At the core of this book is a seemingly simple question: What is Asia? In search of common historical roots, traditions and visions of political-cultural integration, first Japanese, then Chinese, Korean and Indian intellectuals, politicians and writers understood Asianisms as an umbrella for all conceptions, imaginations and processes which emphasized commonalities or common interests among different Asian regions and nations.

This book investigates the multifarious discursive and material constructions of Asia within the region and in the West. It reconstructs regional constellations, intersections and relations in their national, transnational and global contexts. Moving far beyond the more well-known Japanese Pan-Asianism of the first half of the twentieth century, the chapters investigate visions of Asia that have sought to provide common meanings and political projects in efforts to trace, and construct, Asia as a united and common space of interaction. By tracing the imagination of civil society actors throughout Asia, the volume leaves behind state-centered approaches to regional integration and uncovers the richness and depth of complex identities within a large and culturally heterogeneous space.

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ASIANISMS
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Regionalist Interactions and Asian Integration

Edited by
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AAWC  All Asian Women’s Conference
AIWC  All Indian Women’s Conference
ARO   Asian Relations Organization
BCAS  Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars
CCAS  Committee of Concerned Asia Scholars
KFYMCAA Kautz Family YMCA Archives, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis
NMML  Nehru Memorial Museum and Library
RNPP  Rameshwari Nehru Personal Papers
SPP   Savarkar Private Papers
TOSC  The Olympic Studies Centre (Historical Archives), Lausanne, Switzerland
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Chapter One

Introduction

Marc Frey and Nicola Spakowski

The history of Asia since the 19th century can be characterized as a process of parallel and contradictory trajectories of social, political, economic and cultural entanglements as well as differentiations of individual Asian societies. Until now, however, Asian history has been treated largely not as regional history but as the history of distinct national entities. This is true even for the history of international relations or for transnational history, which are concerned mainly with relations of individual countries with the “West”. This book is different. Its chapters look at Asia in its entirety; even better, the book traces constructions of Asia, be it in the form of Western concepts of Asia as a region or as a real historical space whose formation has been influenced by intra-regional interaction. It reconstructs regional constellations, intersections and relations in their national, transnational and global contexts. Its focus is on “Asianisms”, which we define as discursive constructs of Asia and their related political, cultural and social practices. In doing so we appropriate a concept that was first promulgated by Japanese and then by Chinese, Korean and Indian intellectuals. In search of common historical roots, traditions and visions of political-cultural integration, they understood Asianisms as an umbrella for all conceptions, imaginations and processes that emphasized commonalities or common interests among different Asian regions and nations.¹

As the discursive construction of Asia is a highly contested field, we feel a need to somewhat broaden the historical meaning of Asianisms. We refer to Asianisms as a concept that encompasses processes
of entanglement as well as differentiation, and we apply it to integration and fragmentation. We use the term in the plural in order to capture the whole spectrum of discursive constructs as well as practices. These discourses and their related practices may have originated in Asia, but they can also be traced back to Europe or North America. As several of the chapters reveal, Asianist discourses and practices were also invented in the West, where they circulated as distinct forms of knowledge about Asia. At times, these Western-produced Asianisms were imported to Asia or constituted themselves as products of the interaction of non-Asian and Asian actors.\textsuperscript{2} Asianisms relate to pan-Asianism, but they go beyond the term and meaning, as they draw upon the plurality, diversity and inconsistency of intra-, trans- and extraregional conceptions of Asia. Asianisms can not only be detected in processes of integration; they can also relate to moments of rivalry, competition or exclusion within and between political entities.

The analysis of Asianisms is an evolving field of historical enquiry. Prasenjit Duara, for instance, not only sees a need to direct more attention to Asia as a region, but he also asserts that until now disciplinary boundaries within Asian Studies have inhibited transnational and transcultural research.\textsuperscript{3} Renewed interest in concepts of Asia has also enriched research on Asianisms.\textsuperscript{4} This interest in Asianisms has added to our understanding of pan-Asianism, which remains of primary concern to historians investigating forms of Asianisms. A case in point is the classical topic of Japanese pan-Asianism, whose roots have been located in a spectrum ranging from egalitarian to imperialist notions.\textsuperscript{5} But as transnational and global themes have gained in importance in the humanities and social sciences, historians have begun to look beyond particular nations and nationally conceived ideas of Asia.\textsuperscript{6} Processes and structures transcending national boundaries have received more interest from Asian scholars.\textsuperscript{7} In part, this research is conducted in transnational academic communities and institutionalized research associations.\textsuperscript{8} This trend is being promoted by a range of new forms of transnational interaction in the economy, politics and civil societies within Asia itself. Last but not least, researchers have become more mobile and “embody in their persons these continuous flows, as they move freely from an Asian country to another, and between the United States and Asia”.\textsuperscript{9}
Introduction

Concepts of Asia and its regions belong to the field of metageography and world history, both of which employ a decidedly transnational perspective. The term “Asia” itself goes back to ancient Greece, where the then known world was divided between Europe and Asia. Along with the widening spatial horizons of the Western world the territories defined as being part of Asia grew, and mental maps as well as real maps incorporated ever larger areas. As there are no natural geographic demarcations between Asia and Europe, definitions of what constitutes Asia continue to vary.

While there is a long history of entanglements within Asia, a search for an explicit Asian identity began only in the late 19th century. However, numerous economic, political, cultural and religious relations and interactions within Asia can be traced back to antiquity. These entanglements and flows intensified in the modern era. The Silk Road, for instance, is only one example of long-distance interaction in the past. Maritime history has identified the Indian Ocean as a space of interaction and communication. Buddhism, Islam and Confucianism stretched over vast geographical areas and provided religious and cultural identification but oftentimes also conflicting spaces of belonging; they could thus not serve as a basis for an all-Asian cultural identity.

In East Asia and in large parts of Southeast Asia, the Sino-centric world order and the Chinese tributary system provided norms and practices for entanglements and exchange. Since the late 19th century, anti-colonial, reform and revolutionary movements became platforms for inter-Asian interaction. There was cross-border support for political movements, political activists found asylum elsewhere, and in cities such as Tokyo and Paris political exiles and multicultural revolutionary circles met, though they did not necessarily promote explicit Asianist visions.

The vision of Asia as a historical-geographic entity resonated within Asia only with the expansion of the West and with European colonialism and imperialism. Five features of this Asian “discovery of Asia” can be identified. First, constructions of Asia were embedded in a complex system of East-West and inter-Asian interaction. “Asia” or “the Orient” or “the (Far) East” figured as relational concepts that were invented and employed by Europeans in order to demonstrate the perceived superiority of Europe (or “the West”) and to legitimize aspirations to power vis-à-vis Asians (Orientalism). As Pekka Korhonen in his discussion of the changing meanings of the term...
“Asia” explains: “While the narratives of progress and conquest were thus attached to the name of Europe, Asia began to resemble everything opposite, a place to be conquered and colonized.” In most Asian languages the term “Asia” is imported, and its varied meanings, charged with notions of the self and the “other”, are subject to change. East-West interaction played an important role beyond matters of identity and identification. In many cases, Western “knowledge” and Western concepts of modernization, the nation state and civilization served as points of departure for Asian emancipation and self-assertion in politics, the economy and culture.

Second, Asianisms have often been embedded in transnational movements or flows of ideas and ideologies. This volume breaks new ground in that the case studies trace Asianisms in a variety of different movements and circulations of ideas. Stefan Hübner locates the history of the Far Eastern Championship Games in the activities of the American Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA). Maria Moritz sees the Theosophical Society, a transnational association in search of a vaguely defined Eastern spirituality, as an intermediate for the Buddhist Maha Bodhi Society. Tani Barlow looks at Asianisms in connection with mission and missiology and as a central component of contemporary feminist discourses. And Tessa Morris-Suzuki investigates civil society activities that are focused on Japan’s relations with Asia but take their inspiration from feminism, fair trade and similar progressive movements.

Third, Asianisms had varying significance in different Asian societies. Concepts of Asia served diverse functions. Asianisms were employed for truly transnational projects intended to promote solidarity, but they were also invoked in order to foster nationalist and even hegemonic claims. The latter variant is closely associated with Japanese imperialism during the 1930s and the vision of a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere in the early 1940s. However, at varying moments in time projects of domination legitimized by “Asianist” ideas can also be found in Sino-centric or India-centric visions of Asia or East Asia. It is equally important to note that nationalist or chauvinist projects were repudiated by anti-imperialist radical Asian intellectuals and politicians, who espoused ideas of a united Asia in order to fight against suppression, exploitation and paternalism.
Fourth, Asianisms draw on a variety of elements of an assumed Asian community. These can be ethnic, cultural or religious; but geographic proximity and shared historical experiences can also foster Asianisms. Closely associated with imperialism and colonialism, the latter usually transcended the region and linked up to the notion of deprived peoples worldwide. Here, regional or continental schemes conflicted with global socio-economic categories such as the North versus the South, or the Cold War concept of the “three worlds” (First, Second and Third Worlds).24

Fifth, as Torsten Weber and Tessa Morris-Suzuki show in this volume, Asianisms are not always based on postulations of an Asian unity. In the cases they discuss, intellectuals and grassroots activists acknowledge the deep divisions within Asia. They identify ruptures, hierarchies, traumata and social inequality located in various parts of Asia in order to invoke a future united Asia.25

This volume contributes to the growing field of Asianist studies in four ways. Its geographical scope transcends Northeast Asia; its approach is decidedly transnational. It introduces a transcultural perspective in that it discusses a variety of Western Asianist discourses. It problematizes issues that transcend the usual approach to Asianisms (the political). Instead, it offers insight into Asianisms in religion, sports, academics, popular science and business. Finally, it covers a long period of time ranging from the late 19th century to the present.

These themes are not static but have evolved over time. To trace their historicity is to explore the national, regional and global constellations in which Asianist discourses and practices emerged. The discussion begins in the 19th century, when colonialism and imperialism subjected large parts of what was then called the Far East to an imperialist regional order.26 This order constrained opportunities for inter-Asian interaction. But it also promoted new political and cultural dynamics in which new political and discursive alliances and enmities could flourish. Concepts of “Asia” certainly competed with much more popular and widespread nationalist aspirations, but they became important references for processes of transfer, contradistinction and identity formation. Discourses of emancipation and modernization, emerging mainly in response to Western colonialism and imperialism, drew primarily on invented or re-invoked “national” traditions, but they also incorporated Japanese, Chinese, Indian and
Vietnamese visions of Asia. In this period, Western admirers of Asia, critical of European discourses on civilization, were quite often important mediators of regionally varied Asianist discourses in Asia. Japan assumed a particularly important function in a double sense. On the one hand, through its stunning success as a modernizing nation and as victor over a Western power (Russia, 1905) it served as a role model. On the other hand, its aggressive foreign policies and its claim to regional hegemony provoked widespread criticism. However, from the late 19th century, Japan turned into a mediator of Western knowledge in Asia and became an attractive destination for Asian students, intellectuals and exiles. As such, it emerged as a pioneer of pan-Asian ideas.

After World War I Asianist discourses flourished, as European and Asian intellectuals in search of alternatives to the global crisis Europe had created promoted concepts of a spiritual and peaceful Eastern civilization. But again, notions of a homogenous East fell apart. Chinese intellectuals emphasized fundamental differences between China and India, and the term “the East” frequently became synonymous with China. Japanese politicians and intellectuals considered their country a class of its own, not even belonging to an Asia perceived as “backward”. In this climate, the efforts of the Indian author and philosopher Rabindranath Tagore to promote an all-Asian alliance on his visits to China and Japan fell on deaf ears. There is no doubt, though, that Asianist discourses provided fertile ground for a closer cooperation between Chinese and Japanese with the aim to rejuvenate manifestations of Asian culture such as traditional medicine, Buddhism and Confucianism. On a more general level, migrations within Asia increased sharply during the 1920s, as did people-to-people contacts across territories and nations.

Almost a century after the collapse of the Chinese world order, the Japanese expansion in China and Southeast Asia was the first manifest effort from within Asia to restructure Asia in regional terms. The ideology and the politics of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere proclaimed in 1940 were intended, as Duara puts it, as “a commitment to creating a common space akin to the nation that would extend the benefits and pains of creating a globally competitive region, but would extend them unevenly over the whole.” Very few people in the occupied countries were attracted by this version
of pan-Asianism. Rather, occupation, exploitation and mass starvation promoted nationalisms in Korea, China and large parts of Southeast Asia.

The wounds inflicted by Japan would not have healed easily anyway. But they were exacerbated by Cold War tensions and the ideological and political split that manifested itself between and within Asian countries (China, Korea, Vietnam). Regional interaction and efforts at integration were not very high on anyone’s agenda. Regional sports events and conferences (such as the Asian Relations Conference of 1947 and the Bandung Conference of 1955) reinforced national sovereignties rather than regional integration. Only with the founding of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (1967) did regional integration become a slowly evolving reality, albeit on a very limited scale. However, it was mainly developments in the 1970s that opened up possibilities for future regionalist projects: the rapprochement between China and the United States (1972), the end of the war in Vietnam (1975), and the introduction of reform policies under Deng Xiaoping in China (1978). India, which had promoted regional designs in the 1950s, was so taken aback by the 1962 conflict with China in the Himalayas that it took its intellectuals and politicians decades to contemplate regional projects.

Asia in the post-Cold War is marked by parallel and quite contradictory movements. On the one hand, there is much debate about a new regionalism. Because of its conceptual diversity, this regionalism needs to be conceived in the plural. The driving forces of current projects of regional integration are manifold. Increasing economic interdependence, labor migration, tourism and cultural flows that draw upon an “Asian” art, particularly the cross-border consumption of Asian popular culture, TV shows, films, food, etc., are indicative of this new regionalism. These factors open up spaces of interaction, communication and cooperation. It remains to be seen in which ways the various initiatives by states and civil societies draw on past Asianist discourses, and in which ways they produce new forms of Asianisms. At the political level, Asia has witnessed a number of new regionalist initiatives, such as the cooperation between ASEAN and the three East Asian nations of China, Japan and South Korea (ASEAN plus three), established in 1997, or the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) between China, Russia and four states of
Central Asia founded in 2001. On the other hand, continuing territorial disputes thwart these efforts at integration and expose the strength of nationalisms and the persistence of ideas of national sovereignty and national interests. The ongoing dispute over the Senkaku or Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea shows how far Asia is from being an integrated political entity.

Maria Moritz and Stefan Hübner take us back to the early 20th century, when Western imperialism and colonialism were experienced by most Asian societies. They look at the fields of religion and sports in order to show how Asianisms evolved in the context of an imperialist regional order. Constructions of Asia offered a trajectory between imitation and emancipation, as well as between self-assertion and a global mission. In both fields, religion and sports, actors engaged with the Western “civilizing mission” in order to disentangle themselves from foreign rule and cultural oppression. Instead, they appropriated and transformed features of this Western civilizing mission in order to become subjects, rather than objects, of the mission. Hübner discusses the Far Eastern Championship Games (a precursor to the Asian Games of today), which were initiated by the American YMCA. Between 1913 and 1934 they featured athletes from the Philippines, Japan and China. The Western-imported basic idea of the Games was that sports had a civilizing effect, individually and collectively, and would liberate “backward” Asians and correct their perceived cultural and social deficits. This aim was not questioned by Asian national elites. On the contrary, Western sport was seen as an important instrument of empowerment against colonialism, imperialism and paternalism, and it was promoted as such. The history of the Far Eastern Championship Games also presents itself as a history of rising American influence in the region and its decline in the 1920s, when the organization of the Games was taken over by Asians. The increasingly Asian character of the Games serves as an example of liberation from foreign tutelage. At the same time, the Games serve as a telling example of an anticolonial alliance that dissolved under the impact of internal tensions and the hegemonic aspirations of one member, Japan. The increasing conflict between Japan and China made peaceful contests in sports arenas impossible. Asianisms and nationalisms went hand in hand and evolved into contradictory forces of a movement of emancipation that was held together not by intrinsic commonalities but by an external foe.
Within the Far Eastern Championship Games Asians felt united by their nationalisms.

The project of a Buddhist Asianism, promoted by the Ceylonese Anagarika Dharmapala since the 1890s both within and outside Asia, also evolved in the context of European colonialism and imperialism. As Maria Moritz shows, Dharmapala turned around the Western notion of a civilizing mission and substituted it with a mission that assigned Buddhism a global transformative role and would bring Asians equality vis-à-vis Europeans. Dharmapala connected well with European critics of the civilizing mission who were deeply sceptical of Western materialism and were eager to merge European culture with Eastern spirituality in order to create a new global civilization. The Theosophical Society, founded in 1875 in New York City, can best be understood as an institutionalization of this idea of a new global civilization. The society, which operated on a global scale, provided Dharmapala with inspiration and initial support. While staying in touch with the society, Dharmapala turned to his own project, the rejuvenation of Buddhism as a unifier of Asia and as a world religion with Asia as its centre and the Buddha as a global Messiah. He promoted Bodh Gaya, the supposed location of the Buddha’s epiphany, as a pilgrimage site and wanted to turn it into a “Buddhist Jerusalem”. As an endogenous civilizing mission, this rejuvenated Buddhism targeted India, a country that, according to Dharmapala, should have taken inspiration from a modern and Buddhist Japan to liberate itself from its backwardness. But Dharmapala’s civilizing mission was also addressed to the West, which had to be liberated from a pervasive materialism. His project, fascinating as it is, was ridden by internal tensions. His construction of a universal Buddhist dogma conflicted with the many local doctrines and practices of Buddhism, and it failed because of the disinclination of the various Buddhist groups in Asian countries to subordinate themselves to a transnational Buddhist alliance.

Asianisms have often concerned themselves with geographical spaces and the proper location of Asia. For instance, the organizers of the Far Eastern Championship Games considered India to be part of West Asia—and thus excluded it from their Far Eastern Asian games. To Indian thinkers, this was not so clear. Mindful of the multicultural and multireligious character of Indian society, they constructed their own versions of Asia. As Carolien Stolte shows, these Asias took
surprisingly diverse forms, as they were conceived as mental maps and then reproduced as geographical visualizations. Different cartographies of Asia were based on different sets of assumptions about religion, culture or politics. At a time in which the Raj’s future was first contested, then resolved, and eventually substituted by visions of an independent India, these cartographies of Asia reveal differing paths to reinventing traditions and constructing identities. They also display a clear break with an earlier past of Asianisms in India that had drawn their inspiration from religion and the transcendental. Stolte’s chapter reminds us of the plurality of Asianisms.

Morris-Suzuki and Weber focus attention on the important theme of reconciliation in East Asia and, by implication, on Japanese pan-Asianism as the historically most concrete form of Asianist thought. What is new here is that both chapters place activities of civil society actors and network formation squarely at the centre of the debate. Morris-Suzuki calls these activities manifestations of a “micro-Asianism” and Weber “micro East-Asian communities”. Asianisms by these civil society actors are based on critical thinking. They emphasize differences, tensions and distortions, and they oppose superficially defined proclamations of unity. They are critical of dominant economic and political interests who exploit notions of an Asian community for profit or, worse, for hegemonic purposes and exploitation. In this civil society perspective, Asia is “not one”.

Morris-Suzuki looks at micro-Asianisms that have emerged from the post-war situation and the impulses of progressive global movements such as feminism, alternative development, fair trade and humanitarianism. Theirs is not an Asian unity based on constructed cultural commonalities. Rather, a sense of Asian unity is an outgrowth of shared experiences with and/or concerns about exploitation and suffering. Micro-Asianisms’ roots may lie in the experiences of war, but the global progressive movements manifest themselves also in the present in different forms such as class, gender and North-South conflicts. In these conflicts, Japan is seen as an originator of new relations of exploitation. Asianisms assume a universal dimension, as civil society actors strive for solidarity with disadvantaged groups. At the same time, these micro-Asianisms have emerged in the context of relations between states and societies in which the politics of history and memory are highly important and contested. The term “Asianisms from below” points to the civil society component of these
transnational activities in Japan. Morris-Suzuki’s notion of “invisible Asianisms” refers to the typically Japanese character of grassroots involvement that is locally organized, rather small, fragile and ephemeral. Activities encompass Tsurumi Yoshiyuki’s public appeal to foster mutual understanding and empathy through people-to-people contacts; Matsui Yayori’s solidarity project for women in Asia; the East Asia Collaborative Workshops, which are concerned with the fate of Korean and Chinese involuntary labourers in Japan and which promote the concept of “People’s history”; and Kim Sun-yeoul’s support for the rights of female textile workers in Thailand. This Asia of small-scale solidarity movements is an Asia beyond Japan as well as an Asia within Japan.

Torsten Weber investigates Asianist conceptions of contemporary Japanese and Chinese intellectuals. He places them in the context of well-established projects of reconciliation among Northeast Asian countries that are partly sponsored by governments and partly by semi-official networks. And he positions these Asianisms in an official regionalism aimed at establishing an East Asian Community in the future. Weber’s actors are dedicated to reconciliation. At the same time, they acknowledge the pitfalls of official policies of reconciliation, which remain rather nationalist. These intellectuals are decidedly against regionalist invocations of some kind of unity, they are critical of capitalism, and they warn of an “Asia for the rich”. Instead, they subscribe to the ideas of past Asianist thinkers such as Takeuchi Yoshimi, who in 1960 proposed the idea of “Asia as Method”, or to Asianist conceptions dating back to the Meiji period. In China, Wang Hui and Sun Ge historicize past Japanese ideas of leaving Asia and glorifying the West. They explain these notions as appropriations of negative Western discourses on Asia, and in part they even excuse them. Finally, they engage in the more recent Chinese debate about Sun Yat-sen’s Asianism and his call for a kingly way (wang dao) rather than a despotic way (ba dao) in the conduct of interstate relations.

Morris-Suzuki and Weber show that Asianisms are on the agenda within East Asian societies. Their focus on non-state actors points to alternatives to the official politics of historical contestation, and they highlight the diversity of opportunities and activities that are possible within the framework of Asianist discourses and practices.

Tani Barlow, Fabio Lanza and Nicola Spakowski turn their attention to Western Asianisms from the late 19th century to the present.
Regardless of changing world orders and specific global events, these Western Asianisms functionalize Asia for specific interests located on the national, subnational and supranational levels. They can be characterized as Orientalisms, as they have little to do with the complex realities of Asian countries and much to do with Western projections and stereotypes. This knowledge of Asia, which circulates within Western societies, is in part deeply grounded in history. But it is also closely associated with ideologically charged conceptions of the world. Moreover, this kind of knowledge of Asia claims to be scientific. Academics are either producers of certain images of Asia, or certain Asianisms simply claim to be scientific in order to be credible.

Barlow’s treatment of American Asianisms ranges from late 19th century missionaries to the 2011 agenda of a Pacific Century. Diverse topics and actors are analyzed, but they all follow one common rule. They are informed by erudition, or rather, fake erudition. Barlow exemplifies this fake erudition in the context of three specific Asianisms: the pagan Asia of missionaries and of missiology of the late 19th century; the capitalist projections of the hugely popular 1980s male interest fiction by James Clavell; and the patronizing attitude toward Asian women displayed by Hillary Clinton at the 1995 Beijing World Conference on Women. Late 19th century missiology circulated knowledge of Asia for the purpose of training missionaries. At the time, these constructions of Asia were quite powerful, as American missions had made “pagan” Asia their primary focus. Geographically and culturally, this Asia was rather amorphous and could even include Africa. It postulated the degradation of Asian women, and, as with Hübner’s sports officials, it rested on the assumption that deficits were the unifying element in Asia and its ultimate common denominator. Fast forwarding to the 1980s, Clavell’s novels, among them the global bestsellers *Shogun*, *Taipan* and *Noble House*, deeply informed Western perceptions of Asia, including among Western decision makers. In these novels, Asia is portrayed as the stage for and epicentre of global capitalism. Curiously, these novels assumed the status of textbooks; heavily footnoted companion books purported scientific authority, and while scholars of Asia were quick to criticize details of Clavell’s interpretation of Asia, they accepted his main arguments and overall picture. Finally, a third Asianism transpired in Clinton’s assessment of Asian women as deprived of their rights and in dire need...
of emancipation by human rights groups at the Beijing World Conference on Women in 1995.

Fabio Lanza is interested in the Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars (CCAS), a group formed in 1968 to protest the American War in Vietnam. In the group’s first publication, titled *America’s Asia*, these younger American scholars analyzed US relations with Asian countries in a most critical way. They condemned American chauvinism and American violence, and they accused their better-established colleagues in the field of Asian studies of collaboration in a hegemonic project. As with Suzuki-Morris’ protagonists, these concerned Americans were deeply influenced by the progressive movements of the 1960s and 1970s. Members of the CCAS felt that Americans treated Asians as objects rather than subjects in their own right, they emphasized their humanity, and they considered Asia as a source of positive ideas. In light of the dominant theory of modernization, Asia appeared as “backward”. CCAS scholars, instead, regarded Asia as a “geographically located utopia” (Fabio Lanza). This turn towards the revolutionary Asia was accompanied by a debate about the function and self-conception of American Asian studies. However, while these younger scholars were able to criticize US foreign policy, it was more difficult for them to universalize the revolutionary experiences of Asia and thus change the course of history. The failure of Asian revolutions and the integration of Asia into the capitalist world system eventually led to the demise of the CCAS, which dissolved in 1979.

Finally, Nicola Spakowski explores the Western notion of an “Asian Century”, a notion prevalent in a dislocated ideology of economism and globalism. The Asia hype of the 1980s provided fertile ground for current notions of an Asian Century. On closer look, it becomes obvious that investment companies and investment funds, in particular, promote this idea. Spakowski shows how changes in terms—“East Asian miracle”, “Chindia”, “China’s rise”, etc.—mirror a shifting geography of growth that follows the economic cycles of global capitalism, whose driving force seems to have moved to Asia. As other chapters highlight as well, the interplay between academia and pseudo-science is important, particularly the cooperation between historians, business journalists and international institutions. Paradoxically, the future-oriented discourse of an Asian Century is informed by the writings of global historians and historians of Asia.
Past economic potentials of Asia seem to demonstrate that once Western influence over the world comes to its final end, a global equilibrium is re-established. In light of this simplifying history of rise and decline, the rise of Asia turns into a “restoration”, a “renaissance”, a “re-emergence”. The future becomes a range of predictable and certain options. Economic measurements such as gross national product are levelling factors that standardize diverse Asian economies and societies. They allow for comparisons, but they divest Asian countries of their diversity.

Notes


6. See, in particular, Sven Saaler and Christopher W.A. Szpilman, eds, *Pan Asianism: A Documentary History*, 2 vols (Boulder: Rowman & Littlefield, 2011b). Interestingly, this trend can also be observed in research on China (both inside and outside China). Traditionally, there were two kinds of Asianisms: the imperialist Asianism of Japan and the “humanitarian” or “socialist” visions of Sun Yat-sen and Li Dazhao. Currently, Asianisms tend to be regarded in a much more nuanced and differentiated way. See in particular Huang Donglan, “‘Yazhou’ de yansheng—Jindai Zhongguo yuijing li de ‘Yazhou’ gailun” [The Birth of “Asia”: On

7. See, for instance, publications by the Japanese Society for Political and Economic Studies of Asia (Ajia Seikei Gakkai) in the series Gendai Ajia Kenkyū [Contemporary Historical Research on Asia], ed. Ajia Seikei Gakkai (Tokyo: Keiō Gijuku Daigaku Shuppankai, 2008). Volumes 1 and 2 of the series deal with “transnationality” and “civil society”. A similar perspective is taken in the four-volume publication Higashi Ajia Kyōdōtai no kōchiku [The Construction of an East Asian Community], ed. Mōri Kazuko et al. (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2007), which includes chapters on transnational networks in society, politics, culture and the business world. In 2010, the International Association for Asia Pacific Studies was founded at the Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University in Beppu. Its aim is to transcend research undertaken on a national basis. It also publishes the journal Asia Pacific World. Witness also the foundation of the Asian Association of World Historians (founded in Nanjing in 2008), which held its first congress in May 2009 in Osaka. It aims to develop the epistemological and organizational foundations for an “Asian global history”.


20. See the chapters by Maria Moritz and Stefan Hübner in this volume; and Duara, “Asia Redux”: 970ff.


23. See the chapter by Carolien Stolte in this volume.


25. See Gi-Wook Shin and Daniel C. Sneider, eds, *History Textbooks and the Wars in Asia: Divided Memories* (London: Routledge, 2001); and Tessa Morris-Suzuki, Morris Low, Leonid Petrov and Timothy Y. Tsu, eds, *East Asia beyond the History Wars: Confronting the Ghosts of Violence* (London: Routledge, 2013). See also Nicola Spakowski, “‘Gender’ Trouble: Feminism in China under the Impact of Western Theory and the Spatialization of Identity”, *positions* 19, 1 (2011): 31–54. Spakowski explores this conjecture in her discussion of an intra-Asian feminist discourse. On the one hand, “Asian women’s studies” tend to standardize diverse experiences of Asian women and level variations by invoking black boxes such as “unity in diversity” or “diversity in unity”. On the other hand, a “Northeast Asian research” trajectory takes conflicts and differences as its point of departure in order to engage in conversations about shared realities of women’s experiences in Asian countries.

26. See also Duara, “Asia Redux”: 964–8.

27. That goes, for instance, for the French author Romain Rolland, the poet Paul Richard, the German philosopher Rudolph Eucken and the members of the Theosophical Society. See Sachsenmeier, “Searching for Alternatives”: 256–8; and Aydin, *The Politics of Anti-Westernism in Asia*, Chapter 3. See also the chapters by Maria Moritz and Stefan Hübner in this volume.

29. Duara, “The Discourse of Civilization and Pan-Asianism”, pp. 64–83; Sachsenmaier, “Searching for Alternatives to Western Modernity”; the chapter by Maria Moritz in this volume.


36. See the chapter by Nicola Spakowski in this volume.

37. See Spakowski, “Regionalismus und historische Identität”; and the chapter by Torsten Weber in this volume.

38. See the special issue on this topic of *Asian Perspective* 38, 2 (Apr.–June 2014).


40. See also the chapter by Maria Moritz in this volume; and Saaler and Koschmann, *Pan-Asianism*, p. 4.
Chapter Two

“The Empire of Righteousness”: Anagarika Dharmapala and His Vision of Buddhist Asianism (c. 1900)

Maria Moritz

Like other pan-movements, Asianism was a significant force and a result of globalizing processes around 1900 as they imagined and created communities beyond national boundaries. Pan-movements such as pan-Africanism, pan-Asianism, pan-Islam and pan-Slavism claimed an inner unity based on certain characteristics and ideologies they claimed fundamental. These ideologies differed greatly—e.g., pan-Islam was based on a shared religious belief, while pan-Africanism referred to common origins. To a certain extent, however, most pan-movements derived their unifying power from their inherent anti-Westernism as they propagated the legitimacy of alternative civilizations and envisioned contrasting regional spaces to the existing world order dominated by the West. The global dominance of the West was due to an elaborate imperial system that held the majority of the globe subject. The British Empire was the largest colonizing state; it legitimated and rationalized its worldwide dominance through a “civilizing mission” ideology—the famous “white man’s burden”—the justification for establishing overseas colonies by bringing the “benefits” of European civilization such as capitalism or law and order.
Around the turn of the century, however, the global “West”, with the British empire at its heart, arrived at a legitimacy crisis whose climax was the disaster of World War I. Debates in the colonies among Afro-Asian intellectuals illustrate an increasingly anti-imperialist attitude that envisioned alternatives to the “European conceit that discovery and invention were necessarily progressive and beneficial to humanity”. Pan-movements often functioned as germ cells for new civilizational concepts and incorporated older religious elements or transcendental ideals. The close relationship or near-equivalence of the concept of civilization to religion has not been acknowledged only by the historian Prasenjit Duara. The sociologist Johann Arnason, for example, argues that even a materialist historian such as Fernand Braudel suggests “that religion is the civilizational phenomenon par excellence”.

Consequently, influential thinkers who contributed to the discourse of Asianism around 1900 had identified Buddhism as the binding and inspirational force of an envisioned Asian civilization. In his *Ideals of the East* (1904), the Japanese art critic Okakura Tenshin (1862–1913) called Buddhism “that great ocean of idealism, in which merge all the river-systems of Eastern Asiatic thought”—a major source of a common identity in the past and future. The English poet Edwin Arnold’s widely circulated “The Light of Asia or the Great Renunciation. Being the Life and Teaching of Gautama, Prince of India and Founder of Buddhism as Told in Verse by an Indian Buddhist” (1879) inspired not only a personality cult around Prince Siddharta Gautama, the Buddha, but popularized Buddhism in the Western world.

It was the Ceylonese Anagarika Dharmapala (1864–1933), however, who not only explicitly addressed Buddhism as the means by which cultural exchange and common ethics had created a regional unity in Asia and had thus become the spiritual source of an alternative civilization ready to challenge the existing world order but devoted his life to the revival of Buddhism in the region and beyond. Buddhism, as the supposed glue between the various Asian countries, had a long precolonial history and, through the initiative of Buddhist monks and scholars, had long been the source of an identity beyond a national framework.

The new idea of belonging to Asia, however, was not confined to the religious realm but became associated with specific regional
traditions varying from the Asianisms of Japanese intellectuals such as Miyazaki Toten (1871–1922)\textsuperscript{11} to the rather philosophical Asianism of Indian thinkers such as Rabindranath Tagore (1861–1941).\textsuperscript{12} This chapter focuses on how Buddhism was construed and exploited as a common feature of a pan-Asian identity on the Indian subcontinent and how this decidedly spiritual South Asian variant of Asianism fitted into a wider critique of Western cultural and political hegemony. It sheds a critical light on the example of Anagarika Dharmapala’s Asianist vision by demonstrating, first, the intellectual genesis of his Buddhism through his association with the Theosophical Society and close collaboration with intellectuals in Calcutta, India’s Buddhist hub. Second, it elaborates on the institutionalization and implementation of his Buddhist Asianism both in the West and within Asia. This article thereby emphasizes that the West was not the only—or pre-dominant—point of reference for Dharmapala’s modern Buddhist Asianism, especially since Asian Buddhist networks predated political and cultural colonial hegemony and as such had already been successfully “missionized” in many Asian countries and thereby proven to be transnational. While research on the phenomenon of Asianism typically focuses on East Asian conceptions, this chapter analyzes a South Asian variety.\textsuperscript{13}

Dharmapala was not primarily a champion of Asianism, but his adoption of its widespread and flourishing rhetoric in order to promote Buddhist revival in the region and beyond contributed substantially to the discourse on an alternative Asian civilization. Moreover, Dharmapala’s discursive construction of Buddhism as a common source of identity for all Asian peoples was not just a vague concept but a basis for concrete efforts to encourage intraregional cooperation underpinned by the shifting relations between Asia and the West, especially the crisis of European legitimacy after the catastrophe of World War I.

British imperialism was the main reference point for Dharmapala’s adoption of a twofold civilizing mission ideology. On the one hand he built on and intensified the network of Buddhist pilgrimage and cultural exchange in the region. On the other hand, these inner-Asian activities were always closely associated with Dharmapala’s external “civilizing mission” in Europe and America for which he extended the “classical heartland of Theravada Buddhism”—from Rangoon, Mandalay and Colombo to Calcutta and Madras, as well
as Siam, Singapore, China, Japan, Hawaii, the United States, Britain and Germany. He was the first Buddhist in modern times to disseminate Buddhist teachings on three continents: Asia, Europe and North America. He spent most of the years between 1891 and 1933 abroad, only periodically returning to Sri Lanka.\textsuperscript{14}

The same pattern has been detected within the transnational activity of the Salvation Army. Like the Salvation Army, Dharmapala followed a double strategy of targeting both an inner and an external audience—a Euro-American and an Asian audience. This led to various contradictions, tensions and frictions between the two intertwined directions of his conception. This chapter will engage with the relationship between Dharmapala’s internal and external civilizing missions—the two sides of Dharmapala’s concept of Asianism, which included much more than just conversion as they were an intrinsic part of a much larger project—forming an alternative civilization originating from Asia.

**Theosophical Inspiration**

Dharmapala’s self-fashioning as a Buddhist reformer and his vision of an alternative Asian Buddhist civilization was informed by his early membership, first in Ceylon, later in India and beyond, in the Theosophical Society,\textsuperscript{15} a globally operating esoteric organization.

From the founding of its Indian branch in 1879, the Theosophical Society functioned as a bridge between bilingual Asian elites and self-critical\textsuperscript{16} Westerners who collaboratively shaped “the content of the discourse on the Asian civilization’s alternative nature to the West”.\textsuperscript{17} They did not generally reject “Western modernity”\textsuperscript{18} but contrasted the West’s assumed material superiority with an appraisal of the East’s intrinsic spirituality. This oversimplified vision of an overly material West and its spiritual Eastern counterpart underlay many contemporary assumptions about the relationship between the two hemispheres.

At the beginning of the 20th century, the Theosophical Society was by no means a marginal spiritual organization; its astonishing success was due largely to its claim that spiritual traditions from Asia would inspire a new civilization. The society was only the institutionalized spearhead of a larger turn “eastward”\textsuperscript{19} that affected critical
intellectuals, progressive thinkers and reformists in the West—a numerically small but influential elite group. These pro-Asian sentiments gained new momentum especially after the catastrophe of World War I, when it became increasingly accepted that “there were multiple civilizations and that civilization was ultimately a spiritual and moral concern”. Before that time, as Prasenjit Duara has argued for the long 19th century, Europeans conceptualized “civilization” as a singular entity that was based exclusively on material progress. Consequently, the imperial civilizing mission, which became the most important argument for colonial overseas engagements, focused on uplifting the subject countries materially.

The Theosophical Society, on the contrary, reflected the new concept of “civilization” by stressing the spiritual dimension rather than material progress. Theosophists initiated numerous publications on Eastern spirituality, such as the flagship magazine *The Theosophist*, a monthly journal devoted to the study of “Eastern philosophy”. They explicitly encouraged their Western members to learn from these sources. Moreover, the society opened up libraries, schools and reading circles, monitored translations, and generally encouraged discursive activities among its members within the global network of branches. In all the new public spaces that the Theosophical Society opened up, we can discern the workings of an “affirmative orientalism” — a positive appraisal of the East exemplified by the eminent Orientalist scholar Friedrich Max Müller’s *India: What Can It Teach Us?* (1883). This creation of a “cosmopolitan thought zone” was inspired by 18th century Enlightenment ideals in which the increase of knowledge was synonymous with the development of civilization.

Dharmapala, whose original name was Don David Hewavitarane, was the son of an affluent Sinhalese furniture trader in Colombo. He was educated in both Catholic and Protestant missionary schools, while he described his parental home as entirely Buddhist. After finishing school he worked briefly in the educational department of the colonial administration, but in May 1880 he gave up his job to actively participate in the “second awakening which the Buddhists had received” through the two American founders of the Theosophical Society, Henry Steel Olcott (1832–1907) and Helena Petrovna Blavatsky (1831–91). The founders had declared themselves Buddhists in the United States long before and were among the first who took
when they visited Ceylon for the first time in 1880. The founders signalled that to them (and soon to many more around the globe) Buddhism was a philosophy rather than a creed, open to anyone independent of origin and easily accessible in English—the coming lingua franca. Young Dharmapala, 16 years of age at that time, consequently considered the Theosophical Society a tool for “Buddhist propaganda” in the West.

Despite ardent protests from his parents, Dharmapala joined the theosophical founders on their way back to the theosophical headquarters in Adyar, a district of South Indian Madras, in 1884 and stayed with the society for about 20 years, receiving both the structural and ideological foundations for his future work. Dharmapala accompanied and translated for Olcott not only in Ceylon but also on his first visit to Japan and Burma in 1889 and thus witnessed Olcott’s rise as the leading proponent of the Buddhist revival in Asia and of reformed Buddhism in the West, particularly the United States. For his redefinition of Buddhism, Olcott uncritically appropriated the work of pioneering Buddhologists such as the British William Rhys Davids (1843–1922), who had founded the Pali Text Society in 1881 in order to further the study of classical Buddhist texts or the Boden Professor of Sanskrit in Oxford, Monier Monier-Williams (1819–99). Davids regularly corresponded with both Olcott and Dharmapala. Based on his involvement with Buddhist scholarship, Olcott eventually came to the conclusion that Ceylon’s Buddhists knew little, if anything, about what he called “‘real’ Buddhism”.

The “real” Buddhism of Buddhologists and theosophists alike was an interpretation of Buddhism derived from textual sources and stripped of a belief in miracles and mysteries alive with the majority of Ceylonese peasantry “available only to European scholars who read the ancient texts”.

It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the majority of Ceylonese Buddhists were unaware of this new interpretation of Buddhism primarily constructed by European Buddhologists and flourishing in the cities with the aspiring, bilingual middle class. Its close connection with the increase of literacy and a seizure of religious leadership resembled core elements of the European Reformation. Moreover, it developed as a protest against Christianity but at the same time included elements of Protestantism such as religious individualism
and techniques of missionary work; therefore, scholars tend to call it “Protestant Buddhism” or variously “Buddhist modernism.” The interpretation of Protestant Buddhism as a revolutionary reform movement against the dominant Hindu tradition in India by historical scholars such as Monier-Williams added to its aura as a non-national, universalistic religion independent from its original place of birth and according to leading European scholars a potential competitor to Christianity, the other universalistic religion. Like Christianity, Islam and Judaism, Buddhism formally qualified as a world religion by its textual tradition and founding figure. It was its interpretation as a non-national, universalistic religion, however, that eventually defined Buddhism’s status as a world religion ready to be communicated to the world.

Dharmapala did not only substantially contribute to this redefinition of Buddhism but became its most important spokesman and embodiment of its ideals. He therefore changed his name. While the name Dharmapala means “Protector of the Dhamma: Defender of the Faith”, the title Anagarika was an innovation meaning “homeless” in Pali. Dharmapala used the title to describe a new status “half way between monk and layman” making a “dramatic public commitment to devoting his life to Buddhism” “without renouncing worldly” pursuits—the traditional requirement for Buddhist clerics. Dharmapala withdrew from withdrawal and thus established an active monkhood mediating between European and Asian involvement with Buddhism, as well as between laymen and monkhood, tradition and reform.

His rise in a context of Western enthusiasm for the East as a superior civilization based on a clear-cut polarity between Eastern spirituality and Western materialism, and the inspiration from his theosophical ally Henry Steel Olcott, helped him to preach his this-worldly asceticism to an increasing lay community worldwide and thus to become “the most important figure in the modern history of Buddhism.”

**Buddhist Asianism in Bengal**

Calcutta, one of India’s most cosmopolitan port cities, was an especially lively centre for many religious reform movements in the 19th
century. It “became home and inspiration to some of the more definite expressions of pan-Asianism and an influential discourse of Asian civilisation”.

Famous Hindu reformists of the 19th century such as Swami Vivekananda (1863–1902), Keshub Chunder Sen (1838–84) and Bhudev Mukhopadhyay (1827–94) developed the Hindu-based idea that Asian civilization was historically the basis of superior spirituality and would redeem and supplement Euro-American materialism. They struggled for a reformed Hinduism ready to fulfill this task. When Dharmapala mingled with the intellectual elite of the Bengali bhadralok, he became acquainted with nationalist and cosmopolitan versions of Asianism through the Tagore and Hindu reformist circles. In the context of, and in competition with, Hindu religious revival movements such as the Brahmo Samaj and the Ramakrishna Mission, Dharmapala created an interest in the credentials of Buddhism as the philosophical inspiration for an Asian civilization.

Despite its historical roots in North India, Buddhism had practically vanished from Indian soil in the 19th century; and like the civilizations of Greece, Rome and Egypt (but unlike Hinduism), Buddhism was reconstructed by scholars such as Davids mainly from textual sources, which had extensive repercussions on the form and content of Buddhism. Thus, Dharmapala invoked the religion's former glory by emphasizing that “the best historians and the most impartial writers of India have admitted that at no time was India more in her glory than when the Buddhistic system was prevailing.” As early as 1892, Dharmapala's theosophical godfather, Henry Steel Olcott, further deduced that a “subsequent degradation of the Hindus is due chiefly” to the disappearance of “the merciful religion of Buddha” from India. Dharmapala's and Olcott's reference to India's presumed glorious past suggested that a flourishing civilization had been a direct outcome of Buddhist prevalence in the past. This appraisal certainly exaggerated the dissemination and intensity of Buddhism, which had always been but one of many creeds in multireligious India. Nevertheless, not only theosophs but other reformers as well drew on the widespread discourse on India's present-day degeneration, contrasted with a former “Golden Age” to arouse revivalist sentiments. Similar to the distinctly Bengali Hindu revival organization the Brahmo Samaj, which offered a rational interpretation of Hinduism, Dharmapala suggested that Buddhism was not only a
rational but a “scientific” religion. With their legendary openness and high literacy rate, the intellectual Bengali elite were considered by Dharmapala to be particularly equipped for pioneering a Buddhist revival in India since the “seed of Buddhism takes root only on the healthy soil of a freed intellect. Buddhism is for the thoughtful alone”, not only within Asia but in Europe and the United States as well.

The credibility of Buddhism as an intellectual endeavour was additionally furthered by Dharmapala’s reference to scholars such as Davids and the Japanologist Basil Hall Chamberlain (1850–1935); the interpreter of Buddhism to the West, Dharmapala’s and Olcott’s close friend Sir Edwin Arnold (1832–1904); and famed local academics such as the scholar Sarat Chandra Das (1849–1917). Buddhism was a relatively recent offspring of Indology, Sinology and classical philology supplemented by discoveries made through the concerted efforts of archaeologists who explored historical Buddhist sites. Through his intimate contact with scholars and his active support for this new academic discipline, Dharmapala helped to create a new academic tradition.

In May 1891 Dharmapala institutionalized these efforts by founding the Maha Bodhi Society as an independent body, with the comprehensive support of his theosophical allies. Olcott acted as its director and chief adviser, while Norendranath Sen, the president of the local theosophical branch, became Dharmapala’s closest co-worker at the organizational headquarters in Calcutta. Moreover, most of the early members of the Maha Bodhi Society were theosophists.

Following the ideology of a Golden Age present in Bengali revivalist as well as theosophical circles, Dharmapala presented the idea that Asia had been united and civilized under Buddhism during King Asoka’s reign (268–232 BC). His internal civilizing mission assumed a Buddhist revival in India in order to rescue the country. But even more, he said Asia should be united again under the banner of Buddhism in order to redeem the West in an external civilizing mission, which, from the “standpoint of Buddhist morality”, Dharmapala argued, was an “unmoral civilization without spiritual advancement”. Though not identified specifically with Buddhism but rather with Asia in general, this trope echoes Rabindranath Tagore’s and Swami Vivekananda’s claim that Asia should spiritualize the overly materialistic West.
A Global Platform for Asianism

The fact that Dharmapala and other Buddhist representatives from Asia such as Shaku Sōen (1860–1919) from Japan claimed global significance for Buddhism as an ethical and spiritual resource for an alternative civilization was in no small part due to its construction as a world religion around the turn of the century.

The refashioning of Buddhism as a world religion that resembled ordinary practised cults less than it did an abstract and rationalized body of teachings was publicly presented and produced for the first time at the 1893 World Parliament of Religions in Chicago. Dharmapala’s distribution of 20,000 copies of the Five Precepts of Buddhism—the condensed fundamentals of Buddhist morality—on his way to and from Chicago as well as at other locations, is illustrative of how the abstraction and distillation of doctrinal Buddhism allowed for global circulation and Buddhism’s construction in the category of world religions in the 19th century. Like no other single event, the 1893 World Parliament of Religions in Chicago is praised by scholars as having successfully promoted the idea of religious tolerance. It gained wide publicity and newspaper coverage since it accompanied the Chicago World Fair in the same year.

To Dharmapala the World Parliament provided the invaluable possibility of promulgating his interpretation of a Buddhist Asia on an internationally recognizable platform. It also gave him the opportunity to strengthen personal bonds with other Asian Buddhists such as the Japanese Buddhist monk Shaku Sōen, who had previously visited Ceylon in order to study Southern Buddhism, as Theravada Buddhism was popularly called. Dharmapala also managed to win over influential non-Asians such as Paul Carus (1852–1919) of The Open Court magazine and publishing house or the originally Swiss New York businessman C.T. Strauss (1852–1937), whom Dharmapala “baptized” in a public ceremony.

In his brief speech to the congress, Dharmapala claimed to represent “four hundred and seventy-five million of Buddhists” and a “system which has prevailed so many centuries in Asia, which had made Asia mild, and which is today, in its twenty-fourth century of existence, the prevailing religion of those countries.” As a self-appointed spokesperson for Buddhist Asia, Dharmapala claimed that the World Parliament of Religions “was simply the re-echo of a great
The consummation which the Indian Buddhists accomplished twenty-four centuries ago" in the Golden Age of Buddhism in India led by the mythical Buddhist king Asoka.\(^6\)

From 1837 onwards, the year when the English scholar James Prinsep (1799–1840) first deciphered his edicts and proclamations—the “cult of Asoka”\(^7\)—the legendary Buddhist king (304–232 BC) had become a highly popular integrative figure in 20th century India. Dharmapala emphasized that in the same way as Asoka was not just another Indian king, Buddhism was not just another religion but had formed an early predominantly Buddhist civilization in ancient India that could serve as an example for a valid alternative to Western civilization and Christianity at its core.\(^7\)

The message was clear: Not Europe but Asia was and would be at the heart of this civilization and the Buddha would become the “enlightened Messiah of the World”.\(^8\) The basis for Dharmapala’s claim about the global significance of Buddhism was not only its construction as a world religion and core of an alternative civilization, but also the creation of “Buddhist responses to the dominant problems and questions of modernity, such as epistemic uncertainty, religious pluralism, the threat of nihilism, conflicts between science and religion, war, and environmental destruction”.\(^9\)

In short, he presented Buddhism as the solution to the basic challenges of modernity.

One of the most important challenges to religious systems in modern times is their reconciliation with the latest scientific findings. Thus, Dharmapala portrayed Buddhism in full harmony with modern science, even as a kind of science. For example, in the paragraph *Evolution as Taught by Buddha*,\(^10\) he reclaimed the formulation of the law of cause and effect for ancient Buddhism and affirmed that the underlying “spirit of scientific inquiry” was the central approach of Buddhism as “a scientific religion, in as much as it earnestly enjoins that nothing whatever be accepted on faith”.\(^11\)

On the other hand, Dharmapala only expressed the conviction of many Victorians that “Christianity and science directly opposed one another”\(^12\) when he argued that “the dogmas of Christianity belong to an antiquated age” and were thus opposed to “modern science”.\(^13\) The crisis of belief made European civilization not only “unmoral” and “without spiritual advancement”\(^14\) but desperately in need of another source of spiritual inspiration. Following in the footsteps of Asoka’s supposedly non-military interventions, however, Dharmapala
avoided the aggressive rhetoric of the invidious Christian missionaries by claiming that he had not come to the “West” to convert Westerners to Buddhism, but to bring some knowledge of a religion “that for more than two thousand years, has quickened the peoples of Asia to higher achievements in ethics, industry and art”.79 Buddhism’s peaceful and tolerant external mission to Euro-America would thus surpass the civilizing mission of the British empire, which was ailing from the paradox of the liberal promise of moral and material uplift and the violence and oppression employed by the empire in order to enforce these values.80 In short, Dharmapala claimed, a Buddhist Asian civilization would both redeem and surpass the European civilizational model since its civilizing mission would be above all peaceful and it would spread a morally superior kind of civilization. Thus, not only the strategy but also the focal point of Dharmapala’s initiatives was intimately reconstructed in the image of “civilization” and the imperial civilizing mission.81 This intimate connection was reflected by Dharmapala’s rhetoric: calling Buddhism the “Law of Righteousness”82 or “ethics of Righteousness”,83 he envisioned an “Empire of Righteousness”.84

**Institutionalizing Buddhist Asianism**

Dharmapala’s most important tool in his attempts at integrating the different Asian peoples under the umbrella of Buddhism was the Maha Bodhi Society, with its purpose of restoring the assumed place of Buddha’s enlightenment at Bodh Gaya (North India) and trying to secure it for its “legitimate” owners85—the Buddhist sangha.86 As a “spiritual chain that will bind the Buddhist nations together” and “will make them members of one spiritual family”,87 the Maha Bodhi Society symbolized the Buddhist Asianist vision of Dharmapala.

Dharmapala intended to foster discursive activity and enlightenment on modern Buddhism through the circulation of publications within the region. He therefore attempted to “start an International Record and Intelligence under the name of Maha Bodhi Patrika which would serve as the vehicle of communication between the central society and its branches all over the Buddhist world”88 so that the Maha Bodhi Society “would become the centre of the mightiest Buddhist Propaganda”.89 As far as I could determine, this magazine was never published. But Dharmapala’s *Maha Bodhi Journal*, “the flagship
pan-Buddhist magazine organ across India, Burma, and Ceylon’, which he had established in 1892 in Calcutta—secured the dialogue among countries with large Buddhist populations. On each front cover the magazine printed first the Buddhist date, thus boldly advertising its non-Eurocentric perspective. Whenever Dharmapala was abroad, the publication was managed by Sarat Chandra Das, a pioneering scholar of Tibetan Buddhism, and Neel Comal Mookerji, a member of the large Tagore family. The *Maha Bodhi Journal* profited from a high literacy rate and knowledge of English among the rising middle class as well as an impressive circulation of English language journals in Calcutta.

Pilgrimage as a core technique of all major religious systems to develop a shared identity was Dharmapala’s other means of encouraging exchange and cooperation within the region. It had its historic predecessor in the inner-Asian pilgrimages of Buddhist monks. At the assumed place of Buddha’s enlightenment near Varanasi in North India, Bodh Gaya, Dharmapala revived, or rather constructed, a common place of worship. The politics around Bodh Gaya provide a striking example of how Dharmapala attempted to construct Buddhism against the backdrop of local particularities.

His long-lasting and eventually successful attempts to restore the place were inspired by the famous popularizer of Buddhism Sir Edwin Arnold (1832–1904) and his widely circulated book *The Light of Asia*, which portrayed Buddhism in the form of a hagiographic account of its founder’s life and as the unifying factor in the region. This focus on an idealized life of Buddha incorporated devotion towards this integrative figure but also lent an additional aura to Bodh Gaya as the birthplace of Buddhism. By focusing on the life of the Buddha alone (and Bodh Gaya as a historical site) and interpreting Buddhism as the heroic effort of a singular individual’s fight against the supposedly superstitious and outdated but predominant Brahmanic tradition in India, Dharmapala, like European scholars, contributed to the disembedding of Buddhism from its social, political and religious roots while making it transnationally available. Tomoko Masuzawa rightly asks, “What other act or attitude proved better than this, that Buddhism was a religion ‘born of a nation, but rising above it’?”

Consequently, when visiting Bodh Gaya in 1891 Dharmapala was furious that a Hindu religious authority was in charge of the
property and Hindu pilgrims worshipped the Buddha as an *avatāra* (incarnation) of the Hindu God Visnu. He decidedly refuted not only Buddhism’s roots in Hinduism but also the multireligious history of the place.

Like Arnold a couple of years earlier, Dharmapala was devastated by the condition of the site and its lack of shelter for Buddhist pilgrims and blamed it on the Hindus. It was only logical that Sir Edwin Arnold, alongside Dharmapala’s close Japanese ally Shaku Kōzen (1849–1924), a Shingon priest who knew Sanskrit, was one of the initial founders of the Maha Bodhi Society—exclusively established to restore Bodh Gaya. He envisioned Bodh Gaya as the “central head-quarters of four millions of Buddhists” and rhetorically asked: “If the Ministry of England from their Downing Street Foreign Office could govern nearly three hundred millions of people politically, why is it not possible for the Buddhists to have a central office at the spot so sacred to them?”

Dharmapala’s following campaign and fundraising with “co-religionists” from Japan, Burma, Siam, India and Ceylon was his first attempt to create a transnational Buddhist ecumene based on a common place of worship symbolizing the common belief by claiming “what Mecca is to Muhammedans, what Jerusalem is to the Christians and Jews that Buddha-gaya is to the Buddhists of the world”.

It was on this ground, however, that Dharmapala faced criticism from his American supporters at *The Open Court*, whose editor—Paul Carus—was the president of the American branch of the Maha Bodhi Society. The June 1896 article “The Buddha Gaya Case” saw the universalism, fluidity and individuality of Buddhist belief compromised by Dharmapala’s “endeavor to create a center of Buddhism in Buddha Gaya, that would be what Rome is to the Roman Catholics, Benares to Hindus, and Mecca to the Mahommedans”. Instead, it was stressed that “religion does not consist in keeping sacred certain days, or places, or relics, or in making pilgrimage to holy shrines”, because “civilized mankind has outgrown the idea that there is any religious merit in pilgrimages”. The latter argument, particularly the denouncing of pilgrimages as not being “civilized”, threatened the carefully constructed image of a civilized and civilizing Buddhism that was as rational as a natural science, and it jeopardized Dharmapala’s attempt to bring Buddhism closer to other world religions. This
is illustrative of the contradictory claim to rationality and universality on the one hand and Dharmapala’s attempts to invoke a regional tradition on the other. Despite Dharmapala’s former cosmopolitan politics and invocation of seemingly universal values, his promised tolerance was increasingly compromised as he constructed more rigid and exclusive Buddhist identities that were opposed to India’s multi-religious society. The aspired-for transnational Buddhist unity was constructed by inventing “an ancient ‘pure’ Buddhist past” stripped of its multiple religious and historical strands. Dharmapala was not alive to see his Maha Bodhi Society in 1949 successfully restoring and managing the historical site at Bodh Gaya (he died in 1933).

**Buddhist Asianism in Asia**

The facts of Buddhism being an assumed common religion in most Asian countries, the discursive construction of its founder as an integrative figure, and the promotion of a common place of worship could not hide the reality that different Asian countries followed very different Buddhist traditions and had very different national agendas. Against the differing varieties of Buddhism, Dharmapala stressed the universal character and adaptability of Buddhism by referring to the findings of the Scottish educational missionary J.N. Farquhar, according to whom Buddhism inculcated a “world-embracing code of ethics”. He claimed that:

…for a heterogenous people, there is no religion better than the divine teachings of the Tathagato. The humanitarianism of Buddhism appeals to the cultured intellect; its fundamental teachings are based on common-sense. Its adaptability is unique. Its teachings suit the nomadic tribes of Mongolia as well as the most advanced scientific men of Europe and America.

According to Dharmapala, the phenomenal “adaptability” of Buddhism not only integrated far-flung geographical areas but also appealed to educated and uneducated people alike. For example, when visiting Burma, Dharmapala explained that when Buddhism entered Burma it did not eradicate existing cults but integrated them.

The same rhetoric was applied to Japan. In 1908, for example, E.R. Gooneratne, member of the international Pali Text Society—
which was headed by Dharmapala’s ally, the Buddhologist Davids—quoted Lafcadio Hearn’s treatise *Japan: An Attempt at Interpretation* (1904), claiming that “the religion of the Buddha brought to Japan another and a wider humanising influence—a new gospel of tenderness together with a multitude of new beliefs that were able to accommodate themselves to the old, in spite of fundamental dissimilarity. In the highest meaning of the term, it was a civilising power.”

For Dharmapala, the successful integration of pre-Buddhist practices with an assumed Buddhist superstructure in the first wave of Buddhist expansion to Southeast Asia proved the ability of Buddhism to successfully master its reiterated transformation around the turn of the century. He claimed that “Buddha appeared as the Saviour not only of India, but of the world….Buddha alone opened wide the doors of immortality, and admitted the Aryans and non-Aryans alike.”

In short, Dharmapala considered Buddhism universally adaptable and “portrayed Buddhism as a religion perfectly suited to the challenges of the modern age, combating notions of Buddhism as nihilistic, pessimistic, passive, ritualistic, and superstitious and promoting it as activist, optimistic and scientific”. Dharmapala therefore claimed that “there is no other religion which offers at the same time a philosophy, religion and psychology as Buddhism”, and he concluded that “wherever Buddhism went it created a civilization”.

**A Quintessential Asia: Japan**

While Dharmapala had introduced Asoka’s ancient Buddhist reign as an exemplary Buddhist civilization and, starting from Calcutta, attempted to revive this Buddhist glory in India, the perfect, contemporary example of a successful Asian civilization, not only for Dharmapala but for many of his contemporaries, was Japan.

The Japanese victory in the Russo-Japanese War in 1905 significantly aroused Asianist sentiments among “anticolonial nationalists and intellectuals all over Asia”. Dharmapala’s most reliable collaborator in Calcutta, the theosophist Narendranath Sen, interpreted the impact of the Japanese war and the inspiration behind the first Asian power which was held by contemporaries to have defeated a European power:
The attention of the West was forcibly drawn to Buddhism when Japan gave a crushing blow to Russia. Buddhism is the foundation of Japan’s rise as a world power, and her national strength and her great vitality may be distinctly traced to that source.…Well, gentlemen, it is Buddhism, the early religion of Japanese, that has moulded the strong national character of the race. If we examine minutely the secret springs of Japan’s rapid rise, we will find that it is Buddhism on which the foundation of her early civilisation was laid.\(^{112}\)

Differing from the prevalent interpretation that attributed Japan’s rise to its successful adoption of Western concepts such as industrialism and nationalism, Sen interpreted Asian Buddhism as the source of its success. For Dharmapala as well, the success of Japan vis-à-vis a European power proved the civilizing effect of Buddhism on an Asian society. Although the interpretation of Japan as a successful example of an Asian civilization was widespread in Asianist circles,\(^{113}\) its attribution to Buddhism by Sen and Dharmapala was certainly an outsider perspective. However, this example shows how the Russo-Japanese War was charged with a symbolic meaning that did not reflect its actual outcome.

It was thus imperative for Dharmapala to develop close bonds with Japanese Buddhists and deepen the relationship between Japan and India. Here again, Dharmapala could rely on theosophical networks. In 1889, two years before the founding of the Maha Bodhi Society, he had accompanied Henry Steel Olcott on his first three-and-a-half-month lecture tour to Japan to revive Japanese Buddhism. In 1893, on his way back from the Parliament of Religions in Chicago, Dharmapala stopped in Japan for another short lecture tour. His third visit to Japan in 1903 en route to the United States was a very brief one, but in 1913 he made an extended visit to Japan, where he was under intensive surveillance by the Japanese government at the instruction of the British government—a good example of the fact that the Japanese government oriented itself towards its Western allies rather than openly cooperating with other Asian powers as Dharmapala hoped.\(^{114}\) Unfortunately, in Kobe Dharmapala missed out on meeting Ōtani Kōzui (1875–1948), the head of the Nishi Honganji sect,\(^{115}\) whom he had met on 10 January 1910 at the Japanese consulate in Calcutta to discuss future Buddhist propaganda and further strengthening bonds with Japan. On that occasion the
“News and Notes” section of the *Maha Bodhi Journal* in February 1910 noted that “Count Otani” had made “it very clear that the Japanese Buddhists have no idea of Indian Buddhism, and there is very little hope of the Japanese ever helping the Indian propaganda. The first thing to be done is to educate the Japanese Buddhists about India, for the majority of them believe that India is in heaven.”

Japanese surveillance reports show that during his extended visit to Japan in 1913 Dharmapala met with Japanese Buddhist scholars such as Takakusu Junjirō (1866–1945) and Nanjō Fumio (1848–1927), both of whom had studied with Max Müller; Buddhist clerics such as Shaku Sōen (1859–1919), a Rinzai priest he had met at the World Parliament of Religions; Shaku Közen, the co-founder of the Maha Bodhi Society; and Tachibana Shundō (1877–1955), who had studied Pali and Sanskrit in Ceylon for five years. Through his relationship with the popular Asianist thinker Ōkawa Shūmei (1886–1957), Dharmapala published various articles on colonialism in the latter’s journal *Michi* (Way) as well as a critique of “white supremacist” ideology that denied the equality of non-white races. In short, these articles devaluated the existing colonial world order and argued for the construction of an Asian alternative.

Dharmapala could rely on a well-established exchange of personnel and ideas between Ceylon and Japan initiated by Japanese Buddhist monks who had come to Ceylon and India often for years in order to study “pure” Buddhism at the source. Their early travels to Buddhist sites in India and Ceylon in the 1880s and 1890s “increased awareness of other forms of Asian Buddhism and marked the start of growing Buddhist cooperation within the region”. Moreover, the pioneering travels and intense interactions of these Japanese Buddhist clerics with their South Asian counterparts helped to reconfigure modern Japanese Buddhism. At the beginning of the 20th century the exchanges between Japanese and Ceylonese Buddhists played an important role in the creation of modern Buddhist thought.

Japan’s victory over Russia in the 1905 Russo-Japanese War promoted the image of Japan as some sort of wonderland in which people “never spent a minute in sleeping” and children were “all taught to take great care of physical culture, and to pay proper attention to manly exercises and body-building”. Therefore, Japanese were “all hardy and strong, and to a Japanese it was nothing to walk 40 miles a day”, reported Dharmapala in his house gazette. Following
the inner logic of his civilizing mission, and certainly with a good deal of wishful thinking, Dharmapala accredited what he perceived as Japan’s success to Buddhism, while in fact Japan proceeded on its expansionist and militaristic path based on an Emperor-centred ideology. In Dharmapala’s idealized perception, however, only Japan provided the perfect example of what Dharmapala perceived as the “civilizing influence” of Buddhism:

A thousand years with Buddhism, Japan has become one of the greatest world-powers. A thousand years with Brahmanism and without Buddhism, India is in the lowest condition of degeneracy. This sharp contrast between the “civilizational status” of India and Japan led Dharmapala to assume that hitherto “not from the Himalayan ashrams, but from the land of the Rising Sun should Buddhism disseminate into the world”. Although Dharmapala supported the recognition of Buddhism’s roots in India, he considered Japan—which demonstrated the successful synthesis of selected aspects of Western civilization and firm rootedness in Buddhist heritage—to be the modern centre of Buddhism.

Conclusion

Anagarika Dharmapala propagated Buddhism primarily because he believed it to be civilized and possessed of a civilizing potential. Similar to Asianists such as Okakura Tenshin or Rabindranath Tagore, Dharmapala promoted Asianism in opposition to the existing world order. Although Dharmapala’s vision of world order shared with these thinkers the same anti-colonial horizon and aspiration of surpassing the Eurocentric system, his assumption of a definite spiritual fundament of this alternative Asian civilization set him apart from their rather vague, philosophical visions. Moreover, contrary to Tagore’s Asianist ideas, Dharmapala did not oppose nationalism.

As a member of the Theosophical Society under the tutelage of its first president, Henry Steel Olcott, Dharmapala already promoted a reformed Buddhism as the spiritual basis for a new civilization. “Civilization” became the key concept with which Dharmapala emphasized the value of Buddhism, which had a twofold advantage over the existing world order: contrary to the colonial system, it would
not be based on violence; and, in opposition to Christianity, it was not opposed to the latest scientific findings.

For Dharmapala, like for other contemporary intellectuals, Japan was an example for the successful integration of selected elements of modern scientific and technological findings with a lively Buddhist heritage. Especially in India, Dharmapala contrasted the high civilizational status of Japan with the deplorable condition of the Indian civilization, which he attributed to the loss of Buddhism in the latter country. In order to contrast the present condition of India with a golden past and emphasize the potential of a Buddhist civilization, Dharmapala evoked the reign of the Buddhist King Asoka.

By adopting the “civilizing mission ideology”, the core legitimizing discourse of colonial states, Dharmapala aimed to compete with the Eurocentric political and cultural system and with orthodox Christianity on equal terms, or rather to surpass them through the combination of an “internal” civilizing mission targeting Asian Buddhists and an “external” civilizing mission catering to a Western audience. Dharmapala’s conception of an Asian civilization, although focused on the unification of Asia under the banner of Buddhism and the revival of Buddhism in its Indian “homeland”, was indeed meant to be universalizing. Duara argues that this universalizing tendency of civilization differentiates civilizational concepts from the other main “imagined community” that evolved in the 19th century, the nation, since “the gap between the territorial nation and civilization is not only territorial, but principled. Because the spiritual impulse of a civilization tends to be universalizing, national boundaries are ultimately artificial and limiting.”

The analysis of Dharmapala’s appearance at the 1893 World Parliament of Religions in Chicago as the president of the newly founded Maha Bodhi Society, his debates with cosmopolitan Bengali intellectuals, and his relentless fight for the creation of Bodh Gaya as the “Buddhist Jerusalem” demonstrate how Dharmapala aimed at integrating particular elements of Buddhist tradition with the superstructure of a Buddhist “world religion”, thereby universalizing the assumed set of core values of a Buddhism that was presented as individualistic, rational, tolerant and abstract. This interpretation was as much indebted to Olcott’s revivalist efforts, also described as “protestant Buddhism”, as it relied on a global network of Buddhist theosophists such as the French travel writer Alexandra David-Neel.
(1868–1969), the popularizer of Zen Buddhism in the United States D.T. Suzuki (1870–1966), and the rich heiress Mary Foster (1844–1930) of Honolulu. Foster was the main sponsor of Dharmapala’s philanthropic activities, which included support for orphanages, hospitals, temples and schools in India, Ceylon, Hawai‘i and Great Britain. “Religion of Righteousness” and “ethics of Righteousness” were euphemisms Dharmapala frequently used for Buddhism, or more precisely for its fundamentals: the four Noble Truths and the Noble Eightfold Path. Dharmapala’s engagement combined the rise of “Eastern spiritualities” as well as the consolidation of “world religions” as two major trends in the global religious field around 1900.

However, Dharmapala’s efforts at collaboration and fundraising within Asia were unsuccessful since, as he complained, “no Sinhalese Buddhist came forward to help me in my single-handed efforts. No Burmese, no Siamese, no Japanese, no Chinese, no Tibetan came forward to co-operate with me.” On the contrary, Dharmapala’s frustrated attempts at fundraising revealed the wide range of differing agendas in the region and his failure to centralize them. He complained that “Japanese Buddhists were suspicious”, the “Siamese said that charity begins at home”, and though the “Burmese Buddhists started well” and also the “late illustrious King of Siam was quite sympathetic with the aspirations of the Maha Bodhi Society” all of them eventually declined. National as well as other interests seem to have been more important to Asians than transnational endeavours such as Dharmapala’s dream of an Asian Buddhist federation. Although Dharmapala’s vision of an alternative Buddhist Asia was not fulfilled, he was preeminent in introducing “new Buddhism” to Euro-America and initiating a Buddhist revival in Asia that produced lasting, though often problematic, effects on the self-perception of Buddhists.

Notes

1. Parts of this article draw on my yet to be published dissertation “Globalizing ‘Sacred Knowledge’: South Asians and the Theosophical Society, 1879–1930”.


5. Ibid.


Self-critical Westerners criticized their own culture for being overly materialistic and rationalized. Many of them were organized in the above-mentioned Theosophical Society and through their numerous initiatives for cultural revival in the colonies, anti-colonial politics and general quest for alternative lifestyles contributed to the cultural atmosphere. See, for example, Gandhi, *Affective Communities*.


Bevir, “The West Turns Eastward”.


Pansil (Pali) is the acceptance of the five moral precepts of Hinayana Buddhism and tantamount to becoming a Buddhist.

27. Ibid., pp. 168–9.
30. Ibid., p. 100.
33. Ibid., p. 126.
37. Masuzawa, The Invention of World Religions, p. 137.
38. Gombrich, Theravada Buddhism, p. 188.
39. Ibid., p. 192.
40. Ibid., p. 188.
41. Mark Frost, “‘That Great Ocean of Idealism’: Calcutta, the Tagore Circle, and the Idea of Asia, 1900–1920”, in Indian Ocean Studies: Cultural, Social, and Political Perspectives, ed. Shanti Moorthy and Ashraf Jamal (New York, London: Routledge, 2010), p. 252. For an elaborate discussion of the three most important variations of Asianism in India arising from Calcutta, see the pioneering article by Stolte and Fischer-Tiné, “Imagining Asia in India”.
42. Frost, “‘That Great Ocean of Idealism’”, p. 254.
43. Bhadralok (Bengali for “gentleman”) was a term to designate the arising new class of intellectuals in Bengal. It is still used today to indicate members of the Bengali upper middle class.
44. Bharucha, Another Asia.
45. Founded in 1828 in Kolkata (Bengal), the Brahmo Samaj was one of the most influential Hindu Reform movements in the 19th century. For more details, see David Kopf, *The Brahmo Samaj and the Shaping of the Modern Indian Mind* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979).


52. Ibid., p. 357.


54. Sir Edwin Arnold was a British author and journalist whose narrative poem *The Light of Asia* (1879)—about Prince Siddharta’s enlightenment and transformation into the Buddha—was the first attempt to popularize Buddhism for a Western readership. The book inspired the foundation of Dharmapala’s Maha Bodhi Society as well as his interest in the Buddhist founder and his assumed place of enlightenment, Sarnath in northern India.

55. Sarat Chandra Das was an Indian scholar of Tibetan language and culture who travelled twice to Tibet and played host to the first Japanese traveller to Tibet, the Buddhist monk Ekai Kawaguchi (1866–1945).


59. Ibid., p. 399.

60. Stolte and Fischer-Tiné, “Imagining Asia in India”: 82.

61. Shaku Sōen was the first Zen Buddhist master to teach in the United States. In 1887 he visited Ceylon for three years to study Buddhist Pali texts and Theravada Buddhism.

63. For an in-depth discussion on the character of the reconstructed world religions, see Masuzawa, *The Invention of World Religions*.
69. Ibid.
72. Ibid., p. 5.
75. Ibid., p. 20.
78. Ibid., p. 399.
79. Ibid., p. 681.
83. Ibid., p. 578.
86. Sangha (Pali): the Buddhist community.
88. Ibid., pp. 827–8.
89. Ibid., pp. 824–5.
95. Ibid., p. 137.
96. Kinnard, “When Is the Buddha Not the Buddha?”.
99. Shingon Buddhism is one of the major schools of Japanese Buddhism. It is an Esoteric Buddhist school that originally spread from India via China to Japan.
101. Ibid., p. 615.
106. Arya is Sanskrit for “noble”. Dharmapala did not use the term only in its traditional sense but also in its racist sense. For more details, see Obeyesekere, “Buddhism and Conscience”: 238.
107. Dharmapala obviously wants to stress that Buddhism is open to everyone; Dharmapala, *Return to Righteousness*, p. 651.
110. “A Pan Buddhistic Congress”: 413.
115. The Nishi Honganji sect is one of the subdivisions that belong to the largest school of Jodo Shinshu Buddhism, a majority of whose members are Japanese.
122. Reprint from the *Indian Mirror*, “A Short Resume of Mr. Dharmapala’s Lecture in Calcutta”; 121.
125. Ibid., p. 653.
129. Ibid.
130. Prothero, “Henry Steel Olcott and ‘Protestant Buddhism’”.
138. Dharmapala is often considered responsible for the rise of Sinhalese chauvinism on the island. See, for example, Jakob Rösel, *Die Gestalt und Entstehung des Singhalesischen Nationalismus* [The Form and Emergence of Sinhalese Nationalism] (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1996), p. 279.
Chapter Three

Compass Points: Four Indian Cartographies of Asia, c. 1930–55

Carolien Stolte

Introduction

In this work there are no leaders and no followers. All countries of Asia have to meet together on an equal basis in a common task and endeavor…In this atomic age Asia will have to function effectively in the maintenance of peace. Indeed there can be no peace unless Asia plays her part.¹

In the decades surrounding Indian independence, two interlinked questions figured prominently in the Indian public sphere: how an independent India would situate itself in a decolonizing Asia, and how and by whom this new Asia was to be shaped. Many influential thinkers, not least Jawaharlal Nehru as quoted above, saw the mid-20th century as an opportune moment to reshape Asia and create a postcolonial, post-war world of greater justice and equality. “Asia” was considered as a natural building block of that new world order. But if this Asia could be accorded an identity and a mission, in this case as a harbinger of peace in a bellicose world, it left unanswered the question of who and what this Asia included as a continent. What cartography, or cartographies, accompanied such visions of Asia?

It is fast becoming a platitude that regions are discursive constructs and should be viewed as no more than blank canvases on which meaning can be projected when a particular agenda so requires.² A recent scholarly trend demonstrates an increased interest in the
versatile meanings that regions have acquired throughout history, particularly when it comes to laying claim to or contesting political, cultural and economic hegemonies. Asia as a region has arguably seen the most marked surge in studies of regionalist movements and moments. Much work remains to be done: if Asianism were stripped of its statist connotations, one would be left with actors and projects that no longer fit national or linguistic categories, which makes them both harder to track down in the archive and harder to study within the disciplinary divisions of academia. Some of these divisions have been bridged by the two volumes edited by Sven Saaler and Christopher Szpilman, which greatly facilitate access to multilingual primary sources on Asian regionalism from the mid-19th century to the present.

So far, however, this interest in Asianism has largely bypassed South Asia. South Asian historiography itself may have begun to break out of the constraints of the nation as the primary unit of analysis, but the study of Asianism as a concept is still largely focused on its East Asian manifestations. If Indian actors are represented at all in the historiography of Asianism, they figure as recipients of Asianist ideologies originating in places far removed from the subcontinent. They are (self-)exiled revolutionaries, intellectuals and academics, whose ideas are derivative of Asianist concepts circulating at various moments in the 19th and 20th centuries in the Ottoman empire or Japan. A notable exception to this rule is Rabindranath Tagore, whose Asianism might be said to constitute a field of study unto itself. But even in the case of Tagore, his links with Japan, however important, are often emphasized to the point of erasing his many other Asianist engagements.

The pull of the Khilafat movement, the impact of the Russo-Japanese War and the charisma of modernized Japan have been well documented. But while each of these factors has been influential in shaping the Asianist projects of various individuals and groups in South Asia, this chapter argues that this narrative of “derivative Asianism” for South Asia is reductive in two ways. First, it leaves no room for Asianist visions that originated in the subcontinent itself and were driven by locally shaped agendas. Second, it leaves no room for Asianisms—the use of the plural is deliberate—that employed a geographical imaginary of Asia that was not focused either on East Asia or on a Muslim world that was conflated with Asia. In fact, Asia
as a geographical entity could become many things especially when viewed from India. The compass could point in any direction, towards the Arabian Sea, the Indian Ocean or the caravan routes into Central Asia.

This chapter is a preliminary attempt to stretch our understanding of Indian Asianism by looking at four cartographies of Asia that co-existed in the turbulent decades surrounding independence but were informed by very different ideas of what Asia constituted. Here, the image of Asia as a blank canvas onto which various regionalist visions could be projected is particularly apt. Each of the four cartographies described here had a longer history rooted in much older conceptions of Asia originating in trade, pilgrimage and warfare on South Asia’s frontiers. As consciously articulated ideologies, too, Asianist projects and visions had earlier incarnations dating back to World War I and even earlier. Nevertheless, the time frame set here is deliberate. In the years before and immediately after independence, viewed in the context of an expanding League of Nations membership, the emergence of Soviet republics in Central Asia, and later a rapidly decolonizing Asia, the question of what Asia encompassed and how its constituent parts should relate to each other became particularly acute. As Stephan Hay reminds us, “each Asian Orientophile has entertained a somewhat different notion…his image of the East consisting usually of an expanded version of those particular traditions he most wished to revitalize”.

This paper seeks to contribute a directional view from India. First, the Province of Pan-Asia as envisioned by the revolutionary exile Mahendra Pratap will be examined; this included a mythic Turan in the heart of the continent among its five “districts”. Second, Rameshwari Nehru looked farther north in defining an Asia working for peace and nuclear disarmament, which explicitly included the Soviet Union—including Moscow—as a crucial Asian country. Third, the third Aga Khan emphasized India’s ties with West Asia based on an imagined cartography that he could propagate publicly as India’s chief delegate to the League of Nations. Finally, Hindu Mahasabha President Veer Savarkar looked east in claiming Asia as a Hindu-Buddhist space, the cartography of which reinforced the Mahasabha’s views of India’s own Hindu identity.

Although departing from widely varying ideological and political standpoints, the four Asianists considered below had several things in
common. Born within a decade of one another, they all witnessed the first surges of anti-imperialism in India in their formative years. They all became ardent internationalists during the proliferation of transnational movements in the opening decades of the 20th century. They were able to do so because they were all recipients of a privileged education and comfortable in multiple linguistic environments. At home in the world, all four sustained their internationalism well beyond India’s independence in 1947. A cohesive and vibrant Asia remained central to their thought, and some of their fellow travellers easily moved from the orbit of one into the other and back. Put together in one room, however, they would have vehemently disagreed as to what shape their Asia was to take. As a set, therefore, these four cases represent the vibrancy and diversity of Asianism in this period: representing the cardinal points on the compass, they showcase the different ways in which Asia could be viewed from India.

The Asian Heartland: Mahendra Pratap’s Turan in the Province of Pan-Asia

Mahendra Pratap (1886–1979), born in the minor Indian princely state of Hathras, embarked on his first trip around the world at the age of 21. As a self-styled revolutionary exile, he devoted his life to achieving the unification of Asia. To Pratap’s mind, Asian unification was a crucial prerequisite for his ultimate goal of World Federation. The Province of Pan-Asia was to become one of five provinces that would form the government of a federated world.

Pratap’s pan-Asianist thought, however quixotic, has been largely forgotten today. So too has his periodical World Federation, proscribed but smuggled into British India, in which he reported his activities and explained his plans for Asia and the world. If Pratap figures in the historiography of anti-imperialism in Asia at all, it is in the context of one of two things: his participation in the Niedermayer-Von Hentig expedition during World War I, or as one of the Indian pro-Japanese revolutionaries of the interwar years. The former focuses on his meeting with the Ottoman sultan and his subsequent attempt to harness Muslim sentiment to instigate rebellion against the British in Asia, leading him to proclaim the Provisional Government of Free India in Exile in Kabul with himself as titular head of state. The latter generally emphasizes his engagements with Rashbehari Bose,
a revolutionary exile in Japan, and Bose’s participation in various Japanese pan-Asianist societies whose activities resulted in, among other things, the pan-Asiatic conferences of Shanghai and Nagasaki in 1926 and 1927.

But Pratap’s own project for Asian unification was important in two ways. First, he was one of very few political activists who preferred the land routes across Asia to sea travel. Putting his vision of a united Asian landmass into practice, he made use of caravan routes, railways and donkey trails to traverse Tibet, Mongolia, Xinjiang, the Gobi Desert, Turkestan, Siberia, and many other more and less hospitable Asian landscapes. Second, this made him and his comrades vital connectors between centres of Asianist activism as far apart as Moscow, Kabul, Tashkent, Shanghai and Tokyo.

In view of Pratap’s choice of routes, it is no coincidence that Central Asia figured prominently in his political thought. Aside from his unique hand-drawn political map of the region, which will be treated below, his focus on Central Asia is noteworthy in itself. Over the course of the 20th century, the spatial form of Central Asia shifted several times. The political upheavals in the region during the opening decades of the 20th century created multiple political divisions. The erasure of Tartary from global geography during the time of the Soviet Union has been termed a form of “cartographical dismemberment”, while after World War II it disappeared almost entirely from the geographical imagination. Finally, it fell into the disciplinary cracks of Area Studies in the 1950s. However, as Central Asia was receding from view in Western cartographies of Asia, it re-emerged in others. One of its incarnations was as Turan.

Although consistently referring to (parts of) Central Asia, the term “Turan” has multiple connotations. In post-Avestan traditions, it referred to the area north of the Oxus River. From the 7th century, it became identified with those areas of Central Asia inhabited by Turkic tribes. In Safavid Persia, Turan was conflated with Uzbek. In a more general sense, “Turan” was often used to contrast the nomadic areas of Central Asia to the urban or sedentary cultures of, for instance, Persia. To yet others, the term invoked conquerors and empire builders. This ascription of particular characteristics to the otherwise vague cartography of Turan took unexpected forms in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Notable proponents include Sultan Galiev, the “Red Tartar” who briefly dabbled in a socialist pan-Turan on
behalf of the Bolsheviks, but also Puccini, who composed Turandot (Daughter of Turan) in 1926. In the latter days of the Ottoman empire, Turanism became a political ideology that offered an alternative to pan-Islamism: a movement towards closer association with, or even outright expansion to, the Central Asiatic plateau as the semi-legendary home of the Turkic peoples. It extolled a Turkic ethnicism as opposed to the theocratic interracialism of the community of Islam. In this understanding, Turan included the Crimean Tatars, Turkmens, Kurds, Kazakh and Kyrgyz, but could really encompass any people from the Black Sea to Vladivostok. Pan-Turanists from outside the Ottoman empire, such as the Hungarian orientalist Ármin Vambéry, even accused the Ottomans of having become “de-Turkified”, their Mongoloid characteristics lost beneath a cultured urban veneer.

How did Pratap, an Indian anti-imperialist, come to incorporate Turan in his conception of Asia’s future? The term “Turan” itself had long been in use in India, with “Turani” referring to invaders on horseback but also to the feared and valued military leaders from across the Himalayas during the Mughal period. However, it is more likely that Pratap’s incorporation of Turan in his cartography of Asia was strategic. Always in search of allies, he was in touch with Turkish War Minister Enver Pasha, the most famous proponent of pan-Turanism, before embarking on the above-mentioned expedition to Afghanistan. And at least one expedition member, Kasim Bey, discussed pan-Turanism with King Habibullah. In a similar vein, Pratap had high hopes for the Soviet Union’s pan-Turanian sentiments. Although abandoned by the Bolsheviks in the mid-1920s, a group of Russian intellectual exiles still advocated Eurasianism by emphasizing the commonalities offered by the Turanian myth; others saw a natural alliance with Russia’s “Asiatic sisters” against the Romano-Germanic colonizers. The latter idea would have been particularly appealing to Pratap as a pan-Asianist and anti-imperialist. It is no coincidence that Pratap’s Turan was actually an acronym: Turkey, Ukraine, Russia, Siberia, Turkestan (Figure 1).

The map below, published in World Federation in mid-1935, reveals some of Pratap’s plans for Asia. First of all, the Province of Pan Asia was also known as “Buddha” (he dubbed Europe and Africa “Christ” and “Mohemmod” respectively), a religion that parts of Central and East Asia had in common. In Pratap’s cartography of Asia, Turan did indeed bridge both, “from Turkey to Kamchatka”.
His choice of Srinagar as the intended capital of the Province of Pan-Asia, too, seems to have been inspired by its proximity to Pratap’s treasured Central Asian caravan routes. The capital of Turan was to be Tashkent. Pan Asia was further to be divided into four districts: Turan (Central Asia), Aryan (South Asia), Golden Aryan (Southeast Asia) and Golden Land (East Asia), of which Turan was the largest by far. Interestingly, the Middle East had no place in Pan Asia: it was attached to Mohemmod/Africa as the district “Arab”. However, this seems to have been a consequence of Pratap’s focus on Central Asia as the basis of his cartography rather than indicative of a conscious exclusion of Islam as an Asian religion. In fact, Pratap would later be
at loggerheads with the Hindu Mahasabha over this issue, maintaining that Islam was as “Aryan” as Hinduism and Sikhism.\textsuperscript{28}

Although Pratap lived in Japan for most of the 1930s, Central Asia continued to dominate his geo-imaginary of the continent. After the Pan-Asiatic Conferences of Nagasaki and Shanghai, Pratap proposed holding the third conference in Kabul. When this conference failed to materialize in the late 1920s, he revisited the plan in 1937 and proposed hopefully:

So far the Japanese Government has not taken any official steps to organize Asia. Here is an opportunity for the government of Afghanistan to take a lead in the matter. Afghanistan can invite Asiatic governments to send their representatives to the next Afghanistan national festival. On that occasion we can have the first Asiatic Official Conference...accepting the principle of a World State.\textsuperscript{29}

This conference did not materialize either. The Asian Army, arguably Pratap’s most controversial plan, would eventually come to life as the Indian National Army, but certainly not in the way Pratap had envisioned it.\textsuperscript{30} Pratap had desired an Asian Army headquartered in Inner Mongolia, led not by the Japanese but by a pan-Asian directorate of warriors: “one Manchu, one Mongol, one Tibetan and three Chinese.”\textsuperscript{31}

Pratap thus formulated a unique cartography of Asia in which Turan figured not only as the geographical heart of the continent, but also as its future core: with Srinagar as the capital of Pan Asia and Tashkent as the capital of Turan, and with an army operating from Inner Mongolia led, in his words, by generals drawn from Central Asian martial races, Pratap quite literally re-centred pan-Asianism.

\textbf{Looking North: Rameshwari Nehru and the Delhi Inter-Asian Conference of 1955}

Pratap’s contemporary Rameshwari Nehru (1886–1966) was similarly fascinated by the landmass north of the Himalayas but gave expression to her cartography of Asia in a completely different way. Having spent much of her early career as a social reformer and women’s rights activist, she became active in the All India Women’s Conference (AIWC) during the interwar years.\textsuperscript{32} This was also the locus where her Asian engagements took shape. The AIWC had convened an All
Asia Women’s Conference in Lahore in January 1931, which brought together delegates from Palestine, Syria, Iraq, Persia, Afghanistan, Nepal, Ceylon, Burma and Japan. Rameshwari Nehru had attended this conference and became one of the founders of a Permanent Committee, which hoped to convene more Asian Women’s Conferences in the future. In 1932, this led to a collaboration with the Oriental Women’s Conference at Tehran. In 1934, the committee grew into a large but short-lived “All Asia Committee” with 50 members from across India. The All Asia Women’s Conference received official representation through a permanent delegate to the International Alliance of Women for Suffrage and Equal Citizenship in Geneva. And when this alliance held its 12th congress in Istanbul in 1935, the Asian Committee sent a vocal delegation whose presence did not escape the attending press. But a second All Asia Women’s Conference failed to materialize, and Rameshwari Nehru’s colleagues in the AIWC voted against a merger with the Oriental Women’s Conference “on the grounds of maintaining their identity”. This had more to do with their mental geography of Asia than with the group itself, which, much like themselves, propagated a reformist route to gender equality and was connected to the same international platforms. However, “Oriental” in this group was taken to mean largely Middle Eastern and Persian, which many of the members of the Asian Committee failed to identify with their own Asianist vision, which was more inclusive. Given these difficulties, the Sino-Japanese War dealt the final blow in 1937, and Rameshwari Nehru and her colleagues in the All Asia Committee felt that it served “no useful purpose by merely keeping up an association which exists more on paper than in reality”. The committee was disbanded and would remain so until it was revived in the wake of Rameshwari Nehru’s Asianist activities in the 1950s.

Rameshwari Nehru, meanwhile, directed her attention away from the faltering All Asia Women’s Conference and towards other Asianist initiatives. Initially, during the 1940s and especially in the years immediately after independence, she became a vocal advocate of inter-Asian governmental cooperation. She was a consultant for several of the newly established Indian ministries, including the Ministry of Home Affairs. When the latter decided against international cooperation in combating the trafficking of women, she replied that “there is
an international traffic in oriental women and girls in the near, middle and far east…and that the bulk of this traffic is traffic in Asiatic women from one country in Asia to another.”. To her mind, “closer collaboration between the Inter-Asian authorities” was crucial. However, in the 1950s her Asianist activities shifted from governmental work to civil society organizations working for peace and disarmament, notably the All-India Peace Council. The resulting voyages and conferences were constitutive of the Asian vision she propagated in her later life.

With Rameshwari Nehru as its president, the All-India Peace Council was the driving force behind the Conference of Asian Countries, held in New Delhi on 6–10 April 1955. Its story has been drowned out by the thunder of the Bandung Conference, which opened 11 days later and in which the other Nehru—Jawaharlal was a first cousin of Rameshwari’s husband, Brijlal—played an important role. But whereas Bandung was an intergovernmental meeting, the 1955 Delhi conference followed directly in the footsteps of the 1947 Asian Relations Conference by gathering nongovernmental representatives for an international discussion on the future of Asia, which was to be built on a shared sense of continental solidarity. It also copied the 1947 conference by structuring its proceedings in discussion groups on diplomatic, cultural and social issues, including women’s rights. But most importantly, the 1947 conference was reflected in the list of invitations that was issued. The 1947 Asian Relations Conference has gone down in history as the only Asian conference ever to invite the republics of the Soviet Union, the Middle East and Eastern Asia all at the same time. But the 1955 conference did so, too. And, as Jawaharlal Nehru had said in his inaugural address of the 1947 conference, India was uniquely situated to bring Asia together; and Rameshwari Nehru and her colleagues felt the same way. As Chakravarti Rajagopalachari, a prominent politician and peace activist, wrote to Rameshwari Nehru:

…this continent is split into three parts: the Islamic mid-west area, east- and southeast Asia, and India…India’s heart is with the east- and southeastern people, but history has forged a very strong bond with the mid-west. So she feels she is part of either of these—maybe she is thus in an advantageous position, commanding a perspective which the others do not enjoy.
In this way, the conference situated India as the centre from which Asia extended in all directions.

Though the conference invited writers, peace activists, scientists and social workers, its final delegation list showed a considerable imbalance towards red Asia. This was no surprise, considering the underlying network of the All-India Peace Council, which was a chapter of the resolutely leftist World Peace Council. Among the attendees were delegations from, among others, Soviet Russia, Communist China, North Korea and North Vietnam. The Soviet delegation sent representatives hailing from Russia, but also from Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan. The other delegations included Japan, Nepal, Burma, Laos, Ceylon, Egypt, Pakistan, Lebanon, Syria, Transjordan and Mongolia. Interestingly, Indonesia sent a full delegation as well, although the Delhi conference had not been appreciated at all by Sukarno, who felt it might upstage Bandung. He had complained to Jawaharlal Nehru, who subsequently in a protracted correspondence with Rameshwari Nehru could not prevent the conference from being held but dissociated himself from it explicitly. Jawaharlal’s Asia, which had once been no less inclusive than Rameshwari’s, had now become subject to other diplomatic considerations.

Regarding the list of delegations, Nehru was not the conference’s only critic. Some felt that Soviet attendance defeated the very purpose of promoting Asian solidarity:

More! It embraces Russia as an Asian nation. And, what is far worse still, it refuses to take due note of Russian imperialism in Siberia, and in North Korea and Chinese mainland and certain other countries of Asia... It will force [the nations of Asia] eventually nearer and nearer the heels of Communist Russia in the false pretext of reducing world tension, or of building peace and solidarity in Asia.

But despite the critics, few conferences were ever better attended. As most of the meetings were held outdoors, an estimated 2,000 people had gathered to cheer the 188 delegates as they arrived at the conference opening. A dais was erected for the delegates, with a specially made map of Asia showing all the countries represented with their flags. Nationalist dailies such as the moderately left-leaning Bombay Chronicle carried reports of each congress day on their front page, which may have contributed to the fact that by the closing ceremony, crowds had swollen to 25,000 people.
The atmosphere was perhaps best reflected in the gathering of writers at the conference. Several Indian associations, such as the Romain Rolland Club and the Tagore Society, hosted receptions, at which the Indian MP Manarasidas Chaturvedi emphasized strongly that the conference was not a communist-inspired stage-piece. In accordance with the spirit of the conference, the Japanese poetess Setsuko Tammo Kiyoko Nagase, Chinese author Pa Chin, Vietnamese poetess Tran Khanh Van and Central Asian Soviet author Mirza Khurshunzade gave a joint statement that “all the Asian countries had had common cultural bonds for centuries. They had also the common object of establishing lasting peace and building up their respective countries for prosperity and happiness of the people.”

The resolutions at which the conference finally arrived, however, indicated tension rather than unity. The geographical spread of countries covered in the list of resolutions did reflect the inclusive Asian cartography on which the conference was founded. But the Arab delegation’s motion that Israel be considered “an implement of imperialism” did not carry. The Israeli delegation, already angry because they had been demoted to “observers” rather than “delegates”—ostensibly due to an administrative error—protested vehemently. In the end, Rameshwari Nehru explained to the Israeli delegation that

…instead of blaming all the Israelites as being aggressors, we persuaded the Arab delegates to limit their remarks to a certain section of the people termed as the “ruling class”. The Arab delegates did not appreciate it…but agreed to it to avoid the break-up of the Conference. Our acceptance of this resolution was also due to the same reasons.

In the end, the conference could only arrive at a condemnation of colonialism and imperialism and call for a “normalization of diplomatic relations between all countries of Asia”. Among the other resolutions were a demand for admission of the People’s Republic of China to the United Nations; the restoration of relations severed during the war; and full equality for Japan in the comity of nations.

The Delhi conference, by far the largest undertaking in Rameshwari Nehru’s long career as an internationalist and social reformer, adopted the most inclusive geo-imaginary of Asia among the cartographies considered here. Over the years, it would expand to encompass parts of decolonized Africa and shift its administrative base to
Cairo. It also sparked a series of successful spin-off conferences, such as the Afro-Asian Women’s Conference and the Afro-Asian Writers Conference, which continued to include the Soviet Union and its Central Asian republics. Eventually—in Rameshwari Nehru’s own terms—this Asian people’s alternative to the Asian governments’ Bandung, which had grown out of Rameshwari Nehru’s personal network of internationalist peace and women’s rights activists, grew into a full-fledged People’s Solidarity Movement for decolonization and against (neo-)imperialism, in which she continued to play a leading role throughout the 1950s. Rameshwari Nehru stepped down in 1962 at 76 years of age.

Looking West: West Asia in the Imagination of Aga Khan III

A very different cartography of the continent was put forward by Sultan Muhammad Shah, Aga Khan III, the 48th imam of the Shi’a Ismaili Muslims (1877–1956). He offered a very concrete geographical definition of Asia as “extending from Aden to Mesopotamia and from the two shores of the Gulf to India proper, from India proper across Burma, including the Malay Peninsula, and thence from Ceylon to the States of Bokhara, and from Tibet to Singapore.” The political scientist Werner Lévi has argued that this statement by the Aga Khan, made in 1918, was the first expression of India as a “pivot” in the region and “has remained fashionable ever since”. The Aga Khan’s cartography of Asia was informed by two underlying notions of the shared historical connections that to him defined Asia: those offered by the caravan routes through the Central Asian landmass, not dissimilar to the “Asian heartland” concept put forward by Pratap; and the common Asian heritage of Islam. For instance, he had always considered Turkey to be an Asian country, and he had warned as early as 1913 that “Turkey must in the future be an Asiatic Power; she must concentrate on Asia.” To a certain extent, the Aga Khan’s own family reflected the relations between these two ideas: his grandfather had been forced to leave Persia, taking refuge in Bombay, in which city the Aga Khan, though born in Karachi, spent most of his youth. But his family still retained a large following in Central Asia. So much so that when Mahendra Pratap passed through the Oxus
Valley in Badakhshan, the border region between Afghanistan and Tajikistan, he encountered many of the Aga Khan’s followers in remote places such as Wakhan, Ishkashim and Shighnan. He found this peculiar enough to mention in his diary.\(^\text{61}\)

In this regard, it should be mentioned that the Aga Khan did not fit well into a pan-Islamic mould. As noted above, much has been written on the Khilafat movement of the early 1920s and its connections to anti-imperialist movements in Asia generally and in India particularly. However, this form of pan-Islamism in India cannot be equated with Asianism.\(^\text{62}\) It offered a vision of a strong \textit{umma}, the community of the faithful, whose territory incidentally overlapped with large areas of Asia; but Asianism was not its driving feature. The Aga Khan’s conception of Asia, by contrast, was informed by his Muslim identity and his interests as the imam of the Ismailis, but it was not Islam-centric; while he frequently appealed to Muslim sentiments, he considered himself very much part of a diverse Asia with multiple religious and cultural identities. In that sense, his invocation of Islam and his inscription of it onto the history of all of Asia is more reminiscent of the multifarious networks across Asia that made up the “Arabic Cosmopolis” as described by Ronit Ricci, than of the blueprint offered by “untranslated” Arabian Islam.\(^\text{63}\)

In the 1930s, the Aga Khan received a new platform for his ideas through the international institutions in Geneva in which he was involved. As India’s chief delegate to the League of Nations between 1932 and 1938, he was also active in the Red Crescent Society and the Geneva Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments. At these organizations he chose to put forward his views from an Asianist perspective. The Aga Khan saw no contradiction between his multiple identities as a Muslim, an Indian and an Asian. Instead, he saw them as complementary, so much so that he advocated the political union of West and Central Asia into a federation.\(^\text{64}\) But unlike Pratap, who had abandoned his India-centric views when he went into exile, the Aga Khan did view every Asian connection through an Indian lens. For instance, when Turkey entered the League of Nations in 1932, he stated:

the history of India has been linked for countless centuries with that of Turkey, sometimes in the clash of rivalry, but more often with ties of culture and friendship…India thus gives Turkey a triple
welcome to the League: as age-long neighbours and cooperators in culture and civilization; as recent opponents; and now we can say, with confidence, as life-long friends.\(^\text{65}\)

When Iraq entered into the League, he emphasized the “long and intimate spiritual, cultural and economic relations between India and the lands that today form the Kingdom of Iraq”.\(^\text{66}\)

Central Asia was incorporated into his Asian geo-imaginary through a similar emphasis. He noted “a big Muslim square from Samarkand to Sind and from Egypt to Constantinople”,\(^\text{67}\) and he invoked the same image in incorporating China into this geography by saying, “China is our good neighbor…and with her province of Turkestan we have had, since time immemorial, friendly cultural and economic relations”.\(^\text{68}\) This inclusion of China on the basis of its western provinces is rare. In this period, Indo-Chinese connections were affirmed by many, but primarily on the basis of shared suffering under the imperialist yoke (by invoking the treaty ports) or on the basis of a shared Buddhist heritage (see Maria Moritz’ chapter and below).\(^\text{69}\) Insofar as the overland caravan routes were invoked, this was only to demonstrate that they had been travelled by Buddhist monks during the spread of Buddhism.

However, it would go too far to say that Eastern Asia played no role in the Aga Khan’s geo-imaginary. When the Sino-Japanese dispute was brought before the League, the Aga Khan volunteered to mediate:

I felt that it was my duty as India’s representative—*as an Asiatic*—to do all I could in bringing about a direct understanding by conversations between China and Japan…while such a departure by an Indian representative, at a time when India was still without self-government, might seem unusual…the value of an Asiatic intermediary in a solely Asiatic dispute might be considerable.\(^\text{70}\)

But his truly Asianist exultations were directed at West and Central Asia. When Afghanistan was admitted into the League, he proclaimed that “no representative of India, no Muslim, no Asiatic could play his part on this historic occasion unmoved”.\(^\text{71}\) He synthesized India’s religious and cultural variety into a single sphere of “Asian-ness” and directed this amalgam towards a shared commonality with, in this case, Afghanistan:
For India, however much she may seek from the West her political institutions, remains a true daughter of the East, proud of her Eastern blood, her Eastern languages, her Eastern cultures. These she shares with Afghanistan, and seventy millions of her people share, as I share, with Afghanistan in the glorious brotherhood of Islam.\textsuperscript{72}

The Aga Khan consciously played up his multiple identities as a South Asian, a Muslim, an internationalist and the religious leader of a sect scattered throughout Asia, in order to speak in a pan-Asian idiom. He invoked Asia's historical interregional connections to map an Asia that was held together by the roads of trade and religion. He continued to look at Asia from an Indian perspective, and in doing so looked largely to West Asia, with which region he had more affinity. The inclusion of West Asia made the Aga Khan a minority among Indian Asianists, but he was certainly not alone. In keeping with Nehru's aim of maintaining close relations with the Middle East, the Asian Relations Conference would invite the entire Arab world, as would Rameshwari Nehru’s 1955 Conference. Nevertheless, the Muslim East was resolutely excised from the Asian map by others.

**Looking East: Veer Savarkar’s Religious Cartography of Asia**

To Vinayak Damodar Savarkar (1883–1966; more commonly known as Veer Savarkar), who remains a controversial figure to this day, the Muslim East did indeed fall outside of what he considered as Asia.\textsuperscript{73} His focus lay entirely on East and Southeast Asia, with India as the westernmost point on the Asian map. The resulting geo-imaginary reflected what he considered as the unifying identity marker of Asia: the Hindu-Buddhist religion. Islam, and with it most of Central and Western Asia, had no place in his cartography of the continent. Where the Aga Khan had approached China through Turkestan, this was precisely the part of China that Savarkar abhorred. Rather than as the heart of the continent, he depicted Central Asia as an existential (and external) threat:

China was once ruled by the Tartars, and when the Tartars embraced Islam, these Moslems made China their home... But the great Buddhist Empire which rose on the ashes of the Tartars showed the Moslems their right place and they were more or less thoroughly
reduced to unquestioning subjection. But with the fall of the Chinese Empire, the Japanese conquest and the simultaneous rise and spread of the Pan-Islamic movement… Chinese Muslims refused to merge themselves with the Chinese, but maintained that they should keep up their separate entity.\(^74\)

Given these diametrically opposed ideas, there was little love lost between Savarkar and the Aga Khan. The mutual dislike actually dated back to a discussion on Madan Lal Dhingra’s assassination of William Hutt Curzon Wyllie in 1909. The moderately loyalist Aga Khan had argued that the attack should be condemned. This incensed Savarkar, a revolutionary nationalist, so much that a physical fight ensued. And as the communal issue intensified, so did their enmity. A further \textit{casus belli} was the issue of \textit{Shamsi} Ismailis, known to Savarkar as the gupti (secretive) Ismailis in Punjab, a community that wore “Hindu” dress but had followed the Aga Khan since the second decade of the 20th century. The presence of a Muslim community with the outward appearance of Hindus intensified Savarkar’s view that his religion was under threat, and he vowed to “save the Hindu Society from the dangerous practices of these gupti followers of the Aga Khan”.\(^75\) In the 1930s, as both directed their attention to the future of Asia, their differences literally took on continental proportions. In order to claim Asia as a Hindu-Buddhist continent, it was first necessary to establish that Hinduism and Buddhism were one. This was a task well suited to the aims of the Hindu Mahasabha, in which Savarkar had risen to prominence after his release from jail in 1924.\(^76\) The Hindu Mahasabha Working Committee passed a resolution stating that in the beginning, Buddhism “was only a reformation movement among the Hindus. Hence Buddhists are as much Hindus as Protestants are Christians.”\(^77\) This resolution directly echoed Savarkar’s own ideas on the issue. His definition of Hindu-Buddhist unity dated back to 1923, later published in his 1928 \textit{Hindutva: Who Is a Hindu?} Of the Buddha, he said: “Thou art ours as truly as Shri Ram or Shri Krishna or Shri Mahavir… when the law of Righteousness rules triumphant on this human plane, then thou will find the land that cradled thee, and the people that nursed thee, will have contributed most to bring about that consummation…”\(^78\) When Savarkar became president of the Hindu Mahasabha in 1937 (incidentally the same year that the Aga Khan was elected president of the
Muslim League), Hindu-Buddhist Asia became an often-heard trope in Mahasabha circles, and one on which the organization took action through active networking with Buddhist organizations across Asia.

Savarkar’s cartography of Asia was influenced strongly by Greater India thought, which held that ancient India had played an active role in the cultural and religious development of Southeast Asia. The thesis that India had not only had a highly developed civilization that predated most of Europe, but was also a hegemon and an expansive force in Asia, was propagated primarily by the Greater India Society in Calcutta, established in 1926, and through publications by its members, notably Kalidas Nag, P.C. Bagchi and R.C. Majumdar. It was a small step to assert next that India had “civilized” Asia through the spread of Hinduism and Buddhism. As the Greater India idea was translated from academic publications into the popular press, this was the shape in which it became popular in the Hindu Mahasabha. In view of this, it is perhaps peculiar that the Mahasabha did not view India as the natural leader of Hindu-Buddhist Asia. Instead, it looked towards Nepal as the only independent Hindu country in the world. All through the 1930s, the Mahasabha kept up a frequent, if one-sided, correspondence with the Nepali court, urging them to rise to the occasion and show Asia the way, “now that the awakening of the Pan-Hindu consciousness is making us Hindus in Nepal and outside, realizing the oneness of our life as an undivided and indivisible nation.”

Some in the Mahasabha were even “devoutly cherishing the hope of a speedy consummation of our great ideal of creating a federation of powerful and peace-loving Hindu nations from the Himalayas to Ceylon and from Sindh to far-off Java”, but this went too far for Savarkar himself. His geo-imaginary of Asia, in which Muslim regions were cartographically excised from the map, was a call for a united stand against the “slow penetration of Islam” rather than a proposal for an Asian political federation. Savarkar advocated a Hindu Dharma Parishad, not a Hindu Rashtra Parishad, roughly translated as a Hindu “religious” association versus a Hindu “national” one. He made the difference explicit when he called for closer contact with East Asia in the name of Hindu religious brotherhood, but explained: “Hinduism is one of the constituents of Hindutwa [sic] which we share with the Japanese, Chinese and all our co-religionists. The
Japanese and the Chinese are our co-religionists but they cannot be our co-nationalists. We have a religion but no nation in common.”

However, the vocabulary of the Hindu-Buddhist Asia concept soon became an idiom in which not only Mahasabhists were conversant, but also those who petitioned the organization with an agenda of their own. Savarkar’s private correspondence offers an insight into both the transnational networks that were fostered through this perceived Hindu-Buddhist unity and the existing revolutionary networks that were eager to use the rhetoric for their own ends. Savarkar maintained a lively correspondence with the aforementioned Rashbehari Bose in Tokyo. Bose, who had become a naturalized citizen in Japan and had married locally, was a pan-Asianist first and foremost, and his activities give little cause to think of his Asianism in a strictly Hindu or Hindu-Buddhist format. In writing to Savarkar, however, he had no qualms in adapting to the latter’s Asian cartography in writing:

Every attempt should be made to create a Hindu bloc extending from the Indian Ocean up to the Pacific Ocean. For this purpose, the Hindu Sabha should take immediate steps for establishing branches of Mahasabha in Japan, China, Siam and other countries of the Pacific and sending their representatives for creating solidarity among the Eastern races.

Although Savarkar was reluctant to devote Mahasabha resources to international activities, he had no objection to sympathizers expanding his organization on their own dime. The Bombay secretariat of the Mahasabha officially authorized the Japanese branch to be established. Privately, Savarkar wrote to Rashbehari Bose that his “scheme of building a Pan-Hindu temple in Japan is excellent”.

Conclusion: Asia Viewed from India

Savarkar was not in search of Asia’s geographical heart but of a unifying religious identity, as expressed by a cartography that was limited to those regions that followed religions that had their roots in India. Savarkar and Pratap both excised the Middle East from their maps of Asia, but they did so for very different reasons. For Savarkar, this cartographical deletion served to demonstrate that Islam was not an Asian religion; for Pratap, the erasure put further emphasis on the
dominance and centrality of “Turan”. And while Pratap’s Turan overlapped largely with Rameshwari Nehru’s focus on the Soviet Union and its Central Asian republics, the latter’s inclusive conception of Asia was based on ideas of post-imperialist solidarity and reconstruction rather than on a historical understanding of what the various Asian regions had in common. The latter view, finally, was very much the Aga Khan’s, who based his Asia on the shared heritage of Islam as well as the connections of historical trading routes.

These four short vignettes demonstrate that in the decades surrounding India’s independence in 1947, multiple cartographies of Asia coexisted in India. These cartographies, while informed by different assumptions of what Asia constituted and how Asia’s future should be shaped, had other features in common: they are not easily reconciled with narratives of pan-Asianism as understood in its predominant East Asian regionalist form. They also fail to conform to ideas of a spiritual, non-materialist Asia as opposed to a soulless and industrialized West, as attributed to Anagarika Dharmapala, Tagore and other Indian thinkers. Instead, the four Asianists described here offered cartographies of Asia that were driven by locally shaped agendas. With the exception of Mahendra Pratap, who refashioned himself as somewhat of an honorary Turani by going into exile and renouncing his Indian citizenship, they saw a special role for India as the geographical, spiritual or political heart of Asia. While for Savarkar the importance of India to Asia was historically informed, the Aga Khan and Rameshwari Nehru saw India as a potential leader of a decolonizing Asia.

In 1927 J.M. Gupta, a nationalist and a Gandhian, envisioned an India that would be “mistress of the Indian Seas, leader of an Asiatic Zollverein, and upholder of the right of the colored races throughout the world”. None of the thinkers above were quite as jingoistic. Rather, they demonstrated that in whichever direction the compass pointed, Asia was indeed a terra incognita onto which multiple regionalist ideas and visions could plant their flag.

Notes


8. See, for instance, Tagore’s reflections on Western Asia: *Journey to Persia and Iraq* (Santiniketan: Visva Bharati, 1994).


19. *Turanjdot* may be considered somewhat of a pan-Asian opera in itself, with a cast consisting of a Chinese emperor, Timur as the dethroned and
exiled king of the Tatars, a prince of Persia, a Mandarin bureaucrat, and a prince of unknown origin who turns out to be Timur's son but falls in love with the Chinese emperor's daughter.

25. This figure shows the details of the map that depicts Turan. For the full map, see Stolte, “Enough of the Great Napoleons”: 416.
38. Ibid.

40. Ibid.

41. For an extensive report on the 1947 conference, see G.H. Jansen, *Afro-Asia and Non-alignment* (London: Faber & Faber, 1966). In this connection, it should be noted that the widely accepted historiographical narrative that the Asian Relations Conference sparked Bandung, which sparked Belgrade, and that therefore the Asian Relations Conference foreshadowed the non-aligned movement, is in need of revision.


43. NMML, RNPP, C. Rajagopalachari to Rameshwari Nehru, 4 June 1956.


45. NMML, RNPP, File 28 Afro-Asian Solidarity. Preparatory Committee in the USSR: list of names.


47. NMML, RNPP, File 27 Asian Solidarity 1954–8, in particular 24 May 1955: Jawaharlal Nehru to Rameshwari Nehru.


52. NMML, RNPP, File 26: Arab Delegation.

53. NMML, RNPP, File 28: 7 May 1955 letter from Rameshwari Nehru to “My dear Friends”.

54. NMML, RNPP, File 26: Resolutions (incomplete).


57. For a brief evaluation of Aga Khan’s conception of Asia, see Stolte and Fischer-Tiné, “Imagining Asia in India”: 72.
59. Ibid., p. 32.
62. It could certainly be argued to constitute a form of regionalism, but not one that could be equated with Asianism.
64. Lévi, *Free India in Asia*, p. 31.
72. Ibid., p. 1040.
73. Savarkar is simultaneously remembered as a revolutionary advocating armed rebellion, the author of *The Indian War of Independence*, the creator of the term “Hindutva” and a vocal opponent of Gandhi. Accounts of his life range from the hagiographical to the highly critical, with discussions of Savarkar’s connection to Godse, who assassinated Gandhi, continuing into the 2000s. The concern here, however, is with Savarkar’s geo-imaginary of Asia.
77. *Hindu Outlook*, 25 May 1940, p. 3. The resolution itself was made several years previously. See also Stolte and Fischer-Tiné, “Imagining Asia in India”: 85.


80. Kalidas Nag, *Greater India (A Study in Indian Internationalism)* (Calcutta: Greater India Society, 1926); Prabodh Chandra Bagchi, *India and China* (Calcutta: Greater India Society, 1927); Ramesh Chandra Majumdar et al., *History and Culture of the Indian People* (Bombay: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1951–77).


82. NMML, *SPP*, 6449/22: Thakur (alias of Rashbehari Bose) to Shinde Esq, V.P. Hindu Mahasabha Ratnagiri, 10 Jan. 1930.


85. Ibid.


87. NMML, *SPP*, 6450/23: Rashbehari Bose to Savarkar, 11 July 1938. See also, Stolte and Fischer-Tiné, “Imagining Asia in India”: 86.


Chapter Four

Uniting the East via Western Amateur Sports Values: Asian Integration, the Olympic Ideal and the Far Eastern Championship Games

Stefan Hübner

Introduction

This is the first meet managed entirely by Chinese. This is symbolical of New China, it is in keeping with the Nationalist movement. We are in our way adjusting ourselves to meet the demands of a modern world! We in our way are working for our own national salvation to be attained only by our strenuous efforts. You represent the flower of young manhood of the renascent Orient, alert, physically fit, and under keen self-discipline. You, together with our own young men, represent the hope of the Pacific. You will, I trust, learn from each other, and try to understand and appreciate each other’s national aspirations and problems. You have a golden opportunity to learn from each other during this congenial gathering. You will carry the spirit of fairplay that characterizes clean amateur sportsmanship and friendly rivalry into your future life work; fair play that is essential in international dealings, and in everything concerning human intercourse. It does not matter much whether games
are lost or won, if they are fairly and well played. A game can be
honorably lost the same as it ought to be justly won. To you collec-
tively and individually this meet means much, but to the future of
friendly international relations among the three nations represented,
perhaps it means more.¹

For those who know what happened later, it did not mean more.
During the following years Sino-Japanese relations were plagued by
several military incidents, culminating in the Second Sino-Japanese
War (1937–45). In 1927, however, Chinese Vice-Foreign Minister
Guo Taiqi (Quo Tai-chi) still hoped for a scenario in which East
Asia would be more united—not as a result of the enforcement of
Japanese hegemony, but through mutual acceptance as equal partners.
He rightly said during the opening ceremony of the Eighth Far
Eastern Championship Games (FECG), hosted in 1927 in Shanghai,
that the Games were “symbolic of New China”. For the first time
since the Games’ founding in 1913 in Manila by American members
of the Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA), Chinese officials,
not Americans, were in charge of organizing this inter-Asian sports
event.² This newly gained independence from foreign tutelage was
to demonstrate China’s ability to “meet the demands of a modern
world”, meaning that after decades of decline the Chinese had now
finally regenerated and become truly independent. Guo integrated
the Games into the growing nationalist movement in China and the
Guomindang’s (Chinese National Party) struggle to unite and reform
China into a “modern” state able to survive on its own in a world
order conceived in social Darwinist terms. Guo even described the
Games as a possible means to bring Chinese nationalist aspirations of
a “rebirth” together with the same aspiration in Japan and the Philip-
pines, the other countries participating in the Games. The athletic
youth of the three Asian countries, educated in Western amateur
sports ideals such as internationalism and egalitarianism, would be
the “hope of the Pacific”, ready to resist the unmentioned enemy—
Western colonialism. In Guo’s speech, the Eighth FECG therefore
served as an Asianist project in two ways: first, they would provide a
value system allowing members of different Asian societies to trans-
nationally cooperate with each other on equal terms by regulating
their behaviour based on Western amateur sports values such as fair
play, team spirit, self-control and non-discrimination.³ Second, the
Games would be an event from now on organized for Asians by Asians, “liberated” from the control of (paternalist) Americans. In other words, the so-called Western civilizing mission, which justified Western colonial rule and practices as necessary to bring backward and incompetent local populations up to Western standards, would be substituted by an Asian civilizing mission. This Asian civilizing mission would embrace Western amateur sports values, whose usefulness for Asians was not debated, but would end the former colonial power asymmetry between the West and Asia inherent in the Western civilizing mission. Modern sports, which spread into Asia in the late 19th and early 20th centuries and which were characterized by equality, bureaucratization, specialization, rationalization, quantification and obsession with records, would thus be the affair of Asians, not Americans, in their respective nation building and modernization processes.

Applying Sven Saaler’s classification of pan-movements to Guo’s claims, these features fit the description of an anti-colonial pan-movement, which calls for the independence of a group of countries, proclaims or tries to construct a regional identity, and has a tendency to produce a hegemon (this last aspect being rejected by Guo through a focus on a regional identity founded on democratic fairness). Since the late 19th century, a variety of state and non-state actors had voiced similar Asianist claims, mainly as a reaction to Western imperialism and colonialism. During the 1930s and 1940s, Asianist rhetoric was instrumentalized to legitimize Japanese imperialism and aggression. After the war Asianism remained tainted by the bitter and brutal experience of Japan’s oppressive rule over the territories it had temporarily occupied. However, the idea of Asian solidarity survived, for instance, in the form of the (Asian parts of the) Non-Aligned Movement and Third Worldism and discussions about an East Asian Community. Geography, cultural commonality, historical interactions, racial kinship and spirituality as well as a common destiny were among the components pre-war pan-Asianists had emphasized. With these concepts in mind, Guo had welcomed the Filipino delegation at the arrival ceremony by arguing that many of the athletes (like many Filipinos in general) had some “Chinese blood” running through their veins.

Taking Asianist conceptions as a point of departure, this chapter reconstructs a narrative Guo identified as fundamental, namely the process of the Asianization and nationalization of the sportive Western
civilizing mission. Research on this topic is still almost nonexistent.\textsuperscript{9} By focusing on the Far Eastern Championship Games from their inception in 1913 to their dissolution in 1934, a transnational study will answer the following questions: How did the founders of the Games, the American YMCA physical (education) directors, proceed in the three nations? How, when and under what circumstances did Chinese, Filipino and Japanese officials gain control over the hosting of the events? How did American YMCA physical directors respond to Asian claims of being ready to take over the sportive Western civilizing mission? And how do these developments relate to the history of Asianisms in the first half of the 20th century?

**The Founding of the Games by the American YMCA (Manila 1913)**

In early 1910 Elwood S. Brown, an official of the American YMCA, went to the Philippines as its physical director in Manila. Soon after his arrival he began to increase the YMCA’s influence by collaborating with Governor General W. Cameron Forbes and the Bureau of Education. He developed physical education programmes for Filipino clerks, constabulary soldiers and schoolchildren; set up playgrounds; organized athletic competitions during the annual Manila Carnival; and was the primary figure in the establishment of the Philippine Amateur Athletic Federation in early 1911. In 1912–13 he founded the FECCG as a tool to promote sportive Christian citizenship training in the American colony, China, Japan and, less successfully, in other Asian countries.\textsuperscript{10} Western amateur values, perceived as a vehicle for the implementation of Protestant values in the realm of physical education, were to overcome the perceived social and cultural deficits of “backward” Asians.\textsuperscript{11} Brown and his colleagues, imbued with a mission to “uplift mankind”, were practitioners of American purportedly benevolent imperialism. In a long-lasting modernization process under American tutelage, “uncivilized” peoples were to be made ready for successful American-style self-government. For example, while Filipino assemblymen were first elected in 1907, real power, including the right to veto their decisions, remained with the American governor general. In China, the Xinhai Revolution (1911) brought a new group of politicians to power. Many of them had received a Western education or had even converted to Christianity. Generally, they were much
more willing to accept American tutelage in their struggle to change China than the Qing dynasty had been. Only in Japan, which had already undergone a rapid process of transformation and had become a regional great power after its military triumphs over China (1895) and Russia (1905), did semi-colonial American “uplifting” activities find little support in government circles.  

During the First FECG in Manila in January–February 1913, Filipinos had hardly any influence. The contest committee consisted of Brown and two American collaborators. Governor General Forbes and Brown served as the president and the secretary of the Far Eastern Athletic Association (FEAA) respectively. The Chinese delegation, too, was under the supervision of American YMCA officials active in China. Wu Tingfang, a politician and former Chinese minister to the United States, attended the Games but limited himself to representative functions. Only the very small Japanese delegation, including Meiji University’s baseball team and two track and field athletes—the latter being sponsored by a Kansai (Osaka-Kobe) region newspaper (Osaka Mainichi Shinbun) with which Brown had negotiated—remained under its own control.  

Strictly speaking, it was not even an official delegation, since it lacked backing from Kanō Jigorō, the president of the (Great-)Japan Amateur Athletic Association (JAAA/ Dai-Nippon Taiiku Kyōkai) and, since 1909, a member of the International Olympic Committee. Kanō, the founder of modern judo, had already developed his own Bushidō (Way of the Warrior) based physical education ideology, which focused on individual training and on shaping loyal subjects of the Emperor. He thus was not interested in the YMCA’s ideas of democratic Christian citizenship training through team games (for example, basketball and volleyball, both invented by YMCA members); nor did he perceive American tutelage for Japan as desirable, as this would put the latter on the same level as the Philippines and China. Having experienced Japan’s comparatively successful struggle to become a regional great power, he rejected this US-devised Asianism that was based on the view of all of Asia—including Japan—being backward and in need of Western assistance.

The American YMCA Rising (1915–21)
The Second FECG, held in Shanghai in May 1915, brought only very limited changes in terms of nationalization, but it strengthened
the American YMCA’s influence in Asia. In late 1912 a Democrat, Woodrow Wilson, was elected US president. This led to a Filipinization process initiated by Wilson’s new governor general, Francis B. Harrison, which gave more power to Filipinos. Filipinization culminated in the Jones Law (1916), the first official declaration that the Philippines at an unspecified future point in time (when Filipinos had become capable of governing themselves according to American standards) would receive their independence. In line with this process of indigenization, Jaime de Veyra, a former governor of Leyte, assemblyman, and member of the Philippine Commission, served as the first official representative of the Philippines during the FECG. Nevertheless, in practice the Filipino delegation remained under the control of Brown.15 The Japanese team was again very small and lacked official backing from the JAAA. The Japanese Twenty-One Demands, issued to the Chinese government only weeks before the Games commenced, further complicated Asianist projects based on the ideals of egalitarianism and internationalism. Without the intervention of American YMCA officials, not even this small group, led by a sports reporter at the Osaka Mainichi Shinbun, would have travelled to China. The team would then have been reduced to the few Japanese living in Shanghai who also participated.16 The most important position in the contest committee, the secretary, was again held by an American, this time John H. Crocker, the YMCA’s national physical director for China. Its Chinese officials, Wu and Zhang Boling, a Christian and founder of Nankai University, both no physical educators, limited themselves to representative positions. In the FEAA, Wu became president but Brown remained the secretary.17

The Third FECG, which took place in Tokyo in May 1917, brought another increase in the influence that American YMCA secretaries enjoyed in East Asia. After the Second Games, Elwood Brown and Franklin H. Brown, from late 1913 the YMCA’s national physical director in Japan, had convinced Kanō through public pressure to agree to host the next Games in Japan.18 Kanō and the Browns also reached a compromise regarding the disciplines, which were not to be changed for the Games but would be open to discussion afterwards. Moreover, Kanō and the still very young JAAA, which had never organized an international sports event before and had attended the Olympics only once, lacked the necessary knowledge to organize the Games.19 Kanō thus became president of the FEAA, but Elwood
Brown remained the secretary. Franklin Brown, who until then had had only very limited influence in Japanese physical education, became the secretary of the contest committee, the other nine members being Japanese. Elwood Brown had already confided to Pierre de Coubertin, the founder of the modern Olympic Games, that in contrast to the Olympic movement the officials in East Asia would always be those of the host country (not a mixed group), with the possible exception of the secretary of the FEAA and the contest secretary: “We find in the Orient that these men must be of the white race if things are to move.” Elwood Brown’s comment makes it obvious that the Games as an Asianist project still were based on a perception of Asia being a backward region, but simultaneously, due to Japanese cooperation, they marked an internationalist counterexample to the slaughter on the European battlefields.

The Fourth FECG, held in Manila in May 1919, were again marred by Sino-Japanese tensions. The Chinese failure at the Versailles Peace Conference to force Japan to return the German concessions in Shandong province it had won during World War I and the subsequent boycott of Japanese goods as well as the nationalist awakening of the May Fourth Movement worsened relations between Japan and China. These tensions made Asianist projects more difficult to realize, but at the same time the devastation caused by the war, questioning the superiority of Western civilization, and the increasing rhetoric of self-determination created some Asian commonalities. The Japanese foreign ministry rejected Japan’s participation, while the Ministry of Education complained about the unwillingness of the organizers of the Games to reschedule them so that Japanese student athletes would not miss exams. Since the JAAA lacked money and needed government support, Kanō decided to leave the FEAA shortly before the start of the Games. His decision resulted in tensions between Kantō (Tokyo region) and Kansai. Officials from the latter region seceded from the JAAA and set up their own organization, the Japan Athletic Youth Club (Nihon Seinen Undō Kurabu), to participate in the Games under the command of the same people who had been in charge during the Second FECG.

In the Philippines, the implementation of the Jones Law had led to the formation of the Philippines Senate as an upper house. Its president, Manuel L. Quezon, was a leading Nacionalista Party politician, who would in 1934 secure the official promise of independence
and serve as the president of the Commonwealth of the Philippines from 1935 onwards. As president of the Senate he had already been asked in 1917 to represent the Philippines, but he had delegated the office to Manuel Earnshaw, a resident commissioner returning from his period in the United States. Now, Quezon became president of the FEAA, but like before, American YMCA physical directors and their colleagues were in control of the actual work. Walter W. Marquardt, the director of education, held the office of contest secretary. He apparently had close relations with the YMCA and was chosen due to his position as secretary of the Philippine Amateur Athletic Federation, not because of his government office. Independent of that, the mere existence of an (acting) American governor general, Charles E. Yeater—who as head of state took over certain ceremonial business—restricted Filipino self-government in comparison to Japan and China.  

In China the preparations for sending a delegation to the Fourth FECG had led to the decision to create the China Amateur Athletic Union (Zhonghua yeyu yundong lianhehui) as a national sports organization. Almost all the delegates were American or Chinese YMCA leaders, the former holding the most influential positions. The Chinese delegation was thus still headed by an American YMCA secretary, Robert W. Clack. Clack even gave the official Chinese response to Yeater’s closing remarks, even though several leading Chinese politicians from both north and south China attended the Games.

During the Fifth FECG, hosted in Shanghai in May 1921 while the Shandong Problem was still unsolved, the tensions between Japan and China were again overcome only through the intervention of American YMCA secretaries. Wang Zhengting (Chengting Thomas Wang), a leading Chinese YMCA official and politician, had been elected president of the FEAA and the contest committee. Elwood Brown, who meanwhile had become senior secretary of physical education in the YMCA’s foreign department in New York and was therefore responsible for its physical education activities abroad, had to convince Wang to act according to the internationalist ideal:

It developed upon him to sign the invitations or notices to Japan and the Philippines. At that particular time he was the leading spirit in the group of Chinese business men in Shanghai who were urging a boycott of all things Japanese. He felt that it would not be
consistent for him to be the active backer of the Japanese boycott plan and at the same time to have an active part in a plan to bring Japanese to China on a friendly basis.\textsuperscript{25}

Wang’s unwillingness also illustrates that the unequal relations between Chinese and American YMCA leaders had become increasingly uneasy. He finally informed the Japanese delegation but limited contact with them as much as possible. The secretary of the FEAA and the contest committee, John H. Gray, who had recently come from India to serve as the YMCA’s national physical director in China, also kept his distance from the Japanese delegation, feeling that to do otherwise would taint his position in China. He did the same regarding Elwood and Franklin Brown and only grudgingly organized the Games.\textsuperscript{26} In the Philippines, on the other hand, a leading education politician of the Nacionalista Party, Assistant Director of Education Camilo Osías, who had close relations with the Manila YMCA, had become secretary of the Philippine Amateur Athletic Federation in 1920. He served as the official representative of the Philippines, while Frederick O. England, a YMCA-trained physical educator who had gone to Manila after Elwood Brown had asked the government for a playground supervisor, was in charge of the team.\textsuperscript{27} This can be interpreted as another minor setback for the YMCA, since the colonial administration began to increase control over physical education, limiting the influence of nongovernmental organizations. In Japan, the attempt to unify the JAAA and the Japan Athletic Youth Club had resulted in Kanô having to step down as the JAAA’s president. Kishi Seiichi, a leading civil and corporate lawyer who had practised Western sports during his studies at Tokyo Imperial University, succeeded him. He finally convinced the Japanese government to provide funding for the delegation’s trips to the Games, meaning that for the first time a large group of athletes could be sent to China. Even though Kishi led the delegation to the Games, Franklin Brown’s informal position as adviser increased in importance, though not as much as planned. After Elwood Brown had convinced the relevant people in the Philippines, the Japanese declared that they were willing to support Franklin Brown becoming a permanent secretary (or at least serving for a period of six years) of the FEAA. The attempt to further strengthen the control of the American YMCA over the Games to enforce its internationalist ideal was dropped only because
the strong anti-Japanese stance of the Chinese made it unrealistic that they would accept permanent headquarters in Tokyo. Even more problematic for Franklin Brown was Gray’s apparent inability to retreat to the position of a “gray eminence” similar to himself, who would de facto have more influence than the delegates. The meeting of the FEAA had visually demonstrated this deficit in official Chinese representation: “China—two Americans and one Chinese; Philippines—two Filipinos and one American; Japan—three Japanese. The only Chinese to open his mouth at the meeting was the President.”

According to Franklin Brown, choosing at least two Chinese delegates would have made a much better impression on the Japanese, who would accept Americans speaking for Filipinos but would be sceptical regarding American dominance of Chinese issues. The Japanese delegation indeed got the impression that the immense influence of the Americans in the Games, also illustrated by the fact that almost all referees were Americans (or British), might mean that the Asians were mere puppets in an American puppet theatre. It seems that Gray’s indifference regarding keeping the American YMCA more subtly in control of Chinese amateur sports resulted, within months, in another quarrel with the Browns. Gray had given up leadership of the China Amateur Athletic Union, but Elwood Brown reminded him that the Chinese would still need his personal tutelage:

However, I do not need to emphasize the fact that this Union or Federation will need for a long time the technical guiding hand of someone. It was my hope that this person might be you in order that the difficulties and pitfalls which have beset amateur organizations around the world might be avoided. In addition to this, I believe we should continue for some time to be the guiding influence in China, Japan, and the Philippines in the Far Eastern Games.

Already before that, he had confided to Franklin Brown that it would “be a calamity if the inspiration for Chinese participation should get out of the Association hands”. Gray, on the other hand, complied but warned Brown that a Chinese anti-foreign reaction would only be a question of time. The increasing anti-colonial nationalism in the participating countries, accelerated by World War I and the rhetoric of self-determination, thus laid the foundations for an Asianist project that would be more Asian and less American.
The American YMCA Dwindling (1923–25)

The Sixth FECG, hosted in Osaka in May 1923 as a compromise between the Kantō and Kansai branches of the JAAA, ironically brought about a nationalization of amateur sports in China. Anti-Christian movements had further fuelled nationalism in China, and Chinese boycotts of Japanese products continued after Tokyo was unwilling to retrocede the Kwantung Leased Territory. Gray and his American colleagues in the end succeeded in sending a delegation to Osaka in accordance with the internationalist ideal, which was essential for their “civilizing” aims, even though they attracted the hatred of many Chinese, enraged by this Asianist endeavour:

China would not have put a team on the field if it had not been for Gray, Peabody and myself. In the face of the boycott which was projected by some organization in Tientsin [Tianjin] and which threatened to break up even the National Tryouts, we in South China brought about eighty athletes and defied the boycott. As it turned out we supplied nearly all the athletes for China but it is a mighty good thing we foreigners forced it through.33

Gray also made it clear that the Games would not be the property of Japan and that even the Philippines would be annoyed should China decide not to participate. Wang, for example, eventually accepted his responsibilities as honorary president of the FEAA but did not go to Japan himself.34 The fact that Gray held the speeches for the Chinese team during the ceremonies, combined with the rather poor performance of its athletes, caused a wave of criticism that eventually forced him out of power. In July 1923, Chinese sportspersons formed the China Athletic Association (Zhonghua tiyu xiehui) as a rival to the American YMCA’s China Amateur Athletic Union. Following some serious quarrels between the two organizations, they merged in July 1924 into the China National Amateur Athletic Federation (Zhonghua quanguo tiyu xiejinhui), which limited Gray’s role to that of an adviser. A year earlier, Gray had already made the following observation:

In the Physical work nationally there has been no difficulty with the local associations but in the country as a whole there has appeared considerable disapproval of Foreign leadership in National Athletic Organizations. I feel that American leadership has about passed out
Similar developments occurred in the Philippines. Here, Osías served as the representative of the government for a second time while also being first vice president of the FEAA. England, who in 1922 had been appointed National Physical Director of the Philippines—an office created mainly through Osías’ political influence—remained in charge of the team. Through this important step towards governmental control over physical education, the American YMCA lost much of its influence in the Philippine Amateur Athletic Federation. England was primarily responsible to the government, in contrast to the YMCA’s physical directors in the Philippines, who worked for a nongovernmental organization. Moreover, Osías’ final aim was Filipinization of control over Philippine sport, and he seems to have created the office to pave the way for a Filipino official as England’s eventual successor. In contrast, in Japan Kishi became president of the FEAA, but Franklin Brown served for another term as the secretary of both the contest committee and the FEAA, not yet having been negatively affected by another wave of disruptions within the JAAA that broke out during the following year.

The Seventh FECG, hosted in Manila in May 1925, was the last event organized mainly by an American. It also was the second time that the person was not a full-time YMCA secretary but a government official. Government control of the Philippine Amateur Athletic Federation was even further strengthened since this time England as the National Physical Director automatically became secretary of the FEAA and the contest committee. Like in 1919, Quezon had been elected as president of both the FEAA and the contest committee and this time found time to fulfill some of his duties, which again had to be shared with the American governor general. The Chinese delegation, in contrast, for the first time was headed by a Chinese, Shen Siliang (William Z.L. Sung), a physical educator trained in the United States who had returned in 1923, becoming head of the physical education department at St. John’s University in Shanghai. The Chinese consul general in Manila represented the government. The Japanese delegation was led by Kishi, while Franklin Brown served as one of the delegates to the FEAA. Both, however, were unable to prevent an escalation during the Games caused by the increased use of the Far Eastern Athletic Association, to be taken over by the people of each country in turn.
of Filipino referees, some of them apparently either lacking experience or (though this never came up in the official discourse) misusing their power to support the Filipino team. Neither Kishi nor Franklin Brown was able to convince a group of Japanese athletes, who left the Games in protest, to rejoin. Tensions between them and the JAAA’s leaders, especially Kishi (who according to Franklin Brown was very competent but neither democratic nor very diplomatic), had already built up the year before over the selection process for the Olympic Games and had now escalated. These tensions would, like the acceleration of the Asianization and nationalization process, continuously reduce Franklin Brown’s influence.  

The American YMCA Losing Its Central Position (1927–30)

As mentioned in the introduction, the Eighth FECG, which took place in Shanghai in August–September 1927, was the first event in which Asians held all the influential positions on the contest committee. Wang became the honorary president as well as the president of the FEAA, delegating some of his responsibilities to the contest committee’s president, Zhang. Shen served as the secretary of both organizations. Guo represented the Guomindang government, whose commander-in-chief, Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi), at the time of the Games tried to unify China via the Northern Expedition (1926–28). As mentioned in the introduction, the campaign led to the hope of recreating a powerful China that would be able to withstand foreign oppression. Furthermore, the Japanese government’s decision against a major involvement in the conflict (though it sent some troops to China) supported Asianist rhetoric. However, to ensure that the Chinese preparations for the Games were not being affected by the protracted war in China and the exclusion of foreigners, the JAAA sent its secretary to China. His suggestion that the Games be organized by officials from all three countries, which Shen rejected, made it obvious that the Japanese lacked trust in the Chinese organizing skills. Nevertheless, despite quarrels about referees between Japan and China, the Games were held without major incident. Many Japanese sports functionaries, for example Yamamoto Tadaoki, a professor at Waseda University and leading YMCA official, were therefore very
pleased that the Games had finally got into Asian hands.\textsuperscript{42} This was particularly true since even the foreign delegations were under the control of Asians, finally turning the event into an Asianist project organized for Asians by Asians. The tensions within the JAAA had resulted in a temporary isolation of Franklin Brown. The Japanese delegation, led by Hiranuma Ryōzō, an Upper House member who was also involved in the physical department of the Yokohama YMCA (despite not being a Christian), instead of Kishi, apparently almost completely ignored him.\textsuperscript{43} Another dark side of the Asianization process was the waves of mutual criticism of “inexperienced” referees and functionaries. Osías, who again represented the Philippine government, found it necessary to remind his Japanese and Chinese colleagues in a long speech to keep up amateur values and standards, meaning to accept each other as equals and not to jeopardize the civilizing aim of the Games. For the first time, too, a Filipino was in charge of the Philippine team. Regino R. Ylanan, who had been educated by the YMCA at its Training School (now Springfield College) and had served as the physical director of the University of the Philippines in Manila, had become National Physical Director in 1927 following England’s retirement.\textsuperscript{44}

In combination with the Ninth FECG, hosted in Tokyo in May 1930, the Asianization process was completed. Elwood Brown had left the Philippines in 1918 and died in 1924. In China, American YMCA physical directors had lost their power following the Sixth FECG in 1923; and Gray had left China before the Eighth Games were held in Shanghai. Only Franklin Brown had remained in Japan, but after having served there since 1913 he intended to return to the United States in 1930 following the Games. This time the Japanese did not ask him to become secretary of the contest committee. Takashima Fumio, secretary of the JAAA, received that office. However, after it became evident that the Japanese could not manage certain business without him, Franklin Brown became secretary of the constitution and the official report committee as well as a member of the contest committee.\textsuperscript{45} Despite having lost his central role in organizing, he still wielded a lot of authority, illustrated by the fact that he was asked for advice on certain important topics: During the Eighth FECG Osías had suggested changing the name of the Games to “Oriental”, since “Far Eastern” would reflect an American influence over them instead of an Asian one. When the topic came up again in
1930, Franklin Brown reminded the Asian delegates that this certainly could be done, but that “Oriental” would be no less English than “Far Eastern”, and the issue was dropped. His authority in 1930 is further shown by the fact that it was only in 1934, after Japanese and Philippine officials had dissolved the Far Eastern Athletic Association, that the newly established organization was named Amateur Athletic Association of the Orient, as Osías had suggested years before. Regarding ideas in 1930 to extend the FEAA to North and South America to provide Japanese athletes with stronger opponents, Franklin Brown declared that this would mean that the Asians would lose all elections on further host cities and that the International Olympic Committee would hardly react well to such an attempt to take over half the world. This issue was also dropped. Before Franklin Brown left Japan, he was received by Prince Chichibu at his palace; and in 1932 he was awarded the Fifth Order of the Sacred Treasure. Later on, he would be a special guest at the 1964 Tokyo Olympics.46

Conclusion

The Asianization process of the Games, which was a reaction to the Games’ origins being rooted in Western colonialism and the Western civilizing mission, begs the question of whether the voluntary (or involuntary) withdrawal of the American YMCA physical directors determined the dissolution of the Games in 1934, when they were substituted by Games involving Japan, Manchukuo and the Philippines.47 The Asianization process of the Games since the 1920s had consisted of nationalization processes in Japan, China and the Philippines, all of them occurring at about the same time and entangled with each other. The Asianization process was thus “Asian” insofar as it led to Games organized for Asians by Asians, without American tutelage. The nation was never overcome by the process, precisely since it occurred in the contexts of three different nations struggling against (different degrees of) Western colonialism and paternalism to gain self-government in terms of the Games. In the Philippines (in contrast to China and Japan) the process did not directly lead to Filipino responsibility, but in an intermediate step it brought in American government employees instead of American YMCA officials. After the common “enemy” (or, to be more precise, the common paternalist tutor) was finally gone, the question arose of whether the three Asian
nations would be able to permanently take up the sportive civilizing mission by finding new working relationships via mutual acceptance of one another as equals (or unequals). Since the Japanese were unwilling to do the former, which was illustrated in the political arena by the conquest of Manchuria in 1931–32, and the Chinese were unwilling to do the latter, illustrated by their refusal to agree to Japanese predominance, the breakdown of the Games in their current form was predictable.

As a consequence, one can say that American YMCA officials were the better pan-Asianists. For them, Asia was already united, even if only through its backwardness. All three Asian nations were roughly equal to each other, since they all lacked American-style sportive Christian citizenship training. The Browns, at least, were aware that to permanently secure their work in Asia, it would be necessary to hand over to Asians in a controlled way, even though the latter would still need subtle American advice. They believed that the Asians should be trained by the YMCA and sympathetic to it, creating a trans-national network. In the face of growing nationalistic pressure, YMCA membership proved to be as insufficient as amateur sports ideals such as internationalism and egalitarianism in convincing enough Asians to potentially risk their (often political) careers (or even lives) to keep the Games in their current shape, with both Japan and Guomindang-China as members. One has to assume that without the missionary zeal of American YMCA officials, which was based on civilizational criteria and not foreign policy aims, the Games would not have been founded and would have lost either Japan or China as a member even sooner had the Americans withdrawn earlier.

Notes


16. One has to assume that the Browns at least profited from, if not instrumentalized, the eagerness of Japanese newspapers to (if necessary) support sports events so they could have something to report about. On Japanese newspapers and sport, see Shigeki Nishihara, “Tōkyō–Ōsaka ryōtoshi no shinbunsha ni yoru yakyū (supōtsu) ibento no tenkai katei – 1910–1925...”

17. William Tutherly, “The World at Play: A Program of Practical Athletics for the Millions”, Exhibit 2, in H-FC03-EXORI/003, TOSC.


21. See the literature in endnote 4.


25. Elwood Brown, “To: Dr. D.W. Lyon” (3 Apr. 1922; quotation), in *International Work in China, Box 38: Correspondence and Reports. April 1921 [sic]*, KFYMCAA, p. 3. See also Elwood Brown, “My dear Frank” (22 Mar. 1922), in *International Work in Japan, Box 16: Correspondence and Reports. April–June 1922 [sic]*, KFYMCAA, pp. 1–2.

26. Franklin Brown, “Dear Elwood”, 29 Jan. 1922, in *International Work in Japan, Box 16: Correspondence and Reports. January–February 1922*, KFYMCAA; Elwood Brown, “To: Dr. D.W. Lyon” (3 Apr. 1922), in *International Work in China, Box 38: Correspondence and Reports. April 1921 [sic]*, KFYMCAA. Both letters are full of complaints about Gray, who was claimed to be incompetent, jealous of them, and not interested in projects others had set up. Gray, on the other hand, considered the hosting of the Games to be a waste of money and useless for the YMCA’s activities in China. See Gray, “Dear Elwood” (26 Oct. 1921), in *International Work in China, Box 39: Correspondence and Reports. Sept.–Oct. 1921*, KFYMCAA.


31. [Elwood Brown], “My dear J.H.G.” (24 May 1922), in International Work in China, Box 39: Correspondence and Reports. April–June 1922, KFYMCAA.

32. Elwood Brown, “My dear Brownie” (29 Mar. 1922; quotation), in International Work in Japan, Box 16: Correspondence and Reports. April–June 1922 [sic], KFYMCAA, p. 4. See also Gray, “Dear Elwood” (17 July 1922), in International Work in China, Box 39: Correspondence and Reports. July–Aug. 1922, KFYMCAA.

33. Dome, “Dear Mr. Herschleb” (11 June 1923; quotation), in International Work in China, Box 40: Correspondence and Reports. June 1923, KFYMCAA. See also Dome, “My dear Mr. Fawcett” (6 Nov. 1923), in International Work in China, Box 41: Correspondence and Reports. Nov. 1923, KFYMCAA.


35. Annual Administration Report to New York of Dr. J.H. Gray, Shanghai, China, for the Year 1923, in International Work in China, Box 12: Annual and Quarterly Reports (G-M). 1923, KFYMCAA, p. 6 (quotation). See also Morris, Marrow, pp. 77–8; Gray, “Dear Mr. Wu” (22 Aug. 1952), in Biographical Files, Box 73: Gray, John Henry. Biographical Data (C), KFYMCAA, p. 5.


other Americans during a celebration of the 100th anniversary of the exchange of ratifications of the Treaty of Amity and Commerce between Japan and the United States, see the documents in Biographical Records, Box 23: Brown, Franklin H. 1932–1973 (B), KFYMCAA.

47. On the dissolution of the Games, which in 1934 was not much more than a performative act, since the next Games would not have taken place before 1938, see especially Grant K. Goodman, “Athletics as Politics: Japan, the Philippines and the Far Eastern Olympics of 1934”, Pilipinas 20 (1993): 55–66; Morris, Marrow, pp. 162–6; Kō Takashima, “‘Manshūkoku’ no tanjō to kyokutō supōtsukai no saihen” [The Founding of “Manchukuo” and the Reorganization of the Far Eastern Sports World], Kyōto Daigaku bungakubu kenkyū kiyō 47 (2008): 131–81.
Chapter Five

Missiology and Pan-Asia

Tani Barlow

The Western neoliberal formula of civilization and progress is rooted in Social Darwinism with its rugged individualism, self-centeredness, cut-throat competition, and survival of the strongest—that is, the “natural” or “divinely ordained” right to dominate the lesser people and nations. American neoliberal capitalism rests on the belief that the state should play a minimal role in the economy, that unlimited inequality in wealth and power is natural and good, and that prosperity of the “masses” is achieved by the trickle down effects (Dimitri Mikheyev, BRICS and US models: “Beijing Consensus” and “Washington Consensus,” The Voice of Russia, http://english.ruvr.ru/2013_04_02/BRICS-and-US-models-Beijing-Consensus-and-Washington-Consensus/).

A historical perspective must take into consideration the fact that in the thirteenth century the theological code played the role that today is attributed to sociological or economic codes. The difference among the frames of reference in terms of which a society organizes its actions and thoughts cannot be held as insignificant. Reducing one to the other would mean that the very labor of history is denied (Michel de Certeau, The Writing of History, 82).

If truth is essentially undecidable from the perspective of the situation, it is nonetheless through subjective action that a truth can come to displace knowledge (Sam Gillespie, “Badiou’s Ethics”, Pli 12 [2001]: 256–65).

It is quite likely that Hillary Rodham Clinton, former US Secretary of State and former US senator, will run for the presidency in
2016. Even now she is outlining policies that will define her presidency; most distinctive of these is the doctrine of women’s social contract and rights of the person. Clinton is a lawyer and an advocate of US economic hard power. She is also a long-time player in the United Nations’ inspired “international feminism”, and her diplomatic style shows a thorough understanding of international laws and diplomatic women’s rights agreements, such as the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), the 2000 Nairobi Forward-looking Strategies and the 2005 Beijing Platform for Action. In fact, Clinton has become a vocal advocate for Chinese women in her exemplary, American-style international feminist fashion.

Clinton draws on a huge body of mass or faux erudition rooted in stories about women’s singularity and the power of capitalism to emancipate them. In our times this international feminist erudition takes generic form as “women’s voices”, that is, allegedly unmediated accounts by women whose cultures have victimized them; “country reports” indexing degrees of native male misogyny and female poverty; “gender mainstreaming” textbooks for teaching abused Asian women how to accumulate economic and political rights; the “development” of the 1980s and 1990s NGO system for promoting stories about abuse and redemption; and “testaments” about women’s liberation from putative non-personhood into legal and economic personhood, conventionally dated to the 1975 launch of the United Nations’ Decade for Women.

Should Clinton become commander-in-chief, her policy will mobilize this popular erudition into US Asia policy, probably with specific emphasis on China and Muslim countries. As many have noted, the Chinese government’s unhelpful reaction to the 1995 United Nations NGO Forum set off another round of repetitive, familiar stories about Asian women’s degradation. In 2011 Secretary Clinton made a point of declaring that US Asia policy would henceforth include India, and US state policy seems currently rooted in Clinton’s 2013 version of this Obama doctrine. “Asia now consists of the People’s Republic of China, Asia-Pacific ‘pivot’ countries of East Asia, as well as South Asia, India and particularly the nations encircling China—Burma, the Philippines, Indonesia, Mongolia, Cambodia and Vietnam. Particularly if Clinton becomes the US president, universal women’s rights will be sought and contracts with Asia pursued.
The question of political Asianism and its relation to the world’s “Asian women” will take on increasing diplomatic urgency, and that is why international women’s human rights is more than a simple index of platitudes.  

Clinton’s international feminism forwards core legal doctrines about property and investment. It promotes contractual, capital investment in the world’s poor women and declares one of women’s natural rights to be the right to own her body, labour and property. Clinton’s “Remarks to the United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women” in Beijing on 5 September 1995 made explicit this central question of value. Since one of the primary differences among women is that some women have dollars and others do not, the then First Lady announced that the United States would invest in girls’ education in Africa, Asia and Latin America (following the missiological Bible map). Investment would involve a compulsory stepping forward of women into their social contract and into an understanding of their own capital value, value as capital, value as capital owners and value as capital-producing entities.

The backbone of this paper is a concern with faux erudition infused in US popular thinking about Asia, capital accumulation, natural law and sexuality, natural rights and liberation. This kind of erudition sustains Clinton’s claims to be historically accurate and the belief of many voting citizens in the United States that her position is ethically irreproachable. Asianisms, in other words, are historically, painstakingly, politically sustained, and it is within our power as scholars to refute them. This essay accepts the truism that faux scholarship has an ambivalent relation to the history project but maintains that they are not the same thing. Pretense to learnedness, like learnedness itself, has to be open to critique. Faux erudition must be illuminated just as charges that President Barak Obama is a non-citizen and a Muslim are, and as Holocaust deniers are debunked. Since these ideas are not—and cannot be—allowed to stand, taking missiology and clavellianism deadly seriously will perhaps decrease their powers.

**Missiology and Asia**

According to the historian Dana Roberts, US Christian missiology—the theory of mission work and its objectives—was a body of universal
knowledge that centred on “Asia”. This Asia consisted of a significant swath of heathendom stretching from East, North and Southeast Asia to Egypt, Palestine, the Balkans and the residual Ottoman Empire or Oriental Middle East but focused on making China American. Asia existed in the global context along with heathen Africa, Latin America and Canada, which sometimes appears as part of Asia, perhaps because the indigenous population had Asian-looking bodies. China-bound and China-focused American missionaries usually visited mission stations in this amorphous, larger Asia or extensively studied them before going into the field. Although many American missionaries had sojourned in British imperial domains, they had come to specialize in the United States’ Asia by the late 19th century.9

US missiology refers to a flourishing, progressively nuanced, cumulatively researched, theoretical, empirical, scientific and anthropological body of faux knowledge, theories and objectives aimed at Pacific Asia and particularly China, which most considered to be the jewel in the crown of the US Christian movement.10 In British and US journals such as Torchbearer, Daybreak, The Zenana, India’s Women, China’s Daughters and particularly The Heathen Woman’s Friend one finds, moreover, an explicitly woman-centred Asian evangelical knowledge. The capacity of Christ to lift out of bondage all women no matter what their language, caste or creed bound missiology to women’s emancipation, for example, choice marriage, literacy and hygiene.11

Beyond British orientalism, US missiology included four elements. First, training gave trans-Pacific female missionaries a general institutional, sociological and theoretical grasp of Asian women’s condition.12 Second, leaving for China service, American missionaries were already grounded in information gleaned from reports, letters, books, and accounts about Shanghai but also Tokio, Rangoon, Beyroot, Bulgaria, Liberia and Turkey, as well as work in Liberia or Canada, and they often visited those places, particularly if the final destination was China.13 Third, missiology was never isomorphic with nation since heathen Asia did not have fixed boundaries. Thus, fourth, while it had a fused and systematic intellectual profile, missiology was foundationally and topologically heterogeneous.

Protestant missiology stated that once freed from heathen sanctions holding them in bondage, a natural, God-given womanhood
would replace customary degradation. Protestant missionaries established a template to achieve this end, mounting transformative institutions, such as orphanages, day schools, boarding schools, etc., in Hawaii, Shanghai and Lucknow, Hiroshima and Beirut, Chiang Mai and Rangoon. In the process women emerged as the full measure or integer of God’s work in Asia.

Women in Asia

When Miss Laura Askew Haygood set off from San Francisco Bay on 18 October 1884, on the steamship City of Pekin headed for Yokohama and then Shanghai (where she became co-founder with the Rev. Young John Allen of the McTyeire Home and School for girls), she already knew Asia. As they struggled to acquire foreign language competency, missionaries read reports about their “field” larded with learned citations from pioneer Sinologists or Japanologists such as Karl Friedrich August Gützlaff (1803–51) and Justus Doolittle (1824–1910). The Heathen Woman’s Friend and other media distributed information globally to missionaries and the hundreds of thousands of women and men in the United States who financed them.

Earlier in the 19th century, American Protestant missionaries had worked under the umbrella of the British holdings, India, Burma, Ceylon and the Ottoman empire, in the evangelical style the British initiated in the 1790s. By the mid-19th century, however, as US regional ambitions and pretensions escalated, US Protestant outreach set off from Canada and other North American targets in the Pacific basin, consolidating first in the Hawaiian Islands and then moving into what Mrs Edith Moses in 1900 on her arrival into Manila Bay would call “Oriental America”. Following the Taiping Revolution, the “Far East” came to dominate missionary thinking. And as US Protestant mission projects settled into the Far East as their field, a “gender-based missiology” moved from a peripheral to a central strategy and practice.

Single women missionaries gravitated to the centre of imperial US catchment areas, a singular drama of the 1870s and subsequent missiology. Women were allowed to answer the Almighty’s Call instead of being barred from service, and as women they were said to know more about Oriental women’s degradation than men did and
provided access to heathen families. Women missionaries argued that
studying Asian, Eastern or Oriental women readied them to serve,
and so did subsequent missionaries looking from the vantage point
of the early 20th century. Indeed, Mrs Helen Barrett Montgomery’s
influential *Western Women in Eastern Lands: An Outline of Fifty Years
of Woman’s Work in Foreign Missions* (1910) dated the initiation of the
US women’s missionary movement from 1835, not the more conven-
tional date of 1861. In 1835, the China-based American missionary
David Abeel transited London and “was invited to address a little
company of ladies gathered in a private drawing-room” in what be-
came in Montgomery’s view “perhaps the most important afternoon
tea in history”:

The helplessness and misery of the women of the Orient had pro-
doundly touched him, and he had seen also the hopelessness of at-
tempting to dislodge heathenism while its main citadel, “the home,”
was unreach, and unreachable by the agencies then employed….he
had come to hold the then revolutionary doctrine that it was abso-
lutely necessary to bring into the field unmarried women to reach
and teach the women and children.

On the strength of Abeel’s firsthand account, the British women at
the tea established the Society for Promoting Female Education in
the East. They vowed to send unmarried, educated evangelical women
to proselytize in China, South India, Ceylon, North India, Palestine,
Persia, South Africa and Japan—the area that constituted “Asia” in
their minds at that time. Describing the event in her 1898 volume
*Eminent Missionary Women*, the American erudite Mrs Gracey offered
an explanation for why it took so long to establish an analogous US
female missionary force even though the initiative was American from
the start. “Sufficient knowledge of the condition of Eastern women,”
she wrote, “had not reached the Christian women of America for
them to have their hearts touched and aroused to action.”

American women missionaries had to learn about Asian women
first, and when that goal was met, US strategy placed woman-to-
woman transition at missiology’s centre. Gracey wrote a history of
woman-to-woman erudition starting with Mary Lyon, pioneer of US
woman-based missiology and founder of Mount Holyoke Seminary.
Holyoke was a clearing house for “the constant communication kept
up with those who had gone from the school to missionary labor” in
the form of the “electric chain” of letters from “the wilds of America, the islands of the sea, from Persia, India, China, Africa”.21 Gracey introduced the Mount Holyoke-trained scholar Fidelia Fisk, the first unmarried missionary to work in Persia; the learned Ann Wilkins, who devoted her life to Liberia; Miss Rankin, who, while not herself an Asianist, held wide appeal to budding missionaries to Asia and whose Twenty Years among the Mexicans Gracey pronounced to be “a thrilling missionary story” by a woman with “unlimited faith in woman and in her power to bring this to pass”.22 Miss Aldersey, pioneer to Java, China and Australia (a country that even today struggles with its Asianness) studied Asian languages before she left for the field.23 Miss Beaulah Woolston had been a linguist and Latin and Greek teacher.24 Gracey brought women readers into this magic circle.

“Asia”, a Field of Erudition: Amanda Smith, Mrs Ahok, Laura Askew Haygood

Amanda Smith, Laura Askew Haygood and Mrs Ahok each defy easy analysis. Together they illustrate that the logic of missiology reached beyond race, class or personal circumstances: erudition was not isomorphic with racial identity, in other words. Amanda Smith, a holiness preacher in her time, wrote The Story of the Lord’s Dealings with Mrs. Amanda Smith, the Colored Evangelist.25 Born a slave in 1837, she recounts in her autobiography the tale of her family’s struggle to purchase one another, their flight to the North, and the events that led Smith in 1856 to be converted to John Inskip’s Holiness Movement, a sect of Methodism. Smith travelled the world from 1870 to 1910, testifying to white US audiences, racially mixed congregations of Holiness Christians all over South Asia, and blacks and whites in Liberia, where she worked eight years.26 Adrienne M. Israel’s biography stresses Smith’s successes in the US and British Isles with progressive, integrationist, anti-racist preachers of various ethnicities, races and national backgrounds.

Smith’s job was to send information about Burma, India, the United States and Britain through the “electric chain” to other Christians. She encountered Europe, Asia and Africa with fully formed structures of perception, enlivening her Biblically inspired descriptions of the old British Orient, Alexandria, sailing on the River Nile, itinerating in Burma and India with learned reflection. Highly sensitive
to colonial race politics, she presented her blackness in the following way: “And out of all the world round,” she wrote, “it pleased God to bestow this great honor” of Moses “on the black race, which ought to be held in everlasting remembrance.” She added, “I prefer being black, if for no other reason than to share this great honor with my race.” Yet Smith’s description of the bloodstained “great juggernaut car, so well known in the history of sacrifices in India, whose wheels have crushed so many infants at the hands of their poor mothers”, was as persistent a scholarly trope of India as bound feet and female infanticide in China. Smith’s perceptions of native heathen customs in Burma and India were as clichéd, familiar, comfortable and repetitious as those of any white, middle-class contemporary.

The Han China missionary Mrs Ahok is a second example of religious missionaries’ voluminous knowledge. Mrs Ahok was alleged to be the first Chinese woman visitor to Europe (a highly suspect claim). It is not so much the pathos of Mrs Ahok’s genuinely tragic life, but rather that the native informancy, which structured her performances in London, included vast amounts of information about the missiological category of Asian women. Mrs Ahok already knew what there was to know about the conditions of women in India and so could testify to the degradation of her own kind. She told the supportive Christian ladies in London, where she came to raise funds and to help recruit women into the China field, that there was no need for her to convey details of “the cruel custom of binding women’s feet” since “you have heard what is done in India and, as far as I can tell, the women [there] are treated much the same [as we in China are] [emphasis added]”. What Mrs Ahok “knew” was the suffering heathenism inflicted on women in a region India’s women called “Australasia”. The essay suggests that Australia was included in Asia, possibly because missionaries classified as “Asian” Maori, Hawaiians and First Nations peoples from the Americas. The reports on Mrs Ahok in the journal pose versions of the same preoccupation: “How could we raise the women of India, Ceylon, and China to their rightful dignity?” The conversion narrative of Mrs Ahok provided the answer.

Laura Askew Haygood is a third example of the pervasive shaping power of missiological knowledge. The daughter of a slave-holding minister’s family, educated at Wesleyan College, Haygood spent her
early adulthood as a teacher, administrator and Mission Board official. She had a long-term interest in China, which the Sinologist Young John Allen had cultivated in her. She went to Shanghai expressly to work with Allen and establish a model day school for Chinese girls and women, McTyeire Home and School; her biographers wrote extensively about her advertising strategies and fundraising, as well as the joint stock company she established to finance the purchase of land and property. Haygood’s general observations are bookish and missiologically structured.

Mrs Ahok, Smith and Haygood shared the same set of presuppositions about Asian women’s conditions, which each woman’s work expressed differently. Their common conjecture held that Protestant Christianity, usually Methodism, held the key to resolving oppression just as it had alleviated the suffering of slaves in the United States, the wives of “Mohammedans” and all the other zenanas or secluded women, as they were known, of the British Orient. This rhetoric helped women at home to contribute to the cause. Haygood spoke eloquently about missiology’s intellectual presuppositions, though like most missionary women she did not write in a sustained analytic mode. Male figures who did, established general systems to stabilize renewable social outreach institutions.

**Knowledge and Missiology**

When Mrs. Gracey raised the question of the “sufficiency” of knowledge about heathen women’s conditions as a factor in recruiting, she was pointing out that erudition about Asia was cumulative. Late 19th century American women’s missiological strategies rested on a massive volume of knowledge gathering, citations, and normative studies of the East collected earlier in the 19th century, such as David Abeel’s *Journal of a Residence in China and the Neighboring Countries from 1829 to 1833*. Abeel, the first to advocate for unmarried women missionaries in the Asia field, wrote extensively and systematically about the abomination of infanticide: the method of killing, the ratio of infants allegedly permitted to live, the allegation that infanticide led to the assassination of elderly parents.

A more sophisticated work of Asianist erudition is the missionary and missiologist Howard Malcolm’s 1839 two-volume *Travels in South-eastern Asia*. Malcolm truly marks the beginning of a transition from
British colonialism to what emerged after the 1860s as the US colonial project in Asia. Because US missiology focused on Asia, the region—no matter how defined (that is, it only indirectly targeted the British empire and Latin America)—and because of the tenor of the emerging US empire, Malcolm’s field reports were rooted in the political economy of commercial capitalism. He wrote extensively on how to finance religious printing offices, steam paper mills and durable typesetting. These schemes included accumulating mission property and selling coupons to shareholders. In fact, *Travels* is a brief for investing Christian capital into China-oriented projects in anticipation of China’s “opening”. Malcolm wrote about “taking” China circuitously by a strategy of evangelizing overseas Chinese throughout the Pacific Asia region. He arrived in China after extensive field studies at mission stations in India, Burma, Singapore and Malaysia, ready to maximize his own China initiatives. He wrote about the terrain and the languages of the peoples living where he hoped to displace local customs.

There are several implicit measures at work in *Travels in Southeastern Asia*. One is that for Malcolm, region and civilization were co-terminus. Another measure concerned China’s relative economic power in the Chinese-dominated Asian regional political economy. Malcolm’s preoccupation with China and its diaspora rested in part on developed international political economy. The third was the Roman alphabet. To Malcolm in the 1830s and Smith in the 1880s, mission work was Bible-centred. That meant either teaching English or translating the Bible into local languages. Malcolm argued that transliterating heterogeneous Asian languages was cost effective, and he rationalized his position in several ways. Chinese script, ancient and even beautiful, was a barrier to women’s uplift and “knowledge of the proper attributes of Deity”. He truly believed that the Roman script was universal.

Because the Bible addressed women, the effect of Malcolm’s regionally based Asia strategies was to set missiology onto a path dependent on Asian women. In the 1830s and 1840s male Christians like Gutzlaff, Abeel and Malcolm and early American female Asia evangelists like Henrietta Shuck (Hong Kong), Sarah Smith (Japan) and Ann Judson (Burma) had already noted a characteristically “Asian” style of feminine debasement. By the 1870s such writing was prodigious; Rev. Ross C. Houghton’s 1877 *Women of the Orient* systematized and
made it canonical and universal. Houghton combined citations and his own direct observations about Asia (which for him consisted of the old Orient of Egypt, Syria, Turkey and India along with the new, American, East of Japan and China).

*Women of the Orient* systematized a hallmark American missionary slogan: “The Gospel of Jesus is *eminently a gospel to woman.*” Houghton created a life cycle grid and filled out stages of Oriental female degradation placing Asian woman at the centre. “In the Orient,” he noted, “a female child may be permitted to live for various reasons, among which are the following, some of which apply more particularly to China.” In sequential chapters titled “Birth”, “Infanticide”, “Education”, “Binding the Feet in China”, “Betrothal”, “Marriage in Japan”, “Marriage in China”, “Marriage in India” and “Polygamy and Divorce”, Houghton made his case that all women in Asia shared degraded life cycles because heathen regional practices led to punishing social conventions and that his ranking of specific national degradations of women in Asia indexed Asian characteristics.

In 1871 Houghton took part in a debate that the *Heathen Woman’s Friend* had opened over the slogan “Christianity is the woman’s Magna Carta.” Not all missionaries concurred on the thesis of pan-Asian degradation, so the debate is actually refreshingly agonistic. It also focused not on the bodies but on the souls of Chinese women. Rev. H. Mansell took the position that the missiological theses on degradation had to be about souls. From India, he wrote:

> I belong to that class of ardent ones, who look upon the condition of any heathen or idolatrous people as *intensely bad* in every respect, and I try with all my power to better it; and yet I must confess that those who take a more favorable view are usually those who have investigated the subject very well, and if we discard their writings we will often lose valuable information….Read all you can, then, and form your judgments from the whole. *The women of India cannot be as happy as those of America.*

In November 1871 Mrs. Rev. H.N. Lowry in “A Word From Peking” argued the familiar thesis that illiteracy, ignorance and polygamy made it impossible for Chinese women to be elevated “from heathenism and slavery to the position of a human being.” Nonetheless, in the
same issue Rev. J.M. Thoburn cautioned enthusiasts to rest their case on evidence. Horrible stories were circulating “which are true, without being truthful”.54

The epistemic question of what exactly degradation meant was problematic and reappears in altered form in James Clavell’s vision of Asia, which rebukes the missiological position and argues that Asian women in social evolution play a significant but secondary and natural role in the evolution of capitalism. Asian women are happy because they understand their sexual needs and their secondariness (see Part 2). But for the Rev. J.W. Waugh in the March 1872 issue of *Heathen Woman’s Friend*, it was a libel and perhaps blasphemous to claim that heathen parents discounted their children. Like all of God’s children “they do obey our common nature’s behest”. It was not true that “heathen parents do not love their children, both male and female”.55 But even the natural love of Hindu parents for their children did not ameliorate the fact of “horrid, corrupting heathenism”. In other words, *epistemically speaking* all humanity had the same claim on basic altruism towards offspring because the Almighty had made us filial. In the various vernacular societies of Asia, however, heathen “steps inhere at the very threshold of a new life, and so warps and distorts the view of these loving parents”. The high rates of female infanticide could not be attributed to physical want but were the effects of religious oppression.

What is to be drawn from the growth over a century of missiological knowledge? First, as scholars have argued for two decades now, these catalogues of abuses were not groundless. Foot binding, female infanticide, widow sacrifice and so on imposed forms of brutality on elite women in societies where missionaries undertook conversion projects. Second, if the word “culture” is substituted for “religion” in the debate over the causes of Asian women’s degradation a century later, debates on women’s international human rights raise similar questions and struggle with the problem of happiness, too, the question being how women can be happy if they do not have their human rights.

Third, foundational Christian missiology delivered the argument that not just Asian but all women deserved better. This is a point made in Coffin’s *Our New War Round the World*. “One of the glories of the Christian religion,” he wrote, is “that it elevates woman; and one of the brightest features of the time, that men are coming into clearer
perceptions of the claims of the female sex.”

Coffin was convinced that a wave of progress would roll across the Pacific to Asia from the good men in the United States and Britain and their good example. But even if the situation on Coffin’s side of the Pacific was actually bleaker than he let on, the merits of his position are clear. His measure held up and was equally efficacious no matter where the claim to female elevation might be made. Christian missiology, developed in Asia to fight specific Asian abuses of women, had incubated modern female uplift as a universal claim.

This discussion of missiological erudition points to several further generalities. Active missionary women and men criss-crossed the world learning and creating knowledge about a place they called Asia. In the end the wholesale or systematic quality of heathen Asian women’s degradation—as opposed to theories about their physical discomfort—is the common denominator marking Asia as a distinctive place. Literacy projects for female conversion linked Romanization projects to women’s natural rights in the belief that access to the Christian Bible would save Asian women (just as later, under Ford Foundation auspices, Our Bodies Our Selves would be translated and published in Chinese to save Chinese women’s ownership of their own bodies).

Clavell and Capital Accumulation

In 1978 [Newt] Gingrich [Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives] was reading the novel “Shōgun,” by James Clavell and… a major character—Toranaga, a seventeenth-century samurai warlord—had a powerful influence on him. Daryl Conner, too, told me that Toranaga was a critical model for Gingrich.

“Newt said, ‘Toranaga, I think is the perfect example of a leader—you should read it,’” [Carlyle] Gregory said. “The way Toranaga used people and manipulated events and built a mythology about himself—I think that had a lot to do with how Newt saw himself.”

Clavellian erudition mapped Cold War Asia in the “male interest fiction” of the 1980s and reflected and shaped American historians, political scientists and politicians because it celebrated a global telos of capital accumulation. Male interest fiction was an industry-wide category for generic fiction in the last decades of the 20th century. Gingrich was by no means the only Toranaga groupie in politics, and Clavell was not the only writer of male interest fiction. Tom Clancy,
who wrote the thriller series *The Hunt for Red October* (1984), *Red Storm Rising* (1986) and *The Cardinal of the Kremlin* (1988), was also favoured among American policy experts of the time. During the heyday of the Cold War the culture industry pumped out hundreds of novels replicating Clavellian stereotypes, logics and presuppositions. The major mass market writers Larry Bond, Malcolm Bosse, Clive Cussler, Adam Hall, Eric Helm, David Klass, Pamela Longfellow, Tim Lukeman, Colin Maxwell, Marc Olden, Barth Sussman, Paul Wilson, Eric Van Lustbader and David Wingrove—the list of second- and third-tier writers would be endless—produced fiction that recycled the Asia that Clavell canonized in the Cold War era.

A hard right-wing style anarchist realist, who fused together the “Objectivist Individualism” of the pseudo-philosopher Ayn Rand (1902–82), the US John Birch Society’s brand of demonic anti-communism, and William Buckley’s vision of the US class system rooted in merit, Clavell narrativized conservative cultural politics, laissez-faire economic theory and anti-communism. His pop literary Asianism surpassed all competitors and left a persistent record of direct and indirect citations in Cold and post-Cold War middle-brow fiction, pedagogy, popular film, and from that erudition into mainstream political and cultural theory. Samuel Huntington’s theories about culture and civilization are utterly congruent with Clavell’s fictional and political positions.

In other words, male interest erudition saturated politics, news reporting, TV culture, iconography, advertising and children’s culture over the last three decades of the 20th century and propagated a mythic cultural erudition about capitalism, culture clashes and evolutionary inevitability. Clavell’s *Asia Saga* (examined below in this section) has been recycled, sampled, tasted, cribbed, infantilized and mocked. The *Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtles* (1987), *Mighty Morphin Power Rangers* (1993) and *Superhuman Samurai Syber-Squad* (1994) are television series for children that rip off Clavell’s cultural essentialism and have captivated generations. A charming 2006 satire of the classic Clavellian-Lustbader ninja fighter story *Wendy Wu, Homecoming Warrior* generically fuses Buffy the Teenager Vampire Slayer and Jackie Chan-style comedic martial arts to a plot set in a Valley Girl high school screenplay about a Clavellian multigenerational saga regarding Chinese and Chinese American identities and a hero’s rediscovery of the real “Chinese tradition”.
However infantilized, Clavell is not a laughing matter. Like the Biblical presuppositions that guided Asia missiology and its generic conventions, Clavell’s erudition has been sufficiently banalized that it is unremarkable. It has disappeared like an old stain into the fabric of US popular arts. What it leaves behind is consumers’ obsessive interest in “Japanese culture” fused with a fear and loathing of the Chinese, each articulated and propagated in Clavellian-like narratives about the clash of good and evil cultures and the great dynasties that govern the political and, more important for the world, the economic fate of all Asia. To briefly summarize 10,000 pages of Clavell’s pretentious writing is not to anyone’s advantage, but some understanding of the core plot of his “The Asia Saga” is because it bears on the author’s political claims and their long-lived role in US media.

Clavell’s “The Asian Saga” consists of the novels *King Rat* (1962), *Taipan* (1966), *Shōgun* (1975), *Noble House* (1981), *Whirlwind* (1986) and *Gai-jin* (1993). Clavell’s Asia is a map of the international accumulation of capital mediated through cultural differences that are appropriate to a specific stage of global development or “modernization”. The novels did not appear in chronological order. However, the plot arc focuses on economic imperialism and its positive evolutionary role in human history. Thus, for instance, the third and most popular novel, *Shōgun*, discloses a secret history of the English colonial drive into Asia, why England defeated the Portuguese, French and Dutch, and how it came about that Japan attained European rationality without England having to directly colonize it. (The fabulous “Japan” of this novel owed its charisma to Clavell’s ability to spin a great yarn but also to the contemporary widespread perception that efficient Japanese capitalism was threatening US dominance in the world system.) In the novel, the pilot of the fictional ship the *Erasmus*, John Blackthorne, brings into a closed Japanese “feudal” cultural system the DNA or seeds of European rationality that will develop an island nation into a capitalist powerhouse three centuries later. Blackthorne struggles to resolve his Protestant Reformation rationalism with the spiritual code of the warrior, or Tokugawa-era samurai. By the end of this novel Blackthorne is a *bushi* (he owns his enemy’s *katana* or long sword, which in endless spin-offs becomes the unsuble signifier of the Japanese phallus) and a foreigner, a European and a Japanese, a mathematician and an ethicist, a representative of European rationality and an advocate of Asian social superiority, particularly in the area of
hygiene, which sets off another endless evocation of Japanese bathing rituals that characterize the entire genre of Cold War Asianist writing.

*Taipan*, novel number two in the Saga, begins in 1841 with the Opium Wars and the European Treaty Port system. It initiates a sanga-long competition between good capital and bad capital in the figures of Dirk Struan and Tyler Brock. As the major missiologists had, Clavell believed that the centrality of China in world capitalism was inevitable. *Shōgun* delivers the secret history of Japanese cultural preconditions for global capitalism; *Taipan* relates the secret cultural factors that awakened China to its capitalist destiny. The novel circles around the evolutionary role of the opium trade, which, Clavell argues, was a positive event because it introduced the idea of commodity exchange to “Chinese culture” although it had a negative impact on individual addicts. European and US rationality drive this esoteric foundationalism of bio-capital and capital answers to a higher authority than missionary notions of liberation, cultural uplift or female political emancipation. Dirk Struan and his faithful mistress, May-may, perish together in a typhoon, symbolizing the legitimacy of Struan’s genetic line and its organic connection to Asia. The white man is Asia.

In the Saga’s third major installment, *Gai-jin*, Clavell discloses the true meaning of the 1860 Meiji Restoration, which in his vision organically restructured the region of Asia, enabling white men, mixed-race men, and the latter’s Asian wives and consorts to quickly reconsolidate global capital. Toranaga Yoshi, a scion of the original shōgun, fights historical inevitability. Despite Yoshi’s agonistic struggles, the shōgunate must fall in order that Japanese capital accumulation can accelerate and the island state can aggressively modernize, or become what historians call an empire, an imperialist power. Despite readers’ by this time engrained love for martial Japanese values, the 1862 Satsuma Rebellion and the subsequent Meiji Reform era abolish samurai-dom, and the Clavellian regional link between “Japan” and “China” and “Hong Kong” is fully established. (Hong Kong was Clavell’s ideal culture forged of Chinese respect for family, Japanese zen compliance with the *wa* [being] of existentialism, and Anglo democratic, individualistic, laissez-faire values forged into one new stage of capital accumulation.) This historical period posits evolution of the four key Asia family lines or dynasties.
The 1963 setting for *Noble House* introduces the major taipan Ian Dunross and pits the good capitalist model against the chaotic trading company Rothwell-Gornt and its anti-hero, a scion of the Brock-Gornt lineage. The Straun dynasty is rule-governed, sensitive to injustice, ethical when possible, but it confronts a world of madness; the Brock-Gornt dynasty of lawless capitalists, criminal gangs, Cold War espionage unrelated to capital accumulation, as well as weaknesses, open an Asian-based firm to possible hostile US-based corporate takeover. Titanic struggles (struggles in this genre are never less than titanic) unfold whenever Dunross must reassert the positive, Asia-based, progressive, redemptive corporate forms of giant capital. So the final volume, *Whirlwind*, takes the Straun dynasty from “East Asia” to the old Ottoman empire, the “Middle East” and the 1979 Iranian Revolution. Like Michael Corleone in the 1972 movie *The Godfather*, seeking legitimacy for his mass of capital, taipan Dunross dispatches a Straun consigliore, Andrew Gavallan (who has roots in the Chinese Wu family) to establish a real estate empire in the North Sea and integrate the family business into the emergent oil industry and its technology sector, never to sell opium again.

Clavell’s history of global capital accumulation cemented the notion of thick and impenetrable Asian “culture” in the immediate post-Pacific War era popular imagination. Commentators have discussed Clavell’s auto-didacticism and the alleged historical roots of his literary imagination. A branch of popular erudition tracks how the characters in the Saga are “real people” and the works possess real documentary basis, as demonstrated below. Clavell himself loved to tease about the line he blurred between history and fiction. In *Gai-jin* he states explicitly that his novel “is not history but fiction” and yet it might just be more real because works of history “do not necessarily always relate what truly happened” and consequently that he has “played with history—the where and how and who and why and when of it—to suit my own reality and, perhaps, to tell the real history of what came to pass”.

Periodization of the desire and logic of capital underlie Clavell’s taunting claim to be writing realer history than the historians, the history in “history” or secret history. Like the missiologists whom he loathed, Clavell’s historical stake was his claim to be demonstrating universality—the evolutionary power of capital accumulation—
working its way through the particularist diversity of cultures. His work is powerful because by this logic he seized the historian’s prerogative of periodization and dramatized specific historical moments. His teleology fictionalizes European capital expansionism over a longue durée, and it alleges that heroic white men and natural Asian women seeded Asia with their multiracial sons and planted the logic of capital in the Orient. The real story of what came to pass is not about the facticity of the historical company Jardine Matheson, but rather an allegedly deeper story of how “great houses”, noble and ignoble, accumulated great fortunes and engaged in great commercial development of the hinterlands, also known to professional historians as the colonies. According to Clavellian-style Asianism, the historical truth lies in the allegation that robber barons and their compradors invented Asian capitalism and that only a politically correct storyteller can teach it right.

Clavell directly inverts missiology in his thesis that only Asian women truly understand the biological imperative connecting procreation and capital accumulation. Men must seek fertile women throughout life, and natural women seek behind the scenes power once their sexual attractiveness disappears. The men of the Straun, Chen, Toranaga and Brock families intermarry and produce sons who form open marriages with stalwart power-seeking women such as the Struan concubine May-may, Tess Brock and the unforgettable Mariko, who sacrifices her life to Blackthorne and Toranaga, thus setting off an unspeakable frenzy of dagger-plunging female suicides in this genre. Clavellian women are never blighted souls or degraded bodies awaiting redemption in Christ, but natural, biological companions to the white man’s drive for a world historical outpost in Asia.

Clavell’s bio-capitalist “spirit of world history” is most clearly stated in his first novel, King Rat, which he wrote at the height of the Cold War hostilities in 1962, just after completing his 1958 metaphysical movie, The Fly.57 King Rat takes place in the historical Japanese army prison Changi, located in occupied Singapore, where Clavell claimed to have briefly been a POW. Changi is said to be a “genesis, the place of beginning again” (8). Although critics have pointed out that Clavell did not get any of the facts right, in a literary sense the novel’s ahistoricity reinforces the views that forward the origin story for his Saga.
King Rat is Hobbesian in two foundational ways. First, it promotes Hobbes’ version of the authoritarian social contract, which compels citizens to obey the sovereign in order to avoid the state of nature. Clavellian supermen bend lesser people and societies to their will for that charitable reason. Second, Hobbes’ natural philosophy underwrites Clavell’s interest in business competition and ethico-naturalist activities that turn capitalist values into evolutionary ones, remaking the state of nature in emphatic value-making activities. Clavell’s point is that capitalism is what keeps the state of nature at bay.

Pop Hobbesianism provided Clavell a remarkable philosophic agon. King Rat promotes an ethics and an erotics of submission, which Clavell eventually mutated into his enormously attractive libidinous “bushido ethos”. He devised a magical value system he called “Japanese culture” or Asian culture, and he used the derivative ideas to characterize political authority and taipans who became modern shōguns, and Chinese compradors (e.g., the Eurasian Chen family) and bandits, who all compelled submission from inferiors to save ordinary people from scarcity, brutality, abuse of power and rape. The agon of “Japanese culture”, which Clavell suggests was Asia-wide, was that shōguns could not become capitalists on their own because Japanese and Asian values required leavening from “the West”. Submitting to a white, “Chinese”, Japanese-style, authoritarian taipan, for instance, was the best possible choice for all inferior peoples during the Cold War because all other alternatives, some obviously more equitable, would be less effective against counter-evolutionary Communist dictators.

King Rat lays out this logic efficiently. At Changi the Japanese guards are “child-like” figures who accidently engage in violence as boys might haphazardly kill a kitten. The difference between the Japanese guards and the white POWs is that the prisoners concur on a sovereign by virtue of “the true doctrine of the Lawes of Nature”, which are “the true Morall philosophie”, and live by its rules. The natural moral philosophy compels citizen-POWs to accept the authority of the American called the “King” because he is a ruthless genius and magically accumulates capital wherever he lands. Among the prisoners he is always the most fit, clean, life affirming and optimistic. He is preeminent because he keeps himself, his friends and
his subordinates alive by turning a profit and running schemes that benefit every POW in the camp. These include Philip Marlowe, a British officer who comes to understand why the King is so important to the survival of all. The King can afford every commodity—meat, eggs, cigarettes, medicine, watches, entertainment, women—available in the bare life of camp society; his plenty is presented as unfair only in the sense that Natural Law is itself unjust.

The King is an absolute hierarch by two rationales. First, some men are born more talented at wealth making than others. Clavell detests the British class system and its penchant for putting untalented or unsuitable men in positions of command. He offers the example of the US character type, the King, who gives everyone around him the chance to play the capitalist game by franchising his operations and cutting in everyone who wants wealth, so there are never pure losers or winners (except himself) in economic exchanges. The King’s instinctive drive is to make material life better for all at the expense of some. In the pure market society of Changi prison, capitalism brings together heroic men to befriend one another and lesser men to serve them. So, second, the King is an absolutist capitalist because he rules over a capitalist system that is essentially generous and life affirming. Not “fair”, it does not seek to enlighten, convert, reform or salvage humans. Natural law trumps religion.

The King turns everything into a commodity. Learning native techniques, he cures tobacco; and once he has franchised out his technique, he undercuts pricing in the prison market that he has created to neutralize his own franchisees so he can reinvest his capital in a new venture. The King sees potential everywhere. He single-handedly runs the black market in watches, cigarette lighters and, of course, rats. Defending his meat racket, he notes that since rats are “scavengers, like microbes”, without them “the whole world’d be a stink-pile” (98). It takes a capitalist to create value out of nature’s raw materials. As Clavell puts it: “We got one rat….All we’ve got to do is find out if it’s a male or a female. Then we get the opposite one. We put them together. Presto, we’re in business” (99–100). Under the King, the original rats—Adam and Eve—transform a hellish prison camp into capitalist heaven stocked with the processed commodities that nature’s abundance offers. The King gives his citizens a good life and social capital.
This is the heart of Clavell’s vision, and he closes the novel with a meditation on the laws of nature. When V-J day arrives, the men are liberated. They leave and return to their various national cultures, stupid social inequality in inherited class society in the post-war economic order. They leave the state of nature to the rats; the spooky italics appear in the original text:

*And the rats.*

_They were still there. Beneath the hut. And many had died, for they had been forgotten by their captors. But the strongest were still alive._

_Adam was tearing at the wire to get at the food outside his cage, fighting the wire as he had been fighting it for so long as he had been within the cage. And his patience was rewarded…. Eve joined him and he had his fill of her and she of him and then they foraged in consort. Later the whole side of a trench collapsed, and many cages were opened and the living fed on the dead, and the living-weak became food for the living-strong until the survivors were equally strong. And then they fought among themselves and foraged._

_And Adam ruled, for he was the King. Until the day his will to be King deserted him. Then he died, food for a stronger. And the strongest was always the King, not by strength alone, but King by cunning and luck and strength together. Among the rats (352)._

“Among the rats” is to say not among the humans. Humans do not exist exclusively in the spiral of natural selection. Humans are value-producing mammals that rely on culture and industry to evolve. A rat natural law is a contradiction in terms, for rat procreation is nothing more than a state of nature. Only humans, among the mammals, translate desire into capital accumulation. Biology reinforces society, but human desire prompts competition; the sovereign authority must stabilize social relations in service to accumulation. This is Clavell’s secret core of history’s truth.

**Erudition**

The paradox of potboilers or blockbusters is that while they cement key concepts they are exempted from criticism. Just as Christian literacy was unremarkable in 19th century missiology, knowledge about US Asia remains just “known”. On a Wednesday evening, 15 March 1996, the radio talk show “Fresh Air” was on and Marty Moss-Coane
was interviewing the China specialist Orville Schell about his latest book. Moss-Coane opened with the question of why American citizens always got bilked by Chinese in political and trade negotiations. American citizens rely on notions of fair play, Schell declared, whereas the Chinese, steeped in Sun Tzu’s infamous 36 strategies—the touchstone of Chinese thinking for thousands upon thousands of years—play for keeps and therefore resort to pretence—pretending to be a friend, for instance—to achieve their goals. Schell’s reference to Sun Tzu is a ripe bit of Clavellian knowledge, and in fact Clavell even polished a translation of the piece as part of propagating the idea that Chinese have the cultural skill to deceive because they cut their teeth on Sun Tzu. The “expert” Schell was cavalierly applying national characteristics to China that had only recently been systematically attributed to Japan. He was nominating China to replace Japan as the United States’ scariest and most treacherously “cultural” trade partner. And most remarkable of all, with casual and authoritative chauvinism, Schell transmitted to listeners the oldest clichés in the world of mass market, male-oriented, popular Asia fiction, as scholarship.

This is not surprising because Clavell’s 1975 Shōgun had spawned a pop-“scholarly” interpretive industry, and five years later—in 1980—a 12-hour Shōgun TV series, projecting “an image of quality programming for television”, screened on NBC. This 1980 media event included publications explaining Clavell’s erudition and showing how, as Henry Smith put it, one could “learn from Shōgun”. Pedagogic aids included Michael Macintyre’s The Shōgun Inheritance: Japan and the Legacy of the Samurai; Henry Smith’s edited volume Learning from Shōgun: Japanese History and Western Fantasy; and the Stanford University guide—part of a series titled “Teaching Japan in the Schools”—Shōgun: A Guide for Classroom Use. Delta Books put out a fan book called The Making of James Clavell’s Shōgun with pictures, harrowing production stories and cultural tidbits. Even now, intricate, footnoted online fan sites exist about the major families and characters in the Clavell Saga along with more current Reader’s Guides, which cycle the same interpretive frameworks and reference points over and over. There is even a commentary, as when Gina Macdonald writes knowingly about the “masterful control of perceptions” in the “gripping portrait of gradual acculturation” in Shōgun’s “sophistication about the clash of cultures”, which has “much to teach modern readers”, during the Cold War.
So what were contemporary readers supposed to learn from Clavell’s erudition? The Japan historian Henry Smith observed that readers were getting a “popular-cultural version of Harvard sociologist Ezra Vogel’s controversial Japan as Number One (1979), which proposes that America has much to learn from Japan in terms of social, political, and economic institutions”. The TV series had actually quashed Smith’s expectations, he wrote in his Postscript. Unlike the novel’s charming story of mutual understanding, where Americans are instructed to learn Japanese ways because they are superior, Smith claimed that the “theme of ‘learning from Japan,’ which we considered so fundamental to the novel”, had been reversed and Blackthorne became instead “an aloof victim of Japanese aggression” who was a samurai by adhering to his “Western values”.73 Co-contributors to the Smith manual mostly corrected minor concerns, such as there were actually six earlier versions of the Will Adams story; James Clavell did not spend any time in Asia during his childhood; the romance with Japan was an inexplicable conversion narrative; and Japanese “tradition” had been invented many times before Clavell.

_Shogun: A Guide for Classroom Use_ was even more eager to illustrate how much history could be extracted from the novel and TV series. The Japan historian Peter Duus endorsed the _Guide_ and justified the novel and TV series on the grounds that despite superficial errors—using “banzai” is anachronistic, and a samurai does not “cock” his sword—Clavell had got the essence of Japan right. More than Smith, Duus confirmed the legitimacy of Clavellian logic in two ways. First, he noted that in his own historical writing he took positions similar to Clavell’s on questions of culture, barbarity and “continuities within change”. They shared, he wrote, a belief in Japan’s singularly thick culture, an essence that had stewed in the 300-year-old Petri dish of cultural isolation yielding a cultural Galapagos Island. So while “values and social attitudes undergo transformation over time… a cultural essence persists” (3). Second, Duus endorsed Clavellian historiography by agreeing with Clavell’s major claim about global capitalist diffusion. Duus drew on Cold War modernization theory and endorsed the Blackthorne figure because the “economic and cultural impact of Blackthorne and his crew on the Japanese was tremendous” (35). As the _Guide_ argued, “trade was a significant catalyst for cross-cultural activity” in the 17th century as it is today, when the “level of mutual penetration” is vastly larger. The _Guide_
provides a lesson plan, “U.S.-Japan Trade”, which allows American schoolchildren to work on geopolitics of trade and engage in role playing around questions such as “How might Japan’s dependence on trade affect its relations with other nations, especially the United States, Germany, fellow Asian countries, and the Middle East?” And it provides worksheets so that students can gather “data” about Japanese-branded commodities in their own homes.

Duus wanted “accuracy” in detail. He believed that the historian was responsible for correcting errors of fact. That left him free to endorse Clavell’s periodization, and particularly to commemorate Clavell’s depiction of Japanese culture. On the question “What is history?” Clavell and Duus concurred. The modernization narrative common to them neglected the history of Japanese territorial expansion, colonization projects, forced industrialization, the War in the Pacific, the post-War US occupation, and the political, economic symbiosis of Japanese and US Free World Order. Duus never had to question his methodological or theoretical assumptions, because historians and fabulists held them to be self-evident: they reinforced each other. “Shōgun brings life to Japanese history in a way no scholarly text can” (5) because the novel, the Viewer’s Guide to James Clavell’s Shōgun and Duus’s historiography share a pedagogic position.74

The Viewer’s Guide was adult pedagogy, too. It summarized prevailing academic opinion about cultures and culture shock, appealed to expert opinion, and democratically engaged viewers as potential erudites. References to scholarship appear in the guide’s copious footnotes to Edward T. Hall, Alvin Toffler, Masao Kunshiro, Raymond Cormier, Ruth Benedict, Ivan Morris, William Forbis, Hosegawa Nyosekan, Edwin O. Reischauer, Robert Bellah, John Whitney Hall, Robert Jay Lifton, George Sansom and Paul Varley. In the lesson plan NBC and its experts provided for viewers, there are the following assurances. First, “Shōgun is a high-class entertainment but it is also a journey with ample educational value. This television production elicits our involvement and challenges us to become something more than passive spectators.” The challenge involves suggestions that viewers form Shōgun clubs and read the novel and the supplementary text on the making of the TV series.

Second, ambitious viewing collectivities should engage Shōgun as an occasion for informal anthropological fieldwork and make observations on Japanese life—housing arrangements, eating habits, sexual
practices, reactions to death, ways of greeting strangers, bodily adornment, decorative arts, division of labour, etiquette, folklore, funeral rites, gestures, gift-giving rituals, attitudes towards hygiene, language, law, status differentiation, etc. The TV program serves as a starting point for an extended study of Japanese culture. Bibliographies lead to more “information [and]…those who are especially interested in a personal experience with Shōgun and Japan may want to keep a diary in which they record their feelings, reflections, and insights gained from the TV presentation. A diary of this kind can be a vehicle for personal growth” (4).

When adults reviewed Clavell’s work, the same suspension of belief usually prevailed. Again unselfconscious pedagogic openness is on display, whether the reviewer is Terry Teachout, William Buckley, Christopher Lehmann-Haupt or Burton Pollin.75 When Thomas Edwards posed the question “Why would anyone, of any age, occupation, or state of culture, want to read such a book?” the rhetorical question attacked Clavell’s alleged lack of erudition about Iranian politics during the Pahlavi regime and not his super-right-wing politics, inane plotting and transparently foolish ideas.76

A knowing handle on global telos of capital accumulation and the struggle of great agonistic men to get on the right side of history are Clavell’s potboiler, Asianist legacy. The reviews, guides, critiques, accounts, wannabe novels, satires, websites have spread this form of cultural literacy far and wide. Like a bad love affair, the confusion over what Asian culture is and where it ends has not been resolved, because criticism cannot call into question the foundational assumptions of the 1980s or resolve that the Japan-centred historiography of that era resembles in many ways the colonial love that male-identified readers felt for that defeated “enemy culture” of Japan. The suturing of Japan to Asia has had the effect of presuming thick cultures throughout a region that coalesces when a magisterial white man tells magical stories about economic DNA, political reason and biological regionalization.

∗∗∗∗∗

Wendy Wu: Homecoming Warrior (2006) perfectly assembles much of the erudition described here. Even Hillary Clinton could not fault Wendy’s Buffy the Vampire Slayer-like solidity as a rights-bearing
human person, morally intact (even virginal), learning heterosexuality and martial arts to protect her own well-being, exercising and eating well, and relearning her racial-cultural heritage in order to save Chinese culture and also, given her hyphenated position, to globalize her country, the United States, that is, extend its cosmopolitan universality. Wendy’s union with the avatar Shin, the very, very handsome real Chinese man from the past (“I’ve been eating mooncakes for thousands of years. Let’s go get a cappuccino”), reconciles past and present, cultural China and liberated United States, for their destiny is to marry and to live a Chinese American life of capital accumulation in a triumphant US paradise. Two years before the 2008 global financial crisis, the union of a virile Chinese man and a warrior American girl, Adam and Eve, reconciles differences again in family formation. Asianism, like Eurocentrism, Americanism and orientalism, is shown again to be a warm, cute, descriptive, prescriptive part of everyday common sense in Disney World.

Two objectives have driven this inquiry. First, faux scholarship is a palliative: scholars must take responsibility as public intellectuals and critically displace these ideas. Second, popular Asianisms’ extraordinary level of detail and the repetition of the same signifiers year in and year out (infanticide, polygamy, capital accumulation, bathtubs, suicide, bloody juggernauts, femininity based on an acknowledgement of its evolutionary secondariness, dagger plunging, heroic fighting women, family as corporation, etc.) hammer big, old ideas into a sweet familiar banality. Calling attention to the difference between erudition and detail, historiography and storytelling, critique and ideology helps decelerate the cycle and illuminate Asianisms’ repetitive, ideological operation.

Walter Benjamin-style immanent critique of writing, attention to historical indiscernibility a la Badiou, a caution from De Certeau that the project of history must be to show how history’s logic as a lived and written experience changes over time, and a detailed archival adventure intended to draw attention to the giant archive of US Asianisms have laid out one historical pathway. Mass popular understanding of natural philosophy and natural law, sexual evolution, Christian ethics, and pleasurable storytelling about Asian lives and folkways can be connected to histories of many kinds. Immanent critique usefully clarifies past Asianisms as untenable, or untruthful, because their predicate—cultural difference in relation to capitalism—
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is and is not a universal. In liberal political theory, difference instantiates universality because difference is always part of a whole: the problem is that the whole is rarely severely examined or questioned. “Cultural difference” is, in the end, considered remediable because it is a part that has not yet evolved into the whole—for example, recognition and authorization of implicit, natural, universal women’s human rights, God’s universal soul, and, perhaps most important of all, the universal work of capital. We can barely discern historical givens in our own daily life, as the Badiou position notes, but finding out the history of things helps us act when decisions lie within our competency.

Notes

1. Tani Barlow is Chaired Visiting Professor at Shanghai Jiaotong University’s Institute for Arts and Humanities. I thank Professor Liu Kang, Professor Lu Tongling and Dr. Jing Chen for their companionship and support during my residence. This essay is dedicated to my father, Claude A. Barlow (1922–95), son and nephew of missiologists and avid consumer of male interest fiction.


3. “The Asia-Pacific has become a key driver of global politics. Stretching from the Indian subcontinent to the western shores of the Americas, the region spans two oceans—the Pacific and the Indian—that are increasingly linked by shipping and strategy. It boasts almost half the world’s population. It includes many of the key engines of the global economy, as well as the largest emitters of greenhouse gases. It is home to several of our key allies and important emerging powers like China, India, and Indonesia” (Hillary Clinton, Foreign Policy, Nov. 2011). For Xi Jinping’s summit with Obama in May 2013, see the State Department’s Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/americas_pacific_century?wp_login_redirect=0; IIP Kathryn McConnell, “Digital Obama Seeks More Funds for Asia-Pacific Operations”, 17 May 2013; and http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/article/2013/05/20130517147599.html#ixzz2YKW1NAg2, all accessed 8 Dec. 2014.

4. A serious philosophic debate broke out in 1995 among Clinton-style international feminists. See Julie Peters and Andrea Wolper, eds, Women’s


6. Stephen Howe, “Edward Said and Marxism: Anxieties of Influence”, Cultural Critique 67 (Fall 2007): 50–87; Gilbert Achcar, Marxism, Orientalism, Cosmopolitanism (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2013). Established objections to the concept of orientalism are that it is inaccurate, essentializing, ambivalent, indiscriminate and culturalist and that it refuses to recognize a prior history of criticism to which it contributes. Although I, like Said, examine racist, sloppy, idealist thinking, I use the term “faux scholarship”. The material presented does not belong to any scholarly tradition. It is popular, middlebrow, highly invested writing that gives readers an illusion of historical causality without introducing critical distance, an understanding of how the past differs from the present, evidence or scholarly sources, historiographic debate, or scholarly disagreements. This form of writing confuses history, a lived experience, with history, writing purporting to be an account of the lived experience.


9. Note that Robert is claiming that this Asianism shaped a US-located social reform movement. I will not pursue this argument here, but I think she is correct.

Missiology means the theory of mission work and its intellectual objectives. “As women’s groups founded their own journals to disseminate missionary intelligence to their constituencies [in the US and in the mission fields], a common missiology emerged, known as ‘Woman’s Work for Woman.’… The proponents… assumed that non-Christian religions led to the degradation of women, while Christianity provided not only salvation but ‘civilization,’ the nineteenth century term for social liberation, albeit in western dress” (p. 130). Contemporary scholars are developing the concept of “Protestant Empire” to describe the terrain that missiology theorized. See Carla Gardina Pestana, Protestant Empire Religion and the Making of the British Atlantic World (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009); Barbara Reeves Ellington, Kathryn Kish Sklar and Connie Shemo, Of Competing Kingdoms: Women, Mission, Nation, and the American Protestant Empire, 1812–1960 (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010).


15. Reverend Ross C. Houghton, Women of the Orient: An Account of the Religious, Intellectual, and Social Condition of Women in Japan, China, India, Egypt, Syria, and Turkey (New York: Cranston and Stowe, 1877), followed this procedure. “The following are the principal works consulted: Giriffis’s ‘Mikado’s Empire;’ Williams’s ‘Middle Kingdom;’ Doolittle’s
'Social Life of the Chinese; Butler's Land of the Veda;’ Humbert’s ‘Japan and the Japanese;’ M. Rousselet’s “India and Its Native Princes;” Mitford’s “Tales of Old Japan;” Marshman’s ‘History of India;’ Thomson’s ‘Land and the Book;’ and Van Lennep’s ‘Bible Lands’” (p. 4).


18. The date 1861 is memorialized because Mrs. Sarah Doremus (1802–77) of the US Woman’s Union Missionary Society began preparing unmarried missionaries for service; most went to China.


20. Mrs. J.G. (Annie Ryder) Gracey, *Eminent Missionary Women* (Chicago: Missionary Campaign Library, 1898), p. 14. This is not to imply that either American missionaries or wives of missionaries were reluctant to go into the field. Note that “Africa” appears in “Asia” as a constituent element. This is almost always the case with Egypt—part of the British Orient—but Liberia and South Africa are also included from time to time. As a female cohort they also read instructive books about wherever women missionaries sojourned—Mexico and Brazil, for instance.


22. Ibid., p. 58.


28. She talked in Burma to a community of African American men, “some from Boston, Philadelphia, and Baltimore” and some from the West
Indies and Africa. In the face of such encounters, she experienced the world expecting racial heterogeneity.


33. Ibid., pp. 97, 103, and for financial planning, p. 167.
34. Ibid., p. 411. There are few descriptions given of her relationships with individual Chinese, but Haygood stayed within her circle of friends in the US missionary movement, in the United States and other countries.
35. Zenanas were sometimes called harems. In Persian, Hindi and Urdu the word refers to the place in the home where women live.
40. Ibid., p. 212.
41. Ibid., pp. 86, 151.
42. Ibid. “The commerce of countries in and around the China Sea would form,” he suggested, “an important and interesting theme for the political economist.” That was because the region formed a pyramid. At the apex were the civilized Chinese; wild tribes populated the bottom, all of them “animated and benefited by an honorable commerce [with China], which existed for ages before the European found his way into those islands”.
43. Ibid., pp. 214–8. Malcolm felt Chinese did not reflect spoken language, did not grasp dialects, and froze the distinction of writing and speech. May Fourth Chinese intellectuals 40 years later made the same points.
44. Ibid., p. 270.
45. Ibid., p. 314. “That our alphabet is competent to the expression of any language, is proved by the number and diversity of those already written,” he stated.

46. Brouwer, *New Women for God*, pp. 97–105. Brouwer suggests that female missionaries to India declined to tell sponsors zenana work was actually unproductive because most Indian women were not secluded. Funding would have dried up.


48. Ibid., p. 61. The reasons are that she (1) provides labour for the mean classes; (2) is a tradable commodity on the marriage market; (3) is tolerated because “If the family has been blessed with sons already and they are in easy circumstances, one or two girls may be tolerated with patient resignation, or even loved after a fashion” (p. 62); (4) is harboured by a doting mother; or (5) is potentially prostituted by her parents.

49. Ibid., p. 43.


51. Rev. H. Mansell, “Uniform Testimony from India”, *Heathen Woman’s Friend* 3 (2 Aug. 1871): 161. The problem was whether heathen women could be happy despite their degradation.

52. Ibid., p. 162 (emphasis added).


57. Liu Bohong—deputy director-general and researcher at the Women’s Studies Institute of China, executive chief editor of *Collection of Women’s Studies*, member of the Sixth Population Committee of the National Population and Family Planning Commission, deputy secretary-general of the Chinese Women’s Research Society, deputy secretary-general of the China Association of Marriage and Family, researcher and center director at the Beijing Women’s Federation—shepherded the first translation of this classic feminist text through translation and publication in 1998. According to http://www.ourbodiesourselves.org/programs/network/in-progress/china.asp, a 2008 reissue does exist. There is no publication information given, its funders and distributors are not stated, and the group taking responsibility is known only as “Educate Women in China”.

59. Male interest fiction targeted male-identified, adventure-loving readers and included *The Lord of the Rings* as well as spy, espionage, Asianist and Cold War fiction in general. This category apparently no longer exists. A website now sells generic male interest fiction from a large archive, http://www.romulata.com/rfictionmale.html.

60. Eric von Lustbader, a second-generation fabulist, forwarded Clavell’s logic in his Nick Linnear ninja series and in the Robert Ludlum, post-Asianist, *Bourne Identity* franchise, which Lustbader took over in 2004. The hero, Nick Linnear, is a biracial, troubled cultural warrior who uses the ninja “code” to battle evil.


63. The structural features of the Saga appear in many deadpan, non-satirical spin-offs and are a feature of popular Asianism. For instance, the 1992 film called variously *Shōgun Warrior* or *Kabuto: Shōgun Warrior* or *Journey of Horror* is thoroughly Clavellian: a savage male competition erupts among an evil, cleric-friendly, Spanish grandee Don Pedro and a shōgun warrior, Mayeda, who is played by Toshiro Mifune.

64. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wendy_Wu:_Homecoming_Warrior TV and B movie production rests on such genre mixing. Shen, a very, very handsome priest, contacts the airhead American girl Wendy and through many plot devices convinces her that she is the reincarnation of a Chinese warrior woman and has an ethno-ethical-cultural obligation to save the universe and preserve ancient Chinese tradition. She does.

65. If I had written this essay 20 years ago, there would be no need to summarize these plots. Readers knew that *Taipan* fictionalized two trading companies, the Brock lineage representing Butterfield and Swire and the Struans representing Jardine-Matheson. Each hero or anti-hero fictionalized “real” historical men, and aficionados and historians reveled in disclosing Clavell’s empirical roots. The game of historical accuracy became a major issue for Clavellian faux erudition. Over the years fans have established an intricate and erudite Wikipedia presence spotlighting the plot, major families and individual characters.


cross-breeding. A scientist creates a way to dematerialize and rematerialize matter, but when he transports himself he accidentally fuses with a fly trapped in the transporter. The result is two intermingled beings, a fly with a human head and a man with a fly head. These ideas about crossing species show up in Clavell’s dramas of interracial sexuality.


70. Clavell thought that colonialism was good for China. Much Cold War Asia scholarship also felt colonialism had been progressive, but the difference is that scholars received sustained and learned criticism of their assumptions, evidence, periodization and ideologies while Clavell has not, until now.

71. Louis Allen, “Images of Undivided Souls”, Times Literary Supplement, 30 Oct. 1981 reviews several of them. Allen quotes Michiko Kaya, director of the International Society for Educational Information, as saying, “an American University [recently] proposed that Shōgun should be used as a basis for a secondary school textbook. In as much as Shōgun is historical fiction, as indeed is stated by its author, and in a number of ways does not present an accurate picture of Japanese customs, language or way of thought even in the feudal age, its widespread use as an educational instrument is inadvisable.”


73. Smith, Learning from Shōgun, p. 19.

74. Frederic and Mary Ann Brussat, directors of the Cultural Information Service (CIStems, Inc.), a “nonprofit resource agency and publisher of a biweekly magazine on television and the arts/media”, perhaps a CIA front group. The development and distribution of this guide was made possible by NBC.

In 1971 Pantheon Books published *America’s Asia*, a collection of “dissenting essays on Asian-American relationships”. Edward Friedman and Mark Selden, the two editors, explained the title of the collection: “Asia is America’s in three important ways,” they began:

First, it is America’s in the sense that we impose American categories to describe, evaluate and direct Asian experience. Our cultural chauvinism might mainly provide material for humorous self-analysis were it not for the overwhelming explosion of American economic and military might throughout Asia. For Asia is America’s in this second tragic sense that American power has channeled, distorted, and suppressed much that is Asia.

This was, at the time, a very powerful statement and one that carried important implications, especially as it was pronounced within—and against—the entire field of Asian studies. *America’s Asia* was not just the result of a conference or of a short-term collaboration among academics; rather, it was the second volume to appear under the name of the Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars (CCAS), an organization of graduate students and young professors who had come together in 1968, united in their opposition to the Vietnam War and US policies in Asia but also to the very structure of their field of study. The quote above summarizes well the layered and multifaceted
criticism waged by the committee at the time. CCAS proclaimed its unwavering condemnation of the Indochina War but also of the economic and diplomatic strategies of the United States in the entire region; Vietnam was just the most extreme example of policies that ultimately constituted Asia as an extension of the United States’ strategic interests. Those policies, CCAS argued, were made possible and viable through the collaboration of American scholarship on Asia, that is, through the work of their own teachers, who had shaped the categories used to distort, obscure and suppress the very humanity of Asian people. In articles, conferences and debates, the Concerned Asian Scholars described how the field—and all area studies—had come to be instituted in the immediate post-war period precisely as part of a government project, through grants, fellowships and foundations; they traced the legacy of the McCarthy purges, which, they argued, had transformed Asian specialists into obedient experts, incapable or unwilling to see the moral or political implications of their scholarship; finally, they hinted at the mutual imbrication of this scholarship with the actual genocide of Asians. The field of Asian studies was then directly responsible for the making of America’s Asia, for the intellectual, economic and military appropriation of Asia and Asian people by US interests.

Yet CCAS’ devastating critique of US policies and scholarship on Asia had another, more positive, goal, which was to highlight the new Asian realities that those policies and scholarship had made invisible. This was the third way in which Asia could and should be America’s, Friedman and Selden continued:

The essays in this book suggest, moreover, that an Asia conceived in antagonistic or contemptible categories is an Asia where much that is humane, valuable, and worthy of emulation is ignored. This adds a final meaning to America’s Asia. If we could change our relation to Asia we would be open to learning much from Asian people that could help us create a more decent and just society in the United States.

Asia was not just a site of oppression, the location of carnage; rather, it was truly “America’s Asia” in the sense that it offered a viable political alternative to the United States, and potentially to the world. What was going on in Asia transcended its geographical and historical position, as it posed questions and proposed solutions that challenged
the political assumptions of people globally. The very last sentence of the book—found at the end of Steve Andors’ essay on the Maoist factory—makes precisely this case: “Ultimately, however, this process of struggle and development going on in China transcends the Chinese situation, and poses critical questions of action and philosophy for all of us.”  

Asia and Asian people had shifted from objects to be studied to subjects with whom experiences could be—and were—shared.

This chapter investigates the meanings of “America’s Asia” within the experience of the Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars, first of all as a political signifier: unlike the “Asianisms” of the late 19th or the early 21st century, CCAS discourse did not focus on ethnically or culturally based values, nor did it espouse the myth of a “rise of Asia”. Rather, Asia, once divested of the culturalist trappings that scholars and political strategists had created, appeared as one of the crucial motors of global change, and Asian peoples were leading the transformation that we now identify with the “global sixties”: “national liberation movements against colonialism and imperialism; new extra-party and extra-trade union organizational forms and new forms of political subjectivity; radical critiques of capitalism, in politics, activism, cultural production, and life; and radical forms of experimentation in everyday life.” In this perspective, CCAS’ Asianism is part of the more general shift in the global, political and intellectual frame of reference in the 1960s–70s, when what was happening in Asia acquired a new centrality for people all over the world. Christopher Connery has highlighted the “worlded character” of Asia in the long 1960s, a worldedness of “links and co-presence”, when even an overwhelmingly nationalist movement such as Vietnamese communism had international and multiple significance because of its oppositional power vis-à-vis US hegemony, “its actualization of the Great Refusal”. That is why workers in France could call for “Vietnam in Our Factories” and Maoism was a shared reference of Parisian students and Indian revolutionaries.

But CCAS was not just a political organization, it was also—and primarily—a group of young students of Asia, and such a radical shift in their position vis-à-vis the object of their studies had huge implications for their intellectual and professional life. Within the field of Asian studies, the concept of America’s Asia, as framed by Selden and Friedman, involved a critique of “orientalism” before orientalism, and without the support of Said’s elaboration. But in addition, and,
I would argue, more fundamentally, America’s Asia—at least in its third meaning—suggested the need and the possibility of a post-orientalist praxis, as much in scholarship as in politics. It was not enough to criticize the existing epistemic structure of Asian studies and the very practical connections with US foreign policy and militarism; an indispensable next step was to ask what the recognition of the previously inscrutable “Asian other” as a political subject signified for the academic, intellectual and political practice in the United States and globally, and to act upon this recognition. Or, to put it in the much more vigorous terms of the CCAS Newsletter:

Are we going to analyse from a distance, or join in the fray? Are we going to take the opportunities offered us (to educate Americans in their imperial present) by the Koreans, Thais, Indians, Malaysians, Filipinos and Taiwanese in their fight to emerge from a decadent reactionary past? And by the Chinese, Indochinese, and Koreans in their drive for a socialist future? Or will we miss the boat? The time to act is now—not next week, or next year. NOW!

This essay then takes the specific case of CCAS as an example of how this particular form of Asianism affected political, intellectual and organizational practices in the 1960s and 1970s. The framework of America’s Asia opened the way to intellectual and political insights, but it was also dependent on specific historical conditions—the viability of revolutionary movements globally and specifically in Asia. When these conditions changed CCAS experienced a profound crisis, and the organization eventually disbanded in 1979. Some of its members left academia—either of their own volition or because they were refused tenure; others moved to completely opposite positions or found different venues for activism. How does America’s Asia help explain the development of CCAS, its successes, its internal debates, its final dissolution and its fragmented legacy?

Discovering Humanity in Asia

The essays collected in America’s Asia took shape in part during a CCAS Summer Seminar at Harvard University in 1968, and while the participants did not agree on everything—including the very idea of the book—they were conscious of the novelty of considering Asia as a source of ideas rather than a target of ridicule and the object of
technocratic manipulation. However, the closest model they could muster for their approach dated two centuries earlier:

The philosophers of the Age of Enlightenment believed there was much to learn from China about social organization. But as the nineteenth-century West turned to massive imperialist assault on China, the Chinese people became, to our “practical” men, objects of ridicule and contempt, not alternative models to be contemplated, criticized, and, where fitting, emulated. A century later, American social scientists, generals, and politicians continue to see Asian needs in terms of American advice and aid.12

There was obviously a need to unpack, expose and dissolve the accumulated layers of 200 years of scholarship, policy and opinion before one could tackle and accept the new lessons coming from Asia—or even the simple fact that Asia had anything to teach. The first two sections of the volume appropriately deal directly with the ideological premises of Asian studies, the optics distorting not just the perception of Asia but also the practice of US foreign policy and military intervention, thus tracing a direct line of responsibility between Asia scholars and invading troops. It is only the last section of the volume—the three essays by Selden, Gurley and Andors—that moves away from that critique and proposes instead a new model of scholarship, one that does not dissect or demolish but rather aims at creating

...a new Asia for America. It is one that can be approached hopefully and critically, not condescendingly and destructively. Focusing on the humanity of their subject, they [the authors of the last three essays] find inspiration and application to general human problems, to problems Americans as well as citizens of Third World nations face here and now.13

I will return later to the references to “humanity”, “human” and “humane”, which pervade this and other texts by the Concerned Asian Scholars (CAS), but first it is worth pointing out how the structure of the edited volume, while it makes sense to the reader, is intellectually and politically in reverse order. It was the revolutionary experience of Asian nations that made it possible to expose the encrusted ideological blinders of the profession. Asian revolutions—that is my point—came first; they were the necessary precondition for the
scholarly and intellectual shift of CCAS. Asia itself could exist as a point of reference only in the light of the new revolutionary experiences of the 20th century: people’s wars of liberation (from China to Vietnam) and the economic and social experiments of the Great Leap and the Cultural Revolution. The simple acknowledgement of the existence of the Maoist economic experiments, land redistribution in liberated Vietnam, Indian peasant rebellions, Japanese pacifists and Okinawan activists forced a reconsideration of one’s position as an Asia scholar, of one’s relationship to Asia, and of the structure of the field itself, because the field could not even see (let alone study or examine) these phenomena. What made Asia change from an object into a subject was the recognition that Asian peoples had already become subjects of their own politics, and by so doing they had stated the possibility of alternative solutions to issues not confined to Asia. As Friedman succinctly summarized, “the experience and creations of some 700 million Chinese this century provides a basis for asking and probing the most pressing human questions”.

In this sense, the last three essays of America’s Asia, which describe the universal value of these revolutionary “new things”, constitute the logical and political premise of the entire book and, possibly, of the entire CCAS enterprise. For example, in his analysis of people’s war, Selden argues that from the protracted wars of liberation in China and Vietnam “emerged a radically new vision of man and society and a concrete approach to development”. In the liberated areas Selden saw, in embryo, the possibility of new forms of society antithetical to the struggle of “atomized individuals” fighting for private ends—a not-so-subtle reference to his own capitalist society. Rather, Selden concludes, they embodied “the freedom of all continually redefined by an accepted and cherished community”.

As we have seen, the CAS stressed repeatedly the need for a more “humane” approach to Asia, a concern that was inscribed in their statement of purpose: “The Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars seeks to develop a humane and knowledgeable understanding of Asian societies and their efforts to maintain cultural integrity and to confront such problems as poverty, oppression, and imperialism.” I was at first a bit puzzled by the insistence on this term, the extent to which these scholars felt compelled to show that “the Chinese are human too”. It seemed at the same time excessive and vague. What
was to be gained by stressing a shared “humanity”? Was that really necessary?

This insistence makes more sense if we once again reverse the perspective: “humanity” was not just lacking in the eyes of the Western beholder; rather, “humane” was the defining character of the Asian revolutions, which, as such, required a humane approach to be understood. The participatory model of Vietnam and China offered “hope of more humane forms of development and of effectively overcoming the formidable barriers to the transformation of peasant societies”. Similarly, John Gurley described the Cultural Revolution as “perhaps the most interesting economic and social experiment ever attempted, in which tremendous efforts are being made to achieve an egalitarian development, an industrial development without dehumanization, one that involves everyone and affects everyone”.

Here “humane” stands in stark opposition to models (first and foremost those imposed by American planners, but also Soviet technocracy) that were considered “inhumane”, in the sense that they erased the human costs of development under the mask of scientificity and rationality. “Humane” stands in as a reference to the radical equality of the Asian revolutions, as exemplified first and foremost by the Chinese experiments of the 1960s and 1970s. The reference to “humanity” also expressed a frontal attack to modernization theory, which dominated both US state policy and academia. As the understanding of societies in terms of modernization levels and stages of development was connected with a foreign policy that imposed these models onto other nations, those Asian revolutions that presented alternative practices could be understood only through a more humane scholarly approach, one that abdicated the technocratic/culturalistic framework of the existing social sciences. Accepting the “humanity” of Asian revolutions required a radical shift in the very structure of academia and the intellectual world.

It was the recognition that something unprecedented was happening in Asia—yet it was something not exclusively Asian nor confined by culture and geography—that allowed for many of the exceptional scholarly contributions in the early period of CCAS. John Dower used the US economic and strategic concerns in Vietnam as a starting point to rethink the history of Japan’s own imperial enterprise in the 1930s. The Chinese and Vietnamese experience of
peasant revolution made it possible for South Asianists within CCAS to rethink agricultural policies and peasant rebellions on the Indian subcontinent. But possibly the most valuable contribution of CCAS came in the unveiling of the orientalist prejudices embedded in the field of Asian Studies and in the public culture of the United States. James Peck and others showed how the dominant explanations that framed modern Chinese history in terms of a “cultural failure” were an excuse for the continuing imposition of a Western (US) power over Asia. These analyses placed the blame on Asia’s “lack”—of rationality, of modernity, of science—rather than on imperialist aggression; they argued for a “natural”, univocal road to development off which many Asian nations had dangerously veered. By peddling these theories, CCAS accused, Asia scholars in the United States supported the idea that “backward Asians” needed to be shepherded back onto the right path, possibly under the vigilant eyes of American “experts”. In revealing the deep orientalist biases of the field, CCAS anticipated the work that cultural studies and cultural history started a decade later, and with the support of a much more sophisticated theoretical framework.

Beyond the critique and rethinking of existing scholarship, what I find perhaps more interesting is how the recognition of the extraordinary value of Asian revolutions allowed CCAS to expand connections and spaces of comparisons, based on the assumption that “Asia” truly had something to teach the United States and the world. This was visible, for example, in the attention devoted to Asian Americans and the issues of migration, racism and activism within that community (in its relations to Asia). It led CCAS to try to identify “Asian models” for agrarian revolutions in Latin America. And it also justified a new understanding of Asia, this time one not filtered through colonial or neocolonial discourse, but rather viewed through the lens of hope for more radical transformations. CCAS discussed whether there was something called “Asian socialism” that connected China, Korea, Vietnam, but also potentially India and South Asia. “India,” argued Gail Omvedt, “might be used as a negative case to prove that without socialism there is no economic development. India needs what China had: a revolution. And to some extent, the Indian problems enable one to understand what happened in China.”
and Vietnam shifted from being simply “America’s problem” \(^{28}\) to embodying the focal point for a series of Asian connections, a network of activism for which they represented a possible reference. This was evident, for example, in CCAS’ relationship with the pacifist movement Beheiren in Japan and the journal *Ampo*. \(^{29}\)

“Asia”, in the discourse of modernization theory, could exist as a unity only as the vaguely geographically identifiable repository of ahistorical cultural values, removed from the universal normality of natural development. Even when brought back (through colonial force) into the “normal” path of history, Asia, as Dipesh Chakrabarthy synthesized, remained the realm of the “not yet”, endlessly catching up and endlessly lacking. \(^{30}\) In CCAS critique, however, this “not yet”, the space between Western normativity and Asian exceptionalism, instead of a lack, of a failure, becomes an opening, a space of experimentation. Here lies possibly the most important legacy of CCAS to students of Asia of the succeeding generations: the ability to see their chosen locations of study not as exceptions but as part of a global, coeval, and always incomplete political and intellectual undertaking. That is, to see “Asia” as “an unfinished project, whose truth is not in a new and emergent dominant, but in the end of the very logic of domination”. \(^{31}\) In the best of CCAS analysis and practice, “America’s Asia” then prefigured the historical universality of equalitarian and emancipatory politics.

The qualifier “in the best of CCAS analysis and practice” is, however, not a minor one, as “Asia” remained a point of unresolved tension for the Concerned Asian Scholars. On the one hand, especially in the case of China (but also Korea and Vietnam), it came to identify a reified place of desire, the embodiment not of a possible and always evolving search for equality, but of an empirically realized model. The reality of Asian successes needed only to be unveiled to Western eyes: it identified not the open possibilities of the “not yet” but the certainty of the “already there”. And this position, especially when it took the place of a more universal and critical theorizing, was always prone to falling back into a different kind of orientalism, one of dream-like positive imagining. On the other hand, Asia remained “America’s” in the more troubling sense that CCAS often approached it only through a critique of US imperialism. These coexistent and complementary yearnings—for a geographically located utopia and for the end of US destructive policies—were always
present within CCAS. As I will show later, they contributed to lead many CAS back into a faith in empiricism and “objectivity”, which ended up displacing a profound conceptualization of the revolutionary transformations that had allowed CCAS’ critique to exist in the first place. When the Asian revolutions collapsed and the urgency of war ended, for many within CCAS the critique of US foreign policies was all that remained. In other words, Asia once again returned to be completely and unequivocally “America’s”.

To Be or Not to Be a Scholar

To take “America’s Asia” seriously as the signifier of potentially emancipatory experiments could not but have momentous implications for what it meant to be a scholar, both as an intellectual and as a political being. In a field whose methodology had been shaped under the financial and intellectual backing of imperialism, a “re-orientation of the scholarship and teaching” could not proceed without “a commitment to the need for revolutionary change in Asian land”. A revision of the existing scholarship could only be grounded on a radical activist concern; but the articulation between these two sides of the intellectual and practical life of the Asia scholars was one not easily resolved. Or rather, it was not resolved at all.

CCAS started from the recognition that “scholarship is inextricably linked to politics, and all research ultimately reflects a political standpoint”. As Leigh Kagan remarked in the first issue of the CCAS Newsletter: “Politically, we submit that Asian scholars are, in fact, involved in politics, that we acknowledge this, and that we address ourselves to the issue of how we are going to be political.” The first response to this acknowledgement was for scholars to be political in their scholarship, and it was in this area that CCAS produced arguably some of its best contributions.

CCAS spearheaded a radical critique of the belief in “objective scholarship” that framed the entire field. They skewered their own professors (John K. Fairbank, in particular) when these men hid behind academic “neutrality”, by pointing out how “neutrality” was already a political stance, implying acquiescence to existing policies and assumptions. The claim to “objectivity” also operated in a more pernicious and covert way in Asian studies: the empirical and allegedly “rational” approach it fostered was blind vis-à-vis the “new things”
of America’s Asia, as it ended filtering through a specific idea of modernization and development the experience of people who refused and challenged that very idea. The experiments of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution in China, to use the most obvious examples, could not be understood in the “rational” economic terms of modernization theory, as their novelty, argued many in CCAS, resided precisely in that “human” side that remained invisible to an “objective” analysis, the search for a development that was at the same time emancipatory and egalitarian.

But that did not seem to be enough for many CAS, in the sense that scholarship was often perceived as a fruitless endeavour and that true activism resided elsewhere, in the real world. Christine White voiced her discomfort at this notion:

One gets the impression from the newsletter sometimes that “scholars” is a dirty word, that being an Asian scholar is an illegitimate occupation, and that only by engaging in political activity other than leftist scholarship can one atone [sic] for the sin of being a “scholar”; and that only by giving money to “real” movement causes such as the GI movement can CCAS atone [sic] for the sin of being an organization of Asian scholars.36

There were very obvious reasons for the push to real “activism”, first and foremost the presence of war in the United States, which the draft made a daily and lived reality for these young scholars. Radical scholarship provided little comfort to people who were faced with the daily reports of carnage in Indochina and the (not-so-distant) possibility of being involved in that bloodshed.

Being “just scholars” (concerned or otherwise) was made difficult also by the very Asian experiences that CAS were examining, which challenged to the core the role of intellectuals. Students in Paris and in Berkeley were discussing the Chinese Cultural Revolution not because of a blind worship of an exotic and misunderstood model, but because they realized that what was at stake in China had to do with issues that concerned their own daily experience: the relationships between the production of knowledge and the reproduction of social roles, between scholarship and politics, and between politics and learning. These were issues that resonated deeply within the experience of the CAS. They were motivated not by the desire to take an active role in someone else’s revolution37 but by the realization
that the issues were similar, that many things that had happened in China in the 20th century—particularly since 1949—were crucial and meaningful even for students and teachers at Harvard and Columbia. Peck, in his debate with John K. Fairbank, chose as an example of scholarly commitment the pedagogical experiments of 1919, coeval with the very idea of a Chinese modernity: “It is not, then, the image of a ‘neutral’ university that provides a model, but rather the mutually reinforcing intellectual and political forces of the Chinese May 4th Movement.”

The May Fourth Movement remained a “suggestive model” also because it seemed to identify the situation of CCAS within the larger New Left and anti-war movement (an intellectual scholarly group integrated in a truly global political upheaval). But after they summoned May Fourth, the Cultural Revolution, and the Vietnamese ant-colonial struggles as points of reference, could many CCASers still find it satisfactory that “as a group our effective contribution to a new politics at this time lies pre-eminently in exposing the turgid underbelly of American Asian policy and developing an intellectually compelling critique of its ideology and scholarly underpinnings”?

The Pull of Objective Truth

Neither May Fourth nor the Cultural Revolution presented ready-made models of what it meant to be an intellectual, a scholar, a political being. Rather, they embodied the continuing search for a conceptualization of the political and for a theory of the production of knowledge. A similar search animated CCAS since its very beginning. There were, for example, several meetings during the seminar in the summer of 1968 at Harvard—the very place where some of the essays in America’s Asia were formulated and discussed—that dealt precisely with the self-definition of these young scholars and their relations to politics. Many evening hours were spent discussing how to reconceptualize the relationship with Asia in a non-imperialistic frame, how to study Asia without imposing external (Western) concepts and whether some categories could have universal validity.

The group discussed the impossibility of fragmenting one’s life into “discrete compartments” (here scholarship, there activism) but also pondered on what being “radical” meant professionally and in terms of everyday life.
In reading through the minutes of these evening discussions, one gets a glimpse of an already existing division in the group, a split between those who aimed at a “radical scholarship” (in terms of categories, contents, political bias) and others who were proposing a complete redefinition of what “scholarly” meant, a theoretical rethinking of the profession—in general, not just in relation to US policy. This division was particularly evident precisely when the CCAS participants at the Harvard seminar fought over the very idea of publishing America’s Asia. Selden had organized the seminar and spearheaded the book as a revisionist attack on Asian studies; but other (younger) participants objected to a publication bearing the CCAS name, arguing instead for the need of a more profound questioning of the production of knowledge. They maintained that radicalism could not involve just the content of one’s publication, but it also required a reconceptualization of scholarship and scholars themselves.

The idea that “America’s Asia” posed a need for a radical new approach, that the United States (and the world) needed to think through “theories” in order to appraise, understand and help realize the emancipatory experiences of Asia, came to the fore repeatedly in discussions within CCAS. In 1970, for example, Ric Pfeffer stated the need for “more grand theories” on China:

…we’re going to get a lot of people doing the fact-grubbing and lots of people doing kind of middle-level analysis. We have to go to a lot of new approaches to China in terms of grand theories, like Chinese visions of modernization or Chinese visions of anti-modernization.42

In the same year, at the 1970 Eastern Regional Conference, a speaker called for CCAS to develop a counter-imperialist ideology:

this ideology would be the foundation of a lasting CCAS organization and should get at the roots of the whole system we are fighting; it should, for example, concern itself with the basic causes of the American destruction of Vietnam’s and its own ecology: capitalism and imperialism, rather than with the destruction itself. Our opponents know what they’re at—they live in and manipulate the system every day. The questions are: Where are we? What do we believe in?43

These questions still loomed large in the following years; in October 1972, the Newsletter encouraged local chapters of CCAS to form
study groups on Marxist theory. CCAS had developed a rudimentary consciousness of anti-imperialism, yet

people felt that we have never systematically developed an understanding of the origins of capitalism, or an understanding of the origins of the Marxist movement. People recognize that there is a basic difference between simply opposing imperialism, and really understanding its causes and effects.44

Indeed, while CCAS produced an impressive scholarly critique of US imperialist ventures and of orientalism in Asian studies, it did it seemingly without a direct engagement with Marxism, Leninism or any theory of imperialism. CCAS produced excellent analyses of the Maoist economy, people’s war and revolutionary strategy as well as a trenchant critique of Asian studies, but it largely gave up any attempt to conceptualize the political and intellectual issues in universal theoretical terms. It recognized the universality of “America’s Asia” but too often refused to confront it in those terms.

So the question remains: why? Here I can only propose some informed speculations. In part, engagement with theory (Marxism, in particular) was perceived by some as a step towards ideological conformity—“ideological” here standing for something close to party doctrine—and a loose, purposely decentered group such as CCAS abhorred conformity to the point of idiosyncratic independence. There was also the urgency of the moment, one that seemed to require less speculation and more action: it made more sense to invest the time in drafting a fact sheet on the Cambodia bombing for distribution in high schools, rather than ponder the universal significance of the Maoist debates on bourgeois right or on economic construction.

“America’s Asia” also always carried with it the temptation of making Asia into a place, somewhere where the search for a better society had been realized and possibly concluded, a destination for desires rather than the name of a series of political experiments. This was particularly the case with China, which had been literally only imagined by China scholars before two CCAS delegations were invited to visit the country in 1971 and 1972. The group spent an enormous amount of time debating the compositions, the meaning, the political and intellectual usefulness of the China trips; and it was evident that for many within CCAS, China (but also Vietnam and, to a much
smaller extent, Korea) had become the somewhat uncritical grounding for political and intellectual positions. China existed, and that was enough. Just a few years later—and often for the same people—“China” became the reason to abandon those very political and intellectual positions.

Finally, there is the long-standing aversion for “theory” that has marked Area Studies since its inception, or rather an aversion for any theory that does not include a faith in objective truth and empirical measurement (à la modernization theory). For all their exposing of the biases and the influences behind their mentors’ claims to scholarly neutrality, the lure of “objectivity” was never truly dispelled. The models of scholarship available at the time—which many CCASers embraced—were also problematic in this sense. Noam Chomsky, Howard Zinn and Staughton Lynd were among the few public intellectuals in recent US history who were exceptional examples of activism, but they were also intellectuals whose main body of scholarship was critique, not conceptualization. Their personal and professional experience exemplified the tension between scholarship and politics, but they had very little to say about it, at least in the terms that many within CCAS aspired to achieve.

Chomsky and Zinn took part in the early activities of CCAS, they presented at CCAS conventions, and Chomsky was a member of the editorial board of the Bulletin for several years—in spite of not being an Asia scholar. Chomsky also was, quite surprisingly, an occasional participant in the CCAS Harvard summer seminar of 1968, and his contribution seemed to have been particularly significant precisely on the issue of politically radical scholarship. Peck summarized the results of the seminar (in not very glowing terms) in the second issue of the BCAS:

It was not just the nature of our scholarly assumptions, however, which was challenged. Could we, even while abhorring [sic] the ends towards which our research and knowledge are put, do nothing more than polish off another definitive monograph or book while pleasantly chatting with a CIA analyst over lunch about our mutual problems involved in understanding China? What, precisely, was our social role? We debated this with Noam Chomsky and constantly among ourselves. And on a theoretical level, at least, the result wasn’t impressive; we ended with the truism that truth by nature is
radical and the responsibility of intellectuals is to speak the truth and to expose lies. Or, in the words of Camus, the intellectuals’ role “will be to say the king is naked when he is, and not to go into raptures over his imaginary trappings.”

The truism that “truth by nature is radical” was a direct reference to Chomsky’s contribution to the discussion and his stress on the value of “objective truth” in revealing the weak points of US ideology. This idea was not uncritically accepted even during the Harvard seminar: “more is needed than speaking the truth,” seminar members argued; “another level is the perceived need for being radical with a vision of enlarging human potentiality. The need to lead unified lives, whereby scholarship and being radical come together.” But that pull of “objective” truth remained strong, and it always stood as an easy fallback position. The assessment that objective truth was radical did not solve the conundrum of those who wanted to truly integrate scholarship and politics, as in many ways it postulated once again a divided life. One could follow the Chomsky model, write prolifically and successfully within one’s sub-discipline in Asian studies and devote one’s activist efforts to debunking the myths of US foreign policy, or stand up for human rights and fight for the liberation of political prisoners. They were all extremely worthwhile endeavours but, in many ways, a retreat from the openings subsumed in the idea of “America’s Asia”.

After Asia

The retreat into empiricism and objective truth—which was never uncontested, never complete, and never generalized to be sure—had huge consequences for CCAS itself and its relation to and understanding of “Asia”. Already in 1973, Selden asked himself and the other editors what the Bulletin had produced in China studies over the years: his answer was not self-congratulatory in the least. The Bulletin had published very sharp critique but “disastrously little in the way of positive contribution” on what he still viewed as “the great revolution of our century”. By the mid-1970s, empiricism offered little respite from the combined end of the anti-war movement in the United States and of “Asia” itself as potential reference for emancipatory politics. In the
end, if one had to rely only on the “revolutionary power” of objective truth, objectively the Maoist experiments had been revealed to have failed, Deng Xiaoping was dismantling all the new things of the previous period, Vietnam went towards normalization, Cambodia stood on the precipice of madness, India did not have a peasant revolution, and capitalism was triumphant again. Objectively, the US imperialist venture had produced disasters and devastations, but the war, at least for Americans, was over. In that scenario, CCAS did not have much to offer, if not the acceptance of a new status quo. This is how Saundra Sturdevant assessed that specific moment, which coincided with the end of her commitment to CCAS:

The second turning point for me occurred in the late 1970s when I was East Asian editor for *BCAS*. I solicited manuscripts from virtually everyone and worked strenuously for nine months on what became two issues of the *Bulletin* and then the book on post-Mao China. A good number of manuscripts were from old comrades, now established China scholars, many of whom had become so as a result of their positive analysis of Mao’s China. Now, with only the direction of the Deng reforms visible, these scholars were writing about the negative features of Mao China and the glories of the Deng era. For me, this was extremely difficult. It was a political, intellectual, and personal crisis.

From that total crisis, there was very little that could be rescued. In the best outcome, the former Concerned Asian Scholar could continue to fight the forces of imperialism “which have brought us wars in Asia for two centuries and which are still with us”, as the June 1976 newsletter remarked. But that left CCAS with little to do “until the next big, mobilizing war involving us all”. The possibilities of alternative politics were thus reduced to the somewhat morbid faith in the continuing destructive capacity of Western imperialism. Douglas Allen, in his evaluation of the Indochina War and the role of CCAS, points at the currency of anti-imperialism as the major outcome of that experience: “Today,” he writes, “many progressive scholars, without a second thought, quite naturally use such terms as imperialism at the heart of our teaching, writing, and public speaking…. Progressive scholars have found the same legacy in their Central America, Persian Gulf, apartheid, and other activism, often involving attempts to share and apply the lessons of Vietnam and Indochina to
contemporary U.S. policies and anti-imperialist resistance.\textsuperscript{54} That is in many ways an admirable legacy, but one cannot but wonder what is left of Asia, in this perspective, for these “Asian” scholars. The idea of “America’s Asia”, I have argued, was predicated on the universal value of the emancipatory political experiments that had been attempted by people in that part of the world. With those experiments failed or defeated, and Asian people incorporated under capitalism, Asia is once again reduced to “place”, a geographical or cultural location of dubious unity, and one that can exist only as the negative image of a brutal force, shaped by its resistance to the act of being shaped. In that, “Asia” might seem empirically approachable but has no political reality.

Maybe this was unavoidable, given the extent of the collapse. But now that we find ourselves in a different historical situation, the CCAS experience should remind us of the possibilities and openings, for scholarship \textit{and} politics, that Asia could embody when it was understood as a globally significant, yet always unfinished project of emancipation.

\textbf{Notes}

1. Edward Friedman and Mark Selden, eds, \textit{America’s Asia: Dissenting Essays on Asian-American Relations} (New York: Pantheon, 1969). I am thankful to Tani Barlow for our email exchange, which helped me think through some of the issues, and to the participants at the workshop “Asianisms’ and Regional Interaction and Integration in Asia”, Freiburg im Breisgau, 14–15 Oct. 2011.


4. CCAS’ journal, the \textit{Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars} (hereafter BCAS), is still published today. It changed its name in 2000 to \textit{Critical Asian Studies}.

For an example of one of the many debates with the founding fathers of the field, see John K. Fairbank and Jim Peck, “An Exchange”, BCAS 2, 3 (Apr.–July 1970): 51–70. CCAS provided a very detailed analysis of the founding (and funding) of China studies in the United States in the Special Supplement “Modern China Studies: How the Foundations Bought a Field”, BCAS 3: 3–4 (Summer–Fall 1971).


9. One of the working titles for America’s Asia was “The Scrutable East and the Inscrutable Asian Scholar”. Letter from Edward Friedman and Mark Selden to the contributors to the volume, 28 Aug. 1968, CCAS archives.


11. Among the participants at the seminar were Marianne Bastid, Herbert Bix, John Dower, Tom Englehardt, Jon Grant, Richard Kagan, Leigh Kagan, Richard Kraus, Jon Livingston, Maurice Meisner, Victor Nee, Jim Peck, John Watt, Paul Winnacker and, obviously, Friedman and Selden.


13. Ibid., p. xvi (emphasis added).


16. Ibid.


18. In 1977, Ed Hammond compared the situation at the time with that of ten years earlier (when CCAS was founded) and pondered on how the task of advanced scholars was no longer “to explain how Chinese are human too”. Ed Hammond, “Some Thoughts for the Convention – 1978”, CCAS Newsletter, Oct. 1977, p. 3.


21. The membership of CCAS and the readership of BCAS were dominated by people in the China field. As late as 1979, Bryant Avery, the editor in chief of the Bulletin, remarked how up to half of the subscribers to the journal were still China specialists. Bryant Avery to Saundra Sturdevant, Jon Halliday, Jayne Werner, Bruce Cumings, Jon Livingston, Moss Roberts (11 Feb. 1979): 2, Saundra Sturdevant Private Archive. In the same letter Avery remarked that BCAS had historically been focused on two issues: the Vietnam War and the Cultural Revolution.


28. In 1967 John K. Fairbank, during a public lecture titled “East Asia and Our Future”, called China “our biggest problem”.

29. Mark Selden to Orville Schell and Jim Peck, 6 Sept. 1969, CCAS archives. BCAS also planned to do a joint issue with Ampo.


31. Connery, “Editorial introduction”: 548. I owe this insight into a different significance of the “not yet” to Meera Ashar. Her paper “The ‘Not-Yet’ in Indian Politics: Language, Epistemology and Coloniality” was presented at
the conference “Global Coloniality in the Asian Century”, Hong Kong, 7–8 June 2012.


38. Ibid: 67. May Fourth was the first modern student movement in Chinese history. It represented the culmination of a long period of experimentation in terms of language, literature, pedagogy and associational life. On the specific case of Beijing University in the May Fourth period, see Fabio Lanza, Behind the Gate: Inventing Students in Beijing (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010).


41. Minutes of the 19 August 1968 meeting, CCAS archives.


43. CCAS Eastern Regional Conference Report, 1970, CCAS archives.

44. “CCAS Summer Retreat”, CCAS Newsletter, Oct. 1972, p. 2. The same report included another honest and startling admission: “Let’s face it… CCAS has made some contribution to the intellectual side of the anti-war movement, and a few of our members have become deeply involved in anti-war organizing. But as our own internal critics have pointed out, we’ve done far too little to integrate ourselves in the on-going movement.” In other words, there was an acknowledgement of the failure in both scholarship and activism.


47. Minutes of the meetings “July 29, 1968 Monday afternoon” and “August 1, 1968”, CCAS archives. Noam Chomsky is an interesting case, a scholar who initiated an entirely new theoretical approach in his own field (linguistics) but who has not shown the least curiosity for theoretical
or philosophical approaches concerning his “activist” production. See his article “Noam Chomsky on Postmodernism”, http://www.mrbauld.com/chomsky1.html.

48. “August 27, 1968, meeting at MS’s apartment”, CCAS archives.


50. It seems obvious that already in 1970 CCAS depended on the existence of a larger movement within the United States: “There can be no doubt that in the absence of a vigorous political movement CCAS would at best continue as an intellectual anachronism or more likely succumb to political and professional pressures leaving the field once again to the AAS.” Mark Selden to John Berninghausen, 6 Feb. 1970, CCAS archives.


Chapter Seven

Asianisms from Below: Japanese Civil Society and Visions of Asian Integration from the Late 20th to the 21st Century

Tessa Morris-Suzuki

Invisible Asianisms

In her recent writings, University of Hawaii scholar Patricia Steinhoff speaks of Japan’s “invisible civil society”. Her cogent argument is that most research on Japanese civil society has failed to capture the realities of grassroots activism in Japan. Drawing on conceptual models developed in Europe and North America, research has focused on national-level organizations, commonly reaching the conclusion that Japanese civil society is weak and subservient to the state. This conclusion, however, neglects the widespread presence of a mass of very small, geographically dispersed local grassroots movements that exist throughout the Japanese archipelago. These movements are particularly difficult to research because they are so small and localized: they are rarely registered with any state organization, do not (therefore) appear in official listings of non-profit organizations, and produce only ephemeral publications that are seldom collected by major libraries or archives. Nevertheless, this “invisible civil society” is an important part of Japan’s recent history and deserves much more attention than it has received to date.
Extending Steinhoff’s arguments, I should like to suggest that Japan’s invisible civil society has also generated interesting forms of “invisible Asianism”. Histories of Asianism in the Japanese context often trace a shift from a popularly based and relatively egalitarian vision of solidarity with Asia in the late 19th century, to an increasingly expansionist, Japan-centred Great Asianism in the 1930s and 1940s, culminating in the disasters of the Asia Pacific War. Many scholars then go on to describe a retreat of Asianism in the years immediately following Japan’s defeat in 1945, followed by the emergence of new forms of intellectual engagement with Asia from the 1950s onward. Oguma Eiji, focusing mainly on post-war “progressive intellectuals”, sees the 1950s as an era when the Chinese Revolution, the Korean War and the Bandung Conference created a new image of Asia as a counter-pole to the dominance of the Cold War superpowers (particularly the United States). In the 1960s and beyond, he argues, issues such as environmentalism and human rights provided new grounds for Japanese intellectuals’ commitment to Asia, and these decades were also a time when progressive intellectuals became more conscious of the presence of marginalized minorities such as Ainu, Okinawans and Zainichi Koreans—the “Asia within”. Others have depicted proposals for regional economic integration from the 1990s onward as representing a new form of Asianism, while the rapid growth of pop-culture flows throughout the region has engendered a phenomenon sometimes described as “popular Asianism”.

An aspect largely neglected in these studies of intellectual trends, economic integration and culture flows, however, is the role of grassroots civil society in linking Asian societies across borders. One exception is the work of Hatsuse Ryûhei, who has highlighted the contribution of Japanese humanitarian NGOs to a phenomenon he defines as a new form of pan-Asianism, emerging mainly from the 1980s onward. Hatsuse illustrates the characteristics of this humanitarian Asianism by exploring the story of the Peshawar-kai, an influential medical and development NGO founded in 1983 by the Japanese doctor Nakamura Tetsu to provide aid to Afghanistan.

Here I shall draw on some aspects of Hatsuse’s ideas, but argue that the origins of grassroots Asianisms in post-war Japan go back further than the 1980s and that their scope is not limited to humanitarian NGOs. Extending the boundaries of the discussion, I hope to shed light on the existence of a widespread and loosely linked web of
very small grassroots groups across the Japanese archipelago, which have sought in varied ways to deepen the integration of Japan and other parts of Asia. These groups do not necessarily generate very fully articulated visions of an Asian future, but their diverse actions and writings constitute an important part of the complex map of Asianisms in Japan, and their history casts fresh light on the changing contours of this map over the decades from the immediate post-war era to the present day.

**Post-war Study Circles and the Origins of Grassroots Asianisms**

Grassroots Asianisms in Japan have a long history. They can be traced back at least to the late 19th century ideas of popular rights and social reform activists such as Ueki Emori (1857–92), Tarui Tōkichi (1850–1922) and Ōi Kentarō (1843–1922). But, as many commentators have noted, the gradual drift into an aggressive, Japan-centred Great Asianism, followed by Japan’s disastrous defeat in war, led to a profound and difficult rethinking of Japan’s place in Asia. In the immediate post-war period, Japan’s engagement with Asia had to be reinvented, not only at the level of formal politics and scholarly discourse, but also at the level of everyday life.

In the late 1940s and 1950s, significant numbers of Japanese people felt a sense of responsibility for the wartime violence inflicted on other Asian countries by the Japanese military, and a longing to create a new relationship with Asia. But the discourse of war responsibility was not echoed in Japanese national politics, which quickly became dominated by conservative parties. Meanwhile, the deep divisions of the Cold War era made the building of grassroots connections to surrounding countries difficult, if not impossible. Indeed, it can be argued that the divisive impact of the Cold War was particularly profound in East Asia (where it rapidly escalated into hot wars in Korea and Vietnam). There was an important difference between the Cold War order in Europe, where interaction between nations in the pro-United States camp was encouraged, and East Asia, where the “hub-and-spokes” arrangement of separate treaties between the United States and its Asian allies created a more complex set of regional fissures.
Even in these unpromising circumstances, though, a number of small, regional efforts at re-imagining an integrated Asia did appear as early as the mid-1950s. One fascinating example is discussed by Curtis Gayle in his study of the post-war women’s history movement in Japan. An important element in left-wing political activism from the occupation era onward was the development of study circles [sakuru], which aimed to educate ordinary people on topics ranging from folklore to politics, while simultaneously promoting “revolutionary consciousness”. Gayle’s research looks in detail at the story of one relatively long-lived and influential group, the Ehime Women’s History Circle, created in 1956 in Matsuyama, on the southern island of Shikoku. Inspired by the work of the prominent post-war historian Inoue Kiyoshi, the Ehime circle began unearthing the “hidden history” of their own region from the perspective of women, while also endeavouring to develop a sense of international solidarity, particularly with the women of East Asia.

This aspect of the Ehime group’s work was most vividly illustrated by the public events they organized in Matsuyama in 1960 to celebrate the 50th International Women’s Day. Gayle describes how the celebration of the occasion included the public performance of a drama titled “Variety Special: The History of Women” [Baraietê: Josei no Ayumi]. This focused particularly on Asian women’s solidarity, incorporating the voices of Chinese and Korean as well as Japanese women. The second act of the performance addressed the story of Chinese women who had become victims of Japanese wartime aggression. A chorus proclaiming that “the sadness and suffering of Japanese women was the same as that of Chinese women” was followed by a challenging response by the actors representing Chinese women: “Although the Japanese come from the same East Asian ethnicity they attacked our country and as a result a huge number of Chinese men were killed and women violated.” The ensuing scenes explored the post-war experiences of Japanese, Chinese and Korean women, highlighting the liberation of China, the division of Korea, and the “repatriation” of ethnic Koreans from Japan to North Korea (which had begun just three months earlier). The drama concluded with a joint chorus of actors representing Japan, China and North Korea pledging in unison to work “as Asian women and alongside women from all countries” to bring about “the liberation of women worldwide”.
Gayle's analysis of this event, however, also highlights the problems that beset efforts to develop “Asianisms from below” at the height of the Cold War. Women from the USSR were invited to Matsuyama and participated in the International Women’s Day event (Japan and the Soviet Union having established diplomatic relations three years earlier); but attempts to invite women from North and South Korea and China failed because political barriers made it impossible for them to obtain the necessary travel permission. As a result, the roles of the Chinese women in _The History of Women_ drama were performed by Japanese members of the Ehime Women’s History Circle, while the parts of Korean women were performed by members of the local Korean ethnic minority.\(^\text{12}\) Elsewhere, too, Cold War barriers forced study circles with an interest in Asian networking to focus on building connections to the “Asia within”. For example, the Southern Districts Literary Group (Nambu Bungaku Shûdan, founded in 1951 and originally known as the Shimomaruko Bunka Shûdan), a proletarian literary circle based in the south-central area of Tokyo, extended its connections to Korea by assisting with the publication of a journal called _Ômura Bungaku_, whose content was written by Koreans interned as illegal immigrants (sometimes for years) in the Ômura Detention Centre, near Nagasaki.\(^\text{13}\)

**Tsurumi Yoshiyuki, Matsui Yayori and the New Asianism from Below**

During the 1960s and early 1970s, the situation was transformed by the Vietnam War, the rise and fall of the Japanese students’ movement, and the expansion of Japan’s trade and investment to Southeast Asia. As Oguma Eiji notes, the anti-Vietnam War activism of groups such as Beheiren\(^\text{14}\) encouraged a reorientation of the geographical boundaries of Japanese critical involvement with Asia: in the 1950s, the focus had largely been on China, but now Southeast Asia became a growing site of interest. As the student protests of the late 1960s descended into increasingly internecine factional battles, some former participants turned their attention to other forms of activism, including environmentalism, feminism, and the search for alternative paths to economic and social development. Out of this emerged a range of new social movements, several of which extended their activities across Japan’s frontiers to Northeast and Southeast Asia.
Meanwhile, the normalization of political relations between Japan and South Korea in 1965 and between Japan and China in 1972 opened the way for closer personal contacts between Japan and neighbouring countries.

The new visions of “Asianism from below” that accompanied these trends were clearly expressed in the writings and activism of two influential figures whose work spanned the divide between research and engagement in civil society: Tsurumi Yoshiyuki (1926–94) and Matsui Yayori (1934–2002). Both Tsurumi and Matsui founded social movements that sought to link Japan to other Asian countries, which in turn inspired a range of other Asia-focused grassroots groups. Their visions of Asia embodied important themes that have recurred, explicitly or implicitly, in many grassroots Asianisms of the 1980s and beyond.

Tsurumi Yoshiyuki was born and spent a significant part of his childhood in the United States, but he was also haunted throughout adulthood by a sense of personal connection to Japan’s invasion of Asia, because during the war his father had been the first head of the military administration of Japanese-occupied Singapore. After graduation he worked for a long time for International House of Japan, and he became well-known as a writer, peace activist and key figure in the anti-Vietnam War movement Beheiren. In 1973 he co-founded the Pacific Asia Resource Center (PARC, Ajia Taiheiyô Shiryô Sentâ), a social movement that works mainly on issues of human rights and social justice in Asia and on problems emerging from Japan’s relationship to other Asian countries. Tsurumi did not obtain his first formal academic post, at Ryûkoku University, until he was in his 60s.

Matsui Yayori, who was the daughter of a Christian minister, also studied overseas, first as an exchange student in the United States and later in France at the Sorbonne. It was on the return journey from France to Japan by ship in the late 1950s that she first encountered, as she put it, “the reality of Asia”, an encounter that she described as “one of the most shocking events of my young life”:

I saw unimaginable poverty. In Bombay, I saw people curled up in foetal positions dying in the streets. Noisy crowds of begging children followed me in Colombo, Sri Lanka, and squatting Vietnamese women selling food in the streets of Saigon looked exhausted. These scenes were in striking contrast to the ostentatious wealth I had observed in countries in Europe and the United States during my
two-year stay there...In my mind’s eye I could see an Asia exploited, deprived, impoverished by centuries of colonial rule and, as an Asian myself, I felt intense pain and anger.\textsuperscript{15}

On her return to Japan, Matsui became a journalist at the \textit{Asahi} newspaper, where she reported on environmental disasters such as the thalidomide case and Minamata disease. After encountering the US women’s liberation movement in the early 1970s, she began to be involved in networking activities with women throughout Asia, and in 1977 she founded the Asian Women’s Association (Ajia no Onnatachi no Kai), “to examine the relationships between Japan and other Asian countries from the viewpoint of women, focusing on such issues as sex tourism, Japan-South Korea relations, war responsibility, Japanese multinationals, exploitation of women for cheap labour, and so on”\textsuperscript{16}. (In 1994 this was reorganized into the Asia-Japan Women’s Resource Center [Ajia Josei Shiryô Sentâ].) Some members of this association, it should be noted, also played important roles in PARC. In the 1990s, Matsui went on to become the key figure in the creation of the Violence Against Women in War Network, Japan [VAWW-NET Japan], which organized the International Women’s War Crimes Tribunal, held in Tokyo in 2000.

\textbf{“Asia Is Not One”: Tsurumi Yoshiyuki and the Search for Diversity}

Tsurumi and Matsui wrote and campaigned in the context of heated global debates about the “Third World” and about the possibility for relatively poor societies to pursue an alternative path of development, different from the capitalism of the United States, Western Europe and Japan as well as the state socialism of the Soviet bloc. “Asia” for them was therefore a term of contestation—a representation of forces that challenged the hegemonic powers of the Cold War era. In Tsurumi’s writings, indeed, the terms “Asia”, “the Third World” and “developing countries” are often used almost interchangeably. At a time when Japanese multinational corporations were rapidly expanding into the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia, Tsurumi took a particular interest in Southeast Asia, energetically arguing that Asian countries should not seek to follow the Japanese path to development (nor, for that matter, the Chinese path), but
should seek out their own indigenous approaches to prosperity. This emphasis on diverse and indigenous approaches reflects another core element in Tsurumi’s thought: although he was deeply influenced by Marxist thought and by the student movements of the 1960s, like a number of other key “progressive” thinkers of his generation he emphatically rejected a heavy emphasis on theory and ideology, and instead sought a path to social change grounded in the realities of everyday life.

Tsurumi’s writings on Japan’s relationship to its region have sometimes been criticized for presenting a dichotomy between a poor and exploited Asia and a rich and exploitative Japan that appears somehow to stand outside of Asia. The Japan/Asia dichotomy seems particularly evident from the titles of two of his works: *The Asians and the Japanese* (*Ajiajin to Nihonjin*) and *Why Is Asia Poor?* (*Ajia wa naze Mazushii no ka*), published in 1982, at a time when Japan clearly was not. But it would be too simple to assume from these uses of the term “Asia” that Tsurumi was just echoing Japanese orientalist stereotypes of an advanced Japan versus a backward Asia. Rather, his works embody a complex and often uncomfortable sense of Japan’s divided identity, one reflected in many grassroots Asianist movements in Japan.

Tellingly, the first essay reproduced in *The Asians and the Japanese* discusses the question of whether it was possible for Japanese people to find a “method of living in a non-Japanese manner” (*Nihonjin banare no ikikata*). Asia, in this context, becomes an object of desire, an identity in which Japanese people desperately wish to immerse themselves but from which they fear they are excluded because of Japan’s history of wartime aggression against, and later economic exploitation of, its Asian neighbours. Tsurumi, with his background in the Japanese ruling elite, often seemed to share this uneasy sense of being “unworthy to be Asian”, but at the same time he suggested a variety of methods by which Japanese might actively engage in the making of a new Asia, in the process re-creating themselves as Asians.

One method is the approach that he described as “thinking while walking” (*arukinagara kangaeru*). This, for Tsurumi, involved a deep and slow interaction with surrounding Asian societies—not through brief study trips or conferences, but by staying in other countries for periods of time that allowed one to physically experience the life of
ordinary people and to participate in leisured and unstructured conversations and friendships with local people. Far from emphasizing the separation of Japan from Asia, Tsurumi aimed—by “thinking while walking”—to develop an understanding of the interconnections between Japan and its region that Japanese academia and media generally ignored. This approach is best illustrated by his two widely sold short studies, *Bananas and the Japanese* [Banana to Nihonjin] \(^{22}\) and *The Eye of the Sea Slug* [Namako no Me]. \(^{23}\) *Bananas and the Japanese* uses the simple but—at that time—quite radical device of examining Japan’s deep structural relationship to its region by exploring the way in which the humble banana finds its way onto Japanese dining tables. In the process, Tsurumi shows how minor changes in consumption patterns in Japan can have huge effects on the lives and social structures of people many thousands of miles away in the producing villages of Southeast Asia. *The Eye of the Sea Slug* undertakes a similar exploration of the historical development of the trade in the delicacy namako (raw sea cucumber), this time revealing the threads of connection between Japan and the Indonesian archipelago. These studies formed the basis of campaigns by PARC and other related groups to denounce the environmentally or socially exploitative practices of Japanese multinational corporations, and to develop alternative fair trade networks between Japan and Asian communities.

At the same time, Tsurumi depicted Asia as a prism through which Japanese people could come to have a new sense of their own history and identity. Reacting against the tradition of Asian studies that focused on the unifying influence of the great civilizations of China, India and beyond, Tsurumi instead argued for an approach that viewed the region from multiple peripheral perspectives. Viewed from the periphery, he suggested, the most significant characteristic of Asia was its diversity: “Asia definitely is not one.” \(^ {24}\) By studying the rich mixture of cultures and languages that constituted a country like the Philippines, he proposed, Japanese people might be made more sensitive to the presence of minorities and of regional diversity within their own society. \(^ {25}\)

The Pacific Asia Resource Center, which Tsurumi helped to create, reflects this approach, describing its goals as follows:

[to] create a society where people of the “North” and people of the “South” can live with equality and harmony. We believe that changes
achieved by individuals will help bring about change in Japanese society as a whole—as well as help achieve a more balanced North-South relationship.  

As is the case with many of the more successful grassroots social movements in Japan, PARC has helped to spawn a range of other related groups working on issues such as human rights and fair trade in Asia: among them the People’s Plan Study Group (established in 1998) and a nationwide network of “Free Schools” (Jiyū Gakkō) running evening classes and lectures on social issues (often those linking Japan and other Asian countries).

**Matsui Yayori and Women’s Asia**

For Matsui Yayori, too, Asia definitely was not one, but a place riven with class and gender inequality. While Tsurumi’s Asianism sought solidarity with Asian farmers, fishers, craftspeople and factory workers, rather than with political and economic elites, Matsui’s Asianism sought solidarity specifically with Asian women, who, even as national economies expanded, “suffered most from the feminization of poverty and an increase in violence, as well as from many other violations of human rights and unprecedented environmental destruction in the region”. For Matsui, the dilemmas of identity visible in Tsurumi’s work were in some ways simplified by a focus on gender. Wealth and power might separate Japanese women from their Asian sisters, but gender provided a basis for solidarity. Women, she wrote, “are truly the ‘last colony’, and thus the suffering in Asia caused by the new colonialism of First World countries can be seen most clearly through the eyes of women”.

Yet for Matsui and her colleagues, too, solidarity was no simple matter, and an identity as “Asian woman” was something that needed to be hard won rather than taken for granted. This problem is particularly vividly illustrated by the opening words of the founding declaration on “Asia and Women’s Liberation” issued by the Asian Women’s Association in 1977:

The “modernization” accomplished by Japan since the Meiji Restoration was a history of the invasion of Asia, and the [Japanese] women who have lived their lives during the past hundred years have also been aggressors complicit in that invasion. We have finally learnt
that fact from Asian women… The people who once formed the vanguard of the invading army burning, killing, pillaging and raping women in China, the Korean Peninsula and other Asian counties were our relatives, friends and lovers. Now, we refuse any longer to continue to be women who will send husbands and lovers as the vanguard of economic and sexual invasion. Without this determination, it will surely be impossible to make our own liberation a reality.29

In such statements we can see some of the themes repeated in grassroots Asianisms from the 1970s and 1980s onward. Asia is understood to be characterized not by any inherent common culture, but by the experience of exploitation and suffering. Its “other” is a “First World”, which is often identified with the West but which is not geographically confined to Europe and North America. Rather, “the West/First World” is a particular (exploitative and militarized) form of modernity that is also to be found within Japan and within the ruling elites of other Asian countries. By allying themselves to exploited groups within Asia, the participants in this grassroots Asianism sought to transform their own identity while bringing about change within Japan itself as well as in the broader region. In their critiques of “First World” capitalist development and of Japan’s complicity with transnational capitalism and US military power, Tsurumi’s and Matsui’s ideas are close to those of Nakamura Tetsu and the Peshawarkai (as described by Hatsuse Ryūhei). However, neither Tsurumi nor Matsui would have identified humanitarianism as the philosophical basis of their engagement with Asia. Rather, they saw themselves as being involved in a struggle for political transformation based on notions of social justice and (in Matsui’s case) feminism.

**Regional Society and Grassroots Asianism: The East Asia Collaborative Workshop**

Both Tsurumi Yoshiyuki and Matsui Yayori were intellectuals working largely outside formal academia, but both were very much part of the metropolitan progressive circles, and the organizations they founded were Tokyo-based. To understand the extent and nature of grassroots engagement with Asia, however, it is important also to look outside the metropolis and consider the connections made by civil society to
other parts of Japan. Groups such as PARC and the Asian Women’s
Association illustrate an important characteristic of Japan’s “invisible
Asianism”: its “dandelion clock” structure. I shall return to the image
of the dandelion clock later. In essence, though, it means that groups
tend to be small and often quite short-lived, but members, as they
disperse, often move on to establish other small organizations of their
own, creating loosely linked networks of grassroots activism. The
Pacific Asia Resource Center spawned the creation of the loose net-
work of “Free Schools”, of which there are now nine—from Sapporo
in the north to Fukuoka in the south—while the Asian Woman’s
Association (as we shall see) also inspired locally based activism. To
illustrate this dispersal of the seeds of grassroots Asianism throughout
local communities, I shall consider two examples: the cases of the
East Asia Collaborative Workshop and of cross-border links to Asia
created by Kim Sun-yeoul, a Sendai-based participant in the 1980s
Asian Women’s Association.30

The East Asia Collaborative Workshop (Higashi Ajia Kyôdô
Wâkushoppu)—founded in northwestern Hokkaido in 1997 and
originally called the Japan-Korea Collaborative Workshop (Nikkan
Kyôdô Wâkushoppu)—embodies ideas of engagement with Asia that
in many ways resemble the approaches of Tsurumi Yoshiyuki and
Matsui Yayori. The Workshop, however, was also strongly influenced
by a third stream of late 20th century Japanese thought that had a
widespread impact on grassroots Asianisms: the concept of “People’s
History” (minshûshi). As Carol Gluck observed, the People’s History
movement began to emerge in the 1960s as a reaction to both ortho-
dox Marxism and modernization theory. Its leading proponents, who
included Irokawa Daikichi (b. 1925), Kanô Masanao (b. 1931) and
Yasumaru Yoshio (b. 1934), aimed “to revive the individual as an
agent of historical change” and “to make the people into the subjects,
not merely the objects, of political authority”.31 In this sense, they
approached history with a focus on the everyday life of “ordinary peo-
ple” and a suspicion of dogmatic theorizing that resembles Tsurumi
Yoshiyuki’s approach to Asian studies.

People’s History, particularly in its early phases, focused largely on
events within the national boundaries of Japan but also had impli-
cations for perceptions of Japan’s place in the region. Takashi Fujitani
explores how the People’s History pioneer Yasumaru Yoshio developed
a view of history that radically confronted the modernization theories
popular in 1960s Japan and the United States.\(^{32}\) Modernization theory tended to depict Japan as somehow distinct from the rest of Asia in its unique potential to follow US and European models of economic and social development, thus transforming itself into the “New Far West”.\(^{33}\) Yasumaru, on the contrary, explored radical, politicized and conflictual histories of local society to present a picture of Japan’s recent past far removed from that of the modernization theorists, and thus “effectively intervened in the 1960s and 1970s against the modernist social scientists’ classical orientalist assumptions about peasants, the village community and Asia”.\(^{34}\)

Just as Inoue Kiyoshi’s approach to history had helped to inspire local circle movements in the 1950s, so in the 1970s and 1980s the People’s History movement inspired the creation of a number of local history groups throughout Japan, and (like the Ehime Women’s History a quarter of a century earlier) some of these went on to promote new visions of Asian solidarity. In northern Hokkaido, a key figure in this process was an energetic and charismatic local history teacher named Koike Kikô (1916–2003), originally from Tokyo. Because of his involvement in trade unionism and his opposition to the content of officially approved history textbooks, he lost his position as a high school teacher during the “Red Purge” in the latter part of the occupation period. In 1953 he obtained a position as a teacher at a school in Kitami, in northeastern Hokkaido, where he spent the rest of his career, and in the early 1970s he established a local research group called the Okhotsk People’s History Study Group (Ohôtsuku Minshûshi Kôza), named after the Okhotsk Sea, which washes Hokkaido’s northern shores.

Within a few years, the Okhotsk group was attracting audiences of several hundred to its regular lecture series, and its tenth anniversary conference in 1982 was attended by around 1,000 people.\(^{35}\) The group’s aim was to uncover the forgotten voices of local residents: voices unheard in mainstream grand narratives of the settlement of Hokkaido, which tended to present relatively triumphalist stories of the achievements of pioneer settlers. Among the early subjects of its research were the experiences of convict labourers who had been brought to northern Hokkaido to work on construction projects. (Kitami’s neighbouring city of Abashiri is still home to one of Japan’s largest prisons, with a history dating back to the 19th century.) Even
after the abolition of convict labour in the 1890s, poor and unemployed men continued to be shipped to Hokkaido from other parts of Japan to work as *takobeya* (literally “octopus pot”) labourers: contract workers who were kept confined in barracks on mining or construction sites, often working in very harsh conditions for minimal wages.

As oral history collection and the physical excavation and restoration of historical sites progressed, however, the spatial contours of the Okhotsk Group’s work began to change. Digging into the past, the group struck (as it were) underground veins or rivers connecting their local area not just to other parts of Japan but also across borders to other parts of Asia. Research on the *takobeya* labourers, for example, proved to flow into the story of the importation of labour from Korea and China. From the late 1930s onwards, with growing numbers of Japanese workers serving in the military, the Japanese government had passed the first of a series of increasingly coercive laws to conscript Korean colonial subjects for work in mines and on construction sites in Japan. These workers were generally employed—alongside Japanese labourers recruited from the poorest strata of society—in the quasi-penal conditions of the *takobeya* system, and many were sent to labour sites in remote parts of Hokkaido.

The cross-border spread of the Okhotsk Group’s research illustrates the workings of the dandelion clock principle. Several participants in the group, who came from the Sorachi region to the west of Kitami, soon decided to establish their own local Sorachi People’s History Study Group circle on similar lines. The Sorachi area, as they discovered, contained a number of mines and dams where many Korean and Chinese forced labourers had been employed during the war. One of the most important of their research sites was Shumarinai, where a vast hydroelectric dam was constructed by Japanese and Korean labour conscripts during the war, and where many labourers who died in accidents and from harsh working conditions had been buried in unmarked graves. As the Sorachi group’s research on local history progressed, it evolved into a wider movement bringing together young people from Japan, Korea and elsewhere to excavate such sites, discuss issues of cross-border history, and (in some cases) also to return the remains of Japanese and Korean workers who died on labour sites in northern Hokkaido to their families. This was the start of the East Asia Collaborative Workshop, whose participants include Zainichi Koreans (members of the Korean ethnic minority in
Japan) and Ainu, as well as Japanese and young people from other parts of Asia and beyond. By 2010 more than 1,000 people had taken part in the workshops. If Tsurumi Yoshiyuki sought to create new forms of engagement with Asia by “thinking while walking”, the East Asia Collaborative Workshop could be said to aim at a new sense of community created by “thinking while digging”. By engaging together in the manual labour of excavating the past, as well as by debate and discussion, participants in the workshop aim to transcend national boundaries and the divisions created by the violence of history. In the words of the Young People’s East Asia Declaration [Wakamonotachi no Higashi Ajia Sengen], written by one of the group’s key organizers, the Japanese Buddhist priest Tonohira Yoshihiko, “our experience is that by labouring and sweating together, and through dialogue conducted while living together, we have been able to have human encounters of unexpected depth”.

The group offers no comprehensive macro vision of Asian solidarity but rather focuses specifically on East Asia (particularly on the Japan-Korea relationship) and on forging micro-level solidarity between individuals through shared experience. Its notion of regionalism is not of a natural community based on fixed or eternal values, but rather of a community of the future, to be imagined and created through the coming together of young people across national borders. As in so much late 20th century Japanese Asianism, Japan's colonialism and wartime aggression were seen as the greatest obstacle to “becoming Asian”; but at the same time, addressing this past is presented as the most meaningful way of creating a common Asian future:

Half a century has passed since the end of the Second World War, which claimed tens of millions of lives. Humanity has inherited the legacy of that war, and must face a present in which it has still only progressed half the way along the path to overcoming that legacy. Particularly in Asia, Japan, which was an active participant in colonization and the fifteen years war, has allowed fifty years to pass without taking responsibility or making recompense to Asian victims of war. This fact has created a major obstacle preventing Asian countries and Japan from living as friends in the same Asia…From Shumarinai, which was once a cruel place of war and colonialism, we seek to make a place of reconciliation where we shall construct a new human relationship in Asia.
Weaving Asia: Kim Sun-yeoul and the Asian Women’s Association

Like the Okhotsk People’s History Study Group, Matsui Yayori’s Asian Women’s Association also acted as a seedbed for a range of small groups that sought to build both practical and conceptual links between Japan and other Asian countries. This process can be illustrated by considering the life and activism of the Zainichi Korean woman Kim Sun-yeoul, now in her late 70s and living in the northeastern Japanese city of Sendai. Kim’s father migrated to Japan from the southern Korean island of Jeju as a labourer in the pre-war period. She was born in Osaka in 1932, and as a teenager she participated in a left-wing study circle created in the city during the post-war occupation period. Soon after, she and her family moved to Sendai, where Kim worked as a seamstress to support her brothers and sisters, and where she married a Japanese left-wing activist (despite intense opposition from her Korean family) and had two children.

Kim Sun-yeoul’s husband had given up a job in the public service to devote himself full time to political activism for a peace movement with links to the Communist Party. His only income was the occasional payment that he received for giving speeches at meetings. The couple had two children—a son and a daughter—and it was Sun-yeoul who not only looked after the children while her husband travelled the country on speaking tours, but also earned the family’s income with her needlework. The years passed; her children grew; and Kim Sun-yeoul’s life was taken up with an endless dawn-to-midnight cycle of housework, childcare, sewing and an unrelenting struggle to make ends meet. Meanwhile, her father died, and her mother and five of her six siblings decided to join the mass “repatriation” of ethnic Koreans from Japan to North Korea, leaving Sun-yeoul and one younger sister as the only family members still living in Japan. The family was now irrevocably divided by a Cold War that has not yet ended.41

As Kim remembers, it was in the second half of the 1970s that she began to awake from what seemed like a long and troubled sleep. Her husband had promised when they were married that, “like Jean-Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir”, they would have the right of divorce at any time. Sun-yeoul was convinced that as long as she remained married, her life would never change, so, taking her husband
at his word, she sought a divorce and embarked on what she saw as her second chance at life.

A key influence on this new life was her encounter with the recently founded Asian Women’s Association. Kim Sun-yeoul first heard of the association through newspaper reports. She had never met any of its members, but she was so intrigued and excited by what she read that she telephoned their headquarters and was told that she was welcome to attend their meetings in Tokyo. When she joined the association, it was embarking on a new scheme to develop fair trade support for women textile workers in Bangladesh, and this seemed a perfect opportunity to link her skills with work to help women in some of the poorest parts of Asia. There were, however, serious practical obstacles to be overcome. As a Zainichi Korean with Chôsen registration, Kim Sun-yeoul had no passport and was unable to obtain a visa for Bangladesh. Undaunted, she set off for Thailand with nothing but a re-entry document for Japan, in the hope of being able to apply for a Bangladesh visa once she reached Bangkok. Her visa application was rejected, but during this first journey outside of Japan she travelled as far as the Thai-Malaysian border and grasped the possibility of creating a network connecting Thai women weavers directly to the Japanese market. The result was the creation of the Association for Linking with Thai Villagers through Handwoven Textiles (Teorimono o Tôshite Tai Nôson no Hitobito to Tsunagaru Kai, hereafter the Handwoven Textile Association), established in 1984 by Kim Sun-yeoul in cooperation with a Japanese volunteer whom she had met on her travels.

Kim Sun-yeoul’s engagement with Asia reflects her own awareness of her position both as a Korean living in Japan and as a person engaged in a form of craft production that linked her to other Asian women. Oguma Eiji highlights Japanese progressive intellectuals’ discovery of the “other within”; but, by the 1980s, Zainichi Koreans, Ainu, Okinawans and others were becoming not merely the “other” with whom Japanese Asianists sought to interact, but also active participants in the creation of grassroots links between Japan and other parts of Asia, able to bring their own distinct perspectives to the process. Kim’s position made it possible for her to engage with other Asian women on relatively (though not wholly) horizontal terms. Her explicit aim was not to be an activist or a volunteer, but rather to
Kim’s activism therefore resembled much grassroots engagement with the region in being a “micro-Asianism”, which deliberately sought to focus on practical, concrete connections rather than on grand narratives of politics or culture. If she worked very hard at her dress-making, she could save up the 100,000 yen (around $1,000) that she needed to make an annual visit to Thailand of up to one month.

When I went to the Northeast of Thailand I was really surprised. People there were dyeing and weaving fabric from artificial fibres like tetron and nylon, manufactured by Toray and other Japanese companies, and selling it for more than the price of local silk fabrics. For example, silk fabric might cost 500 yen a metre and tetron fabric 700 yen a metre. I was so astonished. It seemed all wrong that these companies were coming in, and people were being persuaded to use artificial products instead of the beautiful traditional materials. So I thought that if we could pay a bit more to buy their traditional silk fabric, the local village economies could benefit.44

Back in Japan, as the movement gathered support, Kim Sun-yeoul began to organize exhibitions to display the Thai woven fabrics to Japanese buyers. She also made clothes from the imported fabrics and sold them to Japanese customers, making sure to take pictures of the finished products back to the villages where the textiles originated. The problems were substantial. Kim spoke no Thai; she was sometimes assisted by an interpreter from a Bangkok university or by Japanese volunteers in Thailand, but sometimes she communicated by gesture and sign language. Exchanging money, she recalls, was particularly difficult, because she had no passport and was therefore viewed with much suspicion by local bank clerks. The problems of travel
without a passport, indeed, eventually persuaded her to change her alien registration from Chôsen to Kankoku, which enabled her to obtain a South Korean passport.

In this way she was also able to travel more widely in South and Southeast Asia and to extend her fair trade activities to Bangladesh. A distinctive part of the Bangladesh project was a literacy programme based on embroidery. In the villages that Kim Sun-yeoul visited, many of the men were absent, working in cities to earn money for their families. Since most of the women were illiterate, they were unable to write to their husbands. However, they were exceptionally skilled needlewomen, and Kim found that by encouraging them to incorporate the letters of Bengali script into their embroidery designs, she could help them to learn to read and write.45

An underlying dilemma of grassroots activism in Japan is the question of organization and institutionalization. Kim Sun-yeoul shared with others of her generation a deep suspicion of large hierarchical political organizations such as the Communist Party and the large party-affiliated peace movements of the 1950s and 1960s. By the late 1990s, the textile fair trade network that she had helped to establish, although still relatively small in scale, had begun to receive financial support from a variety of Japanese grant-giving bodies and was becoming increasingly institutionalized.

When I went to one of the mountain areas of Thailand, there were villages where all the people would gather and make a kind of patchwork together. I asked them about their equipment, and it turned out that they didn’t have any rulers or irons or patterns, and yet they could make the most amazingly beautiful patchwork. They told me that if you looked at the design from above, you just knew what needed to be done. In other words, these were real craftspeople. When I saw that, I thought, “coming from a developed country isn’t such a big deal. It’s not something to be conceited about.” The people who made these patchwork fabrics weren’t recognized as being “artisans”, they were just village women, but for centuries they had absorbed the traditions of this craft. I though it was wonderful. And at the same time, I felt more and more strongly that it was a mistake for people from an economic giant like Japan to go to these villages and condescendingly say “We’ve come to help you.” So I thought that, once these village women had reached a certain level of financial independence, it was time for us to withdraw…”46
With divisions emerging within the Handwoven Textile Association about the best future strategies, Kim Sun-yeoul left the organization in 1996. Meanwhile, however, she had also been engaged with other Sendai-based women’s study groups, and in 1998 she embarked on a further border-crossing project: one that sought to cross the internal borders separating majority Japanese society from the “others within”. In 1988 she and others created a group in Sendai to increase knowledge of the situation of the Korean community in Japan amongst the local community. Kim Sun-yeoul and her co-workers named this new group *Param Sendai*.

Tokyo is always seen as being the centre of things. But, from around the time when I got involved in the textiles movement, I started to dislike the idea that the flow of things was always from Tokyo to Sendai. Instead, I wanted it to be from Sendai to Tokyo. So that’s why we called this group *Param Sendai*. *Param* is the Korean for wind; so the meaning is “the wind that blows from Sendai”.

Its members meet monthly, with each taking turns to organize a gathering on a topic related to the Zainichi Korean community. Members sometimes speak about their own experiences, organize readings of texts, invite speakers from other parts of Japan, issue an occasional newsletter, and have conducted oral history interviews with Zainichi Koreans living in the Sendai area. A characteristic of the group is its loose and flexible structure. It has no officer bearers, committee or formal leaders. Its membership, too, has been a relatively floating one: though a handful of central members have been involved since the group’s founding, many are students or temporary residents in Sendai, who leave when they move elsewhere or find that their careers leave no time for participation in meetings.

Flexibility has its costs. As time has passed, the number of participants has fallen and the group has found it hard to keep its momentum going. The massive impact of the 2011 earthquake and tsunami on the movement remains to be seen. Yet those who leave the group do not necessarily abandon its aims. Some move on elsewhere, to places where they in turn may initiate new actions of their own. The *Param Sendai*’s icon is the image of a young woman holding a dandelion clock up to catch the wind, which scatters its seeds across the landscape. As I suggested earlier, this seems to me an apt image...
for Japan’s “invisible civil society” as a whole. Groups are small and dispersed, like dandelions, pushing their shoots up, often through unfertile terrain. Like dandelions, they too are often short-lived, but their disappearance should not necessarily be read as failure. When members scatter, they take ideas and experiences with them. Who knows where the seeds fall or how they will germinate.

**Conclusion**

Through a rather detailed examination of small-scale examples, this chapter has sought to shed light on Japan’s “invisible Asianisms”. We can trace tendencies of thought, emerging from around the 1970s onward, which sought to define new paths for Japanese engagement with Asia. These new Asianisms drew on earlier traditions, including the “circle” movement of the early post-war years, but developed them in the light of late 20th century notions of alternative development, feminism and people’s history. A particularly important element of these Asianisms from below was that they were not confined to academic discourse but were, in various ways, put into practice by small grassroots movements, many of them based outside Japan’s major metropolitan areas.

This exploration has suggested some of the factors that have kept grassroots Asianism invisible. The lack of large formal organizations has made sustained networking over prolonged periods difficult. Relying as they do on the commitment of individuals, grassroots groups are liable to dissolve when the central member or members have to withdraw due to age, ill health, work commitments, etc. Disagreements between core members also sometimes lead to fission or dispersal. The ability of grassroots groups to influence Japanese national politics is limited by their small-scale, local character and conscious wariness of centralized political organizations.

New groups continue to form as old ones disappear. For historians, a particularly important task is to chart and record the paths taken by Japan’s “invisible Asianisms” to date. Exploring this history makes us conscious of the mass of fine threads that already binds Japanese society to surrounding countries. The experiences of these groups can also provide a fund of ideas for new activities that will emerge as younger generations take up the task of strengthening and expanding cross-border civil society in East Asia.
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Notes

1. Patricia Steinhoff, “Japan’s Invisible Civil Society”, paper presented at the German Institute for Japanese Studies, Tokyo, 31 May 2007; in addition to Steinhoff’s own work, one of the few English language studies that does explore grassroots civil society in Japan is Jennifer Chan, Another Japan Is Possible: New Social Movements and Global Citizenship Education (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009).


3. For example, Nam-kook Kim, “Europe and East Asia: Holistic Convergence or Fundamental Skepticism?”, in Globalization and Regional Integration in Europe and Asia, ed. Nam-kook Kim (Farnham: Ashgate Publishing, 2009), pp. 85–104.


12. Ibid., p. 117.
20. Tsurumi’s father, Tsurumi Ken, was a diplomat who was the Japanese consul general in Singapore in 1942 and became the first head of the administration of the island under the wartime Japanese occupation. Tsurumi Yoshiyuki’s uncle, Tsurumi Yûsuke, was a prominent politician; and two of his cousins, Tsurumi Shunsuke and Tsurumi Kazuko, were well-known post-war progressive intellectuals.
30. Other examples that I have encountered include the work of the Tatsue Folk Art Hall for Peace and Handicrafts (Heiwa to Teshigoto Tatsue Mingeikan) in Mochizuki, Nagano Prefecture; the Grassroots House Peace Museum (Kusa-no-Ne Heiwakan) in Kōchi City, Shikoku; the Oka Masaharu Peace Memorial Museum in Nagasaki (Oka Masaharu Kinen Nagasaki Heiwa Shiryōkan); and the Niigata NGO Humanitarian Aid Liaison Group (Niigata NGO Jindō Shien Renrakukai).
33. Ibid.: 310.
34. Ibid.: 316.
37. Personal communication, Yoshihiko Tonohira, June 2010.
41. Though almost all Koreans in Japan originated from the southern half of the Korean Peninsula, between 1959 and 1984 some 93,000 (including
ethnic Japanese spouses and dependents of Zainichi Koreans) were persuaded to take part in a mass “repatriation” to North Korea, organized by the North Korean and Japanese Red Cross Societies with very strong involvement by Chongryun. Many suffered greatly from poverty and persecution in the DPRK (North Korea); see Tessa Morris-Suzuki, *Exodus to North Korea: Shadows from Japan’s Cold War* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007).

42. From 1947 onward, Zainichi Koreans and Chinese were required to register as “aliens” in Japan. Many registered themselves as nationals of Chôsen (*Joseon* in Korean), using the pre-war name for Korea. After the creation of the Republic of Korea (South Korea) in 1948, however, other Koreans registered themselves as nationals of Kankoku (*Hanguk* in Korean), the name adopted by the new South Korean state. Only those registered as Kankoku nationals were eligible to obtain South Korean passports. For further information, see Morris-Suzuki, *Borderline Japan*.


Chapter Eight

Coming to Terms with Asianism: Historical Reconciliation and Asianist History Politics in Contemporary China and Japan

Torsten Weber

Introduction

The politics of the past have become an omnipresent factor in virtually every terrain of the public sphere in East Asia, particularly Sino-Japanese relations, including diplomacy, education, political and social discourse, and the economy. As could be observed on frequent occasions during the past decade, references to history serve as powerful arguments in political practices and debates that can stir up massive violent protests, halt bilateral exchanges, and severely damage business relations. Since the beginning of the new millennium the “history wars” have erupted practically on an annual basis. They reached extremes in the violent anti-Japanese demonstrations in Beijing and other Chinese cities in spring 2005 (textbook dispute, Yasukuni visits) and again in autumn 2012 (territorial dispute). On these occasions the politicized usage of the past as an instrument to appeal to a certain segment of the public or to the wider public at large played a key role in stirring up fanatical sentiments that rendered any critical debate over historical details, facts and nuanced
interpretations impossible. In 2005 the protests, which to smaller degrees also erupted in South Korea and among overseas Chinese communities, reacted to the assumed whitewashing of Japanese war crimes in Japanese history textbooks. In part they were also fuelled by the regular visits of Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi Jun’ichirō to the controversial Yasukuni Shrine war memorial in Tokyo during his premiership (2001–06).1 In 2012, a different history clash between Japan and China (re-)emerged, namely over the ownership of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, which are claimed also by Taiwan. Both major incidents, regardless of their differences, highlight the significance of the past in today’s political practice and discourse between China and Japan. As the American historian Daqing Yang has observed in the context of the disputes over the Nanjing Massacre—arguably the most prominent and extensively researched site of Sino-Japanese history wars during the past decades2—in modern Sino-Japanese history there is little stable ground (“stable truth”) on which commonly accepted narratives of the past can be based.3 By “stable truth” Yang refers to a consensus among professional historians on facts and interpretations of the past that may form the base of a shared understanding of history among a community that transcends the profession of historians and may also transcend one nation. Only when such a consensus has been reached can other, diverging, narratives be dismissed as denials of this “stable truth”.

But the term “stable” can also refer to a functional dimension of history for contemporary society. The past, or more precisely certain narratives of the past, may contribute to stabilizing societies that have become unsteady due to traumatic historical experiences, be it as victims or as perpetrators. In the context of World War II in Europe and the Holocaust, the lasting, dominant, and often destabilizing influence of the past over the present has metaphorically been referred to, by Aleida Assmann and others, as the “long shadow” that the past casts on the present. Like a real shadow, it can be treated as a natural physical phenomenon that is negligible or controllable; but shadows can also bring with them darkening and obscuration, and they can haunt people and leave them traumatized, especially when they appear unexpectedly or are omnipresent. Coming to terms with the past, known in the field by its oft-quoted German term Vergangenheitsbewältigung, is usually seen as the prescription written against collective traumatization as a result of the persistence of the past in the
Coming to Terms with Asianism

present. But how do peoples and societies come to terms with the past when it serves as a forceful means of history politics in the public sphere?

In this study of the politics of the past in the context of transnational Asianist discourse, I propose to supplement the intimidating and negative character of the “long and dark shadows of the past” with more positively connoted lighter shadows or shades of the past. By this I suggest understanding how the past is employed as a means of political partisanship for the end of historical reconciliation in East Asia. Similar to the way purposefully installed window blinds create shade that shelters from the heat, these lighter shades of the past are intended to cool off the heated disputes of the “history wars” and to provide a forum for relaxation and constructive conversations over the past. One explicit aim of this discourse is the search for commonalities, broadly defined as anything ranging from pragmatic to essentialist features such as shared interests (strategic, economic, etc.) or joint cultural heritage (script, spiritual and material culture, etc.). Interestingly, this search also includes the re-appreciation of various concepts (ab)used in the wartime past as propaganda by and for the Japanese empire, from its early expansion in the Meiji period (1868–1912) through the creation of the quasi-puppet regime of Manchukuo in Northeast China (1932), and to the formation of the so-called Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere (1940). Focusing on two conceptual pairs that have re-emerged centrally in East Asian political discourse during the past decade, the following sections examine the networks driving this debate and their strategies of political uses of the past (a) to promote historical reconciliation in contemporary East Asia and (b) to replace nationalist by regionalist politics of the past.

Governments, Think Tanks and Civil Society Networks

In reaction to the Sino-Japanese disputes of 2005 over the “correct” portrayal of the wartime past in the public domestic spheres (history textbooks, monuments, public commemorations, etc.) both governments agreed to set up a joint committee for history research in 2006. The committee’s main aims were, in the words of a Japanese participant, “to depoliticize the issue of historical recognition [historical
consciousness], and to promote mutual understanding in the spirit of ‘agree to disagree’.” Against the background of the diplomatic ice age in Sino-Japanese relations during Koizumi’s premiership, the implementation of this initiative may already be seen as a major success. The committee consisted of ten leading historians from each country and was subdivided into two groups, one each for ancient/medieval history and modern/contemporary history. The Japanese delegation was led by the conservative historian Kitaoka Shin’ichi, an expert on Japanese diplomatic history and former ambassador to the United Nations. It also included three historians from private universities. The Chinese delegation consisted of historians from the state-run Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and Peking University. It was led by Bu Ping, director of the Institute of Modern History at the academy. Eventually, the committee failed to reach its main targets. First, due to severe conflicts of opinion between the Chinese and Japanese delegations, the final results could not be presented as scheduled during 2008, which coincided with the 30th anniversary of the Japanese-Chinese Treaty of Friendship. They were published only after a two-year delay. Second, far from reaching a consensus as a stable basis for a shared historical consciousness, the committee presented separate accounts that contained many diverging statements concerning modern and contemporary history. The Japanese historian Kawashima Shin attributed this failure in part to the top-down nature of the project and called on non-governmental organizations and civil society actors to actively participate in projects of joint historical research and reconciliation:

New problems were created because of gaps in understanding between the Chinese and Japanese sides as well as communication problems at all three levels [historians, governments, media]. One conclusion is that intergovernmental joint research may harden the shells of both sides’ national histories in the end, making it necessary to encourage private institutions to conduct research on historical recognition in the future.5

In fact, even before the joint intergovernmental committee was inaugurated, a number of groups had emerged that committed themselves to easing the tensions between both countries by addressing issues perceived as critical for a common understanding of the past. Their focus was particularly on the modern period of fierce and continuous
Sino-Japanese rivalry. On the semi-official level, these groups include think tanks such as the Japanese Council on East Asian Community, the Chinese Boao Forum, and the Korean Northeast Asian History Foundation; the transnational scholarly networks of the Inter-Asia Cultural Studies movement and the International Committee on East Asian Community; a tri-national civil society history textbook committee and political activists’ groups as the Japanese Asia New Epoch and Shitamachi group; and local and regional grassroots activists such as the People’s Plan Study Group and the Collaborative East Asian Workshop. With respect to sources of funding and access to political decision makers, groups on the semi-official level are relatively close to the official level. Often, they have been established as a result of strategic policy making on the national or regional level. On the other side, transnational civil society networks usually have less access to resources and influence on political decision making. Some of their work, however, has gained prominence in public debate, and some members have emerged as political opinion leaders. The main focus of these groups, however, is practical work on the grassroots community level or theoretical debate. Despite their heterogeneity, these networks largely share three major concerns. First, they recognize the overwhelmingly negative force of history politics in the bilateral relations and their damaging impact on the respective societies. As countermeasures, they seek new approaches to coming to terms with the past that may potentially contribute to overcoming the prevailing history problems. Second, although this varies considerably between the groups, they acknowledge that convincing the opposite side of one’s own “truth” is futile, and, as a result, that forging a shared historical consciousness requires an exchange of opinions as a prerequisite to achieving a common understanding based on tolerance towards diverging foci and interpretations. As a consequence, most of these groups consist of transnational membership and actively seek cooperation and exchange across national borders. Third, a common topic addressed in this discourse is the potential positive concept of “Asia”, which includes a critical re-evaluation of Asianist concepts from the past. In this way, during the past decade, the first steps have been taken towards the creation of a transnational public sphere in East Asia driven by micro-East Asian communities that share a principally positive stance towards Asianisms.
Rehabilitating “Asia”, Coming to Terms with the Past

Importantly, these positive—that is, affirmative—attitudes towards themes of Asian commonality are based mainly on a functional, not an essentialist, understanding of “Asia”. As a consequence, Asia is not defined by assumed inherent or typical Asian characteristics that informed the so-called Asian values debate of the 1990s. Nor do its proponents subscribe to the booming idea of a coming “Asian century” that celebrates the “rise of Asia”. Instead, the rehabilitation of Asia as a meaningful concept in political discourse rests on two basic assumptions: first, that Asianist concepts of the past can serve as positive models for the present and future; and, second, that in order to do so, their imperialist and hegemonic legacies need to be put into perspective. This, in turn, requires a complicated balancing act between the re-appreciation of Asianist conceptions and Asianist moments from the past, on the one hand, and acknowledging the complicity of Asianism with imperialism that created the history problems in the first place, on the other hand. While this bifurcated task has led to a revisionist revival that seeks to exonerate historical Asianism in toto from its propagandistic role in Japanese imperialism, it has also encouraged others to critically address both roles in a larger historical perspective that draws attention to the potential and pitfalls of Asianist discourse, historically and today. In other words, coming to terms with the past has become both a prerequisite and a consequence of the rehabilitation of Asia as a means of historical reconciliation. In this way, not only can nationalist rivalries (and narratives reinforcing such rivalries) be put into perspective, but Asia may function as one key reference that can be shared, commonly discussed and defined by people in Asia across national borders; it is a vehicle for creating a common discourse and language and, as a possible consequence, a common historical consciousness.

The development of a common discourse and consciousness is also deemed necessary in a second context within which affirmative stances towards Asianisms have re-emerged during the past decade: East Asian regionalism. Since the late 1990s, various mechanisms have been established to foster regional cooperation, particularly after the Asian financial crisis of 1997. These include the adoption of the ASEAN plus Three framework (1997), the East Asian Summit meetings (2005), and the Trilateral Summits of China, Japan and
South Korea (since 2008). Unsurprisingly, these processes too have triggered a political discourse that addresses issues of Asian commonality through legacies of historical Asianisms. In many ways, therefore, politicians and diplomats involved in proposing (or rejecting) steps towards further cooperation or even integration in East Asia speak the same language as the above-mentioned networks. This was epitomized in the proposal of a “New Asianism for the 21st Century” by the high-ranking Chinese diplomat Wang Yi in 2006 and in the debate that followed the proposal of an “East Asian Community” by Hatoyama Yukio on the eve of his becoming prime minister of Japan in 2009. Common themes include general aspects such as the role of the West as Asia’s Other and of Europe as a model of post-war integration and reconciliation. They also address precise motifs from modern history such as personal friendships between the Chinese revolutionary Sun Yat-sen (1866–1925) and his Japanese supporters, and, as will be studied in more detail below, the historical conceptual pairs of “Leaving Asia” vs. “Entering Asia” and the “Kingly Way” vs. the “Hegemonic Way”.

Yet, the Asianist entanglement between regionalism and historical reconciliation has also disclosed some major differences between both discursive streams. As regionalism increasingly displays itself as a site of competition for national leadership and as an instrument of organizing and maximizing strategic, diplomatic and economic interests and benefits geopolitically, it has become viewed as an obstacle to—rather than a means of—reconciliation. Referring to Asian regionalism as pursuing an “Asia for the rich”, Prasenjit Duara has warned of the neo-liberal agenda of Asianism as regionalism that aims at yielding state-led and corporate modes of connecting and coordinating. By contrast, Asianist discourse that is part of the historical reconciliation agenda proposes alternative visions of a global society that may overcome hegemonic systems of social order and of consumption and production, including the hegemonic production and dissemination of knowledge. Asia, in this sense, represents rather the opposite of regionalist standardization and unification. It embraces the diversity and plurality of Asia’s (and of global) reality as sociocultural richness that deserves recognition and protection. This Asia, again, is above all a functional concept; “Asia is not one”, but ideas of a singular Asia are nevertheless meaningful, not least as a means of coming to terms with the past.
Takeuchi Yoshimi’s Encouragement of Appreciating Asia

The major intellectual inspiration for the present-day re-appreciation of Asianism as a means of historical reconciliation stems from the writings of the Japanese Sinologist Takeuchi Yoshimi (1910–77). Many scholars and public intellectuals throughout East Asia have adopted his view of Asia as a site, subject and means of knowledge production, which he called “Asia as Method”. Similar to Takeuchi’s original proposal of the 1960s, in which he complained about the Japanese lack of interest in other Asian countries, cultures and languages, today’s rediscovery of “Asia as Method” promotes a new, active, and self-reflective approach towards Asia. It encourages acquiring knowledge about Asia by entering and experiencing Asia through cultural study and social encounters. In this way, Asia becomes an additional and alternative point of reference for the formation of one’s own world view; it puts the dominant national and Western-centric modes of knowing and self-definition into perspective. As the most fervent advocate of this approach, the Taiwanese scholar Chen Kuan-Hsing argues that this Asianist perspective allows one to confront the imperial Other within one’s own society and nation. As a means of “de-imperialization” (qu diguo), therefore, Asia also becomes an instrument for fostering transnational cooperation in East Asia and for criticizing the re-emergence of Asianism as a top-down project promoting economic regionalism only. Of course, the context within which Takeuchi originally proposed “Asia as Method” was quite different from today’s. Like many thinkers of his generation, Takeuchi was highly critical of Japan’s political and cultural reorientation to the United States after 1945. While in post-war Japan the US occupation of the country and the beginning of the Cold War left little room for alternatives to a leaning towards the West, Takeuchi called attention to the value of studying Asia because of and despite Japan’s complicated wartime legacy there. Using himself as an example, Takeuchi explained how he freed himself from the dominant mode of Western-centrism that had prevailed in his youth in the 1920s and 1930s as it did again in the post-war period.

I decided to study Chinese literature after graduation because of a trip to China I took while in college. I had really wanted to leave Japan at that time, and it was quite easy to travel to and from
China. No passport was necessary; one simply paid for one’s passage, embarked, and then arrived in either Shanghai or Tianjin. These cities were closer to Nagasaki than was Tokyo. I went to China during the summer vacation of my sophomore year. Although registered for Chinese literature, I really had no intention of studying it seriously. I travelled to Manchuria with a tour group and then went on to Beijing alone. Upon arriving there, however, I suddenly felt as if I had discovered the dream or vision that had all this time been lying dormant inside me, a longing within my heart. This was not simply a matter of my being taken with the city’s natural scenery; rather I felt extremely close to the people there. I was moved by the fact that these people seemed to have the same ideas as I did. Although my classmates and I were all registered for Chinese literature, not one of us had imagined that there were actually people on the Chinese mainland who resembled ourselves. In thinking about this afterward, I acutely realized that this was due to the kind of education we had received. This would be different in the case of other countries, particularly those in the West. If one went to Europe or the United States, there would be a sense that the people there are superior to or better than oneself. Why then didn’t we know that there are people in China like ourselves? When we study Asian history or geography at school, no one teaches that there are actually people there—or at least that is how I remember it. 

Takeuchi’s “discovery” of the human dimension of Asia to which he spontaneously felt highly sympathetic as a fellow Asian serves as an obvious encouragement to the present generation of Japanese and Chinese to look beyond the abstract character of “self” versus “other” distinctions based on national borders and abstract textbook depictions of Asian countries and peoples. The underlying, and at times explicit, anti-Western tone in Takeuchi’s project serves this agenda, too. Although he never suggests that the Japanese or Chinese must side with either the West or the East, his own Asianist tendencies are more than clear. As a means of discovering Asian commonality, Takeuchi proposes the study of Asian languages, which, as he de- plores, were not held in high regard in post-war Japan:

Let me provide just one example of such an institutional difficulty. There are currently hundreds of colleges and universities in Japan, among which even a few teach Chinese—such as my own Tokyo Metropolitan University. However, there are no universities here that teach Korean.... Korean used to be taught in the prewar period at
Tokyo University, but that has changed since the war. We Japanese really don’t know anything about Korea, despite the fact that it is geographically closest to us. Indeed, we don’t even try to know it, as evidenced by the fact that there are no universities here that teach Korean. How strange this is! In fact, I would suspect that Japan is the only nation in the world whose universities do not teach the language of that country which is closest to it. Asian languages have been taught extensively in China of late, whereas in Japan there is not even any teaching of Korean…. However, English has spread to such an amazing degree since the war that it is now taught everywhere.\(^{18}\)

To Takeuchi the Japanese policy of ignoring the cultural value of its vicinity represented a renewed Japanese escape from Asia that the famous Japanese thinker Fukuzawa Yukichi (1834–1901) had first postulated in the 1880s. Fukuzawa had referred to Japan’s Asian neighbours as “bad company of the East” that Japan needed to separate from to avoid being mistaken as a backward and uncivilized country itself. Instead, he said that Japan should befriend the countries of the “West” and take the West as the civilizational standard to follow.\(^{19}\) Although the phrase was not widely known in Japan until the end of World War II, “leave Asia, enter the West” (Datsu A, Nyū Ō) has since then become the key concept to describe and rationalize Japan’s turn to the West after the Meiji Restoration (1868). To Takeuchi, this orientation was part of Japan’s major social illness, namely, its characteristic of being a “model student” or “honour student” who blindly imitates his teacher (“the modern West”) without reflection.\(^{20}\) This trait prevented the Japanese from approaching Asia with respect and interest rather than with arrogance and egoism. Even worse, according to Takeuchi, the Japanese mental dissociation from Asia since the late 19th century, which resulted in the forceful physical penetration of Asia in the following decades, survived the war and was still the dominant mode of thought in the 1950s and 1960s. Against this background, it was Takeuchi’s self-declared task to influence the younger generation in a pro-Asian way. Many of his writings, including his treatise on “Asia as Method” (which is based on a speech he delivered to Japanese university students in 1960), seek to combine a Japan-critical attitude with a positive evaluation of Asia. Takeuchi clearly intended to rehabilitate Asia and to encourage the younger generation of Japanese to study Asia, go out to Asia,
and befriend Asians. Physically, he felt that the Japanese should “enter Asia”; however, unlike their fathers, they should do this not as inimical soldiers equipped with guns but as benign students equipped with an attitude of respect and curiosity.

**Leaving Asia, Entering Asia**

Today, the Takeuchian reversal of Fukuzawa’s “leave Asia” (Datsu A) metaphor serves as a key phrase in attempts to rehabilitate Asianism in Japan and other parts of East Asia. But it does not inspire only Asian-minded public intellectuals. Sceptics of Japan’s possible pro-Asian turn today similarly find value in the historical concept, albeit as a reminder of the assumed macro-historical success story of Japan’s Westernization and the uncertainties of a rapprochement with Asia—regarding both regional integration and historical dialogue. This rationale underlies the *Shin Datsu A Ron* (New Leaving Asia Thesis), authored by the Japanese economist Watanabe Toshio. As a prolific writer of articles directed at a wider public, Watanabe has become the main propagator of Japan’s assumed need to learn once again from Fukuzawa Yukichi’s historical advice, which Watanabe takes as his gospel:

…my country does not have time to wait for the enlightenment of our neighbours so that we can together revive Asia (Ajia o okosu). On the contrary, we must leave their company and proceed together with the civilized nations of the West, without treating China and Korea in a special way because they are our neighbours but only approach them in the same way as the Westerners do. Because those who are intimate with bad friends are also regarded as bad I will from my heart decline the bad friends of East Asia (Ajia Tôhô no akuyû).

Watanabe sells his new “Leaving Asia” thesis by drawing an analogy between the political situation when Fukuzawa wrote his treatise (around 1885) and today; as then—before Japan fought and won wars against China (1894–95) and Russia (1904–05)—Japan’s independence and even existence were at stake. According to Watanabe, Meiji Japan’s leadership made the right foreign policy choice of allying with “the civilized nations of the West” (Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1902) and rejecting pan-Asian plans of allying with Japan’s East Asian
neighbours, the “bad company”. Only when Japan’s relationship with the United States deteriorated, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was abandoned (1923), and Japan directed its political attention to Asia rather than the West did the country’s international isolation start and lead to its disastrous defeat in World War II. Of course, Watanabe’s narrative glosses over Japan’s long-term strategy of expanding its sphere of influence and of exploiting natural resources on the Asian mainland, which ran parallel to its pro-Western orientation from the earliest days of the Meiji period. Still, Fukuzawa’s dichotomous paradigm of with or against Asia and with or against the West serves Watanabe’s partisan use of history well. Today, he argues, in the light of the “suicidal behaviour” of North Korea and China’s “despise Japan policy”, Japan’s choice must once again be opting for realist power politics, not sentimental geopolitics.23 In other words, Japan must not seek its allies on the Asian mainland but reaffirm its cooperation with the United States and form a “Transpacific Alliance”. This alliance is explicitly meant as a counter-proposal to the idea of an East Asian Community that may grow out of mechanisms of increased cooperation between East Asian countries, most notably the ASEAN plus Three meetings. At the same time, Watanabe also sees his proposal of a “Transpacific Alliance” as a countermeasure against Chinese ambitions of “regional hegemonism”. As he writes, “the biggest obstacle in the way of China securing regional hegemony is the Japanese-US Alliance”.24 While there is probably a wide consensus on this last assessment, Watanabe’s assumed analogies are far less convincing. As mentioned above, Japan has historically never pursued just one direction of strategic alliances with either Asian or Western countries; similarly, many Japanese (and others) would not agree with Watanabe’s view that an East Asian Community would facilitate Chinese regional hegemonism. On the contrary, Japan, South Korea and most Southeast Asian countries share an awareness of using increased regional cooperation, e.g., within the ASEAN plus Three framework, to jointly check China’s influence in East Asia. At any rate, Watanabe’s reappraisal of Fukuzawa and of his sceptical view of Asia has become an omnipresent point of reference in the present-day debate about the problems of historical consciousness and the future of regional cooperation. It is important to mention here that although Watanabe’s view does not necessarily represent the majority opinion in Japan, it does appeal to a majority
of those who prefer a “better the devil you know” stance towards foreign policy. This position prefers maintaining a pro-United States policy over pro-Asianist change that may harbour risks. While not all Japanese may know the historical _Datsu A Ron_, the memory of its author is well alive. Not only is Fukuzawa known as the founder of the prestigious private Keiō University, a leading Japanese university located in central Tokyo, but he is also the only one who survived the 2004 reshuffle of portraits on Japanese banknotes. Fukuzawa’s face is still on the highest-denomination note (10,000 yen), and overall he enjoys a positive reputation as a pioneering modernizer and educator.

However, voices of dissent in Japan have been growing in the past few years. Watanabe’s apologetic view of Japanese imperialism and his simplistic rejection of pro-Asian attitudes has provoked opposition mainly from two camps: those who see Fukuzawa’s thesis as the core idea behind Japanese imperialism, and those who are distrustful of Japan’s post-war pro-United States leaning. One Japanese voice of opposition that combines both streams of criticism is the Shitamachi Ningen Sōgō Kenkyūjo (Shitamachi People’s Comprehensive Research Institute), a civil society organization named after its meeting place in the heart of Old Tokyo (Shitamachi). It is devoted to discussing current political issues from a pacifist perspective and tries to provide a forum that enables exchange between ordinary citizens and scholars/intellectuals. From 2006 to 2008, the Shitamachi group supported the lawsuit against the dispatch of the Japanese Army (so-called Self-Defense Forces) to Iraq. Led by the historian Yamaguchi Yoshio, it had amongst its most prominent members the Communist politician Yoshioka Yoshinori (d. 2009), a former member of the Upper House of parliament. The contemporary revival of anti-Asianism, as in Watanabe Toshibo’s proposal for a new “Leaving Asia” thesis, is dismissed by the group as a distortion of history that neglects the links of _Datsu A_ with Japan’s wartime atrocities in Asia. Therefore, neither the _Datsu A_ concept nor its author, Fukuzawa Yukichi, should be viewed as representing ideals from the assumed “glorious times” of the Meiji period that could be used as guidance for today. Instead of cultivating nostalgic sentiments that associate the success of progress and modernization, civilization and enlightenment, and independence with the Meiji years, the Japanese need to awaken to the historical reality of their turn to militarism and imperialism and their
betrayal of the hopes of their Asian neighbours. As one step towards correcting their historical consciousness, the Japanese need to grasp the role played by Datsu A as a political concept (or more precisely of the mindset expressed by that concept) in justifying Japan’s history of invasion and aggression. “Leave Asia, enter the West” expressed and rationalized the two-fold policy of “worshipping the West and despising Asia”, Yoshioka maintains.28

At that time, although it never became very powerful, there was also an Asian solidarity thesis being discussed, in particular between Japan, China, and Korea. But the path chosen by the Meiji government was that of striving to become a “Great Power” by “invading Asia and befriending Euro-American imperialism”, just as Fukuzawa Yukichi had proposed. Japan’s invasion of Asia has planted, also among the ordinary people, a worship of the West and simultaneously a mistaken feeling of superiority, hegemonism, and contempt towards Asia. These were further promoted by successive victories in warfare and have not been overcome today but are the underlying reasons why Japan is continuing to make the wrong choices. [However,] Japan does not only have this history which it must not continue to take as a model but also a history that it should take as a model.29

What is this model? Yoshioka suggests that the “Asian solidarity thesis” mentioned above should serve as the rationale for approaching today’s issues of historical consciousness and regional cooperation. As one step in this direction, Fukuzawa Yukichi should be replaced by a more appropriate symbol from history for present-day and future Japan and Asia: Katsu Kaishū (1823–99), a statesman famous for his role as mediator between old and new Japan on the eve of the Meiji Restoration. By referring to Katsu’s negotiation over the peaceful surrender of Edo Castle, on the one hand, and to his criticism of Japanese arrogance towards Korea and China, on the other, Katsu is portrayed as both a pacifist in domestic affairs and a representative of the Asian solidarity thesis in diplomacy. In this sense, Katsu provides the link to the contemporary project of community building in East Asia that must be based on solidarity and peace, as the Shitamachi group argues, not on neo-imperialist hegemonism. Yoshioka suggests that the Japanese need to overcome their limited understanding of the past based on the perspective of national history as taught in school and
reaffirmed in the public sphere—from public memorials and commemorations to portraits on banknotes. In this way, they can emancipate themselves from the inherent feeling of contempt for “other Asians”, which has continuously been nurtured—although more implicitly and indirectly—throughout the post-war period. For the Shitamachi group, the issue of historical reconciliation is closely linked to Japan’s present-day diplomatic orientation. In its view, Koizumi’s decision to support the US-led war against Iraq has revealed that Japan’s alliance with the West has once again led to Japan’s collaboration with militarism and hegemonism. This decision not only violates the peace commitment of Japan’s post-war constitution (Article Nine) but also poses an obstacle in the way of coming to terms with Japan’s own atrocities of the past as it rationalizes aggression as a means of politics. The group, therefore, strongly criticizes Japan’s pro-United States foreign policy and instead promotes Japan’s integration into a future East Asian Community.

Chinese Views on “Leaving Asia”

The controversy over the legacy of Datsu A and its potential contemporary usefulness is a matter largely limited to Japan. In China and Korea, both victims of Japanese imperialism, there was little dispute about the meaning of Fukuzawa’s Datsu A thesis. Revisiting the historical concept and discussing it in a contextualizing manner therefore often functions as a means to push politico-intellectual debate about historical reconciliation in East Asia towards a pro-Asianist stance. Interestingly, recent Chinese studies of Datsu A take a rather conciliatory position that discloses a more nuanced understanding of Japanese historical Asia consciousness.

The Chinese intellectual historian Wang Hui explains Fukuzawa’s negative view of “Asia” by his epistemological indebtedness to Western conceptions of Asia as part of the Western binary that distinguishes between a despotistic Asia and a civilized West. To be sure, Wang is not interested in exculpating Japanese historical abuse of Asia or Japanese war guilt. Nevertheless, his way of re-appreciating Asia as a meaningful and positive concept heavily relies on linking Japan’s historical Asia consciousness to that of the West. Wang thereby implies that the Japanese despising of Asia was not original to Japan but was due
to the Japanese imitation of Western thinking and Western attitudes. Relying on Takeuchi Yoshimi’s famous statement that “Asia is Asia by dint of its European context”, Wang explains why Datsu A Nyū Ō “became a recurring theme of modern Japanese thought”. In Wang’s view, Datsu A contained the interrelated double task of emancipating Japan from the Chinese order and finding its place in the Western order, intellectually as well as politically and socially. Therefore, “the political meaning of ‘shedding Confucianism’ was dissociation from China-centred imperial relations and construction of a European-style nation-state oriented towards ‘freedom,’ ‘human rights,’ ‘national sovereignty,’ ‘civilization,’ and ‘independent spirit’”. However, because of the European origin of “Asia”, “‘shedding Asia’ was a way of forming self-consciousness through differentiating Japan from Asia”. It is no surprise, therefore, that eventually “the theory of ‘shedding Asia’” led to “the reality of ‘invading Asia’”. In order to avoid a similar shift in the contemporary theory and practice of Asia discourse, Wang Hui suggests that epistemological self-determination—that is, the definition and creation of East Asia, including the definition of its identity—from within is a precondition to regional community building beyond the establishment of mechanisms for strategic and economic cooperation. In this way, Wang not only adds to the rehabilitation of Japan’s mistaken attitude towards Asia in the past but also encourages the formation of an Asian self-affirmative stance towards Asia in the present and future.

In a more explicitly Asianist way, Sun Ge, China’s pre-eminent Japanologist, draws on Fukuzawa’s Datsu A thesis. In her view, the re-collection and re-appreciation of historical moments and historical motifs from national history may function as starting points of “East Asia narratives”. In her search for “adhesive forces” and “integrating power” within Asia that may develop into common narratives, Sun Ge emphasizes the importance of grasping Datsu A not as a vicious Japanese strategy for invading Asia but in the context of Japan’s desire “to position Japan vis-à-vis Western civilization in modern Japanese history”. Japanese Datsu A thought, Sun Ge argues, evolved against this background “of the international political configuration among Europe, America and East Asia”. In other words, Datsu A was only to a lesser extent indicative of Japan’s contempt of Asia but to a much greater extent representative of its striving to become “Western”;
“enter the West”, therefore, was the key message while “leaving Asia” only constituted the unavoidable flip side of the same coin. Sun Ge’s approach to Fukuzawa stops short of complete exculpation. Different from the Shitamachi group’s fundamental critique, Sun Ge discovers many positive elements in Fukuzawa’s political thought:

Before writing Datsu-A ron, Fukuzawa, in fact, advocated “The solidarity of East Asia”. For him, this idea had a double structure, i.e. it stresses that each East Asian country must push for revolutionary reform of the old regime and overthrow the power of the conservatives within the country, and only then can it be rid of the pressure from the Western powers. In other words, Fukuzawa’s conception of “solidarity” does not regard national boundaries as its precondition, but rather predicates upon the criterion of “civilization”. He does not believe that the coloured races can join hands to resist the Western powers simply because they are coloured. He also, therefore, advocates that actual support should be given to the progressives of neighbouring countries in helping them with their coup to overthrow their own conservative regimes, so as to export “civilization”.

The key difference, according to Sun Ge, between Fukuzawa’s anti-Asianism and the Asianism of his contemporaries lay in his rejection of racist commonality in favour of civilizational standards. As a consequence, in his world view Japan was closer to the West than to Asia and moving towards the West rather than Asia was the only appropriate policy to follow. In Sun Ge’s words, Datsu A does not primarily express Fukuzawa’s contempt of Asia but merely “his disappointment with the immediate East Asian neighbours”. Not as his first but as his inevitable choice, he therefore “urged Japan to break off with its neighbours in the East, for he thought they were doomed to fall”. Sun Ge continues:

Fukuzawa’s greatest fear was that the West would regard Japan as a barbaric country, like its doomed neighbours. What is primarily conveyed in Datsu A ron is Fukuzawa’s sense of doom for the survival of the Japanese nation; his disappointment with the neighbouring Asian countries; and, as a consequence of this disappointment, his evaluation of Asia as barbaric. There may be different interpretations of his “breakoff statement”, but the undeniable fact is that
Fukuzawa, Japan’s most remarkable modern thinker, is completely committed to the “Survival of the Fittest” way of thinking in his reflection on Asia’s value. Fukuzawa has even gone to the extreme of ignoring Japan’s geographical location in order to ideologically cut Japan off from Asia. Similar to Wang Hui’s strategy of rehabilitating Japanese Asia discourse by linking it to its indebtedness to Western disdain of Asia, Sun Ge traces the intellectual heritage of Datsu A to the assumed superiority of Western concepts, which historically was taken for granted. In this way, Sun Ge even manages to dissolve today’s Asianist views from their—undesirable—conflation with culturalist essentialism. Unlike the prominence of race and culture in most Asianists’ conceptions of the past, today’s “adhesive forces” and “integrating power” in Asia need to be based on solidarity. Sun Ge’s objection against Fukuzawa’s Datsu A lies precisely in the latter’s lack of a sense of solidarity; today, in place of the historical rationale of the survival of the fittest, benevolent support of the poor, the weak and the less privileged should inform present Asianist agendas—as they should have informed Japan’s approach to Asia historically. According to Sun Ge, it was exactly this agenda that the Chinese revolutionary Sun Yat-sen had in mind when he proposed “Greater Asianism” to the Japanese in 1924. While Fukuzawa and his Datsu A thesis are particularly prominent concepts among Japanese debaters, Sun Yat-sen’s Asianism serves as the most frequently employed historical concept in debates about Asian commonality in present-day China.

Solidarity and the Kingly Way

In Chinese public political discourse, here defined as the mesh of political opinions published in widely accessible media such as newspapers, journals and the Internet, the undisputed blueprint for present-day Asianism is Sun Yat-sen’s conception of Asianism in general and of the Kingly Way or benevolent rule of right (wangdao) versus the Despotic Way or hegemonic rule of might (badao) in particular. This dichotomous conceptual pair stems from Confucianism and was particularly emphasized in Mencius’ (c. 372–289 BC) political thought. In brief, it signifies that a true ruler must resort to virtue and benevolence to promote the well-being of his people (Kingly Way).
and must not use force and violence as a means of rule (Despotic Way). Those who employ badao rather than wangdao lose their legitimization and may rightfully be overthrown as unrighteous rulers. This was also one of the key messages of Sun Yat-sen’s famous speech on “Greater Asianism”, which he delivered in November 1924 in Kobe, on the occasion of his last visit to Japan before his death. It was Japan’s choice, Sun Yat-sen argued, to either adopt a hegemonic attitude towards Asia, as the West had done, or to select benevolence as the guiding principle of its relations with the peoples of Asia. Of course, Sun Yat-sen urged Japan to adhere to the latter. In many ways, this binary option resembles Fukuzawa’s thesis 40 years earlier. Japan, as the most powerful or “advanced” country in Asia, was required to choose between being with or against the West, and being with or against Asia. For Sun Ge, the main difference in these historical approaches lies in the sense of solidarity that could be found in Sun Yat-sen’s but not in Fukuzawa’s view of Asia.

For Asians, the Asia question is primarily a question of the sense of solidarity, a sense that arises in the midst of the aggression and expansion perpetrated by the West. Thus, the sense of solidarity is articulated with a sense of national crisis, which distinguishes the question of Asia from the Orientalism and even the criticism of Orientalism in the West. In 1924, Sun Yat-sen made a speech in Japan on “pan-Asianism”, focusing on the question of race. In reference to the Russo-Japanese War, Sun stressed that the coloured races were excited by this war for “it was the first time in the recent several centuries that the Asians had beaten the Europeans”. By “Asia”, Sun meant to include all the coloured races of the Asian region. He further argued from the above assertion that the culture of the Rule by Benevolence in Asia would necessarily win out over the European rule by Force, and went on to warn Japan to make a prudent choice between the two positions. Sun Yat-sen did his utmost to stress the necessity of a sense of solidarity for Asia. “In treating pan-Asianism, what sort of problems do we want to solve with the fruits of our study? It is none other than finding out how the suffering peoples of Asia can resist the European powers. In a word, it is to defend the oppressed peoples against injustices perpetrated on them.” Sun Yat-sen’s view of Asia contains something that is lacking in Japanese views of Asia—a fundamental concern for weaker peoples.
Importantly, Sun Ge—like Sun Yat-sen—reduces “aggression and expansion” to the typical means of Western rule by force. The fact that Japan had, long before Sun Yat-sen’s speech of 1924, employed the same methods to build its own empire in Asia is omitted. It is for this reason that many Koreans still find it much more difficult than Chinese involved in this discourse to approve of Sun Yat-sen’s conception of Asianism. How could Sun Yat-sen appeal to Asian solidarity but forget to mention the annexation of Korea? And why did Sun Yat-sen portray the historical tributary relations between the Chinese empire and the Asian tribute states as examples of friendship, solidarity and benevolence when in fact they were hegemonic and coerced? Sun Ge, however, builds her own vision of East Asian commonality on Sun Yat-sen’s assumed message of solidarity; by remembering and adopting Sun Yat-sen’s conception of “Asia”, the debate on integration and identity formation can be moved away from culturalism, racialism and self-congratulatory “Asia as Number One” rhetoric towards solidarity and concern for the oppressed. For Sun Ge, as for most public intellectuals involved in this debate, hegemonic rule no longer refers—as it did historically—to the dominance of one country over another but to economic, social and epistemological hegemony of the ruling elites that cuts across nations. As Duara and many transnational civil society activists criticize, establishing this new kind of hegemony is the hidden but real agenda behind top-down affirmations of Asianism as regionalism in present-day East Asia.

In his re-appreciation of Sun Yat-sen’s Asianism, Wang Hui emphasizes a different aspect and points to a different meaning of Asia and Asianism today. According to Wang, Sun Yat-sen’s Asianism was above all premised on cultural and national plurality: “a multicultural Asia” whose unity “was based on the independence of sovereign states”. To Wang, Sun Yat-sen’s wangdao versus badao binary has two main functions: first, as a vehicle to appeal to Asian commonality, it allows for a fundamental distinction between Asia and the West, despite the significant internal differences within Asian societies; second, it legitimizes resistance against those who apply hegemonism and despotism. In Wang’s words:

Sun insisted that Asia had its own culture and principles—what he called “the culture of the kingly way” (wangdao) as opposed to “the culture of the hegemonic way” (badao) of European nation states.
He titled his speech “Great Asianism” partly because he connected the idea of Asia with the notion of “the kingly way”. If we compare his speech with the imperialist idea of Asia, it becomes clear that although it preserves its association with Confucian ideas such as “the kingly way” or “virtue and morality” (ren yi dao de), Sun’s notion of Asia is not an Asia with a core of cultural homogeneity….His vision of Asia consisted of Japan in the East, Turkey in the West, and nation-states founded on Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam, Confucianism, and other cultures in the inner areas. He said, “We must insist on Great Asianism and recover the status of Asian nations. If we use only virtue and morality as the basis to unite all nations, all nations of Asia, [when united,] will become powerful”. According to Sun, the culture of the kingly way defends the oppressed nations, rebels against the hegemonic way, and pursues the equality and liberation of all peoples.49

In this way, Sun Yat-sen’s wangdao legacy may also be employed as the rationale for today’s project of embracing Asian diversity in unity—and certainly also serves the official political rhetoric of the Chinese Communist Party, which emphasizes social harmony and peaceful coexistence between different races and cultures within China. As mentioned above, the creation of a transnational consciousness and the re-appreciation of Asia in parts have kept their anti-Western components. This is mainly because despite notable successes of decentring political, economic and intellectual discourses, non-Western voices in general and Asian voices in particular still belong to the less spoken, less heard, less influential in the global public sphere. At the same time, and probably as important as the first step, wangdao as a central idea of Sun Yat-sen’s affirmation of Asianism allows for an identification with today’s Asianist project without directly engaging with the problematic legacy of Japanese Asianism. In other words, Sun Yat-sen’s Asianism as an affirmation of non-hegemonic multiculturalism and diversity may appeal to a large number of people throughout East Asia and elsewhere, even if this means ignoring Sun Yat-sen’s real message and intention. In addition, the commemoration of Sun Yat-sen’s Asianism provides hope in the present-day Asianist struggle against “new imperial dominance” of a capitalist-driven regionalism in the guise of Asianism because similar attempts made by the Japanese at dressing hegemonism and forced homogenization in Asianist clothes had failed.50
Naturally maybe, Japanese interest in Sun Yat-sen’s Asianism and the *wangdao* metaphor is less refined compared to that in the role played by Fukuzawa and his *Datsu A* thesis. However, Sun Yat-sen is of course well known in Japan too and has been portrayed as a pioneer of Sino-Japanese friendship there.\(^{51}\) This positive official view towards Sun Yat-sen rests on his Japanophilism and his support by Japanese collaborators in his revolutionary activities.\(^{52}\) Shindō Eiichi, political scientist and leader of the Japan-based academic think tank International Academic Society for Asian Community, promotes Sun Yat-sen and his friendship with Japanese as examples of “Japanese-Chinese civil diplomacy” (Nitchū minkan gaikō).\(^{53}\) Sun Yat-sen and his Japanese supporters, as opposed to Japanese expansionists, are characterized by Shindō as “good Asianists” who aimed at establishing a new order of equality and reforms from below. In order to push East Asia further together, Asians needed to embrace a “New Asianism” in a globalized world, centring on civil society activities and common culture in East Asia. Japanese Asianism and, more generally, Japanese Asia policy, he argues, had failed to make the right choice when Sun Yat-sen had confronted Japan with following either *badao* or *wangdao*. Japanese today, Shindō argues, are again confronted with a very similar choice: either demonize the Asian mainland as a place of threat or seek relations of cooperation and harmony with the peoples of Asia. In this way, the relevance of Sun Yat-sen’s *wangdao* and the critique of Fukuzawa’s *Datsu A* merge as the politico-intellectual credo of transnational Asianism that seeks to promote historical reconciliation and regional integration on a civil society level.

**Conclusion**

The purpose of this chapter is to delineate the discursive re-appreciation of Asianisms as a tool in civil-society-driven efforts at historical reconciliation in East Asia. On the level of agency, the focus is on political activists and thinkers who take a critical stance towards top-down initiatives promoting regionalism. Many of these activists and thinkers are part of transnational networks and—to some extent at least—live the political agenda they are proposing; their key political positions include the critique of hegemonic relationships in all spheres of society and the fostering of de-nationalized thinking and practice.
One of the main means of achieving these aims is the rehabilitation of “Asia”, including the creation of a self-affirmative Asia consciousness of commonality among people living throughout East Asia. In light of the ongoing and, in fact, increasing political, economic and strategic rivalry in this region, the prospects for historical reconciliation may appear grim. As a deliberate countermeasure against the divisions resulting from the negative legacy of the past and its frequent political instrumentalization, the authors and networks studied above have established a discursive framework within which key motifs from historical Asia discourse are reinterpreted to serve as positive and common references for interactions between societies in contemporary East Asia. The revision of Fukuzawa’s *Datsu A* thesis and Sun Yat-sen’s solidarity-based conception of Asianism as *wangdao* is particularly important for this purpose, as both concepts emerged from a context of hegemonic relations. Both refer mainly to Japanese imperialism in Asia but secondarily also address (a) the negative impact of Western imperialism on Asian societies and (b) problems of the traditional and a possible future Sinocentric order in East Asia. As the case studies reveal, civil society discourse today undertakes great efforts to simultaneously de-nationalize and Asianize the historical articulations of both concepts.

At the beginning of the 21st century, Asia once again constitutes a contested concept in political discourse in East Asia. Be it in the context of visions of East Asian integration, of other foreign policy strategies, of projects aiming at historical reconciliation, or of epistemological self-determination, Asianisms have re-emerged as sites of fierce political and intellectual debate. The affirmative re-emergence of Asianist motifs from the past in the context of historical reconciliation efforts throughout present-day East Asia may be most logical, but is surprising at the same time. It is logical because of the complicity of Asianisms in the historical events that inform today’s “history wars”. Yet it is also surprising, since the concept “Asia” was long believed to be a taboo in the light of its problematic past. Today, references to Asia as a concept containing positive, or at least useful, connotations are no longer seen as evidence of historical revisionism. On the contrary, the idea of Asian commonality has become a driving force in the search for “adhesive forces” (Sun Ge) that may help overcome the negative legacies of the past. This re-appreciation of historical Asianist
motifs is, of course, highly selective and, as we have seen above, filled with a range of different political messages. The key strategy of transforming the long and dark shadows of the past into lighter shades of relief seems to rely on combining a critical perspective on the failure of Asianism in the past with an Asianist perspective on the present and future. In this sense, dealing with “Asia” has taken on the function of a proxy. If a transnational agreement can be reached on the positive potential of Asianisms, isolated episodes from the modern history of Sino-Japanese rivalry may be addressed in a more constructive manner. It can be assumed that the networks involved in these “positive” politics of the past are aware of their partisan use of history. This problematic, however, is not at the heart of their enterprise. Their activities approach the creation of a “stable truth” from the personal rather than political, historical or historiographical level: stable networks of human relationship and common interests and understanding as the first step towards stable narratives as a basis of a common historical consciousness. In this process, Asia serves as a vehicle or method of creating a common discursive space in East Asia below the level of official inter-governmental diplomacy. The re-adoption of Asia by these thinkers and activists also serves to counterbalance the hegemony of top-down discourse on “Neo-Asianism” as economic and strategic regionalism. It has led to a self-empowerment of civil society groups through their attempts at overcoming nationalist history politics by “taking a step forward out of the pattern of thinking in national units”.54 “Entering Asia” with a commitment to solidarity and non-hegemonic interactions, in this sense, not only represents an “intellectual experiment”55 but also characterizes a different approach to dealing with oneself, one's neighbours, and society at large—from the micro-level of communal neighbourhood to global society. It shares with historical conceptions of a solidarity-based Asia its idealism and vulnerability to despotic abuse.

Notes


5. Ibid.

6. Many of these groups have not yet been studied academically. For the Japanese Council on East Asian Community and the Korean Northeast Asian History Foundation, see Torsten Weber, “Remembering or Overcoming the Past? ‘History Politics’, Asian Identity, and Visions of an East Asian Community”, *Asian Regional Integration Review* (2011a): 39–55. For political activist groups, see the chapter by Tessa Morris-Suzuki in this volume.


9. See Nicola Spakowski’s chapter in this volume.


11. This is the basic rationale of scholars affiliated with the Inter-Asia Cultural Studies movement. Many of their publications are available in English, for example in *The Inter-Asia Cultural Studies Reader*, ed. Kuan-Hsing Chen and Chua Beng Huat (London: Routledge, 2007).

& Littlefield, 2011b), pp. 359–70; and Weber, “Remembering or Overcoming the Past?”.
22. Watanabe, “Fukuzawa Yukichi no Datsu A Ron ni manabe”, p. 35.
23. Ibid.
25. Fukuzawa's portrait has appeared on that note since 1984. For a critical discussion of the general positive portrayal of Fukuzawa among the Japanese public, see Junosuke Yasukawa, “Fukuzawa Yukichi no bunmeikan to Ajia ninshiki” [Fukuzawa Yukichi’s View of Civilization and Asia Consciousness], in Nihon no Ajia shinryaku to Kenpō Kyūjō [Japan’s Invasion of Asia and Article Nine], ed. Shitamachi Ningen Sōgō Kenkyūjo (Tokyo: Shitamachi Sōken, 2006), pp. 10–41.
26. For the following quotes and references, see Yoshinori Yoshioka, “Katsu Kaishū, Higashi Ajia Kyōdōtai to Nihonkoku kenpō” [Katsu Kaishū, East Asian Community and the Japanese Constitution], in Higashi Ajia Kyōdōtai to Katsu Kaishū [East Asian Community and Katsu Kaishū], ed. Shitamachi Ningen, Tengukō kyūjō no kai (Tokyo: Shitamachi Sōken, 2009), pp. 6–33.
28. Ibid., p. 18.
31. In addition to the cases studied below (Wang Hui, Sun Ge), see my articles “Wang Yi: ‘Neo-Asianism’”, pp. 359–70; and “Remembering or Overcoming the Past?”, 39–55.
33. Ibid., p. 67.
34. Ibid., p. 68.
35. Ibid., p. 73.
Despite occasional earlier affirmations of Asianism by Sun Yat-sen and other Chinese, Sun’s Greater Asianism speech of 1924 is usually seen as the most original Chinese contribution to historical Asianism discourse. It simultaneously adopts and criticizes Japanese conceptions of Asianism. In consequence, Chinese Asianism is usually treated as a—negating or affirmative—reaction to Japanese Asianism.


See Sun Ge, Baik Young-So and Chen Kuan-Hsing, “Posuto ‘Higashi Ajia’ to iu Shiza” [A Post-“East Asia” Viewpoint], in *Posuto ‘Higashi Ajia’ to iu Shiza* [Post-“East Asia” Viewpoint], ed. Sun Ge, Baik Young-So and Chen Kuan-Hsing (Tokyo: Sakuhinsha, 2006), pp. 1–4.


Ibid., pp. 78–9.

Ibid., p. 67.


Sun Ge et al., “Posuto ‘Higashi Ajia’ to iu shiza”, p. 2.

Ibid.
Chapter Nine

Asia as Future: The Claims and Rhetoric of an Asian Century

Nicola Spakowski

In the history of Asianisms, Western discourse of an Asian Century is one of the more recent, yet quite powerful manifestations of addressing Asia as an entity. Its roots lie in the 1980s and the economic success of Japan. Since then, it has become increasingly broadly applied, from the economies of the “four little tigers/dragons” in the 1980s and 1990s to the big ones of China and India in the 2000s. This shift in geographical specification notwithstanding, “Asia” has assumed unprecedented attention in Western discourse and the Asian Century has become a signal phrase for fundamental shifts in the economic and political order of the world.

The “Asian Century” is a vague term that usually lacks definition. It is related to similar denominations of centuries (Pacific, Asia-Pacific, Chinese) and also to terms such as the “East Asian miracle”, “Asia’s rise”, “Chinda” or “China’s rise”, all of which reflect the general Asia hype of the last three decades. At the same time, the Asian Century is more specific than the above-mentioned terms in that it evokes a historical narrative of shifting centres of world power (from Great Britain in the 19th century to the United States in the 20th century and Asia in the 21st). Furthermore, the Asian Century discourse is future-oriented and makes use of particular claims and rhetoric to substantiate visions of an Asia-dominated future. In this essay, I will dissect the Asia as future discourse by asking the following questions:
What are the substance and promises of the Asian Century? What is the nature of the region addressed as “Asian” in the Asian Century? What kind of world view does it reflect? Who are the producers and beneficiaries of this discourse? Which arguments, rhetorical tools and media do they use?

While I will try to answer all the above-mentioned questions in order to outline the basic features and the ideology of the Asian Century discourse, at the most fundamental level my curiosity lies with the temporality it reflects and its futuristic nature. While Asianisms in general are discourses of region and thus space, the idea of an Asian Century introduces a time perspective into Asia and opens up a macro historical view that spans past, present and future. As I will demonstrate over the course of this essay, the Asian Century discourse, while making claims on the future, resorts to the “big picture” of world history to substantiate these claims. It is a history-cum-future discourse that uses the (allegedly) known—the past—to give shape to the unknown—the future. More specifically, the Asian Century represents a positive vision of the future of global capitalism and profit-oriented business. At the level of the “big picture”, it depicts the evolution and future prospects of global capitalism, namely: capitalism’s centre is shifting East, but its rules of operation will remain unchanged. In the slightly narrower and more selective vision of business, the Asian Century discourse reflects the search for economic policies that guarantee vantage in future market situations and for business strategies that promise the highest yields for investment. The particular “Asian” and “future” element in these business calculations is the notion of the “emergence” of Asia’s markets. As “emerging” markets they are not yet fully developed, or just starting to develop, and thus bear the potential of even bigger or more enduring yields of investments in the region.

The essay is structured in five parts. In Part 1 I will show that the idea of an Asian Century, at a very general level, is related to ideologies of globalism and economism, which make Asia a site of growth. Part 2 will trace the development of the Asian Century (and related “centuries”) discourse since the 1980s. It will be argued that the cycles of this discourse and shifts in geographical specification reflect the business cycles of the world economy and geographical shifts in the dynamic of Asian economies. In Part 3 I will outline the actors, tools and media of the Asia hype that is the breeding ground
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for the idea of an Asian Century. In particular, I will show how history is mobilized to present the current situation of high-speed growth as normal and thus sustainable. I will further demonstrate how the investment world, the business press and international institutions share growth as their fetish and collaborate in constructing Asia as a site of growth. Part 4 will review three recently published and quite influential monographs of the rise/decline genre and show how they provide the “big picture” of world history and world affairs. Within this “big picture”, Asia represents shifts within—but not fundamental challenges to—global capitalism. In the conclusion (Part 5) I will summarize my findings and point out the flaws of these visions of an Asian Century. As will become clear over the course of the essay, voices that feed into the idea of an Asian Century as it is reflected in Western media are predominantly of Western origin and reflect the anxieties and interests of Western actors and audiences. The question of whether the Asian Century is also of interest in Asian societies and how it is discussed in native language contexts is reserved for future research.

Different Asias: Globalism or Realism, Market Opportunities or Security Threats?

Visions of an Asian Century are part of a broader Asia hype, which is full of ambiguities. These ambiguities start at the level of reactions to a rising Asia. One commentator speaks of a “language of awe” when it comes to books on the economic emergence of China and India: “…China and India provoke, in equal measure, so much fear and anticipation.” Fear and anticipation—or “threats” and “promises”—are the two poles of affection that are evoked in future discourse in order “to justify and enable action in the present”. Why can Asia evoke both ends of the pole? At the conceptual level, this ambiguity reflects shifting and extending notions of power, in particular the inclusion of an economic dimension into definitions of power. In addition, it is expressive of the double orientation of governments in the formulation of national interests, either in the form of an inclusion of economics in strategic reasoning or as an acknowledgement of both the “opportunities” and “challenges” that come with the global power shift to the East. When it comes to the more particular notion of an
Asian Century, however, “anticipation”, “promise” and a general optimism prevail. This becomes particularly clear when we discern the opposing world views that feed into the ambiguity of “awe”, namely, realism, which tends to stress the political challenges and the military threat emanating from Asia, and globalism, which tends to praise the economic opportunities of the Asian market. Pekka Korhonen employs different terms but gives a very useful summary of what these two options entail:

Classical economic categories direct thinking toward positive-sum-game situations, where everybody can win at the same time, while military and territorial conceptions tend to force discussants toward a zero-sum-game type of argumentation, where every actor is evaluated as a winner or loser. In other words, economic rhetoric depicts a world of potential increasing abundance, while military rhetoric tends to view a world of scarcity.

In a realist perspective, the nation state is the dominant actor in world affairs and competes with other nations over scarce resources. These other nations are perceived as competitors or rivals in a zero-sum game of power politics. In this view, the rise of one actor means the decline of another. The threat posed by rivals may be military (arms build-up) or economic (“floods” of goods and workers); it might also be, as is the case with China, systemic. The vision of Asia as a source of threat has historically been evoked by the catchword of the “yellow peril”. Even though this term is no longer in use, militarist and protectionist discourses continue to exist (e.g., warnings of China’s military build-up, calls on China to appreciate the yuan). Realism tends to be futuristic in pointing at future threats and future wars as legitimation for military build-up and strategic decisions. Good examples that are related to the Asian Century are Robert D. Kaplan’s essay “How We Would Fight China” and the Obama administration’s recent strategic turn to “America’s Pacific Century”. While notions of threat and rivalry might be invoked in some expressions of the Asian Century, it is important to note that realist discourse privileges the nation and not the region as a political unit. It is true that realists might address “Asia” as a trouble spot within international relations, but in their argument they have to assess the threat posed by individual nations and the potential for conflict between the various states of Asia. Logically, the catchphrase of the
Asian Century will rarely be found in realist rhetoric. Rather, realists would lower expectations of Asian societies’ uninterrupted growth and thus also unlimited business opportunities in Asia. One major example of this trend is the former *Economist* editor Bill Emmott’s monograph *Rivals: How the Power Struggle between China, India and Japan Will Shape Our Next Decade* (2009):

> Asia is divided, and the process of rapid economic development is going to divide it still further, in political terms. The rise of Asia is not just, or even mainly, going to pit Asia against the West, shifting power from the latter to the former. It is going to pit Asians against Asians.\(^\text{15}\)

Emmott particularly warns against the naïve extrapolation of past economic success into the future, which is common among the prophets of an Asian Century.\(^\text{16}\) Critics of the notion of an Asian Century typically point out the structural impediments to further growth.\(^\text{17}\) Or they envision totally different global power constellations (e.g., multipolarity,\(^\text{18}\) the rise of “emerging powers” in different parts of the world,\(^\text{19}\) and many more).

Globalists, on the other hand, focus on the opportunities provided by free trade, which is claimed to be a win-win situation for all participants in the global economy. The globalist world is one of interdependence, cooperation and integration, with open borders as a necessary condition. Competition does occur in this world, but rather in the form of “positive competition”,\(^\text{20}\) which further fosters the improvement of economic performance and thus promises even higher profits. As has been demonstrated by Pekka Korhonen with regard to the Pacific Century, a related term, high tides of economic optimism (the 1880s, 1920s, 1960s, 1980s–90s) were also high tides of the Pacific Century.\(^\text{21}\) A typical statement from the globalist Asia as future discourse is this one:

> As long as China and India support free trade, they present an opportunity for business to expand into countries with a rich resource—at a very cheap rate—which accounted for around 45% of the world’s growth last year.\(^\text{22}\)

What is the nature of Asia in the globalist vision? It is a region exclusively determined by economic factors—globalism and economism go hand in hand here. Furthermore, “Asia” in this view does not reflect
the notion of region in a politico-economic sense but in the sense of a rather loose geography of growth. Here lies also the futuristic aspect of the Asian Century discourse: promises of profit from ever growing markets and the potentials of “not yet” fully developed economies. This geography of growth does not mean that particular Asian nations or sub-regions become invisible. They might still be present as units of economic accounting, in the form of culturally bounded sub-regions (“Confucian capitalism”), in a discourse of size (“Chindia”) or in a distinct position on the ladder of development (“emerging” or “developing Asia”). Typically, however, a number of nations are added up to form a country group of growth. While the precise composition of this group varies according to shifting economic dynamics and differences in the explanations for growth, “Asia” is the rough geographical direction where growth is taking place. It is this globalist Asia that is at the heart of the investigation of the Asian Century that follows.

**Shifting Geographies of Growth: From the “East Asian Miracle” to “Chindia” to China**

Ambiguities can also be found when it comes to concrete century denominations. The Asian Century is related to similar denominations such as the Pacific, the Asia-Pacific or the Chinese Century; and one denomination might easily be transformed into another. The views of centuries appear and disappear from public debate according to the openness or closeness of global markets; they are as volatile as the business cycles of the world economy. Still, the Asia-related century denominations are not totally interchangeable. While the Pacific Century includes America (and in particular the United States) but excludes mainland Asia, the Asian Century excludes America but allows for the inclusion of the entirety of China plus India. The shift from Pacific to Asia and again from East Asia to China and India and, finally, to China is the rough trend based on shifting geographies of attention that reflect shifting identifications of “power engines” in the world economy and changing explanations for Asian economic success. More specifically, three phases can be distinguished.

The first phase, which comprises roughly the 1980s and 1990s, was dominated by the success story of post-war Japan and, subsequently, the “four Asian tigers” (Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea...
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and Taiwan). This phase culminated in the notion of an “East Asian miracle”. Typically, many explanations for this first chapter of Asian economic success were culturalist, combining Western sociological theories of a “Confucian capitalism” and Asian discourse of “Asian values”. The former view was a response to the new Asian realities of growth that had disproved Max Weber’s culturalist argument of the incompatibility of capitalism and the Confucian ethic. The latter was cherished by authoritarian governments within the region who took growth as proof of the beneficial role of authoritarian political structures rooted in an allegedly different Asian culture. A second type of explanation was economic and oscillated between industrial policy/state intervention and economic liberalization as explanations for East Asia’s success. The occurrence of these new theories, be they cultural or economic, reflects the fact that Asian success came as a surprise to Western theorists and forced them to review the basics of economic and sociological theory. This first phase of discussions removed the theoretical obstacles to a more inclusive master narrative of capitalism. Discussions concerning an Asian model, Asian values, an (Asia-)Pacific Century or Confucian capitalism were all related to this effort.

The Asian financial crisis of 1997 tempered enthusiasm about Asia, but only temporarily. From the early years of the 21st century, Asia resumed currency, now with China and India at the centre of attention. China and India were trumpeted as part of the so-called BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China) “emerging economies” group—a concept that had been proposed by Goldman Sachs in 2001. “Chindia”, a term coined in 2005 by the Indian politician Jairam Ramesh and related publications, on the other hand, singled out China and India as the two “giants” of Asia and new “power houses” of the global economy. The Chindia vision is one of sheer size and global share (population, GDP growth). Still, China is given more attention, and from around 2000 the Chinese Century joined the century denominations.

From the early years of the 21st century, the notion of an Asian Century was reinforced through claims of increasing American weakness and potential decline; realist zero-sum-game notions started to sneak themselves into the Asia discourse. Since then, the old rhetoric of the rise and decline of empires or states (and also of US decline in particular) has become more and more influential.
either a hemispheric/regional form (rise of the East, decline of the West) or a national one (rise of China, decline of the United States), with notions of competition being evident in both forms. Various institutions offer predictions for the date when China will have overtaken the United States as the biggest economic power (for Goldman Sachs it is 2027, for the Economist it is 2019, for the International Monetary Fund it is 2016). The elevation of China (against the backdrop of US decline) found its expression also in the discussions of a Beijing Consensus, a Chinese model or state capitalism—terms that all reflect systemic rivalry between the two powers. It was further boosted after the beginning of the global financial crisis. Asia, and in particular China, were credited with quick recovery from the financial crisis. The world started to pin its hopes on Asia as the “power engine” that would lead the way out of crisis. With the outbreak of the European debt crisis in 2010 and China’s offer to help, China for a moment came to be perceived as the potential saviour of an ailing West. However, since early 2012, declining Chinese growth figures and warnings that these might signal systemic problems gave the China discourse a more pessimistic twist. The future fate of the Asian Century probably will continue to depend on the ups and downs of the national economies in Asia, the economic performance of the region (and the world) at large, and the course of international conflicts that typically draw attention away from economic issues and attenuate the prospects for free trade on a global scale.

The Production of the Asia Hype: Actors, Tools, Media

As has been argued, the Asia as future discourse is part of an ideology of globalism and economism. As such, and as will be shown in this part of the essay, it is supported by particular actors and concentrated in particular media. These actors and media make use of a selection of rhetorical tools that are particularly suited to sustain the claims of an Asian Century.

The Rhetorical Tools of the Asian Century Discourse: Quantification, Abstraction and Comparison

The Asian Century is a topic of mainly non-academic genres. Respective texts lack method and theory, a consistent argument, and, for
most information, also sources. Rather, authors tend to give anecdotal evidence and piecemeal information.\textsuperscript{44} Still, an obvious lack of methodological rigidity can be combined with the appropriation of a quasi-academic style. Arvind Subramanian, an important proponent of the vision of China’s rise, for instance, plans to “look at some numbers from the past and for the future, which form the core of the case presented here, leavened by historical narrative”\textsuperscript{45}. In fact, quantification and historical reasoning are central for visions of an Asian Century: The Asian Century is a discourse of size that uses numbers to illustrate growth; it is a discourse of the future that needs history to make up for the uncertainties of the future (see below). Furthermore, as a macro discourse it is necessarily selective (“some numbers”) and has to resort to reductions and abstractions to distill infinite information into a graspable argument, or, more specifically, to reduce the internal complexities of Asia (or a single Asian country) to a site of growth. Subramanian quotes Einstein—“Everything should be made as simple as possible, but no simpler”—and William of Ockham—“plurality should not be posited without necessity”\textsuperscript{46}—to make simplicity a virtue of (pseudo-)scientific reasoning. The most common tools of simplification in the Asian Century discourse are catchphrases (Asian Century),\textsuperscript{47} acronyms for country groups (BRIC, Chindia, RODA,\textsuperscript{48} etc.), metaphors (rise and decline), stereotyped country symbols (tiger, dragon, elephant, etc.), and photographic icons of growth (the Shanghai Pudong skyline). The most powerful rhetoric device, however, is visualization. Articles on the rise of Asia are filled with tables, charts and graphs, most of which deliver one basic message: past, present and future growth.\textsuperscript{49} Bruno Latour, in his essay “Drawing Things Together”, has argued that visualization is an important factor in the persuasiveness of a text in that it presents all the “absent things” needed as evidence in one single instance: “The effect on the construction of facts is sizeable if a writer is able to provide a reader with a text which presents a large number of the things it is talking about in one place.”\textsuperscript{50} And: “A more powerful theory, we submit, is one that with fewer elements and fewer and simpler transformations makes it possible to get at every other theory (past and future).”\textsuperscript{51} In the Asia as future discourse, the graph of an upward line of GDP growth has become the equivalent of the Pudong skyline in the field of macroeconomic accounting.
Finally, since the dominance of Asia can only be demonstrated in relation to its competitors, comparison is a necessary tool for substantiating Asia as future; its most common and authoritative abstraction is gross national product (GDP). Daniel Speich has demonstrated how the development and employment of GDP as a tool of economic comparison since the 1930s, from the very beginning, was met with the objections of individual economists who pointed out the methodological problems and simplifications of national income accounting. In Speich’s words, “(m)acroeconomic abstractions radically reduced the complexity of the human world and tended to replace the manifold economic relationships within it with simple dichotomies.” Once categories, concepts and procedures of assessing economic performance are standardized and reduced to one single indicator—GDP—the global share or the global rank of nations in the world economy can be assessed. GDP, GDP growth, share of global GDP and nation rankings based on GDP accounting are the fetishes among partisans of the Asian Century.

**History for the Future: Asia’s Success from “Miracle” to “Historical Norm”**

Interestingly, history is a central element in the Asia as future discourse. This seems paradoxical at first glance, but in fact historical arguments are not uncommon in future discourse. They reflect a modernist view of the world as controlled by historical laws that bridge past, present and future. Informed by the “grand narrative” of historical development, the futurologist pretends to be able to predict or at least prognosticate the future. This is also true for the Asian Century where the (alleged) certainties of the past are used to tame the uncertainties of the future.

Asia’s rise as a topic of academic attention started in the field of world history, where the East was rehabilitated historically and the role of the West thus became relativized from the other end of the time scale. This tide had its roots in Edward Said’s deconstruction of orientalism and gained substance through the books of Andre Gunder Frank (*ReOrient*, 1998), Kenneth Pomeranz (*The Great Divergence*, 2000) and Roy Bin Wong (*China Transformed*, 2000). Jan Nederveen Pieterse, an authority in the field of global studies, discussed these influential books on Asia (or, rather, China) in world
history under the title of “oriental globalization” and summarized: “Arguably, this body of literature converges on a major thesis: the Orient came first and the Occident was a latecomer.”55 While all these works have certainly contributed to a correction of earlier, obviously Eurocentric narratives of world history, the “global” that is constructed through this genre of comparative world history is, as has been argued by Rebecca Karl, an ahistorical, neutral space, which, through (retrospectively) being opened up to new entrants, is only reconfirmed in its capitalist nature and economics as the overall norm.56

On the purely quantitative side, projections of GDP back into the past play an important role for projections forth into the future. Here, the authority is the world historian Angus Maddison, who reconstructed world GDP for the last two millennia.57 In a quasi-obituary in the Economist, the essence of Maddison’s findings with regard to Asia is given as follows:

Maddison’s figures show that Asia accounted for more than half of world output for 18 of the last 20 centuries. Its growing clout in the world economy is, therefore, a “restoration” not a revolution.58

While the academic historian Gregory Clark holds that Maddison’s numbers are “fictions, as real as the relics peddled around Europe in the Middle Ages”,59 the business press happily grasps at Maddison’s numbers.60 Maddison’s figures, fictitious as they may be, are an important element in claims that Asia’s recent “rise” is not a simple “emergence” but a “re-emergence”,61 “restoration”,62 “renaissance”63 or “return to historical norm”.64 The projection of Asia’s importance back into history obviously further substantiates claims of Asia’s economic capabilities and potentials in the present and future. Past figures matter, because in the light of history, current growth figures no longer appear as mere (short-term) booms but represent stable and long-term trends of positive economic performance. The “miracle” of the 1980s and 1990s thus became naturalized and turned into a historical norm.


While world history writing, as a master narrative or as a basis of numerical projections back and forth in time, is a major source for the construction of an Asian Century, the investment world is its
main actor and the business press the central platform for heating up the Asia hype. Some investment companies and funds bear the Asian Century in their titles (e.g., the Asian Century Fund created by Asian Century Capital,66 Asian Century Quest,67 The Asian Century and TAC by asia 21 gmbh68); and their websites and newsletters abound with commitments to the Asian Century. Here is a typical quote from the “investment approach” page of Asian Century Capital:

We believe this century will be the “Asian Century”: the most important secular trend this century is the return of Asia to the centre of the global economy. During this century, Asia will be the region where wealth creation will be the highest. If history is any guide, investing in the “Asian Century” will yield high returns in the future.69

Arguments for Asia as a site of “wealth creation” and “high returns” are, as is apparent in this quote, backed up with both future projections and historical evidence. Medium- to long-term GDP projections are typically created by investment banks, investment consultants or related papers.70 PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), one of the world’s largest services companies, in 2011 even dared to provide predictions up to the year 2050.71 A datablog in the Guardian (7 Jan. 2011) further processed PwC’s data.72 Both the PwC website and the Guardian block use charts to make the Asian Century visible. Admittedly, investment consulting cannot be accused of an undifferentiated hyping of Asia as a whole. Still, PwC’s growth projections for country groups or single countries and the praise of investment opportunities and expected profit in these places are important elements in the myth of an Asian Century.

History is the second source of arguments for wealth creation in Asia. Here the consultancy firm KPMG73 and its magazine Agenda: Insights into Growth, Performance and Governance are telling examples. The cover of the September 2008 issue of Agenda tries to attract readers’ attention with a photo of the investment guru George Soros and the headline “George Soros Believes that the 21st Century Belongs to Asia. Is He Right?”74 On the second page of Agenda, Bernd Schmid, head of Advisory at KPMG Europe LLP, resorts to history and the “normalization” thesis:

If you take the long view, the last 250 years—when the West’s GDP per capita has far exceeded the East’s—are an historical oddity. This
anomaly is now being corrected. China and India are re-emerging as economic superpowers.\textsuperscript{75}

The same issue includes a one-page portrait of the Ming admiral Zheng He (1371–1433), which is claimed to offer “clues to China’s relationship with the rest of the world, its struggle to innovate and its attitude to science and technology”. The article titled “Lessons from a Eunuch: What the Story of China’s Greatest Explorer Can Tell Us about This Economic Giant” gives a perfect impression of how business speak is imposed on Asian (here: Chinese) history, or, in other words, how Chinese history is manipulated for legitimizing investment advice. Zheng He is portrayed under the rubrics of “scientific edge”, “exceptional innovation”, “global horizon” (and, finally, “Confucian wisdom”, the story of how China returned to Confucianism)\textsuperscript{76} —one more example of crass ahistoricity.

The Asia hype is not restricted to investment magazines; it figures also in the business pages of daily papers, in monographs written by business journalists,\textsuperscript{77} and in the special journals on Asia that have mushroomed since the beginning of the Asia boom. Speculative funds, investment consulting and the business press all contribute to what Walden Bello called a “psychology of permanent boom”.\textsuperscript{78} The economic boom in Asia that started in the 1980s was paralleled by an expansion of press coverage of the region: “With foreign capital came the demand by investors at home to track their new Asian portfolio more closely.”\textsuperscript{79} New Asia-related journals were founded, and older ones expanded circulation or were bought up by dominant Western media who all wanted to have their share in the Asia boom.\textsuperscript{80} Business journalism and investment consulting were closely intertwined, with investment advisers and strategists becoming the major informants for journalists.\textsuperscript{81}

\textit{International Institutions and the Ideology of Growth}

International institutions, particularly the World Bank, the IMF and the Asian Development Bank, are the third pillar in the production of the Asian Century. These institutions provide global-scale economic data that are used in various journalistic and popular publications on Asia, and they produce influential reports on the economic prospects of the region. A publication by the Asian Development Bank even
Nicola Spakowski explicitly takes on the Asian Century theme: *Asia 2050: Realizing the Asian Century* (2011a). The IMF Regional Economic Outlook for Asia of 2011 is titled *Asia and Pacific: Managing the Next Phase of Growth*.

Among the various publications by these institutions, the World Bank’s two reports on East Asia have become particularly famous: *The East Asian Miracle* (1993) and *An East Asian Renaissance: Ideas for Economic Growth* (2007). A third publication, *Dancing with Giants: China, India, and the Global Economy* (2007), moved attention to China and India. A more recent one, co-published by the World Bank and the Development Research Center of the PRC’s State Council and titled *China 2030* (2012), on the other hand, dampened optimism about future growth in China and pointed out the risks China was facing. These reports certainly deserve further and systematic analysis, particularly regarding the explanations for Asian economic success and the policy advice given to guarantee further growth. While *The East Asian Miracle*, a study financed by the Japanese government, reflects a compromise between market and state intervention as explanations for the “East Asian miracle”, *An East Asian Renaissance* moved to economies of scale as a source of growth. *China 2030*, finally, dwells on the so-called middle-income trap as a potential impediment to China’s further growth. What all of them have in common is growth as the central category, value and also explanandum. The ethically dubious side of this genre can best be demonstrated by taking a closer look at the 2007 publication, which elevates the city of Dongguan in China’s Guangdong Province as an example of the benefit of economies of scale:

Dongguan has grown by 22 percent per year for the last 25 years. Cumulatively, the city’s economy now is 144 times as big as it was in 1980, all thanks to its ability to exploit economies of scale and avoid social diseconomies through good public policy.

Alleged “good public policy”, however, does not seem to have an impact on the well-being of Dongguan workers. In the very year of the publication of the World Bank report, Dongguan became famous in Chinese media for its high suicide rates among migrant workers:

According to statistics from the Dongguan 120 medical emergency center, 552 people attempted suicide in Dongguan from April to September 10. Seventy percent of them were migrants.
More recently, Dongguan became the site of massive labour protests.\textsuperscript{91} The century prediction, as Alexander Woodside has critically remarked with regard to the Pacific Century, is devoid of any “common social conscience” or ethical concern. Asia is reduced to its markets.\textsuperscript{92}

The “Big Picture”: Asia/The Rest and the West, from Past to Future

While the former section spelled out important arguments, rhetoric tools and supporting institutions in the Asian Century discourse, this last section turns to monographs that try to provide—in the historian Niall Ferguson’s words—the “big picture”.\textsuperscript{93} This means that they combine the elements we have encountered so far in a more encompassing narrative that, by covering large stretches of time and space (Asia/the rest and the West; past, present and future), pretends to be comprehensive—while, of course, being no less selective than the examples cited above. The space of a monograph permits inclusion of more evidence, demonstration of the historical “laws” one needs to predict or prognosticate the future, and relationality, i.e., the juxtaposition of Asia/the rest/China and the West/the United States. Relationality on the one hand reflects the rise/decline logic of realism. On the other hand, it is also a tool in the globalist discourse of an Asian Century. Here, through relationality the (allegedly) known (the West, past and present) sheds light on the unknown (Asia, the future).

The book market is flooded with catchy titles on Asia as challenge or opportunity and on Asian rise and Western decline. Due to the “awe” that these themes evoke and the authoritative claim of their comprehensiveness, these books are highly marketable. Three examples are reviewed here to illustrate the directions of the genre.

One of the most boisterous prophets of Asia’s rise is Kishore Mahbubani, a former Singaporean diplomat and academic whose occasionally anti-Western rhetoric seems to make him even more successful in the Western book market.\textsuperscript{94} His monograph *The New Asian Hemisphere: The Irresistible Shift of Global Power to the East* (2008) is only one in a series of publications on Asia’s rise.\textsuperscript{95} Mahbubani’s main interest is in contemporary politics, which, however, are placed in the long-term perspective of Western decline and Asian rise: “The rise of the West transformed the world. The rise of Asia will bring about an
equally significant transformation.” Mahbubani is also one of the main sources of the “return to the historical norm” claim:

Curiously, even though the world is returning to the historical norm in terms of the natural place of Asian societies in the hierarchy of societies and civilizations around the globe, Asian societies are not succeeding because of a rediscovery of some hidden or forgotten strength of Asian civilizations. Instead they are rising now because through a very slow and painful process they have finally discovered the pillars of Western wisdom that underpinned Western progress and enabled the West to outperform Asian societies for the past two centuries.

Mahbubani claims to present a truly Asian perspective, but in fact his book abounds in universalism. The narrative he presents is the “great Asian March to Modernity” based on seven “pillars of Western wisdom”. These include free-market economics, science and technology, meritocracy, pragmatism, culture of peace, rule of law, and education. This universalist thrust is abandoned only when it comes to the West’s “iconization of democracy” and the aggressive export of democracy to societies around the world. Mahbubani warns against continuing Western dominance and arrogance and supports a liberal world order where Asia has to be granted the place it deserves.

In *The Post-American World* (2008), the influential American journalist Fareed Zakaria addresses the “rise of the rest” in more general terms. As a matter of fact, however, it is only the United States, China and India that receive detailed treatment in chapters of their own. The book is directed against US blindness towards the global transformations that are taking place and the danger of isolation from the rest of the world. According to Zakaria, the “rise of the rest” and the dissolution of the post-Cold War unipolar world order have to be acknowledged. The United States has to be open and more willing to make compromises vis-à-vis the outside world. Internally, it has to become more efficient. Zakaria embraces globalization as the current trend and a liberal world order that comprises free markets, trade and immigration. The China and India chapters are made up of pieces of conventional wisdom. Similar to Mahbubani, the “rise of the rest” for Zakaria is a matter of emulating the West:

We have urged peoples in distant lands to take up the challenge of competing in the global economy, freeing up their currencies,
and developing new industries. We counseled them to be unafraid of change and learn the secrets of our success. And it worked: the natives have gotten good at capitalism.\textsuperscript{103}

The British historian Ferguson’s \textit{Civilization: The West and the Rest} (2011a) is the most historical among the works discussed here. Ferguson is a specialist in financial and economic history with a conspicuous interest in macro history. From interviews and the foreword to his book we know that Ferguson wants to provide the “big picture”\textsuperscript{104} or “a big story—a metanarrative of why one civilization transcended the constraints that had bound all previous ones—and a great many smaller tales or micro-histories within it”.\textsuperscript{105} His focus is on the rise of the West since around 1500 without, however, excluding “the rest”:

For they [other civilizations] are equally important members of the drama’s cast. This is not a history of the West but a history of the world, in which Western dominance is the phenomenon to be explained.\textsuperscript{106}

The explanation Ferguson gives are the six “killer apps” that supported the rise of the West: competition, science, property, medicine, consumption and work ethic. According to Ferguson, however, “…we are living through the end of 500 years of Western ascendancy”.\textsuperscript{107} Starting with Japan in the 19th century, the “rest” “downloaded” these killer apps and took Western civilization as a template for their own rise.\textsuperscript{108} Ferguson’s “big picture” is best expressed in a graph that shows the estimated shares of Europe, the United States, China and India in global GDP for the years 1500 to 2008.\textsuperscript{109} While the development of China and India form the upper lines for almost 400 years, these two lines drop in the 18th century—only to get back to the top in the late 20th century. Obviously, the West and the rest are changing roles. This is particularly true for the rise of China covered in a different text by Ferguson.\textsuperscript{110}

Ferguson also points out the close relation between futurism, history and investment advice. As a speaker at an investment conference organized by the Swiss private bank Julius Bär on 31 January 2011, he gave a presentation titled “The World Is Changing”.\textsuperscript{111} This presentation consisted almost exclusively of graphs that delivered a clear message about rise and decline. According to a report on the
conference, Ferguson did not even refrain from giving explicit investment advice: “Ferguson thinks that China’s rise simply is the biggest change in history since the West started its era of dominance around 1500. ‘Those who bet against it will lose’, says Ferguson.”

Even though the three books differ in emphasis, they share a Eurocentric master narrative of Asia’s rise as a result of employing Western “wisdom”. They use the known (the West) to delineate the unknown (the rest/Asia). These books, inclusive as they might be, are universalist and not too different from Fukuyama’s “end of history” view. Even though their claimed intentions might be the reverse, they present themselves as triumphalists, albeit of a different shade and with a geographically broader horizon than Fukuyama.

**Conclusion**

The Asian Century is a macro discourse that combines notions of space (Asia and the West) and time (past, present and future) with a narrative of shifting centres of power and opportunities in the world. It traces and further predicts the move of Western capitalist modernity to the East, a relocation of a Eurocentric modernity—but not the formation of a new, Asian modernity. Differing from other Asianisms discussed in this volume, the territorial delineations of Asia, “membership” in this vision of Asian growth and intra-Asian interactions are not of major concern to the prophets of an Asian Century. Asia is not a concrete place but the rough direction capitalism has to take in order to rejuvenate and regain momentum.

More specifically, the Asian Century is a region-centred vision of growth and business opportunities related to an ideology of globalism and economism. Its messages are: invest, cooperate, adjust. As an economist vision, the Asian Century belongs to financial capital that seeks a haven for investment, to market radicals and to free traders. As a vision of an unknown place and time, the Asian Century discourse employs rhetorical tools and narrative configurations that help to make the unknown known. One tool is the employment of history and the evocation of past economic capability that translates current growth figures into a historical norm. The other is the projection of “Western wisdom” onto the story of Asia’s rise. The flaws of this vision of an Asian Century are obvious. First of all, it is devoid of any ethical concerns. Growth is its fetish, and the fate of the workers
who produce this growth is concealed. Second, it abounds with crass ahistoricisms. In the vision of an Asian Century (and Asia’s impressive past), temporally and spatially diverse historical experience is flattened and perceptions of Asia are confined to the notions of GDP and growth. Third, it is abstract. It leaves out the people living on Asian soil and the human agency involved in shaping a century. As the future studies scholar Richard Slaughter sees the fundamental problem of his own field: “the understandable desire to predict the future is in direct conflict with the view of people as agents and makers of history.”

Notes

1. My thanks to Elena Klorer, who helped me find and screen part of the sources for this chapter. Thanks also to Fabio Lanza, who drew my attention to numerous additional sources.
4. A short survey of media databases of the People’s Republic of China shows that notions of an Asian or Chinese Century are of marginal interest only. Interestingly, though, Chinese President Xi Jinping used the Asian Century metaphor on the occasion of a visit to India in September 2014. A text authored by him and published in The Hindu was titled “Towards an Asian Century of Prosperity” and portrayed China and
India as the potential power engines of Asia, albeit in different functions. Indian readers, however, acknowledged this as a friendly gesture but criticized Xi's optimistic outlook on the future of China and India as a form of whitewashing the conflicts between the two countries. They particularly highlighted the still existing territorial disputes (see Xi 2014 and the comments to his article). A shared vision of an Asian Century seems not acceptable in the region, given the various intraregional conflicts and the nationalisms that accompany them.


8. This is not the place to discuss realism in greater detail. For a more differentiated view of Asia in the field of international relations, see Wilkins, “The New Pacific Century”; Michael Evans, “Power and Paradox: Asian Geopolitics and Sino-American Relations in the 21st Century”, *Orbis* 55, 1 (2011): 85–113.


10. See also Evans, “Power and Paradox”.

11. Ute Mehnert, *Deutschland, Amerika und die “gelbe Gefahr” [Germany, the United States and the “Yellow Peril”]* (Cologne: University of Stuttgart, 1995).

13. Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century”.
24. See evidence given in the next sections. See also the World Economic Outlook database of the IMF that provides data for a variety of country groups that are defined by region and/or developmental level, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2012/01/weodata/weoselagr.aspx. Different country groups within Asia are discussed in “Asia 2050: Realizing the Asian Century”, Asian Development Bank (2011a); see below.
30. Ibid., Chapter 5.
32. Huang and Wang, “From the Asian Miracle to the Asian Century”: 2; Scott, “The 21st Century as Whose Century?”.
33. Wilson and Purushothaman, “Dreaming with BRICS”.
36. Even though authors might stress the complementarity of China and India in terms of economic structures, the starting point for discussing them is size.
37. Scott, “The 21st Century as Whose Century?”.
38. See the books and authors listed in Evans, “Power and Paradox”: 107–8; and Subramanian, Eclipse: 6.


44. See also Lingle, The Rise and Decline of the Asian Century.


46. Ibid.: 27–8.

47. See also Mehnert, Deutschland, Amerika und die ‘gelbe Gefahr’: 30–5 on the rhetoric of the “yellow peril” and the general function of catchphrases, in particular “extreme reduction and generalization or even distortion of complex reality” (Ibid.: 30).


49. A good example is Subramanian, Eclipse.


51. Ibid.: 22.


59. Quoted from Ibid.


62. “Maddison Counting: A Long, Passionate Affair with Numbers Has Finally Come to an End”.


70. See the projections for the date when China will overtake the United States in Ross, “China’s Achievement”.


73. KPMG is a US audit, tax and advisory services firm.
74. Interestingly, Soros’ book that is claimed to make the statement on the
Asian Century has a totally different subject and does not really relate
to Asia; see George Soros, *The New Paradigm for Financial Markets: The
75. See KPMG, “Agenda. Insights into Growth, Performance and Govern-
ArticlesPublications/Newsletters/Agenda/Documents/Agenda-O-0812-02.
Greatest Explorer Can Tell Us about the Economic Giant”, in KPMG
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pdf, accessed 20 July 2015. The story of Zheng He as a turning point
in Chinese history from outside-orientation to isolation is also cited
in Fareed Zakaria, *The Post-American World*, 2nd release, updated and
expanded (New York: W.W. Norton, 2011), pp. 49–51. For the role
of Zheng He in recent reassessments of Asia’s role in world history,
see Stokes, “The Fates of Human Society”: 56; and Nederveen Pieterse,
“Oriental Globalization”, p. 3.
77. Plott, “The Rise of China and India”.
78. Bello, “Speculations, Spins and Sinking Fortunes”: 46. Bello discusses
this boom as one of the sources of the Asian financial crisis.
79. David Plott and Michael Vatikiotis, “The Life and Times of the Far
Eastern Economic Review”, in *Free Markets Free Media? Reflections on the
Political Economy of the Press in Asia*, ed. Cherian George (Singapore:
Asian Media Information and Communication Centre, Asian Commu-
80. Bello, “Speculations, Spins and Sinking Fortunes”: 47. See also Plott and
Vatikiotis, “The Life and Times of the Far Eastern Economic Review”,
p. 138.
asian-development-outlook-2011-south-south-economic-links, accessed
8 Dec. 2014, is another ADB publication that combines analysis and
advice.
83. International Monetary Fund, ed., *Regional Economic Outlook: Asia and
Pacific. Managing the New Phase of Growth* (Washington, DC: IMF,
2011).


89. Ibid., p. 10.


display a development from a more anti-Western, Asia-specific perspective (including an insistence on a particular Asian view on values such as democracy and freedom of the press) to a more universalist one. The latter trend is particularly obvious in *The Great Convergence*. Even though Mahbubani is of Asian origin, *The New Asian Hemisphere* and *The Great Convergence* are, in their main line of argumentation, typical examples of the Asia as Future perspective with all the globalist, economist and Western-centric elements that have been identified over the course of this essay. A Western-centric narrative of world history is not uncommon in Asian discourse; see, for instance, my essay on concepts of global history in contemporary China: “National Aspirations on a Global Stage: Concepts of World/Global History in Contemporary China”, *Journal of Global History* 4, 3 (Nov. 2009): 475–95.

95. See the collection of essays in Mahbubani’s *Can Asians Think?* (2009a) and *The Great Convergence* (2013).
97. Ibid., p. 52.
98. Ibid., p. xiii, 8.
100. See the titles of sub-chapters to Chapter 2.
104. Skidelsky and Ferguson, “Westerners Don’t Understand”.
106. Ibid., p. xxv.
107. Ibid., p. xv.
110. Ferguson, “The Triumph of the East”.
113. “The End of History” stated the final victory of capitalism over communism after the demise of the Soviet Union. Fukuyama placed himself in the tradition of “universal history” or “directional history”—see Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Free Press, 2006), Chapter 5—and, like Ferguson, presented a universal pattern of development towards capitalism and democracy. In quantitative terms, Asia does not figure prominently in this book. Qualitatively, however, it is one of the cornerstones in Fukuyama’s argument that capitalism does (or potentially can) work everywhere: “What Asia’s postwar economic miracle demonstrates is that capitalism is a path toward economic development that is potentially available to all countries” (Ibid., p. 103).

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At the core of this book is a seemingly simple question: What is Asia? In search of common historical roots, traditions and visions of political-cultural integration, first Japanese, then Chinese, Korean and Indian intellectuals, politicians and writers understood Asianisms as an umbrella for all conceptions, imaginations and processes which emphasized commonalities or common interests among different Asian regions and nations.

This book investigates the multifarious discursive and material constructions of Asia within the region and in the West. It reconstructs regional constellations, intersections and relations in their national, transnational and global contexts. Moving far beyond the more well-known Japanese Pan-Asianism of the first half of the twentieth century, the chapters investigate visions of Asia that have sought to provide common meanings and political projects in efforts to trace, and construct, Asia as a united and common space of interaction. By tracing the imagination of civil society actors throughout Asia, the volume leaves behind state-centered approaches to regional integration and uncovers the richness and depth of complex identities within a large and culturally heterogeneous space.

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