4 Reversion and reprisal

The allure of going back and the negotiation of historical identities

Mads Daugbjerg, Gönül Bozoğlu and Christopher Whitehead

(CC BY-NC-ND 4.0)
4 Reversion and reprisal¹

The allure of going back and the negotiation of historical identities

Mads Daugbjerg, Gönül Bozoğlu and Christopher Whitehead

As noted by Pierre Nora (1989, p. 17), ‘no-one knows what the past will be made of next’. While this is indeed so, it is also the case that the past will surely be ‘made’ somehow. In this chapter, we take a look at those makings and the ubiquitous desire to recreate what once was that arguably undergirds almost any heritage practice. We discuss re-enactments and reconstructions in France, England and Turkey as examples of this dimension of, and dimensioning of, European memory. The obligation of museums and heritage institutions to keep, store or ‘safeguard’ the remnants and stories of the past includes frequent attempts at piecing those remnants and stories together and reconstituting some sort of wholes out of them – whether these are the scattered bones of a human being, the previously censored files of a re-opened archive, or the tiny splinters of a flint axe. Very often, such recreations are completed with ritual reference to obligations to preserve historical structures or memories as accurately, factually or ‘objectively’ as possible, allegedly isolating such scientific duties from the realm of politics. As much scholarship has shown, in reality these spheres are of course deeply intertwined, as any reassembly involves a contemporary framing as well as (reflexive or unreflexive) processes of selection, omission and emphasis (e.g. Bozoğlu and Whitehead, 2019; Daugbjerg, 2014; Smith, 2006; Handler and Gable, 1997; Trouillot, 1995).

Apart from the ingrained positioning of any innovation, a key question regards the limits of reconstruction. As Barbara Kirshenblatt-Gimblett (1998, p. 193) asks, ‘having reconstituted the pot, why not the potter? Why not his studio, home, and marketplace? And why limit the reconstruction, let alone the exhibition, to drawings and words?’ Such questions are very hard to answer in any general sense but must be dealt with in their specificity, including deliberations over each rendering’s underlying motivations, agendas and affects. In heritage discourse, recreation can sometimes be regarded as a given duty, as if this were a pure and disinterested fulfilment of a heritage-caretaking scheme handed down from above, whether from God or from ‘history’. One needs, however, to reflect critically on the nature and justification of such duties and of how recreations align politically and affectively with desires, often nostalgic, to make a future based on the past that ‘we’ allegedly had – or, sometimes, one that ‘we’ would have liked – and of how they relate to questions about that which is not
remade or those pasts deemed unqualified for reconstruction. Recreating one particular version of a city centre, a palace, a way of life, a national or European story, or historical battle almost inevitably means omitting others.

Below, we focus on contemporary forms of remaking, physical as well as bodily, and ask about connections to power and to processes of selective remembering and forgetting. We ask about the meanings, motivations and consequences of restoration and reprisal processes as they take shape across Europe today. In some cases, they are tied up with particular, officially endorsed accounts of the past, dictated by governmental top-down agendas or ‘scripts’ leaving little room for interpretation or opposition. In others, they align with or respond to consumption patterns or touristic desires, sometimes playful and seemingly unconcerned with scientific claims to accuracy. Inevitably, top-down ‘encoding’ and bottom-up ‘decoding’ practices, to borrow the terminology of Stuart Hall (1973), co-exist and combine to create, adapt and promote certain versions of history.

‘Reversion’ can be understood as a way of thinking about the process of looking to the past to find alternative futures that put back in place what has been lost. Its secondary meaning – re-versioning; making successive versions – speaks to creative and plural imaginings of the past. ‘Reprisal’ is another charged term. When we reprise something, it can be about becoming again who we once were or, in music, the return of a theme. But another sense of reprisal is a belligerent, retaliatory one, connecting our interests in reproducing the past to social conflict, as Svetlana Boym did in her articulation of the dangers of ‘restorative’ nostalgia (2001). This ‘does not think of itself as nostalgia, but rather truth and tradition’, and involves historical revivalisms at state level, including, among other things, the reconstruction of historical monuments to evoke national past and future’ (Boym, 2001, pp. xviii, 41, 49). Mining the etymology of nostalgia (νόστος, meaning ‘homecoming’, and ἄλγος, ‘pain’), she points out the peril of confusing the actual and the imaginary home. ‘In some cases it can create a phantom homeland, for which one is ready to die or kill’ (Boym, 2001, pp. xv-xvi). In relation to heritage policies and landscapes, nostalgia is often connected to traces of Romanticism or romantic nationalism and the appeal to emotions, experience and longing, as we shall discuss later. In some settings, heritage managers have worked explicitly to reduce what they perceive to be romantic and nostalgic allures of (difficult) heritages. In Sharon Macdonald’s work on the afterlife of the Nazi rallying grounds in Nuremberg, Germany, for example, she discusses how a deliberate effort was made to ‘trivialise’ and ‘demythify’ the Nazi ruins and not reconstruct the grounds to any full picture due to a perceived risk of romanticising war and of ‘returning the buildings to their former glory and imbuing them once again with the agency with which they had been originally invested’ (Macdonald, 2006, p. 18).

**Don’t mention the present: remaking D-Day and its vintage heroics**

Each year in early June, D-Day is commemorated and celebrated in Normandy, France. The annual *D-Day Festival*, running since 2007, is organised jointly by
the local tourism offices at the famous beaches where the Allied invasion of Nazi-occupied France took place on 6 June 1944. Each year, thousands of visitors accept the hosts’ invitation to ‘celebrate freedom’, as the 2017 programme leaflet promised, descending on the landing beaches to explore a ‘popular program of festive and cultural events including parachute demonstrations, parades of military vehicles, fireworks, concerts, reconstitutions of military camps, giant picnics, book fairs, exhibitions, dances…’. A bewildering amount of remaking is involved, in forms that shape the past into particular, powerful narrative templates.

The poster featured a small boy against a beach-and-blue-sky background, scouting the horizon through a set of binoculars and wearing a 1940s-style leather pilot’s hat and goggles. The sky is lit up by fireworks together with a warplane, from which a stream of (not paratroopers but) musical notes drop towards the beach, indicating the revival of a certain festive and convivial spirit as part of the liberation.2 The poster thus makes use of a profoundly nostalgic WWII ‘vintage’ imagery, promising an entertainment-rich and family-friendly event schedule which is perhaps surprising given that the event marks one of the bloodiest campaigns of the darkest history of Europe.

The poster imagery quite accurately captured the convivial atmosphere of the 2017 festival. Tourists from all over Europe took part, but a special measure of admiration was clearly reserved for British and US visitors, who came somehow to stand in for the past liberators of the continent. A few actual, still-living liberators were also present, old veterans from the 1944 campaign, now rolled on stage in wheelchairs to receive praise and reverent applause. One programme event (‘Back to the Beaches’) consisted of a visit of ‘up to 120’ British WWII veterans, ‘arriving in London taxis on a trip arranged by the Taxi Charity for Military Veterans’ (quoted from programme leaflet 2017). This was but one of hundreds of activities taking place along the coast, generally saturated by acts of gratitude, ‘thank you’ signs and messages, combined patterns of British, US and French flags, and a material outpouring of all kinds of US- and UK-oriented patriotic paraphernalia. Anglophone pop culture, in the form of 1940s and 1950s music and dance acts performed by young ladies and gents in ‘period’ costume played a key role in the cultural exchange, and the many air shows, parades and wreath-laying ceremonies were interspersed with so-called civilian events and celebrations characterised by broader ‘retro’ affections and desires. Present-day pop-cultural icons in the shape of celebrities from recent WWII blockbusters, including the acclaimed HBO series Band of Brothers, took part on stage to add a few words of reverence here and there. The village streets, beaches, meadows, cemeteries and memorial groves of the coast were packed with tourists, both domestic and international, and included large numbers of Americans and British.

In terms of explicit re-enactment activities, the programme involved several offers, from visits to reconstructed soldier camps, ‘historical’ parachute shows, ‘civilian’ parades as well as a re-enactment of the actual beach landing.3 Some of the most striking and picturesque elements of the festival were the hundreds
of ‘period’ military vehicles taking part. Parades of jeeps, motorbikes, trucks and tanks dominated the coast and drew large crowds of spectators. Vehicle-maintenance hobby groups from all over Europe were present, including a sizeable contingent from the Dutch ‘Keep Them Rolling’ association. One vehicle parade in the village of Sainte-Mère-Église attracted thousands of visitors, who lined the roads while admiring the heavy military machinery and cheering on the ‘liberators’ – i.e. the vehicle owners who had taken it upon themselves to resurrect and maintain not just the old vehicles themselves, but also to dress up to embody the US and UK heroes. Were the cheers meant primarily as a grateful indicator of respect towards the actual liberators of 1944, or were they directed at the contemporary troupe of re-enactors staging such an impressive show? It was impossible to separate, and in a certain sense, that was exactly the point.

The 2017 D-Day Festival thus emphasised and reconstituted (particular) transnational and trans-Atlantic ties of reciprocity and gratitude. Curiously, however, the less rosy realities of present-day Europe were almost everywhere kept out of sight and mind in what could be termed a tacit ‘don’t mention the present’ agreement. The festival took place on a tension-filled political background on several fronts: political and ideological disputes were ongoing between France and the USA, as freshly-elected French president Emmanuel

---

Figure 4.1 At the D-Day festival, the streets and squares of the picturesque Normandy towns are crammed with World War II-vehicles – from motorcycles and jeeps to heavy tanks – maintained and staffed by contemporary re-enactors embodying the allied liberators.
Macron had publicly announced his intention to ‘make the planet great again’ in a direct, taunting response to (almost-as-recently-sworn-in) US President Donald Trump’s national calls to ‘make America great again’. Meanwhile, after the Brexit referendum in 2016, the UK was in the throes of disentangling the very ties of reciprocity with continental Europe that had been forged as a direct result of the end of the Second World War. Alongside numerous claims in the UK and elsewhere, that the ‘lessons of history’ were being forgotten, were decidedly frosty relations between Macron and the ‘Brexiteers’. Indeed, a long-standing refrain from British Eurosceptics was a suspicion that the EU was nothing other than a vehicle of Franco-German domination, an unjust instance of each of these parties ‘winning the peace’ after the war on the back of British heroism and fortitude.

Such current disagreements over international roles and relations found no obvious place in the festival. These kinds of fault lines, along with other contemporary matters related to warfare, security, displacement and more, surfaced neither in speeches, displays, commemorations or otherwise. In this reconstructed time-pocket, everyone seemed happy to comply with, cultivate and embrace the easy-to-grasp good vs. evil narrative of the liberation. Alternative stories regarding the ending of the War and the role of other atrocities – the bombardment of Dresden, the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki – were absent here. One sensed an admiration of, and a yearning for, an allegedly purer and simpler time, a vintage era when heroes were heroes, Nazis were Nazis, and the quest for ‘freedom’ was concrete and territorial. In Normandy in 2017, we were not mentioning the present. The past was indeed a foreign country, and a strict separation between now and then was silently requested and upheld by all. One way of thinking through this is as a space for affective work in which a kind of spiritual reaffirmation takes place in relation to the past. An anniversary celebration like this works as an opportunity to reinforce one’s moral anchorings in time and place, to recalibrate the compass and, through stories of heroism and us-them/good-evil struggles, to confirm one’s values and one’s self-in-history. A double imperative is the sense of the past slipping away, embodied by the elderly combatants who take part and our knowledge that they will soon be gone. ‘We must not forget.’

**Vikings once again: multidirectional reversions in Jorvik/York**

In recent years, we have seen a wave of popular interest in the Norse Viking heritage, anchored in Scandinavia but with historical threads and present-day proponents across much of North-Western and North-Eastern Europe. This is a past seemingly able to fascinate, thrill, and for some also shape strong senses of identification and place-bound belonging, and perhaps increasingly so. It very often involves a considerable amount of recreation, from private volunteer groups pursuing ‘Viking’ crafts like blacksmithing or mead-brewing, to large-scale festivals, battle re-enactments and meticulous museum-based reconstructions of entire
dragonhead ships or Viking longhouses. Neopagan Ásatrú, small congregations worshipping the pre-Christian Norse Gods, seek to reanimate the heathen rituals and faiths of old (Amster, 2015). Meanwhile, a trend in ‘genetic’ heritage, ancestral records and DNA testing plays into popular desires to make (or select) a self-in-history that includes Viking ancestry.

What does it mean to reproduce these early-medieval people, their world, their craft and iconography? Viking history pre-dates nation-states and opens up the possibility of a ‘northern’ non-national identity of a kind that can accommodate a range of cultural attachments, performances and expressions. Refusals of modernity and its regulatory norms of behaviour and civility, an attachment to toughness and the old ways, a love of craft, ancient mythology, dark and other kinds of metal music, or (more often) syncretic mixtures of these, offer non-national identity markers. On the other hand, the Viking past is claimed by nations for the crafting of place identities and the making of tourist economies (more on which in Chapter 5, this volume). Viking heritage tourism contributes considerably to the GDP of the Nordic countries, but also in the British Isles and, increasingly, in North America. International Viking re-enactments take place in which groups from several countries assemble, offering an opportunity for people to bypass nationality as a primary identifier and to collectivise differently via a shared sense of self-in-history.

In the context of the annual Jorvik festival in York, UK, billed as the largest of its kind in Europe, a bewildering mixture of activities show the plurality of different reversions. For some, this is a fun, family day out with a past made spectacular by popular culture, and made safe by the passage of time; for others, it is a serious matter of identifying one’s ancestry and/or one’s pre-modern identity and beliefs. For a week each February, the city is transformed, reputedly inspired by the ancient Viking celebration of ‘Jolablot’, a Norse festival that heralded the end of winter and the coming of spring. When we took part in 2018, large tents appeared in the shopping thoroughfare of Parliament Street, in which children learned sword-fighting and visitors witnessed life in encampments, or bought outfits and souvenirs at Viking craft markets. There were small re-enactments, a longboat and a ‘Strongest Viking’ contest in front of high-street shops. Children in-tow to their parents wore plastic helmets and waved wooden swords around, but there were adults dressing up too. Some were employed as Festival staff; others were enthusiastic volunteers. We met one group of middle-aged men – all British but for one Swede – whose outfits were not quite as authentic-looking as the serious re-enactors. They explained to us that they were ‘into history’ and meet every year to renew their friendship, but that it probably wouldn’t matter whether the theme of the festival was Viking, Roman or something else, as long as they got the chance to dress up. Others were more committed: there was a notable subcultural contingent of black-leather clad men and women who wore Viking metal and Thor T-shirts, with ‘temple shave’ and braided hairstyles, piercings and runic tattoos. The senior manager and archaeologist at the Jorvik Trust, whom we interviewed, suggested that for many, what appeals is the idea of Vikings as ‘all about self-determination, about being brave
and strong, purposeful and accountable to no one but yourself and Odin’. Sometimes, the Jorvik organiser pondered, ‘with a historian’s hat on, what you’re looking at is a fantasy realm, that bears only a passing resemblance to the historical and archaeological record’. In some ways it would be better, he speculated, to skip the ‘Viking brand’ entirely, since the term has become so loaded with modern cultural meanings that it can become a barrier for understanding how people of that age lived, died, and how they perceived themselves. This, however, would be ‘commercial suicide’, for the Trust is private and relies on its appeal to paying audiences for funding.

The festival was loosely organised around an articulation of re-enactments connected to documented events: the arrival and conquest of England by the legendary three sons of Ragnar Lothbrok in 866 CE (the same Ragnar who is a main character in the Vikings TV drama). The spectacular Festival Finale told the story of victory over the Anglo-Saxons by Halfdan and Ubba Ragnarsson and Ivarr the Boneless with a live-action battle re-enactment comprising hundreds of experienced re-enactors. Thousands of paying spectators watched the battle, and voiceover actors told the story via a powerful PA system, using the north-western English accent popularised by Game of Thrones characters from ‘The North’. Filmic music and suspenseful drums kept the drama going. This is Viking Britain re-imagined through layers of popular culture – betrayals, vengeance, honour, violent battle. At the end of the finale, as fireworks exploded

Figure 4.2 Viking re-enactors at the grand finale of the Jorvik Festival, York.
over Clifford’s Tower, a neighbouring Norman fortification, the narrator told us to take care as we left, for ‘the night is dark and full of terrors’ – a recurring saying from *Game of Thrones*.

Amidst these spectacular, almost promiscuous performances full of imaginative references to Viking lore as well as pop culture, otherheritages, both real and unreal, swirl around: in the Barley Hall – once a medieval merchant’s house – there is an exhibition of costumes from the TV Tudor-era show *Wolf Hall*; in the undercroft of the Norman Minster an extensive exhibition tells stories of Roman York; while *Harry Potter* fans flock to the picturesque Shambles said to have been the inspiration for the film saga’s Diagon Alley. Vikings – professional and amateur – wander the streets through multiple pasts, while tourists take Ghost Walks or Terror Trails with creepy Victorian guides, wearing make-up to look pallid and ghoulish. This is cacophonous heritage, where truth-fiction crossings take place routinely.

The senior manager at the Jorvik Group whom we interviewed knew that the Vikings were a potent prism for imaginations and identities. He treaded a careful line between capitalising on people’s fascination with the past and demythologising it. Indeed, the festival catalogue began with an account of the development of the ‘Viking brand’ and did not shirk from enumerating its historical misuses, including the Nazi appropriation of Viking culture and the continuation of this today ‘by others on the far-right of the political spectrum’ (Jorvik, 2017, p. 6). He was frustrated by some people’s conviction that they have Viking ancestry, and by commercial DNA testing companies who play into this in their advertising. But he pointed out that:

> We wouldn’t necessarily want to shake their belief in that, because at the end of the day we’re a commercial operation, we want everyone to have a good time. We don’t want people to leave [with us] having supported obnoxious opinions that they have, but we [also] don’t want to attack them for slightly wrongheaded opinions that are largely harmless.

However, as the catalogue suggested, not all opinions are in fact harmless; our interviewee mentioned skinheads attending the festival attracted not by stories of peace in the Viking Age but by perceived links with machismo and violence.

---

**BOX 4.1**

In her 2017 book *My European Family*, Swedish science journalist Karin Bojs asks ‘Am I a Viking?’ As we have seen, it is a question to which a lot of British people respond affirmatively, in search of a glamorous self-in-history. Bojs’ answer to herself is full of ambivalence, as she discusses the practices of enslaving, gang-rape and killing of female slaves narrated in horrific detail by the tenth-century CE Arab writer Ahmad Ibn Faldan. Although these writings have been the subject of scepticism as a reliable historical source about the Vikings, whom Ibn Faldan may have been seeking to vilify, Bojs points out that archaeological and genetic
evidence provides some corroboration, for ‘archaeologists have interpreted human remains burnt on ships as thralls (slaves) who had been killed’, and DNA analysis confirms that some of the dead do indeed have a different genetic origin (Bojs, 2017, pp. 323–324). Bojs’ own genetic ancestry, it turns out, connects to a female ancestor from (what is now) Scotland, leading her to suspect that that ancestor was taken in slavery. This makes an elective attachment to the Vikings an ambiguous property, as something that can be housed within a politics of regret and difficult history rather than celebration. This points to a kind of troubling slippage between different dimensions of heritage and memory, when a past to which some of us revert for fun, or in search of an identity, turns out to contain horror and wrongdoing.

It seems the Vikings have become a symbol that has a ‘necessary ambiguity’ (Guibernau, 2013, p. 97; Chapter 1, this volume), allowing it to be taken and remade in very many different ways, in pursuit of different futures, not all of them civil.

**Phantom homelands: the Edwardian past as antidote to the present**

The drive towards reconstituting wholes from fragments has taken many forms historically. An important and still thriving model is that of the open-air museum, predicated on a principle of conscious reconstitution of particular (often rural or pre-modern) entities in the face of immanent or imagined loss. The open-air idea emerged in Scandinavia around 1900, with the Stockholm institution **Skansen** (opened in 1891) generally acknowledged as the first of its kind (Rentzhog, 2007; Wallace, 1981; Crang, 1999). Drawing key inspiration from the international exhibitions of the nineteenth century and their display forms (Stoklund, 1993), the open-air museum movement formed part of a reaction against dominant scientifically-oriented exhibitionary models of the period, as its proponents aspired, so to speak, to re-enchant the museum with atmosphere and sentiment. In a larger perspective, the then-new holistically oriented open-air institutions can be viewed as a romantically inspired reaction against a paradigm of science, rationality and reason, and were often tied, explicitly or implicitly, to specific (romantic) national projects. ‘The Skansen movement blended romantic nostalgia with dismay at the emergence of capitalist social relations,’ Michael Wallace (1981, p. 72) notes. ‘What they commemorated, and in some degree fabricated, was the life of “the folk”, visualized as a harmonious population of peasants and craft workers’ (ibid.; see also Bennett, 1995, pp. 109–127). This larger romantic turn contained a nostalgic yearning for ‘authentic’ and ‘primordial’ qualities of life, and insisted on speaking to visitors’ sentiments and feelings – not their reason. Thus, the open-air museums specifically aimed at capturing wholes, atmospheres and feelings instead of parts, causal chains and facts, as a reaction against the conventional, chronologically oriented ‘glass-case’ museum.
In an essay first published in 1984, Stephen Bann (2004) argued that ‘museumological modes of organising data have for some two centuries been polarised between two broad scenographic practices’ (Preziosi and Farago, 2004, p. 15). Contrasting two early Paris museums, the Musée des Petits-Augustins and the Musée de Cluny, Bann proposes that in what he calls ‘metonymic’ museum practices, objects are displayed according to chronological and/or stylistic succession while, conversely, ‘synecdochic’ museum practices – including those of open-air museums – aim to recreate a dramatic effect of ‘being there’, ‘creating a powerful “period” effect, and enveloping the visitor in the illusion of visiting the past’ (ibid., pp. 15–16). Bann’s aim is not to place the two modes at ‘different points in a single evolutionary scheme, but of showing how their differing types of discourse relate to different epistemological totalities’ (Bann, 2004, p. 73). He seeks to demonstrate that these contrasting paradigms are certainly not of a recent date and that the tension between them is indeed a foundational modern one. Summing up the main points of Bann’s paper, Preziosi and Farago (2004, p. 16) state that ‘in a very concrete sense (…) the history of museology since the early nineteenth century has entailed an oscillation between these two semiotic poles – what Bann calls the metonymic and the synecdochic – with every possible variation in between.’

It can be useful to bear such contrasting ways of accessing past worlds and knowledges, as well as the relationship and possible ‘oscillations’ between them, in mind when thinking about the remakings of the past in contemporary Europe. Indeed, research on established and long-running open-air museums, such as Beamish in the North-East of England, point to particular sentimental potentials of ‘nostalgic remembrance of sentimentalized pasts’ made possible in such settings (Bennett, 1995, p. 112). The atmospheric and immersive qualities of the open-air museum – and similar reconstructed landscapes more broadly – hold powerful communicative, multi-sensory potential. Of course, we cannot say that such environments fully determine the interpretations taking place within them, but they do establish a strong and strongly suggestive, pervasive atmosphere for audiences, affording particular readings and relationships to the rebuilt pasts in question. In some cases, this atmosphere is a co-production, for it is also a product of audience appetites and desires. Heritage actors – as we saw with our Jorvik respondent quoted earlier – know what sells. They play to this, while providing correctives where possible – as in the careful display on Viking multiculture and Christianity in the museum. Some visitors come to such sites with particular desires about the past represented in the attraction: that it should align with and respond to their imagination of it, making their visit a matter of confirmation of truth that consolidates a sense of self-in-history. In certain cases, the visit takes on the qualities of a pilgrimage to the past.

Beamish Museum, in north-east England, allows imaginative transport of visitors back in time, assembling landscapes, buildings, objects, food and people from other ages, chief among which is the early twentieth century. In our research, some visitors expressed disenchantment with contemporary Britain and the EU and referred to the museum as proof of better times. In the aftermath of
the Brexit referendum, this took on a remedial and optimistic value: as once ‘we’ thrived in splendid isolation, so we can again; in the old days, life was hard but good. The museum staff, meanwhile, take care to be apolitical, causing dilemmas about what pasts to represent and re-enact and how to balance historical responsibility with visitor desires and income.

A particular example here has been whether to reconstruct – even re-enact – the Empire Days of the early twentieth century: these were patriotic and colonialist celebrations that encouraged children – as well as adult citizens – to express pride in empire and to model its putative virtues, in the watchwords of the Empire Movement, ‘Responsibility, Sympathy, Duty, and Self-sacrifice’. Should Empire Days be revived at the museum in pursuit of comprehensive engagement with the Edwardian past? What if such historicism blurs with celebration, not least in the minds of visitors with an appetite for nostalgic experience with a political edge? As at Jorvik, the museum and its activities only survive because of visitor income, so there is an inevitable dynamic push and pull between imperatives to educate audiences about historical phenomena, and to appeal to audience interests in the past. The difficulty here is that for some, those interests are also desires. In our interview, a senior staff member discussed these issues. ‘We used to be able to hold Empire Day [at the museum] – there was lots of interest, folks taking part, and just enjoying it really, rather than reading other
things into why we might be holding it and imposing too much current thought on it.’ The museum view of Empire Day was as a ‘celebration of Britishness’, and a staple feature of the calendar of customs in early twentieth-century Britain and therefore an unproblematic and necessary phenomenon to remake (Hiles, 2017).

More recently, however, she had noted a change in visitors’ understandings; some asked whether the museum was holding Empire Day ‘because of Brexit’, or whether it was re-enacted in association with the snap election of 2017, or even in association with political parties like the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), known for its anti-EU, nationalist and anti-immigration populism (ibid). If these visitor responses seem bizarre, we should remember that the old empire had come back into view at this time, as the UK government looked away from the EU to make trade deals with its former colonial subjects.

Some staff had become concerned that holding Empire Day made the museum look as if it were representing certain political groups, but they were briefed to help them understand that ‘what we are doing is representing it in its context – back then, not now...[as] a simple part of what would have been celebrated’. The museum based its Empire Day revivals upon documentation of the celebrations that took place in the nearby town of Darlington, thus gaining the legitimation that comes with evidence and authenticity. But as our respondent said, notwithstanding any such ‘historical framing’, there was no telling what some people thought or felt when they saw the Union Jack flags everywhere in the museum: the preconceptions of visitors ‘can be challenging to manage and remain apolitical, which we should’ (ibid). Such comments show the fraught negotiation of agendas – of policing and indulging people’s engagement with the past – and the rhetorical framing required to revive a historical phenomenon that – certainly at a particular political turn – had the incendiary and divisive potential to propose and celebrate again the colonial habitus, with all that this means for alienation and othering in the present.

Where are we with Empire Days? Or, furthermore, when are we, and who is the ‘we’? Which temporalities and imaginations collide in the museum’s choice? There are two strategies at work. One is to drain Empire Days of as much colonialist content as possible – a hard task, given the name – and to focus them as mere ‘celebrations of Britishness’. The colonial subjects are implicated in the revival, but not as the ‘we’; they are out of sight. The project to represent a place – a non-metropolitan region in the north of England, apparently at a far remove from the iniquitous effects of empire – allows a positive translation of colonialist achievement into patriotic affect. This is a preference for a national rather than an imperial story (cf. Chapter 8, this volume). But at a time in which concepts of national identity and sovereignty are at the front line of public debate and political futures, this too is far from anodyne or uncontroversial. The second strategy – the argument that Empire Days should be revived because they were undeniably a feature of the Edwardian past – that because something certainly ‘happened’, its reproduction in the present can somehow evade politics – is common in the rhetoric of remaking
the past in the present. Here, however, we come up against the politics and exigencies of selection, and the potential that there are limits to what can be remade. Or rather, an ethical dilemma obtains about which pasts, if any, should not be remade, and when certain techniques of remaking become too lifelike and shuttle us too affectingly and misleadingly between then and now, lest we lose control of historical distance and begin to prefer the past to the present. We will return later to this slippery edge of representation.

The museum’s principal time zone – in fact the original one – is the year 1913, and in much of the museum’s urban and rural environments it is as if visitors are able to travel back to one day in the year before the onset of the Great War. Buildings from that period have been saved from demolition and re-assembled in the museum, sometimes brick-by-brick, or facsimiles painstakingly reconstructed. Staff wander around in period costume (although the museum opts for third- and not first-person interpretation). Visitors travel the site in historic trams and busses; they watch traditional sweets being made and can buy traditional cakes and bread from the historic bakery. The choice of 1913 – the year before everything changed indelibly – allows for the reconstruction of a bucolic, somewhat serene space of history that allows for wistful and nostalgic reminiscence, particularly for older visitors who find in the museum the material and sensory cultures of their younger days, or of their parents’ generation: they hear again the sounds of the tram, feel again the grain of the school desk and the rasp of a chalk on slate, perhaps to play at practising cursive script or long division ‘how we used to’; they taste again the food cooked and served by costume demonstrators in a deliberate attempt to evoke the past (Hodge, 2017). But unlike with Proust’s madeleine, there is no need for visitors to conjure up a mental memory-scape of streets, buildings, details and ways of life, for these are actual physical presences assembled to sustain the dream. As we will explore later, the specific techniques of remaking mean that the imaginative burden is removed from the visitor because of the sensorial and affective loading of the past into the present, the illusion of time travel, of shuttling between then and now, or indeed of desiring to collapse that difference and revert, reprise, re-become as once we were.

Herein lies a crucial political problem. The regional and national heritage presented at Beamish is amenable for use by some as a pure object of the past whose adulteration in the lead-up to the present is a symptom of degradations. Such degradations are usually perceived to have been, and to be, perpetrated by others (especially ‘intruders’ such as migrants), leading to the state of crisis. It allows people to make attachments to pasts (‘when things were better’) as both refuge from the present and as a point of desired return. In the immediate aftermath of the Brexit referendum in the UK, for example, we surveyed some museum visitors whose romanticising interest in national tradition, community and ‘how things were’ was discursively and affectively linked to an apparent desire to reprise a (mythic) way of life and collective identity that pre-dated large-scale immigration. In one instance, a British visitor whom we surveyed nostalgically recalled how once so much of the territories on the map of the
world were coloured red (or pink) to indicate that they were part of the British Empire, illustrating precisely the mindsets of visitors to whom a revived Empire Day celebration might appeal.

Of course, we cannot quite know how earnest these desires to turn back the clock really are, or whether they represent instead what Margaret Wetherell calls an ‘affective-discursive loop’ – a cycle of emotions, affects and ideas that travels recursively and endlessly through feelings of loss, fear and resentment of others, the desire to belong, blame and exclude, and perhaps a love of melancholy itself (Gilroy, 2004). The novelist and political commentator Elif Shafak (2018) observes that ‘Some 63% of British citizens think life was better and easier in the past,’ and that pro-Brexit politicians have exploited this prevalent nostalgia in references to a national history that simplify, distort and sanitise (often removing from view, for example, the colonial ontology of the state as discussed by Bhambra, this volume). On the politics of blame, she argues:

‘The Russians blame everything on their government, the Americans on their parents, and the Poles on history.’ So said the Russian-born American poet Joseph Brodsky. If he were alive today, he might have added: ‘And the leading Brexeters blame everything on the loss of an imaginary past.’ The seeds of this nostalgia were, of course, present in Britain long before the referendum, but years of austerity and inequality, topped with incendiary debates on refugees and discontent with the status quo, generated a feeling of longing for the ‘good old days’.

(Shafak 2018)

In 2005 Paul Gilroy sketched out the link between ‘post-imperial melancholy’ and the British attachment to wartime memory. ‘The vanished empire is essentially unmourned’:

The chronic, nagging pain of its absence feeds a melancholic attachment. This is both to Nazism – the unchanging evil we need to always see ourselves as good – and to a resolutely air-brushed version of colonial history in which gunboat diplomacy was moral uplift, civilising missions were completed, the trains ran on time and the natives appreciated the value of stability…These dream worlds are revisited compulsively. They saturate the cultural landscape of contemporary Britain. The distinctive mix of revisionist history and moral superiority offers pleasures and distractions that defer a reckoning with contemporary multiculture and postpone the inevitable issue of imperial reparation.

(Gilroy, 2005)

At the time, he wrote of empire that ‘the meaning of its loss remains pending’. Perhaps now (at the time of writing in 2018), that meaning has sharpened – for some – into grievous resentment: if once the British Empire was a dominant
global formation, now such geopolitical primacy has been taken by an EU that is an unworthy beneficiary of British heroism.

Now, what might it mean to travel through time in another post-imperial setting – Turkey – which also has ambivalent bearings towards Europe and the EU?

Cultivating an Ottoman Soul

Immersive and affecting panorama exhibitions are comparable to the synecdoche of open-air museums. This exhibitionary form was first popular in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In his history of panoramas, Bernard Comment notes that they have tended to represent cityscapes or battles, providing a model of an external reality and a privileged viewpoint. He argues that they have been a key technology for fixing in place a version of the past as true, or for controlling a mobile present, as when cities seem to change beyond human control (Comment, 2000, p. 8). In this reading, part of their appeal lies in their capacity to alleviate, at least for the duration of the visit, a zeitgeist of anxiety – whether about change, or establishing ‘what happened’: the true course of events. From the Greek for ‘see-all’, panoramas seek to control the field of vision and to recreate pictorially and affectively a sense of ‘being there’. Aside from the cityscape, a common subject for panoramas was battle, where hundreds or thousands of life-sized figures in a 360-degree representation, often augmented with sound, and diorama elements such as mannequins, weapons and the debris and paraphernalia of war strewn around, mean that viewers can, with a little willing suspension of their sense of time and place, feel themselves in the thick of things. If the open-air museum offers the ambience of an age, the panorama is of the historical moment, as if frozen for us to access at will.

Panoramas lost much of the popularity in Europe from the early twentieth century following the invention of photography, the production of illustrated newspapers and film (Bozoğlu, 2020). They were also popular in Russia before and after the dissolution of the USSR in 1991. However, in recent years, panoramic exhibitions have reappeared and become popular in European space. Historic panoramas such as Waterloo 1815 (completed in 1912), outside Brussels, have recently been restored and new museums built around them, and here visitor interest may be as much about the history of exhibitions as it is the battle (although on our visit there was a coachload of north Americans wearing ‘European Battlefield Tours’ baseball caps). But the artist Yadegar Asisi has produced phenomenally popular – and financially profitable – new panoramas on (among other subjects) key moments in European history: ‘Rome 312’, ‘Rouen 1415: the Epoch of Jeanne d’Arc’; ‘Luther 1517’, ‘Dresden 1945: Tragedy and Hope in a European City’ (which is a combination of the two classic panorama subjects: the cityscape and the battle); perhaps most famous is the Berlin panorama ‘Die Mauer’, which ‘transports visitors to an autumn day in [1980s] Berlin-Kreuzberg’. At a time when VR technology and videogames can so easily replicate the past, it seems there is still an appetite for audiences to make a journey to
Reversion and reprisal

a building that contains a spectacle, perhaps to mark the specialness of engaging with the past, perhaps to commune with others who do the same. Later, we speculate about why this might be.

On one of the eastern-most edges of Europe is a panorama in which the world-making of today is refracted through the past. At the Panorama 1453 Museum in Istanbul, European identities and heritage seem at first to take the form of the vanquished Byzantines, and visitors are positioned as if they were Ottoman soldiers, in the thick of the fighting. But the Byzantines are not the real enemy, for this is the secular and westernised political identity associated with Kemalism that still threatens the Conservative-Islamist administration, the Justice and the Development Party (henceforth ‘AKP’).

The AKP has attempted to remake the public space in relation to Ottoman age as alternative past to the secularist version. Its actors have focused significant effort on fostering public memory of the capture of the Byzantine city of Constantinople on 29 May 1453. Festivities, re-enactments, public imagery and the spectacular Panorama 1453 Museum tell a glorious story of the Ottoman victory and the magnanimous treatment of the defeated Byzantines. The Panorama 1453 Museum opened in 2009 with the patronage of the AKP. This is a museum that makes use of spectacular displays, in the form of a large-scale panorama. This is analogue and inspired by old-fashioned exhibitionary forms of illusionistic painting that seek to encompass complex and physically expansive narrative scenes that require visitors to move their fields of vision. In essence it is a spectacular, immersive panoramic mural painting and dioramas with dramatic audio tracks and some 3D elements, including replicas of objects, like cannons, which are symbolically important for the story of the Conquest because the museum presents their use to breach the Theodosian Land Walls of Constantinople as a

Figure 4.4 The Panorama 1453 Museum in Istanbul.
mark of Ottoman ingenuity and an epoch-changing moment in military and civilisational history (Bozoğlu, 2020). Panoramas take visitors back – as it were – to particular moments in the past, especially to the heat of battle. They offer a possibility for visitors to suspend disbelief: to ‘look on’ to the past but to be in it and inhabit it as well, or at least to feel almost as if they could. Comment (2000, p. 7) notes that panoramas had to be ‘so true to life that they could be confused with reality’ in order to secure one version of events as truth. No visitors – as far as we know – ever mistake the picture for its subject, like the famous myth of the Parisians of 1896 who panicked at the Lumière brothers’ film of a train seemingly heading straight at them. And yet many visitors wilfully use the panorama experience to bridge between past and present: they name the heroic Ottoman protagonists of the painting their ancestors, who made sacrifices for them and should be revered and followed as models of behaviour in the present: they sometimes practise a kind of rebecoming: desiring, as one visitor put it, to regain ‘a more Ottoman soul’. But the time travel of the museum is an illusion, and visitors know that they cannot really inhabit the past (see also Holtorf, 2017, pp. 6–7, 9–12); this is a source of frustration – one visitor commented that he wished he could be in the painting, as if on one of the horses – and, as we will see, resentment towards those whom they believe deprived them of their history.

The museum has been beset by accusations of inaccuracy that are not merely the hobby horses of pedantic historians, but rather attacks on the legitimacy of the state’s authority to speak about the past, to fix in place a dominant, singular narrative in an act of instrumental and governmental violence towards other pasts. Different possible versions of the ‘Conquest’ could be encompassed in the display (from the point of view of different war parties); the less-than-glorious exploits of the victors – known from documentary sources – might be referenced. These are selections and silences in the reconstruction. The museum does not present the inglorious treatment of the vanquished Byzantines documented in contemporary accounts (such as that of Venetian Niccolò Barbaro), but concentrates instead on the supposed magnanimousness of the Sultan towards the city’s population. Other stories in the museum, such as the heroic self-sacrifice of the foot soldier Hasan of Ulubat, who tenaciously hoisted the Ottoman flag atop the Walls before dying from his arrow wounds, are matters of historical mythology that provide potent and well-known symbols; they flow through film, TV and public space (Hasan has a metro stop named after him), but with little grounding in documented sources. In this and other ways the museum requires an act of faith. Its justification of the Ottoman Conquest is based on the Prophet’s Hadith. In the sky of the panorama is a cloud formation in the shape of the face of Sultan Mehmet II.

Above all, the museum represents the effacement of the previously dominant origin story of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s creation of a westernised, modernising, secularist Turkish nation. Atatürk, so prominent in public space and memory culture, is replaced here by the Ottomans, just as he himself replaced the sultanate with a secular republic. The museum is concerned with recovering a ‘lost’ identity that has been taken. Atatürk is the absent presence in the museum, for
although he is nowhere mentioned, the museum is designed against his memory through the provision of an alternative national story, alternative heroes and values and an alternative model of citizenship. The absent presence of Atatürk is all the more noticeable because of his visual dominance in so many urban, public and private settings, and because of the array of museums dedicated to his memory and to the celebration of his achievements. In many ways a counterpart to Panorama 1453 is the Atatürk and War of Independence Museum in Ankara, where panoramas help visitors to imagine Atatürk’s war exploits, and thousands of visual and textual documents reconstruct his vast effort to westernise Turkey in the image of a modern European nation-state, abolishing the sultanate, introducing the Latin alphabet, the metric system, women’s rights, bureaucratic and transport infrastructure and a rigidly secular republican government. With the rise to dominance of the Conservative-Islamism associated with the AKP, a party-political project of erasure of early-Republican memory culture accompanied the repositioning of Ottoman memory. As President and AKP leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has repeatedly stated: ‘Some people insistently try to start this country’s history from 1923. Some unrelentingly try to break us from our roots and ancient values’ (quoted in Shafak, 2018).

Panorama 1453 incites visitors to partake of emotionally charged, us-them expressions, and many visitors do, articulating at the small scale of the lifeworld a geopolitical struggle over past and self, in which resistance to perceived European values is formed. Here, empire is at once a matter of pride and loss. It was important to remember, as one visitor put it, that: ‘we have intimidated the world!’ and that Europe very nearly fell entirely to the Ottomans (Bozoğlu, 2020). This sense of alterity makes it all the more difficult for the largely Conservative-Islamist audiences of the museum to accept those Turks who would uphold a Europeanised identity and promote this as a just model for the Turkish nation. Such people – in truth a loose collection of secularists, Kemalists, ‘cağdas’ (a vernacular term for ‘modernised’) people without strong political positions, people with alternative lifestyles and leftists of various descriptions – become a new ‘enemy within’. In this way the museum’s ‘recovery’ of the Ottoman past is a reprisal in a double sense, for it is part of an array of actions and opportunities to maintain social division by keeping resentment alive. This aids the political mobilisation of citizens to vote against the remnants of Atatürk’s secular and modernising ideals, and to vote against the secularist cağdas people at the ballot boxes lest they be emasculated once again. As Erdoğan’s party-rally catchphrase goes, the intent is to give the secular republican party an ‘Ottoman slap’ at the ballot.

The Panorama Museum sits alongside spectacular re-enactments on the anniversary of 1453, references to Turkey’s glorious Ottoman past in political speeches, ground-breaking ceremonies for new grand projects and the naming of bridges, streets and metro stations that make discursive connections between Ottoman achievements and contemporary ones. The result is a vast and pervasive project of reconstruction, remaking and rebecoming in which the reprisal of Ottoman greatness is a governmental tactic of self-differencing. Political
actors overwrite the palimpsest of the land- and memory-scape, inscribing the Ottoman past into the streets, into new museums, into infrastructure, into political discourse and, through anniversaries, into the calendar, with the ideal cumulative effect of marking it into citizen subjectivity and forging a self-in-history that rejects secular modernity, liberal freedoms and westernised dress, gender relations and behaviours as a false path, an impious aping of ‘rotten’ European ways. This involves proud distinction from an alien European identity, and indeed recalls the old days of imperial expansion when Turkey was Europe’s fearsome other.

Conclusion: power, imagination, anxiety

What kind of dimension is remaking? Memory practices involving revival, re-enactment, restoration and reprisal are attempts to refashion the past into a model for the present in order to foster identity positions and create futures. It is not always helpful to separate and parse these, but rather to understand their fluid intermingling in the making of relations between time, place, identity and power. It can be argued that every heritage presentation is an authored, authoritative copy of some kind: a remaking of the world, or an aspect of it; every museum an encapsulated version of things (Brenna et al., 2019). Any display that seeks to trace a history through artefacts, maps, texts, videos and so on is an assemblage of a past, never mind those that involve immersive techniques or dioramas that invite an eye-level view into a previous age. Any restoration of built heritage is the visualisation of the past in the present. Even the controlled ruins of the gas chambers at Auschwitz-Birkenau – which rely for their effect on not having been reconstructed – are nevertheless and necessarily remakings. Precisely through the control of their physical state they are ‘re-assembled’ affectively, institutionally and experientially as heritage, as public memory of high symbolic importance that should never be forgotten. As Macdonald puts it, this is when ‘the past’ becomes ‘The Past’ (2013, p. 18) through affective and symbolic framing. But the dimension of remaking on which this chapter has focused on is, in various ways, to do with engaging the passions – whether of disaffection and resentment, desire for simpler ways of life or a clear-cut moral universe in which control is easier to achieve and people momentarily evade feelings of powerlessness – through the spectacular, and apparently ludic, imagination of the past in the present.

This involves the invitation to play at past-present ‘worm-holing’; to imagine for a moment that we have travelled back in time, or – better – that time has travelled forward to us. We are asked to refrain from thinking of such a game as indulgent nonsense, and to play along. Some of us do so enthusiastically. There is a kind of willing suspension of disbelief involved in the remakings we have seen, although this has a bitter edge, for the paradox of the time travel of heritage is that however much we may want to feel like it is possible to go back, the return to the past is exactly what brings into view the shortcomings and disaffections of the present (Bozoğlu, 2020). Things are not as good as they were; maybe
they never are. The past has degenerated into the present. Even where this return seems to be a reclusion from the present – as at Jorvik or D-Day, there are alchemic meldings with the dissatisfactions of the present that manifest in the search for alternatives to be found by recapturing and transporting the values of past heroism, however different the moral compasses of the Vikings in Britain or the US and British soldiers in Normandy may seem. If celebration of the Viking past seems the least troubling and least political, the most unambiguously playful, then we may think momentarily of instances where it has been (and is) remade for darkly uncivil purposes, and at another level all of the mediatised fantasies of the self-in-history upon which this chapter has focused feel like similarly desperate searches for an alternate present. The bitter contrast between past and present is what gives remaking its power: it enables reflection on what has been lost or taken, and what could be regained ‘if only’: if only we could re-find ourselves (our selves) in history, perhaps through animus towards those who embrace plural society, world citizenship and political correctness. Remakings of this kind promote resentment towards change itself. The Empire is always gone, the old ways are gone, the heroism is gone. But the glimpse of the past offers a tantalising window into a world remade.

The problems of the physical, sensory and thrilling remakings of the past that we have examined were summarised by the senior manager at Jorvik. He explained that they (the organisers) ‘provide a very complete vision of the past… [that] takes the interpretive burden off people’. But, he stressed, ‘this brings responsibility on ourselves’. In a normal museum an object can go in a case with an explanation, ‘but we’re conjuring up an entire landscape that we’ve peopled’. There is then the risk that people can slip too easily into this fantasy, because the imaginative work required is so easy, perhaps seeking an alternative to the present. The introduction of tropes from difficult history at Jorvik is a measured tactic to destabilise the elisions people make between past and present and between history and identity. It is to encourage criticality, especially in a moment when misuses of, and lies about, the past are mobilised by political actors. There is an appetite for fantasy, and there are those who mistake (mistake) the fantasy to make meaning about the present. This is a recognised tendency that is more or less policed by heritage professionals – for example in the Jorvik museum, one diorama represents a slave being whipped. But elsewhere we see more disingenuous convictions that heritage remakings can be pure, apolitical history. At Beamish, it seems that to say that some phenomenon occurred – like Empire Day – is sufficient to warrant its remaking, irrespective of concerns about how this might be mistaken in the present. In other contexts, this is more problematic: sometimes there is a tacit imperative not to remake and not to mark certain pasts.

In Piazzale Loreto, Milan, where Mussolini’s body was hung and stoned there are no traces of the wartime past other than the flowers left clandestinely on the anniversary of his death. The city has supressed the past and the urban fabric stifles memory: a busy roundabout and medium-rise buildings have emerged. This recalls the reluctance, until 2006, of Berlin authorities to mark the spot of
the ‘Führerbunker’, on the site of what is now a car park for residential housing, and now a popular stop for guided tour groups who congregate in front of a text panel. Meanwhile, there has been controversy over the reconstruction of Hitler’s living and work quarters in the bunker at the Berlin Story Museum. Other museums, including the Topography of Terror museum and archive centre, distance themselves from what they perceive as inappropriate sensationalism and insist on documentary, factual explanation.8 But the notions of fidelity and fact can be deployed for different purposes. At Panorama 1453, the producers’ appeal to accuracy is a tactic to dispel any sense of propaganda, or that it is in fact ideology, and not the Ottomans, who are on the march.

The desire to remake takes a wide array of forms and is spurred by a range of different motivations, many of them related to power and the authority to portray history ‘as it was’ married with dynamic appetites for fantasy identities on the part of audiences in search of alternatives to the present. The fallacies of ‘accurate’ reproductions of the past have for decades been commonplaces of literatures in historical theory, memory and heritage studies (Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983; Lowenthal, 1985; Nora, 1989; Harrison, 2013; Bozoğlu and Whitehead, 2018.). If, as some have argued, the real past is inaccessible and all

Figure 4.5 Piazzale Loreto in Milan, where, on 29 May 1945, the corpses of Benito Mussolini and his closest associates were hung upside down and displayed in front of angry crowds.
we have is narrative (Munz, 1977), then every conscious remaking is necessarily imprinted with politics and passions. On the other hand, we tend to rail against a chaos of stories, because ‘what happened’ matters so much for identities, for projections of the future, for modelling civility, for punishment of wrongdoings and recognition of both victimhood and heroism. Inevitably, we find ourselves trammelled between acceptance that the past will always be multiple, and the fear of an unregulated making of the past in the present. It is appalling (for some of us) to think that no story of the past is reliable because of the inevitable politics of semiosis. It is equally appalling (again, only for some of us) to give ourselves over to a single, dogmatic past mandated as true, and hence apolitical, by powerful authorities whose interests we can only hope align with our own.

This chapter has explored four different reversions, through each of which, in different ways, certain imagined Europes are made and positions are taken – audiences of the sites we have surveyed can position themselves as the moral (and often genetic) descendants of, respectively: the saviours of Europe of 1944; the pre-modern, pre-national northern strongmen who transgressed civilisational norms and territories at will; the ‘ordinary folk’ who lived simpler and better, insular lives before the degradations of the present and the impositions of others; or the pious but fearsome Ottomans who terrified Europe. Many other reversions and remakings are possible (although some are not), and different Europes again emerge from them, as we will see in later chapters. It takes an effort of will to reversion one’s identity through just one of these historical imaginaries, and it is evident that some people do have a dominant referent for the making of a self-in-history. For others, however, making the self is a negotiation between
different symbolic pasts. As we will explore in the concluding chapter, pluralising these pasts and their meanings, disrupting settled narratives and complicating romanticised reversionings may diminish the fun of the fair and the thrill of time travel, but could also form one basis for more reflexive and extroverted senses of how we have come to be, and who we are now.

Notes
1 This chapter is available open access as part of the European Union-funded Horizon 2020 research project: CoHERE (Critical Heritages: performing and representing identities in Europe). CoHERE received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement no. 693289.
2 http://bayeux-bessin-tourisme.com/en/event/d-day-festival-normandy/
3 This re-enactment, unfortunately, had to be abandoned due to rough weather.
4 https://ktr.nl/en/information.html
5 There is no better introduction to this than the 1916 debate in the House of Lords from Hansard, accessible at https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/lords/1916/apr/05/empire-day
6 www.asisi.de/panorama/die-mauer/
7 It is not the only one in Turkey: large-scale flat panoramas were produced in the Atatürk and Wars of Independence in Ankara in 2002, by the (Russian) Grekov School of Military Painting. This was followed by the Panorama 1453 and the Bursa 1326 Panorama Museum (1326 was the year when the Ottomans captured Bursa from the Byzantines). Others are in development: Çanakkale 1915 (Gallipoli Campaign), the ‘Great Attack’ in Afyon and the Battle of Manzikert (Malazgirt) (a war between Seljuq Turks and the Byzantine Empire in 1071 in which the Seljuqs were victorious and the ‘Turkification’ of Anatolia started) in Muş. For an account of the politics of historical panoramas in Turkey see Bozoğlu 2020.
8 www.thelocal.de/20161028/berlin-museum-recreates-controversial-hitler-bunker-model

References


Hall, S. (1973) *Encoding and Decoding in the Television Discourse*.


