity, thus, will be analyzed as an intentional activity and not as a synonym for ethnos, *ethnie* or ethnic group/community, whose characteristics only provide the basis for this intentional action which represents an identity management.\(^\text{139}\)

Ethnicity is already described here as an active, action-oriented concept, which I considered and still consider to be of utmost importance for its semantic role as immediate precursory term and model term for *ethnomanagement*, whereas Greverus also establishes a relational link between *ethnos* and identity management:

\(^{\text{136}}\) A definition of identity management taken from the IT sector reads as follows: “Identity management (ID management) is a broad administrative area that deals with identifying individuals in a system (such as a country, a network, or an enterprise) and controlling their access to resources within that system by associating user rights and restrictions with the established identity. The driver licensing system is a simple example of identity management: drivers are identified by their license numbers and user specifications (such as “cannot drive after dark”) are linked to the identifying number. In an IT network, identity management software is used to automate administrative tasks, such as resetting user passwords. Enabling users to reset their own passwords can save significant money and resources, since a large percentage of help desk calls are password-related. Password synchronization (p-synch) enables a user to access resources across systems with a single password; a more advanced version called single signon enables synchronization across applications as well as systems.

In an enterprise setting, identity management is used to increase security and productivity, while decreasing cost and redundant effort. Standards such as Extensible Name Service (XNS) are being developed to enable identity management both within the enterprise and beyond.” See: http://searchunifiedcommunications.techtarget.com/sDefinition/0,,sid186_gei90630700.html# (05 February 2009).

The following definition can be found on Wikipedia: *Identitätsmanagement* (IdM) “denotes the purposeful and conscious handling of identity, anonymity and pseudonymity.”


\(^{\text{139}}\) Ibid., 223.
The preeminent characteristics of ethnos—common culture, common history and ancestry, common living space, common psychical and mental traits, which are anchored in the awareness of the ‘we’ and the ‘they’—are employed selectively for the identity management or the identity development.

As I aim to speak about current movements here, I prefer the term identity management since it better expresses the organizational aspect, including constellations involving the manipulation and dependence of those being managed. Identity development or identity management are geared towards the confirmation, defence and enhancement of an identity: in this case, of an ethnic identity.140

It is exactly this appropriate interrelation with management that made it crucial for me to retain it in any case as part as a new composite that had yet to be formulated. The point of departure was to create a label for the activities but also the intentions of the minority representations and Volksgruppen representations. This label should be formulated in terms that are as value-free as possible so as not to cause (even more) aggravation up front, especially in the realm of minorities.141 The widely known term management is best suited to express the factors mentioned in the above quotation, such as the “organizational aspect” as well as the “constellation of dependence” between the ethnomanagers and the members of the respective Volksgruppe.

Following the remarks in the above quotation, Ina-Maria Greverus presents six issues that she refers to as the “basic intentions of identity management”:

(1) politico-economic empowerment due to ethnic “superiority” (claims to power);
(2) socio-economic and socio-cultural equality due to ethnic equivalence (national pluralism);
(3) cultural autonomy due to ethnic equivalence without claims to political and socio-economic equality (unilateral cultural pluralism);
(4) special status within the nation due to ethnic otherness (“protected minority,” disengagement strategy);
(5) emphasis of the cultural particularity of ethnically largely dissolved groups with recourse to external ethnic traits (subcultural anti-monoculture-movement, ethnicity as attitude);
(6) politically utilized, ethnic-regressive differentiation in public-festive displays as an instrument of national affirmation (political folklorism).142

Greverus adds to this that the “selection of the ethnic traits depends on the respective objective” and that it is in any case a central concern of identity management to create an awareness of the ‘we.’143 In my view, the validity of these additional interpretations in particular has remained unchanged to this day, especially so when one calls back to mind the process constituting an ‘ethnic group,’ described above. She also clearly shows that this center, around which the collective ‘we’-consciousness gravitates, is indeed consciously shaped, at least in part, and held together by the identity management, although this center is of course mostly presented as something naturally developed. Greverus’s description of “materially or non-materially personally committed representatives of the same eth-

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140 Ibid., 223-224.
141 “Value-free” is used in this context without negative or positive connotations: Even an overly positive description and analysis of ethnomanagement—which mostly result from reflexive patterns of describing “one’s own ethnic group”—in most cases do not withstand a scholarly “neutral” approach.
143 Ibid.
nicity” can in some respects already be transferred to the concept of the ethnomanager. And in her conclusions, Greverus even explains that ethnicity has basically only emerged from a differently motivated identity management:

Ethnicity in its diverse forms is an identity management whose segregative as well as integrative intentions are directed towards generating a new self-confidence of a group by enhancing certain “unique” (ethnic) traits. The expectations that the initiators and mediators, on the one hand, and the adherents, on the other, have of this ethnicity, however, are situated in an area of tension (which is often part of the same movement) between claims to political power, political affirmation, commercial utilization, demands of equality, demands of privileges and emphasis on cultural particularity as a group characteristic [...].

According to this, any form of identity management, consciously or unconsciously, contributes to the shaping of ethnicity. From the perspective of the history of science—seeing as the active components of ethnicity were not yet stressed as much at the beginning of the 1980s—, the term identity management in Greverus’s work, therefore, was supposed to largely cover these active operational elements. When pursuing this thought from today’s perspective, what has materialized since then is a feedback look between the terms. This is, on the one hand, due to the fact that ethnicity is required and used by the identity managers as a tool in the literal sense. It is, on the other hand, due to the fact that ethnicity in its instrumental character also reverberates on identity management.

Christian Giordano describes identity management mainly in the context of the processes of demarcation of social groups. In 1972, Georges Devereux already developed a similar conception in his work “L’identité ethnique.” Giordano later distinguishes mainly two different forms of ethnicity. They are either more or less target-oriented: a free movement, in the sense of a “social movement,” and a guided one, where ethnicity is primarily instrumentalized and manipulated. It is only the second one that—well in accordance with Greverus’s theoretical notions—leads toward the concept of identity management. Giordano starts right off with the role of the agents since that way “the components of the sociology of domination inherent in the phenomenon of ethnicity would be identified.” In the process, ethnicity could “become a stepping stone for personal image-making as well as an object of commercial transactions” for what he called identity managers. Christian Giordano then contrasts identity management with the concept of social movement and thereby formulates the following pairs of opposites:

144 Ibid.
145 Ibid., 231.
148 Cf. ibid., 189-190.
150 Ibid., 192.
With regard to the theoretical characteristics and interpretations of identity management and ethnicity management, I would like to point to Giordano’s core statement, in which he asserts that these were essentially an “institutionalizing process of social movements.”\(^{151}\) When projected onto the present research on the identity management and ethnomanagement of the Germans and Hungarians in Southeast Europe, this signifies an investigation of the ongoing institutionalization of the two ethnic groups.\(^{152}\)

Giordano’s approach at the time, however, differs from my understanding of the terms identity management and ethnomanagement in a crucial aspect due to the following thought. A further conclusion Giordano draws in his 1981 article is: “Identity management therefore is an experienced governing body of dignitaries.”\(^{153}\) In my opinion, this restricts the understanding of identity management too much. Surely this is sometimes an essential aspect in the realm of management per se, but my approach is meant to cover a wider spectrum since it must start from the premise of democratically elected minority representations and from the very possibility for the basis of the ethnic group to elect their representatives. Giordano without any doubt wanted to make the discrepancy to the free social movement even clearer, which in my view is indeed helpful as a model approach; yet, this narrow constellation is in this form not applicable to field research.

In the following, I shall briefly and exemplarily list some further/extended connections as well as transdisciplinary applications of the term identity management, which developed since the early 1980s before the term was increasingly appropriated by the IT sector during the 1990s. Even Frederik Barth, in his 1994 article “Enduring and emerging issues in the analysis of ethnicity,” establishes a clear connection to the basic principles of identity management, even if he doesn’t use the term explicitly:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social Movement</th>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Identity Management</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>spontaneous</td>
<td>spontaneous</td>
<td>induced</td>
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<tr>
<td>grassroots participation</td>
<td>grassroots</td>
<td>decision-making elite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>weak structuration</td>
<td>weak structural</td>
<td>highly developed organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>charismatic leadership</td>
<td>charismatic</td>
<td>rational “bureaucratic management”</td>
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<tr>
<td>extraordinary qualification</td>
<td>extraordinary</td>
<td>factual qualities</td>
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<tr>
<td>enthusiastic feelings</td>
<td>enthusiastic</td>
<td>formulated programs</td>
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\(^{151}\) Ibid.

\(^{152}\) Both the Germans and the Hungarians in Southeastern Europe are perceived as ethnic groups from the inside and the outside perspective. Therefore I will not continue using the phrase “social movement” any further here. But it shall be remarked that every ethnic or national group is also a reflection of a social movement.

\(^{153}\) Giordano, “Ethnizität,” 194. [italics in the original]
Finally, I emphasized the entrepreneurial role in ethnic politics: how the mobilization of ethnic groups in collective action is effected by leaders who pursue a political enterprise, and is not a direct expression of the group’s cultural ideology, or the popular will.\textsuperscript{154}

In the two publications mentioned below, which were both published in the first half of the 1990s, the term—one time in German, the other time in English—appears explicitly in the respective title: The article by Vigdis Stordahl, titled “Ethnic Integration and Identity Management: Discourses of Sami Self-awareness,” dates back to the year 1993;\textsuperscript{155} Elke-Nicole Kappus, a student of Giordano’s at the time,\textsuperscript{156} published an article titled “Ethnisierte Vergangenheit: Über ethnisches Identitätsmanagement von Italienern und Slowenen in Triest” in 1996.\textsuperscript{157} As the following quotations shall demonstrate, she uses the term \textit{Identitätsmanagement} mainly in the context of ethnicity during her field research in Trieste:

The “history” of the Italians and Slovenes in Trieste made it possible to reveal the influence of the political framework on “ethnicity” […] as well as the role that “actualized history” (Giordano 1996) plays in the identity management of ethnic groups.

I was mostly interested in Slovenian-Italian relations in the city and the identity management of the two ethnic groups.\textsuperscript{158}

No further context is provided, however, since the author subsequently does not mention which forms of identity management she investigated.

Towards the end of the 1990s and at the beginning of the new millennium, sociological research above all produced a handpicked number of publications, which deal explicitly or implicitly with the topic of identity management: In 1997, the sociologist Robert Hettlage even published an article in the journal \textit{WeltTrends} which is titled “Identitätsmanagement” and subtitled “Soziale Konstruktionsvorgänge zwischen Rahmen und Brechung.”\textsuperscript{159} Heiner Keupp, in turn, situates the methodological focus of identity management within the framework of reflexive social psychology.\textsuperscript{160} The Southeast Europe historian Stefan Troebst used the term \textit{Identitätsmanagement} in 2003 in the subtitle to his article “Staatlichkeitskult im Pseudo-Staat: Identitätsmanagement in Transnistrien.”\textsuperscript{161}

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{154} Barth, “Enduring and emerging issues in the analysis of ethnicity,” 12.
\bibitem{159} Both quotations: Kappus, “Ethnisierte Vergangenheit,” 38.
\end{thebibliography}
in his conclusion speaks of a so-called “intensive national identity management,” which he locates above all in the nation-building process in Transnistria between 1992 and 2002.162

In the discipline of social psychology, one finds a still relevant meaning of the English-language term identity management, of which a Dutch publication dating back to the year 2008 provides impressive proof.163 This study, which deals with Turkish migrants in the Netherlands, in the context of the term ‘identity management’164 examines some aspects that are also relevant and useful for historical-anthropological research: In this study, the factors stability, legitimacy, permeability take center stage in the description of the relations between the Turkish migrant minority and the Dutch majority population. In simplified terms and in Barth’s sense, this corresponds to an observation of what happens at the boundaries:

Stability refers to the extent to which group positions are considered to be changeable, and legitimacy refers to the extent to which the status structure is accepted as legitimate. Permeability refers to the extent to which individual group members can leave one group and join another. Perceived stability, legitimacy, and permeability would, interactively, determine the cognitive, emotional, and behavioural response to the intergroup context and the strategies to pursue positive distinctiveness.165

Along these lines of observation, Verkuyten and Reijerse recognize the so-called identity management strategies:

This particular intergroup context allows us to go beyond a “mechanistic“ reading of SIT [Social identity theory] in which perceived sociostructural characteristics are “simply” taken to lead to identity management strategies, independently of the content of group identities and the way that the intergroup situation is understood. A social identity account, however, means that predictions regarding relations among sociostructural characteristics, group identification, stereotypes and group evaluations have to take the particular ideological situation into consideration. […] We further examined whether perceived stability, legitimacy, and permeability predict identity management responses of the two groups of participants.166

The degree to which the observed factors stability, legitimacy, permeability vary in relation to the respective ethnic groups depends both on the diverse conditions within the respective groups and on the relations between the various groups:

The meaning and consequences of stability, legitimacy, permeability can be expected to depend on the position of one’s own group within the social structure. For example, permeable group boundaries may imply possibilities for upward social mobility for disadvantaged groups, but may present threats to in-group identity for the dominant group. Similarly, for low-status groups, stable and legitimate status relations can mean a lack of opportunity for collective action, whereas for dominant groups it signifies security.167

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162 Cf. ibid., 983.
164 In this study, the term identity management is used in the following manner: “We found clear evidence of identity management among ethnic minority groups under conditions that should theoretically engender such motivations, and in an ideological context that can explain the reactions of the majority group. Hence, the study indicates important relationships between social structure and ideology, as has been proposed by social identity theorists.” Ibid., 123.
165 Ibid., 107.
166 Ibid.
167 Ibid., 108.
Belonging to a group with a low social status or to an ethnic minority thus conforms to specific socio-psychological conditions and thereby initiates equally specific identity management strategies; these are marked by the interaction with “individual mobility, social creativity and social competition” and depend in equal measure on the contents of identity and on the ideological context.\textsuperscript{168}

The description of interethnic relations stemming from this socio-psychological study\textsuperscript{169} indeed allows comparisons with the interactions between the Germans and the Hungarians as minorities and the respective majority populations in the different host states, when for example the dual identity among the German minority in Southeast Europe already tends toward a stronger identification with the majority population. Due to the long oppression, this surfaces even more clearly in the countries of the former Yugoslavia than, for example, among the Germans in Hungary or among the Germans in Romania. There is comparatively less permeability among these groups, and yet it is on the rise there as well. In their work on minority group members, Verkuyten and Reijerse likewise state that there is a dual identity: “Many ethnic minority group members have a dual identity. They consider themselves to be a member of their minority group as well as the national category.”\textsuperscript{170} Further, there are the interactions between minorities, as they usually appear everywhere in multicultural areas. Verkuyten and Reijerse speak of the simultaneity of social interactions: “In most real-life situations there is, typically, more than one ethnic minority group. This means that minority group members are simultaneously confronted with out-groups of equal and unequal status.”\textsuperscript{171} The situation is thus very competitive, even if minority rights, projected onto the research areas of Southeast Europe, successfully intervene as a regulating force. This, in any case, tells us how big of a challenge it is for identity management and ethnomangement in multicultural areas only to fathom their own group’s current social and cultural status, which constantly changes in relation to the others. This is meant to enable them to develop strategies which are supposed to lead to social and economic improvement, in the short run, and to provide a better minority-political framework, in the long run.

\textsuperscript{168} Ibid., 119-120.  
\textsuperscript{169} The results found in the Netherlands present the following picture: “When the interethnic relations were considered as relatively secure, perceived permeability was associated with lower Turkish identification and less strong in-group stereotyping on the status-irrelevant dimension. Hence, in a stable and legitimate intergroup structure in which, however, a person’s fate is not tied to his or her minority group membership, Turkish-Dutch participants distanced themselves from the Turkish in-group.” Ibid., 121.  
\textsuperscript{170} Ibid., 109.  
\textsuperscript{171} Ibid., 110.
Identity Management and Ethnomanagement

While the term identity management is somewhat more widespread, the term ethnomanagement has so far been used only very sparsely and in rather specific contexts in the German-language world—in the fields of cultural or social anthropology and history—for instance by Regina Römhild in her monograph on the Germans in Russia, indicatively titled Die Macht des Ethnischen. To my mind, the composite ethnomanagement ultimately serves as a positive extension of the scholarly scope of thinking and description in the exploration of ethnic groups up to the level of nations. Viewed from the angle of the history of science, Friedrich Heckmann as early as 1992 emphasized this potential of ethnicity: “The possibility to mobilize interests via ethnicity is also a seminal part of explanations for the for the great significance that is attributed to ethnicity in our ‘modern world.’” Heckmann’s statement indeed remains valid, as the “return of ethnicity in the transformation” in Eastern and South-eastern Europe brings with it in equal measure an increasing importance of identity management and ethnomanagement, not only in the political realm but also in everyday culture. These developments were already the topic of the 6th Congress of the SIEF in 1998, whose official theme was “Roots and Rituals: Managing Ethnicity.” At the time, the two roles of ethnicity were discussed: its role in the practices of everyday culture and its role in scientific thought. In this context, I would like to refer in particular to the active component of the then used term managing ethnicity, which I interpret in a similar manner in the ‘inverse’ composite ethnomanagement:

Invented, imagined, administered, and manufactured: these are among the key adjectives found in current scholarship on both ethnicity and nationalism. Managing Ethnicity summarizes the semantic spread invoked by such adjectives and reflects much of our daily reality […] The composite boundary-management, which was presented as “a new meta-challenge” in 2001, represents a more recent approach in this context. The goal here is to flexibly re-draw, by means of an adroit usage of boundary-management, the boundaries that globalization has increasingly been blurring.

The term ethnomanagement makes it possible above all to adapt the descriptive categories of the term in the sense of a signifiant (signifier) in contrast to the signifié (signified) to the respective needs and tasks arising from the exploration of “the management of ethnic groups.” Through the first part of the composite, ethno-, the units of meaning on which ethnomanagement is based shall explicit-

177 Ibid.
ly point to the terms 

\[\text{ethnos-\varepsilon\theta\nu\sigma, ethnicity as well as ethnic group,}\]

and shall thereby already establish a mental association with them; at the same time, this first part of the term is also inspired by composites of a similar kind, originating in the English-speaking world, such as \textit{ethnic-politics, ethno-politics or ethno-policies.} The second part of the composite points to the action to which the first part is subject or shall be subject: The semantic weight of the term management can be shifted anywhere between ‘to look after,’ on the one end, and ‘to lead, to guide,’ on the other end, on a fictive Redding scale. It simultaneously hints at its immediate relation to identity management. The main difference between ethnomanagement and identity management is that I use the term ethnomanagement to denote the agents and their management of a given ethnos, of an ethnic (or national) group that is already constituted, whereas identity management in much more general terms also denotes the constitution and regulation of individual and collective identity. Identity management is a broader term and may therefore be generally less disputed, while ethnomanagement always refers to processes of a management of ethnicity, or, as mentioned above, of managing ethnicity.

I consider the terms invoked here—identity management, ethnicity, ethnic group, ethnomanagement—key terms because they determine qualities; and since the terminological categories for the determination and description of ethnicity generally have to do with processes of inclusion and exclusion, it is possible to say the following in advance at this early point: identity management and ethnomanagement are logically both forms of a management of these processes of inclusion or exclusion.

Ethnic groups, including minorities and majorities, are not organic communities, which can be viewed as natural. They are made, i.e., socially produced, in specific historical constellations by elites and social movements. Ethnicity, i.e., the application of ethnic categories by social groupings, must not be seen as a given but rather as an integral part of processes of demarcation.180 Identity management exploits the constructedness of identity181 for its purposes, just like reversely ethnomanagement exploits the constructedness of ethnicity.182 The agents of both identity management and ethnomanagement attempt to exert the biggest possible influence on the most important ethnic markers183 such as ancestry, language, religion etc., or to determine the value of these markers. The inclusionary and exclusionary processes, the ascriptions and self-ascriptions resulting from this generate different ethnic groups whose borders run along the boundaries. The ethnomanagement of a specific ethnic group is obliged184 to guide its “own” ethnic group and to represent its interests in the complex network of multiethnic and multicultural societies.185 In practice, ethnomanagement is of course largely tied to the national, internationally valid legal models of/as laid down in the minority law and in the international law. At the same time, the model of (national) majority versus (national)

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minority still fortifies rather than eliminates asymmetries and boundaries between individual ethnic groups within the nation states.186 As a consequence of this imbalance, every single ethnic group develops its own specific identity management and ethnomanagement, determined by the political as well as the socio-economic and socio-cultural conditions and at once shaped by the personal hallmarks of the agents involved. These contexts produce a challenge that needs to be taken into consideration in the exploration of identity management and ethnomanagement: The parameters of inclusion and exclusion repeatedly referred to above, such as descent, ethnic as well as national identity, are, similarly to the ethnic markers, regarded, or at least presented, as something naturally grown. Therefore, the agents are not always poised to critically question their own actions. They are mostly considered sufficiently legitimized based on the “preservation of cultural identity,” mentioned above, and the effort towards the “preservation of traditions” linked to it. Moreover, the legitimacy of identity management and ethnomanagement is reinforced by their role and function as a form of minority representation employed by official political agencies or even by the constitutional law. They thus become key figures in the construction of collective identity.187 In the empirical part of this study, the societies and institutions, in which the agents do their work, are thus at the center of attention. In a more narrow sense, this includes those people who situate their work in the field of ethnopolitics because they realize that it is from there that they can exert the greatest influence on the identity constructions of the members of ‘their’ minority; in a wider sense, this includes also those people who do not (wish to) exert any direct ethnopolitical influence themselves but who do fulfill an implicit leading role through their work, for example in schools, in minority media or at commemorative events, or, or who represent a integrative platform for ‘their’ ethnic group. In theoretical terms, these institutions can be interpreted as a frame in the sense of Goffman’s frame analysis,188 which can offer a group membership to the “acting, reflexive subject.” The concept of minorities does provide the cultural and legal background for this; yet, a “shared internalized basis for understanding,” Goffman claimed, by no means secured the cultural understanding of the meaning of texts.189 What follows therefrom is this: The respective minority societies thus assume exactly this frame-function, inserted as an institutional level of communication between the subject and the Ethnie. These frames—the plural is intended here since a subject can well take part in several frames—make it easier for the “acting, reflexive subject” to identify with its own ethnic group, from a micro perspective, and with its own national group, from a mac-

186 Adopting minority rights is supposed to counteract this, but there are neither a coherent system nor sufficient instruments to implement these rights in Europe. Nevertheless, for every ethnic group—provided it is legally recognized as a minority in the host state at all—, these minority rights build the framework for the ethnomanagement as this framework largely pre-determines both the political and societal possibilities and the financial circumstances. For this reason, I have dedicated a separate section in the empirical part of this book to the aspect of minority rights regarding the Germans and Hungarians in the research areas in Southeast Europe.


As frames, in the sense of Goffman, the institutions of identity management and ethnomanagement come to serve as a kind of interface, helping single individuals to identify with their own *ethnic markers* as well as guiding the resulting (self-)orientation within the group and the demarcation from other ethnic groups. In practice, it is the societies and parties that emerge from a minority. The ethnopolitical delegates are considered to be the most influential representatives of identity management and ethnomanagement, no matter whether they are active on the regional, the national or the international level. Besides those societies that fulfill an ethnopolitical function to the outside, there is a varied array of cultural societies and groupings. Yet, political and cultural areas of responsibility sometimes blend in one society, especially in the case of roof organizations within which the officials have to cover several fields of activity of identity management and ethnomanagement at once.

As my observations during the field research have shown, many symbolic representations that can be viewed simultaneously as political and cultural expressions of an ethnic group certainly overlap. This is the case, for example, when representations of *Volkskunst* and folkloristic performances as well as the literature written in the minority language are not only considered to convey a sense of identity, but also become relevant in the discourse of everyday politics. The identity management and ethnomanagement, in the process, partly consciously defy the realities, as there are attempts to cling to traditions even if it has long been admitted that the younger generations do not or only partly continue them. Among the Germans in Hungary, for example, hardly any adolescents understand or speak a Danube-Swabian dialect.

Matters get complicated when the minority’s symbolic perceptions are an artistic expression and the artists themselves come from a minority but do not at all want to be perceived or even labeled solely in these terms. Ethnomanagers first emphasize these overlaps with the *Volksgruppe* when the artists refer consciously or unconsciously to their own group, and in the case of successful artists sometimes try very vehemently to win them as representatives of the group. In contrast, some artists who come from a minority in turn employ their ‘being different’ consciously in their careers, either in the context of sponsorship programs, or in the ways in which their art thematically engages with their environment.

Further, there are two more highly relevant realms in which the agents of the identity management and ethnomanagement can unfold their capacities: first, the minority school system or—as it is often called in Southeast Europe—*Nationalitätenschulwesen* (nationality school system), and second, the respective media landscape. What results from this are extensive personal and also financial inter-

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190 This model, too, reveals the triadic form of a minority’s interdependence, already mentioned in the introduction above.
191 “Societies and/or parties” in this context means that in some countries there are societies to which the minority rights also accord the political-legal status of a party. For more detail on this, see the section *Minority Protection in the Host States*.
192 Adopting this role so to speak voids the “incongruity between ethnic, cultural and political formations” described by Jan Assmann, as they thus come together in one person. Cf. Jan Assmann. *Das kulturelle Gedächtnis: Schrift, Erinnerung und politische Identität in frühen Hochkulturen*. München: Beck, 2007. 144.
193 A particularly memorable example occurred after the Nobel Prize award ceremony for Herta Müller, the German-language author from the Banat. Cf. the part *The Germans’ Societies (Examples from the Regions)*.
sections and thus dependencies between the politically influential agents and societies and the schools or media operated by them.194 Given the shift toward electronic online media that the media landscape currently goes through, agents of identity management and ethnomanagement frequently speak of a loss of identity, claiming that group-specific print media were better suited to function as an identity-fostering factor for a Volksgruppe: Everyone sees the newspaper at the news stand and understands the message to be derived from it: We are still alive!

In the following, I would like to present some thoughts on problematic issues that can become relevant either to identity management and ethnomanagement as such or through their investigation: Identity management and ethnomanagement try in different ways to present their own group as homogeneous, which subsequently leads to the ascription of categories. By necessity, this means that group formation hardly results from dynamic processes of the single group members’ identification any longer but that it mostly results from the management of a collective identity and ethnicity. The identity management and ethnomanagement corroborate their own power structures by blocking these dynamic processes, since they are concerned about having to accept a loss of power within a group structure that is changing constantly and at an increasing pace.195 It is also the ethnomanagement, rather than the members of the ethnic groups, that primarily evaluates ethnic markers. The term management consequentially implies an exercise of power that is directed top-down.

In the research on identity management and ethnomanagement, there may well be distinctions that can be accounted for based on the difference between an emic or an etic approach. One can observe with scholars, too, a lack of distance and therefore a corresponding lack of objectivity in the context of “their own” ethnic group. Another pitfall is, in the opposite scenario, the a priori ascription of traits to the respective ‘other,’ which ranges from the integration of common prejudices and stereotypes to a deliberate othering. This issue leads to the negotiations of the very problematic ethnic marker race, since diverse areas of minority research continue to be affected by them due to their treatment of ethnicity. I will in principle not pursue the question of how the concept of ethnicity relates to the concept of race in all its facets here, as there are already very many, at times confusing categorizations regarding this topic.196 Instead, I will merely refer to the general problems occurring when using the term race:

The term race, disavowed by biology and anthropology as a scientific concept, is nonetheless widely used in the United States to this day. On the one hand, social scientists insist that it is impossible to differentiate race and ethnicity and often request that the term race be abandoned altogether; and yet, others adopt with equal vehemence exactly the opposite opinion and claim

194 This applies above all to those schools or media that are directly subject to the minority administration, as, for example, some German-language Gymnasien (grammar schools) in Hungary or the German-language Allgemeine Deutsche Zeitung für Rumänien in Romania.
195 The goal is, among others, to prevent as far as possible any forms of cultural hybridization or to slow down corresponding processes because they are still regarded as a counter-model to an ethnically homogenous community. See also the part The Term, the Concept of Hybridity.
that race and ethnicity cannot be reduced to the degree that they become interchangeable and that, therefore, race is an indispensible sociological category.\(^{197}\)

It sometimes happens when engaging in field research that one is confronted with the term race in conversations or interviews, when it is used either to distinctly reproduce ethnic boundaries or to consciously present the respective ‘other’ as subordinate and inferior. In the context of my research, this occurred rarely and only with regard to the Roma population in Southeast Europe.\(^{198}\) There are no explicit case studies on this in the empirical part. However, I did ask in interviews, among other things, about the relationship of the interviewees’ own ethnic group, the Germans or the Hungarians, to the group of the Roma, or simply about the interviewees’ personal relationship to the Roma, if they lived in immediate vicinity to Roma families.

In principle, I approached identity management and ethnomangement on the same methodological basis that has developed and proven viable in the empirical fields of contemporary history, Southeast European history as well as historical anthropology and cultural anthropology. One of its cornerstones is the demand for intersubjectivity, in two respects:\(^{199}\) first, scholars have to direct their attention to the intersubjectivity in communicative action;\(^{200}\) and second, there is the criterion of intersubjective verifiability of findings and the theories based thereon.\(^{201}\) This approach makes it easier to meaningfully embed the interactive method of qualitative field research.\(^{202}\) In order to bring about an intersubjective understanding, it is not enough, according to W. L. Schneider, to master and apply the (shared) rules for language usage; “instead, intersubjective understanding ‘has to be updated and renewed from utterance to utterance by synchronizing the interpretation of the rules as materialized in the respective behavior.’”\(^{203}\) In the case of individual interviews, which fall in the category of ‘face-to-face interaction,’ the mutual understanding is one of the most fundamental bases, as well:

Each participant has to assume that the meaning he/she understood is the meaning of the utterance he/she understood (and not, for example, his/her own notion) if the two are connected. This, however, will only be possible if he/she can as a rule understand the other’s reactions to his/her own contributions as fitting follow-up statements.\(^{204}\)


\(^{198}\) I use the term “Roma” here, bearing in mind the diverse groups of cigan or cigány—as they mostly call themselves—; such as, for instance, Bejasch, Kalderasch, Roma or Sinti.


\(^{203}\) Schneider, Grundlagen zur soziologischen Theorie, 360.

\(^{204}\) Ibid., 432-433.
In linguistics, this constant search for common understanding and the act of common understanding are referred to as a performative act.\(^\text{205}\) I would like to underline here how important a mutual understanding is for the progress of research, especially since the individual approach to issues such as identity and ethnicity differ from interviewee to interviewee, and even the collective does not always serve as a safe haven.

Another relevant category is that of subtext or subtexts, which are conveyed at the same time. I refer to the abstract triad text – context – subtext at this point since it structures both philological and cultural texts to the same degree:

How shall we conceive of the reading of actions, institutions and cultures in practical terms? Culture and social actions do not immediately lend themselves to reading, even if they are referred to metaphorically as texts. In contrast, an ethnologist is at most marginally involved as an agent in the society he/she explores and has no direct access to the “raw social discourse […] of the respective society.” He or she is—seeing as observation, as an old ethnographic recipe, procures only superficial information—dependent on and limited to the small part of the social discourse that the informant makes accessible for him or her.\(^\text{206}\)

Eberhard Berg and Martin Fuchs speak of a surplus meaning in the framework of social actions,\(^\text{207}\) whose nature by all means corresponds to that of the subtexts:

Put in modern terms, actions have a surplus meaning; they refer beyond themselves to farther-reaching contexts of meaning: Social actions are in his [C. Geertz’s] view always also comments, they comment on “more than just themselves.”\(^\text{208}\)

But this projection of textual hermeneutics onto the field of social actions, according to Berg and Fuchs, also brings with it a limitation of both the concept of action discussed above and one’s own practical scientific work, especially with regard to empirical work.\(^\text{209}\) I therefore consider it certainly advantageous, especially in minority research, to take into account several versions of cultural texts from within the respective ethnic group and to compare them; it is for example helpful to compare symbols or visual representations of the group with the observable social interactions. While a thorough familiarization and the necessary language skills are a prerequisite, the considerations connected to this help the researchers during the interviews to better filter what has above been referred to as surplus meaning from the communicated subtexts, to better understand and contextualize it. Based on my experiences in minority research, the understanding and the knowledge of the subtext are accompanied by another personal consideration: Even if the researcher assumes a differentiated perspective vis-à-vis the context of the statements, there could well be a consensus at the subtextual level since, 


\(^{208}\) Martin Fuchs and Eberhard Berg, “Phänomenologie der Differenz,” 47.

\(^{209}\) Cf. ibid., 59.
especially when dealing with minorities, there are always congruities with the political or social demands of a specific weaker group. The question remains whether such a consensus on the subtextual level is enough to partly retract the requested difference in the dialogic relationship between researcher and interviewee (group)?

When adjusting and newly contextualizing a term, it is also necessary to delineate it from terms that operate with a similar semantic content: The designation *ethnic entrepreneurship*/*ethnic entrepreneurs* is used, on the one hand, in a transdisciplinary context, and in a historical and socio-anthropological context, on the other. Being an entrepreneur of an ethnic group has above all to do with rendering bureaucratic and organizational norms compatible with the individual conditions and conceptions:

The implication is that organizational survival and flourishing in the dislocated environments of the present requires the cultivation of an appropriate entrepreneurial competence and style through which at one and the same time organizations conduct their business and persons conduct themselves within those organizations.

*Ethnic entrepreneurship* can indeed be connected to the term *ethno-marketing* due to its embedment in economic and economic-political contexts. In contrast to this, the term *ethnomangement* in its basic conception shall be regarded as neutral. The situation is a different one in the case of the term *ethnic engineering*, which implies from the start that it is a form of political influence based on principles of ethnicity and meant to remain in any case unchallenged. Its scope ranges from ethno-national movements, which were often designed at the drawing board or through manipulative *ethnic engineering*, to self-proclaimed *ethnic engineers*, who (want to) lead an ethnic group even if they aren’t

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210 This question cannot be easily answered in advance. Based on research practice, I can state that this has never consciously happened to me, but that it has dissolved in individual cases on a subconscious level. This question surely concerns those researchers even more who examine their ‘own’ group.


215 The trendy and recently widespread term *ethno* in the context of fashion also needs to be mentioned here: clothing, accessories, shoes and leather goods are often labeled with the prefix ‘ethno-’ in order to establish an association with indigenous clothing or traditional costumes. One can presently start from the assumption that there are no plausible connections between the term *ethnomangement* and and *ethno* fashion. The global fashion industry simply exploits the shapes, colors and patterns of diverse ethnic groups for its purposes and connects them only symbolically to their lifeworld. See e.g. http://www.vogue.de/articles/mode/mode-trends/sommer-2009/2009/07/15/16635 (23 August 2010) or http://www.stylefruits.de/mag/ethno-style (23 August 2010).


217 Such an *ethnic engineering* sometimes also does not shy away from an *ethnic cleansing*. This designation can be applied, for example, to the population exchange between Greece and Turkey, approved by minority law, in 1923 as well as to the expulsions during the Bosnian War in the 1990s. Cf. e.g. Roger Cohen. “Ethnic Cleansing.” http://www.crimesofwar.org/thebook/ethnic-cleansing.html (20 August 2010).
members of that group themselves. An example of the latter scenario is the relation between the ‘Styrian Slovenes’ and the society Artikel-VII-Kulturverein, in whose society management there are no members of the minority. The autochthonous Slovenian-speaking people in Styria, for whom the scientific term “hidden minority” was created, therefore do not feel represented by this society and its activities. The research conducted on this underlines that the political, social and cultural actions of an institutionalized identity management and ethnomanagement should be in accordance with the interests of the members of the minority. What the members expect from the identity managers’ and ethnomanagers’ efforts is that they tend to the specific concerns of the minority; the related activities should at best benefit the members of the ethnic group and not (bottom up) and not primarily the agents of the identity management and ethnomanagement.


219 See the part Identity Management and Ethnomanagement: From the Inside – From the Outside.
1.2 Conceptual Reflections on Identity Management and Ethnomanagement

Bridge-Building with Historical Anthropology and Ethnohistorie/Ethnohistory

When looking at the interplay of anthropology and history, or rather their interpenetration, I do not aim at a reappraisal from the perspective of the history of science at this point. Rather, I will present the approach taken by historical anthropology, on the one hand, and by Ethnohistorie, on the other, since they complement each other smoothly to form a conceptual framework for the exploration of identity management and ethnomanagement. When the term ethnicity emerged, the anthropologist Manning Nash, for example, as early as 1989 examined the link between ethnicity and history. A short time later, a heated debate about historical anthropology ensued, and in the process some characteristics crystallized that, in their interdisciplinary interchange, enrich both anthropology and history. The examples that follow shall call back to mind the debate whose nucleus has been identified by the historian Peter Burke:

1) In the first place, it encourages or even forces us to rethink some central issues in historical writing such as the relation between events and structures […] 2) In the second place, it helps in the undoing of a certain style of western history, once dominant, which centered on the west, and within the west on elites, and within the elites on great men. […] 3) In the third place, it helps us to overcome the problems of cultural distance, of understanding cultural distance, of understanding cultural difference or ‘otherness’, whether it is spatial or temporal. […] 4) Finally, historical anthropology is of value to us because it defamiliarizes our own history. Anthropologists have not only made the remote more familiar, they have encouraged us to see the familiar as strange, as problematic. […]

These brief, concise and summarizing sequences already reveal the associations with identity management and ethnomanagement, as all are aimed at exploring the proportionality of events and structures. Furthermore, the essence of a constructed history of origin is deconstructed, as are its, partly self-proclaimed, elites, who often present this history and their own social position as something naturally grown. The otherness, referenced in section 3), which could also be understood as a construction of the other, is an integral part of the exploration of identity management and ethnomanagement, as well; and so is the dichotomy between the familiar and the alien, mentioned by Burke in section 4), if the view of one’s own is too distorted or if the fear of the other is too dominant.

From the perspective of historical anthropology, the following basic constant must not be left out of sight, namely the seemingly simple, yet central question: “What is the specific use of history in any given study, how do we use temporalities to frame or problematize certain themes or ques-

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tions?”

The concept of identity management and ethnomanagement already suggests an instrumentalization of history, which picks up “one’s own origins and descent” in a more narrow sense and “the group’s own history” in a wider sense. These are subsequently interpreted as an important ethnic marker, understood as an instrument and employed correspondingly. History as historiography thus coincides with the application of this historiography, which is used to establish boundaries. When relating the second part of the question formulated above to this, then the part that asks “how do we use temporali- ties” becomes relevant insofar as it is the researcher’s task to survey this multifunctionality of history and the historical narrative. In order to avoid the danger of becoming tangled up in an utter jumble of historical narratives, Christian Giordano, for example, narrows down the approach to history for anthropologists as follows: “The anthropologist takes the past into consideration only insofar as it is significant for understanding the management of the present projections into the future.”

In his further considerations, he introduces, among others, the term actualized history. This concept describes the role of history in a similar manner in which I have described it for identity management and ethnomanagement, especially since it is noted how artificial the object of historical-anthropological research is. This enhances the character of an “internalized history in use.” Although, in my opinion, the principal accomplishment of history in the case of ethnic or national groups consists in the strengthening of the respective community by creating or simply suggesting a “common history.”

The Hungarian historian András Gerő, for example, chose the title Imagined History for his examination of 19th- and 20th-century Hungarian history since his basic assumption is that what he calls the “history of symbolic politics,” which relates to the history of national identity and culture, differs from history in a traditional sense. The notions of history materialize above all in the various manifestations of the cultures of memory. In general, they are dependent on the form and subsequently on the intensity of a so-called ‘historical awareness’ as it could be established in the single individu-


225 “Actualized history,” considered as an object of historical anthropological investigation, is a ‘conceived,’ ‘imagined’ or even ‘intended’ product.

‘Actualized history’ is ‘internalized history’ in use. It is characterized by its own array of symbols, myths, constructions, and inventions. It may serve as an instrument of dominion, a strategy for resistance, an object of identification, an element of social cohesion, or a detonator in collective conflicts.

‘Actualized history’ is, therefore, an essential component in the basic social processes in which the members of a collectivity are involved.

Ibid., 106.


227 “In summary, the awareness of historicity denotes that aspect of historical awareness that contains information on what can change in the historical process and what remains static, on who or what causes these chances (is there a subject of history, and if so, who). Awareness of historicity further expresses the knowledge of the difference between nature and history.”


http://www.sowi-online.de/reader/historisch-politisch/pandel_dimensionen.htm#kap2.3 (01 December 2010).
al or within a group. This process, in a small framework, undergoes a development that is similar to the emergence of a national consciousness.\textsuperscript{228}

To return to the relation of anthropology and history: Gert Dressel as early as 1996 noted a tendency of development, which could basically be confirmed:

First, the new anthropologies are increasingly sensitized to the perspectivity of any science as well as to the historicity of the object of inquiry; second, the anthropologies nowadays are increasingly anthropologies of human possibilities. History or historical scholarship thus takes on a new role in anthropological research (or, historical scholarship itself can turn into anthropological research).\textsuperscript{229}

Such a historical-anthropological approach to identity management and ethnomanagement includes various options to look at and analyze the conflict situation of political, social, economic, religious, linguistic and other layers. As other anthropologies, it offers not least a reflexive form of analysis and comprises the observation of one’s own actions, including the researchers’ thought patterns that change in the course of research or their subjective perceptions.\textsuperscript{230}

As early as 2003, the authors Hannes Grandits and Karl Kaser have pointed to the ‘problems and limits’ of a historical-anthropological research approach in Southeast Europe. The focal points, according to them, are situated in the science organization, in further institutional barriers, but also in different orientations as regards content.\textsuperscript{231} Even today, as a few countries in Southeast Europe have already become members of the European Union, one can still presuppose a center-periphery-model in Europe in which the countries of Southeast Europe remain marginalized. The reason for this is that Western Europe’s, and more recently the European Union’s identification with Europe mostly has to do with the development of a capitalist economy in this part of Europe and with the accumulation of capital and wealth for hundreds of years.\textsuperscript{232}

Grandits and Kaser have therefore devised a theoretical framework for the historical-anthropological research in Southeast Europe devised, which rests upon the following cornerstones:

1.) A hermeneutic of difference for cultural comparisons within Southeast Europe as well as for cultural comparisons in European and non-European contexts; 2.) The surmounting of the Western dichotomous notions by making visible connections and so-called regional transition zones; 3.) An understanding of the backgrounds of the economic marginalization mentioned above; 4.) The concept of the “synchronicity of asynchronicity,” the juxtaposition of regional or microcosmic states of development as well as paces of development; 5.) The discontinuity of social elites as, for Southeast Europe in particular, an archaizing image is drawn that derives from various sources.\textsuperscript{233} Especially when dealing with the identity management and ethnomanagement of ethnic and national groups in Southeast Eu-

\textsuperscript{228} See e.g. the chapter “The Origins of National Consciousness” in Anderson, \textit{Imagined Communities}, 37-46.
\textsuperscript{230} Cf. ibid., 280.
\textsuperscript{232} Cf. ibid., 16.
\textsuperscript{233} Ibid., 35.
rope, these cornerstones indeed have not lost their relevance. The five cornerstones of the theoretical framework that Grandits and Kaser establish offer valuable stimuli for the reception of the relevant texts from these regions (perceptive communication) and further for one’s own approach to the regions in field research (interactive communication).

The two Vienna-based scholars Karl R. Wernhart and Werner Zips, in turn, who have played and still play a decisive role in further developing the concept of Ethnohistorie, have placed it more distinctly in the context of ethnological and cultural anthropological research traditions.234 The disparity between and the juxtaposition of historical narratives are a primary topic in ethnohistory.

As historical scholarship within the framework of ethnology, it is necessary for ethnohistory in particular to point out the divergence of “histories.” Their historical experiences, superimposed by power relations, are interconnected.235 This is in nuce based on the same development that the American research in ethnohistory236 underwent in the last decades of the twentieth century. It was focused well into the 1960s on the analysis and interpretation of historical archival documents, which it examined, in combination with archeological data, for ethnological insights. Only then were there initiatives to combine those activities with field research.237 The Vienna tradition of Ethnohistorie, following the notion of ethnohistory, is described in summary as follows:

Ethnohistorie in Vienna as a subfield of cultural history is interested in the recent history of societies. It is mainly written sources, pictorial sources, realia, oral traditions and communicative methods of research that provide an interpretational access for their reconstruction.238

Since the 1970s, due to the influences of the social sciences on a conceptual level, the concept of ethnos has been extended so as to include the first concepts of ethnicity; this expedited the “methodologi-

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234 “For the ethnological historical field of research, principally the same holds true as for the superordinate disciplines of ethnology and cultural anthropology: All dogmatic efforts to formulate exact definitions and demarcations appear dissatisfactory in view of the methodological pluralism as well as the variety of divergent theoretical approaches.” Wernhart and Zips, Ethnohistorie, 13.

235 Ibid., 29.

236 The foundations of ethnohistory were laid in the USA, where Clark Wissler proposed the term in 1909; in the German-speaking world, the term Ethnohistorie is used, in France the term École des Annales is used in this context, while Ethnohistorie took on a similar orientation as the American Folk-History. Since 1954, the eponymous journal Ethnohistorie: The Official Journal of the American Society of Ethnohistory (Duke University Press, E-ISSN: 1527-5477, Print ISSN: 0014-1801) has provided an excellent overview of the development of the discipline and the research topics on ethnohistory in the USA. “ABOUT THE JOURNAL: Ethnohistory emphasizes the joint use of documentary materials and ethnographic or archaeological data, as well as the combination of historical and anthropological approaches, in the study of social and cultural processes and history. The journal has established a strong reputation for its studies of the history of native peoples in the Americas and in recent years has expanded its focus to cultures and societies throughout the world.” See: http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/ethnohistory/ (05 June 2009).


238 Against the backdrop of this interplay, the historical sciences introduced the term micro-history in the 1970s and 1980s as a designation for the exploration of small regional areas or groups. This brought with it the distinction between micro historians, who mostly explore the history of daily life, and macro historians, who rather focus on structural history.

239 Ibid.

The Wiener ethnohistorischen Blätter (ISSN 0256-6850), which have been published since 1979 and which now appear at the Department of Ethnology, Social and Cultural Anthropology at the University of Vienna, provide a particularly good overview of the Vienna-school research approaches. See also: http://aleph.univie.ac.at/E/36F2E78KDBPPMDHVYUMTVDPX8NSTG4K4L3167Y8EV13TXFMJD60866?func=direct&local_base=A113&doc_number=000171474 (05 June 2009).
cal shift toward communicative research (‘field research’)." The researchers’ decision of whether to
direct their attention rather toward a relatively limited field in the sense of a mictostudy or whether to
aim for an embedment in wider historical processes (on the macro level) should depend on the respective
topic.

The concept of identity management and ethnomangement surely parallels that of Ethnohis-
torie with regard to the “dynamic conception of history,” which is used to describe political and
economic structures. Another parallel between the concepts is that they exceed “communicative ac-
tions via a process of understanding” because “processes of social integration and sociation” become accessible. In one case, the term ‘management’—as mentioned several times above—a priori suggests purposeful communicative actions, which can also be considered and analyzed in their historical relations and contexts: i) how did the individual’s embedment in the Volksgruppe take place through the factor of the individual’s and the group’s historicity; ii) the inward strengthening of the group identity—bearing in mind the history of the respective group’s own ethnic markers (shared history of origins, language history, religious history, history of customs/Brauchtumsgeschichte, etc.) in contrast to the history of the respective others; iii) what do the organized preservation as well as the ethnicization or nationalization of all powerful instruments of the mediation level and the “storage of memory” of history, historiography or ethnography consist of? Generally, the following observation in the context of identity management and ethnomangement and of the history of a Volksgruppe runs through my concept like a red thread: The representation of ethnicity is regarded as something independent, especially so in its historical contexts, in order for the collective identity to be strengthened on the inside and separated off to the outside. Ethnomangers either adeptly avoid picking up, or even worse, revealing the history of cultural adaption or even acculturation, assimilation or hybridization, or, if this has become inevitable, they simply reinterpret it.

The concept of Ethnohistorie is further based on the premise that “people” should not be “[…]
the ‘property’ of the structures”; instead, “[…] the active molding and reproduction of social condi-
tions through the subjects’ practical activity in the action context of ethnic or political communities move to the center of attention.” This may indeed be valid especially with respect to the agents of identity management and ethnomagement since the purposeful communicative action described above solidifies in the ‘ethnic or political communities’ mentioned in the quote. In the case of the minority representations, we can even link these attributes with an and, in the sense of ‘ethnic and political communities’ since this also corresponds to the practical implementations.

Within the concept of Ethnohistorie, the term “field research,” given the charge of one-
sidedness leveled against it, is replaced with terms like “dialogic, interactive or communicative re-

239 Wernhart and Zips, Ethnohistorie, 18.
240 Cf. ibid., 19.
241 Cf. ibid., 23.
242 Wernhart and Zips, Ethnohistorie, 24.
search” in order to do justice to the (then) postmodern paradigm shift in ethnography. These rigorous terminological demands in my view do not need to be observed apodictically when it comes to the exploration of identity management and ethnomanagement. What is effectively explored, in any case, is a field of social interactions that is defined beforehand and that duly includes the participating agents. This, however, shall not obscure the need to maintain in the respective interview situation a “(self-)reflexive attitude, open-mindedness in the encounter and respect for the other.”

Another differentiation from communicative research within the framework of the concept of Ethnohistorie results from my following insight: When exploring identity management and ethnomanagement, the influence on the communicative actions, on the texts and their structures but also on the symbols or symbolic actions should be kept to a minimum. This helps prevent that, at some point, the researchers themselves unconsciously turn into ethnomanagers—except this happens deliberately and purposefully as well in the sense of “science as an instrument of identity management and ethnomanagement.”

Identity Management and Ethnomanagement in the Context of Globalization and the Transformation

By globalization, I understand simply the fact that in today’s world goods, ideas, people, media images, technologies and funds circulate worldwide. As they are not distributed evenly, globalization consists of asynchronous and irregular flows of influence […].

The scholarly examination of globalization simultaneously reinforced the preoccupation with processes of deterritorialization and transnationalization, which are now also a more prominent theme in minority research. In this section, the by now very broad debate surrounding globalization shall be restricted to the following central aspects: When considering the effects of globalization on ethnic and national groups in their socio-cultural and political actions, the focus lies on a possible shift in the assessment of individual ethnic markers, which was triggered specifically by parameters of globalization.

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243 Ibid., 27.
245 According to Wernhart and Zips, however, this should happen without adopting the concept of “post-Ethnohistorie.” Cf. Wernhart and Zips, Ethnohistorie, 27.
246 This happens in a setting in which, especially in the practice of field research, the researching subject is aware of the inevitable interdependences with political, social, economic, religious and other circumstances.
247 This topic—the question of to what extent science has consciously or unconsciously devoted itself to identity management and ethnomanagement—would have exceeded the scope of this study.
I would like to follow a priori the analysis of renowned experts such as Appadurai, Beck, Hannerz or Robertson, who claim that the diverse cultures are not (sic!) fused into a uniform global culture despite the ever-expanding interdependence. The main reason for this is that localization as one of the most central cultural responses to globalization and the ensuing growing interdependence has increased. In 1993 Roland Robertson coined the term glocalization to describe the conjunction of these two poles. Arjun Appadurai warns against simply dismissing globalization as “a world of things in motion,” since, based on his theory of flows, he also detects therein, among other things, “relations of disjuncture.” In this context, he points out that, opposing a globalization from above, a glocalization from below is taking shape, which he calls grassroots globalization:

While global capital and the system of nation-states negotiate the terms of the emergent world order, a worldwide order of institutions has emerged that bears witness to what we may call “grassroots globalization,” or “globalization from below.”

While this is not identical with the localization mentioned above, some basic parameters still overlap in the two approaches. In cultural anthropology, for example, the phenomenon of glocalization has been studied so intensely in order to “secure a rightful place for the local.” Zygmunt Bauman uses a metaphor to underline the terminological blend of the word glocalization, when he speaks of the two sides of the same coin. The social anthropologist Jonathan Friedman criticizes the marked turn towards the local and towards what is seemingly one’s own, which counters globalization, by pointing out that it results in ethnification, which seems to be inseparably linked to localization:

The process of fragmentation is equivalent to a localisation of identification. The regional is a primary expression of the breakdown of the homogeneous nation-state as a geographic region. […] Indigenisation combines a strong sense of region with a sense of ethnic primordiality. […] The ethnification surrounding the nation runs parallel to the ethnification of the nation-state itself.

Especially with regard to the political developments in Southeast Europe in the last decades, Friedman’s critical viewpoint cannot be dismissed easily, although well-known ethnologists also derive

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253 See Appadurai, Modernity at Large.
254 Appadurai, “Grassroots Globalization and the Research Imagination.” 5. “Examples of such disjunctures are phenomena such as the following: Media flows across national boundaries that produce images of wellbeing that cannot be satisfied by national standards of living and consumer capabilities […]” Ibid., 6.
255 Ibid., 16.
positive aspects from the stronger turn towards the regional. Helge Gerndt, for example, describes glocalization as follows:

The process of globalization […] however only stresses one aspect of the overall events. There are corresponding phenomena that are equally powerful and run counter to it. The internationalization of the living conditions, inversely, has entailed a revaluation of the local and regional environment. The region as the home, as the focal point of familial and social relations strengthens feelings of belonging and provides security of orientation.259

Hermann Bausinger, too, tries to emphasize the positive aspects of globalization and formulates at the same time a vision of the best possible compatibility of ‘local and global structures’:

Local structures do not have to be surrendered to the global in an act of unconditional capitulation; yet, on the other hand, they may not and cannot simply shut themselves off from the new conditions. What should be aimed for is a lifeworld that integrates the old and the new, native traditions and foreign additions, a milieu in which the more vital forms of the local are combined with those forms of the global that are pruned so as to remain humane.260

This reevaluation of the regional—seen in summary—would in many cases not actually have happened without globalization, or, to quote Reinhard Johler on this: “It was only the markets that opened up the possibility for regional cultures to appear on the world stage at all for the first time.”261

For this practical identity management and ethnomanagement of Volksgruppen, this first and foremost corresponds to an increase in attention thanks to a globalized media network. These phenomena of glocalization have contributed to a considerable revaluation of regional cultures and minority cultures, which in many cases were, alongside nature and landscape, declared ‘worthy of protection’ and have since also been given prospects for supporting funds. Identity management and ethnomanagement, which are dedicated with this in mind to the so-called cultural preservation/Kulturerhalt, assume the function of cushioning the forces of globalization, keeping them from altering the characteristics of certain regions, which are of course inseparable from the cultural achievements of their inhabitants. Such an environment is particularly convenient for identity management and ethnomanagement, when the task is to highlight a group’s cultural characteristics as worthy of protection and preservation. At the same, it needs to be criticized at this point—and indeed, in accordance with the criticism voiced by Jonathan Friedman—that efforts and funds are almost exclusively directed at ‘preservative volkskulturell projects,’ such as the establishment of regional museums or the local customs/Volksbrauchtum as predefined by ethnomanagement. Hardly any room is left for innovative spatial-planning, social or artistic initiatives, which could counteract, for instance, the migration away from the villages. The controlling factor is, as in many cases, simply the usage of subsidies, and it is the ethnomanagemnet that determines which kind of ‘Volkskultur’ is accepted and consequentially also subsidized.

At the same time, the globalization by now influences sociocultural actions also across wide expanses. Starting from those factors that fuel the globalization, such as the forms of accelerated communication or the interwoven economies, these are first set into a mainly national context. In a study conducted by the authors Donatella della Porta and Hanspeter Kriesi such social movements fall into three categories:

[...] we suggest that globalization also has other consequences for collective action: first of all, it produces cross-national similarities in protest mobilization via diffusion; second, it increases the relevance of the international opportunities and constraints for national social movements; third, sub-national and national social movements become players in a multi-level game.

What, then, does the connection to ethnicity consist in? To address this question, the hypothesis shall be put forth that the three different categories of influences on social movements, listed in the quotation, can also be applied to the parameters of the interethnic coexistence of different ethnic groups—which, in turn, is a consequence of globalization. Such ‘movements’ again relate in particular to the markers descent (common/separating elements), language (mother tongue/multilingualism), religion (interreligious structures/faith as an additional or even the sole ethnic marker) or one’s own versus foreign customs: In principle, these pairs of opposites should not be taken as absolutes but rather as the ends of a Redding scale, on which the respective status-quo-star shifts to the one end or to the other, as shown in the following exemplary diagram:

While globalization with its influences advanced into all corners worldwide and still advances, the people in Southeast Europe experience the social changes after the collapse of the Communist regimes in a specific climate. This climate makes them oscillate between these two ends and makes the common elements in a multiethnic region come to the fore at one time, the separating elements between the ethnic and national groups at another. At the same time, the opportunities that went hand in hand with the changing socio-economic conditions often remained abstract and could not be seized by the majority of people. In the context of identity management and ethnomanagement the increasing

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262 The ways in which the phenomena of globalization impact the various European social structures or the ways in which globalization could be viewed from a pan-European perspective are described, for example, in the collection *Global Europe, Social Europe* edited by Anthony Giddens, Patrick Diamond and Roger Liddle. See Anthony Giddens et al, eds. *Global Europe, Social Europe.* Cambridge: Polity, 2006.

movement toward nationalization and a growing pressure on minorities to assimilate make themselves felt.

Especially with regard to the era of the *transformation*, the Potsdam-based social and cultural geographer Wilfried Heller speaks of a “return of ethnicity.”264 The awareness of what is one’s own increased because one’s own ethnic group or one’s own nation seemed to offer most stability after the cessation of socialism. Promises of economic uplift through the adoption of a capitalist system, and the concomitant democratic attempts to start over and to pave the way for freedom of expression, by no means managed to counterpoise this. Even the EU membership, whether in prospect or already granted, did not bring much change; in Hungary, for example, laws were already enacted that are ultra-conservative and partly anti-democratic, or, in the “new” states of the Western Balkans, a lot is “sacrificed” for nation-building. One can observe in the case of the minorities in Southeast Europe that this new orientation during the transformation was hardly geared to the given possibilities, which would have offered a pluralistic construction of identity within a multiethnic society. Instead, as did the majority populations elsewhere in Europe, people sought the integration into structures that are determined and dominated by ethnic markers. By necessity, what results from this are socio-economic realities that are distinctly shaped by ethnicity and that are aligned with the *ethnic boundaries*. The change (Wende) of 1989/90 necessitated that the individual ethnic groups in Southeast Europe in general, or in the case of the dissolution of Yugoslavia the affected groups in particular, re-oriented themselves:

I contend only that aspects of the state-making process tend to make identities more rather than less imperative, as identity categories become mandatory elements of people’s existence within the state. […] Thus, Barthian ideas about ascription/self-ascription and situational manipulation would come together with current theories about the constitution of modern subjectivities and with an anthropology of the ‘person’, as well as with an inquiry into how the forms we call ‘states’ have been variously made.265

Viewed from the perspective of minorities, identity management and ethnomangement and their agents play a significant role as they have the legitimization to negotiate with the majority population and other minorities where the *boundaries* are drawn and, in the process, to represent their ‘own’ group’s standpoints in the best possible way.

By now, more than two decades have passed since the era of the so-called *transition*266 in East and Southeast Europe, and after the reorientation in the political, economic and social realms an essen-

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266 The term *transition* in this text is used exclusively to refer to the immediately following period during which the systems were remodeled, at the very beginning of the so-called transformation period. Some others often use the terms *transition* and *transformation* synonymously.

tial question arises: when will this transformation be completed? Or can there be only a partly completion, at best, while other sectors are yet far from transformed—or not transformable at all? In order to address this dilemma at least conceptually, research emerging from the SFB – collaborative research center 580, established at the Friedrich Schiller University at Jena and focused on this subject, at present speaks of the era of posttransformation. At a panel discussion that took place at Schloss Dornberg near Jena on 04 December 2009 the contemporary historian Lutz Niethammer stated, among other things, that this very posttransformation would direct the research on the transformation into a new phase.

These considerations are also significant for my research on identity management and ethnomanagement since all research areas are located in states that prior to 1989 were organized in socialist governmental and economic systems and that after the political upheavals were exposed to the processes of transformation in different ways, respectively. And they are certainly not completed yet, although a lot has since changed in all areas of society, politics and economy—especially in view of Slovenia’s, Hungary’s, Romania’s and Croatia’s entry into the EU. In connection with identity management and ethnomanagement, it is important to observe in individual cases to what extent they were and are able at all to actively help fashion the processes of the transformation, or whether they are seized by the wave of transformation and passively washed along without the option of profoundly influencing the processes. In abstract terms and in the sense of Bourdieu, one speaks of structuring as well as structured structures in the context of habitus. In analogy to this, one can observe to what extent the identity management and the ethnomanagement were able to impact processes of the transformation in a structuring manner, and, in the same way, to what extent they were and are themselves affected by the structural changes.

During the era of the transformation, the tradition(s) were re-evaluated. For historical scholarship, ‘tradition’ represents a term that manifests the relation to the past in the present. Upon the opening of the conference “Erfahrung kultureller Räume im Wandel. Transformationsprozesse in ostdeutschen und osteuropäischen Regionen,” Christel Köhle-Hezinger also spoke of the “dialectical character of the concept of tradition” in the sense of conservation, on the one hand, and transformation, on the other. In identity management and ethnomanagement, the term tradition is ultimately used quite frequently, yet rather in the sense of inclusion versus exclusion when the concern is to strengthen the preservation and transfer of one’s own cultural values. A transformation of traditions and the dialectics of this concept are therefore viewed rather skeptically. For this reason, that facet of

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268 Panel discussion on the topic “Transformation – where to? Does the research on the transformation need new perspectives?” at the conference “Erfahrung kultureller Räume im Wandel. Transformationsprozesse in ostdeutschen und osteuropäischen Regionen” (03/04 December 2009), organized by the subproject A5 of the SFB 580.


270 This conference took place from 03 through 04 December 2009 at Schloss Dornberg bei Jena near and was organized by the subproject A5 of the SFB 580. On the SFB 580, see http://www.sfb580.uni-jena.de/typo3/home.0.html?&style=2 (11 December 2009).
the concept of tradition that Köhle-Hezinger has described as “biased appropriation of history,” resulting in a “continuous narrative of history,” comes much closer to the concept of ethnomanagement. It is there that the historical narrative is formulated in such a way as to follow traditions and correspond to the current needs of the ethnic or national group. In the big picture, these narrative flows then merge in the “historical master narrative.”

Identity Management & Ethnomanagement and Hybridity

Hermann Bausinger holds the mixing of the global and the local responsible for the trend that “the borderlines between one’s own and the foreign become blurry.” In one of my works, I have linked these phenomena of glocalization in the context of Southeast Europe with those concepts that denote something “mixed” or something new, which has emerged from several preexisting cultural resources:

Upon closer investigation, these processes are rather processes of the so-called *creolization*, hybridization or syncretization, that is, of the blending of global and local elements into new forms.

The Swedish cultural anthropologist Ulf Hannerz in 1987 transferred the concept of *creolization* into the discipline in order to characterize culture as a dynamic, flowing and above all a reciprocal process; the concept of *hybridity* in principle derives from a mixed form of two or more previously separate systems and is used differently in different scientific contexts; it is apt to speak of *syncretization* when religious contents merge into one another. At this point, however, I would like to shift the focus on the concept of *hybridization* and in advance warn against a generalizing tendency: If the concept of culture, for instance, is classified in general as ‘hybrid,’ no meaningful assertion can subsequently be derived from it any more. And yet it is the rather dazzling, multifaceted concept of *hybridization* that has already inspired much thought in the postmodern discourse. In this context, the opposition ‘hybridity versus essentialism,’ for example, may come to mind or one may shed light on the complex situation of the ‘human(s)-object-relatedness’ in the sense of ‘human versus non-human.’

The sociologist Pnina Werbner presents the contrariness of hybridity and ‘cultural difference’ and, in the following quotation, also includes the cultural self-ascription of minorities, which is indeed an integral part of the discourse on inclusion and exclusion within the concept of identity management and ethnomanagement:

By analogy, we need to think in our discussions of multiculturalism and anti-racism of the way discourses interact to create bridges or precipitate polarising processes. It is the spirit that Yuval-Davis and others argue here one tendency of multiculturalism is to exaggerate cultural ‘difference’, and thus valorise ‘fundamentalist’ cultural self-definitions among minorities; while by

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275 Cf. ibid., 16-17 and 20-21.
contrast, as Hutnyk and Baumann suggest, a radical hybridity may emerge out of the homoge-

e-nising culture industry in response to violence and suffering. 276

In very general terms, Steven Vertovec notices a distinct turn towards ideas of hybridity and creoliza-
tion in the anthropological research of the late 1980s. The result of this development was that the then

overarching concept of ethnicity was no longer the sole center of attention, even though it was still

regarded as decisive. 277 Particularly with regard to a more profound understanding of the behavior of

ethnic and national groups, which are exposed to a sometimes long-lasting acculturation on the part of

the (majority) population, such views are a considerable enrichment. Especially if they are sensibly

connected to ethnicity research, they benefit the description and analysis of the processes of inclusion

and exclusion, which partly also reveal the hierarchization of the interactions between the groups:

Transnationalism, hybridity, creolization and cosmopolitanism are all conceptual devices that

anthropologists and others now use to get beyond purportedly bounded and fixed understand-
ings of groups and cultures which, fairly or not, have been associated with studies of ethnic-

ity. 278

With the concepts thus interlinked, it becomes easier to examine—under similar conditions as the pro-
cesses of inclusion and exclusion at the margins—the ways in which groups function in their internal

interconnections and demarcations, which are linked to the individual members’ identity construc-
tions. Further, this safeguards better against such pitfalls as, for example, the groupism that Rogers

Brubaker has formulated in the context of ethnopolitics or helps us to better expose what Brubaker has

termed groupist rhetoric as a pitfall, both in field research and in the scientific representation. 279 In

addition, concepts of transnationalism or hybridity provide better possibilities for analysis in the en-
deavor to better comprehend multicultural conflict situations:

Therefore, rather than as absolutely novel, here we mean ‘new’ with regard to methods, con-

cepts, issues or cases […] And by ‘directions’ we refer methodologically to where one ‘goes’ for fuller analytical comprehension after initial ethnographic observations of individuals, groups, settings, interactions and events. 280

Vertovec’s thoughts are similar to a notion that is well suited to depict a “culture of difference and
equality,” as Elka Tschernokoschewa has put it with reference to hybridity. 281 This is yet another rea-

son why the term hybridity in the last two decades could flourish particularly in research and scholar-

ship: 282

276 Ibid., 21-22.


Vertovec further summarizes: “Rather than being content with notions of hybridity as an alternative ‘third space’ (à la Bhaba 1994; cf. Werbner & Modood 1997), the anthropological eye should turn to complex arenas where, ‘to operate effectively, people have to be multi-cultural’ (Amit-Talai 1995b, p. 227).” Ibid., 7.

278 Ibid., 5.


282 The reason why “in research and scholarship” is stressed here is that, in politics, the nation-state concept, which is in most cases interpreted in monoethnic terms, is still strictly adhered to. For this reason, politicians avoid such a positive connotation of cultural hybridity. For them, it already suggests the seeming dissolution of the monoethnic concept and therefore a loss of national identity.
Hybridity is one of the emblematic notions of our era. It captures the spirit of the times with its obligatory celebration of cultural difference and fusion, and it resonates with the globalization mantra of unfettered economic exchanges and the supposedly inevitable transformation of all cultures.  

Despite this boom, the discourse hasn’t abated yet and is far from finished; one of the central questions is whether hybridity should be understood rather as a term or rather as a concept or whether it would be more expedient to understand it as both, as Peter Burke formulates it:

The applicant’s interpretation is the following: This question should not to be answered in either way, because hybridity should keep its elastic characteristics. Therefore, research on hybridity in relation to the dynamics of globalisation should cover fluid processes as well as its crystallizations.

I will at this point briefly review Homi Bhabha’s concept in order to be able to relate both the term hybridity and the concept of hybridity better with the identity management and ethnomanagement. In the first half of the 1990s already, Bhabha ascribed a hybrid nature to cultures in general, understanding hybridity as a dynamic recombination of elements rooted in different traditions. He situates these hybridisation processes in an interstice between the cultures, which he refers to as the so-called third space. Ulf Hannerz or Stuart Hall, for example, around the same time adopted this thought as well as the discourse derived from it into anthropology and sociology. The following quotation from an article published by Hans-Rudolf Wicker in 1996 shall give an impression of attempt back then to grasp the rather elusive term hybridity:

Although by no means a full blown theory yet, the idea of “hybridity” nonetheless contains some of the essential ingredients of one. Hybridity includes those components of the hybrid, of mixing and impurity which will eventually form the groundwork for a future theory based on process, reflexivity, of negotiability and, thus, of weak inner order. If we perceive the world under the aspect of global ecumanisation […] then the different and multifarious processes that contribute to the condensation and the shrinking of the social world can only be understood in the terms of hybridisation.

In the meantime, the discourse on hybridity has focused on those areas in particular where there is a regular, immediate intercultural exchange, as for example in the research on migration and diaspora.

The influences exerted on minority research are indeed blatant, but they keep approaching rather hesitant and do so mainly in the context of the debate surrounding globalization. The identity managers and ethnomanagers try to avoid this discourse. It is therefore mostly engaged in at surrogate sites. This is for example the case when the issue at hand is to describe the “double identity” of national minori-

285 Cf. Bhabha, The Location of Culture, 5.
287 Cf. e.g. Hannerz, Transcultural Connections. Culture, People, Places; Hall, “Cultural Identity and Diaspora.”
ties or to transfer multilingualism, which is quite common in certain regions of Southeast Europe, into manageable dimensions without, however, assigning to the hybrid a new quality or even a third space of its own. Elka Tschernokoschewa, for instance, has introduced the term “hybrid worlds” into minority research as a means of description:

Hybrid worlds, to my mind, are those worlds in which the various experiences, sensibilities and competences are used productively in the endeavor to shape a common life. Where there is space for dialogue. Where being different and belonging are conceptually united and where there is space and recognition for the stories about it.290

This notion of commonality, fully consciously idealized by Tschernokoschewa, should by no means be disregarded when dealing with the identity management and ethnomanagement. This notion could at least help diminish the fear—which especially traditional ethnomangers themselves sometimes fuel—of any form of cultural adaption, which can generate new forms of cultural coexistence. It is also the task of the historically and anthropologically versed researchers to carefully demonstrate that all cultural achievements have already emerged from a mixture of one’s own with the foreign. This would also include those that are at present registered as one’s own cultural achievements in the ethnic or national group’s collective consciousness. Moreover, as “hybrid worlds” are being observed and analyzed, scholarship will likewise be concerned with recording who aims at securing for themselves the definatory power. Precisely this will be one of the foremost goals, particularly in line with the identity management and ethnomanagement, of the respective hybridmanagement.

“Ethnic Group Branding”—Identity as Brand

Since the era of the transformation, nation-branding has become an indispensable part of the national identity management in Southeast Europe in the context of the ‘marketing’ of newly negotiated concepts of the state or after the founding of the new states.291 The idea for this section292 and what I call ethnic group branding are derived from the juxtaposition of nation and ethnic group since the two concepts nation-branding and ethnic group branding are structurally very similar. At the same time, all these activities that contribute to branding are part of the identity management and ethnomanagement because they are responsible for the causes and forms of an ethnic group’s development into a brand in the inside and outside perception. In line with the globalization of politics and economy, it is becoming more and more important to possess a strong brand that is distinctive, can be positively charged and furthermore counteracts conformity. In ethno-politics, this indeed seems to be auspicious:

292 This motto shall be understood in its double meaning: A brand has generally a stronger effect than simply an ‘identity’ or a brand has a stronger effect if the ‘identity’ is turned into one.
We are in a world of parity where everything tends to be equal, and the world marketplace is a world of commodities. The availability of new technologies has enabled companies to easily replicate the products, systems, services, and processes of the others, generating a huge strategic problem for business of differentiation. [...] Strong brands alleviate these problems.  

The status of a brand in the global economic network is projected onto the individual nations, which use nation-branding to try to secure and enhance their (symbolic) market value worldwide. As in the economic world, this is regulated by a brand-management. For that reason, my premise goes, the experiences gained from nation-branding could also be used to the largest extent for the management of the ethnic group branding. The potential uses are manifold in areas that are targeted at ‘customers’ since especially the institutions of public administration have a tremendous need to catch up when it comes to customer orientation. In the case of ethnic group branding, the identity management and ethnomanagement are in charge of the brand management, drawing on more or less the same operating mechanisms that are used in the economic world and that, here too, serve to shape their own group into an inimitable brand and to secure it the best possible position in the regional, national and global competition. The characteristics to be managed basically correspond to the ethnic markers and the boundaries between groups, in turn, correspond to the ethnic boundaries. The management by and large upholds the mechanism of the nation-branding, with nation-branding and ethnic group branding interpenetrating, especially when the nation-branding of the respective kin state provides the basis of the ethnic group branding of a national minority: The Hungarians in Transylvania, for instance, are guided in their ethnic group branding by Hungary’s nation-branding. It is only through the regional course of the boundaries, through the specific regional histories with their equally regional characteristics like customs, foodways, clothing or architecture, that the Transylvanian Hungarians’ identity management and ethnomanagement create their own regionally specific variant, which is then managed like a brand under the designation “Erdélyi Magyarok.” The national symbols, however, hardly differ from the Hungarians. Yet, among the Szeklers in Transylvania, there are pronounced efforts to make that distinction in order to emphasize their autonomy. A second example, also from Transylvania, can be found in the Transylvanian Saxons’ identity management and ethnomanagement, more precisely in the Ortsforum Kronstadt: After the Saxons emigrated in large numbers in the years 1990-9, people above all invoke the historical significance of their own ethnic group. They underline the Saxons’ achievements for the benefit of Kronstadt in the past and how relevant the Saxons therefore still are for the town. The branding of “Who are we Saxons?” therefore takes an indirect course via history and cultures of memory.

294 “The overall aim of this process, naturally, is to increase the value of the brand overtime […].” Ibid., XVIII.
296 Here: in contrast to minorities without their own kin state.
297 On the national usage of symbols among the Székelys, see esp. the second part of the section Mi magyarok – We Hungarians.
These two examples already make two things obvious that *ethnic group branding* pursues: i) The minority’s autonomy should by all means be stressed so that, on the one hand, the group members can effortlessly identify with their brand and so that, on the other, they can both distinguish themselves from others and be distinguished by them; ii) The management, however, does not distance this autonomy and the (regionally) distinctive too far from the *nation-branding* of the kin state because as members of a minority and as a group people want to be perceived in many respects as part of a larger ethnic and national total. This is of central importance for the identity construction and the self-confidence of an ethnic or national minority.

By now, there is also much overlap—once more, similar to the *nation-branding*—in the realm of tourism when, from the perspective of *brand management*, the marketing of a region is at hand that has a specific significance for the *Volksgruppe* or even for the entire nation; here follows a practical example: the Catholic pilgrimage site Csíksomlyó/Şumuleu Ciuc/Schomlenberg, which is located centrally in the Szekler Land (= Székelyföld), has recently been considerably revived with the help of the Hungarians’ as well as the Szeklers’ identity management and ethnomanagement. Together with the Catholic Church, they use the tourism surrounding the pilgrimage in order to intertwine the religious motive with a national one, in the sense of a ‘Hungarian pilgrimage.’ Due to its connotation, the pilgrimage site Csíksomlyó is by now immediately associated with the Szeklers and the Hungarians. In this example, the *brand management* is, rather loosely, composed of regional ethnomanagers, of supar-regional tourism managers, who mainly advertise a pilgrimage by coach to Csíksomlyó in Hungary or in the Hungarian minority regions in Southeast Europe, as well as of representatives of the Catholic Church, who also profit from this pilgrimage. The Pentecost pilgrimage in particular, which is the climax of the pilgrimage season, has by now grown to huge dimensions due to its intentional Hungarian-national charge:

The actual big event took place on 22 May already, the day before Pentecost: Despite the rain and the mud, about 500,000 believers flocked to the mountain near the sanctuary that day to worship the Mother of God. The archbishop of the diocese Alba Julia, his auxiliary bishop and the apostolic nuncio, together with the minister general Fr. José and the definitor general Fr. Roger, had gone on a pilgrimage there, as well. They were all deeply impressed by the zeal in prayer and the faith of this big flock of pilgrims. That afternoon, the minister general met with the brethren of the province of the King Saint Stephen/Brüdern der *Provinz vom hl. König Stephan*.

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298 The Transylvanian Saxons have striven since the 19th century to be perceived as German.
299 “We are talking about a competitive identity for Austria, which is associated with our country in Austria and abroad. Something unique in a positive sense, which everyone has in mind when they have connections with Austrians in the context of commerce, *tourism* or other affairs. […].” Minister of Economy Reinhold Mitterlehner said. N.N.: “Nation Branding - Österreich soll wettbewerbsfähige Identität bekommen.” Wirtschaftskammer Österreich, 19 February 2014. See: https://www.wko.at/Content.Node/branchen/oe/sparte_iuc/Werbung-und-Marktkommunikation/11.06.2012_Nation_Branding - Oesterreich soll wettbewerbsfa.html (29 July 2014) (italics by the author).
300 See http://www.csiksomlyo.ro/bemutatkozas (17 November 2010).
301 A similar achievement was for example made at Mohács, a site of memory in Southwest Hungary; there, however, the process was reversed and a national site of memory in addition became religiously charged.
The export of regional products and services, which has a long history in Southeast Europe, is another central segment of the *ethnic group branding*. It reaches way back to pre-national times when the various ethnic groups could obtain a special status, such as privileges in terms of taxes, inheritance or monopolies, through their specific products or services, which required considerable specialization as well as an internal support for this specialization. There are numerous examples of this, only a few of which will be referenced here to illustrate the diversity: After the Mongol invasion of Europe in the 13th century, the Hungarian kings had sent for Germans in order to develop mining in the Spiš region; many Cigány groups are known in their capacity as tinkers or scissor- and knife-grinders, but above all as musicians, who were fetched on the occasion of celebrations in the family of the village (baptism, wedding, funeral); many regional products, in turn, that were and are “exported” are associated with their region of origin: e.g. szatmári szilvapálinka (= plum brandy of Satu Mare), kalócsai paprika (= paprika from Kalocsa). The identity management and ethnomangement at all times stress the ‘preservation of one’s own culture.’ For their *ethnic group branding* in particular, those regionally specific skills, knowledge, qualifications and the products emerging therefrom are integral components, which can be used mainly for the purpose of a positive outside perception—in ethno politics, in the economy and in tourism. Of course, many ascriptions, especially in the context of ethnic and national groups, appear stereotypical, but they are nevertheless frequently used to strengthen or provide a basis for one’s own brand.

The next segment is meant to demonstrate how important it is in the context of *ethnic group branding* to involve agents coming from one’s own group who gain cultural or political importance, at least on a regional level. This reinforces both a minority’s self-confidence and its perceptibility and directs attention to its achievements. An example of this is the public attention surrounding Klaus Johannis, who is the mayor of Sibiu/Hermannstadt and who has been reelected there by the Romanian majority. The Transylvanian Saxons account for only 1.6% of Sibiu’s population but Johannis’s persona reflects the big brand that they have created at Sibiu and in Transylvania. Which qualities, which narratives or which ethno-political and economic interests are at the bottom of an *ethnic group branding*? It is determined to the same extent by target-oriented actions as is identity management and ethnomangement, as has been underscored in their theoretical considerations above. Yet, in this case, the management bears relation to the *branding*. Identity management and ethnomangement deliberately select from among a *Volksgruppe*’s sometimes diverse narratives those qualities and narratives that best reflect the (myths of) origin, the territory and the ethnic group’s special skills—in a multiethnic area in particular, the predominance in a certain territory is a central desire of almost all who live there. Another important attribute that an *ethnic group brand* should have is trust; by means of comparison, this corresponds to what can be understood with regard to individuals by the term “personality” as opposed to person. The next step in this development, then, is the singular charisma of a *Volks-

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303 These conclusions can be drawn directly from my observations made during the research on the Germans and Hungarians in Southeast Europe.
gruppe, as an indicator of a successful branding.\textsuperscript{304} It is precisely this mixture of a rational and an emotional understanding of a brand that is extraordinarily important and Paul Temporal comments on this in general:

Like human relationships, whether they turn out right or wrong isn’t usually a function of logic and rationality; rather, it is a result of emotional hits and misses. Given this reality, it seems strange that in many cases brand management continues to focus on the non-emotional side of the relationship […]\textsuperscript{305}

Indeed, synergies with the practice of identity management and ethnomanagement become obvious here. Identity management and ethnomanagement, too, primarily rest upon the rational societal-, legal-, social- or (folkloric-)cultural canon in their activities and only secondarily invest effort in the emotional contexts. Eventually, it needs to be registered, despite all the creativity of \textit{brand management}, that the brand’s development should not move too far away from the group members’ values but should be employed to further support the shared attributes. In that, it resembles the management of a corporation, in which its value also should not be undermined for the sake of a brand.\textsuperscript{306} An added value, in which ‘the image of the group’ and ‘the group itself’ complement each other, can only arise from this interplay between the collective identity, which an ethnic group has often constructed over an extended time period, and its \textit{ethnic group brand}.

In the context of the \textit{Erdélyi Magyarok} (= Transylvanian Hungarians), who now live in Hungary, for instance, it becomes quite obvious that they still strive after their Transylvanian identity. This indeed corresponds to an aspect of the \textit{ethnic group branding} since their region of origin, Transylvania, is maintained within the overall Hungarian identity construction. They can pass on their collective identity, which differs from the Hungarian majority population in Hungary; but they now leave open the option of a code-switching between \textit{Mi Erdélyi Magyarok vagy mi Magyarok} (= \textit{we Transylvanian Hungarians} or \textit{we Hungarians}). The situation among the Szeklers in Transylvania reveals even more nuances and traits of a conscious \textit{ethnic group branding}, in the sense of \textit{Mi székelyek vagy mi székelymagyarok} (= \textit{we Szeklers} or \textit{we Szekler Hungarians}). Within scholarship, the predominant opinion is that the Szeklers are a part of the \textit{Ungarntum}, as Sándor Pál-Antal, for instance, summarizes:

The Szekler Land is a part of Transylvania. Its inhabitants are Hungarians, who are called Szeklers and who had a particular history and organization as well as a specific system of institutions. Their origins remain uncertain. They have already spoken Hungarian during the era of settlement and see themselves as an organic part of the entire Hungarian community.\textsuperscript{307}

And yet, there are a few variables in the Szeklers’ orientation that distinguish them from the Hungarians, be it that these are simply historical or historical-mythic points of reference, or that it is about symbolic autonomies, as for example the Szeklers’ runic script (= székely rovásírás), the Szekler flag

\textsuperscript{304} Cf. Temporal, \textit{Advanced Brand Management}, 30-31.
\textsuperscript{305} Ibid., 31.
\textsuperscript{306} Cf. ibid., 250.
or the Szekler hymn, which, respectively, are important parts of the Szeklers’ *ethnic group branding*. Besides the condensed settlement area, which is called Székelyföld (= Székely Land), they indeed suggest a collective autonomy, which is referred to as “siculitas – székelység” (= Szekler culture).308 Another crucial point, which is also mentioned in the quotation above, was—similar to the historical exceptional status of the Transylvanian Saxons—the administrative-political unit, the so-called Szekler seats. The Szekler count (= comes siculorum) was appointed as the representative of the royal power and was recognized as the second highest dignitary in Transylvania besides the voivode. The Szeklers’ social order was a mixture of a society organized vertically in three estates309 and spread out horizontally over 24 noble families who split among themselves the Szekler Land’s territory, were granted tax exemption, yet had to perform military service for the king.310 This social-legal autonomy, which lasted for several centuries, as well as the continuing uncertainty as to their origins311 above all have made it possible for the Szeklers to always retain their own group name both in their self-ascriptions and in external ascriptions.

308 This autonomy corresponds in many aspects to the Szeklers’ demands for the autonomy of the Székely Land, since this feeds into it. See the website *siculitas – székelység* of the domain pontsic: http://pontsic.org/hu/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2&Itemid=4 (14 September 2011).
309 There was the social rank of the genteels (lat. primores), of the primipili and of the commons (pedites).
311 There are three major theories concerning the origins of the Szeklers: i) descendents of the Huns; ii) a people related to the Hungarians, with whom they aligned themselves; iii) originally Hungarians.
2.

On the Practice of the Identity Management and Ethnomanagement of the Germans and Hungarians in Southeast Europe
2.1 The Research Framework

Ethnicity and Nation

This is a world of flows. It is also of course, a world of structures, organizations, and other stable social forms. But the apparent stabilities that we see are, under close examination, usually our devices for handling objects characterized by motion. The greatest of these apparently stable objects is the nation-state, which is today frequently characterized by floating populations, transnational politics within national borders, and mobile configurations of technology and expertise.1

The decline of the nation as a point of reference for the shaping of collective coexistence is no longer only stated in theoretical writings, but it is already part of the everyday experience of the “normal citizen.”2

The two opening quotations postulate an overall decrease in the importance of the nation in general as well as an ensuing weakening of its influence on “its” respective citizens in particular. These findings are indeed relevant in the context of the identity management and ethnomanagement of ethnic and national groups in the research areas of Southeast Europe. There, too, set structures started to soften due to people’s increased mobility and the influences of globalization; at the same time, the link between ethnicity and territory as well as between ethnicity and nation occurs in many areas and it at times appears as a vehement desire to cling to an ethnocentric concept.3 Peter Burke refers to such phenomena as counter globalisation.4 In connection with ethnicity, the following constellations emerge: ethnicity, in principle, claims a certain territory and it has basically no means to evade this regional concentration. Christian Giordano considers this claim to be an integral part of ethnicity: “Territoriality as an integral part of ethnicity can be characterized as an ethnic community’s monopoly-like claim to space.”5 Anthony D. Smith explains the connection between geopolitical space and ethnic group as follows:

To the impact of propaganda and myth-making, we must add the influence of the geopolitical location of each ethnie, in relation both to its natural environment and to neighbouring ethnie, one or more of which may become ‘paired’ with it as historic enemies or allies.6

This territorial areas and boundaries historically developed into the powerful organizational units of nations and nation-states, which are still effective today. Frederik Barth mentions both lines of thought in the interplay of ethnicity and nation-state: On the one hand, the ethnicity influences the nation-state;

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3 “By ethnocentrism, I [Jörn Rüsen] understand the widespread cultural strategy to gain collective identity by differentiating one’s own group from others in such a way that the social space of one’s own life as a shared and familiar space is substantially differentiated from the other’s space.” Jörn Rüsen. “Einleitung: Für eine interkulturelle Kommunikation in der Geschichte. Die Herausforderung des Ethnizentrismus in der Moderne und die Antwort der Kulturwissenschaften.” Die Vielfalt der Kulturen. Erinnerung, Geschichte, Identität. 4. Ed. J. Rüsen et al. 16 (= s.t.w. 1405).
4 Cf. Burke, Cultural Hybridity, 108.
on the other, the nation-state influences the ethnicity.\(^7\) It can be deduced from this that the governance of the nation-states cannot be considered independently of an identity management and ethnomanagement since the governance of mostly monoethnically conceived nations is to a great extent an institutionalized and legally legitimized form of identity management and ethnomanagement, embedded in constructions of national policy. Even the notion of management appears in Barth’s works already, when he demands that the state be regarded rather as an agent than simply as a symbol or an idea:

We are then able to depict the power represented by the state as a specifiable third player in the processes of boundary between groups, rather than confound the regime, and its powers and interests, with the more nebulous concepts of state and nation.\(^8\)

The correlation between ethnicity and the history of nationalism\(^9\) by now seems to be firmly established. In the eyes of Anthony D. Smith, this correlation is being ‘unexpectedly’ revitalized:

Unexpected, because statesmen, social scientists and many educated people were convinced that nationalism was a spent force after the horrors of the two world wars, and that humanity had outstripped ethnic (or ‘tribal’) ties in an era of regionalism and increasing global interdependence; unforeseen, because the same global interdependence appeared to be eroding the bases of the nation-state and leading humanity towards a genuine cosmopolitanism.\(^10\)

I would like to add at this point that, at the beginning of the 1990s, different views of the two terms “ethnicity/nationalism” developed, depending on the respective point of departure. Margit Feischmidt summarizes this as follows:

The few researchers on nationalism who use the terms ‘ethnic’ and ‘ethnicity’ see a chronological relation between ethnicity, ethnic groups and nation. […] Anthropologists who investigate nationalism used to treat the nation as a variant of ethnicity.\(^11\)

Like Frederik Barth, Marcus Banks regards the nation-state as an agent, and when the state follows a nationalist ideology, this inevitably impacts the ethnicity.\(^12\)

Nation and nation-state not only have shaped, and continue to shape, different scientific disciplines, but some of these disciplines (such as history, ethnic studies/Volkskunde, pre- and early history, philological disciplines, archaeology) are themselves, to varying extents, involved in the construction of a national master narrative.\(^13\) Especially in historiography, this interpenetration of science and the individual national institutions plays a role that should not be underestimated:

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\(^8\) Ibid., 20.


Anthony D. Smith defines ‘ethnic’ as follows: “The *ethnie* can be defined as a human group whose members share common myths of origin and descent, historical memories, cultural patterns and values, association with a particular territory, and a sense of solidarity, at least among the élites.” Ibid., 709.


\(^12\) Banks, *Ethnicity,* 122.

The nation was a political project, a utopia or an appellative entity and the institutionalization of historiography, therefore, was a part of the internal nation-building; the state in its many forms was the authority, the employer, and the institutional framework; the national was the object of inquiry and provided a sense of purpose; its language, media and audiences were nationally bounded.\(^\text{14}\)

In a similar manner, it is worthwhile from the perspective of the state authorities to equally control the identity management and ethnomanagement, seeing as the coincidence of ethnicity and nation promises a seemingly indissoluble combination. It simultaneously entails a distinction from the other nations and (sic!) the other ethnic groups within one’s own nation-state from whom loyalty is demanded; the example of a repeatedly invoked ‘politics of national unity’\(^\text{15}\) makes this quite obvious.

The aspect mentioned above is essential especially with regard to the research on the connections of identity management and ethnomanagement and nation in general and on the identity management and ethnomanagement of the Hungarian minorities in particular because the Hungarians see themselves both as members of the minority in the respective host state and as members of the entire Hungarian nation including all its symbols.\(^\text{16}\) In multiethnic regions such as the Danube-Carpathian region, this sometimes includes the adoption of foreign symbols.\(^\text{17}\)

Why is the nation actually established in this manner and with which attributes is it equipped? A brief answer to these questions could be: The matter revolves above all around the identification of/with a nation, which nolens volens rests upon criteria of ethnicity (ethnic markers). If gaps should open up, for instance in the linear history of origins or of ethnic descent, they are filled with the help of historical narratives as well as with the resort to myths.\(^\text{18}\)

As early as 1983, Benedict Anderson’s work *Imagined Communities*\(^\text{19}\) was published and it has lost none of its relevance:

In the theoretical discussions—this seems to be widely agreed upon—collective identities are considered social fiction, a construct. *Ethnie*, nation and the like are no clearly identifiable groups that could be determined in space and time. They are ‘imagined communities’.\(^\text{20}\)

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\(^\text{15}\) In Hungary, for example, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán had the parliament sign off on a manifesto on national cooperation; in Romania, there is the party *Partidul Unităţii Naţionale din România* (Romanian National Unity Party). Oftentimes, such a strategy relies on the mechanisms of xenophobia.

\(^\text{16}\) This attribution is often mixed up with the *natio hungarica*, which already existed in the pre-national era; this included those members of the aristocracy who were ennobled by the respective Hungarian king and received land, with the ethnic affiliation not being in the foreground.

\(^\text{17}\) In order for this to appear less abstract, I would like to present the following observation made by Ina Maria Greverus: “The integration of the music of Hungarian Gypsies into the national we-consciousness […] shows that individual ethnic markers of otherwise discriminated groups can well be integrated into this identity management targeted on nationality.” Greverus, “Ethnizität und Identitätsmanagement,” 225.


\(^\text{20}\) Odoa, Vorwort, 8.
This illuminates both the genesis of the nations and of nationalism from the historical dimension of the pre-national, feudal apparatus of power and the need of the nation for continuity and for narrative of ‘identity’. From the perspective of identity management and ethnomanagement, it seems to be evident that they themselves preferably determine the criteria according to which an ethnic group is “presented” as a nation. Further, they are a guarantor of what Anderson referred to as “narrative of identity.” Anderson describes the way in which the narrative of person differs from the narrative of nation as follows:

Yet between narratives of person and nation there is a central difference of emplotment. In the secular story of the ‘person’ there is a beginning and an end. [...] Nations, however, have no clearly identifiable births, and their deaths, if they ever happen, are never natural.21

The dichotomy of the real and the imagined is omnipresent and inevitable in minority research and often these ethnic, national narratives are reinforced by the ‘myth of being chosen’:

Their role is not only a mobilizing one; they are also important in legitimating the community’s ‘title-deeds’ or land charter. The reward for fulfilment of cultural or religious duties is communal possession and enjoyment of a sacred land as belonging to the community ‘by grace’ (and much later, ‘by right’).22

This chosenness is employed not only to distinguish oneself from one’s neighbors in a multicultural environment but to make a claim to cultural leadership.

Another component outlined above is the strong attachment to a particular territory, in the sense of ‘one’s own homeland’ and simultaneously in the sense of the so-called poetic landscapes:23 the former symbolizes the soil that belongs to a certain ethnic, national group and that this group has received through mythical allocation, that it tills and defends; the poetic landscapes, on the other hand, establish a more far-reaching, mythical relation to a territory, which is able to secure a group’s (mythical) survival as an autochthonous minority in a foreign host state or even in the diaspora. These attachments to the territory are generally a fundamental part of all processes of nation-building and of all imagination.24 Anthony D. Smith differentiates between a “civic” and a “more ethnic and genealogical model of the nation.”25 According to this, I would like to place the states of Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Hungary and Romania, which are part of the research area, in the second category:

Here the emphasis falls upon presumed ties of common descent and the associated myths of genealogical origin. Such a conception gives more weight to vernacular culture, mainly native languages, rituals and customs.26

Many elements and practices of the identity management and ethnomanagement explored here cannot be separated from those of nation-building, the inclusion of ethnicity nor from their own constructedness and the correlated narrative of the nation.27

21 Anderson, Imagined Communities, 205.
23 Cf. ibid., 715.
26 Cf. ibid., 718.
Ethnic Politics

The research on ethnic politics\(^{28}\) assumes a preeminent role in the interplay of ethnicity and nation because, there too, ethnicity equally serves as subject and tool.\(^{29}\) The semantic link that Henry E. Hale establishes between the terms shall serve here as a pivotal point for the reflections on the relation(ality) between ethnicity and ethnic politics. At its core, this link implies an increased acuteness of the analytical and interpretive options, which is highly useful for minority research:

The second core argument […] is hat ethnicity is primarily about uncertainty while ethnic politics is mainly about interests. […] by recognizing the crucial separation between the motives explaining ethnic identification and the motives explaining the group and individual behaviour based on this identification.\(^{30}\)

What Hale designates as uncertainty\(^{31}\) can well be related to the cultural flows mentioned above and the changeability of the structures of identity construction that they entail. This approach is in its core idea further reminiscent of Brubaker’s criticism of what he called the ‘soft concepts of identity’:

In their concern to cleanse the term of its theoretically disreputable “hard” connotations, in their insistence that identities are multiple, malleable, fluid, and so on, soft identitarians leave us with a term so infinitely elastic as to be incapable of performing serious analytic work.\(^{32}\)

This uncertainty, according to Hale, is ultimately the result of our human deficiency—in concrete terms, a consequence of our limited brain capacity in a, from the viewpoint of sociopsychology, highly complex environment; the division of society into ethnic groups would thus facilitate orientation to provide an escape from this uncertainty and other insecurities.\(^{33}\) This makes clear why ethnicity can be understood as an expression of uncertainty and at the same time why the embedment in an ethnic group can reduce this uncertainty. As both the genesis of ethnic groups and their function as well as the parameters of ethnicity have already been dealt with in detail in the preceding chapters, at this point I would like to turn to the interplay of ethnic politics and interests, also mentioned by Hale in the above quote: according to Hale, these are so-called run-of-the-mill interests, among which count, for instance, wealth, power and security.\(^{34}\) Especially in minority regions, these economic notions and expectations, just like the minority-political agendas, adopt an ethnic component. It can very well be observed that people assess exactly which members of which ethnic group have by direct comparison better or worse economic prospects. These are sometimes reinforced by locally specific economic conditions, such as the dichotomy of center and periphery or a limited access to the relevant markets,

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\(^{28}\) In English the terms ethnic politics, ethnopolitics and ethnopolices are mostly used synonymously. Therefore I use these terms in this passage as the respective authors I refer to use them.


\(^{30}\) Hale, The Foundation of Ethnic Politics, 33.

\(^{31}\) In this context, I would like to translate this term as ‘Ungewissheit’ into German, which can then trigger another uncertainty, in the sense of a ‘Verunsicherung’ of the individual, as described in an earlier section.

\(^{32}\) Brubaker, Ethnicity without groups, 38.

\(^{33}\) Hale, The Foundation of Ethnic Politics, 35, 41ff.

\(^{34}\) Cf. ibid., 77.
which is often the result of ethnically motivated exclusion.\textsuperscript{35} For the agents of identity management and ethnomanagement, this means that every-day political interests get bundled together with economic interests.\textsuperscript{36}

Another central aspect is according to my experience also the guarantee of social security\textsuperscript{37} for ‘their’ group, which need to be claimed in the best possible manner from the respective nation state. In Southeast Europe in particular, the official minority representations as well as the NGOs are needed even more, because the traditional networks of family and kinship will dissolve more and more there due to the increasing fragmentation of society. Consequently, the ethnic group has to take over the role of the extended family as a reliable guarantor for social security—also in the sense of a reduction of the individual’s ‘uncertainty’—since in the states of Southeast Europe the income from the public social sector is usually not sufficient to ensure an appropriate quality of life. This basically pertains to the whole range of social security, be it health care, pensions, unemployment benefits or primary care for families. Some minority societies and minority representations try to secure ‘their’ members a better access to the state institutions that are responsible for these matters. Looking at empirical examples reveals how great the expectations are and how extensive the pressure on the identity management and ethnomanagement is because the political power, the economic opportunities and the social framework of one’s own group are constantly set in relation to the majority population as well as to the respectively other minorities.

Which strategies ethnic politics pursue in this matter depends on the following contexts: Which political-legal instruments are at the minority’s disposal, both on a regional and a national level, with the help of which the minority can claim its guarantee of social security? What does the intercultural communication in general look like in this process? Or were there ever violent conflicts between the ethnic groups in question? What is the economic balance like or is there a relationship of economic dependency? These circumstances determine the respective political and cultural behavior to a large extent. The two poles extend from a complete economic dependency, which mainly concerns the Roma, to a territorial autonomy with a far-reaching economic independence, as in the case of South Tirol.\textsuperscript{38} The minority self-governance could be called a comparatively softer form of autonomous minority politics. It does have a limited regional-political and cultural independence, but no economic independence in the sense of minorities having their own fiscal sovereignty. Therefore, there is a considerable dependency on the subsidies granted them through the minority rights. At the end of

\textsuperscript{35} Cf. ibid., 84-85.
\textsuperscript{36} At this point, an example of the practical implementation of autonomy could be added to the discussion since one of the key questions, besides the political implementation, is the economic implementation of this autonomy: e.g. Is an ethnic group allowed to keep the larger part of their own taxes in the autonomous region, like in South Tirol, or do all taxes without exception have to be paid to the national tax authority first?
this scale, there are those Volksgruppen that up until today have no constitutional minority protection at all. To describe them, the scientific term “hidden minority” was created, since the hiding is in many respects twofold: on the one hand, the respective nation-state hides the Volksgruppe by not recognizing it as a minority even though its existence can be proven in many respects; and, on the other hand, the minority itself hides in order to escape a complete cultural assimilation or a social ostracism.

In the context of ethnic politics, one sometimes encounters the term “separatism” in political conflicts, especially when the majority population feels that parts of its national territory are threatened or when it fears a loss of power, for example when a minority tries to gain autonomy. There are repeated accusations of separatism in Southeast Europe, which are linked to a lack of loyalty vis-à-vis the host state; the Szeklers’ and the Hungarians’ aspirations to autonomy in Transylvania, for example, are politically labeled as such by the Romanians. Separatism was more or less consistently enforced in the case of Yugoslavia’s division, which was clearly based on national and ethno-political motives and therefore resulted in armed conflicts in multiethnic regions. The Graz-based legal expert on Southeast Europe Joseph Marko in this context speaks of a “prewar-ethnomobilization,” which already preceded the war in Yugoslavia.

Ethnic politics can in its practice be understood as the interest group politics of one ethnic group and at the same time as the interest group politics for one ethnic group: Ethnic groups that use ethnicity to make demands in the political arena for alteration in their status, in their economic well-being, in their civil rights, or in their educational opportunities are engaged in a form of interest group politics [...].

The more strongly agents of the identity management and ethnomanagement cling to the ethnic markers, the more strongly their integration into every-day political conflicts will be pursued. As agents they turn into active ethno-politicians. In turn, it is the political landscape that attributes to identity management and ethnomanagement central fields of activity, which often go far beyond their role as ‘governors of cultural heritage and traditions.’ This can involve not only a personally motivated extension of power but also—and the events during the time of the transformation in Southeast Europe have shown this—a personal economic enrichment. These forms are among others referred to as patronage-clientilism; Joseph Marko, for instance, calls the ethno-politicians involved in ethnic-nationally orient-ed parties: predatory politicians. This clientilism is oftentimes reminiscent of the one practiced in

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39 For a more detailed explanation of the term “hidden minority” see Hermanik, Eine Versteckte Minderheit, a.a.O. and Promitzer et al, eds. (Hidden) Minorities, a.a.O.
40 Joseph Marko in his talk “Constitutional Engineering in Divided Societies,” given on 25 February 2011 at the University of Graz.
41 This differentiation is necessary because it is possible in the context of the ethnomanagement from the outside (see the next section) that the ethnomanagers themselves do not belong to the ethnic group for whose benefit they are active in ethnopolitics. An example of this is the Artikel-VII-Kulturverein in Styria, which act on behalf of the ‘Styrian Slovenes’ even though none of the protagonists is a member of this minority. See Hermanik, Eine versteckte Minderheit, 290-299.
extended families in Southeast Europe. Such clientilist networks appear quite harmless on the outside, but on the inside those people who are not part of them have no chance of ever attaining a politically challenging or even influential position in the minority representation.

Identity Management and Ethnomanagement: From the Inside – From the Outside

Minority organizations can indeed be considered “target-oriented, formalized social structures.”44 These structures are built, similarly to the boundaries, through self- and outside ascription. When we investigate the identity management and ethnomanagement from the inside, we focus our interest particularly on those minority organizations that can be regarded as the respective Volksgruppe’s official representation in terms of minority politics or minority rights. All those societies that emerge from a cultural or religious context are perceived as an extension of the identity management and ethnomanagement. In practice, however, there is a large degree of overlap between the political and cultural aspirations.45 At first glance, one notices the cultural organizations, which the identity management and ethnomanagement often consciously move to the foreground and which are dedicated to the preservation of Volksbrauchtum; parallel to this, the creativity of succeeding generations and the engagement with contemporary styles in the arts and in music also result in a modified cultural expression, which references the changing living and working conditions within the minority. It is precisely this simultaneity that represents a challenge for the respective identity management and ethnomanagement with regard to the questions of to what extent they allow new developments of traditional forms or whether or not they accept novelties into the canon.

My experiences in the practice of minority research show that, compared to the respective majority population, minorities reveal a greater density of regionally shaped cultural forms of expression. This becomes clear from the self-ascription of a reduced space as well as from a smaller number of creative artists (= from the inside) and cultural institutions. Sometimes, originating from this defensive attitude that is focused on the traditions, a protest against the inferiority of the minority status can be understood as an artistic motor, which underlies minority art as a template. The defensive attitude of the minority status is strictly adhered to if the identity management and ethnomanagement cling to the role of a victim that is anchored in the historical narrative of the minority—offensive artists are either correspondingly sanctioned by their own organizations and cannot hope for any funds from the minority budget or their art is simply located with the others.

What the minority organizations and societies, which in most cases are identical with the identity management and ethnomanagement from the inside, have in common is that they culturally com-

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45 Further differentiations directly concern the agents who work in the framework of the ethnomanagement from the inside. For example, one can differentiate between a ‘conservation of the traditions’ and those artists if they do come from the minority (= from the inside) but see their art as a much more differentiated means of expression than simply as the tradition of the cultural heritage of the Volksgruppe.
mit to their own ethnic group, respectively, through their programmatic-cultural goals, underpinned by statutes. This way as well as by means of a targeted selection of the respective organization members, an active strategy of inclusion and exclusion vis-à-vis the members of one’s own minority is employed. At the same time, many minority organizations function as employers for the identity managers and ethnomanagers. The Pécs philosopher János Weis, for instance, has coined the phrase “professional German in Hungary” to refer to those Germans in Hungary who earn their living with their work for the Hungarian-German minority. Yet he sees this constellation quite critically because it not only harbors something conservatively insistent but it could also be interpreted, in bold terms, as a form of ethno-political and cultural self-fertilization. Those functionaries within the Hungarian-German community, however, who earn their living in the context of their work for the minority strive for a positive re-interpretation of the phrase, which is meant to put the emphasis on the culturally preservative aspect.

If it weren’t for these professional Germans in Hungary, the Germans in Hungary would have no future in the long run [...] the professional Germans in Hungary do all this heart and soul, and if this weren’t an affair of the heart for me, I would have a completely different profession.47

This example from an interview with a staff member of the Hungarian-German minority television from Pécs shows the close intertwining of a sense of mission and the professional task. All inquiries after the professional career that stands behind this enterprise or questions as to whether such a career would also be possible outside of the protected framework of the minority seem to retreat to the background in the respective individuals’ self-view. What is in the foreground is the high valuation, in terms of ethics and meaningfulness, of the efforts on behalf of the minority. I received an evasive response to my rather provocative question as to whether such a choice of profession would serve not predominantly to strengthen the Volksgruppe, but to propel various self-serving motives—especially when higher positions as functionaries in the minority representation, and thus a considerable gain in an individual’s power, are at stake. The editor whom I asked this replied that this was simply “a minority within the minority.”48

This example evidences a wide-spread point of view among those who are themselves active in the identity management and ethnomanagement from the inside. The work for one’s own Volksgruppe is presented in excessive terms because it is presented as work that contributes to the preservation of one’s own culture. The attempt to protect oneself as much as possible from critics from the outside consists in pretending that they are unable to understand one’s group—a circular reasoning that functions only for as long as the boundaries between the ethnic groups make a clear differentiation possible; this point of view will hardly be valid ad infinitum in times of increasing cultural hybrid-

46 Interview transcript, Györgyi Bindorffer, 19 May 2009.
48 Cf. ibid.
ization, emerging from acculturation, assimilation, waves of migration and the phenomena of globali-
ization.\(^{49}\)

An identity management and ethnomanagement from the outside can take various shapes and therefore
I focus on the description of three basic variants here: i) The identity management and ethnomana-
gement is initiated by the ‘mother nation,’ with which the respective minority feels affiliated; this nation
is in this function then referred to as kin state. In the context of the present research, Germany and
Austria emerge as two states that figure as kin states for the Germans in Southeast Europe; Hungary
alone fulfils this role for the Hungarians who live as a minority in Southeast Europe.\(^{50}\) ii) Another
semantic dimension describes all active governing elements of the ethnicity of minorities, which are in
the hands of the respective majority population in the host state—or in individual cases in the hands of
another minority in the group’s regional environment. These elements should correspond to the re-
spective national and international framework of minority rights,\(^{51}\) which is negotiated for the protec-
tion against cultural and linguistic assimilation. Nevertheless every mononational form of government,
which is based on the proven political model of majority population and minority population, in prin-
ciple tends towards homogenization, acculturation and assimilation. For this reason, the state appa-
ratus of the ethnic majority population is sometimes referred to as the “largest identity manager and
ethnomanager within a nation-state.”\(^{52}\) iii) Thirdly, there are further, abstract forms of identity man-
gament and ethnomanagements from the outside, which are not an exclusive part of a single national
identity but have a translocal effect on the respective Volksgruppe: this includes, for example, the writ-
ten language\(^{53}\) as identified by Christian Voss or religious-dogmatic prescriptions.

A particular phenomenon, which has only become evident through my practical experiences in
the research area, could be interpreted as a mixture of the identity management and ethnomanagement
from the inside with the identity management and ethnomanagement from the outside: It appears in the
context of the identity management and ethnomanagement that is initiated by a diasporic community
of ‘one’s own ethnic group’ and that is particularly strong when it is located in the mother nation.
Concrete examples of this are the Transylvanian Hungarians (= Erdélyi Magyarok), who live in Hun-
gary or the Transylvanian Saxons, whose population has emigrated from Transylvania in large num-
bers to Germany, in small numbers to Austria. These cases are not only examples of an identity man-

\(^{49}\) In return, a minority researcher who comes from the outside notices that those researchers who come from the inside evade exactly this question of the “mixed.”
\(^{50}\) The Roma in Southeast Europe have no ‘mother nation’ and therefore also have no such kin state. For this reason, the
European Union assumes increasing responsibility towards this Volksgruppe.
\(^{51}\) These are mostly attempts to assimilate the minority/ies as they are basic to the concept of a mono-ethnically constructed
nation-state. Within a larger conceptual framework, the aspects of minority rights can well be included in this category as
they, too, are a realm that is still controlled by the respective majority population.
\(^{52}\) It needs to be added here that the respective host state, by means of the general financial management, holds a considerable
instrument of power in its hands. This concerns for instance the regular school system, subsidies for the media or the arts.
\(^{53}\) Cf. the synopsis “Die Schriftsprachlichkeit als Identitätsmanagement von außen” in the following article: Christian Voss.
agement and ethnomanagement from the outside through the respective kin state, but also of an identity management and ethnomanagement from the inside, which in some cases even goes hand in hand with the interests of the kin state. Under certain circumstances, however, they can also disconnect from the kin state if their interests are not compatible. The two groups that were named as examples perceive themselves to be in-between. This means that while they are considered Hungarians or Germans in the respective mother nation based on the language they speak, they view themselves additionally as Erdélyi Magyarok or as Transylvanian Saxons, respectively, based on their origins. For legal reasons, however, they cannot strive for the status of a recognized minority in their ‘new homelands,’ which the Transylvanian Hungarians regret particularly: Due to this, they are denied access to those funds that the Hungarian state provides for minorities. Both groups have in common that they still maintain strong bonds to Transylvania. Therefore, instead of a cultural projection, what we notice in the identity management and ethnomanagement of these diasporic communities are political and cultural interventions concerning the Hungarians and Germans in Transylvania. Among those generations who were already born in the country of emigration or who arrived there in infancy, this is achieved above all through symbolica actions. In order to describe such intermediate stages, the term identity management & ethnomanagement of in-between-places could be applied as the most suitable description of these and similar examples.

Germans and Hungarians in the Research Regions (Overview)

Transylvania/Transilvania/Erdély

The German name for the region Transylvania—Siebenbürger—, whose etymology is not entirely clear, is in all likelihood derived from the originally seven seats of the Saxons, who occupied them from the 13th century onwards on the territory of the Hungarian Königsboden/Királyföld. The names of these altogether eight ‘seven seats’ (1 main seat, 7 secondary seats) are: Hermannstadt seat (main seat) as well as the secondary seats from east to west Broos seat, Mühlbach seat, Reußmarkt seat, Leschkirch seat, Großschenk seat, Schäßburg seat and Reps seat. This comparatively slim piece of land was gradually widened. The Romanian name Transilvania (= beyond the woods), in turn, derives from the phrase “ultra silvam” (= the behind woods), first appearing in a medieval Latin source (1075). The Hungarian name “Erdély” can be considered a homonym, yet first appears in writing only in the Gesta Hungarorum in the 12th century as “Erdeelw.” The name “Ardeal,” used by the Romani-

55 Among the Transylvanian Saxons, this includes the membership in a Transylvanian folk dance group located in Germany (sic!), or, among the Transylvanian Hungarians, this includes the shared consumption of zsíros kenyér (= bread and dripping with paprika) during cultural events.
56 For the Saxons, the term Begriff “seat,” following the Hungarian terminology, crystallized only relatively late, in the second half of the 19th century. Before, they rather spoke of the seven judges, who as Königsrichter were only subject to the Hungarian king. See e.g. “Sieben Stühle der Siebenbürger Sachsen” in: http://rumaenien.projekt-one.de/2007/01/29/stuehle/ (27 December 2010).
ans with reference to Transylvania, in turn can be traced back to the Hungarian “Erdély.” The historian Konrad Gündisch, who specializes on Transylvania, gives a brief and plausible explanation for this designation, which evokes the abundant woods in the region:

The Carpathian Mountains are densely forested. No matter from which direction you approach Transylvania, the area is surrounded by woods, it is located beyond the woods (Latin: trans silva). The woods of the surrounding mountains have inspired the Latin, the Hungarian and the Romanian names for the area […] The area was probably given the name by the Hungarian royal chancellery.

Presently, the name Transylvania designates one of the historic provinces of Romania. In the east and the south, the Carpathian arc separates it from the Vltava and from Walachia; the provinces Banat, Kreischland/Crişana and Maramureş/Maramuresch were located in the west, the northwest and the north of Transylvania. The region was multiethnically settled at all times; yet the social structures of the ethnic groups living in Transylvania crystallized in the Hungarian kingdom of the Middle Ages. Next to the Királyföld, mentioned above, with the seven seats of the Saxons, there were the seven seats of the Szeklers (szék = Hung. chair), from which subsequently evolved the ‘three nations (= nations) of Transylvania’.

The predominantly Hungarian aristocracy, the Saxons and the Szeklers. While the Romanians, too, had originally been granted a diet, the so-called Universitas Valachorum, they were de facto excluded from Transylvania’s diet after the proclamation of the Unio Trinum Nationum in 1437, which had been founded above all for the purpose of fighting off the Ottomans. The freedom of religion, which was proclaimed by Johann II. Sigismund/John Sigismund Szapolyai in the diet of Thorenburg/Turda/Torda in 1568, was a special event that was path-breaking for the later history of settlement and for the tolerant side-by-side of several denominational groups.

It triggered the deliberate migration of Protestant German-speaking settlers to Transylvania in the era of the Counter-Reformation. The peace treaty of Sathmar (1711) legitimized Austria’s rule, whose integration had already begun during the last decade of the 17th century, for instance through the Leopoldina diploma (1690). The transformation of the principality Transylvania into an Austrian crown land in 1765 appears therefore like a formal act. The Austrians, with the help of the Russian, crushed the Hungarian revolution of 1848, which the Hungarians themselves refer to as a revolution (= forradalom) or strug-

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57 On these interpretations of names, see e.g. Béla Köpeczi, ed. Kurze Geschichte Siebenbürgens. Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1990. 137.
59 The Romanian census of 2002 records the following numbers with respect to Transylvania: 5.39 mio. Romanians (74.7%), 1.41 mio. Hungarians (19.6%), 244,475 Roma (3.3%), 53,077 Germans (0.7%), 22,518 Serbs. Besides, other minorities live there, such as Jews, Czechs and Ukranians. Source: Etnii in Transilvania după rezultatele finale ale recensământului din anul 2002. http://sebok1.adatbank.transindex.ro (14 July 2010).
60 This designation derives directly from Latin natio and had more of a rank-oriented or societal meaning. Cf. also Köpeczi, Kurze Geschichte Siebenbürgens, 217-218.
62 But there were also forced resettlements in the mid-18th century: The Protestant Landler, for example, were relocated from Salzburg and Upper Austria to the area of Hermannstadt.
63 Cf. Köpeczi, Kurze Geschichte Siebenbürgens, 407. The Leopoldina diploma granted the people in Transylvania an autonomous civil administration, the preservation of the freedom of religion, economic autonomy and the sanctity of the educational institutions.
sage for freedom (= szabadságharc). Only the compromise in 1867 brought about profound changes in the socio-political order in Transylvania: The special position of the land, which had lasted for three hundred years, came to an end, the Nationsuniversität was disempowered, which meant a disadvantage for the Saxons and the Szeklers. The Hungarian aristocracy, in turn, aimed for Transylvania to be integrated into the territory of the dual monarchy, which was administrated by Hungary. The Saxons, who wanted to protect their Protestant-German denominational schools against such reforms, were particularly opposed to all ensuing attempts of Magyarization on the part of the central government at Budapest. These attempts envisioned drastic measures above all in the educational system, for instance a mandatory instruction in Hungarian in the elementary schools, introduced through the educational laws of 1879 and 1882. The prohibition of the Saxons’ Nachbarschaftsordnung (the law of neighborly relations), which the Hungarians proclaimed in 1891, was a watershed event in the Saxons’ social structure and led to considerable tensions. Nonetheless, the Saxons’ loyalty toward the Hungarian crown, which had lasted for centuries, persisted. After the end of World War I, it was hard for them to develop a new loyalty toward the Romanian crown—a constitutional monarchy with a multiparty system—even though the Romanians granted far-reaching rights to the “coexisting peoples” of the former Austrian-Hungarian areas that were joined with Romania. These rights were secured as early as 1919 in a treaty for the protection of minorities. It was equally hard for the Hungarians to get used to the role of a minority, and many Hungarian-speaking Szeklers, who were also not recognized as an autonomous minority, were torn between the idea of emigrating from their economically peripheral area and the wish to maintain their ethnic self-confidence, which had evolved since the era of the self-governing seat. Transylvania remained a multiethnic region.

After the 5th Sachsentag, which took place on 01 October 1933 at Hermannstadt/Sibiu, the Saxons adopted a policy of division and rupture, which was commenced by a Volksprogramm, which in view of Adolf Hitler’s seizure of power in January of the same year prescribed a directive for “a völkisch
way of life”; therefore, the historian Konrad Gündisch views this 5th Sachsentag symbolically as “the beginning of the end of Transylvanian-Saxon history.”72 During World War II, Transylvania was split on 30 August 1940 already, with the German-Italian, so-called Second Vienna Award granting parts of Northern and Eastern Transylvania to Hungary. This partition fueled a nationality policy, which was based on reprisals and oppression on the part of both the Hungarians and the Romanians and which triggered considerable waves of refugees into the respective other part of Transylvania.73 This partition ended in the autumn of 1944, after the Allies had declared the aforementioned Award null and void. The territories were thus supposed to be returned to Romania. Yet, until the spring of 1945 Northern Transylvania continued to be the site of confrontations between the Magyar Népi Szövetség (= Hungarian Volksverband), which was in power there, and the Romanian Communists, whose fight to better their political situation had only just begun.74 The Saxons, many of whom during World War II had entered SS units,75 such as the unit “Prince Eugen” operating on the Balkans, were deported to the Soviet Union in large numbers as of 1945. This as well as the preceding war diminished the number of Germans in Transylvania by almost 100,000 persons:

The Romanian and Hungarian census of 1941 show about 213,000 Germans for South Transylvania and about 38,000 Germans for North Transylvania, thus altogether 251,000 Germans, the largest part of whom were Transylvanian Saxons. The census that was conducted roughly a decade later in Romania (25 January 1948) shows a German population in Transylvania of 157,105 persons.76

The Communist era in Romania did bring with it a new legislation with respect to nationality, which guaranteed legal equality to all Romanian citizens,77 but it also implemented a far-reaching land reform, which entailed nationalizations and expropriations. The social upheavals connected to this affected the rural population to a particular extent. The percentage of Saxons who worked in the sector of agriculture, which by the end of World War II had still been 75%, dropped to 22%.78 In the mid-1960s, Nicolae Ceauşescu’s election as secretary general of the Romanian Communist Party opened a new phase of re-structuring, which, from the perspective of the German and Hungarian minority, brought with it a life in a centralized, Romanian-influenced ‘socialist nation-state.’ During the 1970s, temporary tendencies of liberalization were successively limited and the insistence on a specifically Romanian way led the country more and more into a political and economic crisis, which in turn resulted in restrictions and numerous prohibitions. All this contributed to the growing desire among the

72 Gündisch, Siebenbürgen und die Siebenbürger Sachsen, 196.
73 See Köpeczi, Kurze Geschichte Siebenburgens, 680-681.
74 Cf. ibid., 686-687.
75 With more than 50,000 people joining the Waffen-SS, the Germans in Romania constituted the largest part of the so-called “Volksdeutschen.”
76 Gündisch, Siebenbürgen und die Siebenbürger Sachsen, 221.
77 This decrease can be observed very well in the two towns Hermannstadt/Sibiu and Kronstadt/Braşov, which had the largest German population in Transylvania: In the time period named in the quotation above, the number in Hermannstadt decreased from 23,547 to 16,359 and in Kronstadt from 16,210 to 8,480 German inhabitants. Cf. ibid.
78 The Germans were excluded from this until their rehabilitation, which began in 1948 and was finalized through the Romanian constitution of 24 September 1952, in which the Germans are granted their continued existence and their cultural development in articles 81 and 82. Cf. ibid., 228-229.
79 Cf. ibid., 227.
Germans and the Hungarians to emigrate. For example, the Romanian-German declaration on family reunification of 1978 led to an organized emigration of Saxons in the sense that 12,000 to 15,000 Germans per year were allowed to leave the country. In return—according to the daring socialist plan—8000 villages in Transylvania should have disappeared from the map and turned into agrotechnical centers. The Germans’ emigration then climaxed one year after the revolution in 1990, when 111,000 Germans left the country. The new Romanian constitution was adopted on 21 November 1991 and confirmed through a referendum. It guarantees the minorities the right to form democratic parties and associations.

**Slavonia/Slavonija/Szlavónia**

Slavonia, which is situated in the east and northeast of Croatia, today is bordered by Hungary in the north, by the Danube and Serbia in the east and by the Sava and Bosnia and Herzegovina in the south. It spreads across five Croatian counties (= županije): Virovitica-Podravina, Požega-Slavonija, Osijek-Baranja, Vukovar-Syrmien and Brod-Posavina. The border in the west is not clearly defined. At present, the border of the adjoining counties is used.

The medieval “Pannonian Croatia,” mostly referred to as Slawourien or Sclavonia – solvinje (Slawenland) from the 12th century onward, was far more expansive than the often flat and fertile interfluve between the Drava, Danube and Sava rivers which we picture as Slavonia, with or without Syrmia, since the Ottoman invasion in the 16th century.

Since the end of the Middle Ages, the Latin attribute et Slavoniae was added to the entire kingdom of Croatia and Dalmatia, which was used since the reign of Vladislav II. 1491-1516; since 1105 the Croatian crown had been subordinated to the Hungarian crown of Saint Stephen.

Slavonia was principally an area with an ethnically diverse population. Thanks to the introduction of the census during the Hapsburg monarchy, there are more precise records of the population’s composition from the 18th century onwards. Germans and Hungarians had already lived in this area since the Middle Ages, with the Germans, more so than the Hungarians, concentrating in the urban centers. This was the case because the first German-speaking settlers were mainly craftspeople: “Nijemci kao obrtnice su svakao najstariji sloj Njemačeg na našim prostorima.” Given the lack of demographic records, it is hard to reconstruct the exact ethnic proportions among the population, including

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79 This declaration on family reunification of 1978 was commonly also referred to as “Schmidt-Ceaueşcu-Agreement.”
80 Yet, back then the GDR had to “pay ransom” for these emigrants: The rates, which were negotiated in February 1968, were the following: 1,700 deutsche mark for an average citizen; 5,000 deutsche mark for a skilled worker; 10,000 deutsche mark for an academic. The Romanian state gradually increased these rates and new categories were added, such as those for children, retirees or students.
the Slavic population, during this time; data are also missing for the era of the Ottoman rule since they recorded only those portions of the population in the taxation lists of their administrative districts, the Vilajets, who paid taxes. It can be assumed with certainty that mostly Slavic but also Hungarian and German migrants came to the area after the expulsion of the Ottomans, with those in power supporting this internal colonization due to economic and also military reasons. The rivers Danube and Drava played a very significant role in this in their capacity as trade routes. Since the Ottoman conquest the name Slavonia was only used to refer to Upper Slavonia. After the peace of Karlowitz (1699), the Slavonian territories were restored to the Hapsburg monarchy and the Hungarian kingdom. Today’s Slavonia was then a part of the Hungarian counties Baranya, Verőce and Pozsega, and another part belonged to the so-called Hapsburg ‘military border.’ It was exactly its location at the military border that facilitated the rise of Osijek/Esseg/Eszék to the status of provincial center in the course of the 18th century. It became a magnet for Austrian military officials and civil servants as well as for Danube Swabian craftspeople and German-speaking Jews. In the 18th century already, Osijek was an important garrison town and from 1735 through 1783 it was the seat of the Slavonian military headquarters, which even Emperor Josef II. visited in May 1770 as part of a trip to inspect the troops. Danube Swabian farming villages—in contrast, for example, to Southwest Hungary or Vojvodina—were rather the exception.

After the compromise of 1867, people began to migrate from Southwest Hungary, which was far more densely populated, to Slavonia—a migration that “contributed considerably to the birth of the German and Hungarian minority there, but that has hardly been studied by historians to far.” In 1868, the so-called Croatian-Hungarian Settlement (= nagodbba) granted the Croatians some constitutional independence in their administration, in the defense of their territory (= domobrani), in the educational system and also allowed them to have their own parliament (= sabor) as well as a vice king (= banus). In the 19th century, the Croatian intentions and activities, in the context of which a movement called the “rebirth of the Croatian people” (= hrvatski narodni preporod) played a big role, put a strain on both their relations to the Hungarian crown and their relations to the Hungarian minority in Slavonia.

In turn, the Hungarian rule after the compromise brought with it a palpable Magyarization. According

85 It should not be overlooked that these rivers counted among the most important traffic routes prior to the opening of the railroad line Budapest-Gyékényes-Zagreb in 1871. Cf. ibid.
90 Osijek, for instance, with 46.1% between 1880-1910 was that city in the entire Transleithan region with the largest relative population growth and was, with its 31 388 inhabitants, in 1910 the second-largest city in Croatia after Zagreb. Cf. ibid., 92.
to the Croatian historiography, the more intensive Hungarian colonization at the beginning of the 20th century affected Slavonia in particular, which eventually led the Croatians to reflect it.91

The treaty of Trianon (04 June 1920) in the aftermath of World War I joined Slavonia’s territory to the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (SHS).92 After the victory of ‘the Whites’ in early August 1919, several thousand left-winged Hungarians took refuge in the Baranya/Baranja region, which was occupied by SHS troops.93 Nevertheless, the demographic development in the inter-war period was characterized by a constant decrease of the percentage of the Hungarian population; for instance, in the decade between 1921 and 1931 it dropped from 81,835 to 69,671. This development mostly affected the rural population. During the same period, there was even a slight increase in the Hungarian population in Osijek.94 The region Slavonia was thoroughly Croatiatized,95 and the rights for the protection of minorities, introduced in the SHS state, did not change this either; this treaty was published by the SHS state in 1920 and was subjected to the protection and guarantee of the League of Nations the same year.96 The wave of Croatian nationalization reached its climax in the Independent State of Croatia (= Nezavisna Država Hrvatska), which was established in 1941 by the Croatian Ustaša-regime with the support of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy.97

During World War II already, there were programs to resettle the German minority in Slavonia—in comparison to the other research areas in Slovenia and Vojvodina—, which were directed by the German Mittelstelle in Berlin.98 At the end of World War II and in the years immediately following the war, the majority of the remaining German population in Slavonia99 was interned and expelled or murdered, on the basis of the so-called AVNOJ regulations,100 by Communist Yugoslavia.101 The historian Holm Sundhaussen, who specializes in Southeast Europe, notes:

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92 On the developments up until the treaty of Trianon, see Maria Ormos. From Padua to the Trianon 1918-1920. Budapest: Akadémiai kiadó, 1990.
93 Cf. Bethke, Deutsche und ungarische Minderheiten in Kroatien und in der Vojvodina 1918-1941, 155.
94 Cf. ibid., 158-159.
95 Whether this Croatization was an ethnopolitical answer to the Magyarization practiced in the preceding decades cannot be confirmed given the simplicity of the statement, and establishing a direct connection between these issues is not expedient; from the viewpoint of the Croatian historiography this ‘Croatization’ is rather ‘overlooked’ anyway. Cf. e.g. Dragutin Pavličević. Povijest Hrvatske. Zagreb: Naklada P.I.P. Pavičić, 1994. 309-366.
96 Cf. Bethke, Deutsche und ungarische Minderheiten in Kroatien und in der Vojvodina 1918-1941, 152.
97 See Hrvoje Matković. Povijest nezavisne države Hrvatske: kratak pregled. Zagreb: Naklada Pavičić, 1994. The Serbians, who were expelled, interned or murdered in large numbers, were to a particular extent affected by these ethnic cleansings in the Ustaša state. On the commemoration of this era, which is still today the subject of controversy in the respective countries, see Heike Karge. Steinerne Erinnerung - versteinerte Erinnerung? Kriegsgedenken in Jugoslawien (1947-1970). Balkanologische Veröffentlichungen 49. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2010.
100 For a comprehensive summary on the AVNOJ and the laws enacted by it, see Božo Repc. “AVNOJ: Historische Tatsache und aktuelle politische Frage.” Ost-West-Gegeninformationen 2 (2002): XII-XVII.
101 Cf. also the introduction to the research regions Slovenia and Vojvodina.
Since the end of 1944, the Germans were persecuted not primarily for reasons of ethnicity, because they were German, but because their Germanness/Deutschtum had been politically and ideologically charged and shaped since the 1930s. In the tense atmosphere at the end of the war, there was no allowance for the realization that the majority of Germans had been unscrupulously abused by their own leaders and the Hitler regime. The escalation of the violence on Yugoslav territory, which had been set off by Hitler’s attack and which quickly developed its own dynamic, could not be brought to a halt from one day to the other [...].

The Hungarians were recognized as a minority in Communist Yugoslavia, in contrast to the few remaining Germans. And yet, the Hungarian-speaking population in the Croatian Baranja further decreased to a mere 16,595 Hungarians. After the breakup of Yugoslavia and the proclamation of Croatia’s sovereignty, the minority legislation changed as well and nowadays both Hungarians and Germans can benefit from the protection of minorities. Both Volksgruppen have grown rather small in Slavonia, by now, and the original multicultural character of the region is mostly hidden behind the Croatian acculturation.

**Slovenia/Slovenija/Szlovénia**

The research regions in Slovenia are scattered over several areas since there is no shared geographical space in which the Germans and the Hungarians live. The Germans in Slovenia are themselves spread out over several microregions. I therefore selected as research areas the Gottschee/Kočevska in the south of Unterkrain (= Dolenjska), the Abstaller Feld/Apaško Polje at the Slovenian-Austrian border as well as the city Maribor/Marburg, as these are locations of the Germans’ societies, respectively. In contrast to that, the Hungarians live mainly in the east of Slovenia, in the so-called Übermurgebiet/Prekmurje/Muravidék at the Slovenian-Hungarian border, mostly in or around the bilingual town of Lendava/Lendva.

As early as the 14th century, the Gottschee/Kočevska was settled by German-speaking people who, as linguistic studies of their dialect have shown, originally came from the upper Carinthian and east Tirolean area. The had been lured there by the then landowners, the counts of Ortenburg, who had

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104 Census of 2001—in comparison to this, there were still 121,572 Hungarians living in Slavonian in 1910. The numbers for the two sample censuses were taken from Bethke, *Deutsche und ungarische Minderheiten in Kroatien und in der Vojvodina 1918-1941*, 159.

The example of the word “fišpaprikaš” shows the Croatian spelling of a word that is composed of a German and a Hungarian part.
promised to alleviate taxation and military service, in order to make the land more arable. Since Slovenia—similar to the historical developments in Croatia mentioned above—after World War I also joined the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (SHS), the German-speaking Gottscheers became a part of the German minority in this state. After the annexation of Slovenia by German and Italian troops in 1941, the microregion was subjected to an Italian administration. Therefore the notion of "Heim-ins-Reich" became the Gottscheers’ inevitable fate: “97% of the 12,498 (census 1941) German-speaking Gottscheers opted more or less voluntarily” for the resettlement into the Rann Triangle/Ranner Dreieck/Brežiški trikotnik, which was also located in Slovenia and from which 30,000 Slovenes had been resettled by force earlier. This resettlement into the Rann Triangle, which at the time was situated at the borders of the ‘Provincia di Lubiana,’ administrated by the Italians, and of the Croatian Ustaša state (= Nezavisna Država Hrvatska), mentioned above, was executed during the winter of 1941/42 by the German Reichsmittelstelle, headed by Heinrich Himmler. A large German-speaking population that became a minority in the demographic and legal sense in the interwar period during the monarchy lived in the Abstaller Feld/Apaško Polje, south of the Mur river, which since 1920 constituted the Slovenian-Austrian border, as well as at Maribor/Marburg. During and after the end of World War II, the German population in Slovenia, too, was interned, expelled, or murdered, following the AVNOJ regulations. The numbers of the Germans that remained in the Štajerska (= Slovenian-speaking Styria), or in the microregion Gottschee, can only be approximated, despite very thorough historical investigations since people did not dare reveal their German identity in official censuses for fear of persecution or internment. For this reason and occasionally because of unsettled issues of restitution, the remaining members of the German Volksgruppe were not granted the legal status of a minority, not even after the breakup of Yugoslavia and the proclamation of Slovenia’s sovereignty in 1991. And thus, they did not receive any financial aid from the state. It is therefore the stated aim of most of the German-speaking societies in Slovenia to obtain recognition as a minority.

112 During the Yugoslavian census of 1948, 1824 persons in Slovenia officially declared to be Germans and 582 to be Austrians (total: 2406 persons); for the region Gottschee (including the towns Novo Mesto and Črnomelj), only 144 Germans and Austrians can be traced in the sources. Cf. M. Ferenc, Kočevska, pusta in prazna, 288-294.
The Hungarian minority in Slovenia emerged, like those in other research regions, after a new border was drawn and as a result of the Treaty of Trianon, which was signed on 04 June 1920. During the Hapsburg monarchy, Prekmurje had been included in the Hungarian county Zala and after the compromise of 1867 had been governed at Budapest. Based on this historical perspective, researchers divided the Hungarians living there (= muravidéki magyarság) in two sub-groups: i) “Lendvavidéki” refers to those Hungarians who lived near the center Lendva/Lendava and who, next to this center, live in villages between Dobronak and Pince; ii) “Őrségi” refers to those Hungarians who live in those villages that up until the Treaty of Trianon had been part of the county Vas. Since the inter-war period, the Hungarians have developed a regional consciousness as a minority, which was fueled by Slovenia’s sovereignty because the Hungarian minority could benefit from some privileges in terms of minority rights and, given its marginal position, also from EU assistance measures.

At the same time, there were already transformations in this region during Yugoslavian times, which mainly fostered bilingualism (= kétnyelviség) and in accord with that the formation of a double identity in the sense of szlovén-és-magyar (= Slovenian and Hungarian).

Southern Transdanubia/Dél-Dunántúl

Southwest Hungary is referred to in Hungarian as Dél-dunántúli régió (= southern Transdanubian region). It extends over the three Hungarian counties Baranya/Branau, Somogy/Schomodei and Tolna/Tolnau, and is also called “Swabian Turkey” in German due to its Danube-Swabian population and due to the former Ottoman rule in this region. After the defeat and the retreat of the Ottomans in the so-called ‘Great Turkish War’ between 1683 and 1699 (Treaty of Karlowitz), Southwest Hungary became part of the Hapsburg monarchy, whose goal it was to newly organize the territory and to settle and economically strengthen a German-speaking population in the sense of the concept developed Leopold Kolonich in 1689, which was titled “Einrichtungswerk des Königreichs Ungarn.” Leopold I. then issued the first Impopulationspatent in Vienna in August 1689, which promised to the new settlers affordable plots of land in the cities, plots for free in the villages and other privileges such as a five-year exemption from taxes and services. In the second Impopulationspatent,

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116 On the term “Danube Swabian,” see esp. the following section We Danube Swabians, Germans in Hungary, Transylvanian Saxons, Gottscheers.


which followed in December of the same year in Pécs, the “Schwabenland” was explicitly named as the settlers’ preferred region of origin. After a rather unplanned first phase of immigration and the devastations of the Rákóczi insurrection—referred to as ‘Rákóczi fight for independence’ in Hungary and, by contrast, as ‘kuruc rebellion’ in the Hapsburg hereditary lands—it took until 1712 for a better thought-through private colonization to set in. Toward the end of the 18th and at the beginning of the 19th century, the immigration of new settlers came to a halt. The capacity of the county Tolna, for instance, was already so exhausted that even an internal colonization from east to west set in at the time, namely into the county Baranya, but even more so into the county Somogy. Those in particular who were excluded from the line of succession and had not received their inheritance in cash resettled there or bought the farms of overindebted Hungarians, Croatians or Serbians. Those peasant’s sons whose inheritance was not enough to buy an estate found wives in villages that were not yet overpopulated. In Southwest Hungary, this east-west internal colonization lasted until the second half of the 19th century. The center of the entire region, the city Pécs/Fünfkirchen, was trilingual—German, Hungarian and Croatian—through the first half of the 19th century. After the turmoil of the revolution of 1848/49, the population of Pécs grew further in the second half of the 19th century in the course of the restructuring and the industrialization of trade and production, which showed the following developments with regard to the Germans:

The number of the Germans at Fünfkirchen grew between 1880 and 1900 from 5276 to 7717. Their immigration was mainly directed toward the suburbs, where in 1880 already 80% of the Germans lived. As conclusions drawn from her elaborations, Márta Fata explains why the German immigrants in Hungary in the 18th and in the 19th century could assert themselves very successfully:

The Germans’ ethnic success was the result of the convergence of their specialized knowledge, on the one hand, and the structure of the labor shortage in Hungary, on the other. The German immigrants could therefore profit from the opportunities they encountered in Hungary in the 18th and in the 19th. […] The integration of the Germans, in the end, was so swift and successful because the German workforce proved useful for the host society.

124 The demographic proportions in 1832 were the following: 37.4% Hungarians, 31.6% Croatians and 31.1% Germans. Cf. ibid., 30.
125 Ibid., 32.
126 Ibid., 39.

The expression “the ethnic success” seems rather consequential, especially in the context of the topic of ethnomangement, and yet it remains somewhat blurry in its semantic meaningfulness.
In the course of the 20th century, the process of urbanization intensified even more. Despite the introduction of laws on minority protection, it is regarded as one of the main reasons for the continuously increasing assimilation.\textsuperscript{127} To what extent the forced migration of the Germans in Hungary,\textsuperscript{128} which began in Hungary in 1946 and was later stopped, promoted the later assimilation cannot be assessed exactly, not even with the help of the most recent research. During this forced migration, there were large differences in Hungary from region to region and the central-Hungarian region Pest-Pilis-Solt-Kiskun with its population of 41,303 was particularly affected.\textsuperscript{129} The complete expulsion of the Germans in Hungary had basically already been decided in December 1945 by the parliament at Budapest, based on the Potsdam Agreement of 02 August 1945; for this purpose, a ‘concentration plan’ had been devised, which projected to place the Germans in Hungary in a camp close to the border in west Hungary and to transport them to Germany at a later point in time.\textsuperscript{130} In the Southwest Hungarian research region, by 14 June 1946, 3,312 persons had been expelled from 5 communities in the county Baranya and 11,928 persons from 8 communities in the county Tolna.\textsuperscript{131} It is clear, however, that the Hungarians’ political arbitrariness, the expulsions and expropriations, which the members of the German minority were subjected to, have caused a severe trauma among the German Volksgruppe—also among those who ‘were allowed’ to stay as after mid-1946 the option to exempt Germans in Hungary from this forced migration was used more and more.\textsuperscript{132} Until today, the questions as to the motives for these actions are not fully answered,\textsuperscript{133} particularly since Germany and Hungary were not enemies during World War II. Quite on the contrary, the relation between the Horthy regime and the Nazi regime since 1940 had been perfectly harmonious thanks to the Tripartite Pact.

Only in 1949 were the Germans in Hungary granted equal status with all nationalities in the constitution but it took until 1955 for the Landesverband, which at the time was called Kulturverband der Deutschen Werktätigen in Ungarn, to be founded. Until then, there was no so-called ‘mother-tongue education’ in German. The foundation of the Landesverband continued to conceal that for many decades it was simply impossible to found regional German minority organizations, and with


\textsuperscript{129} Cf. Ágnes Tóth, Migrationen in Ungarn 1945-1948, 154.

\textsuperscript{130} Cf. ibid., 129.

\textsuperscript{131} Cf. ibid., 154.

\textsuperscript{132} Cf. ibid., 175.

regard to schooling the only option was a cooperation with the GDR.\textsuperscript{134} Only from the 1980s on did these prohibitions successively loosen:

Since 1982 more and more elementary schools conducted bilingual lessons. In many kindergartens, there are German-language activities. The number of bilingual Gymnasien and middle schools increased steadily and some technical schools offered a vocational training as masons, cabinetmakers, carpenters and gardener in two languages […] In 1985, the first Hungarian-German society of the post-war period, the Nikolaus-Lenau-Kulturverein at Fünfkirchen, was founded. […] In 1989, more and more societies were founded on the local, the regional and the state level.\textsuperscript{135}

Since 1990, the Germans in Hungary have had a say in local decisions, and after the elections in December 1994 and the byelections in November 1995 165 German Minderheitselbstverwaltungen emerged.\textsuperscript{136} The three counties of the research region have a multiethnic population, with a by now distinct Hungarian majority population.\textsuperscript{137}

\textbf{Vojvodina/Vajdaság}

Vojvodina, located in the north of Serbia, is likewise considered a \textit{multicultural region}, and even more so than in the research regions treated above, politicians and population like to coquet with this image.\textsuperscript{138} This is due, on the one hand, to the fact that indeed more than 20 \textit{Volksgruppen} are at home there,\textsuperscript{139} and on the other, that many people feel they are a part of this diversity. A slightly idealized view of Vojvodina’s history, which ranges from the peaceful coexistence in a fertile region in the Hapsburg Empire to the autonomy in the association of states of Yugoslavia, supports this orientation. Since the breakup of Yugoslavia, which was preceded by the abolition of Vojvodina’s autonomy, and Serbia’s sovereignty, the Serbian majority population palpably intensified their political and societal claim to power.

Carl Bethke quite fittingly calls Vojvodina a “landscape of history” and the individual parts of this region become more accessible if they are set in relation to the rivers: Bačka is situated between the Danube and Tisza rivers, the Banat (Hung. Bánság) lies east of the Tisza and Syrmia (Croat. srijem, Germ. Syrmien) lies between the Danube and Sava rivers.\textsuperscript{140} The Hungarians’ historical claim

\begin{footnotes}{\footnotesize
135} Ibid., 12.
136} Cf. ibid., 13-14.
137} The \textit{Volksgruppen} are distributed sich demographically as follows (census 2001): Baranya – 375,611 Hungarians, 22,720 Germans, 10,623 Roma, 7,294 Croatians, 703 Serbs; Somogy – 311,309 Hungarians, 9,418 Roma, 6,658 Germans, 720 Croatians, 71 Serbs; Tolna – 233,656 Hungarians, 4,760 Roma, 965 Germans, 84 Croatians, 82 Serbs. In all three counties, there live further groups recognized as minorities in Hungary, such as Bulgarians, Jews, Romanians, Ruthenians, Slovaks and Ukrainians. Source: \url{http://www.nepszamlalas.hu/hun/index.html} (14 July 2010).
139} The Serbian census of 2002 records for the region Vojvodina altogether more than 20 \textit{etnien}: 1.32 Mio. Serbs (65.05%), 290,207 Hungarians (14.5%), 56,637 Slovaks (2.79%), 56,546 Croatians (2.78%) (including Bunjevice/Bunjewatzen and Šokci/Schokatzen), 35,513 Montenegroins (1.75%), 30,416 Romanians (1.5%) and 29,057 Roma (1.43%); 15,626 Rusyns, 11,785 Macedonians, 4,635 Ukrainians, 3,154 Germans, 2,005 Slovenes, 1,695 Albanians, 1,658 Bulgarians and further, even smaller minorities such as Egyptians, Gorani, Jews and Vlachs. Source: Etnički sastav stanovništva Srbije prema popisu iz 2002. \url{http://www.pregled-rr.com} (14 July 2010).
\end{footnotes}
mostly relates to the areas in the north of Vojvodina for two reasons: On the one hand, these areas were again subject to the Hungarian administration after the end of the Ottoman rule (Treaty of Passarowitz 1718), but mainly after the removal of the military border in this region until 1918. And on the other hand, the Hungarians clearly made up the majority population there:

According to the census data collected on the mother tongue […], the Hungarians formed the strongest ethnic group in 1910 with 300,263 persons in Bačka and 108,862 persons in the Banat; in Bačka alone, there were more than twice as many Hungarians as there were Serbs. At present, however, they form no majority by any means, representing 42.49% of the population in Bačka and 19.18% in the Banat. […] Including Subotica, the population in this subregion, which is about 12.4% of Vojvodina, was 76.2% Hungarian.141

The immigration of the Danube Swabians to Vojvodina is immediately linked to the settlement along the Hapsburg military border, mentioned above. It took place in the 18th century in three major waves of immigration, which are therefore called the three “Schwabenzüge,” namely in the years between 1722-1726, 1763-1770 and 1782-1790. These settlements were all directed by the Hapsburg monarchy and fall into the reigns of Charles VI, Maria Theresa and Joseph II.142 The German settlement over time produced a very multilayered Danube Swabian society, which extended to the sectors of agriculture, commerce and industry as well as to the sectors of culture and education.143 In contrast to, for example, the Serbs, the Germans were more assimilated, especially since the times of the Magyarization after the compromise of 1867, mentioned repeatedly above. According to Bethke, the reasons why the Germans then still lacked a national consciousness were to be found in their colonial mindset, which seemingly was more geared towards the accumulation of wealth and social upward mobility. For the liberal urban population in particular, Bethke argues, the symbolic Magyarization of the name was also a symbol of modernization.144

After World War I and after Vojvodina had been joined to the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (SHS) in the Treaty of Trianon, some things in the multiethnic fabric of the region changed by necessity:

The first Yugoslavian census of 31 January 1921 recorded on the territory of today’s Vojvodina 370,985 Hungarian native speakers (24.27% of the total population there) and 336,529 people who themselves declared their mother tongue as “German” or let others categorize it as such (22.07%). The two minorities formed thus half of the overall population. The main area of settlement was Bačka, where the Hungarian-speaking population, with a share of 35.5% of the total population, was the relative majority into the 1950s and the Germans, with 23.64%, were the second largest ethnic group.145

141 Ibid., 104.
142 Cf. Ibid., 123.
143 The demographic development at the beginning of the 20th century can be described as follows: “In 1910, 323,793 people (i.e. 21.45% of the total population) on the territory of what later became Vojvodina declared to be German native speakers. The largest group (161,760 Germans, 22.85%) lived in Bačka, esp. in the lowlands, e.g. along the Danube, from Novi Futog in the west of Novi Sad to the later Hungarian border near Stanišić. These settlements were mostly Catholic. There were Protestant communities (Lutheran and Reformed) in middle Bačka […] In the Banat (123,574 Germans, 22.14%), there was a differentiation between the south Banat […] and the middle Banat around Veliki Bečkerek and the ‘heideboden,’ partly shaped by a ‘Lorrainese’ influence, in the north. The most important settlements with a German majority in Syrmia (36,659 Germans, 15.64%) were Ruma, Indija and Nova Pazova.” Ibid., 125.
144 Cf. ibid., 127.
145 Ibid., 157.
Given their separation from the mother nation, 44,903 persons from among the Hungarian Volksgruppe emigrated until 1924, in spite of the treaty for the protection of minorities, which included a right of choice. The majority of them were soldiers and civil servants and their families, who arbitrarily were not taken over by the SHS state.\textsuperscript{146} This initial situation made it hard for the Hungarians to prove loyal to the new host state. The Schwäbisch-Deutsche-Kulturbund (SDKB), founded in 1920, on the other hand, referred to itself as loyal to the state, and further as volkstreu and was at the same time considered to be critical of Hungary.\textsuperscript{147} The establishment of the so-called ‘January 6 Dictatorship’ in Yugoslavia in January 1929 exacerbated all ethnic-national mobilizations. Among the Germans, the “renewers” convinced of the national-socialist ideas more and more appeared on the scene in the 1930s, which eventually led to the overthrow of the leaders of the Kulturbund and the renewers’ advent to power in 1939.\textsuperscript{148} The foundation of a Hungarian Kulturbund, which was declared the most important cultural goal for the Hungarians in Vojvodina, however, proved extremely difficult, as there were not only many counter-currents within the Hungarian Volksgruppe itself—such as aspirations to autonomy, the split of Vojvodina, annexation to Croatian territories,—, but also the resistance on the part of greater Serbian circles, who founded the “Serbischen Kultur-Klub” in Subotica/Szabadka in 1937.\textsuperscript{149} Nonetheless, the Ungarischer Kulturbund in Jugoslawien (= Jugoszláviai Magyar Közművelődési Szövetség) was founded in November 1940, which could then develop relatively quickly.

On the basis of the völkische Kulturbund the unification of the Hungarians seems to have progressed rather quickly. The “Reggeli Újság” in particular constantly reported on the development of the Kulturbund […] As the “Híradó” reported on 14 March 1941, there were already 124 local groups of the Kulturbund at the time, by the beginning of April there were supposedly 150.\textsuperscript{150}

On 06 April, Nazi Germany began to attack Yugoslavia, which capitulated after 12 days. After the rule of the Hungarian occupiers in Vojvodina, the tide began to turn as of September 1944, especially for the German Volksgruppe:

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This demographic distribution made the decision of Trianon especially bitter for both Volksgruppen, and the author Carl Bethke, especially with regard to Vojvodina, therefore poses the legitimate question of whether the Treaty of von Trianon was not for both Volksgruppen a “small-scale end of the world.”\textsuperscript{\textsuperscript{146}}

\textsuperscript{146} Cf. ibid., 161.

\textsuperscript{147} Cf. ibid., 272 ff.


\textsuperscript{150} Bethke, Deutsche und ungarische Minderheiten in Kroatien und in der Vojvodina 1918-1941, 586.
About 200,000 Volksdeutsche got caught in the clutches of the Red Army and the Yugoslavian partisans. […] The authorities referred to the damage done by the depredations as “unestimable,” which best illustrates their extent.151

Until mid-1945, the Germans were interned in camps or murdered152 and after the end of World War II the Yugoslavian government applied to the Allies for the expulsion of 110,000 Germans, who were believed to still be in the country. As the Allies did not approve, the Germans often had to remain in the camps until 1948, which many of them did not survive.153 Afterwards, the Germans tried to emigrate as fast as possible from the Communist Yugoslavia in order to escape another arbitrary government. Those who had intermarried received only restricted civil rights. In most cases, they went into hiding anyway and do not appear as members of the German Volksgruppe any more. According to one source, in Vojvodina, they mostly passed themselves off as Hungarians in public after that, and, in order to maintain this mimicry, spoke only Hungarian in public.154

Andreas Bürgermayer, the president of the Nationalrat der Deutschen in Serbien, however, in an interview also states that there never was a conflict in Vojvodina between the Serbian and the German population, but that any conflict was always on the level of politics. With respect to the events before and after the end of World War II, he points out that the members of the German minority in Vojvodina counted among the poorest groups of society after their forced internment and three years of forced labor as well as the loss of their assets.155 According to Bürgermayer, even today, the fear of losing their employment prevents many, despite their German descent, from declaring themselves to be German, from having their names registered as such in the electoral lists or even from joining a German minority society. Thus, Bürgermayer says, “people themselves officially can do little to maintain their own national identity.”156

As early as 1945, the Autonomous Province Vojvodina was established in the Yugoslavian federation, through whose statute the population’s identification with their region, mentioned earlier, was fostered. It reinforced the foundations of the multicultural character of this region, especially so after the extension of the autonomous rights by Tito in 1974. In 1989, however, it was revoked through a measure taken by president Slobodan Milošević. As of 2002 (omnibus law),157 the region could successively158 win back parts of these rights, yet without gaining tax authority in the region.

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154 Interview transcript, Boris Mašić, 21 September 2005.
155 See interview transcript, Andreas Bürgermayer, 22 April 2010.
156 Ibid.
157 On this law, see chapter 2.1 the section Minority Protection in the Host States.
According to Zsolt Lazar, the more strongly accentuated national Serbian elements in Vojvodina led sometimes to a distrustful and distanced side-by-side, rather than a multicultural togetherness.\footnote{Lazar, Vojvodina amidst Multiculturality and Regionalization.} This, and the demographic shifts, which are mostly due to the arrival of Serbian war refugees from Krajina or Kosovo, whose political opinion is very pronouncedly national-Serbian, even led to ethnic conflicts, which are cleverly exploited by national-populist political circles, as they “profit from an ethnopolitical mobilization.”\footnote{Martin Bruss. “Die Vojvodina in der aktuellen Politik der Verfassungsordnung Serbiens.” Südosteuropa 4 (2005): 573.} Therefore, the ethnic minorities in Vojvodina that are ‘smaller’ in numbers align with the Hungarians as the largest \textit{Volksgruppe} in all questions of minority politics: This allows two conclusions. Firstly, they rally behind the Hungarians with regard to any concrete issue; secondly, they can also rally behind the Hungarians in order not to be the direct target of potential attacks by the Serbian majority population. Parallely, the population in Vojvodina contrasts this with the notion of the peaceful union and the peaceful coexistence, which lasted for many centuries. This not only shapes the historical narrative, but also the interethnic relations—for example, many Serbian families, who have lived in Vojvodina over several generations, sometimes feel more solidarity towards their neighbors, even if they are members a different \textit{ethnie}, than towards the more recently arrived Serbs.

It thus seems, at first glance, as if the situation in Vojvodina were quite similar to the one in Transylvania, where there are also political and social tensions, fueled by national-populist calculation both sides, between the Hungarians as the largest national minority and the Romanians as the majority population.\footnote{The policy of the kin state Hungary also contributed to this, for example in the form of the law on dual citizenship, which only became effective on 01 January 2011 and which makes it possible for every member of the Hungarian minority in neighboring countries to obtain Hungarian citizenship.} The relations between the Germans and the Serbs, however, are markedly different from those between the Germans and the Romanians: Whereas the Germans emigrated from Transylvania in different waves more or less voluntarily, the Germans were mostly expelled from Vojvodina in the years 1944-48. This has resulted in claims made by the Germans in Serbia for “compensation and reparations” as well as for the “revocation of the AVNOJ resolutions of 21 November 1944 and of all laws based on them.”\footnote{Rudolf Weiss. “Die Lage der Deutschen in der Bundesrepublik Jugoslawien.” Europa und die Zukunft der deutschen Minderheit. Schriftenreihe Geschichte, Gegenwart und Zukunft der altösterreichischen deutschen Minderheiten in den Ländern der ehemaligen Donaumonarchie 1. Wien: Felix Ermacora Institut, 2001, 121.} Bethke titles the situation of the Germans now living in Vojvodina with the motto “Between assimilation and \textit{ethnic revival}.”\footnote{Bethke, Deutsche und ungarische Minderheiten in Kroatien und in der Vojvodina 1918-1941, 121.}

\textbf{Self-Designations and Markers}

\textbf{We Danube Swabians, Germans in Hungary, Transylvanian Saxons, Gottscheers}

For the creation of a collective identity, it was and is helpful under any circumstances to give a name to the we-group, especially when the group is as heterogenous in its composition or origins as is the German \textit{Volksgruppe} in Southeast Europe—no matter how artificial that name eventually is. A name suggests community, and after only several generations this name will in most cases be interpreted as

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext{Lazar, Vojvodina amidst Multiculturality and Regionalization.}
\footnotetext{The policy of the kin state Hungary also contributed to this, for example in the form of the law on dual citizenship, which only became effective on 01 January 2011 and which makes it possible for every member of the Hungarian minority in neighboring countries to obtain Hungarian citizenship.}
\end{footnotes}
historically grown. This naming process not only serves the purpose of categorizing people as belonging to an ethnic group, but also of designating the respective other group and thus of clearly identifying boundaries. The Germans’ diverse areas of origin and settlement have resulted in diverse names in Southeast Europe, which will be explicated in more detail in the following as they are an essential element of collective orientation in the Germans’ identity management and ethnomanagement.

The name Danube Swabian or Swabian was primarily meant to suggest the common origin of the German colonists, who moved to Southeast Europe in the migration waves described above. Yet, both historical and linguistic research proves that this term “is imprecise as a designation of origin.”164 Claus-Jürgen Hutterer, a Germanist at Graz, describes as follows how the designation ‘Swabians’ was attached to all German-speaking settlers:

It seems like an irony of fate that the tribe that gave the group its name mostly survives in this area in its name only. […] Almost everywhere in the Carpathian Basin, the Bavarians and the Franconians took their place, and the name ‘Swabians’ was transferred onto them.165 Annemarie Röder, therefore, refers to the population of German origin as “nominal Swabians.”166 Surprisingly, the settlers from Bavaria, Franconia, Hesse or the Hapsburg hereditary lands never protested against this “wrong label” or chose a different self-designation at all. This may be due to the fact that the designation Swabian or Danube Swabian, both as a self-designation and as an external designation,167 was almost considered equivalent with the attribute German or German-speaking. It was hardly used with a pejorative connotation since the stereotypes associated with the Swabians were mainly their industry, cleanliness and frugality. Hutterer therefore names social reasons, rather, which led to the protest against this self-designation, because, in southwest Hungary for instance, the term Swabian or Danube Swabian was associated with the farmers in the village. Therefore, according to Hutterer, the German bourgeoisie objected to this designation and tended more and more towards using the designation German in Hungary.168

The term Danube Swabian apparently was coined in 1922 by the then professor and chair of geography at the University of Graz, Robert Sieger, and was supposed to serve as designation for a “Volksstamm of its own.”169 In this regard in particular, it spread quickly and experienced a veritable boom due to the völkische mindset of the inter-war period. And it didn’t seem to matter in the least

165 Cf. Röder, Deutsche, Schwaben, Donauschwaben, 183.
166 Similar to the Hungarian terms such as “tóth” for a Slovak, “rác” for a Serb or “oláh” for a Romanian. Hungarians, for instance, use the term “sváb” for a Schwabe; in Croatia and Serbia, Danube Swabians are referred to as “Dunavske švabe.”
Since the current research shows that there is a considerable steering effect on the part of the ethnomanagement when it comes to the usage of the terms German in Hungary versus Danube Swabian, an appendix at the end of the chapter was dedicated to this question.
that, according to Gerhard Seewann, it was “geographically imprecise,” “historically inaccurate” and basically an “altogether unfortunate collective term.” Nevertheless, the Landsmannschaften not only cling to it, but they interpret history in such a way as to see a German Volksstamm of its own formed in the term:

The Danube Swabians can be called—by way of a summary definition—the descendants of the settlers from German and Austrian territories, who from the end of the 17th to the beginning of the 19th century were resettled to the middle and lower Danube area in the context of largest colonization project of modern history realized by Austria and who, in the course of their development, were shaped by influences of a shared history and of a shared living space into a Volksstamm of their own.

This inaccurate designation of origin triggered more confusion as all the ‘so-called Swabians’ spoke and speak different dialects, such as Bavarian-Austrian, Franconian, Hessian, Transylvanian-Saxon or Swabian. Furthermore, over time many mixed forms have developed from these original dialects especially in the settlement areas in Southeast Europe, which linguistic laymen all subsumed under the label “Danube Swabian.” In principle it can be observed that the Germans in the research regions currently use the term Danube Swabian as the group’s self-designation with entirely different frequency and connotation. It is often used mainly to lend the German Volksgruppe a historicizing or folklorizing touch, in contrast to the term that is applicable to the Germans according to the respective status within the minority rights: in the settlement areas, it is used, for example, as an attribute in the sense of “the Danube Swabian cuisine,” in a “Danube Swabian inn” or “the Danube Swabian folk dress.” As an external designation from the outside, it primarily serves to identify the Germans living in the countries of Southeast Europe as a group, in contrast to the Germans in Germany. In sum, the term remains rather stereotypical after all, due to its incorrect restriction to an assumed Swabian origin.

The designation German in Hungary, similarly to the term Danube Sawbian yet to a far lesser degree, can also be understood as artificial. According to Gerhard Seewann, the sense of affiliation with Hungary developed because the Germans mostly identified with their home village and the Hungarian culture surrounding them, and not exclusively with their countries of origin, Germany and Austria. Ultimately, this led them to see themselves as and use the self-designation “German Hungari-

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171 See also the educational you-tube-videos by Dr. Georg Wildmann on the history of the Danube Swabians, which are made available online by the Donauschwäbische Arbeitsgemeinschaft (DAG), starting with http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_XznuLddGmM (06 June 2011).
173 Cf. Röder, Deutsche, Schwaben, Donauschwaben, 184.
174 From among the abundance of literature on the history and identity construction of the Germans in Hungary, see e.g. the article by Györgyi Bindorffer. “Hungarian Germans. Identity Questions: Past and Present.” Ethnologia Balkanica 8 (2004): 115-127.
This essentially compares to a gradual process of acculturation. Eszter Probszt describes the interplay with the term identity as follows:

In the context of my research, I understand Hungarian-German identity as collective identity as well as a person’s social identity as discursively produced and reproduced. I need to start from the assumption that the Hungarian-German identity does not exist in an essentialist sense but that Hungarian-German identity constructs are shaped differently and depending on different contexts, that the instances of politics and socialization (including literature) always offer different or even competing models of identity. These patterns of Hungarian-German identity constructions are further reinforced by the varying degrees of language proficiency since the younger generations speak much better Hungarian than German. Seewann even doubts the quality of the education in the mother tongue and thus German should by now have to be taught as a foreign language. The research on the Germans in Hungary, too, is by now oriented along the oscillation process between these two identities (= kettős identitás). The Hungarian-German identity management and ethnomanagement uses the designation Germans in Hungary in the ethnopolitical everyday life and is only willing to accept the term Danube Swabian in folkloristic contexts. The question of whether this stricter handling is the result of political calculation or of processes of acculturation, cannot be answered here without a doubt. Surely enough, however, the Germans in Hungary themselves folklorize the designation Danube Swabian, and they do so completely consciously.

In the course of my field research, I could further notice that the order of the ethnic markers has already shifted among the younger generation for the reasons named above: The Hungarian-German origin has taken the place of the German language in the context of the ethnic orientation, and their German language follows on the second rank only. It is therefore little surprising, for example, that the Hungarian-German youth speaks Hungarian at the so-called ‘Schwabenball’; even in the German-language Gymnasien, the Hungarian-German students mostly speak Hungarian with each other during recess. As the proficiency in German is continuously worsening, the commitment to their Hungarian-German origin allows also those generations among who the proficiency in German is developed only through second language acquisition or even less, because they are the children of mixed parents, to access their German identity and thus to be included in the minority. Gerhard Seewann also observes these developments since he believes that “assimilation or integration are by no means linked...”

to a self-abandonment of the Ethnikum or to the des Zugehörigkeitsbewußtseins zu einer ethnischen Gruppe verbunden“ wäre:

As a Hungarian speaking Hungarian (as a mother tongue), one can also be German. I would like to correct Széchenyi’s statement (The nation lives in its language). The consciousness is the most important factor, not the language.181

This paradigm shift by its very processual nature successively alters the basic attitudes as well as the perspectives of the Hungarian-German identity management and ethnomanagement, which nolens volens have to gradually adapt to these new conditions.

Just as much as the Danube Swabians are for the most part not from Swabia, the Transylvanian Saxons also do not come from Saxony. Their name even goes back to the era of the Universitas Saxonum in the 15th century,182 served as a kind of autostereotype for the purpose of self-identification183 and has since been used both as a self-designation and as an external designation.184 In the context of the nationalization of the ethnic groups in the course of the 19th century, the Sächsische Volkspartei was founded, which was supposed to provide a counterforce to the then increased efforts of Magyarization on the part of the Hungarians after the compromise of 1867. Since then, the Transylvanian Saxons have witnessed several changes, which above all concerned their social organization into the so-called ‘neighborhoods’ to the inside185 as well as the interethnic relations to Romanian and Hungarian neighbors to the outside.186

A decisive difference in the self-conception between the Transylvanian Saxons and the Danube Swabians was that the Saxons for a long time upheld two pre-conditions of their identity as criteria for the access to their community, namely their Protestant faith and their Low German, and thus hard-to-understand dialect. This applied even to German speakers who married into the Saxon community or who had remained in Transylvania for career motives and tried to make connections in the Saxon society. The community of the Danube Swabians, by contrast, was a lot more heterogeneous. While they were mostly Catholic, they were split into many groups according to dialect and origins, which also intermixed. In the research literature, the Germans in Transylvania are often treated neutrally as ‘Transylvanian Germans’ or ‘the Germans in Transylvania,’ and no longer generally as Tran-

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184 In Romanian, the Saxons - the Saxons are referred to as “sas - şaşi” and in Hungarian as “szász – szászok.”
sylvanian Saxons; likewise, their political representation is called *Demokratisches Forum der Deutschen in Siebenbürgen* (DFDS). The self-designation Transylvanian Saxons can still be found quite frequently among the emigrated Saxons, who live in Germany and Austria, and in their organizations, such as the ‘*Verband der Siebenbürger Sachsen in Deutschland*’ or the ‘*Bundesverband der Siebenbürger Sachsen in Österreich*. An interesting socio-cultural phenomenon that could develop only due to the Saxons’ exodus after 1990 are the so-called *Sommersachsen* (Roman. *saşi de vară*): This term refers to former Saxon inhabitants who emigrated but who have kept their properties in Transylvania and who now—they are mostly retirees—spend the warm season in the “old Heimat.” The reasons for this are often sentimental, because they are simply not as strongly rooted in their “new Heimat” Germany; there are also pragmatic-economic reasons, because with the pension, which may be small by German standards, one can afford a much better life in Romania. It is still not entirely certain where the name of the *Gottscheers*, who live in the southern part of Slovenia, mainly in and at the margins of the Hornwald/Kočevski Rog, derives from. The most likely explanation is that the word derives from Slovenian “koča,” which means cottage or hut. German-speaking settlers started to come to the region more than 650 years ago and the then new settlers—judging by their dialect—came from the eastern Tirol and upper Carinthian regions into this area, which at the time was already mostly settled by Slovenes. The name Gottscheers was maintained to this day in the self-designation and the external designation, also after the resettlement and emigration summarized in the preceding section. At present, however, the group who remains in Slovenia is very small, and Slovenian is the predominant vernacular among the younger generations; in the immigration countries such as Austria, Germany or the USA, the Gottscheers are assimilated and their origin shows above all in their culture of memory and does no longer influence their every-day life.

In accordance with the theory on the identity management and ethnomangement, the different designations of the Germans can be explained as follows: During my study of the literature, but also during my field research, I noticed in particular that these artificial designations, such as Danube Swabian or Transylvanian Saxon, as nominal groups have developed into a functional *ethnic group brand*. These designations transport a semantic message that creates in any case the image of an ethnic group because it suggests at the same time a historically grown community. The Romanian-German identity management and ethnomangement try to stress the positive connotations of the brand ‘Transylvanian

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189 There is, however, a pejorative tone to this term: “Dr. Bernd Fabritius […] in turn lamented that attributions such as ‘Sommersachsen’ were used pejoratively. The *Bundesvorsitzende* himself replied to the rhetorical question ‘Can we have several home countries?’: ‘I have only one home country, the Transylvanian-Saxon home!’” Christian Schoger: Panel discussion at Dinkelsbühl on the topic “Heimat ohne Grenzen.” *Siebenbürgische Zeitung*, 18 June 2014, see [http://www.siebenbuerger.de/zeitung/artikel/14544-podiumsdiskussion-in-dinkelsbuehl-ueber.html](http://www.siebenbuerger.de/zeitung/artikel/14544-podiumsdiskussion-in-dinkelsbuehl-ueber.html) (17 July 2014).
190 Cf. interview transcript, Beatrice Ungar, 28 August 2009.
Saxons’ despite the emigration. This mostly takes the form of a mixture of stereotypical self-ascriptions and external ascriptions, such as the virtues of industry, a good educational and economic system or group consciousness. The Hungarian-German identity management and ethnomangement, on the other hand, try to reject the brand ‘Danube Swabian’ as a general designation for the Germans in Hungary and try to put it mostly in a volkskulturell context, which is supposed to provide a framework for folk music, folk dress, the traditional cuisine or the diversity of the dialects. It needs to be added at the same time that the Germans in southwest Hungary are still designated, from the outside, by the Hungarians as well as by the other Ethnien living there, as “svábok” (= Swabians). This can also be observed in Slavonia and in Vojvodina, where the Croats and the Serbs for the most part use the designation “švabe” or “dunavske švabe” to refer to the Germans.

These names in some way also served the purpose of orientation within a (seemingly) organically grown group, where it played no role whether the name is in fact identical with the origin of the group members or not. The advantage of the Transylvanian Saxons was their very early ‘political’ sovereignty. They built a very tight social system in the form of the Nachbarschaften (neighborhoods), which rested on the absolute loyalty towards the neighborhood elder as well as towards the Protestant minister. This framework, which did not provide the chance for orientation, was far looser among the Danube Swabians and without such strict directives as were found among the Saxons. Yet, the religious creed was equally a requirement among the Danube Swabians since during the waves of colonization, controlled by the Hapsburgers, the goal was to resettle as many Catholics as possible to Southeast Europe. In today’s everyday life, the designations Germans in Romania or Germans in Hungary are used but in many works as well as in the external designations, the names for the Germans in Southeast Europe are all mixed up.

Mi Magyarok—We Hungarians

In contrast to the Germans, there are no further collective terms, except the Szeklers, for the Hungarians who live in the research regions. The names are created based on the pattern according to which the word Magyar (= Hungarian) in the singular or Magyarok (= Hungarians) in the plural is preceded by a prefix or attribute that in by far the most cases references the region of origin; for instance: Erdélyi Magyar (= Transylvanian Hungarian), Vajdasági Magyar (= Hungarian from Vojvodina), Horvátországi Magyar (= Hungarian from Croatia), Muravidéki Magyar (= Hungarian from the Slovenian Prekmurje). Essentially, the Hungarians have gradually spread to their present area of settlement, which was continuously subordinated to the Holy Crown of Hungary until after the end of World War

191 As with all external designations or self-designations, these designations can be used by the others stereotypically in a pejorative sense: For example, the svábok are indeed considered stingy by the Hungarians in Baranya, or as arrogant towards all the other ethnic groups living there.

192 On the Szeklers, see the second part of this section.

193 The designation “Muravidéki Magyar” is the traditional designation of the Hungarians who live in the Slovenian Muravidék/Prekmurje. The Slovenian state hasn’t existed for a long time and therefore no designation like, for example, “Slovenföldi Magyar” could develop.
I, since the era that they themselves refer to as land seizure (= honfoglalás) and which had begun in the 9th century. The Hungarians rebelled against foreign rule, such as the Ottoman empire or the Hapsburg monarchy in several uprisings and revolution. Yet, the legal constellation in the Hapsburg monarchy did not turn the Hungarians into a minority in their self-perception since the rule of “their” crown conformed to the existing laws save that there was not actual royal court. The lack of a royal court in a way even proved useful to the Hungarian aristocrats’ courts, which developed into centers of Hungarian culture in the 16th and 17th century. One of the events of the highest importance for the entire region was the compromise in 1867, repeatedly mentioned above, as it was of far-reaching significance not only historically and politically but also for the Hungarians’ identity constructions. From this point in time onwards, according to the historian András Gerő, the significance of a regional identification generally had to cede to a concept of a unified Hungarian culture or of several Hungarian cultures and, therefore, there are only few regional expressions of Hungarian diversity, such as among the Palóc (= palócok), left. This specific form of the Hungarian ‘national identity’ also affected all other ethnic groups in Transleithania, which were called ‘nationalities’ (= nemzetiségek), but which formally belonged to the singular Hungarian nation. Thereby, they were symbolically granted a certain form of equality, but political decision-making could only be effected via or by the Hungarians’ exercise of rule. A strong Magyarization movement on all social, political and cultural levels characterized this era and a broad range of people was assimilated in the Danube Carpathian region in the course of the 19th century. Another climax was the design of a sacralization of the Hungarian nation, which András Gerő has labeled nemzetvallás, which could also be described with the phrase “faith in the nation,” in the sense that the Hungarian nation had/s to be believed in just as much as in God or as in the saints. For this reason, two sites of memory, where sacred elements were blended with the secular, modern idea of the nation, were created in the 19th century: the festivities commemorating the land seizure (896 A.D.) and the crowning and the Christianization (1000 A.D.) of the Hungarian king Szent István (= King Saint Stephen). There were antecessors to this during the time of the 1848/49 revolution already, as voiced for instance by the poet Sándor Petőfi, who in his poem “Nemzeti dal” (= song of the nation), which was circulated all over Hungary, writes, among other things, of a “God of Hungarians” (= A magyarok istene):

A magyarok istenére
Esküszünk,
Esküszünk, hogy rabok tovább
Nem leszünk!

194 See Tóth, Geschichte Ungarns, 370-375.
197 Cf. ibid., 12-13.
198 Cf. ibid., 259-266.
199 See Sándor Petőfi, Nemzeti dal.
To the God of Hungarians
We pledge,
We pledge that never again shall we
Be prisoners! (Trans. Hermanik/Szlezák)

This intertwining of sacred symbols and dogmatic elements of the faith with those of the idea of the nation has determined the collective Hungarian identity construction until this day. It finds expression in the ethnopolitics of the kin state Hungary towards the Hungarian minorities in the respective regions in Southeast Europe just as much as in the Hungarians’ identity management and ethnomangement, which is perfectly legitimized and supported due to this kind of reference to a united Hungarian culture or its struggle for the Hungarians’ autonomy. Therefore, the question asked by the historian Gyula Szekfű “Mi a magyar?” (= What is [a] Hungarian?)\(^{200}\) appears more topical than ever from today’s perspective. Sándor Iván replies to this question that it is hardly possible to give a content-related or methodological answer to this question. Instead, one could answer the modified question “Mi a magyar most?” (= What is [a] Hungarian now?).\(^{201}\) Gábor Gyáni summarizes this endeavor in the question: “In which respects do we differ from our ancestors?”\(^{202}\) Ferenc Pataki, in turn, splits Szekfű’s one question into two questions: “Who is a Hungarian?” and “How is the Hungarian?” The former question, according to Pataki, refers to the origins of, and the latter to the current general state and sensitivities of the Hungarian mentality, which have only evolved from history.\(^{203}\) The social psychologist Pataki further explains the Hungarians’ claim to supremacy in their settlement areas as follows: given the failed revolutions (in 1948/49 and 1956) as well as the barely successful attempts at modernization, the focus has shifted onto symbolic and emotional displacement activities\(^{204}\) because this claim to supremacy compensated for the lack of actual actions.\(^{205}\) This also reveals a mental association with the religion of the nation, referred to above, and its symbolic charge. Different myths of victimization were perpetuated, which among the Hungarian minorities get extended to a particular extent by the component of ‘begin separated from the mother land.’ The Hungarians living in the research regions Transylvania, Slavonia, Slovenia and Vojvodina were separated from Hungary only through the Treaty of Trianon (04 June 1920), mentioned several times above, and therefore, this trea-

\(^{200}\) See Gyula Szekfű (ed.). Mi a magyar? Budapest: Magyar Szemle Társaság, 1939. Gyula Szekfű at the time interpreted this question from his Catholic-conservative viewpoint.


\(^{204}\) “szimbolikus és érzemi pótcselekvés” in the original; ibid., 102.

\(^{205}\) Cf. ibid., 102-103.

The social psychologist Ferenc Pataki, for example, replaces the term “collective memory” with “collective mental state” (= kollektív lelkiállapot), setting it also in relation to the “characterologization of the nation” (= nemzetkarakterológia), which hopefully helps reveal national-ethnic character traits which played an important role in the national history. Cf. ibid., 105.
ty constitutes the greatest trauma in Hungary's history until today and occupies a corresponding role in the Hungarian culture of memory. Only in 2010, 4 June was declared a national day of remembrance and the ‘Day of National Unity’ by the Hungarian parliament (= a nemzeti összetartozás napja).

The Hungarians in the abovementioned regions set out on a search for a new orientation as a minority or, as István Pásztor, the current chairman of the VMSZ in Vojvodina, puts it:

Mint közölte, a kisebbségi léthében is 'meg kell próbálni normális közösségi életet élni', merni kell az utcán magyarul beszélni […]

One has to try to lead a normal community life as a minority, too. One also has to dare speak Hungarian on the street […]. (Trans. Hermanik/Szlezák)

The Hungarian language is still the Hungarians’ most powerful marker. Especially since it differs from the languages of all neighbors in the Danube Carpathian region, the Hungarian identity management and ethnomanagement—like in the preceding quotation—employ it in order to draw the boundaries to the other Volksgruppen if necessary and and entirely consciously. The marker religion is a very complex issue among the Hungarians: In Transylvania, for example, the Hungarians belong to four different Christian religions, which well exist next to each other. Yet it is important to take into account the regional differences. In the north and the northwest of Transylvania, Calvinism, the so-called Reformed church, is more strongly rooted. The Hungarians partly attributed the title a magyar vallás (= the Hungarian faith) to Calvinism, since significant Hungarian lords in Transylvania, such as Bocskai or Bethlen, were Calvinists, especially at the beginning of the 17th century, when this denomination was most wide-spread in the region. Calvinism therefore adopted an (ethno)political dimension. But Calvinism could not develop into the Hungarians’ single faith because they did not consider a change of denomination a breach of taboo—in contrast to the Transylvanian Saxons, who collectively committed to the Protestant faith. Next to the Catholic church, there are the Unitarian church of Transylvania (= Erdélyi Unitárius Egyház) as well as the Hungarian Protestant-Lutheran Synodal-

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211 It can be added here that Calvinism should be interpreted not only as a religious, but also as an ethnic marker for the Hungarians in Transylvania.


213 The Unitarians reject the doctrine of Trinity; the Unitarische Kirche Siebenbürgens und Ungarns was founded as early as 1568. On the present-day Unitarian church in Transylvania, see: http://www.unitarius.com/magyar.html (09 July 2009).
Presbyterian church of Romania (= Romániai Magyar Evangélius-Lutheránus Zsinatpresbíteri Egyháza). At present, all four of the Hungarians’ denominations should be assessed to the same measure, the regional historical-political or numerical differences notwithstanding, since, after Transylvania’s split from Hungary, there was a cooperation, on behalf of the Hungarians, between the Catholic church, the Reformed church and the Unitarian church, above all.

The Hungarians’ identity constructions further make apparent a game of deception between east and west, which is engaged both in the self-perception and in the outside perception: Similar to the exclusivity of language, mentioned above, the symbolic value of the Asiatic origin was and is used, like for instance during the Hungarians’ two revolutions of 1848/49 and 1956, when, next to the red-white-green Hungarian national flag, the red-white-striped Árpád flags were often used. The latter is named after the banner of Árpád, who was the leader of the tribal federation in 895, and has four red and four white stripes. Another symbol from the era of the Hungarian land seizure is the so-called Turul, a plumed fabulous creature, part falcon, part eagle. In the mythology, it was the Turul that allegedly led the Hungarian tribes from the Asian steppe into the Carpathian Basin.

Next to the abovementioned examples, which express the Hungarians’ otherness in comparison to their neighbors in particular and vis-à-vis Europe and the West in general, the “magyar szent korona” (= the Hungarian holy crown), thus named since 1256, reflects Hungary’s and the Hungarians’ Europeanization best. As a sacred symbol, it marks King Stephen’s adoption of Christianity, and as a political symbol, it marks the adoption of European culture and values. It truly is a symbol, because it was in fact not this crown that was used during Stephen’s crowning ceremony, and experts have concluded that in its present form it only reaches back to the reign of Béla III. (1172-1196).

Five hundred years after Stephen’s crowning, the so-called “Magyar korona tan” (= doctrine of the Hungarian crown) was penned in order to ensure that this crown was Stephen’s original. It first appeared in 1514-1515 in the context of István Werbőczy’s Tripartitum, a summary of Hungarian legislation. Afterwards, it was extended by various legends, especially the one that says that Stephen himself during the crowning offered the crown to the Virgin Mary (= Nagyboldogassony), as a symbol of her position as queen of heaven. Therefore, Mary was also declared Hungary’s and the Hungarians’ patron saint. At present, this crown mainly symbolizes the unity between Hungarian culture and Chris-

214 This flag is today mostly used in the national-political spectrum. For example, during the deployment of the right-wing populist Jobbik party on the occasion of Hungarian national festivities, one can see as many red-white-striped Árpád flags as red-white-green flags in the national colors; or the members of the paramilitary “neue ungarische Garde” (= Új Magyar Gárda) wear a red-white-striped kерchief. See the pictures on the homepage of the Új Magyar Gárda: http://ujmagyargarda.com/ (17 September 2011).
217 Cf. Tóth, Geschichte Ungarns, 194.
tianity. Since 01 January 2000, it has been kept in the Hungarian parliament, which indeed evokes a contrast between the modern parliamentary system and a feudal value system.\footnote{218}

These examples demonstrate how thoroughly the Asiatic origin has been blended with the Christian Europe in Hungarian culture. Yet, these symbols exist side by side with one another and can be ideologically charged at any time by the Hungarian identity management and ethnomanagement. For the Hungarian minorities, however, we note a much more diverse picture, extended through the phenomena of acculturation. András Ágoston, the chairman of the Vajdasági Magyar Demokrata Párt (= Ungarische Demokratische Partei in der Vojvodina), for instance, is mostly pessimistic, when he speaks about the unity of the Hungarians in Vojvodina and their future because he thinks that the Hungarian culture in Vojvodina (= Vajdasági Magyarság)\footnote{219} broke apart in the last 20 years: “40,000 have left […] whoever is smart leaves. My son, too, has left and he will never return [he says wistfully; <A/N> Hermanik; Trans. Hermanik/Szlezák].”\footnote{220} There is a big difference, Ágoston remarks, between the Hungarians in Hungary and the diaspora Hungarians. This difference already becomes apparent in the language since in Vojvodina the vernacular is a mixed language; “not even in Becskerek or Busdás, only those who are a bit educated”\footnote{221} are able to speak Hungarian.

In Slovenian Prekmurje, in turn, there is a growing number of adolescents and adults who develop a ‘dual identity,’ which is mostly due to the large rate of intermarriage among Slovenes and Hungarians, which has become a tradition in this area since Yugoslavian times. Lili Kepe, director of the MNMI, however, observes that about 70% of the children of mixed marriages tend towards the Slovenian majority population in the censuses.\footnote{222} If the Slovenian authorities permitted a category that expressed both, the number of Hungarians who declared themselves as such, in Kepe’s estimation, would double, if not even triple. Kepe, more concretely, assumes that there are altogether about 10-12,000 people in the region who feel connected with Hungarian culture (= magyarsághoz), although during the census of 2002 ‘only’ 7,500 registered officially as Hungarians.\footnote{223} Yet, the reason why the Slovenian state does not permit such a category for recognizing this affiliation is that this would also make possible the choice of a dual identity in the context of the immigration of southern Slavs in the era of the former Yugoslavia. Kepe further notes that in Prekmurje some cases are cases of multiple identities—namely Hungarian, Slovenian, Croatian—anyhow and adds:

\footnotetext[218]{The attribute Szent Korona is also attached to individual media in Hungary, such as the radio station Szent Korona Rádió, which is advertised with the slogan “a tiszta magyar hang” (= the pure Hungarian sound) and broadcasts its features and its music for a national-conservative and religious audience. In its blogs and in its shows, the station is directed against left-wing parties, against Roma and against Jews. See: http://szentkoronaradio.com/szentkoronaradio (29 March 2010).}


\footnotetext[220]{Interview transcript, András Ágoston, 19 May 2010.}

\footnotetext[221]{Ibid.}

\footnotetext[222]{Cf. interview transcript, Lili Kepe, 19 January 2010.}

\footnotetext[223]{Cf. ibid. By naming this number in the interview, the director of the MNMI in her positive self-perception deviates somewhat from the statistics of the 2002 census I mentioned above, which records 5,445 Hungarians for the region.}
Austria’s proximity only renders this more colorful. It can be said that, in Prekmurje, one can or should speak of multiple identities with regard to the language, the culture and the religion.224 Béla Kiss, the chairman of the Erdélyi Magyarok Szövetsége (= alliance of the Transylvanian Hungarians), the Hungarians of Transylvania (= Erdélyi magyarok) who now live in Hungary, states the following in the interview on their construction of a Transylvanian-Hungarian identity: “We are the ones who speak Hungarian, whose culture overlaps 90% with the culture of the Hungarians in Hungary.”225 Therefore, Hungarian politics and the Hungarian government regard the Transylvanian Hungarians as that Volksgruppe that can be assimilated easiest. Those Transylvanian Hungarians who live in Transylvania receive support even though this is “actually also only a symbolic matter.”226 These statements are in essence very honest, as the chairman does not hide the fact that the Hungarian nation-state rests upon a monoethnic basis. Otherwise the Transylvanian Hungarians are not affected assimilation only because they differ gradually in the marker descent or origin. And still, for them, the identification with Transylvania und the local Hungarian minority is of central importance for the formation of a collective identity.

**Host State, Kin State, Loyalty**

**Theoretical and Conceptual Basis**

The legal, economic and socio-cultural effects of the pragmatic goals within a nation-state affect the ethnic groups who live there—which in this relation makes it the so-called host state—in various ways, and not only in the sense of a differentiation into a national majority and a minority or *Volksgruppen*. Since the era of socialism and the ensuing transformation, the structures of the nation-states in Southeast Europe227 have changed on their interior as well as on the international level, especially due to the most recent obligations vis-à-vis the European Union.228 With regard to the host states in the research regions, it can be assumed that the respective nation and state power, which all follow a monoethnic conception, demands loyalty toward the national unity.229 The scientific approach to the concept of patronage ranges from the simple patron–client relation230 to wide-ranging patronage networks in political and economic structures. In a complex, socio-cultural environment, such patronage relations represent an important aspect:

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224 Ibid. (Trans. Hermanik/Szlezák)
225 Interview transcript, Béla Kiss, 23 April 2010.
226 Cf. ibid.
229 Under the civic duties, one can subsume for example tax payments, compulsory schooling, military service, law-abidance, etc.
230 From this also derives the concept of clientelism, mentioned above herleitet.
Patronage is a paradigmatic concept of vertical and particularistic power relations, whereas formal groups, that are also called corporate groups or secondary groups, have relations along universalistic lines.231 In principle, the connection based on a patronage relation rests upon mutual loyalty, and as a consequence mutual obligations arise, which are the consequence of a mutual profit. In a simplified patron – client relation, they are, for instance: i) from the viewpoint of the client: economic Grundsicherung, emergency insurance, protection, usage of influence and power in favor of the client; ii) from the viewpoint of the patron: work force, effort or special services, the clients act in honor of their patron, new clients approach the patron. In any case, this relation is based on an asymmetry, with the client’s dependence potentially leading to a relation of coercion.232 Verena Borkolter starts from the assumption that the sum of such patron – client relations usually forms a patron – client cluster.233 Such clusters, which still defined the die feudal era, have transformed into today’s structures, which range from the families to the communities to the state, depending on the various size and scope. With regard to the concept of identity management and ethnomanagement, it is important to demonstrate in this context that Borkolter presupposes connective elements in the context of this cluster formation, which in these enlarged patronage structures assume the role of a mediator between the client and the patron.234 From this consequently emerge yet new connections and new social networks, because a mediator can at the same time, but on a lower level, also be a patron. In its basics, this structure is on the one hand reminiscent of the mediating role that the identity managers and ethnomanagers assume as mediators between the host state and the Volksgruppe that they manage; at the same time, this reveals that they, too, in a way act in the capacity of patrons.

In connection with the identity management and ethnomanagement, the relation of the kin state to a/its minority, living in another host statet, is highly interesting. This ethnomanagement from the outside, which is initiated by the kin state, opens up transnational networks, in which even several kin states may participate if they pursue similar political interests. For example, Carl Bethke notes with respect to interwar Yugoslavia that “Germany and Hungary applied for ‘mother nation’ pools, which partly overlapped significantly.”235 Donatella della Porta and Hanspeter Kriesi in their research explicitly refer to the interrelations of governments (= transgovernmental) and subsequently also to overlaps (= cross-levels) between the interests of a social movement in a country with those of a government of another country.236 This model could, in the present research field, be projected in nuce onto the relations of the German and the Hungarian minorities to their respective kin states. Especially

232 Cf. ibid., 11.
233 Cf. ibid., 18-19.
234 Ibid., 22. She calls these mediators either “broker” or “intermediaries.” The term “broker” is today mostly used in the world of finance and the stock market; originally, it denotes “mediator, intermediary”; “intermediary” means “middleman, arbitrator, mediator.”
235 Bethke. Deutsche und ungarische Minderheiten in Kroatien und in der Vojdovina 1918-1941, 236.
in the context of globalization, such relations can more quickly evolve and fortify beyond the borders of the nation-states, with the processes taking place on all the above-mentioned levels at the same time:

An effect of globalisation is the increasing relevance of the international environment for national social movements: international constraints and international opportunities can operate on the transgovernmental level, the transnational level or the cross level.\(^\text{237}\)

Thus, the relevant relations between a kin state and its Volksgruppe, living as a minority in another nation-state, are more closely tied. A tendency that goes hand in hand with this phenomenon can be noted in those attempts at appropriation on the part of the patronage that originate from the national-minded cultural and/or political organizations or, in some cases, also from national parties. In Germany and Austria, it is mostly the Landsmannschaften\(^\text{238}\) in their political practice that have often emerged from diaspora communities of German minorities and that therefrom derive a claim to being representative of the Germans who remain in Southeast Europe. These organizations are supported by other, oftentimes well-known German-national-minded societies, which have come to understand the patronage concept as an appropriate means to effectively bring their political ideas into play.\(^\text{239}\) At the same time, this form of patronage also goes hand in hand with financial support, donations in kind and other aid campaigns. In Hungary, national-political circles have made the Hungarian minority in the neighbor states an important objective of agitation; on the one hand, they want to ‘strengthen’ the local Hungarian culture, and, on the other, they want to position themselves as the main representatives of the ‘true Hungarian culture’ in Hungary. The patronage of the Hungarian minority, in the process, is also intertwined with the political idea of reviving ‘Greater Hungary’\(^\text{240},\text{241}\).

In the context of patronage, the research concept of loyalty, as Martin Schulze Wessel has adapted it for historical research and Otto Luchterhandt for minority research,\(^\text{242}\) should also be taken into consideration as it helps better understand the oftentimes highly complex relations of the loyalties of ethnic groups. They are subject to change to the same extent as this was discussed above with regard to ethnicity. And even large and therefore seemingly languid groups among the national minorities can shift their loyalties due to watershed events as well as due to the political-economic push- and

\(^\text{237}\) Ibid., 10.


\(^\text{239}\) I noticed, for example, the magazine Aula, which is published as the monthly of the Freiheitlichen Studentenverbindungen in Austria, considered outright German-nationally minded, and which supports the ‘German Volks- und Kulturgemeinschaft.’ This magazine is currently available e.g. in Cluj-Napoca/Klausenburg at the Deutschen Regionalforum Klausenburg or also in the Lenau-Haus in Pécs/Fünfkirchen in the periodicals reading room.

\(^\text{240}\) This refers to all those areas that belonged to the Hungarian kingdom prior to the Treaty of Trianon. The Weltverband der Ungarn/Magyarok Világszövetsége (MVSZ), which operates internationally, plays a significant role in this.

\(^\text{241}\) The Hungarian right-wing party Jobbik, for example, has a map of Greater Hungary on their homepage, with the caption: “a nemzetért” [‘for the nation’ Trans. Hermanik/Szlezák] See: http://jobbik.hu/. There is further also a link on the topic: “Határon Túli Magyarok – mert csak együtt vagyunk erősek” (= Hungarians living abroad – because we are only strong together. Trans. Hermanik/Szlezák.) (10 November 2010).

pullfactors that accompany them. A strongly manipulative ethnomanagement, which originates from a national state, however, comes closer to *ethnic engineering*; an eminent example of this is the ethnic-national mobilization of the Germans in East Europe, East Central Europe and Southeast Europe, planned with military precision, in the 1930s. Besides those processes that mostly take place at the outer margins of the groups the individual group members’ loyalty towards the group, and thus primarily also towards their own identity management and ethnomanagement, needs to be secured just as much. For the agents of the identity management and ethnomanagement, in turn, it is important to guide the socio-cultural dynamics within the group ideally in such a way that they are centripetal and less centrifugal. According to George P. Fletcher, the entire range of loyalty reaches from “Thou shalt not betray me” to “Thou shalt be one with me.” Martin Schulze Wessel has developed three cornerstones for the concept of loyalty:

1. It is a category of social acting and feeling, i.e. faithfulness and loyalty do not stop at obedience or the fulfilment of duties according to a contract, but designate the attitude behind those actions.

2. Faithfulness and loyalty always have a counterpart and presuppose a certain reciprocity. […]

3. Loyalty has to be understood as a phenomenon of a limited duration.

This quotation shows that Schulze Wessel does follow Georg Simmel’s sociological elaborations on the concept of ‘faithfulness’ here, yet he also formulates a distinction between the two terms:

While we also need to speak of faithfulness in private relationships, loyalty is restricted to the relationships between individuals and institutions and to relationships between individuals and institutions as a consequence of processes of communitization.

An active identity management and ethnomanagement, too, aims to strengthen a group member’s loyalty since thus the intentions of the individual’s social actions will consequently be geared more towards the welfare of the group. Moreover, they rely on the ‘reciprocity’ of loyalty, quoted above; yet, it should to be taken into account that the identity management and ethnomanagement themselves act like an institution and are correspondingly perceived as such. However, we can assume that there is a far-reaching reciprocity between the minority group members and “their” minority organizations, especially when the agents come from their midst (= from the inside). In the big picture, more, subordinate levels of loyalty emerge from the relations to the institutions of the respective host state as well as from the relations to the institutions of the kin state or the kin states. According to Schulze Wessel, loyalty could be interpreted in some way as a secularized form of the theological relation between the people’s faith and God, since in the Judeo-Christian religious context the relation between God and the

243 In the context of the so-called *ethnic engineering*, people who do not come from the ethnic group immediately or come from a completely different region can also declare themselves to be ethnomanagers. In that case, there is usually no mutual loyalty, but these ethnomanagers rest on a form of loyalty that is based either on favoritism or on intimidation.


247 Ibid.
Israelites is sealed through a covenant.248 In its secularized form, the term loyalty is used today in the English- and French-speaking world in the immediate context of constitutional law.249 In the New Testament already, these two forms of loyalty, in its religious and in its profane meaning, are referred to in the metaphor “Render therefore unto Caesar the things which are Caesar’s; and unto God the things that are God’s” (Mt 22,21), which would make possible a “pluralist loyalty,” or rather a side-by-side of loyalties as long as they do not compete for one and the same area or as long as the loyalty towards the one would not require renouncing the loyalty towards the other. In history, it has become apparent in various ways that in pre-national times, especially after a change of rule, the loyalty of ethnic groups has assumed an important role,251 which would correspond, for the sake of comparison, to a shift of state borders in national times. Hannes Grandits252 studies the manifestations of familial, denominational as well as seigneurial relationships with the help of the loyalty concept in Southeast Europe intensively from a historical perspective. He describes the initial multiple loyalties and the later nation-building with the help of the example of the Ottoman Herzegovina, which in this multi-ethnic research area has preconditioned an establishment of loyalty/loyalties:

Yet, this often happened within still quite contradictory ideologies, which were directed at the politicization of denominational affiliations but also at a range of other historical, cultural or “ethnic” attributions.253

[…] yet it is not enough for the mobilization of large parts of the population that an educated elite takes over an offer of a (national) identity. What is decisive is, rather, that the offer links up with the ideas of a broader part of the population. Only if one succeeds in constructing

Only if the attempt to construct a—“national”—system of symbols that is accepted and shared by large parts of the population is successful, can this system also evoke and establish sentiments of national loyalty.254

For his research, Grandits prefers the term loyalty to “a notion of ‘collective identity’ that is in my view often understood in rather essentialist terms.”255 In his conclusions, he speaks, among other things, also of ‘multiple loyalties,’ which developed or formed anew in the course of the national movements and what he calls the “state transformation.”256

Not only from the perspective of the identity management and ethnomanagement of a Volksgruppe do the seigneurial or the state institutions as well as the relations between these institutions and the Volksgruppen in the case of a change of rule or state assume a particular role:

248 Schulze Wessel, “Loyalität” als geschichtlicher Grundbegriff und Forschungskonzept. The word loyalty etymologically derives from the word loi (law), already used in the Old Testament.
249 Cf. Luchterhandt, Nationale Minderheit und Loyalität, 16. Loyalty is therefore related to the French word for law: loi.
251 Cf. ibid., 11.
254 Ibid., 32.
255 Ibid., 16.
256 Cf. ibid., 675-685.
This question of institutional economics is geared towards the agent-related conditions for the functioning of institutions. Loyalty makes possible a communication within institutions that is based on trust. It is therefore of immeasurable value, which cannot be translated into monetary value, for the institutions—be it corporations or states.

Luchterhandt sees a weak spot especially in the formation of nation-states in East Europe and Southeast Europe, which took place after World War I, because many Volksgruppen in this region have since been living as minorities in a foreign host state. Luchterhandt interprets the constitutional anchoring, which also includes the constitutionally regulated minority legislation, as a “demand for the duty of loyalty.” The demands for loyalty, fixed in international law, are also included in this. The most critical aspect lies in the interplay between the fulfillment of the duty of loyalty and the implementation of minority rights, since in most states the observance of the duty of loyalty is even seen as a prerequisite for the claim to minority protection and as an “expression of the formal equality of obligations.” At the same time, all demands for loyalty have their limits and ties based on the duty of loyalty, in particular, have their limits in the implementation of minority rights. All demands for loyalty must be checked thoroughly in this context and international standards need to be consulted. All of this demonstrates how closely the concept of loyalty is tied to the statutory provisions of the respective host state or kin state.

Minority Protection in the Host States

Croatia:

The constitutional act of December 1991 speaks of “ethnic and national communities” (etničke i nacionalne zajednice), which replaced the Bosnian-Croatian-Serbian term narod (= Volk, nation). Which differentiations result from these legal terminologies can, for example, be deduced from the remarks on the electoral law:

The electoral law for the delegates in the Sabor as well as the law on the constituencies, as they include listings by name, make evident that the term minority at least refers to the Italian, Hungarian, Czech and Slovak, Ruthenian and Ukrainian as well as German, Austrian and Jewish ethnic groups. E contrario, the Serbs in Croatia as well as Muslims and Slovenes, also named in the constitution, therefore need to be considered nations (narodi) or national communities.
In addition, the Croatian Constitutional Law on National Minorities uses the attribute “autochthonous” (Article 15(4)), for which, according to Marko, there is “no legal definition.” But this attribute separates, like for instance in Austria or Slovenia, the recognized minorities from members of those *ethnien* that have only immigrated to Croatia as migrants or refugees. On an international level, the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities was signed by Croatia on 06 November 1996, ratified on 11 October 1997 and enacted on 01 February 1998. In 2002, the legal framework changed significantly when a new constitutional law on minority protection was passed in Croatia and the minorities were granted more rights. Since it is not irrelevant for the Croatian legal conception, I would like to mention once again at this point the distinction, made in the preamble of the Croatian constitution, between “ethnic communities” in the sense of *etničke zajednice* and the “national communities” in the sense of *nacionalne zajednice*. Antonija Petričušić, who has taken into consideration the changes since 2002, summarizes as follows:

The Croatian Constitution lists in its preamble Serbs, Czechs, Slovaks, Italians, Hungarians, Jews, Germans, Austrians, Ukrainians, Ruthenians, and other ethnic minority communities that are citizens of Croatia and Croatian minorities. Apart from these constitutionally mentioned ethnic communities, members of several other ethnic groups are recognized as minority communities: Albanians, Bosniaks, Bulgarians, Montenegrins, Macedonians, Poles, Roma, Romanians, Slovenes, Turks, Vlahs and Jews.

The individual parts of the constitutional ttminority protection, which are granted to the minorities, are the following:

- guarantees national minorities the right to education in their language and script, usage of the language and script, cultural autonomy, as well as the right to participate in public affairs through representations in representative bodies on the local and regional, as well as on the state levels, including representation in administrative and judicial bodies.

By comparison, the Zagreb-based political scientist Siniša Tatalović emphasizes in his account of guaranteed minority rights the following three points, which mostly concern the minorities’ political representation:

- Self organizing and association for the purpose of exercising mutual interests;
- representation in the representative bodies at the state and local level and in administration and judicial bodies;
- participation of members of national minorities in the public life and in management of local affairs through the councils and through representatives of national minorities.

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264 Cf. ibid., 19.
268 Ibid., 171.
Another particularity in the ‘new’ Croatian minority legislation is the possibility to establish the so-called ‘Räte nationaler Minderheiten’ (council for national minorities). They have in practice the following rights within local self-governance: i) they can propose measures to the local authorities, which improve the significant situation of a majority; ii) candidates for public administrative or political functions can be supported; iii) the rights to information from the self-governances; iv) expression of opinion in minority media (radio and TV). In principle, the representation of an ethnic or national community is regulated in the highest state authorities by Article 18 of the Constitutional Law on National Minorities. What is decisive is whether a minority makes up more or less than 8% of the total population. De facto, until 1999, only the Serbs were granted a proportional number of representatives in the Croatian house of representatives (= zastupnički dom) of the Croatian parliament (= sabor), in which altogether 151 delegates are sitting. All recognized minorities together are given the right to a minimum representation in the sabor, with only a maximum of five representatives for all recognized minorities in Croatia running for office, however. The number of seats in parliament was newly regulated in Article 17 of the electoral law of 1999, correspondingly, and after the elections of 2000, for instance, four seats were filled by the guaranteed representatives of the Serbs, Hungarians, Italians, Czechs/Slovaks and the fifth had to represent all other minorities. The Savjet za nacionalne manjine (= Rat für nationale Minderheiten), whose establishment was decreed in December 2002 in the Croatian parliament, represents a central institution of Croatia’s national organization:


The Rat für nationale Minderheiten is an autonomous body based on the revised constitutional law on the rights of the national minorities, which were granted by the Croatian Parliament in the session of 13 December 2002 and which were made public in the NN 155 on 23 December 2002. (Trans. Hermanik/Szlezák)

Florian Bieber compares the situation of the Rat für nationale Minderheiten in Croatia with a similar institution in Serbia and underlines the significance of such a Rat:

Minority specific bodies of representation are less common in the region, but can be found in Serbia and Croatia, where national councils have been established by recent minority laws to grant the communities a degree of self-government and make them the main interlocutors for contacts with government and ministers. In Croatia, these bodies are directly elected, while in Serbia they are chosen through a complicated system of electors that has been subject to criticism.

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270 Petričušić, “Croatia,” 179.
271 Cf. ibid., 178.
272 Besides, there is another chamber, the so-called Komitatshaus (= županski dom).
As parliamentary representation usually does not translate into the ability to substantially impact votes, institutions such as minority councils can have a greater impact on the areas of concern for the community, such as education or minority language media. The special rights of the Rat für nationale Minderheiten in Croatia concern the following realms: i) It can propose topics that are important for the recognized minorities in the country to the state authorities; ii) it can independently participate in the opinion-making on topics relating to the minorities in radio stations and TV stations; iii) it can also become active in economic, social or other fields if are minorities concerned. Its task is furthermore to allocate the funds that the state provides for the minorities.

What exactly does this initial situation mean for the implementation of minority rights among the Germans and Hungarians in Croatia? The Föderalistische Union Europäischer Volksgruppen (FUEV) describes the situation of the Germans—and in Croatia, one also comes across the addition Austrian or ‘Altösterreicher’—in brief terms as follows:

The minority “Germans and Austrians” is officially recognized and therefore has a permanent seat in the Croatian parliament (Sabor) together with ten other minorities. One delegate to the Croatian parliament is elected from among this group during general elections. During the legislative period 2003-2007, this minority group was represented by a delegate of the German minority. During the legislative period 2007-2011, the group is represented by a delegate of the Roma minority.

The Hungarians, given their considerably larger numbers, are guaranteed a seat in the Croatian parliament. Experience shows how such a status can boost the self-confidence of the identity management and the ethnomanagement. At the same time, it is important to assume political responsibility as well, besides cultural responsibility, which to this extent is by no means standard. Let us take the example of the Hungarian ethnologist Lilla Hervanek, who in the context of her research project, conducted in 2005, visited the Horvátországi Magyarak Demokratikus Közössége (= Hungarian Democratic Community in Croatia), which at the time was the only parliamentary minority representation of the Hungarians in Croatia. This minority organization took for granted that it had always performed its political tasks and pursued its political goals jointly with those in the realms of education or culture:

The minority has the right to delegate one member to the Croatian Government for the protection of their interests and rights. Since 1992 the HMDK member has won every election, which means that the HMDK has delegated the one Hungarian member to the Sabor, who takes over the political responsibility for all Hungarians in Croatia. Otherwise the society does not take up a political role - only if it is necessary.

277 Cf. Petričušić, Croatia, 178.
279 Interview transcript, Nikola Mak, 25 October 2005. Nikola Mak, as mentioned in the above quotation, was the parliamentary representative on the joint seat of the minority groups from 2003 through 2007. See chapter 2.2, section Umbrella Organizations.
280 This project of the Austrian Science and Research Liaison Office (ASO) was titled “The German and Hungarian Cultural Societies” (project director: Klaus-Jürgen Hermanik). See: http://www.aso.rsi.at/project_1_29_2005.html (22 July 2009).
By now, the situation has changed due to the foundation of the *Horvátországi Magyar Nemzeti Tanács*, HMNT (= *Nationalrat der Ungarn in Kroatien*) on 29 May 2010, since now the Hungarian minority can directly turn to both the host state Croatia—for example to the abovementioned *Savjet za nacionalne manjine*—and the kin state Hungary via the *Nationalrat*. The direct comparison of the Hungarians and the Germans shows that the parliamentary representation is already taken for granted by the Hungarian minority in Croatia. By contrast, the one legislative period from 2003 until 2007, when Nikola Mak occupied the parliamentary seat for ‘all other minorities,’ signified a special period for the Germans and Austrians in Croatia since, during that time, they had moved from the periphery into the center of political representation.

*Slovenia:*

In the present Slovenian minority legislation of the Slovenian constitution of 23 December 1991, the two *autochthonous* minorities, Italians and Hungarians, are officially referred to as “*manjšine oziroma narodne skupnosti*” (= minorities or national communities). Besides, there is a protection for the “*Romska etnična skupnost*” (= ethnic community of the Roma), which is also guaranteed in the Slovenian constitution. The Slovenian concept of minority protection, according to Boris Jesih, is positive because it also provided for an active involvement of the minorities, beside the passive protection:

> Pozitivni koncept zaščite manjšin predvideva še aktivno vlogo države tako pri uresničevanju posebnih manjšinskih pravic kot pri zagotavljanju potrebnih pogojev za njihovo uresničevanje.

The positive concept of the minority protection envisages an active role of the state in the implementation of individual minority rights, as well as the furnishing of the conditions necessary for the implementation. (Trans. Hermanik/Szlezák)

The German *Volksgruppe* in Slovenia, on the other hand, has not been considered in the constitutional recognition of minorities, or as Joseph Marko puts it: “The Slovenian government did not welcome the claim to constitutional recognition […].” From this perspective, the efforts of the Germans in Slovenia to gain legal recognition as a minority are easily understandable.

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282 In Croatia, the Serbian and Italian minorities, for instance, also have such a *Nationalrat*.
284 In the Slovenian terminology on minorities, the term “*avtohtona narodna skupnost*” (= autochthonous national community) is used besides narodna skupnost (see above), which thus explicitly presupposes a form of being autochthonous, in the sense of an extended period of settlement on the territory of the present-day Slovenia. This, in order to exclude the largest, but non-autochthonous ethnic or national groups from the former Yugoslavia (e.g. Croats, Serbs, Muslims, Albanians) from these collective rights.
286 Cf. ibid.
The minority rights of the so-called “national community of the Hungarians,” which are guaranteed in the Slovenian constitution, are, according to Mirjam Polzer-Srienz, “regulated in strikingly great detail”; this also includes economic, cultural and scientific activities as well as the public publishing sector and news sector, the right to education and training in the mother tongue, and the members of the Hungarian Volksgruppe are granted the right to maintain relations with Hungary. In the sense of an identity management and ethnomanagement, the following passages from Article 64 of the constitution relate directly to activities of societies:

The autochthonous Italian and Hungarian Volksgruppe as well as their members are granted the right to freely use their national symbols and to establish organizations for the preservation of their national identity [...]. (Article 64(1))

In the areas, in which these two Volksgruppen live, their members establish self-governing communities in order to implement their rights. Provided they apply for it, the state can authorize the self-governing communities to take over certain tasks from among the state responsibilities. (Article 64(2))

The legal status [...] and the commitment of the local self-governing communities in the case of the implementation of these rights are regulated by law. The two Volksgruppen and their members are granted these rights regardless of the number of the members of the respective Volksgruppe. (Article 64(2))

The first citation begins with the qualifying term “autochthonous,” set in italics by the author, which elevates the Italian and Hungarian Volksgruppe to a special status. The term is “linked to the guarantee of special rights that—with the exception of the Roma—are not granted to the other Volksgruppen.” For the protection and the practical implementation of these rights, the Slovenian government has established the Volksgruppenbüro (= urad za narodnosti).

The Hungarians dispose of direct volksgruppen-political instruments in the context of the self-governing communities, on the one hand; on the other hand, the constitution grants them a minimum representation in the parliament, which includes a right of veto. Moreover, there is a legal directive relating to the official languages, which favors the minority, in the sense that Slovenian is the official language everywhere but that Hungarian ranges as an equally official language in the Hungarians’

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290 Numerous additional legal acts (= pravni predpisi) from the Slovenian constitution (= ustava RS) on the Hungarians in Slovenia are available online: http://www.uvn.gov.si/si/pravni_predpisi/pravni_predpisi_posebna_zascita_za_italijansko_in_madzarsko_narodno_skupnost/ (15 June 2009).


293 Cited after ibid. See also: Marko, Der Minderheitenschutz in den jugoslawischen Nachfolgestaaten, 154.

294 Ibid., 130.

295 It has emerged from the Büro für Minderheitenfragen (= urad za manjšinska vprašanja), which has existed since 1959 already. On the activities of the Slovenian Volksgruppenbüro see: http://www.uvn.gov.si/si/o_udru/ (15 June 2009). See further: Marko, Der Minderheitenschutz in den jugoslawischen Nachfolgestaaten, 147.
minority regions. The respective municipal statutes of the five Hungarian communities declare them to be a multilingual region, respectively. Furthermore, the Hungarian Volksgruppen representation is guaranteed a seat in the Slovenian National Assembly (= državni zabor)—this seat is understood to be, not a party political seat, but a non-party seat. For the self-governing communities on the municipal level, a minimum representation of the Hungarian minority is required in the respective communities. The Hungarian representatives are elected through separate electoral lists, with the candidates of the Hungarian Volksgruppe requiring at least 15 endorsements for such a candidacy. The self-governing communities prepare and keep separate Wählerrevidenzen for the election of the Volksgruppen representatives. During an election, the members of the Hungarian Volksgruppe have two votes: one for the election of the Volksgruppen mandate, and another one to elect a delegate. Christoph Pan interprets these self-governing communities as “essentially a form of cultural autonomy,” even though he himself adds that “this term is not used explicitly in Slovenia.”

The German-speaking minority was simply by-passed when the autochthonous Volksgruppen were recognized by collective law—similar to the situation in Croatia, Germans and Austrians/‘Altösterreicher’ are mentioned—or as Stefan Karner remarks: “With regard to the German-speaking Volksgruppe, a status as it applies to the Italians, Hungarians and Romi is not included in the constitution.” This omission could surely have been undone during the last two decades.

For reasons of equal treatment, the German-speaking minority doubtlessly would have to be treated like the Italian and the Hungarian minority as an autochthonous Volksgruppe because it is evident that it has not just migrated to and settled in Slovenia for a few years. It is therefore not comprehensible why Slovenia has by-passed the German-Austrian minority in the constitution and has not yet fixed this neglect.

The number of Volksgruppen members cannot be the reason in this case since the demographic order of magnitude alone must not determine the statuts as autochthonous or not within the realm of minority rights. This was and is a case of a lack of opinion-making on the part of the Slovenian state as well as Slovenian politics. The fear of restitution alone can also not have been the reason since the leaders of the Gottscheer Altsiedler Verein (= Društvo Kočevarjev Staroselcev) explicitly stress that there is no link between the question of recognition and demands for material restitution, and also the claims

296 Cf. ibid., 147. All terms are fixed in a separate law on local elections, see Ur.l. 72/1993.
298 The constitutionally regulated minority protection effects that this dual vote is neither against the constitution nor against the principle of equality. The legislators describe this procedure as “positive concept,” which regards the individual minority member, according to the Volksgruppen protection, as a special subject and the minority as a special group, with the result that the rights linked to this are at the same time individual rights and collective rights. Cf. ibid., 77 as well as on the “positive concept” see also 172.
299 Pan, Die Minderheitenrechte in Slowenien, 438.
300 In contrast to the individual legal protection of citizens who come from the republics of the former Yugoslavia “and who do not have the status of a national minority in the sense of a collective legal subject.” Pan, Die Minderheitenrechte in Slowenien, 430.
302 Pan, Die Minderheitenrechte in Slowenien, 430.
303 See esp. chapter 2.2 the section Umbrella Organizations as well as the section The Germans’ Societies (Examples from the Regions) as well as the website of the society: http://www.gottscheer.net/prva-nem.htm (18 June 2009).
of the Germans expelled from Slovenia after 1945 are excluded therefrom. Since the foundation of the Republic of Slovenia, the German minority societies have fought for recognition as an autochthonous minority:

Our status can well be regulated in various ways but to our mind the constitutional recognition, as in the case of the Hungarian and the Italian minority, would be the simplest way—because these are tried and conventional mechanisms, whereas the development of a new, different status is likely to take much longer. (08 May 2006)

The following example shall demonstrate how ambivalently this matter is handled in everyday politics: On his first visit abroad, the Styrian governor Franz Voves traveled to Slovenia in June 2006 in order to stress the good neighborly climate and to promote cross-border projects in the realms of tourism, culture and infrastructure in the sense of the concept “Europe of the Regions.” In thorny questions concerning minorities, there was a silent consensus that no one had to make a move in either case—the case of the Germans in Slovenia is mirrored by the case of the Styrian Slovenes.

Romania:

During the era of the transition, it was not easy to find a respective legislation for the large number of so-called “national minorities” of different sizes in Romania since the Romanian majority population takes a very cautious stance in this matter. In principle, Romania signed the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities on 01 February 1995, ratified it on 11 May 1995 and, on 01 February 1998, enacted it. Prior to that, and positively, every “national minority” has been granted a seat in parliament since 1992. Initially, there were 13 seats, in 1996 the number rose to 15 and in 2000 to 18 seats. This “guarantee of an equality of opportunities is provided in Article 59(2) of the constitution.” In addition, the electoral legislation determines that minority organizations that are involved in elections are to be treated as political parties, with this freedom being restricted to only one organization per national minority, however.

308 The Csángos, the Aromanians/Vlachs, Macedonians and Carasoveni are further ethnic and national groups, which are not legally recognized as “national minorities.”
309 “As part of the Eastern Romance language family, the Romanians feel cornered by the foreign languages and cultures of the Slavic, Germanic and Magyar Völker.” Christoph Pan. “Die Minderheitenrechte in Rumänien.” Pan/Pfeil (eds.), Minderheitenrechte in Europa, 349.
310 Cf. ibid., 348.
312 Pan, “Die Minderheitenrechte in Rumänien,” 357.
313 Cf. ibid., 358.
In 1993, the “Rat der nationalen Minderheiten” was established in Romania, but it had to give in to the political conditions back then. Only since 2001 has it been an actual advisory council of the government. The Romanian constitution gives weight especially to the territorial administrative units with regard to the usage of minority languages; there are altogether forty administrative districts (Judeţ) and one capital district. Yet the law on the local public administration no. 215/2001, in its amended form no. 286/2006, fixes a population share of at least 20% in an administrative district for the respective minority to be able to benefit from the following rights at all.

The agenda of the local council will also be published in the language of the national minorities (Article 39(7)). If at least one third of the members of the local council belong to a minority, the respective mother tongue can be used during the meetings, with the mayor being obligated to arrange for a translation into Romanian (Article 43(3)). [...] The citizens can also address the authorities of the municipal administration in their mother tongue (in writing or orally) and will receive a reply both in Romanian and in the respective mother tongue (Article 90 (2)). [...] signage for towns and public authorities as well as ads in the general interest are also available in the language of the minority (Article 90 (4)).

Chistoph Pan criticizes this practice since this 20% hurdle is problematic and means “that, except for the Hungarian minority, only very few of the other minorities can benefit from these rights.” The Romanian legal scholar Sergiu Constantin, too, recognizes the need for improvement:

The need for improvement of the existing legal framework is clear when we think about the situation of small or dispersed minorities. The implementation reports show that persons belonging to such national minorities cannot take advantage of the rights stipulated in the legal framework because either they don’t represent at least 20% of the population in their municipality, or there are not enough students, requests from parents, or teaching staff in order to establish educational units with tuition in their mother tongue. Most of the minority mass media depends on financial support from the state budget.

However, small minorities that live in compact groups in certain areas can benefit to a greater extent than a larger minority scattered all over the country.

In October 2007, the Romanian parliament signed the ‘European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages’ and recognized ten languages as minority languages in the sense of Article 5 of the Charter. Moreover, the German and the Hungarian language were vested with special rights.

Article 32(3) of the Romanian constitution guarantees the right to education in the mother tongue for the members of the recognized national minorities. Again, the Germans and the Hungarians

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318 Constantin, “România,” 165.
319 Constantin, “România,” 154.
320 For the entire Charter see: http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/ger/Treaties/Html/148.htm (10 February 2009).
321 “[…] the state shall allow the administrative authorities to draft documents in one of these two minority languages and it shall either make bilingual administrative texts and forms available or publish them in Hungarian or German.” Constantin, “România,” 148.
count among the group with the most privileges, since an education in their mother tongue is available to them on all levels of education, from kindergarten to elementary and secondary schools to Berufsschulen and universities.\footnote{Cf. ibid., 152-153.} The law no. 504/2002 regulates audiovisual media, in the sense of radio and TV, and a “\textit{Nationaler Audiovisueller Rat}” is in charge of both the protection of the Romanian language and culture and the usage of minority languages, with Article 82 of this law resting, once more, on the 20\% clause.\footnote{Moreover, according to Statement No. 14/1999 of the \textit{Nationaler Audiovisueller Rat}, all broadcasts must be offered in a minority language with Romanian subtitles, dubbing or simultaneous translation, except for music videos or foreign-language educational television. Cf. ibid., 158.} Generally, the unsolved problem in the Romanian minority law persist, namely that there is still no framework legislation concerning the status of the national minorities even though a total of nine bills have been prepared since 1993.\footnote{In February 2005, for example, the Department for Interethnic Relations (= Departamentul pentru Relaţii Interetnice) had proposed a new bill, which had been prepared in cooperation with the Romanian minorities as well as international experts, to the Romanian government, which acknowledged and reviewed it and passed it on to the parliament. That same year, people in charge from Romania requested a verification by the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe, which was published on 25 October 2005. This report repeatedly addresses a so-called \textit{cultural autonomy}, with points 58-73 even explicitly dealing with it. In any case, the thorny issue of the cultural autonomy in particular was one of the reasons why the Romanian parliament kept delaying the ratification of the law. On the Department for Interethnic Relations see the English-language site of the “Department for Interethnic Relations”: \url{http://www.dri.gov.ro/index.html?lng=2} (11 February 2009). The remarks of the Venice Commission CDL-AD(2005)026 can be read verbatim at: \url{http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2005/CDL-AD(2005)026-e.asp} (11 February 2009).} Drawing on his own experiences, Sergiu Constantin writes:

I asked the Head of the Department for Interethnic Relations of the Romanian Government when he thinks that this draft might finally become a law. His very short answer was: “When it will be political will.”\footnote{Constantin, “Romania,” 162.}

In the context of this debate, it is predominantly the Hungarians’ demands for autonomy that the Romanian legislators do not pay heed to. There are basically two different demands: on the one hand, they are geared towards a \textit{cultural autonomy}\footnote{On the term “Kulturautonomie” as viewed from a legal perspective see: Stefan Oeter. “Minderheiten zwischen Segregation, Integration und Assimilation. Zur Entstehung und Entwicklung des Modells der Kulturautonomie.” D. Blumenwitz et al (eds.). \textit{Ein Jahrhundert Minderheiten- und Volksgruppenschutz}. Köln: Wissenschaft und Politik, 2001. 63-82.} that is already taken into consideration in the new bill; on the other hand, they may also include the demand for a \textit{territorial autonomy} regarding the Székely Land. The Hungarian identity management and ethnomanagement articulates both demands in different political contexts. Romania usually reacts dismissingly to the demands for autonomy, and the matter is simply adjourned in parliamentary sessions, as “the term autonomy is frowned upon in Romania because it is erroneously equaled with separatism.”\footnote{Pan, “Die Minderheitenrechte in Rumänien,” 359.}

At the same time, the Hungarians are fairly well integrated into the political and parliamentary structures in Romania: as early as 1997, the \textit{Demokratische Allianz der Ungarn in Rumänien} (=...
Romániai Magyar Demokrata Szövetség, RMDSZ)\textsuperscript{328} entered the then government coalition and a representative of the Hungarians was even promoted to “Minister delegated by Prime Minister for National Minorities,” who was the director of the then newly-founded Abteilung zum Schutz nationaler Minderheiten.\textsuperscript{329} In 2001, this division was transferred into the Abteilung für Interethnische Beziehungen, mentioned above.\textsuperscript{330} After the Romanian general elections of 2004, Béla Markó, the then chairman of the RMDSZ, was moved to the position of a vice premier, who was tasked with coordination in the realms of culture, education and European integration.\textsuperscript{331} Yet, not all Hungarian political representations are like the moderate force of the RMDSZ, which has already entered into some political coalitions with Romanian parties. Demands for territorial autonomy were voiced, for example, by members of the Ungarische Bürgerpartei (= Magyar Polgári Párt, MPP),\textsuperscript{332} founded on 14 March 2008, which emerged from the Ungarische Bürgerunion (= Magyar Polgári Egyesület), founded in 2001, or by members of the Szekler Nationalrates (= Székely Nemzeti Tanács, SZNT).\textsuperscript{333} Viewed from a political angle, this demand serves to position and advance the interests of the Hungarian ethnomangement in Transylvania or in the Székely Land: The RMDSZ, represented in the government coalition, has to manage a balancing-act between the moderate demands for cultural autonomy and the more audacious demands for territorial autonomy without antagonizing the Romanian coalition partners but also without losing too many Hungarian votes to the more radical MPP. The SZNT also criticizes the RMDSZ for taking too moderate a stance towards the Romanian state and therefore conducted an unofficial referendum, which ran from December 2006 through February 2008 in more than 200 communities in the Székely Land. The SZNT thereby wished to underline the Szeklers’ demands for autonomy since almost 100% of the circa 200,000 participants voted in favor of a territorial autonomy. Romanian media, however, reported in a destructive way that those ballots that were not unambiguously in favor of autonomy were tossed out prior to the counting.\textsuperscript{334} In the spring of 2009, the SZNT together with representatives of the MPP\textsuperscript{335} encouraged efforts for an official referendum (= nép-zavazás), which was supposed to take place on 15 March 2009.\textsuperscript{336}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{328} On the Demokratische Allianz der Ungarn in Rumänien see http://www.rmdsz.ro/ (12 February 2009). The names of the RMDSZ and its abbreviations are in Romanian: Uniunea Democrat Maghiara din Romania, UDMR, and in English: Democratic Alliance of Hungarians from Romania, DAHR.
\item \textsuperscript{329} Cf. Constantin, “Romania,” 141.
\item \textsuperscript{331} Cf. Constantin, “Romania,” 144.
\item \textsuperscript{332} The RMDSZ obtained ten seats in the senate and 22 seats in the Romanian parliament, 186 mayor’s offices, 112 borough mayor’s offices and another 2,481 local offices.
\item \textsuperscript{333} The official Romanian-Hungarian name is Partidul Civic Maghiar - Magyar Polgári Párt, which in the everyday usage, however, always only appears in the compound version, just as in the abbreviated forms of the party name either PCM in Romanian or MPP in Hungarian is used.
\item \textsuperscript{334} Cf. Constantin, “Romania,” 163.
\item \textsuperscript{335} See http://www.sznt.ro/hu-sic/index.php?lang=hu (12 February 2009).
\item \textsuperscript{336} On the significance of 15 March for the Hungarians see chapter 2.2, section The Hungarians’ Cultures of Memory.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
page of the SZNT show among other things demonstrations staged in the Székely Land in support of such a referendum. Beside the flags of the Székely Land (blue-gold-silver) and the Hungarian colors (red-white-green), these pictures also show banners that inspire an autonomy following the example of South Tirol: “Székelyföld – Déltirol” (= Székely Land – South Tirol).\textsuperscript{337}

In addition, the Hungarians bring into play the term financial autonomy in the context of Hungarian-language higher education. The goal is to get the funds for a Hungarian university structure that is as independent as possible and disconnected from the Romanian language.\textsuperscript{338} For most Hungarians, the current conditions at the rilingual Babes-Bolyai-Universität at Cluj-Napoca/Klausenburg are not an ideal solution,\textsuperscript{339} and there is a constant concern that these conditions could shift quickly, if a Romanian-nationalist party came into power at Bucharest, so as to result in a disadvantage for the Hungarians. This development essentially also affects the private Hungarian-language universities.\textsuperscript{340}

Sergiu Constantin summarizes the dichotomies of the unsolved problems surrounding the Hungarian demands for autonomy in general terms as follows:

Bucharest likes to speak about a “Romanian model of minority protection”, while in Transylvania there are people convinced that Romania is threatening their national identity and that territorial autonomy based on ethnic criteria is the only solution for the future of their community. It is submitted that the truth is somewhere in between.\textsuperscript{341}

This, however, can be countered with the argument that, from the perspective of minority rights, there can be no solution that is a perfect middle course and equally satisfies the Romanians and the Hungarians/Szeklers in Transylvania. Possible forms of autonomy, which can offer a better future for the Hungarians/Szeklers in the Romanian state, should in any case be pondered upon, since the model South Tirol in particular has shown in many of its facets that this could rather counter the separatism dreaded by the Romanians.

From the viewpoint of the German minority, the former publishing director of the Allgemeinen Deutschen Zeitung für Rumänien, ADZ, in his elaborate commentary on the terms of the aforementioned, then newly formulated framework legislation for national minorities in Romania by and large advocated its implementation since would close a lacuna:

The first draft on this issue, which was registered in parliament – that was in 1991 –, had been written by the DFDR. The discussion on the necessity of a law on minority protection was rekindled by the amendment to the constitution adopted in the fall of 2003, since the list, included

\textsuperscript{337} See ibid.
\textsuperscript{338} Cf. Constantin, “Romania,” 155.
\textsuperscript{340} There already is a Sapientia – Erdélyi Magyar Tudományegyetem, EMTE (= Sapientia – Transylvanian-Hungarian University) in the following cities: Cluj-Napoca/ Klausenburg/Kolozsvár, Miercurea Ciuc/Csíkszereda as well as Târgu Mureş/Marosvásárhely. Moreover, the Hungarian-language Partiumi Keresztény Egyetem (= Christian University Partium) was founded at Oradea/Nagyvárad.
\textsuperscript{341} Constantin, “Romania,” 164.
in the constitution (Article 73), of all those areas for which so-called organic laws had to be adopted had been supplemented with the statute of the national minorities in Romania. The problem of minority protection and of a pertinent law was thus given more weight.342

Zéno Pinter, who was undersecretary in the department of interethnic relations in that same year, even said that the forum of the Germans in Romania, too, was in favor of an adoption of this bill, which would include that the demands for cultural autonomy were tolerated to some extent—and thus the support of the Hungarian RMDSZ. Yet, the then member of parliament Ovidiu Gant, who was likewise a high-ranking German functionary of the DFDR, immediately refuted Pinter’s assessment.343 In his article, Wittstock explicates the target of cultural autonomy, which he calls “controversial,” as follows:

The bill (Article 57/1) defines cultural autonomy as the ability of a minority community to assume discretionary competences in matters that concern the cultural, linguistic and religious identity in the form of councils, which are elected by members of this community. […] Such a council is built through internal elections, in which those people take part who are members of that national minority whose cultural autonomy-council is supposed to be established. The rules according to which this is done should be determined by a respective government resolution, after consultations with the representatives of the respective minority organizations.344

In February 2008, the mayor of Herrmannstadt and chairman of the DFDR, Klaus Johannis, spoke out in clear terms against a demand for autonomy voiced by the Transylvanian Saxons: “If the Transylvanian Saxons demanded autonomy, this would be an absurdity, Johannis said.”345 Beatrice Ungar, the chief editor of the Hermannstädter Zeitung, explained to me in an interview that the German minority simply could not afford cultural autonomy, financially, since the German schools in particular, which at that moment were subject to the Romanian ministry of education, could not be financed. As a small minority, they did not have at their disposal the funds necessary for cultural autonomy.346 This may explain why the DFDR itself does not consider voicing demands for autonomy; but it remains unclear, of course, why the Hungarians are still not supported in their political demands.

**Hungary:**

One of the most important features of the new Hungarian law on minorities, adopted in 1993, surely is the open commitment to a minority, Volksgruppe or ethnic group:

The law 1993:LXXVII on the rights of the national and ethnic minorities […] according to § 1(1) refers to any person who feel they belong to a national or ethnic minority, as well as to the

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343 Ibid.

344 The dimension of such a Kulturautonomie-Rat for the German-speaking minority in Romania, which is dependent on the most recent census, respectively, would, according to this bill, amount to 15 members, in proportion to the roughly 60,000 persons of the 2002 census. These Kulturautonomie-Räte would “be able to have far-reaching competences in the organization and administration of the native-language school system and cultural institutions.” Ibid.


346 Cf. interview transcript, Beatrice Ungar, 28 August 2009.
community formed by these persons. The basis is thus the individual’s exclusive commitment to a minority, not an objective factor.347

There are altogether 13 constitutionally recognized minorities in Hungary. In order to benefit from these rights, a Volksgruppe needs to have lived on Hungarian territory for at least 100 years, needs to be a minority in qualitative terms vis-à-vis the majority population and its members have to be Hungarian citizens.348 All in all, the minorities have to fulfill the criteria “in a cumulative manner” in order to be recognized and they have to “bear witness to an awareness of a shared identity.”349 The installation of an ombudsman, a parliamentary agent for minority rights who has above all a control function, was a novelty that was introduced in Hungary after the Wende.350

The so-called Minderheitenselbstverwaltungen (minority self-governments), which Herbert Küpper regards as a “centerpiece of the minority law,”351 are the minorities’ advocacy groups. Minority self-governments exist both on a national and on a local level, with all of them being considered “legal persons” (§ 25(1)). They are set up through the election of minority representatives in the respective communities, with these elections being tied to local elections that provide for a separate nomination for candidates for minority self-governments according to the minority law (§ 64(2)).352

That local self-government can declare itself a local minority self-government in whose delegate body more than half of the representatives were elected as candidates of a national or ethnic minority (§ 22(1) minority law).353

The minority self-government has to begin with the same rights and duties as every other local self-government (§ 25(1) sentence 2). It is in particular in charge of all public matters of local interest (§ 42 sentence of the constitution) [...]. In addition, the minority law assigns to the local minority self-government some rights and duties typical for the minority, which a regular self-government does not have (§ 25(1) sentence 2 at the end).354

Like every form of local self-government in Hungary, local minority self-governments, too, have the right to establish and maintain facilities, “especially in the realms of local public schooling, local print media and electronic media, the maintenance of traditions and public education.”355 If a minority cannot set up a minority self-government in a community this way, it has the right to dispatch a spokes-

347 Herbert Küpper. Das neue Minderheitenrecht in Ungarn. Untersuchungen zur Gegenwartskunde Südosteuropas 36. München: Oldenbourg, 1998. 89. The aforementioned minority law does not differentiate between national or ethnic minorities and does not attached legal consequences to the usage of either of the terms. Both are uniformly referred to as minorities and were formulated so especially with regard to the Roma population living in the country.

348 Cf. ibid., 89 and 92.


351 Küpper, Das neue Minderheitenrecht in Ungarn, 180.

352 Cf. ibid., 181.

353 Ibid., 188.

354 Ibid., 191-192.

355 Petrétei, Minderheitenschutz in Ungarn, 174-175.
person to the local council as a kind of lobbyist. It is entirely irrelevant whether this spokesperson has a mandate or not.\footnote{Cf. Küpper, \textit{Das neue Minderheitenrecht in Ungarn}, 214.}

Every constitutionally recognized minority has the right to establish a nation-wide minority self-government (§33(3)). So-called electors, who are determined beforehand by the local minority self-governments, elect the members of the nation-wide minority self-government.\footnote{Cf. Petrétei, \textit{Minderheitenschutz in Ungarn}, 175.} The nation-wide minority self-government of the Germans in Hungary was established on 11 March 1995.\footnote{Cf. Küpper, \textit{Das neue Minderheitenrecht in Ungarn}, 216-217.} Its principal task is to represent and to protect the minority on the national as well as the county level since the prevailing Hungarian law on minorities does not provide for a specific role for the counties. The concept of the minority self-government was essentially picked up by all the minorities recognized in Hungary. The biggest weakness of this system, from the angle of identity management and ethnomangement, is its lack of joint socio-political clout:

\begin{quote}
Indeed, the minority self-governments are not the leaders or special organs of Verbände […] They are merely an association at the local level of local delegates who run for office as ‘ethnic’ candidates independently and can be elected by anyone based on the general rules of the electoral franchise. The countrywide minority self-governments are ultimately composed of these local minority representatives. This can create the impression that the minority self-governments are in limbo, are disconnected from the people that they are supposed to represent.\footnote{Cf. Küpper, \textit{Das neue Minderheitenrecht in Ungarn}, 258.}
\end{quote}

In the context of the commitment to minorities, Küpper further points out that “given the prevailing double identities, each solution that demands a full commitment to a minority would be unsuccessful,” in view of the danger “that, instead of a full commitment, the current half-commitment would become void.”\footnote{Ibid., 259.} Communities that are particularly affected by the out-migration of young Germans in Hungary are often overtaxed in terms of personnel resources, which is due to the farreaching power and competences of the elected local minority representatives. Moreover, the Hungarian state could and can hardly keep its promises to the minorities given the financial crisis that it has been in for a while now. Another source of uncertainty for the minorities is the debate over the state funds allocated by the parliament, which is held anew every year.\footnote{Cf. ibid., 263.} The minority representations therefore can hardly undertake a long-term plan of investments. By way of a summary, Herbert Küpper describes the “poli-
cy underlying the Hungarian minority law [...] as dissimilatory integration,” as it does not offer any active support but only “supports the voluntary efforts of this kind.” 363

More recent developments show that the Germans in Hungary as well as other minorities strive for a representation in parliament because they are not satisfied with the system in which inquiries to the Hungarian parliament and the Hungarian government are processed via an ombudsman. Yet, a respective request was removed from the agenda on 07 December 2009 after a majority decision by the delegates. According to this request, the government should have been tasked to draft a bill on the parliamentary representation of minorities and to present it to the parliament by the end of 2012. The chairman of the Landesselbstverwaltung der Ungarndeutschen (LdU), Otto Heinek, commented on this process in an interview with the Neue Zeitung as follows:

It proves how ‘seriously’ the parliament takes the parliamentary representation. This is not about a law but about committing the government to a task. We need to keep in mind with which commission, with which mandate the delegates of the political groups are sitting in the minority forum, if their political groups do not support what the delegates vote for in the forum. I hope that this was not the final say in this matter. 364

This scenario and the aforementioned de facto exclusion from the parliamentary system 365 resulted in ever increasing efforts among the Germans in Hungary to gain cultural autonomy: “The fulfillment of cultural autonomy, i.e. the transfer of Hungarian-German institutions into their own responsibility, is the focus of the activities of the LdU.” 366 The following examples shall demonstrate how this policymaking intensified during the last decade: In 2001 still, cultural autonomy was viewed rather skeptically, especially due to lack of sufficient financial means; in the context of a “questionnaire survey by Mónika Mária Váradi about the Deutschen Minderheiten-Selbstverwaltung (DMS) in Hungary,” which was conducted by the Ungarische Akademie der Wissenschaften (= Magyar Tudományos Akadémiá, MTA) for the LdU, 367 the results showed, among other things, the following:

The perception of cultural autonomy – whose cornerstones are the maintenance of the educational and cultural institutions – is a fata morgana these days or appears rather as a feverish dream. … To put it bluntly: Cultural autonomy cannot be realized without money. 368

In November 2006, during a visit by the German secretary of state Christoph Bergner, who is Beauftragter für Aussiedlerfragen und nationale Minderheiten des deutschen Bundesministeriums für Inneres (Federal commissioner for national minorities), 369 the situation seemed much more relaxed:

He [Christoph Bergner] had talks with representatives of the German minority and the Hungarian government, which revolved primarily around the situation of the German minority in Hun-

363 Ibid., 268.
365 This formulation means that mandates are not given directly to minority representatives but that the ombudsman represents the only connection to the Hungarian parliament. In reality, he is mostly swamped with queries by the Roma.
Apart from the money coming from the Hungarian government, those funds that the kin state, the German Federal Ministry of the Interior, provides the Germans in Hungary with represent another financial pillar for the identity management and ethnomanagement of the Germans in Hungary.

In a talk that Otto Heinek delivered at Graz on 16 May 2009, he spoke about cultural autonomy in the sense that “the institutions of the Germans in Hungary should be in their own hands.” There were no political restrictions against this demand in Hungary, even the legal framework was essentially in place; the problem was the funding, Heinek said. The lasting topicality of this matter shows not only in the every-day minority politics but also in the cultural realm of the Germans in Hungary: For example, the Neue Zeitung titled an article on the 25th anniversary of the Deutsche Bühne Ungarn (DBU) on 05 June 2009 as follows:

“An Important Pillar of Cultural Autonomy”
Deutsche Bühne Ungarn celebrated its 25th anniversary

Whether the current Hungarian FIDESZ government with its two-thirds majority in the Hungarian parliament will grant the Germans in Hungary cultural autonomy and will thus permit a drastic change in the Hungarian minority law remains to be seen. But without political pressure exerted by the kin state Germany this seems impossible for the time being—yet Germany is facing a bigger challenge to intervene diplomatically in view of other legal novelties in Hungary, such as the tightening of the media law or the banking law, than on behalf of a cultural autonomy for the Germans in Hungary, which has de facto already been obtained in many realms but which has not been rendered statutory in the minority legislation.

Serbia:
The past developments in Yugoslavia/Serbia in general and the ensuing repeated shifts in the minorities’ legal situation in particular, since the transition, necessitate a brief historical overview of these
changes: First, the Serbian constitution of 28 September 1990 needs to be mentioned, which “in the normative part is free of ethnic resonances to the nation-state principle.” On a terminological level, this constitution did differentiate between ‘nations’ and ‘nationalities,’ without describing them in concrete terms; the term “ethnic group,” however, which was still used in the Serbian constitution of 1974 to designate Roma, Vlachs or Ruthenians, for instance, is no longer used. With respect to my research region, the Serbian province Vojvodina (= autonomna pokrajina Vojvodine, APV), it needs to be said in advance that in 1989 the Yugoslavian government under Slobodan Milošević increasingly restricted its autonomy status, which to a large extent could be implemented politically for twenty years. The new constitution of 1990, which was forced through in the parliament, referred to the two provinces Vojvodina and Kosovo-Metohija officially as ‘autonomous’ but only rhetorically, more or less. The minorities in Vojvodina were now granted much fewer rights than they had before, and the independent regional parliament (= Vojvodina skupština) in Novi Sad/Újvidék/Neusatz was retained, but it was no longer permitted to pass laws. On the basis of the new constitution of 1990, the parliament of the APV created a specific statute in 1991 that was meant to link up with the old form of autonomy. The installation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, created at Beograd/Belgrad on 27 April 1992, was an attempt on the part of the state leadership to link up to the era of the socialist Yugoslavia. Yet, it failed, mostly due to the fact that many aspects surrounding the process of the Yugoslav, Serbian-Montenegrin state formation were ill thought-through, which resulted in a boycott of the elections in the province Kosovo or on the part of the opposition in Serbia in May 1992. While the Albanians in Kosovo boycotted all elections, the Hungarians’ parties in Vojvodina, such as the Allianz der Ungarn in der Vojvodina (= Vajdasági Magyar Szövetsége, VMSZ), did take part in elections and were thus represented both in the Serbian and in the regional Vojvodina-skupština.

Only the overthrow of the Milošević regime in October 2000 prepared the ground for the necessary steps for a democratization on the interior as well as for the closer affiliation with or integration into international organizations:

374 Marko, Der Minderheitenschutz in den jugoslawischen Nachfolgestaaten, 218. Excerpts from this version of the Serbian constitution concerning the minorities, see ibid., 41-42.
375 Cf. ibid.
376 “[…] the SAPs Vojvodina and Kosovo under the constitutional framework of the SFRJ was successively abolished through amendments to the Serbian constitution and to the constitutions of the two SAPs in March 1989; for instance, Amendment XLVII to the Serbian constitution removed the absolute veto right of the SAPs in decisions on the constitutional changes in the Republic of Serbia.” Ibid, 25.
378 Cf. ibid., 10.
380 On the individual points of the statute, see ibid., 245-246. Article 109 of the constitution of 1990 regulates the basic budget, the legislative, executive and other competences of the APV, which were then developed in the (abovementioned) statute and adopted by the assembly of the APV (Article 110).
381 Cf. ibid., 214.
In 2003 Serbia (then within the state union) became a member of the Council of Europe and ratified its key human rights instruments. Since 2001 Serbia has been participating in the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) in order to become a fully-fledged member of the EU.\textsuperscript{382}

On 14 March 2002, the two republics Serbia and Montenegro could still agree on the foundation of a joint state (Srbija i Crna Gora, SCG) and drafted a corresponding document,\textsuperscript{383} but four years later, in June 2006, Montenegro proclaimed its independence.

The war in the former Yugoslavia triggered several waves of refugees, which affected Vojvodina’s ethnic composition since the majority of ethnic Serbs, who had fled from Kosovo or from Krajina, altered the demographic make-up there.\textsuperscript{384} This affected those villages particularly negatively where a minority, such as the Hungarians, the Rusyns (formerly Ruthenians), Banjewatzen (= Bunjevci) or Roma, or several minorities together had made up the majority of the population (>50%).\textsuperscript{385} Concomitantly, the numbers of mostly Croats and Hungarians in Vojvodina decreased, not least due to the repressions against these minorities in particular, since even in the post-Milošević era, there were assaults on minorities:

In 2004 and 2005 a series of ethnically motivated incidents in the province of Vojvodina attracted international attention. Although the number of incidents declined in the meantime, the European parliament adopted two resolutions strongly criticizing the Serbian authorities in their passive and inappropriate response to the incidents.\textsuperscript{386}

On 22 September 2005, I had a conversation with leading activists at the office of the Hungarian society Árgus at Novi Sad/Újvidék. These activists have assumed the task of observing whether the minority rights are implemented vis-à-vis the Hungarians in Vojvodina.\textsuperscript{387}

One month before the aforementioned federation between Serbia and Montenegro was founded, in February 2002, a consensus was reached concerning a new minority law. This consensus, in turn, was preceded, on 23 January 2002, by a vote on the so-called “omnibus law,” which projected the extension of Vojvodina’s autonomy; it was adopted by the Serbian parliament by a narrow majority. Emma Lantschner notes that the “Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities” welcomed the omnibus law, “even if the competences could be more far-reaching.”\textsuperscript{388} Yet, its implementation required further political decision-making, especially with regard to the reorganization of Vojvodina’s autonomy.\textsuperscript{389} This meant at the same time that the APV issued a number of regulations in addition to the minority law, which were supposed to be a concrete counter-

\textsuperscript{384} “[…] the number of Serbs within the FRY may be estimated to have increased by about 4-5% at the time of 1998, since according to UNHCR statistical data there has been an influx of 200,900 refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina, 296,000 from Croatia, 1,300 refugees from FR Macedonia and 3,200 refugees from Slovenia.” König, \textit{The Situation of Minorities in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia}, 17.
\textsuperscript{385} Cf. ibid., 17 and 35.
\textsuperscript{386} Vučić, “Serbia,” 275.
\textsuperscript{387} Argus – Vajdasági Magyar Kisebbségjogi Civil Egyesület/Árgus – Civilno udruženie Mađara u Vojvodini za prava manjina/Árgus – Ziviler Verein für Minderheitenrechte der Ungarn in der Vojvodina; see \url{http://www.argus.org.rs/} (06 August 2009).
\textsuperscript{388} Lantschner, “Soft Jurisprudence im Minderheitenrecht,” 181.
balance and an improvement for the coexistence of the ethnic groups in Vojvodina. One of the most important novelties in the Serbian minority law of 2002 was the establishment of *Nationale Räte* for the individual minority groups:

[…] which according to Article 19(1) of the minority law explicitly were meant to serve the “exercise of self-government rights with regard to the usage of language and script, education, information and culture.” The *Räte*, which are designed as democratic representative bodies, according to Article 19(7) of the minority law may make decisions and establish institutions in these domains.

The *Nationalrat der Deutschen in Serbien* (= Nacionalni savet nemačke manjine u Srbiji), for example, was only founded much later, on 15 December 2007, at Novi Sad/Neusatz, but the council president Andreas Bürgermayer in a press interview celebrated it as a great achievement:

Er [Andreas Bürgermayer] further said: “We confirm by means of this Nationalrat that we exist and still live here. This gives us the status of a national minority and all legal and constitutional rights.” It will be easier from now on to preserve language, culture and traditions because the state will support the council. The foundation of the Nationalrat is of historic significance for the ethnic Germans in Vojvodina, Bürgermayer says.

A representation on the parliamentary level is not easy to obtain for minorities in Serbia since they have to overcome the hurdle of 10,000 signatures first in order to be allowed to run in elections at all. For the APV, the minorities’ access to the elections for a seat in der Vojvodina skupština was somewhat eased, which, however, did not show a positive effect in the electoral practice. On the state level, the *Council for National Minorities of Serbia* (= Savezni savet za nacionalne manjine) was established in 2004, and its tasks are summarized as follows in the *Aide Mémoire* of the United Nations Human Rights Council:

The Government of the Republic of Serbia set up the *Council of the Republic of Serbia for National Minorities* consisted of the representatives of 15 national minorities’ councils and respective ministries in charge for the interior affairs, justice, public administration, education, culture and religion and chaired by the Prime Minister of the Republic of Serbia.

The 15 representatives named here are the minimum number, in Article 19 of the law of 2004 the maximum number of 35 is referenced and in Article 18 the essence and the tasks of the *Savet* are out-

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393 The unproportionality of this number had been criticized and the election commission had lowered it to 3,000, but the constitutional court then revoked this decree in 2008. The fact remains that after the general elections of 2007 only 8 of altogether 250 seats could be filled by minority parties. Cf. Vučić, “Serbia,” 284-285.
394 “As for Vojvodina, the Decision on the Election of Representatives for the Assembly of the APV provides facilitation for parties of national minorities so that they need only 3,000 signatures, instead of 6,000, and so that they do not have to meet the 5% electoral hurdle. In particular regarding the smaller minority parties, these measures did not have the desired effects on the latest elections for the provincial assembly in 2004, as the representation of national minority parties failed to increase as estimated.” Ibid., 285.
In addition, based on the law on local self-governments, a Council for Interethnic Relations can be established on a regional level:


The Hungarian minority welcomed these developments, which Bálint Pásztor, who represents the Hungarian VMSZ in the Serbian parliament, confirms: Back then, only a few paragraphs had been dedicated to the Nationalräte (= hung. nemzeti tanácsok) but the modified law, which was passed on 31 August 2009, now regulated the manner in which the Nationale Räte were elected as well as their areas of competence and their funding. When in November 2009 the new statute of Vojvodina was passed, the new term ‘national community’ (= nemzeti közösség) was introduced. This legal term is formulated in such a way as to do away with national minorities per se and replace them with ‘national communities’ that form a minority in terms of the number of their members. In the eyes of Bálint Pásztor, this was above all a symbolic decision since this made the Serbs in Vojvodina equal to all other nations living there. On 06 June 2010, 19 national communities (= 19 nemzeti közösség) could elect their Nationalräte (= nemzeti tanácsait), 16 of them directly and 3 according to the electoral system. Pásztor commented on this, saying that there was no difference, say, between the Hungarian national minority and the Macedonian national minority, even if the latter had immigrated to Serbia mostly due to economic reasons. The only difference was in the scale of the national minority, and the legislator took this into consideration in the formation of the Nationalräte (= nemzeti tanácsok): 18-35 members according to size. The Hungarian and the Bosnian Nationalrat as well as that of the Roma each had the maximum of 35 members; the Greeks, for instance, had the minimum of 18 members.

Organizations in the Kin States (Selection)

For the examples of the identity management and ethnomanagement from the outside cited in this section, on the one hand, I drew on persons in elected political functions or offices in the kin states who also want to fortify their patronage relation when they express their national interest in the respec-

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399 Cf. ibid.

400 Cf. ibid.
tive German (Germany, Austria) or Hungarian (Hungary) minority in the research regions in Southeast Europe; on the other hand, I drew on organizations that have evolved out of minority and expellee organizations in the kin states and that are therefore linked to the minorities in the research regions mainly via the marker ‘origin.’ The following selection of examples shall, in loose order, make evident various connections between the identity management and ethnomanagement in the kin states and the Germans and Hungarians in Southeast Europe in order to also give an impression of the diversity of this research field.

In Germany and Austria, the Landsmannschaften continue to perform the lion’s share of the identity management and ethnomanagement from the outside. The Verband der volksdeutschen Landsmannschaften Österreichs (VLÖ), which functions as an umbrella organization, contributes significantly to the Germans’ identity management and ethnomanagement in Southeast Central Europe, be it on the level of the material support or on the level of the ‘ideological’ support. It also views itself as the driving force in Austria:

He [Rudolf Reimann] is in Austria not only the chairman of the Donauschwäbische Arbeitsgemeinschaft (DAG), but also the federal chairman of the Verband der volksdeutschen Landsmannschaften Österreichs (VLÖ). Der VLÖ, with 360,000 expellees, is the Austrian equivalent to the Bund der Vertriebenen (BdV) in Germany.

The Austrian federal government provided the VLÖ with the means to establish a cultural center, the Haus der Heimat, on Steingasse 25 in Vienna, which was opened on 14 December 1996.

One of the focal points in the work of the VLÖ is certainly in the realm of the cultures of memory, which in most cases are connected with questions of expulsion or restitution. An example is the Volksgruppen symposium of 2011, which took place from 22 to 25 September 2011 in Subotica/Maria Theresiopel. Significantly, its program was titled “Memorials and Memory Culture.” It is therefore puzzling that Rudolf Weiss, the chairman of the society Deutscher Volksverband in Subotica, said in an interview that the Landsmannschaften in Germany and Austria mostly took care of folklore—the people were likeable, he said, and you could drink beer with them and sing German songs together but the Landsmannschaften had no strategic significance for Serbia.

In Austria, there is mostly still the Österreichische Landsmannschaft (ÖLM), which was founded 1952 and which sees itself as the successor of the German-national Deutscher Schulverein

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401 For reasons of scope, this study does without a detailed description of scientific institutions, as this would have exceeded the framework of the study. As examples see e.g.: Institut für Ost- und Südosteuropaforschung (IOS) http://www.ios-regensburg.de; Forschungsverband Ost- und Südosteuropa (forost) http://www.forost.de; Virtuelle Fachbibliothek Osteuropa (vifaost) http://www.vifaost.de; Südostdeutsche Historische Kommission (SHK) http://www.ahf-muenchen.de/Mitglieder/Institutionen/SuedOstHistKomm.shtml (all sites 24 March 2012).


404 See http://www.vloe.at/, the link ‘Geschichte des VLO’ (03 August 2011); see further http://hausderheimat.npage.de/willkommen_53161455.html (03 August 2011).


Examples of Landsmannschaften in Austria, whose identity management and ethnomanagement is specifically focused on their founders’ regions of origin, are the Landsmannschaft der Deutsch-Untersteirer, the Arbeitgemeinschaft der Gottscheer Landsmannschaften, the Landsmannschaft der Donauschwaben in Oberösterreich as well as other organizations that no longer use the term Landsmannschaft in their name, such as the Donauschwäbische Arbeitsgemeinschaft or the Bundesverband der Siebenbürger Sachsen in Österreich, which emerged only in 2005 through a change in statutes and name from the Landsmannschaft der Siebenbürger Sachsen in Österreich.

We would thereby like to counter the tiresome prejudice that the VLÖ and our societies, too, are “right wing extremists” or are ideologically positioned at the right-wing end of the political spectrum. We hope that the 60 years of post-war history, our proving ourselves and our general appreciation in Austria will finally eliminate the gridlocked prejudices. The statutes of the Bundesverband der Siebenbürger Sachsen show nicely how its identity management and ethnomanagement is connected to Transylvania. What is most striking is that they took on the “sponsorship for northern Transylvania,” which was negotiated to amount to € 10,000.00 per year for the region Bistrița/Bistritz and Reghin/Sächsisch Regen and for the period 2005-2010.

Northern Transylvania was chosen because it is the region of origin of the majority of our members, because there are many personal contacts and because a total of 693 members does not overtax us.

In Austria, the Bundesverband (federal association) and the Landesverband (regional association) Upper Austria and the neighborhoods, the Protestant church, Heimatortsgemeinschaften (HOGs) and other sponsors committed to the undertaking; in northern Transylvania, this assistance was processed by the regional organizations of the forum and the Protestant church so that mostly people in need could be supported effectively. In Austria, too, the immigrated Transylvanian Saxons are very closely connected to the Protestant church, which is not concealed in the self-presentation: “We feel we are a small, but important part of the Protestant church in Austria, which has become our spiritual home and which we are glad to serve with our gifts.” In addition, through the election of pastor Volker Petri, who had began his education at the Theological Institute at Hermannstadt, a Protestant became the chairman of the Bundesverbandes der Siebenbürger Sachsen. The next example introduces one of the Austrian Regionalverbände: Der Verband der Siebenbürger Sachsen in der Steiermark, with its

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408 See http://www.untersteirer.at/ (04 August 2011).
409 See http://www.uni-klu.ac.at/hleustik/gottschee/ (04 August 2011).
411 For further organizations of the Danube Swabians in Austria see: http://www.donauschwaben.at/index.htm (04 August 2011).
412 See http://www.7buerger.at/ (04 August 2011).
414 Ibid.
415 Ibid.
416 Cf. ibid.
417 See http://www.7buerger.at/ (link ‘Ziele’) (04 August 2011).
roughly 50, mostly elderly members very small in numbers. Therefore there are only few activities in the entire yearly program, but the chairwoman Kerstin Simon names three fixed events: The first is the “Holzfleischessen” (= Transylvanian-Saxon for barbecue), another the Advent celebration and the third is the ski camp. The latter already had its 60th anniversary, with Helmut Volkmer, father of the current chairwoman, having organized the ski camp for 50 years. The Advent celebration traditionally takes place at the Protestant Heilandskirche at Graz, but regardless of that religion is a private matter. The Steirische Verband maintains contacts with many other German minority societies and also participates in the countrywide Austrian sessions, which take place twice per year, but is little interested in the current events in Transylvania. I consider this to be quite a remarkable fact since the Steirische Verband is connected, via the larger structures of the association, to the identity management and ethnomanagement of the Transylvanian Saxons both in the kin states and in the host state but it is not active itself in an identity management and ethnomanagement from the outside; this case could be described as an indirect ethnomanagement from the outside since the objectives of other institutions are supported during sessions—however, the central goal and focus of the association work is to bring their own members together in the three annual meetings.

In Germany, it is the Verband der Siebenbürger Sachsen, renamed in 2007, that functions as the umbrella organization and coordinates the identity management and ethnomanagement of the Transylvanian Saxons. The Transylvanian Saxons’ “Heimattag,” which has been celebrated at Dinkelsbühl since 1985, is considered the annual climax of all political and cultural events. The Heimattag is essentially an event that runs for several days and takes places on the respective Pentecost weekend from Friday through Sunday. On these three days, roughly 15,000 visitors get together. The Transylvanian Saxons’ parade of folk costumes on Pentecost Sunday with the celebratory addresses is the highpoint of the festivities. In addition, there are a camping festival lasting several days, which is the main attraction for the Saxony youth above all, diverse lectures, award ceremonies (Transylvanian-Saxon Youth Prize, Ernst-Habermann Prize, Transylvanian-Saxon Cultural Prize) as well as a Protestant mass with the Pfingstbotschaft. Mainly Transylvanian-Saxon Volkstanz groups, members of so-called “Heimatortsgemeinschaften” (HOG) and of suborganizations of the Verband der Siebenbürger Sachsen, which are all located in Germany, take part in the parade of folk costumes.

418 Yet, only one member per family counts.
419 See http://www.7buerger.at/ the link Steiermark, where current events are announced.
421 It emerged from the Landsmannschaft der Siebenbürger Sachsen and the renaming was effected, next to other reforms, on the Verbandstag of 2007, which took place on 03 and 04 November in Bad Kissingen. See http://www.siebenbuerger.de/verband/rueckblick/geschichte (04 August 2011). In Germany, the Verband der Siebenbürger Sachsen had about 24,000 members in 2011. See: http://www.siebenbuerger.de/verband/aufgaben/ziele (08 August 2011).
422 In 2010, I traveled to Dinkelsbühl, together with the ‘Saxons expert’ Bernhard Heigl, on the occasion of the 60th Heimattag of the Transylvanian Saxons.
Personally, I noticed that the coat of arms displayed by the individual groups hardly showed the original Transylvanian coat of arms anymore but in most cases the coat of arms of the *Verband der Siebenbürger Sachsen*.424

With respect to its *identity management and ethnomanagement from the outside*, I would like to refer, by way of an example, to its efforts to actively engage in politics in Romania, next to the *Demokratisches Forum der Deutschen*—and quite successfully so, if we look at the ceremonial address of 23 May 2010 delivered by the then Romanian Minister of the Interior Vasile Blaga at Dinkelsbühl, in which he stressed that he negotiated questions of restitution not only with the elected representatives of the Germans in Romania but also included the *Verband der Siebenbürger Sachsen* as well as representatives of the Banat Swabians:

> It was an open and constructive talk, an important step for both parties involved. We have continued this dialogue here at Dinkelsbühl, and I wish that we can stay in close contact in the future, as well. Federal chairman Fabritius, I will gladly also assist you in the future, if my help is required.425

In my observations on the *ethnomanagement from the outside*, it is not only remarkable but unique that a minister of the interior of a host state invites a *Volksgruppenverband*, which is located in a kin state, to contribute to a legislative amendment.426 Of course, Bernd Fabritius, the chairman of the *Verband*, needed to lay particular emphasis on this constructive dialogue with Romania in his ceremonial address at Dinkelsbühl:

> We are very pleased, Sir, that you assess this issue as a concern that we share and want to support us in tackling it. When Romania applies European standards to the protection of property here and not only creates and protects seemingly gullible new beneficiaries, it thereby sets a signal of legal stability and – perhaps much more important – of trust.427

These developments, however, subsequently slowed down considerably, after Vasile Blaga stepped back. The succeeding Minister of the Interior Constantin Traian Igaș, who is a member of the right-wing conservative governing party PDL, has made no effort towards the legislative amendment promised by his predecessor. In an interview with the *Siebenbürgische Zeitung* in May 2011, Bernd Fabritius, therefore, speaks of a setback:

> We have since been trying to take up the tread at various points. I understand if some of the people concerned feel it is not going fast enough.

424 The coat of arms of the *Verband* was confirmed in its present form as the “coat of arms of Saxony” during the latest *Sachsentag*, which took place in Romania on 01 October 1933, at the urging of the NSDR (= *Nationale Selbsthilfebewegung der Deutschen in Rumänien*). Cf. Walter Myß (ed.). *Lexikon der Siebenbürger Sachsen*. Thaur b. Innsbruck: Wort u. Welt, 1993.

425 There is a bilingual Romanian-German audio-recording of this speech; the quotation, however, is taken from the online issue of the *Siebenbürgischen Zeitung*. See [http://www.siebenburger.de/zeitung/artikel/verband/10026-vasile-blaga-siebenburger-sachsen.html](http://www.siebenburger.de/zeitung/artikel/verband/10026-vasile-blaga-siebenburger-sachsen.html) (05 August 2011). Commentary: The Romanian Minister of the Interior here referred to a roundtable at the Dinkelsbühl townhall, which had already taken place prior to the *Heimattag* and during which the topic of restitution was most central.


The Verband tries to improve the situation with the help of a sober confrontation with facts and constructive dialogue. It is an interactive process. If, however, you understand by “confrontation” threat or quarrel, you talk about means with which nothing can be achieved in such contexts.428

This quotation shall also demonstrate the Verband’s defensive attitude, mostly because it had been heavily criticized for delaying the negotiations with Romania by functionaries of the RESRO (= Interessenvertretung Restitution in Rumänien e.V.),429 which is primarily concerned with restitution for the Germans in Romania.430

The Transylvanian-Saxon youth seems to far less concerned with such ethnopolitical subjects—judging by my observations at Dinkelsbühl. The camping festival in particular, and the parade of folk costumes, which the Siebenbürgisch-Sächsische Jugend Deutschlands (SJD) also helped organize, form the major points of interest for them, rather than the political speeches.31 The German-language dance band “Amazonas Express,” which played on the opening night of the “Heimattag,”432 can be regarded as symbolic of the entire Transylvanian-Saxon diaspora since this entertainment band was originally founded at Großau am Zibin/Cristian/Kereszténysziget in Transylvania and was later revived in Germany.433

The Landsmannschaft der Deutschen aus Ungarn (LDU), too, is active in Germany in matters of expulsion and displacement434 and communicates these matters with great tenacity to the secretary of state in charge at the federal ministry of the interior in Germany; fortunately, the secretary of state in charge, Christoph Bergner, connects the Germans of Hungary in Germany with those in Hungary symbolically, as for example in his semantic bridge building during his ceremonial address, which he delivered at the 55th Bundesschwabenball at Gerlingen in 2010:

The Germans expelled from Hungary and the German minority in Hungary are two firm bridge pillars, on which the stable connection between the two countries rests.435

The LDU has developed a very ‘convoluted’ notion of Heimat, in which they try to somehow integrate both Germany and Hungary:

Heimat is very important for the Germans from Hungary wichtig. Heimat for them is always still Hungary, but Germany by now has also become Heimat. Thus, one often hears Germans from Hungary who go on vacation to Hungary: “We are going home.” Yet, at the end of their

431 At, Dinkelsbühl most teens spend the night on a camping site close to the party tent. During breaks from the dancing, many return there in small groups because some use the trunks of their cars as a bar with (not always chilled) drinks – I have been told that this has become a tradition as it not only allowed them to save money but was a lot of fun.
432 See the you-tube-video of the opening night in the party tent (21 May 2010): http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qlYStGDZDrk (05 August 2011).
434 See http://www.ldu-online.de/ (17 May 2011). The abbreviation LDU can be confused with the Landesselfverwaltung der Ungarndeutschen LdU.
vacation, they also say: “We are going home.” The expelled Germans from Hungary have by now become integrated in Germany but they have not forgotten their old Heimat Hungary.436 The so-called Heimatortsgemeinschaften (HOG), which sprang up in Germany after the forced migration elaborated on above, even use the term Heimat in their name. From among the large number of Heimatortsgemeinschaften from diverse host states in Southeast Europe, I will only present one representative example here, which, after much attention has been paid to the Germans from Transylvania or Hungary, shall direct the spotlight to the Germans from Serbia: There is a close tie between the Deutscher Verein der Gemeinde Hodschag (= Udruženje nemaca opštine Odžaci) in Vojvodina and the HOG at the Hodschag community (officially called Vereinigung der Hodschager e.V. at Moosburg) in Germany. This connection is made apparent above all by the Hodschager Blättli, which is published by the HOG and reports regularly on the Verein’s activities in Serbia.437 This example from the Hodschager Blättli 60 (2005) represents some fields of activity, in which Heimatortsgemeinschaften are mainly active, and if there is a German minority society in the hometown it is supported in various ways. Generally, the ‘preservation of a Danube-Swabian identity’ is at the center of attention, which also means that the flow that the identity construction of the members of the German Volksgruppe in Southeast Europe is currently in is essentially considered a threat for Danube-Swabian traditions by many Heimatortsgemeinschaften in Germany.

The most essential interaction between the kin states Germany and Austria and the German minority societies in the host states of course takes place in the realm of financial subsidies. These subsidies are the most central control elements in the identity management and ethnomanagement von außen because hardly any of the minority organizations could do or keep up the level of their work on the basis of the minority subsidies provided by the host state, plus possible membership fees, donations or other revenue. In many cases there are already publicly subsidized foundations that function as project sponsors for the Germans in Southeast Europe. As an example of such a funding variant, I would like to refer at this point to the two business reports, of 2005 through 2007, of the Donausch-

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437 “A letter addressed to the Vereinigung der Hodschager e.V., Moosburg, reports on the activities of the Deutscher Verein, founded at Odzaci on 15 December 2001 (see Blättli No. 51). In the following, we give the wording in an abbreviated version:

‘The society engaged in the following activities over the past three years:
- we have above all put great effort into integrating all Germans into the Verein and defending their interests;
- we use every opportunity to develop good relations with all the Volksgruppen and Völkern living here;
- we organized an exhibition titled: ‘Remembrance of the Past’ (see Blättli No. 56) at the Hodschager museum in order to preserve the national identity and make known to the local population the Danube Swabians’ origins and identity;
- for a while, we have held a German language class, which was well frequented, at the so-called ‘Bürgerhaus’ for the cultivation of the German language; in order to display the traditions and customs of earlier times, we have set up a booth offering Danube-Swabian cuisine on the ‘Day of Spring, Fecundity and Folk Tradition’ (see Blättli No. 57);
- we cooperated well with the Vereinigung der Hodschager, Moosburg, in the past years, which we would like to continue doing in the future:
- by publishing our book ‘Beyond the War,’ we told the public about the injustice that was done to the Germans who had stayed in their Heimat.”

wäbische Kulturstiftung Baden-Württemberg, which maintains active subsidy programs in Hungary, Romania, Croatia and Serbia.\textsuperscript{438} The foundation itself was founded in 1988 by the Land Baden-Württemberg and then declared as its goal to support the Danube Swabians in Hungary. The board of trustees decided a few years later to “extend the foundation’s sphere of work from 01 January 1995 onward to Romania and to the region of the former Yugoslavia.”\textsuperscript{439}

In the course of time, the sponsorship of the Donauschwäbische Kulturstiftung has pragmatically adapted to the local circumstances and has focused more and more on sponsoring the German language. Because the German language is the prerequisite for the preservation of the German culture.\textsuperscript{440}

In 2005, for example, the foundation’s total subsidy amounted to € 273,104.12, with the help of which which 120 projects in total could be supported\textsuperscript{441}; in 2007, by comparison, € 217,689.39 were provided to support altogether 105 projects. In 1995, when the foundation expanded, a maximum of altogether 280 projects were subsidized (total of € 499,575.59), with the yearly shifting figures resulting from the respectively different constellation of small, medium-sized and large projects.\textsuperscript{442} The foundation received an annual € 25,600, referred to as in the report “Zustiftung,” from the Land Baden-Württemberg as well as project subsidies in the amount of € 76,700. In the business year 2007, for example, another € 63,290 were added by the Federal Foreign Office in Germany. The foundation considers itself also as a “mediator organization”\textsuperscript{443} for the kin state. What follows are some concrete sums from 2007, which went to individual German minority organizations in Southeast Europe: the Landesselbstverwaltung der Ungarndeutschen (LdU), € 4,000.00 for a specific purpose; Volksdeutsche Gemeinschaft (Osijek) for the quarterly “Deutsches Wort” € 14,000.00, which is listed again with € 2,000.00 in the category media subsidies.\textsuperscript{444} What is termed “Sprachförderungsmaßnahmen” (scholarships for student exchanges, continuing teacher education, teaching materials) in the report amounts to the significant sum of € 67,971.86, which, however, covers all subsidized countries.\textsuperscript{445} € 2,249.09 were spent for academic projects, such as a conference for German Studies scholars, € 15,642.42 on the sponsorship of “artistic measures,” and the focus was on theatre-pedagogical work at German theaters in the target regions.\textsuperscript{446} This selection of examples shall provide a rough idea of the amounts of the subsidies, such as those of foundations, that go towards Southeast Europe. Drawing on

\textsuperscript{438} This example was also selected because these business reports are freely accessible online, and therefore a citation of the sums is legally non-hazardous.


\textsuperscript{441} Cf. business report 2005 of the Donauschwäbischen Kulturstiftung Baden-Württemberg, 2.

\textsuperscript{442} Cf. business report 2007 of the Donauschwäbischen Kulturstiftung Baden-Württemberg, 10.

\textsuperscript{443} Cf. ibid., 10 and 14.

\textsuperscript{444} Cf. ibid., 15 and 22.

\textsuperscript{445} Cf. ibid., 16.

\textsuperscript{446} Cf. ibid., 23.

There are other categories such as for “qualification measures” € 14,237.27 and for “other projects” € 19,635.00. Cf. ibid., 24 and 25.

Altogether, the foundation had capital in the amount of € 2,377,719.68 at its disposal in 2007. In 2007, income in the amount of € 163,345.70 could be generated and there was a total of € 12,385.00 in donations. Cf. ibid., 28.
experience, it can be added that an identity management and ethnomanagement from the outside not only draws less attention without the respective funds but also can pursue its goals much less effectively, even if the report of the Donauschwäbische Kulturstiftung Baden-Württemberg relatives this:

Figures express a lot, in the realm of culture, however, they do not express what matters. The quality Kulturarbeit cannot only me measured by the amount of the deployed funds. As the chairman of the Volksdeutsche Gemeinschaft Essegg/ Osijek and theminority delegatein the Croatian parliament, Nikola Mak, expressed so pointedly, it is not always the money that matters. Nevertheless, it becomes apparent, and is generally known, that subsidies are the strongest binder, and based on my research I consider a patronage concept that rests merely upon mutual loyalty based on the markers “shared origins” or “language” and that does without any monetary support to be an extremely unstable connection. The above quotation is also a parable of how generously people argue when there are subsidies for a minority representation, because if these subsidies are cut, people complain vehemently about the lack of funds.

One of the most important institutions in Germany, which acts, among others, on behalf of the German minority in Eastern Europe and Southeast Europe, is the ifa (= Deutsches Instituts für Auslandsbeziehungen). From among my research regions, I would like to name at this point the ifa office at Sombor in Vojvodina since it also shows up in the 2007 annual statement of the aforementioned Donauschwäbische Kulturstiftung, where it was granted € 3,500.00 for the “sponsorship of German societies in Vojvodina.” This implies that the local ifa office fulfills the function of a foothold not only for cultural agendas but also for subsidies.

The Kulturabkommen zwischen Österreich und Slowenien, which was signed on 30 April 2001 by the then foreign ministers Benita Ferrero-Waldner and Dimitrij Rupel, shall serve here as an example of a kin state’s direct diplomatic action. A two years’ break, which had passed between the initialing and the signing, had shown how delicate some issues were for both states. Stefan Karner credits the efforts of the Solvenian head of government at the time, Janez Drnovšek for the eventual signing of the Kulturabkommen. The Slovenian government had been hesitant for so long mostly because

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447 Ibid., 6.
448 Culture is in many places a heavily subsidized asset, and therefore I would like to counter what Mak stated in the above quotation by pointing out that the yearbook of the Volksdeutsche Gemeinschaft, titled Deutsches Wort, received € 16.000 from the Donauschwäbische Kulturstiftung in 2007 alone and only one sponsor is named here explicitly.
449 See http://www.ifa.de/ (10 January 2012).
451 According to Karner, the bilateral negotiations of the Kulturabkommen were protracted mainly for the following reasons: “[…] because no agreement could be reached on the Slovenian term for “Volksgruppe” and because some wanted to name only German-speaking Slovenian citizens in Slovenian in order not to grant constitutional minority rights to the German-speaking groups in the country—by the backdoor, as it were. The compromise does not deny the German-speaking groups the character of a Volksgruppe (narodna skupina, not: narodna skupnost) […] Thus, the German-speaking groups in Slovenia also receive access to those educational, scientific and cultural projects, which are already in place or still need to be put in place, that the Slovenes in Austria also profit from.”

the German-speaking Volksgruppe was officially named for the first time in Article 15 of the Kulturabkommen and it is thus at least “culturally recognized”—even if this has had no legal consequences to date. Yet, it raises questions that bring to the fore above all the historical assessment of the position of the Germans in Slovenia during the era of the National Socialist occupation of Slovenia, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the expulsion of the German-speaking population in the era after World War II:

The Kulturabkommen [thus] has a strong psychological effect, in Slovenia as well as in Austria, its “historic mile stone” still has to prove, by its adherence to its promises and in its handling of the historical burden. Yet, the Kulturabkommen can create that foundation of trust on both sides of the borders that is necessary for its implementation.

A thematic coordination between Slovenia and Austria happened only to the degree that independent historians’ commissions were appointed in both countries, which were supposed to shed light on different questions concerning the common history, including the history of the Germans in Slovenia. Only in 1998 was this question then addressed for the first time on an official bilateral level by the then foreign ministers Boris Frlec and Wolfgang Schüssel. Frlec had already “[…] signaled his willingness to find a solution—for example, in the context of a Kulturabkommen to be agreed upon by the two states.”

To be on the safe side, he added a reservation: The minority should not be given the constitutional status of the Italian or Magyar minority, but cultural sponsorship, such as a school with German-language instruction.

But even for this, Boris Frlec could not gain a political majority in Slovenia; the disapproval was all the more palpable. Three years later, in 2001, a compromise could be reached in the question of how to designate the German-speaking Volksgruppe. The practice of its implementation has since been rather deficient on both sides: In Austria, it was for instance the question of place name signs in Carinthia or the role of the Carinthian Slovenes in the partisan fight against the German occupiers; in Slovenia, the two leading societies of the German-speaking Volksgruppe still demand a better imple-

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452 Cf. Pan, Die Minderheitenrechte in Slowenien, 431. The Slovenian census terminology uses the categories “German” or “Austrian.”
453 Article 15 of the Kulturabkommen reads in Slovenian and German respectively:

15. člen Pogodbenici bosta v programe Mešane komisije, ustanovljene na podlagi prvega odstavka 20. člena, in v danem primeru v skupne delovne programe ministrstev obeh strani na podlagi tretjega odstavka 20. člena vsakokrat vključevati tudi projekte v korist kulturnih kakor tudi izobraževalno in znanstveno pomembnih želja in potreb pripadnikov nemško govoreče etnične skupine v Sloveniji (kot na primer projekte na področju učenja jezika in spomeniškega varstva, stipendij in podobno).

454 Ibid., 271.
457 Ibid.
mentation of the *Kulturabkommen*. Ultimately, however, there had been hopes that this *Kulturabkommen* would be the basis for an extension of Article 15.

In the Hungarian parliament, the so-called *Kárpát-medencei Magyar Képviselők Fóruma*, KMKF (= *Forum der Vertreter der Ungarn im Karpatenbecken*) was founded as early as September 2006 under the then MSZP/SZDSZ government coalition.\(^{458}\) Under the succeeding FIDESZ government, this forum was kept and it is now governed by the acting speaker of parliament László Kövér. During the plenary session of 11 March 2011, the following point, among others, was passed:

> A KMKF üdvözli az új Alaptörvény tervezetében megjelenő, az egységes magyar nemzet eszméjét és Magyarországnak a határon kívüli magyar nemzeti közösségek iránt viselt felelősségét kifejező szándékot.\(^{459}\)

The KMKF welcomes the idea of a unified nation and also Hungary’s intention to take over responsibility for the national communities of the *Auslandsungarn*, which find expression in the concept of the new basic law. (Trans. Hermanik/Szlezák)

One month earlier, in February 2011, the *Nemzeti Összetartozás Bizottsága* (= *Kommission des nationalen Zusammenhaltes*), which has 12 members, was founded. The Hungarian speaker of parliament had presented the proposition of the foundation of this commission directly to the parliament. Its task is to coordinate the relations between the state Hungary and the Hungarian minorities abroad since the affairs of the “*Auslandsungarn*”\(^ {460}\) (= határon túli magyarok), in the eyes of the FIDESZ government, are not the concern of the ministry of foreign affairs, but rather of the deputy prime minister, the minister without portfolio, as well as of the ministry of administration and justice.\(^ {461}\) These two examples illustrate how important this topic is within Hungary’s politics and which institutional conditions were created by the kin state Hungary. The Hungarian state thus does not rest its patronage system primarily on non-government organizations, as is the case in Germany and Austria, but instead itself takes charge of much more. This is due, on the one hand, to the lack of trust in non-governmental organizations, and, on the other, to a return to the centralist power politics under Orbán.

One of the most important platforms for action are the national festivities since they are celebrated not only in Hungary but also in all regions of Southeast Europe where Hungarians live. Therefore, they are particularly suitable to provide a stage for the kin state. On 15 March 2010, for instance, the then Hungarian President László Sólyom visited the Hungarians in Vojvodina/Vajdaság in order to lay a wreath at the memorial of the Hungarian victims of 1944 at the cemetery at Subotica/Szabadka, which represents a dying bird (= Vergődő madár emlékmű). In his ceremonial address after the wreath-laying ceremony, he underlined that 15 March, which recalls the 1849/49 revolution, was a celebration of all Hungarians and that these common commemorative festivities expressed this notion

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\(^{459}\) Ibid.

\(^{460}\) This term, which is used by the Hungarian government, can very easily cause confusion because it can also refer to Hungarian citizens who live and work abroad. Yet, this blurry terminology was surely used consciously because the Hungarian government also counts the members of the Hungarian minority in the neighboring countries among the “Hungarian nation.”


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Moreover, he symbolically brought back to mind that the Hungarians in Serbia did not yield despite public oppression:

Abban az időben, amikor nemzeti ünnepünk tiltva volt, válaszként 37 Petőfi Sándorról elnevezett művelődési egyesület alakult a Vajdaságban.463

In those times when our national holiday was banned, 37 Kulturvereine that were named after Petőfi Sándor were founded in Vojvodina in response. (Trans. Hermanik/Szlezák)

President Sólyom participated in altogether 18 different festivities throughout Vojvodina within 10 days in March 2010.464 The reactions of the local Hungarians in return showed a profound attachment and an unrestricted of loyalty towards the kin state Hungary.

The Hungarians in Slovenia were visited during the celebrations of 15 March 2011 at Lendava/Lendva by János Halász, the state secretary in the Hungarian Ministerium der Nationalen Kraftquelle (= Nemzeti Erőforrás Minisztérium), and at Hodoš/Hodos by László Máté as a representative of the Hungarian embassy in Slovenia. Halász also said that there were cities outside the borders of Hungary, too, that were located at the center of the Hungarian identity, such as Lendva. He then praised György Zala, who had created the statues for the Heroes’ Square at Budapest, as a great Hungarian. The state secretary, however, did not fail to mention that several nationalities lived together in harmony here.465 László Máté, in turn, brought to mind that the Hungarians had taken their fate into their own hands for the first time in 1848/49. The 20th century, the diplomat said, had not actually treated the Hungarians well, the Wende had brought some changes but the real changes for the Hungarians had only set in in 2010—through the election of the FIDESZ government, which was working from a two-thirds majority. Thus, the unfortunate 20th century had finally come to an end, and the revolution and the struggle for freedom in 1848/49 should be celebrated against a new backdrop since now the Hungarians could again take their fate into their hands jointly.466

The Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán had, among other things, a greeting sent from Budapest to Suza/Csúza (Slavonia) on 15 March 2011. It was read there by Gábor Iván, the Hungarian ambassador at Zagreb, and was published two days later in the Slavonian weekly Új Magyar Képes Újság. Since it has become possible through a new Hungarian constitutional law that as of 01 January 2011 Hungarians who live abroad could also obtain Hungarian citizenship, Orbán deliberately ad-

463 Ibid.
464 Cf. ibid.
dresses his audience in the title of the greeting as “my very esteemed fellow citizens” (= Tiszttelt Honfitársaim), and on that topic he said the following:

Megalapítottuk a nemzeti összetartozás napját, és lehetővé tettük a határon túl élő magyarok számára a magyar állampolgárság megszerzését a szülőhely elhagyása nélkül.

We have established the Day of National Unity and have made it possible for the Auslandsungarn to obtain Hungarian citizenship without having to leave their place of birth. (Trans. Hermanik/Szlezák)

It was fitting that just a few days before, on 12 March 2011, 12 Hungarians from Croatia had taken the oath on the Hungarian state during a celebration at Mohács. Krisztina Krijáj, who herself became a Hungarian citizen that day and who wrote an article about these festivities in the Új Magyar Képes Újság, speaks of a historic event:

[…] egy új történet vette kezdetét, amelyben már nem kell többé Trianon árnyékában élnünk. (Trans. Hermanik/Szlezák)

For Hungary as a kin state, this ceremony at Mohács had a very high symbolic value since these were the first members of the Hungarian minority from Croatia who took the oath of citizenship. Therefore, not only local but also high ranking political representatives took part in the event, such as Árpád Potápi, parliamentary delegate and chairman of the Kommission der Nationalen Zusammengehörigkeit in Ungarn (= a Nemzeti Összetartozás Bizottságának elnöke) or Judit Pirityiné Szabó, department head at the state secretariat of national politics of the ministry of administration and justice (= a Közígazgatási és Igazságügyi Minisztérium Nemzetpolitikai Államtitkárságának főosztályvezetője) or, on the part of Croatia, the consul of Croatia at Pécs. Following the granting of citizenship, the candidates were blessed by representatives of the Catholic and the Calvinist church. In view of the elaborate staging, it was not surprising that among the 12 people, there was also Sándor Jakab, the chairman of the HMDK, as well as his predecessor and current honorary chairman Árpád Pasza. By adopting the Hungarian citizenship, the members of the minority are required to demonstrate a new kind of loyalty towards the kin state Hungary.

The last example in this section shall outline the emergence and the work of a non-governmental society in Hungary: The Erdélyi Magyarok Szövetsége (= alliance of the Transylvanian

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468 Ibid.
469 The oath reads as follows: “Esküszöm, hogy Magyarországot hazámnak tekintem. A Magyar Köztársaságnak hű állampolgára Eszék, alkotmányát és törvényeit tiszteletben tartom és megtartom. Hazámat erőmhöz mérten megvédem, képes ségeimnek megfelelően szolgálok. Isten engem úgy segítsen.” I swear that I consider Hungary to be my home country. I will be a loyal citizen of the Republic of Hungary and will respect its constitution and its laws. I will protect my home country with all my strength and will serve it to the best of my ability. So help me God. (Trans. Hermanik/Szlezák)
470 Ibid.
472 Sándor Jakab even says that one needs to be a Petőfi in order to describe these feelings. Cf. Krijáj/Vezércikk.
Hungarians) is located at Budapest and was founded during the socialist era, in March 1988. Its background was a decree by the Hungarian government of February 1988, which officially permitted the refugees from Transylvania to stay in Hungary. Until this moment, they had needed to hide, said Béla Kiss, the chairman of the alliance, who had fled from Transylvania to Hungary in 1987. Yet even before 1988, there had been support for the Transylvanian refugees in Hungary, for instance by the pastor Géza Németh close to Moszkva Tér, which later developed into the Budapesti Erdélyi Kör (= Budapester Kreis der Siebenbürger). When people were looking for a place to assemble after the Allianz der Siebenbürger Ungarn was founded, there were protests in Hungary given the problematic name of the society, especially because of the attribute Erdélyi (= Transylvanian). The explanation was that the Romanian state considered it to imply separatism, fascism or “Horthysm,” which in turn corresponded to the line of argument of the then Hungarian government. This situation changed only due to the ever more powerful opposition parties, such as the MDF, SZDSZ or FIDESZ, which founded the Ellenzéki Kerekasztal (= Runder Tisch der Oppositionsparteien) on 22 March. Since the ruling socialists (then still the MSZP) had no interest in the Hungarian minorities in the neighboring countries, the Allianz Kontakt approached this roundtable. Originally, there was no plan to found a political organization but instead a scientific society for academics. But since no academics had signed up, a different path was chosen. Since societies were still prohibited in 1988, a so-called “club” was organized. Together with other Transylvanian organizations, there were even attempts in the early 1990s to found an umbrella organization but they failed. Béla Kiss sees the Allianz der Siebenbürger Ungarn as the “only representation” of the Transylvanian Hungarians here [in Hungary] and they maintain good contacts with Hungarian organizations in Romania. Béla Kiss also hints at the personal level, at the society members, who themselves are also “in contact with the old homecountry,” and it should not be forgotten that people also return to Transylvania, especially since the economic situation in Hungary was not very stable. In contrast, there are those who never go back, not even for a visit. Still, people clung to their roots even if they could not admit it. This surfaces, for example, when the theater of Cluj-Napoca/Kolozsvár is at Budapest for a guest performance. The Transylvanian Hungarians visit these performances, just like they follow the events in Transylvania with much interest. In response to my question as to double citizenship, Béla Kiss gave a political answer:

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473 Interview transcript, Béla Kiss, 21 May 2009.
474 Cf. ibid.
475 The Budapesti Erdélyi Kör is a member of the country-wide Erdélyi Körök Országos Szövetsége, (EKOSZ) (= Landesweite Allianz der Siebenbürger Kreise), whereas the Allianz der Siebenbürger Ungarn, by comparison, is not. See: http://www.ekosz.hu/index.php (08 August 2011).
476 Cf. interview transcript, Béla Kiss, 21 May 2009.
477 According to Béla Kiss, there are by now over societies in Hungary that have a connection to Transylvania, and all of them have connections to Romania of varying intensity.
478 Cf. interview transcript, Béla Kiss, 21 May 2009.
479 Cf. interview transcript, Béla Kiss, 23 April 2010.
90 percent of the Transylvanians in Hungary have of course voted in favor of it during the Hungarian referendum, but there are also those who just don’t want it. Who are these people? Those who have been in Hungary for a longer period of time and have come under communist influence and have followed the propaganda of the MSZP. This propaganda was thus much stronger than the feeling that they should have had for their Schicksalsgenossen.480 (Trans. Hermanik/Szlezák)

Apart from the political significance of the questions, there is also a symbolic significance since they express the status of the Hungarians from and the Transylvanians in Hungary, and therefore Béla Kiss considers this as a question of identity formation:

A Transylvanian Hungarian wants to belong to the community of the Hungarians, the Hungarian nation, with all the advantages and disadvantages. They want to ‘breathe’ that way, do everything that way. The double citizenship would reinforce this. If there is no citizenship, this means that this Transylvanian Hungarian was discarded of, exploited and sent away because the Hungarian nation does not need her/him. If the decision is ‘no,’ like in earlier times, the Transylvanian Hungarians suffer a lot. Their identity suffers enormously. A ‘no’ that shows that their struggle had no purpose since the mother nation, too, discards of them. Then they give up the fight. [My question: Wherein does it show that they give up?] B.K.: In the assimilation. The emigrate west, not to Hungary.481 (Trans. Hermanik/Szlezák)

The topic of double citizenship is given a unique status on the part of the kin state and it is further charged symbolically. Béla Kiss in the interview did not answer my ensuing question of whether the members of the Hungarian minority in Transylvania would really be faring so much better if they had double citizenship and whether the issue of their own political representation in Romania and in the Romania parliament—the RMDSZ as the representation of the Hungarians was represented in almost all government coalitions—482 was not more important than the symbolic help from the kin state Hungary. In his opinion, the Romanian government only assimilated the Transylvanian Hungarians and thus tried to make them disappear, and only a “strong mother nation can counteract that.”483 The Transylvanian Hungarians’ own responsibility was not discussed, as if the political minority representation didn’t exist there. So, while he considers the involvement of Hungary as the kin state to be important and justified, Béla Kiss at the same time criticized Hungary’s behavior towards the Allianz der Siebenbürger Ungarn, especially because they receive no or only very few public subsidies:

The explanation is that we are supposedly not a minority. This also means that we have supposedly lost our identity. We cannot be Transylvanians in Hungary, are not supposed to hold on to

480 Ibid. By speaking of 90%, Béla Kiss highlights the solidarity of the Transylvanian Hungarians who live in Hungary towards the Hungarian minority living in Transylvania so that they receive Hungarian citizenship. The referendum that he mentioned was requested by the then opposition, especially the FIDESZ party, and then held by MSZP-SZDSZ government coalition on 05 December 2004. Yet it was declared invalid by the government since due to the lack of a broad participation (37.49%) neither 25% yes- nor 25% no-votes were made by the entire enfranchised population. Kiss identifies those unambiguously in the above quotation who had not voted in favor of Hungarian citizenship for “all Hungarians” because he thus actually follows the FIDESZ propaganda, which says that those who do not vote “Hungarian” in fact adhered to the communist ideology. On the referendum, see e.g. N.N. “Népszavazás: igenek többségben.” Magyar Nemzet Online, 06 December 2004. See: http://mno.hu/migr/napvazas-igenek-tobbsegben-612293 (08 August 2011).

481 Interview transcript, Béla Kiss, 23 April 2010.

482 On the RMDSZ see esp. chapter 2.2 the sections Umbrella Organizations and The Hungarians’ Societies (Examples from the Regions).

483 Cf. interview transcript, Béla Kiss, 23 April 2010.
our Transylvanian identity. They support Transylvanians in Transylvania, but not there.\textsuperscript{484} (Trans. Hermanik/Szlezák)

Whenever they turned to the Határontúli Magyarak Hivatala (= Amt für Auslandsungarn) or the Szülőföld Alapítvány (= Stiftung Mutterland), there was no answer, for this very reason. The FIDESZ delegate of the Budapest district, Antal Rogan, was a Slovene\textsuperscript{485} and it was therefore a bit questionable whether he would help them since he had said to Béla Kiss that he would not touch the minorities’ funds, we could speak Romanian anyway and should run for office as such next time, then we would receive the 3.6 millionen forint.\textsuperscript{486} The entire cooperation with societies in Transylvania was thus hampered by this financial plight since “a lot could be done now but the financial situation makes it impossible; we nevertheless try all the time to organize something.”\textsuperscript{487} In comparison, there were also complaints on the part of a Hungarian microparty in Vojvodina about the Hungarian kin state’s rather one-sided subsidy:

There are a few Kulturvereine or civil organizations, such as ours [the VMDP], that are daring but as a consequence they don’t get any money. […] There was the era of socialism, when no one could say anything. But this continues now.\textsuperscript{488}

Some of these statements show that a seeming connection between financial plight and ideology is constructed, or, put differently, the Hungarian government punished them if only little subsidies were provided.

One can indeed observe indeed certain parallels between the emigrated Transylvanian Hungarians and the Transylvanian Saxons who now live in Germany and Austria: Both \textit{Volksgruppen}, if they do not live in the kin state, have developed a complex perspective on the activities of the kin state as well as on those of the former host states—in both cases Romania—, which mostly opens up a very critical, but sometimes also a very romanticizing view of the former home Transylvania. Among both groups, patronage is also linked to an attempt at direct or indirect influence on Romanian politics and is thus also desired:

After such episodes, when the mother land [= Hungary] showed weaknesses, the Romanian parliament did not vote for the education act, etc. Also in the simple workplaces, the Romanians then have the feeling that they are in a position of power vis-à-vis the Transylvanian Hungarians.\textsuperscript{489}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{484} Ibid. \\
\textsuperscript{485} Béla Kiss here means to say that the district delegate of the FIDESZ is a member of the Slovenian minority in Hungary. This skepticism on the part of the chairman of the \textit{Allianz der Siebenbürger Ungarn} has surprised me because it could be assumed that he could get along especially well with someone who himself was a minority member. \\
\textsuperscript{486} In April 2010, it seemed that 4-5 Romanians, who lived in the same district of Budapest in which the \textit{Allianz der Siebenbürger Ungarn} is registered, received 3.6 million forint subsidies but the roughly 36 Transylvanian Hungarians altogether only 180,000 forint. Cf. interview transcript, Béla Kiss, 23 April 2010. \\
\textsuperscript{487} Ibid. \\
\textsuperscript{488} Interview transcript, András Ágoston, 19 May 2010. \\
\textsuperscript{489} Interview transcript, Béla Kiss, 23 April 2010. However, I would like to disagree with this here because the profound study by Margit Feischmidt, for instance, on the interethnic coexistence between Romanians and Hungarians at Cluj-Napoca/Kolozsvár proves rather the opposite. See M. Feischmidt, \textit{Ethnizität als Konstruktion und Erfahrung}. 
\end{flushright}
The role of the kin state Hungary is also further inflated because a repeatedly requested strong “mother land” (= anyaország)—especially after Viktor Orbán’s and his and his FIDESZ party’s landslide victory in the elections—, shall not show the “weaknesses,” mentioned in the quotation, in the future.
2.2 Orientations

Minority Organizations in the Host States

Umbrella Organizations

The individual political and cultural organizations, ranging from the smallest regional minority societies to the minority self-governments, do not only vary in terms of size but also above all in terms of the spheres of influence of their respective agents on the identity management and ethnomanagement or the ethnic group branding of the *Volksgruppe*. There is one thing that they all have in common: They oscillate to varying degrees around the core issue of the ‘preservation of one’s own cultural heritage.’ But the perspective of the respective identity management and ethnomanagement determines what is considered cultural heritage and what is not. The examples listed in this chapter shall – as mentioned in the introduction – present a representative selection of the various societies both of the Germans and the Hungarians in Southeast Europe. The ethno-political variants of the identity management and ethnomanagement take center stage, of course since they make transparent how a *Volksgruppe* is actively managed; in most cases, societies that focus on customs exclusively will therefore not be included here.¹

The *Demokratische Forum der Deutschen in Rumänien*, DFDR (= Forumul Democrat al Germanilor din România, FDGR)² represents the German minority with a guaranteed seat in the Romanian parliament in București/Bucharest, which at the time of my research was occupied by Ovidiu Ganț, himself is from Banat.³ Before the Romanian general elections, which took place on 30 November 2008, he described his work as follows in an interview:

> I have certainly gained experience, at government level, at state level. I would commit myself, on the one hand, the the interests of the community in the sense of German-language education, the Sozialwesen, the retirement planning, to all the projects of our community, but I would also support the projects of the local administrations in which the forum is represented and would get involved.⁴

The seat of the DFDR, which is referred to in German minority circles short as “*Landesforum*” oder simply “forum,” is also located at Hermannstadt/Sibiu in a centrally located building at the top of Stradul Gen. Magheru 1-3, which directly adjoins the *Großer Ring*. Its chairman is the mayor of Hermannstadt, Klaus Johannis. Thus, the switchpoint of the German identity management and ethnomanagement for Transylvania as well as for all of Romania is currently located there, and this building houses both the *Landesforum* and the *Regionalforum*, das *Kreisforum* Hermannstadt (DFDH) as well as:

¹ Many of these societies pursue at the same time activities in the context of minority education, minority media and minority arts; these examples will be treated separately in the following chapter.
² The name of the society is listed first in the language of the society, then, varying from case to case, in the language of the respective host state.
as a dependence of the ADZ, which has also come to be subject to the forum. During my visit to the Sekretariat of the Landesforum on 27 August 2009, I was told that “coordinating and supporting cultural projects”5 counted among the Landesforum’s main tasks. However, this was particularly difficult at the time since the Romanian state had transferred no or only less than the promised funds to the forum in the months between June 2008 or March 2009. But generally, the forum tries to cooperate with the Romanian majority population and with the Romanian government as well as possible: “cooperation instead of opposition” is its motto and “therefore there was no reason to demand autonomy in terms of a cultural autonomy.”6

The Landesselbverwaltung der Ungarndeutschen, LdU (= Magyarországi Németek Országos Önkormányzata, MNOÖ) was founded on 11 March 1995, and it is elected, according to the Hungarian minority law LXVI/1993 by representatives of the local minority self-governments: “The Landesselbverwaltung is the umbrella organization for 378 local minority self-governments throughout the country, over 500 cultural groups and Hungarian-German societies.”7 At the time of my research, Otto Heinek acted as full-time chairman of the LdU, which further comprises a director of the agency, a secretary’s office, a referent for culture, education and finances, a commercial department, a lawyer as well as a project coordinator in the education sector.8 Since January 1998, it is located at Budapest in a house on Júlia u. 9, only a few tramway stations away from the former Moszkva tér9 in an exclusive residential area. The idea of a “Hungarian-German house,” as Otto Heinek tells us, came up during a visit to Budapest by Horst Waffenschmidt, the then Beauftragter für Aussiedlerfragen und Nationale Minderheiten of the German Bundesministeriums für Inneres, around 1996/97.10 The LdU is simultaneously the direct contact and negotiating partner both for the host state Hungary and for the German-speaking kin states Germany and Austria. The goals formulated by the LdU are, in a nutshell, the following:

The declared goal of Selbstverwaltung is the preservation and the fostering of the language, the intellectual cultural heritage, the historical traditions and the identity of the Germans in Hungary. At the cultural level this includes the preservation and maintenance of the German mother tongue, the support for German-language education within the Hungarian school system and the exchange with Germany in the form of partnerships and programs.11 It is furthermore a central concern of the Landesverwaltung to obtain the status of cultural autonomy.

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5 Interview transcript, anonymized, 27 August 2009.
6 Ibid.
8 An up-to-date list of the “Deutsche Minderheitenselbverwaltungen” (= Német Kisebbségi Önkormányzatok) can be found in the bilingual handbook of the Ungarndeutschen/Magyarországi németek kézikönyve, which was published by the LdU (Budapest 2004). It is designed as a binder so that pages can be added to the individual categories.
10 It has since been renamed Széll Kálmán tér.
Otto Heinek states, among other things, that the commitment to the *Ungardeutschtum* is more important than the mastering of the German language.\footnote{12}{See interview transcript, Otto Heinek, 18 May 2009.} The LdU thus reacts explicitly to the change of paradigm with regard to the value of the ethnic markers language and Hungarian-German origins that took place during the past decades among the Germans in Hungary. This change was accompanied by the attempt on the part of the Hungarian-German minority self-governments to set themselves off from the charged term “Danube-Swabians,” especially in matters of cultural heritage.\footnote{13}{Ibid.}

In Slovenia, the *Verband der Kulturvereine der deutschsprachigen Volksgruppe in Slowenien* (= Zveza kulturnih društev nemškogovoreče etnične skupnosti v Sloveniji) was constituted as an umbrella organization only in 2004/2005.\footnote{14}{“The undersigned *Verband ‘Zveza kulturnih društev nemškogovoreče etnične skupnosti v Sloveniji/Verband der Kulturvereine der deutschsprachigen Volksgruppe in Slowenien,*’ founded on 25 November 2004, registered on 04 July 2005 in the administrative unit Ljubljana under the number 3739 (matriculation number 2052458, the legal representative August Gril) is the umbrella organization of the German-speaking *Kulturvereine* in the Republic of Slovenia and so far the only representative organization of the autochthonous German-speaking citizens of Slovenia.” See http://www.gottscheer.net/prva-nem.htm (15 July 2009).} In the following, I will mostly name points of the subgroup 3—including those that go beyond the *Kulturabkommen* between Austria and Slovenia outlined before—which are listed on the website of the umbrella organization in order to provide an overview of what it demands for the German-speaking *Volksgruppe* from the Republic of Slovenia (RS):

3. budget items in the budget of the RS for the funding of the minority and also the feasance of international obligations that are or were decreed by the RS (e.g. the *Kulturabkommen* with the Republic of Austria). The project funds actually do not finance a whole range of minority demands. Particularly pertinent are: a) the maintenance of the vernacular (the Gottschee dialect as a remnant of medieval German is especially interesting for linguists – possible recognition as a regional language), b) the running of cultural centers with all the costs involved, if required also the funding of the necessary jobs, c) scholarships for pupils and students (even if the other requirements are not met), d) their own publications, e) access to public media, f) cultural heritage, sacred objects, the preservation of German inscriptions in churches, chapels, on gravestones on cemeteries; funds to help finance the upkeep of cemeteries and for cemetery fees (both sacred objects and graves are in a particularly critical condition in the Gottschee land because of the resettlement of the majority of the population), to help finance exhibitions of cultural heritage, g) cultural exchange between minorities (with the Slovenes in Austria and Italy, with the South Tiroleans, with other German minorities), h) work in international organizations and corresponding membership fees.\footnote{15}{http://www.gottscheer.net/prva-nem.htm (29 May 2009).}

In Article 2 (= člen 2) of the society statute, German is named as the internal language of communication: “*Interni uradovalni jezik Zveze je nemščina*”\footnote{16}{Statut št. 02001-277/2004-6(21007), 04 July 2005 (Trans. Hermanik/Szlezák). The umbrella organization was kind enough to provide the author with a copy of the statute.} (= internal language of the society is German). According to Article 3 (=3. člen) of the society statute,\footnote{17}{Statut št. 02001-277/2004-6(21007), 04 July 2005.} the two societies the *Gottscheer Altsiedler Verein/Društvo Kočevajev Staroselce*\footnote{18}{See http://www.gottscheer.net/prva-nem.htm (22 July 2009).} and the *Kulturverein deutschsprachiger Frauen »Brücken«*
Marburg/Kulturno društvo nemško govorečih žena »Mostovi« Maribor belong to the umbrella organization. Samo Kristen describes the role and the essence of the Slovenian umbrella organization of the German-speaking Volksgruppe as follows:

In July 2005, the Verband der Kulturvereine der deutschsprachigen Volksgruppe in Slowenien was registered – as an umbrella organization, which currently consists of the two societies mentioned above. The society statutes include this sentence, which reveals a lot about the umbrella organization’s self-perception and the envisioned role as a mediator: "The German-language cultural societies, in their active coexistence with the majority population, contribute their share to the cultural wealth and diversity of their homecountry Slovenia, but also to the fortification of the European spirit and the European relations, especially with countries and autonomous regions where German is the official language." [italics in the original]

Primož Debenjak, the secretary of the Gottscheer Altsiedler Verein, in an interview summarizes the conditions for belonging to the umbrella organization as follows: “The commitment to the German Volksgruppe and the cultural activities connected to it represent the minimum requirement for a potential belonging to the umbrella organization.” This clause describes both the strategy of inclusion and exclusions of the umbrella organization since only the two societies mentioned above, out of the altogether five societies of the German-speaking people in Slovenia, could meet these requirements.

In Slavonia, there is no umbrella organization for the German-speaking minority in accordance with the statutes in the actual sense. The Gemeinschaft der deutschen und österreichischen nationalen Minderheitenorganisationen in Kroatien (= Zajednica Njemačkih i Austrijskih Nacionalno-Manjinskih Udrugra u Hrvatskoj), which was founded in 1997, is located at Osijek/Esseg and has been joined by six societies, comes closest to fulfilling this role:22

Austrijanci i Nijemci u Republici Hrvatskoj organizirani su u Zajednicu njemačkih i austrijskih nacionalno-manjinskih udrug u Hrvatskoj, sa sjedištem u Osijeku.23

Austrians and Germans in the Republic of Croatia are organized in the community of the German and Austrian national minority organizations in Croatia, which is located at Osijek/Essek. (Trans. Hermanik/Szlezák)

Moreover, there are the following societies of regional (Slavonia) and supraregionaler (Croatia) importance in the minority representation of the Germans and Austrians: The Volksdeutsche Gemeinschaft – Landsmannschaft der Donauschwaben in Kroatien (VDG) (= Njemačka Narodnosna Zajednića the Germans in Southeast Europe. See Pressedienst der Altösterreicher (PAÖ) (008/2006) See: http://www.vloe.at/pressberichte/2006/aus2006008.htm (22 July 2009). See http://www.drustvo-mostovi.si/podatki-o-drustvu-nem.html (22 July 2009).


21 Ibid.

This question was part of an interview between Samo Kristen and the secretary of the Gottscheer Altsiedler Verein Primož Debenjak, which was conducted on 12 September 2005 in the framework of the ASO project titled “The German and Hungarian Cultural Societies” (projekt director: Klaus-Jürgen Hermanik) in Ljubljana. See http://www.aso.zsi.at/project_1_29_2005.html (22 July 2009).

22 Cf. interview transcript, Nikola Mak, 25 October 2005. Besides the author, the managing director of the society, Renata Tršler, as well as Lilla Hervanek (Pécs) and Samo Kristen (Ljubljana), the then assistants in the ASO-project, took part in this conversation.

ca Zemaljska Udruga Podunavskih Švaba u Hrvatskoj), which was founded in 1992 and moved to Osijek in 1997, represents the interests of the German-speaking minority in the Croatian parliament (= Sabor) at Zagreb since the constitution guarantees them, in a group with 10 other ethnic minorities, a parliamentary seat. On the Slavonian level, there is furthermore the “Rat der Deutschen Nationalen Minderheit der Esseg-Baranja Gespanschaft” (= Vijeće Njemačke Nacionalne Manjine Osječko-Baranjske Županije), whose chairman during the time of my research was Nikola Mak.

In Vojvodina, the Nationalrat der Deutschen in Serbien (= Nacionalni savet nemačke manjine u Srbiji) was founded on 15 December 2007 at Novi Sad/Neusatz. According to the current Serbian legal situation, such Nationalräte can be compared to country-wide minority self-governments. Rudolf Weiss, the chairman of the Deutscher Volksverband in Subotica, comments on the foundational assembly of the Nationalrat der Deutschen in Serbien as follows:

The delegates for the foundational assembly were nominated through the signatures of exactly 3000 Germans in Serbia. According to the latest census of 2002, 3901 persons declared to be Germans in Serbia. This means that the delegates dispatched to the foundational assembly were supported by 77% (seventy-seven %) of the people committing to German culture. The German minority in Serbia has agreed upon a common list. This common list rests upon 94% (ninety-four %) of the votes. Such a unity is a fantastic result for the Germans in Serbia.

In line with the results of the election in the framework of the foundational session, the committee of the Nationalrat was composed as follows: Andreas Bürgermayer, the chairman of the Deutscher Ver- ein “Donau” in Novi Sad, was elected president of the committee; the vice presidents were Anton Beck, chairman of the Deutscher humanitärer Verein “Gerhard” (Sombor), and Rudolf Weiss, who was mentioned above; Laszló Mandler, the deputy chairman of the Deutscher Volksverband, was put in charge of finances and budgeting. The commentary by the Serbian state secretary Fevzija Murić shall serve as an example of the many positive reactions to the foundation of the Nationalrat:

Državni sekretar Ministarstva za državnu upravu i lokalnu samoupravu Fevzija Murić izjavio je danas da su, na putu pridruživanja Srbije Evropskoj uniji, nacionalne manjine „kohezioni faktor i spona između Srbije i njihovih matičnih država”.

The state secretary in the ministry for public administration and local self-government, Fevzija Murić, announced today that the national minorities are a “factor of cohesion and a linkage be-

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24 See http://www.vdg.hr/ (20 July 2009). On VDG see further below the section The Germans' Societies (Examples from the Regions).
25 These Volksgruppen are “Bulgarians, Jewish Poles, Roma, Romanians, Russians, Ruthenians, Turks, Ukrainians and Vlachs” (qtd. after the business card of the then parliamentary delegate Nikola Mak (German spelling on the double-sided business card Nikolaus Mack). Nikola Mak, the former chairman of the VDG, occupied the seat during the legislative period from 2003 to 2007. See interview transcript, Nikola Mak, 25 October 2005.
26 On the current tasks of the Rat der Deutschen Nationalen Minderheit der Esseg-Baranja Gespanschaft see in Croatian http://www.obz.hr/hr/index.php?tekst=212 (20 July 2009), and on the list of members of the Rat der Deutschen Nationalen Minderheit der Esseg-Baranja Gespanschaft (= Članovi vijeća njemačke nacionalne manjine Osječko-Baranjske Županije) see http://www.obz.hr/hr/index.php?tekst=245 (22 July 2009).
29 Cf. ibid.
tween Serbia and their mother lands” on Serbia’s way into the European Union. (Trans. Hermanik/Szlezák)

In the course of the foundation, the chairman Andreas Bürgermayer was also cited:

Bürgermayer told the Deutsche Welle that the foundation of the Nationalrat der Deutschen had taken five years of intensive efforts. The great discrepancies among the many societies of the Germans in Vojvodina have finally been overcome. Many people had to be convinced that the community is the only chance at survival for the national minority, Bürgermayer explained.31

After this “historic moment, to be recognized after 60 years,”32 a year of very successful work, which was very important for the outside perception of the Germans in Serbia, followed in 2008. This work included the organization of the Kulturtage der deutschen Minderheit in Serbien. Afterwards, the regional parliament in Vojvodina provided much fewer funds for the activities of the Nationalrat and in 2010 there were disputes among the single societies about who should be represented among the 15 German representatives in the Nationalrat.33

Among the Hungarians in Slovenia, the Magyar Nemzetiségi Művelődési Intézet, MNMI (= Zavod za kulturo madžarske narodnosti, ZKMN/Ungarisches Nationalitäten Kulturinstitut),34 which is located at Lendava/Lendva, acts in principle as a cultural umbrella organization. In comparison to other minority organizations in the research regions, it is very interesting that the foundation of this institute on 01 January 1994 took place more or less at the urging of the state Slovenia.35 The MNMI sees itself as a “specialized institute for public service for the Hungarian community living in Slovenia […] the fields of activity include culture, general transmission of knowledge as well as science.”36 Lilla Hervanek summarizes the organization as well as the funding as follows:

The MNMI staff members work in this institution in a full-time job; respectively they are paid for their job. The membership of the institution is not counted, since it is a public organization. […] The society MNMI is a Slovenian establishment so it is financed fully by the state. If some additional aid is needed there are subventions from Hungary. Their Hungarian aid comes through tenders of the Illés Foundation, this reaches at maximum of 30% of their budget.37 Yet, it is not given any political responsibilities since they are taken over by the Muravidéki Magyar Önkormányzati Nemzeti Közösség, MMÖNK (= Pomurska madžarska samoupravna narodna skupnost, 31 Dinko Gruhonjić. “Serbien: Nationalrat der Deutschen gegründet.” Fokus Ost-Südost, 20 December 2007. See: http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,3014651,00.html (24 July 2009).
32 Interview transcript, Andreas Bürgermayer, 22 April 2010.
33 “Especially smaller societies, which often have no more than 10-15 members, wanted to automatically also have a representative in the Nationalrat – and they didn’t want to understand that the electoral rolls in the regions are decisive and those citizens who have registered there as members of the German minority were to elect the members of the Nationalrat and not the societies themselves. This is how the conflict had begun.” Cf. ibid.
PMSNS; Hungarian national self-government community in Prekurje). The latter could therefore be regarded as the political umbrella organization of the Hungarian minority in Slovenia.

In Croatia, both the Horvátországi Magyarok Demokratikus Közössége, HMDK (= Demokratische Gemeinschaft der Ungarn Kroatiens) and the Magyar Egyesületek Szövetsége, MESZ (= Verband der ungarischen Vereine) act as a separate umbrella organization, respectively. The goals of the HMDK, which was founded as early as 1993 in Zagreb, are the following:

Tevékenységének alapja az a törekvés, hogy megőrizze és fejlessze a horvátországi magyarság nemzeti identitását. Szervezze és összehangolja az alkotótevékenységet a kulturában, az oktatásban, a gazdaságban és az élet egyéb területein. Küzd azokért a jogokért, amelyek a magyar nemzeti közösség számára szavatolják az egyenrangúságot. Meg kívánja őrizni a horvátországi magyarság integratitását. Gondot visel a magyarság alkotmányos és jogi helyzetéről. Sikra száll az anyanyelv megtartásáért, ápolásáért és alkalmazhatóságáért.

Its activities are led by the goal to preserve and further develop the national identity of the Hungarians in Croatia. Its work in the realms of culture, education, economy as well as other areas of life are organized and coordinated. The community fights for the rights that guarantee equality for the Hungarian national community. It aims to preserve the integrity of the Hungarians in Croatia and takes care of the Hungarians’ constitutional and legal situation and struggles for the preservation of the mother tongue, its cultivation and usage. (Trans. Hermaník/Szlezák)

The HMDK split from the Horvátországi Magyarok Szövetsége, HMSZ (= alliance of the Hungarians in Croatia), which had been founded after World War II, in 1993 because it “was no longer content “ with the work of the HMSZ after the state of Croatia was established. Yet the specific point in time suggests that the newly founded society was already moving closer in ideology to the then new Croatian regime under president Tuđman than had been the case among the functionaries of the HMSZ, which had already existed during Yugoslavian times. Moreover, there was at the time a bilateral mutual support on the part of Croatia and Hungary: A Croatian Gymnasium was founded at Budapest for the Croatian minority in Hungary, and in turn the Magyar Központ (= Ungarisches BildungsZentrum) was opened at Osijek/Eszék. This educational center has since been administered by the HMDK. As the HMDK was leading among the campaigning organizations of the Hungarian minority during all elections, it has assumed the task of representing the Hungarian minority at the national level in the Croatian parliament (Sabor), where it is granted a seat. Hervanek outlines the basic structure of the umbrella organization as follows:

They work as an umbrella society, and have over 40 base societies. About 70% of the base societies are active in Baranya. The estimated number of active members is 3000. The work in the HMDK is voluntary; the members are not paid for their work. About the membership: the aver-

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38 See: http://www.muravidek.si/ (21 July 2011). On the single activities of the MNMI and the MMÖNK see esp. the section The Hungarians’ Societies – Examples from the Regions.
39 Even the MNMI is officially a foundation of the MMÖNK.
41 See http://www.smu-mesz.hr/ (23 November 2009).
42 See: http://www.hmdk.hr/ (07 August 2009).
43 Interview transcript, Tünde Sipos-Zsivics, 28 June 2010.
44 Cf. interview transcript, Krisztián Pálinkás, 28 June 2010.
age members are from the degree holding middle class, age 25-35. Many of them studied at universities in Hungary, some members of the management even live in Hungary.45 Everybody who felt they belonged to the Hungarian culture could join the HMDK. The Hungarian language no longer played the lead role on this concept and therefore some members could not speak Hungarian fluently.46 But it needs to be noted that the interview partner from the MESZ vehemently disagrees, which shows the discord of the two umbrella organizations.47 The money that the Hungarian minority in Croatia is given by the state is also paid out separately to the two umbrella organizations HMDK and MESZ, which then transfer it correspondingly to the Hungarian societies.

The Magyar Egyesületek Szövetsége, MESZ, which is located at Beli Manastir/Pélmonostor, was founded in 1998 and is also structured like an umbrella organization. It represents the interests of the Hungarian minority particularly in the following areas: schools; media, culture, science, economy and social matters, and all of this mainly with the goal to represent a network of Hungarian societies in Croatia that have a profile similar to the one of the MESZ:

A MESZ tagságába 41 horvátországi magyarság bejegyzett egyesület és civil szervezet tartozik egész Horvátország területéről.48

41 registered societies and NGOs of the Hungarians in Croatia are members of the association of Hungarian societies, which come from all over Croatia kommen. (Trans. Hermanik/Szlezák)

In order to become a member in this umbrella organization, one does not need to be able to speak Hungarian, and Tünde Sipos-Zsivics remarks that the MESZ takes care of these people in particular.49 It is by now represented in the Croatian Sabor for the first time but it has a very strong integrative effect especially at the regional level since almost 1000 members of the Hungarian minority live in the region around Beli Manastir. It is, however, mostly the number of those who by now “admit” to belonging to the Hungarian minority that increases, with the population numbers remaining stable, whereas this number stagnates, by comparison, at Osijek. According to Hervanek, this very well legitimates the society’s work.50

In the context of the MESZ’s self-presentation, it is striking from the perspective of the research on identity management and ethnomanagement that they use the following slogan on their homepage:

A horvátországi magyarságért
Együtt nem megosztva!51

45 Hervanek, Identity Management of the Hungarian Cultural Societies in Slavonia-Baranya (CRO) and Lendava Area (SLO).
46 “It is important to note here, that the self-identification of a ‘would-be member’ is an accepted filter of joining this society. This kind of politics provides that the society is open for anyone to foster and/or learn the Hungarian language and culture. Theoretically even Croats could be supporting members, but only Hungarians can be members with full powers.” Ibid.
47 “The HMDK does not consider Hungarians those persons who consider themselves Hungarians but who do not master the Hungarian language and do not know about the Hungarian history and literature. […] In the county Bijelovar, 1,018 people declare themselves Hungarian. Since Trianon, they have not had the opportunity to receive a Hungarian-language education. Before the war, there was a little effort to maintain the mother tongue, but it actually wasn’t much. So it is not their fault that they cannot speak the language very well. In the eyes of the HMDK, they still do not count as Hungarians.” Interview transcript, Tünde Sipos-Zsivics, 28 June 2010. (Trans. Hermanik/Szlezák).
48 See http://www.smu-mesz.hr/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1&Itemid=3 (23 November 2009). By now, 43 Hungarian societies in Croatia are the wings of the MESZ (February 2012).
50 Cf. ibid.
51 See http://www.smu-mesz.hr/ (23 November 2009).
Fort the Hungarian culture in Croatia
together and not split up!
(Trans. Hermanik/Szlezák)

This integrative motto becomes clearer when one calls to mind that the two umbrella organizations that represent the interests of the Hungarian minority in Croatia are separate from one another. Krisztíán Pálinkás, of the HMDK, also blames this on the government at Budapest because he says: “Budapest did more harm in the past eight years than Zagreb.”

In line with these issues, the MESZ initiated the foundation of the Horvátországi Magyar Nemzeti Tanács, HMNT (= Nationalrat der Ungarn in Kroatien) in Slavonia on 29 May 2010. If it weren’t for this split, it would come closest to being considered the “cultural umbrella organization” of the Hungarian Volksgruppe in Croatia since upon its foundation it was tasked with the following:

A horvátországi magyar politikai, gazdasági, oktatási, egyházi és művelődési élet jeles képviselőinek részvételével megtartott alakuló közgyűlés fontos mérföldkő a horvátországi magyarság együtvételének megerősítésében és jelentős előrelépést jelent magyarságunk közösségi érdekeinek hatékony összehangolása, megővása, védelme és jogvédelme terén.

The general assembly for the foundation [of the HMNT], in which the important representatives of the Hungarian politics, economy, education, church and cultural life in Croatia took part, ranks as an important milestone in the strengthening and preservation of the Hungarians’ unity in Croatia and as a significant progress toward the coordination, preservation, protection and the legal protection of the Hungarians’ interests as a community. (Trans. Hermanik/Szlezák)

In these very broad formulations, which are typical of the function of an umbrella organization, the ever-recurrent corner pillars of the identity management and ethnomanagement become evident. Yet, Krisztián Pálinkás says in the interview that the representation of the HMDK does not regard this Nationalrat of the Hungarians as particularly important since it was not founded as a political organization. There are altogether roughly 80 organisations in Croatia that have “Magyar” as an attribute in their names.

In Vojvodina, the so-called Magyar Koalició, MK (= Mađarska Koalicija/Hungarian coalition), which includes the three most important societies/parties of the Hungarians in Vojvodina, represents the Hungarians on the highest level. During the Serbian general elections in 2008, the MK could obtain four seats in the Serbian parliament at Belgrad and during the regional elections in the Autonome Provinz Vojvodina (= Atonomne Pokrajine Vojvodine, APV/Vajdasági Autonóm Tartomány, 55

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52 Interview transcript, Krisztián Pálinkás, 28 June 2010.
53 The structure of the Nationalrat follows the following scheme: political representatives – 6 members, cultural affairs – 6 members, educational matters – 2 members, media – 1 member, economy – 1 member and from the churches – 2 members. The respective delegate who represents the Hungarians in the Croatian parliament functions as president of the HMNT; besides, there are two vice presidents, of whom one each will be delegated by the MESZ and by the HMDK.
54 See http://www.smu-mesz.hr/hmnt.html (22 December 2011).
55 Cf. interview transcript, Krisztián Pálinkás, 28 June 2010.
57 Vajdasági Magyar Szövetség, (VMSZ) (= Savez Vojvodanskih Mađara/Allianz der Ungarn in der Vojvodina), Vajdasági Magyarok Demokratikus Közössége (VMDK) (= Demokratische Gemeinschaft der Ungarn in der Vojvodina) and Vajdasági Magyar Demokrata Párt, (VMDP) (= Demokratische Partei der Ungarn in der Vojvodina). The VMSZ has, as the only one of the mentioned societies and/or parties, also a Serbian version of its website. See http://www.vmsz.org.rs/index.php (02 December 2011). On the mentioned societies/parties of the Hungarians in Vojvodina see esp. the following section The Hungarians’ Societies – Examples from the Regions.
nineteen seats in the Vojvodina skupština (= Vojvodina Parliament) at Novi Sad/Újvidék. This coalition primarily has a political responsibility since it was founded as a result of the necessity to bundle the Hungarians’ votes in Vojvodina. In the worst-case scenario, no single parliamentary seat at Belgrad could otherwise have been obtained.

As mentioned above, the Serbian minority law of 2002 permits the formation of so-called ‘Nationale Räte’; the Magyar Nemzeti Tanács, MNT (= Nacionalni savet Mađarske manjine/Ungarischer Nationalrat – in Serbian verbatim: “national council of the Hungarian minority”)58 is of central importance for all cultural matters of the Hungarians in the APV and in all of Serbia. It was constituted in late 2002:

The National Council of the Hungarian Ethnic Minority with 35 members was elected according to ministry regulations on the meeting of electors on the 21st of September in 2002. The Council passed the constitution and the procedure, elected its president, vice presidents and secretary on its first foundation meeting on the 19th of October in 2002. On the second meeting held on the 6th of December in 2006, the Executive Board, the executive frame of The National Council of the Hungarian Ethnic Minority was founded, as well as the professional board. There are various consultative bodies which help the National Council in achieving its goals.59

On 24 September 2005, László Józsa, the then chairman of the MNT, told me during an interview that the Hungarians and their Nationaler Rat were the model for all 12 Nationale Räte of the minorities in Serbia, which were founded at that time.60 I have selected the following example because it sheds light on the aspect of cultural autonomy and thus shall demonstrate the interaction of the political agents with the MNT: Bálint Pásztor (VMSZ), delegate of the Magyar Koalició in the Serbian parliament, in an interview with the Hungarian information portal Vajdaság Ma (= Vojvodina Today)61 formulates a comparison of the Serbian minority education system and the situation of the Hungarians in Transylvania:

I affirm with all my consciousness that 90 per cent of the sphere of action from the joint Hungarian Coalition’s conception of autonomy got into the draft about National Councils. So, the new Hungarian National Council will have such important decisional license for example on the field of education, of which the Hungarians in Transylvania could only dream, although there are 1,600,000 of them. I cannot tell similar example in the Carpathian Basin, where representatives of Hungarians has in a form of the highest organ of personal autonomy veto right for the school-books, for instance. We, ourselves can decide in the future the Hungarian pupils which textbooks are going to learn from.62

In Transylvania, the Romániai Magyar Demokrata Szövetség, RMDSZ (= Uniunea Democrată Maghiară din România, UDMR/Demokratische Union der Ungarn in Rumänien)63 represents the Hungarians’ political agendas at the parliamentary level and therefore, based on practice, can be called a sort of “political-cultural umbrella organization.” During the general elections of 30 November 2008, the

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63 See http://www.rmdsz.ro/ (11 August 2009). On the manifold areas of responsibility of the RMDSZ see further the section The Hungarians’ Societies – Examples from the Regions.
RMDSZ obtained 22 of altogether 332 seats in the Romanian house of representatives (= Camera Deputaților) and 9 seats in the senate (of altogether 137). Furthermore, it is represented in the European Parliament through László Tőkes. The fact that Béla Markó, who was chairman of the RMDSZ for many years, was deputy prime minister in the Romanian parliament as of December 2009 can be considered a big success for the Hungarians in Romania. Since 26 February 2011 Hunor Kelemen, who was “minister for culture and national heritage” in the so-called “second cabinet Boc” (= Măsodik Boc-kormány in the original) as of December 2009, has been the new chairman of the Union.64

The so-called Erdélyi Magyar Egyeztető Tanács (= Konsensbildender Rat der Ungarn in Siebenbürgen), which gathers the most important Hungarian representatives, respectively, for work meetings, also assumes the role of an umbrella organization, which is rather strategic than directly political. Other regional umbrella organizations of the Hungarians in Transylvania, which represent both cultural and minority political interests of the Hungarians and the Szeklers there—including the demands for cultural as well as territorial autonomy—, are the Erdélyi Magyar Nemzeti Tanács, EMNT65 (= Nationalrat der Ungarn Siebenbürgens) and the Székely Nemzeti Tanács, SZNT (= Nationalrat der Szekler).66 Among other reasons, the EMNT was founded because the aforementioned RMDSZ, in the opinion of leading functionaries of the EMNT, did not put enough effort into defending the demands for autonomy because this was at odds with its governmental responsibility. The EMNT therefore announced that the demands for autonomy and the steps towards its realization since 2003 were “jointly coordinated by the two non-partisan organizations EMNT and SZNT.”67 The composition of the EMNT is done according to a regional coding scheme, which at present looks as follows:

Az Erdélyi Magyar Nemzeti Tanácsban 500 küldöttnek van helye, területi leosztásban 2864 lakosonként 1 fő.68

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65 The goals of the EMNT, in a nutshell, are the following: “[…] 2003-ban létrejött Erdélyi Magyar Nemzeti Tanács parlament jellegű középviselői testület, amely az őshonos erdélyi magyar nemzeti közösség autonómia-törekvéseinek képviselésére, jogszabályokba foglalására és elfogadatására hivatott. Célja továbbá a romániai magyar politikai szervezetek munkájának összehangolása.”
66 The EMNT, founded in 2003, functions in a similar manner as a parliament and its goals are to represent the demands for autonomy of the autochthonous Hungarian national community in Transylvania and to have them anchored in the law. Another one of their goals is to coordinate the work of the political organizations of the Hungarians in Romania. (Trans. Hermanik/Szlezák).
The EMNT has space for 500 delegates, according to a territorial allocation there is 1 person per 2863 inhabitants. (Trans. Hermanik/Szlezák)

Moreover, the Magyar Polgári Szövetség (= Ungarische Bürgerallianz) appeared in 2003, which made it its goal to “demand the rights of the Hungarian nationality einzufordern.”

The Germans’ Societies (Examples from the Regions)

The Volksdeutsche Gemeinschaft – Landsmannschaft der Donauschwaben in Kroatien, VDG (= Njemačka Narodnosna Zajednica – Zemaljska Udruga Podunavskih Švaba u Hrvatskoj) in Osijek/Esseg defines itself as “an organization of the Germans, the Austrians and their descendants in Croatia.” In a conversation with me, Nikola Mak the then chairman – the current chairman is Zorislav Schönberger – described this society in similar terms: “We are a society of the Austriansein and Germans and their descendants.”

This society has 800 regular members. Its activities encompass several areas: including scholarly conferences of Croatian historians who research the German-Austrian cultural heritage in Croatia. Their contributions are published in the yearbooks of the Volksdeutsche Gemeinschaft, in Croatian with German abstracts. The quarterly Deutsche Wort - Blatt der Deutschen und Österreicher in Kroatien appears in German and Croatian with a run of 1300 copies. There is moreover a choir, called Brevis Donau, and a lay theater, the Esseger Schulbühne.

The VDG is the leading force of the German minority’s identity management and ethnomangement in Croatia. Its focus lies on questions of memorial cultures, particularly the expulsion of the Germans. I consider the VDG as particularly exemplary in terms of a lived Croatian-German bilingualism since it is not deemed a tragedy but rather embraced as a reality.

Furthermore, there is the Verein der Deutschen und Österreicher Kroatiens (= Savez Nijemaca i Austrijanaca Hrvatske – Centrala Osijek) at in Osijek, which was already founded in 1990, in what was then still Yugoslavia. The society’s chairlady Vesna Pichler did not join the Gemeinschaft der deutschen und österreichischen nationalen Minderheitenorganisationen in Kroatien because she sees the VDG rather critically. She considers it one of the main tasks to provide German-language schooling for the children at the elementary school Heilige Anna:

This civic alliance is in direct and close connection to the Hungarian government party FIDESZ. It cannot be be called an umbrella organization proper, yet it names the EMNT and the SZNT explicitly as its partners. See http://www.polgariszovetseg.ro/hun.htm (02 December 2011).

73 Interview transcript, Vesna Pichler, 26 October 2005. Even at an international level, the split interests of the two German societies become apparent: While the VDG is part of the Weltdachverband der Donauschwaben, the Verein der Deutschen und Österreichischen Kroatiens joined the international umbrella organization Volksgruppe der Donauschwaben e.V. (Stuttgart), which was founded in 2002 by Georg Morgenthaler. There is, however, a continuous confusion surrounding Georg Morgenthaler and his registered society: This can be read up on in a statement titled “Georg Morgenthaler, ein Präsident, der keiner...”
Vesna Pichler, the director of the Verein der Deutschen und Österreichischer Kroaten, in her conversation with us […] named as the biggest success the introduction of a German class with 120 children in the school Heilige Anna at Osijek. (italics by the author)74

The chairlady Vesna Pichler named the cultural activities of the society in the following order and I summarized them as follows: Until 2005, ten exhibitions were organized, two books were published and there were about two concerts per year. The choir Esseg counted 28 students in 2005; in addition there war the Volkstanz group Kranz and the theater group Zauberer. The society newspaper Glocke appeared quarterly and an academic group researched the history of Slavonia. On the first Sunday of each month, a German mass was held at the Jesuit church. Vesna Pichler herself stressed that women were dominant in the society.75

In Slovenia, the Gottscheer Altsiedler Verein/Društvo Kočevarjev Staroselek was founded in 1992. According to its own definition, it unites “primarily the Gottscheers from the former district Novo Mesto/Rudolfswerth, who did not resettle in 1941, and their descendants and friends.”76 The two people who gave the society its profile are the chairman August Gril, who was born at Poljane/Pöllandl in 1936, and Doris Debenjak, who lives at Ljubljana/Laibach. In 2008, the society had about 200 members.77

In the community Občice/Krapflern, which is located in the Moschnitztal in Gottschee, the society has had a cultural center, or a community center, since 1998. The house (Občice 9) is visible from afar since it is painted in the Gottschee colors, cerulean and white. It is the locale of German lessons, and sometimes the Gottschee dialect is also passed on to the younger generations; in addition, the youth group and the youth choir meet here.78 During the time of my research, the acting manager of the youth group, Urška Kop, who permanently lives there, managed these activities. The society also publishes a bilingual German-Slovenian newspaper titled Bakh/Pot, in which some contributions are printed in the Gottschee dialect.79 In the framework of an interview on 28 May 2008, Doris Debenjak told me that the Slovenian neighbors’ acceptance of the Kulturhaus in Občice could not only be gained through cultural events. An example of this: When there was a plan to plant an orchard with

74 Samo Kristen. “Das Identitätsmanagement der deutschen Kulturvereine in Slowenien, Slawonien und in der Vojvodina.”

75 Interview transcript, Vesna Pichler, 26 October 2005.

76 See http://www.gottscheer.net/prva-nem.htm (22 July 2009).


78 Cf. also M. Ferenc, Kočevsko, pusta in prazna, 302. In footnote 565 on this page Mitja Ferenc further notes that the activities of all three German societies in Slovenia in 2000 and 2001 were supported by the Slovenian state with 2,206,000- tolar: “V letih 2000 in 2001 je bilo troj društven obdobnih skupaj 2,206.000 tolarjev.”

79 Cf. Samo Kristen “Das Identitätsmanagement der deutschen Kulturvereine in Slowenien, Slawonien und in der Vojvodina.”
old autochthonous species, which both society members and volunteers helped plant, many people
from the region came to help and voluntarily offered their assistance and expertise; or, in Doris
Debenjak’s words: “Everyone came for that, no one comes for the sake of art!”80 It is also decisive for
the work of the society that that generation that only a decade ago had taken the children’s classes are
now grown-ups themselves. Now even two Slovenian women who were once at the top of their class
of Gottscheerish have joined the society.81 What we often observe with the activities of the identity
management and ethnomanagement is an effort to gain the acceptance of the Slovenian-speaking ma-
jority population. This can be ascribed to the tensions that once existed between the Germans and the
Slovenes and that had built up due to the events during and after World War II in Gottschee. The pri-
mary ethnopolitical goal of the society, however, is, as mentioned in the context of the umbrella or-
ganizations, to be officially recognized as a minority, which holds also true for the following society.

The Kulturverein deutschsprachiger Frauen »Brücken« Marburg/Kulturno društvo nemško
govorečih žena »Mostovi« Maribor was founded on 01 December 2000 at Maribor/Marburg. It defines
its basic interests as follows:

The society’s goal is to preserve the linguistic, ethnic and cultural specificities of the German-
speaking population in Slovenia. For this purpose, the society deepens and extends the contacts
with the German-speaking inhabitants and with their descendants as well as with people in the
Heimat and outside of Slovenia who are interested in the German language and culture.82

The central points of an interview with Veronika Haring, the chairlady of the society, which took place
in the society’s premises on Barvarska ulica 5 at Maribor on 26 August 2005, can be summarized as
follows: A children’s workshop, which is also supported by Slovenia, takes place three times per
week, German lessons for adults once per week, and also once per week a discussion group, for in-
stance about German-language literature or customs – Haring emphasized that all this had non politi-
cal content. Besides, there is a “literary group,” which also translates Slovenian literature into German.
The annual Christmas celebration occupies a special place among the society’s festivities. The public
presentation of the collection “Zwischenmenschliche Bindungen,” which took place in the wedding
hall of the old Marburg townhall in January 2005, was also a very special occasion.83

Moreover, there is in Slovenia the Slowenischer Gottscheer Verein Peter Kosler/Slovensko
kočevarsko društvo Peter Kosler at Ljubljana/Laibach, which was founded in 1994 and which is simp-
ly referred to as “Verein Peter Kosler.” The focus of its activities is the preservation of the Gottschee
cultural monuments (e.g. churches, chapels, cemeteries),84 which it does not coordinate with the Gott-

80 Interview transcript, Doris Debenjak, 28 May 2008.
81 Cf. ibid.
83 Interview transcript, Veronika Haring, 26 August 2005.
The most important activities of the society have been made available online since 2008, in both German and Slovenian. See
84 See e.g. a short report from 2004:
The Verein Peter Kosler neither fights for the implementation of the minority rights for the Germans in Slovenia:

The statutes say that this is a non-partisan society, whose main goal it is to foster a constructive coexistence of the Slovenes and Gottscheers in Slovenia.66

During my research, Erik Krisch was chairman of the society and the number of members was limited to 25 to 30, which included many Slovenes, who mostly lived in the capital Ljubljana.87

The Internationaler Verein Freiheitsbrücke Internacionalo društvo most svobode is located at Maribor/Marburg and was already founded in 1991. Yet, apart from the Germans’ recognition as a minority, the chairman of the society, Dušan Kolnik, was mostly concerned with the historical crimes committed against the Germans in Slovenia and with the claims to restitution linked to them. Kolnik’s proximity to the Kärntner Heimatdienst (KHD), however, politically harmed his endeavors more than it benefitted them:

There was also the not only tactical mistake made by the lawyer Dušan L. Kolnik and his society “Freiheitsbrücke/Most svobode” to primarily seek assistance from a known German-national organization at the time when it began its doubtlessly legitimate efforts for legal recognition of its German-speaking fellow citizens as a Volksgruppen.88

Yet, the article by Mitja Ferenc and Božo Repe does not speak of this. They rather try to adopt Kolnik’s perspective and fathom his reasons for distancing himself from the abovementioned societies:

The society understands itself as a representative society of the Germans in Slovenia and is unsatisfied that the two other societies of the Gottschee Germans are active independently of one another and are mostly concerned with the preservation of their own cultural heritage.89

The fact remains that Dušan Kolnik neither sought a closer cooperation with the society Brücken, which is also located at Marburg, nor with the Slovenian umbrella organization.

The Kulturverein Abstaller Feld/Kulturno društvo Apaško polje, founded on 31 July 2000, also plays an independent part. Its Kulturhaus, the so-called Josef-Matl-Haus,90 is located at Apače/Abstall close to the river Mur, which constitutes the border to Austria there. It was reopened

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85 August Gril, the chairman of the Altsiedler Verein, underlines this in a conversation with Gregor Heberle: “Konkretna sodelovanja med društvom Kočevarjev starosecjev in Društvo Peter Kosler ni, ker si ne deklarirajo kot nemško društvo. O svojih projektih jih ne obveščajo ni v vašo k sodelovanju.” – There is no concrete cooperation between the Gottscheer Altsiedler Verein and the Verein Peter Kosler because it does not declare to be a German society. It did not perceive an obligation to do so in its projects and has not initiated cooperation. (Trans. Hermann/Slezák) Heberle, Političnogeografska analiza nekdanjega Kočevarjskega jezikovnega otoka, 82.

86 See: http://www.gottschee.de/frames/Mainframe/Deutsch/Peter%20Kosler%20Verein.htm (23 July 2009).

87 Cf. Heberle, Političnogeografska analiza nekdanjega Kočevarjskega jezikovnega otoka, 82.


90 Josef Matl (1897-1974) was a German-speaking farmer’s son from the Apače Basin, who attended public school at Apače between 1903 and 1908. After the border was established (1991/20) he lived in Austria, where he made a name for himself as a Slavicist, Southeast Europe scholar and folklorist.
with a ceremony in November 2003. At the time of my research, Roza Verbošt was the chairlady of the society. I had a conversation with her and with Eduard Staudinger. Many activities take place at this Kulturhaus, including German and Slovenian language courses. The society members, according to Heberle, are predominantly “German Altsiedler (native settlers) from the Abstaller Feld/Apaško polje” (= “nemški staroselecev z Apaškega polja” in the original). Doris Debenjak, the deputy chairlady of the Gottscheer Altsiedlerverein, finds succinct words to describe the relation between the Kulturverein Abstaller Feld and the Slovenian umbrella organization: “The people from Apače are reticent.”

The Forum der Deutschen is divided into regional subunits: under the umbrella of the Landesforum mentioned above, there are altogether five regional forums in Romania, Altreich, Banat, Bukovina, Northern Transylvania and Transylvania. They, in turn, are subdivided into Kreisforen, Zentrumsforen and Ortsforen. Besides, there is the Arbeitsgemeinschaft Deutscher Jugendorganisationen in Rumänien (ADJ), which is a separate realm exclusively dedicated to youth work. These units are interlinked with one another through their staff, not least because there are only few Germans remaining in Romania. Wolfgang Wittstock, who since 2006 has been the chairman of the Demokratisches Forum der Deutschen im Kreis Kronstadt (DFDKK), summarizes its goals as follows:

The Demokratisches Forum der Deutschen im Kreis Kronstadt (DFDKK) represents the interests of the Romanian citizens of German Volkszugehörigkeit who reside in the towns of the district Kronstadt/Brasov. Together with the other territorial units of the Demokratisches Forum der Deutschen in Rumänien, it works on behalf of the specific concerns of its members and promotes them through its manifold activities, through measures in the political, social, cultural, pedagogical and economic realm, which serve the purpose of securing the survival of our Romanian-German linguistic and cultural community as a loyal part of the Romanian society. Our door is open to anyone who needs advice or help, and everyone who can help us realize our goals is welcome here.

In principle, there is a historically grown competition between the Kreisforum at Hermannstadt and the Kreisforum at Kronstadt, which became particularly apparent whenever the power structures within the Landesforum were at stake. The group at Hermannstadt with Klaus Johannis established a domi-
nant position within the German identity management and ethnomanagement in Romania in the last decade, which the group at Kronstadt of course generally views critically. Wolfgang Wittstock in an interview underlines the strengthening and preservation of the identity as a German minority, which included the preservation of the language and culture, since this affects all areas, such as politics, culture, and social questions, including the schools. He did not go into any detail on how this should be done in the future, yet he made it clear that what he called “Identitätspflege/cultivation of identity” had to consist in concrete actions. The website, which has been online since the autumn of 2008, plays a crucial part in this. At the same time, the forum plays a supportive part, for instance in the schools, when a permanent position for a German language teacher or German-language textbooks are at stake. Likewise, the Kreisforum assists the organizers of folkloristic and cultural events or the Burzenländer Blaskapelle. There is also a steady contact with the Hungarian minority in Transylvania, and even mutual support in occasional undertakings. The dean is invited to the meetings of the Kreisforum, since, apart from the material interest in the mutual relations, both represent the same community.

With respect to the future of the German/Saxon minority, Wolfgang Wittstock revealed a cautious optimism, because the German-language school newspaper at the Kronständter Gymnasium, titled Die Clique, was revived and because the youth carnival, too, was taking place again, which showed that there was hope. Richard Sterner, who has been manager at the Kreisforum Kronstadt since 2008, mostly takes care of bureaucratic matters as politics, he says, is primarily the forum board of directors’ business. During elections, the forum also takes care of the election campaigns since it needs to be elected officially in order to maintain its legitimacy as a minority representation. For the executive board, however, the cultural activities have priority and the web presence in particular focuses on the “presentation and communication of our own identity” in order to show “who we are, what we have done for Kronstadt and what was the significance of the Saxons for Kronstadt.” One of Richard Sterner’s most important tasks is the development of the Deutsches Jugendforum Kronstadt (= Forumul German de Tineret Brașov). He faces, however, severe difficulties in his interaction with the headmaster of the Honterus-Lyzeum, Helmut Wagner, who unwaveringly believes that adolescents should not join the Jugendforum before the age of 18; Sterner uses a parable when he says that a high fence was erected around the school since in other towns the cooperation between the schools and the

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100 Cf. interview transcript, Wolfgang Wittstock, 26 February 2009.
101 Cf. ibid.
103 Interview transcript, Wolfgang Wittstock, 26 February 2009.
forum functioned very well and “where should the interested youngsters come from, if not from the schools.”

When I visited the Zentrumsforum at Cluj-Napoca/Klausenburg, DFDK, in October 2007, I made an exciting, unique observation. It concerns a specific form of ethnic mimicry, which uses a so-called code-switching between several cultural codes. The then library staff was a German teacher at Klausenburg; she has since retired and still served as a part-time secretary at the DFDK at the time of my research. Her profession brought her into closer contact with both the German minority in Transylvania and with the kin states Germany and Austria. The woman’s name—it could well also have stemmed from intermarriage—, but much more so her short excursion into the Hungarian language disclosed to me as a field researcher that this interview partner was actually of Transylvanian-Hungarian origins, even if she had adopted a German mimicry, not least due to her work in the DFDK. The reasons can be manifold since, on the one hand, this mimicry ensures that she is perceived as a German in the context of the DFDK and therefore as equal to all the other members of the Zentrumsforum, and, on the other hand, her profession as a German teacher may already have prepared the ground for it.

In 2008, an example was made of Daniel Thellmann, the mayor of Mediaş/Mediasch and deputy chairman of the Demokratisches Forum der Deutschen in Siebenbürgen (DFDS), short “Siebenbürgen-Forum,” and of the chairman of the Ortsforum at Mediaş, Werner Müller, which was meant to send a clear signal to all those who were unwilling to unconditionally submit to the agenda of the Landesforum: The two men, who had worked in central functions of the forum, had joined the Liberal-Demokratische Partei (PD-L = Partidul Democrat Liberal) or, in the view of the Deutsches Forum, had “changed sides.” As a consequence, during a board meeting, the two were asked to step down from the board of the Siebenbürgen-Forum, which they did. This example was selected in order to show that the forum exercises tolerance in the sense of party affiliation, even if it is not officially registered as a political party in Romania. The reason for this may lie just as much in the structures of the Landesforum as in the Romanian minority legislation, which only grants access to the parliament to one single elected minority organization per recognized minority.

Since the local and general elections of 2008 in particular, the involvement of members of the German-speaking minority in Romania’s political landscape saw a veritable boom:

Countrywide, the Deutsches Forum provided a Kreisrat president, ten mayors, nine Kreisräte as well as 81 city councilmen and borough councillors. When Ovidiu Ganţ, the candidate of the Deutsches Forum, entered the chamber of deputies with a total of 23,190 votes, this was also

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107 Interview transcript, Richard Sterner, 25 February 2009. Richard Sterner adds that this would increase one’s interest as an adult in becoming active in the forum, if one could return to one’s roots dating back to school days.


110 Ruxandra Stănescu. “Sachsentreffen wieder in Birthälm.” Siebenbürgische Zeitung, 20 September 2008. See: http://www.siebenbuerger.de/zeitung/termine/1891-sachsentreffen-wieder-in-birthaelm.html (03 May 2011). Another consequence was the cancellation of the 18th Sachsentreffen, which was scheduled to take place in the autumn of 2008 at Mediaş. It was then held at its usual location, at Birthälm, again. Cf. ibid.
remarkable. None of the other small national minorities in Romania did as well in the elections.\footnote{Klaus Johannis. “Politishe Willensäußerung und Bewahrung der Traditionen.” \textit{Deutsches Jahrbuch für Rumänien} (2009), 16.}

In the course of the Romanian government crisis and the ensuing personnel reorganization in the fall of 2009, Romania displayed an even bigger appreciation of the forum chairman. The ‘new’ majority coalition in the Romanian parliament, which is composed of the PSD, the PNL, the UDMR (= hung. RMDSZ) and other minorities, even proposed Klaus Johannis as an independent candidate for the position as prime minister. Yet, the Romanian president Traian Băsescu rejected this proposal and Lucian Croitoru was nominated.\footnote{Cf. N.N.: “Präsident Traian Băsescu nömitet Lucian Croitoru als Premierminister. Antonescu fühlt sich übergangen und fordert Parlamentssitzung.” \textit{ADZ}, 16 October 2009.}

The mayor of Hermannstadt then tried to stress the positive:

When asked whether he was disappointed that President Băsescu didn’t nominate him, he replied: “No, I have no reason to be.” […] For him, for the people at Hermannstadt and the \textit{Deutsches Forum}, the candidature for the office of prime minister alone was an image boost.\footnote{N.N.: “Johannis: Kein Grund enttäuscht zu sein. Schon Kandidatur eine Ehre für ihn und Hermannstadt.” \textit{ADZ}, 16 October 2009.}

Paul Philippi, the former chairman and current honorary chairman of the \textit{Landesforum}, in his speech in front of the activists of the \textit{Landesforum} in October 2009 tried to keep this euphoria in check:\footnote{Cf. Paul Philippi. “Ohne ‘Wir’ wird es nicht gehen: WIR sind Nobelpreisträger und Fast-premier. Aber was haben WIR dafür getan?” \textit{ADZ}, 27 October 2009. Sec: http://www.adz.ro/m091027.htm#1 (30 October 2009).}

And yes: “We’ have not only received the globally recognized Nobel Prize but also the highest German literature award, the \textit{Büchnerpreis} – naturally, again through a fellow countryman from Hermannstadt who left us a long time ago, Oskar Pastior, who, just like Herta from Nitzkydorf later, has set up camp at Berlin.

And on top of that: In 2009 “we” almost became prime minister of Romania […] highlights for us. Of course not highlights achieved \textit{by} us. Highlights achieved by individuals who belong \textit{to} us. Some of them more indirectly, only one of them fully belongs \textit{to} us. He and his immediate co-workers. We, the Forum, as an entity possibly profit from it, but have contributed relatively little or not at all to it.\footnote{Philippi borrowed and reinterpreted this “we” metaphor from a lead story of the German tabloid \textit{Bild}, which on the occasion of Joseph Ratzinger’s election as pope had read “Wir sind Papst” (“We are Pope”).}

Paul Philippi, who in view of his merits and his advanced age is given the role of a “gray eminence,” did not shy away from openly telling the forum functionaries that these honors could not be considered their achievements immediately. He intensifies his criticism when he metaphorically weighs these two awards against the current activities of the WE (= We forum members):

Who were WE? What would the Nobel Prize winner answer, what would the \textit{Büchnerpreis} winner answer all those who now praise themselves with them, and what WE could our candidate for the office of prime minister rely on? On the forum’s executive board? On a vote of the representatives’ meeting? On the will of the German citizens of Romania? It was a Johannis-
effect that was bestowed on us – like the Nobel Prize was a pure Herta-Müller effect. Not a WE-effect. Neither for Müller, nor for Johannis. 116

This speech not only shows that the figure of the mayor of Hermannstadt, Klaus Johannis, in particular was constructed as a unifying figure for the Germans’ identity management and ethnomanagement in Romania; this was also consolidated by the patronage, for instance through the presentation of the badge of honor of the Bund der Vertriebenen (BdV)/Federation of Expellees on 11 September 2010. 117

Christian Player, the town pastor of Kronstadt, said in an interview: “Denomination and ethnic identity of course are very closely interconnected for us.” 118 He thus points out directly that the commitment to the Protestant church A.B. (= Augsburg Confession) is still considered an essential ethnic marker in the framework of the Transylvanian Saxons’ identity construction. 119 Since the beginning of the 20th century, the Transylvanian Saxons view the Protestant church A.B. as a “Volkskirche,” which is rather problematic in terms of terminology:

The theologians who wrote history saw no problem in fusing the two individual terms ‘Volk’ and ‘church,’ which were confused with the post-Reformatory estates-based confessionalism of the ‘natio Saxonica’ […] 120

In the case of the Transylvanian Saxons, the church is at the same time a “Bekenntniskirche” since they rely on several Protestant confessions of faith, such as the Augsburg Confession of 1530 or the “Formula Pii Consensus” of 1572. 121 The designation “Evangelische Landeskirche A.B. in Siebenbürgen,” introduced in 1867, strengthens this claim; like the Protestants defined themselves since this time of national awakening through their denomination (vallás = faith, religion) and ethnically via the marker language, and in its combination resulted in: “a magyar vallás, a szász vallás, az oláh vallás” (= the Hungarian faith = Calvinist, the Saxon faith = Protestant, the Romanian faith = orthodox). 122 In the historical narrative of the Transylvanian Saxons in general and in the four-volume history of the Transylvanian Saxons written by the Protestant bishops Friedrich and Georg Daniel Teutsch in particular, 123 the “unity of church and Volk” is a given. 124 From the perspective of the history of the Volks-

116 Ibid.
118 Interview transcript, Christian Player, 27 February 2009; the town pastor of Kronstadt, Christian Player, is simultaneously dean of the church district Kronstadt.
119 See http://www.evang.ru/lt/ (09 July 2009). The church plays a comparatively much smaller role among the German minorities in the other Southeast European research regions and the influence of church institutions on the current identity management and ethnomanagement is not nearly as pronounced as it is among the Transylvanian Saxons.
120 Cf. ibid., 112-113.
121 “Evangelische Landeskirche A.B. in Rumänien.”
gruppe, the markers within the group of the Transylvanian Saxons started to overlap and blur: “Ethnic group, language groups and confession of faith coincided, the terms Protestant (Lutheran) and Saxon or German could be used synonymously.” This construction corresponds to a sense of unity that the Transylvanian-Saxon community chose for itself and especially in the course of the first half of the 19th century this unity was often confirmed, like for instance by the Saxon pastor and teacher Stephan Ludwig Roth, who was an influential Transylvanian during the Vormärz era: “Our nationality is bound as closely to church and school as maybe among no other Volk in the world.”

Another central component of this mutual interdependence derived from the Saxons’ traditional social structure, the so-called Nachbarschaften (neighborhoods), in which the Protestant minister also played a dominant role: In the Saxon villages, there was no actual mayor, but the Protestant minister was the integrative head who was above the neighborhood elders. Yet, he was not appointed for life in the village church community but could be voted out of office by the neighborhood elders – this was often a pragmatic decision, if the prevalent opinion in the village was that there was a better minister or minister’s family. The Saxons’ influence within the Romania society has inevitably decreased since the era of communism. Due to the waves of emigration, the Nachbarschaften could just not be maintained as an independent Saxon social structure in their original form. The affinity of the Saxon community toward the Protestant church has shifted from an everyday culture toward a ceremonial and commemorative culture, in the framework of the Sächsische Kulturwochen, for instance, or the various forms of the Sachsentreffen. In the Protestant church in Transylvania, there are still attempts to play the part also in a cultural sense and at Kronstadt organ concerts currently take place three times per week in July and August, signalling that the Saxons and the Protestant church are still around. At Kronstadt in particular, is it the Schwarze Kirche (black church) that as one of the major attractions for tourists not only represents the Protestant Honterusgemeinde alone but also, symbolically, Transylvanian-Saxon cultural history at large.

127 Qtd. in Hochstrasser, 208.
128 The first Nachbarschaft (neighborhood) was mentioned in a document at Schäßburg as early as 1526, since 1543 at Kronstadt and since 1563 at Hermannstadt. The prerequisite for a Saxon man to enter into such a Nachbarschaft was the ownership of a farm (village) or a house (city) as well as marriage. All members of the Nachbarschaft had equal rights and were integrated there for good. The Nachbarschaft depended on the location of the property and entry into another Nachbarschaft was therefore no option. On the structure and the functions of Nachbarschaften see in summary: Hochstrasser, Die siebenbürgisch-sächsische Gesellschaft in ihrem strukturellen Wandel 1867-1992, 201-208.
129 For example, the Bach choir at Kronstadt, which had already been considered for the first radio programs in Romania in the interwar period, set such a cultural anchor in the “German-cultural-religious” sense with the interpretation of Bach cantatas and similar works. The organ concerts could also take place very regularly, five times per week, in the summer in the 1980s, since Christian Player’s predecessor, town minister Mathias Pelger, also had always supported the spiritual message of church music. Cf. interview transcript, Christian Player, 27 February 2009.
130 Cf. interview transcript, Christian Player, 27 February 2009.
131 For a historical self-presentation of the Honterusgemeinde as well as hints to its current activities see http://www.honterusgemeinde.ro/ (28 July 2011).
132 This strong idealization sometimes resulted in peculiar historical howlers during guided tours through the church due to poorly trained staff: “For example, the Schwarze Kirche allegedly had been an orthodox church originally, and when the Austrians forced the Saxons to become Protestant, the church, too, became Protestant.” Quoted after a report by Bernhard
In southwest Hungary, the research focuses on the three counties Baranya/Branau, Somogy/Schomodei and Tolna. In 1995 the *Verband der Branauer Deutschen Selbstverwaltungen* (= Baranyai Német Önkormányzatok Szövetsége) was founded as a successor organization to the *Verband der Ungarndeutschen in der Branau*. At the time of my research, it oversaw, as a kind of regional umbrella organization, 102 minority self-governments in the counties Branau (96) and Schomodei (6). Its task “is the representation of the Hungarians in southwest Hungary at the political and cultural level and the organization of large cultural events.” The *Verband der deutschen Minderheitenselfverwaltung der Tolnau* (= Tolna Megyei Német Kisebbségi Önkormányzatok Szövetsége) represents the interests of the 37 minority self-governments of the eponymous county. The *Verband* is in charge of the interconnection of the self-governments, functions as an information platform and awards two prizes annually “For the Hungarian culture in Tolnau.” At the county level, there are the *Deutsche Selbstverwaltung des Komitats Branau*, DSKB (= Baranya Megyei Német Önkormányzat) and the *Deutsche Selbstverwaltung des Komitates Tolnau* (= Tolna Megyei Német Önkormányzat). The *Landesselbstverwaltung der Ungarndeutschen*, LdU, maintains a regional office at Pécs and Szekszárd, respectively. The fairly large number of minority self-governments of the Germans in southwest Hungary triggers an equally extensive dispersion of the identity management and ethno-management at the local level, whose respective intensity depends on the respective activity or passivity of the agents. An important point needs to be added to this since every member of a minority self-government as of 2005 has to have a sponsor organization or a sponsor agency and has to get involved more in the respective local politics so that s/he can either run for an office for an already existing minority self-government at the local level or found a new minority self-government. This shall put an end to both the candidacy of private individuals and to the parallel action of minority self-government and local politics. The former in particular has almost exclusively been the case among the German minority self-governments so far: A study conducted by Monika Mária Váradi in 2001 shows that 91% of the members of one of the then altogether 271 German minority self-governments in Hungary were not members in a society – or, only the small number of “9.5% had the support of a

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134 The current number of 102 minority self-governments was confirmed on 13 July 2009 by Zoltan Schmidt of the regional office of the LdU at Pécs. This number varies since it depends on the results of the regional elections.


136 On the prize, the so-called *Niveaufreis*, which the *Verband der deutschen Minderheitenselfverwaltung der Tolnau* awards, see also the article in the *Neue Zeitung* 36 (2007): [http://www.neue-zeitung.hu/dokumentumok/nzg_362007.pdf](http://www.neue-zeitung.hu/dokumentumok/nzg_362007.pdf) (10 July 2009).


nationality society.” These stronger ties to what is called Nationalitätenverein in Hungary were also requested in order to bar in the future the foundation of a minority self-governmen that is mostly motivated by personal reasons and is connected to private social or economic intentions. In some cases there had been minority self-governments in which there actually were “no Germans in Hungary in the local community to support them.” In such cases, we encounter a seeming identity management and ethnomanagement from the inside, as the founder of this minority self-government comes him-/herself from that minority but s/he does not act on the behalf of the Volksgruppe but for selfish reasons and other private individuals. I was given the following examples to illustrate the motives: It is much easier to obtain public funds as/in a minority self-government; in my own field research, I could not detect financial motives since people would hardly have openly admitted to this – but indirectly, these motives were confirmed. Other motives have to do with kindergartens or schools, if, for example, several families of Hungarian-German descent, or they together with other minorities from the same village, mostly with Roma families, want to establish a national kindergarten or a national school track in the community.

The large number of local minority self-governments in southwest Hungary is nonetheless surprising since that portion of the population that officially registers as belonging to the Hungarian-German minority and uses the German language in public decreases steadily. Event in 68% of the minority self-governments the meetings are already held in Hungarian, in 30% the meetings are bilingual and only in one single case the meetings are exclusively in German. These statistics also reveal the previous distance of the candidates to local politics (local self-governments) since only 8.3% of them had run for an office not only in the minority self-government but also in the local political administration.

The Ungarndeutsche Kultur- und Informationszentrum in Budapest is located at the Haus der Ungarndeutschen, which is not far from the Heroes’ Square at Budapest on Lendvay u. 22. At the “Zentrum” – as the Germans in Hungary call it, short but no less affectionate – the focus lies on information: The regularly updated website offers an overview of all the cultural events of the Germans in Hungary throughout the country and informs about current topics. The Hungarian-German library, which has been located at the Haus der Ungarndeutschen since April 2001, has also been ma-

140 Interview transcript, György Bindorffer, 19 May 2009.
141 In this case, the minority rights structures, which make it easier for a member of a minority to obtain funds or exert regional political influence, are rather exploited. Basically, these are political or financial interests that often trade under the entire range of activities of the identity management and ethnomanagement and are also deliberately presented as such.
142 Interview transcript, György Bindorffer, 19 May 2009.
144 Ibid.
146 The IT sector should be extended by a database and all minority self-governments should be listed, referenced and updated there. Interview transcript, István Mayr, 20 May 2009.
147 The cultural events of the Germans in Hungary at the time of my research and afterwards made a report available online. Interview transcript, Ricarda Linnenbrink, 20 May 2009.
naged by the Zentrum since 01 January 2005. Important cultural activities at the Zentrum include for instance: the Hungarian-German youth film festival “abgedreht” as well as the photography contest “blickpunkt,” whose calls for proposals are always related to the Germans in Hungary. In southwest Hungary, there is also a regional cultural center of the Germans in Hungary at Pécs, the so-called genannte Lenau-Haus, which is above all conceived as a hub for events, communication and exhibitions.

Fairly soon after the former Republic of Yugoslavia in 1992 had allowed for the first time again the foundation of minority societies – called “Nationalverein” (= narodni savez) in Serbia –, the foundational meeting of the first German society took place at Novi Sad/Neusatz on 30 June 1992. It was registered on 06 July under the name Deutscher Klub Donau and renamed Deutscher Verein Donau in 1996 in the course of an amendment of the statutes. The Germans thus were the second of the more than twenty different Volksgruppen in Vojvodina, after the Hungarians, who founded a society of their own so early on. During the founding period, “the preservation of our national identity – culture, language, traditions etc.” was the society’s main task, the society chairman Andreas Bürgermayer said. Yet, the Germans were afraid, due to the historical burden, to admit to being Germans or even to officially join the society. In 1997, the society was even forbidden und multiple attempts to re-register were prevented. Only in May 2000, when the number of members of the society had already increased a lot (ca. 700 families), was there permission to pass a new society statute. The society headquarters at Novi Sad now also house a German-language library. Since 1992, the annual “Brezelball” during carnival season creates a certain continuity. The “Deutsche Kulturtage” at Novi Sad is another annual event at which German traditions in Vojvodina are displayed and the exchange with Germans in Croatia, German in Romania and Germans in Hungary is exercised. Generally speaking, the German minority in Vojvodina lacks younger members. Even an extensive school contest cannot obscure the fact that children in Serbia learn German less and less in school and, according to Bürgermayer, this is the main problem for the future since the new laws do open up better opportunities of the German minority in Serbia but many young people are moving away from Vojvodina. Nonetheless, some branch offices of the Deutscher Verein Donau could be founded since 2000, which by now work independently. Out of the overall ca. 800 members, even “about 40 members come from

148 It comprises about 5000 books, which thematically relate to the Germans in Hungary. Of particular interest are the than 200 village monographs/local heritage books or summarized censuses and audiovisual documentaries. Among the 48 journals, there is also the entire archive of the Neue Zeitung from the first issue. Cf. interview transcript, István Mayr, 20 May 2009. See http://www.bibliothek.hu/de/uberuns.php (16 July 2009).
152 See interview transcript, Andreas Bürgermayer, 22 April 2010.
153 This number was taken from the statement by Bürgermayer himself and not from any statistics.
155 Cf. interview transcript, Andreas Bürgermayer, 22 April 2010.
other minorities, above all Hungarians or Croats, not so much Serbs, because of their faith.”156 Yet, there had also been quarrels from time to time with the other new societies that had been founded independently of the Verein Donau. Nevertheless, in December 2007, they summoned up enough reason and sense of unity to be able to found the Nationalrat der Deutschen in Serbien.157 Bürgermayer’s account shows very well how light and shadow interact in the realm of minority societies.

The foundation of the Deutscher Verein Kikinda (= Nemačko udruženje Kikinda) in 2003 is closely connected to the Deutscher Verein Donau: “Andreas Bürgermayer, the chairman of the society ‘Donau’ at Novi Sad, played an important part in the foundation of our society.”158 The Deutsche Verein Kikinda, whose president during the time of my research was Aleksander Konečni, who was in office since 2006, defines its goals as follows:

The goal of the foundation of our society is to offer a place where German-speaking people and their descendants, as well as citizens of other nationalities, can come together. We take care of the preservation and maintenance of the German language, history, folklore and culture, as well as of the development of friendly relations between people who have shared interests, without political and nationalist claims.159

Apart from its own library (about 500 volumes), the society offers its own, extracurricular German lessons. The so-called “Kürbistage” (pumpkin days), which take place in autumn, are an attempt to also reach out to the Serbian public as well as to other ethnic groups who live in this area in east Serbia. There is even a “Toleranztag” in the community.160 It can be concluded that the society at Kikinda tries through its identity management and ethnomanagement to offer cultural events for all ethnic and national groups living in the community in order to present a more lively image of the Germans than is widely perceived in Serbia.

The Deutsche Volksverband (= Nemački narodni savez) at Subotica/Maria Theresiopel was founded in December 1996, has been recognized by the authorities since March 1997161 and defines its goals as follows:

*Protection of the interest of the German minority in Serbia/Vojvodina, *Preservation of the German identity, *Maintenance of the German language, customs and culture, *Development and support of the good relations between the Germans and other Völker der Vojvodina.162

At the time of my research, Rudolf Weiss,163 who had already been elected the first society chairman, held this office. I conducted an interview with him and with eth deputy chairman, László Mandler, in the generous facilities of the Kulturzentrum der Deutschen in Vojvodina,164 which could be opened in

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156 Ibid.
157 Cf. ibid.
158 See http://www.d-vereinkikinda.net/Neuigkeiten.htm (27 July 2009). This bilingual German-Serbian website of the society was installed in 2007.
164 A house of some 300 m² was renovated, and the surface area of both the house and the lot is about 1,100 m². Most of the construction costs were covered by the Federal Republic of Germany. Interview transcript, Rudolf Weiss, 23 September 2005.
July 2004. That the Germans were allowed again to carry the German flag in the festival procession during the annual harvest festival at Subotica had an important symbolic meaning for them. The cultural assets of the society are the choir “Lorelei” as well as the lay youth theatre group “Junge Nibelungen,” both of which are composed of multiethnic and multidenominational members. Th smallest common denominator is the usage of the German language – at least during the performances. Rudolf Weiss in a later interview said the following about the name of the society:

In December 1996, I was myself at the police station and told them that we wanted to found a society called Deutscher Volksverband. ‘What’s it called?’ the officer answered and ‘Can you not name it differently?’ After 6 or 7 trials, including approaching the responsible ministries at Belgrad, the society was registered under the name that we had wanted in March 1997.

One advantage for the German minority was that there are altogether 26 “nationalities” (= in analogy to the Serbian minority term narodnost) at Subotica and surroundings. This created a more tolerant atmosphere in the first place. Therefore, they themselves try to establish good connections with the other minorities, and they have even very good connections to the Hungarians:

When someone comes to the deutsches Haus [= cultural center of the Deutscher Volksverband] in Subotica und says ‘dobar dan,’ we also say ‘dobar dan’ or when that person says ‘jó napot,’ we also say ‘jó napot’ or when a Croat says ‘hvaljen Isus’ (= praised be Jesus), we say ‘hvaljen uvijek’ (= praised in eternity).

I would like to add a further remark here on the historical role and the usage of the Hungarian language in the region in connection with the der German minority: Even in the present day, many Germans use mainly the Hungarian language in public since during the era after World War II this mimicry was a necessary strategy for survival. In the Kulturzentrum der Deutschen, there is now a German-language library with 4000 volumes, which were all donated. In the realm of the regional education system, even a bilingual, German-Serbian kindergarten, which is called “Palčica,” could be opened in the autumn of 2007 at the urging of the Deutscher Volksverband:

Jedan od ciljeva Nemačkog narodnog saveza jeste bilo otvaranje zabavišta na nemačkom jeziku u Subotici za sve zainteresovane sugradane koji žele da im deca od malih nogu savladaju nemački jezik.

One of the goals of the Deutscher Volksverband was to open a German-language kindergarten at Subotica for all fellow citizens interested who wish that their children from a very early age onwards develop a link to the German language. (Trans. Hermanik/Szlezák)
This kindergarten is part of the first bilingual – currently in the combinations Hungarian/Serbian, German/Serbian or German/Hungarian – state pre-school programs at Subotica, which bundles several institutions under the name “Naša Radost”\(^{171}\) and which in 2008 already was attended by a total of 66 three- to six-year-old children.\(^{172}\) Generally, people at Subotica are susceptible for ideas concerning youth work, Rudolf Weiss said: “Who wants to do what? With whom? With which adolescents?”\(^ {173}\) People at the *Deutscher Volksverband* realized that a youth work that exclusively revolved around children and adolescents of German origins would not function in the long run. Moreover, one had avoided at all costs, from the very beginning of the society’s activities, to appear like a secret society. Instead, one was open to the idea of cooperation with all *Volksgruppen* in the region in all areas, which at the same time was meant to counter a potential antagonism or hostility against the German *Volksgruppe* in Vojvodina – the historical burden of the German occupation during World War II played into this just as much as the more recent conduct of Germany as a NATO member during the embargo against and the bombing of Yugoslavia.\(^ {174}\)

The *Deutsche Humanitäre Verein “St. Gerhardswerk”* (= Humanitarno udruženje Nemaca “Gerhard”) at Sombor with ust more than 500 active members is one of the largest German societies in Serbia. The chairman Anton Beck is at the same time deputy chairman in the *Nationalrat der Deutschen*. The kin state, more precisely the *Deutsches Institut für Auslandsbeziehungen (ifa)*, established a coordinating office was at Sombor in the years from 2005 to 2008, which strengthened the regional infrastructure there considerably:

> It is the task of the office to better interconnect the members of the German minority in Serbia, to reinforce their organizations with democratic structures and processes and to establish connections to Danube-Swabian associations in Serbia’s neighboring countries. The ifa especially focuses on the support of committed adolescents and young adults.\(^ {175}\)

During the first half year of 2008, on 08 February, the *ifa* organized a ‘Deutschen Kulturtag’ at Sombor, too – it was the first ‘Deutsche Kulturtag’ at Sombor ever –, in which the society “Gerhard” took part in all program items.\(^ {176}\) Anton Beck, in any case, reacts enthusiastically to the results of the cooperation with the *ifa*:

> Thanks to the ifa, we have more contacts to Germany and to Croatia, Romania and Hungary today. We are much better interconnected.“ Beck thinks of ongoing training courses for organizational development, project management, third-party funding acquisition or public relations work and says: “With these skills, we increase our chances that our ideas and projects will be subsidized.\(^ {177}\)

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\(^{173}\) Interview transcript, Rudolf Weiss, 27 May 2010.

\(^{174}\) Cf. ibid.


\(^{176}\) Since the autumn of 2008, the society is assisted by an *ifa* cultural manager.


The very small society *Deutscher Verein Adam Berenz* (= Nemačko udruženje Adam Berenc) with ist roughly 90 members was founded in 2001 in the community Apatin: “In the German society, members of other nations come together, too, who are interested in the German language and culture and in the Danube-Swabians.” In an interview, the former chairman Boris Mašić told me that only 140 of roughly 300 Germans remaining at Apatin—as he estimates the total—still declared to be German. As we have observed in the case of the Germans at Subotica described above, the Germans at Apatin after World War II also did not dare speak German in public but spoke Hungarian, as they had partly taken on a Hungarian mimicry in their everyday culture. The society’s name Adam Berenz refers to that Catholic priest from Apatin who in the 1930s already had resisted against the National Socialist regime in Germany and against the ‘Erneuererbewegung’ in Serbia. In the years of the German occupation he then counted among the most important resistance activists, until the Gestapo arrested him on 22 May 1944. He was released after the Hungarian archbishop Grosz intervened but was not allowed to return to Apatin. The former rectory has therefore been turned into a *Kulturhaus* and it serves at the same time as a memorial as there are still some of Adam Berenz’s personal items and the issues of his weekly newspaper “Donau,” in which he had called for resistance against the Nazis in the Catholic spirit. This collection could be extended in the last decades, and Boris Mašić writes in the minority journal *fenster*:

The Lapidarium is constantly added on to with new items. The most recent discovery of objects from the raided church at Prigrevica has enriched this institution so much that it is categorized as a cultural institution that can no longer be neglected. The collections at the “Adam Berenc” center were augmented by three valuable libraries. There is the parochial library at Prigrevica, the library of the monastery and the school library of Prigrevica. […] The most valuable part is in any case the archival materials, which give us insight into the life of a German village and the church in the 18th and 19th century. […] Once the collection has been catalogued, all the materials will be available of researchers.

The climax of all the society’s activities was indisputably the organization of the ‘*Welttreffen der Apatiner*’, which took place in 2003 and in which more than eighty former inhabitants of Apatin took part.

During the “*Welttreffen der Apatiner*” in 2003 we organized concerts, lectures, exhibitions and other events. Visitors from America above all asked for the tour […] The *Deutsche Verein der Gemeinde Hodschag* (= Udrženje nemac opštine Odžaci), founded on 15 December 2001, was founded as a branch office of the association for Serbian-German cooperation.

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179 Cf. interview transcript, Boris Mašić, 21 September 2005. In a personal letter of February 2008, Boris Mašić told me that he had stepped back from his functions in the *Verein Adam Berenz* in the meantime.
180 Cf. ibid.
182 On the German-language journal *fenster*, published in Serbia, see also chapter 2.3 section *Monthly, Biannual and Annual Publications of the Germans and the Hungarians.*
Stephan Müller (in Serbian spelling also: Stevan Miler), the acting chairman, works in his main profession in the local TV station Kanal 25. Most importantly, what takes place here is the bridge building between the Deutscher Verein der Gemeinde Hodschag and the Vereinigung der Hodschager e.V., located at Moosburg (Germany). Among other things, the Hodschager Blättli, which functions as the society newsletter, is published there. Three times per year, it reports on the activities in the Serbian community Odžaci/Hodschag, with the memorial culture surrounding the expulsions being at the center of attention most of the time. The activities of the Deutscher Verein der Gemeinde Hodschag are described as follows:

The “Bürgerhaus,” established in August 2002, provides facilities for the society. There are regular meetings of the executive board and the members. Many of the ca. 140 members are active and take case of the cemetery, the cemetery chapel and the memorials. […] Since February 2007, Dr Marija Šargač has been the chairlady of the society, Stephan Müller the acting chairman and Biljana Mijić the secretary.

The example of Hodschag shows the interaction between a local identity management and ethnomanagement from the inside and an identity management and ethnomanagement from the outside, in which diverse medial forms of distribution are linked mainly via the culture of memory.

The Hungarians’ Societies – Examples from the Regions

Ferenc Horváth, who was chairman of the Muravidéki Magyar Önkormányzati Nemzeti Közösség, MMÖNK (= Ungarische nationale Selbstverwaltungsgemeinschaft im Übermuhrgebiet) during the time of my research, titled his speech on 15 March 2011 “Magyarnak lenni jó!” (= “It is good to be Hungarian!”; Trans. Hermanik/Szlezák) and said, among other things, the following, which was meant to be representative of the work of the many Hungarian societies in Southeast Europe:

Kossuth Lajos és Széchenyi István teljesen ellentétesen látta a 12 pontban megfogalmazott nemzeti követelések megvalósításának módját. Kossuth a fegyver, Széchenyi a szó, a diplomácia hatalmában hitt. Egy mostani nemzetiségi politikusnak egyetlen fegyvere a szó hatalmából eredő meggyőzőképessége, megfelelő jogi háttérrrel. Néha nehéz meghúzni a vonalat aközött, hogy meddig mehetünk el, s hogy meddig kellett volna elmennünk. A muravidéki magyarságra mindig is a mérsékelt politizálás volt a jellemző, s voltak, akik ezt kevésnek, voltak, akik még ezt is soknak, túlságosan erélyesnek tartották. Egy európai gondolkodás ú Ember számára a radikalizmusnak nincs létjogosultsága – megjegyzem, egyik oldalról sem.189

Lajos Kossuth and István Széchenyi were of completely different opinions on how the national demands formulated in the 12 points were to be realized. Kossuth believed in the power of weapons, Széchenyi believed in the power of the word, i.e., of diplomacy. A contemporary mi-
nority politician has as her/his only weapon her/his power of persuasion, which emerges from the power of the word, founded on a corresponding legal background. It is sometimes hard to draw the line between the options of how far one can go and how far one could have gone.

Moderate politics have always been characteristic of the Hungarians in the Slovenian Prekmurje. There were some for whom this was not enough but also those for whom that was too much and too aggressive. For a person who thinks from a European perspective radicalism has no legitimacy I need to add that this holds true for both sides. (Trans. Hermanik/Szlezák)

Lili Kepe, the former chairlady of the *Magyar Nemzetiségi Művelődési Intézet*, MNMI, said in an interview, which was conducted at the *Bánffy Központ* (= Bánffy Center) at Lendava/Lendva in Slovenia on 19 January 2010: The self-perception and the external perception differ since the Hungarians who live in Slovenia are described by the Hungarian minorities in the Carpathian Basin as follows: “Tejben, vajban fürödnek” (= “They bathe in milk and butter”; Trans. Hermanik/Szlezák), and Lili Kepe counters: “If this were the case, why does the number of Hungarians continuously decrease?”

She names the following reasons for this decrease: i) Until 1965, it was not possible for the Hungarians in Prekmurje to cross the Slovenian border into Hungary, the “Iron Curtain” was a reality and people had to go to Vojvodina and pass through the border station there; therefore the Hungarians in Vojvodina were in a better situation; ii) The number of intermarriages constantly increased during the era of the former Yugoslavia; iii) The Hungarian minority in Prekmurje repeatedly lost its educated elite and now, too, those who go to study in Hungary do not come back to the region.

The MNMI’s fields of activity include “all realms which have to do with the Hungarians in Prekmurje”; the MNMI coordinates these altogether roughly 60 different groupings (= csoport) and societies. In the realm of media, they publish their own newspaper, *Népújság*. But Lili Kepe criticizes the educational realm since no specifically Hungarian institution – she probably means, an institution subject to the MNMI – nor a Hungarian-language school at the middle school level could yet be founded. However, Lili Kepe herself qualifies her call for an exclusively Hungarian-language school a bit by remarking that there are no longer many parents these days who are willing to send their children to an exclusively Hungarian-language school.

Generally, youth work is the most important field of activity of the MNMI because “it is important for the future” and it therefore offers curricular and extracurricular competitions as well as a summer camp (= nyári tábor). Moreover, the MNMI also supports research, with László Göncz, the most widely known researcher among them, representing the Hungarians as a delegate in the Slovenian parliament at the time of my research. As of late, the MNMI has also become more involved in cultural tourism since more and more tourists from Hungary come into this region and thus to them. It has had close contacts with institutions in Hungary for 25 years, especially in the neighboring counties Zala and Vas: “These relations exist not only on paper but also in real life.

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190 Interview transcript, Lili Kepe, 19 January 2010.
192 Cf. ibid.
193 Cf. ibid.
194 Cf. ibid.
The are lively and rest upon nearly daily communications and personal relationships.\textsuperscript{195} It also maintains good connections with some institutions of the Auslandsungarn (= határőtli magyarok) in the Carpathian Basin and the Hungarians’ institutions at Zenta, Cluj-Napoca/Kolozsvár and Beregszász/Sepehore/Bergsaß (UKR) were even established following the model of the MNMI.\textsuperscript{196}

In the research region Slavonia, the most important activities are initiated by the umbrella organizations HMDK (= Ungarische Demokratische Gemeinschaft in Kroatien) and MESZ (= Verband der ungarischen Vereine), discussed in the previous section, or are immediately tied to them. The delegate (= képviselő) Tünde Sipos-Zsivics of the MESZ, which is located at Beli Monastir/Pélmonostor, explains in an interview that it was one of the goals when the Verband was founded to approach societies that were not primarily politically oriented or interested in minority politics at all. And yet, the activities of the MESZ took on an increasingly political dimension over time due to the representation of the interests of the Hungarian Volksgruppe in Slavonia since otherwise, without political legitimization, nothing could be achieved.\textsuperscript{197} At the time the interview was held, there were already 43 societies that belong to the MESZ and once a year there is a general meeting in which representatives of all the 43 societies take part, with a society with more than 50 members theoretically having the right to send two representatives to the general meeting.\textsuperscript{198} In spite of the size of the Verband and the political agendas, the cultural management is still the MESZ’s main focus and one staff member is in charge specifically of the organization of cultural events. Since 2006 another staff member has been in charge of the so-called “Spielhaus-Programm” (= Játszóházprogram) for children. A position for another staff member in charge of dance groups became necessary since many Hungarian societies had their own Volkstanz group (= néptáncsoport).\textsuperscript{199} And still the MESZ came to the conclusion that its own workload, which is so diverse, should be reduced. Therefore, the adult education center “Baranyai Júlia Népfőiskola”,\textsuperscript{200} whose temporary director is Tünde Sipos-Zsivics, was founded in 2007. In 2006, the Apáczai foundation supported the project with 4 million forints,\textsuperscript{201} with which an old house at Beli Monastir could be bought and renovated. Thanks to the so-called “Geburtslandfonds” (=...
Szülőföld Alap\textsuperscript{202} of the Hungarian government, a permanent exhibition could be opened at the adult education center in October 2008 – the first to be initiated by the Hungarians in the independent Croatia. The two officially accredited educational programs offered at the adult education center are also funded by the Szülőföld Alap. These adult education programs each comprise between 120-280 hours and are even recognized as a vocational training in some areas. These programs were primarily created for the Hungarians in Croatia but they are also open to the Croatian majority population, and the goal of the adult education center is to offer bilingual courses. A total of about 100 students was enrolled in the year 2010, and the center tried to mostly offer courses that could be of advantage in the job market for the Hungarian \textit{Völkgruppe}.\textsuperscript{203} A certain advantage was the lack of competition in the region Baranya since the Croats have not yet founded such an adult education center there – therefore, the Croatian population is also happy that the adult education center was opened and the Croats’ appreciation, in turn, pleases the Hungarians.\textsuperscript{204} Tünde Sipos-Zsivics identifies three other fields of activity as major future tasks for the adult education center: i) to support talents with the help of scholarships, which supports two persons per year; ii) to maintain Hungarian houses (= Magyarházak) for the Hungarian community by buying them and using them to house collections or museums; iii) to create databases to help preserve cultural heritage, which can also be made accessible for researchers.\textsuperscript{205} Another aspect that is characteristic of the MESZ’s identity management and ethnomanagement is the preservation of the liveliness of the Hungarian language:

For example, I saw a wall hanging in a kitchen, embroidered with the text of the Hungarian hymn, which was full of mistakes but it nevertheless was in Hungarian. Therefore, you really cannot say that these people aren’t Hungarians. But, for example, they really don’t know what 15 March is and what it means. It is therefore the task of the MESZ to teach them and we have already organized Hungarian courses. (Trans. Hermanik/Szlezák)\textsuperscript{206}

It is exactly this poor language proficiency, which occurs in dispersed settlements, where the Hungarian minority is small in numbers, that the MESZ tries to tackle by offering corresponding courses because the relation between Hungarian and Croatian has in many places already inverted. The acculturation, too, has much advanced. What stands still strong is the commitment to one’s \textit{Völkgruppe}; to show this, the passage from the interview about the hymn in the kitchen was selected.

\textsuperscript{202} On Szülőföld Alap see e.g. http://www.szulofold.hu/id-262-megjelentek_szulofold_alap_2010_evi.html (22 December 2011).

\textsuperscript{203} Cf. interview transcript, Tünde Sipos-Zsivics, 28 June 2010.

\textsuperscript{204} Cf. ibid.

\textsuperscript{205} Cf. interview transcript, Tünde Sipos-Zsivics, 28 June 2010. Given all these plans, it could well be that the Baranyai Júlia Népfőiskola sooner or later will be re-named into a culture institute (= Művelődési Intézet).

\textsuperscript{206} Ibid. On the “language dispute” between HMDK and MESZ see the preceding section \textit{Umbrella Organizations}. 

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Among the Hungarian parties in Vojvodina, the *Vajdasági Magyar Szövetség*, VMSZ (= Savez Vojvođanskih Mađara, SVM/Hungarians’ alliance in Vojvodina) is the strongest and therefore the leading party. It is moreover the most important part of the *Magyar Koalició*, MK, which was mentioned above as an umbrella organization and which ran in the general elections of 2008 in Serbia. The VMSZ was founded in 1994 at Subotica/Szabadka in order to protect the rights and interests of the Hungarians in Vojvodina. The party’s foundation was preceded by a split of the VMDK, which back then was the only Hungarian party in Vojvodina. This split at the same time laid the foundation of the multi-party system of the Hungarian minority. In an interview conducted on 23 September 2005 at Subotica, József Kasza, the then chairman, said that it should not be called a split because the VMSZ is not the largest part of the Hungarians and is in touch with all other parties. Above all, the VMSZ represents a power that needs to be taken seriously in Serbia.207 Kasza names assimilation as one of the problems of the Hungarians in Serbia, but he identifies out-migration as the largest problem, for which he explicitly holds the Serbian governments after 2,000 responsible: “After Milošević, 50,000 were sent away.”208 Gyula László, who is a functionary at the competing party VMDP, however, held Kasza himself responsible for the out-migration of the Hungarians from Vojvodina: “More Hungarians left Subotica because of Kasza than because of Šešelj. Most emigrants sell everything and then cannot return.”209 This example also shows how harshly the agents in the Hungarians’ political ethnomanagement judged the respective political opponent in 2005 and there are not even attempts on the part of the Hungarian opposition to present the Hungarian minority as a unified group, with the otherwise universally praised shared Hungarian culture (= Magyarság), vis-à-vis the interviewers from Ljubljana210 and Graz.211 In March 2007, József Kasza resigned and István Pásztor was elected part chairman of the VMSZ and his son Bálint Pásztor is a delegate for the VMSZ in the Serbian parliament at Belgrad/Belgrad. One of the main goals of their minority politics is to obtain autonomy at various levels,212 reaching from concepts of regional autonomy in Vojvodina to a ‘metaform,’ which István Pásztor calls a “universal Hungarian nation.”213 In an interview, Bálint Pásztor says about the concept

208 Ibid. (Trans. Hermanik/Szlezák.)
210 At the time, the Slovenian researcher Samo Kristen form the *Institut für ethnische Fragen* (INV) was in Vojvodina together with the author in the framework of the aforementioned ASO-project.
211 Despite all the criticism voiced by the political opponent, the fact remained that József Kasza as the party chairman of the VMSZ had excellent connections both within Serbia and abroad, for instance in the framework of the EVP, as well as to the kin state Hungary. Cf. interview transcript, József Kasza, 23 September 2005.
212 On the MK’s concept of autonomy see also the section *Minority Protection in the Host States*.
of the regional autonomy in Vojvodina that would be easier to realize now since many Serbian parties disappeared again and therefore there are now a few votes available, especially in Vojvodina, that would allow the Hungarians to move to the political center. The VMSZ differs from the other Hungarian parties in Vojvodina – which will be described in more detail below – such as the VMDP or the VMDK because it aims at an inner-Serbian solution in this matter:

Ágoston [= chairman of the VMDP] or the VMDK constantly say that we should expect Budapest to come up with a solution, that our fate, that everything in Vojvodina will get better. There is no doubt that the government of the motherland can do a lot while observing the rules of diplomacy. Of course not by meddling in the local internal affair, which is harmful to the relation of the two states since this really does not help anyone. But they can indeed contribute so that the processes pick up speed, so that the Serbian government opens up to certain issues at all. But we must not forget that the laws that apply to us are passed in the parliament at Belgrad. (Trans. Hermanik/Szlezák

The VMSZ does put an effort into establishing a positive relation to the respective Hungarian government, for reasons of partypolitical calculation alone, since there are many loyal followers of Viktor Orbán among the Auslandsungarn. With respect to the inner-Serbian political relations in connection to the Hungarians, we need to consider whether there is a countrywide cooperation with a specific political party or whether it is restricted to Vojvodina and its Skupština Autonomne Pokrajine Vojvodine (= Parlament der autonomen Region Vojvodina), rebuilt since 2002. The Serbian party with which there is traditionally most cooperation is the Liga Socijaldemokrata Vojvodine, LSV (= Liga der Sozialdemokraten der Vojvodina/Vajdasági Szociáldemokrata Liga) under the party leadership of Nenad Čanak. The LSV celebrated its 21st anniversary in 2010 and Bálint Pásztor therefore calls it the “traditional ally from the beginnings.” He says about the relations that the VMSZ maintains with the minority representations in Croatia and Slovenia that he principally regards the Hungarians in Slovenia and in Serbia as “more viable” than in Croatia. The Hungarians in Croatia, even

“Pásztor István said the following: In order to develop a competitive national strategy, one has to resort to the Treaty of Trianon. It points out that the Hungarians in Vojvodina experienced their national affiliation as an integral part of the universal Hungarian nation even after the signing of the Treaty of Trianon. What needs to be achieved is that the communities of the Auslandsungarn gain such a recognition, that the majority population lets them govern their institutions according to the respective legal system – and this is autonomy – he underlines.” (Trans. Hermanik/Szlezák)


On the agendas of the parliament in the autonomous region Vojvodina, see:

As an example of such a difference, Bálint Pásztor references the relations to the conservative Demokratska Stranka Srbi-je, DSS (= Demokratičke Partei Srbiens) under the leadership of Vojislav Koštunica: Generally, Pásztor describes the relation between the DSS, which is very popular with the Serbian population in Vojvodina, and the VMSZ as “quite interesting,” which in my opinion does not necessarily mean ‘good’ or even ‘very good,’ especially since, according to Pásztor, the relation with the DSS party center at Belgrad deteriorated just after the VMSZ had started to also represent the interests of Vojvodina at Belgrad; those representatives of the DSS who are from Vojvodina did agree with the opinions of the VMSZ, but could not vote with the Hungarians due to the party discipline. Cf. interview transcript, Bálint Pásztor, 20 May 2010. See also http://dss.rs/ (16 August 2011).
though their numbers there are larger than in Slovenia, are caught in a kind of lethargy. It is a disadvantage for the Hungarians’ identity management and ethnomangement in Vojvodina that people outside of Vojvodina, even within Serbia itself, know only little about this region and therefore strange images of the Hungarians in Vojvodina exist, for example, that they immigrated there only after 1956. A Serbian journalist, who did a report on the work in the parliament at Belgrad, even asked Bálint Pásztor whether he was really born in Vojvodina seeing as he spoke Serbian so well—basically these misconceptions are mostly not malicious but originate from a lack of information about the history of the minorities in Vojvodina. Of course, there are newspapers in Serbia that sometimes print anti-Hungarians pieces, such as the Večernje Novosti, mostly because “they simply don’t know us.” This could only be changed if one was present “and it depends on our goals, which must not be directed against the Serbian state” (Trans. Hermanik/Szlezák).

András Ágoston, the chairman of the Vajdasági Magyar Demokrata Párt, VMDP (= Ungarische Demokratische Partei in der Vojvodina), perceives the political role of the Hungarian identity management and ethnomangement in the following terms:

It is our task [as minority politicians] to draw attention to the political situation in Vojvodina or in Transylvania, etc., to find out what ideas could the on people’s minds. (Trans. Hermanik/Szlezák)

The work done at a regional level shall serve a greater cause, i.e., the unification of the Hungarians in the Carpathian Basin, which above all the acting Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán is expected to achieve. It is surprising when even the chairman of a minority party seems to rely mostly on the identity management and ethnomangement from the outside, exercised by the kin state Hungary. If Viktor Orbán gained the support of Germany in this matter, he could manage. With regard to the situation in Serbia itself, András Ágoston supposes that the Magyar Nemzeti Tanács, mentioned in the context of the umbrella organizations, was bought by the Serbian state: “The Serbian state will say, here is the autonomy, what we did for you and you should be grateful.”

221 “There is also the ‘wonder of Lendva’ [it sounds a bit ironic in the interview, he is probably referring to the Bánffy Központ] and our cultural institute (= Vajdasági Művelődési Intézet) is connected with it.” (Trans. Hermanik/Szlezák) Ibid.

222 Cf. ibid.

223 See http://www.novosti.rs/ (16 August 2011).

224 Interview transcript, Bálint Pásztor, 20 May 2010.

225 Ibid.


227 Interview transcript, András Ágoston, 19 May 2010.

228 “He [Viktor Orbán] has to gather those who can still believe. There is just one possibility: The first step will be the dual citizenship. The next step should be the autonomy. But not like this: You should tell me what the autonomy should look like, but he will dictate what it should look like, like a king or an emperor. Much can be achieved with the tactics of support. If he makes all this happen, all Hungarians in the Carpathian Basin will back him up completely in 2 to 3 years.” (Trans. Hermanik/Szlezák) Ibid.

229 Cf. ibid.

230 Ibid. (Trans. Hermanik/Szlezák)
The party Magyar Remény Mozgalom, MRM (= Ungarische Hoffnung Bewegung)\(^{231}\) is a new political force of the Hungarians in Vojvodina, which was only founded in 2009 at Subotica/Szabadkajka. The MRM is mostly made up of younger people,\(^{232}\) who split from other parties. By now, they even have won a parliamentary seat in Vojvodina’s province parliament and are proud “to be a parliamentary party.”\(^{233}\) Although they feel closer to Hungary and to Budapest than to Serbia and to Belgrad, the party members wish to play an active part in Vojvodina’s parliament.\(^{234}\) It needs to be added that the MRM is the only political party of the Hungarians in Vojvodina that maintains political contacts with the Jobbik\(^{235}\) and the MRM is viewed rather skeptically due to this ideological orientation.\(^{236}\) Conflicts between Serbs and Hungarians are interpreted and denounced as ‘ethnic assaults’ and not simply as cases of bodily injuries.\(^{237}\)

Another political party of the Hungarians in Vojvodina is the Magyar Polgári Szövetség, MPSZ (= Ungarische Bürgerallianz), which can be classified ideologically as a subsidiary organization of the Hungarian government party FIDESZ. The MPSZ has its headquarters at Senta/Zenta and has emerged from a society that originated in 2004 through a split from the VMSZ. In 2007, this society was transformed into a party, its chairman, László Rácz Szabó, remained in office.\(^{238}\) The party explains its foundation with the desire to create a political balance in Vojvodina, and Senta is meant to play the role of a center of the Hungarian minority along the river Theiss/Tisza. How the MPSZ can see its own role as “balancing” is hard to comprehend since even the party’s website is to a large extent linked up with with national-minded organizations or media in Hungary.\(^{239}\)

The large number of societies of the Hungarian minority in Transylvanian/Erdély, as compared to research regions discussed above, made me choose a depiction in tabular form, rather than a descriptive approach, in order to give an overview of the various forms of the local identity manage-

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\(^{231}\) See http://www.mrm.rs/ (20 December 2011).

\(^{232}\) The general meeting of the MRM consists of ca. 150 members. See http://www.mrm.rs/felepites (02 January 2012).

\(^{233}\) Interview transcript, Gyula László, 21 May 2010. The interviewee Gyula László, for example, used to be a member of the VMDK.

\(^{234}\) Cf. ibid.

\(^{235}\) “MRM has good relations with Jobbik, therefore, it has a symbolic importance that the leadership of the party applied for Hungarian citizenship in Solfvadkert, which is the hometown of Jobbik member of parliament, István Szávay.” http://www.hungarianambiance.com/2011/04/leadership-of-mrm-magyar-remeny.html (02 January 2012).

\(^{236}\) “We are glad that the political circumstances in Hungary have changed in such a way that the parties of national sentiments, such as the Fidesz and the Jobbik were so successful. We hope that now a period of legislation and constitution framing will set in that considers all Hungarians in the Carpathian Basin as a unified nation.” (Trans. Hermanik/Szlezák). Interview transcript, Gyula László, 21 May 2010.

\(^{237}\) Gyula László said that the MRM was open to every form of cooperation in the interest of the Hungarians but no other party had signaled a similar interest. Cf. ibid.

\(^{238}\) Cf. ibid.

\(^{239}\) These links include links to the Hungarian-national TV stations Hun TV and Szent Korona Televízió or to the HirTV, which is considered the station of the Fidesz. More on Magyarok Szövetsége Egyesület or on the highly controversial Turanism, cf. ibid.
ment and ethnomangement. The tables are assigned to different thematic categories; an overview of the geographical distribution of the Hungarian societies is already included in the compilations.

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²⁴⁰ For reasons of space, only the Hungarian original names are listed in the tables and the Romanian place names are not included here.
²⁴¹ It should be added here that Hungarians have a generous notion of what regions are part of Transylvania/Erdély and I have added them in the tables.
²⁴² See http://magyarifjak.org/ (02 January 2012).
²⁴³ See http://hvim.hu/ (02 January 2012).
Number and distribution of Hungarian civil societies in the Transylvanian counties (selection): 245

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<td>Zselyk</td>
<td>Beszterce-Naszód</td>
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Distribution of the political societies of the Hungarians in the Transylvanian counties:246

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Society</th>
<th>Name of Community</th>
<th>County</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RMDSZ Csíki Területi Szervezete</td>
<td>Csíkszereda</td>
<td>Hargita</td>
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<tr>
<td>Udvarhelyszéki RMDSZ</td>
<td>Székelyudvarhely</td>
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<tr>
<td>Szentábrahámi Magyar Polgári Párt</td>
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<td>Tusnádfürdő</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ditrói RMDSZ</td>
<td>Gyergyóditró</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sepsiszentgyörgyi RMDSZ</td>
<td>Sepsiszentgyörgy</td>
<td>Kovászna</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Kézdivásárhely</td>
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<tr>
<td>Uzoni MPP</td>
<td>Uzon</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kolozs Megyei RMDSZ</td>
<td>Kolozsvár</td>
<td>Kolozs</td>
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<td>Közpolitika Központ</td>
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<td>MPP Kolozs, A Magyar Polgári Párt Kolozs megyében</td>
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<td>Belmonostori RMDSZ</td>
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<td>Hunyad</td>
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<tr>
<td>Szatmári RMDSZ</td>
<td>Szatmárnémeti</td>
<td>Szatmár</td>
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</table>

Societies for the preservation of culture and language in the Transylvanian counties:247

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Society</th>
<th>Name of Community</th>
<th>County</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Székely Pajzs Egyesület</td>
<td>Székelyudvarhely</td>
<td>Hargita</td>
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<tr>
<td>Székely Szellemi Egyesület</td>
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<td>-&quot;-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Udvarhelyszék Kulturális Egyesület</td>
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In the Hungarians’ identity management and ethnomanagement in Transylvania, the altogether 62 (sic) foundations of the Hungarians (= Romániai magyar alapítványok) also play a central role, next to the societies listed above. Of course, the political and cultural umbrella organizations also need to be added.

Summarizing the findings, we see that the Székely Land has the largest concentration of Hungarian societies. Societies for the cultivation of culture and language also clearly predominate in the cities in the Székely Land. By and large, these tables depict the Hungarian identity management and ethnomanagement jointly with those of the Szeklers. From a Hungarian point of view, this is how it is mostly handled; from the point of view of the Szeklers, this is perceived more differentiatedly, but they have so far not called for a strict separation from the Hungarians. At the same time, the Szeklers are extremely aware of tradition, and this, too, can explain such a high density of societies in the Székely Land. Among the political societies/parties, the presence of the RMDSZ, which maintains a

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248 On the individual names and areas of subsidy see [http://netkatalogus.adatbank.transindex.ro/?q=86](http://netkatalogus.adatbank.transindex.ro/?q=86) (24 February 2012).
wide network of societies in Transylvania, is clearly dominating; even the second-largest political grouping, MPP, lags far behind. This also explains why not only the RMDSZ representatives at the top are more visible, for example due to their work in the Romanian government as well as in the parliament at Bucharest, but also the representatives in the context. This broad organization, on the one hand, has hindered the emergence of a potential political competition and, on the other hand, it guarantees that the Hungarian *Völksgruppe* in Transylvania can keep relying on their “own” mayor or their own strong representation in the county.
Cultures of Memory

“Symbols are important,” the tall one adds. [...] “Do you have anything like that with you?” the brawny one asks. “Something that can be a sign?” I shake my head. “No, I don’t have anything. Just memories.” “Hmm...,” the brawny one says. “Memories, huh?” “That’s ok. Doesn’t matter,” the tall one says. “Memories can be a great symbol too. Course I don’t have any idea how well memories will stand up, how long they’ll last.” (From: Haruki Murakami, Kafka on the Shore)

Remembering Correctly

Activities in the framework of the cultures of memory are a central component in the identity management and ethnomanagement of both the Germans and the Hungarians: The framework is large as it comprises, in a superordinate sense, the entire collective memory of the two national groups.1 Aleida and Jan Assmann subsequently picked up the basic idea of the collective memory in its cultural studies facets and they coined the phrase “cultural memory.”2 Applied to our research object, this means that (regional) historical events that have to do with the German and Hungarian minorities in Southeast Europe are adopted into the collective memory of the minority. There is a large degree of mutual interpenetration between the construction of ethnicity in a collective sense and the reconstructivity of memory3; put in simple terms: The memory legitimizes the group’s collective identity – for example through the ethnic markers descent, origins or shared history – and the group constructs its own memory, which, in turn, legitimizes the group identity, [...] ad infinitum. This reflexivity is one of the main reasons why I dedicate a separate section to the cultures of memory in my investigations of identity management and ethnomanagement. The control of the parameters of what should be represented to what degree in the collective memory of the national or ethnic group, of what should be stored in which institutions and of what commemorative rituals are practiced lies largely with the identity management and ethnomanagement.

A central function of the relation to the past in the framework of collective memories is identity formation. What corresponds to the self-image and the interests of the group is remembered. The focus thereby lies mainly on similarities and continuities, which demonstrate that the group has remained the same. The partaking in the collective memory shows that the one who remembers belongs to the group.4

The following thought, a conclusion that derives from Maurice Halbwachs’s concept of collective memory, shall serve as a general backdrop for the following examples from the memorial cultures of the Germans and the Hungarians: Memories are a form of the past that is represented both with ele-

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3 “Reconstructivity takes into account the insight that all memory is related to the present: Cultural memory is a retrospective construct.” Astrid Erll. Kollektives Gedächtnis und Erinnerungskulturen. Stuttgart/Weimar: Metzler, 2005. 28.

4 Ibid., 17.
ments that are borrowed from the present and with already existing reconstructions.\(^5\) According to my own insights, there are two different simultaneous processes of how the German and the Hungarian minority locate their own past: On the one hand, it is the minority’s past as the minority itself remembers ‘its past’ since its settlement or its ‘becoming a minority’ for instance through the drawing of borders or the formation of new states in Southeast Europe; on the other hand, it is the past of the entire German or Hungarian nation, including all the individuals identifying with this nation, which equally enters in the minority’s collective memory. Astrid Erll classifies the so-called Traditionsbildung (formation of tradition) in the context of Maurice Halbwachs’s work as belonging in the realm “of the collectively constructed knowledge about distant pasts and its transmission”; she argues that Halbwachs with this already transcended “the field of exploration of the collectively shaped memory of lived history.”\(^6\) This aspect is quite central because the identity management and ethnomangement constantly invokes the concept of traditions and thus uses it often.

In Assmann’s model, there is an explanation as to why the concept of ‘cultural memory’ cannot simply be understood as another form of the concept ‘tradition’: Because tradition puts the focus only on the function of cultural memory, or also the Funktionsgedächtnis (functional memory) – and moreover because the Funktionsgedächtnis construct what is perceived as onw’s own, one’s own present, based on a specific section of the past. The Speichergedächtnis (storage memory), by contrast, which also includes the other sections, is thus located above tradition.\(^7\) Memories that are stored in the communicative memory are “understood as a part of the life experiences that social groups share.”\(^8\) For minority research, this means that the respective memories of the members of a Volksgruppe need to be studied more since especially those memories that are located in the ‘sozialer Nahhorizont’ produce ‘sozialen Sinn.’\(^9\) The aim in the following will be not only to demonstrate the constructedness of memories as well as traditions but the following examples shall also make clear in which ways memories are instrumentalized through deliberate ethnopolitical measure of control. Based on the insights gained in the theoretical part, not least, it can well be presupposed here that history and memories are primarily referenced to legitimize identity politics and ethnomangement, especially is the objective is to draw clearer boundaries between national and ethnic groups. The identity management and ethnomangement lead the way and try to prescribe how their group’s past should be remembered “as correctly as possible,” i.e., according to the notions of the ethnomangement. In the process, the

\(^5\) Cf. Halbwachs, Das kollekte Gedächtnis, 55-56.

How essential the effects of the past onto the present are can, for example, be deduced from the following quotation: “Zweifellos ist es schwierig, die Gegenwart zu verändern, aber ist es nicht in gewisser Hinsicht viel schwieriger, das Bild der Vergangenheit zu verändern, das doch ebenfalls – zumindest virtuell – in der Gegenwart existiert, das die Gesellschaft in ihrem Denken immer die Bezugsrahmen ihres Gedächtnisses trägt? Schließlich ist doch die Gegenwart, wenn man den von ihr eingenommenen Teil des kollektiven Denkens betrachtet, wenig in bezug auf die Vergangenheit. Die alten Vorstellungen drängen sich uns mit der ganzen ihnen aus den ehemaligen Gesellschaftszuständen, in denen sie entstanden sind, zuführenden Kraft auf. Sie sind umso stärker, je älter sie sind und je mehr Menschen und umfassendere Gruppen sie ange- nommen hatten.” Halbwachs, Das Gedächtnis und seine sozialen Bedingungen, 383.

\(^6\) Cf. Erll, Kollektives Gedächtnis und Erinnerungskulturen, 17.

\(^7\) Cf. ibid, 33.

\(^8\) Ibid., 118.

\(^9\) Cf. ibid.
strategies that are common in the context of memorial cultures are employed: They range from autobiographical memorial literature or the visual documentation to memorials placed in the public space, memorial plaques or simply street names to festivities, whose ‘event character’ references a specific event from the past that is closely connected to one’s Volksgruppe and therefore provides a platform for identification. I selected the following examples based on my observations of how memories ‘become condensed’ into a mémoire collective: Among the Germans in Southeast Europe, the commemoration of resettlement or expulsion during or after World War II can be observed not only in all the research regions, it is also already a part of the collective memory. Among the Hungarians, it is mostly the holidays in commemoration of the Holy King Stephen (= Szent István) and the conclusion of the land-taking (= honfoglalás) as well as of Christianization and furthermore the celebrations of the revolutions (= forradalom) of 1848 and of 1956.

**The Germans’ Cultures of Memory**

“Die Erinnerung ist das einzige Paradies, aus welchem wir nicht getrieben werden können” (Jean Paul; Memory is the only paradise from which we cannot be expelled). With this motto, the Transylvanian-Saxon author Eginald Schlattner, in an interview for the Austrian radio (Ö1), described in a nutshell the *Cultures of Memory of the Transylvanian Saxons* after their exodus, described in a nutshell the *Cultures of Memory of the Transylvanian Saxons* after their exodus. I have picked up this motto because it has by now become an immanent part of the Transylvanian-Saxon identity management and ethnomanagement to escape to the paradise of memory. Memories of the incomparably more powerful past are invoked in the German-speaking cities and villages in Transylvania to underpin the contemporary Volksgruppen politics.

The diverse facets of the Transylvanian-Saxon memorial culture became apparent, for example, during the *Sächsische Kulturwoche* that took place in the Capital of Culture year 2007 from 01 to 08 August since the occasion opened up special possibilities for the Saxons and their self-presentation at the then European Capital of Culture Sibiu/Hermannstadt: Besides folkloristic events (Transylvanian brass band Augsburg, dance group of the youth forum Hermannstadt, dance group Ingolstadt, youth dance group München) and a concert of the *Burzenländer Blaskapelle*, some architectural topics were at the center of the program. There were three thematic city tours through Hermannstadt (city development, Gothic architecture and restauration of the old city center) and an exhibition on Transylvanian fortified churches and country churches. Furthermore, there was a reading and a film screening on

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10 Marie-Janine Calic generally perceives a preponderance of this topic in the research on the Germans in Southeast Europe: “Nevertheless, here specifically [in the research on the Germans in Southeast Europe], the abundance of monographs – mostly inspired by Heimatforschern – is blatantly disproportionate to the still relatively modest share of empirically verified, scientific insights. The problem was all too readily reduced to the event of ‘escape and expulsion’ – a perspective that was all too often shaped by ideological predispositions.” Calic, “Zur Sozialgeschichte ethnischer Gruppen: Fragestellungen und Methoden,” 11.


12 Schlattner’s hint as well as single examples of the memorial culture of the Transylvanian Saxons and the Hungarians in Transylvanian were already published in my article: “Ethnopolitics of the Hungarians, Szeklers and Saxons in Transylvania.” *Historical Yearbook VI* (2009), 161-174.
Eginald Schlattner’s “Der geköpfte Hahn” and a reading by Hans Bergel as well as two Transylvanian-Saxon dialect events (“Siebenbürgisch-Sächsisch, wie es singt und klingt” and the play “Meng Vueter”). The Sächsische Kulturwoche basically takes place every year and links the identity management and ethnomangement from the inside, which is represented by the Landesforum, with those from the outside, which are above all shaped by the Landsmannschaft of the Transylvanian Saxons in Germany. Exclusively retrospective or ‘tradition-fostering’ cultural events – and even the tour, which revolved around the restauration of Hermannstadt’s old city center, can be included here – dominated the 2007 program, which paradigmatically reflect the ideas of the Transylvanian-Saxon identity management and ethnomangement.

An exception was the ceremonial addresses during the one-hour-long opening at the Thalia hall, which euphorically stressed the fact that Hermannstadt was the European Capital of Culture and the connections with the Saxons who have emigrated to Germany. The active involvement of the Protestant church should also be mentioned specifically, which showed in two church concerts and a festive service in the city parish church. The Protestant bishop Christoph Klein, in his ceremonial address of 01 August 2007, spoke among other things about the close connection between the Saxons and the Protestant church:

In the sense of a ‘churchly culture and a cultural churchliness,’ both are to a large extent congruent. Both with regard to this characteristic and in the border-crossing cooperation, the Transylvanian Saxons still evidenced ‘unity in diversity.’

The Protestant church still aims at preserving its status in the Volksbrauchtum of the Transylvanian Saxons:

The contribution by Walter Seidner, the pastor of Stolzenburg, excelled in its artistry. His reading of his own works began with ingenious anecdotes, which make the most of the predilection of the Saxon dialect for curious phrases, and ended with his own, moving translation of one of David’s psalms into Saxon. I would like to reiterate here his call to all those who “want to abjure the Saxon” instead of rendering service to its cultivation.

The Transylvanian Saxons’ difficulties to maintain their Low German idiom are evident. Saxon retreats more and more to the background in the public, is mostly used inside the homes or among Saxon neighbors. Yet, this does not mean that the language minority therefore disperses. Instead, I could observe a shift of the ethnic markers – similar to the situation among the young Germans in Hungary: Origins and descent took the place of the Saxon dialects at the top and the proficiency Saxon is not necessary to identify as Transylvanian Saxon. In Germany, this process is even accelerated because the younger generations of the emigrated Saxons hardly learn any Saxon any more, but their identity construction is also shaped by their Transylvanian origins even though this has mostly to do with ro-

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15 Ibid.
manticized ideas, which are not least fueled by memorial cultures. This parenthesis on the topic of language and dialect – which will be picked up again below in the context of the German minority literature – shall demonstrate that Saxon itself has become an essential part of the memorial cultures and of the collective memory of the Transylvanian Saxons, in the sense that: Like in the old days, when the Transylvanian Saxons talked to each other exclusively in this dialect, and when it counted, next to the origins and history including the Natio Saxonica, the Protestant religion and the costumes, among the defining ethnic markers of the Saxons and distinguished them from the other Germans in Romania, such as the Satu Mare Swabians and Banat Swabians or the Dobrujan Germans.

The annual Sachsentreffen is the most important cultural events of the Transylvanian Saxons and is orgnized by the Demokratisches Forum der Deutschen in Siebenbürgen, DFDS, short ‘Siebenbürgenforum.’ It normally takes place in September at Biertan/Birthälm/Berethalom and can be shifted to other Transylvanian communities on special occasions, such as anniversaries. This happened in the case of the 17th Sachsentreffen in 2007, the Cultural Capital year, at Hermannstadt, as well as in the case of the 20th Sachsentreffen in 2010 at Bistrița/Bistritz and of the 21st Sachsentreffen at Brașov/Kronstadt in 2011, on the occasion of the celebration of the double anniversary, 800 years Burzenland as well as 775 years Kronstadt, respectively. Every Sachsentreffen has a specific motto: At the 15th Sachsentreffen at Birthälm in 2005, it was “Über Grenzen, einig …” (“Across borders, unified …”); at the 16th Sachsentreffen at Birthälm in 2006, “Wir in Europa” (“We in Europe”); at the 17th Sachsentreffen at Hermannstadt in 2007 “Erbe und Zukunft!” (“Heritage and Future!”); at the 18th Sachsentreffen at Birthälm in 2008, “Lebendige Gemeinschaft” (“Lively Community”); at the 19th Sachsentreffen at Birthälm in 2009, “Selbstbewusstsein im Wandel” (“Changing Self-Confidence”) and at the 20th Sachsentreffen at Bistritz in 2010 “Bildung ist Zukunft” (“Education is Future”). The Sachsentreffen serve above all the purpose of self-motivation in order to overcome the trauma of out-migration, and despite the minority’s demographic inconspicuousness they are a symbol of the viability of the Transylvanian-Saxon community. What follows are two examples from sermons, on the occasion of the 15th and the 18th Sachsentreffen:

15 years ago, the small group would still have feared the loss of its identity in a large organization. “The fear has gone, we have a new self-confidence and we believe in ourselves. We have to be grateful because we have been caught as we were falling,” Hans Klein underlines. Bishop D. Dr. Christoph Klein said with respect to the motto of the Treffen: “The picture of the merrily celebrating people shows us that we are a lively community.” Against all odds, the Saxon community is not dead but full of life and fulfilled, “since without fulfillment there is no living community.”

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16 I attended the Heimattag der Siebenbürger Sachsen, which takes place annually at Dinkelsbühl, in May 2010 and talked to some young Saxons about such topics there.
The Verband der Siebenbürger Sachsen in Deutschland grows more and more important in these events since the identity management and ethnomanagement from the outside becomes more intense under the positively connoted attribute of the ‘togetherness.’ The overall production of the Sachsentreffen, which is permeated by parades of folk costumes, brass bands and dialect events, is meant to boost the group identity based on the collective memory of a formerly significant role in Transylvania. And the memorial cultures seem to be most effective in reducing the gap between the Saxons who have remained in Transylvania and the Saxons who have emigrated to Germany or Austria – at least for the duration of the event. Both the Saxon Kulturwoche and the Sachsentreffen show how much the Transylvanian-Saxon identity management and ethnomanagement relies on the staging of 800-year-long past in order to unite the Saxons who have remained in Transylvania with the Saxons who have emigrated under the label of “one single” ethnic group, and the culture of memory plays a most prominent part in this.

The cultures of memory of the Germans in Hungary are often dominated by the traumatic events of the expulsions of the Germans from Hungary. The identity management and ethnomanagement from the outside still fosters this today since it is the declared goal of the Landsmannschaft der Deutschen aus Ungarn in Germany to keep these topics alive. The then federal chairman of the Landsmannschaft, Klaus J. Loderer, however, laments that the interest decreases among the younger generations. The Landsmannschaft does not shy away from stereotyping the Germans in Hungary when the remembrance of the history of their expulsion and their subsequent time in Germany are at stake; an example of this is a quotation from a speech that Klaus J. Loderer delivered at a memorial conference on the expulsion of the Germans from Hungary in the Hungarian parliament at Budapest on 16 November 2007:

Despite the honest efforts to house and provide for them, there were also some irritations. These included the dialect, which complicated the communication in Germany. For the children required to attend school the beginning was hard because they had not been allowed to learn Standard German in Hungary. The adults had to put up with many insults: they were called “Hungarian gypsies.” With their wide black skirts and headscarves, the elderly women were particularly conspicuous. And yet the Germans in Hungary proved to be astonishingly adaptable. They quickly tried to get hold of a small piece of land in order to grow corn, peppers and potatoes and become self-sufficient. They helped to clean up and rebuild the destroyed cities. No work was too hard for them in order to earn a few marks.

That some streets influenced by the Germans in Hungary were mocked by the locals as “Paprikasiedlung” (paprika quarter) reveals what was grown in the gardens. Yet, such prejudices have

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20 “Klaus J. Loderer’s talk addresses the expellees and their identity, drawing on literary texts published in the Hungarian-German newspaper ‘Unsere Post,’ which appears in Germany. He comes to the bitter conclusion that the identity of the grand-parents, which was shaped strongly by the expulsion, no longer provides a basis for the identity of the adolescents.” Dezső Szabó. “Über die Chancen der umgarndeutschen Literatur.” Neue Zeitung, 22 April 2005. See: http://www.neue-zeitung.hu/54-7084.php (17 May 2011).
long since been forgotten since paprika is by now an integral part of the Germann cuisine. Just like the Germans in Hungary have long since been integrated into the population and have become recognized citizens. The limitless industry of the Germans in Hungary and their frugality have certainly contributed to this recognition.21

The Landesselbstverwaltung der Ungarndeutschen stirs the remembrance of the expulsion of the Germans in Hungary particularly on the occasion of milestone anniversaries, as for instance in 2005: 60 years ago, the abduction of several tens of thousands of men and woman into the Soviet labor camps began. Only because they were Germans they had to leave behind their families, their parents and children and, crammed in cattle trucks, had to go on a long journey towards an uncertain fate. Many among them never saw their Heimat again. […] There were not many back who believed that there would still be Germans living in Hungary in the 21st century. But after years marked by abduction, expulsion, disenfranchisement and intimidation, we have lifted our head again.22

The collective memory of the Germans in Hungary revolves around the pain jointly endured as well as the aspect of jointly enduring that pain. Especially in an era when the significance of the ethnic marker language increasingly fades among the Germans in Hungary, powerful historical topics are needed that can symbolize gemeinschaft. Especially in 2006, 60 years after the expulsions, this topic again took center stage in the context of the Hungarian-German cultures of memory. At the Landesgala der ungardeutschen Selbstverwaltungen – the annual Landesgala has by now evolved into a traditional event – which took place at the congress center at Budapest on 14 January 2006, the chairman of the LdU, Otto Heinek, linked up the commemoration and the current minority politics in Hungary:

It was not a “translocation” or “resettlement” that began in 1946 but an expulsion, Otto Heinek said, and this was a crime, plain and simple. There was no sentiment of vengefulness, those clear words at the same time were supposed to conjure up the condemnation of any collective guilt. Otto Heinek said explicitly that the Germans in Hungary in 2006 still had to live under political regulations that they did not opt for.23

The commemoration of the expulsions of the Germans in Hungary thus also becomes a political instrument of the identity management and ethnomangement, in this case in order to better legitimize the political goals of the LdU. On 18 June 2006, the Landesdenkmal zur Vertreibung der Ungarndeutschen was uncovered at Budaörsch/Wudersch. At this commemorative ceremony, both the then Hungarian President László Sólyom and the then speaker of the Hungarian parliament, Katalin Szili advocated among other things that the historical facts of the expulsion of 200,000 Germans in Hungary be explored.24 By now, memorials have been erected or memorial plaques have been attached to

24 What followed were the speeches by the ambassadress of the Federal Republic of Germany, Ursula Seiler-Albring, who called the Germans in Hungary a bridge between the two nations, by the mayor of Wudersch, Tamás Wittinghoff, who called to mind the events of 19 January 1946, then by the chairman of the Deutsche Selbstverwaltung der Stadt Wudersch, Imre Ritter, and furthermore by Jenő Kaltenbach, the Beauftragter des Parlaments für die Rechte der nationalen und ethnischen Minderheiten; the speeches by the federal chairman of the Landsmannschaft der Deutschen aus Ungarn, Dr. Friedrich A. Zimmermann and by Otto Heinek, the chairmen of the Landesselbstverwaltung der Ungarndeutschen, followed before the memorial was consecrated by cardinal Péter Erdő, archbishop of Gran-Budapest, primate of Hungary. See http://www.neue-zeitung.hu/54-8251.php (17 May 2011).
buildings in several Hungarian villages and cities, from which the Hungarian-German population was expelled after World War II, both of which are powerful symbols of the Hungarian-German memorial culture in the public space. This topic thus – with all the tragic of the individual human fates linked to it – continues to serve the calibration of the mémoire collective of the Germans in Hungary, which is otherwise not easy given the very heterogenous history due to different regions of origin and periods of immigration, in comparion to that of the Transylvanian Saxons.

Among the Germans in Vojvodina, the expulsions of the German Volksgruppe, which took place in the immediate aftermath of World War II, are also at the center of the commemoration. After the end of communism, memorials were erected at the sites of former camps, mass graves or executions. In the following, I will present an exemplary selection of these sites of memory. Between 1945 and 1948, the formerly Danube-Swabian village Gakovo/Gakowa, which prior to World War II had had about 2,500 inhabitants, was turned into a labor camp for Germans gathered there from some 120 Serbian villages. A total of ca. 30,000 Germans lived in the two adjacent camps Gakovo and Kruševlje/Kruschiwl, of whom 12,000 did not survive this period. At Gakovo, which is today part of the community Sombor, a metal cross of some 6 meters height, whose colors black and white symbolize death and resurrection, was dedicated on 22 May 2004. On 01 October 2005, a memorial was dedicated at Kruševlje as well. The stone cross, which is framed by two inscription plates, is placed on the former cemetery of the community. The erection of these memorials was preceded by a great interest of the Germans’ identity management and ethnomanagement. The Weltdachverband der Donauschwaben, the Bundeslandsmanncschaften der Donauschwaben in Österreich und Deutschland as well as the Deutsche Volksverband in Subotica, which were substantially supported in their activities by donations from around the globe, were the primary organizers. This reveals the strong cohesion between the identity management and ethnomanagement from the outside and from the inside since even before, from 10 to 12 May 2002, a conference of the Weltdachverband der Donauschwaben was

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25 The Hungarian-German authors have also addressed this symbolism of victimhood in various literary genres and were correspondingly supported in this endeavor by the identity management and ethnomanagement of the Germans in Hungary. See esp. also the section Minority Literature, Fine Arts and Performing Arts.


27 I have already published an article on this topic, from which the following text passages were partly taken and extended. See: “The German and Hungarian Identity Management and Nation Building: Examples from the Western Balkans.” Razprave in Gradivo – Treatises and Documents 55 (2008): 118-133.


29 See: http://der-donauschwabe-mitteilungen.de/Website/pdf/Gedenkstaetten.pdf (19 May 2011). It is inscribed as follows in German, Serbian, Croatian, Hungarian and English: “Here rest our Danube-Swabian fellow citizens. They will be in our hearts forever. Through the erection of this cross, we remember them in dignity and reverence. The Danube Swabians are descendants of the colonists who were settled in the Pannonian Basin by Hapsburgers in the 18th century. The camp at Gakovo existed from March 1945 until January 1948. The Danube Swabians, Gakovo 2004.”

30 The equally multilingual inscription reads as follows: “Here rest our Danube-Swabian fellow citizens. They will be in our hearts forever. Through the erection of this cross, we remember them in dignity and reverence. The village of Kruševlje was a camp for civilian prisoners from March 1945 to December 1947. The Danube Swabians. Kruševlje 2005.”
held at Subotica, at which the foundation of this intensive cooperation was laid.\textsuperscript{31} The dedication of this memorial cross, for example, resonated widely across the media among the \textit{Landsmannschaften} in Austria.\textsuperscript{32}

The erection of the two memorials at Knićanin/Rudolfsgnad developed similarly; a camp for ethnic German civilians, who had been categorized as unfit for labor, the majority of whom were children and old people, had been established there between 1945 and 1948.\textsuperscript{33} Up to 20,000 persons at a time were forcefully interned there and a total of 11,000 prisoners did not survive their time at the camp Knićanin. Their mortal remains are buried in the cemetery at Knićanin (3,000 victims) as well as in mass graves on the hill south of the village, the so-called Telečka.\textsuperscript{34} As early as 1953, the HOG Rudolfsgnad was founded in Baden-Württemberg, which began to trace the fate of the 900 families that had lived in this town prior to the establishment of the camp.\textsuperscript{35} On 07 November 1997, the first memorial event took place at Knićanin and in the following year memorial plaques in German and Serbian were placed in the cemetery at Knićanin as well as on the plateau of Telečka.\textsuperscript{36} On 11 November 2001, a memorial cross was erected on the Telečka, which is flanked by two stone tablets onto which the numbers of the victims are engraved. At Knićanin, the cemetery chapel was renovated in memory of the victims. In Serbia itself, there is the Gesellschaft für serbisch-deutsche Zusammenarbeit/Društvo za srpsko-nemačku saradnju, founded in 1991 already, which also promotes the erection and maintenance of the memorial of the Germans.\textsuperscript{37} It should, however, not be counted among the identity management and ethnomanagement from the inside since it is mostly composed of Serbian members who came together in this society via German studies or economic relations with Germany, for example. The erection of the first memorial tablets at Knićanin and on the Telečka in 1998 to a large extent happened at the urging of this society in any case.\textsuperscript{38}

\textsuperscript{31} Cf. interview transcript, Rudolf Weiss, 23 September 2005.
\textsuperscript{32} See e.g.: \url{http://ooe.donauschwaben.net/download/Mitteilungen%202004-02.pdf} (19 May 2011);
\url{http://www.vloe.at/presse/berichte/2004/aus2004003.htm} (19 May 2011);
\url{http://www.vloe.at/presse/berichte/2004/aus2004001.htm} (19 May 2011);
\url{http://www.vloe.at/presse/berichte/2004/aus2004007.htm} (19 May 2011);
\textsuperscript{34} See \url{http://www.rudolfsgnad-banat.de/das-lager/massengrab-und-gedenkstaette} (01 June 2011).
\textsuperscript{35} See \url{http://www.rudolfsgnad.de/} (01 June 2011).
\textsuperscript{36} See \url{http://www.bund-der-vertriebenen.de/pdf-mahnmal/ausland.pdf} (01 June 2011). The memorial tablet at Knićanin reads in German: “Here rest in consecrated earth thousands of our fellow German countrymen, who perished due to violence, hunger, sickness and cold in the camp Rudolfsgnad from 1946 - 1948. May they rest in peace.”
\textsuperscript{37} See \url{http://www.drustvosns.org/drustvo/tekst/krzprofil.html} (01 June 2011).
\textsuperscript{38} Since 2005, the society has initiated an annual ecumenical commemorative event on Europe Day, which is celebrated jointly by the Serbian Orthodox, Protestant and Catholic churches. It commemorates the German victims of the camp at Knićanin and at Kragujevac the Serbian children who were shot there by the German \textit{Wehrmacht} on 21 October 1941. Cf. Hermanik, “The German and Hungarian Identity Management and Nation Building: Examples from the Western Balkans,” 127.
At the urging of the *Deutscher Verein der Gemeinde Hodschag/Udruženje nemaca opštine Odžaci*, mentioned above, a memorial plate was installed at the inside wall of the Catholic chapel at Odžaci in 2004, which is meant to commemorate those 995 inhabitants of Odžaci who were either murdered on 23 November 1944 or perished in the Serbian camps.\(^{39}\) This example was selected because it shows how the memorial culture, in this case the remembrance of the expulsion, represents the focal point for the emigrated, former inhabitants of Hodschag.

Another organization that is central for the memorial cultures of the Germans in Vojvodina is the *Arbeitsgemeinschaft Dialog* (ARDI), founded in October 1998, which was initiated by the Vienna architect Helmut Frisch, who himself had fled from Banat as a 14-year-old in 1944, and the Serbian Germanisten Zoran Žiletić.\(^{40}\) The ARDI’s five-year report explicitly mentions that the individual interest groups of the Germans’ identity management and ethnomanagement were not always on the same page:

> After the first 3 ARDI years, the memorials at Rudolfsgnad, possibly the most symbolic and thus the most important site of the Danube-Swabians’ martyrdom in Vojvodina, were eventually decided upon by the locals themselves after all. This was probably a consequence of the shielding on the part of the former and current people from/at Rudolfsgnad, who were born there, against all concepts for a memorial proposed from outside of their *Heimatverein*, which was founded in early 2002. They could afford to shield off proposals because the *Gesellschaft für serbisch-deutsche Zusammenarbeit* had obtained consent to erect votive tablets by the mass graves at Rudolfsgnad three years earlier at Grossbetschkerek and subsequently at Rudolfsgnad. One of the most negative consequences of this shielding-off may well be the fragmentation, brought about by their taking an independent line, of the centrally conceived donation campaign for the benefit of all Danube-Swabian memorials.\(^{41}\)

These divergent opinions show how a struggle for the leadership evolves parallel to the struggle for the *correct memory*, mentioned above – and in the process also a struffle for the right to call other viewpoints of memory *incorrect*. Another pertinent example relates to the *Deutscher Volksverband* at Subotica and the “work group Commemorative Plaques wantonly blasted by it in March 2002.”\(^{42}\) In this case, we can observe a deviation of the identity management and ethnomanagement from the inside in the ARDI, represented by the *Deutscher Volksverband*, since the responsibility in the matter of commemorative plaques was shifted to the Danube-Swabian *Bundesverband* at Sindelfingen, an umbrella

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Stephan Müller/Stevan Miler, the deputy chairman of the *Deutscher Verein*, states that only about 200 of the original 5,200 Germans live there today: “The board and the members of the society meet regularly. Many of the roughly 140 members are active and take care of the cemetery, the cemetery chapel and the memorials. The cooperation with the *Landsmännern* in Germany and Austria needs to be pointed out in particular. Thanks to many committed people, the memorial cross was dedicated on 29 September 2006 – a honorific memorial meant to warn against war, expulsion and genocide. It is at the same time a sign of understanding and reconciliation. Since February 2007, Dr Marija Šargač has been the chairlady of the society, Stephan Müller its deputy chairman and Biljana Mijić its secretary.” In: [http://www.donaudreieck.org/ustanove_prikaz.php?lng=ge&kid_usr=23&fl=0](http://www.donaudreieck.org/ustanove_prikaz.php?lng=ge&kid_usr=23&fl=0) (01 June 2011).


\(^{41}\) Ibid., 3-4.

\(^{42}\) Ibid., 4.
organization, and thus outsourced. Alle other contacts with the local political authorities in Serbia were dealt with separately from this moment onwards.43

The local Serbian authorities ignored the motions for the erection of a memorial made by the branch office44 at Vršac/Werschetz since 2003, until in 2007 the discussion was made public through a signature campaign. In 2010, this discussion took on dynamics of its own since the countrywide Serbian newspaper Danas (= Today) published statements by people from Vršac; so was the statement by Dragica Stanojilović:

Kod nas, u Vršcu su 2003. godine Udruženje srpsko-nemačko-austrijsko prijateljstva i Udruženje ARDI/Inicijativni krug za podunavskošvapsko-srpske razgovore/iz Zapadne Evrope, pokrenuli inicijativu da se obeleži mesto na kome se nalaze masovne grobnice u kojima počivaju streljani vršački Nemci, Srbi i pripadnici drugih naroda.45

Here at in Werschetz, the Gesellschaft für serbisch-deutsch-österreichische Freundschaft and the ARDI/Initiativkreis für den donauschwäbisch-serbischen Dialog/aus Westeuropa, have launched an initiative since there are mass graves at the site of the square, in which lie Germans, Serbs and victims from other nations from Werschertz who were shot to death. (Trans. Hermannik/Szlezák)

Around the same time on 08 April 2010, a roundtable took place at Vršac, which had been organized by the Verband jüdischer Gemeinden Serbiens (= Savez jevrejskih opština Srbije) and during which a common memorial for all victims of Vršac was discussed.46 This discussion serves as an example of how memory becomes a part of ethnic politics. Given the controversial topic, the work of the local identity management and ethnomanagement triggered a debate throughout Serbia, and due to the ARDI a German-Serbian debate. If we apply Assmann’s terminology to this interpretation of history, we detect a bridge building from the Funktionsgedächtnis to the Speichergedächtnis because the agents try to do justice to the memory of all the victims of Vršac. This includes next to the German victims of the post-war era also mostly Serbs, Roma and Jews, who were deported during the German occupation.47 This example from Vršac shows the dynamics of memorial cultures, for instance through a supra-regional media debate; at the same time they claim a “correct remembrance” vis-à-vis several ethnic groups, which makes possible a reconciliatory form of memory.

In Slavonia, the Germans’ culture of memory is equally dominated by the topic of expulsion. The Volksdeutsche Gemeinschaft, VDG, has proclaimed 11 May of every year the so-called “Day of

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43 Cf. ibid.
44 Concretely a branch of the “Udruženja srpsko-nemačko-austrijsko prijateljstva iz Vršca” (= Gesellschaft für serbisch-deutsch-österreichische Freundschaft aus Werschetz) as well as the ARDI.
Expulsion” because the internment of Slavonia’s German population had begun on 11 May 1945.48 At Krndija/Kerndia and at Valpovo/Walpach, two internment camps were set up for Slavonia’s German population in which more than 2,600 Germans perished.49 After the Germans were recognized as a minority in 1997, a memorial could be erected at Krndija under the aegis of the VDG in 1999. Five years later, on 04 October 2003, the memorial at Valpovo was dedicated.50 The then president of the VDG, Nikolaus Mak, underlined the significance that these two memorials have for the German minority in Slavonia in a greeting to the parliament at Berlin, which he delivered in the framework of the commemorative event “60-Jahre AVNOJ-Beschlüsse und ihre Folgen” on 24 November 2004:

The Volksdeutsche Gemeinschaft organized the erection of two large memorials for our innocent victims of the camps at Krndija and Valpovo, takes care of their maintenance as well as of the establishment and cleaning of the camp cemeteries. It is important to stress that the Weltdachverband secured the lion’s share of the funds for the creation and erection of the memorials via the Bundesverbände in Germany and Austria. The unveiling of the two memorials was very important, also for the Croatian government and public, who participated in the commemorations with utmost piety and sympathy and condemned the genocide committed against our minority without reservation.51

On 14 May 2005, on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the construction of the camp, extensive festivities took place at Valpovo, which members of the VDG, regional Croatian politicians from Osijek and Valpovo, official representatives of the Croatian parliament (= Sabor) as well as an envoy from the German embassy in Croatia attended.52 When one looks at these developments, the suffering and the expulsion uncontestedly rank first among the topics around which the efforts of the German identity management and ethnomanagement to generate a mémoire collective of the Germans in Slavonia revolve. This topic is also fostered most from the outside, for example by the Donauschwäbische Arbeitsgemeinschaft (DAG), the Weltdachverband der Donauschwaben or the Bund der Vertriebenen (BdV), located in Germany.53 This public historical overemphasis on the years 1945-1946 stands in stark contrast to the yearbooks published by the VDG at Osijek; they present a quite multifaceted view on the history of the Germans and Altösterreicher: for example, they publish articles about the biographies of diverse ethnic German individuals who shaped the shared life in the multiethnically

48 See also Hermanik, “The German and Hungarian Identity Management and Nation Building: Examples from the Western Balkans,” 128.
50 The Verband der volksdeutschen Landsmannschaften Österreichs (VLO) has made a youtube video available online. See: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2rLavV54WFU (03.06.2011). See further the written report on the dedication ceremony by the VLO: http://www.vloe.at/presse/berichte/2003/2003004_2.htm (06 June 2011).
53 On the DAG and on the Weltdachverband der Donauschwaben as well as on the BdV see chapter 2.1 the section Organizations in the Kin States (Selection).
settled Slavonia since the 18th century, as well as excerpts from the historical bilingual press or historical events of (supra)regional significance. The vast majority is concerned with cultural and historical similarities between Germans/Austrians and Croats. As the yearbook (= Godišnjak) is written in Croatian, the identity management and ethnomanagement from the outside keeps a comparatively modest low profile. The yearbook is primarily the joint work of the VDG at Osijek and the Croatian historians about a region that was and is multiethnically settled. The role that the VDG generally assumes is not always easy since it has to accommodate both the German identity management and ethnomanagement from the outside and the Croatian claims and has to show loyalty towards both without risking being reproached of being Janus-faced.

Among the Germans in Slovenia, the struggle surrounding memory is shaped by regionally different histories and thus more complex: In Štajerska (= Lower Styria), for instance, the memory of the internment, murder and expulsion of members of the German minority plays the main role in the German memorial cultures. In turn, the memories of the Gottscheers living in Dolenjska (= Lower Carniola), who were already resettled into Brežični trikotnik/Ranner Dreieck by the Berlin Reichsmittelestelle in the winter of 1941/42, from where 37,000 Slovenes had been deported before, are much more difficult, although the Gottscheers were equally expelled from Yugoslavia after the end of the war. In the case of the Gottscheers, two historical narratives overlapped: on the one hand, the memory of the leaving of their actual homeland Gottschee, for which they opted more or less voluntarily; on the other hand, the memory of the escape from partisan units in 1945, of internments and the expulsion from Yugoslavia.

In the following, two memorials of the expulsion of the Germans from the Štajerska, which also are highly symbolic for the German identity management and ethnomanagement, will be referenced as examples: Firstly, that memorial that was erected at the site of the camps Strnišče/Sterntal – this town was renamed Kidričevo after 1945 –, and secondly, the commemorative plaque at Apače/Abstall, which recalls the deportations of the local German population in the spring of 1946. At Strnišče, the Nazi German occupiers had established camp barracks during the war already, which the Yugoslavian secret service OZNA then used as a detention camp and a transit camp starting in

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54 E.g.: Hilleprand von Prandau (extended family), Gustav Dollhopf (autobiographer), Wilhelm Keilbach (philosopher), Carla Eltza (count, railroads), Josip Hoffmann (publicist), Štefan Bäuerlein (bishop), Gustav Fleischer (translator), Caroline Jarnević (diary), Therese von Artner (city description of Sisak 1825), Johann Kohlhofer/Josef Huttler/Christian Monsperger (hospital infrastructure Osijek), Franz von Werner alias Murat Efendi (Turkish diplomat).
56 Some Germans from Bessarabia, from the Dobruja, from South Tirol and from other parts of Lower Styria/Štajerska were also resettled there, the majority (almost 1000 persons), however, was made up of resettled Gottscheers.
57 For an overview of the camps of the OZNA see the section “Trpljenje v zaporih in taboriščih” in the article by Tone Ferenc: “Nemci na Slovenskem med drugo svetovno vojno.” D. Nečak, »Nemci na Slovenskem, 188-190.
58 Fittingly this town was renamed in honor of the Slovenian communist Boris Kidrič.
June 1945. The Red Cross shut it down in October 1945. It was considered one of the most infamous camps in Slovenia – or to put it in the words of countess Helena Fünfkirchen from Gornja Radgona/Oberkrakersburg, who was interned there for some weeks: “Taborišče Strnišče ja bolj žalosten kraj, ki si je ga mogoče zamisliti” (= The camp Sterntal is the saddest place you could imagine. Trans. Hermanik/Szlezák). On 29 November 1992, a memorial was erected by the Slovenian Volkspartei (= Slovenska ljudska stranka, SLS) at Kidričevo, which commemorates the camp Strnišče/Sterntal. For the emigrated German Lower Styrians and Gottscheers, the camp Strnišče/Sterntal has come to be a central symbol of the memory of the Germans’ expulsion from Slovenia and it serves at the same time to commemorate the many victims who did not survive this camp:

Some 8,000 to 10,000 prisoners were interned at the hut camp. Thousands died here, partly due to the maltreatments, but mostly of typhus and dysentery. The fate of the infants was particularly horrid. Hardly any of the children under three years survived Sterntal.

Some people from the German-speaking Abstaller Becken/Apaška kotlina, too, were intered at Strnišče in July 1945:

In July 1945, in a first expulsion series, [...] many of the “Germans” were driven together, loaded onto trucks and brought into a camp called Strnisce/Sternthal, with some of the Slovene population assisting the soldiers in the expulsion procedure. Those who had been more involved in politics under the Naziregime were sent to Sterntal, but also others whose sole crime had been to live with an Austrian passport in Yugoslavia rather than having taken up Yugoslav citizenship. Furthermore, it also depended on whether or not one had good or bad neighbors, some of the expellees explained to me.

The implementation of the so-called agrarian reform and the internal colonization (= notranja kolonizacija) of Yugoslavia subsequently affected all German-speaking families in the Abstaller Becken/Apaška kotlina because a total of 453 properties were ‘nationalized’ there. In January 1946, the German-speaking inhabitants of the Abstaller Becken/Apaška kotlina were transported in several
covert operations from the—even in the post-war era still fairly compact German-language—settlement area to the train station at Gornja Radgona and were there put on a transport train made up of cattle trucks. The train with the deported ‘Abstallers’ was supposed to go through Hungarian territory to Vienna but was instead sent back by Hungary to Yugoslavia. Since the authorities disagreed on what to do, the train was stuck on a siding at the Hungarian-Slovenian border station Murakeresztúr in the January cold for 16 days, where 77 people froze or starved to death. At the end of January 1946 it resumed its journey to Maribor, where those who had survived this ordeal were interned in a so-called repatriation camp. After some weeks at the camp, the Abstallers were deported to Carinthia on a railroad transport.67 Yet, in Austria, they were no Austrians but “Windische” (Windish), just like in Yugoslavia they had not been Yugoslavians but Švaba (= Swabians).68 Today, a memorial plaque, which was installed on the side wall of the parish church at Abstall in 2003, as well as the Abstallers’ necrology, which is openly laid out in the church for everyone to look at, recall the victims of the abovementioned events but also those Abstallers who perished earlier during the German occupation. This is meant to establish a similar connection between memories as we have seen in the Serbian example of Vršac. The memorial at Apače/Abstall is also not irrelevant for the identity management and ethnomanagement from the outside since the Verein Südmark from Graz, which is quite important in the German-national context, now also supports the “Josef-Matl-Haus” at Apače as well as the associated Kulturverein “Abstaller Feld.”69

In a culmination of this effort, a minority house, mainly sponsored by Austrian private and state sources (some of quite dubious standing), has been erected in Apace, the central village of the Apasko polje region.70

This minority house, although it has remained largely unfinished and empty ever since its official opening in 2004, has sparked quite a bit of controversy in the Apasko polje, as – so said the local Slovene municipal administrators in 2004, this house and its putative stress on German victimhood represented only a marginal, or even a distorted version of the goings-on of 1945 and 46.71

The Ortsgemeinschaft Apače, in the community Gornja Radgona, chaired by Jože Cmor, sent a protest note to the German-speaking Kulturverein “Abstaller Feld.”72 The Verein Südmark, on the other hand,

71 Schober, “After the Expulsion,” 8.
72 This protest note was decided upon in the 8th meeting of the local council at Apače on 11 November 2003 and contains for instance the following passages: “1. The opening of the new facilities of the Kulturverein “Abstaller Feld” was not done in a manner that was appropriate or suitable to our surroundings. The event hurt the feelings of the inhabitants of the Abstaller Feld due to the usage of the German language during the speeches and the introductions of the speakers.” as well as “2. The religious act and the address on the so-called ‘people who were expelled from their homes and murdered on the battle fields’ is a rendering of history that is one-sided and offensive to our history.” The German translation of this note was made availa-
tries to see things less dramatically and not let themselves be distracted from their own activities in the context of the remembrance work at Apače. In an interview, the chairman Reinhold Reimann said that the “work of the Volksgruppen, especially for the Germans in Lower Styria (Slovenia) and the Germans (= Styrians) in the Banat Mountains (Romania)” did count among the society’s central goals at present, but he also underlined that “hardly anyone in the society still regarded the ‘borderland’ as a national battle zone.” However, there is a wide gap of distrust between the chairman’s self-perception and the concerns in the regional context, which without a doubt emerges from the history of the society. The German-national sentiment, which the Deutscher Schulverein, the later AKVS as well as the Verein Südmark are associated with, is hard to gloss over as numerous members and agents have always passed it on. At the same time, the mutual approach of the identity management and ethnomanagement on the German-Styrian and the Slovenian-Styrian side, and thus the dialogue, is still the golden path, which leads to a mutual respect of the other’s traumatic memories. Otherwise, the German memorial culture will always repress the events of the years 1941-45 and the crimes committed by the Wehrmacht, the Kulturbund, the SS, or the Gestapo against Slovenes, Jews and Roma, and instead only point to the suffering of the Germans after World War II.

The different histories in the Gottscheers’ memorial cultures, which were referred to above, result in a veritable struggle for memory, which caused major rifts, since there are not only the splits between the German and the Slovenian historical narratives, but also those between the German identity management and ethnomanagement from the inside, which is mainly represented by the Gottscheer Altsiedler-Verein in Slovenia, and the identity management and ethnomanagement from the outside, for instance represented by the society Gottscheer-Gedenkstätte, which is located at Graz. The question of who is able to lastingly influence with their narrative the general view of history in Slovenia or in Austria is naturally at the center of the entire discussion. Put in simplified terms, the different positions spring from the historical cesura that the members of the Gottscheer Altsiedler-Verein are persons and their descendants who in 1941 did not yield to the enormous pressure exerted by the National Socialists and did not opt for a resettlement. Some of them then joined the partisans and they were therefore later allowed, even as ‘Nemci’ (= Deutsche), to stay in the microregion Kočevje/Gottschee, even in the course of the communist agrarian reform in 1946-47. In comparison to the Gottscheers who were resettled and later expelled from Yugoslavia, their memorial culture is, understandably, a different one: “The Altsiedler and the German-speaking people who had intermarried and stayed signified disobedience.” As they did not collaborate with the Nazis and consciously articulated this

ble online by the Gottscheer-Altsiedler-Verein as it is one of the supplements to the memorandum of 31 January 2006 in the German Volksgruppe in Slovenia of the Zveza kulturnih društev nemškogovoreče etnične skupnosti in Sloveniji/Verband der Kulturreime der deutschsprachigen Volksgruppe in Slowenien. See http://www.gottscheer.net/Unterlagen%20zur%20Beilage%203.pdf (08 June 2011).

73 Interview transcript, 22 August 2006. Qtd. after Hermanik, Eine versteckte Minderheit, 301-302. At the time of the interview, the society was still called Alpenländischer Kulturverband Südmark (AKVS).

74 See Trohar, Kočevski Nemci-Partizani.

choice, the emigrated Gottscheers partly vilified them as partisans or communists. The Gottscheers who came to Austria through forced migration and their descendants, on the other hand, are organized in the society Gottscheer-Gedenkstätte at Graz, similarly to the Gottscheer Landsmannschaft at Klagenfurt. Both societies thus cultivate the memory of the Gottscheers’ expulsion from the Brežiški trikotnik/Ranner Dreieck in 1945. The “voluntary” option to resettle in the winter of 1941-42 is largely a taboo in these circles, because it was not a case of forced migration — in contrast to the Ranner Dreieck — but rather a case of subjugation to the National Socialists’ “Heim-ins-Reich” policy. The Kultur bund,76 the Yugoslav party-affiliated organization of the Nazis considerably fueled this policy; the last issue of the Gottscheer-Zeitung,77 which appeared on 03 December 1941, is typical of the developments at the time.78 In the memorial culture of the Gottscheers living abroad, this resettlement represents the end of the 600-year-long history of the microregion Gottschee since they do not want to solidarize with the memorial activities of the Gottscheer Altsiedler-Verein although they take place exactly there.79 The activities include, for example, the renovation of cemeteries in the entire area of the former German settlement at and around the Kočevski Rog/Hornwald, which is an extensive con-

76 “We can conclude these remarks with proud statistics. Of the 12187 Gottscheers, 8553 were members of the Kultur bund.” The organizational development of the Gottsche Volksguppe. From the Department Head for Organization and Propaganda Stabsführer Alfred Busbach.” Gottscheer Zeitung, 50, 03 December 1941. See:
78 Gottscheer, Germany takes us in
In only a few days, we will all have bid our off Heimat good-bye. – United, as it was the Führer’s wish, we return home to the Reich. It is something big, unimaginable in earlier times, to take farewell forever to one’s old Heimat in order to make for oneself a new Heimat in a new area of settlement. Only a Führer Adolf Hitler could make it happen, could lead hundreds of thousands of Germans without a native land, it will be millions, home into the Reich and will give them back their native land, Germany. Faithfully, we will thank our Führer with work, commitment and sacrifice as Germans. We will commit our children and grand-children to this gratitude.

[...] As every single man looks back onto the past in his smallest circle, we all look onto what unites us. We Gottscheers can be proud of our unity! 12187 Gottscheers have remained loyal to the Führer and Volk through all these years. 8553 were in the organization of the Volksguppe, 2994 of them boys and girls in the youth groups and 1705 men served in the attacks. Only very few Gottscheers thus were not part of the organized Volksguppe.

The Mannschaftsführer: Wilhelm Lampeter SS-Sturmbannführer

Gottscheers!
The Führer has called us and we Gottscheers follow his called in unity. When, 600 years ago, our ancestors left the German regions as colonizers in order to clear new lands in freedom, they began to lay the foundation of their Lebensraum, the new Gottsche Heimat, with hard work and sweat. The beginning was hard and difficult, as these brave people came from their native land into a land that had nothing to offer them as the basisi onto which to build the necessary homes.

[...] A fragmented Germany lacked the strength and a non-German Austria lacked the interest to support us in our fight for freedom. Nevertheless, this little land has remained German to this very day.

The outcome was worth the fight. We may now return home, return home into the Großdeutsche Reich, which the beloved Führer has created. Full of faith and confidence, we now begin our journey and prepare ourselves assist in and contribute to the great construction of our Führer.

Gottscheers! Each day the trains depart from various train stations, which will take you into the new Heimat. There you will be received duly, taken care of and led into your new homes. It is up to you now to contribute to Adolf Hitler’s great work with the same robustness and perseverance with which our ancestors have built their Heimat.

Josef Schober, Volksguppenführer

Text excerpts from the Gottscheer Zeitung, 50, 03 December 1941. See:
tiguous woodland. The anti-communist minded members of the Austrian Gottschee societies could not come to terms with the decision made in 1997 that the renovation of the cemetery at Stari log/Altlag followed the concept of a “side-by-side in death,” which included the graves of Gottscheers and partisans to the same extent. Close to the entrance, an obelisk was set up after the renovation in whose marble tablet the following text was engraved in Slovenian, English and German and in the Gottscheer dialect: “Allen Toten des Gotscheer Landes, die in der Heimnat ruhen oder woanders den ewigen Frieden gefunden haben, zum Gedenken.” This example is only one of many projects that were initiated or are still being implemented in order to preserve the Gottscheers’ architectural cultural heritage. In the sense of a joint identity management and ethnomanagement, a cooperation agreement between the Gottscheer Altsiedler-Verein at Občice/Krapflern, the Verein Peter Kosler at Ljubljana and the Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Gottscheer Landsmannschaften at Klagenfurt was signed on 31 July 2009. In general, the struggle for the memory of the Germans in Slovenia cannot be considered settled and this thorny debate will be continued. The aforementioned agreement can therefore be valued as a positive signal that a common policy in the cultures of memory of the microregion Kočevje can be found, also with regard to the era during and after World War II, to Slovenia’s era as one of the socialist republics of Yugoslavia and to the era of the transformation and independence. This policy should express Gottschee’s cultural diversity since its resettlement just as much as the ‘German’ Gottschee history in connection with the preservation of ‘German cultural assets.’

**The Hungarians’ Cultures of Memory**

To illustrate the identity management and ethnomanagement in the specifically Hungarian cultures of memory, three holidays and festivities that are central to the ‘Hungarian nation’ were selected. They

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81 Cf. ibid., 207-219.

82 There are graves of partisans there because Sardinian grenadiers shot 70 men at Altlag in August 1942 during a retaliation in the context of an offensive on the part of the Italian occupiers. Cf. Hermanik, “Kirchenskelette – Holzbaracken – Karsthöhlen – Gottesäcker,” 106.

83 The article “Ohranjanje sakralne, kulturne, tehnike in naravne dediščine Kočevarjev” in the on-line version of the magazine of the Gottscheer Altsiedler-Vereins Bakh/Pot (2009), 14-22, provides a good overview of the most recent renovations. See [http://www.gottscheer.net/prva-nem.htm](http://www.gottscheer.net/prva-nem.htm) (10 June 2011).

84 It contains, among others, the following points: 1. The goal of all Gottschee communities, no matter where they are located, is to preserve Gottscheer cultural heritage, the language and tradition as well as the investigation and representation of the history of the Gottscheers and of the Gottschee land. The preservation of cultural heritage and tradition also comprises the preservation and maintenance of cultural sites (churches, chapels, cemeteries, German inscriptions etc.). […] 5. Important decisions that concern the preservation of the Gottscheer cultural heritage in the old homeland Gottschee need to be made jointly. If the respective cultural heritage is located in the area of the Altsiedlerverein, decisions need to be coordinated with the Altsiedlerverein, and if the respective cultural heritage is located in the area of the Peter-Kosler-Verein, decisions need to be coordinated with the Peter-Kosler-Verein. […] 7. All hostilities and public polemics between the Arbeitsgemeinschaft and the Altsiedlerverein of the Peter-Kosler-Verein are to be avoided, as they would be harmful to the common cause. See Bakh/Pot (2009), 9. See [http://www.gottscheer.net/prva-nem.htm](http://www.gottscheer.net/prva-nem.htm) (10 June 2011).

are celebrated not only in Hungary itself but also by the Hungarian minority in the research regions.\textsuperscript{86} 
i) 20 August is the day on which King St. Stephen/Szent István király and the ‘founding of the Hungarian state’ (= magyar államalapítás) are commemorated; ii) On 15 March, the revolution of 1848/49 (= 1848/49-es forradalom) is commemorated; iii) 23 October is the day when the revolution of 1956 (= 1956-os forradalom) is commemorated.\textsuperscript{87} Therefore, this sections is structured not according to the individual research regions but according to these three remembrance days.

i) On 20 August of every year, King St. Stephen (= Szent István király) is remembered since he was canonized on 20 August 1083. Historiography also marks the completion of the Hungarian land-taking (= honfoglalás) in accordance with his vita and it was during King St. Stephen’s reign that Hungary adopted Christianity.\textsuperscript{88} This mutual permeation of Christianity and Ungarntum (= magyarság) shapes the memorial culture surrounding the canonized king, which is instrumentalized both in Hungary’s politics, in the Hungarian identity management and ethnomanagement and by the church – sometimes even in unison. An example of this is the memorial event that took place at Hostești/Atosfalva in Transylvania on 20 August 2007. During this event, a statue of Gizella, Stephen’s beatified wife, was unveiled, which had been made by the Hungarian sculptor Sándor Simorka. The two Transylvanian-Hungarian bishops Árpád Szabó (Unitarian church) and László Tőkés (Calvinist church) led the dedication ceremony, and Béla Markó, the then chairman of the RMDSZ, was present to represent the political identity management and ethnomanagement.\textsuperscript{89} During the commemorative festivities, which took place at Sfântu Gheorghe/Sepsiszentgyörgy in the Székely Land on 20 August 2008, the Catholic priest Lajos Szabó established a connection between the Roman-Catholic Church and the Hungarian people by stating that King St. Stephen was not only canonized by Rome but by the entire Hungarian people.\textsuperscript{90} Both examples show show to what extent the various Christian churches use 20 August to secure for themselves an active role in the Hungarian identity management and ethnomanagement via the Hungarian memorial culture revolving around King St. Stephen. During the highpoint of the festivities, which took place at Palić/Palics near Subotica/Szabadka in northern Vojvodina on 20 August 2011, István Pásztor, chairman of the VMSZ, among other things even mentioned the dual Staatsbürgerschaft as an element of Ungarntum in Serbia. The stage decoration during

\textsuperscript{86} Such a selection is, of course, subjective, and still I had to make a selection for mere reasons of space; for example, the RMDSZ decided on 27 February 2011 during its conference at Oradea/Nagyvárad that in the future there would be the Tag der ungarischen Diaspora in addition to the aforementioned ‘Hungarian’ holidays: 15 November, Gábor Bethlen’s birthday, was chosen for this. See: http://www.rmdsz.ro/news.php?hir=181 (21 June 2011). Another remembrance day for the Hungarians in Transylvania is 15 October, since on this day in the year 1593 the fight for freedom (= szabadságharc) led by István Bocskai against the Hapsburg rule had begun. On the remembrance day see Márton Okos. “Október 15-én tört ki Bocskai szabadságharca.” Erédélyi Napló, XX/3. See: http://www.hbrf.org/ereldynaplo/cikk_nyomtatatas.php?id_cikk=12016 (21 June 2011).

\textsuperscript{87} 23 October is a dual remembrance day for the Hungarians insofar as – quite consciously – the republic was proclaimed on that day in 1989. For descriptions of how 15 March and 23 October became national holidays, see e.g. Rév, Retroactive Justice, 145-148 (for 15 March) and 194-201 (for 23 October).


this festivity showed a huge portrait of King St. Stephen, next to which the following motto was displayed: “Tudod, hogy Szent István örökségében hagyott” (= “You know that King St. Stephen has left you an inheritance”; Trans. Hermanik/Szlezák).  

ii) The commemoration of the 1848/49 uprising of the Hungarians on 15 March is not as suitable for the Catholic church to base their involvement in the Hungarian identity management and ethnomanagement on – in this case, it is mostly the Unitarian church and the Calvinist church that try to claim their place in the Hungarian memorial culture based on the historical anti-Hapsburg and thus anti-Catholic stance of the Hungarian folk heroes Kossuth, Széchenyi or Petőfi. In Transylvania, the 1848 revolution is commemorated in all Hungarian-speaking parts and the annual event calendar for this occasion is very impressive. The main functionaries of the RMDSZ organize their celebration in a different Transylvanian town every year. The celebration at Târgu Mureș/Marosvásárhely in 2008 was particularly symbolic because it is the only multilingual town in Transylvania, where in 1990, in the immediate aftermath of the Wende, there were severe conflicts between the Romanian and the Hungarian parts of the population. Béla Markó, the then chairman of the RMDSZ, referred to this in his ceremonial address as these very conflicts had demonstrated that the oppression of the Hungarian nation and the hatred against them Hungarians do not lead anywhere; 1848/49, the year of the revolution, exemplified that “we will reclaim what used to be ours.” More than 5000 Transylvanian Hungarians took part in this festivity, which symbolically was held by the so-called ‘Szekler-Mártyrer-Denkmal’ (‘Szekler-Martys-Monument’). Naturally, the demands for political autonomy as one of the most important political goals had to be articulated. This shows how important these commemorative festivities are for the Hungarian identity management and ethnomanagement since they already provide a framework for one’s political messages, which is a priori shaped by the memory of the Hungarian nation’s unity. Interestingly, it was precisely at Marosvásárhely that the Szeklers’ most important organization, the Székely Nemzeti Tanács (SZNT), also held a memorial celebration with about 500 participants at another site, at the Petőfi monument, in 2008. The chairman of the SZNT spoke exclusively on behalf of the Szeklers and of their efforts to make use of their democratic rights in the struggle for collective rights, without the use of violence. This separate appearance by the Szeklers is an unmistakable symbol of their independence within Hungarian culture.

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91 This speech is available as a short video in Hungarian on you-tube. See: http://tudosito.hu/3753/video/A_VMSZ_kozponti_unnepsegE_Palicson (01 October 2011).


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In Vojvodina/Vajdaság, public festivities commemorating the fight for freedom of 1848/49 have been permitted again only since the *Wende*. The festivities at Maradik/Maradék in Syrmia/Szerémség, for instance, which have only been held since 2010, are even more recent. This village is considered the Hungarians’ center in Syrmia. Therefore, the Hungarian-speaking population of that area – for instance from Dobrodol/Dobrádó, Šatrinci/Satrinca or Irig/Ürög – gathered at the Petőfi Sándor MME cultural center, which is affiliated with the Calvinist parish, on 13 March 2011. The festivities commemorating the year 1848 evoke the interaction between the Hungarian identity management and ethnomanagement in a worldly sense – in this case, the festivity was organized by the local and regional representation of the VMSZ – and in an ecclesiastical sense since, among others, the late Calvinist minister Károly Béreswas remembered. After the Hungarian (sic) hymn (= Himnusz) was sung, there was a lecture on the events at Pest in 1848 as well as on the role of Petőfi, Jókai and Kossuth. In the small town Temerin, northeast of Novi Sad/Újvidék, the mayor András Gusztony laid a wreath at the *kopjafa* next to a mass grave in the town’s west cemetery on 15 March 2011 as this *kopjafa* is the only Hungarian site of memory there. Of course, the interconnection of the wreath laying in commemoration of the heroes of 1848 with the Hungarians murdered during World War II was no coincidence, even though the Hungarian victims of 1944 are commemorated in Vojvodina, especially at All Saints. At Temerin, the mayor explicitly stressed during his ceremonial address how important the law on the indivisibility of the Hungarian nation, passed in Hungary, is when a strong mother nation is backing it up. Then the Himnusz and the Szekler hymn (= Székelyhimnusz) were sung. In 1994, a commemoratory festivity for a regional hero, Guiseppe Paganini, who was of Italian ancestry and who died in the battle at Kaponya near Subotica/Szabadka on 05 March 1849, was revived; until World War I, it had been held on 15 March of every year. The following

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96 He was awarded the title “A Magyar Kultúra Lovagja” (= Knight of Hungarian Culture) on 22 January 2011, the ‘Day of Hungarian Culture.’
97 *Himnusz* (music: Férenc Erkel; text: Férenc Kölcsey) can not only be called the national hymn of the Hungarian state but it is also considered the hymn for all Hungarians, regardless of the host state in which they live today.
99 A *kopjafa* can be found all over the areas of Southeast Europe settled by Hungarians since the era of the Hungarian land-taking and has thus become a symbol of Hungarian culture. For instance, the Hungarian parties in Vojvodina and the Hungary-based nationalist youth organization *Hatvanégy Vármegye Ifjúsági Mozgalom* (= 64 Komitate Jugendorganisation) also erected a *kopjafa* at the mass grave at Bečaj/Óbecse in 1997.
101 See also Hermanik, “The German and Hungarian Identity Management and Nation Building,” 127-128.
102 Cf. G.B. “Koszorúzás és műsor Temerinben.”
103 The battle of Kaponya revolved around the issue of whether the Serbs, who fought on the side of the Hapsburgers, could conquer the city Subotica or not. They failed, eventually. Paganini, who had joined the Hungarian freedom fighters at Pécs, led the Hungarian artillery and died on the battlefield. He was buried on the cemetery at Subotica on Zenta Street.
104 The program of 15 March 2011 included among others the following points: Himnusz; a historian spoke on the events of March 1849; a wreath laying at Paganini’s grave by the St. George Knight’s Order; and at the end the Szózat (= Appeal) by
Hungarian societies took part in the ceremony, which underlines the status of this reactivated cult: *Vajdasági Magyar Diákstúdió és Társulat (= Ungarische Jugendallianz in der Vojvodina)*, VMSZ, MRM, *Vajdasági Pax Romana, Vajdasági MME*. At Stara Moravica/Bácskossuthfalva, a bust of Lajos Kossuth was set up on 15 March 1894 – five days before his death at Turin – as the then seventh Kossuth statue worldwide. Until the end of World War I, commemorative festivities were held there before this bronze bust had to be hid from the Serbs. In 1994, 100 years after its original set-up, the VMDK instigated the reinstallation of the bust and what is now the Lajos-Kossuth memorial park has become a very special site of memory for the Hungarians in Serbia.

At Hodoš/Hodos, a village in Slovenia at the Hungarian border, both the Hungarian and the Slovenian hymn were sung at the beginning of the festivities on 15 March 2011. The ceremonial speaker Boris Abraham, chairman of the local MNÖK, said about the then topical debate on the Hungarian citizenship that the Hungarians in Slovenia were also a part of the Hungarian nation, to which currently 15 million people belonged, and that this was very valuable for the Hungarians in Slovenia.

Since March 2005, there is a commemorative plaque of Mihály Antal, a famous son of Rétfalu, at the quarters of the *Eszék-Rétfalusi-Népkör (= Ungarischer Kulturverein des Osijek-Rétfalusi-

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Mihály Vörösmarty was sung. Below is the text of the poem that also has the meaning of a hymn for the Hungarians and that was called “Hungarian Marseillaise” in Paris in 1848:

To your homeland without fail
Be faithful, O Hungarian!
It is your cradle and will your grave be
Which nurses, and will bury you.
In the great world outside of here
There is no place for you
May fortune's hand bless or beat you
Here you must live and die!


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108 Rétfalu was once an independent Hungarian village in Baranya, today it is part of the suburbs of Osijek/Eszék.
Volkskreises). Mihály Antal was a member of the Hungarian parliament in 1848. Therefore, a wreath is laid down there every year on 15 March. At Suza/Csúza – similarly to the aforementioned Stara Moravica – the Kossuth statue that had already been unveiled on 05 July 1897 was hidden during the era of the two Yugoslavias and newly set up and dedicated in 1991. Árpád Pasza, the former chairman and currently a honorary chairman of the HMDK, in the speech he delivered there on 15 March 2011 pointed out the extremely important symbolic value of this statue for the Hungarians in Slavonia. Moreover, a wreath is laid down every year at the Calvinist cemetery at Suza in the context of the festivities commemorating the fight for freedom of 1848/49 since it is the site of the grave of Kossuth’s military pastor, Gedeon Ács. Numerous Hungarian, Croatian-Hungarian and Croatian functionaries delivered ceremonial addresses at Suza on 15 March 2011. Two speakers in particular, Gábor Iván, Hungarian ambassador at Zagreb, and Árpád Potápi, the chairman of the Kommission der Nationalen Zusammengehörigkeit im ungarischen Parlament (= a magyar Országgyűlés Nemzeti Összetaltozás Bizottsága), had the privilege to refer to the 12 Hungarians from Croatia who just briefly before, on 12 March 2011, had been granted Hungarian citizenship in a ceremony held at Mohács. This example of the 15 March festivities at Suza/Csúza thus also shows how strongly the commemoration of the 1848 revolution is intertwined with current political topics und goals.

iii) In Slovenia, the annual festivities commemorating the 1956 revolution make their high symbolic value apparent through the fact that they are not only held in the minority region Prekmurje/Muravidék, but also in the capital Ljubljana, as for instance on 23 October 2010, where these festivities took place at the Hotel Lev. The minister for the Slovenes living abroad, Boštjan Žekš, who officially represented the Slovenian government there, also participated in the festivities.

In Slavonia, a wreath is laid down in commemoration of the revolution of 1956 at the Paulina Hermann Villa at Osijek/Eszék since in this villa refugees from Hungary were accommodated in 1956. In 2007, for example, the Magyar Kultúregyesület of the aforementioned Eszék-Rétfalusi-Népkör and the HMOM Központ (= HMOM Center) organized a wreath-laying and in the framework of this event,
a representative of the city Osijek also laid a wreath to commemorate the victims of 1956. On 23 October 2010, on the occasion of the commemorative celebrations, the board of the HMDK’s Landesverband held a celebratory meeting at Osijek, during which the relations to the kin state Hungary were discussed. The traditional wreath-laying ceremony in front of the commemorative plaque at the Paulina Hermann villa took place only afterwards.

In the course of the 1956 celebrations in 2008, the then Hungarian President László Sólyom visited the Székely Land. He met there, among others, with the chairman of the RMDSZ, Béla Markó, as well as with the chairman of the MPP, László Tőkés, and with the board of the SZNT. On 23 October, Sólyom participated in the commemorative celebration at the symbolic pilgrimage site Csíkszereda and he stressed the cultural sovereignty of the Székely Land in his speech delivered at Kézdivásárhely. This example of the visit of the former Hungarian President László Sólyom in the Székely Land, referenced at the end of this section, demonstrates one more time some crucial connections between the identity management and ethnomanagement and the cultures of memory: as 23 October commemorates the 1956 revolution, it is a priori highly charged symbolically since it calls to mind the Hungarian people’s political fight for freedom against an overpowering opponent. Therefore, any commemoration of the events, with regard to the ethnomanagement, is a priori ethnopolitically coded – as it is specifically Hungarian. The identity management and ethnomanagement ideally can use such celebrations, with their specific symbolic charge and ethnopolitical character, to communicate at the same time day-to-day (volksgruppen) political topics. The visit of a chief politician from the kin state, in turn, strengthens the mutual loyalty in both directions. In Transylvania, László Sólyom was, of course, eager to meet equally with all the leaders of the Hungarian and Szekler identity management and ethnomanagement in order not to create an imbalance. From an ethnopolitical viewpoint, all parties involved agreed anyway on putting the autonomy of the Székely Land at the center of all political demands, which are directed at the unity of the Volksgruppe just as much as at the Romanian

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114 This wreath-laying ceremony was followed by a commemorative event in the library of the Kulturhaus at Kopács, to which the local Arany-János-Kulturverein and the local representation of the HMDK at Kopács contributed. Cf. Tünde Micheli. “A HMDK központi rendezvénye az 56-os forradalom és szabadságharc emlékére.” Új Magyar Képes Újság, 23 October 2010. See: http://www.hhrf.org/umku/1041/index.htm (25 July 2011).

115 Béla Markó, for instance, told the press that the RMDSZ very much appreciated that the Hungarian President Sólyom regularly dealt with issues concerning the Auslandsungarn and thus also tried to find a non-party consensus in the question of the Auslandsungarn. Markó regarded this visit as important because the Székely Land needed this attention. Cf. N.N. “Markó Bélával találkozott Sólyom László.” Erdély online, 23 October 2008. See: http://www.erdon.ro/hirek/news-erdely/cikk/marko-belaval-talalkozott-solyom-laszlo/cn/news-20081023-05062805 (17 October 2011).

116 “[…] azért tartotta fontosnak Székelyföld bejárását, hogy személyesen találkozhasson az itt élő emberekkel, hogy meg tudja miként gondolkodnak az anyaországtól elszakítottak. Székelyföldön létezik egy ’magyar világ’, ezt Bukarestnek és a román közösségnek is el kell fogaadnia- fejtette ki a köztársasági elnök, hozzátéve az itt élő magyarok plusz értéket képviselnek és kulturájukkal, hagyományaikkal gazdagabba, színessebbé teszik ezt az országot.” “He thought it important to visit the entire Székely Land in order to meet the people who live here in person and to hear what those who are cut off from the mother land think. In the Székely Land, there is a ‘Hungarian world,’ and both Bucharest and the Romanian society have to accept this. – the President said and added that the Hungarians living here represent an additional asset, with their culture and traditions, and thus make this country richer and more colorful.” (Trans. Hermanik/Szlezák). N.N. “Sólyom támogatja az autonomia törvényeket.” Erdély online, 25 October 2008. See: http://www.erdon.ro/hirek/romania/cikk/solyom-tamogatja-az-autonomia-t246rekveseket/cn/news-20081025-12355025 (17 October 2011).
state. Cultures of memory in minority regions are in any case one of the most important catalysts in the ethnopolitical discourse, which at bottom is led by the respective identity management and ethno-management.
2.3 Mediators and Instruments of the Identity Management and Ethnomanagement

Media

The Germans’ Daily and Weekly Newspapers

In 1992, the former editors of the German-language daily newspaper Neuer Weg (1949-1992) founded the Allgemeine Deutsche Zeitung für Rumänien (ADZ). The ADZ has appeared five times per week (Tuesday through Saturday) since 1993 and under the rubric “We about us” we can read: “It informs about Romania at large and about the German minority living here.”¹ The head offices of Romania’s only German-language daily remained at Bucharest although the capital geographically is not located in the German-speaking minority region.² In the summer of 2008, the DFDR took over the ADZ after economic difficulties and now functions as publisher. The ADZ’s survival was thus secured,³ but the editors became immediate employees of the Landesforum.⁴ This takeover through the German identity management and ethnomanagement has since influenced the editorial policy. It was therefore one of the central topics in the interview with Hannelore Baier,⁵ the local editor of the ADZ at Hermannstadt, who has her office in a tiny room on the uppermost floor of the Landesforum building. The ADZ is now mostly supposed to shift the activities of the Forum in to the center of its coverage.⁶ This and the direct wage dependency on the Landesforum show the editors’ restrictions. Yet, behind this rather bitter fact is the knowledge that the ADZ could not have survived financially without this assistance. The ADZ editors’ only choice was between accepting the conditions of the Landesforum or withdrawing from their careers. At the same time, Baier explains, saving the ADZ as the only German-language daily was not the only concern; there were also personal interests involved in this complete restructuring of the newspaper.⁷

The Hermannstädtler Zeitung, founded in 1968, which calls itself “Deutsches Wochenblatt,”⁸ appears every Friday. In contrast to the ADZ, the Hermannstädtler Zeitung is subsidized for 50% with funds that are provided by the Romanian government. These funds, however, are only paid out

² This discrepancy between Transylvania and Bucharest can be well detected in the following citation: “For readers who are locally rooted, a supplement is not a full-fledged replacement for their own newspaper, since it is simply impossible for people from Transylvania or Banat to fully identify with a newspaper that is produced in “Buh-karest” (quote: Hannelore Baier).” Jens Kielhorn. “Leserecho: Vier deutsche Wochenzeitungen für Romania.” Siebenbürgische Zeitung, 08 July 2008. See: http://www.siebenbuerger.de/zeitung/artikel/rumaenien/7928-leserecho-vier-deutsche.html (30 September 2009).
⁴ “A political Rundschau and the problem of the ‘Allgemeine Deutsche Zeitung für Rumänien’ (ADZ) were the top items on the agenda of the board meeting of the Demokritisches Forum der Deutschen in Rumänen (DFDR), which took place on Saturday [15 November 2008] and was directed by the DFDR chairman Klaus Johannis. […] This foundation [of a new board] was necessary because the ADZ Ltd. will become inoperative after the take-over of the newspaper through the DFDR and the pervious board will become unnecessary. The DFDR takes on the ADZ employees, who will continue their work as before.” N.N. “Ein Votum für die Forumspolitik. Pressemitteilung des Demokratischen Forums der Deutschen in Romania.” ADZ, 18 November 2008. See: http://www.adz.ro/081118.htm (30 September 2009).
⁵ Hannelore Baier can look back onto a long career as a journalist, which she began in 1984 at the journal Neuer Weg. Cf. interview transcript, Hannelore Baier, 27 August 2009.
⁶ Cf. ibid.
⁷ Cf. ibid.
⁸ The newspaper also exists as an online version at http://www.hermannstaedter.ro/ (01 October 2009).
through the legal representative, the DFDR. The Romanian government as the grantor – unlike during communist times – no longer interferes in matters of content. The Forum itself funds that part of the other half that cannot be covered with the income from sales, advertisement and subscriptions. Beatrice Ungar, the chief editor of the weekly, remarked in an interview that the *Hermannstädter Zeitung* was indeed critical of the Forum, but “in principle the editorial policy is geared towards information and commentaries are printed only in the second place.” The subscribers abroad turned the *Hermannstädter Zeitung* into something like “a German-language newspaper for people who are interested in Transylvania.” The newspaper grew better known in the context of 2007 as the year of the Capital of Culture. The currently eight-page issues of the weekly are structured into the following rubrics: Front page, news, business, society, feature pages, miscellaneous, preview (‘Hermannstadt auf einen Blick’/ ‘Hermannstadt at a Glance’) and sports. Klaus Brill describes the newspaper as follows:

    On eight pages, the five editors, among them two young Romanians, present their readers with local and regional news on politics, culture and society as well as reports and commentaries Romanian domestic politics. The event calendar, the crossword puzzle and a “Junior Corner” complete a paper whose appearance, despite a layout lifting, does not exactly seem modern to Western Europeans. The editorial offices in Hermannstadt’s historical city center are still pleasantly old-fashioned, with their carpet-covered, footworn wood floors, even if computers have found their way here, too.

The central location of the Hermannstadt editorial office, mentioned toward the end of the citation – it is located, fittingly, on Stradul Tipografilor 12 (= street of the printers) – can well be considered an advantage “since the news sometimes walk right through the door.” Ungar clearly agrees that the newspaper has the role of as an institution that provides a platform for identification for the Transylvanian Saxons who stayed here: “the unifying factor is the German language”; a concluding example shall demonstrate how much significance this German-language weekly still has when it is brought once a week from Hermannstadt into the villages of Transylvania to its subscribers; an elderly lady said to Beatrice Ungar: “For 40 years, I’ve had a visitor every Friday.”

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9 The revenue from one issue of a circulation of about 2,000 is not overly sizeable and this circulation is at the same time not very attractive for potential advertizers. Thus, the DFDR is left with a financing item of also almost 50%.

10 With regard to number games concerning the potential readership of the *Hermannstädter Zeitung*, Klaus Brill writes the following in the *Süddeutsche Zeitung*: “Today a remainder of only about 16,000 Germans live in Transylvania, but a large number of young Romanians learn German at the German schools. If we add to this the representatives of German and Austrian companies and the tourists, the result is a potential readership of 30,000 German-speaking people. Yet, it sells them only about 1,000 newspapers, the remaining 1,000 go to subscribers in Germany, Austria, Switzerland, Luxembourg, Belgium and Hungary.” Klaus Brill “Prognosen unerwünscht. Der Überlebenskampf deutscher Zeitungen in Osteuropa.” *Hermannstädter Zeitung*, 07 August 2009, 4 (reprint of an article that appeared in the German newspaper *Süddeutsche* on 28 July 2009).

11 Interview transcript, Beatrice Ungar, 28 August 2009. The chief editor’s personal connection with the Forum and its politics shall be mentioned here for the sake of completeness, as she herself is politically active in the Kreisrat Hermannstadt. See the website of the Demokratisches Forum der Deutschen in Hermannstadt: http://www.forumhermannstadt.ro/identitat/politische-taetigkeit (01 February 2012).

12 Interview transcript, Beatrice Ungar, 28 August 2009.


14 Interview transcript, Beatrice Ungar, 28 August 2009.

15 Ibid.
The Karpatenrundschau (Romanian: Orizont Carpatin) also appears as a German-language weekly. The editorial head office is located at Braşov/Kronstadt, and the weekly’s subtitle is “Kronstäder Wochenschrift.” The Karpatenrundschau has appeared under this name since 01 March 1967. For reasons of sales and distribution, the Karpatenrundschau is now a four-page addition in the respective issue of the ADZ. Since its beginnings, the Karpatenrundschau has conceived of itself as a ‘Wochenzeitschrift für Politik, Gesellschaft und Kultur’ (‘weekly for politics, society and culture’), whose target audience was and is the German-speaking minority in Romania. The Wende and the exodus of the Transylvanian Saxons connected to it, however, made the Karpatenrundschau’s audience decrease drastically, and the survival of the Burzenland weekly could only be secured by connecting its distribution to the ADZ as of 1996. In 2007, Ralf Sidrugian took over the office of chief editor from Dieter Drotleff. Yet, one year later, the survival of the weekly appeared to be ultimately endangered as the ADZ itself had to fear for its survival until it was taken over by the Forum (see above), and only in August 2008 could a solution be found. Due to the Forum saving the Karpatenrundschau, it passed over into the sphere of responsibility of the Kreisforums Kronstadt, DFDKK, and, quite symptomatically of that, the internet appearance of the weekly is now even located on the site of the Kreisforum.

The Neue Zeitung, whose subtitle is “Wochenblatt der Ungarndeutschen,” has been produced at Budapest since 1957 and appears on Friday. After the Wende, its sponsorship changed due to the foundation of the “Neue-Zeitung foundation” in 1992: This foundation was “founded with the collaboration and involvement of the former Verband der Ungarndeutschen, numerous societies and individuals’ and remained “open for all Hungarian-German self-governments and societies.” The self-designation and the declared targets of the weekly are the following: [The Neue Zeitung …]

-acts like a weekly newspaper of the Germans in Hungary that is subject to public law,
-serves the communication within the German Volksgruppe,
-perceives itself as a forum for the self-governments, societies, other organizations as well as all

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16 As a German-language weekly, the Karpatenrundschau is comparable to the Banater Zeitung, which also appears as a weekly supplement to the ADZ. The head offices of the Banater Zeitung are located at Timișoara/Temeschwar.
17 It emerged from the German-language weekly Volkszeitung, which had been published since 30 May 1957.
19 “Together with the ADZ, the future of its weekly supplement Karpatenrundschau (KR) was also in danger. This danger has been averted, the chief editor of the KR Ralf Sudrigian announced. Now that the dismissals of the editors Dieter Drotleff and Hans Butmaloiu have been revoked, the three editors will continue to manage weekly at Kronstadt. ‘We want to try to guarantee that the readers are provided with up-to-date information on topics and problems that concern them. Not only Kronstadt, but also the surroundings shall be taken into account more. Heimatkunde will remain one focal point, and we hope for people like Gernot Nussbächer or Michael Kroner to continue their work as usual,’ said Ralf Sudrigian said in an interview with this newspaper.” Doris Roth. “Krise bei der ADZ vorerst abgewendet.” Siebenbürgische Zeitung, 07 August 2008. See: http://www.siebenbuerger.de/zeitung/artikel/ruamaenien/8023-krise-bei-der-adz-vorerst-abgewendet.html (02 October 2009).
21 Its circulation is about 3,000 and according to the impressum the Neue-Zeitung foundation is not only the publisher but is also in charge of advertisement and sales. This information can be found in the online version under the rubric “About us.” See: http://www.neue-zeitung.hu/54-8058.php (05 October 2009).
members of the German minority in Hungary,
-supports the maintenance and further development of the language and culture of the Germans in Hungary,
-mediates values of the German-language culture and European values,
-through its comprehensive reporting fosters the manifold connections between Hungary and Germany,
-is party-politically neutral,
-makes public different opinions, as long as they do not violate the constitution or laws.\(^\text{22}\)

Due to this sponsorship, the \textit{Neue Zeitung} is now indirectly also tied to the LdU. The editorial office has been located in a rented space on the second floor of the \textit{Haus der Ungarndeutschen}, HdU, on Lendvay u. 22 since 2000. The \textit{Neue Zeitung}, however, is in its content orientation bound exclusively to the foundation’s council and board of trustees. Thus, this structure is a little different from the German-language press in Transylvania. Now three full-time editors present diverse contents on 16 pages, which relate more closely or more loosely to the Hungarian-German minority.\(^\text{23}\) When the Hungarian FIDESZ government changed the media law, which was enacted on 01 January 2011, it secured a farreaching influence of the legislative on the media in Hungary.\(^\text{24}\) Despite the minority protection, the \textit{Neue Zeitung} is also affected by the amendment to the media law since the Hungarian media authority can fine the editors quite severely any time, if they do not behave in conformity with the new media law.

In those research regions in Southeast Europe where the Germans can no longer maintain a German-language daily or weekly newspaper due to their small numbers, it became more and more crucial for the local identity management and ethnomanagement to distribute and discuss topical issues on the internet. The publication of a yearbook or a “Deutschen Kalenders” does not grant as much flexibility. At the same time, the reception of the internet forum, in comparison to print media, is

\(^{22}\) Ibid.

\(^{23}\) There are the following key areas for certain groups of readers: “Contains 4 pages per week for the children ‘NZjunior’ and a page of the GIU - \textit{Gemeinschaft Junger Ungarndeutscher}, every other week 2 pages ‘Ungarndeutsche Christliche Nachrichten.’ Publishes on behalf of the \textit{Bund Ungarndeutscher Schulvereine} (BUSCH) a 12-page Fachforum for pedagogues of German, called ‘BUSCH-Trommel,’ four times per year; on behalf of the \textit{Ungarndeutsche Selbverwaltung} at Budapest the bilingual supplement ‘Ofen-Pesther Nachrichten/Budapesti Hírlevél’ occasionally; on behalf of the \textit{Landesrat Ungarndeutscher Tanzgruppen, Chöre und Kapellen} the bilingual newsletter ‘Forum/Fórum’ occasionally; in cooperation with the \textit{Verband Ungarndeutscher Autoren und Künstler} the supplement for literature and art, called ‘Signale,’ once a year.” http://www.neue-zeitung.hu/54-8058.php (05 October 2009). In an interview, the editor Angela Korb stressed that the children’s supplement \textit{NZjunior} is very popular in the German lessons at schools. Interview transcript, Angela Korb, 20 May 2009.

\(^{24}\) From 14 – 16 November 2011, a delegation from twelve different international media organizations, which advocate freedom of the press and media development, visited the Hungarian capital Budapest. This delegation visited Hungarian lawyers, journalists, editors, representatives of civic organizations, of the media authority as well as of the government and afterwards published some points of criticism; examples are: “- The law leaves but a small margin for the judicial review of the decision made by the media authority and by the media council. - Forms of co-regulation, which were developed in the framework of the new legislation, cannot substitute for the self-regulation of media. Thus, national and international publishing houses are forced into self-censorship. – The strict regulation of the licensing potentially undermines the encouragement of media diversity and pluralism, which European and international contracts require. - The media law is irreconcilable with the European and international legislation.” Aidan White. “Unabhängiger Journalismus in Ungarn ist bedroht.” \textit{Pressemitteilung des Netzwerks für Osteuropa-Berichterstattung (n-ost)}, 18 November 2011. See: http://cms.n-ost.org/files/uploads/2011_11_18_PM_Mediengesetz.pdf (28 November 2011). Aidan White from the \textit{Media Diversity Institute} (MDI) directed the aforementioned delegation. On the MDI see: http://media-diversity.org/en/ (28 November 2011).
above all a generational issue and therefore the new media do not (yet) reach all members of a region’s minority.

The Hungarians’ Daily and Weekly Newspapers

The Hungarian-language weekly Új Magyar Képes Újság, ÚMKÚ,25 is printed and published at Osijek/Eszék by the press and publishing house HunCro (= a HunCro Sajtó és Nyomdaipari Kft. in the original). This magazine appears on the commission of the HMDK and it is mostly funded with that money that the Croatian state provides for the Hungarian Volksgruppe. The weekly Új Magyar Képes Újság has already appeared since 1996 and comes out on Thursdays.26 The publishing house HunCro in addition mainly supports the publications by Hungarian-speaking or bilingual authors or scholars, on whose behalf the publishing house applies for the necessary funds.27

Since 2001, another Hungarian-language weekly has appeared at Beli Monastir/Pélmonostor, and the Magyar Napló (= Ungarisches Journal) is published by the MESZ. At the beginning, this weekly comprised only four pages, Tünde Sipos-Zsivics explained in an interview, and it was still copied. Its volume has since increased to 18 pages, the weekly appear in print and also online on the website of the MESZ.28

The editorial office of the Hungarian-language weekly Népújság (= Volkszeitung)29 is located in the Slovenian city Lendava/Lendva, even in the same building as the Magyar Nemzetiségi Tájékoztatási Intézet, MNTI (= Ungarisches Nationalitäten-Nachrichten-Institut). The Népújság has already appeared since 1956, with the issues of the first two years of its existence appearing as weekly supplements to the Slovenian newspaper Vestnik in the region Prekmurje/Muravidék. As of 1958, however, it has appeared as a newspaper of its own.30 Its location in the Slovenian Prekmurje at the border made/makes it possible for the Hungarian minority to access Hungarian-language newspapers and magazines at Lenti, the adjacent Hungarian city. In a similar manner, books, too, were purchased in Hungary especially before the Hungarian library was opened at Lendava in 1998.31

In Vojvodina/Vajdaság, there even is a Hungarian-language daily newspaper, the Magyar Szó (= Ungarisches Wort).32 Two main editorial offices are located at Novi Sad/Újvidék and at Suboti-

26 In the magazine’s online archive, one can research article from issue 42 of the year 2000 (26 October 2000) onwards. See http://www.hhrf.org/umku/ (09 November 2009).
27 Cf. interview transcript, Krisztián Pálinkás, 28 June 2010.
31 Cf. ibid, 145.
32 On weekdays, the newspaper comprises 20 to 24 pages and in the joint issue for Saturday and Sunday it even comprises 44 to 52 pages. See http://www.magyarzo.com/fex.page:cimoldal (14 November 2011).
ca/Szabadka and there are the regional offices at Tiszavidék, Topolya and Zenta. Moreover, the *Magyar Szó* has its own little publishing house in order to be able to publish book independently. The *Magyar Nemzeti Tanács*, MNT (= ungarischer nationaler Rat) is the legal owner of the paper. The daily newspaper *Magyar Szó* was already founded during World War II, on 24 December 1944, under the name *Szabad Vajdaság* and was renamed *Magyar Szó* on 27 September 1945. That the newspaper comes out daily is considered one of the most important symbols for the preservation of the Hungarian language in Vojvodina. Csaba Pressburger, chief editor of the *Magyar Szó* at Novi Sad/Újvidék, tells me in an interview that the editorial offices for domestic affairs and culture and thus, in his opinion, the central parts of the newspaper were relocated to Subotica/Szabadka in 1995. The editorial offices for foreign politics or agriculture, which has a high status in Vojvodina, for instance remained at Novi Sad, and the editorial office for sports remained at Zenta, where the youth supplement is produced as well. However, Pressburger says, it is a considerable daily challenge to deal with this regional division, which was preceded by an ethnopolitical decision. This triggered mistakes, news appeared parallelly in different rubrics, and it seemed as if it was not even one and the same newspaper. Due to the war in Serbia, many good journalists left the *Magyar Szó* and therefore there are mostly young journalists between 25 and 30 years at the editorial office at Subotica, and the older, more experienced journalists, most of whom are over 50 years old, are based at Novi Sad. From the angle of the people in the newspaper business, the *Magyar Szó* in particular plays a special role for the Hungarian minority in Serbia – Pressburger calls it “a mi közösségünk” (= our community) in the interview – since it is most competent in reporting on this community. Moreover, it is important to transfer information from the Hungarian media into the Serbian media landscape, especially such thorny issues as the beating-up of Hungarians for ethnic reasons or historical reports on the demarcation of the border 90 years ago. Since autumn 2010, there has been progress in this direction and the most important news of the online newspaper are now translated into Serbian in-house. *Magyar Szó* therefore occurs more frequently in the Serbian media as the Serbian newspapers can take over text passages as they are. In the opinion of the chief editor, minority media are mainly supposed to serve the common good, but have an additional function as many people stress that they were supposed to evidence a “Hungarian spirit” (= magyar szellemiség in the original) – he himself is very cautious about this as it is by now connotated very diversely. Yet, not only the positive aspects of the Hungarian community should be presented but also the negative ones, since the politicians, business magnates and oligarchs are in no way better than
those in other nations. At the same time, this is a difficult situation. As this is a small community, in which everyone knows each other or is related with each other, the minority journalists have only a very limited scope of action. Csaba Pressburger hints here at that thorny issue that concerns minority media in general: The unity of the group could be threatened by negative headlines about the agents of its ‘own’ identity management and ethnomanagement – when something similar happens in the media of the majority population, it seems to be more bearable as these are the ‘media of the others.’ But they expect a certain loyalty from their ‘own’ media, and if the minority media are directly subject to the identity management and ethnomanagement, legally as well as financially, then there is always the danger of influencing the choice if topics in particular and a threat to the independence of journalism in general. In order for the Magyar Szó not to stray from the path of objective journalism, its staff tries to be immune to opinions like “this should not be published because it could be used against us.” In financial term, about 30% of the Magyar Szó’s monthly costs are currently covered directly by the provincial government of Vojvodina; the rest of the income derives from the newspaper sales, from product placements as well as from their own print shop. However, the journalists earn only about half of what other media pay because this depends on the provincial government and not on the MNT.

The editors of the Magyar Szó maintain diverse contacts with Hungary, with some dailies that pass on information to them, with Duna TV, MTV, but above all with the Hungarian press agency MTI, which has a correspondent at Beograd/Belgrad. Sports also play an essential role in this as the media in Hungary always cite the Magyar Szó for the sports news from Serbia. Chief editor Pressburger says at the end of the interview that they are considering presenting the website of the Magyar Szó in a version that is markedly different from the print version in the future since “the two media have tow different characteristics and functions.”

In Vojvodina, there is furthermore a Hungarian-language weekly, the Hét Nap (= Sieben Tage), which appears every Wednesday. The editorial office of the Hét Nap is located at Subotica/Szabadka and the weekly, which calls itself “Vajdasági magyar hetilap” (= Ungarische Woch-

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37 ‘During a journalists’ meeting, we once discussed in detail whether minority media were for example supposed to report on it if they found out that a Hungarian politician’s conduct in the distribution of funds was not correct, or whether they should not. In my opinion, that was absolutely necessary because this is just as much of a scandal as when politicians of other nations do that. Others, however, argued that by doing this we would cause more damage than benefit.” (Trans. Hermanik/Szlezák). Cf. ibid.
38 Cf. ibid.
39 Ibid. Trans. Hermanik/Szlezák. In the case of the daily Magyar Szó, too, there is a direct connection to the Hungarian identity management and ethnomanagement due to its aforementioned owner, the MNT, but Pressburger has now high expectations of the new Nationalrat of the Hungarians, especially in educational matters. Cf. ibid.
40 Not only is the salary better at other minority newspapers, for example among the Slovaks or Rusyns, but also the daily circulation in proportion to the population. Cf. ibid.
41 Cf. ibid.
42 Ibid. Trans. Hermanik/Szlezák.
43 See http://www.hetnap.rs/uj/index.php?zg=5967&no=374 (14 November 2011). In terms of formalities, there is for example a weekly editorial (= Vezércikk), a weekly survey (= Heti körkérdés), a review from the entire Carpathian Basin (= Kárpat-medencei körkép), an interview and the regional interests are gathered in the “Suboticer Tagebuch” (= Szabadkai napló); the adjacent region, the Serbian Banat, too, has its own section in the form of the Banat News (= Bánáti Újság).
enzeitung der Vojvodina) in its impressum, is also owned by the MNT. It covers different subjects that overlap in some aspects with the interests or the practical activities of the Hungarians’ identity management and ethnomanagement in Vojvodina. Therefore, the Hét Nap is, next to the daily Magyar Szó, an exemplary platform for the publication of opinion-forming articles – in the sense of a support for the der collective identity – or of interviews that immediately address the contemporary questions and problems of both the Hungarians in Vojvodina and the Hungarians in Southeast Europe.

In Transylvania/Erdély, there are several Hungarian-language daily and weekly newspapers, from among which only a representative selection can be presented here: Krónika*, Új Magyar Szó*, Szabadság**, Népújság**, Székely Hirmondó**, Háromszék**, Erdély Napló, Erdély Riport. The editorial office of the daily Krónika (= chronicle) is located at in Cluj-Napoca/Kolozsvár, from where the paper is delivered to all corners of Transylvania. Its structure thus corresponds to that of a supra-regional daily. It is produced by its own Krónika publishing house, which is supported, among others, by the Hungarian Human Rights Foundation, HHRF, which has its seat in New York. It therefore represents an interesting example of the Hungarian identity management and ethnomanagement from the outside.

The daily newspaper Új Magyar Szó (= Das neue ungarische Wort) also appears throughout Transylvania, with the editorial office and publishing house located at Bucharest. Individual local editors from altogether eleven cities send their news to the head office to Bucharest for the daily issue of the Új Magyar Szó. It is maintained by the RMDSZ’s “Communitas” foundation (= Communitas Alapítvány in the original), which stressed the direct connection to the Transylvanian-Hungarian identity management and ethnomanagement.

The daily Szabadság (= Freiheit) is also printed at Cluj-Napoca/Kolozsvár, with this paper being distributed exclusively in the Transylvanian administrative units Cluj/Kolozs, Sălaj/Szilágy, Alba/Fehér, Sibiu/Szeben and Ciuc/a Beszterce-Naszód. The daily is produced by the eponymous Szabadság publishing house and is subsidized by both the Communitas foundation of the RMDSZ, mentioned above, and by the HHRF.

The daily Népújság (= Volksblatt) appears in the district Mureș/Maros. The editorial office is located in the center Târgu Mureș/Marosvásárhely. Although there are the rubrics “Nap hírei” (= daily news) or “Politika,” the rubric “Megyei hírek” (= Komitatsnachrichten) in particular is presented with

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45 The editors there, however, earn 80% more than at the daily Magyar Szó, Csaba Pressburger says in the interview. Cf. interview transcript, Csaba Pressburger, 04 July 2010.
46 The asterisks refer to the following subcategories: * means that the daily newspaper is distributed countrywide, ** designate regional daily newspapers and the names of the weeklies are not marked with an asterisk.
48 A similar constellation was described above with regard to the German-language ADZ.
much detail for the local Hungarian-speaking population. The daily Népujság is printed and distributed “Impress-Verlag.”

The two Hungarian-language daily newspapers that appear in the Székely Land (= Székelyföld) hint at the fact in their names already: The newspaper Székely Hirmondó (= Szekler Nachrichtenzeitung), which has been in existence since the year of the revolution-war in 1849 (sic), appears five times per week at Târgu Secuiesc/Kézdivásárhely. The second daily, Háromszék (= Drei Stühle), appears six times per week at Sfântu Gheorge/Sepsiszentgyörgy and is above all specialized on regional news and on the political developments in the Székely Land, such as questions of autonomy.

The weekly newspaper Erdély Napló (= Siebenbürger Journal) has appeared at Cluj-Napoca/Kolozsvár since the Wende in 1991. It calls itself “Polgári hétilet” (= Bürgerliches Wochenblatt) in its subtitle. Among the partners listed in its impressum, there are, among others, the Erdély Magyar Nemzeti Tanács, EMNT, as well as the HHRF, mentioned repeatedly above.

At Oradea/Nagyvárad, the Hungarian-language weekly Erdély Riport (= Siebenbürgerreport) is printed, which in its subtitle is also called “Héti Hirmagazin” (= Wöchentliches Nachrichtenmagazin). It is supported by the “Communitas” foundation of the RMDSZ and from the outside by the Szabad Sajtó Alapítvány (= Freie Presse Stiftung) at Budapest.

Monthly, Biannual or Annual Publications of the Germans and the Hungarians

The Volksdeutsche Gemeinschaft, VDG, at Osijek/Esseg publishes a yearbook in Croatian (sic!) under the title Godišnjak njemačke narodnosne zajednice (= Jahrbuch der Volksdeutschen Gemeinschaft). It serves in the first place to publish papers that were delivered in Croatian at a scholarly-cultural conference, which the VDG organizes once a year. Although the yearbook is published in Croatian, it is a symbol of the public presence of the Germans in Slavonia, which they were denied for some decades. In its topics, it invites a joint coming to terms with Slavonian cultural history.

In Slovenia, the Marburger Kulturverein Brücken published the yearbook with the permanent bilingual title Vezi Med Ljudmi - Zwischenmenschliche Bindungen, which also is practically an essay collection. Its subtitle is: “Sammelband des Kulturvereins Deutschsprachiger Frauen ‘Brücken’ –

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53 See http://www.3szek.ro/load/3szek (15 November 2011).
56 Godišnjak njemačke narodnosne zajednice (2007), Njemačka narodnosna zajednica (izd.), title page. An example: The 14th scientific convention of the VDG, which was titled “Nijemci i Austrijanci u hrvatskom kulturnom krugu” (= Germans and Austrians in the Croatian Kulturkreis), took place from 03 to 05 November 2006 at Osijek; as a consequence, the VDG yearbook 2007 was titled: “Zborník radova 14. Znanstvenog skupa “Nijemci i Austrijanci u hrvatskom kulturnom krugu” (= Proceedings of the 14th Scientific Convention – Germans and Austrians in the Croatian Kulturkreis).
Zbornik kulturnega društva nemško govorečih žena ‘Mostovi’” and, apart from the literary contributions, which are written either in German or in Slovenian, it is consistently bilingual.57

The *Gottscheer Altsiedler Verein/Društvo Kočevarjev Staroselcev* publishes the society magazine *Bakh–Pot (= Weg/Path)* at irregular intervals.58 These intervals can be six months, but also longer than a year. The following is posted on the society’s bilingual website: “The magazine *Bakh (Pot)* appears from time to time.”59 The target audience and the intentions of the society’s publication are defined as follows:

It is meant especially for the members of the *Gottscheer Altsiedler Verein*. The aim of the magazine is to inform the members and other interested people about the activities of the society and to foster the sense of unity of the *Volksgruppe*. The magazine is also available to all readers in the libraries in Novo Mesto and in Gottschee.60

In its subtitle, *Bakh–Pot* calls itself “Glasilo Društva Kočevarjev Staroselcev” (= *Vereinszeitung der Gottscheer Altsiedler*) in Slovenian.61 There is a distinct effort towards bilingualism since the single articles mostly appear in Slovenian and German, with Slovenian prevailing somewhat.

In Romania, the *ADZ* publishing house has also published a yearbook for over 60 years, since the editorial office of the *Neuer Weg* was founded in 1949. Initially, it was fittingly called *Neuer Weg Kalender*, and its successor publication is called *Deutsches Jahrbuch für Rumänien*.62

It has always been so that the calendar had to consider all areas where our German population lives in Romania, with not only Banat and Transylvania being taken into consideration but also the marginal areas. This happened increasingly in the last years since the forums in Sathmar or the Banat Mountains in particular achieve spectacular things.63

The close connection between the calendar yearbook and the Forum not only becomes apparent in the preceding quotation; it has been calculated so by the German identity management and ethnomangement. What follows is the foreword by the Forum chairman Klaus Johannis in the yearbook of 2004:

> We have decreased in numbers, and many “Heimatbücher” are therefore no longer in demand. A yearbook, however, continues to have a function in its own right. The board of the DFDR therefore considered, as early as 2000, publishing an almanac of the new generation […] the

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57 I would like to outline, by way of an example, the structure of the 3rd collection from 2004 at this point: At the beginning, the society chairlady Veronika Haring gives an overview of the activities of the society *Brücken/Mostovi* starting with December 2003 to November 2004. Then follow short contributions, which society members have written themselves. The largest part of the collection is made up by works of the bilingual “*Literaturgruppe des Kulturvereins Brücken* – *Literarna skupina kulturnega društva Mostovi*” (Literary group of the *Kulturverein Brücken*) (33-199). Then follow so-called “Bildnerische Beiträge – Likovni prispevki” (Artistic contributions) (202-221). The rubric “Was die anderen über uns schreiben – Kaj pišuje drugi o nas” (What the others write about us) concludes the collection. See Vezi Med Ljudmi - Zwischenmenschliche Bindungen. 3. *Zbornik kulturnega društva nemško govorečih žena “Mostovi” – 3. Sammelband des Kulturvereins Deutschsprachiger Frauen “Brücken.” Kulturnego društva nemško govorečih žena “Mostovi” zanj predsednica Veronika Haring (izd. in zal.), Maribor 2004.

58 The newspaper is called “Weg” (“Path”) in Standard German.

59 See [http://www.gottscheer.net/prva-nem.htm](http://www.gottscheer.net/prva-nem.htm) (08 October 2009). As an example, the data on the issues from *Bakh–Pot* 14 to 18: *Bakh–Pot* Number 14 (December 2002), Number 15 (April 2003), Number 16 (December 2003), Number 17 (April 2005), Number 18 (December 2006).

60 Ibid.


62 “Calendar, almanach, yearbook – over the course of 60 years these were the designations for the same product, which had gained a high significance among the German population of our land, especially in the years after 1989, when the tradition was picked up again after a brief interruption.” See [http://www.adz.ro/jahrbuch2009.htm](http://www.adz.ro/jahrbuch2009.htm) (09 October 2009).

63 Ibid.
first in color print [2004]. And it was again the board of the Landesforum that had this initiative; I myself advocated that the additional costs be covered. The yearbook for our German community is supposed to improve its image not only in terms of contents but also in terms of design. After all, the forum of the Germans in Romania has by now also improved its image; it is know throughout the country who we are, what we want and what we are capable of.64

As a principle, the topics of the contributions of the individual yearbooks are diverse, with most of them conceived as a kind of activity report about schools, choirs, dance groups and folk dress groups, but also about businesses run by Germans. Besides, there are portrayals of historical cityscapes and rural areas as well as depictions of Romania’s diverse flora and fauna.65 The addresses of the various organizations of the DFDR (Landes-, Regional-, Zentrum-, Orts-, or Jugendforum) are listed at the end of the yearbook before the table of contents. The yearbook of 2007 had a special status because, on the one hand, on 01 January of that year Romania entered the EU and, on the other, Sibiu/Hermannstadt, together with Luxemburg, was Europe’s Cultural Capital:


In a nutshell, the yearbook aims to inform its readers about the activities of the German minority in Romania and to advertise at the same time the political goals of the Forum. A frequent trope is to link the contents as much as possible with the topic of the ‘preservation of German culture.’

The Germans in Hungary distribute a calendar yearbook, which is called Deutscher Kalender and in the subtitle Jahrbuch der Ungarndeutschen. It has appeared since 1957, is printed at the editorial office of the Neue Zeitung at Budapest and published by the LdU itself. The contents are diverse, as common in their text genre.67 Traditional as well as volkskundliche topics of course prevail in all parts of the calendar yearbook and the majority of the reports are on public performances in the realm of Volksmusik, Volkstanz and Volkschauspiel.

In August 2011, the magazine fenster, which is published by the Deutscher Verein für gute nachbarschaftliche Beziehungen Karlowitz/Nemačko udruženje za dobrosusedske odnose Karlowitz, already published its 12th issue in Vojvodina. Its subtitle is the bilingual motto “Poverenje, Pomirenje, Poštenje – Trust, Reconciliation, Honesty.”68 The magazine calls itself “Časopis za kulturu i suživot

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65 The single rubrics in the Deutsches Jahrbuch für Rumänien 2009, for example, are: Calendar; In the service of the community; From the city and the country; Culture; Cultural heritage; Travel and Hiking; Customs and Dialect; The pleasure of reading; Fun for children; Entertainment. Deutsches Jahrbuch für Rumänien (2009), 228-231.
Podunavskih Švaba/Zeitschrift für Kultur und Zusammenleben der Donauschwaben, \(^{69}\) and it is consistently bilingual. As of its third issue, it can also be read online. \(^{70}\)

Since early 2009, the Hungarian Pressehaus and publisher HunCro, mentioned above, has printed the free monthly magazine *Horvátországi Magyarság* (= *Das Ungarnum in Croatia*) at Osijek/Eszék on the commission of the HMDK. The individual issues can also be downloaded from the internet as pdf files. \(^{71}\)

As of 1986, the literary and cultural newspaper *Muratáj* (= *Murlandschaft*) has been distributed together with the weekly paper Népújság at Lendava/Lendva. *Muratáj* is conceived as an independent medium and has appeared twice per year since 1988:

*Muratáj* vsebuje literarne prispevke (pesmi, odlomki iz proze), študije, članke, kritike. Avtoriji so prvi vrsti pripadniki madžarske narodne manjšine. \(^{72}\)

*Muratáj* contains literary contributions (poems, prose pieces) studies, articles, reviews. The authors are mostly members of the Hungarian national minority. (Trans. Hermanik/Szlezák)

Once a year, the *Naptár* (= calendar) is published at Lendava/Lendva, whose subtitle is “a szlovéniai magyarok évkönyve” (= yearbook of the Hungarians in Slovenia).

In Romania, the so-called *Romániia Magyar Évkönyv* (= yearbook of the Hungarians in Romania) appears in Hungarian. It documents, according to the journalist Réka Farkas, the most important political events concerning the Hungarians in Romania as well as the most important social questions. \(^{73}\)

Once on the occasion of the presentation of the 2006 yearbook, the editor Barna Bodó underlined the following aspects:

A kezdeményezés a maga nemében nem új, de kisebbségi szempontból igen. Minden közösség megróbálja léttét dokumentálni, erre szolgálnak a politikai, társadalmi, statisztikai évkönyvek […] Az emlékezet elmossa a legfontosabb politikai történéseket, ezek a kiadványok azonban megőrizik, a jövő kutatói […] Az évkönyv rovatait neves szakértők, többnyire kolozsvári egyetemi tanárok szerkesztik. \(^{74}\)

The initiative as such is not new, but it is from the perspective of the minority. Every community tries to document its existence, that’s what the political, social and statistic yearbooks are for […] Memory blurs the most important political events, but these publications conserve them for the future researchers […] The single parts of the yearbook are written by renowned specialists, predominantly by professors at the University of Klausenburg. (Trans. Hermanik/Szlezák)

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\(^{69}\) Ibid.


\(^{71}\) See [http://www.huncro.hr/horvatorszagimagyarsag.php](http://www.huncro.hr/horvatorszagimagyarsag.php) (09 November 2009).

\(^{72}\) Katalin Munda-Hírnök, “Množični mediji na narodno mešanih območjih,” 132.


\(^{74}\) Farkas, “Romániia Magyar Évkönyv.”
The yearbook was supported both by the identity management and ethnomanagement from the outside, i.e. by the then *Határon túli Magyarok Hivatala* (= *Amt der Auslandsungarn*) at Budapest and by the *Illyés Közalapítvány* (= *Gemeinnützige Stiftung Illyés*), and from the inside by the *Communitas Alapítvány* Foundation of the RMDSZ. In view of the re-organization in Hungary, the editors of the yearbook were forced in 2007 to raise funds in the regional context of the Hungarian minority since temporarily no applications could be sent to Hungary.75 Despite these difficulties, the double issue of the *Romániai Magyar Évkönyv* 2009/2010 could be presented in 2011. The funds for the refinancing of the yearbook now flow together in the so-called *Szórvány Alapítvány* (= *Stiftung Streusiedlungen*).76

**Radio and Television**

The German-language *Rundfunksender Pécs* first went on the air on 31 December 1956. The editors’ main goal was “to foster, by means of entertainment, both the encouragement of a new identity-formation and the initiation of a positive change in the attitude of the Germans in Hungary towards their own language and culture.”77 At that time, it was something special for the Hungarian-German population to hear the German language on the public radio in Hungary, seeing as it was rather taboo immediately after World War II to speak German on the street. “Jetzt kommt die *Deitschschtund*” (“Now comes the German hour”), the grand-mother of Eva Gerner, who is an editor at Pécs, used to say before the 30-minute show was on the radio.78 A big jump ahead in time takes us to March 2001, when the *Funkforum*, called “*deutschsprachiges MedienForum*” in its subtitle, was founded on the initiative of the German *ifa* (= *Institut für Auslandsbeziehungen*).79 It is conceptualized as a media society, whose members are from Romania (6 locations), Hungary (Pécs), Serbia (Subotica) and Croatia (Osijek):

The *Funkforum* keeps the audiences of German-language shows informed across borders. The stations of the *Funkforum* have exchanged reports since 2001, produce joint programs and thus serve the purpose of a better acquaintance and mutual understanding. Training seminars every six months contribute to the quality improvement of the programs, targeted advertisement strategies and effectively publicized events increase the numbers of loyal listeners.80

The role of patronage81 in the framework of the identity management and ethnomanagement is conspicuous in the case of the *Funkforum*. It could achieve that several smaller German-language broad-

75 Cf. Farkas, “Romániai Magyar Évkönyv.”
78 Interview transcript, Eva Gerner, 20 February 2008.
80 Quotation from the brochure: *6 Jahre Funkforum*, 6.
81 See also chapter Organizations in the Kin States (Selection).
casting stations came together in one association. The Funkforum therefore is not only an excellent example the unifying effect of patronage, but also of well functioning multiple loyalties in the sector of minority media. The German-language radio program at Pécs/Fünfkirchen is currently broadcast every day from 10 a.m. to 12 p.m. on channel MR4 (= Magyar Radio 4). It is fittingly titled “Treffpunkt am Vormittag” (meeting point in the).82 Robert Stein, the then chief editor of “Treffpunkt am Vormittag,” in an interview called the later morning a very advantageous airtime.83 The program tries to accommodate all listeners’ requests, and this can be done particularly well on the weekends in the musical request program. A lack of German language proficiency can be compensated by the musical requests, which strengthen the sense of emotional affiliation. The listeners identify with volks-tümliche music from the entire German-speaking area.84 From the editors’ perspective, however, entertainment is not the only thing that counts: “We are also an information center, not just a program […] and we gladly take on this role.”85 Among the Germans in Hungary themselves, there is an excellent cooperation with the Neuen Zeitung; the broadcasting act, however, precludes a cooperation with television. In principle, a radio station is however independent of the German minority self-governments.

There is also a German-language regional TV editorial department at Pécs and its show “Unser Bildschirm” (our screen) is broadcast twice a week (broadcast/replay). It is exactly 26 minutes long, which is regulated so in the Hungarian minority law.86 In an interview, Eva Gerner, editor and host of “Unser Bildschirm,” says that the airtime at 1 p.m. is very disadvantageous and the replay slot in the morning is not much better either.87 “Unser Bildschirm” employs only three editors since, as far as camera, sound or lighting are concerned, the MTV regional studio at Pécs is used.88 The program itself is designed like a magazine. During the 26 minutes of airtime one to two topics, respectively, are presented in detail. Besides, there is a extra children’s program, the “Kinderecke” (children’s corner), which is broadcast regularly, yet only in about every fourth or fifth show. In the case of programs that are especially relevant for schools, the German-language minority Gymnasien at Pécs are notified

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82 The independent channel MR4 only was founded in 2007 for the minorities living in Hungary, but it has only been allotted a medium wave frequency in Hungary. Due to its peripheral geographic location, MR4 and thus the German-language radio station Pécs in the southwest of Hungary also broadcasts in Vojvodina and in Slavonia.
84 Cf. interview transcript, Robert Stein, 21 February 2008. In response to my question, I was given the explanation that this was the music that was most widely known in Austria for example from the popular folkloristic music show “Musikantenstadel.”
85 Ibid.
86 There are altogether eight such small minority editorial offices in Hungary: At Pécs, there is that of the Germans and the Croats; at Szeged, that of the Serbs, Romanians and Slovaks; at Szombathely, that of the Slovenes; and at Budapest, that of the Roma and the Jews. See http://videotar.mtv.hu/Kategoriak/Kisebbsegi%20musorok.aspx (21 November 2011). The internet presence of the minority programs also guarantees that people can watch shows they missed at any time.
87 The editors themselves therefore seek to obtain a better broadcasting slot, which, however, according to the Hungarian television requires that they reach more viewers. To this day, they have not managed to break out of this “vicious cycle.” Cf. interview transcript, Eva Gerner, 20 February 2008. In 2008, the audience share was only at 0.1-0.2%, but in proportion to the overall Hungarian population and not to the German-speaking minority since there is no extra Infra test to determine this number.
beforehand and they also receive a copy of the program for teaching purposes upon request. The general selection of subject matter is geared towards the needs of the Hungarian-German audience and therefore “the cultivation of tradition, cultural programs and the history of the Germans in Hungary with a special focus on the era of expulsion” are at the center. Presenting Hungarian-German “Kulturgruppen” (music, dance, choir), Gerner says, is of course very popular because they also like to admire themselves and each other on TV. In response to my question of why the program draws mostly on the conservative, such as the Volkslied, and why contemporary musical genres are not taken into consideration, Gerner said:

The Germans in Hungary identify more with this than with the modern, this is what they inherited. It is actually an integral part of the Hungarian-German identity, to draw on the Volkslied. 

There was generally a lot more euphoria in the 1990s, especially after the ‘new’ minority law was passed, now everything is more or less stagnant. The medium’s cooperation with and connection to its own Hungarian-German minority self-governments mostly happens via personal contacts, Krisztina Szeiberling-Panović, another editor of “Unser Bildschirm”, said in an interview, and “there is no pressure involved.”

In Slavonia, the German-language program d-funk is broadcast every Wednesday from 8 p.m. onwards on Slavonski Radio at Osijek/Esseg. Eduard Rupčić is the part-time editor – without an actual editorial office in the background – in charge of this program, which is the only German-language radio program in Croatia. He is also a member of the Funkforum, mentioned above. This show has already been running on the frequencies 89.7, 91.0, 100.6 and 106.2 MHz since 2003:

The “D-Funk” has a modern concept with short reports (3-5 min.), news and contemporary music by German interpreters so that the program is mainly geared towards a younger audience. It reports also on the German-Croatian relations in the areas of culture, politics and business and on the activities of the German minority.

This meant exploring new avenues, at least as far as minority radio is concerned, since this concept addresses an entirely different target audience than programs that mostly rely on traditional or volkstümliche music.

On Radio Baranja/Horvát Baranya Rádio Hungarian-language programs are broadcast twice a week:

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89 Cf. ibid.
90 Ibid. Yet, it should be added here that every Volkslied in general that is sung in German is considered part of the Volksliedgut of the Germans in Hungary and not just regional “Danube Swabian” songs.
91 “You get the impression that they are trying to put people off. I don’t think that the minorities, not only the Germans, that they are that important. Ok, they exist, they are there, and you notice that in all segments. Therefore we only get 26 minutes […]. For Hungarian politics, I think, the Ungarntum outside of the country is much, much more important. There is no balance between the minorities in the country and those abroad, absolutely not.” Ibid.
95 See http://www.radio-baranja.hr/ (09 November 2009).
A 88 Mhz-es hullámhosszon minden hétfőn 18 és szombaton 19 órakor kötetlen, tabu- és politikamenteshangulatban várják Öröket Kriják Krisztina és Varga József műsorvezetők a kézsülepek elé! Minden hétfőn kivánságműsor!

On the frequency 88 Mhz, the hosts Krisztina Kriják and József Varga await you who are sitting in front of your receivers every Monday at 6 p.m. and every Saturday at 7 p.m. in an informal atmosphere free of taboos and politics! Request show every Monday! (Trans. Hermaník/Szlezák)

These two Hungarian-language shows are announced in the Croatian radio program as “Emisija na mađarskom jeziku” (= Sendung in ungarischer Sprache/show in Hungarian), with the show on Mondays running for 45 minutes and the one on Saturdays running for 35 minutes. As the quotation shows, the format of the (music) request show is uphelp here as well, with the facet of “being free from politics” emphasized in the overall concept of the minority program.

The regional Croatian-language station Televizija Slavonije i Baranje, STV, broadcasts the productions of the Hungarian-language studios Drávatáj (= Drauregion) at Osijek. These half-hour programs are broadcast about every two weeks. Some contributions are also made available on the website of the newspaper Új Magyar Képes Újság. During the 9th meeting of the Hungarian-Croatian Minority Joint Committee, MJC, which took place at Zagreb on 02 May, the participants also appreciated that the Hungarian Drávatáj TV studio was supported on the part of Croatia in the framework of the “Fund for Media Diversity and Pluralism.”

In Slovenia, a 10-minute show in Hungarian has been broadcast every Sunday since 1958, when the regional station at Murska Sobota/Muraszombat was established, with the airtime successively extended later on. As of 1983, the Hungarian-language program has been aired from the regional studio at Lendava/Lendva and the frequency of 87,6 MHz for the Muravidéki Magyar Rádió MMR/Pomurski Mađarski Radio has remained the same since then. After Slovenia became an independent state, this regional studio was turned into a full-fledged radio and television studio in 1996. The program is very much geared towards its target audience and tries to meet the demands of the Hungarian minority in Slovenia:

Program radia je vsebinsko prilagojen različnim potrebam poslušalcev (večkrat dnevno poročila, posebna oddaja o dogodkih iz življenja mađarske narodne manjšine, želje in čestitke poslušalcev, oddaja za mladino, kulturna kronika, kontaktne oddaje, oddaje o filmu, glasbi).

The contents of the radio program are adapted to the various demands of the listeners (news several times a day, specials about the events of the Hungarian national minority, good wishes and congratulations, a show for young listeners, a Kulturchronik, a contact show, programs about films, music). (Trans. Hermaník/Szlezák)

97 Cf. http://www.radio-baranja.hr/content/blogsection/19/1808/ (09 November 2009) as well as http://www.radio-baranja.hr/content/view/3524/1808/ (09 November 2009).
98 See http://www.stv.hr/ (10 November 2009).
102 See http://www.rtvslo.si/mmr/ (29 October 2009).
103 Munda-Hirnök, “Množični mediji na narodno mešanih območjih,” 133.
The situation of the Hungarian-language radio in Slovenia has continuously improved since its beginnings and at present there are broadcasts from 5.45 a.m. until midnight. In 1978, the broadcasting of the bilingual program Hidak-Mostovi (= Brücken; bridges) was taken up at the network at Ljubljana.\(^{104}\) From 1995 till 2000, Hidak-Mostovi was broadcast weekly, as of 2001 twice a week except for the months July and August, when it was broadcast only once, respectively, during a regular broadcasting slot on the first channel of TV-Slovenija, TVS.\(^{105}\) According to target audience or topics, the individual programs have a special subtitle or motto: Barangolások/Potepanja (= Wanderungen), for example, concerns the Hungarians, but also other Volksgruppen living outside of Slovenia. The way the programs are designed is closely connected to the broadcasting of Duna-TV/TV Donava.\(^{106}\) Kanapé/Kanape is a program that is primarily designed for the youth in Prekmurje. In Vendégem/Moj gost (= Mein Gast/my guest), personalities from the region, ranging from artists and musicians to artisans to everyday family life, are portrayed, which gives this series the touch of a documentary. Nagyító alatt/Pod drobnogledom (= Unter der Lupe/under the microscope) engages critically with the socio-economic and socio-cultural conditions in the region, among other things also with the development of bilingualism. The name Határtalan/Brez meja (= Ohne Grenze/without borders) already indicates the cross-border cooperation with the Hungarian regional studios at Szombathely and at Zalaegerszeg.\(^{107}\)

In Vojvodina, Radio Subotica has broadcast the German-language program Unsere Stimme (our voice) every Friday between 7 p.m. and 7.30 p.m. since Christmas 1998 on the frequency 86.9 MHz. Rudolf Weiss, the chairman of the Deutscher Volksverband, is also mainly responsible for the program and he correspondingly ascribes Unsere Stimme a great importance in the interview.\(^{108}\) Radio Subotica is now also a member of the Funkforum.\(^{109}\)

József Klemm of RTV Újvidék\(^{110}\) said in an interview that the Hungarian news had still functioned quite well during Yugoslavian times, but everything had been taken from the Hungarians after the autonomy was abolished, the right to their own editorial office, to their own programs, including

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104 The show, which was broadcast only twice per month in the first years, originally lasted only 15 minutes and was then extended to 30 minutes. From January 1983 through April 1985, it was called Hidak-Mostovi-Ponti since it was simultaneously the show of the Italian minority in Slovenia. Yet, neither the Hungarians nor the Italians deemed this broadcasting format satisfactory as the constant double subtitles, either Slovenian-Italian or Slovenian-Hungarian, confused the viewers too much. The Italian minority then pressed for the establishment of their own Italian-language radio and television broadcasting station at Koper/Capodistria. Cf. ibid.

105 At the moment, the 30-minute show is broadcast four times a week, Tuesday through Friday, at 3:05 p.m. on TVS1 and repeated the next day in the morning on TVS2. See http://www.rtvso.si/modload.php?&c_mod=rtvoddaje&op=web&func=read&c_id=24590 (29 October 2009).

106 On the predominantly Hungarian-language Duna-TV see http://www.dunatv.hu/portal/ (24 November 2011).

107 In such a co-production, each television studio (Maribor, Szombathely, Zalaegerszeg) is given 10 minutes of airtime. Cf. ibid.


110 For the Hungarian website of Vajdasági RTV see http://www.rtv.rs/hu/ (29 February 2012).
all broadcasting frequencies.111 In the second half of the 1990s, there were Hungarian media, but only under the direction of pro-regime chief editors, others were given no financial means. In 1999 – one year before the overthrow of the Milošević regime --, immediately after the foundation of the Ideiglenes Magyar Nemzeti Tanács, IMNT (= Provisorischer Nationalrat der Ungarn), the IMNT adopted a media strategy plan that same year. This plan proposed to introduce news coverage not only in the Hungarian language but also “in the Hungarian spirit” (= magyar érzülettel in the original), which was a very important step in the development of the Hungarian-language media landscape in Vojvodina.112 In 2000, the Hungarian media even dismissed their boards, which had been appointed during the Milošević era, and appointed new chief-editors, who enforced the principle that the IMNT had called ‘magyar érzülettel.’ Thus, there was a positive development after 2000, but the reach of the times before the Milošević-era was still not reestablished:

We do not even make it to 60%, even though the Hungarian-language radio and television range as public-law media. About one third or almost half of the Hungarian population in Vojvodina cannot listen to the Hungarian radio broadcasts.113 In Vojvodina, there are three centers for the production of radio programs for all Volksgruppen: Novi Sad/Újvidék, Subotica/Szabadka and Vršac/Versec, in eastern Banat.114 In Vojvodina, we can observe a clear connection between the minority-language radio and the respective identity management and ethnomanagement both in the case of the Germans and the Hungarians. Besides the news coverage or the various entertainment programs, there is a pronounced symbolic value in the minority-language radio and thus in the way people can be addressed in their mother tongue, which also becomes very clear from the interviews with Rudof Weiss and József Klemm.

In Transylvania/Erdély, there are several Hungarian-language radio and TV stations115 and therefore I have listed them in tables. I also added broadcasting locations to the list, such as Oradea/Nagyvárad, that air in the core regions of Transylvania or those Budapest productions that are specifically produced there for the Hungarians in Transylvania:

111 Cf. interview transcript, József Klemm, 04 July 2010.
112 Cf. ibid.
113 Ibid.
114 At Novi Sad, for instance, the radio airs on three frequencies, two of which are in Hungarian and one in Serbian. For the minorities in the north of Bácska, in turn, such as the Rusyns, Romanians, etc., it is not possible to listen to programs in their mother tongue. At Versec, the opposite is the case, since there are no Hungarian-language programs at all there but other minorities have their own programs. Cf. ibid.
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<td>Szülőföldünk – Határok Nélkül (a show by Magyar Rádió)</td>
<td>Budapest</td>
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<td>Magyar Internet VilágRádió és Világ TV</td>
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| "Antena 1 – Marosvásárhely"
http://antena1.orizont.net | Marosvásárhely    | Maros / Transylvania/Székely Land |
| Csiki TV
http://www.csikitv.ro                      | Csíkszereda       | Csik / Transylvania/Székely Land |
| "Digital3 TV
http://www.d3.ro"                        | Székelyudvarhely  | Hargita / Transylvania/Székely Land |
| "Duna TV Székelyföldi Stúdió
http://www.dunastudio.ro"                   | Székelyudvarhely  | Hargita / Transylvania/Székely Land |
| "Erdélyi Magyar Televízió
http://www.erdely.tv"                        | Marosvásárhely    | Maros / Transylvania/Székely Land |
| "Erdővidék Térségi Televízió (TV station of the region Erdővidék)
http://www.erdtv.com"                       | Barót             | Kovásznak / Transylvania/Székely Land |
| "Fény Televízió
http://www.fenytv.ro"                   | Gyergyószentmiklós | Hargita / Transylvania/Székely Land |
| "Gyergyó TV
http://www.gyergyotv.ro"                  | Gyergyószentmiklós | Hargita / Transylvania/Székely Land |
| "Hargita Line (Kabelfernsehen)
http://hrline.ro"                           | Székelykeresztúr | Hargita / Transylvania/Székely Land |
| "Képzelt Kávéház – RTV
(show by the Hungarian editorial department of the Romanian state TV)
http://kavehaz.ro"               | Bucharest         | Bucharest / Romania/ outside of Transylvania |
| "RTV Magyar Adás
(Hungarian show on the Romanian radio)" | Bucharest         | Bucharest / Romania/ outside of Transylvania |
| "Objektív Televízió
http://objektiv.ro"                          | Gyergyószentmiklós | Hargita / Transylvania/Székely Land |
| "Polyp TV
http://polyp.ro"                                | Kézdivásárhely    | Kovásznak / Transylvania/Székely Land |
| "Szatmár TV
http://szatmartv.ro"                              | Szatmárnémeti    | Szatmár / Transylvania/Székely Land |
| "Várad Videó
http://www.varadvideo.ro"                         | Nagyvárad         | Bihar / Transylvania/Székely Land |
| "Világunk (Our World)
http://www.dunatv.hu/vilagunk"            | Budapest          | Pest / Hungary |
It can be observed in summary that the focal area of Transylvania’s Hungarian-language radio and television stations is located in the Székely Land, which can be compared with the structure of Transylvania’s societies since the Székely Land has the largest density of Hungarian societies, as well. The identity management and ethnomanagement from the outside is very dynamic for the Hungarians in Transylvania, which in turn is reflected in the radio and television productions done at Budapest. In the identity management and ethnomanagement of the Germans, by comparison, there are no such specific broadcasting requests for the German minority in Southeast Europe. The quite considerable Hungarian-language audio-visual offer in Transylvania shows how well the largest Hungarian Volksgruppe in all the research regions is provided for, by comparison. This is of course a clear advantage since a broad range of offers can better meet the diverse cultural demands and there is no need to limit oneself to the ‘preservation of traditions.’ At the same time, radio and television are – despite the increasingly important role of the internet – still the most suitable platform to support and also propagate the work of the identity management and ethnomanagement in the sense of the preservation of the minority language.

Schools

As the identity management and ethnomanagement of both the Germans and the Hungarians still consider the acquisition of the respective minority language to be something essential, the educational institutions in charge, from the national kindergarten to the national Gymnasium, are additionally symbolically charged. This section – as already mentioned in the introduction – shall not aim for a detailed portrayal and analysis of the entire minority school system in the research regions in Southeast Europe. Rather, selected examples116 will demonstrate why the minority school system still has to be regarded as one of the central instruments of the identity management and ethnomanagement even though bilingualism has become a reality in most regions anyway. The developments in the Germans’

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116 In order for the depiction of the minority school education in the research regions to be related to the actual practice, it is mainly supported by interviews, which make possible a broad, multi-perspective access to the minority school system. At the same time, other aspects of the practice of the identity management and ethnomanagement, which were presented in the previous chapters, are directly linked to the minority school system, be it through the minority law, be it through the influence of the different minority organizations, including the churches, and to a certain extent also the minority media as well as the minority literature, to the extent that they are used in the classroom. I have selected the school contacts based on how my field research in the research regions developed.
everyday school life as compared to the Hungarians, when these demonstrate above all demographic differences, shall only be touched upon briefly. A well functioning minority school system does not depend on the number of children exclusively. I regard as equally relevant the discussion surrounding socio-cultural as well as language-political changes, especially if they relate to such questions as how bi- or multilingual education can be implemented in the respective regions. Another question at the center of the acquisition of minority languages is whether it is a case of first or second language acquisition in the schools. The identity management and ethnomangement for a long time ignored the fact that the minority language is often no longer spoken as the first language in the families because it simply did not fit the ideological concept.

In order to give a quick overview of the diversity of the various types of minority schools, I would like to name here the example of the Hungarian education system, in which the following school types are offered: i) There are few monolingual schools, in which lessons are taught exclusively in the minority language; ii) there are bilingual schools, in which several subjects (for example, the respective minority language itself plus at least three other subjects) are taught in the minority language, the majority of subjects, however, in Hungarian; iii) there are so-called “Nationalitätenschulen” (nationality schools), in which the children according to the minority law receive a larger number of school hours for the education in the minority language; iv) in Hungary, a “traditional language instruction” is offered, in the context of which the Germans in Hungary have the right to five hours of German instruction per week; v) there is a branch called “intercultural education,” in which there is no language instruction per se, but the “culture of the minority” is taught. In the following examples from the research regions, the Gymnasien are represented overproportionately in comparison to the elementary schools because the identity management and ethnomangement still bestows a lot of weight on these prestigious traditional schools due to the once preeminent position of the Germans and the Hungarians in the educational history in Southeast. Yet the kindergartens and elementary schools grow more and more important for the passing on of the minority language, especially when it is no longer spoken as the first language in the families.

Examples from the Germans’ Minority School Practice

The preconditions in the realm of minority schools are different in all the research regions. It is therefore symptomatic that the schools sometimes decide themselves whether the German minority language should be the object of first or second language instruction or ‘only’ an optional subject. The

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118 Cf. Schoblocher, Identitätsmanagement der Ungarndeutschen, 28. In practice, there is a very large difference in numbers especially between categories ii) and iv) since in Hungary there are 33 bilingual (German-Hungarian) elementary schools as opposed to 270 elementary schools, which offer a larger number of German lessons.
developments of the status of German as a minority language or a foreign language thus become more and more important.\textsuperscript{119}

In the communist post-war Yugoslavia, the German minority was dropped entirely from the regular school system because it was not recognized, and the German language could only be learnt there as a foreign language. At the same time, the usage of the German language in public was taboo for a long time, which equally contributed to a swift decline in the everyday language competence. In Vojvodina, for example, many people who currently commit to the German minority therefore are better at Serbian or some also at Hungarian than at German.\textsuperscript{120} At Subotica/Mariatheresiopel the bilingual kindergarten “Palčica” was opened in 2007 in the framework of a Serbian state-wide pre-school program, which aims at educating the children bilingually in either of the combinations German/Serbian, German/Hungarian or Serbian/Hungarian. This did not enhance the status of the minority language German. At the school level, instruction of the school subject German is still limited to second-language acquisition in Serbia. Beyond that, the Deutsche Volksverband offers its own German courses in the framework of its youth work.\textsuperscript{121} At Novi Sad/Neusatz, the Matinee der deutschen Poesie takes place annually; students from Gymnasien across Serbia are invited to take part in a competition in which they recite German texts, present group work or sketches in German that they wrote themselves; the format of this competition is targeted at all students in Serbia who learn the German language.\textsuperscript{122} This shows a new facet of the identity management and ethnomanagement to organize a language competition for second language acquisition but to still propagate German this way.\textsuperscript{123}

In Slovenia, German is also only offered in the context of foreign language education. The only instruction that is offered by the Germans’ identity management and ethnomanagement in Slovenia takes place in the microregion Kočevje/Gottschee in Polanje/Pöllandl, in the society center of the Gottscheer-Altsiedler-Verein: Both German courses in Standard German and courses in the Gottschee dialect courses in Standard German and courses in the Gottschee dialect are offered there for the children who come from the microregion. The ethnic origin of the children who join the youth group is irrelevant since they come from German-speaking, Slovenian-speaking or Roma families.\textsuperscript{124}

The following quotation summarizes the school situation in Transylvania:

Due to the out-migration of German (that is: Romanian-German) students and the influx of Romanian students as well as due to the changes in the environment, the character of this schools has changed as well. They are no longer “Transylvanian-Saxon schools” or “Swabian schools,”

\textsuperscript{120} This has mostly to do with the fact that the remaining Germans used Hungarian for decades as the language of communication outside their own four walls and partly also with the fact that they were in part also intermarried with Hungarians. See interview transcript, Rudolf Weiss, 27 May 2010.
\textsuperscript{121} On the bilingual kindergarten program “Palčica” see also the section The German’s Societies (Examples from the Regions).
\textsuperscript{122} See interview transcript, Andreas Bürgermayer, 22 April 2010.
\textsuperscript{123} In direct comparison, the Germans in Hungary even request a proof of the Hungarian-German origins if students want to participate in the literary youth contest of the LdU. See also the chapter Minority Literature, Visual Arts and Performing Arts.
\textsuperscript{124} See http://www.gottscheer.net/prva-nem.htm (27 July 2010).
nor “German schools” in the old sense any longer, i.e., no longer schools of the German minority […] The Demokratisches Forum der Deutschen in Rumänien is a reliable partner for them that is determined to make use of the status delineated by the Romanian educational law and to support them to the extent of its capacities.125

In Romania, compulsory schools are generally run by the ministry of education at Bucharest and the representatives of the Forum emphasize in this context that they couldn’t even afford to run the “Deutsche Schulen” as private schools – in the ethnopolitical sense, the DFDR also uses this argument in order to corroborate the “no” of the Forum to a demand for autonomy since a cultural autonomy was simply not affordable given the expensive schools.126 At the same time, the Romanian-German identity management and ethnomanagement show great interest in the school system. The former chairman of the school commission of the DFDR,127 Martin Bottesch, who was active in this function until 2008, remarked on the topic of the German-language schools that the ministry at Bucharest, despite the predominantly Romanian students, admitted that there was a minority behind these schools that make demands.128 In the eyes of Romanian parents, the respective schools are still perceived as “minority schools” and as “German schools,” Bottesch underlines.129 This is where the Forum likes to take issue because this is in many ways about a public symbolic function of large significance for the Germans in Romania. This interpretation somewhat calls to mind the image of the ‘Potemkin villages’ as the Transylvanian everyday school life contradicts Forum’s notions. This is not only the fault of the demographic change but the many school reforms of the Romanian state, too, have long restructured the former “Saxon school” in its traditional Protestant form, which even the German chronicler do not doubt.130 Nonetheless, the (formerly) German-language schools are interpreted as identity-preserving symbols of the existence of the Romanian-German minority. Therefore, for the purpose of their preservation, large sums from foundations from Germany were pumped into their renovation during the 1990s already.131 An example is the renovation of the school at Schäßburg, the so-called Joseph-Haltrich-Lyzeum, which was finished in time for its 400th anniversary in October 2007.132 The Transylvanian Saxons, at the urging of individual humanist educated personalities like Johannes Honterus

126 On the stance of the representatives of the DFDR on the autonomy or cultural autonomy for the Germans in Romania see esp. the sections Minority Protection in the Host States and Umbrella Organizations.
127 Carmen Reich-Sander, math teacher at the Brukenthal Schule at Hermannstadt, is the current chairlady of the school commission of the DFDR. In general, the school commission supports the Romanian ministry of education in questions of education policy where the status of German-language instruction is concerned.
129 Cf. ibid.
130 “The Romanian teachers’ unions summed up the discussion surrounding the new educational law in February 2008 in the formula: ‘The 29th school reform in 10 years.’” König, “Immer noch etwas Besonderes – aber gefährdet,” 166.
131 Cf. ibid, 167.
132 “Dr. Karl Scheerer, the chairman of the society ‘Restauro Niermann’ and of the Bergschulverein, spoke about the many years of work done at this reference school. Now, the 810 students in 36 classes can ‘enjoy the flair of this educational institution’ in the buildings of the ‘Joseph Haltrich’-Lyzeum – some years earlier, the Bergschule did not even have proper sewer system. The high standard of all the buildings could only be achieved with the help of the donations by the Hermann-Niermann-foundation.” Ruxandra Stănescu. “Schule mit Flair. Bergschule in Schäßburg saniert und neu ausgestattet.” Hermannstädtischer Zeitung, 12 October 2007. See http://www.hermannstaedter.ro/stire.php?id=191&dom=&ed=1324 (10 May 2010).
(1498-1549) from Kronstadt, placed great importance on education and thus the school system by the standards of the times. Such German traditional schools are, for instance, the theoretical Lyzeum ‘Johannes Honterus’ (1.178/1-12) at Brașov/Kronstadt, the Nationalkolleg ‘Samuel von Brukenthal’ (790/5-12) at Sibiu/Hermannstadt, the ‘Joseph-Haltrich-Lyzeum’ (494/1-12) at Sighișoara/Schässburg or the ‘Stephan-Ludwig-Roth-Lyzeum’ (215/9-12) at Mediaș/Mediasch. Besides, there is still a large number of German-language types of schools or departments in Transylvania, which Walter König describes as follows:

They range from the large elementary school with three- or even four classes per year to the elementary school with one class per year with fewer than ten pupils, from the secondary schools in which almost all subjects can be taught in German to the German-language department in which the instruction is in German only in two or three subjects and, in the extreme case, only in the subject “German as a mother tongue” (with a more demanding curriculum than “German as a foreign language”) […] 138

This rather complex structure of school types came into existence because the German minority school system is derived in equal measure from the Saxon school tradition and from the general Romanian school system.

In Slavonia, the German minority is granted the right to a bilingual elementary school education. At Osijek/Esseg, less than 20% of the children – similar to the number of students in Transylvania referenced above – who attended this bilingual elementary school came from families that identified as belonging to the German minority in 2005. Moreover, they use German as a second language and thus resemble those children who came from Croatian families. At the Osijek Gymnasium II, there has been a bilingual branch since the school year 2004/2005. 139

For the Germans in southwest Hungary, the Valéria-Koch-Schulzentrum at Pécs plays an important role since it has offered a bilingual kindergarten/Óvoda, a bilingual elementary school/Általános iskola and a bilingual middle school/Középiskola since 1994. This center has taken on the name of the

133 On the accomplishments of Johannes Honterus, also called Praeceptor Saxonum, regarding the Saxon school system, during a time when the school ordinance was still a subchapter of the Protestant church ordinance, see: Walter König. *Schola seminarium rei publicae. Aufsätze zu Geschichte und Gegenwart des Schulwesens in Siebenbürgen und Rumänien*. Köln et al: Böhlau, 2005. 23-39.
137 The numbers in brackets show the numbers of students in the school years 2007/2008; the from-to numbers indicate the grades or classes. Cf. König, “Immer noch etwas Besonderes – aber gefährdet,” 163. The term ‘Lyzealstufe’ refers to grades 9-12 in Transylvania. Moreover, the student numbers in brackets are only possible after the out-migration of the Transylvanian Saxons because it is mostly (over 80%) the children from Romanian families who visit the German-language departments, Gymnasien and Lyzeen.
139 Interview transcript, Nikola Mak, 25 October 2005.
141 See http://www.dus.sulinet.hu/ (26 July 2010).
Hungarian-German author and pedagogue only in 2004, after it came under the sponsorship of the LdU. The Valéria-Koch-Schulzentrum includes a boarding school. Although it has closed a major gap in the offer of German-language education in southwest Hungary, only about half of students attend the four-year Gymnasium stage after elementary school. Judit Schoblocher explains that this is due to an achievement-oriented education combined with a high number of students per class, which above all negatively impacts the university preparation. The latter is very important in Hungary with view to the later choice of the university and the studies. Furthermore, the Leőwey-Klára-Gymnázium at Pécs as offered a German branch since 1957, which is called “Deutscher Nationalitätten Klassenzug” (= Német nemzetiségi osztályok). It comprises four years and currently a total of 55 students per year are admitted, with the oral and written skills in German are evaluated in the framework of the entrance examinations. Both Gymnasien, the Valéria-Koch-Gymnasium and the Leőwey-Klára-Gymnasium count among the elite schools at Pécs and they advertise their school branches among the Germans in Hungary in the villages and towns throughout Southern Transdanubia. In the so-called ‘Nationalitättenzweigen’ (nationality branches) of the Hungarian-German schools, there are also subjects, mostly during afternoon sessions, in which students are taught about the ‘identity of the Germans in Hungary,’ which is in turn developed from their own perspective on the ‘Hungarian-German tradition.’ This construction is upheld rather uncritically. For Judit Schoblocher, who has herself attended the Leőwey-Klára-Gymnázium, the ‘experiencing of traditions’ in the everyday school life meant primarily learning Danube-Swabian folk songs in the school choir and folk dances in the folk dance group, which could then be performed at Hungarian-German festivities or at the Schwabenball at Pécs. According to Schoblocher, the school sees itself as a multiplier of the Hungarian-German identity that the students bring with them from their Hungarian-German families. Yet there are also irritations in the Hungarian-German school practice, especially in dealing with the so-called Danube-Swabian dialects (mostly Franconian and Hessian, less Bavarian or Swabian): As fewer and fewer students can actively speak a Danube-Swabian dialect, the school management decided to conduct

143 The Gymnasium adopted the name of Klára Leőwey, who had played a role in the Hungarian fight for freedom of 1848/49, in 1950. Before its nationalization in 1948, the building had housed a Catholic educational institution as of 1916/17 and then a girls’ Gymnasium, which since 1921 had been called “Sankt-Elisabeth-Gymnasium” (= Szent Erzsébet leánygimnázium). Cf. http://www.leowey-pecs.sulinet.hu/info.html (26 July 2010).
145 Cf. ibid.
146 In the context of a diploma thesis at the Department for German Studies at the University of Pécs, an empirical study was conducted in 2004 at the two aforementioned Nationalitätengymnasien at Pécs, which yielded the following results: More than 90% of the students questioned named Hungarian as their mother tongue, only 50% still master a dialect, and only passively and not actively. Cf. Ditta Petz. “Identitätsbildung junger Ungarndeutscher. Eine empirische Untersuchung zur Sprache und Identität von Fünfkirchner Gymnasiasten.” Pécs: Phil. Dipl. [unpubl.] 2004. 47.
lessons only in Standard German, even in the elementary schools, which interestingly was a disadvantage for the pupils who can speak the dialect especially. In addition, the school thereby prevented itself from taking over at some point the role of the family, which is decreasing considerably, in passing on the dialect. There are dialect competitions, but they rather heighten the impression that dialect is a curiosity from the past, spoken by the “non-urban” population that has had no opportunity to learn Standard German.\footnote{Cf. Schoblocher, “Identitätsmanagement der Ungarndeutschen,” 32.} Based on census data, Maria Erb summarizes the overall Hungarian situation in terms of the gradual disappearance of the dialects among the Germans in Hungary as follows.

The dialect is on its way out, the standard variety is on the rise. That the dialect for many no longer, and the standard variety not yet, meets the criteria of a mother tongue is proven […] very clearly by census data from 2001: German has this status for only 33,192 persons, 20,000 more use German in the circle of their family and friends – yet without this \textit{Qualitätssiegel} (quality seal).\footnote{Maria Erb. “Sprachgebrauch der Ungarndeutschen: Geschichte – Tendenzen – Perspektiven.” F. Kostrzewa/R. R. Rada (eds.). \textit{Deutsch als Minderheitensprache in Ungarn: Historische Entwicklung, aktuelle Tendenzen und Zukunftsperspektiven}. Hohengehren: Schneider, 2010. 142.}

This creates an increasing pressure on the schools since the education they offer must manage to maintain or even increase the number of those who (still) regard German as their mother tongue. The preservation of the dialects has receded behind the goal to preserve German as a functional everyday language besides Hungarian. The school is principally regarded as an essential instrument of the Hungarian-German identity management and ethnomanagement in the context of this problem.\footnote{“The educational institutions – with their central role in the tradition of language, culture and identity – as well as the next generation assume a key role in this […].” Ibid., 142-143.} Nevertheless, it will not be possible to maintain many of the German-language kindergartens and elementary schools founded after the minority law of 1993, either because of a lack of trained pedagogues or simply because of the precarious financial situation in the Hungarian education system; Márta Müller speaks in this context of great differences in quality between the individual educational institutions and voices her hope that the Hungarian-German educational institutions will not only be preserved but also further developed in the future.\footnote{Cf. Müller, “Die Situation des Schulwesens für die deutsche Minderheit in Ungarn,” 114.} As a reaction to this, the LdU now drafted a pedagogical \textit{‘Kompetenzmodell’} (competence model), which is already better adapted to the situation at the schools. Ibolya Englender-Hock, the chairlady of the education committee of the LdU, said in the program “Unser Bildschirm” on 18 October 2011 that targets should be turned into measures and that a quality system for all \textit{Nationalitätenschulen} should be installed, such as a seal of quality for schools awarded by the LdU.\footnote{Cf. Ibolya Englender-Hock in “Unser Bildschirm,” 18 October 2011. See: \url{http://videotar.mtv.hu/Videok/2011/10/18/14/Unser_ Bildschirm_2011-oktober_18_.aspx} (23 November 2011).}

As a last and common aspect of the German minority school system, I would like to point to the close personal connection between identity management and ethnomanagement and school. Well-known functionaries, who are the leaders of the Germans’ \textit{Dach-}, \textit{Landesverbände} or \textit{Regionalverbände}, were originally teachers. Two examples, one from Transylvania and the other from south-
west Hungary: Klaus Johannis was a physics teacher at the Brukenthal-Gymnasium and then school inspector in the Hermannstadt Kreis, before he switched into minority politics via the DFDR and was elected mayor of Hermannstadt for the first time during the elections in 2000. He was re-elected in the elections of in 2004 and 2008. Moreover, Klaus Johannis is also the chairman of the DFDR. Gábor Frank, who was director of the Valéria-Koch-Schulzentrum at Pécs since 1994, assumed the position of director of the Ungarndeschtes Pädagogischen Institut on 16 August 2010. In addition, he as himself chairman of the LdU and is currently the chairman of the Deutsche Selbstverwaltung des Komitats Branau/Baranya. Likewise, Ibolya Englender-Hock has been elected into the Deutsche Selbstverwaltung des Komitats Branau and took over the office as director of the Valéria-Koch-Schulzentrum from Gábor Frank on 01 August 2010. In the case of the Hungarian-German leaders and functionaries, these personnel changes are easy to explain as the LdU took over sponsorship of the Valéria-Koch-Schulzentrum in 2004, just like the Ungarndeutsche Pädagogische Institut counts among the institutions administered by the LdU. Thus, these appointments are decided upon by the LdU general meeting and not by the Hungarian ministry of education.

Examples from the Hungarians’ Minority School Practice

In Transylvania/Erdély, the Anyanyelvápolók Erdélyi Szövetsége, AESZ (= Verband der Siebenbürger Muttersprachenpfleger) was founded at Sfântu Gheorge/Sepsiszentgyörgy after the Wende in 1992. It extends its activities—such as the day of the Hungarian language—onto the Hungarian-speaking schools in order to better support the instruction in the Hungarian mother tongue. The Iskola alapítvány (= Schulstiftung/school foundation), which was established in 1996 by the RMDSZ at Cluj-Napoca/Kolozsvár for the support of Hungarian-language schools, however, by now has become the protagonist in Transylvania’s Hungarian school practice. This foundation supports the establishment of a competitive education in the mother tongue, the (advanced) training of teachers and can also grant financial support for pupils and students. It moreover takes care of the expansion of the infrastructure in education and of independent institutes for language training in Hungarian. Furthermore, it advocates better working conditions for “ethnic Hungarian” (in the original) teachers in Romania. Such efforts on the part of the Hungarians themselves and the structures in the Romanian school system, which took shape according to demand, allow us to speak of a basic coverage of the elementary schools (= Általános iskolák) in Transylvania with a Hungarian-language instruction. In the cities – similar to the situation of the Germans – there are some Hungarian-speaking Gymnasien with a long

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155 In this year, the so-called bilingual “Nationalitätensubricht” was also introduced at the Valéria-Koch-Schulzentrum.
158 It is by no means the author’s intention at this point to draw into question the qualification of the people referred to. These most recent personnel changes are mentioned solely for the purpose of depicting the close connections, in personnel, between the Hungarian-German identity management and ethnomanagement and the realm of minority schools.
159 See http://aesz.ro/szovetsegrol/ismerteto/ (22 July 2010).
tradition: At Cluj-Napoca/Kolozsvár, these are, for instance, the Kolozsvári Református Kollégium,\(^{161}\) founded in 1557, the Catholic Báthory István Elméleti Liceum,\(^{162}\) founded in 1579, or the Apáczai János Elméleti Liceum (Gimnázium), also Reformed, existing since 1620.\(^{163}\) What follows is a subjective selection of other Hungarian-language Gymnasien, such as: At Brașov/Brassó, there is the Catholic Áply Lajos Főgimnázium,\(^{164}\) founded in 1837; at Oradea/Nagylvárad, there have been the Reformed Lorántffy Zsuzsanna Református Gimnázium as well as the Catholic Szent László Gimnázium since 1905, and since 1771 the Ady Endre Liceum, renamed after a famous Hungarian poet.\(^{166}\) In the Székely Land, there is the Orbán Balázs Gimnázium, founded in 1793 by the Unitarian church, at Cristuru Secuiesc/Székelykeresztúr; at Odorheiu Secuiesc/Székelyudvárhely, there is the Tamási Áron Gimnázium, founded in 1593 by the Jesuits; at Sfântu Gheorghe/Sepsiszentgyörgy, there is the Székely Mikó Kollégium, founded by the Reformed church\(^{168}\); and at the well known pilgrimage site Şuğuleu Ciuc/Csíksomlyó, the Catholic Gymnasium was operating from 1630 until 1911, until it was relocated to Miercurea Ciuc/Csíkszereda, where it continues to exist as the Márton Áron Gimnázium.\(^{169}\) In addition, in those Transylvanian cities in which there are no independent Hungarian-language Gymnasien, there are Hungarian-language branches in the Romanian Gymnasien in accordance with the law for Volksgruppen, like for example at Sighişoara/Segesvár at the Zaharia Boin Állami Gimnázium/Gimnaziul De Stat Zaharia Boin, where 13 out of 58 teachers teach Hungarian.\(^{170}\)

In Slavonia, due to the division in the two umbrella organizations HMDK and MESZ, there are two Hungarian-language elementary school centers, which are located at Osijek/Eszék and at Beli Manastir/Pélmonostor: At Osijek, the Hungarian government – in accordance with the Croatian-Hungarian bilateral agreement of 1992 – established the Horvátországi Magyar Oktatási és Művelődési Központ (= Kulturzentrum der Ungarn in Kroatien) in 1999. In this bilingual center, which is maintained by the HMDK,\(^{172}\) there are a bilingual kindergarten, an elementary school as well as a middle school (= középiskola). In 2010, between 60 and 70 students were inscribed in the middle school, between 35 and 40 pupils in the elementary school and about 50 children in the kindergarten – all children and adolescents were taught bilingually and the Croatian textbooks were translated for this

\(^{162}\) See http://www.bathory.ro/content/iskolank/tortenet (22 July 2010).
purpose. The Croatian state, funding the school itself, and the town of Osijek, paying for the school’s operating costs, jointly finance the bilingual school center at Osijek/Eszék.173

At Beli Manastir/Pélmonostor, the MESZ has even set up overnight accommodations so that it is possible for all pupils from the Slavonian Baranja to attend the bilingual elementary school.174 The Sztárai Mihály Oktatási és Művelődési Központ (= Sztárai Mihály Bildungs- und Kulturzentrum), established in 2004, moreover offers cross-border educational programs with Hungarian educational and cultural institutions; in 2007, a Volksmusikschule was founded there, as well.175 Since 2002, the schools have even received “an extra large financial support from Hungary.”176 At Beli Manastir, too, the Horvátországi Magyar Pedagógusok Szövetsége, HMPSZ (= Allianz der ungarischen Lehrer in Kroatien) was founded in 1996 already.177 The Horvátországi Magyar Pedagógus Fórum, HMPF (= Forum der ungarischen Lehrer in Kroatien) has operated as its counterpart at Osijek since 2001.178 This school situation and the existence of two Hungarian teachers’ associations at bottom reflect the split in the Hungarian identity management and ethnomanagement in Slavonia. The foundations of the different Hungarian-language educational institutions laid the actual foundation for this split.

In Slovenia, there are several bilingual Slovenian/Hungarian elementary schools (= dvojezična osnovna šola/kétnyelvű általános iskola) in all of Prekmurje; the school center of the Hungarian-language minority is now the city Lendava/Lendva, as a bilingual middle school (= dvojezična srednja šola Lendava/kétnyelvű középiskola Lendva) exists only there.179 On 16 June 2011, the Hungarian-language regional radio station MMR reported on Silvija Hajdinjak-Prendl’s appointment as the headmaster of the bilingual middle school as of September 2011. In the radio interview, she advocated that those things that cannot be realized in the minority school system should be separated from those that can be.180 This statement may sound abstract but – especially if one is familiar with the circumstances of the Hungarian identity management and ethnomanagement in Prekmurje – it contains an essential criticism of the exaggerated wishes that the MNMI has always taken to the bilingual middle

173 Cf. interview transcript, Krisztián Pálinkás, 28 June 2010.
175 See http://www.smu-mesz.hr/projektek/emagyar-pontok/946.html (26 July 2010).
176 Cf. interview transcript, Krisztián Pálinkás, 28 June 2010.
178 “10 years ago, the Forum der Ungarischen Lehrer in Kroatien was founded, which has developed into an influential organization. […] Different advanced training programs are organized for the teachers. They are in regular contact with the education council [= Oktatási Tanács], which was established by the department of Auslandsungarn of the ministry of education at Budapest. […] More Hungarian-language textbooks are needed, and more events that help the students maintain their identity.” (Trans. Hermanik/Szlezák). Tünde Micheli. “Évi közgyűlést tartott a pedagógusfórum.” Új Magyar Képes Újság, 17 March 2011. See: http://www.hhrf.org/umku/1111/index.htm (25 November 2011). Another article about the 10th anniversary of the HMPF appeared in July 2011: Cf. Mónika Molnár. “Ülészet a pedagógus fórum elnöksége,” Új Magyar Képes Újság, 14 July 2011. See: http://www.huncro.hr/huncro.hr/kategoria-blog/849-ueleszet-a-pedagogus-forum-elnokesge (25 November 2011).
179 See http://www.dssl.si/ (28 July 2010). In the middle school, both languages, Slovenian and Hungarian, are languages of instruction: But since it is generally difficult to use two languages in the teaching practice, a curriculum is designed in Slovenia that shall provide more explicit guidelines. Cf. interview transcript, Silvija Hajdinjak Prendl, 18 January 2010.
school and its Hungarian-speaking teachers. In a personal interview of the author with Silvija Hajdinjak Prendl, who at the time was still assistant headmaster, she said that the middle school is only continuing on the track that for the Hungarians in Slovenia already begins in the kindergarten and in the elementary school (= általános iskola). For the elementary school, there are now also bilingual textbooks, with one page in Slovenian, one page in Hungarian, respectively. For the middle school, this exists as of now only for the first grade. In the advanced grades, Slovenian and Hungarian textbooks are used parallelly and further translations of the Slovenian standard textbooks, which are financed by the Slovenian ministry of education, are work in progress.\textsuperscript{181} At the moment, the teaching practice in the bilingual instruction at Lendava looks as follows: In the elementary school, there are language groups and when a lesson is taught in Hungarian (80%), only the key terms are also explained in Slovenian (20%). These 20% do not necessarily have to be a summary of the contents taught in the other language. In the bilingual middle school, the teaching practice is similar, but the proportion between the two languages here is about 30% Hungarian and 70% Slovenian; only on the so-called level 1 is there the same number of Hungarian and Slovenian lessons. The children are distributed into groups and can choose in which language they want to graduate.\textsuperscript{182} In principle, Hungarian is taught in the four years as a colloquial language (= in the original környezetnyelv, ambient language). To what extent this bilingual middle school contributes to the maintenance of the Hungarian language in Slovenia could be concluded from the direct comparison: when adolescent members of the Hungarian Volksgruppe had attended schools elsewhere in Slovenia and thus had been taught exclusively in Slovenian, their Hungarian was markedly inferior to that of the graduates of the Gymnasium. And still, the agents of the MNMI are not satisfied with the accomplishments of the school.\textsuperscript{183} These conflicts between the dedicated pedagogical work in the school, where teachers even try to also teach ‘Nationalitätteninhälte’/’nationality contents’ (Trans. Hermanik/Szlezák) of the Hungarian Volksgruppe in the subjects history, geography, music, and art,\textsuperscript{184} and the Hungarian identity management and ethnomanagement are very surprising, given that the work in the school and the bilingual side-by-side of the Hungarian and Slovenian pupils is very fruitful. Yet, the MNMI requests that the entire instruction be in equal parts in Hungarian as well. This may well be a case of minority-political agitation, but especially in minority schooling, the instruction in principle needs to take its point of departure from the language proficiency of the children and adolescents – the aforementioned examples of the Germans in Hungary, for instance, have shown this; at the same time, it needs to be admitted that a sound bilingualism in particular opens up very good opportunities on the job market in Slovenia.

In the framework of a meeting of the so-called Trianon-Forum at Budapest in March 2011, at which representatives of the Auslandsungarn met with those of the kin state Hungary to discuss topi-

\textsuperscript{181} Cf. interview transcript, Silvija Hajdinjak Prendl, 18 January 2010.
\textsuperscript{182} Cf. ibid.
\textsuperscript{183} Cf. ibid.
\textsuperscript{184} Cf. ibid.
cal problems, István Pásztor, the chairman of the VMSZ, summarized the goals of the Hungarians in Serbia in the realm of education policy as follows:

Pásztor István beszélt arról, hogy a határon túli magyarok számára fontos: az oktatás, a tájékoztatás és a művelődés tekintetében maguk irányíthassák saját intézményeiket. Beszámolt arról, arra készülnek, hogy mintegy 45 iskolában és 30 művelődési intézményben vehessék át az alapítói jogokat a Vajdaságban.

István Pásztor said that it was important for the Auslandsungarn that they could control their institutions in the fields of education, news coverage culture independently. He said that they planned to take over the incorporation rights of 45 schools and 30 cultural institutions in Vojvodina. (Trans. Hermanik/Szlezák) 185

The framework within which to implement these ambitious projects is comparably favorable in Vojvodina since the improvement and extension of the law on the establishment and the rights of the minorities’ Nationalräte in 2009 now grants the Nationalräte a considerable say, among other areas also in the school matters. 186 In the interview, Bálint Pásztor, who is a VMSZ delegate in the Serbian parliament, speaks more concretely about the competences of the Nationalräte and about their meaningfulness in the field of schools as the Nationalräte have a say in the appointment of headmasters or also in the matter of textbooks, and it is mostly the subjects fostering a sense of identity that are at stake:

“In our case Hungarian language and literature, history, music and art, the parts with national contents need to be approved by the Nationalräte” (Trans. Hermanik/Szlezák). 187 For Bálint Pásztor, these competences are already a part of the larger framework of the notion of autonomy:

If a certain national community can markedly influence the matters concerning the situation of this national community via its elected representatives, then we must first and foremost think of the preservation of identity. This is the classic example of the minority governments, when the Nationalrat has a say in what a textbook should look like. (Trans. Hermanik/Szlezák) 188

In this quotation, the textbook parable reflects the interaction of the identity management and ethno-management – in this case, the Nationalräte – and the minority school system in an exemplary manner, especially since the textbook is considered a guarantor for ‘the preservation of identity.’ Pásztor furthermore talks about the recent idea of the VMSZ, “to put the student in the center of the school system” (Trans. Hermanik/Szlezák). 189 To achieve this, a school bus system would have to be set up because some Hungarian schools in very small communities can no longer be maintained. School centers could prevent that classes get merged and preserve the Hungarian school system. 190 Csaba Pressburger, the chief editor of the Magyar Szó, also explicitly addresses this problem of the dwindling numbers of students in the Hungarian branches:

This year [in 2010], incredibly few children were enrolled in the Volksschulen at Novi Sad, altogether about 25. There have never been so few […] At the moment, there are five Volksschulen at Novi Sad, in which there is a Hungarian branch, but in each Volksschule there are only 2-
3 Hungarian children in the classes. Different solutions were discussed during a conference of those who are affected by this: 1) to have a separate Hungarian school with a school bus so that the children can be brought there from more remote communities; 2) to wait because the children from the families who left in the 1990s are lacking; 3) to persuade the parents to change their mindset so that they enroll their children in the Hungarian class. (Trans. Hermaník/Szlezák)

Another problem concerns the integration of prospective Hungarian teachers at Volksschulen in Vojvodina since they are only allowed to teach in Hungarian after the Pedagogical Academy (= tanítóképző). Only since recently can Hungarian-speaking teachers at Volksschulen be better integrated, although: “It took an incredibly long time for us to overcome the resistance against this Hungarian Pedagogical Academy. But we have managed” (Trans. Hermaník/Szlezák). The present goal is to restructure the Hungarian Pedagogical Academy in such a way as to train the teachers for two subjects in the future. The young teachers in question should receive financial support for the recognition of diplomas that they earned in Hungary since these recognitions are quite costly in Serbia. Yet it is principally important in this context that these hurdles in the Serbian school system and in the teacher training are not instinctively interpreted as hostility against Hungarians. Bálint Pásztor has a relaxed view on this matter, which could serve as a model for other:

Some things really do not function here for anti-Hungarian reasons, but simply because certain structures (e.g. in education, recognitions, etc.) have not yet developed sufficiently. There are also diplomas or professions that do not even exist yet in Serbia. (Trans. Hermaník/Szlezák)

In the following, I would like to outline, with the help of the example of the festivities of 15 March, the commemoration of the revolution (= forradalom) of 1848/49, which role the school plays among the Hungarians in the framework of the memorial cultures: In the village Kanjiža/Magyarkanizsa, which is situated east of Subotica/Szabadka, public festivities commemorating the revolution of 1848 take place in March of every year in the schoolyard of the Arany-János elementary school. This had no longer been possible after the school had been merged with the Serbian school and had been renamed Jovan-Jovanović elementary school in 1956. But the Hungarian-speaking cantor had secretly continued the then ‘forbidden’ celebrations and had also handed down the traditional choreography, for example with the “Nemzeti Dal” by Sándor Petőfi. István Balogh, who taught Hungarian literature at his ‘own elementary school,’ at which he had already experienced this choreography as a pupil, continued this. At present, the program of the Hungarian elementary schools for 15 March – after the Wende such commemorative festivities are permitted in public again – is often rehearsed together with the Magyar Művelődési Egyesület, MME (= ungarischen Kulturverein), which, in turn, fosters

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191 Interview transcript, Csaba Pressburger, 04 July 2010.
192 The Serbian educational system allows for only one subject per teacher.
194 Ibid.
the interaction between the Hungarian schools and the Hungarian identity management and ethnoman-
gement.196

Minority Literature, Fine Arts and Performing Arts

Examples from among the Germans in Hungary197

The minority literature198 can easily be identified as an instrument of the identity management and
ethnomanagement of a linguistic minority; implicitly, it is about the usage of language in its role as
dialect and sociolect, in its perceptions as a minority language and, beyond that, as a means of artistic
expression. It is not easy to position the production of literature by authors who come from a linguistic
minority in a research context, as the following quotation shall demonstrate with the help of the exam-
ple of the “German literature from abroad”:

The review of the critical engagement with German literature from abroad provides insights into
the tiresome dispute about designations such as “German literature,” “minority literature,” “Na-
tionalitättenliteratur,” “auslands-deutsche Literatur,” etc. But it also makes implicitly obvious
that the decisive question is by-passed, namely of whether the existence alone of printed and
bound pages in few books as well as their labeling e.g. as “Hungarian-German” or “German-
Canadian literature” and the documentation of authors’ activities and publication make it possi-
ble in a serious manner to speak of an independent literature, respectively, which is generally
tacitly assumed.199

Generally, minority literature is classified within the canon of regional literatures,200 which does seem
in a way problematic if region and language as well as ethnic origin are intertwined.201 Moreover, mi-
nority literature was taken to have a great affinity to Heimat literature. In the context of the Hungarian-
German literature, Rita Pável states:

To regain the Heimat that was drawn into question functioned as a keen incentive to write, the
commitment to the Hungarian Heimat, to the village […] The problem of the Heimat including
its attributes unfolded in this literature as an existential question.202

196 On 15 March 2011, for example, by the Kókai Imre elementary school at Temerin with the Szirmai Károly MME. On the
festivities at Temerin see esp. the section Cultures of Memory.
197 For a briefer English version of these topics with examples from among the Germans in Hungary, the Germans in Rom-
ainia and the Hungarians in Transylvania see Klaus-Jürgen Hermanik. “The Role of Arts and Artists as Intermediaries in Iden-
tity Management and Ethnomanagement: Examples from the German Minority in Hungary and the Hungarian and German
198 When the literary genre “minority literature” is depicted here, the focus is not on literary criticism and analysis but above
all on the interaction with the political identity management and ethnomanagement of the Germans in Hungary.
The secondary literature on the Hungarian-German minority literature is thus drawn upon because the philological research
on the minority literature is also connected to the identity management and ethnomanagement of the Germans in Hungary.
200 “The terms ‘Rand-Literatur,’ ‘kleine Literatur,’ ’regionale Literatur,’ ‘Literatur einer Region,’ ‘regionalistische Literatur,’
’Minderheitenliteratur,’ ‘deutsche Literatur im Ausland,’ ‘außendeutsche Literatur’ hint at the regional dimension […] of the
respective literatures.” Rita Pável. “Entwicklungsgeschichtliche Erwägungen zur ungardeutschen Literatur mit besonderer
201 Gregor Alexander Grömmer remarked the following with regard to the charging of the regional with German-national
ideas, which has constantly been present since the 19th century: “First, national-territorial terms such as space, border, Volk
and language are ideologically charged in the general discourse. They served the purpose of perceiving the German as a
mission of high art and the German way of life.” Gregor Alexander Grömmer. “‘Heimatliteratur des Fremden.’ Perspektiven
Furthermore, such topics and motifs as for instance “foreigners and locals, tradition and modernity, genre accounts from the Heimat village, Volkskultur and customs […] province and cultural identity”\textsuperscript{203} in the Hungarian-German literature point in the direction of a literary process of inclusion and exclusions-process. In the case of an exclusive retrospective onto one’s own traditions, Rita Pável speaks of a “walking down into the dead end of the ‘Heimat literature’ […]”\textsuperscript{204} Alexander Ritter describes this hermitical circle of the German minority literature as follows: “The authors and their literature in the foreign German-language provinces are a part of the social and cultural narrowness of their section of the population and their region.”\textsuperscript{205} The inside perspective of the Hungarian-German author János Szabó, in an article in the Neue Zeitung just before the Wende in 1988, reveals this volksgruppen-specific aspect:

I record what I experience in the name of the Volksgruppe, for the Volksgruppe. That is service, that kind of service that the reader demands. Of course, my works cannot be compared with Goethe. Whoever does does so maliciously. I do not mince my words. My audience understands that, expects that; the critical faultfinders should rather take into account the readers’ true demands.\textsuperscript{206}

The term ‘regional literature’ thus assumes an independent existence in that it is above all or ‘only’ produced for the Hungarian-German audience of a specific region and becomes a metaphor, to satisfy the demands of this audience, which expects exactly such a kind of minority literature. The boundaries to the Heimat literature are fluent since generally “the emotional bond with a region […]” is described “frequently as ‘Heimatliebe,’ ‘Heimattreue’ or ‘Heimatbewusstsein,’ […] with the known and proven regional structures taking on a functional charge in the process.”\textsuperscript{207} Regional literature, minority literature, Heimat literature by way of such a charge, which is not least encouraged by the agents of the identity management and ethnomangement, becomes, in the same way as its counterpart, the Heimat song, a site of memory for the minority. In this context, the minority literature assumes the role of a mediator between the author, the reader and the region. Besides, it is up to the writers themselves to engage partly critically with the term Heimat and the out-dated subtexts it connotes. The demand for a deconstructivist approach to this complex form of affiliation to a region is legitimate, as there was, in the 1970s for example, generally an increased tendency of a critical Heimat literature within the German-language literature.\textsuperscript{208} This hardly applied to the Hungarian-German minority literature because, according to Heidi Ritter, the Heimat has an “existential meaning” there\textsuperscript{209} and because the trigon with

\textsuperscript{203} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{204} Ibid., 260.
\textsuperscript{205} Ritter, Deutsche Minderheitenliteraturen, 114.
\textsuperscript{207} Hermanik, Eine versteckte Minderheit, 269. In somewhat more neutral terms, Heimat can “be considered one of many intermediaries between the individual and the society, and sometimes represents the most central factor in the ties to a living space […]” Ibid. 270.
\textsuperscript{209} “All the relationships, summed up and realized in it [the Heimat], between the individuals and what they regard as Heimat conditions are of existential importance especially among minorities, are experienced intensely in an entirely different way than, e.g. in societal circumstances that are secured by a linguistic-cultural majority […] the bond with territory, nature,
its cornerstones language, literature and Heimat thereby assumes a “higher functional value” than, say, in Germany or Austria.210 The theme of Sprache als Heimat (language as homeland) derived from this has played an inestimable role especially in multiethnically settled, multilingual regions up until the present – for some authors as big a role as the notion of Heimat in its regional-geographic connotations; as an example of this follows a poem by the Hungarian-German author Angela Korb:

**Angela Korb**

**Language**

Sprache ist Heimat
die treueste Geliebte
von Wort zu Wort
Wonne herbeizaubernd
weint sie still
wenn ich fremdgehe
und verzieht mein Stolpern
mit einem beglückenden Zauber
ihrer Zärtlichkeit

(from: *Signale* 1/26, 11 December 2009)

The inquiries into the reciprocity between Hungarian-German minority literature and the members of the minority concern, next to their topics and audience, mainly also subsidies for literary production: Is it enough for the subsidy grantor that the author her-/himself comes from the minority? To what extent is it an advantage to make the minority itself the topic, in such a manner as to acknowledge the readers from the Volksgruppe correspondingly? How far may they go in their criticism of their own Volksgruppe? Do thorny topics – such as the period of National Socialismus – have to be omitted entirely and should, in contrast, topics such as the expulsion Germans be addresses by all means? All these questions are just as much a part of the identity management and ethnomanagement. This basically means that every author has to tread the thin line between her/his own existence as a member of the minority – also with view to the subsidies that come from a minority budget –, the documentation of topics and subjects that are relevant for the minority as well as the claim to literariness and thus to a corresponding transregional reception by readers, literary criticism and scholarship.211 Examples from the history of the Hungarian-German literature document the connections between the conditions under which minority literature is produced and the identity management and ethnomanagement of the Germans in Hungary:

After a break of about thirty years, a Hungarian-German anthology titled “Tiefe Wurzeln” – as can be read in the foreword – appeared at Budapest, whose contributions mostly derived from a competition that the Demokratische Verband der Deutschen in Ungarn had organized. The Literarische Sektion of the Verband served as the editor. The collection takes its point of departure from the importance of creating a Hungarian-German literature, which is also stressed in the

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210 Cf. ibid., 289.
211 Cf. also Ritter, *Deutsche Minderheitenliteraturen*, 110.
foreword, whose works want to incite the wish for more among the Germans in Hungary, that is, a literature is supposed to evolve in the circle of the Germans in Hungary “that corresponds to our goals and that over time will also approach great literature.” Thus, a political and a literary goal are set.212

The anthology “Tiefe Wurzeln” mentioned in the quotation was published by Erika Áts in 1974 and it then raised hopes that an independent Hungarian-German literature would be established. It is thereby hard to overlook the dependence on the Demokratischer Verband der Deutschen in Ungarn. This anthology was euphorically received in Hungarian-German circles, the motivation thereof was described as the “urge for linguistic-artistic expression in the mother tongue” and the universal theme is “the love of the mother tongue and of the Hungarian Heimat.”213 A second anthology, titled “Die Holzpuppe,” was edited, also by Erika Áts, in 1977. Helmut Rudolf, a philologist from the former GDR, sees in the love of the Heimat above all an interplay of the so-called Hungarian-German Nationalitätenliteratur and Hungarian national literature.214 The publication of the third anthology “Bekenntnisse – Erkenntnisse” in 1979 provoked the reviewer Heidi Ritter to ascribe the flourishing of the Hungarian-German literature also to the positive developments in the minority politics on the part of the host state Hungary215; she allot the main role in stirring up creative energy among the Germans in Hungary to the Demokratischer Verband der Deutschen in Ungarn.216 In the 1970s, there were on professional authors among the contributors to the anthology, which encouraged the critic Heidi Ritter to draw the following comparison:

True, not all who write among the Germans in Hungary will be able to call themselves authors, but they do not even want that because it is important for them to participate in their way in the cultivation and flourishing of the culture of their nationality. It is exactly this relative breadth of the Hungarian-German literary movement that includes the activity of many that is characteristic at present.217

This makes evident the difficulties to locate a minority literature that was written with view to the clientele – “The readers of the Hungarian-German authors are first and foremost their compatriots […]” 218 and practically had not place in the overall German literary market. These forms of reciprocity between the ‘one writing and his/her audience’ therefore led to a flattening of literary standards.


213 The title of the aforementioned competition of the Verband by the way was: “Greift zur Feder!”

214 Cf. ibid., 38.

215 “The far-reaching rights that the Nationalitätenpolitik of the UVR [= Ungarische Volksrepublik] grants the national minorities (Germans, Serbo-Croats, Romanians and Slovaks) within the socialist democracy have created the conditions for their socio- and cultural-political work.” Heidi Ritter. “Schritte im Prozeß literarischer Selbstverständigung. Bemerkungen zu einer ungardeutschen Anthologie.” J. Szabó/J. Schuth (eds.), Ungarndeutsche Literatur der siebziger und achtziger Jahre, 47.

216 Cf. ibid., 52.

217 Ibid.

218 Ibid.
Since there are a number of different dialects, the authors focused on a very limited audience. So did Franz Zeltner: “[…] I have my audience in my Heimat village. We are 1000 inhabitants.”

János Szabó also recognizes this tendency in the Hungarian-German literature of the 1980s:

The main danger that threatened the Hungarian-German literature in the past one and a half decades was not (as one could potentially assume) political in nature. What has been destructive in the first place is the lack of demand within their own ranks; most authors regard literature as a mere hobby that does not oblige them in any way. Due to the publication of immature works, the lack of a functioning literary public and the overly cautious criticism the situation is rendered more difficult.

The Hungarian-German author Georg Wittmann postulated back then that it was most important for an author “[…] to write and to put our energies at the service of the Hungarian Deutschtum.” He thus explicitly demands a complete instrumentalization of the minority literature for the Hungarian-German identity management and ethnomanagement.

A glance at present times shows an engagement on the part of the Hungarian-German authors with their own societal and artistic status, for instance in the Werkstattgespräche (workshop talks) within the VUdAK, that is already far removed from this and much more differentiated. The choice of motif, too, has changed among the younger generation of the Hungarian-German authors especially with regard to the notion of Heimat, the Hungarian-German author Angela Korb says, who herself was also an active VUdAK member. Yet, there has still not evolved a clear terminological dichotomy between ‘vernacular culture’ and ‘high culture’ among the Germans in Hungary. Among the Germans in Hungary, there are by now four possibilities to combine language and origins with each other: i) Hungarian, ii) German (Standard German) or iii) German (Danube-Swabian dialects); iv) German-language authors who were born as Germans in Hungary but who no longer identify with it at all in their identity as authors, such as the author Terézia Mora, could be subsumed under a fourth category. Category ii) is used most often as a means of artistic-literary expression. Authors falling into category i), who have Hungarian-German origins, treat the Hungarian-German history in their works but publish in Hungarian, are counted among the Hungarian authors, such as Márton Kalász, born in southwest Hungary in 1934. Dialects, however, are rarely used, Angela Korb says, and serve in the

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222 Further explanations on the VUdAK see below in this section.
223 Transcript of the interview with the Hungarian-German author Angela Korb, 22 April 2010. Even today, there are only two professional authors, out of 20, in the VUdAK.
first place as a regional marker for characters. Korb describes her very personal access to the literary language as follows:

You are on a search for a new language – also by means of multilingualism: because you think differently in the other language. Literature is a form of opening up through language and you search for new forms, means of expression, linguistic means, to one’s own writing I […] you come out of the geographic space, experiment, sometimes a text turns out well, sometimes it doesn’t […] this takes place in connection to the Werkstätte (workshop). The functionality of the language remains the same.

Not only for Angela Korb, but for many of the Hungarian-German authors of today’s generation, Valeria Koch (1947-1997) is a model. She wrote her poetry in German and in Hungarian, and thus triggered a discussion at the beginning of the 1980s already:

Those who have read the poems “Daganatnap” and “Alle meine Freunde” have to admit that the one could only be created in Hungarian, the other only in German. Valeria Koch feeds many people’s doubts that poetry can be translated at all, she provokes scholars to analyze her usage of language, her style in German and Hungarian, her choice of words in both languages and so on.

It is, however, not only the bilingualism, with which Valeria Koch forcefully brings about a cesura in the history of the Hungarian-German literature, it is above all her approach to writing. Valeria Koch shifted this spectrum “from the we-poetry of the old generation to the I-poetry of the youngest” and she also tries in her work to establish a link to the overall German literature. She herself says about this: “But it will only turn into literature, if it transcends the single, the level of the curious of the nationality […].” The group of Hungarian-German authors that steered in such a direction in the 1980s included, next to Valeria Koch, other protagonists such as Nelu Bradean-Ebinger, Martha Fata, Claus Kotz, and Josef Michelisz be, of whom several had studied German at the university, which opened up an entirely different access to the German language for them. In the second half of the 1980s, Susanne Breier studied the reading habits of the Hungarian-German minority with regard to the literature written by the aforementioned authors and reached the following conclusion:

The results of the present study do not give much reason for optimism concerning the future fate of the Hungarian-German literature. From the answers given by the almost 60 persons questioned, it can be concluded that the Hungarian-German literature is read only by a

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226 Cf. interview transcript, Angela Korb, 22 April 2010.
227 Ibid.
228 Cf. ibid.
233 Cf. ibid.
dwindling minority of the *Ungarndeutsch*um. I even had the impression that the majority does not even know this exists literature.234

The majority of those questioned in the framework of this study had the following expectations of Hungarian-German minority literature:

> The task of this literature is to cultivate the German language, to preserve and mediate Hungarian-German ideas, to show the position and path to the Germans in Hungary.235

Rita Pável remarks that the “Hungarian-German literature is apodictically a minority literature”236 and thus even delimits the effectiveness of its dissemination:

> The Hungarian-German literature is a regional literature with a dominant regionalism, since it fulfills the specifically regional functions of literature, mostly only meets local needs and does not strive for a supra-regional reception.237

Nevertheless, Pável assigns the Hungarian-German literature a central role in the language maintenance and within the framework of collective identity of the Germans in Hungary:

> To be a carrier and preserver of language, to function as an organ of linguistic identity [...] despite the remoteness from the free inner-German literary and intellectual life, to fulfill the role of a cultural mediator.238

This insight largely overlaps with the research results of Eszter Propszt’s 2007 monograph.239 Propszt perceives a clear cesura between those identity traits that are determined by the Hungarian language and those that are influenced by the German language, while most recently “the theme of identity has been elaborated in a considerably more differentiated manner in Hungarian.”240 Texts in Hungarian thus play a far more socio-psychological role by now in the identity-formation of the Hungarian-German minority. Texts in German, however, can indeed also fulfill their functions as mediators in the Hungarian-German identity management and ethnomangement. This differentiation, which can be deduced less from the literary production itself and much more so from the exploration of the reading habits of the Germans in Hungary has in my opinion by now become a basic precondition for the investigation of Hungarian-German minority literature in its relations to the Hungarian-German identity management and ethnomangement.

When asked about the identity construction as a minority author, Angela Korb says that “literature is a form of opening through language” and the author is thus “in search of new forms, new modes of expression, new stylistic means” in order to adequately express “one’s own writing I.”241

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237 Ibid., 259.


240 Ibid., 209.

241 Interview transcript, Angela Korb, 22 April 2010.
This struggle for a literary expression, for the literary self, however, does not have to entail at the same time the break with all the minority’s traditions. If someone tried to position themselves as Germans in Hungary both within the Hungarian society and within the native language, they can serve as models for the Germans in Hungary. From a historical perspective, the generation of authors surrounding Valeria Koch has made a considerable contribution especially because they tried “to find their own tone in the poetic treatment of their relation to the Heimat, to the language and to the origins.”\(^{242}\) The Hungarian-German authors have always published their works in the context of the Hungarian-German identity management and ethnomanagement. This way of proceeding indeed suggests a Hungarian-German \textit{corporate identity}, which the Verband – later the LdU – certainly wished and wishes. The LdU and the Hungarian-German creatives at present cooperate most intensely in the \textit{Verband der ungarndeutschen Autoren und Künstler}, VUdAK.\(^{243}\) It evolved in 1992 from the writers’ organization \textit{Verband ungarndeutscher Autoren}, which was founded in 1990.\(^{244}\) The most important tasks of the VUdAK consist in the gathering of Hungarian-German creatives in the annual \textit{Werkstattgespräche} (workshop talks) as well as in the establishment of a publication platform. The newsletter of the Verband \textit{Signale}, which appears as a supplement to the \textit{Neue Zeitung}\(^{245}\) every year in December, gives an overview of the activities of the VUdAK.\(^{246}\) In the 2008 issue, the roles were assigned as follows in the context of the Hungarian-German literature: “By publishing books, the Verband contributes to the canonization of Hungarian-German literature […]”\(^{247}\) Such an approach indeed corresponds to an identity management and ethnomanagement because this literary canon, the inclusion into and exclusion from depend on the \textit{Ungarndeutschum}, is explicitly ethnically motivated. An open structure, which is actually close to the literary historical notion of the canon, cannot be detected in this. This refers to the series \textit{Literatur} of the VUdAK, which, for example, boasts a total of 12 publications in 2009.\(^{248}\) This series does represent a sound possibility for publication since the Hungarian state has withdrawn almost entirely from the funding of publishing houses and the general literature distribution, in the form of subsidies for authors, since the \textit{Wende}. The German-speaking countries do not provide support, either:

Publishing houses from the German-speaking area make a bolt exclusively for the few well-known names from Hungary; so the authors who write in German or those who had their works translated into German do not find publishers in the German-speaking countries that would cover the costs for printing. The insignificant degree of feedback from the inner-German literary landscape encouraged the development of a closed production-reception-cycle for the Hungarian-German literature in its country of origin.\(^{249}\)


\(^{243}\) See \url{http://www.vudak.hu} (31 January 2011).

\(^{244}\) Cf. Pável, “Entwicklungsgeschichtliche Erwägungen zur ungarndeutschen Literatur,” 266.

\(^{245}\) In the original: Neue-Zeitung-Beilage für Literatur und Kunst.

\(^{246}\) The \textit{Signale} years 2000-2009 are already available online. See \url{http://www.vudak.hu/signale.php} (31 January 2011).


\(^{249}\) Pável, “Entwicklungsgeschichtliche Erwägungen zur ungarndeutschen Literatur,” 266-267.
The small publishing house NOVUM, which has existed since 1997 and which predominantly takes
care of lead authors, now also has an office²⁵⁰ in Hungary, and there, the author Angela Korb says, you
can sell anything. At the same time, when asked about the competitiveness of the Hungarian-German
literature, she underlined that this in principle mostly depended on the individual person, the younger
generation was indeed keen on spurring one another, but one was also reading.²⁵¹ There is in general a
very low degree of competitiveness in the minority literatures, which is mostly due to the small numbers
of writers within a minority.²⁵² Within the minority literature, the social control is very strong, Angela
Korb says, since Hungary itself is not particularly large, and the LdU itself is involved in the literature
mostly through the systems of subsidy and evaluation.²⁵³ Eszter Probst has studied the practice of the
interdiscourse between Hungarian-German identity constructions and Hungarian-German literature,
among others with respect to “the function of the elementary-literary symbolization”²⁵⁴ in the Hungar-
ian-German literature. With regard to the usage of the German as compared to the Hungarian lan-
guage, she comes to the following conclusion, which also says something about the reciprocity be-
tween author and recipient mentioned above:

The identity construction in the (Hungarian-)German language is effected mostly via a simplifying
reduction of the problem or via the suspension of important real practices: The social reality
and the psychic reality of an individual or of a collective is mainly re-constructed in rather sim-
plified, binary semantic oppositions. The identity construction in the (Hungarian-)German lan-
guage presupposes a much less complex socialisation of its readers than the one in the Hungari-
ian language.²⁵⁵

András Balogh, by comparison, comes to a less sobering conclusion on the ‘Wirkungsgrad’ (effectiveness)
of the Hungarian-German literature:

In the struggle for their language they [the Hungarian-German authors] achieved results that are
not insignificant; books published every year, the serenity of their topics, their poetic power tes-
tify to an extraordinary will to live, which gives hope that this small literature will unfold fur-
ther in the future in the interstice between the Hungarian and the German literature.²⁵⁶

The Hungarian-German identity management and ethno-management also encourage the recruitment
of younger authors. The LdU tries to tie the adolescents who write in German as early as possible to the-
or ‘own’ institutions. This is done primarily at the Nationalitätenschulen and through the ‘Valeria-

²⁵¹ Interview transcript, Angela Korb, 22 April 2010.
²⁵² “In literature, a good ‘Werkklima’ (working climate) also depends on the number of those working because it boosts the
im Spiegel der siebenbürgisch-deutschen Literaturegeschichte.” A. Schwob (ed.). Die deutsche Literaturegeschichte Ostmit-
165.
²⁵³ Gesprächsprotokoll, Angela Korb, 22 April 2010. In response to my question of whether the saying by Walther von der
Vogelweide “Wes Brot ich ess, des Lied ich sing” was principally still valid today, Korb gave an affirmative answer. It has,
however, to be added in this context that the steering effects through an elaborate state system of subsidies and a restrictive
publishing sector geared towards bestsellers are valid for all literary productions and not only for minority authors.
²⁵⁴ Propszt, Zur interdiskursiven Konstruktion ungarndeutscher Identität in der ungarndeutschen Gegenwartsliteratur, 56.
²⁵⁵ Ibid., 209.
Koch-literature competition,’ which is advertised especially for Germans in Hungary and the advertisement title asks the adolescents to describe their Hungarian-German identity.257

For the fine artists among the Germans in Hungary, the reciprocity with the Hungarian-German audience is completely different: The value of the ethnic marker language, which is exaggerated especially in the case of a linguistic minority, is relativized since “it has a universal language.”258 In some respects, there is still a different reception, in the sense of the categorizations into ‘Hungarian-German folk art’259 versus ‘contemporary art.’ A strict separation, however, should not be insisted on here because the borders between the genres become increasingly blurry and because contemporary artists also cite traditional motifs or use traditional techniques.260 The connection to the Hungarian-German identity management and ethnomangement is established above all via the artist her-/himself and via the Hungarian-German origins. Since the already existing writers’ guild merged with the Hungarian-German artists to form the VUdAK in 1992, the Verband has been the most direct connection to the LdU. Following the series Literatur, the VUdAK has also established a separate small series Kunst.261 The Neue Zeitung, the website of the VUdAK262 and the journal Signale inform about the most recent exhibitions of the Hungarian-German artists.

Two fine artists and a purposeful selection of their works will be presented here as concrete examples of the close intertwinem with the memorial culture of the Germans in Hungary: In the courtyard of the Lenau-Haus in Pécs, where the Deutsche Selbstverwaltung and a cultural center are housed, there is a bronze statue that references the forced migration (= kitelepítés) of the Germans in Hungary. It was created by the Hungarian-German sculptor Ferenc Trischler on commission and was erected there in 1995. The sculptor, born at Németbóly/Deutsch-Bohl in 1945, who had first completed an apprenticeship as a (house) painter, registered at the University of Fine Arts only at the urging of his friend, the sculptor János Meszlényi, and earned a diploma in 1975. In his work, it is mainly 257 “The board of education of the LdU welcomes nominations for the ‘Valeria-Koch-Prize’ 2011. The objective is to award a prize to three Hungarian-German middle school students of the last two years for minority-specific activities as well as to a Hungarian-German graduate of an academic institution for an excellent diploma thesis on a ungarndeutschem topic. Middle school students are nominated by the respective school, graduates by the chair of the respective academic institution where the diploma thesis was submitted or also by a minority self-government or a Hungarian-German society. If there are several applicants, the institutions are asked to make a pre-selection and rank the applicants. Proposals for shared prizes are not accepted. It should be noted that the ‘Valeria-Koch-Prize’ can only be awarded to members of the Hungarian-German minority. Required materials are: a) a brief CV (non-tabular!) b) a letter of recommendation from the Deutsche Selbstverwaltung of the home town or the Gemeinschaft Junger Ungarndeutscher c) in the case of graduates, their diploma thesis and the advisor’s evaluation d) in the case of middle school students, a copy of the list report (expectations include a good overall academic performance, excellent achievements in German and Volkskunde, exemplary conduct and discipline), as well as an essay of 2-3 DIN A/4 pages on the topic ‘Was bedeutet mir Ungarndeutscher/r zu sein’ (‘What does it mean for me to be a German in Hungary?’).” See http://www.ldu.hu/de/index_news_01.php (01 February 2011).

258 Interview transcript, Angela Korb, 22 April 2010.


260 The question of whether there is a “ungarndeutsche Kunst” as such at all shall not be answered here. This term is, of course, explicitly used in publication organs of the Germans in Hungary: e.g. in the invitation to the workshop ZeitTräume, which takes place on 03 February 2011 at the Haus der Ungarndeutschen at Budapest, you can read the following formulation: “A workshop leader will work with groups – formed according to age – on the Hungarian-German art and will give an introduction into contemporary Hungarian-German visual art.” See http://www.vudak.hu/96-34384.php (02 February 2011).


allegorical, human figures that are at the center, and he mostly uses bronze as a material. Ferenc Trischler has created a large number of sculptures, which have been erected all over Hungary, but mainly in the public space in southwest Hungary. His works mostly revolve around personalities or symbols from Hungary’s history such as: König St. Stephen (Heves an Döbrönte 2001), István Széchenyi (Pécs 2010), József Rippl-Rónai (Kaposvár 2009), Turul/Trianon-Denkmal (Lajosmizse 2001), King Matthias (Lajosmizse 2003).263

A memorial was dedicated at Elek on 18 August 2001, which is meant to commemorate the expulsion of the nearly 5000 Germans in Hungary, who had to leave Elek for good in 1946. The bronze statuary art was designed by the sculptor Sándor Kligl:

[…] the stylized front of a farm house, on which the angel of evil triumphs, in front of the cosy home, a Swabian family in the last moment before the expulsion. The look in the farmer’s eyes is gloomy: “What will the future bring?!”; the boy hesitantly steps into the unknown; the mother is doubtful, confused: What should be packed, what should be left behind… the grandma is sitting stony-faced… Perhaps she murmurs with clenched teeth: “Why, o Lord, do you let this happen”…She does not understand what is going on… And yet she prays humbly: “Thy will be done.” And the angel delivers the cruel message.264

Sándor Kligl, who also spells his name Kliegl,265 graduated from the Hungarian Academy of Fine Arts in 1970 and has since created some bronze statutes on public commission. Moreover, Kligl is a specialist for bronze commemorative plaques (= emléktáblák).266 The different motifs are also closely connected to the Hungarian cultural history. There are, for instance, bronze statues of Béla Kovács (Budapest, Kossuth tér, 2002) or of József Attila (sculptural group with altogether 5 figures, Hódmezővásárhely, 2005) as well as of King St. Stephen and his wife Gizella (Szeged, 1996).267 Another quotation from the dedication ceremony of the memorial at Elek follows to shed light on the interconnections of art, memorial culture and the Hungarian-German identity management and ethnomanagement:

The Deutsche Minderheitenselbstverwaltung and the Verein der deutschen Traditionspflege at Elek took advantage of the opportunity that the chairman of the LDU, Otto Heinek, and Agnes Szauer, Oberrätin in the Office for National and Ethnic Minorities, were among them.268

During this memorial ceremony, which has the traumatic events of the expulsion after World War II as its theme, several components fuse: The commissioned work of the sculptor is at the center, the Hungarian-German public sees its history represented in the memorial and the Hungarian-German identity management and ethnomanagement play a central role both in terms of commissioning the artwork and in terms of conducting the dedication ceremony.

The Deutsche Bühne Ungarn, DBU, is also assigned the role of a cultural guardian by the Hungarian-German identity management and ethnomanagement, even though no plays by Hungarian-

266 See http://www.kligl.hu/05_hu.html (03 February 2011).
German playwrights are staged there. The DBU is moreover dependent on subsidies to a much greater extent. This constellation alone closely binds the theatre directorship to the LdU, which is further reinforced through kinship networks. The DBU, too, is bound to the German language and cannot unfold its impact beyond the minority like the abovementioned sculptures, which represents the memorial cultures of the Germans in Hungary in public space. Yet, the DBU makes an effort to also attract a Hungarian audience from the area Szekszárd with the help of a banner that shows the Hungarian translation of the respective play.

Examples from among the Hungarians in Transylvania, Slovenia and Vojvodina

In Hungary, an eight-volume dictionary has been created, which covers the Hungarian-language literature by so-called Auslandsungarn exclusively and whose goal it is to make up for a neglect that, from today’s perspective, the socialist era above all is blamed for:

Due to their place of residence and their citizenship, dozens of Hungarian authors have not only been omitted from the schoolbooks but also from the flow of national culture […]. It has to be attempted now to “smuggle” the authors’ lifeworks, comprising 15 or 25 volumes and long neglected, back where they have always belonged, into Hungarian literature. This should happen before the shadows of oblivion and ignorance cover them up for good. (Trans. Herman-ik/Szlezák)

This initial situation is in some ways similar to the situation of German-language literature in Southeast Europe, in which case it is equally challenging to duly classify the literary oeuvre if it could not previously become part of the German literary market. Among the Hungarians, however, the evaluation of a work also depends on the extent to which it is a contribution to the “national culture” of Hungary, mentioned in the quotation, because those Hungarian-speaking authors who after Trianon have been living in a foreign host state are considered part of a ‘symbolic nation Hungary.’ In the examples from the three research regions Transylvania, Slovenia and Vojvodina that I selected, the focus is on the interaction between literature and the respective identity management and ethnomanagement alone, with a special interest invested in those authors who themselves have become active as agents in the political identity management and ethnomanagement.

In Transylvania, some authors are also active in local Hungarian-language cultural or literary magazines or in publishing houses as editors or publishers. They thus already connect their work, in which the Hungarian language is also central, with their literature:270

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Literary Magazine or Publisher</th>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Genre</th>
<th>Place of Publication</th>
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<td>Korond/Corond</td>
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<tr>
<td>János Bartalis</td>
<td>Erdélyi Helikon271</td>
<td>founding member</td>
<td>poetry</td>
<td>Kolozsvár/Cluj</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Fulgur</td>
<td>founding publisher</td>
<td>poetry</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Romániai Magyar Szó</td>
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270 On the information in the table see http://www.mek.iif.hu/porta/szint/human/szepirod/hatartul/ (04 November 2011). It was collected and published by the Hungarian Széchenyi national library.

Due to their bread-and-butter job, the Hungarian-speaking authors in Transylvania come into immediate proximity with the Hungarian identity management and ethnomanagement since all Hungarian-language journals are subsidized by the RMDSZ, by cultural foundation or by Hungary. It has already been mentioned in the case of the Germans in Hungary to what extent literature – the genre of poetry is affected by this in a particular degree – and art in particular depend on a thriving funding system, no matter whether it comes in the form of funds as basic income, of opportunities to publish or, in the case of fine artists, of public commissions. Next to this more or less indirect connection to the identity management and ethnomanagement, there is also a direct connection to the ethnic politics: the poet, literary critic and translator Béla Markó, who even received the József-Attila Literature Prize in Hungary in 1994, needs to be named here before all others. Markó, who was born at Târgu Secuiesc/Kézdivásárhely in the Székely Land in 1951, has been an active politician since the Wende in 1989 has been on the board of the RMDSZ since 1992; he served as its chairman until 2011 and was, among other things, even deputy prime minister in the Romanian government.272 His successor as chairman of the RMDZ, Hunor Kelemen, is also a poet and author.273 György Csávosi, a poet and comic playwright living at Aiud/Nagyenyed, is another prominent figure of the Hungarian identity management and ethnomanagement. He is the chairman of the Romániai Magyar Gazdák Egyesülete (= Verein der ungarischen Bauern in Rumänien) and thus participates in the strategically important gatherings in the context of the Transylvanian-Hungarian minority politics, such as that of the Erdélyi Magyar Egyeztető Tanács (= Konsensbildender Rat der Ungarn in Siebenbürgen).274 István Ferenc, another poet, who so far has published 8 poetry collections, served as the RMDSZ chairman in the county Csík in the Székely Land immediately after the Wende. The graphic designer, poet and journalist Éva Emese Gál works at the RMDSZ in the Székely Land. She is also a member in the Magyar Irőszövetség (= Allianz der Ungarischen SchriftstellerInnen). The poet Lajos Magyari represented the county Kovászna as a senator in the Upper House of the Romanian parliament from 1992 to 1996.

János Orbán, a poet himself and also chief editor of the Klausenburg literary magazine Előretolt helyőrség, served as the secretary of the RMDSZ at Cluj-Napoca/Kolozsvár. The literary magazine or rather the literary workshop Előretolt helyőrség, which has chosen a popular, radical and often frivolous path, was founded primarily also in order to form a counter force to the so-called

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272 See esp. also the section Umbrella Organizations.
274 See ibid.
‘Transylvanism’ as the older Transylvanian-Hungarian literature often was tainted by an archaic language that was taken to suggest the ‘pure Hungarian soul.’

Géza Szőcs, who has already published 10 poetry collections and has also written theatre plays, after the Wende served as secretary general (= főtitkár) of the RMDSZ and was also senator in the Romanian parliament. All in all, a considerable number of authors have occupied quite influential positions in the RMDSZ. Béla Markó, a poet and translator, served for many years as the chairman of the alliance and was part of several government coalitions in the Romanian parliament. This constellation principally has even remained in place when Hunor Kelemen succeeded him. It should be added at this point that the Hungarian-speaking authors in Transylvania have their own interest group in the form of the Erdélyi Magyarok Írók Ligája, EMIL. It not only cooperates closely with the Hungarian writers’ guild and other Hungarian-language literature associations in various countries in Southeast Europe, but is also funded by the Communitas foundation of the RMDZ, mentioned repeatedly above. Thus, here, too, there is a close intertwining with the Hungarian identity management and ethno-management.

The Barabás Miklós Céh, BMC\textsuperscript{275} (= Barabás Miklós Zunft) is also one of the most renowned societies, which is also called Romániai Magyar Képzőművészeti Egyesület (= Verein der ungarischen Bildenden Künstler in Rumänien). It had already existed from 1929 until 1944 and was re-founded in 1994. At present, it has about 90 members. The headquarters of the Barabás Miklós Guild (= Künstlergilde), as it is also called, is located at Cluj-Napoca/Kolozsvár, where it has a building of its own.\textsuperscript{276} The BMC also functions as a foundation, with the costs for the BMC’s own contributions, for art fellowships or for exhibitions are mainly covered by the Communitas foundation of the RMDSZ, mentioned repeatedly above.\textsuperscript{277} The BMC, like other Hungarian artists’ associations in Transylvania, is also a member of the Verband der ungarischen Bildenden und Darstellenden Künstler (= Magyar Képzőművészek ésíparművészek Szövetsége, MKISZ), which is located at Budapest and which also operates as a kind of umbrella organization for the Hungarian visual and performing artists abroad.\textsuperscript{278}

In the performing arts, the Hungarian-language theater at Cluj-Napoca/Kolozsvár needs to be stressed particularly since it was founded as early as 1792 and has been in charge of both the (spoken) theatre and the music performances (opera, operetta, symphonic works). The Kolozsvári Magyar Opera (= Hungarian opera house at Klausenburg)\textsuperscript{279} has been an independent institution since 1948, but still shares the venue space with the so-called Kolozsvári Állami Magyar Színház (= Staatliches

\textsuperscript{275} The society is named after the well known Transylvanian painter Barabás Miklós (1810-1898).

\textsuperscript{276} See http://artportal.hu/intezmenyek/barabas_miklos_ceh_mkitsz_tag (19 March 2012).

\textsuperscript{277} The new tendering for 2012 is already accessible on the website of the foundation; see http://www.communitas.ro/ (19 March 2012).

\textsuperscript{278} On the MKISZ see http://www.mkisz.hu/szovetseg.php (19 March 2012).

\textsuperscript{279} For the current program of the Hungarian opera house at Klausenburg (= Kolozsvári Magyar Opera) see http://www.hungarianopera.ro/ (19 March 2012).
Theater der Ungarn in Klausenburg). Theater and opera house, however, are no longer an exclusively “Hungarian meeting place,” but instead a broad repertoire is meant to attract as many people as possible. Electronic subtitles are meant to include also the Romanian-speaking inhabitants. The opera house plays a classical program in Italian anyway. The municipal theater at Klausenburg shall live up to the expectations arising from its name and shall no longer be merely a minority theater. The connection to the Hungarian language, however, stays intact insofar as there are efforts to get guest performers from Hungary and likewise their own ensemble tours in the Hungarian-speaking foreign countries.

In Vojvodina, the number of Hungarian authors by comparison is naturally far smaller than in Transylvania. The literary magazines Symposion, Táltos, Híd, and Képes Újság mainly serve as publication platforms. Gábor Wyragh, chief editor of the magazine Symposion, also writes himself, but does so under several pseudonyms. Another editor of Symposion, Csaba-Saul Pressburger, is also an author. Attila Sáfrány is a poet, teacher of religious education and chief editor of the literary magazine Táltos. Hungarian authors who are themselves active in political organizations could, however, not be found.

In Slovenia, still in the era of Yugoslavia, the Pomurska Založba (= Verlag an der Mur) in Murska Sobota/Muraszombat also published works in Hungarian. A few years after the sovereignty, the Szlovéniai Magyar Írók Társasága (= Gesellschaft der Ungarischen Schriftsteller Sloweniens) was founded at Lendva/Lendava in 1997, whose goal it is to foster and support the regional Hungarian-language literature. It acts in the immediate framework of the regional Hungarian cultural institute MNMI, on whose commission all books have been published in house as of in 1996. The most widely known figure in the region is the poet and essayist Lajos Bence. He worked as a teacher at a Gymnasium at Lendva (1981-1990), then as an editor of the minority program Hidak – Mostovi (1990-1992), at the same time studied Hungarian language and literatuare at the ELTE at Budapest (dissertation 1994) and has also been university assistant at the chair for Hungarian language and literature at Maribor since 1991. Since 1997, he has been chief editor of Népújság and in addition is chairman of the Magyar Nemzetiségi Tájékoztatási Intézet (= Nachrichteninstitut der Ungarischen Nationalität).

During the time of Yugoslavia, the Hungarian literature from the region Prekmurje rather lived in the shadows as, during that time, the Hungarian-language literary scene in Vojvodina was domi-

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281 The Hungarian-language theater used to have this symbolic name because the Hungarians of Transylvania ‘met’ there, which rather mean that they were ‘among themselves’ there.
284 I would like to mention a significant difference I have observed between Transylvania and Slovenia: Transylvanian-Hungarian authors mostly studied at Cluj-Napoca/Kolozsvár, mostly the obvious subject Hungarian language and literature; the authors from Slovenia, on the other hand, studied mostly in Hungary and then returned to Prekmurje.
nant. Only after the Wende could a larger independence be achieved, and Judit Zágorec-Csuka describes this process as follows:

Szükségessé vált, hogy a kisebbségi magyarság a történelmileg kialakult önkortározást, túlzott óvatosságot elutasítva, megteremtse azt a szellemi-lelki hátteret, amelyben a magyarság és az egyetemes magyarság támogatásával felelősséget vállal sorsának alakulásáért.

It was necessary for the Hungarian minority to reject the historically shaped self-restriction and overmuch caution here and instead to create that intellectual backdrop against which they take on responsibility, with the support of the Hungarians and the universal Hungarian culture (= egyetemes magyarság), for their own fate. (Trans. Hermanik/Szlezák)

She thus also underlines the influence of an identity management and ethnomanagement from the outside and of the idea, born in Hungary, of a unified Hungarian nation. Since the times of the MNMI’s own publishing house the creators of literature in the region have accepted a close intertwinement with the identity management and ethnomanagement anyway as the MNMI now ultimately decides on the literary production.

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Empirically Applied Theory on the Identity Management and Ethnomanagement
(Results—Profits—Reverberations)

The framework within which the synergy fields of the identity management and ethnomanagement of the Germans and the Hungarians in the research areas in Southeast Europe\(^1\) are intertwined is broad. The individual topic areas were set side by side with, and partly over one another, similarly to different stencils, in the manner that seemed best compatible with the observations made during the field research; all of this was developed in immediate relation to the theoretical concept of the identity management and ethnomanagement, presented at the beginning, yet at the same time in the sense of a ‘non-paradigmatic-way of thinking,’ since “knowledge” in the following chapters was generated from this historical-anthropological field research so that the agent-relatedness in the identity management and ethnomanagement moves more to the foreground.

The following shall be considered to be the core statements: i) The identity management and ethnomanagement of minorities function primarily top-down and is determined in the research regions by few agents; it is, however, reflexive insofar as the identity managers’ and ethnomanagers’ respective ‘own’ identity construction is, in turn, determined by the Volksgruppe itself; ii) The identity management and ethnomanagement of minorities are above all a management of processes of inclusion and exclusions, which is meant to serve the purpose of preserving the Volksgruppe and its cultural markers, which it is ascribed from the inside and from the outside; iii) The identity management and ethnomanagement make an effort to reduce the gap between the So-Soll-es-Sein-activities (this-is-how-it-should-be-activities) and the everyday cultural practice or to keep it as small as possible and relies on the ‘preservation of the traditions’ as a bonding agent.

Ad i)

The identity management and ethnomanagement of minorities function primarily top-down and is determined in the research regions by few agents; but it is reflexive insofar as the identity managers’ and ethnomanagers’ respective ‘own’ identity construction is, in turn, determined by the Volksgruppe itself.

The agents of the identity management and ethnomanagement shape the political and cultural topics of “their” minority to a large extent, but are by no means independent in their actions: This can be best described with the help of Bourdieu’s term “habitus” since it particularly takes into account that dual position that understands the individual as both structuring, as an agent, and equally as socially structured because he/she is significantly influenced in his/her thinking and acting by his/her social envi-

\[^1\] It should be remarked with regard to the research areas that they are themselves subject to a slow, if steady change. The focal points of these changes are at present, for instance, the economic crises in various areas of the economy or the increasing nationalist political agitations, which can be observed in Southeast Europe. This reflects not least in the voting behavior and ultimately in national-conservative policies, which often take shape to the detriment of the minorities in the host state. All states in the research area have in common that the neoliberal economic policy, which was predominant after the Wende, in particular has negative effects on the regional resources – no matter whether this affects financial, social or cultural resources – and subsequently on the opinion-making in the fields of minority politics and minority rights. This has become evident in the realm of social security. As a response to this, the identity management and ethnomanagement now steer in an ethnopolitical direction in which the social security of their own Volksgruppe has almost equal importance as the traditions.
environment. Bourdieu speaks in this context of the habitus as a “structuring and structured structure.” The actions of the identity managers and ethnomanagers were or are ‘structured’ in any case by their Volksgruppe, and I consider this mutual reflexivity to be insoluble.

Despite the different research regions, it becomes obvious both among the Germans and among the Hungarians that the agents of the identity management and ethnomanagement are most responsible for the policy and the assertion of the ethnic politics of their Volksgruppe. The legal minority protection in the individual host states may well present different conditions but it is possible in some cases to speak of comparable goals, for example the achievement of a cultural autonomy —, even if the scope of the minorities and the political possibilities are different and even if these goals are not formulated identically. These different basic conditions thus require corresponding strategies of implementation and the interpenetration of ethnicity and ethnic politics that can be observed is therefore a fact not only for the scholarly theory-formation, but also for the minority political practice. It has reverberations on various domains of the identity management and ethnomanagement since their agents mainly derive their political goals from parameters of ethnicity, which are still influenced by the identity discourse of the 1990s.

In which ways ethnic politics are then reinforced with contents, for instance, from the traditional historiography or ethnography depends even more on the agents’ subjective interpretation, on how they mould the shape of ‘their’ Volksgruppe, from the shared origins to the minority language to the customs, in order to strengthen the group’s cohesion.

The scope of action and at the same time the ethnopolitical possibilities of the identity management and ethnomanagement are pre-conditioned by the minority law valid in the respective host states, which determine, among other things, whether the minority has a (guaranteed) say in the parliament, and which regulate, and delimit, to a large extent the use of instruction in the minority language and of the minority media. Moreover, the electoral procedure of how minority representatives can be elected is of great importance here since the possibilities in the research regions range from participation in general regional or national elections to minority self-governments, which in turn can only be established through elected minority representatives. At the same time the minority representations vary considerably in size and in the political participation. It would be indeed obvious in this context — and the research has clearly demonstrated this — that the personal interests of those who have their names added to the electoral lists or who have even co-founded an ethnopolitical society should be related with the collective interests of the minority since this way the various foundations of the identity management and ethnomanagement can be illuminated. What becomes apparent from this, among other things, is how power gets concentrated within a Volksgruppe, which is, as experience has shown, even more dependent on individual persons than is the case in the party politics anyway; how autocratically a minority party or a minority society is led depends primarily on the personality of the

respective chairperson and only secondarily on the “structuredness” mentioned above, thus on the other functionaries in the party or society as well as on the members of the minority themselves. Notable influences from the outside, through the ethnomangement by the kin states can but do not necessarily have to interfere with these constellations. This can increase a concentration of political power in the identity management and ethnomangement if it is suggested that the minority is constantly threatened by ‘being assimilated.’\(^3\) The identity management and ethnomangement anticipate as a consequence of this that the members of the minority regard their actions as justified in any case and thus do not draw them into question because they (supposedly) serve the purpose of averting assimilation. In the practice of minority society politics, those agents have the greatest scope of action who have themselves founded a minority society and who serves as its chairperson and do not have to run for office in direct elections – an example of this is August Gril of the \textit{Gottscheer Altsiedler-Verein}. Besides, there are those personalities who preside over a political minority organization and have established themselves because they were involved in numerous ethnopolitical successes – examples are Béla Markó, who has represented the Hungarian minority in Romania in several government coalitions, or Klaus Johannis, who as the mayor of Hermannstadt has maintained the Transylvanian Saxons’ high esteem in Transylvania despite their demographic decline.

For the analysis of the identity management and ethnomangement of the Germans and Hungarians in Southeast Europe, the minority organizations are in any case the centers of gravity. The protagonists in the framework of the \textit{ethnic politics} are the local agents, regardless of whether they are influential at a national or even transnational or only a local level. In the practice of field research, they declare their activities to be not simply a regular job but they rather seem them as a political-cultural mission. Some have joined a minority organization, others, in turn, have themselves founded a society or a minority self-government because they wanted to actively participate. The motives are manifold: For example, I met people\(^4\) who, with a candidacy in the local elections, founded a Hungarian-German minority self-government in a village in southwest Hungary, after they had advocated its foundation in the municipal administration simply because they wanted to make sure that their children and those from neighboring German-speaking families can attend a kindergarten with a minority language section; others, in turn, who come from the field of minority schools made use of their expertise and their networks to celebrate the successes achieved in the \textit{ethnic politics} for ‘their’ minority.

Other limits to the identity management and ethnomangement become apparent in the realm of the schools. Since it is the respective ministry of education in the host state that designs the curricula in the state schools, the influence of \textit{Volksgruppen} organizations on the minority schools or on the instruction in the minority language is often only very little. The example of the bilingual school at Lendava/Lendva has demonstrated in this context how hard the Hungarian ethnomangement there

\(^3\) The “Ausländerthematik” (“topic of foreigners”) can serve as a point of comparison since some political parties in Europe also evoke it in the context of a scenario of threat that basically serves to swear the voters in a country to a national-political course.

\(^4\) Anonymized, with the plea for understanding.
tried to have a say both in the appointment of who they considered to be the ‘right’ headmaster and in the conceptualization of the actual teaching practice. They did so by still counteracting in nuce this bilingual Slovenian-Hungarian school concept even though it has shown exemplary results in comparison to other research regions. Another limit to the identity management and ethnomanagement should be mentioned at this point as it seems to originate by necessity exactly from the competition within a minority, often because the organizations do not perceive one another in the sense of a common whole but mainly as minority-political opponents, who are separated both by different political-ideological goals and by different historical-cultural narratives. As a negative consequence, minority organizations from within the same Volksgruppe oppose one another, partly even was enemies: I would like to refer here to both the German and the Hungarian societies in Slavonia as examples, whose devisiveness suggests no common “standing-up-for-the-minority” and within which mutual accusations are a indeed part of their minority politics. It can thus be stated that the theoretical exploration of the German and the Hungarian minority societies and the pertinent scholarly literature have so far actually not clearly demonstrated how extensive the competitivy among the societies but also the power consciousness of individual agents in the practice of minority politics are. It is far too readily assumed that especially the identity management and ethnomanagement of one and the same minority would act in concert in one host state as they basically pursue the same ethnopolitical goals—admittedly with different ideological backgrounds or cultural means and strategies of assertion, but still. This, however, is not at all the case in practice, and no matter how small the number of minority members is there are partly fierce conflicts between the individual societies. No matter whether the Germans or the Hungarians, they prefer building up many structures doubly to finding common ground with the irreconcilably opposing society/societies that come from the same minority or agreeing at least on a compromise by formulating common ethnopolitical goals. Instead, they prefer to blame the respective other, especially when there are fewer funds available to realize their own projects. In summary, my observations can be interpreted as an interplay of personal and institutional power interests, in which the respective agents of the identity management and ethnomanagement in any case play the lead role since ultimately what is at stake is the distribution of political, cultural and not least financial resources, of which the minority partakes and which it is provided with.

Ad ii)

The identity management and ethnomanagement of minorities are above all a management of the processes of inclusion and exclusion, which is meant to serve the purpose of preserving the Volksgruppe and its cultural markers, which it is ascribed from the inside and from the outside.

The common strategies of inclusion and exclusion in minority politics could equally be regarded as limitations since they build – and the field research has also confirmed this – a nearly dogmatic framework for the respective identity management and ethnomanagement, whose imaginary line es-
sentially cannot be crossed. Although the initially chosen formulation of ‘preserving and maintaining,’ which the respective agents declare to be a political maxim in interviews, in official speeches and in their press statements, appears to be rather passive, the political ethnomanagement per se is an extremely active part of any minority politics and the entire identity management and ethnomanagement has to be understood as the cultural leadership of the Volksgruppe, as it were: They do not simply happen, but they are, in abstract terms, the sum of the targeted actions of the agents involved. It was deliberately underlined several times that the choice of terminology alone is meant to evoke the etymological link to *ethnos-ἔθνος* and *ethnicity* more clearly than could be expressed with the term identity management. This is also meant to automatically imply the processes of inclusion or exclusion that are closely connected to ethnicity. The management in both terms furthermore makes clear to what extent these processes of inclusion or exclusion are controlled in an active, target-oriented and deliberate manner and are inseparable from the respective politics of the Volksgruppe. The agents of the identity management and ethnomanagement set the tone for how the collective identity of ‘their’ Volksgruppe should look, what should be done to this end and – not insignificant for a historical-anthropological investigation – what value should be attributed to the single ethnic markers. They make primarily use both of their ‘own’ history in the form of historical narratives richly adorned with symbolic capital and of the ethnic marker language, which is particularly relevant for linguistic minorities such as the Germans and the Hungarians. Especially in the process of the German and the Hungarian nation-formation since the 19th century, the two components – descent, origins, history, on the one hand, and language, on the other – came together in a nearly symbiotic relation. At first glance, it seems as if the Germans valued the self-designations and markers differently than the Hungarians. More detailed research reveals of course more synergy fields in the flows of the changing identity constructions and especially so because both Volksgruppen consider themselves linguistic minorities: These flows are propelled in the first place by the increasing bilingualism in the research regions and there above all by the weakening marker “mother tongue/anyanyakvél (hung.”); the latter’s number-1-position has by now been taken over in many cases by the marker “origins/descent/shared history,” which, as mentioned above, necessarily triggered a shift of strategy in the identity management and ethnomanagement. By and large, even the customary ethnic group brand ‘linguistic minority’ is now being challenged and re-interpreted case-by-case, by historical-cultural values, which are meaningful for the collective, being shifted to the center of attention. The “historical achievements” of the Germans or the Hungarians that the agents of the identity management and ethnomanagement stress are thus stressed even more in order to enter into a sort of positive competition with the historical achievements of the respective majority population and at the same time to more clearly define the boundaries, which in the case of

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5 I think that the identity management and ethnomanagement primarily use the terminology of preserving and maintaining frequently in order not to deter a priori since these Volksgruppen also have to prove their loyalty to their host state. It more or less serves to set into soft-focus a quite hard political core.

6 The ordering of the markers in this way is a scientific aid that I have used here; the Germans and the Hungarians themselves do not apply such an ordering.
bilingualism is no longer so successful as far as the usage of the marker language is concerned. As we move on from the collective identity to the identity construction of the individual, it was furthermore striking in my observations with regard to the shift in the position of the two markers descent/origins and language that, as the individual speaker’s language proficiency in the respective minority language, German or Hungarian, deteriorates, the question of one’s origins becomes more important since this can guarantee one’s orientation within the minority.

I could, however, observe that the identity management and ethnomanagement continue to view hybrid or creolized life forms rather skeptically and partly regard them as an offense against an idealized, collective identity construction and as a pre-stage of cultural assimilation. It is therefore often difficult for the members of a minority to openly profess a multiple identity and, consequently, a multiple loyalty. People who have intermarried, for instance, are therefore still expected, if not required to commit as unambiguously as possible to one (sic) ethnic group. It will thus be a while until the Germans and the Hungarians in Southeast Europe will accept hybrid or creolized life forms into the identity management and ethnomanagement concept as being equal – there is already a trend in this direction in the everyday cultural practice, but the ideological and ethno-political background still has to change correspondingly and dogmatic viewpoint in particular need to be dropped first. By and large, a strong demographic backing slows down such flows, but cannot prevent them. In the case of the Hungarians and Szeklers in Transylvania, we can observe no swift or significant movement toward a Hungarian-Romanian bilingualism. Therefore the Hungarian ethnomanagement uses the marker “Hungarian language” correspondingly in its politics. In the case of other larger groups, such as the Germans in Hungary and the Hungarians in Serbia, the decline of the competence in the minority language from one generation to the next generation, paralleled by a growing bilingualism, led to a shifting of the markers which the respective ethnomanagement interprets differently.

Ad iii)

The identity management and ethnomanagement make an effort to reduce the gap between the So-Soll-es-Sein-activities (this-is-how-it-should-be-activities) and the everyday cultural practice or to keep it as small as possible and relies on the ‘preservation of the traditions’ as a bonding agent.

As a reaction to the abovementioned flows, the identity management and ethnomanagement elevated the ‘preservation of the traditions’\(^7\) \textit{nolens volens} to the status of another dogma within the \textit{ethnic politics}, besides the preservation of the minority language.\(^8\) These processes all take place at what I call

\(^7\) It is irrelevant whether these traditions are historically founded or imagined; what matters in this context is that they are first of all recognized as such by the ethnomanagement and then, eventually, by the base of the \textit{Volksgruppen}.

\(^8\) In my empirical work, I wanted to illuminate more the perspective of the agent-relatedness of the identity management and ethnomanagement concept with the help of interviews. In summary, it becomes evident to what extent the different areas of responsibility in the identity management and ethnomanagement overlap in practice. This affects by no means only the \textit{ethnic politics} as a homogenous or even separate realm, but I could also realize how for instance teachers, authors or artists sought to locate their bread-and-butter job in the context of the identity management and ethnomanagement, be it at minority schools, in the minority media or in the legal minority representations at large.
‘predetermined breaking point,’ that is, that pivotal point that metaphorically speaking is between a “how something should be” prescribed by the identity management and ethnomangement and a “what does the corresponding everyday cultural lifeworld look like.” The identity management and ethnomangement thus prescribes an adherence to their ‘own’ traditions in order to reduce the gap between the So-Soll-es-Sein-activities and the everyday cultural practice or to keep it as small as possible. Moreover, any form of escape into a worldview that is oriented towards the past and dependent on traditions can also be interpreted in the Freudian sense as a pattern of suppression that leads the way out of a (seemingly) unhappy present. In order to adapt the former ethnic group brand ‘linguistic minority’ to the present conditions and particularly also to shine more light on the aforementioned So-Soll-es-Sein-activities, the identity management and ethnomangement also increasingly employ the instrument of the nation branding: One’s own minority should be positioned, presented and advertised in the ethnic politics like a brand. In the process, the Germans and the Hungarians can also have recourse to phenomena of the nation branding of their the kin states since the historical narratives and the nation-building qualities of the marker language overlap in most matters anyway. This ultimately means that the thoughts and skills of a brand management are adopted into the overall corpus of the identity management and ethnomangement, and also requires the agents to acquire corresponding competences or consult corresponding experts so that the ethnic group corresponds to a positively connoted brand both in the self-perception and in the perception from the outside.

The memorial cultures in their various manifestations and shapes serve as a central pivot both for the ‘preservation of the traditions’ and for the ethnic group branding. In the sense of the agent-relatedness, one can witness during the speeches of the minority representatives of the Germans and the Hungarians in which ways memorial cultures are drawn upon in order to underpin the Volksgruppen politics of the present and how the identity management and ethnomangement try in the process to deliberately instrumentalize memories and historical narratives for political ends. This struggle for the ‘correct remembrance’ takes place to the same extent on the inside, for instance through the guardians of the traditions within one’s own Volksgruppe, and on the outside, through the patronage of the national states Germany/Austria or Hungary and their pertinent interests in a “shared history” and in a homogenous nation branding. The minorities living in Southeast Europe are also drawn upon whenever the unity of the nation is being invoked, and commemorative festivities are all but predestined for this purpose, given their power of historical-political monopolization. The closely associated ‘sites of memory’ turn into focal points of collective identity, so to speak, that, once they have been adapted to contemporary exigencies, can be politically charged correspondingly. From the angle of cognitive psychology, remembrance itself is preceded by the stages of attention and perception so that the subject remembers a concrete historical figure or a concrete historical event at all and associates them with his/her subjective notion of history and historicity. The identity management and ethnomangement try, of course, to actively interfere at this early stage of the attention and perception already in
order to direct the attention to those events that most correspond to their own projection of how the collective history of the Volksgruppe should look (sic!). The rest can well be hidden or rather suppressed in this process of remembering if they are facets of memory that are not conducive to the historical-political purpose, or even worse, when a competing historical narrative contradicts the ideal version(s) of collective history. These processes are generally highly self-referential and serve as an effective support for the widely defined ethnic marker “descent/(one’s own) origins/(shared) history.” All commemorative festivities and designated sites of memory thus turn into key areas of the identity management and ethnomangement. The symbols and symbolic actions related to them serve in many respects to strengthen and demonstrate mutual loyalty between the identity management and ethnomangement from the inside and that from the outside; occasionally, a commemorative event is attended not only by representatives from the kin state but also by political and cultural representatives of the host state, which can also be interpreted as a sign of mutual loyalty. The ethnic-national symbols are oftentimes ‘heroic figures’ that can be vested with a great potential for identification, especially because collective identity can very well be linked to historical figures who originate from the same ethnic or national group or can at least be associated with it indirectly; when creating myths of victimization, the identity management and ethnomangement, interestingly, works with similar psychological patterns as in the creation of myths of heroism. The weight of an empathetic identification with the victims of a historical epoch in the process of remembering, however, is certainly more pronounced than in the case of the myths of heroism. For that reason alone, myths of victimization are *a priori* strongly ethnopolitically charged and the agents of the identity management and ethnomangement use them very purposefully to transfer this power from the respective symbols onto the ethnopolitical discourse of the present. In principle, this interpretation of one’s own role as a victim is most suitable for minorities for explaining and interpreting their own fate as a minority as well as for holding the others, the perpetrators, responsible for this fate. When myths of heroism and victimization are ethnopolitically instrumentalized in the memorial cultures, the following characteristics in the German and Hungarian minority organizations can be observed: Among the Hungarians, both the myths of heroism and of victimization are connected to the entire Hungarian nation – as it is perceived by the Hungarian politicians and the Hungarian historians, respectively. They thus concern a certain regional Hungarian minority only to a small extent, or the regional component of such commemorative festivities, which are arranged by Hungarian minority societies, is inscribed into an overall Hungarian-national, collective memory. It is therefore quite commonplace that official speakers from the identity management and ethnomangement of Hungarian minority organizations intermingle with politicians.

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9 In the sense of Sigmund Freud, who already implies a pattern of suppression, or non-remembrance, in this term.
10 In the case of the “Heldenplatz” at Vienna or the “Hősök tere” at Budapest, centrally located squares are dedicated to this historical construction of heroic figures, which at the same time pervade the historiography of Austria or Hungary: See Peter Stachel. *Mythos Heldenplatz*. Wien: Pichler, 2002; as well as András Gerő. *Der Heldenplatz Budapest. Als Spiegel ungarischer Geschichte*. Budapest: Corvinus, 1990.
11 In the sense of “that is how it was!” from the angle of the respective identity management and ethnomangement.
from the kin state Hungary, but also that diverse topics are intermixed during the speeches. Among the Germans in Southeast Europe, the memorial cultures in many cases revolve around the traumatic events at the end of World War II and during the immediate aftermath of the war. The regional forms of commemoration, which take place at the sites of former camps or of mass graves, are indeed in the foreground. These festivities are co-organized by the Landsmannschaften from the kin states, which still influence them considerably through their German-national orientation. The minority organizations in the host states do not distance themselves at all, and these memories are not passed on in a ritualized commemoration without reason. Similar relations concerning the instrumentalization of the Hungarian minorities’ commemorative events by national or right-wing populist societies or parties can be observed among the Hungarians. Another parallel in the memorial cultures of the Germans and the Hungarians could be detected in the context of the myths of victimization in a group-psychological phenomena of the “having-suffered-together-as-a-Volksgruppe” since among the Hungarians, too, the defeats especially in the revolutions of 1848/49 and 1956 as well as the trauma of Trianon are understood as features that convey collective identity. The identity management and ethnomanagement sometimes associate this emphasis on suffering with the demographic decrease of minority group members and with the ensuing threat to the cultural heritage of the entire Volksgruppe. But upon closer inspection, this is just as much staged as most of the ethno-politically ritualized commemorative events, which are surrounded by a canonized historical narrative. If we return from these peaks of ethnopolitical instrumentalization or sometimes monopolization, whose nationalist overtones were and are hardly challenged, to the everyday business of the societies of the Germans and the Hungarians in Southeast Europe, we may recognize in many agents of the identity management and ethnomanagement a strong internalization of their tasks because the identification of one’s own person and one’s self with the Volksgruppe – because it is reflexive, as elaborated on under aspect i) – plays an essential role. Such a large degree of identification also contributes fundamentally to the bridge building between the So-Soll-es-Sein-activities and the respective everyday cultural practice. The identity managers and ethnomanagers in most cases do not wear a political-ideological guise that they take off at the end of their workdays but they interpret their actions indeed as a kind of political mission, intended to safeguard the cultural heritage of the minority, in the sense of the aforementioned ‘preservation of the traditions.’ Therefore, some agents even have founded a society themselves, in the context of which they can work more effectively towards these goals. They derive their strategies from the large pool of the formation of a collective identity, and it ranges from the unconscious in culture to a specific political calculation, includes the framework of minority rights and is to a considerable extent also de-

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terminated by the finances and the personal constellations in their own society, in the entire minority or among the neighbors, no matter whether they belong to the majority population of the host state or to other minorities. In this context it was obvious for me to investigate the fields of activity in the every-day practice of the identity management and ethnomanagement, which demonstrate the actions of the agents in these overlapping areas of tension: Among the diverse tasks, which have been subsumed under the label ‘preservation of traditions,’ it is mostly those areas that have to do with the minority language of the Germans and the Hungarians: the minority school system, the minority media and the minority literature; in the case of the Germans, the cultivation of dialects can be added here. In my experience, an active identity management and ethnomanagement aim at exerting themselves a large influence on these realms. In Southeast Europe, the upheavals were particularly dynamic in the past two and a half decades due to the transformation or the impacts of globalization. Consequently, the minority organizations of the Germans and the Hungarians have been re-structured completely or have been newly constituted at all. The usage of the minority language among the Germans and the Hungarians also changed – from the perspective of the identity management and ethnomanagement, this entails that premises are formulated on how much the usage of the minority language would be allowed to change at all (towards a bilingualism) since language is, of course, interpreted as a fundamental anchor for the entire Volksgruppe and therefore still regarded as an equally fundamental ethnic marker.

To evaluate the situation not flexibly enough, however, will quickly cause the gap between the Soll-es-Sein-usage of language and the respective everyday cultural practice to open up widely. The German and Hungarian identity management and ethnomanagement in the research regions rather overestimate the role as a mediator of the minority media and the minority school branches. Of course, the structures or the spread of the minority media and minority schools differ in the individual example regions, which has not only to do with the different subsidy programs and the differences in the minority laws but also with the respective claims made by the agents of the identity management and ethnomanagement and, more or less depending on that, with the respective personal and financial resources of the Volksgruppe. In principle, learning and mastering the minority language is still considered a conditio sine qua non for the cultural survival of the Volksgruppe both among the Germans and the Hungarians. Yet, in many regions, people had to admit that there are developments in which obstinately clinging to the usage of the minority language alone is not a sustainable concept for the preservation of the Volksgruppe. In my estimation, the bi- or multilingual education models in the multicultural areas in Southeast Europe are much more apt at present to secure the survival of minorities to the same measure, if not better. In the course of my field research, I could see for myself, particularly in those schools, that the linguistic-cultural heritage of the local minority is by no means lost in bilingual education models; instead, they provide a balance early on in childhood and adolescence between the proficiency in the language of the host state and in the minority language, which allows the students to
communicate in both languages at a native-speaker level. This will keep them both from becoming outsiders in the host state later on and from forgetting their own linguistic-cultural heritage.

Certain minority media or minority schools are sometimes themselves the very pillars of the ‘preservation of traditions’: For instance for the German identity management and ethnomanagement in Transylvania, the German Gymnasien in particular are important symbols of Protestant history of learning, even though it is known that the majority of students, thanks to whom these schools ultimately survive, are not German native speakers. The Hungarians equally have to deal with demographic changes but they try to keep establishing the Hungarian minority schools as such and to maintain a status via the minority law that shall secure for the minority representations, under the guise of language maintenance, a possibility to stay involved. Furthermore, the relationship between the Germans’ and the Hungarians’ minority schools and their minority organizations is one of a mutual give-and-take: The ones, the minority organizations and the identity management and ethnomanagement, provide financial but also “ideological” support, while the schools represent the most important pool for the junior members in the respective youth work of the Volksgruppen societies. Oftentimes, adolescents can be ‘won’ over for the youth organization of the Volksgruppe through competitions that take place at minority schools or through the organization of folkloristic events in which they are involved minority schools.

With regard to the fine arts and the performing arts in general and to literature, painting, sculpture as well as theatre and dance in particular, it has already been noted that each of these art forms has its specific connections to the respective identity management and ethnomanagement. When minority literature and minority art turn into an instrument of the identity management and ethnomanagement, questions arise – besides the personal relationships that partly exist between the agents of the identity management and ethnomanagement and the artists – especially in the interaction with the creators of literature and art; these questions ask, for instance, whether there are deliberate stylistic particularities in which the minority background becomes apparent or in which ways the respective artistic work is interlocked with the historical narrative and the historical-political culture of memory of the Volksgruppe. Besides these instances in which literature and art are embedded in the cultural framework of the Volksgruppe both through people and themes, what also takes center stage in the results of my field research are the economic links. The professional dependence of the writers and artists, particularly in the realm of the minority theaters, on the funds that are provided for the minorities and are thus administered and distributed by the identity management and ethnomanagement requires a specific form of loyalty. This forces the writers and artists to profess a German or Hungarian minority identity in order to benefit from subsidies but this way they do not have to assert or establish themselves in the general marketplace for literature, art or theatre in order to make a living. If art thereby becomes the instrument of identity management and ethnomanagement, then the strategies ultimately hardly differ from those of the aforementioned political, educational or medial fields of the identity management.
and ethnomanagement. Here, too, the agents, in this case the writers and artists, and their relations to ‘their’ Volksgruppe are at the center. Their works are vehicles for (volks)cultural topics, which address completely different levels of reception with the readers or viewers – and this is indeed in line with the goals of the political identity management and ethnomanagement.

Reflecting on what a target-oriented study of the identity management and ethnomanagement of ethnic and national minorities can contribute to the general study of minorities in Southeast Europe and to the science community working in this field, I would like to summarize one more time, and at the same time reevaluate, the following aspects, which derive from my work on the theoretical concept and from the practical research on the identity management and ethnomanagement of the Germans and the Hungarians: What is new about the term “ethnomanagement” is this junction of the terms ethnos/ethnicity and management. The significance of ethnos/ethnicity is undisputed in the historical and historical-anthropological research landscape in Southeast Europe, which deals with nation, nation-formation and nationality and, included therein, topics relating to ethnic and national minorities. The active aspect of management in the second part of the composite semantically stresses the oft-mentioned agent-relatedness. This alone is geared above all towards the context of the political ethnomanagement. Yet, in order to cover the entire range of the cultural management of an ethnic and national group this term was connected with its antecessor, “identity management,” whose theoretical developments provided the basis for all my reflections, to form the term identity management and ethnomanagement. This broad(er) approach, in which the developments in both identity research and ethnicity research are taken into consideration, has proven useful in practice since in many cases individual identity constructions overlap with and are hardly separable from manifestations of the collective identity and various ethnic markers, which serve as the foundation of ethnicity. This simultaneous agent-relatedness of the identity management and ethnomanagement concept shall illuminate the fields of activity of the minority research – here the cycle from the introduction and the ‘extension’ held out there is completed – in a person-related context, also from the angle of the active realization and practicability of political as well as (everyday-)cultural programs and measures, which in our case concern the German or Hungarian Volksgruppe. The goal is to be able, consequently, to better understand and analyze the different motives for the ethnopolitical actions. This, of course, requires the concise observation and exploration of minority organizations, in which the identity management and ethnomanagement is situated. From the large number of societies, the different personal and structural loyalties and the concept of the kin state emerges an extensive and large-scale network, at the linkages or intersections of which the agents come together. Researching these aspects – who manages the switchboard in a minority, what motivations were or are at the bottom of this and what political or cultural goals are pursued with this – gives some insight into why this or that cog was or is set into motion in the content-related and structural construction of the minority that is researched. Through the above references, but even more so in the empirical part of the investigations, the implicit promise made in
the introduction should also be fulfilled now, namely that the two terms identity management and ethnomanagement are well suited as a tool to study, describe and interpret the agent-relatedness within the minority in clear and simple terms.

The identity management and ethnomanagement concept and thus also the practical implementations of this concept presented here were meant to expand the minority research as an object of research within the discipline of Southeast European history in a transdisciplinary manner since it ties in directly with some academic disciplines such as philology, law, sociology, and cultural and social anthropology. It thus becomes possible for it to be more widely embedded into the disciplinary variety, which is so lively in the minority research, since the research for instance from the perspective of the agents or of processes of inclusion and exclusion basically no longer has any immediate disciplinary boundaries. This and other, future research on the identity management and ethnomanagement of ethnic or national groups in Southeast Europe, or beyond that, shall above all demonstrate how such complex fields as those of ethnic politics can be approached with the help of theory-founded empirical studies. Moreover, this concept has proven very useful for the study of the practical realization of memorial cultures in particular, which are very closely connected with the political agents in the respective Volksgruppe, and for the study and depiction of what I have called the “mediators” of the identity management and ethnomanagement, the media and the minority school system. Upon the consideration and analysis of the manifold clusters of topics of the minority literature and of the visual and performing minority arts, an extension of the application of the identity management and ethnomanagement concept could be pursued during my research whose treatments are linked to all other areas mentioned here, precisely because the motifs that the creators of literature and art use are often derived from the history of the Volksgruppe or from their own socio-cultural relations as well as from their relation to the respective other ethnic and national groups in the research regions. In addition, many of the political agents of the identity management and ethnomanagement were previously or are simultaneously minority authors or minority artists, which reflects, so to speak, the close connection between artistic inquiries into the identity of one’s own person or one’s (Volks)gruppe and those of the ethnic or national collective unity.
Bibliography


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Source Materials

Texts from Web Sources


N.N. (nomen nominandum): Since many web sources and articles published online do not make the author name or publisher name available, or only provide initials, the following section—N.N.—is arranged alphabetically according to title:


Definition - identity management (ID management). See: http://searchunifiedcommunications.techtarget.com/sDefinition/0,,sid186_gci906307,00.html# (05 February 2009).


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1 Naturally, only those interviews are listed here for which the interviewees did not request to remain anonymous. The author conducted the majority of the interviews listed here. In addition, the list includes interviews that were conducted by FWF research assistants in the context of their contract-based work (in alphabetic order: Bernhard Heigl, Lilla Hervaneck, Judit Schoblocher, Miodrag Vukčević), provided these interviews were included in the analysis. All interviews listed here are also referenced in the footnotes.
Maps
Deutsche im südöstlichen Europa: Orte, in denen über die Forschungen durchgeführt wurden.