Global humanitarianism
and media culture

Edited by
Michael Lawrence
Rachel Tavernor
Global humanitarianism and media culture
This series offers a new interdisciplinary reflection on one of the most important and yet understudied areas in history, politics and cultural practices: humanitarian aid and its responses to crises and conflicts. The series seeks to define fresh the boundaries and methodologies applied to the study of humanitarian relief and so-called 'humanitarian events'. The series includes monographs and carefully selected thematic edited collections which will cross disciplinary boundaries and bring fresh perspectives to the historical, political and cultural understanding of the rationale and impact of humanitarian relief work.

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Gabriel Andrade received a Doctorate of Human Sciences from Universidad del Zulia, Venezuela. He is currently a Lecturer of Behavioral Sciences at Xavier University School of Medicine, Aruba. He has written peer-reviewed articles on religious studies, psychology and philosophy. He published El darwinismo y la religion (University of Cantabria Press, 2009), amongst other books. His research interests are in medical ethics, religion and health, and evolutionary psychology. He frequently writes op-ed pieces on ethics and current affairs in The Prindle Post.

Emily Bauman teaches core humanities and human rights and development at New York University. She has published on the visual rhetoric of political biography, NGO video narratives and postcolonial theory, amongst other topics. She is currently at work on a book on religious iconography and the Cold War.

Shohini Chaudhuri is a Senior Lecturer in Film at the University of Essex. She has written three books – Contemporary World Cinema: Europe, the Middle East, East Asia and South Asia (Edinburgh University Press, 2005), Feminist Film Theorists (Routledge, 2006) and Cinema of the Dark Side: Atrocity and the Ethics of Film Spectatorship (Edinburgh University Press, 2014). Her most recent work focuses on the intersections between film and human rights, including book chapters and articles about documentaries on the Syrian and Iraq wars, and a forthcoming book on freedom of expression and the cinema.

Lene Bull Christiansen is an Associate Professor at the Institute of Communication and Arts at Roskilde University, Denmark. Her current work deals with development communication and celebrity and nationalism in Denmark. She is a core member of the Nordic Celebrity Studies Network.

Toby Fricker works as part of UNICEF’s global emergency response team, supporting offices in conflict settings, from Afghanistan to Syria and Nigeria to
Ukraine. Toby was based in Jordan from 2012 to 2015, working with UNICEF in covering the response to the Syrian refugee crisis. He previously lived in countries including Laos, Indonesia and Uganda, working in many others in-between as a communications professional, videographer and journalist.

**Andrew Jones** is an Assistant Professor in Global Sustainable Development at the University of Warwick. His research focuses on the recent history of British humanitarianism, with a focus on the rise of NGOs. He is currently preparing a monograph which will investigate how the contemporary humanitarian sector developed in post-war Britain.

**Michael Lawrence** is Reader in Film Studies at the University of Sussex. He is the author of *Sabu* (British Film Institute, 2014) and the co-editor, with Laura McMahon, of *Animal Life and the Moving Image* (British Film Institute, 2015) and, with Karen Lury, of *The Zoo and Screen Media: Images of Exhibition and Encounter* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2016). He is currently working on a monograph, *The Children and the Nations: Juvenile Actors, Hollywood Cinema and Humanitarian Sentiment, 1940–1960*.

**Katerina Loukopoulou** is Associate Lecturer at the London College of Communication of the University of the Arts London, where she teaches on the MA Documentary Film. Her publications include articles in the *International Journal of Media and Cultural Politics* and *Film History* and essays in the collections *Learning With the Lights Off: Educational Film in the United States* (Oxford University Press, 2012) and *Cinema's Military Industrial Complex* (University of California Press, 2018). Her current project, supported by a British Academy/Leverhulme Small Research Grant, investigates the relationship between pacifism and documentary cinema.

**Jairo Lugo-Ocando** is Associate Professor in the School of Media and Communication at the University of Leeds, UK. Before becoming an academic, he worked as a journalist, correspondent and news editor for several news media in Latin America and the United States. He has been a Visiting Fellow at the National University of Singapore and an associated professor of the doctoral programme in Communications at the University of Malaga (Spain). His research deals with the relation between journalism, development, poverty and social exclusion. He is author of *Blaming the Victim: How Global Journalism Fails Those in Poverty* (Pluto Press, 2014) and author of the forthcoming *Developing News: Global Journalism and Coverage of the Third World* (Routledge, 2015).

**Pierluigi Musarò** is Associate Professor of Sociology at the University of Bologna, Italy. Visiting Fellow at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), Research Fellow at the Institute for Public Knowledge at the New York
University, and Faculty Expert/Mentor for the WISE Learners’ Voice Program, Qatar Foundation, where he teaches ‘humanitarian communication’ and ‘media and security’. His teaching and research examines humanitarian communication, media and security. He has published several articles on migration, cultural sociology and sustainable tourism.

Mette Fog Olwig, a human geographer, is Assistant Professor in International Development Studies at the Department of Society and Business at Roskilde University, Denmark. She has published on development and humanitarian communication in relation to ethical labelling, celebrity humanitarianism, benefit events and branding globally, as well as on dynamics, power relations, narratives and development policy in relation to natural disasters and climate change in Vietnam, Ghana and Tanzania. She is currently doing research on business–humanitarian partnerships and how they relate to commodifying compassion.

Agnieszka Sobocinska is Senior Lecturer in the Faculty of Arts at Monash University, and Deputy Director of the National Centre for Australian Studies. She is an historian with research interests in the intersection of popular opinion and foreign affairs through travel and tourism, and of popular Western perceptions of the third world. She is the author of Visiting the Neighbours: Australians in Asia (NewSouth, 2014) and, with David Walker, co-editor of Australia’s Asia: from Yellow Peril to Asian Century (UWA Publishing, 2012).

Laura Suski is Professor in the Department of Sociology at Vancouver Island University. She also teaches in the Liberal Studies Department and the Global Studies Program. She holds a PhD in social and political thought from York University. Her current research interests include the analyses of political emotions, humanitarianism as an Enlightenment project, notions of the family and childhood in global ethics, and new theories of consumption and taste.

Rachel Tavernor recently completed her AHRC-funded PhD titled Communicating Solidarity: The Cultural Politics and Practices of Humanitarian NGO Campaigns at the University of Sussex. Her research interests include anti-poverty activism, feminism and rights based approaches to communication. She is the founding editor of the interdisciplinary website, Reframing Activism, and has worked for humanitarian NGOs in youth, community and campaign roles.
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Introduction: Global humanitarianism and media culture

Michael Lawrence and Rachel Tavernor

Since the 1990s, there has been a marked increase in the scholarly consideration of the relationships between humanitarianism and media culture, and from a range of critical and disciplinary perspectives and institutional contexts. An emergent field of inquiry has been significantly shaped by several foundational analyses of the representation of humanitarian crisis, and particularly of the media’s various repertoires for relaying to its audiences the desperate suffering of distant others. As Suzanne Franks states, ‘Our awareness of nearly all humanitarian disasters is defined by the media.’ Subsequently, and as Keith Tester argues, ‘if we want to understand modern humanitarianism, we need also to understand modern media culture, because the two are inextricably entwined.’

An exhaustive historical overview of modern humanitarianism and media culture is beyond the scope of this introduction and book; however, with this collection we intend to understand some of the longer historical, cultural and political contexts that shape how humanitarian relationships have been mediated since the Second World War. As Simon Cottle and Glenda Cooper suggest, ‘media and communications … have entered increasingly and sometimes profoundly into the contemporary field of humanitarianism and this warrants sustained, critical attention.’ Drawing and building on scholarship from sociology, journalism, development studies, politics, film and media studies and anthropology, we investigate the complex relationships between humanitarianism and popular media forms, technologies, events and cultures. Our authors explore a variety of media, from film, television and memoirs to music festivals and social media, and chart the development of different modes of communicating humanitarianism. As this book illustrates, the twentieth century is a significant period of transition in humanitarian and media institutions, which requires further analysis and investigation.

The origins of humanitarianism have recently become the subject of historical and geographical debate. Humanitarianism, as Peter Walker and Daniel G. Maxwell argue, is a system that ‘evolved.’ Scholars such as Jonathan Benthall and Kevin Rozario suggest that global humanitarianism acquired its distinctive contemporary ethos
and form in the West with the founding of the International Committee of the Red Cross in 1863, and subsequently with the work of the American Red Cross during the First World War. However, humanitarianism underwent a significant shift in the aftermath of the Second World War. Craig Calhoun, for example, claims the civilian suffering and population displacement that characterised and distinguished the war led to a new idea of ‘humanitarian emergency’. War was no longer the sole focus of humanitarian efforts. Instead a concern for a common humanity was promoted with ‘renewed efforts to articulate humanitarian norms and build institutions to enforce them.’ The institutional, organisational and operational development of humanitarianism that began accelerating in the 1940s is therefore simultaneous with dramatic shifts in media culture (for example, the growing popularity of television and of mass-market paperbacks) and thus warrants and requires an expansion and a reorientation of our ‘critical attention’. The popularising of the humanitarian project, intrinsically entwined with media culture, has created further tensions, as ‘media logics’ increasingly determine the character of virtual humanitarian relations.

The chapters in this collection offer original interrogations of the representation of humanitarian crisis and catastrophe, and the refraction of humanitarian intervention and action, from the mid-twentieth century to the present, across a diverse range of media forms: traditional and contemporary screen media (film, television and online video) as well as newspapers, memoirs, music festivals and social media platforms (such as Facebook, YouTube and Flickr). Addressing humanitarian media culture as it evolved over a period of more than seventy years, the chapters offer a critical assessment of the historical precedents of our contemporary humanitarian communications. The contributors to the book are all specialists in the fields of media and communications, film studies, cultural studies, history or sociology: these different disciplinary perspectives inform their approaches to and understanding of the relationship between humanitarianism and media culture. Our authors reveal and explore the significant synergies between the humanitarian enterprise, the endeavour to alleviate the suffering of particular groups, and media representations, and their modes of addressing and appealing to specific publics. The humanitarian community has more recently (since the end of the Cold War) questioned its ambitions, purposes and principles, while also debating its relationship to politics and ethics. Michael Barnett and Thomas G. Weiss suggest this period is marked by the ‘struggle to (re)define the humanitarian identity’, specifically in relation to ‘the boundaries, unity, and purity of humanitarianism.’ The role played by the media in humanitarian endeavours is arguably central to such questions and struggles.

Humanitarian media is typically constituted by revelatory yet routine representations of emergency and exigency aimed at the prompt solicitation of sympathy and solidarity. As Erica Bornstein and Peter Redfield suggest, contemporary humanitarianism ‘remains inherently presentist’ due to its concern for ‘the lives and welfare of those now living’: ‘the life-saving norm of international aid … at its core seeks to confront immediate suffering, usually understood as bodily or psychological
However, the ‘immediate suffering’ happening now is more often than not ‘distant suffering’ taking place somewhere else, to ‘distant strangers’.

The suffering must be mediated to the public (in words, in images, in sounds). In many cases, the communication of suffering is combined with a plea to act (for instance, to make a donation to an appropriate charitable organisation). John Silk, in ‘Caring at a Distance’, argues that media networks ‘play a significant part in extending the range of care and caring beyond the traditional context of shared spatio-temporal locale and our “nearest and dearest” to embrace “distant others”’. Th s ‘embrace’, however, remains virtual and imaginary. Despite the instantaneity of today’s global media communications, their representations paradoxically preserve distance (and subsequently the differences) between those who are suffering and those who are able to intervene. Our book contributes to further understanding the different ways people experience such a humanitarian ‘embrace’.

Cottle and Cooper acknowledge the role of communications in ‘the growing recognition of distant others as not so different from ourselves’, and in the subsequent ‘development of a humanitarian sensibility’. Certain differences nevertheless obtain. Th relationship between humanitarianism and media culture is often addressed in relation to strategic or ideological communications, with a particular focus on the presentation of those who are suffering to those with the potential to ‘help’. Lilie Choulia, for instance, has explored how the media might ‘cultivate a disposition of care for and engagement with the far away other’ and ‘create a global public with a sense of social responsibility towards the distant sufferer’. Whereas Roberto Belloni is critical of the role of the media, or rather the choices it typically makes, and suggests the media ‘adopt unethical tactics to provoke an impression among the general public and enable humanitarian organisations to raise more funds’. The marketisation of humanitarianism (specifically monetised humanitarian action) has inevitably shaped the competitive commodification of both ‘distant suffering’ and ‘caring at a distance’ by the mass media. In turn, humanitarian organisations have become ‘market’ players. For Ian Smillie and Larry Minear (2004) the ‘humanitarian enterprise’ refers to ‘the global network of organisations involved in assistance and protection. Humanitarianism is the act of people helping people’; however, as the authors acknowledge, while ‘[an] expression of ethical concern, humanitarianism is also a business driven by market forces and by agencies seeking to maintain and expand market share’. In a highly competitive sector, brand design and management are increasingly important for humanitarian organisations wishing to maintain visibility. As this collection shows, representations of humanitarianism are created in increasingly contested environments, with financial, political and cultural pressures shaping their production.

**Structure of book**

In Part I, ‘Histories of Humanity’, we begin by mapping the historical contexts of popular humanitarian communication. The authors consider how moving image
and print media were deployed to promote awareness and understanding of, and also active involvement in, various global humanitarian endeavours, organisations and institutions that developed during and in the decades following the Second World War: the United Nations Organisation, the Marshall Plan and the US Peace Corps. This section examines a range of media forms, including popular cinema and television shows and documentary films, and press coverage and public relations campaigns, in order to address the ways in which humanitarianism was strategically linked to images of and ideas about childhood and internationalism, history and heritage, and altruistic intervention and ‘underdevelopment’. In “United Nations Children” in Hollywood Cinema: Juvenile Actors and Humanitarian Sentiment in the 1940s’, Michael Lawrence addresses the significance of the child for representations of the United Nations in studio cinema produced during and immediately following the Second World War. Lawrence suggests that Hollywood cinema of the 1940s encouraged a primarily sentimental understanding of internationalism in the era of the United Nations by offering audiences an ‘appealing’ image of displaced and orphaned children from the warzones. The chapter suggests how various genre films deployed either realism or fantasy in their ideological presentation of the war’s most vulnerable victims to promote the United Nations’ internationalist ethos and associated humanitarian campaigns. In chapter 2, ‘Classical Antiquity as Humanitarian Narrative: The Marshall Plan Films about Greece’, Katerina Loukopoulou contributes an in-depth analysis of the relationship between global humanitarianism and non-fiction cinema by examining the rhetorical representation of ancient history and national heritage in several documentary films produced to promote international relief and reconstruction endeavours in post-war Greece, audio-visual campaigns that promoted humanitarianism at a transnational level. Loukopoulou attends to the means by which Marshall Plan films sought to assert continuities between the classical and the modern periods in order to promote humanitarian campaigns to both local and transnational audiences. Focusing in particular on British director Humphrey Jennings’ The Good Life (1951), she explores the significance of the formal relationships between foreground and background, and between image and voiceover commentary, for the film’s humanitarian historiography. Agnieszka Sobocinska, in chapter 3, “The Most Potent Public Relations Tool Ever Devised”? The United States Peace Corps in the Early 1960s’, investigates how public relations and popular culture were exploited to promote the Peace Corps as a humanitarian project to the general public. Using an analysis of the United States Peace Corps’ early publicity materials, Sobocinska identifies this period as a critical historical juncture that shaped popular understandings of an altruistic America that has a moral mandate to intervene. Sobocinska considers the deliberate production of a Peace Corps mystique in which an explicit emphasis on the volunteers’ patriotism, beauty and ‘pioneer spirit’ helped to popularise the belief in America’s responsibilities towards ‘underdeveloped’ nations and subsequently to normalise, and glamorise, a logic of intervention.
Part II, ‘Narratives of Humanitarianism’, considers the different actors at work producing public understandings of humanitarianism as apolitical. The authors examine a range of media, including the memoir, the news, social media, television and film, and their representations of humanitarian relationships. In chapter 4, ‘The Naive Republic of Aid: Grassroots Exceptionalism in Humanitarian Memoir’, Emily Bauman considers humanitarian memoir and argues that the genre can provide a counter-discourse of humanitarian government, specifically through its presentation of the exceptional project founder or entrepreneur as the ‘sovereign irrational’ or even ‘fool’. Bauman illustrates the significance of naiveté in narratives presenting first-hand accounts of personality-driven enterprises in an increasingly institutionalised humanitarian sector. Bauman argues that popular humanitarian life-writing exploits the genre’s association with confessional authenticity to offer a reassuringly ‘human’ image of humanitarian institutions. Shohini Chaudhuri, in chapter 5, ‘Telegenically Dead Palestinians’: Cinema, News Media and Perception Management of the Gaza Conflicts, reflects on why such oppression is possible and acceptable. Chaudhuri explores representations of Palestinian casualties (and the disavowal of their political causes) across mainstream news coverage, social media, popular American television (The Good Wife [2009–16]) and documentary film. The chapter concludes with an analysis of Where Should the Birds Fly (2013) by the Gazan citizen journalist Fida Qishta, which, Chaudhuri contends, emphasises everyday violence so as to refuse the widespread tendency to separate the humanitarian crisis from political concerns. In chapter 6, ‘The Unknown Famine: Television and the Politics of British Humanitarianism’, Andrew Jones analyses the television coverage of the famine in Ethiopia in 1973 that was predominantly unreported in Western media. In doing so, Jones argues that there is a pressing need for sustained historical research into the relationships between media representations and politics. Jones highlights how many of the issues with the 1973 Ethiopian famine, such as NGOs’ dependency upon the mass media, are pertinent today. This chapter considers the colonialist dimensions organising conventional humanitarian representations of emergency and suffering in the global South, and the critical debates within the aid sector about the value of ‘negative’ images. Focusing on the influence of ITV’s The Unknown Famine, Jones studies its dramatic impact on disaster fundraising, and specifically its transformation of the relationship between NGOs and both popular broadcasters and government aid policy and administration.

In Part III, ‘Reporting Refuge and Risk’, we focus on the movement of people displaced by conflicts and explore the longer histories of this current ‘crisis’. Pierluigi Musarò, in chapter 7, ‘European Borderscapes: The Management of Migration between Care and Control’, considers both state and non-state media campaigns associated with Mediterranean border controls amidst the migration ‘crisis’. Focusing on Europe’s border controls, and narratives of national security, Musarò’s chapter critiques the dichotomies between care and control, threat and vulnerability, solidarity and indifference, which are presented in media campaigns and coverage.
Musarò argues that the securitised approach to managing migration produces a depoliticised discourse of humanitarianism. The ambiguities and contradictions that characterise discourses and practices constituting the military-humanitarian governance of migration are addressed with an analysis of media representations and campaigns concerned with the loss of life as well as those targeting would-be migrants. In chapter 8, ‘The Role of Aid Agencies in the Media Portrayal of Children in Za’atari Refugee Camp’, Toby Fricker charts the evolution of media coverage of young Syrian refugees in Jordan and considers refugee camps as a ‘melting pot’ of aid workers, journalists, visiting politicians and celebrities. Fricker explores how children were framed by the media according to established narratives that shifted in focus from the children’s propensity to violence and vengeance to their urgent need for education and protection. This chapter argues that NGOs have an ethical duty to intervene in media narratives, and to shape the media’s decision-making process during a crisis, and ultimately to amplify rather than silence the voices of children. This section concludes with chapter 9, ‘Selling the Lottery to Earn Salvation: Journalism Practice, Risk and Humanitarian Communication’, in which Jairo Lugo-Ocando and Gabriel Andrade explore the tensions between journalism and humanitarianism as social practices, and examine the potential for representations of suffering to address the structural problems responsible for suffering rather than simply promote palliative measures. The authors argue for the strategic embrace by news journalists of the notion of shared risk (collective, everyday uncertainty) in order to produce a political solidarity in their readers, one more likely to result in active and effective responses to the problem of vulnerability. Lugo-Ocando and Andrade argue that by advancing a new humanitarian narrative, which privileges a solidarity that promotes equal relations and communicates a shared risk, a shared view of society can be created.

Part IV, ‘Capitalism, Consumption and Charity’, concludes the collection with case studies that acknowledge the paradoxes that can occur when corporate actors communicate humanitarianism. Chapter 10, ‘Consumption, Global Humanitarianism and Childhood’, asks whether political consumerism can create a space for humanitarian care and justice. Using an analysis of online discussions of children’s toys as her central case study, Laura Suski illustrates how notions of care for ‘our’ children and a humanitarian impulse to protect ‘other’ more distant children are intertwined in consumption practices. In doing so, this chapter considers the tensions that exist when consumption practices enact notions of care, responsibility and identity. Rachel Tavernor, in chapter 11, ‘Liking Visuals and Visually Liking on Facebook: From Starving Children to Satirical Saviours’, explores how the architecture of Facebook, which privileges positive sentiments, changes visual representations of humanitarianism. This chapter draws upon an analysis of Facebook and interviews with young people, to investigate the spaces and ways in which people are invited to engage in humanitarianism. Tavernor argues that the commercial ideology of Facebook contributes to shaping and promoting humanitarian action as quick, immediate and measurable. The final chapter is based on original fieldwork at a music festival in
Denmark. In ‘The Corporate Karma Carnival: Offline and Online Games, Branding and Humanitarianism at Roskilde Festival’, Lene Bull Christiansen and Mette Fog Olwig discuss the progressive and problematic aspects of popularising humanitarianism. Christiansen and Olwig illustrate the influence of corporate actors in producing humanitarian imaginaries that endorse their own branding strategies, and identify the hierarchies and social norms challenged during the festival. In doing so, the authors consider the complex relations that are negotiated when humanitarian causes are partnered with corporate companies.

We argue that media have become integral to humanitarianism and the changing relationships between organisations, institutions, governments, individual actors and entire sectors. Central to this book are analyses of the explicit, and implicit, power relations, and the structural global injustices, that shape the relationships created when communicating the suffering associated with famines, disasters and wars. We edited this collection during a period reported across the media as a ‘crisis’. The mass movement of people seeking refuge in the UK, and across the world, has made visible how public opinion is fractured. The humanitarian responsibilities of governments, communities and individuals continue to be debated, negotiated and redefined. Popular discourses concerned with borders, control and hospitality, alongside a resurgence of far right nationalist rhetoric in Northern America and Western Europe, have contributed to the changing political terrain. During a period when geographical borders and nationality are emphasised, we felt it was important to craft an international collection that crosses disciplinary borders. While the focus in this book is on distinct campaigns, festivals, films, television and reporting, we hope that our discussions of the interweaving of humanitarianism and media culture may speak to contemporary, and future, contexts.

Research in the field has often focused on representations of suffering. Critical readings of humanitarian imagery have shown how people living in poverty are homogenously represented as ‘children’, are ‘dehumanised’, or ‘imperially’ imagined, and ‘marketed’, ‘branded’ and ‘commodified’. When it came to selecting an image for the front cover of this book, we were both sure about the kind of representation that we did not want to use. The photograph we chose is a self-portrait produced by Toni Frissell. In various ways it reflects several of the themes of this collection. Frissell was a pioneering fashion photographer in the 1930s, who, like several women photographers, subsequently became a war correspondent. Frissell volunteered her photography services to the Red Cross, the Women’s Army Corps and the Eighth Army Air Force. Frissell’s images were used in posters to promote the work of the Red Cross, as well as to popularise the wider humanitarian project. The images she produced during her assignments across Europe captured the devastation of war, particularly in her photographs of orphaned children, but also the human face of humanitarian intervention, represented by her portraits of nurses and military personnel. The original negative of our cover photograph is archived at the Library of Congress and titled as ‘Toni Frissell, sitting, holding camera on her lap, with several
children standing around her, somewhere in Europe. The photograph captures a relationship between Frissell and the children, the latter expressing both intrigue and delight as she shows them the camera with which she will mediate their suffering to others. Frissell’s photograph thus foregrounds the interaction between the producer and the subjects of humanitarian media by depicting their different relationships with the technological basis of humanitarian media itself. Our book unpacks and explores the historical, cultural and political contexts that have shaped the mediation of humanitarian relationships. Together, the chapters illustrate the continuities and connections, as well as the differences, which have characterised the mediatisation of both states of emergency and acts of amelioration. The collection considers the ways in which media texts, technologies and practices reflect and shape the shifting moral, political, ethical, rhetorical, ideological and material dimensions of international humanitarian emergency and intervention. It is important, we argue, that the histories of humanitarian media culture inform contemporary debates.

Notes


2 See, for example, Cohen, States of Denial; Choulakari, The Spectatorship of Suffering; Moeller, Compassion Fatigue; and Brelsford, Distant Suffering.


4 Tester, Humanitarianism and Modern Culture, p. viii.


7 Walker and Maxwell, Shaping the Humanitarian World, p. 2.


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United Nations children’ in Hollywood cinema: Juvenile actors and humanitarian sentiment in the 1940s

Michael Lawrence

This chapter examines specific ideological and aesthetic dimensions of the representation of children in American films produced during and directly after the Second World War in relation to the promotion and operations of the United Nations. It addresses how pitiable and vulnerable children from the world’s war zones – specifically groups of orphaned, abandoned and injured children from different countries – appeared and functioned in four Hollywood studio pictures: Twentieth Century Fox’s suspense thriller The Pied Piper (Irving Pichel, 1942), Universal’s romantic musical The Amazing Mrs Holliday (Jean Renoir/Bruce Danning, 1943), RKO’s comedic comedy Heavenly Days (Howard Estabrook, 1944) and RKO’s family fantasy The Boy with Green Hair (Joseph Losey, 1948). I explore how these films presented groups of children to harness humanitarian sentiment in support of the ideology and activities of the UN, and consider the critical response to (and a director’s reflections on) the juvenile actors who appeared in the films; while the figure of the child acquired new cultural and political significance in the era of the UN’s wartime and post-war humanitarian endeavours, the presentation and performance of the Hollywood child actor simultaneously became subject to new modes of aesthetic apprehension and evaluation.

As Liisa H. Malkki has suggested, children are ‘central to widely circulating representations of “humanity” that are foundational to the whole affective and semiotic apparatus of concern and compassion for “the human” that underlies practices of humanitarian care.’ Malkki is concerned with ‘tracing affect and sentiment in the humanitarian and humanistic uses of children’ (103), and draws on the work of Ann Stoler, who argues that consent (to the state) is made possible ‘by directing affective judgments’, and ‘by educating the proper distribution of sentiments and desires.’ The images of children presented by Hollywood contributed to the ‘affective and semiotic apparatus’ appropriate for a new era of global humanitarianism. Raymond Williams described ‘structures of feeling’ as ‘affective elements of consciousness and relationships: not feeling against thought, but thought as felt and feeling as thought: practical consciousness of a present kind, in a living and interrelating
community". A humanitarian 'structure of feeling' crystallises around an affective beholding of a group of displaced and dispossessed children; the groups themselves offer a sentimental model of a supranational 'interrelating community'. Judith Butler's analysis of the 'conditions under which it becomes possible to apprehend a life or set of lives as precarious' is useful for thinking about how the children in these films functioned to produce 'affective and ethical dispositions' concerning the suffering of distant others. Butler argues that apprehension, as distinct from recognition, 'is bound up with sensing and perceiving, but in ways that are not always - or not yet - conceptual forms of knowledge.' Hollywood films invited precisely such an apprehension of both the child and the obligation to help her; they produced a humanitarian sentiment appropriate for the 'practical consciousness' required by mid-century internationalism. As a short New York Times article proclaimed in November 1943: 'The saddest, dreariest, most heartbreaking aspect of modern war is not battle, in which the soldier has literally a fighting chance. It is among civilians in occupied areas. Old people and children suffer most, and of those two the children are the most sorrowful spectacle.' Herbert H. Lehman, the director of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, stated in his November 1943 acceptance address: 'We must be guided not only by the compelling force of human sentiments but also by dictates of sound commonsense and of mutual interest.' However, it is to those 'human sentiments' that Hollywood cinema's 'sorrowful spectacle' of suffering children (sorrowful meaning both showing and causing grief) is most likely (and, perhaps, solely) to appeal; as Lilie Choulakaki has suggested, 'pure sentimentalism ... cancels out its own moral appeal to action.'

Tara Zahr suggests the Second World War 'was not only a moment of unprecedented violence against children ... [it] also spawned ambitious new humanitarian movements to save and protect children from wartime upheaval and persecution.' As Dorothy Stephenson, writing in the New York Times in November 1943, declared: 'If there are any priorities among war victims when the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration embarks on its mission of mercy after the war, the children come first.' For Dominique Marshall, the child, as a privileged focus of global humanitarian endeavour, was of particular significance in the attempt 'to channel the humanitarian movements of wartime toward international cooperation in peacetime.' The children presented in Hollywood's war-themed films functioned to solicit and shape humanitarian sentiments that were central to popular support for the UN as an organisation and the 'one world' vision it was understood to herald. Wendell L. Willkie, in his bestselling book One World, warned 'if hopeful billions of human beings are not to be disappointed, if the world of which we dream is to be achieved, even in part, then today, not tomorrow, the United Nations must become a common council, not only for the winning of the war but for the future welfare of mankind.' Popular cinema was a powerful means with which to promulgate and promote this view: indeed, in 1945, Dorothy B. Jones, former head of the Film Reviewing and Analysis Section of the Hollywood division of the Office of War Information,
suggested ‘in a world shattered by conflict it has become increasingly evident that only through solidly founded and dynamic understanding among the peoples of the world can we establish and maintain an enduring peace. At the same time it has become clear that the film can play an important part in the creation of One World. In her discussion of ‘the United Nations theme in pictures’, Jones notes how the ‘sympathetic portrayal of our allies aided in increasing American world-mindedness’ and ‘[contributed] … to a better understanding among the people of the United Nations.’ More recently, Julie Wilson has shown how ‘[the] atrocities and devastation of World War II … afforded the principles of international cooperation and a shared, common humanity new cultural significance.’ In her analysis of ‘cultural diplomacy programs and “one world” visions’ Wilson suggests ‘new and expanding conceptions of internationalism and citizenship made their way into popular culture via sentimental discourses that emphasized emotional, common bonds between Western citizens and distant others.’ Wilson draws on Christina Klein’s work on Hollywood cinema and post-war international relations: for Klein, sentimental narratives ‘uphold human connection as the highest idea and emphasize the forging of bonds and the creation of solidarities among friends, family, and community.’ The sentimental is ‘a universalizing mode’ that both ‘imagines the possibility of transcending particularity by recognizing a common and shared humanity’ and ‘values the intensity of the individuals felt experience, and holds up sympathy—the ability to feel what another person is feeling, especially his suffering—as the most prized.’ As such, the sentimental is an ideal mode for promoting the UN: Todd M. Bennett, in One World, Big Screen: Hollywood, The Allies and World War II, argues ‘[wartime] diplomats, propagandists, and media moguls mobilized popular culture, especially cinema, to … create from scratch an imagined international community’ and sought to give civilians ‘an emotional investment in the United Nations.’ Bennett examines how Hollywood deployed ‘kinship discourses’ – ‘international romances, fraternal combat epics, or paternal fantasies’ – to ‘[facilitate] the big screen’s one-world sensibility by emotionalizing inter-Allied relations’; the significance of the child, however, and of paternal, maternal or parental sentiments, for Hollywood’s ‘emotionalizing’ of both inter-Allied relations and the UN, requires further examination. Hollywood cinema’s representation of vulnerable foreign children in these films sometimes challenged and sometimes typified the industry’s conventional and sentimental representation of children as appealingly cute. As Lori Merish has argued, cuteness engenders a ‘formalized emotional response’: the cute stages … a need for adult care.’ The juvenile actors appearing in these films, moreover, were apprehended (by critics) as either challenging or typifying traditions of juvenile performance in American commercial cinema, with a restrained ‘realism’ (an appealing but not appalling authenticity) regarded as a more appropriate register for even popular entertainments concerned with the war’s most vulnerable victims. Hollywood’s humanitarian representations of the child’s ‘need for adult care’, however, were vulnerable themselves to (charges of) a mercenary and manipulative cuteness.
Sentimental modes of representation will be examined here to consider the efficacy of Hollywood films (and the juvenile actors who worked on them) in communicating particular ideas about the UN and providing audiences with an affective apprehension and experience of those ideas. Richard Patterson, writing in 1951, discussed the establishment in 1946 of the Film Division of the UN Department of Public Information, which, in addition to making newsreels and documentaries, sought ‘to interest the [Hollywood] studios in using occasional episodes and turns of plot that might condition audiences to accept the UN as part of their daily lives’ so that ‘the stereotyped image of an organization given to unpleasant wranglings and harangues would be replaced by the truer impression of high purposes and humanitarian actions’.22 Following the end of the war, in August 1946, the fifth Council session of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) in Geneva decided the agency would be integrated into the UNO, following its liquidation in October, but one of its closing actions was ‘to establish an international children’s fund for care of minors in liberated countries’.23 A year later, in October 1947, Gertrude Samuels accused the ICEF (International Children’s Emergency Fund) of failing the tens of millions of children in Europe and Asia, but welcomed the plans for a UN Appeal for Children in 1948.24 For Chester Bowles, Chairman of the International Advisory Committee for the UN Appeal for Children, the appeal sought to support the work of the ICEF ‘by asking individual men and women all over the world to fill in the gap left by their governments’: the Appeal was ‘a challenge to every parent, every worker, farmer and business man who seeks to build a world of peace and understanding’.25 Reporting on this ‘truly global’ appeal, the New York Times stated ‘people in many nations have shown a readiness to act as world citizens’.26

The groups of children in my chosen films provide appealing images of international unity (the children act as one even when they speak different languages) and thus offer a sentimental idealisation of the organisation itself, as well as of the children the organisation’s ‘humanitarian actions’ sought to help, with the aid of ordinary Americans’ charitable support. The groups of children represent miniature international societies in which the specific nationality of each member matters less than their material vulnerability as children. United by the ‘affective authority’ Malkki suggests is conventionally attributed to children, these groups function as triggers for sentimental modes of internationalism and humanitarianism appropriate for the UN era.27 Bonds of affection forged between American adults and foreign children in the first three films provide a model for the audiences’ imaginative and empathic apprehension of the suffering of other distant children; in the fourth film, the American child protagonist appears to ‘imagine’ (dream or hallucinate) a group of suffering foreign children, and then directly addresses the camera, challenging the audience to (in Butler’s terms) ‘apprehend a life or set of lives as precarious’.28

In The Pied Piper, hereafter Piper, an elderly gentleman (Monty Woolley) holidaying in France in the summer of 1940 reluctantly agrees to chaperone two
British children (Roddy McDowall and Peggy Ann Garner) back to London. Their party is joined by several further children, of different nationalities, and is captured by the Nazis, but eventually reaches England, from where the children travel to the United States; the events are presented as a flashback when Wooley’s character recounts his adventures at a London club. According to one contemporary critic, the film concerned ‘an austere British greybeard upon whom devolves the unwonted task of shepherding an increasing flock of refugee kids across war-racked France at the time of the Nazi breakthrough’. In The Amazing Mrs Holliday, hereafter Holliday, a young missionary (Deanna Durbin) arrives in San Francisco having fled China along with a group of orphans of various nationalities, and pretends to be the widow of a Commodore Holliday (who disappeared when their ship was torpedoed) so that the children can enter the United States. As one critic put it, the film presented ‘the account of a young American school teacher in China who manages to smuggle nine assorted moppets aboard a homeward-bound ship’. In the more whimsically episodic Heavenly Days, hereafter Heavenly, Jim and Marian Jordan (Fibber and Molly McGee), visiting Washington, encounter a group of children from various countries while hiding out in the house of a senator who has arranged for their adoption, or, in the words of the critics, ‘get tangled up charmingly with a group of multi-tongued refugee kids’ and ‘act as guardians to a group of United Nations orphans’. In The Boy with Green Hair, hereafter Boy, an American war orphan (Dean Stockwell), whose parents were killed in the Blitz, takes part in his school’s war orphan charity drive, and then discovers (dreams or imagines) a group of war orphans in a forest glade. For one critic the film was ‘a novel and noble endeavour to say something withering against war on behalf of the world’s unnumbered children who are the most piteous victims thereof’.

The groups of children presented in the films gradually grow in size (six in Piper, nine in Holliday, eight in Heavenly and ten in Boy) and, more importantly, are increasingly international in constitution. The ’flock’ in Piper comprises British, French, Dutch and German children; the ‘assorted moppets’ in Holliday include European or Australian children from Vietnam, China, Hong Kong, Singapore and Burma, and a Chinese baby; the ‘multi-tongued refugee kids’ in Heavenly are from Czechoslovakia, Greece, England, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, China and the Soviet Union; the children in Boy, whose nationalities aren’t specified as such, are based on images of children on the posters on display at Peter’s school promoting specific relief campaigns (for children in Greece, Yugoslavia and China, and for Jewish children), and a photograph labelled simply ‘Unidentified War Orphan’. Heavenly’s group most clearly represents the UN (with children from England, France, China and the Soviet Union): the director’s original outline of the story describes them as ‘orphan refugee children, four to eight years old, representing the principal countries of the United Nations, including Chinese [sic]’ and then simply ‘the United Nations children’. The children, however, occupy increasingly marginal positions in their respective films: in Piper they
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are central to the rescue narrative and in *Holliday* they are the backdrop to the romance plot, while in *Heavenly* they feature in just a couple of scenes and in *Boy* they appear in a five-minute dream sequence. All four films, however, accord with James Chandler’s account of the sentimental mode in Hollywood cinema. For Chandler, sentiment, or ‘distributed feeling’, is ‘dependent on a relay of regards’, produced in the Hollywood film via cinematography and editing, patterns of close-ups, reverse shots and eye-line matches. In these films, the groups of children are encountered as ‘sorrowful spectacles’ by the protagonists; the audience member thus ‘beholds what amounts to a mutual beholding on the part of two other parties’, which, for Chandler, is ‘a hallmark of the sentimental mode and its way of making a world’. Scenes of mutual beholding occur in liminal spaces, thresholds and borders as the children journey towards and arrive in the United States: in the first three films, when the children are ushered inside a safe house in France (*Piper*), escorted into San Francisco (*Holliday*) or chaperoned into a senator’s mansion in Washington (*Heavenly*); in *Boy*, the children appear in an American child’s dream or imagination.

These Hollywood films are deserving of attention precisely because the stories revolve around or feature children displaced, dispossessed, terrified and traumatised by the war, subject matter more commonly associated with the ‘new’ realist European cinemas of the immediate post-war period. The Hollywood films were produced several years before American audiences (at least those in metropolitan centres) were able to see the neorealist films from Europe. This cinema often privileged the experiences and perspectives of children and featured non-professional child performers in leading roles; well-known examples include Vittorio De Sica’s *Shoeshine* (Italy, 1946 [released in the United States in 1947]), Gerhard Lamprecht’s *Somewhere in Berlin* (East Germany, 1946 [1949]), Robert Rossellini’s *Germany Year Zero* (Italy, 1948 [1949]), Geza Radvanyi’s *Somewhere in Europe* (Hungary, 1947 [1949]), and Aleksander Ford’s *Border Street* (Poland, 1948 [1950]). In his discussion of children in post-war European cinema Pierre Sorlin refers to filmmakers ‘running the risk of having recourse to juveniles who were not even amateur actors and who seldom made a career in cinema’, and suggests ‘[as] they were not professional, the young actors could not remember long lines and their dialogues were necessarily short.’ The, however, helped the films: ‘they did not communicate ideas marked by words but raised sentiments and feelings affecting the disposition of the spectators’ minds.’ In the opening pages of *Cinema and Sentiment* (1982) Charles Affron states: ‘Art works that create an overtly emotional response in a wide readership are rated inferior to those that engage and inspire the refined critical, intellectual activities of a selective readership, but then reminds us that ‘the works of the Italian neo-realist directors … immediately recognized by intellectuals as challenging and by general audiences as “art,” are awash with the same trappings of sentimentality … that are often considered negative in “commercial” narrative films’. Karl Schoonover has discussed the international reception of Italian neorealism in
relation to ‘the emergence of a new visual politics of liberal compassion’ and argues that for both American and European commentators alike ‘an emergent realist aesthetic of cinema could build new vectors of post-war globalism’. In De Sica’s cinema, for example, realist devices were ‘capable of triggering and nourishing a charitable gaze in line with the nascent institutional practices of global humanism’. The influence of European neorealism on American cinema is usually discerned in films produced at the end of the 1940s, such as Fred Zinnemann’s *The Search* (1948) and George Seaton’s *The Big Lift* (1950), both of which were filmed on location in Europe, but Hollywood studio films had since the early 1940s offered audiences commercial and sentimental entertainments in which the ‘realistic’ representation of the war’s impact on children was regarded as innovative and progressive, and seemed designed to ‘[trigger] and [nourish] a charitable gaze’ appropriate for the humanitarian sentiment upon which the UN’s popularity depended. These Hollywood films thus preceded and anticipated European neorealism due to their sentimental and realistic representations of the suffering of children from the warzones. When, reviewing Rossellini’s *Germany Year Zero*, André Bazin declared ‘the days of Shirley Temple [were] now over’, he meant not only that the war demanded more honest stories about children’s lives, but that such films would require a new style of juvenile performance. But if Temple had provided the dominant model of the accomplished and irresistible child star during the 1930s, then the children who featured most prominently in Hollywood productions of the early to mid-1940s – Margaret O’Brien, Roddy McDowall, Peggy Ann Garner, Claude Jarman Jr, Elizabeth Taylor – were celebrated for their sensitivity and subtlety as ‘actors’ and were widely seen as inaugurating a more realistic style of juvenile performance, in stark contrast to the precocious posturing of entertainers like Temple and in keeping with the more serious dramatic roles being given to children at this time. In a 1945 *LIFE* feature about the shift from child stars ‘who relied more heavily on their talent for being likeable than on their ability to portray complex character’ (such as the ‘curly-haired, doll-like Shirley Temple’) to the young ‘dramatic actresses’ of today, who share ‘a remarkable faculty of appearing perfectly natural before the camera’, Garner is described as ‘a severely plain little girl’ and ‘the most perfect example of today’s trend towards realism in child acting’. The desire for and apprehension of new and ‘natural’ styles of juvenile performance during the war – what Alexander Nemerov has called ‘the Temple-O’Brien axis’, whereby saccharine cuteness and overt innocence ‘fell out of favour’ with audiences and critics alike – thus precedes by several years the revelatory authenticity of the non-professional child actors in the European neorealist films. Tracking evaluations of the child’s appearance and performance in Hollywood’s war-themed films reveals surprising continuities between American and European cinema, and suggests how humanitarian sentiment appropriate for and conducive of a ‘one world’ sensibility was produced by both Hollywood’s professional juvenile actors and neorealism’s non-professional child performers.
The Pied Piper (1942)

Upon the film’s release, the New York Times announced ‘From Nevil Shute’s novel of the war’s saddest flotam, the children, Twentieth Century Fox has created a warm, winning and altogether delightful film’. The success of Piper might be explained by the balance it maintains: as one critic put it, ‘[stern] realism has held the sentiment within bounds so that it never becomes obnoxious’. The studio’s press book described the film as demonstrating Hollywood’s new maturity, due to the ‘dignity’, ‘restraint’ and ‘realism’ with which it ‘[focuses] on the quieter drama of civilian life’. LIFE magazine concurred that the film demonstrated the ‘subtlety and sense’ with which Hollywood was capable of responding to ‘the human rights now at stake’. Critics agreed that the performances by the film’s ‘Remarkable Group of Child Actors’ were integral to its realism, restraint and subtlety: one critic declared ‘where children on the screen are apt to be either unbearably dull or unbearably precocious, Roddy McDowall leads as sincere and appealing a group of youngsters as we’ve seen’ and another suggested ‘[as] a group these children come pretty close to establishing a new high for the portrayal of children in American-made movies’, adding ‘the fact of genuine child-like quality cannot be denied.’

In terms of representing individual humanitarian endeavour, the film offers audiences someone who neither plans to save any children nor flinches from his duty despite the dangers involved, even when the party is captured by the Gestapo and he is threatened with torture. The film makes it clear that John’s understanding of his responsibility grows as the number of children in his care increases, and that it is the children’s intuitive solidarity, the group’s hospitality to outsiders – which takes place between scenes, and off screen – which establishes a standard for his own actions. As one review stated, ‘waif by waif—a French girl, a fear-haunted boy orphaned by Nazi strafers, a shave-headed Dutch lad unaccountably lost in Chartres—the old man’s resistance to his Pied Piper destiny en route is charmingly overcome by the curious, instinctive humanity of children toward one another’.

Around a third of the way into the film, John, with four children (Ronnie, Sheila, Rose and Pierre [Maurice Tauzin]) in tow, arrive at the house of his dead son’s former French girlfriend, Nicole Rougeron (Anne Baxter). At the front door, John explains that they desperately need a place to spend the night. Nicole invites them inside where they are met by her mother, who welcomes John into the front parlour while the children wait in the hall. In a continuous medium shot from inside the
room, John then rather formally introduces the children one by one as they enter the parlour from the hall, accompanied by orchestral music on the soundtrack (it is the melody associated with the children’s nursery rhyme “Twinkle Twinkle Little Star”, based on Mozart’s arrangement). Ronnie, Sheila, Rose and Pierre enter the parlour in turn and stand with the adults, after which John is surprised to discover a fifth child (Merrill Rodin) by his side, at which point the music pauses. The next shot is from over and behind John’s shoulder, showing the boy looking up at him and then hanging his head (he is dirtier than the other children, his hair has been shaved off, and he has a large open sore on his forehead) and the following shot is from under and behind the boy’s shoulder, showing John looking down at him in amazement. The camera’s position, behind their shoulders, emphasises the mutual beholding presented to the audience. The film then cuts to another medium shot of the parlour from behind the boy’s head, showing the ‘relay of regards’ as the other characters look at the boy and at each other. The music resumes as Sheila explains to John how the boy came to join the group. John, and with him the film’s audience, are suddenly confronted with a more distressing image of the war’s impact on children; the boy’s appearance is similar to that of the children documented by photographers such as Th rese Bonney (whose collection *Europe’s Children* was published the following year); he embodies what Giorgio Agamben would later term ‘bare life’. The critic for the *New York Post*, noting that ‘[every] youngster Howard acquires … has his own individuality and each presents a special problem’, suggests that this little Dutch boy, ‘lovable because of his sores and his dirt’ must have ‘[passed] through the Nazi decontamination machine’. The scene of ‘mutual beholding’ fuses suspense, comedy and humanitarian sentiment. John is somewhat exasperated as to how the boy has joined them (Wooley excelled at befuddlement) but Ronnie and Sheila explain that ‘Willem’ has actually been with them ‘on and off since yesterday’ (this is, however, the first time we have seen him – the film is told from John’s point of view) and that even though none of the children know Dutch (they have or are French) they had made it clear to the boy that he was welcome to join them. The increase in realism produced by Willem’s arrival is simultaneous, then, with a rather sentimental account of international relations – the children’s humanitarian hospitality – that utterly bamboozles John, who must abandon any desire for a rational explanation of the spontaneous solidarity, and what he calls the ‘system of Lilliputian communication’, demonstrated by the group of children under his care.

At the very end of the film, John is asked to take with him a Gestapo officer’s niece, who is brought to the harbour where the party are preparing to set sail: yet another child joins their group. Significantly, this little girl, Anna (Julika) – unlike Sheila or Rose – is extremely pretty (or rather prettified), a proper pet. ‘The days of Shirley Temple’ (Bazin) are quite clearly evoked by Anna (and the little doll she clutches). Her arrival late in the film is important for two reasons: first, and following Shute’s novel, the film shows John’s humanitarian endeavour as profoundly inclusive – the group of children, by the time the film ends, includes both ‘Allied’ and
‘Axis’ children on the boat bound for England.\textsuperscript{54} Second, the way Anna is styled and behaves (and Julika's performance), compared with the other children in the film, arguably imbues the earlier style named in Nemerov's 'Temple-O'Brien axis' with a mechanical precision here explicitly associated with Nazism (most apparent when Anna greets John with a dainty 'Heil, Hitler!' salute) while the other children (and the other child actors) appear, by contrast, as authentic, ordinary individuals.

\textit{The Amazing Mrs Holliday}

\textit{The Amazing Mrs Holliday}, on which the French director Jean Renoir worked for several weeks before being replaced by the film's producer Bruce Manning, was intended to provide the popular teenaged singing sensation Deanna Durbin with a more grown-up and serious image. Following Renoir’s departure, the studio demanded a more conventional and commercial product, which explains the film's sometimes awkward blend of romantic comedy (in the San Francisco scenes) and realism (in the China scenes), and its ultimate recourse to a sentimental mode with which to educate its audience about the urgent need for international humanitarian endeavour in China. The reconciling of cultural internationalism with the imperatives of commercial entertainment is perhaps best encapsulated by the sequence in which Ruth sings 'Rock-a-bye Baby' to the children in fluent Mandarin. Nevertheless, for William K. Everson (writing in the 1980s) \textit{Holliday} is 'probably (in a relative sense since the story is somewhat artificial) the most realistic and certainly the least glossy (in terms of production techniques) of all the Durbin films'.\textsuperscript{55}

The film received mixed reviews: for the \textit{Motion Picture Herald} it was ‘a heart-warming story of the war's homeless children, with a good measure of comedy to leaven the sentiment', featuring 'nine waifs of uncertain origin and undeniable appeal', who 'will enchant the audience by just being themselves'.\textsuperscript{56} But for the \textit{New York Times}, the film lacked the 'understanding and grace' of \textit{The Pied Piper}, and was clumsy, 'contrived and crude', 'a trivial story upon a theme much too sensitive and real to be exploited in such shoddy fashion', in which 'the authors at no point show any real concern for the children; they are merely scattered through the scenes to serve as a sort of pathetic background for Miss Durbin's display of mother-love' and 'presented in such an awkward and stilted style that one never senses any poignance in their insecure lives'; Durbin's rendition of the Chinese lullaby, furthermore, was 'simply sacrificing the genuine for the cute'.\textsuperscript{57}

The flashback sequences showing the bombing of the orphanage in China, usually attributed to the original director Jean Renoir, however, are only slightly less harrowing than the scenes that conclude \textit{China Girl} (Henry Hathaway, 1942), released a few months before, in which Johnny (George Montgomery), an American cameraman working in occupied China, falls in love with Haoli, a Chinese woman (Gene Tierney) who runs an orphanage with her father. When the Japanese bomb the orphanage, the father and several orphans are killed outright; Haoli is killed
trying to rescue the remaining children. One critic suggested that ‘[the] last scenes of frightening realism should not be seen by children, indeed one does not like to see the Chinese children acting in them,’ and concluded that ‘[it] is a moot point whether scenes of death and destruction should be used for entertainment, even from the highest motives.’ In One World, Big Screen Bennett argues Haoli’s death in China Girl results in Johnny’s ‘reformation into a committed internationalist warrior’ and the film’s tragic romance thus ‘symbolized and lent emotional sustenance to the actual Sino-American partnership.’ The ‘kinship discourse’ deployed in Holliday, however, revolves around Ruth’s intensely felt maternal responsibility for the group of international children; this prompts her to masquerade as the Commodore’s widow, and this pretence is the obstacle to her relationship with the Commodore’s son. While the film is topical, it abides by the conventions of the romantic musical. However, it begins with a scene of ‘mutual beholding’ in which the orphans’ harrowing experiences in the warzones are described (rather than dramatized) for both the immigration officer in the film and the audience of the film.

The scene begins with two shots that bring us closer to a group of children as a young woman tells them about San Francisco, where they will shortly land. Ruth and the children all look over to the left as the inspector from the Immigration Service arrives. Standing to face him, Ruth tells the inspector that while she is not related to the children, they are ‘just like a family.’ The inspector asks Ruth whether the children have any documents, and she answers that they have no ‘formal passports.’ ‘What kind do they have?’ he asks her. ‘The same kind all children have during a war,’ she replies, at which point the film cuts to a group shot of the children, from Ruth’s perspective, and she explains: ‘Fear and need of shelter.’ Ruth volunteers to tell the inspector everything she knows about Marie, Rodney, Winifred, Teddy, Elizabeth, Anna and Vido, and a (Chinese) baby. While she does this, the film shifts between medium shots of the group of children sat on the deck, approximating the perspective of the adults, close-ups of the faces of the individual children as Ruth narrates their particular circumstances, in which each child raises their eyes to meet the adults’ gaze, before dropping their heads (just like Willem in Piper), and a medium shot of Ruth and the inspector looking down at the children (figures 1.1 and 1.2); there is, rather surprisingly, no music on the soundtrack during this sequence. Of Teddy, for example, Ruth explains ‘his father was a doctor in a hospital near our village – the Japs [sic] took his parents prisoner and left Teddy there to die – they didn’t know Teddy – he crawled two miles to a road – a Chinese soldier brought him to us’; of Marie, ‘Her father had a petrol station by a river near our school – the Japs [sic] needed fuel for their boats – she hasn’t seen her mother or father since.’ Once Ruth and the children have disembarked a senior immigration officer tells her each child requires a $500 bond; the children watch from a nearby bench, at which point Ruth promises them she will return for them as soon as she can (after presenting herself as the Commodore’s widow, she and the children move into the Holliday mansion). During the relay of regards in these scenes, characters view the
Figure 1.1  *The Amazing Mrs Holliday*

Figure 1.2  *The Amazing Mrs Holliday*
children in different ways, often in the same shot: Ruth sees them as her family (her children), but the immigration officers see them simply as a case to be processed according to the regulations, despite their being subjected to the same appealing gaze of the children. The children seem to recognise their own precariousness, how they can be apprehended simultaneously by both a sentimental (here, maternal) and a bureaucratic humanitarian gaze. The lack of over-the-shoulder shots in the sequence situates the film audience more securely in the actual position occupied by, first, the adults looking down at the children and, second, the children looking up at the adults. The film thus invites the audience to evaluate the conflict between Ruth’s ‘sentimental’ idealism (regulations should not prevent her from carrying out her responsibilities) and the inspectors’ objective ‘sense’ (responsibility for children requires regulations), but ultimately, and inevitably, endorses Ruth’s subterfuge. It is this subterfuge, after all, which provides the romantic plot with the conventional element of uncertainty regarding the heroine’s eventual marital happiness. While the film establishes very clearly at the start that the claim of the child upon the adult, as the more positive critic suggested of the child actors’ appeal, inheres in children ‘just being themselves’ (that is, children), its obeisance to the conventions of the romantic musical inadvertently demonstrates how a just response to the child’s claim is all the more necessary given how often children are marginalised, or, as the negative review put it, relegated by adults’ affai rs to a mere ‘pathetic background’.

**Heavenly Days**

For one critic Heavenly was ‘a heartening if not always tip-top example of how even straight comedy can be relevant and constructive’; for another it was ‘an example of how a picture can be both instructive and entertaining’, and off red specifically ‘a preaching for more active participation in public affai rs on the part of the average citizen and for better understanding among national groups’. Th ese ‘national groups’ are embodied in the film by ‘a young league of nations that demonstrates different international groups can live harmoniously with one another’, or, as the script described them, the United Nations children.

In the sequence in which the McGees first encounter the war orphans, around halfway through the film, they are posing as domestic servants in a senator’s mansion in Washington; the arrival of the children (chaperoned by adults of various nationalities) is somewhat similar to the children’s arrival at the mansion in Holliday, while the admission of another orphan (after the McGees have closed the door) is similar to John’s encountering ‘yet another’ child at the door of the parlour in Piper. The scene of ‘mutual beholding’ proceeds as the ‘United Nations children’, attired in national costumes, are lined up as if for an inspection, although the manner in which the children address the adults, in a mixture of broken English and their native languages, suggests at the same time an audition. When they are first asked to introduce themselves, they simply show their official tags, as if anticipating an
administrative bureaucratic regard. The McGees persist in talking to them one by one; as they move along the line of children, orchestral music plays on the soundtrack (as in Piper) and the film presents us with close-ups of the children's faces, approximating the McGees' perspective, as the children tell the McGees their names and nationalities: Katrina, a Dutch girl, Zoe, a Belgian girl, Pepi, a French boy, Jan, a Czechoslovakian boy, Dimitra, a Greek girl, Yen Choi, a Chinese boy, Antonovich, a Russian boy and, lastly, Drinkwater, an English boy (figures 1.3 and 1.4).62

Unlike Holliday, in which Ruth provided information about each orphan's bereft and destitute state, Heavenly has the children speak, but only so as to offer thanks to the McGees (or rather to the United States) for their kindness in receiving them.63 Their experiences of danger in the warzones are suggested by their scrambling for safety under sofas and tables when they mistake Fibber's whistle for an air raid alarm (the children in Holliday do something similar). But Heavenly arguably presents the children in a much more idealised register than either Piper or Holliday, and the efforts of the child actors are emphasised by the formality and theatricality of the occasion: the various orphans' faltering statements of thanks seem like rehearsed recitations, and when the Russian boy performs a Cossack dance, it is the young performer's accomplishments (more so than his character's predicament) the film exploits for sentimental effect. The director's initial screenplay specifies one of the orphans as '[the] cutest youngster, perhaps a Czechoslovakian, an alert, curious boy
about five or six.’ In other words, the ‘United Nations children’ were from the outset conceived in terms of their conventional aesthetic appeal (quantifiable cuteness) as much as their international diversity and specificity.

**The Boy with Green Hair**

According to Brian Neve (writing in 1992), *Boy* ‘is a strange mixture of aesthetic experiment, social protest and studio sentiment.’ The film’s protagonist, Peter, whose parents have died in the Blitz and whose hair has inexplicably turned bright green, encounters the group of war orphans following his involvement in his school’s UNICEF-style charity drive. Earlier in the film, Peter looks at various humanitarian campaign posters in the school gymnasium promoting the Greek War Relief Association, the American Committee for Yugoslav Relief, the United Jewish Welfare Fund and United China Relief, as well as a poster showing an ‘Unidentified War Orphan’. After deciding to run away, he collapses in tears on the ground near a forest glade. A close-up of a tear sliding down a blade of grass, shot from Peter’s point of view, places the audience in the protagonist’s position. Peter hears another child call his name, and slowly stands up, at which point a match dissolve suggests the film enters his dream state or imagination. A shot of the forest glade shows a group of children, frozen in tableau; they are the children from the posters, wearing the same clothes and holding the same postures (see figures 15 and 16). For a few moments, as Peter approaches, they are motionless, and the film is silent, before some of them begin to walk toward and crowd around him, while melancholy orchestral music plays on the soundtrack. The orphans explain that Peter must tell ‘all the people’ that ‘war is very bad for children’; the ‘Unidentified War Orphan’ refers specifically
to the original ‘Four Policemen’ of the UN, asking Peter to tell ‘the Russians, the Americans, the Chinese, the British’. As the children take it in turns to talk to Peter, the film shifts between medium close-ups of the war orphans addressing Peter, close-ups of Peter listening and responding, and medium long-shots showing the orphans arrayed in the glade. Upon receiving his commission, Peter turns to face the camera (and the film’s audience), and insists ‘The world doesn’t have to be blown up’.

Whereas the earlier films presented groups of children journeying towards or recently arrived in the United States, *Boy* offers instead children who remain distant others. While the first three films show children under the direct care of various guardians, as immediate responsibilities, *Boy* suggests the children are (still) in need of such care, and their needs remain *mediated*, first by the humanitarian campaign posters presented in the film, and second by the film itself. The children in the posters at Peter’s school reappear in the dream sequence, and the posters are thus revealed to be images of these juvenile actors posing as war orphans, and therefore as inauthentic and contrived as the glade sequence itself. Director Joseph Losey later admitted, ‘the [original] story really was a fantasy about racial discrimination and that’s what the picture should have been about. But we all felt so strongly that there must be a world movement for peace that we tried to make a film about peace’.

Alerting audiences to the film’s potentially problematic combining of topical realities
and fanciful conceits, the RKO Press Book, which describes Boy as ‘a unique dramatization of the plight suffered by children, innocent and unwilling victims of the wars that plague the world,’ acknowledges that ‘the story fluctuates between piquant imagery and realism’. Reflecting on his attempts to combine elements of fantasy and reality in the film, Losey complained:

I was stymied in both because the reality was the RKO lot, their clapboard houses and their streets which had been used a million times before; it’s pretty hard to get reality from that, so that was the problem … The trouble with the fantasy was, nobody knew, nobody understood. What I wanted to get, in the scene in the glade, was absolute horror, real terror, the kind of thing Joris Ivens and John Ferno did in their film of the Chinese-Japanese conflict, The Four Hundred Million [1939], with that shot of the baby sitting on the railway track, bombed and with no clothes, desolate and crying. I wanted to get that kind of horror, that kind of reality / [There’s] no horror and there’s no reality in the glade, and the figures of the children are marionettes.67

Losey’s frustration concerning his ambitions to replicate the ‘kind of reality’ he encountered in Ivens and Ferno’s documentary within his film’s fantastical premise is suggested by his likening the children to puppets. For Losey, the studio’s commercial

Figure 1.6 The Boy with Green Hair
expediency thwarted his desire to experiment with the realism that a popular format might accommodate.

In a June 1943 address Frances Harmon, the Executive Vice-Chairman of the Motion Picture Industry division of the War Activities Committee, stated: ‘Solidarity in the ranks of the United Nations is a prerequisite to victory in war and peace. Knowledge of one another and mutual appreciation of our diverse countries, cultures and war sacrifices can be obtained most quickly on a popular level through this people’s art which speaks a universal language.’ In a July 1943 speech Harmon celebrated the ‘inspiring cooperation’ of the film industry, which had ‘proved conclusively that we can come together … as a hard-hitting team in behalf of victory for the United Nations’ and then offered an intriguing analogy: ‘Fundamental differences exist between some of the United Nations, but today all are united in a solemn determination to force the unconditional surrender of our common foes. Basic divergences similarly exist between various branches of our industry—between the artistic and the commercial approach to production problems.’ In both cases (the UN, the film industry) strength depends on unity, and quarrels will lead to weakness. The representation of children from the warzones in these Hollywood films is sometimes surprisingly realistic (for commercial entertainments) and sometimes objectionably sentimental (for topical dramas). The representation of these groups of children demonstrates how the ‘divergence’ between ‘artistic’ and ‘commercial’ approaches (not, or not always, however, synonymous with realist and sentimental registers) is managed and modulated, sometimes in a single film. The four films’ propaganda unquestionably derives from their presenting groups of children, but with varying degrees of realism and sentimentality – the genuine and the atee – determining the authenticity and appeal of the children (including of course the children’s performances themselves) and thus governing the apprehension of their suffering. The groups of children in the first three films are assembled via increasingly bureaucratic modes of humanitarian action, from the ministrations of heroic individuals to the administration of international organisations: in *Piper* the children are under John’s unofficial protection; in *Holliday* the children are originally from an institution (an orphanage) and must be processed by immigration services; in *Heavenly* the children have presumably come to America under the auspices of an official committee responsible for the adoption of war orphans. In *Boy*, however, the children appear first on photographs (publicity materials for humanitarian campaigns) and subsequently in the protagonist’s imagination. The ambiguous ontological status of the children in this film – played by real children, they are presented first as ‘documentary’ images in the humanitarian campaign posters and then as ‘imaginary’ children in the protagonist’s fantasy – is instructive for a consideration of the presentation of the children in the earlier films, precisely due to the awkward combination of realism and fantasy, and authenticity and sentimentality, with which the real suffering of the war’s youngest victims is presented as a ‘sorrowful spectacle’ both in the film and to the film’s audience.
Notes

1 The United Nations originated with the Declaration of the United Nations in January 1942, signed by the so-called Four Policemen (the US, the UK, the USSR and China) and a further twenty-two Allied Nations; the Organisation followed in 1945. The United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), established in 1943, and the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF), established in 1946, represent the organisation's global humanitarian operations during and immediately following the war. Maurice Pate, UNICEF's first Executive Director, made his candidacy conditional on the organisation's committing to provide relief to children from the former Axis countries (see M. Black, *The Children and the Nations: Growing Up Together in the Post-War World* (Melbourne: Macmillan, 1987), p. 17). The expansion of UNRRA's original remit reinforced the idea of the child being 'before' or 'beyond' the politics of international relations.


6 Butler, *Frames of War*, p. 5.


14 D. B. Jones, 'The Hollywood War Film: 1942–1944', *Hollywood Quarterly*, 1:1 (1945), p. 1. In the 1940s awards were established for films 'promoting international understanding' (Golden Globe, from 1946) or 'embodying one or more of the principles of the United Nations Charter' (BAFTA [UK], from 1949). War-themed films featuring children were often nominated; Fred Zinnemann's *The Search* (1948) for example, won both awards.


20 Bennett, *One World, Big Screen*, p. 13. The four films discussed in this chapter are not mentioned in Bennett’s book, nor are the more well-known films about Allied Nations’ children such as MGM’s *Journey for Margaret* (W. S. Van Dyke, 1942) or *The Search*.


War orphans and child refugees from Europe in fact appear in many popular feature films made in America during the war, and were arguably instrumental (even integral) to the anti-isolationist propaganda we associate with Hollywood productions such as *Mrs Miniver* (William Wyler, 1942). In MGM’s *Journey for Margaret* (W. S. Van Dyke, 1942), for example, Margaret O’Brien played an orphaned air raid victim at a London nursery adopted by an American journalist, and in Fox’s *On the Sunny Side* (Harold D. Schuster, 1942), Roddy McDowall played an English evacuee in Ohio ‘for the duration’. Following the end of the war, orphaned children from Europe continued to appear in generic and sentimental Hollywood entertainments: for example, the Czechoslovakian stowaway (Mark Dennis) in *The Return of Rusty* (William Castle, 1946), promoted with the tagline: ‘A boy with a dog … A kid without a country … In a story with a great heart-tug!’ and the boy of unknown nationality (Robert Blake) in *The Return of Rin Tin Tin* (Max Nosseck, 1947), the French girl (Beverly Simmons) smuggled into the United States in *Buck Privates Come Home* (Charles T. Barton, 1947) and the French orphans (Jacques Gencel, Beverley Washburn) adopted by Bing Crosby in *Here Comes the Groom* (Frank Capra, 1951).

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53 In Shute’s novel, however, it is the adult John who arrangements with an aunt to look after Rose, decides to take Pierre with them after finding the boy beside his parents’ bodies, and who assumes responsibility for the Dutch boy (called Willem in the film). See N. Shute, *The Pied Piper* (New York: Vintage, 2009), pp. 75, 97, 128.

54 John Boyne avers: ‘[it] is particularly noteworthy, especially considering that this is a wartime novel published at the height of hostilities, that Shute recognizes no geographic boundaries or ideological differences in assembling his band of lost children’. “The differing backgrounds of these children and, most crucially their ability to get along with each other during a stressful and exhausting journey, says much for Neville Shute’s ideals of human nature. At its most simple level he is asking the question why the adults of the world cannot coexist like these young


56 E. A. Cunningham, 'The Amazing Mrs Holliday', Motion Picture Herald (6 February 1943), p.1145


59 Bennett, One World, Big Screen, p.241

60 McManus, 'Fibber Goes A-Stumping'; Anon., 'Heavenly Days', Variety (2 August 1944), page unknown.

61 Anon., 'Heavenly Days', Variety (2 August 1944), page unknown.

62 Two of the child actors in Heavenly had appeared in the earlier films; Teddy Infuh, who plays Jan in Heavenly, played Teddy in Holliday, and Maurice Tauzin, who plays Pepi in Heavenly, played Pierre in Piper.


64 Estabrook, 'Heavenly Days Shooting Script' (23 October 1943), p. 11.


70 For example, the United States Committee for the Care of European Children was responsible for coordinating the Directive on Displaced Persons which was aimed at filling immigration quotas with war orphans: sixty-seven such children arrived in the summer of 1946.

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Classical antiquity as humanitarian narrative: The Marshall Plan films about Greece

Katerina Loukopoulou

A growing number of studies have argued for a historical and historicised understanding of global humanitarianism and humanitarian intervention. However, the history of the interdependence of humanitarianism with media campaigns and the wider visual culture of each period remains an underexplored field, as the few studies in this area highlight. The Marshall Plan films stand for a landmark moment in the long history of this relationship; they were part of one of the first post-Second World War audio-visual campaigns to promote a humanitarian cause at a transnational level.

The Marshall Plan (MP) is the widely used term to describe the European Recovery Program (ERP), that is the material aid that the United States sent to the devastated economies of Western Europe to help them with the reconstruction process after the Second World War. Overseen by the US State Department and the Department of Commerce, it was executed by a newly established agency, the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA), which had offices in Washington and in each of the eighteen Western European countries that received the aid. It became known as the ‘Marshall Plan’ after Secretary of State General George Marshall, who spearheaded its conception, implementation and publicity campaigns from 1947 onwards.

Having persuaded President Harry Truman of the need for the United States to boost European economies with immediate material aid, on 5 June 1947 General Marshall made the initial announcement with a speech that was imbued with the rhetoric of impartial humanitarianism: ‘our policy is not directed against any country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos’. This set the tone for the ensuing pro-MP campaigns to persuade the US taxpayers of the plan’s worthiness and necessity. For example, on 17 November 1947 the newspaper of the US Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), a federation of industrial unions, featured pro-MP articles, in one of which the CIO president described the MP ‘not merely as a gesture of humanitarianism’; ‘hunger’ was ‘a threat to the peace and security of the world. The very use of the term ‘humanitarianism’ and
its connection with geopolitics was thus very much in the air during this period of intense public debate about the parameters of the MP's implementation. The main area of disagreement within US political circles had to do with the MP moving away from the internationalist cooperation approach of previous relief schemes, such as that organised by the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) (1943–7), towards adopting the mantra: ‘The United States must run this show’, as the Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs put it in 1947. And, the ‘Marshall Planners’ ensured that ‘this show’ received more visibility and media presence both in the United States and in Europe than in previous cases of the United States offering loans and aid that remained under radar.

General Marshall’s predilection for film was instrumental to this end, adopted as the ideal medium for propagating the ‘benevolent’ nature of the ERP. Marshall had expressed his staunch belief in the dramatic power of cinema to promote the US cause in 1942, when he personally hired renowned fiction film director Frank Capra to work on the Why We Fight non-fiction film series (1942–5). Marshall even publicly defended his mobilisation of cinema at the Senate in response to accusations of trivialisation of the war effort. While the Why We Fight series was produced for US audiences, the MP documentary films were commissioned exclusively for European ones, while a parallel and distinct pro-MP media campaign was running for the US public.

During a short period (1948–52), the MP-sponsored European Film Unit produced approximately 300 documentaries, newsreels and informational films, alongside press releases, posters, photographs and exhibitions. MP historian David Ellwood has recognised this as ‘the greatest international propaganda and information programme ever seen in peacetime’ and has claimed that ‘the film program was at the heart of [the ERP] effort’. Indeed, high expectations had been invested in the MP films, viewed at the time as the beginning of a ‘European film movement’. Though funded by the United States, the European Film Unit had its headquarters in Paris and ensured that the films about the eighteen Western European countries that received the MP aid were directed by European filmmakers in multilingual versions intended for both national and transnational exhibition. Alongside documenting and reporting on the uses of the MP aid, these films were defined by a humanitarian discourse that foregrounded what political scientist Michelle Cini has called ‘the language of altruism’. This discourse was deemed necessary for attaining support for an aid programme whose multi-layered economic, geopolitical and military motivations and its subsequent impact have for long been debated. As Cini has put it:

The humanitarian motive behind American involvement in the Marshall Plan is perhaps hardest to demonstrate … The Marshall Plan’s ‘fleece factor’, which was important in ensuring the support of U.S. public opinion and Congress, was a necessary
if not sufficient element in the promotion of a political consensus on Marshall Aid. It is not surprising, then, that the European Recovery Program should be couched in the language of humanitarianism.10

But in the case of the campaign for the persuasion of the European public, the mobilisation of the humanitarian discourse operated against a very different geopolitical landscape. Scholarship tends to agree that the MP was a response to the pre-eminent fear of Truman's administration that communism would expand to Western Europe, accentuated by the prospect of a Communist electoral victory in Italy in 1948, and even more urgently with the ongoing Civil War in Greece, which had erupted very soon after the liberation of the country from the Nazis. The Greek Civil War (1945–9) was fought between the Greek Government Army (backed by the United Kingdom and the United States) and the Democratic Army of Greece (backed by the USSR).11 The MP publicity campaign in Europe was thus addressing a much more divided public.

Scholarship on the MP films and the media campaign is a more recent addition to the long-standing discussion of the MP's impact and its history. The MP films re-emerged in the public sphere after almost half a century of neglect. Since the first screening of a selection at the 2004 Berlin Film Festival, public and scholarly interest in these films has expanded. Thanks to the Selling Democracy project and the expanding filmographic record, the MP films have acted the interest of archivists and historians.12 With public events and digitisation projects, these films have found new audiences after almost sixty years in the United States, where they were banned from public viewings until 1990, because of a 1948 bill 'that prevented their being shown to American audiences (who were not to be “propagandized” with their own tax dollars).13 Although in Europe such a ban did not exist, they quickly fell into neglect. The Selling Democracy project has generated a process of unearthing the MP films in various European film archives, which is ongoing, especially in the case of the non-English versions and the trans-European ones.

The majority of writings about the MP's publicity campaign and the MP films tend to focus on national case studies, such as Ireland, Austria and Italy, and an emphasis on narratives of reconstruction, productivity and national identity.14 Thus the case of Greece and the humanitarian narratives of the MP films at large have been underexplored so far. By concentrating on the MP films about Greece, my aim is to correlate their discourse of reconstruction with the narrative of humanitarianism and to complement my previous work in this field that explored the geopolitical and military contexts of the MP propaganda.15 This is particularly relevant for the case of Greece, where the Civil War quickly acquired international dimensions, as had been the case with the Spanish Civil War in the 1930s. For Amikam Nachmani, historian of international relations, 'few if any twentieth-century civil wars involved greater
foreign intervention than that in Greece. The country became the first ‘hot spot’ of the Cold War, with stark contradictions characterising this international intervention, the emphasis of which shifted from militarism to humanitarianism almost overnight. For example, in August 1949, the US Air Forces, with the collaboration of the Greek Government Army, dropped large amounts of napalm in the northern regions of Greece to wipe out the Democratic Army and to bring the civil war to an end. And in December 1949, the millionth ton of ERP aid arrived at the port of Piraeus and the Greek Army paraded it in central Athens with formal ceremonies. Until October 1949, when the Civil War ended, approximately 80 per cent of the MP aid to Greece had been channelled to support the Greek government’s military operations against what Truman called the ‘armed minorities’ of the Democratic Army. The MP thus secured that Greece ‘more than any other European country’ retained ‘its Western orientation by playing an integral role in the termination of the Civil War’. Within this post-Civil War context, humanitarian aid became even more urgent in terms of relief and reconstruction, but even more crucially, in terms of implementing an ideology of humanitarian values that were aligned with the US foreign policy.

The majority of the MP films about Greece mobilise a particular kind of humanitarian narrative, one that evokes the ancient Greek heritage in such a way that it stands not only for Greece’s reconstruction but also for Western Europe’s future and its alignment with the US vision of a geopolitical ‘pax Americana’. My argument is that the MP films inaugurated the visual politics of what historian of international affairs Michael Barnett has called ‘the age of neo-humanitarianism’, the period from the end of the Second World War up to the end of the Cold War. This period was characterised by a new ‘architecture of humanitarianism’, dominated at large by the patterns established by the United States during the Second World War, which were ‘increasingly planning-minded and influenced by states and their interests’. It was within such a context of ‘mutual aid’ and long-term planning that the target audiences in Western Europe experienced the MP films, often as part of the full MP package. As Sandra Schulberg has put it: the MP’s ‘genius lay not in sending money but in shipping tangible goods — fuel, fertilizer, food, farm animals, machinery — that were essential for life and for economic recovery’. The products bore the ERP logo and the American flag, and their delivery was often accompanied by formal ceremonies and non-theatrical screenings of MP films. While such ceremonial display framed the United States as provider of material goods, the rhetoric of the MP films sought to win over local audiences by engaging with the target country’s history, while presenting the goods brought by the United States as essential to peacetime prosperity.

The projection of ancient Greece onto post-Second World War neo-humanitarianism

Notions of national cinemas and national historiography are inadequate methodologies to tackle the challenges of the complex network of production and exhibition
and transnational narratives of the MP films. With on average nine different language versions produced of each documentary and with an extensive network of theatrical and non-theatrical distribution, the MP filmography must be one of the most expansive manifestations of 'the process of matching geo-political scale [with] language' and cultural heritage. Even if the funding originated from the United States, it was European filmmakers and production crews, deployed across the eighteen Western European recipient countries of MP aid, which produced the first purposeful cinematographic discourse of Europe for the Europeans.

The arrival of the MP films in Greece, where the experience of cinemagoing was rather limited, had a particular resonance in terms of showing Europe and Greece to the Greeks. Apart from newsreels, hardly any Greek documentaries about the country exist from before the mid-1950s, let alone documentaries about this crucial historical conjuncture, the immediate aftermath of the Civil War (1949–52). Up to the mid-1950s, Greek film production and exhibition were under huge financial strain. Moreover, non-fiction cinema about Greece was sparse, mainly taking the form of travelogues. The MP films, therefore, can be considered amongst the first documentaries about modern Greece. If there is a common thread in their narratives, it is the referencing of classical antiquity as an anchor of transhistorical continuity between ancient and modern Greece, thus offering a unifying rhetoric to the deep post-Civil War political and ideological divisions. Such is the case with the following MP films: *Victory at Thermopylae* (David Kurland, 1950); *Marshall Plan at Work in Greece* (James Hill, 1950); *The Corinth Canal* (John Ferno, 1950); *Island Odyssey* (1950); *A Doctor for Ardaks* (John Ferno, 1951); and *The Good Life* (Humphrey Jennings and Graham Wallace, 1951). While direct references to classical heritage are not prevalent in the other films about Greece – *Return from the Valley* (John Ferno, 1950); *Mill Town* (David Kurland, 1950); *Story of Koula* (Vittorio Gallo, 1951) – there is still a particular emphasis on history and the pastoral.

Due to Greece lacking both a tradition of and an infrastructure for documentary production at the time, the MP films about Greece were directed by non-Greek filmmakers from the ECA-sponsored units of London (*The Good Life*), Paris (John Ferno's films) and Rome (*Story of Koula*). This was another facet of the 'Greek exception' (alongside it being the only post-Civil War European country to receive the MP aid), because most of the MP films about a specific country were directed by national filmmakers, sometimes building on the country's cinematographic and documentary tradition, as in the cases of Italy (neorealism) and the UK (the British Documentary Movement). Many MP films – such as the ones about Austria – mobilised national culture and identity politics in their audio-visual rhetoric. Although the MP films about Greece follow this trend, their projection of a 'humanitarian narrative' is consistently related to a historical dialectic between modern and classical Greece that positions the MP aid within a dual perspective of national reconstruction and universal necessity.
The sociologist Nicos Mouzelis has discussed this attachment of modern Greece to its classical past as a form of cultural imperialism. For Mouzelis, this re-appropriation of the ancient Greek heritage as a vehicle for the formation of modern Greek identity was a non-Greek invention, ‘imported from abroad, as developed by the Europe of the Renaissance and the Enlightenment’, creating thus what he calls a condition of ‘disarticulation’, a negative and artificial mapping of Greece’s distant past onto its modern nation-state. The MP films about Greece conform to this discourse, directly aiming to bridge the country’s glorious past with the promise of an equally glorious future that is more aligned with the US vision for Western European unity as the stronghold to contain the expansion of communism. This is particularly prevalent in the films Corinth Canal, Victory at Thermopylae, Island Odyssey and this chapter’s case study, The Good Life, initiated by renowned British documentarian Humphrey Jennings. My aim in what follows is to relate this process of ‘disarticulation’ with the way that The Good Life constructs its humanitarian narrative and audio-visual rhetoric.

To disentangle the complex geopolitical context within which this film was produced, I am drawing on what film historian Antoine de Baecque calls the ‘cinematographic form of history’. Building on long-standing debates about positioning cinema in history, de Baecque argues that ‘the historical operation—from archive to narrative—and the cinematographic process—through the aesthetic chain that transforms recorded material into a film … produce a sensible experience of reality, past or present, by giving it form. This sets up historiography and cinema as two parallel phenomena, at once intellectual and aesthetic’.

The notion of a ‘cinematographic form of history’ offers a more nuanced understanding of the intense interaction of the documentary’s filmic discourse with the reality it responds to than analytical models that tend to reduce culture to a supplement or mere ideological reflection of hard politics. Cinema, as an intellectual and aesthetic enterprise, mobilises visual signs to create an open-ended and fluid language of historiography. In this light, it is worth foregrounding a statement by the Director of the American Historical Association, who in 1988 made a case to end the prohibition of the MP films in the United States by describing them as ‘an important visual record of American foreign policy in action’ (emphasis mine). It is not, therefore, a question of whether the filmmakers and producers of the MP films were consciously enacting a predetermined US foreign policy, but a question of how the films were offering a parallel discourse about a reality being shaped by the impact of the ERP.

This framework is particularly apt for The Good Life, a documentary conceived and partly directed by Humphrey Jennings, an accomplished filmmaker with a central position in the influential British Documentary Film Movement. By 1951, Jennings had forged one of the most sophisticated approaches to cinematographic ‘polysemy’
and ‘iconographic displacement’ in the documentary film mode. The Good Life shares a common aesthetic trait with the majority of the MP films about Greece: the referencing of the country’s ancient heritage, intertwined with the contemporary geopolitical landscape. But The Good Life stands out for its treatment of this trope in a similar way that Jennings’s wartime propaganda films – Words for Battle (1941), Listen to Britain (1942) – occupy a distinct place for their poetic treatment of life at the British Home Front and for bringing to the fore ‘the cultural plurality of the wartime totality’. Similarly, Jennings brought a visual and intellectual sensibility to the mapping of classical antiquity onto Greece’s post-war modernity and precarious state of affairs.

The Good Life was produced as part of the MP film series The Changing Face of Europe (1951), with each film focusing on one country and one theme (e.g. agriculture, health), but within the framework of European and international co-operation. Apart from this common thread, each film in the series has a distinctive approach ranging from the informational to the poetic. The Good Life seems to veer towards the latter and the final film might have been a fully poetic one, had it not been for Jennings’s sudden death in Greece during the film’s production. Although it is impossible to determine which scenes were directed by Jennings himself, film scholar and Jennings biographer Kevin Jackson has claimed that the film bears Jennings’s signature throughout: ‘Few other directors would have chosen to begin and end their films with evocations of the Homeric world, or to film pastoral scenes of a shepherd boy with his pipes or his flock, let alone doff the hat to Lord Byron.’ Jennings would have been motivated by his romantic vision of Greece, as the land where Byron died, an interest that dated back to the late 1930s, as evidenced by his painting a cubist rendition of Byron dressed in characteristic early nineteenth-century clothes of Greek fighters of Independence, and his poem The Boyhood of Byron. Jackson has noted that during his travels in Greece, the director was carrying a copy of Edward Trelawny’s Recollections of the Last Days of Shelley and Byron (1858). Alongside his philhellenism, Jennings’s intellectual baggage played a key role in constructing the film’s depiction of humanitarian intervention as ‘simultaneously universal and circumstantial’.

Moreover, Jennings’s assistant director, Graham Wallace, who completed the film, had already worked in the same capacity on previous Jennings films. One of these was The True Story of Lili Marlene (1944), a dramatised documentary about the remarkable story of the song ‘Lili Marlene’ becoming a hit with soldiers from both sides of the war in Europe (Germans, English, Russians). Wallace was therefore well versed with the ‘Jennings text’, its carefully crafted dialogical sequences and ‘intermedia linkages’. Either because of this dual authorship or because of the wider neglect of the MP films, The Good Life was for long forgotten even amongst Jennings scholars, with extant prints held in the Imperial War Museum’s Film Archive and in the US National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), until its recent digitisation and inclusion in BFI’s comprehensive Jennings DVD collection (2013).
Jennings’s final film maintained the exploration of the pastoral-modernist dialectic prevalent in most of his films. According to film historian Philip Logan, *The Good Life* could be seen as a continuation of Jennings’s previous Festival of Britain film *Family Portrait* (1951), which ends with a recognition of the Cold War climate and the international programme for political reconstruction of post-war Western Europe. Indeed, one of the concluding voiceover comments in *Family Portrait* depicts Britain as ‘too small, too crowded to stand alone. We have to come both inside the family of Europe and the pattern overseas’. This duality is continued in *The Good Life*’s commentary on Greece, a country that was heavily under an Anglo-American influence. And despite the film being sponsored by the US-funded European Film Unit, its perspective is informed by a British point of view with references to Byron’s devotion to and death for the ‘Greek cause’ of independence. But this philhellenism had more recent roots in the UK, with Oxfam (Oxford Famine Relief Committee) having been set up in 1942 in response to news of mass starvation in Nazi-occupied Greece. It was solely on Greece that Oxfam focused its charitable activities until the end of the war, before moving on to other territories and causes.

Moreover, in the summer of 1944, the Fitzwilliam Museum in Cambridge opened an exhibition with the ambitious title ‘Greek Art: 3000 B.C.–A.D. 1938’. Ths show was the result of political collaboration between the British and the Greek government in exile, with the motto ‘everything good we stood for’. Greek art was hailed as the emblem of democracy and freedom in the fight against the Nazis. Historian Abigail Baker has analysed the propaganda value of this exhibition for both the British and the Greek governments, which resulted in a paradoxical ‘celebration of Greek independence as dependent on foreign imperialism’: ‘The idea of a debt owed to Greece for its cultural influence pervades the material relating to the exhibition. Even the poster used to advertise the exhibition credited ancient Greece with “all modern civilisation in Europe and America”.’ Jennings would have taken note of this exhibition, considering the significant publicity and press coverage it received, and he had been a frequent visitor to the Fitzwilliam since his student days in Cambridge, often finding it a source of inspiration.

*The Good Life* was only the second film that Jennings made with a non-British subject matter, the first being *The Defeated People* (1947) about post-war Germany. Jennings’s films have in general been analysed within the history of the Documentary Film Movement, tightly associated with notions of Britishness. In a sense, this was inevitable, since its origins lay in powerful British institutions of the 1930s and 1940s, such as the Empire Marketing Board (EMB), the General Post Office (GPO), and the Crown Film Unit. However, after the Second World War key players of the Movement moved on to projects and positions associated with newly formed international organisations and ‘universalist’ ideologies. For example, John Grierson became UNESCO’s Head of Communications (for a short spell), while Basil Wright and Paul Rotha directed and produced the UNESCO film *World Without End* (1953).
In this context, Jennings’s move to make a film that promoted the ERP can be seen as part of the British Documentary Movement’s shift towards internationalism and global humanitarian causes. *The Good Life* documents aspects of the post-war reconstruction of the health system of Greece, as part of the wider European and international ‘grand design’ to eradicate disease through international collaboration. The film foregrounds images of children who become the first beneficiaries of the international humanitarian interventions and of the MP aid that helps Greece to build new and modern hospitals. Thus Laqueur, historian of humanitarianism, offers an apt description of nineteenth-century literary manifestations of the ‘humanitarian narrative’ as focusing ‘on the personal body, not only as the locus of pain but also as the common bond between those who suffer and those who would help’.45 This kind of narrative has forged one of the central paradoxes of humanitarianism: the tension ‘between emancipation and domination’.46 This acquires powerful and dramatic connotations once transposed into a nonfiction audio-visual discourse of factuality and direct address.

The MP films about Greece were produced after the end of the Civil War. Although some MP-sponsored reconstruction work had started in early 1948, when the Civil War was in full flow and the Greek film production in disarray, the ECA film units did not arrive in Greece until late 1949. By then, there had not been significant visible progress in the reconstruction work to record. It is mainly in photographic records, rather than in the MP films, that researchers may find visual evidence of the actual construction of new buildings, bridges, hospitals and factories.47 This thematic is therefore less prominent in *The Good Life*.

Instead, the camera focuses on ‘bodies’, on the actual recipients of humanitarian aid, and on what Laqueur calls ‘the common bond’ between givers and receivers of humanitarian aid: children inoculated against tuberculosis in the remote villages of Greece; patients recovering from illnesses; and orphan girls and boys at summer camps and orphanages supported by the MP aid. Moreover, the film’s narrative situates the MP within the context of other recent and concurrent humanitarian interventions in Greece: the Red Cross’s inoculation campaign against tuberculosis; United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) posters, which feature in shots of children receiving the necessary nutrition; and the operations of the World Health Organization (WHO), which is shown crossing international borders and reaching the malaria-inflicted areas of mainland Greece, near Missolonghi where Byron died, as the film’s voiceover reminds its viewers. It is only halfway through the film’s narrative that the first direct mention of the MP aid occurs, in a shot of an ECA sign that both in Greek and English language acknowledges the source of funding for the new hospital shown in the background. Sequences of doctors treating patients with modern equipment are introduced with the voiceover remarking, ‘Today, help is coming too, from America. This new sanatorium at Lamia in Greece was built as part of the European Recovery Programme.’
This contextualisation of the MP aid was a reminder of how Greece had become the epicentre of expansive international humanitarian aid throughout the 1940s. UNRRA had, for example, offered the immediate emergency support towards the end of the war, while balancing 'political impartiality' with 'military exigencies'. However, the MP's humanitarianism is not only promoted with reference to contemporaneous international organisations, but most crucially in relation to the universal principles of 'impartiality' and 'neutrality', which have historically 'rendered humanitarians apolitical' (and that Marshall himself was keen to emphasise in his initial declarations of the Plan's purview). References to 'classical antiquity' achieve this: the film opens with a long panning shot of the ancient site of Delphi, 'the navel of the Earth' as mythically known, followed by a montage of closer shots of the surrounding ancient ruins and shots of young shepherds and their flocks. This bucolic imagery offers the visual cue for actor Leo Genn's carefully delivered voice-over to commence the film's opening commentary:

Whoever shall have taught me the art of healing, with him will I share my substance. I will regard his offspring even as my own brethren. I will impart the knowledge of healing by precept, by lecture, and by all other manner of teaching. So ran the oath taken by the physicians of Ancient Greece. The root of all good life lies in good health. This they believed here on the slopes of Mount Ida 2,000 years ago. 'Whatsoever house I enter,' the Greek doctor solemnly vowed, 'I will enter for the benefit of the sick.'

These lines set the film's tone, with Genn's delivery maintaining a reassuring register throughout the film and particularly when the motto is repeated ('The root of all good life lies in good health'). But the viewer is quickly transferred to the urgency of the present with an abrupt cut from the bucolic landscape to a close up of a Chevrolet with the Red Cross sign speeding up across the bumpy roads of rural Greece to deliver anti-TB vaccination to remote villages. And Genn's 'voice-of-God' narration sums up the introductory part with this line of transhistorical universalism: 'From Ancient Greece, this humane teaching spread across all Europe. Today, Europe returns her thanks to Greece in kind.'

The choice of Genn, renowned for his 'velvet' voice, to deliver the introductory commentary was well considered. An established actor by then, albeit largely in minor roles, his voice had accompanied a good number of non-fiction British wartime propaganda films and he had also featured in Laurence Olivier's acclaimed fiction propaganda *Henry V* (1945). The choice of an actor for the voice-of-God narration also chimed with the British documentary's tradition of treating voice-over narration as a form of soundtrack with its own musicality and tonality. Genn's professional and impassioned delivery accentuates the core theme of *The Good Life*, which is to balance the particularity of the Greek situation with the impartial and universal beliefs of ancient Greek physicians.
If the opening narration and imagery stand for the universal humanitarian message, then what follows is the historical present. The Red Cross Chevrolet carrying the red sign ‘International Tuberculosis Campaign’ enters the village and the voiceover narration shifts to a point of view mode, as it is delivered in a female voice by one of the village’s children: ‘We could see that something important was going on and we children were all trying to find out what it was.’ The Greek girl’s point-of-view accented narration introduces the viewer to the village’s life and the positive reception of the Red Cross by the children who all turn up at the central square to be vaccinated. During the vaccination sequence, Genn’s voice returns to repeat the opening lines ‘Whoever shall have taught me the art of healing …’. The repetition offers a sense of rhetorical unity. This sound montage of the male professional voiceover narration with the young girl’s consolidates the dialectic of the ‘universal with the circumstantial’. Both sound and image carry the dialectic of the classical with the modern. The contrast between the assured male voiceover standing for the ‘European-cum-British point of view’ with the accented child’s voice representing Greece could be interpreted as patronising, infantilising the Greeks as the ignorant natives who suffer from diseases that the more civilised Europeans will eradicate. The line ‘Europe returns her thanks to Greece in kind’ is an instance of what Mouzelis calls ‘disarticulation’: the ancient Greek heritage returns to Greece via a foreign voice that possesses the knowledge of millennia and brings it back to its homeland.51 Similarly, in his innovative study The Nation and its Ruins, Yannis Hamilakis has demonstrated how classical antiquity stood for Greece’s alliance with the West and the so-called ‘free world’ during and after the Civil War.52

The child’s point of view, though, could also be seen as representing the future of the country. As Frank Mehring has noted in his comparative study of MP films, children and young people were an active and popular theme, featuring prominently in many MP films to project the future of Europe.53 The Good Life, however, is not oblivious to the predicaments of the Greek orphans, victims of the vicious Civil War. In an ironic and rhetorically self-conscious mode, the film’s narrative appears to turn against its own discourse and to question the relevance of the ancient Greek classical heritage with a shot of a boy labouring as a shoe polisher with the Parthenon in the background (see figure 2.1). This shot is the ‘climax’ of a sequence, introduced with discomfiting questions that implicate the viewer:

all across our ancient continent, we Europeans dwell surrounded by much of the greatest that life can offer, fashioned by our forebears, bequeathed to us and our children. Have we nothing to hand on but this? [a shot of run-down dwellings] … Will those who follow say we left them this? [a shot of children playing and sorting out rubble from damaged buildings] … those without inheritance, selling peanuts, shining shoes beneath the glories of our common past [a shot of a boy polishing shoes at the foot of Acropolis].
If there is one sequence with Jennings’s signature throughout, then this should be a strong candidate: it bears the director’s predilection for treating landscape as a found object to comment critically on the current state of a nation. In *Spare Time* (1939), for example, Jennings had famously framed the statue of Richard Cobden, manufacturer and advocate of a free-trade liberal capitalist ideology, against the grim and desolate landscape of factory chimneys. Similarly, in *The Good Life*, the revered pictorial motif of the Acropolis is subverted by the very presence of the impoverished child; the framing throws into question the contradictory meanings of what classical antiquity could stand for within the context of the early stages of the Cold War: as an apolitical cultural terrain, potent enough to conjure up sentiments of national and trans-European unity; and as what Alexander Kazamias has called ‘a Greek version of anti-communism’ exploited by the royalist, right-wing government to promote a new discourse of national mindedness (ethnikofrosyni). This shot subverts both discourses through the sheer powerful juxtaposition of the new (a child in a state of exploitation and precarious existence) and the old (the celebrated Parthenon, standing as an impasive reminder of how history can too often be indifferent to its ‘lesser’ characters). The positioning of the child in the frame creates a sense of
entrapped – caught hopelessly, both between the indifferent foot of the well-off customer and the architecture of the powerful past, and between the materials of modernity and the past.

A similar vein of cautiousness can be detected in the film’s concluding sequences, which in a way share similarities with Jennings’s *A Diary for Timothy* (1946), in which the director had warned against the dangers of complacency and triumphalism in post-war Britain. The village girls’ accented voiceover returns to introduce one of the film’s last sequences, in which three teenage girls are shown sewing in a cheerful mood. But the voiceover reminds the viewer that their reality is harshly different: ‘Koula has no parents, they were shot outside her home; Parisi and Maria have never been to school. A shell hit it.’ This is followed by a long shot of teenage girls exercising outside a brand new school and here the girl’s voiceover directly interpellates the adult viewer: ‘Perhaps your children do this at school every day … But don’t forget that millions of us haven’t had time to think about keeping clean or being well since I was born.’

The film concludes with visual rhymes: a montage of shots of the famous wall paintings of the Minoan women dancers of Knossos Palace intercut with shots of modern Greek teenage girls dancing along a traditional folk song (see figure 2.2). A sense of empowerment is conveyed as the modern young Greek women are compared with the ones of the Minoan society, where women occupied privileged, visible positions.

The Knossos sequence leads to a succession of shots of Delphi, the Acropolis and the Parthenon, followed by shots of modern hospitals and an expansive bridge in an unnamed Northern European country, with the voiceover narration delivering the concluding unifying message: ‘In the Europe of today, we are striving towards a better life for all our people, young and old, striving to blend the best of our past with the best that the present can offer, building as it were a grand design for the future of our continent. Let us be sure it rests upon that firm foundation: the harmony of the human mind and body in full health.’ This sequence and the voiceover re-affirm the film’s audio-visual rhetoric, which strives to establish the ERP as part of

*Figure 2.2 The Good Life. Montage sequence that sets the young orphans of the Greek Civil War in dialogue with their ancestors’*
a universal humanitarian order. It does so by appropriating the ancient Greek heritage as the ERP’s forbear. And this results in shaping the narrative of the US aid as a benevolent force that helps Western Europe to overcome its dividing recent past.

**Conclusion**

*The Good Life* is heavily implicated with the US-led ‘neo-humanitarian’ discourse of the post-Second World War era. But the director’s agency for a poetic cinematographic discourse lends the film a humanitarian narrative that veers towards romanticism with its focus on children – ‘the living spirit of today’, as the voice-over narration emphatically reminds the viewers. Logan has drawn an interesting parallelism in relation to Jennings’s being caught in the maelstrom of the geopolitical forces of the time: ‘International politics had contributed to Byron’s accidental death while in Greece and so it was for Jennings … as in his other films, through cultural and social references and its implicit political commentary, *The Good Life* would have provided both witting and unwitting testimony to a greater international story.’

This ‘international story’, however, needs qualifying. If Byron stood for one of the earliest cases of humanitarianism and humanism that permeated the early nineteenth-century philhellenic movement and its concomitant rebellion against the Ottoman Empire, then Jennings’s film was implicated in a matrix of geopolitical forces, where the humanitarian cause was implicated with the US foreign policy to contain the Soviet Union away from the Mediterranean and Western Europe.

Jennings’s and Wallace’s creative choices chime with the wider ideological construct of the time that linked the notions of universalism and internationalism with Greece, a country that in post-Enlightenment Europe stood for the source of such aspirations. For example, UNESCO, upon its establishment in 1945, had adopted a minimalist rendition of the Parthenon as its visual logo, manifesting thus the endorsement of a Eurocentric iconography. Often with a critical undertone, the filmmakers structured *The Good Life* around relationships and contrasts between the Greek classical heritage and the post-Civil War present. The humanitarian aid that the MP brings to Greece is very different from the one of urgent relief from starvation that Oxfam had offered during wartime. The humanitarian intervention, as represented in the MP films, and in particular in *The Good Life*, has more to do with reasserting the newly re-invented universal values of humanism, impartiality and individualism. Whenever the film’s motto is repeated (‘The source of good life lies in good health’) it is visually associated with the individual bodies of young men and women and with international organisations aligned with the West (the likes of Geneva, Italy, Austria and the United States). The more apolitical the discourse is, the more powerful the humanitarian narrative becomes.

The invocations of the classical past are instigated by the US liberal humanist ideology of the time, which projected a teleological line of continuity from the dictum of impartiality, as advocated by the ancient Greek physicians, to the
American promise of a ‘free world’. The vehicles for this narrative are the bodies of the children and the young people who are inoculated and provided with welfare, through a process of building a new Europe of liberal ideology and Western-centred civilisation, and by the exclusion of all the other Eastern European countries that Cold War politics had excluded from the MPs reach.57

Notes


3 Throughout the chapter, I use both abbreviations (ERP and MP) as synonyms to refer to the European Recovery Program and the Marshall Plan respectively.


Histories of humanity

17 Jones, A New Kind of War, pp. 27–18.
22 Schulberg, Selling Democracy, p. 10.
26 The main source for identifying these MP documentary films about Greece is the Marshall Plan Filmography, www.marshallfilms.org/mptasp. Accessed 25 March 2015. No director is credited for Island Odyssey: the only existing information is that it was produced by the ECA Paris for the ECA Greece. Viewing copies for all nine documentaries about Greece are available in English at the US National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) and information about them is included in the aforementioned MP Filmography website. This is a comprehensive list as per the following criteria: viewing copies available; confirmed MP sponsorship; documentary mode of production. However, it is possible that more MP films about Greece and other European countries could be identified in the future. No copies have been located so far in Greek or with Greek subtitles. Digital files of a selection of MP films (including a few about Greece) in German and French can be viewed at the following online collections: Deutsche Historische Museum (DHM), www.dhm.de/filmarchiv/die-filme; Institut National de l’Audovisuel (INA), www.ina.fr. Accessed 20 July 2016.
30 The work of Guilbaut and Saunders is pioneering in terms of foregrounding the ideological uses of cultural diplomacy during the Cold War; but their methodological approach for analysing the relationship between culture and US foreign policy is reductive, with little consideration of aesthetic choices and the agency of the artists. See S. Guilbaut, How New York Stole the Idea of Modern Art: Abstract Expressionism, Freedom and the Cold War (Chicago: University

31 Letter (20 April 1988) from Samuel Gammon, the Executive Director of the American Historical Association, sent to Senator John Kerry, supporting the introduction of legislation that would eventually lift the prohibition against domestic screenings of the Marshall films, quoted in Hemings, *The Marshall Plan’s European Film Unit*, p. 276.


33 Mellor, ‘Sketch’, p. 17.


36 Mellor, ‘Sketch’, pp. 107, 111.


39 Mellor, ‘Sketch’, p. 106.


41 Logan, *Humphrey Jennings*, p. 337.


44 Mellor, ‘Sketch’, p. 106.


56. Logan, Humphrey Jennings, p. 38.

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'The most potent public relations tool ever devised’? The United States Peace Corps in the early 1960s

Agnieszka Sobocinska

The United States Peace Corps captured the public’s imagination in a way that few international development initiatives ever did. Presidential candidate John F. Kennedy first uttered the words ‘Peace Corps’ in early November 1960; two months later, a Gallup poll found that 89 per cent of Americans had heard of the Peace Corps, with 71 per cent in favour. Over the following years, the Peace Corps was the subject of countless articles in newspapers and magazines, and featured on the television and on radio. It also intersected with popular culture: portrayed in plays, novels, cartoons, television sitcoms and game shows throughout the 1960s, the Peace Corps helped introduce America’s agenda for international development to a popular audience.

This chapter explores the nature and effects of this publicity during the 1960s. It begins by charting the close alliance that Peace Corps HQ, and particularly its first director, Sargent Shriver, built with the burgeoning corporate industries of advertising and public relations. It shows how the Peace Corps rendered international development into a topic for mainstream discussion and public engagement. It also traces some of the political outcomes of this publicity. Peace Corps publicity explained the nature of international development to the broader public in particular ways. First, by focusing on volunteers’ altruistic intentions rather than the effectiveness of their actions on the ground, Peace Corps publicity portrayed international development as a humanitarian project. By presenting US intervention as a positive expression of American altruism, the Peace Corps helped popularise the view that America had a responsibility to modernise the ‘underdeveloped’ nations of the world. This chapter argues that, by privileging American viewpoints and eliding competing visions, Peace Corps publicity helped normalise a logic of intervention.

In 2000, Nick Cullather called on historians to treat ‘development as history’ and to make ‘history the methodology for studying modernisation, instead of the other way around’. Historians have taken up the challenge, producing some important work on modernisation and aid projects in Asia, Latin America and Africa. Scholars have focused particularly on the Cold War context, and how this influenced policy
makers in organisations such as USAID. Historians of development have begun to look beyond the bureaucrats, academics and politicians who devised policy, to investigate how the public engaged with international development during the 1950s and 1960s. This chapter extends such work by focusing on the role played by media and popular culture in constructing public images of international development, with particular reference to the United States Peace Corps. The cultural significance of the Peace Corps in America has long been acknowledged. By 1966, anthropologist Robert Textor had identified a 'Peace Corps mystique', which attracted widespread interest and helped maintain public support for the programme. In her monograph covering the first decade of the Peace Corps, Elizabeth Cobbs Hoffman argued that the programme gained widespread popularity because it symbolised what America wanted to be, and what much of the world wanted America to be: superhero, protector of the disenfranchised, defender of the democratic faith. Whilst more critical of the Peace Corps, and focused on its gender politics, Molly Geidel has similarly pointed to its currency in the popular culture of the 1960s. The historical literature has built our understanding of the Peace Corps' operations during its first decade, but we do not yet have a sustained analysis of the Peace Corps' publicity or representations in popular culture.

This chapter uncovers the construction of a Peace Corps mystique by publicity experts and the media, and tracks its reception by popular audiences in the United States. Based on archival research, media sources and analyses of popular cultural productions, it is attentive to both the producers and audiences of media and popular culture. It argues that the Peace Corps' publicity helped stir public interest and support for international development, and contributed to widespread acceptance of Western developmentalist intervention in the Third World.

Cultures of publicity

It was 2 a.m. by the time presidential candidate John F. Kennedy ascended the dais at the Cow Palace in San Francisco on 2 November 1960. Yet, as the New York Times reported, it wasn't long before the 20,000-strong crowd was 'roaring' in approval at Kennedy's proposal to establish a Peace Corps of young Americans serving in technical aid roles abroad. The idea received widespread press coverage. The New York Times reprinted lengthy extracts from Kennedy's speech the next morning, and over the following days, articles introduced the Peace Corps to readers around the nation. Ordinary Americans responded with great enthusiasm. In the following months, Kennedy's office received somewhere between 30,000 and 40,000 letters; Cobbs Hoffman estimates that more people offered to work for the as-yet non-existent Peace Corps than for all the existing agencies of government combined.

Kennedy assigned his brother-in-law, Robert Sargent Shriver, to head the Peace Corps. Both men were keenly aware of the importance of public opinion. Shriver engaged public relations experts to sketch the basic outline of a vast publicity strategy
even before the Peace Corps was formally constituted on 1 March 1961. Shriver’s PR outfit soon boasted a full-time Associate Director of Public Affairs; within a couple of years, the Public Affairs section had grown to accommodate separate departments for Public Information, Communications, and Radio and Television.

Shriver forged close relationships with corporate public relations and advertising agencies. The US government had begun to use corporate advertising agencies during the Second World War, and this became increasingly common as propaganda activities became centralised during the Cold War. Shriver brought the talent and glamour of both Hollywood and Madison Avenue to bear on the Peace Corps’ image. He looked for people with Hollywood connections to add glamour to his agency, and poached well-connected journalists to act as in-house publicists. Terry Turner, the Peace Corps’ Director of Radio and Television in the mid-1960s, characterised his career trajectory as being ‘From Madison Avenue to Malawi’. In addition to in-house staff, Shriver engaged external PR consultants, and the National Advertising Council contributed by appointing corporate agencies including Young and Rubicam to work for the Peace Corps to fulfil their public service contribution.

Together, these agencies saw the Peace Corps message carried in hundreds of posters and pamphlets as well as countless advertisements in national, regional and college newspapers and magazines. They invested heavily in radio advertising. The Peace Corps also commissioned dozens of films, starting with Peace Corps in Tanganyika (1962). Screened on national television, and at hundreds of university campuses and high schools across the United States, these were regarded as an important recruitment tool throughout the 1960s. Shriver was particularly tele-genic, and he maintained a punishing schedule of news and current affairs shows, as well as radio programmes. The publicity profile was unusually high for the head of a government agency, and it helped sustain the public’s initial enthusiasm over the coming years.

The constant stream of publicity contributed to the Peace Corps mystique identified by Textor, which had ‘a direct, fresh, personal appeal to millions of Americans’. Exceptionally for a government agency, the Peace Corps acquired mainstream, pop culture glamour. Even celebrities flocked to be associated with the Peace Corps. Notable individuals, from Harry Belafonte to football stars to anthropologist Margaret Mead, offered their suggestions and services. A young Clint Eastwood wrote to President Kennedy in March 1961, offering to create what he called ‘a volunteer entertainment group to supplement the work of the Peace Corps’. At this time, Eastwood starred in the CBS series Rawhide, which was the sixth-highest rating television programme in the United States. The letter was prioritised and evidently provoked some discussion amongst Peace Corps staff, but Eastwood was ultimately turned down. The United Nations had begun to use celebrity ‘Goodwill Ambassadors’ to promote its international development programmes from 1954, in the hope that their profile and glamour might rub off on the rather sombre topic of international development. The Peace Corps was placed in the unusual and enviable
position of being pursued by actors, athletes and other celebrities who wanted to have some of its glamour rub off on them.

The Beautiful Americans

The previous section established the extent of the Peace Corps’ publicity, but what messages did it convey? Despite its global vision, Peace Corps publicity was overwhelmingly focused on America. In publicity, the Peace Corps was framed as an expression of American goodwill, and Peace Corps volunteers as the personification of everything good about the United States. As Cobbs Hoffman notes, ‘at its inception the Peace Corps told Americans what was best about their country’.17 This message, present in Kennedy’s early speeches, was sharpened through the Peace Corps publicity machine. The foregrounding of American motivations was politically important for the Peace Corps. It served to assuage early critics in Congress, many of whom had to be convinced of the national benefit of international development. It also served to counter rising critiques of American culture. As Shriver put it, there was a ‘widespread belief that many Americans have gone soft’, and the Peace Corps was presented as a corrective. As Shriver went on, ‘the exciting thing about the Peace Corps is that we are finding the Americans who have the faith and the conviction to lead the free world’.18

Geidel has located anxieties that America was going ‘soft’ in masculine fears about the dual encroachments of consumerism and feminism.19 Cold War politics also played an important role. International development assistance became another front in the Cold War during the 1950s.20 Unflattering contrasts between American softness and the determination of the Soviet Union figured prominently in critiques of the US approach to international development. Proving that America had the resolve to ‘lead the free world’ became a core priority amidst the Cuban Missile Crisis and growing unrest in Vietnam. The Peace Corps was presented as an answer. Hollywood producer Michael Abbott thought it was ‘without doubt, the most potent public relations tool ever devised’, as ‘for those parts of the world inflamed with anti-Americanism, America’s Peace Corps will be the salve and the counter-irritant to the infectious spread of the “ugly American”’. This was a riposte to Lederer and Burdick’s vastly influential 1958 novel The Ugly American. In the novel, American haughtiness and indolence was contrasted with the grassroots approach of Soviet aid experts, who won villagers over to the communist cause by sheer hard work and determination. Abbott thought that the Peace Corps was America’s answer. Far from ugly Americans, the Peace Corps would be ‘beautiful Americans … bringing hope and trust and self-esteem’.21

In print, on radio, on TV and in countless recruitment drives at college campuses, early Peace Corps publicity emphasised Americans’ good intentions in order to claim a moral right to leadership of the free world. Recruitment publicity emphasised volunteers’ altruism, whilst omitting details about the work they would
do, or why it was needed. One of the earliest official Peace Corps publications, the *Peace Corps Fact Book* began with the question, ‘Why a Peace Corps?’ As an answer, the *Fact Book* reaffirmed Western motivations, writing that ‘the Peace Corps idea … has demonstrated a strong appeal to the idealism and altruism of Americans.’ References to Kennedy’s New Frontier, which sought to revive America’s pioneering spirit and harness it to international causes, were frequent. Americans were shown to be eager and ready for hard work, but Peace Corps publicity rarely explained what kind of work they would do beyond generalities such as ‘teaching’ or ‘helping’, or why their presence was required. Significantly, Peace Corps publicity did not explain the need for American intervention abroad, presenting the vast enthusiasm of Americans as justification enough. Voices from recipient nations were almost entirely absent. A one-minute radio spot produced in early 1962 by Chicago-based agency Doherty, Clifford, Steers and Shenfeld is illustrative of the determined focus on American motivations:

> Probably no public activity has ever captured the imagination and interest of the country – and the world – as quickly, as has the Peace Corps. Many see it as a way in which America can help in the world-wide fight for freedom among new and rising nations – and it is. Many see it as a way to serve humanity in the battle against poverty, ignorance and hunger – and it is that, too. Still others feel about the work of the Peace Corps as their ancestors felt about the opening of our own West – and it is true that many of the same traditional American characteristics are needed for Peace Corps work as were needed then. Today, Peace Corps volunteers are working, teaching, helping people in Africa, Asia and South America – and requests are pouring in for more.

In addition to commissioned recruitment material and in-house publications, Peace Corps HQ worked closely with private authors to produce works that blurred the line between publicity and reportage. The same focus on volunteers’ motivations was also common in books and pamphlets written about the Peace Corps. Dozens of Peace Corps staff collaborated with journalist Roy Hoopes to produce the 1961 *Complete Peace Corps Guide*. In tone and content, Hoopes’s work was virtually indistinguishable from official publicity; the line was blurred further by the inclusion of an introduction penned by Shriver. Like official Peace Corps publicity, Hoopes located the purpose of the Peace Corps in its ideals rather than its effects. ‘Whether or not we … have a significant impact on the economic lot of the countries where they will serve does not make any difference’, he wrote. ‘The point is that thousands of young Americans are willing to help and are willing to make sacrifices to do so; the principal purpose of the Peace Corps is to provide the organization through which this desire can be channeled.’

Much of the Peace Corps publicity was produced as an answer to the image of the ‘Ugly American’. However, publicity focused on Peace Corps volunteers’ beauty in a literal sense, too. Photographs of volunteers at training, work or leisure abounded. The centrepiece of a 1963 Paperback Library volume, *The Peace Corps*, intended for
mass distribution at a low cost, was a sixty-four-page collection of photographs contributed by Peace Corps HQ.\textsuperscript{25} The vast majority of images portrayed Peace Corps volunteers as young, active and energetic. Whilst the photographs were clearly staged, only a few were posed. The stress was on action, with a disproportionate number of images capturing volunteers undertaking physical activities. Photographs of pre-departure training depicted male volunteers performing backbends and female volunteers rope climbing and abseiling. Partly, this was designed to appeal to potential volunteers, many of whom were attacted to the Peace Corps precisely because of their dissatisfaction with the conventional, highly gendered life awaiting them in the United States.\textsuperscript{26} However, the parade of youthful, active young bodies also underscored the notion that America’s best and brightest were eager to devote themselves to international development, thus confirming America’s fitness for moral leadership. The images portrayed Peace Corps volunteers as Beautiful Americans, both in body and spirit.

Of course, not every Peace Corps volunteer was young and beautiful. Most Peace Corps volunteers were in their mid to late twenties, but even septuagenarian volunteers were not uncommon. Yet, Peace Corps HQ liked to portray its volunteers as active and glamorous, with a particular focus on good-looking women. In 1968, seven years after writing \textit{The Complete Peace Corps Guide}, Roy Hoopes returned to the subject with a pictorial collection, \textit{The Peace Corps Experience}. Part of the collection was devoted to a photo-essay titled ‘Pretty Girls: The Peace Corps Has Its Share’. Running over four pages, this depicted ten female volunteers teaching classes in Africa, Asia and the Middle East. The text accompanying the photographs claimed that ‘Everybody remembers falling in love with the pretty young teacher at one time or another in their school days, and the boys who have Peace Corps teachers will no doubt face the same hazards’.\textsuperscript{27} Depictions of active volunteers, with whom the locals ‘doubt’ fall in love, suggested that American development intervention was eagerly desired. The absence of genuine local voices speaking for themselves, rather than having their desires ventriloquised by American writers, left little room for contradiction. Focusing on female beauty, \textit{The Peace Corps Experience} presented volunteers as appealing counterpoints to the ‘Ugly American’.

Throughout its early years, publicity was fixated on the volunteers, with relatively little attention devoted to the other side of the equation – that is, the people and places receiving Peace Corps volunteers. Cullather notes that ‘developmentese became the Kennedy administration’s court vernacular’, but this was rarely translated for a broader public.\textsuperscript{28} Rather than engaging with modernisation theory, or with the histories, economies and cultures of nations in Africa, Asia and Latin America, Peace Corps publicity presented a simplified account of Americans assisting ‘under-developed’ nations. This reflected Kennedy and Shriver’s vagueness in explaining what the Peace Corps would do, and where it would serve. When Kennedy first announced the Peace Corps in late 1960, he merely noted that volunteers would serve ‘abroad’. This imprecision was preserved in the Peace Corps Act, passed by
Congress in September 1961, which failed to define the Peace Corps’ area of service, referring to it only as ‘these countries.’\textsuperscript{29} The ambiguity of ‘these countries’ or ‘underdeveloped nations’ was in keeping with the development discourse of the 1960s. As Rist notes, development discourse subsumed economic and regional specificities to a binary between ‘developed’ and ‘underdeveloped’ nations.\textsuperscript{30}

Leaving the area of service ambiguous allowed the ‘underdeveloped world’ to be imagined as a tabula rasa upon which the Peace Corps could inscribe its achievements. In 1962, the New Yorker interviewed Harris Wofford, Special Representative for the Peace Corps in Africa. In an article titled ‘Pioneers’, Wofford claimed that ‘the greatest future for the Peace Corps is in Africa’, because ‘it’s so wide open. And limited only by our imagination. It’s an empty continent’. He went on: ‘You get a feeling that that must be like what the people felt who first saw America … The ‘re starting out with a clean slate’:\textsuperscript{31} Such publicity was far removed from reality. Rather than pioneers starting with ‘a clean slate’, most Peace Corps volunteers were placed in established communities. The largest number of volunteers was employed as teachers, often delivering existing curricula in established schools. Many volunteers were based in cities, and enjoyed at least some modern comforts. Yet, neither the publicity nor media acknowledged this fact, instead preferring to portray volunteers as ‘pioneers’ in the ambiguous category of ‘underdeveloped’ nations.

**Peace Corps in the media**

In addition to formal publicity, the Peace Corps acted a great deal of media coverage in the United States. The vast majority of press coverage was positive. As its First Annual Report noted, ‘press comment on the Peace Corps has been generally favourable’, and at times, it was ‘overwhelmingly so’:\textsuperscript{32} Taking its mark from official publicity, the media focused on volunteers, rather than the task of modernisation and what it involved. The mainstream press regularly portrayed Peace Corps volunteers as ‘Beautiful Americans’. Hilda Espy Cole’s 1962 article in the Atlantic Monthly was based on a visit to the Peace Corps training camp in Puerto Rico. Illustrated with photographs of a young, blonde female volunteer abseiling, the article claimed that ‘volunteers must be sturdy, have the skills of pioneers and a proud team spirit.’\textsuperscript{33} The relationship between abseiling and a volunteer posting in a Filipino school (to take one of the most common positions in the early years) was always problematic, and, internally, Program Directors worried that ‘the jungle camp experience tends to produce in the trainee an inappropriate sense of confidence … verging on arrogance, [which] is exactly the opposite of the humility which … should be the hallmark of the good PCV’.\textsuperscript{34} But it formed a core element of the public image of the Peace Corps, reproduced in numerous articles.

Media coverage of the Peace Corps generalised and simplified conditions in the developing world. As previously noted, this was in keeping with development discourse. Removing any specific context, however, also allowed the media to run with
crude assumptions about developing nations. Many reports assumed that volunteers would live in mud huts in rural villages far from civilisation. A common trope removed them even further. Cole Espy thought that the distance between America and ‘under-developed’ countries was so great it could only be expressed in temporal, rather than geographical, terms. She depicted the Peace Corps volunteers as having gone ‘backwards in time’, so that they grappled with ‘the realities of life in primitive places.’ Cole Espy’s depiction of underdeveloped nations as ‘backwards in time’ was echoed in numerous media reports. It also featured in published accounts: *The Complete Peace Corps Guide* claimed that the Peace Corps served in parts of the world where ‘history has not happened’; the Paperback Library edition of the *Peace Corps* wrote of volunteers serving in places where ‘time seemed to have stopped’.36

A good deal of coverage focused on the volunteers before their departure, profiling their training or asking about their motivations. Coverage that followed volunteers overseas was less common. These reports often discussed the ‘primitive’ conditions they would live in, but retained a resolute focus on the volunteers. Often, the aim was not to present an accurate picture of conditions in ‘underdeveloped’ nations, but to accentuate the extent of volunteers’ sacrifice. *Time* magazine profiled the Peace Corps in July 1963.37 The cover, a portrait of Shriver flanked by volunteers working with attentive Asians and Africans, featured a banner denoting the Peace Corps as ‘A US Ideal Abroad’. The article began with a sense of irony, noting that ‘from the front porches of the US, the view of the Peace Corps is beautiful’, in so far as the ‘image is that of a battalion of cheery, crew-cut kids’, who ‘have all but won the cold war’ through ‘the application of Good Old American Know-How and That Old College Spirit’.

However, *Time* wrote, ‘as so often happens, the image is glossier than the reality’. Far from ‘glimpses of glory’, the article depicted volunteers who had ‘been racked by illness and bedded down in squalor’ and who ‘wrestled with tongue-twisting languages [and] gagged on incredible foods containing everything from cat meat to sheep intestines to fish heads’. They had also ‘cursed the mistakes of their superiors and muttered in fury at the ignorance and inertia of the natives they are trying to help’.

Yet, *Time*’s portrait was by no means critical; indeed, emphasising the difficulty of their postings only served to further entrench the Peace Corps mystique. *Time* fetishised the difficulties of Peace Corps life in order to counter criticisms that a ‘Kiddie Corps’ would be unable to face the tough reality of underdevelopment. The Peace Corps experience may have been rough, but *Time* thought ‘the reality is more meaningful than that unflawed popular image’. As with official PR, *Time*’s measure of success was set on America’s terms. Ultimately, it was decreed a triumph, as ‘in scores of small ways, through their own zeal and ingenuity, the Peace Corpsmen have made a disproportionate number of friends for the US’. Because of this, *Time* decreed it ‘probably the greatest single success the Kennedy Administration has produced’.

Going back in time and giving up modern conveniences, was presented as a sacrifice that deserved the respect and gratitude of the American nation. A 1966 *New York Post* profile of Kenya volunteer Philip Shaefer emphasised the difficulties of Peace
Corps service in order to heighten veneration for volunteers.\textsuperscript{38} Titled ‘Peace Veteran’, the article claimed that Peace Corps volunteers were ‘exposed to varied forms of disease and danger’, and ‘rendered a form of distinguished service under a special kind of emotional fi eld’. By likening the Peace Corps to active military service, the \textit{New York Post} tapped into idealised images of the veteran to thwart critiques that Peace Corps volunteers were draft-dodgers. As Cobbs Hoffman and Geidel have shown, this was one of the few negative images of the Peace Corps to gain traction during the programme’s early years.\textsuperscript{39} Coverage such as the \textit{New York Post} article served to negate charges that volunteers were taking the easy option. Schaefer had ‘been through two rough years’ – so much so that ‘one can only imagine how much private trial he has survived or how much hidden strength he discovered on this journey’. In articles such as this, Peace Corps service was rendered into ‘the moral equivalent to war’ – ‘but let no one suggest that they have a soft, easy time on these lonely fronts. In a better hour they may be accorded some of the honors now reserved for the valiant of the battlefields’.\textsuperscript{40}

The Peace Corps mystique focused on volunteers as agents, with host locations relegated to backdrops and locals portrayed as passive recipients of the Peace Corps' dynamism. Media representations of the Peace Corps, therefore, located the source of the programme's success in the American volunteers. Ironically, this caused significant problems within the organisation. As Shriver noted in a congressional message in 1963, ‘volunteers and staff alike have the feeling that the Peace Corps stories most often repeated are too glamorous, too glowing, too pat’, and ignored ‘the day-to-day problems, the frustrations, the harsh disappointments’.\textsuperscript{41} The Peace Corps mystique had become a liability in that many volunteers didn’t feel like their experiences lived up to the ideal. Returned volunteers complained that ‘the gap between what they felt they ought to achieve and what they were actually achieving was so great as to produce, in many cases, considerable anxiety and guilt’.\textsuperscript{42} As Shriver noted, ‘the most unsettling challenge the volunteer faces is his publicity’.\textsuperscript{43}

Anxiety and guilt could turn to anger. As Geidel has shown, by the late 1960s a number of returned volunteers were severely critical of the Peace Corps.\textsuperscript{44} At the height of the Vietnam War in 1970, the Committee of Returned Volunteers called for a boycott of the Peace Corps, arguing that volunteers co-opted previously self-sustaining foreign societies into Western capitalism and US hegemony. Yet, the glowing image of the Peace Corps proved impossible to shift. Thereturn of Iran volunteer Barkley Moore, who served for five years from 1966, provided the space for coverage so positive it verged on hagiography. The \textit{National Observer} profiled Moore in a 1971 article titled ‘The Beautiful American’. It portrayed Moore in superhuman terms: he was ‘able to move people to accomplish what they said was impossible’. One former supervisor was quoted as saying, ‘He’s the only person I’ve ever met … who makes you want to say, “I’ll follow you anywhere”’.\textsuperscript{45} Even into the 1970s, amidst rising opposition to America’s overseas interventions, the image of the Peace Corps volunteers as the Beautiful American endured.
Peace Corps in popular culture

The Peace Corps was integrated into numerous mainstream cultural productions. As Geidel notes, it featured in at least fourteen novels and two plays during the 1960s. Just as significant was the Peace Corps’ presence on television, which emerged as the dominant media format in the 1960s. Shriver was eager to capitalise on the publicity potential of television, and Hollywood producers were attracted by the promise of a broad audience. It seemed a natural match. The Westinghouse Broadcasting Company (WBC), which owned a number of television stations, was the first to offer its services. Ten days after the Peace Corps launched in March 1961, WBC presented President Kennedy with a television concept that would blur the lines between popular entertainment, private profit, domestic politics and international relations, predicting that television programming about the Peace Corps would help ‘strike a new force for American prestige in the international field’.

Shriver soon established a separate Radio and Television Division to focus publicity through these media. Throughout 1962 and 1963, the Radio and Television Division contemplated a flagship TV serial. Several production companies competed for the rights to this program; Variety reported that ‘everybody wants to get into the act’. Producer Danny Mann drew together support from Universal-Revue and NBC, and recruited Kaiser Aluminium as a potential sponsor. Variety speculated that Mann had also recruited famed writers including James Mitchener, Carl Sandburg and Archibald MacLeish, briefing them that ‘the language … should be deep feeling’. Although Mann regarded this as a ‘coup for Hollywood’, he also considered a TV program about the Peace Corps to be the ‘best way to channel our American way of life to the world’.

Mann’s treatment was predicated on the premise that ‘Peace Corps is people’, and proposed to focus on the human drama of cross-cultural encounter rather than on the detail of the work done. ‘The way in which a Peace Corps volunteer, for example, may help another human being to irrigate a rice field is interesting’, Mann’s pitch went, ‘but not nearly as arresting as a revelation of the emotional conflicts that arise between the two’. That conflict would not only be dramatic, but also didactic: ‘The resolution of those conflicts will reveal to our audience the capacities of human beings to live and learn and share a common experience that brings together men’s minds as well as their [sic] heart.

Mann’s proposal aroused a great deal of debate at Peace Corps HQ. The Radio and Television Division thought highly of the pitch, at one point noting that the proposed format ‘would be perfect’. However, the proposal to blur politics and entertainment provoked difficult questions. Should the Peace Corps lend its official endorsement to a fictionalised drama? Should it demand script approval? Doug Kiker and Norman Shavin from the Radio and Television Division recommended caution. The Peace Corps should ‘endorse nothing officially’, they argued, for the simple reason that ‘the show might, despite all our efforts, be a dog’. Peace Corps
Deputy Director Bill Moyers disagreed. ‘Any weekly TV show that carries the name “Peace Corps” or deals with the Peace Corps will in the public’s mind have Peace Corps approval, whether a trailer credit is carried on each episode or not’, he wrote. ‘That being true, we will be responsible, in the public’s mind, for the proper projections of the Peace Corps.’ Moyers recommended the Peace Corps demand strict controls, including script approval rights.

In the end, Mann’s sample script did not measure up to expectations. (Kiker opined that it ‘is a lot of crap … full of big words and fuzzy ideas’). Other proposals also came to nothing. While plans for a flagship TV serial never eventuated, the Peace Corps featured in numerous syndicated variety shows, serials and sitcoms throughout the 1960s. The popular Gertrude Berg Show ran an episode with a Peace Corps plotline in 1962. That same year, the Peace Corps proposed a regular segment to NBC’s Jack Paar Program, a primetime vehicle for the former host of the Tonight Show. Rather than dramatisations, the Peace Corps envisioned short segments starring real volunteers at work, ‘which reflect the best in America’:

In the matted reaches of Malaya, an American girl nurses 80 lepers, doing it alone … In Sierra Leone, young Americans, teaching in the schools, spend their spare time showing crippled children and African policemen how to swim … In Tanganyika, a Japanese-American lad spent so much spare time with the Wagogo tribe that he will become an honorary member … These are but a few of the hundreds of touching, dramatic and humorous stories about Americans abroad – the Peace Corps Volunteers.

In keeping with the Peace Corps mystique, the focus remained firmly on the volunteers, with locals portrayed as passive, grateful tribes rather than agents in their own right. On television, Peace Corps publicity portrayed volunteers as simultaneously humanitarian and heroic, nursing lepers and teaching crippled children and authorities alike. This image was in keeping with the Peace Corps’ broader publicity strategy of focusing on individual volunteers rather than the broader development context.

Peace Corps HQ never managed to exert control over all the television shows that featured volunteers in their storylines. Yet, even in the absence of official oversight, depictions did not stray far from the official script. The popular ABC sitcom The Patty Duke Show aired the episode ‘Patty and the Peace Corps’ to a nationwide audience on 11 November 1964. In this episode, Patty – a loveable teenager always getting herself into scrapes – secretly signs up to the Peace Corps. As with the official publicity, the show’s focus was on American volunteers’ motivations rather than the effects of their work on the ground. Patty’s success in being chosen for the programme is portrayed as a great honour in the episode, she is interviewed for the local newspaper and even her teenage nemesis, Sue Ellen, thinks that Patty’s assignment is ‘the most exciting thing I’ve ever heard of!’ Explaining why she signed up, Patty dreamily likens Peace Corps volunteers to ‘the great humanitarians. Albert Schweitzer, Clara
Barton, Betsy Ross. Explaining what an unqualified teenager, still in high school, can offer the developing world, Patty replies 'a little skill can go a long way in those countries.' She explains, 'I’m teaching English but that’s just the beginning. Once I get there I’m going to spread around some good old American know-how.'

As with official publicity, the nature and location of the Peace Corps’ work was glossed over. Patty assumed that the Peace Corps would send her to Africa, which the sitcom portrayed as ‘a primeval paradise … Man pitted against raw nature’. References to Africa’s ‘darkness’ were recurrent, as when, for example, Patty explained ‘I want to light a candle in the darkness’. The Peace Corps storyline gave The Patty Duke Show a chance to rehash stereotypes that bordered on caricature.

Patty decorates her suburban bedroom with masks and shields, learns to drum the message ‘take me to your leader’ and practices a ‘tribal’ dance by throwing a spear at a dartboard. Patty also attempts to prepare ‘native’ foods, as ‘we have to live like the natives … share the same kind of living accommodation, eat the native food’. As Patty explains, ‘in certain parts of Africa grasshoppers are a rare delicacy’, and so she set out to capture one – before finding that she couldn’t bring herself to kill an insect. She then goes on to make grass soup from the cuttings of her lawn, which unsurprisingly proves to be no more palatable than the grasshopper.

Although it was produced without agency approval, ‘Patty and the Peace Corps’ followed the discursive path set by the Radio and Television Division of Peace Corps HQ. By focusing on American volunteers’ good intentions, the Patty Duke Show portrayed the Peace Corps, and by extension the United States, as a global force for good. In positioning the Peace Corps amongst the ‘great humanitarians’, it represented international development as an act of altruism, designed to assist those in developing nations. It also justified American intervention, as ‘a little skill can go a long way in those countries’, and America possessed a great deal of ‘know how’. This language mirrored that of media reports such as Time magazine’s 1963 cover story, further revealing the close ties between official publicity, media coverage and popular culture. Yet, as Arturo Escobar has demonstrated, international development was always contested. During the 1960s, organised opposition movements against the Peace Corps arose in Nigeria, Indonesia, Bolivia and Chile, among others. Popular representations elided the broader reality in which the Peace Corps operated by focussing on the volunteers’ ideals, and their willingness to endure rough conditions without taking an interest in the contexts in which they operated.

Public interest and political effect

So far, this chapter has traced publicity, media and popular culture portrayals of the Peace Corps. But how did the American public receive and understand those images? Gauging audience responses is notoriously difficult, but the tens of thousands of letters that were hauled into Peace Corps HQ offer some insights. Letters posted to the president and the Peace Corps provide some evidence of the
diffusion of official and unofficial images. They also allow a rare glimpse into public opinion surrounding the Peace Corps, and, more broadly, about America's role in the 'underdeveloped' world, during the early 1960s.

As Rottinghaus notes, the practice of writing letters to the president was long established by the time of the Kennedy administration. Kennedy received thousands of letters about the Peace Corps, which, as his administrative secretary noted, was the issue that 'most consistently produces responses through mail.' Heaving mailbags were also dragged into the Peace Corps' Washington offices each morning. In 1970, well after the first surge of enthusiasm had died down, the Communications department still processed approximately two-thirds of a ton of mail every day. The US National Archives holds several boxes of Peace Corps mail briefs from the early 1960s. Letters came from almost every US state, from Alabama to Wyoming. Although most correspondence came from within the United States, letters also arrived from around the world.

In the early years, the vast majority of correspondents were extremely enthusiastic. Fifteen-year-old New Yorker James Pastena wrote in July 1961 to express his support for this 'excellent idea,' even though he was still too young to join. On the other end of the age scale, eighty-two-year-old Walter Robb also gave his full support, seeing 'in it many possibilities that their generation did not have.' A great number wrote to apply for the Peace Corps, and others recommended an applicant. The tone and syntax of many letters reflected the tone of Peace Corps recruitment and publicity material, assuring Shriver that applicants were fit for the Peace Corps because they were 'serious, intelligent, active, tactful and durable.'

Many letters spoke to hours of thought and creative effort. Dozens of correspondents enclosed insignia, symbols and badges that they had designed for the Peace Corps. One of Senator Henry M. Jackson's Washington State constituents even redesigned the American flag so that it better reflected the Peace Corps' objectives. Others submitted poems, stories, songs, anthems, jingles and mottoes to 'educate those ignorant and apathetic Americans' about the Peace Corps and world affairs. Others still promised to talk to their friends and families, or even to travel the country 'under Peace Corps auspices, spreading goodwill.' Leon A. Jaris, an administrator in a Californian hospital, wrote to propose 'a total PEACE OFFENSIVE,' by which 'idle factories and farming lands could be turned into training centers here for foreign nationals, staffed by our unemployed as teachers.'

Alongside such offerings were more tangible donations of books, food, clothing and money which poured in from private individuals, community groups, schools and private companies. Anna Steiger of Long Island forwarded a check for thirty dollars 'to aid the Peace Corps movement,' adding that only her two small children prevented her from signing up. Seventh graders from Lincoln Junior High School in Ferndale, Michigan, sent $66.46 in the hope that 'the Peace Corps will find it helpful!' Fourth graders at the New Lincoln School of New York collected 200 books, which they hoped could be distributed by Peace Corps volunteers in
Africa; their efforts were surpassed by the students of Brookline High School in Massachusetts, who collected sixty-five boxes of books. On a slightly different note, the Catholic Youth Organization of New York hoped to spend the summer of 1961 growing fruit and vegetables that they would then donate to Peace Corps volunteers heading to Tanganyika. Community groups were similarly enthusiastic: the New York State English Council, the American Vegetarian Party and the American Society of Traffic and Transportation were among scores of groups that placed their resources at the Peace Corps’ disposal. Religious organisations ranging from Methodist student groups to Jewish community organisations and Catholic schools also wrote to express support and offer their assistance.

Although they brimmed with goodwill, many correspondents were vague about the purpose of the Peace Corps. Was its purpose, as Elliot Forbes of the Harvard Glee Club thought, ‘to promote world peace’? Or was it another weapon in America’s Cold War armoury? New Yorker Blair Rogers wrote to say that he thought the ‘Youth Corps’ was ‘one of the most encouraging developments to people who, like himself, have returned from the Soviet Union with an increasing worry about the need for an ideological fervour in our own people.’ A New Jersey correspondent suggested that ‘a further step to the Peace Corps’ would be a specialist ‘group of young Americans skilled in debating to act as America’s “intellectual commandoes”’. However, others thought that the purpose of the Peace Corps was purely humanitarian, and protested any suggestion of realpolitik. Pat Montague of Seattle felt that ‘the Peace Corps should not get tangled in foreign policy and politics’. Pointing to the situation in Peru, where a military junta had overthrown the recently elected government, Montague argued that ‘if the purpose of the Peace Corps is to be humanitarian it should be allowed to go to Peru despite diplomatic relations’, as he could not see ‘why the needs of the people should be denied because the government in power is not to our liking’.

Perhaps unsurprisingly, considering the imprecision of publicity and recruitment material, many Americans were confused about the countries where Peace Corps volunteers would serve. While many letters used the technical language of ‘developed’ and ‘underdeveloped’ nations, others used vernacular terms such as the ‘poor’ or ‘have not’ nations. Some correspondents freely admitted their confusion. Texan Ray Greene, for example, wrote specifically to request ‘information from the Peace Corps on underdeveloped nations’. Others made telling assumptions about where Peace Corps volunteers would serve. A. W. Dawson of New York thought that the Peace Corps sent youngsters to ‘the wilds of Africa’ and other places ‘without the convenience of modern civilization’. However, many others assumed that the Peace Corps would serve in nations that were already industrialised, thus revealing a broad ignorance of the nature of underdevelopment (or indeed development). In March 1961, Californian John F. Spence wrote to seek a Peace Corps placement in Japan. Others wrote hoping to serve in Germany, Hungary or Israel. In late 1961, two of Congressman William Cramer’s Florida constituents separately wrote to express
their desire to serve in Britain. Th se letters, amongst thousands more held in US archives, point to a low level of knowledge about the nature and location of under-
development. Th se common blind spots refl cted the ambiguities of Peace Corps rhetoric and publicity material.

Despite this ambiguity, many correspondents expressed support for America's intervening in foreign countries in order to bring about development. Egon W. Mueller of Escondido, California thought that although so far 'foreign aid has been detrimental, to a great degree' there was now the 'opportunity to correct this in establishment of Peace Corps.' Many Americans wrote to propose schemes to place even more Americans abroad. Cecil Powell of Jacksonville, Florida, suggested 'the government hire several hundred unemployed farmers and send them overseas … to countries, predominantly coloured, and teach those in underdeveloped countries how to raise crops.' Charles Hoffner of Philadelphia thought what was needed was 'filling people with hot dogs, milk shakes and … soda fountains.' Embedded in such proposals was the assumption that the developing world was a blank slate that warranted America's intervention. Proposals to send Americans to teach people how to farm, or to feed them American foods, overlooked existing agricultural knowledge and foodways, many of which were suited to local environmental conditions.

In addition to providing a platform through which the public engaged with foreign aid and international development programmes, the Peace Corps also encouraged refl ction regarding the United States' role in the world.

Others were not so sure about America's involvement. W. H. Owens of New Hampshire liked to spend his winters in Jamaica, where he had observed Peace Corps volunteers at work. Returnin g home, he off red Sargent Shriver 'some rather disturbing observations'. Amongst other things, the Peace Corps were teaching Arts and Crafts, which is 'a waste of time' as 'the natives do quite well with their own arts and craft'. Similarly, Laurence S. Moore wrote a letter to the Peace Corps following a trip to Turkey in June 1961. He wasn't convinced that it would be possible to change Turkey for the better, and indeed, felt ‘raising the spirit of living’ in any country is just a dream. Floridian E. A. Munyan similarly thought ‘the people do not want to be changed’ and ‘we are fools to spend money to try and change the way they have been doing things for centuries.’

It is difficult to gauge the extent to which Peace Corps publicity and popular culture portrayals helped shape the views held by these correspondents, or indeed the wider public. As with all issues of popular opinion, it is impossible to point to a single driver. Personal histories, ideologies and personalities all had a role to play alongside broader discourse. Yet, the letters reveal an audience attuned to Peace Corps publicity. As President of the University of Notre Dame, Theodore Hesburg wrote in 1961, the Peace Corps is getting 'lots of press coverage, radio and TV time', and consequently 'everybody is talking about it.'

Elwyn Owen, a Minister at the Congregational Church of Lima, Ohio, hosted a screening of Peace Corps in Tanganyika in November 1962. He was certain that 'the young people who saw the
picture will be “witnesses” for the effectiveness of the Peace Corps and that they will speak a good word for it wherever they are.89

A number of correspondents engaged directly with Peace Corps publicity, confirming its personal impact as well as extensive reach. Their letters suggest a receptive audience for publicity material. However, some thought that the involvement of corporate advertising and popular entertainment degraded the Peace Corps. In early March 1961, to give one example, Georgian John Kirby sent a telegram to inquire if it was necessary ‘the PC be corrupted’ by appearing on the panel game show What’s My Line? A few astute correspondents reflected on the bias they perceived in Peace Corps publicity. Katherine Stone Philipp of New York phoned Sargent Shriver after watching a television programme about the Peace Corps in early December 1961. Shriver’s secretary took notes, thus making this otherwise ephemeral interchange between Peace Corps HQ and a member of the public accessible. In Stone Philipp’s view, the Peace Corps mystique was unhelpful: there was ‘[too] much emphasis in the TV program on what a rather patronizing and not too popular Uncle Sam could show the rest of the world’. In particular, she was critical of the fact that the locals who were hosting Peace Corps volunteers ‘seemed not to have a chance to say a word’ in the TV programme. In her view, Americans ‘could make more friends’ if they approached the world in a spirit of mutual exchange, rather than creating a fetish object of the Beautiful American.90

Conclusion

From its launch in early 1961, the Peace Corps drew upon a small army of publicists, advertisers and public relation experts. Together, they curated an image that emphasised the good intentions and humanitarian motives of American volunteers, portraying Peace Corps volunteers as embodiments of the Beautiful American – both literally and allegorically. The intense focus on the volunteers served to elide detail about the places they would go and the work they would do, let alone the effectiveness of their efforts. It also obscured the broader political and ideological contexts of international development. Rather than providing public information about US aid policy, or educating constituents about international development, the Peace Corps’ publicity machine finfly tuned to the glamour of Hollywood and Madison Avenue, set about constructing a Peace Corps mystique.

The Peace Corps mystique was transmitted in voluminous publicity material. Intense media coverage, much of which reproduced the images and concerns of official publicity, furthered the reach of this mystique. Moreover, the Peace Corps entered the realm of popular culture. Throughout the 1960s and beyond, the Peace Corps became shorthand for a certain type of virtuous and principled American; in the 1987 film Dirty Dancing, set in 1963, the idealistic Baby was set to join the Peace Corps before she met Johnny.
The US Peace Corps in the early 1960s

The Peace Corps was extremely unusual in drawing the attention of the American public to international development. Public opinion polling, as well as the tens of thousands of letters, telegrams and phone calls received by Shriver, confirmed that the Peace Corps captured the public’s imagination. Thinking about the Peace Corps spurted many people to consider the system of international development for the first time, and indeed many were confused about the nature, definition and location of underdevelopment. In this, many people’s views accorded with the image presented by Peace Corps publicity and the media. Like the publicity material, the vast majority of letters focused on volunteers’ altruistic intentions rather than their actions or effectiveness.

Imagining the Peace Corps in this way had further ramifications. By presenting US intervention as a positive expression of American altruism, the Peace Corps popularised the view that America had a moral mandate, if not an obligation, to intervene in the underdeveloped nations of the world (even if the precise locations of underdevelopment were not clear). By reaching a broad audience, privileging American viewpoints, and eliding competing visions and critical appraisals, Peace Corps publicity helped normalise and glamorise the logic of intervention embedded in the global system of international development.

Notes

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The US Peace Corps in the early 1960s


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66 Meredith J. Rogers to Mr. Shriver, 28 June 1961, Incoming Mail Briefs, Box 1; Timmie Rogers to The President, 15 March 1961, Incoming Mail Briefs, Box 1; Harry L. Wilson to Mr. Shriver, 27 March 1962, Incoming Mail Briefs, Box 2; Rose Gelb Good to Mr. Shriver, 1 October 1961, Incoming Mail Briefs, Box 1.


68 Leon A. Jaris to Mr. Shriver, 31 May 1961, Incoming Mail Briefs, Box 1.

69 Anna L. Steiger to Mr. Moyers, 8 August 1962, Incoming Mail Briefs, Box 2.

70 Mary Jo Denja (Lincoln Junior High School) to Mr. Shriver, 3 June 1963, Incoming Mail Briefs, Box 2.

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Part II
Narratives of humanitarianism
Memoir has for some time played a significant role in the expansion and interpretation of the humanitarian industry. It was Henri Dunant’s 1862 memoir *A Memory of Solferino* that made the case for the first global institutionalisation of humanitarian work in the ICRC (International Committee of the Red Cross) and Geneva Convention, and Moritz Thomé’s 1969 memoir *Living Poor: A Peace Corps Chronicle* that helped promote participation in the US Peace Corps. As the industry has become entrenched as a third player permanently integrated into global relations, humanitarian memoir has become a fast-growing genre. For both the relief and development industries, memoir is admirably suited as an ambassador from the field to the larger public, oriented as it is to personal experience and testimony. The genre helps build awareness of humanitarian efforts and issues and facilitates the translation of professional work to popular understanding; most important, as a medium whose defining posture is confessional and revelatory, humanitarian memoir generates an aura of authenticity much-needed by an industry reliant on public donations and on the perception of its status as a player outside the systems of state sovereignty and global capital.

Unlike other forms of humanitarian narrative, which are focused on humanitarian crises and projects or on the work of a particular organisation, humanitarian life-writing tells a story of individual education and empowerment. As a result the genre’s emphasis is not the typical one of compassion and pathos, though images of human suffering may be highlighted. Instead, humanity is defined intellectually as a pure intelligence and understanding that operates outside of established systems of knowledge production, separated from corporate and bureaucratic hegemony. In humanitarian memoir, the prototypical humanitarian is the naive who confronts injustice with instinct; naivety and even foolishness are presented as the hallmark of the humanitarian agent and the ultimate sources of his or her power. The memoir-based humanitarian speaks to a broad public alienation from a rising culture of expertise and from ‘big’ management more generally. Since the end of the Cold War,
as aid has increasingly been channelled through mega NGOs who take on the roles of state actors, appetite for stories about the naive exceptionality of the humanitarian industry has begun to find its voice. Paradoxically, this figure has come most to life just as humanitarianism has become more professionalised, assuring readers that the face of this global multi-billion dollar industry is still predicated on the spontaneous ingenuousness and ingenuity of the rogue actor bucking the system in order to effect social change.²

As the aid world has expanded to serve its beneficiaries in mass capacity, confronting greater exigencies of service delivery, accountability and public relations, its discourse and biographies have become increasingly planned, standardised and scientifi. Originally consisting of a few small emergency-driven charity groups in the first half of the twentieth century, the humanitarian industry has since the Second World War become ‘increasingly centralized and bureaucratized’, a necessary result of the secularisation of an industry increasingly shaped by states and internationalist development economists.³ The hallmark of this approach is ‘planning-mindedness’, an orientation that sees humanitarian work less as a simple response to immediate need than as a complex operation casting the long view across an unevenly developed world, looking towards progress and modernisation.⁴ During the decades following the end of the Second World War, the turn to planning and rationalisation created important overlap between relief and development, especially as operations globalised. It was this era that saw the rise of the humanitarian ‘kit’, a prepackaged assembly of tools designed to help expand a particular development project or type of emergency action by standardising it.² During the 1990s, when the humanitarian industry expanded again with the collapse of the Cold War and retreat of the welfare state, humanitarian organisations began to grapple with issues of accountability, mostly to donors who expected not just financial transparency but impact assessment. Organisations ‘introduced camp surveys; developed performance indicators; and created new methodologies and instruments that can better assess eff civeness’.⁶ Amongst these instruments was the logical framework approach (LFA), a planning and evaluating tool adapted by USAID and eventually the aid world from the US military and NASA.⁷ A staple of results based management based on the application of ‘basic scientific methods’, log frames have been controversial due to their technocratic, mechanistic approach.⁸ The widespread use of the LFA also reflects the growth of professional development training in the past couple of decades, especially of degree programmes oriented towards a career in international relief or development.⁹ A recent article in Forbes magazine has described a master’s degree in an appropriate (usually social sciences-based) fi ld as a ‘must’ for the aspiring international aid worker, a reality confi med by job postings and surveys amongst professionals in the fi ld.¹⁰

Professionally, then, the face that humanitarianism is increasingly putting forward is one that mixes managerial culture, scientisation and institutional training. Th s rationalisation of the humanitarian endeavor reinforces and extends
to aid worker subjectivity the phenomenon that Didier Fassin has called ‘humanitarian reason’ – the administrative judgement and discourse by which the humanitarian conglomerate governs those who come under its wing.11 As we shall see, humanitarian memoir provides a counter-discourse to this phenomenon. For the aid industry’s appeal to the public generally relies on the allure of individuals living outside the system, thinking outside the system, and experiencing the world non-systematically. Even as humanitarian authority presupposes structured reasoning and methodical organisation, its mandate is still viewed through the lens of personal impulsion and independence. Improvising in the midst of chaos, testing the limits of one’s endurance and ingenuity, following gut instinct even or especially when it flouts the rules: these are the core stories that acquaint the industry with its (potentially participant/donor) reading audience. Where the humanitarian order is working towards wider consensus, industry narrative relies on and cultivates what I would call the sovereign irrational: an ideal of individual, intuitive integrity seen as the fundamental component of what it means to be human. This vision of the human undergirds, contradicts, but ultimately legitimates the elaborate web of humanitarian power that is now part of the new world order. It is nowhere more evident than in memoir – a genre that already celebrates the revelation of pure individuality as an agent of change within the status quo.

This chapter examines memoirs by ‘humanitarians’, that is, workers in non-governmental or intergovernmental institutions devoted to promoting the welfare of others. I exclude memoirs by aid recipients or survivors, such as the significant body of life-writing by members of the Lost Boys of Sudan, as these follow their own rules and logic. An emerging genre (most titles date from the new millennium), humanitarian-worker memoir nevertheless may already be divided into subgenres. Surprisingly these do not necessarily fall into the ‘relief’ versus ‘development’ categories that have for so long divided the aid industry itself. Rather, the genre tends to divide amongst aid worker memoirs of individuals who document their experiences serving in one or more humanitarian organisations, and memoirs of individuals (often well-known in the industry, or Nobel Peace Prize-winners or nominees) who have themselves founded a humanitarian organisation or served a leading role within it. The first category includes Peace Corps memoirs, memoirs of career professionals, and ‘gap year’ volunteer memoirs. These books are often coming-of-age, ‘rite of passage’ narratives that move the subject from naivety to thoughtfulness or cynicism; even while some end with disillusionment and criticism of the aid industry, they usually continue to affirm the writer’s original values and vision in some rediscovered form.12 The founder narratives – whether autobiography or biography – tend to be more analytical, focused on problem-solving and building support in order to counter entrenched opposition or inertia. In both subgenres the role of the ‘fool’ in a larger sea of institutional limitations proves both revelatory and empowering, asserting the value of sui generis intelligence to produce humanitarian knowledge and even participate in global governance.
In this chapter I concentrate on founder memoirs in the field of humanitarian international development. I look at founder memoirs because there is more at stake in their need to legitimise the organisation whose founding they describe; as a result their perspectives speak more directly to humanitarian ideology. Thenaive is also perhaps more surprising and provocative in this subgenre, where in aid worker memoirs the reader expects the stories to be about a novice confronting the field and learning from the outside. My aim is not to give a comprehensive genre analysis; instead I look at two case studies that represent distinct forms of the humanitarian naive at work. Greg Mortenson and David Oliver Relin’s 2006 award-winning but controversial *Three Cups of Tea* is one of the bestselling humanitarian founder memoirs of all time, spending 220 weeks on the *New York Times* bestseller list. Muhammad Yunus’s 1999 *Banker to the Poor: Micro-Lending and the Battle Against World Poverty* gives a genesis story of one of the most influential recent reconfigurations of aid provision, microfinance. As development memoirs, both illuminate the impact international development has had on the humanitarian field and reveal a core tension between humanitarian narrative and humanitarian institutionalisation, where what might be called the field’s aesthetic runs up against its growing forms of power.

**Naive ontologies: the misfit abroad**

Humanitarian founder narratives build on the precedent of classic aid worker memoir: the protagonists arrive knowing very little about their host countries or aid work – yet their naivety is fruitful. Even as they learn the ropes they learn that there are no ropes, that all good paths must be self-generated. But while aid worker memoir tends to view the humanitarian international as part of the larger global order, for founder narratives humanitarianism is still a third sector capable of acting from outside. Thus unlike aid memoir, where worker contributions may follow an individual logic but only as exceptional drops in a larger institutional bucket, founder memoirs show their heroes generating lasting outcomes based on following their own instincts and personal calling.

One of the best places to begin a discussion of humanitarian founder memoir is with Mortenson and Relin’s *Three Cups of Tea*. It is the story of the unorthodox founder of the Central Asia Institute (CAI), mountaineer-turned-humanitarian Greg Mortenson, and his efforts to build schools across underserved and often remote areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan. The book begins with Mortenson (referred to in the third person throughout) lost in Pakistan’s Baltistani mountains near K2 and accidentally discovering the town of Korphe, where after being nursed to health he discovers that the town children have no school and determines to build one for them. It is a conversion narrative of sorts, ultimately transforming Mortenson, an emergency room nurse, into the founder of a global education nonprofit. His shift from medical to education industries mirrors the rising transition in post-war humanitarianism from relief to development (notably before he became a
medical worker Mortenson was in the military – the other forebear of emergency humanitarianism), while at the same time rejecting development’s rationalised and deliberative ethos. One school leads to another as Mortenson becomes more embedded in local relationships and develops a closer understanding of the community and its needs. His accidental entry into school building in Pakistan and Afghanistan becomes a lifelong mission. In interview, Mortenson has said of CAI’s growth: ‘There was no initial plan’, and throughout the memoir, Mortenson’s story demonstrates the inferiority of planning as a form of humanitarian knowledge and agency. He works intuitively, for instance hiring CAI’s staff – a cast of unusual and even ‘unsavory’ characters – based on ‘gut feelings’ rather than résumé, producing ‘what has to be one of the most underqualified and overachieving staffs of any charitable organization on earth’. Mortenson’s success, the book maintains, is a result of a spontaneous, grassroots approach that has allowed him to maintain his initial novice-like energy and ingenuity. Unlike in a bildungsroman, his initial naivety does not become worldliness; rather even as CAI expands Mortenson remains ‘foolish’ to the ways of the international development complex, setting his own course in the mountains of central Asia.

*Three Cups* portrays its hero as a return to the early humanitarian ideal – beginning with Durant – of the lone pioneer independently improvising solutions in a broken system without any formal training. The locals, we are told, call Mortenson ‘Dr Greg’, even though he has no MD or PhD. Mortenson’s self-taught autonomy is represented in Relin’s introduction when we see him heroically guiding a local pilot to land in the mountainous territory. Brigadier General Bhangoo is ‘one of Pakistan’s most experienced high-altitude helicopter pilots’, yet he almost imperils everyone on the plane when he gets lost flying over terrain Mortenson has come to know – literally – on the ground. ‘How is it you know the terrain better than me?’ the pilot asks, later dubbing him ‘the most remarkable person I’ve ever met’ (1–3). Mortenson’s self-taught expertise is celebrated later in the book by Representative Mary Bono after she has become acquainted with his knowledge of Muslim culture in Pakistan: ‘I have to tell you I learned more from you in the last hour than I have in all the briefings I’ve been to on capitol Hill since 9/11. We’ve got to get you up there’ (280–1). Humanitarian knowledge comes from lived experience and ‘winging it’, not training or expertise, the book suggests (4). Mortenson’s credibility as local guide and development pioneer also requires that we see him as a student of the culture, though one who pointedly learns outside of a classroom. His alternative ‘schooling’ is epitomised in the scene where, after driving all of his workers crazy as taskmaster, he is deprived of his tools and lectured by Korphe’s village chief Haji Ali on the need to take time for ‘three cups of tea’ – a counter-vision of development work that Mortenson commits himself to as apprentice. The book quotes Mortenson as saying that this moment taught him the most important lesson of his life, that ‘I had more to learn from the people I work with than I could ever hope to teach them’ (150). A second time Ali lectures Mortenson, following an apocryphal
scene where he is kidnapped by the Taliban, and a second time Mortenson says: ‘So once again, an illiterate old Balti taught a Westerner how to best go about developing his “backward” area’ (177).

Dwelling on the role-reversal of foreign ‘expert’ and local representative is a standard trope in aid memoir. It allows the aid worker to adopt a pose of humility while claiming exception to Western arrogance and appearing to make a naive intervention in commonsense development attitudes (apparently unaware that this ‘intervention’ is already a commonplace in international development). The quotes above serve a further function of magnifying Mortenson’s role as novitiate of the local culture and its organic humanitarian knowledge, whose mastery he demonstrates by educating his readers about it. The Balti culture is represented in the book as itself a bearer of naive knowledge, outside the paradigms of modernity. Indeed, Mortenson is often quoted emphasising the danger of imposing ‘modern’ values and mechanisms on a people who ‘still held the key to a kind of uncomplicated happiness that was disappearing in the developing world as fast as old-growth forests’ (120). Such statements help the book frame its mission to a liberal audience eager to sympathise with a non-threatening Islamic ‘other’. By aiding a people who are seen to maintain a pre-modern worldview and (unlike al Qaeda) are not technologically sophisticated, donating to CAI can be embraced as a peaceful, non-Islamophobic contribution to the war on terror; it was in fact required reading amongst US military officers during reconstruction in Afghanistan. In a post-2001 context, building schools (with culturally appropriate but non-extremist education), the memoir insists, is the best way to counter the power of the Wahhabi madrassas fuelling the rise of radical Islamic extremism (241–5). By the end of the book Mortenson has become a ‘doctor’ of peace and human rights as well as humanitarian development, a position he has earned through his non-traditional education in the field.

If Mortenson is the ideal development visionary, able to act as bridge between cultures and even (the book suggests) temporalities, it is because like many aid workers he is presented as being ‘different’ from other Westerners. He lives out of a storage locker, doesn’t wear socks to a fancy event (where the guest of honour is Sir Edmund Hillary), keeps a list of potential celebrity-donors in a ziploc bag, and writes out his first batch of letters to Congressmen appealing for funds on outdated technology. “I had no idea what I was doing”, Mortenson remembers. “I just kept a list of everyone who seemed powerful or popular or important and typed them a letter. I was thirty-six years old and I didn’t even know how to use a computer. That’s how clueless I was” (50). Most telling, Mortenson doesn’t wear a watch (24). He is, we are told twice, living on ‘African time’, a behaviour trait left over from growing up in Tanzania. “Greg has never been on time in his life”, his mother says. “Ever since he was a boy, Greg has always operated on African time” (39). Mortenson’s mother-in-law goes one step further, portraying him as a prehistoric but sublime ‘other’ living beyond the boundary of civilisation.
‘I had to admit Tara was right, there was something to this “Mr Wonderful” stuff’, Lila says. And like her daughter, she had come to the conclusion that the large, gentle man living two blocks away was cut from unusual cloth. ‘One snowy night we were barbecuing, and I asked Greg to go out and turn the salmon’, Lila says. ‘I looked out the patio door a moment later and saw Greg, standing barefoot in the snow, scooping up the fish with a shovel, and flipping it, like that was the most normal thing in the world. And I guess, to him, it was. That’s when I realized that he’s just not one of us. He’s his own species’. (238)

Throughout, *Three Cups* develops the above image of Mortenson as a savage mind challenger to Western decadence and technology, naturally primed to find his abilities best realised in ‘developing world’ or indigenous contexts. This reinforces the reader’s trust in him as a maverick figure who can see and act beyond managerial or technical paradigms, a portrayal that is brought out in the memoir’s language. During the story of Mortenson losing his way on the mountain we see him waking up after having fallen asleep on the way down, lost, exposed to the elements, separated from his climbing buddy ‘He untangled his hands from the blanket’s tight cocoon with nightmarish inefficiency’ (17). The Young Reader’s version of *Three Cups of Tea* elaborates on the ‘African time’ quote by explaining that after he moved to the United States, ‘Greg never adjusted to the kind of scheduled life that most Americans think of as normal’.” In other words, Mortenson’s inefficient, unscheduled habits are not those typically valued by the business world, making him a fitting counterpoint to the professionalised culture that has come to dominate ‘big’ humanitarianism.

The memoir develops – seemingly purposefully – the image of its hero as an unlikely candidate to manage an international organisation. This is most apparent when it comes to finances. Mortenson’s often flailing attempts to get cash are part of his anti-materialist appeal, and the memoir gains much traction from this counterpoint as it moves agilely between his work in Baltistan and his fundraising efforts back in the States. Sandwiched in between descriptions of an uplift water scheme to help Kashmiri refugees in northern Pakistan and a visit to pay respects to the exposed corpse of Mother Teresa in Calcutta, we find Mortenson’s trip to Atlanta to meet with a potential donor; the elderly widow picks him up in a car filled with tin cans, arranges a massage for him in her living room, and in the middle of the night wanders into his bedroom half-naked, in the end giving nothing to the organisation. Stories like these of Mortenson’s gullibility at home are effective foils to his openness and curiosity in the field, his clumsy financiering separating him from the profit-driven worldliness to which the non-profit industry pleads exception. As a kind of ‘fool’ Mortenson offers readers (who are also potential donors) a resolution to the ethical tension inherent in the industry between altruism and commercialism, giving and selling. After the memoir’s publication the press celebrated the (re)emergence of a non-corporate humanitarianism: “[Mortenson’s] organisation has no fancy offices or fleet of Land Cruisers like most aid agencies or non-governmental organisations.” *Three Cups* seemed to promise that a personality-driven, homemade
humanitarianism would preserve the industry's integrity by reducing its business to a single individual stripped of all business-like qualities.

Indeed, *Three Cups* appears to celebrate its hero's self-described 'cluelessness' and even seeming incompetence. The book includes, for instance, the story of how Mortenson, as executive director of CAI, frustrates members of the organisation's board of directors because he doesn't delegate or set boundaries. Tom Vaughan, the former director of the board, explains Mortenson's freewheeling approach: 'The board had a discussion about trying to make Greg account for how he spent his time, but we realized that would never work. Greg just does whatever he wants' (229). Vaughan's quote may seem severe, but in the context of the memoir his admission merely affirms the humanitarian basis of its hero's success story and his sovereignty as a 'separate species'; Mortenson's unaccountable methods serve to distinguish him from something as corporate-sounding as a board. Rather than being a form of powerlessness, his financial naivety appears to demonstrate his fitness for the field and his exceptionality as a humanitarian worker.

The irony that history would reveal, of course, is that going rogue when it comes to financial management does not necessarily spell humanitarian redemption. Less than five years after the book's publication scandal broke, a scandal that halted its bestseller streak and was followed months later by Relin's suicide. In April of 2011 *Sixty Minutes* revealed that some of the stories were fictionalised (the introductory narrative about getting lost and finding Korphe and, most luridly, of being kidnapped and released by the Taliban) and that CAI funds were being spent disproportionately on private jet PR rather than education. Then Jon Krakauer, a former donor to CAI, published a lengthy exposé of Mortenson's mismanagement of CAI funds, in particular funds used to promote *Three Cups of Tea*, and of the number of schools he claimed to have built.21 Interpreting these revelations, Peter Hessler questioned the 'mom and pop' quality of Mortenson's school-building efforts, suggesting that his organisation had become an expansionist machine that no longer thought and acted at the local, human level. Mortenson, he wrote, 'believes in scale, speed, and the constant need for more money and more construction.'22 Hessler's image of CAI as top-down and quantitatively obsessed contrasts with its image painted early on in the media and in the book, a contradiction that illuminates some of the potential consequences latent in aid memoir's 'amateur founder' ideal. Penguin's promotional quotes and high-school-age study guide proclaim that CAI's story is about the power of a single individual, giving voice to a desire latent in the humanitarian unconscious that the humanitarian agent should subsume the humanitarian organisation; what the fallout of the scandal suggests is what can happen when this actually takes place.23 'The fact is the CAI is Greg,' Tom Vaughan is quoted as saying in the memoir (230). For the reading public this statement articulates a deep assumption about the aid industry that, unlike other institutions, it should still be 'human' and preserve human-scale governance within the larger global order. The naive exceptionalism that helped to build Mortenson's star power seemed to guarantee this humanity;
at the same time the radical freedom it sanctioned may have laid the ground for corruption and abuse.

The question of accountability was, as we have seen, one of the motivators behind the rationalisation of the humanitarian industry. At the same time this rationalisation has also frustrated aid accountability. In the face of aid world corruption scandals and charges of one-size-fit-all obliviousness, *Three Cups* returns us to the 'small is beautiful' equation of the humanitarian project with human personality and biography, where individual character transcends and supersedes rational planning. Perhaps it is for this reason that every single summary or description of Mortenson's work dutifully begins with the story of his failing to summit K2 before getting lost and finding Korphe, as though building schools was really the mountain he had wanted to climb all along, only he didn't know it. The memoir's hero has stumbled into international development, into the war on terror, into his position of power. If a reader had any questions about whether – as is so often said of the aid industry – the road to hell is paved with good intentions, a backstory grounded in the naive absence of intention might go a long way towards assuaging them.

**Naive epistemologies: in search of the simple**

As portrayed in *Three Cups of Tea*, Greg Mortenson was the ultimate anti-professional humanitarian hero, the founder of an international education NGO who had no expertise in education, international development or public management. But many founder narratives are written by or about professionals, even experts, in their given fields. The narratives use the naive differently – less to represent an outside culture and the aid worker's belonging in it than to reveal an outside analytic that the aid worker has helped generate or discover. Though highly trained, 'professional' founders often describe their foray into humanitarian work as a blank slate experience and their success as the result of their outsider perspective and embrace of an ingénue point of view. So, for instance, even an expert in economics finds himself on fresh ground when he attempts to alleviate poverty via the world of banking.

The search for solutions to development problems since the height of the post-war era has tended to focus on 'modernising' poor countries, usually using Western systems and institutions as models. This has meant promoting technological makeovers, large-scale infrastructure projects and economic liberalisation. At the same time some of those with advanced training who are from developing countries have taken a different approach, generating alternative ideas for how to structurally alter conditions of impoverishment, powerlessness and inequality. Perhaps the most famous of these is Muhammad Yunus, the founder of the Grameen Bank and one of the pioneers of microcredit banking. Yunus and the bank he founded earned the 2006 Nobel Peace prize for helping to create a new form of financial services, oriented towards rural women in Bangladesh trapped in cycles of debt to predatory moneylenders because they cannot obtain bank loans. Since 1983 when the Grameen
Bank was officially authorised by the Bangladeshi government (the same year that Acción International founded the first international network of micro-lending organisations in Latin America), microcredit has been widely embraced as the silver bullet of development economics. Despite recent criticisms, microfinance (which includes microsavings and microinsurance as well as microcredit) remains a significant player on the global scene. In including non-profit and for-profit banks, NGOs, and other financial structures, it is estimated to be a $60–100 billion industry serving 200 million clients and is a key contributor to wider approaches that see the extension of financial services to the rural poor as a necessary component of international development.

Muhammad Yunus began to experiment with micro-lending in the mid-1970s, which is when his memoir, *Banker to the Poor*, begins. *Banker to the Poor* is a testament to how well narrative can function as an alternative textbook, teaching complex concepts through a step-by-step discovery process. Yunus allows plenty of time to explain the economics of the Bangladeshi borrowing system to his readers – he does not disavow his expertise. But he also takes the reader with him into a state of ignorance. The techniqueworks to transmit Yunus’s ideas to a potentially non-expert audience, while also building up his role (and hence that of his organisation) as interloper in the world of rural poverty alleviation. For Yunus this interloping is a discursive experience, one that returns again and again to an engagement with a single word. The memoir pointedly positions the problem of cyclical, intractable poverty against the question of the ‘simple’. The simple grows throughout the opening pages, taking on a larger-than-life quality, as Yunus gets deeper into a world he has developed theories about but never truly known.

If there were a compendium of ‘keywords’ in humanitarian development memoir, the ‘simple’ would be a necessary inclusion. As with Raymond Williams’s keywords, the term is part of popular vocabulary but laden with cultural and social meanings that at once indicate and interpret experience. As we shall see, it is also a term whose successful appropriation endows the writer or speaker with a specific power: the power to authorise a particular type of action, especially in the context of a challenge to formal evaluative guidelines. Claiming ‘the simple’ reinforces the humanitarian desire to strip reality down to elemental, unequivocal truths in order to imagine deeds that are clear and unambiguous, and it reaffirms the belief that such work takes place outside of complicating superstructures. The term is used in this way, for instance, in environmentalist Wangari Maathai’s founder memoir *Unbowed*, when she is coaching her team of rural Kenyan women how to plant trees in the early stages of the Green Belt movement. She does so against the advice of foresters who have told her ‘You need people with diplomas to plant trees’. But, she realises, ‘professionals can make simple things complicated’. In *Banker to the Poor* the quest for the simple emerges as a kind of unorthodox divination system. It becomes a way of exposing the false justification of business-as-usual and a way of discovering and naming the founding principle of a new kind of business: the seemingly impossible,
The naive republic of aid

paradoxical and contradictory business of humanitarian banking, of being a banker to the poor. As naive interrogator, Yunus exposes the illogic of the system, an illogic whose complexity can seemingly only be addressed by a systemic outside by something that cuts through the maze of exploitation and circularity of poverty in rural Bangladesh.

But first he must become that interrogator. The action begins with Yunus, chair of the economics department at Chittagong University, disenchanted with the world he has trained to work in. It is 1974, during the Bangladeshi famine, and the national response is crippled; religious organisations find that even ‘the simple act of collecting the dead’ exceeds their capacities. All that is left is mute communication. ‘The starving people did not chant any slogans. They did not demand anything from us well-fed city folk. They simply lay down very quietly on our doorsteps and waited to die.’30 The eloquence of the simple — figured in the images of dying and collecting the dead — is at once statement and accusation, challenging Yunus to devise a way to meet it on its own terms. But his field fails this test, lost in an abstract philosophy of knowledge-production that ignores the physical reality that Yunus will later incorporate into his own theories.

I used to feel a thrill at teaching my students the elegant economic theories that could supposedly cure societal problems of all types. But in 1974, I started to dread my own lectures. What good were all my complex theories when people were dying of starvation on the sidewalks and porches across from my lecture hall? […] Nothing in the economic theories I taught reflected the life around me […] I needed to run away from these theories and from my textbooks and discover the real-life economics of a poor person’s existence. (viii)

So Yunus sets off to Jobra village, the town next to Chittagong where he teaches, to ‘become a student all over again’, to learn how to grasp the realities of everyday life outside of ‘traditional book learning’ (ix). Instead of the macro the micro will be his analytical lens, as it will eventually be the foundation of his humanitarian enterprise: naively shifting from universal, systems-based thinking to the point of view of the radical particular. In an echo of Mortenson’s tutelage under Haji Ali, Yunus writes, ‘The poor taught me an entirely new economics’ (ix).

Yunus’s first teacher is Sufiya Begum, one of many in a series of interviews he conducts with local women, ultra-low wage earners, behind a bamboo wall or curtain (since he is male and the custom of purdah requires it). In a widely cited story, he recounts learning that Begum’s profit off of bamboo stools was only two cents a day since she lacked the twenty-two cents worth of capital needed to buy the raw bamboo materials herself instead of from the usurious trader. In sequence Yunus flirts with conventional aid responses that seem ‘so simple, so easy’: giving Begum the money outright, loaning all the villagers their needed funds (twenty-seven dollars) interest-free. He rejects the first and tries the second, only to have morning-after
regrets; these are simple responses, but not simple solutions (48–51). So he goes to persuade the bank, source of commercial lending rates to which middle and higher income people in developing countries have access, to issue a loan to the villagers. The lengthy debate that follows pivots on contradictory uses of the word ‘simple’, each seeking to claim its soul; on the side of the bank manager it signifies the law of banking necessity and on the side of Yunus, humanitarian freedom.

The manager begins with what he thinks is an unanswerable rhetorical question: how do you run a bank with illiterate clients?

'Simple, the bank just issues a receipt for the amount of cash that the bank receives.'

'What if the person wants to withdraw money?'

'I don't know... there must be a simple way. The borrower comes back with his or her deposit receipt, presents it to the cashier, and the cashier gives back the money. Whatever accounting the bank does is the bank's business.' (53)

The branch manager is not convinced and tells him, 'Professor, banking is not as simple as you think,' to which Yunus responds, 'banking is not as complicated as you make it out to be.' At this moment the word is seized by the manager himself: 'Look, the simple truth is that a borrower at any other bank in any place in the world would have to fill out forms.' Again he emphasizes, 'we simply cannot lend to the destitute.' Yunus parries with the basic naive question: 'Why not?', asking the status quo to reveal its own mandate (53). The manager's answer unveils the core problem of banking for the poor: collateral, security against the risk of default. Yunus, as the voice of naive logic, states the obvious: 'It's a silly rule. It means only the rich can borrow' (54).

It is one thing to know general principles about banking, another to sit in the chair as if you yourself were a group of poor women applying for a loan. Above Yunus confronts the rules of the bank experientially, placing himself in the role of the disenfranchised trying to get a loan and pushing irreverently until he hits the wall of a final cause. In the end it turns out that the branch manager doesn't even have the authority to grant loans (though he does eventually direct Yunus to the higher-ups); like a Monty Python sketch he is having fun with Professor Yunus, who is made a fool of even as he has played the fool in order to expose and challenge the unfairness of the system.

The power of the fool is not so much to reveal or elicit particular information; that is the role of the sleuth or the investigator. It is rather to reveal the abstract realities and forces that create reality, its laws, principles and governing modes. 'It had become clear from my discussions with bankers in the past few days that I was not up against the Janata Bank per se but against the banking system in general [...] Out of sheer frustration, I had questioned the most basic banking premise of collateral. I did not know if I was right. I had no idea what I was getting myself into. I was walking blind and learning as I went along' (55, 57). Once the premise of collateral has been challenged Yunus, still 'walking blind', tries different strategies for replacing it, eventually hitting on the invention of group lending. This solution is directly heretical
to the assumption that banking economics is an abstract system based on signs and representations, for Yunus's 'simple' intervention has been to reformulate the rationalised, abstract banking system as an intuitive, physical one. 'My work became a struggle to show that the financial untouchables are actually touchable, even huggable' (57). Demonstrating the 'touchability' of the banking untouchables is not only a caste allusion, but the very essence of Yunus's approach: to convert the impersonal, bureaucratic institution into human relationships. He literally tells his workers to 'touch' their clients in an effort to understand their perspective and 'mentality' (81). Intimate contact is further epitomised by the borrower 'support groups' whose 'peer-pressure' he stresses will guarantee loan recovery in the absence of collateral (62). All of these relationships make 'human trust', not 'meaningless paper contracts', the basis of the loan-recovery procedure. 'Grameen would succeed or fail depending on the strength of our personal relationships. We may be accused of being naive, but our experience with bad debt is less than 1 percent' (70). In Banker to the Poor, these relationships appear to be the simple governing logic of microfinance.

The essence of microfinance may be relationships, but in the end the institution still subscribes to the logic of individual accountability and autonomy that governs traditional banking. The implication that the 'naive' approach of microcredit constitutes a humanitarian intervention in commercial logic and economic inequality has been challenged on the ground that it replicates neoliberal ideologies of individual entrepreneurship over state safety nets and sees market involvement as the solution to poverty. Ultimately, solidarity lending enables the bank to shift to borrowers – now interpellated as self-governing, responsible entrepreneurs – the burden of cost and risk. For this reason Morgan Brigg argues that microcredit is not in fact a conceptual revolution of approaches to poverty alleviation or rural development; it differs only in that it is 'micro':

Notions of individual initiative, determination and provision of capital to improve people's situation and increase economic growth are a micro-version of the dominant economic development approach, and resonate with aspects of modernisation theory which dominated in the 1950s and 1960s. Thus while it is possible to view microcredit as a radical departure from conventional development practice, it also exhibits significant continuities with the approach of previous decades and does not introduce a rupture or significant shift in the development dispositif.

Rather than the promised 'outside' on which the humanitarian imaginary depends, then, microcredit may be viewed as a vast expansion of the 'inside', extending contemporary capitalism to new markets by cultivating the ethos of 'individual initiative' and self-determination amongst previously disenfranchised borrowers.

It is just this focus on the individual that has made microfinance so attactive to international donors. I would also argue that the attaction goes even deeper than political or economic ideologies, including a cultural anti-systems fantasy that has been historically attached to the humanitarian project. In other words, the
‘micro’ – equitable with the individual and with the ‘simple’ – is itself an object of humanitarian desire. As with Greg Mortenson, organisational power is understood as humanitarian only if it is reframed through the human. Positioned against the history of large-scale, top-down foreign loans and development programmes, microfinance offers a hyper-local, improvisatory theory of social change that, like Three Cups, celebrates the natural intelligence of the person over the formal intelligence of the institution. Only this time it is the figure of the beneficiary, not the humanitarian founder, who theoretically serves as the naive axis of change. This was made possible as the ideology of self-help came to challenge that of aid in international development, turning the micro-borrower into the figure par excellence of global humanitarianism. In this context Yunus’s memoir serves the important function of appropriating for the micro-lender and his institution the borrower’s naive appeal, thus downplaying microcredit’s affinities with the macro financial complex.

We have seen how Yunus claims the power of the ‘simple’ while occupying the subject-position of the poor person applying for a loan. In this way the memoir imagines Yunus’s subjectivity as a collective one: Yunus conveys the rational authority of a banker and head of a lending institution while engaging and putting into play the innocent subversiveness of the fool, grounded in what the book presents as the simple ‘mentality’ of the aspiring micro-entrepreneur. Thus Banker advertise the naive humanitarian dimension of microcredit in opposition to the cynical sophistication of traditional banking and development approaches. Key to this project is the particular subjectivity of the microcredit founder as established through humanitarian memoir. Banker to the Poor illustrates that one of Yunus’s great innovations was the creation of a new sovereign figure: the grassroots, unregulated yet corporate social entrepreneur.

Conclusion

If the central appeal of the naive to humanitarian studies is its promise of an intellectual and practical ‘outside’ to state and corporate sectors, both CAI and Grameen Bank have disappointed hopes that they would deliver. That this is the case in both examples selected is not intended as an empirical indictment of that promise; rather, the revelations of ‘inside’ complicity serve to highlight how strong is the desire for the institutionalisation of a humanitarian alternative in public culture, that even those cases most hailed as harbingers of such an alternative still demonstrate the difficulty of its attainment. I have presented these two founder memoirs as examples of the prominence and use of the naive in humanitarian life-writing. Three Cups of Tea and Banker to the Poor depict two complementary figures who populate the genre: the naive pioneer and the naive philosopher. Each fulfills its own reader fantasy. In the first type, naive humanitarianism is defined as a combination of professional innocence and gut instinct that helps the founder bridge heterogeneous worlds in order to build new institutions. In the second humanitarianism appears as naive questioning
of establishment first principles, with the founder adopting the role of simpleton in order to effect a fundamental change in supposedly self-evident practices and ways of thinking. But they also share important appeals to the reader, including a suspicion of ‘expert’ knowledge and planning and a belief that humanitarian institutions should be ‘human’ – whether through literal identification, as in the case of Greg Mortenson and the Central Asia Institute, or by following small-scale thinking and approaches, as we see with Muhammad Yunus’s story of his founding of microcredit and the Grameen Bank. Above all, the ‘naive’ of the institution’s beneficiaries should be absorbed, mirrored or complemented by the founder himself. Thus Three Cups’ Mortenson, whose personality appears in bold contrast to that of Western executive and administrative culture, is at home in the ‘wild’ of northern Pakistan. And Banker’s Yunus constructs a ground-breaking economic theory and practice based on the experience and point of view of ‘illiterate’ rural women. These traits, though perhaps most prominent in the founder genre, also influence the construction of aid worker memoirs, highlighting the special contributions that memoir, a genre constructed on the power of personality and confessional authenticity, has made to humanitarian narrative during a time of industry professionalisation and expansion.

Notes


9 It is now possible to get a bachelor’s or master’s degree in Europe and North America in such areas as Global Humanitarian Engineering, Logistics Management-Humanitarian and Disaster Relief, Refugee and Forced Migration Studies, and International Humanitarian Action.


12 L. Smirl, ‘The State We Aren’t In: Liminal Subjectivity in Aid-Worker Autobiographies’, in B. Bliesemann de Guvëra (ed.), *Statebuilding and State-Formation: The Political Sociology of Intervention* (Oxon and New York: Routledge, 2012), pp. 230–45. In Smirl’s samples all subjects descend into a despair and disillusionment that prompt the final return home; this trait distinguishes them from the memoirs of Peace Corps volunteers, who have signed up for cultural exchange as well as humanitarian work and hence tend to be less ambitious about effecting change in their host countries.


14 In the 2013 memoir *Chasing Chaos*, for instance, Jessica Alexander arrives in Sudan long past her initial ignorance of international affairs (now she knows how to spell Tegucigalpa), but she has no sense of direction, clinging to her unnamed NGO’s formulated wisdom and planning strategies. As she continues to work, however, she realises that ‘naivete and humility actually worked to my advantage’, making her more receptive to the input and advice of the community. See J. Alexander, *Chasing Chaos: My Decade In and Out of Humanitarian Aid* (New York: Broadway Books, 2013), p. 163.
[55x618]The naive republic
[0x0]99
18 When Greg gets to Korphe he is leading a procession of fifty curious children. ‘The children fingered his shalwar, searched his wrists for the watch he didn’t wear, and took turns holding his hands’ (24). How the children, who we are told earlier had never before seen a foreigner, knew that a foreigner would most likely wear a watch is never explained.
20 Foreman, ‘Pakistan: Free to Learn’.
24 Mountains Beyond Mountains, Tracy Kidder’s 2003 biography of Paul Farmer, a doctor and infectious diseases specialist who co-founded the NGO Partners in Health, is a well-known example; and, although he does not mention this background in his 1862 memoir A Memory of Solferino, Henri Dunant was an experienced social activist, able to apply his knowledge and skills to medical crises in work leading to the founding of the ICRC.
25 Criticisms include its high interest rates, which increase the risk of loan default and over-indebtedness; misrepresenting loan recovery rates; producing loan recycling and consumption smoothing instead of economic development; failing to demonstrate any significant reduction in poverty or women’s empowerment; and creating psychological trauma amongst those populations that use the industry’s famous group lending approach.
27 R. Williams, Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011), p. 13.
29 M. Yunus with A. Jolis, Banker to the Poor: Micro-Lending and the Battle Against World Poverty (New York: Public Affairs, 1999), p. vii. Subsequent references will be provided parenthetically in the text.
The literal personal touch is the simple foundation of the trust between borrower and bank, humanising the inhuman world of debt and finance. Grameen's vision here may be hailed as the banking corollary to Marx's famous dictum about commercial transactions: that however obscured by commodities, in the end the relationship is a social one, between people rather than between things.

In the decades following, Grameen would advertise a still impressive 98 per cent loan recovery rate. However, as L. Karim points out, this figure includes forced recoveries as well as voluntary ones, which may be misleading. See Microfinance and its Discontents: Women in Debt in Bangladesh (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2011), p. xxii.


Bateman, Why Doesn't Microfinance Work? p. 160; D. M. Roodman, Due Diligence: An Impertinent Inquiry into Microfinance (Washington, DC: Center for Global Development, 2012), p. 106. Bateman comments on the burden shift in terms of high interest rates; the application of this logic to solidarity lending is my own. The goal also includes independence from the local predatory moneylenders and from their husbands and male kin. The extent to which either of these forms of independence actually occurs has been contested, with loan moneys sometimes appropriated by husbands or other male kin or funneled back into local moneylender circuits. See A. M. Goetz and R. S. Gupta, ‘Who Takes the Credit? Gender, Power, and Control Over Loan Use in Rural Credit Programs in Bangladesh’, World Development, 24:1 (1996), pp. 49–50; Roodman, Due Diligence, pp. 25–7. In evaluating the status of the loan as an intra-household commodity and object of resource leverage and manipulation, Goetz and Gupta quote one field worker as saying that credit ‘is just another form of dowry’, though they point out that amongst the organisations they surveyed in Bangladesh, Grameen Bank had the highest rate of female control over loans given (54, 60). Karim also notes the contradiction between the ideology of rational sovereignty and kinship constraints acting on these female borrowers (Microfinance and its Discontents, p. xvi).


Its great success is incorporating the economically marginalised into an institutional system that – while potentially empowering them as free agents – nevertheless also maintains their subordination as citizens and to private industry.


For a discussion of the portrayal of rural Pakistan as ‘wild’ in the memoir see Ali, ‘Books vs. Bombs?’

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In the animated film *Waltz with Bashir* (2008) about the director Ari Folman’s attempts to recover his and other ex-soldiers’ memories of the 1982 Lebanon War, we hear the story of an amateur photographer. He coped by picturing everything through an imaginary camera, which protected him from the horrors. With still images, the film tries to show us how a traumatised soldier sees the war as distanced ‘snapshots’. When his imaginary camera ‘breaks’, still frames jam in the shutter gate, then become moving images of a derelict landscape, where injured ‘Arabian horses’ pitifully collapse and die.

As Karen Lury writes, ‘Tears and emotion erupt when the innocent – dumb animals, little children – are seen to suffer’; their blamelessness magnifies the harms of war. Yet, there is something disingenuous about this scene of pity in *Waltz with Bashir*. Why are they Arabian horses? Could those horses, revealed by the broken camera, actually be Arabs? As in its anecdote of another soldier who could only shoot dogs, and now suffers nightmares of being chased by them, the film’s use of animal imagery makes it easier to discount that people are suffering and dying. It is a kind of ‘perception management’ – a term that I draw from the journalist Mark Curtis – that leads us into an inward, affective engagement through the soldiers’ perspective: what the war did to them, not what they did to others.

In a previous publication, I drew parallels between this film and mainstream Western news media, which routinely prioritises the Israeli viewpoint. Now I would like to show what occurs when humanitarian images of Palestinian casualties take centre stage, as they did during the 2014 Israeli bombardment of Gaza. Here, I will argue that a media outcome that appears to be favourable to the Palestinians, in that it focuses on their suffering, can actually have the opposite effect. To illustrate my argument about the framing of humanitarian images, I will refer to a range of media texts related to the Gaza conflicts: UK, US and Israeli news coverage, including UK journalist Jon Snow’s video blog upon his return from Gaza in 2014; *Waltz with Bashir*, which was released around the time of the 2008–9 conflict; and the Palestinian film *Where Should the Birds Fly* (Fida Qishta, 2013), which focuses on the 2008–9 conflict and its aftermath.
In a CNN interview, Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, in response to a perceived shift in international coverage of the conflict, accused Hamas of using ‘telegenically dead Palestinians’ for their cause:

We’re sad for every civilian casualty. The’re not intended. This is the difference between us. Hamas deliberately targets civilians and deliberately hides behind civilians. They embed their rocketeers, their rocket caché, their other weaponry, which they use to fire on us, in civilian areas. What choice do we have? We have to protect ourselves. We try to target the rocketeers—we do. And all civilian casualties are unintended by us but actually intended by Hamas. They want to pile up as many civilian dead as they can, because somebody said they use—it’s gruesome—they use telegenically dead Palestinians for their cause. They want the more dead, the better.4

Netanyahu’s statement gives renewed significance to what Paul Virilio calls the ‘logistics of perception’—that a ‘war of pictures and sounds’ rages alongside conflicts and shapes our attitudes towards them as just or unjust.5 Ostensibly highlighting that images of destruction in Gaza spelled a public relations disaster for Israel, Netanyahu’s statement contains the Israeli public relations narrative, through which public perceptions of Israel’s actions against Palestinians are managed. For Curtis, perception management is a tool used by the powerful to disseminate rhetoric about noble intentions and moral purpose, ensuring that what is friendly to their interests is reported and that what is unfriendly is discredited: it promotes and normalises a way of seeing the world.6 In no way unique to the Gaza conflicts, perception management can serve to divorce the public from realities of state violence through a kind of cinematic derealisation that enables states to reduce perceptions of blame for their atrocities and act with impunity.

Why the 2014 conflict seemed different

There have been three major military conflicts in the Gaza Strip in the last decade, widely known by their Israeli codenames ‘Operation Cast Lead’ (2008–9), ‘Operation Pillar of Defence’ (2012) and ‘Operation Protective Edge’ (2014). During the twenty-two-day ‘Operation Cast Lead’, in which around 1,400 Palestinians and thirteen Israelis were killed, Israel banned foreign journalists from entering the Gaza Strip. Therefore, the conflict was reported by Palestinian journalists inside Gaza and foreign reporters stationed on a hill outside—a strategy designed to avert public reaction to pictures of dead Palestinians, although it did not stop the flow of images from Gaza.7 However, for the eight-day ‘Operation Pillar of Defence’ and fifty-day ‘Operation Protective Edge’—the most devastating of these conflicts, resulting in the deaths of over 2,000 Palestinians, seventy-two Israelis (sixty-six of them soldiers) and 1 Thai—the ban was lifted, enabling images of Palestinian deaths and injuries to gain centre stage.
As one user commented in 2014 on the news website Mondoweiss, ‘There is not one Phan Thi Kim Phuc photo (the little naked girl flinging a napalm strike in Vietnam) but the combined photos and stories from Gaza this time have indeed changed the imagery of this conflict in the American mindset.’ These words recall the widely held, though inaccurate, view that a critical news media shifted public opinion from a ‘just war’ to a ‘dirty war’ in Vietnam. One of the Vietnam-like moments was the killing of four boys, Ismail, Mohammad, Zakariya and Ahed, all aged 9–11, playing on a Gaza beach; they were caught on CCTV when shells started falling. NBC journalist Ayman Mohyeldin, who was at the scene, instantly tweeted the story. In the UK, the incident became the focus of testy interviews with Israeli officials – for example, the Channel 4 anchor Jon Snow interrogated the Israeli Prime Minister’s Chief Spokesperson Mark Regev on how killing children squared with the stated aim of Operation Protective Edge’ to protect Israeli people.

A major part of what made the 2014 conflict seem different was widespread use of social media as a tool for exposure of violence against Palestinians, without the usual editorial filters. Social media filled in some of the gaps of mainstream coverage, often from the perspectives of Palestinians within warzones, live-tweeting updates – including video clips of bombardment and pictures of devastation and injured children. That made, Ben White claims, ‘the lived experience of the colonised accessible in new ways and by new audiences’. For journalist and broadcaster Paul Mason, social media has wrought a huge shift in the balance of power towards people and away from governments. Whilst Western mainstream media, especially in the United States, is ‘traditionally heavily skewed towards the pro-Israeli view … now, for the first time, in a major Arab-Israeli conflict, the American public has other sources of reality’, namely endless pictures of dead Palestinian children:

Netanyahu complained that the Hamas strategy was to provide ‘telegenically dead’ people but where Israel is losing the hearts and minds of the world is not via ‘tele’ anything; it is in the JPEGs that stream into millions of people’s mobile phones.

However, social media is also subject to perception management, and considered a battleground for public opinion by both parties to the conflict and their international supporters. As during the 2012 conflict, described as ‘the first social media war’, ordinary citizens claimed the hashtags #GazaUnderAttack and #IsraelUnderFire to exchange ‘reports, opinions, and challenges to mainstream news reports and to each other’.

In their book Digital Militarism, Adi Kuntsman and Rebecca Stein offer a counter-argument to optimism about social media’s ability to override official narratives, by showing how it can be mobilised for repressive state ends. In this light, let us return to Netanyahu’s phrase ‘telegenically dead’, which he appears to be quoting from somewhere. He reduces the materiality of Palestinian deaths to the production of pixels on a screen, hinting that the images were faked. Suspicion of images of dead
or injured Palestinians circulating in international media (but not in Israeli national media, which mostly focuses on Israeli suffering) is commonplace on pro-Israeli social media. For Kuntsman and Stein, this ‘digital suspicion’, which deflects issues of Israeli violence onto alleged fraudulence and attempts to defame Israel, functions as ‘a surrogate media ban, enforced not by state censorship but by everyday readers and social media consumers themselves’. 

In 2012 and 2014, therefore, images of dead and injured Palestinians gained centre stage amidst a form of perception management to which digital suspicion belonged. Concomitant with charges of fakery was the accusation that Palestinian deaths were caused by Palestinians themselves, mainly by Hamas’s disregard for its own people, rather than by Israel – a narrative equally exemplified by Netanyahu’s statement and visually embodied in the infographics of Israel Defence Forces (IDF) tweets about the housing of Hamas’s weapons caches in civilian areas.

While social media participate in and extend perception management, the more open climate they have fostered has allowed ‘establishment journalists … to be more forthcoming’ about what is happening on the ground. In the UK, one of the most outspoken journalists was Jon Snow, who made a heartfelt emotional appeal in a video blog upon his return from Gaza. Though filmed in the Channel 4 studio, it was intended for online distribution and posted on YouTube. The video recounts what Snow witnessed in Gaza, images that are ‘etched’ in his mind, particularly his visit to al-Shifa hospital and his encounter with a two-and-a-half-year-old girl with panda-like eyes due to bruises from her broken skull. One of the definitive images of Palestinian suffering that summer, Snow’s video went viral, gaining over one million views across multiple platforms within five days.

As Susan Sontag has remarked, ‘so far as we feel sympathy, we feel we are not accomplices to what caused the suffering’. Standard humanitarian images position viewers as benevolent helpers, letting us off the hook regarding our own implication in that suffering. Snow’s video breaks this convention by using the humanitarian image to highlight UK complicity in the suffering of Palestinian children. Citing official statistics of child deaths in the conflict to date, he states: ‘We have to know that, in some way, we share some responsibility for those deaths.’ The video even prompted an eight-year-old girl to write to the British Foreign Secretary. ‘We are killing the people of Gaza by giving Israel weapons. We need to take our part in it and stop giving Israel weapons.’ The video invites UK citizens to make links between themselves and the suffering, through their own government’s culpability.

Yet, Snow’s emotive appeal is anchored in the iconography of the passive, suffering child in need of rescue. In this respect, it is similar to conventional humanitarian images, such as the Disasters Emergency Committee Gaza crisis appeal poster of a lone boy, surrounded by rubble. Separated from their wider societal context, pictures of children with imploring eyes are usually used to raise funds for their basic needs. According to Wendy Hesford, in order to generate sympathy, such humanitarian images deploy a visual rhetoric that reproduces repressive Western ideologies,
depriving endangered children of any agency. A generic victim, the injured girl in Snow’s video is not even given a name. Didier Fassin writes that ‘the prolixity of humanitarianism increases in parallel to the silence of the survivor.’ The humanitarian speaks in the child’s name, becoming a spokesperson ‘for the supposedly voiceless.’

Susan Moeller has observed that the prevalent focus on children as ‘innocent victims’ elicits sympathy on an ‘apolitical or suprapolitical’ level. The killing and injuring of children, who are unable to protect themselves and who do not pose any threat to soldiers, was therefore considered safe territory for UK journalists when interrogating Israeli officials. However, Palestinian teenagers and children are regularly shot and killed by Israeli forces – a violence so routine it is generally not considered newsworthy. Furthermore, a vulnerable child killed or injured while playing in a park or the beach elicits instant public sympathy, unlike a teenager involved in resistance or unrest. The Palestinian child, however, is a long-standing icon of Palestinian resistance, as in the cartoon character Handala created by the artist Naji al-Ali. Appearing as graffiti in Palestine, Handala is a boy with his back turned, symbolising the Palestinian refugee who will not look forward until he returns home: a very different image of the child from humanitarian ones.

**How the structure of mainstream reporting endorses the Israeli perspective despite focus on Palestinian casualties**

Analysing media coverage of the 2008–9 conflict, the Glasgow Media Group found that humanitarian focus on Palestinian suffering can be allied to a structure of news reporting that prioritises the official Israeli perspective. I contend that this structure of news reporting applies to the 2014 conflict. Even when journalists were critical of civilian casualties, they tended to endorse the Israeli narrative – for example, that the kidnap and murder of three Israeli teens in June 2014 formed the ‘backdrop’ to the conflict. The Palestinian perspective on these events – or indeed, any perspective other than the official Israeli one – tended to be missing. As the Glasgow Media Group discovered, much of what the public takes to be true are ‘exactly the points … highlighted in Israeli public relations and reported uncritically on the news. Crucially, this can affect how audiences apportion blame and responsibility and also influence how … images of civilian casualties [are] interpreted.’

UK news media often try to ‘balance’ the Israeli and Palestinian perspectives in a way that is thought to be objective. For example, the BBC’s *News at Ten* combined an elegiac slideshow of life in the Gaza rubble, highlighting the humanitarian disaster, with a feature on Gaza’s ‘terror tunnels’ and reports confirming that Israel was hitting Hamas targets. Such ‘balancing’ presents a skewed picture of the conflict and fails to convey the fundamental power asymmetry underlying it.

NGO images suffer from similar problems. Gaza is frequently rehearsed in terms of humanitarian statistics, described as one of the most densely inhabited
places in the world, with around 1.8 million residents, 80 per cent of whom are dependent on humanitarian aid. Such images can make Palestinians in Gaza seem only a humanitarian problem, thereby eliding the political context of their oppression and struggle for justice. The majority of Gaza’s population are refugees, descendants of those displaced from historic Palestine when the Israeli state was created there in 1948. They were expelled across what was then an imaginary boundary, which later became fenced to prevent them from returning to their homes, turning into the hard border of a new geographical entity called the Gaza Strip. Since then, further political factors have exacerbated their situation – amongst them, Israel’s expansionist policies of expropriating more land and resources.

As Jehad Abu Salim asserts, ‘because the current Gaza Strip is a product of political history, humanitarian discourse contributes to normalizing Gaza’s current reality, transforming it into another case … of hunger and poverty that the international community has to deal with through aid and expertise.’ Moreover, humanitarian agencies address only the symptoms, not the causes, of crises. Many of them seek to avoid politicising the situation. However, the refusal to deal with politics can never work because the situation that the Palestinians face is thoroughly political. While, on the one hand, Israeli suspicion towards bodies of Palestinian victims disavows their humanitarian claims, on the other, exclusive focus on their humanitarian status disavows their political claims, as a people colonised by Israel.

On the news, the Gaza conflicts are typically described as ‘wars’ between Israel and Hamas, disconnected from a history of colonisation and occupation. We are repeatedly told that Israel is under terrorist attack by Hamas rockets, fired into Israeli territory from Gaza, and is simply ‘responding’. A huge part of Israel’s perception management during the 2014 conflict was to conflate Hamas with the global threat of radical Islam, whilst presenting Israel as part of the democratic world from which Hamas itself was excluded, although Hamas itself was democratically elected. As John Berger remarks in another context, a sure-fire way to discredit and eradicate your opposition is ‘by calling it terrorist.’

The emphasis on Hamas, not Israel, as a terror organisation that causes suffering to civilians also enables a shift of responsibility for the killing, as can be seen in an account given by an Israeli history student, Sophie Tal, featured on the BBC website, in which the killing of Palestinian civilians is justified as a response to terrorism:

This is about us defending ourselves from terrorists … I feel very sorry for the people in Gaza too, but what can we do when they have fighters shooting at us from hospitals, from the roof of UN schools and using these places to launch terror attacks? We have to stop the terrorists who are using their own people as human shields. In this case targeting those buildings is the moral and right thing to do … Israel had the firepower to finish this a lot quicker. We could have bombed Gaza completely but we didn’t because we are more humane than Hamas.
The message that Hamas is a terrorist organisation makes it easier to blame casualties on them or, if not, to blame Israel and Hamas equally, as indeed many onlookers did, as testified by a CBS News Poll, taken in the United States at the height of the 2014 conflict.\(^3\)\(^4\) Asked who they thought was mostly to blame for the fighting, 6 per cent of respondents replied ‘Israel’, 34 per cent named Hamas, 47 per cent answered ‘Both sides equally’ and 12 per cent were unsure or gave no answer.

In the UK, Channel 4 News explained the Palestinian view of the conflict more clearly than the BBC. It featured interviews with Hamas spokespersons in Gaza which referred to effects of the Israeli blockade, otherwise given a low priority in the hierarchy of storytelling about the conflict, due to the predominant narrative that Israel ‘gave back’ Gaza in 2005, which helped sell ‘the war as a defensive campaign against terrorists who will not leave Israel in peace’\(^3\)\(^5\). Despite so-called withdrawal in 2005, Israel still occupies Gaza, controlling its airspace, land and sea borders, along with the flow of goods, electricity, water, medicine and building materials; the only border Palestinians are permitted to cross is on the Egyptian side, and that is frequently shut. The blockade was tightened shortly after Hamas took power in 2006.

During ‘Protective Edge’, BBC journalists were told to downplay the blockade.\(^3\)\(^6\) Even its objective reality was questioned by phrases such as ‘What Hamas is calling a blockade’, used by Edward Stourton on BBC Radio 4’s Today programme.

Israel regards the blockade as an economic sanction on a problematic regime. Dov Weisglass, adviser to the then Prime Minister, Ehud Olmert, said that ‘the idea is to put the Palestinians on a diet, but not to make them die of hunger’.\(^3\)\(^7\) The blockade works by calculating the level of calories, electric current and other necessities required to sustain the population at ‘the limit of bare physical existence’.\(^3\)\(^8\) Israel aims to reduce Gazans to what the philosopher Giorgio Agamben calls ‘bare life’ – a people with purely biological needs, making them liable to be killed with impunity but not sacrificed.\(^3\)\(^9\) This is one point where the Israeli state and humanitarian viewpoints mirror each other for, as Agamben points out, ‘humanitarian organizations … can only grasp human life in the figure of bare or sacred life, and therefore, despite themselves, maintain a secret solidarity with the very powers they ought to fight’.\(^4\)\(^0\)

The conditions that the blockade is intended to induce would have been far worse without the hundreds of tunnels dug underneath the Gaza–Egypt border to bring supplies of food, fuel, livestock and appliances as well as weapons. Along with Hamas firing rockets, tunnels rose to the top of the hierarchy of mainstream media storytelling about ‘Protective Edge’; this time, the spotlight was on the ‘discovery’ of ‘terror tunnels’ between Gaza and Israel, so called to inspire fears about Israelis being abducted by Palestinian fighters and provide the pretext for further Israeli violence. Rockets and tunnels were presented as an existential threat to Israel and Israelis. For example, BBC coverage emphasised the need for security and stopping the smuggling of weapons through tunnels. Embedded with the IDF, the correspondent, Orla Guerin, took us into tunnels constructed by ‘Palestinian militants’
in order to ‘infiltrate’ Israel. The long presentation on the tunnels, with extended commentary on their engineering, how dangerous they are, and the need for Israel to do something about them, became one of the ‘most watched’ videos on the BBC website at the time.

Historically, ‘infiltrators’ is the term for Palestinians who attempted to cross the Gaza Strip boundary (which became the 1949 armistice line) in order to return home, and who, when apprehended, were often killed. This provides a context for understanding the anxiety provoked by the underground tunnels. The news portrayal of Palestinians as ‘infiltrators’ taps into the colonial imagery of the ‘civilised’ and ‘barbarian’, similar to the Hollywood Western, which, as Robert Stam and Louise Spence have remarked, ‘turn[s] history on its head, by making the Native Americans appear [as] intruders on what was originally their [home]land’. In the Western genre, white settlers are shown as being encircled by primitive attackers, whose hostility is inexplicable. Mainstream news coverage reproduces this colonial perspective through this image of encirclement, presenting for our sympathy Israel as a besieged nation, surrounded by inexplicably hostile assailants.

When the BBC drama *The Honourable Woman*, another fictional counterpart to these news media representations, aired during the 2014 conflict, its timing was described as ‘serendipity’. In the series, Nessa Stein, an Anglo-Israeli daughter of an Israeli arms-dealer, makes amends for her father’s past by turning the family company to humanitarian ends: creating telecommunications in the West Bank. Similar to news coverage, it appears to have a favourable outcome for Palestinians, including US endorsement of a Palestinian state, but its subtext and imagery express the Israeli line. The drama draws on the iconography of tunnels when Nessa and her Palestinian translator Atika enter Gaza to trace some funds that have been directed there. A Gazan herself, Atika arranges for them to be smuggled in via a tunnel. Inside Gaza, they are taken captive – the scene of an Israeli citizen abducted by Palestinian militants encapsulating the fearful image presented on news media. The synopsis of this episode refers to Nessa and Atika’s witnessing of atrocities in Gaza, but the atrocities they encounter are only by Palestinian militants, including Nessa’s rape at their hands. The drama portrays the destruction and dereliction of Gaza as exclusively Hamas’s fault, since there is no mention of the bombings or blockade by Israel. As in news coverage, our attention is directed away from the violence of Israel and other state parties to the conflict, and focused on the Palestinians, who carry out the most visible violence.

**The appeal to and manipulation of International Humanitarian Law (IHL)**

In UK reportage, any criticism of Israel, either from politicians or NGOs, tends to be couched in the rhetoric of ‘disproportionate response’, a language of condemnation that derives from a branch of international law known as International Humanitarian
Law (IHL) or the ‘laws of war’. IHL places restraints on warfare methods to limit human suffering. Its rules and principles of proportionality, distinction between civilians and military targets, and precaution against excessive harm to civilians and civilian infrastructure focus on playing by the fair rules of war, not why there is a war in the first place. For example, Amnesty International, whose report on ‘Protective Edge’ focuses on breaches of IHL, tells Israel it should find other ways of waging its conflicts in Gaza:

[Th] Israeli military should learn the lessons of this and previous conflicts and change its military doctrine and tactics for fighting in densely populated areas such as Gaza so as to ensure strict compliance with international humanitarian law, in particular the principles of distinction, proportionality and precaution.

Amnesty’s solution is to revise the weapons deployed and rules of engagement, not to halt policies that lead to atrocity. Framed in this way, humanitarian images showing the rising Palestinian death toll and destruction of Gaza’s civilian infrastructure invite us to consider Israel’s violence as excessive, even to call it a ‘war crime’, but not to question the Israeli narrative that it is responding to Hamas rockets and acting in self-defence. It endorses the aggressor, which merely has to moderate its ‘response’.

As Nimer Sultany argues, ‘International law does not prevent the powerful from crushing the weak, if it is done legally, that is.’ Neither does it stop civilians from being killed, as long as it can be presented as ‘unintentional’ or ‘proportional’. It simply codifies what kinds of violence can be permitted and regarded as legitimate. For this reason, manipulation of IHL, or ‘lawfare’, has become a key strategy for Israel. Similar to the Bush administration, which employed lawyers to give legal cover to torture, IDF operations are aided by IHL experts. As George Bisharat has observed, Israel has established itself as a ‘legal entrepreneur’ taking advantage of the elasticity of international law, which is capable of being stretched and altered through practice, in order to lend legitimacy to its violence and establish new norms. To this end, Israel has developed ‘knock on the roof’, a tactic of firing a warning missile before destroying a building in order to prompt residents to evacuate – a procedure that supposedly embodies the IHL principle of precaution (warning civilians of attacks) and the IDF’s ‘humanitarian approach to war’. But many have been killed in homes by the warning shots themselves, and just off ring a warning does not justify an attack on a building, especially as some may be unable or too frightened to leave or, misunderstanding the instruction, they may take cover at home.

Along with dropping leaflets and making phone calls before attacks, ‘knock on the roof’ forms part of Israel’s claim to have ‘the most moral army in the world’, a mantra repeated in news coverage. On Newsnight, Kirsty Wark interviewed Netanyahu’s adviser Dore Gold who stressed that these warnings made the IDF a compassionate institution, even though the Palestinian death toll had by then already mounted
to over 1,000.\textsuperscript{51} In displaying compassion for the people they were bombing, Israeli spokespeople were acting on a recommendation in a manual written by Republican political strategist Frank Luntz to help Israelis influence Western public opinion ‘Show Empathy for BOTH sides!’\textsuperscript{52} Together with the strategy of blaming Hamas analysed earlier in this chapter, these measures are calculated to lend the impression that Israel is acting within a legal framework and doing all it can to alleviate Palestinian suffering.

The laws of war reconcile us to war as the norm; they form an aspect of perception management. As Weizman points out, moderating violence is just another kind of violence. It belongs to the logic of ‘the lesser evil’ illuminated by Hannah Arendt: ‘Acceptance of lesser evils is consciously used in conditioning the government officials as well as the population at large to the acceptance of evil as such.’\textsuperscript{53} Appeal to and manipulation of IH\textsuperscript{L}, including in news coverage, thus becomes a way of perpetuating intolerable injustice. It enables Israel to carry on its policies with international support, normalising the violence. It leads to acceptance of the ‘lesser evil’, so that, Weizman says, a ‘greater evil’ may be gradually imposed on the Palestinian people.\textsuperscript{54}

From this discussion of the state’s compassionate, humanitarian façade as a mask for its violence, I want to return to Waltz with Bashir, which exemplifies these elements in its cinematic treatment of the 1982 Sabra and Shatila massacre, when Lebanese Christian Phalangists killed thousands of Palestinians with the IDF’s complicity. As mentioned in my opening, the film is constructed as victim trauma. It revolves around the unknown nature of Folman’s involvement in the massacre. While recovering his memories, he realises that he and other IDF soldiers illuminated the night sky with flares to facilitate it. Lurid amber flares form a leitmotif of his guilt, staining much of the film’s colour palette. The verdict of the narrative, however, is reduced culpability: as his therapist tells us, Folman merely shone the flares; he did not carry out the massacre itself, and his excess guilt is a product of inherited Holocaust trauma, unrelated to Sabra and Shatila.

In its final scene, the film imagines an encounter between Folman and Palestinian women from the refugee camps. Folman’s eyes enlarge, implying alarm or sympathy with the suff ring before him. The sounds overlaid on their animated forms are real women’s actual cries of grief, as the film segues into live-action archival news footage. As I have previously written,

\begin{quote}
The live footage is intended to confront audiences with an uncomfortable reality – it is the moment when, in the film’s own analogy, ‘the camera’ breaks, preventing the possibility of dissociation or denial. The use of archive footage, with its indexical properties, imparts a revelation of ‘truth’. But, as we know … news media do not signify unmediated ‘truth’.\textsuperscript{55}
\end{quote}

The Palestinian women speak but, at least in the international print, their Arabic is not subtitled, which creates the perception that they are lost in their grief: a passive
backdrop for an Israeli soldier’s trauma. Without speech, the women are turned into classic icons of suffering, evoking a Christian tradition of suffering motherhood (pietà) frequently used in humanitarian images to invite pity. But these women do not want our pity; they want exposure and action. One of them advances towards the camera, demanding in Arabic: ‘Film, film and deliver it to foreign countries.’

The ending replaces justice with compassion, which masks the Israeli army’s violence, providing what is effectively an image of impunity, as the film surveys the bodies of innocents on the ground, closing into a little girl’s head in the rubble, before fading to black. This call for compassion dehistoricises Palestinians’ collective political claims and turns them into pathetic victims. It exemplifies a form of perception management that I have been tracing through news coverage: acknowledge the tragedy, express sympathy and remorse, but blame others. This narrative of absolution of responsibility is as much about Israel’s continuing actions against the Palestinians as it is about the past.

**The different perspective offered by Where Should the Birds Fly**

Palestinians have challenged the perception management of mainstream media by creating their own images of both the destruction and everyday life in Gaza, in which they feature as agents and actors in their own narratives. *Where Should the Birds Fly* (2013) is a documentary by a Gazan citizen journalist, Fida Qishta, about the 2008–9 conflict. In her director’s statement, she expresses her desire to narrate it from her own perspective:

> In 2009, when Gaza was attacked, most internationals left. There were no journalists. The only people filming were from Gaza, myself included. But, because they weren’t English speakers, others talked about their footage. I thought this wasn’t fair. I wanted to tell my own story.57

*Where Should the Birds Fly* confronts the official Israeli narrative about the war through its video testimony. During the film, Qishta describes her camera as a weapon, the only weapon she has against the attacks on the people of Gaza. She sent her footage to a US production company, Deep Dish TV, which used crowdfunding to finance the film. Unlike *Waltz with Bashir*, *Where Should the Birds Fly* has not benefited from exposure at the most prestigious film festivals and a general theatrical release; however, it has become well-known by Palestine solidarity groups and human rights campaigners via its circulation in documentary and other specialist film festivals, community and university screenings, and online distribution.

At a time when Gaza is becoming increasingly inaccessible to the outside world — hidden behind fortified fences as well as a media veil — metaphors about it have proliferated, as Helga Tawil-Souri and Dina Matar remark in their anthology *Gaza as Metaphor*.58 *Where Should the Birds Fly* takes its title from a line in a poem by the
Palestinian writer Mahmoud Darwish. Poetically rendering the experience of siege, the title breathes new life into the now familiar metaphor of Gaza as an ‘open-air prison’, conveying (in the film’s context) that people are unable to fly from the bombardment, despite the IDF’s ‘humanitarian’ warnings, since they lack any safe place to fly, surrounded as they are by heavily guarded land and sea borders. The birds metaphor in its title is emblematic of the film’s different use of animal imagery from Waltz with Bashir, where it serves to dehumanise the enemy, whether it be through the dogs, whose indefatigable chase and hellishly glowing amber eyes suggest a threatening and demonic aspect, or the majestic and pitiful ‘Arabian horses’. Where Should the Birds Fly evokes smaller animals (birds, chickens, mice), using them, first, to express the vulnerability of Palestinians in the face of the oppressor and, second, to draw attention to how Palestinians are dehumanised in both news coverage and military practice.

Both Qishta’s choices and those of her production company shape the film, which may be regarded as the result of their complex negotiation:

We had a lot of footage from the destruction caused by the Israeli attack. Both Brian [Drolet, the producer] and Gladys [Joujou, the editor] initially focused more on the war as a major part of the movie. For me, people’s lives are more important than showing just destruction … There are so many parts of our lives that go unrecorded. And I had footage to document many of these invisible struggles.

In contrast to news reports, where humanitarian concern about Palestinians declines once a fragile ceasefire is declared, the film charts what happened before ‘Cast Lead’ and after. It captures the everyday violence that Gaza experiences at Israel’s hands, along with Gazans’ efforts to live a normal life – what Qishta calls their ‘invisible struggles’. Criticising Hamas’s tactics, she declares, in voiceover, ‘All weapons strike fear into the hearts of people living under them. It doesn’t matter if they are the relatively simple and ineffective rockets from Gaza into … Israel or Israel’s sophisticated US-made missiles launched from F-16s or Apache helicopters’. Her film imparts the bigger picture (missing from mainstream coverage) through its focus on the blockade and routine attacks by Israel of which the full-scale ‘wars’ are magnifications.

We follow Qishta as she films farmers and fishermen trying to earn a living, accompanied by international observers, although the latter’s presence is not always a safeguard. The militarised ‘buffer zone’, which penetrates three kilometres into the Gaza Strip in some places and absorbs 30 per cent of its arable land, prevents farmers from cultivating their fields; when they approach the buffer zone they are shot at by IDF patrols. In one scene, fishermen are shown under fire, as the Palestinian territorial waters in which they fish are policed by Israeli gunboats. The clatter of gunshots comes over the choppy sea. The picture of injustice – the Israeli navy shooting at unarmed Palestinians – is unmistakable. ‘Why?’ cries the international observer
accompanying the fishermen. Their reply from the gunboat’s loudhailer is merely that they are in ‘a closed military area’ and therefore must retreat. While threatening to shoot at the fishermen, the Israeli soldiers aim at the cables that attach the fishing nets to the boat; the cables eventually break, resulting in loss of the fishermen’s catch.

The film intimates the ubiquitous Israeli presence in Gaza, not just in moments of spectacular violence during military operations. Do the Israeli soldiers ‘consciously intend’ to deprive the fishermen of ‘the ability to make a living and feed their families’ asks Qishta in voiceover. Her film suggests the blockade purposefully creates unliveable conditions for Palestinians in Gaza, providing a striking contrast to news footage where Israel is portrayed as under siege and encircled by hostile attackers, threatened by ‘infiltrators’ and tunnels. It presents the opposite scenario: the colonised who are threatened and encircled by tanks on land and gunboats at sea, and with whose predicament we are urged to identify. We may be reminded of the parallels with the Native Americans as well as their ultimate fate.

In addition, Where Should the Birds Fly gives voice to a child survivor, a ten-year-old girl, Mona, in a way that partly differs from standard news and humanitarian images, such as the mute, unnamed girl with panda-like bruises on her eyes in Snow’s 2014 video blog who, as discussed earlier, appears as a generic victim, lacking any agency of her own, instead becoming a means for Snow to express his own impassioned appeal. We first encounter Mona walking through the rubble in the aftermath of ‘Cast Lead’, pursued by Qishta with her camera. With her bold gaze at the camera and precocious responses to Qishta’s questions, Mona seems to be endowed with the power to express herself, rather than having others speak on her behalf. At the same time, her quiet voice, slightly different demeanour and bandage over one eye designate her as a victim, fragile and weak. When asked how many people in her family died, she replies, ‘not many, just my mother, my father, both my sisters-in-law and my nephew’. We observe her delicate face as a register of her pain and studied indifference, as she self-consciously drains her testimony of emotion. As Lury writes, we often interpret a child’s ‘unreadable face’ to fit our own agendas.61 In her pursuit of Mona, Qishta makes the child a vehicle for both her humanitarian and political concerns.

In the film, Mona is framed within a narrative of ‘lost’ or ‘denied’ childhood.62 She shows us her drawings of the attack on her family home. In these moments, the film pulls us into the child’s perspective. Although Mona is capable of elucidating her drawings with astonishing verbal articulacy, the pictures remind us that she is a child, who sees the world differently from adults, interpreting it through shapes and colours, rather than through linguistic means. In one drawing, a huge heart encompasses her ‘precious ones’, her father and mother, now dead as a result of the attack. In another, a helicopter drops bombs on a house which catches fire and is reduced to rubble. Two Israeli soldiers carrying machine guns stand nearby, while the dead lie on the ground. Mona remarks, ‘The Israeli soldiers were shooting at the people as if they were not human, as if they were chickens or mice. For the
Israeli army this is without meaning. But the victims were very precious to us, even if they didn’t consider them human. Seeing through the child’s perspective, the scene invites us to reflect not only on the cruelty of the Gaza ‘wars’, but also the perception management that facilitates them. Colonial violence operates by dehumanisation, as one can see in the Arabian horses and dogs of Waltz with Bashir. The effect of this is that Palestinian lives can be disregarded in the pursuit of power, both by those perpetrating the violence and by those who support them. Caught up in the conflict, the child Mona figures in Where Should the Birds Fly not only as a traumatised victim and witness, but also as an agent and spokesperson for social justice.

Conclusion

Humanitarian images can limit our understanding by cultivating sympathy for Palestinians in Gaza as victims in need of international aid, separated from their political context. As I hope to have conveyed in this chapter, it is not enough to have sympathy but to reflect on what makes such oppression possible, acceptable and ‘normal’, including the international community’s accommodation to an unjust political reality. This chapter has framed these issues through the notion of perception management, which influences how images of Palestinian suffering are viewed and how blame is allocated. Perception management serves to prolong the conflict. As a result, the dispossession of Palestinians can be continued. This is why it is crucial to reflect on the images and narratives that support the status quo; it may be a step towards changing it.

Notes

11 J. Snow, Interview with Mark Regev, Channel 4 News, 16 July 2014, 7 p.m.
15 A. Kuntsman and R. Stein, Digital Militarism: Israel’s Occupation in the Social Media Age (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2015). Alongside this, Kuntsman and Stein criticise the discourse of ‘the first time’, which conceals a longer history of the militarisation of online communities – developments that they track from 2000, including the IDF’s use of YouTube and Twitter during the 2008–9 conflict.
16 Kuntsman and Stein, Digital Militarism, p. 69.
21 Cited in Deans, ‘Jon Snow Video Backed by Channel 4’.
27 Many Palestinians believe that Israel’s purpose was to destroy, in a divide-and-conquer strategy, the Unity government formed by former rival Palestinian parties Hamas and Fatah in June 2014; it has also been suggested that oil and gas reserves off Gaza’s coast may have been an added incentive, since a functioning Palestinian state would impede Israel’s possession and access.
29 BBC, News at Ten, BBC 1, 29 July 2014, 10 p.m.
39 Compared to other international conflicts, the number of direct or violent deaths in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is not especially high. However, as Eyal Weizman writes, ‘another, rather more subtle form of killing has become commonplace’. A calculated Israeli policy regarding Gaza, this takes place ‘through degrading environmental conditions to affect the quality of water, hygiene, nutrition and healthcare; by restricting the flow of life-sustaining infrastructure, forbidding the importation of water purifiers and much-needed vitamins (mainly B12), by restrictions on planning and by making it difficult for patients to travel’. The Least of All Possible Evils, p. 86.
44 D. Aaronovitch, ‘Why The Honourable Woman is the Year’s Most Important Drama’, The Times (7 August 2014), www.thetimes.co.uk/article/why-the-honourable-woman-is-the-years-most-important-drama-bg0dktrh3h0 Accessed 10 September 2016.
48 Weizman, The Least of All Possible Evils, p. 92.
50 Weizman, The Least of All Possible Evils, p. 121.
51 K. Wark, Interview with Dore Gold, Newsnight, BBC2, 21 July 2014, 10.30 p.m.
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The mass media is a critical actor in the global humanitarian system. New communication technologies have publicised and drawn attention to disasters and faraway suffering, collapsing the distance between global North and South, mobilising public empathy and accelerating the growth of international NGOs. The linkages between humanitarianism and the media have been analysed from a range of perspectives, with many scholars focusing on the nexus between media representations of human suffering, international NGOs, donor publics and policymakers. While this literature has advanced our understanding of the dynamics of humanitarian action, it has predominantly focused on the contemporary epoch. There is still much we do not fully understand about how interactions between specific humanitarian actors and media institutions originated and developed over a sustained length of time, despite an ongoing boom in historical studies of humanitarianism and NGOs. There is a pressing need for sustained historical research into the humanitarianism–media relationship, to shed new light on familiar debates and set out more rigorously how the contemporary aid industry evolved.

This chapter undertakes such an analysis, focusing on how television coverage of major disasters in the global South shaped the historical and political trajectory of humanitarian aid in Britain. The chapter does so through a case study of British television coverage of a deadly famine in Ethiopia in 1973, which despite causing a huge number of fatalities had gone unreported in the Western media. The famine was suddenly exposed in October 1973 by a single British television documentary, aired as part of ITV’s current affairs series *This Week* under the title *The Unknown Famine: A Report on Famine in Ethiopia*. Presented by popular journalist Jonathan Dimbleby, the film captured graphic scenes of masses of starving Ethiopian peasants at a relief camp in the north of the country. The shocking images were overlaid with Dimbleby’s sparse yet poignant narration, which emphasised the sheer magnitude of the disaster and the need for immediate assistance.

Aired at a time when British viewers were limited to a choice of only three television channels, *The Unknown Famine* was watched by an audience of over ten million
The Unknown Famine

people and triggered an immediate outpouring of mass emotion. The film was repeated on ITV and the BBC, screened at the House of Commons, and shown by television stations across Europe and the Commonwealth. The documentary's massive impact spurred donations to the largest humanitarian NGOs, while galvanising government officials into taking action. Dimbleby's film also had significant political consequences inside Ethiopia, as opposition movements utilised its shocking images of starvation to mobilise against and overthrow Emperor Haile Selassie's imperial government. Yet despite its importance, The Unknown Famine and the mobilisations that followed it have been largely neglected in studies of humanitarianism and media culture, being overshadowed by the larger-scale Ethiopian famine of 1984–5, which sparked the iconic Band Aid/Live Aid phenomenon.

This case study draws on a range of British media, NGO and governmental archival sources. The central argument is that The Unknown Famine shaped the trajectory of British humanitarianism in three important ways, which are discussed in three corresponding analytical sections. First, the film provided an empathic demonstration of the power of televised images of human suffering to mobilise the public, at a time when television coverage of overseas events was coming into its own and supplanting the popular press as a leading medium. As the first section discusses, this generated substantial funds in donations for the largest NGOs while consolidating their links with television broadcasters. Second, The Unknown Famine and its aftermath was an important signpost for wider critiques of media representation and disaster fundraising imagery emerging within the aid community. As the second section sets out, Dimbleby and ITV framed the crisis in a specific way, focusing on simplistic messages of disaster and obscuring the more complex causes and political dimensions of African famine. In doing so, the film helped consolidate the use of 'negative' images of suffering at the very moment that several prominent NGOs were growing uncomfortable with the effects of such images on public perceptions of the global South.

Third, the film's popular impact contributed towards significant changes in the British government's approach to disaster relief policy. During the late 1960s and early 1970s, Britain had struggled to adequately respond to a succession of major emergencies in Africa and Asia. Media coverage of Ethiopia brought further pressure to bear on policymakers, as the government was widely criticised for failing to react to the famine until it was too late. This criticism accelerated longer-running trends and helped bring about an overhaul of the British state's capacity for humanitarian aid, permanently raising the significance of disaster relief within policymaking. It is ultimately concluded that, despite the many profound changes that have reshaped both the global mass media and the humanitarian aid field since the early 1970s, several of the dilemmas and issues raised by this case study remain pertinent to our understanding of the relationship between NGOs and television, the popular appeal of 'negative' images of African suffering, and the enduring tensions between fundraising and education within the international aid sector.
The power of television

There is a long history of famine in Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa. The Ethiopian famine of 1973–5 was protracted and severe, affecting millions of people and causing an estimated 250,000 deaths. The famine was primarily the result of long-term drought, which caused desertification and crop failure across the Sahelian region of Africa in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Livestock was decimated, and millions were exposed to hunger, thirst and disease. The impact of the drought inside Ethiopia was aggravated by chronic poverty and inadequate infrastructure. Crucially, the famine was also exacerbated by the ineffective political response of Haile Selassie's government, which failed to acknowledge the true extent of the crisis or competently respond to the growing number of victims. International donors failed in their obligations by refusing to intervene or speak out against the Ethiopian monarchy, which was an important Western Cold War ally.

Western publics knew little of Ethiopia, a remote nation in the Horn of Africa which had largely avoided formal European colonialism. Humanitarian organisations also lacked a presence in the region, and international NGOs were unaware of the true situation inside Ethiopia for most of 1973. One notable actor on the ground was the Christian Relief and Development Association (CRDA), an umbrella body of Ethiopian churches and missionaries. The CRDA was set up in May 1973 by Father Kevin Doheny, a veteran Irish Catholic missionary and relief worker. The CRDA publicised the famine and appealed for funds from European churches, and it was through the CRDA that some European NGOs (including Oxfam) came to learn of the unfolding disaster. However, it was not until UNICEF conducted a survey inside the country in August that the true extent of the suffering became known. Oxfam (one of the first donors to CRDA) subsequently despatched Tony Hall, its 'publicity man in Africa', to the famine zones. Hall reported back on 'towns along Ethiopia's main road where people have been dying in tens and twenties every day for months.' Hall also sent a series of articles and photographs to the British press in the hopes of generating media interest at home, with little success. Hall later commented that 'the news gatekeepers on this occasion could not give the story prominence ... the crisis quota had been filled ... We had failed to catch the wave'.

During the same period, British journalist Jonathan Dimbleby (son of famous broadcaster Richard Dimbleby) received rumours of a great famine from Ethiopian students via an intermediary. Dimbleby had recently joined ITV's flagship current affairs series This Week as a reporter and presenter. This Week had been running since 1956, and by the 1970s the programme had developed a distinct journalistic ethos grounded in social democratic values, committed to objectivity, with a reputation for professionalism. Dimbleby started with This Week in 1972, and became interested in African development issues after presenting a documentary on the Sahelian drought in June 1973. Dimbleby and a small crew travelled to Ethiopia in September to film a programme on the famine, receiving permission from the Ethiopian authorities.
to film on the condition that they referred to ‘the problem of drought’ rather than an outright ‘disaster’. Dimbleby and his colleagues stayed for fourteen days, during which time they met with Father Kevin Doheny and other aid workers, and filmed footage at a relief camp in Dessie in northern Ethiopia.14

All of the This Week crew were profoundly affected by the horrific scenes of mass starvation they encountered. Dimbleby later described the famine as an ‘unspeakable horror’ which ‘fundamentally marked’ his life. The team were accompanied by an official minder from the Ethiopian government, who was also so shocked by the tragedy that he permitted them to film without restrictions.15 Having captured the necessary footage Dimbleby and his staff then returned to Britain, clandestinely smuggling the raw film out of the country due to fears of it being confiscated.16 The footage was subsequently edited and produced into a half-hour documentary, broadcast by ITV on 8 October to a primetime audience.

The film is an exceptionally powerful piece of broadcast journalism, skilfully shot and produced for maximum impact. The documentary opens with a wide angle tracking shot, which gradually moves along rows of stationary Ethiopian peasants. The scene is dominated by large numbers of visibly malnourished men and women of all ages, sat listlessly and quietly on the dusty ground of the Dessie relief camp. At over two minutes in length the sequence is deliberately slow, conveying to the viewer the sense of an unending mass of suffering people. The shot itself was achieved by simply having cameraman Ray Siemann walk slowly between the long lines of exhausted Ethiopians with his camera held low.17 Dimbleby’s narration accompanying the shot is sparse yet captivating, his voice subtly cracking with emotion as he states: ‘this is a queue for food. These people are Ethiopian peasants. Once they had cattle, land and houses. They sold them all to buy food. Now they have only their rags; they’re destitute’. Dimbleby goes on to describe in drawn-out detail the hardships of daily life at the camp, observing ‘two handfuls of boiled wheat in the morning, and a piece of bread in the afternoon keeps them from death, no more … these men, women and children have been like this now surviving, not living, for six months’. The narration methodically constructs for the audience the impression of a land where destitution and death are not only widespread, but have become a normal part of everyday life. As Dimbleby states, ‘these people are now without hope. The ‘ve seen mothers and fathers and sons and daughters, weaken and die. Now family by family they await the same end’.

The powerful opening shot is followed by an extended discussion between Dimbleby and one of the few medical professionals at Dessie, concerning the weakened condition of children at the camp. At one point during the interview, the medic highlights visually and describes for the camera the different conditions of specific infants in turn, stating: ‘this infant is skinny and dry, mildly dehydrated … [pointing to a young girl] she is suffering from protein calorie malnutrition … [moving to a young boy] if he doesn’t get the necessary feeding, of course he will die … [highlighting a different young boy] he is almost a skeleton, he hasn’t got the
necessary muscles and flesh… he is almost skin and bones’ (see figures 6.1 and 6.2). The focus on these children roots the depersonalised opening sequence in specific individuals, and heightens the fatalistic tone underpinning the film.

As the film progresses Dimbleby’s narration continues to describe life at Dessie in excruciating detail, focusing more and more on the plight of the children. As he remarks to the audience, ‘babies are born here, to mothers too malnourished to feed them. Without the protein they need, their chances of survival is remote’. This commentary is accompanied by graphic and unyielding shots of starving children crying out in visible pain. In one scene the camera lingers on a huddle of sick children receiving rudimentary medical care, as Dimbleby bluntly states ‘these seventeen children will die’. Towards the end of the programme a stockpile of motionless bodies is shown, most of whom appear to be young infants. A Catholic monk working at the camp informs Dimbleby that they all perished from starvation ‘between twelve o’clock last night and six o’clock this morning’. The film finally concludes with a direct plea by Dimbleby to the audience for immediate international assistance:

Figure 6.1 This Week: The Unknown Famine TX 1973

This is the first time that the government of Ethiopia has allowed the outside world to witness this catastrophe. For six months now it has remained a secret. The delay was fatal for thousands of people. The situation was out of control. But the government does now desperately seek the help of the outside world. Relief is now under way, but much more is needed. These people need medicine, doctors and nurses, supplies, blankets and clothes, and above all, they need protein and milk and corn, and they need these right now.¹⁸
The Unknown Famine was watched at the time of broadcast by an estimated twelve million viewers, and the shocking scenes it depicted had an immediate impact upon many of those who tuned in. The IV phone switchboards were jammed as soon as the programme ended, with callers wishing to help. The popular press picked up and ran with the story, carrying articles and photographs and launching fundraising appeals. The documentary was screened at the House of Commons, which the Shadow Minister for Overseas Development (Judith Hart) used to criticise the government and call for greater official aid. The film was also disseminated across Europe and the Commonwealth, having similar effects upon audiences wherever it was aired. Oxfam summarised that the documentary aroused popular concern 'first in Britain, and later in Canada, New Zealand, Australia, Holland, Belgium, Germany, Ireland, Sweden, Denmark and Italy'. Concerned viewers in Britain naturally looked towards the largest humanitarian NGOs to take action on their behalf. Oxfam's phone switchboards were jammed after The Unknown Famine aired, with many callers reported as being 'near tears' and reacting with 'uncontrolled emotion'. Seemingly overnight, the Ethiopian famine had been transformed from an unreported African disaster into a major domestic issue, and the public expected an immediate response.

British NGOs had little involvement in the making of The Unknown Famine, and had not anticipated the media frenzy that followed. The leading agencies responded...
by hastily opening a public appeal for donations through the Disasters Emergency Committee (DEC). The DEC had been created a decade earlier as an umbrella body for what were then the five largest and most influential organisations in the humanitarian sector: the British Red Cross, Christian Aid, Oxfam, Save the Children and War on Want. The DEC was founded to co-ordinate its members’ responses to major disasters, to share information and avoid competition or duplication. Crucially, the DEC was also granted exclusive arrangements with the two British television broadcasters (BBC and ITV) to make emergency appeals to the public on primetime television after major disasters. These appeals were produced by BBC specialists working from scripts and material provided by the Committee. Any donations generated from these appeals were then allocated amongst its members, to spend on relief programmes in the affected regions. The DEC was thus a unique and important actor in the British humanitarian world, with a level of access to television that was unprecedented for the entire voluntary sector.

Within a week of *The Unknown Famine* being aired, the DEC had requested and been granted a primetime television slot to appeal to the general public. The appeal was presented by Jonathan Dimbleby, and consisted of powerful scenes and clips recycled from the documentary. The broadcast was also accompanied by an advertising campaign in the popular press. The appeal quickly set a new British fundraising record of £1.5 million (£16.4 million in 2015 prices). This funding was allocated amongst the DEC membership, which had grown from five to six shortly before the appeal following the admission of the Catholic Fund for Overseas Development (CAFOD). The individual organisations used these funds to support relief and development programmes not only inside Ethiopia, but across the Sahelian belt of Africa. This was a deliberate decision on the part of the member agencies, who worded the appeal to be for ‘victims of the droughts in Ethiopia and the countries in the Sahelian zone’.

Jonathan Dimbleby and *This Week* went on to receive multiple awards and accolades for the documentary, including the British Academy of Film and Television Arts (BAFTA) Richard Dimbleby Award for Outstanding Presenter in the Factual Arena in 1974. *The Unknown Famine* was undoubtedly one of the most influential British television programmes of the 1970s. The film was also a compelling demonstration of the unrivalled power of television images of distant human suffering to provoke an emotional response from the general public. The film and its accompanying publicity generated an estimated £1.5 million in total donations from publics in Britain, Ireland and Western Europe, amounting to over £160 million in 2015 prices. This was not an unprecedented phenomenon – indeed, one of the factors behind the creation of the DEC a decade earlier was the realisation amongst mainstream NGOs that televised emergency appeals could reach massive potential audiences. Television news reports had also played an increasingly important role in publicising major disasters in the immediate years prior to 1973, including the Nigerian Civil War in 1968 and the East Pakistan crisis of 1970–1 (the latter of which led to the independence of Bangladesh).
Yet for many observers, *The Unknown Famine* was an exceptional illustration of how a single piece of television reporting could transform an invisible ‘third world’ emergency into an international *cause célèbre* with significant domestic political consequences. ITV interpreted the film as a new phenomenon in broadcasting, where ‘a disaster fails to make the news headlines and instead hits the public through a single documentary’. Stunned by the huge public response to Dimbleby’s film, the broadcaster called for new production procedures which would ensure they were in a better position to respond to such outcomes in future. One proposed method was ‘relaxing the controls’ on broadcast appeals, to explicitly link programmes such as *The Unknown Famine* with a DEC appeal at the time of broadcast (and thus provide an immediate outlet for public compassion). To do so required closer collaboration between the broadcasters and the DEC, and television companies and journalists were subsequently required to consult with both bodies in advance if they were producing current affairs programmes or reports on overseas disasters.28 This resulted in a closer symbiosis between the television broadcasters and the NGOs represented on the DEC, which consolidated the latter as the most influential actors in their sector. The perception of the film as a new phenomenon in broadcasting also foreshadowed what would become a familiar trend in global humanitarianism, of single television news bulletins or programmes galvanising massive international public responses. This reality was not lost on the largest aid agencies, and it soon became accepted wisdom within the sector that emergency fundraising was ‘next to impossible’ without television coverage.29

**Representing famine**

*The Unknown Famine* was a profoundly moving documentary for many who viewed it. Indeed, it is unlikely that many of the film’s more shocking scenes of children would be approved for broadcast today.30 Dimbleby and his colleagues wanted to capture the attention of the public, and communicate the full scale of the disaster through uncompromising footage of the relief camps. However, the documentary also omitted any discussion of the politics of famine, with Dimbleby’s narration providing no explanation or underlying causes for how the disaster had happened beyond vague references to drought. The political failures of both the Ethiopian government and the international community were also not acknowledged, beyond Dimbleby’s veiled remarks at the conclusion of the programme. This was a deliberate decision by Dimbleby and the film’s producer John Edwards, who felt that to adopt an ‘accusatory’ tone would lead to ‘the impact of the horror’ being ‘diminished’.31 In a recent interview, Dimbleby commented that he ‘didn’t do politics, didn’t say [the famine] was being suppressed … I was only concerned that people should know what has happened’. He added that he ‘was sure that was the right decision … otherwise it would have turned the film into my judgement on Ethiopia, rather than reporting on a terrible situation.32
The DEC organisations adopted a similar frame for their subsequent broadcast appeal. This was perhaps inevitable, given that the appeal re-used clips from *The Unknown Famine* and was presented by Dimbleby. The voiceover narration accompanying the appeal emphasised the magnitude of the disaster, stating that 'in one area alone, 150,000 are thought to have died since the drought first took effect back in April.' The appeal also emphasised that the simple act of donating money could directly alleviate this suffering, declaring 'this is what you can do to help: give money. That's the quickest, kindest way you can help over two million people in Ethiopia and the Sahel now on the verge of starvation.'

Like the original film, the DEC appeal made no reference to the man-made causes of famine, or the political complexities of providing aid in the region. The latter were particularly acute, as there were serious logistical obstacles and transport bottlenecks to co-ordinating aid across the Sahel and the Horn of Africa. In Ethiopia these challenges were compounded by the lack of adequate administrative machinery or transport infrastructure, and all of the DEC members struggled to effectively spend their shares of the appeal funds. In early 1974 Oxfam acknowledged that the agencies were 'open to severe criticism … the international media and general public are not going to be impressed by the apparent lack of concrete action to relieve effectively the drought situation.' This lack of 'concrete action' was in stark contrast to the simplistic messages of philanthropy and salvation being communicated to the general public.

Simplifying disasters in this way was the established norm for the DEC. The Committee had made thirteen televised emergency appeals during the decade prior to 1973 all of which conformed to similar aesthetic conventions: foregrounding powerful images of human suffering (usually children), accompanied with guilt-laden narratives designed to tug on the heartstrings of those who viewed them and prompt a monetary donation. None of the appeals provided any information of substance concerning the political causes underlying such disasters, and many actively sought to prevent such discussion. As a DEC appeal for Vietnam in 1967 stated: 'No politics. No boundaries. Send us money now.' This method of representation was typical for humanitarian actors during this period, who gravitated towards using hard-hitting visual images of vulnerable children in their communications as the most effective way to raise money. A significant body of scholarship has since implicated this form of representation in reproducing colonial discourses and stereotypes of the global South as helpless, passive, infantile and dependent upon the civilised North for assistance. Such images thus fit into a longer lineage of child-centric charitable appeals dating back to missionaries and philanthropists in the colonial era, who used suffering children as symbolic objects of universal concern.

This depiction of the global South became ubiquitous in the Western media during the 1960s. Decolonisation drew new attention to hunger and poverty in the emerging ‘third world’, and images of starving children were widely disseminated in NGO appeals and television news reports of overseas disasters. In 1968, media images of starving children affected by the ongoing Nigerian Civil War gave rise to
huge public demands for intervention across the Western world. Tony Vaux refers to Nigeria as the ‘first humanitarian disaster to be seen by millions of people.’ The stereotypical image of the starving African child was thus elevated into a ‘universal icon of human suffering’ during this period. The Ethiopian famine may have been ‘unknown’, but its depiction on British television and reception by the general public fitted into a broader framework for viewing and encountering the global South.

Crucially, simplistic media images and messages about the famine concealed growing divisions within the sector about the value of disaster relief. The DEC members had already met months earlier in 1973 to discuss Ethiopia and the Sahel, revealingly deciding not to request a broadcast appeal due to disagreements over the appropriate course of action. Christian Aid and War on Want wanted any appeal to be made in support of long-term development, rather than short-term relief. The British Red Cross and Save the Children opposed this position, on the basis that the situation ‘demanded long-term attention by international agencies and governments rather than DEC member charities’, and therefore they should stick to humanitarian assistance only. Oxfam supported long-term development in principle, but argued that in this case short-term relief was preferable.

These discussions were a microcosm for broader trends crystallising within the aid community, as several (but not all) NGOs were engaging with confrontational theories of alternative development and exploring new avenues to publicise and tackle the root causes of global poverty, rather than solely ameliorating its visible effects. From the DEC this included CAFOD, Christian Aid, Oxfam and War on Want, who all took up the cause of long-term development in the global South over the course of the 1960s. As these organisations matured in their expertise and programming, a critique of disaster relief began to be articulated from within. An early example was the publication of The Haslemere Declaration in 1968 by radical elements from Christian Aid and Oxfam, which likened charitable relief to ‘tossing sixpence in a beggar’s cap: money given by those who have no intention of changing the system that produces beggars, and no understanding that they are part of it.’ War on Want’s staff were particularly radical, commenting in 1973 that they were ‘not a disaster organisation’ and no longer wished to have an ‘ambulance function’.

Disillusionment with disaster relief inspired a critique of the aesthetics of emergency fundraising. This critique denounced the ubiquitous images of suffering children as unethical, and counter-productive to new goals of raising the awareness and engagement of the British public in development issues and tackling global poverty. This thinking was apparent when Oxfam announced in 1973 (only a month before The Unknown Famine aired) that it would cease using such imagery altogether, and instead ‘educate rather than incite pity’. The agency added that ‘people have become blunted by disaster, so we now intend to concentrate on the constructive aspect of our work in advertisements’. War on Want commented at the same time that ‘the starving child has really been flagged to death, and we must now make the assumption that the energy we used to give to advertising for funds must be spent on
education of the public here.\textsuperscript{45} The implication was clear – these organisations (or at least, certain sections of these organisations) were growing uncomfortable with the simplistic and misleading messages being promoted in their fundraising appeals, which appeared to be contradictory to an emerging and more sophisticated public education and advocacy agenda.

The Unknown Famine therefore helped consolidate a colonial discourse of Africa and the ‘third world’ as a helpless region of disasters and suffering, at the very historical moment that several prominent NGOs were seeking to challenge and undo it. Development-oriented NGOs could not turn away from the intense publicity whipped up by Dimbleby’s documentary, despite their own misgivings. Oxfam and other agencies were thus compelled to endorse and perpetuate problematic messages which they knew were misleading and over-simplistic, but appealed to a wider public. War on Want would later call for a way to ensure that fundraising communications would ‘consider the long-term needs’ and ‘not react solely on the basis of … Dimbleby’s emotive programmes that tell only a fraction of the truth’.\textsuperscript{46} While laudable, this critique failed to acknowledge how aid agencies were frequently not setting the terms on which they operated. As the sudden reversal of the DEC’s earlier decision not to make an appeal for Ethiopia had shown, NGOs were regularly pulled and pushed between the structural pressures of television coverage and public opinion.

The British government and disaster relief

The tremendous strength of public feeling whipped up by The Unknown Famine not only brought pressure to bear on the leading humanitarian NGOs – it also made an important contribution to wider shifts in how the British government approached disaster relief. Britain had little involvement in either Ethiopia or the Sahel in the early 1970s, with no significant historical or diplomatic ties to the region. The British state had also been preoccupied during the late 1960s and early 1970s with major disasters in two of its former colonies (the Nigerian Civil War and the East Pakistan crisis). Both of these emergencies had significant political repercussions, and both had required significant diversions of funds from the official development aid budget to pay for emergency relief operations. Doing so had stimulated heated debate within government over the correct response to major disasters, as the established policy was that disaster relief was of minimal political importance and any expenditure on it should be tightly restricted.\textsuperscript{47}

The sudden exposure of the Ethiopian famine in 1973 caught the Conservative government by surprise. At this time the overseas aid budget was managed by the Overseas Development Administration (ODA), a department within the Foreign Office and the predecessor to today’s Department for International Development (DFID).\textsuperscript{48} The sudden outcry which followed The Unknown Famine’s broadcast had an immediate effect on official donors – as one ODA official commented, the documentary had ‘stirred consciences in many countries and provoked an
enormous response ... it even galvanised government machines.\textsuperscript{49} The UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) launched an appeal for 500,000 tonnes of food aid and $30 million for emergency relief in November 1973, which the British government contributed towards. At the same time, Britain (along with other donor governments) agreed to participate in an international programme of long-term development programmes throughout the Sahel. Britain also rolled out a major rural development programme inside Ethiopia.\textsuperscript{50} As Peter Woodward summarises, after \textit{The Unknown Famine} the 'wheels of the relief juggernaut rolled a little faster'.\textsuperscript{51} The DEC member organisations also participated in these initiatives, benefitting from official funding for transporting equipment and supplies.\textsuperscript{52}

Despite these efforts, the film's shocking images of mass starvation raised difficult questions about how the famine had occurred. The British government received widespread public and parliamentary criticism for its perceived lack of response, which was presented in the media as bureaucratic failure and indifference to human suffering. Christian Aid's Deputy Director denounced the government for its 'lack of vigour, lack of imagination, and a lack of ground representation that goes beyond red tape or bureaucracy'.\textsuperscript{53} The Minister for Overseas Development (Richard Wood) recognised the 'considerable concern in the House of Commons, reflecting the concern in the country as a whole, that the British Government had repeatedly found itself reacting to crisis situations which might perhaps have been foreseen earlier'.\textsuperscript{54} The perceived inability of the British state apparatus to competently respond to third world disasters was publicly contrasted with the leading NGOs, who were depicted by many journalists as efficient, flexible and non-bureaucratic.\textsuperscript{55}

The public feeling unleashed by Dimbleby's film accelerated and culminated a trend that had been developing since the late 1960s. Decolonisation increased public awareness of hunger and poverty in the newly christened 'third world', while the simultaneous spread of television, along with concurrent advances in communications technology, brought a new immediacy and emotional impact to images of distant suffering. News reports of overseas disasters helped stimulate humanitarian empathy amongst the viewing public, evoking an impulse to act immediately to 'save' newly post-colonial states.\textsuperscript{56} The ODA conceded in early 1974 that 'the quick access of news media to disasters and their presentation, especially by television, has created a Ministerial and public demand for a more immediate and fuller response'.\textsuperscript{57} Wood acknowledged a 'change in public opinion over the last few years', with governments now 'expected to do more in distant countries than they had been'.\textsuperscript{58} This acceptance that the government had 'to do more in distant countries' was an important turning point for the British state's involvement in humanitarian aid, marking a new significance for disaster relief in foreign policy. As one ODA official summarised, 'public and parliamentary opinion ... will not permit [the government] to do nothing'.\textsuperscript{59}

The immediate consequence of this shift was an internal review of the government's administrative machinery for emergency relief. A policy paper
in early 1974 opened with the revealing statement that ‘the problem of disaster relief in developing countries is one of which governments are becoming increasingly aware.’ Thís reform process took on a more radical character following the election of a Labour government in March 1974. The new administration altered the ODA to become a separate entity from the Foreign Office as the Ministry of Overseas Development (ODM), and Judith Hart replaced Wood as the Minister for Overseas Development. Hart had briefly served as Minister in 1970, and had been Labour’s Shadow Minister in the years since. Hart and her advisors were highly critical of the previous administration’s inefficient capacity for emergency relief, commenting that ‘the only people who have emerged with credit from these disasters are the media’ – referring specifically to ITV and Jonathan Dimbleby.61 Hart’s overhaul resulted in the creation of a Disaster Unit within the ODM in June 1974. A specialist body staffed with experts, the Disaster Unit was a ‘focal point’ for responding to major disasters in the global South, which would regard emergency relief as a primary consideration rather than a distraction from long-term development. Other donor governments established similar bodies during the 1970s, institutionalising the distribution of humanitarian assistance and constructing the framework for a global relief network.62

The Disaster Unit also aspired for a closer relationship with the leading NGOs, to improve its capacity and effectiveness. Government officials stressed the need to ‘make sure our efforts were integrated with [voluntary organisations] … we wish to plan and work in collaboration with these bodies at all stages, since their role will continue to be an essential one.’63 Thís prioritisation of NGOs reflected how aid agencies were being increasingly feted for their perceived efficiency, expertise, lack of bureaucracy, and capacity to reach the poorest communities. Television was an integral aspect of this process, as it was through the mass media that NGOs publicised their ideals, acquired popular recognition, and thus stimulated their own expansion. The emphasis placed by the ODM on coordination also represented a broader increase of state support for the voluntary sector in the 1970s, as a number of governmental departments looked for ways to liaise with NGOs and draw upon their distinctive capacities and methods.64

The Disaster Unit designated the DEC as its preferred vehicle for coordination, and in the following years the Unit frequently coordinated with the DEC members in responding to humanitarian crises of varying magnitudes. In practice, collaboration usually involved the Disaster Unit taking up a coordinating role, overseeing and directing NGO relief efforts, for which it provided considerable financial and logistical support. The 1970s thus witnessed the building up of connections and channels between humanitarian NGOs and the state, which would make possible the funneling of substantial official funds through the sector which has now become a routine norm.65 *The Unknown Famine* made an important contribution to this process, as it accelerated an overturning of governmental assumptions and helped permanently raise the prominence of humanitarian aid in policymaking.
Conclusion

There have been many profound changes within the mass media and global humanitarianism since the 1973 Ethiopian famine. Radical improvements in communications and information technology have constructed a global media ecology on a scale unimaginable in the 1970s. Successive innovations such as electronic news-gathering, satellites, 24/7 news channels, the internet, mobile telephones and social media have been important spurts for globalisation, collapsing time and space and reducing the distance between people all over the globe. Live news reporting from warzones and disasters has now become routine, and it seems inconceivable that an African famine could remain ‘unknown’ today as Ethiopia’s once did. Technological advances in the media have been analogous with a sustained growth of global humanitarianism, as evident in the phenomenal expansion and proliferation of international NGOs in recent decades. British humanitarianism is now a vibrant and imposing field of activity, with substantial funds flowing into the sector from both the public and official donors. These trends are all evident in the recent history of the DEC, which underwent internal reform during the mid-1990s before being relaunched with an expanded membership and more professional governance mechanisms. The DEC has thrived in the years since (despite operating in a more commercially competitive broadcast environment), regularly raising massive funds from the public for disaster relief. This includes a remarkable record sum of £392 million for the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004.

The representational practices of humanitarian NGOs have come under significant scrutiny since the 1970s. Critiques of emergency fundraising imagery (quite radical in 1973) permeated through the sector over the following decade, before exploding in the aftermath of the 1984–5 Ethiopian famine. The widespread dissemination of images of starving Ethiopian children in the media, NGO appeals and the Band Aid fundraising events generated heated debate within the sector over their potentially harmful impact on public engagement and education. These debates resulted in the formulation of internal guidelines and shared Codes of Conduct amongst aid agencies, including the well-known 1992 Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief. Virtually all mainstream NGOs are signatories to the 1992 code, which binds them to ‘recognise disaster victims as dignified human beings, not hopeless objects’ in their information, publicity and advertising. Since the late 1980s, many NGOs have also aspired to utilise ‘positive’ imagery in their communications, which depict their subjects as self-sufficient, dignified, active, and even heroic. The motive behind this was that ‘positive’ representations could convey a more complex story of justice and equality, rather than simplistic paternalistic charity.

However, despite these developments, many of the issues highlighted in this case study of the 1973 Ethiopian famine remain pertinent today. For all their growth and increased influence, NGOs are still dependent upon the mass media to
set agendas and galvanise public responses. Furthermore, they do so within a highly crowded and competitive humanitarian sector, and a more fragmented commercial broadcast environment. Thus, despite a more nuanced awareness of the politics of representation, many NGOs are still driven by institutional imperatives to use problematic images and messages in their communications. Simon Cottle and David Nolan argue that humanitarian NGOs have now internalised a form of ‘media logic’, deliberately packaging their work in ways which conform to known media needs – which tends to mean simplistic narratives, shocking images and regular use of celebrities.72 Some observers have spoken of a return to ‘poverty porn’ reminiscent of the 1970s, due to the pressures of raising funds in a marketing-driven environment.73 The Unknown Famine may have marked the high point of these negative representations of Africa and the global South, but these images and stereotypes clearly still hold sway over the popular imagination today.

The education and advocacy campaigns of development NGOs were still in their infancy in 1973, and there were genuine hopes within the aid community that paternalistic discourses of charity and disaster could be overturned. Four decades later, ‘development education’ appears to have largely failed as a project. This failure is borne out in successive opinion polls and surveys, which indicate that the British public’s support for overseas aid is motivated by humanitarian and moral concerns only. There are low levels of popular engagement in issues relating to global poverty and inequality, of which the public is uninterested and knows little.74 The media, and especially television, has been critical to this process. Graphic images of suffering children such as those aired in The Unknown Famine have consistently sparked an emotional response from viewers. This may be fundamental to the visual nature of television, and the news values which underpin its production – privileging the dramatic and shocking, while discouraging more complex verbal efforts to explain why.75

Recent research findings suggest that the constant repetition of negative images and simplistic messages in NGO appeals is fostering growing cynicism, as many citizens feel such communications are cynically designed with the sole objective of making money. This disconnection further limits the potential for these agencies to challenge the charitable frame through which so many people view and understand the wider world.76 Reversing these trends will be exceptionally difficult in the years to come, and may not be possible within the structural constraints of the commercialised aid industry. At the very least, there is a pressing need to revisit and strengthen agency Codes of Conduct on imagery and representation, and for all actors connected to the sphere of humanitarianism and international aid to acknowledge and evaluate the long-term impacts of their messages upon supporters and the general public. A case study of The Unknown Famine reminds us just how challenging this task can be. As one Oxfam official remarked in 1973 following the film’s explosive impact, ‘after two and a half years of our efforts to publicise the causes of underdevelopment, 15 minutes of publicising the effects through the film seemed to do it’.77
Notes


3 The landscape of British television in 1973 was radically different to the competitive and fragmented environment of the twenty-first century. There were only two television broadcasters – the publicly funded BBC, and the commercial Independent Television network (ITV). These broadcast three channels in total – BBC1, BBC2 and ITV. For more on the historical development of British television, see J. Curran and J. Seaton, *Power Without Responsibility: Press, Broadcasting and the Internet in Britain* (Abingdon: Routledge, 7th edn, 2009), pp. 101–232.


14 Interview with Jonathan Dimbleby, conducted by the author (Andrew Jones), 12 June 2015.

15 Interview with Jonathan Dimbleby, conducted by the author (Andrew Jones), 12 June 2015.

16 The full story of how *The Unknown Famine* was filmed and smuggled out of Ethiopia is recounted at length in Harrison and Palmer, *News Out of Africa*, pp. 40–66.


18 Independent Television Authority (ITA) Archive, University of Bournemouth Library (hereafter ITAA), Ths Week scripts collection, ‘The Unknown Famine (original script)’, October 1973.
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19 ITAA, box 3996264, file 5002/5, vol. 1, K.W. Blyth, ‘Special Disaster Appeal Procedures: Memorandum by the IBA Appeals Secretary’, 1 April 1974.


27 Jones, ‘The Disasters Emergency Committee’.

28 ITAA, box 3996264, file 5002/5, vol. 1, K.W. Blyth, ‘Special Disaster Appeal Procedures: Memorandum by the IBA Appeals Secretary’, 1 April 1974.


30 Gill, Famine and Foreigners, p. 29.


32 Interview with Jonathan Dimbleby, conducted by the author, 12 June 2015.

33 Disasters Emergency Committee, ‘Ethiopian and African Drought Appeal’.


35 Jones, ‘The Disasters Emergency Committee’.


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65 D. Hulme and M. Edwards (eds), NGOs, States and Donors: Too Close for Comfort? (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1997); A. Bebbington, 'Donor-NGO Relations and

66 Cottle nd Cooper, ‘Introduction’.


68 Jones, ‘The Disasters Emergency Committee’.


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Part III

Reporting refuge and risk
European borderscapes: The management of migration between care and control

Pierluigi Musarò

Tens of thousands of migrants and refugees stranded in camps in Greece and in Calais, shipwrecks and deaths in the Mediterranean, fences and walls across the Balkans, hotspots along the European Union (EU) southern borders, increasing controls within the Schengen space, military-humanitarian naval operations, the EU–Turkey migrant deal, NGOs and activists denouncing the ongoing ‘war on migrants’ is too often framed as a humanitarian emergency: these are some of the images we usually associate with the so-called ‘migration crisis’. Nevertheless, this ‘crisis’ is neither new nor exceptional, especially when viewed through a historical lens. This discourse of an allegedly uncontrolled ‘invasion’ of Europe dates back to the 1990s when the alarming image was first used particularly in the Spanish media, followed by the Italian media. Soon the packed refugee boat on the open sea became the image that symbolised migration to Europe. It also became the central figurative element in the debate on European refugee and migration policy and was used by all sides to legitimise their respective demands and ideas.

Over the last two decades, while the EU has more or less eliminated internal borders between member states in order to create a unified integrated European market, it has also sought to secure the EU’s common external border in response to fears that a continuum of ‘uninvited’—unauthorised immigrants, known and suspected criminals and terrorists—will ‘deluge’ Europe. These fears were amplified and fomented in the wake of 9/11 and the subsequent terrorist attacks in Madrid, London, Paris, and the following major attacks in 2016 that have taken place in Brussels and Nice. Moreover, propaganda declaring war on Rome was released by the established presence of Islamic State affiliates on Libya’s coast, and the potential threats that terrorists could take control of migration networks were disseminated. These events have increased the perception of the Mediterranean as Europe’s vulnerable underbelly.

Articulating freedom of movement within the Schengen space with a variable geometry of control of the external frontiers, the 1990s are marked as the period
when the EU began tightening and militarising its borders. The EU justified its massive investments in border controls through the narratives of national security – combating human smuggling and potential terrorists. As well as a narrative of humanitarian action – rescuing lives and protecting asylum-seekers’ human rights. As such, it becomes clear that the current focus on both the securitisation and the humanitarian sides of the phenomenon supports a more complex logic of risk and benevolence, of threat and vulnerability, allowing for a military-humanitarian response.

The representation strategies and discursive practices enacted by a wide range of state and non-state actors present the Mediterranean Sea as the setting of a perpetual emergency. European and national political agencies, military authorities, humanitarian organisations, and activists, have been representing migrants crossing borders as a significant problem to be managed in terms of a wider social, cultural and political ‘crisis’. Far outstripping any real crisis is the public anxiety about migration and asylum-seeking in Europe, which in part has grown due to the media coverage of the phenomenon as well as the rhetoric of politicians, who describe Europe as being besieged by people fleeing conflict or seeking a better life.

The whole complex of these actors, their discourses, as well as their technologies of surveillance and control – which are at the same time confronted by diverse actors in their attempts to cross borders or to facilitate their transgression – is what several critical migration and border scholars describe with the notion of ‘border regime’. While constructing an Elysium-like sanctuary protected by perimeter fortifications and remote control border strategies, most of the EU and national actors commonly depict a border regime that is turning the Mediterranean into a mass grave in depoliticising terms as a ‘humanitarian’ crisis with its root causes always attributed to troubles ‘elsewhere’ – Africa, the Middle East and Asia – usually in desperate and chaotic places beyond the borders of Europe.

The EU has been devising a securitised, depoliticising and technocratic approach towards the Mediterranean, which arises from the EU’s construction of the region based on geopolitical considerations and threat perceptions. As Cebeci and Schumacher argue, securitisation refers to the state of exception where everything else is subordinated to the logic of security, commonly expressed through the rhetoric of the threat of terrorism, illegal immigration, energy disruption, the rise of extremism, economic instability or the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It prioritises security over concerns with regard to democracy, human rights and socio-economic needs of the local.

At the same time, removing the securitised issues from public debate and referring to the crisis in abstract technical terms, the EU’s securitised approach to the Mediterranean is depoliticising because it means imposing the EU’s measures on target societies without letting them ‘politically’ decide on their own lives and/or futures. Rather, it makes them agree on a set of standards, benchmarks and measures imposed on them by the EU and/or its member states.
As Kurki states, depoliticisation mainly refers to a technocratic approach which is based on a discursive set of ideals for governance, which emphasise the virtues of depoliticisation, harmonisation, rationalisation and objectification of policy-making and evaluation, and which promotes the role of technical experts in policy-making over substantively “political” or “democratic” public actors. 

Ironically, at the same time, the EU authorities point to the high death toll, particularly in and around the Mediterranean, as part of their rationale for more restrictive border enforcement measures. As Shields claims, analysing the human cost of the EU’s border regime, “the claim is that the surveillances and border control system will save lives by providing “pre-frontier” information that will permit border patrol agents to intercept migrants’ vessels soon after departure and before they undergo hazardous journeys.” Nevertheless, as Weber and Pickering persuasively argue, much of the death toll associated with displacement effects should be understood as a form of “structural violence.” That is, rather than these deaths being directly attributable to an individual culprit, responsibility lies in good measure with the various public and private institutions, organisations, networks of actors and structures that forge and implement the EU’s border control policy. In other words, the problem is that, adopting the alarming and compassionate frame in currently covering the ‘crisis’ and its management, the same state actors (Frontex, NATO and other EU members) and non-state actors (MOAS, MSF, Sea Watch and other humanitarian ships patrolling off the coast of Libya) use media (websites, social networks, newsletters, press releases) in a way that feed the depoliticising rhetoric of ‘crisis.’

Thus, this depoliticised politics based on compassionate care and technocratic control contributes to construct the Mediterranean as a ‘migration crisis space’ in which it is totally misperceived the same role and culpability in what has become a routine production of serious harm.

As Calhoun claims, crisis demands an immediate response often thought to be outside of politics. It asks that the situation categorised as a crisis be managed in some way. However, this crisis management is focused only on restoring the status quo, not on changing it. Meanwhile, questions regarding what this status quo looks like remain unaddressed. Thus, policymakers and common citizens do not realise that this crisis is also a crucial opportunity to reform an unsustainable system, changing it for the better. What are current communication strategies on ‘migrants/refugees crisis’ of the several European actors aiming at? What role do the media play in shaping this ‘crisis’? And how does this affect solidarity with refugees?

Taking as a starting point Michel Foucault’s work on biopolitics, Giorgio Agamben’s work on sovereign power and bare life, and Achille Mbembe’s work on necropolitics, this chapter focuses on the ambiguities and contradictions that bedevil discourses and practices around control and care of human mobility in the Mediterranean. Contemporary scholarship provides important insights into the ways that migrant deaths result from bordering practices that govern through death. This chapter aims to shed light on the role of ‘crisis’ narratives and the
hyper-visibility of the ‘military-humanitarian spectacle of the border’ in obscuring (by making it invisible) the political stakes surrounding European borders.\textsuperscript{22}

Different aspects of the European border regime in the Mediterranean may appear paradoxical, incoherent and mutually contradictory: the role of humanitarian narratives and the human rights discourse in Frontex’s operational activities; the language of combating human smuggling commonly used by the Italian navy while simultaneously rescuing lives; Barcelona’s digital billboard that counts the number of people who have died in the Mediterranean in 2016; and the media campaigns aimed at dissuading African would-be migrants from making the unsafe journey to Europe launched by Hungary, Denmark and Italy. This chapter explores the double-sided nature of the military-humanitarian governance of migration, and suggests that these aspects are part of the intricate dichotomies of care and control that mark contemporary migration regimes.

**Frontex and the humanitarian borderlands**

*Europe is at War against an Imaginary Enemy* is Frontexit’s campaign slogan.\textsuperscript{23} Supported by a platform of human rights organisations, the campaign started in March 2013 to unveil the increasingly securitarian approach by EU member states. The campaign was launched through a short video that taunts Frontex’s quasi-military role in policing the borders, while denouncing how the EU has invested millions of euros in deploying disproportionate measures to fight an enemy who is not a real enemy: the migrant.

This campaign is a good example to start a discussion of the politics of the Mediterranean ‘migration crisis’. It focuses on the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the EU – Frontex.\textsuperscript{24} This agency has received a fair amount of criticism for its joint operations in the Mediterranean, and has been the most visible representative of the militarisation of European borders and of the so-called outsourcing of European asylum rights to third countries.\textsuperscript{25} Frontex was created in 2004 as a ‘compensatory measure’ to Schengen.\textsuperscript{26} Its overall mission is to promote and coordinate the management of EU’s external borders, and it does so through common risk analysis, training of border guards, and most visibly, through expansive joint return, sea and land border operations. It has approximately 300 employees stationed in its headquarters in Warsaw, and a much larger pool of personnel and equipment at its disposal from member states for potential operations.\textsuperscript{27} It receives funding mainly from the European Commission, in addition to funding from some member states, such as the Schengen countries. The agency’s budget has grown from EUR 6.2m in 2005 to EUR 119.2m in 2013, exceeding that of Europol.\textsuperscript{28} How does Frontex’s public communication explain and legitimise its actions and the increasing investment in border control to the citizens of Europe and to the national politicians of the EU member states?
According to Horsti, through media, Frontex discursively assures its public that there are security concerns and border problems, which the agency needs to ‘combat’. For example, it reinforces official security initiatives through its language and practice of risk analysis. One definition of risk used by the agency is: ‘Most risks associated with document fraud were assessed as high. Indeed, document fraudsters not only undermine border security but also the internal security of the EU.’ Implicit in this definition is a view of the border as ‘vulnerable’, while the people crossing it are construed as a threat. On the other hand, in recent years, Frontex is also embracing the discursive strategy of humanitarianism, based on saving migrant lives. After human rights activists and NGOs began complaining about its mission to protect the ‘Fortress Europe’ without respecting minimum human rights standards, the humanitarian discursive strategy has become a direct response to that. For example, the prevention of migrants from reaching their ‘illegitimate’ destination is described as a humanitarian action, ‘saving lives’. In these joint operations with member states, Frontex prevented migrants from continuing their journey and forced them to return. At the same time, since the security discourse focuses on the trafficking and smuggling of humans, migrants are typically described as ‘victims’ of these criminals, and therefore those ‘detected’ in surveillance operations are ‘protected’.

Should we consider this humanitarian discourse simply a smokescreen for a repressive practice, as a critical observer might be tempted to conclude? Investigating this conflicting and ambiguous position of human rights and humanitarian ideals in the policing of European borders, Aas and Gundhs analyse the complex role of humanitarian thinking and the human rights discourse in Frontex operational activities. Based on interviews with Frontex officials and border guard officers, and on the analysis of relevant policy documents and official reports, they reveal that the emotive narratives of compassion and humanitarian assistance feature prominently in the agency’s internal discourse, its training standards and in its self-presentation. This type of paradoxical policing – termed by the authors ‘humanitarian borderlands’ – is ‘often conducted simultaneously with, against and through humanity. The mission is framed and legitimized through the language of humanitarianism and human rights, officers are partly required to perform their tasks as humanitarian agents, at the same time as they find themselves complicit and practically involved in deeply inhumane conditions’.

The Italian navy and the compassionate repression

A similar integration of humanitarian and security responses within a common ‘emergency frame’ can be explored through the representation strategies and discursive practices enacted by the Italian navy since the launch of the operation Mare Nostrum. The military-humanitarian operation – targeted at both rescuing migrants and arresting smugglers, while stopping the illegal entry of unauthorised
migrants – was established by the Italian government after two big shipwrecks off Lampedusa on 3 and 11 October 2013, which resulted in the deaths of over 600 migrants. It was launched on the wave of the compassionate reaction of citizens watching hundreds of coffins on their television screens. Although Mare Nostrum signified a strengthening of two other permanent missions co-ordinated and financed by Frontex and Italy and operating in the Mediterranean during this period, it constituted a transformative moment that contributed to reshape the relationship between the military and the humanitarian aspect of the naval operations. As we can read on the Italian navy’s website, Mare Nostrum was established ‘to tackle the dramatic increase of migratory flows during the second half of the year and consequent tragic shipwrecks off the island of Lampedusa’. At the same time, ‘the naval and air units deployed by Mare Nostrum were necessary to improve maritime security, patrol sea lanes and combat illegal activities, especially human trafficking.’ As such, the operation was led by military personnel and means, with the participation of voluntary healthcare operators. The Italian navy, on the one hand, deployed amphibious vessels, frigates, helicopters, a coastal radar network and submarines to gather evidence of the criminal activities. On the other, it was supported by several humanitarian actors: the Fondazione Rava, the emergency services corps of the Order of Malta, the Italian Red Cross military corps and nurses, and Save the Children.

As I have shown in a previous article on the visual politics of this operation, speaking the language of combating human smuggling and potential terrorists, while rescuing lives and protecting migrants’ human rights, Mare Nostrum performs the spectacle of the ‘humanitarian battlefield.’ The concept of ‘humanitarian battlefield’ can be better understood if we investigate the communication performances of Mare Nostrum within what Choularakis defines as a ‘war imaginary’: a structured configuration of representational practices, which produces specific performances of the battlefield at specific moments in time, with a view not only to informing and persuading us, as per the instrumental aspect of propaganda, but also to cultivating longer-term dispositions towards the visions of humanity that each war comes to defend. Assuming, with Choularakis, that the imaginary works performatively through a morality of virtue, that is, ‘it draws upon familiar practices of aesthetic performance so as to engage spectators with images and stories about our world and, thereby, to socialize us into those ways of feeling and acting that are legitimate and desirable in a specific culture’, we see how these images contribute to influencing public perception, while shaping the social imaginary through moral discourses of care and responsibility.

The extent to which these images invite us to legitimise the operation (which costs EUR 9 million per month) becomes clear if we adopt a visual framing approach that takes into account how the images of rescue operations are symbolically organised, the representational genres that they utilise to convey distant suffring, and the sorts of ideological and aesthetic positioning of actors involved in this process. The
Italian navy’s choice of some key words, phrases and images (as well as the omission of other elements that could suggest a different perspective or trigger a different sentiment) reinforces a particular representation of reality and a specific emotion towards it. Let me note that Mare Nostrum (our sea) was the Roman name for the Mediterranean Sea, picked up by Mussolini to frame fascist propaganda about the ‘Italian lake’. As the same (ambivalent) name indicates, the possessive ‘our’ imagines the Mediterranean as a European space of care and control, while it ambiguously refers to both Italy and Europe. As most photographs available on the Italian navy’s website make clear, the official visual narrative constructs borders at imaginary levels triggering sympathy for the soldiers and pity for the migrants.40 There are plenty of images that portray the soldiers’ activities with the aim of drawing us into a community of witnesses. Emphasising practices and discourses of care, aid and assistance, soldiers covered this operation as a programme of humanitarian, national benevolence that institutes an ‘imagined community’ between spectators and soldiers from the same country: a community in which the spectator is positioned as the possible saviour, while the rescued bodies are the ‘other’.41 Though such images it becomes clear that border control is being redefined within a moral imagination that puts emphasis on human vulnerability. The soldiers’ activities are depicted in the recurring imagery of aid delivery, with rescued, grateful migrants receiving food parcels and water. Women with tiny, innocent babies are the most commonly represented subjects.

To what extent the legitimacy of the military-humanitarian operation Mare Nostrum depends on how it is described and explained through media becomes evident through the analysis of the official video of the operation.42 It starts with silent images of a man drowning on the high seas, two black women desperately crying over a coffin hundreds of coffins on a vessel, emergency news commenting on shocking images of the Lampedusa shipwrecks, and the trembling voice of the Pope announcing: ‘the only word I can say is: shame!’ During these first twenty seconds, through silence and with no voiceover describing the action, nor explanation and context, just drama, the editing of the erratic shots constructs a compassionate narrative that appears as ‘real-time story telling’ made by intense images. We are invited to read the military-security dispositive of Mare Nostrum through the moral voice of the Pope – a religious authority who is here reframed through a secular humanitarian narrative, continuing the sacred salvational narratives of rescue.

An intense apocalyptic musical score immediately erupts after the Pope’s words. Following the visual quality of a Hollywood adventure, the rescuers arrive by helicopters, frigates and well-armed vessels, wearing uniforms and medical facemasks. The music grows increasingly epic. Images of soldiers rescuing people in the high waves alternate with that of medical care interventions as the rescued reach the technologically highly equipped vessel. The visual focus is on soldiers distributing food to starving children and exhausted women; a mass of black men praying on the vessels, thankfully gazing at the camera (us). In the last shot we are faced with
the smiling eyes of two grateful rescued children, with a signboard on which they have written: ‘Thank you Italy!’

Furthermore, this rearticulation of the military as the humanitarian is even more evident in the docudrama co-produced by the Italian navy and broadcast at prime time in October 2014 by the Italian national television network (RAI): Catia’s Choice: 80 Miles South of Lampedusa. Catia Pellegrino is the (female) lead character of this ninety-two-minute docudrama, chronicling the rescue of refugees crossing borders during the last two months of the Mare Nostrum operation. Alternating images of the brave rescue operations with personal stories of the crew, the video focuses on the positive influence of Catia’s strength and empathetic nature in serving others, while maintaining vigilance, keeping the seas safe on her watch.

Though the hyper-emotionalisation and psychologisation of the marines, these images project a moral agency of emotional fragility that humanises the armed forces within the realm of those needing ‘protection’. Emphasising the value of personal narratives, the marines appear closer to social workers than soldiers: social workers with guns. This attitude is in line with what Chouliaraki has defined ‘the empathetic soldiering self’, which is infused with the spirit of benevolence and can be associated with the soldiers’ effort to cultivate a military subjectivity that sees the ‘other’ as the self and is committed to protecting her/him as one of ‘our own’ – thereby, paradoxically perhaps, effecting a new “civilianisation” of the military. To sum up, in the communication performances enacted by the Italian navy, the moralisation of the spectator takes place through a mechanism of aestheticisation of suffering that is detached from any historical or geopolitical context.

3,034: the number of fatalities in 2016

In order to get a picture of the inability of European countries to act cohesively in the face of common pressures at their southern shores, let me enrich the analysis with two different pieces of news released on 28 July 2016. Focusing on the current tragedies in the Mediterranean Sea, both the initiatives invite us to reflect on the effect of the media on public understanding of the so-called ‘migration crisis’. On 28 July, Barcelona’s mayor Ada Colau unveiled a large digital billboard showing the number of migrants and refugees who died in the Mediterranean Sea in 2016. The large metal rectangular pillar is located near one of the city’s most popular beaches and comes with a digital counter that began with 3,034 – the number of fatalities that year. But, as the inscription on this ‘monument of shame’ states, ‘This isn’t just a number, these are people.’ On the same day, Italy’s interior minister, Angelino Alfano, launched a media campaign aimed at dissuading African migrants and refugees from making the unsafe journey to Europe over the Mediterranean. Drawing upon the same estimated number of people killed that year while attempting to reach Italy’s southern shore, the Aware Migrants campaign features news, articles and powerful
video testimonials from refugees who made it to Italy but had to endure physical and sexual abuse from people smugglers along the way. Developed in partnership with the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the campaign was launched in three languages – English, French and Arabic – on various platforms, including its own website, Facebook, YouTube, Twitter and Instagram.

As different ways to framing current tragedies and raising awareness on what is happening in the Mediterranean, both the initiatives do not only report on the world ‘out there’, but also constitute this world in meaning, opening up the space for certain forms of intervention and the production of specific types of subjects. Assuming, as I did in the previous paragraph, that the military-humanitarian response to the political ‘migration crisis’ can be intended as a spectacle that invites us to look at the Mediterranean Sea as a ‘humanitarian battlefield’, the two initiatives make people ‘aware’ that there are different ways of looking this liquid ‘battlefield’ in the face. Tracking the dramatic deaths in real time, the digital monument in Barcelona invites us ‘to look the Mediterranean in the face and look at this number’, as Colau has said that ‘3,034 people who drowned because they were not offered a safe passage’. This radical initiative aims at making ‘us’ – European citizens – aware that our human fear towards these strangers, which often becomes open hostility and shameless xenophobia, and is expressed in racist prejudice and physical violence, is transforming the same blue sea of our relaxing holidays into a horrific graveyard. As such, it focuses on the pressures that these deaths are exerting in Europe upon the concept and practice of collective responsibility in order to expose our indifference.

The focus on the total number of people that died due to different causes (disasters, wars, inequality, bad policies, etc.) as a technique to denounce our normalised indifference is not new. Stats about deaths occurring in a specific place or within a certain amount of time have been around for years. Being large figures notoriously difficult to visualise and imagine, the communication of humanitarianism usually focuses on the individual to humanise a problem. By using a short, accessible phrase that in a brief period of time will convey both the emotional impact of the tragedy and that sense of scale and urgency that will precipitate some kind of action, NGOs and charities adopt those kinds of statistics to represent the horrifying image that grabs the headlines. In the Make Poverty History campaign, for example, a host of celebrities from the world of music, cinema and fashion appeared on a video clicking their fingers at regular intervals. Then the message was that ‘A child dies unnecessarily as a result of extreme poverty every three seconds’.

A few years later, the promotional videos of Enough Food for Everyone IF campaign, featured the host, the comedian Eddie Izzard, saying: ‘In every minute of every day, four children die of hunger’. The WFP’s video campaign A Time for Action claimed that ‘Every six seconds a child dies of hunger’. What is new, in this case, is the effort to make sense of the emergence of death as a routine or normalised dimension of contemporary bordering practices between more and less stable and privileged regions. In its attempt to unveil the biophysical violence in
any hierarchy of ‘worthy’ and ‘unworthy’ lives, Colau’s initiative reminds us that, despite Enlightenment traditions and Kantian cosmopolitanism emphasising that ‘every life matters’ (as highlighted in the same motto of the search and rescue organisation MOAS), the EU is acting openly hostile towards asylum seekers. It forces us to reflect upon the fact that the ethics of responsibility are today suspended between European democracies’ moral imperative to save the lives of people in need and an economy of indifference that, through denial and inaction in the sea, allows for the deaths of certain populations to take place without sanctions or repercussions.

On the contrary, assuming that migration is a decision often based on false expectations (‘many migrants leave their home without a concrete project of precise idea of the socioeconomic and political situation of their country of destination’, said Aware Migrants), Alfano’s campaign aims at making ‘them’ – i.e. would-be African migrants – aware that if they are aspiring to leave their home countries in search of better lives for themselves and their families, they will experience the dangers of violence and exploitation during their perilous journey. Drawing upon statistics on migrant deaths in various regions and from various causes in its effort to reduce the influx of asylum-seekers, the campaign warns would-be migrants that their dream can ‘end up a nightmare’: the nightmare of women raped in front of their husbands in Libya, or people seeing loved ones die of thirst in the desert or drowning at sea. Furthermore, the news, articles and videos of the campaign advise potential newcomers from fifteen African countries (including the top three asylum-seeker suppliers to Italy – Nigeria, Eritrea and Sudan) that, even if they are strong and lucky enough to reach our shores, they need to convince us that they are really in need of international protection. Indeed, besides the stories of survivors who experienced terrible dangers to come to Europe, the campaign advises Africans that 60 per cent of refugees had their applications rejected last year because they were not deemed by authorities to be ‘true refugees’ fleeing war.

It is certainly true that, like Barcelona’s mayor, Italy’s interior minister recognises that ‘Europe’s migrant crisis is an epochal struggle’, affirming that ‘obviously we pride ourselves on welcoming all those fleeing war’. Nevertheless, as he said, ‘we can’t welcome everybody’. It is worth noting that the two initiatives adopt a ‘necropolitical’ tool to tackle different aspects of the same migrant crisis. While the Spanish mayor seeks to tackle the crisis of humanity that is affecting European migration policies, urging everyone to awaken from indifference, Italy’s interior minister seems to legitimate our ethical failure, highlighting that ‘they’ are unwanted and undeserved. If the former aims at convincing European citizens (and policymakers) to be more welcoming, the latter seeks to keep refugees out by making it clear that they are not been invited, and that we aren’t willing to welcome many newcomers. Targeting different people but with the same aim of making them aware of the challenge of responsibility, the two initiatives appear to give opposite advice regarding the acceptance of immigrants. ‘Don’t turn a blind eye to poor and helpless people, they are in danger; we can avoid these deaths, it is our responsibility to help those who are
victims of our hostile policies’ Colau seems to be saying to the European audience. ‘Open your eyes and do not even think of starting the journey, it is dangerous and you are (perceived as) a danger, the loss and suffering you will go through is your own responsibility’ – this is the veiled warning launched by Alfano and directed at the African audience. It is interesting to note that the EUR 1.5 million campaign is the latest of several attempts by Italy to convince fewer refugees to make the journey, with others including a deportation and relocation programme. Although this campaign focuses on reducing loss of life by informing migrants of the dangers of irregular routes, smuggling or trafficking, in its attempt to use communication to discourage irregular migration Italy seems to follow Hungary and Denmark.55 This is not the first European fear-mongering campaign. Indeed, to limit the flow of refugees, in 2015 the Hungarian government – besides the 112-mile-long fences along its border with Serbia – used advertising campaigns to actively dissuade refugees from entering the country.56 The advertisements were published in several Lebanese and Jordanian newspapers warning refugees not to attempt to enter Hungary illegally. The full-page advertisements, published in Arabic and English, warned that refugees caught entering the country illegally could face imprisonment. A few months later, the Danish government released a similar advertisement in major newspapers in Lebanon in which it warned migrants not to come to the prosperous Nordic country, highlighting that those rejected for asylum would be deported from the country. It spent EUR 30,000 on an advertising campaign that emphasised the stringent regulations and constraints that await migrants.57 Probably to avoid accusations of drumming up anti-immigrant rhetoric (as seen in the Hungarian and Danish cases), Italy’s Minister of Interior decided to adopt a more veiled warning to migrants; the involvement of the IOM, one of the main refugee rights groups that has called for better treatment of those choosing to make the journey, represents a strong humanitarian aspect of the project.

Angelino Alfano is the Interior Minister of the government led by Matteo Renzi, Italy’s prime minister, who perfectly integrated the humanitarian discourse of assistance and hospitality within the ongoing language of migration governance. Alfano launched the campaign stressing that ‘economic migrants comprised 60 percent of last year’s 154,000 arrivals’, and noting that Italy and the rest of the EU ‘must speed up the repatriation of migrants with no legal residency rights, otherwise the bloc’s migrations policies will collapse’. Indeed, since 2015, Matteo Renzi has insisted that Italy and all of Europe had a humanitarian ‘duty’ to protect people making the journey. On 15 October 2015, for example, during his visit to the Italian parliament, the UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, paid homage ‘to the Italian soldiers who saved thousands of human lives in the Mediterranean’, and thanked ‘the Italian population for the efforts made to welcome and assist migrants’.

Concluding the event, Matteo Renzi affirmed: ‘the Italy that welcomes you is the country of the Italian officers who became nurses to deliver babies in the ships on the Mediterranean. It is an Italy of which we are proud.’58 Furthermore,
on 7 March 2016, Renzi gave each EU leader at a migration summit a DVD copy of *Fuocoammare* (*Fire at Sea*, Gianfranco Rosi, 2016), a documentary about the plight of refugees as they wash up on the shores of the Sicilian island of Lampedusa, which won the top prize at the 66th Berlin Film Festival. At the same time, Renzi – like most European leaders – is keen to show he is taking steps to differentiate between refugees who are fleeing war, and those who are seeking a better life and economic opportunities. Despite the fact that – as the GSDRC research report shows – there is extremely scant evidence on whether these campaigns are effective, and anecdotal evidence suggests that they have limited, if any, effect on migrants’ decisions to leave, these initiatives represent a further example of how media performances contribute to shaping the Mediterranean as an emotional and physical setting in which fears and insecurities can be used for both progressive as well as regressive purposes.

**Conclusion**

In my attempt to critically make sense of the political stakes surrounding European borders, in this chapter I have explored several examples of initiatives that may appear paradoxical and mutually contradictory, but – this is my suggestion – are part of the complex dichotomies of care and control, the absence and presence of law, transparency and darkness, solidarity and indifference, which mark contemporary border regimes. The intricate role of humanitarian narrative and the human rights discourse in Frontex’s operational activities of border control; the language of combating human smuggling while rescuing lives, currently adopted by the Italian navy; the digital billboard that counts the number of people who have died in the Mediterranean Sea in 2016; the media campaign aimed at dissuading African would-be migrants from making the unsafe journey to Europe launched by Italy’s Interior Minister; Matteo Renzi’s emphasis on the humanitarian duty to protect people making the journey: these examples suggest, on the one hand, that the discourse of assistance and solidarity has been perfectly integrated within the ongoing language of migration governance. On the other hand, it shows that coercive policies of control, which directly and indirectly contribute to the precariousness of life, co-exist with a humanitarian self-perception by European member states and EU agencies.

Drawing attention to the biopolitical, thanatopolitical and necropolitical dimensions of contemporary border practices as these operate in the Mediterranean Sea, this chapter invites to reflect on the co-existence of the humanitarian narratives of saving lives and the increasingly militarised borders, as well as the misperception of our own role and responsibility in this routine production of deaths. In examining the contradictory tension between different initiatives, discourses and practices of border reinforcement and border crossing, it shows how the ethics of security is intrinsically related to geopolitical reason.
Indeed, looking at the integration of humanitarian narrative in the language of security deployed by European and national actors, it would seem that the primary subject of security (i.e. deserving of protection) is the citizenry of the EU. Migrants and asylum-seekers do not feature as objects of state knowledge, either on the EU level or on the level of individual member states.

Thus, on the one hand, by enabling us to imagine ourselves as compassionate citizens who have both the capacity to save migrants in the high seas, and to defend our countries from the invasion of the aliens, the mediated nature of the humanitarian assistance results in undermining rather than intensifying solidarity. On the other hand, by seeing the deaths in the Mediterranean only in terms of crisis, while depicting the Mediterranean as a place where the ‘state of exception’ takes place and migrants are reduced to ‘bare life’ – excluded from the sphere of human values, civic rights and moral obligations – contributes to obscure the structural role of European border policies and everyday practices in these deaths. As such, the consolidation of Europe’s external borders, the implementation of Schengen and the restrictive visa regime, as well as the consequences on people’s ability to seek safe and legal routes into the EU, becomes invisible. Indeed, if the governance of migration is reduced to a humanitarian question of saving lives and to a question of combating the smugglers, its technocratic management appears to be beyond politics. In spite of the humanitarian rhetoric often employed or the declared aim to target smugglers and traffickers, several scholarly analyses have demonstrated that no naval operation in the Mediterranean has made passage more secure for migrants. On the contrary, the emergency management of the crisis has led to a situation in which tens of thousands of migrants and refugees are stranded in Greece and Turkey because crossing the Mediterranean has become more and more dangerous and expensive. The EU’s border regime has funneled migratory flows towards longer and more perilous routes as migrants seek to avoid detection, detention and/or return. These displacement effects, by now very predictable and foreseeable, have contributed to a terrible human toll.

Despite the emotional and technocratic framing usually adopted by the media to describe the Mediterranean as a depoliticised border, we must be aware about what Mezzadra and Neilson call the ‘productive’ and even ‘creative’ functions of the borders, which means the specific forms of ‘order’ they enable within the space they appear to merely circumscribe. As they argue, the ‘encounter’ of a would-be migrant with the border, its crossing, tends to reproduce itself across large parts of that experience and biography, with multiple manifestations of the border haunting migrants in their negotiations with citizenship and labour markets, in the urban as well as the ‘national’ spaces they inhabit and to which they contribute and thus transform and produce. Since the birth of the EU, this ‘productive’ nature of borders has played crucial roles in the establishment and constitution of a European space. Yet, in the current situation it is nurturing a ‘compassionate repression’ that increasingly and silently legitimises the difference between the ‘us’ (the figure of the citizen) and the ‘them’ (the figure of the foreigner).
Amongst the ‘existential’ questions that are at stake for the EU integration process as a whole, it is fundamental to consider that migration to Europe will continue over the coming years, both because of the push of migrants and because European economies and societies need migration. As it is confirmed by demographic as well as economic reports, Europe needs more migrants, not fewer. Thus, the EU’s political elites should understand the absolute necessity of attracting more migrants, and co-operate to convince voters that Europe’s future is at stake. Stopping migration is not only an unrealistic prospect that produces concrete effects in the everyday life of millions of vulnerable people on the move. It also contributes to worsen the conditions under which migration will happen in the near future as well as of the lives of migrants already established in Europe. If we really wish to save lives and to come up with better responses to meet the tremendous needs people face risking the dangerous journey it probably would be better for EU governments to turn the core question from ‘how can we stop migrants?’ to ‘why are people fleeing?’ and ‘how can we provide people with the ability to apply for visas/asylum lawfully?’

Notes

1 Although there is a crucial legal difference between ‘migrant’ and ‘refugee’, it is worth noting that in the media these terms are often used interchangeably, depending on the period and its public sentiment (e.g. according to Google Trends data, throughout 2015, searches for ‘refugee’ remained slightly higher than ‘migrant’ spiking in early September, around the time the distressing photos of Alan Kurdi were released). Moreover, although the legal and political separation between refugees, asylum seekers and migrants is ever-present in the communitarian discourse and agenda-setting, the difference – upon which not everybody agrees, and that has received criticism by the double standard it imposes upon people in need, producing a selective recognition of suffering – is much more blurred in practice. According to this, it is interesting the announcement by Al Jazeera English it would stop using the term migrant, as it ‘is no longer fit for purpose when it comes to describing the horror unfolding in the Mediterranean’. See L. Westcott, ‘Refugees vs. Migrants: What’s the Right Term to Use’, Newsweek (11 September 2015), www.newsweek.com/refugee-vs-migrants-whats-right-term-use-371222. Accessed 15 July 2017.


21 For example, A. Estevez, ‘The Politics of Death and Asylum Discourse: Constituting Migration Politics from the Periphery’, Alternatives, 39:2 (2014), pp. 75–89; Vaughan-Williams,


26 Vaughan-Williams, ‘Borderwork beyond Inside/Outside?’, p. 66.


31 As the Deputy Executive Director Gil Arias Fernandez argues: ‘Facilitators lure these desperate people with the promise of an easy crossing and a better life, and charge up to USD 7,500 for a trip from Afghanistan. This is not always the case. Tragically, since the beginning of the year 41 people lost their lives trying to cross the Evros river or the sea in the area of Alexandroupol, many more die as a result of the dangerous forms of transport used by unscrupulous smugglers, others still end up victims of trafficking for the sex trade or in forced labour’, quoted in Horsti, ‘Humanitarian Discourse Legitimating Migration Control’, p. 305.


35 Hermes controlled the border along the Italian coastline, while Aeneas controlled migrant flows.
51 Squire, ‘Governing Migration through Death in Europe and the US’.
52 MOAS was established in 2013 by Christopher and Regina Catrambone as the first private rescue service organization to assist refugees at sea. See www.moas.eu/. Accessed 15 July 2017.
54 Membre, ‘Necropolitics’.
55 Before the EU governments, on July 2013 Australian customs and border protection launched a series of advertisements to educate and inform asylum-seekers, including unaccompanied minors, in source countries about the futility of investing in people smugglers, the perils of the trip, and the hardline policies that await them if they do reach Australian shores (www.border.gov.au/about/operation-sovereign-borders/counter-people-smuggling-communication). The campaign, which has been criticised as one of the harshest border policies in the world by
human rights groups for its perceived bigotry and disregard for human life, was predominantly conducted online featuring a video message that has the commander of Operation Sovereign Borders, Lieutenant General Angus Campbell, standing next to a sign declaring ‘NO WAY’ in bold red letters over an ominous background featuring a small rickety boat on a churning sea. ‘The message is simple, if you come to Australia illegally by boat, there is no way you will ever make Australia home,’ he says. See ABF TV, ‘No Way. You Will Not Make Australia Home – English’, 5 April 2014 www.youtube.com/watch?v=flI2WH4a92w Accessed 15 July 2017.


60 Although the Italian campaign seems to adopt some factors which, according to UNHCR, may improve the effectiveness of these campaigns – like targeting a specific group of migrants, engaging real-life testimonies from returned migrants, and using celebrities to convey the message, like the Malian artist Rokia Traoré who accepted the invitation to participate in the project – the absence of information about legal opportunities and the missing trust in the information received are amongst the main reasons that limit effect on migration behaviour. As the GSDRC Report argues, ‘awareness campaigns may be irrelevant to prospective migrants who consider the attempt at changing their life to justify the risks involved.’ www.gsdrc.org/publications/impact-of-communication-campaigns-to-deter-irregular-migration/. Accessed 15 July 2017.


62 Musarö, ‘“Africans” vs. “Europeans”’.


65 Mezzadra and Nelson, Border as Method.


European borderscapes


References


The role of aid agencies in the media portrayal of children in Za’atari refugee camp

Toby Fricker

When the Syrian conflict escalated in early 2012, there was still little sense that this would result in what is now described as the world’s biggest humanitarian crisis of our time. But by mid-2012, thousands of Syrians, half of whom were children, started fleeing their country for safety across borders, including to their southern neighbour, Jordan. To cope with the rapid influx of people, the Jordanian government opened Za’atari refugee camp in late July 2012, with support from the Jordan Hashemite Charity Organisation, United Nations agencies and other partners. In the harsh conditions of Jordan’s northern desert, Za’atari rapidly became a massive aid operation and at the same time the media face of not only the refugee crisis in Jordan but across the region.

What was apparent, from the early days of the camp, was the large numbers of children and young people fleeing Syria, with more than half of the Za’atari population under eighteen years of age. For visitors, statistics were unnecessary; there were simply children everywhere. The majority came from the southern Syrian province of Dar’a, where the conflict first erupted. It was from here that children became central to the narrative of the Syrian conflict, when in March 2011 a group of teenagers painted a phrase on their school walls in Dar’a town calling for the fall of the government. The boys were reportedly arrested, beaten and tortured in prison. After Friday prayers on 18 March 2011, a protest march took place during which five demonstrators were killed and the conflict in Syria was born.

The hundreds of refugees crossing to Jordan daily turned to thousands by late 2012 and Za’atari grew rapidly in size. Aid agencies found themselves in a race against time to provide shelter, food, schooling and other services for those arriving. At the same time, journalists and TV crews from across the world became part of the Za’atari landscape. The camp was a major news story and by August 2013, the 120,000 Syrians were living within a melting pot of aid workers, journalists, visiting politicians and celebrities. Though extensive experience of working with media in Za’atari, news reports from international English-language media and academic literature, this chapter looks at the portrayal of children in media coverage of the camp.
By analysing how reporting on children’s issues evolved over a three-year period and the role of aid agencies in the newsgathering process, this piece of work argues that the relationship between humanitarian organisations and journalists can be mutually beneficial and result in reporting with deeper context and nuance, whilst better protecting children along the way.

There are well-documented concerns about the focus on media work by aid agencies and their close relationship with journalists. Simon Cottle and David Nolan claim that, “These developments imperil the very ethics and project of global humanitarianism that aid agencies historically have done so much to promote.”

Glenda Cooper also questions the editorial integrity of journalists working with aid agencies: ‘While journalists – if sometimes imperfectly – work on the principle of impartiality, the aid agency is usually there to get a message across: to raise money to raise awareness, to change a situation.’ Despite this, the collaboration between aid agencies and journalists may serve each other’s interests but also produces more informative, accurate and engaging media content for the reader, viewer or listener. With increasing debate and discussion about the rising role of fake news and in a post-truth political environment this could be more important than ever.

This outlook is most likely too positive for some but the case is put forward by focusing on the period from the opening of Za’atari camp in late July 2012 until July 2015, during which two phases of media coverage are identified. The first could be termed a more hard news approach that mirrors the acute emergency phase of aid operations in Za’atari, where children are framed in what could be perceived as a more negative manner. For example, children who vow for revenge in the fight back in Syria and others who play a role in the reported lawlessness of the camp’s earlier days. While the second phase of media coverage, from early 2014 until mid-2015, reflects a more features led approach with deeper context and nuance to articles, presenting children as more actively and positively involved in camp life. This includes articles about children desperate to continue their education and others who are improving their living conditions by designing small gardens. Reporting that reflects an ongoing childhood and aspirations for the future, despite everything children have been through.

A newsworthy venture

After opening, Za’atari rapidly became a major global news story, with significant media coverage from the camp focusing on issues related to children and young people. Given that this was, as Sean Healy and Sandrine Tiller note, the most easily accessible camp in the highest profile conflict in the world, it may not be surprising. But it is important to consider the news values for foreign media coverage, such as those cited by Johan Galtung and Mari Holmboe Ruge, to provide some insight into the media’s decision-making process for coverage from Za’atari. This helps us to better understand how and why reporting evolved over time and what role aid
Aid agencies and the portrayal of children

agencies may have had in influencing the discourse used. Galtung and Ruge focus on the process that leads to a story being produced, ‘a chain that could have seven or eight steps in it or be much shorter if the newspaper has a correspondent.’ Whether there is a reporter on the ground close to the location of the ‘event’ is an important consideration. For at the top end of the chain, where editorial decisions are made in capitals far from the news, exacting influence can be more challenging. When a correspondent is present, there are greater opportunities for aid agencies to play a more direct role. In both cases, personal relationships are critical, for journalists not only bring with them the interests of their organisation but also their own experiences in society, which are, as Rukhsana Aslam notes, ‘ingrained in their minds from childhood.’ The reporter, as an individual, interprets the events they cover and forms the ‘first draft of history’, which is why the relationship between aid workers and journalists is so important.

Whether a reporter gets to the relevant location in the first place relies on a number of factors. Economic issues, distance, safety and media accreditation all play their part. The economic interests of media outlets are often at the forefront and with foreign news budgets shrinking sustained coverage of humanitarian crises is a challenge. As John Simpson notes, ‘Most newspapers have largely sacked their foreign correspondents, relying instead on one or two staff members, one in, say, the United States and the other perhaps in the Middle East.’ Despite this, conflicts, natural disasters and health emergencies are more likely to fit the required narrative of big bangs and negative news to justify the cost of covering the story. When there is a major ‘event’ within these crises, as opposed to an ongoing process, this is also more likely to be reported. Add in some elite people, or celebrities, and the probability that it will become news rises further.

In the case of Za’atari, access was not such a pertinent issue. Travelling to Jordan is easy, safe and relatively inexpensive, while at just over an hour from the capital, Amman, the camp is an easy day trip, with a full range of accommodation options on return. Once in Jordan, acquiring media permits to enter the camp was initially straightforward and required not much more than an email and printed acceptance. When this process became more complicated in late 2013, there was a shift in the working relationship between aid agencies and journalists. But there were also a number of layers of access, as the journalist Rana F. Sweis noted:

In order for me to see some of the refugees in the centers and other spaces, I had to organize this through the respective aid agencies. So in some ways the aid agencies were facilitators and in other ways they were the experts on the issues and provided me with information I often needed.

To enter the schools, health clinics and youth centres in the camp, as in any town, you needed permission and aid agencies were primarily managing these services. There was at the least a forced relationship, though journalists were not always
interested in activities at the centres. In phase one of coverage, Syrian refugees were vital sources for reporters to get first-hand information about the situation inside Syria. Journalists were primarily focused on talking with families who had just fled their country. The Syrian refugee population in Lebanon was very scattered, with no official camps, and those in Turkey and Iraq harder logistically and more expensive to reach. From its outset, the war in Syria has been extremely dangerous to cover.

In 2012, Reporters without Borders called Syria a ‘Cemetery for News Providers’. In the following years, the conflict became even more complicated and dangerous to cover. Journalists would often request to interview people who had just arrived from Syria, those who could provide stories from across the border just 15 kilometres away. This changed when Za’atari was declared full by the camp management and Syrians arriving in Jordan were sheltered in Azraq camp that opened at the end of April 2014. Azraq, from its outset, had much stricter regulations for journalists and interviewing families was a much more controlled process.

Events inside Za’atari also met the news values in that, ‘The more negative the event in its consequences, the more probable that it will become a news item’.

Incidents of unrest, violence and sexual harassment all fed the media agenda. It was an abnormal environment: a camp that grew out of the desert within months and by March 2013 was being referred to as Jordan’s fifth largest town. Regular high-profile visitors and elites, from actress Angelina Jolie to the US Secretary of State, John Kerry, also contributed to the regular media coverage, despite the fact that only 15 per cent of the Syrian refugee population lived in Za’atari. It was very challenging to convince journalists to cover stories outside of the camp. There were concerted efforts by a number of aid agencies to do this but with few results, particularly during the earlier days of the camp.

The Za’atari child

The first phase of media coverage includes the period from the opening of the camp until early 2014. During this timeframe, Za’atari became synonymous through the media, for being a lawless place where children ran riot and harboured thoughts of revenge on their return to Syria. ‘We are going to kill them with our knives, just like they killed us’, eleven-year-old Ibtisam is cited as saying in one New York Times article titled, ‘Syrian Children Offer Glimpse of a Future of Reprisals’. This early media discourse portrays children in a more aggressive and threatening manner, young people who were not only responsible for playing a role in the instability of the camp but who were looking to fuel the fight back home. ‘Young Refugees to Haunt MidEast for Years’, reported Mark MacKinnon for Canada’s Globe and Mail. While Catherine Philp’s UK Times story led with, ‘Children are Groomed for War in Huge Refugee Camp’.

The attention-grabbing headlines may not be surprising but within the main body of the articles, the portrayal of children often reflects the pre-existing frames that
Jaap Van Ginneken notes as being critical to media producers and consumers in their understanding of the world. Philp writes about meeting a boy playing computer games on the camp’s main street. ‘Counter Strike, has become the most populous diversion for the thousands of young, restless boys of Za’atari refugee camp. “It teaches us how to fight jihad”, nine-year-old Mohammed is quoted as saying. MacKinnon also uses the computer game analogy:

Counterstrike, which pits terrorists against counterterrorists. Players watch over the barrel of a virtual assault rifle as bullets slash through virtual enemies. Also, because the computers are connected, kids can divide into teams and recreate ‘Regime against Rebels’.

The article goes on to explain how another child is waiting for his chance to join the jihad, following a question to the boy about how the war is going. The link in the articles between violent computer games and the conflict that the children lead is in some ways pertinent. It highlights an example of what Galtung and Ruge call ‘cultural proximity’ that helps to engage an audience. ‘That is, the event-scanner [audience] will pay particular attention to the familiar, to the culturally similar, and the culturally distant will be passed by more easily and not be noticed.’ Parents geographically removed from the Syrian crisis can identify with this image being played out in their own homes. But while a European or North American child plays the game for fun, the children in Za’atari prepare themselves for jihad, framing Syrian children within the global terrorism narrative. As David Altheide notes, terrorism has become a dominant frame surrounding many cultural and institutional narratives, which produces a code for the ‘fear of the other’. With media texts a part of our world, this positioning may not be surprising, ‘for these texts and images are social phenomena and often part of the debate about society going on in the world.’ The language used influences how we talk or think about a subject and as Suzanne Franks has highlighted, public awareness about humanitarian disasters is primarily defined by the media, which is why the discourse used in representing Syrian children is so important. When Philp’s story was read by a Jordanian aid worker in the camp the response was, ‘This presents a twisted version of the reality in Za’atari.’ He was particularly surprised by the jihad reference stating that it was quite normal for children to play the game for fun, as opposed to the article’s more sinister insinuation. This framing is maybe predictable, as Jean Seaton notes, ‘stories news-makers construct are often shaped by a limited range of established narratives into which diverse and real events are fitted.’ In some articles, quotes from aid workers were used to help explain why children behaved in a more aggressive manner: ‘Such profound stress can be mind-altering, especially for young brains, which switch off simply to survive … They can’t determine risk anymore and when they get angry they have no ability to control these impulses,’ a child protection officer is quoted as saying. While this provides valuable context, it could be argued that the overall framing of the article
around children’s determination to exact revenge already presented children as complicit in the violence. On some occasions, the concerns raised by humanitarian organisations played in to this narrative. For example, one aid worker is quoted as saying, ‘I’m afraid of the kids here’.

The Syrian population crossing into Jordan presented a different image of children affected by humanitarian crises. The ‘Live Aid Legacy’ visual, of ‘starving children with flies around their eyes,’ wouldn’t fit the narrative, nor was the reality, for Syrian children in Za’atari. They were not poverty-stricken or malnourished but were from the working- and middle-class communities of towns and villages across Syria. They were living a childhood like any other children, most were attending school in a country that had a 97 per cent enrolment rate before the conflict. But they were now deeply traumatised from their experiences of conflict and displacement. This is an important consideration when it comes to the aid agency response and media discourse from Za’atari. Education and child protection issues came to the forefront, two sectors that are often not prioritised, particularly when it comes to funding. For example, prior to the Syrian crisis education in emergencies received on average just 2 per cent of humanitarian aid funds. In this new environment, aid agencies focused on raising awareness about the education and child protection issues affecting Syrian children. The ‘No Lost Generation’ initiative was one example of this work. The campaign included multiple partners and was designed to highlight the critical needs of getting Syrian children back to school, as well as ‘to help them heal from the horrors of war and displacement and to better engage young people in the issues affecting them.’ The initiative was to act as an early warning message about the long-term impact of a whole generation of children growing up through conflict, at the same time there was a clear fundraising goal to support the two sectors of often underfunded humanitarian assistance. The language used in the ‘No Lost Generation’ initiative is one of urgency. ‘An entire generation of Syrian children and youth are living through conflict and displacement. They are on the verge of being a lost generation.’ The warnings balanced with a sense of hope, ‘But against all odds, children and youth are not giving up on their dreams and aspirations’, and a call for support, ‘We all must do more to provide them with opportunities to heal, to learn and to thrive again.’ The discourse was used in varying degrees across a number of media reports. ‘A Lost Generation: Young Syrian Refugees Struggle to Survive,’ led a New York Times article by Jodi Rudoren, the story reflecting some of the key concerns raised by aid agencies about the futures of Syrian children.

These children, the next lost generation, make up a particularly troubling category of collateral damage from Syria’s chaotic conflict, which has left 70,000 people dead. There is Ahmad Ojan, fourteen, who wanted to be a teacher, but now spends his days peddling tea in Jordan’s sprawling Za’atari refugee camp. And there is Marwa Hutaba, fifteen, who still hopes to be a pharmacist, but is increasingly worried she might be married off to a wealthy foreigner – like the fourteen-year-old who disappeared from school after ‘getting engaged one day and married the next.’
Freelance journalist Stephanie Parker, who reported for the *New York Times*, stated that, ‘I’m very aware of the No Lost Generation initiative. In the series of stories that I wrote revolving around refugees I used the spirit of the program and the importance of it without directly referencing the campaign.’ While Parker knew about the initiative, many other journalists did not but the essence of a ‘Lost Generation’ of Syrian children was picked up in many articles. The involvement of multiple aid agencies in the initiative, at a headquarters, regional and country level, helped create a common discourse when talking about education and child protection issues with the media. ‘Inside a Refugee Camp with Syria’s “Lost Generation”’ led a NBC News story. While the headline implied that it was too late for the children, the article reflected the essence of the issue. ‘Gassem and Jalal have not stopped thinking about the future. Even though he is too intimidated to attend school in the crowded camp full of strangers, Gassem dreams of one day becoming a doctor.’ The No Lost Generation initiative played a role in framing the education and child protection issues in Za’atari within the media. This is not to say that the news selection process was necessarily influenced, for as Silvio Waisboard notes, there are so many determining factors along the media chain. But the common discourse helped aid agencies to present one voice around the relevant issues when working with media.

**The shifting media narrative and evolving conditions on the ground**

As time progressed, it was clear that the conflict in Syria was not going to be resolved soon. Life in Za’atari became more routine and stable, with an increasing sense of semi-permanence in the camp. By early 2014, a shift in the nature of media coverage can be identified, with articles that looked more at the resolve of children and their active involvement in camp life, as opposed to direct association with the conflict back home or violence within Za’atari itself. The hard news giving way to an increasingly features-led approach, for example ‘The Secret Gardens of Syria’s Refugee Camps’ in which children and their parents are involved in a gardening project organised by the NGO, Save the Children, to ‘start building just a bit of hope and happiness.’ Or the children who enrol in taekwondo classes and are featured in a documentary and Buzzfeed article, ‘a surprisingly uplifting story in the midst of all this tragedy.’ The case of then fourteen-year-old Muzoon is another example. ‘Syrian Teen is Called “the Malala of Za’atari”’, ran a CNN edition headline. ‘We can help and improve our nation with education,’ Muzoon is quoted as saying. While there is recognition of the desperate situation that many Syrian children face, the story focuses on the childhood dreams of one young girl. ‘Days go by, and an end to the Syrian crisis does not seem near, but [Muzoon], who dreams of someday becoming a journalist, is already thinking of better days for her country’s future,’ reports Alvarado. The work behind this story provides an interesting example of the intersection between aid agencies and journalists. In the summer of 2013, Muzoon was part of a team of girls who went from home to hometrying to convince children and their parents to enrol
them for school.54 An articulate and inspiring girl, Muzoon played a key role in advocating for children to continue their education in the camp. For media she was an obvious choice and Muzoon spoke to a number of news outlets but it was following the visit of global education advocate, Malala Yousafzai, with whom she spent a day in the camp in February 2014 that journalists would specifically ask to talk with her (see figure 8.1). The focus on Muzoon by the media meant she played a critical role in changing the discourse around young people’s issues. But the relationship with the media had to be carefully managed by aid agencies. Resentment within the community, a perception of preferential treatment and a lack of opportunity for other girls were some of the issues that had to be addressed.

Another example of the shift in media portrayal of children is an audio photo essay, ‘Through Teenagers’ Eyes: Unique Snapshots of Syrian Refugee Life’, featured by BBC Online.55 The content focused on a project run by the charity, Save the Children, that included the work of Syrian teenagers in photographing their lives in Za’atari. The BBC on this occasion published prepackaged content. ‘I want to be a famous photojournalist and travel the world,’ says Khaled.56 ‘The children struck me as being very optimistic for their situation,’ adds photographer Michael Christopher Brown, who worked with the children. The involvement of an internationally renowned photographer may well have helped in the placement but the

Figure 8.1 Malala Yousafzai at the camp
voices presented here are a far cry from the sentiment of the children who expressed their desire for jihad in the earlier articles reviewed. While it can be expected that content produced by an aid agency about one of its projects would focus more on the positives, it was still exposed to the news selection process, as part of the BBC’s coverage.

It is important at this point to revisit the issue of access, as a factor in the evolving media coverage of children’s issues in Za’atari. As mentioned earlier, media permits to access the camp were granted relatively easily during the first phase of reporting and journalists were freer to come and go. The conditions on the ground meant that reporters could take more time, or the amount allocated by their organisation, to identify their stories and the children to interview. But this changed in late 2013 and the earlier reporting, perceived as more sensationalist, was a contributing factor. The process for acquiring media permits for Za’atari became more stringent and, when granted access, journalists were only allowed two days to report from the camp before having to apply again. This played a role in changing the working relationship between journalists and aid agencies on the ground. The portrayal of children in Za’atari during phase one of coverage, from potential jihadists to the camp’s number one troublemakers, had a direct impact on families living there. As Linda Polman highlights, ‘Most refugee camps have TVs that can pick up CNN, so refugees see how “we” portray victims’. While Za’atari residents were not watching CNN, they were viewing other satellite channels in 2013. There was also access to the internet through phones and many residents were in regular contact with relatives both inside Syria and further afield. The high profile presence of media in the camp from the outset had been tolerated by most people in the camp. While some were not willing to talk with journalists, or be photographed, for fear of repercussions on family members back home and because they were expecting to return to Syria, others wanted to tell the world their stories in the hope of more outside support. But as more reporters came to Za’atari and the situation inside Syria got worse, residents became less tolerant of what they perceived as a negative portrayal of Syrians in the camp, including children. Coverage of the so-called pleasure marriage story became particularly problematic.

The story of pleasure marriages was based on Syrian women and girls who were being married off to older men, the majority of whom were reported to have come from Gulf countries. These marriages would then be annulled within a couple of months or weeks, as the men left, so in effect a form of prostitution. ‘In a Jordan Camp, Outsiders Seek Syrian Brides’, reported the Washington Post. While the Daily Telegraph highlighted how Syrian girls were being sold into ‘forced marriages’. ‘The “dowry”, which in Muslim society is traditionally paid by the groom as a guarantee of the bride’s security, has become a payment for sex. And the “marriage”, is an affair that lasts only a few days or even hours’, the article explained. These pleasure marriage narrative was predominant in the first phase of media coverage and was a very sensitive subject in the camp. An Agence France Presse article featured a father...
who explained that he had no choice but to marry off his teenage daughter to a forty-year-old Saudi man.\textsuperscript{60} The report also highlighted how a group of activists in the camp were trying to stop the marriages. \textquoteleft\textquoteleft We launched a revolution to win back our dignity,\textquoteright\textquoteright Naimi said. \textquoteleft\textquoteleft We are not going to surrender it for a dowry.\textquoteright\textquoteright These emotions would soon have an impact on the work of journalists in the camp. Aid agencies spoke about their concerns of the reported pleasure marriage practice but had few hard facts to add to the story. \textquoteleft We have seen no evidence of prostitution in the camp, but we have heard rumors of it,\textquoteright the head of the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR) in Jordan, Andrew Harper, was cited as saying in an Associated Press article.\textsuperscript{61} \textquoteleft Given the vulnerability of women, the camp's growing population and the lack of resources, I'm not surprised that some may opt for such actions,\textquoteright he added.

In a number of quotes on the issue, Harper framed the problem around a need for more financial support for aid agencies, so that families could be better assisted and as a result were not driven to such desperate measures. When journalists reported on the story, they would often source the affected girls in the camp themselves. One of the first locations to visit was the wedding dress shop on Za'atari's market street. A steady stream of reporters went to take photographs and conduct interviews. But there was growing frustration amongst residents about the way media were portraying Syrian girls. When a TV crew from Al-Arabiya arrived on the camp's market road in October 2013, rumors spread that they were focusing on a pleasure marriage story, and they were subsequently attacked and had to be escorted to safety by Jordanian police.\textsuperscript{62} In late 2013, the Jordanian authorities reduced the permitted reporting time in Za'atari to two days per visit and journalists were required to leave the camp by 3 p.m. each day. With less time, this meant an increased reliance on aid agencies to access stories and families in the camp. But this development also came at a time when aid agencies had to be more careful than ever when accompanying journalists around the camp. It could be problematic to be associated with media who were perceived to be contributing to the negative image of Syrian girls and residents of the camp as a whole, or media outlets whose governments took a particular political stance. For example, some families in Za'atari would not talk with Chinese or Russian media, given their countries' backing of the Syrian government. While aid workers were building stronger relationships with people in Za'atari and given their long-term presence on the ground, they did not want to jeopardise this. As Kimberly Abbot notes, \textquoteleft\textquoteleft The lives of staff members, especially nationals, can be endangered, if reporters they accompany are associated with the \textquoteleft\textquoteleft wrong side\textquoteright\textquoteright or are reporting in what is seen as a more exploitative manner.\textquoteright\textquoteright But media embedding with aid agencies that would normally be more prominent in the first acute phase of an emergency, became more common and critical, as reporters were time restricted. Aid agencies could provide journalists with quick access to stories and an overview of the problems and issues. Working with journalists in covering sensitive issues, such as the pleasure marriage story, was
important in other ways. Despite not being able to add specific facts or information about the pleasure marriage phenomenon, supporting reporters who would cover the story anyhow could help to better protect and support children and families interviewed. A specific handbook for journalists was produced with guidance on ‘Reporting on Gender-Based Violence in the Syrian Crisis’, which highlights how ‘child marriage is not always perceived as a “real” form of gender-based violence, so journalists can be unscrupulous in sharing details, including pictures of young brides’. By being involved in the newsgathering process, child protection workers can help to create a more protective environment. For example, framing questions in a more sensitive way and through providing follow-up support to the child after their interview. Freelance reporter, Stephanie Parker, noted that:

> Agencies did have a big impact on how I reported because organisations like UNICEF acted as a gatekeeper, protector, or armed guard of the children if you will. This protection type attitude made me feel comfortable and at ease about how the children were being treated and grateful that they wanted to speak to me about their family life and circumstance.

### From pleasure to early marriage

The coverage of the so-called pleasure and early marriage issue provides a deeper insight into the evolving narrative between phase one and two of reporting from the camp. The pleasure marriage story became newsworthy in the earlier days of Za’atari, as the issue fitted well into the news frame. It was an event, whereby a girl is married and then the so-called marriage is relatively quickly annulled. This is important, as Jake Lynch and Johan Galtung note, the rhythm of news is punctual, based on events not processes that take more time to evolve and reveal where they are headed. The pleasure marriage story also demands attention of readers because it ‘crashes through routine order’. Young girls from a religious conservative background are sold off to rich men from the Gulf. For international readers, this is a shocking consequence of the refugee crisis. The media spotlight, in the pursuit of readers, ratings and revenue, is, as Cottle and Nolan note, drawn selectively to images of distress rather than issues of structural disadvantage, in which early marriage would more clearly fit. The portrayal of Syrian girls, as being exploited through the pleasure marriage narrative, was a factor that changed the working conditions for journalists on the ground and, as highlighted, potentially played a role in complicating media access to Za’atari. By early 2014, media coverage of the issue evolved to look in more depth at the practice of early marriage amongst the Syrian refugee population. While both pleasure and early marriage are classified as gender-based violence and detrimental to the futures and health of the girls involved, the nuances between the two are important. They are fundamentally different issues that require different types of responses. As Mukkaram Odeh notes:
The crisis complicated this problem [early marriage] even more because of the lack of safety and stability. It increased fears regarding economic challenges and harassment, and many refugee families believe that their daughters will be safer if they are married.70

While there were financial considerations, there was a sense amongst some families that it was in the best interest of their girls to marry younger, and in the majority of cases to men within their own community.71 The pleasure marriage story, however, was driven by a narrative of exploitation. When new statistics on the extent of early marriage amongst Syrian girls were verified in mid-2014 it provided an opportunity for aid agencies to present a more in-depth picture. The release of two new reports by UNICEF and Save the Children were timed to coincide with the 2014 ‘Girl Summit’, hosted by the UK government and UNICEF in London. The gathering aimed to push for concrete commitments to end child, early and forced marriage and female genital mutilation for girls everywhere.72 The UNICEF report, ‘A Study on Early Marriage in Jordan, 2014’, showed the rate of child marriages amongst Syrian refugees in the country increased from 18 per cent of total marriages in 2012, to 32 per cent in 2014 while ‘Too Young to Wed’ focused more on case studies and stories of girls who had married early.73 The new statistics and information in the reports, including quotes from affected girls, were picked up by a range of media. The Guardian highlighted the increasing numbers of girls marrying early and the subsequent impact, ‘Child marriage among Syrian refugees in Jordan has more than doubled since the start of the conflict, leaving girls vulnerable to health problems, domestic abuse and poverty, the UN has warned’. The article went on to identify the factors responsible for children marrying early, as well as further depth into the long-term impact. ‘They [girls] also have more limited economic opportunities due to loss of schooling and can get trapped in a vicious cycle of poverty’, the UNICEF Jordan Representative was quoted as saying.74 ‘Child marriages double among Syria refugees in Jordan’, reported Agence France Presse, while Buzzfeed used photos of drawings produced by Syrian girls in Za’atari to raise awareness about the dangers of child marriage.75 The article presented a more creative and visual way to tell the story. The communications products to accompany the new reports were produced to target media outlets and conform to the known dispositions of news organisations.76 A process that Natalie Fenton refers to as ‘“news cloning” that mimics, or indeed matches, the requirements of mainstream news agendas’, but does not mean that aid agencies ‘have managed to change news agendas and challenge normative conceptions of news criteria’.77 Cottle and Nolan believe that by working in this way aid agencies ‘practically detract from their principal remit of humanitarian provision and symbolically fragment the historically founded ethic of universal humanitarianism’.78 However, in the case of the early marriage reports and related communications products, it renewed focus and presented an opportunity to advocate for more support to tackle the issue, whilst providing additional context and reporting in a more dignified way for the girls and families affected. This is particularly important, as media attention of early marriage
had mixed consequences. ‘Syrian girls and their families reported feeling that the media contributed to a negative perception of Syrian women and girls, and sometimes reacted by increasing isolation and control over young women.’

There was a spike in coverage of the early marriage story around the ‘Girl Summit’ and the reports also led to follow-up coverage from journalists in subsequent months, for example an article by the New York Times, ‘In Jordan, Ever Younger Syrian Brides’, that looked in depth at the issue. ‘The girl, Rahaf Yousef, is 13. Speaking wistfully of her days at school, she declared herself throughout the day to be “indifferent” to the marriage she says will keep her from finishing her education. But no one seemed to be listening.’ The article went on to include some of the ongoing efforts to tackle the rising trend:

‘By the time they reach us, they are in a dire strait – legally, mentally, physically.’

While the pleasure marriage story was important to cover and may have been a more compelling, simplistic and attention-grabbing narrative, as with the children awaiting their chance to join the jihād, it was far from the full picture.

**Conclusion**

The international media narrative covering children in Za’atari camp evolved as time progressed, from one where Syrian children were portrayed as more aggressive and threatening, to a representation that focused more on their resolve and aspirations. The potential influence of aid agencies on this discourse is one of a number of factors to consider, given that many mechanisms intervene to shape the news. The shift in the discourse reflected life in the camp, as the days became more stable and routine, while the aid operation evolved from an acute emergency operation into a more systematic response. But the loss of trust between the Za’atari population and journalists, as a result of what was perceived as negative media coverage, particularly around the pleasure marriage issue, led to tougher working conditions for reporters. There were direct attacks against journalists and access became harder when the media accreditation process was made more stringent, including a reduction in the time allowed to report from the camp. With less flexibility, there was more of a reliance on aid agencies to source people and stories and as a result a greater role in the newsgathering process.

The Syrian refugee crisis presented a new image of children and young people fleeing war. Working- and middle-class populations forced to flee their houses and apartments for the relative safety of what became the largest refugee camp across the region. While living conditions were tough, it was the loss of education and ongoing psychological recovery from exposure to conflict and displacement that would have
the most immediate and mid- to long-term impact on children. Initiatives such as ‘No Lost Generation’ were designed to raise awareness and more funds for these traditionally underfunded sectors of humanitarian work. The discourse used in the campaign was meant to appeal to media and to present the challenges but also the hope and aspirations of Syrian children affected. The nuance of the language arguably in some cases played into the more negative outlook for Syrian children but the essence of supporting a generation of children to regain their childhood helped to frame the education and protection issues at the forefront of the response. As time went on, media articles in phase two of coverage had an increasingly features-led approach and looked more at children’s involvement in camp life and what it meant for their lives. This was in contrast to earlier reporting, where Syrian children were framed within narratives that emerged as part of the so-called ‘War on Terror’.82

This chapter argues that aid agencies can help to provide the extra context required for more sophisticated coverage of issues affecting children during humanitarian crises. This is seen more clearly in the later media reports from Za’atari, as the evolving pleasure to early marriage story highlights. As Abbott notes, NGO and media partnerships are a reality and can lead to stronger foreign news reporting that better serves audiences in our interconnected world.83 In today’s society, where the fear of the other is often reflected in media narratives, I would argue that aid agencies have an even more critical role to play, or even a moral obligation, to amplify the voices of children affected, so that they are not drowned out.84 The media presents an important opportunity to advocate for the rights of the children affected, to contribute to public education and to support fundraising efforts. While aid agencies have clear goals and aims, the information provided should add to and be a natural part of the story. When aid workers are part of the news process they can also help to better protect children and encourage more ethical reporting on sensitive and traumatic subjects. The media portrayal of Syrian children in Za’atari is so critical because the language used provides us with not just a mode of interaction but also with a capacity for representation.85 As the Syrian refugee crisis subsequently spread to Europe, it was in turn followed by a narrative of fear and negativity that often failed to take into account the impact of the situation on children. The effects of this discourse – similar to those prominent in the early days of the Za’atari camp – are now being felt across the world.

Notes
Aid agencies and the portrayal of children

7 Bowen, The Arab Uprisings.
8 The reference to aid agencies in this chapter refers to United Nations agencies and local and international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) working in Zaatari refugee camp.
21 R. Sweis, Interview with the author, 15 June 2016.
28 Philp, Children are Groomed for War in Huge Refugee Camp.
29 MacKinnon, Why Young Syrian Refugees will Haunt the Mideast for Decades to Come.
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33 P. Altheide, Terror Post 9/11 and the Media (New York: Peter Lang, 2009).
36 Discussion with Abdul Majeed, UNICEF Jordan staff member in Zaatari refugee camp.
38 Philp, ‘Children are Groomed for War in Huge Refugee Camp’.
39 MacKinnon, ‘Why Young Syrian Refugees will Haunt the Middle East for Decades to Come’.
44 See http://nolostgeneration.org/partners. Accessed 18 June 2016. The ‘No Lost Generation’ initiative includes multiple partners working on the Syrian and Iraqi crises across the region including: United Nations agencies and international and local NGOs, as well as governments, international donors, private sector and the young people themselves who are so affected by the crises in Syria and Iraq.
47 P. Alvarado, ‘Syrian Teen is Called the Malala of Zaatari’ CNN International (18 April 2014), http://cnn.it/RgrtWv. Accessed 5 June 2016. Malala Yousafzai the Pakistani schoolgirl who was shot on her way to school in 2009 and was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize five years later for her work in campaigning for girls’ education.
50 All children’s names were changed on the original photo essay to protect identities.
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65 S. Parker, interview with the author, 29 June 2016.
66 Lynch and Galtung, Reporting Conflict, p. 18.
67 Seaton, Carnage and the Media.
69 United Nations Population Fund, Reporting on Gender-Based Violence in the Syria Crisis.
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Selling the lottery to earn salvation: Journalism practice, risk and humanitarian communication

Jairo Lugo-Ocando and Gabriel Andrade

Regarding the need of an effective humanitarian communication that can politically assist mobilisation and public engagement, many scholarly works have focused upon the ability of the news media to create regimes of pity in order to mobilise the public towards humanitarian causes.¹ Some authors have gone further to say that if audiences are passive and uninterested, sometimes the media have to stand in for them, and agitate on their behalf.² The key argument of those who advocate for these regimes is that they enable empathy and solidarity by means of emotions.

However, pity has been subject to criticism by some authors.³ Philosophers of a Nietzschean strand, for example, believe that pity is in fact a corrosive emotion, deeply inculcated in our culture by Judaism and Christianity and more recently shared by socialist ideologies.⁴ In their view, pity is not a proper way to promote others’ wellbeing, in as much as it diminishes the other person’s potential for self-reliance. To a certain extent, we tend to agree with this stance as in our view these regimes of pity tend to obviate, all too often, the power relations between those who suffer and the spectators.⁵

In this context, charity events promoted as ‘media events’ have become spectacles in themselves (e.g. concerts such as Live Aid, in 1985), and although they may serve the public good in the short term – i.e. by raising funds for a particular campaign – in the long term they actually contribute to further detachment from moral concerns.⁶ Moreover, such events contribute to shape what philosopher Guy Debord called the ‘spectacle society’; this to the point that victims of suffering become themselves objects of entertainment.⁷ To put it bluntly, these charity actions give ‘black’ children in Africa their fifteen minutes of fame while reassuring once again the quasi-messianic role of the ‘white man’s burden’ in the international system by means of international aid.⁸

What is needed instead, as we argue here, is a type of news coverage that creates a specific type of political solidarity. One which makes individuals at both sides of the screens see each other as equals and as having the same rights and which does not reproduce the same type of power relations that have been prevalent until now.
in most news narratives and humanitarian campaigns. In order to achieve this, journalism practice requires to set aside the sense of power and certainty that articulates in its news narratives and adopt instead a view of 'shared risk' in which people embrace equally concerns about a common future, therefore calling into play the principle of average utility.9 Our thesis is that by doing this, 'risk' could be journalistically narrativised as a more rational process in our daily lives rather than just be assumed in terms of irrational 'fear'. One which advances a shared view of society that is equally empathetic to challenges such as poverty and environment.

To us this is possible because the notion of societal risk tends to create the type of collective uncertainty that brings about political action in ways that pity regimes do not. In other words, individuals who do not know what their position in society might be in the future are more willing to undertake the type of actions that will address the underlying collective issues that affect our society. In relation to this, Pierre Rosanvallon has pointed out that in times of uncertainty ‘we all become equals’.10 By this he suggests that individuals are more willing to subordinate their individual aims and aspirations, and make sacrifices, if they perceive that what is in play could also affect them both as an individual and as a community.11

This is not only a theoretical assumption. In fact, some audience research has showed that in news beats such as the environment, the notion of collective risk is able to trigger political action amongst larger segments of society than other issues of public concern.12 This because the notion of risk is closely linked to vulnerability and therefore if articulated properly it conveys a real possibility that could affect anyone as an individual regardless of their current social status. In those cases, as this body of research indicates, there is a greater chance that people might be willing to engage and sacrifice individual prerogatives, go against individual interests and support collective responses towards reducing the risks posed to them.

In order to explain how this notion of risk could be incorporated into journalism practice, we need however to first explain the link between collective risk and individual action in the context of social vulnerability. In this sense, the late philosopher John Rawls pointed out that when the parties are deprived of all knowledge of their personal characteristics and social and historical circumstances, their conception of justice becomes one that advances their interests in establishing better conditions for all. Rawls contends that the most rational choice for the parties in the original position are two principles of justice: The first principle guarantees the equal basic rights and liberties needed to secure the fundamental interests of free and equal citizens and to pursue a wide range of conceptions of the good. The second principle provides fair equality of opportunities and it secures for all a guaranteed minimum of all-purpose means. In other words, according to this principle if ‘I’, as an individual, ignore the situation I will be in danger in the near future. Consequently, ‘I’ am more inclined to opt for a more redistributive social welfare policy because it could be the case that ‘I’ will need to make use of it at some point in the face of the uncertainty around my own circumstances.
It is by no means absolutely clear, however, how we should understand ‘equality of opportunities’ in this context, and what policies can ensure it. At some basic level, ‘equality of opportunities’ implies equality in terms of the law, something that was widely debated amongst different factions during the French Revolution. Indeed, liberal doctrines, such as those embedded in the constitution of the United States and which have been so influential in shaping modern journalism, frequently proclaim ‘all men are created equal’. In that tradition what this means is that no citizen shall be above the law, and that every citizen must get the same legal treatment.

Yet, there is no philosophical agreement as to what comes next. Egalitarians of a stronger bent believe that equality before the law is not just enough. Communists, for example, believe that, as long as there is no equality of outcomes, society will be unjust. In this view, everyone shall end the race, so to speak, without winners or losers. Other voices, however, prefer an intermediate approach. For them, equality of outcome is not desirable, for the simple fact that it is not fair. According to this tradition, some people do make a greater effort than others, and thus, do deserve more. They argue that equality of outcomes takes away motivation and incentives for further production, and thus, will end up hindering the total utility measure. It is precisely for this reason that Rawls did not endorse socialism or communism. Such systems of wealth distribution, end up affecting negatively even the least well-off in society. There must be winners and losers; otherwise, no one will have incentives to keep running according to Rawls.

Nevertheless, those moderated philosophers who reject equality of outcomes, would nevertheless uphold some form of wealth redistribution in order to ensure equality of opportunities. For them, the race was not fair from the start. Some runners had initially greater obstacles than others. And thus, in order to make it truly fair, these philosophers believe that some sort of wealth redistribution is necessary, in order to correct the initial disadvantages of the least well-off. For them, the institution of inheritance, for example, invites a lot of reflection about its fairness. Do inheritors deserve what they get? Is it not an additional, undeserved advantage that erodes equality of opportunity? And yet, other philosophers believe that even if, indeed, there are plenty of injustices in the world, there is not much that we can do about it, because interventions would imply a great violation of individual rights. Nozick, an example of this school of thought and who extensively debated with Rawls about these matters, challenged this point of view. He invited us to think about the injustice in the face of millions of people with defective kidneys, something they could not foresee or plan for. Does that warrant some sort of forced kidney redistribution in order to ensure a stronger equality of opportunities? Others, such as Sowell, reinforced this critique by arguing that the nation state can attempt to correct some social injustices, but it must renounce its attempts to pursue cosmic justice.

This particular debate, we fin, is crucial in addressing the transformations and changes that are taking place in the realm of humanitarian communication.
Particularly because they help explain the current tensions between journalistic narratives that emphasise palliative measures and more radical narratives around structural change, which in many ways reflect these debates. While journalism covering suffering normatively advocates for assistance and equal opportunities it nevertheless also tends to suggest that cosmic justice is unviable. That issues such as corruption, lack of institutional framework and 'civilised' political engagement in these societies are not only the root causes of the problems they face but also endemic to them. These philosophical debates also underpin another very important tension between those who see journalism as a neutral player that presents the facts to the public so they can make their own mind and those who see journalism advocating for certain causes. This is of course a false dichotomy as in both cases the ultimate goal of journalists is to achieve social justice despite normative claims of neutrality.

This tension is also present between journalists advocating for equality of outcomes and those advocating for equality of opportunities. In the context of humanitarian communication there should be no doubt, journalism is normatively committed to helping those who suffer. The weight of each of these tensions is however not equal and some are far more influential than others in shaping the news. All this in addition to, as we will discuss later, important tensions between journalism and humanitarian communication as social practices.

Overall, the dominant journalism narrativisation of humanitarian crisis is one that is currently interlocked with a rationale which assumes that if it exposes tragedy, then individuals would be more willing to donate as it sees pity as conducive to empathy and solidarity. After all, it appeals to the moral and ethical understanding that those who suffer will be assisted by those who are better off because pity will make them ‘feel’ a moral responsibility to do so. Hence, it is expected that in light of suffering, people will engage and act towards their fellow citizens as soon as this suffering is exposed on their screens.

However, it is far from clear if, in fact, the exposure to deep suffering does indeed lead to greater moral concern for the wellbeing of others or triggers political action. Furthermore, the problem is that this approach assumes that these values are universally shared, something that is also far from certain. Ths approach also has the problem that it assumes that journalists are intentionally seeking to promote this type of empathetic link between audiences and those suffering as part of their deontological practice, which again is not certain in all cases. Hence, we are left with a theoretical explanatory framework of why and how journalists narrativise suffering, which is mostly based on assumptions around normative claims and ethical aspirations that are far from universal.

Moving forward

However, our aim in this chapter is not to explain motivation and agency of the current journalism narrativisation of suffering, which in fact has been diligently
and comprehensively discussed by a series of authors.\textsuperscript{22} Instead, we want to articulate an alternative to it, in ways in which journalism could realistically, within its deontological constraints, contribute to addressing the structural problems that cause this suffering in the first place. Our thesis here is that by changing the terms of this narrativisation, journalists could still inform their publics in ways that it would make it more clear to them what that suffering means and how it links to them as individuals.

At the centre of this proposal we argue for the need to incorporate the notion of risk. By this we mean that it is possible and desirable for journalists to link the notion of the principle of average utility exposed by Rawls, given that the ‘the veil of ignorance’ would insure impartiality of the audiences’ judgement towards those in need, making them more willing to participate and engage with collective responses. Indeed, we believe that if journalism that covers human tragedy can articulate their stories within a framework that somehow manages to bring about uncertainty in the perspective of their audiences it could achieve a far more effective type of empathy; one that can be better placed to mobilise towards solidarity. Consequently, journalism, as a professional body, could then contest not only the utilitarian ethics that currently dominates humanitarian news but also overcome the restrictions imposed by the normative claims that it is there just to inform about tragedy.

Yet, in order to advance a new type of humanitarian narrative, journalists will need to re-interpret their contractual relation with society. This means revisiting the social arrangements in which they are allowed to operate semi-protected by society in exchange for performing the duty of keeping the democratic citizenship well informed in an ‘objective’ and ‘balanced’ manner. Hence, the question remains: How can journalists incorporate the notions of risk in their stories so as to foster public engagement and solidarity? Answering this question is made more difficult by the imperatives imposed by traditional news values such as that of objectivity/neutrality/detachment and by other elements related to the process of news production such as the structure that journalists commonly use to articulate news stories. The possible answer is further complicated by the emergence of a new technological landscape that in itself poses important challenges. Conversely, if we are able to provide a sound answer to this question, one that can translate into political action within the journalism profession, then we could help solve one of the key problems facing both journalists and activists working in the humanitarian field.

The problem is that Western journalism deontology relies heavily on the strand of ethical thought that promotes the idea that ethics does not need any measure of empathy. Journalism deontological ethicists advance the claim that moral action is to be performed on account of duty, regardless of how we feel about it. Accordingly, it is claimed, it is our imperative to help others in need, irrespective of whether or not we feel other people’s suffering. Furthermore, if we are motivated to help others, not on account of duty, but rather, because we feel their own pain, we would be acting immorally. This approach, traditionally associated with Immanuel Kant
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(1724–1804), is frequently viewed as too restrictive but nevertheless closely linked to journalism practice and normative claims. Indeed, as journalism ethics go, the presentation of factual evidence and data to the public should be sufficient to allow them to make a rational decision. This decision is expectedly one that should underpin solidarity given the fact that it is assumed that audiences would feel a moral duty to act, irrespective of whether they feel the pain of others or not.

What type of risk?

Generally speaking, the reporting of risk and vulnerability in the context of humanitarian crises remains an area that is largely under-researched. This is so, despite calls from scholars such as Simon Cottle who in 1998 pointed out the need to embrace in media studies the notion of the ‘risk society’. Moreover, the notion of risk within globalisation has been duly noted by authors such as Beck, Peter Bernstein, Niklas Luhmann and Rifkin, amongst others. According to Anthony Giddens, our society is increasingly preoccupied with the future, something that pushes to the centre stage the notion of risk. Historically speaking, the notion of risk derives from the uncertainties that modernity has created. It is overall different from how we, as a society, viewed risk in the past when risk was accepted and even embraced as an unavoidable part of life. The arrival of modernity has instead co-opted risk into the sphere of fear and today, far from accepting the odds of destiny (to paraphrase Sophocles), we now seem to live under the threat of uncertainty.

In this sense, the advent of the ‘market society’, which Karl Polanyi refers to, marked a fundamental change in the mentality of humankind towards risk. For Niklas Luhmann, the rationalisation of ‘risk’ in terms of the market had an important effect on the way it is defined by society. Th s meant that over the following years, a utilitarian notion of risk took over; one which equated to fear and that became prevalent. In our times we see and narrativise risk as a pervasive threat. Yet, and despite this narrativisation, risk needs to be valued and understood in different ways. Rawls, for example, recommends a safety net and a welfare state that may support the least well-off, by making the rational calculation that, if we did not know what our position will be (i.e. if we were under the veil of ignorance), we would avert risk. In such a manner, we would ensure that the least well-off would be properly attended. The core element of this view around risk is that it introduces the notion of ‘prudential social morality’. Certainly, the idea of mutually beneficial co-operation underpins the Rawlsian original position on ‘justice fairness’, one that is supported by the tradition of humans coming together, collectively, to face risk.

This contrasts sharply with what professional journalism does in regards to the coverage of distant suffering as it tends to individualise the responses to risk, particularly in relation to suffering. Thenarrativisation of suffering is in fact characterised by ‘assistencialism’, that is ‘individuals extending the hand to other individuals’ in the context of voluntary and charity efforts. Because of this, most news stories gravitate
around ‘intervention’ from the helping hand of the West, which invariably comes to
the rescue of those in need. However, the root causes of suffering are rarely discussed
in these reports, which keep recycling prevalent explanatory frameworks about why
these people suffer.33

Foreign intervention in the face of distant suffering is central in the journalistic
narrativisation of suffering because it is mostly presented as an event that seems only
to affect those in developing countries. Journalistic advocacy then concentrates upon
the need to guarantee that palliatives – i.e. donations and foreign aid – are in place
to assist the individuals, while efforts are made to reduce ‘compassion fatigue’ by
increasing the tone and dramatic features when reporting suffering and emphasising
the theatricality in the style.34 In this way, journalists covering famine, natural
disasters or war try to create a link between the ‘distant’ suffering that happens to
‘others’ and those at home watching the news. Risk, in these terms, is a notion that
remains detached and abstract to those in the West.

However, in the past few years the political context has been changing. Massive
waves of migration, the financial crisis of 2008 and the increasing terrorist threats
in the West have suddenly brought risk home. Indeed, journalism faces a new and
unprecedented context in which traditional explanatory frameworks and narratives
are becoming unviable. The transformation of humanitarian communication, which
Lilie Choulakari refers to, is setting new and more demanding parameters
for reporters, who now need to question more critically structural reasons for that
suffering and go beyond the comfort zone offered by the neutrality of charity work
and aid.35

Re-narrativising suffering

The transformation of humanitarian communication is in fact creating important
tensions within journalism practice. On the one hand, we find that traditional normative
claims of balance and detachment when reporting the suffering of others are
increasingly tested by the ever-closer links between journalists, corporations, NGOs
and governments in the face of news production deficits and the increasing role of
public relations.36 On the other, we find that the depoliticisation and fragmentation
of audiences and dislocation of the news media landscape is pushing the ability of
journalists to connect with their audiences to the extremes. In both cases, these
tensions create a situation in which traditional narratives towards suffering seemed
exhausted or are quickly undermined.

Take for example the news coverage of famines and how it mostly remains
anchored in reporting of these events within the regimes of pity. In these cases, the
ability of the news media to mobilise the publics has become limited and ineffective.
The ‘compassion fatigue’ which Moeller speaks about is a situational variable,
rather than a personality trait in which contemporary media coverage contributes
decisively to exhaust people’s engagement with social problems.37 In other words,
people get saturated and feel disempowered hence feel the need to detach themselves from the issues being reported. This is particularly aggravated by the recurrent coverage of issues that seem to be never resolved. The charity sectors, multilateral agencies and the media fall into the trap of intensifying the coverage both in terms of frequency and dramatic exposure with the hope that this would re-engage the audience. This, of course, rarely happens and it rather ends up exhausting even more the audiences, who then seem to completely disengage from international humanitarian issues.

To overcome these tensions journalism ought to redefine its approach to humanitarian news. In our view, this will require incorporating the notion of risk. To do so, journalists will need to make sure that what they report relates to the individuals at the other side of the screens. This relationship needs to be based upon creating awareness around shared risk by asking key questions about how the distant suffering affects all. However, is it really realistic to expect that people in the global North understand, assume and feel risk in the same manner as people in the global South? After all, those living in the North live in conditions that make it very unlikely that they will ever have to confront the same type of humanitarian risks as those in the South, and chances are they never will.

To advance the discussion let us refer first to what we know about people's attitudes towards probability and the key questions posed by the average utility principle by asking some basic questions: Am I likely to need humanitarian assistance? Is tragedy likely to happen to me as an individual? And how likely is it to happen to me? To explore this, let us invert the situation from negative risk (that is the risk of losing) to positive risk (ergo the probability of winning). In relation to this, research on lottery consumption confirms that heavy players are found to have less income and to fantasise more than light players. These heavy lottery players are also more prone to risk-taking. So, those who have less tend to take more risks with their disposable income while those who have higher incomes tend to be more risk-adverse (at least in relation to the probability of winning). Another important finding in this body of research is the phenomenon of 'anticipatory regret', that is those who buy the lottery because they would find it intolerable to discover their regular numbers had been drawn when they had not purchased a ticket. That is, people who play the lottery are not inclined to take the risk of missing out on winning.

We refer to the lottery case as it perfectly exemplifies our argument, that despite having a low probability, people nevertheless are convinced by media campaigns and advertising to buy the lottery because 'it could be you' (although some also buy it for charity reasons). This, to us, provides a window of opportunity to explore the narrativisation of risk within humanitarian communication and particularly in relation to journalism covering suffering. Indeed, if media campaigns and advertisement are able to convince people to buy the lottery despite minimum probability of winning, why can't we do the same in relation to convincing people to invest in the same way their disposable income in the face of losing in a possible humanitarian crisis?
The first challenge we would face would be to take the journalistic narrative to a meta-geographic level. Reporters covering in Africa, Asia and Latin America tend to create common codes when reporting events such as the economy or national elections. So political parties are narrativised as being on the ‘left’ or on the ‘right’ while a variety of economic systems tend to be amalgamated into free-market or state-run. This allows the audiences to understand those aspects of those societies in similar terms to their own and draw, for example, conclusions to their own realities. Consequently, by reading the coverage of places such as Zimbabwe and Venezuela (with their economies crumbling), readers are left with the risk-awareness that voting for pro-state-run economy parties could do the same to their own societies. This, however, does not happen in the case of humanitarian disasters where very few common codes between audiences and events are created, therefore limiting any bridges that could create similar patterns of risk-awareness. Instead, what we find is news coverage that overemphasises geographical distance.

This spatial detachment is key in limiting the ability of audiences to see and feel the proximity of humanitarian risk, which is why journalistic narratives tend to focus on individuals who are connected. Hence, a US news media outlet reporting a hurricane in Bangladesh will highlight if there were any US citizens killed or injured, a UK outlet reporting a tsunami in Samoa would do the same, and so on. However, proximity in the news media is already in many occasions a meta-geographical criterion in the selection and narrativation of news. This is because the risk-awareness links – epitomised in the notion ‘that could happen to me’ – are also established in relation to dimension, cultural background, historical links, amongst other elements. This has been the case of several humanitarian crises in relation not only to the amount of coverage provided but also in relation to its distinctive nature.40 To be sure, humanitarian crises triggered by natural disasters in countries such as New Zealand tend to receive more news coverage than others in places such as Pakistan despite the magnitude and death toll of the latter being greater.

The second challenge is that risk-awareness can become a discursive mechanism to further detach the audience from those who suffer by fostering fear and individualistic responses to the perceived threat. If people perceive human tragedies as a threat, then the danger is that they could entrench themselves in political isolationism as a way of protecting themselves. This also is one of the biggest rebuttals to the viability of the ‘regimes of pity’ as a communication strategy as it is exemplified by the case of public attitudes towards homeless people in big metropolises. Only a few people feel the ‘compassion’ to give money to the beggar while most pass by indifferently or cross to the other side of the road to avoid that person altogether because of the fear of crime.41

To illustrate this further, it is worth reminding ourselves that if recent waves of Syrian migrants into Europe initially met with sympathy and empathy, the continual flux of those groups entering the continent and the links that public discourses established between them and issues such as terrorism and rape – widely exploited
by right-wing populist politicians and media – have created a climate of fear. Indeed, a major Ipsos MORI survey across twenty-two countries worldwide provides an insight into attitudes to immigration and the refugee crisis. This study highlights that six in ten people across these countries are concerned about terrorists pretending to be refugees, while four in ten want to close borders entirely. The danger that risk-awareness becomes moral panic and its use for political scaremongering is in fact one of the most difficult challenges for the proposed narrativisation of risk.

The third challenge to the narrativisation of risk is presented by the established values in journalism cultures which demand objective truth based on the presentation of balanced views, corroborated facts and unbiased interpretation of the events. In order for journalists to be accepted as part of a legitimate community they have to be seen to comply with these demands. This is what Maras calls procedural objectivity. This in itself does not hinder the possibility to narrativise risk, as it would still be possible to do so in the terms of balanced and unbiased information. The problem arises from the concept of ‘truth’ itself, which in journalism philosophy is assumed in terms of unbiased interpretation of facts. This goes against the principle of truth in humanitarian communication which is one defined instead by social justice. To explain this succinctly: how can individuals committed in principle not to do advocacy do advocacy? After all, part of the deal of humanitarian communication is to engage and mobilise the audiences in order to address the suffering of others (achieve justice). However, this means in practice convincing the public of the merits of the ideas and principles related to solidarity, which in Western society remain the building stones of Christian propaganda. In contrast, contemporary journalism, developed as a by-product of the Enlightenment project normatively embraces an epistemology that attempts to make a clear distinction between a public rational sphere dominated by reason (built upon science and objective facts) and a private sphere, which contain emotions, faith and opinion. This means presenting facts to the public and then, supposedly, allowing each individual to make their own mind (the dilemma between collective and individual interpretations is also a result of journalism being a collateral outcome of the Enlightenment project).

This makes journalism incompatible with humanitarian communication aims as the ‘means’ of each one seem to be at odds. Journalism has tried to resolve this by embracing the regimes of pity as it allows the presentation of suffering as a fact in a detached and subordinated manner; where the international donors have the power to save those who suffer but no legal, financial or political responsibility except a moral one to do so. This moral solidarity, as we discussed earlier in this chapter, is predicated upon the values of empathy and pity, which happen to be – in our view – incompatible. One can only feel empathy for those who we see as equals. Pity, on the other hand, is felt for those who we see as beneath us, to put it metaphorically; it is a patronising approach. Moreover, while pity allows you to offer sympathy and charity, empathy creates a political responsibility. This is why the notion of the average utility risk is so powerful, because it immediately makes us see the others as equals.
Conclusion: overcoming the challenges

The first priority of journalism is therefore to reconcile its own normative demands for scientific procedures in seeking truth with the implicit demands of humanitarian communication for advocacy. The second is to create a connection between the presentation of humanitarian crises and the need for collective responses within the parameters mentioned above. In both cases journalists can learn from what has happened with the news coverage of environmental news and in particular in relation to the way the reporting of the global warming threat has evolved in the past few years. The lessons from this particular news beat shows that it is possible to narrativise risk without creating moral panic while retaining the key rational elements that risk off rs that make people change patterns of behaviour.

Indeed, once it became clear that global warming effects would be ‘inevitable’ and ‘generalised’ then it became narrativised in a way that pushed for collective action. After all, if sea levels rise and freak weather becomes more common, this will affect all, not only a few. Today, despite isolated examples amongst pro-climate-change-denier news media outlets such as Fox News in the United States and the Daily Telegraph in the UK, most news media outlets and journalists approach and present global warming as a collective risk that will affect all. This is not to paint a rosy picture of environmental news coverage. On the contrary, journalists covering humanitarian crisis can learn even more from the mistakes made in the news beat of environment.

To be sure, media reports of environmental science often give equal weight to opposing viewpoints, making science appear more controversial than it actually is, therefore influencing risk and uncertainty perceptions. By complying with the notion of supposed bias journalists in fact provide a distorted view of reality. Moreover, in recent years there has been a consensus that has been galvanised towards a news agenda that recognises collective response and global risks in the environmental news beat. This despite constant and robust attempts by corporation and government lobbies to bring these responses into the individualistic and utilitarian realm by presenting environmental risks as an ‘individual choice’. Instead of succumbing to this pressure, in recent years a big and very influential segment of the news media is now above and beyond these lobby attempts and environmental risk is now a key mobiliser for collective responses in the news narratives.

Can journalism do the same in relation to humanitarian crises? The answer is yes. We argue that by linking humanitarian risk with ‘poverty risk’ it is possible to galvanise this type of consensus around risk. This is because ‘poverty risk’ – that is the danger of one becoming destitute – tends to influence public opinion in similar ways as climate change does. If news coverage of humanitarian crises can highlight that these events occur because of destitution as a result of inequality, then there is a greater chance that people will feel the need to engage in terms of collective responses to humanitarian crises.
However, the question remains as how to bring the Rawlsian principle into journalistic narratives. In this sense, the job of journalists reporting humanitarian crisis may not be so much to present images of suffering people, not even to persuade audiences that those tragedies happen, but rather, to expose audiences to the ‘possibility’ that they might happen to those looking at the screens. This chapter does not intend to resolve the practicalities that will derive from trying to achieve the above. However, any effort to introduce risk and conciliate journalism and humanitarian communication will require that journalists rethink what they conceive as ‘truth’ and embrace this in their daily practice. This means that they will need to overcome the limitations inherited from the Enlightenment project with regards to both ethical conceptualisation and practical elements. This is, for us, the future task for scholars and practitioners.

Notes

8. W. Easterly, The White Man’s Burden: Why the West’s Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good (London Penguin, 2006).
9. J. A. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971). It is important to underline that average utility as a concept is not universally accepted by philosophers, and philosophical reflections about it may lead to some paradoxes. If our moral objective is to increase average utility at all costs, then it would be quite easy to simply reduce population size (not necessarily through coercive methods, such as in China’s one-child policy, but simply through more persuasive birth controls). In this case, we would have a smaller population, with a higher mean measure of happiness. This would imply that a country with 100 people and an average utility of 100 units is more desirable than a country with 1,000,000 people, and an average utility of 99 units. This is counter-intuitive, and it calls into doubt that average utility is in fact the right criterion. Furthermore, Derek Parfitt has outlined an analysis that leads to the conclusion that, indeed, average utility...
cannot be the right criterion. Suppose a country has a population of 100 people, with an average measure of 100 happiness units. If, to that country, we add a population with a lower average utility (but still, with lives worth living), would it make the situation better or worse? It would seem to make it better, as the original population is not affected, and the happiness units are increased. But, by doing this, average utility is decreased. If we keep on doing this procedure many times, we would reach a situation in which population size has increased, average utility has decreased, and we would believe this is in fact more desirable. In this case, a country (such as Bangladesh) with a huge population and lower living standards may actually be more desirable (provided all lives are worth living) than a country with very high standards (such as Norway) but with a smaller population. Parfit admits this conclusion is repugnant, but he is unclear about how it can be avoided, if at all. There really is no consensus about what the best ethical criterion is for the distribution of utility. See D. Parfit, *Reasons and Persons* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986).


11 This may have a biological basis. Most contemporary biologists give little weight to ‘group selection’ (i.e. altruism gives the group an advantage, and thus, it is selected for). In current discussions, genes for altruism are assumed either to be mediated by reciprocity (we help those whom we expect to reciprocate) or kin selection (we help those who share a portion of our genes, i.e. relatives). However, some biologists, such as Wilson, offer considerable arguments in favour of group selection as the basis for altruism. See D. S. Wilson, *Does Altruism Exist? Cultures, Genes, and the Welfare of Others* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2016). If he is right, then we may be biologically conditioned to make sacrifices for the good of the group, regardless of kin proximity or expectation of reciprocity.


19 This may even have a basis in Aristotle’s theories on catharsis in ancient Greek drama: when we watch tragedies on the stage, we are emotionally moved to act. Aristotle, *Poetics*, trans. M. Heath (New York: Penguin, 1997).

20 There is some neurological evidence that may support this claim. So-called ‘mirror neurons’ activate feelings of empathy when we observe others’ suffering. See C. Keysers, *The Empathic Brain: How the Discovery of Mirror Neurons Changes Our Understanding of Human Nature* (Bonn: Social Brain Press, 2011).


29 Luhmann, Risk, p. 177.

30 Rawls, Theory of Justice.

31 This despite critics who believe that too much reliance on that safety net can hinder the common good. See J. Harsanyi, ‘Can the Maximin Principle Serve as a Basis for Morality? A Critique of John Rawls’s Theory’, The American Political Science Review, 69:2 (1975), pp. 594–606. In that case, we would be rational not to desire too much protection for the least well off in society as to encourage them to work.


33 There is also a case to be made about the more perverse interests of the narrativisation of suffering. Ever since the end of the Cold War, and especially after the humanitarian crisis of Rwanda, national sovereignties have been weakened, and a growing international consensus, promoted by the United Nations, is tilting towards concepts such as ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P). According to this view, there may be legitimate military interventions in order to stop humanitarian crisis. See A. J. Bellamy, Responsibility to Protect (Cambridge and Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2009). This rationale was used most notoriously in Kosovo, and more recently, Libya. However, there are critics who believe that this is nothing more than a refashioning of old colonialist interventions, dressed in a humanitarian costume. Under this view, the narrativisation of suffering is in fact a media strategy to serve imperial purposes. See P. Cunliff, Critical Perspectives on the Responsibility to Protect: Interrogating Theory and Practice (New York: Routledge, 2012).
34 Moeller, Compassion Fatigue.
35 Chouliairaki, ‘Post-Humanitarianism’.

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Selling the lottery to earn salvation


Part IV

Capitalism, consumption and charity
The notion of political consumption suggests that our everyday practices of consumption are ethical practices. It may be argued that these ethical practices become more important when children are involved as it is often argued that our ethical obligations to children require protection and care. As political consumers, we might seek actions such as protecting ‘our’ children by purchasing environmentally friendly products, or we might act against child labour practices in ‘distant’ nations by purchasing garments manufactured by particular companies. These practices raise several questions of a global humanitarianism for children. Can the intent to protect ‘our’ children extend to a more universalised impulse to protect ‘other’, more distant children? What are the limitations of political consumerism as a channel for a humanitarian impulse? Can the everyday practice of consumption be a space of care and concern for international justice?

In this chapter, I bring these questions to the analysis of the consumption of children’s toys and the online discussions of boycotting ‘unsafe’ toys. I explore how a neoliberal parenting culture in the West, which promotes a highly individualised and intensive model of parenting, affects a more universal and collective call for a global international humanitarianism. While social media provides opportunities to share and discuss information about toy safety, it will be argued that emotion is an important part of humanitarian mobilisation, and that the emotions of consumption are often thwarted by the identity politics of consumption.

Distance, care and the political consumer

The landscape of contemporary consumption practices includes practices considered ‘ethical’ responses to the myriad of problems that have come to mark global consumption. Political consumption recognises the power of consumers to use their spending power to alter such things as the labour relations behind products, the ‘green’ or organic content of products, the health of local economies, the safety of products and the treatment of animals in the production process. The varied spaces
of political consumerism make it very difficult to draw parallels between forms of political consumption like boycotting, the refusal to buy certain products, and boycotting, choosing to support one product over another. What, for example, is the relationship between the consumer who purchases carbon offsets for her recent flight to Greece, and the consumer who purchases second-hand clothes at the local thrift store? Political consumerism may also be gendered in that women and men may be affected by different factors including levels of trust in organisations and corporations. Moreover, while political consumerism can be used to create more ethical consumption, 'it can also be a tool to support nationalism, intolerance, exclusiveness, or other types of hatred'.

A recurrent theme in the analysis of ethical consumption is the claim, or worry, ‘that it reflects a substitution of publicly oriented collective participation by identity-based, individually motivated and privatized forms of concern.’ The theme is made more acute if we are asking consumers to think about global collectivities. As Jo Littler points out, certain versions of anti-consumerism can lead to a ‘quasi-pathology of consumerism heroism’ and to ‘more individualized solutions than the modes of consumption that they critique.’ Global ethicists have always had to contend with the question of how far our ethical obligations extend, and whether such obligations could ever trump obligations to those closest to us. In the early 1970s, utilitarian philosopher Peter Singer asked what our obligations might be to distant sufferers of famine. Acknowledging that we first have responsibilities to our family, he personally practised the maxim that we should move to channel our personal surpluses to those who need it anywhere in the world, and in this sense we should give until it hurts. For Singer, the utilitarian maxim is transportable in that we must look beyond the needs of our own society. Adam Smith (1759) raised the question of indifference for the suffering of distant others in his eighteenth-century work *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*. Asking his readers to compare the experience of losing a little finger to an earthquake in China, he presented the model of an inner impartial spectator that was capable of a form of reasonable sympathy that was both mobile and capable of moving men out of self-love. Given the profound difficulty of traversing differences in geography and privilege, it makes sense that Adam Smith was absorbed by sympathetic identification as critical to his eighteenth-century model of the impartial spectator. Cosmopolitan sentiments, however, can be highly sentimentalised and problematic. As Sonia Bookman points out in her analysis of contemporary emotional branding and the urban ‘consumptionscape’ of coffee, everyday consumers of coffee build their own affective experiences of coffee where the ‘love of coffee is extended to a “care” for coffee origins.’ In essence, she suggests, the coffee consumer is able to ‘do good’ through cosmopolitan branding because he or she gets to act out feelings of care and empathy, and in turn, gain more pleasure in the consuming activity.

One might argue that today’s consumer may not need to work very hard to feel connected to distant issues. Sites such as ‘sweatfreeshop.com’ provide resources for shoppers to avoid problematic brands. Personal blogs dedicated to minimalism and
ecofriendly living can also direct people to local fashion brands. If such information is readily available to those who Google, or follow blogs, Twitter or Facebook feeds, it begs the question if one may even need sympathetic identification to connect with distant strangers? Faced with the facts of problematic consumption, won’t the global consumer who is inclined towards ethical consumption simply make reasonable decisions about what to consume, particularly if such facts are delivered by a Facebook friend or a curated newsfeed?

Discussing the case of a wave of sit-ins and protests by the indignados to the economic crisis in Spain in 2011, Paolo Gerbaudo refers to a ‘harvesting of indignation’ by social media like Facebook and Twitter, and explores how such media ‘contributed to transforming individual sentiments of anger into a collective identity animated by a desire to take back the streets after years of demobilisation’. Gerbaudo insists that we not see social media in purely ‘cognitivist’ way as a ‘network of brains’, and rather, argues for the need to ‘recuperate a sense of the body and the emotions in the process of contemporary mobilisation’. As he examines various movements of 2011, including the Arab Spring, he stresses the ‘emotional coalescence of the people’ and refuses to see social media as merely an informational conduit.

My focus in this chapter, and indeed in my other work around humanitarianism, is the emotional and social character of humanitarianism. I argue that it is important to see humanitarianism as a social configuration of moral actors, and to see that social configuration as embedded in a politics of emotion. In her compelling history of human rights, Lynn Hunt argues, the claim that human rights are ‘self-evident’ relies on an ‘emotional appeal’ because ‘it is convincing if it strikes a chord with each person’. Global humanitarianism requires a breaking down of distance between humanitarians and so-called victims and emotion plays a large role in breaking down this distance.

On the question of consumer action, we can see an intersection in debates in the scholarships around online activism and global humanitarianism. While it is true that global capitalism makes possible material connections between consumers, and while we can be informed of these connections more quickly and easily through digital networks, these connections do not fully explain why we respond to some calls for action and not others. We need to further unpack the sentiments that mobilise humanitarian action. An exploration of political consumption and childhood offers a window into the complex space of humanitarian mobilisation.

**Toys and the consumption of childhood**

While many have challenged historian Phillippe Ariès’ confident claim that childhood was a ‘modern invention’, scholars have described an important shift in the understanding and the experience of childhood that took place with the spread of industrialisation, and the accompanying movement away from childhood as a period of labour: childhood became a period of innocence and play. Toys became
part of this shift in that they affirmed childhood as a unique period in the life course, and middle-class homes soon sought out toys to affirm this ‘ideal childhood’.

Researchers of consumption see children as occupying an important frontier for capitalist expansion. Childhood play has become fully ‘capitalised’ and children fully socialised as consumers, evidenced by such trends as the intersection of entertainment and merchandising, and by toys that necessitate collecting and cumulative consumption. Child-centred, open-ended imaginative play has been replaced by toys that limit play possibilities and necessitate consumption on the part of the child. In the spirit of work like Juliet Schor’s Born to Buy (2004), childhood is a site where excessive consumption is intensified through a socialisation that occurs in the market. As Langer notes, at the end of the twenty-first century children’s consumption works to re-inscribe children as ‘sacred’, this time due to their spending power.

While it is clear that childhood takes place in the world of consumption, and that the market is implicated in the ‘psychic formation of the child’, there is much disagreement as to what this means for the consuming child. Despite the presence of childhood in many theories of consumerism, I concur with Daniel Tho as Cook’s claim that such theories ‘do not know childhood’ and that most discussions of consumption have failed to provide a thorough account of the economic life of children. For example, classic sociological theorists of taste and consumption, such as Pierre Bourdieu, do not provide a serious treatment of children. Few contemporary theorists of consumption draw directly on accounts of the social lives of children, nor the cultural histories of childhood. Cook argues that we need to move beyond seeing the individual child as an independent economic actor, to a theory of consumption which sees contemporary children as participating in a social world in which they are already embedded as consumers, and that purchasing often ‘takes place, for, in the name of, or with someone in mind other than the shopper’. Cook insists that children call into question the ‘individuality of desire, identity, and lifestyle’.

The analysis of childhood consumption is also affected by the use of models of identity to understand consumption. An added analytical difficulty is that we are often presented with dichotomous models of shopping where the consumer is either an ‘enraptured pleasure seeker’ or a ‘relationally constrained actor locked into a series of actions’. Sociologist Zygmunt Bauman is wary of the identity politics of consumption where a fully commodified self replaces the citizen, and where mass consumption is affirmed as the only economic foundation of society. This debate dovetails neatly with discussions about ‘new’ and ‘old’ models of childhood socialisation. Where psychological and sociological theories of childhood development once saw the child as a passive sponge who simply absorbed socialisation, more recent theories see the child as an empowered agent in their own becoming. Mapped onto the analysis of consumption, this dichotomous reading of childhood development sees children as either exploited and manipulated consumers (along with the rest of us), or active agents in their own identity building through consumption.
There are, however, answers to the impasse around consumer identity. As Dennis Soron argues in his discussion of sustainable consumption, there are promising ways to bring self-identity ‘back in’ without succumbing to a mere celebration of consumption, nor an overly individualist account of how consumer agency operates. He argues that we need to pay due attention to the ambivalent role of consumption in our daily lives: ‘exploring the intersection of sustainable consumption and self-identity requires us to comprehend the constrained context and political limits of individual “green” lifestyle choices even as we engage sympathetically with the ethical and collectivist impulses underlying them.’ Again, Soron is clear that in approaching sustainable consumption through the analysis of identity we must continue to aim for ‘reconstituting a social, collective and non-commodified basis for personal identity’.

If we take Cook’s suggestion that we need to look at the social lives of children and move beyond the notion of children as independent economic actors, then it seems we should explore toy buying as part of parenting (noting, of course, that many children are active consumers in their own right). A key line running through Vivian Zelizer’s book *The Purchase of Intimacy* (2005) is that we take the relationship between economics and intimacy seriously and see household economics as a social process through which household relationships are constructed. As Charlotte Faircloth also insists, contemporary parenting is a project of identity work: ‘In deciding how to dress, feed, put to sleep and transport their children, adults do not simply live their lives through children but, in part, develop their own identity through them.’ Thus, toy consumption can be seen as a space where the identity of parent is also constructed.

Privileged parents buying toys certainly occupy a unique space of consumer agency in that they no doubt experience some of the ambivalences around consumption as they both seek to provide a childhood of innocence and play for their children, while at the same time perhaps try to think ethically about how to provide this kind of childhood. One of the key aspects of the social lives of privileged children is the current dominance of a model of intensive parenting. According to scholars of childhood, this model of parenting mainly applies to privileged women as primary caregivers and suggests that mothers are to invest large amounts of time, money and energy into parenting, and that they should gather expert knowledge to build their parenting repertoires. Intensive parenting is also accompanied by what some call ‘parental determinism’ in which it is the parent alone who is considered responsible for the wellbeing and socialisation of the child, and in turn, the child is considered a product of parenting. In intensive parenting, the moral view is entirely parent to child, in particular, the mother to child relationship: As Glenda Wall notes, the intensification of parenting is wrapped up in a neoliberal logic which emphasises individual self-management and control. Intensive parenting also includes protecting children from risks, and the list of risks is ever increasing, even including parents as risk factors themselves. Given that it is promoted as an ‘ideal
form' of mothering, those mothers who are unable to follow the model, like low-income mothers, can view intensive mothering as enforced and coercive.37

More recently, there has been some backlash against this model and greater discussion of the 'over protected child'. Journalist Lenore Skenazy, for example, has popularised the idea of 'free range parenting' where parents are encouraged to allow their children to take more risks and to resist the idea that their kids occupy a world of constant danger and threat. Frank Furedi's 2008 *Paranoid Parenting*, as another example, encourages parents to ignore the experts. Still, given that the model powerfully intersects with a popular embrace of the idea of a 'risk society', the individualisation upheld in neoliberalism, and the cultural approach to childhood as a period of innocence, contemporary parenting is still marked by the assumption that children demand constant protection by parents.

Toy consumption occurs in a particular kind of moral community that involves an intersection of parenting and consumption. Some buycotts and boycotts have successfully produced moral communities that join localised consumers with distant producers, and in turn, have contributed to initiatives to improve labour conditions for workers and more sustainable forms of production. However, due to the natures of contemporary childhood and parenting, toy consumption often works to separate and alienate consumers from producers, rather than bringing them into co-operation or connection. The moral economies of Western childhood that see children as vulnerable subjects in a society of risk and, in turn, in need of care and protection, can come into conflict with the moral economies of global consumption that require consumers to expand their moral vision. In short, the general push is often to protect children from the dangers of global consumption, rather than to bring them into a moral community that seeks to make social and political connections between so-called distant strangers. Still, I conclude that it is important to look at the example of toy consumption as it deepens the analysis of consumption and childhood, challenges idealised or romanticised notions of a global moral community, and allows for further exploration of consumption as a site of global citizenship.

How do toy consumers feel and care about the producers of the toys who are most often making toys in other 'distant' parts of the world? The case of a 2007 toy recall of a popular toy train series offers some preliminary insights. "Thomas and Friends Wooden Railway Toys" is a series of trains made of wood and plastic, based on an early twentieth-century book series, and later developed into a television series in the 1970s. They are expensive toys; current prices for individual trains range from $15 to $30 Canadian dollars. The toys tend to be played with by younger children with the suggested age range being 2–7 years old. In 2007, RC2, the company that made the internationally popular children's wooden train toys, recalled 1.5 million units as a result of the 'discovery' of lead-based paint in the trains.38 Most of the recalled units used red paint and all were manufactured in China. Consumers were told to send the trains back to receive a replacement. This recall came amongst a series of
product recalls in China, including cases of tainted pet food, milk and toothpaste. In fact, a recent book, *Not Just China*, described 2007 as the ‘year of the recall’.

Other toy manufacturers like Mattel and Fisher Price were also embroiled in recalls that same year.

It is no doubt that the use of lead paint makes a toy a more dangerous plaything, particularly if flakes of lead paint are ingested. The WHO confirms that ingested lead can have dangerous impacts on the developing brains of young children, and even low levels can have neurological effects. There are a number of factors that contribute to higher concern for lead poisoning in children, including the fact that children absorb lead at greater rates than adults. While there are no safe levels of lead, it is difficult to assess the amount of risk involved with lead-painted toys, including the likelihood of paint being ingested and the amount of paint that would be needed to cause serious health concerns, particularly given that the effects of lead are cumulative. There is little evidence to suggest that the toys themselves caused health consequences, and in turn, that the recall is more of a case of a lead panic.

When the dangers of lead became known, many countries adopted legislation to limit the use of lead in consumer products and the environment. Lead gas and household lead paint, for example, is considered hazardous and it is no longer available in many countries around the world. Like most environmental risk stemming from the production of good, the dangers are greatest in the global South and amongst the poor: according to the WHO about one half of the burden of disease from lead occurs in the South-East Asia Region, with about one-fifth each in the Western Pacific and Eastern Mediterranean Regions. In addition to children, workers are at great risk due to continued, cumulative exposure. Workers who work with leaded paint, for example, can also bring it home to their families on their clothes in the form of dust. In North America, lead poisoning risks remain, particularly around older homes with deteriorating paint and increased dust.

How did parents respond to these recalls? If online conversations, parenting blogs and online comments sections are used as data, the overwhelming reactions were shock, anger and fear. One *New York Times* article quoted a mother discussing her son’s attachment to the toys and her disappointment with the recall:

> These are the kinds of things he takes to bed with him. He puts them in his pocket and he takes them to the store, he takes them in the car – everywhere … You think that when you're buying a high-end toy like a Thomas the Tank Engine train, that you're getting something that has gone through all the proper channels to make sure it’s a safe toy.

Another parenting blog responded with equivalent shock but also with annoyance:

> I am utterly shocked that our consumer protection agency even allows these products imported into our country since we’ve known about the dangers of lead poisoning.
for 30+ years. I am a working mom and additionally angry that I have to take the time to remove and replace these items and check for any poisoning in my children. I will sign a petition to ban any imported children’s products that do not meet our own standards. Next time, buy German toys!41

As parents who had purchased Thomas and Friends merchandise expressed fear and anger about the recall, some who had not purchased the toys took the opportunity to remind parents about the problems of mass-produced toys more generally. Comments to a Washington Post article included the following statement:

My 4-year-old has a drum kit, a group of stuffed animals, and a lot of outdoor toys (jump rope, bouncy ball, sidewalk chalk). I prefer her to use her imagination than have the toy companies imagine stuff at her, but now I have another level to be smug about.

Many respondents directed their outrage at the government for not protecting the interests and safety of their children; however, China and Chinese products also became vilified in the media. China was ‘not to be trusted’ and the general parenting lesson to be emphasised was that toys from China were to be avoided.

Amidst the mass of comments that spoke with anger that North American consumers should not have to worry about dangerous toys, there were a few voices that raised different concerns. For example, in response to an online discussion that included some anti-Chinese comments about the recall, one commentator noted: ‘It’s silly to blame this on China, and turn it into a question of nationalism. The company is American and listed on NASDAQ! Unless the lead paint was a conspiracy sponsored by the Chinese government with the goal of poisoning the youth of America through toys, try a different, valid argument to express your upset.’42

It makes sense that the first reaction of parents was to protect their children from harm, but why did it stop there? Why didn’t any parents express concern about the workers who had to make such ‘hazardous’ toys or the communities that might be affected by increased exposure to lead paint? Why were consumers seemingly unable to expand their moral communities so as to think of themselves as part of a chain of production and consumption, as in other practices of ethical consumption? From this particular recall, no larger initiative of political consumerism seemed to emerge to eliminate the use of lead paint in countries around the world or to encourage better labour conditions. Nor did the recall seem to trigger an attempt to increase awareness about lead poisoning in the global North. No online petition was circulated by parents, and surprisingly, no initiative to formally boycott the company emerged.

The HIT company which owned Thomas the Train was not severely financially affected by the recall, though it reported losses in 2009. The company was later bought out by Mattel in 2011 for $680 million.43 Most consumers seemed to return the specifically recalled trains with enough faith in the company that they felt assured that this would not happen again, and that they had effectively managed the
risk. If, as consumer theory suggests, we can be ‘attached to commodities in deeply ingrained, affectively charged ways’, consumers seemed certainly attached to Thomas and Friends. The recall had impacted the sacred space of play and perhaps the key goal was simply to return play to an original state of innocence and joy. In this case, the feelings of anger and distrust that parents experienced did not function as moral emotions in that they did not work to fuel some kind of global ethical connection or some cosmopolitan feeling.

No doubt the fact that China is seen as an impenetrable nation where consumers can do little about the politics of production is responsible in part for a lack of discussion and concern amongst parents for the producers of the lead-painted trains. Consumers need to feel as if their actions will have an impact in order to feel motivated to act. Many consumers felt as if China and Chinese citizens have willingly accepted the risks that accompany the production of cheap goods. Moreover, this recall was one amongst many and consumers probably felt that a boycott or buy boycott would be futile. One key difference from other recalls at the time, however, was that Thomas and Friends made high-end toys that many parents assumed to be safe due to the price of the toys. Affluent North American mothers engaged in a practice of intensive parenting likely viewed the Thomas and Friends recall as an affront to the already difficult task of parenting in a society of risk. Further, as Wall points out, the 1990s saw a rise in the discussion of parents as the builders of children’s brains. One can only assume that the potential of lead poisoning would have been a double affront in this sense.

The space of child’s play may be also an impenetrable moral space in that it is highly guarded by parents themselves. Products like organic baby food or hemp clothes have little difficulty penetrating the insular parent–child relationship of intensive parenting as they promise increased safety and health for children, but other forms of political consumerism have a more difficult road. While intensive parenting seems a likely discourse for extending the moral vision of parents through empathetic identification with distant others, instead, the impetus seems to be for good parenting, not good collective citizenship. When parenting is consistently raised as the cause of all social ills, it is not that parents are accused of ignoring their roles as public citizens, but rather, that ‘bad parents’ are ignoring or failing at their role of raising future good citizens. One of the most serious problems of intensive parenting is that it is often a highly solitary process in that the parent themselves must know the child inside and out, and must act as the sole moral agent on the behalf of the child. This can breed distrust if parents become less and less able to trust other adults in the task of socialising the next generation. As one mother noted after the recall: ‘That’s the scariest thing, because now it makes me want to go out and test all their toys because … I don’t trust any of them.’ While Arlie Hochschild’s important work on emotional labour focused on the costs of emotional regulation in labour, her general lesson that emotional regulation comes with its costs is relevant; one of the emotional costs of intensive mothering may be the heavy burden of the constant regulation of worry and risk.
Mel Y. Chen argues that ‘lead stories’ also require attention to race. The ‘lead panics’ of 2007, Chen notes, centred around images of vulnerable white middle-class children playing with suspect toys. While the company took legal responsibility for the recall, it was China that became the site of attention and blame. The apparent global movement of toxic lead emphasised its mobility through and against imperialistic spatializations of “here” and “there.”

Chen notes that the new lead panic can be understood in the discourse of ‘contagion’ which echoes a ‘turn-of-the-century Orientalized threat to white domesticity’; parents, therefore, were guarding against not only the threat of lead, but voicing a concern for a vulnerable ‘national body.’

As Chen also points out, the image of a vulnerable white child is promoted while the ongoing exposure of people of colour to risk is ignored: ‘An environmental history of toxic objects must minimally register the gendered, laboring, and chronically toxically exposed bodies of globalized capital, which systematically bear less frequent mention in narratives of toxicity than the cautionary warnings from the seat of US empire.’

Chen’s analysis encourages us to think carefully about the dangers of parenting narratives of protection, as such narratives can easily extend into nationalist narratives. Moreover, against the history of colonialism and empire, the global South becomes a reminder of unsafe versions of childhood that the global North has progressed beyond, and in turn, the connection is made that much harder.

If the space of political consumerism and toys demonstrates clashing narratives of parenthood, the tragic photographs of Alan Kurdi, a drowned Syrian boy, which circulated online in the fall of 2015, may offer a more unified narrative of parenting. The photographs were unique in their ability to galvanise concern for Syrian refugees in many parts of the world. It was a surprising galvanisation given that the photograph broke the powerful taboo of presenting a dead child in mainstream media. The taboo was even broken in headlines like the New York Times story (2 September 2015) that proclaimed ‘A dead baby becomes the most tragic symbol yet of the Mediterranean refugee crisis.’ In response to the New York Times story, one online reader simply articulated: ‘I cried. I just cried. What are we?’ While some viewers were not ready for such images, others saw the merits in publishing the photographs and were moved to action. How did these particular photographs move viewers, while hundreds of other photographs of refugees seemed to lead to indifference? One possible reason is that Alan Kurdi was an innocent victim who people could easily identify with, and who could easily be absorbed into a parenting narrative of cosmopolitan caring. He wore clothes that most parents in the West could recognise, and the beach on which his body lay seemed like a beach that anyone might visit on holiday. One comment on a Huffington Post story (2 September 2015) urges those engaged in the online debate to ‘imagine themselves a parent to that child.’ The protection of Alan Kurdi (and future Alan Kurdis) was not positioned as coming at the expense of the protection of children in the West. If anything, the tiny child in a red T-shirt and running shoes was already a child of the West in the eyes of many viewers. In Canada, Alan Kurdi became the call to increase the number of Syrian
refugees, or put differently, to make him and others children of Canada. Th s kind of narrative is used successfully by many international NGOs, particularly those that employ a child sponsorship model. Donors are essentially engaged in restoring lost childhoods.

There is a larger question haunting my analysis: does parenting a child make parents better global citizens? Th re is no easy answer to this question. Erika Languir's compelling art history of childhood, Imagining Childhood, off rs us an important refl ction in its concluding line that images in the Western tradition have 'always made plain that we are all childlike'. Our ethical encounter with our own children is always an ethical encounter with our own childhoods. If contemporary parenting cultures turn us inwards, and if political consumption leads to individualised identity politics, these inward turns may be more accentuated by the fact that the often unstable category of childhood is constructed by parents themselves. The inward push may be an obstacle for the apparent requirement of an outward pull for global humanitarian activism. Still, we can recognise this challenge. Jo Littl r highlights the 'interior economies' of radical consumption politics and notes that we need to think more deeply about the models of 'refle ivity' that lead to activism. While she sees promise in tools off red by cultural studies, she also recognises the need to move into 'wider' and more 'messy' terrain to explore how 'alternative economies elicit aff ctual investments (or not)'. Thus, to understand how and when media cultures support a global humanitarianism for distant children, our theoretical tools must includethose that can unpack parenting culture, and the emotional economies that govern this culture.

**Conclusion**

When children are mentioned in reference to issues of inequality, it is often through the very possessive claim 'our children', implying that there are other people's children that are not of 'our' concern. Interestingly, the moral claims we make in the name of children often seek to stabilise them as moral subjects, as vulnerable and at risk. In the case of the toy train recall, there was a clear sense that middle-class and wealthy children could be protected from the risks that other children experience. The intensification of modern parenting is deeply at odds with a model of ethical consumption that requires that moral distance be overcome. Gaining knowledge of the working lives of others becomes even more difficult if we are witnessing a model of parenting that embraces a neoliberal, individualised notion of child as product.

If we are to understand how ethical consumption is practised and whether it holds promise as a way to shift from the individual to the collective, we cannot simply speak of connection as an abstract principle, and we cannot think of social media as simply erasing distance. Instead, we must see consumption practices as enacting social relations of care, responsibility and identity. The consumption of toys challenges the notion that cosmopolitan moral viewpoints can simply be willed
into existence. In the case of the Tho as and Friends recall, parents took up a moral response that few ethicists would call them on: a fundamental desire to protect their children from harm. We need to think more deeply about whether protection of harm is the only moral reaction a parent can or should have to something like a toy recall. Exploring moral emotions requires us to see how emotion works to constitute people as legitimate and illegitimate objects of emotion.58

If a model of intensive parenting and the marking of childhood as sacred makes it difficult for parents to move from the personal to the collective, it seems fitting to end with a question that theorists of consumption have posed many times: Is the model of citizen consumer a dangerous one? Theories of consumption which recognise that children are not independent economic actors, and that speak to the complex emotional life worlds of childhood, will be better able to understand how morality can be built in the space of consumption.59 As Barnett et al. note, we need to speak of everyday consumption practices as ‘ordinarily ethical’, as practices through which we construct a life through negotiating practical choices about routine consumption.60 While it is clear that childhood consumption requires a uniquemodel of political consumerism, it also provides an important opportunity to explore a consumer identity where the identity being built, in this case the identity of parent, is already a volatile ‘moral category’. The online responses to toy safety register a narrative of protection, but they also register deep anxieties amongst parents about being good parents. It would seem that consumption could easily be put in the service of global ethics if it involves consumers who are trying to be ‘good parents’. Yet, as the analysis of toy consumption demonstrates, understanding the complexities of caring for those closest to us is critically important to the understanding of caring at a distance.

For scholars of global humanitarianism, we might refine the concluding question further and ask if a model of humanitarian as consumer is a dangerous one? Scholars of humanitarianism have long pointed out the important historical connections between the rise of global capitalism and global humanitarianism, paying particular attention to nineteenth-century anti-slavery movements as an emblematic example.61 This scholarship has not typically reduced the humanitarian to consumer as the critical question for global humanitarianism is not whether or not global connections exist, but rather how and when such connections mobilise social and political action. I conclude that the emotional landscape of consumption offers the possibility of mobilising action when the sentiment itself can travel, and in this sense, we need to speak of ‘affective’ models of connection. Media cultures may well provide connection between humanitarians and so-called victims, but as in the historical lessons of the past, connection alone is not enough. The case of children’s toys demonstrates that in the face of apparent threat, we can seek to guard national and domestic borders, and deny such connection. Distant vulnerable children may trigger powerful rescue narratives, but close, apparently vulnerable children trigger equally powerful narratives of protection. Perhaps, then, the greatest danger to a
global humanitarianism that seeks a more radical vision of justice, is not the embrac- 
ing of a consumer identity, but rather, a neoliberal discourse of parenting in which 
the spectre of risk only serves to incite the emotion of fear.

Notes

1 Given the great variety of moral problems that face consumers, the term 'ethical consumption' is clearly a problematic catch-all term for this range of practices, and as T. Lewis and E. Potter note, the field of ethical consumption mirrors this in its 'inchoate' drawing on political economy, sociology, philosophy and cultural studies. See 'Introducing Ethical Consumption', in T. Lewis and E. Potter (eds), Ethical Consumption: A Critical Introduction (Oxon and New York: Routledge, 2013), p. 5. Jo Littl r also notes that a distinction between moralism and morality is important to the analysis of consumption. See Radical Consumption: Shopping for Change in Everyday Life (Maidenhead: McGraw-Hill, Open University Press, 2009), p. 14. In this chapter I will use the general terms 'political consumerism' and 'ethical consumption' with the recognition that this may simplify a complex philosophical space.


3 Stolle and Micheletti, Political Consumerism, p. 39.


5 Littl r, Radical Consumption, p. 77, emphasis in original.


7 A. Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 894 [1759]).


10 Gerbaudo, Tweets and the Streets, p. 77.

11 Gerbaudo, Tweets and the Streets, p. 60.


17 Some research suggests a less passive model of consumption under capitalism whereby children join some adults as ‘creationist’ consumers in that they are active in the production of what they consume. See Minna Rucklestein’s study of Habbo Hotel, an online gaming world for children and teenagers: ‘Children in Creationist Capitalism’, Information, Communication and Society, 14:7 (2011), pp 6060–76.
19 Langer, ‘Commodified Enchantment’, p.78.
20 Langer, ‘Commodified Enchantment’, p. 73 Of course, it must also be noted that many children around the world exist outside of this model precisely because they do not figure at all in practices of consumption.
34 Wall argues that the re-emergence of an interest in attachment parenting makes the intensification of parenting abundantly clear. Gone are the biological claims that came with the classic research of John Bowlby. These claims are replaced by an attachment that must be constantly built and monitored by the parent, again, largely mothers (Conference presentation, Annual Meetings of the Canadian Sociological Association, Brock University, 2014).
37 Romagnoli and Wall, “I know I’m a good mom”, p. 286.
44 Barnett et al., Globalizing Responsibility, p. 125.
45 See for example, Stolle and Micheletti, Political Consumerism.
46 Wall, ‘Mothers’ Experience with Intensive Parenting and Brain Development Discourse’.
47 There are, however, many examples from the world of contemporary childhood where affluent children are engaged in activities that make connections with others around the world. For example, in Canada, the ‘toonie toonie’ (the common name for the two-dollar coin) birthday party has become popular where children bring two toonies for the birthday girl or boy. The birthday girl or boy keeps one toonie for themselves, and donates another to charity.
48 Faircloth, Militant Lactivism?
50 Chen, Animacies, p. 167.
51 Chen, Animacies, pp. 170, 171
52 Chen, Animacies, p. 188.
53 Refugee organisations in Canada reported a surge of interest in sponsorship after the publication of the photographs of Alan Kurdi (CBC, 2 September 2016, www.cbc.ca/news/canada/manitoba/image-of-alan-kurdis-body-led-to-spike-in-sponsorship-of-syrian-refugees-group-says-L3746552. Accessed 14 July 2017). It was soon reported that Alan Kurdi’s family was trying to get to Canada. Weeks later the new Liberal government announced that they would support an increased number of Syrian refugees to Canada.
54 Suski, Children, Suffering and the Humanitarian Appeal.
56 Littler, Radical Consumption, p. 86.
57 Littler, Radical Consumption, p. 91.
60 Barnett et al., Globalizing Responsibility, p. 28.

References


Liking visuals and visually liking on Facebook: From starving children to satirical saviours

Rachel Tavernor

The development of social media sites, such as Facebook (founded 2004) and Twitter (founded 2006), has changed humanitarian non-governmental organisations’ (NGOs) media practices and subsequently altered the ways that supporters and publics are engaged. This chapter focuses on a recent movement for NGOs to humour humanitarianism to achieve visibility on social networks, like Facebook. In particular, examining how visuals of humanitarianism have moved away from depicting starving children awaiting assistance towards satirical representations of ‘saving’ those in need. This chapter also contributes an understanding of how people participate in these differing narratives on Facebook with an analysis of interviews with young people (aged 18–35) in the UK.

Starving children

Since the 1970s, the images of extreme hunger communicated by NGOs have been widely criticised as overtly negative and representatively inaccurate, depicting starving children through a colonial gaze. In 1989, the General Assembly of European NGOs adopted a new Code of Conduct on the ‘Images and Messages relating to the Third World’ (1989). The document called for NGOs to avoid using apocalyptic or pathetic images that fuel prejudices and promote a sense of Northern superiority (1989: 2). Despite the adoption of new codes, decades later, the representations of humanitarianism in NGO adverts still include isolated suffering children in need of a ‘saviour’. Most notably, these representations are mobilised in daytime television adverts; using close-up shots of skeletal bodies, habitually children, surrounded by flies. However, on Facebook, dominant images of starving children are now filtered by a structure that privileges content that users can ‘like’, ‘comment’ or ‘share’. Facebook algorithms, along with the architects of Facebook, have now become the new ‘gatekeepers’ of humanitarian communication and NGOs have started to adapt their representations of humanitarianism. In particular, I propose that the Facebook ‘like’, and users’ interaction online, changes the visual communication used by
contributing to the governance of visibility. I will explore these themes by using the UK Enough Food IF (2013) anti-poverty campaign as my site of investigation.

On the 23 January 2013, the Enough Food IF campaign was launched by a coalition of the largest leading humanitarian NGOs in the UK, including Save the Children, Oxfam and Christian Aid. The campaign broadly aimed to tackle extreme international hunger by rallying the British public to use their national citizenship to pressure their MPs, prime minister and chancellor to take political action on aid, tax avoidance, biofuels and government transparency. Due to a limited financial budget, the Enough Food IF campaign organisers predominantly communicated their messages across digital platforms, such as Facebook, Twitter and YouTube (Enough Food IF Interview 2013).

The Enough Food IF campaign's Facebook page was launched the same day as the campaign. In the first twelve months, content published by the campaign received an average of 125 likes per post, totalling 52,217 and 77 shares per post, totalling 31,953. The Enough Food IF campaign's internal Digital Insights reported, 'Social media was the hero in this campaign. With strong engagement rates on content, social media was also the largest referrer [to the campaign website]' As a coalition, the Enough Food IF campaign organisers agreed to have a tight–loose control of their social networks. For the key moments, the launch in January, the UK budget stunt in March and for their rallies at the G8 Summit in June 2013, the steering group took tight control of their messaging, branding and media image. During these 'moments', the visual communication, which included videos, images and info-graphics, achieved the most interaction on Facebook. However, in the time between these 'moments', there was a loose arrangement of various NGOs (varying in size) authoring communication for the Facebook page each week, during these times the frequency of posts increased, however the circulation of the material reduced. This indicates that the coalition, who were advised by social media consultants, were better equipped at producing communications that fit the architecture of Facebook.

Nick Couldry proposes that media research is often constrained by a focus on texts or audiences instead of the 'open set of practices relating to, or oriented around, media.' While this chapter focuses on the practices that occur online, it is important to note that they are intertwined with wider open sets of actions. Couldry argues that practice theory can contribute to translating the hype of a 'digital revolution' by asking: 'What types of things do people do in relation to media? And what types of things do people say (think believe) in relation to media?' This chapter explores the acts of 'liking visuals' and 'visually liking' content on Facebook, to examine how Facebook structures both discourses and practices in humanitarian NGO campaigns. First, I analyse the act of 'liking' visuals on Facebook by examining the architecture of the social networking site, to understand how visibility of communications is governed and what actions are permitted. Here, visibility is explored using the work of Taina Bucher as a 'highly contested game of power in which the media play a crucial role.' Second, I address the act of visually 'liking' content on Facebook with reference to eight interviews with young British adults (aged 18–35) to investigate their actions
taken online and how campaign acts contribute to ‘presencing’ political engagement. I conclude with a discussion on how humouring hunger, to fit the architecture of Facebook, potentially pacifies the politics of poverty and humanitarian intervention.

‘Liking’ visuals

Architectures of action

The act of clicking a button to support a campaign or cause has been criticised widely, both within NGOs and externally, that ‘clicktivism’ is a downgrade of activism proper. The focus on the ‘click’ is an oversimplification of the many practices that take place in digital environments. Discussing the architecture of online spaces is not a new perspective. However, work on the architecture of social networking sites that address humanitarian campaigns has previously neglected to address who the architects are and the implicit ideology of their design. I apply these fundamental questions to the social networking site Facebook as the starting point of this chapter.

Facebook was founded in the United States in 2004 as a network for Harvard University students to share ‘social’ information. In 2005, the network was open to other US educational institutions, corporate professionals and in the following year was made public. Checking social networking sites has now become part of daily life; within the UK, twenty-four million people log on to Facebook every day. With the penetration of social networks into everyday life, NGOs now use online platforms as a tool to connect and communicate to ‘networked publics’. In 2009, the introduction of Facebook ‘pages’ facilitated a space for organisations, including NGOs, to create public profiles. Facebook ‘pages’ mirror individual profiles, with the ability to publish content to a ‘timeline’ and interact as a ‘friend’ in a user’s ‘News Feed’ (introduced in 2009).

Mark Zuckerberg, most visible architect of Facebook and CEO, states that ‘the goal of the company is to help people to share more in order to make the world more open and to help promote understanding between people’. Zuckerberg articulates a philosophy that resonates with humanitarian values of helping others to create a better world with the promise to ‘build richer relationships with the people we love and care about’. However, as will be explored in this chapter, the mechanics of Facebook differ from the ethos that Zuckerberg attempts to promote. I will examine three ways that the ‘social’ is constructed by the architecture of Facebook: ‘liking’, ‘sharing’ and having Facebook ‘friends’. For each, I explore how their implicit ideology shapes participation in humanitarian campaigns.

Liking

Facebook aims to be a positive network, where ‘users are constantly prompted to like, enjoy, recommend and buy as opposed to discuss or critique’. In 2009, the ‘like’ button was introduced as a way for users to acknowledge content and contribute to
the positivity of the network. To ‘like’ content and ‘pages’ is now the most popular action taken on Facebook; every day the ‘like’ button is hit 3.2 billion times across the world contributing to what some have termed a ‘like economy’. Facebook’s architecture scripts actions that conform to an ‘affirmative atmosphere, in which people only agree and do not disagree or express discontent and disagreement’.

Consequently, paradoxical relationships are produced when NGO campaigns, which protest against hunger, poverty and ultimately the status quo, communicate through Facebook. In the case of the Enough Food IF campaign, Facebook users were no longer confronted by images of a suffering child, which audiences may wish to ‘dislike’ but were invited to engage with poverty through visuals of satirical videos, smiling children and even cats engaging with the campaign.

While users have petitioned Facebook for a ‘dislike’ button, Zuckerberg has continually argued that to say something ‘isn’t good … [is] not something that we think is good for the world. So we’re not going to build that’. Zuckerberg attempts to silence the corporate agenda of Facebook and instead vocalises that its decisions are based on producing a network that ‘is good for the world’. To ensure the positivity of the network, Facebook’s architecture limits the interactivity of users. While Facebook users have the opportunity to choose the activities that they wish to participate in, they are confined by the architecture of Facebook to predefined actions. Users are directed to engage with communications by liking, commenting or sharing. In September 2015, while I was conducting research for this chapter, Zuckerberg announced that Facebook was working on a button for users to ‘express empathy’ because for some posts, users may not feel comfortable to “like” that post, but your friends and people want to be able to express that they understand. Yet, as will be explored in this chapter, the architecture of Facebook is shaped by corporate actors who define the need for the social to be positive. On social networks, corporations aim to build ‘positive’ relationships with consumers, who will endorse rather than reject their brands. While news articles reported that Facebook was creating a dislike option, the button did not take the form of a ‘dislike’ button. In 2016, Facebook launched a range of seven emoticons: ‘Like’, ‘Love’, ‘Haha’, ‘Yay’, ‘Wow’, ‘Sad’ and ‘Angry’. The emoticons still privilege the ‘like’ button, which remains the primary button that users have to click to access different responses.

**Sharing**

Zuckerberg’s public statements about Facebook emphasise the ability to ‘share’ content. Similar to the act of ‘liking’ the ability to ‘share’ is framed as a positive act, whereby ‘sharing is an expression of your caring’. The ability to ‘share’ encourages users to contribute to a circulation of content which is monitored by Facebook. Christian Fuchs argues that Facebook’s tracking of users’ actions is a strategy that ‘violates their [users’] privacy for economic ends’. In the case of campaigning, the act of sharing campaign information is not new. For centuries, social movements
have distributed leaflets to strangers, neighbours and friends asking for their support. Sharing also goes beyond sharing communications. Activism is a shared activity, which involves a shared identity and common understanding of how to make or change the future. Yet, when the act of sharing is conducted through Facebook it differs. The act to ‘share’ content on Facebook contributes to data flows and, similar to the ‘like’ button, is ‘instantly turned into valuable consumer data’. While the act of sharing may echo traditional activist actions by contributing to a circulation of campaign material, the action also contributes to Facebook’s implicit corporate agenda. Therefore, in the case of the Enough Food IF campaign, the NGOs requesting supporters to ‘share’ their content, is also a request for them to ‘share’ their personal data for ‘corporate social media monitoring’, although NGOs do not financially benefit from this transaction.

**Facebook ‘friends’**

Facebook promotes all relationships between users as ‘friendships’, in contrast to other social networking sites, such as Twitter and Instagram, which use the term ‘follower’. Corporate and charitable organisations producing ‘pages’ also occupy the position in users’ ‘newsfeeds’, similar to a ‘friend’. The architecture of Facebook promotes social exchanges between users, as well as ‘pages’, as socially valuable. Defining the connection as a ‘friendship’ implies that it is a reciprocal relationship that both find mutually beneficial.

By defining social connections as a ‘friendship’, both positivity and intimacy are implied. The positive connotations of ‘friendships’ are integral to the way Facebook’s architecture structures positive sentiments. Friendship also implies a degree of intimacy whereby users wish to ‘share’ the personal in semi-public spaces. A user sharing the ‘personal’ again benefits the corporate agenda of Facebook, which is then able to capture intimate information that can be instantly sold to advertisers. Popular social networking sites that preceded Facebook, like MySpace (founded 2003), produced less intimate spaces, with users adopting pseudonyms and only sharing one or two images, whereas Facebook encourages users to ‘log on and carry out their digital lives with their offline identities’, proposing that ‘the use of authentic identity helps people get the most value out of the site’. Facebook promotes that the authenticity in self-presentation helps people to connect and contribute to friendships both on and offline.

In the case of the Enough Food IF (2013) campaign, supporters were encouraged to ‘like’ Facebook content and ‘share’ YouTube videos with their Facebook ‘friends’. These ideologically driven actions were determined not by the NGOs themselves but by the architecture of Facebook. The adoption of commercial strategies in humanitarian communication has a long history. Visual communication used by NGO campaigns is often developed by external corporate branding organisations. While this signals a change in the communications produced, the NGO maintains control of the messaging of these materials. However, in the case of Facebook,
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the architecture is imposed not by the NGO but by the social networking platform, which dictates both the type of communication produced and how users can respond to issues, such as encouraging people to ‘like’ global poverty.

Governing visibility

In the twentieth century the communication of humanitarianism was governed by traditional media powers, including mainstream newspaper and TV news editors. The power to govern visibility of contemporary humanitarianism in social networking environments shifts from traditional media editors towards ‘technological mechanisms and algorithmic selections operated by large social media corporations’.

I propose that these algorithms and their producers, which dictate a set of rules, are the new ‘gatekeepers’ that NGOs have to negotiate to achieve visibility. While Facebook ‘pages’ facilitate a space for organisations to have editorial control and to directly publish their own communications, research conducted in North America shows that only 6 per cent of users return to a page once liking it. For communication to achieve visibility on Facebook, NGOs need to penetrate the News Feeds of Facebook users, where people spend the majority of their time online.

The Facebook News Feed was created in 2006 and is controlled by algorithms to contribute to the personalisation of users’ experiences. At the time of the Enough Food IF campaign, the News Feed was governed by the Edge Rank algorithm, which determined what was displayed in a user’s News Feed by calculating:

1. The Facebook relationship between the NGO and the Facebook user. For example, how often the user interacts with the NGO, defined in the algorithms as the Affinity.
2. The type of content and how people have engaged with the content, classified as the Engagement.
3. And finally the Time Decay of the post: Facebook wants the News Feed to contain recent posts.

On 6 August 2013, Facebook announced that the Edge Rank algorithm had been updated to include more factors. However, users’ interaction with the content is still valued in selecting material for the News Feed. In particular, older content can return to users’ News Feeds if it is ‘still getting lots of likes and comments’. The visibility of content is dependent on these numerical interactions.

Michel Foucault, with reference to Jeremy Bentham’s design for the panopticon penitentiary, stated that ‘the diagram of a mechanism of power reduced to its ideal form’, identifies the power relationships that are rooted in visibility and surveillance. For Foucault, visibility is an apparatus of control that governs human behaviour. In the case of social networking environments, visibility is not a punishment
but 'functions as a reward'. For any interaction to take place, users and organisations need to be visible. Facebook dictates that only specific communications, which fulfil the algorithmic selection, will penetrate users' News Feed and be granted a degree of visibility. Achieving visibility on social networking platforms is also a temporary status. Unlike the circular panopticon, where the threat of visibility is continuous, the Facebook News Feed is a linear space that is continually updated by the algorithm, with posts at the top being most prominent.

Transience of visibility

The Facebook algorithm calculates the 'time decay' of communication, privileging recent posts by granting them visibility as well as pushing them towards the top of the News Feed. Although the algorithm dictates what communication temporarily penetrates the News Feed, the user's command of the space brings a further degree of transience to the visibility. Michel de Certeau, in *The Practice of Everyday Life*, discusses the practice of walking in the city, 'the networks of these moving, intersecting writings compose a manifold story that has neither author nor spectator, shaped out of fragments of trajectories and alterations of spaces'. Similarly, Facebook users scrolling through their News Feed can be perceived as 'walkers' temporarily experiencing spaces in flux, following fragments of stories encountered on their visual journeys. While photos, status updates and shared links may be visible to the user 'walking' their individual News Feed, the whole is not encountered and neither is the collective.

De Certeau positions the 'walker' who is 'below the thresholds at which visibility begins' in contrast to the 'voyeur' who has an elevated experience of the city, who sees the city as a whole and 'allows one to read it, to be a solar Eye, looking down like a god'. The architectures of social networks, as discussed above, are not designed for the complexities of humanitarian politics but for consumerism. Facebook users are prevented from the elevated view of the 'voyeur' who might read humanitarian communication as a complex process that maps across different inequalities (economic, social, gender, racial). Users encounter only fragments of humanitarian stories, which fit the commercial design of the platform. The process that commodifies the lives of people living in poverty, and the contextual politics, are excluded. However, as 'walkers' users are positioned as practitioners, who have the ability to participate in their News Feed as a site of practice.

The way in which technologies change the request for publics to act, but also the act itself, is critiqued in the work of Jodi Dean, Lilie Chouliaraki, Mirca Madianou and others. Although Chouliaraki does not focus on social networking platforms her analysis of post-humanitarian communication is relevant to the social media used within the Enough Food IF campaign. Chouliaraki discusses how the 'technologisation of action' has resulted in acts being simplified. She argues that online activism now promotes 'effortless' action, without the need for a sustained commitment to the cause. The actions promoted in the architecture of Facebook are...
easy; ‘sharing’ a video or ‘liking’ a post is not a time-consuming or skilled activity. Chouliairi further juxtaposes the ease of expressing ‘solidarity’ from the ‘comfort of her living room’ with the suff ring of the distant other.43

Humanitarian NGOs promote these time efficient practices. In the Enough Food IF campaign, the time that actions would take featured prominently in the communications used. On the Save the Children website, for example, supporters were directed to follow the campaign on social media in ‘two minutes’ or take part in producing a YouTube video in ‘fi ve minutes’. Robert Hassan, in his work on network time, discusses the role of the clock in the development of what Nigel Thrift calls ‘capitalist time consciousness’, which shapes an instrumental view that ‘takes the world largely as given and attempts to find means of living ever more productively and efficiently in it’.44 Keith Tester proposes that audiences of mediated suf ring rely on ‘commonsense humanitarianism’; this uncritical understanding of humanitarianism is needed to promote ‘time efficient practices’.45 Antonio Gramsci defined common sense as ‘the conception of the world which is uncritically absorbed by the various social and cultural environments in which the moral individuality of the average man is developed’.46

Instrumentalism can be identified in contemporary humanitarian communication that directs supporters towards ‘time efficient’ actions online that promotes, perhaps due to time, a decontextualised problem of poverty and a solution (taking action with NGOs) as a given. These time-bound practices produce a transactional mode of engagement that does not require a sustained commitment to a cause. The success of the Enough Food IF campaign on social networks was not measured by the quality of the supporters’ engagement with the issues (by analysing their YouTube Videos, Facebook updates or Tweets); instead the success was measured by the number of actions taken as an indication of public engagement. Jodi Dean defines a post-political formation of ‘communicative capitalism’ where the ‘only thing that is relevant is circulation’.47 The request by the Enough Food IF campaign for supporters to produce and circulate communications contributes to a ‘massive stream of content, losing their specifi city and merging with and into the data fl w’.48 While producing a ‘fl w’ of communication acts as a catalyst for further ‘likes’, ‘shares’ and ‘re-tweets’, the ‘fl w’ has a pace, dictated by algorithms, that produces fleeting weak communicative affinies between supporters and/or NGOs, not shared political actions.49 Facebook users individually interact with the NGO communication visible in their News Feed – the practice of ‘following’, ‘liking’ or ‘sharing’ are individual endorsements. Endorsements differ from exchanges, as the ‘fl w’ of communication is linear, with the ‘endorser’ absorbing the politics of another, not exchanging their own understanding.

Visualy ‘liking’

Nick Couldry, in his theorising of media as practice, uses the work of Ann Swidler (2001) to develop the notion of ‘culture’ in terms of ‘two types of publicly observable
processes … fi st, practices themselves … and, second, the discourse’ which, as Swidler argues, ‘is not what anyone says, but the system of meanings that allows them to say anything at all’. Consequently, Swidler, as well as Couldry, propose a new understanding of ‘culture’ away from internal ‘ideas’ or ‘meanings’ towards open practices ‘notable for their unconscious, automatic, un-thought character’. By analysing eight interviews with young people (aged 18–35), I investigate practices of participating in NGO campaigns through Facebook.

An interviewee commented that ‘because its [visual communication] on Facebook, we’re directed to “Like” poverty, which seems natural at the time’ (Interview A). The act of ‘liking’ poverty, presented as ‘natural at the time’, illustrates that actions within the architecture of Facebook can be experienced as instinctive. Yet, the interviewee, reflecting on her actions, perceived that a paradox occurs when asked to ‘like’ poverty. These tensions are explored by discussing ways that visually ‘liking’ can be understood as a form of ‘presencing’ humanitarian action.

**Participation as ‘presencing’**

People rarely self-identify as performers in everyday acts of self-presentation even though they frequently adjust or adapt behaviours to different social settings, situations and audiences. Zizi Papacharissi, drawing on Erving Goffman, has argued that digital environments are conducive to online users participating in a performance of self-presentation. By adjusting and adapting their behaviour, people present different ‘faces’ understood by Papacharissi as ‘an information game’ where information is concealed, discovered and revealed. Building on Papacharissi’s work on self-presentation, I wish to deploy Couldry’s theory of ‘presencing’ to understand individuals’ practices of participation in NGO campaigns and communication. Couldry defines ‘presencing’ as:

acts of managing through media a continuous presence-to-others across space … oriented to a permanent site in public space that is distinctively marked by the producer for displaying that producer’s self … It responds to an emerging requirement in everyday life to have a public presence beyond one’s bodily presence, to construct an objectification of oneself.

Similar to NGOs authoring communication that contributes to producing themselves as authentic and legitimate actors, individuals are ‘presencing’ themselves as campaigners of certain causes. Intertwined with individuals ‘presencing’ participation is the personalisation of politics and communications. Bennett and Segerberg define ‘personalised’ communication, for organisations or coalitions, which ‘broker’ action as involving ‘opportunities for customisation of engagement with issues and actions’. The customisation of engagement and ‘presencing’ of individuals as ‘supporters’ contributes to a practice of self-expression. By
organisations brokering action across social networks, which are increasingly reflectors of individual self-expression, the customisation of action has focused on visually ‘presencing’ the self.57

The Enough Food IF campaign included several opportunities for supporters to visually present their involvement in the campaign with Twibbons, visual petitions and YouTube videos, all of which, I propose, contribute to customising engagement that looks predominantly towards the ‘self’, rather than people living in poverty. The Twibbon was developed in 2009 by Storm Ideas, as a tool for users to customise their profile picture on Facebook and Twitter by adding a brand or charity’s logo to show their public support for a ‘cause’.58 The Twibbon, now part of the architecture of Facebook, is a contemporary version of the traditional supporter ribbon, badge or car sticker.59

In the case of the Enough Food IF campaign, supporters were invited to add an IF logo to their profile image. Changing a Facebook profile image, the most visible part of the profile (due to the enforced public setting), is a practice of self-expression, which is typically temporary but contributes to a public archive of profile images, unless actively deleted. The visibility of the profile picture, along with the act of changing the image, which is publicised in ‘friends’ News Feeds, has the potential to raise awareness by reaching ‘networked publics’.60 In the interviews, Facebook was discussed as a way that supporters became aware of campaigns. One interviewee acknowledged that their awareness of the Enough Food IF campaign was ‘through a friend’s Facebook’ (Interview A) and another was made aware of new campaigns ‘on Facebook mainly, I’m not really signed up to any charity email lists’ (Interview B). While raising awareness, the practice of adding Twibbons to profile pages also contributes to users identifying themselves as part of a movement. The practice of ‘presencing’ is a continuous ‘project of the self’ that requires users to take action to remain socially visible.61 However, users can only practice participation via a Twibbon for one cause at any one time. Traditionally, being part of a ‘movement’ is perceived as a sustained commitment until the goals of the campaign are met. However, the act of adding a single Twibbon for a given period contributes to conveying action that is a singular and temporary commitment.

Self-expression and mobilising ‘friends’

The act of ‘liking’ content on Facebook is recognised by interview participants as a visible act that has the potential to address a public by penetrating the News Feeds of their ‘friends’. Similar to Michael Warner’s understanding of publics existing by participating in reading, writing and watching ‘the discourse[s] that addresses them’, the act of ‘liking’ was perceived as a semi-public act that calls a public into existence, whereby strangers meet by being addressed by a mutual friend’s action.62 Interviewees understanding the potential for their actions to be visible discussed that the ability to engage with NGO communication online was normatively
positive. The interviews conducted indicated that young people perceive social networks as spaces to mobilise friends. One interviewee rationalised her action of 'liking' having the potential to make 'other people see it' and persuade Facebook 'friends' to also act:

I think because I know if you 'like' it or 'share' it – I think maybe even if you just 'like' it – it comes up on your feed that you like something and then it will come up on my friend's News Feeds – so hopefully other people will see it and be persuaded to take action. (Interview C)

Reflecting on her relationship with NGO communication on Facebook, one interviewee commented that although she would 'like' many posts by NGOs, she discussed being more selective with the NGO material that she shared. She wanted to only share content that would achieve interaction with her friends ('likes', 'shares' and 'comments') and that when communication achieved a lot of interaction, she felt that she was part of something bigger. However, typically the NGO communications that she has shared 'haven't got a massive amount of likes and comments and I think the problem is that only certain people will look at it – you know some of your friends on Facebook will look at it and others won't' (Interview C). The interviewee's reflection on her use of Facebook and her 'friends' reception of NGO communication illustrates how campaigns are only visible for 'friends' that are actively willing to 'look'. Returning to my earlier argument that users 'walk' their News Feed, the interviewee's reflection illustrates that another degree of visibility/invisibility occurs once the communication penetrates the News Feed.

Several of the interviewees had volunteered overseas as part of the government-funded Platform2 programme and discussed that by sharing their own stories and images of 'humanitarian' action, more of their friends had engaged with their personal encounters of poverty (Interviews C, D, E). The personalisation of poverty in this way echoes the mediation of celebrities' trips overseas, including a similar sentimental discourse, 'going to Kenya and seeing Kibera the large slum was heart-breaking' (Interview C). The sharing of volunteer experiences on Facebook is both a communicative act that raises awareness of the poverty that exists as well as an act of self-expression that contributes to identifying themselves as actors within a cause. Choularaki identifies a recent humanitarian turn to self-expression, as a key feature of new media, which is a 'practical response to compassion fatigue, the public's apathy towards traditional iconographies of suffering'. However, self-expression and humanitarianism has a deeper heritage that dates back to the publication of early missionary work overseas that situates missionaries as benevolent actors. What has changed in recent decades is the tone of the communication that shapes self-expression. Previously, self-expression in relation to humanitarianism was presented as a sacrifice to the cause, with sober imagery of missionaries feeding people living in poverty. In contrast, missionary work and overseas volunteering is now promoted with imagery of smiling young people
From starving children to satirical saviours

conducting overseas 'development' that contributes to the personal growth and fulfilment of the volunteer, while also 'saving' those in need.

Although interviewees all agreed that sharing NGO communication on Facebook is normatively positive, each participant discussed being selective about what they chose to share. The self-imposed criteria were either feeling 'really strongly about something and I feel that I want to encourage other people to do it' (Interview B) or because they believe that their friends will interact with it (Interview D). However, one interviewee was conscious that 'I don't want to put it [global poverty] in other people's faces' (Interview B), implying that the act of sharing communication could invade friends' personal spaces.

Each of the interview participants were asked to watch humanitarian NGO video clips and images during the interview and comment whether they would interact with the communication if they had encountered the imagery on Facebook. All participants rejected the imagery of a starving child, interpreting the image as 'negative' and 'repetitive'. Visuals of children smiling were generally perceived as 'positive' imagery and were a result of people already receiving international aid. Several interviewees commented that they would share the 'What has aid ever done for anyone?' and believed humour works:

I think humour is a good way to engage people, it wasn't used in a way to make it seem lighthearted – so I think it draws you in more – obviously everyone likes to laugh and I think positive images are always going to work much better than negative images because people see it as something different. I think it definitely works. (Interview C)

Interviewees understood humour and 'positive' imagery as 'working' due to it being 'something different'. The attraction to 'new' communication as a result of it being 'different' indicates that there is a perceived need, by audiences, for humanitarian communication to be continually changing if it is to 'work'.

Satirical saviours

Since 1985, Comic Relief has been producing telethons that include a juxtaposition of comedy performances alongside emotive pleas to help people living in poverty. Yet, the use of humour in the narratives of global poverty produced by NGOs has a much shorter history. Since 2005, in the era that Choulaki defines as 'post-humanitarian', the humouring of poverty has been used intermittently in protest campaigns (Make Poverty History), fundraising appeals (Comic Relief) and in educational campaigns critiquing NGO representations (Radio-Aid). The humorous narratives have included self-reflexive critiques of the NGOs' own fundraising practices, subverting the traditional emotive plea, dramatic music and starving child. According to Cameron, using humour in public engagement, in particular for
protest and education, has the potential ‘to work as a hook to attract initial public interest in serious issues … [and] promote a sense of hope that change is possible.’ The humouring of hunger, which parodies the traditional narratives of poverty and humanitarian action, has gained large online audiences. ‘Africans for Norway’, a spoof charity single that asks Africans to send radiators to Norway because ‘Frostbite kills too’, has been watched by nearly three million YouTube viewers (published online 6 November 2012). As a result of NGOs’ desire to produce communications that circulate across social networks, the visuals used by campaigns have radically changed. The adoption of digital environments with implicit rules has challenged NGOs to produce satirical narratives of global poverty. The iconography of a starving child, who still remains a dominant focus in televised NGO adverts, is replaced on social networks by ‘likeable’ content.

The Enough Food IF campaign’s Facebook communication that achieved the most ‘likes’, ‘shares’ and ‘comments’ is a satirical video that asks ‘What has aid ever done for anyone?’ Save the Children UK produced the video, which is directed by Paul Weiland (*Blackadder* and *Mr Bean*) and includes the actors Peter Serafin wicz, Joanna Scanlan and Matt Berry. The video was introduced by the organisation in a colloquial and friendly tone:

> Hope you all had a great and eventful weekend! We certainly did – without giving too much away, it involved going undercover at an anti-aid rally and documenting what really goes on behind the scenes …

The short video, less than three minutes long, was published on 18 March 2013, two days prior to a UK budget announcement, a key ‘moment’ in the campaign that asked for the UK government to spend 0.7 per cent of Gross National Income (GNI) on international aid. The question posed in the video resonates with the public scepticism on the value of aid. Henson *et al.* conducted an analysis of Mass Observation diaries on the topic of aid in 2008, which showed that people in the UK ‘tend to be much better at picturing aid “failure” than aid “success”’. The video mimics a popular skit from *Monty Python’s Life of Brian* (1979), that ironically asks, ‘What have the Romans ever done for us?’ with the conclusion being that they significantly developed society. Similarly, in the Enough Food IF video, British characters are on their way to an anti-aid rally, determined to campaign against aid even after their discussion on the bus about the many ‘successes’ of international aid. The video satirises traditional NGO protest action, with the characters participating in a demonstration, singing their protest song and holding placards displaying their anti-aid messages, including ‘Make Aid History’ in the same font as the 2005 Make Poverty History logo.

The larger audiences that humorous narratives of global poverty have achieved online illustrate that laughter can be a successful ‘hook’ for audiences to click and watch. However, the way in which social suffering is represented determines the type
of engagement provoked and contributes to the social relations formed between the North and the South. Tho as Hobbes, writing in England in the mid-seventeenth century, developed a theory that humour was based on superiority over ‘the defects of others’ and that laughter was thus the ‘roar of the victor’. The premise for the ‘What has aid ever done for anyone?’ video is that the characters on the bus are both dim-witted and ignorant about the value of international aid. The humour is revealed in the incongruity of their determination to campaign an anti-aid message even after their discussion about how aid is:

Providing 2 million people with clean water and sanitation, enabling 5 million children to go to school, vaccinating over 80 million children against killer diseases, helping people dying from preventable illnesses, nearly eradicating polio, and responding to 32 natural disasters across the globe in the last year.

Applying Hobbes’s theory, the laughter in the clip is provoked by the ‘superior’ audience witnessing the ‘defective’ view of the anti-aid campaigners. The humour of the video is contingent on the audience already supporting, or adopting during the clip, the pro-aid position of the Enough Food IF campaign.

Hobbes’s theory of humour as depending on superiority is challenged in the work of Robert C. Solomon, who proposes ‘laughter as the great leveller, beyond contempt or indignation, antithetical to pretention and pomp… to avoid the supposed bad taste of enjoying the Three Stooges [a 1920’s American comedy group] we encounter the much greater danger of taking ourselves too seriously’. Hobbes and Solomon are absolute in their divergent theories about the uses of laughter, yet both approaches can be identified in NGO communication. Solomon’s claim that the authors of the comedy in truth laugh at themselves can be identified in many of the NGOs’ self-reflexive narratives of the work that they conduct. Yet, NGOs are specifically only self-reflexive on their public engagement activities with people living in the global North. NGOs deconstruct and satirise development adverts: the ‘caring’ celebrity, the emotive music and their use of ‘African’ children, but not their development project work in the field.

The focus by the NGO sector to only parody their public engagement work, in an effort to further engage the public, produces a communicative feedback loop NGOs are inviting audiences to be part of the game, using their cynicism to acknowledge the inferiority of their communications. Although the humorous narratives address public cynicism, the social relationship between the global North and people living in poverty remains the same. In the case of the Enough Food IF video: celebrities remain the dominant voices, the people living in poverty are not only silent but are now also invisible, and the NGOs’ work in the field is still promoted as providing the gift of clean water, sanitation, education and, more generally, ‘saving people’s lives’. The agency to be the comedian, and to tell the joke, holds implicit power and often the same framework of stereotypes are used without subversion. People living
in poverty are imagined, as in the Enough Food IF video, as passive, hungry and helpless – in need of campaigners in the UK.

John Cameron argues that ‘in the context of low levels of public engagement in the global North with issues of global injustice, the strategic use of humour is a risk worth taking.’ However, I argue that the current use of humour in humanitarian communication deflects attention towards celebrating a temporary subversion. Humanitarian NGOs’ adoption of humour in the context of their public engagement work can be understood in relation to Mikhail Bakhtin’s discussion of the carnival as folk-humour. For the carnival only suspends dominant hierarchies, it is a ‘celebrated temporary liberation from the prevailing truth and from the established order.’ The carnival, like the humour used in NGO campaigns, does not permeate all spaces. It achieves visibility only when ‘permitted by the culture which is operating these hierarchies as norms, [which] leads us to see carnival’s long term effect as constraining rather than liberating.’ Humanitarian NGOs satirise their communication practices on their own terms. While they offer a degree of self-deprecating humour by parodying their communication traits of starving children, celebrities and dramatic music, this rarely results in a change in how they communicate poverty more widely.

Conclusion

While digital interactions can be archived, the rapid change in users’ Facebook News Feeds contributes to NGO communication occupying only a temporal position of visibility. The architecture of Facebook, in particular the algorithmic selection of the News Feed content, is both the ‘gatekeeper’ and ‘governor’ of visibility. The implicit ideology of Facebook to be a network of positive sentiments has produced a new code of conduct for NGOs. To achieve visibility, humanitarian communications need to be ‘likeable’, which has resulted in NGOs changing their visual communications. However, while the communication becomes visible to a wider audience, people living in poverty still remain invisible within humorous communications that rely on the same framework of stereotypes.

Time-based actions are promoted by NGOs as a ‘moment’ to act, which is both quick and immediate. The commercial ideology of the Facebook platform promotes transactional and numerical modes of citizenship, in which public engagement is quantitatively measured by NGOs, similar to fundraising campaigns. In doing so, action is orientated towards ‘endorsements’ of NGO-produced communication, not communicative exchanges between publics or people living in poverty. Everyday practices on Facebook contribute to users ‘presencing’ themselves as actors within NGO campaigns. My interviewees identified Facebook as a space of mobilisation. The visibility of their actions, such as ‘liking’ and ‘sharing’ NGO communication, contributes to establishing support for a campaign. Users’ self-expression of compassion on issues of global poverty has also taken a turn towards the ‘positive’ with participation being conveyed as joyful.
Notes


19 Fuchs, *Social Media*, p. 160.


22 Cited in Rundle, ‘Zuckerberg: Telepathy is the Future of Facebook’.


24 Oremus, You Can't Dislike Ths Article’.


26 Fuchs, *Social Media*, p. 151.


32 Hampton et al., *Social Networking Sites*.

33 Poell and Dijck, ‘Social Media and Activist Communication’, p. 533.

34 Bucher, ‘Want to be on the Top?’


37 Bucher, ‘Want to be on the ’Bp’?, p. 174.


40 Although embedded links within Facebook have the potential for users to experience an ‘elevated’ view of a subject by following the link to an external platform, similar to the potential
for Twitter to contribute to a discussion not by the 140-character post but by an embedded link to a site.


42 Choulakian, The Ironic Spectator, p. 70.


45 K. Tester, Humanitarianism and Modern Culture (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2010), p. 34.


47 Dean, Communicative Capitalism, p. 58.

48 Dean, Communicative Capitalism, p. 58.


55 Couldry, Media, Society, World, p. 48, 50.


57 van Zoonen, ‘From Identity to Identificion’


59 A survey of 186 Australian blood donors conducted by Kathleen Chell and Gary Mortimer identified virtual tokens, such as the Twibbon, are perceived as a reward for altruistic behaviour. See ‘Investigating Online Recognition for Blood Donor Retention: An Experiential Donor Value Approach’, International Journal of Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Marketing, 19 (2014), pp. 143–63.
Boyd, 'Social Network Sites as Networked Publics'.

Couldry, Media, Society, World, p. 50.


Choularaki, The Ironic Spectator, p. 17.


S. Henson, J. Lindstrom and L. Haddad, with R. Mulmi, Public Perceptions of International Development and Support for Aid in the UK: Results of a Qualitative Enquiry (Brighton: Institute of Development Studies, 2010), p. 3.

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The corporate karma carnival: Offline and online games, branding and humanitarianism at the Roskilde Festival

*Lene Bull Christiansen and Mette Fog Olwig*

In humanitarianism the popularising of causes, and the use of celebrities and media culture to do so, is a rising phenomenon. Academic writing on humanitarianism, however, tends to criticise the popular, especially when it is mediated through celebrities.¹ Such critiques often intersect with disapproval of the growing collaboration or crossbranding between humanitarian causes and commercial interests, e.g. via corporate social responsibility (CSR), cause-branded products or philanthropy.² Critics of the popular characteristically draw on various theoretical and analytical approaches, such as critical discourse analysis, Žižekian ideological critique and/or grounded critical analytics.³ These analyses often echo critical approaches to popular culture in media studies that, following Horkheimer and Adorno, view it as an extension of the commercialisation of culture and thus as an expression of capitalist interests rather than popular sentiment.⁴ Conversely, many contemporary media scholars see popular culture as an expression of a playful anarchic potential that elites have often feared and attempted to regulate.⁵ The divide in debates concerning the popularising of humanitarianism is thus to some degree focused on the question of the critical potential of ‘the popular’ in the media. Is it possible to harness the powers of ‘the popular’ and media culture in service of humanitarianism, or will ‘the popular’ inevitably serve neo-colonial and commercial interests?⁶

In this chapter, we explore the possibilities of an alternative analytical approach to these topics, based on the Russian literary theorist Mikhail Bakhtin’s carnivalesque analytics.⁷ We wish to see the increasing use of ‘popular’ forms in relation to humanitarian causes from a different perspective, which may reveal insights into the ‘popular’ beyond the primarily critical traditions. This is because, as we argue, the carnivalesque has something of a double identity as being both affirmative of the status quo, and, at the same time, an embodied critique of the status quo. In our case, we examine how the carnivalesque can function both as a form of corporate
branding and as a means to destabilise the status quo identified with a negatively branded segment of the population. This means that there is a constant need to critically balance an analysis of the potentially progressive and/or problematic aspects of a popularised humanitarian event, rather than to simply criticise or praise. In order to make this point we will explore the energies that are at play in the popular ‘carnival’ of the Danish non-profit music and culture festival, the Roskilde Festival.

A second key aim of this chapter is to expand our understanding of the time-space/place relation of the festival, or carnival, encapsulated in the notion of the festival as a chronotope, by drawing attention to the contemporary practices of adding online activities to the offline events of the festival. The many humanitarian, social and environmental happenings and routines generated by the festival are often communicated online. Facebook pages, blogs, Instagram, Twitter and hashtags all accompany the initiatives and events. The place of Roskilde Festival is thus expanded into cyberspace. The difference between the experience of lived community at Roskilde Festival, and the way that this is tied to the virtual reality of the internet, might help enhance the Roskilde Festival experience, and deepen the audience’s understanding of the humanitarian issues at play. It is, however, a mediated reality that easily turns into a public relations vehicle for the humanitarian organisations, as well as corporate sponsors, that goes well beyond the physical Roskilde Festival experience. The case study that we have chosen for this chapter illuminates these different trends by exploring the links between a corporate brand, festive humanitarian engagements with Roskilde Festival, and the offline–online interconnectivity of the humanitarian events.

Roskilde Festival is the largest North European culture and music festival and is held each summer in the outskirts of the city of Roskilde, which is ca. 30km from the capital city of Denmark, Copenhagen. The festival prides itself on its non-profit status and its commitment to sustainability and global solidarity. In this chapter we focus on Hummel, one of the festival’s many corporate sponsors and a Denmark-based international sports clothing company. In collaboration with local NGOs, Hummel participates in Roskilde Festival with brand-related happenings and has named its events ‘Orange Karma’ after its CSR philosophy ‘Company Karma.’ Orange is the signature colour of the festival chosen because of the orange colour of the biggest concert stage at the festival, which is used as the logo for the festival. We are here examining the Orange Karma events in 2013 and 2015.

**Case study: Orange Karma**

While ensuring a good concert programme is of course crucial, an important component of Roskilde Festival is instilling a sense of community and there is an element of utopian vision in the history and mandate with which the festival is associated. This is often referred to as the ‘Orange Feeling’ and has been described as embracing solidarity, charity, tolerance, artistic freedom, creativity and community. The
Orange Feeling infuses all aspects of the festival experience, as exemplified by the following excerpt from Lene’s field notes:

While Mette has gone to fetch flowers, I sit down to write some notes. A couple of young guys in their late teens pass by me. One of them gently dunks the top of my head, calling out ‘hey you’ – I reply: ‘hey there’ – they both say ‘bye bye’ and walk on. I think to myself that this is a typical Roskilde Festival encounter. One would not behave like this anywhere else; approaching a total stranger, who is decidedly outside of your own age group, in this playful casual manner for no apparent reason. Here on this lazy afternoon in the sun, it seems perfectly natural.11

Many NGOs as well as businesses draw on the Orange Feeling, and the potential of reaching some of the more than 100,000 festival participants through various events, shops, happenings and promotions at the festival.12 Orange Karma, one of numerous platforms through which Roskilde Festival supports the promotion of environmental and social causes, is organised as a collaboration between Roskilde Festival and Hummdd. For Hummdd, Roskilde Festival provides a high-profile opportunity to raise the profile of its CSR philosophy, while also, of course, increasing brand recognition. The CSR philosophy behind Hummdd’s campaign is a carefully crafted branding strategy, which is personified by the owner and CEO of the company, Christian Stadil. In collaboration with one of the country’s leading researchers in organisational change and business management, Steen Hildebrandt, Stadil shaped this philosophy inspired by his own interest in Buddhism.13 Stadil’s public persona embodies Company Karma, and combines the urban cool of a fashion icon with a self-styling that is reminiscent of a Buddhist monk or even Mahatma Gandhi.14 As part of its CSR strategy, which includes a number of charities, Hummdd has sponsored several sports events that are linked with good causes.

The 2013 Hummdd sports event examined in this chapter is a football (soccer) tournament, organised in collaboration with an organisation called ‘Eir Soccer’ – the significance of the name will be explained shortly. The tournament consisted of two competitions taking place simultaneously in adjacent football fields. In one of the twinned tournaments female festivalgoers competed, while in the other tournament female asylum-seekers competed. The other Hummdd sports event examined in this chapter is the 2013 ‘Street City Games’ (such as street basketball, volleyball and football), organised in collaboration with a NGO named ‘GAME Denmark’, or ‘GAME’ for short. It involved male and female festival participants and included two high-profile events: a street basketball game pitting celebrities against the Hummdd-sponsored basketball team, ‘Stevnsegade’, and a beach football game involving (male) members of the local Roskilde police force playing against (male) members of the hippie anti-establishment community ‘Christiania’ located in Copenhagen.

As we will return to below, Eir Soccer and GAME promote humanitarianism in different ways.
The corporate karma carnival

The case study is based on participant observation and the analysis of press and online representations of the Orange Karma events as well as related online materials. Online material and coverage include Facebook announcements of events, Instagram campaigns, a webpage with video reportages of the events, short videos presenting individual players from participating sports teams, and videos portraying the festive spirit of a football tournament.

The popular as carnivalesque

Bakhtin's ideas have been adopted by different disciplines beyond literary studies: his works have inspired, amongst others, sociologists, cultural theorists and linguists. In this study we apply Bakhtin's concepts to the study of humanitarian events and communication in relation to the Roskilde Festival. We have elsewhere depicted how Roskilde Festival in many respects exemplifies Bakhtin's theory of the carnivalesque, 'where festive forms of the carnival include parodies, dressing up in costumes, eating and drinking in abundance, satirical rendering of authority figures and an emphasis on carnal pleasures such as sexual experiences and eating'. The energies that are at play in carnivalesque popular forms are intimately connected to bodily experiences and performances.

Two elements of the carnivalesque are worth highlighting here. First, the satire and laughter of the carnival is associated with the 'lower regions' of the body. There is an important duality to this; the lower regions of the enclosing body are seen as the place of birth and rebirth, and hence as the enclosing womb as well as the enclosing bodily tomb of death. They are also viewed as the place of excrement often used to mock authority figures. When used as fertiliser, however, excrement contributes to nature's rebirth. Such a duality was exemplified at Roskilde Festival 2015, by the Danish Agriculture and Food Council, which ran a campaign to recycle urine, via large mobile urinals, under the slogan 'Don't waste your piss. Danish farmers can turn it into beer again' (see figure 12.1). Second, for Bakhtin the carnival constitutes a turning 'upside down' of society. Authority figures are 'fair game' for satire and normal moral codes are suspended for the duration of the carnival:

We must consider again in more detail the ambivalent nature of carnival images. All the images of carnival are dualistic; they unite within themselves both poles of change and crisis: birth and death (the image of pregnant death), blessing and curse (benedictory carnival curses which call simultaneously for death and rebirth), praise and abuse, youth and old age, top and bottom, face and backside, stupidity and wisdom.

Combined, these dualistic elements suggest for Bakhtin that the degradation of the exalted figures of society in carnival satire has an internal ambivalence, because this degradation also points towards a rebirth of society (literally and figuratively) passing through the lower regions of the body in order to be reborn. This means that the carnival is simultaneously satirically denigrating and (re)affirming, and thereby
can work to either revitalise existent social power structures, or to motivate their transformation.\textsuperscript{18}

In our context, this duality and/or ambivalence in the carnivalesque analytics poses similar challenges. It means engaging the deeply problematic power relations behind global inequality and corporate greed that produce, for instance, the social reality of the asylum-seekers whom we encountered in the Orange Karma event. With this analytics there is a risk of over-interpreting the significance of embodied experiences and performances, and the regenerative powers of the carnivalesque, while underestimating the reinforcement of social power relations, which from a Bakhtinian point of view is also part of the carnival.

In order to understand the relation between the festival and the social context and power relations associated with it, we propose to analyse the festival in terms of Bakhtin's concept of the 'chronotope'. The notion of the chronotope has been applied in order to understand the ways in which specific meanings, significance and consequences are attached to particular space/place-temporalities.\textsuperscript{19} Bakhtin develops the concept to describe the specific time-space/place relations that govern literary genres via the attributes, norms, traditions and 'worldsense' that characterise a particular genre.\textsuperscript{20} The chronotope thus governs the norms, traditions, socialites and aesthetic forms linked to a particular delimited time-space/place.
The delimited nature of the chronotope does not indicate that it is a contained unit. The chronotope is, as per Bakhtin's overall focus on 'dialogism', intertextual in the sense that in the carnivalesque it involves a dialectic dialogue between the popular instituting of the event, which is a sociological fact, and the immaterial forces that are associated with the carnivalistic forms. For Bakhtin carnivalistic folklore is a particular world sense that 'possesses a mighty life-creating and transforming power, an indestructible vitality.' Connected to this dialectic is another dialectic between space and place. Chronotope is often translated as time-space or the spatio-temporal. The Greek word 'topos', nevertheless, literally means place, not space.

Space and place, and the relationship between them, are highly debated topics within disciplines such as geography. Some (positivist) geographers, according to Tuan, see place as merely a location and thus as 'subsumed under the geographer's concept and analysis of space'. From this perspective, which tends to be associated with economic geographers, space is a web of (commercial) nodes/locations that they term 'places'. Place is then a location within a spatial structure. For the humanistic geographer, however, place is more than mere location. It 'incarnates the experiences and aspirations of a people'. The place of the carnival, from this perspective, can incarnate the experiences and aspirations of people in relation to a sense of community. But as we will show in our analysis of the Roskilde Festival, the place of the carnival also risks being incorporated into the media cultural branding of a global corporation through a cyber-spatial network.

The place of a carnivalesque event is important. Roskilde Festival, for example, takes (and thereby makes) place in the same spot every year, and participants in the festival get a special feeling and behave in a different way than they would outside this place. The place is thus crucial to understanding the festival chronotope, and the humanitarian events’ use of, and contribution to, this place are important to this understanding. With the increasing use of online communication in relation to the Roskilde Festival, however, the festival progressively expands into cyberspace. Cyberspace differs from place in that it is not experienced directly with all the senses, and thus the whole body. Furthermore, as we will show, cyberspace, and the media culture with which it is often linked, is a mediated reality that can be carefully manicured and controlled by specific interests, in this case humanitarian and corporate communication and branding. Additionally, cyberspace is not contained spatially and temporally in the same way as the material place of the Roskilde Festival. At a different time, for example, the grounds used for the festival are used for a county fair; but it is possible to continue experiencing Roskilde Festival in cyberspace long after leaving the place of Roskilde Festival. There is thus a continuing dialogic relationship between place and space that is manifested through the relationship between the 'offline' place of Roskilde Festival as an event, and the 'online' cyberspace of the internet.
Social soccer and basketball benefit events

The organisation involved in arranging the Orange Karma events with Hummud in 2013 used to be called ‘Sensational Football’ but is presently named ‘Eir Soccer’ after ‘a goddess and valkyrie associated with medical skill and a healing goddess’.26 As the Eir Soccer website explains, the organisation employs ‘soccer and the ball as a means of creating a better world’ and in order to stand ‘up against the severe injuries as well as gender stereotype in soccer – and support women to live a full life with soccer’.27 The carnivalesque festiveness of its activities is featured prominently on the organisation’s website, where a photo of happy female football players in costume adorns the front page.28 When scrolling further down the front page, one of Eir Soccer’s other activities is described: the Asylum United initiative, which includes establishing football teams for young women in Danish centres for asylum-seekers run by the Danish Red Cross.29

The main feature in Hummud’s Orange Karma area in 2013 at Roskilde Festival was a twin football tournament that took place simultaneously. One tournament comprised teams of asylum-seekers, named after the different asylum centres, wearing matching Hummud gear (see figure 12.3). The other overlapping tournament was made up of ordinary female festival participants who signed up in teams that were more or less created for the event. Some had chosen a silly and festive theme and name for their team, such as ‘Puzzy Riders’ or ‘Girl Power and Fishermen’, whereas others had more commercial themes, such as team KitKat – a global candy bar brand – or team Cocio – a Danish chocolate beverage.30 The teams wore outfits matching the themes (see figure 12.4). The festive front-page picture of Eir Soccer’s website appears to be from a similar tournament of festive teams.

Figure 12.2  Sensational Football tournament at the Roskilde Festival
Mette's field notes from the 2013 festival describe how the football tournament came to our attention, and how it appeared to accidental onlookers, such as Mette who initially was looking for another humanitarian event:

In the distance I notice a crowd watching something and decide that this must be it. As I get closer I realize the crowd is watching women playing football – The Orange Karma Sensational tournament … [The area] turns out to be filled with various Orange Karma events, communicated as: a wide range of activities during the festival that enable the festival guests to party and have fun while supporting Sensational Football's projects in Danish Asylum Centres at the same time.

[The next day I return to have a better look.] The central part of the area consists of two fields and on each side of each field a big crowd is enthusiastically cheering the players. Girls dressed in bizarre outfits, such as full suit tiger outfits, are waiting eagerly for their turn to play … Each game is only six minutes, so by the time I figure out what the team is called, a new one enters. Someone in the crowd yells: ‘We are all rooting for whoever wins!’ … I notice that the audience is very diverse. One couple is sitting next to me, silently watching the game, smiling. Several groups of rowdy guys are cheering loudly and happily. Even the bottle and can collectors who come to the festival to make money occasionally take a break to watch the game. Behind me are three girls with fake noses hanging around their necks. It must be part of their team outfit … At one point I hear one of them saying ‘The tournament is a really great place to advertise – I can see that Cocio has put together a team!’ Her friend agrees and responds: ‘I saw that there is a team called KitKat!’
... Two very different all-female teams now appear on the field: ‘Team Kongelunden’ and ‘Team Jelling’ – names of Danish asylum centres. They are different in the sense that they are wearing Hummel outfits and not fake noses or tiger tails. I hear some people from the crowd comment that they are probably very good at playing football. Six minutes later ‘Team Kongelunden’ has won the game and ‘Team King Henrik’s Harem’ and ‘Team Camp Tiger Kitten’ enter the field.

In an attempt to better understand the event, Mette spent some time reading the different posters advertising and explaining the events, looking at the different Orange Karma booths that were placed in the area, and asking the booth managers about the event. She was finally enlightened when she walked over to an organised bonfire:
a sign reads ‘SUPPORT ASYLUM UNITED: marshmallows, banana, popcorn and snorbrod over fi e – 10 Danish crowns [approximately £1]’. I decide to ask the woman raking the fi e if she can tell me a bit more about the event. She explains that it has taken place at Roskilde Festival for two years and keeps getting bigger. It is very popular which is probably why the festival continues to let them do it. Sensational football, she elaborates, has existed for ten years and used to have its tournament at a square in downtown Copenhagen where inner city kids can play street basket. Four years ago Sensational Football started Asylum United, and two years ago it came to Roskilde Festival … When I comment on the elaborate outfits, she explains that participants can win a prize for best outfit, as well as best karma and best sensation. She is not sure what the difference is between karma and sensation, but it is something about creating the best atmosphere when playing.

… Across from the bonfire is a nail bar. She tells me that it is run by girls from the asylum centres and that it was the girls’ idea to do it. I walk over, curious, and see many girls doing the nails and hair of men as well as women [see figure 12.5]. Everyone is smiling, chatting and hugs are distributed at regular intervals.

As indicated in the above quote, it is unusual for this kind of event to take place repeatedly at Roskilde Festival, and especially in such a prominent location. Usually

Figure 12.5 Orange Karma booth where festivalgoers and asylum-seekers can meet and talk during a nail or hair treatment
Roskilde Festival makes a point of enabling different causes and organisations to gain exposure at the festival. Indeed, as it turned out, Eir Soccer was eventually only involved for one more year in the Orange Karma events. When we returned in 2015, the asylum teams and girls in costumes had been replaced by a different event. Street basketball, volleyball and football tournaments had been set up as part of the Orange Karma area, and the NGO GAME was now collaborating with Hummel in the organising of the events. GAME promotes health and civic participation by supporting and organising street sports and training programmes amongst, for example, marginalised urban youth and children with mental illnesses. The NGO has won several prizes, including one for its contribution to integration in Denmark, and has expanded its operations to Lebanon with plans to further expand to eight more countries before 2020.

As part of the 2015 Orange Karma activities participants in the festival could sign up for tournaments and during each game it was possible to ‘exchange fighting spirit for karma’ since Hummel donated a ball to GAME for every goal that was scored. A total of 1,162 balls were eventually donated. Two of the most highly advertised and popular events, as mentioned, were a street basketball game between the successful Copenhagen-based basketball club Stevnsegade and a team of Danish celebrities, and a beach football game between the Roskilde police force and the hippie anti-establishment community of Christiania.

When we made observations during the GAME celebrity match in 2015, we were struck by the scant mention of both the GAME organisation and its mandate, as illustrated by this extract from Lene’s field notes:

> When I arrive at the Orange Karma area shortly after 2pm no basketball match is taking place. We had anticipated that it would have already started, and I try to glean some information from the large screen, which is mounted above the basketball court. The screen flashes the GAME slogan ‘we love asphalt’ and runs promotion videos such as a promotion video for GAME, mostly consisting of shots of kids playing different street sports, and another promotion video for Orange Karma and GAME’s collaboration, which calls on the festivalgoers to ‘Change the world at 108 Decibel’ and to ‘join the GAME and support vulnerable children and young people’ [see figure 12.6]. This leaves me wondering which vulnerable children they are referring to, and where one can join the GAME – is it here, or somewhere else? Occasionally a program for the day appears on the screen – but the celebrity match is not on, which frustrates me because this is what I’m here for. I do not have a smartphone with me, so eventually I call Mette, who has Internet access and can confirm that it has been announced online as starting at 3pm.

> … After the celebrity game, a commentator, speaking over the loudspeaker, initiates a game of hoops, which is open to everyone. I am pondering why there has been no mention of GAME by the commentator at all throughout the two hours that I have been observing the matches, since there is such a strong visual presence of GAME’s logo on the screen. I have been given a flyer, though, which promotes some
GAME activities: a basketball event in Odense (Denmark’s third largest city) and one in Copenhagen. The flyer, however, does not provide any information about what GAME is. I leave the Orange Karma area feeling more confused than when I arrived.38

It turned out that GAME relied heavily on online promotion of the organisation. In fact, it was difficult, or nearly impossible, to attain any offline information from the organisation, even when we approached the Orange Karma information booth. Rather, Orange Karma and GAME logos adorned posters, banisters and a large screen, which was mounted above the basketball court and, as described above, showed promotional videos presenting mostly images of street sports, and very little text beyond slogans (see figure 12.7) and an announcement of the week’s program. While it was sometimes difficult to comprehend the full dimensions of the events while they were taking place without being online, the interplay between online and offline activities had the potential of creating a whole different experience. This leads us to analyse the two as interconnected, with the online presentations not only providing background information for the offline activities during the festival, but also figuring as an integral part of the offline experience. We therefore analyse the online representations in relation to the festival chronotope.

**Online representations and offline experiences**

The Orange Karma events at the Roskilde Festival in 2013 and 2015 included both online and offline activities. Part of the 2013 Sensational Football/Eir Soccer online representations consisted of videos from the different years, where the tournament...
has taken place, which highlighted the festive spirit. Alongside these videos, the Hummd YouTube channel also presented documentaries on the young asylum-seekers participating in the tournament. These depict the daily struggle of being refugees in Denmark, how the young people came to live in the asylum centres and the various ways in which the football teams provide a free space where their daily troubles could be forgotten and a sense of community and belonging could be experienced.

The videos celebrating the tournament spirit are underscored by pop music, they have bright colours and sunshine and they show partying and playful people dressed in silly costumes, mixing and playing with the asylum-seekers in football uniforms. The videos portraying the tournament as a free and happy space of community, togetherness and joy stand in stark contrast to the videos depicting the lives of the asylum-seekers. An example of this is a video reportage that features Midheta and Mihreta. In the first shot of the video, they (along with a third unnamed young woman) are shown in an empty, dark hallway, with their backs turned to the camera. They are standing on a small balcony, looking out into the light green outdoors. The narrative of this video reportage is relatively simple, the film is no more than two-and-a-half minutes long, but it clearly shows a situation in which their daily lives are ‘tedious’ and the opportunity to play football is the light at the end of the tunnel (symbolically rendered via the opening shot of the video). The video then goes on
to present interviews with the two young women, interspersed with shots from a training session:

We were in Copenhagen – we slept there – and I think that it was fun, also that we were outside the centre for a bit, without our parents, and without our brother. We did not win; we were second place or so. We were just out from the centre, so we kind of forgot it a little bit. It [the centre] becomes a little boring, because we have been here so long.

[A song with English lyrics plays, while the young women are shown at a training match in a gym]: ‘Shaking, making. Something new. Already made by someone else. Trying to make a living, stop the spinning wheel of life.’ [The last shot from the gym shows small children, watching the game, smiling and waving at the camera.]

The narrative describes the football training and matches, which take place outside the asylum centre, as the catalyst for the girls moving from a dark and boring existence at the centre, to a fun and community filled life of football. Getting away from the dark and boring life of the asylum centre is also at the heart of a corresponding video reportage, featuring Nancy.

Nancy, who is fifteen years old, says: ‘I think that it helps one to get away from some of the stuff. It’s like, being together with others rather than – like – sitting inside at home.’ Nancy describes how a friend invited her to participate in the team, and how playing can also be a little hard, but that she is now in love with football. She is shown in her home environment, where she is hanging out with a friend in typical teenage fashion and reading books on her bed beneath posters of the singer Justin Bieber, and at the training ground, where she is shown playing with the ball with her team mates. The video portrays, on the one hand, a typical teenager, and on the other hand, a life which is very different from that of an ordinary Danish teenager – what makes Nancy part of the community is football.

Similar videos are found on the GAME website. As part of the description of a particular programme, ‘Support on the asphalt’, a video features a young girl, Annika, and her mother, Birgitte. The mother narrates in voiceover/filmed interview, while we follow the two of them, accompanied by a younger brother, as they take part in a parkour training session at a GAME gym. The setup of the video echoes the Hummel videos by moving from grey/dark everyday life to a bright and lit-up gym setting:

Birgitte: Annika has always been particularly sensitive – that was what I called it – we kind of gave it our own name. When she turned ten she suddenly became really, really ill and unfortunately it took more than a year for her to get a diagnosis and get help. Her diagnosis now is OCD [Obsessive Compulsive Disorder], she is now medicated and functions well, but she has faced a lot of difficulty at various periods of time.

[A project leader from GAME explains that the aim of the project is to create sports for everyone, they do this at the street level, but also by focusing on groups that
often do not participate in organised sports. The ‘head coach of the street movement’
describes how the training programme is constructed to allow anyone to participate
with positive results.]

Birgitte: We had hardly left the gym the first time, before Anni said ‘wow, it would
be even better if it lasted two hours’ and her little brother said ‘yea – two times a week
would also be really great’. I was really like ‘what has happened to my children!’ – and
it really is an amazing leap. The good days are parkour days. It is so positive and nice
and you do it together and you play. It has such a good feeling, and I think this is what
makes a difference for us.43

This narrative depicts the GAME parkour training as vitally important to the mental
and physical health of the kids who come there. The visual markers of movement
from dark tones and sombre moods to light and celebratory moods underscore the
transformative properties of the GAME programme.

In both the GAME programme and the Sensational Football/Eir Soccer pro-
grammether is a contrast between the videos that present the narratives of ‘benefici-
iaries’ and the videos of the football tournament and festival activities. The festival
footage depicts the colourful and joyful activities during the tournaments and
games of the festival in sharp contrast to the darkness and dullness of the asylum
centres and the difficult daily life of living with illness. In the festive videos, we see
the celebrities and spectators of the basketball match, the imaginative and colourful
costumes of the different football teams as well as bodies dancing, drinking, playing,
falling, colliding with each other, and embracing after a win.44 Read together, the
videos about the beneficiaries and the videos celebrating the community atmos-
phere of the festival can be seen to display a dichotomy involving detachment and
exclusion versus community and inclusion. The festival and the tournament
constitute breaks from the constraints of everyday life. The intertextual meaning
created between these videos represents the Sensational Football/Eir Soccer and
GAME events at Roskilde Festival as radically different places that are infused with
the ‘Orange Feeling’. In this chronotope a new community of fun is created where
hierarchical divides such as citizenship, language, culture, nationality and diagnosis
were temporarily suspended. Having a party while supporting the marginalised
is the logic behind the Orange Karma events. This is depicted in the description,
which accompanies the video reportage of Midheta and Mihreta on YouTube:

In the very heart of the Orange Karma collaboration you find arma Asylum United.
All the different Orange Karma activities at Roskilde Festival contribute to the
shared ambition of creating moments of peace and friendship for women in Danish
asylum centres.

With Sensational Football as the driving association behind the projects, we use
football and music as tools for change in six Danish asylum centres. More than 200
female asylum seekers have practiced and found unity and a lot of smiles in our sport
and music activities.
At the festival, teams from each centre will participate in the football tournament – but also party and dance together with festival guests.

During the two years that had passed between the 2013 football tournament and the 2015 GAME events there had been a great increase in the use of smartphones (especially at the festival site, where recharging facilities had become readily available, enabling continuous access to the internet) to the extent that many activities throughout the festival have become online/offline integrated. As we have seen, the connection between online and offline participation in the events themselves was essential to experience the GAME events – indeed we literally had to go online in order to even know when the event would take place. Particularly the Instagram feed of GAME extends the organisation’s ability to portray itself as simultaneously hip and cool as well as socially active and engaged. With the popularisation of humanitarianism social media is increasingly used and it has become common to promote humanitarian causes online through images and videos enabling consumers to show their interest and concern through ‘likes’ and ‘sharing’ such causes. It had thus in some ways become ‘natural’ for the festival participants to ‘meet’ the beneficiaries online in 2015, whereas they encountered the asylum-seekers in person in 2013. Being online had become the norm in 2015, whereas being offline, and thus ‘turned off’, had come to denote being deficient or lacking, and thus an abnormal situation. So, simply put – our offline experience of the GAME celebrity basketball game was only half – we were meant to be tuned into it online as well as show up in order to participate. The chronotope of the Roskilde Festival, and the Orange Karma events, was thus extended beyond the time-place of the festival grounds/Orange Karma area via the online representations and participation in the events.

**Conclusion: Orange Karma as corporate utopia**

When people dress up in costumes and associate more freely with strangers than one would outside the festival chronotope, new norms and social imaginaries are created – with which Hummel can be associated. The organisations Sensational Football/Eir Soccer and GAME add to this. Sensational Football/Eir Soccer did so with its practice of creating spaces for enacting equality and bodily proximity between people who in their everyday lives are separated by virtue of their differing legal status. The festival in 2013 happened well before the sudden media focus on refugees spurred by the 2015 large-scale movement of refugees to Europe. At the time, the tournament therefore enabled the Danish population to become better acquainted with asylum-seekers and to see how different the asylum-seekers playing on the teams could be. Some were black, some white; some wore headscarves, others had high ponytails. Additionally, participants in the events were introduced to the different asylum centres by virtue of the team names. Furthermore, through the asylum-seeker teams the women shared something besides being asylum-seekers – football.
Finally, the fact that the tournament of both the asylum-seekers and the regular festival participants only comprised women challenged the European norm that it is men who play football. GAME similarly played with turning things on their head by letting bitter rivals such as the hippie anti-establishment community of Christiania and the police play against each other. The organisations thereby also acted as co-imagers of new social norms.

What the two events that we have studied here share is the involvement of the corporate sponsor Hummel via Orange Karma. The corporate philosophy of Company Karma places Hummel as a not-so-silent partner with the two organisations GAME and Sensational Football/ Eir Soccer. Not only does Hummel get positive branding for its corporate philosophy via the collaboration, it also promotes the marketing of its products. An Orange Karma shoe and clothing line, with the characteristic orange colour of the festival, has thus been launched and sold in the Orange Karma area and at a Hummel shop in the concert area (see figure 12.8). The profits go to good causes while simultaneously promoting the Hummel brand.

The CEO of Hummel, Christian Stadil, embodies the Karma branding of Hummel to such an extent that his mere presence at the festival was described by one local tabloid as adding Karma to the festival. Roskilde Festival seems like a near perfect match for Hummel’s CSR branding. The Orange Feeling and Orange Karma can be seen to
complement, and blend seamlessly into, each other. At another level, however, the fit between Orange Karma and Roskilde Festival seems to benefit mainly Hummel.

The chronotope of the festival is characterised by being limited both geographically (to the festival grounds) and in time (the festival takes place during a short well-defined period of time). However, as argued above, this time-place is stretched beyond the fixed geographical and temporal boundaries of the festival via online representations of the festival by numerous actors: the festival organisation itself, participants in the festival, volunteer organisations, NGOs and corporate sponsors such as Hummel. On the one hand, Orange Karma is as such provided with a time-place, Roskilde Festival, where it can manifest its physical presence, as the bearer of ‘good karma’, and become associated with the positive vibes of the Orange Feeling. On the other hand, it also acquires a virtual time-space for positioning itself, especially on the Internet, as a commercial corporation benefiting from what amounts to generous advertising. Furthermore, the corporation’s association with the Roskilde Festival places Orange Karma as a co-imager of new possible meanings and norms for society. In this way it can promote the Hummel brand as symbolising the ‘community, solidarity and free spiritedness’ associated with these new norms. This arguably adds significant value to a fashion sports brand.

Whether or not the inclusion of a corporate brand such as Hummel in the processes of creating new cultural meanings enables the imagining of new equalities is a critical question. The carnivalesque spirit of turning normal hierarchies of authority upside down, of mocking the clergy and of using laughter and bodily functions as mediums for this mockery, appear far removed from the Company Karma imagery associated with Christian Stadil’s Buddhist fashion iconography and the Hummel brand. Likewise, it seems strange that the seriousness of the online representations of the young asylum seekers and the young children struggling with mental illness flow seamlessly into the carefree spirit of the festival. This apparent contradiction, nevertheless, does correspond well with the festival’s overall humanitarian manifesto and carnivalesque spirit. Solemnity and laughter are both part of the festival chronotope and the connection between the two may be integral to the creation of utopian imaginings of new and different cultural imaginaries. These imaginaries, however, are also part of a corporate branding strategy that may be regarded as a means of exploiting the festival chronotope for ends that have more to do with private gain than community building, and which are thus counter to the carnivalesque spirit.

Notes


11 Lene Bull Christiansen, field notes, 30 June 2015.


13 Hildebrandt and Stadil, *Company Karma*.


16 Olwig and Christiansen, ‘Festival Environmentalism’, p 12.


24 Tuan, *Space and Place*, p. 12.
25 Tuan, *Space and Place*, p. 12.
31 Mette Fog Olwig, fi ld notes, 1–2 July 2013.
32 Snobrod (‘Twistbread’) is bread on a stick that is made over a bonfire and usually with children.
33 Mette Fog Olwig, fi ld notes, 2 July 2013.
36 S. Prahm, *GAME Årsberetning 2015* (Copenhagen: GAME Denmark, 2015), translated from the Danish by the authors.
38 Lene Bull Christiansen, fi ld notes, 30 June 2015.
41 hummd923TV, ‘Orange Karma Asylum – Featuring Midheta & Mihreta’, translated from the Danish by the authors.
43 Game Denmark, ‘Støtte på Asfalten’, translated from the Danish by the authors.
45 hummd923TV, ‘Orange Karma Asylum – Featuring Midheta & Mihreta.’
46 Hildebrandt and Stadil, *Company Karma*.
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