Fascism, Liberalism and Europeanism in the Political Thought of Bertrand de Jouvenel and Alfred Fabre-Luce

Daniel Knegt
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NIOD Studies on War, Holocaust, and Genocide

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Dieser Krieg ist in Wirklichkeit eine Revolution. Die alte soziale Ordnung, das alte politische Regime sind am Zusammenstürzen. Hitler stellt eine Art elementarer oder dämonischer Kraft dar, die eine vermutlich notwendig gewordene Zerstörungsarbeit verrichtet... Ob Hitler die politische Einheit Europas zustande bringen wird, läßt sich nicht voraussagen; wahrscheinlich ist er vor allem ein Zerstörer, der Hindernisse aus dem Wege schafft.

*Hendrik de Man, De Panne, 20 May 1940*

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All we need is one world, one vision
One flesh, one bone
One true religion
One race, one hope
One real decision
Wowowowowo woh yeah oh yeah oh yeah

*Queen, ‘One Vision’ (1985)*

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Weil du Probleme hast, die keinen interessieren
Weil du Schiss vor schmusen has, bist du ein Faschist
Du musst deinen Selbsthass nicht auf andere projizieren
Damit keiner merkt, was für ein lieber Kerl du bist.

*Die Ärzte, ‘Schrei nach Liebe’ (1993)*
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Preface

More than 70 years after the end of its era, fascism continues to haunt our political and cultural imagination. It is the classic Hollywood villain, the standard ingredient of dystopian science fiction and a multi-use political swear word. Its more attractive elements have permeated modern pop culture, and its symbolism survives in brands, emblems and music. Recently, it has also made its comeback in headlines of the international press. Although not primarily motivated by present-day concerns, this study was inspired by the lasting relevance of fascism. It sets out to explore this relevance, especially in relation to two other prominent modern political phenomena: Europeanism and neoliberalism.

This book is a reworked, updated and partially extended version of the doctoral thesis I defended at the European University Institute in November 2015. As it is the result of years of research in different countries, I owe gratitude to more people than I can possibly mention on these pages. First, I want to thank my supervisor Dirk Moses and my second reader Laura Lee Downs, who have both been crucial for the success of my thesis. I also express my gratitude to Professors Peter Romijn and Kevin Passmore, and to Heinz-Gerhardt Haupt, Kiran Klaus Patel, Anthony La Vopa and everybody working at the EUI history department, in whose midst it has been a true pleasure to pursue my research. During my MA years at the University of Amsterdam (UvA), Professor Frits Boterman gave me the guidance, inspiration, enthusiasm and historical Bildung that made it possible for me to imagine becoming a historical researcher in the first place.

My Florence years would never have been so pleasurable without the company of my Florentine friends, with whom I have shared so many unforgettable moments. Besides being a ‘community of scholars’, the EUI is also a great place because it is an endlessly inspiring and energising melting pot at all kinds of less scholarly levels. With Jonas, Gabriele and Karena, I have thrown myself down snowy mountain slopes, discovered unknown islands and cycled through the impressive landscapes of the Mugello and the Chianti. With Robrecht, I shared so many drinks, hikes, crappy football games, serious thoughts and laughs that I can’t wait for the next Benelux meeting with him, Griet and of course little Kasper and Suzanne. I have also experienced countless memorable moments with Matti, Vera, Alan, Sani, Kaarlo, Pol, Bart, Roel, Tommaso, Andrea, Brian, Carolina and so many others, and I hope that official and unofficial occasions will keep bringing us together.
Archival research brought me to Paris for several short and less short stays. I wish to thank Anne de Jouvenel and the descendants of the Fabre-Luce family for generously giving me access to their relative’s private archives, kept at the Archives Nationales and the Bibliothèque Nationale de France. At this latter institution, I am grateful to conservator Michèle Le Pavec for preparing the manuscripts I wished to consult, and for her friendly and important guidance through the vast Jouvenel archive. I would also like to thank Anne de Simonin and Pascal Raimbault, who have been very helpful in directing me towards Fabre-Luce’s Épuration dossier. I am grateful to the Deutsches Literaturarchiv in Marbach for hosting me, for several snowy February days, in a studio right next to their beautiful archive, where I consulted the Ernst Jünger papers.

During the past years, my good old UvA has provided me with an academic refuge of the best kind. I am very grateful to James Kennedy and Jouke Turpijn for giving me the occasion to further develop myself as a visiting scholar and subsequently as a lecturer. My office mates, colleagues and friends, Tim, Frans, Josephine, Thomas, Alberto, Valentina, Guido, Eleá, Jan, Lisa, Karlijn, Robin, Lotte, Nathan, Merel and Marjet, made my working environment a fantastic place where I liked to spend time, albeit occasionally slightly too much time. The editors of Historisch Café deserve a special mention here, as do all the students of the Grand Tour historical study trip, with whom I have shared unforgettable experiences.

Although it would be impossible to mention them all, I want to thank all my Amsterdam friends – Tim, Micha, Tim, Matthijs, Ambi, Harmen, Ellen, Tim, Onno, Willemijn, Thomas, Bo, Ambi, Lea, Maria, Sterre and so many others – for supporting me, distracting me and most importantly for just being there. For general inspiration, I wish to thank Wamberto. The German, Italian, Austrian and Swiss national railways have carried me, the seldom-flying Dutchman, across Europe on so many occasions that they also deserve my gratitude. They gave me breathtaking views of the Alps and ample time to think, read and listen to music, while feeling weirdly happy. *I senk ju för träweling.*

Lastly, I want to thank my parents, Jette and Robert, for everything that I have done in life. And I thank my brother Bram and his family, Anne-Rose and Jonas, for being such great people. And finally, of course, my love Julia, with whom I share my life and who has given me our children Simon and Elsa. This book is dedicated to them.

*Daniel Knegt*

*Amsterdam, 18 February 2017*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFL</td>
<td>Alfred Fabre-Luce</td>
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<tr>
<td>AN</td>
<td>Archives Nationales</td>
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<tr>
<td>ARPTR</td>
<td>Association des Représentants du Peuple de la Troisième République</td>
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<tr>
<td>BdJ</td>
<td>Bertrand de Jouvenel</td>
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<tr>
<td>BNF</td>
<td>Bibliothèque Nationale de France</td>
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<tr>
<td>CdF</td>
<td>Croix-de-Feu</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFA</td>
<td>Comité France-Allemagne</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIRL</td>
<td>Centre International d’Études pour la Rénovation du Libéralisme</td>
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<tr>
<td>CNE</td>
<td>Comité National d’Écrivains</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNIP</td>
<td>Centre National des Indépendants et Paysans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDC</td>
<td>European Defence Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUI</td>
<td>European University Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FFI</td>
<td>Forces Françaises de l’Intérieur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LVF</td>
<td>Légion des Volontaires Français Contre le Bolchévisme</td>
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<tr>
<td>MPS</td>
<td>Mont Pèlerin Society</td>
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<tr>
<td>MRP</td>
<td>Mouvement Républicain Populaire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSI</td>
<td>Movimento Sociale Italiano</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NRF</td>
<td>Nouvelle Revue Française</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCF</td>
<td>Parti Communiste Français</td>
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<tr>
<td>PPF</td>
<td>Parti Populaire Français</td>
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<td>PSF</td>
<td>Parti Social Français</td>
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<tr>
<td>RNP</td>
<td>Rassemblement National-Populaire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD</td>
<td>Sicherheitsdienst</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFIO</td>
<td>Section Française de l’Internationale Ouvrière</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STO</td>
<td>Service du Travail Obligatoire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USR</td>
<td>Union Socialiste Républicaine</td>
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<tr>
<td>UvA</td>
<td>Universiteit van Amsterdam</td>
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**Introduction**

**Fascism in France and Beyond**

This study analyses the political ideas of two twentieth-century French intellectuals, Alfred Fabre-Luce (1899-1983) and Bertrand de Jouvenel (1903-1987), between 1930 and the early 1950s. During this period, both intellectuals moved from the republican centre-left to fascism and the post-war extreme right. Despite these lasting extreme-right connections, they also reinvented themselves as right-wing liberals and cold warriors. My leading argument is that Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce’s political trajectory needs to be seen as the result of an interplay of Europeanism, fascism and (neo)liberalism. Not only were Europeanist and pacifist convictions an important element in both intellectuals’ ‘fascist drift’; the same ideas permitted them to make an important contribution to the post-war intellectual renewal of the French extreme right. Paradoxically, their continuing involvement with the extreme right did not collide with their post-war adherence to neoliberalism. Rather, Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel seem to have been inspired by anti-communist, Europeanist and elitist ideas that were common to both the extreme right and the early neoliberal movement. This interpretative framework is mainly based on scholarship on fascism and the French extreme right, but it also takes inspiration from other directions such as the study of internationalism, technocracy, early neoliberalism and collaboration during the Second World War. With this approach, I aim to contribute to a better understanding of the links between French fascism, Europeanism and intellectual renewal between the interwar and the post-war period.

**Intellectual Fascism?**

In 1982, the Italian legal philosopher Norberto Bobbio said in an interview: ‘Where there was culture, there was no fascism; where there was fascism, there was no culture. There never was a fascist culture.’ Half a decade later, the French historian Lionel Richard described Nazi cultural policy as ‘the inverse of King Midas.’ The message of these claims is clear: fascism is to be seen as negative and barbaric, the natural enemy of all things respectable in human society. Fascism and culture can never truly combine, and as soon

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as fascism does ‘touch’ culture, it does not, like the mythical king, change it into gold but into barbarity. Even though Richard supported his statement with some convincing examples of Nazi cultural barbarity, it can be taken with a grain of salt in the light of modern scholarship n fascism. In the first place, it is not always possible to clearly distinguish between culture and barbarism or to find objective criteria to separate respectable from unrespectable manifestations of human culture. Secondly, fascism seems to have been both cultural and barbaric at the same time, placing extreme forms of ‘redemptive violence’ as its core method but also attracting the service of path-breaking artists, architects and musicians.

Of course, Bobbio and Richard were not the first to advocate a fundamental opposition between fascism and culture. There is a longer intellectual tradition of denying fascism any positive characteristics and describing it as a purely negative, incoherent political phenomenon – as having no real ideology at all but being just an instrument of the base and inhumane. Consequently, supporters of fascism can only be brutal sadists, opportunists or misguided petty bourgeois. In the Marxist variant of this tradition – one of the first to develop in the late 1920s – fascism was reduced to being the ultimate defence reaction of late capitalism in crisis. This was the only way to make fascism ‘fit’ into the historical-materialistic theory of the course of human history. Marxists had been puzzled by the rise of fascism, since it seemed to contradict their convictions of a direct transition from liberal capitalist society to socialism. They embraced a conception of fascism as ‘the power of finance capital itself’, a form of ‘political gangsterism’ based on deceit and brutality, typical of the transition phase before the coming of revolution and ‘real’ social progress.

On a more general level, the view of fascism as the antithesis of culture seems to be almost as old as fascism itself. It can be traced back at least to Benedetto Croce’s ‘Manifesto of the Anti-Fascist Intellectuals’ from 1925. Croce, an Italian liberal, had endorsed the Mussolini regime during its first years, even raising his hand in support of the Duce during key moments such as the parliamentary vote of confidence after the assassination of Giacomo Matteotti. One year later, however, shortly after the publication of a ‘Manifesto of Fascist Intellectuals’ – written by the philosopher Giovanni Gentile and signed amongst others by Curzio Malaparte and Luigi Pirandello – Croce wrote a counter-manifesto, signed by many intellectuals

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2 See Rauschning, *Die Revolution des Nihilismus*.
including Gaetano Mosca and Luigi Albertini, in which he expressed his scepticism about fascist claims as to having founded a ‘new religion’ and a ‘new culture’. He accused the fascist intellectuals of betraying not only the liberal nationalist tradition of the Risorgimento but also – foreshadowing Julien Benda’s famous thesis of the Betrayal of the Intellectuals – their task as intellectuals owing allegiance to humanity as a whole instead of a political party. He pointed to the inconsistencies of the fascist manifesto and called the fascist attempts at culture ‘sterile nods in the direction of a culture devoid of the necessary premises, mystical swoons, and cynical utterances’.4

After the Second World War, historical scholarship on fascism echoed this conviction. Hannah Arendt famously wrote in 1945 that Nazism ‘owed nothing to any part of the Western tradition, be it German or not, Catholic or Protestant, Christian, Greek or Roman’.5 Scholars generally neglected cultural aspects of fascism, preferring to analyse it from an economic, political or social point of view. This situation might have also been influenced by a contemporary political agenda – the Cold War context favouring a quick integration of Germany and Italy into the liberal West – while theories on ‘totalitarianism’ permitted fascism to be lumped together with Soviet communism as antithetical to Western liberalism. If fascism could be considered a shallow political phenomenon, born out of the First World War and dead because of the next, it could be presented as nothing more than a regressive interlude in an otherwise progressive narrative of triumphant liberal modernisation. This meant that no fundamental investigations were necessary as to its origins, heritage and relationship with mainstream culture and mentality.

This situation changed during the 1970s because of a new generation of scholars like George L. Mosse who explicitly approached fascism from a cultural perspective, demonstrating that culture was at the centre of fascist politics and that fascism often shared many aspects of its culture with other political currents of the interwar period. According to Mosse and later also Emilio Gentile, fascism ought to be seen as a ‘political religion’ that mobilised key elements of the culture, traditions and mentalities of a society with which it was profoundly connected.6 Since the 1990s, the relationship between fascism and modernism, modern mass culture and

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4 Sternhell, ‘How to Think about Fascism and its Ideology’, 280. An English translation of both manifestoes is included in Schnapp, ed., A Primer of Italian Fascism, 297–307.
postmodernism has become a key focus of study, even to the point where scholars have spoken of a ‘new fascination with fascism’. 7

What can be said about the cultural aspects of fascism also applies to its intellectual dimensions. For a long time, many scholars were largely unable and unwilling to explain why fascism was so attractive to some of the twentieth century’s brightest intellectuals. How could great minds like Martin Heidegger, Louis-Ferdinand Céline and Giovanni Gentile have ‘betrayed’ their role as intellectuals and involved themselves with an anti-intellectual ideology of violence and hatred? Several strategies have been used to avoid asking this question, all starting from the assumption that fascism is incompatible with intellectual thought. The first is to ignore an intellectual’s political affiliations and focus solely on his or her contribution to the arcane realm of the mind, pretending that it is completely independent of the ‘profane’ world of politics. This strategy has often been used in studies on Heidegger. The second strategy is either to deny that the intellectual in question ‘really’ was a fascist or, where this is impossible, to stress mental instability or to question his or her qualities as an intellectual. This has often been the case with treatises on Céline or his fellow novelist Pierre Drieu la Rochelle. 8

This study takes a fundamentally different approach. In line with Zeev Sternhell, A. James Gregor and Roger Griffin, I argue that fascism can only be understood properly if it is taken seriously both as an ideology and as an intellectual phenomenon. This approach, of course, does not imply any kind of sympathy or admiration for fascism, nor is it an attempt to trivialise the crimes against humanity that were committed as a direct consequence of fascist ideology. On the contrary: this study stresses that the effort to take the intellectual dimensions of fascism at face value is a better guarantee against related phenomena occurring today than a lazy denial that it could in any way be attractive to a developed mind. If there is any truth to Sternhell’s claim that fascism ‘impregnated the political life of Europe in the period between the two World Wars to such a degree that it became its distinctive feature, its Zeitgeist’, fascism simply cannot be dismissed easily and a fundamental investigation must be undertaken as to its ideology, meaning and attractiveness. 9

9 Sternhell, ‘How to think about Fascism’, 284; Gregor, Mussolini’s Intellectuals, 8; Griffin, ‘Studying Fascism in a Postfascist Age’, 6.
For reasons that will be discussed below, this is especially true for the way fascism manifested itself in the French context. Although France is traditionally not counted among the countries that were central to the development of fascism, several scholars have stressed fascism’s influence on French interwar society, its specifically intellectual character and its strong ties to related phenomena abroad. In comparison with other national manifestations of the fascist phenomenon, French fascism was organisationally weak, with a plethora of competing, generally short-lived political formations, none of which was at any time able to monopolise the extreme right. But French intellectuals played a very important role in developing and spreading fascist ideas. They often looked abroad for inspiration, establishing connections in Italy and Germany as well as with related movements and intellectuals in other countries, giving French fascism a pronounced international outlook. In the complex international context of the late 1930s, French fascism could even present itself as a form of pacifism and internationalism, entering conflict with traditional nationalism. This paradoxical situation endured during the German occupation and the Vichy regime and survived even in the post-war era, when many former fascists clung to Europeanist ideas and advocated the construction of an international human rights regime. To explain these specific characteristics of French fascism, a deeper excursion is necessary into the development of the scholarly debate on the topic.

Between Immunity and Pan-Fascism

In his classic work *La Droite en France* (1954), the French political historian René Rémond established an interpretation that would hold a dominant position in French academia. According to Rémond, the French political right consisted of three currents that were born in the nineteenth century: an ‘Orleanist’ (bourgeois-liberal), a ‘Bonapartist’ (authoritarian) and a ‘legitimist’ (reactionary monarchist) current. Since in Rémond’s view all French right-wing movements and parties necessarily belonged to one or more of these currents, there was no room for any kind of French fascism. The few authentic fascist movements, he claimed, existed in the very margins of political life because they did not fit within the political tradition of the French right. Parties and movements that called themselves fascist were not only small, they also largely depended on financial support from Italy and/or Germany. It was only after the country’s traumatic defeat in 1940 and in the special circumstances of the Vichy regime that some
political space was to open for fascists in France. Even this collaborating regime was, according to Rémond, essentially conservative, not fascist. Anti-parliamentary right-wing groups from the 1930s that did attract a big following, such as the Croix-de-Feu movement of Colonel François de la Rocque, could not be labelled as fascist. Rémond stated that these parties had a clear Bonapartist affiliation.10

In the decades since its publication, Rémond's book was regularly reprinted in updated editions. It laid the foundations of the French school of political history, and it became mandatory reading at the grandes écoles in Paris, where the French political and intellectual elite is trained. Consequently, generations of French historians and political scientists were taught Rémond's paradigm. His political institutional approach included a preference for the use of French historical comparisons at the expense of contemporary international parallels.11 Another reason for Rémond's success lies in the political and social context of post-war France, that is, implicit assumptions about the fundamentally democratic character of the French people fit his approach well. Henri Rousso has described how, during and after the Algeria War, a ‘relative consensus’ around a Gaullist ‘resistance myth’ dominated French memory and provided French society with democratic and anti-fascist credentials.12 After Charles de Gaulle’s return to power in 1958 and the foundation of the Fifth Republic, Rémond could state that the right had been definitively reconciled with the Republic. With Gaullism, which Rémond saw as a mixture of Bonapartism (De Gaulle’s authoritarian style of leadership and his establishment of a presidential system with a very strong executive) and Orleanism (De Gaulle’s democratic convictions and support for civil liberties), the conflict between the right and a republic – initially considered an adventure of the left – seemed to be solved.13

It took foreign intervention to finally break this silent consensus about the marginality of French fascism. Already in 1963, Ernst Nolte had attacked Rémond’s thesis in his Der Faschismus in Seiner Epoche. By emphatically associating the Action Française with Italian Fascism and German National Socialism as three manifestations of the ‘fascist era’, Nolte identified France as one of the heartlands of European fascism. Although a French translation

10 Rémond, La Droite en France.
12 Rousso, Le Syndrome de Vichy, 117.
appeared in 1970, Nolte's book seems to have had surprisingly little influence on French scholarship on the topic.\textsuperscript{14} Vichy France (1972), Robert O. Paxton's work of reference on the Vichy regime, had a more significant impact. Paxton's analysis collided with some of Rémond's key assumptions about the period of the Second World War. In Paxton's view, ‘Vichy’ was not Rémond's conservative government mainly trying to protect its own population from the worst aspects of Nazi occupation but an anti-democratic regime that enthusiastically collaborated with the Nazis while wilfully taking part in the Holocaust.\textsuperscript{15}

French historians were quick to adopt Paxton's analysis of the Vichy regime, but this at first did not lead to a reconsideration of French fascism and its presumed marginality. Regarding this point, it was the Israeli historian Zeev Sternhell who opened the debate sometime around the turn of the 1970s. Sternhell had first published a study on the nationalist writer Maurice Barrès that had largely gone unnoticed, but his next two, more ambitious books caused a big stir. In La Droite Révolutionnaire (1978), Sternhell traced the birth of fascism to ultra-leftist circles in fin-de-siècle France. Long before the start of the First World War, these marginal groups had developed a synthesis of revolutionary syndicalism, anarchism and nationalism. Under the influence of the sociology of Georges Sorel, the philosophy of Henri Bergson and a fundamental rejection of liberal politics and the bourgeoisie, a completely new ideology was born that combined anti-rationalism, anti-Marxism, elitism and a cult of violence and heroism. The implication was that fascism had a pedigree preceding the First World War. All the war had done was to spread this thought among larger circles in Europe, preparing the ground for a political mass movement that was finally given the name of fascism by Mussolini a few years before its coming to power in Italy.\textsuperscript{16}

By far the greatest controversy arose after the publication of Sternhell's third book, Ni Droite, Ni Gauche, in 1983. In this book, Sternhell radicalised his thesis from La Droite Révolutionnaire and extended it to the period after 1919. He claimed not only that French interwar society had been ‘impregnated’ with fascist thinking, which had taken hold of a large number of intellectuals, writers and politicians who mostly did not see themselves as fascists. Sternhell also described – using a history of ideas approach far

\textsuperscript{14} Nolte, Der Faschismus in seiner Epoche; idem, Le Fascisme dans son Époque.
\textsuperscript{15} Paxton, Vichy France, 233, 371. Surprisingly, in 1963 Nolte had already suggested something comparable on the Vichy regime, of which he stressed the popularity. Nolte, Der Faschismus, 120.
\textsuperscript{16} Sternhell, Maurice Barrès; idem, La Droite Révolutionnaire. For an interpretation of Sternhell's work, see: Costa Pinto, 'Fascist Ideology Revisited', 471.
removed from Rémond’s classical political history – how fascism came to symbolise an ethical, anti-materialist and anti-Marxist revision of socialism. Once ‘freed’ from the materialism of Marx, this socialism presented itself as a ‘third way’ between liberalism and communism. Its goal was no longer a revolution for the proletariat but a ‘revolution for the entire nation’. In the climate of political and economic insecurity of the interwar period, reinforced by widespread cultural notions of decadence and decline, this fascism was highly attractive to large parts of French society.

Sternhell pays much attention in his book to ‘non-conformist’ politicians and intellectuals. Dissident socialists and communists like the Belgian Hendrik de Man and the Frenchmen Marcel Déat and Jacques Doriot, who opted out of their left-wing parties and ended up advocating fascist ideas, figure prominently. Sternhell also addressed a specific group of young French intellectuals whom the French historian Jean-Louis Loubet del Bayle labelled ‘the non-conformists of the 1930s’ in his 1969 classic. These non-conformists consisted of several small circles centred around intellectual periodicals and thinkers such as Emmanuel Mounier, Denis de Rougemont and Thierry Maulnier who distanced themselves from all political parties during the early 1930s and engaged in a quest for radical political renewal. Sternhell’s analysis of these groups was fundamentally different from Loubet’s. While Loubet considered their thought as an experimental but altogether valuable contribution to the post-war renewal of democracy, Sternhell saw them as democracy’s fascist or semi-fascist gravediggers.

The response to Sternhell’s book was massive, both inside and outside academia. Bertrand de Jouvenel, one of the main characters in Ni Droite, Ni Gauche and still alive during the 1980s, took the Israeli historian to court in a libel suit that became a media event involving prominent French and foreign intellectuals. Among others, Nolte, Rémond, Mosse and Stanley Payne testified in defence of Sternhell, often stressing that they disagreed with his analysis but wanted to defend its academic legitimacy. Jouvenel was supported by friends he knew from the post-war period: prominent names like Henry Kissinger, Milton Friedman and Raymond Aron, who – adding to the drama – died of a heart attack just a few hours after leaving the court. Caught in the difficult situation of having to pronounce a verdict on a history book, the judge refused to persecute Sternhell on his claims that Jouvenel had

17 Sternhell, Ni Droite, Ni Gauche, 295.
19 Loubet del Bayle, Les Non-Conformistes des Années 30, 464. For a longer treatment of this subject, see chapter 2.
been a leading fascist intellectual during the 1930s and that he had after 1945 actively tried to hide these compromising elements of his past. Instead, he reached a different verdict on Sternhell’s other statements about Jouvenel’s proximity to collaborationism during the war. Judging this claim unfounded in empirical evidence and therefore libellous, he condemned Sternhell to a fine of 1500 French francs without ordering that the book’s text be changed.20

Outside the courtroom and within French academia, the reactions were no less intense. French political historians like Michel Winock, Serge Berstein and Jacques Julliard repeated the arguments of their tutor Rémond, presenting what Michel Dobry has described as the ‘immunity thesis’.21 Berstein argued that French society of the 1920s and 1930s was to a large extent immune or ‘allergic’ to the ‘fascist impregnation’ that Sternhell claimed to signal. Established in 1871, democracy had more time to settle in France than in the unstable young democracies of Germany and Italy. With the Parti Radical, France also had a strong party of the republican centre that could dominate politics and function as a bridge between the left and the right. As a result, an overwhelming majority of the French population considered democracy a positive achievement, not a façade for a political oligarchy (Italy) or a Fremdkörper installed by foreign victors (Germany). Finally, the relative mildness and slow development of the Great Depression shielded French politics from the degree of destabilisation experienced by other European countries at the start of the 1930s.22 Winock added that the absence of any kind of irredentism after 1919 effectively robbed French fascism of much potential support. As a victor of the First World War, France had reintegrated the lost territories of Alsace and Lorraine and added several protectorates to its colonial empire. Therefore, from a territorial point of view, the country could not have been more satisfied.23 Because of these elements, so the argument went, France never experienced a fascist takeover, its extreme-rightist movements only able to achieve at most short-time success.

Sternhell’s French and foreign opponents mainly protested his analysis of the leftist origins and the revolutionary character of fascism. By using a very

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selective definition of fascism as the anti-materialistic revision of Marxism and by focusing almost exclusively on young, non-conformist intellectuals, Sternhell was said to have closed his eyes to evidence that contradicted his theory. He was also accused of neglecting political reality because of his history of ideas approach and of underestimating the importance of the First World War in the genesis of fascism. Sternhell also seemed to pay little attention to the Third Reich, a clear example of right-wing fascism that did not seem to fit his theory well.24

Although Sternhell clearly overplayed his hand and used an excessively polemical style, he changed the field of scholarship on French fascism, despite the fact that most of the French and foreign reactions to his books were critical. Because of the heated debates following the publication of his book, French fascism became more closely linked to wider developments in the international discipline of fascist studies. As the dust settled, two questions remained:

1 Is fascism essentially an anti-bourgeois, modernist and revolutionary phenomenon that is clearly related to radicalism of the left? Or should it be considered an extreme variation of the conservative right, happy to use revolutionary rhetoric but always willing to collaborate with the forces of business and capital?

2 How receptive was French interwar society to fascist thought, and which political movements can be labelled fascist? And what does this say about key political events of the 1930s such as the anti-government riots of 6 February 1934 and the rise and fall of the Popular Front government in 1936-37?

The American historians Robert Paxton and Robert Soucy agreed that there were many fascists in interwar France, but they claimed that Sternhell was looking in the wrong places. Instead of Sternhell’s intellectual approach, Paxton proposed to study fascism ‘in motion’ and ‘contextually’, mainly focusing on the paramilitary ligues and parties of the French extreme right and their relationship with non-fascist groups.25 On the basis of extensive research on this wide palette of movements – from Charles Maurras’ anti-Semitic and monarchist Action Française via Henri

Dorgères’ pitchfork-wielding peasant militias to the authoritarianism of La Rocque’s Croix-de-Feu – Soucy and Paxton concluded that French fascism was not associated with the left, as Sternhell claimed, but belonged to the political right, its agenda corresponding to the political programme of conservative parties.26 Soucy showed that right-extremist movements were at their strongest around electoral victories of the left – the Cartel des Gauches in 1924 and 1932 and the Popular Front in 1936. At these times, they could present themselves as the necessary allies of the conventional parties of the right. By manifesting their willingness to fight the danger of a ‘Bolshevik’ takeover using every possible means, they attracted political and financial support from alarmed rightists. After political change led to a government coalition of the centre-right – as happened in both 1926 and 1934 – conventional rightists were much less interested in working together with the extreme right, which was weakened as a result. This means that where Sternhell implicitly drew a line between moderates and extremists, Soucy and Paxton re-established the traditional political spectrum, where the main division is between left and right.27

If there was much agreement between English-speaking historians like Soucy and Robert Wohl and their French colleagues Winock, Berstein and Pierre Milza on the point of criticising Sternhell, on other issues they still split along language lines. The biggest source of division was the question of the size and importance of French fascism. Strikingly, many French scholars implicitly shared Sternhell’s view of fascism as an essentially revolutionary phenomenon related to the radical left, defining it in such a way that the ligues of the extreme right hardly meet the criteria. While Sternhell, as a historian of ideas, stressed that this revolutionary fascism ‘impregnated’ French society and its intellectuals, they conclude based on their political history approach that there were hardly any political organisations that could be called fascist, which made French fascism a very marginal phenomenon. English-speaking historians tended to apply less sharply delineated definitions of fascism, including large parts of the French radical right in their definition. In their approach, interwar France suddenly seemed to be sprawling with fascist and semi-fascist parties, movements and ligues.28 Later exchanges between Winock, Soucy and Berstein on the pages of the periodical Vingtième Siècle suggest that the gap remains wide.

26 Paxton, The Anatomy of Fascism, 68.
27 Soucy, The First Wave, 234; and especially the historiographical introduction of the second part: idem, The Second Wave, 5.
between French and English language historians, which does not improve the tone of the debate.29

Within this ongoing debate, the Croix-de-Feu (CdF) and the Parti Social Français (PSF) play an important role. Under the charismatic leadership of Colonel de la Rocque, the Croix-de-Feu grew from a war veterans' social club into a very large anti-parliamentary league marked by a paramilitary style, strictly organised storm troopers, an absolute authority of the leader and code speech about an ‘H hour’ on which ‘action’ was to be taken. After the victory of the Popular Front in 1936 and with the political union of the left against the presumed ‘fascism’ of La Rocque and others, all paramilitary ligues were dissolved by government decree. La Rocque, who had always maintained that he was a republican, responded by founding the Parti Social Français, a party that appeared to be more moderate and that publicly respected the rules of parliamentary democracy. The allusions to a coup and to founding a new, authoritarian regime never completely disappeared, though, and after 1940 La Rocque radicalised his opinions again. Because of its sheer size, the question of whether the CdF/PSF could be called fascist is of major importance. When it was dissolved, the CdF had peaked at 500,000 members, and two years later the PSF achieved a high point of probably around one million members. That is more than the French socialist and communist parties combined and almost as much as Hitler’s NSDAP in 1932. If the PSF was indeed fascist, the immunity thesis cannot be maintained.30

The Paris riots of 6 February 1934, known in French public memory simply as Le Six Février, is the second key issue in this debate. After the victory of the centre-left in the 1932 elections and in response to the government’s incapacity to deal with the consequences of the Great Depression, right-wing opposition against the government kept growing, reaching its climax at the end of 1933 in the Stavisky scandal. This corruption scandal involving several prominent members of the governing Parti Radical was seized upon by radical right-wing groups to illustrate the ‘perfidy’ of the parliamentary system and to call for a general ‘cleansing’ of French politics. After a reshuffling of ministers, Prime Minister Édouard Daladier wanted to assure his government of the support of the Socialist Party by firing the police prefect of Paris, Jean Chiappe, a known reactionary lenient in his

dealings with violence by right-wing groups. The radical right responded immediately, organising a day of demonstrations and violence in Paris. On 6 February 1934, a demonstration of some tens of thousands of members of right-wing parties, ligue and veterans organisations on the Place de la Concorde escalated into shootings with the police and an attempt to storm parliament which left 17 dead and thousands injured. Three days later, in a civil war atmosphere, the French communists staged a counter-demonstration against what they saw as a ‘fascist coup attempt’. The police intervened, killing six and injuring hundreds.

During the afternoon of 6 February and with the violence still raging outside, Daladier resigned as prime minister, making room for a government of national union led by former president Gaston Doumergue. His grandfatherly aura and the broad base of support for his government soon brought a relative return to tranquillity, but the events of Le Six Février cast a shadow over French politics throughout much of the 1930s. The perceived threat of fascism played an important role in bringing together the parties of the left in the Popular Front coalition, and in the large electoral victory it achieved at the 1936 elections. At the same time, the events marked the breakthrough of La Rocque’s CDf, at that moment a minor group in the wider landscape of veterans’ ligue. His troops had caught the country’s attention through their military discipline and organised behaviour. Instead of taking part in the improvised attack on parliament, they had manoeuvred tactically, approaching the building from behind but in the end refraining from attacking it. La Rocque himself had not been among his men but in a secret headquarters, where he was in constant touch with his troops. This display of force and discipline brought the CDf a tremendous reputation on the far right while at the same time making it the organisation the left feared most.

These two subjects are treated very differently by English-speaking historians and by French-speaking representatives of the immunity thesis. Many French historians stress the spontaneous character of the violence of 1934. Most demonstrators had been unarmed, and not all belonged to the extreme right, with even a small number of communist war veterans taking part. They also argue that for many participants, cuts in the veterans’ benefits had been the principle reason to protest. These historians consider the CDf/PSF as an authoritarian but essentially conservative formation.
Paramilitary style being nothing more than uniformed folklore or ‘political boy scouting for adults’, according to a famous quotation from Rémond.33 La Rocque’s ideology clearly became more moderate and republican after 1936, showing more commonality with post-war Gaullism than with contemporary fascism. Finally, French historians stress the difference between the PSF and Jacques Doriot’s smaller and more radical Parti Populaire Français (PPF). If there was an authentically fascist movement in France during the late 1930s, this had to be the PPF, not the more moderate PSF.34

English-language historians such as the American Soucy, the Canadian William Irvine and the British Brian Jenkins – and to a lesser extent also Kevin Passmore – have refuted the conclusions that French historians drew from *Le Six Février*. They conceded that the violence had indeed been largely spontaneous and that most demonstrators had been mainly interested in bringing down a government of the left rather than staging a fascist coup. But in their eyes, this did not necessarily mean the movements involved were not fascist. La Rocque’s attitude during the riots seems to have been at the very least ambiguous. Moreover, a certain degree of political legalism can be easily combined with fascist convictions.35 Recently, the French scholar Laurent Kestel has joined these critics by attacking the false dichotomy between republicanism and fascism. He argued that, on the extreme right, ‘republicanism’ was mostly used to distinguish oneself from Maurrassian monarchism, while it did not imply any attachment to a republic with a democratic, let alone a parliamentary character. During the 1930s, France produced some models for a future ‘republic’ that in reality looked more like authoritarian or corporatist regimes led by an almost almighty dictator. La Rocque’s self-asserted republicanism should, according to Kestel, not be taken as an affirmation of anti-fascism.36

Furthermore, Mussolini and Hitler also allowed their parties to participate in parliamentary politics and sometimes suggested fidelity to republican rules before finally coming to power not through a violent takeover but in a semi-legal political way. The French circumstances of the late 1930s offered no opportunity for La Rocque to proceed with a comparable *Machtübernahme* – the apogee of his movement coincided with a Popular Front government that kept a close watch on the PSF, and after 1938 interior

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36 Kestel, *La Conversion Politique*, 122. See, for example, Gustave Hervé’s ‘République Autoritaire’ as described in: Hervé, *C’est Pétain qu’il Nous Faut!*, 26.
political struggle was mainly suspended under the threat of war and foreign invasion. This lack of opportunity does not necessarily mean that La Rocque did not cherish plans to seize power. These historians not only considered the differences between the CdF/PSF and Doriot’s PPF to be smaller than French historians claimed, they saw both parties as ideologically linked with fascism.\textsuperscript{37} Sternhell has made known that despite his own focus on non-conformist intellectuals, he has been convinced by the arguments of Irvine and Soucy that the CdF/PSF was a fascist movement.\textsuperscript{38}

New Perspectives

Although the ‘deaf men’s dialogue’\textsuperscript{39} between French-speaking representatives of the immunity thesis and English-speaking members of the ‘pan-fascist school’\textsuperscript{40} seems to be far from over, research is also turning into new directions. Firstly, the French political scientist Michel Dobry, who already criticised the immunity thesis in 1989, has gathered a group of young French academics around him who do consider French fascism a significant phenomenon. Inspired by a sociological perspective borrowed from Pierre Bourdieu, they reject the immunity thesis and the general ‘classificatory logic’ of historians involved in the controversy about French fascism. Instead, and in contrast with their older French colleagues, they prefer to focus on aspects of intellectual and social history. Since they also do not seem to be willing to fully accept the conclusion of English-language scholars, they have generally considered the debate undecidable and relatively irrelevant to their approach.\textsuperscript{41}

Secondly, after research on French fascism having been entirely dominated by the question of who was fascist and who was not, in the last fifteen years researchers are finally also turning to other topics. Developments in


\textsuperscript{38} Sternhell, ‘Morphology of Fascism in France’, 49.

\textsuperscript{39} Term coined by Berstein, ‘Pour en Finir avec un Dialogue de Sourds’, 243.

\textsuperscript{40} Term coined by Winock, ‘Retour sur le Fascisme Français’, 5. Generally, immunity thesis historians declare the discussion closed since they claim they have convincingly established the marginality of fascism in France. English-speaking scholars stress that many questions are still unanswered and insist on continuing the debate.

the wider international field have also started to have a larger impact on the research into fascism in France. In the wake of Dobry, some scholars have dropped the idea that there is a fixed definition of fascism or an essential ‘fascist minimum’. As a consequence, researchers have been free to pick any working definition, which is worthwhile only in as far as it leads to new insights within one’s own research. This development has led to the popularity of the use of the plural ‘fascisms’ instead of the singular form, intended to illustrate the impossibility of including all variations of fascism within a single definition. There has also been a rise of micro-studies, often concentrating on a single organisation or on the developments in one region or town. Provincial France, Algeria and Indochina have started to receive attention instead of the formerly exclusive focus on Paris. Themes from social history such as the relationship between gender and fascism are also starting to receive more attention.

Thirdly, the cultural turn in fascist studies seems to have increasingly influenced the French debate. Scholars have not given up asking questions about fascism as a general phenomenon, and the search for a definition or a theory of ‘generic fascism’ continues. The primacy of culture in thinking about fascism could open doors to more agreement between French and English-speaking historians, since it avoids key issues from the Sternhell controversy. Roger Griffin has repeatedly called upon his French colleagues to give up their resistance to a general definition and join his ‘new consensus’ definition, stressing the importance of populism within fascism as well as the ‘palingenetic’ myth of national rebirth after a period of decadence. It is very questionable whether Winock, Milza and others will accept this invitation. Also outside of France, disagreement on the nature of generic fascism is still the rule rather than the exception. Griffin has himself been accused of academic ‘imperialism’ – trying to impose a non-existent consensus definition within a still very heterogeneous field of research. While Stanley Payne seems receptive to Griffin’s ‘new consensus’,

42 For example: Passmore, From Liberalism to Fascism; Paxton, French Peasant Fascism; Goodfellow, Between the Swastika and the Cross of Lorraine; Jennings, ‘Conservative Confluences’; Kéchichian, Les Croix-de-Feu à l’Âge des Fascismes; Kalman, “Le Combat Par Tous les Moyens”.
44 Griffin, “Consensus? Quel Consensus?”, 59, 68. Griffin has repeated this request at a more general level in 2012: see Griffin, ‘Studying Fascism in a Postfascist Age’, 12.
45 For a rich collection of reactions to Griffin – and for another example of the problematic confrontation between different national traditions in fascist studies – see the exchanges in the special theme edition of Erwägen, Wissen, Ethik: Streifforum für Erwägungskultur 3 (2004).
Paxton, Soucy and Passmore have declared their unwillingness to join his approach, stressing that it overestimates fascism’s revolutionary character and places too much emphasis on intellectual currents in the early ‘stages’ of fascism – at the expense of the ‘real’ politics of fascist regimes once power has been achieved.⁴⁶

French fascism appears to be more in touch with international developments in studies that stress its participation in an international phenomenon. Within this approach, fascism is considered a transnational ideology that manifested itself within different national contexts. The influence of the two fascist regimes on comparable movements in France is an obvious subject for such studies, but this approach opens a much wider field of transnational and comparative analysis within fascist studies. Studies on international relations at the level of intellectuals, organisations and governments could shed new light on the way fascism functioned during the interwar era, exploring the ‘entanglement’ of different manifestations of fascism in Europe and beyond. Recent publications – such as Dietrich Orlow’s book on the relationship of Dutch and French fascists with Nazi Germany and Robert Grunert’s work on Europeanist ideas among Dutch, Belgian and French fascists – are inspiring examples of this new direction of research.⁴⁷ Similarly, Arnd Bauerkämper has refused to dismiss fascist Europeanism as mere propaganda, stressing the role of European discourses, entanglement and transfer within different fascist movements.⁴⁸ Samuel Goodfellow has applied the same method on a regional level, tracing a transnational fascism in interwar Alsace.⁴⁹

Another recent and controversial development concerns the question of the existence of fascism outside its ‘classical’ geographical and temporal boundaries of Europe during the first half of the twentieth century. It would take us far beyond the scope of this introduction to discuss the possible existence of fascism in Brazil, Argentina, the United States, South Africa, Egypt, amongst anti-colonial groups in India and China or even among the present-day Israeli

⁴⁹ Goodfellow, ‘Fascism as a Transnational Movement’, 87-106.
extreme right (or, according to one’s preferences, in the ‘Islamo-fascism’ of Muslim extremists). The question of fascism after 1945, however, certainly deserves some attention here, especially since it is very relevant for the French case. French post-war history suggests the continued existence of a right-wing extremist tradition from the Vichy years until the present day: from the neo-fascist and Pétainist circles of the 1950s, the terrorists of the Organisation de l’Armée Sécrète (OAS) during and after the Algerian War, the later intellectual prominence of the French New Right (Nouvelle Droite) as well as the enduring success of the ‘national-populist’ Front National (FN). Seen in this light, Jean-Marie Le Pen’s succession at the head of the FN by his allegedly more ‘modern’ daughter Marine – who saw the FN become the country’s biggest party at the 2014 European elections and captured close to 34% of the votes in the second round of the 2017 French presidential elections – is just another chapter in the history of the French extreme right.

Many historians of fascism are inclined to treat their subject of study as something that perished in May 1945 and was buried under the ruins of Berlin. For all his later controversial statements, Ernst Nolte was following a generally accepted idea when he published his study of Italian, German and French fascism ‘in its epoch’, that is, the period between 1919 (or, for some, the end of the nineteenth century) and 1945. Many felt that transcending these temporal boundaries by examining a period with fundamentally different dynamics and political culture risked inflating the concept of fascism to the point of blurring it. Although the existence of post-war neo-fascist groups could not be denied altogether, they were generally considered too marginal to merit serious consideration. After all, skinhead and neo-Nazi groups posed (and continue to pose) more of a problem of public order than a menace to democracy, their symbols and slogans giving rise to almost universal revulsion in modern society. The same cannot be said of the political parties of the more ‘modern’ post-war extreme right, who have achieved considerable electoral support in France and many other European

53 Nolte, Der Faschismus in Seiner Epoche. See also Payne, ‘Fascism and Racism’, 148.
countries and have sometimes even participated in coalition governments. Not only do these parties themselves energetically reject any affiliation with fascism, they also generally lack such prominent characteristics of ‘classical’ fascism as a paramilitary style, uniforms, a leader cult and an official agenda to abolish parliamentary democracy. The question is whether these are merely ‘superficial’ aspects of fascism that could easily be shaken off to adapt to the political culture of a new era or whether their absence simply means that the fascist element is gone.\(^{54}\)

Despite these understandable hesitations, several younger academics such as Andrea Mammone and Tamir Bar-On have pointed to some striking resemblances between the interwar, wartime and post-war European extreme right, while at the same time showing how it could adapt to radically new circumstances. They signalled the rise, especially in the ranks of 1950s French and Italian neo-fascism, of a European and internationalist discourse that had been overshadowed by ultra-nationalism during earlier stages. Neo-fascist movements were also eager to establish relations with like-minded groups in other countries. Support for the extreme right waned during most of the 1960s, but the student movement of 1967-69 provoked a right-wing backlash, providing a new stimulus for extreme-rightist and neo-fascist groups and laying the basis for the new successful ‘populist’ parties of the late twentieth century. Underlying these new directions, Mammone and Bar-On have traced a high degree of personal and ideological continuity of the European extreme right from the 1930s well into the late twentieth century.\(^{55}\) In articles covering a wide range of post-war extreme rightist groups, parties and individuals, Roger Griffin has concurred with Mammone and Bar-On, declaring that large parts of the post-1945 extreme-right conform to his ‘consensus’ definition of fascism.\(^{56}\)

Despite these new tendencies, Sternhell’s original perspective has not entirely left the stage. Even if most historians are critical of Sternhell’s conclusions, it is hard to completely dismiss his analysis. Some French scholars have started to follow Sternhell’s (and Loubet del Bayle’s) focus on young intellectuals in the 1930s without necessarily abandoning the immunity thesis. In ‘L’Europe Nouvelle de Hitler’ (2003), Bernard Bruneteau looks back from the perspective of intellectuals who supported the Vichy

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54 Griffin, ‘Fascism’s New Faces’, 293; Paxton, The Anatomy of Fascism, 185.
55 Bar-On, Where Have All the Fascists Gone?, 142; idem, ‘Transnationalism and the French Nouvelle Droite’, 208; Mammone, ‘Revitalizing and De-Territorializing Fascism in the 1950s’, 296; idem, Transnational Neofascism, 27.
regime in 1940. How could these intellectuals, many of whom belonged to the progressive left, end up supporting a collaborating regime of the reactionary right? His striking conclusion is that Europeanist idealism and a longing to break with ‘old-fashioned’ nationalism often played an important role in their choice.\(^{57}\) Other scholars are less willing to make this link, preferring to adopt a more technical approach to their study of circles of young intellectuals in 1930s France and Belgium. Olivier Dard is hostile to Sternhell’s thesis, even concluding at the end of a 300-page general study that France’s young intellectuals failed to develop original ideas or to achieve any considerable influence.\(^{58}\)

It is also possible to both apply and refute Sternhell’s method at the same time, as the Swiss historian Philippe Burrin has done. On the one hand, Burrin distanced himself clearly from Sternhell with arguments that show a strong similarity with those used by representatives of the immunity thesis: Sternhell was using too narrow an approach and his focus on non-conformists and dissident ex-socialists made him inflate a marginal phenomenon to excessive proportions.\(^{59}\) On the other hand, Burrin’s own book, *La Dérive Fasciste* (1986), shows clear affinity with Sternhell’s approach. He conducted extensive research on three leftist militants who ‘drifted’ towards fascism during the 1930s: the communist Jacques Doriot, the socialist Marcel Déat and the liberal Gaston Bergery. Burrin described how, in the case of all three militants, a combination of idealist ambitions, personal frustrations and psychological identification with a former opponent (fascism) contributed to this drift.\(^{60}\)

Burrin noticed that within the international and national tension field of the late 1930s, fascism was highly attractive to a host of mostly young intellectuals. Widespread notions of decadence, political ‘putrefaction’ and the inertia of the Third Republic made them long for a more powerful and ‘masculine’ regime that would put an end to eternal division and install a new, harmonious society. Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany seemed to reflect this longing, but at the same time these countries were a manifest threat to European peace. Through their aggressive attitude, Italy and Germany increasingly challenged the order of Versailles, and the incapacity of the French government to act against them reinforced the image of the weak

\(^{57}\) Bruneteau, ‘*L’Europe Nouvelle de Hitler*’, 336, 338.


\(^{59}\) Burrin, ‘*La France dans le Champ Magnétique des Fascismes*’, 54.

and divided democracies versus the dictators marching from one success to another. The establishment of the Popular Front government and the wave of strikes and factory occupations that came in its wake increased fears of chaos and class war. At the same time, across France’s southern border, the election of a related Spanish Popular Front government escalated into civil war. And in France itself, the 1936 elections resulted in the country’s first ever socialist becoming prime minister, Léon Blum, whose Jewish origins made him susceptible to verbal and physical violence from right-wing anti-Semites.

After the German remilitarisation of the Rhineland in 1936, the threat of European war loomed ever larger over French politics. In their desire to maintain the peace at all costs, France’s non-conformist intellectuals typically combined progressive and nationalist elements. From their period on the left, they had preserved a pacifism rooted in the experience of the First World War. This was joined by the conviction that France would have more to lose than to win from a future war. They were hoping that peaceful concessions to the fascist regimes could keep France out of this war, but this hope was frustrated considerably with the signing of a Franco-Russian pact in 1935. Doriot, Déat and Bergery were sufficiently informed about the agenda of National Socialism to consider a conflict with the Soviet Union to be inevitable. Their fierce anti-communism and their increasing identification with the fascist regimes meant that they rejected the pact as a step towards war. Some French intellectuals were convinced that ‘world Jewry’ was in some way working towards war because it ‘selfishly’ wanted to punish Germany for its anti-Semitic policies. If only France could rid itself of its ‘Jewish yoke’, entente with the ‘new’ Germany and Italy could surely be achieved.

The radicalisation of a large part of the French intelligentsia, combined with the complex international constellation, led to unexpected alliances: the declaration of war in 1939 was denounced by an unlikely coalition of fascists and radical pacifists, both unwilling to ‘die for Danzig’ in the name of democracy or the French guarantees of the Polish border. They faced a broad majority of conservatives, liberals and socialists who, despite their fundamental differences, all agreed that Hitler had gone too far and that the mistake of ‘Munich’ should not be repeated. Communists were divided between loyalty to the Komintern (which meant loyalty to the

62 An important element was the effective use of double language by Hitler, who accompanied every act of aggression (remilitarisation of the Rineland, ‘Anschluss’ of Austria, annexation of Sudetenland) with declarations that Germany had no territorial claims on French territory and that he wanted to achieve Franco-German reconciliation. Burrin, La Dérive Fasciste, 212.
63 Burrin, La Dérive Fasciste, 197, 231, 241, 295; idem, ‘La France dans le Champ Magnétique’, 54.
Molotov-Von Ribbentrop Pact) and a rejection of fascism combined with a patriotic affection for France. The same disarray in the political spectrum caused some convinced fascists to end up fighting in the Resistance, while others completely identified with the Nazi European order.

Laurent Kestel, a former student of Dobry, has recently published a book dedicated to Doriot and the PPF in which he criticises Burrin’s approach as based too much on intellectuals, ideas and international developments. Instead, Kestel proposes a ‘socio-political’ analysis of Doriot and his peers’ process of political ‘conversion’, strongly inspired by Bourdieuan sociology. Within this perspective, Doriot is reduced to being a political entrepreneur who manoeuvres across a political field, his actions influenced by the opportunities and barriers of a given moment. In Kestel’s analysis, Doriot’s exclusion from the French Communist Party (PCF) and from the Popular Front coalition brought him to the frontiers of a new political field, directing Doriot towards the foundation of the PPF. Kestel’s book does an excellent job in refuting the use of the Doriot case to either lazily lump together communism and fascism or to analyse the psychological disposition of a supposed ‘fascist mind’. He fails, however, in his attempt to refute the importance of ideas. Halfway through his book, in order to explain the attractiveness of the nascent PPF to young non-conformist intellectuals, Kestel grudgingly finds himself obliged to dedicate an entire chapter to their thought. He shallowly concludes that all these intellectuals were essentially ‘reactionaries’.64 It is also questionable what the added value of some of Kestel’s comparisons is, such as the one between Doriot and Martin Luther as rejected prophets vengefully turning to repressive and ‘reactionary’ ideas.65 As this study is more about the ideas and activities of intellectuals than about politicians ‘converting’ to fascism, Kestel’s approach is of less use to us than Burrin’s. But for this to become clear, I must explain in more detail what this book aims to do.

Europeanism, Fascism and Neoliberalism

No definitive conclusions can be drawn on the leftist or rightist character of fascist ideology and practice. The debate on this topic is beginning to repeat itself, although the tone is not showing signs of calming down.66 Meanwhile,

64 Kestel, La Conversion Politique, 9, 109.
65 Ibid., 231.
66 For example, see Roussel, ‘Le Fascisme Français ne Passera Pas’, Le Figaro (27 November 2014).
recent research is spreading in a range of directions, which will surely enrich our understanding of the fascist phenomenon but at the expense of a general overview of the field. Even so, it is possible to arrive at a few preliminary conclusions. Fascism draws its attractiveness from the fact that it combines revolutionary as well as conservative elements within its ideology, which makes it not ‘ni droite, ni gauche’ but both right and left at the same time, in the words of Robert Wohl. Revolutionary and anti-capitalist rhetoric and a considerable social agenda almost always joined hands with a political praxis that robbed workers of their rights as well as a readiness to ally the movement with conservative elites. It should also be stressed that, upon achieving power, fascist regimes have generally proved themselves to be much fiercer enemies of left-wing parties and organisations than of conservative groups. This is not to say that social arguments played no role in the ‘fascist drift’ of certain intellectuals. On the contrary: its capacity to present itself as a revolutionary, anti-capitalist ideology without the frightening downside of class war was one of the elements that made fascism especially attractive to non-conformist intellectuals.

With the calls for a ‘new consensus’ and the arrival of a new, sceptical generation of French scholars, it seems that the immunity thesis has had its time. No state can be considered historically ‘immune’ to fascism, and in the case of interwar France, the steadily growing influence of fascist thought cannot be denied. Marshall Pétain’s ‘National Revolution’ reached back to a strong indigenous anti-democratic tradition, and his regime was anything but an incident uniquely born out of military defeat. Long before 1940, the French republic had been undermined by an anti-rationalist and anti-republican counter-culture that showed many commonalities with the fascist tradition, being just as strongly rooted in the French past as it was influenced by contemporary phenomena in other countries. This counter-culture persisted in post-war France, manifesting itself in different movements and parties of the extreme right, some of which remained confined to intellectual or extremist circles while others received mass electoral support.

French fascism must be taken seriously both at the level of organisations (parties, groups and ligues) and as an ideology that attracted a large following among the country’s intellectuals. An approach focused purely on intellectual history does not do justice to fascism’s very concrete political

67 Wohl, ‘Both Right and Left’, 95.
context in interwar Europe. The same is true for traditional political history, since it fails to explain the reasons why fascism was so attractive to intellectuals and why it exercised such a wide influence on culture and society during the interwar period. This study combines these two approaches instead of focusing solely on one of the two manifestations of fascism. In this sense, it is not so far removed from the one proposed by Tony Judt in his classic book *Past Imperfect*, dedicated to the intellectual irresponsibilities of the French post-war Marxist intelligentsia. In his introduction, Judt stated that he was not conducting a full-fledged history of ideas but rather a history of conversation: the one conducted among themselves by a generation of French intellectuals and addressed to questions of “engagement”, “responsibility”, “choice”, and so forth.69 Though this study will neither treat an entire generation nor follow Judt’s focus on moral failure, it is similar to Judt’s approach in its focus on the political engagement, choice and responsibility of intellectuals.

Fascism should also be studied as an international phenomenon that manifests itself within different national contexts. There is an obvious interrelatedness of European fascist movements, but scholarship has too often stuck to the boundaries of a single nation-state, as if an ultra-nationalist phenomenon like fascism did not ‘look’ at what was happening across the border. In the same way, more attention should be paid to the links between fascism and internationalist and Europeanist intellectual currents in interwar Europe. Contrary to what one would intuitively expect, elements of the French liberal and internationalist intellectual avant-garde turned out to be very receptive to fascist ideas during the 1930s—and sometimes even kept thinking along these lines well into the 1950s. Fascist sympathies could evidently coexist with European engagement and the longing for a peaceful international order. After the Second World War, Europeanism became an even more important part of the extreme right’s discourse. Not only did it provide a way to escape political isolation and association with aggressive war within the national context; it also allowed for extensive contacts and collaboration with neo-fascist and extreme-rightist groups in other countries.70

This study explores the development of the political thought of two French intellectuals who belonged to this Europeanist avant-garde while placing special emphasis on the way their ‘fascist drift’ related to their Europeanist and internationalist ideas. Alfred Fabre-Luce and Bertrand

70 Mammone, ‘Revitalizing and De-Territorializing Fascism in the 1950s’, 301.
de Jouvenel were precocious and productive journalists, novelists and political writers. During the 1920s, they were among the ‘Young Turks’ of the Parti Radical, the governmental flagship of French progressive liberalism. Enthusiastic about the League of Nations and detesting the traditional nationalism they held responsible for the outbreak of the First World War, they advocated a programme of elaborate reforms, Franco-German reconciliation and the construction of a ‘United States of Europe’. Jouvenel came from a prominent family of politicians and notables, while Fabre-Luce was the grandson of Henri Germain, the founder of the Crédit Lyonnais bank. Because of their wealth, their foreign acquaintances and their journalist work, they could travel frequently. Both regularly visited Britain and all of France’s neighbouring countries, while Fabre-Luce spent several months in the Soviet Union and Jouvenel in the United States.

From the end of the 1920s, Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel rapidly lost faith both in the capacity of the Third Republic’s political system to renew itself and in the capacity of free-market capitalism to survive the Great Depression. The years between 1932 and 1936 marked a turning point in their political thought and engagement: they left the Parti Radical, developed a hatred of the Marxist left and the Popular Front, and called for a revolution that would sweep away both the parliamentary and the capitalist system. This revolution, they claimed, would have to be both national and socialist. Shortly after its foundation by Doriot, they joined the PPF and became members of its political bureau. Their visits to foreign countries seem to have played an important role in their rising anti-capitalism: both were shocked by the misery of the unemployed in Liverpool, Chicago and the American South, and admired the leadership of Hitler, who seemed to have pulled his working class out of inertia and imbued it with energy and hope. In the same way, they saw Doriot’s party as a way to bridge the class divide and to construct a ‘healthy’ national community. Although both distanced themselves from Doriot in the wake of the Munich Agreement in 1938, their fascist conceptions of society did not change. After France’s defeat against Germany and the establishment of the Vichy regime, both were fascinated by the German victory and the unseen chances it offered for building a fascist Europe and a continental economic bloc. While Fabre-Luce fully embraced collaboration out of a conviction that a nationally regenerated France would have a rightful place within the new German-dominated Europe, Jouvenel was more hesitant, preferring to support the collaboration politics of the Vichy regime rather than the more radical Paris-based Germanophiles. Both Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce were in close contact with French collaborators and high-ranking officials of the German embassy.
This attitude gradually changed in 1942 and 1943. The increasingly harsh occupation regime, the German occupation of the ‘free’ southern zone and the prospect of German defeat led Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel to begin to question their prior engagements. Jouvenel managed to flee to Switzerland, while Fabre-Luce, who remained in Paris, was first imprisoned by the Germans and later by the Free French. Despite their very critical attitude towards De Gaulle and the Resistance and a fundamental rejection of the Fourth Republic, after 1945 Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce were able to gradually reintegrate into the political mainstream while embracing the post-war European project. At the same time, Jouvenel and especially Fabre-Luce remained prominent members of right-extremist and neo-fascist circles. By relating both intellectuals’ ‘fascist drift’ to their Europeanism and their economic and political ideas for French politics from the beginning of the 1930s until the early 1950s, this study explores the implications of fascist engagement for two of France’s leading intellectuals. In doing so, it also raises the larger and thornier question of the relationship between fascism and Europeanism between the 1930s and the early 1950s.

Both Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel lived long lives and enjoyed an extraordinarily long period of intellectual production spanning seven decades. In 1922, at the age of twenty-three, Fabre-Luce published his first political book, a study of Franco-British relations since the end of the First World War.71 Jouvenel was made editor-in-chief of the progressive journal La Voix when he was twenty-five, and his first book appeared that same year.72 Both continued to publish until shortly before their deaths in the 1980s.73 From the dozens of books and thousands of articles they wrote, it is possible to analyse many different intellectual and political currents of the twentieth century. Especially in the case of Jouvenel, the better-known and probably the more Janus-faced of the two, this longevity and productivity have led to different and often mutually hostile readings of his work. Considered by some authors to be essentially a liberal political scientist and the spiritual father of ecology and future studies, others have called him an ‘aristocratic’ or a ‘melancholic’ liberal and a neoconservative avant la lèttre, while still others have labelled him one of France’s leading fascist intellectuals and a wartime collaborator.74 Although one claim does not necessarily exclude

71 Fabre-Luce, La Crise des Alliances.
72 Jouvenel, L’Économie Dirigée.
74 Essentially, see Sternhell, Ni Droite, Ni Gauche, 132; Soucy, The Second Wave, 256; De Dijn, ‘Bertrand de Jouvenel and the Revolt Against the State in Post-War America’, 376; Jouvenel &
the other – and all three seem to be at least partially true – these different readings have sparked controversy and conflict all the way up to the French courtroom, as we have seen. Fabre-Luce has almost exclusively been the object of shallow commentaries in which the conclusion is fully determined by the political positions of the writer. While Marxists and former members of the Resistance attacked him as a ‘reactionary’ and a collaborator, his only existing biography is in fact a hagiography, whose author attempts to justify and praise about every political position taken by Fabre-Luce during his life.75

To avoid the conflicts of definition and categorisation that have already dominated the study of fascism in France for too long, and being all too aware of the absence of a real ‘consensus’ in fascist studies about its own exact subject of analysis, I prefer not to start from a fixed definition of fascism. Working with a definition based on present-day scholarly insights carries the additional risk of according a meaning to a historical phenomenon that is very different from how contemporaries interpreted it – an inconvenient situation for anyone writing the history of intellectuals. Instead, I choose to focus on what meaning the relevant concepts of fascism, Europe and (neo) liberalism had for the intellectuals themselves during the period with which I am concerned. This means that I also consider fascism a relevant concept for the years following 1945, since during this period it was extensively interpreted and discussed by Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce.

I base myself on published material by Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel but also on archival sources (letter correspondences, reading notes, unpublished material and personal documents). The main part of the relevant archival material consists of Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce’s personal archives, respectively kept at the Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris and the Archives Nationales in Pierrefitte-sur-Seine. While Fabre-Luce’s archive is an invaluable source of information about his entire life, the (very extensive) Jouvenel papers mainly consist of documents relevant to the years after 1942, almost all prior material having been lost during the war. Although this lacuna in Jouvenel’s papers cannot be filled entirely, a partial solution consists of using the surviving archival fragments, other sources and memoirs written by Jouvenel and his associates. The judicial file of Fabre-Luce’s


75 See, for example, citations in Blandin, ‘Les Interventions des Intellectuels de Droite dans Le Figaro Littéraire’, 188; Garbe, Alfred Fabre-Luce; Sternhell, ‘Entre le Tragique et l’Imposture’, 80-120.
collaboration trial during the late 1940s, also kept at the Archives Nationales, is an important source on both his activities during the occupation and his post-war experience with the transitional justice of the French Épuration. It also offers valuable insight into his sophisticated attempts at whitewashing compromising elements from his own history.

In this study, I focus on both intellectuals’ political thought from the beginning of the 1930s to the early 1950s. As this period corresponds to the time of their ‘fascist drift’ during the 1930s, their involvement with intellectual collaboration during the war and their ambiguous post-war position as extreme-rightists turning to neoliberal ideas, the main aim of this book is to analyse Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel’s political trajectory as the interplay of Europeanism, fascism and (neo-)liberalism, a topic that historiography has failed to treat in a proper way. Biographers Olivier Dard and Laurent Kestel mostly stress Jouvenel’s anger and frustration with established politics as the prime motivation behind his process of radicalisation.76 The author of an unpublished PhD dissertation on Bertrand de Jouvenel as a ‘disenchanted liberal’, written under the supervision of immunity theorist Serge Berstein, largely denies that Jouvenel was anything more than a ‘Platonic’ fascist very momentarily infected by the ‘brown Germanic contagion’.77 Fabre-Luce’s biographer even tries to justify his fascism as an understandable defensive reaction against the communist menace, much along the arguments advanced by Ernst Nolte during the German Historikerstreit.78 The American political scientist Daniel J. Mahoney has written a very sympathetic biography of Jouvenel’s post-war ‘conservative liberal’ thought that is of little use for the period we are concerned with here. Mahoney, whose main aim is to prove the value and relevance of Jouvenel’s ideas for current-day use, tries to minimise Jouvenel’s fascist period. Altogether, he seems more shocked by the fact that Jouvenel supported the socialist François Mitterand during the 1981 French presidential elections than by his admiration for Hitler during the 1930s.79

Klaus-Peter Sick, a scholar of French liberalism, states that an elitist criticism of democracy led Jouvenel to fascist positions, while Fabre-Luce

77 Delbecque, ‘Bertrand de Jouvenel ou le Libéral Désenchanté’, 435.
79 Mahoney, ‘A Symposium on Bertrand de Jouvenel: Introduction’, 37; idem, *Bertrand de Jouvenel*, 4. Jouvenel’s support of a fellow Vichyite and former sympathiser of the CdF who walked an equally winding political path is probably less surprising than it at first sight seems.
was seduced by the concept of a strong authoritarian leader.\textsuperscript{80} In a contribution published in the French right-wing liberal review \textit{Commentaire} – to which Fabre-Luce himself frequently contributed during the last five years of his life – Sick describes Fabre-Luce as essentially a liberal who was only seduced by certain superficial aspects of fascism. He wrongly claims that, during the war, Fabre-Luce supported Vichy but retained a certain distance vis-à-vis the German new order. Sick’s suggestion that Fabre-Luce always stayed attached to ‘the essential elements of liberal centrism’ seems rather inspired by wishful thinking and a readiness to please his readers than by a thorough analysis of Fabre-Luce’s work from the early 1940s.\textsuperscript{81} Bruneteau, in his excellent study of the intellectual seduction of ‘Hitler’s new Europe’, does stress Europeanism and the concept of a new, ‘totalitarian democracy’. His analysis remains largely confined to the early 1940s, and he does not explore what happened to this Europeanism once the Nazis were gone.\textsuperscript{82}

In their post-war memoirs, Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce stress the social dimension of their move to the extreme right. Fabre-Luce wrote in 1962 that, during the 1920s, he had too long believed in ‘fashionable liberalism’ but that the Great Depression opened his eyes. He came to believe that large-scale state intervention as promoted by ‘Keynes, Hitler and Roosevelt’ was necessary to restore the economy to a situation of full employment.\textsuperscript{83} In his 1980 memoirs, Jouvenel focuses on the day his political hero Daladier became prime minister on 31 January 1933, one day after Hitler was named Reich Chancellor. Daladier’s subsequent failure to launch a New Deal programme along the lines of Roosevelt and Hitler left him with feelings of disappointment and anger, ‘with major consequences for my judgment and my conduct.’\textsuperscript{84} These explanations might have easily been influenced by the need to retroactively justify fascist political positions for a post-war audience. Regarding the general self-justifying tone of these publications as well as their possible deformation through hindsight, it is appropriate to concentrate on contemporary sources rather than on these later explanations by the authors themselves.

The second element in this book is the development of the two intellectuals’ political ideas after 1942, especially their relation to neoliberalism and the post-war extreme right. Although Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce both

\textsuperscript{80} Sick, ‘Vom Neoliberalismus zum Faschismus?’, 65.
\textsuperscript{81} Sick, ‘Alfred Fabre-Luce et la Crise du Libéralisme’, 561.
\textsuperscript{83} Fabre-Luce, \textit{Vingt-Cinq Années de Liberté I}, 165.
\textsuperscript{84} Jouvenel, \textit{Un Voyageur}, 114.
claimed that their wartime experience laid the basis for a return to the liberal democratic principles of their youth, many ambiguities remained. As public opinion associated them with fascism and collaboration, the years following the Liberation saw them in the position of outcasts resentful of Gaullism, the Resistance and the republican regime. Branded as collaborators and excluded from large sections of the post-war press, they were confined to publishing in extreme rightist newspapers and publishing their books outside France. Thanks to his Swiss exile, Jouvenel was the quickest of the two to adapt to the new circumstances. In his influential magnum opus *Du Pouvoir*, translated into English as *On Power*, he adopted a sceptical form of right-wing liberalism, convinced that both state power and the essentially irrational character of the masses could easily lead to tyranny.85

Outside of France, this analysis caught the attention of neoliberal academics such as Friedrich Hayek and Wilhelm Röpke, who were equally sceptical of democratic society’s potential to survive. Jouvenel was quickly integrated into these international circles and became a founding member of the neoliberal Mont Pèlerin Society in 1947. At the same time, he continued to associate himself with extreme-rightist and even royalist newspapers and journals.

Released from prison but condemned for ‘national indignity’ and partially stripped of his civil rights, Fabre-Luce initially maintained a principled rejection of the post-war order. In a series of brochures and books, he defended the position of Pétain and his supporters and strongly attacked De Gaulle, the Resistance and Marxist intellectuals like Jean-Paul Sartre. During the late 1940s and early 1950s, Fabre-Luce became a prominent and indefatigable spokesperson of former collaborators, Vichyites and other ‘victims’ of the French Épuration. He frequently published in the extreme-rightist monthly *Les Écrits de Paris* (as did Jouvenel) and even acted as editor-in-chief of the neo-fascist review *Rivarol* as late as 1955. But, paradoxically, in the meantime Fabre-Luce also began to reintegrate into the right-wing mainstream. His support for European integration and especially the project to create a European Defence Community in 1954 seems to have played a certain role in this development. Despite initially fierce clashes, he became a close friend of Raymond Aron and eventually a regular contributor to Aron’s right-wing liberal journal *Commentaire*. Apart from the question mentioned above of fascism’s relationship to Europeanism, the treatment of Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel’s post-war ideas and affiliations also carries a broader relevance, since it could shed new light on three other larger questions: the

intellectual relationship between fascism and neoliberalism, the character of the post-war ideological transformation of the French extreme right, and its relationship to fascism.

The first two chapters are dedicated to Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce's activities and ideas between the late 1920s and the outbreak of the Second World War. The first focuses on Europeanism and international contacts, while the second analyses the two intellectuals' political and economic ideas for France as well as the national framework of their 'fascist drift'. Chapter three provides an analysis of Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel's ideas and activities during the German occupation, including their attitude towards the prospect of a continental Europe under German occupation, issues of collaboration and *attentisme* (wait-and-see), Vichy and the Resistance. The fourth chapter is dedicated to the period from 1944 to the early 1950s, focusing on liberation, persecution and the relationship of both intellectuals to the post-war extreme right and the lasting importance of their Europeanist ideas. The fifth and final chapter discusses the extent of rupture and continuity in the two intellectuals' thoughts about neoliberalism during the same period.
‘En Faisant l’Europe’
Internationalism and the Fascist Drift

‘La Nouvelle Génération Européenne’: Generational Politics in 1920s France

Through their family background, Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce encountered foreign ideas, languages and culture from a very young age. Both grew up as members of the French intellectual upper bourgeoisie in a privileged environment of absent parents, foreign holidays and an important educational role played by British and German governesses. As the son of a diplomat, Fabre-Luce initially cherished a short-lived dream of a career in diplomacy, and in 1919 his father’s connections provided him with a six-month internship at the French embassy in London.1 Jouvenel’s father Henry de Jouvenel was a political writer and prominent member of the liberal Parti Radical, while his mother Claire Boas hosted a well-known political salon in Paris. It was through this salon that the young Bertrand met a great number of foreign politicians, especially around the time of the negotiations of the Paris peace treaties. He was impressed by the Czech politician Edvard Beneš, who together with his Slovakian colleague Milan Stefanik almost designed the new state of Czechoslovakia during an evening at the Jouvenels. In 1924, Bertrand spent a few months in Prague as the personal secretary of president Beneš, and he also considered a career in international politics.2

Both these first diplomatic steps ended in failure – Jouvenel did not understand Czech and Fabre-Luce accidentally insulted King George by turning his back on him during a reception. They soon abandoned this career prospect to concentrate on journalism and political writing, which, along with the occasional novel or play, would be their main métier for the rest of their lives.3 In 1924, Fabre-Luce published *La Victoire*, a thoroughly researched study of international diplomacy before and after the First World War. In the first part of this sarcastically titled book, Fabre-Luce refuted the war guilt thesis according to which Germany had been solely responsibility for the outbreak of the conflict. Although this thesis held official status

1 Garbe, *Alfred Fabre-Luce*, 70, 74.
2 Dard, *Bertrand de Jouvenel*, 17, 45; Bertrand de Jouvenel, ‘Tchéco... Slovaquie...’, *Gringoire* (25 March 1938).
as a clause in the Versailles treaty that Germany had been forced to sign, he claimed that no serious historian defended it anymore. The Russians also had their share of responsibility, and so did even the wartime French president Raymond Poincaré, whom Fabre-Luce found to have encouraged the Tsar to take an aggressive stance during the July Crisis. The second part centred on post-war politics and described a fragile international order still under the spell of wartime antagonisms. Especially France, again under the leadership of Poincaré who had become prime minister in 1922, had been unable to ‘master its victory’ and work on a just international order. By sending French troops to occupy the Ruhr area after Germany defaulted on its payment of reparations, Poincaré had alienated France from the United Kingdom and resorted to the same kind of politics that had led to the war less than a decade before.4 In early 1920s France, Fabre-Luce’s conclusions were explosive. Although largely ignored in the nationalist press, the book sold well, was quickly translated into several foreign languages and became a reference work for historians of the First World War. It also earned him the lasting admiration of Thomas Mann, who wrote to thank him for his ‘oeuvre pleine de liberté, de sagesse et d’humanité’ and who was impressed when introduced to Fabre-Luce during a visit to Paris in 1926.5

In his memoirs, Jouvenel pays respect to La Victoire as the book that defined his generation’s thought about international relations and war.6 For Fabre-Luce, Jouvenel and a larger group of young progressive-liberal French intellectuals, the Poincaré-led right-wing governments that had come to power after the 1919 elections represented a France that was stubbornly clinging to outdated nationalist politics. Instead of the logic of force and inequality behind the Versailles Treaty and the Ruhr occupation, they came to promote an international order built on justice and cooperation. Inspired by Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points and the foundation of the League of Nations but unsatisfied with its realisations, they adhered to what Klaus-Peter Sick has called a theory of interdependence in international relations.7 The horrors of the war inspired them to refute traditional diplomacy’s doctrines of national sovereignty and balance of power. Although he first considered the League of Nations a vehicle for the victorious Entente powers

4 Fabre-Luce, La Victoire, 417, 424.
5 Thomas Mann to Fabre-Luce (22 August 1924), Thomas Mann to Fabre-Luce (15 March 1931), Fonds Alfred Fabre-Luce, Archives Nationales de France, 472 AP 2. See also extract from Thomas Mann, Pariser Rechenschaft included in Fonds AFL, 472 AP 1.
6 Jouvenel, Un Voyageur, 77.
to consolidate their positions, Jouvenel quickly came to appreciate the Geneva-based organisation as a necessary step towards European union. This enthusiasm received a considerable boost during the middle of the 1920s. The left won the 1924 elections and the Poincaré governments were replaced by an unstable series of minority governments led by the Parti Radical. Under the leadership of Foreign Minister Aristide Briand, France ended its occupation of the Ruhr and started to pursue a politics centred on improving international relations through the League of Nations. The Locarno treaties and the resulting German membership of the League further enhanced the reputation of this organisation in the eyes of Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel.8

Around the same time, Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel associated themselves with Jean Luchaire (1901-1946), a precocious journalist and essayist like them but politically more engaged since his earliest years. It is hard to overestimate Luchaire’s importance for the political development of Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel.9 Luchaire was born in Siena, Italy to an intellectual and cosmopolitan French family and spent most of his youth between Paris and Florence, where his father Julien Luchaire founded the French Institute that is still extant today. During the First World War, the young Jean volunteered to work in military hospitals close to Grenoble and in Florence, after Italy entered the war in 1915, receiving a first impression of the horrendous consequences of modern industrial warfare. He met Jouvenel in 1920 and the two soon became inseparable friends, participating together in several internationalist youth organisations.10 In 1927, Luchaire founded the review *Notre Temps*, together with Émile Roche. Subtitled ‘Revue de la Nouvelle Génération Européenne’, *Notre Temps* and its associated publications assumed a leading role in mobilising a group of young internationalist French intellectuals – amongst whom were Jouvenel, Fabre-Luce, but also Pierre Mendès-France, Henri Jeanson, Hubert Beuve-Méry, Pierre Brossolette and Jacques Kayser – while providing them with a political agenda and a strong generational identity.11

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9 Jouvenel, *Un Voyageur*, 81. It is striking that even in his memoirs, just after mentioning Luchaire’s wartime career as the head of the collaborationist press office in Paris and his execution as a traitor in 1946, Jouvenel still paid homage to him as ‘le plus brillant sujet de notre génération’.
Like several other European countries, 1920s France witnessed a spread of generational discourses centred on the experience of the First World War. During the same decade, through the work of social scientists such as Karl Mannheim, the generational concept also acquired validity as an academic tool of analysis.\(^\text{12}\) Although generational discourses differed markedly from country to country – and competing versions could exist within a single country – a few interesting transnational commonalities can be identified. The war experience was often considered an essential divide between the old and the young, the latter having been fundamentally transformed by the experience of the conflict. The discourses often displayed a certain wariness with the rituals of parliamentary politics and with established ideologies such as (reformist) socialism, liberalism and conservatism. Instead of these ‘outdated’ political reflexes, they championed a ‘pragmatic’ and ‘unemotional’ approach to politics as a matter better left to technical ‘experts’ rather than petty, squabbling party politicians. There was also a widespread feeling of urgency – the need to achieve radical reforms within a short time – possibly reinforced by the notion of a ‘missed opportunity’ (‘verpasste Chance’) by having been too young to fight in the war. In several European countries, the 1920s saw a new political generation claim a central place in the reshaping of politics.\(^\text{13}\)

In Luchaire and Jouvenel’s minds, their generation consisted of those who had been born around 1900. Through their specific experience of having been ‘raised by the war’ and coming of age during the conflict without having fought in it, Luchaire found his generation essentially different from both the older generation and the war veterans, their ‘older brothers’ who had proven themselves unwilling to build a new France once victory had been achieved. Instead, the veterans had retreated into private life, quietly accepting conservative government and failing to seize the political role that seemed reserved for them. This left only Luchaire’s generation to achieve radical reforms in both national and international politics.\(^\text{14}\) Luchaire defined his generation as ‘realistic’, unimpressed by ideological dogmas and instead favouring a concrete approach to political problems. His generational concept also bore technocratic and potentially elitist connotations: rather than trusting politicians and the machinations of

\(^{12}\) Heinz Bude, “‘Generation’ im Kontext: Von den Kriegs- zu den Wohlfahrtsstaatsgenera-

\(^{13}\) See Herbert, “Generation der Sachlichkeit”, in Zivilisation und Barbarei, eds. Bajohr et al., 117; Wildt, Generation des Unbedingten; Wanrooij, ‘The Rise and Fall of Italian Fascism as a Generational Revolt’, 405.

\(^{14}\) Sirinelli, Génération Intellectuelle, 642, 643; Luchaire, Une Génération Réaliste, 20.
parliament to deal with these problems, he felt these matters were better left to technically and economically trained ‘experts’.  

Its ‘European spirit’ was, according to Luchaire, what fundamentally separated the young generation from those rooted in the world before 1914. But this is not to say that this ‘generation’ lacked older tutors or that these tutors were homogeneous. Campaigning in favour of the League of Nations brought Luchaire into close contact with Briand, who had been able to remain foreign minister after Poincaré’s return to power in 1926. His ministry came to provide considerable annual subsidies to Notre Temps, allowing it to become a weekly, and its contributors often accompanied Briand to Geneva to attend his speeches in front of the Assembly of the League. Through Bertrand’s uncle Robert de Jouvenel and through Roche, who were both important figures in the Parti Radical and who acted like tutors of the young intellectuals, Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce were drawn closer to this party. They joined the group of ‘Young Turks’ around Daladier, who was triumphantly elected party leader in 1927.

Fabre-Luce was a long-time admirer of Joseph Caillaux, the liberal reformist politician who had been arrested and imprisoned as a traitor in 1918 for his wartime initiatives to end the war through a ‘paix blanche’, a peace without annexations. From the beginning of the twentieth century, Caillaux defended a progressive income tax, pacifism and Franco-German rapprochement based on free trade and industrial relations, which exposed him to violent attacks by the nationalist right. Apart from these political reasons, the right also hated Caillaux because in early 1914 his wife had shot Gaston Calmette, the chief editor of Le Figaro, who had led a press campaign against her husband. The 1924 victory of the left permitted parliament to adopt an amnesty law, after which Caillaux resumed his political career and figured as finance minister in several governments. During this period, Fabre-Luce regularly met Caillaux. They became friends and in 1925 Caillaux even viewed the young writer as his political successor. Failing to achieve

16 Jean Luchaire & Émile Roche, ‘Frontières Spirituelles’, *Notre Temps* (October 1927), 2.
this, Fabre-Luce instead became his biographer, and the two remained in touch until shortly before Caillaux’s death in 1944.\(^{19}\)

During the 1920s, Luchaire was a stated enemy of Italian Fascism and a close friend of anti-fascist intellectuals like the brothers Carlo and Nello Rosselli and Gaetano Salvemini, who had become his stepfather after Luchaire’s mother remarried in 1916. But these credentials did not keep Luchaire’s writings from drawing the attention of Georges Valois.\(^ {20}\) Before the First World War, Valois (a pseudonym of Alfred-Georges Gressent) had been a member of what Pierre Milza called ‘the Maurrassian left’. He started his political career on the extreme left as an anarchist and revolutionary syndicalist inspired by the ideas of Georges Sorel, the theoretician of mass psychology, myths and violence. After turning to the Action Française in 1906, Valois took the lead of the Cercle Proudhon, an intellectual initiative to create a synthesis of nationalism and revolutionary syndicalism that was to pave the way for an anti-republican alliance of the extreme left and right. Some historians, most notably Zeev Sternhell, consider the Cercle Proudhon as the intellectual birthplace of fascism due to its role in creating this synthesis.\(^ {21}\)

After the war and inspired by Mussolini’s March on Rome, Valois left Maurras’ monarchist phalanx to found Le Faisceau, France’s first attempt at a genuine fascist movement. Valois called upon all war veterans and ‘producers’ to support the creation of a national state that would sweep away republican bourgeois mediocrity, restore ‘natural hierarchy’ under the rule of an authoritarian leader and create a ‘new elite’ by appointing war veterans at the head of private enterprises and various institutions of society. At the same time, Valois was careful not to entirely alienate the intellectual bourgeoisie from his project, as he frequently stressed that especially young non-conformists and technical experts were more than welcome to contribute to the renewal of France as members of its new elite. Despite initial signs of success and lavish subsidies from the perfume tycoon François Coty, which permitted Valois to start the mass daily *Le Nouveau Siècle*, Le Faisceau never achieved large support and quickly went down under the pressure of fierce competition from the Action Française and other right-wing ligues.\(^ {22}\)
His failure to rally the war veterans behind his project left Valois disappointed with the conservatism and political inertia of these former soldiers – a dismay he shared with Luchaire, Jouvenel and their ‘generation’. Instead, Valois now turned to them and other representatives of the ‘Young Turks’ inside the Radical Party as well as future neosocialists and dissident members of the French Socialist Party, hoping they would be the vanguard of a revolutionary remaking of France along technocratic corporatist lines. Abandoning his aspirations to be a fascist leader and retreating to publishing and editing, Valois became the publisher of both Luchaire and Jouvenel’s first books through his book series of the Bibliothèque Syndicaliste.\(^\text{23}\) In a further attempt to realise a synthesis of technical experts and progressive non-conformist intellectuals, Valois also founded the periodical *Les Cahiers Bleus*, which published contributions from Jouvenel, Luchaire, Pierre Dominique, Marcel Déat, André Philippe and Paul Marion. Despite some striking commonalities between the ideas of Le Faisceau and members of the ‘young generation’, these connections could hardly be seen at the time as a sign of outright fascist affiliation on the part of Jouvenel and Luchaire. After the failure of Le Faisceau, Valois started moving to the left again, and he would end his life in 1945 as an imprisoned Resistance fighter at the Bergen-Belsen concentration camp. Valois later expressed his disappointment at seeing so many of the young intellectuals he had tutored end up associating themselves with fascism and collaboration.\(^\text{24}\)

The turn of the 1930s saw a radicalisation of the Europeanism espoused by Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce. While they had first only supported the European project as the best guarantee against future war, it soon became the very core of their political agenda. Back in 1927, in *Locarno sans Rêves*, Fabre-Luce positively compared the League of Nations to the balance-of-power system of the late nineteenth century and called on support for the League of Nations out of pragmatic reasons including enlightened national self-interest.\(^\text{25}\) A few years later, this stance was not enough for him. As the beginning of the economic recession and the decline of the Locarno collective security system began to make themselves felt, the sense of crisis did not milden their Europeanist convictions – instead, it encouraged


\(^{24}\) Amzalak, *Fascists and Honorable Men*, 76.

\(^{25}\) Fabre-Luce, *Locarno sans Rêves*, 222.
them to continue at increased speed. In 1930, Jouvenel published *Vers les États-Unis d’Europe* in which he rejected the ‘powerless’ League of Nations system and called for the quick realisation of a European state. He took the American founding father Alexander Hamilton as an example and wanted, much like Pierre Drieu la Rochelle at the time, a European nationalism to replace the old narrow-minded nationalisms. From a global perspective, the differences between European nations and cultures were minimal, and they had to be overcome if Europe wanted to keep its dominant position vis-à-vis the rising superpowers in the East and the West. Europe already had an own identity, which was mainly constructed in opposition to the ‘despotism’ of Asia and the ‘plutocracy’ of the United States. In his last chapter, Jouvenel showed the degree to which Europe had in his eyes become a panacea to all the problems of his time: ‘On ne peut réaliser le Désarmement qu’en faisant l’Europe. On ne peut organiser la répression de la guerre qu’en faisant l’Europe. On ne peut restaurer l’État qu’en faisant l’Europe.’

Reconciliation with Germany at All Costs?

In international politics, European peace and cooperation meant above all Franco-German reconciliation. Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce called for revisions to the Versailles Treaty and participated in several initiatives to establish contacts with German representatives of their generation. As Jouvenel described six years later, the first post-war meeting with a German delegation during a Prague youth congress in 1923 left him feeling more French than ever, but later contacts were less tense. Relations were established between the *Notre Temps* group and non-conformist elements of the German progressive youth movement. Wolfgang Stresemann, the son of the German foreign minister, published an article in *Notre Temps* on ‘the young German generation’, and Luchaire was given the chance to develop his generational points of view in the German press.

The most lasting contacts were established through Otto Abetz (1903-1958). During a visit to Paris, Abetz, at the time the head of the Circle of Karlsruhe Youth Organisations, invited the *Notre Temps* group, along with representatives of other receptive French youth associations, to a meeting with various representatives of German youth movements on the Sohlberg, a low mountain in the Black Forest not far from the French border. Through the pines, the Sohlberg offered a view of the cathedral of Strasbourg. Held in the summer of 1930 in a deliberately unacademic, all-male atmosphere of camping, hiking, singing and campfire chats, the Sohlberg meeting was a great success, and it marked the beginning of a permanent Sohlberg Circle that organised youth meetings in France and Germany. Common points in the generational discourse of the participating French and German youth organisations played an important role in bringing them together in an atmosphere in which their very real political differences were cloaked by a meta-political form of spiritual affinity.

Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce did not attend the 1930 meeting, but they were present in subsequent years. When Luchaire could not attend a reunion in Berlin in January 1934, Jouvenel – who had become president of the associated Comité d’Entente de la Jeunesse Française pour le Rapprochement

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27 Bertrand de Jouvenel, ‘La Politique à Vingt Ans’, *Notre Temps* (February 1929), 84.
Franco-Allemand – instead headed the French delegation.\textsuperscript{30} In a report written by Jouvenel in preparation of the Berlin trip, he mentioned the difficult situation of the Comité d’Entente, which had come under attack from both the ‘anti-German’ right and the ‘anti-Hitlerian’ left. Nonetheless, the Committee and its member organisations were convinced that the quest for reaching ‘a common vocabulary’ between French and German youth was too important to be abandoned merely ‘for political reasons’.\textsuperscript{31} This position was supported by a plethora of associated youth organisations, from Marc Sangnier’s pacifist Catholic Le Sillon via the ‘Jeunesses Démocrates Populaires’ to the ‘University Group in Support of the League of Nations’ [‘Groupement Universitaire pour la SDN’]. A representative of Gustave Hervé’s fascist Milice Socialiste Nationale was more outspoken: his organisation had always been in favour of reconciliation, ‘whether with Stresemann’s, Brüning’s or Hitler’s Germany’, and it considered reconciliation with Hitler ‘not more difficult, but more effective’, since Hitler’s government better reflected ‘the German temperament’. Even Rudolf Sobernheim, representing the exiled Germans in opposition to National Socialism – those who, he stressed, ‘used to be the ones fighting for Franco-German rapprochement’ – indicated that the meeting should continue, since they did not want to ‘play the role of the Coblenz émigrés’.\textsuperscript{32}

Jouvenel’s private papers reveal an elaborate correspondence with Abetz, who organised the practicalities of the trip. Abetz was happy to announce that beds had been found at youth hostels in the city centre and that, in line with the committee’s wishes, it would be strictly a youth meeting ‘without official ceremonies’. Those who wished so were welcome to attend ‘une grande soirée hitlérienne’ as well as a lunch at the Hotel Adlon organised by the Reichsjugendführung. ‘For you personally’, Abetz continued, ‘we have planned several meetings with German captains of industry and I think you will be interested’.\textsuperscript{33} Although in his memoirs Jouvenel tries to minimise the importance of the Berlin meeting, he was still impressed by his experience of the German capital under National-Socialist rule, especially when contrasted with the ‘chaos’ he had found when he visited the city two years earlier. Drieu accompanied Jouvenel to Berlin, and his experience of the fanaticism and discipline of the Hitler Youth marked

\begin{footnotes}
\item[31] Bertrand de Jouvenel, ‘La Jeunesse Française et le Rapprochement Franco-Allemand’, folder ‘1933’, Fonds Bertrand de Jouvenel, Bibliothèque Nationale de France (BNF), Don 90 39 (52).
\item[32] Jouvenel, ‘La Jeunesse Française et le Rapprochement Franco-Allemand’.
\item[33] Letters from Abetz to Jouvenel included in folder ‘1933’, Fonds BdJ, Don 90 39 (52).
\end{footnotes}
an important step in his conversion to fascism.\textsuperscript{34} During 1934, Jouvenel brought Abetz into contact with several key personalities within the French veterans’ organisations. Henri Pichot, leader of the left-wing Union Fédérée des Anciens Combattants, showed considerable enthusiasm for a reconciliation ceremony with German veterans, and even Jean Goy of the right-wing Union Nationale des Combattants was won over. After meeting Hitler in Berlin in November 1934 (through an invitation organised by Abetz), Goy told Jouvenel he used to have little faith in reconciliation with a republican government that was ‘not really in charge’ in Germany. But with Hitler, Germany finally had ‘a stable government’ that allowed for ‘long-term agreements’\textsuperscript{35}

By this time, the ‘youthful’ element of the meetings had lost most of its importance. The Sohlberg Circle had evolved from a youth platform into the Comité France-Allemagne (CFA), a club of cultural and political writers centred on the bilingual review \textit{Cahiers Franco-Allemands / Deutsch-Französische Monatshefte}. Although Abetz may have adhered to social democracy in the 1920s and kept presenting himself in France as a man of the left, by 1933 he proved more than willing to accommodate himself to Hitler’s rule, moving tactically between rivalling Nazi institutions to play as big a role as possible. The German foreign office funded the bilingual review and several of Abetz’s initiatives, rightly supposing that they were an excellent tool to seduce a considerable part of the French intelligentsia into accepting the Third Reich.\textsuperscript{36} Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel proved to be an easy catch. Their conceptions of Europe and peace were so intimately linked to Franco-German rapprochement that there seemed to be no alternative to this politics. Already in 1926 in private writings, Fabre-Luce considered Germany the only way of salvation for France. He lamented the predominance of ‘Anglo-Saxon’ culture and the ‘Americanisation’ of Paris, which he held responsible for the spread of ‘European decadence’. Like the Paneuropean Movement of the count Coudenhove-Kalergy, with whom he had several meetings at the time, Fabre-Luce imagined Europe as

\textsuperscript{34} Jouvenel, \textit{Un Voyageur}, 202; Drieu la Rochelle, \textit{Socialisme Fasciste}, 202. Jouvenel seems to have played a certain role in bringing Drieu into contact with Abetz, who was eager to present him with the marvels of National Socialism. Abetz obtained an invitation for Drieu to attend the 1935 Nuremberg Party Rally and to visit a Nazi elite school at the Pomeranian castle of Krössinsee in 1936. See Lambauer, \textit{Otto Abetz et les Français}, 107.

\textsuperscript{35} Lambauer, \textit{Otto Abetz et les Français}, 72, 79; Jouvenel, \textit{Un Voyageur}, 203. These reconciliation attempts led to little more than two joint Franco-German veterans meetings, in Besançon in 1935 and at Douaumont in 1936. Duroselle, ed., \textit{La Décadence}, 207.

\textsuperscript{36} Bruneteau, ‘\textit{L’Europe Nouvelle de Hitler}’, 234; Unteutsch, \textit{Vom Sohlbergkreis}, 95.
a continental civilisation, both a political and a cultural centre of gravity between Asia and the United States. Coudenhove even asked Fabre-Luce to head his movement’s French section, which the latter politely declined while assuring Coudenhove of his complete agreement on the necessity of propaganda for the European idea.

In Fabre-Luce’s view, with such an important objective in mind, how could the rise of Hitler bring any change to this agenda of reconciliation? Indeed, during the first years after Hitler’s coming to power, Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce took pains to stress that nothing had changed and that the League of Nations system would continue to function. In private, Fabre-Luce thought that Nazi rule was a passing phenomenon in a Germany on its way to ‘communism or the republic’. In public, he stated that the biggest danger to European peace was not the fascist regimes but the panicked reaction against them in the French press. An understandable antipathy toward the fascist regimes should not inspire French foreign policy: ‘Un vrai libéral ne doit pas vouloir imposer le libéralisme.’ Hitler might be an ‘anti-European, prisoner of a bellicose demagogy’, but he would continue on the path to Franco-German reconciliation, as this was manifestly in the interest of his country. If Hitler did not seize the chances for peace and international cooperation, he would be confronted with a strong liberal opposition. If France fought off its ‘absurd collective psychosis’ and if it were willing to revise the Versailles Treaty, it was still possible to realise a large project of European union in which ‘borders would become irrelevant’.

Jouvenel showed the same degree of underestimation and misinterpretation of National Socialism, which was later joined by an increasing admiration. In 1930, when visiting Munich to report on the German parliamentary elections, Jouvenel attended two Hitler speeches which failed to make much of an impression on him. On the first occasion, he found himself in a largely empty circus tent in which a handful of ‘fat-bellied Austrians and boy scouts’ had apparently been the only ones willing to pay the 10-pfennig entrance fee for listening to an incoherent political monologue. A few days later, Jouvenel did find the tent packed with people, but he quickly noticed that a large part of the audience consisted of Hitler’s own men, uniformed SA storm troopers who had been herded into the tent to give their leader

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37 Fonds AFL, 472 AP 10 dr. 1.
39 Fonds AFL, 472 AP 10 dr. 1.
40 Alfred Fabre-Luce, ‘Contre la Manifestation Gide’, Pamphlet (31 March 1933), 9; idem, ‘La Paix en Quelques Mots’, Pamphlet (14 April 1933), 2; idem, ‘Comment Vaincre Hitler?’, Pamphlet (14 April 1933), 4.
the appearance of mass support. Otherwise, Jouvenel was struck by the overrepresentation of women and youth. Ironically titling the article ‘What is Menacing World Peace’, Jouvenel criticised French nationalists who were taking Hitler’s rise as a pretext for pushing French politics towards rearmament and away from international reconciliation. In a speech at the October 1930 congress of the Parti Radical, Jouvenel evoked his Munich experiences and tried to explain the Hitler phenomenon through a typical series of comparisons with the French past: ‘We have seen this: first Thiers (or Stresemann). Then the election of MacMahon (or Hindenburg). Then finally the Hitlerian (or Boulangerist) movement.’ But he also linked ‘Hitler’s whiteshirts’ [sic] to related phenomena in Italy, Austria and Hungary and to the French Jeunesses Patriotes and Action Française.

During the following years, Jouvenel did become aware of the significance of Hitler and his party. By 1934, he had to concede that Hitler’s popularity had not been as short-lived as General Boulanger’s mass appeal. In a long article, he advised the French not to expect a quick end to Nazism in Germany but to instead hope for an ‘authoritarian regime’ for France, as this would make it easier to solve international conflicts by taking ‘drastic steps’. Jouvenel explained National Socialism as essentially an attempt to organise and rationalise the economy at the national level after the failure of international socialism to coordinate the economy by international agreements. According to Jouvenel, this project need not be a menace to international relations and the chances of peace: ‘It is the task of the new generations to see to it that these different national socialisms do not turn into nationalist socialisms.’ He blamed the failure of the 1934 disarmament negotiations on France, whose weapons industry had exploited the unpopularity of the Hitler regime to sabotage a unique chance of ‘pacifying Europe’.

Through these statements, the two intellectuals were engaging themselves along the lines of an anti-leftist neo-pacifism, which was gaining ground in 1930s France. Blaming the danger of war on the ‘bellicosity’ of the French left, they held French communism, socialism and anti-fascist intellectuals such as André Gide and André Malraux responsible for missed chances for coming to a fundamental agreement that Germany was supposedly offering. Jouvenel’s most well-known manifestation of this attitude

41 Bertrand de Jouvenel, ‘Ce Qui Menace la Paix du Monde’, L’Oeuvre (13 September 1930); idem, [untitled], L’Oeuvre (16 September 1930).
42 A transcript of Jouvenel’s speech is included in Fonds BdJ, Don 90 39 (11).
43 Jouvenel, ‘Réflexions sur les Rapports Franco-Allemands’.
45 Vaïsse, ‘Der Pazifismus und die Sicherheit Frankreichs’, 605.
is his notorious Hitler interview of February 1936, a few days before the German remilitarisation of the Rhineland, during which he showed himself impressed by the ‘giant task’ the Führer had assigned himself of ‘putting an end to the old French-German hatred’.46

In Fabre-Luce’s writings, this pacifism sometimes took on anti-Semitic dimensions. In an article discussing European problems ‘from a racial point of view’, Fabre-Luce called Arthur de Gobineau ‘possibly the most important writer for today’s Europe’. He refuted Nazi ideas of racial purity as an illusion, but he also tried to explain anti-Semitism as the understandable hatred of the poor Austrian peasantry against rich and hedonistic Vienna, which was ‘dominated by the Jews’. The French media had been justified in criticising the ‘excesses’ of German anti-Semitism, but too much indignation was misplaced, as France’s allies Poland and Romania had known persecutions that were ‘much worse’ than what was happening in Germany. Most importantly, France should put strict limits on Jewish immigration, since it was already receiving the ‘worst elements’ of German Jewry. Jewish immigration even meant a danger to international peace, since ‘Hitler’s anti-Semitic persecutions have been followed by a Jewish counter-offensive’ inciting France to go to war with its eastern neighbour. ‘Against this provocation’, Fabre-Luce concluded, ‘French anti-Semitism or anti-Marxism can turn out to be legitimate defence movements, or a kind of tolerance’.47

This attitude was reinforced by admiration for the fascist dictators, whom Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce had the honour of meeting in person. In his Hitler interview, organised by Abetz and held at the Führer’s mountain retreat in Berchtesgaden,48 Jouvenel described Hitler as ‘completely different from the way I expected him to be’. Instead of the frightful dictator doing everything to impress his visitor, as he had found Mussolini during an earlier trip to Rome, Jouvenel was confronted with a ‘modest’ man dressed in a khaki suit who sat down next to him at a small table and repeatedly patted him on the shoulder. Hitler was ‘un homme de sport’ with ‘beautiful hands’ and a sincere will of peace. When Jouvenel confronted him with radically anti-French citations from Mein Kampf, Hitler responded by stressing that it was a book he wrote in prison as a young man at a time when the Ruhr was occupied by French troops. The text did not need to be rectified in

47 Alfred Fabre-Luce, ‘Les Querelles de Races’, Pamphlet (15 December 1933); idem, ‘Faux Départ’, Pamphlet (23 February 1934).
48 See also Abetz, Das Offene Problem, 78.
later editions, according to Hitler: ‘My rectification? I’m giving it every day with my foreign policy that is fully oriented towards friendship with France!’ In 1938, having obtained an official invitation through Abetz, Jouvenel attended the Nazi party rally in Nuremberg – a privilege very seldom accorded to foreign guests. In the same way, Fabre-Luce showed himself deeply impressed after a private meeting with Mussolini in early 1934. Describing the Duce as an authentic, great man, ‘animated by the soil, the people and history’, Fabre-Luce concluded that France had a lot to learn from his fascist regime.

In November 1934, the famous feminist journalist Louise Weiss, no longer believing in the League of Nations she had championed for many years, abandoned her position at the head of L’Europe Nouvelle, the prestigious Europeanist weekly she had founded in 1920 and headed ever since. The board of editors was split over the question of whether the European project could continue after the coming to power of Hitler. A considerable group agreed with Weiss that nothing could be done and left the periodical in her wake, while those who believed in rapprochement stayed. Within a week’s time, Fabre-Luce took Weiss’ place as the editor in chief. Closely involving Jouvenel, Drieu and Pierre Dominique with the weekly, he steered it towards the neo-pacifist line of continued rapprochement with Germany.

This is not to say that Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel welcomed all of Hitler’s political moves. While they initially continued believing in the vitality of the League of Nations system, developments in international politics gradually led both intellectuals to change their minds. They supported the April 1934 Stresa agreements between France, Great Britain and Italy as an efficient way to contain German expansion (and to convince Hitler to return to the negotiating table), and they severely criticised Britain and France when this alliance fell apart as a result of Italy’s invasion of Abyssinia. Although writing in a more pessimistic tone about the menace of

49 Jouvenel, “Soyons amis”.
50 Jouvenel, Un Voyageur, 322. Private notes suggest that Jouvenel had another private meeting with Mussolini on 3 June 1936, but he was not allowed to comment on it in the French press. See ‘Documents diplomatiques français’, Fonds BdJ, Don 90 39 (12).
51 Idem, ‘Le Fascisme est-il Exportable?’, Pamphlet (19 January 1934); idem, ‘Scandale International’, L’Europe Nouvelle (21 December 1935). The signatories to the Stresa agreement reaffirmed the Locarno Treaties, guaranteed the independence of Austria and pledged to resist any further German attempt to change the Treaty of Versailles.
war, Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel continued to consider Hitler's foreign policy as led by essentially rational considerations. They were convinced that through clever diplomatic moves, France could make Germany see 'no other solution than peace'.

In his 1974 memoirs, Fabre-Luce prided himself on his last editorial in *L'Europe Nouvelle*. From the same post-World-War-II perspective, Raymond Aron and Daniel Garbe, his very sympathetic biographer, joined him in this praise. In the article, which appeared in late January 1936 – less than two months before the German remilitarisation of the Rhineland – Fabre-Luce envisaged the event and correctly estimated its political consequences. With the Rhineland effectively closed to French troops, France would have no means to enforce its Eastern European treaties, Fabre-Luce stated. Considering the evident fact that Germany was engaged in a politics of aggressive expansion into new 'virgin territories' in Eastern Europe, France was left with two political options: either to pre-emptively occupy the Rhineland together with the British or to try to satisfy Germany through territorial, political and economic concessions at the expense of France's eastern allies. The risk of the first option was an escalation into a European war, while the second option carried the risk of being interpreted as an encouragement by a Germany whose 'hunger grows while eating'. Doing nothing was worse still, since it would inevitably lead to a later war, 'under less favourable conditions'.

While the article gave a correct estimation of the implications of remilitarisation, it did not mark a fundamental shift in Fabre-Luce's attitude. On the contrary, after the victory of the Popular Front in May 1936 and their association with the PPF, both Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce's sympathy for Germany grew again. They even partially returned to the idea of Europeanism, albeit in a different form than before. Instead of the League of Nations model, they now came to advocate the concept of a European federation based on treaties between a smaller number of large, authoritarian states with their spheres of influence and colonial dependencies. This new conception went along with some technical large-scale projects from their *Notre Temps* days, such as the joint exploitation of colonial empires, which Jouvenel enthusiastically proposed in a German-language article.

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55 Alfred Fabre-Luce, 'Le Tragique de la Politique Extérieure Française', *L'Europe Nouvelle* (25 January 1936). Fabre-Luce left *L'Europe Nouvelle* in order to fully dedicate his time to his second (failed) attempt to be elected to parliament in the May 1936 elections.
in the *Cahiers Franco-Allemands*.\(^{56}\) Even the countries of Eastern Europe could become parts of a Franco-German colonial empire, Jouvenel suggested in early 1938. A trip through Romania and the Balkan countries left him with little hope about the capacities of these ‘invertebrate nations’ to exist independently. He proposed that France and Germany jointly found a ‘Europe Company’, modelled after the colonial chartered companies of the eighteenth century, to assure the rational exploitation of the Balkan territories.\(^{57}\) Jouvenel continued to blame the international tension almost exclusively on France. He accused Prime Minister Léon Blum of refusing offers of friendship by Mussolini and Hitler because he was only serving the interests of the Socialist International rather than France. Instead of reconciling itself with Germany and Italy, France had signed a treaty with the Soviet Union, abandoning its foreign policy to ‘Potemkin’ and raising ‘all of Europe against us’.\(^{58}\)

**Metaphysical Europeanism**

In 1937, Fabre-Luce imagined a peaceful international order dominated by ‘five of six’ great powers (he failed to name them, but probably meant France, Germany, Britain, Italy, the Soviet Union and a future Francoïst Spain), bringing all smaller countries under their respective spheres of influence. These smaller powers would lose their independence, but they would profit from being part of a ‘larger organisation’. German racism was one of the best guarantees against further expansion, since ‘out of hygiene, it shuns annexing other peoples’.\(^{59}\) One year later, he even directly contradicted his own Rhineland article by stating that only ‘bellicose’ demagogues of the extreme left wanted France to pre-emptively go to war, pretending that it was in any case inevitable in the long run, ‘under less favourable conditions’.\(^{60}\) France could save the peace only by allowing Germany ‘free hands’ in Eastern Europe, by ending ‘decadence’ and giving itself a strong regime, a French version of what had already been achieved in Italy and Germany. If

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\(^{56}\) Jouvenel, ‘Das Französische Weltreich’, 104.


\(^{59}\) Fabre-Luce, *Journal Intime*, 70.

\(^{60}\) Fabre-Luce, *Le Sécret de la République*, 195.
France continued to fail at this job, it would inevitable become ‘Germany’s vassal, progressively through peace or brutally through war’. Looking back at his engagements during the past fifteen years, Fabre-Luce resumed his political convictions in the battle cry ‘Contre la guerre d’Occident! Contre le bolchevisme!’ Of course, he admitted, complex political problems could not be solved so easily, but it was at least a beginning and there was no time for doubt. ‘We will doubt no more, as long as we have not saved Europe.’

Around the same time, possibly in reaction to the bleak political perspectives for peace and European integration during the late 1930s, the Europeanism of both intellectuals gained spiritual and metaphysical dimensions. Fabre-Luce – seemingly foreshadowing Mircea Eliade – reflected on the metaphysical identity of his European generation engaged in a search for an ‘Eternal Return’, deepening ‘the experience of the Moment’ and ‘reshaping the Sacred’. Jouvenel longed for a situation where the spiritual and the temporal would overlap, as in the Arabian Peninsula under Muhammad during the first years of Islam. Regrettably, Western society was hopelessly divided, not only between spiritual and secular powers but also within the spiritual sphere between rival beliefs and ideologies, with communism playing an especially disruptive role. Because of these divisions, modern man was lost in the world, a prey to cynicism and scepticism. While the new regimes attempted to solve this crisis by acting as a necessary ‘organising authority’ restoring a coherent social sphere, they were confronted with opposition from the side of the Church and ‘so-called humanists’ claiming to defend general principles but in fact only prolonging Europe’s state of crisis.

For inspiration, Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel mainly looked abroad. Aware of the disaster that a public association with Hitler would mean for his party, Doriot repeatedly stressed that the PPF was thoroughly French and that neither its doctrine nor its ideas were imported from abroad. This did not keep the two intellectuals from travelling to France’s neighbouring countries in search of political examples that reflected their aspirations. Apart from the two fascist regimes, they were also interested in related movements in Belgium, Britain and Spain. When the Spanish Civil War broke out in July 1936, Jouvenel crossed the frontier at Irun and became one of the first French journalists to report from the insurgents’ side. He met the generals Emilio Mola and Francisco Franco as well as José Antonio

61 Ibid., 224, 237.
62 Fabre-Luce, Journal Intime, 238.
63 Ibid., 236; Jouvenel, Le Réveil de l’Europe, 279, 283.
64 Davis, A Fearful Innocence, 135, 140.
Primo de Rivera, the leader of the fascist Falange movement, and was impressed by their dedication. When Primo de Rivera was killed by Alicante republicans in November 1936, Jouvenel praised him as a martyr who had inspired young Spaniards to sacrifice themselves for their fatherland. His death was a great loss to Spain, Jouvenel argued, because Primo de Rivera had dedicated his life to ‘the social ideal of class fusion within a fraternal community’. Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce’s articles on Spain betray a definite sympathy for the insurgents’ side, blaming the outbreak of the war on the republican Frente Popular government and using the Spanish example as a warning for the kind of damage the French Popular Front could inflict.

Largely along the lines of other fascist French writers like Drieu and Robert Brasillach, they depicted Spain as ‘a different world’, a country of strong believers rooted in the traditions of Medieval chivalry and the ‘example of the conquistadors’ and willing to give their lives in defence of their faith.

In Belgium, Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel were fascinated by the quick rise of the young Walloon fascist Léon Degrelle and his Rexist movement, which won more than 11% of the votes at the 1936 parliamentary elections. Degrelle concluded from this victory that he was close to seizing power through legal means, much like Hitler in 1933, but he was weakened by repeated disavowals of his party by the Belgian Catholic Church and in subsequent years lost support. Fabre-Luce met Degrelle and admired his dynamism and youthful charm. Jouvenel also met the Flemish fascist Joris van Severen, who had founded the Verdinaso movement which campaigned for a corporatist Greater-Dutch state including all three Benelux countries plus the French part of Flanders. Despite being a radical anti-Semite, Van Severen despised Germany almost as much, telling Jouvenel he hated the ‘Hitlerians’.

Despite these encounters, Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel’s sympathies were divided between Degrelle and the very government he was fighting, a big coalition of socialists, Catholics and liberals that had adopted large parts of

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65 Bertrand de Jouvenel, ‘On a Tué un Chef: José Antonio’, L’Assaut (24 November 1936); Jouvenel, Un Voyageur, 275.
68 Alfred Fabre-Luce, ‘La Défaite de Degrelle’, L’Assaut (13 April 1937).
the ‘planist’ programmes of Hendrik de Man and Paul-Henri Spaak.\footnote{Fabre-Luce, ‘La Défaite de Degrelle’; Bertand de Jouvenel, ‘Une Expérience Belge Commence’, \textit{Vu} (27 March 1935). For a longer treatment of De Man and planism, see the next chapter.} When the government took energetic measures against Degrelle and Spaak spoke of founding an ‘authoritarian democracy’, Jouvenel praised the initiative: ‘The speech should be read with care. It’s about infusing enough fascism into democracy as to immunise it against fascism.’\footnote{Bertrand de Jouvenel, [no title], \textit{Vu} (21 October 1936).} Fabre-Luce, who had already met the English fascist Oswald Mosley in 1933, thought likewise about the chances of fascism in Belgium and Britain. He was unsure whether fascism could be effective and relevant in countries with streamlined and ‘authoritarian’ democratic systems, the very elements he had little hope of seeing established in France.\footnote{Alfred Fabre-Luce, ‘Conversation avec Sir Oswald Mosley’, \textit{Pamphlet} (19 May 1933); idem, ‘Rex et l’Assaut’, \textit{L’Assaut} (13 April 1937).} He explained that, contrary to the Third Republic, the British system worked because it artificially created stable majorities and kept public opinion at a certain distance from government. Most importantly, the British political parties created a natural elite that was up to its tasks. The parties functioned as ‘schools of Führers’ who were ‘chosen from adolescence, trained in athletes’ schools, imposed upon the people and assured, even while in power, of long periods of rest that keep them worthy and serene’.\footnote{Fabre-Luce, \textit{Journal Intime}, 98.}

The Sudeten Crisis in August-September 1938 may have contributed to both intellectuals leaving Doriot’s PPF,\footnote{For a larger treatment of Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce’s activities as members of the PPF, see the next chapter.} but it could not fundamentally detach them from their pacifist and Europeanist convictions. Jouvenel, making good use of his long-standing relations with Beneš, visited Czechoslovakia twice in 1938, writing long articles for the French mass press. During a conversation with Beneš in March, at the time of the Anschluss, Jouvenel noted that the Czechoslovakian president manifested his confidence in French guarantees of his country’s independence. In late September, during the Munich negotiations, Jouvenel visited the Sudeten area and several Czechoslovak cities, witnessing the populations’ anger and despair when it became clear that France was abandoning its ally by refusing to assist the country militarily in the case of a German attack.\footnote{Bertrand de Jouvenel, ‘Tchéco… Slovaquie…’, \textit{Gringoire} (25 March 1938); idem, \textit{Un Voyageur}, 333; Dard, \textit{Bertrand de Jouvenel}, 138.}
In French society, the resulting Munich Agreement initially met with wide acclaim. Prime Minister Daladier, himself aware that France had suffered a severe diplomatic defeat, was given a hero’s welcome upon his return by cheering crowds. The mass daily *Le Petit Journal* opened a ‘livre d’or’ in which more than a million people expressed their gratitude to Daladier and Chamberlain for having saved the peace. The French parliament gave the prime minister a standing ovation and approved the agreement by 515 votes against 75. As soon as the initial wave of relief had passed, however, this attitude changed and French politics became strongly divided between ‘munichois’ (supporters of the agreement) and ‘antimunichois’ (its opponents). Except for the unanimously disapproving communists, lines cut right through all parties, but the ‘antimunichois’ camp gradually grew during the following year, receiving considerable boosts from subsequent German acts of aggression such as the annexation of the entire Czech territory in March 1939. By the time of the German invasion of Poland in September 1939, only a small number of fascists, radical pacifists and communists opposed the French declaration of war.76

Division also raged in the PPF, with many high-ranking members disapproving the ‘munichois’ stance that Doriot had adopted. In a speech at the national party congress of 15-16 October, Jouvenel reported his experiences in Prague and openly criticised Doriot’s position. The same day, he wrote a letter to the editor, published in *The Times*, in which he stated that ‘the British and French governments have, in fact, not granted the right of self-disposal to the Sudeten Germans, but simply turned Czechoslovakia over to Germany, lock, stock and barrel’. If a European war were to break out in the future, Jouvenel asserted, ‘the Führer will not be the only one to blame for that disaster’, since Paris and London had ‘led him to think that England and France were dogs that bark but bite not.’ He called upon France and the UK to ‘cure themselves of their present laxity and slovenliness. What has been achieved by Germany has been achieved only because the ceaseless effort of every German, man, woman, and child, has built up that platform of strength from which Herr Hitler speaks.’77 Jouvenel left the PPF a few days later, appalled with its compliance with the dismembering of Beneš’

76 Duroselle, *La Décadence*, 356. The negative votes consisted of all 73 communist deputees plus two individuals, the socialist Jean Bouhey and the rightist Henri de Kerrilis. One year later, the PCF officially kept to the Molotov-Von Ribbentrop Pact and opposed going to war, but many French communists refused to follow this line.

77 Jouvenel, ‘To the Editor of *The Times*’ (signed Paris, 16 October).
state. Fabre-Luce also left, calling the Munich Agreement a ‘catastrophic humiliation’ for France.\textsuperscript{78}

It is uncertain whether Doriot’s support of the Munich agreement really was their main reason for turning their backs on the PPF. Just one month earlier, Jouvenel had energetically defended the party’s position, calling upon France to pressure the Czechoslovakian government into making territorial concessions to Germany. Fabre-Luce had accused ‘liars’ of wanting to plunge France into an avoidable war. During the summer of 1938, in an exchange of letters with the pacifist baron and Action Française financer Régis de Vibraye, Fabre-Luce agreed that France should do everything to stay out of a future European war, especially since ‘conditions no longer exist for a French intervention in Czechoslovakia or Poland’.\textsuperscript{79} Kestel and Dard believe that the departure of Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce was instead due to the PPF’s weakened financial and political position, which diminished their prospects of launching a political career via the party. Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce were unhappy with their status of ‘party intellectuals’ having to follow the line of the PPF without being able to really influence it. Doubts were also rising about the leadership qualities of Doriot, who failed to meet Jouvenel, Drieu and Fabre-Luce’s criteria of a dynamic fascist ‘chef’.\textsuperscript{80}

As dramatic as Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce’s separation from Doriot – the ‘chef’ they thought they had finally found just two years earlier – may seem, it did not lead to a fundamental rethinking of their international principles. Their separation was also not complete from the beginning. Fabre-Luce continued to publish in L’Émancipation Nationale until as late as 28 October 1938, while Jouvenel was still in touch with the party leadership in December of the same year.\textsuperscript{81} During the same month, Fabre-Luce called upon French politics to abandon Central and Eastern Europe and focus instead on France’s overseas Empire, where its essential interests lay. France was ‘neither willing nor able’ to prevent German eastward expansion, and it would have little to fear from it. Rather than German aggression, Fabre-Luce

\begin{itemize}
\item[78] Fabre-Luce, Histoire Sécrète de la Conciliation de Munich, 110; idem, ‘Mensonges’, L’Émancipation Nationale (30 September 1938); Bertrand de Jouvenel, Un Voyageur, 338.
\item[79] Correspondence with Régis de Vibraye, July-August 1938, Fonds AFL, 472 AP 2.
\item[80] Kestel, ‘L’Engagement de Bertrand de Jouvenel au PPF’, 123; Dard, Bertrand de Jouvenel, 140.
\item[81] Alfred Fabre-Luce, ‘Histoire Sécrète de la Conciliation de Munich’, L’Émancipation Nationale (28 October 1938); Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (59).
\end{itemize}
argued that low birth rates and a lack of political ‘authority’ were France’s real enemies.\(^{82}\) This is strikingly similar to a statement made by Jouvenel one year earlier, before their separation from the PPF. He announced that he was still hoping for a ‘definitive reconciliation’ with Germany, which should be possible because France’s interests lay in the Mediterranean area, not in Eastern Europe towards which German expansion was directed.\(^{83}\)

From early 1939, the growing threat of war left little room for grand international projects. During the first half of the year, possibly because they foresaw its imminent impossibility, both Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel took long-distance trips. Via Genoa and Naples, where he stopped for a few days after an inflammatory Mussolini speech made him fear that war might break out at any moment, Fabre-Luce travelled to India, Burma, China and Hawaii. His journey resulted in *Un Fils du Ciel* (1941), a novel inspired by a combination of Nietzschean longing for a heroic Übermensch and oriental spirituality, garnished with observations from war-torn China.\(^{84}\) In late spring, Jouvenel went to Turkey, Lebanon, Syria and Palestine, writing long articles for the right-wing weeklies *Candide* and *Gringoire* that revealed his talent as an écrivain-reporter, a travelling reporter with writer’s credentials that was a prominent feature of French interwar journalism.\(^{85}\)

In Turkey, Jouvenel contrasted his observations of hedonistic and decadent Constantinople – ‘une sorte de foire malade où s’assemblent toutes les graisses de la nation’ – with Ankara, the new capital where a harsh climate kept people working hard. The militaristic Ankara atmosphere reminded him of Prussia under the ‘soldier-king’ Frederick William I (1688-1740). Jouvenel was surprised that Turkey had aligned itself diplomatically with the ‘satisfied nations’ of France and Britain, while he found its political structure to be more similar to fascism: ‘One man commands, a single party educates the nation and spreads the instructions of the leader everywhere. The role of Parliament is to register the dictator’s wishes, while the press must explain them. Isn’t this fascism?’ But the Turks assured him that it was not, since Kemalist ideology was ‘progressive, not reactionary’. Jouvenel concluded by citing Hippolyte Taine and associating the Kemalist, Mussolinian and Hitlerian variants of authoritarian government all with Taine’s description of ‘Jacobinism’.\(^{86}\)

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\(^{82}\) Fabre-Luce, ‘Veux-Tu Vivre ou Mourir?’.


\(^{84}\) Fabre-Luce, *Un Fils du Ciel*; idem, *Vingt-Cinq Années de Liberté* I, 278.


\(^{86}\) Article included in folder ‘Allemagne’, Fonds BdJ, Don 90 39 (23).
Planning, Fascism and the State: 1930-1939

From Liberalism to ‘l’Économie Dirigée’

The European project and the will to preserve the peace at all costs were important factors in the ‘fascist drift’ of Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce. We shall see in this chapter that elements linked to developments in French politics and the socio-economic ideas of the two intellectuals played at least as big a role. During the 1920s, Fabre-Luce adhered to free-market liberalism. Both intellectuals considered economic capitalism as intrinsically linked to democracy and political freedom, although Fabre-Luce was more insistent on this point than Jouvenel. Fabre-Luce criticised collectivist socialism, Italian Fascist corporatism and American Taylorism as incompatible with liberty.1

In the summer of 1927, Fabre-Luce was invited for a one-and-a-half-month tour of the Soviet Union, a favour the regime only accorded to writers deemed to write sympathetically about the communist experiment. Following the directions of a typical Russian Grand Tour, Fabre-Luce travelled to Moscow and Leningrad by train, after which he descended the Volga on a boat almost to the shores of the Caspian Sea. Trains and cars took him from Stalingrad over the Caucasus to Tiflis, then to Batum where he crossed the Black Sea to Crimea and Odessa. The Soviet authorities probably selected Fabre-Luce because of his harsh criticism of French nationalism in La Victoire, but their faith could not have been more misplaced. In the introduction of his resulting book, Fabre-Luce criticised the failure of other overly positive travel accounts to stress ‘the profound, irreducible moral opposition separating liberal intelligence from communism’.2 Fabre-Luce was even more outspoken in an article in L’Europe Nouvelle. He lumped Soviet Communism and American Taylorism together as materialistic enemies of human civilisation marked by ‘the same contempt of the person, the same suppression of liberty’. Both countries had abandoned all metaphysical and cultural attachments, believing in nothing but the ‘quantitative ideal’. The only inspiration that France could gain from communism was fear of this materialistic onslaught by a country as large as a continent, which had incorporated the technological discoveries of the West but not

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1 Fabre-Luce, Le 22 Avril, 69, 80.
2 Fabre-Luce, Russie 1927, 7; idem, ‘Au Tombeau de Lénine’, Notre Temps (November 1927), 55.
its civilisation. Calling communism ‘the great sickness of the century’, Fabre-Luce concluded: ‘like the Japanese, like the Moroccans, the Russians will turn our inventions against us’.3

Jouvenel disagreed with Fabre-Luce’s view of the United States, which he considered essentially liberal and capitalist. In a comparison of the economic situation in the United States and the Soviet Union, he celebrated capitalism as clearly the most efficient economic system, since even ‘the proletariat agrees that the capitalist system’ provided ‘the strongest productivity and the biggest general prosperity’.4 By contrast, even if American capitalism were to momentarily grant a higher level of prosperity than Soviet communism, the young Jouvenel was unconvinced of the long-term viability of the capitalist system in post-1919 society. Already in 1927 in a contribution to Notre Temps, he associated laissez-faire liberalism with an old generation hypocritically clinging to an outdated model that no longer reflected economic reality: ‘Free competition? The liberty to conspire to put an end to competition. Free trade? An open door to all kinds of dumping. Private initiative? The right to lack initiative! The liberal system? A myth that is defended in theory because it has long been suffocated in reality!’5

From the mid-1920s, both intellectuals developed a critique of the excesses of the free market and envisaged the need for an organising authority able to rationalise it. Already while working on La Victoire, Fabre-Luce became interested in the ideas of John Maynard Keynes about the economic consequences of the 1919 peace treaties, but he later also read and discussed the Englishman’s publications on fiscal policy and monetary devaluation as an effective way to temper an economic crisis. In 1933, Fabre-Luce utilised a trip to London to meet Keynes in person.6 Jouvenel played a pioneering role through his first book, L’Économie Dirigée, thereby coining a French term that would have a prolific life. Ambitiously subtitled Le Programme de la Nouvelle Génération, the book first described a situation in which the state, instead of leading the economy, remains a passive element in the struggle between competing oligarchies in business and industry. To combat this situation, the state should directly intervene in the economy.

3 Alfred Fabre-Luce, ‘Méditation devant le Kremlin’, L’Europe Nouvelle (12 November 1927), 1514, 1515.
5 Bertrand de Jouvenel, ‘La Politique à Vingt Ans III’, Notre Temps (August 1927), 93. See also Maier, Recasting Bourgeois Europe, 13.
Jouvenel’s solution, however, did not go as far as a communist-style state-led economy. In his view, the state had to orient the economy by making use of its traditional tools, taxes and tariffs, in a rational way, based on an analysis of statistical material and making use of a trained elite of economic experts. In an article in The New York Times, Jouvenel argued that a capitalism enriched by state planning based on the systematic study of consumer needs was much more efficient than a communist system.

This insistence on the role played by economic and technical ‘experts’ rather than supposedly unqualified politicians was an important topic in the discourses of Jouvenel and other members of the Notre Temps group. It brings them close to a current that Jackie Clarke has analysed in her book France in the Age of Organization. In interwar France, an increasing number of young social scientists, industrialists and economists were proposing a similar programme of reforms in which techniciens had to play a leading role outside and partially against parliamentary politics. Rational economic organisation also became part of Jouvenel, Luchaire and Fabre-Luce’s idea of a future European Union, where large-scale planning would ensure a rise in prosperity for everyone. The prospect of a joint exploitation of the European colonial empire offered even more opportunities. At the second meeting of the Solhberg Circle in 1931 in the French town of Rethel, Jouvenel gave a lecture entitled ‘De l’Unité Économique Européenne à l’Économie Dirigée Mondiale’, in which he suggested studying ‘immense regions, like the entire African continent, that offer the occasion for immense projects to undertake collectively’. In 1934, Fabre-Luce enthusiastically discussed the possibility of large-scale settlement of white Europeans in French North and West Africa in preparation for ‘a political Federation of the European-African block’. Its triple benefits would be a new ‘impetus’ [élan] for the European youth and a tool against overpopulation and unemployment, an economic impulse for Europe and Africa and a substantial reduction of the risk of European war.

8 Jouvenel, ‘Communism Contrasted with Modern Capitalism’.
9 Clarke, France in the Age of Organization, 8.
11 Plan du 9 juillet, 50.
At a more general level, interest in alternative economic models was strong during the early 1930s. Facing a malfunctioning laissez-faire capitalism and the frightful prospect of communist revolution, many young intellectuals were looking for a ‘third way’ between the two systems. The corporatist model of Fascist Italy represented a potentially attractive alternative, as it allowed – at least theoretically – for the continued existence of a degree of personal freedom while bringing employers and workers together at the negotiating table. The New Deal in the United States and the large-scale employment projects of Nazi Germany seemed to be almost as promising examples of state intervention to combat the unproductive chaos of fluctuations in the economy. 

In interwar France, the most popular alternative model was the ‘planism’ proposed by the Belgian socialist leader Hendrik de Man. Like his French counterpart Marcel Déat, De Man had delivered a fundamental critique of Marxism, stating that its principles failed to meet the economic development of its times. Instead of the mechanical doctrine of Marxism, De Man proposed an explicitly ‘moral’ socialism aimed at integrating the middle classes and ready to boost the national economy through state-led planning. De Man did not consider the proletariat a worthwhile agent of social change, as he found it to have essentially the same aspirations as the bourgeoisie, which meant that a proletarian revolution would necessarily be a shallow, hedonistic one. Instead of a class with a supposedly historical role, De Man considered the state as the only institution capable of revolutionary change. To achieve this transformation, the state depended on qualified experts, civil servants and techniciens. Based on their merit and their dedication to the common good, but independent from the fluctuations of parliamentary politics, they would be the natural elite of a planist economy.

Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel’s enthusiasm for planism seems to have been motivated by the linking of two main elements. At the national level, De Man’s ideas of social peace offered an alternative to both laissez-faire capitalism and Marxist class struggle, which could then be linked internationally to a project to reinforce European peace and reconciliation through large-scale projects of economic planning on a continental scale. In the minds of Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel, planning could permit the energy of the European youth to be directed away from warfare and towards more

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13 Sternhell, Ni Droite, Ni Gauche, 136, 159.
14 Amzlak, Fascists and Honorable Men, 105.
constructive activities like public service, colonisation and engineering. Jouvenel played an active role in spreading De Man’s ideas in France. When Louise Weiss wanted to invite De Man to give a lecture at the Sorbonne in December 1934 as part of the lecture series of her Europeanist École de la Paix, Jouvenel brought her into contact with the Belgian politician. Fabre-Luce was quick to apply for tickets via the Groupe du 9 Juillet, even stressing that in the case of scarcity of tickets he ought to have priority over other candidates. A few months later, De Man became ‘minister of public works and absorption of unemployment’ in a Belgian government coalition that had embarked on a policy inspired by planism. Jouvenel travelled to Brussels to obtain an interview with him and had long conversations about his ideas for restarting the economy and about the Office of Economic Recovery that he wanted to create.

While Fabre-Luce’s visit to the Soviet Union increased his appreciation of liberal capitalism, a long trip by Jouvenel to the United States pointed him in the opposite direction. Leaving in October 1932 from a France in which the crisis was only just beginning to make itself felt, Jouvenel arrived in a United States at the depths of the Great Depression. During the eight months he spent travelling through the country, he was appalled by the misery of the masses of unemployed in Chicago and New York and also in the South, where the cotton industry had collapsed. Jouvenel had originally planned to use the trip to study American capitalism, much in the same way his compatriot Alexis de Tocqueville had studied American democracy one century before. But instead of studying its functioning, he felt he was witnessing its death throes. In the last chapter of the resulting book, La Crise du Capitalisme Américain, Jouvenel concluded that American ‘big capitalism’ had died. The Wall Street crash, the closing of the banks and the election of Franklin Delano Roosevelt had delivered the final blow. The new president was taking energetic measures, replacing capitalism with ‘a vast experience of économie dirigée’. Jouvenel showed enthusiasm for the psychological aspects of the New Deal: Roosevelt had given the nation hope and contributed to the rise of a new civic patriotism, from which a new elite of young technicians would rise. If Roosevelt continued the chosen track, Jouvenel believed that his rule would mark ‘the greatest revolution of our times’.

15 Correspondance of Louise Weiss and Hendrik de Man, BNF, FR Nouv. Acq. 17814.
17 Jouvenel, Un Voyageur, 222.
18 Jouvenel, La Crise du Capitalisme Américain, 13, 333, 343.
Fabre-Luce also became interested in ‘l’économie dirigée’, probably by reading Jouvenel’s book, and he paid shorter visits to all three countries that he considered to have taken this direction: The United States, Italy and Germany. At first, his conclusions were more mixed than Jouvenel’s. Compared to France, where state control of the economy was very weak, he estimated that Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany had a great advantage in their capacity to mobilise national wealth and reserves in the interest of the state and the regime, if necessary by ignoring personal freedoms and property rights. He praised the successes of all three governments in fighting unemployment through public works and in reducing salaries and working hours. He disagreed with Jouvenel on the revolutionary nature of Roosevelt’s achievements. Instead, he stated that Roosevelt had not gone far enough, which would have implied ‘to orient the American political system much more clearly towards fascism’. But he also signalled the inefficient interior chaos of the Nazi system, in which different overlapping institutions often defended contradictory policies. In March 1934, Fabre-Luce put his cards on the table when he announced that his economic point of view was very close to the corporatist fascist model: rather than Roosevelt’s New Deal or De Man’s ‘planism’, his ‘économie dirigée means Revolution’. Contrary to the communist model, fascist corporatism would still preserve elements of private initiative but in a disciplined way, within a corporation ‘under discreet government supervision’.

A National and Social Revolution

During the first half of the 1930s, political developments in France led to the two intellectuals drifting further away from conventional politics. The 1932 elections marked a return to power of the centre-left, but as in 1924 this led to a series of unstable minority governments dependent on the uncertain support of the Socialist Party. With a few years’ delay, the Great Depression started to hit France hard, and its governments found no effective way to respond to it, clinging to budget cuts and the gold standard. In 1933, the coming to power of Hitler and the growing exasperation with the inertia of the

French government led to increased activity among the anti-parliamentary right, which culminated in the Stavisky Affair and the Paris riots of 6 February 1934. In the direct aftermath of the riots, Daladier resigned as a prime minister. The establishment of a government of national union under Gaston Doumergue could bring back a certain degree of political tranquillity, but by that time events had already convinced many young intellectuals that, like in Germany and Italy, a revolution of the right was possible in France.

Le Six Février, as the events came to be known in France, shocked Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce. Although at the time, both opposed the ‘reactionary’ right-wing leagues, their confidence in the parliamentary system, which was already far from solid to say the least, received a fatal blow. In 1933, Fabre-Luce anticipated the rising anti-parliamentary sentiment in the country and called for a ‘stronger’ regime. Dictatorships had already triumphed in most European and ‘in all American’ countries, while France was also on its way to a form of authoritarian rule. Most markedly, Fabre-Luce became convinced that the spirit of the times did not favour liberal democracy, which led him to argue that it was necessary to pull back from this political system. Whether one liked it or not, to be able to preserve certain freedoms in a profoundly non-liberal age, France would have to ‘discipline its liberty’ and make concessions to fascism. When discussing the menace of the fascist regimes to the position of France, he stated:

One upon a time, the whole of Europe has made concessions to democracy to fight against the French Revolution. Today, we must make concessions to fascism in order to fight against the foreign fascisms. In a certain sense, the defence of liberty and the limitation of liberty have become synonyms.

As agitation among the right grew in the wake of the Stavisky scandal, Fabre-Luce decided to keep a ‘Bulletin de la Révolution’ in the hopes that a revolution would soon break out. However, after three of these bulletins, he condemned the riots as a ‘reactionary revolt without leader, programme or social aspirations’. Similarly, Jouvenel was electrified by the ‘fermenting’ anger that filled the Paris air as the scandal ran its course. A visit to a meeting of the executive committee of the Radical Party left him disgusted

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21 See the introduction for more background information.
22 Soucy, The Second Wave, 32.
23 Alfred Fabre-Luce, ‘Quel Remède?’, Pamphlet (28 April 1933), 12; idem, ‘Adaptations à la Démocratie’, Pamphlet (11 August 1933); idem, ‘Du Nouveau en France’, Pamphlet (11 August 1933).
with the party, where he suspected Stavisky’s protégés everywhere around him. The smell of clientelism and corruption had not only infested the Radicals but was also ‘poisoning our republic’. On the same day, during a demonstration in front of his house on the Boulevard Saint-Germain, Jouvenel tried to help a man who was being beaten up by the police, only to be mistreated himself and arrested by ‘half a dozen of cops’, who dragged him to the police station under the threat of further violence. Released thanks to the intervention of an influential friend, Jouvenel concluded that police brutality would never suffice to uphold a system that was rotten to the core.\[25\] This did not lead Jouvenel to approve of the events of 6 February, however. In a letter, he dismissed the riots as a spontaneous but useless ‘agitation d’aveugles contre la nocivité du néant’\[26\].

For Jouvenel, the events had nothing but negative consequences: Daladier had proven himself incompetent as a leader, the demonstrators had achieved

\[26\] Jouvenel to Pierre Andreu (undated but probably from 1953-1954), Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (294).
nothing they wanted, and the Doumergue government was set on a conservative course, doing nothing to address France’s financial, psychological and political problems. Fabre-Luce concluded that the only positive revolution could come not from the right or the left but from the ‘centre’, combining social and national elements. If during the following months a ‘chef’, a strong leader, could be found to unite the forces of Marcel Déat’s neosocialism and the Croix-de-Feu movement of Colonel François de la Rocque, this revolution would be possible: ‘Revolution of the Centre, Left-wing Fascism, or just simply the extra-parliamentary resurrection of the old ideal of a Controlled Economy’. The board of Fabre-Luce’s journal Pamphlet was split on the issue, with Fabre-Luce and Jean Prévost opposing the riots and Pierre Dominique considering them a worthwhile contribution to the fall of the republican system.27

Jouvenel’s conclusions were not very different, but they had more radical consequences. Furious with established politics, parliamentarianism and Daladier, who had not dared to compose a strong reformist government in response to the riots, he left the Parti Radical and founded La Lutte des Jeunes. This weekly, which Jouvenel edited and published together with a small group of non-conformist intellectuals – Drieu figured prominently, along with Pierre Andreu, Jacques Arthuys, Philippe Boegner and Georges Roditi – rejected all established political parties. Very much against parliamentary politics, it wanted to unite French youth to establish ‘a regime in which all particular interests are mercilessly subjected to the general interest’.28 In Jouvenel’s eyes, the riots had marked the beginning of a national revolution that would result in a ‘new state, cleansed of parliamentarianism and capitalism’.29 He grouped these two enemies systematically together to stress the social dimension that his anti-parliamentarianism had taken. In a long article in which he gave a generally positive analysis of the Italian economic system, Jouvenel announced that he refused to take a principled stance on the character of France’s future regime: ‘I will accept any [regime], under the sole and explicit condition that it has as an objective to profoundly transform the living conditions of the working classes’.30 Jouvenel announced that the Depression would lead to the end of

27 Alfred Fabre-Luce, Pierre Dominique and Jean Prévost, ‘L’Avis de Pamphlet’, Pamphlet (23 February 1934); Alfred Fabre-Luce, ‘Si Daladier n’avait Pas Été Daladier’, Pamphlet (23 February 1934).
28 ‘Que Voulons-nous?’, La Lutte des Jeunes (25 February 1934).
democracy but expressed the hope that new, authoritarian leaders would use their strength to ‘break capitalism’ and install ‘a rational economic regime assuring the legitimate satisfaction of human needs’.31

Placing trust entirely in the young generation, La Lutte des Jeunes was another manifestation of the generational discourse from Jouvenel’s Notre Temps days. In his memoirs, Pierre Andreu recalled Jouvenel walking the boulevards of Paris, distributing leaflets that called upon ‘all youth, to constitute battle groups against misery and against the regime’. Below this text figured photographs of two political demonstrations, one of the left, the other of a right-wing demonstration. ‘Voyez-vous la différence? Non. Il n’y a qu’une jeunesse.’32 In a contribution written for Le Cahier Bleu, a left-wing periodical directed by his half-brother Renaud de Jouvenel, Bertrand denounced the ‘bourgeois’ mentality that had for too long pressed French youth to be patient, save money and wait for rewards that would come with old age. He described ‘young intellectuals, arched over vile old papers, hoping to once be at the Institut de France so that glory will bring them the women they desire today’. Now a new youth was on the rise that was no longer willing to wait, burning to pursue its desires right here, right now. This generation was exasperated with the ‘extraordinary obstruction’ of the country: ‘from the Gambetta monument to the busts of Marianne, so many things to destroy!’ A ‘thorough clean-up’ was necessary to build a ‘new civilisation’:

Il faut rétablir un certain sens de l’espace. Nettoyer par le vide, édifier l’indispensable, travailler pour vivre et non pour accumuler, jouir des loisirs et non pas les rejeter à la fin de la vie, organiser une civilisation d’hommes libres et non pas d’ilotes ivres de travail, – le programme de la jeunesse est simple. Sa réalisation, croyons-nous, sera un coup de gomme dans la grisaille contemporaine.33

At the same time and partially with contributions from the same people, Fabre-Luce engaged in a different attempt to bring his intellectual generation together and establish a common political programme through the Groupe du 9 Juillet. Containing young representatives of diverse political currents in France – syndicalists, socialists, agrarians, republicans,

32 Andreu, Le Rouge et le Blanc, 87.
Croix-de-Feu, Jeunesse Patriote – the Groupe du 9 Juillet was inspired by the same generational ideas as Jouvenel’s weekly. Though present at the first meetings, Jouvenel dropped out of the group before it had agreed on a common programme. The pacifist writer Jules Romains, who was also a prominent member of Abetz’s Comité France-Allemagne, informally led the Groupe du 9 Juillet. The meetings of the group resulted in a Plan du 9 Juillet, probably written by Fabre-Luce, signed amongst others by Philippe Boegner, Jean Coutrot, Paul Marion, Georges Roditi and Romains (who also wrote the introduction) and edited as a book, which was widely discussed in the French press.

Though the political diversity of the group inevitably led to a certain vagueness, the general line of the plan was manifestly authoritarian and corporatist. First, the plan established the end of ‘decadent’ liberalism and called for stronger executive power. While warning against the danger of ‘totalitarianism’, the Groupe stated that liberty could only be safeguarded ‘through order’:

An unemployed man unable to find work, a worker erring from factory to factory according to the caprices of overproduction, a citizen informed by a corrupt press are not free men. To emancipate an individual means first to give him the means to live from his work, within a framework [‘dans un cadre’] that he knows and accepts, within a society to which he can contribute.

Apart from constraining parliament by reinforcing the power of government, which would alone hold the right to legislate, the plan called for the creation of a new ‘Conseil des Corporations’ that would represent the interests of various economic professional groups. The Conseil would have the task of coordinating the national economy and enforcing mandatory consultation about all proposals of economic or financial character. A total ban on strikes and a crackdown on labour unions were to guarantee a more fluid functioning of the national economy. The plan also provided for the complete suspension of the constitution ‘under exceptional circumstances’, when full political power would be assumed by a ‘gouvernement de salut public’ consisting of ‘experienced and disinterested men’.

34 Fabre-Luce, J’ai Vécu Plusieurs Siècles, 170.
35 Amzalak, Fascists and Honorable Men, 110; Dard, Le Rendez-Vous Manqué, 194, 197.
36 Plan du 9 juillet, 18.
37 Plan du 9 juillet, 22, 23, 25.
Through the Groupe du 9 Juillet and *La Lutte des Jeunes*, Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel came in touch with the plethora of groups and periodicals that Loubet del Bayle has dubbed ‘the non-conformists of the 1930s’, with some members of these movements expressing their opinions on the pages of Jouvenel’s weekly. As there were elements that both linked and distinguished Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce from these groups, it is useful to take a closer look at these contacts. According to Loubet del Bayle, the ‘non-conformists’ can be divided into three groups: those connected with the journal *Esprit* around the Catholic philosopher Emmanuel Mounier; those associated with the journal *Ordre Nouveau* around Alexandre Marc, Robert Aron, Arnaud Dandieu and Denis de Rougemont; and a group that Mounier called ‘La Jeune Droite’ consisting of young right-wing intellectuals close to *L’Action Française* such as Thierry Maulnier, Jean de Fabrègues and Jean-Pierre Maxence. Most members of these groups were young intellectuals roughly of the same age as Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce and subscribing to a similar generational perspective. They saw their periodicals as part of an intellectual revolt against a crisis of civilisation that was manifesting itself in the ‘désordre établi’ of individualism, capitalism and communism. They were looking for ways to overcome this ‘established disorder’ by supplanting it with a more organic model built on authority and a sense of community, which had to be ‘neither left nor right’. To a certain extent, all three groups subscribed to Mounier’s personalist philosophy, which rejected both liberal individualism and communist or fascist collectivism. Rather, a ‘spiritual revolution’ would pave the way for a new relationship between man and his environment. The school of thought known as personalism claimed to respect individual human rights but stressed that a ‘person’ could only truly exist as an organic part of a community.\(^38\)

Loubet del Bayle estimated that these groups, short of achieving immediate political influence during the 1930s, made an important – and generally positive – intellectual contribution to French politics. By contrast, Sternhell has taken the position of associating the non-conformist movement with the ‘fascist impregnation’ of French society.\(^39\) More recently and in concordance with Sternhell, the Canadian scholar John Hellman has stated that personalism was an anti-democratic, anti-republican and authoritarian philosophy, closely related to the German Conservative Revolution that helped carry the Nazis to power.\(^40\) Dard is more cautious

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in his judgments, even shunning the use of non-conformism and fascism as terminological categories of analysis. He prefers to use the deliberately empty concept of the ‘nouvelles relèves’ and concludes that their story is generally one of failure. Within the non-conformist milieu, Dard primarily distinguishes between ‘spiritualists’ and ‘materialists’, the former being primarily interested in philosophical and metaphysical solutions to the perceived crisis of civilisation, while the latter preferred concrete technical reforms, often inspired by corporatist and technocratic ideas. From this perspective, while the reformist Catholic Esprit environment clearly belongs to the spiritualist side, Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce might be counted as belonging to the materialistic group at least from their days at Notre Temps. But it must be stressed that this distinction is not rigid, as some of the two intellectuals’ writings of the late 1930s and early 1940s show a clearly metaphysical tendency.

Jouvenel wanted La Lutte des Jeunes to play a federating role, opening his periodical to all initiatives of the young generation under the sole condition that they were not linked to any existing political party. This attempt soon resulted in a cacophony of rivalling and mutually hostile movements and groups, most of whom were unwilling to recognise Jouvenel as one of theirs. Robert Aron wrote a particularly angry contribution, violently attacking Jouvenel and Luchaire as opportunistic members of the political establishment belatedly turning to revolutionary rhetoric. An earlier discussion between members of the ‘Jeune Droite’ and Esprit had already escalated into open conflict. The most problematic aspect of Jouvenel's attempt was that it came precisely when the ‘non-conformist’ milieu was becoming more and more divided. After a short period of centripetal tendencies in 1933, the aftershocks of the 6 February riots began to tear the groups apart, and instead of being ‘neither left nor right’, they became more and more split along traditional political lines.

Within a few months’ time, Jouvenel had to conclude that his weekly had been a failure. In its last edition, he admitted that, having already taken up more debts than he could, he was unable to finance the journal any further. He drew pessimistic conclusions about the prospect of uniting French

41 Dard, Le Rendez-Vous Manqué, 286.
42 Especially: Jouvenel, Le Réveil de l’Europe; Fabre-Luce, Journal Intime 1937; idem, Anthologie de la Nouvelle Europe.
44 Loubet de Bayle, Les Non-Conformistes des Années 30, 192; Dard, Bertrand de Jouvenel, 78.
youth around a single political programme. Henceforth, like Fabre-Luce, he fixed his hope on a synthesis of the ‘virility’ of the Croix-de-Feu and the social programme of Marcel Déat’s neosocialism, Gaston Bergery’s Front Commun and a possible future initiative by Jacques Doriot. This synthesis, Jouvenel admitted, could come down to a French fascism. When *Le Cahier Bleu* enquired among several intellectuals what position they would take in the case of a fascist revolution, Jouvenel provocatively stated that he would participate in it. He was quick to stress that many left-wing intellectuals were defining it incorrectly: fascism was not an ‘armed reaction of capitalism against those who attack its privileges’. To Jouvenel, fascism meant ‘violence to conquer power, authority to exercise it’. It meant ‘creation of a revolutionary state of mind among the masses by every means of propaganda to fight fatalism and inertia [quiétisme], which are so undeservedly called Marxism’. Fascism, above all, was a method that could be used for different ends. But since a revolution would mean the destruction of all existing institutions, particularly the ‘master institution’ of capitalism, Jouvenel knew on which side of the barricades he would be.\footnote{Bertrand de Jouvenel et al., ‘Réponses à Notre Enquête: Quelle Serait Votre Position et Votre Attitude devant une Révolution Fasciste?’, *Le Cahier Bleu* (10 June 1934).}

Within this line of reasoning, fascism is not something desirable for its own sake but a useful method to break the stalemate of French politics. As a means of achieving a revolution that was both anti-capitalist and anti-Marxist, Jouvenel’s interpretation of fascism was not so different from how Fabre-Luce saw the phenomenon. In an ‘open letter’ to André Gide, Fabre-Luce criticised the famous writer for his compliance with Soviet communism, even after having openly denounced its grim reality after a trip to the Soviet Union. Instead of easily dismissing their opponents as ‘fascists’, Fabre-Luce argued, Gide and his anti-fascist friends would do better to understand the circumstances under which fascism had become an attractive alternative for many French intellectuals, who normally shunned anything reeking of authoritarianism. Fascism, according to Fabre-Luce, was a necessary ‘counterweight’ to the Soviet system, only desirable because ‘in the order of tyranny, fascism is less barbaric than communism’. Fascism did not lead to the socialisation of the means of production, it respected ‘moral and religious forces’ and allowed itself to be ‘tempered’ by them. He wrote: ‘Our “fascists” know all this. Forced to choose, they would prefer fascism to communism. But they still hope that we will be spared this
Besides a weapon against the communist menace, Fabre-Luce saw fascism as a necessary alternative to a democracy in crisis. Half a year later, he remarked that Belgium did not need a fascist revolution because it had managed to ‘discipline’ its democracy, like the United Kingdom: ‘For fascism, if needed, against communism? Yes. For fascism, against a disciplined democracy like in England or Belgium? No!’ The omission of his own country was clear: in the case of France, Fabre-Luce was not so sure the country could do without a fascist revolution.

Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce realised that their revolutionary agenda could only be realised if a credible popular leader were available. Writing for the non-political mass press and for Fabre-Luce’s L’Europe Nouvelle, Jouvenel initially had high expectations of La Rocque and his veteran league that had turned into an anti-parliamentary mass movement. His Croix-de-Feu movement grew quickly at the time, achieving such momentum that some saw La Rocque as a candidate to become France’s authoritarian leader. During 1935, however, increasingly disappointed with La Rocque’s social conservatism and his hesitation in making a political move, Jouvenel turned more towards those who had left his movement due to a longing for ‘action’. Like Déat, Doriot and Bergery, who had all turned their backs on the conservatism of the established parties, Jouvenel expressed hope that a ‘chef’, a charismatic leader, could be found to lead these ‘démissionnaires’.

With or without such a ‘chef’, Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel did run for parliament in 1936, as candidates for the Union Socialiste Républicaine (USR), essentially a vehicle for personalities close to Déat, Paul Marion, Adrien Marquet and other neosocialist renegades who had split off from the SFIO or the PCF. Both had already been candidates for the Parti Radical in 1932, and Jouvenel had also run in 1928 – always unsuccessfully. In 1936, Fabre-Luce presented himself as a candidate in the Ain department, close to Lyon. Jouvenel ran in a Bordeaux

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49 See, for example, Pierre Drieu la Rochelle, ‘Si J’Étais La Rocque…’, La Lutte des Jeunes (20 May 1934); Bertrand de Jouvenel, ‘France Is Stirred by “Crosses of Fire”’, The New York Times (29 September 1935).
51 Several drafts of speeches and electoral programmes from 1928 (when Fabre-Luce eventually decided against candidacy) and 1932 can be found in: Fonds AFL, 472 AP 1 and 10. Fabre-Luce did manage to get himself elected into the Conseil Général (departmental assembly) of the
district instead of in his native Corrèze, where he could have counted on influential support from family connections. Both intensively toured their districts, holding electoral rallies and presenting their political programmes, a mixture of pacifism in international relations, reconciliation with Germany, protection of farmers’ interest and a stronger national government. Jouvenel was beaten in the first round, Fabre-Luce in the second, because a Parti Radical candidate refused to step down in his favour. This left two progressives in the race and thus paved the way for a victory of the sole conservative candidate, a bar owner from Trévoux. While the few USR candidates that did win their mandates prepared themselves to become a small fragment in the Popular Front coalition, Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel left the party.52

This repeated political failure further embittered Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel about the functioning of parliamentary democracy. In his memoirs, Fabre-Luce poured scorn on his victorious opponent Marius Gallet, whom he described as a ‘marionette’ and a typical product of provincial republicanism. According to Fabre-Luce, Gallet, ‘barely able to speak and write’, had spent his uneventful life in front of the stuffed fox at his bar, joylessly accepting drinks from mediocre costumers. Despite his election, Gallet did not even move to Paris and he ‘never spoke a word’ in Parliament. Looking back on his own experience as a candidate, Fabre-Luce admitted to having felt like a ‘prostitute forced to solicit’ an electorate that instead should have been ‘put in its right place’ by an authoritarian leader like Doriot.53 Jouvenel shared his feelings of humiliation. His electoral campaign had been ‘an effort to seduce’ rather than a glorious electoral battle, and his defeat left him feeling ‘ridiculous like a dancer failing to draw applause’. Jouvenel had nothing but contempt for the ‘animal stupidity’ of voters, ready to follow ‘the animal with the strongest smell’.54

Party Intellectuals at the Service of Fascism

By the spring of 1936, these conceptions had been formed. With only the ‘chef’ missing, it is hardly surprising that the foundation of the Parti Ain department in May 1935. He held this relatively unimportant office until 1940, travelling to Trévoux several times a year to attend the council’s seasonal meetings.

52 Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel were not alone, as even leading neosocialist Déat was beaten in the second round. Dard, Bertrand de Jouvenel, 134; Alfred Fabre-Luce, Vingt-Cinq Années de Liberté I, 18.


54 Fonds BdJ, NAF 28143 (59).
Populaire Français by Jacques Doriot, on 28 June 1936, just a month after the electoral victory of the Popular Front, unleashed such enthusiasm among Fabre-Luce, Jouvenel and other non-conformist intellectuals. Pierre Andreu has described this spirit in his memoirs. At the end of June 1936, he received a phone call from Drieu, who had just attended the birth of the party, telling him that ‘What we have been waiting for has finally happened. Doriot has founded his party. We’re waiting for you; you will find all your friends here: Jouvenel, [Paul] Marion, [Jean] Fontenoy, [Claude] Popelin...’

Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce were present at the founding ceremony of the party, during which both the Marseillaise and the Internationale were sung and the audience was confused over which way to greet their leader: with the communist or the fascist salute. Drieu was deeply impressed by Doriot’s three-hour-long speech, during which he sweated abundantly, leaving upon Drieu the impression of health and masculine strength: ‘Doriot is big and

55 Andreu, Le Rouge, 125.
56 Jouvenel, Un Voyageur, 294; Fabre-Luce, Vingt-Cinq Années de Liberté II, 156; Kestel, La Conversion Politique, 135.
strong. Everything inside him breathes health and plenitude: his thick hair, his mighty shoulders, his large belly.  

During the 1920s, Doriot was seen as the rising star of the French Communist Party (PCF). In 1931, he won an easy election and became mayor of the ‘red’ Parisian suburb of Saint-Denis. His ambitions to head the party were thwarted, however, as he lost the leadership battle to his rival Maurice Thorez. During the spring of 1934, Doriot openly began to rebel against the PCF and the Komintern. With the collapse of the German KPD after Hitler’s seizure of power, and with the incidents of *Le Six Février* on his mind, he opposed the Komintern doctrine that disallowed any collaboration with socialists. Doriot stated that fascism could only be stopped if all forces of the left joined hands against it. Although Stalin would encourage his followers less than five months later to work together with the socialists formerly branded as ‘social fascists’, Doriot’s views were considered treason to party discipline. Doriot responded by quitting the PCF. During the 1936 elections, Doriot could narrowly defeat a communist counter-candidate and retain his position as the mayor of Saint-Denis, but his position was manifestly under pressure from the left-wing parties that were now working together in the Popular Front, excluding him.  

Confronted with rising political and financial problems and realising that his plan of unity of the left against fascism had been brought into practice without him and against him, Doriot took drastic measures. He founded the Parti Populaire Français, a party that rejected Marxism and instead called for class collaboration. He soon became strongly anti-communist and increasingly anti-Semitic, while also advocating a programme of European peace through friendship with Nazi Germany. During its first years, the PPF received financial support from Fascist Italy and from financial backers in the French banking and business world. Members swore an oath to their leader Doriot and greeted each other with the fascist salute. In 1937, after violent clashes with communist militants, the party also developed a ritual martyr cult for members who had died fighting for its cause. The PPF, which probably counted about 100,000 members at its climax in 1938, was first dominated by former communists like Doriot, but their percentage decreased slowly. When in 1936 La Rocque changed his dissolved CdF to

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57 Drieu la Rochelle, *Doriot ou la Vie d’un Ouvrier Français*, 31.
58 Burrin, *La Dérive Fasciste*, 172.
60 Burrin, *La Dérive Fasciste*, 319.
the seemingly more moderate PSF, several prominent far-right members left the party and joined Doriot.\textsuperscript{61}

Considering Doriot and his associates' past communist credentials, Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce had reason to believe that, unlike the Croix-de-Feu and the other right-wing leagues, the PPF would be a fascist movement with a serious social dimension. Jouvenel, who had already been on friendly terms with Doriot since 1935, was convinced that the PPF embodied his dreams of realising a 'French socialism' without class warfare within an organic, authoritarian state.\textsuperscript{62} In 1954, attempting to explain and justify his PPF engagement in a letter to the American historian Rudolph Binion, Jouvenel even compared Doriot to Marshal Tito (as a fellow renegade Stalinist) and claimed:

my association with Doriot at its inception marks my extreme-left high-mark! We were then a strange little band of intellectuals fascinated by our association with real manual workers!! A feeling of the team grew up which bound us together and Doriot shifted us to the extreme right in no time at all to our amazement and disappointment: still so close were the personal links which had grown up that one hated to break them.\textsuperscript{63}

Evidently, these claims are to be taken with more than just a grain of salt as far as the supposed left-wing character of the PPF is concerned, as well as Jouvenel's falsely naïve 'amazement' at Doriot's move to the extreme right and his claim that this was the reason he left the party. But the elements Jouvenel highlighted are striking: the association of intellectuals and manual workers, a 'feeling of the team' and a reluctance to cut ties and quit the party. Andreu and Jouvenel suggest that the PPF offered them something they had been looking for for a long time.

Fabre-Luce praised Doriot as the ideal, universally admired 'Chef', applauding his directness, his simplicity, his 'eloquence that doesn't care about eloquence'. Under PPF leadership, Saint-Denis had become a place where 'the words national and social, so often used in vain in so many speeches, have regained a vital meaning'.\textsuperscript{64} In practice, the PPF soon had to walk a tight rope between its obligations to its financial backers in big business and its alleged social agenda. Doriot's electoral victory in Saint Denis in

\textsuperscript{61} Soucy, The Second Wave, 217, 256.
\textsuperscript{62} Jacques Doriot to Jouvenel (27 November 1935), Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (298).
\textsuperscript{63} Jouvenel to Rudolph Binion (August/September 1954), Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (294).
\textsuperscript{64} Alfred Fabre-Luce, 'Interview de Jacques Doriot', L'Assaut (16 March 1937).
the second round of the May 1936 elections had been by a narrow margin and had been mainly thanks to the right that had called upon its followers to vote for him against his communist opponent. Thus, Doriot was forced to attack the Popular Front even as it was busy realising large parts of his own traditional agenda. This impossible situation may have contributed to Doriot quickly severing his left-wing affiliation.65

Nevertheless, the PPF was, at least during its early days, a party that indeed seemed to cross the class divide, uniting workers, the middle classes and non-conformist intellectuals all in the service of the uncontested ‘chef’ Doriot. Both Jouvenel and Andreu stressed the importance of their new experience of being in touch with completely different social environments in their enthusiasm for the new party.66 Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce but also Drieu, Andreu, Pierre Dominique, Paul Marion, Jean de Fabrègues, Robert Brasillach and Ramon Fernandez became party intellectuals and joined the PPF press, which permitted their ideas to reach a much larger and more diverse audience than ever before. As prominent intellectuals in a party that took both its nemesis and its inspirational model from the French Communist Party, Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce were supposed to serve the PPF in every possible way. Apart from writing for the PPF press and sitting on its central bureau, they were also expected to tour the country and speak at party rallies in every corner of France. Convinced that his party would create a new elite for the French nation, Doriot set up student sections in Paris and other larger cities in France and Algeria, dispatching Drieu, Fernandez and Jouvenel to hold propaganda lectures at several universities.67

When the Popular Front government banned all paramilitary ligues, Doriot hoped to fill the void left by their disappearance, especially that of La Rocque’s mass-based Croix-de-Feu. The successful rebirth of the CdF as the seemingly more moderate and parliamentary Parti Social Français marked Doriot’s failure to do so, although he did manage to attract a few disillusioned former followers of La Rocque, including Robert Loustau and Pierre Pucheu. Noticing that his movement was failing to grow any further, Doriot then tried to play a federating role. In March 1937, he proposed to unite all right-wing parties in a ‘Front de la Liberté’ that was supposed

66 Jouvenel, Un Voyageur, 294; Andreu, Le Rouge, 128.
67 Dard, Bertrand de Jouvenel, 132. Dard wrongly claims that Jouvenel only joined the PPF’s central bureau in the summer of 1938, shortly before he left the party. Jouvenel’s personal notes show that he sat on the bureau right from its creation at the first party congress in November 1936, frequently attending its meetings during the following two years. See ‘chrono-f ile’, Fonds BdJ, Don 90 39 (11).
to fight the Popular Front in an organised way, under his leadership. The initiative drew support from the Action Française, the Jeunesse Patriote and the centre-right Fédération Républicaine, but La Rocque, who was eager to preserve his full independence, rejected it. With the single largest anti-Popular Front party not participating, the Front de la Liberté did not materialise. After the government forced advanced mayoral elections in Saint-Denis in May 1937, which Doriot lost to the communist candidate, the PPF was increasingly marginalised and began losing support from its major financial backers. By late 1937, the PPF started to move increasingly to the extreme-right fringes of French politics, aligning itself with the pro-Nazi course that would continue to mark its activities during the occupation years.68

This loss of significance initially did not lead Jouvenel or Fabre-Luce to break with Doriot. On the contrary: in June 1937, Fabre-Luce announced that he would be discontinuing his weekly L’Assaut to merge it into La Liberté, a

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well-known mass daily bought by Doriot with Italian subsidies. Formerly an opinion weekly that was led by Fabre-Luce and that published contributions from Jouvenel, Drieu, Brasillach, Maurice Bardèche, Robert Poulet, André Thérive, Claude Popelin and others, L’Assaut became a weekly supplement of the PPF newspaper, and its subscribers were offered to start receiving La Liberté at a discount price. Fabre-Luce dismissed the importance of the Saint-Denis elections and identified Doriot as the incarnation of the ideals of class collaboration and national recovery that his weekly had campaigned for. Above all, he admired Doriot’s strength: ‘Doriot has built around himself a force comparable to the one he freed himself from [i.e. the Communist Party]. That’s enough to measure the value of this man.’ During the same month, Jouvenel, who frequently published in La Liberté, became editor-in-chief of the other party newspaper L’Émancipation Nationale. Jouvenel’s articles betrayed his complicated task of having to attack the Popular Front while at the same time defending a social policy very similar to the one followed by the Blum government. In a series of articles, he tried to explain that the financial chaos that the government was supposedly causing would effectively lead to the evaporation of all the benefits it had just granted to French workers, although it is likely that his complicated economic analysis was lost on many of his readers.

Jouvenel did not limit himself to dry economic analysis. Especially his attacks on socialism and communism received bodily and racial connotations that are normally associated with the fascism of authors like Drieu la Rochelle and Céline. Socialists wanted to rob France of its ‘masculinity’, of its capacities to be proud of itself. They were an ‘illness’ that France had to get rid of ‘in any possible way’. Calling communists ‘the Russian microbe’ plotting to destroy France by provoking a war with Germany, Jouvenel wondered: ‘are we wrong for wanting to throw them out of the country?’ Jouvenel was not afraid to explicitly state the superiority of racist theory over historical materialism, favourably comparing Arthur de Gobineau

69 Alfred Fabre-Luce, ‘À Nos Lecteurs’, L’Assaut (8 June 1937).
70 Bertrand de Jouvenel, ‘La Déflation, pour Stimuler l’Économie Nationale, doit être faite par un Gouvernement ayant la Confiance de Tout le Pays’, L’Émancipation Nationale (3 October 1936); idem, ‘De Combien la Vie va-t-elle Renchérir?’, L’Émancipation Nationale (10 October 1936); Alfred Fabre-Luce, ‘Le Ministère des Dupes’, L’Émancipation Nationale (11 February 1938).
71 See Kestel, ‘L’Engagement de Bertrand de Jouvenel au PPF’, 116. Kestel wrongly claims that Jouvenel reserved his attacks for Blum and socialism while leaving communism alone – he violently attacked both.
Figure 5  Bertrand de Jouvenel in 1938

Source: Roger Viollet / Hollandse Hoogte
to Karl Marx. He considered the two philosophers the most important thinkers of the twentieth century, since two of the world’s most powerful states had adopted their respective theories as their national ideologies. But Marx had been ‘completely wrapped in the mechanistic superstition of his century’, confounding ‘material progress with progress of civilisation’, while Gobineau ‘based his pessimism on the degeneration of manly virtues. One was only addressing the tool. The other addressed man.’

In Jouvenel’s mind, racial and class stereotypes were not mutually exclusive. In January 1937, he visited a large communist rally in the Paris Vélodrome d’Hiver, and he was struck by the foreignness and the ‘perfect homogeneity’ of the crowd. Instead of the usual collection of subtly disagreeing individuals, this was an anonymous, amorphous mass, pushing and pulling to get inside the already packed cycling stadium. When he took a closer look, he saw ‘a pale, dwarf-like race, with soft mouths and red eyelids’. They made him think of the living conditions in the banlieue that, ‘within two or three generations’, had produced these characteristics. Then he thought about Marx’s prediction that ‘the bourgeoisie brings forth the proletariat that will eventually kill it’. There was also something more directly foreign about the crowd. Foreign faces – Spanish, German, Russian, Jewish – did not contrast with the French ones, who seemed as foreign, under the spell of a kind of ‘national decolourisation’. This, he concluded in a striking racialisation of class elements, was the result of unchecked labour immigration promoted by irresponsible industrialists: ‘The banlieue has become a melting pot where, under the influence of blood mixing and the conditions of the environment, a particular race is constituted. This race is now invading Paris.’ Jouvenel now understood why anti-communism was so strong among French banlieue workers. For them, it was not about opinions but an attempt to fight against the ‘Lithuanisation of the Île-de-France’.

When Andreu left the party at the end of 1936, having become quickly disillusioned by Doriot’s alliance with financial backers in business and industry, Jouvenel was furious at him, accusing him of not daring to engage himself fully and preferring to watch from the sidelines with his hands in his pockets. With such an attitude, Andreu could return to writing for ‘reviews that no-one reads’ and abandon all prospects of making a political difference – a striking example of the way Jouvenel reflected on his own current and past activities. According to Andreu, Jouvenel told him: ‘Look, with my articles, I’m reaching every week hundreds of thousands of people

73 Bertrand de Jouvenel, [untitled], L’Émancipation Nationale (17 July 1937).
who would never read me if I weren't in the Party.’75 Fabre-Luce repeatedly claimed, both in his memoirs and in his statement of defence during his 1948 collaboration trial, that he was never formally a member of the PPF. This could be true. Since the PPF administration papers have been lost, there is probably no way to answer this question. It is also questionable whether it matters if Fabre-Luce held a membership card or not, given that he sat on the party’s central bureau and frequently published in its newspapers. Moreover, were it true, it would have been a weird exception for a non-member to hold such a prominent position inside the PPF.76 As we have seen, it was to take almost two more years before Jouvenel, Fabre-Luce and Drieu were willing to follow Andreu’s path – without fundamentally changing their political orientation.77

75 Andreu, Le Rouge, 131.
76 Fabre-Luce, Vingt-Cinq Années de Liberté I, 160; Fabre-Luce, J’Ai Vécu Plusieurs Siècles, 170; Fabre-Luce to the Juge d’Instruction (10 January 1948), Dossier d’Épuration FABRE-LUCE Alfred, Archives Nationales de France, Z/6/285 dossier 8648.
77 In his post-war memoirs, Fabre-Luce also claims that he had been ‘the first’ to break off all contact with Doriot and the PPF, in 1937. Despite receiving support for this claim in Jouvenel’s memoirs, this is a double lie: Andreu had already left the party in 1936 and Fabre-Luce remained strongly involved with the party until the autumn of 1938. See Fabre-Luce, J’Ai Vécu Plusieurs Siècles, 170; Jouvenel, Un Voyageur, 302. Dard mistakenly believes Fabre-Luce’s claim: Dard, Le Rendez-Vous Manqué, 243.
Defeat and Readjustment

On 10 May 1940, eight months of Phony War gave way to just six weeks of Blitzkrieg, during which Germany achieved a quick victory over the Benelux countries and France. Advancing through the Ardennes, the German army avoided the heavily fortified Maginot Line along France's eastern border and managed to cut off French and British forces stationed in Belgium from their main army corps. While large numbers of British troops could do no more than evacuate at Dunkirk, abandoning large amounts of materiel, the German army quickly advanced into northern France. The approaching German armies caused six to eight million French citizens to flee southwards, making it even harder for the French military to regroup. By this time, the failing French general Maurice Gamelin had been replaced by Maxime Weygand as supreme commander. Paying frequent visits to frontline troops and trying to restore morale, but also calling off a counter-offensive strategy proposed by his predecessor, Weygand unsuccessfully attempted to reorganise French defence lines. On 10 June, Paris was declared an open city, while the French government established itself in Bordeaux. To Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel, who had been just too young to fight for France in the First World War, the Battle of France offered the first opportunity to defend their country against foreign invasion. Although both were mobilised during early stages of the Phony War, they saw no combat. Jouvenel spent a few months in Alsace as ‘the oldest and by far the clumsiest soldier’ in his battalion, before being wounded in an accident and sent home. Fabre-Luce served in Paris at the ‘Second Passive Defence Regiment’, charged with demonstrating the use of gas masks to protect the city’s population from an attack that never came.1

Prime Minister Paul Reynaud, who had succeeded Daladier in March, quickly lost faith that the German advance could be stopped. Bringing Marshall Pétain into his government as well as Charles de Gaulle (as undersecretary of state), who had distinguished himself on the battlefield, he tried to reach a decision on what had to be done. When it became clear that the army staff and most of his government not only opposed the British proposition to unite Britain and France for the duration of the conflict but also refused to retreat to French North Africa and continue fighting from

1 Jouvenel, Un Voyageur, 364; Fabre-Luce, Vingt-Cinq Années de Liberté II, 10.
the empire, Reynaud resigned. He was succeeded by Pétain, who had already stated that it was ‘useless’ to fight on. Pétain had been part of Doumergue’s national union government in 1934, after which he worked as ambassador in Franco’s Spain. The ageing marshal had generally kept himself at a certain distance from French politics, sometimes raising his voice to warn against ‘moral degeneration’ and the supposed danger of the left. Even so, from 1935, Pétain’s name was repeatedly mentioned as a possible authoritarian leader for France. His status as a First World War hero combined with his charismatic, grandfatherly aura to create an image of a trustworthy ‘saviour’ that France could call upon in times of trouble. Pétain now rose to the occasion. His first step as a prime minister was to announce on French radio that he had asked for an armistice.

Since Pétain had announced the end of hostilities almost a week before the armistice was signed, large numbers of French soldiers laid down their weapons and let themselves be taken prisoner by the Germans. More than 1.5 million of them were deported to Germany and locked up in POW camps or sent into forced labour in German agriculture or industry. Instead of the quick release they were counting on, by the terms of the armistice Germany continued to consider the French soldiers as prisoners of war until the eventual signing of a peace treaty. This massive cull of prisoners gave Hitler an extremely powerful bargaining instrument during future dealings with France, as he could make the partial release of prisoners dependent on the collaborative attitude of the French government. During the occupation years, Pétain could buy the release of several hundreds of thousands of prisoners at the price of increasing subservience to Germany and implication in its crimes.

Under the armistice conditions, France saw three-fifths of its territory occupied by German troops and it had to pay high reparations to support the German occupation regime. The French franc was fixed at an artificially low exchange rate vis-à-vis the reichsmark, assuring strong buying power for all Germans stationed in France. Though not mentioned in the armistice, Alsace-Lorraine was annexed to Germany while France’s northwestern territories around Lille and Dunkirk were provisionally transferred to the German military administration of Belgium, raising fears of a further partitioning of France. In an exact reflection of the Versailles treaty of 1919, the French army was confined to a maximum of 100,000 men, with

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2 See Hervé, C’est Pétain qu’il Nous Faut!; Burrin, La France à l’Heure Allemande, 15.
3 Von der Goltz & Gildea, ‘Flawed Saviours’, 446; Fischer, Le Mythe Pétain, 201.
4 For example, see Pierre Andreu’s personal account in idem, Le Rouge et le Blanc, 156.
the sole task of maintaining order. The French fleet – undamaged at the
time and still a force to reckon with – was ordered back to its home ports
for disarmament while remaining under French authority. Fearing that
this last clause would not be upheld and seeking additional guarantees
against the French navy falling into German hands, the UK acted militarily
against its former ally. In the Algerian port of Mers-el-Kébir, after the French
admiral Marcel-Bruno Gensoul had refuted an ultimatum to join British or
American ports, the British bombed the French fleet, killing 1,297 French
servicemen. The Mers-el-Kébir attack provoked an outburst of anti-British
sentiment in France and became a propaganda success for the Germans.5
‘In one day’, Fabre-Luce wrote, ‘England killed more French marines than
Germany during the entire war’.6

Pétain was allowed to govern the French colonial empire, which survived
intact, as well as France’s remaining southeastern two-fifths, establishing
his government in the tranquil Auvergne spa of Vichy, a town rich in hotels
and casinos. Assisted by the resentful right-wing politician Pierre Laval,
who would become his recurrent prime minister, Pétain soon asked for
special powers and announced a reform of political institutions. On 10 July,
a favourable vote by a joint meeting of the French Parliament and Senate
granted him the authority to declare a new constitution, effectively voting
the Third Republic out of existence. The next day, Pétain declared himself
head of state and assumed full legislative powers. His government soon
replaced the republican system with an authoritarian one (dubbed ‘État
Français’) and announced a ‘National Revolution’. Besides implying a clear
break with the Third Republic, the exact meaning of this revolution was
vague enough to reflect the political aspirations of a plethora of different
groups in French society. Especially during the first years of its exist-
ence, Vichy France could count on support from traditional nationalists,
Catholics, political conservatives and agrarians as well as non-conformists,
technocrats, neosocialists and fascists.7

The shock of such a quick and crushing defeat favoured Pétain’s projects,
for many people held the country’s politicians, and often the entire republi-
can system, responsible for France’s ruin. Jouvenel recalled that, during his
last days of military activity, his group of soldiers had been assigned the task
of guarding a road in central France. When a governmental convoy passed,
carrying various politicians on their way to Vichy, one of his fellow soldiers

5 Jackson, The Dark Years, 126.
6 Fabre-Luce, Journal de la France I (1940), 361.
7 Passmore, The Right in France, 352; Burrin, La France à l’Heure Allemande, 78.
raised his bayonet and pretended to shoot Édouard Herriot.\footnote{Jouvenel, \textit{Un Voyageur}, 367.} Herriot’s status as long-time prime minister and leader of the Parti Radical (as well as his notorious corpulence) made him an ideal target of all the grievances the French had against the system that had fallen into disgrace. Pétain himself was eager to encourage feelings of hatred and revenge towards the Third Republic and its representatives. He created a Supreme Court of Justice and gave it the sole task of judging republican personalities such as Blum, Daladier and Reynaud, who were accused of weakening national defence and provoking the war with Germany. The accusation was limited to the period between 1936 and 1940, clearly making it a trial directed against the Popular Front and subsequent Daladier governments. Pétain was careful to distinguish between these ‘guilty’ politicians and his own leadership, which supposedly could not be blamed for the defeat. In a radio speech on 25 June 1940, he famously declared: ‘Je hais les mensonges qui vous ont fait tant de mal. La terre, elle, ne ment pas. Elle demeure votre recours. Elle est la patrie elle-même.’\footnote{Pétain, \textit{Discours aux Français}, 66.}

The text of this speech, in which a supposedly honest Pétain distanced himself from the ‘lies’ of France’s republican politicians and announced Vichy’s cult of the soil as the very expression of the French fatherland, was written by Emmanuel Berl. Berl was an unlikely candidate to celebrate any conservative earthly idyll, to say the least. Of Jewish origin and a decorated veteran from the First World War, he was a long-time friend of Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel. During the 1920s, he had been a bohemian anti-bourgeois intellectual, close to the surrealists and partner-in-crime of Drieu la Rochelle, with whom he experimented with opium and frequented brothels. In 1927, Berl and Drieu had created the famous avant-gardist review \textit{Les Derniers Jours}, the leading idea of which was, according to Drieu, that European culture was doomed and that, in general, ‘everything is fucked’.\footnote{[‘Tout est foutu’]. Morlino, \textit{Emmanuel Berl}, 72, 77, 93.} Shortly before, Berl had also made plans with Fabre-Luce to start a political and philosophical weekly that failed to materialise due to lack of funds.\footnote{See ‘Notes en Vue de la Création Éventuelle avec Emmanuel Berl d’une Revue’, Fonds AFL, 472 AP 10 dr. 1.} During the 1930s, Berl turned to political journalism and became chief editor of the prominent left-wing weekly \textit{Marianne}, to which Jouvenel contributed until 1936. During the 1930s Berl, unlike Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce, remained on the French left and supported the Popular Front, but he became equally
interested in neosocialism and radical pacifism. France’s defeat found him receptive to the Pétain myth, admiring the old marshal’s leadership and becoming his official speech writer. However, Berl soon became disillusioned with Vichy and spent most of the war years at a certain distance from politics. He retreated to Argentat in the Corrèze region, where he worked on a history of Europe. Jouvenel joined him there in 1942.12

Support for the Vichy regime was not so short-lived in the cases of Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce. War, defeat and occupation marked the beginning of a period during which intellectual activity could have direct consequences for one’s own position or sometimes even life. More than in peaceful republican times, life under occupation and dictatorship was modelled by one’s political position towards the authorities. Opinion and choice mattered more than ever. For intellectuals tired of gratuitous opinionating in insignificant journals and repetitive discussions with other intellectuals, this new situation had its charms. Fabre-Luce almost rejoiced in the observation that ‘From now on, everyone will have to suffer the consequences of his actions. We are entering a true world.’13 Nevertheless, Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce had not been masters of prudence in the past, and continuing on the same foot implied high risks for themselves and for their families. Jouvenel generally refrained from publishing in the Paris-based or Vichy-based press, while Fabre-Luce only published articles during the first two years of occupation, making it harder to track the evolution of their ideas on a day-to-day level. This lack of articles is partially compensated by Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce’s increased wartime production of books, many of which had direct political significance. Especially Fabre-Luce’s chronicle-like book series Journal de la France (1940-1944) make it easy to follow the directions of his political ideas through the war years. Jouvenel was almost as productive. In two studies of French interwar diplomacy and especially in Après la Défaite, which was written during the summer of 1940 under the immediate shock of the defeat, he reflected extensively on France’s current situation and the history of its downfall.14

Before going into the details of Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel’s wartime thoughts, it is necessary to first explore certain aspects of their later interventions with regard to their own publications from these years. A

12 Morlino, Emmanuel Berl, 159, 324, 344.
13 Fabre-Luce, Journal de la France I (1940), 309.
14 Fabre-Luce, Journal de la France I (1940); idem, ed., Anthologie de la la Nouvelle Europe; idem, Journal de la France II (1942); idem, Journal de la France III (1943); idem, Journal de la France IV (1944); idem, Journal de la France (1946); Jouvenel, De Versailles à Locarno; idem, Après la Défaite; idem, La Décomposition de l’Europe Libérale.
substantial problem consists of post-war attempts by both intellectuals
to cover up, thwart and rewrite parts of their own intellectual history. 
Apart from the cases of selective memory and retroactive justification that 
are typical for war memoirs that were written decades later,15 Fabre-Luce 
in particular has played a more active role in attempting to modify his 
own past through new editions of his wartime books. Both in the 1946 
and 1969 reprints of his collected Journal de la France books, the text was 
substantially altered to present the author as a neutral observer rather 
than the convinced collaborationist, anti-Semite and fascist intellectual 
he was.16 A systematic comparison between the post-war reprints and his 
four original Journal de la France books (from 1940, 1942, 1943 and 1944) 
reveals countless cases in which statements against Gaullism or in favour 
of collaboration, National Socialism and Vichy have been rewritten so as to 
appear neutral or even critical of the German and Vichy-French authorities.17 
From each of these books, one or several entire chapters have disappeared 
in later editions. In the first of these – tellingly called ‘Hitlérisme Français’ 
(1940) – Fabre-Luce argued that Nazism had French philosophical roots and 
regretted that French fascists had not been able to seize power during the 
1930s, expressing the hope that the shock of defeat would help spread fascist 
ideology in France. He also stated that his country had too long ignored 
its ‘Jewish problem’, giving free rein to ‘Léon Blum and the Jewification of 
ministerial cabinets’.18

The second chapter that has gone missing in later editions, ‘Regard sur 
Vichy’ (1942), deals with Fabre-Luce’s opinion of Pétain and his regime. 
Despite criticising Vichy’s conservatism, its bureaucracy and its race laws – 
while stating that France should have dealt with its ‘Jewish problem’ in 
a more elegant way – Fabre-Luce was overwhelmingly positive about the 
National Revolution. He especially appreciated the personality of the marshal 
who incarnated ‘the continuity of the fatherland’; the attempts at national 
resurrection through work, family and education; and the clear choice in

15 Jouvenel, Un Voyageur; Fabre-Luce, Vingt-Cinq Années de Liberté II; idem, J’ai Vécu Plusieurs 
Siècles. See also Sternhell’s devastating comments on Jouvenel’s ‘memory problems’ figuring in 
the introduction of Un Voyageur Dans le Siècle: Sternhell, Ni Droite, Ni Gauche, 11.
17 For a typical example about London-based Gaullism, compare the two versions of the same 
text from the chapter ‘Double France’ in: Fabre-Luce, Journal de la France II (1942), 36; idem, 
Journal de la France (1969), 301. See also Fabre-Luce’s enthusiastic celebration of Operation 
Barbarossa as a civilizing crusade in the chapter ‘Troisième Hiver’ of Journal de la France II 
(1942), 266, as well the absence of these lines in Journal de la France (1969), 431.
18 [‘Léon Blum et l’enjuvimage des cabinets des ministres’], Fabre-Luce, Journal de la France 
I (1940), 229.
favour of collaboration with Germany for the sake of building a united and organised European 'Empire'. The third volume of *Journal de la France* (1943) is a specific case. Despite later priding himself on having been imprisoned by the Gestapo for bypassing censorship and for his critical stance towards Vichy and collaboration in the book, Fabre-Luce still found it necessary to erase no less than two chapters from later editions. And understandably so: in the chapter ‘Spectateurs’, he praised Hitler as the greatest man of his times and the only political leader who had understood that ‘biology is the centre of the political sciences’ – though he had regrettably ‘gone too far’ in his anti-Semitism. A few pages later, Fabre-Luce attacked Churchill for delivering Europe to communism and for refusing to compromise in reaching a peace agreement with Hitler that would have permitted a joint crusade against Bolshevism. He found Roosevelt worse still: essentially a marionette in the hands of a team of Jews who used him to ‘manipulate the American people’.

In the new preface to the 1946 edition, Fabre-Luce admitted to making textual changes, but he claimed that the omitted parts were either ‘purely polemical’ or related to his prediction of German defeat and his protests against persecutions of Jews. These lines ‘had their value during the Occupation, but today they would appear as flattery’ for the author – a surprising reading of his omitted ‘Regard sur Vichy’ chapter, to say the least. In 1969, Fabre-Luce even dared to suggest that he had kept the text unaltered. He admitted that, from a post-1945 perspective, his longing for peace – born out of the traumatic experience during the First World War of having seen some his older high-school classmates leave for the front and never return – had led to certain ‘excesses’ of his judgment. But ‘I have maintained them for my text to keep its full documentary value’. Not a single historian seems to have dealt with Fabre-Luce’s later reshaping of his wartime positions. Some have even let themselves be misled more explicitly by his claims. Julian Jackson, only citing the 1946 edition of *Journal de la France*, wrote that one had to ‘scratch the surface of Fabre-Luce’s polish’ to grasp his collaborative mentality. This would not have been necessary had he used

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19 Fabre-Luce, *Journal de la France II* (1942), 293, 300, 306.
20 Fabre-Luce, *Journal de la France III* (1943), 225, 228, 235, 236. The fourth volume (1944) also contained a chapter that disappeared from later editions. In ‘Le Genie de la Monarchie’, Fabre-Luce called for the institution of a ‘new monarchy’ in France, different from Maurras and the Action Française and more willing to incorporate ‘the lessons of Nazism’ while at the same time protecting the French from ‘totalitarianism’. Fabre-Luce, *Journal de la France IV* (1944), 51. For a longer treatment of Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel’s monarchist reflex, see the next chapter.
21 Fabre-Luce, *Journal de la France* (1946), 11.
the original versions.\footnote{Jackson, \textit{The Dark Years}, 207.} The same goes for Dietrich Orlow and for Anthony Beavor, who used the same reworked 1946 edition and called Fabre-Luce a ‘Pétainist’ who wrote ‘an anti-Nazi book’.\footnote{Orlow, \textit{The Lure of Fascism in Western Europe}, 173; Beavor & Cooper, \textit{Paris After the Liberation}, 93, 511. Though the issue is less important for his Jouvenel biography, Olivier Dard may have made the same mistake about Fabre-Luce, since he only cites the 1969 edition: Dard, \textit{Bertrand de Jouvenel}, 483.}

The care with which Fabre-Luce tried to reshape his past can only be understood within the light of his situation after the war. The liberation of France found him ostracised as a collaborator, excluded from French publishing houses and persecuted for ‘collusion with the enemy’ but also admired by many fellow Pétainists and former collaborators, who recognised him as one of their most prominent and courageous spokespersons.\footnote{For a more detailed treatment of Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel’s post-war position, see the next chapter.} Apart from the direct legal reasons to cover up certain elements of his own recent past, Fabre-Luce was also aware of the possible advantages that his position implied. This resulted in a double strategy. On the one hand, he presented himself as a maverick freethinker who had accepted imprisonment by both the Germans and the Gaullists as the price to pay for his complete independence from all kinds of political power. On the other hand, he was very careful not to reveal every aspect of his collaborationism, anti-Semitism and admiration of Nazi Germany, while making excellent use of selective citation from his books. A typical example of this strategy is a citation from the second volume of \textit{Journal de la France} that figured prominently in Fabre-Luce’s trial defence, in which he condemned collaboration as a ‘black stock market, where crooks are selling a fake France to the Germans’.\footnote{[‘une Bourse noire, où des escrocs vendent à l’Allemagne une fausse France’], ‘Projet de Défense’, Fonds AFL, 472 AP 1. See also Jérôme Sauerwein, ‘Notes sur l’Activité de Monsieur Alfred Fabre-Luce’, Dossier d’Épuration, AN, Z/6/285 dossier 8648.} Understandably, Fabre-Luce omitted to say that this indictment was only aimed at collaborators motivated by opportunism. The original text continued by contrasting these base profiteers with real ‘Europeans’ who had chosen to support collaboration out of the idealistic conviction that the defeat could be ‘surmounted’ by the construction of a united Europe under German leadership. Fabre-Luce did not fail to imply that he ranked himself among this second group.\footnote{Fabre-Luce, \textit{Journal de la France II} (1942), 31; Raymond Aron made the same observation in his war diaries: Raymond Aron, \textit{Chroniques de Guerre}, 537.} The same strategy was applied with regard to Fabre-Luce’s condemnations of the deportation and
persecution of Jews, without mentioning the anti-Semitic parts of especially his 1940 *Journal de la France* book.²⁸

An additional nuisance for Fabre-Luce was that several of his wartime publications had sold very well and were still widespread after 1944. Together with the long anti-Semitic pamphlet *Les Décombres* by the French fascist Lucien Rebatet (1903-1972), the first two volumes of *Journal de la France* rank as France’s greatest bestsellers from the occupation years. They received permission by German and French censorship to appear both in the ‘free’ (Vichy) zone and in the zone under German occupation, and the first editions were sold out almost immediately. During the first two years alone, despite a troubling lack of paper, the first volume went through 45 reprints, while there have been at least 52 print runs of the second volume.²⁹ The books also did not fail to provoke reactions from readers. Fabre-Luce received countless letters from diverse personalities ranking from Joseph Caillaux to Jean de Pange and from Bernard Faÿ to Jean Montigny, who generally congratulated him with his analysis but sometimes criticised his collaborationist stance. Together with *La Victoire* (1924), the first two volumes of *Journal de la France* are not only the most successful of Fabre-Luce’s books but probably also the ones with the largest impact on French society.³⁰ The situation was slightly less complicated for Fabre-Luce regarding the third and the fourth volume of *Journal de la France*. The third book had only appeared in a single print run, half of which was confiscated unsold from Parisian bookshops by the Germans after they found out he had bypassed censorship by using a false authorisation number. Fabre-Luce’s subsequent arrest and imprisonment, as well as the fame of his first two books, assured the book of a large audience, and there are indications the surviving copies were passed on between readers, but the book had only been on sale for a week and therefore the number of copies on the market was very limited. The fourth volume, published by Fabre-Luce personally without an editor around the time of the liberation of Paris, probably had an even smaller reach. Most post-war readers interested in the last two volumes of *Journal de la France* had only the substantially modified 1946 reprint to refer themselves to.³¹

²⁸ ‘Aide-Mémoire Personnel’, Fonds AFL, 472 AP 1. For a treatment of Fabre-Luce’s anti-Semitism, see the next section of this chapter.
³⁰ Letters included in Fonds AFL, 472 AP 2.
³¹ Fabre-Luce, *Vingt-Cinq Années de Liberté II*, 135, 164, 194; idem, ‘Projet de Défense’, Fonds AFL, 472 AP 1. Fabre-Luce claimed that a thousand copies of the third book had been sold.
This permitted Fabre-Luce, if he was unable to entirely deny the content of the first two *Journal de la France* books, to at least claim that by the end of 1942 he had completely distanced himself from anti-Semitism, collaboration and fascism, his imprisonment serving as convincing proof of this new attitude. Although a change did occur, this claim fails to do justice to Fabre-Luce’s very dubious position in 1943, but this will be discussed in a later paragraph in this chapter. The lasting notoriety of *Journal de la France* obliged Fabre-Luce to uphold his double strategy consistently every single time his wartime activities were invoked, possibly to the point of believing it himself. A 1978 episode of the French television programme *L’Homme en Question*, during which a panel including René Rémond, Marie-Pierre de Brissac and Alexandre Sanguinetti confronted Fabre-Luce with his collaborationism and his anti-Semitism, saw him repeating basically the same arguments from his 1940s trial, underlined with the same selective self-quotations.\(^\text{32}\)

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Tracing the Origins of Defeat

On 14 June 1940, the victorious German army paraded in Paris. German newsreels show German troops assembled at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier at the Arc de Triomphe, holding a small ceremony in honour of the defeated enemy ‘who fought bravely’, after which endless columns of Wehrmacht soldiers march off through the tree-lined Avenue Foch, Paris’ widest and most prestigious street.33 From the windows of his own apartment at number 56, Fabre-Luce would have had a good view of the spectacle. But like most of the capital’s population, he had not waited for the Germans to arrive, instead joining the southward exodus and following the French government towards Bordeaux, leaving the Germans to celebrate their victory in a largely empty city. Fabre-Luce spent most of the summer in Trévoux, which ended up in the unoccupied zone, regularly travelling to Vichy to witness key events such as the final vote of Parliament and Senate on 10 July. He returned to Paris at the end of the summer, only to find that the Gestapo had established its general headquarter at number 84, Avenue Foch, just two blocks away from his place – a presence that led witty Parisians to rebaptise the street ‘avenue boche’ (‘Kraut avenue’).34 Like Fabre-Luce, Jouvenel, whose release from military service in the unoccupied zone probably saved him from war captivity, was also quick to establish connections at Vichy. He acquired a diplomatic pass that permitted him to cross the demarcation line and return to Paris in July.35

While Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel had long since envisaged the eventuality of an overthrow of the Third Republic, the swiftness of the defeat took both intellectuals by surprise and left them free to draw their own, far-reaching conclusions. At a practical level, the defeat released them from any obligations they had during the war, providing them with ample time to meditate on their country’s situation while in the relative security of the unoccupied zone. Thanks to their family’s wealth, they were able to survive without having to rely on professional engagements, though Jouvenel did suffer some financial difficulties during the war.36 Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel engaged in fundamental reflections on France, its history and its place in Europe. They were convinced that the war was over and that a durable new European

33 Footage from Die Deutsche Wochenschau (22 June 1940), widely available on www.youtube.com but often posted and commented upon by people with Nazi sympathies (retrieved 25 April 2013).
34 Fabre-Luce, Journal de la France I (1940), 398; idem, Vingt-Cinq Années de Liberté II, 41, 132.
35 Jouvenel, Un Voyageur, 380.
36 Ibid., 390.
order had established itself, of which a victorious Germany was naturally entitled to be the organising authority. This German new order was not just the result of an accidental military victory the kind of which Europe had seen many times but was the result of more fundamental developments in history, philosophy and economy. This section will first treat Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce’s explanations of the underlying causes of the downfall of France, after which the next section will address their understanding of German superiority and their attitude towards a German-dominated Europe.

Obviously, Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce were not the only French intellectuals at the time who felt the need to meditate on the underlying causes and consequences of their nation’s downfall, but the general mood of their writings stood out. Instead of fear and pessimism, their texts generally reflect ambition, optimism and a certain fascination with the vast new opportunities offered by the complete collapse of the traditional structures of French and European politics as they had known them since their adolescence. This sudden tabula rasa tapped their 1930s longing for a radical new beginning and their wish to dismantle the structure and symbols of the Third Republic from the bottom up. Fabre-Luce described the misery of the masses of refugees flocking the roads leading southward from Paris as a ‘picturesque’ punishment for French decadence. Amusedly, he noticed that an entire insane asylum was on the run, too. ‘Oh no, they have not forgotten them; France loves her madmen, multiplies them through alcohol, fattens them at the cost of taxpayers’ money, it is the only curve that is on the rise in our demographics.’

Despite their obvious differences, this attitude brings Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce closer to the schadenfreude of Charles Maurras, who famously spoke of a ‘divine surprise’, than to Marc Bloch’s equally famous defence of republican and democratic values.

Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce not only considered the defeat a victory of fascism over liberalism but also that of one generation over another. Jouvenel regretted that interwar France had not seen the coming to power of his own generation, which he associated with dynamism, ‘physical virtues’ and a willingness to dedicate oneself to a political myth. In his mind, admiration for Nazism could fit with the generational discourse from his *Notre Temps* and *La Lutte des Jeunes* days. Fascism became synonymous with a ‘youth

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37 Fabre-Luce, *Journal de la France I* (1940), 336.
38 Bloch, *L’Étrange Défaite*; Judt, “‘We Have Discovered History’”, 155. Maurras’ ‘divine surprise’ was cited approvingly by Fabre-Luce as a first sign of national recovery: Fabre-Luce, *Journal de la France II* (1942), 50.
revolution’, a generational revolt against capitalism and parliamentarianism which had succeeded in Italy and Germany, while in France and Britain, political leaders had been able to temporarily stabilise bourgeois society before its downfall in 1940.39 This also led Jouvenel to associate liberal democracy with an older bourgeois generation, rooted in the comforts of an easy life and the lazy preference of security over heroism and improvisation. The wave of democratisation that had followed the end of the First World War acquired the characteristics of a ‘bourgeois revolution’ with restorative accents. Outside Bolshevik Russia, the revolutionary experiments of Béla Kun, Kurt Eisner and Karl Liebknecht soon had to make way for the establishment of parliamentary systems: ‘everywhere, the bourgeoisie has to take the lead. For it belongs to her to rule Europe.’40

By acting as the guardians of this bourgeois order, France and Britain had unwittingly mobilised Central Europe’s young generations against them during the huge generational struggle that, in Jouvenel’s interpretation, the interwar period had become. This youth had embraced a new way of life marked by ideals of speed, technology, straightforwardness and risk. Only Lenin, Kemal, Mussolini and Hitler had been able to understand the revolutionary implications of this generation and mobilise its energy, acquiring a huge advantage vis-à-vis the democratic nations.41 This is where Jouvenel saw the ‘genesis of fascism’ and the origin of German victory over France:

A brutal reaction against a way of living, feeling and thinking that is no longer adapted to the new times. There is a revolution of the machine and a revolution of the body. Those who understand these two revolutions, putting young athletes in fast trucks, will triumph over those who have refused to understand and who can only mobilise pedestrians wearing ridiculous caps and a heavy gear.42

This perceived superiority of German athletes over French pedestrians led Jouvenel to another psychological and possibly very personal explanation of defeat. After rejecting the thesis of a ‘fifth column’ that had helped the Germans during their invasion, he stated that the real fifth column had

39 ‘Une Révolution de la Jeunesse’ is the title of one of his chapters: Jouvenel, Après la Défaite, 34, 39; idem, La Décomposition de l’Europe Libérale, 323.
40 Jouvenel, Après la Défaite, 13.
41 Jouvenel, La Décomposition de l’Europe Libérale, 432; idem, Après la Défaite, 36.
been ‘something subtler’: ‘some kind of curiosity in the very minds of the soldiers [...] about the customs and beliefs of the enemy’. In his epilogue, Jouvenel specified that things had not needed to go this way. A fascist youth revolution might have also succeeded in France in the aftermath of the February 1934 riots, if it had been possible to unite the left-wing and the right-wing youth much in the way his own La Lutte des Jeunes had attempted to do. Fabre-Luce agreed, while also providing a surprisingly accurate analysis of the weaknesses of fascism in 1930s France. He stated that French fascism had failed not because of Doriot or any other leader but rather due to the ‘lack of ambition’ in the country, the success of foreign fascisms and the fear they inspired, as well as the relatively moderate course of the Popular Front under Léon Blum. While regretting that France had been unable to mobilise the energy of its ‘young fascists’, Fabre-Luce rejoiced in the observation that these had kept themselves safe from the ‘emasculating’ influences of republican politics. Now their time had come: ‘their youth, suppressed for too long, will burst free. It will be the life juice of France. But one terrible question arises: in the meantime, won’t France already have received from abroad the doctrine of renovation that they want to bring to her?'

Seen from a defeated France, twentieth-century history started to look very different. Before the outbreak of the war, Jouvenel was already working on a large diplomatic history of post-1919 Europe, but the defeat provided him with a title – D’Une Guerre à l’Autre – and a narrative strongly coloured by notions of decline and decadence. The first volume, subtitled De Versailles à Locarno (1940), was dedicated to the 1920s during which France had been the predominant European power, although ‘neither its position at the outer end of Europe nor its shrinking population entitled it to be the master and organiser of the continent’. An interventionist foreign policy would have been necessary to maintain this unnatural position of dominance, but France had retreated behind its purely defensive Maginot Line. According to Jouvenel, the ‘experience of history’ showed that this was a suicidal strategy: ‘If it [the nation] ceases to intervene, it ceases to dominate. If it ceases to dominate, it loses its allies it owed its position of mastery to. If it loses its allies, it finds itself weak in front of invasion.’

43 Jouvenel, Après la Défaite, 45.
44 Ibid., 244.
45 Fabre-Luce, Journal de la France I (1940), 223.
46 Jouvenel, De Versailles à Locarno, 409.
47 Ibid., 411.
In the second volume, originally meant to bear the name ‘De Briand à Hitler’\(^{48}\) but finally called *La Décomposition de l’Europe Libérale* (1941), Jouvenel extended his analysis to the period between 1926 and 1933, interpreting it as the time of ‘the big retreat’ of French diplomatic and economic power. Like Fabre-Luce, he defended the idealist Europeanism of Briand and Coudenhove-Kalergi and blamed the liberal bourgeoisie in charge of French politics. This ‘classe égoïste et mesquine’ had failed miserably at its two main tasks: to maintain French preponderance and to construct a united Europe.\(^ {49}\) This position led Jouvenel to an elitist critique of French parliamentary democracy: while the mental horizon of the common people was clearly too limited to understand matters of international and European politics, the same had been true of most French politicians. The Third Republic was led by ‘a class of lawyers and teachers with mediocre provincial backgrounds’ who only came in contact with foreign countries ‘superficially’ and at an old age, understanding nothing of their language, habits and history. Jouvenel contrasted this republican political class with the inborn cosmopolitanism of the higher echelons of society, which happened to correspond perfectly to his own family background: ‘une aristocratie qui voyage, qui reçoit chez elle de notables étrangers, que des alliances matrimoniales, des lectures, de fréquentes correspondances, tiennent en contact permanent avec les autre pays!’\(^ {50}\) It was ‘the great drama of post-war Europe’ that the democracies had replaced this aristocracy ‘at the moment it was most necessary’ with incapable middle-class politicians who were electorally bound by ‘the control of classes naturally ignorant of everything happening beyond the frontiers’.\(^ {51}\)

Jouvenel not only found fault with his own country’s politicians, as his writings also took on an anti-British tone. He held the ‘Anglo-Americans’ responsible for the ‘big retreat’ of French power through their insistence on disarmament. The British, led by their ‘mercantile spirit’, had naïvely believed that the natural ‘will to power’ of communities could be diverted from the political to the economic realm, replacing ‘the Age of War’ with ‘the Age of Competition’. This had a devastating influence on France’s capacity

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\(^{48}\) Cited as the upcoming second volume on the title page of Jouvenel’s *Après la Défaite*. Two more volumes covering the period after 1933 were planned but never published. See Jouvenel, *Napoléon et l’Économie Dirigée*, VI.


\(^{50}\) Jouvenel, *La Décomposition de l’Europe Libérale*, 439.

\(^{51}\) Ibid., 440.
to resist: ‘Le maréchal Foch a abdiqué en faveur de J.-P. Morgan.’ This attempt to tame a violent natural order via economic competition was paired with an equally naïve and bourgeois belief in the importance of written treaties. As an example of this mentality, Jouvenel evoked the character Shylock from the Shakespearean comedy The Merchant of Venice. Shylock, a Jewish moneylender, insisted on receiving one pound of flesh from his rival Antonio’s body, to which he was entitled by the terms of a signed contract, even though this would mean Antonio’s death. Interestingly, Fabre-Luce also used the Shylock metaphor at around the same time, applying it to Winston Churchill, who in June 1940 had not wanted to release France from the duties of its British alliance, even though the war with Germany had already been lost. This attitude, according to Fabre-Luce, was typical of British dealings with France: ‘The English have never looked at the South with anything else but contempt. In their eyes the French are half Italians, a quarter Negroes. They have ruled over them for some years with a skill acquired through long imperial practice, with the same economy of violence that ensures a larger power.’

Through his cruelty, evil and greed, Shylock epitomised some of the most prominent topoi of classical anti-Semitism. Regardless of the fact that the original play also allows for more sympathetic interpretations of Shylock and Jews, modern anti-Semites did not fail to exploit these elements, including Nazi Germany which may have produced around fifty stage productions of The Merchant of Venice. In his comparison, Fabre-Luce used these negative images of the Jew and made them overlap with anti-British stereotypes: like the Jews, the British were also a greedy, mercantile race hungry for ways to exploit and subtly dominate others. Furthermore, both the Jews and the British had selfishly incited France to go to war with Germany, making France shed its blood while they watched from a safe distance. Had not the British hastily evacuated at Dunkirk, abandoning its ally to the German onslaught? The last-ditch proposal for a Franco-British union had been nothing less than

52 Ibid., V, 64.
53 Jouvenel, Après la Défaite, 32. Elsewhere, Jouvenel also cites foreign newspapers comparing France to Shylock after the French government’s objections to the Hoover Moratorium in 1931: idem, La Décomposition de l’Europe Libérale, 357.
54 Fabre-Luce, Journal de la France I (1940), 359.
56 Fabre-Luce, Journal de la France I (1940), 351.
a ‘rape attempt’, a badly concealed form of French ‘serfdom’ that fortunately went too far even for the most ‘devoutly’ pro-British politicians in the French government. When Churchill suggested that France cede its fleet to Britain as a warranty against future hostilities, Fabre-Luce felt ‘the weight of the iron hand that was for a long time hidden underneath a velvet glove’.57

Similarly, Fabre-Luce saw a column of rich Jews at Hendaye hastily trying to cross the frontier into Spain. They were ‘an anti-France’ that had never truly been part of the nation. Meditating on Hitler and the Jews, Fabre-Luce observed: ‘When Hitler started his propaganda, they [the Jews] first revolted against the monstrous description he made of them. But after a while, they realised with fear that they were beginning to resemble it.’ It was ‘only natural’ that menaced Jews had looked for soldiers to defend them, but by doing so, they had become ‘frauds and warmongers’ responsible for plunging France into an avoidable war.58 According to Fabre-Luce, the best-integrated Jews had been able to hide these character traits during peacetime, but the war was now revealing the size and importance of the ‘Jewish world’ in France. He argued that this world not only consisted of the Jews themselves but also of those they had ‘corrupted or seduced’:

This painter has a Jewish lover, this stock market trader would be ruined by racism, this polyglot journalist does not dare to offend the American Jews. [...] Don’t listen to their discourses, just look at them: somewhere on their bodies, you will find the claw of Israel. During these days of panic, basic passions conduct the world, and there are no stronger passions than the fear or the desire of a pogrom.59

In this light, it is astonishing that Fabre-Luce did not approve of the French government’s anti-Semitic persecutions and race laws. In October 1940, Vichy France introduced its Jewish Statute, a series of anti-Semitic legislation that was gradually extended during the following years, excluding Jews from ever more professions, from access to public facilities and from their entitlement to ordinary citizens’ rights. Three months earlier, a denaturalisation law had already robbed recently naturalised foreign Jews of their French citizenship, while all foreign Jews residing in France could be immediately arrested and locked into concentration camps. Of this last group, more than 3,000 died from cold, malnutrition and illness even before

57 Ibid., 359.
58 Ibid., 383.
59 Ibid., 384.
Hitler’s Final Solution had started. All of these measures were introduced on the initiative of the Vichy authorities without direct German pressure, albeit with an ‘emulative zeal’ to imitate Nazi anti-Semitic legislation.\textsuperscript{60}

Despite the many displays of anti-Semitism in the first volume of \textit{Journal de la France}, which antedated most Vichy anti-Jewish legislation,\textsuperscript{61} Fabre-Luce remained relatively vague on what kind of solution he advised France to adopt with regard to its ‘Jewish question’. He admitted that many great French thinkers from the past had been Jews, ‘but it is not less true that an overabundance of Jews in the essential machinery of the state almost always causes trouble’. Instead of persecuting them, which he dismissed as a servile imitation of ‘a foreign nationalism’, he stated that ‘just the vigilance of public opinion would be enough’. Thus, it would have sufficed to despise and distrust the Jews instead of arresting them.\textsuperscript{62} The second volume was published in the summer of 1942, after trains had already begun deporting Jews from France to the extermination camps. Despite attacking the Gaullists as led by ‘Jewish propagandists’ (which was a badly concealed personal attack against his future friend Raymond Aron) and accusing the Jews of having tried to run the world through some kind of ‘Judeo-Masonic’ world government, Fabre-Luce’s anti-Semitic outbursts were slightly less frequent.\textsuperscript{63} In the final chapter, in which he drew a provisional conclusion on Vichy, he approved of the denaturalisation of foreigners and repeated that a ‘Jewish problem’ existed in France. ‘But we have witnessed the birth of a Jewish Statute that contains useless infringements on humanity, property, veterans’ rights – and the world is astonished to learn that it is a work of French genius.’\textsuperscript{64}

And besides, not all Jews were bad. Fabre-Luce praised his friend Emmanuel Berl as ‘almost the only Jew’ who had been against the war in 1939 and who had stayed in France at the time of defeat, ‘hoping that a small zone will remain in which it is allowed to be both a Jew and a pacifist’.\textsuperscript{65} In an obituary included in the second volume of \textit{Journal de la France}, Fabre-Luce also did not fail to pay his respect to the Jewish philosopher Henri Bergson, who

\textsuperscript{60} Jackson, \textit{The Dark Years}, 355. For a more detailed study of the origins of the Jewish Statutes, see Joly, ‘The Genesis of Vichy’s Jewish Statute of October 1940’, 276–298.
\textsuperscript{61} Only the denaturalisation law had been introduced at the moment the book was published.
\textsuperscript{62} Fabre-Luce, \textit{Journal de la France I} (1940), 227, 229.
\textsuperscript{63} Fabre-Luce, \textit{Journal de la France II} (1942), 36, 173.
\textsuperscript{64} Ibid., 300.
\textsuperscript{65} Fabre-Luce, \textit{Journal de la France I} (1940), 373. In a strikingly similar manner, Marcel Déat also accused the Jews of having plunged France into war with Germany, with the same ‘honourable exception’ of Emmanuel Berl, who had remained faithful to his pacifist principles. Cited in Amzalak, \textit{Fascists and Honorable Men}, 143.
had died of bronchitis at the beginning of 1941. He also included a fragment of one of Bergson’s texts (on the unnatural character of democracy) in his *Anthologie de la Nouvelle Europe* (1942). Like many intellectuals of his generation, Fabre-Luce was a long-time admirer of the spiritualist philosopher, who had pitched intuition and *élan vital* against the supposed shallowness of scientific rationalism. Fabre-Luce had read Bergson's *Les Deux Sources de la Morale et de la Religion* and solicited to interview him for *L’Assaut* in 1937, although Bergson declined while expressing his sympathy for Fabre-Luce’s articles. When the Vichy regime offered to exempt Bergson from the Jewish Statutes because of his merits for France, he refused, preferring to step down from all his academic honours. Although Bergson admitted that the development of his thought had brought him close to Catholicism, he chose not to convert since he did not want to turn his back on the Jewish people in its hour of suffering. While already ill, Bergson even had himself carried to the police commissariat to register as a Jew. Fabre-Luce recognised the ‘grandeur’ of these decisions, but he could not keep himself from criticising Bergson’s choice for Judaism in the same breath. Bergson neglected that Judaism had been ‘opposed’ to Christianity ever since the days of Saint Paul. In the end, Fabre-Luce wondered, was Bergson’s mystical universalism anything other than ‘an attempt at revanche by a people that has not been able to win its unity on the national level and now hopes to achieve it on a global level by dominating the thought of all other peoples’?

By the time the third volume of *Journal de la France* appeared, in July 1943, some 50,000 French and foreign Jews had already been deported from France. While the French population had initially reacted largely with approval or indifference to the anti-Jewish Vichy legislation, the start of the Holocaust in France did not fail to provoke an outcry amongst the French population about the treatment inflicted on the Jews. In July 1942, during the notorious Vel’ d’Hiv’ round-up, 13,000 mostly foreign or stateless Jews were arrested in the Paris area, 7,000 of whom were subsequently held in the Vélodrome d’Hiver cycling stadium for three to six days with no food and hardly any drinking water. Almost all the arrested Jews, more than a third of whom were children, ended up in French transition camps, from where they were deported to Auschwitz during August. Less than a hundred of them

67 Henri Bergson to Fabre-Luce (10 July 1937), Fonds AFL, 472 AP 6; Reading notes from 1932 included in Fonds AFL, 472 AP 10 dr. 2.
69 Julian Jackson notes that ‘Vichy’s anti-Semitism in 1940–1 was the aspect of the National Revolution which seems to have aroused the least opposition’: Jackson, *The Dark Years*, 380.
would survive the death camps. During the round-up, many non-Jewish Parisians witnessed children being separated from their parents, public displays of despair and misery on the part of the victims and brutality on the part of the German and French officers. The raid would have been impossible without the assistance of 9,000 French policemen, who carried out the arrests and were involved in every stage of the operation. As a result of this and other round-ups, during the summer of 1942, a turning point occurred in public opinion, which became more sensitive to the treatment of the Jews. There was a considerable rise in support for clandestine rescue organisations, and individuals, including some influential members of the Catholic Church, did not fail to publicly oppose Vichy’s involvement in the arrests, cruel treatment and deportations of Jews.70

Despite these developments, Fabre-Luce struck an only slightly different tone in his 1943 volume. In a discussion of the main tenets of Hitler’s politics, he stated that anti-Semitism had originally been ‘an admirable political instrument’ since it had forged the unity of the German people ‘at the expense of a very small minority’ suitable for the role of the scapegoat. But the whole enterprise had ‘gone beyond its limits’, not because of Hitler but due to the influence of ‘subordinates’ and blackmailers who wanted to profit from the Jews’ misery. The paradoxical result was that ‘the Jew of Europe, yesterday a parasite of nations, has today become a symbol of human suffering that one bows before’.71 This phrase was cited by Fabre-Luce as an argument for acquittal during his collaboration trial, and in that function it might have served as a convincing manifestation of empathy from an author who was willing to risk imprisonment for openly proclaiming his convictions. Read within its entire paragraph, however, its alleged humanness suddenly appears less solid. Fabre-Luce continued by discussing the reactions of various people to the fate of the Jews: Christians wondered whether the Jewish ‘pariah’ was not an instrument of God for testing their charity, opportunistic anti-Semites started to fear a coming ‘revenge of Israel’ that would make them ‘succeed’ the Jews in the concentration camps. Generally, Fabre-Luce concluded:

Christ and Nemesis join hands to create around the persecuted Jew a kind of respectful fear. The emigrated profiteer [i.e. the emigrated Jew] capitalises on that. He uses the sufferings of his fellows to become, ever

71 Fabre-Luce, *Journal de la France III* (1943), 225.
more, the cement of the Allied coalition. And one can wonder whether the provisional result of the ‘liquidation of the Jews’ is not an increase of their influence and harmfulness in the entire universe.\textsuperscript{72}

This text raises several significant questions. Was Fabre-Luce, generally well-informed about the events of his times and well-connected to several Paris-based German officers, aware of how literally this ‘liquidation of the Jews’ had to be taken in mid-1943?\textsuperscript{73} And was his criticism of the Holocaust really grounded on humanitarian considerations? The last sentences seem to suggest that Fabre-Luce opposed the Holocaust primarily because of its ineffectiveness and counterproductivity: instead of ridding the world of the Jews, which might have been a good thing, its ‘provisional result’ would be a ‘universe’ in which the surviving Jews would be pulling the strings even more than they had done before the war. Seen in this light, even the seemingly sympathetic sentence about the Jew as a ‘symbol of human suffering’ now looks like a rather neutral observation of the changing image of the Jew in French public opinion. It also suggests Fabre-Luce believed the Nazi propaganda myth that emigrated Jews were leading the Allied coalition and making it serve their interests.

Nevertheless, whether out of recognition of Fabre-Luce’s half-hearted condemnation of the Jewish Statute or out of despair (or simply because he was deemed well-connected to the German authorities), some French Jews considered him a possible source of help. In September 1942, Fabre-Luce received a letter from Jacques Ber, a Jewish Frenchman who expressed his surprise that the second volume of Journal de la France contained ‘barely a word about the Jewish question’. While stating that Fabre-Luce had ‘profoundly honoured’ himself by condemning the Jewish Statutes, Ber wondered how well-informed he was about their actual impact on Jewish life in France:

\begin{quote}
\textit{ce que je peux vous dire, moi, Juif, c’est que nous sommes devenues des morts vivants, tout nous est interdit: Restaurants, cafés, bars, théâtres,}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{72} Ibid., 226.

\textsuperscript{73} It is not unthinkable that – despite claiming in his memoirs that he first heard about the death camps in May 1945 – Fabre-Luce received at least some information through Ernst Jünger or his other German contacts. A perpetrators’ study by Ahlrich Meyer establishes that, though the exact system of the extermination camps was only known to a small number of officials, there was little doubt among the Germans based in France what fate awaited the Jews who were deported to the east. Jünger’s war diaries suggest that in late 1942, during a short visit to the eastern front, he heard about the use of ‘poison gas tunnels, through which the trains filled with Jews pass’. In April 1943 Jünger noted that mass executions of Jews were no longer in use, ‘since we [“man”] have passed to gassing the victims’. Jünger, \textit{Strahlungen}, 199, 246; Meyer, \textit{Täter im Verhör}, 282; Fabre-Luce, \textit{Vingt-Cinq Années de Liberté II}, 234.
cinéma, concerts, téléphones, marchés, foires, piscines, plages, Musées, bibliothèques, champs de courses, campings, parcs, squares, ... Les aryens, même ceux qui sont contre nous, reconnaissent combien tout cela est atroce et exagéré! Et, le but de cette lettre, Monsieur, est de vous demander de faire comprendre cela aux autorités d’occupation, parce que, ceux qui ne sont pas Juifs, ont l’angoissante intuition (vraie ou fausse?) que leur tour à eux, français, pourrait bien arriver! Et je suis persuadé, que toutes ces persécutions ont, absolument, tué l’esprit de collaboration.74

Half a year later, Fabre-Luce received a letter from Madeleine Fajon, a Jewish Frenchwoman whose husband, a French-Romanian Jew, had been deported ‘to Silesia’. After thanking Fabre-Luce for his ‘courageous’ criticism of the Jewish Statutes and listing the military awards (the Croix de guerre, the Légion d’honneur) that her husband, ‘a patriotic Frenchman’, had received, she begged Fabre-Luce to help her acquire ‘special authorisation’ to send her husband clothes and food. She had not heard from him for a long time and was worried about his health.75 The Fabre-Luce papers do not contain answers to these letters.

Fabre-Luce’s brand of anti-Semitism is absent from Jouvenel’s writings. Partially of Jewish origin himself through his mother’s family, Jouvenel would have counted as a ‘half-Jew’ according to Nazi race laws. Even so, he was not entirely devoid of remarks echoing anti-Jewish clichés. Before the war, during the spring of 1939, Jouvenel had visited Palestine, where he was shocked by the sight of ‘filthy’ orthodox Jews praying at the Wailing Wall. He contrasted these wretched worshippers with the positive impressions he gained from a visit to a kibbutz: ‘in the same country where Jews with corkscrew curls keep the habits of the ghetto, young Jewish pioneers are living an exhilarating adventure’. He was delighted to see a ‘nervous and gesticulating race’ finally work the earth and acquire ‘the sure malicious smile of the earthly people’. But this idyll was disturbed by the realisation that the kibbutzim were unable to finance themselves and depended on money provided by Jewish communities abroad: ‘for each young couple joyously working the fertilised earth in the sunshine, there is a fat-bellied Jew sitting at the desk of a shop or a bank piling up pieces of money. One redeems the other... The race is going to change.’76

74 Jacques Ber to Fabre-Luce (14 September 1942), Fonds AFL, 472 AP 6.
75 Madeleine Fajon to Fabre-Luce (1 March 1943), Fonds AFL, 472 AP 2.
76 Long article written for Candide, May/June 1939, included in the folder ‘Candide’, Fonds BdJ, Don 90 39 (12), folder 11.
Jouvenel’s wartime publications bear witness to what could at most be called a philo-anti-Semitism that saw him legitimise particular people’s hatred of the Jews without directly agreeing with it personally. Jouvenel mentioned how successful the Nazi party had been in winning the support of German shopkeepers ruined by the arrival of a ‘Jewish warehouse’ in their quarter and industrialists beaten by big business ‘supported by Jewish banks’. He also explained how during the days of hyper-inflation, to be able to eat, the Viennese high society had had to prostitute itself or auction off all its valuable furniture to ‘a certain number of bandits, who were often Jewish’. This unwillingness to oppose anti-Semitism is possibly reflected in Jouvenel’s notorious interview of Hitler in 1936. Among the many reactions that the interview provoked in the French press, the Jewish review Univers Israëlite criticised Jouvenel’s uncritical attitude in the following words:

It is not ours to comment on the interview that Chancellor Hitler has accorded to Mr. Bertrand de Jouvenel, representing Paris-Midi. But was the Führer aware that his spokesperson was not a ‘pure’ Aryan? What to think of a journalist who is able to repress in his heart – for realistic reasons – all the emotions certainly shared by some of his relatives? Instead of a theatrical prostration, one reference to racist persecutions, even a single word would have been an act of courage worthy of France.

Jouvenel was not blind. He did notice the very visible manifestations of Nazi anti-Semitism when he was a guest at the 1938 Nuremberg party rally, but they seemingly failed to have a large impact on him. In a long article written for Gringoire, he mentioned the demonic caricatures of ‘the Jew’ on the propaganda posters and the threatening warning signs painted on the Jewish shop windows of a city that had repeatedly seen pogroms and anti-Jewish violence since the Middle Ages. But ‘like the other Frenchmen attending the congress’, he noticed these signs ‘while passing by, without giving them all my attention’, occupied as he was by the question of whether the Germans would risk another world war. In the resulting article, these observations were almost entirely buried in Jouvenel’s fascination with the

77 Jouvenel, La Décomposition de l’Europe Libérale, 409; idem, Après la Défaite, 19.
78 [‘un acte de courage... bien français’]. Article from Univers Israëlite (13 March 1936), included in folder ‘1-8’, Fonds BdJ, Don 90 39 (12).
'religious' force of Nazi mass ceremonies and the 'immense constructive effort' that he saw as the essence of National Socialism.79

Jouvenel's family origins did not remain unknown to the Nazis for long and, in late 1937, Abetz had come under attack in Germany for being a 'judeophile' and for having confronted the Führer without prior notice with a journalist who was a 'half-Jew'. He defended himself by arguing that Jouvenel, despite his 'weak, inconsistent' character, was a 'stylistically highly talented writer' whose Hitler interview had been 'a huge political success in France'. Moreover, Abetz stressed that Jouvenel had a bad relationship with his Jewish mother, while his outer looks were such that even Hitler had complimented him on his 'fabulous race'.80

‘On the Threshold of a New World’81

As we have seen, in their reaction to France’s defeat, Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel fell back upon the metaphysical directions of their political thought that had revealed themselves during the late 1930s. This was even more the case in their search for the underlying causes of the German victory. The continental, imperialist and pro-German accents that their Europeanism had gained also made them prone to identify with the idea of a new Europe under Hitler’s leadership. Germany should lead Europe not because of its military superiority, they explained, but because it had developed the historical, material and spiritual means to do so. From a kind of a longue-durée perspective, Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel attempted to provide National Socialism with the historical and philosophical roots of a major revolution in human history, equal or even superior to the French Revolution of 1789.82

According to Jouvenel, the ‘German Revolution’ and its victory over France were the lasting outcome of centuries of preparation that had shaped a particular German conception of Europe. He distinguished between historical, political, economic and social conceptions. In his explanation of the historical dimensions, Jouvenel engaged in an extended treatment of German historiography since the late eighteenth century, paying special attention to the perverse role France had supposedly played in Germany since

79 Bertrand de Jouvenel, ‘Nuremberg’, Gringoire (9 September 1938), included in idem, La Dernière Année, 16, 24.
80 Cited in Ray, Annäherung an Frankreich im Dienste Hitlers?, 234.
81 ‘[Au seuil d’un monde nouveau’], Fabre-Luce, Journal de la France I (1940), 404.
82 Fabre-Luce, Anthologie de la Nouvelle Europe, XXVII; idem, Journal de la France I (1940), 404; Jouvenel, Après la Défaite, 166.
the Peace of Westphalia (1648). For more than a millennium, the Holy Roman Empire had embodied the ideal of universal monarchy and the defence of Christendom against attacks from Huns and Turks, while the French kings had been essentially particularistic, assuming the role of ‘the dissociative element in Europe’.83 Ironically, Jouvenel observed, it was precisely the Holy Roman Empire’s liquidation by Napoleon that had paved the way for the transformation of German nationalism from the imperial myth into its modern variant, without it losing its European aspirations. This is where the political conception of Europe came in, which Jouvenel saw grounded in the specificities of German unification, including the long-cherished desire of ‘vital space’ in the East. He explained that, if Germany wanted to aspire to world power and compete with the United States, it had no choice but to appropriate large territories in Eastern Europe for itself, expel the non-German populations there and ‘settle pure Germans in their place’.84

Private notes from 1940 show just how well-read Jouvenel was in German völkisch and Nazi texts about these topics, including the genocidal implications of a colonial policy oriented at the creation of Lebensraum in Eastern Europe. After citing texts by Rudolf Kötzschke and Paul Rohrbach and quoting from Mein Kampf, Jouvenel concluded: ‘the more merciless the vae victis, the greater the security of the peace that follows it; in antiquity, defeated peoples were destroyed completely. Today, this is materially impossible, but one can imagine conditions that come very close to total destruction.’85 Jouvenel’s reading notes from this period reveal his admiration for the direction of the German economy under Hjalmar Schacht and Hermann Goering, his fascination with the prospect of German control over ‘almost 180 million people’ and continental Europe’s entire metal, mechanic and electrical industry, and a combination of fascination and horror regarding the consequences of Nazi colonialism.86 He mentioned that within the Nazi party, theorists were discussing what to do with non-German ‘aliens’ living within the Greater German Reich. Some proposed erecting “reserves” similar to the ones given in North America to the Redskins, while others stated that these ‘aliens’ could live next to the Germans ‘not as citizens but as “foreign nationals” [“ressortissants”]’. His correct estimation of the importance of Lebensraum within National Socialist ideology

83 Jouvenel, Après la Défaite, 142.
84 Ibid., 149, 157, 211.
85 Untitled notes included in folder ‘Allemagne’, Fonds BdJ, Don 90 39 (23).
86 For a longer treatment of these ideas, see Mazower, Hitler’s Empire, 180, 199. Mazower does not cite Jouvenel.
also led Jouvenel to a far-fetched interpretation of Hitler’s Führer title: ‘He proclaimed himself “conductor” in remembrance of the age of migration, the times during which “conductors” of the Germanic race led the Goths from the icy shores of Sweden to the warm beaches of the North Sea and the Vandals from the Pomeranian birch forests to the olive groves of Tunisia.’

Jouvenel situated the German economic conception of Europe in its readiness to go beyond the outdated ‘orthodoxy’ of free trade and develop a policy of autarky. During the 1930s, Germany had superseded France as the privileged trading partner of Central and Eastern Europe, as it could guarantee the purchase of a fixed quantity of primary commodities in exchange for the sale of an equally fixed quantity of end products. Combined with military conquest, Jouvenel envisioned ‘the constitution of a large autarchic sector, stretching from the Rhine to the Pacific’. He was fascinated by the similarity between this situation and the Continental System from the Napoleonic Age. Like Napoleon, Hitler was in control of a European empire pitched against Britain dependent on its colonies, while the two blocks tried to exhaust each other commercially. In 1942, Jouvenel published a lengthy study of the Continental System titled \textit{Napoléon et l’Économie Dirigée} in which he also observed that the blockade had contributed significantly to the development of German metallurgy, which was sheltered from British competition during its vulnerable start-up years. The German Zollverein later played the same role, erecting tariff walls that allowed German industry to prosper, while France, swayed by free-trade ideas that only benefited Britain, lagged behind. \footnote{Jouvenel, \textit{Napoléon et l’Économie Dirigée}, XI; idem, \textit{Après la Défaite}, 167, 174, 185.}

Finally, in his treatment of the German social conception of Europe, Jouvenel returned to his view of National Socialism as essentially a superior form of socialism. His elaboration came strikingly close to Zeev Sternhell’s ideal type of fascism as the anti-Marxist revision of socialism. Jouvenel criticised Marxism for having completely ignored the psychological aspects of the social question. The nineteenth-century proletariat suffered not only from material poverty but also from isolation and fragmentation, both in the

\footnote{Untitled notes included in folder ‘Allemagne’, Fonds BdJ, Don 90 39 (23).}

\footnote{Alfred Fabre-Luce, ‘L’Avènement de l’Empire: Vers l’Empire d’Occident par Louis Madelin’ (book review), \textit{Nouvelle Revue Française} (February 1941), 376. Boulogne was the French port where Napoleon assembled his army and fleet for a planned invasion of England.}
city and inside the factory, where it was not allowed to organise itself or even to gather. While utopian socialism and anarcho-syndicalism did address this problem, Jouvenel regretted that Marxism had taken over large sections of the workers’ movement during the late nineteenth century. He cited Georges Sorel, who criticised the Marxists for having ‘bureaucratised’ the socialist movement, creating a separate class of representatives and professional politicians. ‘Come the revolution, these personnel will replace the capitalists and direct the factories in their place. For the workers, not much will have changed.’ Like anarcho-syndicalism, fascism instead offered to forge workers together in ‘a moral body’, creating a bond between them and their work that permitted them to feel pleasure and accomplishment through it. ‘What determines the success of communist and fascist parties more than that they have permitted modern man to escape from his isolation?’

French and British traditions of utilitarianism and individualism had led both countries to ignore man’s psychological need for collective belonging, while in Germany traditions survived that provided people with frameworks that went beyond the individual level. From the ‘intuitive transcendence’ of Germanic tribes worshipping their dead via the medieval guilds (which were only abolished in Germany in 1869) to the many clubs and organisations of early-twentieth-century Germany, Jouvenel saw these collective traditions as an important element in the German victory of 1940. The Third Reich had merely extended this organisational structure and given it an even more prominent place in society. Jouvenel even considered this framework to be a possible check on totalitarianism: ‘In our recent admiration for the totalitarian state, we still have not understood that the absolutism of the state is corrected by the constitution of small collectivities that satisfy the human instinct of loyalism, creating feelings that profit the state but that the state itself is unable to generate.’

According to Jouvenel, one more aspect made National Socialism a superior form of socialism: state control over national resources. As an example, he stated that, although France had more automobiles, all German vehicles were used by the army, while in France, hundreds of thousands of private vehicles filled with people fleeing the German offensive had blocked the roads, making it even harder for the ill-equipped French army to resist. ‘In totalitarian regimes’, Jouvenel concluded, ‘the national strength is not only built on public but also on private resources. In this way, the fascist regime accomplishes the “conscription of fortunes” that is written in the socialist

90 Jouvenel, Après la Défaite, 191.
91 Ibid., 195.
programme.’ Jouvenel found consolation in this observation, since this meant that the defeat was less one of France by Germany but rather ‘that of a system that incompletely mobilised the resources of our fatherland, by a system that fully used the adversary’s potential.’ This underlined the revolutionary novelty of the Third Reich. Foreshadowing what would become the main analysis of his post-liberation magnum opus, *Du Pouvoir*, Jouvenel came to another analogy with the Napoleonic age centred on the growing power of the state. The victories of the Corsican general had been based on the mobilisation of people, resources and money on a scale that early modern Europe’s dynastic rulers had never seen. Hitler’s victory was built on a revolutionary extension of the same principle: a state that controls all the national resources, including business and industry.

Fabre-Luce agreed with Jouvenel (and Sternhell) that National Socialism was an ‘anti-Marxist socialism’, which he saw as part of an international fascist revolution directed against both Marxism and ‘reactionary’ capitalism. He named Mussolini’s Italy, Portugal’s Salazar, Franco’s Spain and Pétain’s France as other manifestations of this revolution. The fascist revolution matched the French Revolution in another aspect: it had so strongly transformed society and politics that no restoration could undo it anymore. Just as Napoleon had ‘digested’ the French Revolution, repressing its chaotic consequences while making its revolutionary achievements an integral part of his imperial European project, Hitler had ‘digested’ socialism. Although Napoleon eventually lost control of the territories he had conquered and raised Europe’s national sentiments against him, Fabre-Luce was unconvinced that the same would happen with Hitler’s empire. After all, Hitler had the party at his disposal, an ‘instrument of inner cohesion’ that Napoleon lacked, as well as an air force that was ‘an effective weapon against maritime powers’. If Germany were to prove itself able to recognise the New Europe’s ‘authentic national forces’ and collaborate with them loyally, ‘one can say that Napoleon’s dream has finally come true’. The probability of this destiny was enlarged by the genius of Hitler, whom Fabre-Luce described as a formidable brain ‘that easily dominates the large spaces of history’. A reading of Hermann Rausching’s anti-Nazi book *Hitler Speaks* only confirmed for him Hitler’s quality as an ‘Übermensch’ whom France’s democratic leaders

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92 Ibid., 218.
93 Ibid., 216.
94 Fabre-Luce, *Anthologie de la Nouvelle Europe*, XXV, XXVII.
95 Fabre-Luce, *Journal de la France II* (1942), 84; idem, ‘*L’Avènement de l’Empire*’ (book review), 376.
96 Fabre-Luce, ‘*Neue Einsichten in die Französische Geschichte*’, 323.
could never defeat. 97 Two years later, Fabre-Luce made Hitler even more superhuman, comparing him to ‘Jupiter’ frowningly looking down from his Alpine Olympus upon the petty rivalries and conflicts of Vichy France. 98

Among the German authors cited by Jouvenel, a plethora of romantics, nationalists, conservatives and racial theorists figure, including Friedrich Schiller, Georg Wilhelm Hegel, Johan Gottlieb Fichte, Karl Haushofer, Ernst Hasse, Friedrich Naumann and Friedrich Lange. Despite obvious disagreements between these authors, Jouvenel still saw them united in the service of the German state. Unlike French intellectuals, Jouvenel explained, German scientists and intellectuals were acutely conscious of their national duties. Like the Jesuits, German intelligence was ‘an Order, working for the greater glory of the fatherland’. 99 Fabre-Luce also explored the philosophical and historical basis of the Nazi victory while placing a stronger accent on the European character of the New Order and its origins. In 1942, this resulted in the publication of Anthologie de la Nouvelle Europe, essentially an eclectic collection of texts that Fabre-Luce found had contributed to the emergence of a ‘New Europe’ along National Socialist lines.100

This anthology included predominantly French and German authors, garnished with two Italians (Machiavelli and Mussolini), two British (Thomas Carlyle and D. H. Lawrence) and one Spaniard (Miguel de Unamuno). Nationalist, conservative, fascist and racist authors such as Maurras, Gobineau, Haushofer, Barrès, Alfred Rosenberg, Nietzsche, Bergson, Oswald Spengler, Drieu and Ernst Jünger figured alongside Paul Valéry, Goethe, Caillaux and even the young communist novelist Paul Nizan. Fabre-Luce had some of the German authors that were still unknown in France translated into French by the Dutch literary translator Dolf Verspoor. In a long preliminary essay, Fabre-Luce admitted that there was substantial disagreement between the included authors, ‘but as I assembled the texts, the authors started to dialogue. [...] What I saw being born in front of my eyes, in its solidarity and diversity, was Europe itself.’101 A letter to Jünger in which Fabre-Luce requested permission to include an extract from his personal war account Das Wäldchen 125 in his anthology probably laid the basis for the long-lasting friendship between him and the Paris-based Wehrmacht captain.102

97 ['Surhomme'], Fabre-Luce, Journal de la France I (1940), 196, 225.
98 Fabre-Luce, Journal de la France II (1942), 283.
99 Jouvenel, Après la Défaite, 132.
100 Fabre-Luce, Anthologie de la Nouvelle Europe, II.
101 Ibid., II, XLV. Fabre-Luce accidentally called him ‘Delf Verspoor’.
102 Fabre-Luce to Ernst Jünger (23 December 1941), Ernst Jünger Nachlass, Deutsches Literaturarchiv Marbach, Hs.1994.0009.
The major aim of Fabre-Luce’s anthology was to prove that French literature and philosophy had made an essential contribution to the New Europe that had been born in 1940. At the end of his essay, Fabre-Luce observed that British authors were almost absent from his anthology because the country had only marginally contributed to the intellectual genesis of the new Europe. ‘If one recognises this fact, one has to conclude that the Franco-German couple is the dominating element of the European synthesis.’

Separate chapters were dedicated, amongst others, to ‘the respect of force and aristocratism’, ‘biological politics’, ‘towards a new religion’, ‘anti-Marxist socialism’, ‘national revolution’, ‘collaboration’ and ‘Europe’. Fabre-Luce honoured Gobineau and Sorel as the ‘spiritual fathers’ of Hitler and Mussolini. He stated that French idealism was in dire need of some ‘inconvenient truths’, citing Blaise Pascal that ‘historically, law is nothing but the justification of force’. With his work on the force of political myths, Sorel had contributed to the elaboration of the Führerprinzip and to the struggle against ‘intellectual devirilisation’, since ‘ideas degenerate when they are no longer nourished by heroism’.

Goethe, Carlyle and Napoleon had proven that a natural elite consisting of Übermenschen needed to lead the masses, establishing a kind of feudal bond: ‘Between disciple and master, between man and superman, the bond of vassal and lord is sublimated and recreated.’ Nietzsche and Pierre-Joseph Proudhon had inspired National Socialist doctrine in their attack on religion for having burdened man with the ‘Jewish’ notion of sin and for having established a religious hierarchy separated from political power. Fabre-Luce considered ‘the decline of Christianity’ and ‘the conscription of religious energies in the service of the nation’ one of the most important elements of the new fascist Europe. He concluded that ‘the essential signification of the fascist revolutions is maybe of having resituated to the leader the religious character that Christianity took away from him.’

Fabre-Luce also ventured into racial theory, social Darwinism and eugenics. While Ernest Renan had already dreamt of ‘humanity creating out of itself a race of gods’, racial science was about to bring this ideal within arm’s reach. Gobineau, Houston Stewart Chamberlain and Barrès had laid the basis for biological thought, which Hitler and the French biologists Jean Rostand and René Quinon elaborated into a programme of genetic improvement of man by means of selection. With Quinon, Fabre-Luce stated that war was ‘as much a necessary instrument of selection as reproduction itself. One is the

103 Fabre-Luce, Anthologie de la Nouvelle Europe, XLIII.
104 Ibid., III, V, XI.
105 Ibid., XII, XVIII.
task of females, the other must be the task of males.’ Hitler had introduced state policy based on eugenic principles, making procreation ‘for some an obligation, for others a shameful act that has to be forbidden’.106 In two letters, Fabre-Luce asked Rostand for supplementary information on the practical use of eugenics on humans and the possible use of X-rays to provoke mutations. Despite Rostand’s relatively discouraging reply – he wrote that the only useful application of human eugenics was to encourage reproduction of individuals disposing of ‘exceptional qualities’ – Fabre-Luce concluded that Rostand basically agreed with Hitler. Although Rostand had stated that the mixing of races was not negative, Fabre-Luce still found that it disrupted social order and that ‘the results of crossbreeding are often disastrous’.107

According to Fabre-Luce, Rostand also fully approved of the Nazi law of 14 July 1933 on the sterilisation of ‘idiots’, which indicated ‘a more profound agreement’ between Hitler and the French biologist. The German sterilisation law made Fabre-Luce doubt the viability of democratic states, since these still allowed people to reproduce who otherwise would have been ‘ruthlessly eliminated’. This led to a ‘progressive weakening of the species. Our “civilisation” finishes by turning against itself. It is unable to transform our individual acquisitions into biological progress.’ On the contrary: a ‘counter-selection’ was taking place against which legitimate action needed to be undertaken. Hitler was the only person powerful and free enough to organise this, which made him a powerful ally ‘against democratic and Christian humanitarianism’.108 Although less willing to go into details, Jouvenel thought along the same lines. He called for the new science of ‘biopolitics’ to replace the traditional French republican politics, addressing ‘men’ instead of parties, institutions and electorates. The first task of the biopolitician was to ‘redress the weakening tendencies of the French race’, which Jouvenel found ‘in a state of inferiority vis-à-vis its contemporaries in other countries’ both in terms of numbers and physical fitness. After this stronger French race had been ‘forged’, these human cattle had to be oriented towards the work ‘that it is most fit for’.109

In addition to biopolitics, Jouvenel was aiming for a more fundamental transformation of French science and politics. He stated that the whole fabric of republican science, which he felt was contaminated by the idealistic

106 Ibid., VII, XIV,
107 Two letters of Rostand to Fabre-Luce (18 March 1940 and date unknown), Fonds AFL, 472 AP 6; Fabre-Luce, Journal de la France I (1940), 227.
108 Fabre-Luce, Journal de la France I (1940), 228.
109 Jouvenel, Après la Défaite, 232; Loiseaux, La Littérature de la Défaite, 314.
formalism of the law faculties where the country’s political elite was trained, had to be replaced by ‘new political sciences’ rooted in concrete facts and inspired by recent progress in racial biology, geopolitics and psychology. He called for the establishment of ‘biopolitics, geopolitics and psychopolitics’ as three distinct new disciplines within French academia, ‘with their professors and their chairs’.

While biopolitics had to address the quality of the French race, he presented geopolitics as the continuation of the thought of Richelieu that had been lost in France, while in Germany Karl Haushofer had inspired a whole new science on the basis of the study of the political value of soil, natural resources and coastlines. Jouvenel’s interest in Haushofer’s ideas preceded the war. Already in May 1939, Jouvenel had cited Haushofer abundantly and even borrowed maps from Haushofer’s monthly Geopolitik, while stressing the importance of geopolitical thought behind each of Hitler’s political moves. During the interwar period, France’s failure to seize geopolitical occasions such as the construction of a channel between the Rhine and the Rhone, which would have laid the basis for a true Franco-German ‘community of interests’, illustrated how much France needed to learn from Germany. Psychopoliticians had to study the ‘national temperament’ as well as the unknown needs and desires of the masses to be able to better lead them, ‘exiting their strengths and healing their weaknesses’. So long as a great leader had not revealed itself, at least an ‘intellectual elite’ could prepare the ground by studying great men from the past and establishing ‘a solid base of political knowledge’ rooted in these three disciplines.

**New Rulers, Old Acquaintances**

Besides these philosophical and historical reflections, the war years also confronted Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce with concrete political choices. In the context of Vichy, the presence of Germans in Paris, collaborationism and – especially after 1942 – the Resistance, questions of adherence, association and abstention became paramount to French intellectual life. As we have seen, the general direction of Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel’s thought was unequivocal in its admiration for Nazi Germany, its certainty of the

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110 Jouvenel, Après la Défaite, 229.
111 Jouvenel, ‘Le Secret de Hitler’.
112 Jouvenel, Après la Défaite, 234.
113 Ibid., 237.
inferiority of France and its political system, and its wish to give France a new regime and a new doctrine inspired by the fascist example (without necessarily being an exact copy of the German or Italian model). There was, however, a certain difference in the conclusions the two intellectuals drew from these reflections. Due to fragmentary information, incomplete archives and untrustworthy post-war accounts, it is impossible to provide a complete overview of the activities and contacts of the two intellectuals during the war years, but at least some conclusions can be drawn.

In occupied Paris, several close friends of Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel rose to important positions within the world of collaboration. The key figure within the Paris collaboration network was Otto Abetz, who had triumphantly returned to Paris in the Wehrmacht’s wake as the German ambassador to occupied France. Until the end of the 1930s, he had been active in France via the Comité France-Allemagne and its periodical, maintaining contact with Jouvenel, Fabre-Luce, Drieu and other pacifist, fascist and Germanophile French intellectuals like Fernand de Brinon, Jacques Benoist-Méchin and Jean Fontenoy, many of whom were members of the PPF. Married since 1932 to Jean Luchaire’s personal secretary, Abetz also remained close to Luchaire and the *Notre Temps* group. From 1934, both the committee and Abetz were on the payroll of the Dienststelle Ribbentrop, the foreign policy department of the Nazi party which played a major foreign propaganda role in competition with the German foreign ministry. The CFA also received occasional subsidies from successive French governments, including the Popular Front. When Ribbentrop became foreign minister in 1938, he took Abetz with him to his new position. Abetz joined the SS in 1935 and the party in 1938. One year later, he was promoted to the rank of Sturmbannführer.

In early 1939, Abetz’s activities came under increased criticism in the French press, where he was denounced as a German spy (correctly, as it turns out) attempting to divide French public opinion and play France off against her British ally. As the pre-war international tensions approached boiling point, the press campaign against Abetz intensified. Luchaire and Jouvenel tried to defend their old friend by publicly testifying to Abetz’s ‘sincerity’ and stressing his long-standing activism for Franco-German reconciliation, but the French government evicted him in July 1939. A few months earlier,
Fabre-Luce had defended Abetz within the CFA, which was falling apart under the threat of war. After the German occupation of Prague, many influential members – including Louis Bertrand, Jules Romains and Émile Roche – wanted to leave the committee in protest against this open violation of the principle of self-determination. At a meeting on 22 March 1939, only Fabre-Luce and Fernand de Brinon spoke out in favour of continuing to work towards friendship between France and Germany. A majority of the members held the opposite opinion, as a result of which it was decided to suspend all activities and investigate the possibility of dissolving the committee.118

One year after his eviction from France, Abetz was back in Paris in a new position of power. Officially, since there was no French authority in Paris, Abetz was the ambassador to the German military commander [Militärbefehlshaber in Frankreich] in Paris. His competence included Vichy, where his embassy held a branch office that he frequently visited.119 Like the Third Reich in general, the German occupation authorities in France gave a polyocratic impression, with representatives of leading Nazi personalities bitterly competing for overlapping responsibilities and the Führer’s favour. The highest authority in France was held by the Wehrmacht general Otto von Stülpnagel, later to be succeeded by his cousin Carl-Heinrich, who was responsible for security, supplying the German forces, maintaining order and exploiting the French economy. Officially under the authority of the military commander but in fact taking their instructions from Berlin, Goebbels’ Propaganda-Abteilung wanted to establish German control over the French spirit, while Himmler’s representative Helmut Knochen led an SS commando ready to fight and destroy Nazism’s ‘ideological enemies’ in France.120 As the pawn of Ribbentrop, Abetz could have become just one out of many rivaling German officials in Paris. But his ambition, maneuvering talent and connections in France, as well as the relative independence of the embassy from other institutions, gave him an important advantage over his rivals, at least during the first years of occupation.121

he left the Comité France-Allemagne in the aftermath of the Munich crisis in 1938, but evidence suggests that he kept in close contact with Abetz and the committee during the following year. The day before Abetz’s eviction, he had been with Jouvenel and several members of the committee at a dinner party at the house of Horace de Carbuccia, the director of the right-wing weekly Gringoire. See Lambauer, Otto Abetz et les Français, 121; Jouvenel, Un Voyageur, 338.
118 Lambauer, Otto Abetz et les Français, 118.
119 Conze et al., Das Amt, 227.
121 Burrin, La France à l’Heure Allemande, 96.
Abetz, at the age of 37 the youngest active German ambassador, was assisted by a number of predominantly young officials with a good knowledge of France and the French. Most notably, his assistant Rudolf Schleier (41) ran affairs concerning veterans and prisoners of war, while Ernst Achenbach (31) led the political section of the embassy. Eager to establish control over cultural, press and radio affairs at the expense of the Propaganda-Abteilung, Abetz set up a German Institute in Paris with the mission to mobilise influential French intellectuals and cultural personalities in the enterprise of collaboration. Its director Karl Epting (35), who had headed the French branch of the German academic service before the war, promoted German culture in France through language courses, expositions and conferences.
while attempting to win over French intellectuals and socialites with lavish receptions at the Institute. Epting could count on the help of the well-known journalist Friedrich Sieburg, the former French correspondent of the *Frankfurter Zeitung* who had published the best-selling book *Gott in Frankreich* in 1929 – translated into French as *Dieu Est-Il Français?* – as well as the support of Friedrich Grimm, an international law expert from the University of Münster who gave frequent lectures at salons in support of collaboration. Apart from these human resources, Abetz’s embassy also had at its disposal a well-filled treasury of one billion French francs, directly taken from the ‘occupation costs’ that France had to pay by the terms of the armistice.  

During several meetings with Hitler, Abetz elaborated on his plans for France. It was in the German interest, he told the Führer, to reduce France to the status of a ‘satellite state’ ready to wilfully accept the ‘permanent weakening’ of its position in Europe. In order to effectively divide the French and to prevent them from ever uniting against their victor, Germany would have to simultaneously support rivalling parties and groups of various political colours. But it was not enough to divide and rule by force alone. Despite Hitler’s hesitations and against the hostility of Himmler and Goebbels, Abetz was convinced the French could be won over to the idea of collaboration and the acceptance of their own subservience to a German world order. He told Hitler that the Germans had to occasionally put up a friendly face and make vague promises regarding a future peace treaty that would guarantee the territorial integrity of the country. Abetz claimed that ‘the French masses’ already had a great admiration for Hitler and that, with the right propaganda, it would be easy to make them blame their misery on the right scapegoats: MPs, Freemasons, Jews, clergymen and others who were ‘responsible for the war’. The French elite and intelligentsia could be seduced by exposing them to German culture and especially by stressing ‘the European idea’. In Abetz’s words: ‘In exactly the same way as the idea of peace was usurped by National Socialist Germany and served to weaken French morale, without undermining the German fighting spirit, the European idea could be usurped by the Reich without harming the aspiration to continental primacy embedded by National Socialism in the German people.’

Although Abetz disliked Pétain’s conservative entourage, within the Vichy government he established a good relationship with Laval, whom he supported after his removal from power and temporary house arrest by

Pétain as the result of a Vichy intrigue in December 1940. But Abetz was careful to also develop alternative options by supporting several Paris-based collaboration movements, most predominantly Marcel Déat’s Rassemblement National-Populaire (RNP) and Doriot’s PPF. Abetz could more easily manipulate Pétain by creating the impression that the Germans might at any moment replace him by a government consisting of more radically pro-German collaborators. In his dealings with Laval, Déat and other collaborators, Abetz kept presenting himself as a Francophile and an admirer of French culture and lifestyle who wanted the best for France but needed to compete with anti-French hard-liners within the Nazi administration. This implied that Abetz, Laval and Déat had a common interest in sincerely working for Franco-German collaboration as a direct continuation of pre-war activities, albeit under different circumstances. Setbacks could be conveniently blamed by Abetz on the influence of other hostile currents within the Third Reich.

In the world of the Paris press, Abetz had just as few difficulties finding collaborators. Jean Luchaire, who had continued his Notre Temps until the end of the 1930s despite financial difficulties, was ambitious, unscrupulous and bankrupt enough to work for the Germans at any paid position in journalism. After a short-lived editorship of the newspaper Le Matin, Abetz appointed him as head of the French Press Corporation, the organisation all journalists in the occupied zone were required to join. Encouraged by Abetz, Luchaire also founded a new daily newspaper, Les Nouveaux Temps, which was meant to reflect the opinion of ‘the left’ of the world of collaboration. Together with Déat’s L’Œuvre and La France au Travail – both of which were also supported or even created on behalf of Abetz – Les Nouveaux Temps was supposed to counterbalance the weight of right-wing (i.e. Maurrassian or fascist) newspapers such as Je Suis Partout, Au Pilori and La Gerbe and to convince progressive Frenchmen to support collaboration. There are some indications that Abetz first wanted Jouvenel to assume its editorship, but he declined. Although both Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel generally refrained from contributing articles to their old friend’s collaborationist newspaper, they did allow Luchaire to publish promotional extracts of their first books appearing under occupation. The extracts of Après la Défaite and the first tome of Journal de la France appeared one after the other in January 1941.

124 Jackson, The Dark Years, 174.
125 Burrin, La France à l’Heure Allemande, 104.
126 Alden, ‘The Road to Collaboration’, 223, 226, 244; Meletta, Jean Luchaire, 178.
127 Lévy, Les Nouveaux Temps et l’Idéologie de la Collaboration, 7, 89.
After a six-month interruption, December 1940 saw the reappearance of the *Nouvelle Revue Française* (*NRF*), the flagship of the pre-war French intellectual and literary world. Founded in 1909 by André Gide, during the interwar period it had opened itself up to new literary currents, publishing contributions from upcoming authors like André Malraux, Louis Aragon, Drieu la Rochelle, Jean-Paul Sartre and Julien Benda. When Jean Paulhan resigned as its editor-in-chief, unwilling to run the periodical under occupation and German censorship, he was succeeded by Drieu who by this time had fully embraced the idea of a fascist Europe under German leadership. Abetz supported the return of the *NRF* under the condition that it would be headed by a man who could be trusted ideologically, and Drieu was his perfect candidate. Although at first, Drieu’s new *NRF* also published contributions by authors who did not share his enthusiasm for the German new order – Paulhan remained involved behind the scenes while Gide and Paul Valéry contributed to the first issues – it increasingly came to reflect his personal interpretation of collaboration and fascism as a revolutionary enterprise to free Europe from ‘Jewish’ decadence and communism. Despite his choice to collaborate unconditionally, Drieu retained a certain solidarity with authors who were ideologically his enemies. He used his contacts with the Germans to protect Malraux and Aragon from persecution and even arranged for Paulhan to be freed from prison after his arrest for Resistance activities.\(^{128}\)

Fabre-Luce held a prominent place in the first edition of Drieu’s *NRF*, and he continued to publish regularly in the periodical until the summer of 1942.\(^{129}\) His presence seems to have not only been due to his friendship with Drieu but also inspired by common points in their view of the European dimensions of collaboration. In a ‘Letter to an American’, Fabre-Luce advised an unnamed and possibly imaginary trans-Atlantic friend not to feel sorry for the French. First of all, occupied Paris was more beautiful than ever: the noise of cars had disappeared and one did not risk his life anymore when crossing the street. The city’s monuments had regained ‘a new majesty’ and a purity reminiscent of Baalbek or Angkor Wat rather than a modern city.


\(^{129}\) His last contribution appeared in July 1942: Alfred Fabre-Luce, ‘Lawrence d’Arabie, Le Colonel de Trente Ans qui Battit les Turcs’, *Nouvelle Revue Française* (July 1942), 17. Between December 1940 and July 1942, a total of eight contributions by Fabre-Luce can be found. In his memoirs, Fabre-Luce misleadingly claims that he only wrote one article for Drieu’s *NRF*, about Lawrence of Arabia, even implying his ‘British’ subject was subversive. See Fabre-Luce, *Vingt-Cinq Années de Liberté II*, 77.
And what, Fabre-Luce wondered, had the French really lost in the war? Their freedom? Addressing his friend directly, he asked:

Do you really believe that a man enslaved by alcohol, a man enslaved by gambling can become, by virtue of a ballot paper, a free man? This summer, we have abolished the apéritifs and regulated our stock exchange... Another race is beginning to take shape, one that will maybe later be able to fully enjoy its freedom, because it will be worthy of it.130

In *Journal de la France II*, Fabre-Luce elaborated on this comparison of a reborn authoritarian France and a ‘decadent’ United States. The Americans were wrong to think they were free, subjected as they were to ‘a Jewish press consortium’, puritan leagues and omnipresent advertising. And the French, who still enjoyed certain ‘zones of traditional freedom’ – echoing Fabre-Luce’s persistent view of fascism as less totalitarian than communism – had also discovered an entirely new kind of liberty: that of a young man in a youth camp who ‘learns to believe’. Altogether, these considerations made the French feel ‘less like slaves than our eventual “liberators”. Their victory would maybe bring us back the institutions that bred our decadence, but it would convert us in forced clients of their trusts.’131

Apart from bringing a necessary end to the nation’s alcoholic decadence, laying the basis for a new kind of freedom and improving road security in the capital, Fabre-Luce saw another merit of defeat. It had cut France off from Britain and the ocean and finally made it ‘look towards Europe’. ‘France is like a house of which the walls and windows have changed their place’. This new perspective allowed him to address his American friend ‘from continent to continent, in an equality that we have never known before, and you will not feel the same contempt that you had for our old Balkanised Europe’.132 Fabre-Luce supported the National Revolution under the condition that it would not neglect its international dimensions: ‘Isn’t it mostly a global revolution? From now on, France is an element of a larger assembly. It is not upon her to command, but to collaborate, to inspire and above all to be...’133 Two years later, citing Jacques Bainville, Fabre-Luce described France as a pivotal country that had always hesitated ‘between sea and land,

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130 Alfred Fabre-Luce, ‘Lettre à un Américain’, *Nouvelle Revue Française* (December 1940), 65, 71. Italics in original.
131 Fabre-Luce, *Journal de la France II* (1942), 122, 123.
132 Fabre-Luce, ‘Lettre à un Américain’, 67, 72.
133 Fabre-Luce, *Journal de la France I* (1940), 404. Italics in original.
between England and Germany’. The French climate, ‘in which continental
drought and Atlantic humidity alternate’, reflected this attitude. Now, the
time had come to make a definitive choice for a continental European
empire: ‘It is a collective Rome that we must build. At this work, we will
not be subjects but collaborators; we can even become – as the result of
evolution – co-emperors.’ This choice was easier, as its alternative came
down to national slavery. Combining threat and reward, Fabre-Luce stated
that ‘the choice offered to us is simple. A new Europe is being built. We are
invited to participate in its construction. If we accept, we will become part
of the aristocracy of blood, we will enjoy its privileges. If we refuse, a place
of slaves will be prepared for us after the war.’

For Fabre-Luce, collaboration even became a kind of a final ersatz for
French international grandeur. He stated that France could take a leading
role in convincing other countries who held her in high esteem. After all, it
was from France that ‘during the last centuries, the big slogans of European
thought have started. The moral support of France is important to anyone
willing to launch new ones. [...] If France “collaborates”, the whole of Europe
will collaborate. If she resists, there will only be slaves.’ Militarily, France
could even play such a decisive role as to end the war and save the world
from further bloodshed. By resolutely choosing the German side, France
could effectively bring the Mediterranean under Axis control, after which
the Allies would realise that a total victory was impossible and search for a
diplomatic solution. The peace could then take the form of ‘a ratification of
the state of affairs: Germany in Europe, the Anglo-Saxons on the other side
of the Ocean. France, by practicing collaboration, recognises its geographi-
cal and moral belonging to Europe.’

While both the British (through RAF bombings) and the Germans
(through forced labour) demanded sacrifices of the French, at least the
latter were ‘fighting for Europe. If he [the German] triumphs, he will bring
her [Europe] unity, security, economic organisation. Since he will bring us
all of that, he is entitled to our butter, to our horses, to our workers. He will
give it back to us a hundred times after the war.’ The British had, by contrast,
always played a destructive role, doing everything in their power to prevent
Europe from organising itself.”

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135 Ibid., 285.
136 Ibid., 68.
137 Ibid., 116.
138 Ibid., 13, 285.
of the collaboration, Fabre-Luce described what this new Europe should look like: ‘a large economic area in which peoples, formally partitioned, thrown back upon themselves and tired of endless quarrels, will find themselves back with an unknown feeling of security and the intoxication of space. […] She [France] will not be enslaved, because Germany needs clients, not slaves. Machines will be the only slaves.’

Fabre-Luce’s interpretation of collaboration as a way to rid France of decadence, create a new race and new political institutions, and organise the continent under German leadership are strikingly similar to what motivated Drieu la Rochelle. A surviving letter from 1942 in Fabre-Luce’s personal papers suggests the two regularly exchanged letters during the war. Drieu illustrated this ideological closeness by dedicating an NRF article to Fabre-Luce in November 1942. In his description of Fabre-Luce as living proof that a rich man could have talent and as essentially ‘a liberal liberally open to the opposite of liberalism’, he mixed irony with sympathy.

Even as late as 1944, when the national socialist Europe he had wished for was falling apart in front of his eyes, Drieu still counted Fabre-Luce as on his side. Amidst the depressed avowal that he found himself ‘almost alone to think what I think and to say what I say’, he took comfort in knowing that at least ‘Giono, Montherlant, Céline, Jouhandeau, Chardonne, Fabre-Luce, Fernandez’ were still with him.

Apart from Drieu, Fabre-Luce was close to other collaborationist intellectuals like Jacques Chardonne, who was not primarily motivated by the same continental Europeanism but instead appreciated the German occupation for protecting an idealised rural France against the communist menace. Fabre-Luce had known Chardonne since 1924, but their friendship grew as a result of their shared wartime positions. Chardonne complimented Fabre-Luce on the first volume of Journal de la France and Anthologie de la Nouvelle Europe, which he admitted reading like ‘a Bible for this moment’. In 1941, Chardonne praised Fabre-Luce as ‘the most intelligent man of France’ – a quotation that was to have a long life. His wartime books also won Fabre-

139 Ibid., 31, 32.
140 Pierre Drieu la Rochelle to Fabre-Luce (March 1942), Fonds AFL, 472 AP 6.
142 Cited in Loiseaux, La Littérature de la Défaite et de la Collaboration, 115.
143 Chardonne, Chronique Privée de l’An 1940, 200; idem, Voir la Figure, 31.
144 Two letters of Jacques Chardonne to Fabre-Luce (15 July 1942 and date unknown), Fonds AFL, 472 AP 2. A meeting with Chardonne is mentioned in Fabre-Luce’s notes from April 1924. Fonds AFL, 472 AP 10 dr. 1.
145 Garbe, Alfred Fabre-Luce, 24; Raymond Aron, Chronique de Guerre, 534.
Luce the admiration of Régis de Vibraye, the advocate of Franco-German reconciliation; the Pétainist historian Daniel Halévy; and even Bernard Faÿ, a historian obsessed with Masonic conspiracies who became the head of the French National Library after the sacking of its Jewish director Julien Cain. Faÿ was so impressed by the first two volumes of *Journal de la France* that he was willing to revise his earlier negative judgment ‘when your book about *La Victoire* gave me such a fit of bad temper’.\(^{146}\) Fabre-Luce was also in touch with Georges Albertini, the former pacifist socialist who had embraced fascism and become the second man in Déat’s RNP. In a letter to Fabre-Luce, Albertini told him not to expect too much from Uriage, Vichy’s elite school that Fabre-Luce had enthusiastically described in *Journal de la France*. In a review, Albertini also praised Fabre-Luce’s *Anthologie de la Nouvelle Europe*, describing it as a book that laid the basis for a new European order.\(^ {147}\)

As in the writings of other collaborationist intellectuals like Drieu, Marcel Jouhandeau and Henry de Montherlant, Fabre-Luce’s view of collaboration sometimes took on sexual or gendered connotations, with France playing the female role.\(^{148}\) He argued that, from a historical perspective, ‘occupations are voyages of peoples’ in which the ‘receiving’ party travelled as well, generally with positive results. Just like the West rediscovered Aristotle thanks to the Arab invasions and Switzerland owed its democratic law system to occupation by Napoleon’s armies, even France itself was ‘the product of a rape’: the one of Gaul by Rome. ‘The first sign of civilisation of our ancestors has been to let themselves be fertilised by a victor who enriched himself through their contribution’. Everywhere in occupied France, Fabre-Luce saw scenes reflecting this historical cross fertilisation: German officers enjoyed the hospitality of French families and made sure their men behaved correctly, while ‘in the darkness of side streets’ all kinds of ‘illegitimate love’ were consumed. During their conquest of France, the Germans had behaved like ‘respecting, almost timid conquerors’. When called to the eastern front, the German soldiers were sad to exchange a beautiful French village for the eastern plains, and the French farmers were almost as sad to see them leave. Citing a peasant, who may have been just as imaginary as the American friend he addressed his open letter to, Fabre-Luce stated:

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\(^{146}\) Two letters of Bernard Faÿ to Fabre-Luce (20 July 1942 and 28 November 1942), Letters of Daniel Halévy (3 January 1942) and Régis de Vibraye (10 September 1942), Fonds AFL, 472 AP 2.

\(^{147}\) Georges Albertini to Fabre-Luce (16 September 1942); Albertini, review of *Anthologie de la Nouvelle Europe* (Fabre-Luce), *L’Atelier: Hebdomadaire du Travail Français* (4 April 1942), Fonds AFL, 472 AP 2; Fabre-Luce, *Journal de la France* II (1942), 175.

\(^{148}\) Jackson, *The Dark Years*, 211. Jouvenel’s writings were also not entirely devoid of these connotations. See Jouvenel, *Un Voyageur*, 370, 377.
“Ils faisaient marcher le commerce. Et puis, ils n’étaient pas méchants. C’est tout de même dommage qu’ils aillent se faire tuer.”

Strikingly, Fabre-Luce’s main problems with German censorship (before 1943) were caused by his anti-communist attitude. While he had been forced to delete a few lines in the first volume of *Journal de la France* out of respect for the Molotov-Von Ribbentrop Pact, the start of Operation Barbarossa freed Fabre-Luce from such considerations and gave an even stronger impetus to his collaborationism. Fabre-Luce interpreted the German offensive against the Soviet Union as a victory ‘of the field over the steppe […], of the German over the Slav, of hierarchy over undistinguished community. If a soldier born on the banks of the Rhine crosses the Vistula, the border of *our* civilisation moves with him. It is from France too that he repels the danger of the horde.’ When Jacques Doriot left for the eastern front to fight in the ranks of the Légion des Volontaires Français (LVF), a special Waffen-SS division founded on his initiative, Fabre-Luce celebrated him as a rare case of ‘a statesman who completes his political figure and takes a decision for the future’. Fabre-Luce criticised the ‘lukewarm’ attitude of the Vichy government, which formally supported the LVF but did nothing to help it recruit members. Even in an *NRF* review of Montesquieu’s *Cahiers*, he was able to find arguments in favour of collaboration. Citing Montesquieu’s statement that under problematic circumstances, no mistake is more harmful than inaction, Fabre-Luce proudly concluded that in the twentieth century, Montesquieu ‘would not have been an *attentiste*.’

**Collaboration and Attentisme**

In contrast to Fabre-Luce, traces of *attentisme* (wait and see) can be found in the writings of Jouvenel. He did not publish in the *NRF* or in any other collaborationist newspaper, but he was involved with the founding of the new periodical *Le Fait* in the autumn of 1940. In his memoirs, Jouvenel claims he used this as a cover-up for intelligence activities, and there is some evidence for this. During his trips to Eastern and Central Europe in

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149 Fabre-Luce, *Journal de la France* II (1942), 25, 26, 28.
150 Fabre-Luce, *Vingt-Cinq Années de Liberté* II, 68.
151 Fabre-Luce, *Journal de la France* II (1942), 266. Italics in original.
152 Ibid., 266.
154 Apart from the extracts from *Après la Défaite*, published in *Les Nouveaux Temps*. 
early 1939, Jouvenel had already been active as a voluntary correspondent of the French military Service de Renseignement, to which he reported his observations on the dispositions of political leaders and populations towards France and Germany.\footnote{Two reports written by Jouvenel during February-April 1939: (‘Notes sur une Tournée en Europe Centrale du 15 Février au 2 Mars 1938’ and untitled [April 1939], Fonds BdJ, Don 90 39 (52); Jouvenel, \textit{Un Voyageur}, 339, 385.}

On several occasions after the war, Jouvenel showed considerable frustration with the accusations of collaboration that were raised against him. In a letter written in 1946, in his memoirs and, most famously, during the lawsuit against Sternhell, Jouvenel claimed that he went to Paris, renewed contact with Abetz and moved around in French collaborationist circles – all at the explicit request of General Henri Navarre of the Service de Renseignement, whom he had met in Vichy in July 1940 and who asked him to find out what plans the Germans had with France and her empire.\footnote{Jouvenel, \textit{Un Voyageur}, 381; Assouline, ‘Enquête sur un Historien’, 100; Draft of a letter by Jouvenel to the lawyer of Bernard Faÿ (23 January 1946), Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (300).} Dard has established the truth – ‘dans les grandes lignes’ – of these claims. Jouvenel was indeed in contact with Navarre, never published in \textit{Le Fait} despite being one of its founders, and the report which Jouvenel included in his memoirs – addressed to Navarre, Laval and Pétain – is probably authentic.\footnote{Dard, \textit{Bertrand de Jouvenel}, 180.} The report, drafted on 2 August 1940, neither supports nor rejects the prospect of Franco-German collaboration. Jouvenel wrote that the Germans did not believe France had truly rid itself of its republican politicians and wanted the country to establish a more genuinely fascist regime. If so, the Germans might be willing to do business with the French, though German dominance had to be acknowledged. In his memoirs, Jouvenel opportunistically titled the report ‘La collaboration impossible’, but it seems he was anything but sure about this when he wrote it.\footnote{Report included in Jouvenel, \textit{Un Voyageur}, 391-393.}

This ambivalent attitude towards full-scale collaboration is also reflected in the last chapter of \textit{Après la Défaite}. Jouvenel rejected the idea that France should propose a plan for a new Europe: ‘The initiative belongs to him who holds the authority. That’s not us. Is this the time for French intelligence to embrace the continent? Let it first discover France.’\footnote{Jouvenel, \textit{Après la Défaite}, 227.} A more elaborate version of this ambivalence can be found in a long letter that Jouvenel sent to Fabre-Luce on 1 February 1941, the first surviving part of their correspondence. Jouvenel included the unpublished manuscript of a
critical review of Fabre-Luce’s *Journal de la France I* that he had written at Drieu’s request, probably for the *NRF*. In response to a preceding letter by Fabre-Luce in which he had criticised Jouvenel’s reluctance to name and shame the political leaders of the Third Republic in * Après la Défaite*, Jouvenel wrote that he had expressly refrained from such attacks. While assuring his ‘dear Fabre-Luce’ of all his admiration for his style and his talent, Jouvenel remarked that in his book, ‘I would have wanted to find a complaint that is not there’. Jouvenel’s unpublished review specified these objections:

The defeat has inspired Fabre-Luce too much. A kind of joy enters his verve. He has, I know, foreseen this collapse. And his book proceeds, starting from spotless premises, like a brilliant demonstration. But, since the fatherland [‘patrie’] is concerned, it seems that the pleasure of having been right should cede to sorrow at our subjection. And one does not feel that at all. We have to discover France as it has been made to be. That is a necessary thing. But in the act of tearing away the cloak, there is a bit too much impiety, to my taste.\(^{160}\)

In his letter, Jouvenel was quick to stress that he had written the review in a vengeful mood, convinced that *Journal de la France* contained a negative description of himself, which was not the case. Now, he was ‘happy that this article does not appear’. He had also been told that Fabre-Luce had ‘a less simplistic view’ of the future than ‘our builders of Europe, amongst whom I hate to see my very dear Drieu’. Jouvenel ended his letter by expressing the wish to exchange private notes with Fabre-Luce in which they would ‘try to define what the comportment of France should be’. ‘Abandoned in the hands of Germany by the Paris collaborationists, reduced to the agricultural age by the absentees of Vichy, promised to the Anglo-Saxon Perseus by the BBC listeners, France needs us […] to rethink politics for her.’\(^{161}\) The Jouvenel papers, very incomplete concerning this period, do not contain a reply by Fabre-Luce. But the degree of familiarity suggests this was not the only letter they exchanged during the occupation, while they also moved in the same circles.

This is not all that can be said about Jouvenel’s wartime positions. Between 1940 and 1942, there is more agreement in the text between Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel than the letter suggests. As described in earlier

\(^{160}\) Review by Jouvenel of Fabre-Luce, *Journal de la France I* (1940), included in a letter by Jouvenel to Fabre-Luce (1 February 1941), Fonds AFL, 472 AP 2.

\(^{161}\) Jouvenel to Fabre-Luce (1 February 1941), Fonds AFL, 472 AP 2.
paragraphs, there were clear similarities in their analysis of defeat, their conviction of the inferiority of parliamentary democracy and their wish for France to be inspired by the fascist example. In an interesting historical metaphor, both Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel compared the German conquest of France to the Roman conquest of Greece during the second century BC. Like the Greek city-states of antiquity, France boasted a superior culture and civilisation, but its interior divisions and lack of military spirit had made it unable to oppose a serious resistance. Though the rivalling Greek city-states were no match for the Roman legions, they continued to prosper under Roman rule and passed on much of their culture, religion and science to their conquerors.\textsuperscript{162} Like Fabre-Luce, Jouvenel welcomed certain aspects of defeat and occupation. He observed that all over Europe, city-dwellers suffered from food shortages, while the farmers were better off, regaining their ‘old primacy’ through the disappearance of competition from colonial imports. Jouvenel rejoiced in the fact that by physically experiencing the consequences of defeat, the French citizens were finally forced to discover the importance of national solidarity. ‘Abundance has made Europe liberal, shortage will make Europe totalitarian.’\textsuperscript{163}

Politically, scientifically and socially, France had much to learn from Hitler, Jouvenel suggested. He saw France ‘longing for new institutions’ and:

\begin{quote}
As after any large setback, we are automatically inclined to implant in our country those of the victor. Some complain we are not adopting them fast enough as they are. Others, to the contrary, excite our pride against any imitation of Germany: these people do not realise that it is our old repugnance to take the initiative for a French reform that is condemning us today to repeat foreign experiences. But the former are wrong too, since they neglect the psychological problem our leaders are facing.\textsuperscript{164}
\end{quote}

After all, Hitler had also built his success on foundations laid by his predecessors. Jouvenel suggested that, instead of plunging head-first into a German-led national socialist Europe, the French elite should first meditate on French identity, history and the ‘national temperament’ of the French people. Innovations inspired by foreign fascist regimes were welcome, even necessary, as long as they were compatible with the ‘psycho-political’ characteristics of the French people. He claimed that, during the autumn of

\textsuperscript{162} Fabre-Luce, \textit{Journal de la France II} (1942), 28; Jouvenel, \textit{Après la Défaite}, 119.
\textsuperscript{163} Jouvenel, \textit{Après la Défaite}, 225.
\textsuperscript{164} \textit{Ibid.}, 235.
1940, France found itself ‘in the eye of the storm’. In this ‘deceptive calm, as if enclosed between powerful walls of air’, a wise captain should navigate carefully. ‘The closing of France is essentially of intellectual order. The constitution of a coherent and compact national thought is necessary to guide our leaders, form our educators, inspire our press.’

This emphasis on the national element seems to have been the major difference between Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce’s attitude to collaboration. While for Jouvenel a rediscovery of nationalism put a brake on his willingness to collaborate, Fabre-Luce fully welcomed collaboration as a way ‘not to confirm our defeat, but to surmount it’. He saw Europeanist collaboration as the task of an ‘elite’ that had embraced the future, while he associated nationalism with the backwardness of the common people that kept hating the Germans regardless of what happened, even if their misery was actually caused by the British. It was as impossible to bring these people back to reason as it was ‘to reason with a madman’. Gaullism constituted their irrational ‘compensating dream’, a ‘mythology’ the British eagerly supported ‘while starving us’. Fabre-Luce conceded that De Gaulle’s Free French included a few heroic men, but they had let themselves be exploited by the British national interest. And he mockingly wondered how their leaders could ever claim to represent the true France while in fact consisting of ‘a wayward general, a discredited admiral, Jewish propagandists – a general staff for which even the English themselves have little respect’.

Fabre-Luce was as derisive about the Parisian ‘bourgeois’ who slipped into their basements during the evening to secretly listen to Radio London. He compared them to drug addicts needing their daily portion of morphine, naughty children disobeying their governess or a sect performing incomprehensible rituals. While such activities could be done away with by mockery, Fabre-Luce reacted much more strongly to the first cases of armed resistance, which began to occur after the German invasion of the Soviet Union. He condemned communist resisters as a ‘handful of terrorists’ who were trying to sabotage Franco-German relations. When the Germans carried out mass executions in reprisal, Fabre-Luce justified this decision by arguing that at least their victims were prisoners accused of other criminal acts. In 1943, Fabre-Luce continued to stress that the Resistance had very

165 Ibid., 236, 238.
166 Fabre-Luce, *Journal de la France II* (1942), 26, 32.
167 Ibid., 36.
168 Ibid., 146.
169 Ibid., 271.
little support among the population, most of all because its actions were insignificant and only led to German violence. Only communists and Jews were willing to ‘cynically sacrifice’ others of their kind for their ‘hatred of the invader’.170

Instead of resistance, Fabre-Luce favoured French participation in the war on the German side. Although he was against the dismissal of Prime Minister Laval in December 1940, he welcomed the visit that his successor, Admiral François Darlan, paid to Hitler in Berchtesgaden, during which Darlan offered the Germans the use of French airbases in Syria. He was also enthusiastic about the fact that Benoist-Méchin, Marion and Pierre Pucheu were joining Darlan’s government. All three had been members of the PPF before the war, which allowed Fabre-Luce to declare that Doriot’s party had been a good learning school for ‘a new generation of statesmen’ led by a ‘preference for direct action’ and a ‘contempt for old habits’, especially the one of ‘prostration for London’. These new faces were thoroughly ‘collaborationist’ and had already ‘inhaled the fascist atmosphere in their party’, which made them better able to understand German politics than those who still fell under the influence of ‘Cartesian logic’.171 When Vichy forces did battle in Syria against a British-Gaullist invasion during the summer of 1941, Fabre-Luce celebrated these events as a consecration – by ‘a plebiscite of sacrifice’ – of Pétain and collaboration: ‘On meurt pour Vichy!’ Through a ‘ceremony of blood’ similar to the cult of the dead the Nazis had built their solidarity on, France had dedicated itself to collaboration.172

While Fabre-Luce clearly struck a different tone than that of Jouvenel, can we then conclude that the latter was against collaboration? Some of his activities suggest the opposite. If Jouvenel was merely in Paris to collect information and to report to general Navarre, one wonders why he played an active role in bringing Abetz into contact with pro-German French politicians and intellectuals and why he bothered submitting articles to the collaboration press. It was Jouvenel who convinced Déat and Bergery to come to Paris and meet Abetz, Achenbach and Schleier at the German embassy on 20 August 1940 to talk about constituting an opposite power to a Vichy deemed too reactionary and insufficiently willing to collaborate.173 Similarly, he introduced Abetz to his long-time acquaintance Bernard Faÿ, the new director of the French National Library whom he had previously

171 Fabre-Luce, *Journal de la France II* (1942), 113.
172 Ibid., 131.
173 Burrin, *La Dérive Fasciste*, 386.
met in Vichy.\textsuperscript{174} Around the same time, Jouvenel also dined with Abetz and three Belgian guests: Hendrik de Man, the ‘planist’ who had embraced collaboration, the extreme rightist journalist Pierre Daye, and Léon Degrelle. Abetz had taken them to Paris with several leaders of the Flemish movement, hoping to convince them to join hands and form a Belgian national government that would reflect ‘the aspirations of the young generation’. De Man believed Abetz had comparable plans for France via a joint government by Doriot, Déat and Bergery.\textsuperscript{175}

It also seems that Jouvenel’s refusal to publish in any newspaper ‘as long as the occupier stayed in France’ was not as categorical as he later claimed.\textsuperscript{176} Apart from the aforementioned unpublished review of \textit{Journal de la France} in the \textit{NRF}, there is some evidence that Jouvenel also submitted articles to the extreme-rightist weekly \textit{Gringoire}, which had established itself in southern France after the defeat. Its bourgeois affiliation, Anglophobia and anti-Semitism had quickly earned \textit{Gringoire} the reputation of being Vichy’s quasi-official mouthpiece.\textsuperscript{177} In November 1940, Jouvenel wrote a letter to its chief editor Horace de Carbuccia, whom he knew from the Comité France-Allemagne and from pre-war contributions to \textit{Gringoire}. He sent him an article ‘about a youth camp that I have seen on several occasions. Maybe it is of interest to you.’ Jouvenel also recommended Bernard Faÿ, whom he had met the day before and who ‘could write, on the base of unpublished documents, a truly sensational series of articles […]. I am sure this would interest you, and if he has your principle agreement, Bernard Faÿ will make them for you.’\textsuperscript{178}

These articles were probably meant to be part of Faÿ’s anti-Masonic campaigns. Faÿ, a historian of eighteenth-century French-American relations, had been a professor at Columbia University and the University of Iowa before joining the Collège de France in 1932 as one of France’s prime américanistes. During the late 1930s, Faÿ increasingly held anti-liberal and pro-German opinions, and he became obsessed with Masonic conspiracies, which he suspected in places as unlikely as the episcopate. Faÿ used his wartime position as director of the French National Library to seize the Masonic archives and to study them intensively to prove the alleged power and perfidy of the secret societies.\textsuperscript{179} Two weeks later, Jouvenel addressed

\textsuperscript{174} Compagnon, \textit{Le Cas Bernard Faÿ}, 183.
\textsuperscript{175} Jouvenel, \textit{Un Voyageur}, 395, Dard, \textit{Bertrand de Jouvenel}, 156.
\textsuperscript{176} Jouvenel, \textit{Un Voyageur}, 390.
\textsuperscript{177} Bellanger et al., eds., \textit{Histoire Générale de la Presse Française: Tôme IV}, 76.
\textsuperscript{178} Jouvenel to Horace de Carbuccia (27 November 1940), Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (295).
\textsuperscript{179} Compagnon, \textit{Le Cas Bernard Faÿ}, 129, 155; Jackson, \textit{The Dark Years}, 190.
another letter to Carbuccia in which he asked his advice on a subject for a possible article. Carbuccia had told him to limit himself to one paper, but with ‘so many things to say’, Jouvenel hesitated between a comparative analysis of France’s ‘great lost battles, Crécy, Poitiers, Azincourt, Padua, Waterloo, Sedan and the Somme’ and ‘a reminder about the French political divisions, considered as the factor of decadence of our country’. Jouvenel added a draft article on this second subject.\footnote{Jouvenel to Horace de Carbuccia (10 December 1940), Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (295). Neither of the two articles is included in Jouvenel’s papers.}

Despite his impressively elaborate analysis of Jouvenel’s wartime activities and his private notes, Olivier Dard says surprisingly little about Jouvenel’s published works, especially \textit{Après la Défaite} and \textit{La Décomposition de l’Europe Libérale}. This omission allows him to suggest that Jouvenel had not anticipated or supported collaboration in any way. He also wrongly claims that Jouvenel restricted his attacks to the political system of the Third Republic and refrained from criticising ‘the Anglo-Saxon world’, apparently ignoring Jouvenel’s indictment of the British bourgeois ‘mercantile’ spirit as responsible for ruining France’s ‘will to power’ that figured prominently in \textit{La Décomposition}.\footnote{Dard, \textit{Bertrand de Jouvenel}, 175. See Jouvenel, \textit{La Décomposition de l’Europe Libérale}, V, 64 or a larger treatment of this subject in the last section.} And, though conceding that Jouvenel’s critique of French parliamentary democracy may ‘smell badly’ to a present-day nose, Dard takes pains to stress there was nothing exceptional about it. He resorts to the Catholic writer and former \textit{résistant} Jean-Marie Domenach, who remarked in 1983 during the Sternhell affair that anti-democratic and anti-republican feelings were widespread both among collaborators and those in the Resistance, to the point of constituting a ‘convergence of all that thinks and all that feels, amongst young Frenchmen. You can call that fascism... That may look provocative, but it’s wrong.’\footnote{Cited in Dard, \textit{Bertrand de Jouvenel}, 171.} Although there is some truth to these claims – and it is indeed easy to mine the writings of Charles de Gaulle and other prominent members of the Resistance for harsh attacks on parliamentarianism – they seem to miss the point when the discussion is not about fascism but about Jouvenel’s attitude to collaboration.

Dard presents Jouvenel during the early 1940s as having two faces: a ‘visible’ one and a ‘hidden’ one, the visible being that of a ‘Germanophile intellectual’ and the hidden that of a secret agent and crypto-\textit{résistant}.\footnote{Dard, \textit{Bertrand de Jouvenel}, 145, 178.} There is an obvious insinuation in this analysis, as it suggests that the ‘visible’ face was a mere façade, while Jouvenel’s real attitude was reflected...
by his hidden activities. Dard ignores the possibility that, at least during the early phases of occupation, there may have been little or no opposition between these two ‘faces’. Through his intelligence activities, Jouvenel served a regime that was set on a course of collaboration with the Germans, especially after Pétain’s notorious handshake with Hitler in Montoire on 22 October 1940. One week later, Pétain announced on radio that France was ‘entering the path of collaboration’.\(^\text{184}\) Despite all their petty internal rivalries – between Laval and Pétain, Laval and Darlan, Déat and Laval, Déat and Doriot, Doriot and Bergery – these leaders were all united in their willingness to do business with the Germans, albeit to different degrees and sometimes with different aims. Altogether, competition for power and for the Germans’ favour seems to have been a much stronger driving force behind these conflicts than existing political disagreements. Without too much exaggeration, one could state that Jouvenel was spying on Germans and Parisian collaborationists on behalf of collaboration.

When discussing the German translation of *Après la Défaite*, Dard suggests that the Germans ‘instrumentalised’ Jouvenel without any active participation from his side. Similarly, he claims that Jouvenel’s supposedly purely scientific study *Napoléon et l’Économie Dirigée* was the object of an ‘ideological recuperation at the service of continental unification against maritime England’.\(^\text{185}\) This interpretation accords very little agency to the man himself. If Jouvenel was a passive victim of ideological recuperation, why did his statements fit German propaganda so well that he was included – alongside Fabre-Luce, Bénoist-Méchin and Alphonse de Chateaubriant – on the Militärbefehlshaber’s list of eleven French authors to be translated and published in Germany?\(^\text{186}\) Why did he allow for this translation to occur in the first place? While all other French authors were banned from publication in Germany, the translation of *Après la Défaite* appeared in 1941, the same year as the French original. A Dutch translation was published in 1943 in the occupied Netherlands. German reviewers saw little difference between Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce, who held the privilege of being the only French author to have two books (the first two volumes of *Journal de la France*) published in German translation during the war.\(^\text{187}\) They generally interpreted the books according to Nazi doctrine as reflecting France’s

\(^{184}\) Jackson, *The Dark Years*, 173.

\(^{185}\) Dard, *Bertrand de Jouvenel*, 165, 167.


decadence, its ‘Jewification’ and ‘negrification’, while constituting an encouragement for Germany to maintain a tough line towards France. Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce were seen to share their national decadence, although they were occasionally complimented for at least having grasped the superiority of National Socialism and France’s subservient position in a German Europe.188

In May 1942, the first volume of Journal de la France received a plainly negative review in the Berliner Monatshefte. The reviewer considered that Fabre-Luce, just like France as a whole, had apparently experienced its recent history while merely ‘hesitating, interpreting and observing’ instead of being fully ‘transported’ by the dramatic events of its downfall.189 In annexed Alsace, the Strassburger Neueste Nachrichten was more positive about the second volume, which was deemed to offer serious possibilities for a Franco-German ‘European conversation’. Alfred Püllmann, citing abundantly from Fabre-Luce’s statements in favour of European collaboration and France’s special role in convincing smaller nations to follow in its wake, was enthusiastic about his contribution to the spread of the right ‘imperial idea’. This idea would allow the constitution of a German-occidental [‘abendländisch’] empire in which ‘the defeated, who are often already collaborators, will one day become co-creators’ – a clear reference to Fabre-Luce’s term of ‘co-emperors’.190 Around the same time, Joachim Freyburg, a journalist writing for Goebbels’ intellectual weekly Das Reich, paid a visit to Fabre-Luce in Paris. He complimented Fabre-Luce as an excellent ‘chronicler of France’ but, describing the ‘mundane’ interior of his apartment, also ironized the fact that he could afford to calmly observe ‘the direction France is now taking, after its defeat, from the ever-safe place that his wealth allows him to occupy’.191

Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel were given a prominent place in Phönix oder Asche?, an anthology of French literary and political publications since the defeat published by Bernhard Payr, a close collaborator of Alfred Rosenberg. Payr praised Fabre-Luce for his ‘vivid and rich painting of the French politics of catastrophe’ that had led to his nation’s ruin. With his description of decadent bourgeois Parisian life in early 1940, Fabre-Luce had revealed ‘why a people whose social structure was already in full decomposition, could have possibly won this war’. Payr was almost as positive about

188 Loiseaux, La Littérature de la Défaite et de la Collaboration, 97, 417.
190 Püllmann, ‘Frankreich als Beispiel’.
191 Cited in Geiger, L’Image de la France, 321.
Après la Défaite. After giving a fairly accurate description of the main lines of Jouvenel's book, he conceded that the author occasionally tended to 'light relativisations' but asserted that this must not obscure his 'true insight in the essential elements of the French collapse and the victorious resurrection of Germany'. This made Jouvenel's work a 'positive contribution to a clarification of positions before the beginning of a European new order'.

In an article written for Das Reich, Payr was pessimistic about the extent to which the spirit of collaboration had caught on in France, which he saw confined to small circles of intellectuals who had often themselves not sufficiently understood the meaning of a national socialist Europe. He made a positive exception for two intellectuals, Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel, whom he credited as the only authors who showed a 'feeling of European responsibility'.

The French reactions to Jouvenel's work were not very different. In the fascist collaborationist journal La Gerbe, Jouvenel's La Décomposition de l'Europe Libérale was positively reviewed by Ramon Fernandez, a former Marxist who had joined the PPF and sat on the party's political bureau with Jouvenel. The same book won him the admiration of the extreme-rightist writer Jean-Pierre Maxence. In December 1941, in an article published in the isolationist American newspaper Chicago Tribune, Bernard Faÿ painted a rosy picture of the intellectual climate in occupied Paris, ranking the 'brilliant' Jouvenel (Après la Défaite) and Fabre-Luce (Journal de la France I) amongst the fine fleur of its unprecedented literary production. Faÿ's article was part of a German-led press campaign to discourage the United States from intervening in the war. Published on the day of the attack on Pearl Harbour, which led to the United States declaring war on Germany four days later, these efforts were entirely ineffective.

Jouvenel's third wartime book, Napoléon et l'Économie Dirigée, was also quick to win the admiration of collaborationists. While it is true that in its end result the book is a dry, academic study of the effects of the Continental System on French and European commerce, this may not have been Jouvenel's idea from the start, when he began working on the topic in the spring of 1941. In the introduction, Jouvenel warns against establishing 'apparent analogies' between the book's subject and the present day, but it is easily
conceivable that he was originally motivated by these very analogies.\textsuperscript{197} It is also hardly surprising that this warning was largely ignored by reviews of the book in the collaborationist press, as Bruneteau rightly observed.\textsuperscript{198} Jouvenel chose to publish his book at the Éditions de la Toison d’Or, a Belgian collaborationist editing house that was run by the Didier couple, contacts of Jouvenel who had been active in Europeanist circles before the war and who had also fallen under Abetz’s influence. The Didier couple, who had been interned in France as possible German spies during the German invasion, met Abetz in Paris in August 1940, after which they founded their editing house in Brussels, partially with money provided by Ribbentrop’s foreign ministry. As one of the prime publishers in the Belgian collaborationist world, the Toison d’Or published books by De Man, Friedrich Sieburg, Robert Brasillach, Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel.\textsuperscript{199}

Little doubt remains, however, that Jouvenel’s willingness to support collaboration was short-lived and often mixed with a certain \textit{attentisme}. In December 1940, during a visit to Luchaire at the offices of the \textit{Nouveaux Temps}, he told Luchaire and Déat, who had railed against the ‘old fool’ Pétain, that France had only accepted collaboration because it was Pétain who undertook it. If the Germans were to force the marshal out, the French people would ‘unanimously’ follow him into resistance.\textsuperscript{200} When Déat founded his RNP in February 1941, which he intended to make France’s fascist-style ‘single party’, Jouvenel warned him that it was impossible to unite the French people on a collaborationist agenda. ‘In Germany, they have assembled the people against France; here, you can only do it in the opposite direction. If that’s impossible, one has to wait.’ In March 1942, a German diplomat reported Jouvenel’s ‘pessimistic’ and ‘embittered’ attitude towards collaboration, even admitting that he no longer believed in it. Jouvenel called Luchaire and his crew a bunch of traitors, comparable to the Rhineland separatists in 1920s Germany.\textsuperscript{201} In an April 1941 report written for his Vichy connections and entitled ‘France between Germany and the Anglo-Saxon World’, Jouvenel called for closer relations between Vichy France and the United States. Stronger ties with the US government would not only provide a partial solution to the problem of food shortages,

\textsuperscript{197} Jouvenel, \textit{Napoléon et l’Économie Dirigée}, XII.  
\textsuperscript{198} Bruneteau, \textit{L’Europe Nouvelle’ de Hitler}, 84.  
\textsuperscript{199} Xavier Dehan, ‘Jeune Europe, le Salon Didier et les Éditions de la Toison d’Or’, 225, 226, 234. Fabre-Luce published two books at Le Toison d’Or: Belgian editions of the first two volumes of \textit{Journal de la France}.  
\textsuperscript{200} Dard, \textit{Bertrand de Jouvenel}, 157.  
\textsuperscript{201} Cited in: Burrin, \textit{Fascisme, Nazisme, Autoritarisme}, 237.
it would also make France look less bad in the case of an ‘Anglo-Saxon’ victory against Germany. Jouvenel had low expectations of German offers to fight food shortages through the construction of a continental economic system in exchange for French participation in the war against England. Instead, he advised his government to use this German offer as a bargaining instrument with the Americans.  

In early 1943, Jouvenel started keeping a personal diary in which he recorded his reading notes but sometimes also ideas for his book on power, political reflections and comments on his personal life. On one of the first pages, Jouvenel reflected on a certain ‘contradiction’ in his political thought. On the one hand, he pleaded for strong state involvement to develop the nation’s industrial capacity as a means of increasing national power, while on the other hand he was becoming more and more critical of state power in general. This, he explained to himself, was because at the moment he became aware of these means of state power, ‘my country did not have the biological conditions anymore’ to apply them. ‘From this moment, it was clear to me that the French interest is to denounce this political competition in which the French community can no longer figure honourably.’ Almost surprisingly, Jouvenel concluded that at the heart of his contradictory opinions ‘there is an excess of national sentiment that I can only take notice of’.  

While only fragmented and often distorted information exists about the social whereabouts of Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce in occupied Paris, it seems that they were regular guests at the German embassy, the German Institute and collaborationist salons. According to Fabre-Luce’s memoirs, he saw Abetz only once and very briefly, during a reception at the embassy. He claimed he found the ambassador ‘arrogant’ and was ‘appalled’ with the behaviour of the other French guests, who hungrily stormed the buffet to stuff themselves with the exquisite food. Fabre-Luce quickly left, ‘without having eaten a sandwich or spoken a word with my host’. A photograph taken in June 1941 seems to contradict this claim. It shows Fabre-Luce standing almost next to Abetz during a reception given at the German Institute in honour of Winifred Wagner. While Fabre-Luce seems engaged in a pleasant conversation with the famous composer’s daughter-in-law, elegantly dressed in white, Abetz is standing just one metre away, talking to Jean-Louis Vaudoyer, a collaborationist writer who was director of the Comédie Française during the war. Other guests are the German star

202 Report included in Jouvenel, Un Voyageur, 419-421.
203 Journal de travail, cahier 1 [April 1943, exact date unknown], Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (37).
204 Fabre-Luce, Vingt-Cinq Années de Liberté II, 69, 71.
conductor Herbert von Karajan and Karl Theo Zeitschel, responsible for ‘Jewish questions’ at the embassy. Altogether, the guests in this photograph were a typical cross section of the Paris collaborationist world.\(^{205}\) Fabre-Luce seems to have been an early guest at German events in Paris. In a personal account from 1941, Jacques Chardonne described his first visit to the German Institute to listen to a Franco-German concert. He admitted at first feeling uncomfortable about his presence amidst the invaders, but he was relieved at the sight of two prominent compatriots: the ‘infallible moralist’ Henry de Montherlant and Fabre-Luce, ‘the most intelligent man of France’. Vaudoyer and Abel Bonnard were also present at the concert.\(^{206}\)

Fabre-Luce welcomed Germany’s cultural policy, which he found fairly tolerant, and actively enjoyed the victor’s cultural offensive. Just as the

\(^{205}\) Photograph included in the photo section of Paxton, et al., eds., *Archives de la Vie Littéraire Sous l’Occupation*.

\(^{206}\) Jacques Chardonne, *Voir la Figure*, 42, 46.
capital’s roads had been cleansed of noise and traffic jams, newfangled plays had disappeared from its theatres, making way for a new appreciation of the classics. The German victory had rid Parisian cultural life of boring receptions, snobbish fashions and innane publicity. France’s new position at the western end of a German-dominated continental empire also reoriented the literary and cinematographic taste of its population. Cut off from Hollywood and British literature, the French audience was now free to discover Ernst Jünger, Ernst Wiechert, Emil Jannings and Zarah Leander.207 In May 1941, Fabre-Luce attended a Mozart and Wagner concert of the Berliner Philharmoniker at the Paris Opera. He showed himself profoundly impressed by the conductor Von Karajan, whom he later met at the German Institute and hailed as a ‘magician who made frontiers fall’. Two months later, during an open-air Mozart concert in the garden of the Palais-Royal, Fabre-Luce experienced a similar Franco-German fraternisation through music: ‘The victor has come to charm the defeated. He has taught him how to make use of his city. […] What do the fortunes of politics matter?’208 Fabre-Luce also visited the famous Arno Breker exhibition in Paris, one of the highlights of the cultural collaboration. In the more sceptical third volume of Journal de la France, he recognised the ‘authentic talent’ of Hitler’s favourite sculptor, who had specialised in gigantic nudes, but he questioned the viability of the ‘German renaissance’ that Breker was supposed to embody.209

Fabre-Luce did not only read Jünger and include him in his Anthologie de la Nouvelle Europe, he also regularly met the Wehrmacht captain, who was comfortably based in Paris throughout most of the Second World War. As a famous writer and highly decorated veteran from the First World War, Jünger enjoyed certain privileges among the German officer corps. Largely free from military obligations, he was allowed to move around in Paris in civilian clothing and establish connections with the city’s high society. Jünger’s diaries and papers show meetings with Fabre-Luce as well as a correspondence stretching from 1941 into the late 1960s. Fabre-Luce remembered Jünger as ‘a superior spirit, able to surpass the nationalism that has animated his youth. For him, as for me, a united Europe was an inevitable fate, whatever the result of the war would be, restraining the

207 Fabre-Luce, Journal de la France II (1942), 140, 153. Fabre-Luce wrote ‘Wychert’ but probably meant the German writer Ernst Wiechert. Despite being a known opponent of Nazism and banned from publishing in Germany, Wiechert figured among the authors translated into French on behalf of Epting’s German Institute. See Geiger, L’Image de la France dans l’Allemagne Nazie, 251.
208 Fabre-Luce, Journal de la France II (1942), 154, 156.
209 Fabre-Luce, Journal de la France III (1943), 114.
victors and consoling the defeated.’ They met in May 1941 and speculated about Rudolf Hess’ flight to Scotland, a hotly debated subject at the time that was also discussed between Jouvenel and Abetz. In February 1942, Fabre-Luce invited Jünger for dinner at his apartment to personally hand him ‘one of the first copies of the Anthologie, in which I have included one of your most beautiful texts’. The dinner was also meant as an occasion for Jünger to meet Drieu la Rochelle, after an earlier attempt had failed when Drieu had forgotten to bring his laissez-passer needed for entry into the building of the German military administration. But Drieu failed to show up once again, for which he later apologised. Jünger recalled that they dined in Fabre-Luce’s wood-clad study, next to a large world map: ‘it was kept all white, like terra incognita, and only the places its visitor had seen, were depicted’. Fabre-Luce wrote Jünger to express his admiration for Gärten und Strassen, Jünger’s account of his personal trials and tribulations during the Fall of France, which he found as impressive as his earlier fantasy novel Auf den Marmorklippen. He appreciated Jünger’s talent for describing ‘the eternal through the transient’ and admitted counting the discovery of these two books ‘among my most important events of the year’.

Fabre-Luce also established warm relations with Sieburg and Epting, who brought him into contact with Carl Schmitt during one of the famous political theorist’s visits to Paris. He was frequently in touch with Gerhard Heller (1909-1982), who acted as the censor to the first volume of Journal de la France. A friend of Horst Wessel, Heller, like Abetz, had been involved in German youth organisations before joining the Nazi Party in 1934. Holding a university degree in Romanistik (Latin Studies) and having extensively studied and travelled in France during the 1930s, Heller was appointed literary censor at the Propaganda-Abteilung in 1940. In 1942, when censorship was transferred to Abetz’s German embassy, Heller became the head of its literature department, while also having a desk at Epting’s German Institute. Heller made only small cuts in Journal de la France I and told Fabre-Luce that he was welcome to ‘freely’ write a sequel to the book. But he was more reluctant about the second volume after Epting had criticised him for not having prevented Fabre-Luce from including a few pages by

210 Fabre-Luce, Vingt-Cinq Années de Liberté II, 106; Jouvenel, Un Voyageur, 427.
211 Fabre-Luce to Ernst Jünger (19 February 1942), Ernst Jünger Nachlass, Deutsches Literaturarchiv.
212 Jünger, Strahlungen, 101; Mitchell, The Devil’s Captain, 75. Jünger notes that ‘two professors of philosophy, who were brothers, and a man called Rouvier’ were also present at the dinner.
213 Fabre-Luce to Ernst Jünger (29 June 1942), Ernst Jünger Nachlass, Deutsches Literaturarchiv.
214 Compagnon, Le Cas Bernard Faÿ, 146.
Bergson, a Jew, in his *Anthologie*. Not daring to assume responsibility for the publication of a book that included Fabre-Luce's criticism of the Jewish Statute, Heller forwarded the book to Achenbach, who authorised it.  

Like Jünger, Heller enjoyed the privilege of invitations to dinner at Fabre-Luce's place, where he met Sieburg and the former minister Georges Bonnet.

Although Fabre-Luce continued to hail Heller as ‘indisputably Francophile and personally sympathetic’ during the 1960s, their relations suffered a sharp decline in the early 1980s as a result of the publication of Heller’s wartime memoirs. By this time, Heller had become a well-known translator of French literature, especially of the works of Drieu, Céline and Patrick Modiano. He described his war years as a pleasant period of Franco-German fraternisation and amorous adventures with French people of both sexes (amongst whom figured Marcel Jouhandeau), during which he had always retained a genuine admiration for French literature and lifestyle, and secretly for the Resistance too. The book included a less-than-flattering description of Fabre-Luce, whom he placed alongside Benoist-Méchin (and implicitly also Céline) in a group of hard-core collaborators he had not wanted to be in contact with. Heller cited from Fabre-Luce’s ‘Letter to an American’ – including the sentence about ‘a new race’ that was beginning to take shape – and expressed his ‘shock’ that a French intellectual could truly believe in ‘a new Europe under the sign of the Nazis’. Fabre-Luce reacted furiously, reminding Heller in a letter that he had been the one who invited him to one of the two notorious propaganda trips to Germany in the autumn of 1942. Fabre-Luce had declined the offer but ‘apparently, had I accepted, you would have now reproached it to me’.

It seems that Heller matched Fabre-Luce in the game of self-justifying historical falsification, especially when considering some other evidence. The wartime correspondence between Heller and Jünger suggests that both Germans considered their mission to be that of establishing German control over the French mind. During the winter of 1942-1943, while Jünger was spending a few months at the eastern front, Heller wrote him from Paris.

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215 Fabre-Luce, ‘La Deuxième Invasion du Lieutenant Heller’ (1981), unpublished article included in Fonds AFL, 472 AP 10 dr. 5. The presence of Bergson in the *Anthologie* was also the official reason why the German Institute deemed the book unfit to be published in a German translation. See Fabre-Luce, *Vingt-Cinq Années de Liberté II*, 79.


217 Fabre-Luce, *Vingt-Cinq Années de Liberté II*, 69.

218 Heller, *Un Allemand à Paris*, 46, 47, 150.

219 Fabre-Luce to Heller (7 April 1981), Fonds AFL, 472 AP 10 dr. 5.
that the Allied invasion of North Africa had had ‘a large effect’ on the French and even ‘on our friends’, making it ever harder ‘to walk the indicated path with them’. Jünger answered that he would soon be back in Paris, where he was hoping ‘to serve the fatherland well. The total mobilisation should now especially include the use of all spiritual reserves, a sharper consideration of everything that is necessary in the presence of threat’. In June 1943, Heller wrote Jünger that things were getting worse: ‘at this time, one has to seriously pay attention that our last friends don’t also defect’. Less than three weeks later, Fabre-Luce published the third volume of his *Journal de la France*. Though the book can hardly be considered anti-German or pro-Resistance, Jünger and Heller must have disliked reading one of their ‘friends’ condemn the persecutions and deportations of Jews, envisage an Allied victory and openly announce that the politics of collaboration had failed the moment Germany occupied the ‘free’ zone. On 8 July, during an evening spent with Epting and the Déat couple, Jünger first heard about the book, which had caused ‘big annoyance’. He noted in his diaries: ‘I have the impression that this will lead to a police affair’.

The same evening, Fabre-Luce was arrested and detained in the Cherche-Midi prison in Paris. According to Fabre-Luce, he spent just over two months at the Cherche-Midi, where he shared his corridor with communists and black-marketers – some of whom were awaiting execution – before being transferred to a more comfortable cell in a Gestapo villa in Neuilly-sur-Seine. Fabre-Luce was reluctant to give much information as to how exactly he was treated, but in a later book he claimed he was beaten up by a German jailor, who took him for a Jew. Not all Germans treated him as badly, however. After the war, Fabre-Luce testified in defence of Karl Braun, the inspector of his Neuilly prison, claiming that Braun had helped him during his detention by pleading for his release and making it possible for his wife to visit him. Fabre-Luce was released after another month in Neuilly upon payment of a fine of 200,000 francs, but it seems things could have turned out much worse for him. The writer Maurice Martin du Gard, an acquaintance to whom Fabre-Luce had sent a dedicated copy of the third volume of *Journal
de la France, heard the rumour that the Germans had been planning to send him ‘to a quarry in the General Government’, which he feared the frail-healthed intellectual would never have survived.227

Other, more hostile readers either did not believe Fabre-Luce’s life was at risk or simply could not care less what happened to him. Under the headline ‘Trop Tard!’, the influential clandestine Resistance newspaper Les Lettres Françaises surmised that Fabre-Luce had apparently described the approaching German defeat with just enough accuracy ‘to obtain his arrest by the Gestapo. This kind of operations is exactly what we used to call, in the language of parliamentary customs, “to have oneself exculpated” [“se faire dédouaner”].’ After a few collaborationist citations from the first two volumes of Journal de la France, the (anonymous) author concluded: ‘Now, the ex-unifiers of Europe, the ex-Duce’s allies can put Mr. Fabre-Luce in prison or even give him hot feet. All that doesn’t matter to us. It’s just a settling of accounts between people from the underworld.’228 Similarly, a report drafted by Vichy’s intelligence service concluded that ‘left-wing and particularly communist circles’ were mocking Fabre-Luce’s new position. Calling the third volume of Journal de la France ‘a masterpiece of deceitfulness’, they stated that Fabre-Luce’s attempt to change sides would not win him any indulgence and that, ‘whatever he does now, his fate will be the same as that of all traitors’.229

Both Heller and Jünger claimed to have played a role in Fabre-Luce’s release. Jünger wrote that he was happy to hear from Heller, on 4 August, that Fabre-Luce’s prison regime had been alleviated and that he would be entitled to a normal trial, ‘after the information on him that I gave to the Militärbefehlshaber’.230 Heller described a joint meeting of representatives of the Propaganda-Abteilung, the embassy, the German Institute and the Sicherheitsdienst (SD) to decide the fate of Fabre-Luce. Heller and an unnamed acquaintance who also attended the meeting were convinced that ‘all should be done to avoid that anything happens to Fabre-Luce’, but they did not dare raise their voice when SD-leader Helmut Knochen mentioned the ‘Nacht und Nebel’ treatment, which would have implied the complete disappearance and possible death of Fabre-Luce in a German concentration camp. Heller was relieved when it was decided to let him go

227 Martin du Gard, Chronique de Vichy, 379.
228 [author unknown], ‘Trop Tard!’, Les Lettres Françaises (September 1943), 6.
229 Report by Renseignements Généraux, 4ème section (22 November 1943), included in Dossier d’Épuration, AN, Z/6/285 dossier 8648.
230 Jünger, Strahlungen, 374.
‘after a serious warning’.\textsuperscript{231} This relief may have been motivated by feelings of guilt. The historian Wolfgang Geiger has established that it was Heller who had reported Fabre-Luce as ‘anti-German’ on 5 July 1943 to consul general Wilhelm Knothe.\textsuperscript{232} During his post-war trial, Knochen himself mentioned the Fabre-Luce case as proof of his supposed leniency during the occupation: ‘my service did not insist on strict measures’.\textsuperscript{233}

Information on Jouvenel’s relations with Germans is even more fragmented, but there is evidence he was in close contact with Abetz and Epting, whom he found ‘interesting and friendly’. He also had a private dinner with Carl Schaefer, who functioned as the German commissary at the Banque de France.\textsuperscript{234} In early 1942, Jouvenel contacted the German Institute asking for permission to consult the confiscated archives of the French foreign ministry for a series of documents relevant to his study of Napoleon and the Continental System. Jouvenel remained loyal to Abetz long after the war was over. In 1954, when Abetz was released from his French prison, Jouvenel sent a cheque of 100 French francs to the couple in Düsseldorf to alleviate their financial difficulties.\textsuperscript{235} Even at an advanced age, Jouvenel continued to defend Abetz as a sincere lover of France who considered himself a Rhinelander and therefore ‘closer to the French spirit’ than to the ‘Prussian’ one. ‘I have known since a long time that Abetz is not an anti-Semite, and he also does not believe in the superiority of the Germanic race’.\textsuperscript{236} Whether Abetz believed in this superiority or not, it is a fact that he was deeply involved with the organisation and the execution of the Holocaust in France. On 17 June 1942, he met with Carl Oberg, the higher SS and police leader of France, to discuss the first wave of deportations. When Oberg asked him which Jews should be exempted ‘in the name of the political interests of the Reich’, Abetz named only three: Henri Bergson’s widow, the writer Colette (Jouvenel’s stepmother and erstwhile lover) and Jouvenel’s wife Marcelle Prat ‘in case it is proven she is really Jewish’.\textsuperscript{237}

\textsuperscript{231} Heller, \textit{Un Allemand à Paris}, 152, 174. Heller also claimed that Abetz played a role Fabre-Luce’s liberation, but this is improbable as he had been recalled to Berlin between November 1942 and December 1943.
\textsuperscript{232} Geiger, \textit{L’Image de la France dans l’Allemagne Nazie}, 320.
\textsuperscript{233} ‘Extrait des Déclarations du Dr. Knochen’, Dossier d’Épuration, AN, Z/6/285 dossier 8648.
\textsuperscript{234} Jouvenel, \textit{Un Voyageur}, 398; Dard, \textit{Bertrand de Jouvenel}, 152.
\textsuperscript{235} Jouvenel to Luc Braemer (6 February 1942), Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (302); Suzanne Abetz to Jouvenel (17 May 1954), Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (294).
\textsuperscript{236} Jouvenel, \textit{Un Voyageur}, 397.
\textsuperscript{237} Lambauer, \textit{Otto Abetz et les Français}, 549.
While Jouvenel seems to have already stopped reporting to the Vichy secret services in the course of 1941, in November 1942 the Allied landings in North Africa and the subsequent German-Italian occupation of the southern zone brought a definite end to his intelligence activities. Jouvenel returned to his native Corrèze, where he frequently met Malraux and Berl, who was busy working on a history of Europe. He also received the visit of Jean Jardin, Laval’s Chief of Staff. Jardin’s son Pascal, who was nine years old at the time, later recalled meeting

a huge man, as handsome as a Greek god. He was sleeping naked under an apple tree. The early spring sunshine was gilding his skin. It was the economist Bertrand de Jouvenel, future author of that citadel nine hundred pages long, *Du Pouvoir*. At the present time he was still something of a playboy, and since his mother was Jewish he had certain worries. He was a day-dreamer, incurably lost in the mazes of his thought.238

It was at this time that Jouvenel probably also became involved in supporting local Resistance activities, mainly by trying to appease farmers angry about the theft of chickens by hungry résistants, and possibly also retrieving Allied airdrops and helping men hide from forced labour in Germany. When Martial Brigouleix, his former platoon leader from the Phony War and one of the leaders of the Corrèze Resistance, was arrested in May 1943, Jouvenel was sent to Paris to try to obtain his liberation via Abetz or Brinon.239 Failing to meet either of them, Jouvenel was instead arrested by the Gestapo and questioned about his activities in Poland during 1939. A series of arrests that took place at the same time brought an end to the Corrèze Resistance network. Released after two days but convinced that his release was meant to lead the Germans to other resisters, he chose to go in hiding, first in a Burgundian abbey and later abroad. On 21 September 1943 around noon, Jouvenel and his wife illegally crossed the Swiss border.240

Liberation and Persecution

For Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce, emigration and imprisonment respectively precluded any journalistic or literary activities during the final year of the German occupation. Though a free man by October 1943, Fabre-Luce was intimidated enough to temper his incessant urge to comment on current events at least until the Germans were gone. Just how literally he took this imposed silence is illustrated by the fact that he published the fourth volume of *Journal de la France* on 18 August 1944, the very day the Germans were beginning to leave Paris – and almost immediately landed in trouble with the liberation authorities.¹ In his Swiss exile, Jouvenel soon mingled with the growing French émigré community living on the north shore of Lake Geneva. He continued to work on the manuscript of his future magnum opus *Du Pouvoir*, but he was not to return to France for several years. At the moment of the liberation of Paris, he noted in his diary that there was ‘nothing worse’ than feeling ‘cut off from the national communion’ like he did.² The summer of 1943 not only put an end to both intellectuals’ prior activities at a practical level, it also marked the definitive end of their anticipation of a fascist Europe under German leadership. As we shall see in this chapter, this did not mean they welcomed the post-war order or that they distanced themselves thoroughly from their earlier engagements. The French Fourth Republic, the Épuration, the domestic appeal of communism, the Soviet expansion, the Cold War and the post-war European project fundamentally changed the political context of their intellectual activities.

Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel’s absence from the French political scene meant that they largely missed the most radical phase of the war. The final year before the liberation saw a radicalisation on all fronts. The German occupation of the southern zone – a reaction to the Allied landings in North Africa – had robbed the Vichy regime of what little agency it had and turned it into a de facto German puppet state led by a powerless and increasingly passive Pétain. Support for the Vichy government dwindled, but those still willing to serve it became ever more radical. In early 1944, Déat finally

¹ Fabre-Luce, *Journal de la France IV* (1944); idem, *Vingt-Cinq Années de Liberté II*, 195.
² Jouvenel, *Un Voyageur*, 463.
became minister of labour, while the information ministry was given to Philippe Henriot, an anti-Semitic collaborator whose inflammatory radio speeches earned him the nickname ‘the French Goebbels’. The rising internal influence of the paramilitary Milice Française under the leadership of Secretary General Joseph Darnand (who also became SS Sturmbannführer after August 1943) is often taken as a sign of Vichy’s ‘fascist drift’ during its final year of existence, even by historians inclined to consider Vichy as essentially conservative.  

In marked contrast to his earlier admiration of the LVF volunteer Doriot, Fabre-Luce described Darnand as a member of ‘such a weak International that it is just the fifth column of a foreign nation’.  

The Service du Travail Obligatoire (STO), established in February 1943, further discredited Vichy and dramatically enlarged the ranks of the Resistance by driving large numbers of young men into illegality, unwilling to be forcefully enlisted to work in Germany. The Resistance manifested itself more openly, taking control of inaccessible rural areas and committing acts of terrorism and sabotage that were requited by brutal reprisals by the Germans (and the Milice). Especially after the Casablanca Conference in January 1943, the presence of a Free French authority in liberated North Africa created a supplementary pole of attraction for the French population, one directed against Vichy and collaboration. Although De Gaulle was initially forced by the Allies to share power with Henri Giraud, a senior general who was seen as a hero after escaping from a German prison during both world wars, the younger general was able to gradually outmanoeuvre Giraud and establish himself as the unquestioned leader of Free France.  

While the events were not directly linked, there is a symbolic side to Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel’s departure from the scene precisely when violent radicals like Darnand were on the rise. For all their frequenting of events and receptions on the bel étage of the collaborationist world, it seems that Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel rarely ventured into its less refined basement. Foul-mouthed fascists such as Rebatet and Céline – who considered himself the only true collaborator for having proposed already in 1938 to annihilate all Jews and sign a ‘colossal’ alliance with Hitler – probably seldomly encountered the two intellectuals during the war years. In Céline’s wartime writings, only one mention is made of Fabre-Luce, in a complaint about not

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3 Payne, A History of Fascism, 401; Jackson, The Dark Years, 232; Paxton, Vichy France, 231.
4 Fabre-Luce, Journal de la France IV (1944), 11.
5 Jackson, The Dark Years, 228, 458, 480.
6 Céline, L’École des Cadavres, 283.
having been included in his *Anthologie de la Nouvelle Europe*.\(^7\) In a letter published in *La Gerbe* in February 1941, Céline attacked Jouvenel’s *Après la Défaite* for keeping all options open on France’s future and for refusing to talk about the Jews. According to Céline, if things had gone very differently, Jouvenel would have happily written ‘*Après la Victoire*’, a remarkable 225-pages work looking almost perfectly like the one he published.\(^8\)

Culturally sophisticated members of the occupation authorities like Abetz, Heller and Jünger (with the notable exception of Karl Epting) preferred Fabre-Luce over Céline, whose strong language, uncivilised behaviour and inadequate personal hygiene appalled them probably more than his anti-Semitic obsessions. The description in Jünger’s diaries of ‘Merline’ (Céline) as ‘a maniac who cannot really be made responsible for his declarations’ speaks volumes.\(^9\) After the war, while in hiding in Denmark from the French authorities who he thought wanted to have him killed, Céline bitterly lamented his fate. He convinced himself that he had been made into a scapegoat – through some Jewish machination, of course – for the collaborationist crimes of others. In a letter to a friend, he expressed his disbelief that he had to fear for his life while people like Fabre-Luce walked around freely:

\[\text{If it wasn't him it must have been his brother. Fabre-Luce was collaborating and a lot. He wrote a big book, a kind of retrospective history of the collaborators, their merits etc. - IN WHICH I DID NOT FIGURE - and after Stalingrad, wanting to exculpate himself [...] , he starts pissing off the Germans, who lock him up. Oh just a bit! [...] He counted among the most appreciated guests at the Embassy - [rue de] Lille - where they were drooling, having tenderness only for plutocratic and slightly Jewish collaborators [...]}.\(^{10}\)

There is no mention of Jouvenel in Rebatet’s fascist autobiographical novel *Les Décombres*, which competed with *Journal de la France* on the bestseller list of occupied France. The only mention of Fabre-Luce in the book is Alfred’s cousin Robert Fabre-Luce (1897-1966). An early convert to racism

\(^7\) Godard, Céline, 318.

\(^8\) Céline in *La Gerbe*, 13 February 1941, included in Céline, *Choix de Lettres de Céline et de Quelques Correspondants*, eds. Godard & Louis, 618.


\(^{10}\) Céline to Albert Paraz, 9 March 1951, in: Céline, *Choix de Lettres de Céline*, 1397. Italics and caps in original. Céline was obviously referring to Fabre-Luce’s *Anthologie de la Nouvelle Europe.*
and National Socialism, ‘baron’ Robert Fabre-Luce had on several occasions lent his voice to Nazi propaganda during the 1930s. In June 1940, he was imprisoned on the orders of Minister of the Interior Georges Mandel for being a member of the pro-German ‘fifth column’, along with a few other radicals. This crackdown turned Mandel – a Jewish conservative who had taken outspoken anti-Nazi and anti-appeasement positions during the 1930s – into a hate object of the French extreme right, which led to his assassination by the hands of the Milice in 1944. Released after the armistice, Robert Fabre-Luce went to Vichy and served the regime in various functions before being arrested again during the Liberation.11 In his memoirs, Alfred claimed that his cousin ‘was interested in the same questions as me, but took position more strongly’. Robert ‘had always caused trouble in the family’ and Alfred had avoided him since his youth, even to the point of refusing to see him while they were detained in the same prison camp in 1945.12

Jouvenel’s fascism certainly was more scrupulous than Rebatet’s, and not even the Fabre-Luce of the first Journal de la France came close to Céline’s hysterical, genocidal brand of anti-Semitism. Nevertheless, the distinction was probably due to a difference in style, milieu and social circles rather than ideology. Even Fabre-Luce’s remark on his pariah cousin, who shared his political interests but expressed himself too imprudently, illustrates this attitude. Moreover, both Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel remained very close to their ultra-collaborationist friend Drieu la Rochelle throughout the war. Despite having made biting remarks about Jouvenel in his private diaries during the early war years – calling him a nervous ‘half-Jew’ and a pathetic ‘bastard’ whose unstable mind was the product of ‘miscegenation’ – Drieu visited Jouvenel and his wife in Switzerland in late 1943 and spent several days having long, personal conversations with him. Jouvenel recalled his sadness when Drieu left and claimed he sensed it had been their last meeting.13 Living in hiding since the liberation and having already made several failed attempts, Drieu committed suicide in Paris in March 1945. In a letter to Drieu’s first wife Colette Jéramec, at whose apartment Drieu was staying when he ended his life, Jean Paulhan wrote that Drieu had sacrificed himself in order to save his peers: ‘It is certain that Drieu’s trial would have also been the trial of Chardonne, Jouhandeaux, Fabre-Luce...’14

11 Rebatet, Les Mémoires d’un Fasciste I, 454; Jackson, The Dark Years, 579. For Robert Fabre-Luce’s pro-Nazi activities, see, for example, Binding et al., Sechs Bekenntnisse zum Neuen Deutschland, 21.
12 Fabre-Luce, Vingt-Cinq Années de Liberté I, 24.
13 Remarks cited in Dard, Bertrand de Jouvenel, 156; Jouvenel, Un Voyageur, 462.
14 Cited in Lottman, La Rive Gauche, 456.
Drieu was not the only one who had to go in hiding after the liberation. As the Allied armies approached Paris, some collaborationist intellectuals like Céline and Luchaire followed Pétain and the remnants of the Vichy administration to a castle in the southern German town of Sigmaringen, where the Germans set up a French government-in-exile that officially strove to ‘liberate’ France from the Allied invasion. Those who remained in France faced the prospect of both legal prosecution and arbitrary acts of vengeance. Especially during 1944 and early 1945, with the war still underway, the authority of De Gaulle’s Provisional Government was feeble to say the least, and local impromptu liberation committees often took matters into their own hands, summarily executing any supposed collaborator they could find. Though figures have often been inflated by writers sympathetic to Vichy or the collaborators, the more trustworthy estimations range between 9,000 and 15,000 summary executions – an illustration of the civil-war-like atmosphere that reigned in France during and in the immediate aftermath of the liberation. Both arbitrary violence and measures that took place within a legal framework of some kind are included under the French term Épuration ['purification'], which is still a point of much debate in French society.15

As the French version of the almost Europe-wide phenomenon of post-war transitional justice, the Épuration had a double aim: to punish those guilty of having collaborated with the enemy and to ‘purify’ French society as a whole by removing these unwanted elements. There was possibly also a symbolic side to the operation: the German invader having symbolically defiled French national territory, a ritual act of cleansing was necessary in order to re-establish French independence. This implied the temporary or permanent exclusion from society of all people who had worked with the enemy. Despite De Gaulle’s famous declaration in October 1944 that collaboration had been the work of only ‘a handful of miserable and unworthy’, the post-war purges quickly grew into a vast enterprise. Investigations were launched against 350,000 persons (including both Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce) belonging to every branch of French society, of whom more than 125,000 had to appear in front of a judge.16 Besides the Gaullist drive to preserve the myth of an undivided and heroic French nation by focusing on the punishment of a small number of traitors, other members of the Provisional

Government had different aims. The Communist Party sought to profit from its unequalled level of popular support (capitalising on its leading role in the Resistance, it called itself ‘the party of the 75,000 shot’) to use the Épuration to reshape France and to extend its influence. A purge of the entire French state apparatus had the additional advantage of opening up positions to which communist militants could be appointed.17

For writers, journalists and intellectuals, the Épuration took on a distinctive form. This was partially linked to the special qualities of ink on paper. Since it was considerably easier to assemble written proofs of collaborationist statements than it was to reconstruct acts that had taken place years ago, writers were among the first to be tried – while the war was still going on – and tribunals were inclined to punish severely. Public intellectuals lacked the kind of position or technical expertise essential for the functioning of the state that would have saved them from persecution, in contrast to many higher public servants, lawyers and magistrates.18 Moreover, intellectuals themselves were largely in charge of the intellectual Épuration, people who almost by definition believed in the utmost importance of the written word. Already during the occupation years, writers close to Les Lettres Françaises and the clandestine editing house Éditions de Minuit formed a Comité National d’Écrivains (CNE) that later played an important role in purging the French literary world of collaborators. The members of the CNE, intellectuals such as Vercors, Louis Aragon, Jean-Paul Sartre, Jean Paulhan, François Mauriac, Simone de Beauvoir and Jean Guéhenno, established a ‘blacklist’ of ‘undesirable’ writers and announced they would collectively refuse to contribute to any newspaper, review or editing house that published articles by these proscribed authors. Both Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce figured on the list, alongside Drieu la Rochelle, Montherlant, Chardonne, Jouhandeau and many others.19

While the CNE blacklist had the character of self-censorship that placed it outside the legal system, collaborationist authors were also hit by more direct criminal sanctions. The high-profile trial and execution in early 1945 of Robert Brasillach, the young journalist, novelist and former chief editor of Je Suis Partout, was meant to be a model for trials against intellectual collaborators of the worst kind – and was initially greeted as such by a majority of the French population. However, it rapidly became a symbol of unnecessary bloodshed that robbed France of a promising

17 Drake, Intellectuals and Politics, 13.
18 Sapiro, La Responsabilité de l’Écrivain, 525.
19 Sapiro, La Responsabilité, 535; Assouline, L’Épuration des Intellectuels, 161, 163.
writer. In addition to providing the post-war extreme right with a martyr and multiple-use poster boy, Brasillach's death rapidly provoked an intellectual debate in French society about a writer's responsibility and his eventual 'right to err'. After Brasillach's condemnation, a petition asking for his pardon was signed by many intellectuals including Paul Valéry, François Mauriac, Paulhan, Colette and Camus, but De Gaulle refused to show clemency, presumably because he mistakenly believed Brasillach had worn a German uniform.20

The journalist Georges Suarez, a former PPF member and colleague of Jouvenel at _Gringoire_ whose book about Briand had received a laudatory _NRF_ review by Fabre-Luce in 1941, had already been tried and executed several months earlier.21 Fabre-Luce had had few contacts with Brasillach during the war, but the two had worked together at the periodical _L'Assault_ back in 1936.22 The person dearest to Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel to face the firing squad was Jean Luchaire. The former chief editor of _Notre Temps_, with whom Jouvenel had spent so many wine-filled evenings during the 1920s discussing youth movements, corporatism and the future United States of Europe, had become a hated symbol of collaboration and venality. Inspired by the same ‘realism’ that he saw as the defining trait of his generation, Luchaire had taken advantage of France's defeat to further his career. He headed the German-controlled Paris press corporation, founded his collaborationist journal _Les Nouveaux Temps_ with German money and lived lavishly throughout the occupation years. After leaving for Sigmaringen, he served as propaganda minister in the French government-in-exile led by Fernand de Brinon. In this function, Luchaire frequently spoke on the French airwaves, calling upon his compatriots to resist De Gaulle’s call to arms and announcing that the Allies were delivering France to a ‘Bolshevik’ takeover. Arrested on the run in his native Italy in May 1945, ‘the Führer of the French press’ was brought back to France. Luchaire was condemned to death in January 1946 and executed one month later, his death marking the end of the most violent phase of the _Épuration_ of intellectuals.23

Despite the emotion and media attention surrounding these trials, legal executions remained relatively rare. A total of 7,000 people were sentenced

20 Assouline, _L’Épuration_, 88; Kaplan, _The Collaborator_, 212.
22 Fabre-Luce, _Journal_ 1951, 91.
to death during the Épuration, but fewer than 800 of these sentences were actually carried out. A far larger number of people were subjected to less definitive punitive measures, ranging from prison sentences and forced labour to the confiscation of property and the partial loss of their rights as citizens. In addition to the traditional crime of treason, a new crime known as ‘indignité nationale’ (‘national unworthiness’) was formulated. While treason was reserved for people who had collaborated directly with the Germans, ‘indignité nationale’ was aimed at the more indirect kind of collaboration of those who had merely served Vichy. Since legally the Pétain regime had been France’s official government, treason did not apply to this group. Though controversial in the eyes of legal scholars due to its air of ex post facto legislation, indigéité nationale made possible the extended purge of collaborators while creating differentiated ways of punishing them. While the regular punishment for treason was death, those guilty of indignité nationale were to be punished with what could be called a form of ‘civic death’, now reformulated as ‘civic demotion’ (‘dégradation nationale’): the loss of active and passive election rights; exclusion from government service and the exercise of certain liberal professions (lawyer, advocate, notary); exclusion from the right to lead or regularly contribute to newspapers, editing houses, radio stations or cinemas; exclusion from the right to head a bank or an insurance company; alongside the possible confiscation of all their belongings and the loss of pension rights. Almost 95,000 people were condemned to dégradation nationale, making it by far the Épuration’s most applied sanction.

Both Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce had every reason to fear persecution. While by the end of 1943 Jouvenel was already anticipating a post-liberation trial in France, his Swiss exile saved him from arrest during the ‘wild’ months directly following the liberation. In early 1945, when he considered coming back to France to defend himself against the allegations of collaboration and ‘collusion with the enemy’, he asked the advice of Philippe Boegner, a journalist friend from his La Lutte des Jeunes days with Resistance credentials. Boegner strongly advised him to stay where he was, since a fair trial was improbable:

26 Simonin, ‘L’Indignité Nationale’, 40, 42, 47.
I believe that you currently enjoy a blessing that you have never known in your life, the one of being forgotten, and I don’t see any necessity to end this oblivion. [...] In many ways we are in 1936 again. There are no facts, only interpretations, there is no truth but only emotion. One can say that four years of defeat and eight months of liberation have changed almost nothing. Perhaps if there had been precise charges against you, I would tell you to come and justify yourself, but since there is nothing, you would find yourself accused of being called J., of having had friends that they don’t like at this moment, and what can you do against that?28

If his plans to end his exile had been serious at all, this letter convinced Jouvenel to stay in Switzerland and quietly wait until legal investigations against him were closed without further action.29 In the meantime, Fabre-Luce had a more serious rendezvous with French transitional justice. On 26 August 1944, less than a week after publishing the fourth and last volume of Journal de la France, Fabre-Luce witnessed the triumphant entry of De Gaulle down the Champs Élysées. The American troops arrived three days later, giving him the impression of ‘an army of truck drivers [...] throwing cigarettes to the spectators as to an African crowd’.30 French Resistance forces arrested him three days later, as part of a first wave of arrests targeting Chardonne, Jean-Pierre Maxence, Maurice Bardèche and about any other collaborationist writer or intellectual they could find.31 Fabre-Luce spent a month in an overcrowded prison cell in the Parisian suburb of Fresnes before being sent to the Drancy camp. Located in another suburb and originally intended as a modernist residential project, Drancy had functioned as the main transition camp of the Holocaust in France. Nine out of ten Jews arrested in France passed through Drancy on their way to the extermination camps. After the liberation, the camp was used by the Resistance to intern collaborators and criminals.32

Outraged with his arrest, the shabby treatment he received, the chaotic amateurism of the authorities who failed to tell him what he was accused of and who denied him access to a lawyer or a judge for several months, Fabre-Luce found inspiration for several furious books and articles. In one of the

28 Philippe Boegner to Bertrand de Jouvenel (21 March 1945), Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (295).
29 Sapiro, La Responsabilité, 546, 559. Elsewhere, Sapiro used the term ‘non-suit’ to describe the outcome of the investigations against Jouvenel.
30 Fabre-Luce, Vingt-Cinq Années de Liberté II, 193.
31 Sapiro, La Responsabilité, 540.
32 Poznanski, Les Juifs en France Pendant la Seconde Guerre Mondiale, 373; Fabre-Luce, Double Prison, 147, 156.
first of these, titled *Double Prison* and published without an editor in 1946, he contrasted his ‘German’ with his ‘Gaulist’ captivity, while explaining both as the logical result of his position as a free-thinking intellectual who refused to make any concessions to political powers. Presenting himself as a humanist and a liberal in profoundly illiberal and inhumane times, Fabre-Luce claimed he had almost accepted that such would be his fate. He went so far as to take pride in it. By refusing to go in hiding and by turning himself in after the police had come looking for him, he had forced the authorities to make a mistake, which was the best way to fight them. At least he was showing more courage than ‘the “collaborator” who fled to Switzerland and will come back on a wagon-lit’. Such people, Fabre-Luce thought – possibly alluding to Jouvenel (who ended up doing both) – may have escaped prison but ‘will not dare to look in the eyes of those who have suffered’.33

Whether out of irony or ignorance, Fabre-Luce contrasted the treatment of Drancy’s former Jewish inhabitants with his own situation, arguing that at least the Jews had heating and more personal space in the barracks: ‘there used to be four Jews where there are now ten “collaborators”’. In terms not so different from those used in the third volume of *Journal de la France*,

33 Fabre-Luce, *Double Prison*, 148, 221.
Fabre-Luce continued to allude to the idea that the liberation was some kind of revenge of the Jews, in which they made the collaborators suffer the same treatment hitherto inflicted upon them. He noted that relatives and lawyers were not allowed into Drancy to visit the prisoners, while ‘communists, Anglo-Saxons and Jews can inspect us as they please. They give them entry tickets, as to a zoo.’ Jewish visitors were especially vindictive, taking pleasure in witnessing the detainees’ humiliation. He wrote that he would have liked to believe that a Jew would speak out in defence of him and others, just like he had himself supposedly defended the Jews during their years of suffering, but he had the impression his hope was in vain.34

Fabre-Luce shared the camp with a colourful mix of other prisoners: Milice and PPF members, shaved women accused of ‘horizontal collaboration’ with German soldiers, madmen, petty thieves and collaborationist socialites with nobility titles. The comic actor Sacha Guitry was a long-time inmate of Drancy, as were Bernard Faÿ and Georges Ripert, a law professor and member of the Institut de France. The actress and model Arletty, who had famously defended her love affair with a German officer by declaring ‘my heart may be French, but my ass is international’, made a short appearance.35 While Fabre-Luce liked to spend his time with Guitry and Ripert, he was not willing to meet his cousin Robert Fabre-Luce, who was at Drancy too. When the prison director summoned Alfred and offered to correct the ‘inhumanity’ of not even introducing him to his own relative, he declined politely.36

While Fabre-Luce had good reasons to paint the Épuration as black as he could, his trial record does give the impression of chaos and amateurism on the side of the ‘épurateurs’, although this did not always work to his disadvantage. In September 1944, notified by his wife, Fabre-Luce’s lawyer wrote the minister of justice to complain about being denied access to his client, which was ‘a violation of republican legitimacy’.37 Only in late October did the overburdened legal apparatus open investigations against him, after he had spent more than two months in captivity. Fabre-Luce was summoned for questioning for the first time on 13 November. But as his file was empty and an indictment was still lacking, the policeman in charge instead asked him what he had to declare.38 Five days later, Fabre-Luce was transferred

34 Ibid., 158, 159, 163.
35 Jackson, The Dark Years, 335; Fabre-Luce, Double Prison, 170, 177, 185.
36 Fabre-Luce, Vingt-Cinq Années de Liberté I, 25.
37 Daniel Viraut to ‘Monsieur le Ministre’ (30 September 1944), Dossier d’Épuration, AN, Z/6/285 dossier 8648.
38 ‘Réquisitoire introductif’ (28 October 1944) and ‘Procès-verbal’ by Jean Tesnière (13 November 1944), Dossier d’Épuration, AN, Z/6/285 dossier 8648; Fabre-Luce, Double Prison, 205.
back to the Fresnes prison. In the meantime, an indictment had been found: ‘intelligences avec l’ennemi’ [‘collusion with the enemy’], formulated more specifically (though still rather broadly) as ‘to have knowingly, in France or abroad, delivered direct or indirect help to Germany or its allies, or to have undermined national unity or the liberty and equality of Frenchmen’. This was a crime against the security of the state, punishable under laws voted in 1939 and early 1940, and considerably more serious than indignité nationale.39

On 25 November, Fabre-Luce finally appeared before a judge, who wanted to know why the Germans had not condemned him to death in 1943.40 Unable to answer that question, he protested instead against his detention and refuted the charges by claiming that, instead of helping the Germans, he had been ‘one of the only, if not the only French citizen writer, to engage in an open resistance against the enemy’. In line with arguments used by collaborationist politicians such as Laval, he defended his support of collaboration during the first two years as a logical consequence of military defeat and an attempt to save as much as possible of what was left of French ‘national independence’ – against which De Gaulle’s categorical non was as symbolically admirable as it was unworkable in practice, that is: in France as opposed to London. But he claimed his attitude had changed fundamentally in November 1942, when the entire occupation of France and the liberation of North Africa convinced him that collaboration had become ‘contrary to the French interest’.41

Additional notes drafted by his lawyer stressed Fabre-Luce’s absolute ‘independence’ as a writer and his categorical refusal to engage in political activities during the occupation or to take part in propaganda trips to Germany. Furthermore, he had played a subtle game that only few could understand. Despite becoming bestsellers, the *Journal de la France* books had been originally intended for ‘a minority of cultivated readers able to appreciate the constraints imposed by censorship and the resulting value of nuances and stylistic reservations’. That is, if only people had been ‘cultivated’ enough to read between the lines, there would have been no doubt about Fabre-Luce’s subtle yet open resistance. After reminding the judge that Fabre-Luce had criticised the Jewish Statutes and the enlistment of French workers, his lawyer stated that writers like Gabriel Marcel, André

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40 Fabre-Luce, *Double Prison*, 239.
Siegfried and Édouard Bourdet, ‘most of whom are today members of the Comité National d'Écrivains’, had apparently been able to grasp Fabre-Luce’s real attitude, since they had ‘at the time congratulated Fabre-Luce with his work’.42

The judge ordered his provisional release on the same day.43 A letter written by François Mauriac probably played a role in the judge’s decision. The famous Catholic writer, Académie Française member and future Nobel Prize winner was a founding member of the CNE and had put his signature underneath the blacklist that included Fabre-Luce’s name, but after the Liberation he soon became disillusioned with the consequences of the Épuration. In his regular contributions to Le Figaro, Mauriac criticised the ‘vengeful spirit’ in which his colleagues were busy calling for each other’s arrest and tried to vindicate an intellectual’s ‘right to err’. In doing so, Mauriac engaged in a passionate press debate with Camus (who initially demanded harsh justice). Mauriac had personally handed over the clemency request for Brasillach to De Gaulle. His indefatigable defence of those accused of collaboration earned him the mocking nickname ‘Saint-François-des-assises’ ['St. Francis-of-the-Assizes'].44 One day before Fabre-Luce’s release, Mauriac wrote a letter reminding the judge that with the third volume of Journal de la France, he had braved German censorship and earned himself ‘five months’ of imprisonment at the Cherche-Midi. Considering this feat of bravery, Mauriac suggested, the judge might take Fabre-Luce’s ‘very fragile health’ into account and release him provisionally.45

Fabre-Luce went back home to his wife and children, but the investigations against him continued. When on 31 January 1945 two policemen came to his house to take him with them, he decided he had seen enough, despite his former resoluteness to challenge the authorities by letting them commit the error of persecuting him. Fabre-Luce asked to first make a phone call to his lawyer. When he was allowed to do so in a side room, he made a run for the back stairs and then for the street. Fabre-Luce spent the following six months in hiding, frequently changing places: first with different friends in Paris, then at home while staying away from the windows, in Biarritz, in provincial chateaux owned by acquaintances and even in a Benedictine

43 Declaration by the prison director (25 November 1944), Dossier d’Épuration, AN, Z/6/285 dossier 8648.
44 Assouline, L’Épuration, 117.
45 François Mauriac to the Juge d'instruction (24 November 1944), Dossier d’Épuration, AN, Z/6/285 dossier 8648.
monastery in Solesmes.\textsuperscript{46} In his absence, the judge ordered the partial confiscation of his belongings and the freezing of his bank accounts.\textsuperscript{47}

In the late summer of 1945, Fabre-Luce was back at his apartment and walked the streets of Paris undisturbedly, but he was still unsure as to what he could expect. If the authorities were alternating between repression and laissez-faire, it was because they were under pressure from different groups. Besides the slow functioning of the legal system and calls for clemency from Mauriac and others, communist and other left-wing journalists were putting pressure on the government to arrest more people and punish them more harshly, since anything else would be nothing but an insult to those who had paid with their lives during the occupation. Already during Fabre-Luce's time at Drancy, \textit{l'Humanité} had called the camp 'a holiday resort for the fifth column' and called for the quick punishment of Guitry and Fabre-Luce, 'demimonde' collaborators 'without scruples and without a fatherland'.\textsuperscript{48} Fabre-Luce noticed how the 'tidal' movement of French politics directly influenced the situation in the camp. Communist demonstrations meant a new wave of arrests, while the prison regime was eased as soon as bourgeois newspapers had begun to write critically about the Épuration's excesses.\textsuperscript{49}

The anger of Resistance newspapers against Fabre-Luce further increased as a result of his many publications in which he attacked the Épuration, mocked the importance of the Resistance and defended Marshal Pétain. Even from his prison camp, he succeeded in having an article published telling 'The Truth about Drancy' (it was not exactly a holiday resort, diseases were breaking out and some detainees had been tortured, tattooed or physically abused) by having it smuggled out of the camp.\textsuperscript{50} After his release, he continued to publish books and brochures at an unequalled pace. Initially unable to find an editor willing or daring to publish them, he decided to do so by himself. He invented the name 'Éditions de Midi', a mocking reference to the Resistance editing house Éditions de Minuit and in line with his statement that he was speaking out at clear daylight, not clandestinely at midnight.\textsuperscript{51} His prison memoirs appeared in 1945, initially little more than stencilled papers (just like the fourth volume of \textit{Journal de la France} one year earlier) but soon republished in book form as \textit{Double Prison}. He

\textsuperscript{46} Fabre-Luce, \textit{Vingt-Cinq Années de Liberté II}, 218, 230, 233, 237; Fabre-Luce, \textit{Hors d'Atteinte}, 8.
\textsuperscript{47} Document by Juge d’Instruction Raoult (15 May 1945), \textit{Dossier d’Épuration}, AN, Z/6/285 dossier 8648. It seems this confiscation was not carried out.
\textsuperscript{48} Diquelou, ‘Drancy Deviendra-t-il Villégiature Pour la 5e Colonne?’.
\textsuperscript{49} Fabre-Luce, \textit{Double Prison}, 198, 211.
\textsuperscript{50} Alfred Fabre-Luce, [untitled] (11 October 1944), Fonds AFL, 472 AP 2; idem, \textit{Double Prison}, 215.
\textsuperscript{51} See, for example, Fabre-Luce, \textit{En Pleine Liberté}, I.
also self-published three brochures, which were eventually bundled in *Au Nom des Silencieux*, in which he paid homage to the ‘hommes du Maréchal’ who had sincerely followed Pétain and were now wrongfully accused of treason, while calling Gaullism a ‘new inquisition’ and comparing it to the Ku Klux Klan. During the summer, Fabre-Luce published a lengthy report on the Pétain trial that mixed appreciative comments on the Marshal with refutations of most of the accusations against him. In his concluding remarks, Fabre-Luce suggested that De Gaulle could be persecuted for the same kind of treason attributed to Pétain.

During 1945, Resistance newspapers published outraged commentaries on Fabre-Luce, who was ‘abusing’ his freedom by publishing his admiration for Pétain and the ‘Krauts’ and his hatred of De Gaulle and other ‘patriots’. How was it possible that the police were letting such a man walk around freely, a member of the fifth column ‘who, at the moment of the debacle of 1940, uttered a cry of triumph’? In fact, the police were not entirely inactive in stopping Fabre-Luce’s activities. The entire unsold print runs of *Double Prison* and *Au Nom des Silencieux* were confiscated from bookshops and storage, provoking protests by Fabre-Luce and a long-lasting legal fight against this ‘censorship’. Fabre-Luce’s trial record contains a report about fruitless police attempts to obtain the other texts he published via the ‘Éditions de Midi’, despite a declaration from the Juge d’Instruction that post-liberation material could not be part of the accusation. Bookshop owners questioned by the police declared that they had only ‘heard about’ those books and claimed they were not selling them.

At the end of 1945, the Juge d’Instruction decided that Fabre-Luce was again to be held in administrative detention, but the police could not find him at his home. Fabre-Luce’s wife declared that they were late: her husband

53 Fabre-Luce, *Le Mystère du Maréchal*, 47, 193. Fabre-Luce would finally take on this challenge himself, with *Haute Cour* (1962), a play in which De Gaulle is brought to trial for high treason by a Supreme Court consisting of the Senate and the National Assembly sitting in joint session.
had gone to Switzerland. This was true. In the summer and autumn of 1945, several personal and more general events had convinced Fabre-Luce that his best option was to look for shelter abroad. At the October 1945 parliamentary elections – the first since the liberation and the first French elections in which women were allowed to vote – the communist and socialist parties won an absolute majority. With more than 27% of the votes, the PCF became the country’s largest party, raising fears of a long-lasting communist hegemony if not a direct political take-over. Around the same time, Pétain’s death sentence (commuted to life imprisonment by De Gaulle) and the execution of Laval proved that, despite the end of the War, the Épuration was still capable of showing its teeth. Together with the confiscation of his books and the attacks against him in the press, these developments prompted Fabre-Luce’s decision to apply for a visa for Switzerland. To his own surprise and surely also that of his Juge d’Instruction, his visa was granted by regular procedure, and he crossed the Swiss border by car in early November.

Exile and Exclusion

Going to Switzerland to escape arrest in France, Fabre-Luce was making the same journey that Jouvenel had made just over two years earlier. In 1943, Jouvenel and his wife crossed the border as illegal immigrants requesting refugee status, and only the reputation of Bertrand’s father Henry de Jouvenel prevented them from being housed in a refugee camp. Instead, the couple were temporarily placed under house arrest in a luxury hotel, then moved into a more modest place in Fribourg before settling with their daughter in a three-room apartment in Saint Saphorin, a village on the shores of Lake Geneva, not far from Lausanne. Jouvenel was distrusted by the Swiss authorities, who considered him a collaborator and kept a close watch on him during 1944. As a condition of his residence in Switzerland, he had to promise he would refrain from any political or journalistic activities. This ban from what had until then been Jouvenel’s main occupation caused him serious financial difficulties, which were partially alleviated when he received permission to publish books about economic subjects and articles in the Swiss press as long as he used a pseudonym. Signing his

58 Fabre-Luce, Vingt-Cinq Années de Liberté II, 245; Vinen, Bourgeois Politics in France, 1.
articles with ‘Guillaume de Champlitte’, ‘G. de Monfort’ or ‘XXX’, Jouvenel became a regular contributor to *Curieux* and the *Gazette de Lausanne*, both conservative Pétainist newspapers.59

Jouvenel’s owed his most important support to his integration into the curious émigré community living on the shores of Lake Geneva. When he arrived, this community still consisted of a mix of those who had fled the occupation and those wanting to escape the post-war order. Pétainists and former collaborators soon started to dominate, including the Vichy diplomat Paul Morand, Pétain’s former chief of staff Henry du Moulin de Labarthète, René Belin, Coco Chanel, Georges Bonnet, René Gillouin, Raymond Abellio, Charles Rochat and many others. The Belgian Hendrik de Man was also part of these circles. The pre-war planist socialist, who had been strongly admired by Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel at the time, had become a leading collaborator during the war and fled to Switzerland to escape persecution in his native Belgium. His king Leopold III, equally exiled after his dubious role during the Belgian capitulation and the occupation years, was also living on the shores of Lake Geneva. The central figure in this high society was Jouvenel’s old friend Jean Jardin. Jardin had been a member of Ordre Nouveau, one of the ‘non-conformist’ formations of the 1930s. After serving as Laval’s chief of staff during most of 1942 and 1943, Jardin joined the French embassy in Berne, where he established personal contacts with the Swiss authorities, Gaullists, the American Office of Strategic Service and German officers conspiring to kill Hitler. As a neutral country, Switzerland provided excellent opportunities for these kinds of mixed frequentation. When Paris was liberated, Jardin resigned his diplomatic position, but he retained connections with France’s former and new authorities that would ensure him few problems with the *Épuration* and a long post-war career as an influential political background figure in the Fourth Republic.60

Well-placed to provide financial and political services to his contacts, Jardin became the linchpin of the French émigrés. The weekly Saturday afternoon tea parties at the Jardins in Vevey was the occasion for everybody to meet, exchange novelties and escape the boredom of daily exile life. Aware of Jouvenel’s presence after reading one of his articles in *Curieux*, Jardin quickly included him in these circles and helped him by acting as an intermediary for money sent from France by the family of Jouvenel’s wife.61

When Fabre-Luce arrived in Switzerland, he soon established contact with

60 Assouline, *Une Éminence Grise*, 130, 177, 205.
his ‘dear friend’ Jouvenel and was naturally absorbed into the same milieu.\footnote{Alfred Fabre-Luce to Bertrand de Jouvenel (28 December 1945), Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (299).} Fabre-Luce’s memoirs give a vivid description of the atmosphere reigning in this intact micro-Vichy. While remarking with irony that ‘there are many things I can blame on the liberation government, but not for failing to provide me with pleasant company in prison and in exile’, he described his encounters with Bonnet, Jouvenel, Morand, De Man and Jardin and their collective joy at being safe from the ‘madness’ of the Épuration. When they heard that one of them, Charles Rochat – according to Fabre-Luce an ‘irreproachable functionary’ but also a long-time Vichy secretary-general for foreign affairs who had followed his government to Sigmaringen and then fled to Switzerland with Jardin’s help – had been condemned to death in absentia, ‘we were split between indignation and the giggles’.\footnote{Fabre-Luce, \textit{Vingt-Cinq Années de Liberté II}, 251, 254.}

Jardin founded À l’Enseigne du Cheval Ailé, an editing house that became an important recourse for the French émigré community. Officially led by the Swiss extreme-rightist editor Constant Bourquin but in reality directed by Jardin, the ‘Winged Horse’ specialised in books, memoirs and justifications by fascists and collaborators, alongside a few nineteenth-century classics. These books were intended for export, resale and clandestine distribution in France, appearing in unrealistically large print runs for the Swiss francophone home market. Du Moulin de Labarthète published his account of the war years through the Cheval Ailé, as did Louis Rougier, René Benjamin, Georges Bonnet, Pierre Dominique, André Thérive, Hendrik de Man, and even Dino Alfieri, Léon Degrelle and the Spanish fascist (and Franco’s brother-in-law) Ramon Serrano Súñer.\footnote{Clavien ‘Les Intellectuels Collaborateurs Exilés en Suisse’, 87. Amongst others, see De Man, \textit{Au-Delà du Nationalisme}; idem, \textit{Cavalier Seul}; Du Moulin de Labarthète, \textit{Le Temps des Illusions}; Serrano Súñer, \textit{Entre les Pyrénées et Gibraltar}.} Providing the only publishing opportunity for writers who were blacklisted, persecuted or otherwise excluded from the public sphere in France, the Cheval Ailé acted as a bridge between collaboration and the post-war French extreme-right.

Jouvenel published his magnum opus \textit{Du Pouvoir} at the Cheval Ailé as well as an edition of Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s \textit{Du Contrat Social} that included his long introductory essay.\footnote{Jouvenel, \textit{Du Pouvoir}; Rousseau, \textit{Du Contrat Social}, 13-165.} With Jouvenel’s help, Fabre-Luce also obtained a contract with Bourquin – an attractive alternative to amateurish self-publishing, given that most of the copies had been confiscated by the police. In Geneva, Fabre-Luce published \textit{Au Nom des Silencieux} and \textit{Le Mystère du Maréchal}, a longer version of his commentary on the Pétain trial, as
well as a two-volume ‘final edition’ of *Journal de la France*, essentially a fundamentally cleansed and mutilated version of his four wartime books. He also published *Journal de l’Europe*, a series of political observations from post-war France, England and Italy and an attempt to continue his approach from the war years. These publications permitted Fabre-Luce to exchange his rented room in an insane asylum – the only place accepting French francs – for an apartment in Geneva that he could pay for in freshly earned Swiss currency. Especially *Au Nom des Silencieux* soon became a success in France, selling 40,000 copies in the first six months alone and inspiring an Italian translation published in 1946. In Montreal, a Canadian editor published *Double Prison* but balked at Fabre-Luce’s suggestion that he do the same with the ‘final’ *Journal de la France*, fearing the book might cause ‘emotions’ and accusations of ‘defeatism and the spirit of collaboration’.

Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce’s contracts at the Cheval Ailé brought them their first post-war successes while at the same time closely associating them with people who had plunged considerably deeper into collaboration than they ever had. In 1949, at Le Cheval Ailé, Degrelle published his memoirs from his time on the eastern front where he had fought as the leader of the Walloon SS brigade and become a ‘European’ hero celebrated by Nazi propaganda. The backside of the book listed Le Cheval Ailé’s ‘greatest successes’: Du Moulin, Rougier, De Man, Bonnet, Serrano Suñer, Goebbels (his diaries) and Alfieri figured alongside Fabre-Luce (*Journal de la France*) and Jouvenel (*Du Pouvoir*). Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce did not see this as a problem. Instead, they thought of their Swiss publications as providing a necessary correction to the censorship (self-imposed or otherwise) and one-sidedness still prevailing in French journalism and publishing. In a letter to the chief editor of the *Gazette de Lausanne*, Jouvenel stated that, in Paris, his newspaper was held in great esteem for writing ‘what our newspapers don’t say’. According to Jouvenel, the *Gazette* was in fact playing ‘the role of the deliveries from Holland under the ancien régime’.

67  Fabre-Luce, *Vingt-Cinq Années de Liberté II*, 249, 259; idem, *La Verità sul Generale De Gaulle*, 5. Probably with some exaggeration, the introduction to the Italian translation stated that ‘millions of Frenchmen recognize themselves in this book’ and that it was ‘the most sold book in France’.
68  Paul Péladeau to Fabre-Luce (18 October 1945), Fonds AFL, 472 AP 2.
70  Jouvenel to Pierre Béguin (6 August 1946), Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (300).
Understandably, these publications initially did not contribute to an end to Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel’s ostracism in France. On the contrary: both the French authorities and the left-wing press continued to see them as pariahs or worse, and this antagonism only exacerbated as their Swiss books started pouring into France. When the University of Lausanne considered making Jouvenel professor of political doctrine, the French diplomatic service in Switzerland intervened to prevent the appointment of someone with ‘anti-democratic tendencies’ who had published books under the German occupation. In the end, a French member of the appointment commission made it clear that the chair should go to a Swiss national. Similarly, the new French ambassador in Berne was outraged with Fabre-Luce’s frequent trips to Paris and his ‘propaganda against the national interest’. He alerted the French foreign ministry and called for a re-examination of his visa for Switzerland. In 1947, when Fabre-Luce was planning a trip to Belgium, he received a letter from the Belgian authorities asking him to reconsider his visit. It is unclear whether this request had been inspired by the French diplomatic service.

In August 1946, the communist newspaper *Ce Soir* started a full-fledged press campaign against those ‘traitors on the run’ leading a luxury life in ‘the most reactionary’ corner of Switzerland, with the help of police protection and secret funds provided by Vichy. The special reporter Serge Lang was outraged at seeing Fabre-Luce publishing his books with impunity, ‘three quarters’ of which were being spread in France. In a separate article, he tore Jouvenel apart:

This haughty character, with his monocle and his little chinstrap beard, is the laughingstock of the little village of Chexbres, above Vevey [...]. The winemakers amidst whom he lives are frank and simple folks who cannot understand his pretentious manners [...]. Sometimes, he tries to pose as a ‘resistant’, brandishing a certificate written by a FFI officer from Tulle, who has by the way been sacked for having given Jouvenel this certificate of complacency.

The bellicosity of these attacks could not eclipse the fact that the political climate in France had started to change. The summer of 1946 saw a turn away from the Épuration and the Resistance discourse dominated by the
Marxist left and towards national reconciliation, centrist politics and a willingness to forget about the recent past. At the 5 May 1946 referendum, a proposed new constitution mainly backed by the communists and socialists was narrowly defeated, much to most people’s surprise. At subsequent parliamentary elections, these two parties lost their absolute majority, while the centre-right MRP (Mouvement Républicain Populaire) replaced the PCF as France’s largest party. A tripartite coalition of MRP, PCF and SFIO subsequently drafted a new constitutional project that was finally accepted by referendum in October as the constitution of the Fourth Republic. Unhappy with the course of events and the choice for a parliamentary system instead of the strong executive he desired, De Gaulle had already relinquished his position as president of the provisional government in January 1946.74

Like many other former supporters of Pétain and collaboration, Fabre-Luce was relieved when the news of the outcome of the first referendum reached him in Switzerland and considered it a sign that ‘the tide had started to withdraw’. Pierre Andreu, who was in Paris and in a similar mood, remembered clinging to the radio during the entire night as the results from all the corners of France poured in. He was convinced that with the final result, France had narrowly escaped a communist coup of the sort that Poland and Czechoslovakia had experienced.75 Despite some friends advising him to stay where he was, Fabre-Luce decided that it was safe to end his exile and go back to Paris at the end of summer. In August, he defiantly wrote to his Juge d’Instruction pretending that he had been surprised to hear that his investigation had not been definitively closed, especially since he had regularly obtained a visa for Switzerland ‘to follow a cure’. Now that things had turned out to be otherwise and with his health sufficiently recovered, ‘I will soon come back to France and will be at your disposal at my home, 56 Avenue Foch in Paris, 1 October the latest’.76

More exchanges took place during the next two years and Fabre-Luce was questioned several times, but it was not until 1949 that his trial took place – a sign that the authorities were by this time hardly more enthusiastic about the affair than Fabre-Luce himself. Furthermore, the amateurism that had marked the early days of his persecution continued to play a role. The Juge d’Instruction hired a translator for a German text by Fabre-Luce about collaboration, without realising that he already had the original: the

74 Rioux, La France de la Quatrième République I, 146, 152.
75 Fabre-Luce, Vingt-Cinq Années de Liberté II, 259; See also Andreu, Le Rouge et le Blanc, 240.
76 Fabre-Luce to the Juge d’Instruction (16 August 1946), Dossier d’Épuration, AN, Z/6/285 dossier 8648.
text came from the German translation of the first volume of *Journal de la France*. Fabre-Luce was repeatedly confused with his cousin Robert, a mistake that he did not fail to exploit in order to cast doubt about other, occasionally correct, incriminating claims. Amongst other things, Fabre-Luce denied he had ever met Léon Degrelle and been a member of the PPF, both incorrectly. He claimed that his long article about Hitler's European Empire as a more successful successor to Napoleon's 'dream' and about the need for France to be inspired by the 'teachings' of Hitler had never been intended to be published in the *Cahiers Franco-Allemands* in 1942. The authorities had the greatest trouble finding a copy of Fabre-Luce's *Anthologie de la Nouvelle Europe*, and it had to resort to the French National Library to finally get a copy. Altogether, the trial record seems to suggest that, except for introductions and summaries, the Juge d’Instruction did not bother to actually read the four to five Fabre-Luce books that would have normally been the focal point of any trial against him.

These mistakes permitted Fabre-Luce to develop his double strategy of defence. Since the authorities often failed to pin him down on his manifest support for the German New Order and his admiration of National Socialism, he was able to largely bypass this inconvenient subject, limiting himself to selective self-quotations (the collaboration was a ‘black stock market’ full of ‘crooks’, Jews were ‘symbols of human suffering’, etc.), and switch to what had become his favourite topic: the political legitimacy of Vichy and Pétain. As in his publications from these years, Fabre-Luce built his defence on the supposedly positive role that Vichy – recognised by both the US and the Soviet Union as France’s legal government – had played in protecting as much as it could of the French population (including its Jews) against the Nazi onslaught, while keeping the fleet and military reserves safe until armed resistance was effectively possible. Although this policy became pointless with the German occupation of the ‘free’ zone in November 1942, it had been perfectly reasonable until that moment. There is a marked contrast between the relatively secondary role of Vichy in Fabre-Luce’s wartime books and the importance it had suddenly gained in his trial defence and in his post-war books. This served both as a decoy.

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77 Translated text and invoices by Léon Buée, Dossier d’Épuration, AN, Z/6/285 dossier 8648.
78 ‘Procès-verbal’ (4 December 1947); Fabre-Luce to the Juge d’Instruction (10 January 1948); ‘Exposé des Faits’ (19 March 1949), Dossier d’Épuration, AN, Z/6/285 dossier 8648; Reaction by Fabre-Luce to the ‘Exposé des Faits’, Fonds AFL, 472 AP 1.
79 The Service des Recherches de Presse to the Juge d’Instruction, Dossier d’Épuration, AN, Z/6/285 dossier 8648.
and to cause a different kind of controversy, one that was associated with a dissenting view on France’s recent history rather than with treason.

Stressing the importance of his intellectual shift in the third volume of *Journal de la France* and of his imprisonment by the Gestapo, Fabre-Luce attempted to affirm his status as a free-thinking intellectual independent of any political power. In court, he ended his spoken defence with something that held middle ground between a challenge and a profession of faith:

My independence has already caused me several prison terms. I will persevere in the future. [...] Last Sunday on the radio, I heard the President of the Republic speak about the ‘disgrace of the armistice’. A historian by
profession, I studied all the documents relative to this question and I have formed myself a different opinion. I think the armistice was honourable, appropriate and useful. And as I think so, I say so. Since a few years, many people have ceased to express their real opinion, even if legitimate, out of fear to have ‘their files opened again’ or to make an unfavourable impression upon their judges. I will not, by adhering to what I consider a false history, buy the indulgence that I estimate I do not need. Let me be frank with you: I’d rather be condemned because of my ideas than acquitted out of ambiguity or renunciation.81

In the end, the French legal system was willing to do him this favour. On 19 March 1949, the Court of Justice of the Seine department reached its judgment. While recognising that Fabre-Luce had kept his distance from the collaboration press, it concluded that in his books from the first two occupation years, he had ‘at least indirectly, served Hitlerian propaganda’. Especially in his *Anthologie de la Nouvelle Europe*, Fabre-Luce celebrated ‘the cult of force, aristocratism, racism, the critique of democracy, Germany’s predestination to hegemony’. The judge was less pronounced in his statement on *Journal de la France*, declaring that Fabre-Luce had expressed himself ‘in a very nuanced way’, although the first two volumes were ‘clearly oriented towards intellectual and material collaboration with Germany within the framework of a New Europe’. It was also to Fabre-Luce’s advantage that he had changed his course in late 1942, spent several months in German captivity and maintained ‘a certain independence from anti-national and pro-German organisations’. Moreover, ‘it has not been established that he was in contact with members of the occupation troops’. Taking these elements into account, the judge decided that Fabre-Luce’s case was not heavy enough to be treated by a Court of Justice, and he referred the trial to the Chambres Civiques.82

The Chambres Civiques were special sections of the Courts of Justice intended for the persecution of collaborators who were not punishable under regular criminal law. This automatically meant that Fabre-Luce had escaped the verdict of ‘collusion with the enemy’ (and thus the potential sanction of forced labour, a long prison term or theoretically death) and could now only be condemned for the lighter crime of indignité nationale. Acquittal had also become unlikely, though, since the Chambres Civiques condemned

81 Fabre-Luce, [untitled], Fonds AFL, 472 AP 1.
82 Transcription of judgment by the Court of Justice (19 March 1949), Fonds AFL, 472 AP 1.
about three-quarters of the accused who appeared before them. On 31 May 1949, the Chambre Civique heard his case. In his memoirs, Fabre-Luce wrote that he felt pity for his judge, who had probably himself sworn an oath to Pétain and was now supposed to persecute him for his loyalty to the same man. Fabre-Luce’s defiant defence plea had not missed its effect on the prosecutor, who placed pressure on the judge to show some severity: ‘If you think he has talent, condemn him severely.’ Fabre-Luce claimed that this left him feeling almost offended when the judge condemned him to ‘only’ ten years of dégradation nationale, without banishment from the country.

This condemnation failed to have any concrete consequences for Fabre-Luce. Apart from his confiscated books, his property was left untouched, and within two years the first of two amnesty laws put an end to his electoral and professional restrictions. Nevertheless, and despite his own indifferent comments, Fabre-Luce was perfectly aware of the weight that the sanction carried at a symbolic level. Like tens of thousands of other Frenchmen, he had been found ‘unworthy’ of his nationality because he had served the propaganda of the enemies of the French nation and turned against its most elementary values. Several of his citizens’ rights had been temporarily taken away from him. When friends wrote him letters to express their solidarity with him, they often did so with a certain reserve. In a book written in 1945, Fabre-Luce had described the significance of dégradation nationale for a man who had enlisted for work in Germany in order to feed his wife and children: ‘he will have to suffer the sanction of ostracism. “Unworthy”: this word will haunt him for a long time. Around him, there will be a vague suspicion of treason.

‘Beyond Nazism’: Monarchism and the Heritage of Fascism

Their Swiss exile brought Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce together again, with both in roughly the same circumstances. There are clear differences, however, between the position and experience of the two intellectuals during the early post-war years. Fabre-Luce’s Swiss exile was but a short intermezzo compared to Jouvenel’s, who only moved back to France at the end of the
1940s. Though Jouvenel was initially as blacklisted and ostracised as Fabre-Luce, he was ultimately not the object of legal prosecution. He profited from his longer stay abroad to lay low and generally avoid provocation, mainly writing about economic subjects and political theory. This was partially because his permission to stay in Switzerland depended on it, but it was also due to changes at a personal level. Jouvenel's more distanced attitude marked a major shift in his career as a public intellectual, especially with regard to his behaviour during the interwar period, but it did not preclude sharp political remarks in private.\textsuperscript{88} In the meantime, as we have seen, Fabre-Luce faced persecution and condemnation. Choosing a tactic that was the exact opposite of Jouvenel's, he openly struck back at the authorities and became a vocal spokesperson of Pétainists, former collaborators and other ‘victims’ of the Épuration. This conscious choice in favour of controversy brought him admirers and prominence in extreme-rightist circles as well as enemies and a more lasting exclusion from the mainstream press. Despite these major tactical differences, there are striking similarities in the two intellectuals' political ideas and their affiliation with several publications and associations of the post-war French extreme right.

Both intellectuals felt uncomfortable about the demise of fascism. As the Allies landed in Sicily and Southern Italy, the Russians advanced through Eastern Europe, and the German occupation of France descended ever more into civil war and arbitrary violence, Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel became aware that the approaching defeat of Germany was turning into a mirror image of how they had interpreted the Fall of France just a few years earlier. It would mark not only the end of Axis rule in Europe but also the collapse of an ideological system that they had admired and identified with for a long time. They saw fascism fall into near-universal discredit, not because of the crematoria of Auschwitz, Bełżec and Sobibór – of which they seem to have been either unaware or unable to grasp the political significance – but due to its association with brutality and treason. The disappearance of the fascist alternative cleared the way for communism or a return to parliamentary democracy – a less-than-appealing prospect for both Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce. A striking expression of this pessimism is found in the holiday greetings card that Fabre-Luce sent to Jouvenel in December 1945 in which he cynically congratulated his friend that, whatever would happen, the New Year ‘couldn’t be worse than the last’.\textsuperscript{89}

\textsuperscript{88} For a longer treatment of the personal and intellectual elements of Jouvenel's ‘metamorphosis', see the next chapter.

\textsuperscript{89} Alfred Fabre-Luce to Bertrand de Jouvenel (28 December 1945), Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (299).
Mussolini was the first fascist leader to go. In early August 1943, just after the Duce had been deposed by the Grand Council of Fascism and imprisoned on the orders of King Victor Emmanuel III, Jouvenel reflected on his heritage. While many people saw Mussolini’s fall as proof of the victory of democracy, Jouvenel admitted to arriving at other conclusions. He noted that Mussolini had been in power for more than twenty years, about as long as the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Empire combined. Not only had Mussolini ‘shaped all the men who will play a role in his country for a quarter of a century to come’, he also ‘represented a principle that has manifested itself all over the world’. Furthermore, since his enemies had copied his tactics, Mussolini’s defeat was proof of the success rather than the failure of his ideology: ‘doesn’t the collapse of the providential man in Germany and Italy go together with the apotheosis of the providential man in the United States, in Great Britain and above all in Russia?’

A few months earlier, seeing Mussolini’s ‘star fade’, Fabre-Luce remarked that people had forgotten how he had ‘pulled his country out of anarchy and, during eighteen years, brought order and peace.’ People were unwilling to see that ‘even his opponents are today inspired by the political formula that he has created’.

The prospect of an Allied victory and a return to the Third Republic made Jouvenel sick with dread. In his diaries, he fulminated against ‘this horrible pre-war society without respect for essential values’ in which ‘officers were despised […] until the moment people needed them’ and in which he ‘had to write chit-chat articles for *Paris-Soir* to survive’. He was equally unenthusiastic about the ‘fake’ heroism of the Gaullists – whom he described as a collection of renegades, gamblers and adventurers – and ‘the little moralists of democracy’, inspired by nothing but ‘sentimentality and lies’. Facing this prospect, Jouvenel claimed to even prefer the communists, who at least had ‘something virile and military that pleases me’, and of course the fascists, whose style he liked even more despite having ‘fought them as a nationally-minded Frenchman’. He admitted preferring ‘the fascist punch to the adipose and suffocating envelopment of the democrat’.

Jouvenel was convinced that the victory of the Gaullists and democrats would be short-lived:

90 Journal de travail, cahier 1 [early August 1943, exact date unknown], Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (37).
92 Journal de travail, cahier 1 (4 July 1943), Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (37).
I don’t believe that my country will fall prey to this clique for long. It has lived without them for three and a half years. New ways of feeling and thinking have taken root. By living with the Germans and by fighting them, virtues similar to theirs have been awakened among us. We shall see what the returnees from London will do. [...] I give them six months before they will be overwhelmed by the communists. Against the danger of the extreme left, they will then have to call upon the men of the right, like Noske did in Germany.94

Fabre-Luce imagined the return of Herriot as the ‘incarnation of collective foolishness’ at the head of a future government that was supposed to embody all the flaws of the Third Republic. He advised the first post-war session of parliament to start with an expiatory ceremony during which the MPs would have to wear dunce caps and write down ‘elementary truths’ on a chalkboard such as ‘It is impossible to win without working’, ‘A defeat forces one to take the victor into account’ and ‘It takes young people to nourish the old’.95

After the war, Jouvenel explained fascism as a counter-reaction against communism that was as regrettable as it was useful. Fascism copied and sometimes ‘exaggerated’ communist methods, since only these were capable of protecting society from the Bolshevik ‘poison’ against which a regular democracy was defenceless.96 Fabre-Luce went further than that, and once the Épuration’s most heated phase was over he was not afraid to say so in public. According to him, fascism had a larger positive legacy that could not be ignored by discarding it as a whole. Fascism was worthwhile both as ‘a reaction against [Soviet] totalitarianism’ and ‘a generous effort to render to the bourgeoisie its value as an elite [...] and to unify the people, not through envy, civil war or foreign imitation, but through the admiration of a leader and the cult of the fatherland’.97 In another publication, he listed what he saw as the ‘best’ elements of National Socialism: ‘the cult of work, the sense of a community, the respect of natural hierarchies, and even a certain pride of white man that is the superior form of racism’.98

Referring to Salazar and Mussolini as examples, Fabre-Luce stressed that terror, racism and warmongering were neither exclusive nor necessary traits

94 Cited in Delbecque, ‘Bertrand de Jouvenel ou le Libéral Désenchanté’, 300.
95 Fabre-Luce, *Journal de la France III* (1943), 255, 257. See also id., *Journal de la France IV* (1944), 49.
of fascism. In a statement reminiscent of his 1942 distinction between good (Europeanist) and bad (opportunistic) collaborators, he claimed there had been good and bad fascists in France. While both groups had been sincere in their will to defend their country against the Bolshevik menace, the latter had ‘undergone the Hitlerian contagion to the point of preferring their political solidarity with Germany to the French interest’, while the former had only retained ‘certain assimilable elements’ of fascist ideology like unity, discipline and a strong executive with the objective of using these to establish ‘the French conditions of freedom’. While the former had been ‘traitors’, the latter were ‘patriots’ who had an important contribution to make to post-war politics and society.

Despite their lasting appreciation of fascism, Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel could not entirely ignore the Holocaust and its moral implications. In their publications immediately following the end of the war, both intellectuals explicitly mentioned the death camps, albeit drawing very different conclusions than those predominant today. Instead of the emphasis put today on the uniqueness of the Holocaust as a genocidal event of unprecedented scope and brutality, Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel saw it as an integral part of larger developments in politics and civilisation. Fabre-Luce, whose brother-in-law François de Brantes had been arrested for Resistance activities and died in Mauthausen, welcomed the Nuremberg trials, especially as punishment for the ‘sadistic torture’ of the camp system. Although the Allies could have simply executed those responsible on the spot ‘without shocking anyone’, a trial was the better option because it showed to the world how these crimes had become possible. Only by letting the Nazi leaders speak could ‘their ignominy and their stupidity’ fully come to light: ‘how they have killed their state in the name of the state, betrayed their fatherland while invoking it and committed, by “realism”, crimes that coalesced invincible forces against them.’

Fabre-Luce, who managed to discuss Nuremberg and the camps without mentioning Jews, also stressed that ‘a single nuclear bomb destroys as many lives as a German extermination camp’. He was outraged that the Russians – the ‘inventors of the concentration camp’ – were present in Nuremberg solely as judges and not as accused. Referring to Jouvenel’s Du Pouvoir, Fabre-Luce

99 Fabre-Luce, Le Siècle Prend Figure, 218.
100 Fabre-Luce, Hors d’Atteinte, 201.
102 Fabre-Luce, Vingt-Cinq Années de Liberté II, 234; Garbe, Alfred Fabre-Luce, 265.
103 Fabre-Luce, Hors d’Atteinte, 96.
remarked that ‘Roosevelt (or his successor) has let the assassins of Katyn put on a judge’s cap’, something that ‘Wilson would not have dared to do’. This development illustrated how far morality had regressed between 1919 and 1945. Fabre-Luce was unconvinced that the crimes of Nazi racism would necessarily lead to a lasting discredit of eugenics and what Jouvenel called ‘biopolitics’. Though regretting that Hitler had ‘compromised’ it, he continued to be interested in negative eugenics as a way to improve the genetic make-up of the population. Again citing Rostand, who had already figured in his 1942 *Anthologie*, he stated that the ‘sterilisation of idiots’ remained a useful instrument to achieve the ‘extinction’ of certain ‘flaws of society’.  

With arguments very similar to those later used by Ernst Nolte, Fabre-Luce even suggested that the contagious influence of the Soviet Union – ‘a Slavic semi-barbarianism’ – was somehow to blame for the crimes the Germans had committed. In reaction to the violence of the Russian Revolution, Central Europe’s conservative forces had gradually borrowed its methods, thereby drifting away from Western civilisation. Hitler’s war against the Soviet Union had done the rest. In France, ‘the correct occupier that we have known in 1940’ had by 1942 turned into a barbarian ‘drunken with blood’: ‘he came back from a country that refused to admit the Red Cross and to humanise war’.

Even the French Resistance had drunk from this well, since it had triumphed over ‘Hitlerism’ only to ‘repeat, to a certain extent, its excesses’. This made the Nuremberg trials a deserved, though very selective, punishment for crimes that Fabre-Luce linked to a plethora of other acts.

For Jouvenel, the concentration camps were yet another sign that he was living in profoundly barbaric and inhumane times. In a peculiarly pessimistic article, written for the Swiss *Curieux* in March 1945, he compared the Holocaust to the Allied bombing of German cities as two symptoms of a general rupture of civilisation. The first had been ‘the largest manhunt in history’ during which ‘hundreds of thousands, maybe millions of men, women, even children’ had first been ‘marked as prey’ by the wearing of the yellow star and subsequently arrested, separated and deported ‘as if by the slavers of the past’. And ‘a great people’, which had made ‘an immense contribution to our common culture, the people of Leibnitz, Bach and Goethe, has allowed this abomination to take place in its name!’ And now (with Jouvenel apparently still unsure about what had happened to the Jews

104 Fabre-Luce, *Le Siècle Prend Figure*, 155, 156; idem, *Hors d’Atteinte*, 96.
107 Fabre-Luce, *Le Siècle Prend Figure*, 155.
after their deportation) another ‘drama’ was unfolding, as Allied carpet bombing marked ‘the greatest extermination operation in history’. Noting that 51% of Königsberg had been destroyed and 69% of Darmstadt, he wondered if mankind had fallen back into savagery. ‘But savages themselves are incapable of this kind of fierce cruelty. Their destructive rages are brief, ours is systematic.’ Jouvenel stated that civilisation as such was not at fault, it was the gradual political usurpation of religion and morality and the subsequent development of political ‘pseudo-religions’ that was to blame:

How can one not see that [...] it was by posing as a spiritual and moral leader that Hitler was able to excite the foolish fanaticism that Europe has fallen victim to? How not see that it was by promising a moral order that his adversaries have rallied the peoples? And who would dare to assure that these promises will be kept? For political reasons, propaganda has forged pseudo-religions of which the people are now possessed. The creators of these great emotions have lost control over them. And we see the destruction of cultural heritage in the name of civilisation, the massacre of women and children in the name of humanity, the rule of injustice in the name of justice and the death of intellectuals in the name of the mind [l'esprit].

Apart from these lamentations, what kind of political future did Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce envisage for the post-war period? Although pessimism often predominated, the two intellectuals’ hopes and aspirations were reflected in two elements: a political synthesis of fascism and freedom, and a new attempt at European unification. During the last years of the war, Fabre-Luce rejected a return to parliamentarianism as essentially an ‘Anglo-Saxon’ machination to forever prevent Franco-German rapprochement. ‘To a pure Frenchman, parliamentarianism and Nazism appear both as foreign imports. If we have kept some pride, we will reject them equally and we will be the first to develop the political synthesis that the whole of Europe will end up looking for.’ Jouvenel was less hopeful about these prospects, writing in his diary about his fear that ‘for all the brutality and

109 XXX [BdJ], ‘La Confusion’. For more on these aspects of Jouvenel’s thought, see the next chapter.
110 Fabre-Luce, Journal de la France III (1943), 254.
the clumsiness of their approach, the Germans may have been Europe’s last chance’.\textsuperscript{111}

At the national level, Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce looked for a political alternative to parliamentarianism that would secure fascism’s ‘positive’ legacy – essentially understood as order, unity, authority and heroism – without plunging into the murderous chaos of war. At the same time, this peace-loving ‘néo-fascisme assoupli’\textsuperscript{112} would have to be strong enough to fight communism, and to effectively do so it needed the free use of methods that were not allowed within a democratic system. Fabre-Luce specified what measures he deemed necessary to counteract ‘communist sabotage’: the dissolution of trade unions and their replacement by state-led corporations, a ban on strikes, the interdiction of the PCF and the removal of communist MPs from parliament. Although these measures were ‘incompatible with formal liberty’, universal suffrage and freedom of association, they would allow ‘the vast majority of citizens to breath freely’. As an example, he referred to the constitution of Salazar’s Portugal, which promised freedom of expression while also providing for all kinds of ‘special laws to repress “any perversion of public opinion”. In fact, it is always possible to camouflage fascism as a “presidential republic”. That is the deep tendency of neo-Gaullism.’\textsuperscript{113}

Yet Fabre-Luce was obviously not attracted to Gaullism. During the mid-1940s, a monarchy best reflected both intellectuals’ aspirations. In 1943, Fabre-Luce first mentioned the possibility that Vichy’s failed National Revolution might succeed in a future liberated France under the authority of a fresh ‘leader or monarch’. One year later, he suggested that France needed a king both to re-establish order in society and as a rampart against totalitarian tyranny. All the ancien régime’s abuse of power was surely nothing compared to the revolutionary terror that succeeded it.\textsuperscript{114} In 1946, he admitted thinking, ‘after having for a long time held a different opinion, that the overthrow of monarchy at the end of the eighteenth century has been a serious mistake’. He even interpreted this regicide as a psychoanalytical root cause of the hatred and violence that had henceforth characterised French politics: ‘Vaguely, France continues to reproach itself for having murdered its king and queen, and it tries to justify itself with new violence.’\textsuperscript{115} Even in 1949, when the Fourth Republic had long since established itself, Fabre-Luce continued to

\textsuperscript{111} Cited in Dard, \textit{Bertrand de Jouvenel}, 191.
\textsuperscript{112} Fabre-Luce, \textit{Le Siècle Prend Figure}, 218.
\textsuperscript{113} Ibid., 219.
\textsuperscript{114} Fabre-Luce, \textit{Journal de la France III} (1943), 257; idem, \textit{Journal de la France IV} (1944), 50.
\textsuperscript{115} Fabre-Luce, \textit{Hors d’Atteinte}, 203, 204.
stress that France needed ‘a hereditary prince’ to re-establish ‘an exchange of feelings between rulers and ruled, a common consciousness of responsibility towards the ancestors, a presence of the sacred’.

Fabre-Luce also published *Une Tragédie Royale* (1948), a book about the Belgian king Leopold III, whose behaviour during the occupation had given rise to the Royal Question and his replacement by a regent. He had nothing but praise for the exiled king – ‘le plus pur des épurés’ – whose ‘mystique’ he presented as the only thing that stood in the way of a communist takeover. Without the king’s influence as a ‘mediator’, Belgium was bound to fall prey to the sectarian politics and mutual hatred that had already marked the *Épuration*.

Fabre-Luce avoided explicitly naming his candidate for king of France, but he was referring to Henri d’Orléans (1908-1999), ‘Comte de Paris’ and Orleanist heir to the French throne as King Henry VI. Banished from France like all pretenders under the Third Republic, Henri had lived in Belgium during the 1930s, occasionally visiting the country in secret and publishing a newspaper, *Courrier Royal*, which targeted his French followers. Despite the Action Française being the only serious political movement that campaigned in his favour, Henri d’Orléans gradually distanced himself from Maurras and his crew and in 1937 publicly condemned their doctrine of ‘integral nationalism’. This did not mean he lacked political ambition. Since the February 1934 riots had convinced him that regime change was possible, the Comte de Paris nourished the hope of somehow becoming France’s ‘providential man’ as a stepping stone to claiming the throne.

When Pétain usurped that position in 1940, Henri publicly announced his support of Vichy, hoping to eventually become his successor. Pétain and Laval, however, showed only minimal interest in the Comte de Paris, so he then tried his luck with the other side. Residing in Morocco, he established connections with Allies and members of the Resistance. In December 1942, he was involved in a royalist assassination plot aiming to put him in charge of French North Africa instead of Darlan. Though Darlan was shot dead by a monarchist member of the Resistance and Henri arrived in Algiers to claim power, his attempt was thwarted by the categorical refusal of the Americans to accept this *fait accompli*. Power went to Giraud, while the Comte de Paris was sent back to Morocco, suffering from an infection and discredited in the eyes of the Allies.

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116 Fabre-Luce, *Le Siècle Prend Figure*, 223.
118 Osgood, *French Royalism Under the Third and Fourth Republics*, 128, 133.
Jouvenel had been in touch with Henri d’Orléans since the mid-1930s, when they became acquainted via the Catholic agrarian syndicalist (and future Vichy agriculture minister) Jacques Le Roy Ladurie. Fabre-Luce first met him during a trip to Morocco in late 1941, and the young pretender’s modesty and charm made a very favourable impression on him. He regretted that the 1942 plot had not succeeded in bringing the Comte de Paris back to power. In 1947, Henri was a frequent guest at his friend Jardin’s tea parties in Vevey, possibly meeting Jouvenel there and trying to win the support of the exiled Pétainists and collaborators for his plans for a French constitutional monarchy as part of a new European Holy Roman Empire. The Comte’s Swiss activities gave rise to speculations in the French press about a ‘Leman Connection’ and the existence of a ‘Maquis Noir’ of extreme-rightist resisters, monarchists and Vichyites plotting to overthrow the republic. An official inquiry by the French embassy in Berne concluded that no such conspiracy existed, but the prince felt obliged to deny the allegations in public.

During the same years, with the Action Française out of the way due to its role in Vichy and the trial and condemnation of Maurras, the Comte de Paris made an attempt to revive the monarchist movement in France and tie it to his own ideas. Amongst other press initiatives, he founded the weekly *Ici France* that bore Henri’s motto ‘La mission essentielle du pouvoir est de rendre les hommes heureux’ as a second title. Contributors consisted essentially of close collaborators of the Comte de Paris (Pierre Longone), Catholic conservatives (Gabriel Marcel, Gustave Thibon) and extreme-rightists (Pierre Boutang, Antoine Blondin, François Le Grix). In its fourth edition, the front page of *Ici France* approvingly cited a statement by Fabre-Luce about the ‘nationalisation’ of the British royal family as the embodiment of the nation in which the people were happy to recognise themselves. Jouvenel contributed several articles to *Ici France* in which he criticised the popularity of revolutionary ideologies and defended the concept of order as the foundation of Western civilisation. All the talk of a ‘Révolution permanente’ was nothing but ‘an inversion of aesthetic, moral and above all religious sense’. In line with these conservative ideas, Jouvenel also worried about the intellectual development of French youth, for the

120 Walter, *Paysan Militant*, 222.
121 Fabre-Luce, *Vingt-Cinq Années de Liberté II*, 101; idem, *Le Siècle Prend Figure*, 223.
first time not counting himself as part of it. In order to prevent young people from falling prey to cynical opportunism or ‘base Marxism’, intellectuals and teachers had an important role to play. But all too often these very intellectuals had themselves become recruiters in party service, which led Jouvenel to conclude that ‘M. Benda had not been wrong to denounce the “treason of the clerks”’. If there was a natural selection in the world of ideas, it worked not in the normal way but rather ‘virus-like’: ‘the newest ones often prove to be the most vigorous, and, as far as we are concerned, the most dangerous’.

With their republican upper-bourgeois origins, Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce lacked the conservative Catholic background that was the natural hotbed of French monarchism, but their post-war affiliation with the Comte de Paris is not surprising if one takes a closer look at the political programme defended by Henri d’Orléans. First of all, Henri had shaken off the suffocating embrace of the Action Française while keeping certain corporatist ideas advocated by the right wing of the 1930s non-conformist movement. Claiming to oppose party struggle and the mutual hatred of left and right, his vision of monarchical restoration promised order, social peace and a certain degree of democracy. Like the two intellectuals and many other former collaborators, he was also a supporter of the European federalist movement. Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce recognised their own political desires in the Comte de Paris’ promise that his royal ‘mystique’ – something the Fourth Republic entirely lacked – was the only way to reconcile France’s warring factions (republicans, socialists, Gaullists and former Pétainists) and unite them against the communist menace.

Reinventing the Extreme Right

*Ici France* soon shipwrecked due to poor sales as well as competition from *Aspects de la France*, not only in its initials a reincarnation of *L’Action Française*. A few years later, the Comte de Paris entirely abandoned all royalist propaganda as a precondition for permission to return to France. This robbed Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel of only one out of many journalistic platforms. Fabre-Luce also contributed to *Aspects de la France* – the newspaper

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125 Goyet, *Henri d’Orléans*, 279; Osgood, *French Royalism*, 191. For more about European federalism, see the final part of this chapter.
that the young law student Jean-Marie Le Pen at the time was energetically hawking on the rue de la Sorbonne – but the two intellectuals’ main activities were for publications issued by the broader extreme right. 126 Not that there was a big difference between the two. Despite its moderate tone, *Ici France* overlapped with other extreme-right periodicals in its themes – anti-communism, attacks on the Épuration, praise for Francoist Spain and other authoritarian regimes – and at least partially in its personnel. In France as well as in exile, monarchists, Pétainists, former collaborators, fascists and anti-republican Catholics were quick to reorganise themselves after 1944. Their very real political differences were largely sublimated by their shared troubles with the Épuration, their position as outcasts in the post-war order, and their rejection of the Fourth Republic and its ‘system’. Grouped together under the epithet ‘opposition nationale’, this community revolved around several ‘study centres’ bearing very general names in order not to arouse suspicion. To avoid covert censorship like being cut off from the paper supply, their press often started as members-only bulletins before becoming regular periodicals in 1946 or 1947. Contributors used multiple pseudonyms and had to resort to side activities to make ends meet. 127

The most successful extreme-right press initiative in the late 1940s, *Les Écrits de Paris*, published contributions from both Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel. Founded in 1946 as *Questions Actuelles*, the internal bulletin for members of the ‘Centre d’Études des Questions Actuelles, Politiques, Économiques et Sociales’ and initially camouflaging itself as a monthly of the moderate right, its true political colour had already begun to show before it transformed into a regular periodical at the beginning of 1947. Chief editor René Malliavin oriented the journal along two main lines: the struggle against the ‘lynch law’ of the Épuration and the defence – close to veneration in practice – of Marshal Pétain and the Vichy regime. After Pétain’s death in 1951, the *Écrits* continued to dedicate commemorative articles to him, often written by Jacques Isorni, the lawyer who had eloquently defended him at his trial. Many contributors were old (Pierre Dominique, Émile Roche, Jean Montigny, Maurice Martin du Gard) or new (Pierre Boutang, Henri Massis, René Gillouin, François Le Grix) acquaintances of Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel. The fiercely anti-Semitic Xavier Vallat, who had headed Vichy’s

127 Vinen, *Bourgeois Politics in France*, 104. Vinen mentions one case of a journalist who ‘supported himself by writing books about the English royal family under the pseudonym Caroline Jones’.
General Commissariat for Jewish Questions, also contributed articles to the periodical. Under Malliavin’s leadership, the Écrits de Paris soon grew from a circulation of 4,000 to about 30,000 copies, making it by far the largest extreme-right press initiative of the late 1940s.128

From the beginning, its editors held Fabre-Luce in high esteem for his outspoken attacks against the Épuration. In December 1946, Questions Actuelles paid tribute to him as the ‘psychoanalyst of the Resistance’ for his dissecting analysis of the Resistance mentality in Hors d’Atteinte. In this book, Fabre-Luce interpreted the ‘hystérie’ of the Épuration and the Gaullist Resistance myth – “I am big and strong, I have never been beaten, I liberated myself” – as symptoms of ‘overcompensation’ for a reality that was much less glorious and of which even the noisiest ‘résistantialiste’ was secretly aware: France had lost the war in record time in 1940, after which it had been ‘successively occupied by all the belligerents’, and all the Resistance had done was to make things worse by creating a vicious circle of mutual bloodshed. Pretending to put France on the Freudian sofa, Fabre-Luce concluded that the nation was not very different from the girl suffering from erotic dreams who punished herself with neuralgia. Similarly, France was ‘secretly in love with Nazism’, and it punished itself for these ‘bad thoughts’ through political paralysis and food deprivation.129

Similarly, Fabre-Luce saw the Épuration as essentially a ‘biological struggle. It’s about sterilizing the opponent, through prison or ostracism, for the period of his life during which he can act and enrich himself with experience. They try to prematurely ossify him.”130 He was furious against left-wing intellectuals who approved of the Épuration, especially Jean-Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir, whom he felt had blood on her hands for refusing to sign Brasillach’s clemency request because she claimed he had during his trial ‘conquered her respect’. By honourably recognising Brasillach as an existentialist free to undergo the ultimate consequences of his choices, Beauvoir had proven the ‘inhumane rigidity’ of her principles. While Camus and Maurice Merleau-Ponty also initially defended harsh justice against collaborators and violence ‘in the name of the proletariat’, they had at least been willing to admit their mistakes, whilst Sartre and Beauvoir never had such scruples. For Fabre-Luce, Sartre symbolised the

128 Algazy, La Tentation Néo-Fasciste, 66; Cotillon, Ce Qu’il Reste de Vichy, 122.
130 Fabre-Luce, Journal 1951, 95.
‘résistantialiste’ whose own Resistance credentials were ‘very questionable’. ‘During the Épuration, Jean-Paul Sartre published a defence of the Jews that would have been admirable during the occupation. But, at the same moment, he pinned the yellow star on other chests, the ones of the indigènes nationaux, who were the Jews of the moment’.

Starting from early 1948, Fabre-Luce soon became one of the most authoritative voices expressing themselves in the Écrits de Paris, publishing an impressive 26 articles between 1948 and 1954. He published travel impressions, excerpts from his new books and commentary on foreign policy but also a criticism of the Fourth Republic dubbed ‘the reign of chaos’. While the biggest merit of Vichy had been to keep the country safe from ‘Polandisation’ (the famous idea that Hitler would have treated France in the same way as Poland if it hadn’t been for Vichy) and with an intact elite able to rebuild the country, the post-war situation came down to a carnivalesque travesty of values and hierarchies that had devastated France. Fabre-Luce held the republican regime responsible for lowering the nation’s gold reserves, rising inflation, sinking living standards for the ‘honnêtes gens’ (while all kinds of crooks could freely enrich themselves), the fall in productivity, the weakening of the army and foreign exploitation of French diplomacy. Since no one still believed in the regime, its collapse was only a matter of time. The communists had secured important positions within the regime ‘in preparation of the next war’, while the Gaullists were actively working to make the chaos worse, hoping that a final crisis would bring their icon to power.

Apart from printing Fabre-Luce’s frequent articles, the Écrits de Paris also prominently announced his upcoming lectures and books. This was scant consolation for the near-complete silence of the mainstream press, which not only rarely reviewed his books but also often refused to publish paid advertisements for them. In reaction to one such refusal from Le Figaro, Fabre-Luce sent a personal letter to a number of readers of the newspaper, objecting to ‘a systematic operation of suppression’ against his work. At least one reader agreed, replying to Fabre-Luce that Le Figaro

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131 Fabre-Luce, Vingt-Cinq Années de Liberté II, 264, 267.
132 See, for example, Alfred Fabre-Luce, ‘La Séparation de Wynendaele’, Écrits de Paris (February 1948); idem, ‘Dublin 1948’, Écrits de Paris (October 1948); idem, ‘Impressions d’Allemagne’, Écrits de Paris (November 1949); idem, ‘Crise au Quay d’Orsay?’, Écrits de Paris (December 1951).
134 See Écrits de Paris (January 1948); idem (February 1949); idem (March, 1950) idem (November 1953).
was indeed unequalled in its ‘cowardliness and spinelessness’. This letter was yet another episode in a long-running feud between Fabre-Luce and the newspaper and especially its long-time chief editor Pierre Brisson. After supporting (and accepting subsidies from) Vichy between 1940 and 1942, *Le Figaro* had ceased publication when the Germans occupied the southern zone. Fabre-Luce was outraged that after 1944, Brisson hypocritically tried to ‘buy an antedated “resistance” certificate’ by attacking other Pétainists, including Fabre-Luce himself. When *l’Humanité* reminded Brisson of his former Pétainism, the editor, rather than standing by these positions, humbly acknowledged his own lack of ‘perspicacity’. Fabre-Luce furiously concluded that Brisson’s fabricated ‘super-Gaullism’ was nothing but ‘insurance’ against his own past: ‘He went to the “Resistance” just like Maurice Chevalier went to the communists, and he has been rewarded for that – because, as everyone knows, the “collaborator” is not the man who approved of Montoire or sang for the Germans, but whoever subscribed neither with Gaulle, nor with Thorez.’

Fabre-Luce was angry enough to resort to menace. In 1953, in response to an article by Dominique Auclères in *Le Figaro* accusing him of being a member of a ‘fascist international’, Fabre-Luce demanded that his reply be published unabridged, threatening legal action if the newspaper failed to do so. When the publication of his letter (together with a reaction by Auclères) failed to satisfy him, he wrote another reply, personally addressing himself to Brisson: ‘For as far as my opinions are concerned, I do not recognise you any right to judge them. You have too much forgotten your support of Marshal Pétain to conserve its merit, and I only accept resistance lessons from the journalists I met in the Gestapo prisons.’ Demanding once more the full publication of these words, Fabre-Luce concluded with a threatening postscript: ‘If you desire to continue this controversy about the past – which I have not aroused – I am at your disposal, with a very complete record.’

In 1955, after he discovered that even the Swiss press was uninterested in his recent *Histoire de la Révolution Européenne*, a furious Fabre-Luce wrote Jouvenel asking him to signal his book to the *Gazette de Lausanne*: ‘That the work of several years [...] is not even noticed by the French big press

135 Fabre-Luce to unnamed readers of *Le Figaro* (8 July 1949) and response from a reader [name and date illegible], Fonds AFL, 472 AP 3.


137 Fabre-Luce, *Hors d’Atteinte*, 165, 166.

138 Fabre-Luce to Pierre Brisson (15 April 1953), idem to Pierre Brisson (21 April 1953), Fonds AFL, 472 AP 1.
(with one exception) does not need to surprise us. That is the way things are. But if Switzerland also participates in this conspiracy of silence, what hope do we still have?“139

Fabre-Luce did not share the uncritical veneration of Pétain that is present in the articles of Isorni and several other contributors of the Écrits de Paris. In his eyes and at least retrospectively, the Marshal had, despite his ‘good intentions’, made a mistake by staying in Vichy after November 1942, and many of his later decisions were also questionable.140 But this did not stop Fabre-Luce from making his occasional contribution to the Pétain cult. When the Marshal died, Fabre-Luce was ‘by coincidence’ just spending a holiday weekend at the Île d’Yeu, the isle off the Vendée coast where the Marshal had been imprisoned since 1945. He watched the arrival of Pétainists, First World War veterans and a few officials of the state and the Catholic Church, all emerging from the same small ferry that linked the island to the mainland. He met Pétain’s widow and attended the funeral service at the Yeu Marine cemetery. In a special mourning edition of the Écrits de Paris, Fabre-Luce reported from Yeu with an homage to ‘the man whom, in our times, the French have loved the most’. He expressed the hope that his inconsiderable grave, ‘amidst drowned sailors, crashed English pilots and German occupiers who died of neurasthenia’, would be only temporary, in preparation for his glorious reburial at the Douaumont Os- suary near Verdun.141

Jouvenel started publishing in the Écrits de Paris in early 1947, one year before Fabre-Luce. During his two-and-a-half-year involvement with the review and in line with his general post-war attitude, he stuck to his careful avoidance of political provocation, mainly addressing economic topics or political ideas and treating these subjects in an analytical, distinguished style. Nevertheless, the concrete political dimension of his contributions is evident. In November 1947, Jouvenel favourably contrasted the ‘happy impotence’ of royal power during the ancien régime – held at bay by traditional beliefs and feelings of responsibility – to the ‘arbitrary despotism’ of popular sovereignty. In April of the same year, he stated that the British Labour

139 Fabre-Luce to Bertrand de Jouvenel (21 January 1955), Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (299). In response, Jouvenel cited the book in one of his own articles in the Gazette de Lausanne.
141 Alfred Fabre-Luce, ‘À l’Île d’Yeu’, Écrits de Paris (July 1951), 35, 38; idem, Vingt-Cinq Années de Liberté III, 185.
government’s interventionist economic policy was inevitably leading the country towards Soviet authoritarianism.142

Jouvenel also contributed to La France Catholique, a right-wing weekly linked to the Action Catholique (the successor to Édouard de Castelnau’s Fédération Nationale Catholique from the interwar years) that catered to conservatives, monarchists and many former or unrepentant Pétainists. Its chief editor, Jean de Fabrègues, was a 1930s ‘non-conformist’ and former supporter of the AF, PPF and Vichy whom Jouvenel knew from La Lutte des Jeunes and their joint activities for Doriot. Although he may have published in La France Catholique before, Jouvenel's contributions only started to become a regular feature in early 1950 when Fabrègues offered him 3,000 francs per article.143 Their correspondence shows a mutual admiration and the conviction of fighting for a common cause but also frequent clashes about the general line of the weekly, especially regarding the wars of decolonisation. In early 1952, after discovering that a sentence had been deleted from one of his articles, Jouvenel angrily complained about the periodical’s utterly un-Christian ‘right-wing howling’ and announced he saw no choice but to cease his collaboration, even if that meant a ‘financial sacrifice’ for him.144 Jouvenel's contributions did not cease, however, and in September 1952, his criticism of French policy in Tunisia led to him receiving angry letters from readers. More clashes followed in 1955 and one year later, Fabrègues’ refusal to publish an article in which Jouvenel expressed his shock about the French bombing of the Tunisian village of Sakhiet Sidi Youssef led to a lasting break between the two.145

Jouvenel was in touch with other Vichy nostalgics, united in the Association des Représentants du Peuple de la Troisième République (ARPTR). Camouflaging as a generic association of Third Republic politicians and led by Catholic priest and former MP Jean-Marie Desgranges, the ARPTR in fact represented those who had been declared ineligible to run for political office due to their vote in favour of full powers for Pétain in 1940. The organisation’s main objectives were to campaign against the ‘illegal’ ineligibility law and

143 Jean de Fabrègues to Jouvenel (13 February 1950), Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (299); Cotillon, Ce Qu’il Reste de Vichy, 121.
144 Jouvenel to Fabrègues (undated, 1952). See also Fabrègues to Jouvenel (25 September 1950); Jouvenel to Fabrègues (10 August 1952), Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (299).
145 Jouvenel to anonymous reader (12 September 1952); Jouvenel to Fabrègues (29 October 1955), Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (299); Dard, Bertrand de Jouvenel, 313.
against the system of the Fourth Republic, plead for a general amnesty and an end to the Épuration, fight communism and defend the heritage of Vichy by stressing the legal continuity between the Third Republic and Pétain’s regime. The ARPTR published a journal, sought and received the support of French and foreign politicians and organised a petition to the United Nations. Desgranges, who had himself been exempted from ineligibility because of his Resistance activities, also authored a book about the ‘Hidden Crimes of Résistantialisme’. This concept, originally coined by Malliavin, conveniently created a distance between the actual wartime Resistance and the ideology that exploited its heritage after the liberation. In the eyes of Desgranges and many other extreme-rightists, while the Resistance had its merits, résistantialisme was a base ideology of hatred and persecution that was the driving force behind the Épuration, mainly adhered to by people with fairly limited or no real Resistance credentials. A recurrent theme in the ARPTR campaigns was to describe Vichy and the Resistance as two equally honourable reactions to the defeat, with both sides counting a few criminal individuals amongst them.

The highlight in the existence of the ARPTR was the ‘Banquêt des Mille’ that it organised in March 1948. This massive ‘banquet of a thousand ineligibles’, marking the centenary of the 1848 revolution, featured speeches by a dozen prominent ineligible politicians, including former Third Republic and Vichy minister Pierre-Étienne Flandin. In his speech, included in an official ARPTR brochure among Jouvenel’s papers, Flandin positively contrasted the patriotism and unity of the Third Republic with the ‘present disorder’ of the Fourth, while stating that the liberation had only exchanged Hitler’s imperialism for Stalin’s. Unless a strong European federation quickly took hold and received American support, Flandin concluded, ‘mankind’s only choice is between the totalitarian mill and death!’ The banquet ended with a short speech by Desgranges, during which he requested a minute of silence for ‘the thousands of innocent’ who were still in prison. In terms befitting a defender of the Third Republic, he called them ‘the new Dreyfuses’ and compared their sort to that of the Jews during the War: ‘Remember that the people of Paris have eased the ignominy of the yellow star by paying the highest respect to those who were forced to wear it.’

146 Côtillon, Ce Qu’il Reste de Vichy, 172; Vinen, Bourgeois Politics in France, 106.
147 Côtillon, Ce Qu’il Reste de Vichy, 172, 174, Vinen, Bourgeois Politics in France, 103. See also Michel Dacier [pseudonym of René Malliavin], ‘Le Résistantialisme’, Écrits de Paris (January 1947).
Jouvenel’s own ideas were politically close to the ARPTR, especially when it came to denying the legitimacy of the post-war order by describing Vichy and the Resistance as equally honourable, or collaboration and the Épuration as equally reprehensible reactions to the course of events. In 1946, he characterised the Fourth Republic as essentially a system of lies of opportunism: in a ‘society bereft of foresight or principles’, people were mainly occupied with proving that they had been ‘neither a collaborator, nor munichois, nor anti-communist’ just like they had asserted in 1940 that they were ‘neither Jewish, nor freemason, and that they had never been a warmonger’. Continuing this comparison, Jouvenel stated that under the tripartite coalition of PCF, SFIO and MRP, people had cowardly accustomed themselves to the illusion of ‘a quasi-communism that would not be communist, just like they did under Vichy with a quasi-fascism that would not be fascist’.149 In a letter to Rudolph Binion in 1954, he described the Épuration and the collaboration as ‘two periods of autocracy and madness’.150

Olivier Dard, Jouvenel’s biographer, seems a bit too eager to justify Jouvenel’s contributions to the Écrits de Paris by pointing to his ‘marginalisation’ in the mainstream press, downplaying the importance of Jouvenel’s ideological proximity to the post-war extreme-right.151 Nonetheless, Fabre-Luce’s position in these circles was more prominent than Jouvenel’s. Fabre-Luce’s journalistic productivity, his outspokenness and his position as a ‘victim’ of the Épuration earned him the admiration of many members of the extreme right, who often asked for his help. The Belgian fascist journalist Robert Poulet, an acquaintance of Fabre-Luce from the 1930s who was arrested after the liberation and put in prison awaiting an execution that was ultimately not carried out, was forever beholden to Fabre-Luce for enabling him to publish an excerpt from his prison memoirs in the French press. In several long letters, he expressed his gratitude to Fabre-Luce and emphasised how important he had become for him and his fellow prisoners:

Should I repeat to you how strongly, inside this hell and around it, we admire you, love you? We thought that your career would be that of a superior but cerebral and aloof writer. For five or six years, your books, and the man who appears through it, have found the hearts of countless readers. Something has magnificently grown in your person, in your heart, in your destiny. If one looks for the origin of this change, one finds

150 Jouvenel to Rudolph Binion (August/September 1954), Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (294).
151 Dard, Bertrand de Jouvenel, 266.
this: you have been courageous at the moment when all your colleagues were cowardly. You alone have not stepped back from certain truths.\footnote{152}

Fabre-Luce’s prominence was also recognised outside this milieu. In 1955, Jean Paulhan named three men who were important for the resurgence of the extreme right since the Liberation: Pierre Boutang, Maurice Bardèche and Fabre-Luce.\footnote{153}

Fabre-Luce received a letter, addressed ‘from the French border’, from Pierre Clementi, a French fascist who had founded a tiny fascist fringe party in 1934 that became one of the supporting pillars of the LVF during the war. Having fought on the eastern front in 1942-1943, Clementi chose to go into hiding in Italy and Germany when the war was over to escape the death penalty. Clementi expressed his admiration for Fabre-Luce’s work and asked him for a copy of *Au Nom des Silencieux* and other books published through the Cheval Ailé. Through Clementi’s tips about the Italian press, Fabre-Luce seems to have come into contact with the famous Italian journalist Indro Montanelli, who discussed his books in an article published in *Oggi*. In a cordial but distant letter, Montanelli expressed his interest in a meeting ‘between Europeans united not by similar ideas, but by a similar “civilisation”’.\footnote{154}

Fabre-Luce’s apogee as an extreme-rightist journalist and political writer came during the early 1950s with the foundation of the weekly *Rivarol*. Named after the anti-revolutionary writer Antoine de Rivarol (1753-1801) who had in his days criticised the Reign of Terror, *Rivarol* was launched on the initiative of René Malliavin together with Fabre-Luce, Thérive, Blondin, Dominique, Boutang and many other members of the *Écrits de Paris* team. Under the chief-editorship of former Vichy youth secretary Maurice Gaït, *Rivarol* soon grew to a circulation of 45,000, making it the French extreme right’s most successful and most influential weekly. This success was due to the quality of its contributors, its effective use of derision and provocation, and its extremist political positions. While the *Écrits de Paris* often defended the heritage of Pétain and Vichy and the supposedly good intentions of those who served them, *Rivarol* did not eschew associating itself outright with collaboration, Nazism and anti-Semitism, including regular flickers of Holocaust denial.\footnote{155}

Adhering to a variant of Europeanism that figured prominently in the

\footnotesize{\begin{itemize}
\item[\footnote{152}]{Robert Poulet to Fabre-Luce (24 March 1947), Fonds AFL, 472 AP 2.}
\item[\footnote{153}]{Cited in Weber, ‘Le Fièvre de la Raison’, 565.}
\item[\footnote{154}]{Pierre Clementi to Fabre-Luce (13 August 1946); Indro Montanelli to Fabre-Luce (7 October 1946?), Fonds AFL, 472 AP 2.}
\item[\footnote{155}]{Algazy, *La Tentation Néo-Fasciste*, 131; Grynberg, ‘Des Signes de Résurgence de l’Antisémitisme’, 187.}
\end{itemize}}
programme of early-post-war neo-Fascism – during the 1950s it adopted the subtitle ‘Hebdomadaire de l’Opposition Nationale et Européenne’ – *Rivarol* was also quick to establish connections with like-minded movements and reviews in other countries, primarily in Italy and Germany.\(^\text{156}\)

Fabre-Luce wrote the front-page article for the first issue of *Rivarol*, in which he struck a conciliatory tone between supporters of Pétain and De Gaulle. Denouncing the *Épuration* as a machination of the Left to play out the Right against itself in a useless ‘civil war’, he called for an end to ‘yesterday’s quarrels’ and a united front of all nationally minded Frenchmen. This meant putting an end to the persecution of collaborators, opening all ‘political prisons’ and the ‘elimination of the fifth column in the whole of Western Europe’. He deemed all these measures necessary to save the country from a communist coup and to protect Western Europe from an attack from the East.\(^\text{157}\) The risk of France falling prey to a Soviet takeover from the inside or outside was a recurrent theme in Fabre-Luce’s contributions to *Rivarol*. He repeatedly pointed out that the country had been infiltrated by Stalin’s future collaborators – sometimes quoting Léon Blum’s dismissal of the PCF as essentially a ‘foreign nationalist party’ – and how quickly it could become a Soviet ‘satellite’. While Jacques Duclos or Maurice Thorez were ready to be France’s next Laval, even the non-communist press was already anticipating its ‘gleichschaltung’.\(^\text{158}\)

Fabre-Luce’s contributions to *Rivarol* ceased after three months, probably due to conflicts between him and the neo-fascist hardliners among the editors. When *Le Figaro* linked him in 1953 via *Rivarol* to a ‘fascist international’ consisting, amongst others, of *Europa Nazione* (Italy) and *Nation Europa* (Germany), he was quick to stress that he had ‘withdrawn’ from *Rivarol* and had only published one article in *Nation Europa*.\(^\text{159}\) A friend (possibly Gaït) reacted angrily to this statement, after which Fabre-Luce wrote him back to explain what had made him leave:

> You will surely remember my remarks about the anti-Semitic articles, a certain obsession with the past, the systematic praise for any fascist

\(^{156}\) Mamonne, ‘Revitalizing and De-Territorializing Fascism in the 1950s’, 306.


\(^{159}\) Fabre-Luce to Pierre Brisson (15 April 1953), Fonds AFL, 472 AP 1. This claim is supported by an unpublished Swedish MA thesis, which established the existence of one article by Fabre-Luce in *Nation Europa* during the years 1951-1954. Frölander, ‘Att Kunstruera en Kontinent’, 84.
regime, even when the leader rules against good reason (example: Peron). 

[...] Such a pity that Rivarol often combines good insights and legitimate protests with outrages that to me appear as hardly tenable.\textsuperscript{160}

As much as this sounds like a clean ideological break, Fabre-Luce returned to lead Rivarol at the end of 1954. When Gaït gave up his chief-editorship to pursue a teaching career, Malliavin asked Fabre-Luce to take over as head of the weekly. In his memoirs, Fabre-Luce – remaining silent about his initial contributions in 1951 – claimed that he mainly joined Rivarol because no other newspaper allowed him to express his opinions with the same freedom. Though he ‘disliked the tone’ of Rivarol and tried to ‘introduce more nuance’, he soon discovered that his real influence was limited. Editors told him that this was a suicide strategy since readers only wanted to see their pre-established opinions confirmed. ‘It was a no-win situation. Once more, I was going to look like a fascist to the liberals, like a liberal to the fascists.’\textsuperscript{161} Still, Fabre-Luce was to lead Rivarol for a full year. He later claimed that his friendship with Dominique, Poulet and Jean Madiran kept him at the weekly, as well as his fascination for Malliavin:

\begin{quote}
a strange, slightly diabolic man. [...] One day, he told me the depths of his thought. According to him, history was made by the groups of people who were determined to persevere in their being. This general view led him to admire authoritarian regimes, to feel a certain indulgence for racism (including Israel’s), to fiercely oppose anything that could lead to the weakening of our traditions and the disappearance of our elites.\textsuperscript{162}
\end{quote}

He also felt that the Rivarol ‘fanatics’ had their purpose: ‘Their narrow-mindedness was often paired with much loyalty and selflessness. Amongst them, I sensed a reserve of strength that could be of use to France in days of trouble.’\textsuperscript{163}

It is probable that in retrospect Fabre-Luce overemphasised the distance between himself and the other editors of Rivarol. While his subtler intellectualism clashed with the weekly’s propensity for extremist provocation and his positions were indeed more nuanced than those of authors like Rebatet and Madiran, Fabre-Luce fitted within the range of positions adopted by

\begin{footnotes}
160 Fabre-Luce to Maurice Gaït (?) (date unknown, 1953?), Fonds AFL, 472 AP 1.
161 Fabre-Luce, \textit{Vingt-Cinq Années de Liberté III}, 199, 201.
162 Ibid., 202.
163 Ibid., 202.
\end{footnotes}
periodicals like *Rivarol* and the *Écrits de Paris*. The ‘opposition nationale’ was a loose coalition of royalists, collaborators, neo-fascists, authoritarian Catholics, Pétainists and conservatives who were often more united by what they were against (the Fourth Republic, De Gaulle, Marxism) than by what they were for. Of very different backgrounds but forged together by their common experience of exclusion and persecution in the period after the Liberation, they relied on a press that could only exist by including a variety of opinions and positions. This pluriformity is illustrated by readers’ different reactions to Fabre-Luce’s return to *Rivarol*. The Swiss writer Aldo Dami, who had submitted articles to *Rivarol* before but had fallen out of grace after criticising its ‘outdated fascism’, congratulated Fabre-Luce and hoped that he would ‘kick out a few extremists’. Fabre-Luce’s papers include a copy of a letter to Malliavin in which a reader from Rouen complained about the chief editor. Claiming to speak for ‘a certain number of your readers’, he called upon the board of editors to more clearly distance themselves from Fabre-Luce’s ‘multiple theses’.

Despite Fabre-Luce apparent distaste for *Rivarol*’s anti-Semitism, his own contributions were not entirely devoid of anti-Semitic references. Especially in a commentary on Pierre Mendès-France, who was prime minister from June 1954 to February 1955, Fabre-Luce alluded to his Jewish identity as well as the high numbers of Jews in his ‘brain trust’ of young functionaries and politicians. Quasi-innocently, he also mentioned the glass of milk that Mendès drank at a reception in Washington. Mendès-France’s Jewish background as well as his role in the decolonisation of Indochina, Tunisia and Morocco made him one of the extreme right’s favourite hate objects. Despite being a member of the Radical Party, not a socialist, Mendès was often paired with Léon Blum, that other Jewish prime minister and favourite target of the anti-Semitic right. When as part of a government campaign against alcoholism, Mendès-France drank a glass of milk during a high-profile reception in Washington, Pierre Poujade lashed out at him as a dangerous foreigner without ‘one drop of Gallic blood in your veins’ who was ruining the country’s wine and champagne producers. In his memoirs, Fabre-Luce caricaturised Mendès as a nervous Jew who ‘only felt secure inside his little ghetto’ of Jewish counsellors. In a resurgence of his anti-Semitism from the war years, Fabre-Luce took Mendès’ leadership as an

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164 Aldo Dami to Fabre-Luce (10 December 1954), Fonds AFL, 472 AP 3.
166 ???
occasion to blame the outbursts of anti-Semitism on the Jews themselves. As in his wartime diatribe about ‘Léon Blum and the Jewification of ministerial cabinets’, he reproached Mendès and his counsellors for not having understood the capital lesson of the Popular Front, during which the ‘indiscreet invasion’ of the government by too many Jews had laid the foundations for the racial hatred that Hitler’s propaganda could all too easily tap.\(^{168}\)

Fabre-Luce preferred Antoine Pinay to Mendès as prime minister, as he made clear in a book he published in 1953.\(^{169}\) Pinay, a conservative industrialist from the Rhône department, was a member of the Centre National des Indépendants et Paysans (CNIP), a loose coalition of right-wing politicians who identified neither with the MRP nor with Gaullism. In the political landscape of the Fourth Republic, the CNIP often held the key to governmental majorities. Despite calling itself ‘moderate’, the CNIP displayed a relative openness towards ideas from the far right. Jacques Isorni, a prominent extreme-rightist and a regular contributor to the *Écrits de Paris* and *Rivarol*, had been included in the party together with a few other Pétainist MPs. Seemingly out of nowhere, Pinay rose to prominence in the early 1950s to become minister for public works and subsequently prime minister in 1952. After the fall of the Mendès-France government in February 1955, he became foreign minister under Edgar Faure. Pinay’s mass appeal was based on his unpretentious looks and manners. While cartoonists despaired over his near-complete lack of characteristics, many Frenchmen valued him as an everyman whose modesty was in every sense the opposite of the ambitions and personality cult of Gaullism and Stalinism.\(^{170}\) In November 1953, Fabre-Luce declined a dinner invitation from Jouvenel because he had to go to Bordeaux ‘to deliver a eulogy of Pinay’.\(^{171}\) Jouvenel appreciated both Pinay and Mendès, whom he knew from his *Notre Temps* days and with whom he corresponded in the early 1950s. The former sent him a letter in which he expressed his admiration for ‘a Frenchman who, during cruel and difficult circumstances, has voluntarily placed himself at the service of the country’.\(^{172}\)

\(^{168}\) Fabre-Luce, *Vingt-Cinq Années de Liberté III*, 195; idem, *Journal de la France I* (1940), 229.

\(^{169}\) Sapiens [pseudonym of AFL], *Mendès ou Pinay?*, 46, 152; Fabre-Luce, ‘Bonne chance, Monsieur Pinay’, *Rivarol* (10 February 1955).

\(^{170}\) Assouline, *Une Éminence Grise*, 277; Shields, *The Extreme Right in France*, 64.

\(^{171}\) Fabre-Luce to Jouvenel (23 November 1953), Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (299).

\(^{172}\) Correspondence between Jouvenel and Mendès-France included in Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (303); Antoine Pinay to Jouvenel (31 October 1952) Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (304). Pinay was possibly referring to Jouvenel’s intelligence activities for Vichy.
Fabre-Luce and other members of the extreme right had additional reasons for appreciating Pinay. A right-wing senator during the late 1930s, Pinay had voted in favour of giving full powers to Pétain on 10 July 1940 and had subsequently sat on Vichy’s Conseil National. Ineligible as a result of his vote for Pétain, Pinay profited from the 1951 amnesty law to return to politics and stand for elected office. Although he had hardly been a prominent servant of Vichy, Pinay’s election as prime minister nevertheless marked an important step in the rehabilitation of Pétainists and Vichyites in post-war France. In addition, despite looking back on a decades-long uninterrupted political career, Pinay presented himself as an apolitical candidate, as a man who ostentatively ‘hated politics’ but ‘loved administration’ and for whom the categories of ‘left’ and ‘right’ had no meaning. Richard Vinen has remarked that this apolitical attitude could be interpreted in two possible ways: as a pragmatic distaste for ideology and a preference for concrete problem-solving, much like the attitude of the Parti Radical at the time, or as a revulsion against the political system as such. This latter variant came remarkably close to the opposition nationale’s attacks against ‘the system’ of the Fourth Republic and its supposedly all-permeating ideology of ‘résistantialisme’.173

Fabre-Luce repeatedly tried to interest his friend Jouvenel in writing for Rivarol, but it seems the latter maintained a certain distance towards the review.174 In March 1955, Fabre-Luce sent out a large survey around the question: ‘Can France get rid of the “system”? With what means?’. An announcement in Rivarol asked readers to give their opinion, while Fabre-Luce sent letters asking for contributions to a number of prominent writers and journalists, including Jouvenel. In his letter to Jouvenel, he specified that by the word ‘system’ he meant the Fourth Republic characterised by ‘a parliamentary regime and a deep penetration of communism and progressivism in the governmental and administrative machinery’. Describing Rivarol as the principal bulwark of the ‘opposition nationale against this system’, Fabre-Luce concluded: ‘a large number of citizens Frenchmen today recognise and sense the relevance of our criticism. Maybe even the hour of construction is close.’175 If Jouvenel agreed at all, he abstained from participating in the survey. The resulting publication in Rivarol was a cacophony of different views on France’s situation and the possibilities of gradual or

173 Vinen, Bourgeois Politics in France, 244; Assouline, Une Éminence Grise, 277.
174 Fabre-Luce to Jouvenel (21 January 1955), Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (299).
175 Fabre-Luce to Jouvenel (28 March 1955), Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (299); ‘Rivarol Ouvre und Enquête’, Rivarol (21 April 1955). Crossing-out in original.
revolutionary change, both from readers and from the intellectuals who did take part (René Gillouin and Jacques Plassard, among others). In the conclusion, Fabre-Luce faced the difficult task of finding common ground between the desires of his conservative, monarchist and neo-fascist readers. Navigating carefully, he concluded:

We can have [...] different views on the ideal regime that should be established in the future. That is legitimate and even desirable. Rivarol is not and must not be the device of any faction. No totalitarianisms against totalitarianism! But whatever our particular preferences [...] we all want to defend our Western and Christian civilisation against materialism and against the law of the numbers. There is a combat, small or big, that needs to be fought every week.176

The many contributions of Fabre-Luce to Rivarol ended abruptly in December 1955. In his published resignation letter to Malliavin, he explained that his main reason for quitting was his loss of faith in the possibility of ‘constructive action’ in the near future. Having wrongly believed that men like Pinay and Faure would pursue a politics different from Mendès, in which France would retain its colonial empire and take the initiative for the military integration of Western Europe, Fabre-Luce admitted that he was arriving ‘at the end of the road that we could follow together’. Having lost all hope for improvement within the regime, he saw only two remaining possibilities: fundamental protest against the authorities, including ‘an appeal to a France of the past that might be resurrected in an indeterminate future’, or ‘retreating in the shadows’. While he saw Malliavin had chosen the former option, Fabre-Luce preferred the latter. He stated that France had become nothing but ‘a fortress under siege’, and he predicted the foreseeable collapse of the European project, NATO, the Empire, the French franc and the Republic. Only after this deluge, Fabre-Luce thought, ‘in front of humiliation and a vital threat, old quarrels can become meaningless and many Frenchmen will be ready to surmount them together. I wish – without being certain – that these new chances will find us in agreement.’177

Fabre-Luce’s departure and the return of Gaït to the head of Rivarol marked a step in the periodical’s evolution to even more extremist positions and the burning of bridges towards the established political system. In the

wake of Gait’s return, collaborationist hardliners like Rebatet, Henri Lèbre and Guy Crouzet joined the Rivarol team. Although his observation fails to do justice to Fabre-Luce’s collaborationist attitude during the occupation, the historian Jérôme Cotillon considers his departure a key moment in ‘the marginalisation of Pétainists to the advantage of journalists who were much more marked by their collaborationist engagement’.178 To this day, Rivarol has specialised in revisionist views on the history of the Second World War. More straightforwardly, it is one of France’s principle channels for Holocaust denial and the glorification of fascism and collaboration. While its editors are regularly faced with fines and legal condemnations, Rivarol has on several occasions lent its columns to Jean-Marie Le Pen’s statements about the Nazi occupation as ‘not particularly inhumane’ and about Pétain as a French patriot unjustly treated during the Épuration.179 Today, Rivarol owns the Écrits de Paris and considers it its intellectual ‘brother’.180

Europeanism, Federalism and the Reconfiguration of the Extreme Right

In his study of the extreme right in Europe after 1945, Pierre Milza professes to be surprised by the Europeanist discourse of French neo-fascists during the early post-war years. At a loss to explain this sudden upsurge of internationalism among movements ‘whose identity was founded on a particularly narrow and rigid conception of the national fact’, he came up with the ‘internationalisation of the Waffen-SS’ during ‘the two final years of the war’ as the phenomenon’s sole historical antecedent.181 One does not need to have extensive knowledge of the Europeanist thought of fascist intellectuals in interwar France, their relations with foreign intellectuals, movements and regimes, the conflict potential between French fascists and traditional nationalists and the shift of pacifism to the right during the late 1930s to establish the short-sightedness of this statement. Nevertheless, Milza did signal an important post-war trend. After 1944, Europeanism became a key feature of large segments of the extreme right in France, Italy, the UK and many other countries. Partially, this was due to the strategic need to

178 Côtillon, Ce Qu’il Reste de Vichy, 125.
181 Milza, L’Europe en Chemise Noire, 49.
make fascism attractive within a post-war context and especially to escape association with aggressive nationalism and war. It can also be seen as an attempt of the extreme right to adapt to a changing global environment in which decolonisation, the Cold War and Western European cooperation played an important role. For the French extreme right, Europeanism had the additional advantage of harking back to an element of its own ideology that long predated the Second World War.182

The several attempts at the establishment of a neo-fascist ‘International’ were but one manifestation of the Europeanism of the extreme right and largely the work of its most radical fringes. After a previous meeting in Rome, neo-fascists from various European countries came together in Malmö in 1951 for a conference hosted by the Swedish fascist Per Engdahl and with important contributions from Giorgio Almirante’s Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI), which was for a long time post-war Europe’s most important extreme-right party (until the rise of the Front National). Participants at the Malmö conference were inspired by ‘universalist’ ideas from Fascist Italy, Nazi Pan-European romanticism and the writings of Europeanist fascist intellectuals like Drieu, Brasillach and Julius Evola. Maurice Bardèche, Brasillach’s brother-in-law and political heir, headed the French delegation to the Malmö meeting, during which the European Social Movement was founded. This ‘Malmö International’, as it was soon called, inspired by the MSI but ideologically closest to Bardèche’s periodical Défense de l’Occident, officially strove for a European ‘Empire’ with a central government, army and economic zone and without parliamentarianism and Russian or American influences.183

Jouvenel was entirely uninvolved with these initiatives, while Fabre-Luce’s involvement – albeit hard to grasp due to fragmentary information – seems to have been limited to links via Rivarol and his single contribution to Nation Europa, the German review created in the wake of the Malmö congress. Nation Europa, like its short-lived Italian MSI cousin Europa Nazione, took its name from the ‘Europe-a-Nation’ campaign launched in 1947 by Oswald Mosley. Founded in 1951 and edited by former SS Colonel Arthur Erhardt, Nation Europa became Germany’s foremost right-extremist press platform. During its first years it published articles from Hans Grimm and Karl-Heinz Priester, a prominent member of the Deutsche Reichspartei, alongside an important contingent of foreigners: Engdahl, Mosley, Bardèche,

182 Mammone, ‘Revitalizing and De-territorializing Fascism’, 300, 308.
183 Shields, The Extreme Right in France, 60; Mammone, ‘Revitalizing and De-territorializing Fascism’, 301, 315.
Pierre Dominique and Fabre-Luce. In addition to its dream of a neo-fascist Europe with Africa as its colonial ‘Lebensraum’, Nation Europa campaigned for German rearmament and the rehabilitation of the Waffen-SS, considered a bare necessity in a future war against the ‘Soviet hordes’. Mosley frequently published in Nation Europa and provided it with financial aid during its first years. Fabre-Luce’s article, titled ‘Frankreich und Deutschland’, was published in mid-1951. During the early 1950s, the aforementioned Le Figaro article was not the only one to cite Fabre-Luce as a ‘sympathiser’ or even a member of the Malmö International.

Fabre-Luce was in touch more directly with Mosley, whom he knew from their contacts during the 1930s, and they regularly met after Mosley’s move to Paris in 1953. In his book on Mosley’s post-war activities, the historian Graham Macklin even claims the English fascist had an affair with Fabre-Luce’s wife. Fabre-Luce was also an attentive reader of Bardèche, and he approvingly cited his attack against the retroactive character of the Nuremberg trials in his revisionist pro-Nazi tract Nuremberg ou la Terre Promise. He criticised his younger colleague, though, for attempting to revive the ‘Maurrassian tradition’ and for equating all kinds of internationalism with a Jewish conspiracy, ‘as if the old notion of national sovereignty weren’t obsolete in any case’. With his participation in the Malmö International, Fabre-Luce must have been happy to see Bardèche subsequently shake off this ‘outdated’ nationalism.

Unrelated to and arguably more important than these Eurofascist fringe groups was the connection between important segments of the French extreme right and more mainstream Europeanist initiatives. Several authors have signalled the striking numbers of former Pétainists and collaborationists who ended up as champions of post-war European unification. Both Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel were early supporters of the European project, which they saw as the logical continuation of their pre-war thought, made more urgent by the experience of the Second World War. Despite being in

184 Macklin, Very Deeply Dyed in Black, 111, 112; Barnes, ‘A Fascist Trojan Horse’, 178.
186 Macklin, Very Deeply Dyed in Black, 136. Fabre-Luce’s personal papers are entirely silent on these post-war connections.
187 Fabre-Luce, Le Siècle Prend Figure, 156, 158.
no way an admirer of Winston Churchill, Fabre-Luce was thrilled by his speech in Zürich in September 1946 in which he called for a ‘United States of Europe’ based on Franco-German rapprochement and with the UK as its friendly neighbour. The man he otherwise described as the ‘gravedigger of capitalism and the British Empire’, whose dogmatic insistence on unconditional surrender had unnecessarily prolonged the war and facilitated Soviet expansion, who had not shrunk back from carpet-bombing Dresden and killing ‘135,000 civilians in one day’ and who was mendaciously denying his secret negotiations with Pétain and his own earlier statement that the armistice had been ‘useful’ to the Allies, was suddenly worthy of his praise.189

Whereas the French government initially showed little enthusiasm for the proposal, Fabre-Luce dedicated a book responding to ‘Churchill’s project’.190

Agreeing with Churchill that there was no time to lose, Fabre-Luce saw ways to realise the United States of Europe within a short time. He imagined an initial campaign by a few great men in every country who would mobilise electoral mass support for the idea, after which it would depend on ‘technicians’ to organise the transition process and to provide ‘the embryo of a common government’ with the right institutions. Fabre-Luce was happy to hear from Coudenhove-Kalergy, whom he met in Switzerland during the summer of 1946, that even De Gaulle was sympathetic to his Paneuropean Movement, which had associated itself with Churchill’s proposal.191 Fabre-Luce dedicated a large part of his book to refuting various arguments against European union. To ‘the liberal objection’ he responded that ‘Europe will not be an autarky’; to ‘the communist objection’ that ‘Europe will be an intermediary between the Great Powers’; and to the ‘résistantialiste’ that ‘Hitler did create Europe, but despite himself’. He saw Europe’s socialist and Christian democratic parties as the natural supporters of European integration. If these two ‘strongest political forces of the West’ joined hands, the inevitable opposition of communists and narrow-minded nationalists could be overcome. On his concluding pages, written in February 1947, Fabre-Luce noted that in the five months between Churchill’s speech and the publication of his book, the idea had gained momentum. The support of various groups and intellectuals, amongst whom were René Courtin, Arthur

189 Fabre-Luce, Journal de la France III (1943), 235, idem, ‘Les Mémoires de Churchill’, Les Écrits de Paris (April 1949); idem, Vingt-Cinq Années de Liberté II, 277. See also idem, La Fumée d’un Cigare, 225. See also the correspondence between Fabre-Luce and Louis-Dominique Girard, Basil Liddell Hart and General Georges in the file on La Fumée d’un Cigare, Fonds AFL, 472 AP 3.
190 Fabre-Luce, Le Projet Churchill, 15.
Koestler and Raymond Aron, confirmed his hope that ‘United Europe will finally – after two big defeats – be the victory of the men of our century.’

Fabre-Luce specifically cited the action of a group called La Fédération, led by André Voisin and Alexandre Marc, as a hopeful sign that the European ideal was winning support. Since 1946 and at least until 1952, Jouvenel was an active member of this circle of European federalists, often contributing to its press and maintaining regular contact with its leaders. Its eponymous monthly only became a regular periodical at the beginning of 1947, after initially lacking government authorisation and appearing as the internal information bulletin of the associated ‘Centre d’Études Institutionnelles pour l’Organisation de la Société Française’. La Fédération’s difficult start and the very vague and general name of its associated ‘study centre’ may sound familiar to the attentive reader of this chapter. There were more commonalities between La Fédération and reviews like the Écrits de Paris, as many of its members belonged to the same group of right-extremist outcasts of the post-war order. André Voisin, whose real name was André Bourgeois, had been the personal secretary of the Comte de Paris, while many other members were Pétainists who had formerly belonged to the Action Française or the PSF: Jean de Fabrègues, Louis Salleron, Jacques Bassot, Daniel Halévy and even François Mitterand and Jouvenel’s PPF colleague Pierre Andreu. There was also an important component of 1930s ‘non-conformists’ in La Fédération who, still inspired by Mounier’s ‘personalist’ philosophy, supported the idea of a federal and ‘communitarian’ Europe: Alexandre Marc, Denis de Rougemont, Robert Aron and Thierry Maulnier. La Fédération’s version of Europeanism was strongly inspired by corporatism and anti-parliamentarianism.

Despite its modest membership figures, La Fédération proved highly influential during the early post-war years. In addition to the intellectual qualities of some of its early members and its effective political lobbying work, it was successful in gradually attracting people less tainted by their past political activities, many of whom had been members of the Resistance. La Fédération was also quick to build an international network of like-minded European federalists, which led to the foundation in December

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192 Fabre-Luce, Le Projet Churchill, 147, 153, 155.
193 Ibid., 154.
1946 of a European Union of Federalists at its offices in Paris. With the help of a joint agenda of anti-communism and the relatively vague principle of federalism, *La Fédération* even managed to draw contributions from neoliberal intellectuals like Raymond Aron and Wilhelm Röpke. Jouvenel participated in the organisation’s first International Congress of Federalists held in Montreux in August 1947. A draft of his speech demonstrated both his prominence in the movement and the degree to which he identified with its ‘communitarian’ ideology. Rejecting both the principle of nationalities and ‘the partisan spirit’, which led states to move from ‘the oppression of ethnic minorities’ to the ‘even more brutal oppression of ideological minorities’, Jouvenel celebrated federalism as ‘a return to the true notions of command’. According to Jouvenel, federalism meant ‘neither the enslavement of man to political powers, which is tyranny, nor the enslavement of political powers to the human will, which is disorder, but the accord of these powers as docile servants of a same master, all of which are sanctified and humanised’.

In October 1946, Jouvenel published his first article in *La Fédération*’s internal bulletin as ‘B. de J.’, in which he stated that in 1938 ‘the Sudeten question would have never arisen […] if Czechoslovakia had been a federal state’ assuring the Sudeten Germans the protection of their rights. A year later, this time using his full name, Jouvenel sceptically described European history not as a march towards union but as a fatal drifting apart of its peoples under the pressure of particularism, culminating in the post-war triumph of ‘national socialism’ in every country. If Europe’s present-day ‘national socialist representative governments’ sincerely wanted to build Europe, they merely had to ‘undo what they have done’: relinquish their currency rights, denationalise their education systems and recognise the authority of a natural law transcending their own temporary interests.

Jouvenel considered the human rights declaration of 1789 a suitable candidate for this transnational law system. A ‘European tribunal’ could protect Europe’s citizens against violations of this ‘superior law’ by ‘particular governments’. He rejected the idea of a European parliament, though, as an unrealistic and unnecessary imitation of the United States, whose history

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had taken a fundamentally different course. Instead, Jouvenel hoped that ‘a revulsion of public sentiment’ would put an end to ‘the prison regime’ of the nation-state.199 The historian Marco Duranti has established the importance of La Fédération for the post-war human rights revolution, and especially its successful lobbying for the creation of a supranational human rights court during the 1948 Congress of Europe in The Hague. According to Duranti, the French extreme right had two reasons to play a key role in the establishment of a transnational European human rights regime: it correctly estimated that such a regime would create opportunities to undermine the entire legal system of the Épuration, and it saw the regime as a bulwark against the despised principle of parliamentary sovereignty. France’s ‘prison regime’ was indeed altered drastically as a result of these actions. At the turn of the 1950s, anticipating the risk of the European Court of Human Rights toppling indignité nationale as an illegal retroactive law, the French parliament was quick to adopt several amnesty laws.200

Fabre-Luce stressed that his abiding faith in Europe was the cornerstone of his thought, and he was not afraid to contrast it in very essentialist terms with the supposed omnipotence of money in America, the inhumane cruelty of Asia and Africa’s lack of civilisation.201 At the concrete political level, Fabre-Luce jumped to action in defence of the European Defence Community (EDC) in the spring of 1954, when it became clear that the French parliament might reject it. Lacking a journalist platform, Fabre-Luce decided to send a series of eight long letters to ‘thousands’ of acquaintances and influential persons, including Jouvenel, whose personal archives contain a full collection. The EDC was a French suggestion, developed to make the controversial issue of West German rearmament, which the United States was insisting on, part of the foundation of a Pan-European army. Fabre-Luce considered it essential to ensure the security of Western Europe against Soviet aggression. In his third letter, he told his readers that in the long run, NATO forces would also be able to achieve victory against Russia without West German military participation, ‘but you won’t live to see that day, since you would have been first deported to a mine in Siberia where you would have died working’.202

In other letters, Fabre-Luce tried to address possible objections against the EDC while stressing its absolute necessity to prevent the ‘Anglo-Saxons’

199 Jouvenel, ‘La Femme Coupée en Morceaux’.
201 Fabre-Luce, Hors d’Atteinte, 192.
202 Fabre-Luce, Letter 3 about the EDC (undated, 1954), Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (299).
from taking their hands off the continent and Germany rearming on its own. A vote against the treaty could have far-reaching consequences: ‘By rejecting the treaty, you overthrow [...] Dulles or Adenauer. Do you believe that their successors will be more favourable to our interests? I already see you run after them to propose sacrifices that today you withhold from them, just like you gave to Hitler what you refused the Weimar Republic.’

When De Gaulle expressed his opposition to the EDC, thereby bringing about exactly the double communist-nationalist opposition to Europe that Fabre-Luce had anticipated in 1947, Fabre-Luce reacted furiously. After accusing the general of conspiring with the communists against the Fourth Republic and mocking his vanity and ‘circus-like’ public appearances, he took consolation in the certainty that even if the EDC were to fail, at least De Gaulle would never come to power. Although the communist danger remained strong, at least ‘we do not in any case have to fear a victory of the general.’ Fabre-Luce’s final two letters were a last-ditch effort to convince the fifty MPs who were still in doubt about their vote, reminding them that a refusal to ratify the treaty meant the triumph of ‘France’s enemies, and those of the regime you represent’: the USSR, the communists, the ‘neo-Nazis’ and the ‘neo-Bonapartists of Gaullism’. A vote for the EDC was a vote to help France in its essential mission: ‘to defend, in close cooperation with its neighbours, her own territory and its African extensions’.

Both Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce initially imagined Africa as the colonial backyard of their project of European integration. In 1946 and in accordance with his geopolitical ideas of the early 1940s, Jouvenel explained the present-day power of the United States and Russia as the result of their historical capacity to expand towards immense, sparsely populated territories in their West and East. This unchecked ‘centrifugal’ expansion, which he compared with the conquest of Mexico by Hernán Cortés, was the exact opposite of the behaviour of Europe’s Great Powers, who had engaged in endless attempts to expand ‘centripetally’ in the middle of Europe, always clashing with each other on ‘the eternal battlefields of Flanders, Lombardy and the upper Danube’. Whilst the former kind of expansion harboured enormous gains, Europe’s had largely been a zero-sum game. Crediting England as the only European power to have sufficiently understood the importance of centrifugal expansion, Jouvenel stated that France would inevitably be reduced to the status of a ‘dwarf amidst giants, if she fails to do in the South

203 Fabre-Luce, Letter 1 about the EDC (undated, 1954), Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (299).
204 Fabre-Luce, Letter 5 about the EDC (undated, 1954), Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (299).
205 Fabre-Luce, Letter 7 and 8 about the EDC (undated, 1954), Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (299).
what the Russians have succeeded doing in the East and the Americans in the West’. Similarly, in a long article in 1952, Fabre-Luce called for the construction of ‘Eurafrica’ based on the joint European exploitation and industrialisation of the ‘almost virgin’ territories of French North Africa.

While Fabre-Luce claimed this project was also in the interest of the North Africans, who would be given ‘the order, justice and prosperity satisfying their aspirations’ instead of ‘the toys of a verbal democracy and an ephemeral independence’, racism and feelings of Western superiority were manifestly present in his thought. In 1947, he mockingly discussed the ‘unease’ caused by the presence of ‘blacks’ in France’s parliament during a debate about the French Union. The behaviour of several overseas deputies aroused the question: ‘is this assembly entirely French?’ A lady in the audience wondered if it were not better to ‘give them their independence, as long as they don’t bother us in our country’, but Fabre-Luce disagreed with her suggestion. ‘There are, despite everything, still indigènes who remain loyal and France has a mission to fulfil amongst them. But she could maybe give them a little more clothes and a little less “democracy”.

Jouvenel was the earliest of the two to realise that the empire could not be maintained. He was worried about the success of the Soviet Union in exploiting the colonised nations’ desire for independence and the inability of Western countries to respond to this challenge. In private notes, he complained about the British sympathy for Sukarno and indignation against the Dutch, while he found the Netherlands to have accomplished ‘a civilising work’ in Indonesia that was ‘materially important for the West’. In an article, he concluded that given the circumstances, the only reasonable foreign policy was to ‘gently engage these [colonial] peoples on the road towards liberty’. He even stated that France was better able to pursue such a policy than the British, since ‘we do not feel differences of colour’, whereas for the British ‘feelings of superiority’ made them less able to succeed in the ‘necessary fraternisation’. Although at the time Jouvenel still shared Fabre-Luce’s hope that North Africa could be preserved through the more efficient exploitation and development of Africa as a part of the European project, he soon relinquished this hope. When Prime Minister

206 Bertrand de Jouvenel, ‘L’Europe, Tombeau des Ambitions Européennes’ (26 April 1946), in idem, Quelle Europe?, 209, 211.
208 Fabre-Luce, ‘Construisons l’Eurafricque’.
Mendès-France signed a Franco-Tunisian agreement granting autonomy to its former colony, Jouvenel congratulated him: ‘I persist in thinking that it is a duty of a Frenchman who cherishes his country’s honour, to get us out of an attitude that is contrary to our principles and our commitments, in which we appear as malevolent and unjust. This merit has been yours [...]’

In mid-1954, despite France’s crumbling empire; the persistent anti-European opposition of communists, Gaullists and other nationalists; and the approaching failure of the EDC, which was eventually rejected by the French parliament, Fabre-Luce was confident about the success of European unification. Looking back upon the ten post-war years, he concluded that Europe’s different peoples had, ‘unbeknownst to themselves, made a revolution’. After a long period of destructive warfare and mutual hatred, the Cold War had given them the ‘sobering cold shower’ that made them ‘wake up as brothers’. The heart of this united Europe should not consist of a European parliament, which Fabre-Luce – like Jouvenel – rejected as the ‘sum of weaknesses’, but of ‘an open elite, nourished by the life-juice of the people, impregnated with the notion of service’. By embracing international parliamentarianism, Europe would turn its own ‘errors, because Hitler denounced them, into a counter-religion’, thereby ‘robbing itself of the ways to arrest its decadence’.

In an interesting revival of his metaphors of love from the occupation years, Fabre-Luce stated that the prime ingredient of European unity was to be the ‘fusion’ or even the ‘marriage’ of France and Germany. In 1950, in a lecture in Hamburg that was subsequently published in the Zeitschrift für Geopolitik, he presented the same idea to a German audience. Citing Plutarch’s description of the mass wedding of 10,000 Greek-Persian couples following Alexander the Great’s conquest of Babylon, after which the ‘lives and customs of the different races melted together’, causing them to ‘forget their old feuds’, he called the European Coal and Steel Community the occasion for the same kind of ‘blending’. ‘One day, I hope, the unification of France and Germany will be celebrated in a symbolic feast reminiscent of the ceremony [...] that the Great Alexander celebrated more than two thousand years ago.’

During the ten years following the liberation, the French extreme right reinvented itself, emerging from a situation of near-complete discredit and

211 Jouvenel to Pierre Mendès-France (19 April 1955), Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (303).
212 Fabre-Luce, Histoire de la Révolution Européenne, 341. 343.
213 Fabre-Luce, ‘Mittel und Wege zur Deutsch-Französischen Einigung’, 56; idem, Histoire de la Révolution Européenne, 343.
marginalisation. This resurrection, limited by its lasting organisational weakness, was based on a profound transformation of its ideology. The two traditional Maurrassian dogmas of aggressive nationalism and contempt for republican legality, which had also been dominant in many circles unassociated with the Action Française, were largely discarded and replaced by something more fluid: an attachment to the legal framework of the Republic and a suspicious attitude towards national delusions of grandeur. Three elements were the driving force behind this transformation: the experience with persecution during the ‘civil war’ of 1944-1946, the defence of the legacy of Pétain and his supporters, and hostility to Gaullism.

As Vinen has remarked, during the Épuration, the legal system was often the only thing that stood ‘between right-wingers and political banishment, prison or the firing squad’.214 With leftist militants calling for the harsh punishment of collaborators and for revolutionary action, the extreme right’s natural reflex was to focus its hope on the judges (most of whom had also served under Vichy) and on governmental authority to uphold a system of due process. The attacks on the Épuration were mainly aimed at demonstrating how it was a violation of republican legality.215 After 1947, the calls for amnesty, reconciliation and forgetting the ‘quarrels of the past’ were often paired with an appeal to human rights and international law, while republican diversity and the right to free speech were invoked to defend the fledgling extreme-right press against censorship measures.216 In 1951, Fabre-Luce noted the obvious incompatibility of ‘the defence of human rights with the monopolisation of information, retroactive laws, exceptional jurisdiction, ineligibility because of crimes of opinion [délits d’opinion], etc.’217

As we have seen, Fabre-Luce played a leading role in defining his and his peers’ choice of Vichy (while obfuscating his own pro-German collaborationism) by developing a ‘realist’ interpretation of France’s position during the war. With France having lost the war and political power having been legally transferred to Pétain, the armistice was honourable and necessary. While Pétain sacrificed his reputation and his aura of invincibility to protect French lives, De Gaulle, safe in his London exile, enjoyed the freedom to persist in his theoretically impeccable but practically impossible position of refusal and resistance. While the Resistance had merely caused bloodshed
among Frenchmen, its military contribution to the liberation of the country had been marginal given that the country had been liberated by foreign powers. Though neither as outspoken nor as prominently published as Fabre-Luce’s, Jouvenel’s ideas were not far removed from this analysis. The same line of thought was continued into the post-war years, with both intellectuals often stressing the extent of France’s downfall. The country’s supposed weakness not only rendered it defenceless in the face of a Soviet attack, it also illustrated both the impossibility of De Gaulle’s politics of national grandeur and the urgent need for European integration.218 Fabre-Luce and Maurice Bardèche depicted De Gaulle as vainglorious and cruel, willing to sacrifice French lives and the future of the nation in order to pursue abstract notions of France and victory.219 In Fabre-Luce’s eyes, only European unification and NATO protection could save France from again falling prey to invasion and disintegration.

While the ‘opposition nationale’ found many allies in its campaign for the release of prisoners and the abrogation of the ineligibility law, especially after the break-up of the tripartite coalition in 1947, its own political organisations remained weak. Partially this is a distorted image, however, since the CNIP and other parties who were at the centre of political power showed considerable interest in the extreme right’s personnel and ideas.220 This openness of the centre to the extreme right was due to the specifically uneasy situation of governmental politics during the Fourth Republic, which was based on a fragile coalition of interests. Since 1947, governments had faced the double opposition of the communists and the Gaullists, who were both hostile to the system as such, which increased the need to do business with whoever was willing to work with them. Despite its revulsion against the republican system, the ‘opposition nationale’ still largely preferred it to the two main alternatives of communist revolution or personal rule by De Gaulle. While for the extreme right, the late 1940s were marked by survival and ideological innovation, the 1950s were to offer new perspectives for political success. Decolonisation, European integration, the Algerian War and the regime crisis brought opportunities that the extreme right did not fail to exploit. With Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel’s Europeanism and their ‘realism’ reaching back all the way into the 1920s, they were extremely well-situated to contribute to this ideological transformation.

220 Vinen, Bourgeois Politics in France, 102.
5   Europeanism, Neoliberalism and the Cold War

On Private Life and Facial Hair

The private lives of our two protagonists have so far hardly been touched upon in this study. In order to explain some factors related to the post-war positions of Fabre-Luce and especially Jouvenel, it is necessary to consider them. Based on their post-war identity as, respectively, an outspoken and unrepentant extreme-rightist risking prison sentences under different regimes and a political scientist avoiding provocative statements while reading Thomas Hobbes in his Swiss village, one would expect Fabre-Luce's private life to be unruly and Jouvenel's to be that of a sedate family man. For a large part of their adult lives, the exact opposite seems to have been the case. While there is little information about his early years, in 1928 Fabre-Luce married Charlotte de Faucingy-Lucinge, a princess from a prominent French noble family who was an appreciated guest in France's interwar high society.1 Although the announcement of the wedding led notorious womaniser Drieu to write a 'jealous' letter of congratulations, Charlotte managed to escape Drieu's charms and the marriage seems to have been both happy and fairly uneventful.2 Charlotte often accompanied Alfred on his travels, and they jointly published a book calling for the legalisation of contraception.3 The couple had two children, born in 1941 and 1942.

Jouvenel's case was different. When he was sixteen years old, his father Henry's second wife, the famous writer Colette, began a love affair with him. Soon after the affair started, she published Chéri, a book about a beautiful young boy being seduced by an older woman. This initiation into love by his 47-year-older stepmother, described by Jouvenel himself as a Flaubertian 'sentimental education', continued for five years.

1 For elegant pictures of 'Madame Fabre-Luce', see, for example, Vogue (November 1930), 53; Vogue (January 1935), 27.
2 Pierre Drieu la Rochelle to Fabre-Luce (spring 1928), Fonds AFL, 472 AP 6. Reluctantly, Daniel Garbe addresses the possibility that during the late 1930s Charlotte slept with Alexis Leger, the secretary general of the French foreign ministry (and successful poet under the pseudonym Saint-John Perse), who wanted to take revenge against Fabre-Luce for attacking him in an article. See Garbe, Alfred Fabre-Luce, 142.
3 Fabre-Luce, Pour une Politique Sexuelle. See also Charlotte Fabre-Luce, 'L’Exemple Hollandais' and Alfred Fabre-Luce, 'Nous Proposons...', Pamphlet (12 May 1933).
fail to provoke a scandal, contributing to Henry’s divorce from Colette, and it only ended in 1925, when Jouvenel married Marcelle Prat, another writer who was seven years his senior.\textsuperscript{4} The marriage, which took place under considerable pressure from Jouvenel’s family who wanted to wrest him from Colette’s embrace, seems to have been an unhappy one, and Jouvenel had several affairs. The most serious of these was with the American writer and journalist Martha Gellhorn, whom he first met in Paris in 1930. Jouvenel and Gellhorn lived together in Paris, went on Swiss and Mediterranean holidays (where they once ran into Marcelle and her lover) and travelled across the United States in the ‘Lady Jane’, a platinum-coloured Dodge that they had bought for 25 dollars. Their marriage plans, mostly pursued by Jouvenel, were dashed by Marcelle’s refusal to agree to a divorce.\textsuperscript{5}

In 1937, as a prominent member of the PPF, Jouvenel spoke at a protest meeting in defence of general Edmond Duseigneur, a First World War hero who had been arrested for his implication in the fascist terrorist Cagoule conspiracy. His eyes fell on the general’s daughter Hélène, who was sitting in the front row. The two soon fell in love and would spend the main part of the rest of their lives together. It was with Hélène and their baby daughter Anne (born in 1943) that Jouvenel settled down in Switzerland, and from 1950 (with two more children) in Anserville in France.\textsuperscript{6} Jouvenel’s first years in exile were not only difficult in material terms, they probably also marked a personal crisis. While he enjoyed the quiet family life with Hélène, his past political engagements and adventurous behaviour continued to haunt him. In his private diaries, he painfully reflected on the intellectual mistakes of his ‘generation’ and those of his friends (Luchaire, Drieu, Bergery), while linking them to his own irresponsibility. After meeting with ‘Madame E.’, Jouvenel criticised his own ‘puerile’ habits of seduction that he claimed he could not escape practicing ‘every time’ he was ‘alone with a woman’.\textsuperscript{7}

The death of his first son Roland, born out of his union with Marcelle, probably further contributed to Jouvenel’s personal crisis. In May 1946, aged fourteen, the boy died of an unknown disease. While Jouvenel stayed in Switzerland, Emmanuel Berl visited Roland at his sickbed every day and

\textsuperscript{4} Jouvenel, \textit{Un Voyageur}, 54, 58; Dard, \textit{Bertrand de Jouvenel}, 22, 46.

\textsuperscript{5} Letters by Gellhorn to Jouvenel included in: Moorehead, ed., \textit{Selected Letters of Martha Gellhorn}, 6, 14, 18, 29, 47. See also the surviving post-1945 correspondence between Jouvenel and Gellhorn included in Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (300).

\textsuperscript{6} Kestel, ‘L’Engagement de Bertrand de Jouvenel au PPF’, 106; Dard, \textit{Bertrand de Jouvenel}, 10.

\textsuperscript{7} Cited in Delbecque, ‘Bertrand de Jouvenel ou le Libéral Désenchanté’, 296, 299; Dard, \textit{Bertrand de Jouvenel}, 187, 196; Journal de travail, cahier 1 [2 August 1943], Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (37).
informed Bertrand of his son’s situation. There is little information on the bond between Bertrand and his first-born son. A year after Roland’s death, he accused Marcelle in a letter to Berl of having estranged his son from him, which he considered the main reason why he had not been a responsible father. Marcelle had given Roland ‘instructions to talk about her’ when they met and demanded that she always be present at their meetings: ‘it wasn’t me who charged him with a burden too heavy for a child, it was her.’\textsuperscript{8} Jouvenel’s bitterness may have been inspired by his frustration with Marcelle, who, still refusing to divorce, was causing serious problems for Jouvenel and his new ‘illicit’ family. In a series of letters to Berl, all written in the last months of 1947, Jouvenel elaborated on the problems with his wife. Optimistic at first, he told Berl that he felt more tenderness for Marcelle than ever before, ‘as I wake up from the buzzing thoughtlessness of my youth’. He just wished that she would agree to end the ‘legal fiction’ of their marriage, for the sake of his children and their good relationship. Anne grows and develops an intelligence that is reminiscent of her grandmother: soon she will ask why her mother doesn’t have the same name as her father.’\textsuperscript{9}

Since Berl was in touch with Marcelle, Jouvenel hoped that he would talk to her on his behalf. While Berl was reluctant to become involved in the connubial conflict, Jouvenel grew increasingly exasperated with Marcelle’s refusal to even answer his letters. When Jouvenel visited the United States and found out that his wife had followed him there, he wrote to Berl that he was fed up with the situation. Marcelle was free to travel wherever she pleased but should stop doing so as ‘Miss Jouvenel’. As late as 1952, when preparing for a stay in the United States and wanting to take his family with him, Jouvenel worried about possible problems due to his marital status. He asked Gellhorn for advice, who warned him that due to the ‘protestant puritanism’ predominant in American society he would be considered living ‘in sin.’\textsuperscript{10} Just two months after Roland’s death, Hélène gave birth to a healthy son, Hugues. The contrast between the two events was almost unbearable to Jouvenel, who noted in his diary: ‘between Hélène’s success and Marcelle’s total failure there is a disproportion that haunts me.’\textsuperscript{11}

\begin{footnotes}
\item Jouvenel to Emmanuel Berl (undated, late 1947), Fonds Emmanuel Berl, BNF, NAF 28216 (28); Morlino, \textit{Émmanuel Berl}, 359.
\item Jouvenel to Emmanuel Berl (9 November 1947); Jouvenel to Berl (undated, November/December 1947), Fonds Émmanuel Berl.
\item Jouvenel to Emmanuel Berl (undated, November/December 1947), Fonds Émmanuel Berl; Martha Gellhorn to Jouvenel (1952), Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (300).
\item Cited in Dard, \textit{Bertrand de Jouvenel}, 202; Jouvenel to Wilhelm Röpke (undated, July 1946), Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (305).
\end{footnotes}
Roland’s death had a different effect on Marcelle, who became interested in communicating with her deceased child and started to experiment with automatic writing. Convinced that her son had saved her from suicide and was sending her important messages from beyond, she published several books about their exchanges.12

Any attempt to determine the extent to which these personal elements influenced Jouvenel's political and intellectual positions is speculative. Nonetheless, it is striking that his professional transformation went along with a transformation at a personal level. The pre-war raging journalist, ever in the vanguard of political action, open to fighting duels, meeting the important men of his times and seduced by the idea of an anti-bourgeois fascist youth revolution, changed into a cerebral political scientist who preferred a quiet life away from political turmoil.\(^\text{13}\) Physically, the change was dramatic too. The pre-war ‘playboy’ (in the words of Pascal Jardin) adopted the unfashionable looks of a sage. Although the 1946 newspaper reports about the monocle and the chinstrap beard were baseless communist propaganda, Jouvenel did grow a beard that was notable enough for his friends to comment upon it with disdain and disbelief. While Boegner was sure that the beard would affect his chances of a fair \textit{Épuration} trial even more negatively, Colette found that it belonged in a movie rather than on his chin. Berl merely hoped that Hélène would catch Jouvenel in a moment of sleep to shave it off.\(^\text{14}\)

This was not the first time Jouvenel changed his course, as we have seen. Despite his fascist engagement, at the turn of the 1940s the rediscovery of a sense of national belonging prevented him from fully embracing collaboration within the framework of a German-dominated national socialist Europe. In the same way, half a decade later it was probably a combination of a personal crisis and a feeling of collective failure – of his ‘generation’, his friends and the political ideology he had identified with for a long time – that led Jouvenel to reconsider his positions and even his identity. This new identity was built upon the remains of the old, however, and in some respects his political thought changed little. Having discussed Jouvenel’s proximity to the post-war extreme right in the last chapter, it is now necessary to ask how these elements relate to \textit{Du Pouvoir}, the magnum opus that won him a new notoriety and set off the academic career that would dominate the second half of his life, as journalism had dominated the first. In a larger sense, it brings up the question of the relationship between Jouvenel’s (and to a lesser extent also Fabre-Luce’s) affiliation with fascism and the extreme right, and his integration into the world of early post-war neoliberalism.

\(^{13}\) On the duel, see ‘Film Producer Refuses Duel with a Foe in Paris’, \textit{The New York Times} (22 February 1935).
\(^{14}\) Philippe Boegner to Bertrand de Jouvenel (21 March 1945), Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (295); Colette to Jouvenel (undated, 1954), Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (297); Emmanuel Berl to Jouvenel (undated, 1945/1946), Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (295).
On Power: Pessimism, Aristocracy and the Distrust of Democracy

Published in 1945, the almost 600 pages of Du Pouvoir: Histoire Naturelle de sa Croissance were the result of years of work. During the war years, Jouvenel spent a large part of his time reading and researching at the French national library, and the unfinished manuscript was among the few personal belongings that he carried across the Swiss border in 1943. To a large extent, Du Pouvoir was a continuation of the ideas and research that were already present in his preceding books, but two things were radically different: its unprecedented scale and the political conclusions that can be drawn from the work. Essentially a political history of humankind since the very beginnings of civilisation, the book analysed history as a story of rampantly growing state power, eating its way through institutions, human collectivities and ultimately individuals. Although translated as On Power, the English word fails to convey the full meaning of the French term. In the words of Dennis Hale, while the English term ‘power’ generally refers to a quality or an attribute, le pouvoir is ‘a thing, a force and ultimately an institution’.

In a modern context, Jouvenel’s pouvoir meant state power, but it also included all pre-modern kinds of power and authority of a ruler over his subjects and territories. The concept had the convenience of bypassing questions of regime and form of government, which according to Jouvenel were of secondary importance. In his analysis, what was key was state power, a largely independent category with a particular agency that surpassed all others. This pouvoir, described as a ‘minotaur’ in the introductory chapter, has manifested itself throughout human history, constantly extending its grip on society and on individual citizens. Regardless of its particular structure or supporting ideology, Jouvenel asserted, state power in the end only served itself, its own growth and survival. Changes of government were often the occasion for an extension of state power and the replacement of weak rulers by stronger ones. Paradoxically, revolutions, albeit begun in the name of freedom, always led to a heavier kind of pouvoir: ‘First, there was the authority of Charles I, Louis XVI, Nicholas II. Afterwards, the one of Cromwell, Napoleon, Stalin.’ Profoundly pessimistic on Western society’s

16 Jouvenel, Du Pouvoir, 322. This observation about revolutions may have originally been Lenin’s. In his working diaries from 1943, Jouvenel relates how he received this Lenin citation from André Malraux, who read a part of his manuscript. Journal de travail, cahier I [20 April 1943], Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (37). Citations, French or translated, are taken directly from the French-language version of Du Pouvoir.
capacity to invert this trend, he concluded by suggesting that the same powerful impetus that had led to its flowering would also bring about its downfall, after which there would be nothing but ‘an amorphous mass, bound for despotism or anarchy’.17

Written during the war, Du Pouvoir was inspired by Jouvenel's experience of the conflict, with the French debacle of 1940 and the (impending) defeat of Nazi Germany four years later as the two main events. Jouvenel shared Hobbes' view of war as the natural state of affairs 'between two powers of the same kind', while he also saw it as intrinsically linked to the growth of state power through history. War inevitably acted as a catalyst of state power (and vice versa) by the means of competition between states. In the modern era, this competition took the shape of an arms race and more importantly of a struggle for the mobilisation of national resources, both material and human. This law of political competition prescribed that any state that failed to mobilise its resources on the same scale as its enemy was bound to perish.18 Repeating the same explanation of the French defeat that had figured prominently in Après la Défaite, Jouvenel used this approach to explain how, during the first phase of the Second World War, Germany – a streamlined war society that mobilised all private and public national resources – was able to crush the Western democracies ‘like a cruiser’ attacking ‘a transatlantic passenger ship equipped with canons, on board of which the stewards continue to serve drinks to idle passengers’. Things went differently for Germany as soon as it came up against its totalitarian nemesis: ‘a country where, since twenty years, individual tasks are assigned by public authority: Russia.’19

Jouvenel's pessimism was also reflected in his view on the direction Western societies were planning to take once the war was over. The plans for a post-war order based on social security would only deliver new ways for the state to extend its influence, and thereby its grip, on the lives of men. To make the state ‘responsible for all individual destinies’, it was necessary to equip it with tremendous means, with dire consequences:

Unfortunately, we cannot believe that by breaking Hitler and his regime, we're fighting evil at its source. [...] How can we not feel that a state that binds men to itself by every link of needs and feelings, would be the able to devote them to martial means. The greater the attributions of power,

17 Jouvenel, Du Pouvoir, 560.
18 Ibid., 207, 215.
19 Ibid., 229.
the greater also the material means for warfare; the more manifest the services it renders, the swifter the obedience to its call.20

It would take only one new Hitler to reactivate the whole infernal machine of political competition, with all other states forced to extend their military might and their control over the population in his image. To give, in the name of social progress, even more responsibility to the state, ‘as reassuring as its face is today’, meant risking the ‘nourishing of the war to come’. Waged by a still stronger and more totalitarian state, this future war would ‘compare to the present war like the present war compares to the French Revolutionary Wars’.21

This view on war and the law of political competition was not the only thing that linked Du Pouvoir to Après la Défaite and other works from around 1940. The original version of Du Pouvoir carried the subtitle ‘Natural History of its Growth’, an indication of the lasting importance of biological and organicist impulses in Jouvenel’s thought.22 Both in his treatment of early civilisations and in his interpretation of recent history, Jouvenel showed a propensity for Darwinist explanations. He acknowledged the existence of peaceful societies but stated that all human progress came about as the result of belligerent ones with a strong ‘will to power’. Only in these societies could a ruling ‘gerontocracy’ be replaced by a young warrior elite, achieving power and prestige through victory on the battlefield. He criticised monogamy for giving the weak, who belonged to ‘the lower strata’ of society, the possibility to reproduce, while in a situation of polygamy this privilege would have been largely reserved for the strongest warriors, considered the forebears of the aristocracy.23 Noting that most revolutions broke out under weak kings rather than their despotic predecessors, Jouvenel observed that they were ‘not the moral punishment of despotism but the biological sanction of impotency [impuissance]’. While the people feared and instinctively respected strength and authority, they had nothing but contempt for softness, just like ‘a hesitant rider makes even the most obedient mount ferocious’. Equating political struggle with natural selection, Jouvenel concluded that the merit of revolutions was to replace these ‘sceptical and tired’ rulers with ‘athletes emerging victorious from the bloody qualifiers of the revolution’.24

20 Ibid., 26.
21 Ibid., 27.
22 In the English translation, the subtitle was reformulated as: Jouvenel, On Power: Its Nature and the History of its Growth.
23 Jouvenel, Du Pouvoir, 126, 130.
24 Ibid., 326.
There is a striking resemblance between this last sentence and Jouvenel's description in *Après la Défaite* of the way German 'athletes' triumphed over the crumbling remnants of France's tired and obsolete bourgeois society.\textsuperscript{25} In the same way, his rejection in *Du Pouvoir* of parliamentarianism as a 'lowering' mechanism that selected its politicians for their docile obedience to the party line, their incapacity of independent action and their willingness to be part of a 'political machine' echoes similar statements made in 1941 about the mediocrity of France's political class under the Third Republic.\textsuperscript{26} Similarly, Jouvenel lamented how, as a result of the 1789 Revolution, France had lost its guilds, social bodies and all other 'associative instincts' acting as countervailing powers to the state. This echoed his emphasis in *Après la Défaite* on the survival of these organisations in Germany as a reason for that country's superiority.\textsuperscript{27}

Jouvenel was especially scornful of democracy and those who expected salvation from it. Rather than naively seeing it as the end of despotism and oppression, Jouvenel saw the rise of democracy as the occasion for a further dramatic increase of state power at the expense of freedom. The principle of popular sovereignty led the power of the state to become associated not with a specific will but with the general will. As soon as the state was supposed to no longer represent somebody's interests but the interests of society as a whole, there could be no more challenge to its authority or a reasonable limitation of its power, opening up the 'age of tyranny'.\textsuperscript{28} Thus, revolutionary France soon saw a range of measures that would have been utterly unachievable during the heydays of absolute monarchy: heavy taxation, conscription and the abolition of provincial autonomy. While under the ancien régime, royal power was limited by established traditions and divine sovereignty based on unchanging laws, the fundamentally variable nature of popular sovereignty gave the state potentially unlimited manoeuvring space that could easily result in 'popular absolutism'.\textsuperscript{29}

Popular sovereignty in fact came down to parliamentary sovereignty, via the 'bold fiction' that parliament should actually be seen as a gathering of the people itself. Approvingly citing Rousseau's rejection of parliamentary democracy as a system in which men were 'citizens for one day and subjects for four years', Jouvenel argued that elections were the only 'very loose

\textsuperscript{25} Bertrand de Jouvenel, *Après la Défaite* (Paris, 1941), 37.
\textsuperscript{26} Bertrand de Jouvenel, *La Décomposition de l’Europe Libérale,* 440; id., *Du Pouvoir,* 402.
\textsuperscript{27} Jouvenel, *Du Pouvoir,* 428; idem, *Après la Défaite,* 195.
\textsuperscript{28} Jouvenel, *Du Pouvoir,* 380.
\textsuperscript{29} Ibid., 47, 68, 389.
umbilical cord’ still linking the people to power. Instead of ‘power by the people’, there was rather ‘power over the people’ – a power, however, that was ‘the greater as it authorises itself through this cord’.30 Worse still, with the rise of political parties and the extension of clientelist networks, elections increasingly became ‘plebiscites’ during which the people delivered themselves to a ‘team’. Deputies could no longer operate independently and became bound to a party leader exercising control over their numbers. Jouvenel saw the ‘military’ behaviour of the Nazi fraction in the 1933 Reichstag as this development’s culmination point, while stressing that the communists would have done the same in French parliament had they had the same numeric weight. Democracy thus bred totalitarianism, since totalitarianism was nothing but a team that had – thanks to better organisation, propaganda, brutality and more shameless lies – overtaken its rivals and seized its ‘prey’ without wanting to let it escape again.31

Once this take-over happened, Jouvenel had little respect for the ‘outraged complaints’ of the members of the losing ‘teams’. Had they not ‘all contributed to this result’?

One man, one team disposes of immense resources accumulated in the power’s arsenal. Who successfully piled them up if not the others who never found the state developed enough when they were its occupiers? In society there exists no counterforce capable of stopping the pouvoir. So who destroyed these powerful bodies that the monarchs of yore did not dare touch? A single party makes the entire national flesh feel the master’s claws. So who was the first to flatten individualities under the crushing weight of the party? And who dreamt of his own party’s triumph? The citizens accept this tyranny and only start to hate it when it is too late. But who made them lose the habit to judge by themselves, who replaced the independence of the citizen with the loyalism of the party militant? There is no freedom anymore, but freedom only belongs to free men. And who has worried about educating free men?32

According to Jouvenel, the fundamental mistake was to believe that a political system could be built on the principle of popular sovereignty alone. Under such a regime, Montesquieu’s separation of powers was nothing but a façade behind which the pouvoir was supposed to hold itself in check, a

30 Ibid., 375, 388.
31 Ibid., 405, 410.
32 Ibid., 411.
situation that gave free rein to ‘a crushing of liberty like Europe had never known before’.33

Only two elements had been able to alleviate the historical trend towards ever more despotic state power: the authority of divine or otherwise immutable law and the existence of a strong aristocracy. If the legal system was considered changeable according to the will of the people, Jouvenel saw it subjected to the pouvoir, whereas divine law, which was traditionally supposed to be above the king, could maintain a certain autonomy. Praising the Catholic legal scholar Léon Duguit, Jouvenel specified this autonomy as possible only if society consisted of ‘a profound community of feelings rooted in a common faith, giving rise to an uncontested morality and supporting a divine law’.34 In other words, an uncontested religious mystique was needed against division and democratic despotism, just like the mystique of constitutional monarchy was necessary to end the political division of the Fourth Republic. Jouvenel recognised that universal human rights could theoretically play the same role, but he stated that they were much less effective.35

In line with statements both he and Fabre-Luce had made during the 1930s, Jouvenel continued to exempt the British parliament from his critique of democratic society. In England, he explained, the Bill of Rights had permitted the aristocracy to retain its historic role as a parliamentary check on ‘statocracy’. Due to its continued relevance as the guarantor of civic freedom, the British aristocracy never lost its prestige amongst the masses, as was demonstrated by its continued electoral support. The French aristocracy had been too divided and too stupid to play a comparable role, with the old nobility shielding itself from the new and both groups snubbing the higher bourgeoisie of state servants. As a result, France’s ‘plebeian elite’ had become ‘jacobinised’, turning its back on the nobility and working closely with the monarch, ‘so naturally a servant of royal power that it could only continue it, without a king’.36 Jouvenel cited a statement by John Stuart Mill about the essential difference between the English and the French people. Whereas the French were all too willing to sacrifice their individual freedom for the mere appearance of power, the English were less interested in exercising power but the more willing to oppose a power transgressing its traditional boundaries. Jouvenel concluded that in England freedom was a ‘generalised privilege’, the result of a process by which aristocratic privileges had gradually been extended over

33 Ibid., 431, 441.
34 Ibid., 456, 461.
35 Ibid., 453, 460.
36 Ibid., 286, 290, 409.
the entire plebs, which had been ‘aristocratised’ as a result. In revolutionary France, the absolutist instrument of state had fallen into the hands of a people that understood itself as a mass and saw individuals as subjects.37

Throughout human history, Jouvenel considered the aristocracy as the incorporation of its etymological meaning: rule by the best men. In the chapter ‘The Aristocratic Roots of Freedom’, he described how the aristocracy traditionally represented society’s strongest and most courageous individuals, who had alone been able to limit state power in its despotic voracity. He contrasted these ‘virile’ and ‘sanguine’ people with the weaker ‘securitarians’, who were overrepresented in the lower echelons of society. While the former group, dubbed ‘libertarians’, valued freedom above all and was willing to take risks, the latter put security first and appealed to the state for protection. Only the people with the first mentality could put up the pretense of real freedom, while the ‘securitarians’ contributed to the de facto subversion of liberty by seeking shelter with the state. Jouvenel specified that, while the effects of ‘heredity’ tended to conserve the character of the two groups, he did not consider them as hermetically closed. The aristocracy could develop ‘securitarian’ tendencies, just like the lower classes occasionally produced individuals of an outstanding ‘libertarian’ character. In the normal situation, however, the ruling classes consisted of the bravest men, while ‘timid souls’ sought protection in a ‘subjugation almost exactly matching their fears’. While recognising its fundamental inequality, Jouvenel still called this situation a ‘social equilibrium, because freedoms correspond to risks’.38

In modern society, the aristocracy had either lost its power (as happened to the nobility) or become bound to the state apparatus (as was the case with a new elite of higher civil servants), thereby losing both its independence and its ‘libertarian’ mentality. These aspirations were adopted by the middle class, which mistakenly tried to extend liberty to all social classes, including the ones that could not carry the weight. The exploitation of workers in the nineteenth century was a direct consequence of the abstract application of the principle of human rights, since it had imposed a freedom so absolute that there could be no more protection of the weak or restriction of the strong, leading to an ‘intolerable’ level of insecurity for the lower classes. After the First World War, with both the aristocracy and the proletariat looking to the state for protection, only the middle classes remained to defend freedom, but they too became insecure as a result of inflation and unemployment. This resulted in an ever stronger appeal for state protection

37 Ibid., 497, 498.
38 Ibid., 507, 510, 511.
in the form of social security, which came down to ‘men handing over to the state their individual rights in exchange for social rights’. Western societies became ‘social protectorates’ like the United States under Roosevelt and Germany under Hitler, in which the state held all power:

The Minotaur is indefinitely protective, but it also needs to be indefinitely authoritarian. It needs to never doubt itself, and to convince in order to be obeyed: it unites the spiritual and the temporal. It combines the two powers that Western civilisation always kept separated.

With this description of the monstrosity of an infinitely protective state, Jouvenel directly contradicted his own longing in 1938 for an early-Islam-like fusion of the spiritual and the temporal under the authority of a revolutionary fascist regime. Likewise, there is a clear opposition between his negative reference to Hitler and Roosevelt’s state interventionism as infinitely authoritarian and his mid-1930s call for France to be inspired by the German and American examples. To a certain point, Jouvenel was aware of these contradictions himself. While working on Du Pouvoir, he wrote in his diary about his hesitation as to whether it would ‘at first sight’ not be considered strange for the author of L’Économie Dirigée to presently write an ‘indictment against the state’. While remarking that the ‘abuses of the state should not eclipse the economic disorder as we have known it in the period 1920-29’, he decided that he should analyse the interwar economy more systematically to determine whether its collapse was a consequence of excessive laissez-faire or the opposite. In resignation, he decided: ‘I will have to explain myself about the économie dirigée. It is the most unfortunate adventure that can happen to an author to see his formula receive an immense publicity meaning something different than what he was aiming for.’

For many other statements, Jouvenel would be spared the obligation of having to explain himself, since they were hardly different from his earlier positions. In a statement seemingly anticipating Zygmunt Bauman’s thesis of the quintessentially modern ‘gardening state’, Jouvenel described the ‘noble temptation’ of any ruler confronted with mankind’s ugly insufficiency to ‘garden in the disorder’ of society: ‘What a world ours is, in which

39 Ibid., 514, 519, 523.
40 Ibid., 529.
41 Jouvenel, Le Réveil de l’Europe, 279, 283; idem, Un Voyageur, 114; idem, La Crise du Capitalisme Américain, 343.
42 Journal de travail, cahier I [25 April 1943], Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (37).
children conceived by accident grow up like weeds, in which cities grow on the impulse of sordid speculations like blind beasts crawling among their own excrement.’ As big as the temptation was to ruthlessly intervene in this mess to build ‘cities of the sun, inhabited by a nobler race’, Jouvenel warned against such thoughts. Intoxicated by such grand designs, a ruler may decide that ‘the happiness of a continent demands the full suppression of fermented drinks, or worse, the extermination of an entire race accused of having impure blood’.43 In Jouvenel’s view, only the ‘mundane wisdom of an ancient aristocracy can protect against enthusiasms that intend to be constructive but risk being incendiary’. These last words were remarkably close to his praise in 1941 of the virtues of an aristocracy that should have led France instead of its political elite of mediocre middle-class politicians.44

There is considerable ambiguity in Jouvenel’s attitude towards force and power as expressed in Du Pouvoir. He felt little more than contempt for the intellectual capacities of the masses, who were permanently inclined to sacrifice freedom by seeking shelter with the state and allowing themselves to be exploited by its propaganda. Rebellious only against weak rulers, the plebs almost longed to be dominated, accepting ‘any masters as long as they show themselves courageous and severe towards themselves’.45 In Jouvenel’s description of rulers, caution about the consequences of unchecked state power was occasionally eclipsed by outright admiration for authoritarian leadership. Citing Oswald Spengler’s The Decline of the West, whose fundamental pessimism about the course of Western civilisation he shared, Jouvenel stressed that there was always and inescapably an ‘egoistic’ component to state power. Any ruler, as altruistic or democratic as his motives may be, would be transformed intellectually ‘and almost physically’ through the exercise of power, to the point of becoming an Übermensch-like version of himself. It was lonely at the top:

The command is an attitude. One breathes a different air there, one discovers other perspectives than down in the valleys of obedience. The passion of order, the architectural genius that our species has been endowed with, deploy themselves. From high up in his tower, this enlarged man sees what he could forge from the squirming masses that he dominates.46

43 Jouvenel, Du Pouvoir, 527. See also Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust, 13; Griffin, ‘Modernity under the New Order’, in A Fascist Century, ed. Feldman, 43.
44 Jouvenel, Du Pouvoir, 528; idem, La Décomposition de l’Europe Libérale. 439.
45 Jouvenel, Du Pouvoir, 518.
46 Ibid., 179.
Just as Jouvenel evolved little in his contempt for the weak and powerless and his admiration for the courage, power and physical strength of an elite, so too was there little change in the people whom he deemed deserving of admiration. He dropped his earlier fascist praise of the land-working peasantry, the ‘families rooted in the earth’, at the expense of traders. Rather than attacking the ‘mercantile spirit’ of the English, Jouvenel now ranked intrepid risk-taking merchants amongst his aristocratic heroes. At the same time, in a distinction also inspired by Spengler, he remained dismissive about capitalism’s industrial elite, which he accused of having lost its mass support due to financial speculation and risk-avoiding behaviour, just like the Roman patriciate who had been defeated by the emperors after degenerating from austere military leaders into greedy capitalists illegally enriching themselves and practicing usury. There remained a certain similarity between Jouvenel’s glorification of courageous, severe, quasi-military aristocratic leaders – superior men avoiding the comforts of an easy life and being rewarded for that choice with freedom – and his earlier praise of the bravery of fascist youth avoiding the comforts of bourgeois society and preferring a life of risk, joy and heroism.

A Mountain in Switzerland: Neoliberalism and the Mont Pèlerin Society

Published in Geneva as part of the Cheval Ailé’s collection of fascist and collaborationist books, Du Pouvoir initially failed to draw much attention in France. Hardly a bestseller, the book also suffered from unavailability in France, and it took Jouvenel decades (and a long-running financial conflict with Bourquin) to solve this problem by buying back the rights and republishing Du Pouvoir with a French editor. The Écrits de Paris was one of the few newspapers to publish a (largely positive) review of the book. Fabre-Luce repeatedly cited the book with approval, and a few friends wrote Jouvenel to congratulate him with his magnum opus (or to tell him

47 Jouvenel, Du Pouvoir, 518; idem, ‘Comment on Restaure un Pays’, L’Émancipation Nationale (1 October 1937).
49 See the correspondence between Jouvenel, Constant Bourquin and Le Cheval Ailé (1952, 1954, 1964) included in the folder ‘Éditions du Cheval Ailé’, Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (296). Du Pouvoir was finally published in France by Hachette in 1972.
they had not yet finished reading it). The book’s breakthrough came from outside the French-speaking world.\footnote{Fabre-Luce, Hors d’Atteinte, 110; idem, Le Siècle Prend Figure, 156.} In Italy, the renowned philosopher and president of the liberal party Benedetto Croce was immediately interested in *Du Pouvoir*, and he discussed it (albeit critically) in two articles. Thanks to Croce’s support and an intervention by the German economist Wilhelm Röpke, who also lived in Switzerland and had become a close friend of Jouvenel, several Italian editors became interested in the book, publishing a translation in Milan in August 1947. Röpke also tried to interest his Swiss publisher in a German translation, but in vain.\footnote{Dard, Bertrand de Jouvenel, 243, 247; Wilhelm Röpke to Jouvenel (20 September 1945), Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (305); Jouvenel, *Il Potere*.}

In his criticism of the ‘voracity’ of state power in *Du Pouvoir*, Jouvenel described how the state would not tolerate any other societal power to exist besides itself. If unchecked, this process would result in ‘social atomisation, the rupture of all particular links between men only held together by their common serfdom to the state’.\footnote{Jouvenel, *Du Pouvoir*, 255.} Although it is almost certain that when writing these lines, Jouvenel was unfamiliar with Friedrich Hayek and his *Road to Serfdom* (1944), readers who were could not help but notice the similarity of the two books. Both Hayek and Jouvenel analysed fascism and communism not as political aberrations but as the results of a larger trend in Western societies towards ever greater state power. Both saw totalitarianism as a permanently looming presence inside democratic society and warned that planning and social security represented a major step towards it. In terms of positioning and self-image, both claimed to represent the voice of reason, a tiny minority in an age of passions and fanaticism.\footnote{Hayek, *The Road to Serfdom*, 70, 185, 239.} Hayek himself enthusiastically reviewed Jouvenel’s book in *Time and Tide*, praising it as a ‘monumental study’ that provided a ‘masterly and frightening picture of the impersonal mechanisms by which power tends to expand until it engulfs the whole of society’.\footnote{Cited in De Dijn, ‘Bertrand de Jouvenel and the Revolt Against the State’, 382.}

To a large extent, this explains why, upon its publication in the United States in 1949, *On Power* had such a large impact. By that time, *The Road to Serfdom* had become a bestseller that had provoked reactions from both sides of the political spectrum, and Jouvenel’s book was immediately interpreted as an important Hayekian publication. Within months of its publication, *On Power* was reviewed in all the major American newspapers, with reactions ranging from enthusiasm (including the obligatory Tocqueville comparison)
to outright dismissal as capitalist propaganda, depending largely on the newspaper’s political orientation.\textsuperscript{55} This is not to say that Jouvenel and Hayek agreed on everything. Besides needing only a third of the number of pages of Jouvenel’s book, Hayek also did not share Jouvenel’s distrust of party politics, and he was less pessimistic about democracy’s chances of survival. Whereas Hayek cited Spengler (especially his \textit{Preußentum und Sozialismus}) only to describe the danger of his ideas and to associate Nazism with socialism, Jouvenel approvingly used his analytical concepts. While Hayek concluded with a plea to return to something not far removed from classical liberalism, Jouvenel dismissed classical liberalism as ‘fully utopian’ for its completely mistaken idea of state power and how to limit it.\textsuperscript{56}

In the UK, \textit{On Power} was published in October 1948 and was almost as successful. British interest in the book was considerable, mainly thanks to a laudatory commentary on \textit{Du Pouvoir} by D. W. Brogan (who also prefaced the English translation) published on the first page of the \textit{Times Literary Supplement} in early 1946. Jouvenel received a less flattering review in \textit{The New York Times}, where Hugh Trevor-Roper ripped the ‘pretentious’ book apart and called its author ‘a laboriously learned man who has not learned to think’.\textsuperscript{57} Hans Morgenthau had very mixed feelings about the book, praising Jouvenel’s ‘relevant diagnosis’ of the totalitarianism present within modern masses-oriented democracy while criticising his partiality and ‘backward-looking romantic aristocratism which follows in the footsteps of Bonald, de Maistre, de Tocqueville, and Taine’. All in all, Morgenthau’s impression was ‘not unlike Spengler’s: irritation over much that is obviously one-sided and false and admiration for a political thinker of the first order who has something important to say’.\textsuperscript{58}

The American and British success of Jouvenel’s magnum opus marked an important step in Jouvenel’s career. It opened doors for him at ‘Anglo-Saxon’ universities, starting with Manchester and Cambridge’s Corpus Christi College, where he lectured on socialism and income redistribution during the autumn of 1949. This was soon followed by stints at Yale and Berkeley. The Cambridge lectures, in which he criticised socialism’s ‘disastrous’ fall into ‘enlightened despotism’, were published in 1952. In the preface, Jouvenel thanked Ely Devons, Willmoore Kendall and Milton Friedman

\textsuperscript{55} De Dijn, ‘Bertrand de Jouvenel and the Revolt Against the State’, 381; Dard, \textit{Bertrand de Jouvenel}, 245, 247.
\textsuperscript{56} Hayek, \textit{The Road to Serfdom}, 177, 240; Jouvenel, \textit{Du Pouvoir}, 535.
\textsuperscript{57} Trevor-Roper, ‘Aspects of Power’.
\textsuperscript{58} Morgenthau, ‘The Evil of Power’, 507, 517.
for proofreading and helping eliminate the ‘economic barbarisms’ from the text – a striking illustration of his degree of integration into an international community of mostly conservative economic scholars.\textsuperscript{59} In an exchange of letters from the time, Friedman reprimanded Jouvenel for several ‘erroneous statements’ about national income and welfare economics. He told Jouvenel that even if his ‘heart’ was with him, his ‘instinct of workmanship in this instance’ was not.\textsuperscript{60}

The overseas fame of Jouvenel’s book soon combined with his chance presence in Switzerland to make him one of the key personalities in the international network of early post-war neoliberalism. This is remarkable given that, despite neoliberalism’s important French roots, Jouvenel had almost no connections with this milieu until 1944. At the unofficial birth hour of neoliberalism – the Colloque Walter Lippmann held in Paris in August 1938 – Jouvenel was a prominent member of the PPF and seemingly far removed from the small community of academics, industrialists and journalists who wanted to revitalise a liberalism that they cherished but deemed unadapted to modern challenges. The colloquium met at the initiative of Louis Rougier, a philosophy professor at the University of Besançon who advocated an eclectic mixture of logical positivism, anti-rationalism, anti-Bergsonism and anti-democratic elitism borrowed from Vilfredo Pareto and Gustave Le Bon. The only French member of the Vienna Circle, Rougier differed from most other logical positivists in his political convictions, which were markedly on the right. In a critique of ‘the democratic mystique’ published in 1929, he attacked the democratic ideal’s egalitarian messianism, which he blamed for paving the way for Marxism and Bolshevism.\textsuperscript{61} Rougier firmly believed in the fundamental distinction between the elite and the masses, denouncing the latter as ‘ignorant and self-important’ and their reign as ‘synonymous with commonness, vulgarity and boredom’. According to Rougier, liberal societies ultimately faced the choice between the rights of the citizen and the principle of popular sovereignty, and he urged them to choose the former.\textsuperscript{62}

As equally hostile to the planning agenda of the French left as to the right’s admiration of fascist state intervention, Rougier was convinced by the coming to power of the Popular Front that he needed to mobilise his considerable international academic network and lead ‘an international crusade in

\textsuperscript{59} Jouvenel, \textit{The Ethics of Redistribution}, ix, 47.
\textsuperscript{60} Milton Friedman to Jouvenel (15 April 1952), Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (300).
\textsuperscript{61} Denord, \textit{Néolibéralisme Version Française}, 96, 97.
\textsuperscript{62} Burgin, \textit{The Great Persuasion}, 68, 69.
favour of constructive liberalism’. In 1938, he seized the opportunity of a Paris visit of the American journalist Walter Lippmann, author of *The Good Society*, to organise a colloquium to discuss the book with the author and like-minded intellectuals. Lippmann was reluctant at first, especially after hearing that Rougier was planning to also invite Paul Baudouin and Marcel Bourgeois, who had both financed the PPF and other fascist movements in France, but the presence of Hayek and Ludwig von Mises finally convinced him to agree to a ‘restricted and closed conference’ to discuss his book’s ‘main thesis’. Meeting in the last days of August amidst high international tensions, the colloquium was attended by French economists, businessmen, academics and higher state officials (Louis Baudin, Ernest Mercier, Auguste Detoeuf, Louis Marlio, Jacques Rueff, Raymond Aron, Robert Marjolin) and what in retrospect was a very prestigious community of foreign academics and intellectuals: Hayek, Röpke, Mises, Alexander Rüstow, Michael Polanyi, Stefan Possony and Alfred Schütz. Politicians were the only group explicitly excluded from this almost ecumenical meeting.

Notwithstanding the diversity of ideas expressed at the colloquium and its often lengthy and inconclusive discussions during which Lippmann drew sketches to amuse himself, the meeting did lead to lasting results. Firstly, a name for the new creed was intensively discussed. Out of all the different names suggested – including ‘individualism’ (Baudin), ‘positive liberalism’ (Rougier) or even ‘left-wing liberalism’ (Rueff) – Rüstow’s proposal of ‘neoliberalism’ gradually established itself in the wake of the colloquium. Despite its potentially troubling association with neosocialism, the term has proven its staying power up to the present day, possibly also because very few people are familiar with Déat’s search for an anti-Marxist and national kind of socialism. Secondly, a manifesto was unanimously accepted that established several principles that went beyond classical liberalism. This ‘Agenda of Liberalism’, taken directly from Lippmann’s presentation at the colloquium, gave the state the duty to determine the legal framework for the national economy and asserted that the state should not only bear responsibility for internal security and national defence but also for social insurances, social services, education and scientific research.

Thirdly, the colloquium led to the foundation of an international organisation to support the new ideology. Both a study centre and a propaganda organisation, the Centre International d’Études pour la Rénovation du Libéralisme (CIRL) organised several meetings in the Paris Musée Social during 1939 and published a journal of which only one edition ended up seeing the light of the day, which contained the minutes of the colloquium. By June 1940, a second edition was in preparation featuring an article by Hayek that was a first sketch of what would become *The Road to Serfdom*. Presided by Rougier, the CIRL was based in Paris, while chapters were planned in the United States, England and Switzerland, headed by Lippmann, Hayek and Röpke respectively. Although the outbreak of war soon brought an end to the activities of the CIRL, its framework allowed the neoliberal network to survive through its designated national representatives, who acted as gatekeepers determining who was to be part of the movement. Thus, despite its short life, the CIRL provided the layout for a neoliberal International that could easily be revived once the war was over.67

In 1938, to be a ‘neoliberal’ meant to recognise the insufficiency of laissez-faire and the need for the state to develop an economic policy.68 In a metaphor by Rougier that Hayek borrowed in his *Road to Serfdom*, to be a neoliberal ‘does not mean to be a “Manchesterist” who leaves the cars circulating in all directions, if such is their will, which can only result in traffic jams and incessant accidents; it does not mean to be a “Planist” who gives every car its exit time and its route; it means to impose a highway code’.69 This statement was vague enough to act as the greatest common denominator of the neoliberal movement, finding the support of its different currents. From those convinced of the need for social security (Rougier, Lippmann) to those who saw these views as dangerous and for whom neoliberalism often came close to classical liberalism (Mises, Hayek), from future supporters of the Chicago School to architects of the post-war German ‘social market economy’ (Röpke, Rüstow): all had their own interpretations of what shape this ‘highway code’ ought to take.70

Both within and outside France, the Second World War led to a political split and a reconfiguration of the fledgling neoliberal movement. While a minority of French neoliberals joined De Gaulle or the Resistance (Raymond

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68 Ibid., 120.
69 Cited in Denord, ‘French Neoliberalism and its Divisions’, 49. See also Hayek, *The Road to Serfdom*, 74.
Aron, Marjolin), most either supported Vichy (Joseph Barthélemy), chose not to commit (Charles Rist) or left the country (Marlio). Rougier played a shady role. Exploiting his connections with Vichy and the London School of Economics, he convinced Pétain to send him on a secret mission to London in October 1940 with the aim of negotiating a ‘gentlemen’s agreement’ between him and Churchill. This episode later gave rise to a bitter feud between Rougier and the British government, which denied that any such agreement had ever existed. Two months later, Rougier left for New York where he joined the New School for Social Research with a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation. His Vichy activities as well as his refusal to recognise the legitimacy of the Free French discredited him in the eyes of his French colleagues, however, and ultimately even led to him losing his teaching position. Concluding that Rougier had proven to be ‘a rather malleable type’, Hayek and Röpke became increasingly reluctant to maintain relations with him. Lippmann, whose prominence as a neoliberal diminished due to his own shift in attention to other concerns, grew frustrated with Rougier’s many activities in New York, while he had advised him to remain quiet.

With Rougier discredited and Lippmann less interested, Hayek and Röpke were left as the central figures of the neoliberal movement. At the end of the war, both launched new initiatives for an international organisation, and both involved Jouvenel in their plans. While Röpke’s plans for a trilingual (English, French, German) periodical catering to a cosmopolitan intellectual elite fell through due to a conflict with investors, Hayek’s took longer to ferment but were more successful. After initially being distracted by obligations in the United States, where the success of The Road to Serfdom prompted him to tour the country and make countless public appearances in front of enthusiastic conservative crowds, Hayek was able to organise a new international gathering of neoliberals in early 1947. Convening on 1 April 1947 in a hotel on the slopes of the Mont Pèlerin, a low mountain bordering Lake Geneva and Vevey, the conference was attended by journalists, businessmen and academics – roughly the same sort of community that had met in Paris nine years earlier, albeit with a stronger American contingent. Of the thirty-nine men and one woman (the British historian Veronica Wedgwood) present, fifteen (including Raymond Aron, Baudin,

72 In support of his claims, Rougier published a book at the Cheval Ailé: Rougier, Mission Sécrète à Londres.
Hayek, Mises, Polanyi, Röpke and Rüstow) had taken part in the Walter Lippmann colloquium. Amongst the new faces were Karl Popper, Walter Eucken, Frank Knight, Fritz Machlup, William Rappard and Milton Friedman. The conference programme provided for ten days of discussions, meals and excursions into the Swiss countryside. It marked the establishment of the Mont Pèlerin Society (MPS), the reincarnation of the CIRL.74

By complete chance, Jouvenel’s house in nearby Saint Saphorin was practically a stone’s throw away from the conference venue. His presence at the foundational meeting of the MPS marked his consecration as a neoliberal intellectual, and thanks to his English skills he was the most active French participant in the discussions. While Rougier had been excluded for his connections with Vichy and was only allowed to join the MPS in the 1950s, Jouvenel’s acceptance was seemingly fluid, although there were limits placed on this acceptance. For example, there was no question of appointing someone with Jouvenel’s political past as head of the French section of the society, as was discussed for a moment. As William Rappard told André

Siegfried, whom he wanted to take that position: ‘everyone realised – and he himself the most, I believe – that for reasons you will surely understand, it would not be appropriate to ask him to represent your country at the council’. Jouvenel's successful integration into the MPS can be traced back to some prior steps he had taken. After the war, Jouvenel had been quick to establish contacts with Jacques Rueff, whose work he praised. He profited from his first post-war English journey to meet Hayek, probably in late 1945, and the two maintained a regular correspondence starting in the late 1940s. Hayek was keen on inviting Jouvenel to the Mont Pèlerin gathering, and Jouvenel subsequently became his preferred counsellor on all matters French. In return, Jouvenel retained an abiding gratitude to the MPS, and especially to Hayek, for including him. In 1951, when Hayek asked if he would be present at the Society’s next meeting in Beauvallon in southern France, Jouvenel replied: ‘Seriously, as long as I am on my legs I won’t miss your gatherings to which I am in every way indebted.’

The Beauvallon meeting resulted in a book edited by Hayek, *Capitalism and the Historians*, containing an article by Jouvenel in which he castigated ‘continental’ intellectuals for their increasingly critical attitude to capitalism, whereas the ‘business community’ had been ‘strikingly bettering the conditions of the masses, improving its own working ethics, and growing in civic consciousness’. Jouvenel agreed with Hayek’s analysis, expressed in the same volume, that historians had falsified history by creating ‘the legend of the deterioration of the position of the working classes in consequence of the rise of “capitalism”’, while a ‘more careful examination of the facts’ proved that the exact opposite had been the case. Jouvenel concluded by suggesting that the problem lay not with capitalism but with the ‘intellectual class’ itself. In modern society, intellectuals had lost their old primacy to an ‘executive class’ of producers who gave the consumers the ‘goods’ they desired most – an attitude that intellectuals eschewed almost by definition. Thus, jealousy mixed with an inferiority complex resulted in the intelligentsia pitting itself against capitalism with unjustified anger. In an earlier letter to Hayek, Jouvenel explained that the aim

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76 Dard, *Bertrand de Jouvenel*, 274.
77 Jouvenel to Friedrich Hayek (June/July 1951), Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (301). See also Jouvenel, *Problèmes de l’Angleterre Socialiste*, 97; idem, *L’Amérique en Europe*, II.
of his contribution was to analyse ‘the moral condemnation of Capitalisme [sic]’ by various intellectuals:

As I see it, the success of Capitalism is linked to the admission of certain traits of man, those which were strongly and exclusively stressed by Hobbes (and Locke). Critics of Capitalism are those which [sic] either are unsympathetic to those traits (the Christian and Carlylean strains of criticism) or who do not accept the unfolding of the logic of favouring these traits.80

With these kinds of statements, Jouvenel aligned himself with a general critique of intellectuals that was developed by a larger group of academics affiliated with neoliberalism. Writers like Hayek, Raymond Aron and Joseph Schumpeter, convinced that they were engaged in an ideological combat in which the overwhelming majority of intellectuals had picked the side of Marxism, wrote influential works in which they attacked the role of intellectuals in society as such. While Aron famously described icons like Marxism as ‘the opium of intellectuals’ in search of a ‘secular religion’, Hayek notably denounced intellectuals as ‘second-hand dealers in ideas’ whose ‘all-pervasive’ influence had paved the way for ‘socialist totalitarianism’ in the entire Western world.81

Schumpeter saw the subversive behaviour of intellectuals as a function of the capitalist system itself. In his popular tract Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, he complained that ‘capitalism inevitably and by virtue of the very logic of its civilization creates, educates and subsidizes a vested interest in social unrest’. While under earlier systems of rule, intellectuals had been constrained by a menacing state power, the capitalist order was neither willing nor able ‘to control the intellectual sector effectively’.82 Despite sharing many positions with the neoliberal movement, Schumpeter never joined the MPS, and some of its members had reservations about his ideas. In a letter to Jouvenel, Röpke called his work a ‘disgusting book’, but Jouvenel read it with interest and discussed it in several articles.83 Although he seemed to struggle with Schumpeter’s assertion that a socialist system could function in reality, Jouvenel concluded that it could never be reconciled with individual liberty:

80 Jouvenel to Friedrich Hayek (June/July 1951) and other parts of their correspondence from 1951 and 1952, Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (301).
82 Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, 146, 151.
83 Wilhelm Röpke to Jouvenel (3 July 1946), Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (305).
'We are moving towards socialism. But there is little reason to believe that it will signify the advent of the civilisation the socialists dream of. It is more probable that it will bear fascist traits.'

His MPS connections and the success of *On Power* provided Jouvenel with important ties to intellectual milieus of the American right. Directly following the conference at Mont Pèlerin, the American journalist and fellow MPS founding member Felix Morley involved him with *Human Events*, a conservative weekly he had founded together with Frank Hanighen and Henry Regnery. Between June 1947 and the end of 1951, Jouvenel wrote twenty-eight contributions for *Human Events*, first in the form of long articles and later as a monthly ‘European Supplement’.

In one of his early articles, he criticised both state intervention and laissez-faire, essentially repeating his arguments from *Du Pouvoir*. Since the assumption ‘that the collective interest would also be served by the pursuit of the various personal interests’ was proven wrong, the ‘vigilant wisdom of a statesman’ was necessary to make ‘modes of conduct which are disadvantageous to Society also disadvantageous to the individual’ and vice versa.

Jouvenel also published an attack against Soviet communism and everybody in the West who was indulgent towards it – including Churchill, ‘who raised Tito from bandit status’, and De Gaulle, who ‘acquitted Communism’ of ‘sabotage’ during the first year of the war and allowed ‘Thorez, the war deserter’ to sit at the government table. For Jouvenel, recent history showed how dangerous this indulgence of communism really was, especially when combined with the financial ruin of the middle classes:

> When these people have been despoiled, when it is understood that private property is not to be respected but that whatever faction gains the upper hand can alter the distribution of the national income to suit its partisans, when politics fall to the level of a tug of war between vote-getting machines. Extremists on both sides then resort to violence. The Communist army marches violently to the complete destruction of

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society, and some Fuehrer or other always arises to rally those who seek
the restoration of order.\footnote{\textit{Bertrand de Jouvenel, ‘The Curtain of Haze’, \textit{Human Events} (31 December 1947).}}

In spite of these depressing perspectives, Jouvenel saw hopeful signs as more and more people were finally becoming aware of the danger of the ‘savage imperialism’ of the communist block: ‘only last spring, when a little group of true liberals assembled from various countries at the Mont Pèlerin Conference in Switzerland, it still seemed as though we could not break through the curtain of haze, however much we tried. But now, with 1948, the break-through has come.’\footnote{\textit{Jouvenel, ‘The Curtain of Haze’}.}

Even more radically anti-Marxist than Jouvenel, the editors of \textit{Human Events} occasionally summarised his conclusions for the American reader. In December 1951, at the end of a long article in which Jouvenel explained the lasting influence of Labour in England, even after losing the elections to the Conservatives, the editors concluded that socialism was ‘a disease that penetrates the very marrow of the nation that tries it’. They reminded their readers that there could be ‘no compromise with Socialism. It must be fought at every step.’\footnote{\textit{Bertrand de Jouvenel, ‘European Supplement’, \textit{Human Events} (December 1951).}} In the early 1950s, possibly via Raymond Aron, Jouvenel became involved with the periodical \textit{Confluence}, founded and headed by the Harvard PhD candidate Henry Kissinger, who was at the time working on his dissertation on Metternich and Castlereagh. Kissinger, who counted on Jouvenel, Aron and Gabriel Marcel to provide his periodical with regular contributions from France, met Jouvenel in Paris in January 1953. The two established a long-lasting friendship that would lead Kissinger to testify in favour of Jouvenel during his lawsuit against Sternhell in 1983.\footnote{Henry Kissinger to Jouvenel (13 November 1952); Jouvenel to Kissinger (17 November 1952) and their subsequent correspondence included in Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (302).}

During these years, Fabre-Luce lacked the international neoliberal connections of Jouvenel. He was in regular contact with neither Hayek nor Röpke, and he never joined the MPS – let alone that he would have been allowed to.\footnote{While there is no correspondence with Hayek, a single letter by Röpke from 1951 complimenting Fabre-Luce on an article in the \textit{Écrits de Paris} suggests that the two did not know each other prior to this date. Wilhelm Röpke to Fabre-Luce (11 March 1951), Fonds AFL, 472 AP 8.} Nevertheless, his public and private writings show striking commonalities with Jouvenel's ideas and aspirations of the time. Fabre-Luce attentively read \textit{Du Pouvoir}, and his reading notes show a propensity to focus on its political conclusions. From Jouvenel's praise of the English aristocracy,
Fabre-Luce concluded that ‘the system of liberty was a class system’, and he saw the Épuration as the logical consequence of the abandonment of divine law: ‘in 1944, we left the shelter of the constitution that still linked us to our ancestors’. Fabre-Luce also read Schumpeter’s *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy* and he discussed Hayek, Rueff and the Colloque Walter Lippmann in one of his first post-war books. He praised *The Road to Serfdom* for demonstrating that a regime of perfect social security would eliminate the Darwinian mechanism of ‘the selection of the best’ and that a system of rationing always led to censorship. Fabre-Luce was critical, however, of Hayek’s tendency to simply describe any appeal for state intervention as an intellectual mistake. ‘One can expect the people to suffer certain automatic adaptations, not to starve without reacting with demands of intervention’.93

At the national level, Fabre-Luce took the first steps leading to his gradual reintegration into the French right-wing mainstream. The most striking episode in this process was his passionate correspondence with Raymond Aron, which started as an icy exchange of letters about Pétain, De Gaulle and their own positions during the war, gradually becoming more cordial as the two intellectuals discovered their joint agenda for the post-war period and their agreement on the necessity of a united Europe against communism.94 By 1951, their relations had improved to the point that they met for a beer in a Paris brasserie, enjoying the quality of their intellectual exchange.95 Fabre-Luce also renewed his contacts with Hubert Beuve-Méry, chief editor of *Le Monde*, whom he possibly knew from *Notre Temps* and surely from his visit during the occupation to the Vichy elite school at Uriage, where Beuve-Méry was the assistant of director Pierre-Dominique Dunoyer de Segonzac. Despite their strong political disagreement, Beuve-Méry allowed Fabre-Luce to publish several articles in *Le Monde* during 1952 and 1953, appearing under the ‘libres opinions’ heading that explicitly did not represent the newspaper’s own political convictions.96

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94 See the letters (1938-1954) between Fabre-Luce and Raymond Aron included in Fonds AFL, 472 AP 2 and Fonds AFL, 472 AP 3. A selection of their letters was published in Aron’s own *Commentaire*, any scholar’s blessing considering the utter illegibility of Aron’s handwriting: Casanova, ed., ‘Correspondance entre Raymond Aron et Alfred Fabre-Luce’, 593-617.
95 Fabre-Luce, *Journal 1951*, 175.
‘This General Feeling of Open Conspiracy’

Wilhelm Röpke was one of Jouvenel’s earliest acquaintances in the neoliberal milieu, and their very rich correspondence, scarcely studied so far, provides insight into the doubts, pessimism, ambitions and obsessions of early post-war neoliberalism. It also offers an inside view of the practicalities of Jouvenel’s integration into the neoliberal community. A cosmopolitan liberal and an outspoken opponent of National Socialism, Röpke was fired from his economics chair at the University of Marburg in April 1933 as one of the few non-Jewish academics targeted by the early phase of the Nazi *Gleichschaltung*. He subsequently served as a professor in Istanbul, where he had Rüstow as a colleague, before joining the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva in 1937. During the Fall of France, unsure about what would happen to Switzerland, Röpke hesitated about whether to emigrate to the United States, and finally decided against it. The desperate journey of Mises, his colleague at the Graduate Institute, who travelled with his wife through a France in turmoil and only managed to cross the Spanish border after Rougier intervened in Vichy to secure a special visa for him, probably played a role in convincing Röpke to stay in Geneva.

Caught between his aversion to Nazism and a patriotic attachment to his fatherland, Röpke spent the war years in the relative security of a besieged Switzerland writing books reflecting his concerns. *Internationale Ordnung* (1945) was an energetic plea for a post-war international economy based on free trade and peaceful brotherhood and a vigorous attack against the ‘absurdity’ of planning. Rather than treating National Socialism as a uniquely German phenomenon, Röpke linked it to a totalitarian ideology that was at work in almost every country. For him, ‘fascism and National Socialism [...] are socialism as much as communism; all are variants of the totalitarian system shaped in its modern form by the Russian Revolution of 1917’. In *Die Deutsche Frage* (1945), Röpke applied this line of thought to the future of Germany. An attempt to convince a non-German audience of the possibility of a different Germany after the defeat of Hitler, his book was an exploration of the ‘historical and psychological roots of National Socialism’ and a sketch of a new Germany based on a de-Prussianised federal structure and a liberal economic system. Calling the concentration camps ‘a ques-

97 Jouvenel to Wilhelm Röpke (undated), Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (305).
100 Röpke, *Die Deutsche Frage*, 7, 226, 232.
tion of system and human type, not of national spirit’, Röpke concluded that the aim for the future should be ‘to put an end to such systems and types, not to the nations in which they find themselves’. He found it ‘bizarre’ that ordinary Germans were now the object of an international outrage that would have been much more effective had it mobilised itself ‘twelve years earlier’. Röpke’s final chapter carried as a motto a Schiller citation: ‘Der bloß niedergeworfene Feind kann wiederaufstehen, aber der versöhnte ist wahrhaft überwunden’.

Jouvenel and Röpke met at the beginning of 1944, and the two soon started an intense correspondence, especially during the first years when their letters occasionally crossed each other. Writing in French during the first year before shifting to English in September 1945 – almost symbolic of the shift during these years of neoliberalism’s centre of gravity to the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ world – Röpke and Jouvenel discussed the political and economic issues that occupied them, discovering their shared agenda and the possibilities for establishing a community of interests stretching from ideological issues to a very practical level. In addition to their written conversation, the two also met regularly. Röpke stayed several times at the hotel on Mont Pèlerin, using these occasions to pay a lunch visit to the Jouvenels. This is not to say that Röpke initially did not harbour any doubt as to Jouvenel’s past political activities. In 1948, looking back on the growth of their friendship, Röpke stressed that he had always had the greatest respect for him, ‘even at the earliest time of our personal relations when, as you will remember and as you will not have found unnatural, I had to make some efforts to do full justice to you and to get your personality into the right focus’.

In one of his first letters, Jouvenel praised Röpke’s Internationale Ordnung, especially for its analysis of ‘the wrong ideas from which we suffer’. Flattered, Röpke returned the compliment for Jouvenel’s Du Pouvoir (or at least the first half that he had finished reading) and announced that he had personally made sure the Geneva correspondent of the Neue Zürcher Zeitung would dedicate an article to the book. Jouvenel then convinced Bourquin to publish a French translation of Röpke’s Deutsche Frage at the Cheval Ailé, after which Röpke published an article about Du Pouvoir in the Journal de Genève. Röpke subsequently suggested that Jouvenel dedicate an article to the German version of Hayek’s Road to Serfdom, translated

101 Ibid., 219, 224n.
102 Röpke to Jouvenel (10 March 1944), Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (305).
103 Röpke to Jouvenel (6 April 1948), Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (305).
by Röpke’s wife Eva. Jouvenel replied that Röpke’s laudatory article was ‘infinitely precious’ to him since it ‘so strongly affirms the convergence of our points of view’. He announced that he was more than happy to write a ‘compte-rendu’ of Hayek’s translated book ‘in which I will try to establish the links connecting *The Road to Serfdom* to your work. It seems very important to me to affirm in this way the existence of a liberal current of thought.’

In the resulting article, Jouvenel treated the French edition of Röpke’s *Deutsche Frage* at great length. Röpke’s analysis of the historical growth of the Prussian state, ideologically supported by Hegel, Kant and the Lutheran tradition, illustrated how in Germany the state had become ‘an immense depot of material power and moral prestige’ ready to be hijacked by the ‘Hitlerians’ through regular elections. In full agreement with Röpke, Jouvenel stated that rather than blaming the Germans for this escalation, a more general lesson needed to be drawn: ‘certain poisons are capable of a prodigious effect on the modern masses. Vast crowd movements can be caused, not by appealing to reason, but through a stimulation of anger and hope that truly is a demonic art.’ This implied, according to Jouvenel, that those who, ‘motivated by generous intentions’, were busy extending the state apparatus for social means, should ask themselves ‘if they are not preparing a prodigious dungeon for other madmen. Just like M. Hayek [footnote: Hayek, *Der Weg zur Knechtschaft*, transl. Eva Röpke], professor Röpke stresses how strongly all the ideas currently in vogue come from Germany and belong to a preparatory process that we can call Bismarckian.’

So shortly after the end of the war, not all were ready to welcome Röpke’s German history lessons. When Emmanuel Berl publicly attacked Röpke as a champion of ‘la bonne Allemagne’ who cynically blamed Europe for crimes the Germans committed, Jouvenel tried to appease Röpke by explaining Berl’s perspective. Although Berl’s assertion that ‘you accuse totalitarianism rather than Germany’ was essentially correct, he ought not to have condemned Röpke for it, since ‘the strength of your book lay in the fact that you represented totalitarianism as a malady which had struck Germany first, because that country had been rendered susceptible to it’. Jouvenel too had been ‘made uneasy in my mind by some streaks of German ferocity and sadism that are unimaginable to me’, but he was convinced that ‘visiting those sins on the whole nation [...] leaves little or no hope for Europe’.

104 Jouvenel to Röpke (26 April 1945); Röpke to Jouvenel (25 May 1945); Röpke to Jouvenel (5 July 1945); Röpke to Jouvenel (20 July 1945), Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (305).
105 Jouvenel to Röpke (23 July 1945), Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (305).
106 XXX [BdJ], ‘Penchons-Nous sur le Chaudron Allemand’.
Furthermore, Berl’s harsh words on Röpke may have been motivated by his ethno-religious background. Whereas some of Jouvenel’s friends had been ‘killed or tortured’ by the Germans ‘for having actively resisted German domination’, Berl ‘has had friends and parents turned into soap not for having fought Germany but because they were Jews. These unheard-of crimes are apt to give one a bad opinion of the whole nation which condoned them.’ Disagreeing with Berl, Jouvenel found Röpke to have sufficiently recognised German responsibility for these horrors.107

Jouvenel and Röpke indeed agreed on many things. In an earlier letter to Röpke, Jouvenel stated his ‘profound conviction: in order to save Europe, Germany has to be saved’. Since ‘all Western powers had their share of responsibility for the despair that finally drove Germany into the arms of Hitler’, an international solution had to be found.108 Röpke thanked Jouvenel for his article on *Internationale Ordnung*, especially since he found the Allied occupation authorities to be ‘so terribly blundering in Germany’ and hoped his book would help ‘spread some reason’. He admitted feeling ‘more depressed than I can say’ about the future of Germany, especially when thinking about ‘the Poles and the Russians who are making of Eastern Germany a super-Buchenwald’. For a moment, Röpke nourished the hope that, ‘as non-signatory of the ill-starred Potsdam agreements’, France would ‘appear to be the real saviour of Germany by insisting on a federal solution’. Instead, De Gaulle and Georges Bidault had found ‘nothing better than the old separatist stuff’, leaving Röpke disappointed.109

In late 1946, a short trip to Freiburg (the first time he visited Germany since 1933) confirmed the worst of Röpke’s fears: ‘what the Allied quack doctors are doing at the German sick-bed is nightmarish. It couldn’t have been done worse.’ He was especially angry with the British ‘Labour ideologues’ for refusing him entry into the British occupation zone because they considered him ‘a dangerous sort of Neo-Nazi. It simply does not get into their little skulls that somebody who is a non-Socialist and anti-Communist can have been at the same time one of the most uncompromising and militant anti-Nazis. That is our world!’110 To comfort Röpke, Jouvenel reminded him of his personal achievements and the long-term perspective of their common cause: ‘it seems to me you have every reason to be pleased of the influence that you exert single-handed [sic]. You have become an adjective: “this is a

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107 Jouvenel to Röpke (28 August 1946?), Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (305).
108 Jouvenel to Röpke (30 May 1946), Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (305).
109 Röpke to Jouvenel (20 September 1945, 16 December 1945), Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (305).
110 Röpke to Jouvenel (21 November 1946), Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (305).
Röpkian outlook” is a not infrequent phrase. Besides, ‘we have got a long way to go intellectually before we shake liberalism free from Ricardianism, and it may be a good thing that the full flare of public attention is not turned upon the Third Way before the old structure it is meant to replace has been entirely swept away. This is the time to sow and not the time to reap.”

By using the concept of the ‘third way’ in his letter to Röpke, Jouvenel was referring to an idea that played an important role in the specifically German school of early post-war neoliberalism. Röpke, Rüstow, Eucken and other representatives of German ‘ordoliberalism’ (named after the periodical *Ordo* that acted as their platform of discussion) developed a variant of neoliberalism that diverged from Hayek and Mises’ Austrian School in its emphasis on a strong state. Röpke’s view of a third way between Keynesianism and laissez-faire was based on a combination of Spenglerian cultural pessimism, fear of the mass society and anti-modernism closely resembling Jouvenel’s ideas. It bore the traits of an elitism that was deeply suspicious of capitalism and democracy. Ordoliberals exerted considerable influence on the ‘social market economy’ policy that was adopted by the German Federal Republic under Konrad Adenauer and his long-time minister of economy Ludwig Erhard.

From the beginning, Röpke involved Jouvenel in his plans for an international neoliberal journal, which he wanted to call *Occident*. He asked Jouvenel’s advice on other potential French contributors to ‘our periodical’ and suggested that he write ‘an article on Nationalism (in your beautiful French, of course).’ When *Occident* failed to materialise, both intellectuals had their doubts about Hayek’s alternative plan for what was to become the MPS. Röpke told Jouvenel:

I am not quite sure whether it would be wise to sail thus under Hayek’s flag. I dare say you are right in your judgement on his book. Would it not be better to march separately, though to strike jointly? Hayek is perhaps too apt to stress the stupidity of the people he really ought to wish to convince and too little inclined to ask what the legitimate grievances of people are. I also would make some reserves before accepting his tendency to lump together Social Democracy and Nazism.

111 Jouvenel to Röpke (28 November 1946), Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (305).
113 Röpke to Jouvenel (20 October 1945); Jouvenel to Röpke (11 November 1945); Röpke to Jouvenel (16 December 1945), Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (305).
114 Röpke to Jouvenel (1 March 1946), Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (305).
Jouvenel agreed. As ‘admirable’ as *The Road to Serfdom* was ‘as an aggressive weapon’, he found Hayek’s work ‘too partisan, too one-sided, to carry conviction. At least in my mind it leaves as an after-taste the feeling that the other case had not been put, that the motives of the policy denounced are insufficiently understood and sympathised with.” He called Hayek’s proposal for an international neoliberal conference an ‘excellent development’, as long as the meeting would not become a ‘restatement of the Way to Serfdom [sic] but something new. Hayek seemed to me to be brimming with ideas.’ Both Hayek and Mises had spent too much time assailing their socialist opponents and too little time discussing their own positive ideas. According to Jouvenel, this was ‘good tactics’ but an unnecessary distraction from what should be their ultimate goal: the elaboration of a new liberalism.\footnote{Jouvenel to Röpke (undated, 1946), Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (305).}

Like Fabre-Luce, both Röpke and Jouvenel were convinced of the need for reconciliation between former members of the Resistance and collaborators, since the new global confrontation between communism and liberty had made these past quarrels irrelevant. Confirming that he received a paper by Hendrik de Man, probably sent to him by Jouvenel, Röpke praised the exiled Belgian collaborator as ‘an exceptionally gifted man’ and expressed the hope that ‘we shall see here soon a new alignment of fronts in which those old quarrels will cede into the background. Every day, the clash between Bolshevism and everything which is on this side of the ditch is becoming clearer and clearer.”\footnote{Röpke to Jouvenel (20 September 1945), Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (305).} When Röpke expressed his hesitations about accepting a French invitation to deliver lectures in Freiburg and Tübingen, both situated in the French zone of occupation, Jouvenel drew an analogy to collaboration during the German occupation of France: ‘I am somewhat astonished that my compatriots, who have given to “collaboration” such an extensive sense, cannot put themselves in the place of the now vanquished, of the now occupied, and understand that ever the best things, that especially the best things must not come to the Germans under the colours of a foreign flag.”\footnote{Röpke to Jouvenel (11 November 1945); Jouvenel to Röpke (November 1945), Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (305).}

Röpke hesitated between what he saw as his duty ‘to establish the contact between those intellectually starved people and the outside world’ and the fear of negative reactions if he made his first public appearance in Germany.
since 1933 as the official guest of an occupying power. Jouvenel responded that he faced the same moral dilemma towards his own fatherland. Claiming that he had been asked to resume his activities as an international reporter for the Paris big press, he was unwilling to subject himself to signing a declaration of twenty-four points about his behaviour under the occupation. Although he fulfilled the criteria and the doors were 'wide open' to him, Jouvenel did not want 'to cross a door which is unjustly closed to some. During the occupation I refused a subvention of a scientific character because it would not have been open to a jew or a free-mason. Since there was a discrimination, I didn't want it. Now can we subscribe to another discrimination? I think not.'

Three years later, Röpke had fewer scruples accepting an invitation to hold lectures as an official guest of Francoist Spain: ‘Despite everything the “incorrupibles” might say, I really think I ought to go.’

Both Röpke and Jouvenel were frustrated with what they saw as the weak or overly sympathetic attitude of Western politicians and media towards Soviet communism, which for Jouvenel came down to ‘a policy of appeasement’. At the same time, they shrunk back from the risk of war implied by a firm stance towards ‘the cynical imperialism of the East’, since this would come down to ‘a surgical operation which the ailing and weakened body of the Occident cannot well bear’. This dilemma led Jouvenel to draw a parallel with his own activities in favour of rapprochement with Hitler during the 1930s. He wrote to Röpke explaining that a decade earlier his own ‘pacifism’ had made him try to ‘understand’ Germany as others are trying today to ‘understand’ Russia. I was blamed then for this ‘understandingness’ by the very people who practise it with Russia to day. The outcome showed I was wrong and I could not preserve my attitude to the end. Munich was the turning point for me. Now if I was wrong, the people who do the same today must be wrong too.

One is struck by the general tone of the Jouvenel-Röpke correspondence, in which pessimism about world affairs was mixed with the conviction of representing a tiny elite of reasonable people in a world possessed by madness.

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119 Röpke to Jouvenel (14 November 1945); Jouvenel to Röpke (10 August 1946), Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (305).
120 Röpke to Jouvenel (16 December 1948), Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (305).
121 Jouvenel to Röpke (1 October 1945, 22 December 1945), Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (305).
122 Jouvenel to Röpke (3 February 1946), Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (305).
and fury. Just like Hayek, who regretted that his movement lacked a ‘liberal Utopia’ and harboured a jealous admiration for the courage and dedication of the socialist militant, Jouvenel and Röpke were convinced that their ideas lacked the ‘mystique’ necessary to win the mass appeal and electoral support that the champions of planning and totalitarianism could easily mobilise.\(^\text{123}\) Nonetheless, mixing fundamental pessimism with delusions of grandeur, they kept telling each other that if their faith was strong, they might prevail in the long run. In December 1945, in a particularly morbid Christmas letter, Jouvenel told Röpke that ‘even though injustice is rife, brutality rampant and imperialism arrogantly assertive, I feel that we may yet triumph over the forces of evil’.\(^\text{124}\) In a later letter, Jouvenel told Röpke that ‘it is an enormous comfort to feel that we are not alone in our effort’ and that their joint mission to move ‘this mass of untruths’ was beginning to bear fruit. ‘I cannot tell you how much I value our correspondence and meetings and this general feeling of open conspiracy, as my dear [H.G.] Wells would put it.’\(^\text{125}\)

If the masses were irrational and easily influenced, capitalist propaganda might also have an effect on them. With this aim, Jouvenel inquired into the possibility of spreading Walter Sulzbach’s pamphlet ‘Capitalistic Warmongers’ in a French version. Having already found a publisher interested (probably Bourquin), he stressed the necessity of such activities by referring to ‘the psychological conditions prevailing on this continent, which make it very difficult to oppose the currents of irrational thinking’.\(^\text{126}\) Just how much Jouvenel and Röpke were in agreement on the dangerous irrationality of the masses is illustrated by another long article in Curieux in which Jouvenel introduced Röpke’s work to a French-speaking audience. Citing Röpke, Jouvenel lamented that the introduction of democracy in the nineteenth century had coincided with the decline of aristocratic individualism and the rise of the hordes. From that moment, it had become useless to ‘reason with individual common sense’ but one had to ‘excite collective fever’ instead. ‘Citizens want laws and magistrates, the masses want myths and heroes: they tend towards totalitarianism with a movement required by their nature as masses. Whoever wants to fight this has to study the phenomenon of swarming [grégarisme].’\(^\text{127}\)

\(^\text{123}\) Hayek, ‘The Intellectuals and Socialism’, 432.
\(^\text{124}\) Jouvenel to Röpke (22 December 1945), Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (305).
\(^\text{125}\) Jouvenel to Röpke (undated, 1946/1947), Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (305).
\(^\text{126}\) Jouvenel to unknown (28 February 1946), Don 96 01 (305). See Walter Sulzbach, ‘Capitalistic Warmongers: A Modern Superstition’ (Chicago, 1942).
At first sight, this contempt for the masses and the anti-democratic insistence on the work of a tiny elite seem out of place among liberal intellectuals, but Röpke and Jouvenel did not consider this a paradox. For both of them, liberalism represented the rule of law, free enterprise, individual liberties and the protection of a sharp social hierarchy associated with the ‘natural’ order. They associated democracy with very different things: mob rule, the subjection of the legal system to the tyranny of the majority, irrationality and the ever-looming danger of totalitarianism and war. As Jouvenel wrote in an article destined for *Human Events*, liberalism and democracy were ‘far apart’. While liberalism started from the ideal of the ‘free agent’, only limited in his freedom by the smallest possible requirements of society, democracy meant ‘the absolute command of a majority’ legitimised by nothing but ‘the formalization of a reign of force’. The democratic system was defenceless against the establishment of a ‘team-will’ that considered itself entitled ‘to lead, drag or force along a willing or unwilling majority. The Führer-prinzip is in fact prevalent in the party spirit.’

Fabre-Luce applied the same distinction between democracy and liberalism. In 1946, using Abraham Lincoln’s definition of democracy as ‘government by the people’, he dismissed it because ‘that government never remains liberal. The crowd, if it rules, is the most absolute and the most basely flattered of all sovereigns. Louis XIV was still moderated by the respect of a tradition. Nothing contains the crowned Caliban. This means I am not a democrat.’ In 1949, Fabre-Luce insisted that ‘liberty remains historically associated with property, with the predominance of the bourgeoisie, much more strongly than with the establishment of universal suffrage or collectivisation. By their own movement, the masses run towards the tyrant.’

The essential characteristics of Jouvenel’s brand of neoliberalism can be summarised as freedom of the enlightened individual, an emphasis on the natural leadership of a small aristocratic elite, a fundamental distrust of democracy and mass society, a strongly hierarchical view of society and pessimism about the future of Western civilisation. While the ideological differences between fascism and liberalism seem almost irreconcilable when understood in their absolute sense, the gap narrows considerably

128 P tak, ‘Neoliberalism in Germany’, 104.
130 [‘Je ne suis donc pas démocrate’]. Fabre-Luce, *Hors d’Atteinte*, 195.
131 Fabre-Luce, *Le Siècle Prend Figure*, 15, 16.
if one takes a look at Jouvenel's specific ideas during the early post-war years.\textsuperscript{132} The temporal overlap of his activities in the intellectual milieu of the French extreme right and his neoliberal activities can also serve as an illustration of a larger trend. By the end of the Second World War, like former collaborators and Pétainists, French neoliberals belonged to those excluded (albeit not ostracised) from a governmental leadership set on an agenda of planning and nationalisations.\textsuperscript{133} During this period, Jouvenel was not the only French neoliberal who published in the Écrits de Paris, which also featured contributions from Rougier, Jacques Chastenet and Claude-Joseph Gignoux. A joint Cold-War agenda of anti-communism and often also European federalism were other elements that made extensive connections possible between extreme-rightists and neoliberals such as Röpke and Raymond Aron, who contributed several articles to La Fédération. The CNIP opened itself both to extreme-rightists like Isorni and to right-wing neoliberals such as Rueff. Strikingly, the early 1950s marked the return of former Pétainists and collaborators to political positions, the resurgence of a self-confident extreme-right press and the renewed influence of neoliberalism on French politics. Both prime ministers Faure and Pinay took inspiration and advice from neoliberal advisors.\textsuperscript{134}

\textsuperscript{132} Failing to see this factual proximity, Serge Audier bluntly states that Jouvenel's ideas as expressed in Du Pouvoir have nothing to do with his fascist past. See Audier, \textit{Néo-Libéralisme(s)}, 274.

\textsuperscript{133} Nord, \textit{France's New Deal}, 145.

\textsuperscript{134} Denord, 'French Neoliberalism and its Divisions', 52, 53.
Conclusion

From the Sohlberg to Mont Pèlerin

To a large extent, this has been an exercise in political swear words. Fascism is today almost universally seen as one, even by most political parties historically inspired by the phenomenon or belonging to the same tradition.\(^1\) With the exception of a few generally marginal extremist groups and equally marginal intellectuals, nobody calls him/herself a fascist.\(^2\) More or less the same is true for neoliberalism. Although considered a less absolute evil than fascism, little positive meaning is intended when the spectre of neoliberalism is conjured up in a present-day political context. This is partially the result of how the neoliberal milieu itself developed during the second half of the twentieth century. While the term was used as a positive epithet by neoliberals during the two decades following its invention in 1938, this began to change during the late 1950s alongside the rising dominance inside the Mont Pèlerin Society of a Chicago-School radical anti-statism that looked remarkably like classical liberalism. During the same period, the MPS lost the support of its founding members Raymond Aron, Polanyi and Jouvenel, who grew bored with its laissez-faire dogmatism and highly technical discussions and therefore stopped attending its meetings. In 1960, in a letter to Milton Friedman, Jouvenel admitted feeling ‘out of harmony with the Society’, which he saw turning ever more strongly to ‘a Manicheism according to which the State can do no good and private enterprise can do no wrong’.\(^3\)

With neoliberalism falling into disuse as a self-descriptive tool of analysis, it was abandoned into the hands of its opponents, who have vocally denounced its influence, especially since the onset of neoliberal policy during and after the Reagan-Thatcher era. This development has led to the confusing situation that ‘neoliberalism’, a concept originally launched to develop a new liberalism acknowledging the importance of the state, is today often seen to stand for the most radically anti-statist

\(^1\) For an early analysis of fascism as a near-universal swear word, see George Orwell, ‘As I please: 17’ [1944], in Fascism, vol. 1, eds. Griffin & Feldman, 51.

\(^2\) For a rare example of a self-proclaimed ‘fascist intellectual’ engaged in a discussion with historians of fascism (the twentieth-century historian’s version of a paleontologist interviewing a T-Rex), see the discussions with and about the Russian ‘Eurasian’ right-extremist Alexander Dugin in Erwägen, Wissen, Ethik 3 (2004).

\(^3\) Cited in Burgin, The Great Persuasion, 150, 175.
free-market fundamentalism. Though much less universally despised than fascism and neoliberalism, Europeanism (and especially its evil twin brother ‘Europhilia’) is also rapidly becoming a swear word in present-day politics. While it is still in use as a positive or neutral term, politicians have become increasingly reluctant to revindicate it, fearing the backlash of an electorate that has in many countries turned against the current state of European integration. From a present-day perspective, the principle use of the three main concepts treated in this study is the negative description of an other. This brings us close to a Sartrian paraphrase: the fascist/neoliberal/Europeanist, c’est les autres.

This has not been my approach. Rather than preliminarily according a present-day meaning to the concepts or engaging in the conflicts of definition and categorisation that have already exerted too large an influence on the historiography of fascism in France, I have analysed what meaning the concepts of fascism, Europe and (neo-)liberalism had for the intellectuals themselves during the period with which I am concerned. My main argument has been that Europeanist and internationalist ideas and context are key to understanding the development of Bertrand de Jouvenel and Alfred Fabre-Luce’s political thought between 1930 and the early 1950s. The commitment of these two intellectuals to a future united Europe, with a reconciled France and Germany at its core, originated in the 1920s. This was not only the driving force behind their ‘fascist drift’ during the first half of the 1930s, it also strongly influenced their attitude during the occupation and permitted them to forge new contacts once the war was over. By the mid-1950s, both Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce were able to look back on the first half of their political and intellectual life and draw positive conclusions. After the horrors of the Second World War, the violent death of several of their closest friends (Drieu, Luchaire) by execution or suicide, and the near-complete collapse of the fascist ideology with which they had long identified, they witnessed the onset of a ‘European revolution’, which they identified as the fulfilment of their decades-old ambitions.

During the 1930s, Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce’s internationalism evolved from a Briandist collective security model with ambitions for a larger United States of Europe into an alliance of authoritarian imperial states that would jointly and rationally exploit the wealth of their colonies and weaker neighbours. Their revulsion against war and the influence of their German contacts steered them towards an intransigent pacifism of the

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right, willing to subject all other interests to Franco-German rapprochement. During the same period, their economic ideas shifted from a belief in a liberal economy with limited state guidance to a fascist-corporatist model. Growing frustration with the lack of reforms, chronic governmental instability and the slow procedures of parliament, together with the shock of the Great Depression, ended up shattering Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce's confidence in parliamentarianism and capitalism. Hostile towards the left and associating all socialist reform projects with ‘totalitarian’ Soviet communism, they came to see dictatorship, corporatism and rapprochement with Hitler's Germany as the only solution for France.

Fabre-Luce's fascist ideal type was a revolution without bloodshed, a fascist economy with islands of private initiative and a society of disciplined freedom. Jouvenel's was the realisation of socialism without class struggle, a revolution without a proletariat and with continued privileges for a natural elite. They sometimes presented fascism as a mere method to discipline democracy and immunise it against the threat of communism, but they generally interpreted it as a revolutionarily different system. Both intellectuals associated fascism with the youth, dynamism, adventure and 'physical virtues' of a younger generation, with which they had identified since the late 1920s. This new fascist youth was considered different in their very essence from the ossified legalism and parliamentarianism of outdated bourgeois society. Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel attributed the foreign-policy successes of the fascist regimes to Hitler and Mussolini's association with this new generation, while France, still under the reign of a tired and mediocre bourgeoisie, suffered one setback after another. From the founding of the PPF, Jacques Doriot reflected their hope of a strong and dynamic leader forging a fascist party with a more credible popular base than the ‘reactionary’ anti-parliamentary leagues. Their activities as intellectuals at the party’s service permitted them to reach an unprecedented audience while bringing them into contact with different classes of society.

The Fall of France, the occupation and Vichy’s National Revolution fundamentally changed the circumstances under which the two intellectuals worked but not their convictions. Both were fascinated with the grand opportunities offered by a Europe united by German arms, and they explained the German victory of 1940 as the result of larger historical, psychological and political developments in Western civilisation, giving National Socialism the credentials of a revolution equal or superior to the French Revolution of 1789. They linked the Nazi victory to a more general fascist revolution which, they hoped, would engulf all of Europe. Fabre-Luce fully embraced the idea of collaboration in the name of this new fascist
Europe, convinced that France would be able to make a worthwhile and even necessary contribution to the system. He criticised the narrow-minded nationalism of those who, out of French patriotic sentiment, refused to take the same direction. Jouvenel was more reluctant, sharing Fabre-Luce’s fascinations but unwilling to commit himself entirely to a German Europe. Many ambiguities remained in his behaviour, however, and he seemed to alternate between his connections in the Paris collaborationist world, where several of his closest friends held key positions, his espionage activities on behalf of the Vichy regime and the Resistance network with which he established contacts in his native Corrèze.

After mid-1943, their joint experiences with exile and persecution led to a partial rethinking of their earlier engagements. While both intellectuals rejected the post-war order as a return to the parliamentarianism they held responsible for France’s decadence under the Third Republic, they sought for a new creed that would preserve what they understood to be the ‘positive’ legacy of fascism, essentially consisting of unity, authority, an austere working spirit and respect for a ‘natural’ hierarchy without the pitfalls of aggressive warfare. They temporarily supported the monarchist movement around the Comte de Paris, after which they found a political home in the post-war press initiatives of the French extreme right. While Jouvenel developed a broader network during his exile in Switzerland and generally tried to avoid political provocation, Fabre-Luce chose the opposite strategy, openly defending the heritage of Pétain and Vichy (though not of collaboration) and attacking the post-war authorities. This brought him lasting notoriety and an almost unmatched prominence among French extreme-rightists, who considered him their prime spokesperson. Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce were hostile to parliamentarianism and to the personality cult of Gaullism, while at the same time fearing the permanent risk of a communist take-over from within or without. As an alternative, they supported an authoritarian kind of Europeanism based on Franco-German cooperation, with joint exploitation of France’s North African colonial empire. At the same time, Fabre-Luce was also in touch with the extremist hard core of post-war Eurofascism.

During the same early post-war years, Jouvenel gained international prominence as a neoliberal intellectual and founding member of the Mont Pèlerin Society, partly due to the success of his magnum opus *Du Pouvoir*. Advocating a pessimistic, Spenglerian, elitist variant of liberalism that was far removed from democratic parliamentarianism, he established strong links with Hayek, Friedman, Röpke and American Cold War conservatives. His correspondence with Röpke reveals how both neoliberal intellectuals
saw their activities as an ‘open conspiracy’ aimed at devising a system of rule by a tiny enlightened liberal elite over the essentially irrational masses who, manipulable and ever tending towards totalitarianism, could not be trusted politically. For Röpke, Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce, the concept of totalitarianism not only served to associate Soviet communism with Nazism as two equally dangerous enemies of the free world but also to associate Nazism with democracy, stressing the plebiscitary tendencies of Hitler’s system of rule and the frightening efficacy of mass propaganda. They stated that any democracy, unless restrained by a strong aristocracy and a tradition of natural law, permanently carried the risk of totalitarianism within itself, since a single party could at any time hijack the system and destroy it from within.

This analysis raises several big questions. Without pretending to be able to answer them systematically, I am nonetheless convinced they need to be addressed, if only to avoid misunderstanding. What is the relationship between fascism and Europeanism? Rather than following Milza’s disbelief that adherents of an ‘ultranationalist’ creed could ever be genuinely interested in internationalism and a European ideal, I am convinced that the relationship was more complex. On the one hand, despite the present-day character of the EU (and the present-day extreme right’s predominantly anti-European stance), Europe never was nor is an exclusively liberal-technocratic concept unrelated to questions of identity, nationalism and imperialism. On the contrary: its strong connection to these concepts was exactly what made the ideal of a United Europe attractive to many right-extremists, who were among the earliest supporters of post-war European integration. During the interwar period, Europe was an ideal projection screen for the ambitions of intellectuals in favour of revolutionary reforms, especially those unrelated to the Marxist parties and inspired by fascist visions of large-scale planning. Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce are not the only cases of intellectuals who drifted to fascism because of their Europeanist ideas. During the war, and especially in Western Europe, Nazi propaganda was able to mobilise these Europeanist visions at the service of its own imperialism. Mark Mazower has argued that it was Hitler’s complete unwillingness to envision building a European empire for anybody else than ‘pure-blooded’ Germans that led to the failure of these propaganda initiatives, not a lack of receptivity among the conquered populations. 5

On the other hand, the opposite was also true. Because ‘Europe’ was an alternative for the national framework, it was highly attractive to those who faced exclusion and persecution within their own countries. Considering

5 Mazower, Hitler’s Empire, 447, 559, 590.
themselves ‘victims’ of their own country’s nationalist passions, many former collaborators and Pétainists expected protection from international law and the European Court of Human Rights. Jouvenel pleaded for a ‘European tribunal’ as a bulwark against the totalitarian tendencies of post-war ‘national socialist’ representative governments. For French extreme-rightists, European integration also offered a ‘realistic’ alternative to De Gaulle’s politics of national grandeur. From a post-war geopolitical point of view, since France, Germany and the UK could no longer claim Great Power status on an equal footing with the United States and the Soviet Union, European integration was a necessity. In the context of the Cold War and decolonisation, a Western European union was the only possibility for these nations to keep playing the role of imperialist states with their colonial dependencies, fend off the military danger of communism and maintain Europe as a focal point for culture, science and civilisation.

The relationship between fascism and neoliberalism is an equally thorny issue. While I do not feel qualified to answer this question at a general level, I have stressed both the differences and the striking similarities between Jouvenel’s specific kind of neoliberalism and his earlier fascist ideas. Jouvenel abandoned his fascist enthusiasm for the state as the possessor and sole ‘organising authority’ of all public and private national resources, and the post-war bearded neoliberal academician was obviously far removed from the 1934 rebellious youth calling for an anti-Marxist and anti-capitalist revolution, but this is not all that can be said. In his neoliberalism, Jouvenel retained both his admiration for the strength and courage of a ‘virile’ aristocracy, deserving of its freedom and its right to rule, and his contempt for the stupidity of the masses and the weak and ‘decadent’ system of parliamentary nationalism. More generally, despite differences that are both obvious and essential, neoliberalism and fascism do share a few characteristics: a Darwinist vision of society as a fierce struggle between competing groups and individuals in which the best manage to prevail; a positive appreciation of societal inequality, considered not as an unfortunate and morally unjust by-product of the system but as a key requirement to its functioning; and a meritocratic elitism that presumes that those destined to rule deserve the privileges, rewards and honours associated with their position. Based on these characteristics, it is less surprising that two exiles – the outspoken anti-Nazi German economist Wilhelm Röpke and Jouvenel, a former prominent member of the prime fascist party in 1930s France – discovered their profound agreement on so many issues.

How important were Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel for the post-war reconfiguration of the French extreme right? It is clear that they were well-suited to
contribute to this ideological innovation, based on their pre-war status as Europeanist fascist intellectuals with ample international contacts and a background in progressive republicanism rather than the extreme right’s traditional hotbed of Maurrassian Catholic conservatism. It is hard to measure the exact extent of their contribution, however. Both their Europeanism and their ‘realism’ dated from the late 1920s, and it is true that these two elements came to replace the traditional Maurrassian dogmas of aggressive nationalism and contempt for republican legality that had exerted such an important influence on the French extreme right. Their replacement by a concern with the republican rule of law, a suspicious attitude towards national delusions of grandeur and a pro-European orientation could have been taken directly from the writings of Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce. Considering especially Fabre-Luce’s prominence in extreme-rightist circles during these years, it seems probable that he made an important contribution to the ideological renewal of the French extreme right, while Jouvenel’s newly found identity as a more systematic and academic intellectual enabled his thought to play a more indirect role.

Another difficult question is how this post-war ideological renewal relates to fascism. This question is linked to the controversial topic of fascism outside its classical temporal boundaries of interwar and wartime Europe. Can political formations that drift away from what are often considered key elements of fascist ideology, during a period marked by a context fundamentally different from that of interwar Europe, still be meaningfully analysed in relation to it? Formulated more concretely: if the extreme right drops its aggressive nationalism and its opposition to the republic, what does it still have to do with fascism? While I consider this very much an open question, I have clung to the concept of fascism in my post-war analysis. Since I have studied the years immediately following the end of the Second World War, during which fascism was permanently evoked and interpreted by Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel, who both kept positioning themselves towards it and attempting to distil its ‘positive’ elements, I argue that fascism remains a valuable topic of analysis, regardless of the exact behaviour of the movements it has inspired.

As the crow flies, the Sohlberg and Mont Pèlerin are less than 300 kilometres apart. Both are low mountains situated in a country neighbouring France, in a beautiful natural environment. When the weather is clear, they offer breathtaking views of eastern France. With an altitude around or just below
1,000 metres, the two mountains are easily eclipsed by higher reliefs in their surroundings, which would have assured them a relatively anonymous existence had it not been for Otto Abetz and Friedrich Hayek. Although neither Jouvenel nor Fabre-Luce camped on the Sohlberg during the original Franco-German youth meeting in 1930, and only Jouvenel was present on Mont Pèlerin seventeen years later, the two mountains symbolise key elements in the two intellectuals’ political trajectory. The Sohlberg meeting resulted in the foundation of the Sohlberg Circle, which played a major role in mobilising the two intellectuals’ Europeanism to serve the cause of Franco-German rapprochement and later, after 1933, of the political agenda of the Third Reich. Presided by their close friend Abetz, the future German ambassador to occupied Paris, the Sohlberg Circle – later rebaptised as the Comité France-Allemagne – became the laboratory of intellectual collaboration during the occupation.

Jouvenel’s participation in the Mont Pèlerin conference laid the basis for a very different kind of collaboration. It meant his consecration as a neoliberal intellectual and his inclusion in its international circles, bringing him into close contact with its most prominent members and boosting his academic career in the English-speaking world. While the political and intellectual distance between the two mountains appears to be be much greater than the geographical distance, Mont Pèlerin and the Sohlberg were part of a political trajectory of two intellectuals that was as strongly marked by continuity as it was by ruptures.
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