Christianity, Islam, and Nationalism in Indonesia

As the largest Muslim country in the world, Indonesia is marked by an extraordinary diversity of languages, traditions, cultures, and religions. Christianity, Islam, and Nationalism in Indonesia focuses on Dani Christians of West Papua, providing a social and ethnographic history of the most important indigenous population in the troubled province. It presents a captivating overview of the Dani conversion to Christianity, examining the social, religious, and political uses to which they have put their new religion.

Farhadian provides the first major study of a highland Papuan group in an urban context, which distinguishes it from the typical highland Melanesian ethnography. Incorporating cultural and structural approaches, the book affords a fascinating look into the complex relationship among Christianity, Islam, nation making, and indigenous traditions. Based on research over many years, Christianity, Islam, and Nationalism in Indonesia offers an abundance of new material on religious and political events in West Papua. The book underlines the heart of Christian–Muslim rivalries, illuminating the fate of religion in late-modern times.

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Christianity, Islam, and Nationalism in Indonesia

Charles E. Farhadian
To the memory of my father,
Edward Charles Farhadian
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Preface

My fieldwork in West Papua was from June 1998 to the last day of April 1999. Since 1983, I have visited West Papua on numerous occasions engaged as a person of faith and intellectual conviction. Prior to my departure for field research in 1998, I wondered what historical moment would conclude my analysis. As I waited for my visa to be processed, increased economic and social instabilities caused partly by a surmounting debt crisis and the unmasking of President Suharto’s patronage system throughout the archipelago eventuated in Suharto’s abdication of the presidency after thirty-two years in power on May 21, 1998, and with him the demise of the New Order regime. The Southeast Asian economic crisis beginning in late 1997 combined with the political uncertainty following President Suharto’s resignation to considerably increase social tensions and scapegoating. It appeared the nation might come unglued. The crisis, though partly economic, was essentially one of socio-political unrest that threatened to tear apart the entire country. Indonesia was searching for a new mechanism for change. As the world witnessed the truly historical events of social unrest the New Order regime suddenly collapsed and the nation entered into a period commonly referred to as Reformasi.

In July of 1998 government officials admitted that 50 percent of the population – some 100 million people – would be living in poverty by the end of the year. Resentment arose from Muslims and Christians alike. Economic stability, a hallmark of New Order strategies, had masked rampant corruption at the highest levels of government, giving way to the depreciation of the Indonesian currency, the rupiah. For US$1 the exchange rates were as follows: on July 26, 1996, Rp2,338; on October 3, 1997, Rp3,420; on December 24, 1997, Rp6,200; on January 20, 1998, Rp12,000; and on October 13, 1999, it was Rp8,125; and on November 29, 2004, Rp8,995.

Entering the island of West Papua, I was fully aware of the unique historical period in which Indonesia was struggling to define itself – now with greater urgency. The events prior to and subsequent to the fall of President Suharto’s rule, unlike the disruptions on the “peripheral” islands, exploded from the center, Jakarta, where students and later the general public demonstrated for a legitimate, transparent governmental regime. The New Order’s economic success, which was largely dependent on foreign loans, had accrued a foreign debt of US$130 billion.
by the end of Suharto’s rule. Students demonstrated for clean politics, democracy, and moral renewal. Among intellectual elites, debate over the role of religion in civil society continued to be fiery.

President Suharto was well known for his ability to create and maintain conflicts among Indonesians, and he used this skill for his own purposes. Tension between the Muslims and the Christians increased as Muslims suspected Christians of “Christianization,” while the Christians accused Muslims of attempting to create an Islamic State. The military complex played a unifying role in all levels of society and government; and continues today as a significant force in the political arena of power struggles among the Indonesian elite. Yet movements for political independence threaten to Balkanize the archipelago.

 Whereas the collapse of the New Order regime has led many Indonesians to have unrealistic expectations of change, I did notice a social and political opening in West Papua in the wake of Suharto’s demise. In 1983, during my first visit to West Papua, the government’s strong hand was apparent in virtually all sectors of daily life, such as in its censorship of print and film media (e.g. blackening out of what was deemed sensitive or inappropriate material in international news magazines). Displaying the Papuan flag (i.e. Morning Star), a symbol of Papuan independence, was recognized as a capital offence. And security measures required surat jalans (travel papers) for travel to nearby locales.

During the initial days of Reformasi, censorship, the public display of Papuan symbols, and the requirement for travel papers became more liberalized, permitting the public sphere to be a place where human actors have been able to begin to assert their views. I was surprised on several occasions to see young Papuans walking on main streets in the largest towns of West Papua wearing T-shirts on which large Papuan flags were printed. This cultural confidence symbolized that a slight lacuna had begun to open throughout the social and political system. Erupting from the fine fissure of an otherwise tightly sealed political structure was the public insertion of the notion of “Papuanness,” with its conspicuous self-assurance. On the other hand, the force of the military was still readily felt as family members report continued incidents of extra-judicial killings, intimidation, and torture of those suspected of being a threat to government efforts at national integration. Strict police control, surveillance of dissidents down to the village level, and harsh penalties for anyone who steps out of line were still the order of the day (Scott 1998).

Aceh, East Timor, and West Papua have historically been grouped together as high security zones because of the presence of ongoing movements for political independence or autonomy. On August 30, 1999, East Timor voted against the autonomy package offered by the nation, electing for independence by default. Leading up to the end of the New Order government incidents of violence exploded in Aceh, Ambon, East Timor, Java, Kalimantan, and West Papua. Violence was directed against the Chinese, Christians, Muslims, Madurese, Ambonese, with unclear lines of demarcation, encouraging political pundits to debate the religious, ethnic, political, and economic causes of the national upheaval. And in Jayapura, West Papua, in the first days of June 2000, following
the Second Papuan Congress, Papuan leaders voted to declare West Papua an independent nation.

Living in Indonesia during the transition from New Order to Reformasi periods afforded me the opportunity to observe, experience, and inquire directly of urban Dani Christians and their religious and political aspirations during the most significant historical period since West Papua became the twenty-sixth province of the Republic of Indonesia. The Dani are the largest indigenous group in West Papua, and therefore provide insight into the struggle among religions and ideologies in the province. The occasion of being in West Papua during such extraordinarily important times permitted me to see the events emanating from the political center through the perspective of the periphery. It was a periphery consisting of those who fought hard to become defined by their own aspirations.
Acknowledgments

Several people and institutions have provided the source of personal inspiration and intellectual stimulation necessary to complete the writing of this study. Strong links exist among the various persons with whom I have studied and established friendships. At Yale University, I thank Lamin Sanneh for the academic influence his teaching and writing has had on the direction of my studies. He was the first voice that ignited my curiosity about the complexities of Christian mission, Islam, and local cultures. When he learned that I was returning to California, Professor Sanneh suggested I introduce myself to Lewis Rambo, professor of psychology and religion at San Francisco Theological Seminary, a school of the Graduate Theological Union, in Berkeley. Professor Rambo’s personal friendship and intellectual rigor provided marvelous support during the research and writing phases of this book. In 1995, Professor Rambo gave me Robert Hefner’s volume, *Conversion to Christianity*, which I found immensely engaging. Professor Hefner’s book further added to my interest in religious and social change by introducing me to anthropological and sociological theories that directly impacted my understanding of cultural revitalization.

While at Boston University, I had the pleasure of studying international mission with Professor Dana Robert and anthropology with Professor Robert Hefner. Professor Robert’s intellectual acumen opened the historical realities of the global expansion of the Christian movement for me and persuaded me of the importance of the role of historical analysis in understanding its worldwide diffusion. Professor Robert Hefner’s superb scholarship and curiosity added significantly to the complexity of my understanding of religions in the modern world. To the obvious influence of religion in religious change, he added the importance of recognizing social, economic, and political forces at work. Through Professor Hefner’s book, *Conversion to Christianity*, I was introduced to Professor Aram Yengoyan, who had a distinguished teaching career in anthropology at the University of Michigan and now is professor of anthropology at the University of California at Davis. I am grateful to Professor Yengoyan for his time and willingness to meet with a fellow Armenian in order to discuss the shape of and approach to the study.

Dr Myron Bromley, a retired Christian and Missionary Alliance missionary linguist provided warm hospitality and engaging conversation on my several visits
to his home in North Carolina. He and his wife Dr Marge Bromley, a medical doctor, deeply love the Dani, having spent the majority of their lives to serve them. I have great respect for many of the Christian missionaries who have worked in West Papua.

In West Papua I thank Rev. Lukas Noriwarl, Dean of the Gereja Kristen Injili di Irian Jaya, Sekolah Tinggi Teologi (GKI–STT) and Rev. Hermann Saud, Moderator of the Synod of GKI. Without their invitation to teach at GKI–STT, I would not have had the opportunity to research the social history of the urban Dani. I only regret I was unable to stay longer on staff. The internet permitted the establishment of an important relationship with Dr At Ipenburg, who patiently communicated with me and established the necessary collegial relationship required for my tenure at GKI–STT. Additional friends and colleagues that provided insight into the contemporary religious landscape of Irian Jaya were Dr Rainer Scheunemann and Dr David Neilson. I will miss late night chats with them and their families. David Neilson, who lived in Indonesia for fifteen years, was kind enough to allow me to read a draft of his dissertation, *Christianity in Irian Jaya*, from the University of Sydney. He also provided helpful comments on a latter draft of my work. For bibliographic suggestions, I thank Dr Chris Ballard from the Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies at Australian National University.

In the Netherlands, I was delighted to spend several days with Nicholaas Jouwe, an important early Papuan leader of West Papuan political independence. In Sir Nicholaas I saw a man without a country; he was one who longed to return home, but who knew of the impossibility of doing so. His kindness will not be forgotten. Although in his late seventies at the time of my interviews, Sir Nicholaas was patient in sharing with me the nuances of the larger geopolitical maneuverings behind the acquisition of West Papua by Indonesia. I also thank J. W. Schoorl, Professor of Development Sociology/Anthropology at the Vrije Universiteit in Amsterdam, who warmly received me into his home during the January snowfall in the Netherlands, allowing me to interview him.

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There are numerous Dani and other Papuans who should be thanked individually. They are the reason why I conducted this research. The irony lies in the fact that though they are unhesitatingly willing to be made known, I choose to allow their names to remain hidden for their personal welfare. Papuans used in this study are anonymous. I have made some dear friends among the Dani and other Papuans and I hope that their lives will prosper. My desire is that this study will encourage Papuans in their struggle for their future and give Indonesians a view of their country from “the periphery.” Along the journey that this book represents, I have made several dear Indonesian friends. I am sympathetic to the strivings of
both the Indonesian nation-state and the Papuan people. What has become so clear to me during the research and writing of this project is that a nation’s elite policy and opinion-makers can often be so different than the ordinary men, women, and children whose lives are directly impacted by decisions made from distant capitals.

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Abbreviations

ABMS  Australian Baptist Missionary Society
ABRI  Ankatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia
      (Indonesian Armed Forces)
ACFOA Australian Council for Overseas Aid
AL    Alliance Life
APCM  Asia Pacific Christian Mission
APMS  Asia Pacific Mission Society
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
CAM A Christian and Missionary Alliance
CMA  Christian and Missionary Alliance
DPR   Déwan Perwakilan Rakyat (Indonesian Legislative Assembly)
FIC   Freeport Indonesia Corporation
GBIJ  Gereja Baptis Irian Jaya (Baptist Church in Irian Jaya)
GIDI  Gereja Injili di Indonesia (Evangelical Church of Indonesia)
GKI   Gereja Kristen Injili di Irian Jaya (Evangelical Christian
      Church of Irian Jaya)
GKII  Gereja Kemah Injil Indonesia (Evangelical Tabernacle
      Church of Indonesia). Also referred to as KINGMI
GOLKAR Golongan Karya (The Group of Functionaries)
GPK   Gerakan Pengacau Keamanan (Security Disturbing Group
      or Wild Terrorist Gang); often used as a pseudonym
      for the OPM
GPL   Gerakan Pengacau Liar (Organization of Wild Terrorists)
GVD   Grand Valley Dani
IBRp  Irian Barat Rupiah (West Irian Rupiah)
ICMI  Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Se-Indonesia (Association of
      Indonesian Intellectuals)
IDT   Inpres, Desa, Tertinggal
Irja  acronym for Irian Jaya
KINGMI Gereja Kemah Injil Irian Jaya (Gospel Tabernacle Church of
       Indonesia). Also referred to as GKII
KPPD  Kursus Pelopor Pembangunan Masyarakat Desia (Training Course
       for Pioneers for Community Development)
KTP   Kartu Tanda Penduduk (residence identification card)
Abbreviations

LGVD Lower Grand Valley Dani
LIPI Lembaga Ilmu Pengatahuan Indonesia (The Indonesian Academy of Sciences)
MAF Mission Aviation Fellowship
MK Missionary kid (children of expatriate missionaries)
NGO Non-governmental organization
NRC Netherlands Reformed Congregation
OPM Operasi Papua Merdeka (Free Papua Movement)
Pepera Penentuan Pendapat Rakyat (The People’s Decision). Commonly referred to as the Act of Free Choice, 1969
PGI Persekutuan Gereja-Gereja di Indonesia (Communion of Churches in Indonesia)
PKI Partai Komunis Indonesia (Indonesian Communist Party)
PNG Papua New Guinea
RBMU Regions Beyond Missionary Union
Rp Rupiah, the national currency
RT Rukun Tetangga (neighborhood association)
RW Rukun Warga, the administrative unit at the next-to-lowest in city. The term literally means “harmonious citizen(s)”
SARA Suku, Agama, Ras, and Antar golongan (matters pertaining to ethnic, religious, and race relations)
SBY Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono
SIL Summer Institute of Linguistics
SMP Sekolah Menengah Pertama (middle school)
SPG Sekolah Pendidikan Guru (teacher training school)
STT Sekolah Tinggi Teologi (Theological College)
TAW The Alliance Witness
TEAM The Evangelical Alliance Mission
TMF The Missions Fellowship
UFM Unevangelized Fields Mission
UnCen Universitas Cenderawasih, Abepura, Jayapura
UNTEA United Nations Temporary Executive Authority
UZV Utrechtse Zendingsvereniging (Utrecht Mission Society)
WBT Wycliff Bible Translators
WD Western Dani
YAPIS Yayasan Pendidikan Islam (Muslim Education Foundation)
YBI Yayasan Betani Indonesia (Bethany Foundation of Indonesia)
YPK Yayasan Pendidikan Kristen (Educational Foundation for Christians)
YPPGI Yayasan Persekolahan Persahabatan Gereja-Gereja Injili (Educational Foundation for Evangelical Churches)
YPPK Yayasan Pendidikan dan Persekolahan Katolik (Catholic Education and Schools Association)
ZGK Zending Gereformeerde Kerk (Mission Board of the [Liberated] Reformed Churches)
Map 1 Map of West Papua.

Source: Adapted from Peter King, *West Papua and Indonesia Since Suharto*, UNSW Press (2004).

Note

Some maps show a proposed division of the region into two provinces, West Irian Jaya and Papua.
Burning

In the September of 1998, during Indonesia’s worst economic crisis in decades, highland Dani Christians near the town of Wamena burned down a mosque near a historically important salt spring (air garam). A local Dani church leader explained that whereas no Muslim was present in the immediate area a mosque was built by the Indonesian government in order to “bait people” with material things like rice and clothes. In a meeting of highland Dani Christians to discuss the situation, a church leader asked, “Why do Muslims use that method of proselytization? The gospel enters somebody’s heart and life and then they believe. Not with material things.” The fiery charismatic Dani leader shared his strong feelings against what he believed was a concerted governmental effort to Islamize the Dani highlands:

In September 1998, I told the government, and all the chairmen that worked in Wamena, “don’t let Javanese and other non-Papuans work here. They have to be Papuans. Don’t bring their bad (jelék) religion here.” We were mad…. the first assistant of the bupati of Jayawijaya [a Muslim] was leading the Muslim program. Once a Dani receives those material things from the mosque he does not know it but he is automatically considered a member of Islam…. [The assistant bupati] is a Javanese. Now the Papuans are mad because of the Muslim’s trick. The Irianese raised up the gospel. They shared the gospel without giving anything. And the Muslims use money. We say, “Your God is not a real God. So, you better leave this country. You can pray to him in your own country. You have to go home.” I prayed like that in front of parliament in Wamena. The people heard directly that I was praying like this; “this land is already paid for by the cross of Jesus. The gospel arrived here first. The land of Irian from end to end, the land of the Papuans, we give to God. This is to erect the cross of Jesus. This is Christian land. We don’t accept Muslims.” I prayed like that directly in front of parliament, in front of policemen and military. I told them when we were going to pray there.

Later, in a conversation with the district military commander of Wamena, the Dani church leader protested, “You came from Aceh. Your people in Aceh don’t
want us Christians to bring Christianity to Aceh, why do you bring Islam to us? You go home.' I got angry. We stood up face to face and I told him like that. I said, ‘you go back.’” A large segment of Dani Christians in fact felt threatened by the perceived Islamization of local Papuans. Native land was, in the words of a Western Dani (WD) informant, “holy land.”

On December 22, 1998, a group of Muslims burned down the house of a Dani pastor in Arso (Perlima C), a large transmigration camp in the West Papuan provincial city of Jayapura near the Papua New Guinea (PNG) border. Prior to the event, Christians from Gereja Kemah Injil Indonesia (GKII, Evangelical Tabernacle Church of Indonesia), Gereja Kristen Injili di Irian Jaya (GKI, Evangelical Christian Church of Irian Jaya), and Roman Catholic churches gathered at the Arso GKII Church for an ecumenical Christmas celebration. Religious tensions between Muslims and Christians had been burgeoning as a result of the conversion of a number of Arso Muslims to Christianity. Before the ecumenical service a group of Muslims from Arso dumped a large mound of sand and gravel in front of the door of the church in an attempt to prevent Christian worshippers from entering. Eventually, the congregation, numbering 200–300, was able to enter the church.

Fifteen minutes into the service, a group of Arso Muslims poured gasoline around the pastor’s house, which was made completely of wood. They set the house on fire, burning it entirely down. In an attempt to rescue the motorcycle, the pastor’s younger brother entered the burning building and saved the motorcycle but sustained burns on one side of his entire body. As the house burned, the congregation gathered, and many were visibly angry. The pastor, a Dani graduate of a coastal theological college decided to wait for God to build up his losses, rather than retaliate. Matius Wenda, the Dani leader of the Operasi Papua Merdeka (OPM, Free Papua Movement), was contacted in PNG about the situation and was ready to send his troops to exact revenge on the Muslim community in Arso. However, Wenda honored the pastor’s wishes to wait to see how God would answer his prayers.

The pastor believed that God would give him a better house, because he had literally lost all of his material possessions. After word was conveyed to churches in the West, donations were sent to finance the construction of a new cement house as well as the purchase of clothes and other lost material items. The pastor felt that God had answered his prayers.

In West Papua, burning is a common means of completely destroying of what is perceived as a rival. As such, it is a response of repudiation, rejection, and disapproval similar to what characterized the burning movement that blazed through WD communities in the early 1960s, serving as a potent symbol of Dani renouncement of their past religious practices. The act of burning is tantamount to turning one’s back against what is razed. In the Dani highlands, an instance of burning sheds light on the resolute desire to retain a homogeneous religious identity in West Papua, and the use of fire as a powerful public response to a perceived threat.

It is important to recognize that acts of burning were not a sebastianomic phenomenon, but rather were expressive of the desired end of the Other.
Religious conflict in the highlands and in Jayapura suggested that Indonesian Muslims and Dani Christians did not inhabit a shared world except when necessary, for example in common institutions, sporting events, taxis, and public spaces.¹ Within the New Society an intriguing question was to what degree political protests stemmed from theological or socio-political conflict. Many Christians in West Papua knew theologically little about Islam, though theological colleges made efforts to teach its basic tenets and history. The same was true of Muslims – they knew little about Christianity. To what degree do political protests in West Papua stem from theological or socio-political conflict?

Indonesia’s national slogan “Unity in Diversity” (Bhinneka Tunggal Ika), however, gainsays the strong undercurrents of instability that ominously imperil the integrity of the archipelago. Some wonder if Indonesia as a unified political entity has outlived its usefulness. Others question what kind of social or political glue is necessary to hold together such a diverse nation. On the topic of Indonesian unity, Clifford Geertz says, “the call to national unity in the name of a shared ideal seems to be a wasting asset. Whatever is going to hold the place together, if, in the face of population movements, regional imbalances, and ethnic suspicions, anything is, it is not going to be settled by an ingrained sense of common identity and historical mission, or by religious, ‘Islamic State’ hegemony. It is going to be something a good deal more patchy, capricious, and decen- tered – archipelagic” (Geertz 2000). State-enforced national ideologies, a massive military infrastructure, and a centralized bureaucracy have aimed to create a uni- fied nation of more than 200 million people. The success that this monumental project has achieved has been complicated by the region’s uneven development and religious history.

This book traces the development of modern Dani self-understanding through a consideration of the conflicting social visions of Dani, the Indonesian nation-state, Western Christian missions, and Islam. Beyond these forces lie influences from the wider world, garnered through education, contact with expatriates, and, to a lesser extent, popular media. By elucidating the discourse among Dani, Western mission, Islam, the nation-state, and the formation of new identities and social arrangements in Jayapura as a result of their mutual encounter, this study investigates the forces at work shaping Dani self-understanding as Christians in the plural world of Jayapura.

Underlying the contests for political authority and religious persuasion lie the deeper issues of moral legitimacy, trust, personal, and social identifications. Legitimacy is not a new concept among social scientists, but it has become increasingly the modus argumentum among Papuan intellectuals in their rhetorical strategies to assert their political aspirations and challenge the powers that be. This study is unique because it provides the first analysis of a highland Papuan people living in urban West Papua. While several anthropologists have studied the Dani in their indigenous environment (e.g. Heider 1969; O’Brien 1969; Hayward 1997), there are no significant social histories of the Dani under modern conditions, where the strategies of missionary religions and state ideologies that seek Dani allegiance are explored. Danilyn Rutherford’s Raiding the Land of the
Foreigners: The Limits of the Nation on an Indonesian Frontier (2003) is a fine example of recent scholarship on Papuans (Biak), identity, and Indonesian nation-making, but it is not a social history, and only has a few remarks to offer about Christianity. Rutherford’s theoretically sophisticated work illumines the ambivalences of “nationhood” in Biak island, just north of West Papua, but, unlike the present study, it does not consider how the encounters among Christianity, Islam, nation-making, and traditional Papuan culture have provided a new perspective from which to view Indonesian/Melanesian cultures and authenticity.

Christianity and indigenous cultural confidence

Non-Western appropriation of Christianity appears to have evoked indigenous confidence on a scale that warrants a re-evaluation of what connection there might be between Western missionary contact and indigenous cultural aspirations. Among social and religious minority groups Christianity seems to play an essential role in identity-formation, particularly when these Christians are surrounded by others who are ethnically different and practice other religions. For the Dani, the tensions among Indonesian nation-state, Dani tradition, Islam, and Christianity are exacerbated by the political, economic, social, and religious realities of Indonesia, where race, ethnicity, and religion occupy an important place in the discourse about the formation of the nation-state. Culturally Melanesian, politically Southeast Asian, and Christian, in religion, modern urban Dani identity emerges in part from active involvement in the relational matrix encountered in the new urban milieu. How are emergent Dani identities formed? How have Dani utilized their religion, an increasingly indigenized form of Christianity, to navigate through severe cultural dislocation and new patterns of social organization and social interaction to reach the shores of new cultural identities that serve as vehicles for meaningful participation in the modern world? What are the rhetorical strategies and control mechanisms by which Western missions and the Indonesian nation-state endeavor to form Western-styled Christians or Indonesian citizens?

Maintaining Dani distinctives

Changes occurring in and around Dani communities located in urban Jayapura outstrip those in highland villages, where relative isolation impedes rapid modernization. Urban Dani Christian self-understanding is challenged by the severe cultural dislocation caused in part by an intensification of Western acculturation, rural to urban migration, postcolonial nation building, poverty, and new patterns of social organization and interaction that characterize modern cities.

Within this context, negotiating social and personal identities becomes an important task for the maintenance of Dani distinctives, particularly as the Dani encounter attempts by the government at Indonesianization and Islamization. How have Dani utilized and adapted Christianity in ways that may have assisted
them in the pluralistic city of Jayapura? How has the Bible shaped indigenous attitudes toward the reality of God and various themes of religious belief? How have Dani rhetorical strategies utilized Christian ideals to thrust their political agendas? Recognizing that the Christian church plays a central role in the lives of Dani society, as it does for many Pacific societies, it will be critical to address how specifically the church serves as the “ideological and social cornerstone” of Dani lives and how it has, in a similar vein to other Pacific societies, “become a vehicle through which islanders are negotiating new social identities and world views” (Lockwood 1993: 15).

The quest for moral legitimacy

Western missions, Islam, Indonesian nation-state, and Dani individual and society function as narratives whose designers and speakers search continually for moral legitimacy through a variety of discursive and nondiscursive means in the context of their mutual encounter. Deeply involved in the relational matrix are the employment of rhetorical strategies, the competition between state and mission ideologies, and institutional-building apparatuses that reflect political, economic, and social allegiances, with the aim of reconfiguring Dani personal and social identities in line with the imagined ideal and its constituent “truth system” (Hefner 1993a: 17).

Each player in the encounter forwards its distinctive vision, with attending institutions, commitments, social orders, symbols, lifestyles, along with strategies for implementation. Each extends, whether explicitly or implicitly stated, an ideological vision equipped with a specific history, prejudice, and promise, promoted and sustained within rationalizing institutions and standardizing canons. Each vision aims naturally for the standardization, dissemination, and “rationalization” of its implicit ideals. Issues of identity are brought to bear at each level of encounter, from the “purely” visional to the quotidian tumble of life. It must be said, however, that no vision is an unadulterated, purely rational image of the present and future condition. Rather, each vision and those who cohere to it are fraught with inconsistencies and irrationalities, a reflection more of the messiness of human nature than of its weakness or passivity. Finally, the concept that animates this study is that the emergence of the church, the creation of a new social sphere, plays a primary role in the construction of modern Dani individual and social identity, thus offering an alternative moral authority as well as the structures and strategies to reconceptualize the self within a meaning-generating transethnic community that “affirms a transcendent ideal” and “becomes the clarion call for the redemptive transformation of the social world” (Hefner 1993a: 13). A new social space, like its counterpart, national culture and identity, “hinges on the production of new persons endowed with strong individualism and bundled together into larger social entities (e.g. class, region) by virtue of categorical identities as opposed and in addition to relational identities” (LiPuma 1997: 61). Understanding the function of the church in personal and social Dani life
is important because, similar to some other Oceanic groups, the urban Dani community appears to be “nearly always established through the initial creation of a church with its own minister” (Yengoyan 1995: 341).

Multiple identities and single self

A supposition of the study is that individual human actors consist of a single self with multiple identities that depend in part upon context. Even within traditional social conditions, identities are marked by pluraformity (see Gellner 1983: 13). Identities are demonstrable through the complexity of contexts, which act like social collages, mixing and blending various social worlds, and moral commitments. When is a particular identification advantageous? In which context does each identification surface? Multiple identities are reflective of an offshoot of one responding-self in contexts of multiple encounters. Dani take advantage of various associative identifications, giving rise to complex moral orientations that require blending, adding, subtracting, balancing, and experimenting with new information and commitments.

Dani may identify with the nation-state as they participate in the state educational system (identifying as “Indonesians”), yet inside the doors of the church may identify themselves as Christians. To visitors from Papua New Guinea, they may self-ascribe as Melanesian. Dani employ religion pragmatically. If religion is “true” then it must be helpful in practical ways, so Dani give up certain things in place of other things in a process of continual negotiation, of rejection and acceptance, give and take. What is kept and what is discarded depends on what happens and when. Melanesians can hold conceptually to both this and that, either/or (Giay 1995; Swain and Trompf 1995). Religion, then, can be both a means and an end in this never-ending, dynamic process.

The future of identity

There is a teleological dimension, implicit and explicit, to Dani self-understanding. This dimension prompts Dani to act with particular ends in mind and helps guide them along a corresponding historical trajectory toward what they believe is “the good” (Polanyi 1962: 212; Longergan 1970; Taylor 1989: 32). Yet is it important to recognize that whereas between the Dani and Indonesian elite there exists a contest of visions (among theological, educational, missional, and government elites), people at the village level are waiting to see which vision will win. All selectively choose from the alternatives and make sense of their world (see Douglas 1994: 37). For instance, Dani may utilize the government educational system, church institution, and Dani ritual at the same time, without apparent conflict or inconsistency. Western mission and Indonesian government authorities tend to think in terms of whole packages, as though people will subscribe to one total package, and forfeit the others. However, Dani pragmatism compels Dani to choose what will work for them. In this sense, Dani religiosity in part functions as a technology (Lawrence 1989), deployed to create new persons, new societies,
and, eventually, new worlds. It is important to keep in mind the interplay between aspects of ideology (upper-level discourse) and pragmatism (lower-level discourse) that help to shape Dani identity.

The historically charged discourse about personal and social identity becomes apparent when contests arise over the reasons why the Dani and other Papuans have found themselves living in a subjugated condition. Until anthropologists and mission scholars discovered “history in peripheral societies” (Comaroff 1994: 313), instances of the colonization of history, the dismissal of indigenous viewpoints, whether from a mission or government regime, have served to delegitimize actors’ aspirations.

**Beyond cargo**

Much has been written about so-called Melanesian cargo movements (e.g. Burridge 1969; Trompf 1984; Lawrence 1989). While many early observers sought to explain Melanesian social and religious phenomena in heavily materialist terms, assuming that behind Melanesian social and religious change lies the primary Melanesian objective of gaining “free access to European goods or cargo” (Burridge 1969: 48), later commentators sought to expand the concept to capture the sense of a “search for salvation” (e.g. Hayward 1992b), thus highlighting religio-spiritual features. Others directed the discussion toward indigenous concepts of change, resisting the analytical separation of the concept of “cargoism” from the indigenous notion of change (Kempf 1992).

In earlier observations of Christian Dani subjectivity, chronology (i.e. immediate expectation) was fused with qualitative notions of peace and health, producing a picture of a desperate group waiting expectantly for the imminent return of Jesus and doing things necessary to bring that about. Upon his return, well-being would be established. But so-called Melanesian cargo movements were in part anti-Western and anti-mission, and they rejected and reinterpreted prominent features of mission Christianity. Early Western missionaries to the Dani therefore spent much time correcting “heterodox” versions of Christianity as it was transmitted orally by Dani recipients to their fellow clanspersons.

Kenelm Burridge contends correctly that “the most significant theme in the Cargo seems to be moral regeneration: the creation of a new man, the creation of new unities, the creation of a new society. On the whole the accent is equally weighted: the integrity of the new individual is balanced against the form of the new society” (Burridge 1960: 247–248). Here, I would highlight the complexity of the Dani; the reality of material, historical, emotional, and religious sensibilities warrant a broadening of the notion along the lines Burridge has suggested. Dani aspired for justice and prosperity through a new world order that Burridge, referring overall to Melanesians, maintains consisted in the creation of a “new man” (or “new person”) and a “new society” (see Hayward 1992b: 19), and, concomitantly, the emergence of individuality (Burridge 1979).

Dani tell me that they were more impressed with the Western missionary’s social position than with the missionary’s possessions. Perhaps there are parallels with Dani war practice, where gaining a strategic hill position is more important than
overrunning the enemy and killing him (Heider 1962: 1). That is to say, Dani aspired to high-positions – status – because of the ascribed influence it engendered, rather than being motivated by pure materialism. Much like political figures in the West aspire for political positions in part for political power, social prestige, and honor, and less so for the direct monetary gains accompanying the position (e.g. successful CEOs typically earn more money than presidents of nations), Dani strive to obtain positions of honor, respect, and prestige within their own communities. Since Dani cultural logic subsumes material concerns under the broader theme of the expectant realization of a new world of peace, prosperity, and justice, I prefer to use the general term “a better world” to describe the aims behind the reformulation of relations with the deity or spirit entities (including Christian ones) as well as those rituals that attempt to implement the vision of a new socio-moral order – a new heaven and a new earth (Burridge 1991: xv). I would contend that this more broadly envisioned and nuanced understanding captures more accurately the perceptions and realities of urban Dani Christians in modern Indonesia.

The Dani in their traditional environs

It is revealing that when delineating Indonesia’s social complexity and the “ethnically diverse Outer Islands,” which contain the bulk of the country’s land, Kipp and Rodgers employ the common Inner verse Outer Island typology and yet fail to mention West Papua, though it forms by far the largest land area and contains the most diverse linguistic variety in the country (Kipp and Rodgers 1987: 2). Indonesia’s official annexation of West Papua in 1969, like other actions that were to follow, was done without concern for, consultation with, or even the knowledge of the Papuans. It was done to secure the southeastern approaches to Holland’s flourishing empire in the East Indies. By that act a million people were to pass out of the history of Melanesian New Guinea and into the history of Indonesia (Woolford 1976: 2).

According to Nicholaas Jouwe, the President of the National Liberation Council of West Papua and early leader of the struggle for Papuan self-determination, Papuan representatives during the 1969 Act of Free Choice, cast their votes in the face of Indonesian military who demanded, “your vote or your life” (Jouwe 1999). It is widely held that voting involved “intimidation of the crudest kinds” (Feith et al. 1985: 10), through such familiar instruments of political persuasion as “free cigarettes, cheap plastic brief cases, and food and goods specially flown into all centers for the occasion combined with heavy-handed military and security activities, gaily decorated towns [and] endlessly exhortative posters declaring solidarity” (Bell et al. 1986). In the words of a Dani observer,

Actually, the Papuans didn’t want integration. They wanted independence. But here [in Wamena] there was manipulation. Indonesia said that if Papuans even mentioned the word “freedom” they would be shot. And, the Indonesians brought women from Java to have intercourse with the tribal chiefs. So the Javanese women pleaded with the chiefs to integrate with Indonesia. The chiefs voted for integration. Because the chiefs didn’t know,
they looked at the pretty ladies, who were clean, and so they just forgot. They could not say, “Freedom.” The second thing is that they were given things so that they had to say, “We will follow Indonesia.”

The vote could hardly be called representative; for instance, in the regency of Jayawijaya, the traditional Dani homeland, 175 voters represented 168,000 people (Dorney 1990: 254). International press coverage at the time reflects the travesty and tragedy of the Act of Free Choice:

We do not attach much credit to this free choice, for there is no question of a real choice. The Indonesians have done everything possible to make it appear so, but at the same time news of Papuans being persecuted came in from other sources.

(Het Vaderland, The Hague, June 18, 1969)

According to Jakarta the decision in West Irian has already been made, even though a few pollings will still have to be held. This procedure followed at the performance of the “Act of Free Choice” has actually nothing to do with free choice.

(Het Parool, Amsterdam, July 24, 1969)

West Irian fiel aus der kolonialistischen Bratpfanne ins Feuer des Neo-Kolonialismus. (“West Irian fell out of the colonial frying-pan into the fire of neo-colonialism.”)

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Frankfurt, July 21, 1969)

A chapter of Western colonial policy is coming to an end. A chapter of Asiatic colonial policy begins. All things considered, the Papuans living in West Irian have the same relationship with the Indonesians as the Eskimos with the Basques.

(Die Welt, Berlin, August 5, 1969)

Wie Indonesien Westirian gewann. Ein seltsamer Volksentscheid ohne Volk. (“How Indonesia won West Irian. An odd decision of the people without the people deciding.”)

(Der Bund, Bern, Switzerland, August 12, 1969)

The Indonesian Government has agreed to hold new elections of four of the members of the consultative assembly who will decide the future of the New Guinea Province of West Irian, so that the United Nations Observers can attend this crucial phase of the forthcoming act of free choice, U.N. envoy Dr. Ortiz Sanz disclosed. Dr. Ortiz Sanz complained earlier this month that his team was not informed when the elections began and were unable to attend at least four of the major sessions in key areas. Informed sources said the [Indonesian] Government was attempting to shut out the U.N. Observers from the elections but U.N. Secretary-General U Thant rapped Indonesian troubleshooter on West Irian, Dr. Sudjarwo Tjondronegoro, when he visited New York this month.

(The Japan Times, June 27, 1969)
The Government of President Suharto chose to proceed with the act of free choice to further international goodwill. But every Indonesian leader from the President on down has insisted for the past two years that any decision against Indonesia during the act of free choice would be totally unacceptable to Indonesian national pride.

*(The Japan Times, June 27, 1969)*

The critical commentary of the Australian press engendered an ominous foreshadowing of the long struggle ahead in the relations between Indonesia and West Papua:

In realistic terms, by ignoring the fact that New Guinea [West Papua] is ethnically and geographical an entity and that all the “musjawarah” in the world cannot turn Melanesian Papuans into Indonesians, we are helping to prepare the ground for a Papuan irredentist movement and laying up grave trouble in store for New Guinea and consequently for ourselves. Where else in today’s world would the dictum be accepted that a people was too primitive ever to be free?

*(The Sydney Morning Herald, 1969)*

In November of 2002, nearly four decades after the vote that determined the future of West Papua, the former United Nation deputy Secretary General, Chakravarthy Narasimhan, who was in charge of the United Nation mission, confessed that the Act of Free Choice was a “whitewash” (Shanks 2002).

**Dani internal states and identifications**

*Big-man leadership pattern*

Of the few things one could say with confidence about Dani “big-man” leadership patterns, similar to Melanesian “big-man” typologies, Dani leaders were “men of influence, not men of power” (Heider 1979: 66; Swain and Trompf 1995: 142; see Hayward 1997: 73). Leadership was achieved rather than ascribed in a fashion similar to other Melanesian South Pacific societies (Sahlins 1963). This pattern contrasts with that of (ideal-typical) Javanese political culture, whereby leadership is authenticated through a claim to descent not only for purposes of historical continuity but for the sake of absorbing “a recognized pool of Power” (Anderson 1990: 39). Simply put, traditional Javanese leadership is “inherited rather than achieved status” (Jackson 1978b: 346). Melanesian societies display greater egalitarian patterns led by “managers” (i.e. “big men”) “who achieve status through hard competition rather than by inheritance” (Swain and Trompf 1995: 142).

Under modern conditions these simple distinctions began to dissolve as more utilitarian qualifications and skills came to be assumed as criteria of good leadership. Generally, “big-men” were simply “the most important leaders” (Heider 1979: 66). Beyond this broad description, big-men could be found at every level
of Dani socio-political organization: hamlet, parish, confederacy, and alliance (Hayward 1997: 74–76). That is to say, the big-man designation should be interpreted as a fluid concept that could be applied to a variety of (mostly) men in a diversity of leadership roles.3

Big-men orchestrated principle ceremonial exchange cycles through which clans related to other clans and, thereby, integrated putatively distinct units (Weiner 1988: 19; see Ploeg 1988: 515). The key to big-man success was the ability to manage the complex web of obligations constituent of his role as leader (Finney 1993: 104), reflecting a distinct egalitarianism unlike the precontact pattern of Polynesian social structures in which social organization was based on stratified chiefdoms (see Lockwood 1993: 4).

Traditional identifications

A traveler meeting new people frequently reveals his moiety and/or clan in order to identify himself with his hosts along a dimension useful in establishing trade or possibly marriage ties. He identifies his home area, when away from it, in geographical terms, usually valley names…[o]n his home ground a person most often identifies himself and is identified by his political group, made up, as locals see it, of members of named clans who live in a defined area. (Bromley 1973: 4)

Relevance to the context and person addressed, determined Dani self-introductions – whether a Dani would self-identify by political alliance or clan name (Bromley 1973: 5; Hayward 1980: 13–14). Among the Ilaga Dani (Western Dani) a person called members of his own sublineage his eebe, “his body.” He indicated his membership in a patrilineage section by his relationship to the leader of that section (Larson 1987: 116). It is significant that intermarriage between tribes was not an uncommon practice, and as such formed the basis for new alliances (see Larson 1987: 150–151), thus adding a degree of complexity to social relations.

Moral economy and social reproduction

Traditional leaders served as social carriers of knowledge within the wider community. Tribal history, ritual, and moral economy were geared toward averting disruptions in the relationship among human beings, the environment, and the spirit world. To become “fully human” involved sustaining a good relationship with neighbor, the natural world, and the spirit world; it was then that pain and suffering would cease. Bromley suggested that for the Dani “ritual stabilization of life” involved relationships with the ancestral battle victims and with the immortals (Bromley 1970: 20). As Bromley pointed out, however, the stabilization of life also involved a contingent relationship with the moral universe, which provided the setting for all (Bromley 1970: 20). These relationships of dependency, which were extended beyond the here and now, reached backward to the very beginning, but also outward to the whole structure of the moral cosmos.
This cosmos was structured in terms of dual relationships reflected in moiety structure that pervaded human and immoral life, and it provided in this structure the sanction against moiety incest. A violation of moiety sanctions automatically brought disaster, because the whole moral structure of the cosmos was twisted (Bromley 1970: 20). In areas were there was a prescribed ceremony for averting this disaster the central feature was confession, which aimed at bringing the dangerous hidden transgression into the open public (Bromley 1970: 20). According to Bromley, the importance of confession resided not in forgiveness from supernatural beings, but rather an aversion of automatic punishment for hidden violations (Bromley 1970: 20). Offences against fellow human beings could be righted with compensation payments; offenses against the ancestors could be righted by sacrifices of pigs. But offences against the structure that surrounds both the offender and the sacred beings required confession (Bromley 1970: 20).

Inasmuch as some engaged in intertribal marriage and trade, traditional Dani communities were neither hermetically sealed congeries nor tightly bound homogeneous units, unperturbed by non-Dani neighbors. On a wider scale, traditional Dani society, like many premodern groupings, lacked “a stable specialized order-enforcing institution” (Gellner 1983: 5). Because Dani lacked chieftainship that could rule over large groups and was able to prevent personal quarrels to grow as big to become a real war, and nobody could force people to come to an agreement, all differences, all cases, could only be handled by force (Dubbeldam 1962: 1). Lacking was a transcultural institutional authority capable of reordering social relations in a wider network of groupings that structured discourse between external forces and thereby provided rhetorical strategies and narratives whereby Dani cultural and religious aspirations could be realized. It is important to recognize that the Dani were in no way as limited and isolated as some early anthropologists and mission officials portrayed. Presenting traditional Dani lifeways as predictable, being marked by high plasticity, skews the social and culture realities inherent in their complex condition. Like other traditional societies, the Dani had no single overriding social and cultural identity, for they had links with a variety of religious rituals and were organized by alliances, confederations, parishes, and hamlets according to circumstance. Trade and marriage patterns often necessitated making inroads into new communities, thus creating economic and relational bonds that impacted the organization of their mutual defense and their participation in communal ritual activities (see Larson 1987; Hayward 1980: 46). Homogeneity was never the mainstay of Dani life, for upland Dani exhibited social and cultural fluidity in their most salient life domains. They were never the “naive isolates” that many had thought them to be (see Linnekin and Poyer 1990: 11).
Vision of the evangelical mission

**Building a Christian community**

Western Evangelical Protestant missionary endeavors in West Papua were permeated by a deep-felt spiritual vision about humanity and its purpose within the created order and heavenly realm. For missionaries “attempting to build a Christian community in a virgin field never was simply a social or personal challenge and adventure but a divine instruction, why they were born” (Burridge 1991: 240). Evangelical, premillennial missionaries in West Papua were explicit about their firm intention to work for the evangelization of the world as a precursor to Christ’s return to gather his faithful. Their intention was to form new persons and new communities.

Yet for many Dani, Western mission activities engendered more than the single communicative act of proclaiming an overly spiritualized gospel. In the words of a college-educated, urban Dani, “the missionaries built up their evangelism post by bartering salt and steel axes and shovels. By that way, the missionaries brought the gospel.” Because the preponderance of highland Dani conversions could be attributed in part to contact with the vigorous missionary efforts of the Christian and Missionary Alliance (CMA), a US-based Christian denomination that distinguished itself by being among the first missions to have established permanent mission residences in highland West Papua, it is important to note the theological convictions that underpinned their mission outreach.

The CMA was founded by Albert Benjamin Simpson (A. B. Simpson) (1843–1919), who was raised on Prince Edward Island, Canada as a strict Scottish Presbyterian (Robert 1998: 662). At the age of 38, Simpson “experienced faith-healing of heart trouble . . . [and] founded the Gospel Tabernacle, from which he launched various mission and healing activities, including rescue missions, an orphanage, healing homes, and outreach to immigrants” (Robert 1998: 622). Simpson was described as being “explicitly premillennial” (Hutchison 1987: 115), believing that “Jesus’ return was dependent on the gospel being preached to all the world” (Robert 1998: 622).

The CMA’s mission methodology was driven by verbal evangelism and church construction, while social gospel concerns, although extant, were secondary
objectives. The urgency to evangelize compelled missionaries to share the gospel as widely as possible throughout the world’s hinterlands, including the highlands of West Papua, where some ended their earthly lives in martyrdom (Cowles 1977; Lake 1979; Bromley 1990). In contrast to the independent, premillennialist faith missions, the older Protestant missions did not necessarily share Simpson’s perspective.

**Evangelicals in the highlands**

Christian missionaries were first to establish permanent settlements and provide extensive translations of the Bible into Dani languages, thus supporting the local tradition.1 A significant result of the Christian mission in West Papua was the introduction of countervailing forces that would eventually offset governmental pressure to devastate local tradition (see Chapter 6).

The mission work of the CMA, occupied the east and west ends of Daniland while other evangelical missions (i.e. Asia Pacific Christian Mission (APCM), Regions Beyond Missionary Union (RBMU), and Unevangelized Fields Mission (UFM)) established themselves in all the other areas. Early accounts of the Dani perception of Western missionaries reveal mutual curiosity and the attempt to understand “the other.” It is striking to note that the initial meeting between outsiders (Westerners or newcomers) and highlanders often involved testing, where highlanders sought to discover the sorts of beings that entered their village.

When missionaries entered the area the local people were surprised about the plane, and about how differently the missionaries looked. They thought that the missionaries were not human, but like a spirit that could destroy the area. They thought, “Where are these people from?” The next day there was another plane that landed. They thought, “What should we do?” We killed and ate a pig as the sign of what will happen with their future life. They made the ceremony to protect themselves from the missionaries. We thought the missionaries were a kind of spirit. It was here [pointing] that they had a big meeting; kepala suku [big-men] and all the people were here. They decided that they were just going to kill them. “We have to kill them.” But others said, “No, we cannot directly kill them, because we saw them doing the same thing as humans, they speak like humans, they’re just like humans. But the difference is just the skin and hair. So, we better try to give them something to eat. If they are spirit, then they cannot eat, but if they eat that means they are human.” They gave them a banana. First, they gave the missionaries a whole stalk of bananas, with leaves. Then, second, they served the bananas the normal way. Elisa Gobay [a Papuan missionary from the Me tribe who assisted the first Western missionaries] with the other missionaries, picked the first gift of bananas. But, before they ate they cleaned the bananas off the stalk. Then, the missionaries ate just like normal people eat bananas. They asked the local people, “Just like this.” The local people answered, “Yes, good, good.” Then, the local people brought the green bananas for another test.
They brought green and then yellow bananas. They served these to the group. The missionaries refused the green bananas and accepted the yellow bananas. The local people thought, “Hey, these are human. They’re not spirits, because they don’t eat everything.” Then, after the missionaries ate, the missionaries passed the test.

Here, in an encounter that I call “the banana test,” highlanders examine whether the newcomers are “human” or “spirit” by using various kinds of bananas. Will the newcomers eat bananas? If so, what kinds of bananas will they eat, the under-ripe or ripe ones? This incident, and many more like it, demonstrate highland non-passivity in relation to missionary newcomers (Farhadian 2003).

While the CMA missionaries went to share a spiritual gospel unencumbered by worldly entrapments, their contact was replete with, in the eyes of local Dani, unbelievable material wealth. Virtually every early contact story contained within it an instance, often times forming a crucial medium of contact, where gifts of food, tools, or both were given by the missionary to the local group. In the words of a highland Dani church district superintendent,

Elisa [a Me missionary] took out the cowrie shells and said, “Do you want these or not?” The people said, “Hey, we need that.” Then the people competed for the cowrie shells. This is our expensive money. So the people thought that these people came to make us rich and so they were not our enemy. In our language, we call this, “Ninayali, ninayali.” Ninayali means they can give us blessing – “they bless us.”

As missionaries later built airstrips and received copious goods delivered by Mission Aviation Fellowship (MAF) Cessnas and helicopters, Dani associated material blessings with Christian mission. The location of an airstrip came to be identified as “important influences on all future developments associated with the government and the missionaries,” becoming centers of mission outreach and community development (Hayward 1997: 94).

Constructing the New Jerusalem

Upon arrival early missionaries became students of local languages and cultures, driven by the urgency to share the gospel in the Dani vernacular. They focused on four priorities: translation of the Bible into local Dani languages, education-literacy work, medical and health care work, and building projects. These four pillars were geared toward preparing the evangelized for the modern world. Dani expectations of a better world burgeoned as a new world was being constructed literally within their presence, representing in part a modernization of bodies and spaces. In the words of missionary Gordon Larson, “This desire for assimilation to Western ways is evidenced by the recent mass movement of hair cutting and washing with soap, building of homes with as many as four rooms, a revival of intense interest in the literacy programs, the establishment of a number of new
churches, the building of roads in some areas, and a number of different but related reform movements” (Larson 1963a: 3).

Early missionaries were the first to record Dani morphologies, write primers, and construct dictionaries of local Dani languages and as early as the 1960s the Dani were taught in Dani, Dutch, and Malay languages. Western Christian missionaries were the first to record extensive ethnographic data of the Dani language and culture. Dani language studies by early missionaries Dr Myron Bromley (CMA), Dr Gordon Larson (CMA), and Dr P. van der Strap, OFM (Roman Catholic) remain the most authoritative Dani language sources today.

In all the Dani mission stations, literacy became a focal point of the educational arm of mission, with over 1,500 literacy students spread out over several villages. The pedagogical method was not a unidirectional process, but was rather marked by a dialogical encounter in which missionaries and Dani learned from one another. Pedagogically, missionaries focused on teaching and memorizing Scripture. Missionaries introduced a formal class schedule through the Adult Witness Schools, and early on introduced Bahasa Indonesia into the curriculum of highland Dani.

The third leg of the missionary effort centered on the curative and healing work of medical intervention through the training of Dani clinic workers and the establishment of separate health clinics throughout Daniland. The introduction of modern medicine supplanted traditional healing practices and, for some Dani, confirmed the power of the gospel. Small health clinics became distribution centers for medicine and treated thousands of Dani a year, where access to medical treatment was not contingent on religious commitment, Christian or otherwise. Healthcare was perceived by missionaries as a ministry of healing and an instrument of “winning many for the gospel.” Beyond dispensing medicine and treating disease, missionaries engaged in preventative public health education.

Finally, the construction of the New Jerusalem entailed aggressive building projects throughout the various mission districts, with church construction as a priority. The labor of translation, literacy and education, and medical work were located in these new buildings, which often required an enormous financial and physical sacrifice of the Dani.

[m]ore than anything else, the churches are preoccupied with building new aluminum-roofed churches. Each has a team or two of pit sawers [sic] producing sawed framing, siding and floor planking. All are being painted (mostly creosote base with white enamel trim) and some have glass louvre [sic] windows. The largest to be built so far is the Eromaga church. It cost the congregation well over a million rupias [sic] (US$2500.00), not to mention the twenty-five pigs paid to saw and carpenter crews. (Larson and Larson 1976a: 3)

By 1969, the mission at Pyramid had built so much that at one point it was mistaken for Wamena, the largest town in the highlands, by the pilot of a twin-engine Beachcraft. At that point, there were two five-room dormitory conference
buildings, one daily vacation Bible school building, one office-clinic building, one kitchen-vegetable building, one general storage building for missionary use, a prep school and teacher’s house, and a five-room school and teacher’s house at the village of Tagi.

**Dani spiritual awakening**

*The personalization of nabelan kabelan*

Early mission reports tell of the spiritual climax of early evangelical work as occurring in February 1960, when local Damal and Me missionaries and Western missionaries succeeded in communicating the gospel message through the appropriation of the analogy of *nabelan kabelan*, the indigenous concept for eternal life held commonly by highland Papuans throughout the cordillera of West Papua. Among the Dani, the concept of eternal life (i.e. salvation) was *nabalal kabalal*, among Me it was *ayi*, among the Damal *hai*, among the Moni *hazi*, and among the Yali *nabalal kabalal* (Sunda 1987).

It is important to note that *nabelan kabelan* referred to the quality of life in which death and mourning ceased; it was a state when the Dani would experience reunification with their dead ancestors and a return to a life as it had been in the past (Hayward, Time and Society, n.d.: 42; see also Godschalk 1988: 2–5). Although *nabelan kabelan* was understood broadly, it was measured practically through increase of food, betterment of health, and general prosperity. Local recipients of mission Christianity believed that accepting the message of the gospel was tantamount to receiving eternal life on earth, with the guarantee that their skin would be regenerated, disease would end, and crops would yield plenteous sweet potatoes.

*Nabelan kabelan*, the Dani term that translates literally as “my skin, your skin” refers to eternal life or salvation.

Long ago, our ancestor saw a snake coming from the direction of where our ancestors had come from – where the sun comes up. As the snake slithered along, he was whispering “*nabelan-kabelan, nabelan-kabelan*” (my skin, your skin; my skin, your skin). Our forefathers were excited: the snake is saying, “As my skin is, so yours can become. You too can have the secret of eternal life.” Then a little black and white bird swooped in from the same direction. “*Piriwak nalop kalop! Pirik! Pirik!* (mud on you, mud on you),” the bird mocked. Our forefathers decided he was talking about our custom of covering ourselves with mud as a sign of mourning. “Is the bird saying that death will remain with us?” they wondered. “Yet the snake is ready to tell us the secret of living forever. What can all this mean?” Both creatures moved in the same direction, but the bird quickly outdistanced the snake. As our ancestors argued, the bird flew away. Then they saw that the snake, too, was gone. They were left with death…. [i]f the *pirogobit* bird had not shown scorn, the snake would have shared the secret of eternal life.…  

(Dekker 1992: 59–60)
Nabelan kabelan, then, referred to eternal life or salvation, a state in which it was believed the skin would continue to renew itself. According to Doug Hayward, nabelan kabelan connotes the Dani belief in that happy time of life at the dawn of creation that has been lost due to the foolishness of man. According to the actual legend from which the term derives, this time of bliss was lost when the Dani in those mythological days were following the snake to discover its secret of immortality (presumably evidenced in the fact that it could shed its skin and thereby renew itself), but who allowed themselves to be distracted by the singing of a bird. As a result, men do not have immortality, so at Dani funerals the dead are spoken of as “dead birds” and mourners decorate themselves in imitation of a bird by coating themselves with white mud. (1997: 206)

The gospel message of eternal life, as presented by local missionaries, resonated deeply with traditional Dani mythology, and as such was responded to with large-scale conversions and spontaneous burning movements of fetishes and weapons of war, as well as ignited serious debates within the wider mission community regarding the appropriate missiological response to such extravagant behavior.

Conjoining of the concept of nabelan kabelan with the gospel message functioned like a flash point that spread like wildfire throughout the WD areas. The burning movement began among the Amungme, where the Roman Catholic mission was working, and then emblazoned through kinship ties to the Ilaga valley and then eastward until Pyramid, the borderline of WD and Grand Valley Dani (GVD) areas, where there was a major dialect boundary (Larson 1960a).

According to the Dani, that the human-God was at the same time fully God and fully human meant that God had done the work that for centuries the Dani had tried so hard to accomplish themselves through ritual means, thus the indigenous notion of salvation was personalized and anthropomorphized. After Western missionary contact, Dani became convinced that they were waiting not just for nabelan kabelan, but, for “He” (Jesus Christ) who would lead them to an eternal life, free from disease, hunger, and death. Accompanying the testimonies of WD believers was the statement, “I have confessed all my sins and Jesus has cleansed my heart with His blood” (Sunda 1963: 40–41) and Ninago dleko – Jetu ninago (“We have no sacrifice pigs. Jesus is our sacrifice.”) (Sunda 1963: 43).

**Burning movement**

The advance of the gospel followed local trade routes and marriage alliances, and expanded concomitant with engagement in trade (Giay 1999a). Intermarriage among Dani and adjacent tribes also served to disseminate the gospel message through kinship lines. As complexes, clans, and entire villages accepted the tenets of Christianity, as expounded by fellow highlanders, tens of thousands of Dani responded by burning their sacral instruments in a symbolic act of commitment.
to the gospel message, thus sparking theological conflicts among the evangelical and Roman Catholic mission communities, and ethical dilemmas among anthropologists as to the efficacy of what appeared to be a culturally deleterious act. Some of these pyres measured over 200 meters long, more than a meter wide, and 60 centimeters high (Muller 1993: 124; see Plate 2.8).

For the vast majority, the Christian message was received with great enthusiasm. A college-educated Dani informant related the following:

We had a prediction. The old people said, “Later, something will happen. In the future, there will be a person with white skin, wearing a hat. Their feet covered with leather. In their hand they will have something sharp, like a parang, or ax. They will come. From where, we don’t know. They will enter the Baliem Valley.” The old people did not say that those people were the ones who were going to bring nabelan kabelan. They also said, “You will stay together with them in good relationship, like friends. After that, something bad will come. The difficulty will be that you will hold the fire in your hand, but it won’t burn your hand. You gather the fire, but your body doesn’t get hot. A big snake will come and eat you. One big weakness will come in your life.” Because of these words, people received the gospel and they learned about what the Bible said about hell. So, they decided to receive the gospel. But, if there was no story like that, I cannot imagine how they could receive the gospel. Would they have received the gospel or not? We have no idea.

While the concept of nabelan kabelan served to channel Dani social and religious aspirations, its reception was uneven and, on occasion, was backed directly by powerful village big-men who strong-handedly reprimanded those unwilling to convert.

An educated Dani in his thirties tells of the use of the big-man’s “command stick” to compel conversions. His account may be somewhat exaggerated because he was not an eye-witness to the occasion and other accounts of the incidents do not reflect such total devastation.

The first evangelists were the big-men of the villages because they have the command stick and they are the ones who the people have to listen to. Whoever did not believe was killed. They had a whip in their hands to hit the people who did not believe the gospel. This happened in each village [kampung]. Each village has their own war leader. So, it was difficult for an evangelist to enter the village. That’s why they told the village big-men to be evangelists to their own people. All the big-mens’ villages were united, and cooperated in teaching the gospel. If there was anyone who didn’t want to believe the gospel, their houses, animals, and family would be killed and burned.

Evangelization by force suggested that “if a group resists the Gospel, they should be roughed up, and that they will then ‘find their hearts’ and embrace the Gospel... several of our people were killed” (Sunda and Sunda 1964: 3).
For some, the missionary was closely associated with God, thereby legitimating the missionary’s call for change. Said one Dani, “the missionary is the mouthpiece of God; therefore this is a command from Him! Failure to build the little house [i.e. toilet house] behind the village will call forth the anger of God” (Sunda 1987: 62).

Said one informant, for our people, the very presence of the missionaries, the airplanes, which they had never seen, the clothes, even their bodies. That was part of [salvation]. Everything was new. . . . Why not accept it. So, the question whether there was a moral transformation or whether there was spiritual renewal was taking place. . . . From that time on they had to be critical, “this is old, this is new, this is old, this is new.” Like church attendance, no smoking, no drinking. This becomes a rule. One of the possibilities. Whether renewal, as Romans 12:1 says, took place or not is not clear.

Yet, in spite of the secondary ministries of literacy, healthcare, and education many younger Dani began to believe that the overemphasis given to the “spiritual” gospel, rather than on being trained to live successfully in a rapidly changing West Papua, hindered the continued advancement of Christianity.

After we had high education we told the missionaries it was good that they taught us the gospel for our spiritual life. But the gospel walks with what? There’s no wheel. This is how we think. The missionaries think as though Jesus will come tomorrow. And so we shouldn’t think about other things. “Don’t think about having a lot of pigs or a big garden. We have to tell the gospel only.” But at that time we had nothing. We didn’t need anything. We just had penis gourds. We didn’t have to use beauty soap to take a bath. We could just use grass. But now we wear modern clothes. Those clothes cannot be used for more than two or three days. We have to wash them. If we don’t wash them, we’d smell bad. And now our children have to go to school. The teacher tells them they have to bring money for their studies. And the students wear uniforms. We have to buy these for them. We need books. Several things. Several things come and come. So, finally the gospel, which came first, is covered with change. We have no budget because we’re not ready for that kind of life. We were not prepared before. No one told us that the future would be like this. We were just ready to go to heaven tomorrow. Always waiting for tomorrow, when we die. But we’re not dead. We’re still alive. So, what now? How?

These words summarize the thoughts of both highland and urban Christian Dani as they were burdened by modern problems of economic scarcity, material necessities, and ontological insecurity. Although the promise of heaven assuaged immediate concerns and fears, with time, and having read the Bible in their own language, many highland Dani felt they were unprepared by Western missionaries to engage the larger social and economic realities surrounding them in West
Papua. It is important to recognize that the majority of Protestant missionaries did provide education, healthcare, and literacy to highland Dani, and that many of the concerns and criticisms raised by Christian highlanders today in part reflect the challenges living as an increasingly subjected people in modern Indonesia.

**The status of women**

Tremendous social change followed Dani conversion. The Western missionary presence impacted not only the material and social organizational spheres of the Dani. Gender relations between Dani men and women varied between GVD and WD communities. Generally, the social and ritual lives of Dani men and women were separate. Men held economic power over women, while women were responsible for the majority of farming and harvesting activities. Men, for their part, usually cleared the land and prepared the initial garden area for planting, but women did the daily hard work of planting, cultivating, and harvesting. Said a Mulia (Western) Dani woman, “We are tired of being just the receptacles for the men’s penises, and the victims of their witch hunts” (Hayward 1997: 98).

Furthermore, within the traditional religious complex, Dani women were disallowed from participating in the ritual activities. The introduction of Christian ideals, however, raised the status of Dani women. During the first ever Christian Dani women’s retreat in Pyramid, in the late 1970s, a Dani woman stood before the congregation and drew stick figures on the chalkboard to illustrate her point. One figure had a large head and a small body. At the feet was a second figure with a smaller head. Explaining the drawings the Dani woman said,

> When the gospel came to us Dani people, we were told that the gospel was for the men. The men said we women did not have souls, so we did not need the gospel message. The men crowded around the speakers of the good news. We women were told to sit out on the edges of the crowd and to keep the children quiet so the men could get all the profit from the message. . . . This large figure with the big heads represents the men in our society who have stood on us and tried to keep us away from the gospel, saying we were only spirits and had no souls. They have taught us that when we die, we die just like dogs die. And as dogs do not need the gospel, neither do we. . . . However . . . once I was in a group when a photo was taken by the missionary. I was so excited I could not wait until that picture had been developed and came back. When word came that the picture had arrived, I elbowed my way through the crowd to see if my face would show up or if, as the men insisted, I would not appear because I was only a spirit. There I was! In the picture I saw my husband, the village big-man, a young student, and other men. And right there where I had stood in the group was my very own reflection! I had shown up the same as the men had! I, too, was a real person. I am here to tell you that in the past the men have stood on us and kept us under, as this drawing illustrates. But the gospel message is for us all – for men and women and for our children. (Sunda 1988)
Increasingly, since the early 1980s, highland Dani churches established women’s groups (*Kaum Ibu*), with their own appointed women leaders (see Hayward 1997: 98). While women do not occupy the highest levels of church leadership in evangelical churches, the gathering of Christian Dani women has inspired courage to confront issues directly impinging on their well-being.

Mission Christianity impacted gender relations of highland Dani by advocating that women were not passive actors in Dani life. Christian ideals taught Dani men to see their wives as companions rather than as possessions, thus raising Dani women’s social status. However, Dani Christian women were still prohibited from occupying the most significant positions of leadership within the society.

The impact of Western mission

On the heels of the entrance of Western mission a new discourse within the Dani community emerged rapidly, on the one hand threatening the persistence of traditional authority structures and cosmologies, and, on the other hand, providing answers to the Dani longing for eternal life, human fulfillment, and hope for a better world. Religious revival continued long after the initial reception of mission Christianity.

John Murib, a Western Dani and, at the time a church district secretary, reported what occurred following an evangelistic meeting held in April 1975:

Rev. Selan came to teach us the Gospel. Two weeks after the meetings, all of us preachers and elders gathered. We were in continuous prayer. After a period of pray [*sic*], on Saturday evening the Holy Spirit came upon all of us. Then on Sunday we divided into teams. While teaching the Gospel, some cast out demons, others healed lame people, and still others saw Satan being cast out of persons on three different occasions. Some of us also experienced the following: although it was raining all around us, none in the middle were rained on. Many of us were not rained on at all. With some, *mbonon* snakes came out of them; with other *kole’na* lizards [*sic*] came from them, and with still others, worms came from their stomachs. Some saw angels, and others saw Jesus himself on the cross. And still others saw the Holy Spirit coming down glowing like the sun, while others saw the Holy Spirit come down like a bright light of flaming fire. After experiencing these things, there were many who really believed. Ninety persons in all trust the Lord Jesus. Pu’nymende Kom and Puunom were among those who believed on the Lord. Because of this, the people are saying: “Let’s keep on preaching the Gospel.” They are very enthusiastic about all of this. This is what I have to say. Oh yes. And now as the result of all of this, though the churches were fallen asleep (as one’s foot goes to sleep), now, as far as the Gospel is concerned, people gather at 3:00 p.m. for pray [*sic*] and leave at 7:00 p.m. Some leave earlier at 6:00 p.m. And in the morning they gather at 4:00 a.m. and leave about 6:30 a.m. There are also two women in particular who have had very unusual experiences in the Lord: Tumbalyakwe Tabuny from Nggiliny and Pawulina Magai from Eronggobak (i.e., Mbaninggup’s wife).

(Larson and Larson 1975: 3)
Mission Christianity influenced traditional Dani lifeways in part by its deroutinization of existing familiar practices by placing them within a larger social and religious universe, thus enabling its content to act upon those practices in a way that was at once continuous and discontinuous with common Dani desideratum. Dani reflexivity centered on an analysis of the validity of mission Christianity and its promises to their local situation. The concept of nabelan kabelan, reconfigured along the lines of biblical affirmations, served as a channel to galvanize an alternative vision, providing a medium and serving as an internal mechanism to channel Dani aspirations.

In its uneven appropriation, mission Christianity grew to be another socially defined boundary marker between those inside the faith and those yet to receive it. Yet for the majority of the Dani, Christianity was an appealing alternative to previous ways. Despite its emphasis on a “spiritual” gospel, the mission church was responsible for providing a host of human services beyond simply preaching. It advanced a unified vision of social uplift that integrated physical, intellectual, and spiritual ministries, and did so with surprising success given the relative paucity of Western missionaries. The incredible demands placed on missionaries was daunting, for in most settings they served as teachers, translators, doctors, nurses, anthropologists, linguists, pastors, counselors, builders, engineers, economists, agriculturalists, and community developers.

Conversion to Christianity entailed membership in a new reference group, with new rules and social expectations and was often precipitated by contact materials (e.g. salt, clothes, food, grammaphones, airplanes, and airstrips), use of missionary high-status within the village, healthcare measures, education, and literacy all deployed as means to an end – conversion (Farhadian 2003). Sunday became a day of rest, and virtually all villagers attended church services that were fashioned closely on an evangelical Protestant model. Monday through Saturday became days for work and school. Numerous Dani cultural particularities, such as polygamy, men’s long hair, greasing with pig fat, finger cutting, bride price, and pig sacrifice, were discouraged, being part of the “former life,” while idioms reflecting the new creation were introduced.

Western missionaries advanced a highly rationalized religious perspective, at once reflecting established theological emphases of CMA’s premillennial brand of Christianity as well as ushering in incipient modern conditions, particularly by their introduction of the “standardized, literacy- and education-based systems of communication” (Gellner 1983: 54). Missionaries pioneered the standardization, dissemination, and “rationalization” of mission Christianity as well as other spheres of life in part through their practices of record keeping and the introduction of modern economic social conditions by stipulating that access to education required payment of either cowrie shells or national currency, however small. Bible translation, education, healthcare, and building projects formed the foundation of the mission campaign. In addition, Western missionaries supplied a “readily accessible reservoir of meanings” (Hefner 1993a: 18) through the process of religious rationalization.

Missionaries heralded a new vision, translating the message of Christianity with Dani cohorts, and endorsing the social carriers of its message throughout
the highlands. Dani evangelists, the essential carriers of mission Christianity, reconstituted the message, making it relevant to indigenous tacit knowledge. Although their preaching was frequently “corrected” by missionaries, who often stood nearby measuring Dani words against the doctrinal standards of the CMA, Dani missionaries were given immediate authority to preach the gospel. The democratization of authority among CMA and other Protestant faith missions contrasted with the Roman Catholic practice of requiring a lengthy catechism.

The emergence of the distinct social field of a transtribal church became inseparable from the flow of material goods and access to a wider world provided by contact with missionaries and their promotion of education, health care, and literacy. Missionaries in West Papua, like all missionaries, were complex people who rarely followed their church’s or agencies’ particular missiological orthodoxy in toto. The irony was that despite CMA’s mission theology, which separated the proclamation of the gospel from social engagement, social uplift was in fact a criterion of success in the field.

The first generation of Dani recipients of the gospel assumed that a state of human infinitude and perfect human fulfillment would follow their conversion. Needless to say, death, disease, and all other marks of human finitude persisted. Mission Christianity introduced a new system of knowledge and morality based on biblical passages, church authority, and the particular theological convictions of the CMA about human beings, sin, and salvation. For many throughout West Papua, the period before 1963 was considered the golden age of Christianity in the province, “where Christianity was the religion of government and people, the population was predominantly Papuan, and the other religious and ethnic groups that existed were minorities that had to adjust to the mainstream Papuan and Christian majority” (Neilson 1999: 141).

Because the Dani lacked big-men that could rule over large groups, the arrival of Western missionaries precipitated a significant social structural shift that, although Dani groupings had been connected previously through trade and marriage, served to invigorate those relations with a translocal religion. The unifying nature of this shared vision enabled local communities once primarily self-sufficient to become subject to a similar transtribal confidence.

The New Order’s New Society

During the middle and late-1960s, state and locally instigated changes increasingly challenged the taken-for-granted world of traditional upland Dani. Indonesian-initiated changes introduced to upland communities consisted of rhetorical strategies for the building of the nation-state and the introduction of repressive administrative policies and a massive military apparatus. On the ground level, as they encountered both Western missions and Indonesia’s New Order regime, upland Dani concomitantly confronted a variety of attempts and appeals to be converted to a particular vision of the new world.
Ideals of the New Society

The establishment of the New Order regime in 1966 embodied an explicit attempt to create a just and prosperous society, often called the “New Society” in Indonesian propaganda literature, invigorated by economic stability through aggressive development strategies and efforts to instill national unity upon Indonesia’s fissiparous population. Following the closing of the “heavily politicized days of the Old Order” (Hefner 1987a: 545), bureaucratic reform “made the army the most powerful political force in the country” (Emmerson 1978: 90; also Liddle 1978: 179–180), insinuating itself deeply into every branch of the government and economy. Put simply, “[t]he watchwords of the New Order government have been ‘development and security’ (pembangunan dan keamanan)” (Hefner 1990: 14).

Indonesianizing identity

Since its annexation of West Papua in May 1963, the New Order regime set out to form Indonesian citizens of the newly incorporated Papuan population (see Gietzelt 1989). The process of Indonesianization, that is, the attempt to forge new identities as Indonesians rather than as Melanesians, proved to be a formidable task. Getting Papuans of West Papua to collectively identify with Southeast Asian cultural and political proclivities rather than Melanesian (Oceanic) lifeways created a context of conspicuous subjugation, to which the Dani responded by asserting ethnic and cultural symbols into the public arena that became reinvented to validate their common identity. The most potent symbol of that identity was concretized later in the Morning Star flag, an enduring sign of West Papuan political independence.

The attempt to encapsulate Papuans into the Indonesian (Southeast Asian) historical narrative involved the implementation of enforcement strategies designed to incorporate religious and cultural minorities into the new story, a narrative of community, nation, and people enshrined in the national ideals (see Atkinson 1983; Kipp 1996). Such a massive social orchestration forwarded onto indigenous Papuans in West Papua required (a) a massive military infrastructure that enforced national integration through the means of intimidation, torture, and killing; (b) educational and development programs and policies that promoted Indonesian lifeways and history at the expense of advancing local cultures, languages, and histories; and (c) a program of transmigration in which predominantly landless Muslim Javanese were moved to areas surrounding the larger cities of West Papua and given free land, healthcare, and education.

While official government statements characterized the New Society as just and prosperous the Dani experienced it as prejudicial, racist, and oppressive. Moreover, the restriction of visas to “outsiders,” like missionaries and anthropologists, further raised Dani misgivings about the Indonesian government. Dani approached the governmental and its institutions with feelings of great distrust and suspicion.
Defining moments: instilling the vision of the New Society among highland Dani

*Pembangunanisme* (developmentalism) and *visi KelIndonesiaan* (vision of Indonesianness), the axiomatic priority of economic and social development over cultural concerns and the attempt to create a common vision of “Indonesianness,” imbued Indonesian efforts to form a modern nation. The making of the New Society was a conscious project forwarded by the state and its agencies.

An unwritten, yet presumed, task of establishing the New Society in West Papua aimed at preventing Dani from looking east to define themselves in relation to culturally similar peoples in PNG, Melanesia, and the Pacific region. The Indonesian challenge was to keep Dani looking west, toward Jakarta, to self-identify as Southeast Asian, which proved an immensely Herculean task. Among the Dani there was an inner debate whether to be Papuan, Indonesian, or a blended combination of the two. Complicating their decision was that some Dani wanted to believe the government’s promise to create a better future (“we’re going to make you prosperous” and “we’re going to build a prosperous and just society”).

The ideology behind Indonesian developmentalism was tied to the vision of Indonesianness that infused the rhetorical and developmental strategies of the nation. Dani, and other Papuan highland neighbors, became special targets of national ideologies and cultural projects, with the result that they were assigned positions as objects of development. With “unmistakable overtones of paternalism. . . . Javanese officials saw themselves on a ‘mission’ to ‘civilize’ backward (*masih bodoh*) [literally, ‘still stupid’], naked Papuans” (Gietzelt 1989: 205).

Beyond the ideology of Pancasila, the 1945 Constitution, and the slogan *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* (“Unity in Diversity”) there was little agreement about what exactly legitimated the vision of Indonesianness, although political and religious discourse was commonly animated by competing notions of a better society.³ On the ground level, however, economic exploitation and income-generating projects set aside Dani cultural particularities in an effort to socialize the vision of the New Society through an integrated development program (see Manning and Rumbiak 1989).⁴

The establishment of “security” in the regency of Jayawijaya through military force preceded cultural and economic development of the region. Presidential Decrees No. 75 and 93 of 1969 provided *raison d’être* for the establishment of the Task Force whose forthright objective was to develop Jayawijaya according to well-defined national development ideals. From the Dani perspective, the meting out of *visi keIndonesiaan* was, and continues to be, often harshly applied, and included numerous occasions of torture, intimidation, and extra-judicial killing (see Osborne 1985; Budiardjo 1988). For instance, only one month before the Act of Free Choice, 100 Dani men and boys were executed by Indonesian troops (Sharp 1977: 24). Culture-mediated nationalism rather than structure-mediated tribalism engined an irredentist scheme that on the whole was carried out with widespread impunity throughout the New Order period. The valorization of Indonesian lifeways, supported by a massive military presence, was the strategy the Indonesian government employed to teach the Dani how to become
Indonesians, a promise that was clearly articulated from officials on their arrival to the highlands, with words that were later understood as empty buncombe.

The arrival of government authorities at each of these new (formally missionary) outposts was inevitably accompanied by introductory speeches and promises for the future: promises that in the future law and order would prevail in society, that there would be economic and social advancement and that through their schools Dani children would soon become professionals, government employees, and salaried participants of the wider society in Indonesia.

(Hayward 1992b: 13)

In January 1963, Indonesian government officials (military) assumed control of the Baliem Valley, only seven years after the Dutch entered the same region (Bromley 1997). Hayward notes,

For the Dani, then, these government representatives were laying claim to the rights (and obligations) of being treated as “big-men,” which the Dani understood to mean that in return for their support of the Indonesian government, the government would in turn bestow upon them the privileges, advantages, and wealth that were already available to those who lived in the cities where the government was already firmly established.

(1992b: 13–14)

With time the hopes that Indonesian officials would fulfill their promises by providing Dani highlanders with jobs, training, and other “advantages” would be dashed as the government’s words were never realized.

SARA and the rise of Dani “orang bodoh”

The New Order’s disregard of ethnicity, religion, and race in its attempt to realize visi keIndonesiaan in part reflected the nation’s blindness to ethnicity. Topics about Suku (ethnicity), Agama (religion), Ras (race), and Antar golongan (groups or classes) or SARA were prohibited by the New Order state, while the illusive notion of “Indonesianess” was apotheosized. According to this model, the Dani, along with other highlanders, occupied the bottom rung of a racial hierarchy where Asians, and particularly Caucasians, were on top. The political necessity of a shared national identity in service to development was reflected in the following statement from President Suharto:

I am reminded that a nation that neglects its cultural heritage will lose its identity. A nation without its identity will be weak, and in the end, a weak nation will deteriorate from within and without... Only a nation with its own identity can be a nation with self-confidence...[and] it is this self-confidence, this ability to be self-reliant and creative that are the keys to success in development.

(Schwarz 1994: 230)
Identity issues were in fact an essential part of the competing narrative of postcolonial Indonesia, and as such were often politicized to valorize the imagined unity of the nation. Suharto’s vision of national identity was never clearly articulated by the New Order regime in a manner that adequately legitimated its existence from the perspective of the nation’s many ethnic and religious minorities. Functionally, President Suharto’s vision of “cultural heritage” meant Javanese history and culture, with the adequacy of all others in the nation measured against the center-piece culture.

What the government actively promoted among the Dani were what Rita Kipp says, referring to another context, “the showcase aspects of culture or tradition – dance and music, the plastic and textile arts, rituals, costumes, and indigenous architecture” (Kipp 1996: 110). Today, one can view decontextualized Dani “art” (e.g. axes, finger cutters, penis gourds) in the provincial museum in West Papua, or purchase artifacts in local non-Dani owned tourist shops; Dani cultural particularity has become culturally invisible to the public in order to mask ethnic and class problems in a manner like other ethnic minorities in Indonesia.

The Dani were forced to sing Indonesia’s nationalistic songs, such as Satu Nusa, Satu Banggsa (One Island, One Nation). However, despite the shared chorus, full access to the high normative culture of Indonesia was denied by virtue of Dani membership in another culture and a putative racial category, and by their lack of education. Below the surface ideology of equality, Indonesian officials viewed the Dani as a racially inferior population and contrary to the image it wished to convey to the world, except through its eco-tourist publications that tribalize Dani identity for profit-making. Indonesia wanted to be perceived by the world as a modern and rapidly developing nation rather than as a primitive Asian backwash.

In the sarcastic words of a long-time Westerner living in West Papua, “The Indonesians despise the frizzies [kinky-hair, Dani]. They’ve just come out of the trees recently. That’s how they regard them. They despise them, actually. They’re not civilized.” Feith et al. note that “in Papua New Guinea, as in West Irian, the Indonesian presence is seen in heavily racial terms: ‘We are fuzzy haired and black. They are straight-haired and brown. We are few. They are many and they are after our land. We are in danger of being swamped’ ” (Feith et al. 1985: 4).

The New Society imposed on the Dani, having originated in Jakarta more than 2,500 miles away, officially denied discourse on sensitive issues of ethnicity, race, and religion (SARA). Yet for the Dani, race and religion formed salient identity markers that distinguished them from non-Papuan immigrants and, in some cases, from other Papuan groups. When asked to explain themselves, the Dani consistently employed racial categories: black people with kinky (ulotrichous) hair.

Their experience of racism and prejudice contributed to the ongoing political and social struggles on the island, as well to the isolation that most Dani felt within the modern bureaucracy. Reflecting on the racial overtones of the Indonesian perception of the Dani, a Dani informant said,

We are black people working as government employees. If a black person works for the government it’s difficult for us to move up a level through the
system because the government thinks that the Papuans are incapable. So, we don’t like to be called Indonesian. If they [the Indonesians] feel that we are unified together they don’t believe we can do anything. So, it’s better to be alone by ourselves.

Post-1969 Indonesian development policies for West Papua aimed expressly at “civilizing” the Dani, casting them into the secularized version of the “new man” and “new woman” of the new nation. As such, the government objectives engendered explicit visions of the New Society that were unhappily forced onto highland Dani in their traditional setting, with the message that the Dani were orang bodoh (stupid people) and malas (lazy), possessing a local culture that had little, if anything, to contribute to the national project envisioned in visi keIndonesiaan.

The Dani were, in turn, assigned to low positions in the government bureaucracy and, because of their “nakedness” were seen as the most primitive people on the island (Osborne 1985: 66; Premdas 1985: 1067). In a 1997 West Papuan newspaper article, an Indonesian government official reasoned, “the Papuans cannot yet be given important positions in government,” reflecting the myth that the Papuans are an incapable class and inducing in the military a strong tendency to act as occupation troops (Lowry 1996: 173).

More importantly, the effects of the earliest sustained encounters between Indonesian government personnel and highland Dani insinuated themselves into the historical consciousness of the Dani and immensely influenced their perception of themselves and Indonesia. Two worlds and two visions met. These historical first impressions were incorporated into the story of the Dani and transmitted to younger generations by those who experienced the events first hand. Such first impressions became constituent parts of the mental and emotional package carried in the minds, bodies, and psyches of young upland Dani migrants to urban Jayapura.

**OPM: curtailing the vision**

Another salient vision is solidified in the pan-West Papuan movement known as the OPM. The history and activities of the OPM (Free Papua Movement) are well documented (e.g. Premdas 1985). Classified by the government as Gerakan Pengacau Liar (GPL, Organization of Wild Terrorists), the OPM is a loosely organized movement existing in local chapters throughout the island and engaging in guerrilla activities in support of Papuan nationalism. According to Robin Osborne, the OPM is one of the world’s least known but most durable liberation forces (Osborne 1985: xvi).

Although difficult to verify, many suggest the Dani constitute the largest numbers within their forces. The OPM function as an ethnonationalist movement enlivened by an ad hoc mixture of Christian ideas and local religious aspirations blended under a unified vision to free West Papua of what it calls its neo-colonialist oppressor, or, what Nicolaas Jouwe calls, its second Asian colonizer (Japan being the first) (Jouwe 1999).
When CMA missionaries arrived and preached to highland populations, Dani responded with large-scale conversions, but by 1977 they were severely disappointed. A generation had passed and death and disease had continued. Jesus had not returned. The OPM entered and provided a new vision. Their enthusiasm had something to do with collective aspirations for a better society, a new society, which lay at the village level. Because of the diversity of Papuan groups supporting its aims, the ideals of political independence crystallized by the OPM represented perhaps the largest explicitly political pan-West Papuan organization in West Papua during the New Order regime. Christianization provided a kind of community among different clans and dialect groups that preceded the OPM and to a great degree set the context in which it could flourish.

While the OPM was a decentralized movement, organized primarily along tribal and geographic lines, their overall unity was premised in part “on the illegitimacy of Indonesian control of Irian Jaya” and its ideological content drew upon the political ideal of independence (Premdas 1985: 1063). While the movement undoubtedly engaged in violent activities and was adamantly opposed by Western missionaries, much of its rhetoric and ideology were imbued with Christian notions. With regard to the validity of prominent members of the OPM describing themselves as Christian and contending that their movement was animated with Christianity, the straightforward advice of Pacific Island scholar Charles Forman, referring generally to Pacific Christianity, provides prudent counsel: “If they themselves call their religion Christianity, outsiders would do well to accept that name” (Forman 1990: 27). In the words of a Dani pastor supportive of the movement,

A lot of warriors who fight for freedom [OPM] use the Bible as the foundation for their struggle. They say, “We have to be free because every country and tribe and culture has a basic human right to be free. Why do the Indonesians oppress us? We have different skin, different hair, the way of life, like cooking, we heat up the stones and cook the potato with them. With the Indonesians it’s not like that. Our houses are different. The Indonesian government cannot make us all the same…."

We have a lot of mines, like gold and copper and gas. The government takes all the profits of all these natural resources to Jakarta to help develop the other people in other parts of Indonesia. But, we, the owners of the natural resources are just sleeping in our huts until Jesus comes… forever. It’s better for us to be free from Indonesia. If so, then the profits of all the natural resources can be used to help the development of the people of Irian Jaya. We also need to eat. And God put the gold in the mountains of Irian Jaya for us. This is special for Irian Jaya. Why do the outsiders want to steal our natural resources?

It’s just like the story of Moses when Israel was oppressed by the Egyptians in the Exodus. The Christians had to pray to God in their special place. So, we don’t want to be oppressed and ruled by false gods. Indonesia is like Pharaoh. If I pray like Exodus 14:13–14, the brutal nation can kill the evangelist, burn the church, rape the Dani evangelist’s wife. We don’t like to see this brutal nation of Indonesia. That’s my prayer."
Combining themes of race and religion, a past OPM member described the promise proffered by the OPM.

This is the promise I heard from them. Jesus will come to save his people. They said to me, “You have faith that Jesus will come to save all his people. But we also have our own faith, that Papua will be free from all Indonesia. Agree or not, God allowed us to be by ourselves…. When I went to preach near the Membramo I met my younger brother who is a member of the OPM with a machine gun and the bullets around his body…. We found in Acts 17 that God decided about the difference between each human being. We think like this: they have different skin, different hair. God placed us here with curly hair and black skin. So, the place of the “straight hairs” is outside of Irian Jaya.⁶

Dani informants at the highest levels of leadership within the OPM stated their vision in theocratic terms:

The aim of the OPM is to form a state that is free, with the Lord Jesus Christ as the Kepala Negara (Chief of State) and the Kepala Gereja (Chief of the Church). And all the members of the state will hold the law of love in high esteem for the Lord more than previously and they will love their fellow human beings in order to honor basic human rights as creations of God, who is honorable. Finally, the Lord Jesus Christ will bless the entire citizenry that will abound in blessings of the body and spirit. There will be a life of peace, harmony, and full of loving affection.

Within their jungle camps across the border in PNG, the Dani OPM possessed churches with pastors who were trained in Bible schools and theological colleges and then had abandoned their church-related work in West Papua in order to support the aspirations of the OPM. Other Dani pastors opposed the OPM, and burned out OPM camps in various locations. The OPM continued to engage in small-scale guerilla activities throughout the island, seeking to bring international condemnation to bear against the plight of the indigenous Papuans (e.g. Start 1997). Among Papuan Christians, the OPM had a mixed reputation, with some pastors and congregants having joined their forces while others remaining adamantly opposed. In interviews with several of its members and supporters it was clear that the Dani commitment to the OPM began as a response to what Dani perceived as an encroachment on their land, religion, and basic human rights (hak asasi manusia) by Indonesian officials.

The beginnings of the Dani OPM variant stemmed in part from Dani opposition to the Penentuan Pedapat Rakyat (The People’s Decision), commonly referred to as the Act of Free Choice, 1969 (Pepera) and Dani perceptions of the decimation of their self-determination at the hands of Indonesian officials.

Pepera . . . was between the Indonesia, Holland, and United Nations. The Dani people refused it, we didn’t want it. The old people didn’t know what was
happening, they didn’t understand the Indonesian language. The Indonesian government knew that in Jayawijaya the young people refused the decision. So, the government took the older people, people who didn’t understand Indonesian language; they were in their 50s. The government told them that they will join Indonesia. When the people heard about that news (that Irian joined Indonesia) the people in Pyramid started a war. They were mad. They killed two military men, cut up their bodies and threw them into the Baliem River [in 1969]. All the young people ran away. Only I was left to answer the questions of the government. I had to answer them. I worked with them until it was peaceful. Since that time the OPM was active, led by Obed Tabuni. Many young people still continue to refuse the Indonesian government. Not only in 1969, but up until now. Not only in Pyramid, but throughout the entire [Baliem] Valley. But, the center is Pyramid. 1977 was the zenith of the activities. The young people who refused to join the Indonesian government went to PNG [beginning in 1969], by crossing the border. They returned in 1977. People were happy. We wanted to oppose the government, but not with guns. Just using the traditional weapons.

The OPM’s immediate genesis was stimulated by the recognition of corrupt voting procedures during the Pepera in Jayawijaya. My informant, Stephanus, and some of his friends, campaigned for Pepera and gathered all the big-men of the area: “if Indonesia wants to colonize Irian Jaya and so force us to join Indonesia, we will have to say ‘no’.”

When Indonesian army took one of the big-men from Maggi [Western Dani region] to vote, we went to spy on them, to see what they were going to do with them. . . . Our plan was just to spy on them. So, we went there and in the night, before the members of the United Nations arrived, they already recorded the votes of everybody. But, really, the vote was only from one person who wanted Irian Jaya to join with Indonesia. It was not a vote where everybody voted. So, that was the vote they announced to the public. . . . For the first vote, we chose two persons, Guname, the big-man, and Kuloken. Kuloken had to vote first. He voted for Papuan freedom [Papua merdeka]. Then, the military arrested him and made him vote again. We spied on them and we killed two of the military.

Western missionaries often supported the Indonesian government. In the words of missionaries present at the time, “we were called on to help apprehend the murderers in order to help the government get the problem settled” (Sunda and Sunda 1970: 1). The earliest Dani leaders of the OPM had little formal education, having received only elementary education at the Yangamundik Bible school in Pyramid, an educational foundation run by the Gereja Kemah Injil Irian Jaya (KINGMI, also referred to as GKII), Gospel Tabernacle Church of Indonesia), where they learned Bible stories.

In 1973, Obed Tabuni, an early Dani OPM leader, was shot dead by the Indonesian military. He was replaced by Matius Wenda, another Pyramid Dani,
who would take over as leader of the Wamena OPM division. The killing of Obed Tabuni stirred up the OPM once again, and incited further campaigning that would eventuate in the war of 1977. In June of 1977, a police conference was held at Pyramid, giving the OPM ample opportunity to revenge Obed’s death. One of the key members of the party relates the story:

Seven [policemen]. They were all from Toraja and Ambon. At night, people gathered at the villages in the hills to discuss ways to capture the policemen. We found a way: we would kill a pig and chicken from the village and we would bring them to the jungle. Early in the morning we would come to the conference center. They would think these were animals that we hunted. So, we went down the mountain at 6:00 a.m., and they were asleep. We hid our knives and machetes [parangs]. We knocked on the door. The policemen came out. We killed some of them. We stole their weapons and we arrested the rest of them. We took them outside and shot them. These are the details: One guy who opened the door asked, “What do you want?” We said, “We want to have a knife to clean the pig.” He came out and we killed him. One guy, he had just come out of the bathroom. When he was locking the bathroom door we killed him. There were also some teachers at the state school and we informed them that they should leave Wamena and Pyramid. But, they didn’t care what we told them. There was only one family who left. But the others said, “You’re lying.” The ones who said we were lying were staying with the policemen in Pyramid. We captured them and killed them. The other teachers were from Biak, Genyen, and Toraja. We arrested them but did not kill them. That was around June of 1977. There was another policeman from Ambon and one from Java and from Toraja. We arrested them and brought them alive to the OPM camp.

Seven policemen were killed. It is illuminating that just prior to 1977 official Indonesian documents mentioned the invisibility of the OPM, despite their undeniable activity throughout the province. Referring to the OPM, an official statement of the Department of Foreign Affairs stated plainly, “As far as Indonesia is concerned, the movement is of no significance, because in Irian Jaya itself it does not exist” (Department of Foreign Affairs 1976: 11). According to the Indonesian government,

[...] the people in this province are now busily engaged in the development of their autonomous region, and have gained tremendous achievements. ... Approached and misled by OPM’s colonial henchmen, foreign Governments and leaders, who are unfamiliar with the historical growth of the Indonesian nation, may take it for granted that this organization is a “genuine” nationalist movement, not being aware that by doing so they are actually made instrumental in helping the dying breed of Dutch colonial diehards to realize their scheme.

(Department of Foreign Affairs 1976: 11)
Official rhetoric denounced the OPM, arguing for its non-existence, and contending forcibly that its activities should be understood as lying under the specter of Dutch colonial schemes. By dismissing the activities of the resistance movement, anti-colonial rhetoric belied the truth on the ground.

The struggle to civilize: the Indonesian national endeavor

The Indonesian government, much like Western missions, came to West Papua from far away. They too came with a sense of mission to civilize and bear witness to a new way of life to “heathens” lacking both a civilized culture and the ability to determine their own future. The government’s message promised a better society encapsulated in the notion of the modern nation-state. The story of Indonesia’s early contact with highland Dani and efforts to civilize the “naive isolates” required that the Indonesian Armed Forces immediately act as the strong-arm of national government policies and development strategies (Linnekin and Poyer 1990: 11). Having received explicit orders to operationalize civilizing programs among highland Dani, the military, without delay strove to implement national ideals among highland Dani through numerous civilizing campaigns.

In 1971, the government launched Operasi Koteka (Operation Penis Gourd), “a civilizing program” aimed at those living in “a stone-age environment” in the regency of Jayawijaya, whose only clothing covered “the sexual parts” (Zainal 1971). Dani were to look, dress, and eat according to the patterns and ideals of the New Society. Highland rice growing projects sought to shift Dani staples from sweet potatoes to rice. As a program of continuance of the Act of Free Choice, the Military Command VII of Jayawijaya together with the Armed Forces and the Provincial Government of West Papua, guided by “a humanitarian motive” (Zainal 1971: 1), the overly ambitious goal of Operasi Koteka set out to discourage the wearing of the traditional penis gourd and grass skirt and to encourage the wearing of more modest clothing, to eat rice and less pork, and speak the national language (Suter 1982: 16).

Given the fact that Western missionaries were, by the early 1960s, also teaching Malay (Bahasa Indonesia) they too inadvertently (or purposefully) supported the government’s vision, though perhaps their intention lay more in helping equip Dani to face the new world waxing on the horizon. The government in Jakarta allocated Rp100,000,000 per year to supply clothing to the highlanders. According to the commander-in-chief and officer-in-charge of the program, Brigadier General Acub Zainal, the overall goal of Operasi Koteka was the “attainment of security and success of Pepera…so that they may become an integral part of Indonesian society and thereby realize the just and prosperous social conditions of life, physical as well as mental, embodied in the Pancasila and the Constitution of 1945” (Zainal 1971: 2).

Zainal described the Dani pejoratively as “extremely backward” and their “pattern of life” as “still of the Stone Age” and therefore “[e]fforts to indoctinate them with the ideology of Pancasila [Pancasila] must be promoted and will have to be continuous” (Zainal 1971: 2–3). Any rough adjustment to the Indonesian
ideal was blamed on Dani “primitiveness”: “these primitive communities have not yet reaped the fruits of these ideals” (Zainal 1971: 12).

The first teams were sent out among highland communities with the goals of creating an awareness among the people “of new forms of life and a desire to exchange their ‘koteka’ for proper clothes,” to “awaken their national consciousness,” “improve their abilities in the field of farming, animal husbandry, fish culture, and other productive efforts,” and “arouse the aspiration for progress” (Zainal 1971: 21). It is remarkable that the Task Force sought to teach farming and animal husbandry to groups of highlanders with a 9,000 year history of agricultural practice. The Task Force’s approach was first to learn the local vernacular language and “maintain contact with the community through daily association, film and art entertainment, sports and daily work, so as to win their hearts and create sympathy…” (Zainal 1971: 41). In addition, the team method included teaching Dani to understand and speak Indonesian, to sing the national anthem (*Indonesia Raja*), and to learn about the Pancasila and the ideals of the Indonesian nation.

Field teams carried “contact supplies” that included salt, tobacco, and safety matches as well as “group-sports equipment,” such as footballs and volleyballs, and portraits of the president, the national emblem (*Bhineeka Tinggal Ika*), a set of Indonesian flags, and a map of the Indonesian islands (Zainal 1971: 26–28). The main objectives were as follows:

1) to educate and give practical training to the people in normal social ethics so as to improve their living standards and their way of life; 2) to instill national consciousness and awareness of nationhood and of possessing a Government; 3) to encourage the people to abandon their nakedness and to begin wearing clothes; 4) to encourage activities designed to create a better social, economic, and cultural order; and 5) to encourage and induce the people to abandon their unsettled and dispersed way of life and tribal fanaticism and to create a well-ordered permanently settled society, offering mutual help [gotong royong] among its members.

(Zainal 1971: 30)

Field teams were to take six-month shifts and, upon their return to headquarters to Jayapura, be received with a grand ceremony “so as to create a good impression on the community” (Zainal 1971: 39). The efforts of *Operasi Koteka* failed, the Dani being less than enthusiastic about the government’s overbearing project to change their autochthonous culture into the image of modern Indonesian life-ways. Today, while the majority of Dani residing in Wamena wear Western-style clothes on which are emblazoned nonsensical English expressions, many men have retained the use of the *koteka* and the women their traditional skirts.

A second developmental program, *Kursus Pelopor Pembangunan Masyarakat Desia* (KPPD, Training Course for Pioneers for Community Development), in the early 1970s was located in Wamena and Nabire and offered three-month training in Pancasila, Indonesian ideology, Indonesian history, Indonesian language,
and a basic course on community development. Following their training the young Dani were to be sent to different regions to promote what they had learned. A more recent program called *Inpres* (president’s instruction), *Desa* (village), *Tertinggal* (left behind) (IDT) was a presidential decree to help develop underdeveloped villages. IDT funds sought to develop villages through the support of animal breeding (e.g. chickens and goats) and planting (e.g. vegetables and coffee) initiatives. Another presidential decree provided a subsidy to non-Papuan interior village workers (e.g. teachers and health workers). Usually government employees prefer to work in large cities, such as Jakarta, Surabaya, or Yogyakarta. If, however, they volunteer to work in the interior of West Papua they will receive an extra stipend beyond their salary.

In spite of the civilizing campaign, the government and both national and international tour companies profited from retaining the image of the Dani as ignorant primitives dwelling in a tramontane region. It was common to find the Dani depicted fully “tribalized” in Indonesian tourist literature, national museums, national parks (e.g. *Tanah Mini Indah*, Jakarta), and international airline magazines, with penis gourds (*koteka*), grass skirts (*thali*), net bags (*noken*), war makeup, and bird feathers in their hair.

What was once considered backward was later employed to bolster a thriving ecotourist industry. The cultural confidence of the Dani was radically challenged by their political annexation into the vision of the New Society beginning in the 1960s. In the words of one long-time expatriate living in Jayawijaya, “[the Dani] were the lords of the earth. These were the people who were proud. Now, you go through the market and you’ll see a great big-man digging through the garbage or begging cigarettes.”

**The 1977 War: bows and arrows, bombs and grenades**

As the Indonesian government presence and military intimidation of the Dani escalated in the highlands, “Dani were thoroughly disillusioned with the progress of the government, through its officials, to meet their expectations. Justice, peace, and tranquility simply had not been realized, nor had these government officials been able to distribute with ‘cavalier generosity’ (i.e., in the expected role of a ‘big-man’) the wealth of the nation” (Hayward 1992b: 14; see Osborne 1985).

Growing animosity and mistrust among the Dani, particularly the members of the OPM, and Indonesian authorities, as well as numerous killings from internecine feuds, erupted in the war of 1977 (Osborne 1985: 66; Gietzelt 1989: 212). In the words of a Westerner, “It started in the Western Dani area. The same people that latched on to the gospel were the ones who latched on to the freedom movement.” They sought to usher in a new kingdom. When the Dani OPM ambushed military posts with bows and arrows, Indonesian armed forces responded by sending paratroopers of the Special Army Strategic Force to the Baliem Valley, decimating villages in areas west of Wamena. Pyramid village was hit particularly hard. Other areas severely bombarded included Kelila, Tagime, Bokondini, and Kobakma. The imbalance of weapons between Indonesian Armed
Forces and Dani warriors gave way to swift subjugation of the indigenous population. Bows and arrows proved no match for modern weaponry.

The Dani frustration was tied to their comparative economic disparity, cultural threat, recognition of increasing discrepancy between coastal and highland development, and their feelings of hopelessness in the face of a rapidly changing world. Dani followers of the rebel movement in the Ilaga Valley, who also served as lay leaders in the KINGMI (GKII) church, shared their disappointment during a Sunday church service:

How many times has the Snow Mountain District Conference convened since the first one in 1962? (Answer: Fifteen times.) We have become Christians and turned our lives over to the Lord years ago. We have served Him, have sought to move forward in the civilized world. We see the big centers in Wamena and the Lakes, the growth and investment in Nabire, Sentani, and Jayapura. But we are neglected. All we are asking is for a way to cloth [sic] ourselves, to have a means to earn money, to progress as does the Coast. If this can not be, we are willing to die fighting for it.

(Larson and Larson 1977: 3)

An informant relayed the following story, illustrating dragonnade methods of intimidation and conquest employed by the Indonesian Armed Forces during the 1970s. In 1977 several Dani tribal big-men were gathered together in Jayawijaya. The military forced them into their helicopter, put them in large rice sacks, and then threw them into the rushing Baliem River to drown in the sight of fellow Dani. When in 1988 a member of parliament from Jayawijaya tried to raise the issue, the military killed him. On another occasion, when local police in Jayawijaya demanded that Dani make a show of loyalty to Indonesia, eighty came down from the mountains. Twenty were shot by Indonesian officials and sixty ran away.

In other regions of traditional Daniland, “the government party then proceeded to kill pigs, dig up gardens, tear down fences, and burn all houses in the area” (Larson and Larson 1978: 4). Suffering increased in the Ilaga as “the military arrived by helicopter…they first evacuated the post personnel and then proceeded to burn out village after village in five church areas” (Larson and Larson 1977: 2). The Australian airforce confirmed that the Indonesian Air Force strafed villages with conventional bombs and napalm (Osborne 1985: 66; Dorney 1990: 263; Lowry 1996: 172). Dani eye-witnesses told of watching Indonesian soldiers use hand grenades to destroy villages. According to a missionary who lived in a warring area, “[the rebel Dani] were just lined up and killed by the government.” Another reported that the Ilaga church “participated in the dissident movement which brought serious retaliation by the government and many losses to the population” (Larson and Larson 1978b: 1). Dani weapons were limited mostly to bows, arrows, and spears, however, on occasion, a gun was used when stolen from the military.

A Dani informant told me of a discussion he had with a retired member of the military who communicated to him that during the 1977 highland bombings the
Air Force “held fake exercises on the border between Papua New Guinea and West Papua, near Jayapura. They tricked the spectators. In Jayapura there was an air show. Many people gathered to watch. Over the city the Air Force performed for the people, then flew directly over the highlands and bombed the highland people, returning to the city to continue the show.” Government rhetorical strategies involved depoliticizing the events, claiming that the conflicts were not political, but rather tribal clashes.

After the war

Although a semblance of peace shrouded the regency of Jayawijaya after the war, the humiliating loss forcefully challenged the physical and religious life of all Dani communities. It was estimated that about forty Ankatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia (ABRI, Indonesian Armed Forces) members were killed while Dani casualties numbered in the hundreds. Many Dani lost their houses, gardens, family members, and relatives, while sustaining permanent physical disabilities, including loss of appendages. Eye-witnesses estimated that over six hundred Dani were killed during the war. This number may be a low estimate given the fact that in one village alone nearly two hundred Dani were killed. The Jakarta newspaper, Merdeka, estimated one thousand deaths (Dorney 1990: 263–264).

Nevertheless, according to a Dani educator in the area, “In the people’s minds there is no peace even until today” because so many Dani had lost their families and relatives in the struggle against Indonesia. It is significant that during the 1977 war and its aftermath, many Dani returned to their traditional religious practices, believing that supernatural power in war decides who wins. During and after the war there was a marked increase in the involvement of Dani Christians in the performance of war magic. According to a 1978 report from Ilaga,

sacred fire was kindled and taken to the field of battle each day to determine through divining the best course for combat. This was done by the war shamans known as the aap mage, the “tabooed ones,” that is, those who were consecrated and segregated from the rest of the population and who ate only certain food during the period of fighting. Two of these men were Christians, and they had been sent out from Ilaga as an evangelist-teacher at one time.

(Larson and Larson 1978a: 2)

Furthermore, pietistic expressions of mission Christianity, previously instilled by CMA missionaries, declined noticeably as Dani returned to smoking cigarettes and other worldly practices.

Church attendance waned, as churches in the Ilaga experienced an all-time low. Religious enthusiasm noticeably declined. In the words of a Dani woman from Karubaga, “After the war of 1977 they went back to their first life, like unbelievers, and they returned to their traditional religion with all their sacral, spiritual things. This made them forget about God.” Many Dani Christians turned their back on their faith in a nativistic return to their old traditions because, in the words of
a Dani college-educated informant, “in their efforts to save themselves [in war], they asked help from the traditional spirits. . . . The destruction of their moral life was due to their participation in acts of fornication and rape they had perpetuated at the time so they didn’t feel suitable entering the church. . . . [and] they didn’t want to forgive those that had killed, raped, or fornicated members of their families.”

A Dani witness recalled the war and the subsequent rise in traditional religious practices as an effort to regain power in the midst of loss, and argued for the critical importance of education to the prosperous future of Dani (and other Papuans).

[They returned to their traditional religion] not because they didn’t win. When the war started their faith was shaken. Among the youth there has been a big change. Before, they were loyal and faithful and went to church regularly. But, after the war people’s minds were affected. But the old people, whom I met in Tiom, said, “Praise the Lord,” and they gave me food during the war. But the young people didn’t care because their way of thinking changed. So, they are confused. They have no faith anymore because they thought that Papua was going to gain freedom. At that time, people in Wamena didn’t yet understand how to be free. People had no education and were easily influenced. People came and said, “If we’re free, we’ll have food and everything. We’ll have everything we want if we’re free.” Because people didn’t have education it was easy for them to be influenced by these messages. But for people who are educated they can judge whether someone is saying the truth or not.

Christian missionaries had a different interpretation of the war of 1977, reporting from Pyramid that Christmas of 1978 “was a time of great rejoicing for most,” with some interpreting the events of 1977 as a judgment of God on persons uncommitted to the belief in the parousia. In so doing, local Dani Christmas dramas re-ritualized and reconfirmed the tenets of mission Christianity while serving to assuage and provide a theological counterstatement to the previous year’s terrible loss.

Most every Church presented an indigenous initiated and directed drama. In almost every instance the prominent theme illustrated the judgement of God on those who were two-hearted at His coming, and hardly dwelt on the coming into the world of the Prince of Peace. The drama by the young people had God sending some of the [local big-men] (called by name) to eternal damnation. Those faithful to God in this life were given great riches in heaven, illustrated by new clothes (robe of righteousness?) and plenty of rice to eat.

(Sunda and Sunda 1978a: 7)

The watershed events of 1977, and particularly the impotency of traditional Dani religion to successfully combat the dominance of a modern military, led to
indigenous cultural disruption and the recognition that the traditional means of obtaining power proved comparably inefficacious. Up until that point, the war of 1977, was the nadir of Dani social and religious life in modern Indonesia.

**Hostages of trauma**

The effect of developmentalism and the attempts to socialize *visi keIndonesiaan* left the Dani unwilling to completely trust the government and its promises. A mission report from Western missionaries living in Pyramid captured the Dani sense of being overwhelmed after the tragic events of 1977: “Returning here to live under military rule and the accompanying uncertainties left the people feeling most insecure and unsettled… Following their long months of suppression and hiding, then final defeat, there is an apathy that has affected their whole mental attitude, especially relative to their physical well-being. It has been most difficult to get the people to *want* to be well and healthy” (Sunda and Sunda 1978a: 6).

**The Western mission response: “Be subject…”**

Early mission reports and letters advocated the importance of Indonesia’s entrance into West Papua, and detailed the Dani “persistent request that the area be occupied by the government” (Larson 1963a: 2). Local Dani leaders, having learned of the opening of government posts in Wamena and Bokondini (WD region), and after experiencing increasing tensions among various competing Dani groups, made “strong and repeated appeals… for the establishment of a similar post in the Ilaga area… and for the government to intervene” in order to resolve group conflicts (Larson 1963a: 2). The last sentence of a brief prepared by CMA missionary Gordon Larson for Dr Sudhir Sen, the Deputy Administrator for the United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA), stated unequivocally that “[t]he population of the Ilaga valley are welcoming the coming of the Indonesian government officers and teachers” (Larson 1963a: 3), in effect supporting the Indonesian claim to territorial control.

Despite the destruction wrought by government forces during the various civilizing campaigns and the war of 1977, Western missionaries, based predominantly on their exegesis of the New Testament book of Romans, sought a biblical mandate for the faithful living and upheld the view that government authorities were established by God and therefore ought to be obeyed. Much of the missionary sentiment was based on the biblical passage that reads, “Let every person be in subjection to the governing authorities. For there is no authority except from God, and those which exist are established by God. Therefore he who resists authority has opposed the ordinance of God; and they who have opposed will receive condemnation upon themselves” (Romans 13:1, 2).

Following the events of 1977, the Ilaga mission reports called for the mission to “pray much that this persistent left-over element of the underground will submit itself to the government” (Larson and Larson 1978b: 4). Other missionaries labeled the rebels “heathen” (Wilson and Wilson 1978: 2), further stigmatizing
them from the mission church and erecting a grim boundary between those submitted to the government (Christians) and those who rebelled against it (heathens). Early missionaries to the Dani suggested that economic and social development be done “under the direction of the Indonesian government” (Larson 1963b: 1).

From a missionary living in Maggi, “[t]he church lined itself up with the government…church leaders and missionaries took the government side” and frequently provided information to the government about rebel activities:

We reported their [rebels] activities in July [1976] to the feild [sic] chairman who in turn talked to the Bupati about it when he attended [sic] CAMA conference. We also reported their activities to the local CAMAT…we consistently advised the pastors to take a stand against the rebels and warn the people about the danger of association with this outside anti-government enfluence [sic]. We held a pastor’s seminar and emphasized specifically the Christian responsibility towards the government.

(Bozeman and Bozeman 1977: 1)

Missionaries frequently played the role of intermediaries between government forces and rebel supporters, providing personnel as escorts during their humiliating capitulation to Indonesian forces: “a real influx of people surrendered to the government, so that by the first week of December, over 2,000 people, including a delegation of about 100 representing the Tagi [Dani] people, came in for a meeting with our chairman, John Ellenberger, and they made formal surrender to the military at Pyramid” (Sunda and Sunda 1978b: 3). These announcements were ironic considering the fact that the CMA and its Indonesian national counterpart, the GKII, explicitly rejected involvement of its church or mission in political affairs.

**Conclusion**

During the 1970s, government and OPM forces gained strength and impeded upon the lives of the local Dani, forcing a response. Interestingly enough, the failure to successfully implant the normatively centralized New Society through efforts of *developmentalism* and the installation of *visi KeIndonesiaan* was blamed on the cultural backwardness of the local inhabitants (Dani) rather than the strategies and policies themselves. This attitude remains today among many Indonesian officials in the region. For instance, in a recent comment, the Director of West Papua’s Social Affairs Department, Dicky Asmuruf, argued that “the biggest hindrance to government aid getting through is that many natives are tribal nomads who depend on nature and still live in the Stone Age, refusing to accept civilization” (West Papua’s Poor 2000). Asmuruf, though, acknowledged the contribution of Christian missionaries: “Most of them [Papuans] are still wandering about naked or half-naked, and the only outsiders who have been able to reach them are Christian missionaries” (West Papua’s Poor 2000).
“Indonesian Department of Health reports show that in the central highlands, with a population of around 400,000, there is only one hospital with 70 beds, and 15 health centres with a doctor in the 13 subdistricts covering an area of 53,000 square kilometres” (Wing 1995). An Australian-based Non-governmental organization (NGO) reported the following health-related statistics:

The infant mortality rate in West Papua ranges between 70–200/1000. The maternal mortality is 4.5/1000 in rural districts, where the majority of the population live, compared with a rate of 1.3/1000 in other parts of Indonesia. Pneumonia accounts for 26 per cent of infant death, diarrhoea 19 per cent, and malaria 11 per cent. According to an international church NGO, the major underlying cause is clearly malnutrition with over 20 per cent of the population in the central highlands experiencing some degree of malnutrition. Less than half the children under five are judged to be well nourished. The percentage of immunised children is 40.8, well below the national average of 60.3. West Papua has the lowest life expectancy of all Indonesian provinces, particularly for women, who have a life expectancy of 50.3 years compared to the national average of 62.7.

(Wing 1995)

More recent statistics revealed that although life expectancy in Indonesia was 65.1 years of age for the people of West Papua, reaching the age of 40, let alone 50, was “an extraordinary divine reward,” according to Asmuruf (Irianese’s Life Expectancy 2000). Furthermore, HIV infection rose significantly in the past few years, outpacing rates throughout the archipelago. Recently Butt et al. (2002) reported that there were 20.4 cases of HIV infection per 100,000 people in West Papua, contrasting dramatically to the rest of Indonesia, which had only 0.42 cases per 100,000 people: “Approximately 40% of the HIV and AIDS cases in Indonesia are located in the province of Papua, even though that province has less than 1% of the population” (Butt et al. 2002: 283).

Despite the increased number of highland state primary schools, missionary-initiated schools continued side by side with secular ones. The empty governmental rhetoric about development left the Dani feeling skeptical of the promises engendered by Indonesian overlordship and the identity ascriptions enforced on them. By the late 1970s, it was clear that the goal of highland development projects had failed, leaving in its wake Dani disillusionment about the promises of the New Society. Yet Dani remained ambitious and curious enough to pursue a new future by heading off to the provincial capital, where they continued to pursue their ideal future through education.
Plate 2.1  Baliem Valley. (Photograph by Charles Farhadian.)

Plate 2.2  Western Dani highland complex. (Photograph by Charles Farhadian.)
Plate 2.3 Pasar Nyak, Wamena. (Photograph by Charles Farhadian.)

Plate 2.4 Dani women in front of garbage dump. (Photograph by Charles Farhadian.)
Plate 2.5 Dani Bible students. (Photograph by Charles Farhadian.)

Plate 2.6 Western Dani youth. (Photograph by Charles Farhadian.)

Plate 2.7 Western Dani Bible village. (Photograph by Charles Farhadian.)
Plate 2.8 Dani burning movement monument. (Photograph by Charles Farhadian.)

Plate 2.9 Dani church. (Photograph by Charles Farhadian.)
Plate 2.10 Wamena storefront. (Photograph by Stephan Babuljak.)

Plate 2.11 Grand Valley Dani men breaking rocks. (Photograph by Stephan Babuljak.)
Plate 2.12 Highland mosque sign, Walesi. (Photograph by Charles Farhadian.)

Plate 2.13 Highland mosque and village, Walesi. (Photograph by Charles Farhadian.)
3 Jayapura and transformations of the New Society

Down from the mountain

Traveling to the metropolitan center

There are only two ways to travel from the regency of Jayawijaya in the highlands to the regency of Jayapura on the north coast – walking or flying. Trekking through the jungle, if one is in excellent health, takes at least a month, and involves traversing through the highly humid and heavily malaria-infested Memberamo marshlands. Separating the northern coastal sea ports from the highlands are about 150 miles of swampland, crocodile-infested rivers and rugged mountain terrain, and to the south lie jungles stretching 100 miles to the sea. Flying on an Indonesian airline takes about one hour from the highlands to the northern coast.

For the highland Dani, entering the regency of Jayapura is like setting foot in a new world. Huge buildings (two to four stories high), banks, department stores, movie theaters, restaurants, concrete sidewalks and roads, cars, taxis, motorcycles, and boats combine with new kinds of foods, smells, cultures, and peoples to create an atmosphere that is at once exhilarating and daunting to newcomers. One immediately encounters a massive military presence that appears more like an allochthonous occupying force. How will a Dani make his/her way in such a new environment? How will he/she be able to sort things out and make sense of the new world? How do they overcome feelings of isolation and alienation?

Dani diaspora

Highland Dani arrive to Jayapura as impecunious strangers, and for the most part, they explore the new world alone, without knowledge about how to navigate successfully through their new surroundings. The urban canopy of Jayapura isolates by the isolation of the individual from his traditional community. These individuals become members of the Dani Diaspora, having left their highland homes and being now scattered throughout Jayapura, possessing neither the essential skills nor critical perspectives necessary for success in the wider world. They meet “strangers,” co-nationals, those claiming the same national citizenry but who are socially, racially, and culturally distinct from highlanders. And they become minorities, disenfranchised in an environment where local knowledge holds little
value and where they find themselves politically, socially, and economically underprivileged.

New authorities in part based on education, new forms of prestige, and access to powerful government officials, have gained ascendancy while moral and social norms that once kept things going in the hinterland break down. In the newly emergent world, the Dani Diaspora come not only to look, but also to be made new. Their source of strength is secured in part through venacularized biblical truth received in the hinterland. And while the myth of nabelan kabelan is not shared in the city, Dani do meet non-Dani who in fact hold the Bible as authoritative, enabling the Bible to become a new transcultural authority in the metropolitan center. While they enter Jayapura at a considerable social, economic, and educational disadvantage, Dani participate actively in the emergence of new social units, adding substantially to the discursive visions that have characterized West Papua in the New Order Period.

Dani parents in the interior know that when their children move to the city they will enter another world and so they tell them to contact the church and other family members for help. Continuity in areas of church, tribe, education and conversely discontinuity in the same such areas could lead to conflicts in ethnic diversity, religious options, cultural variety and perhaps even to alcoholism and prostitution. Four conspicuous groups, the Indonesian nation-state, Islam, the Dani, and Western missions, each present a unique vision of the past, present, and future, with explicit and implicit goals and aspirations. It is in the contest of these imagined communities that the struggle of a Dani at self-definition is realized.

Missionary interlocutors

Western missionaries served as both interlocutors and instigators of change among the Dani in their migration to the new world of Jayapura.1 Beginning in the late 1960s, Western missionaries from the highlands brought Dani to the northern coast for the purpose of evangelism and for use as gardeners (tukang halaman), night guards (penjaga malam), clothes washers (pencuci pakaian), and general househelpers in missionary homes. By March of 1969, a Dani church was established in Sentani. Urban Dani connected family crop yields in the highlands to missionary families on the coast. Highland crops are renown for their size, flavor, and variety, and the Dani were able to arrange for crop shipments from their highland gardens to the expatriate missionary dorms and schools in Sentani, using the services of the MAF. Some food shipments to the coast exceeded 2,000 pounds.

New ideological realities

Despite its pelagic cultural identity, Jayapura is dominated economically and ethnically by Southeast Asian migrants, making it appear more like a bustling Asian “wild west” than a Melanesian town. It exhibits many of the characteristics common to most modern nation-states: a division of labor, a monopoly of legitimate
violence, widespread bureaucracy, social mobility, and the disruption of the many-stranded social relations of traditional village life (see Gellner 1983). Although continuities exist between traditional and modern lifeways, thus belying the simple bifurcation that over-dramatizes religious and social discontinuities between hinterland and town, the combination of the pace of change and the scope of change nevertheless makes entering Jayapura an immensely new experience (Giddens 1990: 6).

Nearly every Indonesian cultural group is represented in Jayapura. Though ethnic diversity also characterizes the population in numerous large Indonesian cities, like Jakarta or Surabaya, the relatively small population in Jayapura makes it a stunningly diverse cultural and religious environment. Within the regency of Jayapura, the largest towns include Sentani, Abepura, and Kota Raja. Dani have marginal influence in their new environment. Estimates are that approximately 15,000 Dani live in the regency of Jayapura.

As large numbers of Dani moved to the provincial capital regency of Jayapura on the north coast, they were confronted with new religious options (e.g. Islam, secularism, Roman Catholicism, mainline Christianity, Pentecostalism, and Evangelical churches), economic realities (e.g. monetary system, skilled labor market), and political ideologies (e.g. Indonesian’s Pancasila democracy, Papuan freedom movement). Religious and social activities became the vehicles through which the urban Dani negotiated new social and personal identities.

The Dani entered the new world with stories and memories of their interactions with both missionary and government forces in the highlands. From a common, moral world bound by multistranded connections, Dani moved to an urban domain of single-stranded relations, defined by an increasingly rationalized and efficient modern bureaucratic order. They entered nationalism’s arena, where a comparably high degree of social fluidity enabled novel associations.

Old structures that once sustained quotidian Dani life gave way to education as the means to access bureaucratic employment, raise social prestige, and construct modern identities as city dwellers. While the Dani arrived as strangers they were described by fellow Papuans as being “energetic, open, entrepreneurial” (Giay 1999a).

The Dani entered the city-seeking models and resources for becoming modern. Although most were drawn to Jayapura for the possibility of obtaining a permanent gaji (wage) or furthering their education, upon arrival they discovered that competition for jobs between migrants and the local population was exceedingly burdensome (Manning and Rumbiak 1989: 22). Yet, given the fact that Indonesia was the most dominant modernizing agent, some Dani equated being modern with being Indonesian. “Modern” clothes like blue jeans, T-shirts, dresses, and blouses contrasted sharply to the penis gourds and grass skirts of Dani tradition.

Television broadcasted Jakarta-oriented programing, showing stories, newscasts, announcers, reports, and news coverage strictly of and about Indonesia (see Budiardjo 1988: 56), including religious programming reflective of the country’s Muslim majority. Movie theaters (bioskop) showed films made in the Western world or that featured Asian, that is, Indonesian, characters rather than Papuan
Jayapura and the New Society

(see Plate 5.2). Personal parabolas (satellite dishes) captured Western-oriented films shown on IndoVision and reflected the conspicuous consumption of the modern city landscape. Magazines and newspapers rarely showed Papuan (much less Dani) faces on the covers, except when denouncing Papuan rebel activities that threaten the unity of the nation. The few national magazines that covered the people and events in West Papua usually pictured a highlander (particularly a Dani) wearing a nose bone, bird feathers, and a penis gourd (holim, koteka).

Modern identities were marked in part by lifestyle choices, and clothes became a sign of membership in the New Society. Although most students wear similar style clothes (e.g. pants, dress shirt, dress, blouses), and the typical school uniform, both male and female students often carry school bags made in their home regions, thus creating a territorial and ethnic identity marker. Many Dani use traditional net bags for book bags. With the increase of Western style imports, there is a growing interest in nylon backpacks and book bags, although they are comparatively more expensive than those made from local products.

“One belongs’ to ‘a nation’ or ‘possesses’ a national culture much as one has or possesses commodities” (Foster 1997c: 177).

A friend of mine, a Dani college student, was noticeably self-conscious about his looks. I was surprised one day to find that he had purchased trendy glasses with clear lenses to improve on his already good looks. Referring to the advantages of living in the city, a young, urban Dani informant said the following:

They [i.e. urban Dani] know how to manage time because they watch. They know how to travel with vehicles, airplane, in the ocean or lake, or on a taxi. They know how to swim at the beach or the lake. They know how to use the telephone. They learn how to speak Indonesian well. They study in school. They try to live on their own. They learn about eating on time and a good diet [proper nutrition]. They can watch TV. It’s easy to get money. They can live in a modern house. They can take a bath twice a day, minimum. In the kampung the water is cold, so they can’t take a bath as often.

Yet the Dani enter metropolitan Jayapura at a distinct economic and political disadvantage. Most become employed as manual laborers (buruh kasar). What motivates many, in the words of one informant, is “to search for a new life” (cari kehidusan baru). Urban Dani college students report that when the Dani come to the city “they are surprised, they want to try everything. Not because they are frustrated or sad, but because it is new. For the Dani who grow up in Jayapura, they get drunk for different reasons: no money, problems with girlfriends, or because their parents fight.”

The Dani begin the search as subjugated people, in an arena where the social order is concentrated in the hands of a few members of society. “Many newcomers die when they move to the coast due to sickness (malaria), lack of food or drink. Clinic workers don’t know newcomers; there’s also prejudice against newcomers because newcomers may smell, have old clothes, and no bath” (Giay 1999a). In addition, no prior social relationship defines their new status. If they survive, they are forced to be made new, or at least different. In order to
communicate with loved ones in the highlands, most urban Dani borrow short-wave radios or send messages with friends traveling back to visit family, thus increasing the already distant spatiality between family members on the coast and in the highlands.

*Reflexively remade*

In the city, newcomers are required to trust abstract systems such as healthcare, education, transportation, and banking. Most urban Dani distrust the banking system, as they do not fully understand the concept of a bank and it represents another Indonesian-run institution. Therefore some Dani approach missionary personnel and ask them to store their money, because the Dani do not believe they will be treated fairly by the Indonesian banks because of their experience of being prejudiced against by bank employees. Dani resistance to modern banking further marginalizes them.

The face-to-face commitments that once characterized traditional Dani society have given way to faceless commitments where trust in abstract systems is required (Giddens 1990: 80). “Self-identity is not a distinctive trait, or even a collection of traits, possessed by the individual. It is the self as reflexively understood by the person in terms of his or her biography…self-identity is such continuity as interpreted reflexively by the agent” (Giddens 1991: 53). Urban Dani frequently mentioned that the most significant drawback to living in the city was feeling of being separated (*berpisah*) from their families in the village. How will they reflexively negotiate their surroundings and incorporate new alternatives and associations into their developing biographies? Whereas in the village the existence of moieties and clans depends upon a balanced exchange pattern across moiety and clan lines, such as the purchase of brides and exchange of personal or clan wealth, the new social conditions of the metropolitan center, complicated by intensive social diversity, provide no such balanced exchange. In the city, this balance-maintaining structure has been lost.

Modern nation-making requires basic shared imaginations. Two particular traits are essential for its success. First, two people “are of the same nation if and only if they share the same culture, where culture in turn means a system of ideas and signs and associations and ways of behaving and communicating” (Gellner 1983: 7). Second, two people “are of the nation if and only if they recognize each other as belonging to the same nation. In other words, nations maketh man; nations are the artefacts of men’s convictions and loyalties and solidarities” (Gellner 1983: 7). Jayapura becomes just one of many final destinations of the “centrally directed pluralism” advanced by the massive bureaucratic polity headquartered in Jakarta in an attempt to inculcate the imagined nation-state (Kipp 1996: 87). The Dani realize that the relatively diffused authority within their traditional society cannot compare with the concentrated power of hegemonic bureaucracy, enforcement agencies, and “modern high cultures” encompassing Jayapura (Gellner 1983: 89). In this nexus, four particularly crucial elements forcefully impact Dani identity: power, education, culture, and capitalist social relations.
Power

**ABRI/TNI as enforcer and guide of the New Society**

West Papua is a territory occupied by the military. The massive numbers of Indonesian armed forces gives the impression that West Papua is perhaps the most densely militarized region in the entire country. This fact cannot be overstated. The legally sanctioned military regime of Suharto’s New Order served to unify the disparate peoples of the vast archipelago. No where else, except perhaps for Aceh, is there a comparable degree of occupation of military force to that in West Papua. ABRI reign with near absolute power and are responsible for countless extra-judicial killings, intimidation, and torture of Papuans (see, e.g. Sharp 1977; Tapol 1983; Amnesty International 2000).

Given the fact that they are deeply enmeshed in civilian life (dwifungsi), the military continues to be the most robust physical image of Indonesian national unity in West Papua (see Drake 1989; Schwarz 1994; King 2004: 95–112). Furthermore, the militarization of bureaucracy, placing officers in key bureaucratic positions, served to strengthen the bureaucratic machinery (see Emmerson 1978: 100–105). Thus, ABRI’s ubiquitous presence embodies the imagined community’s political stability and economic development, cardinal virtues of the New Order. From the most powerful generals down through the lesser ranks of administrative officials, the Indonesian Armed Forces have, since the earliest days of the New Order period, enjoyed a lucrative symbiotic relationship with many of Indonesia’s most profitable business enterprises (see Schwarz 1994: 33–34, 283), notwithstanding their collusion with several of the wealthiest Chinese cukongs.

During the New Order, the widely acknowledged government use of military-paid spies (mata-mata), often whom are petty traders, copy shop operators, and food stall (warung) owners, provides an unsettling background of surveillance over nearly every level of daily life throughout Jayapura. The employment of spies contributes to the erosion of any potential confidence the Dani may have in the legitmacy of the government as well as eradicates the notion of real human freedom.

Employing Foucauldian state instruments, the ABRI’s regime of observation, surveillance, and social control impacts deeply the quotidian routine of Dani life in Jayapura through its imposition and maintenance of clearly delineated parameters of membership within the modern nation. As such, the ABRI serves as one of the most important vehicles for Indonesian nation-making. Young Dani city-dwellers raised by highlands parents who lived in a period marked by torture and killing at the hands of the Indonesian armed forces, distrust Indonesian officials. The Dani suspicions have contributed to the development of a young Dani generation that is emotional, aggressive, and, in some ways, uncritical. The Highland Dani children, raised in that context, carry stories of trauma and brutality along to the urban centers, where most stories of torture and intimidation are shrouded in a cloak of silence, buried in their “sejarah sunyi” (silent history) and “memoria passionis” (Hernawan and van den Broek 1999; van den Broek et al. 2001).
Renaming localities in accordance with the imagined (national) community and making Jakarta the cultural, historical, linguistic, and political epicenter of the Republic absolutizes the vision of the New Society by valorizing the center and disfavoring the peripheries. As social spaces are named, they are signified in accordance with national culture (LiPuma 1997: 58). From the early sixteenth century, when Portuguese explorers saw the Papuans, the island was referred to as Island of the Papuans. Later, under Dutch colonization, the island was called Netherlands New Guinea. In 1962, Indonesia took control and renamed it Irian Barat (West Irian), then changed it again to Irian Jaya (Irja) (“Victorious Irian”) in 1973.

On January 1, 2000, President Aburrahman Wahid agreed to change the name of the province from “Irian Jaya” to “Papua,” based on his view that the word Irian was a distortion of the Arabic word meaning naked (Irja Renamed Papua 2000). However, Papuan intellectuals argue that it originated as a pro-Indonesian term, introduced by a pro-Indonesian group before the incorporation of Irian Jaya (West Papua) into Indonesia. Whatever the official history of the term “Irian,” within its politicized context, it is interpreted by the Dani as an acronym for Ikut Republik Indonesia Anti Nederland (Follow the Republic of Indonesia against the Netherlands), reflecting pro-Indonesian sentiments.

Like the European practice of naming places in colonized areas as “new” versions of the “old” (Hirsch 1997: 185; see B. Anderson 1998), the renaming of colonized localities fosters “the capacity for the ‘residents’ (creoles) of these colonized lands to ‘imagine themselves as communities parallel and comparable to’” the imagined national community of Indonesia (Anderson quoted in Hirsch 1997: 186). When questioned about the meaning of “Irian,” no Dani has replied to me that it derives from the Biak term “Iria” (“hot place”), but rather argued the term signifies a nationalist call to follow Indonesian’s opposition to Dutch political sovereignty. The term for the provincial capital, Jayapura, also has changed significantly through its history, in an attempt to provide spatial simultaneity with greater Indonesia. When occupied by the Dutch the present day city of Jayapura was called Hollandia. Then, in 1963, Indonesia renamed Hollandia Sukarnopura (Sukarno’s Town), then Kota Baru (New City), and then finally Jayapura (Victorious Town). During the 1980s, a movement to Indonesianize local business names resulted in several name changes of local businesses, exchanging non-Indonesian names for Indonesian ones. Since 1998, during the period of Reformasi, there have been discussions among Papuans to change the name of Jayapura to Port Numbay: Port Numbay, they suggest, is the earliest local word for the area. Names, therefore, become access points to a new way of perceiving one’s surroundings and defining membership in the shared community.

What is important for the Dani was not whether place names are cognates of Biak or Arabic, but rather their meaning and symbolic hold on the people to whom they are applied. Place names became part of the historical myths and concrete reality of day-to-day living. As such, place names were not neutral facts but rather contributed to the composition of the historicized identity of the larger group,
which became increasingly non-Papuan. The national myth was adopted and concretized by supplanting non-local city names, statues, and other public markers with those emanating from the cultural and bureaucratic fountainhead, Jakarta.

In this sense, the non-literal meaning is key, providing a springboard for Dani identity construction: “whose city am I entering, have I not entered an Asian cultural milieu rather than a Papuan (Melanesian) ethnic and religious context; I was a member of the tribe, yet now I am a stranger in a strange world; who does this nation represent?” Thus, national symbols, in the form of civic names “have come to the fore in public life and provide a language for issues of citizenship, ethnicity, shared histories, and morality” (Metcalf 1997: 309). Because of the moral dimension to the dynamic of self-identification, superimposed names that honor Indonesian national heroes, myths, and histories fail to resonate with Dani lifeways. As such, the attempts at creating spatial simultaneity are considered illegitimate by the Dani and therefore become targets of vigorously contested definitions of West Papua and the Indonesian nation (cf. Hefner 1993a: 25; see Chapter 5).

Education

Promoting Indonesian lifeways

The Indonesian national narrative, advanced especially through its educational apparatus, attempts to convey a common frame of reference for the young Dani generation by inculcating a shared translocal identity (see Kipp 1996: 107; Jourdan 1997: 127). What is particularly striking among the young, urban Dani is that most have forgotten or in fact never learned some of the important traditional Dani myths. For instance, the majority of city-dwelling Dani less than twenty-five years old have little knowledge of the story of nabelan kabelan, which once served as a primary catalyst for the expansion of mission Christianity in the hinterland.

Education is a state strategy that gives rise to an objectification of culture and reconfiguration of the human actor. Now, in the metropolitan center of Jayapura, dignity, security, and employability hinge on education, through which human actors acquire the skills and sensibilities which make them acceptable to their fellows, which fit them to assume places in society, and which make them “what they are,” by being handed over by their kin groups (normally nowadays, of course, their nuclear family) to an educational machine which alone is capable of providing the wide range of training required for the generic cultural base.

(Gellner 1983: 37)

Indonesia’s national educational system was introduced in 1945, following the country’s independence from Japan and Holland, and has since served as a vehicle for expanding national consciousness and socializing newcomers to the national ideals (Drake 1989: 71). “The Department of Education and Culture is
the state’s main instrument for preserving, inventing, and transmitting both national and local cultures” (Kipp 1996: 107).

The national ideology of Pancasila is officially promoted through education (Steenbrink 1989: 2; Kipp 1996: 107). According to Karl Heider, “[e]very day that a Dani child spends in school is a day away from Dani life. The years of youth, which once a Dani spent learning to be Dani, are now spent in school, learning to be Indonesian” (1979: 61).

Despite the apotheosis of the imagined community through schooling, the overwhelming reason why young Dani move from their highland homes to Jayapura is to seek higher education. While many highland towns have state or religious elementary schools, obtaining a junior high and high school education requires for many, moving from the hinterland to the metropolitan center. Upon graduation from either junior high or high school in the highlands, Dani move to Jayapura to continue their education.

Younger Dani generations have discovered that education was the means through which their aspirations could be realized. Having a child enrolled in college-level education in Jayapura is a mark of prestige for highland families, yet it exacts a heavy cost in terms of financial burden, culture loss, and healthcare struggles. Highland families make great financial sacrifices to pay for their children’s school and living costs, deriving their incomes mainly from crop yields sold at local highland markets. Through the hard work of their parents, their own work in Jayapura, and limited sponsorship from, perhaps, a religious foundation or mission, young Dani have the opportunity to study in the urban environment of Jayapura. Unlike many urban-to-rural cash flows that characterize modern conditions, the flow of money predominantly goes from hinterland to city in West Papua. A college-educated Dani shared with me his story, which is typical of urban Dani youth.

I had to work for a family...as a gardener. They would give me food and maybe Rp 5,000 or Rp 10,000. I would return home and use that money for food and school. But, my parents would send me money only twice a year, only when they killed a pig. They would sell the pig and get about Rp 100,000–300,000 and they would send me money. With that my parents thought they had paid entirely for my studies [but it was not so]. But, we [Dani] must work as gardeners, washing dishes, any kind of job, so that we could study. In general, the students from Wamena [Jayawijaya] study that way. If there are parents who work as state employees or teachers, they can send their children money monthly. But, with us, the parents have no work in the village so we must work as gardeners or house help or in construction [retrieving rocks from the river]. If I didn’t work that way I probably could not finish my studies.

Urban Dani parents are concerned about their children becoming sick with malaria, and exhibiting increased rebellion due to what they call “the bad influences of the city.” Since 1978, the government has tried to present alternatives, most notably in the form of education and scholarships, that seek to encourage
the Dani to move to the northern coastal regency of Jayapura. Some Dani are convinced that the government refuses to establish college-level education in the interior highlands because they are less able to control those areas, thus expediting the Indonesianization of Dani identity.

The main thrust in socializing the vision has become less forceful, since efforts after 1977 have focused on getting Dani youth educated into the Indonesian educational system. Particularly since the highland war of 1977, Dani believe that education is the key to future success. To enter the modern higher educational arena in Jayapura, young Dani leave their parents and siblings in the highlands and enter an *asrama* (dormitory). Asramas are divided by region so that students from the same village live together and are often sponsored by either a Christian or Muslim educational foundation (see Chapter 4). For instance, among the asramas run by the KINGMI (GKII), there is a Dani asrama, Damal asrama, and a Me asrama. Students come alone from the highlands, and enter the asrama, making new friends, or renewing old acquaintances. Many urban Dani students find they cannot compete successfully against classmates from Java, Sulawesi, Sumatra, and other islands that have had a comparably long history of education.

**Bahasa Indonesia**

Education and mass-literacy programs were promoted to propagate the national language, Bahasa Indonesia, in order to unify the nation’s disparate ethnic and linguistic groups. Essential to the Indonesian national project was the ubiquitous use of Bahasa Indonesia, the lingua franca of the entire archipelago. William Liddle notes that Indonesian was “perhaps the most important single ingredient in the shaping of the modern culture” (quoted in Kipp 1996: 106). It is important to note that Bahasa Indonesia was employed during the nationalist struggle as “the pure spirit of resistance to the domineering monopoly of Dutch as the bridge to ‘modernity’” (Anderson 1990: 138).

The close tie between language and nation building makes the learning of Indonesian a requirement for participation in the New Society. Urban Dani youth in Jayapura use Indonesian more frequently than their indigenous language, contrasting sharply to the spirited missionary drive to record highland Dani languages, thus raising questions about the future status of indigenous Dani languages and Dani linguistic work that formed the backbone of much of the Christian missionary enterprise (see Chapter 4). Urban Dani are forthright about the prestige gained from having mastered Bahasa Indonesia. In fact many of the older Dani migrants to Jayapura are unable to speak Indonesian fluently, leaving them further marginalized in their new environment.

**History and the curriculum**

The Indonesian national school curriculum is designed and printed in Jakarta by persons never having been to West Papua or, for that matter, to eastern Indonesia.
Standardization has been a key component in nation-making, leaving little room for diversity. The predominant historical perspective taught in the national school system is Java-centered, with much attention paid to the history of Javanese kingdoms. Little attention is paid to the history of the people of Sumatra, East Kalimantan, South Sulawesi, and, most egregiously, West Papua. In the words of one informant,

We are drawn to Java. We have no time to think about what has happened to our own past. No energy to dig into our own history. There’s no diversity because all books, curricula are Java-centered. All this finance is used to produce books on history and culture, which are all Java-based... that is why if you work for the government here and you don’t know Javanese history, they will say you are stupid [bodoh].

The conspicuous absence of West Papuan history, culture, and languages in school curricula exacerbates the marginalization of West Papuans and can lead to increased feelings of shame – the erasure of history communicates poignantly that only certain groups are deemed worthy to be considered a part of the national story.

Providing culture to the cultureless

Transmigration: socially engineering the New Society

Intentional efforts at social engineering, particularly through its transmigration scheme, have been a significant feature of the New Order’s attempt to reshape social geography. Government documents legitimate official transmigration as part of the government’s promise to create the New Society and, invigorated by new values and traditions, “the new man” and “the new woman.” Particularly illuminating is a document called “Transmigration in the National Development of Indonesia,” written by Martono, the minister of transmigration. In the words of Martono (1985: 10), the goal of the transmigration program is to create a “new society.” “The consequence of such development is the creation of new values reflected in the behaviour of the new people, the new man” (1985: 12). The promise is that the “‘new man of development’ will be born in the regions” (1985: 12).

Transmigration mixes various systems of tradition and habit, systems of authority and cooperation, systems of conduct and human freedom. Transmigration accelerates changes in grouping and stratification [sic: stratification] of people and creates new social relationship [sic] and interaction. Resettlement of population in transmigration means creating new TOGETHERNESS patterns that in turn will create NEW PEOPLE to create [sic] NEW SOCIETY.

(1985: 10, capitalization in original)
Transmigration relocates people, typically landless Javanese peasants, most of whom are Muslim, from densely populated islands (predominantly Java and Sulawesi), to less crowded islands (e.g. West Papua, Kalimantan) in an effort to create the just and prosperous New Society implemented through Indonesian developmentalism and *visi keIndonesiaan*. In addition, it is argued that the transmigration program serves to “speed up the realization of the Trilogy of Development, namely equal distribution of development and its achievements toward the creation of social justice for the entire people, a sufficiently [sic] rate of economic growth, and to establish a sound and dynamic national stability” (Martono 1985: 2). The Indonesian Minister of Transmigration explicitly links transmigration to the national ideology. “Every activity pursued by an Indonesian whether he (she) is in the country or abroad cannot deviate from the nation’s philosophy of life: PANCASILA” (Martono 1985: 4). The government only allows Muslims to transmigrate to West Papua, thus forcing Christian *pendatang* (outsiders) to falsify their identity cards, in order to participate in the transmigration program.

Regional recipient targets include areas inhabited by those “who have had [sic] long settled in a particular area” and “have become lethargic to change” (Martono 1985: 12). In a revealing statement that economizes culture, Martono juxtaposes the waste of old traditions (i.e. traditional culture) to Indonesia’s national development. “There are several communities in the regions which consciously or not are placing themselves in ‘splendid isolation’ in facing National Development. Strict isolation manifests itself in the forms of wasteful adat [customs], tradition, and habit detrimental to development” (Martono 1985: 12).

A promotional booklet produced by the Department of Transmigration states that the government’s intention for the program is to develop the “outer islands,” raise living standards, create new jobs, slow the rate of population growth, reduce environmental degradation, and, most importantly, “become a force in bringing the nation together” (Department of Transmigration 1993). A photo presumably of well-adjusted transmigrants shows five neatly dressed girls standing shoulder to shoulder, carrying bookbags on their sides, and wearing national school uniforms and Muslim headcoverings (*jilbab*). The photo suggests the existence of social, cultural, and religious parity between “outer islands” and “inner islands” (e.g. Java), easing the perception of the unfamiliar in the minds of prospective transmigrants. According to the brochure, transmigration benefits those who “search for a new life” and promises hope and a bountiful future. The last words of the brochure state why they prefer their new life: “Their reasons are clear. They own a house and land. They have food for their families. Schools for their children. And medical care for the community. Most of all, they have hope. For themselves. For their children. And for Indonesia, a nation full of promise for the future.”

A third official publication, called “Transmigration: To Build a Better Future,” restates the rationale behind the development-driven nature of transmigration.

Transmigration is a cross-sectoral program that must be continued to evenly disperse the Indonesian population throughout the country. Since the objective of [sic] transmigration program is not only population dispersion, but also supply of manpower from the densely populated to the sparcely-populated
[sic] areas, transmigration has provided great contribution to the efficiency of Indonesia’s national development.

(Zakaria 1997: 5)

Both official (government-sponsored) and unofficial (spontaneous) transmigration is encouraged by the government. Jayapura is the Wild West of Indonesia; everybody has come to stake his or her claim, with the effect of “severely limiting opportunities for employment of Irianese in private sector activities” (Manning and Rumbiak 1989: 27). In addition, according to official documents, transmigration also strengthens state defense by employing the “Javanisation of borders as a defense tactic” (Peter Hastings quoted in Budiardjo 1988: 52).

The government statistics office, located in Jayapura, notes that the majority of transmigrants to Jayapura come from East Java (Jawa Timur), Central Java (Jawa Tengah), West Java (Jawa Barat), East Lesser Sundas (Nusa Tenggara Timur), and Western Lesser Sundas (Nusa Nenggara Barat). Official statistics from Indonesia are notoriously inconsistent and inaccurate (see Appendix A). In the popular opinion of urban Papuans, there are about 50 percent Muslims and 50 percent Christian throughout West Papua. David Neilson, using statistical data from a 1999 thesis written by a student at STT–GKI notes the following numbers of transmigrants living in the Kecamatan of Arso, Kabupaten Jayapura, a large transmigration area: 3,213 Muslims, 2,487 Protestants, and 2,110 Catholics.

Highland West Papua is off limits to the transmigration scheme. According to Zakaria, “much of the highlands has [sic] been damaged by stone axes and fire of the Dani tribal people.” (1997: 35) This prejudicial statement is incorrect – it portrays Dani as savage stone-age people. Highland West Papua continues to be rich in nutrient soil. Highland Dani adamantly reject the idea of building transmigration camps in the highlands. However, there is no causal relationship between Zakaria’s statement and the fact that the highlands are off limits. Volunteers for transmigration are transported to newly built settlements, complete with schools, medical clinics, and religious houses for worship.

Newly arrived transmigrants are allotted a welcome package that includes a house and land – the first two and a half acres of the 12.5 acres plot allotted to each family, and movables consisting of clothing, household utensils, farming implements, fertilizer, seed, and sufficient food for their use until their first crop is harvested (Zakaria 1997: 36). They are encouraged to develop horticulture plants, such as coffee, cocoa, rubber, coconut, and fruit, along with establishing sawah (wet rice field) production. After five years, the settlers receive the deeds to their land. According to promotional literature, “What once had seemed like an impossible dream is now a real life for these pioneers [transmigrants], a new life full of opportunities and new dreams” (Department of Transmigration 1993). Beyond these idyllic claims stands the devastating reality that the transmigration scheme severely disrupts Papuan culture, indigenous land rights, social structure, and economic conditions.7

“The land allotted to Javanese peasants by the Indonesian government, and with overt military protection, is land that has been taken from the Papuans” (Budiardjo 1988: 58). Little or no compensation is made for the loss of land.
According to the Minister of Transmigration, “the surrender of land for the needs of transmigration is not accompanied by compensation (ganti rugi) but only by granting recognition, namely a certificate of recognition of right. . . . Recognition can take various forms, even the form of something with no economic value such as the holding of a traditional ceremony, the presentation of agricultural implements, a church or a mosque or other social facilities” (Wing 1995). Transmigration camps, later to be transformed into kecamatan with a mosque and church, have become targeted areas for evangelism by local Papuan theological students (Tabuni 1997; Kilungga 1998; Neilson 1999: 220).

In 1984 alone, some 700,000 hectares of customarily held land had been appropriated. In addition, internal displacement, amounting to approximately 17 percent of all migration in the province, involved West Papuans in renouncing shifting horticulture and leaving their land to work at transmigration sites on government and commercial farms. Papuan dislocation is reported to have caused much hardship, with the result that many have tried, with difficulty, to return to their own land and former life styles (Manning and Rumbiak 1989).

West Papua has the poorest health standards of all twenty-six Indonesian provinces, including the highest infant and maternal mortality rates. Of all the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries, Indonesia has the lowest quality of life, with the statistics for West Papua indicating the lowest by far in the country. This index includes longevity, measured by life expectancy, knowledge, measured by years of schooling, and standard of living, measured by purchasing power. “Of Irian Jaya’s 2.2 million population, 1.3 million are indigenous. Critics accuse Jakarta of trying to outnumber natives by sending vast quantities of Javanese transmigrants to the region. Dicky Asmuruf, Director of West Papua Social Affairs Department, says about 477,000 natives have never experienced the results of the government’s development programs in the province” (West Papua’s Poor 2000).

Sounding an ominous note, Dicky Asmuruf warns that, given the high mortality rate and malnutrition, “unless the central government in Jakarta [does] something to reverse the situation, Irians would see its indigenous population shrink every year” (Irianese’s Life Expectancy 2000). “It is projected that by the year 2010 the population of West Papua will have grown to a range between 2.6 and 3.9 million. This will largely be due to transmigration, both government-funded and ‘spontaneous,’ and subsequent industrialisation resulting from Jakarta’s ‘Eastward Development Policy’ of 1990. Non-Papuan born already consist of over 70 percent of the province’s urban population. In the current five-year plan the province will receive 52,000 transmigrant families.” A major consequence of Indonesia’s social engineering policies is the large-scale displacement of the indigenous population from their traditional lands (Wing 1995).

**Dani experience and response**

The overwhelming majority of Dani feel strongly that the transmigration scheme aims at their demise and the forceful acquisition of their land. In the words of a nineteen-year old urban Dani, “I don’t like the transmigration program because
I think God made this land of Irian not for transmigrants, because God already gave the transmigrants land where they originally came from. This land was given by God to the Irian people and it is their inheritance...Irianese cannot be colonized for their land.” And an elderly city-dwelling Dani argued,

I do not agree with outsiders (orang pendatang), especially the Javanese. The problem with transmigration is clear; its aims are to kill and eliminate Papuans or Irian people...[Papuan] hopes have been destroyed through Javanization, Islamization, and modernization through assimilation through marriage so that it kills the black skin race (ras kulit hitam) here. Transmigration is a stumbling block (batu sandungan) for Papuans. The transmigrants are brought in to monopolize work and food.

Other Dani interpret the influx of newcomers as “a veil for the government’s mission of Islamisasi (Islamization).” While most Dani disagree with the transmigration scheme, some say they are pleased with the presence of transmigrants. “For me, transmigration is good, because Irian people are lazy with work. Transmigrants are disciplined (rajin) and work hard (kuat kerja).” A twenty-nine year old says, “I have many friends from outside [West Papua] because we live in the same area, where there are lots of people from outside of Irian. Transmigration is good for helping Irianese.”

The Dani and other Papuans contend that the combination of high mortality rates among Papuans coupled with the continuation of the official and unofficial (spontaneous) transmigration program will eventually lead to a depopulation of Papuan inhabitants and a repopulation by non-Papuan Indonesians from Java, Sumatra, Sulawesi, and other high-density islands. Some suggest that it is the government’s plan to place Papuans on reservations. While Papuan perceptions may be overstated, these sentiments reverberate among the overwhelming majority of Papuans.

Economic disparity arose as a result of the influx of non-native transmigrants. In the words of a successful urban Dani,

They [transmigrants] have a lot of wealth. In Irian Jaya, with wealthy land and the original people being just above 1 million people, but with the coming of outsiders the population has grown to 2.5 million people. This is a problem. If the original people were alone here and they could manage their wealthy land, then Irianese would be very prosperous too. But, if people from outside come and take out our riches and bring it back to their islands, or buy Irian land, then Irianese will be poor in their own land. Irian cannot be erased. People from outside come in and become officials and state employees. They don’t build their wealth here. They just entered and were given important positions. They make their money here but they don’t deposit it here in the local banks but rather in the banks in their home islands. They earn their money here in Irian and build a nice big house in their home island; for instance, in Manado. But, for the Irian people they share with their families
and build their houses here in Irian. I have seen some Chinese people who have already lived in Irian Jaya for a long time. They build their nice houses in Irian. I see that and I think it’s good. They’ve been here since the 1950s. But, people from Java, Ujung Padang, Manado, they take their money from here and deposit into banks in their home towns. They build their houses on their home islands. And when they retire from Irian Jaya they return to their home island and they have everything already for them. They also send their children to their home islands to study and build houses for the family. The money that pays the salaries of the government employees is from Jakarta. And after the employees receive that money they send it back to their families in Jakarta or other islands. The money goes from Jakarta to Irian Jaya to Jakarta and elsewhere.

The transmigration scheme, far from implementing cultural mixing and shared technological knowledge, has resulted in greater economic disparity between natives and newcomers (pendatang). Not surprisingly, transmigrants themselves complain of the difficulties of their adjustment, and the conditions they find less than ideal.9

New economic realities

Currency and valuations

The cities of West Papua have experienced immense economic transformations following its incorporation into the Indonesian economy, with the goal of integrating the province into the wider Indonesian economy, spreading its national ideology and language, and extending its administration within the province (Garnaut and Manning 1974: 54). Two significant changes directly impact Dani identity. First, the currency and valuation fluctuations forced the Dani to participate in a foreign economic system. Currency objectifies “the nation,” and also symbolizes the nation-state as an entity in a system of entities, thus affirming that those who use a common currency are a bounded community of consumers (Foster 1997c: 160).

According to most economic indexes, the economic realities in West Papua fared significantly worse following its annexation by Indonesia (Garnaut and Manning 1974; Manning and Rumbiak 1989). “Before 1962, wage rates were very much higher in Irian Jaya than in Indonesia, interest rates were much lower and the relative price of goods and services very different. From 1962 to 1968 the Indonesian economy suffered extreme rates of inflation and chronic foreign exchange scarcity” (Garnaut and Manning 1974: 32). With Indonesia’s appropriation of West Papua came a massive immediate economic readjustment. Within a relatively brief period, Dani currency changed from the predominant use of cowrie shells (traditional currency), to Dutch guilder mixed with cowrie shells (late 1950s), to Irian Barat Rupiah (IBRp, West Irian Rupiah) (1963), and finally to Indonesian rupiah (February 1971). Use of new forms of money at each stage demonstrated a deepening participation in the New Society.
A Dani informant recalls the currency changes:

When Indonesia came here the local people were already friends with missionaries. Then, we heard that Indonesia was coming. We heard this from the missionaries, because Indonesia was looking for a way to enter Wamena. That’s what we heard around 1962. This was the same year in which we opened the Bible school [high school]. They [Indonesia] entered in 1963. When the Indonesians came we used the West Irian money together with dollars. We used cowrie shells as money because when missionaries came, they used cowrie shells as payment, but we didn’t use the cowrie shells for buying things in stores. We used them as money to pay for things around the community, like for brideprice or fines. We continued to use West Irian money in 1972. We used West Irian money from 1962, when the Indonesians brought it in, until 1972. And we continued by using rupiahs, since 1972. So, our money was just lost. People thought, “What do they [Indonesia] want to do with us? Our things are lost.” People were waiting to see what Indonesia would do for them.

Missionaries in the highlands report using Dutch guilders in 1960, and some suggested that they should actively promote a guilder economy. For instance, missionaries argued that “we lay the foundation for a guilder economy even before the government arrives” through the establishment of a market economy (Larson 1960b: 3; see Sunda and Sunda 1969: 2). Even in the early 1960s, though, cowrie shells continued to be the predominant form of money exchange used by the missionaries. In the early 1960s, each cowrie shell was worth from one to three days labor “in terms of the local economy” among the Ilaga Dani (Larson and Larson 1962a: 1). Throughout the highlands, the cowrie shell economy was banned upon Indonesian arrival, as a sign of new authority.

By 1965, “the inflation in Indonesia had brought about a wide disparity in purchasing power, at official exchange rates, of the Indonesian and West Irian rupiah. Prices of many imported good in Jakarta were ten to twenty times their official prices in Jayapura. This price disparity promoted high levels of exports; of movable commodities, including capital equipment and machine parts, from Irian Jaya to other province of Indonesia” (Garnaut and Manning 1974: 33). Following the implementation of measures to forestall declines in living standards in West Papua, including the emergency air dropping of food supplies, a modicum of economic stability ensued.

Despite the high level of subsidies directed toward West Papua, concomitant development projects, village welfare and development of Papuan human resources has received low priority (see Manning and Rumbiak 1989: 3). Much of the subsidized assistance is used for enhancement of prestige, such as large government buildings that further concretize the image of the New Society. Moreover, within the metropolitan center of Jayapura, pigs no longer carry the social prestige they once did in the highlands. Whereas in their traditional environment, pigs foraged for their own food in open areas, their urban context
requires the construction pens and the extra cost of providing food for them, and therefore more intensive care and expense.

Today, pigs constitute a commodity value, being sold strictly for the money they can bring in at the open market. Pigs can possess high valuation: in 1998, a large pig could sell for between Rp700,000 and Rp1,000,000 (exchange rate being approximately US$1.00 = Rp9,500). Pigs continue to figure important in the large yearly church celebrations, when, for instance, at the Christmas feast given in each church several pigs will be slaughtered for food. The traditional ritual practices that involve pigs no longer form an essential part of Dani social or religious life in Jayapura. Pigs fare poorly in the urban context. Lack of space, food, and proper care have left some in a state of starvation. Nevertheless, the church-defined limit of four pigs provided for a bride price still serves as a considerable exchange.

Capitalist social relations

A second economic reality that significantly impacts Dani identity formation is the restructuring of relationships brought about by capitalist economic conditions. Capitalist social relations characterize the newly emergent modern economic arrangements in Jayapura, where the spread of mass-consumption practices emphasizes new socio-cultural linkages (cf. Foster 1997c: 152). In addition, the social relations fostered by a modern capitalist economy directly impact Dani moral economy. No longer do Dani exchange wealth in the traditional manner, characterized by meaningful communication, and founded on trust in a common moral community.

With the growth of urban capitalism, Dani economic life is ensnared by an economic condition in which short-term economic gains outweigh long-term social commitments. And modern social relations help to define new associations and communities, giving rise to an “anonymous mobile mass society” (Gellner 1983: 104).10 Personalized experience has given way to commodified, abstracted negotiation of Dani personal and corporate identity. Without overemphasizing the point, it is important to mention the relationship between consumption practices and identity: “[c]onsumption, then, is not the economist’s inscrutable act of shapeless desire. On the contrary, consumption is implicated in identity and is socially communicative as well as technical and material…Through such processes, consumption marks out social differences in an expressive and public way and helps to recreate the very values to which its actions give visible form” (Hefner 1998c: 25).

Compared to their traditional world, where each member of the clan was dependent upon the other, now, in the city, each member of the clan is independent. She is responsible for meeting her own obligations. Disconnected from their traditional moral framework, urban Dani are compelled to function as consumption-driven actors. Moreover, beyond the mere externalities of wearing T-shirts and jeans, drinking Coke, or watching HBO beamed in from a satellite dish, there is also a connection between “market growth” and “religious revival” (Hefner 1998c: 26; see Chapter 5). An important result of capitalist social relations is the
objectification of lives. The creation of (nearly) well-bounded entities finds a sense of commonality in the consumption of national commodities, thus nationalizing the person (Foster 1997c: 155), with the real possibility of serving as a springboard for religious revivalism.

In the words of a 29-year-old Dani, “Dani who live in the city have difficulties with daily expenses for food, drink, and paying for their children’s school costs. In the interior we didn’t experience financial difficulties because we could find our daily necessities [around us]. We don’t have to buy things in the interior.” Or, “in the village we grow up without knowing about salaries.” Along the same lines, another urban Dani claimed that a major difference between the highlands and the provincial capital is that in the city “living is difficult because you have to have money. The majority of stuff in the city has to be purchased with money; so, we are forced to adapt our lives to the culture of another people.”

When compared to highland Dani exchange patterns, economic transactions in Jayapura are ritually shallow. Whereas in highland communities the social uses of wealth contribute to the general equity and reciprocity between Dani patrilineages (Hayward 1983a: 10), in Jayapura economic expediencies and increased commodification of goods brings about a system of competition and comparative economic disadvantage. The vast majority of Dani hold menial labor jobs: airport baggage handlers, night security officers, parking attendants, ojek drivers (motorcycle taxi drivers). An inaccessible economy has led most Dani to feel fragmented and isolated vis-à-vis the dominant culture. A Dani man provides a vivid example of how his economic life has changed since moving to the city: “in Wamena [highlands] I could eat breakfast, but here I can’t.”

A few Dani, however, have successfully reached higher social and economic statuses in Jayapura through a combination of obtaining higher education and working their way through Indonesian bureaucratic channels. Their stories reflect unique yet increasingly prevalent attitudes and perspectives among urban Dani. Among them is a Dani man named Wenda. Wenda is a Dani who works for Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (DPR, Indonesian Legislative Assembly), is a member of Golongan Karya (GOLKAR) as well as being a member of the GKII (KINGMI) church. Born in the village of Pugima, near Wamena, in 1962, Wenda attended KINGMI schools, moving to Tiom for junior high school, and finishing in 1977. Upon graduation from junior high school Wenda entered Sekolah Pendidikan Guru (SPG), Teachers Training School in Abepura (kabupaten, Jayapura) in 1978. In 1980, he entered Universitas Cenderawasih Abepura Jayapura (UnCen), graduating in 1987. Following a brief period working at the office of the governor, Wenda joined the Organisasi Sosial Kemasyarakatan (Social Work Organization), with the hope of becoming “an important person like the missionaries I saw in my village. They had everything.” He had intended to study theology in Ujung Pandang at the Jeffrey Theological School (KINGMI), the only option if he were to continue his theological studies within the KINGMI educational system.

However, due to his encounter with a Javanese teacher in SPG, who taught him “how to learn about people (masyarakat), society, and political organization,” thus
sparking to his interest in politics, Wenda enrolled at UnCen with the intention of becoming a politician. During his education at UnCen, Wenda took a two-week political-education course offered by the government, along with 42 other students from nearby colleges. Upon the completion of the course, he joined the GOLKAR campaign during the 1987 general election in Jayapura and Wamena. Following the election, he returned to UnCen to complete his thesis (skripsi). Later he returned to Wamena to work at the office of the bupati (regency government officer) for eight months, supporting Lembaga Ilmu Pengatahuan Indonesia (LIPI, The Indonesian Academy of Sciences) research of traditional culture in Wamena. At that time, he recalls, LIPI was conducting research on the roots of Dani tribal war practices. This enabled him to travel throughout numerous villages with LIPI personnel. Without notice, the bupati recommended Wenda for employment at parliament (DPR) in Jayapura, where he worked for two periods (ten years total), until February 1999.

Wenda’s experience is unique, for he is among the first generation of Dani who entered non-religious college-level education. Of the opinion of fellow villagers, Wenda mentions that they “did not understand” why he chose to attend a state university rather than a Christian college. Yet his local church and villagers remained supportive of his pursuits. Wenda believes he is the second person from Wamena (i.e. Jayawijaya) to have graduated from UnCen. He notes that the highest number of Dani from Jayawijaya to enter schools in Jayapura were between 1980 and 1985. In addition, from 1984 there was an increase in highland Dani matriculation to universities in Manado (e.g. SamRatulangi), Surabaya, and Jakarta, where many have found local marriage partners.

Structural changes of the New Society

Kampung vs. Desa: the twilight of traditional authority

Conflict resolution became increasingly dominated by a centralized authority in West Papua. Police, military, and all levels of civil bureaucracy (e.g. Ketua rukun tetangga (RT, Head of sub-neighborhood), Ketua rukun warga (RW, Head of neighborhood), camat, bupati served to channel traditional organization structure into more complex, highly bureaucratized, modern conditions of greater centralized authority and control of the means of violence. In an urban center it was impractical and impossible for a Dani tribal big-man (kapala suku) to dictate a resolution because his position lay outside the enveloping authority structure – he did not have the endorsement of the centralized government, or a least not to the same extent as his civil counterpart. This dynamic led to a bifurcated authority system (see Appendix B). The traditional Dani authority system could inevitably get subsumed in the larger, more powerful system simply because traditional Dani rulers could not be efficacious in the modern social world since their authority and legitimacy were not mutually recognized by conflicting parties.

During the New Order period, two authority structures lay side by side: traditional (kampung system) and modern (desa system). While each vied for allegiance, the modern Indonesian authority structure in Jayapura was clearly more
pervasive, powerful, and future-oriented. Indeed, upon the occupation of West Papua, Indonesia transported its characteristically hierarchical desa-system, previously unknown in Melanesia (see Lagerberg 1979: 17), and supplanted the traditional system of the indigenous inhabitants. Dutch contrôleurs were replaced by Indonesian bupati (the point of coordination for a number of departments) (Lagerberg 1979: 152), yet on a much more massive scale, such that its bureaucratic structure would penetrate nearly every village in the province.

The supplanting of Dani local structures with the Indonesian bureaucratic–administrative apparatus sought to create a unified political entity. The traditional organization appeared backward and anachronistic when compared to the standardization, efficiency, and rationality of its modern counterpart. Overlapping each other, the traditional structure showed signs of fatigue and enervation, being overpowered by modern systems of authority geared precisely for modern conditions of the division of labor, bureaucratic efficacy, and professional expertise. When the Indonesian government entered an area in West Papua, they began by placing a non-salaried kapala desa in each village, who served as the initial government presence. In Jayapura, the modern authority was fully operational, with retired military often serving in roles of kepala desa, RW and RT (see Appendix B).

An important part of the New Society was the restructuring of relationships in accordance with the modern bureaucracy. Census taking, social organization, and bureaucratic order were key features of the modern enterprise in Jayapura, as it was throughout the archipelago. Each village, and to a larger extent metropolitan centers such as Jayapura, received a development budget from the government. That money was channeled through the kapala desa, a government official, to develop the village. He undoubtedly used some of that money as his profit for implementing the program. The government chose the kepala desa. While in theory the kapala suku and kapala desa shared the same level of authority, on the ground level it was apparent that the kapala desa possessed greater power. Above the kapala desa was the camat, the lowest salaried government official. The kapala desa also received government money, though unofficially. In West Papua, this level of authority was typically filled by non-Papuans. Many were Javanese.

In the context of judicial decision making, the kapala suku and kapala desa serve as separate authorities, one with authority in tribal issues, the other in government (state) issues, respectively. That is, if a problem was connected to life outside the church (i.e. secular life) then the RW or camat, in the presence of the pastor, would decide the issue, with the pastor providing a theological interpretation. In addition, disputes between church members or related to church matters were typically adjudicated through the ketua klasis (church district superintendent), thus providing a third channel for resolving conflicts. The three systems represented three institutions: tribal, state, and church.

Though Dani youth were feeling more and more triangulated among the three authority channels, several commented to me that for minor disagreements they would rather go to the government authorities than the tribal authorities because the financial fines were typically less when meted out by the civil government representatives. According to one informant, “in the village, a small problem can
grow to become large, so that one can lose one’s wealth [through fines]. At the same time, in the city it’s a little better because all problems are solved through the procedure of law. That makes it easier for me to concentrate on my family.”

However, for serious infractions the penalty could be harsh because of the military presence embedded within the system: “[t]he subdistrict (kecamatan) remains basically a transmitter, receiving directives from the district (kabupaten) and impressing them, in turn, upon the village (desa). The army maintains its own hierarchy down to and including the villages . . . the army in 1974 began to give military training to some of the better educated camats . . . Future graduates of this program would receive officer status in the army reserve” (Emmerson 1978: 103).

Identity cards

Obtaining a Kartu Tanda Penduduk (KTP, residence identification card), a requirement of all Indonesian citizens, involved a lengthy process in which citizens were forced to navigate through modern authority structures. An urban Dani explained the channels he had to negotiate in order to obtain his identity card. He began by visiting his own RT, who provided a written recommendation. From there, he went to the RW to prove that he was from the community represented by the RT. Then, the RW gave the recommendation to the kepala desa, after which the kepala desa provided the applicant yet with another recommendation, which the applicant took to the kecamatan. The KTP was issued only at the kecamatan (subdistrict) level. Then he received his identity card. Even the kepala suku had to get a KTP in this manner, going through the kepala desa and kecamatan system.

Conclusion

The standard-bearing function of both Pancasila and mission Christianity have forced the objectification of culture and religion (see Linnekin: 1990: 150), externalizing culture and religion as symbols, making them something outside the individual to be contemplated and discussed and in service of the national (Pancasila) or spiritual (mission Christianity) vision. Objectification plays a critical role in understanding “nation-state.” Robert Foster (1997c: 154) describes the objectification of the nation as a condition in which “the nation” takes on a thing-like form, external to the individual. Such objective forms – flags, costumes, dances, foods, monuments, languages – are “possessed” in common by the individuals constituting the nation as markers of their shared subjective identity as “owners”. The “externalization of culture” implies that something is to be contemplated, reflexively, and culture itself then is up for grabs, debatable, and no longer taken for granted. The objectification of culture deeply impacts personal identity and human subjectivity.

These new realities ignited a degree of reflexivity unknown to the Dani in their traditional environs. New competing authorities arose in the form of the state, bureaucracy, and education apparatus, which gave way to the demise of traditional Dani authority. The positive side of the government was their promise of
a New Society. As the promise was never realized, the entire vision was seriously questioned. Indonesian ideology sought to convince people that it could be realized. Highlanders came with little education and scant critical views as they entered a new journey in the city. The government’s strategy of control, then, entailed orchestration of military might, bureaucracy, intimidation, and terror, providing a direct channel for the presence of the central government throughout the province. The coupling of the educational language requirement of Bahasa Indonesia with the state principle of Pancasila ensured the exposure of everyone to Indonesian politics and culture.

The city-dwelling Dani responded unfavorably to the New Society. Its assurances failed to meet their expectations for a better world. Through various forms of resistance, the Dani sought to curtail the Indonesian government vision, a world in which they perceived themselves as passive spectators. In the words of an elderly Dani man, “I don’t understand what the government is doing. We are considered stupid [bodoh] or that we can’t compare to those from outside of Irian. We want to compete but it’s made difficult. We have land, but the ones who live freely and who enjoy our land are the outsiders [transmigrants].”

While modern identity implies the widening domains of alternatives, the choices existing in Jayapura were oriented increasingly toward “modern” styles and patterns. Traditional Dani lifeways and styles were seen as primitive, backward, and shameful, thus severely precluding their inclusion into the arena of choice. Here I would note that the transformed image of the body (i.e. from “primitive nakedness” to “modern clothed”) and notions of the nation-state can themselves be refashioned as tools for resistance. Forms of resistance for urban Dani included engaging in political resistance (e.g. OPM), displaying putatively pro-Papuan symbols (e.g. Morning Star), counteracting government policies, and the public display of getting drunk – by being drunk, the Dani could say anything they wanted and by raising the Morning Star flag they could create a symbolic space for their own aspirations.

Yet urban Dani continued to exhibit a strong sense of optimism. Reflecting the confidence of many city-dwelling Dani, an elderly urban Dani said, “I agree with the [Dani] motto from Jayawijaya – ‘yogotak hubuluk motok hanorogo’ (a GVD expression that means, ‘tomorrow will be better than today’). When the wisdom of the government is pregnant with justice, then we Dani will live a better life. Yet, if we free ourselves, I am optimistic that my life will be even better.” The conflict faced by the urban Dani was exacerbated as Christianity itself struggled in the New Order Period.
4 Secularizing society
The struggle of Christianity in West Papua

Of Irian Jaya’s population of almost 1.9 million, between 750,000 and 850,000 were born outside the province and the non-Papuan population continues to rise. In Jayapura, about 80% of the 90,000 inhabitants are non-Papuan. Islam, with an estimated 450,000 adherents in Irian Jaya, recently eclipsed Christianity to become the province’s biggest religion, and more than 90% of civil servants are Muslims.

Roberts 1996

This chapter deals with the privatization of mission Christianity among Dani in Jayapura by focusing mainly on the spatial–structural dimensions of the church in its urban context. The chosen option of religious privatization is related to the spatial separation between Dani community and church, the enervation of Dani pastoral authority in the face of the increasing encompassment of government structures, and the growth of Islam as a countervailing social force to Christianity in West Papua.

Religions are in part integrative forces that create new alliances, associations, and moral orientations. As such, they play the most important role in defining and legitimating competing visions of the world as well as new social groupings. Christianity’s new place in the urban milieu, however, is alongside contending moral authorities, most particularly represented by the Indonesian nation-state and Islam. A proliferation of visions complicates Dani aspirations. Secularization variably ensnares Dani Christians, fragmenting what traditionally was a more unified worldview and reinserting it alongside various secular realms, in which new classificatory systems and competing visions of the world have developed (cf. Casanova 1994: 65–66).

Increasingly in the 1980s, the church and the OPM burgeoned as two separate, distinct channels and institutions (Appendix C). The urban church failed to furnish the integrative function and social benefit that characterized its presence as a total institution in the highlands. As such, Christianity recessed from being the sole normative institution among the Dani.

This chapter focuses on four indicators of the enervation of mission Christianity among the Dani in Jayapura. First, I discuss Islam as a competing vision and highlight its attraction to Dani Christians. Islam and the burgeoning of
institutions animated by Muslim values pose a significant countervailing force to Christianity in West Papua. Second, I highlight three Dani communities reflecting alternative living patterns that reflect general orientations to their new surroundings. In two of these communities the spatial separation from the church represents a splintering of a once fairly coherent stable lifeworld and increasing opportunities for social mobility. Third, it is important to discuss the demise of the “big-man” role of the urban pastor. His delimited authority and status become a potent symbol of the church’s disorbed position. It is worthwhile to mention that evangelical faith mission churches and their national equivalents oppose the ordination of women. The mainline Protestant church, the GKI, however, ordains women on a regular basis. Finally, I discuss how intertribal conflicts within the church threaten to impede efforts at ecumenism. It is important to note that intertribal animosities threaten political unity as well. For instance, division still characterizes the relationship between the two most well-known early Papuan political leaders, Nicholaas Jouwe and Marcus Kaisiepo, even while they have both been exiled in the Netherlands since 1962, where they lead separate Papuan political movements for self-determination. In 1999, Jouwe was 75 years of age, while Kaiseipo was 85. Jouwe explains that he and Kaisiepo were never of the same mind in West Papua, then, Dutch New Guinea and now in the Netherlands because, in Jouwe’s own words, “[Kaiseipo] is a Biaker. He said, ‘everybody has to listen to us’. Biaker’s never accept leadership from the mainland. They always say, ‘we are the leaders’ ” (Jouwe 1999).

The resurgence of Islam

The rise of Islam in West Papua during the New Order era, due more to Muslim peopling through transmigration than outright conversion, within a context dominated previously by Christians, precipitated an ongoing social and identity struggle for Dani Christians. Islam’s ascendancy itself was not without contention. The history of the struggle of Islam in Indonesia was a story of early failed attempts to gain sufficient political mobilization to usher in an Islamic State and the later successful Islamization of the wider society and culture through renewed efforts at socializing Islamic values (see, e.g. Steenbrink 1989; Hefner 1993c; Poerwowidagdo 1994; Madjid 1996).

The ascendancy of Islam in legal and social domains throughout Indonesia complicates a previous proposal aimed to prevent proselytism between religions. In November 1967, the government proposed that the religions should declare they would not take the believers of other universal religions as the object of their missionary activities; Christian missionary activities and Muslim dakwah (da’wa) should only be directed at deepening the faith of adherents of one’s own religion.

By the 1980s, Muslim discourse justifying Islam as a source for ethical guidance centered on the notion that “if this ethical change could be achieved, more just and democratic political system would inevitably follow” (Hefner 1997b: 77), a vision mirrored by the explicit aims of the New Society. This “new
thinking” (pemikiran baru) of Muslim intellectuals sought a “deeper Islamization of society” and “the birth of a civil religion” (Steenbrink 1989: 6; Alagappa 1995e: 307; Hefner 1997b). Rather than a top-to-bottom approach, Muslim leaders sought to influence public discourse at the most widespread level, a bottom-to-top strategy. The frustrated realization that the nation-state would not be guided by political Islam was transformed as the New Order regime increasingly gave Muslim organizations more social and legal concessions, thus permitting Muslim ideals and institutions to infuse the nation circuitously, bypassing a putatively political approach to Islamization.

Religious policies restricted Christian mission activities as well (Steenbrink 1998: 330–331). In August 1978, the Indonesian government set limitations on religious evangelization through the Department of Religion’s Decision No. 70, thereby placing restrictions both on winning converts to the major religions (Islam and Christianity) and on the use of foreign religious funds within Indonesia (Suter 1982: 11). “The decision banned missionizing by the members of any one religion (Christians being the main target) among citizens who already professed, however nominally, another government-recognized religion” (Hefner 1993c: 9). “Since Christian missionaries derive, comparatively speaking, far more material aid from overseas than do Muslims, the imposition of this rule is bound to hinder the former more than the latter” (Suter 1982: 11). The Dani accused the provincial government in Jayapura of directly frustrating their evangelistic efforts, thus increasing their suspicions about the government’s unequivocal endorsement of Islam. In a master’s thesis on the Dani church, Jennifer Beasley recalled an interview she conducted in which the politics of religious conversion in West Papua demonstrated the government’s hand at weakening Christian expansion:

A couple of Danis discussed the situation surrounding KKR – Kebaktian Kebangunan Rohani or Revival Meetings that were staged in 1988 when a large number of evangelists gathered together in “Jayapura at Trikora Park and Mandala Park” and commenced to present and explain the gospel to those who attended the open evangelistic rally. “The government became angry because many followers of Islam and many Catholics became members of the Baptist church…. When attempts were made to organize another KKR with a letter of permission being applied for once again, this time permission was denied by the government. The stance taken by the government has been interpreted by the Dani Christians as evidence that the Indonesian Government is against the presence of the Christian message or its messengers, especially in the cities.

(1994: 101)

According to William Liddle, “[t]he Islamization of Indonesian society and culture has been one of the most remarkable developments of the New Order period” (Liddle 1996a: 622). While in the two decades from the mid-1960s to the mid-1980s President Suharto relied relatively little on Islamic political support,
by the late 1980s “a new policy of support for many specifically Islamic projects…emerged” (Liddle 1996b: 347). Since the late 1980s there was “clear evidence of Islamic revival” (Hefner 1993c: 12). Following numerous political setbacks of Islamic political parties to institute an Islamic state, many Muslim intellectuals firmly committed themselves to “provide an alternative ideal of what the nation should become” through efforts aimed at instilling Islamic values within the society at large (Hefner 1993c: 3). This route proved surprisingly effective.

An important factor in the ascendency of Islamic values within the wider society was the founding of *Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Se-Indonesia* (ICMI, Association of Indonesian Intellectuals) (see Hefner 1993c: 1; Liddle 1996a), which ushered in a “deepening Islamization of the urban middle class” as well as captured “the moral allegiances of the urban middle class” (Hefner 1993c: 2).

ICMI was founded at the end of 1990, and B. J. Habibie, who later became the president of Indonesia, was its first national chairman. While its early leadership was previously hostile to Islamic political movements, ICMI succeeded in serving as a powerful catalyst for establishing widely impacting policy changes and thus has become a potent symbol of Islamic revitalization. William Liddle argues that the formation of ICMI, rather than being an organization reflecting the political interests of the Muslim community to the government, “is a state corporatist organization, dominated by high officials beholden to President Suharto, whose main policy slogan is human resources development and whose chief political enemies are not Christians and other non-Muslims but market-oriented economists” (Liddle 1996a: 625). According to Liddle, then, the formation of the ICMI is closely allied to President Suharto’s command structure, to shore up his “strategic plan to maintain control over the political system through the 1997 parliamentary election and the 1998 convening of the super-parliamentary People’s Consultative Assembly (*Majelis Permusjawaratan Rakyat*), which has the constitutional responsibility of electing the president and vice-president every five years” (Liddle 1996a: 625). Robert Hefner, on the other hand, ties the establishment of ICMI to the Islamization of the nascent middle class and suggests that ICMI reflects the “new thinking” (*pemikiran baru*) that characterized activities of Muslim intellectuals who sanctioned efforts to Islamicize social and educational activities rather than to engage in formal politics (Hefner 1993c: 8).

This cultural approach to Islamic revitalization stimulated Islam’s near complete saturation of its ideals throughout the New Society in West Papua. Yet it is important to keep in mind that in the mid-1980s, even before the founding of ICMI, President Suharto’s New Order made concessions to Islamic organizations. For instance,

the Department of Education and Culture abandoned a decades-long firmly held policy forbidding the wearing of the *jilbab*, or Islamic head covering, by female students in state schools. The Department of Religion presented to Parliament a bill regulating Islamic courts, and also published a codification of Islamic family law. A new marriage regulation made interfaith marriages virtually impossible. The Catholic editor of a popular
television tabloid was found guilty of insulting the Prophet Muhammad and received a long prison sentence. A national sports lottery, opposed by devout Muslims as sanctioning gambling, was discontinued. And old demand for an Islamic bank was finally granted. Not least significant, in 1990 President Suharto (at the relatively advanced age of 69) and his family made the pilgrimage to Mecca.

(Liddle 1996a: 614)

The process of Islamization in West Papua involved a pattern that began with establishing government posts throughout the island, bringing in heavily armed Indonesian military, providing pendatang Muslim teachers, and then making the case for the need for the building of a mosque. According to David Neilson,

Many older people date their disillusionment with Indonesia from the completion of the central mosque in Biak, which convinced them that Sukarno’s promises, that Irian would not be a target of Muslim settlement and evangelism, were valueless. When the mosque was flattened by an earthquake in February 1996, despite extensive destruction of church buildings, it was one of the first worship centres to be restored.

(1999: 236)

Some Papuans complained that Christianity was seen as inferior by Muslim newcomers and suspected that Indonesian officials perceived that Christianity was an ineffective instrument of development. From the viewpoint of a Christian Papuan intellectual,

I get the impression that Muslims feel that Christianity is powerless to raise the social, economic standards of people here in Irian Jaya. That is why Muslims are here, they feel they are needed to give people in Irian Jaya a new religion that will help Papuans come out of economic, social, and religious poverty… There’s a view from Muslims that Christianity is nothing. That is true also for Papuans who are Christian – “they will not make it.” They say, “Christianity has been here 100 years and you are still living in this condition.” These are Muslims and ethnic Malays. They bring the idea of development here. The idea that development is brought by Muslims, ethnic Malays, and political elites who come here to help…. The political elites are from Jakarta, they include bupatis, people who work at parliament. So, in their eyes [Papuans] are under bondage. Religious bondage. Christianity is seen as a bondage, a religion that cannot get the people away from Papuanness. Christianity prevents them from integrating into Indonesian society. So they are here with a sense of mission, to do something. The implication, in their view, is “as long as you are Papuans and hold to your Christian views you will not make it. You’re nothing. You have to accept Islam.”

Indeed, many locals feel that there are explicit religious overtones to the intolerance they experience by Indonesians. For instance, during the beating
and interrogation of local students in December, 2000 for an attack in Abepura, a student cried out, “Jesus,” and a policeman responded, “Your God Jesus is dead” (King 2004: 33).

On a visit to Pyramid Bible School in 1987 the Indonesian Minister of Religion, Munawir Sjadzali, asked the students whether the missionary and church was teaching them other skills such as agriculture, technical skills, chicken husbandry, apart from the Bible, to raise and improve their social and economic condition. The assumption behind this question was that the church has not been able to help the Dani meet their social and economic needs. According to a Papuan observer, “this fact is being used by the Muslims to justify their policy to spread Islam in the region.” It is important to note that despite the perceptions of some Papuans at the time, Sjadzali had a fine reputation on matters of interfaith dialogue.

The social impact of Islam was immense, even in remote highland Dani areas. In the highland village of Karubaga (WD), for instance, there were several Muslim teachers (guru) and government employees (pegawai negeri). While the Gereja Injili di Indonesia (GIDI, Evangelical Church of Indonesia) church prohibited the construction of a mosque, Muslims in Karubaga built a prayer room (musholla) with a speaker system inside. Also, intermarriage between Dani women and pendatang (Muslim) men led to Karubaga Dani women converting to Islam. A Karubaga Dani woman said the following about the presence of Islam in her village:

Many Lani have already married with Muslims. They follow their [Muslim] husbands…there are more than twenty Lani women who have married Muslim men, then have changed their religion. Then, they go with their husbands and pray at the musholla. It’s very difficult. But, some of them, without their husbands knowing, still eat pig in hiding. This happens even though their husbands tell them not to eat pig…. Their Muslim husbands are mixed. Some are Macassan. There are Javanese. The majority of Muslims are from Java and Macassar…. Some Muslim men just make the woman pregnant and then return to their home villages [in Java and Macassar].

This description illustrates a common experience for many Dani in West Papua. Muslim pendatang, whether located in the highlands or Jayapura, occupied positions of authority, and thereby were seen as congruent with the diffusion of Indonesian development schemes and the implementation of the New Society.

The economic crisis in the late 1990s, provided an incentive for directing more dakwah activities toward the Dani and other Papuans. Highland mosques became centers where gifts, food, clothing, and jobs were distributed gratuitously, generously funded by ICMI money and dakwah offerings. The eventual presence of Muslims necessitated the establishment of a mosque and madrasah (state-supported modern Islamic school), repeating a characteristic pattern of Muslim expansion in West Papua. This process repeated itself in both highland and urban areas. In its metropolitan centers, with the massive influx of Muslim transmigrants, the government also justified a concomitant increase in the construction of mosques,
Muslim educational centers, Muslim missionaries, and the further development of Muslim infrastructures (Appendix D). Several public institutions have mushol-las attached for Muslim employees, presenting a vision that Islam and modern institutions are conjoined (Farhadian 2004).

In the interior of West Papua, it was not surprising to find Muslim Javanese petty traders who set up small shops (toko) in large highland Dani villages, which led to increased conflict between pendatang and locals as government-funded mosque construction and Muslim educational centers were built hand-in-hand in order to serve extant government employees. Government-funded mosque and madrasah projects continued to expand in interior regions, surpassing funding resources provided by overseas Christian missions. The government conjoined the transmigration scheme with Islamization of social spaces, protecting these public domains by massive military control and tight surveillance. In addition, the calls from the minaret inserted a Muslim presence throughout its environs. According to some, the funds to purchase speakers for mosques in West Papua were donated by the government of Saudi Arabia (Jouwe 1999).

According to an employee at the regional parliament in Jayapura, every regency (kabupaten) of West Papua had a branch of ICMI through which the government channeled development money. For instance, in Wamena and Jayapura the ICMI organization, which maintained an account at a local bank, received government money for development projects. The regency of Jayawijaya became an important destination of ICMI funds for two reasons:

First, Jayawijaya has the largest population and, second, people in Jayawijaya are unstable, the economy is weak, so they can enter with their economy [funds]. Muslims don’t seek old people, but seek out young people. They enter through this way. They have a strong economic base. So, the missionaries only taught about spiritual things, but to people who have a weak economy Muslims will give money, and the locals will be interested. The Muslims ask to take their children away to study in the pesantren and the Muslims will pay.

In the early 1990s, the national director of the Department of Religion (Jakarta) visited West Papua, where he met with Christian missionaries. As a missionary informant recalled, the director said, ‘‘thanks for your work,’’ as though we were done and Muslims are coming in to take over.” In the meeting, the director noted that the government was spending ten times as much on West Papua for Muslim work than for Christian work, due to “Muslim offerings” that were earmarked for West Papua. Despite its historical precedence, Christianity was quickly on the way to being eclipsed by the growing presence of Islam.

Yet many Dani viewed the Islamization of West Papua as an opportunity for wider Christian evangelism. Transmigration camps became centers for the massive influx of Muslims as well as an attraction for Dani theological students who desired to share the gospel with those without a personal relationship with Jesus Christ (see Beasley 1994: 109–110). Increasingly, Dani college theses (skripsi) reflected strategies for evangelizing and ministering to Muslim
transmigrants (e.g. Yahya Tabuni 1997; Kilungga 1998). Interlocal Christian Dani transmigrants sometimes requested placement in a transmigration camp with the implicit intention of evangelizing newly arrived Muslim transmigrants, many whom were nominally Muslim and so were perhaps more open to religious change. The result was that many Javanese Muslims converted to Christianity.

**Market Muslims of Jayapura**

Muslim missionaries, from Indonesia and the Middle East, worked vigorously to advance Islam in West Papua through contributing Islamic literature, teaching, and other *dakwah* activities. In Jayapura, as well as the Dani highlands, Muslim missionaries, many whom were active through their local businesses, became channels for employment and education. Given this arrangement, Islam was seen as united with economic advancement. It is important to note that Islam in Jayapura reflected the diversity that characterized Islam throughout Indonesia and Southeast Asia (see Hefner 1997a). Among the Islamic organizations active in West Papua were the two largest in Indonesia, the modernist Muhammadiyah and the traditionalist Nahdatul Ulama (see, Peacock 1992; Feillard 1997). Jayapura was beginning to bear the marks of an Asian Islamic port city: mosques, *pesantren*, *madrasah*, and Muslim prayer chapels (*musholla*) abounded, much like in other areas of the archipelago during its resurgence in the New Order era:

Mosques have proliferated in towns and villages; religious schools and devotional programs have expanded; a vast market in Islamic books, magazines, and newspapers have developed; and, very important, a well-educated Muslim middle class has begun to raise questions about characteristically modern concerns, including the role of women, the challenge of pluralism, the merits of market economies, and, most generally, the proper relationship of religion to state.

(Hefner 1997a: 5)

Within the context of Jayapura, the revitalization and advance of Islam contrasted sharply to its less public appearance prior to the 1970s. A government employee, and, on another occasion a Western missionary, noted that the government’s aim was to construct a mosque in every neighborhood (i.e. RW) and transmigration camp. Perhaps the most conspicuous religious change in West Papua was the noticeable increase in the numbers of girls and women who donned Muslim headscarves (*jilbab*). During the early 1980s, few women wore the *jilbab*, but by the late 1990s, because of the liberalization of religious laws pertaining to Muslim clothing and proliferation of *pesantren* and mosques, both headscarves and complete body covering became a significant Muslim identity marker, dividing Papuan from *pendatang*, Christian from Muslim. Local shops carried a wide selection of Muslim clothes, wall hangings with Qur’anic verses, and a selection of *halal* (permitted, kosher) foods. In the late 1990s, the Papuan batik factories and outlets were taken ownership by Muslim *pendatang*.
Most Muslim transmigrants were located either in the numerous government transmigration camps in Jayapura (most notably Kecamatan Arso) or near open markets (pasar) (e.g. at Hamadi, Entrop, Jayapura City, Sentani City) where they occupied the most central, shaded stalls. From the perspective of an urban Dani, a government employee, “the government has to stop the transmigration program because I see that they are the only strong ones in the markets (pasar-pasar) and they dominate.” Throughout the regency of Jayapura, official 1996 statistics recorded the presence of over 54,000 authorized transmigrants. However, including unofficial (spontaneous) transmigrants, the number would be at least twice as much (Department of Transmigration 1993).

A mosque stood at the center of each large pasar in the regency of Jayapura, serving the religious as well as social needs of Muslim merchants. Night markets displayed Islamic literature, such as Muslim magazines, brochures, Korans, and Koranic verse books, which considerably outnumbered pieces of Christian literature at the same sites.

Conflicts at the pasar were frequently between, in the words of a missionary, “curly hairs [Dani/Papuan] and straight hairs [pendatang; outsiders, newcomers].” Dani merchants, along with fellow Pauans, occupied the outside stalls, in the open, unprotected courtyard, while pendatang took up the central, large, covered area. The observably distinct separation between Papuan and non-Papuan merchants, where pendatang occupy the most advantageous and comfortable locations, created tension between the two groups and open conflict, often with fatal consequences.

In the November of 1998, a Dani man threw a stone through a window of the mosque situated at the center of pasar Sentani (Sentani market). Five Muslim merchants responded by stabbing him several times, until he died. The local Pauans were furious and threatened to burn down the entire pasar. The police and military responded by closing the pasar for five days following the incident. A similar scenario occurs about twice a year at the various large markets in the regency of Jayapura. The police typically promise to investigate the killings in the first month or so of the incident and then lay aside the search.

Most pendatang were comparably wealthy transmigrants. Merchants at Entrop pasar, close to the city of Jayapura, consisted entirely of Muslim transmigrants. A mosque sat in the center of the market, serving their religious and social needs. There were no Dani or other Pauan merchants at the Entrop market. Coupling the market and mosque in spatial simultaneity helped to give the Muslim community great control of economic and religious resources in metropolitan centers in West Papua. To the Dani, the conjoined vision of market and mosque presented a picture of the future, economically driven, religiously inspired national ideal. This was what they encountered each day they frequented the market. Churches did not occupy a central place in the market, but rather remained on the outside of the marketplace.

**Mosques (Masjid) and the state**

The announcements of the obligatory prayer (Arabic, salât) five times a day dominate the airspace, filling neighborhoods with Arabic calls to prayer. What is
unusual is the dual-function of the mosque. In addition to the call to prayer (Arabic, *adhan*), mosque speaker systems make government announcements and military proclamations, further conflating the voice of the government with Islam. Mosque speakers are deployed to announce, for instance, celebrations for a city’s founding or a meeting of citizens. Even nonreligious announcements close with an Arabic salutation.

In late March of 1999, during a period of increased threat of protest over the military’s killing of a Me (i.e. Papuan) Roman Catholic college teacher in Abepura (Kabupaten Jayapura), the local mosques in Waena declared a “Level 1” alert for the military at 10:00 p.m. The use of the mosque as civic and government soap box was common practice in Jayapura. Undoubtedly, some announcements served to intimidate citizens. Even in Wamena, the call to prayer was broadcast throughout the city, due to the presence of large numbers of Muslim merchants. Local Wamena Dani used terms like “Islamisasi” and “Javanisasi” to describe being surrounded by Muslim and Indonesian government officials in the largest highland town in West Papua.

What is significant about the conflation of the voice of the mosque and state is not so much the particular message that is announced, but rather the idea that is transmitted; that the mosque is used for mass communication signifies that the social conditions have changed (see Gellner 1983: 127). The medium matters because it ennobles a particular language and style and represents a new “centralized, standardized, one to many communication” (Gellner 1983: 127). Those who can understand the message are included as members in the economic and moral community it engenders. The others are outsiders. Simply put, the voice from the mosque is the voice of the future, the dissemination of the New Society, which concomitantly provides “the crucial sign as to whom the new power will favour and whom it will exclude” (Gellner 1983: 128). These are the real voices that Dani encounter throughout their daily lives, and that surround them in their neighborhoods. The Dani are compelled to judge the legitimacy of these claims on a daily basis.

**Dani conversion to Islam: Nasi (rice) Muslims?**

A good number of Dani have converted to Islam. Generally, individual Muslim conversion characterizes the pattern in numerous highland Dani villages in which Muslim civil servants have married local Dani Christian women, thus requiring the woman, along with her prospective children, to convert to Islam. Larger-scale Muslim conversions have occurred most notably the in Dani highland villages of Walesi (Grand Valley) and Kimbim (east of Pyramid). Both Muslim groups have received a special dispensation permitting them to eat pork. I was told by local Dani in both regions that first generation Muslim Dani have been permitted to eat pork, with the intention that the following generations, after receiving education at either local or Java-based pesantrens, will consider pork *haram* (forbidden) under Islamic law. The portion of the village that converted in Walesi around 1977 received a paved road, modern rectangular houses, electricity, and a parabola.
It is widely known that the village of Walesi also received great amounts of government largesse (see Plates 2.12, 2.13).4

At Christmas time in 1977, the Walesi Dani, who were at the time identifying themselves as Muslim, killed about twenty Dani Christians. During the civil disturbances in the highlands in the 1970s, the local tribal leader, Haji Aipon Asso, was used to subdue the locals, and many were believed to have converted to Islam out of fear. During the 1977 Dani war against the Indonesian government, the highlands (Jayawijaya) was divided into heathen, Christian, and government areas (after the 1969 Act of Free Choice, when Papuan political aspirations were frustrated, Dani Christians took the lead in articulating a desire for freedom). Instead of fighting them directly in the Baliem Valley, the government, in the words of a highland Dani, “just gave the pagans, who hate the Christians, license to kill [the Christians].” The government invited the Dani down from the mountains in order to negotiate. However, according to local sources, the government’s promise of guaranteeing safe passage to Wamena was a ploy that allowed the Walesi Dani to massacre the “rebel” Dani. Accepting the government’s offer the Dani descended the mountain, and were soon killed by the Walesi Dani Muslims. The government failed to prosecute the Walesi Dani Muslims, convincing Dani Christians of the government’s culpability.

Most Dani highlanders interpret the conversion of the Walesi Dani Muslims as a means to access government aid. Yet some say Walesi Dani Muslims feel used by the government, “tricked into turning against our own people.” Haji Aipon Asso, the tribal chief of Walesi (kepala suku Walesi), has actually taken government-sponsored pilgrimage to Mecca and proudly acknowledges the generosity of the government with regard to the development of his village (Bantuan 1999).

The village of Kimbim, located near Wamena, has always been unresponsive to Western missionary activities. Despite the presence of both the Roman Catholic and GKII churches, two prominent big-men (kepala suku), who had been members of the GKII church, converted to Islam upon receiving several material and food gifts from a non-Papuan Muslim missionary based in Wamena. According to witnesses, every week a chartered vehicle would arrive to the village, pick up the two chiefs, and drive them to the Muslim missionary’s house in Wamena, where they were taught about Islam and given gifts. Upon converting to Islam the two family groups represented by the two chiefs received employment on the government projects in the area. In September of 1998, Muslims missionaries took nine chiefs from Wamena, including the chief of Indugu, to Jakarta for religious indoctrination.

An economic of understanding religious conversion would suggest that the inability of the GKII to provide for the physical needs of its congregation may perhaps be an aspect of why thirteen GKII Dani families of Kimbim converted to Islam. Particularly during the economic crisis in the late 1990s, this would seem to be the case. According to a Dani GKII evangelist in the village, “in their condition like this, the Muslim comes to them and offers them used clothes, rice, noodles, cigarettes, salt, cooking oil, and some money. The Muslims also promised them [Christians] to start a coffee project, rice fields, and a range with cows, goat, and sheep. So, finally they ran from the church and became Muslim,
starting with mass circumcision.” Accordingly, the new Muslim converts are now preparing a location to build a new mosque in the village, which will undoubtedly increase social tensions within the immediate area. In the words of a local Dani, “If they build a mosque, we will burn up the mosque. And the Muslim who influenced those people will find out themselves what we will do [to him].”

Why did highland Dani convert to Islam? Human actors are not motivated simply by economic reasons. Going beyond a simple understanding of religious conversion would entail recognition of the social, as well as economic, factors involved in religious change. In the village of Kimbim, along with a history of being opposed to Christian mission, the two big-men (two brothers) who converted to Islam had a long-time feud with others in the village. That family feud may have provided an inspiration for conversion. Additionally, an often neglected aspect of the dynamics of conversion may have been that the two big-men were authentically convinced of Islam’s theological maxims. The conviction about God’s absolute unity (tawhid) may have resonated with the big-men in a community context fraught with disagreement and disorder.

Conversion to Islam contributed immensely to the complexity of Dani identity (Farhadian 2003). Unlike in East Java, where “Islam came to provide the terms for a post-traditional identity that bridged the ethnic divide between Madurese and Javanese” (Hefner 1994: 93), Islamic upsurge in West Papua rigidified boundaries between Christians and Muslims. It should be noted, though, that contact between Christianity and Islam yielded mutual conversions. Comments from Christian Dani about Dani conversion to Islam reflected feelings of deep animosity at the lack of respect demonstrated by the way in which proselytizers of Islam entered the region. Reflecting on Haji Aipon Asso’s conversion to Islam and his attempts to convert others, a Dani leader explained,

Aipon didn’t enter through the gate, he just jumped over the fence. He entered through the window, not from the door. If he came through the door, I would think he was my friend, but because he came through the window I know he is a thief. That’s why I told people to kill him. The polite way to bring in another religion is to knock on the door and say, “excuse me,” and ask permission from the people if you can bring your religion. Don’t be secretive about it. It’s the same as bringing evil religion. If you have a good purpose to pay a visit to someone’s house you have to knock and the owners will allow you to come in. Then you may ask them if you need a place to sleep or work. The owners will say, “okay.” But, if you go into the house without permission, the owner will be angry and hit you.

The process of Haji Aipon’s conversion to Islam did not follow the dictates of traditional Dani cultural logic, so he was compared to a thief, and his conversion discontinuous with Dani religiosity and cultural protocol.

Whereas Christian missions enjoyed unchallenged access to Dani populations in the early period of the New Order, the increased presence of Muslim government personnel in the highlands gave rise to intermarriage between Muslim
**pendatang** and Christian Dani. In the opinion of a college-educated Dani, “Dani who become Muslim do not enter the religion because of any firm conviction about Islamic doctrine, but rather because of their need for something that’s difficult to get as a Christian: money, work, women, and other guarantees (jaminan-jaminan). They give no thought about their future, about when Judgment Day will come.”

Non-Muslim Dani observers argued for a materialist interpretation of these conversion accounts – namely, that conversion to Islam was motivated by either marriage to a Muslim or to receiving employment benefits. In at least two Dani enclaves in Jayapura, at Yayasan Pendidikan Islam (YAPIS, Muslim Education Foundation) and Angkasapura, there were several cases of Christian Dani intermarriage with Muslim **pendatang**. David Neilson notes that

**Yapis** was active in opening schools and Islamic centres in areas considered Christian, such as Baliem region. With the support of Muslim businessmen and the government, Dani Muslims were given scholarships for education in Jayapura and Java… They were encouraged to convert by being allowed to eat pork. The thinking among many Muslims seemed to be “we will convert this generation and purify the next.”

(1999: 236)

Furthermore,

This challenge to the Christians is a serious one as they offer the local people the same choices that their grandparents were offered: in place of the “traditional” religion, in this case Christianity, that is not meeting their material needs and seems to be indifferent to their spiritual needs, they are being offered a religion that is led by someone with alleged magical powers, which has financial backing sufficient to improve their financial state, and political backing in the form of a national government that at the time was becoming increasingly pro-Islam.

(Ulimpa quoted in Neilson 1999: 319)

Moreover, some young people follow Islam to gain financial support for their education. Since the early 1990s many school-aged young people from the Central Highlands have been recruited to go to Parung, not far from Bogor, West Java, for education. Among the recruits are those from Me, Moni, Damal, and Dani backgrounds, and with either GKII or Roman Catholic church backgrounds. In Bogor, West Java Dani converts have lived under the leadership of Haji Yuddy Kotouki, a student at the University of Indonesia. In the community they learn practical skills such as carpentry, how to raise chickens, and entrepreneurialship. The income from their work is used to sponsor other Papuan students who study in universities in Java. Muslim charitable organizations and a group of concerned senior Hajis in and around Jakarta provide financial support for such da’wa activities.
Christian Dani use strong language when referring to Dani converts to Islam: “people like that [Muslim Dani] are like Judas Iscariot or like Esau who sold his right as first-born only because of red beans. Those people are hypocrites (*munafik*, an unbeliever who pretends to be Muslim) because although they say they’re Muslim they still eat pork.”

In addition, ethnicity plays a significant role in erecting boundaries between religious communities. The stereotype is that all Papuans are Christian, and most *pendatang* are Muslim. However, simple ethnic divisions belie the social complexity of religion in West Papua, for many *pendatang* and local non-Papuans also identify themselves as Christians (e.g. Chinese, Javanese, Manadonese, Ambonese, East Timorese). This blending of religious and ethnic diversity convolutes a simple parity between ethnicity and religion, and thus further complicates the religious landscape of Jayapura. Dani converts to Islam speak of the compatibility they perceive between Islam and Dani tradition with regard to polygamy. Dani converts consider the Old Testament more acceptable to them because it allows polygamy, thus there is a perceived similarity between practices of Islam and the teachings of the Old Testament. The Dani feel that Muslims accept them because Muslims allow polygamous relationships, which are permitted in traditional Dani culture. Some Dani, then, insist that Muslims do not reject Dani culture, as the missionaries and Indonesian officials did. Christian missionaries, on the other hand, preach a gospel of justification by faith, not by works, which is a highly abstract notion. Furthermore, Muslim Dani accommodate their interests by reading the Old Testament, pointing out that magic was allowed, and using Rachel, Jacob’s wife, as an example. They argue that God allowed humans to have magic. In their Old Testament example, Rachel left her father’s house and took his “household idols” (Genesis 31:19, 34). And God did not disapprove. Upon conversion, Papuan Muslims are offered work and education, which also provided a practical incentive to remain within the Muslim community, especially during more difficult economic times.

**The variety of Dani Christian communities in Jayapura**

*The demise of the total institution*

In the metropolitan center of Jayapura, Christianity was marked by its inability to continue as a total institution. Mission Christianity was not separated from the village, but rather incorporated within itself programs of medicine, education, and literacy. Most upland mission posts located themselves in the center of the host village, and through its varied social programs sought to minister to an individual’s body, mind, and spirit with the explicit goal of conversion. In Jayapura, by contrast, the Western (i.e. evangelical) mission community and its ministries were bounded. The spatial relationship of the church to its urban setting was significant because the church was the only consistent Dani public architecture in both the highlands and the urban center. It persisted as the most cherished institution among the Dani. The delimited nature of the church and mission
stemmed not from any particular contempt by the government, but rather was a feature of the modern condition, the fragmentation of social spaces, as well as the theological conviction of the (evangelical, fundamentalistic) mission community. The majority of evangelical missionaries lived together on a large mission station, where, while they were surrounded by Dani communities, they nevertheless were comparatively powerless to meet the tremendous economic, social, and educational needs of the Dani, and thus were themselves marginalized. Their urban work involved almost solely “spiritual” ministries. Medical, literacy, and translation work tasks no longer were handled by mission personnel because healthcare in Jayapura was state-run and Dani literacy and translation held little relevance in a city where Bahasa Indonesia was the lingua franca.

City-dwelling Dani overwhelmingly read the Bible in Bahasa Indonesia rather than in their local dialect. Bahasa Indonesia was perceived as the language of the future and of the modern world. Nevertheless, on Sundays the streets were filled with sharply dressed men, women, and children from a wide variety of Papuan and non-Papuan backgrounds, with Bibles in hand, walking or taking public transportation to church. Despite the demise of Christianity as a total institution in the metropolitan center, the overwhelming majority of individual city-dwelling Dani remained committed to the church.

Three types of relationships characterize Dani communities in the wider Indonesian society encountered in the Jayapura regency. The migrant enclaves discussed below do not include the numerous, free-floating Dani individuals who live scattered throughout Jayapura in search for jobs, some of whom live in ethnically mixed neighborhoods, or are among the numbers of young Dani students who live in an asrama. Outside those churches consisting predominantly of Dani, few churches have Dani at the highest levels of lay leadership, that is, serving on the church council. Each community reflects a different strategy for incorporating or rejecting urban alternatives.

The spatial simultaneity between the organization of Dani traditional highland living and the city is remarkable. In Dani complexes in Jayapura, several mixed clans from the same highland region live together. (Most Dani communities in Jayapura are divided along lines of clan [fam] membership.) A salient commonality among city-dwelling Dani is that their groupings consist almost always of assemblages of expanded versions of traditionally defined confederacies or alliances. In the case of the urban Dani, there exist connections between identity and ecclesiastical affiliation yet to a lesser degree than among the Batak Christians (cf. Kipp 1996: 45). Among evangelical congregations, for instance along the road to Pos 7, the Dani meet in relatively ethnically homogeneous churches (with a minority of non-Dani members) and use Bahasa Indonesia in preaching, singing, and Scripture reading. However, in communities with a dispersed Dani population, urban Dani Christians attend evangelical churches consisting of a majority of non-Dani members. The demographics of the Dani who attend Pentecostal churches tell a different story as they have co mingled more freely and purposefully with non-Papuan Christians (see Chapter 5).
Reconfigured social groupings help maintain Dani identity in the urban center. The Dani migrate to Jayapura individually, or in small groups, but they establish themselves through familiar village networks that are transplanted in an urban setting. These reconfigured and enhanced groupings are based not on familial consanguinity but rather on spatial parallelism. For instance, urban Dani complexes often consist of two or more villages related by their spatial highland proximity rather than narrowly defined consanguineous relations. For that reason, highland villages that are located relatively close together (e.g. Tagime/Pyramid or Bokondini/Kelila) in their traditional setting form large combined complexes in Jayapura.

That is to say, boundaries that once encompassed two clans (marga) living within a single complex in the traditional setting (e.g. family groups Kilungga-Wandigbo, Kombata-Tabuni, Wenda-Tabuni) are significantly altered in the metropolitan center, where social borders are defined by a pairing of neighboring traditional villages. This boundary adjustment represents a significant alteration in identity ascription. Where once possession of mutual ancestry determined confederacy boundaries, in the metropolitan milieu, highland spatial proximity plays a significant role in defining new habitation patterns. Kin-based clan organization gives way to class and residence as determinants of dwelling patterns. Territoriality becomes a priority in Jayapura. It is important to note that settlement patterns reflect in part religious orientation, in-group perceptions and self-identification, and social positioning with regard to the wider (i.e. Austronesian) society. Dani enclaves have formed, marked by in-group attitudes, in several locations throughout the regency of Jayapura. The layout of the various Dani communities is a physical representation of what is important for the community.

Urban Dani women, and particularly Dani mothers, are at a considerable economic disadvantage upon moving to the regency of Jayapura. Most are barely able to provide for their families. The following scenario is a common routine for urban Dani women from Monday to Saturday: A Dani woman awakens at daybreak and gathers fruit and vegetable crops from her own garden. She takes her yield to the market, using an ojek (motorcycle taxi) or taxi. After a day of selling she may earn between Rp10,000 and Rp12,000 (approximately US$1.00 = Rp9,500). With her earnings she purchases rice, oil, and salt for her family for the evening meal. She may have up to ten or more children, most of whom are in school.

The majority of urban Dani women earn their income from selling the yield from their garden. Yet their profits are unable to meet their daily expenses. Most are unable to manage with their daily earnings. For instance, the daily ojek charge (i.e. transportation) is Rp1,000 and minimal daily food for their family (e.g. rice, salt, oil) cost Rp20,000. These expenses do not take into consideration school or healthcare costs, or other unforeseeable everyday expenditures. The average Dani women at the market earns approximately Rp20,000 while she requires much more for her daily expenses. Naturally, when she, her husband, or children contract malaria or other illness, or encounter a number of other setbacks, her earnings are further depleted.
**Dok 8 (Dock 8)**

The first example of urban Dani settlement patterns and religious orientation is the Dani group that resides at Dok 8 (Dock 8), named by Allied Forces under General Douglas MacArthur during their occupation of the region in the Second World War. Dok 8 sits high above the city in mountainous Jayapura, representing an adamantly nativistic response to the New Society. Here lies an entirely traditional WD village, replete with huts (*honai*), traditional Dani fence, and gardens built on remarkably steep slopes, as though transported in its totality to the mountainside of Jayapura.

This thoroughly Dani village mirrors the living and working patterns of the highlands. Men and women work in the gardens and raise pigs, selling their yield at the local market. The complex consists of sixteen *honai* separated by family groups rather than gender, a notable characteristic of WD. At the entrance of the complex lies one large hut (*honai*), while eight smaller (family-sized) *honai* line the perimeter along the length of the fence on each side of the large *honai* at the entrance. At the far end of the complex entrance lies a simple open structure – the church (GIDI). Church services are conducted in WD language. Dani of Dok 8 moved from the highlands directly to Sentani, but their children wanted to go to junior high school (*SMP*) in the city of Jayapura rather than in Sentani. So they moved to Jayapura.

Adult Dani narrate the wonderful benefits of living in the village of Dok 8: they tell of more available and fertile land than in Sentani to raise pigs and cultivate gardens, splendid weather (cool and breezy), and the ability to retain a traditional life. Their urban village is meticulously clean, lacking the discarded plastic, paper, and metal trash that frequently marks conspicuous living patterns in the city. A desire for education, along with a desire for more land, despite the fact that they still have family who live in Sentani, has led this group of around 200 WD to establish a traditional village above the city of Jayapura. Most are originally from the highland WD villages of Karabaga, Bokindini, and Kelila, and more specifically they originate from Ilu. Ironically, Dok 8 does not reflect the urban squalor characterizing segments of the Pos 7 Dani community. Opting for the conventional settlement pattern reflects a spiritual representation; it keeps their religious experience and life intact and far from the possibility of being contaminated by worldly life. Urban Dani at Dok 8 are the cultural conservatives who have retreated from urban life and have re-enacted cultural particularities in an encapsulated context above the city.

**Angkasapura**

The Dani come to the city and have brought their religious experience with them. Their religious commitments either prevent or enable them to integrate into the urban context. If the urban church does not accept them, then they will start a new local church as an alternative. The Dani congregation and community of Angkasapura epitomizes an entrepreneurial enthusiasm to assimilate to their new
surroundings. Angkasapura Dani blend their own traditions to improvise with the new material offered by the urban context.

The name Angkasapura (Sky Town or Heaven Town), an appropriate name given its high altitude in the mountains of the city of Jayapura, refers to both a neighborhood of the city of Jayapura, within which live a diverse ethnic mix of Papuans (particularly Dani) and *pendatang*, as well as to the location of the GKII church started by the Dani. Dani built the church, called *Eklesia* (the Church), and are noticeably proud of their accomplishment. The building is a large, Western-style structure, seats about 200, and is approximately forty feet high inside. On the property lies a traditional Dani open-sided *honai*, that is used for Sunday school. It measures about 30 feet across. The congregation started as a meeting in a house in Angkasapura, owned by a Tagime (Western) Dani. Soon after, in 1983, the new congregation moved to the small church that still stands on the new church property. The sides of the old church were constructed from corrugated aluminum and was around 20 by 30 feet.

In 1992, the congregation, which was all Dani, completed the present church structure. Since its construction, several non-Papuan families have joined the congregation. The present pastor is Me (from Lake Paniai) and the organist is Ambonese. Of approximately 100 people in attendance, there are about 75 percent Dani and 25 percent non-Dani (mostly from Ambon, Biak, Fak-Fak, Manado, Paniai, Serui, and Sorong). Most members of the congregation wear batik shirts or skirts, but with Papuan motifs. Several Dani congregational members are government employees, while others are farmers or have no formal education. Overall, though, *Eklesia* is considered by Dani to be the location of the Dani elite and wealthy, a church of professionals. The Angkasapura Dani community brims with efficiency and formality. They have selectively assimilated to their surroundings and evince an openness to change and an optimistic hope that they can create their own lives.

The Eklesia Church has a white tile floor and lace curtains that cover all the windows and the communion table. An electric sound system with keyboard plays trembling sounds like an old-fashioned American revivalist organ. Long fluorescent lights are attached to the ceiling. Large plastic flower arrangements decorate both sides of the podium and along various sections of the stage. A large purple satin sheet serves as background for the entire front stage and podium area. The sign above the stage reads, “*Indonesia Penuh Kemuliaan Tuhan*” (Indonesia is Full of the Glory of God). Under this statement is a cut out map of Indonesia, with a sun behind it, the rays shining to each large island. All deacons wear white, long-sleeved shirts and neck ties. Women wear long skirts, bright blouses, and makeup.

The liturgy incorporates responsive readings and congregational recitation of the Doxology and Apostle’s Creed. All hymns are sung from the hymnal “*Nyanyian Kemenangan Iman*” (Victory of Faith), an Indonesian hymnal published in Bandung, West Java, with translations of Western hymns and melodies by, for instance, A. B. Simpson, Fanny Crosby, and Charles Wesley. The hymnal’s Western orientation is reflected not only in the choice of songs but also by the fact that it has an index of English titles.
On one of my visits to the church the pastor preached from Leviticus 27:26–34 (we own nothing, God owns everything), 2 Corinthians 9:6–9 (importance of giving) and Matthew 6:19–20 (store treasures in heaven, not on earth). The revivalist-style preaching focused on humankind’s spiritual condition and the recognition that spiritual realities take precedence over earthly conditions.

The Dani residence at Angkasapura lies approximately a half kilometer from the Eklesia Church, where about two hundred people live in numerous small rectangular houses. Traditional honai are conspicuously absent. The complex has been built alongside an exceptionally steep mountain. Pigs live in stalls donated by the government, though the pigs have much less land on which to roam and interact with people as they did in the highlands. Some Dani have participated in the government’s interlocal transmigration program, having moved from the interior to the coast. The land lacks the fertility of the Baliem Valley, but Dani women carry on with their traditional gardening practices and pig husbandry. Unlike their traditional complex, where paired clans are surrounded by the aesthetically pleasing Dani fence, the Angkasapura community looks like a small (and muddy) town without a community fence. Separating other communities are the high mountains and a narrow walking path that leads through the neighborhood.

The Tagime (Western) Dani live higher up the mountain than the Pyramid (Western) Dani, paralleling their spatial relationship in the Baliem Valley. There are six ethnically mixed marriages in the complex, Dani men who have married non-Dani women. These include three marriages between a Dani man and a Javanese woman, one between a Dani man and a Serui (island north of West Papua) woman, a Dani man and a Biak (island to north of West Papua) woman, and a Dani man and a Depapre (north coast West Papua) woman. One of the Javanese wives is Muslim. Her Dani husband converted to Islam and decided to remain in the village. He died a few years ago, but I was told that his conversion to Islam opened doors to further his career in the military. Their marriage, particularly within the context of the isolated Dani community, represents a significant opening for Muslim advance among Dani. All other non-Dani wives are Christian. The layout of Ankassapura is a physical representation of what is important for the community. The Dani church and their employment resides outside the Angkasapura complex, signifying the separation between church and wider society. Angkasapura Dani exemplifies an innovative society that creatively chooses from alternative ways.

**Pos 7 (Post 7)**

The majority of city-dwelling Dani live throughout the midland mountain slopes of the regency of Jayapura. Smaller groups live dispersed throughout urban Jayapura. The overwhelming majority of Dani in the regency of Jayapura inhabit in the town of Sentani, west of the city of Jayapura, sharing the mountain region with the large mission station called Pos 7 (Post 7), a name given by Allied forces during the Second World War, and where some missionary families resided in bunkers abandoned by Allied forces. Although I would estimate the number of
Dani living at Pos 7 to be well over 300, made up of both GVD and WD groups, settlement patterns reflect the importance of traditional social organization. City-dwelling Dani bands live in groups according to the village in which they originated.

Highland settlement patterns are transported *en masse* to the regency of Jayapura: Dani from the proximal highland villages of Pyramid and Tagime live in a common complex, while those from Bokonini and Kelila, also traditionally neighboring villages, live together, reflecting the same pattern as in their highland homes. While most highland Dani encapsulate their received form of evangelical mission Christianity and take it to Jayapura, not all the Dani at Pos 7 attend church or ascribe to commonly held pietistic religious practices (e.g. abhorrence to smoking cigarettes, drinking saguer, chewing beetle nut, or attending movies). Christianity has acquired the status of tradition among the Dani: the Dani insist that, “we are Christians.” Christianity is understood by Dani as their tradition and thus it acts as a powerful legitimating guide for their self-understanding. Even most non-churchgoing Dani self-ascribe as Christian.

Many Dani at Pos 7 serve the physical needs of the missionary community. Missionaries employ Dani men as gardeners (*tukang halaman, tukang kebun*) and guards (*penjaga*), while Dani women, and occasionally men, are employed as a clothes washers (*babu cuci, pencuci pakaian*) or househelpers (*pembantu*). Dani also earn income from selling fruit and vegetable yields from their gardens that they have meticulously groomed on the slopes of the mountains of Sentani. It is typical for a school-aged Dani to spend the day at a local school, while her mother cultivates the family garden and then sells her yield at the local market (*pasar*). In the last few years, Dani have begun an informal night market near the top of the main road up to Pos 7 (*Jalan Pos 7*), where they sell beetle nut, saguer, and a small assortment of fruits and vegetables. Local Dani and other Papuan groups frequent these Dani night stalls, however it is rare to see a *pendatang* present.

Occupying the center stage of Pos 7 is Newman Memorial Chapel, the open-air church building that the predominantly Dani congregation shares with the predominantly American evangelical missionary community. The Dani have migrated specifically to Pos 7 for three major reasons. First, Pos 7 is the first coastal location where missionaries took their highland Dani helpers in the late 1960s, thereby bridging highland and coastal Dani and thus swelling their numbers as new Dani migrants have entered Jayapura. Second, being the largest missionary settlement in Jayapura (and most likely of all West Papua) the proximity to missionaries provides greater access to wealth and opportunities for employment, although Dani quickly learn that this assumption does not always get realized. Finally, the mountain location of Pos 7 permits the same gardening practice as in the highlands, except on a much smaller scale. The limited available land at Pos 7 acts to severely limit pig husbandry. In several Dani complexes around Pos 7, I have noticed what appeared to be half-dead mother pigs with ribs protruding from their sides and small piglets vying for the limited milk supply. It is significant that both gardening and pig husbandry are significantly impeded due to availability of land in the urban center.
Taruna is a Dani village on a mountain slope adjacent to Pos 7. It is organized as a traditional village, except that rectangular single-room houses with planed-wood siding replaced the more traditional round hut (honai) with thatched roof and vertically placed boards. The village is surrounded by pineapple shrubs, banana trees, and a few pig stalls. One large centrally located water basin (bak) serves the bathing, clothes-washing, and dish-washing needs of perhaps twenty families. The main road through the village is so steep it permits only walking. Villagers, all Dani, spend the early mornings harvesting their fruit and then walk down the very steep hill to the pasar (market) in Sentani. The few pigs corralled in the village are malnourished and listless. Life here lacks the robust vitality of interior villages; this village reflects both the urban poverty in which many Dani live, as well as the physically perceptible demise of pigs, once a source of great pride and prestige among highlanders.

**The fountainhead of American evangelicalism**

Pos 7 epitomizes a bounded community in Sentani, being for the most part a walled-off mission station, replete with a swimming pool that contains a sign with the words “Members Only” posted on the entrance gate. Two communities reside side by side at Pos 7, missionary and Papuan, creating a grim scene reminiscent of the wealth and social disparity characteristic of some nineteenth-century Protestant missions in the colonized world. Here lies the American clan, defining itself against the other, an enclave fortifying religious and racial boundaries, while strengthening their social identity and self-definition as providers of religious and theological doctrine.

Dani children are not permitted to use the jungle gym that stands in the center of Pos 7, on an expansive, neatly groomed lawn shaded by palm trees, or to swim in the cool waters of the swimming pool, where missionary children and their families enjoy themselves. With the cool mountain breezes and the serene, tranquil environment, Pos 7 is situated in a spectacularly beautiful setting. A Papuan guard enforces the rules. Gracefully providing a dramatic backdrop of Pos 7 is a large mountain range called Cyclops Mountains, where the government has successfully cleared large swaths of native trees and vegetation in order to further its transmigration scheme.

The mission station at Pos 7 serves as the fountainhead of evangelicalism for West Papua. With roughly 200–300 Westerners, most of whom serve with an American (or Western) evangelical mission, Pos 7 is the centerpiece of religious activity in West Papua. Yet, many in the Western Pos 7 community are inward looking – they receive strength from each other rather than from local Papuans.

The evangelical church service at Newman Memorial Chapel mirrors an American evangelical service in the United States. The church service and hymn singing is in English. A Papuan church leader describes his feeling about Pos 7 when saying sarcastically that they give him the feeling that “God is in our midst,” which makes many unwilling to listen to other perspectives on Christianity. Except for its tropical surrounding, Pos 7 is a slice of American living, an
American social enclave. Nearly all missionary families drive air-conditioned vehicles and occupy houses with well-maintained tropical landscapes. Yet Pos 7 is also the location where the majority of urban Dani reside, exposing the stark contrast between the conspicuous wealth of the mission community and Dani poverty. Because of their proximity to the Dani community, the social dynamics at Pos 7 sheds light on the missionary response to the urban Dani.

The most salient social dysfunctions that characterize the lives of a segment of young urban Dani at Pos 7 includes alcoholism (mabuk), glue-sniffing (mencium aibon), thievery (mencuri), gambling (menjudi), sexual acts outside of marriage (perzinahan) and, to a lesser degree, prostitution (pelacuran). By far the greatest difficulty in Dani families is heavy drinking. It is not unusual to meet Dani parents directly impacted by the results of their children’s heavy drinking.

As an older Dani man says, “drinking has killed two of my children.” When asked about what he wanted for his future, he responds, “I want to be wherever my two dead children are.” The Dani experience a loss of personal meaning as they enter the city, and some are unsuccessful at making the transition, leaving them feeling neglected and despondent. Families become shattered as members give in to “new temptations” (godaan baru) of the city: “my children can’t go to school because of the bad influences in their circles; and they get sick with malaria… There are many struggles that emerge in the city. You already know that my children smoke [cigarettes] and sniff glue [cium aibon].” Dani parents feel frustrated because they themselves lack skills to teach their children how to thrive in the urban arena. And they too are observably concerned about how the negative influences (pengaruh negatif) could affect the future of their children.

Naturally, many Dani complain of the difficulties of being separated from their families in the highlands. Young Dani, then, consult different social options for survival. Many young Dani children, from elementary school age and older, intoxicate themselves by sniffing glue, and often pass out in Newman Memorial Church. Missionaries at Pos 7 have responded by building an enormous, metal fence, sending a clear message to the community that the church property is not to be profaned by troubled youth. Although two woman missionaries have begun a weekly program for Dani youth, the social problems have not subsided.

Non-Papuans (pendatang) living in Sentani admit that Dani have a bad reputation when they get drunk: intoxicated Dani men are known to be abusive to women and are prone to physical violence. Dani youth estimate that around Pos 7 about 70 percent of men drink alcohol, whereas among women the figure is around 30 percent. Saguer is perhaps the most common, least expensive, fermented drink. Among the other popular intoxicants are beetle nut (penang), whisky, and rubbing alcohol (spiritus). Drunkenness for the Dani can be seen as a form of resistance as well as demonstrative of maladaptive behavior, which only increases the prejudicial treatment and outright mockery of the Dani. Ridicule and derogatory language serve as a powerful sanction against the Dani and is used by pendatang to humiliate them. Depreciating language unfavorably compares others to Dani, much like, “hey, don’t be like a Dani.” Though originating in the
regency of Paniai, the term *noge* has been commonly used to refer to the Dani people (as Indonesians have a hard time to distinguish the two), and means something like “dodo” (i.e. a stupid person or someone hopelessly behind the times), “boogie man,” or “fool.” The burgeoning of social dysfunctions around the mission station of Pos 7 in part symbolizes the inability of the mission community to meet the vast social, religious, and economic needs of the Dani living in its midst.

Many Indonesians living in West Papua see local inhabitants as “stupid Papuans; backward Papuans, especially highlanders; ungrateful Papuans; treacherous, wild terrorist and ‘secessionist’ Papuans…aliens, in a word” (King 2004: 33). Peter King, a researcher at the University of Sydney, notes that following the beating and torture of local students, the Indonesian police exclaimed to the students:

Your mother eats pig and you have the brains of a pig…. Even with your college degree you won’t get a job… You Papuans are stupid [*bodoh*]; stupid and yet you think you can be independent…. You put your hopes in a guy like [Papua Council Presidium Vice-Chairman] Tom Beanal who knows nothing.

(2004: 33)

Even formal education had not helped to assuage the deeply held prejudice of the Indonesians against local inhabitants.

**Theological discontinuities**

Theological dissimilarities between Dani tradition and mission Christianity created uncertainties for many city-dwelling Dani, resulting in the innovative theological combinations of Dani religion and mission Christianity. Many Dani blended themes within both the Dani religion and mission Christianity. Such theological combinations increased the varieties of indigenous Christianities within urban centers of Jayapura. The multiplicity of interpretations of Christianity further undermined the theological homogeneity that many missionaries sought to uphold.

A significant aspect of traditional Dani life that persists in the urban context among Christian Dani is the use of sorcery (cf. de Vries 1987). Many Dani believe in and communicate with traditional spiritual beings. Young city-dwelling Dani, according to a WD Christian woman, “bring their leaves from their plantations and they use them for their spiritual needs… The church says that it’s not true, but the people still use [magic]… They still use [magic] every day of their lives… They cannot be free from those spiritual things. And they still believe that if there’s someone dead it was due to someone killing him via magic.” In the words of a Dani man,

Yes, some Dani still believe [in traditional spirits] although they are already Christians and have already been baptized in the church. They kill pigs and
pay tribute to the spirit of the dead so that he will be happy. Whenever the person does not bring something to pay homage to the spirit of death, then the person will die. . . . Traditional religion is very important because whenever one breaks the laws (hukum-hukim) they will experience misfortune in their individual lives.

The belief in kuguruok (black magic activities) is frequently mentioned as persisting in the city. “People still believe that when a person dies suddenly (without long suffering) the death is a result of someone sending kuguruok, from either the village or somewhere in Jayapura.” A dual religious perspective persists among city-dwelling Dani, reflecting their eclectic religiosity.

The portrayal of the Holy Spirit as a bird, the third member of the trinity in the classic Christian theological formulation, introduces ideological obstacles for some older Dani Christians. Upon ascending into Heaven, Jesus said to his disciples that he would give them the Holy Spirit to comfort and guide them (John 14). Consistent with Christian portrayals, many Western missionaries pictured the Holy Spirit in the shape of a bird. Yet older Dani believers in Jayapura interpreted this picture in terms of their traditional religious categories – it was the bird in the story of nabelan kabelan that signified death, being the one who lost the race with the snake and therefore sealed forever the fate of the future Dani generations.

However, young Dani city dwellers, being raised in the metropolitan center of Jayapura, have little chance to hear traditional Dani stories. And if they had, most find no meaning in the traditional normative myths; they are considered “just old stories.” Young urban Dani will recount the traditional Dani stories to their young as “a thing of the past.” Although older urban Dani still wait for the return of nabelan kabelan; for “his” return, a personified category, younger Dani aware of nabelan kabelan creatively interpret its meaning through Christian theological notions. One young urban Dani explains that

according to the story of nabelan kabelan (eternal life), if the snake won the race that would mean that there would be no experience of death, that there would be eternal life. But because the bird won, we now experience death. This is a sign of the Savior of the world. We experience death because of sin.

Another interpretation is, “in the past, the old people waited a long time for nabelan kabelan. People that received Jesus see Jesus as the manifestation of nabelan kabelan, but people that don’t believe in Jesus are still waiting for the arrival of nabelan kabelan.”

The transplanted mission church and its objectification

The history of Christianity among the Dani began at the level of the tribe, with tribal big-men making decisions whether or not to receive the new religion. From its incubation in the village, Christianity spread through highland valleys by the efforts of Dani missionaries. Soon after, highland intravillage and later intravalley church conferences began to provide a forum for understanding Christianity on a wider
scale as well as for establishing peace between warring tribes. It is important to note
that in forming new churches, “the missionaries wanted to establish not just a Dani
church, but a denominational organization that would include believers from
several tribal groups in Irian Jaya” (Hayward 1997: 82).

Moreover, at each stage in its expansion mission Christianity brought local
people into contact with more extensive knowledge and access to a wider com-
munity of ideas and social realities. Each ever-widening interval introduced the
possibility for multiple identifications. One aspect of the new social reality
included the dominance of the state in determining “proper religion,” and the
responding need to reconceptualize the church’s authority structure to corre-
spond to Indonesian law (Hayward 1997: 82). This shift signaled a significant
adaptation to official requirements, subsuming religious structures under the
authority of state government. Furthermore, new social arrangements evolved,
whereby the terms of one’s employment took precedence over Sunday activities
and modern demands frequently re-oriented commitments away from the
church.

Given the difficulty of providing for their families, Dani parents have had to
accept any available employment to sustain their families, preventing many from
attending church on Sundays because of conflicting schedules. An illiterate,
45-year-old Dani man said, “When I just became a Christian my spiritual life was
very good. But now, it’s not like before. I’m so busy working that I forget to pray.
And I seldom go to church. Now I see the enthusiasm of the evangelists
has decreased. Before, when we had just received the gospel, people went [to
evangelize] with pleasure [senang hati].” This man, although he lives in the
metropolitan center, has never used a telephone. There is a sadness in his voice
that foreshadows the long struggle ahead for Dani living under complex social,
religious, and economic conditions.

Neither the church nor mission occupied a central place in urban Dani neigh-
brhoods, except for in the most traditional setting – Dok 8. Furthermore, the
church itself became a topic of intense conversation. Congregations were increas-
ingly commenting on the inadequacy of the preaching and its biblical basis.
An older Dani informant claimed, “I notice that the pastor reads the Word of God
but presents many stories from outside [non-biblical parables] that are not appro-
priate with the context of the verses so that it isn’t a blessing to hear. The
congregation criticizes preaching like that.” Increasingly, Dani were reflecting on
the failure of the church to meet their needs and provide practical guidance.

The specialized role of the big-man

Social carriers of knowledge have proliferated in the urban arena. Dani pastors,
as carriers of spiritual knowledge, compete with carriers of other messages and
authorities in Jayapura. Given the modern conditions in which he works, he is
unable to monopolize power over others’ lives, because competing authorities,
institutions, and promises undermine his once nearly ubiquitous influence.
According to an informant, “I have observed that Dani in Jayapura no longer
respect the activities of the pastor, like they did in the village. People that have influence are people that have political positions (jabatan-jabatan politis). For example: the head of the village (kepala desa), the head of the neighborhood (ketua RW).”

Although he continues to be held in high esteem by his fellow Dani, the pastor’s influence shows signs of waning as educated Dani discover they can secure a high degree of public prestige through education and wealth accumulation, and in most cases with wider acknowledgment. For example, Mr Wenda, a Dani man from the highland village of Maki (WD), is in his late thirties, has five children, volunteers frequently for his Baptist church activities, and serves as the church’s treasurer for development. He is unique among city-dwelling Dani because of his conspicuous wealth and prosperity. Wenda has embraced the new economic realities he has encountered in Jayapura. For many, Wenda’s life is a success story. He came out to the coast to Jayapura, purchased land, built a cement and brick house at Pos 7, and got a steady job at MAF. Presently, he works for Summer Institute of Linguistics (SIL). According to a Western missionary, “the interesting thing is he doesn’t give too much away. If you want to stay with him you’ve got to pay board.” While he works part-time as well at a Sentani shop that sells kerosene, Wenda comments that, with regard to his house, “even Westerners are amazed because it’s like a rich Westerner’s house.” Among his possessions is a television, a symbol of wealth among Dani. The new ethic of prosperity requires new forms of self-interest.

While the urban Dani pastor fulfills only a functionally equivalent role to that of the big-man, his authority is severely redefined. He no longer needs to demonstrate skill in warfare, economic competition, and household size. Rather, his demonstrated mastery of preferred skills in the city refers to his proven ability to preach, his established moral uprightness, and his possession of a teachable spirit.

An important criterion for selection of pastors was their willingness “to live by the teaching of Jesus Christ, and the Apostles in the New Testament” (Hayward 1997: 86). His responsibilities included “preaching, supervising the teaching ministries of the church, representing the church to the diocese, carrying out pastoral ministries to the members of the congregation, and giving leadership and direction to the board of elders” (Hayward 1997: 96). Urban pastors, like highland big-men, continued to serve as arbitrators of conflicts within the church, however, their role as authorities in non-church domains (e.g. political or educational arenas) became denuded because these areas were controlled by secular government authorities. His function as big-man changed from filling a generalized role in his traditional environment to performing a specialized role as pastor, and as one among many authorities to which Dani could submit. The pastor’s role was recontextualized, dispossessed of its past integrative, group enhancing function. The urban Dani pastor served a church that considered him a new big-man, yet he possessed little power or ability to provide employment, healthcare, or political stability for his people, the very abilities that once defined his status in the traditional sense.
However, despite the narrowing of his influence in wider society, the urban Dani pastor did retain a good measure of authority over his flock. It is important to note that even in his traditional highland community, the pastor’s authority was neither completely hegemonic nor uncontested, as his sovereignty often existed alongside the traditional structure of Dani authority, such as the tribal big-man (kepala suku) and customs big-man (kapala adat).

Within the church the urban pastor maintains his role as adjudicator. In effect, the notion of the pastor as big-man is variously related to both his access to a wider world and his immediate context. That is to say, if the Dani pastor has access, for instance, to MAF pilots, is able to effectively communicate in Bahasa Indonesia, and can communicate with the government officials successfully, then he proves his ability to serve as mediator between local and wider worlds. Acting as a bridge, a big-man pastor can access ideas and knowledge from the outside world and can communicate those with his congregation.

Context provides a second variable in understanding the potency of a big-man pastor, for his status is context-dependent. For instance, when settling a church-related issue, the Dani pastor is perceived as a big-man. Yet in another context, where a financial contribution is required (e.g. for building a house or funding education), he is no longer considered a big-man because he lacks financial leverage. Moreover, the pastor’s authority is greatly enhanced through obtaining education and networking among Dani and other pastors at regional and national church conferences. Networking enhances his position by giving him knowledge of other people, cultures, and languages, and thus enables him to mediate between local and wider worlds. Consequently, the big-man status of the pastor is derived from his knowledge of the wider world, access to status-enhancing persons and institutions, and context.

The Dani evangelists face another sort of limitation – that imposed by modern economic and social circumstances. In their traditional environment, Dani evangelists, left extended families and property in order to walk through the highlands to trade and evangelize. Usually they would be received by the host tribe and given food and shelter until he and occasionally his nuclear family was able to build a hut himself and start a garden. Modern social conditions prevailing in the city, however, have dramatically curtailed this practice. Now, in the words of an elderly Dani informant, “We see people evangelize casually. They have to wait for the support money and other things before they can evangelize.” Economic limitations have severely restricted the more aggressive evangelistic methods of the earliest periods of highland missionary contact. Economic realities and social complexities have prohibited easy travel and acceptance by non-Dani people, making evangelization outside the given area dependent on adequate financial support prior to departure from home.

Most significantly, urban churches have become abstract, unable to meet many of the practical needs of its members, which was the requirement of the village big-man. No longer does the church and the mission provide answers for physical, economic, and political conditions, for it is unable to function as a panacea for social ills. Because the big-man pastor is unable to redistribute tribal wealth,
economic pressures no longer are relieved by his presence. Since urban evangelical churches, as well as their highland equivalents, are marked by a heavily spiritual view of Christianity, as exemplified in their disparagement of any connection between Christianity and “the world,” the church plays a minor role in helping people secure employment or skills training.

A church ill-prepared for urban challenges fails to appeal to a young Dani generation, for the relevance of Christianity is closely related to its ability to meet practical needs, make political sense, and to articulate a sense of past, present, and future of individual and corporate lives in a way that provides meaning for its adherents. The evangelical churches that have become the model for much of urban Dani Christianity are ill-equipped to fully prepare Dani for the present in which Dani live and the future that looms before them. This admittedly dire analysis, which focuses primarily on church transplants stylized on missionary predecessors, does not account for the existence of alternative churches (e.g. Pentecostal, Roman Catholic, mainline Protestant) in Jayapura.

**Intertribal church conflict**

Between April 13 and 15, 1999, an emergency island-wide GKII Synod meeting was held in Kotaraja (Kabupaten Jayapura) to discuss whether the present chairman of the synod (Ketua Sinode) should step down because he and his staff were, in the words of a participant, “living in sin” (i.e. they were accused of having two wives and stealing church money). Also, under his leadership, the church was increasingly influenced by the military. The meeting shed light on significant issues threatening the unity of the church. In the end, the chairman retained his seat as chairman of the GKII synod. A Dani participant described the gathering not as a meeting, but a war (perang). However, out of their heated discussion, two camps developed, for and against the chairman and his staff. Each day of the meeting was filled with debates over hotly divisive ethical issues, as well as discussions about what role the church should play in society, in view of numerous human rights violations against its members. These realities illuminated the objectified nature of the urban, multiethnic church – something to be debated and contested.

The background of the meeting illuminates the tribal dynamics and economic strategizing that underpinned various political maneuverings at the synod level, and which threatened the unity of the church in general. In the January 1999, due to the moral problems of the chairman of the synod, several GKII students drafted a letter requesting the chairman to relinquish his leadership. He refused. So an emergency synod meeting was held. It is important to note that the Me and Dani tribes were the most numerous members in the GKII synod-wide. However, from the early 1960s, when the church was nationalized, to 1975, the KINGMI (GKII) church leadership was made up entirely of Moluccans, who were among the first evangelists in the highlands, along with Timorese and Manadonese.

For fifteen years (1960–1975) these leaders did not have a training program to advance highland Papuans (i.e. no theological colleges, and no scholarship funds.
were given to Papuans although funds were available). According to an informant, the attitude of the Moluccans toward the Papuans was summarized in a Moluccan’s statement, “these Papuans won’t make it.” Scholarship funds became the major issue as the Moluccan leadership used church scholarship funds to support their own family members and not Papuans. Given this leadership disparity, the Papuans wanted the Moluccans out of leadership. The CMA provided funds to synod leaders, who then used those monies for their own children’s schooling (i.e. master’s level education) rather than equitably distributing scholarships. This created a situation in which the Manadonese, Timorese, and Ambonese (particularly the Moluccans) fought each other at the synod level over leadership positions, leaving the Papuans as spectators.

Despite the eventual Dani leadership of the synod in 1986, signaling a significant shift of leadership from the Moluccans to the Papuans, the new chairman of the synod (WD) rejected scholarship funds to a fellow Dani, which, in the eyes of other Papuans, reflected his collusion with the Moluccans. The Dani began to graduate from college in the mid-1980s and expected a fellow Dani in a position of influence would assist them in obtaining a scholarship for graduate studies (master’s level). Yet, according to one source, the Dani chairman of the synod became a member of the elite Moluccans in Jayapura. This conflict also reflected the tensions between the WD and the GVD, for the chairman was a WD, but a strong scholarship applicant was a GVD. Thus the GVD opposed the chairman’s leadership, and the synod then elected a Me as chairman.

Succinctly stating the problem, a GKII leader argued, “Tribalism still exists within the church.” During the April 1999 meeting, Me and Nduga leaders and students sought to end the chairmanship of [the chairman], a fellow Me. The issue became interpreted by others as enmeshed with tribalism (sukuisme). Others said the intent of the Me leaders on deposing the chairman reflected infighting within the Me community itself. However, the Me leaders argued forcefully that the present chairman was receiving payments from the military, which prevented the chairman from raising an issue about military killings of Ndugas and others around the Freeport mines, around Timika and Tembagapura (Copper Town). (Most of the Nduga and Amungme churches are GKII, while about a third of the Amungme churches are Roman Catholic.) It is important to note that the chairman, as head of all GKII churches, had been appointed by the military commander (panglima) of West Papua to serve as an advisor to Freeport mines, further complicating his role. The Me leadership believed the chairman was in collusion with the military to keep silent over the killings and rampant human rights violations.

The Dani, on the other hand, considered the Me both responsible for the synod-wide leadership as well as for its destruction. Consequently, the Dani wanted the Me chairman to remain, believing that the problem reflected Me infighting. The Dani were resolute about keeping the same leadership, although some influential, elderly Dani church leaders did not fully trust the Me. This mistrust could be traced to two reasons. First, Dani leaders asserted that the Me leaders had not responded to the human rights violations among the Nduga under the New Order regime. Second, Dani felt betrayed during the 1977 war, when a Me synod
chairman failed to help the Dani. Although the Me chairman was elected in 1977, he claims the previous Moluccan chairman did not want to give up his office, thereby preventing the new Me leader from taking his position. However, the Dani do acknowledge that the Me chairman eventually requested the military commander remove his troops from Pyramid during the 1977 war, which he eventually did.

A Dani church district superintendent, along with a Dani theology student, rejected the notion of deposing the Me chairman because, they argued, “the Me started the problem with [the chairman] and the Me were going to replace him with another troublemaker anyway.” This has motivated the Dani to partner with the Moluccans. The outcome of the synod meeting was that the Moluccans, the Dani, and coastal Papuans decided to begin another synod.

It is important to recognize that if the Dani segment of the GKII became the basis for Moluccans and coastal Papuans to form a new synod, the Dani may have an opportunity to maintain their own identity. The majority in the new synod would be Dani, yet they may defer authority to the Moluccans, as they have in the past. This question should be seen within the context of the past experience of the Baptists in West Papua, where the Dani made up the majority. The ketua sinode (chairman of the synod) of the Baptist church was a Moluccan, while coastal Papuans served as leaders below him. Eventually, though, the Moluccans were thrown out as synod chairs. Moluccans, then, tried to approach Sorong Papuans in order to create a new Baptist Synod.

The Moluccans functioned as good middle men between Papuans and government because they were Malay but born in West Papua. The Moluccans felt they knew Papuans because they were in West Papua for years. And Papuans felt that since the Moluccans were in West Papua by a long time, they could represent them well. Furthermore, the Moluccans were more educated because they were urban-based. These issues tied into identity and the future. The Dani felt they were not part of the leadership of GKII synod so they wanted to start a new synod. The Dani were grateful to the Me for starting churches in Jayapura, Jayawijaya, and Timika, and Sekolah Tinggi Teologi (STT, Theological College) Walter Post, but they also considered the Me as instigators of trouble because of the situation with the Me synod leadership and the protests by the other Me.

The Dani and Me ethnic stereotypes and religious differences get played out in the course of synod leadership meetings. The Dani and Me were both upland tribes that lay relatively close to each other in the central highlands and were observably proud of the history of Christianity among them. The Me played a significant role in Dani church history since they were evangelized earlier than the Dani and then accompanied early Western missionaries to Dani areas, being interlocutors between the Dani and the Westerners. When asked to provide descriptions of the Dani, both my Me and Dani informants said that the Dani were more quiet and less willing to start problems. According to a college-educated Dani informant, “it is hard to work with Paniai [Me] people. They are too strict with their principles. Too stubborn. For example, if they say ‘yes’ they won’t change. If they say, ‘1 + 1 = 1’ and I say ‘no, it equals 2,’ they will adamantly say ‘no, it
equals 1”. They are not very flexible.” The Dani characterized themselves as peaceful (berdiam), wanting to listen more than to speak, happy to be taught, easily influenced, and taking pleasure in working together. They say their view of life (pandangan hidup) was summarized in the statement, “it is better to live together than to be divided.” The Me, on the other hand, were characterized by Dani as hard, aggressive, melancholy, and animated by a “just me” individualism, qualities that may reflect the Me entrepreneurial spirit and their being referred to as “primitive capitalists” (Pospisil 1963).

The Me were, according to a Dani informant, tribal fanatics (fanatisme kesukuan). Given Me advancement in education and their comparably more assertive personality, some Dani did not feel Dani could compete in church leadership. A Me told me, “the Me go after cowrie shells.” Traditionally Me were able to count to a high number whereas the Dani could count to no more than ten (some say only to three). Consequently, during the emergency synod meeting the Dani and Me were symbolically at war; their weapons were not bows and arrows, but Bible verses and theology, and their prize was control of one of the largest churches in West Papua.

Another interesting feature that provides insight into the intertribal ecclesiastic conflicts between the Dani and the Me is their past religious experience in their highland communities. It is significant that the Me were contacted by missionaries in 1938, with sustained contact beginning in 1947, whereas the Dani contact with missionaries began several years later. Highland GKII Me had more internal conflicts due to the Zacheus movement (Gyi 1995) and the presence of Roman Catholics. Highland Evangelical Me (i.e. GKII members) were forced to defend their beliefs against the Roman Catholics, and thus spent great energy in social and theological posturing. The Dani never had such a religious conflict, for among most WD only evangelicals (mostly GKII) were present, providing little competition in church polity, structure, or theology.

Competition to obtain power for tribal interests was strong, but not new. Once someone secured a position of influence and authority he or she would undoubtedly consider his or her own people first for promotions, scholarships, and other advancements. Indeed, tribalism (sukuisme) was an extraordinarily strong motivating factor within the political dynamism of the synod. Gaining an influential position was among the highest virtues for highland peoples. Essentially, the synod meeting of 1999 reflected the internal problems between Dani and Me, rather than purely theological disagreements. Multiple loyalties to kinship, territory, and land made urban living a complex endeavor. However, even within the church, tribal loyalties persisted as determining factors in church politics.

The fractured foundation of education

Education played a vital role in Western mission outreach in West Papua since the first contact between Western missions and Papuan groups. Beginning in the early 1960s, education foundations (yayasan pendidikan) sought to administer teachers,
curricula, and physical properties, including elementary (Sekolah Dasar), junior high (Sekolah Menengah Pertama), and high (Sekolah Menengah Atas) schools and their educational facilities. Four major foundations (yayasan) in West Papua controlled the vast majority of educational efforts (1) Yayasan Persekolahan Persahabatan Gereja-Gereja Injili (YPPGI, Educational Foundation for Evangelical Churches), which includes all GKII (KINGMI), GIDI, and Baptist Churches (2) Yayasan Pendidikan Kristen (YPK, Educational Foundation for Christians), from the GKI (3) Yayasan Pendidikan dan Persekolahan Katolik (YPPK, Catholic Education and Schools Association), for the Roman Catholic community, and (4) YAPIS, for Muslims.

Since the 1980s, several smaller foundations have arisen, such as Yayasan Betani (Bethany Foundation), which is a Pentecostal foundation that serves educational and social needs of the inhabitants of West Papua. Before the Indonesian annexation of West Papua, Dutch officials gave Christian missions the responsibility of overseeing education. Under the Dutch, all schools were run by Christian missions, and the Dutch provided funding for salaries for teachers, supervisors and educational supplies, giving missionaries the freedom to teach religious subjects. When Indonesia acquired West Papua, they determined to start a state education system rather than continue with the practice of funding the church or missions. It was under Indonesian authority that religious bodies in West Papua were required to establish education foundations, thus giving control of the church to the government. Under the New Order regime, beginning in the 1960s, Indonesian state schools were established throughout West Papua, co-existing with mission-instituted religious schools.

The importance of the yayasan lay in its purpose of retaining a theological identity, for each yayasan follows the mandate of their charter to support the teaching of its own theological and moral commitments and each hired staff and teachers of the same persuasion. However, since the 1980s the government began to reduce its subsidies to church-related yayasan (foundations), forcing them to allow the government to provide teachers, and causing a radical adjustment to the religious makeup of the teaching faculty. For instance, YPPGI, the education foundation for evangelical churches, was started on September 30, 1961, just after Indonesia entered West Papua under UN supervision. Because of the lack of funds, YPPGI was forced to accept Muslim and Roman Catholic teachers provided by the government. In the YPPGI elementary school in Sentani (Kabupaten Jayapura), for instance, the only evangelical instructor taught Christianity. All the other teachers, including the principal, were not evangelists.

Many church leaders argue that although the yayasan in theory provides support for Christian education, in reality they serve as channels through which the government endeavors to weaken Christian education and strengthen Muslim advancement. This does not seem far from the truth, given the disparity of subsidies given to Christian and Muslim foundations. I was told by the director of a yayasan that Muslim countries contribute to YAPIS as well, though I was unable to substantiate that claim. According to my informant, YPK receives about Rp30 million per annum and YPPK about Rp50 million.
In 1995, the government provided YPPGI with Rp3 million a quarter (equivalent to approximately US$4,000), which had to cover salaries of employee as well as building construction and maintenance costs for 115 schools island-wide. By contrast, and illustrative of the government’s concession to Islam, YAPIS, the Muslim foundation, that same year fared much better, having received Rp3 billion to support the building of mosques and educational complexes. The YPPGI leadership consisted mostly of Dani, Me, Moni (uplanders) and people from Jayapura, rather than non-Papuans.

In addition, the exclusively Bible-school centered notion of education forwarded by Western missions has produced a generation of young Dani unskilled to effectively contribute to the modern society in which they live. Said a Papuan intellectual,

There’s no institution to help people learn about other ethnic groups that are coming…. Because in the highlands, pastors are the only well-educated people in their setting. They teach only Bible and theology from year to year… we have our own educational system. From the kampung (village) you go to a Bible school. From the village you go to Bible school. You spend two to three years. You learn how to read and write. Then, after you finish that you go another three years to another Bible school. After that you go to Nabire, learn Bible and theology again. From there they come here [e.g. STT-WP] where they learn Bible and theology again. Nothing else. You can imagine these graduates of these theology schools. When they go back, all they teach is Bible, Bible, Bible, period.

Western missions put immense effort into translating the Bible into the various Dani vernaculars. Many locals today feel the Bible alone has been inadequate to face modern, urban economic and social challenges.

**Conclusion**

The struggle of Christianity in the metropolitan centers of West Papua refers essentially to the ways in which it became a privatized religion, ill-equipped, in its bequeathed evangelical formulation, to serve as an all-encompassing reality for city-dwelling Dani believers. The struggle lay in the fact that Christianity and its institutions became privatized, divested of their capacity to be an all-encompassing reality to Dani city dwellers, unlike the place and function it held within the traditional Dani setting. Alongside its claims and associations, new visions and modern realities usurped its once central position within the Dani community.

To understand the Dani experience, it is important to recognize not only the power of religion and religious discourse in capturing people’s allegiances, but the equally important strong bonds persisting through associations. Religious skirmishes, then, were fought not purely on theological grounds. Often, more was going on. The social aspect of these struggles, namely, that these are not just
theologically motivated but socially, ethnically, and politically driven as well, representing a discourse of competing communities, and the ultimate visions that animate them. Religious affiliation serves as an important identity marker in their struggle (perjuangan) and justification for self-preservation.

Although some urban Dani were satisfied with the church’s condition in the city, many lacked the confidence in it they once held. The unified social canopy of tradition was torn into pieces, and its remnants, challenged by the fissiparous institutions, authorities, and ideals of urban Jayapura, contended for popular allegiance. Accompanying the modern conditions of Jayapura was unparalleled social mobility, difference, exclusion, marginalization, and a fluidity of personal and social boundaries. Being dislocated from their primary source of socialization (i.e. religious traditions, social structure, and a moral framework that once served as a unifying social glue), the urban Dani Christians were forced to choose among those social and religious associations that could best sustain them in their new environment. They chose individually among competing visions of how the world ought to be, acting not as abstract theoreticians, but as practical, instrumental thinkers. Many young Dani believe that a good future included having a motorcycle, a television, a cement house, and a cell phone. They embraced competing visions of the future with ambiguity and hesitation. The question “what works?” rather than “what’s truth?” drove Dani decision-making. In this sense, Dani continued to be exceedingly open-minded to new alternatives.

No combined Christian Dani-Muslim pendatang social institution arose during the New Order regime in Jayapura. Acceptance of Papuan Muslims by Papuan Christians was ambiguous. In the words of a 29-year-old urban Dani man, “if a Dani becomes Muslim, we don’t accept them anymore. Wamena people [i.e. highland Dani] have to be Christian, they cannot be Muslim.” Yet in Dani communities there appeared to be relative acceptance of Muslim pendatang marriages. With conversion to Islam the Dani became embedded in new social and religious affiliations. Some urban Dani received consequential upward social mobility because of such willingness to change religions.

Despite its marginalized position in civic society, the church remained the most important institution among the Dani. What happens in the church? Although its institutional status may have been characteristically relativized in its modern moorings, the church nevertheless provides a critical “free space” where, in evangelical parlance, people become “new creations” and “transformed,” acquiring new notions of themselves, their community, and God (cf. Martin 1990: 66, 279). We turn now to the role of the church in modern, Dani urban life.
5 The vision of the church
The New Jerusalem

This chapter illuminates what actually happens in the church and happens to the self in church. It sheds light on the vision of the New Jerusalem promised by evangelical (and Pentecostal) city churches. Not simply a delineation of liturgies, songs, and programs, this chapter examines how the church transforms the self and imparts an understanding of others and the world. The Dani reimagine themselves in the context of these transethnic, future-oriented eschatological communities, making the church a crucial site of individual and social transformation. The Dani are remade as they dwell in this alternative moral community and share its ultimate frame of reference. Simply put, the church is where new identities are formed, and where the Dani are able to imagine themselves as children of God. The New Jerusalem is the imagined community that is characterized as being the dwelling place of God. Whereas not always explicitly stated, the New Jerusalem connotes harmony between God, individuals, and communities. The New Jerusalem is a reflection of heaven on earth, where human beings experience peace with each other and God and anticipate an eternal reward in heaven.

By the decade of the 1980s, it was evident that the church itself, and the unique free space it created, served as an important religious sphere for the incubation of new ideas and new understandings of self (cf. Martin 1990). What is the church? – a gathering of people who share trust in God as revealed in Scripture. In addition, the church provides the free space for reflexive monitoring, and, as such, serves as a main socializing agency in the metropolitan center. Faith here is understood sociologically and psychologically as “a sense of ontological security that will carry the individual through transitions, crises, and circumstances of high risk…. Trust in the existential anchorings of reality in an emotional, and to some degree in a cognitive, sense rests on confidence in the reliability” of God (Giddens 1991: 38). South African scholar David Bosch describes the church as “that segment of the world that is obedient to God,” “the people of God,” and, as sign and symbol, “an instrument of the kingdom of God.”

The church occupies a unique position within society, for as a new community in the social realities of West Papua divided culturally (e.g. Papuan vs. pendatang), religiously (Christian vs. Muslim), economically (rich vs. poor), racially (e.g. Melanesian vs. Austronesian), and educationally (educated vs. uneducated) the church affirms that all are “one in Christ Jesus” (Galatians 3: 27). That is to
say, “[t]he members of the new community find their identity in Jesus Christ rather than in their race, culture, social class, or sex” (Bosch 1992: 172). Princeton University sociologist Robert Wuthnow notes that the church is a community of memory, of moral discourse, of service, and functions as storyteller as well as the transmitter of identity (Wuthnow 1993: 20–54). At its root, it is a place where believers glorify God (see Taylor 1989: 187). At the same time the church exhibits characteristics found in all social organizations: (a) sharing of convictions, (b) sharing of a fellowship, (c) co-operation, and (d) authority or coercion. Yet, it is a unique institution, requiring no money for its services, and promising a multiethnic community of unconditional love and nurture, at least in its ideal sense.

Here I consider the modes of self-reproduction in “the modern differentiated religious sphere” of the urban church, and recognize the church sphere as “an accessible and legitimate vehicle for moral-practical reflection and for inner-subjective expression” (Casanova 1994: 214, 233). While the church has been delimited by modern conditions, it remains the most salient institution for city-dwelling Dani, for it provides social leverage against feelings of comprehensive social anomie. In its confines, the church fortifies a shared supralocal world, where Dani gain “a collective sense of peoplehood” (see Foster 1997b: 2). As such, the church provides a sphere in which Dani are recontextualized in the shared moral community.

Robert Hefner suggests that Max Weber identifies “transcendentalism” at the core of the doctrines of the world religions.

It is not just that the doctrines of these religions put a greater distance between the mundane and spiritual worlds or that they “reject this world” by redefining it in relation to another…. The real force of the world religions lies in their linkage of these strict transcendental imperatives to institutions for the propagation and control of religious knowledge and identity over time and space.

(Hefner 1993a: 19)

It is important to note that the urban church has been subsumed into Dani tradition. Its “transcendentalism” is directed toward the God as revealed in the Bible. In terms of ecclesiastical diversity, some urban churches maintain the same styles and liturgies as modeled by early Western missionaries, while others seek a more radical transformation of the person through, for instance, concerted rehabilitation programs. Even in the church there is a plurality of meanings, different worship styles, and ritual expressions. As such, the term “Dani church” presents an inaccurate picture of the social realities of urban Dani ecclesiastical diversity. It is important to note that there is no such thing as “the Dani Church.” However, for convenience, the term describes Dani Christians in the context of the urban church and therefore reflects the twofold notion of “church” as “believers” and “church” as particular congregations. An important premise is that identity, for all its theoretical and practical difficulties, is a dynamic, fluid concept.
Despite the fact that urban churches do exist consisting of a vast majority of Dani members (especially around Pos 7) none of these is ethnically Purely Dani because of the presence of minimal numbers of non-Dani and the use of Bahasa Indonesia as the ecclesiastical lingua franca. This fact represents a significant sociological shift, for “the Dani Church,” though perhaps existing in the highlands, can no longer be perceived as a unified social product in its urban context. Other Papuan Christians (e.g. Me, Yali, Nduga, Amungme) as well as a few Austronesian Christians (e.g. Ambonese, Javanese, Manadonese) have found their spiritual homes in these, mostly Dani, congregations. Still other congregations consist of a majority of Austronesian Christians and a minority of Dani congregants. The majority of urban Dani Christians attend churches that are ethnically mixed. There is no homogeneous “Dani church” in Jayapura. Rather, their social distribution points to the fact that urban Dani Christians are scattered, in some cases in more densely populated Dani congregations, yet in others as minorities within multiethnic gatherings throughout the evangelical and Pentecostal churches of Jayapura.

The loss of Dani ethnic homogeneity within the urban churches enabled them to experience ethnic pluralism within the confines of a shared moral community. A particularly important implication of the loss of ethnic identity in the city churches was that Dani were forced to self-reflect on and compare their social condition with other Papuans and non-Papuans who shared the same religious commitments. Moreover, the prejudice that some Dani may have felt against pendatang was assuaged and heightened through more intense social contact and shared experiences in worship.

**The ends of the church**

**Religious conversion**

Generally mission Christianity “appealed to a reality seated in a metaculture; offered doctrines, disciplines, and rituals directed to completions of the person in relation to sociocultural orders; provided ways of transcending or evading the inevitable corruptions of culture and society; and also afforded political opportunities to the hitherto powerless” (Burridge 1991: 39). Simply put, the task of the church, and the missionary movement that helped to found it, is nothing less than metanoia.

Within the Christian tradition a metanoia signifies a complete change of heart and mind, usually a reversal of previous dispositions. It realizes the relationship between metaculture and culture and includes repentance (turning to God) for past sins, acceptance of the universal significance of the sacred events, reconciliation in Christ through one’s fellows, a life based on Christian faith, hope, and love… What is essential is that metanoia is…enlightenment, an awareness of the truth of things that goes beyond sociocultural constructions of reality; the discovery of one’s true self in the pervasiveness of the divine presence.

(Burridge 1991: 154)
This turning to God is a common priority among Christian missionary efforts worldwide. Of course, the concept of *metanoia* was not introduced by evangelical missions – religious conversion is an important aspect of most world religions. The real difficulty, as Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann point out, is to be able to keep on taking it seriously; to retain a sense of its plausibility. *This* is where the religious community comes in. It provides the indispensable plausibility structure for the new reality. In other words, Saul may have become Paul in the aloneness of religious ecstasy, but he could remain Paul only in the context of the Christian community that recognized him as such and confirmed the “new being” in which he now located his identity.

(1966: 158)

Among evangelical missionaries this “turning” issues forth by way of response to an invitation to accept the gospel message of salvation. The end of the church, then, is to provide an atmosphere in which metanoia occurs – “that transformation of heart and mind which will enable them to realize, first, that requiting God’s love for oneself and humankind can only be completed in a love of one’s fellows in community; second, that contained in this completion is not only a radical transformation of the person, oneself, but potentially of all the world” (Burridge 1991: 4). Describing the change that occurred in his life after becoming a Christian, Mr Tabuni states simply, “my love for others is greater than before.” Tabuni’s statement illustrates the personal and sociological impact of religious change.

In evangelical parlance, the church’s goal is to enable people “to be more like Christ” by “putting on the new person”: “Therefore if anyone is in Christ, that person is a new creature; the old things have passed away; behold, new things have come” (II Corinthians 5:17). Indeed, a “special relationship is posited between the believer and Jesus Christ” (Burridge 1969: 125). For evangelical missionaries, conversion entails recognition of one’s personal sin and an acceptance of Jesus Christ’s mission of death and resurrection as the only salvific means to peace with God. Less explicitly, it entails a concomitant acceptance of a predominantly evangelical perspective on Christianity.

**The intersection of class and race: the new family**

The concept of the church was not new among Dani Christians. What was new, however, was that many experienced for the first time a degree of multiethnic diversity within the community that they had never encountered before. In the urban church, the Dani were enveloped in a new social space where cultural and religious identities were articulated. The sociological makeup of the Christian church in Jayapura consisted of an intersection of class and race. Highly significant was that, whereas in civil society various social classes and races inhabited distinct social worlds, within the ecclesiastical community persons encountered one another in the intimacy of worship and service. The church existed to reconfigure the individual to conform to the imagined religious ideal, “to be a new creation.”
Personal transformation occurred in the context of wider social encounter, within the sphere of the church, making it a particularly unique social institution among the Dani (and other Papuan groups). While a large number of Western missionaries frequented the “American” evangelical church at Pos 7, others attended local urban churches, making the urban church a diverse social space. Church members consisted of students, government employees (pegawai negri), Western missionaries, among others; that is, they represented the multi-class cross-section of Indonesian society in West Papua. There was no other comparable voluntary association that attracted persons across such vast boundaries of gender, class, race, income, and education. The church was where a government employee, school teacher, parking attendant, gardener, and college student gathered and affirmed a common moral anchor in the urban milieu.

The large KINGMI (GKII) Bethesda, which in August 1998 celebrated its twenty-fifth anniversary, typifies the social complexity of the metropolitan church as well as reflects the reality that Dani fail to obtain positions in church leadership among most urban evangelical congregations. The Bethesda Church is a large building, able to accommodate perhaps 500 people, with a high ceiling, organ, and electronic keyboard. The hymnal, “Nayayian Kemanggangan Iman” (Victory of Faith), consists entirely of translated Western hymns. The church is located in the college town of Abepura. The Dani girls who sing in the children’s choir (about 50 voices) wear colorful frilly dresses. While the church consists of a large percentage of Dani (and other Papuans), there are no highland persons serving on the church council (majelis).

The paucity of the Dani and other Papuans occupying leadership positions is illuminating given that CMA’s motivation for working in West Papua was to evangelize upland peoples. All members of the council are non-Papuan (pendatang). The most outspoken leader is a Javanese man from the Central Java city of Solo. The pastor and his wife, both Ambonese, lead the choir. The Moluccan church leaders wear suits and jackets with white shirts and neckties, which are uncomfortably warm in the tropical heat. I was told that despite the interracial mix of the congregation the absence of Dani leadership in the congregation is justifiable for a variety of reasons. First, the financial burden carried by the students of Abepura preclude them from traveling far to attend church on Sundays. A Western missionary mentioned that if they did have the finances, Dani students would rather attend a more culturally homogenous church, such as those around Pos 7 in Sentani. A combination of proximity and financial limitation determines their choice of church. Second, Dani continue to attend these ethnically mixed churches because of the appeal of modernity. They consider large churches, with electronic keyboards and hymns translated from English and “high” liturgies, as modern.

“High” liturgy for the Dani refers to the use of congregational-responsive reading and congregational recitation of the Christian creeds such as the Doxology, the Apostle’s Creed, and the Lord’s Prayer. For this reason, the formality of the liturgy of the GKI (mainline Protestants) appeals immensely to some Dani, particularly students who view it as a reflection of progressive, modern ways. Dani students studying on the coast (i.e. Jayapura) learn this more liturgical worship expression
and return (if they do return) to the highland and introduce the new style to their upland communities. Despite their modest position, the Dani have expanded their cultural repertoire as they have encountered larger social influences in the context of the church.

Among the Pentecostal Dani is a distinctly different attitude regarding ethnicity, race, and the church. Whereas many evangelical Dani I spoke to prefer to worship in a culturally homogenous (at least Papuan) environment, the Pentecostal Dani insist that in Pentecostal churches they feel at home. The Pentecostal Dani tell me that there is a strong sense of family among its members, within the believing community. In the words of a young Pentecostal Dani,

If I meet one of the congregational members [in the street], I truly feel that they are my family. Whether he’s white, black, or brown, I feel they are my family. If I walk down the street and see a church member I feel, “Hey, that’s my family.” But, if I meet my [biological] family, I just feel normal. I don’t feel anything special. It’s just normal. The family of my church is closer than my [biological] family. . . . We know each other heart to heart. Not skin to skin. So, we look inside the heart, to know whether he’s family. So, we can change our knowledge. We’re closer to each other than our own family that we never speak to, or share our problems with. But, here in this family relationship, it’s more special. I feel that what I have in my heart, I can tell you and what’s in your heart you can tell me. That makes us more close and open with each other.

Before, we could not associate with other types of people. We really hated the straight hair people [rambut lurus]. We always wanted to kick them off this island. But, later I learned that the Word of God says that all people are created in the image of God. All people were created in the image of God. So, that means that the white-skin people were created by God and the black people, like me, are also created in God’s image. And the people from Java are also created in God’s image. What is the difference between me and them? They are the same as I. They are my family. I start to understand that God loves Americans, and he also loves Javanese. He also loves Lani [Dani]. That means that there’s absolutely no difference between us. I learned from God that they and I are one. I cannot make a difference between them and me. Even though we have different backgrounds. I always think about the fact that we all came from God. That makes me feel that everyone is my family. And we are all one family of God. In this world we can say that someone is from Sumatra, Java, and I’m from the interior. But, if you look at the Word of God, you’ll see we all come from God.

According to the Pentecostal Dani, Christianity redefined kinship patterns because of their acceptance of a common “father” (i.e. heavenly father).

“Doing church”: the ritual of ecclesiastical space

Ritual behavior always formed an integral part of Dani identity. In their traditional environment, Dani religiosity was characterized by a “desire to search out, identify,
and be in proper relationship to the spirit beings in the universe” (Hayward 1997: 46). Every event that required communication with ancestral spirits, such as those requiring their assistance and good favor, was mediated by ritual activity and centered on the desire to control them (see Hayward 1997: 131–163; Larson 1987: 71f.).

The Dani religion is inherently pragmatic. Spirits in the jungle control the known universe. The task of traditional the Dani religious practice involves controlling the power of the spirits through different kinds of prayers and rituals. Among the Mulia Dani (WD), for instance, if a life form is identified as a kugi (spirit) life form they “will seek to establish a proper relationship with it through appropriate ritual behavior, often in the form of sacrifices to either placate, propitiate, or otherwise manipulate” (Hayward 1997: 46). Among the Iлага Dani (WD), “[t]he appeasement and conciliation of ancestral spirits is the most central feature of Dani magic and ritual. More pigs are killed for them, more sacred objects consecrated to them, and more rituals performed in their name than for all other spirits in the hierarchy of beings in the supernatural world of the Dani” (Larson 1987: 68).

Learning to control the spirits, through prescribed rites, served to appease the spirits’ wrath and invite their blessing. Fear and ambiguity marked the relationship of the Dani with the spirit world; they feared the spirit’s wrath, but their knowledge and application of the formulaic model of ritual practice pacified the spirits’ vengeance. So, according to an informant, “it’s very easy for Dani to grab a hold of a model, ‘this is how you do church, this is the structure you build, this is the kind of leadership you make’.” The Dani adopted a model of ecclesiology introduced by Western mission, with the anticipation that the promises of Christianity, and the New Jerusalem, will be realized in their lives in part through their adherence to rites of the church. Morality occupied a background position in the religious economy of Dani lifeways. Learning to perform the right religious activities provided fundamental protection against harm and misfortune. This religious perspective was transferred to how most Dani viewed the church, both in its hinterland and urban contexts. From the viewpoint of a Western missionary,

It’s just learning to perform the right religious activities. “I’m supposed to get baptized, okay I’ll get baptized.” In Irian Jaya, if people want to be baptized, they will go to a baptism class for maybe ten weeks. They’ll be there every week. As soon as they get baptized, you’ll never see them again in the church. They did it…. So they come to the coast and get involved in all kinds of sin…. At first it doesn’t make any difference. “I’m a Christian, I can drink all night long, I can go to the prostitute house.” That person is still in that [traditional] structure of religion, so he feels he’s still a Christian.

Jean Comaroff notes two uses of the term “ritual.” In her words, “ritual has been used to designate any kind of repetitive action whose stylized form is dense with social significance – dance, dress, even deportment. Yet if this is ‘ritual’ in the lower case, there is still the ‘Ritual’ that is set apart, for its practitioners, from
everyday time and space: Ritual with ultimate referents” (Comaroff 1994: 313). While the urban church can be understood correctly to consist of ritual in either sense, it is the second notion, “Ritual with ultimate referents,” that most adequately describes Dani religious experience. Expressed simply, the ritual provided by the church serves as a functional substitute for traditional Dani ritual performance.

The dominant theme in the ritual life of the Dani is that of life and death, which also serves as the focus of two subordinate themes: prosperity and despair, and health and sickness. Through their observance of these rituals the Dani hope to triumph, collectively and individually, in life.... Rituals further serve the Dani community as opportunities to reaffirm their cultural institutions, their beliefs and values.... Further, ritual is a form of communication, and for the Dani it is communication between the living and their ancestors, and between human beings and the spirits.

(Hayward 1997: 131)

The urban church provides the dual function of providing a ritual substitute for the requirements of Dani religiosity as well as filling the content of ritual with the ideals of the new person. The Dani take church seriously, mirroring the seriousness with which they practiced their traditional rituals. Expressed simply, the church is a new ritual. Given its urban location, the church as ritual serves to mediate a wider social experience by making “visible external signs of internal states” (Douglas 1994: 70), thereby resonating with norms that the human actor finds necessarily valid. Essential to Dani ritual behavior is the reconciling of damaged relationships with the environment, one another, and the spirits. Life-sustaining associations are maintained through ritual.1 In these new associations, new persons are made, for the church as ritual is morally charged. As individuals encounter ritual they inevitably ask themselves whether there is a consonance between what has been idealized in the ceremony and their own perspective. Ritual and mythic communication is both public and individual.

What is communicated in ritual and myth is that which has been given public authorization and reflects truths that are foundational for the majority in the community. However, what has been idealized is not necessarily archetypical for everybody. The discontinuity between social and individual idealizations may result in both positive contributions in the form of creativity and innovation as well as negative responses such as social deviancy and maladaptive behavior. Its significance resides well beyond the doors of the church. Ritual “not only makes and remakes its actors, but can also call on them to make and remake worlds” (Comaroff 1994: 314).

A 38-year-old Western Dani claimed, “All sources of success are from God alone. I’m aware that my life in this world is only provisional. So, I have to go to church to prepare myself for eternity.” According to several conversion narratives, a salient measure of received Christianity is the degree to which traditional customs have been displaced by Christian rituals. In the words of a Dani living in Sentani, “Since becoming a Christian I feel my life has changed. Before I received the gospel I was still too influenced by the old customs and traditions
The vision of the church (adat istiadat). But after becoming a Christian the influence of those customs has decreased.” Dani cultural logic suggests that their religious identity is tied to a future eschaton, the hope of a better world, and thus is future-oriented (e.g. the expression, “yogotak hubuluk motok hanorogo,” – “tomorrow will be better than today”) summarizes aptly their implicit hope and positive attitude.

Women

To begin, it is important to note the wide disparity between the older, married Dani women who have come from the interior as adult with their families, and young Dani women who, whether born in Jayapura or having moved there at a young age, are more adaptable to language, culture, and social mores of the city. Also, distinctions can be made between Dani women in evangelical churches and those in Pentecostal churches. When comparing the responsibilities and opportunities of young Dani women in evangelical and Pentecostal churches, a young Dani woman said,

women are considered not to have value in the typical [GIDI, GKII] city church. In the interior everything is about preaching. It’s just for men. And only for the pastor. If you are not a pastor you cannot preach. It’s the same in the city. At Pondok Pemulihan [Pentecostal church] the men and women are equal when serving the church. We want to bring in people who drink and smoke. We do it together [men and women], to save them. But, in GIDI there is no method like that. In other churches [GIDI, GKII], evangelism is done only by men. But, the men don’t know how to do evangelism. Because they say evangelism is just sending a pastor and his family to another village in order to preach. But they don’t know about intensive, individual evangelism. They don’t do evangelism on the streets or at the movie theaters.

Whereas the Dani women meet by the hundreds at regional church retreats, their religious role in the city has diminished substantially given the increased time and effort demanded of them to supply the financial needs of their families. Generally, though, according to a Dani church leader, women’s church activities “include arranging flowers and decorations in the church, helping the pastor’s wife, and teaching Sunday school.” Said a Dani church member about older Dani women,

women’s activities consist of making rice cakes boiled in young coconut leaves; organizing visitation, and helping serve the social needs [of the church]. In the women’s worship not all women attend because of their busy schedule. For example, they are late coming home from the garden and market; take care of pigs; take care of children. Also, some women don’t attend because they feel they cannot speak Indonesian well and fluently. There’s a big difference between women in the city compared to those in the village. The difference is in the area of language, spirituality, and harmony. In the village, the spirituality of women is stronger. Here, in Jayapura, their spirituality has declined because they seldom worship.
Given the Dani women’s concentrated activity in their gardens and the marketplace, they have little opportunity to learn to speak or write Bahasa Indonesian adequately. Echoing the sentiments of several informants, one person acknowledged, “Dani women are used less in the city churches – they are not as active – because they don’t speak Indonesian well.” Language has become a severe limiting factor in their participation and leadership in city churches. Nearly all Dani informants mentioned the comparable lack of women’s church activity when speaking about the leadership differences characterizing women in the rural highland and metropolitan center of Jayapura.

Overall, though, despite the time limitations, Dani women have great opportunities for social advancement in the city. A young Dani woman mentions the fact that they can now obtain higher education and participate in business and government:

> Here, in Jayapura, many of the women have higher statuses than men. They’re used more than the men; used for the church, community, or in government. In the village, they are nothing, but here in the city, they are valuable. In the village, women may want to be leaders, but they are not permitted. Here, they can go to school in Jayapura. They can graduate and get a job.

Consequently, the older Dani women carry the heaviest loads, having difficulty with the language, market, and culture of their new home, while young Dani women exhibit great optimism about their future.

City-dwelling Dani women have mixed reactions to the urban church. Generally, for younger Dani women, urban realities provide greater freedom to participate in the church. Gender boundaries are more relaxed in the city. Young Dani women are ambitious and enthusiastic, being among the first generation of Dani women to receive college-level education. However, Dani women who have entered the metropolitan center later in life are severely hampered from leading or participating in church activities. Many older Dani women have failed to learn Bahasa Indonesia and, therefore, end up occupying the peripheries of church activities or not participating at all. Overburdened by feelings of shame, many have not gained the necessary language skills to understand or communicate formally to a wider audience. Added to the burdens of both young and old Dani women are economic conditions that stress out urban women. Economic demands have usurped time and energy that Dani women would rather have spent supporting church activities.

### Source and means of strength

Negotiating their surroundings, and the social and economic difficulties they endure, Dani repeatedly told me they use the Bible for guidance and as a source of strength. A common expression among city-dwelling Dani is that they utilize the Bible “sebagai pedoman hidup” (like a compass or guide for living).

> For me, the Bible is a book of history, because it’s filled with the stories of humankind. But also it’s about the history of God, because it is his story
of being in the lives of humankind. The Bible speaks of living history (sejarah yang hidup) because it’s a story about the Living God who will never change (Hebrews 13:8). Because of that, the Bible can give life to each person that reads and meditates on it. The Bible has a dual function. For me, I can use the Bible for seeking answers and comfort (jawaban dan hiburan). In facing suffering, the promises of God in the Bible are a source of consolation that strengthens my faith and gives me optimism that the next day will be better. Because of that, I always read the Bible.

The Dani view the Bible as abstract, truth-encapsulated knowledge, and at times like a talisman. Their reading of it is for comfort and direction: “The Bible is history because it has the events of the past written by prophets (nabi-nabi). So, it becomes history for those who believe. The Bible is filled with truth, so [by reading it] I can know Jesus.” Said another, “I read the Bible for comfort and answers. When I face difficulties there are [Bible] verses that comfort me in my loneliness. When I don’t have food I pray to God and am given food by others. [The Bible] provides answers for my life at any moment there’s a need…Jesus Christ is the exact answer when I experience difficulties.” It is important to note, however, that the overwhelming majority of city-dwelling Dani read the Bible in Bahasa Indonesia rather than in their own Dani dialect. Therefore, contextualization of Christianity in an urban area may require translation of the Bible in the lingua franca rather than an indigenous language.

Most importantly, the Bible is a source of transcendent knowledge, for it narrates the story of the creation of the world, the separation between human beings and God because of sin, the world’s eventual demise and its consummation, and the final judgment of all humankind. It tells a story on to which the Dani have grafted their own story. As such, it brings people to a different world, thus becoming at once a source and means for religious knowledge for both missionaries and local people. Scripture serves as a source where both missionaries and the Dani get ideas, as well as contains the possibility to change lives because it is held as authoritative in the community of believers and as a source for inspiration. For many Dani it is tantamount to the voice of God. The son of an OPM member who was raised in PNG, living in the jungles for ten years, exclaimed, “the contents of the Bible are like the voice of God himself…God is the highest authority, then human beings.”

When the Dani read the Bible it can challenge them to rethink their views about themselves, making the Bible’s message both continuous and discontinuous with the exegetical interpretation provided by Western missions. Dani continuity with the Scripture resides, at least on an ideological level, in its confluence with the Dani tradition, and particularly with their central traditive expectation of the emergence of a better world. Older urban Dani still conceptualize the future, better world in terms of the traditional notion of nabelan kabelan, striking a parallel between Dani oral tradition and Christian scriptures. What is most compelling about the Bible for the Dani is that they see themselves and their own history recorded in its pages.
The discontinuities, however, are vast. They include the introduction of an array of new words, ideas, and meanings evoked in the Bible. The translation of the Bible raises particularly difficult theological and linguistic concerns in any culture area (Nida 1960; Sanneh 1989; Smalley 1991). The Dani expectation of a new world, a better society free of physical suffering, was thought of as having arrived with the coming of the missionaries and the gospel. The Bible, then, is a source of religious knowledge and therefore in the interpretive moment can move in various directions (toward tradition, Christianity, or a combination of the two) in its affirmation. For instance, when the congregation says, “Hallelujah,” during the preaching of a sermon, it may be that they believe what is being said affirms their own tradition. At a deep level, the Dani use biblical messages to continue their own beliefs, especially when biblical narratives seem congruent to their own traditional stories. Nabelan kabelan persists as an important theme in the lives of older city-dwelling Dani, providing meaning and hope—an expectation of a better society. But in the younger group, the Bible is seen as a tool for integrating into modernity.

Finally, the Bible is seen by the Dani as a physically relevant religious identity-marker. Said one Dani, “For the majority of the members of the congregation, the Bible is a symbol that indicates that they are Christian.” As such, the Bible has become a potent symbol of religious affiliation, as well as a source of spiritual and physical protection. Some city-dwelling Dani mentioned that they carry the Bible at night if they are going on a long walk or are unsure of their surroundings. Said an older Dani man, “For me, the Bible is a guide for life and source of wisdom. The Bible is very authoritative. From my first to my fifth child, I have always put the Bible next to their heads when they sleep so that God will protect them.” As guide, the Bible serves as both source and means to an end (see Chapter 6). The Bible becomes a new transcultural authority, publicly disseminated within the shared moral community of the church, the social space where the Dani meet others (non-Dani) who likewise accept the Bible as authoritative. Unhappily, because most older Dani are unable to read Bahasa Indonesia they often feel left out and ashamed. Their roles will most likely continue to be marginalized in the urban church.

The Pentecostal Dani

Sociologist David Martin illumines the evangelical (and Pentecostal/charismatic) upsurge throughout much of the world by highlighting the cultural characteristics of evangelicals—namely “participation, pragmatism, competition, personal discipline” (Martin 1999: 49) and the believer’s experience of “both discipline and release” as they “embrace new controls and discover new sources for unburdening themselves” (Martin 1990: 108). This reality holds true for the evangelical (and Pentecostal) churches in West Papua as well. While most city-dwelling Dani were members of evangelical churches, they began attending charismatic and Pentecostal churches in greater numbers during the late New Order Period. Leaving the relatively comfortable setting of the “historic” evangelical churches (i.e. GKII, GIDI, Gereja Baptis Irian Jaya [GBIJ, Baptist Church in Irian Jaya]),
several young Dani were making Pentecostal churches their religious home. Some Dani consider the churches established by evangelical missions as the “old” churches that lack spiritual vitality while the Pentecostal/charismatic churches are seen as new, robust, and “full of the spirit.” Historically, though, this is not necessarily the case (see Neilson 1999). To Dani congregational members, the formalized and routinized liturgy of both the GKII (evangelical) and GKI (mainline Protestant) lacked meaning for their lives.

It is necessary to define the terms “evangelical,” “Pentecostal,” and “charismatic.” Naturally, these terms, as with any closely related religious movement, denote emphases in religious belief and practice. For the purposes of this chapter, I consider evangelical and charismatic as relatively broad notions, whereas I define Pentecostal more narrowly. The term evangelical characterizes those churches that stress belief in personal conversion and salvation by faith in the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ, the Bible as sole authority in matters of faith, and the urgency of evangelization (see Hubbard 1991; Carpenter and Shenk 1990). Evangelicals, that is the “born again,” typically legitimate their theological convictions by appealing to the biblical passage where Jesus tells Nicodemus that “unless one is born again, that person cannot see the kingdom of God” (John 3:3).

Within the notion of evangelicalism, the term Pentecostal refers to the emphasis on the use of the “gifts of the spirits,” particularly glossolalia (“speaking in tongues”) and healing. Central to Pentecostal worship is the immediacy of the Holy Spirit and the signs accompanying the Holy Spirit’s presence. The “gift of tongues” as well as the accompanying “gift of interpretation” are considered signs of God’s presence. While Pentecostals would concur with the theological tenets of evangelicalism, they emphasize a much more experientially demonstrative worship style that attests to the validity of one’s religious conversion. Pentecostal believers highlight the biblical passage in Acts 2, the Day of Pentecost, when the disciples of Jesus were gathered in an upper room and “suddenly there came from heaven a noise like a violent, rushing wind, and it filled the whole house where they were sitting. And there appeared to them tongues as of fire distributing themselves, and they rested on each one of them. And they were all filled with the Holy Spirit and began to speak with other tongues, as the Spirit was giving them utterance” (Acts 2:2–4; see Cox 1995; Martin 1990). The English term charisma comes from the Greek, meaning “gift of God’s grace” (see also Lindholm 1990). Many charismatic believers often remain in their own historic churches. I would define the term charismatic more generally as an expressive quality of worship that is not necessarily, but often is, accompanied by the particular “gifts of the spirit” such as speaking in tongues and interpretation of tongues.

A helpful analysis is presented by Weber’s sociological perspective. Summarizing Weber’s contribution, Talcott Parsons notes the following:

There are two particularly notable points about the concept of charisma, the significance of which should be assessed in the light of the relation of the concept to the development of conceptions of order, i.e., the cognitive aspect
of the process of rationalization. The first is the focus on the individual person who takes the responsibility for announcing a break in the established normative order and declaring this break to be morally legitimate, thereby setting himself in significant respects in explicit opposition to the established order. In order to legitimize his sponsorship of such a break the prophet must in turn invoke a source of moral authority. . . . The second notable and closely connected point about the concept of prophecy is Weber’s insistence that, in spite of the very close connection between it and cognitive conceptions of order, there is a crucial noncognitive aspect of it, namely that of commitment to the break and the order embodied in the break.

(1993: xlii–xliv)

Given these definitions, evangelicals and Pentecostals may both be characterized as charismatic; to be Pentecostal implies an expressive quality of worship style that is dynamic and physically demonstrative (e.g. raising of hands, healing). However, the reverse is not necessarily the case: that is, Pentecostals are charismatic, but to be charismatic does not always imply Pentecostalism. Evangelicals can be charismatically inclined but not necessarily Pentecostal.

The economic crisis of the late 1990s exacerbated the social and economic disparities throughout the entire region. The wealthy as well as the poor were greatly affected, causing them to reconsider and seek more aggressively new avenues of personal and social anchoring. Here I would like to highlight a particular Pentecostal church in Jayapura sponsored by Yayasan Betani Indonesia (YBI, Bethany Foundation of Indonesia) that represented a significant and particularly charismatic religious upsurge among young urban Dani Christians.

The growth of Pondok Pemulihan (House of Restoration) typified the appeal of the Pentecostal movement in West Papua in the late New Order Period, by far the fastest growing movement of the Christian church in West Papua. Most young people of the congregation, including Dani, came from either GIDI or GKII backgrounds. Many were children of highland church leaders of the GIDI or GKII. Within a year the church grew from around a dozen members to over two hundred.

At the outset, it is essential to recognize the importance of the idea of power in religious activity. Anthropologist Kenelm Burridge rightly contends that “all religions are basically concerned with power” (Burridge 1969: 5). Religions, then, “are concerned with the systematic ordering of different kinds of power, particularly those seen as significantly beneficial or dangerous” (Burridge 1969: 5). Accompanying the ordering of power are rules, moral imperatives, and obligations that invigorate a stable and robust moral community. Rules include prescriptions of moral behavior and judgment, and the right-ordering of the believing community. Undoubtedly, charismatic authority, that allusive quality that Weber connects to extraordinariness and power is a critical component of the charismatic movement in West Papua (Weber 1993: 2; see Lindholm 1990). Understanding charisma requires that one distinguishes between the charismatic style of worship that characterizes the religious worship and the religious experience of believers. However, I am more concerned here with illuminating the individual subjectivities
of the Dani recipients of the Pentecostal experience. It should be noted that Pente-
costalism helps bridge diverse ethnicities by making common communication
possible. It overcomes the limitation of expository, word-based (i.e. evangelical)
worship.

*Pondok Pemulihan*, located in Hawai, a neighborhood east of Sentani, meets in
an empty restaurant that it purchased on the main road that connects Sentani,
Abe pura, and Jayapura. In 1998, a volunteer work team from a church in the United
States visited *Pondok Pemulihan* in order to renovate the space, allowing for greater
numbers of worshipers. *Pondok Pemulihan* began as a rehabilitation center for six
troubled Dani youth who came from the GIDI church in the highlands.

Adjacent to the metamorphosed restaurant stands a reconditioned motel, which
serves as the rehabilitation center as well as the habitation for recovering youths.
The Dani youth in the rehabilitation program were raised in evangelical Christian
families in the highlands. However, upon entering Jayapura these youths were
socially marginalized. Whether in reaction to disappointments at not being
accepted at a college or the university or by getting involved with a morally cor-
rupt crowd, many of these youth resorted to thievery, prostitution, and heavy
drinking. They led unproductive, fragmented lives, lacking social stability, eco-
nomic livelihood, and, worse, any hope for their future. In early 1999, the Dani
youth made up nearly 50 percent of the congregation at *Pondok Pemulihan*. The
congregation displays among the greatest ethnic diversity of any church in
Jayapura. While families attend the worship services, it is the young single men
and women who make up the majority of the congregation. The church is led by
collectors, an American and a Javanese.

**Worship**

The worship space is half-filled with neatly arranged, white plastic folding chairs.
The rear half of the church is empty, providing young people a common space to
sit casually, dance, and run about as a means to express worship. Banners, flags,
and church bulletins reveal much about the spiritual orientation of the church.
A large purple cloth banner located alongside the inside of the church announces
boldly the congregation’s vision: *Irian Jaya Memberkati Bangsa Bangsa* (Irian
Jaya Blesses the Nations). The church explicitly focuses on transforming individ-
ual lives, with the belief that remade lives will transform the world. *Irian Jaya
Memberkati Bangsa Bangsa* is their rallying cry and it is shouted five times by
members of the congregation at the end of each Sunday service, while punching
the air above their heads with clenched fists.

Colorful shirts and baseball caps worn especially by the young people in the
rehabilitation program also publicize the church’s vision: *Irian Jaya Memberkati
Bangsa Bangsa*. The church too has become a purveyor of identity markets by
introducing logos and designs that promote the vision of the church. Along
another interior wall of the church is spread a large banner that displays a map of
“Irian Jaya” (West Papua), with a fire consuming it, suggesting the overwhelm-
ing, ubiquitous nature of the power of the Holy Spirit. It is important to note that
the conjoining of fire and power (of the Holy Spirit) is a common theme within
the Pentecostal movement (Martin 1990; Cox 1996). The title of the Sunday
church bulletin, Anggur Baru (New Wine), signifies an important religious expec-
tation and openness to new formulations of individual and social identity.2 What
is emphasized is the immediacy of experiencing God, not just the translation of
information. Worship is heartfelt and genuine, often issuing forth in physical and
emotional outpouring. The vision of Pondok Pemulihan was summarized enthu-
siastically in terms of spiritual renewal that would give rise to the spread of reli-
gious revival throughout Indonesia.

It’s the new generation that’s so important. If anything breaks [i.e. spiritual
revival] in Irian Jaya it’s going to do it with this generation. And, our whole
ministry has the sense that God has a divine purpose for Irian Jaya in the spir-
tual economy of the world, and of Indonesia. Irian Jaya plays a key role in
the evangelization of Indonesia. So, there has to be a break through. It’s going
to happen with young people. We see the sparks of that kind of fire right now.
And the historical churches are going to oppose it, because they aren’t going
to understand it.

(Yost 1998)

According to a leader of the congregation, the confession of sin is an essential
component of Pondok Pemulihan’s appeal to the young Dani. In his own words,
“Confession of sin goes against the grain here. Now you’re getting into something
different. That’s why what’s been happening at our church is so unusual, because
it goes against the tendency in Irian Jaya. Sin in Irian Jaya is defined socially. Sin
is wrong doing, what I do against somebody else that they find out about. If I do
it, and nobody finds out about it, it’s not sin” (Yost 1998).

The worship style of Pondok Pemulihan is characteristically Pentecostal, yet
with a perceptible Papuan cultural flavor. Electric instruments, drums, and tam-
bourines, enhanced by a modern speaker system, pump out loud contemporary
worship songs accompanied by a crowd of up to 200 enthusiastic young people.
All songs are in Indonesian, many of which were written outside of Irian Jaya
(e.g. in Jakarta, the West). Rhythms and harmonies are patterned on popular
Western rock music.

In my several visits to Pondok Pemulihan, I heard Christian lyrics put to the
melodies of songs by the popular Irish rock band U2, as well as the American
(Latino) band Los Lobos. While the physicality is toned down, even the evangel-
ical churches throughout West Papua (i.e. in the highlands as well) have adopted a
“contemporary style” worship service, accompanied by electronic instruments,
drums, and hand clapping. Within Pentecostal services, physical boundaries
become blurred as congregational members feel free to dance, shout, raise their
hands in praise, and clap vigorously. This style distinguishes itself from “tradi-
tional” worship, which is more subdued, and is marked by hymnal-based singing, a
higher degree of ritual liturgical formality, overall conservative bodily participation,
and the presence of rigid boundaries between congregational members.
For instance, the Efata Church (GKII) in the central highland town of Wamena is stylized on a blended pattern of the contemporary and the traditional. Songs are sung from hymnals, and the liturgy includes congregational responsive reading and corporate recitation of Christian creeds such as the Doxology and Apostle’s Creed. However, the music is led by a band consisting of electric guitar, bass, drums, and keyboard. Bodily movement is limited to hand-clapping, as members worship standing in place. Of course, the descriptive use of “contemporary” and “traditional” is meant to refer to a continuum of worship styles and associations. Thus while many evangelical churches in West Papua may utilize electronic musical instruments, their congregational participation may be limited to hand-clapping rather than the more loosely patterned style evident in Pentecostal services, where the whole body moves and there is a modicum of glossolalia.

In larger cities, even in the highland town of Wamena, worship trends clearly are moving in the direction of employing electric musical instruments, rather than traditional ones, and are displaying an overall loss of traditionally rigid congregational participation. Village churches, on the other hand, show little evidence of the more “contemporary” style worship. Of course, this could be due in part to the absence of electricity in most hinterland villages, the inconceivable expense of purchasing costly Western instruments, and a reluctance to adopt new religious patterns. It is not implausible to suppose that contemporary styles of worship will accompany the supply of electricity throughout the highlands.

Worship at Pondok Pemulihan’s is fast-paced, upbeat, and energetic. Congregational members are encouraged to freely express worship by hand-clapping, dancing, and lifting hands to God. Frequently the music is punctuated by ecstatic voices praising God and exhilarated bodies jumping in place and running around. The Papuan cultural contribution consists of a form of liturgical dance, performed with long, colorful ribbons, with movements that reflect highland dance. On occasion, a group of Dani young people provides special music – an indigenous Dani Christian song using Dani language, traditional harmonies, and rhythms. Songs, whether in a Dani language or Bahasa Indonesia, serve a teaching function in the church, highlighting important themes within Christianity. The first song below is from the language of the GVD and the second from the WD. They were sung in evangelical and Pentecostal congregations consisting of a majority of Dani as well as in the initial months of the establishment of Pondok Pemulihan.

*Nahalok Yesus Wagaike (GVD)*  
Why Jesus came

*O Yesus kanyat meke*  
O Jesus, you are great

*Nenalok nen at wagaike*  
Why did you come

*Nenalok nen at watuka*  
Why did you die

*O Yesus kanyat meke (2x)*  
O Jesus, you are great

*Weakma lasak meke*  
When we didn’t have the power

*Yesus nen at telninapike*  
Jesus redeemed us

*Hat heki owa ’ne owa*  
His hand is powerful
Hat hane owa’ne owa  
Let’s receive His Word

Nit hano telninapigin  
We all have been saved.

Yesus Ninamaluk Koregerak  
Jesus is the Redeemer of Our Sins

(WD)

Good aput ninake Yesus  
Jesus is the Son of God

Paninuk nagon  
Don’t leave me.

Inambik piginake dikme  
When you help other people

An te panogon  
Don’t let me go

Chorus:

Yesus, Yesus, karuk koneno  
Jesus, Jesus, listen

Kar mendek wonero Yesus  
Teach me your will

An te panogon  
Don’t let me go

Ninapa agarik Yesus  
Jesus constantly loves us

Nit pebi kagun  
Later, we will see him

Niniki eyak wake  
Our hearts are deeply longing

Nit ar amendek  
We are his possession

Cell groups

Pondok Pemulihan is based on a relatively new church organizational structure among evangelical churches called the “cell-group model” (gereja sel). Each church consists of several cells (small groups) of six to twelve people that gather weekly in a local home with the intentional purpose of studying Scripture, praying for one another, and opening their personal lives (struggles, joys, histories) to one another – in an act of trust. Cell groups at Pondok Pemulihan are interethnic and cut across boundaries of class, gender, and age. The cell is considered the foundation of the church – where, in the words of a leader, “everything happens.” A young Dani man who has completed the rehabilitation program and is an active member of the church mentions the spiritual needs met and the therapeutic import of the cell group. In his cell group six people from a variety of ethnic backgrounds meet weekly.

In that group we can pray for what we need. So, we can bring our prayer concerns to the group. We change our thinking. We share our problems. Whatever your problem is, I will pray for you. Whatever is my problem, you will pray for me. In the cell group we are more open. We speak about what we want so it is more open than in a normal praise and worship service…. It’s more open than in the public worship. Whatever we want prayer for can be shared in the cell group. Cell groups make people more open in front of God.

It is at the cell level that personal and corporate transformation occurs, and where personal accountability and a sense of belonging are engendered. One leader compares the cell model to the New Testament church and the seismic
growth of the early church. It is within the context of the cell group that individuals feel a sense of belonging and nurture – a new community. Consequently, cell groups provide a context of caring community, a free space where belonging and ownership are experienced. The cell groups are crucial spheres for deepening trust and intimacy. Given the fact that cell groups cut across racial boundaries, intermarriage between tribes is not frowned upon by the church.

**Democratizing sermons**

Sermons frequently address themes about personal worth and human freedom, topics particularly potent for Dani who have experienced the heavy hand of the New Order regime. Preaching is peppered with the idiom of democracy – the putatively egalitarian notion that we are all equal under God. Given the subordinated position in which the Dani feel themselves to be, the theme of freedom was among the most popular sermons topics during the late New Order and Reformasi periods. Among the evangelical and Pentecostal churches, freedom was frequently defined in heavily spiritualized terms, using biblical passages from Galatians 5:1 and John 8:30–32: “freedom in Christ is true freedom.”

A major political theme throughout West Papua, particularly in the 1990s, is that of merdeka (freedom). While outside the doors of the church merdeka is defined politically as freedom from Indonesian oppression, within its walls it is defined in highly spiritual terms. According to one sermon, “Freedom [merdeka] is not just political. Instead, there’s greater freedom [merdeka] in Christ.” What is preached is a reformasi (reformation) of the heart, after which Indonesia and the world will be changed.

Worship, small-group structure, and sermons serve to unite the Pentecostal Dani around similar spiritual themes and objectives. Worship is flexible, physical, and easily accessible to the newcomer, because there are no detailed and complicated liturgies to memorize or interpret and the music is upbeat and uplifting. The small-group weekly meetings provide opportunities for the intensification of spiritual practice and fellowship. Intimacies are encouraged in the multiethnic gatherings of the cell group. Sermons stress equality before God and a spiritual freedom found in following Jesus. For many, the Pentecostal church reflects the New Jerusalem, an enclave of peace in a world of confusion and oppression.

**Ecclesial praxis**

**Healing**

Spiritual healing is a fundamental activity of the Pentecostal movement worldwide (Martin 1990), and healing is the primary reason why urban Dani are attracted to Pondok Pemulihan. From what are the Dani being healed? In their words, sin and shame. Leaders of Pondok Pemulihan suggest that the concept of sin is defined socially. For that reason, sin is understood as hurting the entire community. Stealing a parang (machete) from a neighbor’s house is not considered a sin,
unless someone sees the act committed – then it is sin. Consequently, the concept of sin is closely tied to social shame.

In the new enclave, the experience of both discipline and release is enabled through new controls and the discovery of mutual support and solace (Martin 1990: 108). Missionary Jim Yost explains the dynamics involved in the spiritual and social healing intended by Pondok Pemulihan. Their comprehensive vision centers on transforming a congregant’s understanding of God, the family, and self. Therapeutic intervention is a critical component of healing, and is explained by church leaders in psychological terms.

What do they hear when they hear, “God loves them”? What does a Dani understand by love? “Love” is a very key principle here. Your understanding of the love of God is permeated by the love that you have received in the context of your family, as you have been brought up. From your parents, the amount of love you’re received from them, especially from your father, has colored your understanding of the love your heavenly Father has for you. In Irian Jaya, when people hear that God loves me, their immediate picture is when they were small in their hut, the love they received from their father. Across the board, you have fathers who have not expressed love to their children here in Irian Jaya. Fathers who may have left their families, may have been polygamous, haven’t cared for their kids. Families are destroyed.

There’s been no teaching on the Christian family. There’s been no understanding of the purpose of the family. Why did God create Adam and Eve in relationship, and give them children? Traditionally, the wife is seen as the child-bearer and the preparer of food. That’s it. Very low self-esteem. Especially, the husband doesn’t give her any self. The husband is the warrior, someone who protects. Doesn’t help in getting the food. She does the predominant work in the garden. Once in a while he may help. He’s the protector. And, discipline. Across the board in Irian, people do not discipline in love. They let their children go and do whatever they want until they are at the point at where they cannot hold their emotion anymore. So, they explode in anger, and beat their children senseless. So, children grow up in an atmosphere where they’re afraid, they don’t know correct discipline, they don’t know boundaries. They’re only kept in the boundaries because of the corporate social boundaries that says that you cannot do this. This is not necessarily from their father or mother, but from their entire social network, the larger family.

So, the whole idea that “God loves me” is so foreign. You have to start there. That’s why there are two days [a month] of prayer and fasting. One of the major elements in that teaching is on the father-heart of God. We just go back to the basic understanding of God as father. We look into what makes our understanding of God colored wrongly. What are the features in Irian Jaya that give the people here their understanding of God as father. That goes into teaching on self-esteem. How has your self-esteem just been broken to pieces through your upbringing in your family. You have to address those issues, so
people can come to a true understanding of God’s love… You’ve got these kids coming out of the interior, not knowing the love of God in their family. They come to the coast and their self-esteem is already low, and they hear the world here saying, “hey, you’ve got to try this [beer], smoke Marlboro’s, that’s how you get your self-esteem up.” So, they start going after that stuff and it ruins their lives. It produces strong holds in their lives and their self-esteem is still low. That’s why we’ve got so many kids on the side of the streets. They’ve left school. They can’t find work. Because their self-esteem is so low, they cannot pull themselves out of it. So, it’s multiplied when they come to the coast. It doesn’t get better. It gets worse because the world tells them they need this, and this, and this. It’s all on outward appearance, on outward things. It never addresses inward issues.

In urban Pentecostal congregations like Pondok Pemulihan, where spiritual healing forms the central vision of the church, therapy-like encounters reshape personal understandings, placing ideas of self, family, and world, in a wider context of biblical notions of God, salvation history, and reconciliation. New ontological bases are constructed in the context of a mutually supportive community. On my first visit to Pondok Pemulihan the sermon was about repentance—asking forgiveness from God for sins in one’s life. When the preacher extended an invitation for those needing to ask for forgiveness to come forward for prayer, five young Dani men, each who had been struggling with “moral vices” went forward. Each was sobbing violently; two fell to the ground without control. Immediately, men and women members of the congregation also went forward to lay their hands on the remorseful Dani and pray for their fellow believers.

That therapeutic moment enhanced the democratized authority of the community as well as the belief in a God who heals in the public context of community. Self-esteem and reception of the “Father” figure of God are central teaching and rehabilitation themes at Pondok Pemulihan, because many grew up with either an abusive or absent father. Formal rehabilitation (therapy) begins with a development of personal inventories, along the lines of a genogram, geared to illumine the individual’s family background and unearth tacit feelings regarding the nature of the individual’s father. The assumption (echoing Freud) is that one’s earthly father represents a potent representation of one’s heavenly Father. Complementing the reorientation of self to God is the need for power and control over one’s life and environment. Referring to the Dani, a leader at Pondok Pemulihan says

here [in Jayapura] they have malaria, they have sickness, they see people from off-island [pendatang] coming in and taking advantage of them. They feel like every opportunity is gone for them. Lack of control. And the church has to answer this. And their faith has to answer this. There has to be power that God gives in the midst of a world that seems chaotic and out of control. So, healing addresses that need for power, that need to have a power outside of me that comes in and touches my life.
Participation

Among evangelical congregations, and particularly Pentecostal ones, members play an indispensable role all aspects of the church’s life, enabling the development of personal skills and dispositions as well as inculcating egalitarian and participatory social conditions. The church has provided the free space to develop new competencies. Loose internal churchly boundaries divide neither gender, class, nor race. Anyone with a modicum of talent can play in the worship band, sing a song, present a liturgical dance, or speak in front of the entire congregation. Since worship (“led by the Holy Spirit”) is free of strictly defined liturgies, all members of the congregation are encouraged to participate in any aspect of worship or ministry.

Pondok Pemulihan follows an informal order of worship. The service commences with up to an hour of energy-filled congregational music. This is followed by a period where members of the congregation are encouraged to publicly share their “testimonies” (stories) of how they believe Christ has impacted, directed, or saved their life during the previous week. The open-microphone format allows anyone to share from one’s experiences, without time limitations, and with guarantee of personal affirmation by the congregation. Such times offer members of the congregation the opportunity to gain self-confidence in public speaking. On one occasion, for instance, I listened to a young man’s testimony that lasted well over an hour, displacing the sermon altogether. The sermon is normally delivered by either co-elder. After a period of sharing testimonies, the sermon, the collection of tithes and offerings, and announcements, the worship band closes the service with several more songs. Normally the service runs between two and four hours.

The voluntary nature of Pondok Pemulihan is particularly striking when considering that most members have neither experience nor opportunity to assume leadership roles within society at large, much less across racial and ethnic lines. Describing the social benefits he receives by attending the GKII, a 19-year-old Western Dani explains, “I previously was a shy person and could not step forward in front of many people. But now that’s not so, because in the church I learned to be a leader.” Women Dani congregational members speak in terms of “feeling called to ministry,” reflecting a confidence unheard of in the typical GKII or GIDI church where ordination of women is precluded on the basis of ecclesiastical polity. Voluntarism, then, is an essential ingredient in the success of the church.

Pragmatism

Equipping members of the congregation with practical knowledge enhances their view of themselves, provides them with new competencies, and psychological and social knowledge. The Sunday church bulletin (Anggur Baru, New Wine), unlike in most Papuan churches, presents a weekly theme and its exposition rather than an order of liturgy. Complementing the weekly sermons, the bulletin serves as a significant medium for teaching. The kinds of practical knowledge
highlighted at *Pondok Pemulihan* include a combination of communication skills, developmental psychology, biblical exegesis, and spiritual advice. Much teaching aims at educating families, couples, and individuals about good communication skills, such as listening techniques, and how to love one another. Generally, religious knowledge is presented in the forms of principles to be followed. For instance, the church bulletin entitled “*Keluarga yang Harmonis*” (A Harmonious Family) states that there are three fundamental principles that form a pattern of intimacy within the family:

a) time (*waktu*) – it is essential to have personal discipline (*disciplin*) and a schedule (*jadwal*) to arrange family activities. There has to be enough time for sharing discussion and stories about one’s day and for laughing and praying together; b) words (*kata-kata*) – words have the characteristic of building up or tearing down people. Parents who can provide an example of intimate communication will have a strong impact on the atmosphere of the family. When was the last time you shared words of love to the members of your family?; and c) action (*tindakan*) – small things that aim for attention and are tangibly done are far more beneficial in developing intimate connections in the family. Who is responsible for raising and developing intimate connections within the family? Of course, the father and mother, and also the children of the family. Each has the responsibility to maintain intimate connection with the family. However, this needs to be planned. There’s a time especially just for the parents’ enjoyment for intimacy and privacy…. You each have the responsibility for taking a part in the restoration (*pemulihan*) of the family that God (*Allah*) yearns for in his community (*umatNya*). So that the original plan of God about the family will be fulfilled. “And he will restore the hearts of the fathers to their children, and the hearts of the children to their fathers, lest I come and smite the land with a curse” (*Malachi* 4:6).

*(Anggur Baru, October 4, 1998)*

Sources of such knowledge come from a blending of the leaders’ personal experiences and insights, films, books, and sermons from both American and Jakarta-based churches. Films of what has come to be referred to as the “Toronto Blessing,” because of its explosive start in that Canadian city, are shown to illustrate the “power of the Holy Spirit.” The Toronto Blessing is otherwise known as the “laughing movement,” because some persons caught up in the activity of the Holy Spirit begin laughing heavily.

The School of Restoration (*Sekolah Pemulihan Awal*), a program of *Pondok Pemulihan*, which advertises itself as open to anyone “who yearns for restoration in their life, family, church,” teaches a combination of weekday courses that are oriented toward theological, psychological, spiritual, and church organizational topics. Graduates of *Sekolah Pemulihan Awal* receive a certificate of graduation (*sertifikat*). More technically oriented courses include computer and English language training. Here, then, congregational members are received into an intimate fellowship, where they experience a sense of belonging, practical training, and
encouragement to try out new skills without being judged on their educational history, racial makeup, or social standing.

Freedom from the law

Several Dani members of Pondok Pemulihan similarly described their previous church (GKII or GIDI) as rule-oriented, overly pietistic, morally restrictive, and culturally and spiritually irrelevant to their personal lives. A WD informant, reflecting on his experience in such a strictly controlled church, observed the following.

In my opinion, if I did something wrong, God would get angry. So, I thought that if I returned to God he would be mad. So, it's difficult for us to return to God. Because we felt that the Lord was wrathful. Like the police or the military. So, if we made a mistake, we were scared to return to God. There's no one who could explain the good way to go... Before I felt different if I had sin in my life. I could not go by myself to God to get his forgiveness. I couldn't go to God by myself... Yes, I was afraid. I thought that if I went to God by myself he would hit me until I died. So, I was afraid. After I was brought here [Pondok Pemulihan] all the thoughts I had realized before were wrong. God was different than my ideas.

He then continues by explaining the difference between “traditional religion” (i.e. mission Christianity) and what he experiences at Pondok Pemulihan.

This fear is from the traditional religion. Now, in the traditional religion if the pastor has a sin he cannot go to preach to the people. That's what our opinion was of God – that God is always mad or angry. So, we are always afraid and return to God and repent. When we fell down the first time we can’t stand again and return. When I arrived here [Pondok Pemulihan] we learned about the heart of the Father. When we first arrived to rehabilitation, Pak Sumiran taught us the lesson about the heart of God. This is from the Bible. From out classes we realized that the heart of the Father is totally different from the view of the world than from that of heaven. Our Father in heaven will receive us no matter what our condition. For example, if I’m dirty then my earthly father will tell me to clean myself, take a bath. But, that's less than our heavenly Father. Even though we have sinned our heavenly Father will receive us in love. God always wants us to return to him. That made us feel new... Even though we are opposed to Him he always accepts us.

In the highland church all they taught were “dos and don’ts.” “This you can’t do. That you can’t do.” Like, if people smoke, they’re afraid to go to church because he knows he's a sinner. Because the pastor always says a person like that will go to hell. They feel like smokers are not fit to go to church. Maybe they would go to church, but they would sit in the back, and hide... They feel like sinners, dirty, as though they are not fit to go to church.
The vision of the church

So, it’s always, “don’t do this, don’t do that.” So, we cannot grow and we cannot see the heart of our heavenly Father... I never felt God was present with me. We did not feel that God was able to do anything. Until I was in high school, I didn’t believe God created everything, that he would do this, or give us that. I believed God existed, but that he wouldn’t come to me. So, we could never grow. We never know about the Lord. We didn’t know about the Lord’s heart. We didn’t know that God would give us all we wanted. But, when we were here we learned that God would give us anything we ask for.

Finally, he paints a vivid picture of the impact of the Western missionary on Dani church behavior and the concomitant demise of the freedom to worship in a way that was continuous with the Lani (WD) tradition of celebrating.

Especially for Lani people, worshipping God involves dancing. Like King David. But Western missionaries came and said, “That is not good. In front of God you have to be polite.” So, the people followed the tradition of worship from the Western missionary. So that became a rule. People now tell others to worship that way. So Lani people always give bodily expression to worship. But the missionaries entered and said, “You can’t. Don’t. In front of God you have to be polite.” So, people believed them. Now, [in Pondok Pemulihan], the spirit of Lani is here... we don’t feel like foreigners, because this is our culture, this way of worship. In the past people were afraid of God if we weren’t polite in front of God. So we had to be polite. So, people were doing whatever the missionary said... The people, when they sang a song to praise the Lord, they did it by dancing and forming a circle. And when the pastor would begin to preach, he would say, “Stop, I will preach now.” And, the church wasn’t in a building, it was in an open area. But now, because it’s inside a building, they [missionaries] say, “This is God’s house, you have to be polite.” So, local people followed their [missionaries] model... I can’t understand how come the old Lani could allow all the rules to enter into their worship [in the 1980s]. Especially because they knew about the word of God.

Liturgical practices have also become a divisive subject between the Pentecostal Dani and the evangelical Dani, determining in the minds of believers the correctness of particular religious traditions. Pentecostal Dani argue they experience greater freedom to worship within Pentecostal services. Evangelicals (e.g. GIDI and GKII) too recognize that a wide disparity separates the liturgical styles of the Pentecostals and their own traditions. According to a Pentecostal Dani,

GIDI says the liturgy from [our church] is not the same. So, they are very unhappy that we are here. GIDI people say that [our church’s] teaching is incorrect [agama sesat], that it leads people to the wrong way. That’s absolutely wrong. We don’t feel that way. We feel blessed. Spiritually, we have grown quickly... If someone goes to [our church], according to GIDI, it’s like going to a bad religion. But, actually, the minds of [GIDI members]
The vision of the church

have already been closed because of all the rules and limitations told to them by the missionaries. There’s no freedom. So, for GIDI all is covered by their rules. “This is right” and “this is wrong.” Like during a sermon, we say, “hallelujah, amen.” But it’s impossible for GIDI people. In GIDI people have to be quiet.

Understanding the New Jerusalem has become complicated by increasing dissimilarities between evangelical and Pentecostal churches. The Pentecostal churches continue to gain members from the evangelical and mainline Protestant churches. Among urban Dani, Pentecostalism provides ontological security and an immediate experience of God. Whereas evangelicalism is seen as rigidly theological, Pentecostalism is marked by flexibility and openness, encouraging full participation of men and women, young and old. Anyone can lead, pray, and testify to the power of God in their lives. Within this context, Dani cultural particularities are deemed worthy of employing in corporate worship. Dani dances and songs are given a place to be seen and heard within the worship experience. Furthermore, many of the theological restraints of evangelicalism, such as the prohibition against women preaching or teaching, are simply of no concern to Pentecostals. The general openness of Pentecostalism makes it immeasurably attractive.

Narrating the truth

The story of the church

Narratives play an immensely significant role in the structuring of “taken-for-granted frames of reference” and as such shore up the notion of the imagined community inculcated in the church sphere (Anderson 1998: 12). A community, like a nation, is produced by more than only gathering weekly in corporate worship. Being a community requires sharing a common story, one to which they give personal assent.

The basic message of the evangelical (and Pentecostal) church is one of forgiveness and reconciliation with God; it requires a response of repentance for personal sin and faith that God, through Jesus’ death and resurrection, provided a means by which individuals can be reconciled to God and experience peace and an assurance of salvation (abundant life on earth and an eternity in heaven). The church’s message is about ultimate truths, which acts to define personal knowledge of a God who loves humankind. According to these churches there is neither a higher nor more noble message than this. As such, the church provides an important “plausibility structure” (Peter Berger 1979).

As a community of memory, the church must, among other things, be backward looking; it has a special mission to preserve to past, to carry on a tradition. The church must be a community of memory by perpetuating the narratives of the past, by telling stories that bring the past into the present. And, while the idea of
church-as-storyteller may seem to diminish its importance, this function must actually be seen as having the utmost significance. For the very likelihood of anyone in the future retaining the identity of “Christian” depends on it.

(Wuthnow 1993: 48)

Pastors in evangelical and Pentecostal churches in Jayapura preach frequently about prominent persons in the Bible who provide a practical model for daily living. The story of Christianity also functions as a vehicle of ethical transmission by delimiting appropriate behaviors and spiritual orientations. A particularly salient theme within evangelical and Pentecostal churches is the believer’s relationship to Christ.

“Identity in Christ”

Evangelical and Pentecostal churches in West Papua stress the indispensable requirement of an unmediated relationship with the eternally existent Jesus Christ, who is believed to provide personal comfort through the granting of the Holy Spirit. The emergence of the language “identity in Christ” (i.e. God) cannot be understood without shedding light on “a corresponding progression from a lower to a higher conceptual level” (Polanyi 1962: 394). Michael Polanyi views personhood as a multi-leveled reality, with each higher level integrating the lower levels into a greater unity; “the highest level introduces an integrating order of personal unity” (Polanyi 1963: 62; see Lonergan 1970). The fragmentation of the self under modern conditions requires reconfiguring, with new knowledge and experience being incorporated into higher-level syntheses (Giddens 1990, 1991; Kipp 1996). Within notions of metanoia, the higher-level syntheses can be understood in terms of the turning toward God, the highest, unifying idea, and ultimate ground of being (see Tillich 1969).

Like the resolution of moral dilemmas, where solutions are often found by transcending to higher-level syntheses, “identity in Christ” reflects a notion of highest-level explanations and results in a profound alteration in ontogeny, for it constitutes a shift from a human-centered to a Divine-centered worldview. The teleological nature of learning suggests that knowledge proceeds belief. The idea that knowledge follows belief is summarized in Augustine of Hippo’s (354–430) apt phrase, credo ut intelligam (I believe in order to know), whereby he took “the biblical story as the starting point for a way of understanding which required a radical reconstruction of his former ways of thought” (Newbigin 1995: 9). This starting point stands in sharp contrast to the idea that knowledge precedes belief – “I know in order to believe.”

It was the Hungarian philosopher-scientist Michael Polyani “who used the term ‘personal knowledge’ with the precise intention of affirming that the objective-subjective dualism is false and that all knowing of reality involves the personal commitment of the knower as a whole person” (Newbigin 1995: 39; see Polanyi 1962). The act of indwelling is implicated in personal commitment and personal knowledge. All knowledge involves “indwelling” a particular tradition (e.g. scientific tradition, a religious tradition), which functions “like the lenses of our
spectacles...we attend through them to the things we are examining” (Newbigin 1995: 40). Leaders of Pondok Pemulihan use the term “identity in Christ” to describe the objective of rehabilitation and worship, that is, to indwell Christ – making his words, principles, and mutual indwelling through the Holy Spirit the framework through which they perceive the world. Here it is supposed that human actors receive forgiveness for past offenses and spiritual healing.

Personal narratives

“The existential question of self-identity is bound up with the fragile nature of the biography which the individual ‘supplies’ about herself. A person’s identity is not to be found in behaviour, nor – important though this is – in the reactions of others, but in the capacity to keep a particular narrative going” (Giddens 1991: 54). Subjectivities are affirmed as the worshipping community publicly valorizes personal narratives attesting to the validity of the plausibility structure of the church’s story. Whereas outside the doors of the church a combination of money, social status, ethnicity, and educational history form the basic measure of worth, within its doors prestige is relativized, reconfigured on the basis on one’s standing before God (i.e. conversion), and enhanced by personal biographical narratives evincing an inner transformation.

In contrast to the traditional Dani social environment, where identity ascription was conferred by the community, in modern social conditions identity must be actively created, negotiated among an expansive array of options. No longer do the Dani follow the relatively taken-for-granted biographical trajectory supplied by tradition and family, as they once did in the hinterland. Coming to the city as singular human beings, individuality must be created (Burridge 1979), and it is done so with greater complexity given the need to continually revise their biographical narrative. Tribal associations no longer provide lasting confidence or ontological security. So rather than being ascribed by family, tribe, state, or determined primarily by achievement (Melanesian pattern), religious identity is conferred by the institution of the church (see Wuthnow 1993: 44), where ontological certainties are shored up through affirmation of publicly listened to personal stories. Here identity enters an interstitial zone, where one moves from being “no one” to “someone” (Burridge 1991: 75). The existential movement from the Dani self-perception as “no one” to “someone” stands in stark contrast to how Dani were perceived as slaves (djenggi-slaven) in earliest recorded history of their contact with non-Papuans.

It is a period marked by danger, for all margins are dangerous – “If they are pulled this way or that the shape of fundamental experience is altered” (Douglas 1994: 122). Sharing of personal biographies is a primary means of working out one’s identity. “[T]heir frame is historical and their setting sociological” (Anderson 1998: 204). Indeed, more so than other forms of the religion, evangelical Christianity is a personally appropriated faith (Martin 1990). Essential to the personal declaration is its blending and continuity with the larger story of the church; the church’s story becomes the recipient’s story. Maintenance and
boundary-enforcing strategies include sermons that teach that believers have responsibility and that they will face God for the actions they have done in this world. It is important to note that the notion of God has partly supplanted the idea of spirit beings and village big-men (*kepala suku*) as ones to whom an individual must be held accountable. Also the reaction of missionaries to these testimonies, whether in hinterland or municipality, serves to judge them according to the theological perspectives of the missionaries (“this is not biblical”), thus disqualifying certain testimonies. Testimonies are made true by both their compatibility and continuity of the story laid out in Scripture as well as their personal authenticity. The formality and structure of church testimonies help define existential and communal boundaries.

Yonas is a WD (i.e. Lani), and the son of a GIDI pastor. His testimony speaks of being recreated in the context of rehabilitation, group intimacies, and church teachings. While being a member of the *Pondok Pemulihan* congregation he envisions making relevant the liturgy of GIDI. Yonas was born in 1977 and has five siblings, each of whom is noticeably successful in his or her career. Yonas explains his testimony in his own words.

Of all of us I’m the only bad one [nakal]. When I was a child my parents taught me a good way of life, but my life was influenced by my circle of friends. Since I was in sixth grade I started smoking. I continued junior high school in Wamena, where I learned to drink, smoke, and use *spiritus* [i.e. drink methylated spirit, rubbing alcohol]. In my home village I was just smoking. But when I came down to Wamena I had to find another way to get drunk because the normal alcohol was expensive in Wamena. So, we had to use *spiritus* or the leaf of the trumpet flower [*bunga terompet*]. We boiled it and drank the water so that we could be drunk for three days. It’s stronger than other things. It’s a green plant with a white flower. Coconut wine [*saguar*] is not as hard. With the water from the trumpet leaves we could not think for three days. Couldn’t eat, just sleep. Like a dead person. We would not be able to tell where we were. When I came here [Jayapura], I learned to drink whisky or Jenefer [special factory-made alcohol, with a higher percentage of alcohol than whisky]. It’s just low class, and weak. So, I felt nothing.

These things became my life. I had sex with many women, which God did not like. Until that time my father always reminded me about God, but I didn’t care. Even though I took that way of life my parents wanted me to continue studies, so they sent me to Jayapura. Because I finished my junior high school and high school in Wamena I wanted to continue my studies in Jayapura. I wanted to go to UnCen [i.e. *Universitas Cenderawasih*], but I wasn’t accepted. By that point it was common for me to get drunk, to smoke, and make problems for people. So, I was always going in and out of jails. In other words, I was broken. My older brother didn’t like me to live that way, so he hit me a lot. He then called the police, and they took me to jail. Since that time my heart was hurt. I decided I didn’t want to depend on my parents.
I wanted to go my own way in life. I just went, without direction. I didn’t want to go to the university, I didn’t want to depend on my parents. So, I just drank and followed friends, beat-up people. In July 1997, I was drunk at Imbi Park, the central park of Jayapura. While we were drinking, the evangelistic mission of Pondok Pemulihan was coming around. One guy, Timotius, recognized me. He knew me. He told his team, “go and evangelize him,” meaning me. One man, Petrus, came forward to me, shook my hand and said, “let’s talk outside of the park.” My heart was hit hard about the need for repentance because that was what I missed, to return to my heavenly father. Because I was angry and had bitter roots I always fought with the truth. But now other people want to help me. My heart broke and I cried. I wanted to receive the Lord. They asked me, “do you want to go home with your friends or go with us?” I came here and was led by one of the co-elders of Pondok Pemulihan for rehabilitation.

One year after that I didn’t know how to serve people but the Lord trusted me, along with a friend, so that we served as evangelists in the interior [i.e. highlands]. I learned about how to live with God. I now have an open attitude towards life. I think it’s better to live with God than to live with what I want. I fell in love with God. If I think about what I did before, I think it’s really bad. I feel like vomiting when I think about my past. But now I want to hear from God what he wants from me, what he wants me to do. If he says, “Do this, do that,” I’ll do it. When I entered Pondok Pemulihan there was no church yet. There was only a rehabilitation program. I came by myself. I made my own decision to join Pondok Pemulihan because I needed to be helped. The program saved my life. I was mad, really mad when I was not accepted into UnCen. I knew I could be accepted, I’m not dumb. But, God had another plan. At Pondok Pemulihan I learned that God shut the door of the university so that I could serve him. God must have a special plan for me. While I was learning, I thought I shouldn’t go for studies at the university. I have to serve. Or maybe I will go to a theological school. I’m waiting for God to tell me what he wants for my life.

Who am I? This is what makes me understand who I was exactly. In the past, I didn’t understand. But, actually, I wanted to know who I am. Before, I was opposed to my father, I did whatever I wanted. But, when I opened my heart to God’s words everyday and I had lessons and counsel and preaching from the church, which was unusual for me, finally, I knew who I was. I can understand now that my life has special meaning to the Lord. I was so disappointed about not having the chance to go to the university while others in my family did. I had a lot of questions. Why? Then I returned to God and asked him about what I should do. I know about my weakness. If I went to the university I would be prideful. That’s my weakness. I think God told me to be patient so that I could be shaped and formed. So that I could overcome my pride. I tell you the truth, if I went to the university I would be prideful. And God doesn’t want me to be prideful because he wants me to prepare me specially. Now every time I find a problem it helps me to progress.
Before, if I had a problem, I would always complain: “Why is my life like this?” Now, I say, “Thank God, the Lord wants to make me more pure. Like gold.” Actually, God wants to seriously prepare me to serve him. I know exactly that the Lord has a special purpose for me. So, I just wait for what he wants.

For instance, if I go somewhere for preaching and if people were to kill me, I wouldn’t care. When the Word of God has entered our lives, the feeling of being fearful of death is absent. That truth, that my father told me, helped me. My father [early Dani missionary] went to his enemies areas in order to preach. The Lord didn’t make a mistake by putting me here [at Pondok Pemulihan]. I know I am being prepared for something great. Now, I’m just waiting.

Although Naomi is a WD, she was born in 1976 in a coastal city in the northwest region of West Papua. Her father was among the first group of Christian converts in his WD village, and he was responsible for large numbers of Dani conversions. While most of Naomi’s siblings reside in Jayapura, two of them live in Yogyakarta, Central Java. She mentions that of her family only her mother and father have stayed in their traditional village. Like Yonas, Naomi comes from a GIDI church background.

I finished my elementary school and junior high school in my highland village. Then I studied in Jayapura for high school. I’ve been here already five years. I moved here to Jayapura for studies. When we were in the village the reputation of the children of the evangelist [like herself] was worse than other children. When I was in the village my father was a pastor, but I didn’t know a deeper understanding of God. I would just go to church and do activities of the church. But I didn’t receive Jesus personally until I came here. It was just the same. I’d go to church on Sundays. It was like any other day. Normal. When I came out to Jayapura I went to a GIDI church. When I was in GIDI I felt like Sundays were like any other day. There were many discussions about the Bible, but it was typical, normal, predictable.

When I was in my home village, I knew about the Word of God. But, for myself, I didn’t know it deeply. Also, I used traditional spiritual things, like special leaves for stealing the heart of a man. Also, when I went to the church I just [passively] heard what they said. It would go in one ear and out the other. It’s true that I was raised within the church congregation, but my heart was not yet restored. So, you know, I had not yet known God seriously. When I moved from my home village to Jayapura I went to the same GIDI church. But, I did the same. I didn’t take the traditional spiritual [magic] things to Jayapura but I couldn’t face God about my past life. I went to church, and did all the Dani activities in the church. It was just normal, until I entered Pondok Pemulihan with four of my friends, two men and two women from my home village. The first time I entered Pondok Pemulihan I thought things were going to be just like the church I had been raised in. When the leaders prayed for me and I heard the pastor preach about God’s Word, it started to break my
heart down. Some of the sins in my heart, things I haven’t told God, were destroyed and came out during that prayer. We prayed together. And then I felt free from all the sin I’ve done in my past life. I felt sorry about my parents; even though they told me about the gospel I didn’t care. So, I apologized to them. Now, I want to tell the truth about whatever I do. I totally repented and for whatever I did bad to God before. I apologized to God. I apologized to all the people whom I hurt. Now, I believe God has forgiven me. Most of the young people at Pondok Pemulihan are GIDI. They also learned how to be like us. When we were still in GIDI we said we had repented, but we had not. Actually, God wants to use us. Even though we had repented the church didn’t want to use us to further the gospel, which made us feel farther from God. What our parents taught us about God is true, but we just heard it in one ear and it came out the other. All the GIDI people are like that. They feel as though praying is enough. When there’s a pastor they sleep [don’t pay attention to the sermon] and walk out.

Here, at Pondok Pemulihan, I repented when I heard the preaching. Our village pastors don’t preach about relevant things. Usually, they just reuse the same theme, again and again. But here we learn about prophets, speaking in the spirit [bahasa roh], and also that even if we fall into sin we are saved by God and God wants to use us. I feel that even though I have sinned in the past, the Lord wants to use me. Even though I sin and make mistakes the pastors and people here still trust me and forgive me. God does too. After I was free from sin, I loved to hear whoever spoke about the Word of God. And I enjoy sharing with others what I have experienced here. People actually believe in me.

I love to be in my church cell group [komsel] because we can share problems with each other. If I know about the Word of God I can share that in the group. We can pray for our problems together. The others can pray for me and I can pray for them. This is good because the faith of each of us gets stronger. I was so happy when I learned about cell groups as the place where I can grow. Most of us here are from GIDI. When we were still with GIDI we were told that we all had the same faith, but each of our lives were separate from the others. We lived our faith privately. But, after we joined Pondok Pemulihan we all felt we had the same father and mother [i.e. God]. In the komsel and in the church we feel we share our faith together. We don’t care if you’re from the coast or I’m from the interior. We just realize that we are from the same father and mother, the same parents. In other churches, like GIDI, if someone came from the fringes of my home village and we were from the center of the village, we would just think that the others were not part of us. We weren’t together. So I’m happy at Pondok Pemulian, because even though I may not know about others here we can live together and speak together. We’re like one. In GIDI knowing that we were the same family [clan] was enough. There was no depth of sharing. But here we know more details about others, without paying attention to whether it’s a man or woman. In GIDI we were not like that: when we went home from the church we didn’t shake hands with each other. But here, if we don’t shake hands and don’t love
each other, we feel it’s not enough – like it’s lacking something. Here it’s more open in terms of relationships and friendships. Even if they’re from different tribes, or have different skin, or different hair. We feel we are united. We are the same.

With GIDI we had no blessings from God. All my siblings have joined me here [at Pondok Pemulihan]. They also tell the same story, that before they joined Pondok Pemulihan they did not accept God personally, but after they came here they changed. And, our parents are happy and proud of us because we are all here growing well. I think in the city God gave me something better. Now that I am here I have the things I wanted before. I have heard many testimonies about how God has prepared something special for those who repent and are faithful to him. I want to be like them. After I moved the Pondok Pemulihan, I felt I experienced the same things that I heard others testify about.

I had a horrible life before. Now, I am changed. They trust me. My life is different and the people who were my friends before respect me even more now. They don’t make dirty jokes like before. I repented. I know God now. The leaders of the church did a good thing for me. They believed in me. I have changed. In GIDI, learning about God depended just on me. But now, here, all that is gone. Now because of what they have done for me, I can do evangelism. Because I want others to have the same experience as me. So, now I’m doing evangelism down the street.

Several salient features in the personal stories of Yonas and Naomi similarly attest to a set of common experiences and follow a similar patterned formulation. First, their testimonies witness to experiencing an immediacy of God, forgiveness for past sins, and warm acceptance into Christian fellowship. They feel a sense of social uplift, as they are accepted and nurtured by the church community. Second, Pentecostal Dani distinguish between qualities of Christianity – between normal Christians, namely those in GKII or GIDI churches, and real Christians, those who have personal experience of reconciliation with the Divine. Said a Pentecostal Dani woman about early Western missionaries to her village, “Why didn’t they teach about the gospel and develop the church until the people there were really Christian. We feel like the first missionary didn’t bring either good evangelism or good gospel to our village.” These distinctions, between true Christians and normal Christians, characterize much of the churchly rhetoric in strongly bounded evangelical Christian movements worldwide.

In Naomi’s narrative, the distinction between Christians is explained in terms of deep and shallow knowledge of Scripture. Sin is understood as immoral actions, while restoration entails inwardly felt experience of reconciliation with God, invigorated by an internally validated reception of forgiveness and an externally energized therapeutic context of social acceptance. Third, their proclamation of new life is filled with the content of new identities, new purposes, and a new hope for the future. A reconfigured understanding of the past, present, and future fosters a sense of ontological renewal that, when filled with the content of
restored purpose and hope, animates their story, giving them a sense of validity and authenticity at the deepest personal levels. These stories are publicized orally in biographic detail within communities of shared ontological certainties.

The complexity of religious belief

Sickness, pain, and suffering often make religious belief precarious and complex. Suffering brings one’s deepest held religious commitments to task. In times of crisis, where do Dani turn for the source of their strength? The answer to this question exposes how the Dani think about themselves. The way Dani Christians suffer and their response is an indication of their use of Christianity and the ways in which it is blended with their own traditional religious perspectives. Suffering introduces ambiguity, complicating religious belief altogether. Here I highlight the story of a young urban Dani man who struggles daily with physical disability.

Amos is a young Dani who lives in Jayapura. As a college-educated man, his home village in the highlands considers him an important future leader of their village, one thoroughly evangelized by CMA missionaries in the late 1950s. However, Amos is unable to walk, and has to be carried on the back of a brother or friend. He desires to be an evangelist. Amos was born in 1975 in a Dani village in the highlands, the second of six children. After completing a two-year academic program on the north coast of West Papua, Amos’ family moved to Ujung Pandang in the mid-1980s, where his father attended STT Jeffrey, a college-level Bible school founded by CMA missionaries, and he entered junior high school (SMP). While he had heard that there were other Papuans in Ujung Pandang, the size of the city made it difficult to meet them. Amos was the only black person (kulit hitam) in his school. All others were Malay. In his own words, “Some were prejudiced; they called me ‘monkey’ or ‘cannibal’. Or ‘you eat people.’” Yet he explains that the positive side of being in Ujung Pandang was “learning the character of the Makasarese; they are egotistic, easily angered, they hold grudges, they are fanatics in Islam and culture. Not open.” In his second year of junior high school Amos’ “legs got sick.” A doctor in Ujung Pandang gave Amos several injections, but the doctor’s medicine did not help assuage the pain. According to Amos, the shots were an overdose and “made things worse.”

In the early-1990s, Amos’ family returned to West Papua. His legs and nerves (urat saraf) had become noticeably weaker. In 1992, Amos moved to Wamena and lived in a dormitory called Anak Yatim Piatu (dormitory for orphans), where he describes his experience as difficult. “There was no food, we had to work to get food, and it was difficult to study. There were too many people. And bad morals. Sex was too open.” Amos says that the lack of food was the worst part of the dormitory experience; students resorted to stealing dogs and cats for food. In addition, corrupt leadership siphoned off money budgeted for food. The leader of the dormitory was a Roman Catholic Manadonese, the wife of a previous bupati. Apparently, money given for dormitory food was sold off by the ex-bupati’s wife in order to fund her children’s own schooling and to start businesses. I was told
that the government and church authorities were aware of the situation, but were afraid of speaking against corruption.

In the mid-1990s, Amos moved to Jayapura to attend a college-level Bible school. His superb schoolwork made him among the best students on campus. However, Amos’ legs grew weak, his nerves became more pain-ridden, and his muscles atrophied. At that point, Amos could no longer walk, and had to be carried on the back of a younger brother.

Amos repeatedly asks himself, “Why am I sick? I used to be good in sports, I eat enough. Why can’t I walk?” After the doctor’s visit, who could not determine the source of the affliction, Amos’ family said it was the result of magic. Returning to his home village, Amos’ uncles and relatives said that the illness was “done by a person. Grandfather did it” (the grandfather was still alive at the time). Then, after being given an examination and x-ray by a Dutch doctor working in West Papua, the doctor concluded that “Everything is fine. Bones and nerves are fine.” Yet all the villagers back home felt the same: they firmly believed that the sickness was caused by the grandfather. Amos contends, “I don’t believe it’s from my grandfather, I believe Jesus Christ is more powerful – we’ve already prayed. If there’s sorcery from my grandfather, it is over.” Amos’ paternal grandfather has four younger siblings. The one held responsible for Amos’ ill-health is the youngest sibling, who is now blind. Amos’ family reasons as follows: the paternal grandfather (called Yambonep) is responsible because he stole the only pig owned by the maternal grandfather (called Opalalok) in the 1980s. Opalalok searched hard for the stolen pig and asked the villagers if they had seen it. Yet he was unsuccessful.

Finally, Opalalok went to the dukun (indigenous medical practitioner) of the village and asked him to send Kuguruok (sorcery spirit) to discover who stole the pig. When Yambonep heard that Opalalok already went to a dukun then Yambonep also went to another dukun to seek help so that Kuguruok would be sent to fight the other Kuguruok. Finally, Kuguruok and Kuguruok battled, then Opalalok died near the time of his own child’s death. Also, following the battle between the Kuguruok, Yambonep’s child died and many of his pigs died as well. This situation went on until a family member of Yambonep’s died. According to those in the village, the war between the spirits (i.e. Kuguruok) still is not over even until today. The problem is that Yambonep refuses to admit that he stole the pig. According to Amos’ relatives, the war would end only if Yambonep would admit to stealing the pig.

Yambonep is afraid – if he admits he stole the pig that Amos’ uncles would later ask Yambonep to pay for the members of the family who have died (Opalalok and his child). Now, Yambonep lives with Amos’ father and feels there is no problem. Amos said to his grandfather Yambonep, “Grandfather, you have to understand that the village can’t be this way forever – this village one day will change. If I don’t go to school who will help you all in the village (kampung)? Others will lie to the villagers, if there are no educated children from our village. I went to school to help our village. But how can I do it? You made me sick.” Yambonep answered, “What can I do? There’s no problem.” Amos says his grandfather is
“hard headed” because in the past he was the head of war (kepala perang) in the village. Yambonep does not attend church. Villagers now say, “let Yambonep face God. God is all powerful. God will deal with him.” The issue has not yet been resolved.

Amos asks, “In the Bible, is there a place for me being sick? What is God’s plan? If I wasn’t sick, I would be kacau (troublemaker) and nakal (mischievous). God has a plan for my life. God gives me karunia (grace) and bakat (talent) to write so that I can help others in school. And so that I can get money for helping students with their skripsi (theses).”

Amos interprets his illness looking back to Dani tradition and forward to the hope supplied by his belief in Christian affirmations. Yet he wrestles with the cost of his suffering. What should he do? What do others expect of him? Everyone wants him to get healed. To provide an explanation for his affliction, Amos uses existing cultural and religious means, relying on a blending of traditional Dani religiosity and notions adapted from his Christian experience. Amos’ acknowledgment of the power of sorcery does not negate the power of Christianity to provide meaning. Amos’ story demonstrates that not all interpretations from Western missionaries, in this case the CMA, about culture resonated with Dani lifeways. The message villagers received from Western missionaries was that they should “turn their backs on culture.” However, the Dani, like Amos, affirm their own tradition in ways unbeknownst to Western missionaries. Amos struggles to find the means to go through his suffering – and uses existing cultural categories to explain his predicament.

In the hour of need, abstract theology does little to comfort if it is not relevant and meaningful to the most local conditions; the most innovative responses to life can come as responses to such moments. Within the Dani “plausibility structure,” the degree of one’s overall health (life fulfillment, satisfaction, contentment) and one’s humanity is directly attributable to the state of one’s good relationship with God, neighbor, and natural environment: the environment, because they depend on it; human beings, because they live in a community; and God, because they live with God. What if the natural environment does not give enough sustenance? Or if human beings do not give enough? Amos’ story illuminates the social significance of illness and the complicated ways in which meaning is constructed to make sense of difficult realities.

Amos’ response reflects an indigenous response to Christianity after fifty years of missionization. For Amos, Christianity is one source of spiritual knowledge. At a particular point, the Dani tradition becomes another source of religious knowledge. What emerges is the fact that the Dani epistemology does not get caught on the horns of the subjective–objective dilemma inherent in the Enlightenment project. Rather, the Dani display a natural ability to accept and blend both traditional religion and mission christianity.

To what degree Christianity has indeed been vernacularized among Dani Christians in an urban context (cf. Hayward 1997)? Church polity, leadership structure, architecture, hymnody, liturgy, clothing, and, more profoundly, theological perspectives in part reflect Western-introduced methods and tastes. Concomitantly,
many Dani cultural and axiomatic particularities have been dismissed. The displacement of Dani cultural particularities within evangelical churches need not preclude creative adoption of distinctly Dani contributions and lifeways.

Even the ritual of communion has been so thoroughly modeled after Western ecclesial practice that it symbolizes just the identification of God with the community, and leaves any environmental connotation completely out (cf. Daneel 1999). Traditional Dani rituals that served to reconcile broken relationships among life-sustaining forces no longer provides the assurance they once did. In the urban church rituals of reconciliation have been internalized, literally within the four walls of the church, and figuratively by the embodiment of it in prayer, songs, and sermons. Ritual life once marked with a high degree of physicality and public-ness has been privatized, translated into purely spiritual notions, being denuded of any social expression within the public sphere.

Conclusion

The urban evangelical church, invigorated by common canons and creeds, and fortified by equal access to Scripture and God, formed the basis of a new collective identity for city-dwelling Dani Christians. The social significance of the church lay in its ability to facilitate ethnic bridges that fostered multi-ethnic communities. As a moral enclave the urban church bolstered a new prestige system that stood apart from the public arena and therefore enabled the incubation and expression of new selves and new social identities without the overburdening of public and government imposition. New modes of measuring human actors were based upon the demonstration of “spiritual gifts” and one’s standing before God, which resulted in parishioners gaining self-respect, status, and integrity.

Dani subjectivities were reshaped as their biographies were reconstituted by their identification with what they perceived as the objective reality of the biblical story. In the ecclesiastical community existed “an ongoing mutual identification” because of the successful internalization of the identity-conferring definitions posited for them by objective reality (see Berger and Luckmann 1966: 130–131). Formulations of new identities based on a common commitment and autobiographical complementarity with the biblical narrative rather than to more narrowly defined notions of tribal consanguinity. Furthermore, the propagation of voluntaristic evangelical and Pentecostal Christianity proved to be “the creature and creator of free social space” in which new selves could be conceptualized and proved (Martin 1990: 279).

Persistent distinctions, however, continued to fragment the notion of a unitary body of Dani Christians. Dani self-defintions became complicated as simple notions of tribal identity combined with denominational affiliation to create a complex picture of reference group associations and moral commitments. Some who had been nurtured in evangelical highland churches instead discovered their homes in urban Pentecostal fellowships, while others found a spiritual home in a mainline church (e.g. GKI), the Roman Catholic church, or dropped out of Christian fellowship altogether. Generally, the dissimilarities between the Dani
experience in evangelical churches and Pentecostal churches can be illuminated in part by considering the difference between means and ends. For many, participation in evangelical churches is tantamount to “doing church” for ritualistic ends; while for others, the Pentecostal experience entails “being church,” where church functions as means to an end – becoming “the new creation.” After all, like Saul’s conversion on the road to Damascus, the consequences of the “new creation” are unpredictable. Saul was renamed Paul; he turned from being a persecutor of Christians to himself becoming a follower of Jesus and their most important early advocate. By definition, a “new creation” implies something fresh, innovative, and original; it is something unlike the past, yet continuous with it.

During much of the New Order, Dani religious life and discourse dwelled within the boundaries of the church. In their acceptance of mission Christianity, Dani had followed the pattern of a contained religious life as modeled by missionary predecessors. Whether within evangelical or Pentecostal circles, the urban church served as the most conspicuous conduit of Dani religiosity. The absence of any collaborative multi-ethnic venture outside the church revealed an underlying lack of Christian civility extending beyond the doors of the church. Courtesies and warm fellowship abided only within the church. Outside, the urban Dani Christians during the New Order struggled to articulate their inchoate vision of a better society. Despite their attempts, the public square remained dominated by the discourse of developmentalism forwarded by Indonesian officials and their communication media, and abetted by the military apparatus.

In the late New Order period, however, Dani intellectuals, having received the Bible as the authoritative statement for their experience of subjugation, began to show signs of interpreting that reality within a putatively Dani epistemological framework. The final destination of Dani (and Papuan) religiosity would be the public sphere where they would begin to reintegrate their vision, combining it with voices of other Papuans, and deprivatizing its containment from within the four walls of its ecclesiastic asylum. Here, among Dani as new creations lay the most robust edge of new growth – a public role of Christianity that struggled to combine distinctly Papuan visions of human freedom and dignity with modern notions of egalitarian ideals.
Plate 5.1 Transmigration shantytown, Jayapura. (Photograph by Charles Farhadian.)

Plate 5.2 Movie theater, Jayapura. (Photograph by Charles Farhadian.)
Plate 5.3 Taxi stand, Jayapura. (Photograph by Charles Farhadian.)

Plate 5.4 Dani boy. (Photograph by Stephan Babuljak.)
Plate 5.5  Papuan batik store, Jayapura. (Photograph by Stephan Babuljak.)

Plate 5.6  Weary transmigrant. (Photograph by Stephan Babuljak.)
Plate 5.7 Urban Dani youth. (Photograph by Charles Farhadian.)

Plate 5.8 Dani woman reading the Bible. (Photograph by Stephan Babuljak.)

Plate 5.9 Multiethnic church Sunday school class. (Photograph by Stephan Babuljak.)
Plate 5.10 Indonesian soldier. (Photograph by Stephan Babuljak.)

Plate 5.11 Post-New Order newspapers. (Photograph by Charles Farhadian.)
The dilemma that became increasingly salient in the 1990s centered on the general question of what role the church would play in civil society, and, more particularly, what would its response be to the increasing public awareness of human rights violations against its members. During the 1990s, Dani religiosity and identity emerged from its privatized encasement within the doors of the church and boldly intervened in the public sphere. Voices of Dani and Papuan dissatisfaction blended together, creating a new chorus of public protest. There was a sense among many that everything was being made new—Papuan expectations of a better world was “all in the making.” Although unfinished and open-ended, Papuan elites led the charge in articulating and channeling the political will of those who had lived as subjected people for far too long. Out of the instability of the political and social conditions of the late and post-New Order periods arose the vigorous public insertion of Papuan political will.

The church is not an end unto itself. Rather, its aims are geared toward the transformation (metanoia) of individual lives and collective plausibility structures. The outcome is not always predictable because for believers the personal and social encounter with a transcendent message ensconced in a morally charged community produces new self-understandings apart from what was offered by the missionary messengers. Papuan elites became visibly recognizable in the 1990s by encouraging the establishment of new channels for public political mobilization, such as non-governmental and human rights groups as well as becoming an increasingly outspoken ecclesiastical voice.

The privatized form of Christianity resulting from both extant modern conditions and imparted mission theology introduced a cultural dilemma among Dani and other Papuan Christians, the horns of which many fought hard to surmount. On the one hand, since the reception of mission Christianity, the Dani closely followed the religious and ritual patterns set out by missionary predecessors, a religious prototype based essentially on evangelical, pietistic notions of spiritual and religious life estranged from direct political engagement. Yet, on the other hand, Dani, like those of other Oceanic societies, constructed their identities in part out of practice; their identity was realized through public practice.

The “public-ness” of Dani and Papuan identity construction suggests that Melanesian identity is “continually demonstrated, a matter of behavior and
Desecularization of the Dani performance” (Linnekin and Poyer 1990: 8). That is, public performance is a critical element in Dani and Oceanic identity ascription. Marshall Sahlins’ term “performative structures” helps illuminate a particularly Oceanic ontogeny. Sahlins suggests a difference between “prescriptive structures” and “performative structures.” The former describes bounded groups and compelling rules that prescribe in advance much of the ways people act and interact, whereas the latter continuously makes relationships out of practice (Sahlins 1985: 28). Paraphrasing Sahlins, Linnekin and Poyer note that “[s]ubstance is not merely acquired from one’s parent’s but may derive equally from living in a place” (Linnekin and Poyer 1990: 8–9).

Oceanic cultural identities “are made as well as born” (Sahlins 1985: 28). Furthermore, “meanings inhabit the same universe of discourse and are subject to common conceptual operations. . . . just by sharing any experience do [Oceanic peoples] become kinsmen or fellow ‘children of the land’, only by those experiences that entail the appropriate value of consubstantiality” (Sahlins 1985: 30). Thus Melanesian identities are substantiated in part “by what they do and where they do it” (Linnekin and Poyer 1990: 9). Public demonstration and performative action reflect important self-understandings and often serve to communicate, in quite powerful ways, notions impregnated with dense sociological, psychological, and religious meaning.

The Me Christian Zackheus Pakage and his communities exemplify the performative nature of Papuan identity. Zackheus was seen by some “as a representation of Jesus Christ who had come to deliver them from politico-religious domination” (Giy 1995: xxi). Zackheus was a highly controversial figure among Me and Western missionary communities, having attended Bible school and then been hospitalized for mental illness and rejected by the Dutch and American missionary personnel. Giay argued that Zakheus’ public actions portrayed Me (and more generally Papuan) destiny “by acting out or dramatizing what was going to take place in the future” (Giy 1995: 159). Giay recalled one such incident. Shortly before he died, Zakheus moved to Pos 7, where he was rejected by missionary personnel. Giay recalled what happened shortly before Zakheus’ death in January 1970.

Zakheus went outside the house and took off his clothes. He was standing naked for sometime and then he muttered some words. He went around the town [Sentani] then he was again escorted back to his home. This too has been interpreted as having something to do with his way of communication with the people regarding the future course of their history. Some believe that legalization or institutionalization of prostitution by the present administration (by putting up houses for prostitutes in certain localities) which has been carried out in Jayapura and other towns in Irian Jaya is the fulfillment of this. Others have interpreted this politically by saying that Zakheus was showing the things we are experiencing now. By standing naked in the midst of a town Zakheus was teaching that strangers will come to Irian Jaya and take everything away from us. This is taking place now, they say. When our land
is taken away and everything we have will be gone and the last thing the Irian Jayans will do is to sell everything they have left including their clothes or koteka and they will die naked in their own land. “Let us start crying,” says one of them.

(Giay 1995: 160)

Zakheus was acting out what the future of West Papua would be, namely naked and powerless. Many laughed, thinking him to be mentally ill. Zakheus communicated a powerful message but remained silent, for his communicative act consisted strictly of public performance. As such, Zakheus’ demonstrative display functioned as a vehicle for self and social transformation.

**Papuanization of Christian Dani**

During the 1990s, Christian Dani identified closely with pan-Papuan aspirations for political independence. No longer were Dani concerned solely about their own communities. Rather, Dani began to look toward other Papuans to identify themselves. This section traces the historical trajectory that led the Dani to identify with the larger Papuan community rather than with the Indonesian nation-state. The Papuanization of Christian Dani meant their concomitant aversion to identifying as Indonesian. Under the Indonesian nation-state, most Dani felt there was no room for the co-existence of Papuan and Indonesian identities. Dani explicitly chose to self-ascribe as Papuan.

**Stories of torture and intimidation**

The New Order enforcement of the vision of a unitary nation-state has resulted in numerous and terrible human rights violations against indigenous Papuans. Like other Papuans who have been intimated and tortured, many Dani fear telling their stories. They are uneasy about revisiting such horribly painful experiences. Yet their “sejarah sunyi” (silent history) and *memoria passionis* impacts deeply their self-understanding and vision of the future (Hernawan and van den Broek 1999; van den Broek et al. 2001). They are silent sufferers whose lives are plagued with profound, isolating trauma. Many Papuans say they would rather live with the trauma than die at the hands of ABRI if they were to publicly tell their stories. Hostile activities at the hands of the ABRI are typically justified by identifying the intended victim as a member of the OPM.

The following story was told through the tears of the widow of a victim of military brutality. In the early 1980s, a Papuan highland Christian who was the secretary of the church district (GKII) and employed as a teacher was buried alive by members of the ABRI after being tortured for several hours. First, ABRI members forced him to dig his own grave. The grave was not an ordinary grave, but one in which the victim would have to stand upright. Then they used a blade to cut along the backside of his hands, between the fingers. ABRI members broke the bones of his hands and ordered him to stand in the grave. They buried him up
to his neck. Then they put a large, heavy piece of wood on his head. People heard him being tortured, but could do nothing. He cried through the night, “Mama, mama.” Today, whenever his family and clan go back to that place they remember him.

In another story that took place in the highlands, a child of a man accused of supporting the OPM watched as his father was tortured to death, along with two others. The Indonesian military heated an iron bar and shoved it up the father’s anus. The son was pleading, “Let my father come home, he’s not guilty.” In the words of my informant, “This is how they cried. Three young men were killed by the military. The last one watched the others get killed by the heated iron bar being pushed up through their anuses and he cried, ‘I don’t believe it, but they are gone. Now, it’s my turn.’” And silence. This was the voice of the boy’s dying father. His father’s last words. These are the last words that the son heard. Today, his son is fifteen and he is still angry. He hates those who killed his father and the other men.”

Similar stories can be told by many Papuan tribes during the New Order period. Intimidation, torture, and killings continue to take place in the post-New Order era. For example, on March 27, 1999 (Saturday) Obed Badi, a Me teacher at the Roman Catholic Theological College in Abepura, who had received a masters degree from a Roman Catholic seminary in Washington DC, was arrested by Indonesian intelligence officers and beaten to death while in detention at the police station in Abepura. When Obed’s wife and daughter had returned from a church meeting Saturday night, and discovered that Obed had not returned home, they became concerned and asked neighbors if they knew his whereabouts. Obed’s wife went to sleep after waiting many hours and awoke at 4:00 a.m. (Sunday morning), having become increasingly worried that Obed had not yet returned. At 5:00 p.m. (Sunday evening) the police notified Obed’s wife that Obed had died while in police custody.

The police said that Obed was drunk in Abepura the night before and they arrested him, and that he died at 1:00 p.m. Sunday. Obed did not drink alcohol. An informant, one of the few who saw his body at the hospital, reports large open gashes on his chin, chest, and forehead, as well as bruises along his cheek. Obed’s friends and family, along with several other Papuan supporters, went to the hospital to view the body and wait for the police chief to explain why Obed had been killed. When the police chief refused to go to the hospital ten people were chosen to go directly to the police station, which is within walking distance, to demand an answer. At that point, approximately 2,000 people, mostly Papuan, gathered in front of the Abepura police station. Some began to throw rocks, angry at the silence of the police department. The riot police showed their force by firing five rounds from their guns into the air, which controlled the crowd.

During this period these stories were limited to individual families and communities affected, and as such were free-floating painful realities. There were no common institutions or spokespersons to notify distant tribes of each other’s shared experience in suffering. Personally, many Dani (and Papuans) remained sequestered individuals and communities. However, during pastoral visits to the districts of Jayawijaya and Paniai in the mid-1990s, a Dutch Roman Catholic
priest used the term “sejarah sunyi” (silent history) to describe how the people dealt with their trauma. It is important to note that violations were not limited to highland communities. An informant told me that in 1984 in Sarmi (kabupaten Jayapura) a man was suspected of being a member of the OPM and was killed by the Indonesian military. According to my informant, they sliced his flesh and roasted it, and then forced other people to eat it.

The Dutch priest said that during his pastoral visits he heard things like, “This is where my husband was taken away and they tortured him over there.” “My father died there, by that tree.” “This is where I was raped.” These stories are not read in official textbooks, but are carried everywhere by people; they are carried on people’s minds, bodies, emotions, and psyches. And they are buried in collective memories, ready to explode (see Giay 1996).

The Bishop’s report

On August 3, 1995, Bishop H. F. M. Munninghof, OFM (Franciscan Friar), of the Roman Catholic Diocese of Jayapura, released a summary report, Violations of Human Rights in the Timika Area of Irian Jaya, Indonesia: A report by the Catholic Church of Jayapura, that would eventually lead to a conscientization of diverse Papuan groups throughout the province. The initial spark that led to the writing of Bishop Munninghof’s report was ignited by a publication of an alarming investigation by the Australian Council for Overseas Aid (ACFOA) on April 5, 1995 entitled Trouble at Freeport: Eyewitness Accounts of West Papuan Resistance to the Freeport–McMoran mine in Irian Jaya, Indonesia and Indonesian Military Repression: June 1994–February 1995. Trouble at Freeport publicized a number of human rights violations perpetrated by ABRI against Papuans (e.g. Amungme, Dani, Ekari [Me], Damal) in the Timika and Fak-Fak districts.

Bishop Munninghof’s report details executions and murder, disappearances, arbitrary arrests and detention, torture, surveillance, and destruction of property, as well as provides specific names, dates, and surrounding events of the human rights violations. Some abuses were perpetrated on those held responsible for or considered to be supporters of raising the Morning Star (Bintang Kejora) flag, the sign of Papuan independence. Others were brutalized for a variety of reasons, mostly to do with unsubstantiated suspicions of having connections with the OPM. In one such incident eleven Amungme members of the GKII were killed while praying together. In addition, Bishop Munninghof’s report exposed the occurrence of arbitrary arrests, torture, and killing of Dani on Christmas day, 1994.

Timika is the center of the mining activities of Freeport Indonesia Corporation (FIC). In the foreword to Bishop Munninghof’s findings he notes that the ACFOA report served as an impetus to the Roman Catholic Diocese to launch a verifying investigation.

Considering that this area is served by the diocese of the Bishop of Jayapura, we felt particularly disturbed by the report. Because the sources of the report were anonymous, we were not able to accept it at face value. On the other
hand, what happened in these accounts challenged us to examine the contents of this report as well as we could. This is what we have done and herewith we present the report without repeating all of it, although it was our reference material. But we also add from other sources which are dependable, since these sources are mostly the victims themselves or are very close to the happenings told here. We have conveyed this report to the Indonesian Bishops Conference so that it can share our concern and, more importantly, bring the report to the attention of the national Commission on Human Rights which has been given a mandate by President Suharto to see to it that the human rights of Indonesian citizens are properly respected. We hope that the National Human Rights Commission will follow up this report with an independent investigation on location. This is our hope and we want to express our gratitude to the Indonesian Bishops Conference for its involvement and assistance.

(Munninghof 1995)

Bishop Munninghof’s report summarizes various forms of torture during interrogation as follows. Papuans were forced to confess to accusations, had to sign confessions, and death threats were made to have them comply. This was done without any break for relatively long periods. Physical torture consisted of kicking in the belly, chest, and head with army boots; beating with fists, rattan, sticks, rifle butts, and stones; denial of food; kneeling with an iron bar in the knee hollows; standing for hours with a heavy weight on the head, shoulders, or cradled in the arms; stepping and stamping on hands; tying and shackling of thumbs, wrists, and legs; sleeping on bare floors; stabbing, taping eyes shut; and forced labor in a weakened condition. The torture caused bleeding head wounds, swollen faces and hands, bruises, loss of consciousness, and death because of a broken neck (Munninghof 1995).

The report notes that around the Freeport mines (FIC) “[s]urveillance is so tight in the area that it causes fear and tension among the civilian population. Surveillance is conducted in churches, during prayer meetings, in villages and towns, and in the streets where passers by are monitored. Surveillance is conducted by training guns on people, and threatening everybody who is deemed to defy the army/security units” (Munninghof 1995). Based on a surviving eyewitness’ account,

[on Wednesday, 31 May 1995 in the village of Hoea, soldiers from the 572th Trikora battalion, stationed at Paniai, at the security post of Jila (90 km east of Tembagapura), in Paniai shot a number of Amungme indigenous people from Hoea, killing 11 of them. According to the testimony of eyewitnesses who survived, the civilians of Hoea had been living in the forest because of fighting between OPM (Free Papua) guerrillas and the Indonesian military between June and December 1994. When the incident took place they were praying together because they were meeting to discuss who from the community would return to the government (controlled area) and who would
stay in the forest. They were also preparing food on heated stones. The meet-
ing was led by the minister of the Kingmi [GKII] Protestant Church of Hoea,
the Rev. Martinus Kibak. While waiting for the food to cook, the people gath-
ered in prayer. Rev. Kibak asked everybody to beseech God to grant them
peace and calm in the uncertain future they had to endure. While they were
praying, a 572 patrol led by master sergeant Marjaka who was patrolling the
Hoea area, surrounded the people and without warning started shooting at
the congregation while they prayed. The Rev. Martinus Kibak raised his
hands to surrender, but Sergeant Marjaka did not care. He ordered the soldier
closest to him, soldier second-class Titus Kobogou, to shoot the minister. The
bullet wounded the minister in the left part of his abdomen, and he died
instantly. At the same time the patrol fired shots at the people (among them
children) who were praying, killing 10 others.

(Munninghof 1995)

Bishop Munninghof’s report provided the details on intimidations and killings,
providing for the first time names, dates, and locations of the human rights
violations throughout the region.

It was highly significant that these stories of abuse and intimidation came from
members of both Roman Catholic and GKII churches and illuminated, through
publication, experiences of a variety of Papuan tribes (e.g. Amungme, Dani, Me,
Damal). In addition to Bishop Munninghoff’s report, the GKI also produced an
important report that chronicled West Papua’s thirty years under Indonesia
(GKI 1992). Both reports were written originally in Bahasa Indonesia. In early
August of 1995, Bishop Munninghoff sent his report via the Indonesian Bishops
Conference to the Indonesian National Commission for Human Rights. The inves-
tigation was later obtained by various non-governmental human rights organiza-
tions (e.g. Human Rights Watch) and posted on the internet. Australia used the
document to challenge Indonesia’s report on human rights violations. When
Papuans read Bishop Muninghoff’s 1995 report on human rights violations and
the GKI report on the experience of living under Indonesia, a new awareness
and solidarity was born among indigenous groups of West Papua.

The rise of “Papuanness”

It was at this time, in the late 1990s, that the explicit term Papuan was reintro-
duced into the public discourse. The reports from the Roman Catholic Church and
the GKI gave disparate Papuan groups awareness of their common experience in
oppression. Learning of Bishop Munninghof’s report helped to make Papuans of
“one heart.” Indigenous Papuans began to revalorize the concept of Papuan rather
than being humiliated by its past pejorative association with uncivilized,
“cultureless” black natives. With the distribution of the reports from the Roman
Catholic Diocese of Jayapura and the synod office of the GKI, people began to
feel, in the words of an informant, that “we are just like others . . . they’ve been
killing us all these years, but we’ve been silent. We thought this is how we are
supposed to live. Then, this report changed things. If we open up ourselves, putting these issues on the table and make a good report, then there will be people who will listen to us and help us.”

People responded, “Yes, it’s all of us. We’ve all been affected. Yes, they’ve been doing that among the Amungme and Dani, but they’ve also been doing that to us too.” Various tribes recognized their own story reflected in the violations exposed in the reports. Even the methods of torture sounded similar. The result was that a “we-ness” was created that indicated a new awareness among Papuans. The experience of unity in suffering led to a burgeoning of feeling Papuan. A common experience in suffering became the vehicle for reconceptualized self-understanding.

Prior to the mid-1990s the term “Papuan” was deployed solely by the OPM and their supporters. “Papuan” had a negative connotation, being anti-government, anti-Indonesian, and anti-military. In September 1998, during the post-New Era period, the term was formally used for the first time publicly to reflect multi-tribal sentiment during a forum of Papuan leaders. During this period, the notion of “Dani-ness,” or what was particular about being Dani, enmeshed with the general idea of Papuaness. It is important to recognize what is already obvious; there was no such individual tribe called the Papuan tribe. For that reason, the use of the term Papuan signified an overarching ethnic designation. Dani cultural particularities were subsumed in the more expansive notion of Papuaness, an explicit ideological shift toward greater universality. The term connoted something that would benefit all disparate groups, in part by relativizing them one to another, and providing a framework through which to articulate a new public voice and popular movement. As such, “Papuan” was a new concept, reflecting a new world and new social relations. It also provided direction and served as a unified goal. Consequently, the Dani reconceptualized themselves as Papuans, not entirely dismissing their cultural particularities but rather emphasizing the cultural, religious, and social commonalities they shared with other local people.

Summarizing the feelings of several Papuan groups, a member of the Papuan elite said, “Before I read those things in the bishop’s report . . . I was tied to my own tribe. But when I read this about the Dani in Wamena, others in Sarmi, and Nduga, that created a feeling that maybe this was being done systematically to all of us. So that maybe we had a common enemy. A new enemy. I got the strength to put all these things in writing and begin talking about this . . . Previously I was not aware that other tribal groups were experiencing this. But when I heard it I said, ‘this is something we have to strive to prevent’.” Increasingly in the late 1990s, various tribes described themselves as “Papuan” rather than by particular tribal identifications.

**Absence of outlets**

Despite their common experience of subjugation and repression, there was a conspicuous absence of available outlets for expressing Papuan collective
dissatisfaction. First, the GKII’s (CMA) evangelical tradition, which focused explicitly on doctrinal matters and church growth, had itself become a religious tradition among most Papuans. However, its decidedly mission-oriented outreach had caused it to become, in the words of a Papuan GKII leader,

oriented toward outreach only, it doesn’t care for its own sheep. It’s not open to the village, community level. The national church [GKII] is preoccupied with things that were missionary concerns but doesn’t respond to living with Christ. The church is under the bondage of evangelical tradition. The church is active in evangelism, not because of its burden for the lost, but because [GKII] has money for evangelism; so evangelism continues as a result of wanting to spend the available money. There’s no real conviction. So, there’s no space even for members of the church to minister to their own suffering.

Many church elite continually justified themselves by appealing to evangelical mission theology and policies introduced by Western missionaries, allowing neither room for new expressions of Christian faith nor a space to hear the voices of affliction from its own people. Second, the government provided no institutional outlet in West Papua for the distressed. Often times it was the government whom Papuans held responsible for oppressive measures and corruption. For instance, during past environmental catastrophes, such as the El Niño earthquake of 1976, aid money donated by Indonesia or by an outside country was expropriated by government personnel in West Papua and sent off-island to their home communities, mostly to their own families. Said one Papuan leader, “The government doesn’t care about the suffering of people, the government people steal money from those who suffer.” It is worthwhile to note that the perspective of the military is similar to that of the Christian missionaries in the 1940s and 1950s. The military justifies their oppressive activities by its rhetoric that “West Papua is a stronghold of the OPM” and missionaries likewise employed a rhetorical strategy that said, “West Papua is a stronghold of Satan.” These rhetorical strategies raise the particularly thorny question about how popular imagination is formed and how it is perpetuated. Both missionaries and government officials saw Papuans as smelly, dirty people: the former responded, “Satan is here” while the latter, “the OPM is here.” These imaginations justified a constant inflow of money and resources to thwart the advance of the respective opponent.

Finally, Dani tradition itself dealt with suffering (dis-ease) through the religious ritual means of pig sacrifice. Within the traditional system, suffering and sickness were believed to always have a prior cause. For instance, suffering and sickness could be due to problems with human, spirit, or ecological relations. If a human being had a good relationship with her neighbor, spirits, and environment, then pain and suffering would not beleaguer the individual. But the move to the city has enervated the efficacy of tradition.
Repoliticization of private spheres

Protest and resistance were, since Dutch occupation, a part of the Papuan response to foreign domination. During the New Order era, any threat to the perceived unity of the Republic was dealt a harsh blow. The possession or display of the Morning Star flag (*Bintang Kejora*) was a capital offense. The Morning Star flag was approved at the first meeting of the Papuan National Congress in Hollandia (Jayapura) in 1961. As Nicholaas Jouwe, the creator of the flag, explained,

> the basic colors are taken from the Dutch flag; red, white, and blue. We used our own variation on the meaning. Red means blood, all the struggles for independence always go through tears and blood. This represents human blood. In that blood I put the morning star. Every morning at 3:00 a.m. you could see the morning star from the east. If you could see that morning star with your eyes that meant it would be a good day. If you couldn’t see the morning star it would be a bad day. There would be rain, etc. And, it is the star of hope. For all Melanesians, if you could see the star going up then you would take the canoe and go fishing. That would be a good day. That star would show us that it would be a good day, because that star was bright and came from the east, before the sun rose, three hours before the sun. Put in the field of red [blood] means that one day we will be independent. It is the star of hope. As long as we have hope we will be free one day. Six white stripes; New Guinea during the Dutch times was divided into six provinces. Seven blue stripes representing the different tribes of Papuans. All the tribes spread out and living between these provinces. That is it. Simple.

(Jouwe 1999)

Many Papuans were fatally wounded when attempting to raise the Morning Star flag. Since May of 1998, with the demise of President Suharto and the New Order regime, people’s confidence in displaying the Morning Star flag has increased significantly. On one occasion, while I was at a photocopy shop in Jayapura, a young Papuan man entered and asked the clerk to make several copies of the Morning Star flag he had with him. Such brazen public display and talk could have been fatal in the New Order period. In the post-New Order period Papuans wore T-shirts with large Morning Star flags pictured on them. Such “freedom” never existed under the New Order regime. While raising the Morning Star flag was still an offense it was responded to with greater ambiguity by ABRI. Following the June 2000 Second Papuan Congress, President Wahid, the fourth president of Indonesia, agreed to allow the Morning Star flag to be flown under two conditions: it was to be smaller than and displayed lower than the Indonesian flag (*Merah Putih*).

Raising the Morning Star flag and ethnic conflict between Papuan (Dani) and *pendatang* occurred throughout the New Order period. However, what was significant in the late New Order period was the degree to which modes of resistance consisted of multi-Papuan voices in a shared chorus of public protest. Moreover, there was an emergence of an inchoate institutional apparatus to channel Papuan
political aspirations. Increasingly, Dani future expectancy got subsumed in the larger Papuan vision of a better society.

Here, then, was the beginning of the Papuanization of Dani Christians, for it was the commonly shared Papuan vision that served to define resistance and protest of Dani Christians in the late New Order period. The role of Papuan elites was crucial to the socializing of a Papuan vision, which in important ways stood in contradistinction to the vision provided by the New Society. In effect, what was challenged was the nation’s insistence that the New Society was “just and prosperous.” For Christian Papuan elites the notion of “justice” constituted a normative claim, one that was imbued with assertions of truth and the right ordering of society. As such, when government-initiated order was characterized by episodic or systemic injustice toward segments of those within its political boundaries, thereby failing to act in congruence with its God-given function, its legitimacy was questioned (see Alagappa 1995a; Keyes et al. 1994).

While evangelical missions sought to legitimate near absolute submission to government authorities based on their reading of Romans 13:1 (“Let every person be subject to the governing authorities”), other New Testament pericopes suggest that the right ordering of society implies the existence of governmental responsibility of providing justice. For instance, according to one Christian commentator, “When Paul, however, saw that the state was failing to fulfill its God-ordained function of providing justice for all, he called it to account and insisted that the wrong be righted (Acts 16:37)” (Foster 1978: 105). Acts 16:37 reads, “But Paul said to the police officers, ‘We were not found guilty of any crime, yet they [Roman authorities] whipped us in public – and we are Roman citizens! Then they threw us in prison. And now they want to send us away secretly? Not at all! The Roman officials themselves must come here and let us out.’ ”

The role of intellectual Papuan elite: conscientizing Papuans

In these developments the role of Papuan elites cannot be understated, for they provided the most salient articulation of the Papuan vision. Many Papuan intellectuals, not surprisingly, focused on the idea of common experiences in suffering as a transcultural concept to unify scattered people. In the late New Order period, Papuan elites were increasingly dealing with local issues by placing them within the context of universal questions of human rights and democracy. Generally, the conscientization work of Papuan elites was divided between two complementary approaches. First, what I call the intellectual elites describes the decidedly intellectual endeavors of the academically trained Papuan elites, such as writing, lecturing, and the public dissemination of broad themes of Papuan emancipation through print media, classroom, and public meetings both in Papua and in international forums. Second, what I refer to as the instrumental elites are those strictly action-oriented individuals, many whom have lost their lives through a variety of resistance activities.

Instrumental elites are leaders and organizers of public protest. Intellectual elites, including Dani, serve as pastors, educators, or government employees. Their exposure to wider knowledge through national and international church conferences and
coursework leading to graduate degrees position them to comment articulately on social and political changes facing Papuan communities and enable them to serve as a cultural and intellectual bridge between universal questions and particular concerns. Describing the impetus for his work, a Papuan intellectual elite explains,

What I’m saying is that Indonesia has been trying to make statements that put Papuans down. But after 35 years they are seeing the reaction, even from elite Papuans, for example, raising the [Morning Star] flag. That’s a very strong reaction. “We don’t want to be a part of you, you’ve been imposing your world on us. We want to have a space.” Then the reaction came from the government: “those who want to keep their own identity, their own aspirations, their own history, are just a few, too insignificant to talk about it, so forget it.” Then, there was the problem of Sukarno; there was no communication in those days, 1945, when he declared independence. Indonesian independence was actually declared by an Indonesian elite minority. The point is that you [Indonesia] have been forcing them [Papuans] to be part of your world, but there’s a time when people say, “No.” That time is now.

There are two assumptions that shaped the government’s policy toward local culture. The first assumption is that these tribal cultures are backward, so they have to go, we have to wipe them out. If you give them space it is against the spirit of development and modernization. You have to remove the old, local culture. It’s like the missionary policy in the 18th and 19th century toward local culture. Wipe out the heathen, all these pagan cultures and start a Christian culture. The second assumption is that local culture is identical with local politics. It’s a political view, from their viewpoint. Once you give space to local culture it will create tribal consciousness. So, they have to wipe that out. They always think there will be national disintegration. To prevent that they have to come up with “kebudayaan nasional,” national culture, which they themselves cannot explain. What is it? What do you mean? Is it Javanese? Batak? Chinese? Modern? Western?

Papuan elites leveled criticisms against both government and Christian mission. Says one informant,

Whether you like it or not you have to speak about the Evangelicals. These have been important in understanding ourselves [Dani, Me, etc.]… we as a church have been taught that we have to be involved in evangelization and church growth, period. And, now, we wonder, “Why are we now behind?” The Christian missions say, “Going to a [state] elementary school is a school for non-Christians.” Today, the people still have this idea, because of these evangelical missions. So, in our discussions you feel like you are rejected. You are not trained to deal with development. You live in Indonesia where development is a must. Whether you like it or not, you have to respond to it. Indonesia is coming, all these small vendors. We Christians are just watching, because doing business is not a work that God has told us to do. What we have
been commanded to do is to evangelize, only. Then, we say, “When we go on our children will be involved in activities like riots, burning markets and stores. You see, we have not been able to educate our young people.”

While the specific term *nabelan kabelan* has become a distant memory of the majority of younger city-dwelling Dani, it remains accessible, and the idea it engendered serves as a window through which to create an alternative vision to counter the dominant view of the New Society proffered by the Indonesian nation-state. The idea of *nabelan kabelan*, the traditional Dani notion of salvation, whether articulated in its traditional form or reconceptualized to meet the social and religious requirements of urban Dani, continues to have strength, because it was inborn, indigenous, and provided an innate medium to channel political and social aspirations. The notion of a better world, that is *nabelan kabelan*, becomes more specifically defined as a countervailing force in the urban context of domination and exploitation. Dani, like other Papuans, when in a context of a dominant oppressive system, become radical with their visions of a new world.

**The role of instrumental Papuan elite: the God of action**

Instrumental Papuan elites are considerably more dangerous in their immediate context, for their activities are performative, physical, and immediately recognizable, and their social statuses are lived in transitional states. They are less directly defined by available institutional definitions provided by the church or state. Their existence in a liminal sphere has made their life dangerous; their lives have followed a pattern of initiation into profound new ways of being and living, no less significant than the performative structure and ontological transformation that has accompanied the rituals of rights of passage in their traditional societies. Instrumental elites live on the edge of the social margins, being rejected by some and accepted by others. They do not fit typical social categories, but rather exhibit characteristics similar to prophets and charismatics, for they see visions, hear voices, and give themselves entirely to implementing their vision. What they leave is a legacy of activities, for often times their lives are cut short in the meting out of the military response to their actions.

Here I highlight the story of one instrumental Dani elite whose life and activity exemplifies extraordinary courage and commitment in the face of harsh subjugation. Petrus Tabuni, a Dani, grew up in the GKII and is a staunch supporter of the activities and ideals of the OPM. He has little formal education. Between 1975 and 1980 Petrus lived in the jungle. He was arrested in 1980 for raising the Morning Star flag and was imprisoned at Kalisosok in Surabaya, in eastern Java. He was released more than a decade later, in 1992. Then, from 1993 to 1996 Petrus was in the jungle again with the OPM, back and forth from PNG to West Papua. Petrus says that because the church is silent about human rights violations it bears responsibility, and so the church sides with the government and the military because of its quiescent compliance. While in prison Petrus identified
himself as a Roman Catholic because, he says, in his hour of need no GKII pastor or parishioner visited him. Only the Catholics came to comfort him. At one point in his imprisonment, Petrus was put in solitary confinement for six months, where he saw neither the sun nor any other light but, he says, “I did not regret it.”

While incarcerated Petrus had several visions. Petrus recounts one he had in 1981. “My hands had been handcuffed for one and a half years. So much so that it was difficult to move my hands, difficult to eat, and I was in a serious condition. Suddenly, I saw a person standing in front of the door of my cell. I was startled and stood up spontaneously and reflexively. I moved my hands in order to raise them and suddenly I stood. I was free from the handcuffs. The handcuffs were released from me.”

On December 31, 1988, while incarcerated in Kalisosok, Petrus fasted to bring in the New Year. He asked direction from God. “Suddenly,” he recounts, “I heard a voice from behind me say, ‘don’t bother – he still sleeps – it’s not necessary to awaken him.’ At that point I was startled and thought that the spirits [roh-roh] of the dead had come to disturb me. Because of that I directly commanded them to go from me in the name of Jesus. But without awareness of the Bible in my hand, I threw it from my hand. I was disturbed [terganggu].”

After his discharge from prison, he waited to be picked up by his family, but they thought he had died and did not know about his release. He returned to Jayapura. Several months later he contacted Matias Wenda, a Dani OPM leader, and moved into the jungle in 1993, yet was arrested again soon after. When the military (ABRI) arrested him they opened his shirt, thinking he might be carrying a weapon, and beat him until he was black and blue with welts (babak belur). Petrus says he did not know from where the hits and kicks were coming, but he was shot after the military saw writing on his chest in large letters: “One Nation One Soul” (in English), the motto of the Republic of West Papua state emblem, a government in exile.

Petrus was then tortured until blood ran from his nose, mouth, and ears. Half conscious, Petrus remembers screaming “Lord, forgive them because they don’t know what they are doing.” That prayer only added to the anger of his torturers and they hit his head with a rifle butt until he lost consciousness. He says, “My expression of forgiveness was said because I thought I was going to die.” Friends who saw Petrus beaten later took his body to a bathroom. Before trying to awaken Petrus, a friend said, “If a person struggles from a heart that is impure, he will die. But, if he struggles for something that is right and true he will not surrender to his enemy, and he will live.” They then threw cold water on him. Petrus said, “I lived again.”

Petrus continues to work for Papuan political freedom and to commemorate the day of the proclamation of West Papua that was pronounced on July 1, 1971. On this date several Papuans, including self-styled Brigadier General Seth Rumkorem, Maties Tabu, and Yacob Prai, officially declared the establishment of the state of West Papua (Osborne 1985; Dorney 1990: 255). Since that day, the OPM and their supporters have been struggling to implement what they believe is a de facto state of West Papua.
Reflecting on his near-death experience at the hands of the military, Petrus contends that “God knows me, that I am not guilty. I struggle for something that’s good. Because of God’s goodness he did not take away my life. This is miracle of God that I now live – because God saved me, because God knows that I struggle to save the Papuans. I don’t struggle for my own importance, position, or status.”

Petrus is hesitant to talk about God and religion because he believes that church and mission have “put God in a church box.” He tries to deal with his subjugated life by coming up with his own solution, his own view of God, that lies outside formal church doctrine and is based almost entirely on his religious and social experience of struggle. Petrus is setting out on his own journey, outside the comforts of a community, developing his own theology, and his own understanding of God and God’s mission in the world.

Petrus is a spiritual and social entrepreneur, trying to engage his struggle in a dialectic between his personal experiences of oppression and the teachings of the GKII. He finds that the mission community, including the GKII, is keeping God for their own purposes, solely to build churches and to evangelize. Petrus says that the church people contend that, “God is in our midst.” Yet he challenges the mission community by saying, “God is with me.” It is important to note that while being tortured Petrus relied on, in his own words, “the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, the God of Jacob, and the God of the Papuans” as his source of strength. His view of Papuan history is intimately associated with that of the Old Testament Hebrews, “the chosen people of God.” Petrus understands his personal history and the history of the Papuans as rooted and empowered by the God of Abraham, exhibiting a religious and social simultaneity with the Old Testament story – Petrus’ struggle mirrors the struggle of the Hebrews for political emancipation. Yet Petrus’ religious perspective blends traditional religious notions with Christian concepts.

When asked to comment on the presence of God in the struggle of the OPM, Petrus says that he is not aware of how God is present.

But I can tell you that I always hold to the tribal religion and religions of the Papuans. Here, I always reject an identity from God as is confessed and attested to by the church and announced by the gospel. I recognize and am convinced that there are many miracles and things that have happened in my life and struggle. I realize and pray to the God of the Jews (orang Yahudi), the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, the God of Jacob, and the God of the Papuans, so that he will take note of the loyalty [kesetiaan], suffering [penderitaan], and oppression [penindasan] experienced by Papuans. So that he will pay attention to the Papuans too. It truly appears that there are many things that I have experienced as guidance from the hand of God.

As an example, Petrus tells of when he and other OPM members were surrounded by military in the jungle yet were able to escape. “God frees me from my enemies and friends from the sudden encirclement from my enemies. He always has a way for freeing me from danger. This means to me that God always
accompanies us in the struggle for emancipation. This is proof that God sees the
teardrops and hears the suffering of widows of whose husbands have been killed.
God cares about the destitute poor [fakir miskin].” Petrus recounts a meaningful
experience that attested to God’s presence with him:

For instance, take just one example of my experience, when I was [walking]
on the way to Papua New Guinea. During the trip we didn’t eat [meat] for
22 days. We only ran across snakes and some vegetables to eat. Then we
arrived at the river, and God showed us the way. At that point, the pastor, who
has since died, told us we shouldn’t eat snake anymore. We had to stop eat-
ing snake because before it was the snake that lied to Eve and Adam so that
human beings fell into sin and the result was that we now bear the weight of
colonization [penjajahan], oppression [penindasan], and exploitation
[pemerasan]. The snake that we ate on the path served as a sign of danger –
that we better stop eating snakes. But that night God showed the way. God
did not forget us, but showed us a certain vision. At that time, because the
pastor usually prayed at 3:00 a.m. he awoke and prayed. Then, after he
prayed, I had a very clear vision that was very distinct. At that moment, I saw
three people suddenly standing before me. I had the bones from the snake
I was eating. Then, I became afraid and hid the bones. Then, the three people
said, “in the name of the Father, the Son, and Holy Spirit, don’t fear, it’s a
blessing that you may eat because it has already been made holy. Because of
that, eat.” When I woke up in the morning I conveyed this vision. Then the
pastor said, “This means I’m wrong. We can eat snake because truly all that
God has created and made holy is good and we can eat it.”

Later, when we arrived at the defense base for the OPM, we grew hungry.
Late that night I had a vision in which I saw a tall, white Western person, with
a long white beard. He was carrying a pig and said to us, “This pig I bring
for you. Cut it and eat it.” Then, in the morning I told them [compatriots] to
pray. I went outside the house and saw a white pig eating grass near a papaya
tree I had cut down the day before. I yelled back to my compatriots and told
them what I saw. It was in fact a big pig. So, I told the pastor to bow the pig
but [the arrow] fell short and the pig ran. Then I was angry at the pastor, but
then I lamented, and regretted that I had those emotions. Then I asked for-
giveness. I prayed to the God of the Papuans – the God that cares about the
struggle of the OPM. I asked God to help us. And God truly heard. Several
hours later that same pig returned – at 3:00 p.m. – and I bowed the pig and
then thanked God and we ate it. This was a miracle from the God of the
Papuans, the God of Hebrews – our God.

In 1998, Petrus was at Timika, where he saw “Jesus step forward on a cloud and
say himself, ‘Papuans will be free’.” In Petrus’ own words, “I struggle in this city
for freeing the people of Papua from colonization, with neither financial support
nor organization. I have to sweat myself. I’ve got to create a way and organize the
people so we can be connected. I’m involved with preparing and organizing the
carrying out of activities that we think we have to take care of in Jayapura and around it. In the struggle and this situation, our sponsors are the existing Papuan people. Sometimes I get money from taxi passengers whose things may fall. This is the God of the Papuans.” Petrus readily acknowledges his past and present reliance on God:

Like I said before, all this was done by God – I have never busied myself with worrying about investigating the identity of God. I don’t have the time to investigate God – his characteristics, who he is, his essence, his desires – like students of theology, pastors, and members of the GKI that worry themselves with questions about the identity and personality of God with the intention of being close and getting to know him better. I want more to see him as God of the Papuans who is present in our journey as a people and nation [bangsa] that struggles for emancipation and freedom and liberty that has been forcefully taken away from us by Indonesian authorities.

Whereas intellectual Papuan elites understand God at a theological, abstract level, employing documents, books, articles, and commentaries as their resources, instrumental elites are praxis-oriented actors who understand God-in-action, as enacted theologians, rather than in abstract theological terms. As intellectual and instrumental elites shared their visions together, the former by learning of experiences of suffering and oppression and the latter by learning the wider theoretical issues couched in terms of rights, justice, and democratic ideals, what were once dispersed Papuan populations began to show signs of becoming a relatively harmonious cultural voice in the late New Order and early Reformasi periods.

**Songs of protest: the blending of voices**

The performative structure of Papuan discursive practice results from an encounter among Papuan cultural logic, Malay *pendatang*, Western mission, and the New Society encapsulated in development policies and national ideologies forwarded by the Indonesian nation-state. Public displays of resistance and the chants and songs forwarded function as a counter-statement to the ubiquitous colonization of Papuan identity. Songs of protest are sung by a third category of Papuans, that is, a group consisting predominantly of students.

In 1989, a large garden was organized by Papuans to commemorate the raising of the Morning Star flag by Kotowangai a year earlier. People came from all over Jayapura. An informant remembers that the police stopped the traffic in Kota Raja, a small town east of Abepura. “All the *pendatang* were allowed to proceed through to Jayapura but all the [Papuans] were instructed to stop and turn around. The meeting was supposed to be in Jayapura.” The police decided whom to stop on purely racial grounds, by skin color and hair type (curly or straight). He continues, “We couldn’t go through. So, the Papuans started singing, ‘Onward Christian Soldiers’. This helped people realize that they are different than the *pendatang*, the Indonesians. The feeling of ‘we-ness’ was created.” Increasingly,
Papuan students, and, less so, non-students, have gathered in public places in order to raise their voices against human rights violations and champion political independence. The tactic is distinctly different from the small-scale guerrilla activities of the OPM, who tend to limit their mode of resistance to raiding transmigration villages, attacking facilities, such as of mining industries, and kidnapping.

“Onward Christians Soldiers” (Maju Laskar Kristus) was adopted by Papuan protestors and recast as a vehicle for the insertion of a religious perspective into the public sphere as well as a political message couched in religious terms. Written in 1865 by Sabine Baring-Gould, “Onward Christian Soldiers” was based on the biblical verse, “Endure hardship with us like a good soldier of Christ Jesus” (Second Timothy 2:3). Quoting the song,

Onward, Christian soldiers marching as to war, with the cross of Jesus going on before! Christ, the royal Master, leads against the foe; forward into battle see His banner go!

Like a mighty army moves the Church of God; brothers, we are treading where the saints have trod. We are not divided, all one body we – One in hope and doctrine, one in charity.

Onward, then, ye people, join our happy throng; blend with ours your voices in the triumph song. Glory, laud, and honor unto Christ the King – This thru countless ages men and angels sing.

Refrain: Onward, Christian soldiers, marching as to war, with the cross of Jesus going on before!

Since the late 1980s and early 1990s diverse Papuan groups have deployed “Onward Christian Soldiers” as their rallying cry. In contrast, when the predominantly American evangelical community of Pos 7 sings “Onward Christian Soldiers,” it is couched in highly spiritualized sentiments – the fight is between God and Satan, good and evil, not between “flesh and bones.” In that context, “Onward Christian Soldiers” serves a special spiritual function, reminding believers that the battle is between “spiritual forces,” between “flesh” and “spirit.”

Among Papuans, however, the social uses to which the song has been contextualized infuses it with political meaning. Singing “Onward Christian Soldiers” in the context of public protest radicalizes its message, making it an instrument of political strategizing. What is axiomatic for Papuans is not church performances but public performance. As such, the church has officially rejected the song. Church members in West Papua renounce the song because of their firm desire to depoliticize it. Some church leaders too reject the song because of their position in the church; they fear being closely associated with anything even remotely resembling political engagement. Yet at the same time, church leaders often do not experience the same problems of those they lead. Juxtaposing those “down there,” the common person (volk), with those “up here,” the educated elites, a church leader says,
Down there . . . there’s conflict between the Javanese and them. The problem of having access to government institutions . . . This is their experience. But, we church people are “up here,” and we say, “forget it, you are using that song for political purposes, you are wrong.” That’s what we say from up here. But, we get our salaries from them. For these people this song has become a part of tradition, a part of their language, their rhetoric, their words. Their culture is Christian culture where Christian ideas become part of their daily life. So, at times like these crises, at a time like this they have to protest. The existing, Christian ideas which have become part of the local cultural package can be a channel.

In terms of song selection, there are no common non-Christian songs, apart from Indonesian nationalistic ones. Of course, each Papuan group possesses its own traditional songs, but these carry little meaning neither across Papuan cultures nor in the public sphere. Ironically, it is the church, the multi-ethnic congregations, which have taught Papuans universally recognizable hymns. When crises arise these songs have become the cultural repertoire from which protesters choose their rhetorical message. Many protesting Papuans are third and fourth generation Christians. Many are from theological colleges. In Jayapura, voices of highland Papuan Christian, whose experience with Christianity dates only to the 1960s, merge with that of coastal Papuans, whose Christianity dates back more than a hundred years (see Neilson 1999) to form a unified Papuan awareness. “Onward Christian Soldiers” is a new language for Papuans. Using it in public protest suggests that Christian language, in times of need, can become a cultural vehicle to communicate Papuan frustration.

According to Benny Giay, the song suggests that “for local Papuans, Christ is a liberator, a victor, someone who brings political freedom. That’s what they think on the basis of their experience of everyday . . . . This kind of Christology, this idea about Christ, is born in a very specific life experience, which as a pastor or as a university instructor [dosen] I may not experience it, but I’d like to listen to them. To know what they think about it” (Giay 1999a). In the context of the militarization of social space, the announcement that Papuans too are “soldiers” is a significant response to their subjugation. They are soldiers and Jesus is the leader. They say, “We are behind him. Jesus is with us and he’s going ahead of us and he’s going to fight for us.” This sends an important message about themselves. It is significant that protesters sing “Onward Christian Soldiers” while they are marching, making it difficult to distinguish between verbal and physical modes of protest.

Two cultures, Malay and Papuan, have collided in the public sphere, the former dominating the latter for thirty-five years. Understanding the symbolism of their encounter requires one to recognize that an emerging Papuan Christianity results from the struggle in context. This is a contextual Christianity, a belief in deliverance at the hands of Jesus, their political liberator. They claim, “Oh, Jesus is our Savior, our liberator. When Jesus returns he will liberate Papuans from Indonesia.” According to Giay, “We cannot evaluate this type of Christology
without taking into consideration the entire context, the whole complex, the cultural and social dynamics, the interactions, the problems, the hatred, the frustrations that are taking place because of the encounter of two cultures. One strong and one weak.” Recasting a commonly understood spiritual song into a political assertion suggests that Papuans in protest have utilized Christian notions, reformulating them into what they believe to be a Christian strategy.

The overwhelming majority of city-dwelling Papuans continue to attend church, where they receive strength, gain a sense of belonging, and are given opportunities for lay leadership. Urban Papuan (e.g. Dani) Christians receive encouragement, strength, and comfort from their commitment to Christianity and the Bible. It is important to acknowledge that the church is the only place where Papuans have received such encouragement. In some respects, there is no other choice. As one person noted, “sing the song, maybe it’s the last hope there can be.” The context of subjugation combined with low social position have radicalized and repoliticized Christianity. Singing “Onward Christian Soldiers” has become a theological–political counter-statement that unsettles both mission and government.

A second song, *Tanahku Papua* (My Land Papua), which had become repoliticized in the New Order period, has important historical precedents and has much more explicit nationalistic overtones than “Onward Christian Soldiers.” Nicholas Jouwe, President of the National Liberation Council of West Papua, recalls its history. In 1919, a Dutch missionary sent a group of Papuan students to Java to receive teacher education.

What happened was that they were brilliant. They were musicians. They played the trumpet, piano, organ. What happened was that the Indonesian students took all these Papuan students asking them to become their slaves. After three years, the director, who was Dutch, saw it. For these brilliant students everything was going wrong. He asked the students why they weren’t doing well. They said, “everyday we have to polish [the Indonesian students’] shoes and wash their clothes. They told us, ‘shut your mouth, if you tell the director about this we will kill you.’” So, they were afraid. All of them.... So they took them away to Halmahera because the Papuans were being treated as slaves. At Halmahera they went to a new institute for missionaries.... The same thing happened. The Papuans were treated as slaves. So, Van Haselt appealed to the Zendingshuis in Utrecht. They made an advertisement through the church newspapers to get a teacher for the Papuans. Only one man came forward. His name was Isaak Samuel Kijne. He was a Christianized Jew. Isaak said, “I would like to go to New Guinea.” So he was sent to New Guinea in 1921. He set up a normal school [*school normaal*] on the island on Mansinam, a small island off Manokwari. That was the first place where two missionaries from Germany, Otto and Geisler, first set foot. That is the same island. They [Kijne *et al.*] opened the school but there was no food in that place. So, they moved to Waiser where there was sago. In May, 1923 Kijne composed our national anthem [*Hai Tanahku Papua; My Land Papua*]. I was born on 24th November 1923. When we made a congress
[Papuan National Congress] we had to choose a national song. I proposed the one Kijne wrote. “Oh, my land Papua, I love thee until the end of my life. Thank you, oh Lord, for giving me this land. May it fulfill thy desire.” It was accepted as the national anthem [of West Papua]. It became the national anthem [agreed upon at the New Guinea Council]. I was Vice-President of the New Guinea Council. It was accepted on 19th October 1961.

(Jouwe 1999)

The lyrics of Hai Tanahku Papua (Oh, My Land Papua), held by many Papuans to be the national anthem of an independent West Papua, are as follows:

1. Hai tanahku Papua, 1. Oh, my land Papua,
   Kau tanah lahirku, thou, my native land,
kukasih akan di kau I love thee
sehingga adjalku until the end of my life

2. Kukasih pasir putih 2. I love the white sand
dipantaimu senang, of thy glorious beaches,
dimana lautan biru where the blue ocean
berkilat dalam t'rang shine in the light

3. Kukasih bunji ombak 3. I love the sound of the waves
pemukul pantaimu dashing against thy beaches,
njanjian yang selalu a song that always
senangkn hatiku rejoices my heart

4. Kukasih gunung-gunung, 4. I love the mountains,
besar, muliahlah, great and sublime,
dan awan yang melajang and the clouds
kelilang puntyaknya floating around their summits

5. Kukasih hutan-hutan 5. I love the forests,
selimut tanahku; the blanket of my land;
'ku suka mengembara I love roaming about
dibawah naungmu in their shadow

6. Kukasih engkau, tanah, 6. I love thee, oh earth,
yang dengan buahmu that with thy fruits
membayar keradyinan pays for my industry
dan pekerdyaanku and for my work

7. Syukur bagiMu, Tuhan: 7. Thank thee, oh Lord,
Kaub' rikan tanahku, Thou hast given my land;
b'ri aku radjin juga May I be intent on
sampaikan maksudMu accomplishing Thy design

What is particularly striking about Hai Tanahku Papua is the obvious identification Papuans make among God, environment, and themselves. Although
written by a Dutch missionary, I. S. Kijne, the song resonates deeply with Papuans and their struggle for political independence. Especially among older coastal Dani, *Hai Tanahku Papua* has served as a robust anthem of nationalism.

The church helped create a national consciousness through the introduction of songs that spanned tribal associations, theologies that provided a transcendent ideal, and an idiom of democracy that inspired and invigorated a public response to subjugation. National consciousness emerged in part from the fact that the message of the church cut across lines of tribes and clans, and, therefore, unified disparate congeries under a shared vision. Said differently, Christianity, with a common scripture and practices provided preconditions for nationalism by unifying different clans into “Dani” and then “Papuan” identity.

**Dani Christians in the post-New Order era**

The period of *Reformasi*, which followed the demise of the New Order regime in May 1998, was characterized as one of the unheard openness of freedom and expression and a lessening of military repression and outright control. Yet what continued was the targeting of leaders who organized peaceful rallies. The new social and political realities of the *Reformasi* period, which locals felt was marked by the greatest openness to Papuan aspirations since their Indonesian colonization, gave birth to noticeable changes. Papuan activities during the early *Reformasi* period could not be described as jacquerie, because Papuan elites, who occupied relatively high statuses in ecclesiastical and educational leadership, spearheaded the insertion of the new public voice, and challenged the Aesopian language of Indonesian bumbledoms.

Increasingly in the era of *Reformasi*, numbers of locally owned and operated newspapers, such as *Tifa Irian* and *Irja Post* featured the writings of intellectual Papuan elites and reported on the activities of instrumental Papuan elites. For Papuans, *Tifa Irian* and *Irja Post* represent a significant source of intellectual freedom and space to articulate a putatively Papuan vision, in contradistinction to the *Cendrawasih Pos*, a Muslim-owned newspaper and the largest daily circular in West Papua.

Moreover, print media became a major vehicle for the socialization of the emerging Papuan vision. Their writings questioned the assumption that Papuans should be made targets of development schemes, raised issues of equity in terms of Papuan access to education, scholarships, and promotions, exposed the severity of environmental degradation resulting from national and international forestry and mining operations, and stimulated discussion about the limited role of Papuans in the national discourse.¹

The emerging vision of intellectual and instrumental Papuan elites was compellingly real given its location within broader historical realities. The repoliticization of public spheres was animated by notions gleaned from both traditional and modern realities. Whereas public protest during the New Order era resulted in minimal social and political changes, and numerous Papuan and Malay deaths, Papuan elites in the era of *Reformasi* aimed at the institutionalization of their vision.
of a better society. Theys Eluay, a Sentani leader of Papuan political independence murdered by the military on November 10, 2001, said of the people of Papua, “We are fighting without weapons . . . every Papuan is fighting for independence through prayers to Jesus Christ. He is God’s greatest gift for this country.”

FORERI

FORERI (Forum Rekonsiliasi Masyarakat Irian Jaya, Forum for Reconciliation of the People of Irian Jaya) started officially on July 24, 1998, just three months after the demise of the New Order regime. FORERI was organized by Papuan NGOs and leaders from churches, traditional councils, and women’s and student groups in West Papua. The key concerns for FORERI were dialogue with the national government, reconciliation, non-violence, and promoting and protecting human rights in order to support the political aspirations of the Papuan people. One hundred Papuans, known as “Team 100,” representing a variety of Papuan groups (e.g. by age, gender, tribe), would eventually meet with the president of Indonesia to ask for political independence. FORERI’s immediate inception was a response to Papuan student street protests demanding political freedom. Indonesia’s Vice-President B. J. Habibie, ascended to fill the office of the president in May 1998, following President Suharto’s decision to step down from office. In Jayapura Papuan students took to the streets, demanding to talk to leaders from the provincial parliament (DPR) in Jayapura. However, the DPR and the governor, Freddy Numberi, closed their doors, refusing to speak to the students. All protesters were Papuan students (i.e. Dani, Nduga, and Me) seeking to raise the issue of the culpability of human rights violations suffered by Papuans.

The students began protesting on July 1, 1998 in Jayapura. On July 3–4 the military shot some Papuans, even bystanders. In the front yard of a theology teachers’ house adjacent to STT I. S. Kijne (GKI), the Protestant theological college in Abepura, a young daughter of a teacher was running to warn her father of the protest and military engagement. Her father recalls seeing his daughter running toward him, when suddenly she fell from having her knee shot off from the Indonesian military. He heard six shots being fired, and one hit her. This occurred on the STT campus. Eventually, she was flown by the military to Jakarta and hospitalized, where military leaders visited her. Photos were taken and published in newspapers showing military officers standing by her bed, apologizing for the permanent injury caused by their men.

The Abepura demonstrations were centered on the campus of Universitas Cenderawasih, adjacent to the STT I. S. Kijne (GKI), and included Papuan students from several colleges and secondary schools in the area. Prior to the demonstration, students held a pembahasan (free discussion), an organized public meeting where students could say whatever they wanted. Then the police entered, sending a member of police intelligence as an undercover spy. He was the only non-Papuan in attendance, as an undercover spy. Students discovered his presence and beat him. At that point the military fired their weapons. Neither the NGOs nor the government was willing to mediate between the students and the military.
In the March of 1996, intelligence personnel provoked students at Universitas Cenderawasih to raise the Morning Star flag. The students were convinced that “the military is joining us.”

Into this vacuum, Christian church and educational leaders spearheaded the formation of FORERI. The background to the Papuan student protests can be traced more immediately to a meeting on July 1, 1998 organized by a WD man, Petrus living in Timika. While in Timika, he had a vision in which he saw Jesus appearing in a cloud saying, “Papuan people will get freedom.” Papuans because it was on July 1, 1971 that Papuan leaders, led by Seth Rumkorem, proclaimed an independent state of West Papua in Waris (Kabupaten Jayapura). Petrus interpreted the vision as a confirmation of the future independence of the Papuans. That was the confirmation he needed. Upon receiving the revelation, Petrus organized a movement to raise the Morning Star flag on July 1, 1998. They did not succeed in raising the flag in Jayapura. Yet Petrus believed that God had given him confirmation through his vision. He then helped to motivate the Papuan students of Jayapura. The protest and conflict with military in Abepura occurred from July 1 to July 4, 1998. Later, when the events in Abepura settled down, there were flag raising attempts in Wamena, Nabire, and Biak. These places took up the challenge during the second week of July, 1998.

Following these events a pastoral letter was issued by the three largest churches represented in West Papua (Roman Catholic, GKI, and GKII). The ecumenically initiated pastoral letter admonished the military and people not to use violence, but to restrain themselves and be willing to sit down and talk directly to Papuans. The letter was then edited by a group of lawyers from an NGO and sent out during the third week of July, 1998. The pastoral letter was also published in the well-circulated newspapers Tifa Irian (Irian Jaya), Cenderawasih Pos (Irian Jaya), and KOMPAS (Compass) (Jakarta). The publication of the joint pastoral letter marked the beginning of FORERI. Following the publication of the pastoral letter, a fact-finding team from DPR Jakarta (parliament) went to West Papua in August 1998 to investigate the military killings from the July events in Jayapura (Abepura), Wamena, Biak, and elsewhere. It was claimed that up to one hundred Papuans were killed by the military in Biak alone. The members of the fact-finding team from DPR Jakarta were Abdul Gafur (Deputy Chairman of DPR Jakarta), two Papuans (Simon Morin and Jaap Salossa), and two Indonesians (one from a Muslim group and one from the military). The team took seriously FORERI’s proposal for dialogue. A National Dialogue was proposed at a meeting between FORERI members and the investigative team.

The Dialogue took place on February 26, 1999 in Jakarta and was interpreted by Papuans as an affirmation of their political freedom. The Team 100 was received back to West Papua with a fury of excitement and anticipation. Team 100 was flown to Jakarta, at the government’s expense, and spoke directly to President Habibie about their concerns, their history of colonization by Indonesia, and their determined desire for political independence. The face-to-face meeting was scheduled for Friday February 26, from 2:00 to 4:00 p.m., where the delegates had the rare opportunity to speak directly to the president. When it came time for President Habibie to offer a response, he set aside his prepared speech and told
the group of one hundred, “I’m just human. I don’t have all the answers. I ask you to return to Irian Jaya and think through clearly what you are asking for.” President Habibie told the Team 100 that “should ponder this issue well.”

Many in West Papua interpreted Habibie’s comment as a not-so-veiled denial of their request for political freedom. Many were angry. Others, however, were optimistic that Habibie did in fact hear their request with his heart. The educated Papuan elites who participated in the Dialogue recognized that political freedom does not come easily. They insisted that a meeting with the president was just a first step. The general population back in West Papua, however, expected immediate independence. Driving to the Sentani (Jayapura) airport early in the morning on February 28, 1999, I noticed a stream of cars, buses, and motorcycles driving toward me and motioning me to pull over to the side of the road. Unbeknownst to me, this procession carried the one hundred Papuan delegates who had just moments earlier returned from their meeting with President Habibie in Jakarta. Numerous motorcycles were escorting the five buses carrying the delegates. Several motorcycle passengers were waving Morning Star flags. Several delegates were flying Morning Star flags outside the bus windows.

As Papuans from West Papua met with President Habibie, some felt their aspirations were honestly heard. Papuans felt a sense of mission. And Dani were a significant part of it. Dani identity was in the process of being remade again because they were becoming part of the Papuan national awareness. Dani were becoming Papanized. Their future was, as one intellectual said, “all in the making.” In Jayapura, Dani became aware of the process of integration with Indonesia, but at the same time there was a burgeoning awareness of Papuan identity. What was certain was that Dani felt they were deeply part of the growing Papuan awareness. They were not simply sitting back idly and watching. There were six Dani in the Dialogue with President Habibie. Among the six were Reverend Obed Komba (a GKII pastor in Wamena), Agus Alua (an instructor at the Roman Catholic Theological College in Abepura), and Murjono Murib (a state high school social studies teacher in Wamena). Given that the Dani are the most numerous indigenous group in West Papua, they will undoubtedly continue to play a crucial role in the ongoing Papuan discourse about nationalism and ethnicity.

Post-FORERI period

In the April of 1999, Papuans learned that the Indonesian government planned to split West Papua into three regions, a decision Papuans interpreted as another strategy by the ABRI to divide and rule. Some violence broke out as Papuans demonstrated against the Indonesian announcement to divide the province. On December 1, 1999, several thousand Papuans (some reported 800,000) celebrated “West Papua’s National Day,” a commemoration of West Papuan freedom declared officially on December 1, 1961, but never acknowledged by the Indonesian government. When Morning Star flags were raised in Timika and elsewhere, the ABRI responded with gunfire, killing several Papuans. On October 29, 1999, President Abdurrahman Wahid (known as “Gus Dur”) was elected president of
Indonesia, with his popular rival, Megawati Sukarnoputri, daughter of the nation’s founding father, Sukarno, as the vice-president. On December 31, 1999, President Wahid visited West Papua, where he met Papuan leaders, including members of Team 100, and heard again the Papuan demand for political independence. For his part, President Wahid agreed with members of Team 100 to change the name of the province from Irian Jaya to Papua (West Papua) in order to differentiate it from independent PNG. With increasing concern that their grievances were left unheard and that political independence would not be realized, from February 23 to 26, 2000 approximately 300 delegates (many of Team 100) met in a Musyawarah Besar Papua (Grand Papua Consultation), where members of the consultation formally and categorically rejected the results of the “Act of Free Choice” (Pepera) of 1969 and established a strategy to gain political independence.3

The Second Papuan Congress

The most significant Papuan political gathering occurred between May 29 and June 3, 2000, the convening of the Second Papuan Congress in Port Numbay (Jayapura), with the theme “Let Us Rewrite the History of West Papua” and sub-theme “The West Papuan People Vow to Uphold Democracy and Human Rights Based on the Principles of Truth and Justice Leading to a New Papua.”4 The First Papuan Congress was held in October of 1961, and attempted to mobilize Papuans to form an inchoate government as an empirical proof for the legitimacy and possibility of Papuan independence from both the Netherlands and Indonesia (Lijphart 1966; Lagerberg 1979).

Partly funded and endorsed by President Wahid, the meeting of the Second Papuan Congress resulted from the “upsurge in the struggle of the Papuan people towards the end of the 20th century” (Tapol 2000) that, in the minds of Papuans, left them with either one of the two choices: “To remain with the Unitary Republic of Indonesia or to separate from the Unitary Republic of Indonesia.” During the Council meeting, 501 Papuan Council and 31 Papua Presidium members were installed. Nearly 5,000 Papuans attended the Second Papuan Congress, which represented a wide cross section of male and female leaders from various tribes, NGOs, educational institutions, and church denominations. The five signatories of the Congress included Tom Beanal, Chairman, Dr Benny Giay, the Rev. Herman Awom, Franzalbert Joku, and Theys Eluay, who acted as co-chair but was not an original signatory. At the end of the Congress, on June 3, 2000, Papuan representatives approved a statement declaring their desire for political independence from Indonesia. Throughout the post-FORERI period, several members of Team 100 were killed, either by poisoning, murder, or torture. For instance, Theys Eluay, perhaps the most popular Papuan leader in West Papua was brutally murdered by members of the Indonesian Special Forces (Kopassus) on November 10, 2001 immediately following a military dinner given in Eluay’s honor as “the Great Leader and Hero of the Papuan Struggle.”
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Post-Second Papuan Congress period

By December of 2000, five Papua Presidium leaders were jailed – Theys Eluay (chairman), Thaha Al-Hamid (Secretary-General and Papuan Muslim), Rev. Herman Awom, Don Flassy, and John Mambor. With the dialogue with Jakarta stalling and human rights violations continuing, Indonesia’s response was to increase the military build-up in the West Papua. With the installment of each new president in Indonesia, Papuans remained hopeful that their political aspirations would be realized, even in July 2001 when Megawati Sukarnoputri became the first woman president of the Republic. President Megawati, like her father, Sukarno, maintained the integrity of the nation as a priority. Consequently, President Megawati rejected invitations to hold a serious dialogue with Papuans regarding political independence, and, in January 2003, she issued a Presidential Decree to divide West Papua into three “provinces,” which met with widespread opposition in West Papua.

Since 2001 Laskar Jihad, a violent Indonesian Islamist group responsible for the torture and killing of thousands of Christians in Ambon, Halmahera and Posso, Central Sulawesi beginning in early 1999, had established several offices throughout West Papua, operating with consent by the Indonesian military. Papuans contend that since 2001 members of Laskar Jihad had been training on mosque properties throughout the province. It is important to note that Laskar Jihad, while claiming Islamic ideals to legitimate their violent activities, were not supported by the vast majority of Indonesian Muslims living in West Papua, despite the tensions between transmigrant and Papuan communities in the region. Perhaps most troubling is that in early 2004 the Indonesian government appointed former East Timor police chief Brigadier General Timbul Silaen to the post of police commander for West Papua. General Silaen had been indicted for war crimes in East Timor but has been given the charge to lead a twenty-five-member team in an investigation into the killing of the two American schoolteachers in West Papua in 2002, near Freeport McMohan mining operations in Timika.

Remarkably, following the examples of Martin Luther King and Mahatma Gandhi, Papuan leaders have declared West Papua a Zone of Peace, even in the face of the increasing militarization of the province. Church leaders have spearheaded the response of peace, advocating a posture of non-violence against Indonesians and ABRI. Sadly, there has hardly been a time since the annexation of West Papua when ABRI have not borne down hard on Papuans, and violated their human rights and curtailed Papuan attempts to gain self-determination. Ongoing conflicts continue even today.

Papuan endeavors to raise the issue of political independence are being successfully internationalized, for instance in the United States, Ireland, the Netherlands, Germany, Australia, and New Zealand, as international journalists, NGOs, church workers, and exiled Papuan intellectuals are helping to expose the ongoing human rights violations against Papuans as well as more assertively calling to justice the powers that be. Furthermore, more and more Papuans are obtaining graduate-level education in the West, where they are learning about the histories of colonization,
human rights law, and social sciences, and then are able to apply these insights to their own situation. These newly emerging, Western-educated Papuan elites are providing important leadership to Western NGOs focused on human rights issues in West Papua. In addition, in February of 2003, in a significant demonstration of ecclesiastical unity, churches in West Papua created a Papua chapter of the Communion of Churches (PGI Persekutuan Gereja-Gereja di Indonesia), which included mainline Protestants, Baptists, evangelicals, and Pentecostals. A growing body of educated Papuans and the emerging unity of the churches in Papua may represent hope on the horizon.

In September 2004, former Army General Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (known as SBY) won Indonesia’s first-ever direct presidential elections, supplanting President Megawati. When SBY served as Coordinating Minister for Social, Political, and Security Affairs, he argued for “tighter controls” over West Papua and Aceh. The following month it was reported that

Demonstrators rallied in Jayapura yesterday demanding that recently elected president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono allow international negotiators to end the decades-long conflict in Papua. The protest by up to 500 students came as church leaders and civil groups began lobbying Mr Yudhoyono for Papuan self rule in Indonesia’s easternmost province.

(Kearny 2004)

In November of 2004, in one of his first decisions concerning West Papua, SBY banned all journalists from both West Papua and Aceh, signaling that more repressive measures may be ahead for Papuans, and a possible return to some of the dismal strategies implemented under Suharto’s New Order regime.

Conclusion

Within the New Society, particular ethnic groups were encouraged to flourish (e.g. Javanese, Bataks, Balinese). Papuans, however, were prevented from prospering due to prejudicial treatment, pejorative language, marginalization of local histories, and the repression and minimalization through showcasing of their “primitive culture.” Dani, and other Papuans, could not openly identify culturally as Papuans because of the implied threat that cultural identification could bring to the integrity of the Indonesian nation-state; the implication was that a rise in Papuan cultural awareness would give rise to desires for Papuan political aspirations. These threats could be traced locally, that is, to the various tribal histories of West Papua, or more generally to Papuan (Melanesian) cultural and political yearnings. But, given Pancasila’s inherent religious affirmation and ascriptive obligation, Dani could identify with Christianity; they could say, “I’m Christian,” but they could not say, “I’m Papuan.”

Christianity was used to bolster Papuan political aspirations. This fact suggests that for some there was a connection between Christianity and Papuan identity. Because Papuans were prevented from asserting a putatively Papuan identity,
Desecularization of the Dani

in opposition to an Indonesian one, many employed Christianity as a channel for self-assertion. The absence of any viable political conduit in the church (GKII) forced Dani to the streets, making their voice publicly heard. Christian self-identification was one of the few available options for Papuans.

Of course, as more Muslims move to West Papua, Islam will continue to exert a significant countervailing force to Christian expansion and affiliation. How these new religious realities will play themselves out on the social canvas of Jayapura is yet to be realized. Race and religions will become increasingly complicated issues of discourse, as Dani who once self-ascribed as Christian convert to Islam and Javanese who once self-ascribed as Muslim convert to Christianity, increasing the social and religious plurality. However, the narrow, exclusively Papuan-centered vision of nation making, based entirely on racial commonalities, has already been challenged by Papuan intellectuals. For instance, Dr Benny Giay, lecturer in religion and society at Walter Post Theological College near Jayapura, recognizes the rapid religious and ethnic demographic changes in West Papua and argues for a more inclusive vision. According to Peter King,

In February 2000, Benny Giay called for Mubes [Grand Consultation] delegates to consider the drastic demographic changes that have transformed Papua under occupation and he asked, “What now?” “Are we to be multinational, multiracial or just us – a monosociety?” He called for solidarity with “good Indonesians”; “Our suffering is also the suffering of good-thinking Indonesians.” Bring them into the movement, he suggested.

(King 2004: 56)

Giay’s political realism represents a more nuanced and sophisticated perspective compared to earlier visions that were based entirely either on common race or religion.

Papuan awareness arose in the 1990s. While some rejected Christianity and embraced the nativist option, others saw that Christianity could successfully infuse Papuan awareness, giving Papuans a transcendent legitimation for their cultural and political perseverance. A social and political space and recognition of rights for all was key in this process. Deprivatization of Christianity among the Dani gave rise to a reimagining of themselves. Papuan stories of suffering, intimidation, torture, and human rights violations became publicized. Using performative measures, Dani responded in totality. Their protests were conjoined to voices of other Papuans who shared a similar story of encounter with Indonesia. And their protests helped to create a new definition of “peoplehood.”

In the late New Order and early Reformasi periods Papuans raised their voices in the streets, raised flags, wore the Morning Star, and sang “Onward Christian Soldiers” as a unified religious and political statement. The fissiparous nature of their early conversion was being worked out publicly, becoming reintegrated into the Papuan (Melanesian) persons they believed God created them to be. And these statements were acted out in the public sphere and written about in daily newspapers. The public square became the canopy on which Dani boldly stated their
hopes of their future. They were adamantly Christian, yet it was a Christianity reformulated in its expression and theological integration. Christ was portrayed as the victor and commander. It was not the entire Dani community that marched in the street. However, the overwhelming majority of Dani, if they did not make their public stand in the street, did in fact agree with the aspirations of those who protested against Papuan ill-treatment.

Dani conversion to Christianity and their involvement in the “new kind of moral authority and a new or reconceptualized social identity” helped to create new authorities and meanings that have outstripped those communicated by government and mission strategies (Hefner 1993a: 17). Rather than purely social or political forces, Dani (and other Papuan) elites in the 1990s became social carriers of new knowledge, letting loose a new role for religion as public intervention. The forward drive was set loose by social carriers rather than by social or political realities. While some urban Dani (particularly evangelicals) argued against the involvement of either Christians or the church in politics, a number of Dani and other Papuan elite in the late New Order regime began asserting their political aspirations in the public sphere with greater intensity and articulation.

José Casanova fittingly describes “deprivatization” of modern religion as “the process whereby religion abandons its assigned place in the private sphere and enters the undifferentiated public sphere of civil society to take part in the ongoing process of contestation, discursive legitimation, and redrawing of boundaries” (Casanova 1994: 65–66). At issue for the Dani were the salient questions of identity, history, and future, which, when inserted into public debate, became imbued with political meaning.5

Finally, it was ironic that nascent Christian ecumenism emerged in the public sphere, within the space of civil society rather than as a byproduct of ecclesiastically initiated undertakings, as various Christian groupings together “protested,” giving public voice to their human concerns. Dani identity was repristinated in the public sphere as they, like other Pacific Islanders, constructed their identities out of practice (see Linnekin and Poyer 1990: 8). New voices were raised, articulating and challenging the notion that what were at odds were not sectarian truths, but public truths (Weigel 1999: 25). Religious truths incarnated in Melanesian lives could not help but be public, performatively made real. In the case of urban Dani Christians of West Papua, they challenged the very moral foundations of the New Society. The claim was not just normative, but ontological as well, for it asserted a new understanding of being human. What was asserted was their hope for a better society – one in which they were the authors.6
7 Conclusion
Beyond mission Christianity

My approach has attempted to integrate cultural and structural approaches to understanding Christianity among the Dani of West Papua in their encounter with Islam, the Indonesian nation-state, and mission Christianity, particularly during the New Order period. Ethnopsychological theories, while important, have been outside the scope of this discussion (see White and Kirkpatrick 1985). By studying a locally specific form of Christianity and illuminating how recipients of the missionary message have transformed it into something meaningful for themselves, one that coheres to its own internal logic (see Robert 2000: 57), I have argued that Christianity should be treated as a religious movement rather than simply as Scriptural, dogmatic, or creedal system (Sanneh 1989: 7). Dani response to mission Christianity points to the complex relationship among indigenous religious traditions, nation-making, and identity formation in the modern world. When placed within the larger context of nation-state and worldwide Christianity, what becomes apparent is that, in the words of mission historian Dana Robert, “the tension between the global and the local is not merely an academic exercise but is a struggle over identity” (2000: 57). Indeed, identity issues have been played out at every level of personal or communal encounter. What can we gain from such an investigation? I conclude with several comments.

Vernacular pluralism and structural trends

Christianity flourishes through its intrinsic translatability. The process of vernacularizing the Bible required Western and non-Western missionaries alike to become students of local culture and language. They in turn recorded local myths, developed grammars, dictionaries, primers, as well as recorded local myths and religious practices, in an effort to communicate the gospel. In many regions Western missionaries were the first outsiders to make permanent contact with hinterland communities. While many sought to implement a Christendom model of mission, equating Western culture with Christianity, others recognized that accepting cultural elements from their home country was not requisite for embracing the gospel. There is no pure, cultureless gospel; one cannot prepackage the
gospel, transporting it to another culture as though it were a kind of commodity. Christian missiologist Lesslie Newbigin correctly notes,

Neither at the beginning, nor at any subsequent time, is there or can there be a gospel that is not embodied in a culturally conditioned form of words. The idea that one can or could at any time separate out by some process of distillation a pure gospel unadulterated by any cultural accretions is an illusion. It is, in fact, an abandonment of the gospel, for the gospel is about the word made flesh.

(1986: 4)

Culture carries the gospel, enshrining it, yet not exclusively controlling it. Christendom always guts Christianity of its essential spirit, by failing to recognize that the gospel at once endorses and judges aspects of all cultures – this is the double movement of the Christian gospel. But how has mission Christianity succeeded in separating the cultural accoutrements of its expression from the universal truth of its message? Scriptural vernacularism, in part, transferred the locus of religious authority from the missionary to the indigenous recipient. Thus inherent to vernacularization was the concomitant decrease in missionary authority and the ascendancy of religious authority derived from local understanding of Scripture. The translatability of the Bible fostered new self-understandings as the Dani were able to read the Christian Scriptures in their mother tongue translations and recognize themselves in the Divine economy.

Islam’s primary sources, namely the Qur’an and Hadith, formalized in Shariah, prescribe countless behavioral, legal, and religious actions congruent with the revelation of Allah to Prophet Muhammad in Arabic through the angel Gabriel. The term “Allah” comes from the Arabic, “al-ilah,” “the God,” making it impossible to pluralize. The Prophet Muhammad’s message to his fellow Meccan tribesmen was the revelation of absolute monotheism, that “God is One” (Arabic, tawhid), a Divine unity that should be reflected in the unity of the ummah (Muslim community worldwide) under the authority of the Qur’an. Because the Qur’an is the word of Allah incarnated in written form, similar to the Christian affirmation that Jesus is the word of God made flesh, and because the Qur’an testifies to the right ordering of society in all areas of life, “the straight path,” Islam implicitly envisions a total way of life adhering to the revealed will of Allah. Although more diverse than most Westerners would imagine, global Islam does valorize Arabic language, and, by association, Arabic culture, reminding us that there is an intimate link between language and culture (see Nida 1954, 1960).

Comparing the expansion of Islam to that of Christianity requires that one pay serious attention to the relationship among sacred texts, cultures, and languages. It appears that Islam advances in part through successful absolutization of a particular language (Arabic), culture, and space (Mecca), whereas Christianity expands by its relativization of languages, cultures, and spaces (Sanneh 1989, 2003). That is, Christians are neither required to read their sacred text in the original Hebrew and Greek nor required to make a pilgrimage to holy sites in
the Middle East. Muslims, on the other hand, are required to know Arabic prayers (e.g. and the Shahada confession) and make the pilgrimage (hajj) to Mecca, if they have the means to do so. Any translation of the Arabic Qur’an is considered an “interpretation,” whereas translations of the Bible remain the Bible, no matter into what language or idiom the book is translated.

In the Dani case, what is striking is that the evangelical priority of Bible translation contributed to unintended consequences among the Dani and the wider West Papuan society, such as the burgeoning of political aspirations and movements for political self-determination and cultural self-preservation. The translated Word became a catalyst for political action, providing the impetus for emancipation. The irony is that while conservative evangelical missionaries (e.g. GKII) held in the one hand the priority of biblical translation into local languages, in the other they held a firm opposition to church involvement in worldly things, including politics. Yet after the Bible was translated, many indigenous believers aspired for political freedom and self-determination. What are the origins of these ideas? On the ground level, Dani believers are leading many of the political protests. These leaders were raised in evangelical mission schools stressing scriptural memorization and Bible knowledge. Unlike leaders of other collective actions toward independence, Dani Christians were not raised on ideas of liberty based on studying the French or American Revolutions. Their knowledge was based on personal experience and their encounter with a biblical message that claimed they were children of the Divine (“God of Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, and the Papuans”). Because of the dynamic nature of translation, then, the cohabitation of colonialism and Christianity seems difficult to sustain. That is to say, the ideas inherent in Christianity, namely freedom, tolerance, and dignity, do not fare well with colonialism and domination, even when those mission endeavors were supported by colonizing forces. Vernacularization propels movements for self-determination, giving rise to unintended social and personal changes that blossom in the public sphere with political consequences. It was the ideal of evangelical Christianity that also assumed individual choice and action necessary for faithfulness, alongside an appropriation of the dignity of the biblical account of the Exodus experience. Of course, many oppressed groups have identified with the Exodus account.

Lamin Sanneh (1989) insightfully notes this paradox in the African context. “Sanneh goes on to say that converts armed with a written vernacular scripture called into question the legitimacy of all schemes of foreign domination – cultural, political, and religious. Here lay the paradox, since the impulse to question colonialism came through an alien agency…. Sanneh goes on to put forward the interesting argument that Islamic gains are related to the existence of a lingua franca, and Christian gains to the existence of vernacular pluralism” (Martin 1990: 180). Sanneh’s thesis applies equally well to West Papua: “Missionary translation was instrumental in the emergence of indigenous resistance to colonialism. Local Christians acquired from the vernacular translations confidence in the indigenous cause” (Sanneh 1989: 123; see 1993: 152–183).1

However, Sanneh concedes that Christianity expands robustly “except in strongly Islamized areas.” According to Sanneh (1989: 186), Islamized communities
constitute “an impenetrable barrier to Christian renewal.” Sanneh (1989: 187) recognizes that, in his own words, “it takes more than translation to penetrate society with the gospel.” At least in the African case, “a psychological predisposition” against translation, due to the high esteem of Islamic devotion to Arabic, presents a formidable obstacle to the Christian advance. What needs to be highlighted here is how public religions engage the modern world (see Casanova 1994). As public collective action, Christianity becomes deprivatized as it enters “the undifferentiated public sphere of civil society to take part in the ongoing process of contestation, discursive legitimation, and redrawing of the boundaries” (Casanova 1994: 66). In effect, the Dani case shows that Scriptural vernacularization serves as the initial springboard for understanding the self in new ways, but Melanesian performative structures combine with reconfigured identities, then act upon social conditions, to begin to democratize civil society.

Divorcing the translatability of Christianity from cultural or social realities within which it is embedded distorts the complexities of religious change.² Historical accounts that stress translation to the exclusion of social structural and cultural trends run the risk of oversimplifying the data. On the other hand, descriptions that present an overly muscular view of historical forces fail to recognize the inherent transformational power of the word and the intrinsic variety of the vernacularized religion. Moreover, understanding the impact of Christianity and Islam on culture entails unearthing those “psychological predispositions” that either help or hinder the reception of new religious insight and authority.

**Localizing Christianities and world Christianity**

A particularly troublesome anthropological and theological enigma centers on the adaptation of mission Christianity to its local environment. Vernacularization of Christianity has indeed sparked its expansion across the globe. Yet left in its wake was a dissonance between local and universal forms of Christianity. Missionaries were often the first to convert to local (new) understandings of Christianity as they revisited taken-for-granted truths of their religion from the standpoint of the indigenous hermeneutic (cf. Donovan 1978). Translation closed the door on any kind of unidimensional transference from Western to Melanesian formulations of the gospel and opened the window to new locally initiated responses. The resultant new creation was different than what evangelicals preached, for stripped from its Western interpretative vantage point, the message intertwined with Melanesian lifeways.

Papuans received the word about heaven and eternal life, but neglected to adopt the post-Enlightenment Western mission epistemology. Whereas the evangelical theology of mission upheld the split between fact and value, subject and object, and while many early converts adopted the contrastive notion of “spiritual” verses “worldly,” with the emergence of challenges to their identity many Papuans found this epistemological bifurcation impossible to sustain. They remained, as it were, on the familiar epistemological ground, invoking local expressions of the new religion that often challenged Western mission perceptions of the Divine.
Papuans naturally sought to use the Bible for their whole lives, not just as a truncated spiritual guide. Where Western evangelical mission theology highlighted the personal transformation wrought in a relationship with Jesus, Papuan Christians emphasized Jesus’ religious pragmatism when feeding the multitudes, healing the sick, and overturning the tables in the temple. This same pragmatic religiosity would animate their public use of Christianity. All people have their own vision of a better society, a better life. And these visions are always constructed in the context of the existing society: “better than what we have now – better than the existing one.”

The dissonance affected by translation between localizing and universalizing forces, which in the Papuan case creates the space for creative public engagement, lies in the fact that Melanesians respond differently than either South-east Asians or Westerners to social realities. While the ultimate vision of salvation, eternal life, and heaven may be shared by both mission Christianity and local Dani believers, on matters concerning the here and now, the Dani respond as Melanesians. On the ground level, the Dani try to use Scripture from their own standpoint. They interpret Scripture in their language to expound their own vision of a new society, one marked by Melanesian characteristics yet consonant with broad themes of Christianity. This truism remains even for those for whom Bahasa Indonesia serves as a mother tongue language. The results are both continuous and discontinuous with views presented by mission Christianity. It is continuous because the Dani vision of a new society comes from their own perspective and resonates well with their own religious and cultural aspirations (what used to be articulated through the notion of nabelan kabelan). The discontinuity involves the insertion of a new source of knowledge, the Bible, a written authority that contains a transcendent message, without rejecting the realities of “this world.” Vernacular plurality affirmed local culture and functioned interculturally to provide a new medium of contact among diverse cultures and tribes and thus shaped a new way to associate with one another.

Among criticisms leveled against Christian mission is that localizing Christianity prevents local people from accessing the fruits of modernity and national ways. This concern reflects how modern scholarship shapes our questions about the past. Critics assume all people should take part in the modern world but that Christian mission’s primary focus on language translation prevents local people from engagement in the wider world. Recipients of Christianity have become mired in their own particularity. This mistaken assumption fails to see that localizing Christianity in fact gave rise to cultural renewal, innovation, and, in some cases, nationalist aspirations, providing a forceful challenge to the notion that Christianity is unable to penetrate the public sphere or engage modern consciousness.

**Indigenous responses and authenticities**

The present study shows that local responses to Christianity may provide a useful correction to historiographies and anthropologies that often privilege Western
perspectives, particularly those dominated essentially by a Western guilt complex that too closely, and sometimes indiscriminately, associate Christian mission with the history of Western colonial domination of the non-Western world (Sanneh 1987, 1993: 213–214). 5 Christian renewal suggests the “loss of territoriality” of Christianity (Sanneh 1993: 214); the “Christendom Era . . . is not normative for the church” (Lesslie Newbigin cited in Sanneh 1993: 214). 6 Moving beyond triumphalist accounts of the Christian movement, we must revisit the historical and ethnographic data to retrieve ground-level accounts of the impact of Christianity on culture and self-understanding. While historiographic material is replete with instances of the conflation of mission advance and state expansion, a more nuanced reading would illuminate the complex nature of worldwide Christianity.

Kenelm Burridge (1991: 220) asks, “what is authenticity?,” then answers, “Cultures and their peoples can only be authentic unto themselves in a given present, not to a preconception of what they ought to be like . . . . structures and people remain authentic to themselves.” Can we describe with any confidence that when Dani and other Papuans take to the streets and employ media to publicize their ideas, their movement is necessarily a Christian one reflecting Papuan authenticities unique to their given present? Yes and no. These public interventions exhibit characteristics of Christian collective action because their ideas are animated by concepts gleamed from the Christian Scriptures and the overwhelming numbers of their members self-ascribe as Christian. These are social actions inspired in the name of religion and thus blur the line between religious and political expression (see Casanova 1994: 5). While some confess holding exclusive positions, most are more nuanced in their comments, suggesting the movement for political independence implies religious tolerance and not the outright co-option of Christianity by its establishment by the state nor the exclusion of non-Papuans in the political and religious life of a politically independent Papua. Opinions vary as to its centrality in defining an alternate vision, but Christianity is nevertheless inevitably part of the mix.

On symbol and power

Privileging social, textual, religious, or psychologistic features to the exclusion of other forces belies the complex phenomena of both conversion and social change. Meaning does not emanate monicausally from symbol, text, or ritual alone. Clifford Geertz overlooks this conceptual insight, for he asserts that symbol and meaning are inextricably bound, an argument that narrows the field of anthropological inquiry to an interpretation of extant cultural symbols. For Geertz, religious symbolism is intrinsically linked to the problem of meaning.

Furthermore, Geertz (1973: 95) contends that religious symbols and symbol systems not only contain meaning but they also possess inherent force that shapes a person by “inducing in the worshipper a certain distinctive set of dispositions (tendencies, capacities, propensities, skills, habits, liabilities, proneness) which lend a chronic character to the flow of his activity and the quality of his experience.”
Geertz (1973: 112) forwards the idea that it is specifically in the arena of ritual in which symbolic forms, as vehicles of meaning, induce in actors the general conceptions of the order of existence. As such, Geertz compares the religious perspective with common-sense and aestheticism to suggest only the religious perspective moves beyond the realities of everyday life to wider ones which correct and complete them, and its defining concern is not action upon those wider realities but acceptance of them, faith in them...[i]t is this sense of the “really real” upon which the religious perspective rests and which the symbolic activities of religion as a cultural system are devoted.... (1973: 112)

Talal Asad (1993) provides a corrective to Geertz’s heavy reliance on symbol as vehicle for meaning and yet he, in the end, relies too heavily on the role of power in the construction of identity. Asad points out correctly that Geertz’s perspective divorces religion from the socioeconomic and historical processes and power by which meanings are constructed. Asad argues that a transhistorical definition of religion is not viable, and he does so by dismantling, point by point, Geertz’s definition of religion and challenging an anthropological definition of religion that has been cast in the mold of modern Western thought.

Generally, Asad (1993: 35) calls attention to the fact that it is not mere symbols that implant true Christian dispositions, but power. Power and its use in identity formation and meaning construction serve as the lens through which Asad views the historical development of Islam and Christianity.7 First, Asad forwards a vigorous critique of the inherent passivity in Geertz’s notion of the human actor. By exposing the inadequacy of Geertz’s idea of “systems of symbols” as “extrinsic sources of information” (Geertz 1973: 92), that they are meaning-carrying objects, external to social conditions and states of the self (Asad 1993: 32), Asad reinserts the import of socio-economic and historical conditions into the equation of meaning formation.8 Second, and closely related to the first point, Asad (1993: 43) sees as problematic Geertz’s insistence on the primacy of meaning formation without regard to processes by which meanings are constructed. Here Asad (1993: 53) brings to his argument historical data that serve to challenge the Geertzian stimulus response model of rituals. It is important to recognize not just that religious symbols are intimately linked to social life (and so change with it), but that they usually support dominant political power.9 Based on this assertion Asad begins an analysis of different kinds of practice and discourse that occur in the field of religious representation and argues for the primacy of power in the creation of religious identity.

It is interesting to note that the inherent power Geertz gives to symbol complexes finds parallels in Asad’s insistence on the overwhelming power of hegemonic Western historicity. For Geertz, human actors are passive when confronted with the inherent power of symbols that induce distinctive dispositions, specific world-views, and perspectives. Likewise, for Asad (1993: 45), the authenticity of the
human actor, and indeed even “the making of the modern world,” is molded almost deterministically by the juggernaut of Western history. Simply put, Geertz’s human actor is passive in the face of ritual, whereas Asad’s human authenticity is passive in the face of hegemonic Western logic and history making. For Geertz (1973: 89), meaning is the concept around which religions are constructed; for Asad (1993: 45), it is power that creates religion.

A major problem with Asad’s approach is that it overlooks the countless historical examples in which actors without power were in fact successful at preserving their authenticity and independence in the face of regnant political or religious force. The present study of the Dani of New Order Indonesia helps to confirm that even those without power can succeed at maintaining their authenticity. The insertion of Papuan identity into the public sphere breaks the resolve of the powers that be. Neither Geertz nor Asad provide reasons why numerous individual actors, and in some cases entire social or ethnic congeries, resist the authority of the “system of symbols” (Geertz) provided by a nation-state or the “discipline and power” (Asad) promulgated by a mighty army. The truth of the matter is that ritual and text mean different things to different people. Some believe wholeheartedly, while others remain skeptical. And whereas power may be compelling, it is not absolutely coercive. That is the wonder of nation-making and the human spirit. Neither symbol complexes nor power alone determine the actions and commitments of human actors. In his discussion of Medieval Christianity, Asad fails to mention the numerous mendicants whose lives were not predictably patterned by the discipline and power of religious ritual (e.g. Martin Luther, Bartolome de Las Casas). As such, it is important to keep in mind that meaning is not entirely derivative of either the scriptural or cultural medium itself.

For instance, Robert Hefner (1985) correctly notes, in his research in East Java, that the knowledge and experience possessed by Tengger people far exceeds what is demonstrated in ritual and myth alone.

**Translation revisited**

What are the origins of the religious imagination if not in symbol (e.g. text), ritual, or power? The Dani case suggests that vernacularized Scripture points beyond itself, to extra-textual realities and affirmations that deeply inform new self-understandings and visions of the world. Using Geertzian language, the text as symbol is a “model for” new realities, in this case, of the Divine. Is that not to say that it functions as symbol? The truth to which the scripture points is true for those who believe it and who are affirmed by the believing community. Yet, its truth can be denied. For Dani Christians, the text does not contain, but points to, new ultimate realities that profoundly shape their lives. However, and this seems crucial, given the complex nature of sociohistorical trends, psychological predispositions, and political and economic conditions, a necessary precondition of religious change appears to entail a notable measure of consonance between the individual or community and the truth enshrined in the introduced religion. The new religion must resonate with local lifeways. The will to believe, that is,
the acquiescence of self to higher-level explanations, is a critical component of religious commitment, but is complicated by the messiness of social and political circumstances.

Such complexity is exemplified by the conversion patterns discussed in the present study. Despite the absence of strongly Islamized areas in the West Papuan highlands, adoption of Christianity among the Dani was uneven. Some Dani groups, such as those in Kimbim and Welesi, deconverted from Christianity, and became Muslim. Other Dani resisted conversion to Christianity because of the threat posed to their authority (e.g. tribal big-men of the GVD). Conversion dynamics are impacted by socio-historical realities (Rambo 1993): some accept or reject the new religion in order to define themselves in contradistinction to the other, such as against an historic enemy or opposing alliance. Thus, along with translation, it is important to illumine the cultural, social, and historical elements that either constrain or invigorate conversion to Christianity (see Hefner 1993a; Jordan 1993; Keyes 1993; Yenoyan 1993). Ultimately, religious truth is not contained solely in symbols (Geertz), social structures (Durkheim), nor individual psyche (James 1929; Freud 1961), however important these might be. Religious truth, therefore, should never be interpreted as simply a by-product of psychological, economic, or historical processes. Rather, religions reflect something of the sacred, which can never be reduced or domesticated (Eliade 1959). Another vehicle for communicating truth is scripture, whether the religion ordains many language translations or just one. In the end, however, that truth is received as such, only by those who assent to its claims.

In view of the recent discussions on the public role of religion (see, e.g. Casanova 1994; Hefner 1998a; Berger 1999a), it seems important not to ignore the persistence of religious phenomena in the private sphere, especially in the most “secularized, atheistic” nations. That too is religion, writ small. For one, Christianity experienced intense growth as an underground movement during and subsequent to the Chinese Cultural Revolution. And Russian Orthodox believers are understandably pleased to have kept the church from collapse under the communist regime of the Soviet Union. Islam also has experienced great revival throughout the modern world, particularly in periods of decolonization and nation-building. Its posture toward the state varies as well, continuing to spark intense debates among Muslim leaders (see, e.g. Alagappa 1995a; Liddle 1996a; Madjid 1996; Woodward 1996a; Hefner and Horvatich 1997; An-Na’im 1999). These advances were not always visibly observable, but were nevertheless transformational to the self-understanding of individuals and entire communities, even if they did not occupy the public sphere. Needless to say, there is a thread of continuity through social and personal experiences, historical moments, and the religious imagination.

Finally, the adaptability of Christianity is in part constrained, at least initially, by the social carriers that bring Christianity to a local social context. Social carriers can be cajoled to turn the meanings of Christianity toward those borne by the carriers, indigenous or otherwise. Thus highland Dani interests in combining trade with evangelism influenced the degree to which local carriers were allowed
to adapt the word to local circumstances. Likewise, urban Dani participation in collective action blends the word with Melanesian-style public performance. As this study shows, Christianity is not an ideological monolith but eminently adaptable to a variety of local circumstances. This is the irony: Western missionaries intent on transmitting Christianity were constrained by the priority of translation to adapt Christianity to local conditions, thereby releasing hermeneutic control of the sacred text and releasing its inherent message as a force for social change and a new vision for hope, which, when combined with a traditional Dani outlook, transformed the self-understanding of a community and perhaps a nation.
### Numbers of inhabitants in the regencies of Jayawijaya and Jayapura and numbers of official transmigrants in the regency of Jayapura

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
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<th>Kabupaten Jayapura</th>
<th>Jayapura transmigrants</th>
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<td>3,905</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>423,275</td>
<td>129,770</td>
<td>4,984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>443,760</td>
<td>138,891</td>
<td>5,871</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Office of Census and Statistics, Jayapura, West Papua.
## Appendix B

*Kampung and Desa* lines of authority

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kampung authority structure</th>
<th>Desa authority structure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kepala suku (Chief of tribe)</td>
<td>Gubernor (Governor)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kapala perang (Chief of war)</td>
<td>Bupati</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kapala adat (Chief of tradition, customs)</td>
<td>Camat (Government officer in charge of regency)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>—</td>
<td>Kepala desa (Head of desa)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>—</td>
<td>Ketua rukun warga (Head of neighborhood: “RW”)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>—</td>
<td>Ketua rukun tetangga (Head of sub-neighborhood: “RT”)</td>
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## Appendix C

Total number of churches by district (kabupaten) and city

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Kabupaten Jayapura</th>
<th>Kabupaten Jayawijaya</th>
<th>Jayapura city</th>
<th>Abepura city</th>
<th>Sentani city</th>
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<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>515</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>339</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
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<td>1986</td>
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<tr>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: Office of the Department of Religion, Jayapura, West Papua.
Appendix D

Total number of mosques by district (kabupaten) and city

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Kabupaten Jayapura</th>
<th>Kabupaten Jayawijaya</th>
<th>Jayapura city</th>
<th>Abeputra city</th>
<th>Sentani city</th>
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<td>1997</td>
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<td>15</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Office of the Department of Religion, Jayapura, West Papua.
Glossary

**ABRI**  *Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia*; Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia.

**Asrama**  School dormitory.

**Bupati**  Government officer in charge of a regency.

**Camat**  Sub-district government official.

**Christian message**  Except where noted, refers to evangelical Protestantism, which emphasizes the primacy of the vernacular translation of the Scriptures and the centrality of Jesus Christ as sole mediator between God and human beings. The evangelical theology of missions share the following features: (a) a dependence on biblical Scriptures, which are regarded as inspired by God and all-sufficient for life and doctrine; (b) emphasis on the reconciliation of human beings to God through the death and resurrection of Christ; (c) emphasis on the necessity of a personal decision of trust (i.e. conversion); and (d) the priority of evangelization (i.e. proclamation of the reign of God in the person and ministry of Jesus) and the building up of congregations over all other work (e.g. social justice and interreligious dialogue) in the field of mission (Müller *et al.* 1997: 144).

**Cukong**  The term *cukong* denotes a relationship between a Chinese “who knew how to raise money and an Indonesian official (often an army officer) who could provide protection and influence” (Jamie Mackie quoted in Schwarz 1994: 106).

**Dak’wah**  Arabic term for religious proselytization.

**Dani**  A general term for a group of closely related Papuan cultures and languages in Irian Jaya, including the Yali (Eastern Dani), the WD, the Southern Dani, and the centrally located GVD of the Baliem River Valley (Jayawijaya Division). Although some Dani were contacted by European expeditions just before and after the First World War, continuous outside contact did not begin until the 1950s (Heider 1979).

**Dwifungsi**  Dual function; doctrine that members of the Indonesian Armed Forces function in double roles as both defenders of the nation and as social and political forces in national development, including through their active role on corporate boards of trustees.
Faith missions  This describes a large number of mainly nondenominational and often international evangelical missions. The term refers to the means of financing these missions (missionaries do not receive a salary, but raise financial support from their local churches, friends, and family members) (Müller et al. 1997: 158).

FORERI  Forum Rekonsiliasi Masyrakat Irian Jaya; Forum for Reconciliation of the People of Irian Jaya.

Identity politics  Refers to the dynamics of identity issues being drawn into highly charged political issues.

Irianese  A general term denoting indigenous populations of Irian Jaya (includes all indigenous tribal groups) or can refer more generally to anyone born in Irian Jaya, including Papuans and non-Papuans.

Lani  General designation for the WD group.

Madrasah  State-supported modern Islamic schools.

Munafik  Religious hypocrite; an unbeliever who pretends to be Muslim.

Musholla  Arabic term for a small building or room set aside in a public place for performance of religious duties.

Musjawarah  Meeting, conference, deliberations.

New Order Indonesia  Refers to a period of Indonesian history (1966–1998), instigated by President Suharto as a new era marked by social stability and economic development.

Ojek  Motorcycle taxi.

Pancasila  The five principles that form the ideological basis for the Republic of Indonesia: (1) belief in one supreme God; (2) humanitarianism; (3) nationalism expressed in the unity of Indonesia; (4) consultative democracy; and (5) social justice.

Papuan  A general cultural, linguistic, and racial term for the hundreds of thousands of people living in the central highlands of New Guinea (including the Dani). The Papuan cultures are concentrated in the temperate mountain valley systems between 4,000 and 6,000 feet altitude. Traditionally, Papuans raise pigs and sweet potatoes, are patrilineal, and, until the mid-1950s, have had endemic warfare and used stone tools. Until recently most parts of the highlands have been isolated from world events. Major European contact began only after the Second World War, and intensive anthropological research dates only from the late 1950s and the 1960s (Heider 1979).

PDP  Presidium Dewan Papua; Presidium of the Council of Papuans.

Pendatang  Outsider, newcomer; usually refers to “off-island” immigrants.


Pesantren  School of Koranic studies for children and young people, most of whom are boarders.

TNI  Tentara Nasional Indonesia. Indonesian National Army (term replaced ABRI beginning on April 1, 1999).

Western missions  refers to efforts to convert others to Christianity initiated by European and American missionaries and mission organizations.
Notes

1 Conflicting visions and constructing identities: beyond splendid isolation

1 The two communities exhibit what has been (cumbersomely for English speakers) referred to by Native Americans as Chargoggagoggmanchauggagoggchaubunagungamaugg, an Indian name for a Massachusetts lake that means, “You fish on your side, I fish on my side, nobody fish in the middle.” However, the church (and school, to a lesser degree) is perhaps the most salient institution in which Dani and non-Papuan encounter each other (see Chapter 4).

2 Musjawarah (or mushawarah) means persuasion leading to understanding and was also the discursive method surrounding the “incorporation” of East Timor into the Republic in 1977. The old Malay concept that “[t]here is always at one end the just prince, the authority who knows what is good for the people, and on the other hand the people, willing to be persuaded and eventually pressured in a process of mushawarah, till mupakat [agreement, consensus] is reached in the opinion of the sacred leader” (Lagerberg 1979: 27).

3 There are Dani “big-women” among WD. Although unusual, these are important women who exhibit leadership abilities within the community and possess material wealth beyond their affines. Ineke de Vries notes the existence of “big women” among the WD who are single and renown for their healing power (de Vries 1987: 45). Heider claims that there is no term like “big-woman” among the GVD and that “Dani women do not have the same leadership roles as men” (1979: 71).

2 The Western mission enterprise and the New Order’s New Society: instilling the visions

1 Local languages are “the repositories of tradition” (LiPuma 1997: 53). At ethnography conferences held at Wamena, translation projects would prove to be among the few major ecumenical (evangelical and Roman Catholic) ventures among Western Christian missionaries in the highlands.

2 For instance, the Pyramid mission reported that in 1971 a “textbook of 100 pages was written and duplicated in order to make the theory available for study rather than the students just taking notes. Basic subjects as bacteriology, hygiene, nutrition, anatomy, physiology, medicine, first aid, and midwifery were taught, and the importance of improving the village health was being stressed from the viewpoint that prevention is better than cure” (Myss-Hansen 1971: 1).

3 Pancasila are the five principles that form the ideological basis for the Republic of Indonesia: (1) belief in one supreme God, (2) humanitarianism, (3) nationalism expressed in the unity of Indonesia, (4) consultative democracy, and (5) social justice.

4 It is interesting to note that Indonesian government officials believed themselves able to control Christian missions and churches. Government officials also stated that
religious organizations played an active role in the development of the New Society. In the words of Indonesian Armed Forces Brigadier General Acub Zainal (1971: 12), “Religious beliefs do not present significant problems. We have not fully put to advantage the efforts of the Catholic/Protestant Missions and of the GKI to develop living standards among the inland communities.”

5 Exodus 14:13–14 is the periscope that immediately precedes Moses leading the Hebrews across the Red Sea. It reads, “Moses answered, ‘Don’t be afraid! Stand your ground, and you will see what the LORD will do to you today; you will never see these Egyptians again. The LORD will fight for you, and all you have to do is keep still.”

6 Dani often use rambut lain (literally, “other hair”) as a general slang term that connotes Javanese and other outsiders (pendatang).

7 Zainal’s comments echo the racial prejudice not unlike the earliest outside perceptions of Papuans, beginning when Papuans were taken as slaves for the Sumatran king of Srivijaya in the eighth century. The attitude that Papuans were less than fully human and, therefore, useful only as servants and unable to dictate their own lives persists in the popular imagination of many Austronesians today (for a more detailed discussion of early perceptions of Papuans please see, Nieuw–Guinea Instituut te Rotterdam 1956: 71; Kijne 1961; Souter 1964: 17–23; Vicedom 1971: 438; Bromley 1973: 3; Heider 1979: 1–32; Schurhammer 1980: 126–127; Osborne 1985: 7–8; Reid 1988: 133).

3 Jayapura and transformations of the New Society: down from the mountain

1 Jayapura is an Indonesian word that means “victorious town” or “glorious city” and comes from the combination of the Sanskrit terms jaya (victorious, glorious) and pura (town, city). Following the annexation of Irian Jaya, the name of the provincial capital was changed from Hollandia to Kotabaru (New City), then to Sukarnapura (Sukarno Town), and eventually to Jayapura (Glorious Town).

2 The official statistics for 1996 note that there were 196,976 people in the city of Jayapura, 56,535 in Aepura, and 41,382 in Sentani (Kantor Sensus dan Statistik, Propinsi Irian Jaya).

3 “A new consciousness requires a new world in which to realize itself. And if that new world is not there, the new consciousness seeks to create it or, in default, runs wild. In the colonial situation, especially in rural and outpost areas, the constraints of the secular community were weak and haphazard; the opportunities for channelling, containing, and absorbing the newfound energies woefully few….With a domain unable to fulfil a myriad aspirations, going to an urban centre that seems to hold so many possibilities is a temptation hard to gainsay” (Burridge 1991: 163).

4 IndoVision is the largest Indonesian digital satellite company. Among IndoVision’s broadcasts are HBO, ESPN, BBC World, CNN International, Disney Channel, Discovery, Cinemax, Animal Planet Asia, Nickelodeon, and Bloomberg Television. There has been an observable increase in the numbers of parabolas in Jayapura in the past decade. Parabolas appear even in locations far from the city center. I was surprised on a visit to the highlands to see that my hosts, a Timorese couple, not only had a parabola, but also IndoVision, which they proudly told me was the only such service in the entire regency. In 1998–1999 Indovision subscribers paid about Rp220,000 per month.

5 Giddens (1991: 18) uses “abstract systems” as a general term denoting symbolic tokens and expert systems. Symbolic tokens “are media of exchange which have standard value, and thus are interchangeable across a plurality of contexts.” A prime example of symbolic tokens is money: “[m]oney brackets time (because it is a means of credit) and space (since standardised value allows transactions between a multiplicity of individuals who never physically meet one another)” (Giddens 1991: 18).

7 On the “positive” side of the transmigration program, city-dwelling Dani tell me that they have learned much about agriculture and farming from transmigrants. This seems hardly possible, given that Dani rarely work with pendatang (outsiders) in farming or agriculture. This attitude may simply reflect the official line of government officials and campaigns that have promised such transference of knowledge between pendatang and Papuans. “The official view is that the transmigration program is beneficial to the native inhabitants because it enables them to ‘learn from the Javanese.’ It has been argued that the program must be hurried along as a means of transferring agricultural knowledge while integrating the indigenous Irianese into the mainstream of the nation. On the other hand, critics of the program argue that many of the Irianese people are not ready for, nor do they desire to enter into, an imported community of agriculturalists, forced without their consent to forego their traditional land rights and culture” (Wing 1995).

8 Clause 17 of Indonesia’s Basic Forestry Act of 1967 states that “the rights of traditional law communities may not be allowed to stand in the way of transmigration sites.” Article 2 of the Basic Agrarian Law of 1960 notes that “…it is not permissible, …for a community based on its traditional rights, to refuse to allow forest land to be cleared on a large and organised scale for the implementation of large-scale projects undertaken in the framework of plans to increase the production of foodstuffs and to shift the inhabitants.” An Australian NGO writes that “[t]here is estimated to be 770,000 migrants now living in the province, mainly landless Javanese, sponsored and unsponsored, encouraged to move to West Papua under the government’s Transmigration program. Under this national program of population resettlement, the province of West Papua is now the largest recipient of migrants transported from other islands such as Java, Bali and Sulawesi. The most extensive migration program in history, the Indonesian government’s Transmigration program has contributed to West Papua having one of the country’s highest provincial population growth rates (Wing 1995).

9 A brief article published in the Jakarta Post, though written in the post-New Order era, paints a clear picture of the woes experienced by many transmigrant families. “As many as 47 transmigrant families at the Bonggo resettlement unit VIII marched to the provincial legislative council to demand that the government send them home or resettle them in a more appropriate area. The head of Commission F of the legislature, Hulda Wanggober Imbiri, who received the transmigrants, admitted that the area where the families were resettled was inadequate. The resettlement unit VIII in Bonggo is situated some 200 kilometers southeast of here. Public transportation was not available from Jayapura to Bonggo. ‘We could not sell our crops,’ Anton Leo, one of the transmigrants said. He said residents had to spend Rp25,000 in motorcycle taxi (ojek) fares each to reach the closest resettlement area. ‘The resettlement site was also lacking medication. Once a man suffering from malaria was given a contraceptive pill.’ Around 100 families, mostly from Java, were resettled in the area in 1998. Spokesmen for the disgruntled transmigrants, Paulus Lake and Anton Leo, said that drainage and irrigation systems were not made available at the location. Hulda confirmed that the stagnant water had caused various illnesses for the resettlers” (Transmigrants Want To Go Home 2000).

10 According to Gellner, “[t]his was quite different from the relations prevailing inside a moral community, where a commercial deal between two individuals was inevitably far more than a mere commercial deal. The two partners in it were also kinsmen, clansmen, allies, enemies, and so forth; hence the deal was never restricted to a simple delivery of this good at this price. There was always a promise or a fear of greater advantages or possible betrayal. Both sides were involved in bargains and calculations far more long-term and intangible, and thus had to try to deliver more. If on the other hand they were dissatisfied with the deal, powerful considerations operated to inhibit complaints, lest all the other strands in the relationship were thereby also put at risk” (Gellner 1983: 104).

Notes 197
Secularizing society: the struggle of Christianity in West Papua

1 In 1968, there were 15,000 Muslims in West Papua (Cooley 1968: 60).
2 Beasley (1994: 99–101) notes, “attempts have been made by Muslims to establish Islam in the North Baliem Valley, initially by building mosques at the government stations of Makki or Tiom. Yet due to the conviction and determination of the Dani people, the Muslim efforts have failed. In Makki inquiries were made about building a mosque but permission was denied by members of the Dani community who could not agree to the building of a mosque in their midst. The Danis apparently had the right and authority to do so as they represent the majority group in the area. A number of my respondents related what took place in Makki…. The future position of Islam in the North Baliem Valley may be assisted however by an increase in the number of pendatang to the area who profess to be Muslims, or by the conversion of nominal Dani Christians from the area who may have been converted in Wamena or Jayapura, or by locals who have already become Muslims and have been trained to convert their own people…once the land was denied by the community [Dani], a few Muslims in the area reported to government officials the presence of hundreds of Muslims in the area and as such a great need for a mesjid, a mosque. Fortunately for the Danis who had firmly forbidden this, the officials did not simply make a decision from their office. Rather they came and investigated the situation, discovering that the number of Muslims was in fact no more than ten, which included a couple of teachers, their families and a number of policemen. …in Tiom, a Muslim policeman decided to take the matter into his own hands. The policeman threatened the minister of the Tiom church. Disregarding any form of religious tolerance, he also physically beat the minister in an attempt to change his mind regarding the mosque, but he was unsuccessful. The Government, once it heard of this disturbance in Tiom from the students in Jayapura, dealt responsibly with the situation, keeping the well-being of the Dani community in mind. The policeman was reprimanded and rapidly removed from his post in Tiom.”
3 In 1965 the first Muslim group entered Wamena, and by 1968 had won several converts from among the Dani. The government helped them by supplying funds for mosques and schools at the expense of programs directed at the majority Christians, enabling them to increase in visibility and influence. Muslims were also active in providing money for children’s homes and scholarships for disadvantaged children. The military was helpful in this process … due to its control of the economic, political, and social life of Irian. Muslims rapidly increased in number and were perceived as dominating both the economy and the government apparatus” (Neilson 1999: 210).
5 Sagu is an inexpensively homemade strongly fermented drink made from coconut-palm toddy.
6 It is rare for a Western missionary or teacher working for the GKI (the mainline Protestant church) to be asked to preach at Newman Memorial Chapel; it is even rarer to invite a Roman Catholic. The same can be said of GKI and Roman Catholic congregations about evangelical missionaries, who typically are not invited to preach at the respective services.

The vision of the church: the New Jerusalem

1 Compare this sociocentric perspective to Janet Hoskins’ understanding of the Christian Sumbanese perception of church attendance on the seventh day of the week as a ritual of purification associated with the Christian system of prohibitions that seemed to parallel prohibitions of the tenth month of the Sumbanese calendar (Hoskins 1987).
“New Wine” refers to the Day of Pentecost (Acts 2), when the disciples departed from the upper room, full of the Holy Spirit, and where they had received the “gift of tongues,” and were accused by those in Jerusalem of being “drunk with new wine.” The disciple Peter responded that they, in fact were not drunk, but rather were intoxicated with the “new wine” of the Holy Spirit that had fallen on them. Additionally, Jesus referred to his own message as “new wine,” which could not be contained in old religious forms. Rather, something new must take place—a personal transformation—so that the “new wine” could be poured into new lives. Jesus said, “And no one pours new wine into old wineskins. If he does, the new wine will burst the skins, the wine will run out and the wineskins will be ruined. No, new wine must be poured into new wineskins.” (Luke 5:37, 38). That is, Jesus contended that the older religious forms of the Pharisees would erupt under the pressure of the new reality introduced by the presence of the Holy Spirit. Attempts to accommodate older religious models and formulae to the newness promised by Jesus could not succeed.

“You have to build a whole new basis. It’s not something that happens overnight. In Irian Jaya, their self-esteem has been built by other people. They’ve listened to the words of others towards them, of the world toward them. ‘This is ujung bumi [the ends of the earth]. Irian Jaya is so far behind.’ They’ve been told since they were small, ‘you’re bodoh [you’re stupid]… See yourself as God sees you. Takes time. That permeates our whole ministry at Pondok Pemulihan. We want people to realize their potential, that they can do something that other people cannot do. They can raise up, they can be a blessing to the nations. That permeates everything here.”

Of course, this is a thoroughly Trinitarian understanding of the Godhead: Father (i.e. Creator), Son (i.e. Redeemer), and Holy Spirit (i.e. Sustainer). On the concept of “identity in Christ” a leader of Pondok Pemulihan explains it as follows: “It’s understanding everything that God says about me. I’m a new creation in Christ, I’m brand new, old things have passed away, all things are new. I have been given gifts, I have been given a new mind, a mind that’s going to be renewed (Romans 12:2 says) everyday, I’ve been given a new heart, a heart of flesh has been given in place of a heart of stone, ability to forgive, I’ve been forgiven so now I can forgive” (Yost 1998).

Donald Capps recalls a fascinating story about traditional Papuan biographical histories. “Gregory Bateson, one of the early leaders in the development of the systemic model of therapy, tells the story of his encounter with a teenage boy in a small village in New Guinea (see Kris 1952: 83). He asked the boy to tell him about his life, which the boy proceeded to do. He told about his experiences as an infant, then as a child, then as a young adolescent. But then, to Bateson’s surprise, he continued his story, telling about his life as a young adult, then a mature adult, and finally as an old man. When he finished, Bateson thanked him for telling the story, but, thinking that the boy had misunderstood, he reiterated that he wanted the boy’s own story, and therefore wondered how he could speak of events and experiences that were chronologically beyond him, lying far into the future? The boy replied that he had not misunderstood, that for a male in his village, there is only one life, and he already knows what it will be. W. E. H. Stanner… calls this ‘the one possibility’ life, and contrasts it with life in modern societies where children grow up assuming that they will have options and choices, perhaps so many that the very idea of deciding what to become creates anxieties that the boy in New Guinea will never experience” (Capps 2000: 302).

Benny Giay argues that despite evangelicalism’s theological insistence on the primacy of Scripture, personal narratives possess de facto greater influence in the lives of believers. “Personal testimonies help build the church. Among evangelicals, personal testimonies often hold greater authority than the Bible because people today are seen as Christian heroes. Personal Christian testimonies become a new source of strength and knowledge. For example, Ruth Tucker’s From Jerusalem to Irian Jaya consists of numerous brief missionary testimonies. The emphasis on person and people is more
Notes

important than text [i.e. Scripture]. Personal testimonies can be source of spiritual knowledge and inspiration. . . . At times of crises and needs at the local level they need spiritual stories to materialize Bible. At a secular level, for instance, Elvis Presley comes alive as he is spoken about” (Giay 1999a).

7 “The most necessary feature of religious conversion, it turns out, is not a deeply systematic reorganization of personal meanings but an adjustment in self-identification through the at least nominal acceptance of religious actions or beliefs deemed more fitting, useful, or true. In other words, at the very least – an analytic minimum – conversion implies the acceptance of a new locus of self-definition, a new, though not necessarily exclusive, reference point for one’s identity . . . it always involves commitment to a new kind of moral authority and a new or reconceptualized social identity” (Hefner 1993a: 17).

6 The desecularization of Dani religiosity and identity: “all in the making”

1 For example, Dialog Nasional Papua, Sebuah Kisah “Memoria Passionis” (National Papuan Dialogue, A story of “Memories of Suffering,” Tifa Irian, Minggu Ketiga [same as above dates], March 1999, by J. Budi Hernawan, OFM and Theo van den Broek, OFM, p. 8; Tuntutan Papua Merdeka dan Kebangkitan Orang Papua (Demands for Papuan freedom and the resurgence of Papuan people), Tifa Irian, No. 2465, Tahun 43, April 3–9, 1999, by Benny Giay, p. 2; Suara-suara Dari Daerah (Voices from the area), Tifa Irian, No. 2465, Tahun 43, April 3–9, 1999, p. 7.

2 The GIDI did not participate in the creation of the pastoral letter. The initial FORERI members were Bishop Dr. Leo Laban Radja (Roman Catholic bishop, originally from Kupang, West Timor), Herman Saud (chairman of the GKI, originally from Bird’s Head, Irian Jaya), Benny Giay (STT Walter Post teacher, GKII pastor, originally from Paniai district), Theys Eluay (chairman of adat, freedom fighter, originally from Sentani), Yusan Yeblo (women’s representative; originally from Merauke), Martinus Werimon (representing all the students of Irja, student at Universitas Cenderawasih), and Annis Bonay (representing NGOs).

3 For an overview of the political developments in West Papua following the demise of President Suharto, see Peter King’s West Papua and Indonesia since Suharto: Independence, autonomy, or chaos? (2004). King’s focus is on the political changes in the post-Suharto period, therefore little attention is paid to the role that religions have played in contemporary developments in West Papua.

4 The renaming of Jayapura to “Port Numbay” occurred in the Reformasi period. Port Numbay is held by local Papuans to be the original name of the location.

5 “Identity politics are thus a contest to retain power, or else an assertion of value against the grain” (Kipp 1996: 6). While some urban Dani Christians exhibit strong identifications to a spiritual view of change and access to power (spiritual power), others insist on a public role for religious discourse. Among the latter are Papuan intellectuals who have shorn up identity issues in the public sphere.

6 “To dream a dream and make it come true; to realize the shape of what can be seen only in the mind’s eye; to feel compelled to bring about the seemingly impossible – these are the prerogatives of man” (Burridge 1969: 3).

7 Conclusion: beyond mission Christianity

1 Four general points help to complicate the “vernacular argument.” First, the urban Dani community was a minority one seeking identity vis-à-vis oppression. Second, they appropriated the “New Jerusalem” experience from the biblical accounts from Exodus to Revelation. Third, Dani learned to read as a result of the close relationship between literacy and secularization. Finally, Dani have through evangelism learned about
voluntarism, individual choice, and their own right to interpret their history in light of Scripture.

2 On the proliferation of denominational names and religious orders, Sanneh notes that Christianity stands “in sharp contrast to the other major world religions, and especially with those that have a missionary tradition such as Islam. The name, ‘Muslim’, for example, is shared by all the followers of Islam, whatever the real differences in culture, custom, history, language and nationality, with explicit Qur’ānic sanction [Qur’ān xxii:77–78] for the rule. Christians, on the other hand, identity themselves by a variety of religious labels, from Anglican to Zionist, with Methodists, Orthodox, Presbyterians, and others making up the middle ranks. Instead of decrying this phenomena, or applauding it in Islam, it is our duty to understand it within the general context of the translatability of Christianity” (Sanneh 1993: 120).

3 Alongside translation is a host of other realities that enable Christianity’s reception into local conditions. Christian missionaries went to recipient cultures with their bags full. They carried with them material goods to mitigate difficult communication gaps, making material goods the initial medium of discourse. It is important to recognize that at least initially their full bags communicated in powerfully attractive ways the truth of the new religion to future recipients of Christianity. One cannot gainsay that local perceptions equated missionary possessions with the introduction of a new world, a better society.

4 It would seem that while Bahasa Indonesia is not the tribal language of any indigenous group in West Papua, it can function as the mother-tongue for those for whom it is their first language. The importance of mother-tongue status involves a high degree of consonance between language and its context; so Arabic is foreign to indigenous tribes in West Papua because it is entirely non-existent in the day-to-day realities of the market, school, and public sphere.

5 “Despite the contradictions and, indeed, suspect self-interest in wishing to preserve cultures in a pristine form for further anthropological research, the question of authenticities is an important one, although how and by what criteria something is determined to be authentic to a culture is difficult to ascertain. If there is a sense in which the introduction of new crops, steel tools, medicines, technologies, and an assortment of other cultural borrowings do not make for inauthenticities, rational precisions are wanting and primacy of authenticity is implicitly given to the symbolic or epiphenomenal. Almost anything that offends the romantic notion of a primordial innocence, the more especially if it is of Western origin (but not medicines, crops, tools, or item of technology), tends to be regarded as in some way spurious and demeaning, not authentic. Why?” (Burridge 1991: 220).

6 Lamin Sanneh, D. Willis James Professor of Missions and World Christianity at Yale University and Chair of Yale’s Council on African Studies, suggests that an important distinction between Islam and Christianity is their conception of space and language. Islam absolutizes space, requiring the pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina, a crucial component (one of the five pillars) of religious devotion. To the contrary, Christianity relativizes space, making no religious requirement for pilgrimage to Jerusalem or Bethlehem, because of the affirmation that the body (individually or corporately), rather than a spatial locality, is the temple of God. In terms of language, Islam absolutizes Arabic, believing it to be the language of the Divine and requiring it as the language of prayer and religious devotion, whereas Christianity relativizes language, making the vernacular the final destination of God’s word (see Sanneh 1987, 1993).

7 The early chapters of Genealogies of Religion surveys the genealogy of the definitions of ritual in anthropological and religious literature, its employment as a judicial instrument in the Middle Ages, and finally its use in the disciplinary practices of Medieval Christian monasticism. Through historical recollection, Asad suggests that the initial intent of religious ritual was for use as an instrument of discipline, control, and power,
in contradistinction to Geertz’s denuded portrayal of ritual as simply a “system of symbols.” Medieval religious ritual, Asad (1993: 131) asserts, served to reform moral dispositions; “the performance of rites is directed at forming and reforming Christian dispositions.” In any case, Asad’s efforts are directed at unmasking the structure of normal personhood and the techniques for securing it (Asad 1993: 12) by paying particularly close attention to the ways in which religious power has been wielded by the powers that be from the Medieval to modern periods. Whereas Asad makes several insightful comments that are pertinent to a reassessment of Geertz his over-emphasis on the power (normative influence) of power turns out to be a near monocausal explanation.

8 Geertz claims that two levels of symbols, social (“extrinsic,” Geertz 1973: 92) and psychological (“intrinsic,” Geertz 1973: 93), interact to produce meaning. However, as Asad points out, since religious symbols act, in Geertz’s words, “by inducing in the worshipper a certain distinctive set of dispositions... (95), prediction of how a worshipper will interpret religious symbols is a far more varied process than Geertz acknowledges. There exists no one-to-one relationship between symbol and interpretation. In no domain of life do actors participate with the degree of lifeless passivity by which Geertz characterizes them in the process of meaning formation. The reason, Asad writes, is that “it is not simply worship but social, political, and economic institutions in general, within which individual biographies are lived out, that lend a stable character to the flow of a Christian’s activity and to the quality of her experience” (Asad 1993: 33).

9 “[I]t does not follow that the meanings of religious practices and utterances are to be sought in social phenomena, but only that their possibility and their authoritative status are to be explained as product of historically distinctive disciplines and forces...[m]y aim is to problematize the idea of an anthropological definition of religion by assigning that endeavor to a particular history of knowledge and power (including a particular understanding of our legitimate past and future) out of which the modern world has been constructed” (Asad 1993: 54).

10 Said differently, it is nonsensical to suggest that a Pentecostal from Brooklyn will be induced to acquire certain dispositions when she participates in the “system of symbols” of the Latin Mass performed in Latin America. Though she may participate for numerous years, to the point of acquiring specific knowledge of its history, language, and significance, she may never consent to the authority of the Mass. She may remain skeptical. The Mass is seen in the best light as a cultural charm of the neighborhood, having virtually no moral authority over her personal life. Applied differently, vernacularization is no guarantee for belief, for people can deny the truth claimed in the vernacular scripture.

11 The conjunction of subjectivity and reference group identification is eminently critical for the maintenance of identity: “Indeed, identity is objectively defined as location in a certain world and can be subjectively appropriated only along with that world. Put differently, all identifications take place within horizons that imply a specific social world” (Berger and Luckmann 1966: 132). Those worlds, and the visions that animate them, compete for allegiance. That is, Dani identity is a contested identity; Indonesian forces claim them as “citizens of the Republic,” thus aligning them with Southeast Asian social worlds, while subjectively Dani themselves ascribe as Papuan (i.e. Melanesian).

12 Social conditions carry much weight in some conversion histories. Robert Hefner notes that following the September 30, 1965 failed left-wing coup attempt, which was blamed on the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) “the [Indonesian] military responded by joining forces with Muslim organizations to eliminate their powerful rival...hundreds of thousands of [PKI] followers were rounded up and killed in a massive bloodbath. Muslim youth groups worked in conjunction with representatives of the military to carry out the bloodletting, going from village to village arresting and
executing suspected communists…. In this terrorized atmosphere it was extremely dangerous not to be able to claim affiliation with a recognized religion lest one be accused of atheism and, by implication, communism. Not surprisingly, then, the years following the coup saw a spectacular increase in conversions to Christianity and Hinduism (Hefner 1993b: 113–114). Some estimate that between 1965 and 1971 more than two million Javanese were baptized (Willis 1977: xiii).


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