1 Introduction

(CC BY-NC-ND 4.0)
1 Introduction

1.1 Why electoral management matters

In the immediate aftermath of the 2007 Kenyan Presidential election, the country entered into a political, economic and humanitarian crisis. Post-election violence erupted leading to estimates of over 1,000 people being killed by police, criminal gangs and militia groups, and 660,000 displacements, as opponents of President Mwai Kibaki alleged electoral manipulation (CBS News 2008; Kenny 2019). Tensions were deeply rooted in Kenya’s political history. The sequence of events surrounding the conduct of the vote count were the immediate sparks for the conflict, however. An announcement from the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) about the result was expected by 10am on Sunday 30 December at the latest, three days after the poll, but there were repeated delays. Rumours circulated that the results were being rigged by the ECK to favour the President (Throup 2008). In its evaluation of the election, the European Union Election Observation Mission (2008, 1) concluded that:

Kenya fell short of key international and regional standards for democratic elections. Most significantly, the electoral process suffered from a lack of transparency in the processing and tallying of results, which undermined the confidence in the accuracy of the final result of the presidential election. . . . This overall conclusion is all the more regrettable, since in advance of the tallying process and despite some significant shortcomings in the legal framework, the elections were generally well administered and freedoms of expression, association and assembly were generally respected.

Kenya 2007 highlights the high stakes involved in delivering elections and the consequences of getting it wrong. Kenya’s experience was evidence that fragile multi-party systems can quickly fall apart under intense political pressure (Cheeseman 2008). It wasn’t a gerrymandered electoral system that was to blame, or the role of money in politics – the traditional sources of concern about electoral integrity. Instead, it was the logistical delivery of the electoral process.

Problems with the delivery of elections are not uncommon and found in established democracies alongside electoral autocracies and transitioning democracies, however. The 2000 US Presidential election infamously exposed shortcomings in
America’s electoral machinery with confusing ballot papers, faulty equipment, queues at polling stations, problems with absentee ballots and citizens missing from the electoral registers (U.S. Commission on Civil Rights 2001; Wand et al. 2001). In the UK, at midnight on Friday 7 May 2010, with the result of the UK general election unclear, the BBC News carried the headlines that the election had been marred by widespread errors with electoral administration. Hundreds of voters in Chester were unable to cast a ballot because of an out-of-date electoral register; long queues formed in Sheffield and Leeds leaving voters ‘locked out’ when polls closed at midnight; polling stations in Liverpool reported that they had run out of ballot papers. Some dissatisfied voters staged sit-ins to protest against what they called ‘disenfranchisement’ (Channel 4 News 2010). ‘It sounds like a disgrace from beginning to end, the way that this election has been handled’, exclaimed the BBC’s TV presenter David Dimbleby, who was questioning the Chair of the Electoral Commission, Jenny Watson, live on air as the news unfolded (BBC News 2010). Elsewhere, the completeness and accuracy of electoral registers have been questioned in Ireland (James 2012, 185–90) and New Zealand (Downes 2014). Poor ballot paper design invalidated many votes in Indonesia (Schmidt 2010; Sukma 2009) and Scotland (Denver, Johns, and Carmen 2009). Over 1,300 votes were lost in a knife-edge Western Australian Senate recount race (Lion 2013). In the 2013 Malaysia election, election officials were criticised for not shaking the bottles of indelible ink, meaning that some citizens could wash off the ink and double vote (Lai 2013). Most bizarrely, in the small village of Wallsburg, Utah, part-time election officials forgot to run the election. Twice. First in 2011, and then again in 2013. To the hilarity of the US media, County Clerk Brent Titcomb said local officials in the sleepy hamlet of approximately 300 residents had forgotten to advertise for candidates: ‘They just went on without doing anything . . . close to the election day, they called to ask what they should do’ (Associated Press 2013). A local resident commented that ‘they got in a whole bunch of trouble’ (Smart 2015).

Elections, it is often said, are the most complex logistical event to be organised during peacetime. These anecdotes and examples routinely catch headlines as they are picked up by journalists and quickly circulated over social media, suggest that societies often fail to deliver elections successfully. But there has been relatively little academic attention on the management of elections. This begs the question of whether, if we begin to turn over the rocks and look underneath, we will find fundamental problems in elections up and down the land, even in established democracies? Or will we instead find that elections are generally well run by dedicated, professional and hard-working electoral officials? Are they officials who don’t deserve the tough press and populist criticism that they receive?

This book aims to provide some tools and methods to find out and consider what can be done to improve the delivery of elections, which will be of use worldwide. This introductory chapter begins by arguing that the study of the delivery of elections, electoral management, has been fundamentally overlooked in the academic literature. The concept of electoral management is defined and arguments made for an inter-disciplinary approach to the topic. Evidence is provided
of the considerable variation in the quality of delivery worldwide. The chapter explains why electoral management matters. An overview of the book ahead is then set out.

1.2 Electoral management: the new sub-field

Electoral studies is widely thought to be one of the most established areas of political science (Htun and Powell 2013). There is a major hole in the centre of the study of elections, however. There has been a lengthy scholarship on why people vote for candidates and parties. There have been considerable efforts to understand how electoral institutions such as the voting system, boundaries, electoral finance and voting technologies shape political outcomes (see Table 1.1 below). We know in detail how electoral systems can affect whether people vote, the nature of the party system and who wins elections. There have been many lengthy studies on the funding of political parties and candidates. The choice of methods used to register electors and cast votes has seen significant attention with many studies looking at the effects of voting by post, early voting and internet voting. Elections are not just about designing laws and procedures, however. Once a law or rule has been made, it needs to be implemented. Resources need to be mobilised, staff recruited and motivated, technology designed. Electoral management therefore refers to the organisations, networks, resources, micro anthropological working practices and instruments involved in implementing elections.

Table 1.1 Foci of study within electoral studies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Broad scope</th>
<th>Example key works</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Election administration</td>
<td>The administrative procedures used for casting votes and compiling the electoral register</td>
<td>Piven and Cloward (1988, 2000), Massicotte, Blais, and Yoshinaka (2004), Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suffrage legislation</td>
<td>The criteria for who is legally enfranchised to vote</td>
<td>Uggen and Manza (2002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral boundaries</td>
<td>The number, shape and size of electoral constituencies</td>
<td>Handley and Grofman (2008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral finance</td>
<td>The rules for how political parties are funded in elections</td>
<td>van Biezen (2004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral systems</td>
<td>The formulae for rules of how votes are converted into seats</td>
<td>Duverger (1951), Rae (1967), Farrell (2011), Renwick (2010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ballot initiatives and referenda</td>
<td>The circumstances under which referenda can take place on a policy issue and/or citizens can remove an elected representative from office</td>
<td>Parkinson (2001), Qvortrup (2005), Schlozman and Yohai (2008)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The management of elections remains chronically under-researched around the world. Given that elections have been conducted in many countries for centuries, this is an extraordinary oversight. As recently as 1999, Robert Pastor complained that he was ‘unable to locate a book or even an article on election commissions or their history’ (Pastor 1999a, 76). Since then a number of significant reports have been published by international organisations (López-Pinter 2000; Wall et al. 2006), but these do not fully connect to the literature on democratic theory or assess electoral management through academic methods. The 2000 Presidential election rekindled an enormous interest in the choice of voting technologies (how are people registered? how do they cast their vote?) in the USA (Alvarez, Atkeson, and Hall 2012; Atkeson et al. 2010; Gronke, Miller, and Galances-Rosenbaum 2007; Kiewiet et al. 2008), but this research is predominately concerned with evaluating the effects of voting technologies rather than the design of electoral management bodies (EMBs) and the management of the people within these organisations. Some work eventually followed on poll workers (Claassen et al. 2008; Hall, Quin Monson, and Patterson 2009). Poll worker studies eventually expanded to reach Europe (Clark and James 2017; Goerres and Funk 2019). Studies also sought to establish whether an EMB with de jure independence would positively affect electoral integrity (Hartlyn, McCoy, and Mustillo 2008). Mechanisms have been proposed and introduced in the US, such as the Pew Elections Performance Index, based on Heather Gerken’s concept of a Democracy Index (2009a) (but hereto not been evaluated). These recent inroads have marked important progress. However, studies on how elections are implemented have usually been isolated national cases and there has been no cross-national monograph on electoral management.

1.3 Clarifying the terminology

Such an oversight is remarkable because there is an established set of theories and concepts that have been used to subject the quality of other government services, such as schools, hospitals, and social care, to continuous critical review. An inter-disciplinary approach can therefore be taken to the management of elections. Taking electoral studies into other disciplines requires some conceptual tidying, however, because the terms ‘electoral governance’, ‘management’, ‘administration’ and ‘regulation’ are often used interchangeably or are not differentiated from each other. Scholars from public administration also attach different meanings to concepts such as ‘governance’ – and have even criticised themselves for giving terms multiple meanings. Electoral governance is defined here as the broader set of power relationships and actors involved in deciding how elections are organised. The power relations involved in electoral governance cover all aspects of the electoral cycle – from designing an electoral system, electoral justice or polling station design. Electoral governance is therefore about more than electoral management bodies (EMBs) because there is a wider set of actors who will seek to shape the electoral rules of the game. Electoral governance involves rule-making – making decisions about which electoral institution designs to adopt. Rule-making can involve proactive rational decision making, but more often involves institutional drift, layering and
conversion (Mahoney and Thelan 2010). The drivers for continuity and change in electoral systems (Blais 2008; Renwick 2010) or other electoral practices (James 2012; Massicotte, Blais, and Yoshinaka 2004; Norris and van Es 2016) have been studied elsewhere. Electoral administration is just one set of electoral institutions subject to rule-making – the procedures used to allow citizens to register and cast their votes (James 2010a).

After rule-making comes rule implementation. Laws and procedures have been made by Parliaments and executives; the role of electoral management bodies (EMBs) and other actors is to apply them. Electoral justice is the final stage of the process. This refers to the mechanisms through which electoral disputes are resolved. This dimension therefore usually takes place in judicial venues (Hernández-Huerta 2017; Orozco-Henríquez 2010).

1.4 Implementation involves rule-making and governance

The focus of this book is electoral management – the implementation of elections. However, implementation also involves elements of rule-making and electoral governance too. This claim deserves some further expansion.

Firstly, designing implementation infrastructures brings rule-making questions. Decisions need to be made about who is responsible for implementing elections – should it be one agency, two or more? What role should there be for civil society? Should the agencies involved be independent of political parties and government ministers – or under their control? Each of these decisions is likely to have consequences for the quality of the election (James et al. 2019a).

Secondly, implementation can involve decision making. There is likely to be considerable discretion afforded to middle-level managers in picking an accessible polling station, resourcing the polling stations and motivating their workforce. As theories from public administration show, front-line local officials and managers are involved in everyday decision making in running elections (Lipsky 1980). They may need to interpret hand-written voter registration applications, deal with queues that arise at polling stations and manage conflictual situations in polling stations. The way that they deal with the everyday voter matters. A basic continuum can be envisaged from being friendly and pointing out all services available, to being rude, aggressive and perhaps not even replying to an email or call which can make a vital difference to a citizen.

Thirdly, administrative bodies such as EMBs are also strategic and political actors. Legislators do not make laws on elections alone. As this book shows, electoral administrators can themselves be highly mobilised actors seeking to lobby and affect the policy process. Although this is not always the case, electoral officials in many countries lack organisation – this is itself significant. At the same time, it is common for more than one organisation to be responsible for organising an election. There are commonly many organisations working together. This leads to opportunities for positive-sum collaborative forms of implementation and governance. But less optimistically, it can lead to inter-organisational politics, rivalries and disputes. In these systems, each EMB has strategies, tactics and tools that they
can deploy. In short, they are embedded into resource-dependent governance structures in which their powers and futures are dependent on the strategies they take.

Electoral management is therefore not a simple and narrow process which should be left for practitioners to consider or consigned to dusty bookshelves as it has been. As James et al. (2019a) set out, it involves:

- **Organizing** the actual electoral process (ranging from pre-election registration and campaigning, to the actual voting on election day, to post-election vote counting).
- **Monitoring** electoral conduct throughout the electoral process (i.e. monitoring the political party/candidates’ campaigns and media in the lead-up to elections, enforcing regulations regarding voter and party eligibility, campaign finance, campaign and media conduct, vote count and tallying procedures etc.).
- **Certifying** election results by declaring electoral outcomes.

But, in turn, these tasks require states to have the bureaucratic machinery for at least the following:

- Measuring and monitoring performance.
- Managing and maintaining external and internal organisational relationships.
- Decision-making processes about delivery mechanisms.
- Designing policy instruments to improve performance.
- Allocating resources amongst the stakeholders involved in the delivery of elections.
- Staff recruitment, training, retention and motivation.

### 1.5 Evidence of variation in electoral management worldwide

This chapter began with examples of problems with the implementation of elections from a variety of countries. Going beyond anecdote, recent cross-national datasets demonstrate systematic global variation in the quality of electoral management, however. Unweighted data on the quality of elections between 1978 and 2004 in electoral observation reports suggest that problems with electoral management are present on the day of elections in 15.2% of elections (Kelley 2011, 13–15). A more recent survey of experts, the Perceptions of Electoral Integrity survey, asked about the quality of electoral management worldwide 2013–2017. A 100-point electoral authorities index was constructed based on whether the electoral authorities were ‘impartial’, ‘distributed information to citizens’, ‘allowed public scrutiny of their performance’ and ‘performed well’. The mean score was 65.1 (Norris, Wynter, and Cameron 2018).

Intuitively we might think that problems are less likely in democracies. Freedom of association and broader levels of electoral integrity should provide the environment in which electoral authorities are held to account more readily and this could boost performance. Figure 1.1 presents data on the electoral authorities
Figure 1.1 The performance of electoral authorities in national elections held worldwide in between 2013–2017 and level of democracy.
Source: Author with data from the Perception of Electoral Integrity Dataset (Norris, Wynter, and Cameron 2018).
index against levels of democracy as measured by Polity. As this shows, there is a strong association with electoral authorities running better elections in democracies than autocracies. However, there are also significant outliers. This data suggests that electoral authorities can perform relatively well even in autocratic systems – as illustrated by Oman, Kuwait and Rwanda. Meanwhile, there are cases of poorly performing authorities in democratic systems, as illustrated by Honduras, Nicaragua and Kenya.

We might also expect problems with electoral management to be less frequent in richer states because they should have the resources to deliver elections well. Figure 1.2 maps electoral performance against GDP per capita. The data suggests that this is marginally true, but that there is an enormous range of outliers. Singapore, Kuwait and Bahrain feature as states that are rich but whose electoral authorities underperform using the indexes. This is perhaps explainable since these countries tend to have lower levels of democracy. But there are also established democracies including the USA where electoral authorities perform lower than expected. Then there are states that have much lower levels of income but implement elections well, such as Benin, Costa Rica, Timor-Leste and Lesotho.

Figure 1.3 maps the performance of electoral authorities by geographic region. The data suggests that there are variations in electoral management quality across all continents. While Europe has many well-run elections, it seems, there are also those with major problems. Problems are found in Africa too – as the start of this chapter illustrated – but there are also many well run elections on the African continent.

In short, there is a wide variation in the quality of implementation worldwide, and the overall quality of democracy and economic development are important contextual factors. But the data presented raises many serious questions. Firstly, as the case of the USA illustrates why can countries spend such long periods of time as democracies and be wealthy and yet seem to have comparatively low levels of electoral management quality? Why is there so much variation?

Secondly, what does it mean to say that electoral authorities performed well? What are the goals that they are trying to achieve? What goals should they be trying to achieve? Is the ‘electoral authorities index’ picking the right way to measure the performance of electoral authorities?

Thirdly, should we ‘reward’ electoral officials who perform their job well in difficult contexts? If electoral authorities struggle against adversity in difficult times, shouldn’t that form part of the assessment? How can we build this rich context into parsimonious regressions? And what are the challenges that they face?

Fourthly, what can democracies do to improve the quality of electoral management?

1.6 Why does electoral management matter?

It is well known that there has been a long-term increase in the number of elections held around the world since 1945. Between 2000 and 2006, only 11 states did not hold national contests (Hyde and Marinov 2012, 193). For this reason, the study of electoral management is a global problem. By now, it might not be
Figure 1.2 The performance of electoral authorities in national elections held worldwide in between 2013–2017 and GDP per capita.
Source: Author with data from the Perception of Electoral Integrity Dataset (Norris, Wynter, and Cameron 2018).
Figure 1.3  The performance of electoral authorities in national elections held worldwide in between 2013–2017 and region.

Source: Author with data from the Perception of Electoral Integrity Dataset (Norris, Wynter, and Cameron 2018).
difficult to realise why such variation in the quality of electoral management matters. But four principal reasons are set out here:

- **Democratic ideals.** As David Beetham set out, democracy is a political system in which there is political equality and popular control of government (Beetham 1994). If an individual’s vote is not counted because it is lost in transit from ballot box to polling station, or because of defects in the counting process, then the individual might be denied their democratic right and this equality is undermined. But if errors aggregate to give a systematic advantage to a candidate or party, either through design or mistake, then democratic government is fundamentally undermined.

- **Confidence in democratic institutions.** Defects in electoral management and their widespread reporting can quickly ebb away at public confidence in democratic institutions and we already have some studies to demonstrate this (Atkeson and Saunders 2007; Claassen et al. 2008, 2012; Hall, Quin Monson, and Patterson 2009).

- **Security, peace and conflict.** As the case of Kenya illustrates, situations in which the electoral authorities and the results of elections are not trusted can quickly undermine fragile peace processes. Civil war and conflict may follow – the prospects for democratic consolidation may be undermined (Elklit and Reynolds 2002; Pastor 1999b; Snyder 2013). During times where there are concerns about democratic retreat, there might be consequences even in established democracies (Norris and Inglehart 2018).

- **Public accountability.** There has been an enormous international investment in elections and electoral management around the world, as the professionalisation of elections has been set as a priority by key commissions such as Kofi Annan’s Global Commission on Elections (Global Commission on Elections 2012). For example, the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights spent approximately EUR€307 million on over 700 projects relating to democracy promotion between 2007–2010 (EIDHR 2011, 8), much of which was spent on electoral assistance. Delivering well-run elections is therefore important to ensure that the public money is spent well.

### 1.7 Multi-disciplinarity

If electoral management is so important, why did scholars overlook it for so long? One reason is that academics are commonly organised into communities which can be difficult to break down. Scholars might take training in comparative politics, law or public administration – but not usually more than one of them. Professional associations exist with sub-groups such as APSA’s organised section on Elections, Public Opinion, and Voting Behavior which was formed in 1994 to focus on research on ‘elections, electoral behavior, public opinion, voting turnout, and political participation’ (APSA 2018). Or the UK Political Studies Associations Elections, Public Opinion and Parties (EPOP) – but these rarely cross over with other inter-disciplinary groups. Editors of journals that focus on
elections and democracy may see articles about the management of elections as something that belongs to public administration journals, and vice versa. The barriers for researching electoral management are therefore high at an institutional level. They are also high at an individual level. It requires moving outside of our comfort area and significant additional work reading into other disciplines. The costs of this are high. Workloads in higher education can be demanding. There is a risk of making mistakes if you work in a discipline in which you were not trained. There is a risk that journals will not publish work if it doesn’t have ‘a home’. However, multi-disciplinarity provides opportunities for new lines of research. It is suggested in Figure 1.4 that at least six sub-disciplines are useful: comparative politics (including electoral studies), political philosophy, public administration, business management, law and computer science. We could even add social policy and sociology. In the aftermath of the 2000 US Presidential election the journal *Election Law* was founded in 2002 to respond to this. Yet much more inter-disciplinary thinking is needed.

![Figure 1.4 An inter-disciplinary approach to electoral management.](image)
1.8 The book ahead

Electoral management is therefore a global issue that requires systematic study. This book, which seeks to advance this, is composed of four parts. The first part is about approach. Chapter 2 sets out a specific methodological approach to the study of electoral management. This is a sociological approach, with its roots in scientific realism. This is quite a deliberate and radical turn away from the positivist-behaviouralist approach which has dominated electoral studies so far. This will need some justification (and maybe a little patience and open-mindedness from the reader). Rather than considering the researcher to be a white-coated scientist who undertakes experiments like a ‘natural scientist’ we need to recognise that the social world is different. EMB, parties and citizens are all reflexive actors who can change their behaviour in response to our knowledge and the process of generating our knowledge. This has major consequences for the study of electoral management and elections in general – but is rarely explicitly recognised.

Part two looks at performance. How do we know when electoral management bodies are doing their job well? What does failure look like? Performance is often said to be the ultimate dependent variable and we therefore need some considered conceptual definition in the field of elections. Chapter 3 therefore reviews existing measures and concepts of performance as well as reviewing the available data sources. Chapter 4 introduces a new framework for evaluating electoral management based in theories of organisational performance. It argues for thicker, more descriptive comparative evaluations based on multiple sources than has been used to date. This is applied to cases in Canada and the UK so that their relative strengths and weaknesses are identified – and policy prescriptions made.

Part three looks at who runs elections. There is never one single organisation delivering elections: they are delivered by governance networks. Chapter 5 therefore introduces the concept of electoral management governance networks and develops a new typology which supersedes existing typologies of EMBs. Chapter 6 applies the approach to the UK to give a detailed historical account of the emergence there and how parts of this book had contributed towards that, before Chapter 7 contrasts networks based on smaller case studies of India, Jordan and Australia, and comparative data from a survey of EMBs. Chapter 8 demonstrates the usefulness of the governance concept by arguing that a transgovernmental network of actors has emerged since the 1990s with some vertical and horizontal integration. This is undertaken using qualitative interviews with actors, secondary document analysis and data on in-person interactions.

The final section is about policy instruments. Policy instruments are initiatives designed to improve performance or alter the network structure. This might involve changing the organisational structure of EMBs, changing the use and allocation of resources. Rather than taking a rationalist approach, a sociological policy instrumentation approach is taken (Kassim and Le Galès 2010; Le Galès 2016). Subsequent chapters then look at the nature of several
Box 1.1 Data sources used in this volume

- A worldwide survey (consisting of two sister projects: the Electoral Management Survey (‘EMS’) and the ELECT Survey) of EMB personnel (approx. \( n = 2,200 \)) and EMBs (\( n = 70 \)) (James et al. 2019b; Karp et al. 2016) in which the author was co-investigator.
- Qualitative interviews of electoral officials in the UK, India and at the international level.
- Existing public opinion datasets.
- Secondary document analysis of EMB archives.
- A bespoke dataset of speakers at international conferences.
- A bespoke dataset of downloads from the websites of international organisations.
- Participant observation notes taken from involvement in Parliament and at major international conferences.
- Auto-ethnography

different types of instruments and the possible causal relationships that they have: voter registration reform, centralisation, human resource practices and austerity.

The conclusion aims to bring together the main lessons and an agenda for future research. Each chapter will provide its own literature review where appropriate and the methods used to research it. However, Box 1.1 above lists the key original data sources that are used overall.

1.9 Contribution

The contribution of this book is therefore to:

- Define electoral management as a concept and a new sub-field for political science and electoral studies. A new definition is used in this book which can help to organise future work.
- Develop a sociological approach to electoral management in opposition to the rationalist scientific approach which has dominated to date.
- Provide a new framework for assessing electoral management: the PROSeS framework which can be used by future academics and practitioners to identify strengths and weaknesses in any country.
- Develop a new approach to identifying and typologising the delivery mechanisms for elections. Rather than adopting the concepts developed by the international community to date, it introduces the new concept of electoral governance networks.
- Electoral governance networks are the the constellation of actors involved in steering and delivering elections, including the anthropological practices,
beliefs and power relationships between them. A typology of different types of electoral governance networks is set out.

• Develop a new approach for understanding policy instruments with specific evaluations of the effects of new reforms.

These are the key theoretical lessons and contributions. There are also empirical and applied policy lessons which practitioners will be able to take forward into the delivery of elections, which are summarised in the conclusion (Box 13.1).

Notes

1 In setting out the agenda to study electoral governance, Mozaffer and Schedler define it ‘as a set of related activities that involves rule making, rule application, and rule adjudication’ (p. 5). The term ‘governance’ is therefore a container concept that involves no activity itself. They claim that ‘good elections are impossible without effective electoral governance’ (p. 6). Hartlyn et al.’s (2008) much-cited study ‘Electoral Governance Matters: Explaining the Quality of Elections in Contemporary Latin America’ define electoral governance as ‘the interaction of constitutional, legal, and institutional rules and organizational practices that determine the basic rules for election procedures and electoral competition’ (p. 74) and then focusses on ‘the impact of central institutions of electoral governance – electoral management bodies (EMBs)’. Four types of electoral governance are differentiated depending on the structure of the EMB (depending on the degree of party involvement in the EMB). Elsewhere Ugues’s excellent article on citizen views of electoral governance in Mexico is about citizens’ evaluation of the Mexican EMB, the Instituto Federal Electoral (IFE). Pastor, meanwhile, often refers to the study of ‘Electoral Commissions’ as ‘electoral administration’ (Pastor 1999b). Norris’s article entitled ‘Conclusions: New Research Agenda Studying Electoral Management’ summarises data on the quality of electoral administration (Norris 2019). Her index of ‘electoral administration’ included whether the electoral authorities were impartial; the authorities distributed information to citizens; the authorities allowed public scrutiny of their performance; and, the election authorities performed well.

2 Kjaer (2011, 104) defined governance as a ‘weasel’ word.