Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius

Scripta Antiquitatis Posterioris
ad Ethicam REligionemque pertinencia
XXV

Mohr Siebeck
SAPERE
Scripta Antiquitatis Posterioris
ad Ethicam RELigionemque pertinentia
Schriften der späteren Antike
zu ethischen und religiösen Fragen

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Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius

Introduction, Text, Translation, Commentary and Interpretative Essays by

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SAPERE

Greek and Latin texts of Later Antiquity (1st–4th centuries AD) have for a long time been overshadowed by those dating back to so-called ‘classical’ times. The first four centuries of our era have, however, produced a cornucopia of works in Greek and Latin dealing with questions of philosophy, ethics, and religion that continue to be relevant even today. The series SAPERE (Scripta Antiquitatis Posterioris ad Ethicam REligionemque pertinentia, ‘Writings of Later Antiquity with Ethical and Religious Themes’), now funded by the German Union of Academies, undertakes the task of making these texts accessible through an innovative combination of edition, translation, and commentary in the form of interpretative essays.

The acronym ‘SAPERE’ deliberately evokes the various connotations of sapere, the Latin verb. In addition to the intellectual dimension – which Kant made the motto of the Enlightenment by translating ‘sapere aude’ with ‘dare to use thy reason’ – the notion of ‘tasting’ should come into play as well. On the one hand, SAPERE makes important source texts available for discussion within various disciplines such as theology and religious studies, philology, philosophy, history, archaeology, and so on; on the other, it also seeks to whet the readers’ appetite to ‘taste’ these texts. Consequently, a thorough scholarly analysis of the texts, which are investigated from the vantage points of different disciplines, complements the presentation of the sources both in the original and in translation. In this way, the importance of these ancient authors for the history of ideas and their relevance to modern debates come clearly into focus, thereby fostering an active engagement with the classical past.
Preface to this Volume

Diogenes Laertius’ report on Pyrrhonian skepticism occupies part of Book IX of his Lives of Eminent Philosophers (§§61–116). Diogenes writes in the 3rd century CE, and his account of Pyrrhonian skepticism covers roughly four hundred years of the history of Pyrrhonism. It is divided into two chapters, one devoted to Pyrrho and more generally to Pyrrhonian skepticism, and a much shorter chapter devoted to Timon, Pyrrho’s student. Next to Sextus Empiricus’ writings, Diogenes’ report is the most detailed and philosophically sophisticated description of Pyrrhonian skepticism.

This volume offers a new English translation, printed next to the Greek text generously supplied by Tiziano Dorandi, as well as a range of scholarly essays by experts on ancient skepticism. As part of the SAPERE series, it aims to make a lesser known ancient text accessible to a wider audience. The contributors to the volume are specialists in classics and philosophy, approaching the text from a wide range of perspectives. The translation and essays were discussed at a workshop at Columbia University in October 2013. Great thanks are due to the series editors as well as to all contributors for much valued feedback on every component of this book. Sam McVane, Ph.D. student in the Classical Studies Program at Columbia University, did invaluable research assistant work. Elizabeth Scharffenberger, a classicist specializing in ancient poetry and intellectual history, and Katja Maria Vogt, who works in ancient philosophy and normative epistemology/ethics, are jointly responsible for the translation and the commentary. Given the philosophical density of the text, the commentary contains brief summaries of relevant sections, as well as notes on particular points. Vogt is also responsible for the general introduction to the text.

The volume contains five essays. It begins with a general discussion of Diogenes’ account of Pyrrhonian skepticism by Richard Bett, a philosopher specializing in ancient skepticism and more generally ancient philosophy, as well as Nietzsche. Bett’s editions of several of Sextus Empiricus’ treatises are well known, as is his monograph about Pyrrho. His essay addresses the question of how Diogenes’ presentation of Pyrrhonism differs from and compares to Sextus’, thus situating the text – and the versions of skepticism Diogenes refers to – vis-à-vis these more widely studied treatises.

In the volume’s second essay, James Warren addresses sections of the text (§§67–73) that contain numerous references to early Greek thought. Apparently, skeptical ideas were compared – by the skeptics themselves or by others – with ideas in Pre-Socratic philosophy, Homer, tragedy, and
Warren, a specialist in ancient philosophy with particular interests in Pre-socratic and Hellenistic philosophy, looks carefully at each of these references. Up to now, scholars have tended to neglect this side of Diogenes’ report, even though it constitutes a significant portion. Warren offers suggestions and analyses for every quote, supplying context and making dense and often cryptic material comprehensible.

The volume’s third contribution, by Lorenzo Corti, covers §§74–77, sections in which Diogenes Laertius speaks about skeptical language. In particular, the so-called skeptical formulae are a stock element of Pyrrhonism. In these short and enigmatic pronouncements, which are meant to be non-dogmatic, the skeptics express some of their core ideas. Corti, a specialist in ancient philosophy and philosophy of language, approaches Diogenes’ account after having written a monograph on skeptical language. His essay provides close analysis of the text, and detailed comparison with relevant passages in Sextus Empiricus.

The fourth essay, by Christiana Olfert, covers sections of the text – §§69–70, as well as various remarks throughout – that address the nature of skeptical investigation. The Greek word ‘skepsis’ literally means investigation, and the skeptics self-identify as inquirers. Given that the skeptics routinely arrive at suspension of judgment, scholars have called into question whether this description can be taken seriously. Olfert, a philosopher and specialist in ancient philosophy whose work addresses the nature of practical reason and truth, defends the skeptics against the charge that they are not genuinely investigating.

In the volume’s final essay, David Sedley reexamines the most famous tools in skeptical investigation, the so-called modes or tropes. The Pyrrhonists employ several sets of modes of argument, among them the Ten Modes standardly ascribed to Aenesidemus, and the Five Modes standardly ascribed to Agrippa. Philosophers have scrutinized these arguments, although often with greater attention to the versions found in Sextus than in Diogenes. Sedley, a classicist who has published widely in ancient philosophy, including, inter alia, editions of Hellenistic texts that are central points of reference in the field, argues that Diogenes Laertius’ version of the Ten Modes postdates Sextus’ version and improves on it.

New York City, March 2014

Katja Maria Vogt
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A. Introduction
You may not agree with this, but people seem to disagree about pretty much anything. The world looks differently to different cognizers, at different times, in different circumstances. A theory convinces some, but not others. Customs differ. No sense-perception, no proof or premise, and no practice, or so the skeptics argue, can be invoked to demonstrate what the world is really like, which theory is true, or which way to live is good. Because of these and similar considerations, change, disagreement, and difference belong to the basic currency of skeptical investigation.

Scholars of Pyrrhonism tend to focus on the kind of skepticism known from Sextus Empiricus’ *Outlines of Pyrrhonism*. Call this version Epistemic Skepticism. Arguably, it can be described entirely in epistemic terms – terms that refer to activities and attitudes such as being puzzled or disturbed, examining premises and arguments, and eventually suspending judgment. Sextus criticizes an earlier form of skepticism which scholars refer to as negative dogmatism. Early Pyrrhonians arrive at negative conclusions to the effect that X does not exist, or that Y is neither F nor F*, for example, that there is no proof, or that honey is neither sweet nor bitter. In doing so, they make claims about the way the world is. And this is precisely, or so Sextus argues, what skeptics do not do. In making this observation, Sextus rightly points out that negative pronouncements are just as much claims about the world as positive ones. And yet they are distinctive sorts of claims. If change, disagreement, and difference are as pervasive as skeptics suggest, this presents deep puzzles – puzzles that are likely to disturb anyone with the kind of philosophical disposition skeptics have. Thus even seasoned skeptics who have thought their way through competing accounts of reality, finding fault with all of them, may still feel the pull of metaphysical questions. Doing so, they might revisit the concerns of their skeptical predecessors. Arguably, if Pyrrhonism were better understood, its metaphysical beginnings would gain more philosophical appreciation, perhaps to the extent that one may set aside the dismissive term negative dogmatism. In this spirit, I will instead use the term Metaphysically Inclined Pyrrhonism to designate the ideas of early skeptics who seem to
have arrived at conclusions about reality, human thought, language, and action.

In this Introduction, I make some suggestions about ways in which the
study of Diogenes’ report may alter one’s perception of ancient skepticism.
To situate these suggestions, a sketch of the nature of Diogenes’ report is
needed. I shall address what kind of author Diogenes is, the history of
Pyrrhonism, the structure of Diogenes’ report, and which versions of skep-
ticism it covers (Section 1). To illustrate how interesting Metaphysically
Inclined Skepticism may be, I then turn to §§61–73. Here Diogenes talks
about Pyrrho, Pyrrho’s immediate students, as well as presumed ancestors
of skepticism in early Greek thought. Interpreters tend to agree that noth-
ing of philosophical interest can be found in these references to poets and
Pre-Socratic thinkers. I shall suggest that the opposite holds (Section 2).
My remarks on these matters are brief. They are intended to raise rather
than answer questions, pointing the reader to the essays in this volume,
to existing contributions in the field, and to what I see as potential topics for
future research.

1. Diogenes Laertius’ report about Pyrrhonian skepticism

1.1. Doxography

Diogenes Laertius is a so-called doxographer, someone who writes about
the views of others. The text translated in this volume is a portion of Book
9 of his extensive treatise, Lives of Eminent Philosophers. In these Lives,
Diogenes compiles biographical and philosophical material about a wide
range of ancient thinkers. His style thus differs from that of philosophers
who lay out arguments relevant to their own approach. It also differs from
those who write, as philosophers, about diverging points of view, aiming
to discredit them. Sextus Empiricus is the prime example of a skeptic
writing in his own voice, with a view to presenting the argumentative
resources of an approach he pursues. Sextus aims for a unified account,
at least within a given treatise, and most perspicuously in Book 1 of the
Outlines of Skepticism. In this spirit, he may at times reformulate details
of earlier Pyrrhonian material, in ways that make it fit in with the over-
all picture he sketches. Importantly, this is not what Diogenes does. Nor
is Diogenes a critic of skepticism. He does not record skeptical strategies
with the implication that they fail. Diogenes’ report thus has the potential
to add further perspective. This perspective does not bear traces of the ‘re-

1 Two recent editions are Dorandi 2013; Brunschwig 1999.
pair work’ that a skeptic philosopher may undertake, nor does it approach skepticism through a hostile lens.

Moreover, Diogenes’ report is philosophically subtle in its own way. Scholars often hold doxography in low esteem. Doxographers, it is assumed, provide biographical material as well as some main ideas. They do not attend in any sophisticated way to terminology or the details of philosophical proposals. Whether or not this is a fair generalization, it does not fit Diogenes’ chapter entitled “Pyrrho.” This text is extraordinarily complex. It presents, in quick succession, philosophically difficult ideas, many of which are only comprehensible against the background of earlier ancient discussions. For example, Diogenes speaks in great detail about the skeptical expression *ouden mallon*, roughly, “no more this than that” (74–8). This expression goes back to Pre-Socratic philosophy. It has received any number of interpretations, including skeptical ones. In this and other instances, Diogenes does not adopt the presumed mode of doxography, skipping particularities and focusing on ‘the main idea’. His report is rich in detail, to the extent that §§74–8 by themselves can contribute significantly to our understanding of skepticism. Generally speaking, our text does not seem to be composed by someone who is unaware of the details of skeptic philosophy, or who does not care to report them in precise and accurate terms.

1.2. The structure of the text

In an influential article, Jonathan Barnes divides Diogenes’ chapter on Pyrrho into four parts: an introductory section, 61–62, with a condensed account of Pyrrho’s philosophy; anecdotal material, 63–69; observations on Pyrrho’s successors, combined with a list of putative precursors, 69–73; and finally the longest part, 74–108, devoted to Pyrrhonian philosophy. The chapter on Timon, then, takes up the rest of the text (109–116). For the purposes of further discussion, a more fine-grained division into sections will be helpful:

- 61–68 Pyrrho’s biography and main ideas
- 69–73 Pyrrho’s students and predecessors
- 74–78 Skeptical expressions and skeptical language
- 78–88 Ten Modes (Modes of Aenesidemus)

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2 For this reason, the present volume includes an extensive commentary, with notes on expressions and formulations that have a long history in ancient discussions, or are too compressed to be clear to anyone who has not studied related matters.

3 Lorenzo Corti’s contribution to this volume discusses these paragraphs in detail.


5 David Sedley’s contribution to this volume is devoted to one centerpiece of this section of the text, namely the Ten Modes or Modes of Aenesidemus.
Consider in comparison the structure of Sextus Empiricus’ writings:\(^6\)

*PH* 1: An outline of what skepticism is.
*PH* 2–3 and *M* 7–11: Skeptical investigations in the three philosophical disciplines: logic, physics, ethics.
*M* 1–6: Skeptical investigations in further fields of: arithmetic, geometry, music, rhetoric, grammar, astronomy.

Diogenes’ report on skepticism covers many of the topics Sextus discusses in *PH* 1: some anecdotes, the names that the skeptics give to their approach, so-called ‘expressions’ and skeptical language, skeptical modes of argument, anti-skeptical objections and skeptical responses.\(^7\) §§90–102 are somewhat similar to *PH* 2–3 and *M* 7–11. Central questions in logic, physics, and ethics are investigated in skeptical manner. Though Diogenes offers some brief remarks about fields of learning in general, there is no analogue to Sextus’ discussions of arithmetic, geometry, grammar, rhetoric, astronomy and music.

1.3. Pyrrhonian skepticism and its Hellenistic interlocutors

Almost nothing is known about Diogenes’ own life, to the extent that even his biographical data are controversial. Roughly, it is assumed that he lived in the 3rd century CE. Scholars have tried to determine his lifespan relative to that of Sextus Empiricus. Sextus and one of his students are the latest skeptics Diogenes mentions. This may indicate when he wrote, or at least when he composed the relevant portion of the text that interests us here. And yet the question of when Sextus lived is just as controversial. Thus it is easier to establish a relative chronology, according to which Diogenes writes a few decades after Sextus, than to establish any firm dates.

Diogenes’ account of Pyrrhonian skepticism consists of two chapters, one devoted to Pyrrho (365/60–275/70 BCE) and more generally speaking Pyrrhonian skepticism, and a much shorter one to Timon (325/20–235/30 BCE). Most of the material on Timon is anecdotal, to the point of focusing

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\(^6\) In his contribution to this volume, Richard Bett offers a detailed account of the nature of the text, pursuing among other things the specifics of how Diogenes’ report relates to Sextus’ writings.

\(^7\) The names that skeptics give to their approach are discussed in Christiana Olfert’s contribution to this volume, which picks up from the most basic point on this issue: that *skepsis* means ‘investigation’. 
on his eccentricities rather than his philosophy. Scholars tend to explore, first and foremost, the chapter on Pyrrho, which covers the complete history of Pyrrhonian skepticism, from its beginnings to its endpoint. Diogenes talks in detail about Pyrrho, his immediate followers, as well as Aenesidemus (1st century BCE), and he includes Agrippa’s Five Modes (1st to 2nd century CE). Thus he addresses more than four hundred years of Pyrrhonian skepticism. Sextus’ biographical dates are hard to establish; scholars place him either in the 2nd or 3rd century. For present purposes, this means that Sextus’ skepticism is likely to be among the spectrum of approaches that Diogenes is aware of.

The main ideas of Pyrrhonian skepticism seem to have been formulated in Hellenistic times. In reconstructing Pyrrhonian arguments, scholars consider Stoics, Epicureans, and Academic skeptics as critics and/or competitors of the Pyrrhonians. That is, even though Sextus and Diogenes write in post-Hellenistic times, the relevant points of reference seem to belong mostly to the era of Academic skepticism, as well as Stoic and Epicurean philosophy. Arguably, the Hellenistic philosophers are quite generally concerned with strategies for avoiding judgments that may turn out to be false. They take different routes in addressing this concern. Epicureans propose a distinction between the truth of all sense-perceptions and the potential of judgment to go wrong. They offer norms for belief-formation, geared toward keeping an open mind when phenomena allow for several explanations, and accepting as true only what is in agreement with sense perception. Academic skeptics investigate in ways that are much indebted to Socratic methods, arriving at suspension of judgment and thereby avoiding doxa, belief. The Stoics argue that wise cognizers assert only when they have cognitive impressions, which make it clear by themselves that they present things precisely as they are. Much more could be said. For present purposes, however, the upshot is that Diogenes

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8 For more detail, cf. Richard Bett’s contribution to this volume.


10 In these Hellenistic discussions, however, Plato – and in particular some dialogues such as the Theaetetus – play a major role. Moreover, Agrippa’s Five Modes seem to engage with arguments known from Aristotle.

11 Pyrrho is, roughly, a contemporary of Epicurus. Traditionally, scholars focused specifically on exchanges and relations between Stoic and skeptic philosophy. More recently, the role of Epicurean philosophy as interlocutor, critic, and competitor of skepticism has been recognized as important.

writes about ideas that were formulated over a period of more than 400 years, responding mostly to arguments from Hellenistic philosophy.

1.4. Which skepticism?

It is the merit of Richard Bett’s *Pyrrho, his Antecedents, and his Legacy* to have pointed out that Pyrrho may not have been a skeptic in Sextus’ sense of the term. In response to the observation that the world appears differently to different people (at different times, in different circumstances, and so on), Pyrrho seems to infer that reality is indeterminate. It is, in terms of the expression mentioned a moment ago, ‘no more one way than another’. Our sense-perceptions and beliefs about the world do not capture any reality. Accordingly we should not hold anything to be true. And thus Pyrrho is, at least in some respects, not a skeptic in the sense that his successors emphasize: someone who continues to investigate, not having settled the question of how things are. Instead, he seems to put forward a view about the nature of reality, and recommends cognitive attitudes that reflect this view.

Between Pyrrho and Sextus, skepticism undergoes significant developments. In particular, Aenesidemus and Agrippa are innovative thinkers. Diogenes often flags which skeptical philosopher he is referring to, and to some extent his report can be read as covering the history of Pyrrhonian ideas. But often he mentions the names of lesser known skeptics, and at other times he just speaks of ‘the skeptics’. Thus it can be difficult to determine, at many points in the text, which version of skepticism he has in mind.

Notably, Diogenes gives pride of place to the beginnings of Pyrrhonism. Pyrrho figures as more than the namesake of a line of thought that – as it were luckily – developed further. Instead, he and his immediate followers are treated as serious philosophers. Scholars have long noted traces of, in their terms, negative dogmatism in Diogenes’ report. Adopting Sextus’ perspective, they have largely set it aside as philosophically less interesting than the kind of skepticism known from Sextus. In Sextus, one does not see a fascination with phenomena of change, disagreement, and difference. Skeptics, it is presumed, *initially* were disturbed by discrepancies.

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14 The crucial evidence is contained in the following quote: “...things are equally indifferent and unstable and indeterminate (adiaphora kai astathméta kai anepikrita); for this reason, neither our perceptions nor our beliefs tell the truth or lie (adoxastous kai aklineis kai akradantous). For this reason, then, we should not trust them, but should be without opinions and without inclinations and without wavering, saying about each single thing that it no more is than is not, or both is and is not, or neither is nor is not (ou mallon estin è ouk estin è kai esti kai ouk estin è oute estin oute ouk estin)” (Aristocles in Eusebius, *Præp. evang.* 14.18.1–5 = DC53; trans. Bett 2000 with changes).
and wanted to find out what is true and false (PH 1.12). But as they go along, as Sextus does in his discussions of logic, physics and ethics, it can appear as if they simply adopted a certain mode of investigation. What may be missing, then, is a genuine desire to get clear about things. And yet this kind of motivation is an important component of the skeptical enterprise. Why else would skeptics continue to investigate, if not that, in addition to being puzzled by the relevant phenomena, they also want to figure out what is true or false? Early versions of skepticism may preserve some of the pull toward metaphysics that, in one way or another, must be part of the skeptics’ motivations, if they really do care sufficiently about the questions they investigate.

2. Beginnings and Ancestors

2.1. Skepticism: departure or continuity?

In §§69–73 of our text, any number of quotations from early Greek thinkers and poets are cited as expressing ideas relevant to Pyrrhonian skepticism. Diogenes suggests, or so I propose, that Pyrrho and his followers adduced these quotes, claiming earlier authors as ancestors of their thought. If this is what he does, Diogenes’ account of Pyrrhonism may provide material for future research on questions that are as-of-yet neglected. Let me elaborate.

The idea that Pyrrhonism is continuous with trends in early Greek thought is a significant departure from what, based on Sextus, we know about skepticism. Sextus emphasizes that Pyrrhonian skepticism differs from all other schools of thought. He devotes no less than six chapters to these discussions (PH 1.210–41). For him, they serve at least two purposes: to highlight the uniqueness of the Pyrrhonian approach, and to emphasize that skepticism does not make any claims about the way the world is, while every other, seemingly similar philosophy, contains traces of dogmatism.

Diogenes’ report may offer a different picture, one according to which some early skeptics see their philosophy as continuous with early Greek thought. I say ‘may’ because the reconstruction of the text involves some difficult assessments. The very fact that Sextus writes extensively about the differences between Pyrrhonism and other schools suggests that skeptics were confronted with the following charge: you skeptics say that your philosophy is non-dogmatic, and that it thereby differs from all other philosophies; and yet there are a number of other thinkers who say pretty much the same things that you say, and who are dogmatists, even by your lights. This objection addresses both of Sextus’ points: it disputes the uniqueness of Pyrrhonian skepticism, and it makes the anti-skeptical argument that,

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15 James Warren’s contribution to this volume aims to remedy scholarly neglect of these citations. Warren offers detailed analysis of each citation.
despite professions to the contrary, the skeptics also hold doctrines. Perhaps the fact that Diogenes includes a wide range of early Greek quotes—quotes that presumably express ideas similar to Pyrrhonism—means that he includes anti-skeptical material? In §§71–2, he refers to ‘some’ who say that Homer originated skepticism, and ‘some’ who add several poets and Pre-Socratics to the list of skeptic ancestors. Who is making these comparisons: the skeptics themselves or their critics?

When Sextus emphasizes the differences between skepticism and other approaches, he exclusively refers to philosophical and medical schools of thought, not to poetry. This suggests that, if there was a pool of quotes that was employed to demonstrate that skeptics too were dogmatists, it did not include the citations from poetry that are prominent components of our text. Further, Diogenes does not signal that he takes himself to be reporting anti-skeptical material. He devotes a large subsection of the text to anti-skeptical challenges and skeptical replies (§§102–8). There, he mentions two presumed similarities, namely between skeptics and Democritus as well as Epicurus (§106); but he does not return to the relevant ideas from poetry. And Diogenes is clear about the following: Pyrrho admired Homer, regularly quoted him, and praised him for views expressed in the citations (§§67–8). Moreover, there is no indication in the text that Homer alone is held in high regard. Instead, Homer seems to spearhead a list of authors, including the seven sages and early philosophers, invoked by Pyrrho and like-minded early Pyrrhonians. If this is correct, the strategy Diogenes records is quite unlike anything in Sextus. Rather than suggest that everyone else’s views are misguided, early skepticism may invoke earlier revered thinkers as authorities whom it is good to have at one’s side.

2.2. The ‘dogmatism’ of the quotes

Arguably, the quotes from early Greek authors are an ill fit for the kind of skepticism associated with Sextus. Verses from poetry, enigmatic sayings by sages, and excerpts from Pre-Socratic philosophers tend to allow for multiple interpretations. At times, they may appear intentionally cryptic, suggestive of more than one idea. And yet, as Diogenes reports the quotes, they tend to have dogmatic upshots. Claims are made about the nature of the world, about human life, thought, agency, and speech. Consider an example that goes to the heart of skeptical philosophy. “Make a commitment, delusion is nearby” is ascribed to one of the seven sages and cited by skeptics as expressing the spirit of their philosophy. Skeptics of the variant that Sextus discusses cannot issue such verdicts. They may, at best, report that they themselves experience commitments as a source of turmoil. To

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16 The only bit of verse in Sextus’ discussions of these matters comes from Timon (PH 1.224).
go beyond this, and to claim that commitments are a symptom or cause of a distorted state of mind, would be dogmatic. What should one make of the fact that skeptics, according to Diogenes, quote early Greek thinkers with similar pronouncements?

One line of interpretation may invoke considerations from the philosophy of language. To quote is not to assert. Thus quoting someone else might be a way of availing oneself of an idea without committing to it, and without putting it forward *in propria persona*. Quoting a sentence that employs metaphors bordering on the obscure and that allows for several interpretations may be an even more intricate way of not affirming anything. Who is to say what claim a poetic verse, a pithy saying, or an out-of-context line from Pre-Socratic philosophy ‘really’ makes? It would be in the spirit of Sextus’ skepticism to exploit quotations in such manners, advancing evocative ideas without endorsing any claims themselves.\(^\text{17}\) And yet, even though Diogenes has much to say about skeptical expressions, he does not report anything to this effect.

Thus there is good reason to consider a different interpretation. The skeptics Diogenes refers to may not be as averse to putting forward ideas about the nature of the world, human thought, and so on, as later skeptics are. They may quote earlier thinkers as expressing thoughts that they too embrace, exploiting to some extent the obscurity and metaphorical nature of the quotes, but nevertheless endorsing what they take to be their upshot. If this is plausible, the citations from early Greek authors gain relevance for the study of early Pyrrhonism. Contrary to Barnes’ assumption that the philosophically interesting material in Diogenes is exclusively located in §§74–108, the focus on ancestors in §§61–73 may offer substantial evidence for Metaphysically Inclined Skepticism.

2.3. Skeptical scenarios

The early thinkers whom Diogenes’ skeptics invoke have a reputation for depth and profundity. Moreover, some of these early figures, though held in high honor, are fearlessly subversive. When scholarship on ancient skepticism was reinvigorated in the late 1970s, philosophers were less attuned to the differences between ancient and modern skepticism than they are today. Myles Burnyeat, in an influential early paper, “Idealism and Greek Philosophy: What Descartes Saw and Berkeley Missed,” could plausibly ask whether the ancient skeptics failed to see the threat of external world skepticism.\(^\text{18}\) Part of the thrust of his question was to inquire how

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\(^{17}\) Cf. Vogt 1998, chapter 2.2 on the way in which quoting and reporting the views of others figures in skeptical language.

radical ancient skeptics were. To be ‘radical’ as a philosopher is, presumably, a good thing, at least if what is meant by this is rigor and imagination. Did the skeptics fail in not being rigorous thinkers, stopping short of drawing the inferences that follow from their own premises? Did they lack philosophical imagination in not raising the kinds of questions later skeptics asked?

Rather than wonder why the ancient skeptics did not come up with external world skepticism, one may think that they were right not to. Medieval and early modern premises about the mind, as entirely different from anything in the physical world, are alien to them. Instead of pursuing Burnyeat’s question, one may ask whether there are ‘radical’ skeptical scenarios not wedded to the premises about mind and world that are formulated in medieval and early modern philosophy. What if one thinks through, rigorously and with imagination, the framing concerns of early Greek puzzles about conflicting appearances and the fleeting nature of human life, human thought, and speech? Diogenes’ report offers clues on this question. Some of the citations from poets and Pre-Socratic philosophers suggest scenarios worthy of the most fearless skeptic.

For example, as Diogenes has it, Pyrrho embraces Homer’s observation “[l]ike leaves on trees, such is the generation of men” (Il. 6.146). A human being may think of herself as rather different from a leaf. Her life may appear to her shaped by decisions and pursuits particular to her. It may appear to be an intricate story, and hopefully distinctive. A leaf, however, lives just for one season. Its life’s structure seems to be, simply, that of birth, growth, decay, and death; and it is but a component of a larger organism, growing out of the tree and sustaining the tree. And yet, if a different context of evaluation is presupposed – if one stands back, looking at human life from a distance, considering, say, the many who died at Troy and the many who came after them – a human life can seem just as short as that of a leaf and just like that of other people, tied up with the life of others, and composed of events that affect everyone in just about the same way.

From this perspective, it is not far-fetched to compare human beings to leaves on trees, as well as to wasps and flies and birds. Pyrrho, according to Diogenes, admired Homer for drawing precisely these comparisons (§67). Arguably, the thought of one’s life as similar to that of a fly or a leaf is as radical as the thought of a mind-without-world, or in today’s terms, a brain in a vat. Those philosophers who entertain external world skepticism may marvel at what they take to be best about human beings – the mind – and be rather smitten with its perceived complexity. The instinct of the early skeptical scenario that emerges via Pyrrho’s approval of Homeric ideas, on the contrary, is deflationary. Its challenge is not how a human cognizer
can be in touch with the physical world at all. Its challenge is whether a human cognizer is at all different from it.

Several of the citations from early Greek thinkers suggest that human beings do not acquire their views through active belief-formation, coming to think that something is so-and-so based on consideration of evidence or reasons. Instead, beliefs grow on us. We come to think of the world in ways that are non-transparent to us, caused by non-rational means such as conventions and custom (say, we come to see our own culture’s funerary rites as correct), or, at the other end of a spectrum, prompted by the attractions of the rare (say, gold strikes us as precious). Moreover, perhaps the gods decide for us, and our actions issue from their considerations for what is to happen next, not ours. This is an idea that Diogenes says the skeptics invoked. It may be hubris to conceive of oneself as a deliberator, who sets herself in motion based on her own plans. Several of the quotes that Diogenes adduces undermine our self-conception as reasoners who convey information when we speak, act based on our own choices, and arrive at conclusions based on our own reflections. Human speech appears like chatter or the sounds of nature; the gods or fate or some other force makes us do what we perceive as our agency; thoughts crop up in our minds for any number of reasons unrelated to our own cognitive achievements.

2.4. Turning the tables

If early skeptics thought along similar lines, then the burden of proof in some of the most famous exchanges between skeptics and dogmatists is shifted away from the skeptic. Consider the best-known anti-skeptical objection, the so-called Apraxia Challenge. Here dogmatists argue that skeptics, if indeed they suspend judgment, cannot act. Implicitly, they work with a premise that is shared by many action theorists today: that motivation involves beliefs. Agents believe that they should perform such-and-such an action, or that such-and-such an outcome is good. Reconstructions of ancient skepticism assume that the skeptics must demonstrate that, though they suspend judgment, their cognitive attitudes are sufficient for playing the action-guiding role that beliefs are standardly taken to play.

But if one takes seriously the picture that emerges from the citations of Homer and other early Greek figures, the burden of proof lies with the dogmatists. How do they know in the first place that we are agents in the robust sense they stipulate, beings motivated by what they believe to be good? The quotes in Diogenes suggest that these premises are based on a self-aggrandizing illusion human beings are prone to: they see themselves as agents guided by their own reasoning. And yet, agency may have a causal explanation, not a rational one. This is a radical skeptical challenge, directed against our self-conception as agents. It undermines our ways of
engaging with the world to such an extent that it is unclear what would be involved in refuting it.

Similar scenarios could be constructed by attending to the quotes about human language and belief. Evidently, they are speculative. But they are philosophically rich, and they present serious challenges. As of today, philosophers still worry whether agency in the sense of setting oneself in motion via one’s own deliberation and choice is merely an illusion. They continue to ask whether utterances, though they have the surface structure of assertions, may just express some state of mind of the agent, rather than conveying information about the world. Similarly, they study how causes rather than reasons figure in the acquisition of beliefs. Diogenes’ inclusion of early Pyrrhonian references to poets and Pre-Socratics may cast new light on some of the most cherished topics in research on skepticism: action, language, and belief.\textsuperscript{19}

3. Acknowledgements

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\textsuperscript{19} I’m much indebted to Jens Haas for input on several versions of this Introduction, as well as manifold support in the process leading up to this volume.
B. Text, Translation and Commentary
61. Πύρρων Ἡλείος Πλειστάρχου μὲν ἦν υἱός, καθὰ καὶ Διοκλῆς ἱστορεῖ· ὥς φησὶ <δ᾽> Ἀπολλόδωρος ἐν Χρονικοῖς, πρὸτερον ἦν ζω-γράφος, καὶ ἦκουσε Βρύσωνος τοῦ Στιλπωνος, ὡς Ἀλέξανδρος ἐν Διαδοχαιαί, εἰτὰ Ἀναξάρχου, ξυνακολουθῶν πανταχό, ὡς καὶ τοῖς γυμνοσοφισταῖς ἐν Ἰνδιᾷ συμμεῖα καὶ τοῖς Μάγοις. θέθεν γενναίω-τατα δοκεῖ φιλοσοφῆσαι, το τῆς ἀκαταληψίας καὶ ἐποχῆς εἰδὸς εἰσα-γαγόν, ὡς Ἀσκάνιος ὤν Ἀβδηρίτης φησίν. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἔφασκεν οὔτε καλὸν οὔτε αἰσχρὸν οὔτε δίκαιον οὔτε ἄδικον· καὶ ὁμοίως ἐπὶ πάντων μηδὲν εἶναι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, νόμῳ δὲ καὶ ἔθει πάντως ἀνθρώπους πράττειν· οὐ γὰρ μᾶλλον τόδε ή τόδε ἐίναι ἕκαστον.

62. ἀκόλουθος δὲ ἦν καὶ τῷ βίῳ, μηδὲν ἐκτρεπόμενος, μηδὲν φυ-λαττόμενος, ἅπαντα ὑφιστάμενος, ἀμάξας, εἰ τύχοι, καὶ κρημνοὺς καὶ κύνας καὶ ὅσα μηδὲν ταῖς αἰσθήσεις ἐπὶ τρέπων. σώζεσθαι μέν τοι, καθά φασίν οἱ περὶ τὸν Καρύστιον Ἀντίγονον, ὑπὸ τῶν γνωρί-μων παρακολουθοῦντων. Αἰνεσίδημος δὲ φησι φιλοσοφεῖν μὲν τὸν κατὰ τὸν ἐποχῆς λόγον, μὴ μέντοι γε ἀπροοράτως ἐχούντα πράτ-τειν. ὁ δὲ πρὸς τὰ ἐνενήκοντα ἐτή κατεβίω.

Ἀντίγονος δὲ φησιν ὁ Καρύστιος ἐν τῷ Περὶ Πύρρωνος τάδε περὶ αὐτοῦ, ὅτι τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀδοξός τε ἦν καὶ πένης καὶ ζωγράφος. σώζεσθαι τε αὐτοῦ ἐν Ἡλίδι ἐν τῷ γυμνασίῳ λαμπαδίστας μετρίως ἔχοντας. 63. ἔκτατεν τε αὐτὸν καὶ ἔρημαζεν, σπανὼς ποτὲ ἐπήφαι-νόμενον τοῖς οἴκοι. τούτῳ δὲ ποιεῖν ἀκούσαντα Ἰνδοῦ τινος ὀνειδίζον-τος Ἀναξάρχῳ ὡς σὺν ἵνα ἔτερον τινα διδάξαι οὕτος ἁγαθὸν, αὐτὸς αὐλὰς βασιλικὰς θεραπεύων. ἀεὶ τε εἶναι ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ καταστήματι, ὥστε εἰ καὶ τὰς αὐτῶν καταλίπους μεταξὺ λέγοντα, αὐτῷ διαπεράειν τὸν λόγον, καὶ τοῖς κακακημένους {τε} ὅντα ἐν νεότητι. πολλάκις, φησί, καὶ ἀπεδήμησε, μηδενὶ προειπών, καὶ συνενοχέμετο οὕτως ἤθελεν. καὶ ποτὲ Ἀναξάρχου εἰς τέλμα ἐμπεσόντος, παρῆλθεν οὐ βοηθήσας-τινῶν δὲ αἰτιωμένων, αὐτὸς Ἀνάξαρχος ἐπήνει τὸ ἀδιάφορον καὶ ἀστοργὸν αὐτοῦ.
Diogenes Laertius: Lives of Pyrrho and Timon
(9.61–116)

Pyrrho

61. Diocles among others relates that Pyrrho of Elis was the son of Pleistarchus. As Apollodorus has it in his Chronicles, Pyrrho was previously a painter. According to what Alexander asserts in his Successive Heads of the Philosophical Schools, Pyrrho studied under Bryson, the son of Stilpon, and then Anaxarchus. He followed Anaxarchus everywhere, so that he ended up spending time with both the gymnosophists in India and the Magi. Because of this background, Pyrrho appears to have practiced philosophy in the noblest fashion, introducing (as Ascanius of Abdera says) the approach of non-cognition and suspending judgment. Pyrrho, you see, used to claim that nothing is fine or shameful, or just or unjust, and that similarly – in the case of all things – nothing is in truth (this or that), but that men do all things by custom and habit. For, he claimed, each thing is no more this than that.

62. Pyrrho was consistent with respect to his life. He avoided nothing and was not on his guard against anything. He put no trust in his perceptions and took everything in stride – traffic, if he found himself in it, and cliffs and dogs and the like. But, as those around Antigonus of Carystus say, he was saved from death by companions who followed him around. Aenesidemus affirms that Pyrrho practiced philosophy according to the way of reasoning that leads to suspended judgment, yet that he did not do things without foresight. Pyrrho lived close to ninety years.

In his About Pyrrho, Antigonus of Carystus claims the following things about Pyrrho: that he was at first poor and unregarded and a painter; that some halfway decent paintings that he did of torch-race runners are preserved in the gymnasium at Elis; that he used to withdraw from the company of others and isolate himself, sometimes showing himself infrequently even to those in his own household. Pyrrho did this, according to Antigonus, after he heard some Indian faulting Anaxarchus with the reproach that he could not teach anyone else to be good as long as he himself was in attendance at the royal court. Antigonus also says that Pyrrho was always in the same state. This is why, if anyone walked away from him while he was in the middle of saying something, he used to continue the discussion with himself. Yet he had been excitable in his youth. According to Antigonus, Pyrrho frequently went out of town without letting anyone know in advance, and he used to roam with whomever he wished. Once, when Anaxarchus fell
64. καταληφθεὶς δὲ ποτὲ καὶ αὐτῷ λαλῶν καὶ ἔρωτησεις τὴν αὐτίαν ἐφ᾽ ἡμελετάν χρηστός εἶναι. ἐν τε ταῖς ζητήσεσιν ὑπ᾽ οὐδενὸς κατεφρονεῖτο διὰ τὸ [καὶ δὲ] εξοδικῶς λέγειν καὶ πρὸς ἔρωτησιν· ὅθεν καὶ Ναυσιφάνην ἢδη νεανίσκον ὅντα θηραθῆναι. ἐφασκε γοῦν γίνεσθαι δεῖν τῆς μὲν διαθέσεως τῆς Πυρρωνείου, τῶν δὲ λόγων τῶν ἀειτοῦ. ἔλεγε τε πολλάκις καὶ Ἐπίκουρον θαυμάζοντα τὴν Πύρρωνος ἀναστροφὴν συνεχές αὐτοῦ πυνθάνεσθαι περὶ αὐτοῦ. οὕτω δ᾽ αὐτὸν ὑπὸ τῆς πατρίδος τιμηθῆναι ὥστε καὶ ἀρχιερέα καταστῆσαι αὐτὸν καὶ δι᾽ ἐκείνον πάσι τοῖς φιλοσόφοις ἀτέλειαν ὑπῆρθαι.

καὶ δὴ καὶ πολλοὺς εἰχε ζηλωτὰς τῆς ἀπραγμοσύνης· ὅθεν καὶ ὁ Τίμων περὶ αὐτοῦ φησιν ὡς...</p>
into a pond, Pyrrho continued on his way without helping him. Some people found fault with Pyrrho, but Anaxarchus himself praised Pyrrho’s indifference and lack of affect.

64. One time, when Pyrrho was caught talking to himself and was asked why he did so, he said that he was practicing to be a man of worth. In his disquisitions he elicited contempt from no one, because he spoke in great detail and addressed questions directly. This is why Nausiphanes was enthralled by him when he was still rather young. Nausiphanes at any rate used to say that one ought to be influenced by Pyrrho’s disposition, but go along with his own arguments. Nausiphanes further said many times that Epicurus too, marveling at Pyrrho’s conduct, frequently asked him about Pyrrho. (According to Nausiphanes,) Pyrrho was so esteemed in his native land that the people of Elis made him a chief priest, and because of him they accorded an exemption from taxes to all philosophers.

What’s more, there were many who admired the way Pyrrho kept to himself. This is why Timon said the following about him in the Pytho and in his Silloi:

65. “O old man, o Pyrrho! How, or from what inspiration, did you discover the means of casting off the servitude imposed by the empty-headed fancies of sophists? How did you loosen the bond of every deception and every effort to persuade? You had no interest in asking after these things: in pursuing what distractions possess Hellas, or in inquiring after the cause and effect of each single thing.” And again in Timon’s Appearances:

“My heart, Pyrrho, longs to hear this: How did you alone, though a man, lead your life easily and in peace, mastering the manner of a god while living among men?”

As Diocles tells it, the Athenians honored Pyrrho with citizenship because he killed Cotys the Thracian. According to Eratosthenes’ On Wealth and Poverty, Pyrrho lived chastely with his sister, who was a midwife. In those days he used to personally take birds and piglets, if they were what he happened to have, to the market and sell them, and he cleaned things in the house with an attitude of indifference. It is said that, because of his indifference, he even washed a pig. But once he got angry at something concerning his sister (whose name was Philista), and he is supposed to have said to someone who found fault with him that displaying indifference is not appropriate when a female is involved. Once, when a dog attacked him, he was scared away, and he purportedly said to someone who reproached him that it is difficult to shake off humanity completely, and that the point is to contend as much as pos-
67. φασὶ δὲ καὶ σηπτικῶν φαρμάκων καὶ τομῶν καὶ καύσεων ἐπὶ τινος ἐλκοὺς αὐτῷ προσενεχθέντων, ἀλλὰ μηδὲ τὰς φόρους συναγαγείν. καὶ ὁ Τίμων δὲ διώσαφει τὴν διάθεσιν αὐτοῦ ἐν οἷς πρὸς Πύθανα διέξεισιν. ἀλλὰ καὶ Φίλων ὁ Ὅθηναιος, γνώμης αὐτοῦ γεγονός, ἐλεγεν ὡς ἐμέμνητο μᾶλλον δημοκρίτου, εἰτα δὲ καὶ Ομήρου, δαιμονίων αὐτὸν καὶ συνεχές λέγων·

ὅτι περὶ φυλλῶν γενείν, τοῖς δὲ καὶ ἄνθρώπων· καὶ ὁΤίμων δὲ διασαφεί τὴν διάθεσιν αὐτοῦ ἐν οἷς πρὸς Πυθωνα διέξεισιν. ἀλλὰ καὶ Φίλων ὁ Ῥήτορος, γνώριμος αὐτοῦ γεγονός, ἔλεγεν ὡς ἐμέμνητο μᾶλλον Δημοκρίτου, εἰτα δὲ καὶ Ομήρου, δαιμονίων αὐτὸν καὶ συνεχὲς λέγων·

68. καὶ ὁσα συντείνει εἰς τὸ ἀβέβαιον καὶ κενόσπουδον ἅμα καὶ παιδαρίωδες τῶν ἀνθρώπων. Ποσειδώνιος δὲ καὶ τοιοῦτο τι διέξεισι περὶ αὐτοῦ τῶν γὰρ ἐμπλεόντων ὑπὸ χειμῶνος, αὐτὸς γαληνὸς ὢν ἀνέρρωσε τὴν ψυχήν, δείξας ἐν τῷ πλοίῳ χοιρίδιον ἑσθίον καὶ εἰπὼν ὡς χρὴ τὸν σοφὸν ἐν τοιαύτῃ καθεστάναι ἀταραξίᾳ. μόνος δὲ Νουμήνιος καὶ δογματίσαι φησὶν αὐτὸν. τούτου πρὸς τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ μαθηταὶ· ὃς τὸν Ἀλφειόν ἦν οὖν πολεμιώτατος τοῖς σοφισταῖς, ὡς καὶ Τίμων φησίν.

69. οὐδὲ Ναυσιφάνης ἄπαντας ἀκοῦσαι Ἐπίκουρον. οὗτοι πάντες Πυρρώνειοι μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ διδασκάλου, ἀπορητικοὶ καὶ σκεπτικοὶ καὶ ἐπὶ ἐφεκτικοὶ καὶ ζητητικοὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ οἷον δόγματος προσηγορεύοντο. 70. ζητητικὴ μὲν οὖν φιλοσοφία ἀπὸ τοῦ πάντοτε ζητεῖν
possible with life’s challenges, first through one’s deeds and then, if that fails, with argument.

67. They say that Pyrrho did not so much as frown when, as a treatment for a wound or sore, he endured the application of toxic medicines, or had something cut out or burnt off. Timon plainly outlines Pyrrho’s disposition in his accounts addressed to Pytho. Philo the Athenian, who had been Pyrrho’s acquaintance, used to say that Pyrrho quoted Democritus most of all, and Homer too, and that he admired Homer, regularly reciting the verse,

“Like the generation of leaves, such is that of men,” (Iliad 6.149)

He admired Homer also because he likened men to wasps and flies and birds. Pyrrho would also recite,

“But, friend, die – you too. Why do you lament thus? Even Patroclus was killed, a far better man than you.” (Iliad 21.106–7)

68. And so forth with many other verses that direct attention to the unstable and frivolous and childish qualities of human beings.

Posidonius also relates a story along the following lines about Pyrrho. Once, when his fellow passengers on a ship were distressed by stormy weather, Pyrrho, being calm and collected, bucked up their spirits by pointing to a little pig on board that was eating, and he said that a wise man ought to settle himself in that kind of unperturbed state. Only Numenius claims that Pyrrho also put forward doctrines. Some of his students became famous, and Eurylochus was one of them. The following unflattering story is circulated about him. For, they say that he once got so annoyed that he grabbed a spit with the meat still on it and chased a cook all the way to the marketplace. 69. When he was overwhelmed in Elis by people seeking to engage him in conversation, he stripped off his tunic and swam across the river Alpheus. He was, then, as Timon also reports, most hostile to the sophists.

Philo used to talk <to himself> a lot. That is why Timon says the following about him:

“Oh! That Philo who devotes all his time to himself apart from men, talking to himself, not caring for what others think and for their verbal wranglings.”

In addition to these men, Hecataeus of Abdera was a student of Pyrrho, and so was Timon of Phlius, who composed Silloi – we will say more about him later – and also Nausiphanes of Teos, with whom, as some say, Epicurus studied. All of these men were called Pyrrhonians, the appellation being derived from the name of their teacher, and they were also called Aporetics, Skeptics, Ephetics, and Zetetics, these labels being derived from their doctrine if we may call it that. 70. Their phi-
τὴν ἀλήθειαν, σκεπτικὴ δ’ ἀπὸ τοῦ σκέπτεσθαι αἰεὶ καὶ μηδέποτε εὐφρίσκειν, ἐφεκτικὴ δ’ ἀπὸ τοῦ μετὰ τὴν ζήτησιν πάθους λέγω δὲ τὴν ἐπιχήν ἀπορητικὴ δ’ ἀπὸ τοῦ τῆς διανοίας ἀλήτητον ἔστιν, οὐκ εἰσόμεθα τὴν Πυρρώνιος διάθεσιν μη εἰδότες δὲ οὐδὲ Πυρρώνειοι καλοίμεθ’ ἄν. πρὸς τῷ μηδὲ πρῶτον εὑρηκέναι τὴν σκεπτικὴν Πύρρωνα μηδ’ ἔχειν τί δόγμα. λέγοιτο δ’ ἀν τὶς Πυρρώνειος ὀμότροπος.

71. ταύτης δὲ τῆς αἰφέσεως ἔνιοι φασιν Ὄμηρον κατάρθει, ἐπεὶ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν πραγμάτων παρ’ ὄντιν’ ἄλλοτε ἄλλος ἀποφαίνεται καὶ οὐδὲν ὁρικῶς δογματίζει περὶ τὴν ἀπόφασιν. ἐπεὶ καὶ τῶν ἐπὶ σοφῶν σκεπτικῶς εἶναι, οἰον τῷ ‘μηδὲν ἄγαν’, καὶ ‘ἐγγύα, πάρα δ’ ἀτα’ δηλοῦσθαι καὶ τῷ βεβαίῳ καὶ πεπεισμένῳ διεγνωσμένῳ ἐπακολουθεῖν ἄτην. ἄλλα καὶ Ἀρχίλοχον καὶ Εὐριπίδην σκεπτικῶς ἔχειν, ἐν οίς Ἀρχίλοχος μὲν φησι’

τοῖς ἀνθρώποις θυμός, Γλαύκη Λαστίνεω πάϊ,
γίνεται θρήτως ὁκοίην Ζεὺς ἐπ’ ἡμέρην ἄγει.
Εὐριπίδης δὲ:
τι δῆτα τούτους τοὺς ταλαιπώρους βροτοὺς
φρονείν λέγουσιν; σοῦ γὰρ ἔχομεν ἑτέρα
dομένε τοῖς τοιοῦθ’ ἀν σὺ τυχόνης θέλων.

72. οὐ μὴν ἄλλα καὶ Ξενοφάνης καὶ Ζήνων ὁ Ἐλεάτης καὶ Δημώκριτος κατ’ αὐτοὺς σκεπτικοὶ τυχάνουσιν· ἐν οίς Ξενοφάνης μὲν φησι’
καὶ τὸ μὲν οὐν σαφὲς οὕτως ἀνήρ ἰδεῖν οὐδὲ τις ἐσται εἰδώς.
Ζήνων δὲ τὴν κίνησιν ἀναιρεί λέγων, ‘τὸ κινοῦμενον οὕτε ἐν ὧ ἐστι
tοπὸς κινεῖται οὕτω ἐν ὧ μὴ ἐστι’ Δημώκριτος δὲ τὰς ποιήτας ἑκ-βάλλων, ἵνα φησί, ‘νόμος θερμόν, νόμος ψυχρόν, ἔτει δὲ ἄτομα καὶ
κενόν’ καὶ πάλιν, ‘ἔτει δὲ οὐδέν ἰδεῖν ἐν βιβθῷ γὰρ ἡ ἀλήθεια.’ καὶ
Pyrrho 70 – 72

philosophy was searching, or zetetic, because they constantly searched for the truth; it was investigative, or skeptic, because they were always investigating but never discovered anything; it was suspensive, or ephetic, because of what they experienced after their searches – I’m referring to their suspension of judgment – and it was perplexing, or aporetic, because † they brought both those who put forward doctrines and themselves to a state of perplexity †. The term Pyrrhonian comes from the name Pyrrho. In his Skeptical Chapters, Theodosius denies that it is appropriate to call skepticism ‘Pyrrhonian.’ His reasoning is that, if what goes on in another person’s thought is ungraspable, then we will not know Pyrrho’s disposition, and, without knowing that, we could not be called ‘Pyrrhonian.’ What is more, Theodosius argues, Pyrrho was not the first to discover skepticism, or to embrace no doctrine.

71. Some say that Homer originated this philosophical approach (i.e., skepticism) since, concerning the very same matters, he more than anyone else declares one thing in one place but another in another place, and he never offers a definitive doctrine concerning any of his claims. The utterances of the seven sages are also said to be skeptic, such as “Nothing in excess” and “Make a commitment, delusion is nearby.” The latter saying can be interpreted to mean that delusion attends the man who firmly and with conviction commits himself to something. It is said that Archilochus and Euripides were also skeptically disposed, if one goes by the verses where Archilochus says:

“The spirit in human beings, Glaucus son of Leptines, is such as the day that Zeus brings on.” (fr. 131 West)

For his part, Euripides says,

“Why, then, do they say that these wretched mortals have any sense? For we depend on you and do such things as you happen to wish.” (Suppliant 734-6)

72. According to these people, not just Archilochus and Euripides, but Xenophanes and Zeno of Elea and Democritus are also skeptics in their own ways. Take, for example, the passage in which Xenophanes says,

“No man has seen that which is clear, nor will there be anyone who knows it.” (fr. 34 DK)

Zeno does away with movement, saying, “The thing that is moved is neither in the place in which it moves nor is it in the place where it is not” (fr. 4 DK). Democritus tosses out qualities, when he says, “By convention cold, by convention hot; but in reality, atoms and void.” (fr. 9 DK). Elsewhere Democritus asserts, “In truth we know nothing; truth is
Πλάτωνα τὸ μὲν ἀληθὲς θεοὶς τε καὶ θεῶν παισίν ἐκχωρεῖν, τὸν δὲ εἰκότα λόγον ἔτηειν, καὶ Ἐυριπίδην λέγειν·

72. τίς δ᾿ οἶδεν εἰ τὸ ζήν μὲν ἔστι καθθανεῖν, 

tὸ καθθανεῖν δὲ ζήν νομίζεται βροτοίς;

ἀλλὰ καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλέα·

οὔτως <οὔτε> ἐπιδερκτὰ τάδ᾿ ἀνδράσιν ἐκθανεῖν,

καὶ Ἐυριπίδην λέγειν·

τίς δ᾿ οἶδεν εἰ τὸ ζῆν μὲν ἔστι κατθανεῖν, τὸ κατθανεῖν δὲ ζῆν νομίζεται βροτοῖς;

ἀλλὰ καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλέα·

οὕτως <οὔτε> ἐπιδερκτὰ τάδ᾿ ἀνδράσιν ἐκθανεῖν,

καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλέα·

οὕτως <οὔτε> ἐπιδερκτὰ τάδ᾿ ἀνδράσιν ἐκθανεῖν,

καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλέα·

οὕτως <οὔτε> ἐπιδερκτὰ τάδ᾿ ἀνδράσιν ἐκθανεῖν,

καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλέα·

οὕτως <οὔτε> ἐπιδερκτὰ τάδ᾿ ἀνδράσιν ἐκθανεῖν,

καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλέα·

οὕτως <οὔτε> ἐπιδερκτὰ τάδ᾿ ἀνδράσιν ἐκθανεῖν,

καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλέα·

οὕτως <οὔτε> ἐπιδερκτὰ τάδ᾿ ἀνδράσιν ἐκθανεῖν,

καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλέα·

οὕτως <οὔτε> ἐπιδερκτὰ τάδ᾿ ἀνδράσιν ἐκθανεῖν,

καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλέα·

οὕτως <οὔτε> ἐπιδερκτὰ τάδ᾿ ἀνδράσιν ἐκθανεῖν,

καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλέα·

οὕτως <οὔτε> ἐπιδερκτὰ τάδ᾿ ἀνδράσιν ἐκθανεῖν,

καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλέα·

οὕτως <οὔτε> ἐπιδερκτὰ τάδ᾿ ἀνδράσιν ἐκθανεῖν,

καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλέα·

οὕτως <οὔτε> ἐπιδερκτὰ τάδ᾿ ἀνδράσιν ἐκθανεῖν,

καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλέα·

οὕτως <οὔτε> ἐπιδερκτὰ τάδ᾿ ἀνδράσιν ἐκθανεῖν,

καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλέα·

οὕτως <οὔτε> ἐπιδερκτὰ τάδ᾿ ἀνδράσιν ἐκθανεῖν,

καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλέα·

οὕτως <οὔτε> ἐπιδερκτὰ τάδ᾿ ἀνδράσιν ἐκθανεῖν,

καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλέα·

οὕτως <οὔτε> ἐπιδερκτὰ τάδ᾿ ἀνδράσιν ἐκθανεῖν,

καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλέα·

οὕτως <οὔτε> ἐπιδερκτὰ τάδ᾿ ἀνδράσιν ἐκθανεῖν,

καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλέα·

οὕτως <οὔτε> ἐπιδερκτὰ τάδ᾿ ἀνδράσιν ἐκθανεῖν,

καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλέα·

οὕτως <οὔτε> ἐπιδερκτὰ τάδ᾿ ἀνδράσιν ἐκθανεῖν,

καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλέα·

οὕτως <οὔτε> ἐπιδερκτὰ τάδ᾿ ἀνδράσιν ἐκθανεῖν,

καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλέα·

οὕτως <οὔτε> ἐπιδερκτὰ τάδ᾿ ἀνδράσιν ἐκθανεῖν,

καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλέα·

οὕτως <οὔτε> ἐπιδερκτὰ τάδ᾿ ἀνδράσιν ἐκθανεῖν,
in the abyss” (fr. B 117 DK). And they say that Plato cedes the truth to the gods and the children of gods, and looks only for a likely account. Euripides, it is claimed, also said the following:

73. “Who knows if life is death, and death is deemed to be life for mortals?” (Phrixus A or B, fr. 833N)

And Empedocles is credited with saying:

“Thus these things are neither visible nor audible for men, nor can they be apprehended with the mind.” (fr. 2.7–8 DK).

Earlier in the same poem, Empedocles had already said:

“Persuaded only of whatever each has encountered.” (fr. 2.5 DK)

Moreover Heraclitus is said to have urged, “Let us not conjecture at random about the most important things” (fr. 47 DK). Hippocrates too, they say, put forward views in a doubtful and human fashion. And earlier Homer said,

“The tongue of mortal men is pliant, and many are the tales on it.” (Iliad 20.248)

And,

“The range for words is great.” (Iliad 20.249)

And,

“Whatsoever sort of word you might say, such you might hear.” (Iliad 20.250)

These quotations refer to the equal strength and opposition of arguments.

74. The skeptics, then, continually overturned all the doctrines of philosophical schools, and they themselves declare nothing in a dogmatic fashion. They go so far as to cite the views of others and report them, but they themselves determine nothing, not even this very thing (that they determine nothing). Thus the skeptics even denied their “not determining anything,” when they said something like, “We determine nothing.” Otherwise they would have determined something. We utter these denials, the skeptics say, just for the purpose of revealing our non-precipitancy, just as, if we accepted them, this would be shown. Through the expression “We determine nothing,” our state of inner balance is made plain. So it is with the expressions “not at all more (this) than (that)” and “for every argument there is a counter-argument,” and so forth.

75. The expression “not at all more this than that” is also said in a positive sense, meaning that certain things are similar, as in “The pirate is no more bad than the liar.” But the phrase is deployed by skeptics not declaratively, but with a view to doing away with something, as it is by the person who dismantles other peoples’ views and says, “The
Χίμαιρα. ἀυτὸ δὲ τὸ 'μᾶλλον' ποτὲ μὲν συγκριτικῶς ἐκφέρεται, ὡς ὅταν φῶμεν 'μᾶλλον τὸ μέλι γλυκὺ ἢ τὴν σταφίδα' ποτὲ δὲ θετικῶς καὶ αναιρετικῶς, ὡς ὅταν λέγωμεν, 'μᾶλλον ἡ ἀρετὴ ὥφελεί ἢ βλά-πτει' σημαινομεν γὰρ ὅτι ἡ ἀρετὴ ὥφελει, βλάπτει δ' οὐ.

76. ἀναφοροῦσι δὲ οἱ σκεπτικοὶ καὶ αὐτὴν τὴν 'οὐδὲν μᾶλλον' φω-νὴν ὡς γὰρ οὐ μᾶλλον ἐστι πρόνοια ἢ οὐκ ἐστίν, οὔτω καὶ τὸ 'οὐδὲν μᾶλλον' οὐ μᾶλλον ἐστιν ἢ οὐκ ἐστίν. σημαίνει οὖν ἡ φωνή, καθὰ φησὶ καὶ Τίμων ἐν τῷ Πύθωνι, 'τὸ μηδὲν ὁρίζειν, ἀλλὰ ἀπροσθετεῖν.' ἡ δὲ 'παντὶ λόγῳ' φωνή καὶ αὐτὴ συνάγει τὴν ἐποχήν τῶν μὲν γὰρ πραγμάτων διαφωνοῦντων τῶν δὲ λόγων ἰσοσθενοῦντων ἁγνωσία τῆς ἀληθείας ἐπακολουθεῖ· καὶ αὐτῷ δὲ τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ λόγος ἀντί-κειται, ὡς καὶ αὐτὸς μετὰ τὸ ἀνελεῖν τοὺς άλλους ὕφ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ περιτραπέζων ἀπόλλυται, κατ᾽ ἰσον τοῖς καθαρτικοῖς, ὁ τὸν ἅμα προεκκρίναντα καὶ αὐτὰ ὑπεκκρίνεται καὶ ἐξαπόλλυται. 77. πρὸς οἱ φασιν οἱ δογματικοὶ μὴ αἴρειν τὸν λόγον, ἀλλὰ προσεπισχύειν.
Scylla existed no more than did the Chimaera.” The expression “more ... than” is itself employed sometimes to convey comparison, as whenever we say “Honey is more sweet than wild stavesacre,” and sometimes in a declarative fashion and with a view to denial, as whenever we say, “Virtue helps rather than harms.” For, in this case, we are signifying that virtue helps and that it does not harm.

76. But the skeptics reject even the very expression “not at all more this than that.” For, just as forethought is no more than it is not, thus also the phrase “not at all more this than that” is no more than it is not. Thus the expression signifies, as Timon too says in his Pytho, “to determine nothing and to suspend judgment.” The expression “for every argument (logos) (there is a counter-argument), in itself entails suspension of judgment.” Whenever things are at odds with each other and arguments have equal strength, ignorance of the truth follows suit. And also for this very argument a counter-argument lies in opposition, which, after refuting the other arguments, is itself turned upside down by itself and destroyed, just like medicines used for purgation, which, once they have cleared out toxins from the body, are themselves also eliminated and thoroughly destroyed.

97. In response to this, those who put forward doctrines say that the skeptics do not refute the argument, but in fact strengthen it.

The skeptics used statements (logoi) only as tools. For one cannot refute a statement except by means of a statement. In the same way, we have a habit of saying that place “is not,” but we always must mention the place – not in a dogmatic way, but just for purposes of reference. And in saying that nothing happens by necessity, one must still mention necessity. The skeptics relied on a similar style of expressing themselves, saying that, however things appear to be, they are not that way by nature, but they only seem to be. They said that they investigate not their thoughts, since what one thinks is evident to oneself, but what they access by the senses.

78. Thus the Pyrrhonian approach is a recording of appearances or of any kind of thought. In this recording, all things are tossed together with all other things, and, when they are assessed in conjunction, they are found to have much discrepancy and confusion, as Aenesidemus says in his Outline of Pyrrhonism. Regarding the contradictions that arise in their investigations, the skeptics first pointed out the ways in which things persuade, and then according to the very same ways they did away with confidence concerning these things. For what persuades us are matters where sense-perceptions fit together, as do things that never or rarely undergo change. And so, too, we are persuaded by matters
σταλμένα καὶ <τὰ> τέρποντα καὶ τὰ θαυμαζόμενα. 79. ἐδείκνυσαν οὖν ἀπὸ τῶν ἐναντίων τοῖς πείθουσιν ἴσας τὰς πιθανότητας.

καὶ τὰς πιθανότητας ἐδείκνυσαν ὁπὸ τῶν ἐναντίων τοῖς πείθουσιν ἴσας τὰς πιθανότητας.

δ᾿ ἀπορίαι κατὰ τὰς συμφωνίας τῶν φαινομένων ἡ νουσμένων ἡ προσωπική θαλάσσεις. 80. καὶ τὰ τρόπους καθ᾿ ἕντιθησιν·

tρίτος <ὁ> παρὰ τὰς αἰσθητικῶν πόρων διαφοράς, τὸ γοῦν μήλου ὁρᾶται μὲν ἄχρον, γεύεται δὲ γλυκὺ, ὀσφρήσει δὲ εὐῶδες ὑποπιπττεῖ. καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ ἡ μορφὴ τὰς διαφορὰς τῶν κατόπτρων αἰσθητείται. ἀκολουθεῖ οὖν μή μᾶλλον εἶναι τὸ φαινόμενον ἢ ἀλλοίον.

δεύτερος ὁ παρὰ τὰς ἀνθρώπων φύσεις κατὰ ἐθική καὶ συγκρίσεις. 81. Δημοφῶν γοῦν ὁ Ἀλεξάνδρου τραπεζοκόμος ἐν σκιᾷ ἐθάλπετο, ἐν ἡλίῳ δὲ ἐρρίγου. 82. Ἀνδρὸς ὁ Ἀργεῖος, ὡς φησιν Ἀριστοτέλης, διὰ τῆς ἀνύδρου Λιβύης ὡδεν ἁπότος. καὶ ὁ μὲν ἱατρικὴς, ὁ δὲ γεωργίας, ἄλλος ὑποτείχει. καὶ ταῦτα οὓς μὲν βλάπτει, οὓς δὲ ὀφελεῖ· ὅθεν ἐφεκτέον.
where there is an accepted way of doing things and where things are established by laws, and by things that give pleasure and amaze us. 79. They showed, then, based on oppositions to what persuades us, that both sides are equally persuasive.\textsuperscript{83}

The perplexities they addressed regarding agreements between appearances and thoughts were in Ten Modes, according to which the matters under consideration were made to seem discrepant.\textsuperscript{84} These are the Ten Modes the Pyrrhonian approach lays out one by one.

The First Mode is the one that pertains to the differences between living beings, with a view to pleasure and pain, and to harm and benefit. It is inferred from this that the same impressions do not befall them from the same things, and suspension of judgment arises from this sort of conflict. For some animals are generated without intercourse, such as those that live in fire\textsuperscript{85} and the Arabian phoenix\textsuperscript{86} and worms; others come into being from sexual reproduction, such as human beings and others.

80. And some living beings are constituted in one way, some in another way. And therefore they also differ in regard to sense-perception; for example, hawks have the sharpest \textit{vision} whereas dogs have the keenest sense of smell. It is plausible that different visions, too, befall those that are different from one another with respect to the eyes. And for the goat the shoot of the vine is edible, but for humans they are bitter; and for the quail hemlock is nutritious, but for humans it is deadly; and dung is edible for a sow, but not for a horse.

Second is the mode that pertains to the natures of human beings according to their ethnic origins and their physical constitutions. For instance Demophon\textsuperscript{87}, Alexander’s waiter, used to warm up in the shade, and in the sun he shivered. 81. Andron of Argos, according to Aristotle,\textsuperscript{88} traveled without drink through waterless Libya. And one person is inclined to be a doctor, someone else toward farming, and again someone else toward trade. And the same things that harm some people benefit others. Therefore one must suspend judgment.

The Third Mode is <the> one that pertains to the differences in sense-perceptual pathways. For instance an apple strikes sight as yellow, the sense of taste as sweet, and the sense of smell as fragrant. And depending on the differences among mirrors, even the same shape is seen as different shapes. So it follows that what appears is no more this way than some other way.

82. The Fourth Mode is the one that pertains to conditions and, in general, variations, such as health, illness, sleep, waking, joy, distress, youth, old age, confidence, fear, need, satiety, hatred, friendship, heat,
θάρσος φόβον, ἐνδεικνύοντα, μίσος φιλίαν, θερμασίαν ψύξιν· ταύτα παρὰ τὸ πνεῖν παρὰ τὸ πιεσθῆναι τοὺς πόρους. ἄλλοια οὖν φαίνεται ἐντὸς προσπέπτοντα παρὰ τὰς ποιὰς διαθέσεις. οὐδὲ γὰρ οἱ μαίνομενοι παρὰ φύσιν ἔχουσι τί γὰρ μᾶλλον ἐκείνοι ἢ ἡμεῖς; καὶ γὰρ ἡμεῖς τὸν ἥλιον ὡς ἐστῶτα βλέπομεν. Θέων δὲ ὁ Τιθορεύς στιχωκός κοιμώμενος περιπάτει εν τῷ ὑπνω καὶ Περικλέους δοῦλος ἐπὶ ἄκρου τοῦ τέγους.

83. πέμπτος ό παρὰ τὰς ἀγωγὰς καὶ τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὰς μυθικὰς πίστεις καὶ τὰς ἑθικὰς συνθήκας καὶ δογματικὰς ὑπολήψεις. ἐν τούτῳ περιέχεται τὰ περὶ καλῶν καὶ αἰσχρῶν, περὶ ἀληθῶν καὶ ψευδῶν, περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν, περὶ θεῶν καὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθόρας τῶν φαινομένων πάντων. τὸ γοῦν αὐτῷ παρ’ οῖς μὲν δίκαιοι, παρ’ οῖς δὲ ἄδικοι καὶ ἄλλοι οὖν ἀγαθῶν, ἄλλοις δὲ κακῶν. Πέρασι μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἀτοπον ἤγοντο μηγατοὶ μὴν νυσθαῖ, Ἐλληνες δὲ ἐκθέομεν. καὶ Μασσαγέται μὲν, ὡς φησὶ καὶ Εὐδοξὸς ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τῆς Περιοδοῦ, κοινὰς ἔχουσι τὰς γυναῖκας, Ἐλληνες δὲ οὐ. 84. Κύλικές τε ληστείαις ἔχαιρον, ἀλλ’ οὐκ Ἐλληνες, θεοὺς τε ἄλλοι ἄλλος ἤγονται καὶ οἱ μὲν προνοεῖσθαι, οἱ δ’ οὐ. θάπτουσι δὲ Αἰγύπτιοι μὲν ταρχεύοντες, Ἐγυμαίοι δε καίντες, Παίονες δ’ εἰς τὰς λίμνας ὑπετύντες· οὗτοι περὶ ταλιθοῦς ἐποχή.

ἔκτος ὁ παρὰ τὰς μίξεις καὶ κοινωνίας, καθ’ οἱ εἰλικρινῶς οὐδὲν καθ’ αὐτῷ φαίνεται, ἄλλα σὺν ἄερι, σὺν φωτ, σὺν ὑγρ, σὺν στερεώ, θερμότητα, ψυχρότητα, κινήσει, ἀναθυμίασι, ἄλλας δυνάμεις. ἗ γοῦν πορφύρα διάφορα ὑποφαίνει χρώμα ἐν ἡλίῳ καὶ σελήνη καὶ λύκῳ. καὶ τὸ ἡμίτοιχον χρώμα ἀλλοιον ὑπὸ τῇ μεσημβρίᾳ φαίνεται καὶ ὁ ἡλίος. 85. καὶ ὁ ἐν ἄερι· ὑπὸ δυνοῦ κουφιζόμενος λίθος ἐν ὕδατι ὑβάδιος μετατίθεται, ἦτοι μαράζων καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ ὑδατος κουφιζόμενος ἐλαφρὸς ἐν καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ ἄερος βαρυσμένος. ἀγνοοῦμεν οὖν τὸ κατ’ ἴδιαν, ὡς ἔλαιον ἐν μύρῳ.

ἔβδομος ὁ παρὰ τὰς ἀποστάσεις καὶ ποιῶς θέσεις καὶ τοὺς τόπους καὶ τὰ ἐν τοῖς τόποσι, κατὰ τούτον τὸν ἄγαλμα μικρὰ φαίνεται, τὰ τετράγωνα στρογγύλα, τὰ ὀμαλὰ ἐξοχάς ἐχοντα, τὰ ὀρθὰ κεκλασμένα, τὰ ὕψος ἐκτροχοα. ὁ γοῦν ἡλίου παρὰ τὸ δικαίωμα ἰπόρφωθεν φαίνεται καὶ τα ὅρη πόρουθεν ἀεροειδὴ καὶ λεία, ἐγγύθην δὲ τραχέα. 86. ἔτι ὁ ἡλίος ἀνίσχων μὲν
and cold; and then there would be matters of breathing and having the air-passages blocked. Thus the things that strike one appear different depending on whatever condition that person is in. And even the mad are not in an unnatural condition. For why should that apply more to them than to us? For we too see the sun as standing still. And the Stoic Theon of Tithorea walked in his sleep after going to bed, and so did a slave of Pericles on the rooftop.

83. The Fifth Mode is <the> one that pertains to ways of life, customs, beliefs engendered by myths and stories, conventional agreements and dogmatic assumptions. Questions about beautiful and ugly things, the true and the false, good and bad things, about the gods and about the coming-into-being and perishing of all appearances belong to the domain of this mode. Surely the very same thing is just among some people and unjust among others; or good for some and bad for others. The Persians think it is not unnatural to have sex with one’s daughter; but for the Greeks this is unlawful. And the Massagetae, as Eudoxus says in the first book of his Travelogue, have their women in common; but the Greeks do not. 84. The Cilicians used to take pleasure in piracy, but the Greeks did not. Different people conceive of gods differently; and some believe that they are provident, but others do not. When burying their dead, the Egyptians embalm them, the Romans burn them, and the Paeonians throw them into lakes. As regards the truth, then, we are left with suspension of judgment.

The Sixth Mode is the one that pertains to mixtures and combinations. According to it, nothing appears to be just simply what it is, but it appears in conjunction with air, with light, moisture, solidity, heat, cold, motion, vaporizations, and other powers. For instance purple displays a different shade in the sun, in the moonlight, and with light from a lamp. And our own coloration seems different at midday and so does the sun. 85. And a stone lifted up in the air is easily transported in water – either because it is heavy and the weight is alleviated by the water or because it is light and made heavy by the air. Therefore we do not know what it is according to its own characteristics, just as with olive oil blended with myrrh.

The Seventh Mode is the one that pertains to distances, specific positions, places, and that which is located in them. According to this mode what seems to be large appears small, and the square round, the flat having protrusions, the straight bent, the pale colored. For instance the sun, due to its distance, appears † from afar †; and mountains at a distance appear misty and smooth, but from nearby they appear rugged. 86. Moreover, the sun when rising seems one way, and not the
αλλοίος, μεσουρανῶν δὲ σῶμα ἡμεῖς· καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ σώμα ἐν μὲν ἀλλοίον, ἐν δὲ ἡμεῖς γῆ ἔτερον καὶ ἑικὼν παρὰ τὴν ποιῶν θέσιν, ὁ τε τῆς περιστερᾶς τραχύλος παρὰ τὴν στροφήν. ἐπεὶ οὖν οὐκ ἐν ἔξω τῶν καὶ θέσεων ταῦτα κατανοήσαι, ἀγνοεῖται ἣ φύσις αὐτῶν.

όγδοος ὁ παρὰ τὰς ποισότητας αὐτῶν ἢ θεμότητας ἢ ψυχρότητας ἢ ταχύτητας ἢ βραδύτητας ἢ ὠχρότητας ἢ ἐτεροχροιότητας. ὁ γοῦν οίνος μέτριος μὲν ληφθεῖς χώλνυσι, πλείων δὲ παρήστην ὀμοίως καὶ ἡ τροφή καὶ τὰ σῶμα.

87. ἐνατος ὁ παρὰ τοῦ ἐνδελεχές ἢ ξένον ἢ σπάνιον. οἱ γοῦν σεισμοὶ παρ᾽ οίς συνεχῶς ἀποτελοῦνται οὐκ θαυμάζονται, οὐδ᾽ ὁ ἴλιος, ὅτι καθ᾽ ἥμεραν ὃκαί. τὸν ἐνατὸν Φαβωρίνος οὔγουσιν, Σέξτος δὲ καὶ Αἰνεσίδημος διακότον ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν διακότον Σέξτος οὔγουσιν φησὶ, Φαβωρίνος δὲ ἐνατόν.

δέκατος ὁ κατὰ τὴν πρός ἀλλὰ σύμβλησίν, καθάπερ τὸ κοῦφον παρὰ τὸ βαρύ, τὸ ἱσχυρὸν παρὰ τὸ ἀσθένες, τὸ μείζον παρὰ τὸ ἐλαττον, τὸ ἀνὸ παρὰ τὸ κάτω. τὸ γοῦν δεξιόν φύει μὲν οὐκ ἐστὶ δεξιόν, κατὰ δὲ τὴν ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ ἐτερον σχέσιν νοεῖται· μετατεθέντος γοῦν ἐκείνου, οὐκέτ᾽ ἐστι δεξιόν. 88. ὀμοίως καὶ παρὰ καὶ αἰδέλφος ὡς πρὸς τι καὶ ἡμέρα καὶ πάντα ἢ πρὸς τὴν διάνυσιν. ἀγνωστὰ οὖν τὰ πρὸς τι καθ᾽ ἑαυτά. καὶ οὕτωι μὲν οἱ δέκα τρόποι.

οἱ δὲ περὶ Ἀγρίππαν τοῦτοι ἀλλοις πέντε προσειδάγουσιν, τὸν τε ἀπὸ τῆς διαφωνίας καὶ τὸν εἰς ἀπείρον ἐκβάλλοντα καὶ τὸν πρὸς τι καὶ τὸν ἐξ ὑποθέσεως καὶ τὸν διὰ ἀλλήλων. ὁ μὲν οὖν ἀπὸ τῆς διαφωνίας, ὁ ἀν προτεθῇ ζήτημα παρὰ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις ἡ τῇ συνθεσίᾳ, πλειστής μάχης καὶ τραχύχες πληρεῖς ἀποδεικνύει ὁ δὲ εἰς ἀπείρου ἐκβάλλων οὐκ ἐκ βεβαιοῦσθαι τὸ ἐπωθοῦμεν, διὰ τὸ ἀλλὸ ἀπ᾽ ἄλλου τὴν πίστιν λαμβάνειν καὶ οὕτως εἰς ἀπείρον. 89. ὁ δὲ πρὸς τι οὐδέν φησι καθ᾽ ἑαυτὸ λαμβάνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ μεθ᾽ ἑτέρου. οὐθεν ἀγνωστα εἶναι. ὁ δ᾽ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως τρόπος συνισταται, οἰομένων τινῶν τὰ πρὸς τοῦ παραγμάτων αὐτῶν δεῖν λαμβάνειν ὡς πιστὰ καὶ μὴ αἰτείσθαι ὁ ἐστὶ μάταιον τὸ ἐναντίον γὰρ τις ὑποθέσεται. ὁ δὲ διὰ ἀλλήλων τρόπος συνιστάται ὅταν τὸ ὑφέλουν τοῦ ἐπωθοῦμεν πράγματος εἶναι βεβαιωτικὸν χρείαν ἐχεῖ τῆς ἐκ τοῦ ἐπωθοῦμεν πίστεως, οἷον εἰ τὸ εἶναι πόρους τις βεβαιῶν διὰ τὸ ἀπορροίας γίνεσθαι, αὐτοὺς παραλαμβάνοι πρὸς βεβαιώσιν τοῦ ἀπορροίας γίνεσθαι.
same way when it is in mid-sky. And the same body appears in a certain way when in the forest, and differently on an open field. How an image looks depends on how it is placed, just as how the neck of a dove looks depends on how it is turned. Since we cannot perceive these things apart from places or positions, their nature is unknown.

The Eighth Mode is the one that pertains to the quantities of things, or their warmth or coldness, their fastness or slowness, their lack or variety of coloration. Thus moderate amounts of wine strengthen the body, but too much makes it slack; the same applies to nourishment and similar things.

87. The Ninth Mode is about the regular, the strange, and the rare. Earthquakes, for example, do not evoke wonder where they happen all the time; nor does the sun, since it is seen every day. Favorinus lists the Ninth Mode as the eighth, but Sextus and Aenesidemus list it as the tenth; but Sextus also refers to the Tenth as the eighth, whereas Favorinus lists it as the ninth.

The Tenth Mode concerns things that are compared to each other, such as the light compared to the heavy, the strong to the weak, more to less, up to down. For instance what is on the right is not on the right by nature, but it is thought of this way according to its position vis-à-vis something else; if this other thing were to change its position, it would no longer be on the right. 88. Similarly both father and brother are relative to something, and day is relative to the sun, and everything is relative to thought. Thus relative things in themselves are unknown. These are then the Ten Modes.

But those in Agrippa’s circle posit another Five Modes: one that argues from Disagreement, one from Infinite Regress, one from Relativity, one from Hypothesis, and one from Reciprocity. The mode from Disagreement exposes any question put forward among philosophers or in ordinary life as full of utmost conflict and complete confusion. The mode from Infinite Regress does not permit that which is under investigation to be established, because one thing receives its credibility from another and so on ad infinitum. 89. The mode from Relativity says that nothing is apprehended by itself, but always with something else. Therefore it declares these matters unknown. The mode from Hypothesis is introduced in response to those who believe that one should take as trustworthy the starting-points of things straightaway, rather than put them into question. But this is pointless: someone else will set up the opposite hypothesis. The mode from Reciprocity comes up when that which should confirm the matter under investigation is itself in need of being confirmed by the very thing that is investigated, as when some-
90. ἀνῄρουν δ’ οὕτω καὶ πάσαν ἀπόδειξιν καὶ κριτήριον καὶ σημείον καὶ αἴτιον καὶ κίνησιν καὶ μάθησιν καὶ γένεσιν καὶ τὸ φύσει τι εἶναι ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν. πάσα γὰρ ἀπόδειξις, φασίν, ἢ ἐξ ἀποδειγμένων σύγκειται χρημάτων ἢ ἐξ ἀναποδεικτῶν. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐξ ἀποδειγμένων, κάκεινα δείσται τινος ἀποδείξεως καντεύθεν εἰς ἀπειρόν· εἰ δὲ ἐξ ἀναποδεικτῶν, ἦτοι πάντων ἢ τινῶν ἢ καί ἐνός μόνου δισταζόμενο, καὶ τὸ ὁλὸν εἶναι ἀναποδεικτὸν. εἰ δὲ δοκεῖ, φασίν, ὑπάρχειν τινὰ μηδεμίὰς ἀποδείξεως δεόμενα, τὸ ὅλον εἴναι ἀναπόδεικτο. εἰ δὲ δοκεῖ, φασίν, ἃνευτὸς τῆς γνώμης, εἰ μὴ συνιᾶσιν ὅτι εἰς αὐτὸ τούτο πρῶτον, ἂς ἄρα ἐὰν αὐτῶν ἔχει τὴν πίστιν, ἀποδείξεως χρή. 91. οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸ τέτταρα εἶναι τὰ στοιχεῖα ἢ ἐξ ἀποδεδειγμένων, ὅτι πάντων ἢ τινῶν ἢ καὶ ἕνὸς μόνου δισταζόμενο, καὶ τὸ ὁλὸν εἶναι ἀναποδεικτὸν. εἰ δὲ δοκεῖ, φασίν, ὑπάρχειν τινὰ μηδεμίὰς ἀποδείξεως δεόμενα, τὸ ὅλον εἶναι ἀναπόδεικτο. εἰ δὲ δοκεῖ, φασίν, ἃνευτὸς τῆς γνώμης, εἰ μὴ συνιᾶσιν ὅτι εἰς αὐτὸ τούτο πρῶτον, ἂς ἄρα ἐὰν αὐτῶν ἔχει τὴν πίστιν, ἀποδείξεως χρή.

εὐθεῖας δὲ τοὺς δογματικοὺς ἀπέφαινον. τὸ γὰρ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως περαινόμενον οὐ σκέψεως ἀλλὰ τὸς θέσεως ἐγένετο λόγῳ. τοιοῦτω δὲ λόγῳ καὶ ύπέρ ἀδυνάτου ἐστὶν ἐπιχειρεῖν. 92. τοὺς δ’ οἰομένους μὴ δεῖν ἐκ τῶν κατὰ περιστασιν κρίνειν τάλθησις μηδ’ ἐκ τῶν παρὰ φύσιν νομοθετείν, ἔλεγον ταῦτοις μέτοχα τῶν πάντων ὁρίζειν, οὐχ ὄρθως ὅτι πάντα τὸ φαινόμενον κατὰ ἀντιπερίστασιν καὶ διάθεσιν φαίνεται. ἦτοι γοῦν πάντα ἀληθῆ όρθέον ἢ πάντα ψευδῆ. εἰ δ’ ἐνιαί ἐστιν ἀληθῆ, <ἐνιαὶ δὲ ψευδῆ>, τίνι διακρίτεο; οὗτο γὰρ αἰσθήσεις τὰ κατὰ αἰσθήσεις πάντων ἰσον αὐτή φαινομένων, οὗτο νοήσει διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν. ἀλλ’ δὲ παρὰ ταύτας εἰς ἐπίκρισιν δύναμις οὐχ ὀρᾶται.
one, seeking to confirm that there are pores by appealing to the occurrence of emanations, might adduce pores as confirmatory of there being emanations.

90. The skeptics did away with every proof, criterion, sign, cause, movement, field of learning, process of becoming, and the supposition that anything is by nature good or bad. For, they say, every proof is founded either on things that have been demonstrated or on things that admit of no proof. If a proof is based on things that have been demonstrated, then those too will require some proof, and so on ad infinitum. If it is based on things that admit no proof, with all or some or just one of these things being in doubt, then, they say, the whole point that one seeks to prove is itself indemonstrable. And, according to the skeptics, if it seems to some that there are things needing no proof, then those people are astounding because of their mindset. For, they do not realize that one needs proof first of all with regard to the very assumption that some things have credibility in themselves. 91. And indeed, that there are four elements cannot be derived from there being four elements. What is more, the skeptics say, when proofs about specific points become unconvincing, proof in general also becomes suspect. There must be a criterion, so that we may recognize that there is a proof. And there must be a proof, so that we may recognize that there is a criterion. Hence, they say, each of these things is beyond our grasp, since each depends on the other. How might things that are not evident be cognized if their proof is unknown? Whether things appear a certain way is not the subject of investigation, according to the skeptics, but rather whether in reality they are such.

The skeptics exposed the naiveté of those who hold doctrines. For, whatever is concluded from a hypothesis derives its argumentative force not from investigation, but merely from positing something. With an argument founded on a posited premise, it is possible to undertake proof even of the impossible. 92. As for those who suppose that one must not judge the truth on the basis of circumstantial factors, nor to frame laws on the basis of things that are against nature, the skeptics used to say that these people determine for them the standards of all things without seeing that every appearance seems as it does according to its context and state. It must be admitted, then, that all things are true, or that all things are false. If some things are true <and some false>, by what means ought one to make the judgment? One ought not to judge things that are sensible by means of sense perception, since to sense-perception all things appear equal, nor should one judge by
ὁ οὖν, φασί, περὶ τινὸς διαβεβαιούμενος αἰσθητοῦ ἢ νοητοῦ πρότερον ὁφείλει τὰς περὶ τούτων δόξας καταστήσας· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ταῦτα, οἱ δὲ ταῦτα ἀνηρήκασι. 93. δεῖ δὲ ἢ δὲ αἰσθητοῦ ἢ νοητοῦ κριθήναι, ἐκάστερα δὲ ἀμφισβητεῖται. οὕ τοι ποιητῶν ἢ νοητῶν ἐπικρίνει δόξας· εἰ τε διὰ τὴν ἐν ταῖς νοήσεσι μάχην ἀπιστητέον πάσιν, ἀναιρεθήσεται τὸ μέτρον ὧν δοκεῖ τὰ πάντα διακριβοῦσθαι· πάντων οὖν ὑπήρχοντα. ἦτι, φασίν, ὁ συζητῶν ἀμφισβητεῖ τὰς αἰσθητῶν ἢ νοητῶν δόξας· εἰ δὲ αὐτὸς πιστός τὸ φαινόμενον λέγειν, ὡς γὰρ αὐτὸς πιστός τὸ φαινόμενον λέγων, οὕτω καὶ ὁ ἐναντίος· εἰ δὲ ἀπιστος, καὶ αὐτὸς ἀπιστηθῆσεται τὸ φαινόμενον λέγων.

94. τὸ τε πείθον οὐχ ὑποληπτέον ἀληθὲς ὑπάρχειν· οὐ γὰρ πάντας τὸ αὐτὸ πείθειν οὐδὲ τοὺς αὐτοὺς συνεχές. γίνεται δὲ καὶ παρὰ τὸ ἐκτὸς ἢ πιθανότης, ἢ παρὰ τὸ ἐνδοχόν τοῦ λέγοντος ἢ παρὰ τὸ φροντιστικὸν ἢ παρὰ τὸ αἰμύλον ἢ παρὰ τὸ φαινόμενον λέγοντος ἢ παρὰ τὸ σύνηθες ἢ παρὰ τὸ καταληπτικὸν λόγῳ.

ἀνήσουν δὲ καὶ τὸ κριτήριον λόγω τοιώδε. ἦτοι κέκριται καὶ τὸ κριτήριον ἢ ἀκριτών ἐστιν. ἀλλ’ εἰ μὲν ἄκριτων ἐστιν, ἀπίστων καθέστηκε καὶ διημάρτηκε τοῦ ἀληθοῦς καὶ συνεχές· εἰ δὲ κέκριται, ἐν τῶν κατὰ μέρος γενήσεται κρινομένων, ἀν τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ κρίνοι καὶ κρίνοιτο τὸ κεκόρος κριτήριον υφ’ ἑτέρου κριθήσεται κάκεινο ὑπὸ ἄλλου καὶ οὕτως εἰς ἀπειρον.

95. πρὸς τῶς καὶ διαφωνεῖσθαι τὸ κριτήριον, τῶν μὲν τὸν ἀνθρωπον κριτήριον εἶναι λέγοντων, τῶν δὲ τὰς αἰσθήσεις, ἀλλὰς τὸν λόγον, ἔνιοι τὴν καταληπτικὴν φαντασίαν. καὶ ὁ μὲν ἀνθρωπος καὶ πρὸς αὐτὸν διαφωνεῖ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους, ὡς δὴ λογεῖ τῶν διαφόρων.
means of the intellect for the same reason. But besides these two faculties, another faculty for judgment is not available.

According to the skeptics, the man who holds a firm view concerning something sense-perceptible or something that can be thought of must first review his beliefs concerning these things. For, some men have rejected some beliefs, and others have rejected others. We are obliged to make judgments going by either what we perceive or what we think, but both what we perceive and what we think are subject to dispute. Therefore it is not possible for us to reach a definitive judgment about something sense-perceptible or something that can be thought of. And, if trust in all things is impossible because of the conflict in our thoughts, this will do away with the standard by which it appears that all things are precisely determined. People will, then, consider everything equal. Besides, the skeptics say, the person who examines with us a given appearance is either trustworthy or not. If he is trustworthy, he will have nothing to say against the person to whom the contrary appears. For just as the person accounting for a given appearance is trustworthy, so too is the person who gives the opposite account. If he is not trustworthy, then he will not gain credence when he gives an account of an appearance.

One must not assume, according to the skeptics, that the convincing is true. For, the same thing does not convince all people, nor does it convince the same people all the time. Convincingness is also dependent on something external, or on the reputation of the person who makes a particular claim, or on our thought-process, or on something that seduces us, or that feels familiar to us, or that has given us pleasure.

The skeptics did away with the criterion with the following kind of argument. Either the criterion has already been discerned, or it is undiscovered. If it is undiscovered, it is untrustworthy and does not track either truth or falsehood. If it has already been discerned, it will be one of those particular things that are discerned, with the result that one and the same thing would both discern and be discerned, the criterion we use to discern something will be in turn discerned by another criterion, and this other criterion will in turn be discerned by yet another, and so on ad infinitum.

In addition, according to the skeptics, there is disagreement about the criterion, since some people claim that man is the criterion, whereas others say that it is the senses, and others nominate reason, and some the cognitive impression. But man disagrees both with himself and with other men, as is evident from different customs and habits. The
πων νόμων καὶ ἐθῶν. αἱ δὲ αἰσθήτεις ψεύδονται, οὗ δὲ λόγος διάφωνος. ἡ δὲ καταληπτικὴ φαντασία ὑπὸ νοῦν κρίνεται καὶ ὁ νοῦς ποικίλως τρέπεται. ἄγνωστον οὖν ἐστὶ τὸ κριτήριον καὶ διὰ τούτο ἡ ἀλήθεια.

96. σημείον τε οὐκ εἶναι εἰ γὰρ ἑστι, φασί, σημείον, ἦτοι αἰσθήτων ἐστιν ἢ νοητόν· αἰσθήτων μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἐστίν, ἐπεὶ τὸ αἰσθητὸν κοινὸν ἐστι, τὸ δὲ σημεῖον ἄνθρωπον καὶ τὸ μὲν αἰσθητὸν <τῶν> κατὰ διαφοράν, τὸ δὲ σημεῖον τῶν πρῶτ θ. νοητῶν δὲ οὐκ ἐστίν, ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἐστὶν ὁτι φαινόμενον ἐστὶ φαινόμενον ἢ αφανές ἢ αφανεῖς φαινομένοι· οὔδὲν δὲ τούτων ἐστιν· οὐκ ἀρά ἐστι σημείον. φαινόμενον μὲν οὖν φαινόμενον οὐκ ἐστίν, ἐπεὶ τὸ φαινόμενον οὐ δεῖσαι σημείῳ ἢ αφανεῖς δὲ αφανεῖς οὐκ ἐστίν, ἐπεὶ δὲ φαίνεσθαι τὸ ἐκκαλυπτόμενον ὑπὸ τίνος· 97. αφανές δὲ φαινομένου οὐ δύναται, καθότι δὲ φαίνεσθαι τὸ ἐτέρῳ παρέξον ἀφορμήν καταλήψεως· φαινόμενον δὲ αφανεῖς οὐκ ἐστίν, ὅτι τὸ σημείον τῶν πρῶτον τοῦ συγκαταλαμβάνεσθαι τὸ οὐδὲν ἐστὶ σημείον, τὸ δὲ εἰ μὴ ἐστίν, οὔδὲν ἄν τῶν ἀδήλων καταλαμβάνοιτο· διά γὰρ τῶν σημείων λέγεται τὰ ἀδήλα καταλαμβάνεσθαι.

ἀναφοροῦσι δὲ τὸ αἰτιόν ὡς· τὸ αἰτιόν τῶν πρῶτον τοῦ ἑστι πρὸς γὰρ τῷ αἰτιατῳ ἐστὶ τά δὲ πρὸς τι ἐπινοεῖται μόνον, ὑπάρχει δὲ οὐκ καὶ τὸ αἰτιόν οὐκ ἐπινοεῖτο ἀν μόνον. 98. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐςτίν αἰτιόν, ὦ φαίνει τί οὐ λέγεται αἰτιόν, ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἐστι αἰτιόν· καὶ ὅπερ ὁ πατὴρ, μὴ παρόντος τοῦ πρῶτον ὁ λέγεται πατὴρ, οὐκ ἄρα πατήρ, ὤν ὁτι δὲ καὶ τὸ αἰτιόν· οὐ πάρεστι δὲ πρὸς ὁ νοεῖται τὸ αἰτιόν· οὔτε γὰρ γένεσις οὔτε φθορὰ οὔτε ἄλλῳ τι οὐκ ἀρά ἐστιν αἰτιόν.

καὶ μὴν εἰ ἐστιν αἰτιόν, ἦτοι σῶμα σώματος ἐστίν αἰτιόν· ἥ αἰσθήσεως ἁπάντων ἡ σωμάτων σωμάτων· ἡ σώμα αἰσθήσεως· οὐδὲν δὲ τούτοις· οὐκ ἀρά ἐστιν αἰτιόν. σῶμα μὲν οὖν σώματος οὐκ ἄν εἰς αἰτιόν, ἐπείπερ ἀμφότερα τήν αὐτήν ἐχει φύσιν. καὶ εἰ τὸ ἐτερον αἴ-
senses mislead, and reason is discordant. The cognitive impression is judged by the mind, and the mind turns in intricate ways. Accordingly, the criterion is unknown, and hence truth too is unknown.\(^\text{117}\)

96. The skeptics say as well that there is no sign. For, if there is a sign, they say, it would be either sense-perceptible or intelligible. However it is not sense-perceptible, since the perceptible is common to all, whereas the sign is something particular.\(^\text{118}\) And the perceptible belongs to <the things that are> distinct from one another, whereas the sign is relative. Nor is a sign apprehended by the mind. Since it is not <... > apprehended by the mind, it is either an apparent sign of something apparent, or a non-apparent sign of something non-apparent, or a non-apparent sign of something apparent, or an apparent sign of something non-apparent. But a sign is none of these. Therefore there is no sign.\(^\text{119}\)

To be sure, there is no apparent sign of something apparent, since something that is already apparent does not require a sign. Nor is there a non-apparent sign of something non-apparent, since that which is hidden needs to be made apparent by something.\(^\text{120}\) 97. A non-apparent sign of something apparent is impossible, inasmuch as that which is going to offer to something else the resources for apprehension must itself be apparent. And there is no apparent sign of a non-apparent thing, because a sign, since it is one of the relative things\(^\text{121}\), ought to be comprehended together with the thing of which it is a sign. Otherwise, none of the unclear things would be comprehended, because it is through signs, so it is said, that the unclear things are comprehended.

The skeptics do away with cause in the following way:\(^\text{122}\) Cause is one of the relative things, since cause relates to what is caused by it. But, according to the skeptics, relative things are only thought of, and do not exist.\(^\text{123}\) And thus cause would be only conceived of in the mind. 98. Besides, if there is cause, it ought to contain the thing of which it is said to be the cause, since otherwise it will not be the cause.\(^\text{124}\) Just as the father, absent the child in relation to whom he is said to be a father, would not be a father, so too it is with cause. But that in relation to which the cause is conceived is not present. For neither coming-into-being, nor destruction, nor any such thing, is present. There is, then, no cause.

Moreover, if there is cause, then either something corporeal is the cause of something corporeal, or an incorporeal is the cause of an incorporeal, <or an incorporeal is the cause of a corporeal, or a corporeal is the cause of an incorporeal>.\(^\text{125}\) But none of these is the case. Cause, then, does not exist. Indeed, a corporeal could not be the cause of another
τιον λέγεται παρ’ όσον ἐστὶ σῶμα, καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν σῶμα ὃν αἴτιον γενήσεται. 99. κοινῶς δὲ ἀμφοτέρων αἰτίων ὄντων, οὐδὲν ἔσται τὸ πάσχον. ἀσώματον δὲ ἀσώματου οὐκ ἂν εἴη αἴτιον διὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον· ἀσώματον δὲ σώματος οὐκ ἔστιν αἴτιον, ἔπει οὐδὲν ἀσώματον ποιεῖ σῶμα. σῶμα δὲ ἀσώματου οὐκ ἂν εἴη αἴτιον, ὦτὸ τὸ γενόμενον τῆς πασχουσῆς ὑλῆς ὁφείλει εἶναι· μηδὲν δὲ πάσχον διὰ τὸ ἀσώματον εἰναι οὐδὲν ὑπὸ τινος γένοιτο· οὐκ ἂν ἐστὶ τὸ τῶν ὀλῶν ἀρχάς· δεῖ γὰρ εἶναι τι τὸ ποιοῦν καὶ δρών.

ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ κίνησις ἐστὶν τὸ γὰρ κινούμενον ὃτι ἐν ὦ ἔστιν ὑπὸ τῶν οντων καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν σῶμα ὕπο τὸ αἴτιον. 100. ἀνῄρουν δὲ καὶ μάθησιν. εἴπερ, φασί, διδάσκεται τι, ἢτοι τὸ ὅπου οὐδὲν κινεῖται· τὸ ὅπου οὐδὲν κινεῖται διὰ τὸν ἄσωμον αἰτίον, ὡστε οὐδὲ τὸ σώματος οὐκ ἂν οὐδὲν κινεῖται—οὐκ ἔστιν οὖν κίνησις.

οὐδὲ μὴν γένεσις ἐστὶ, φασίν. οὔτε γὰρ τὸ ὅπου γίνεται, ἢτο κακόν, οὔτε τὸ μὴ ὅπου, οὐδὲ γὰρ ὑφέστηκεν· τὸ δὲ μὴ ὑφέστηκε· ὅπερ οὐκ ἐνδεχόμενόν.
corporeal, since both have the same nature. If one of two corporeals is said to be the cause, to the extent that it is a corporeal entity, then the remaining corporeal entity, since it is a corporeal entity, will also become a cause. 99. And if both are jointly causes, there will be nothing that is the thing acted upon. By the same argument, an incorporeal could not be the cause of an incorporeal. An incorporeal is not the cause of a corporeal, since nothing that is incorporeal makes something that is corporeal. And a corporeal entity could not be the cause of an incorporeal, because the thing that is brought into being ought to be of the matter that is acted on. 126 If it is in no way acted on because of its incorporeality, then it is not brought into being by anything else. Thus there is no cause. Entailed in this argument is that the first principles of the universe are without sure foundation. For what makes and acts on something else must be something.

And yet, according to the skeptics, there is no motion, either. For, something that is moved is moved either in the place where it is, or in the place where it is not. But no thing is moved either in the place where it is, or in the place where it is not. It is, then, not moved, and there is no movement.

100. The skeptics also did away with learning. If, as they say, something is taught, either that which is is taught through its being or that which is not is taught through its not-being. But neither is that which is taught through its being (for the nature of the things that are is apparent to all and recognized by all), nor is that which is not taught through its not-being. For nothing happens to something which is not, with the consequence that it is not taught, either.

And moreover, as the skeptics say, there is no coming-into-being. For neither does that which is come into being, because it is; nor does that which is not come into being, since it does not even exist. Something which does not exist and is not cannot succeed in coming into being.

101. The skeptics also deny that there is anything that is good or bad by nature. For if something is good or bad by nature, it should be good or bad to everyone, just as snow is cold to everyone. But nothing good or bad is common to all. There is, then, no thing that is good or bad by nature. The alternatives are to call “good” everything that anyone believes to be good, or not. But one ought not call “good” everything that anyone considers good, since the very thing that is considered good by one person, such as pleasure by Epicurus, is considered bad by someone else, like Antisthenes. The same thing will thus turn out to be both good and bad. If we were to say that not everything believed to be good by anyone is good, we will have to adjudicate between beliefs,
ἐστι διὰ τὴν ισοσθένειαν τῶν λόγων. ἀγνώστον οὖν τὸ φύσει ἀγαθόν.

102. ἐστὶ δὲ καὶ τὸν ὅλον τῆς συναγωγῆς αὐτῶν τρόπων συνιδεῖν ἐκ τῶν ἀπολειφθεισῶν συντάξεων. αὐτὸς μὲν γὰρ ὁ Πύρρων οὐδὲν ἀπέλιπτεν, οἱ μέντοι συνήθεις ἀπ' αὐτοῦ <…> Τίμων καὶ Αἰνεσίδημος καὶ Ναυσίφάνης καὶ Άλκατος τοιοῦτοι.

οἷς ἀντιλέγοντες οἱ δογματικοί φασιν αὐτοὺς καταλαμβάνεσθαι καὶ δογματίζειν ἐν ψυχόκυσμι διελέγχειν καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ κρατύνουσι καὶ δογματίζουσι. καὶ γὰρ ὅτε φασί 'μηδὲν ὀρίζειν' καὶ 'παντὶ λόγῳ' λόγον ἀντικείσθαι, αὐτὰ ταύτα καὶ ὀρίζονται καὶ δογματίζουσι.

πρὸς οὖς ἀποκρίνονται: 103. περὶ μὲν ψυχής ψυχής πάσχουσι, ὡμολογοῦμεν καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲν ἐστὶ καὶ πᾶς ὁ ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἀλλα πολλὰ τῶν ἔν τῷ βιώσαντίσκωμεν γινώσκομεν. τὰλλ᾽ οὔ τι περὶ μὲν οἱ δογματικοὶ διαβεβαιούνται τῷ λόγῳ, φάνειναν κατελήφθησαι, περὶ τούτων ἐπέχουσαν ἡς ἀδῆλων, μόνα δὲ τὰ πάθη γινώσκομεν, τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὅτι ὀρίζομεν ὡμολογοῦμεν καὶ [τὸ] ἢ τὸ τὸν νοοῦμεν, γινώσκομεν, πιθὲ δὲ ὀρίζομεν ἡ πῶς νοοῦμεν ἀγνοοῦμεν· καὶ ὁτι τὸ τὸν ἀνθρώπου καταλαμβάνονται διηγηματικῶς λέγομεν, οὐ διαβεβαιοῦμοι εἰ καὶ ὁντος εἰστι. 104. περὶ δὲ τῆς οὐδὲν ὀρίζων φανής καὶ τῶν ὀμοίων λέγομεν οὐ δογματίζοντες· οὐ γὰρ εἰσὶν ὡμοία τῷ λέγειν ἀπὸγραφής ἔστιν ὁ κόσμος. ἀλλὰ γὰρ τὸ μὲν ἀδηλόν, αἱ δὲ ἐξουσιοδοτόκες εἰσί· [τὸ μὲν ἀδηλόν] ἐν ψυχής λέγομεν μηδὲν ὀρίζειν, οὐδὲ αὐτὸ τούτο ὀρίζομεθα.

πάλιν οἱ δογματικοὶ φασὶ καὶ τὸν βίον αὐτοὺς ἀναφεύγειν, ἐν ψυχής ἐκφάθονεν ἐξ ἦν ὁ βίος συνείστηκεν. οἱ δὲ συνείσθε, ψυχής ἀναφεύγειν, ἀλλὰ τὸ πᾶς ὁ τοῦ ἀγνοεῖν. καὶ γὰρ τὸ φαινόμενον tibēmēthet, φωνῆς· ὑπὸ γὰρ τὸν μέν τῷ καὶ αἰσθητζομέθα· ιδέ δὲ φύσιν ἔχει καυστικήν ἐπέχουσαν. 105. καὶ ὅτι κοινοί τις βλέπομεν, καὶ ὅτι θείεται τῶς τὸ ταύτα γίνεται καὶ τὸ ἀγνοεῖν. μόνον οὖς, φασίν, αὐτούς ἀνθρώπως πρὸς τὰ παρυφιστάμενα τοὺς φαινόμενος ἄδηλα. καὶ γὰρ ὅτι τὴν εἰκόνα ἐξορεῖν λέγομεν ἔχειν, τὸ φαινόμενον διασαφοῦσε· ὅταν δὲ εἶπομεν μὴ ἔχειν αὐτὴν ἐξορεῖς, οὔκετι ὁ φαίνεται ἑτεροῦ δέ λέγομεν.
which is impossible because of the equal strength of arguments. Therefore what is good by nature is unknown.

102. It is possible to get an overview of the skeptics’ entire mode of reasoning from the treatises that they have left behind. Pyrrho himself left nothing behind, but his associates and followers, such as Timon, Aenesidemus, Numenius, Nausiphanes, and others like them.

In their counterarguments, those who hold doctrines say that the skeptics apprehend things and that they put forward doctrines. The reasoning behind this claim is that the skeptics apprehend something in the very moment they seem to refute a claim. And in that very same moment the skeptics insist on something and thereby put forward a doctrine. And when the skeptics say the expressions “nothing is determined” and “for every argument there is a counter-argument,” they determine these very points and put forward doctrines.

To these critics, the skeptics respond: 103. Concerning those things by which we as human beings are affected, we concede. For we acknowledge that there is day, and that we live, and many other things that appear in life. But concerning the things about which the dogmatists make affirmations, claiming that they have grasped them – concerning these things we suspend judgment on the grounds that they are non-evident, and we recognize only how we are affected. On the one hand, we admit that we see, and we recognize that we are thinking something. But we are ignorant about how we see and how we think. And we say in a purely descriptive fashion that “this is white”, but do not affirm whether it is also really white.

104. Concerning the expression, “I determine nothing”, and similar sayings, we speak in this way without putting forward doctrines. For these expressions are not like asserting that the cosmos is spherical. The latter is non-evident, whereas the former are mere acknowledgments. In saying that we determine nothing, we do not even determine this very thing.

In response, those who put forward doctrines claim that the skeptics do away even with life, insofar as they cast out all the things from which life is constituted. But the skeptics say that these critics engage in misrepresentation. For skeptics do not deny that seeing occurs, but they claim ignorance about how we see. For, we accept a given appearance, but not as if it also were such. We perceive that fire burns, but we refrain from declaring whether it has a burning nature. 105. And we see that someone is moving, and that he perishes. But we don’t know how these things occur. Thus, they say, we only take a stand against the non-evident things that subsist beside the appearances. For when we say that an image has prominences, we are describing the appearance in clear
ὅθεν καὶ ὁ Τίμων ἐν τῷ Πύθωνὶ φησι μὴ ἐκβεβηκέναι τὴν συνήθειαν. καὶ ἐν τοῖς Ἰνδαλμοῖς οὕτω λέγει:

ἀλλὰ τὸ φαινόμενον πάντη σθένει οὕτως ἡ ἐλθή.
καὶ ἐν τοῖς Περὶ αἰσθήσεων φησι, 'τὸ μέλι ὅτι ἐστὶ γλυκὺ οὐ τίθημι, τὸ δὲ τὸ φαινόμενον ὁμολογώ.' 106. καὶ Αἰνεσίδημος ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν Πυρρωνείων λόγων οὐδέν φησιν ὁρίσει τὸν Πύρρωνα δογματικῶς διὰ τὴν ἀντιλογίαν, τοῖς δὲ φαινομένοις ἀκολουθεῖν. τάτα δὲ λέγει κἀν τῷ Κατὰ σοφίας κἀν τῷ Περὶ ζητήσεως. ἀλλὰ καὶ Ζεύς ὁ Αἰνεσίδημος γνώφιμος ἐν τῷ Περὶ διττῶν λόγων καὶ Ἀντίοχος ὁ Λαοδίκεως καὶ Ἀπελλάς ἐν τῷ Ἀρχιτατι κατακολούθει τὰ φαινόμενα μόνα. ἔστιν οὖν κριτήριον κατὰ τοὺς σκεπτικοὺς τὸ φαινόμενον, ὡς καὶ Αἰνεσίδημος φησιν' οὕτω δὲ καὶ Ἐπίκουρος. Δημόκριτος δὲ τὰ μὲν εἶναι τῶν φαινομένων, τὰ δὲ μὴ εἶναι.

107. πρὸς τούτῳ τὸ κριτήριον τῶν φαινομένων οἱ δογματικοὶ φασιν ὅτι ὅτε ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν διάφοροι προσπίπτουσι φαντασίαι, ὡς ἀπὸ τοῦ πύργου ἢ στρογγύλου ἢ τετραγώνου, ὁ σκεπτικὸς εἰ οὐδετέραν, ἀπρακτήσει· εἰ δὲ τῇ ἑτέρᾳ κατακολούθει, οὐκέτι τὸ ἑσοδινέται, φασί, τοῖς φαινομένοις ἀποδώσεί. πρὸς οὓς οἱ σκεπτικοὶ φασιν ὅτι ὅτε προσπίπτουσιν ἀλλοια φαντασίαι, ὡς καὶ ἐκεῖνος ἐφιάλεσθαι καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὰ φαινόμενα τιθέναι ὁπότε φαίνεται.

tέλος δὲ οἱ σκεπτικοὶ φασιν τὴν ἐποχήν, ὡς σκιάς τρόπον ἐπακολουθεῖ ἡ ἀταραξία, ὡς φασιν οἱ τε περὶ τοῦ Τίμωνα καὶ Αἰνεσίδημον. 108. οὔτε γὰρ τὰ δ’ ἐλευθερὰ ἢ ταύτα φεύγομεθα διὰ τοῦτο, οὐ δυνάμεθα φεύγειν τὸ πεινῆν καὶ διψῆν καὶ ἀλγεῖν· οὐκ ἔστι γὰρ λόγῳ περιελεῖν τὰ τούτα. λεγόντων δὲ τῶν δογματικῶν ὡς οὐ δυνήσεται βιοῦν οἱ σκεπτικοὶ μὴ φεύγων τοῦ, εἰ κελεύσθη, φασὶν, τοῖς βιωτικοῖς κατὰ τὴν συνήθειαν καὶ φεύγομεν καὶ νόμοις χρώμεθα. τινὲς δὲ καὶ τὴν ἀπάθειαν ἄλλοι δὲ τὴν πραότητα τέλος εἰπεῖν φασί τοὺς σκεπτικοὺς.
language. Whenever we say that it does not have prominences, we are no longer speaking of what appears, but of something else.

This is the reason why Timon in his *Pytho* avows that he has not stepped beyond customary norms. And he says the following in his *Appearances*:

“But appearance prevails everywhere it goes.”

And in his work *On Sense Perceptions* he says, “I do not posit that honey is sweet, but I concede that it seems so.”\(^{142}\) 106. And, in the first book of his *Pyrrhonian Arguments*, Aenesidemus says that Pyrrho determined nothing in a dogmatic fashion because of the opposition of arguments, but that he followed appearances.\(^{143}\) He says these things also in *Against Wisdom* and *Concerning Inquiry*. But Aenesidemus’ associate Zeuxis\(^{144}\) (in *Concerning Double Arguments*), Antiochus of Laodicea,\(^{145}\) and Apellas\(^{146}\) (in *Agrippa*) maintain that there are only appearances.\(^{147}\) Thus, according to the skeptics, that which appears is the criterion. Aenesidemus says this, and so does Epicurus.\(^{148}\) But Democritus claims that some things that appear are, and that other things that appear are not.

107. With regard to this criterion that is based on appearances, those who put forward doctrines claim that, when impressions from the same things turn out to be different, such as impressions from a circular or square tower, the skeptic will do nothing if he does not favor one impression in his judgment. But, if he goes along with one of the impressions, they claim, he will no longer be giving equal weight to all that appears to him. In response, the skeptics say that, when impressions of different sorts occur, we will say that both impressions appear.\(^{149}\) They add that, because of this, they posit appearances as, at a given time, they appear.

The skeptics say that their end is suspension of judgment,\(^{150}\) which, as those in the circles of Timon and Aenesidemus claim,\(^{151}\) is accompanied by peace of mind as if by its own shadow. 108. For we will not pursue these things or avoid those things that are in our sphere of influence.\(^{152}\) We are not able to avoid those things that are not influenced by how we deal with them, but that occur according to necessity, such as hunger and thirst and pain. For it is not possible to cancel out these things with argument. The dogmatists allege that the skeptic will not be able to live without refusing to butcher his father, should he be ordered to do so. The skeptics say that they will be able to live, suspending judgment on matters studied by the dogmatists\(^{+}\), but not on matters that pertain to ordinary life and its observances. As a consequence, we both pursue something and avoid something else according to common usage, and we rely on laws. Others say that the skeptics claim that their
109. Ἀπολλωνίδης ὁ Νικαεὺς ὁ παρ᾿ ἡμῶν ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν Εἰς τοὺς Σίλλους ὑπομνήματι, ἃ προσφωνεῖ ἡμῖν ἐν τῷ Τιμῶνα εἶναι πατρός μὲν Τιμάρχον, Φλάσιον δὲ τὸ γένος· νέον δὲ καταλειφθέντα χθεσεὶν, ἔπειτα καταγαγόντα ἀποδημήσαι εἰς Μέγαρα πρὸς Στίλπναν· κάκεινων συνδιατρίφαντα αὐθείς ἐπανελθείν σάρκας καὶ γῆμαι. εἶτα πρὸς Πύρρωνα εἰς Ἡλίν ἀποδημήσαι μετὰ <τῆς> γυναικὸς κάκει διατριβεῖν ἐώς αὐτῷ παιδεῖς ἐγένοντο, ἣν τὸν μὲν πρεσβύτερον Ζάνθον ἐκάλεσε καὶ ἰατρικὴν ἐδίδαξε καὶ διάδοχον τοῦ βίου κατέλιπεν 110. (ὁ δὲ ἐλλόγιμος ἦν, ὡς καὶ Σωτίων ἐν τῷ ἑν· δεκάτῳ ψηφίοις). ἀπορῶν μέντοι τροφῶν ἀπῆρεν εἰς τὸν Ἐλλησποντὸν καὶ τὴν Προποντίδα· ἐν Χαλκηδώνι τοιοῦτοι εἰς σοφιστεύον ἐπὶ πλέον ἀποδοχής ἤξιώθη· ἐντεῦθεν τε πορισάμενος ἀπῆρεν εἰς Ἀθήνας, κάκει διετριβεῖ μέχρι καὶ τελευτῆς, ὅλουν χρόνον εἰς Θήβας διαδραμών. ἐγνώσθη δὲ καὶ Ἄντιγγον τῷ βασιλεί καὶ Πτολεμαίῳ τῷ Φιλαδέλφῳ, ὡς αὐτὸς ἐν τοῖς ἑαυτοῖς αὐτῷ μαρτυρεῖ.

hydrate ἦν δὲ, φησιν ὁ Ἀντίγγονος, καὶ φιλοπότης καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν φιλοσοφῶν <ei> σχολάζοι ποίηματα συνέγραψε· καὶ γὰρ καὶ ἔπει τὸν καὶ τραγῳδίας καὶ σατύρους (καὶ δράματα κομικὰ τριάκοντα, τὰ δὲ τραγικά ἐξήκοντα) σύλλοις τε καὶ κιναιδοῖς. 111. φέρεται δὲ αὐτοῦ καὶ καταλογάδην βιβλία εἰς ἐπῶν τείνοντα μυριάδας δύο, ὅποια ἂν καὶ Ἀντίγγονος ὁ Καρποσίας μέμηται, ἀναγεγραφῶς αὐτοῦ καὶ αὐτὸς τὸν βίον. τὸν δὲ Σιλλών τριὰ ἐστὶν, ἐν οἷς ὡς ἂν σκεπτικὸς ὄν πάντας λοιποὺς καὶ συλλαίνει τοὺς δογμάτικους ἐν παραδίας εἰδεί. ἃν ὁ μὲν πρῶτον αὐτοδιήγητον ἔχει τὴν ἔμμηνειαν, τὸ δὲ δεύτερον καὶ τρίτον ἐν διάλογου σχήματι. φαίνεται γοῦν ἄνακρινων Ξενοφάνη τὸν Κολοφώνιον περὶ ἐκάστων, ὁ δὲ αὐτῷ διηγούμενος ἐστί· καὶ ἐν μὲν τὸ δεύτερον περὶ τῶν ἀρχαιοτέρων, ἐν δὲ τῷ τρίτῳ περὶ τῶν υστέρων θέου δὴ αὐτῶς τινες καὶ Ἑπίλογον ἐπέγραψε. 112. τὸ δὲ πρῶτον ταῦτα περιέχει πράγματα, πλὴν ὅτι μονοπρόσωπος ἐστίν ἡ ποίησις· ἀρχὴ δ‘ αὐτῷ ἦδη·

ἔσπετε νῦν μοι ὅσοι πολυπράγμονες ἔστε σοφισταί.
end is lack of suffering, while still others say that they claim evenness as their end.

Timon

109. Apollonides of Nicaea, who is one of our own, in the first book of On the Silloi, which he dedicates to Tiberius Caesar, says that Timon was the son of Timarchus and a Phliasian by birth. According to Apollonides, Timon, after being orphaned as a boy, used to dance; then, when he developed contempt for this profession, he went to Megara as a student of Stilpon. After associating with Stilpon, Timon returned home again and got married. Then he left town once more with his wife and headed to Pyrrho in Elis; he spent time there until his children were born. He called the elder child Xanthus and taught him medicine and left him as his heir.

110. (Xanthus was held in high regard, as Sotion also says in his eleventh book.) Because he was having difficulty supporting himself, Timon sailed away to the Hellespont and Propontis. Giving lectures in Chalcedon he enjoyed an increasingly favorable reception. Journeying from there he went to Athens, where he stayed until his death, except for the short time he spent in Thebes. He was known to King Antigonus and Ptolemy Philadelphus, as he himself attests for himself in his iambic verses.

Timon was fond of drink, as Antigonus relates, and <if> he was at leisure away from philosophers, he composed poems, and in fact he composed epics and tragedies as well as satyr-plays (thirty comedies and sixty tragedies), and Silloi and Bottoms. 111. There are also prose works of his in circulation, running to 20,000 lines, which Antigonus of Carystus also mentions in his own account of Timon's life. There are three books of Silloi, in which he adopts the manner of a skeptic in order to abuse everyone and mock those who put forth theories in a parodic style. The first book presents a narration in the first person, whereas the second and third books are in a dialogue format. Timon appears in the second and third books as the questioner of Xenophanes of Colophon concerning each of the philosophers, and Xenophanes is made to respond to him with detailed accounts. In the second book, the examination concerns the older philosophers; the third deals with more recent thinkers, which is why some have also titled it The Epilogue. 112. The first book encompasses the same matters, except for the fact that it is a poetic monologue. This is its first verse:

“Tell me now, all of you who are sophists, curious and prying.”
ἐτελεύτησε δὲ ἐγγὺς ἐτῶν ἐνενήκοντα, ὡς φησιν ὁ Ἀντίγονος καὶ Σωτίων ἐν τῷ ἑνδεκάτῳ. τούτον ἐγὼ καὶ ἐτερόφθαλμον ἤκουσα, ἐπεὶ καὶ αὐτὸς αὐτὸν Κύκλωτα ἐκάλει. γέγονε καὶ ἔτερος Τίμων ὁ μισάνθρωπος.

ὁ δὲ οὖν φιλόσοφος καὶ φιλόκηπος ἦν σφόδρα καὶ ἰδιοπράγμων, ὡς καὶ Ἀντίγονος φησι. λόγος γοῦν εἰπεῖν Ἰερόνυμον τὸν περιπατητικὸν ἐπ’ αὐτοῦ, ‘ὡς παρὰ τοὺς Σκύθας καὶ οἱ φεύγοντες τοξεύουσι καὶ οἱ διώκοντες, οὕτω τῶν φιλοσόφων οἱ μὲν διώκοντες θηρόσι τούτως σημάδια, οἱ δὲ φεύγοντες, καθάπερ καὶ ὁ Τίμων.’

113. ἦν δὲ καὶ ζύξιος νοῆσαι καὶ διαμυκτήσαι· φιλογράμματός τε καὶ τοῖς ποιηταῖς μύθους γράψαι ἤκαπη καὶ δράματα συνδιατιθέναι. μετεδίδου δὲ τῶν τραγῳδιῶν Ἀλεξάνδρῳ καὶ Ὑμήρῳ. θορυβοῦμεν τε ὑπὸ τῶν θεραπαινῶν καὶ κυνῶν ἐποίει μηδέν, σπουδάζων περὶ τὸ ἠρεμάζειν. φασὶ δὲ καὶ Ἄρατον πυθέσθαι αὐτοῦ ὡς τὴν Ὑμήρου ποίησιν ἀσφαλῆ κτῆσαι τοῦ δὲ εἰπεῖν, ‘εἰ τοῖς ἀρχαίοις ἀντιγραφοῖς εντυγχάνοι καὶ μὴ τοῖς ἠδὲ διωρθωμένοις.’ εἰκῇ τε αὐτῷ ἔκειτο τὰ ποιήματα, ἐνίοτε ἡμίβρωτα· 114. ὥστε καὶ Ζωπύρῳ τῷ ῥήτορι ἀναγινώσκειν καὶ κατὰ τὸ ἐπελθὸν διεξιέναι· ἐλθόντα δὲ ἐφ’ ἡμισείας, οὕτως εὑρεῖν τὸ ἀπόσπασμα τέως ἀγνοοῦντα συνῆλθεν ἀτταγᾶς τε καὶ νουμήνιος. εἰώθει δὲ καὶ παίζειν τοιαῦτα. πρὸς τὸν θαυμάζοντα πάντα ἐφη, ‘τί δ’ οὖν θαυμάζεις ὅτι τρεῖς ὄντες τέτταρας ἔχομεν ὀφθαλμούς;’ ἦν δ’ αὐτὸς τοὺς ἐτερόφθαλμος καὶ ὁ Διοσκουρίδης μαθητής αὐτοῦ, καὶ ὁ πρὸς ὅν ἐλεγεν χιλιόν. 115. ἐρωτηθεῖς δὲ ποτὲ ὑπὸ Ἀρκεσίλαον διὰ τὶ παρεῖ ἐκ Θηβῶν, ἐφη, ‘ἐν’ ὕμας ἀναπεταμένους ὀρὸν γελῶ.’ ὁμως δὲ καθαπτόμενος τῷ Ἀρκεσίλαον ἐν τοῖς Σίλλοις ἐπήνεκεν αὐτόν ἐν τῷ ἐπιγραφομένῳ Ἀρκεσίλαον περιδείπνῳ.
Timon was almost 90 years old when he died, according to Antigonus and Sotion in the eleventh book. I personally heard that Timon was also one-eyed, since even he used to call himself "the Cyclops." There was also another Timon known as "the misanthrope." 168

The philosopher Timon was a passionate lover of gardens who kept to himself,169 as Antigonus says as well. There is at any rate a story that Hieronymus170 the Peripatetic said the following about him: "Just as among the Scythians171 both those in flight and the pursuers shoot arrows, so among the philosophers some hunt after students by pursuing them, others, like Timon, by shunning them."

113. He was also quick at grasping something and at turning up his nose in disdain. A lover of literature, he was capable of writing stories for poets and of helping them compose plays, and he shared in the labors of the tragedians Alexander and Homer.172 When he was bothered by serving women and dogs he composed nothing, since being in a quiet state was important to him. They say that Aratus173 once asked Timon how he might get hold of Homer’s poetry in a sound text,174 and that Timon answered, "You can do that if you happen on the old editions and not the more recently corrected ones." Timon left his own poems lying about in disorder, sometimes half-eaten by mice. 114. As a result, they also say that, when he was once reading to Zopyrus175 the orator, Timon unfurled a scroll and proceeded to read what he found; when he was halfway through, he then discovered the torn-off part, having been in the meantime ignorant of its whereabouts. That is how indifferent he was. He went with the flow176 so much that he did not mind missing dinner.177 They say that, when he spotted Arcesilaus178 going through the Knavesmarket179, Timon said to him, "What are you doing here, where we free men are?" He was accustomed to remark to those who accept sense perceptions when the mind also bears witness, "The francolin and the curlew always fly together."180

Timon also used to make the following kind of joke. Toward the person who marveled at everything, he would say, "Why aren’t you surprised that the three of us have four eyes?" He himself was one-eyed, as was his student Dioscurides181, and the person he addressed was healthy. 115. When he was asked by Arcesilaus why he had come from Thebes, Timon responded, "So that I can have a good laugh while watching you all on full display." Nonetheless, though he upbraided Arcesilaus in the Silloi, he praised him <in> the work titled The Funeral Feast of Arcesilaus.
τούτου διάδοχος, ὡς μὲν Μηνόδοτός φησι, γέγονεν οὔδείς, ἄλλα
dιέλιπεν ἡ ἀγωγή ἐως αὐτὴν Πτολεμαῖος ὁ Κυρηναῖος ἀνεκτήσατο. ὡς δὲ Ἡπατείωνος φησι καὶ Σωτίων, διήκουσαν αὐτοῦ Διοσκουρίδης Κύπριος καὶ Νικόλοχος Ρόδιος καὶ Εὐφράνωρ Σελευκεύς Πραύλος τε ἀπὸ Τραῶδος, ὡς οὐτὸ καρτερικὸς ἐγένετο, καθὰ φησὶ Φύλαρχος ἰστορῶν, ὡστε ἀδίκως ὑπομεῖναι ὡς ἐπὶ προδοσία κολασθῆναι, μηδὲ ἀπὸ τούς πολίτας καταξιώσας.

116. Εὐφράνωρος δὲ διήκουσεν Ἐὔβουλος Ἀλεξανδρεύς, οὗ Πτολεμαῖος, οὗ Σαρπηδών καὶ Ἡρακλείδης, Ἡρακλείδου δὲ Αἰνεσίδημος Κυνόσιος, ὡς καὶ Πυρρωνείων λόγων ὁκτὼ συνέγραψε βιβλία· οὗ Ζευζίτης ὁ πολίτης, οὗ Ζευζίτης ὁ Γωνιόπους, ὡς Ἀντίοχος Λαοδικεύς ἀπὸ Δικού πτούτου δὲ Μηνόδοτος ὁ Νικομηδεύς, ἰατρός ἐμπειρικός, καὶ Θεωδάς Λαοδικεύς· Μηνοδότου δὲ Χρόνιους Ἀρίέως Ταρσεύς· Ἡροδότου δὲ διήκουσε Σέξτος ὁ ἐμπειρικός, οὗ καὶ τὰ δέκα τῶν Σκεπτικῶν καὶ ἄλλα κάλλιστα· Σέξτου δὲ διήκουσε Σατουρνίνος ὁ ἡκ-
θηνάς, ἐμπειρικός καὶ αὐτός.
As Menodotus\textsuperscript{182} relates, there was no successor\textsuperscript{183} of Timon, and his school of philosophy was in hiatus until Ptolemy\textsuperscript{184} of Cyrene resumed it. According to Hippobotus and Sotion\textsuperscript{185}, Diocurides\textsuperscript{186} of Cyprus and Nicolochus of Rhodes were his students, as were Euphranor of Seleucia and Praïlus from the Troad, who, as Phylarchus\textsuperscript{187} the historian relates, was full of such endurance that he withstood being unjustly punished on a charge of treason, deeming his fellow citizens worthy of not even a word.

116. Eubulus of Alexandria studied under Euphranor, and Ptolemy studied under Eubulus. Sarpedon and Heracleides studied under Ptolemy, and Aenesidemus of Cnossus, who compiled eight books of Pyrrhonian arguments, studied under Heracleides. Studying with Aenesidemus was his fellow citizen Zeuxippus, who in turn taught Zeuxis the crooked-footed; and Antiochus of Laodicea on the Lycus was Zeuxis’ student, while Menodotus of Nicomedeia, a doctor of the Empirical school, and Theiodas the Laodicean, learned studied under Antiochus. Herodotus son of Areius, from Tarsus, was the pupil of Menodotus, and following Herodotus was Sextus the Empiricist, who was also the author of the ten books of \textit{Skeptical Writings} and other very fine works. Saturninus the \textsuperscript{†} Cythenas \textsuperscript{†188}, an Empiricist as well, was a student of Sextus.
Diogenes Laertius’ report can be divided up into the following parts:

- 61–68: Pyrrho’s biography and main ideas
- 69–73: Pyrrho’s students and predecessors
- 74–78: Skeptical expressions and skeptical language
- 78–88: Ten Modes
- 88–89: Five Modes
- 90–102: Skeptic investigations
- 102–108: Anti-skeptical challenges and skeptical replies
- 109–166: Timon

### 61–68: Pyrrho’s biography and main ideas

Pyrrho’s life and thought are introduced through a mix of biographical data and reports about his philosophy. Some of Pyrrho’s proposals are illustrated by anecdotes. Thus much of what is said about his life, spanning from c. 360–270 BCE, does not refer to large-scale events. Rather, it refers to incidents that are considered indicative of Pyrrho’s thought. Pyrrho’s indifference is, presumably, visible in events such as Pyrrho cleaning the house or washing a pig. His unaffectedness is illustrated, for example, by an incident where Pyrrho passed by the drowning Anaxarchus, not stopping to help. His suspension of judgment regarding perceptual appearances is dramatically evident in a scene where friends have to save him from traffic in the street. Cumulatively, these and similar anecdotes fashion Pyrrho into a sage-like figure. His vita displays further features otherwise ascribed to wise men, most notably, that at some point he traveled to the East and that he was eventually made a chief priest in Elis. Moreover, the anecdotes bring out that Pyrrho’s philosophy is intended as a way of life. They contain the seeds of prominent anti-skeptical objections. First, the skeptics are said to be unable to live. This so-called Apraxia Charge argues that, if, for example, one does not make such perceptual judgments as ‘traffic is approaching’, one is likely to have an accident. Second, the skeptics’ indifference is not considered praiseworthy by critics. It may display exceptional tranquility to pass by a person in danger; but others may greatly prefer that one runs and helps, based on the belief that there is a drowning person. The opening paragraph of Diogenes’ report contains a quote that raises a major difficulty in interpreting early Pyrrhonian skepticism. A claim is ascribed to Pyrrho that is arguably dogmatic. Pyrrho is presented as putting forward a thesis about value judgments, a thesis that he then extends to all other domains: matters are no-more-this-than-that, where this means that in reality they have neither of the conflicting properties that people ascribe to them. It is a much debated question whether Pyrrho can be saved from the ascription of a dogmatic, metaphysical position (Cf. Bett 2000, esp. 14–37; H. Thorsrud, *Ancient Scepticism* [Berkeley 2009]; S. H. Svavarsson, “Pyrrho and early Pyrrhonism”, in: Bett 2010, 36–57). [KMV]

#### §61

1 Diocles: Diocles of Magnesia (fl. 1st c. BCE) is credited with two works, *Compendium of Philosophers* and *On the Lives of Philosophers*, on which Diogenes Laertius relied for his *Lives and Opinions of Renowned Philosophers*. Our translation interprets καὶ Διοκλῆς as “Diocles among others” or “Diocles too.” [ES]

2 Apollodorus: Probably Apollodorus of Athens (c. 180–120 BCE), author of a work titled *Chronika*, which was an account in verse of Greek history from the fall of Troy to the 2nd c. BCE. [ES]
Alexander: Very likely Alexander of Miletus, also called Alexander 'Polyhistor'; fl. 1st c. BCE. [ES]

“studied under”: Literally, ‘heard’ or ‘listened to.’ We regularly translate forms of ἀκούω as ‘study under,’ ‘study with,’ or ‘was a student of;’ cf. §§ 69 and 116. [ES]

Bryson: Bryson of Achaea (fl. c. 330 BCE) may have been a pupil, not the son, of Stilpo of Megara (c. 380–300 BCE); F. Nietzsche, “Analecta Laertiana”, RhM 25 (1870) [217–31] 222, n. 1, proposed the emendation ἤκουσε Βρύσων ή Στίλπωνος (“he heard <lectures by> Bryson or Stilpo”). But Hicks 1925, 474–5, notes that “chronology seems to forbid the supposition that Pyrrho was a pupil of either Stilpo or Bryson.” [ES]

Anaxarchus: From Abdera; fl. 330–320 BCE. [ES]

gymnosophists: Literally, the ‘naked philosophers’ of India encountered by Alexander the Great on his eastern campaign. Cf. Plutarch, Life of Alexander 64.1–5 and The Alexander Romance 3.6. Pyrrho and Anaxarchus accompanied the army that Alexander led to Persia and India. [ES]

Magi: Members of a sacerdotal caste who served as advisers to the Persian king. [ES]

Ascanius of Abdera: Otherwise unattested. [ES]

Pyrrho is said to have introduced the approach of non-cognition and suspension of judgment (epochê). The former is a core notion in Stoic epistemology. Cognitive impressions are the Stoic criterion of truth. Much of the critical exchanges between Academic skeptics and Stoics turn on the question of whether there are any impressions of this sort. Moreover, the Stoics formulate the epistemic norm that one should assent only to cognitive impressions. The Academics argue that, as long as there are no such impressions, one will find oneself suspending judgment. This is, in brief, how the notions of cognition (katalêpsis) and suspension of judgment relate. The Academic skeptics employ both of these terms, borrowing Stoic vocabulary in their non-dogmatic manner. That is, they employ these terms without thereby endorsing any theories or without themselves issuing epistemic norms. Pyrrhonian and Academic skepticism share this so-called ‘dialectical’ mode of co-opting dogmatic premises. [KMV]

Pyrrho is said to have claimed that nothing is fine or shameful, or just or unjust, and that similarly in the case of all things nothing is in truth (this or that), but that men do all things by custom and habit. Our translation supplies “this or that,” for otherwise the idea would be that according to Pyrrho “nothing is in truth.” That could be read, probably misleadingly, in an existential way, as if Pyrrho suggested that nothing really exists. Pyrrho is said to have argued that each thing is no more “this” than “that” (literally “not rather this than this”). Ou mallon is an expression that goes back to Democritus, and that can be understood in different ways. Pyrrho seems to employ it in dogmatic fashion. He seems to have held the view that if something is judged to be F and F* by different people (or in different contexts, etc.), it neither is F nor F*; this is expressed as the view that it is no more F than F*. Later skeptics see this as a dogmatic position, in tension with suspension of judgment. In later Pyrrhonian skepticism, suspension of judgment does not mean that one refrains from ascribing one of several conflicting properties to X because X is neither F nor F*. It means that one does not hold a view, and is likely to continue to investigate whether X is F, or F*, or neither F nor F*, or both F and F*. [KMV]

Our translation construes τῷ βίῳ as a dative of respect. [ES] It is difficult to determine in which sense Pyrrho is said to be ‘consistent.’ Presumably, he is consistent in not departing from his attitude of indifference, and generally not being impressed by whatever happens. Perhaps he was also considered consistent in a more ambitious manner, inspired by other Hellenistic conceptions of consistency. In Stoic ethics, a consistent life is such that one’s actions are perfectly based on knowledge and thereby...
attuned to the way the world is. Arguably, Pyrrho takes his indifference to capture the way in which things are “no more this-than-that”. If so, he might be considered consistent in the latter, stronger sense. [KMV]

13 Antigonus: fl. c. 240 BCE; Antigonus lived in Athens and was connected with the Academy. Our translation, “those around Antigonus” is literal. The phrase οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἀντίγονον can be taken to mean “Antigonus and his circle” or “those who agree with Antigonus”; it might also be interpreted as a periphrastic expression that simply means “Antigonus.” For discussions of the phrase οἱ περὶ with the accusative case of proper names in Greek authors of the imperial period, see S. Radt, “OI (AI etc.) ΠΕΡΙ + acc. nominis proprii bei Strabo”, ZPE 71 (1988) 35–40; R. J. Gorman, “OI ΠΕΡΙ ΤΙΝΑ in Strabo”, ZPE 136 (2001) 201–13; Id., “Polybius and the Evidence for Periphrastic ΟΙ ΠΕΡΙ ΤΙΝΑ”, Mnemosyne 56 (2003) 129–44. [ES]

14 Aenesidemus: fl. mid-1st c. BCE; author of works on Pyrrho and Skepticism. His Pyrrhonian Arguments was dedicated to Lucius Aelius Tubero, a friend and relative by marriage of Cicero. [ES]

15 The tragedian Euripides (c. 485–405 BCE) is similarly said to have started out as a painter (ζωγραφός), according to Euripides’ Origins and Life (§33), a compilation of biographical anecdotes that is transmitted in some mss. of Euripides’ tragedies. The motif of the early career abandoned for the more serious pursuit of philosophy or poetry recurs in Diogenes’ Life of Timon (§109). [ES]

§63

16 “teach anyone else to be good”: Our translation supposes that Diogenes’ original audience would have automatically supplied εἶναι to έτερόν τινα διδάξαι … ἀγαθόν. [ES]

17 The royal court is the court of Alexander the Great. [ES]

18 The adjective ἄστοργος literally means ‘without affection.’ [ES]

§64

19 Nausiphanes: From Teos, born c. 360 BCE; perhaps a companion of Pyrrho and Anaxarchus in Alexander’s army; teacher of Epicurus. [ES]

20 “was enthralled”: Literally, ‘was hunted’ or ‘captured.’ The use of the passive voice of θηράω (‘to hunt’) to describe the condition of being intellectually ‘captivated’ or ‘enthralled’ appears to be unparalleled. [ES]

21 “go along with his own arguments”: The reflexive pronoun εαυτοῦ appears to refer to Nausiphanes. [ES]

22 Epicurus: Founder of the Epicurean school; born in Samos 341 BCE and died in Athens 270 BCE. [ES]

23 “According to Nausiphanes”: Diogenes’ text does not explicitly credit Nausiphanes as the source of this information concerning the honor paid to Pyrrho by the people of Elis, but the construction is an indirect statement dependent on the verb of saying that begins the preceding sentence. [ES]

24 Timon of Phlius, c. 320–230 BCE, wrote satirical poems titled Silloi (literally, Squint-eyes), which made fun of the theories of dogmatic philosophers. Pytho was a dialogue presenting a (probably fictitious) conversation between Pyrrho, while on his way to Delphi, and a companion. [ES]
§65

25 **Appearances**: ‘Imaginings’ or ‘Mental Images’ are other possible translations for the title Ἰνδαλµοί. The verses quoted here appear to be in elegiac couplets; Xenophanes of Colophon established a precedent for using elegiac couplets as well as dactylic hexameter in poems dealing with philosophical topics. [ES]

26 “‘t though a man, lead your life ‘t’: The text is corrupt. The words ἀνήρ (‘man’) and ἄγεις (‘you lead’) are detectable in the jumble of letters presented by the manuscripts. The translation offered here guesses at the meaning of the original verses, but is not based on a plausible emendation. [ES]

27 Part of Pyrrho’s exceptional peace of mind seems to reside in not being impressed with persuasive arguments, and not being attracted by the methods and arguments of sophists. [KMV] The verses quoted here, which we translate into prose, are in dactylic hexameter, the meter used since the archaic period in epic poems, such as the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, and didactic poems such as those by Hesiod (fl. late 8th or early 7th c. BCE), Xenophanes of Colophon (c. 570–475 BCE), Parmenides of Elea (fl. early 5th c. BCE), and Empedocles of Agrigentum (c. 490–430 BCE). [ES]

28 Cotys the Thracian: There was a Cotys who ruled Thrace from 382 until c. 360 BCE; he fell out with his erstwhile Athenian allies and was eventually assassinated. But it would have been chronologically impossible for Pyrrho, who was born c. 360, to have been involved in the assassination of this Cotys. [ES]

§66

29 Eratosthenes: Likely Eratosthenes of Cyrene, the mathematician and polymath, c. 275–195 BCE. [ES]

30 “shake off humanity”: Literally, “doff the human being.” The verb ἐκδύ(ν)ω typically describes the taking off of clothing. [ES]

31 “life’s challenges”: πράγµατα literally means ‘things’ or ‘affairs’, often in the sense of the troublesome matters with which one must cope. [ES]

§67

32 Philo: The adjective γνώριµος suggests a personal acquaintance. If this Philo was a contemporary of Pyrrho, he is otherwise unattested. [ES]

33 Democritus: From Abdera, born c. 460 BCE; one of the foremost atomist theorists. [ES]

34 “Pyrrho quoted Democritus most of all, and Homer too”: To claim that practices or ideas found precedent in the works of respected figures of the past, Homer first and foremost, was a common strategy of legitimization in antiquity. [ES]

35 “Like the generation of leaves, such is that of men”: The relevant idea might be that human life is similar to that of natural entities that are presumed to be less complex. Similarly, Homer is taken to have compared human life to that of animals of fairly low repute, such as flies. [KMV]

36 “But, friend, die – you too. Why do you lament thus?/ Even Patroclus was killed, a far better man than you”: This quote reinforces the emphasis on generation and destruction as features of human life. [KMV]

§68

37 Posidonius: From Apamea, c. 135–50 BCE. [ES]

38 Numenius: Probably the same Numenius who is mentioned in the list of Pyrrho’s associates and followers in §102, and perhaps alluded to in the verse quoted in §114. [ES]

39 “put forward doctrines” (δογµατίσαι): The critics of the Skeptics who put forward theories are identified as οἱ δογµατικοί in §70 and elsewhere. Often, we translate
dogmatikoi as ‘dogmatists’, because the term comes to be a label for all non-skeptical philosophers. Where the literal meaning seems relevant to the context, we translate along the lines of ‘those who put forward doctrines’. [ES, KMV]

Eurylochus: Otherwise unattested. [ES]

§69–73: Pyrrho’s students and predecessors

Pyrrho had a number of students. Anecdotes about some of them survive. Timon of Phlius is Pyrrho’s most well-known follower. Nausiphanes of Teos is also mentioned as a second-generation Pyrrhonian. He is also said to have been the teacher Epicurus. Pyrrho and Epicurus were, roughly, contemporaries. Arguably, skepticism shares some concerns with Epicurean philosophy, especially as far as the Epicurean method is concerned (cf. ch. 18 in LONG / SEDLEY 1987 for relevant Epicurean texts). Relations between skeptical and Epicurean thought are less well researched than relations between skeptical and Stoic thought (some recent exceptions are SCHOFIELD 2007 and VOGT 2012b). According to Diogenes, the designation ‘skeptics,’ literally translated ‘investigators’ or ‘inquirers,’ comes to be employed by second-generation Pyrrhonian skeptics. These skeptics seem to have used a range of names for their approach. The preference for listing several designations rather than settling for one appears skeptical in spirit. It captures different lines of inheritance, some relating back to Pyrrho and Hellenistic traditions, others to Socrates. Further, one single designation could be taken to imply that one endorses a particular conception of investigation and commits to it. A range of terms may counteract this impression. Homer (cf. §67), the seven sages, the Athenian tragedian Euripides, and Archilochus (a Greek iambic and elegiac poet from Paros who lived in the mid- to late-7th century BCE), and several Presocratic philosophers are cited as expressing ideas that are skeptical in spirit (BRUNSCHWIG 1999, 1108, refers to §§71–3 as “la galerie des ancêtres”). Notably, some of these quotes seem to be dogmatic claims. Through a list of citations that skeptics presumably invoke, Pyrrhonism is presented as a continuation of central concerns in early Greek thought. [KMV]

§69

41 “Oh! That Philo…”: The verses are in dactylic hexameter and appear to be a Homeric parody. [ES]

42 Hecataeus: fl. c. 300 BCE; author of a history of Egypt. [ES]

43 “doctrine”: The word doctrine (dogma) is employed with caution, signaling that the skeptics do not put forward doctrines in the way in which the dogmatists do. [KMV]

§70

44 “† they brought both those who put forward doctrines and themselves to a state of perplexity †”: The translation offered here guesses at the meaning of the original text, but is not based on a plausible emendation. [ES]

45 The Pyrrhonian skeptics call themselves Pyrrhonians, after Pyrrho; Aporetics, because their investigations lead into puzzlement and aporia; Skeptics, insofar as they are investigators; Ephetics, which means that they suspend judgment; and Zetetics, another word for ‘searchers’. Throughout the translation and commentary, we are using ‘skeptic’ to refer to anyone who belongs to the multifaceted approach in philosophy that begins with Pyrrho. Skepticism is, like dogmatism, an approach that allows for many variations. In the context of the list of names cited above, we make an exception, rendering the Greek as ‘Skeptics,’ precisely because it is intended as a name that apparently some skeptics employed to refer to themselves. [KMV]

46 Theodosius: Unknown. [ES]

47 Theodosius denies that it is appropriate to call skepticism ‘Pyrrhonian’: He seems to have argued that one cannot know another person’s thought, and accordingly cannot know that person’s disposition. How then can one describe oneself as thinking
along the lines of Pyrrho? This question might be considered a forerunner of modern skepticism about other minds. Though Theodosius is unlikely to share the premises in the philosophy of mind that are crucial to early modern and modern skepticism, he may be raising a similar challenge. Otherwise, the context of his remark, namely how a skeptic is to refer to his approach in philosophy, may supply a different bent. Theodosius’ point may be that skeptics must themselves be investigators; they cannot simply decide to be someone’s followers. If they are not genuinely investigating, they are not going to arrive at suspension of judgment. [KMV]

“to embrace no doctrine”: Contrast with the claim of Numenius reported in §68. [ES]

§71

Homer is described as saying different things in different places. This may be considered skeptical either insofar as the skeptics compile different views, generating suspension of judgment by putting them into opposition, or insofar as Homer, like a skeptic, may merely record what goes through his mind at a given moment, without affirming it as the truth. [KMV]

“seven sages”: By the imperial era, lists of the seven sages could include Solon (Athens), Thales (Miletus), Bias (Priene), Chilon (Sparta), Cleobulus (Lindos), Pittacus (Mytilene), Periander (Corinth), Myson (Chenae), and the Scythian Anacharsis. All were active in the 7th-6th centuries BCE. [ES]

“Nothing in excess”: This is difficult to place as resembling skeptic ideas, and perhaps best understood as relating to Pyrrhonian indifference and moderate affect where it is unavoidable. [KMV]

“Make a commitment, delusion is nearby”: This invokes the idea that committing oneself to views on how the world is brings inner turmoil, while suspension of judgment goes along with tranquility. [KMV]

“The spirit in human beings, Glauces son of Leptineus, is such as the day that Zeus brings on”: The verses are in trochaic tetrameter catalectic. [ES] The idea that interests skeptics might be that human thoughts are not, as we would like to believe, formed based on reasons and therefore rationally justified. Instead, thoughts happen to pass through our minds, and to change from day to day. [KMV]

§72

“are also”: Our translation supposes that Diogenes’ original audience would have automatically supplied ὄντες to τυγχάνουσιν, and would have interpreted the phrase τυγχάνουσιν (ὄντες) as the equivalent of εἰσίν. [ES]

“No man has seen that which is clear, nor will there be anyone who knows it”: The full verse is in dactylic hexameter. [ES] It is unclear whether the skeptics can invoke this without making a dogmatic claim to the effect that “there is no knowledge” or that “no one has ever and will ever gain knowledge.” [KMV]

“Zeno does away with”: The verb ἀναιρέω literally means ‘kill’ or ‘destroy,’ and also ‘demolish,’ ‘refute,’ or ‘dismantle’ an argument. Diogenes repeatedly uses forms of ἀναιρέω to describe the discursive practices of the Skeptics, in §§74, 78, and especially
90–100; we usually translate ἀναιρέω as ‘do away with.’ See note 105 on §90 for more detail. [ES]

58 “The thing that is moved is neither in the place in which it moves nor is it in the place where it is not”: This may have spoken to the skeptics insofar as it appears to encourage suspension of judgment on whether that which moves has a location, and to contribute to suspension of judgment on whether there is motion. [KMV]

59 “By convention cold, by convention hot; but in reality, atoms and void”: The skeptics do not endorse atomism. This quote may have been taken by the skeptics to suggest that ascriptions of perceptual qualities are shaped by convention, rather than capturing how the world is. [KMV]

60 “In truth we know nothing; truth is in the abyss”: The meaning of this pronouncement is contested. Later Pyrrhonian skeptics did not make the dogmatic claim that there is no knowledge, though perhaps Pyrrho did. [KMV]

61 Plato is invoked as a predecessor on account of ceding the truth to the gods and aiming only for likely argument. Eikos logos – “likely account” – is an expression from Plato’s Timaeus. Plato argues that, when it comes to knowledge of the physical world, we can only attain a likely account; this matches the nature of the universe, which is itself an image. Notably, Plato made this proposal only for the domain of nature, not in the kind of general fashion in which it seems to be invoked by skeptics. On related ideas in Plato and Presocratic philosophy, cf. Bryan 2012. [KMV]

§73

62 “Who knows if life is death, and death is deemed to be life for mortals?” (Euripides, Phrixus, tr. 833): Verses in iambic trimeter from one of two tragedies by Euripides titled Phrixus. These verses were very widely quoted in antiquity; cf. Σ Aristophanes Frogs 1082 and Stobaeus 4.52b.38. [ES] The skeptics may have cited the verses because of their apparent relevance to the Ten Modes. There, different conditions and states are contrasted. Say, one thing appears while dreaming and another while awake. Who is to decide which appearance is to be privileged? And who is to decide whether, perhaps, while we deem ourselves awake we are merely dreaming, as Plato suggests in Republic V (476c-d)? A skeptic may have suggested that life and death are merely two conditions to be in, such that one may be mistaken about the condition one is in. [KMV]

63 “These things are <neither> visible nor audible for men, nor can they be apprehended with the mind”: This quote makes a dogmatic claim, seemingly discrediting both sense perception and thought as routes of access to certain matters. In Sext. Emp. M 7.122–5, the quotation is presented in a larger context. There it becomes clear that Empedocles’s position is more complex. However, given that Pyrrho may have held views that later count as negative dogmatism, it is conceivable that early Pyrrhonists picked the quotation in isolation and considered it a precursor for their own outlook. [KMV]

64 “Persuaded only of whatever each has encountered”: The second citation from Empedocles may have been suitable for appropriation both by negatively dogmatic Pyrrhonism and by later, skeptical, Pyrrhonism. It can be taken to express the idea that human cognizers find themselves with views that are caused by their surroundings and circumstances, rather than actively forming beliefs by considering reasons. [KMV]

65 “Let us not conjecture at random about the most important things”: We agree here with Jonathan Barnes’ translation (The Presocratic Philosophers, London 1979). The citation allows for multiple interpretations. For the skeptics, it may have reinforced the idea that views are acquired in any number of ways and randomly, and that therefore one should not take oneself to be able to pronounce on important matters. [KMV]

66 Hippocrates: Probably the physician Hippocrates of Cos, fl. mid-5th c. BCE. [ES]
“The tongue of mortal men is pliant, and many are the tales on it”; “The range for words is great”; “Whatever sort of word you might say, such you might hear”: These three citations from the Iliad are said to refer to a preoccupation of the skeptics, namely the ways in which opposite arguments seem to be of equal strength. More generally, they capture ideas that were already alluded to in earlier quotes: people’s views are formed in random ways; one encounters all sorts of views, often in conflict with each other. However, the quotes go beyond earlier citations insofar as they focus on language rather than states of mind – on what people say instead of what they believe. Human beings are said to talk in manifold ways. What they say may be mere tale, guided by the speaker’s imagination and intentions. Moreover, one should not expect, in response to one’s own utterances, anything beyond an utterance that in some way reflects what oneself said. [KMV]

§§74–78 Skeptical Expressions and Skeptical Language

Up to and including §73, Pyrrho and his students are described; and early Greek thinkers are cited as expressing ideas that are similar in spirit. §74 begins with ‘the skeptics.’ This may indicate that the report now shifts to a larger group of skeptics, some of whom may depart in their philosophy from the beginnings of Pyrrhonism. The skeptics who are now under consideration seem to have paid great attention to how a skeptic can speak, aiming to avoid dogmatism. This question arises specifically with respect to the expressions that capture skeptical attitudes and ways of doing philosophy. The latter belong to the core components of Pyrrhonism. Scholars sometimes use their Greek name phônai. This name can be taken to refer to the physical aspect of speech: the sound that is produced. It is thereby suggestive of the skeptical attempt to refrain from ‘saying something’ in the strict sense, where one’s utterance has a fairly precise meaning, refers to something, and asserts something about it. Skeptical expressions are used in formulaic ways. That is, they are elucidated in skeptical philosophical writing, and then employed in the hopes that they are understood in the sense that the skeptics intend. The skeptics were aware that ordinary language is not amenable to their project. Ordinary language pervasively involves assertion, i.e., sentences that state that something is so-and-so. For example, in ordinary language a speaker may say “the honey [referring to the bit of honey the speaker is tasting] is sweet.” In such utterances, speakers assert something. They ascribe a property, for example, ‘sweet,’ to something else, the honey that is presently tasted. It is difficult, if not impossible, to go through life without assertion. The skeptic expressions are a core component of this project. On skeptical language, cf. Vogt 1998, ch. 3 and Corti 2009. [KMV]

§74

“continually overturned”: The expression διετέλουν ... ἀνατρέποντες describes a sustained and continuous endeavor. [ES]

69 The skeptics are said to overthrow all doctrines of philosophical schools. This is potentially in conflict with earlier indications that the skeptics are in agreement with views expressed by Pre-Socratic philosophers and other early Greek thinkers. [KMV]

70 “We determine nothing” is one of the so-called skeptical expressions. The skeptics flag that this expression is not intended as an assertion (though it grammatically is an assertion) and explain in several ways how it is to be understood. (i) They contrast ‘determining’ with mere ‘citing’ and ‘reporting’ of views. (ii) They say that the expression is self-referential, such that they also do not determine that they determine nothing. (iii) They deny that they do not determine anything, presumably such that saying and denying cancel each other out. (iv) Utterances that are grammatically assertions (declarative statements) are further said to be employed for the purpose of laying open one’s state of mind. The skeptics’ state of mind is non-precipitancy and inner balance. Precipitancy is a technical term in Stoic epistemology: one ought not
to assent in a precipitant way. The skeptics can argue, against their Stoic critics, that in holding back judgment they do precisely what the Stoics think one should, namely not assenting precipitantly. Inner balance relates to the skeptics’ equidistance from opposing views. The skeptic is not more inclined towards one view than toward another, and does not commit to either. (v) The skeptics argue that their way of ‘laying open’ or ‘showing’ their state of mind works as well as ordinary sentences do, where the speaker assents to what she says. [KMV]

“not at all more (this) than (that)”: following the articulation of the saying οὐ γὰρ µᾶλλον τόδε ἢ τόδε εἶναι ἐκαστὸν in 61.11–12, our translation supposes that Diogenes’ original audience would have automatically supplied the demonstrative pronoun τόδε and the comparative conjunction ἢ to the phrase οὐδὲν µᾶλλον. [ES]

The same set of considerations that was adduced for “we determine nothing” is said to apply to the skeptical expressions “not at all more (this) than (that)” and “for every argument there is a counter-argument.” [KMV]

§75

73 “with a view to doing away with something”: ἀναιρετικῶς; cf. note 57 on §72 above. [ES]
74 “stavesacre”: A poisonous plant. [ES]
75 The skeptics go to particular lengths in explaining their skeptical use of οὐ µᾶλλον (“no more this-than-that”), contrasting it with non-skeptical usages. Several examples (relating to the pirate, honey, and virtue) in §75 illustrate non-skeptical usages of the expression. In contrast, the skeptics are said to use the expression like someone who dismantles someone else’s view, for example, by saying “The Scylla existed no more than did the Chimaera.” This sentence can be read as negatively dogmatic, claiming that neither existed. A skeptical reconstruction that avoids negative dogmatism might be: ‘it is no more (and no less) compelling that Scylla existed than that Chimaera existed.” [KMV]

§76

76 “(there is a counter-argument)”: following the articulation of the saying παντὶ λόγῳ λόγος ἀντίκειται in 74.173–4, our translation supposes that Diogenes’ original audience would have automatically supplied the words λόγος ἀντίκειται to the phrase παντὶ λόγῳ. [ES]
77 Suspension of judgment is said to reflect that one is ignorant of the truth. This differs from descriptions in Sextus, who instead of using the language of ignorance in this context talks about how the skeptic’s mind is in balance, and pulled equally toward different views. [KMV]

In a famous analogy, skeptical argumentation is compared to medications that purge the body. Arguments are put in opposition to each other, and cancel each other out. What is left, so the suggestion goes, is a clarified state of mind, purged of what needed to be gotten rid of. [KMV]

§77

79 Diogenes relates a somewhat cryptic anti-skeptical objection against the comparison between skeptical argument and medications that purge the body. The objection might be that skepticism relies thoroughly on argumentation, while at the same time, as mentioned earlier, some skeptics seem to have taken a bleak view of the powers of reasoning. [KMV]

80 Diogenes may here relate a skeptical distinction between using concepts in a way that implies existence, and in a way that is “merely for reference.” It is unclear how precisely this would work. Cf. Sextus on skeptical use of concepts PH 2.1–12 and M 8.337–336a. [KMV]
Toward the end of his presentation of skeptical language, Diogenes relates two puzzling moves. He ascribes to the skeptics the dogmatic view that, however things appear, this is not how they really are. Moreover, “[t]hey said that they investigate not their thoughts, since what one thinks is evident to oneself, but what they access by the senses.” It is highly questionable whether this should be ascribed, generally, to the skeptics. The skeptics certainly investigate theoretical questions, such as whether there is place or motion or a criterion of truth. [KMV]

§§78–88 Ten Modes

By way of leading toward the Ten Modes, Diogenes introduces Aenesidemus. Aenesidemus began his philosophical career in the Academy, but left in order to develop a different kind of skepticism from the one practiced by contemporaries in the Academy. Aenesidemus is considered the originator of ten modes of argument, which are also presented, albeit differently, in Sextus Empiricus (PH 1.36–163; cf. M 7.345 for ascription of the Ten Modes to Aenesidemus) and in Philo of Alexandria (On Drunkenness 169–202).

With respect to Aenesidemus, interpreters face the same puzzle that they encounter in Pyrrho. On the one hand, both of these philosophers seem to defend major components of what we know, through Sextus, as Pyrrhonian skepticism. On the other hand, they seem to draw inferences that Sextus would classify as negative dogmatism. For example, some of Aenesidemus’ modes, as Diogenes reports them, culminate in the dogmatic norm that one ‘must’ suspend judgment (rather than in the report that suspension of judgment is generated); or they employ “no more this-than-that” in negatively dogmatic fashion, to the effect that in reality something is neither this-than-that. One particularly interesting dogmatic inference concludes Diogenes’ presentation of the Tenth Mode. Aenesidemus is said to have argued that everything is relative to thought and that relative things in themselves are unknown. In Sextus, the Ten Modes are largely concerned with conflicting sense-perceptions which arise in different animals, under different circumstances, and so on. Only the Tenth Mode refers specifically and in detail to customs, beliefs, and ways of life. In Diogenes, the Ten Modes are markedly different insofar as practical matters – what is pleasant and painful, beneficial and harmful – are treated throughout as analogous with sense-perception. The Ten Modes, according to Diogenes, are ways of generating suspension of judgment – or of leading to dogmatic inferences, such as that X is neither F nor F* – through oppositions. The skeptics create these oppositions by arguing that things are bound to appear differently to different animals on account of their physiologies (First Mode). They appear differently to different human cognizers depending on their physical constitutions and cultures (Second Mode), depending on the sense, say, vision or hearing, that is employed (Third Mode), and depending on states and conditions they may be in (Fourth Mode). They lead toward suspension of judgment by contrasting different beliefs, customs, myths and stories (Fifth Mode) and by arguing that things do not appear in isolation, but in some mixture with air, light, etc. (Sixth Mode). Further, things appear to cognizers from different distances, locations, etc. (Seventh Mode), in different quantities and qualities, etc. (Eighth Mode), and depending on their frequency or rarity (Ninth Mode). And finally, the skeptics put together oppositions by constructing comparisons between things that are relative to each other, say, the left being left not simpliciter, but left-of-what-is-to-its-right (Tenth Mode). [KMV]

§78

Prior to his presentation of the Ten Modes, Diogenes offers some general remarks. The skeptics are perceiving and thinking. As they record what goes through their minds, they as it were assemble thoughts. These thoughts are in conflict. Thus there is discrepancy, anomalía, and confusion (cf. PH 1.12). The assembling and ‘tossing together’ of different thoughts is described as the skeptics’ investigative activity. [KMV]
In putting together contradictions, the skeptics aim to show that convincingness is equal on both sides. [KMV]

The skeptics, as Diogenes describes them, operate with assumptions about what tends to persuade us: (i) matters where sense-perceptions fit together; (ii) things that never or rarely undergo change; (iii) matters where there is an accepted way of doing things or that are established by laws; (iv) things that give pleasure; (v) things that amaze us. Notably, (v) refers to matters that might be at the other end of a spectrum from (i)-(iii): rather than frequent, these matters may be rare and exceptional. Similarly, (iv) might not fit into the pattern of (i)-(iii): what gives pleasure may or may not be customary. The list seems to record psychological tendencies in how human beings are persuaded, rather than reasons for rational persuasion. The fact that the list contains quite unequal factors may suggest an idea mentioned earlier, namely that humans find themselves with all sorts of thoughts, caused in all sorts of ways. Notably, assumptions about human psychology may count as negative dogmatism from the perspective of Sextus’ skepticism. [KMV]

“those that live in fire”: Our translation supposes that Diogenes’ original audience would have automatically supplied ζώα (‘living creatures’) or something similar to πυρίβια. The context does not make it clear what kind of creatures Diogenes or his source had in mind. [ES]

“the Arabian phoenix”: The phoenix was thought to be reborn from its own ashes. [ES]

Demophon: Cf. Sext. Emp. PH 1.82. This is not the Demophon who was a seer in Alexander’s retinue. [ES]

“according to Aristotle”: Fr. 103 (Rose). [ES]

“and then there would be matters of breathing and having the air-passages blocked”: Literally, “alongside breathing, alongside the (air-)passages being pressed down on.” [ES]

“For why should that apply more to them than to us?”: Literally, “For why are those people (i.e., the mad) rather than we (in an unnatural condition)” [ES]

Pericles: Athenian military and political leader, c. 495–429 BCE. [ES]

Massagetae: A nomadic people in the territory bordering ancient Persia. [ES]

Eudoxus: Possibly Eudoxus of Cyzicus, fl. 2nd c. BCE; navigator and explorer. [ES]

Cilicians: A people who lived on the southeastern coast of Asia Minor. [ES]

When burying their dead, ...”: Cf. Herodotus 3.38.3. [ES]

Paeanions: A people who lived on the northern edge of the Balkan peninsula, near Thrace and Macedonia. [ES]

purple: Specifically, the dye obtained from the myrex, or ‘purple-fish.’ [ES]
99 “due to its distance”: Or, “from the interval (that separates the sun and the earth).” [ES]

100 “† from afar †”: The text here is generally thought to be corrupt; πόρρωθεν in this clause may be a dittography, since it recurs in the very next clause. [ES]

§87

Favorinus: From Arelate; fl. 2nd c. CE; rhetorician and polymath; courtier of the emperor Hadrian, and teacher of Aulus Gellius and Herodes Atticus. [ES]

Sextus: I.e., Sextus Empiricus, c. 160–210 CE. [ES]

88–89 Five Modes

The Five Modes are ascribed to Agrippa, about whom almost nothing is known (probably fl. late 1st c. CE; Apellas (§106) wrote a work titled Agrippa [ES]). His modes, however, are famous, and have inspired much research (a prominent contribution is J. Barnes, The Toils of Scepticism [Cambridge 1990]). They seem to have some connections to themes in Aristotle’s epistemology, in particular, whether there are first principles that are not, themselves, in need of being proven. It is difficult to see how the third mode, from Relativity, fits into the sequence and structure of Agrippa’s other modes. Presumably, someone who employs the modes could begin to investigate some question Q by putting together different views on it, thus arguing from Disagreement. If, however, someone were to argue that the disagreement can be settled, because some views have been shown to be false, and one view has been proven right, the skeptic might move to the second mode, Infinite Regress. The skeptic would then argue that for every premise that is being adduced as an argument in favor of a given view, another argument has to be adduced; ad infinitum. Suppose now that someone objects that some premises do not need to be justified; they are known to us by themselves. Against this dogmatist, the skeptic would now employ the mode of Hypothesis, arguing that a premise that is unaccounted for is nothing but a hypothesis, that is, something that is simply posited. The interlocutor may respond, suggesting that two principles may support each other. Against this, the skeptic argues that if premises are adduced in support of each other, the argument is circular. He would thus employ the mode of Reciprocity. In this exchange, four of the five modes are employed. If this train of thought is imagined, the mode of Relativity appears as an ill-fitting interjection. Perhaps it is meant to sum up the core of the Ten Modes, which can be interpreted as putting appearances relative-to-X (relative to different animals, distance, etc.) into opposition. More literally interpreted, the mode of Relativity makes a point that is similar to the Sixth Mode, namely, that nothing is perceived or thought of in isolation, but always in relation to something else. [KMV]

§88

103 “those in Agrippa’s circle”: See note 13 above on the possible interpretations of οἱ περὶ Ἀγρίππαν. [ES]

§89

104 straightaway: Alternatively, ‘by themselves.’ [ES]

§§90–102 Skeptic Investigations

This section of the report covers, roughly, what Sext. Emp. covers in PH 2–3 and M 7–11: skeptical investigations of those questions and concepts that were central to dogmatic philosophy. §90 offers a list of the topics that the skeptics subject to their arguments: proof, criterion, sign, cause, movement, every field of learning, every process of becoming, and
the supposition that anything is by nature good or bad. Though the text does not make this explicit, these topics may be thought to belong to the philosophical disciplines: (a) Logic: proof, criterion, sign (b) Physics: cause, movement, processes of becoming. (c) Ethics: whether anything is by nature good or bad. [KMV]

§90

"did away with": The Greek verb is ἀναιρέω, see note 57 on §72. The outcome of skeptical argumentation may not be the same for all skeptics. If and where Diog. Laert. refers to early, negatively dogmatic versions of Pyrrhonism, the skeptics may take themselves to demonstrate that dogmatic theories are false or that something that dogmatists discuss – proof, criterion, cause, and so on – does not exist. If ἀναιρέω is translated in terms of refutation, this is implied. We avoid this implication throughout our translation, though it is possible that early Pyrrhonians thought of themselves as refuting dogmatic theories, or as demonstrating that, for example, proof does not exist. Our translations in terms of ‘doing away with’, ‘overturning’, and sometimes ‘denying’ aim to be open to dogmatic and non-dogmatic interpretations, thereby making room for questions about the development of Pyrrhonism. Note that here and in the following paragraphs skeptical arguments are said to do away with proof, criterion, cause, etc., in the sense of calling the existence of proof, criterion, etc., into question. [KMV]

§91

107 Diogenes presents criterion and proof as interrelated. One would need a criterion by which to recognize that some proof exists; and one would need proof in order to recognize that there is a criterion. [KMV]

§92

† for them †: The text is difficult to construct; † αὐτοῖς † may be a corruption. [ES]

109 From the observation that every appearance appears the way it does according to its context a weighty inference is drawn: that everything must be true, or everything false. Arguably, the former option represents relativism, along the lines of what Plato ascribes to Protagoras in the *Theaetetus*. The latter option may represent the upshot of some of Pyrrho’s arguments. The third option, that some things are true and some false, is at this point ruled out on account of there being no way to decide which are true and which false. [KMV]

§93

111 beliefs: Here, in §93, and in §101 Diogenes employs the term δόξα (*doxa*), belief. See also δοξαζόμενον in §101. This is noteworthy because it is an exception. Otherwise, Diogenes describes related questions in terms of whether the skeptics hold doctrines (dogmata) and whether they put forward doctrines (dogmatizein), or on the level of language in terms of whether they make assertions. The question of whether the skeptics have beliefs is at the center of scholarly work on Pyrrhonism. Cf. for example the seminal collection of essays by *Burnyeat / Frede* 1997. [KMV]

§94

112 “trust in all things is impossible”: the Greek is ἀπιστητέον (literally, “there must be a distrusting …”). Relatedly, we translate πιστός, as referring to a person, as trustworthy. [KMV]
§94

“something that seduces us”: Literally, ‘wily’ or ‘wheedling.’ [ES]

“does not track”: διαμαρτάνω (literally, ‘to fail of obtaining’) is the opposite of τυγχάνω, ‘to hit the mark.’ [ES]

Epicurus introduced the notion of a criterion into epistemology, employing two Greek terms, kritêrion and kanon. A criterion is thought to be a means of identifying some perception or thought as true. Accordingly, the full term is ‘criterion of truth’. It is controversial among Hellenistic philosophers, and among interpreters today, how precisely one should think of a criterion of truth. Epicurus’ term kanon suggests that a criterion is employed like a measuring tool, as something by which something else is to be assessed as true or false. Stoic cognitive impressions work differently. Here the impression identifies itself as true. A criterion is thus something that enables us to discern the truth of a given thought or perception which, itself, qualifies as serving the role of criterion. The argument proceeds via a number of cognates of kritêrion: κριτήριον, κέκριται, ἄκριτον, κρινοµένων. We aim to capture this by using cognates of ‘to discern’. [KMV]

§95

Various candidates for what could be the criterion are refuted. The proposal that ‘man’ is the criterion echoes Protagorean relativism, according to which “man is the measure.” The proposal that the cognitive impression is the criterion is Stoic; the proposal that sense perception is the criterion is Epicurean. [KMV]

The inference is drawn that the criterion is unknown and that hence truth is unknown. This may sound like dogmatism, as if the skeptics held that “there is no knowledge.” But the formulation is different. The skeptics observe that no one knows the truth. This is compatible with the truth being knowable, and that someone may discover the truth eventually. [KMV]

§96

Signs are a standard topic for Pyrrhonian discussion, equally much attended to in Sextus as in Diogenes. The skeptics here address dogmatic views to the effect that signs are, alongside proof, a route to knowledge. [KMV]

Formulations like “there is no X,” where X is proof, criterion, sign, etc., may either be negatively dogmatic, or they may be elliptical versions of more elaborate formulations, to the effect that the skeptic suspends judgment on whether X exists. [KMV]

The question of whether there is a sign – i.e., whether anything can be identified as serving the function of disclosing something that is otherwise in the dark – is discussed in terms of what is apparent versus non-apparent (aphanês, adêlon). Diogenes uses phainomenon as opposite of aphanês. Cf. the contrast of délon and adêlon, which comes up frequently in Sextus. [KMV]

§97

Signs are said to be relative (pros ti). A sign is relative to that which it discloses or signifies. Therefore, the skeptics argue, a sign cannot be ‘apparent’ (such that no sign or proof is needed in order to make it accessible for apprehension). What is relative to each other is understood together. Thus a sign must be something that is understood to be a sign when that which it signifies is understood. And that seems to imply that it must, initially, be equally obscure as that which is signified and brought to light by the sign. [KMV]

Diogenes transitions to physics in mid-paragraph: cause, movement, and becoming are the only topics from physics that Diogenes lists as investigated by skeptics. [KMV]
Causes belong to the relatives or relative things (*ta pros ti*). Cause and that which it causes are *relata*. Relative things, the skeptics argue, are only in the mind, rather than really existing. That is, cause does not exist. Accordingly, that which is thought to involve causation, namely coming into being and destruction, does not exist. [KMV] §98

The text does not speak of cause and effect, but only of causes and “what they cause.” The language of cause and effect should not be supplied as if it were evidently suitable. Prominently, the Stoics do not think of cause-effect chains. Instead, each entity in the natural world shares in the one causal power of the active principle. Effects are incorporeal, which do not exist but merely subsist. It is conceivable that Stoic-Skeptic debates shape skeptical vocabulary in the discussion of causation. [KMV]

Corporals and incorporeals: Skeptical discussion, as presented in Diogenes, proceeds via the Stoic distinction between corporals and incorporeals. According to the Stoics, corporals are causes; effects are incorporeals. [KMV] §99

The skeptics seem to explore the following options: that an (a) incorporeal is the cause of an incorporeal, (b) a corporeal of a corporeal, (c) an incorporeal of a corporeal, or (d) a corporeal of an incorporeal. (a) is impossible, according to skeptical arguments, because there would be nothing that is acted upon. (b) may be attributed to the Stoics, namely insofar as for them bodies co-cause everything in the physical world. The skeptics dismiss this option because, in this case, there would be nothing that is acted upon, only causes. (c) is impossible because nothing incorporeal can make anything corporeal. (d) is the Stoic view. The skeptics dismiss it, assuming that in causation something is acted upon, and that which is caused ought to be, they argue, of the same material as that which is acted upon. [KMV] §100


“The skeptics also did away with learning”: Diogenes here seems to observe a distinction between philosophy on the one hand (logic, physics, ethics), and other fields of learning on the other (grammar, rhetoric, arithmetic, geometry, astrology, music). However, contrary to Sextus, he does not suggest that there is any difference in the skeptics’ attitudes to philosophical fields on the one hand and disciplines like grammar on the other hand. In Sextus, skeptics are presented as adhering to fields of learning in the way in which ordinary life does, that is, for example, observing grammar to the extent that ordinary people do, and to the extent that is needed for comprehensible utterances and everyday communication. For a related thought in Diogenes, cf. §108. [KMV]

Diogenes turns to skeptical discussion of good and bad, the only question in ethics that he mentions. The target of skeptical investigation seem to be claims about what is by nature good or bad. That is, philosophers are thought to put forward doctrines of the form “X is good (by nature).” [KMV]

The skeptics seem to make a concession with respect to sense-perception that they do not make in other contexts: that there are perceptual matters, such as snow seeming cold, which appear the same to everyone. [KMV]
Antisthenes: From Athens; c. 445–365 BCE; member of Socrates’ circle. [ES]

If one were to consider everything good that someone considers good, and everything bad that someone considers bad, the same thing would turn out to be good and bad. This can be read as an anti-relativist argument. [KMV]

§§102–108 Anti-Skeptical Challenges and Skeptical Replies

Diogenes relates two anti-skeptical challenges. Dogma Charge: the skeptics dogmatize, even though they claim not to. Apraxia Charge: in their attempt not to dogmatize, they aim to do without attitudes that are integral to human life. These objections interrelate. The very things that the skeptics say in reply to the Dogma Charge heighten their vulnerability to the Apraxia Charge. The skeptical responses involve, throughout, reference to reliance on appearances. The skeptics do not assert anything; instead, they record appearances. They do not hold any doctrines, but go with appearances. The skeptical replies recorded in Diogenes seem largely in agreement with the responses in Sextus. [KMV]

§102

“It is possible to get an overview of the skeptics’ entire mode of reasoning from the treatises that they have left behind”: There is a striking combination of compounds beginning with συν- in this sentence (συναγωγῆς ... συνιδεῖν ... συντάξεων). [ES]

“(did)”: Understanding ἀπέλιπον ("they left behind (works)") from ἀπέλιπεν in the preceding clause. [ES]

Diogenes mentions an anti-skeptical objection that locates dogmatizing in the very moment in which the skeptics refute a claim: in this moment they must apprehend something, and thereby they accept something as true. Presumably, the idea is that when one takes an argument to have refutational force against a premise, one understands and ‘apprehends’ something, and thereby dogmatizes. This anti-skeptical objection addresses the difficulty mentioned in our notes to §90, about the skeptical use of ἀναιρέω. If the skeptics take themselves to refute in a literal sense (rather than, say, create discrepancy in the mind, such as to lead to suspension of judgment), they take themselves to demonstrate that something is false. This is a dogmatic conclusion. [KMV]

The skeptical expressions are criticized as dogmatic. Responses to this charge are already contained in §§74–8. [KMV]

§103

The skeptics concede that, as human beings, they cannot but be affected in certain ways. In Sextus, similar considerations matter at two points. First, the skeptics’ end is tranquility, but not in an unqualified way. Where one cannot help but be affected, it is moderate affection (PH 1.25). Second, Sextus explanation of how skeptics lead active lives contains reference to hunger and thirst as affections that skeptics have, and which guide their behavior (PH 1.23–4). [KMV]

“But † concerning the things † about which the dogmatists make affirmations”: The mss. reading of the sentence’s first words, ἀλλ’οὐδὲ περὶ ᾧν, features a negative that is difficult to construe, since the point of the sentence seems to be that the skeptics do withhold judgment concerning matters that adherents of dogmatic theories claim to understand. Our translation attempts to make sense of the passage, but is not based on a plausible emendation. [ES]

The skeptics seem to say that they suspend judgment merely on philosophical or theoretical issues. If this would be all they suspended on, they would be left with any number of beliefs about the world. However, as the text continues it becomes clear that the contrast is not between philosophical matters on the one hand, and everyday matters on the other. What the skeptics concede is how things affect them. They do
not – in an everyday context – affirm that X is white. They merely relate or acknowledge such things. Presumably, these verbs are to be interpreted in the light of the arguments about appearances in §104. [KMV]

§104

141 The skeptics say they are ignorant about the way sense perception works. This point is made in conjunction with the more familiar contrast between how something appears to the senses as opposed to how it really is. Perhaps both contrasts – between appearances as opposed to how something really functions, or as opposed to how it really is – are taken to coincide in some cases. For example, the skeptics admit that they perceive that fire burns, but do not hold views on whether ‘burning’ is fire’s nature. [KMV]

§105

142 Timon seems to have tied appearances both to sense-perception and to custom. This connection survives throughout Pyrrhonism. For example, in Sextus the skeptics’ adherence to appearances includes sense-perception and custom (PH 1.23–4). [KMV]

§106

143 Pyrrho is said to have “followed appearances”. This is an idea that Pyrrhonians throughout the tradition seem to have embraced. [KMV]

144 Zeuxis: Since he is identified here as the acquaintance (γνώριµος) of Aenesidemus, this Zeuxis may or may not be Zeuxis “the crooked-footed” who was the student of Aenesidemus’ follower Zeuxippus (§116). [ES]

145 Antiochus: From Laodicea on the Lycus; the student of Zeuxis “the crooked-footed” (§116). [ES]

146 Apellas: Otherwise unattested. [ES]

147 A further group of thinkers is mentioned who claim that there are only appearances. This is a dogmatic position. [KMV]

148 Aenesidemus is credited with the view that appearances are the criterion. Cf. Sext. Emp. PH 1.21–4. Aenesidemus’ version of this view is presented as similar to Epicurus’ position. According to Epicurus, sense-perceptions are criteria of truth. It is unclear whether Aenesidemus speaks of appearances as criteria of truth, or as criteria of action, as some other skeptics do. A criterion of action is thought to direct action, without thereby indicating anything about the truth. [KMV]

§107

149 One version of the Apraxia Challenge says that, if confronted with different appearances, the skeptic is paralyzed, and will not perform any action. In response, the skeptics say that they go with the appearance of a given moment. This prompts a further version of the Apraxia Challenge, namely that the skeptic may end up performing horrible actions, for example, butchering his father if ordered to do so (cf. Sext. Emp. M 11.164). [KMV]

150 The skeptics’ end is described as suspension of judgment, accompanied by tranquility. The relation between these, and the question of whether they constitute one or two ends, are controversial among interpreters. [KMV]

151 “those in the circles of Timon and Aenesidemus”: See note 13 on § 62 concerning the possible meanings of the phrase οἱ περὶ τὸν Τίµωνα καὶ Αἰνεσίδηµον is a periphrasis meaning “Timon and Aenesidemus.” [ES]
§108

"in our sphere of influence": The context indicates that the prepositional phrase περὶ ἡµᾶς is used here as the equivalent of the more common ἐφ’ ἡµῖν, often translated as "up to us." P. Shorey, "Note on Diogenes Laertius IX.108", Classical Philology 11 (1916) 465 and 13 (1918) 412–13, argued that περὶ ἡµᾶς does not readily accommodate this meaning and suggested the emendation παρ’ ἡµᾶς. [ES]

§109–116 Timon

The final section of the text is devoted to Timon, the most prominent follower of Pyrrho. Timon seems to have written profusely, and in many genres. He praises Pyrrho for a mindset and philosophy that no one else quite achieved. Though Timon’s writings provide the best evidence we have for Pyrrho’s thought, Timon is more than just a source for the ideas of his teacher. He may have expanded on Pyrrho’s thought, as well as addressed additional questions (cf. Bett 2000; J. Brunschwig, "Once again on Eusebius on Aristocles on Timon on Pyrrho", in: Brunschwig 1994, 190–211; Decleva Caizzi 1981; Clayman 2009). [KMV]

§109

154 Apollonides: The fact that Apollonides dedicated his commentary of Timon’s Silloi to the emperor Tiberius indicates that he was active in the early 1st c. CE. The designation ὁ παρ’ ἡµῶν, which we have rendered “one of our own,” is puzzling; it could refer to place of origin (i.e., “my fellow-citizen”), or it could refer to Apollonides’ philosophical affiliation (i.e., “a skeptic like me”). Hicks 1925, 518–19 notes that the second interpretation is further complicated by the ambiguity of the first person plural pronoun: “Is Diogenes here speaking in his own person or has he merely transcribed ὁ παρ’ ἡµῶν from a monograph of a Skeptic?” [ES]

155 “used to dance”: There were abundant opportunities for professional performers of all sorts from the 4th c. BCE on; the text does not offer any details concerning Timon’s early career as a dancer or, more properly, a member of a chorus. [ES]

156 “left him as his heir”: Timon’s bequeathal of his property to his son long before his death seems like an unusual move especially since, according to Diogenes’ account, he soon found himself in financial difficulties. [ES]

§110

157 Sotion: From Alexandria; fl. early 2nd c. BCE; author of Successions of Philosophers (in 13 books) and a commentary on Timon’s Silloi. [ES]

158 King Antigonus: Antigonus II Gonatus, c. 319–239 BCE; son of Demetrius Poliorcetes and grandson of the Macedonian general Antigonus (I) Monophthalmus; ruler of Macedonia. [ES]

159 Ptolemy Philadelphus: c. 309–246 BCE; son of the Macedonian general Ptolemy (Ptolemy I Soter); ruler of Egypt. [ES]

160 Antigonus: Of Caryrustus (§62); mentioned in the next sentence. [ES]

161 Silloi (Squint-eyes): Writing in the early 1st c. CE, the geographer Strabo (14.1.28) categorizes poems composed in the 6th c. BCE by Xenophanes of Colophon as σίλλοι,
but it is uncertain whether Xenophanes’ poems were known by this title in Timon’s day. [ES]

§111

abuse and mockery: Other than Timon, skeptics are not in the business of abusing philosophers or mocking them. It is conceivable that Timon is influenced by a wider range of genres and lines of thought than other Pyrrhonian skeptics, perhaps including Cynics who are famous for employing abuse in order to impress their philosophical stance on others. [KMV]

§114

175 Zopyrus: From Clazomenae (fl. c. 275 BCE). [ES]

176 “went with the flow”: The adjective εὐρ(ρ)ος literally means ‘easily flowing.’ [ES]
“† he did not mind missing dinner †”: Our translation guesses at the intended meaning of the corrupt text. [ES]

Arcesilaus: From Pitane; c. 316–242 BCE; head of the Academy in Athens in the mid-3rd c. BCE. [ES]

Knivesmarket: In myth, the ΚΕΡΚΩΠΕΣ were mischievous thieves captured by Heracles. There was an area in Athens (location now unknown) called ΚΕΡΚΩΠΟΝ ἀγορά, “the market of the Kerkopes,” where stolen goods were apparently fenced. [ES]

“The francolin and the curlew always fly together”: Verse in iambic trimeter, which could have been a folksy proverb or, as Hicks 1925, 524–5 notes, an allusion to individuals (nick)named Attagas and Numenius. If so, the Numenius in question was possibly Pyrrho’s student (§§68 and 102). [ES]

Dioscurides: From Cyprus: cf. §115. [ES]

§115

Menodotus: Perhaps the empirical doctor Menodotus of Nicomedia (fl. c. 125 CE), mentioned in §116. But L. Perilli, Menodoto di Nicomedia. Contributo a una storia gale-niana della medicina empirica (Leipzig / Munich 2004) 109 argues that the Menodotus mentioned in this chapter is not to be identified with Menodotus of Nicomedia. [ES]

successor: The title Διαδοχαί, (literally Successions; often translated as Successive Heads of Philosophical Schools), used of works by Alexander (§61) and Sotion (§109), attests to the considerable interest in antiquity in establishing the pedigrees of philosophers and demonstrating the continuity within traditions of philosophical thought. [ES]

Ptolemy of Cyrene: Perhaps fl. c. 100 BCE. [ES]

“According to Hippobotus and Sotion …”: The picture that Hippobotus and Sotion present of continuity in the teaching of ‘Pyrrhonism’ is at odds with Menodotus’ claim that Pyrrho had no immediate successor. [ES]

Dioscurides of Cyprus, et al.: Of the individuals listed in §§115–16, the following have already been named in Diogenes’ chapters on Pyrrho and Timon: Dioscurides (§114), Ptolemy (probably the same Ptolemy mentioned earlier in §115); Aenesidemus (§62 and passim.); perhaps Zeuxis (§106); Antiochus (§106); perhaps Menodotus (§115); Sextus (§87). [ES]

Phylarchus: From Athens, Naucratis, or Sicyon; fl. 3rd c. BCE; historian. [ES]

§116

† Cythenas †: It is unclear what † κυθηνάς † means or refers to. [ES]
C. Essays
Pyrrhonism in Diogenes Laertius

Richard Bett

1. Introduction

This paper has two goals. First, it offers a general overview of Diogenes Laertius’ lives of Pyrrho and Timon, distinguishing as far as possible a) the biographical from the more purely philosophical material in these lives, and b) the parts bearing upon the period of Pyrrho himself and his immediate following from those bearing upon the later tradition started by Aenesidemus and taking Pyrrho as an inspiration. Both these distinctions, however, are less than hard and fast, and this is of interest in itself. Second, focusing on the philosophical material, it investigates in detail the many parallels between the text of Diogenes and passages of the Pyrrhonist Sextus Empiricus, and attempts to extract from these parallels some lessons concerning the development of the Pyrrhonist tradition. Though not a Pyrrhonist himself, Diogenes emerges as an important witness to the character of Pyrrhonism.

Book 9 of Diogenes Laertius is something of a mixed bag. It begins with two philosophers described as σποράδην, ‘scattered’:¹ that is, who do not belong to the two main ‘successions’ of philosophers Diogenes has established in the first book, the Ionians and the Italians (1.13–15). This is despite the fact that in book 8 Diogenes has already begun the Italian succession, having spent the first seven books on the Ionian succession; the Italian succession is thus interrupted at the start of book 9 and then resumed after these two. This is the more surprising in that the two σποράδην philosophers are Heraclitus and Xenophanes; although Heraclitus was not mentioned in the initial lists of successions in book 1, Xenophanes appeared in the Italian list (1.15) as the teacher of Parmenides. And compounding the problem is the fact that Xenophanes’ status as the teacher of Parmenides is repeated immediately after the life of Xenophanes; Xenophanes’ life ends with the sentence “These were the scattered ones” (9.20), and the next sentence, beginning the life of Parmenides, starts “Parmenides learned from Xenophanes” (9.21). Diogenes goes on to say that Parmenides did not follow Xenophanes, despite having been his student, and this may help to

¹ Both Plato and Aristotle use this word of humans or other animals who do not belong to any community.
explain Xenophanes’ anomalous position. In any case, we now return to the Italian succession, and except for the insertion of Melissus, we follow the order previewed in the first book down to Democritus. The list in book 1 ended at Democritus, and Diogenes simply added that he had many pupils or successors, including Nausiphanes and the otherwise unknown Naucydes, the teachers of Epicurus. However, we do not get a life of Nausiphanes, let alone Naucydes, in book 9; indeed, we do not get a continued tidy teacher-pupil succession. The start of the life of Anaxarchus places him in the atomist tradition stemming from Democritus (9.58), and Anaxarchus is named as a teacher of Pyrrho (9.61), whose life immediately follows, with the life of Timon, Pyrrho’s pupil, concluding the book. But between Democritus and Anaxarchus we have Protagoras – also named as a student of Democritus (9.50), though this has often been regarded as chronologically impossible, but not as the teacher of anyone else – and Diogenes of Apollonia, who seems to have no connection with any of the surrounding context.

The life of Pyrrho is by far the longest in book 9, and the lives of Pyrrho and Timon together occupy almost half the book. And I think it is at least possible that the weighty presence of Pyrrhonism in the book has had some influence on who else got included in it. In the section of the life of Pyrrho

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2 For more on this topic, see Brunschwig 1999, 1027–42 (Introduction); Decleva Caizzi 1992.

3 Naucydes has often been suspected to be merely a figment born of textual error; see most recently the text and app. crit. in Dorandi 2013.

4 His inclusion has generally been thought to be a mistake due to confusion with Diogenes of Smyrna, who is named as the teacher of Anaxarchus (9.58), and who appears in that position in a teacher-pupil succession in Clement, Strom. 1.14.64.2–4, which has a great deal in common with the sequence in book 9 of Diogenes Laertius (on this, see also the following note). But A. Laks, Diogène d’Apollonie. La dernière cosmologie présocratique (Lille 1983) 258–63, has argued that there are traces of a tendency predating Diog. Laert. to link Diogenes of Apollonia with Democritus and Protagoras and, more broadly, with the atomist tradition; see especially Cicero, Nat. D. 1.29. Pace Decleva Caizzi 1992, 4220, n. 6, Laks’ argument strikes me as tenuous at best; but in any case it does not alter the fact that, as Diog. Laert. himself presents the sequence of philosophers, the inclusion of Diogenes of Apollonia is wholly unmotivated.

5 A similar conclusion is argued for by Alcalá 2012, especially section II. Alcalá also helpfully points to the presence of several other texts reporting a succession of philosophers from the Eleatics (including Xenophanes as their supposed founder) through the Atomists to Pyrrho (and in one case continuing to Epicurus); see Clement, Strom. 1.14.64.2–4; Eusebius, Praep. evang. 14.17.10, and pseudo-Galen, Hist. Philos. 3.228, collected as texts 25A–C in Decleva Caizzi 1981. Since, on any normal view of his chronology, Diogenes is preceded by at least Clement, whose list is, of the three, the closest to Diogenes’ sequence, Diogenes is clearly not working with a blank slate in deciding who to include in book 9. (On Diogenes’ dates, see most recently J. Jouanna, “Médecine et philosophie: sur la date de Sextus Empiricus et celle de Diogène Laërce à la lumière du Corpus Galénique”, Revue des études grecques 122/2 [2009] 359–90.) However, since he does not invariably proceed (in book 9 or elsewhere) by means of alleged teacher-pupil successions, he also seems to be
on sceptical predecessors Diogenes includes four of the philosophers who are dealt with in the first half of the book, including both the σποράδην philosophers: Xenophanes, Zeno, Democritus and Heraclitus (9.72–3). Diogenes does not endorse their status as proto-sceptics, attributing these views to an unnamed ‘some’ (9.71), and indeed in the life of Xenophanes he reports, but then immediately debunks, the claim of Sotion that Xenophanes was the first to say that everything is inapprehensible (9.20); it is Pyrrho, we later learn, who introduced ‘non-cognition’ (ἀκαταληψία) to philosophy (9.61). But the prevailing view that Xenophanes was somehow feeling his way towards a sceptical position may have influenced Diogenes’ choice to include Xenophanes here, and as a σποράδην philosopher, rather than in book 8 – soon after Pythagoras, as his position in the list in book 1 would have led one to expect, and before Empedocles, as chronology would seem to demand. And the fact that sceptical leanings can be detected in some other members of the Italian succession may also have contributed to his choice to continue the Italian succession immediately after Xenophanes, despite having just taken Xenophanes out of that succession. In addition, although Protagoras is not mentioned as a proto-sceptic in the life of Pyrrho, he is cited (in his own life) as being the first to hold that there are two opposing arguments on every issue (9.51), which might well be taken to put him in the same intellectual neighborhood as the sceptics, and hence to justify including him slightly before them. These suggestions do not explain all the peculiarities of book 9’s cast of characters, but they may go some way in that direction.

Besides being the longest in the book, the life of Pyrrho also includes an extensive doxographical section (9.74–108). It has sometimes been said that Diogenes is more interested in the lives of philosophers than in their thought, but whatever may be true of the work as a whole, the life of Pyrrho certainly does not bear that out. What the doxographical section does not have as its primary concern, however, is the thought of Pyrrho. We begin with a biographical section, which includes some very general points about Pyrrho’s philosophy (9.61). But, as has long been recognized, exercising some measure of autonomy in how he uses these materials. And I see no reason why his choice of who to include where, and how to present them, should not have been dictated at least in part by philosophical considerations.

6 In a similar vein, it is worth noting that most of the philosophers about whom the surviving fragments of Timon have partially positive things to say appear in book 9: Xenophanes, the Eleatics, Democritus and Protagoras. See Clayman 2009, 136–44.

7 It was presumably the same sort of supposed connection that led someone, at some point, to append the Dissoi Logoi to the text of Sextus.

8 For more on this topic, from a partially different perspective, see James Warren’s paper in this volume.

the doxographical section derives – for the most part, at any rate – from the later tradition calling itself Pyrrhonism and initiated by Aenesidemus. From reading the life of Pyrrho alone, one might well get the impression that Diogenes had no idea that he was dealing with widely different historical phases. For he freely switches back and forth between speaking of Timon (sometimes along with other immediate disciples of Pyrrho) and Aenesidemus, who lived at least two centuries later (9.76/78; 105/106; 107); in one place Timon and Aenesidemus are actually both named as ‘associates’ (συνήθεις) of Pyrrho (9.102). Yet the life of Timon ends with an extensive succession of Pyrrhonist philosophers beginning with Timon himself and continuing to Sextus Empiricus and beyond (9.115–16); while the details are a little murky, it is at least clear that Aenesidemus and Timon are presented, as they should be, several generations apart. Presumably, then, Diogenes is aware that Timon and Aenesidemus were not contemporaries. Still, it is fair to assume that he takes Pyrrhonism to be an essentially unitary philosophical outlook, where what is true for Pyrrho and Timon is also true for Aenesidemus and beyond. The reference to Timon and Aenesidemus as both ‘associates’ of Pyrrho may be a slip of the pen, but

10 Along with Nausiphanes, who also appears in the biographical section on Pyrrho (9.64; 69), and Numenius, who is a mystery. On this see Barnes 1992, 4260–2 – including n. 99, where the possibility that συνήθεις might refer to intellectual followers in a broader sense, rather than personal acquaintances, is explored, but convincingly rejected. (Scharffenberger/Vogt in this volume non-commitally translate συνήθεις ‘associates and followers’.)

11 It is striking that this is the only place in Diogenes where a philosophical tradition is treated (even if only by way of a list of names) as extending up to or close to his own time; otherwise it looks as if, from his point of view, the history of philosophy ends in the early 1st century BC. (Unless book 7, the end of which is missing, continued with lives of additional Stoics, as the index found in two of the manuscripts suggests. But that index, the so-called index locupletior, extends only to Cornutus, who lived in the time of Nero – still quite a bit earlier than Diogenes himself. In any case, as noted in Sedley 2003, 37, the list in the index locupletior is substantially different from what we actually find in the surviving part of book 7, so it is not clear that much weight should be put on it. Dorandi, who has a more positive view of the index [see T. Dorandi, “Considerazioni sull’index locupletior di Diogene Laerzio”, Prometheus 18 (1992) 121–6], includes it at the front of his new edition.) Diogenes is by no means alone in this; several others, including Sextus himself, seem to adopt the same terminus in their treatment of the histories of the various philosophical schools. The explanation of Sedley 2003, which posits a major sea-change in ancient philosophy occurring in the first century BC, seems to me both fascinating and generally persuasive. However, I am not convinced that it fully accounts for Sextus’ apparent lack of interest in the philosophies of his own time. (Or, for that matter, the rhetoric of his own time; on this see R. Bett, “Skepticism”, in: W. Johnson / D. Richter [eds.], The Oxford Handbook to the Second Sophistic [Oxford, forthcoming].) For Sextus, despite the great attention he gives to the views of past philosophers, clearly regards himself not merely as a chronicler or preserver of the ideas of the past, but as a practitioner of a still living mode of thought; he is also clearly interested in drawing Pyrrhonism to the attention of outsiders. One would think he would therefore feel some need to take account of actual or possible philosophical rivals among his contemporaries.
Diogenes shows no signs anywhere of regarding Aenesidemus’ Pyrrhonism as importantly distinct from the Pyrrhonism of Pyrrho himself and his immediate disciples. However, given our other evidence for the history of Pyrrhonism, it is possible for us (again, for the most part) to distinguish between sections of these lives that apply to Pyrrho and Timon themselves and sections applying to the Pyrrhonism of Aenesidemus or later. This is not to treat these two lives as the relatively integrated and well-crafted compositions that they actually are. But if our primary interest is in the history of philosophy, rather than in the genre or genres of ancient biography, we are going to have to be willing to pick Diogenes apart.

If we are considering Diogenes as, in part, a source of evidence for the Pyrrhonist tradition begun by Aenesidemus, a central question for us to examine is the question of parallels with Sextus Empiricus, whose surviving works are by far the most extensive record we have of Pyrrhonist scepticism. It has long been recognized that Diogenes’ life of Pyrrho addresses many of the same topics as Sextus, and the similarities sometimes extend to the verbal level. Since Diogenes appears to be at least a generation later than Sextus – he mentions a pupil of his, Saturninus (9.116) – one might

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12 I return to this issue at the end; without entirely exonerating Diogenes of oversimplification, I suggest that his assimilation of the two periods is understandable and perhaps even philosophically significant.

13 M. Frede, “Doxographie, historiographie philosophique et historiographie historique de la philosophie”, Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 97 (1992) 311–25, has argued (using Diogenes as a central case) that there is an inherently anachronistic aspect to the enterprise of ancient doxography, in so far as the goal is to exhibit ideas of the past in such a way as to highlight their relevance to contemporary concerns. But the anachronism drawn attention to by Frede has to do with matters of general approach, and does not (nor is it attempting to) account for the fact that Diogenes seems to equate the views of Pyrrho and of the thinkers who later called themselves his followers; he is elsewhere quite capable of distinguishing among the ideas of successive members of the same school – e.g., the Cyrenaics, 2.85–104. Frede’s paper is nonetheless a valuable demonstration of the variety of enterprises that have fallen under the heading “history of philosophy”, and a salutary warning against jumping to the conclusion that Diogenes or other doxographers are attempting (and doing badly at) any of the same kinds of things that we now might understand under that label.

For another excellent account of what Diogenes is up to, see Warren 2007.

14 The works of Sextus are as follows: 1) *Outlines of Pyrrhonism* (*PH*), a work in three books, of which the first is a general account of the Pyrrhonist outlook, and the second and third scrutinize the theories of non-sceptics in the three traditionally recognized areas of philosophy – logic, physics and ethics; 2) five surviving books of a longer treatment of roughly the same material as books 2 and 3 of *PH*, with two books *Against the Logicians* (*M* 7–8), two *Against the Physicists* (*M* 9–10) and one *Against the Ethicists* (*M* 11), these books having been almost certainly preceded by a lost book or books of a general character corresponding to *PH* 1; and 3) a work in six books addressing the specialized sciences (*M* 1–6, *M* standing for Πρὸς μαθηματικούς, *Against the Professors*), with one book each on grammar, rhetoric, geometry, arithmetic, astrology and music. Almost all the parallels with Diogenes come in *PH* and *M* 7–11. (The second of these three works was at some point wrongly thought to be a continuation of the third, hence the conventional numbering *M* 7–11; Sextus himself refers to this work as Σκεπτικὰ Ὑπομνήματα, *Sceptical Treatises.*
suppose that Diogenes is drawing directly on Sextus. But there are also a great many differences between the two; while there is scarcely any case of a topic treated by Diogenes that does not appear at all in Sextus, the extent of the similarities varies quite widely, and there are numerous cases of topics being treated in a different order or in a different manner. Besides, the places in Diogenes that are very close to Sextus are often juxtaposed with places that are much less close, sometimes in the course of a continuous stretch of homogeneous material. I shall return to these points in detail below. But if they are granted, then a more plausible explanation of the similarities is that Diogenes and Sextus are both indebted, perhaps to differing degrees, to some other, now lost common source or sources.\textsuperscript{15} And if so, then it is possible that in the cases where he diverges from Sextus, Diogenes, being presumably the one who is less likely to innovate,\textsuperscript{16} is preserving traces of a stage in the history of Pyrrhonism that precedes Sextus and differs from him.

In what follows I shall pursue this question of the relation between Diogenes and Sextus, with particular attention to a portion of the Diogenes text not focused on in any of the other papers in this volume; this is the account of the Pyrrhonists’ treatment of a number of central topics in logic, physics and ethics that immediately follows the summaries of the Ten and the Five Modes (90–101). I begin with a structural breakdown of the entire Diogenes text, distinguishing the parts that seem to relate to the period of Pyrrho and Timon themselves from those deriving from the later Pyrrhonist tradition. Focusing on the latter, I then move to an analysis of the nature and extent of the parallels with Sextus, and what they may tell us about the relationship between the two; in my main text I cover only the passage just mentioned, while analysis of the remaining portions of the later Pyrrhonist material (69–89; 102–8) appears in an Appendix. Finally, I concentrate on some salient differences between the treatments of Pyrrhonism in Diogenes (as revealed particularly in 90–101) and Sextus, and their implications for our understanding of its history.

\textsuperscript{15} This too has long been recognized; see especially Barnes 1992.

\textsuperscript{16} At least deliberately. Of course, another possibility is that Diogenes has misunderstood and thus distorted what he found in his sources. So the fact that Diogenes diverges in certain respects from Sextus has to be combined with other evidence before we can venture any conclusions.
2. Outline of the structure

A structural analysis of the lives of Pyrrho and Timon might go as follows:

61–68: Pyrrho’s life, including a brief account of his thought (61), and several remarks bearing on the relevance of his thought to his life (esp. 62; 66; 68), together with a mention of those whom (according to Philo of Athens) he admired (Democritus and Homer, 67)

68–69: Pyrrho’s pupils (some of whom were already mentioned in the previous section)

69–70: The various titles for those professing allegiance to Pyrrho; Theodosius’ challenge to the label ‘Pyrrhonian’, and a hint of a response to it

71–73: The precursors of Pyrrhonism, according to an unnamed ‘some’ (who may or may not have been Pyrrhonists themselves)

74–76: The sceptical phrases, their meaning and their self-applicability

77: Dogmatic objection and the sceptics’ reply, expanding on their attitude to language

78–79: General characterization of Pyrrhonism, drawing at least in part on Aenesidemus

79–88: The Ten Modes

88–89: The Five Modes

90–101: The Pyrrhonists’ treatment of certain key philosophical concepts, described as ‘doing away with’ them (ἀνῄρουν, 90, etc.). This section can be divided into the following subsections:

90: Introductory list of the topics to be addressed

90–91: Demonstration

For another analysis, largely in agreement with this one, see the section headings in Brunschwig 1999. I have also learned a good deal from the scheme offered by Luca Castagnoli at the 2007 Cambridge Mayweek Seminar on Diogenes Laertius book 9.

The response is suggested by the final sentence, λέγοιτο δ’ἄν τι<ς> Πυρρώνειος ὁµότροπος, following some mss. with a small supplement (Hicks, Brunschwig, Dorandi), or, according to other mss. λέγοιτο δ’ἄν Πυρρώνειος ὁµοτρόπως. Either way, the point is that it makes sense to call someone whose demeanor resembles Pyrrho’s a Pyrrhonist, despite the doubts Theodosius has raised.

The list of precursors begins with Homer (71), which may seem preposterous; but see S. Perceau, “Logique poétique et logique sceptique: Homère, le premier des sceptiques”, Cahiers Philosophiques 115 (2008) 9–28, for an analysis of themes and narrative approaches in Homer that could justify such a claim. Note also Pyrrho’s own reported admiration for Homer, mentioned just above. For more on this, see James Warren’s paper in this volume; also Katja Vogt’s Introduction, section 2.

The nature of the objection is obscure and there is probably a lacuna in the text; but the basic idea seems to be that the sceptics do not succeed in ‘eliminating’ (ἀἴρειν) some statement or argument, contrary to what was just claimed in the passage dealing with the self-applicability of the sceptical phrases. Brunschwig 1999, 1114 n. 2, doubts whether the objection refers back to the preceding discussion; but given the opening words πρὸς ὅ (“Contre cela” in Brunschwig’s translation), I do not see any alternative.
91–94: Digression against Dogmatists
94–95: Criterion
96–97: Sign
97–99: Cause
99: Motion
100: Learning
100: Coming into being
101: Good and bad by nature
102: A note on sources
102–104: The charge of dogmatism and the sceptics’ reply
104–105: The charge that sceptics ‘overturn life’ and the sceptics’ reply
106–107: The sceptics’ criterion,\(^2\) including a dogmatic objection and the sceptics’ reply
107–108: The sceptics’ telos (‘end’), including the objection that the sceptic has no resources to avoid committing unspeakable deeds, and the sceptics’ reply
109–115: Timon’s life and works\(^2\)
115–116: The succession of Pyrrhonists, including a disagreement on whether Timon had any immediate successors.

The two biographical sections obviously have to do with the earlier period in which Pyrrho and Timon themselves lived. This is not to say that the material in them derives solely from that period. On the contrary, the life of Pyrrho includes a mention of Aenesidemus’ view of the relation between his philosophy and his life (9.62), and the life of Timon opens with some information from a certain Apollonides of Nicaea,\(^2\) who wrote a commentary on Timon’s 
Silli which he dedicated to the emperor Tiberius (9.109). But the period that is the topic of these sections is clearly the earlier period. As noted above, most of the remaining sections, whatever Diogenes himself may think of the matter, have to do with the later Pyrrhonist tradition. There are a few exceptions to this – leaving aside the closing section on

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\(^2\) This can be understood as a continuation of the sceptics’ reply to the previous objection; I list it separately because it introduces issues of its own.

\(^2\) There is no mention of Timon’s thought as such. Perhaps Diogenes and/or his source thinks this is superfluous given the extensive doxographical section in the life of Pyrrho, which includes several mentions of Timon.

\(^2\) Referred to as ὁ παρ᾽ἡµῶν ‘one of our own’; but there is no agreement on what kind of connection Diogenes (or possibly his source, to whom he is sticking too closely?) is claiming. See the note ad loc. in Brunschwig 1999 for various options that have been proposed. Most recently Alcalá 2012 has suggested that it indicates a common interest (also shared with Timon himself) in poetry; Diogenes’ lives are scattered with verses of his own composition, most often on the philosophers’ manner of death, from a work entitled Πάµµετρος (1.39; 1.63). But despite this, I see no good reason to think that poetry was the primary concern of either Diogenes or Apollonides (on Apollonides, see Barnes 1992, n. 12); if this was the point of the phrase, it would seem oddly gratuitous, especially in context.
the succession of Pyrrhonists (9.115–16), which of course bridges the two periods; Timon is mentioned four times in the doxographical sections of the life of Pyrrho. One of these simply says that their ‘manner of thinking’ (συναγωγή) can be discerned from their surviving writings, and includes Timon and also Nausiphanes, as well as Aenesidemus, among the authors in question (9.102). One might think that Diogenes is here citing the sources that he himself has used in compiling the doxography. But he says that it is “also” possible to gather “the whole” of their manner of thinking (καὶ τὸν ὅλον τρόπον) from these works, which seems to distinguish them from the foregoing summary of the Pyrrhonist outlook; this would not exclude his having drawn on these authors – as, indeed, he explicitly has in the case of both Timon and Aenesidemus – but it would mean that he is not signaling that fact here. The other three appearances of Timon’s name in the doxography are citations of his work Pytho on the meaning of the sceptical phrase οὐδὲν µᾶλλον, ‘no more’ (9.76), of several of his works on the subject of the sceptic’s reliance on the appearances (9.105), and of unnamed writings of his on the sceptic’s end (9.107). Thus at least a small fraction of the doxographical material goes back to the early Pyrrhonist period. But the core sections of the doxography – by which I mean the two sets of Modes together with the ‘doing away with’ numerous central philosophical concepts, all of this preceded by the introductory sketch of the Pyrrhonist outlook citing Aenesidemus (9.78–101) – contain no mention of Timon or any other early follower of Pyrrho. Moreover, these sections have an organizational and stylistic consistency, and they are where a great many of the parallels with Sextus Empiricus are to be found. It is a fair inference that these sections, together with a good deal of the surrounding portions, are products of the later Pyrrhonist tradition.

3. Parallels with Sextus

I move now to a catalog of the Sextus parallels. These have of course been noticed by others. But in a volume like this, I think it is worth providing some detail, rather than a simple list; the nature and extent of the parallels varies considerably from case to case, and only a detailed picture will allow us to understand what can be learned from them. I use the same headings as in the structural analysis above, sometimes in abbreviated form. Parallels with Sextus occur only in the doxographical portion of the life of

24 Cf. n. 10.
25 I here follow BRUNSCHWIG 1999, 1133, n. 3.
26 I have learned especially from BARNES 1992, Appendix II; BRUNSCHWIG 1999; and Luca Castagnoli (cf. n. 17). Barnes indicates different degrees of closeness between passages of Sextus and Diogenes. But these are sometimes open to dispute; in particular, there are more verbal parallels than Barnes allows.
Pyrrho, so I limit myself to that part of the text; and, as noted earlier, the main body of the paper deals only with the treatment of central philosophical concepts immediately following the Modes (90–101), with the remainder being consigned to an Appendix.

90: Introductory list of the topics to be addressed
There is no parallel in Sextus for this passage, although it is interesting that, with only one exception, the order of topics is logic, physics, ethics, as in Sextus; the exception is μάθησις, ‘learning’, which appears in the ethical section of Sextus’ works (PH 3.252–72; M 11.216–56), but before coming into being, a physical topic, in Diogenes. With one other exception (the placing of ἀπόδειξις, ‘demonstration’, at the front in Diogenes), the order of topics within logic and physics in Diogenes also parallels the order in both Sextus’ works that address these topics (i.e., PH and M 7–11; with rare exceptions I do not mention M 1–6 in this paper).27

90–91: Demonstration
Sextus addresses this topic at length in both works (PH 2.144–92; M 8.337–481). In most cases Diogenes’ account follows lines of thought rehearsed by Sextus at much greater length. The appeal to the reciprocal mode, where demonstration requires a criterion and vice versa (9.91), has a counterpart in both works (PH 2.183; M 8.380), and this is the closest we come to a really detailed parallel; otherwise, precisely because of the great differences of scale, the similarity is generic. As Barnes has noted, Diogenes’ point that distrust of particular demonstrations leads to distrust of demonstration in general (9.91) goes against a methodological recommendation in Sextus (M 8.337a–339): that one attack demonstration in general, since this will encompass an attack on any particular demonstrations, whereas attacking particular demonstrations with a view to undoing demonstration in general would be an impossible, because infinite, task. As Barnes suggests, Diogenes may be preserving an alternative Pyrrhonist approach with which Sextus is here disagreeing.28

91–94: Digression against Dogmatists
This passage is something of a surprise, since it is a general attack on the dogmatists, not focused on any of the topics previewed in the list at 9.90. Barnes suggests that perhaps it originally belonged immediately after the Five Modes and before the introduction to the treatment of specific topics.29 But, although it begins with a reference to the mode of hypothesis, it quickly moves to other issues, and would be a somewhat unmotivated di-

27 For a brief catalog of Sextus’ works, see again n. 14.
28 Barnes 1992, 4250–1, endorsed by Brunschwig 1999, 1125, n. 8. Note that at the start of Against the Physicists (M 9.1) Sextus associates the focus on particular cases with the Academics.
29 Barnes 1992, 4249.
version in that position as well; moreover, since the general topic is how we are to judge what is true, there is at least a rough connection with the topics of demonstration and the criterion that precede and follow it. So although it does not conform to the neat preview of topics shortly before, it is not obviously more out of place in this position than anywhere else. As for parallels with Sextus, the rejection of the idea that the ‘convincing’ (τὸ ... πείθον, 9.94) is true echoes a question on the same topic in Sextus (M 8.51), and Diogenes’ explanation, “the same thing does not convince all people, nor does it convince the same people all the time” has a close, though not perfect, linguistic parallel at the start of Sextus’ response to the question (M 8.52). Otherwise the similarities are again at a generic level.

94–95: Criterion

The opening dilemma – “Either the criterion has already been established (κέκριται), or it is not yet determined (ἄκριτον)” (9.94) – has a partial verbal parallel in Against the Logicians (M 7.441); and the more or less explicit references to various of the Five Modes that are then used to close off attempts to resolve the dilemma can be paralleled, though not at a detailed linguistic level, both in Against the Logicians (M 7.340–2; 440–2) and in Outlines (PH 2.20). In addition, the dispute about the criterion that Diogenes goes on to sketch – some say that it is the human being (τὸν ἄνθρωπον), some the senses, some reason, and some the cognitive impression (9.95) – has a parallel in the structure of the discussion of this topic in both works of Sextus; there is the criterion “by which” (namely, the human being), the criterion “through which” (namely, the senses or thought [διάνοια]), and the criterion “in virtue of which” (namely, appearances, of which the Stoic cognitive impression, if it existed, would be the most plausible candidate) (PH 2.21–78; M 7.261–439). Diogenes presents these as rival views of what the criterion is, which is misleading; as both works of Sextus make clear, they are in fact different ways of speaking about a criterion, complementary to one another (PH 2.21; M 7.34–7). But it is striking that the same error occurs at one point in Against the Logicians, where Sextus has just finished laying out what he calls “the entire disagreement about the criterion”, and slips into speaking as if the criteria “by which”, “through which” and “in virtue of which” are instances of this disagreement (M 7.261). Finally,

30 Diogenes employs the distinction between sense-perception and intellect (9.92), which also appears in Sextus’ longer treatment of the Five Modes (PH 1.170–2); but the way it is used in Diogenes has no overt reference to the Five Modes (even if one could make a connection with them – as one could without too much trouble in almost any context of Pyrrhonist argument).

31 At least, if this part of the sentence is not in fact an ill-advised gloss, as argued by Heintz 1932, ad loc. But Heintz has a somewhat excessive tendency to suspect the text of Sextus whenever he detects a problem of consistency or logic. The term “in virtue of which” (καθ᾽ὁ) does not occur at this point in the text; here and elsewhere in Against the Logicians, Sextus resorts to a more cumbersome paraphrase.
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Diogenes’ closing remark that the criterion is not to be known, “and hence truth too is unknown” (9.95) has a parallel in the fact that truth is the next topic in both works, and a closer parallel in Against the Logicians when Sextus remarks, at the opening of the discussion of truth, that “if there is no obvious criterion, the true is also necessarily made unclear at the same time” (M 8.2).

96–97: Sign
Diogenes identifies the sign as “something relative” (πρός τι, 9.96), as opposed to one of “the things that are distinct from one another” (κατὰ διαφορὰν) – that is, absolute. He also presents four possible combinations (all of which are then argued against): a sign is either apparent or non-apparent, and so is the thing of which it is a sign. In both respects, although there is a great difference in length, this passage is paralleled by a passage early in Against the Logicians’ discussion of the sign (M 8.161–75) that is centered on the sign’s relative status. But Diogenes’ discussion incorporates a further pair of alternatives – the sign is either perceptible or intelligible – which is not present in this passage of Sextus.\(^{32}\) Later, however, Sextus considers each of these alternatives, and one part of that discussion (M 8.188–91) reads like a greatly expanded version of Diogenes’ terse remark that “the perceptible is common to all, whereas a is something particular”, i.e., varies from one individual to another (9.96). There is no passage in Outlines that parallels Diogenes’ treatment of the sign in the same way as M 8.161–75 does; but one particular point – that since the sign is relative, it “ought to be comprehended together with” (συγκαταλαµβάνεσθαι ὀφείλει) the thing of which it is the sign – does have a verbal parallel in Outlines (9.97; PH 2.119) of which there is no exact counterpart at the corresponding place in Against the Logicians (M 8.165), even though the broader context in Outlines is slightly different (the idea being that a sign should occur before that of which it is a sign, not “together with” it).

97–99: Cause
There are no significant parallels with the discussion of cause in Outlines (PH 3.13–29). The relativity of causes, and their corporeality or otherwise, are both mentioned (3.28, 3.14), but the approach to these topics is substantially different from Diogenes’. In the former case Sextus appeals to the idea that a cause must be conceived before its effect (which is not possible if causes are relative to their effects), whereas Diogenes emphasizes

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\(^{32}\) According to the manuscripts, the possibility that the sign is intelligible is explored by means of the apparent/non-apparent dichotomies: τὸ νοητὸν ἤτοι φαινόµενον ἐστὶ φαινοµένου, etc. Barnes 1992, 4292, and Brunschwig 1999, 1129, n. 4, call attention to the fact that this makes no sense; they posit a lacuna in which the ‘intelligible’ option is dismissed, after which Diogenes turned to the apparent/non-apparent issue as a new topic. (The new text of Dorandi also posits a lacuna, presumably for the same reason, though in a slightly different place and following a different set of manuscripts.)
that relatives are merely conceived and do not exist (9.97); in the latter, whether or not causes are corporeal is simply mentioned by Sextus as the object of a disagreement, whereas in Diogenes a series of jointly exhaustive alternatives – body is cause of body, incorporeal of incorporeal, incorporeal of body, or body of incorporeal – is presented and then argued against one by one (9.98–9). One part of Against the Physicists’ discussion of cause, however – it is the first section of the sceptics’ critique – is very close to Diogenes’ treatment (M 9.207–17). In both cases the relativity issue comes first, then the corporeality/incorporeality issue, and the main point in each case is the same in Sextus as in Diogenes. Moreover, there is a considerable number of verbally identical (or almost identical) passages in the two authors, as follows:  

33 Diogenes begins τὸ αἴτιον τῶν πρὸς τι ἔστι (9.97); Sextus has the same words plus the particle τοίνυν and φασί, “they say” (M 9.207). The problem with the relativity of causes is given by Diogenes as τὰ δὲ πρὸς τι ἐπινοεῖται μόνον, ύπάρχει δ’ οὔ (9.97); Sextus’ wording is identical except for a γε after the δὲ and ἀλλ’ οὐχ ύπάρχει instead of ύπάρχει δ’ οὔ (M 9.208). In developing this point Diogenes has καὶ τὸ αἴτιον οὖν ἐπινοεῖτο ἀν μόνον (9.98) and Sextus has καὶ τὸ αἴτιον ἄρα ἐπινοηθήσεται μόνον (M 9.208). Introducing a new line of thought having to do with the relativity of cause, Sextus says εἴπερ τε αἴτιον ἔστι, ὀφείλει ἔχειν τὸ οὗ λέγεται αἴτιον, ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἔσται αἴτιον, “And if there is cause, it ought to contain the thing of which it is said to be the cause, since (sc. otherwise) it will not be the cause” (M 9.209); Diogenes’ wording is identical except that (at least according to the manuscripts) it begins ἐτι εἶπεο ἔστιν αἴτιον (9.98).  

34 In the development of this argument, both authors mention ‘coming into being’ and ‘destruction’ (γένεσις and φθορά) as among the things that would have to exist if there were to be causes (9.98; M 9.209).  

35 This was already documented in JANÁČEK 1959. JANÁČEK argues for the view that, when the two texts differ slightly, Diogenes is closer to the original source and the text is “changed by the active Sextus” (56), whose version is often a little more elaborate and varied. But his argument, which is based on small stylistic differences between the different works of Sextus, depends in part on the highly dubious assumption that Against the Physicists is later than Outlines; on this see n. 49. To me these differences seem just as likely to be due to Diogenes flattening the style of the original, with Sextus’ version therefore being closer to it. But I doubt very much that any definite conclusions can be reached on this matter.  

34 BARNES 1992, 4292, proposes to alter ἐπει to ἐπι or to amend to [ἐπει] εἰπεο <επει> ἔστιν αἴτιον, since it is clear (and is made clear by Sextus) that this sentence is beginning a new argument rather than (as ἐπει would indicate) continuing a previous one. In this he is followed by the texts of MARCOVICH 1999 and DORANDI 2013 (who adopt the first of Barnes’ options) and BRUNSCHWIG’s translation (BRUNSCHWIG 1999, 1130 with n. 4). As a point about the logic of the passage, this is unimpeachable; as an argument for changing the text of Diogenes, it is questionable.  

35 The point is considerably clearer in Sextus’ more expansive version. Sextus says that there is no such thing as “that of which it is the cause” because of the non-existence of
this stretch of argument ends in both authors with οὐκ ἄρα ἐστίν αἰτίον (9.98; M 9.209).

The arguments surrounding corporeality and its opposite begin in both authors with the words καὶ μὴν εἰ ἐστιν αἰτίον, ἦτοι σῶμα σώματος ἐστιν αἰτίον ἢ ἀσώματον ἀσωμάτου (9.98; M 9.210). Sextus adds the other two alternatives at this point – body as cause of incorporeal or vice versa – whereas Diogenes does not mention these until later (9.99). The order in which the alternatives are dealt with is the same in both authors, except that Sextus treats the last two simultaneously (M 9.216–17), Diogenes separately (incorporeal as cause of body first, then the reverse). The considerations used to dismiss these various alternatives are broadly, though not exactly, the same, and Sextus inserts a doxographical excursus about Stoic and Epicurean views (M 9.211–13), designed to confirm that these four alternatives really will capture the range of views out there, that has no counterpart in Diogenes. The dismissal of the first alternative consists of several lines of text that are almost word-for-word identical in both authors (9.98–9; M 9.214). In both authors the second alternative – incorporeals as cause of incorporeals – is said not to hold “for the same reason” (διὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, 9.99; διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν, M 9.215). Finally, the dismissal of body as cause of incorporeal in both authors includes the phrase τῆς

γένεσις, φθορά and motion in general; presumably the point is that these are necessary conditions of anything being brought about by causes, and hence of causation itself. By contrast, Diogenes’ more compressed wording at least implies that γένεσις and φθορά are themselves instances of the effects that would have to accompany causes, if there were to be such things as causes.

36 Unless we decide to add them to the text at this point, as do Marcovich 1999 (apparently following a suggestion of Hirzel) and Dorandi 2013. Janaček 1959, 53–4 also argues that this is required by the logic of the argument, by parallel cases in Diogenes, and by the following words οὐδὲν ἔστι τούτων, “none of these”, which suggests more than two options. Janaček proposes that “the scribe – it may be hoped it was not Diogenes himself – omitted by mistake” the two further alternatives (53). A scribal omission in such a case is of course quite possible, and the “none of these” certainly suggests that the source mentioned all four alternatives at this point, as does Sextus. But I do not find it at all implausible (and unlike Janaček, I do not shudder at the thought) that Diogenes may have omitted the last two, out of mild carelessness, a (perhaps slightly misplaced) desire for conciseness, or whatever. So I prefer to leave the text as it is.

37 In Diogenes the text reads as follows: σῶμα μὲν σῶματος σῶμα ἄρα ἐστιν αἰτίον, ἐπείπερ ἀμφότερα τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει φύσιν. Καὶ εἰ ἂν τὸ ἐπαρχέων αἰτίον λέγεται παρ’ ὅσον ἐστὶ σῶμα, καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν σῶμα ἄν αἰτίον γενήσεται. Κοινῶς δὲ ἀμφότερων αἰτίων ὄντων, οὐδὲν ἄρα τοῦτο πάσχον. The only differences in Sextus are these: 1) he has παρ’ before the first occurrence of αἰτίον, 2) he has παρ’ before καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν σῶμα, 3) he has σῶμα καθεστώς instead of σῶμα ἄρα, and 4) he has ἐστι instead of ἄρα in the final sentence.

38 “By the same argument” in Scharffenberger / Vogt; I use ‘reason’ to cover both λόγον and αἰτίαν. In discussion it was suggested by David Sedley that Diogenes’ λόγον is an improvement on the αἰτίαν that appears in Sextus, indicating that Diogenes’ version represents a later phase. It is true that αἰτίαν is awkward in the context of alternative possibilities concerning ‘cause’ (αἰτίον).
πασχούσης ὕλης, “the matter that is acted on”, next to the word ὀφείλει, ‘ought’, though the thought in Sextus is more spelled out and sophisticated (9.99; M 9.216). Diogenes’ treatment of cause ends with the additional point that, if there is no such thing as cause, “the principles of everything” (τὰς τῶν ὅλων ἀρχάς, 9.99) do not exist, “for what makes and acts must be something” (δεῖ γὰρ εἶναι τι τὸ ποιοῦν καὶ δρῶν). There is no counterpart of this in the current passage of Sextus, although the entirety of Against the Physicists is presented in the introduction (M 9.1–12) as having to do with principles, and ‘active’ (ποιητικαί or δραστηριότητα) principles, of which cause is one, are one of the two main types of principle.

99: Motion

Diogenes’ treatment of motion is very short. He simply says that whatever moves does so “either in the place where it is, or in the place where it is not” (ἦτοι ἐν ὧν ἐστι τόπῳ κινεῖται ἢ ἐν ὧν μὴ ἐστίν, 9.99), then denies, for each of these cases, that movement occurs, and concludes “there is no movement”. The denial that movement occurs in either case was mentioned earlier and ascribed to Zeno of Elea (9.72); the wording was identical to the phrase quoted just above, except that οὔτε ... οὔτε occurred in place of ἤτοι ... ἢ. But in several places in Sextus the same pair of alternatives is ascribed to Diodorus Cronus (PH 3.71; M 10.87; M 1.311 – cf. PH 2.242, where the argument appears as an example of a sophism, with no attribution). The wording of the two alternatives themselves is identical to Diogenes’ in all these places, except that the two passages from Outlines have οὐκ instead of μή in the initial statement of the alternatives. Most of these passages of Sextus, however, include some semblance of argument for why neither alternative obtains, rather than simply stating this as Diogenes does. Regardless of this point, there was clearly a standard presentation of the paradox that was well known to both authors.

100: Learning

All three of Sextus’ works contain arguments against teaching and learning (PH 3.252–73; M 11.216–43; M 1.10–38), including arguments to the effect that either “that which is” (τὸ ὄν) or “something which is not” (τὸ μὴ ὄν) is taught. The argument in M 1, in the general introductory section of Against the Professors preceding the treatment of specific fields, is set up as a dilemma with precisely the same wording as in Diogenes – εἴπερ διδάσκεται τι, ἢτοι τὸ ὄν τῷ ἔντω καὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν τῷ μὴ ἐγίνεται (M 1.10) – though it explores the two alternatives in somewhat more detail and in the reverse order (M 1.10–14). Diogenes’ point against the first alternative, that “that which is” cannot be taught “through its being” because “the nature of things that are is apparent to all and recognized by all”, is also paralleled in the M 1 version (M 1.14), though not at a verbal level. There

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39 Scharffenberger / Vogt add “on something else” after “acts”.
is, however, a verbal parallel in Against the Ethicists to Diogenes’ argument against his second alternative: “Nothing happens to something which is not, with the consequence that it is not learned, either” – οὐδὲν γὰρ αὐτῷ συμβεβήκεν, ἀπότευκτο τὸ διδάσκεσθαι (M 11.219), Against the Ethicists, too, goes on at considerably greater length on this topic than Diogenes (M 11.219–23), as does Outlines (PH 3.256–8); there are no precise parallels between the Outlines passage and Diogenes.  

100: Coming into being

Against the Physicists and Outlines both have sections on coming into being and perishing (PH 3.109–14; M 10.310–50), including an argument parallel to the one in Diogenes: what comes into being either is or is not, but neither alternative is feasible (PH 3.112, M 10.326–7). There are no precise verbal parallels (and in both works of Sextus, the alternatives are treated in the reverse order), but the argument against the “is” option in Against the Physicists (“for what is already is”, ἐστὶ γὰρ ἣδη τὸ ὄν, M 10.327) is close to that of Diogenes; the Outlines version is somewhat more circuitous.

101: Good and bad by nature

Again there are parallels between Diogenes and two works of Sextus, Outlines and Against the Ethicists (PH 3.179–82; M 11.69–75). But the parallels with Against the Ethicists are considerably closer. Like Diogenes, Sextus here (but not in Outlines) begins with a conditional of the form “if there is anything by nature good or bad, it ought to be good or bad for everyone” (M 11.69); the wording is not identical in both passages, but there is a lot of common vocabulary. All three works follow with the example of snow, preceded by fire in both works of Sextus (M 11.69; PH 3.179). Diogenes continues with the words οὐδὲν δὲ κοινὸν πάντων ἀγαθόν ἢ κακόν ἐστιν· οὐκ ἄρα ἐστὶ φύσει ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακόν. In Against the Ethicists (M 11.71) Sextus has a near-identical sentence (following some further exploration of the requirement that things which are by nature a certain way must be so in a way that is “common to all”); the only differences are a) Sextus has τι before φύσει, b) the ἐστιν in the first part is in a different position, and c) Sextus adds ὡς παραστήσομεν, “as we will establish”. Diogenes follows with ἢτοι γὰρ πᾶν τὸ ὑπὸ τινὸς δοξαζόμενον ῥητέον ἀγαθόν ἢ οὐ πᾶν· καὶ πᾶν μὲν οὐ ῥητέον … Again Sextus in Against the Ethicists has almost the same wording (M 11.72); the only differences are an additional occurrence of ἀγαθόν after δοξαζόμενον and the words ταῖς ἀληθείαις after the first ῥητέον. Both works then cite the example of pleasure, with the contrasting views of Epicurus and Antisthenes (not mentioned by name in Sextus, but identified by the quotation “I would rather be mad than feel

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40 I have analyzed the relations among the three Sextus passages, including the parallels with Diogenes, in Bett 1997, 267–9.

41 I have compared the two Sextus passages and the Diogenes passage, though with less detailed attention to the latter than here, in Bett 1997, 258–60.
Sextus then mentions several other views on the subject and then reflects further on the topic, ending with the thought that if we accept all these views, pleasure will be simultaneously good and bad and indifferent, but the same thing cannot by nature have opposite characteristics (M 11.74); this resembles Diogenes’ next words συμβήσεται τοίνυν τὸ αὐτὸ ἀγαθὸν τε εἶναι καὶ κακόν, though there is no precise verbal parallel. Both works then introduce the other possibility: that instead of everything thought by anyone to be good or bad being good or bad by nature, some things are and some are not – which would mean that there would need to be some means of distinguishing between them (9.101; M 11.75); the wording is not particularly close, although both passages include the word διακρίνειν. Sextus then considers (and rejects) possible means by which the difference between the opinions that correctly track the nature of things, and those that do not, might be discerned (M 11.76–7), whereas Diogenes simply says that this is impossible “because of the equal strength (ἰσοοθένεια) of argument”, and concludes “what is good by nature is unknown”.

4. Some implications

What, then, are we to make of all this material? I think we can discern three kinds of things going on in the parallels that I have summarized both in the preceding section and in the Appendix. First, there are a few cases where the verbal parallels between Diogenes and Sextus are so close that we must assume that they are both indebted, directly or indirectly, to a common Pyrrhonist source, and that they are copying parts of this source (again, directly or indirectly) word for word. Second, in a number of cases we find common phrases or vocabulary, but of a more isolated and less extended variety; we also find parallels in the order or manner in which topics are treated, without significant verbal parallels. In these cases, although a reliance on common sources – with at least one of the two authors being more independent or creative (as compared with the previous scenario) in his adaptation of the material he finds there – cannot be ruled out, we might rather be inclined to infer a broad commonality of approach or lingua franca among the Pyrrhonist movement as a whole, with a number

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42 Outlines also includes a brief mention of pleasure (PH 3.181), but most of its examples of disagreement are quite different.

43 One can of course postulate as many generations of sources as one wants, so long as a good deal of verbal copying occurred from one generation to the next. The simplest hypothesis is that Sextus and Diogenes both draw from the same common source, but it is not impossible that Sextus draws on a source A and Diogenes on a source B, both A and B being similarly indebted to a common source C (and so on). But since we are almost entirely ignorant of what the works in question might have been, it is idle to speculate between these alternatives.
of Pyrrhonists both writing and speaking among themselves on common topics in a somewhat established manner and with catch-phrases that were common property; in this case Diogenes and Sextus need not be drawing on the very same sources, but could be absorbing these common features via distinct sources, without there being any single Ur-Text behind them. Third, we saw occasional instances where a difference in how some topic is dealt with in Diogenes and in Sextus may point to rival approaches within Pyrrhonism, with the two of them drawing on sources that are not only distinct, but in opposition to one another. Whichever of these three possibilities may obtain in any given case, it is fair to say that Sextus and Diogenes represent the tip of the iceberg that was Pyrrhonism, to the rest of which we have almost no direct access.

It may nevertheless be possible to make some inferences about the history of Pyrrhonism, and this brings me to my last topic: a set of differences between Diogenes and Sextus about which I have so far said nothing – differences that are especially apparent in the passage of Diogenes on which I have focused in the previous section, as compared with the position one typically finds in Sextus. Diogenes begins this passage with the word ἀνῄρουν, “they did away with” (90), followed by a list of all the items to be discussed in what follows. It sounds, then, as if he is going to report a series of arguments for the non-existence of the items in question: demonstration, the criterion, and so on. And this seems to be born out by the fact that, while several of the individual topics are introduced with the same word ἀνῄρουν or the equivalent present ἀναιροῦσι (the criterion [94], cause [97] and learning [100]), several others are instead introduced by assertions of the form “There is no X” (sign [96], motion [99], coming into being [100] and the good and bad by nature [101]); the same kind of assertion, οὐκ ἄρα ἐστὶν or οὐκ ἔστι τοίνυν αἴτιον, “There is, then, no cause”, also occurs several times in the course of the discussion of cause, which was introduced, as we just saw, with the “doing away with” language.44

So Diogenes represents the Pyrrhonists as arguing for the non-existence of the whole series of items discussed in this passage. Now, this is certainly not what one would expect from Sextus’ standard account of Pyrrhonism. For, while Sextus very frequently offers arguments against the existence of things believed in by the dogmatists (arguments that are surely in many cases of the Pyrrhonists’ own devising), he also frequently makes clear that these arguments are to be balanced with the positive arguments of the dogmatists themselves, leading to a situation in which one suspends judgement about the arguments on either side. Has Diogenes, then, mis-

44 Note also Diogenes’ report of the sceptics’ use of the phrase οὐ μᾶλλον; according to him they used it ἀναιρετικῶς (9.75 – see the analysis of this passage in comparison with Sextus in the Appendix).
read the Pyrrhonists’ goal? Or is he being very unclear about the function their negative arguments are meant to play? Or is he, rather, accurately reporting a version of Pyrrhonism different from what we find in Sextus? I will offer some considerations in favor of the last alternative. But before I do that, there is a further complication to address.

In addition to reporting these arguments as showing the non-existence of various things, Diogenes also says of several of these same things that they are unknown or unknowable; demonstration is said to be ‘unknown’ (ἀγνωστόν, 95), and both the criterion and the good and bad by nature are described as ἀγνωστόν (95; 101), which can mean either ‘unknown’ or ‘unknowable’. Is this not flatly inconsistent? I once tried to explain it by saying that if something is non-existent, it cannot be known about.45 There may be something to that, and it might be worth further exploration; but I now think that a better explanation comes from the nature of the particular things that are said to be unknown. In the case of demonstration and criterion, it is at least tempting to argue that if they are not known as such, they cannot play their roles as demonstration or criterion respectively; for something to serve as a demonstration or criterion, one must be aware that this is what it is.46 Hence there cannot be any such thing as a demonstration or a criterion that is not known, and so to say that demonstration or criterion is not known is equivalent to saying that these do not exist. That this is the kind of connection envisaged is supported by the fact that the arguments in both cases (90–1; 94–5) – arguments introduced, as we saw, as establishing the non-existence of demonstration and criterion – revolve entirely around epistemological considerations about what it would take for something to be ‘confirmed’ or ‘validated’ as a demonstration or criterion; to fail in this task is to leave us in the position where there are no specimens of either. The case of good and bad is a little less obvious. But here too (101) the arguments have to do centrally with whether there is agreement in what is viewed as or experienced as good or bad. For something to be good or bad by nature, the assumption seems to be, it must be good or bad for everyone, and the analogy with snow (which is cold to everyone) suggests that this includes everyone’s being aware of it as good.47

45 See Bett 1997, xxi-xxii.
46 This would not be granted on all sides, at least for the case of the criterion. Those who have argued for an externalist reading of the Stoic criterion would claim that, on the Stoic view, someone could be in possession of the criterion without being aware of this; what counts is that the person’s impressions are in fact guaranteed to be true (because of being in the right relation to their objects), not that the person is in a position to certify this. See especially M. Frede, “Stoics and Skeptics on Clear and Distinct Impressions”, in: Burnyeat 1983, 65–93. But it is at least a common and intuitive view that, by definition, a criterion must be something that the agent can make conscious and deliberate use of.
47 In my commentary on Sextus’ more detailed version of this argument in Against the Ethicists, I called this the Recognition Requirement (Bett 1997, 95–107). From the point of
Hence if there is irreducible disagreement about what is in fact good, then there is no such object of common awareness, and this result may be expressed interchangeably by “what is good [or bad] by nature is unknown”, as Diogenes ends this section, or by “there is no thing that is good or bad by nature”, as he begins it.

Let us return, then, to the conclusions concerning the non-existence of all the things discussed in this part of the doxographical section. Is Diogenes here in error, or is he reporting on a different kind of Pyrrhonism from that which predominates in Sextus? I think that Sextus himself provides some confirmation that the latter is the correct alternative, and that is why I said “predominates”; in Against the Ethicists Sextus (contrary to his usual practice) argues for the same kind of negative existential conclusion as we find in the Diogenes passage. He offers several arguments to the effect that nothing is by nature good or bad (M 11.68–95). The first of these (68–78) is the one bearing close parallels with Diogenes’ own section on good and bad (9.101); I said earlier that this passage of Against the Ethicists is much closer to Diogenes than is the corresponding passage of Outlines of Pyrrhonism, and one respect in which this is true is that the former, but not the latter, simply argues for this conclusion, rather than suspending judgement on the topic. And that Sextus really means us to accept this conclusion is later stated by him in so many words; although, as I said, he often offers negative arguments with the intention that they be balanced with the dogmatists’ positive arguments (so that suspension of judgement is the result after all), Against the Ethicists cannot be read in this way. The only way to bring someone to ἀταραξία (the sceptic’s goal, which he assumes others also desire) is, he says, “if we show (ὑποδείξαι µεν) to the person who is disturbed on account of his avoidance of the bad or his pursuit of the good, that there is not anything either good or bad by nature … But such a teaching (τὸ δὲ γε διδάσκειν τὸ τοιοῦτον) is certainly peculiar to scepticism; it is scepticism’s achievement, therefore, to procure the happy life” (140). In a similar vein, a little earlier, he says that “when reason has established (λόγου δὲ παραστήσαντος) that none of these things (that is, things misguidedely sought or avoided on the assumption that they are truly good or bad) is by nature good or by nature bad, there will be a release from disturbance” (130); once again, ἀταραξία is produced not via suspension of judgement, but by becoming convinced of the conclusion that nothing is by nature good or bad.48

In this one place, then, Sextus and Diogenes are in agreement in arguing for a definite conclusion concerning the non-existence of something. Now,

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48 I follow the translation in Bett 1997. The commentary also includes a much fuller exposition of the issues mentioned here.
since the parallels between Diogenes 9.101 and the corresponding passage in Against the Ethicists are much closer than those between Diogenes 9.101 and the corresponding passage of Outlines of Pyrrhonism, it seems plausible that in Against the Ethicists Sextus is following the common source much more closely than he is in Outlines. And since one of the respects in which the Outlines passage differs from Against the Ethicists and Diogenes is that the former aims for suspension of judgement on the topic, but the latter two argue for a definite negative conclusion, it also seems plausible that the common source argued for the definite negative conclusion, and that Sextus in Outlines has modified what he found in that common source so as to conform to his own habitual sceptical practice. If so, we have evidence of a version of Pyrrhonism predating Sextus that is preserved in Diogenes, but that Sextus himself has largely eliminated.

Can we say anything more substantial about the character of this earlier form of Pyrrhonism? I have elsewhere tried to fill it out, appealing both to further details in Against the Ethicists and in Diogenes, as well as to the summary by Photius of Aenesidemus’ Pyrrhonist Discourses (Bibl. 169b18–171a4). A key idea is the principle, present in both the Diogenes passage on good and bad (9.101) and in the corresponding passage of Against the Ethicists, that for something to be a certain way “by nature”, its character as such must be “common to all” – that is, it must be that way without exception. Given that principle, drawing attention to exceptions suffices to disqualify the thing’s being that way by nature. It does not, however, prevent the thing’s having that set of characteristics in certain circumstances, or in relation to some people but not others. And so, accompanying the denial of things being good or bad (or any particular way) by nature is

49 This does not absolutely require that Against the Ethicists is earlier than Outlines, but it makes it very likely. It is one of a number of indications that Outlines comes after, not before, the longer work the surviving portions of which are Against the Logicians, Against the Physicists and Against the Ethicists. See Bett 1997, Introduction and Appendix C, and the works cited in the following note.


51 See especially Bett 1997, introduction, together with commentary on 68–78; 112–8; also Bett 2000, chapter 4.
a willingness to make relativized assertions about their characteristics. We find this in Against the Ethicists, where alongside denying that things are good or bad by nature, Sextus speaks of things as good (or to be chosen) at some times but not others (M 11.114; 118); we also find traces of it in both Sextus’ and Diogenes’ versions of the Ten Modes. The case for connecting all this with Aenesidemus is controversial, and I certainly cannot undertake a full defense of the position here. But I hope at least to have shown that we have reason to regard Diogenes’ account of the Pyrrhonists’ “doing away with” all the things discussed in 9.90–101 as genuinely reflecting a form of argument employed by Pyrrhonists at some point prior to Sextus.

If we accept this much, then we may be more inclined to give some credit to a connection between the Pyrrhonism on which Diogenes is reporting in the doxographical section of the life of Pyrrho and the views of Pyrrho himself, as reported in a very brief passage at the start of this life. Pyrrho, Diogenes says (9.61), “used to claim that nothing is fine or shameful, or just or unjust, and that similarly – in the case of all things – nothing is in truth this or that, but that men do all things by custom and habit. For, he claimed, each thing is no more ‘this’ than ‘that’.” Again we have a denial that anything is any particular way “in truth” (τῇ ἀληθείᾳ), which seems close to Against the Ethicists’ denial, in the case of good and bad, that anything has either of these characteristics “by nature”. And again we have an appeal to something other than the nature of things – namely, “custom and habit” (νόµῳ δὲ καὶ ἔθει) – to explain the way people behave, and presumably, therefore, the way they see things (as just or unjust, for example) on any given occasion; this seems to parallel Against the Ethicists’ appeal to relativities to explain how people can view things as having particular characteristics in particular circumstances – and legitimately so, although they may go on to make the mistake of thinking that these characteristics belong to the things in some more permanent or essential way.

It does not follow, of course, that the views of Pyrrho himself, and of the Pyrrhonists whose position is reflected in the doxographical section of Diogenes on which I have been concentrating, were identical. I have elsewhere argued that the other evidence on Pyrrho, particularly the passage of Aristocles that purports to summarize Timon’s account of Pyrrho (Eusebius, Praep. evang. 14.18.1–5), points towards his having held a view of reality as indeterminate in its nature (which is certainly one way the sentence from Diogenes 9.61 can be read, perhaps the most natural way),

Schofield 2007 has challenged numerous aspects of this view, particularly the reading of the Photius passage to support pinning this earlier form of Pyrrhonism on Aenesidemus. Schofield criticizes my interpretation, but also that of Paul Woodruff in an earlier article by which I was much influenced (Woodruff 1988). But Schofield is not unsympathetic to the general idea of an evolution in the Pyrrhonist tradition, and as far as I can see, nothing in his article puts into doubt my use of Against the Ethicists 130 and 140 to support the conclusion that Diogenes is preserving an authentic earlier variety of Pyrrhonism.
but that the later Pyrrhonists reflected in Diogenes’ doxography and in Sextus’ Against the Ethicists refrained from any attempt to specify the nature of things. Here too the issues are complex and controversial – and Diogenes, at any rate taken on his own, can hardly be regarded as the most reliable evidence on either phase in Pyrrhonism’s history. But at least the comparison in the previous paragraph can make sense of the fact that, as we noted earlier, Diogenes seems to regard the Pyrrhonism both of Pyrrho and of his later followers as a single outlook throughout its history. It is by no means obvious that the view of Pyrrho, as Diogenes sketches it in 9.61, amounts to anything particularly close to the outlook expressed in the first book of Sextus’ Outlines of Pyrrhonism. But since Diogenes focuses in the doxography not on the Pyrrhonism of Sextus’ Outlines but on what seems to be a different and earlier version, it is easier to see how he would not find anything much to distinguish Pyrrhonism from Pyrrho. And even if we may wish to distinguish them, we can also allow that Diogenes’ readiness to see Pyrrhonism as a single outlook may, whatever his philosophical limitations, reflect something true and important about the history of Pyrrhonism: that the earlier version of Pyrrhonism featured in his doxography really was considerably closer to the ideas of Pyrrho himself than is the Pyrrhonism of the Outlines. Sextus appears distinctly stand-offish and even a trifle embarrassed about the label ‘Pyrrhonian’; he very rarely uses it (or mentions Pyrrho, for that matter), and his official explanation of it (PH 1.7) hardly makes it sound very significant. One would surely expect that those who first adopted this label did so with more enthusiasm; and the picture that I am pointing to, with Diogenes’ help, would explain this.

Appendix: Analysis of Parallels with Sextus in 9.69–89, 102–108

69–70: The various titles for those professing allegiance to Pyrrho
The list of titles (Πυρρώνειοι, ἀπορητικοί, σκεπτικοί, ἐφεκτικοί, ζήτητικοί) is identical to that in the short chapter “On the names of scepticism” near the beginning of Sextus’ Outlines of Pyrrhonism (PH 1.7), except that Sextus applies these adjectives to the ‘method’ (ἀγωγή) rather than to the people themselves, and that he presents σκεπτική, a term that he has already introduced, as the central one, and the other four as alternatives to it. The labels are not presented in the same order, and the language used to explain each one is not particularly close, with one exception: Sextus explains the label ‘ephectic’ by the phrase ἀπὸ τοῦ μετὰ τὴν ζήτησιν περὶ τὸν σκεπτόμενον γινομένου πάθους, “from the effect that occurs in the

53 See Bett 2000: on Pyrrho, chapters 1 and 2, and on the later Pyrrhonists, chapter 4.
inquirer after the investigation”, and Diogenes offers an abbreviated version of this same phrase, ἀπὸ τοῦ μετὰ τὴν ζήτησιν πάθους.

71–73: The precursors of Pyrrhonism
There are no parallels with Sextus in this section. But it is noteworthy that three of the philosophers named here as proto-sceptics – Xenophanes, Democritus and Heraclitus – appear in Sextus’ account of the “neighboring philosophies” at the end of book 1 of *Outlines of Pyrrhonism*. Sextus’ aim is to show that all of these philosophies are different from scepticism; so Diogenes’ source (who, as I suggested, may or may not come from within the sceptical movement) is perhaps one of the authors to whom Sextus is responding.

74–76: The sceptical phrases, their meaning and their self-applicability
Diogenes introduces the sceptical phrases very early in his exposition, in order to explain how to understand the sceptics’ words, given that they put forward no doctrines (9.74). By contrast, this topic comes towards the end of Sextus’ *Outlines* book 1 (187–208), although it is previewed in the early chapter on whether the sceptic has beliefs (1.13–15), where Sextus briefly refers to the self-applicability of οὐδὲν μᾶλλον and other sceptical expressions. The three expressions discussed by Diogenes – οὐδὲν ὁρίζοµεν, οὐδὲν (or οὐ) μᾶλλον, and παντὶ λόγῳ λόγος ἀντίκειται – are also discussed by Sextus, along with numerous others. There is a considerable amount of common vocabulary, particularly as applied to the sceptic’s attitude in using language: προφέρεσθαι, ‘cite’ (9.74; *PH* 1.14–15; 197), διηγεῖσθαι, ‘explain’ (9.74; *PH* 1.197), δηλοῦν τὸ πάθος, ‘make plain our state’ (9.74; *PH* 1.190; 197), ἀρρεψία, ‘inner balance’ (9.74; *PH* 1.190), µήνυσις, ‘revealing’ (9.74; *PH* 1.187). The first two of these are perhaps not distinctive enough to suggest any historical connection, and the others might suggest a standard terminology for describing the sceptic’s state of mind, rather than a common dependence on a specific source. The same might be said of the ‘purgatives’ (καθαρτικά, 9.76) to which Diogenes compares the third of the three expressions, which eliminate themselves after eliminating the dogmatic theories to which they were applied; the same term can be found in several places in Sextus (*PH* 1.206; 2.188; *M* 8.480). Slightly more idiosyncratic is µετὰ τὸ ἀνελέιν, “after doing away with”, which occurs in Diogenes’ description of this as well as in the last of these passages of Sextus. But in general the impression is of an established vocabulary used to treat a well-entrenched element in the sceptics’ account of themselves; and this impression may be reinforced by the fact that both the self-elimination of the purgatives, and the self-applicability of

54 Sextus has ὁρίζω instead of ὁρίζοµεν (*PH* 1.197).
55 I am speaking of common roots; again, the exact forms often differ from one author to the other (e.g., noun versus adjective).
56 The last of these adds fire and the ladder as alternative images.
οὐδὲν ὀρίζω, can be traced back to Aenesidemus (Photius, Bibliotheca 170a11–14; Aristocles in Eusebius, Praep. evang. 14.18.21–2). 57

Quite different from anything in Sextus is Diogenes’ account of the positive and negative uses of οὐδὲν μᾶλλον (and the different sceptical uses of μᾶλλον alone) (9.75). Diogenes says that the sceptics use it ‘negatively’ (ἀναιρετικῶς) to indicate the non-existence of either item; Sextus specifically denies this, distinguishing Democritus’ negative use of the phrase from the sceptics’ use of it to express a lack of knowledge (PH 1.213). 58

Also interesting is that Diogenes, in describing self-elimination, uses the language of περιτροπή, ‘turning about’ or ‘self-refutation’, whereas Sextus speaks instead of ‘self-bracketing’ ([συµ]περιγράφειν, PH 1.15; 206; 2.188; M 8.480) Luca Castagnoli has argued cogently that this is part of a very deliberate and subtle strategy on Sextus’ part, 59 in which case it may very well be his own choice of term. But quite apart from this likely Sextan innovation, this passage of Diogenes does not read like something that shares an immediate common source with Sextus; the family resemblance, though real, is quite a bit more distant than that.

77: Dogmatic objection and the sceptic’s reply, expanding on their attitude to language
There is a loose connection with PH 2.1–10, where Sextus explains (again in response to a dogmatic objection) how the sceptic is able to examine the dogmatists’ views without subscribing to them. The explanation appeals to the fact that it is quite possible to have thoughts without committing oneself concerning the real nature of the things thought about (2.10), and this roughly echoes Diogenes’ remark that the sceptics are not investigating what is thought – “for what one thinks is evident”. 60 But there are no verbal parallels, and the character of the objection is somewhat different in Sextus, being centered on whether or not the things being investigated are apprehended.

78–79: General characterization of Pyrrhonism
There is a partial parallel with Sextus’ one-sentence characterization of Pyrrhonism at PH 1.8. Diogenes speaks of ἀνωμαλία, ‘discrepancy’, 61 as the effect of the sceptical procedure, rather than ἰσοσθένεια, ‘equal strength’, as Sextus has it. Elsewhere (e.g. PH 1.12) Sextus speaks of the

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57 Photius is explicitly summarizing Aenesidemus’ Pyrrhonist Discourses; Aristocles refers to Aenesidemus as having ‘recently’ (ἐχθὲς καὶ πρώην, 14.18.29) revived Pyrrhonism, and appears to show no knowledge of any Pyrrhonist later than him.

58 For a different reading of the relations between the two, see Lorenzo Corti’s paper in this volume.

59 Castagnoli 2010, chapter 14.

60 On the contrasting phrase for what the sceptic is investigating – “what they access by the senses” – see Brunschwig 1999, 1115, n. 1.

61 At least, if Künn’s conjecture is correct for the mss. reading ἀνωφέλεια, ‘uselessness’, which seems clearly hopeless in this context.
ἀνωμαλία in things as what first prompts people to investigate them, in order to resolve the conflicts – an investigation that eventually leads to scepticism. Diogenes’ explanation, however, introduces something like ἰσοσθένεια when he says that the sceptics showed “that both sides are equally persuasive” (ἴσας τάς πιθανότητας, 9.79). Diogenes also mentions ταραχή, ‘disturbance’ or ‘confusion’, alongside ἀνωμαλία. This is presumably a confusion in things rather than in the subject contemplating them, but it does draw attention to the fact that Diogenes makes no mention of the further psychological effect outlined by Sextus, namely ἀταραξἰα, ‘freedom from disturbance’. One interesting linguistic parallel is that both authors speak of the sceptical procedure as applied to “things that appear” and “things that are thought” (φαινόµενα and νοούµενα), and both add a term emphasizing absence of limitation: ‘however’ (ὁπωσοῦν, 9.78) in Diogenes, “in any way whatever” (καθ᾽οἱονδήποτε τρόπον, PH 1.8) in Sextus. In Diogenes it only applies to thoughts, whereas in Sextus it applies to both (as his explanation, PH 1.9, makes clear), but there is some reason to think that some such term was common in the Pyrrhonists’ summary descriptions of their method. At least the reference to ἀνωμαλία and ταραχή is ascribed by Diogenes to Aenesidemus, and perhaps the mention of appearances and thoughts is also intended to come under this heading.

79–88: The Ten Modes
Since other essays in this volume cover this section in detail, I will not comment on it, except to say that Sextus’ Ten Modes are the same ones as those in Diogenes, but treated in a different order; the approach, too, often differs, and so do the examples. This is the one place where Diogenes actually mentions Sextus’ treatment of the same material, indicating that his order is different (9.87).

88–89: The Five Modes
Diogenes tells us that these Modes come from Agrippa, who is otherwise unknown except as the title of a work mentioned later (9.106) by (the also otherwise unknown) Apellas; Sextus ascribes them to “the more recent sceptics” (PH 1.164), that is, more recent than those responsible for the Ten Modes. The Five Modes, like the Ten, are the same in the two authors, and in this case they are presented in the same order. There is a good deal more similarity (than in the case of the Ten Modes) in the ways they are applied to “things that appear” and “things that are thought” (φαινόµενα and νοούµενα), and both add a term emphasizing absence of limitation: ‘however’ (ὁπωσοῦν, 9.78) in Diogenes, “in any way whatever” (καθ᾽οἱονδήποτε τρόπον, PH 1.8) in Sextus. In Diogenes it only applies to thoughts, whereas in Sextus it applies to both (as his explanation, PH 1.9, makes clear), but there is some reason to think that some such term was common in the Pyrrhonists’ summary descriptions of their method. At least the reference to ἀνωμαλία and ταραχή is ascribed by Diogenes to Aenesidemus, and perhaps the mention of appearances and thoughts is also intended to come under this heading.

62 Hence Scharffenberger / Vogt’s translation of the whole phrase, “any kind of thought”.
63 The work cited appears to be called εἰς τὰ Πυρρώνεια ὑποτύπωσις. It is hard to disagree with Scharffenberger / Vogt’s translation Outline of Pyrrhonism, although the εἰς perhaps also suggests the notion of an ‘introduction to’ the topic. One might wonder what the relation of this work is to the Purrôneioi Logoi summarized by Photius (identity, or an abbreviated version?).
64 I am speaking of Sextus’ initial presentation (PH 1.164–9); when he goes on to explain how the Five Modes can be exploited together, he adopts a different order (170–7).
presented, and there is one stretch of text that is verbally identical, in the account of the reciprocal mode: ὁ δὲ δι᾽ ἀλλήλων (in Sextus, διάλληλος) τότες συνιστάται ὅταν ... πίστεως (9.89; PH 1.169). Here the hypothesis of a not too distant common source for Diogenes’ account and at least the first part of Sextus’ has some plausibility.

102: A note on sources
There are no parallels with Sextus in this passage.

102–104: The charge of dogmatism and the sceptics’ reply
Sextus also responds to the charge of dogmatism in the introductory chapters of Outlines (PH 1.13–5), and the response takes essentially the same form: we acknowledge that we have certain impressions of things, or are affected by things in certain ways, but we never go beyond registering our impressions, or ways of being affected, to any kind of assertion about how things actually are. This is a point that Sextus makes numerous times elsewhere, especially when he discusses the sceptical phrases towards the end of the first book of Outlines (PH 1.190; 193; 197; 198; 200; 201; 203; 208; cf. PH 1.4). One of these is “I determine nothing” (οὐδὲν ὁρίζω), which is addressed in this passage of Diogenes, both as part of the dogmatic objection and in the sceptical reply; as in Sextus (PH 1.197), the reply includes the point that when the sceptics say “I determine nothing”, they apply the formula to itself just as much as to everything (9.104). That this point about self-applicability goes back at least to Aenesidemus is suggested by its appearance in Photius’ summary of his Pyrrhonist Discourses (Bibl. 170a11–12), including the same words οὐδὲ αὐτὸ τοῦτο, “not this very thing”, which we find in Diogenes.65 A version of the dogmatism charge also appears in Aristocles’ attack on Pyrrhonism (Eusebius, Praep. evang. 14.18.7), so it too has some history. One thing about Diogenes’ version of the sceptical reply that would not have been expected from Sextus is that he has the sceptics saying “we recognize only how we are affected” (µόνα δὲ τὰ πάθη γινώσκοµεν, 9.103). This sounds like the language of the Cyrenaics rather than the Pyrrhonists, as reported by, among others, Diogenes himself (2.92); Sextus says that he would not deny that he is affected a certain way (e.g., PH 1.13; 19) or that he “agrees” that this is so (e.g., PH 1.20),66 he does not claim any kind of cognitive grasp of this fact.67 But

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65 Cf. above on 74–6, the sceptical phrases.
66 This type of language may go back to early Pyrrhonism; an apparent quotation from Timon in Diogenes just below (9.105) reads “I do not establish that honey is sweet, but I concede (ὁµολογῶ) that it seems so”.
67 If we translate γινώσκοµεν by ‘know’, as we surely might, the contrast will come across even more strongly. In rebutting the claim that Cyrenaicism and scepticism are the same (PH 1.215), Sextus does use of the Cyrenaic school the words “since it too says that it apprehends only the ways we are affected”, which imply that this could be said of the sceptics. But at this point he is summarizing the view of those who claim that the schools are the same, rather than speaking in his own voice.
even aside from this discrepancy, we do not find in this passage the kind of detailed parallels with Sextus that we have noted in a number of earlier sections.

104–105: The charge that sceptics ‘overturn life’ and the sceptics’ reply
There is no clear parallel to this passage in the works of Sextus. There is a loose parallel in the chapter early in Outlines book 1 called “whether the sceptics do away with the appearances” (PH 1.19–20).68

106–107: The sceptics’ criterion, including a dogmatic objection and the sceptics’ reply
Sextus has a chapter on the sceptic’s criterion in the introductory section of Outlines book 1 (PH 1.21–4), and here too, as in Diogenes, ‘the apparent’ (τὸ φανόμενον) is said to be the criterion. Beyond this, the two passages have no significant material in common.

107–108: The sceptics’ telos, including the objection that the sceptic has no resources to avoid committing unspeakable deeds, and the sceptics’ reply
A chapter on the sceptic’s telos immediately follows the one on the criterion in Outlines book 1, just as these topics are juxtaposed in Diogenes. There is an interesting difference in what is characterized as the sceptics’ end in each case. Diogenes says that it is ‘suspension of judgement’ (ἐποχή, 9.107), whereas Sextus says that it is ‘tranquility’ (ἀταραξία) in matters of opinion and ‘moderate feeling’ (µετριοπάθεια) in matters of compulsion (PH 1.25). Sextus does, however, report that “some highly regarded sceptics” (τινὲς δὲ τῶν δοκίµων σκεπτικῶν) have added “suspension of judgement in investigations” as an end (PH 1.30); it is not clear whether this means that they themselves also posited the ends that he identified, or whether by ‘added’ (προσέθηκαν) he means simply that their view, that ἐποχή (and it alone) is the telos, is different from (and therefore additional to) his own. But Diogenes also says that, according to Timon and Aenesidemus, ἀταραξία follows ἐποχή “as if by its own shadow” (9.107). Diogenes’ language strongly implies that Timon and Aenesidemus are among the sceptics who posit ἐποχή as the end, and it is at least possible to read the text as suggesting that they identified ἀταραξία as an additional end, or an additional component of the end. They would surely qualify in Sextus’ eyes as ‘highly regarded’ sceptics, and this gives at least some partial support to the first of the two options I just noted. Nothing exactly corresponding to Sextus’ µετριοπάθεια is explicitly mentioned in Diogenes, although he, like Sextus, concludes the entire section by mentioning alternative views of the sceptic’s end, both of which are roughly in the same territory as µετριοπάθεια: one is ‘lack of suffering’ (ἀπάθεια) – which several texts ascribe to Pyrrho, either as an ideal or as an attitude actually

68 Noted by Luca Castagnoli (cf. n. 17).
Pyrrhonism in Diogenes Laertius

attained – the other ‘evenness’ (πραότης, 9.108). Besides, in what appears to be an explanation of ἐποχή (9.108), Diogenes says that “we will not pursue these things nor avoid those things, which are in our sphere of influence”, and contrasts this with the case of things not up to us but necessitated; in the latter category he mentions several examples including thirst, which in Sextus figures as one of the things towards which μετριοπάθεια, rather than ἀταραξία, needs to be the goal (PH 1.29). The ‘shadow’ language also occurs in Sextus to characterize the relation between ἐποχή and ἀταραξία. Sextus is explaining how the sceptic achieved ἀταραξία by a route different from the one originally hoped for; this is the point of the striking analogy of Apelles and his painter’s sponge (PH 1.28–9). Concluding this discussion he says that ἀταραξία is discovered to be a by-product of ἐποχή (which is the immediate effect of the inconclusive inquiries that had originally been hoped to lead to the truth), and adds “as a shadow follows a body” (PH 1.29).

Another issue arises in the course of Diogenes’ treatment of the telos. In addition to arguing that the sceptics cannot live, the dogmatists also argued that scepticism fails to contain any prohibition on the most atrocious behavior. This charge, too, can be found in Aristocles (Eusebius, Praep. evang. 14.18.18), and Diogenes includes it here, with “butchering his father should he be ordered to do so” (9.108) as the atrocious deed in question. The mention of orders brings to mind Sextus’ example in Against the Ethicists (M 11.162–7) of the tyrant who forces you to do some unspeakable deed on pain of torture and death. The cases are not exactly the same, because in Sextus the charge is inconsistency; the point is not that the sceptic will not have the backbone to avoid doing terrible things, but that whatever the sceptic ends up doing must result from a deliberate choice – a choice that involves a commitment, contrary to his professed suspension of judgement, to certain things being in reality good or bad. But the response in Sextus, that the sceptic follows the laws and customs of his native land, is along the same lines as that in Diogenes; the text of this passage of Diogenes is problematic in a number of places, but ‘common usage’ (συνήθεια) and ‘laws/customs’ (νόμοι) are cited as the factors enabling us to make practical choices for and against courses of action. Another point of contact between the two passages is that Sextus speaks

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69 For references and discussion, see Bett 2000, chapter 2, sections 1 and 2.

70 Its inclusion in the passage on the telos makes more sense than it would have done in Sextus because in Diogenes, unlike in Sextus, the primary end, and the one first mentioned, is ἐποχή; a lack of definite beliefs about how things really are could easily be understood to include a lack of any moral convictions, which is the point of the objection. (One could make the case that someone whose end was ἀταραξία would be liable to the same charge, but the connection is not so obvious.)

71 Here treated alongside the charge that the sceptic cannot live (the ἀταραξία charge).

72 See Barnes 1992, 4293; Brunschwig 1999, 1138, n. 1.
of the sceptic’s choices as being dictated not by philosophical reasoning, but by “non-philosophical observance” (ἀφιλόσοφον τήρησιν, M 11.165); Diogenes speaks of the sceptic suspending judgement when it comes to philosophical investigations, but not about “matters that pertain to ordinary life and its observances” (τῶν βιωτικῶν καὶ τηρητικῶν, 9.108).
Precursors of Pyrrhonism: Diog. Laert. 9.67–73

James Warren

The section of Diogenes Laertius’ Life of Pyrrho from chapter 67 to chapter 73 begins with the tail end of a sequence of anecdotes illustrating Pyrrho’s life and outlook and ends when Diogenes embarks on a list of various sceptical formulae which then paves the way for the exposition of the modes that fills most of the remainder of the book. This section includes a brief account of various precursors of Pyrrho’s outlook. Diogenes’ grand structure of philosophical history places Pyrrho in book nine as part of the Italian tradition inaugurated by Pherecydes and Pythagoras which includes the Eleatic philosophers and Democritus, and culminates with Epicurus. Pyrrho’s connection with this tradition is evidently somewhat problematic, however, since he does not appear in the list at 1.15. He finds a way into book nine in part through a connection with various followers of Democritus (Anaxarchus, Nausiphanes) and in part through a perceived similarity between Pyrrhonian scepticism and some concerns about knowledge offered by Xenophanes, Democritus, and others. We can therefore disentangle two distinct ways of thinking about Pyrrho’s place in Diogenes’ narrative. The first takes its cue from Pyrrho’s behaviour and outlook, in particular his apparent indifference in the face of conventionally troubling situations; this is thought to illustrate something like the notion of tranquillity that some ancient writers attributed to Democritus and which certainly found later expression—albeit in different forms—in both Epicureanism and the Pyrrhonism of Sextus Empiricus. The second takes its cue from Pyrrhonism’s sceptical epistemological stance and finds antecedents for this too in philosophical history. These two ways of finding Pyrrho’s place in the grand story of philosophy, however, are not easy to reconcile.

This passage (9.67–73) does not have a clearly announced structure and it is hard to detect even an implicit organizational method at work throughout. The overall impression is that Diogenes is lurching from biographical material to concerns about philosophical successions and the demarcation of different philosophical traditions and then back to thoughts about the antecedents of Pyrrhonist scepticism. The result is somewhat disconcerting. For example, Homer and Democritus appear twice as predecessors: both before and after the taxonomic interlude. And Philo of Athens appears first as a source for the claim that Pyrrho liked these two authors at
9.67 and then again as the subject of some verses by Timon at 9.69. But we can distinguish three basic textual units. First, 9.67–9 ends the biography with a report about Pyrrho’s approval of Democritus and Homer and includes a pair of quotations from Homer supposed to illustrate affinities between the epic poet and Pyrrho before relating the famous tale of Pyrrho and the pig and other brief anecdotes. Diogenes breaks off in a taxonomic interlude to give the list of Pyrrho’s pupils that looks ahead to the tenth book and its account of Epicureanism and then he worries about how to name the school (9.69–70).\(^1\) The next sub-section, 71–3, begins and ends with more quotations from Homer (9.71, 9.73) but also includes mentions of other precursors of what Diogenes is finally prepared to call ‘this hairesis’: the seven sages, Euripides, Archilochus, Xenophanes, Zeno, and Democritus once more. The signs we have of Diogenes’ sources for this section are the opening report that Philo of Athens mentioned Pyrrho’s love for Democritus and for Homer (9.67), references to Posidonius, Numenius and Timon at 9.68–9 and the vague reference to some ‘people who say’ (phasi) that Homer was the founder of the school (9.71) who must also be those according to whom (kat’ autous: 9.72) Xenophanes, Zeno of Elea, and Democritus are sceptics. We cannot rule out the possibility that Diogenes is working from some un-named intermediate source or sources for some or all of this information and it is likely that he is using a variety of sources for these few chapters.\(^2\)

I will consider two of these sub-sections in turn: first, and more briefly, 67–9 and then 71–3. As a pair they illustrate rather well the combination of the ethical and the epistemological aspects of Pyrrho’s outlook at work throughout this part of book nine and neatly announced in 9.61: “And in general he denied that anything is ‘in truth’ but thought that all human actions are ‘by habit’ or ‘by convention’, for each thing is no more this than that.” The question of the precise original emphasis in Pyrrho’s own thought between these ethical and the epistemological strands is, of course, rather difficult to settle. Modern interpreters differ, often quite significantly, in their assessment of the extent to which later sceptics influenced the presentation of Pyrrho’s original position. This brief section in Diogenes neatly encapsulates the difficulties in our sources that give rise to these on-going disputes and suggests that certainly already by Diogenes’ time it had become difficult to reconcile all the various accounts and inter-

\(^1\) For a discussion of the notion of the Pyrrhonists as zētētikoi (‘inquirers’), which Diogenes introduces at 9.69–70, see the contribution by Olfert in this volume.

\(^2\) Hicks 1925 ad 9.67 suggests that 9.62–7, including Philo’s report of Pyrrho’s liking for Homer and Democritus, derives from Antigonus of Carystus. Barnes 1992, 426–7, argues against Janáček’s view that all of Diog. Laert. 9.70–116 derives from a single source, namely the Theodosius mentioned in 9.70. This is part of Barnes’ long (1992, 4257–90) discussion of possible sources for Diogenes’ presentation of the various modes, a discussion that ends without any positive conclusions.
interpretations of Pyrrho’s philosophy. This passage also exemplifies a more general difficulty that ancient philosophers and ancient historians of philosophy faced in accommodating scepticism as a tradition or movement in their stories of the development of Greek thought.3

1. Diog. Laert. 9.67–9: Philo of Athens and Pyrrho’s approval of Homer and Democritus

Diogenes begins this section with a reference to a certain Philo of Athens, who is offered as evidence for Pyrrho’s approval of Homer and of Democritus.4 This Philo might be the same person as the one mentioned at 3.40 as having written a skōmma on Plato; if so, then perhaps he was also Timon’s competitor in writing satirical works about other philosophers and may have been a rival pupil of Pyrrho. It is possible that the first generation of followers of Pyrrho were involved in something of a tussle over Pyrrho’s image and philosophical legacy, as also happened with the first generation of followers of another philosopher who committed none of his thoughts to writing: Socrates. Certainly, Philo interested Timon enough for there to be a poem about him in the Siλλοι which Diogenes quotes at 9.69 (= Timon fr. 50 Diels, SH 824) and which is itself, like much of Timon’s work, a clever reworking of a Homeric original.5

The first quotation at 9.67 is Homer, Iliad 6.146: Diomedes asks to hear Glaucus’ ancestry. The line cited here is the beginning of Glaucus’ reply in which he first asserts that such things are not, in the final reckoning, very important before offering his own family story. Glaucus compares humans to the leaves on trees, presumably in the sense that just as leaves grow and then are shed as the seasons change, so too do human generations come and go. Given this constant change, we are supposed to infer, there is nothing particularly important about a particular person’s lineage. A comment that follows adds that Pyrrho also admired Homer for his comparison of humans with wasps, flies, and birds.6 Here too the idea might

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3 For an excellent and concise account of this difficulty see Brunschwig 1999a, 232–7.
4 This section forms T20 in Decleva Caizzi 1981, with commentary at 171–5. Compare the story of Pyrrho reading Democritus presented by Aristocles ap. Eus. Praep. evang. 14.18.27 (= F4.27 Chiesara, T23 Decleva Caizzi), which is often taken to derive from Antigonus of Carystus’ biography (=2B Dorandi) and therefore share a source with Diogenes. Decleva Caizzi 1981, 171–2, suggests that the citation from Philo at Diog. Laert. 9.67 also derives from Antigonus.
5 In particular, it reworks Homer, Od. 21.364. See Di Marco 1989, 224–5.
6 I assume that it is Homer who thus compared humans with wasps and the like and that Pyrrho approved of him for this. Homer compares the Achaian army to a flock of birds and a swarm of flies (Iliad 2.459–73) and Patroclus’ men to a swarm of wasps (Iliad 16.257–65). Decleva Caizzi 1981, 173, suggests that the subject of eikaze is Pyrrho and that it is Pyrrho who made these comparisons.
be that human lives are fleeting and insignificant, perhaps noting the sheer number of human lives that come and go over time.

Alongside his interest in Homer, Pyrrho’s admiration for Democritus was thought by Philo worthy of mention. Democritus will also appear later as one of those whose epistemological outlook might have anticipated some aspects of Pyrrhonism, but here it seems that the connection between him and Pyrrho is based more on a particular outlook on human affairs and aspirations. There is no reason to think that there is any direct connection between Pyrrho’s approval of the Homeric sentiment, Pyrrho’s approval of Democritus, and Democritus’ atomist physical theory nor, in turn, is there any reason to think that Pyrrho’s approval of Democritus in this regard is any endorsement of Democritus’ atomist physical theory, even as some kind of metaphor. More likely, there is a general similarity between Democritus’ approval of a certain kind of balanced and moderate life of equanimity and Pyrrho’s own advocacy of a certain kind of tranquillity. If we think that the appreciation of the fleeting and temporary nature of human life might encourage an outlook that regards much of what humans happen to strive for or quarrel over as, in fact, only valuable by convention and not ‘by nature’, then there are clear parallels between the sentiments attributed to Pyrrho at 9.61 and a certain interpretation of Democritus’ own ethical and metaphysical outlook. It is hard to make very much more than this rather general claim without delving more deeply into both the contested evidence on Pyrrho and the fragments and testimonia that concern Democritus’ ethical outlook. It will suffice here just to note this alternative account of Pyrrho’s predecessors that looks not so much to accounts of knowledge or the impossibility of knowledge but rather to concerns about value and human happiness.

The second quotation is Iliad 21.106–7: Achilles is addressing Lycaon, son of Priam and half-brother of Hector. Lycaon offers himself as a supplicant to Achilles; Achilles replies that this time he will not be prepared to ransom Lycaon. Patroclus is dead, who was much better than Lycaon, and Lycaon will die too. Again, the quotation is followed by a brief explanatory comment: Homer is praised here for drawing attention to the fact that human life is not only unstable (abebaion) — perhaps also reinforcing the idea of the fleeting nature of human lives — but also full of folly (kenospoudon)


8 For more discussion of these aspects of the philosophies of Pyrrho and Democritus and the various followers of Democritus — especially Anaxarchus and Nausiphanes — who appear to connect him with both Pyrrho and, later, Epicurus, see Bett 2000, 152–65; Warren 2002; S. H. Svavarsson, “Tranquillity: Pyrrho and Democritus” in: S. Marchand / F. Verde (eds.), Épicurisme et Scepticisme. Convegni 22 (Rome 2013) 3–23. Timon also offers a reasonably positive assessment of Democritus, so far as we can tell from fr. 46 DK = SH 820, quoted by Diogenes at 9.40.
and childishness (paidariōdes). The vocabulary of ‘empty’ or ‘groundless’ striving is certainly reminiscent of both the Epicurean diagnosis of ‘empty opinion’ (kenodoxia) as the foundation of much unnecessary human misery and also, closer to home, of Timon’s approval of Pyrrho’s freedom from the ‘empty thoughts’ (keneophrosynē) of the sophists (Timon fr. 48 Diels, cited at Diog. Laert. 9.65). But it is also part of a more general debunking of the supposed values that determine what most people spend their lives pursuing or avoiding. What these two citations share, of course, is that they reflect no epistemological outlook whatsoever. Rather, they continue the depiction and explanation of Pyrrho’s particular — and often peculiar — diathesis. In fact, 67–9 contains a concise list of various reports about Pyrrho’s outlook and behaviour drawn from a variety of later sources: Philo, Posidonius, Numenius, and Timon. The two sources closest to Pyrrho, Philo and Timon, bookend this section. Philo introduces the thought about Pyrrho’s preferred authors and Timon’s verses on Philo then prompt Diogenes to say something about the first generation of Pyrrho’s followers. This in turn leads Diogenes to think about Pyrrhonism’s place in the broader scheme of philosophical successions and therefore of his own work.


After the discussion of the proper nomenclature for the movement inaugurated by Pyrrho, Diogenes takes a look back at the precursors of this hairesis. This account is both like and unlike 9.67–9: it contains more references to and quotations of Homer and Democritus but it makes no claim that the authors it mentions were praised or held as predecessors by Pyrrho himself. What is more, the emphasis on the similarities — such as they are — between these earlier authors and Pyrrhonism is more obviously epistemological and metaphysical than the apparently ethical perspective of Philo’s report at 9.67–9. The source of this list is unclear. Diogenes introduces it with the observation that ‘some say’ that Homer began this hairesis and it is not revealed whether these people are the Pyrrhonists themselves, eager to find an august heritage for their view and to combat the opposing philosophies’ similar claims, or a reference to a less partisan account of the


\[10\] Iliad 21.107 is used by Callisthenes at Plut. Alex. 541 to remind Alexander that he is mortal. Callisthenes and Anaxarchus — someone else offered as a philosophical inspiration to Pyrrho (9.63) — are paired as rival philosophical advisors to Alexander at Plut. Alex. 52.3–7.

\[11\] Cf. Brunschwig 1999, 236.
history of scepticism. If this is a list produced by Pyrrhonists themselves then their approach differs markedly from that of Sextus who, in general, is more interested in stressing how his philosophy differs from its rivals. If there is any structure to Diogenes’ catalogue at 9.71–3 then it is at best a very rough and ready one. It divides the precursors roughly into two groups. It begins with poets and purveyors of ‘traditional’ wisdom: Homer, the seven sages, Archilochus, and Euripides; then it turns to philosophers: Xenophanes, Zeno, Democritus, Plato, Empedocles, and Heraclitus. It then goes back to Euripides and Homer begins and ends the list. There are some interesting features. Plato appears in 9.72 but not in the initial list at the beginning of the chapter. Euripides appears in both groups, perhaps because of his familiar associations with a more philosophical kind of tragedy, the sophists and the like. The members of these groups do not fit perfectly well with the overall organization of Diogenes’ Lives into two principal successions of thinkers (see 1.13–15): the ‘Ionian’ (books 2–7) and the ‘Italian’ (books 8–10). While most fall into the second of these two lists, Plato is certainly an ‘Ionian’ in Diogenes’ classification and both Heraclitus and Xenophanes are categorized as ‘sporadic’ philosophers outside the main traditions (8.91, 9.20). Within each of the two groups in 9.71–3, moreover, there is little sign of a concern for relative chronology. Nor is there a consistent treatment of all the members of the group. Some of the characters have their views illustrated with a quotation, others with a simple report. Sometimes the evidence presented is left to speak for itself; at other times it is accompanied by a brief explanation why it suggests a sceptical outlook.

The overall impression is that our passage in book nine is not a systematic attempt to document a particular and determinate Pyrrhonist epistemological outlook in earlier thinkers. Rather, it is a collection of familiar and impressive names gathered in order to point to a set of loosely related concerns about human uncertainty and the impossibility of moving beyond conjecture, the mismatch between appearance and reality, or the equal plausibility of two or more mutually inconsistent claims. There is also an interest in the distinction between mere mortals and the gods in terms of their respective chances of cognitive progress, an interest in the terminology of custom or opinion (nomos and nomizein), and the use of quotations for the purpose of illustrating a sceptical outlook which we

12 See, for example, the different treatments of Xenophanes and Plato: n.30 below.
13 Brunschwig 1999a, 236, calls this passage “workmanlike, if somewhat muddled”.
know were also used elsewhere to support a positive dogmatic view. All
of these themes will be illustrated as we discuss each of the precursors and
each quotation. There is no sense in this section that the various episte-
mological caveats offered by the thinkers in this list are connected at all
with the thought that there is a comfort, indeed a kind of happiness, to be
found in avoiding holding dogmatic beliefs.\textsuperscript{15} This is an important part
of the Pyrrhonist enterprise, but there is no sign of any connection made
by these predecessors between the proposed epistemological stance and
human flourishing. Pyrrho’s behaviour and charismatic tranquility have
been covered earlier in Diogenes’ \textit{Life} and Diogenes only briefly returns to
the matter of the effect of the various sceptical strategies on the Pyrrhon-
ist’s behaviour and outlook only at the very end of his account (9.107–8).

This section is in some ways similar to the much more extensive ac-
count in Sextus Empiricus of previous philosophers’ views on the crite-
rian (\textit{M} 7.46–260) which also includes references to views found in Homer,
Archilochus, and Euripides (7.128). However, it is not clear that we should
simply conclude that Sextus and Diogenes share a common source. Al-
though they share a similar cast of characters, they regularly differ in the
particular texts and passages they choose to cite from those authors.\textsuperscript{16}
What is more, Sextus includes some of the people who are on Diogenes’ list
among those who place the criterion in \textit{logos} and are therefore not particu-
larly close to Pyrrhonism in outlook.\textsuperscript{17} It is likely, therefore, that if there is
a connection between the two catalogues then it is a reasonably loose one.

We know that both the sceptical Academy and Aenesidemus were inter-
ested in offering earlier philosophers as examples of precursors for their
own positions (indeed, it is possible that Aenesidemus was interested in
doing so in part to try to wrest from the Academy the title of true heir of
this sceptical tradition). We can probably go no further than the conclu-
sion that both Sextus and Diogenes — or Diogenes’ source — reflect this
interest.\textsuperscript{18}

\textsuperscript{15} As Sedley 1983, 9–10, notes.
\textsuperscript{16} See the table in the Appendix, below.
\textsuperscript{17} Xenophanes appears both among those who say there is no criterion and also in the
second group: \textit{M} 7.49–52, \textit{M} 7.110; cf. \textit{PH} 2.18. He was clearly a difficult case for
both Sextus and Diogenes: see S. Tor, “Sextus Empiricus on Xenophanes’ Scepticism”,
\textit{International Journal for the Study of Skepticism} 3 (2013) 1–23 and also n. 19 below. We might
also notice that Diogenes himself notes that Parmenides said that \textit{logos} is the \textit{criterion}: Diog.
Laert. 9.22.
\textsuperscript{18} For the New Academy’s use of these earlier philosophers see Cicero, \textit{Acad.} 1.44–5 and
2.13–15 with the discussion in C. Brittain / J. Palmer, “The New Academy’s Appeals to the
Presocratics”, \textit{Phronesis} 46 (2001) 38–72. For the claim that Aenesidemus is a source for
at least some of Sextus’ discussion (in particular \textit{M} 7.49–88), see Sedley 1992, 25–6. (Cf.
Galen, \textit{In Hipp. de med.} \textit{off.} 1.658.10–12 K: αὐτοὶ οὖν οἱ τοῦ Πύῤῥωνος εἰς παλαιοτάτους
ἀνδρῶς ἀνάγοντι τὴν ἑαυτῶν προαίρεσιν.) Sedley 1992, 27–34, goes on to argue that the
source of Sextus’ account of the \textit{physikoi} (\textit{M} 7.89–140) is Posidonius’ \textit{On the criterion}, and
Certainly, there are signs of a dispute about the origins of certain forms of scepticism that dates back at least as far as the end of the third century BC. For example, Diogenes notes that according to Sotion of Alexandria (fl. c. 200 BC) it was Xenophanes who first declared that all things are *akatalēpta* (9.20). Diogenes then adds the brief remark that Sotion was mistaken (*planōmenos*) but does not explain what the correct view is. In short, the structure of book nine in general and this brief section of it in particular show the signs of a combination of different traditions in ancient philosophical historiography, some of which were championed by Pyrrhonists from Aenesidemus onwards and some of which might be traced back to earlier Hellenistic sources such as the sceptical Academy and successional and biographical works such as Sotion’s *On the successions of the philosophers*. (The curious and contested position of Xenophanes and Heraclitus is just one indication of these differences.) The Pyrrhonists themselves may well have had something of an ambivalent attitude to these putative ancestors. On the one hand, they allow Pyrrhonism to stand as the natural development of an earlier tradition of sceptical thinking, something that might have been particularly useful at a time when Pyrrhonism was in direct competition with Academic scepticism. On the other hand, it was nevertheless important for the Pyrrhonists to stress the distinctive nature of their own outlook and note the differences between their stance and all these alternatives (see e.g. Sext. Emp. *PH* 1.209–41). Diogenes’ work retains the imprints of these different and sometimes incompatible approaches.

Before we turn to look in more detail at each case in turn, we should notice that Diogenes uses a variety of expressions to describe the sense in which these poets and philosophers are to be thought of as predecessors of Pyrrhonism. What might have been accounted for as mere *variatio* looks

that the source of the third section (*M* 7.141–260) is Antiochus. (Cf. Sedley 2012, 88–93. For a critical reaction to this last suggestion, see: C. Brittain, “Antiochus’ epistemology”, in: Sedley 2012 [104–30] 108–13.) Diogenes uses Posidonius as a source for some of the biographical material about Pyrrho (9.78 = F287 EK); it is hard to see how this could have come from the *On the criterion*.  

19 For example, at the beginning of the *Life of Pyrrho* Diogenes appears to endorse Ascanius of Abdera’s view that it was Pyrrho who introduced the notion of *akatalēpsia* (9.61) and at 9.70 he notes the view of Theodosius that Pyrrho was not the founder of scepticism. Presumably, Diogenes here reflects the same divergence of interpretations of Xenophanes’ position in the succession that leads Sextus to place Xenophanes twice in his own classification of views on the criterion. Heraclitus does not appear in the list at 1.13–16 while Xenophanes does appear in the Italian succession at 1.15. Diogenes notes again Sotion’s view that Heraclitus was a pupil of Xenophanes at 9.5; Sotion’s views may have been influenced by the presentation of these various philosophers in Timon’s *Silloi*, on which he wrote a commentary, since it is clear that Timon looked to Xenophanes as something of a poetic and perhaps philosophical predecessor: Athenaeus 8.336D. See also Decleva Caizzi 1992, 4223–30. (For the view that, at a certain level of analysis, there is a clear structure to the whole of 9.61–108, see e.g. Barnes 1992, 4242.)
rather more significant in the light of the preceding discussion of whether Pyrrhonism is a *hairesis*, the variety of labels used for this philosophical movement, and Theodosius’ doubts about whether ‘Pyrrhonism’ is an appropriate term at all. Nevertheless, Diogenes first introduces Homer who, “according to some, began the *hairesis*” (9.71). Later, the sayings of the seven sages “are sceptical” (*skeptika einai*), Archilochus and Euripides “are sceptical” (*skeptikos ekhein*), and Xenophanes, Zeno, and Democritus are, according to these same people, “in fact sceptics” (*skeptikoi tugkhanousi*: 9.72).

Homer begins and ends the list. At 9.71 his position is accounted for not with any quotation but with a pair of observations. Even taken together, they suggest that the requirements for identification as a member, let alone the founder, of this movement are remarkably lax. First, he apparently gives different answers to the same question at different places in his poems. Second, he never gives a definite or dogmatic answer. The relationship between these two statements is not clarified but we can speculate that the fact of giving different answers to the same question at different times is best explained by assuming that, on each occasion, the answer given is offered without ‘dogmatizing’ (*ouden horikos dogmatizei*). Presumably, the sceptical Homer should be thought to suspend judgment on the matter. Otherwise, we would simply have to assume that the apparent *diaophonia* marks a genuine contradiction in Homer’s views. The lesson to be drawn is that it is possible to offer a view without strong commitment to its truth: something that Diogenes will go on to explain is in fact the usual tactic of the Pyrrhonist when offering and expounding other philosophers’ views (Diog. Laert. 9.74: *autoi d’ ouden apephainonto dogmatikos ... meden horizontes*...). Since everyone would be familiar with Homer and therefore with the fact that there are apparent contradictions between various passages, it is not a bad idea to use Homer in this way to exemplify the sense in which a Pyrrhonist might offer a point of view undogmatically. What is more, since Homer was regarded as something of an authority, this proposal suggests that even the most authoritative of ancient poets was in fact rather undogmatic.

After Homer, Diogenes moves on to the seven sages. There is something to be gained, we might suppose, in being able to trace the seeds of a philosophical view all the way back to those who were genuinely wise and Diogenes chooses to begin his entire account of the *philosophoi* with those who were in fact *sophoi* (1.13). All the same, the supposed grounds for including the seven sages here are rather flimsy, even in comparison with the other members of the list. For example, it is not at all clear how

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20 Diog. Laert. 9.69–70; Theodosius’ concerns may well be what provoked the comments by Sextus at PH 1.7.

21 On whether Pyrrhonism is a *hairesis* see also Diog. Laert. 1.20 and Sext. PH 1.16–17.
the famous maxim “Nothing too much” \((\textit{mēden agan})\) is supposed to be related to a Pyrrhonist outlook. Perhaps it is a pointer to the Pyrrhonist notion of \textit{isostheneia} or it looks back once more to the theme in the biographical anecdotes of a distaste for strong commitments to things as having positive or negative value. Pyrrhonism is characterized by a lack of unqualified commitment to anything in particular, opinions and objects of pursuit or avoidance included, and we are perhaps asked also to trace back this attitude of relative indifference to the seven sages. The next piece of evidence — the advice against making pledges — also turns up at Plato, \textit{Charmides} 165a: “pledges lead to ruin”. What was presumably originally advice against making unbreakable promises which might generate unfortunate obligations is here in Diogenes being taken as a general warning against commitments of any sort: it can be disastrous to assert anything with certainty and with conviction \((\textit{bebaiōs, pepeismenōs})\).

Euripides and Archilochus come next (Archilochus fr. 131 West; Euripides, \textit{Suppliant} \textit{s} 734–6). They both stress the fleeting nature of humanity and the inferiority of human thought compared with the will of Zeus. They share the idea that human thought, indeed human life in general, is subject to the whim of the divine. If what we think and do is not entirely self-directed then the recognition of this kind of divine influence might well undermine confidence in the accuracy and truthfulness of what we do happen to want or believe. The first citation is Euripides, \textit{Suppliant} \textit{s} 734–6: Adrastus is explaining how human hopes are fragile and human cities and accomplishments can easily be dashed because they all depend on the will and whim of Zeus. This is an interesting text, because although it is here offered in favour of a pessimistic view of human cognitive possibilities, elsewhere it is used to make a positive claim. Plutarch cites these line at \textit{Stoic. Repug.} 1056B, adding that they were quoted with approval by Chrysippus because they present the view that nothing stays the same or changes without the will of Zeus. This was offered by the Stoic as a good illustration of the all-pervasive causal reach of fate and the underlying rational divine will that guides the world. Plutarch notes that, given the approval of these lines, the Stoics cannot claim that fate is merely a predisposing cause; it must instead be a necessitating cause. In any event, Chrysippus offered these lines in defence of a positive view about the divine causation that governs the world. In Diogenes, in contrast, they are offered as a sign of the mutability and instability of human affairs.

The end of the second line of the Archilochus fragment is also cited at Sextus Empiricus at \textit{M} 7.128 along with Homer, \textit{Odyssey} 18.136–7 and is followed by a citation from Euripides (\textit{Tro.} 885).\footnote{Ps. Plut. \textit{Vit. Hom.} (b) 155 states that in these lines Archilochus is deliberately echoing the lines from \textit{Odyssey} 18.} The Homeric passage seems to be something of a favourite of Sextus, since he also quotes it at
Precursors of Pyrrhonism: Diog. Laert. 9.67–73

PH 3.244. A closer look at the two citations reveals an interesting difference between the two. In Sextus, M 7, the context of the quotation from Archilochus is an account of Heraclitus’ criterion of truth and, more importantly, the positive claim that human intelligence is derived from — or perhaps part of — divine intelligence.\(^{23}\) Here in Diogenes, however, the quotation seems to be offered to illustrate the more pessimistic idea that human intelligence is at the mercy of divine intelligence and is not itself in control or able to determine its own contents. Again, therefore, what Diogenes cites in favour of a pessimistic view of human life and human achievements is elsewhere cited by Stoic sources or perhaps Stoicizing interpretations of Heraclitus in favour of a positive view of the guiding power of divine reason over human lives. It is possible that these are two examples of attempts to object to Stoicizing interpretations of Homer by providing alternative Pyrrhonist readings. As we shall see, some of the other examples offered by Diogenes also seem to concern a comparison between a mortal form of cognition and some alternative, divine, understanding. In all these cases it appears that mortals’ grasp on reality is revealed as being somehow deficient in comparison; the contrast between a divine understanding and our own encourages us to be less confident in the truth of our views about the world.

These two quotations also illustrate neatly how liberal are the criteria for inclusion as an example of sceptical leanings. Diogenes — or his source — has to interpret the references in these texts to various psychological capacities, states, or activities (thumos in Archilochus, phronein in Euripides) as plausibly anticipating the later more precise philosophical terminology. Of course, Diogenes does not need to come up with any precise account of the sense of thumos here, provided the lines can plausibly be offered as saying something roughly like the desired epistemological stance.

The next few citations come from people more commonly regarded as philosophers and who have figured previously in Diogenes’ work. First, Diogenes cites the opening of Xenophanes B34 (Diog. Laert. 9.72). It is not hard to see why sceptical philosophers were interested in this aspect of Xenophanes’ philosophy. All four lines of this fragment are cited also by Sextus; they appear at both M 7.49 and 7.110 since there were apparently two competing interpretations of Xenophanes’ epistemology and he is therefore listed twice in Sextus’ classification.\(^{24}\) Diogenes’ version

\(^{23}\) This is perhaps rather ironic given Heraclitus’ famous attack on Archilochus and Homer in B42. We might wonder if, by citing Homer and Archilochus as anticipating Heraclitus, Sextus’ source has this fragment of Heraclitus in mind.

\(^{24}\) Sextus Empiricus, M 7.49: “According to some” (kata tinas) this shows that Xenophanes thought all things are akatalēpta; 7.110: some think this means he denied the phantasia katalēptikē but allowed the phantasia doxastikē. Note that at M 7.50, Sextus cites after Xenophanes a line of Euripides (Phoen. 469). Although the Euripidean quotation is different from the one here in Diogenes, it is clear that Sextus and Diogenes are both following
is again truncated in comparison with the rich account of various pre-classical and classical accounts of the criterion in M 7 both in the sense that he offers only part of what Sextus offers but also because there is no sense here in Diogenes of the interesting debate about Xenophanes’ views that Sextus mentions. In fact, Diogenes’ very brief citation omits not only the specification in line 2 that the subjects about which no man has ever seen what is true and clear (to saphes) are “the gods and what I say about all things”. It also omits the intriguing idea that even were someone to happen upon the truth it would not be recognized as such and — perhaps more surprising — the final comment that opinion (dokos) covers all. Instead, it stresses (as we might expect) the simplest negative part of Xenophanes’ statement. Diogenes’ Life of Xenophanes, we might also note, contains no discussion of this fragment nor any particular interest in Xenophanes’ epistemology despite this evidently having been a matter of some debate and interest. Diogenes does cite Timon’s qualified approval of Xenophanes’ modesty (Diog. Laert. 9.18 = Timon fr. 60 Diels, SH 834), however, in a line that also refers to Xenophanes’ well-known criticisms of Homer. Most likely, the criticisms Timon has in mind are those famous attacks on Homeric theology that are also mentioned by Diogenes (9.18).  

Next, and very briefly, Diogenes attributes to Zeno of Elea a denial that motion is possible since any supposed moving body must be moving either where it is (which is impossible since being where it is it would be stationary) or else where it is not (which is also impossible since the body is not there). This is our fragment B4. We can compare this problem with Aristotle’s treatment of the ‘arrow paradox’ in Physics 6.9 (A27 DK). In Aristotle’s presentation, at least, the paradox threatens because there is no way in which an arrow can be in motion ‘now’ if ‘now’ is understood as a durationless temporal point; furthermore, the arrow can never move if time is composed of such ‘nows’. Diogenes’ presentation makes no reference at all to the constraints on motion placed by an unextended ‘now’. Rather, it seems as if in the case of a body supposedly moving ‘in the place it is in’ the difficulty is caused directly by the spatial constraints of body being in a place exactly its size and therefore offering no space for motion to occur. Other sources attribute this form of the argument to Diodorus.

sources with similar strategies of combining philosophical texts and tragic poetry in their catalogue of examples.

25 For Timon’s attitude to Xenophanes see both fr. 59 and fr. 60 DK (SH 833 and 834), both cited at Sextus Empiricus PH 1.223–4). Timon may well also have seen Xenophanes as something like a poetic model. See Long 2006, 77 and 85–8.

26 To be sure, this might figure in Aristotle’s presentation in the claim that at any ‘now’ the arrow will always be stationary because it will be “opposite something equal to itself” (kata to ison) and everything that is kata to ison must be stationary (Physics 6.9, 239b5–7) but it remains the case that Aristotle’s version has an explicit interest in the way in which time is conceived in the paradox that is absent from Diogenes’ presentation.
Cronus rather than Zeno and there are therefore reasons to doubt that this is indeed an argument that was offered by Zeno himself.\footnote{Diogenes gives the same argument at 9.99. The argument attributed to Zeno by Diogenes is attributed to Diodorus Cronus by Sextus at \( M \) 10.85–111 where it is clear that the argument provoked quite a debate. Cf. Sextus, \( PH \) 3.71–5.} In Diogenes’ Life of Zeno, Zeno is said to hold that there is no void (9.29), which itself is perhaps an extrapolation from one half of the dilemma concerning motion presented here. It is not made explicit just why the denial of motion is related to some kind of sceptical epistemology, but presumably if the argument does indeed demonstrate that motion does not occur, then our senses must systematically be misrepresenting the reality of things to us. This is a view attributed by Diogenes to Melissus (9.24: “there is no motion in reality, although it appears that things move”) and it is also possible that it is the intended force of a claim attributed to Timon by Sextus at \( M \) 10.197: “Nothing divisible (\( meriston \)) can come to be in indivisible time (\( amerei \) \( krhnomoi \))” (= Timon fr. 76 Diels, \( SH \) 834), where examples of divisible things include: coming-to-be and perishing.\footnote{See F. Decleva Caizzi, “Timone di Fliunte: i frammenti 74, 75, 76 Diels”, in: N. Badaloni (ed.), La Storia della Filosofia come Sapere Critico. Studi Offerti a Mario Dal Pra (Milan 1984) 92–105.} It is possible that something like the Zenonian concerns about reconciling the reality of processes that take time with the idea that ‘now’ is really a durationless instant were put to use by Timon in service of a sceptical conclusion about the reliability of our senses. Diodorus’ puzzles about motion were also thought to conflict with the way we tend to perceive motion and change; the two were conflated and this argument was then attributed to Zeno himself.

The contrast between how things appear to us and how things really must be is raised again in the next few quotations from Democritus. The details of Democritus’ own metaphysical stance are of course subject to a great deal of controversy, but Diogenes’ preferred interpretation is very clear. He cites B117 and 125 which both seem to stress that how things really are is somehow inaccessible to us and is certainly not accessible through sense perception. On this occasion Diogenes also gives one of his short explanatory glosses: Democritus “threw out qualities” (\( tas \) \( poioitētas \) \( ekballôn \)). This gloss sounds like a good Greek equivalent for ‘eliminativism’: although we perceive things having various qualities such as being hot or cold and often from opinions that things are indeed as they thus appear, these opinions must be mistaken since there are in fact no such qualities in reality. This view of the sceptical consequences of Democritian metaphysics seems to have been the preferred interpretation of both the Pyrrhonist and the Epicurean traditions, in contrast to Aristotle’s interest in making Democritus rather more like his fellow Abderite Protagoras. Diogenes did not, however, make any reference to this aspect of
Democritus’ philosophy in his *Life* which gives only a very brief account of atomism and mentions only that Democritus held the view that we see by means of the impact of atoms from external objects on our eyes (9.44).

Plato appears next, very briefly, with the simple report that he “leaves truth to gods and the sons of gods and seeks after the ‘likely account’” (*ton eikota logon zêtein*). This is surely a reference to the famous qualifications Timaeus gives to his cosmological account and to the possibility of mortals acquiring knowledge about certain aspects of the universe, including the traditional gods (see e.g. 29b–d, 40d). Although Diogenes has a lot to say on the difficulty of interpreting Plato’s works and although there is a long tradition by his date of interpreting Plato as a sceptic of some kind, there is no mention in the account of Plato’s views in the *Life of Plato* (3.67–80) of the particular piece of evidence offered in book nine for attributing to him a sceptical outlook.

After Plato, Diogenes returns briefly in 9.73 to Euripides, citing fr. 638 Kannicht: “Who knows if being dead is really living and what mortals call living is really being dead?” This same fragment is cited by Plato at *Gorgias* 492e and appears also in Sextus, *PH* 3.229 as part of an argument against the claim that death is bad *per se*. The question obviously has an epistemological emphasis, but we might note in passing a similar thought attributed to Pyrrho at Stobaeus 4.53.28 (=T19 Decleva Caizzi): “living and dying do not differ” (*mēden diapherein*). When he was then asked why he did not simply end his life, Pyrrho replied: “Because it does not differ” (*ouden diapherei*). Pyrrho’s claims seem to me more ethical in nature and perhaps are based on the idea that there is no difference in value between being alive and being dead. On this occasion in 9.73, Diogenes’ Euripidean quotation continues the theme of a contrast between mistaken or uncertain human opinions and an alternative correct divine account.

29 There is also no mention of any sceptical consequences of atomism in the *Life of Leucippus*.


31 This is probably to be related to the general sense in many of the anecdotes about Pyrrho’s life that he was indifferent to various things that most other people would pursue or avoid. And it may also relate to the notoriously controversial claim — which, depending on a much-debated emendation of *tutó* to *to*, is either an opening premise or else a conclusion of an argument based on the unreliability of the senses — that ‘things’ (*pragma*na) are ‘indifferent’ (*adiaphora*): see Aristocles *ap. Eus. Præp. evang. 14.18.3, 14.18.5.2 and 14.18.7.1 (= F4 Chiesara).

32 Perhaps Xenophanes too should be included as an example of this thought, particularly if we emphasise the reference to *tis anër* at the beginning of B34 and remember B18
Next, Diogenes turns to Empedocles, citing first B2.7–8 and then skipping back (epanō) a couple of lines to give B2.5. Here too we have the familiar implied contrast between mortal (andrasin: B2.7; cf. broteiē mētis at the end of the fragment B2.10) and divine access to the truth and, in B2.5, a gesture towards the fact that each person’s beliefs will depend upon that person’s particular experiences. This is one case in which Sextus Empiricus cites the same material as Diogenes (M 7.122–5). In fact, Sextus gives a rather more extensive quotation of the original text at M 7.123–4 and the interpretation he offers stresses how Empedocles has a complex view. First, there is both a divine and a human form of right reason (orthos logos). Second, while B2 shows that Empedocles agreed that the senses cannot function as the criterion of truth, there is nevertheless at the end of the fragment the reassurance that there is an extent to which human reason might nevertheless attain the truth. Sextus concludes by citing B3 as evidence that Empedocles elsewhere offered a rather more positive assessment of the reliability of the senses. Whatever the interpretative merits or deficiencies of Sextus’ discussion, Diogenes’ account — as we might by now expect — is in contrast much less nuanced and much more truncated.

As at Sextus, M 7.126, so too in Diogenes 9.73, Empedocles is followed by Heraclitus. Diogenes cites without further comment only one fragment — B47 — where Heraclitus is interpreted as advising against mere conjectures (eikē) about the ‘greatest matters’. Presumably, this is intended as an anticipation of the recommendation to suspend judgment rather than form insufficiently reliable beliefs about important matters.33 Then Diogenes offers a rather cryptic comment about Hippocrates, who apparently offered his view ‘in a doubtful’ or ‘uncertain fashion’ (endoiastōs) and ‘in a manner appropriate for a (mere) human’ (anthropinōs).34 We have seen enough to imagine that the second of these continues one of the principal themes of the passage. Endoiazō and its cognates do not appear elsewhere in Diogenes or Sextus, although it is used commonly enough elsewhere to mean something like ‘to be uncertain’ or ‘to waver between competing options or conclusions’ and also occurs in Hippocratic texts, sometimes with the sense of a patient being in a precarious state that could either improve or deteriorate (e.g. Epidemics 1.2). But in fact, Diogenes or his source

33 The Pyrrhonists, particularly Aenesidemus, had a complicated relationship with Heraclitus. See e.g. Sextus, PH 1.210–12 and Schofield 2007.
34 The text here is disputed. Dorandi 2013 retains the MSS: epeita; Marcovich 1999 prefers Richards’ estin ha. Hicks 1925 translates: “… shows himself as two sided and merely human”; Brunschwig 1999 has “… se prononce de façon dubitative et qui convient à un homme.”
has a specific text in mind. At Prorrhetikon 2.3, the Hippocratic author is discussing medical predictions, their claims of accuracy and the spirit in which they ought to be interpreted. He argues that even if some medical prognoses have turned out to be accurate, we should nevertheless bear in mind that at the time they were made they were asserted “tentatively and in a manner appropriate to humans” (endoiastōs te kai anthrōpinōs).35 This is clearly an attitude that would chime well with Pyrrhonist views.

Finally, Diogenes comes back to Homer, giving this section some kind of ring-composition. This time, Diogenes quotes Iliad 20.248–50: Aeneas is speaking to Achilles. Aeneas says that the two of them can, if Achilles likes, trade accounts of their respective noble lineages. But this would serve no purpose. First, no one can be sure that such boasts are true. Second, even if are true they count for nothing in battle. Poseidon steps in to whisk Aeneas away from danger. Diogenes comments that in these lines Homer is talking about ‘equipollence’ (isosthenēia) and ‘opposed statements’ (antithesis logōn). Presumably, the idea is that Aeneas and Achilles will not resolve their dispute by trading accounts of their ancestry since their speeches will carry equal weight. This is then taken to be an example of a more general problem, perhaps a problem faced in particular when we are dealing with conflicts between noble and skilled opposing philosophical views.36 In any case, the mention of isosthenēia provides something of a bridge into the next section of the text in which Diogenes turns to explain various sceptical formulae.

Our discussion has been somewhat piecemeal, perhaps inevitably so given the brief and somewhat staccato nature of Diogenes’ list. Nevertheless, there are some themes and general observations that we can highlight. For the most part, in the cases of those members of the list who also have independent Lives in Diogenes’ work, the interpretations of the epistemological views outlined here in 9.67–73 are not emphasized in the corresponding Life. This might suggest that the source Diogenes is using here in book nine is not one he regularly checked when composing other parts of his work. Furthermore, what might at first glance have seemed a somewhat chaotic jumble with no chronological or obvious thematic structure, in fact displays some signs of coherence despite the obvious effects of concision. It aims at a kind of ring-composition by beginning and ending

35 Prorrhet. 2.3: δοκέω δὲ αὐτῶν εἰ τι ἁληθές λέγεται ἡ πώς τῶν πείρα τούς γεννα-, ζομένους, ἢ ἑκεῖνων τῶν προτέρον γεγραµµένων, πρῶτον μὲν τῶν σηµείων ὅν λέγω τεκµήρασθαι τοῦτο γνόντα, ἔπειτα ἐνδοιαστῶς τε καὶ ἀνθρωπίνως προειπεῖν, ἅµα δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἀπαγγέλλοντας τερατωδεστέρως διηγεῖσθαι ἢ ὡς ἐγένετο.

36 Again, we should notice the reference to the tendency of mortals (brotoi 20.248) to concoct many varied tales. Also, it is possible that the reference to the ‘wide pasture (polus nomos) of words’ in 20.249 is chosen because it chimes with the interest in custom and convention seen earlier in quotations from Democritus (nomoi: B9 at 9.72) and Euripides (nomizetai: fr. 638 Nauck2 at 9.73).
with Homer and the chosen quotations have various thematic interests in common. It is, of course, not a convincing portrait of a long-lasting tradition of sophisticated sceptical thinking before Pyrrho. But it does outline various ways in which Pyrrhonism relates to earlier concerns about the possibility of acquiring knowledge and the difficult task of dealing with the often varied and conflicting appearances we receive about the world.

Appendix

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1. Introduction

The Pyrrhonian sceptic makes no judgements and has no beliefs; if so, how could he speak? Different versions of this question animated a lively debate between the ancient non-sceptic philosophers (or Dogmatists) and their sceptic adversaries. The debate is echoed in the account of the sceptical use of language provided by our extant sources for ancient Pyrrhonism: Sextus Empiricus, the most important source, devotes several passages to the sceptic’s speech acts, in particular the section on the sceptical phrases or φωναί in PH 1.187–208; and his later contemporary Diogenes Laërtius dedicates several sections of his Life of Pyrrho (in particular Diog. Laert. 9.74–7) to the same subject. But if the Sextan account of the sceptic’s linguistic behaviour has provoked much scholarly attention, Diogenes’ parallel pages have elicited just some scattered remarks. Still, it has been emphasised that at least some of them deserve more attention than scholars have given them so far. The aim of this paper is to contribute towards fill-
ing this gap by analysing and elucidating the Laërtian account in the light of the closest Laërtian and Sextan loci similes.

Diog. Laert. 9.74–7 may be divided into four main parts. Diogenes starts by characterising the sceptics as being devoted to a certain philosophical activity: they overturn all the tenets of the philosophical schools. In doing so, they speak – they utter some characteristic phrases. In the rest of our passage, Diogenes reports some remarks indicating how we are supposed to understand these phrases. In the first section (74) he points out that the sceptic does not affirm or determine what he says, but just utters and reports; he then adds that the sceptic’s φωναί – of which he mentions “In no way more”, “We determine nothing” and “Opposed to every account there is an account” – express some affections of his. The second part of the passage (section 75) discusses several uses of the expressions “more/rather” and “in no way more”, and indicates that the sceptics use “in no way more” negatively. The following part (76) discusses the self-applying property of two sceptical expressions in particular: “In no way more” and “Opposed to every account there is an account”. Finally, in the last section of the passage (77), Diogenes hints at a dogmatic reaction to the description of the sceptic’s linguistic behaviour just sketched and puts forward another one of its features, by indicating how the sceptic uses his words and statements.

In the following pages I will put forward an analysis of each of the four sections and of the major features they ascribe to the sceptical φωναί. I will end by discussing an intriguing difference between the account of the Pyrrhonist we find in Diogenes and the corresponding account we find in Sextus.

2. The sceptic does not affirm, but reports his feelings:
Diog. Laert. 9.74 and 102–4

So let us start with section 74.4 How are we supposed to understand the typical phrases uttered by the sceptic during his activity of overturning the tenets of the philosophical schools – phrases like “I/We determine nothing”, “In no way more” and “Opposed to every account there is an account”? Diogenes starts by pointing out that the sceptic does not affirm (ἀποφαίνεσθαι) or determine what he says, but just utters and reports it

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4 For the Greek text of Diog. Laert. I refer to the edition by Dorandi included in this volume, indicating when I follow an alternative reading. As far as section 74 is concerned, at lines 166–7 I follow Brunswig 1999 (1111, n. 2) and excise τὰ τῶν ἄλλων after προφέρεσθαι. For the translation of the Laërtian passages see the translation by Scharffenberger and Vogt in the present volume, with a caveat: I understand some words and sentences in the Laërtian text differently from the way they do: for each of them I offer my own translation or paraphrase.
(προφέρεσθαι καὶ δηγεῖσθαι). He then stresses that the sceptic utters his expressions to show (δηλοῦν) some of his psychological states (πάθη): absence of precipitation and inner balance.

I suggest that we should understand section 74 in the light of sections 102–4. Having provided an account of the Pyrrhonian attack against some central concepts and tenets of the dogmatic schools – proofs (9.90–1), criteria of truth (9.94–5), sign-inferences (9.96–7), causes (9.97–9), motion (9.99), learning and teaching (9.100), coming into being (9.100), ethics (9.101) – Diogenes reports a dogmatic objection followed by a sceptic reply. I take the former to run as follows. The sceptic holds no scientific or philosophical tenets (δόγµατα) and devotes himself to refuting (διελέγχειν) those of scientists and philosophers. But precisely the fact that he carries out this activity implies that he holds some theoretical views. In particular, the fact that, in the course of his refutation, he says things like “I determine nothing” or “Opposed to every account there is an account” entails that he determines and holds some views: namely that he determines nothing and that opposed to every account there is an account.

The sceptic’s reply may in my interpretation be analysed in four different steps and represented as follows. First, two kinds of items are distinguished: what the sceptic feels and how things appear to him on one hand, and the non-evident things the Dogmatists make affirmations about (διαβεβαιοῦσθαι) on the other. The sceptic knows what he feels and what appears to him (for example, that it is day, that he lives, that he sees, that he knows something); by contrast, he suspends his judgement on non-evident matters such as scientific claims purporting to explain how he sees or how he knows – and therefore believes and knows nothing on the subject. Now when the sceptic utters phrases about the first kind of items – saying for example “The flag looks white to me” – he does that in a purely descriptive fashion (διηγηµατικῶς) and does not affirm (διαβεβαιοῦσθαι) that the flag really is white. And even when he pronounces on dogmatic claims about non-evident items, saying for example “I determine nothing”, he is not thereby committed to holding what he says. For saying “I determine nothing” is not like saying “The cosmos is spherical”: the latter is non-evident, the former a confession (ἐξοµολόγησις).

Let me emphasise the structural similarities between 9.74 and 9.102–4. Both passages provide a characterization of the sceptic’s phrases – in particular, of formulae like “I/We determine nothing”, “Opposed to every account there is an account”, which he utters in the course of his attack on the dogmatic tenets. An element common to both characterizations is the claim that the sceptic does not affirm what he says. In 104 the claim that

5 See Diog. Laert. 9.102, lines 468–73.
6 See Diog. Laert. 9.102(line 474)–104(line 488). At 103(line 477) I accept Marcovich’s conjecture and read ἀλλὰ δὴ περὶ ὧν after γινώσκοµεν.
they are confessions corresponds to the claim in 74 that the sceptic’s φωναί show his affections.

Diog. Laert. 9.102–4 suggests that the characterization of the sceptical phrases put forward in 74 is to be understood as the sceptic reaction to a dogmatic objection. In order to get clearer on both, let us turn to Sextus’ account of the sceptic’s mental attitude and linguistic behaviour. The sceptic is an inquirer capable of suspending his judgement on any issue of his inquiry. He asks: “Is it the case that \( p \)” where \( p \) is a proposition concerning one of the non-evident objects the Dogmatists hold tenets about – things like Providence or the atoms (“Does Providence exist?”, “Is the world made of atoms and void?”). As a meticulous inquirer, he collects whatever can be taken to speak for each of the two possible answers to his question and considers it in the light of the modes of suspension of judgement. And here ἐποχὴ supervenes; it appears to the sceptic that neither of the two claims is more persuasive than the other: he can judge neither that \( p \) nor that not-\( p \).

The psychological state of suspension of judgement has consequences on the sceptic’s linguistic behaviour – consequences which Sextus indicates, in particular, in the sections where he presents the modes of suspension of judgement (PH 1.36–186). A paradigmatic passage is PH 1.87: the Pyrrhonist, who suspends his judgement on the question whether it is the case that \( p \), can say “how each of the existing things appears to him” (ὅ

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7 Sextus often refers, sometimes confusingly, to a dogmatic distinction between evident and non-evident items of knowledge, which he reports in PH 2.97–8 and in M 8.145–7. The distinction might be expressed as follows: (i) it is evident to \( x \) at \( t \) that \( p \) iff \( x \) can know that \( p \) directly at \( t \), without using an inference, whether on the basis of perception or through some sort of intellectual intuition; (ii) it is by nature non-evident to \( x \) that \( p \) iff \( x \) can know that \( p \) only by means of an inference – on the basis of other pieces of knowledge of his. For instance, it is evident to me now that it is raining: I can come to know that it is raining just by looking out of the window. By contrast, it is by nature non-evident to me that there are invisible pores in my skin. I can come to know that only by making an inference from another piece of knowledge I possess: for instance, my justified belief that I sweat. For discussion and references see L. Corti, “Hidden Causes: Ancient Sceptics and Doctors and Modern Thinkers on the Perceivability of Causal Links”, in: C. Natali / C. Viano (eds.), Aitia II. Avec ou sans Aristote. Le débat sur les causes à l’âge hellénistique et impérial (Louvain-la-Neuve forthcoming).

8 The verb φαίνεσθαι (‘to appear / to seem’) may be used to express the fact that one is inclined to believe something. But it may also be used differently, in a phenomenological way, to denote the fact that things appear in a certain way – which does not imply being inclined to believe something. (“I ran half an hour to reach the cinema and have the impression that it is really hot: I am not inclined to believe that it is hot – nor that it isn’t – but that is how I feel now”; “That argument looks sound – but don’t be taken in by it.”) The impressions or appearances (φαντασίαι) at stake in the sceptic texts this article comments on are psychological events of the latter kind: see J. Barnes, “Aristotle and the Methods of Ethics”, Revue Internationale de Philosophie 34 (1980) [490–511] 491 n. 1; Burnyeat 1980, 34–5; Barnes 1990, 2623; Corti 2009, 13–14; 58–64.

τι μὲν ἐκαστὸν φαίνεται τῶν ὑποκειμένων), but cannot “assert what it is in its nature” (τί δὲ ἔστι ὡς πρὸς τὴν φύσιν ἀποφήνασθαι). Let us focus on what the sceptic cannot do. In PH Sextus often observes that, as a consequence of his use of the modes, the sceptic cannot affirm that the object of his inquiry has the property that is under consideration in the inquiry. The verbs used by Sextus for ‘affirming’ are the same we found in Diog. Laert. 9.74 and 103, that is διαβεβαιοῦσθαι (see for example PH 3.55; 128; 140; 182; 249; cf. PH 1.35; 226) and ἀποφαίνεσθαι (PH 1.87). How can Sextus infer, from the fact that the sceptic suspends judgment on the question whether it is the case that \( p \) (that is, cannot judge that \( p \) nor that not-\( p \)), that he cannot affirm that \( p \)? The standard way of characterizing the linguistic act of affirming something is that of ‘manifesting a judgment’; so if someone utters a phrase affirming it, he manifests having judged its content to be true. Affirming implies judging; but a sceptic cannot judge; therefore he cannot affirm.  

We may get other crucial features of the Sextan characterization of the sceptic’s linguistic behaviour by focusing on the remarks he makes about the sceptical φωναί. The crucial passage is PH 1.15. Commenting on the sceptical phrases like “In no way more” and “I determine nothing” (which he addresses further in PH 1.187–208) Sextus indicates that

“in uttering these phrases they [sc. the sceptics] say what appears to them and report their own feelings without holding opinions, affirming nothing about the external objects.”

The sceptic, after having examined incompatible dogmatic claims (call them \( p \) and not-\( p \)), reaches ἐποχή and says: “In no way more \( p \) than not-\( p \)”. He thereby says what appears to him: the phrase he utters describes his feeling (“In no way does \( p \) appear to me more persuasive than not-\( p \)”), and not the properties possessed by some objects external to his psychological states (“In no way is \( p \) more persuasive than not-\( p \)”). Furthermore, in uttering this phrase, the sceptic affirms nothing, but reports a feeling of his. Sextus puts forward here a double characterization of the scepti-

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10 For discussion and further references see Corti 2009, 112–16.
11 Sextus, PH 1.15: ἐν τῇ προφορᾷ τῶν φωνῶν τούτων τὸ ἑαυτῷ φαινόμενον λέγει καὶ τὸ πάθος ἀπαγγέλλει τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἀδοξάστως, μηδὲν περὶ τῶν ἐξωθὲν ὑποκειμένων διαβεβαιοῦμενος. For this and the other Sextan passages quoted I offer the Greek text edited by Mutschmann / Mau 1958 and the translation by Annas / Barnes 2000 (sometimes slightly modified, as in the present case).
12 In conformity with this indication, when commenting on the sceptical phrases which display a universal quantifier (phrases like “Everything is undetermined”), Sextus will carefully indicate that its domain includes only the dogmatic claims actually examined by the sceptic, of which he had the impression that they are no more persuasive than their opposites and on which he suspended his judgement: cf. PH 1.193; 198–9; 200; 202; 208. Elsewhere, however, Sextus takes the universal quantifier to include every dogmatic claim: see infra, section 4.
cal phrases, grounded on a double distinction. The first is the semantic distinction between phrases describing the speaker’s feelings and phrases describing objects external to the speaker. The second distinction concerns the illocutionary force with which the sceptic utters his phrases: whether he affirms what he says or does something else.\textsuperscript{13}

All throughout his characterization of the sceptical phrases, Sextus claims that the sceptical φωναί show or indicate the sceptic’s feelings\textsuperscript{14} – and that is, what appears to him to be the case. This is particularly evident in \textit{PH} 1.187–208. When he introduces all the sceptical φωναί, Sextus says that they show a condition (διάθεσις) and a feeling (πάθος) of the sceptic (\textit{PH} 1.187); he then says of some of them that they show a feeling of the sceptic, or that the sceptic uses them in order to show that he feels a certain way (\textit{PH} 1.193; 194–5; 197; 201); and, commenting on other phrases, he says first that they show a feeling of the sceptic (or that the sceptic uses them to show that he feels a certain way, or in lieu of a phrase which means that he feels a certain way), and then that he uses them to show that things appear to him in a certain way (\textit{PH} 1.196; 198–9; 200; 202–3). By saying that the phrase uttered by the sceptic shows a feeling (an impression) of his, Sextus speaks both of the sense of the phrase (the sceptical phrase means a proposition of the form “It appears to me now that \textit{P}”), and of the illocutionary force with which he utters his phrases (the sceptic does not affirm something, but expresses a feeling he has).\textsuperscript{15}

So the sceptic does not affirm what he says, but just reports or announces (ἀπαγγέλλειν, διηγεῖσθαι) the impression he has, when he has it.\textsuperscript{16} The non-affirmative illocutionary force with which the sceptic utters his phrases has been greatly clarified by Barnes, who suggests understanding the sceptic’s speech acts in terms of Wittgenstein’s ‘Äußerung’ or ‘Ausdruck’ – mere expression of a feeling:

“Children cry when they are in pain: they thereby express their pain, but they do not state that they are in pain … Adults, when they are in pain, may utter the sentence ‘I am in pain’ or some vulgar equivalent: they thereby express their pain, but they do not … state that they are in pain (they state nothing at all). The Pyrrhonist of \textit{PH}, when he is mentally affected, may utter the sentence ‘The tower seems round’: he thereby expresses his πάθος, but he does not state that he is experiencing a certain πάθος (he does not state anything at all).”\textsuperscript{17}

\textsuperscript{13} This semantic and illocutionary characterization of the sceptic’s speech acts also appears in \textit{PH} 1.200. Elliptical formulations of it are to be found in \textit{PH} 1.4; 191; 196; 197; 199; 203; 208: see Corti 2009, 116–19 for details and discussion.

\textsuperscript{14} The verbs used by Sextus are δηλόω and µηνύω; Diogens makes the same claim using δηλάω and a cognate of µηνύω, µηνυσίς (cf. Diog. Laert. 9.74).

\textsuperscript{15} For further discussion and references see Corti 2009, 119–25.

\textsuperscript{16} Cf. \textit{PH} 1.4; 193; 196; 197; 201.

\textsuperscript{17} Barnes 1990, 2625; for a discussion of this interpretation see Corti 2009, 148–60.
We may now put forward the main features of the Sextan characterization of the sceptic speech acts. The sceptic’s phrases have a certain meaning: they mean a proposition of the form “It appears to me now that P”. The sceptic utters these phrases with a certain illocutionary force: he does not affirm them – manifesting a judgement he has made – but expresses or confesses his characteristic psychological state, that of having a certain appearance, when he has it. Why does Sextus put forward this characterization of the sceptic’s linguistic acts? We find an answer in PH 1.200, where Sextus deals with the phrase “Everything is inapprehensible”. Sextus, having indicated the meaning and the illocutionary force of the phrase in conformity with the above mentioned distinctions, concludes that the anti-sceptical charges of ‘self-refutation’ (περιτροπή) misconstrue the sceptical expressions.18

This passage clearly indicates that the Sextan characterization is to be understood as the sceptic reaction to a dogmatic charge of pragmatic (illocutionary) self-refutation, which we may reconstruct from Sextus’ reply. The sceptic says ‘P’; so surely he affirms that P. But affirming that P amounts to manifesting to have judged and to believe that P. Now a sceptic by definition cannot judge and believe that P. So we have a contradiction: a sceptic cannot say that P. We know Sextus’ reply: the sceptic, saying ‘P’, does not affirm that P; he avows that he is having the impression that P.

We are now able to provide an interpretation of the dogmatic linguistic objection of incoherence expressed in Diog. Laert. 9.102 and of the sceptic reaction witnessed in 9.102–4 and 74. The dogmatic objection refers to the charge of pragmatic (illocutionary) self-refutation we have just mentioned. And the sceptic’s reply runs as follows. Let us distinguish between two items: the feelings we have, and the non-evident objects the Dogmatists theorize about. When we utter phrases containing terms that denote the first kind of items, phrases like “The flag looks white to me”, we do

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18 PH 1.200: “Our attitude is similar when we say ‘Everything is inapprehensible’: we explain ‘everything’ in the same way, and we supply ‘to me’. Thus what is said is this: ‘All of the non-evident matters investigated in dogmatic fashion which I have inspected appear to me inapprehensible.’ This is not to make an affirmation that the matters investigated by the Dogmatists are of such a nature as to be inapprehensible; rather, it is to report our feeling ‘in virtue of which’, we say, ‘I suppose that up to now I have not apprehended any of these things because of the equipollence of their opposites.’ Hence everything brought forward to turn us about seems to me to be at a variance with what we profess” (Οὕτω δὲ φερόμεθα καὶ ὅταν λέγωμεν ‘πάντα ἐστίν ἀκατάληπτα’· καὶ γάρ τὸ ‘πάντα’ ὁμοίως ἔξηγομεθα καὶ τὸ ἕμοι συνειδηχόμεθα, ὡς εἶναι τὸ λεγόμενον τοινῦντον ‘πάντα ὡς ἐφωδέν τῶν δογματικῶς ζητούμενων αὐθέντων φαινεται μοι ακατάληπτα.· τούτῳ δὲ ἐστιν οὐ διαβεβαιωμένου τερι τοῦ τά παρὰ τοῖς δογματικοῖς ζητούμενα φύσεως εἶναι τοιαύτης ὡς εἶναι ακατάληπτα, ἀλλὰ τὸ εὐανοῦ πάθος ἀπαγγέλλοντος, καθ’ ὅ, φησιν, ὑπολαμβάνων ὅτι ἀχρὶ νῦν οὐδὲν κατέλαβον ἕκεινων ἐγὼ διὰ τὴν τῶν ἀντικειμένων ἰσοθένειαι· ὅθεν καὶ τὰ εἰς περίτοπτην φερόμενα πάντα ἀπαδόντα εἶναι δοκεῖ μοι τῶν ὑπ’ ἦμον ἀπαγγέλλομένων).
not affirm that the flag really is white – we just report or avow our feeling according to which the flag is white. And even when we say “We determine nothing”, we do not refer to a non-evident object: we talk about what we feel (since ‘nothing’ here means ‘none of the dogmatic claims we have examined’), and we just confess it – we do not affirm it. Both the dogmatic objection and the sceptic reply are placed at the level of illocutionary force.

3. The Pyrrhonist uses οὐδὲν μᾶλλον negatively:

Diog. Laert. 9.75

Section 75 is structured in two parts:

(a) the expression οὐδὲν μᾶλλον (‘in no way more’) may be said affirmatively (θετικῶς); the sceptic does not use it that way, but negatively (ἀναιρετικῶς).

(b) The expression μᾶλλον (‘rather/more’) is used sometimes in a comparative way (συγκριτικῶς), and sometimes affirmatively and negatively (θετικῶς καὶ ἀναιρετικῶς).

To get clearer on (a), let us start from (b). The text clearly states here that

- μᾶλλον can be used συγκριτικῶς, and in this case the sentence where it occurs expresses a relation of comparison: an object possesses a property to a higher degree than another object: $F > _x y$; for instance, “Honey is sweeter than a raisin”; 19

- μᾶλλον can be used θετικῶς καὶ ἀναιρετικῶς, and in this case the sentence where it occurs does not express a relation of comparison. For it amounts to the conjunction of an affirmation and a negation: $G x \land \lnot F x$; for example, “Virtue helps rather than harms”, which means “Virtue helps and does not harm”. 20

Now this section on μᾶλλον also seems to give us a clue on how to understand the qualifiers θετικῶς and ἀναιρετικῶς. If, when μᾶλλον is used θετικῶς καὶ ἀναιρετικῶς, the sentence where it appears expresses no comparative relation but the conjunction of a θέσις (an affirmation) and an ἀναίρεσις (a negation), then, when οὐδὲν μᾶλλον is used θετικῶς, the sentence where it appears will express the conjunction of two affirmations.

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20 Cf. Sluiter 1988, 51–5. This latter use of μᾶλλον is taken by Sluiter to throw light on one of the Stoic complex propositions reported by Diog. Laert. in 7.72: the proposition “showing that something is the case more than something else” (διασαφοῦν τὸ μᾶλλον ἀξίωμα), an example of which is “It is rather day than night”.

tions; and when οὐδὲν µᾶλλον is used ἀναιρετικῶς the sentence where it appears will express the conjunction of two negations.

If we read the first part of 75 in the light of these remarks, we may understand it as follows: οὐδὲν µᾶλλον is said θετικῶς, to show that two things are similar: in this case, the sentence where it appears amounts to a conjunction of assertions (“The pirate is no worse than the liar” = “The pirate is bad and the liar is bad”). The sceptic however uses οὐδὲν µᾶλλον ἀναιρετικῶς, as it is used by someone who rejects something and says: “Scylla existed no more than the Chimera did”. In this case, the sentence where οὐ(δὲν) µᾶλλον appears amounts to a conjunction of negations: “Scylla did not exist and the Chimera did not exist”.21 So surely this text indicates that the sceptic, when he applies this expression to incompatible dogmatic claims and says, for example, “Providence exists no more than it does not”, is saying “It is the case neither that Providence exists nor that it does not exist”.

This is the way the passage has been understood in secondary literature so far.22 However, this is odd. For Diogenes has just said that the sceptical οὐ µᾶλλον sentences express a πάθος of ἀρρεψία or inner balance (74), and will suggest that it means “to determine nothing and withhold assent” (76). And even if we think, as some do,24 that other parts of the Laërtian account of the Pyrrhonist characterize him as a negative dogmatist (as someone who, having refuted the existence of place, accepts that place does not exist), this would clash with taking him to accept conjunctions of negations of the form ¬p∧¬(¬p).

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21 Diogenes, here, illustrates the negative use of οὐδὲν µᾶλλον (‘In no way more’) made by the sceptics by means of a phrase which does not contain this expression, but the expression οὐ µᾶλλον (‘No more’): οὐ µᾶλλον ἡ Σκύλλα γέγονεν ἢ ἡ Χίµαιρα (“Scylla existed no more than the Chimera did”). This might be explained by the fact that the Pyrrhonists treat the two expressions as equivalent, as Sextus indicates at PH 1.188: “This phrase [sc. ‘No more’], then, we utter sometimes in the form I have given and sometimes in the form ‘In no way more’. It is not the case, as some suppose, that we use ‘No more’ in specific investigations and ‘In no way more’ in generic ones; rather, we utter ‘No more’ and ‘In no way more’ indifferently, and will here discuss them as a single phrase” (Ταύτην τοινυν [sc. ‘οὐ µᾶλλον’] ὅτε μὲν ὡς ἐφή προφερόμεθα, ὅτε δὲ οὕτως ὡς ‘οὐδὲν µᾶλλον’ οὐ γὰρ ὡς τινες υπολαμβάνοις, τὴν µὲν ‘οὐ µᾶλλον’ ἐν ταῖς εἰδικαῖς ζητήσεσι παραλαμβάνομεν, τὴν δὲ ‘οὐδὲν µᾶλλον’ ἐν ταῖς γενικαῖς, ἀλλ’ ἀδιαφόρως τὴν τε ‘οὐ µᾶλλον’ καὶ τὴν ‘οὐδὲν µᾶλλον’ προφερόμεθα, καὶ νῦν ὡς περὶ µας διαλεξόμεθα). In this and in the next lines I will indicate the fact the sceptics used the two expressions interchangeably by using the formula οὐ(δὲν) µᾶλλον.

22 Cf. for example De Lacy 1958, 69; Striker 1983, 99; Woodruff 1988, 150; Brunschwig 1999, 1112 n. 5; Bett 2000, 31 n. 34.


24 See ch. 4. of Bett’s contribution to this volume, with references.
accepted interpretation of the sceptic negative use of οὐ µᾶλλον is con-
tradictory both with the Laërtian account of this expression in 74 and 76,
and with the Laërtian account of the Pyrrhonist in 90–101. (Not to mention
Sextus, who explicitly denies that the sceptic uses οὐ µᾶλλον to express a
double negation – as the Democriteans do.)

In order to get clearer on the matter, let us go back to the first part of
9.75: the sceptic uses οὐ(δὲν) µᾶλλον as someone who rejects something and
says: “Scylla existed no more than the Chimera did”. How does the rejecter
use οὐ(δὲν) µᾶλλον – what does the sentence he utters amount to? Brun-
schwig suggests that the text alludes to the following refutation: “Scylla
existed no more than the Chimera did; the Chimera did not exist; there-
fore Scylla did not exist either”. But if this is so, then the sentence at stake
cannot mean “Scylla did not exist and the Chimera did not exist” (other-
wise the refutation would be absurd: “Scylla did not exist and the Chimera
did not exist; but the Chimera did not exist; therefore Scylla did not exist
either”). If the text alludes to the refutation mentioned by Brunschwig, the
οὐ(δὲν) µᾶλλον sentence must mean something different, namely that the
two claims are on the same level – something like “The claim that Scylla
existed is as persuasive as, or as believable as, or true as, the claim that the
Chimera existed”.

If this is so, then the use of οὐ(δὲν) µᾶλλον made by the rejecter is not
so far from the use of οὐ(δὲν) µᾶλλον made by the sceptic according to
Sextus (and Diogenes himself). For, given a couple of incompatible dog-
matic claims, say \( p \) and \( q \), this use amounts to saying: “It appears to me
now that \( p \) is no more persuasive than \( q \) nor \( q \) than \( p \) – so that I can judge
neither that \( p \) nor that \( q \)”. But why would Diogenes call this use of οὐ(δὲν)
µᾶλλον ‘negative’? Precisely because the sceptic uses it to express the fact
that he is incapable of giving his assent to \( p \) and \( q \) – and this is a double
negation. Despite appearances, Diogenes does not ascribe to the Pyrrhon-
ist conjunctions of denials of opposite claims. Instead he ascribes to him
the standard conjunction of negations which, as Sextus reminds us, sus-
pension of judgment may be expressed by: “Suspension of judgment gets
its name from the fact that the intellect is suspended so as neither to posit nor
to reject anything because of the equipollence of the matters being investi-
gated” (PH 1.196); cf. PH 1.191: to say οὐ(δὲν) µᾶλλον \( p \) \( \eta \) \( q \) amounts to

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25 Sextus, PH 1.213–14: “The Sceptics and the Democriteans use the phrase ‘No more’ in
different senses. The latter assign it the sense that neither is the case, we the sense that we
do not know whether some apparent thing is both or neither” (διαφόρως µέντοι χρώνται
tῇ οὐ µᾶλλον’ φωνῇ οἱ τε σκεπτικοὶ καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ Δηµοκρίτου· ἐκείνοι µὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ
tοῦ µηδέτερου εἶναι τάττουσι τῆν φωνήν, ἡµεῖς δὲ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀγνοεῖν πότερον ἀµφότερα
ἢ οὐθέτερον τι ἔστι τῶν φαινοµένων).

26 Sextus, PH 1.196: ἡ ἐποχή δὲ ἐφείσεται ἀπὸ τοῦ ἑστῆσαι τὴν διάνοιαν ὡς µήτε

**tithέναι τι µήτε ἀναφέρειν διὰ τὴν ἀσοσθένειαν τῶν ζητοµένων.**
saying ἀγνοῶ that \( p \) and ἀγνοῶ that \( q \) – that is, “I do not know that \( p \) and I do not know that \( q \”).

4. The self-applying property of the Pyrrhonian universal formulae: Diog. Laert. 9.76

The structure of the passage is reminiscent of a chiasm: Diogenes starts by alluding to the self-applying property of “In no way more”, and explains its meaning by quoting from Timon (“to determine nothing and maintain no position”); he then deals with the meaning and the effect of “To every account” (which alludes to the equipollence of opposed accounts and entails suspension of judgement), and ends by discussing the self-applying property of this phrase.

Let us focus on the ascription, on Diogenes’ part, of the self-applying property to “In no way more” and “To every account”. In order to appreciate Diogenes’ remarks, it is particularly useful to compare them with Sextus’ parallel observations. Sextus ascribes the self-applying property to the universal sceptical phrases in two loci. At PH 1.14–15 he considers “In no way more” and “I determine nothing”, then focuses on the former and finally generalizes his remarks on all the universal sceptical φωναί he will discuss at PH 1.187–208 (including “To every account”); and at the end of this discussion (PH 1.206) he directly addresses his remarks to all the universal sceptical phrases. Let us give a sketch of the Laërtian and the Sextan observations about “In no way more” set side by side:

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27 Sextus, PH 1.191: “Thus, although the phrase ‘In no way more’ exhibits the distinctive character of assent or denial, we do not use it in this way: we use it indifferently and in a loose way, either for a question or for ‘I do not know which of these things I should assent to and which not assent to’ (ἡ οὖν ‘οὐδέν μᾶλλον’ φωνή κἀν εμφαίνη χαρακτῆρα συγκαταθέσεως ἢ ἀρνήσεως, ἡμεῖς οὐχ οὕτως αὐτῇ χρησάμεθα, ἀλλ’ ἀδιαφόρως αὐτήν παραλαμβάνομεν καὶ καταχρηστικῶς, ἢτιοι αὖτι πύσματος ἢ ἀντὶ τοῦ λέγειν ἀγνοῶ τίνι μὲν τοῦτων χρή συγκαταθέσθαι, τίνι δὲ μὴ συγκαταθέσθαι’). Following Annas / Barnes 2000, 47 nn. ah and ai, I retain οὖν with the MSS and συγκαταθέσθαι after the μή with the Greek manuscripts). Isn’t Sextus denying here that the sceptic uses οὐδέν μᾶλλον in the way Diogenes labels ἀναιρετικῶς? He is not: he is not talking about the syntax and the sense of the sceptic οὐ(δὲν) μᾶλλον sentence and denying that it amounts to a conjunction of negations; he is talking about the illocutionary force with which the sceptic utters it and denying that the sceptic affirms or denies anything.
Three main differences are worth mentioning. First, Diogenes’ reference to the parallel case of Providence does not explain why “In no way more” is no more so than it is not so. By contrast, Sextus offers an explanation of such a phenomenon — and his remark clarifies Diogenes’ case: “In no way more” says of any claim (for example, “Providence exists”) that it is no more so than not so — and therefore of itself, too. Second, Diogenes says rather vaguely that the sceptics abolish “In no way more”, while Sextus refers more precisely to its semantic and logical properties of being self-applying and self-cancelling. Third, Diogenes does not say a word about the role of these remarks, while Sextus makes it very clear: they are sup-

28 Sextus, PH 1.14–15: “Not even in uttering the Sceptical phrases about non-evident matters — for example, ‘In no way more’, or ‘I determine nothing’, or one of the other phrases which we shall later discuss — do they hold beliefs. For if you hold beliefs, then you posit as real the things you are said to hold beliefs about; but Sceptics posit these phrases not as necessarily being real. For they suppose that, just as the phrase ‘Everything is false’ says that it too, along with everything else, is false (and similarly for ‘Nothing is true’), so also ‘In no way more’ says that it too, along with everything else, is no more so than not so, and hence it cancels itself along with everything else. And we say the same of the other sceptical phrases. Thus, if people who hold beliefs posit as real the things they hold belief about, while Sceptics utter their own phrases in such a way that they are implicitly cancelled by themselves, then they cannot be said to hold beliefs in uttering them” (ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ ἐν τῷ προφέρεσθαι περὶ τῶν ἀδήλων τὰς σκεπτικὰς φωνὰς, οἷον τὴν ὦδὲν μᾶλλον’ ἢ τὴν ὦδὲν ὄριξο’ ἢ την τῶν ἄλλων περὶ ὧν ὄστερον λέξομεν δογματίζει. ὃ μὲν γὰρ δογματίζων ὡς ὑπάρχον τίθεται τὸ πράγμα ἐκεῖνο ὃ λέγεται δογματίζει, ὁ δὲ σκεπτικὸς τὰς φωνὰς τίθησι ταύτας ὡς πάντως ὑπαρχούσας· ὑπολαμβάνει γὰρ ὅτι, ὄσπερ ἢ ‘πάντα ἐστὶ ψευδῆ’ φωνὴ μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων καὶ ἑαυτὴν ψευδῆ εἶναι λέγει, καὶ ὧδὲν ἐστὶν ἀληθεῖς’ ὄριως, οὕτως καὶ ὧδὲν μᾶλλον’ μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων καὶ ἑαυτὴν φησι μὴ μᾶλλον εἶναι καὶ διὰ τούτο τοῖς ἄλλοις ἑαυτὴν συμπεριγράφει. τὸ δ’ ἀυτὸ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων σκεπτικῶν φωνῶν λέγομεν. πλὴν ἀλλ’ εἰ ὁ δογματίζως τίθησιν ὡς ὑπάρχον τούτω ὁ δογματίζει, ὁ δὲ σκεπτικὸς τὰς φωνὰς αὐτοῦ προφέρεται ὡς δυνάμει ύπ’ ἑαυτὸν περιγράφεσθαι, οὐκ ὂν ἐν τῇ προφορᾷ τούτων δογματίζειν λέγει·)

29 That is, of any dogmatic claim: Sextus is considering the hypothesis that “In no way more” is used as a self-applying dogmatic claim: see infra.
posed to defend the sceptic from the dogmatic charge of dogmatizing in uttering his φωναί.

Now let us deal with “To every account” (παντὶ λόγῳ). This expression is the elliptical version of “Opposed to every account there is an account” (παντὶ λόγῳ λόγος ἀντίκειται) which Diogenes refers to in 74 and 102: all the Laërtian remarks about the former should be taken to refer to the latter. The meaning of this Pyrrhonian formula can be greatly clarified by the remarks devoted by Sextus to its complete version, “Opposed to every account there is an equal account” (παντὶ λόγῳ λόγος ἰσος ἀντίκειται). Although the word λόγος may mean ‘argument’ (something purporting to establish a given claim “by way of assumptions and consequence”, as the Stoics characterized it), Sextus indicates that he takes it in the more general sense of something purporting to establish a claim ‘in any way’. The Pyrrhonian formula, then, should be understood as follows: for any consideration or account in favour of a given dogmatic claim you can find an equally convincing consideration or account in favour of another dogmatic claim, incompatible with the first.  

Let us now compare the Laërtian remarks about the self-applying property of “Opposed to every account there is an account” with the Sextan observations on the self-applying property of the sceptical universal φωναί:

Diog. Laert. 9.76

– Opposed to “Opposed to every account there is an account” there is an account;
– because of this (ὡς), “Opposed to every account there is an account” is overturned (περιτραπεῖ) by itself and destroyed after abolishing the other accounts,
– just as the purgatives which, once they have cleared out toxins from the body, are themselves eliminated and destroyed.

Sextus, PH 1.206

– The sceptical phrases are cancelled along with what they are applied to – just as purgative drugs do not merely drain the humours from the body, but drive themselves out too along with the humours;
– so the sceptical phrases can be destroyed by themselves;
– so we do not affirm definitely that they are true.

31 PH 1.206: “In the case of all the sceptical phrases, you should understand that we do not affirm definitely that they are true – after all, we say that they can be destroyed by themselves, being cancelled along with what they are applied to, just as purgative drugs do not merely drain the humours from the body but drive themselves out too along with the humours” (περὶ πασῶν γὰρ τῶν σκεπτικῶν φωνῶν ἐκείνο χρή προειληφέρειν, ὅτι περὶ τοῦ ἀληθές αὐτάς εἶναι πάντως οὐ διαβεβαιούμεθα, ὅπως γε καὶ ὑπὸ εὐτῶν αὐτάς ἀναμείθει λέγωμεν δύνασθαι, συμπεριγραφομένας εκείνως περὶ οὖν λέγονται, καθάπερ τὰ καθαρτικὰ τῶν φαρµάκων οὐ μόνον τοὺς χυµοὺς ὑπελαχεί τοῦ σώµατος, ἀλλὰ καὶ εὐτὰ τοῖς χυµαῖς συνεξάγει).
There again, Diogenes does not explain why to “Opposed to every account there is an account” an account is opposed. By contrast, Sextus’ text hints at the property of the sceptical phrases (including “Opposed to every account there is an equal account”) of being self-applying, and offers a way of interpreting Diogenes’ claim: being an account, “To every account an account is opposed” is self-applying and says that an account is opposed to itself.

What exactly does the logical property of the sceptical φωναί hinted at in Diogenes’ text amount to? In order to answer the question let us analyse its Sextan, fuller account. In PH 1.14–15, Sextus faces the same dogmatic objection that is under discussion in Diog. Laert. 9.102. The sceptic utters phrases like “In no way more” or “We determine nothing” about non-evident objects – the dogmatic claims; he thereby affirms these phrases, that is, he shows that he judges and believes their content to be true.

In section 2 we examined a way to defend the Pyrrhonist that appears both in Diog. Laert. (74 and 102–4) and in Sextus. This amounts to arguing that the sceptical universal φωναί talk about the dogmatic claims actually examined by the sceptic speaker – and are confessions of a πάθος experienced by him (in this case, “In no way more” stands for the non-dogmatic phrase [S1] “It appears to me now that, for any couple of incompatible dogmatic claims about non-evident objects p and q which I have examined, p is no more persuasive than q nor q than p – so that I can judge neither that p nor that q”). In the passage we are examining, however, the defending strategy of the reply is completely different. For both the Dogmatists in their objection and Sextus in his reply take “In no way more” to stand for a dogmatic claim: (S2) “For any couple of incompatible dogmatic claims p and q about non-evident objects, p is no more persuasive than q nor q than p – so that I can judge neither that p nor that q”. The reply can be analysed as follows: “In no way more”, understood as (S2), is a dogmatic claim: therefore it is included in the domain of its universal quantifier. So (S2) says of itself what it says of any other dogmatic claim – namely, that it is not µᾶλλον than the opposite claim. What does this mean? As we have seen, when the sceptic says of a dogmatic claim that it is not µᾶλλον than its opposite, he means that he has the impression that the former is no more persuasive than the latter nor vice versa, and therefore that he believes neither. In brief: “In no way more”, understood as (S2), is a statement such that that someone believes it to be true entails that he does not believe in any dogmatic claim and in particular he does not believe that (S2). (S2) has such a logical form that it cannot be believed: so from the fact that the sceptic utters “In no way more” in the sense of (S2) it cannot follow that the sceptic believes that (S2).32

32 This account of the self-cancelling property of the sceptical universal φωναί is indebted to L. Castagnoli, “Self-Bracketing Pyrrhonism”, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philos...
Thus, both Diogenes and Sextus witness two strategies of defending the sceptic from the dogmatic charge that he affirms the universal formulae he utters – and therefore shows that he believes them to be true. The first amounts to indicating that the sceptic’s universal formulae express his feeling of being unable to assent to any member of the couples of opposed dogmatic claims he has considered. The second, that of the συμπεριγραφή (PH 1.14–15; 206; Diog. Laert. 9.76), amounts to arguing that all of the sceptical universal formulae are self-cancelling – that is, that they are such that if someone believes them to be true, then he does not believe them to be true – and therefore unbelievable.

Are the two strategies compatible? In the first, the sceptical phrase (say “In no way more”) is taken not to be self-applying: for it refers to a feeling of the speaker (meaning) and is not affirmed (illocutionary force), while the domain of its universal quantifier includes only claims concerning external non-evident objects (and not the speaker’s impressions) that are affirmed. By contrast, the second strategy implies that the sceptic universal formula falls within the scope of its quantificational domain, which includes formulæ describing non-evident objects (and not feelings of the speaker) that are affirmed. The two strategies are not compatible. Still, we can save the coherence of the sceptic’s advocate, if we understand the strategies as two parts of a disjunctive answer. Either the sceptical universal phrase is self-applying, or it is not. If it is, then from the fact that the sceptic utters this phrase we cannot ascribe to the sceptic the corresponding belief. If it is not, then it expresses a feeling. In that case, the sceptic does not affirm it and once again we cannot, from the fact that the sceptic utters this phrase, ascribe to the sceptic the corresponding belief.

5. How the Pyrrhonist uses his λόγοι: Diog. Laert. 9.77

The passage is structured in three parts. The first indicates the dogmatic reaction to the sceptic’s remarks about the phrases he utters: they do not abolish the statements, but actually reinforce them. In the second part Diogenes indicates how the sceptics used their words and statements and illustrates the point with a couple of examples. The third part appears

to ground the sceptical use of statements just mentioned on some claims about the nature of appearances and the object of the sceptical inquiry.

The text of the first part is not certain: the subject of αἴρειν and προσεπισχυρίζειν is not expressed, and a lacuna after δογµατικοί has been conjectured by Cobet. If there is no lacuna, the dogmatic reply should be taken to be addressed to the sceptic remarks in 76. The sceptic takes his universal phrases and statements (παντὶ λόγῳ in particular) to be self-applying. But if one assumes that παντὶ λόγῳ applies to itself, not only to the other λόγοι, then one takes it to be even more powerful.33

If there is a lacuna, then it should include the subject of αἴρειν and προσεπισχυρίζειν and indicate the sceptic’s move which, according to the Dogmatists, does not abolish their statements, but actually reinforces them. In both cases, the second part should be taken to illustrate the sceptic reaction to the dogmatic objection.

The question, however, has no importance for the understanding of the second and more important part of the passage, the characterization of the sceptic’s use of λόγοι. In this part of the passage Diogenes puts forward two main claims. First, he explains why the sceptics used the λόγοι: it is necessary to use λόγοι in order to abolish λόγοι: for example, it is necessary to use the word ‘place’ in order to say that place does not exist, or the word ‘necessity’ in order to say that nothing happens by necessity. Second, the text explains how the sceptics used their λόγοι: they use them ‘only as servants’ (διακόνοις); when they say that “place does not exist”, they say ‘place’ οὐ δογµατικῶς, ἀποδεικτικῶς δέ. It seems clear that the sceptic is reacting against a dogmatic objection suggesting that he cannot say things like “place does not exist”; and that he reacts indicating that, when he uses these words, he does that in a peculiar way. But unfortunately, the adverbs which qualify the sceptical use of language in the passage have raised perplexities: διακόνος has been judged “no more than a stopgap” and διακένως or διακενής have been suggested in its place; ἀποδεικτικῶς has been taken as ‘shocking’, and ὑποδεικτικῶς, ἀπορητικῶς and ἀπαγγελτικῶς have been conjectured.34

Given the controversy on these issues, it would be unsafe to ground our understanding of the passage on them. Let us rather have a look at the

33 Cf. Brunschwig 1999, 1114 n. 2. The reply is hopeless: the point of the sceptical remarks was to show that the fact that the sceptic says παντὶ λόγῳ does not imply that the sceptic believes it, since the phrase is self-applying and therefore unbelievable. I cannot see how the fact that παντὶ λόγῳ is self-applying could strengthen it – i.e. suggest that the sceptic actually believes its content.

34 See the revised version of Barnes 1992, included in his Essays in Ancient Philosophy IV, forthcoming from Oxford University Press. Brunschwig 1999, 1114 n. 5, suggests understanding ἀποδεικτικῶς in terms of “in the context and for the needs of the sceptic demonstration of the non-existence of place”. But this remark has no weight on the claim which it is supposed to justify, i.e. that the sceptic can say things like “place does not exist”.
third part of the passage. This, as the γὰρ suggests, seems to introduce a couple of remarks on which the sceptic’s use of words just mentioned is grounded. I take the first remark to run as follows: that $x$ appears to be $F$ does not imply that $x$ is $F$. We have here a distinction between two different facts: the first is the psychological state of being struck by the impression that something is $F$; the second is the fact, external to the person who has this impression, that $x$ is $F$. The second claim is about what is/is not the object of the sceptics’ inquiry, and why this is so: the sceptics do not inquire into the things they think (νοούσων), since they are evident to them; they inquire into the things to which they have access by means of perception (things which presumably are not evident to them).

A similar double distinction plays a crucial role in an important Sextan locus: PH 1.19–20. Here Sextus faces the Dogmatic objection according to which the sceptic destroys his own appearances. Sextus reacts by indicating that (a) there are two things to distinguish, namely the fact that $x$ appears to be $F$ to someone, and what is said about what appears – the fact that $x$ is $F$; and that (b) the sceptic does not (and cannot) inquire into items of the first kind – into the question whether $x$ appears to him to be $F$, but only into items of the second kind – into the question whether $x$ is $F$. The sceptic inquires and suspends his judgement on the question whether $x$ is $F$, not on the question whether $x$ seems to him to be $F$; he rejects the former, not the latter.

Both in Diog. Laert. 9.77 and PH 1.19–20 we have a distinction between facts and a distinction between the objects of the sceptical inquiry. The distinction between facts is the same in the two passages. Now in PH 1.19–20 there is a connection between the two distinctions: the latter is grounded in the former. It is natural to expect such a connection to be at issue in Diog. Laert. 9.77 too. Furthermore, it seems possible to reduce the distinction between the objects of the sceptical inquiry in Diog. Laert. 9.77 to

35 PH 1.19–20: “When we investigate whether existing things are such as they appear, we grant that they appear, and what we investigate is not what is apparent but what is said about what is apparent – and this is different from investigating what is apparent itself. For example, it appears to us that honey sweetens (we concede this inasmuch we are sweetened in a perceptual way); but whether (as far as the argument goes) it is actually sweet is something we investigate – and this is not what is apparent but something said about what is apparent”; ὅταν δὲ ζητῶμεν, εἰ τοιούτον ἐστὶ τὸ υποκείµενον ὅποιον φαίνεται, τὸ μὲν ὅτι φαίνεται διδόµεν, ζητούµεν δ’ οὗ περὶ τοῦ φαινοµένου ἀλλὰ περὶ εἰκόνος ὁ λέγεται περὶ τοῦ φαινοµένου· τοῦτο δὲ διὰ διαφέρει τοῦ ζητεῖν περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ φαινοµένου. οἷον φαίνεται ἡµῖν γλυκάζειν τὸ µέλι (τοῦτο συγχωροµένη· γλυκαζόµεθα γὰρ αἰσθητικῶς), εἰ δὲ καὶ γλυκὸ ἔστιν ὁσὸν ἐπὶ τῷ λόγῳ, ζητούµεν· ὅ οὐκ ἐστὶ τὸ φαινοµένου ἀλλὰ <τὸ> περὶ τοῦ φαινοµένου λεγόµενον. With Annas / Barnes 2000, 8 n. d, I retain the MSS text; Mutschmann / Mau 1958, following Heintz 1932, add <ὅτι µὲν> after ὁσὸν.

36 Cf. PH 1.22: “[Appearances] depend on passive and unwilled feelings and are not objects of investigation” (φαντασία ἐν πείσει γὰρ καὶ ἀβουλήτῳ παθεῖ κειµένη αξίητητος ἐστίν).
the one witnessed in Sextus: the thoughts at issue in Diogenes’ text may be understood as the psychological states of having impressions; and the things the sceptic has access to through perception may be taken to be the property possessed by the external objects.

In light of these remarks, Diog. Laert. 9.77 may be read as follows: the question whether \( x \) is \( F \) is different from the question whether \( x \) appears \( F \); and the sceptic inquires and suspends his judgement on the former, not on the latter. But what does this have to do with the claim that the sceptic can say things like “Place does not exist”?

The link may be provided by another Sextan passage, \( PH \) 2.10.\textsuperscript{37} In this passage Sextus faces a dogmatic objection. The sceptic, who suspends judgement about the existence of the non-evident objects that the Dogmatist holds tenets about, cannot think about and inquire into them. Sextus reacts denying the dogmatic charge – that is, claiming that someone who suspends judgment on the existence of the non-evident objects can think and inquire about them, and then arguing for this claim.\textsuperscript{38} Sextus’ reasoning, as I understand it, can be taken as a two-pronged argument and schematized as follows:

1. The sceptic can have the thoughts which:
   (a) arise from things which give him a passive impression and appear evidently to him; and
   (b) do not at all imply the reality of what is being thought of.


\textsuperscript{38} \( PH \) 2.10: “If they [sc. the Dogmatists] say they mean that it is not apprehension of this sort but rather mere thinking which ought to precede investigation, then investigation is not impossible for those who suspend judgment about the reality of what is non-evident. For a Sceptic is not, I think, barred from having thoughts, if they arise from things which give him a passive impression and appear evidently to him and do not at all imply the reality of what is being thought of – for we can think, as they say, not only of real things but also of unreal things. Hence someone who suspends judgement maintains his sceptical condition while investigating and thinking; for it has been made clear that he assents to any impression given by way of a passive appearance insofar as it appears to him”; εἰ δὲ φήσουσι µὴ τοιαύτην λέγειν κατάληψιν ἡγεῖσθαι ζητήσεως προσήκειν, νόησιν δὲ ἀπλῶς, οὐκ ἐστὶν ἀδύνατον [ἐν] τοῖς ἐπέχουσι περὶ τῆς ύπάρξεως τῶν ἀδήλων ζητεῖν. νοῆσεως γὰρ ἡµῶν ἀπείργεται ο σκεπτικός, οἶµαι, ἀπὸ τῶν παθητικῶς υποπτώντων κατ’ ἐνάργειαν φαινοµένων οὐ µόνον τὰ ἐπέχουσιν φανοµένων, ὡς φασίν, ἀλλ’ ἴδη καὶ τὰ ανύπαρκτα. θέναι καὶ ζητοῦν καὶ νοοῦν ἐν τῇ σκεπτικῇ διαθέσει μένειν ὃ ἐφεκτικός· ὅτι γὰρ τοῖς κατὰ φαντασίαν παθητικῆς ὑποπτώσεως αὐτῷ, καθ’ ἐφεκτικός· συγκατατίθεται, δεδήλωται. With Annas / Barnes 2000, 69 n. c, I omit λόγῳ after the first αὐτῷ.
2. Now, as a matter of fact,
   [(b*) the thoughts that do not at all imply the reality of what is being
   thought actually exist:] for – as the Dogmatists recognize – we
   can think not only of real things but also of unreal things; and
   [(a*) the sceptic possesses the psychological states from which these
   thoughts arise:] for I have already made clear that the sceptic
   assents to any impression given by way of passive appearance
   insofar as it appears to him.

3. Therefore, the sceptic can think about the non-evident objects and
   consider the claims which the Dogmatists hold about them.

According to Sextus, the kind of νόησις which is permitted to the sceptic is
the thought which (a) derives from his impressions and (b) does not intro-
duce the existence of what is thought. Sextus wants to show then that (b*)
there actually is a thought which does not introduce the existence of what
is thought and that (a*) the sceptic has impressions at his disposal. This
enables Sextus to conclude that the sceptic can think about non-evident
objects.

In (b*), Sextus claims that, as the Dogmatists themselves recognize, we
think about things that do not exist.39 Take Scylla and the Chimera, for
instance: they do not exist, and no one believes them to exist; still, it is
possible to entertain thoughts about them (to think that the Chimera is a
revolting monster, to think about Bellerophon fighting the Chimera, etc.).
So it is possible for the Dogmatist to think about a non-evident and not-
existing object such as the Chimera without believing it to exist; so it is for
the sceptic too.

In (a*), Sextus indicates that the sceptic has the υποπίπτοντα necessary
to think about the non-evident objects, and hints at a passage where he
has already said something that implies that. He surely refers to PH 1.1340
(and 19), where he has said that the sceptic assents to his impressions in the

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39 Sextus may have in mind Gorgias' περὶ φύσεως, which he quotes in M 7.65–87; cf.
especially 80: “Scylla and Chimera and many non-existing things are thought” (Σκύλλα
καὶ Χίµαιρα καὶ πολλὰ τῶν µὴ ὄντων φρονεῖται).

40 PH 1.13: “When we say that the Sceptics do not hold beliefs, we do not take ‘belief’
in the sense in which some say, quite generally, that belief is acquiescing in something;
for Sceptics assent to the feelings forced upon them by appearances – for example, they
would not say, when heated or chilled, ‘I think I am not heated (or: chilled)’. Rather,
we say that they do not hold beliefs in the sense in which some say that belief is assent
to some non-evident object of investigation in the sciences; for Pyrrhonists do not assent
to any non-evident thing”; Λέγοµεν δὲ µὴ δογµατίζειν τὸν σκεπτικὸν οὐ κατ’ ἐκεῖνο
τὸ σηµαινόµενον τοῦ δόγµατος καθ’ ὃ δόγµα εἶναι φασί τινες κοινότερον τὸ εὐδοκεῖν
τινι πράγµατι (τοῖς γὰρ κατὰ φαντασίαν κατηναγκασµένοις πάθεις συγκατατίθεται
ὁ σκεπτικός, οἷον οὐκ ἂν εἶποι θεµαίνοµενος ἢ ψυχόµενος ὃτι δοκῶ µὴ θεµαίνονται
ἢ ψυχεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ µὴ δογµατίζειν λέγοµεν καθ’ ὃ δόγµα εἶναι φασί τινες τὴν τινι
πράγµατι τῶν κατὰ τὰς ἐπιστήµας ζητουµένων αδήλων συγκατάθεσιν (οὐδὲν γὰρ
τῶν αδήλων συγκατατίθεται ὁ Πυρρόνειος).
sense that he acquiesces to them, he does not resist them. For to claim that the sceptic assents to his impressions implies that the sceptic has impressions, that he finds himself in the psychological state denoted by the term φαντασία. So Sextus is putting forward an a fortiori argument: the sceptic can have the thoughts of the kind mentioned above: for we have already said that the sceptic assents to his impressions, and we have thereby presupposed that he has those impressions which enable him to think about the non-evident objects denoted in the dogmatic claims.

In PH 2.10 the expression νοεῖν is used to denote the act of thinking about something: the question at issue in the dogmatic objection and in the sceptic reply is whether the sceptic can entertain thoughts about a non-evident object – consider and inquire into the dogmatic claims. But the Sextan text seems to contain the traces of a linguistic parallel argument too. For the main dogmatic charge earlier in the Sextan passage (PH 2.1–10) is formulated in linguistic terms: “if the sceptics do not apprehend [what the Dogmatists talk about], they do not even know how to talk about what they have not apprehended” (PH 2.2). Now given that the object of ‘apprehending’, here, is “what the Dogmatists talk about”, it is tempting to think that the apprehension at stake is a specific psychological state: that of understanding the meaning of the terms occurring in the sentences affirmed by the Dogmatists. In other words, Sextus’ text suggests that the Dogmatists attacked the sceptics with a semantic version of the argument we have considered so far, in which the crucial claim is that understanding the meaning of the word ‘y’, which denotes a non-evident object, implies knowing and believing something about y. That is: if y is a non-evident object (say Providence), then to understand the meaning of ‘y’ implies to know and believe something about y.

Now in Diog. Laert. 9.77 the sceptic appears to react against a dogmatic objection according to which he cannot say things like “place does not exist”. It seems to me that a linguistic argument analogous to the one we have detected in PH 2.1–10 underlies Diogenes’ text too, and that we can provide an interpretation of the Laërtian passage in the light of the Sextan locus. The sceptic says things like “place does not exist”: he utters phrases that contain terms referring to non-evident objects. The Dogmatist then raises an objection: “You say that place does not exist. But if place does not exist, how can you talk about it? The fact that you understand...

41 For this interpretation see Barnes 1990, 2626–34 and Corti 2009, 65–74, with references.
42 The capacity of thinking about something (in our case, a non-evident object) implies or amounts to that of possessing the corresponding concepts. So it is not surprising that in a locus similis to PH 2.1–10, M 8.337–336a, the question at stake is whether the sceptic can have the concept (ἔχειν ἔννοιαν) of a non-evident object such as demonstration.
43 PH 2.2: ἤτοι καταλαμβάνει ὁ σκεπτικός τὰ υπὸ τῶν δογµατικῶν λεγόµενα ἢ οὐ καταλαµβάνει ... εἰ δ’ οὐ καταλαµβάνει ἀρα, περὶ ὃν οὐ κατείληφεν οὐδὲ οἶδε λέγειν.
the word ‘place’ entails that place exists: your understanding of this word presupposes the existence of its reference”. And the sceptic replies: “Understanding a word designating a non-evident object does not presuppose its existence: for it is an ordinary experience to understand words denoting non-evident objects which do not exist, such as the Chimera. So we are not forced by your argument to accept that place exists on the ground that we understand the word ‘place’. In order for us to entertain thoughts about place, to understand ‘place’ and to possess the concept of place it is not necessary to have beliefs on the matter: it is sufficient to have psychological states of another kind – the impressions. And our suspension of judgement does not prevent us from having these psychological resources. For what we inquire into, suspend our judgement about and get rid of are not our impressions (the fact that x appears to us to be F), but claims about how things actually are.”

6. Conclusion: Laërtian vs Sextan Pyrrhonism

By way of conclusion, I would like to devote a few words to an interesting difference between the Sextan and Laërtian account of the Pyrrhonist. The crucial passage is Diog. Laert. 9.102–5. Here Diogenes reports two dogmatic objections, each followed by the pertinent sceptic reply: that of incoherence (102–4), which we have examined in section 2; and that of unlivability (104–5).

According to the first objection, the fact that the sceptic, in his refutation of the dogmatic claims, utters phrases like “I determine nothing”, entails that he believes their content to be true (δογµατίζειν).

According to the second objection, if someone is a sceptic, then he rejects his perceptions (for example, vision), and therefore he destroys life – he cannot live. I take this objection to run as follows: “Suppose that you are a sceptic. It appears to you that the fire in front of you burns. But you reject/mistrust your impressions. So nothing can prevent you from

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44 So I take the philosophically exciting issue at stake here to be the following: how are we to analyse sentences like “The Chimera is a revolting monster” and (shifting from singular to general terms) “Unicorns cannot fly” in order to account for the facts that (a) we understand these sentences and (b) the Chimera and the unicorns do not exist?


46 In the light of this interpretation, I find Barnes’ δικενωσ (in lieu of the transmitted διακόνως) quite tempting. We may take it to be a sceptic allusion to one peculiar feature of the Stoics’ vacuous impressions (διακένοι φαντασίαι: cf. Sextus, M 8.67), that of not implying the existence of what is thought: just as Orestes’ impression of being assaulted by the Furies does not imply their existence, so the sceptic’s understanding of “Place does not exist” does not imply the existence of place.

47 For the objection of unlivability and the sceptic reply see Diog. Laert. 9.104(line 489)–5; the text reporting the objection of incoherence and the sceptic reply is indicated at nn. 5 and 6.
walking into the fire and getting burned. So you die.” “But,” the sceptic’s advocate replies, “the Pyrrhonist objects and rejects only claims about the non-evident objects which lie beyond the things that appear. He suspends his judgement on the question whether fire has a burning nature or on how things change and perish: but he does perceive that fire burns and things change and perish.”

The sceptical replies to the two objections witnessed by Diogenes share a common ground: they both (a) distinguish between two kinds of items, namely, what the sceptic feels/what appears to him to be the case on the one hand, and the non-evident objects that lie beyond the things which appear and that the Dogmatists make affirmations about on the other; and (b) indicate that the sceptic has impressions and knows what he feels and what appears to him, while he suspends his judgement about the non-evident objects.

What does the sceptic know, exactly? The expressions used by Diogenes to denote them are “the things about which, insofar as he is a man, the sceptic has feelings about” (περὶ ὧν ὡς ἄνθρωποι πάσχοµεν); “the things which appear to him in daily life” (πολλὰ τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ φαινοµένων) and “only his feelings” (µόνα τὰ πάθη); examples include that it is day (ὅτι ἡµέρα ἐστὶ), that he lives (ὅτι ζῶµεν), that he sees, that he thinks something. Most of these locutions and examples indicate that the sceptic knows that he has an appearance or a feeling, when he has that appearance or feeling – for example, that when honey strikes the sceptic as being sweet, he knows that honey strikes him as being sweet. But the first two locutions and the first two examples suggest that the sceptic also knows something else: namely, that when it seems to him that honey is sweet he also knows, at least sometimes, that honey is sweet.48

So let me stress two points. First, the replies do not concede that the sceptic ‘believes’ (δογµατίζει) something. Second, they represent the sceptic as knowing not only that he has an appearance, when he has this appearance (say, knowing that honey appears to him to be sweet, when honey appears to him to be sweet), but also – at least sometimes – as knowing the object of his appearance, when he has it (say, knowing that honey is sweet, when it appears to him to be sweet).

48 Barnes 1990, 2634 n. 105, understands the passage (in particular, 102–4) differently. He takes Diogenes’ account to suggest that the Pyrrhonist both believes and knows that he feels in a certain way or has a certain impression, when he has it. The reply mentioned by Diogenes, though, does not concede that the sceptic believes anything, but only that he knows something. (In this respect, the difference between Diog. Laert. 9.102–4 and the locus similis PH 1.13 is striking: for Sextus, replying to an analogous dogmatic objection, does distinguish between two alleged senses of δόγµα and concedes that the sceptic has δόγµατα, if we take this word in the first of its senses: see n. 40). And the examples of what the sceptic knows include not just the fact that he is having a certain feeling or impression, but also their objects.
And this is remarkable. Scholars have found two kinds of Pyrrhonist in Sextus’ pages. The radical sceptic suspends his judgement over every issue and has no beliefs whatsoever: still, he has impressions or appearances and manages to live being guided by these psychological states of his. The urbane sceptic suspends his judgement on non-evident matters only: he has ordinary beliefs and can act by means of them.\(^{49}\)

I suggest that in Diog. Laert. 9.102–5 we may read another characterization of the sceptic and of the defence of the possibility for him to act, different from the two we find in Sextus. The Laërtian sceptic has no beliefs; he has impressions or appearances – for example, honey appears to him to be sweet; he knows that he has an appearance, when he has it; and sometimes, when it appears to him that \(x\) is \(F\) (say, that honey is sweet), he also \textit{knows} that \(x\) is \(F\). For in some cases in order for someone to know that \(x\) is \(F\), it is sufficient for him to have the impression that \(x\) is \(F\) (it is not necessary to judge and believe that \(x\) is \(F\)). And these pieces of knowledge are sufficient for the sceptic to act successfully and to live.

Is this \textit{homo sapiens non iudicans/credens} a piece of ancient eccentricity? It is not: although a tenacious philosophical orthodoxy from the \textit{Theaetetus} onwards wants knowledge to be characterized in terms of belief (and takes knowing that \(p\) to imply believing that \(p\)), some heterodox philosophers resist. Among them, the one who has the more refined and interesting position for our inquiry is Zeno Vendler. According to his account, while believing that \(p\) is a psychological state determined by a previous act of judging that \(p\), for which we may and should have reasons, knowing that \(p\) is a mental state in which one falls and on which the act of judging has no influence. I do not want to defend this position here; but I do want to suggest that an analogous distinction between the mental state of having δόγµατα or beliefs, determined by a previous act of judgment or συγκατάθεσις, and the mental state of knowing or γινώσκειν, triggered by a previous impression or φαντασία with the intervention of no judgment, may underlie the variant of ancient Pyrrhonism accounted by Diogenes in 9.102–5.\(^{50}\)

\(^{49}\)The Sextan sceptic also knows something: when he has an appearance or feeling (when honey strikes him as being sweet), he knows that he has that appearance or feeling (that honey tastes sweet to him/that it looks as though honey is sweet): cf. Barnes 1990, 2621 n. 46.

\(^{50}\)See Z. Vendler, \textit{Res Cogitans. An Essay in Rational Psychology} (Ithaca, NY / London 1972) ch. V; for an analysis of Vendler’s argument and ancient Pyrrhonism, cf. Corti 2009, 238–48. In my book, I came to the conclusion that Vendler’s \textit{homo sapiens non credens} is not the Pyrrhonian sceptic: that is, the Pyrrhonist as depicted by Sextus, whom the book is devoted to. I did not focus on the Laërtian account of Pyrrhonism and its peculiarities: I am very grateful to Katja Vogt and the co-authors of the present volume to have given me the opportunity to do so in an ideal working environment. I also would like to thank Jonathan Barnes and Myrto Hatzimichali for their precious comments.
Skeptical Investigation and Its Perks: Diog. Laert. 9.69–70 and 79–89

Christiana M. M. Olfert

1. Introduction

When we say we are ‘investigating’ or ‘searching’ for something, we might mean one of several different things. For instance, on my way out of the house in the morning, I might investigate the urgent question: “Where are my keys?” Or, in a different context and for different purposes, I might investigate whether there really is change and motion in the world, or whether our perceptions of change and motion are mere illusions. Both of these types of investigations or searches are arguably covered by the Greek terms σκέψις (‘investigation’) and ζήτησις (‘search’), and yet we can agree that they are significantly different activities.¹ The second kind of investigation is what we might call ‘epistemic investigation’: it aims to discover the truth about the existence of motion and change, and it will count as successful or unsuccessful depending on whether or not it advances our understanding of this topic. In contrast, the first kind of investigation aims at a practical result – getting my hands on my keys – and need not be concerned with the truth in any special way at all, so long it achieves this important result.

According to Diogenes Laertius, the Pyrrhonian Skeptic’s philosophical program is defined in terms of investigation and searching. But given the broad range of things that might count as an ‘investigation’ or a ‘search,’ it is not entirely clear what this means. Moreover, Diogenes’s descriptions of the Skeptics’ investigations only seem to add to the puzzle. One thing we are told is that the Skeptics search for the truth (70). But we are also told that the Skeptics “were always investigating but never discovered anything” (70); that by their own admission, they “determine nothing” (74); that when they undertake their investigations, “ignorance of the truth follows suit” (76); and that the purpose of their investigation is not to arrive at some settled view or knowledge about the truth of things, but rather “suspension of judgment” and “peace of mind” (107).

¹ For a discussion and classification of the breadth of possible meanings of these terms, see Palmer 2000, 366–7.
To anyone who is not already a practicing Skeptic, this combination of claims about the defining activity of Skepticism is puzzling. What kind of investigation, if any, systematically and predictably results in ignorance, and discovers nothing? What does it mean to search for the truth if the aim of this searching is not discovery of the truth, but a kind of mental tranquility? And what sort of genuine investigation, which is not a mere intellectual exercise but a sincere attempt to figure something out, proceeds by pre-established formulas (called ‘Modes’ or ‘Tropes’) to a predictable conclusion, namely, suspension of judgment and no determination?

These are some of the questions about the nature of Skeptical investigation that arise from Diogenes’s description of Pyrrhonism in Book 9 of Lives of Eminent Philosophers. In what follows, I will argue that despite some appearances to the contrary, Skeptical investigation has all the features we usually think belong to the epistemic type of investigation described above. The epistemic credentials of Skeptical investigation have often been discussed by other interpreters, but I hope to add to this discussion by focusing on epistemic improvement or advancement, and the sense in which Skeptical investigation aims to improve or advance the epistemic state of the investigator. In particular, I hope to show that the Skeptic – or anyone engaged in a Skeptical investigation – arguably achieves a number of epistemic advancements or benefits when she achieves suspension of judgment. These, we might say, are the perks of Skeptical investigation.

2. Investigation and Epistemic Improvement

Investigation and searching feature prominently in Diogenes’s description of who and what a Pyrrhonian Skeptic is:2

“All of these men were called ‘Pyrrhonians’, the appellation being derived from the name of their teacher, and they are also called ‘Aporetics’, ‘Skeptics’, ‘Ephetics’, and ‘Zetetics’, these labels being derived from their ‘doctrine’, if we may call it that.” (Diog. Laert. 9.69)

As Diogenes suggests, these descriptors of Pyrrhonians as ‘Skeptics’ (literally, ‘investigators’) and ‘Zetetics’ (literally, ‘searchers’) are not merely hostile labels given to Pyrrhonians by outsiders and by their philosophical opponents. They are also self-descriptions, which arise from what Pyrrhonians themselves say and do.3 As such, it is safe to say that investigation

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2 For the purposes of this paper, I will not enter into the debate about the differences and similarities between Pyrrhonian and Academic Skepticism. I will frame my discussion in terms of Pyrrhonian Skepticism here simply because Diogenes does so: this book is specifically about Pyrrho and Pyrrhonists. In what follows, I will simply use ‘Skeptics’ to refer to Pyrrhonians.

3 For these descriptions as self-descriptions, see e.g. 76, 78–9, 107. For a report by a Skeptic that he happily adopts these monikers, see e.g. Sextus Empiricus, PH 1.3.
and searching are of central importance to the Pyrrhonians’ philosophical
program – as we will see, both to its content and to its method.

In order to understand what it means for Pyrrhonians to be ‘Skeptic’
and ‘Zetetic’, it will be helpful to start with a brief discussion of some
Platonic antecedents of the notion of inquiry or investigation. In the Meno,
the title character, Meno, begins to worry that he and Socrates will not
be able to discover an answer to the question “What is virtue?” because
both of them seem to have been reduced to a state of intellectual numbness
or perplexity about the question. Meno expresses this worry with three
questions:

“How will you search for (ζητήσεις) [virtue], Socrates, when you do not know at all
what it is? How will you aim to search for something you do not know at all? If you
should meet with it, how will you know that this is the thing that you did not know?”
(80d)

Socrates then reformulates these questions into a dilemma:

“Do you know what a debater’s argument you have introduced, that a man cannot
search either for what he knows or for what he does not know at all? For he cannot
search for what he knows, because he knows it, and in that case is in no need of search-
ing; nor again can he search for what he does not know, since he does not know for
what he is to search.” (80e)

These passages are famous for their discussion of the so-called “Meno’s
Paradox” about the possibility of investigation. But within their discussion
of the paradox, these passages also express some general and plausible
ideas about what constitutes a particular kind of investigation.

To start with, every genuine investigation has an object, something that
the investigation is about. However, as Socrates points out, there are some
restrictions on what can count as an object of investigation: we do not in-
vestigate what we already know, but only matters that ‘need’ investiga-
tion (δεῖ τῷ γε τοιούτῳ ζητήσεως, Meno 80e). So in addition to an inves-
tigative object, we may add that a genuine investigation must also have
a stimulus, some feature of the object that provokes or calls for investiga-
tion, which may be connected to our lack of full knowledge about it. Then,
as Meno and Socrates suggest, every genuine investigation must also be-
gin with some content. An investigation that starts with no information
at all – a complete mental blank – about the matter under investigation
has nowhere to go. Further, there also seems to be a question for Meno
about how investigation takes place, the steps by which it proceeds. This
suggests that, at least for Meno, a genuine investigation is not a (merely)
random intellectual activity, but it has some sort of method, plan, or other
structure by which it proceeds. Finally, Socrates and Meno also assume
that investigation has an aim or end. In their case, this aim or end is to gain

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knowledge, and more specifically, to make a discovery about something one did not have full knowledge of before the investigation. As such, we might say that Socrates’ and Meno’s central concern here is the possibility of a specifically epistemic form of investigation, which aims at gaining new knowledge.

This last point deserves some more elaboration. In fact, it incorporates two distinct points about the aims of a specifically epistemic form of investigation. The first is that an epistemic investigation aims, roughly, at getting at the truth, avoiding false beliefs, and perhaps even achieving knowledge, as opposed to simply getting practical results of a certain kind (“I don’t need to know the precise truth about where my keys are; I just need my keys!”). The second, importantly distinct point is that a genuinely epistemic investigation does not aim at just any truths, but at new truths which constitute a real epistemic improvement or advancement for the investigator. In contrast to other intellectual activities like contemplation or imagination, investigation as such aims to grasp or see or understand something significant that one has not grasped, seen, or understood before. The prospect of making such a discovery gives our investigations a point or a purpose; it provides a standard of success for our investigations; and real discoveries offer us genuine epistemic benefits.

These, then, are six important aspects of epistemic investigation that arise in the Meno: a bonafide epistemic investigation has an object; a motive or stimulus; some starting content; a method; and it aims both at knowledge and truth, and at a discovery or epistemic advance that defines the success or failure of the investigation. So far, this seems to be a relatively standard and plausible conception of epistemic investigation. In what follows, I will ask whether the Pyrrhonian Skeptics engage in epistemic investigation in this sense.

3. The Distinctive Features of Skeptical Investigation

It is important to the Skeptics’ philosophical project that their type of investigation qualifies as epistemic investigation in roughly the standard sense just described. For one thing, it is important to the Skeptics’ self-conception. As Diogenes tells it, the Skeptics are called ‘investigators’ and ‘searchers’ because they are “constantly searched for the truth” (70). They also frequently present their Skeptical project as a direct competitor to that

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5 By this I mean simply that real intellectual improvement does not come from adding to one’s list of tautological, trivial, or otherwise unimportant or uninteresting truths.

6 Some interpreters have also read the beginning of Sextus Empiricus’s PH in this way, as claiming that “the Skeptics are still investigating” the truth. Other interpreters disagree, citing the fact that in a parallel passage to Diog. Laert. 9.70, namely PH 1.3, Sextus does not say that the Skeptics’ labels or names are derived from the fact that they search for the
of the so-called ‘dogmatists’, a group of philosophers engaged in epistemic activities and projects, who claim not only to have engaged in epistemic investigation, but also to have thereby discovered deep and important truths about the world. But in order for Skepticism to count as a genuine alternative to dogmatism, so that we would be forced to choose between the two, the Skeptics need to be engaged in broadly the same kind of epistemic project as those they claim to be competing with. Moreover, although Diogenes sometimes struggles to find the right generic term for practitioners in the Pyrrhonian tradition, and for their arguments and practices, he does end up frequently describing them as ‘philosophers’ and as doing ‘philosophy’ (61, 62, 70, 71, 74, 110, 112, 113). But we might wonder whether the Skeptics could really count as philosophers unless they were engaged in truth-seeking activities that aim to improve our minds. For these reasons, it is important by the Skeptics’ own lights that we try to understand them as engaging in epistemic investigation. Still, even

truth. For more discussion of this debate, see P almer 2000, 366–73. Thank you to Richard Bett and James Warren for emphasizing this point to me.

These are typically thought to include Peripatetics, Epicureans, and Stoics, to name a few.

See Diog. Laert. 9.74, 77, 83, 103–8; for similar claims in Sextus’s text see e.g. PH 1.1, 2, 8, 10, 12, 14, and PH 2 in its entirety.

For some of Diogenes’ reservations about the correct title for the Pyrrhonians and what they do, see e.g. 9.69, 70.

For an alternative view of Skepticism as a philosophy or philosophical practice, comparable to but distinct from dogmatism, see Striker 2001, 117, 121–4.

There is also another important piece of evidence that the Skeptics aimed at cognitive improvement. They famously compare their Skeptical arguments and sayings to medicine: “Whenever things are at odds with each other and arguments have equal strength, ignorance of the truth follows suit. And also for this very argument a counter-argument lies in opposition, which, after refuting the other arguments, is itself turned upside down by itself and destroyed, just like medicines used for purgation, which, once they have cleared out toxins from the body, are themselves also eliminated and thoroughly destroyed” (Diog. Laert. 9.76). The analogy between Skeptical investigation and purgative medicine is found in PH as well (see Sext. Emp. PH 1.28). At least one of the things this analogy seems to be telling us is that Skeptical investigation, like medicine, can improve us or benefit us in some way. Now, it may be tempting to read this passage as claiming that Skeptical investigation can have therapeutic benefits that are not specifically epistemic: perhaps it removes our troublesome desire for knowledge (as Sedley argues), or more generally, perhaps it is “a therapeutic device to deter people from trying to be guided by reason” (as Striker argues) (Sedley 1983, 10; Striker 2001, 124). However, it seems to me that the medical analogy need not be interpreted in only a narrow, non-epistemic sense. It could just as easily be read as a comparison between bodily health and epistemic ‘health’: just as the health of the body might be improved by the use of medical purgatives, so too might our epistemic ‘health’ be improved by the use of Skeptical arguments and investigative techniques (which, in some importantly non-dogmatic fashion, self-destruct once they have done their beneficial work). If this is right, then the medical analogy can be invoked as evidence in my argument that Skeptical investigation aims at epistemic improvements, and consequently, that it meets one of the requirements for a genuinely epistemic investigation.
regardless of how the Skeptics conceive of themselves, we might be independently interested in the questions of whether the Ancient Skeptics count as philosophers, and whether Skepticism really is a strong competitor to dogmatism and to the cognitive practices we engage in everyday which are centrally concerned with uncovering the truth. In what follows, then, I will describe the project of Skeptical investigation with a view to whether it counts as ‘epistemic’ in the sense described above, and if so, in which respects.

When we think about what it means for the Skeptics to be investigators, we may start with what the Skeptics investigate – the object of Skeptical investigation. As we have seen, in the most general terms, Diogenes describes the Skeptics as “searched for the truth” (70). But which truths does the Skeptic search for? Diogenes tells us that “whether things appear a certain way is not the subject of investigation, according to the skeptics, but rather whether in reality they are such” (91). After all, the way things seem to be is already manifest to the person to whom they seem that way. For example, the Skeptics simply acknowledge and do not investigate the fact that apples taste sweet or that snow looks white (103). Instead, in the most general terms, the object of Skeptical investigation is the truth about what is ‘really the case’ in the sense of what is not obviously (‘non-evidently’) the case. These non-evident things include facts about the way things in the world really are, beyond how they ‘merely’ seem to be; facts about the basic natures of things; and in general, any facts about things that would decisively resolve questions or puzzles we might have about what they really are (74, 77, 103). Like Meno in Plato’s dialogue, then, the Skeptic is investigating and searching specifically for truths that are not yet obvious to her, the grasp of which would improve or advance her epistemic state.

But there is also supposed to be a distinctively Skeptical way of trying to improve our understanding of non-evident truths, which distinguishes the Skeptics from the so-called ‘dogmatists.’ These dogmatists are thinkers who hold beliefs and make declarations in a ‘dogmatic fashion’: they are in the business of forming settled views about the way things really are in their fundamental, hidden, underlying natures, beyond the ways these things seem or appear to us (74, 77, 103). According to the Skeptics, the dogmatists take themselves to have already figured out the truth about how things are (about some particular subject), so they find nothing left to investigate (about that very subject). But whereas the dogmatists have ceased to investigate the hidden matters they think they have discovered, the Skeptics are continuing to investigate them. And they continue to investigate because, in contrast to other philosophers, they have no ‘dogmatic’

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12 There may be some interesting differences between the process of investigation by which one becomes a Skeptic, and the investigations that practicing Skeptics undertake. I will not comment extensively on these differences here.
beliefs or views that would prevent ongoing inquiry into how things really are.\footnote{There is also a famous and long-standing scholarly debate about whether and to what extent the Skeptics can be said to have beliefs: for instance, whether we should say that they believe that things appear to be a certain way, or also that, in an ordinary sense, things are how they seem to be, or again that certain things seem to be true, or whether we should say that the Skeptics have no beliefs whatsoever. For a range of positions adopted in this debate, see e.g. \textit{Barnes} 1997, 61–7; \textit{Burnyeat} 1997, 30–1; \textit{Frede} 1997, 8–24; and \textit{Perin} 2006, 145–62. However, the Greek terms for belief and believing – \textit{doxa} and related verbs – appear only a handful of times in Diogenes’s text (see 92, 93, 101). (Thanks to Katja Vogt for emphasizing this point to me.) Moreover, the sense in which the Skeptic assents to or believes certain things is more thoroughly discussed by Sextus in \textit{PH}, and his text is almost exclusively the focus of the scholarly debate about Skeptical beliefs. For these reasons, I will not engage with this particular scholarly debate here.}

Next, we will want to know: What motivates the Skeptic to start an investigation into the truth about some particular non-evident matter? As in the \textit{Meno}, not just any non-evident truth calls for Skeptical investigation. Rather, the Skeptical investigator is motivated to inquire when she notices ‘discrepancies,’ ‘confusion,’ and ‘contradictions’ in a set of appearances and thoughts that she confronts (78).\footnote{The ‘appearances’ and ‘thoughts’ (\textit{phainómena} and \textit{noómena}) among which the discrepancies and contradictions arise are a very broad class of cognitive states, which includes everything from sense-perceptions to quasi-perceptual appearances, to complex thoughts and beliefs, to abstract philosophical doctrines, to what seems to be full knowledge of some subject. For some examples of the variety in the kinds of states that can give rise to the Skeptic’s initial puzzle, see especially the Third and Fifth Modes of the Ten Modes of Aenesidemus. Note also that the relevant discrepancies can be achieved between any combination of appearances and thoughts (between multiple appearances, between appearances and thoughts, and between multiple thoughts). For more on the broad, non-technical notion of ‘appearances’ at issue in Skeptical investigation, see e.g. \textit{Annas / Barnes} 1985, 23–4; \textit{Striker} 1983.} This class of intellectual puzzles seems to be broad enough to include general discrepancies (e.g. “The apple is sweet” [to our sense of taste] and “The apple is yellow” [to vision]) as well as outright contradictions of the form ‘\(p\) and not-\(p\)’ (e.g. “There is no change or motion” [say, according to Parmenides], and “There is change and motion” [say, according to Aristotle]). It is a feature of these discrepancies and puzzles that, on the one hand, the Skeptic has several plausibly-true-seeming thoughts and impressions about some subject, and on the other hand, it seems to her that these thoughts and impressions cannot all be true together without significant qualifications.\footnote{In this respect, some Skeptical puzzles, and the investigations that follow, seem to assume the truth of the Principle of Non-Contradiction (PNC) (see e.g. \textit{Hankinson} 1995, 156–60; \textit{Striker} 1983, 100). Note, however, that the Skeptic need not be dogmatically committed to the truth of PNC or any similar principle. She may simply find it apparently plausible and a useful principle in helping her investigate the truth.} In such cases, the Skeptic can \textit{neither} immediately determine what the truth is (because she sees that not all of her thoughts and impressions about the subject can be
true together) nor can she simply forget the matter and avoid making a determination (because she finds several of her thoughts and impressions about the subject compellingly true). So if, as we have seen, the Skeptic is the sort of person to have a basic desire for or orientation toward the truth, and in particular if she has a basic desire to search for truths that improve her epistemic state, it is plausible that she will be dissatisfied and troubled when confronted with such a puzzle. Here, she has an opportunity to improve her epistemic state, but cannot see precisely how to do so. So she will be prompted to investigate her seemingly plausible thoughts and impressions about the puzzle to see if she can discover which of them, if any, is really true.

Now, what does the Skeptic hope to achieve in her investigation? This brings us to one of the most distinctive and puzzling features of Skeptical investigation: “the skeptics say that their end is suspension of judgment, which... is accompanied by peace of mind as if by its own shadow” (107). To understand what exactly this state of suspension of judgment or non-determination is, we will need to examine how it is produced in the Skeptic. As they tell it, when the Skeptics investigate their puzzle, they find several different, incompatible accounts of the truth equally convincing or plausible (πιθανόν) (79). Again, the effect that these equally convincing accounts have on the Skeptic is perhaps best understood in the context of her search for the truth. Precisely because the Skeptic cares about searching for the truth and for advancing her epistemic state, when she encounters equally convincing accounts of the truth about the puzzle under investigation, her mind is pulled equally in several different directions at once.

Her epistemic concerns prevent her from settling on any arbitrary, inconsistent determination of where the truth lies. Instead, her judgment about the solution to her puzzle is suspended, and she makes no determination about the truth of the matter. And since the equally plausible solutions comprise everything she has been able to find during her investigation, her investigation comes to an end.

Of course, one possible response to confronting such a discrepancy would be for the Skeptic to assent to a claim such as: “The basic fact of the matter about this subject is either X or Y or neither.” But this claim about the basic natures of things, even if it is true, probably does not constitute an epistemic advance or improvement in the sense relevant to the Skeptics' aims. In other words, the fact that the Skeptic aims at genuine epistemic improvement helps to explain why she is not satisfied to conclude with such a claim.

More specifically, Diogenes reports that the Pyrrhonian Skeptics Timon and Aenesidemus took suspension of judgment as their main investigative goal.

Again, if the Skeptic were concerned only with the truth and not with epistemic advancement, presumably all she would have to do in the face of equipollent arguments is to judge that the answer to her puzzle is “Either X or Y or neither” (where X and Y are the incompatible solutions). But she does not do this, precisely because the judgment “The truth is either X or Y” where X and Y are recognized as the only viable alternatives does not count as a significant improvement to her epistemic state.
This account of how the Skeptic achieves suspension tells us a number of things. First, as Diogenes says, suspension of judgment is a πάθος: it is a way in which the Skeptic’s mind is passively affected by the arguments she encounters, in combination with her concern for the truth and for epistemic improvement. It is not something the Skeptic does. But we also know from how it is produced that suspension is not just any way of being passively affected. It is not the same thing as a feeling of doubt or uncertainty; nor is it merely a feeling of frustration or disappointment at not being able to resolve her puzzle; nor is it merely a state of ignorance of or a lack of interest in the puzzle, or a simple failure to make a judgment about it. After all, these emotions and states can arise under a variety of circumstances, but the Skeptic’s suspension is a specific response to the recognition that there are equally convincing arguments on different sides of her puzzle. As a result of this recognition, as long as the Skeptic continues to be guided by her epistemic concerns, she simply cannot settle on any solution to her puzzle. As Paul Woodruff nicely puts it, “the equal power of opposed arguments … [is] supposed to leave one’s mind poised in suspense between the force fields of the two arguments.”

However, Skeptical investigation does not merely happen to conclude with suspension of judgment. The Skeptic deliberately aims at suspension and its attendant feeling of tranquility. To understand why, we can refer again to how the state of suspension is produced. Precisely because the Skeptic arrives at suspension by an exacting and thorough examination of all sides of the puzzle, it is likely that, once she achieves suspension, she no longer sees any further avenues for epistemic improvement or advancement. This is not to say that the Skeptic is no longer puzzled in any sense: after all, the Skeptical philosophical project is called “‘perplexing,’ or aporetic, because they brought both those who put forward doctrines and themselves to a state of perplexity” (Diog. Laert. 9.70, my emphasis). But even if the Skeptic does not aim at suspension of judgment as an entirely unpuzzled state of mind, she may aim at it as an admittedly puzzled

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19 For more about suspension of judgment as a πάθος, see e.g. Annas / Barnes 1985, 49–50; Striker 2001, 116.
20 For the influence of the Stoic and Epicurean theories of cognition on the motive and the conclusion of Skeptical investigation, see Vogt 2012a, 126–8.
21 Woodruff 2010, 211.
22 Of course, there is a deep question here about the very sense in which Skeptical investigation ‘aims’ at anything at all. In order to be charitable to the Skeptic, we must understand the relevant notion of ‘aiming’ in a way that does not commit the Skeptics to a settled view about the real existence or the fundamental nature or value of what she is aiming at. This would, after all, make her a dogmatist. For a discussion of some problems with a Skeptic’s positive recommendation of an end or goal (τέλος), see Sedley 1983. It is also part of Sedley’s view in this paper that not all Pyrrhonists agree about the end or aim of Skepticism: whether it is suspension (Aenesidemus) or tranquility by means of suspension (Sextus) (Sedley 1983, 21–2).
state in which she has tried everything in her power to solve her puzzle and improve her grasp of it.\textsuperscript{23}

But this is only part of an answer to the question of why the Skeptic deliberately aims at suspension of judgment. Although Diogenes says remarkably little about the other part, he does note that the end of the Skeptic’s investigation is “suspension of judgment ... accompanied by peace of mind (ἀταραξία) as if by its own shadow” (107).\textsuperscript{24} Whatever it might mean for peace of mind to be the ‘shadow’ following suspension of judgment, this additional state of mind helps us to better understand the goal of the Skeptic’s investigation. The Skeptic acknowledges that, in response to the confusion and puzzlement with which she began to investigate, she is looking not only for a conclusion to her quest for epistemic improvement, but also a removal of the troubled state of mind that prompted her to investigate in the first place. And the Skeptic has discovered that the state of suspension itself brings on a further state of mental tranquility and peace, which is a response to a specific aspect of the investigation’s starting-point: namely, her feeling of confusion and intellectual turmoil when she encounters a puzzle. So there is also an important sense in which peace of mind is also the end or goal of the Skeptic’s investigation, and the distinctively Skeptical way of achieving peace of mind is not by dogmatically determining the truth about her puzzle, but by arriving at suspension of judgment.

So far, I have suggested that the main steps of Skeptical investigation are best understood in light of the Skeptic’s deep concern with the truth and with epistemic advancement, which are also marks of the epistemic type of investigation that Meno and Socrates were after in the \textit{Meno}. However, as we will see, some questions still remain about whether the Skeptics’ activities fully live up to the standards of epistemic investigation, and consequently, whether the Skeptics live up to their own self-descriptions and to our expectations of philosophical investigation.\textsuperscript{25}

\textsuperscript{23} This is also reported in Sext. Emp. \textit{PH} 1.3.

\textsuperscript{24} Sextus, by comparison, has more to say about ataraxia. See e.g. \textit{PH} 1.12. For some contemporary discussion see Sedley 1983.

\textsuperscript{25} The Skeptics’ critics, both Ancient and contemporary, have raised a wide range of objections against the Skeptics’ devotion to ongoing investigation. There is the famous apraxia challenge: roughly, if the Skeptics go on investigating rather than forming beliefs, they will be unable to act because acting requires that the agent has at least some beliefs. There is also a closely related challenge that aims to show that the Skeptics’ position is self-refuting in some way: roughly, the Skeptics cannot investigate, or even think, without holding some beliefs – for instance, about what counts as thinking correctly and well, about what follows from what, and so on. Here, however, I will focus instead on a set of problems and questions about the epistemic credentials of Skeptical investigation. For more on the so-called ‘apraxia challenge’, see Diog. Laert. 9.104–8 and Sext. Emp. \textit{HP} 1.23–4; see also e.g. Burnyeat 1997; Frede 1997; Vogt 2010. For the objection that the Skeptic cannot investigate or think, see e.g. Sext. Emp. \textit{HP} 2.1–12; Diog. Laert. 9.102–4; see also e.g. Woodruff 2010, 210–11.
The first question has to do with the method of Skeptical investigation. As we have seen in the *Meno*, some sort of method is plausibly necessary for us to be engaged in an epistemic investigation. In the Skeptics’ case, Diogenes suggests that their method makes use of the so-called Skeptical Modes or Tropes, which are patterns or formulas of argument which purport to lead the investigator toward suspension of judgment. But once we look closely at the Modes themselves, we might wonder: Is the Skeptic’s aim of epistemic improvement consistent with the method of using a small number of formulaic, predictable arguments in their investigations? After all, mere repetitions of logical patterns do not count as epistemic investigations. A child may repeat multiplication tables to herself without thereby seeking to learn something new about the nature of multiplication. So in what follows, we will want to know: How does Skeptical investigation by way of these Modes constitute a genuine attempt to figure something out, rather than a mere schoolbook exercise?

The second problem is one that we have already glossed over. On the one hand, we have seen the Skeptics say that their investigation aims at suspension of judgment and peace of mind. On the other hand, I have suggested that the major steps of Skeptical investigation are best understood in terms of the Skeptic’s concern for the truth, and her aim of epistemic advancement or improvement. But how do these two sets of aims relate to each other? Given the Skeptics’ consistent and explicit claims to aiming at suspension of judgment, is it really plausible to also attribute to them a concern for the truth and a desire to better their minds for its own sake? What truths, and what sort of cognitive improvements, could they possibly be after in the process of striving for the state of suspension—a state in which they are no closer to solving their intellectual puzzles than they were when they began investigating?

These problems need to be addressed if we are to make sense of the Skeptics as engaging in *bonafide* epistemic investigation and as offering a real philosophical alternative to dogmatism. In what follows, I will address each problem in turn.

4. The Ten Modes and Epistemic Investigation

In order to understand how the Skeptical Modes or Tropes (τρόποι) might contribute to the Skeptic’s epistemic improvement, we must first review what they are.26 The Skeptical Modes or Tropes are, broadly speaking, argumentative formulas or schemas that are supposed to lead the Skeptic toward suspension of judgment. As such, they are centrally important to

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26 For a condensed discussion of the historical origins of the Modes, see e.g. Striker 1983, 96–8.
the method of Skeptical investigation or inquiry. Diogenes introduces the Ten Modes of Aenesidemus in the following passage:

“The Pyrrhonian approach is a recording of appearances or of any kind of thought. In this recording, all things are tossed together with all other things, and, when they are assessed in conjunction, they are found to have much discrepancy and confusion, as Aenesidemus says in his Outline of Pyrrhonism. Regarding the contradictions that arise in their investigations, the skeptics first pointed out the ways in which things persuade, and then according to the very same ways they did away with confidence concerning these things. For what persuades us are matters where sense-perceptions fit together, as do things that never or rarely undergo change. And so, too, we are persuaded by matters where there is an accepted way of doing things and where things are established by laws, and by things that give pleasure and amaze us. 79. They showed, then, based on oppositions in what persuades us, that both sides are equally persuasive. ‘The perplexities they addressed’ regarding presumed agreements between appearances and thoughts were in Ten Modes (τρόποι), according to which the matters under consideration were made to be discrepant.” (Diog. Laert. 9.78–9)

As we can see from this passage, the purpose of the Ten Modes of Aenesidemus is to help ‘us’ – Skeptic, dogmatist, or lay person – move from an initial puzzle (discrepancy, confusion) about our appearances and thoughts, to the discovery that incompatible resolutions to the puzzle are equally convincing, from which suspension of judgment and peace of mind follow. Importantly, nothing in this introduction to the Modes, nor in the descriptions of the Modes that follow, requires the person who

27 My argument in what follows depends significantly on interpreting the Modes as schemas for producing equal persuasiveness on both sides of a puzzle, and hence suspension of judgment about the puzzle. I think this interpretation follows from the claim that “They [the Skeptics] showed, then, based on oppositions to what persuade us, that both sides are equally persuasive” (ἐδείκνυσαν οὖν ἀπὸ τῶν ἐναντίων τοῖς πείθουσιν ιδας τὰς πιθανότητας) (Diog. Laert. 9.79). This passage introduces all of the Modes, and I take Diogenes’s presentation of the Ten Modes in Diog. Laert. 9.78–88 to have the following structure: first, he presents a general, schematic introduction to how the Modes are supposed to work; then he discusses each of the Ten Modes briefly, with the implication that each of them should fall under the general schema presented in the introduction. This way of reading the text has a number of advantages. First, it clearly explains the purpose of the introductory passage at Diog. Laert. 9.78; second, it provides a unitary description of all of the Modes and their conclusions, which is in line with their generally formulaic structure; third, it gives us clear interpretative directions for how to expand and understand each of Diogenes’s highly compressed discussions of the particular Modes; and fourth, since the introduction describes the Modes as concluding with an equipollent opposition (from which suspension of judgment follows), this interpretation helps to tie all of the Modes to the general description of Skeptical philosophy given at Diog. Laert. 9.70 and 76 as ‘ephectic’, after the suspension of judgment that follows from their investigations. Importantly, this interpretation entails that, despite how the Modes are sometimes presented in Diog. Laert. 9.79–88, they are not intended to be instruments for establishing final, definitive conclusions to the effect that we cannot know the basic natures of things, or that the basic natures of things are not really one way or another. That is, despite some appearances to the contrary, the Ten Modes are not methods of establishing what is sometimes called ‘negative dogmatism’ in epistemology and metaphysics. Rather, they are all ultimately tools for bringing the investigator to suspension. For other parts of Diogenes’s
uses them to be a ‘converted’ Skeptic. On the contrary, the Modes seem to be designed to be accessible to a variety of investigators, including card-carrying dogmatists as well as those who have no particular philosophical affiliation. The predictable outcome of using the Modes, however, is not so ecumenical. According to Diogenes, the Modes serve (1) to identify why we are convinced of the truth of contradictory or discrepant thoughts and appearances; (2) to show that these sources of convincingness or persuasiveness are equally ‘convincing’ or ‘persuasive’; and (3) to show that these sources of convincingness or persuasiveness are opposing, insofar as they convince or persuade us of opposing appearances or thoughts that cannot be true together. When we realize that all sides of the contradiction or puzzle are equally convincing, but cannot be true together, we are presumably led toward suspension of judgment and away from dogmatic beliefs.

However, from the brief outline of the Modes I have just given, it is not clear how exactly they are related to the Skeptics’ project of epistemic improvement. Part of the difficulty comes from the formulaic structure of the Modes themselves. If we thought that the entirety of Skeptical investigation consisted of repetitive, predictable patterns of argument like the 

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28 However, some scholars have worried about the extent to which use of the Modes, itself, presupposes that the investigator has a certain set of beliefs, dogmatic or otherwise. See e.g. Hankinson 1995, 156–60; Woodruff 2010, 210–21. These concerns touch upon a much broader worry about Skeptical investigation, which I have mentioned before: How can a Skeptic investigate, or even think, without beliefs? See n. 25 above.

29 As I will explain in more detail below, contrary to some interpreters, I understand the Ten Modes – at least, as presented by Diogenes – to be arguments that presuppose that the Skeptic has already noticed a conflict or opposition between appearances and thoughts, not arguments that generate or discover such a conflict or opposition. As we have seen above, Diogenes says that the Skeptics “first point out the ways in which things persuade and then according to the very same ways they did away with confidence concerning these things” (Diog. Laert. 9.78, my emphasis). This suggests that the first step of the Modes is to identify what makes the Skeptics’ initial puzzle convincing, not to present or generate the puzzle in the first place. If this is right, then according to Diogenes, the Modes are not designed to artificially generate puzzles and inquiries, but they contribute to the progress of an inquiry that has already naturally begun. For the other view of the Modes as generating puzzles, or as beginning with the statement of a puzzle (including discussions of the Modes as presented by other sources), see e.g. Annas / Barnes 1985, 22–3; Hankinson 1995, 156, 161; Striker 1983, 100. Other interpreters seem to be more non-committal on the question of whether the Modes themselves generate puzzles: see e.g. Palmer 2000, 364–6; Woodruff 2010, 216–21.

30 Although this is the usual outcome of Skeptical investigation, there is nothing to prevent the Skeptic (or a Skeptical investigator) from actually discovering the truth by using the Modes. In this case, the result of her investigation will not be suspension but assent to some claim, and she will cease to be a Skeptic about that particular question. For more about the possible dogmatic outcomes of Skeptical investigation, see e.g. Palmer 2000.
one outlined above, how could we reasonably expect this investigation to improve anyone’s epistemic condition, or to lead to progress in our understanding? The other part of the difficulty comes from how Diogenes describes the conclusions of the Modes. Some of the Modes suggest that suspension of judgment will immediately follow from the use of the Mode (Modes 1, 5); other Modes seem to conclude that one ought to suspend judgment (Mode 2); still others seem to conclude with claims that (as it appears to the Skeptic) things are not how they appear, or that they are not knowable (Modes 3, 6, 7, 10).31 Given these different conclusions, we might wonder: Precisely what role do the Modes have in Skeptical investigation in general, if this investigation aims at suspension of judgment and peace of mind? Answers to these questions should tell us more about whether Skeptical investigation is entirely dictated by the Modes, and whether, and in what sense, the Modes may be used to contribute to the investigator’s aim of epistemic improvement.

In fact, there are a number of reasons to think that the Modes are not nearly as formulaic, and not nearly as exhaustive of Skeptical investigation, as they might have initially seemed. We might begin by recalling that according to Diogenes, the first step in the use of the Modes is to identify the source of our conviction in the puzzle that is troubling us. This suggests that the Modes are intended to be used only after we have already become puzzled by something; they do not have the dubious role of both artificially generating problems for us to investigate, and then resolving them. But if the Modes only work on puzzles we are antecedently troubled by, then the Skeptical investigator is free to set her own epistemic priorities and projects, and her own goals for cognitive advancement. This might help to relieve some concerns about the role of the Modes in a genuinely epistemic investigation: the use of the Modes does not interfere with or dictate our initial hopes and intentions of improving our epistemic state.

In addition, common sense dictates that whatever the Skeptics have in mind with their use of the Modes, it does not involve treating the Modes as mere intellectual exercises. In order to achieve suspension of judgment, we must engage with the Modes in a particular way. We must apply them to puzzles that are actually puzzling to us, in which we have a stake in settling our convictions. We must approach them in a way that stimulates our interest and our commitments. But these additional features of Skeptical investigation are actively brought to the investigation by the Skeptical investigator herself, and they do not automatically follow from thinking about or using the Modes. This, then, is another respect in which the Modes are limited in their contribution to Skeptical investigation, and again, the epistemic investigation.

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31 For more on the variety of ways in which the Skeptics say that suspension of judgment follows from the Modes, see e.g. Annas / Barnes 1985, 49–50; Barnes 1997, 58–9; Striker 1983, 96, 98; Woodruff 2010, 210–14.
temic goals and concerns of Skeptical investigator are not guided by, but actively guide and motivate, her use of the Modes.

As a final point about whether the Modes are compatible with genuinely epistemic investigation, we might consider the role of positive, non-Skeptical arguments in Skeptical investigation. Recall Diogenes’s claim that “The skeptics, then, continually overturned all the doctrines of philosophical schools, and ... they go so far as to cite the views of others and report them” (74). He also says, in the paragraph before his introduction of the Modes, that “the skeptics use λόγοι (statements, arguments, or accounts) only as tools. For one cannot refute a λόγος (a statement, argument, or account) except by means of a λόγος” (77). Together, these points suggest that Skeptical investigation addresses more than individual appearances and thoughts. The views of the so-called dogmatists often include arguments or purported proofs which are supposed to convince us of their conclusions. This in turn suggests that addressing, opposing, and explaining dogmatic views will often require an examination of dogmatic λόγοι in the sense of the accounts and arguments intended to convince or persuade us of particular dogmatic claims.

And something similar might also be said of our ordinary, everyday views, outside of any particular dogmatic context: we often can, and sometimes do, come up with plausible-seeming justifications for what we think to be true. If all of this is right, then it seems plausible that in order to achieve a thorough suspension of judgment about her puzzles, the Skeptical investigator will want to somehow address and examine the positive arguments, dogmatic or not, in favour of the pieces of her puzzle.

But when we consider how an examination of these arguments fits into Skeptical investigation, we see again that the Modes are neither as formulaic nor as exhaustive of Skeptical investigation as we might have thought. First of all, if the positive arguments in favour of various parts of a puzzle are important to Skeptical investigation, these will have to be uncovered and understood by the investigator independently of her use of the Modes. Again, this means that the Modes, as Diogenes records them, do not exhaust the content of Skeptical investigation. Second, if it is true that

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32 One scholar who emphasizes the importance of examining arguments in Skeptical investigation is Vogt 2012a, 128–32.

33 In Diogenes’ text, he seems to go on to cite an example of the kind of dogmatic logos he has in mind: namely, the claim that “place is not” (77). Of course, the particular thought or claim “Place is not” or “Place does not exist” is itself a λόγος, which the Skeptical investigator might address and oppose with various claims to the effect that place exists. But we should also keep in mind that Skeptical investigation, by way of the Modes, attempts to uncover the source of plausibility or conviction we might assign to such claims. Since a claim like “Place does not exist” is likely to be supported by some set of reasons or arguments (it is unlikely to be plausible to us otherwise), it follows that Skeptical investigation must investigate these reasons or arguments (λόγοι) as sources of plausibility for this claim.
positive and dogmatic arguments must be incorporated into Skeptical investigation in some way, then it might be that our use of the Modes is not quite so mechanical and unimaginative as one might have thought. For instance, if the Modes must respond to and explain the persuasiveness of entire arguments, not only of individual appearances and thoughts; if they must explain the plausibility of premises and inferences in a positive argument; if they must sometimes serve as an equipollent argument to some specific positive argument; then in order to use the Modes effectively, the Skeptical investigator must choose them and tailor them with care according to her particular puzzle and her particular investigation. When we combine these points with the ones above, we can begin to see how it might be possible for the Skeptical investigator to use the Modes in a way that is compatible with a genuine attempt to figure something out and to advance her epistemic state through investigation.

5. But Do The Skeptics Really Investigate?

Let us now turn to the second problem we discussed above. Given the Skeptics’ prominent concern with suspension of judgment and peace of mind, it might seem that Skeptical investigation “aims not at getting things right, but at leaving us in a state of suspension.” But if this is true, then we will want to know: In what sense does Skeptical investigation count as a bonafide epistemic investigation? And if the Skeptics are not epistemic investigators, do they live up to their own descriptions of their philosophical program, and does Skepticism really count as a philosophical alternative to dogmatism?

In fact, there are two related problems in the vicinity here. First, interpreters have sometimes worried about the fact that Skeptical investigation ultimately aims at suspension of judgment and peace of mind rather than the truth. As we have seen, epistemic investigation in the standard and plausible sense that we find in the Meno aims at the truth (and possibly also full knowledge). In light of this standard view of epistemic investigation, we might worry that if Skeptical investigation does not aim at the truth as its ultimate end, then it is not a genuinely epistemic activity. And this, in turn, is a problem for the Skeptics insofar as they describe their investi-

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34 Woodruff 2010, 210. Also, see Striker 2001, 117: “What leads the Sceptic into philosophical investigations is disturbance and confusion; but he engages in the search for the truth not just in order to find answers to puzzling questions, but in order to attain peace of mind. Contrast this picture with Plato’s and Aristotle’s description of the philosopher as someone who ... desires to find the truth for its own sake.”

35 For contemporary articulations of this challenge, see e.g. Palmer 2000; Perin 2006; Striker 2001; Vogt 2012a.
skepticism in epistemic terms, as a “search for the truth” and a philosophical competitor to so-called ‘dogmatic’ theories.36

In response to this concern, some interpreters have pointed out that there are a variety of ways in which Skeptical investigation might be guided by considerations of truth and responsive to the norms of truth without requiring that their concern for the truth is merely instrumental or incidental to their aim of suspension of judgment. For instance, perhaps when we reflect on the important steps in Skeptical investigation, as I have described them above, we see that they can reflect a concern for the truth, and can indicate that the Skeptic values, finds important, and cares about the truth, without aiming to discover the truth, precisely because discovery of the truth may not be possible. Also, as Katja Vogt has rightly pointed out, when we say that an intellectual activity “aims at the truth”, we might mean a number of different things: we might mean that it “aims to acquire as many of thoughts, or views as possible”, or that it “aims to acquire more true beliefs than false ones”, or that it “aims to acquire beliefs that are not false”, or simply that it “aims to avoid false beliefs.”37 If, then, what it means to aim at the truth can have a number of different interpretations, perhaps we can understand the Skeptic’s search for the truth not only in terms of a quest for the truth as such, but primarily as a quest to avoid falsehood.38 This interpretation fits nicely with the Skeptics’ description of their project as avoiding dogmatic beliefs and mistaken commitments that might arise from being persuaded by something false, and also reveals an important sense in which Skeptical investigators have a deep respect for the truth.

From arguments like these, we might be convinced that the Skeptic deeply values the truth and that this is reflected in her investigation in a variety of ways. But there is also a second, rather different problem that we might have with the epistemic features of Skeptical investigation, one which has received less attention in the literature. Recall that, according to the Meno, epistemic investigation does not aim at the truth or value the truth in some way. As a form of investigation, it also aims at making intellectual gains or improvements of some sort. In Meno’s terms, we want to use investigation to come to know (in some sense) something we didn’t know before (in some sense). In order to be engaged in epistemic investigation,

36 These worries might become even more pressing when we think about the role of the Modes in Skeptical investigation. If we think of Skeptical investigation as proceeding by repetitive and predictable formulas – which is how I have argued we should not think of it – then it starts to look even less like our ordinary, epistemic notion of investigation, and more like a routine schoolbook exercise that is not particularly interested in the truth. For contemporary discussion of further worry about the Skeptics’ use of the Modes, see e.g. Palmer 2000, 355–60; Perin 2006, 338.


then, it is not enough for the investigator to demonstrate a concern for the truth. In addition, as an investigator, she must be sincerely trying to figure something out, to improve her intellectual standing with respect to some question or problem. So the end at which investigation aims is not just any truth, but some kind of cognitive advancement over one’s prior cognitive state.

But this raises the question: Is it plausible, in the end, to attribute this aim to the Skeptics and to Skeptical investigation? There are some reasons to think not. Consider, for instance, that Skeptical investigation begins with an unresolved puzzle, and ends with suspension of judgment, which as we have seen, is itself described as a ‘puzzle’ or an unresolved state of mind. The Skeptics even describe suspension of judgment as “ignorance of the truth” (76). Moreover, it seems to the Skeptics (based on their past experience) that all future investigations are likely to result in puzzlement and ignorance, and they actually aim at this kind of ignorance about their unresolved puzzles and problems, precisely because it seems to them that a better understanding of the nature of things cannot be achieved. Of course, the puzzlement and ignorance that results from the investigation – namely, suspension of judgment – comes along with peace of mind, which makes it importantly different from the puzzled and ignorant state of mind that motivates investigation in the first place. But it is not clear that this psychological and phenomenological improvement in the Skeptic’s mental life is really an epistemic improvement in the relevant sense. So, given that the Skeptics positively aim at a kind of ignorance and a lack of resolution to their puzzles, this type of investigation might seem to be epistemically self-defeating, or at least an epistemic wash, rather than an intellectual activity genuinely aimed at cognitive improvement. And if this is right, then it seems that despite its respect for the value of truth, Skeptical investigation might not count as epistemic investigation after all.

However, despite these worries, I will argue that there are at least four epistemic improvements or advancements that may result from Skeptical investigation, all of which are connected with the Skeptics’ stated aim of suspension of judgment. These may not be merely epistemic advancements; as we will see, they may improve the investigator’s life in more ways than one. But if I am right, then when the Skeptics aim at suspension of judgment, they are in fact aiming at a number of improvements to their epistemic state, whether or not they make precisely these improvements explicit to themselves. I do not mean to say the Skeptics, themselves, were dogmatically committed to the claim that these improvements will really follow from their investigations, and that they “really are” improvements (in their natures, so to speak). However, if we could understand Skeptical investigation as aiming at epistemic improvements by aiming at suspension of judgment, this would allow us to explain and unify a great many
features of the Skeptics’ philosophical project. For one thing, it would help to explain why the intermediate steps of Skeptical investigation seemed to us earlier to be so naturally and easily explicable in terms of aiming at epistemic advancements or benefits. For another, it would help us to recognize Skeptical investigation as a philosophical project at all. So even though these epistemic improvements are not explicitly identified or described as such by Diogenes, identifying them interpretively is nonetheless necessary to our understanding of Skeptical investigation as epistemic investigation, to our charitable interpretation of the Skeptics as real philosophical opponents to the dogmatists, and to our own appreciation of Skeptical investigation as a live option in the philosophical landscape.

The first epistemic benefit I have in mind derives fairly directly from the Skeptics’ search for the truth: if we interpret this search for the truth in terms of a project of avoiding forming or finding oneself with false beliefs, we see that Skeptical investigation benefits us by preventing the kind of cognitive failure that happens when we take false things to be true (or true things to be false). And it could be argued that this beneficial effect of Skeptical investigation is best achieved by deliberately aiming to not settle one’s judgment on any particular view or thesis about the way things really are. In this way, by aiming at suspension of judgment, Skeptical investigation can be a form of preventative cognitive care.\(^{39}\)

A second cognitive improvement provided by suspension of judgment comes from the way in which suspension is produced. Recall that the Skeptic arrives at suspension by examining a wide range of reasons and sources of conviction for different views about the puzzle that troubles her. As such, even if the state of suspension provides no resolution to the Skeptic’s puzzle, it does involve a grasp of the persuasive and unpersuasive reasons for various claims and an understanding of why they are persuasive or unpersuasive; of what kinds of pitfalls and strengths these reasons and arguments have; and because of this, probably also what kinds of further proposals or reasons, and from what sources, would be needed in order to push the Skeptic toward a particular resolution to her puzzle. Arguably, then, the Skeptic is in a much more sophisticated and informed epistemic position with respect to her puzzle after investigation than she was at the beginning, insofar as she now has a clear grasp of the reasons and arguments that are, and might be, given for and against various parts of the puzzle. And she puts herself in this more sophisticated, better informed position by aiming at suspension of judgment, and specifically, by aiming

\(^{39}\) Importantly, I do not mean to suggest that this cognitive benefit is unique to Skeptical investigation, and that it cannot be achieved by any other means. Rather, I mean to say that aiming at suspension of judgment plausibly does achieve this benefit, and that it plausibly does so at least as effectively as various forms of dogmatic investigation. The same holds for the other benefits I discuss below.
at it via examining a range of reasons, arguments, and views in careful detail.

A third epistemic benefit arises from the sensitivity and the precariousness of the state of suspension. Because this state is not a dogmatic settling of opinion but a state of cognitive tension among equally convincing alternatives, remaining in suspension depends entirely on the continued equipollence of all the considerations for and against various solutions to the puzzle. Any new, plausible consideration or argument that occurs to the Skeptic, or is presented to her by a proponent of one view or another, could easily begin to tip her judgment in one direction or another and thereby unsettle her suspension of judgment. This new information or argument might re-open her puzzle by being opposed to arguments she has already considered, and perhaps also by being opposed to her state of suspension itself, in which it seemed to her that the views about her puzzle were all equally convincing. And once the Skeptic’s puzzle is re-invigorated, then, being a good Skeptic, she will re-open her investigation into it.

One major advantage of this sensitivity of the state of suspension lies in the fact that the Skeptic can easily be prompted to perform yet another round of investigation about the same puzzle. But as we have just seen, in this new round of investigation, the Skeptic’s understanding of the puzzle and what makes its various aspects puzzling is much more refined than it was before. Her previous state of suspension has framed the puzzle in greater detail, so that her new investigation will be more focused, more directed, more refined, and more genuinely responsive to live concerns. So, rather than being a merely repetitive exercise, each new round of Skeptical investigation about the same puzzle is likely to be a better investigation than the previous one in many ways. This improvement in the quality of her ongoing inquiry is yet another benefit that the Skeptic acquires from aiming at suspension of judgment.

The final epistemic improvement I would like to discuss is somewhat more speculative, and of a slightly different nature. As we have already noted, there are a number of important philosophical and dogmatic antecedents of the Skeptics’ ideas about investigation and what it can achieve. For instance, it is no secret that the notion of peace of mind or tranquility, which the Skeptics claim is a consequence of suspension of judgment, is

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40 As Perin 2006, 349–50, puts it: “the Pyrrhonist’s suspension of judgment is, and is understood by her to be, provisional. … [it] can be disturbed or unsettled by the introduction of a new consideration which bears on the matter about which she has suspended judgment. If this occurs, the Pyrrhonist once again finds herself distressed by a conflict between candidates for belief. The distress, or rather the desire to alleviate it, provides the Pyrrhonist with her reason to continue investigating the matter in question.”
connected to a similar notion in Epicurean thought. According to the Epicureans, peace of mind or tranquility is our highest good and greatest pleasure. So if the Skeptics could plausibly claim to achieve this peace of mind through their investigations, then they could claim to be able to achieve the dogmatists’ version of our greatest, best good with their own Skeptical methods, and this, in combination with some of their other arguments, could potentially give the dogmatists convincing reasons to become Skeptics themselves. Along similar lines, I would like to discuss a less frequently acknowledged connection between Skeptical investigation and dogmatic views about the benefits of rational activity. I have in mind the Platonic and Aristotelian idea that we are greatly benefitted as specifically rational beings by living a life devoted to ongoing rational activity. My final point is that we might find yet another epistemic benefit of Skeptical investigation in that it promotes a life devoted to more, ongoing epistemic activity, which arguably has many of the same benefits as Plato’s and Aristotle’s notions of contemplation.

To see how, consider again the sensitivity of the Skeptic’s suspension of judgment. As we have seen, by aiming at suspension of judgment, the Skeptic aims to enter a state from which it is particularly easy to engage in further, active investigations, as soon as she has acquired new information. So it seems to follow that investigation aimed at suspension of judgment promotes a life of engaged and sincere intellectual activity. My proposal now is that this new investigation counts as an epistemic advance for the Skeptic, not only by being a better investigation than the one before it, but also simply because it is more ongoing, informed and informative rational activity. This ongoing, informed rational activity is an epistemic advance for the Skeptic by being an increase in careful, thoughtful epistemic activity, by promoting a life devoted to such activity, and ultimately by promoting a

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41 See e.g. Hankinson 1995, 155 n. 2; Sedley 1983, 15, 24 n. 22.
43 In fact, one of the reasons it is important to distinguish truth and epistemic improvement as goals of intellectual activity is so that we preserve an important distinction between investigation on the one hand, and contemplation on the other. Roughly, we might think that both contemplation and investigation aim at and are concerned with the truth, but only investigation, and not contemplation, also aims at improving the thinker’s epistemic state with respect to some question.
44 This is contra Striker 2001, 117–18: “When he finds himself unable to discover the truth, but nevertheless relieved of his worries once he has given up the project, the Skeptic also loses interest in the investigation of philosophical problems.” Of course, Striker’s claims here are specifically about the version of Pyrrhonism described by Sextus; she goes on to argue that ‘Academic’ Skepticism, as described by thinkers such as Arcesilaus and Carneades, “can properly be described … as leaving all philosophical questions open and continuing the search for the truth” (Striker 2001, 127, my emphasis).
life that is overall best – epistemically and otherwise – for rational beings such as us.

Of course, to claim definitively that the more epistemic activity (of a certain kind), the better for rational beings is to make a dogmatic claim, one that may be supported by dogmatic theories about the nature of rational beings, of intellectual excellence, and of the value of an intellectually engaged and active life. For instance, we might think that both Plato and Aristotle argue for such a position. In the Republic, Plato warmly describes the process by which a true philosopher, after extensive education and training, finally grasps the highest and most important realities: the Forms themselves. Notably, however, Plato tells us that the philosopher’s intellectual activity does not stop once she has seen and known the Forms. Rather, the philosopher’s soul is “always pressing upwards, eager to spend time” with the Forms (Resp. 517c). As a philosopher, this person loves knowledge and truth, and she continues to think about the Forms because she continues to love and to want to engage with them as sources of knowledge and truth even once she knows them. And in fact, Plato tells us that for the best kind of nature – a philosophical nature – the life devoted to such continued, knowledgeable thinking about the Forms is the best and pleasantest life one could lead.

A similar picture emerges from Aristotle’s account of contemplation in the Nicomachean Ethics. There, he famously argues that the life devoted to theoretical contemplation is the best and happiest life for human beings on the grounds that contemplation is the best rational activity of which we, as rational beings, are capable. Again, however, the contemplative activity that Aristotle describes is not a process of learning, and has no natural stopping-point; it is the ongoing activity or activation of theoretical wisdom we have already acquired. On Aristotle’s view, then, the best life for human beings is a life devoted to the continuous activity of reflecting on and re-appreciating what we already know about the most important things in the universe.

For our purposes, Plato’s and Aristotle’s views of contemplation share two important, related features: first is the high value placed on contemplative activity for rational beings like us, and second is the idea that this highly valuable contemplative activity is a continuous, ongoing epistemic activity that defines a whole life. However, for these thinkers, it is also the case that the best and most continuous rational activity must be one of rethinking what we already know because (in these texts at least) they assume that it is in fact possible to gain knowledge. Now, even if we find

45 See e.g. 581b–e.
46 See e.g. 490a–b, 580d–586e.
47 See Nicomachean Ethics 1177a12–1178a8.
48 See Nicomachean Ethics 1177a20–23; 1177a33–b3.
it plausible that the best way to spend our life is to devote ourselves to a highly complex form of rational activity, we may not find it nearly as plausible that the best way to spend our life is to repetitively, continually think through things we already fully know. While Plato and Aristotle praise the amazing epistemic achievement and the pleasantness of gazing at such deep knowledge with our mind’s eye, we might wonder: Is going over and over the same things in one’s mind the very most attractive, most engaging, and most pleasant intellectual activity we can perform, even if it is about the most important topics? Is it more attractive, more engaging, and more pleasant than, say, the Skeptic’s project of ongoing investigation in response to stimulating puzzles, of continually revising and improving these puzzles and the strategies involved in investigating them, and of sincerely striving to get at the truth about the fundamental reality of things from every possible angle? In considering these matters, we might also want to acknowledge that we are epistemically limited and fallible creatures, and that, as Aristotle admits, the best life for us needs to be sensitive to facts about our specifically human epistemic capacities.49 With this in mind, we might also ask: Which conception of the good life for human beings best reflects our natural epistemic limitations – the one that demands that we first come to know the most fundamental principles of the universe, and then asks us to continue to think accurately and unflaggingly about these very principles, or the one that asks us to continually improve and refine our epistemic capacities without demanding that we unerringly come to know anything? And finally, we might wonder which kind of epistemic activity is the sort of thing we could devote our whole life to, as a continuous, ongoing project: reflective contemplation of things we have long since fully understood, or the project of trying to figure out a deeply motivating problem, one that requires us to be constantly responsive to new information, new arguments, and new solutions?

If, like Plato and Aristotle, we find it plausible that the life devoted to excellent rational activity is the best life for us – not only on epistemic grounds, but overall – then depending on how we answer these questions, we should take seriously the life of Skeptical investigation as a candidate for the best life. At first, it might have seemed to us that Skeptical investigation, with its reliance on formulaic Modes and apparent lack of progress on any questions of significance, was merely a stale exercise, more like a way of scratching an intellectual itch or a fruitless search for one’s keys than a true epistemic inquiry. But now, when presented in a certain light, it may be the dogmatic picture of contemplative activity that looks like a stale exercise rather than a genuinely engaging, deeply satisfying, and con-

49 See Nicomachean Ethics 1097b23–1098a21: the so-called ‘Function Argument.’
In fact, it may be that by the dogmatists’ own lights, Skeptical investigation, as a form of genuinely epistemic activity, meets many of their own criteria for the best achievement of reason, and indeed, for highest form of happiness for us as rational beings. If this is right, then in a dialectical spirit, we might say that the fact that Skeptical investigation promotes a life devoted to ongoing intellectual activity is not merely one among its many epistemic benefits. We might even be tempted to say that Skeptical investigation both aims at and actually achieves the best possible benefit we could get as rational beings: the benefit of a rational life well lived.

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50 Perin 2006, 359, seems to agree, at least in spirit, with this suggestion: “The Pyrrhonian, more than her dogmatic counterpart, emerges as an advocate of reason.”
Diogenes Laertius on the Ten Pyrrhonist Modes

David Sedley

1. The Ten Modes

The most recognizable and recurrent manifestation of Pyrrhonist Scepticism, from the movement’s revival by Aenesidemus in the first century BC down to Diogenes Laertius’ *Life of Pyrrho* in the third century AD, is its trademark list of ten ‘Modes’ or ‘Tropes’. These are, roughly speaking, encyclopaedic catalogues of cases in which appearances conflict, so presented as to shut off any chance of finding a privileged perspective from which such conflicts might be decisively arbitrated. Thus, in all surviving versions, the first Mode compiles evidence that animal species differ as to how they perceive the same things. If you think you can resolve such conflicts by privileging the human viewpoint, the second Mode forestalls you with an abundance of evidence that human perceivers similarly differ from each other. If you respond to the latter difficulty by suggesting that one particular kind of human perceiver (for example a sage) is the arbiter, the third Mode awaits you, pointing out how even within a single human individual the sense faculties disagree as to how they represent things. After these first three Modes the order varies, but in Diogenes’ version we get the following sequence: Mode 4, based on the perceptual effects of observers’ differing bodily states; Mode 5 which surveys the cultural dependency of innumerable beliefs and attitudes; Mode 6 which appeals to the probable contamination of our sensory input; Mode 7, which points out the differences made by an observer’s position; Mode 8, which collects a variety of ways in which differing quantitative proportions alter the way things affect us; Mode 9, which points out that the same things impress us differently depending on their familiarity or lack of it; and Mode 10, finally, which seeks to show in some generalized way that all things are relative.

These ‘Ten’ Modes are to be distinguished in particular from a further ‘Five’ Modes, credited to the otherwise unknown Agrippa, which profess

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1 These are exhaustively presented and studied in the pioneering *Annas / Barnes* 1985. The primary sources are: Sextus Empiricus *PH* 1.35–163; Philo, *De ebrietate* 169–205; Aristocles *ap. Eusebius, Praep. evang.* 14.18.11–12; Diogenes Laertius 9.78–88. Other apparent references to the Ten Modes include: Favorinus as cited by Gellius 11.5.4–5, and Plutarch’s lost *On the Ten Modes of Pyrrho* (Lamprias catalogue 158, accepting the emendation of τόπων to τρόπων). See further, *Annas / Barnes* 1985, chapter 3.
to secure suspension of judgement (epoche) by an entirely different set of considerations, primarily methodological in nature. In the present study I shall concentrate on Diogenes Laertius’ presentation of the Ten Modes. Although he, like Sextus Empiricus (PH 1.164–9), goes on to add the Five Modes (Diog. Laert. 9.88–9), his account of the latter is virtually identical, word for word, to that given by Sextus, and therefore does not appear to demand a separate discussion here. In Sextus’ surviving account of the Ten Modes, they are more fully “the modes [τρόποι, i.e. ‘means’] through which (ν’ ὄν) suspension seems to be inferred” (PH 1.35–6). Later, contracting this phraseology, Sextus calls each of them simply a “mode of suspension” (e.g. 79, ο ... πρώτος τῆς ἐποχῆς τρόπος). Alternatively, Sextus tells us, instead of ‘modes’ they can be called ‘arguments’, λόγοι, or ‘headings’, τόποι, although the latter may instead, on a variant reading of his text, be ‘patterns’, τύποι. Jointly, these designations make it reasonably clear that the Ten Modes are so called because they are the inferential means through which, and/or the domains by reference to which, the Sceptic attains epoche.

2. Diogenes’ version

Diogenes Laertius introduces his own account of the Ten Modes with an importantly different indication of what they are modes of:

78. ... πρὸς δὲ τὰς ἐν ταῖς σκέψεις ἀντιθέσεις προαποδεικνύντες καθ’ οὓς τρόποις πείθει τὰ πράγματα, κατὰ τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἀνήρον τὴν περὶ αὐτῶν πίστιν· πείθειν γὰρ τὰ τε κατ’ αἰσθήσεις συµφώνως ἔχοντα καὶ τὰ µηδέποτε ή σπανίως γοῦν µεταπίπτοντα τὰ τε συµήνη καὶ τὰ νόµοις διεσταλµένα καὶ τέρποντα καὶ τὰ ἁθυµαζόµενα. 79. ἐδείκνυσαν οὖν ἀπὸ τῶν ἐναντίων τοῖς πείθουσιν ἴσας τὰς πιθανότητας. αἱ δ’ ἀπορίαι κατὰ τὰς συµφωνίας τῶν φαινοµένων ἢ νοουµένων ἢ ἐπιστήµονας ἢ ἐπιστήµονας ὀρθά ἔτι πετυχόtauש τὰ ὑποκείµενα παραλλάττοντα ἐφαίνετο.4

“78. ... In moving towards the oppositions that arise in inquiries,5 having first demonstrated (προαποδεικνύντες) the modes according to which things persuade people, they used those same modes to eliminate confidence about them. For, they say, people are persuaded by perceptual experiences when these are in agreement with each other; by things that never or at any rate rarely change; by things that are familiar; by things

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3 It has often been observed that the methodology of the Five Modes is at some points applied by Sextus while expounding the Ten Modes. It is impossible to say whether this represents a difference from Diogenes, whose version of the Ten Modes is too condensed for such methodological details to show up.
4 I gratefully follow the text of Dorandi 2013 except where otherwise indicated. All translations in this study are my own.
5 It is quite likely that σκέψις here refers not to inquiries in general but to ‘Sceptic’ inquiries. However, that usage of σκέψις is not found elsewhere in Diog. Laert., and in Sextus, where it is common, occurs only in the singular.
that are commanded and enjoyed due to customs, and by things that excite wonder.

Thus, by appeal to the things that are opposite to those that persuade people, they showed that the amounts of persuasion are equal. The puzzles which they presented corresponding to the agreements among things that appear or things that are thought were arranged in ten modes, according to which the underlying things appeared to differ.

This introductory passage has an importance which as far as I know has been overlooked in the modern scholarship. In Sextus’ account the Sceptic, presumed already to be in some sense aiming at epochē (cf. PH 1.30), invokes the Modes as a generalised methodology for the pursuit of that goal. In Diogenes, on the other hand, the Modes start out as a set of weapons belonging to the opposing camp. They are equated with the various ‘ways’ (τρόποι) in which apparent things tend to persuade or convince us, owing to the mutual consistency and almost exceptionless regularity with which they appear to us. Why, those who trust appearances seem to ask, would things seem to us to function with such determinate regularity if those appearances did not reflect the fixed nature of the things themselves? It is at that point, and not before (note προαποδεικνύντες), that the Sceptic takes up the argument, noticing that, under the very same headings which the confident believer can deploy in order to catalogue the evidence of consistency and regularity, an equal amount of inconsistency and irregularity of appearance in fact emerges.

The listing of this and similar sets of Modes is known to go back at least to Aenesidemus, but we have witnessed here two different receptions of his legacy, and the one preserved by Diogenes may well seem to be the more refined of the two. Sextus’ approach, a co-ordinated set of methods

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6 I do not follow the editors (including now Dorandi 2013) in adopting Huebner’s <τὰ> before τέρποντα in 78. To do so would be to mark off a separate Mode or group of Modes focused on what pleases us, and there is no such Mode. Hence it is better to retain the transmitted text and take “things that are commanded and enjoyed due to customs” as covering the content of Mode 5, where some νόµοι are prescriptive, notably those about what is just and unjust, while others are descriptive of customary taste, e.g. mythical beliefs, lifestyle choices (cf. 84 ἔχαιρον: the Cilicians used to ‘enjoy’ piracy).

7 The supplement τὰ <µὴ> θαυµαζόµενα in 78, proposed by Annas / Barnes 1985, is unnecessary if my proposal for interpreting this (p. 176–177 below) is correct. Barnes 1992, 4291 retracts the emendation for different reasons: “[T]here is no reference to a Mode at all; and θαυµαζόµενα might mean ‘admired’ rather than ‘surprising’.” This latter suggestion is taken up by Brunschwig 1999, who translates “celles que l’on admire”. On my interpretation, there is a reference to a Mode, the ninth, namely to the dogmatist component of it.

8 αἱ δὲ ἀπορίαι κατὰ τὰς συµφωνίας τῶν φαινοµένων ή νουµένων. Here most editors have emended συµφωνίας, e.g. to διαφωνίας (von der Muehll ap. Dorandi 2013, Annas / Barnes 1985) or οὐσιονολίας (Kayser), but I see no great problem in retaining the transmitted text, with Brunschwig 1999 and Dorandi 2013: the ‘agreements’, as I shall argue below, are those that initially inspire confidence (78) but are then counteracted by the Sceptics.

or ‘Modes’ for attaining a preconceived end, risks inviting the charge of
dogmatic systematicity, especially as each of them ends up by advising
epochê with regard to an entire domain (the differences between animals,
the differences between people, etc.). At the very least, reliance on some
kind of inductive reasoning seems to be implied by this. Sextus is no doubt
reflecting his or his school’s sensitivity to that danger when he remarks
that the Sceptics do not insist on either the Modes’ precise number or their
validity (PH 1.35, cf. 39). The alternative strategy reported by Diogenes
does not need to disguise or play down the Modes’ systematicity, because
this purports to be borrowed from the opposing camp: the very same do-
 mains of evidence as work in favour of the reliability of appearances turn
out, on further examination by the Sceptic, to provide equally strong indi-
cations of their unreliability.

When we read on and examine the condensed summaries of the Ten
Modes that follow in Diogenes’ text (9.79–88), we find that the second,
counter-persuasive side of each equilibrium is expressed with a largely
conventional range of Sceptic inferential formulae. Several conclude to
suspension of judgment: 79, “… from such a conflict [the evidence in Mode
1 that animals’ impressions of the same objects differ], suspension of judg-
ment follows”; 81, “Hence [from the evidence in Mode 2 of differing hu-
man responses to the same sensory stimuli] one should suspend judge-
ment”; 84, “Hence [from the evidence in Mode 5 that societies differ in
their values and practices] suspension of judgment about what is true.” In
some other cases the immediate conclusion amounts to a denial that this
or that is, or can be, known: 85, “Hence [from the role played by admixture,
as set out in Mode 6] we do not know its [a rock’s] specific property”; 86,
“Therefore … [because of the role of positioning etc. in the way
we perceive things, as set out in Mode 7] their nature is unknown”; 88,
“Therefore [according to Mode 10] relatives are unknown/unknowable in
themselves.” Finally, the ou mallon formula crops up once: 81, “Therefore
it follows [from the differences between the senses, in Mode 3] that what
appear is no more (µὴ µᾶλλον) of one kind than of another.”

10 Sextus also remarks that his sequence of modes is chosen ‘arbitrarily’ (θετικῶς, PH
1.38), which may suggest sensitivity to the danger that any fixed and systematic ordering
of the Modes might be interpreted as dogmatist in spirit. The translation of θετικῶς as
‘conventionally’ by Annas / Barnes 1985, 29 is rightly retracted by Barnes 1992, 4278 n.
181, who instead proposes ‘in the manner of a (rhetorical) thesis’, i.e. put forward for the
sake of argument. I connect it rather with θέσις as typically used in debates as to whether
language is ‘natural’ (φύσει) or the result of mere arbitrary fiat (θέσει).

11 Also, whereas Sextus’ modes are methods of suspending judgment, which seems to
imply a preconceived end, in Diogenes they amount to a procedure that simply moves
‘towards’ (πρός) sceptical oppositions (78). The choice of the otherwise puzzling πρός
here is, I suggest, explained by the wish to avoid more obviously purposive prepositions
like ‘for the sake of’.
Among these, the inferences to \textit{epochē} can be paralleled throughout Sextus’ version of the Modes,\textsuperscript{12} and are likely to be standard features of the entire tradition. The formulae expressing ignorance of things’ natures may simply be condensations of what in Sextus would typically be expressed as “Therefore we can say how \(x\) appears, but what \(x\) is like in its own nature we cannot say.”\textsuperscript{13} The single \textit{ou mallon} conclusion (81) does not have any parallel in Sextus’ version of the Modes, but at \textit{PH} 1.190 Sextus makes it clear why such a formulation would have been acceptable there: when Sceptics say “Not more this than that” they are expressing the sense of equipollence that leads them to suspend assent.\textsuperscript{14}

To this extent the inferential methods and structures of the individual Modes in Diogenes do not look importantly different from Sextus’. What Diogenes’ version adds, however, is a further layer of undecidability. At the lower level, the Modes trade on the impossibility of deciding between conflicting appearances in this or that domain. At the higher level, an equilibrium emerges between the appearances’ power to establish truth claims in some domain, and the Sceptic’s power to undermine truth claims in that same domain. The upshot of a given Mode may itself be expressed in terms of first-level undecidability, as much in the Diogenean as in the Sextan version of the Modes; but it is from the higher-level equipollence, that between the persuasiveness of appearances across an entire chosen domain and the unpersuasiveness revealed by the Sceptic across that same domain, that \textit{epochē} finally follows, generated each time simply by the Sceptics’ applying the opposition’s own reasoning more extensively and thoroughly than it itself does.

Those who are described here as being persuaded by appearances are not necessarily limited to dogmatist philosophers. They may well include anyone, philosophical or otherwise, who trusts appearances. Nor, for that reason, need the series of headings under which these people are said to be persuaded represent any actual dogmatist methodology. It is enough for the Sceptic’s purposes that this way of evaluating the range of evidence derives from non-Sceptics. Thus none of the systematicity discernible in the Modes is supplied by the Sceptics themselves.

\textsuperscript{12} \textit{PH} 1.59; 89; 117; 129, etc.
\textsuperscript{13} \textit{Ibid.} 99; 123; 125, etc. For an alternative view, according to which these expressions represent an Aenesideman strand of Scepticism which differs from Sextus’ \textit{inter alia} by affirming unknowability, see Bett 2000, 209–10. I am taking no position on the broader questions surrounding Bett’s important proposal. But to anyone who shares his suspicion, the methodology of the Diogenean Modes as I reconstruct it amounts to a potential reply: the concluding claims of ignorance may be intended simply to counterbalance dogmatist claims of knowledge.
\textsuperscript{14} All that the Diog. Laert. 9.75 account of \textit{ou mallon} adds is that for Sceptics the term has a negative connotation, i.e. that “not more \(p\) than \(q\)” is recommending disbelief in \(p\) rather than belief in \(q\). This is entirely in keeping with Sextus’ remark.
In this passage of Diogenes, the central motif is that people tend to be persuaded by certain things, but can equally be dissuaded by those things’ ‘opposites’ (ἐναντία), a claim illustrated with a specific list of the headings under which this dual outcome occurs. The next task is to work out just how those headings are assumed to be used in the series of antitheses envisaged. The following seems to me the most promising way to divide up the description of them:

(a) “perceptual experiences when these are in agreement with each other”, whose opposite will be “perceptual experiences when these are in disagreement with each other”;

(b) “things that never or at any rate rarely change”, whose opposite will be “things that frequently change”;

(c) “things that are habitual (συνήθη), and things that are commanded and enjoyed due to customs (νόμοι)”, whose opposite may be, roughly, “things regarding which there are no uniform habits and customs”;

(d) “things that excite wonder”, whose opposite will be “things that excite no wonder”.

We can take these four headings one by one, drawing our data from the summary of the Ten Modes to which Diogenes immediately proceeds (79–88). Under each heading, we must suppose, (i) a conjectured case for being persuaded by appearances will be followed by (ii) the Sceptic’s counterbalancing argument:

(a) (i) Perceptual experiences typically agree in telling a single story: all animals seem to find fire hot; most people think grass is green; different senses confirm each other’s information, etc.
(ii) There is equally plentiful evidence of perceptual disagreements among animals (Mode 1), among human beings (Mode 2), and among the competing sense organs (Mode 3).

(b) (i) Perceived facts about the world remain more or less unchanging over time.
(ii) People’s perceptions of the facts vary according to their current state of health, of wakefulness and of respiration, their mood, and their temperature (Mode 4).

(c) (i) The way in which people tend to agree in their main cultural outlooks – moral, religious, etc. – encourages trust in the truth-content of those outlooks.
(ii) Such agreement may exist within a given society, but not between societies (Mode 5).
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(d) (i) Even remarkable events, e.g. comets and earthquakes, appear to be reliable evidence: the wonder they arouse marks them as portents.

(ii) Those very same events, and others at least as remarkable, would cause no wonder if they recurred regularly: cf. the daily rising of the sun (Mode 9).

Regardless of this or that detail, it seems clear from the above analysis that there is a fairly accurate correspondence between the methodology sketched for the Modes in the present passage (78–9) and the actual sequence of Modes that follows (79–88). I say this because the analysis has turned out to take us in order through Diogenes’ first five Modes, then finally to jump to Mode 9. The omission here of most of the later Modes (6–8; 10) calls for no special explanation, being a typical symptom of Diogenes’ drastic condensation of his material. We can therefore readily assume that similar analyses were available for those remaining Modes too.

3. Diogenes’ Relativity Mode

The assumed availability of similar analyses for all Ten Modes can be illustrated by turning to Mode 10:

“87. Tenth is the Mode based on comparison with other things, such as light compared with heavy, strong compared with weak, larger compared with smaller, and up compared with down. At any rate, what is on the right is not on the right by nature, but is conceived on the basis of its relation to the other item: when the other item has changed place, it will no longer be on the right. 88. In a similar way father and brother are relative, day is relative to the sun, and all things are relative to the mind. Therefore relatives are unknown/unknowable in themselves.”

In Diogenes’ summary the last three Modes are kept much shorter than the preceding ones, and the effects of the author’s condensation are particularly evident in this tenth and final one, whose philosophical meaning is as a result far from plain. With a little expansion and added precision, I suggest that its main points are probably as follows:

1) Some supposedly basic features of reality are in fact purely relative. For example, we may identify light things with those that naturally move up; yet things are light only comparatively to whatever is heav-

15 I borrow ‘comets’ from Sextus’ less condensed version of Mode 9 at PH 1.141.

16 87, ὁ κατὰ τὴν πρὸς ἄλλα σύμβλησιν. With Brunschwig 1999, Dorandi 2013 and others I retain ἄλλα rather than with Annas / Barnes 1985 adopt ἄλληλα (from F and a corrector of P), which would point to reciprocal relativity. None of the examples that follow is explicitly reciprocal; and the final two (day-sun, appearances-mind) are presumably non-reciprocal.
ier, not in themselves, and up is a position which one thing occupies only relatively to others below it.

2) How much further does this relativity extend?

3) To say that \( x \) is relative to \( y \) amounts to saying that \( x \) can cease to be present purely because of a change to \( y \), where \( y \) is something distinct from \( x \): cf. the examples of right/left, father/son and brother/brother.

4) By extension, then, day (another purportedly major feature of reality) is relative to the sun, because if the sun were destroyed, or even appropriately repositioned, day would cease.\(^{17}\)

5) By a further extension, all <appearances> are relative to the mind, because if there were no minds there would be no appearances.

6) But relative things cannot be known in themselves.

7) Therefore nothing <apparent> can be known in itself.

Supplying ‘appearances’ and ‘apparent’ in steps 5–7 is a simple remedy for an obvious incoherence in Diogenes’ version, which as reported offers no grounds at all for the assertion that “all things are relative to the mind”.\(^{18}\)

Others might prefer to leave the incoherence intact. Either way, the Mode seems to conclude with the finding that things (however specified) cannot be known in themselves. And that conclusion may appear to be beside the point. Annas and Barnes, commenting on a different reconstruction of the argument but one with a similar outcome, write as follows:

“The conclusion Diogenes invites us to draw is disappointing: ‘things that are relative cannot be known in themselves’. That conclusion is no doubt true, but it seems wholly trivial: of course relatives are knowable, if at all, as relatives — how could they be known in any other way? No dogmatist will be moved by that claim.”\(^{19}\)

The comment is apt, but I think the objection can nevertheless be met. As I have been insisting, the full Sceptic methodology at work here is imagined as starting from non-Sceptics’ reliance on this or that domain of appearances as justifying conviction; only then do the Sceptics add their own argument, conducting a further survey of that same domain and producing the opposite result, lack of conviction. In this particular case, I conjecture,

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\(^{17}\) Cf. Heraclitus B99: “If there were no sun, so far as the other stars are concerned it would be night.” Is the criterion invoked in this Mode, that relatives are those items that are subject to merely Cambridge change [i.e. change which consists in its subject’s acquiring or losing a predicate without undergoing internal change], applicable to the pair day-sun? It depends on what, physically or metaphysically speaking, a day is. Hence it is questionable whether, with the sun’s hypothesized disappearance, the day too would perish without having undergone any change in itself. But if day is identified with a period of time, rather than e.g. an illuminated atmosphere, the argument looks credible.

\(^{18}\) A similar move is made by Annas / Barnes 1985 in their reading of Sextus’ relativity Mode (pp. 143–4), helpfully comparing Sextus’ remark (PH 1.135) that by “All things are relative’ the Sceptic actually means “All things appear relative(ly)” (ποὺς τι πάντα φαίνεται).

\(^{19}\) Annas / Barnes 1985, 136; italics original.
appearances are initially taken to correspond to things’ own intrinsic natures, so that apparent things are knowable in themselves. It then becomes perfectly plausible for the Sceptic to make the counter-case that apparent things are inescapably mind-relative, and therefore not knowable in themselves.

This is, I suggest, an example of how, by not overlooking the strategy announced by Diogenes in his introductory remarks, we can hope to find more coherence in the Modes as he portrays them than is at first sight visible.

4. Competing orders

I shall return to the relativity Mode soon, since it plays a key part in a historical disagreement about the order of the Modes. The evidence about the competing orders adopted can be set out in tabular form:

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<td>Differences of animals</td>
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<td>Differences of humans</td>
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<td>Differences of senses</td>
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<td>Different bodily states</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<td>Differences of belief etc.</td>
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<td>Effects of mixture</td>
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<td>Position of observer</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Effects of quantity</td>
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<td>Familiarity/ unfamiliarity</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
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<td>[absent?]</td>
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<tr>
<td>Relativity</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
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It is immediately clear that Diogenes’ sequence, in the left-hand column, is non-accidentally similar to, but also importantly different from, the one reported by Sextus in PH 1, shown in the next column. A little more needs to
be said about this. Diogenes Laertius, at 9.87, adds the following comment about his Mode 9:

“The ninth Mode Favorinus puts eighth, but Sextus and Aenesidemus put tenth. Moreover, the tenth is called eighth by Sextus, ninth by Favorinus.”

The one point here on which we can, by good fortune, perform an independent check is the report that what Diogenes lists as Mode 10, the relativity Mode, was placed eighth by Sextus. This is indeed confirmed by Sextus’ own list in book 1 of the Outlines of Pyrrhonism. It is very important, then, to bear in mind that in introducing that list Sextus nowhere attributes it to his forerunner Aenesidemus. This in turn lends some credence to the further, admittedly surprising, assertion that Diogenes’ Mode 9, the one based on familiarity and unfamiliarity, was placed tenth by ‘Sextus and Aenesidemus’. What are we to make of this?

First, we should note that the reported numbering does not this time match the ordering in PH 1, where Diogenes’ Mode 9 is listed as ninth by Sextus as well. Second, we should keep in mind that Sextus had another list of the Modes, featured in a different work. He set it out in a lost book which preceded his surviving book Against the logicians 1 (= what we now incorrectly call Adversus mathematicos 7).20 We know this because in book 1 of that work (M 7.345) he refers back to such a list:

“The senses both lie in many cases, and disagree with each other, as we showed when we went through Aenesidemus’ ten Modes.”

This must surely be the version of the Modes which Diogenes attributes jointly to ‘Sextus and Aenesidemus’.21 For Sextus in the words just quoted makes it clear (a) that it was Aenesidemus’ list, and (b) that he himself endorsed it. Assuming that the work from which the two books of Against the logicians survive predated Outlines of Pyrrhonism,22 it becomes plausible that Sextus originally, in that earlier work, adopted Aenesidemus’ order for the Ten Modes, but in the later Outlines of Pyrrhonism adopted a revised version, drawn from some intermediate source (referred to simply as “the earlier Sceptics”, PH 1.36).

In the light of this, I have positioned the ‘Aenesideman’ orderings in the two right-hand columns of the chart, a chart so ordered as to display a chronological sequence running from right to left.23 The reason for includ-

20 The opening of this book, Against the logicians (M 7.1), refers back to earlier books of the same work, now lost: see Bett 2005, xi.

21 Cf. Barnes 1992, 4228–9, who offers this among three options without choosing between them.

22 See e.g. Bett 2005, xxiv–xxx.

23 My chart differs from that in Annas / Barnes 1985, 29 mainly in taking its canonical order from Diogenes, not Sextus. But my reconstruction of Aenesidemus’ sequence of Modes, as conveyed by Aristocles, in the right-hand column also differs in some details from their corresponding ‘Aristocles’ column. I take Diogenes’ modes to be referred to
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ing two Aenesideman columns lies in Aristocles’ report that Aenesidemus’ Outline (Ὑποτύπωσις, Aristocles ap. Eusebius, Praep. evang. 14.18.11–12, presumably identifiable with ἡ εἰς τὰ Πυρρώνεια ύποτύπωσις, Diog. Laert. 9.78) listed ‘nine’ Modes. This has been treated with disbelief by some scholars, 24 but for no good reason that I can see. Ten is a canonical number (compare the ten Aristotelian categories), and it is easy to see why, once the number of Modes counted by Aenesidemus had reached ten, it was likely to stay there. But it is perfectly credible that at an earlier stage he had been steadily accumulating Modes and had reached an interim total of nine. The right-hand column suggests that the missing Mode was either ‘quantity’ or ‘familiarity’ (Mode 8 or Mode 9 in Diogenes’ listing). Since in Aenesidemus’ expanded list (penultimate column) ‘familiarity’ was tenth and last, it seems a reasonable bet that it had been the one missing from his ninefold list, and was added at the end of his revised list to avoid renumbering the others. On this basis, I have tentatively marked ‘quantity’ as ninth and last in the earlier Aenesideman list, and ‘familiarity’ as the missing Mode.

The sequence from right to left is, at the very least, more or less chronological in respect of the sources: Aenesidemus (x 2), Philo of Alexandria, Favorinus, Sextus, Diogenes Laertius. But of course Diogenes himself is here as always reproducing material drawn from an earlier source, and both that source itself and the version of the Modes recorded by it could in principle belong almost anywhere in the sequence. Besides, Sextus’ version of the Modes in PH 1 is not necessarily a fully up-to-date one, since he attributes it to “the earlier Sceptics” (36): it may therefore belong further to the right in the chart than I have placed it.

in the following sequence: ὅπόταν γε μὴν Αἰνησίδηµος ἐν τῇ Ὑποτυπώσει τοὺς ἐννέα διεξή τρόπους (κατὰ τοσούτους γὰρ ἀποφαίνειν ἄδηλα τὰ πράγµατα πεπείραται), πότερον αὐτὸν φῶµεν εἰδότα λέγειν αὐτοὺς ἢ ἀγνοοῦντα; φησὶ γὰρ ὅτι (1) τὰ ζώα διαφέρει (2) καὶ ἡµεῖς αὐτοὶ, (5) καὶ αἱ πόλεις καὶ οἱ βίοι καὶ τὰ ἐθή καὶ οἱ νόµοι· (3) καὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις δέ φησιν ἡµῶν ἀσθενεῖς εἶναι, (7) καὶ πολλὰ τὰ ἐξωθεν λυµαινόµενα τὴν γνῶσιν, ἀποστήµατα καὶ µεγέθη καὶ κινήσεις· (4) ἔτι δὲ τὸ µὴ ὁµοίως διακεῖσθαι νέους καὶ πρεσβυτέρους καὶ ἐγρηγορότας καὶ κοιµωµένους καὶ νοσοῦντας· (6) οὐδενός τε ἡµᾶς ἁπλοῦ καὶ ἀκραιφνοῦς ἀντιλαµβάνεσθαι· πάντα γὰρ εἶναι συγκεχυµένα, (10) καὶ πρὸς το λεγόµενα. Admittedly the inclusion of Mode 3 here is debatable; but I can at any rate find no obvious reason either to omit Mode 6 or to include Mode 8, as they do.

24 Annas / Barnes 1985, 27 suggest a scribal error. It is true, as they point out, that numbers are often corrupted in MSS; but there is no particular likelihood of δέκα being corrupted to ἐννέα, or I to Θ.
5. Dating Diogenes’ version

My proposal, nevertheless, will be that Diogenes’ version of the Modes in fact postdates Sextus’, and that therefore, whoever Diogenes’ source may be, his version really does belong to the left of Sextus’, as shown.

The only Sceptic later than Sextus that Diogenes names is a certain Saturninus (9.116), of whom nothing is known other than that he was Sextus’ pupil. Given that Diogenes’ source for the Ten Modes appears, as we have seen, not merely to postdate Sextus but also to be sufficiently well informed about him to cite two different versions of the Modes found in his works, there is a very reasonable chance that he is in fact Saturninus. It need not also follow that the version of the Modes he passed on to Diogenes was itself post-Sextan, but it would be unsurprising if it was.

I have already offered one ground for the proposal that Diogenes’ version postdates Sextus’, and is thus the most up-to-date version of the Modes that we possess. That is, the methodology of the Modes sketched by Diogenes has proved to be not just different from that of Sextus, but also the more elegant and effective of the two when it comes to protecting the Sceptic from the charge of relying on theoretical presuppositions. Better need not mean later, of course. But the impression that Diogenes’ version is a refinement of Sextus’ gets further support from the following consideration. In Sextus’ exposition, the Mode based on ‘relativity’, eighth in his list, is anomalous for more than one reason, and in each case the Diogenean presentation of the Modes avoids the anomaly.

First, in Sextus the relativity Mode shares its name with one of the Five Agrippan Modes (PH 1.135; 164): ὁ ἀπὸ τοῦ πρὸς τι. In Diogenes the relativity Mode among the ten is ὁ κατὰ τὴν πρὸς ἄλλα σύμβλησιν, “the Mode based on comparison with other things” (87), whereas its counterpart among the Five Agrippan Modes remains ὁ πρὸς τι, “the relativity Mode” (89). This looks like an adjustment made in the interests of integrating the Ten Modes with the Five Modes. In Sextus, no interactive relation between the two sets is stated or implied: they might even be meant as competing and mutually exclusive Sceptic strategies, for all we are told on the matter. In Diogenes by contrast it is made clear that the Five Agrippan Modes complement the Ten (88, “To these [the Ten] the circle

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25 There is no basis in the text for reading Diogenes as citing the Modes from Aenesidemus. Although Aenesidemus is mentioned in 9.78 (just before the passage quoted on p. 172 above), there seems no way that he can still be the assumed subject of τούτους δὲ τοὺς δέκα τρόπους [καθ’ οὓς] τιθήσων in 79. Some scholars think the unintelligible καθ’ οὓς has supplanted the source’s name (for further details see app. crit. in Dorandi 2013, and Annas / Barnes 1985, 186–7), but Barnes 1992, 4288 has more plausibly proposed emending τιθήσων to τιθέασιν, making the implied subject simply ‘they’, the Pyrrhonists.

26 At PH 1.167 the third Agrippan Mode is in effect equated with general relativity (on which see below) as summarized in Sextus’ Mode 8, PH 1.135–6. This acknowledges some
of Agrippa add a further Five ...’). This is already enough to provide a plausible reason why Diogenes, or rather his source, has adjusted the terminology of the relativity Mode among the Ten: the motive needs to be no more than that of making the two sets of Modes capable of operating in unison with each other without confusion.  

Second, in Sextus this Mode is divided into two types of relativity, which we may call general and special. Special relativity (137–9) is represented by a small group of arguments, often and understandably viewed by scholars as sophistical to a degree uncharacteristic of the Modes, attempting to show that in any taxonomy of reality – e.g. absolute-relative, genus-species, like-unlike – the taxa will be relative to each other. Preceding this in Sextus’ exposition, general relativity (135–6) in effect simply summarises the other nine Modes, in so far as all of these rely on evidence of appearances’ relativity to the judging subject, and/or to the context of judgement. Sextus has indeed already referred in similar terms to this second, very general principle of relativity when introducing the Ten Modes at PH 1.38–9, explicitly including under it all ten.

This is awkward for two reasons. First, the relativity Mode, in its guise as an appeal to general relativity, has to include itself, taken as specific relativity. This is not necessarily altogether incoherent, but it at the very least leaves one wondering why general relativity should be mixed in among the specific Modes, at position 8. And that problem becomes hard to ignore when, at 1.136, Sextus writes “That all things are relative we have argued earlier as well, for example in relation to the judging subject because each thing appears relatively to a specific animal ...”: that is, general relativity has been illustrated by Modes 1–7. But aren’t Modes 9–10 also meant to illustrate general relativity (1.38–9)? No doubt the reason Sextus does not mention them too in explaining general relativity here is simply that, given the order adopted, the reader has not yet heard about those final two Modes.

An appropriate rectification is found in Diogenes’ list, where the relativity Mode is placed last. Moreover, its relation to the other nine Modes

27 Note the price that Diogenes’ source has paid for this clarification. His Mode 10 is now named, not after relativity as such, but after the particular kind of relativity that it cites at the beginning to launch its argument, comparativity.

28 See e.g. Striker 1983, section III; Annas / Barnes 1985, 140–1; Hankinson 1995, 180.

29 It is clear from the list of Modes in this passage, which excludes any reference to Sextus’ Modes 9 and 10, that the words I have emphasized, “we have argued earlier”, refer explicitly to Modes 1–7, not (pace Annas / Barnes 1985, 141) to the introductory taxonomy of all Ten Modes at PH 1.38–9.

30 As Annas / Barnes 1985, 142 well remark, “No doubt the Ninth and Tenth Modes are omitted simply because Sextus has not yet discussed them. (But why, then, did he
is clarified. Instead of juxtaposing general with special relativity, as Sextus does, Diogenes’ version offers a single, ascending argument. As we saw above, it starts with specific cases of relativity: lighter/heavier, up/down and the like. It then proceeds to extend the range of relative items, until in the end all things – or at any rate, on my suggested reconstruction, all appearances – have been relativised: all alike are mind-relative. Hence as Diogenes’ Ten Modes draw to their close, general relativity emerges at the climax in a way which confirms, and elegantly subsumes, all the preceding Modes.

One might have suspected that in Sextus the somewhat chaotic order of his final three Modes (= Modes 10, 9, 5 in Diogenes’ list) simply reflects the cumulative sequence in which extra Modes had been added to the list during its history. A comparison with the final two columns of the chart, however, gives reason to think that the full tenfold list at which Aenesidemus arrived did not match the order we find in the Outlines of Pyrrhonism. It is perhaps marginally more plausible, then, that the element of apparent incoherence at the end of Sextus’ sequence is deliberate, intended to corroborate his assertion that the order is adopted ‘arbitrarily’ (PH 1.38).

Be that as it may, Diogenes’ source seems to have differed from Sextus in feeling at liberty to rationalise the sequence. Possibly that liberty owed something to the more elegant methodology he adopted, which, as we saw at the outset, attributed any methodical look the Ten Modes might seem to have ultimately to a pre-existing inventory of grounds for trusting appearances, rather than to the Sceptics themselves.

One comparable oddity remains to consider. Mode 4 in Sextus is called “the Mode which depends on circumstances” (PH 1.100, ὁ παρὰ τὰς περιστάσεις καλούµενος). This description is plainly inappropriate, since ‘circumstances’ are by definition external, whereas the varying conditions of the judging subject catalogued under Mode 4 are internal states: waking/sleeping, moods, drunkenness, and so on. No wonder, then, that Sextus feels obliged immediately to explain “by ‘circumstances’ we mean ‘states’” (περιστάσεις λεγόντων ἡµῶν τὰς διαθέσεις). And, true to his word, he proceeds in his detailed argumentation under this heading to speak repeatedly of ‘states’, not ‘circumstances’.

It is hard not to suspect that the retention of an inappropriate title for the Mode reflects a degree of conservatism in the school. One possible conjecture is that place the Relativity Mode tenth in order, as Diogenes does?"; italics original.) More speculatively, they go on (142–3) to hypothesize that something like Diogenes’ relativity Mode was already in the tradition before Sextus, and that Sextus himself, influenced by the terms used in the Agrippan relativity Mode, has replaced it with what we now find at PH 1.135–40. My proposed alternative, that Diogenes’ version originated after Sextus’ and sought to improve on it, finds support in the fact that the latter is also, of the two, the less coherently positioned in the order, a difference which their hypothesis might have trouble explaining – cf. their parenthetical remark quoted above.
ture is that this Mode originally included a preponderance of circumstantial examples, but that, as new Modes accumulated, those examples were gradually hived off into such Modes as those concerning cultural context (Diogenes’ Mode 5, Sextus’ Mode 10), the position of the observer (Diogenes’ Mode 7, Sextus’ Mode 5) and familiarity/unfamiliarity (Mode 9 in both lists), leaving the established title of the Mode looking less and less apposite, to survive, if at all, as an archaism.

Whatever the explanation of the anomalous title in Sextus, it is striking that Diogenes’ source (9.82) was ready to overrule the tradition in the present case, calling this same Mode “the one that depends on states and, in general, variations” (ὁ παρὰ τὰς διαθέσεις καὶ κοινῶς παραλλαγάς). The addition “and, in general, variations” seems to be a distant echo of the anomaly we met in Sextus. Although ‘(internal) states’ accurately captures the content of the Mode in all the surviving expositions of it, Diogenes’ source has left a sliver of room for other kinds of variation between different judging subjects, circumstantial differences included, to be taken into account as well. The formulation, that is to say, seems on the one hand to be chosen to rectify the Mode’s misleading rubric, while on the other hand avoiding outright incompatibility with its more traditional title.

Whether or not Diogenes’ Sceptic source for the Ten Modes is to be identified with Saturninus, as I suspect he is, we have enough data here to start sketching a profile of the faction that he represents. This faction’s sense of allegiance to the school is enough to require at least a veneer of continuity with the established tradition of Aenesideman Modes. At the same time it is sensitive to that tradition’s accumulated weaknesses and to the need to rectify them. To maintain full philosophical efficacy, particularly as regards the Modes’ ordering and interrelation, these Pyrrhonists are ready to streamline and update the school tradition as and where necessary.

31 Annas / Barnes 1985 emend καὶ κοινῶς παραλλαγάς to καὶ κοινὰς παραλλαγάς, “and common variations”, remarking that “if we read κοινῶς we are obliged to suppose falsely that παραλλαγάς is a wider term than διαθέσεις” (187). But it surely is a wider term, potentially covering external as well as internal variations, and I take that to be precisely the point of the formulation.

32 My thanks for helpful discussion to participants in the May 2007 Cambridge seminar on Diogenes Laertius book 9, and the October 2013 New York-Göttingen-Cambridge conference on Diogenes’ Life of Pyrrho. I should also note that my interpretation of the Modes strategy in Diogenes Laertius has something in common with a paper on Sextus’ strategy presented by Benjamin Morison at the July 2013 Symposium Hellenisticum, although based on a different body of evidence.
D. Appendices
Bibliography

1. Abbreviations

ANRW  Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt
DK    Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, ed. H. Diels / W. Kranz
M     Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos
PH    Sextus Empiricus, Pyrrôneioi Hypotipôseis
SH    Supplementum Hellenisticum
RhM   Rheinisches Museum für Philologie
ZPE   Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik

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a. Diogenes Laertius


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