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Navigating Borders

Inside Perspectives on the Process of Human Smuggling into the Netherlands

Ilse van Liempt

IMISCOE Dissertations

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Introduction

Tarifa, a former fishing town in the south of Spain, is famous today for two types of travellers who both depend on the wind: surf tourists and ‘illegal’ immigrants arriving by boat. Beginning in the 1980s, windsurfing tourism became the city’s main industry, and around the same time, the first immigrants started coming ashore by small boats, also known as *pateras*. In June 2003, I went to this city of wind to see for myself how Tarifa had changed, from a fishing town into a port of arrival for immigrants who cannot enter Europe any other way than via *patera*. A former fisherman in the harbour explained to me how, at first, the inhabitants of Tarifa thought that these ‘poor Africans’ travelling via *patera* could not afford the expensive ferry ride to Spain. Now Tarifa’s natives understand that these migrants are not necessarily poor: but rather, they have no legal options for leaving and therefore choose to cross in this dangerous way. Meanwhile, fishermen on the other side, in Africa, have left the fishing for another ‘business’: the business of bringing people across. But this new enterprise is not without risks. Border control officers are known to intercept the boats, and the water’s waves are high, making it difficult to navigate a secure course. Human fatalities are the regular result of following a wrong course or a journey that takes too long. Often the boats are also overloaded, which may result in capsizing.

A Red Cross worker told me about the first large accident that happened in Tarifa, in 1989, which resulted in the eighteen bodies found dead at Los Lances beach. Since the incident, Tarifa became renowned for its arrivals of *pateras*. The former fisherman remembers a July day in 2002 when five *pateras* arrived at the same moment – 200 immigrants stepped ashore and all were arrested. Those who could be sent back were repatriated immediately; however, most of the immigrants left Tarifa and travelled onto places where they thought they could find work. At the time this book is being written, people continue to drown on a daily basis at the southern border of ‘Fortress Europe’. Under pressure from the European Union, the Strait of Gibraltar is now very well controlled. As a result, the main migration route has shifted towards the Canary Islands. On 29 May 2006, 732 Africans on eleven boats arrived on several islands, including La Gomera, Fuerteventura,
and Gran Canaria. The EU responded by providing boats and helicopters to help Spain better guard its borders (www.nrc.nl/anp/buitenland/article334818.ece). The question thus remains: where will future clandestine immigrants set ashore, and how many more will die while attempting to reach that spot?

In the Netherlands it was, first and foremost, the Dover accident of 2000 that brought smuggling onto the political agenda. Rotterdam had served as a point of transit for 60 Chinese immigrants who were all supposed to be smuggled to the United Kingdom. Some had been en transit for months, already having passed through several countries. While in Rotterdam, they were stored in small groups, above several Chinese restaurants. The next day they departed in mini-busses for the Rotterdam harbour. There, they all entered a container, which was subsequently filled with tomatoes, then sealed, and put on a lorry. The container was transported to Zeebrugge, Belgium, from which point it made the crossing into Dover, England. Upon arrival, the tragedy became apparent: 58 of the Chinese migrants had suffocated. The driver had closed off the cargo’s air supply on one of the hottest days of summer (Meeus 2000). In 2002, another big case involving Chinese smuggling was brought to light, this time involving a young Chinese woman of Dutch nationality. Called by some the ‘godmother’ of human smuggling, ‘Sister P.’ had a monopoly on a smuggling route from China to England that passes via Rotterdam, and along which she transports approximately one hundred people per month. Sister P.’s presumed role in the Dover case, however, was never proven (Meeus 2002).

The framework in which smuggling incidents like the Dover accident are discussed is rather different from what I experienced in Tarifa. Former fishermen talked about Africa as ‘the other side’, in terms of its poverty, and when referring to their ‘colleagues’ who have started bringing people across as a way to earn some extra money. By contrast, the framework in which the smuggling of Chinese immigrants is discussed by policymakers and politicians is one of organised crime. Terms, such as ‘gangs’ or ‘the mafia’, are often used without defining exactly what is meant by them. The discourse, one-sided and of a criminal language, seems to be dominant not only in the media, but also in jurisdiction. Illustrative is the fact that, for a long time, smuggling was not considered a crime, but rather, held in the same regard as helping Jews or communists to escape ‘bad’ regimes. Shortly after human smuggling entered the Dutch penal code in 1993, the penalties for smuggling were raised. And in 2005, the humanitarian clause was removed from the Dutch smuggling article, meaning all smuggling cases were to be treated as criminal acts.
Objective of this study

When it comes to academic theory, it could be said that the topic of human smuggling remains a neglected area. Most research in this field consists of single case studies: few cross-comparisons are made vis-à-vis types of smuggling or on a country-to-country basis, and there is a fundamental lack of hard evidence to substantiate most aspects of the smuggling process (Salt & Hogarth 2000). This study takes an internal approach to compare various types of smuggling. The research method used is biographical interviews. Talking to migrants about their smuggling experiences serves to fill some of the empirical gaps existing in present-day knowledge about human smuggling processes. It also challenges assumptions that are commonly made about smuggling, both in the media and by politicians. For example, certain elements of organised crime, such as the use of violence or debt-bondage, are often linked to smuggling without clear empirical evidence. This research emphasises the diversity of smuggling processes; no presumptions are made about the involvement of organised crime in smuggling. How smuggling is embedded more widely in society and the economy is also taken into account. In order to move beyond legal and criminal discourses, applied is a broad definition of smuggling that spans the whole spectrum: from smuggling-as-altruism to smuggling-as-organised-crime. The definition of human smuggling employed in this research is as follows:

Every act whereby an immigrant is assisted in crossing international borders and this crossing is not endorsed by the government of the receiving state, neither implicitly nor explicitly.
(Doomernik 2001: 10-11)

Another term that needs to be examined critically is ‘illegal’ migration. When is somebody ‘illegal’? In actuality, this is not so easy to determine. A person may enter a country in a legal way but then, for example, overstay a visa, thus becoming ‘illegal’ after a while. Migrants may thus slide into and out of legality over time. ‘Irregular migration’ is a broader and less normative term than ‘illegal’ migration, as it refers to the far wider range of border crossings that may occur without standard authority (Jordan & Duvell 2002). Besides, when the term ‘illegal’ is used in reference to people, it implies that such people should not be where they are. In this study, the word ‘illegal’ will be used when speaking from the state’s perspective and accordingly placed between single quotation marks.
Beginning in the mid-1980s, with the rise of asylum seekers in the Netherlands from places with which the country had few to no prior links, a facile connection was made between smuggling and the increase of migration. Smuggling was considered a ‘business’ – even a global ‘business’ – that transported migrants over enormous distances, and also offered possibilities to those who had no prior inclinations to migrate. Smugglers were, to a large extent, held responsible for the greater influx of immigrants to the Netherlands (Tweede Kamer 1995). The general rhetoric is that smuggling has *created* migration possibilities for those immigrants not allowed to immigrate, and whom receiving countries have classified as ‘aliens’, rather than ‘guests’ (Sassen 1999). This perception has compelled law enforcement agencies to respond by stopping ‘criminals’ who break immigration laws upon entering a country. Criminal prosecutions of the facilitators and controls to stop irregular movements have become essential to the management of migration flows. A programme designed to this end by the European Commission, which started in 1996 and lasted for four years, even bore the striking name of STOP. The enormous amounts of money paid to smugglers may have also fuelled the idea that those who break immigration rules are not in need of protection. The perception that ‘wealthy’ refugees are not ‘real’ refugees is reinforced by this new phenomenon, even though one’s level of welfare, in principle, does not say anything about one’s possible needs for refugee protection. Not only has smuggling created migration opportunities for those people who were not officially ‘invited’ by receiving states, but it has also blurred the distinctions among different categories for immigrants. This makes it harder for immigration officers to evaluate asylum applications. Some smugglers provide ‘good asylum stories’ as part of their service, and most smugglers advise people to hide their true identity to avoid deportation, which may undermine the efficiency and even the legitimacy of the asylum application system.

So far, not much research has been done on what migrating with the use of a smuggler means for the migration process. Authors who base their research on migrant interviews often use the social network approach. For example, Staring (2001) showed in his studies among the Turkish community in the Netherlands that relatives can be very helpful in the process of ‘illegal’ migration to the country. By far, the most common way is to enter on a valid visa and to remain after the visa has expired. Data collected from interviews with over 2,200 people who migrated from Morocco or Senegal to Spain, and from Egypt or Ghana to Italy, also show that, among the migrants who admitted to having migrated ‘illegally’, 58 per cent had used the overstaying meth-
(Schoorl et al. 2000). Studies like these are very useful to the deconstruction of sensational reports on smuggling. Boat accidents, and the public discussions subsequently spurred on by them, give the impression that this is the channel for ‘illegal’ migration. Research, however, shows that there are many other ways to enter the European Union in clandestine ways. Still, these studies do not reveal how travelling with a smuggler may have an effect on migration processes, in light of how, for example, travelling on an official visa with the intention to overstay does not greatly diverge from the appearance of regularised travelling.

Studies that deal with smuggling, in the criminal sense of the word, usually focus on the social organisation of human smuggling and are based on analyses of police files or court cases (Neske 2006; Soudijn 2006). The main interest of these studies is to find out how smuggling is organised and who is involved in the ‘business’. This perspective assumes that smugglers all have the same motives for being involved, and are the only active actors in ‘illegal’ migration processes. It does not consider the agency of migrants themselves, nor the personal interactions between smugglers and migrants. Rather than focusing on migrant social networks or smuggler activities, this study presents an integrative approach towards analysing migration processes that utilise smugglers. By comparing different smuggling cases, it is possible to construct a more general analysis of the link between smuggling and the migration process, and to better understand the overall dynamics of human smuggling. Three different regions are included to better diversify border-crossing methods: Iraq, the Horn of Africa, and the former Soviet Union. From the literature (IAM 2002), it is known that most people originating in Iraq need several smugglers to reach their final destination as they travel in a step-by-step process. A question that thus arises is: are there differences between how the first and the last smugglers operate? Moreover, how do people decide with which smuggler to go or to continue the journey? In the Horn of Africa, smuggling by air, on forged or borrowed documents, was the practice frequently mentioned in the literature as well as in the media. By contrast, in the former Soviet Union it seemed relatively easy to travel on a visa, an opportunity that was rarely possible for the other groups.

Migrants’ smuggling experiences can serve both to balance the popular image of irregular migrants and to fill the gaps in migration theory as to the extent with which irregular migration processes differ from regular migration processes. The central question raised in this study is: what does it mean for the evolution of the migration process if people with constrained mobility make use of the services of smugglers?
Structure of the book

Chapter one lays out the migration map, to show how for some people in the world, there are legal obstacles that make it hard to travel, whereas for others, it has become easier to move around. A closer look is given at what exact measures are taken in Europe to control migration from certain areas, consequently begging the question: what are the underlying reasons for these forms of control? On a more abstract level, raised is the question of how migration theory has dealt with constraints on mobility. For a long time, migration has been mainly studied from an economic point of view, which works on the assumption that people can move freely around the world. But once the myth of free mobility is deconstructed, the next step in developing migration theory is to incorporate constraints on mobility.

Chapter two discusses the development of an industry that assists migrants in their migration process. The main questions posited are: what different types of assistance exist and in what kind of discourse are these different forms of assistance debated? The common assumption seems to be that migrants completely lose control during the migration process, having surrendered to smugglers or traffickers; this is an assumption that should be challenged. This research thus takes into account the agency that migrants possess over themselves. The goal is to better understand their decision-making processes, the possible negotiations made between smugglers and migrants, and also to produce a fuller picture of what it really means to be smuggled into a country.

Chapter three gives detailed information about our interviewees and how the interview process proceeded. General issues, such as gaining access to the target population, and how to build up trust within it, are discussed. Special attention is also given to difficulties and problems encountered during fieldwork. For instance, it is not readily apparent why people might be inclined to speak about a secretive, and sometimes dangerous, topic such as smuggling.

Chapter four is devoted to the root causes underlying migration. As a way to understand why they may have decided to migrate to Western Europe, there is discussion of the general pre-migration living conditions of our respondents. The existing structural conditions in countries of origin will also be addressed to appreciate the context in which respondents made the decision to travel with a smuggler. This is important in order to get an idea of who migrates with a smuggler, and for what reason a smuggler is needed. Chapter five presents three concrete border crossings from the three regions up for discussion: Iraq, the Horn of Africa, and the former Soviet Union. ‘Thick descriptions’ will be used to analyse decision-making processes of migrants as well as the general course of smuggling processes.
Chapter six addresses the issue of who is involved in the smuggling business. An overview is given of the different types of service providers, drawing a link to how various types of smuggling can yield various outcomes. Chapter seven addresses the difficulties migrants encounter once they have reached the Netherlands. For example, once a smuggled migrant has reached the Netherlands he or she might encounter difficulties lodging an asylum application or regularising his or her position in some other way. Finally, in chapter eight the implications for theories on migration will be central.
The Janus face of globalisation

‘Globalisation’ is a term often used without a clear definition. In the simplest sense, it refers to growing interconnectedness over and across national borders, as the result of revolutions in communication and transportation technologies. People nowadays have easy access to information and relatively cheap transportation, and therefore the distance between places and peoples has been dramatically reduced. This phenomenon is what Harvey (1989) has called ‘time-space compression’ and all sorts of expressions have followed, such as the ‘global village’ or the ‘flat world’. To speak in Castles and Miller’s terms: ‘The global character of international migration is the way it affects more and more countries and regions, and its linkages with complex processes affecting the entire world’ (1998: 283). Moreover, some borders have been removed. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, it became possible to migrate from countries previously blocked from the West, and within the EU, border control has almost entirely disappeared. EU citizens can move unrestrained between member states, and a free internal market exists. This global ‘connectedness’ and the diminishment – if not disappearance – of borders has its impact on labour markets. For example, some companies have enjoyed a sense of being footloose as they move to places where they can produce or operate at lower costs. However, this is not a one-way process; there are also different opportunities in the types of jobs available in Western economies, attracting people from the very places where the companies move to as well. According to Sassen (2001) an informal, flexible labour market forms an inseparable part of the current official economy – and it is one of the main pull factors for immigration.

But the other face to globalisation shows an oppositional outlook: tighter controls for people from outside the EU. Workers migrating Westward can rarely move as easily as the company employees transferring to points more east or south on the continent. In fact, for many people in the world, borders are not disappearing, but are very much present. Parallel to the increase of a global exchange in goods and information, processes meant to restrict migration are taking place. There are many constraints on mobility, especially for people from parts of the world that are associated with poverty or perceived as ‘back-
ward’. For individuals from certain parts of the world it is difficult – if not impossible – to obtain a travel visa, and the criteria for granting asylum have been tightened.

1.1 Distinction between wanted and unwanted migration

Globalisation’s so-called Janus face, simultaneously looking in two directions of opposite dispositions, causes a dilemma for states. On the one hand, economic and political imperatives call for more permeable borders. Businesspeople, students, visiting professors, and tourists are often welcome, as they are seen to foster and further economic growth. Efforts are made to facilitate their migration because they bring into the state both their skills and income. On the other hand, certain types of migrants are not considered a contribution to society. Asylum seekers and immigrants with low levels of education, for example, are often seen as a ‘burden’. Asylum seekers do not fit into the category of potential workers, while less educated immigrants are undesired because the demand for workers is always linked to the higher end of the labour market. This dichotomous thinking has created a polarisation of migration types. Today’s borders thus function as a filter, separating out the ‘wanted’ from the ‘unwanted’ migrants, or as Sassen has termed it, the ‘guests’ from the ‘aliens’ (1999).

State-defined categorisations of migrants

Since the beginning of the nineteenth century, citizenship has been linked to territory, and states have had the power to determine who is entitled to certain rights and who is not (Lucassen 1995; Torpey 2000). For the Netherlands, large state-controlled immigration started with guest worker programmes in the mid-1950s. War reconstruction had led to labour shortages in various sectors, and bilateral agreements were subsequently signed with Southern Europe, Morocco, and Turkey. These foreign workers were seen as guest workers; the Netherlands did not consider itself to be ‘an immigration country’; as a nation, it neither comprised a high-immigrant population nor expected to be the future host to one. The importation of labour on such a mass scale began on the assumption that these immigrants were supposed to return home once the work was accomplished. This view of migration as something temporary resulted in only minimal regulations. Residence and labour permits were required in order to, respectively, live and work in the Netherlands, though the enforcement of these provisions was limited (Doomernik 2005).
But with the economic recession that followed the first oil crisis in 1973, the Dutch state’s recruitment activities were terminated. Closing down the labour migration channel was a simple way of managing migration. Officially, the Netherlands has been closed for labour migration since 1973. But by the end of the 1980s, persistent labour shortages in particular economic sectors led the Dutch government to manage temporary labour migration through so-called covenants (Bruquetas-Callejo et al. 2006: 3).

Invited guest workers, who were already residing in the Netherlands, did not go home when the work was done. Rather, they started to settle down and bring their families into the country, thus leading to an increase in the total numbers of ‘unwanted’ immigrants. Because the whole recruitment movement had been based on the assumption that these migrants would not stay, family reunification can be seen as the unexpected outcome of the guest worker period. Although the right to bring over relatives has never been openly questioned in the Netherlands, the enormous increase in family migration during the 1980s led the government to curtail family reunification and formation. These measures introduced new requirements regarding housing, as well as income of the family member already positioned in the Netherlands; fixed a maximum time before which family reunification could take place; and limited the rights of family reunification only to those with permanent residence permits (Bruquetas-Callejo et al. 2006: 6). In 2002, even more restrictive requirements were introduced in matters of income and age. But this time, the provisions were not only intended to delimit immigrants as a whole. The family migration of non-Western immigrants, in particular, was now increasingly being perceived as problematic for the integration of migrants into Dutch society (Van Walsum 2004). Measures restricting couples from continuing to cohabit or provisions preventing families from living in union, however, may come up against international treaty obligations, particularly Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Liberties (ECHR). As such, family migration policymaking, to a certain extent, goes beyond the scope of national policymaking.

As for asylum, national states also have less autonomy in tightening this channel than they do when it comes to labour migration; refugees can claim the right to move on the basis of the Geneva Convention, which goes beyond the scope of national policy. But before the Geneva Convention was enacted, the situation was different. Many asylum seekers fleeing after disruptions in the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires, or from the First World War, were refused entrance at the gates of Western European states. Opinions on these kinds of measures were diffuse. The Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs, for example, was worried about ‘damaging the image of the Netherlands as a tolerant country’
After the failure of the international community to rescue European Jews from the Holocaust, all sorts of attempts were made to reach international agreements for the protection of refugees. In 1945 the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was signed, and one year later, the UN General Assembly established the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Geneva. By 1951, the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees was put in place, thus providing a definition of the term ‘refugee’.

As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable, or owing to such a fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable, or, owing to such a fear, is unwilling to return to it. (Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, General Provisions, Article 1 (2))

The 1951 Convention, however, was Eurocentric in its scope, being based on – and very much influenced by – the global political order of that time: being pro-or anti-communist. Later, with the assignment of the Additional Protocol in 1967, the Convention became universal by removing its temporal restrictions (to events occurring before 1951), and geographical limitations. Nevertheless, the treaty remained problematic because the issue of individual persecution was still at its core, thereby implying that many people whose lives are threatened by their countries’ political situations or conflicts – but who may not fear individual persecution – do not fit the definition of ‘refugee’. Moreover, the Convention has not been updated since 1967, and people in more recent history may very well be persecuted for reasons other than the five criteria listed in 1951. Environmental refugees, for example, are not covered in the provisions of the Convention. UNHCR fears that replacing the treaty as it now stands would only undermine the refugee regime to offer even less protection, because the majority of states would try to reduce their current responsibility under the Convention.

### 1.2 A shift in migration regimes

There has been a clearly noticeable shift in Dutch history: from welcoming restricted numbers of guest workers and invited refugees, to restricting access to those who arrive ‘spontaneously’. ‘Spontaneous ar-
rivals’ are those who are not explicitly invited by a government, but make an appeal to international treaties. As a way of managing these quotas arrivals, annual quotas, from 1977 to 1987, were established to determine the number of refugees invited to resettle in the Netherlands. These asylum seekers were sheltered in independent housing in various municipalities and were entitled to social benefits. But the growing number of spontaneously arriving asylum seekers led to housing shortages and increased costs for municipalities. This resulted in less than luxurious situations. In 1987, the Regulation on the Reception of Asylum Seekers (ROA) was introduced, offering asylum seekers central reception as well as some pocket money. But due to the growing numbers of newly arriving asylum seekers from 1989 onwards, the ROA system also became overburdened. And in 1992, a new admission and reception policy for asylum seekers was introduced: the New Regulation and Reception Model for asylum seekers (NTOM). One of the most important differences of ROA was that asylum seekers were no longer accommodated in decentralised ROA housing, but in reception centres. Limiting asylum seekers’ rights and benefits, as such, can also be seen as a way to manage asylum migration (Muus 1997). Recently, more measures endeavouring to reduce the number of asylum requests have been introduced, such as the introduction of temporary statuses, the emphasis on return, and new procedures to speed up asylum applications. Chapter seven devotes more attention to the effects that the new Aliens Act (2000) had on the rights of currently arriving asylum seekers to the Netherlands.

A shift has also been underway as far as how the asylum issue is perceived and subsequently talked about. In the past, refugees who had fled the communist regime, for example, were identified as being anti-communist, as being like ‘us’. This attitude changed when migration started to occur increasingly from places with which the Netherlands had seldom prior exchange or knew little about. The so-called ‘disruptive movements of people’ (Ghosh 2000: 221), enforced a new suspicion with which immigration was handled. According to Beck, the redefinition of migration as a ‘threat’ reflected a growing tendency to channel diffuse socioeconomic and cultural concerns into the migration problem (1992: 49). Moreover, the notion of ‘migration as a threat’ has also resulted in disproportionate notions about the numbers of immigrants coming to the West. The developing world is frequently believed to be packed with millions of desperate people who are all waiting to come to improve their lot. Receiving countries, on the other hand, are thought of as so attractive that a ‘wave’ of Third World immigrants is just waiting outside the Western gates to benefit from the wealth and social services contained therein. Although some migrants do move because of the world’s unequal opportunities, it is more often
development, as opposed to underdevelopment, that causes migration (Massey et al. 2002, Castles & Miller 1998, De Haas 2003). Under the new regime, it is also increasingly acknowledged that a threat may come from people themselves, as states fear the arrival of potential terrorists and other criminals. Since the end of the Cold War more attention has been placed on migration-specific insecurity. States have, in general, responded to this new situation by tightening their admission rules to better canalise migration flows. But it is also acknowledged that restrictive admission rules, paradoxically, have caused a pressing need on the side of the migrant to find loopholes and break these laws. This paradoxical situation demands other measures to control migration.

1.3 Other measures to control migration

The growth of unsolicited forms of migration has resulted in more measures to control and prevent exactly these forms of migration. In the next section some such measures will be explained in detail.

Travel and identification document checks

Torpey (2000) demonstrates in his beautiful book, *The Invention of the Passport*, how passports and visas, in one form or another, have existed since medieval times. But the comprehensive system, as we know it today, is inextricably linked to the evolution of modern nation-states. It has played a crucial role in state-building activities as a mechanism to define who is ‘in’ and who is ‘out’ vis-à-vis membership. Passports and visas thus help to distinguish who may make legitimate claims to rights and benefits, and the use of documents has no doubt become an established way of confirming identity.

However, passports are no longer completely trustworthy testimonies to identity because people may use forged or borrowed ones. Moreover, prejudices exist, and certain ethnic groups are suspected as being more likely to lie about their identity than others. For example, Liberian asylum seekers in the Netherlands are often asked whether they truly come from Liberia due to the alleged tendency for Nigerians to claim to be Liberians in hopes of receiving political asylum. So, apart from the suspicion directed at individuals themselves, migrants’ passports may also be mistrusted based on the fact that certain states and their administrative system are mistrusted. As such, presumptions about how certain states deal with passport issues may also impact the care with which asylum claims are handled.
An additional way to control asylum applicants without passports is through the Eurodac central database. This is a joint EU database that collects and centralises the fingerprints of all asylum seekers over age fourteen, with the aim of preventing their cases from having to be heard in several EU countries. However, this control can also be circumvented, for instance through self-mutilation. In Sweden, cases are reported of refugees cutting or burning their fingertips to prevent authorities from identifying them by fingerprint (BBC News 02/04/2004: http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/world/europe/3593895.stm). One wonders what the future will bring, now with biometric measures being taken by governments as a way of ascertaining individual identity with far greater precision and efficacy. There is even a growing tendency to view biometrics as a panacea to prevent all forms of ‘unwanted’ mobility (Thomas 2005).

Visas and the unequal access to foreign space

In addition to identification documents, visa requirements are another opportunity states seize upon when selecting between ‘guests’ and ‘aliens’. Neumayer (2005) shows how nation-states employ bilateral visa restrictions in an attempt to manage the complex trade-off between facilitating and promoting economic and political interests, on the one hand, and maintaining immigration control and upholding security, on the other. He states that it is not passports as such, but rather the visa restrictions imposed on passport holders from certain countries, that are one of the most important devices by which nation-states control entry into their territories. The most striking aspect of the visa restriction system is that it produces unequal access to foreign spaces. Holders of some passports face fewer visa restrictions for travelling abroad, and therefore have much easier access to foreign spaces, than holders of other passports. Of the 25 countries facing the smallest number of visa restrictions for their passport holders, all are Western, high-income OECD countries – with the exception of Malaysia and Singapore, which are nevertheless relatively high-income countries. On the other end of the scale, are passport holders from countries that need a visa to travel to almost any foreign country. This group generally comprises countries with a history of violent political conflict, those with a strictly autocratic regime, those that are very poor, or places with any combination of these characteristics (Neumayer 2005: 10).

There are numerous examples of visa impositions by states after (perceived) threats and subsequent state attempts to try to get a grip on the situation. One of the major policy consequences of the increase in asylum applications to Western European countries during the 1990s was the establishment of a common policy of visa restrictions³. After
9/11, the United States also imposed new visa restrictions. The fact that all the terrorists identified as participating in the World Trade Center attack entered the US on valid visas\(^4\) led to the American decision to severely restrict visas issued since the event (Salter 2004). Meanwhile, new member states to the EU are now also pressured to impose visa restrictions on their neighbouring countries, including those among which there previously had been frequent and relatively easy movement. For example, citizens from Ukraine, Belarus, and the Russian Federation now need visas to cross the Polish border; previously travelers only needed to have their passports on hand (Freudenstein, 2000).

As with passports, a black market for visas has been built up in response to a restrictive immigration system. A scandal in Germany arose when, between 2002 and 2003, visa requirements were loosened for Ukraine, Russia, Albania, and Kosovo. This policy change unleashed a flood of visa applications, and has made it virtually impossible for consulate workers to perform adequate checks on the thousands of cases they are required to process each month. Additionally, it was believed that traffickers easily gained access to Germany and other EU countries through this loophole. Young women being forced into prostitution became ‘tourists’, their traffickers became ‘business travellers’, and those hoping to take advantage of the loophole swarmed German consulates. Hundreds of thousands, mostly coming through consulates in Kiev, Moscow, and Minsk, were able to enter this way into Germany and the EU (Der Spiegel 22/02/2005: http://service.spiegel.de/cache/international/0,1518,343108,00.html). Research from Portugal has revealed how these migrants not only went to Germany, but also turned up in Southern Europe. Ukrainians, after immigrants from Cape Verde, are currently the largest immigrant group in Portugal; Ukrainian research has made it clear that most of these immigrants, counted at 59 per cent, had come through one specific German consulate (Baganha et al. 2004: 30).

Physical border control

Apart from document checks, there are also more draconian measures taken to restrict people from entering a country. Probably the clearest example is the wall currently being built around the Spanish enclaves – or better put, exclaves – in Morocco: Ceuta and Mellila\(^5\). The situation along the North African-European border can very well be compared with the US-Mexican border. Both are zones where economic, political, cultural, religious, and demographic differences divide two completely different worlds. The year to decisively transform the practice of Spanish immigration control was 1991. When Spain signed the Schengen Treaty it began to impose visa restrictions on North Africans\(^6\), and as
soon as the visa restriction took effect, migrants turned to various clandestine methods for entry (Andreas 2000: 130-131).

Usually state responses to clandestine attempts at border crossing involve measures to increase border control, which is precisely what happened in the aforementioned case. The EU decided to pressure Spain, as well as Morocco, for more forceful border control. In 1995, the Spanish government started building fences in Ceuta, as well as Melilla, to keep out ‘unwanted’ immigrants. In Ceuta, a double fence was built: three metres high and eight kilometres long, including sensors to detect ‘illegal’ crossings, 30 closed-circuit TV cameras, and high-intensity floodlights. The fence was patrolled by the army, police, and civil guard, and unsurprisingly, dubbed ‘Europe’s new Berlin Wall’ (Andreas 2000: 135). However, people soon started climbing over it, as well as through the fence (by cutting holes), underneath (via tunnels), and around (by floating on inner tubes around the edge). In Mellilla, on 27 August 2005, a group of some 300 immigrants tried to storm the border fences by using homemade ladders. In response to these attempts to undermine boundaries, the wall was heightened from three to six metres and an extra barrier of steel wires, a third fence, was built around the already existing double-layered fence (BBC News 22/09/2005: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/4271536.stm).

Managing migration by ‘remote control’

In order to make it easier for ‘wanted’ immigrants to travel, while at the same time trying to prevent the ‘unwanted’ from entering, it is often thought necessary not only to place controls at immediate borders, but also at more distant locations. Many controls have shifted from the outer borders of Europe to more distant countries (Boswell 2003). Zolberg (2003) uses the term ‘remote control’ to denote immigration policies designed to deter immigration by regulating departure at, or near, the point of origin. Since the 1980s, liaison officers have been doing pre-boarding checks at ‘risky’ airports in countries from which high amounts of undocumented or falsely documented immigrants originate.

When it comes to asylum seekers, all sorts of specific measures are taken to keep them at a distance. Despite a quadrupling of the world’s refugee population since the 1970s, there has been a significant drop in the absolute number of UNHCR cases being resettled. Although many nations have agreed to accept refugees on a temporary basis, only twenty nations worldwide participate in UNHCR resettlement programmes during the early phases of a crisis. Resettlement countries have grown reluctant to continue open-ended resettlement of refugees. Resettlement criteria have become more restrictive, making it an op-
portunity only for the ‘lucky few’. In the late 1970s, there were over 200,000 resettlement cases a year; in 2003 only 41,000. After the 9/11 attacks in the US, the resettlement programme was particularly hard hit. The US used to accept, by far, the largest number of refugees for resettlement in the West, but from 2002 onwards, the state established a quota of 70,000, though started accepting even fewer people than the quota allows (26,300 in 2002) (UNHCR 2003).

Apart from refusing the resettlement of refugees on a large-scale basis, there are also measures taken to offer people protection within the region. The general rhetoric is that it is better to find protection close to home without having to travel far. Argumentations are currently directed towards problems within the current political system that provoke ‘illegal’ migration and human smuggling, making the journey unsafe for the refugees. Another line of reasoning is that better screening could be done in countries within the region, allowing people to know prior to travel whether or not they will be granted refugee status. This new approach, also advocated by UNHCR (Ogata 1995), emphasises ‘preventive protection’. This approach is more concerned with the root causes of forced migration, and focuses on the right to remain, rather than on the right to leave or the right to seek asylum (Hyndman 1999). The European Commission designed several measures to diminish the need for people seeking protection to come to Europe. ‘Regional Protection Zones’ and ‘Transit Processing Centres’ are some examples of initiatives to try to keep people in need of protection within their own region.

These ‘preventive’ policies are disputed and touch upon sensitive political considerations, such as the responsibility of the international community to intervene in humanitarian crises in the world. Several authors have raised criticism against these measurements. Noll (2003) has critically analysed the regional protection zones and transit processing centres concluding that the refugee is, in these cases, located beyond the domain of justice, for there is a tendency of ‘opting out from ordinary asylum processes’ by ‘outsourcing international legal obligation’. A notable parallel can be drawn to Europe’s temporary protection measures taken during the early 1990s in response to the war in Yugoslavia. Temporary protection measures also allow states to opt out from ordinary asylum processes and to make exceptions. However, such exceptions, with their diminished human rights, were later extended to the majority of asylum seekers. Chapter seven discusses in more detail how the asylum system in the Netherlands has changed over time.
‘Burden’ sharing

Once asylum seekers have reached Europe an array of additional measures is taken to deny them further access to specific nation-states. The Dublin II Regulation ensures that asylum seekers can make only one application for asylum within the EU. The ‘safe third country’ rule makes it possible to send asylum seekers back to the ‘safe’ countries they have already passed through, in order to file their applications there. Prior to these measures, there had been reported incidents of ‘asylum shopping’, a reference to those who applied for asylum in several countries as a way to diversify their risks. It was deemed necessary to share the ‘burden’. In practice, this means that many asylum claims are now filed in EU candidate countries that are obliged to apply EU standards of migration management, something one could also call ‘burden shifting’ rather than ‘burden sharing’ (Icduygu 2005: 22).

The list of ‘safe countries of origin’ is another measure to prevent asylum seekers from applying in a specific country or to share the ‘burden’. This list will allow EU countries to send asylum seekers back to countries that have commonly been defined as ‘safe’, or even to regions of the country defined as such. Which countries should be included on the list, however, has yet to be agreed upon.

Readmission agreements are another example of trying to limit access by immigrants and asylum seekers. For example, Italy is giving financial and material support to Libya to enforce border control. In return, Italy can send people back who have set ashore. In theory, these readmission agreements are designed with the human rights perspective in mind, meaning that people still need to have the opportunity to ask for protection. However, in practice, Italy has deported people to Libya without first allowing them to make asylum claims. Moreover, Libya has not signed the Geneva Convention and there are no asylum procedures in place, thus denying people overall access to protection. The declared and expressed intention to return people, without examining their asylum claims or structural violations of the non-refoulement principle, is one of the latest developments in Europe (Schuster 2005).

Privatising border control

There is not only a deterritorialisation of control taking place, but also an expansion of the range of actors targeted in the whole apparatus of immigration control. Actors that are involved in transporting people, for example, are deemed responsible through ‘carrier sanctions’. Carrier sanctions are penalties that can be given to airline and transport companies for transporting ‘illegal’ aliens. As a result, private actors now also have the responsibility to make sure their passengers possess
the right documents. This is not entirely new; Torpey, for example, notes that European governments of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries already required steamship companies to check whether individuals had the right to travel to their chosen destinations (1998: 243). Today this happens on a larger scale. For example, Dutch embassies are instructed to cooperate only with a small portion of trustworthy travel agencies (Tweede Kamer 2003: 22), and after 9/11, visa-issuing institutions are instructed to be even more cautious than before about whom they work with (Tweede Kamer 2003: 33).

When external control is no longer perceived as effective, states increasingly turn their attention to internal control (Brochman 1998). In the past two decades, a vast body of laws have come into being in the Netherlands to exclude undocumented migrants from facilities of the welfare state. Chapter seven gives more attention to the general effects of the implementations of these laws. The Benefit Entitlement Act (1998) is a good example of a law that disperses control over different actors. This law states that by linking different administrative systems, state support for ‘illegal immigrants’ can be denied. If someone applies for state benefits but has no legal status, there is the risk of being reported to the alien police. The Benefit Entitlement Act has resulted in private actors, such as teachers, medical doctors, and housing corporation employees, becoming indirectly involved in the control apparatus. However, the implementation of these controls is not always straightforward. On the local level, people may boycott existing policies if they do not consider it their task to report undocumented migrants to the police. In a way, a reverse NIMBY (‘not in my back yard’) mechanism is at work when it comes to ‘illegal’ immigrants and even more so for rejected asylum seekers (Van der Leun 2003). The general public tends to support the tough measures taken against immigration, though people often seem willing to offer support when faced with a case that hits closer to home – for example, if a neighbour is refused asylum and is about to be deported to a war zone area. Moreover, priorities may be diffuse, as people do also benefit from the labour performed by the very rejected asylum seeker or ‘illegal’ immigrant (Anderson & O’Connell Davidson 2003).

1.4 Unintended and undesirable effects of migration control

Sometimes measures taken by governments create unintended or even undesirable effects. This does not necessarily mean that the assumptions on which the policy measures are based are false, but rather, that they are fragmented and fail to grasp the full range of relevant variables (Van Amersfoort 1998). As already stated, an unintended effect
of stricter migration control is that it has reinforced the state’s selection regarding who is allowed to migrate and who is denied access. This system favours immigrants with good educations, specific working skills, or people with familiar cultural backgrounds. Those who do not meet these criteria are apt to find loopholes in the laws, confusing the legal channels through which they ought to enter. This mixing up of categories by migrants may fuel xenophobic arguments and reinforce the idea of migration as a ‘threat’.

Cornelius et al. (1994) note that the gap between the aim for total control and its actual results – more irregular migration – adds pressure to adopt even more restrictive policies. The unintended effect of this is that more restrictions posed on the receiving end might push migrants into the hands of smugglers or even traffickers. As Koslowski has noted: ‘Just as states cooperate to control unwanted migration, unwanted migrants can cooperate as well to form social networks or employ non-state actors, smugglers, to foil restrictions imposed by states’ (2000: 205).

Migrating with help from smugglers or traffickers has all sorts of perverse effects. First of all, it has created a pre-selection of who can migrate because travelling with smugglers and traffickers is costly. Those who have the means to buy their way across borders do not necessarily have the most urgent reasons to flee (Morrison 1998, Van Hear 2004, Doomernik 2004). Second, travelling has become more dangerous. The most recent Report of the Third Meeting of the Commission on Human Security states that international migration, particularly forced migration and irregular movements of persons, creates new insecurities, which are of concern from a human rights perspective (Commission on Human Security Report 2002: 7). No doubt one of the clearest illustrations of the undesirable effect of increased border control is that on, an almost daily basis, immigrants die on Europe’s outer borders. UNITED, a network against racism comprising more than 550 European organisations to support refugees and migrants, has put together a document that lists 6,336 officially recorded victims of Europe’s restrictive immigration policy, from January 1993 until April 2005 (http://www.united.nonprofit.nl/pdfs/deathlist2005.pdf). In fact, the figure is likely far higher because many incidents go unrecorded. And third, when smugglers determine a final destination they do not necessarily do so in the interest of the migrants; this leads to unfortunate outcomes, such as the isolation that results when families are scattered.

Another effect of stricter border control is that it can impact how smuggling and trafficking is organised. However, some disagreement exists over the effects of border control, and what has possibly resulted in a professionalisation of the smuggling business. Some scholars
think that small-scale organisations will increasingly be taken over by the bigger and better-organised. This means that migration processes would, more and more, fall under control of criminal gangs and take on a more organised nature. Others state that small-scale organisations will co-exist with large-scale organisations, the smaller ones being likely embedded in local culture. Chapter two gives a more detailed overview of different viewpoints by academic researchers on human smuggling.

1.5 Migration theory and irregularity: towards a research question

In practice, migration may thus evolve very differently from what it is, in theory, officially aimed at accomplishing. How is this discrepancy between practice and theory incorporated into migration studies? Economic explanations of migration still dominate popular and scholarly thinking on migration. The neoclassical economists conceptualise migration as a cost-benefit decision, with wage level differences cited as crucial explanatory factors. Migrants, in their view, estimate the costs and benefits of moving to various locations before finally settling in a place where they can be more productive and earn more money (Borjas 1989). In 1885, Ravenstein was the first to theorise this economic train of thought in his famous ‘laws of migration’. He saw migration as inseparable from development, arguing that the most important cause for migration was economic differences. In his classification, time and distance dimensions were of high importance, seeing as most migration tended to be across short distance and from agricultural to industrial areas (rural-urban migration).

Lee (1966) has expressed these ideas into the classical push and pull theory. He argues that migration is the result of the interplay of economic factors of attraction in potential destination areas and negative factors in the area of origin. Central to this understanding is the migrant who has self-agency and is assumed to be capable of making simple cost-benefit calculations. However, if we only look at migration from this economic perspective some paradoxes come to light. One is that most people in the world are immobile. Given the huge income differences between the South and the North, this is puzzling; one would expect to see far more people on the move. Another paradox is that migration should not occur in the absence of a wage differential, yet such flows are frequently observed. Additionally, widely occurring patterns of circular migration are hard to explain from this perspective. Why would people return if they could enjoy higher wages in the place they migrate to? (Massey et al. 2002: 11). These paradoxes show that
maximisation of expected income or securing one’s job is neither the only, nor necessarily the most important, motivation for individuals to migrate. Such approaches, therefore, fail to recognise that more than just economic motivations may play a role in migration. Someone may be pulled by economic factors while being pushed by other, non-economic factors. Moreover, this approach ignores the fact that there may also be structural constraints that impact someone’s mobility. It is simplistically assumed that people have a thorough knowledge of the costs and benefits of migration, and that they can move freely without any restrictions. Lee (1996) discusses intervening factors, such as distance, physical barriers, and immigration laws, that all influence the evolution of the migration process. Yet, the way he theorises intermediary structures only produces the conclusion that migration will *not* occur, or it will be *more difficult* if migration laws are restrictive. Such constraints are mainly dealt with as distortions in the market. In this research, a more detailed look is given at how migration processes are affected by these distortions and what this means, concretely, for how migration processes evolve.

At a macro-level, the ‘historical structural approach’ focuses on the structural political economy that has produced global inequalities. In this approach, with intellectual roots in Marxist political economy, individual decisions are bypassed for a focus instead on larger social and historical forces that have led to the unequal distribution of resources and power worldwide. The theory pivots around the political hierarchy of global markets. Wallerstein (1974) used the terms ‘core’ and ‘periphery’ in his ‘world systems theory’. He argues that migration is foremost produced by unequal spatial development between the ‘core’ and the ‘periphery’. Castells (1996) and Sassen (1998), among other theorists inspired by Wallerstein’s work, claim that decisions to migrate cannot only be explained by economic wage differences, but also must be understood around the political origins of these differences. Based on a study among refugees, Zolberg et al. (1989) specifically noted how inequalities in resources and power between different countries, combined with the entry policies of potential immigration countries, put great constraints on the choices migrants have. International migration is therefore a political, not an economic, process arising from the organisation of the world into mutually exclusive sovereign states.

Apart from a division between political and economic ways of viewing migration, there is also heated debate in migration theory about structure and agency. The neoclassical economists are criticised for being overly focused on the micro-level, failing to take into account that individual decisions are influenced by their contexts. Structural theories of migration, on the other hand, usually describe migrants as actors propelled around the world. Giddens (1984) argues in his ‘duality
of structure’ that the ‘traditional’ division between structure and agency is not a satisfactory way of understanding social life and social change. Agency and structure cannot be viewed as two independently given sets of phenomena (Giddens 1984): structure does not operate above or outside the individual, but rather, through the individual.

In migration theory, the ‘new economics approach’ tries to overcome the structure-agency impasse and the dominant economic perspective by integrating different levels of analysis. Scholars taking this approach argue that migrant networks are important to the process of international migration because immigrants do not make their decisions in isolation. An individual’s position within a social structure very much influences his or her taste and preferences, which impacts the decisions that are made. The social network approach, therefore, expands the decision-making scope to larger social units; migrants, potential migrants, return migrants, and non-migrants are all connected through ties of kinship, ethnicity, and friendship. These networks may facilitate or encourage further migration by providing concrete information and assistance to potential migrants (Massey & Espinosa 1997; Portes 1995; Pric 1963). The first migrants who leave may not have social ties to their destination area, but they are the ones who can set in motion a chain effect. They are inevitably linked to non-migrants who may draw upon the obligations implicit in relationships such as kinship, friendship, and community ties to gain access to employment and other forms of assistance. Massey (1994) argues, based on Myrdal’s idea of cumulative causation (1957) that, over time, individual decisions and actions have a cumulative effect that can alter a whole decision-making context. Images of prosperity in the West may, for example, increase incentives to move, especially when individuals are faced with economic hardship or violence. The so-called ‘dream’ to move abroad may even become all-consuming. Some authors have referred to this dreaming as a sort of ‘disease’. Horst, for example, speaks about buufis: the dream of resettlement among Somalis in a refugee camp (2003). Mabrouk (2003) uses the expression ‘Italian Dream’ as something many Tunisian youngsters are ‘infected’ with. This explains why the same set of push or pull factors in different countries can lead to very different migration patterns, and why there are clear migration systems between specific countries (Kritz et al. 1992).

However, currently there is an emergence of ‘new geographies of migration’ (Koser & Pinkerton 2002): the arrival of migrants to places with which they or their countries of origin have no previous links. This new migration pattern may indeed be a reflection of the fact that these migrants are merely newcomers, but it may also give insight as to why smugglers, as well as migrants, could have other considerations for choosing a specific destination. Moreover, policy measures may
have an impact on the decisions smugglers and migrants make. Therefore, the social network approach is not a completely satisfactory explanation, for this theory only focuses on the enabling characteristics of social networks; it ignores the fact that people may be constrained in their mobility.

This present research questions the free movement assumption underlying the social network approach. Migrants, who for all sorts of reasons cannot rely on contacts abroad, may contact recruitment agencies or smugglers that help migrants overcome border restrictions. In the next chapter, these service providers will be further analysed. The central question of the research then is: what does it mean for the evolution of the migration process if people’s mobility is so constrained, and they need to utilise the services of intermediaries, such as smugglers? Sub-questions include: why do people need smugglers in the first place? What does the decision-making process look like, and how do smuggled migrants exert power in negotiations with their smugglers? After having examined this duality in structure, I hope to be able to present different types of smuggling based on different outcomes of the smuggling process.

Conclusion

In principle, the creation of nation-states has given countries the ability to import migrants according to their own whims: when, from where, in what quantity and even for how long a duration. There are several channels through which states accept immigrants. However, the perception of a state’s ability to control migration diminished when immigrants started to come from places with which no prior links existed. A view of state control became further blurred when immigrants tried to find ways to ‘accommodate’ to the system, thus making it harder to judge who was entering the country for what reason.

This breakdown of a regime in which there was a strong belief in the state’s capacity to control migration has created a paradoxical situation, the Janus face of migration. On the one hand, there is still a firm belief in the free mobility of people, information, and capital goods; yet on the other hand, immigration from Third World countries is perceived as an uncontrollable threat. In contrast with the deregulation of trade and finance, migration processes are thus becoming increasingly selective and restrictive. The entrance channel of asylum is an exception in the sense that states have an obligation under international law to protect and accept refugees so they cannot manage asylum in the same way as they try to manage other forms of migration. Restrictions on other entrance options, however, have increased pressure on the asylum system, making it hard to manage anyway.
Another clear consequence of this hammering down on admission channels is the recent development of a vast market of intermediaries who arrange migration opportunities for those who cannot travel through legal means. The next chapter devotes more attention to these new intermediaries in the field of migration.
2 New intermediate structures in response to restrictive admission policies

Chapter one described the mismatch between, on the one hand, increasing mobility, and on the other hand, a tightening of the rules of admission. In migration literature, links between countries of origin and countries of destination are usually called the ‘intermediate structure’. Van Amersfoort (1998) distinguishes three separate elements of the intermediate structure. First of all, there are technical means for transport and connection, such as airlines, airport, shipping lines, and harbours. In the globalised world, distance has lost much of its meaning seeing as transportation’s infrastructure has improved, and almost all places in the world are linked to one other. The second element refers to those resources needed for individuals to effectively utilise transport links, such as information and/or money. The third element of the intermediate structure is put in place by political or legal authorities: travel and residency regulations and requirements such as passports, visas, etc. According to the general discourse, no migration should exist between countries that have implemented strong restrictions. However, in reality, the discrepancy between an increased desire to migrate and the restrictions of receiving countries has given free play to smugglers and all sorts of institutions providing alternatives for people who want to cross the border, without regard for legal limitations. More mobility combined with greater restrictions has meant more breaches of law.

Goss & Lindquist (1995) have called these intermediate structures ‘migrant institutions’. These are a complex articulation of rules and resources that present constraints and opportunities to individual action (Goss & Lindquist 1995: 345). Asia is especially renowned for a large infrastructure of recruitment agencies that send people abroad (Kuptsch 2006). Depending on the individual country’s perspective, they are referred to in various terms, such as ‘migrant exporting schemes’12 or ‘slave-importing schemes’13 (Kyle & Dale 2001). Sassen (2003) uses the more general expression of ‘counter geographies of globalization’. ‘Counter geographies of globalization’ include the illegal trafficking of people for the sex industry and other types of formal and informal labour, which have become an important source of hard currency for governments in receiving countries (Sassen 2003: 5)
Apart from arranging labour migration, these brokers and institutions also make it possible for all sorts of other migrants, including asylum seekers, to cross borders. These institutions can be seen as structural complements to migrant networks, indicating that interpersonal ties (social networks) are not the only means to perpetuate international movement. One could say that smugglers, as well as the institutions that facilitate smuggling and trafficking, are the new intermediate structures that help transcend state-drawn boundaries. In this line of reasoning, these institutions serve as another form of social capital that people can draw upon. Studying this mid-level concept beyond the sum of individual relations is useful for understanding the emergence of new ‘geographies of migration.’ It also allows for a better understanding of how structure and agency interact.

This chapter presents the theoretical framework for building a typology of different forms of smuggling. In chapter six, the final typology will be presented, after having linked the initial framework to the collected empirical material. Questions that underlie the typology are: what different organisational forms can be distinguished? What does it mean for the migration outcome to travel with a specific type of smuggler? And are migrants in a position to exert power over the decisions made? The discourse surrounding human smuggling and the term ‘human smuggling’ itself will also be critically examined. Should we always define helping someone across a border as ‘human smuggling’, even when there is no request for money involved? And what exactly is the difference between smuggling and trafficking?

2.1 Legal definitions of human smuggling

Assistance for migrants who are officially prohibited from migrating through legal channels is not new. For example, parts of guest worker migration to Northern European countries in the 1960s occurred outside the regulatory system (Berger & Mohr 1975). A clear difference, however, is that these immigrants usually could regularise their status once they had arrived and found a job. Such forms of migration thus took the same form, more or less, as legal migration processes. The context in which assistance occurs today is different. Most immigrants who enter through ‘illegal’ channels do not have the opportunity to regularise their situation, which also makes their entrance all the more problematic. Many of the ‘spontaneous’ immigrants who enter through unofficial channels today are classified as ‘illegal’ immigrants, with little prospect of lifting this label and remedying situation. Since the early 1990s, the term ‘smuggling’ has been used in reference to ‘illegal’ forms of assistance, with growing resources being devoted to ‘com-
bat’ the phenomenon. Human smuggling became part of many European countries’ penal systems after a provision in the Schengen Agreement harmonised smuggling penalties at the European level. In the Netherlands, since 31 December 1993, human smuggling has been considered a crime in Dutch penal code. Article 197a states:

A person who, for motives of pecuniary gain, assists another person in gaining entry to the Netherlands or in remaining in the Netherlands or in gaining entry to or in remaining in any state whose obligation it is to exercise border control also on behalf of the Netherlands, or who, for motives of pecuniary gain, supplies that person with the opportunity, means or information for that purpose, where he knows or has serious reason to suspect that that person’s gaining entry or remaining is unlawful, is liable to a term of imprisonment of no more than four years or a fine of the fifth category.

In 1996, the minimum penalty for human smuggling was raised from one to four years. For an act that is committed by someone in a professional capacity the maximum penalty has been raised to six years of imprisonment and/or dismissal from office. If someone makes a profession of smuggling, or does it in some organised way, the maximum penalty is doubled to eight years of imprisonment. This increase in punishment also widens the possibilities for the police to detect smugglers. In practice, however, it remains difficult to prove that a profit has been made on the act of smuggling, not least because it is difficult to find witnesses ready to testify against their smuggler (Slobbe & Kuipers 1999).

In 2000, strengthening the penal framework of smuggling was put high on the European Council’s agenda. Its delegations, however, had very different views on what constitutes ‘humanitarian’ grounds for the smuggling of asylum seekers. The definition of ‘help’ in the Council Directive does not specify doing so for ‘financial gain’, meaning that any ‘helper’ can fall under the classification, regardless of their personal, non-profitable motivations. The adopted humanitarian clause says that member states shall not be obliged to impose such penalties if they are not in keeping with national legislation (ECRE 2001). Member states may thus decide not to sanction individuals acting for humanitarian reasons, though they may also decide to do so if they wish. This EU decision made it easier for the Dutch government to remove the profit-making element from the smuggling definition. Initially, pecuniary gain was included in the Dutch definition of smuggling in order to prevent those who help people exit a country for humanitarian reasons from falling within the definition of human smuggling.
On 1 January 2005, the Netherlands enforced a new rule, listed as Article 197a, in which the profit-making element was completely removed from the definition of smuggling (it remained intact, however, for assisting ‘illegal’ stay). Smuggling for non-profit goals now also became punishable, meaning that smugglers with political or religious motivations could also be sentenced under this new article pertaining to the transportation of people across borders.

2.2 The difference between smuggling and trafficking

When the UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime was adopted, two separate Protocols – one on smuggling and one on trafficking – made a clear distinction between the two phenomena. The definition of smuggling comprises three important elements. First, it requires a smuggler or intermediary who undertakes the job of facilitating the cross-border movement. Second, it involves a payment to the smuggler by the migrant or someone paying on his/her behalf. Third, the migrant’s choice to participate in the transaction is voluntary. The Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Air and Sea (2000) defines smuggling as follows:

Smuggling of migrants shall mean the intentional procurement for profit for ‘illegal’ entry of a person into and/or ‘illegal’ residence in a state of which the person is not a national or permanent resident.

The Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking Persons defines trafficking as follows:

Trafficking in persons means the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, either by the threat or use of abduction, force, fraud, deception or coercion, or by the giving or receiving of unlawful payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having the control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.

Three separate elements are key to the definition of trafficking. The first is the criminal act: recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring, or reception of persons. The second is the means used to commit such acts: threat or use of force, coercion, abduction, fraud, deception,
abuse of power or vulnerability, or giving payments or benefits to a person in control of the victim. Finally, the third element refers to motives for trafficking: sexual exploitation, forced labour, slavery or similar practices, and even the removal of organs (Aronowitz 2001). For a long time, trafficking was only related to prostitution, but since the UN Protocol came into being, the definition has been extended to incorporate exploitation in all sectors of the economy. In fact, expanding the definition of trafficking was required in order for Dutch national legislation to meet international obligations. Entering into force on 1 January 2005, Article 273a in the Penal code replaced Article 250. According to this new article, all forms of labour exploitation – sexual as well as socio-economic – are criminalised under one provision and labelled as the trafficking of human beings.

Smuggling and trafficking are mostly distinguished by the fact that the latter implies the involvement of victims, but smuggling does not. In terms of smuggling, emphasis is placed on the ‘illegal’ movements of migrants across international borders. For trafficking, border crossing is not, by definition, necessary; the focus falls instead on coercion and exploitation. Smuggled migrants are considered more or less free to enter the process, while trafficked migrants are not. As such, definitions of smuggling and trafficking are based on the assumption that there is a clear-cut demarcation between voluntary and involuntary processes of migration.

In practice, however, the distinction between smuggling and trafficking is not always easy to make. There are clear cases of smuggling in which a fee has been mutually agreed upon, and there are clear cases of trafficking in which someone is kidnapped and trafficked completely unwillingly. But the majority of migration strategies, being much more complex, defy easy categorisations. For example, it is very probable that some trafficked prostitutes leave their country of origin in full self-consent, as a strategic action to improve their situation (Andrijasevic 2004). It is therefore not helpful to view trafficked migrants exclusively as having migrated against their own wills and smuggled migrants as the opposite. Migrants, in general, often face few choices when fleeing persecution and/or social and economic insecurity. Smuggled migrants may be punished, tortured, or taken hostage by their smugglers while in transit, thus defying the demarcation of what would otherwise be considered voluntary in this category (Gallagher 2002).

A problem with the UN’s trafficking definition is that no explicit definition of exploitation or ‘slavery-like’ conditions is given, thus leaving these terms open for interpretation (Van der Leun & Vervoorn 2004, Van Liempt 2006a). This lack of clear criteria also hinders the identification of nuances between different types of trafficked persons. This is
needed especially when the definition is broadened to sectors other than prostitution.

### 2.3 The discourse surrounding human smuggling and smugglers

Apart from the fact that smuggling is criminalised by law, the official state perspective is also spurred on by images of smuggling as portrayed and discussed in the media. The image of the modern-day smuggler often conjures images of ‘the mafia’, without actually defining what is meant by it. Smuggling is usually seen as a criminal activity pursued by triadic organisations that may also be involved in criminal businesses other than just smuggling people. Moreover, smugglers are often referred to as merciless criminals who charge exorbitant prices, send people off on their own in faulty ships, abandon them at open sea, and may even be prepared to throw children overboard as a threat to the coast guard.

This last image of throwing children overboard is sometimes also used for reverse reasons, to criminalise smuggled migrants. After the 2001 Tampa Boat Incident in Australia, in which asylum seekers on board were accused of having thrown their own children overboard, Prime Minister John Howard reacted with the following words: ‘I can't comprehend how genuine refugees would throw their children overboard.’ After the election, it became clear that no child was thrown overboard and that this story had been expressly used by the media to feed the image of ‘bogus’ asylum seekers and ‘economic’, rather than political, asylum seekers (www.truthoverboard.com/story1.html).

Mountz (2003) describes a similar shift in the discourse on immigration in Canada that occurred after several boat arrivals in 1999. She criticises the process of identity construction by the state. Apart from using words such as ‘bogus’ or ‘economic’ in reference to immigrants, she points to the fact that there was even a separate category created: ‘boat migrants’. The category distinguished these specific smuggled migrants from those who entered Canada by other means. Entrance via boat was assumed to signal not having legitimate reasons for entering the country, and ‘boat migrants’ were identified, along with their smugglers, as criminals. Research confirms that asylum seekers discovered in connection with smuggling are sometimes labelled ‘bogus’, only because they have entered the country through ‘illegal’ channels (see also Koser 2000). Smuggling is for the same reason often conflated with, or put on the same plane as, trafficking. What’s more, the word ‘trafficking’ arouses a more emotive response from the media.
and the public, thereby justifying the tougher measures to combat and criminalise it.

2.4 The research on human smuggling

It is not only policymakers and journalists who are caught up in stereotypes and rigid categorical thinking. Research on human smuggling often adopts a strong focus on criminal and economic perspective (Salt & Hogarth 2000), even though human smuggling is a phenomenon that spans many more fields and can be looked at from various angles.

Smuggling as a ‘business’

The British geographers Salt & Stein (1997) were the first to frame migration as a ‘business’. A valuable contribution of their model comes through viewing smuggling from the perspective of the country of origin, the process in transit, and the country of destination. The different services offered in the smuggling process are also divided into three phases that offer an inside perspective to the various services offered by smugglers: mobilisation, en route, and insertion. Mobilising people for the business of smuggling characterises the first phase. Some who work in the smuggling business have the only responsibility of bringing migrants in contact with smugglers. These so-called ‘recruiters’ have contact with the actual transporters, such as sailors or lorry drivers who, in the next phase, actually conduct the business transaction. Recruiters try to persuade migrants to come along with a specific smuggler. In the second phase, the actual movement takes place. If smugglers do not provide documents themselves, they usually know border-crossing points where they can point their clients to in a clandestine way. Recruiters might, in such a scenario, advise people on what to bring or – often more importantly – what not to bring. The amount of luggage must be as minimal as possible. En route, there are other people whose business is to offer shelter, sell new documents, or keep a close eye on the border passages. In the final phase of the smuggling process, the migrant may not only be assisted in entering the country of destination, but also advised on the asylum procedure, guided as to where to find housing, or introduced into the labour market.

The acknowledgement that smuggling comprises different stages is furthered by Salt & Stein’s (1997) statement that countries of origin, transit, and destination all try to find different ways to control migration within their own economic structures. That is, national governments are at work to control business as a means of investing in valu-
able returns. ‘Illegal migration’ is defined as ‘a system of institutionalised networks with complex profit and loss accountants, including a set of institutions, agents and individuals each of which stands to make commercial gain (Salt & Stein 1997: 468). Chapter one raised the criticism that most migration theory is only based on economic perspectives and does not consider migrants’ self-agency. The same critique can be made of this ‘business’ model; it does not provide for the possibility that migrants may have other motives for contacting smugglers, and that involvement in smuggling does not necessarily mean ‘business’. For example, family members, political parties, and churches may be involved in helping people cross borders as an alternative to legal travel options. In some studies, smugglers are seen as being part of, or as extensions and substitutes to, migrants’ social networks (Koser 1997; Staring 2001). Moreover, from the ‘business’ point-of-view, smuggled migrants are seen as actively choosing to follow ‘illegal’ practices, and are, for this reason, often classified as ‘criminal’ too. This may have a severe impact on the way human smuggling is portrayed, understood, and discussed.

**Smuggling as a ‘crime’**

From the moment smuggling was punishable and perceived as a threat, criminological studies appeared more and more on the topic of smuggling. These studies are usually based on police files and criminal court proceedings, primarily focusing on discovering who the smugglers are, how they operate, and whether or not organised crime is involved (Aronowitz 2001; Kleemans et al. 1998; Kleemans & Brienen 2001; Kleemans & Van de Bunt 2003; Neske 2006, Schloenhardt 2001, 2003; Soudijn 2006; Staring et al. 2005). Opinions are divided on the exact involvement of organised crime in human smuggling. A problem with measuring organised crime is that it is difficult to come up with completely exclusive criteria. As a result, the definition of organised crime is still a source of controversy among researchers and international organisations as there is no consensus on what criteria to use. The Expert Group on Organised Crime of the European Commission, for example, calls collaboration of three or more people ‘organised’, while Europol cites two or more. Whatever the case, any collaboration of people together doing something ‘illegal’ – and profiting from it – can be referred to as organised crime.

Based on interviews with smugglers and smuggled migrants, Chin (1999) and Zhang & Gaylord (1996) state that even for Chinese smuggling, which is often associated with organised crime, there are hardly any ‘gangs’ that control or implement the entire migration journey, from country of origin to that of destination. According to their re-
search, smuggling is performed by loose coalitions of local organisations with specific expertise, working together on an ad hoc and bilateral basis. But seeing as the research is based on interviews with smuggled migrants and smugglers themselves, there may be a bias in the findings; it is possible that people belonging to – or having been smuggled by – large criminal networks may not be willing to speak openly about it. However, authors of a publication based on the 1998 Dutch Monitor on Organized Crime\textsuperscript{16} also come to the conclusion that organisations involved in human smuggling are less hierarchical, permanent, or clear-cut than usually assumed. Most smugglers work together in several loose organisations, without one person serving as leader, and these organisations are dynamic in the sense that people easily work together with others (Kleemans et al. 1998). Smugglers are thus not necessarily dependent on one central figure, but, more informally, ‘know someone who knows someone’ they can work with.

The ethnic background of smugglers usually interests researchers in the criminological field, for it is suggested that particular ethnic groups are better at certain criminal acts. Ethnicity as such is used to explain the differentials in crime rates and types of crime. Exotic features, such as initiation rites with the use of voodoo by Nigerian traffickers (Van Dijk et al. 2000) or specific use of violence among Chinese criminal gangs, are cited as expressions of a natural cultural habitus. In this regard, smugglers are seen as static categories. Critical criminologists are of the opinion, however, that instead of studying opportunity structures for crime, most criminologists operate as though ethnicity represents an independently compelling force affecting crime patterns (Bovenkerk et al. 2003: 36). Research shows that different ethnic groups also work together. Most of the time, the ethnicity of the smugglers simply reflects the countries through which smuggling operations pass. A study based on an analysis of 88 Chinese smuggling court cases in the Netherlands affirms this finding. That many Western smugglers are involved in transporting Chinese migrants is explained by Soudijn (2006) as being due to the fact that different stages of the smuggling process are taken care of by different smugglers, not necessarily all linked to each other. Chinese smugglers often lack the contacts, skills, and knowledge, and therefore have to rely on ‘outsiders’. Western transporters are ideal because they attract less attention.

\textit{Smuggling as an ‘illegal’, yet licit, activity}

The literature on smuggling greatly lacks the voice of the migrant, as well as the voice of the smuggler. As we have already seen, smuggled migrants are usually seen as passive migrants who are recruited by their smugglers and have nothing to say within the process. And
smugglers are seen as ‘criminals’, usually acting consistent with their ethnic backgrounds. In general, there is little space for a broader, more socially embedded understanding of the phenomenon of human smuggling, even in spite of the sociological studies that have been conducted on interviews with smuggled migrants and smugglers. These studies provide a larger and more socially contextualised picture of who the smugglers are and why the migrants need them.

In another example, Zhang & Chin (2002) interviewed 129 individuals working in the human smuggling business in New York, Los Angeles, and Fuzhou. They found that most smugglers were men, in their thirties and forties, with a high school education, and the majority were self-employed or unemployed. They represented ordinary citizens (such as restaurant owners, car salesmen, barbers, and waiters) and most were desperate for some extra money. This is consistent with Spener’s conclusion (2004) drawn on interviews with smugglers at the Mexican-US border. He found that nearly all smugglers were working-class Mexicans. Something that is often forgotten in discussions on the subject is that smuggling may very well be part of a local culture. For example, most of the Moroccan and Tunisian fishermen who now work in smuggling are doing so only after having lost their jobs, in part due to European regulations, and in part, because their governments already sold their fish quotas to Spain and Italy (Mabrouk, 2003). The former fishermen now exploit their expertise by bringing people across in their *pateras*. And although they take their chances in the smuggling business, they are not necessarily connected to other smugglers or to serious criminals. In this regard, smugglers may even be seen as a discrete form of resistance to the dominant mode of globalisation (Mittelman 2000: 210).

As Zhang and Chin (2003) argue, it is not necessary to have large-scale criminal organisations involved in smuggling; the practice is a consensual affair and migrants are willing to let themselves be smuggled, simply because there are no alternatives. For the smugglers, it is important that people are transported successfully not only to earn money, but also to preserve their good reputation (Bilger et al. 2006, Van Liempt 2006b). Smugglers depend on stories of their successes to keep the business going. Another interesting point is that a link to the mafia or involvement in organised crime is not necessarily an advantage; it is even better for smugglers to have the reputation of ‘helper’, not criminal. Who would deliberately want to migrate through a violent criminal organisation? Usually people try to avoid smugglers who are only in the business for money; they deliberately look for smugglers who have other reasons for being involved, or at least make it seem so. Chapter six devotes more attention to how smugglers and migrants re-
late to each other and how migrants perceive and talk about their smugglers.

To better understand who the smugglers are, it is necessary to go beyond state-defined categories of who and what is defined to be criminal or non-criminal. Some literature, for example, views the smuggling and trafficking of refugees as a response to humanitarian needs (Morrison & Crosland 2000). The distinction between licit and illicit also seems very helpful in this case. These terms do not refer to the state, but to social perceptions of activities that are defined as criminal by the state (Van Schendel & Itty 2005). This broader look will be central to the whole study, and the definitions used will go beyond legal and criminal discourses. The introduction of this book already explained the broader definition of human smuggling that will be further employed in this research. It is easier to understand how people have travelled, under what circumstances, and with what intentions, without specifically labelling them or their voyages as legal or ‘illegal’. Many people nowadays travel under categorical headings, but with other intentions, thus complicating the separation of legal versus ‘illegal’ forms of migration. For example, if an individual travels as the musician of a famous folk group, but knows beforehand that he will ‘abandon’ his group to stay abroad, then it is his intention that would come under critical view.

2.5 Towards a typology of different types of smuggling and trafficking

In IOM’s first study on trafficking dating from 1994, a first attempt was made to come up with a typology of trafficking organisations (IOM 1994). At that time, no legal distinction was made between smuggling and trafficking. Based on the geographical area covered by smugglers (measured according to the number of borders crossed) and how they work together with others, three different organisational forms were identified. The first type was called the occasional trafficker. Van Dijk (2002) calls this the freelance criminal or the soloist. He or she is an amateur who usually works in a regional context, provides services at specific border crossing points, is not part of a larger organisation, and has no overview of the rest of the process. The second type is the small-scale network, a well-organised group that focuses on two or more countries, and often uses similar routes, or is specialised in a specific part of the process. Examples of these specialisations involve recruiting people, arranging documents, or in the case of trafficking, bringing people into specific segments of the labour market.
The third type, the large-scale network, is an organised international network that consists of many people providing wide-ranging services along the whole route; it is flexible, and might be part of a broader criminal network involved in activities other than just smuggling (IOM 1994). The difference between the second and the third types is that the latter has a manager on top and that all phases of the smuggling process are connected to each other. Chin (1999), in his book *Smuggled Chinese*, makes a distinction between ‘Big Snakeheads’ and ‘Little Snakeheads’. Big Snakeheads are organisers, who are often Chinese immigrants living abroad. They are usually not known by those being smuggled and hold a position at the top. Little Snakeheads (recruiters, guides, transporters, corrupt officials, and debt collectors) work as middlemen between Big Snakeheads and their clients. In his research on Polish smuggling, Okólski (2000) uses the ‘The Brain’. ‘The Brain’ looks at the entire route and its security. Complications in classification arise when it is acknowledged that alliances between organisers and those actually performing the job may be fluid, and that people may work for several organisations simultaneously.

**Adding the perspective of the migrant**

When the migrant, as an actor, is incorporated, the classification of different types of smuggling becomes even more complicated. Migrants may suddenly decide, en route, to contact another smuggler, or leave one they deem untrustworthy. Migrants may also cover one part of the trajectory on their own, without smugglers, if they are sufficiently informed about the route. As such, it is not only how smugglers work together, but also the decision-making process of migrants that matters. The role of information seems crucial in this regard. Because smuggling is a covert activity, migrants often have very little information to decide with whom they will travel best. Some people know smugglers personally, others have to ask around, and others are forced to seek out places where smugglers offer their services. The amount of time available to become familiarised with the smuggling market is also of importance. For example, asylum seekers leaving a country in a hurry have fewer opportunities to choose a smuggler they trust than those who have more time to prepare their travel.

A good illustration of how smugglers profit from migrants who did not have time to familiarise themselves with their migrational options is the so-called ‘Izmir trick’. In the Turkish coastal city of Antalya smugglers approach new migrants, or transfer clients who were apprehended, sent back and want to try again. When evening falls, the smugglers board the migrants on a ship and after a night of crossing, by early morning, instruct them to jump off the boat in what they are
told is Italy. After reaching land, they are told, they will find a police of-

cifice some kilometres down the road where they can ask for asylum.

However, after some walking, the migrants observe people speaking

Turkish or hear the call for prayer and realise they are back in Izmir,

Turkey. By this time, the smugglers have already begun their way to-

wards Antalya (Godfroid & Vinckx 1999: 82-83). Hence, it is not only

size and composition of the network, but also its quality – defined by

trust – that impacts the smuggling process. Migrants who are betrayed

by certain smugglers can pass this information onto other migrants

who, in turn, can then decide not to contact such a smuggler. This rela-

tive power that migrants hold within the smuggling and trafficking

process seems of most importance when we look at smuggling purely

from a migrant’s point of view. It is crucial to answer, therefore, the

question of whether the migrant is in position to exert such power in

smuggling and trafficking processes (Van Liempt 2006b).

In order to answer this question, account must be taken of the de-

grees of dependency on the smuggler and the level of agency that may
differ throughout. What can start as a legal migration process may very

well end up as smuggling or trafficking. Such is the case when some-

one travels on a temporary visa, but, upon arrival, is taken hostage and

forced to work to pay back his or her debts. A smuggling process may

also turn into a trafficking process when migrants are exploited or mal-
treated by their smuggler during their travel or while in transit. This
could push them across the fine line separating smuggling from traf-

ficking. Figure one shows the dynamics in smuggling and trafficking

processes in terms of degrees of dependency.

![Figure 1: The dynamics of degrees of dependency in smuggling and trafficking processes](image)

Apart from the fact that the distinction between smuggling and traf-
ficking is, in practice, sometimes difficult to make, within the classifi-
cation of smuggling there are also discrepancies. Various types of
smuggling seem to be characterised by different degrees of autonomy.
Related to this is the question of reputation and trust. If someone is
helped through one’s network, or is smuggled by the aid of ‘a friend of
a friend’, the process will probably evolve differently than if someone is smuggled by an anonymous professional smuggler.

In the US there is a longer tradition of research on what is referred to as ‘undocumented’ migration (Nevins 2002; Cornelius et al. 1994; Singer & Massey 1998; Hagan 1994; Durand & Massey 2004; Andreas 2000; Eschbach et al. 2001). The Mexican Migration Project is one example of the tradition of rich research on undocumented migration on the Mexican/US border. This multidisciplinary research project by investigators in Mexico and the US comprises a unique database of 107 communities, with surveys of more than 17,000 households in Mexico and over 800 in the US. In contrast to studies that only focus on the activities of border control authorities, or solely take into account the considerations of migrants, Singer & Massey (1998) explain how the interaction between migrants, the border police, and the ‘coyotes’ takes place. They view clandestine border crossing as a well-defined social process whereby migrants draw upon various sources of human and social capital to overcome barriers erected by the authorities. A similar, integrative approach that acknowledges migrants’ agency, possible governmental interventions in the migration process, and interactions between the two will also be central to this study on migrants smuggled into the Netherlands.

Conclusion

Human smuggling is a complex phenomenon and understanding it is very much dominated by external projections. The context in which smuggling is framed has changed rapidly since the beginning of the 1990s, when immigration control became more of a pressing issue. In chapter one, it was shown that a high numbers of asylum seekers, mainly from unexpected places in the world, has led to tougher border controls and presumptions that smuggling has created possibilities for the ‘uninvited’. Later, the focus was placed on huge profits made by smugglers. And after some serious high-profile accidents fed the image of smugglers as unscrupulous mafia types, the paradigm shifted to smuggling as an act of transnational crime. The UN Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants is a supplement to the UN Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime, focusing on repressive measures against ‘illegal migration’ and ‘organised crime’ while doing relatively little to secure migrant rights. Shifts in the paradigm are exemplified by this convention, as well as rising penalties and the removal of the humanitarian clause in the Dutch penal code’s smuggling article.

Some research on smuggling is also driven by the interest of law enforcement, and specifically aims at understanding how the ‘criminal
business’ works. Others view it more as an economic affair. But in both approaches, migrants are seen as passive actors. The present research includes the possible strategic actions taken by migrants themselves, as well as their interactions with smugglers. Furthermore, most migration theories are one-sided: they either focus on motives for migration in the country of origin, or on integration in countries of destination. There is a frequent failure to link what happens in between to what happened before or after migration. This research seeks to develop tools to study migration in a more dynamic way. It incorporates different phases of the migration process and focuses on the decision-making process of migrants along its many phases. This research will go beyond legal and criminal discourses to use a broader definition of smuggling that covers a whole spectrum, from smuggling-as-altruism to smuggling-as–organised-crime. When a legal framework alone is used as a starting point for research, it becomes impossible to include those cases of smuggling in which a migrant’s status drifts in and out of legality. In order to sketch the broader picture, a comprehensive approach has been taken with a focus on three different regions where smuggling methods differ substantially. The next chapter explains this study’s research methodology in more detail.
3 Conducting research among smuggled migrants: an inside perspective

In this research, smuggling will be looked at from an inside perspective. Even though smuggling has received strong attention from the media, policymakers, and scholars, migrant accounts are rarely featured as the primary source of information about smuggling. Personal stories will reveal what it is like to be smuggled, something hardly ever heard about. The starting point of this research is a migrant’s self-agency, as also specified in the approach of Giddens (1984), who claims that people are not ruled by society, but have agency even when their options are limited. The central question of the research is: what does it mean for the evolution of the migration process if people are constrained in their mobility, and therefore need to make use of the services of intermediaries, such as smugglers? Sub-questions are: why do people need smugglers? What does the decision-making process look like? How do smuggled migrants exert power in negotiations with their smuggler? And what different types of smuggling can be identified in relation to the migrant’s role in deciding the final destination?

Spending time with individuals and showing interest in their experiences makes it easier to collect sensitive data. Adopting the agency perspective also shows that migrants do not only suffer from the obstacles they face, but that they can also proactively exploit these constraints. As such, smuggled migrants, especially asylum seekers, may deliberately align themselves with certain preconceived notions. For example, during their asylum hearings they may allude to wars that have been made known in the West, or to simplistic views of being a minority in a certain country. In every qualitative research study, self-presentation is an issue, but when self-presentation is part of strategic behaviour, it puts extra pressure on the story people tell and may therefore affect the data-collecting process. This chapter will first examine official data on human smuggling in the Netherlands. It will then move onto the issue of self-presentation, as well as other methodological issues encountered during fieldwork with vulnerable people speaking about ‘illegal’ activities.
3.1 Data available on human smuggling in the Netherlands and its limitations

Salt & Hogarth (2000) have evaluated several studies to estimate the amount of irregular migrants and the role of smugglers within irregular migration. They come to the conclusion that most data on this topic are unreliable, and there is plenty of sensational reporting. Just as in other countries, the Netherlands has a clear lack of data on smuggling. The most obvious reason has to do with the ‘illegal’ character of smuggling; it is not talked about openly and in most cases, is not even ‘registered’. Another reason is that smuggling into Europe is a relatively new phenomenon, which also means data has only recently become available.

Data from the police and the public prosecutor

The Royal Marechaussee (KMAR) is responsible for guarding the Dutch border and, as such, may reveal incidents of human smuggling in the Netherlands. They carry out gate-controls at airports where immigrants are refused, often due to missing documents. A large proportion of those refused at the gates of Schiphol Airport, in Amsterdam, ask for asylum on the spot. In 2000, there were controls of 4,659 flights at the gates of Schiphol: 1,122 people were refused and 866 immediately applied for asylum. In 2001, out of 4,205 controls, 572 were refused and 374 asked for asylum at the gate (IAM 2002: 80). But, of course, these numbers do not cover all smuggling cases. It is unknown how many smuggled migrants pass through without being caught. Furthermore, not all smuggled migrants who arrive by plane come directly to Schiphol; some fly into Brussels or Frankfurt to be picked up by someone with a car, thus technically entering the Netherlands via land.

The fact that Schiphol is a better controlled facility than the Netherlands’ various border crossing points on land may also cause biases in the data on smuggling. For example, very little is known about the role Dutch harbours play in smuggling processes. A representative of the Dutch Unit Human Smuggling (UMS) claimed in an interview that the Rotterdam harbour is not significant for human smuggling to the Netherlands (expert interview 17/12/2002; see appendix I). However, it is not clear exactly how many smuggled migrants enter via Dutch harbours. In 2001, the Immigration and Naturalisation Service published a report stating that 91 per cent of Guinean asylum seekers claim to have entered the Netherlands by boat. Claims to also have travelled this way are recorded at 35 per cent for Liberia and 34 per cent for Sierra Leone (IND 2001). The Immigration and Naturalisation Service doubts
these findings, deeming it implausible that so many people sneak through the well-secured ports of the Netherlands. They suggest that immigrants use this story to prevent their being sent back to the original EU country they first arrived to, as the Dublin Regulation would otherwise stipulate (see also Van Wijk 2003). Yet, there is high-density traffic between West Africa and Europe. Chelpi (2005) found that shipping lines between West Africa and the Netherlands are frequently used and have even increased over time. For the Amsterdam port alone, there are five shipping agents that operate in West Africa. One shipping agent has fourteen boats that travel between West Africa and the Netherlands on a regular basis, making between four and eight connections a month (Chelpi 2005: 55). It is a known fact that Dutch harbours are used for smuggling migrants out, making it seem plausible that they would also be used for smuggling migrants in. Figures from the Royal Marechaussee confirm that ‘illegal’ immigrants are caught in Dutch harbours on a frequent basis. In 2001, 564 people were found hiding in trailers and apprehended in the Rotterdam harbour (Expertise Centrum Haven 2002). In 2004, 447 ‘illegal aliens’ were detected in trailers in the smaller harbours of Vlissingen, Hoek van Holland, and Scheveningen, where ships were destined for the UK.

Apart from collecting quantitative data on apprehensions, the Royal Marechaussee also conducts criminal investigations, which are led by the public prosecutor and give insight into how smugglers operate. The first official report on human smuggling in the Netherlands dates from 1996. It was written by the Special Prosecutor against Human Smuggling, who was appointed the year before, to help coordinate information on human smuggling gathered by several institutions. The report, ‘Plan Van Aanpak Mensensmokkel’ [‘Approach to Human Smuggling’] is mainly based on the annual ‘Criminaliteitsbeeldanalyse’ [‘Criminality Analysis’] in which 867 smuggling incidents were registered during the period between November 1994 and April 1995. In 1997, the Taskforce on Human Smuggling was set up to coordinate information exchange between different institutions and to increase the law enforcement capacity to control smuggling. The Information and Analysis center on Human smuggling (IAM) was part of this taskforce, having been established to collect, analyse, and provide data on smuggling. The information derived from these sources is clearly aimed at the offenders. Recent works have been published based on data derived from these smuggling cases (Soudijn 2006; Staring et al. 2005).

Data from the Immigration and Naturalisation Service (IND)

Since the beginning of the 1990s, it became increasingly apparent that asylum seekers were, on a large scale, using human smugglers to enter
the Netherlands. Hesseling and Taselaar (2001) have come to estimate that, of all asylum seekers to the Netherlands, between 10 per cent and 60 per cent, varying according to ethnic group, have used smugglers. Only 10 per cent of West African asylum seekers, for example, claimed to have been smuggled. The definition of human smuggling employed is ‘someone who has entered the Netherlands without valid travel documents, is assisted by a travel agent, and has paid a sum of money for this assistance (Hesseling & Taselaar 2001: 15). When the definition of smuggling is widened to include all types of third-party assistance, including that of a non-profit nature, the statistics increase significantly. The table produced by Immigration and Naturalization Service is misleading in its apparent preciseness as the percentages are not rounded, with numbers even given in the tenth’s place. Nevertheless, what remains clear is that most asylum seekers in the Netherlands – on average, 95 per cent of asylum applicants – claim to have been smuggled at some stage during their migration process.

Table 1: The use of smugglers by asylum applicants in 1999, per stage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Country of origin</th>
<th>During travel</th>
<th>In the Netherlands</th>
<th>Unknown</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>69.1%</td>
<td>61.4%</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
<td>98.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>96.2%</td>
<td>16.0%</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
<td>98.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>38.8%</td>
<td>85.1%</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
<td>97.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>82.7%</td>
<td>73.6%</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
<td>97.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>81.8%</td>
<td>61.6%</td>
<td>18.7%</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
<td>88.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>58.7%</td>
<td>53.8%</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>84.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>74.0%</td>
<td>30.2%</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>93.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>61.3%</td>
<td>50.4%</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>97.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>87.0%</td>
<td>27.5%</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>93.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>82.4%</td>
<td>22.0%</td>
<td>20.3%</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
<td>91.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>70.6%</td>
<td>54.1%</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
<td>94.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: IND 2000: 31)

Efinoyai-Mäder et al. (2001) come to the same conclusion in a study among asylum seekers in Switzerland. Almost all their respondents claimed to have used the services of a smuggler to enter Switzerland for at least one stage in their migration process (Efinoyai-Mäder et al. 2001). Research in the Netherlands also shows that asylum seekers are more frequently smuggled than traditional immigrant groups (Engbersen, Staring et al. 2002). In 2002, the number of people smuggled into the Netherlands had increased by 400 per cent from figures quoted in an earlier research project called the Unknown City (Burgers & Engbersen 1999 and Engbersen et al. 1999). This latter research spanned the period of 1994 to 1995, with a focus on the more traditional immigrant groups.
Since asylum seekers are registered and interviewed upon arrival, alongside information on motives for asylum, there is also information on the modes of travel, the routes taken, and the prices migrants pay to smugglers. A first glance at this database, however, already shows that the information is qualitatively weak, being compiled of standard stories with few details, such as: ‘I travelled via unknown countries, stayed a while in an unknown place, and from there, was brought here.’

Asylum seekers are usually well informed of the fact that their story to immigration officers will be used in deciding the eligibility for their asylum. Hence, these stories determine their future, and news goes around of what should be revealed versus what should be concealed. The Dublin II Regulation (which replaced the original Dublin Convention of 1990) is a clear example of how a certain law may lead to adaptations in the autobiography migrants share. Without some modification or discreteness when it comes to describing the route taken, a person who has transited through other European countries will not be allowed to stay in the current country of destination. According to the guidelines of the Dublin II Regulation, the person will be sent back to the first European country he or she passed through. As a result, immigration authorities receive little to no detailed information on the final phase of the migration trajectory. Qualitative research seems the only proper tool to describe the complex and secret phenomenon that is human smuggling; it is the only way to reveal discrepancies between the official and the more unofficial stories (see also Cornelius 1982).

To better understand the discourse surrounding human smuggling, the present research conducted expert interviews with policemen, immigration officers, border control authorities, and several individuals working for NGOs. However, the main source of information that sustains this research is migrant interviews.

3.2 The biographical method as the main source of information

Even though we could readily rely on previous research that used the same biographical method (such as Chin (1999) who managed to interview no less than 300 Chinese immigrants smuggled into the US), there was scepticism surrounding our interviewing method, especially from potential funders. It was assumed that people involved would never speak openly about such a sensitive topic and consequently, our research would not provide accurate information on the detailed characteristics of an ‘illegal’ business such as smuggling. In general, field studies are less attractive to funding agencies than quantitative studies
because the latter can produce – at least the illusion of – precise, measurable data (Ferrell 1998: 5).

Statistics and research methods intertwined with law enforcement objectives, usually standing outside the lived experience of smuggled migrants or smugglers, can never capture a wider understanding of the phenomenon. Another methodology altogether is needed in order to know more about how people travel and the effects this type of border crossing has on human lives. Actually going into the field to do research makes it possible to reveal parts of the social world that would otherwise remain hidden. Moreover, a strict conformity to legal codes can limit a researcher’s scope, thus making it more difficult to study the internal logic of phenomena such as human smuggling.

A real advantage to the biographical method is that it offers space for respondents to tell their own story, presenting the issues that are of importance to them. For the researcher, this can lead to new insights, thereby encouraging movement beyond the rigid and static assumptions made on something that very little is known about. This method, however, asks for the researcher to play an active role. The researchers’ own identities should be made transparent, for researchers cannot totally distance themselves from the situations in which the subjects reside. A degree of sympathetic understanding between a social researcher and his or her subjects is needed so the researcher can also come to share, in part, the situated meanings and experience of those under scrutiny (Ferell 1998: 27). This research method therefore moves beyond objectivity and asks for openness to the subjective experience. This makes it possible to study the way people talk about smuggling and may reveal discrepancies when juxtaposed with the ‘official’ pictures (Cornelius 1982). Another advantage is that respondents can determine the order in which topics are discussed, which might make them feel more at ease, often turning the interview into a ‘normal conversation’. For us, a conversational tone turned out to be of vital importance, for it was something people had missed during their official interview with immigration authorities.

3.3 The research population

The decision was made to concentrate on three groups in particular, so as to analyse regional differences in smuggling as demonstrated in Iraq, the Horn of Africa, and the former Soviet Union. Reasons for choosing only three groups were both practical and financial. Interviewers who speak the language needed to be trained, and there was a one-year limit to the fieldwork period. As many asylum seekers turned out to be smuggled, it seemed apt to focus on nationalities within the
top ten of asylum requests. When this research began, the amount of requests for asylum in the Netherlands was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Requests</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>4111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>3614</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>2405</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>1519</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>1467</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>1400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>1329</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>1098</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia</td>
<td>1026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td>911</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>13,699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>32,579</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: IND)

Special attention was paid to the feasibility of interviewing each group. The size of the group and differences in migration patterns were looked at in order to create grounds for comparison and contrast. From the literature, it was known that ways of border crossing into the Netherlands differ region wide (IND 2000a). From Africa (Angola, Sierra Leone, Guinea) there were many unaccompanied minors coming to the Netherlands; we decided not to focus on this group because interviewing minors would involve both ethical and practical difficulties including the permission that would first be needed from the interviewees’ guardians. As such, the Horn of Africa was chosen, a group expected to have come by plane or boat and often on forged documents. At the moment the research began, there were many newspaper articles about Somalis travelling on someone else’s passports, using the so-called ‘look-alike method’. Through a Dutch agency helping highly educated refugees in the labour market, we recruited an Ethiopian man to assist us in carrying out the interviews. In total, nineteen respondents from this area were interviewed: 17 by the research assistant and two by myself. In total, we spoke to seven Somali asylum seekers (four males, three females), six Ethiopians (all male), five Eritreans (one male, four females) and one Kenyan (male).

Afghans, Iranians, and Iraqis often travel over land, step by step and via Turkey (Icduygu & Toktas 2002, Akinbingöl 2003). We decided to focus on Iraqis because their migratory statistics were expected to continue rising due to current political instability in Iraq. Our research assistant was a male Kurd from northern Iraq. Together we interviewed nineteen males and three females from Iraq, one male from Iran, and one couple from Syria. I conducted six out of these 24 interviews. We
had sought to interview Iraqis, but as it turned out, all respondents were Kurdish. While the interview assistant’s own Kurdish background may have influenced this skewing in our respondent pool, a closer look at the Iraqi community in the Netherlands also shows that 64 per cent of the population is Kurdish (Choenni 2002: 24). Within Iraq, Kurds comprise only 20 per cent of the country’s overall population (Choenni 2002: 8).

The countries of the former Soviet Union were selected for research, not only because they have prominent asylum statistics, but also because of their recent increase as an immigrant group in the Netherlands. The case of the former Soviet Union countries illustrates the fact that many people nowadays travel under certain categorical headings, though with other intentions. Most of the immigrants from this region entered the Netherlands on a tourist visa but then overstayed, thus blurring the boundary between legal and ‘illegal’ migration. For this research, a Georgian student who spoke fluent Russian interviewed seven Russians (five females and two males), three Ukrainians, and two families from Azerbaijan and one Chechen family. I myself did not do any interviews with people from the former Soviet Union.

In total, the research team managed to collect 56 life stories in a one-year period, spanning May 2003 until May 2004, from the Horn of Africa, Iraq, and the former Soviet Union. I myself did additional interviews with seven West Africans (Guinea, Togo, Cameroon, Nigeria, Liberia) and five North Africans (Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia). These life stories with people who were not part of the original focus groups contributed to a general understanding of smuggling, but were not incorporated as part of the data analysis. The same holds true for two interviews with women from Sierra Leone. These interviews were too short to even be called life stories, and the circumstances in which they were conducted far from ideal, but their message still proved important for a general understanding of the issue. Most of the interviews lasted for two to three hours.

It would have been interesting to also interview smugglers, but gaining access to this group would have been challenging and the fact that we performed the interviews in a country of destination made it still more difficult to get into contact with smugglers (Doornbos & Shalmashi 2001). Such inaccessibility no doubt has much to do with the criminal connotation smuggling carries in the West.

How is trust built up in a context of mistrust?

Immigration officers are trained to find inconsistencies in the stories people tell, and it is their job to determine whether someone really is who he or she claims to be. As one immigration officer we interviewed
said, ‘How can I trust somebody if I am not even sure if I know who is sitting in front of me?’ (Interview with IND officer 19/12/05). Migrants, most of the time, experience these official interviews as a lack of respect. One Jewish family from Grozny, Chechnya, was not believed to be Jewish and, as such, were asked why – if they were ‘real Jews’ – they did not migrate to Israel. It is not hard to imagine that the family was sceptical about how their case would be handled after this remark. Many of our respondents talked about their interviews with Immigration Service as though they were ‘interrogations’. A female respondent from Iraq explained the following:

I had the feeling they wanted me to make the story simpler than it was. I constantly had the feeling I was forgetting important details. And the most horrible thing was when I talked about painful events – they did not want to know how it must have been for me. They said they had enough information now. They did not even comfort me.

These examples show that asylum application interviews especially favour those able to express themselves in a clear way. They also show that interviewees often fear the lack of having substantial ground for asylum, and that immigration officers hardly put themselves in the interviewee’s position, which may encourage mistrust on both sides. The fact that, for refugees, trust is often overwhelmed by mistrust is not always taken into account while doing research among this group. Although it is important to know why and how refugees have developed mistrust towards specific groups of people or situations, these facts are usually unaccounted for in research among this specific group (Hynes 2003). Some of the people interviewed still feared those related to the situations they escaped from in their country of origin or, more generally, had bad experiences with people in uniform or officials. As a result, anyone asking questions might be a government agent with whom asylum seekers are very reluctant to share certain crucial information. More specifically, Thompson (1988) acknowledges that people who have experienced persecution might fear being tape-recorded by researchers, questioning whether the information may end up in the hands of the police or other authorities to be used against them. We always asked if respondents were uncomfortable being tape-recorded. Accordingly, it was sometimes simply not possible to tape-record because respondents refused. On other occasions, people requested to have the tape recorder turned off when relaying information on the routes taken or about participation in certain political parties.

Another reason for mistrust encountered in this research was the negative experience migrants had with translators. Some people told us
that, after having learned some Dutch, they were really shocked by how their interviews had been translated. Issues that were of real importance to them were translated as though they were minor details, while other things were blown out of proportion\textsuperscript{21}. Soon after hearing this complaint, I decided that my research assistants could not solely function as translators anymore; instead, they should do the interviews on their own, in the respondents’ own language. Therefore, I myself conducted interviews only with those who could speak Dutch, English, or French. In general, the research team tried to create a setting deliberately opposite to the formal interview setting at Immigration Services. Most of the interviews were done in cafes, in the offices of NGOs, or at people’s own homes. These settings helped distance ourselves as researchers from possible associations with ‘officials’, thereby making it easier to build up trust. Of course it was also helpful that most of the people we spoke with had either been granted a status or were already rejected asylum seekers, thus leaving them unafraid to talk to us openly.

3.4 Gaining access to smuggled migrants

In the absence of a sampling frame, it was necessary to adopt alternative strategies for locating respondents. We tried to avoid one-sidedness by using different access points. As the target population focuses primarily on asylum seekers, those still in procedure were of course easy to locate, but interviewing people whose status was not yet secure would probably have had a strong impact on the interview. People in these situations would most likely be more concerned with day-to-day survival than with the interview. They might also fear that the story they provided us could impact the outcome of their status, making it more plausible if they had an official version of the story to tell the researcher, too. Refugees who already had obtained refugee status, rejected asylum seekers, and other smuggled migrants living in ‘illegality’ were assumed to be more at liberty to tell their own stories, but they were also more difficult to find.

Snowballing is a method usually used when the target population represents a comparatively small part of the total population, or where some specific degree of trust is required to initiate contact among respondents. Various studies indicate that snowball sampling can prove economical, efficient, and effective in this respect. Respondents are obtained through referrals among people who share the same characteristics (Bloch 1999), and trust is developed because referrals are made by acquaintances or peers, rather than through more formal methods of gaining access (Cornelius 1982). However, there are also authors who
say that people in vulnerable situations are often reluctant to give the names and addresses of migrants in the same precarious situations (Staring 2001; Efionayi-Mäder et al. 2001). Furthermore, the snowball method entails the danger of limiting research to a biased sample, since contacts will mainly pertain to individuals belonging to the same group or having the same background. To minimise this risk, we utilised diverse access points.

Moreover, our research assistants shared the linguistic, national, and/or ethnic background of the respondents. This was crucial in order to gain access to these networks in the first place. Ellis & MacGaffey (1996) point out that research into areas where there is a high degree of suspicion cannot do without ‘insiders’. It is not enough to simply share the same ethnicity; a researcher must also be part of the network and in possession of extended personal The research assistants I worked with all had such an extensive personal network to draw upon. One of the three assistants had previous experience in researching refugees in the Netherlands and still maintained contacts from that research. Another assistant had been an interpreter for refugees and also had, apart from personal contacts, more professional contacts whom he invited to participate. The Georgian assistant had few contacts with asylum seekers, yet more with Russian women married to Dutch men as she too was married to a Dutch man.

**Working with research assistants**

It was assumed that the respondents would probably not speak Dutch or English, and that the research assistants would be able to gain their trust more easily, since respondents would more easily identify with them. When I, as a white Dutch woman, did the interview the situation proved different than when the research assistants did the interviews. It was more difficult for me to establish contact and build trust among the respondents. On the other hand, this ‘outside’ position sometimes allowed the informants to speak more freely about topics that they would usually avoid discussing among their own community. And sometimes I was deliberately provoked on certain topics to see what the possible prototypical reactions of a Dutch person might be. In one instance, a Liberian man played with his ‘fake’ identity by showing a forged identity card and asking, ‘Don’t you believe me? Don’t you think I am a British citizen? Why not? It can be possible, no?’

Using co-ethnics to do research, however, also raises issues of objectivity and bias (Bloch 1999). I was well aware that working with co-ethnics is not recommended in view of the risk of ‘going native’: over-socialising with the group and therefore losing the necessary distance and objectivity. Yet, I remained convinced by its advantages in terms of
access and openness. In order to maximise the quality of the data collected, the research assistants were carefully informed of the possibility of bias and confidentiality problems that might emerge, and together my assistants and I critically discussed and evaluated the interviews in order to avoid misinterpretations. Sometimes things were taken for granted by the research assistants; they may have thought certain information was common sense, and therefore did not require further probing. Fortunately, for most cases there was the chance to bring up such issues in subsequent interviews to clarify the matter at hand. Nevertheless, in some instances, respondents had already left the country before we could arrange a follow-up interview. One Somali respondent left for the UK after the first meeting, so the research assistant never had the chance to really interview him. The same happened with an Iraqi man who left for Denmark. One of my research assistants also left the Netherlands after the research's fieldwork period. However, we were able to keep in touch via email, and I could always ask him for advice while analysing the data.

**Contact points other than personal networks**

When it comes to accessing respondents through personal networks there is the risk of interviewing individuals within only one friendship network. We therefore tried to use as many different networks as possible. Diversifying access points is one way to reduce bias when it comes to selecting information. In order to gain access to people other than those she knew personally, my Georgian research assistant placed an advertisement on an Internet news portal for Russian-speaking people in the Benelux region, to which several people responded. I myself mainly contacted respondents through gatekeepers who worked at NGOs, churches, shelters, health and advocacy groups, and political activist groups. Gatekeepers typically include those with roles in political, economic, or social lives that put them in close contact with the target group, on a regular enough basis to thereby enjoy certain respect among the people. Interestingly enough, these different access points sometimes also led to contrasting cases. There were NGOs that only helped rejected asylum seekers who still had what they called a ‘legal perspective’. People to likely never gain asylum status were not helped (expert interview 05/11/2002). And one priest I interviewed explained that his endeavours were specifically aimed at African boys who were not helped by NGOs (expert interview 27/11/2002, see appendix I).

Gatekeepers facilitate access, not only by arranging contacts between the interviewer and the potential interviewee, but also because they themselves are trusted, and reduce the amount of mistrust directed towards the researcher. Gatekeepers sometimes even encourage the parti-
cipation of potential respondents who would otherwise have been un-
willing to be interviewed without their recommendation (Bloch 1999).
A negative side effect of this situation is that people may sometimes
feel obligated to talk and therefore communicate in a forced way. A
couple from Togo, for example, asked after one hour: ‘Can we go now,
do you have enough information?’ Gatekeepers may also choose inter-
view partners they think would fit best, either because they provide in-
formation they think the researcher would like to hear or because they
have a certain experience in interview situations with journalists, re-
searchers, etc. And, of course, if a gatekeeper keeps the gate closed it is
difficult to gain access. We were only faced with problems from one
NGO that was unwilling to cooperate because of scepticism of the re-
search overall. According to the NGO, the results of the research would
only benefit the police and help the Immigration and Naturalisation
Service in detecting people.

3.5 Reasons for participation and refusal

In contrast to what was expected, no one refused to participate in the
research because they did not want to, or from fear of speaking about
smuggling. There were some people who did not want to address cer-
tain aspects of their biographies, but this often had to do with the fact
that officials had questioned them so much on the topic already.
Others were experiencing ‘interview fatigue’, since this had been the
third or fourth time they were approached to participate in research on
refugees. Reduced to research subjects, they were just too tired to have
to speak about their migration history over and over again. Another
reason for not participating was that, at the time of our fieldwork (May
2003 through May 2004), the asylum issue was extremely politicised.
This discouraged some people to participate because they thought re-
search would not change that situation anyway. For others, the political
climate was in fact a reason to participate in the research. Some re-
spondents tried to use the interviews as a means to draw attention to
their case. They expressed a desire to make their story public – through
academia or journalism – so that people would know about what was
happening in the Netherlands.

For most people, the interview was a form of social contact; they felt
lonely and simply wanted to chat. Many respondents expressed feelings
of surprise that we were interested in their situation. Simply showing
an interest was the characteristic that most contrasted from the official
interviews that the migrants had already experienced. Respondents
may also have hoped for some kind of benefits from participating. In
these cases, their responses could have been part of a survival strategy.
Depending on the type of survival strategy at work, this might have affected the interview. For example, a respondent’s answers could have been coloured by the hope that becoming good friends with the Dutch interviewer could lead to ascertaining legal papers. The implicit aim of the respondent’s interview could be self-promotion, often either as a marriage partner or a friend worth doing a favour for. Another reason to participate might be the respondent’s belief that the researcher could offer legal advice. When this was the case, the interview revolved around a political asylum story. I did some interviews with people who presented tons of paperwork and the correspondence they had exchanged with authorities because they wanted to hear my opinion on their case and expected help from me.

Smuggling: a secret topic?

As already described, people did not always see ‘smuggling’ to be a problem. Consequently, many were willing to state that they had broken the rules, because they thought the rules were unreasonable. As a result, they talked quite openly about most aspects of their ‘illegal’ journey. An advantage of the biographical method is that special attention can be devoted to the expressions people use while talking about a particular subject. It is therefore possible to research the difference between the official discourse on smuggling and the migrants’ real experiences. Migrants usually bring particular words into play while talking about smuggling, the smuggler, or the wish to go abroad. Chapter six elaborates more on how people refer to their ‘smuggler’.

Still, smuggled migrants may have good reasons for hiding certain details of their journey from researchers as well. While interviewing people, we found that some respondents did not want us to know who their smuggler was or which exact route they had taken. Sometimes people openly stated that they preferred not to give the names of cities or mountains they passed through, for there were more migrants planning to come via the same route. As an Eritrean woman said, sharing her fears with us:

*I won’t tell you the exact name of the mountain where we were hiding; it is a famous place. You might want to know about it, but there are more people to follow, and I do not want to betray them.*

It is thus possible that people leave certain details out of their route descriptions. However, most of the stories we heard were very detailed, at least indicating that respondents were more open to us than they had been with the immigration authorities upon arrival.
3.6 Biases in the interviews

Despite the fact that difficulties faced during fieldwork and methodological failures often provide fruitful research material, they are rarely written up and analysed. This analysis of the interviewing process with smuggled migrants in the Netherlands tends to go beyond the short confessionals usually found in methodology sections of reports. While carrying out fieldwork it was acknowledged that people sometimes presented themselves in a certain way as a strategic action. Almost all of our respondents had undergone several prior interviews and held conversations with all kind of administrative bodies – the police, the asylum authority, medical doctors, etc. They had built up a certain expertise in presenting who they are, even though this did not always turn out to be successful.

The story of a Kenyan man illustrates how people may be instructed on how to present themselves and how this can affect their future lives. Immediately after arrival in the Netherlands, the Kenyan man met someone at Amsterdam’s central train station who told him that, in the eyes of the Dutch, Kenya is a ‘safe’ country. He advised him therefore not to tell the immigration officer that he was from Kenya, although the man had a very strong case for asylum. In Nairobi, he had worked as the national coordinator for an environmental NGO known for its criticism of the government. One day he was consequently apprehended by a government employee and tortured. He could prove that he was tortured (his vocal cord very noticeably cut). He also had various documents proving his case and almost all his former colleagues were living scattered around Europe for the same reason. The stranger advised the Kenyan man to give a story that focused on the war in Rwanda. The man decided to follow his advice, but when he told the authorities he was from Rwanda but could not even tell them the simplest details about the country, such as its capital, his application for asylum was rejected. He recounts:

The problem was that I really had to convince people that I was from that place. The interview was about small things, street names, and so on. I didn’t know what to say. It is stupid. I mean, imagine if you say that you are from the Netherlands and you don’t even know where Dam Square [Amsterdam’s central plaza] is, that is stupid… I am not the kind of person that normally lies.

The Kenyan man now lives in ‘illegality’. Ironically, advice given by others regarding what to tell authorities may thus impede asylum-seeking procedures and even work against migrants’ interests. Inventing
parts of a flight story or destroying identity documents may result in a less credible claim. And sometimes the real reasons and circumstances for flight may be considered valid grounds for granting asylum status. Most of the respondents we spoke to who lied about the exact reason for an asylum claim or their age did not have a sufficiently detailed story and were thus rejected asylum (see also Staring et al. 2005: 177). This illustrates how some people were more honest with us, telling us another version of the story they told to immigration officers.

But sometimes people withheld the full truth from us as well. It was obvious some interviewees were hiding information or relayed inconsistent stories. Therefore it seemed useful to understand more about the occasions when respondents might be altering the truth and seek possible explanations for this. The inside perspective makes it possible to gain a deeper understanding by not only analysing what people say, but also how they present themselves. Before looking into these identity constructions, I must acknowledge that lying can be a way of managing information and that I do not have the illusion that ‘the’ truth exists, let alone that I can reveal it. Still, I think it is important to understand why certain facts may be constructed because they do indeed impact the interview and its subsequent data analysis (see also Bilger & Van Liempt 2006).

‘Constructing a productive other’

There are many studies done on how refugees are labelled and the consequences of such labelling. Extensive empirical evidence shows that refugees conceive an identity which is very different from that which is ascribed to them. Surprisingly little is known, however, on how refugees present themselves within this context. Zetter (1991) raises an interesting point when he says that refugees may have an interest in the label they are given by others. Although it often categorises them negatively or incorrectly, it also entitles them to certain rights. Migrants therefore might try to present themselves in what they deem to be the most ‘correct’ way possible. Barsky (1994) introduced the concept of ‘constructing a productive other’ vis-à-vis asylum seekers. Accordingly, asylum seekers are highly invested in suitable self-presentation because any ‘wrong’ answers in official interviews can have severe consequences for their present as well as future situation.

The constructed other stands in the place of original claimant as a doormat would stand in the place of a house, it bears little semblance to the interior space in which lived experience occurs, but rather fits into too-easily accepted bureaucratic procedure that requires a façade of self-justification rather than veritable representation (Barsky 1994: 4). Adaptations to the stories we came across were related to motives for
asylum, one’s country of origin, or ethnicity. Age also turned out to be a vital variable in the asylum procedure: unaccompanied minors, for example, get special protection. Another important factor was fear of deportation: without proof of identity, it is hard to deport people back to their countries of origin. Sometimes migrants said they had an official story that they used for asylum application, but when talking to us admitted that the official and the unofficial stories had gotten confused in their heads. In other cases, it was more difficult to judge the veracity of the story told. When a story does not seem totally reliable it is challenging to know how to take the reported information into consideration. Of course there is no clear-cut solution to this, but when analysing data, a researcher can take into consideration the context in which information was provided, as well as the interview’s circumstances and the interviewee’s surrounding intentions or expectations.

3.7 Ethical considerations

The complexities of researching private lives and publicising the results of such research raises ethical issues which cannot be easily solved by applying a rigid set of rules and guidelines (Bilger & Van Liempt 2006). Standard interview rules like guaranteeing anonymity, confidentiality, and honesty were upheld throughout the entire interview process – from the moment a person was contacted until the time the details of a case were made public. No real names were used, and when life stories were so idiosyncratic that revealing certain details could reveal the identity of the person involved, circumstances were changed. Special ethical issues must be contended with when interviewing asylum seekers whose aim is to publicly conceal their identity, either because details do not match the asylum proceedings, or because they have made use of ‘illegal’ methods to secure their status.

First of all, the ethical code of ‘minimising harm’ and ‘maximising benefits’ vis-à-vis subjects was crucial in our research of smuggled migrants. It was acknowledged that conducting an interview with a smuggled migrant could automatically turn the researcher into a ‘secret holder’, in possession of information that could be harmful for the respondent, sometimes without even being aware of it. This type of research therefore demands active involvement from the researchers’ side. However, it must be acknowledged that being overprotective can also be interpreted as a lack of respect for dignity. We tried to avoid situations that made people felt obliged to talk to us, instead endeavouring to create an open atmosphere that allowed people to refuse participation if they did not feel comfortable.
Secondly, in cases where we deemed the story untrue – because the details provided were too bogus – we had to be very careful in presenting such a story to the public. Revealing ‘lies’ could not only harm the individual, but more generally, it could also affect a whole group and reinforce stereotypes. Researchers working in the field of marginalised people should be careful not to misuse their power. Nevertheless, accepting constructed identities as ‘real’ without critically analysing them does not do justice to ‘reality’. When it comes to analysing data, it is very important to be aware of the specific political arena in which smuggled migrants, and especially asylum seekers, operate, and to ask why people sometimes present themselves in a certain way.

Thirdly, there was the question of whether it was ethical to request a person to recall painful events, seeing as this could touch upon or reopen psychological wounds. Sometimes painful memories were triggered during the interview. The open and flexible nature of our interviews was helpful in this regard, and generally made for very effective methodology. Some migrants wanted to talk, while others clearly wished to avoid certain topics. Malkki (1995) argues that building trust may be related to the researcher’s willingness to leave some stones unturned, at first, thereby learning not to ask further when probing is a technique we used was starting the interview with more neutral questions, so as to avoid immediately addressing potentially traumatic experiences. When people wanted to talk on their own accord, or when they were sometimes prompted to talk by others, the researcher’s role ran the risk of being interfered with. An interview can have a profound effect on the respondent, who perhaps has never relayed some such accounts before. During the 20 interviews that I myself conducted, I also questioned my own motives: why further bother these people who have so much trouble on their mind? Another ethical dilemma I faced was what to do when confronted with injustice and/or exploitation. People sometimes told me stories about how they were cheated by lawyers, exploited by their employers, or as in one case, betrayed by a social worker. In turn, I tried to advise migrants on how to best handle their situations, even though I myself could have reported the wrongdoers to the police – though at the risk of also putting my respondents in danger.

**Conclusion**

Interviews within a difficult context, such as among smuggled immigrants, raises a specific set of methodological issues. Smuggled migrants often experience difficult travel and unpleasant confrontations with authorities, all of which can have a very concrete impact on the stories they later tell to researchers. An understanding of these pre-
vious experiences can help interpret the collected data. The biographical method is useful in the effort to understand the underlying reasons people may provide a certain story. Collecting people’s lifestories makes it possible to better grasp the context in which life’s decisions are made. This was a vital tool for comprehending such a complex phenomenon as human smuggling. Working with research assistants who have had their own migration experiences and come from the same regions as the research subjects meant that I could discuss the interviews with them, and therefore actively involve them in the process of data analysis.
4 Structural conditions and individual choices

This chapter will focus on the underlying causes of human smuggling. A lot of work has already been done on people’s reasons for migrating, but when it comes to irregular migration and human smuggling, over-emphasised is the side of the receiving country and the consequences of migration, rather than its causes. However, individual stories show how a knowledge of the circumstances prompting people to leave everything behind is essential in understanding the decisions migrants make and the situations they end up in. To better understand the context in which our respondents made their decision to migrate, this chapter presents a brief description of the histories and political situations of the countries where they originated. This chapter asks: what structural conditions in the Horn of Africa, in Iraq, and in the former Soviet Union make people decide to leave? For this description, I rely on information provided by the respondents themselves, as well as on secondary literature. For more in-depth background knowledge on the selected countries, references are made in the text to relevant literature. Towards the chapter’s conclusion more attention is devoted to individual choices and different forms of capital that shape migrants’ decision-making processes.

4.1 Why people migrate and categorisations of migrants upon arrival

Early studies of migration often discussed migration in macro terms, in which the masses were represented as being guided by clear-cut motivations. The distinction usually made between voluntary and involuntary migration (Kunz 1973) follows migration theory’s general economic-political division. Voluntary, economic migrants are considered free to make decisions, whereas forced migrants are seen as being propelled around the world by external forces. Involuntary types of movement are understood to be more about minimising risks, rather than maximising utility. Kunz (1973) defined voluntary migrants as those who are attracted by pull factors and involuntary migrants as those who are pushed away: It is the reluctance to uproot oneself, and the ab-
sence of positive original motivations to settle elsewhere, which characterizes all refugee decisions and distinguishes the refugee from the voluntary migrants (Kunz 1973: 130).

Economic hardship, poverty, and the lack of work opportunities are believed to produce economic migrants, while political violence, human rights violations, and war produce refugees. In reality, it is more often a combination of motives that finally leads to the decision to migrate. The degree of choice people have differs. No doubt the decision to migrate is harder to make under conditions of extreme stress, but ‘forced’ migrants also actively make choices regarding migration. As Van Hear observes, almost all migration involves some compulsion, as well as some choices, so that forced migrants make choices, albeit within a narrower range of possibilities (1998: 42). Thus, the same decision-making process is at hand for economic migrants as for political asylum seekers. In reality, there exists a continuum that is anchored on one side by those who have some freedom of choice – whether, when, and where to move – and on the other, by those who see no other option than to migrate and have little to say in the process. Involuntary migration is therefore an extreme situation in which the decision to leave is more self-evident, but the need to decide when and where to move nonetheless exists.

Richmond (1993) looks in more detail at the category of forced migrants and proposes a multivariate model that includes the wider social context in which decisions are made. He emphasises a distinction between proactive and reactive migrants. Proactive migrants are sufficiently tied to the political arena and are able to anticipate political disasters. They have the resources to flee their country of origin before the outbreak of large-scale political violence, and they can collect information before they move. By contrast, reactive migrants merely respond to political violence once it erupts. They make decisions in a state of panic, during a crisis that leaves few alternatives but to escape. Ironically, reactive migrants most often flee at a time when mobility is restricted, which further constrains their decisions. Zolberg et al. (1989) also identify different categories of refugees by looking at the cause of their departures in a wider context. The first classification is that of ‘the refugee as an activist’. Refugees are usually part of the conflict that compels them to flee. The second classification is ‘the refugee as a target’. Such a migrant belongs to a certain ethnic minority that has been identified as a political target. The third classification is ‘the refugee as a mere victim’, which covers people displaced by societal or international violence that is not personally aimed at them, but still challenges their lives. All such categorisations show that there are different types, perceptions, and capacities with which to respond to these (perceptions of) conflicts.
Individual capacities for responding to conflicts also can change during the process of migration. Migrants might have a limited degree of choice regarding where to go and when to move, because they may, for example, only have access to one specific smuggler who can only bring them to one specific place. Or, other migrants may find themselves in a better position once they are in a neighbouring country where they can more peaceably rethink their migration decision. This dynamic character of the process of migration will be central throughout this research.

The ‘real’ refugee

The legal discourse surrounding refugees may, much like the static categorisations set up by researchers, limit an understanding of what motivates people to migrate. As explained in chapter one, the legal definition of who exactly a refugee is was established in the Geneva Convention in 1951. If one can demonstrate a ‘well-founded fear’ based upon one of the Convention’s five grounds – race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion – one can acquire refugee status. Other forms of violence are not reflected in the ‘refugee’ definition. The emphasis on ‘well-founded fear’ paradoxically implies that one must prove individual persecution. But, in practice, there is rarely enough time to ascertain and classify individual stories. Moreover, there is a tendency to treat individual asylum cases as belonging to groups. As Tuitt argues, the general consensus on the subjective notion of ‘well-founded fear’ has gradually transformed, in practice, into a group-wide determination based upon an assessment of the country from which the refugee claims asylum (1996: 83). If an asylum seeker does not fit the Geneva Convention criteria, he or she can try to rely upon the state’s humanitarian considerations and/or other forms of exception, such as protection against *refoulement*. But the outcome usually depends on the state’s good will.

Thinking in rigid categorisation schemes neglects the possibility that people may fit several categories at the same time. Without overlooking the fact that refugees are in need of special protection, it ought to be stressed that the distinction between forced and voluntary migration is, in reality, not so easily made. Take the story of Shiela, who comes from Sierra Leone. At the time of our interview, she had just arrived in the Netherlands. Her asylum application was processed in the accelerated 48-hour procedure and had resulted in a negative answer. Shiela was very concerned about her future while I talked to her. In Sierra Leone, rebels had kidnapped her after having killed her brother and her father. She was taken into the bush and forced to have sex with several men. She also had a miscarriage because of this brute violence. One day, she
managed to escape from the bush. When Sheila came back to her village, however, nobody wanted to speak to her because she had been affiliated with the rebels. She then decided to go to the country’s capital city of Freetown, where her aunt lived. In a hotel, she met a Dutch man offering her a ‘safe and prosperous future’ and a trip to Europe. Together they flew to the Netherlands. He had documents for her and negotiated with the customs workers, thereby making the journey relatively comfortable. However, upon arrival in the Netherlands he locked Sheila up in his house and forced her to have sex with him. For thirteen days, Sheila could not leave the house. When she found out that this man wanted to ‘put her behind the window’ (that is, to work in prostitution), she escaped. Sheila went to the police and asked for political asylum.

The interview I had at Rijsbergen [reception centre] was horrible, because they didn’t listen to me; they did not even want to know my story. They told me: ‘That is not interesting, that is not interesting for us...’ I didn’t understand, they wanted to know why I was here, but they did not even listen. Then they asked me if I wanted to testify against this man, but I did not want that – he helped me to escape from a terrible place, Sierra Leone. What happened to me in the bush was worse than what happened to me here. And I was lucky. I escaped at the right moment. So I did not want to turn him in.

The violence Shiela faced in the bush and the subsequent rejection from her family was not sufficient grounds for political asylum. Moreover, because Sheila refused to testify against her trafficker – since she did not perceive this man as a criminal – she could not fit into the categorical box of trafficking ‘victim’. Sheila wanted to be recognised for the cruelties that had happened to her in Sierra Leone, but her case was only evaluated from the perspective at receiving end. Now Sheila lives in ‘illegality’ in the Netherlands, without any social or legal protections at all.

Indeed, a simplistic view of who is a refugee and who is not can have severe consequences. First and foremost, it is dehumanising to reduce refugees to categorisations labelled ‘real’ or ‘bogus’, all the while ignoring specific and individual circumstances. And secondly, simplistic views do not contribute to further understanding of how processes of migration evolve. Migrants can be pushed by certain motives while being pulled by others. Or they may be labelled – or present themselves – as belonging to another category. Such complexities are overlooked when only a rigid legal distinction is adopted.
The ‘tourist’

Examples of self-presentation as a certain type of immigrant are clearly apparent in the interviews conducted in this study, particularly stories from the former Soviet Union. Most respondents revealed that they had migrated to work abroad, but entered the country as ‘tourists’. For example, Anna, a Russian woman from Donetsk, Ukraine, entered the Netherlands as a tourist, but she was actually meeting up with her boyfriend Boris for their joint intention of finding work. Because neither had relatives abroad who could help them along in their migration process, they decided to travel as ‘tourists’. The process of finding the right details for a story to get a tourist visa can demand a lot of effort, time, and money. When Anna wanted to join Boris, she tried to obtain a visa through an agency, but things did not work out as planned.

I decided to go to the same agency as Boris had. It was in Kiev. One day I went there with my suitcase, ready to leave. I had already made a reservation for the bus to Germany, for the next day. But when I went to the agency to pick up my passport with the visa in it (hoping it wouldn’t be a problem, just as it had not been for Boris) I found out that my visa was rejected! This was a real shock for me. I really did not expect this could happen. I had already quit my job and told everybody that I was leaving for the Netherlands. The lady at the agency promised me I could try again, but she needed time for that, and I did not want to stay in Kiev waiting. I had to cancel my reservation for the bus and go back home, to Donetsk. The same evening I saw an advertisement in the newspaper of an agency in my own city that offered a Schengen visa through Germany. I then decided to try it again. The next morning I called the agency in Kiev to send all my paperwork back. They sent it via someone travelling by train and I brought the papers to the agency in Donetsk. I was just on time because they were going to bring the applications to the German consulate in Kiev that same day.

In order to apply for a Schengen visa Anna needed a short autobiography stating her marital status, the reason for travel, and her salary. A woman working at the agency asked Anna whether she had a document proving where she worked and indicating her income. The rule was that a prospective traveller had to earn at least US $450 a month. Upon applying the first time (in Kiev), Anna had brought a false document stating that she worked as a secretary at a firm, because her actual income did not meet the minimum requirement to obtain the visa. She thought she would use that document again, but the woman from
the travel agency in Donetsk told her that such certificates were not good enough. The woman said could make better, more believable ones, but they would cost US $10 each. Anna agreed, and the document was made in front of her as she waited. The woman typed something into her computer and printed out a document with the firm’s logo and details. She then signed and stamped it. But the woman then looked at Anna doubtfully, noting that she was too young, not to mention unmarried, which would make it more difficult to get a visa. She checked the records of the people she was processing visa applications for, to find an older couple in the group whom she believed Anna was young enough to pass as the daughter of. Thus, the story emerged: Anna was travelling with her parents, the older couple on whose application form the woman cross-referenced as having a daughter. She then made a copy of Anna’s national passport and drew a stamp on it, stating she was married. On another page she wrote down that Anna had a baby of several months old. Being married and having a baby would guarantee her return, she told Anna. The visa itself cost Anna about US $250, plus she had to pay approximately US $30 for the extra papers. She could pick up her visa within two weeks. All she had left to do was buy her ticket to Cologne (which cost US $270 including the cost of a return ticket purchased to prevent any suspicion of overstaying by immigration) and finally she could go. From Germany, she travelled on her own to the Netherlands. Anna and Boris both have overstayed their visas, now working and living ‘illegally’ in the Netherlands.

4.2 Structural conditions for people coming from the Horn of Africa

In 1869, when Italy acquired territory in the Horn of Africa it developed what was to become the colony of Eritrea. In 1885, the French moved into the area around the port of Djibouti (later called French Somaliland), and Britain took a slice of Somaliland (it already held Yemen’s nearby port of Aden). In Ethiopia, Emperor Menelik was able to resist all colonial violence, meaning that Ethiopia was just one of the two African states (the other being Liberia) that did not fall under European imperial control. The way the colonial map of Africa was drawn had severe repercussions for Somalia. After the drawing of the new map, the largest Somali-inhabited area was ruled by Italy, while Somalis to the extreme south now lived in Kenya, and those in the west inhabited parts of Ethiopia. When President Siyaad Barre came to power in Somalia, in 1969, he encouraged pan-Somali aspirations to unite the country’s nationals living throughout the five different countries
comprising the Horn of Africa. In the beginning, there was no opposition to his ideas, but as growing corruption and the uneven distribution of national resources took a toll on the economy, opposition grew.

_Siyaad Barre’s repressive regime and how the Somali nation fell apart_

After Somalia’s war with Ethiopia over the legitimacy of their border (from 1977 to 1978), President Siyaad Barre lost the support of his people. This war is also called the Ogaden War, because it generated an influx into Somalia of hundreds of thousands of Ogadeni people (ethnic Somalis who were Ethiopian nationals). After the Ogaden war Siyaad Barre’s regime turned into a true dictatorship. Conditions in Somalia worsened and tensions among ethnic groups increased. The first ten Somali asylum seekers in the Netherlands arrived in 1984 because of Siyaad Barre’s repressive regime (Van den Reek & Hussein 2003). One of our respondents was among this first group of asylum seekers in the Netherlands and he explained his situation:

> Because we lived in Mogadishu and belonged to the Haviye clan – as did almost 75 per cent [of the population] around Mogadishu – we had a problem. The government, including Siyaad Barre himself, belonged to the Darod clan and there was a conflict between these two clans. So basically, we had to decide whether we wanted to participate in this war or leave the country. We choose the second option, even though it was not easy for us at all to leave our country.

In 1988, the Somali and Ethiopian governments signed a peace accord that recognised Ethiopian control over the Haud areas, forcing a large number of Somali refugees to go back to Somalia. When the Somali National Movement (a clan-based resistance movement founded in London in 1981) attacked the biggest cities in the north-west of Somalia, the government countered with assaults on the local population. A civil war broke out (Lewis 1994: 177-219 in Kleist 2004) and many people fled to Ethiopia. For a long time, the conflict in Somalia was considered an internal matter. Though relief agencies were alarmed by the situation in Somalia in 1990 and 1991, the international community turned a deaf ear. When the longstanding President Barre was overthrown in 1991, the Somali nation-state fell apart, divided along ethnic lines. This resulted in two more civil wars: one in 1992, the other lasting from 1994 until 1996. Many Somalis were killed in these wars; others were able to flee the country. Currently, a quarter of Somalis are believed to be living outside their country of origin (Al-Sharmani 2004).
The Somali community in the Netherlands grew rapidly after the Somali nation fell apart in 1991. Most of the Somalis we interviewed had left their country between 1990 and 1995, when the violence erupted. Consequences of the war, such as lack of education and employment opportunities and, more generally, the impossibility of building a future in Somalia, also played a role in migrational decision-making processes. Usually after a stay in a refugee camp in Kenya, Djibouti, or Ethiopia, our respondents managed to continue their journey to Europe. The Somalis we interviewed did not come through official channels, such as resettlement through UNHCR. Small, carefully identified groups who are perceived as being most vulnerable can officially apply for resettlement. Women and children, for example, can opt for resettlement more easily than single men. Horst (2003) points to the fact that resettlement is only a possibility for the lucky few, and most people must use means other than the UNHCR procedure. Apart from not falling under the category of the most vulnerable, sometimes migrants do not want to contact UNHCR. They may not be willing to wait for official procedures because they feel unsafe in the camps. Some may fear having their claim rejected only to be deported back to their country of origin where they are not safe. Others may believe that UNHCR shares case information with the authorities in their country of origin. Still others do not want to register with UNHCR because their aim is rather to reach a specific settlement country. They plan to seek asylum directly, after arriving through irregular channels (Chatelard 2002:12). These spontaneous asylum seekers very often need smugglers to reach their destination.

The Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict

Eritrea has had a long colonial history with Italy, which formed a basis for Eritrean separatism from Ethiopia. Ethiopia referred to its repeated attempts to gain territory in Eritrea as a recolonisation. In 1958, a handful of Muslim exiles in Cairo, committed to armed struggle, launched the Eritrean Liberation Movement (ELF) (Zolberg 1989). Later, from ELF, the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) was formed. During the war for independence, many Ethiopians and Eritreans were driven into Sudan. When a famine struck the area in 1984, there was an even larger influx of Ethiopian and Eritrean refugees into Sudan. It was then that the Horn of Africa began to be recognised as a region of famine, not least because the 1984 and 1985 famines of northern Ethiopia and northern Sudan were put on the agenda of Bob Geldof’s Save the Children campaign. EPLF led the 30-year war for Eritrean independence, and in 1991, Ethiopian armed forces were defeated, and Eritrea gained its indepen-
One of our female Eritrean respondents was an EPLF front fighter, and according to her, there were more women in positions like her own. Today, the People’s Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ) – the core of an earlier EPLF that had split off from the government in 1994 – is the country’s sole political party. But the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea was not solved in 1991, and the struggle for power continues. In 1998, Eritrea again plunged into a disastrous new conflict with Ethiopia over their 1,000-kilometre border.

One of our respondents was living testament to the situation. Emanuel was born and raised in Ethiopia, with parents who came from Eritrea. In 1998, the Ethiopian government, with its newly defined borders, forced Emanuel’s entire family to return to Eritrea. They could not bring anything with them, as their Ethiopian bank account was under state control and the government confiscated their house, car, and garage, among other property. At this point, Emanuel decided to leave the country. He explained:

My parents and my brother are now in Eritrea. They live in a smaller place and are supported by friends and by one of my brothers, who lives in the United States now. When I think about it, it makes me sick. I consider myself as an Ethiopian living in exile. I don’t know any street or square in Eritrea. I don’t even know what Asmara, the capital, looks like. I do not want to be a victim of a struggle over power. It is a dirty game they are playing and, on top of that, there are only few people in the world who know about the existence of this game.

Arbitration by a boundary commission in The Hague was appointed to settle the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict, but the symbolically significant Tiggrinya village of Badme has obstructed the decision-making process when it comes to defining exact borders. War seems likely again (Jacquin-Berdal & Plaut 2005).


### 4.3 Structural conditions for people coming from Iraq

Most of the Iraqi refugees we interviewed in the Netherlands were Kurds. Kurds are scattered over Iran, Syria, Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Iraq. Their total population is estimated to be around 30 million and the majority, estimated at approximately fifteen million, lives in Turkey (Cornillie & Declercq 2003). Until the end of the First World War, most
Kurds were part of the Ottoman Turkish Empire, which ruled large parts of the Middle East. During the First World War, however, the British made plans to divide the Turkish Ottoman Empire with their allies, France and Russia. The Arab provinces would be allotted to France and Britain, and Armenian and Kurdish areas to Russia. Russia, however, retracted their involvement due to concerns over their own country’s state of affairs vis-à-vis the Bolshevik Revolution. After the First World War, the British decided to take over three Ottoman provinces: Mosul, Baghdad, and Basra. These provinces would later come to form Iraq. Largely against their own will, the Kurds found themselves now living in a state with a predominantly Arab population. In Iraq most Kurds live in the northern mountainous area and are Sunni Muslims (Cornille & Declercq 2003).

The Treaty of Sèvres (signed in 1920) theoretically allowed for the foundation of a Kurdish state, but when in 1923, Mustafa Kemal ‘Atatürk’ and his nationalists replaced the Ottoman sultan to gain power in Turkey, the Treaty of Sèvres was updated with a new version. This Treaty of Lausanne made no provisions for Kurdish independency. With the new Republic of Turkey at hand, Kurdish rights diminished, and the Kurdish language was officially banned. International emigration among Kurds started just before the Second World War. At first, this still small number of Kurds was mainly active in Kurdish cultural and political activities, therefore being directly threatened by bans on the Kurdish tradition. In 1946, the Kurds declared an autonomic Kurdish republic, Mahabad with the support of the Soviet Union. But the republic only existed for one year, because the British and the Americans saw Iraq as a pawn in their own struggle against the Soviet Union and supported Iraq’s fight against the Kurds. Between 1945 and 1965, the first Iraqi Kurds came to study in Western and Eastern Europe. Then in 1968, a faction within the Ba’ath Party, with Saddam Hussein at its top, conducted a coup. The party’s main goal was to create a new Iraqi society by spreading the so-called ‘eternal message’ of pan-Arabism. At this time, the international emigration of Kurds increased.

The 1974 war and the Black Day in Kurdish resistance

When war broke out in 1974 between Iraq and the Shah of Iran, the Kurdish Peshmerga (resistance army) gained considerable support from Iran in their fight against the Iraqi government. In 1975, Iran suddenly withdrew its support. Beginning in 1973, Iraq had nationalised its oil with consequently high profits, thus deciding to hand over an oil-rich part of the Arab Gulf to Iran. This day is often referred to as the ‘Black Day’ in Kurdish resistance because, from that moment on, all previous resistance seemed futile. The first hundred Iraqi refugees
in the Netherlands came as a result of this war between Iraq and Iran. The Western media, however, largely ignored the Kurdish side of the war, because Iraq was seen as an ally to the West rather than as a refugee-producing country.31

After this Black Day, the Kurdish political movement split into two parties: the conservative, more traditional Kurds supported the KDP (Kurdistan Democracy Party) with Massoud Barzani as its leader, while modern left-wing intellectuals, mainly coming from urban areas, supported the PUK (Patriotic Union of Kurdistan) with Jalal Talabani as its leader. This internal division led to problematic relations between the two parties. On top of that, the Ba’ath Party’s ambitious Saddam Hussein ousted President Ahmad Hasan Al Bakr and rose to power in 1979. With this move, the nation was suddenly under the absolute rule of a dictator. The Ba’ath regime practised different forms of brutal policies against people who did not join or support the Party, and surveillance became a crucial factor of control. The Mukhabarat and the Amen (the intelligence service) monitored citizens. Torture, disappearance, and murder of political dissidents became a daily reality. During this period, many Kurdish villages were destroyed and numerous people murdered.

The First and Second Gulf Wars

When Iraq invaded Iran in 1980, Kurdish people deserted the army en masse, seeing as the chances were high that they would have to fight against their own people. The Iraqi army attacked not only Iran in this First Gulf War, but also Kurdish soil. The Iraqis used chemical weapons and many Kurdish villages were destroyed. The villagers were deported to concentration camps, where the men were executed and women and children deported to other parts of Iraq (McDowall 1996). At this time, many Kurds from Iraq left for Turkey or Iran, or went even farther away, to the West. The refugee stream increased, reaching its highest point in 1988 when in March, the city of Halabja was completely destroyed. In August, the Ba’th regime announced the Anfal campaign32, also referred to as the Kurdish Guernica, which led to thousands of deaths (Cornillie & Declercq 2003).

After this war, rather than focusing on alleviating the hardship of the Iraqi citizens, Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait and the Second Gulf War began (from 1990 until 1991). His short-term agenda was to solve economic problems by confiscating Kuwaiti oil, but there was another long-term agenda behind this invasion, namely to change the landlocked position of Iraq by annexing Kuwait as Iraq’s nineteenth province. Iraqis have had to suffer two major wars in less than ten years. Additionally, many nationals have had close relations to people
in the countries with which Iraq has been at war. The American support of Kuwait and Operation Desert Storm finally led to the defeat of Iraq in 1991. However, the US left the Ba'ath regime and Saddam Hussein to stay in power. Immediately after the Second Gulf War, refugees started to flee the country as failed uprisings against Saddam Hussein by the Kurds and Shiites were met by repression and ongoing human rights violations. The majority of Iraqis living abroad as refugees or rejected asylum seekers had fled their country during the Second Gulf War or in the following decade.

In 1991, the international community installed a safe haven in the north of Iraq. Its aim was to give humanitarian aid and provide security for the Kurdish people. It was thought that the refugee flows would soon thereafter decrease, but contrary to what was expected, the situation did not improve and the Kurdish region was isolated. The area could now only be reached over land via Syria, Iran, or Turkey. Moreover, the UN sanctions against Iraq, combined with the fact that Saddam Hussein had stopped all trade with the Kurdish area, worsened the conditions. Poverty hit the area. Many people had no assurance, either of physical security or ways to sustain their livelihoods. An additional factor propelling people to leave Iraq was the KDP’s and the PUK’s total failure in stabilising the region. They had instead started to fight amongst themselves. Moreover, Islamic parties and organisations still tried to persuade Kurdish people to join them; many of our respondents reported having been threatened by such parties.

One tragic example of these threats comes from an Armenian family who lived in Northern Iraq, along the border with Turkey. To get to their new home in the Netherlands where I interviewed them, I had to pass through the fence of a large Catholic church before coming to their tiny tree-surrounded house in the backyard. The Armenian family had found a place to live through the help of an NGO that helps rejected asylum seekers or those still in the application process but without governmental support. When I entered the house, I saw only one room and a very small kitchen for four people. Despite the poor conditions, the table was laid out with food, the atmosphere warm and welcoming. The father of the family started to tell me about their situation back in Iraq, and a friend, who was there with us, translated his words for me.

We had to leave our country because an Islamic group wanted our oldest son to join them. They approached him in a shop. But he refused. Three days later, they approached him again. But this time they took him with them in a car. And outside the city, in an open field, they shot him. The boy was only twenty-one.
The mother, crying while her husband relayed the horrible incident, held her hands in front of her eyes and placed a wet napkin around her head. She told me she suffered from terrible headaches; she then retched, and told me that she felt sick. After a couple of minutes she recovered; apparently such occurrences were not unusual because her husband and children explained to me that her recovery process does not take long, as though they knew what to expect. When the mother started talking again, she explained to me that she knew exactly what had happened to her son. Even though, according to the police, there was no evidence, she knew who had done this to her son. She had even written a letter to the government; however, after the letter was sent, the situation only worsened. The Islamic group then came to visit their home and started to threaten the other children (a nine-year-old boy and his seven-year-old sister). A family friend helped them escape the country. Now they live in the Netherlands, yet their future is again very uncertain.

The war on terror

The attacks in New York, Washington, D.C., and Pennsylvania on 9/11 have put Iraq back on the international agenda. In January 2002, US President George W. Bush declared his intention to attack Iraq and the other countries that he referred to as an ‘axis of evil’. Convinced that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction, the American president invaded Iraq. Saddam Hussein was captured on 14 December 2003. It was expected that more refugees would come to Europe after this invasion, but asylum requests from Iraq have only increased slightly. According to Dutch authorities, this increase was not caused by newcomers, but by the repeated requests of those already in the country who, as a result of the war, had new motives and therefore renewed chances for gaining refugee status (DNRI 2005: 12). The great majority of those who have left Iraq appear to have remained in neighbouring countries such as Jordan and Syria, and to a lesser extent, Lebanon (www.global-policy.org/security/issues/iraq/attack/consequences/2005/0927new-guidelines.htm).

For further literature on Kurdish history see for example: Van Bruinesen (1992), Cornillie & Declercq (2003), Kreyenbroek & Stefan (1992), McDowall (1996), and Wahlbeck (1999).
4.4 Structural conditions for people coming from the former Soviet Union

In the Soviet period, movement outside the Eastern Bloc was assumed to be for purposes of trade or profession, rather than personal or humanitarian motivations. This selection limited travel to people with diplomatic, business, or cultural interests, leading to strict control over the departure of most citizens. Borders were sealed and there was an absence in the granting of entitlements for international passports. Those citizens who managed to travel abroad were normally issued a temporary foreign passport. The first group of international emigrants from the Soviet Union were asylum seekers who faced persecution before and after the Russian Revolution of 1917. The second period of international migration began after the collapse of the Nazi regime at the end of the Second World War, predominantly involving ethnic Germans. The third wave started in the 1970s, in a period of relative calm between the Soviet Union and Europe; it consisted mostly of ethnic Jews who left for Israel, the US, Canada, Australia, and Western Europe (Doomernik 1997). In the early to mid-1980s, a few hundred Russian Jews joined the Amsterdam Jewish community (Snel et al. 2000).

Perestroika and the opening of borders

It was not until Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in the late 1980s that emigration gained ground for new possibilities. The severe passport restrictions were openly criticised under the new regime, and in 1986, the first agreements to simplify border procedures were started with Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Hungary. Day-passes were given and more crossing points were opened (Matthews 1993). Finally, the end of the Cold War in 1989 further opened the border for many people wishing to leave despair back in their home country.

Economic and cultural motives for migration

After the collapse of the communist regime, the Russian economy was completely devastated. Most of the Soviet successor states were characterised by serious economic problems. Even people with relatively good educations were confronted by economic hardship. Alex from Ukraine, for instance, had a good position in a well-known hospital, but still faced financial difficulties. He decided to migrate to the Netherlands to earn extra income, and at the time of the interview, he was a worker in the flower bulb fields. Apart from economic strife, Alex also cited the Russian mentality as something that restricted him in many ways. His hardships, he explained, were not only the result of a low-paying salary,
but because he refused to take bribes, a commonplace practice in the hospital where he worked. For Alex, economic motivations for migration were thus combined with frustrations about corruption. Another respondent from Ukraine also touched upon economic and cultural reasons to explain why he came to the Netherlands.

I just didn’t see any future for me there. I could never save money, as I had to spend everything I earned. Besides, I knew some people who graduated from the same university as I did and had no perspective for a good job or whatsoever. They were doing the same job for years without seeing any changes. I became very depressed when I thought about that... I also felt oppressed by the government: everybody tells you what to do, how to live, how to work, how to raise your children. That was making me sick. I had the feeling there was no space for me in Ukrainian society.

A general lack of hope for the future was something most of our respondents from the former Soviet Union mentioned. The new economic structure after the collapse of the Soviet Union had an especially profound effect on women. Socialist ideology always had proclaimed the equality of men and women. Consequently, most women were full participants in the economy, and care for their children was always guaranteed. The collapse of the communist regime, however, led to mass unemployment, particularly among women, who were often the first at work to be fired. In this context, then, it is unsurprising that the majority of the migrants in the Netherlands originating from the former Soviet Union are women. For women, it is relatively easy to migrate if they should choose to marry Western men. Such women usually refer to cultural, rather than economic, reasons when asked about their decision to migrate. They might make statements such as: ‘Western men are faithful, kind to their wives, and good-looking.’

Gender discrimination, in the form of limiting women’s rights, stipulating their working conditions, and perpetuating patriarchal traditions does not only lead to more female migration, it also places women at a higher risk of being vulnerable to trafficking. After the collapse of the communist regime, sexually exploitative trafficking from the former Soviet states became a booming business. The countries of the former Soviet Union are presently the main source to provide the Dutch sex industry with women (Bruinsma & Meershoek 1999; NRM, 2002; 2004; Vocks & Nijboer 1999).
Political and ecological reasons for migration

Apart from economic and cultural reasons for migration, political and ecological aspects of society also played a role in our respondents’ decisions to migrate. In 1991, when the Soviet Union dissolved, it became clearly visible that communism had always held many different people together, even if artificially. Many of the newly created states were now torn apart by internal struggles. As Brubaker (1992) formulates:

The break-up of the Soviet Union has transformed yesterday’s internal migrants, secure in their Soviet citizenship, into today’s international migrants of contested legitimacy and uncertain membership. (269)

Nationalism and inter-ethnic conflicts generally exploded across many former Soviet states. As a consequence of these internal struggles, with their increasingly anti-Semitic tendencies (Doomernik 1997: 1), many people emigrated. In the beginning of the 1990s, the Netherlands was confronted with asylum seekers from Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, and the Russian Federation (IND 2000b). Another typical problem for people from Ukraine was the radioactive pollution caused by the Chernobyl disaster of 1986. A woman we interviewed said that she did not want to give birth in her own country, as fears of related health problems were still prevalent there.

For further literature on the history of the former Soviet Union see for example Doomernik (1997), Matthews (1993), Shelley (2003), Kopnina (2005).

4.5 Who migrates in an irregular way?

According to Lee (1966), the decision to migrate is determined by factors associated with the area of origin, the destination, intervening obstacles (such as distance, physical barriers, immigration laws), as well as by personal factors. It is common knowledge that there are people who will not easily move. They do not like the idea of going abroad. Sentimental considerations bind them to their trusted environments, where they are provided a certain sense of security and belonging. Most people throughout the world need compelling reasons to leave their homes. Because we conducted our research in the Netherlands, we could not investigate the reasons people had for not migrating. A story of an Ethiopian man we interviewed, however, illustrates how dif-
ficult it was for him to make the decision to migrate, to leave everything behind.

I had obtained a visa that was valid for 30 days, but I only decided to really leave when the visa had only for three more days left of being valid. You can't imagine how hard it was for me to make this decision. It was so difficult to leave my family and my Ethiopia. I had been hesitating all the time, but in the end, there was no alternative. I just had to go.

The picture is more complex for reactive migrants because migration is not, as it is for proactive migrants, a premeditated option. Reactive migrants are not in charge of their migratory process in the same way as proactive migrants. One day they may just come to the conclusion that they have reached a limit. In this light, a Kurdish man explained how people with political problems do not have options other than to leave. He said he would never advise other people to leave home. He illustrated this with the Kurdish proverb *Bard la jegai goi sangina*, which can be translated to mean something close to 'the stone is strongest where it is'.

On the other hand, there are also people who are more inclined to migrate because they are enterprising and more willing to see the world. As Mahler & Pessar (2001) note, agency is not only affected by extra-personal facts, but also by quintessentially individual characteristics, such as initiative. They also note that agency must include the role of imagination. Imaging, planning, and strategising influences much of what people do. Those who already think a lot about migrating and those who can imagine themselves in a Western country in the near future are more likely to eventually migrate.

*Moving away from the ‘young single man’ as the stereotypical irregular migrant*

In 1885, Ravenstein was first to note that young, single male adults characterised the predominate profile of migrants. These people migrated to improve themselves in material respects, though women did not have the same need to do so. Many studies on migration still focus solely on the experience of men. The lack of gender-differentiated statistics reinforces the lack of scholarly interest in the relation between gender and migration (Kofman et al. 2005). Besides, when women are brought into the picture, it is implicitly assumed that they migrate for the same reasons as men. There are, however, gender-specific triggers, such as patriarchal norms and gender-linked power differences, that simultaneously constrain migration and push women away (Cerrutti &
Massey 2001; Hondagneu-Sotelo 1994; Kofman et al. 2000; Morokvasic 1983). For a long time, the labour market structure mainly benefited male migrants. Nowadays, however, there has been an increase in demand for female labour, mostly in precarious sectors of the economy including domestic work and sex work. The existence of gender-specific economic niches for immigrants has produced overwhelmingly gender-based linkages between certain pairs of countries. In Italy, for instance, women constitute 85 per cent of the Cape Verdean immigrants, while men constitute 96 per cent of the Senegalese. Cape Verdean women almost always work as domestic workers, while Senegalese men work as street vendors (Andall 2000, King et al. 1997 in Carling 2005: 2).

When we take a look at refugee flows, the dominance of males is less obvious. Women and families also escape war-like situations. The assumption that certain risks are more likely to be taken by young and single persons (Goss & Paul 1986), therefore, is not entirely true. When it comes to migrants’ personal activism, a common stereotype is that female asylum seekers are merely migration’s passive followers; not taken into account is the possibility that they have been politically active themselves or may arrive on their own accord (Spijkerboer 2000).

Who migrates from the Horn of Africa, Iraq, and the former Soviet Union to the Netherlands?

The Statistics Netherlands (CBS) registers how many immigrants reside in the Netherlands. The following statistics reflect those legally residing in the country and includes first and second generations. In 2003, 27,587 Somalis were legally residing in the Netherlands (14,781 males; 12,786 females). In the same year, there were 10,120 Ethiopians (5,538 males; 4,582 females) and 655 Eritrean (327 males; 328 females) (CBS 2003). Contradicting general assumptions that men are usually the pioneers and that families are immobile, we interviewed a number of families from the Horn of Africa, and sometimes women, alone, who came with their children. Most of these women saw migration as an opportunity to secure or improve theirs and their children’s prospects. They explained to us that men were not very involved in this family-based decision-making process. A similar pattern of scattered families was found among Somali communities in the UK and Denmark (Kleist 2004).

The Iraqi population in the Netherlands has increased since the 1990s. In 2003, there were 41,959 Iraqis legally residing in the Netherlands (24,950 males; 17,009 females) (CBS 2003). This group shows an overrepresentation of men. When we wanted to interview Iraqi women, we also found that it was very difficult to locate women who were smuggled. This was most likely due to the fact that Iraqi refugee wo-
men do not arrive first, but only follow their husbands later, through legal channels. A study done on Iraqis in the Netherlands supports this idea: it states that three quarters of the first arrivals are men initially travelling by themselves, and are later joined by their wives (Choenni 2002). Women we spoke to from Iraq had all been accompanied by men along their travel, or at least pretended to have a man awaiting them, such as in the case of our interviewee who told border authorities that her uncle was waiting for her on other side of the border.

From Iraq, fourteen out of our 24 respondents were single. This contrasts with the results of another study done among Iraqis in the Netherlands which concludes that 78 per cent of newly arriving asylum seekers from Iraq are married (Choenni 2002). During fieldwork we heard that this difference may be the result of some Iraqi refugees having pretended to be married during their asylum interview in order to make way for the possibility of bringing a prospective wife to the Netherlands. But these days, the rules have changed; if an individual is married, he or she must bring his or her spouse to the Netherlands within three months. Therefore, it is not useful to falsely claim marriage, because there is no longer the prospect of bringing over someone as a spouse.

More Russian women than men are legally residing in the Netherlands. As such, a reverse stereotypical image may be created. In 2003, 39,375 migrants from former Soviet Union countries were residing in the Netherlands:16,677 males and 22,698 females (CBS 2003). As mentioned before, after the collapse of the Soviet regime, the feminisation of poverty and a revival in patriarchal traditions took place to constrain the freedom of women, especially. This led not only to an increase in Russia’s divorce rate, but also to the organised migration of women as future wives for men abroad.

The socioeconomic background of migrants

Apart from individual characteristics, such as age, gender, and family status, the socio-economic background of migrants also plays a role in selecting who migrates and who does not. Social ties abroad may act as magnets and produce ‘chain migration’ (Boyd 1989). As a result, those who have such strong social ties abroad may experience migration in a very different way than those who do not, as the former group has reduced risks and costs in migration. Social ties also increase the anticipated net returns of migration because contacts are likely to help migrants find jobs upon arrival.

Half of our respondents had, at the time of the interview, social ties abroad. But as we will see in the next chapter, not everybody could take advantage of these connections in their migration process. A distinc-
tion will be made between general social capital and migration-specific social capital.

Table 3: Social ties\textsuperscript{39} of respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social ties abroad</th>
<th>No social ties abroad</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Horn of Africa</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former Soviet Union</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

An important characteristic of social capital is its convertibility: it can be translated into other social and economic benefits (Bourdieu 1984). If contacts do not facilitate in the migration process by providing migrants with a social framework, these contacts can still be useful as sources to lend money for paying smugglers. Most of our respondents borrowed money from family members to finance their trips, thus converting their social capital into economic capital. Transnational relations played an important role in this regard. As a Somali respondent explained to us:

My brother in Italy financially supported me. And I also owned a lot of gold myself. I had sold everything I possessed, and with this money I arranged my trip to Europe.

Table 4: Financial help from social ties abroad

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Financial help</th>
<th>No financial help</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Horn of Africa</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former Soviet Union</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From the Horn of Africa, two-thirds of our respondents were given money by family members or friends abroad in order to pay their smuggler. It is interesting to note regional differences in attitudes toward money. Respondents from the former Soviet Union explicitly said that they did not like incurring debts. Such a statement would indicate that they were in the position to make decisions about borrowing money for themselves, that they had less pressing reasons to leave, and that they were in a financially better position. People relied on different standards to express their wealth; some measured it according to the education they attained. One common characteristic of our research population is that the majority had a relatively good education. Van den Tillaart et al. (2000) found that education differs between groups, though one can generally say that ethnic groups newer to the Nether-
lands are better educated than groups with longer emigration traditions (such as Turks and Moroccans).

Table 5: Education level of respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Higher education</th>
<th>No higher education</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Horn Africa</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former Soviet Union</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Apart from education, people also used the ownership of a business as a standard to express their wealth. Another status marker was the ownership of personal property, such as a car or a house. One Iraqi man from the countryside referred to the large amount of land he possessed. Most people had to use all their savings, sell their house, car, land, or family jewellery to finance a trip to Europe, but still, they were the ones who could afford to go to the West in the first place; they were definitely not among the poorest. This image of asylum seekers who are, at least compared to the average population of their country, highly educated and relatively rich is also supported by the literature on asylum seekers (Hulshof et al.1992). Meanwhile, the image sharply contrasts with the media’s image of asylum seekers being uneducated and poor.

Conclusion

Central to this chapter is the apparent correlation between understanding the fundamental reasons migrants use smugglers and understanding the smuggling issue as a whole. Most attempts to divide migrants into categories solely concentrate on political or economic motives (Kunz 1973; Lee 1966; Ravenstein 1885; Richmond 1993). However, individual migration stories clearly indicate that motives for migration – other than the economic or the political – may be pertinent, including explanations of a social, cultural, and ecological nature. These stories also reveal just how interconnected different motives are. For example, finding a job or uniting with a future husband, was often cited in conjunction with social and cultural reasons for migrating, such as the country of origin’s general ethos (undemocratic, racist, sexist, corrupt, etc). This multiplicity of reasons for migration illustrates that the division between forced and voluntary migrants, in practice, is not so easy to make. Furthermore, as Anna’s story made clear, migration channels can be used in creative ways by adapting one’s profile presentation to the preferred profiles the various channels of admission propagate.
This chapter opened by describing the general background of our respondents: where they came from, what their life was like before they arrived in the Netherlands. Their stories made it clear that, for many people, the state they left was unable or unwilling to meet their basic needs or to provide protection. Indeed, states may also be unwilling to protect or persecute individuals perceived as a threat, for example Kurds in Iraq, or Jews in Chechnya. However, international migration is not solely an effect of such difficult conditions. People respond differently to the general conditions of poverty, war, torture, and discrimination, and leaving one’s country requires plenty of courage, money, and contacts. Drawing on our own material, we again ask: who migrates? First of all, this research has shown that irregular migrants include the young and the middle-aged, males and females, singles and couples, those with children and without, the highly skilled and the less skilled. It is therefore difficult to generalise. Still, some broad patterns can be found for each region. An overrepresentation of men was found in Iraq, whereas the former Soviet Union demonstrated an over-representation of women. Most of our respondents were relatively highly-educated, middle-class people, or they came from wealthy families. This affirms the fact that the poorest of the poor are usually not in the position to migrate internationally, let alone through ‘illegal’, often expensive channels. The next chapter offers a closer look at how country-specific circumstances, as well as migrants’ social, human, and economic capitals impact the specific way borders are crossed.
There are many ways to cross a border without permission. In this chapter the various methods and means of border crossing experienced by our research population will be described and analysed. To understand how specific borders work, one must first be familiar with the borders' geography. This chapter will therefore present three concrete examples of border crossings from the Horn of Africa, Iraq, and the former Soviet Union. Specific opportunities or obstacles faced along these borders will be discussed. Migrants' social, economic, and human capitals also affect how borders are crossed. Border crossings may even vary along age, gender, and personal circumstances, such as the level of insecurity people face and its resulting limitations. Chapter four discussed the general decision-making process concerning migration. In this chapter, decisions surrounding the smuggling process will be central, addressing questions like: how do people find a ‘good’ smuggler? What routes or ways of travelling does one prefer, given the available opportunities? Is there room for negotiation when it comes to price and destination agreements, or do migrants face complete loss of control? The answers to these questions will first be explored through specific narratives from selected respondents from each of the three research regions, and then examined in light of more general personal characteristics, such as age, gender, social, and economic capital.

5.1 The story of Zhara from Somalia

Zhara was born in 1954 in Mogadishu, Somalia. Her father was a colonel in the army, and her mother stayed at home to care for their ten children, one who was handicapped. By the time Zhara was in secondary school, she was already married with her first child. Although she had to quit school for a while, she was able to continue later on. After secondary school, Zhara started working as an accountant at ENECO (the country’s state energy company. After working there for four years, she attended accounting and management school, from which she graduated in 1989.
Travelling to a neighbouring country first

Zhara left Somalia in 1991 when Siyaad Barre’s regime fell. Her father and her husband both had been in the army, and her family belonged to the ‘wrong’ clan. However, initially nobody had thought about migrating to the West. In her words:

> You know, in the beginning we thought the war would be over soon, and therefore we weren’t really scared. We thought things would change with the new government. I stayed on a farm for three weeks, but then I thought: “Well, we have to go further away, we have to leave the country.” So I went back home to get some clothes for my children. Now I regret this – clothes were all I could think of! Really, I don’t understand why I did not take documents or certificates, because that would have helped me a lot here. But, you know, you simply don’t think about these things when you are in a war situation. And we were not thinking about migrating to the West either.

In total, thirteen of our nineteen respondents from the Horn of Africa had first gone to a neighbouring country, travelling via land, to Ethiopia, Sudan, Djibouti, Kenya, or Yemen, from which they arranged their eventual trip to Europe. Zhara left the country with her children, father, brothers and sisters, and their children. The only member of the family who did not want to leave was her mother who was living in a quiet area outside of Mogadishu. She was not really affected by the war, preferring thus to stay in Somalia. More tragic was the fact that Zhara’s husband was not in the country at the time that war broke out because he was attending a course in the US, and they had to leave without him. The family went to Kismaayo by car, as Zhara explains:

> We had four cars in total, and they were all fully packed with people. In Kismaayo we took a boat to Mombassa [Kenya]. We just left the cars there. I don’t know who is driving inn our cars now, or who is living in our house.

According to Zhara, many people were looking for boats and some boats sunk simply because there were too many people aboard. It was not easy to get on a ship, and the lines were cumbersome, to say the least. Some people fainted because they could no longer stand while waiting. This happened particularly to those who had been walking for days or weeks to reach the harbour. Zhara and a part of her family found a dirty fishing boat on which they could cross for US $ 100 each
(there was no special price for children). The boat was crowded and there was hardly enough space for everybody. Zhara’s oldest child was eleven at that time, and the youngest, at age five, had to endure a boat journey lasting four days and four nights. Even though it was a horrible trip, Zhara and her children were very fortunate. Zhara’s father and her oldest sister, along with her own children, were on another boat. After a couple of days, Zhara and the others heard that the other boat had a severe accident and 22 people had drowned, including everybody Zhara knew aboard. Zhara later learned that the shipwrecked boat did not even have a motor, and that its passengers had been waiting for the wind to take them.

When Zhara and the others arrived in Mombassa, there were UN workers who gave them food and shelter. It was no less a difficult time though, as they had to sleep on the floor and the camp did not have enough food. Zhara did not want to stay in the camp. Fortunately, she had brought her gold along and she sold it in Mombassa. She was also lucky enough to have a brother in Italy who sent more money so that she could afford a place in town for her and her children to all stay. Zhara’s brother did them another favour – he contacted Zhara’s husband to tell him they were safe. After nine months, Zhara decided to move again. She did not want to stay in Kenya, nor could she go back home, seeing as it was still very unsafe there.

Problems encountered while deciding to move on

Once people have decided to resettle, a new set of difficulties arises. Legal options to migrate to the West are limited. Because people arrived during different time periods to the Netherlands, it was possible to see from their data how smuggling methods and routes have also evolved. For example, it became clear that in the second half of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, it was relatively simple to travel to Western Europe via Eastern European countries because visas were obtained relatively easily. Consequently, the routes taken were often ‘illogical’ and the journeys long.

Since 1991, official Somali passports have no longer been issued, which also means that a Somali national cannot get a visa to travel abroad. On top of that, there are no working Somali embassies in surrounding countries. As a consequence, there has been the start to a trade in forged, borrowed, and stolen passports. People we interviewed came not only on Yemeni and Djibouti passports, but also on Dutch or other EU-country passports, while some came on UN documents. Others did not know on what passport they travelled because their smuggler was in complete control. Passports can be obtained through theft or bribery, or they can be forged. Visas may be fraudulent, or
ghost companies can obtain them on fake employment certificates, bank statements, or letters of invitation. Zhara had heard that in Nairobi it was easy to find a mukhali who could bring her and her children to a safe place, in a safe way. In a Nairobi hotel, Zhara found her mukhali, a Somali man with a EU passport. She trusted him as he was her compatriot, and because he promised that his method was very safe. This ‘safe way’ implied travelling directly by plane. It was a costly route, but also a secure one. Zhara could use the money sent by her brother to finance their tickets and travel documents. He would accompany the family to the Netherlands. She simply had to pretend to be his wife and that her children were their children together. Zhara was given a new name, Asha, and the children also had new names to learn by heart. They were also instructed to call the mukhali ‘papa’. Zhara received a new passport, and the children’s names were written in the mukhali’s passport. Zhara had to spend money paying this man for his service and on purchasing the plane tickets herself. The total cost for her and her four children was US $ 7,000, though as she noted: ‘But you must realise that was in 1992; I hear people pay around US $ 7,000 per person nowadays.’

One morning, Zhara and her children were picked up by a taxi driver from their hotel to go to the airport. The mukhali was there and accompanied them the whole way. They were advised not to talk during the check-in procedures and to stand a little bit behind. The mukhali would do the communication. It worked out well, and they had a safe flight from Nairobi to Amsterdam.

Most of the people we interviewed from the Horn of Africa came by plane, via other European countries. They used the following transit places: Paris, Brussels, Frankfurt, or Rome. Djibouti-to-France was a well-known route among our respondents. From other research, it is known that South Africa (Moret, Baglioni et al. 2006: 85) and Arab countries, like Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates, are also used as transit places (Al-Sharmani 1998). Istanbul, Turkey, is now also known as a transit place for people from East Africa (Brewer & Yuksek 2005). Some smugglers accompany people on their plane ride; others do not. In the latter case, smugglers just show up to make sure their clients board the plane. When Zhara and her children arrived at Schiphol Airport in Amsterdam, the mukhali left them, saying they could ask for asylum there. And so they did, deciding to stay in the Netherlands. After six months, Zhara and her children received their residence permits, and Zhara’s husband could then finally join them. The rest of Zhara’s family lives scattered around the globe in Kenya, the US, Canada, England, and Italy.

But cases do not always follow such straightforward procedure – we interviewed a number of people who were brought to France by their
mukhali, but then decided to continue their journey to the Netherlands. Sometimes family members came by car to pick up people who had been stranded in other European countries. Migrants often perceived this action as helping, whereas from a present-day law enforcement perspective, this would also be considered smuggling. Unknown compatriots may also bring people to neighbouring European countries, most of the time for a price, but also out of concern.

Smuggling from the Horn of Africa and corruption

Travelling on forged passports is not always a sufficient way to avoid border checks. Officials working at airports are sometimes bribed to not say anything about the poor quality of documents. Kenyan newspapers⁴² carry numerous articles on corruption scandals at the airport. As is the case at all international airports today, documents are checked in three different stages: at the check-in counter, upon entering the departure lounge, and directly before boarding the flight. In order to avoid people destroying their documents, such as by flushing them down the toilet, there are sometimes even checks when disembarking from a flight. When flights are considered ‘risky’, documents are photocopied upon boarding and checked during the flight so that ‘illegal’ passengers can be deported immediately upon landing. Staff working at any stage of the embarking and disembarking process may also be bribed. As one respondent said:

The person checking you at customs is the key figure for the whole process. If he says no, everything is destroyed. So the smugglers have to arrange everything beforehand, and they tell you to go with this document, to this man or to that lady. He or she will then have a quick look, but you can pass anytime.

This demonstrates how widespread corruption is the modus operandi of smugglers. As a consequence, many smuggling networks are facilitated through bribing immigration officials intelligence, or police officers. Sometimes, such a manner of travelling that completely relies on the contacts of mukhalis can cause delays for the migrant. One of our respondents told us that he was sent back from the airport three times, because according to his smuggler it was ‘not a good day’, and they had to try again at a later time. This could have been because the person with whom the smuggler has been in contact was off-duty or some additional unforeseen controls. Corruption is also prevalent along the last leg of the smuggling chain, such as in the Netherlands. Dutch newspapers incidentally report cases of corruption at Schiphol Airport; probably the most famous is of the cleaner who misuses his or her se-
curity card to let immigrants exit using the transit lounge. Between 2000 and 2005, the Royal Marechaussee apprehended 675 employees — roughly three people per week — for human smuggling. Most were working as cleaners, in tax free shops, or for airline companies (Bogers & Salden 2005). It is estimated that half of the 60,000 people working at Schiphol Airport possess a security card. The Royal Marechaussee screens everybody before issuing security cards. Criminal records and financial debts are checked and, as much as possible, a person’s vulnerability to bribery is tested (Olgun & Schoof 2005). However, it remains difficult to thoroughly screen all 30,000.

Another case of corruption in the Netherlands directly related to Somali smuggling is the so-called look-alike method. A criminal investigation led by the police in Leeuwarden (a city in the north of the Netherlands) uncovered a smuggling organisation based around the Somali owner of a travel agency. The owner advised smugglers on which routes to take and methods to use, as well as arranged visas and bought passports for them. One of his tactics involved recommending that Somalis sell or lend their Dutch passports for a price to look-alikes in their countries of birth. Most of the Somali migrants using these Dutch passports travelled through other European countries to avoid Dutch language checks (expert interview 30/6/2001, see appendix I). It is interesting to note that for this specific method, a large migrant community is needed. A report on the secondary movements of Somali asylum seekers reveals that Somalis who entered Switzerland clandestinely often used forged documents, while for the Netherlands the look-alike method proved far more common (Moret et al. 2006).

5.2 The trouble with getting out of Iraq

It is very difficult to depart directly from the northern region of Iraq. There is no international airport in the area or hardly any other infrastructure, for that matter, and there are only very few countries with which Iraq maintains diplomatic ties. People leaving Iraq must first travel to a neighbouring country before they can continue their journey onwards. The neighbouring country one chooses depends on the geography of the point of departure and the openness of the border, as well as socio-political factors, such as the attitude of, and treatment by, authorities. From Iraq’s north-east area (including Sulemaniya, Ranje, and Irbil), people usually cross the border that is shared with Iran. Marivan, Bane, and Sardast were often mentioned by our respondents as the first towns in Iran people passed through. People then moved to Razaiya (Urmia) or sometimes to Teheran, especially if the plan was to reach a Dutch embassy. From the north-western part of the Kurdish
area – in Zakhu or Mosul – people crossed immediately into Turkey usually via Ibrahim Khalil (Habur), the official border crossing, to Silopi, the first town in Turkey one comes upon when crossing from the north-east part of Iraq. Some people crossed via Syria, but according to one of our respondents, crossing the Iraqi-Syrian border without being caught is difficult: the area is flat and hiding places are scarce. There are also Iraqis who use Jordan as a transit country. This is not perceived as the ideal crossing point among Kurdish migrants though, since Turkey and Iran are closer, and Kurds prefer to travel over Kurdish soil (Chatelard, 2002: 7).

For Kurds, there is also the problem of obtaining documents for leaving Iraq. Theoretically, Iraqi Kurds have the right to a passport, but almost no Kurd in Iraqi Kurdistan has one, due to the lack of Iraqi authorities in the area. One Iraqi Kurdish woman we interviewed travelled on her niece’s passport, because the two apparently looked alike. When she successfully crossed the border with Iran, she gave her taxi driver an envelope in which she had placed the passport, asking him to bring it to the address on the envelope. For Iraqis to go to Iran, they officially need a bargai (permission to stay in Iran) from the Iranian government, but few can ascertain one. Smugglers provide the people with alternatives. One of our respondent’s smugglers arranged papers for allegedly ill Iraqis to go to Iran for a couple of weeks for the purpose of undergoing special treatments. Our respondent explained how he had to pretend to be very sick. Travel to Turkey also requires a visa. In the Kurdish area, visas are distributed by KDP (in Irbil) and by PUK (in Suleimanya), but waiting lists for these visas are lengthy (Cornillie & Declercq 2003). A loophole in the law is darnak; a special document for Turkomans from Iraq who wish to visit Turkey. Two of the people we interviewed were able to receive a darnak from their smuggler, though it meant they had to pretend to be Turkoman, which was difficult for them because they did no speak Turkish.

It is thus not only policies in countries of destination, but also in countries of origin, that may drive people to employ smugglers. Halleh’s narrative illustrates the paradox of people being allowed to enter a certain Western country yet simultaneously being forbidden from leaving their own country. Halleh is an Iraqi woman who was officially invited to come to the Netherlands for family reunification with her husband. However, she could not leave Iraq because she could not obtain an exit-visa. A smuggler was therefore arranged to remove Halleh from Iraq so that she could at least reach the Dutch embassy in Iran. But because she was an Iraqi, the Dutch embassy could not help Halleh exit Iran. She consequently found lodging in a hotel in Teheran, and there she met other families who were in the same situation (some had an official invitation to go to Sweden, others to Denmark). Through her
new acquaintances, Halleh found a smuggler who could arrange an Iranian passport for her. A man would accompany her to Dubai, and there she would fly to Amsterdam as an Iranian. But, as it turned out, at the airport in Dubai, Halleh was caught with her forged Iranian documents and put in detention. Her husband immediately had to fly to Dubai from the Netherlands to show them the official invitation to get her out of detention and take Halleh along with him.

The story of Hussein

Hussein was born in 1978 in Kaladeze, a city on the border between Iraq and Iran. When the Iraqi government destroyed the city, he moved, together with his parents, to Irbil. Luckily, his family had enough money to buy a new house, and his father opened a shop where Hussein could work. As Hussein grew older, he became interested in communist ideology and acquainted himself with a local communist party – which led to trouble with Islamic Parties. One day while he and a friend were distributing flyers on the emancipation of women, they were suddenly shot at. His friend was seriously wounded, but Hussein managed to run away. He hid for a couple of days, and while in hiding, he thought about all the trouble he had experienced in recent years. Now at age 25, Hussein decided to leave it all behind. He only informed immediate family of his plan. Luckily, they were in the position to support him financially, and they even helped him find a smuggler. Hussein’s uncle contacted a friend, a Kurd from Iran, who knew the border area in detail since he was a trader (and according to Hussein, not a smuggler). Hussein’s uncle had helped this man before, and now the man could return the favour. Hussein knew he had a dangerous trip ahead of him, and as he expressed it: ‘If you travel without a passport you always run the risk of getting caught.’

If travelling without documents, passing through Iran is considered an easier route than going directly from Iraq to Turkey, because the border with Turkey is more tightly controlled. Hussein also crossed the Iraq-Iran border. One day at six o’clock in the morning, his uncle’s friend came to pick him up from the place where he was hiding. His family had helped him pack his bag, which was not an easy task because he was not supposed to bring much luggage. He had a long walking journey ahead of him and he knew it was better to pretend to be ‘travelling’ as opposed to ‘migrating’. A small bag would be more credible for the ‘travelling’ scenario.

Hussein drove with his guide to the border city, and at midnight, they crossed the Iraq-Iran border by foot. The first village in Iran was reached after five hours of walking. There, the guide had a car waiting, and they drove via Sardasht, the first city to be reached in Iran, to a vil-
lage at the Turkish border. There were two controls on the way, but they avoided them by taking smaller roads. Hussein’s guide knew the way, and everything went quite smoothly. From the border village, Hussein and his smuggler started walking again, this time towards Turkey. This was a very dangerous route, as described by many of our respondents. This passage takes between five and eight days on foot. Usually, people walk during the night and sleep during the day. At night, you hear dogs barking, the mountains are steep, and people have to hold each other while crossing particularly dangerous passages. There are many mines and the Turkish army sometimes shoots at refugees trying to cross the border. As one respondent stated: ‘No matter how silent you are, when the border police hears just about anything, they already start to shoot.’

A smuggler’s role can involve not only transporting people, but also, more generally, facilitating travel. One smuggler, for example, explained to one of our respondents that he had ‘bought the road free for that night’: there were no controls to be exchanged for money. Often smugglers inform travellers beforehand that a border crossing is troublesome, but that giving money can solve these problems. One respondent recalls:

One of the border policemen said to me: ‘We are going to help you, but are you going to help us?’ I gave him the US $200 I was advised by the smuggler to put in my passport, and I could pass. When Hussein had to cross the Iran-Turkey border, the war between the PKK and the Turkish army was going strong. It was public knowledge that refugees suspected of being PKK members who tried to cross the border were shot at. Busses at the border were also sometimes targeted for the same reason. One of our respondents said that when his bus was shot at, both the driver and the person sitting next to him were killed. Another Iraqi Kurd respondent had an experience in which the whole village where he had stayed, while in transit in Turkey, was suddenly surrounded by the Turkish army because the villagers believed them to all be PKK members.

When Hussein arrived in the first Turkish village he had time to wash, change clothes, and say goodbye to his guide, who would go back to Iran. Hussein’s uncle’s friend introduced him to a Turkish smuggler who could bring him to the next stop, Van. It was only then, upon arrival, that Hussein paid him US $100. As Hussein recalls, from the moment he began travelling with this smuggler, trouble started and the level of trust diminished. The Turkish smuggler needed to be paid the US $150 in advance. In the first village Hussein also
had to pay for drinks and food, whereas with his uncle’s friend he never had to pay for anything. In the second village, he was handed over to a new smuggler who said he could bring him to Van for US $100. This smuggler did not know anything about the deal Hussein had made with his first smuggler. Hussein felt really powerless, and simply had to pay again; there was no other solution. The farther away from home, the more people had to often rely on smugglers they did not know or whom they had not heard anything about. It was then more likely to go ‘wrong’, in the sense that people would have to pay more, might be badly treated, or cheated.

Having arrived in Van, Hussein was brought to a house and promised that from there someone could bring him to Istanbul. He had to pay US $100 again – US $50 for the bus ticket to Istanbul and US $50 for staying in the house. After two days, Hussein was brought to a highway. The smuggler told him it was impossible to get on a bus at the bus station without a passport. When the bus came, Hussein stepped in and he immediately saw there was no seat left for him. When he turned around to speak to the man who brought him there, the man was already gone. The driver told Hussein that he could come along, but that he had to stand in the aisle. After a couple hours, the bus was stopped and the Turkish police stepped on, asking for people’s identity papers. Hussein did not understand a word of Turkish. He only saw angry looking faces, because everybody in the bus had to wait for him. The driver told Hussein he had to pay US $200 to stay out of trouble, but he saw him give only US $100 to the police, and the other US $100 disappeared into the bus driver’s pocket.

Waiting room Istanbul

Certain places in the world, such as Istanbul, serve as ‘hubs’ in the smuggling process. Hubs are places where smuggled immigrants from different countries are brought so as to be grouped for onward transfer to other destinations, or to find another smuggler to continue their journey. Istanbul is a very important ‘hub’ because several routes from different countries to the EU pass through this city. One of the reasons for the attraction is its key geography, being positioned next to the EU. In these hubs, one can find transit migrants: people who come to a country temporarily, with the intention of settling in another country (IOM 1995: 127). Sometimes people become transit migrants accidentally: they may not have had intentions to further migrate, but in the end, decide to move on either because of safety reasons or limited economic opportunities in their current country of destination. Another scenario may be that their smuggler has dumped them at a particular location, even though they have paid for a complete trip to a farther
destination. Almost all our Iraqi Kurdish respondents said they had used Istanbul as a ‘waiting room’ before they continued their journey.

When Hussein arrived in Istanbul he knew, thanks to information from his uncle’s friend, to go to an area called Fatih. Fatih was described as a place where many Kurds live, as well as a place where it would be possible to find a new smuggler. After asking for directions on the street, Hussein arrived in Fatih – where the first thing he heard was Kurdish. His uncle’s friend was right! Hussein approached a Kurdish-speaking man, explaining that he was new to the area and looking for someone to bring him to a safe country. The man brought Hussein to a shop where he introduced him to someone who spoke both Kurdish and Turkish fluently and knew many smugglers. This man immediately made some phone calls and asked Hussein whether he had family somewhere in Europe. After an hour of waiting in the shop, a Kurdish man picked up Hussein. This man, who was also waiting to be brought to a safe European destination, accompanied him to an apartment where more Kurds were waiting.

In the literature, apartments for people in transit are called ‘safe houses’ (Soudijn 2001). People wait there before continuing with their travel and collect information about their next journey. Our Iraqi respondents who passed through Istanbul needed, on average, two weeks to find a new smuggler, to collect money, and to get acquainted with the route to be taken. The first night Hussein spent in his safe house in Istanbul, a smuggler already came to offer him a trip to Greece. However, it took eighteen days before Hussein and his smuggler finally left, and in the interim, the entire group of people waiting in the safe house was not allowed to leave the apartment. They were told that it was very dangerous to go out. If one were apprehended in the streets, there would be the risk of being deported. This would mean losing all money so far invested, no to mention potentially facing persecution upon arrival home. In one example, the windows of a safe house were blinded and people were explicitly forbidden to eave; however, most of the time people were simply advised not to do so. There are also smugglers who arrange a Turkish ID called a *kimlik* for their clients, but this costs additional money.

Bribing the police is a strategy to avoid deportation if apprehended. The police in Istanbul caught one of our Iraqi respondents while he was out walking on the street. They requested his ID and when he responded that he was from Iraq, they forced him into a police car and asked how much money he had. He had kept all his US dollar bills in his shoes and some Turkish Lire in his pockets. So he presented the Lire as the last of his money. But the police started to threaten the man, saying they would imprison him or deport him back to Iraq if he did not produce more money. He consequently turned over all the
money he had, and was let go. In this kind of scenario, social constructions of gender roles might create advantages for women. An Iraqi woman we interviewed was the only one allowed to leave the ‘safe house’ in Istanbul, because as a woman, she would probably not be apprehended on the street. She had even sewn an extra pocket in her underwear to store a large sum of the safe house group’s cash, seeing as women are usually not searched in Turkey. This advantage, based on gender, is echoed by research done on the border between Mexico and the US, where the police are less likely to apprehend women because they are not suspected as being ‘illegal’ migrants (Doneto & Peterson 2004).

Sometimes when migrants run out of money, they must work while in transit to finance the next leg of their journey. Our respondents who found themselves in financial trouble, while in transit, all managed to find a solution: most borrowed money from family members and/or friends abroad, some even borrowed money from people they just met in Istanbul. Others revised their initially intended terminus to a cheaper one. Being in transit can also affect the way people think about their destinations, as they may, along the way, receive more specific information about what it is like to live in certain countries, what the chances are of obtaining needed documents, and the dangers and costs involved in certain smuggling routes (see also Koser & Pinkerton 2002).

**Entering the European Union: the route via Greece**

From Turkey, six of our Iraqi respondents had a direct flight to the Netherlands, and five found a lorry or car driver who could bring them to Europe, either via the Greece/Italy or the Balkan route. The Balkan route passes either through Bulgaria or parts of the former Yugoslavia, or goes via Romania-Hungary to Austria or Germany. One of our respondents followed an even more eastern route – he took the bus from Istanbul via Trabzon to Georgia, then to Ukraine and, from there, he continued via Poland to Germany. In Berlin, he contacted his brother residing in the Netherlands, who then came to pick him up by car. Under pressure of the EU, border control has become stricter in some Eastern European countries, and as a consequence, some routes have become altered to go through Mediterranean ports (Futo & Jandl 2005; Ghosh 1998; IAM 2000). Two-thirds of our Iraqi respondents entered the EU via the southern entrance, the Turkish-Greek border.

The Turkish-Greek border can be crossed in two ways. If one travels over land, the northern route must be taken. This takes about a week of walking and the Evros River (also known as the Meric) must be crossed. After crossing this river, people usually travel to Athens via Alexandropolis, Komotini, and Thessaloniki. The southern route is a sea route, along which people cross the Agean Sea by speedboat, sail-
ing ship, or occasionally by simple inflatable boats (Icduygu 2004). Sometimes smugglers drive the boat and unload people quickly, but it also may be the case that a passenger serves as the boat ‘driver’ under instruction of the smuggler. Many boats depart from Istanbul or other Turkish coastal cities, such as Izmir, Bodrum, and Antalya, to reach one of the many small islands in the Aegean Sea (Samos, Kos, Rhodes, and Lesbos). Only a few people head directly to the Greek mainland by boat.

In the safe house in Istanbul, Hussein and some of the other migrants had agreed to go with a smuggler offering a trip to Greece via the southern route, for US $ 1,200. They would first travel to Bodrum, and from there, take a boat to one of the Greek islands. They paid everything in advance to the man who offered the trip. This man, however, did not accompany them; he had sent instead a man who took the bus with them to Bodrum. In Bodrum, they stayed at a very nice hotel for one night, and the next day very early in the morning, they went to the coast in a dolmus (a van). The man said that Greece was on the other side of the water, explaining how they had to get off the boat just before reaching the coast and swim the last stretch. The driver of the boat could then go back immediately, at high speed, without getting caught. For Hussein, this moment was really special: he had waited so long for this. Seeing the lights of Europe made him realise that a safe place was in reach. The trip, however, was terrifying. All the passengers had to hold on tight because the boat was going really fast. Within twenty minutes, they arrived in front of – what Hussein later learned to be – Kos. It was like a movie scenario: they jumped off the boat, swimming to the coast with all their clothes still on, while tourists were everywhere. The migrants had been instructed to shout for the police and identify themselves as asylum seekers. Nobody, however, came to see them, so they decided to go to the police themselves. At the police station, they were told that they would not be given permits in Greece; instead, they would be sent to Athens by boat the next day and, from there, could decide for themselves where they would go.

Transit within Europe and the differences between national asylum systems

When Hussein and the others were dropped off in Athens, the question of what to do next arose. One of the fellow travellers already knew that in Athens, Amonja was where to go to meet other Kurds. These experienced migrants could inform the new migrants on how to survive without papers, sharing not only where to get free food or where to sleep, but also providing legal advice. In Amonja, Hussein learned that it is impossible to get asylum in Greece. Having taken a liking to the Greek climate and culture, he was disappointed to discover that
he could not stay there. Hussein then had to try to get his bearings, to decide where to go next. He had heard that the only way out of Greece was to go to Patras, where one could sneak onto lorries waiting to go to Italy. In Patras, Hussein tried more than ten times to sneak onto a lorry. The drivers were very suspicious, usually checking their lorries before they left the harbour. Hussein was kicked out several times. By the time he found himself inside a lorry and heard the engine turn on, after three hours of waiting, he knew that this time it had worked out. He felt the lorry drive on board of the ship.

One danger of hiding in the back of a lorry is the possibility of suffocation. In the lorry, people normally keep two plastic containers, one with water and one for urine. It is also advised to eat light food (in anticipation of the need to defecate) and to refrain from making any noise. Children sometimes are given sleeping pills so that they remain quiet. Each time the lorry stopped, Hussein was afraid of being caught. Upon finding somebody hiding in his lorry, a driver might beat up the migrant or force him or her to pay money. When the ship stopped, Hussein knew he was in Italy. The last obstacle was figuring out how to get out of the lorry without being seen.

When people cannot get out of the lorry themselves, they are usually advised to bang on the door, but in these cases, there is always the danger of being apprehended. Fortunately, Hussein could open the door himself, though he waited until he did not hear any sound. One hour after its engine had stopped, he exited the lorry. He saw lorries everywhere, and he did not have a clue where he was. He asked the drivers in the parking place where the closest train station was, and after one hour of walking, arrived at a station to depart for Rome. On the train, Hussein was arrested. It was the first time in his life that he was handcuffed, and it felt strange because he did not feel he had done something wrong. The police sent him to prison. There he was told that he would be released and given a letter permitting him to stay in the country for fifteen days, but that he had to leave Italy before this time was up. At this point, Hussein knew he could not remain in Italy either; he had to move again.

In prison he was told that, without a passport, the only way into France was via Ventimiglia, and that a smuggler was not necessary to follow this route. Hussein thus took the train to Ventimiglia and walked across the border, experiencing no problems. From the small village of Menton, France, he took a bus to Nice and then a train to Strasbourg. Because he had been told it was also very hard to get asylum in France, he decided to continue his journey once again. He took a taxi to Germany (costing US $80), but there again, he did not stay, for he had heard rumours about racist attacks. He was also told that Kurds are more easily accepted in the Netherlands, which prompted
his decision to make the Netherlands his final destination. Hussein bought a train ticket to Amsterdam and, upon arrival, went straight to the police to ask for asylum. In total, the whole journey from Iraq to the Netherlands took six weeks and cost US $ 5,000.

5.3 The story of Oemar from Chechnya

Oemar was born in 1983 in Grozny, Chechnya. His mother is Azeri and his father, Jewish. He used to live together with them in the Jewish district of Bashirovka in Grozny. But Muslims in the surrounding areas had been intimidating. Oemar’s mother even had to quit her job because she experienced hatred as a Muslim woman who had affiliated herself with a Jew. Oemar and his brother were also bullied at school. According to Oemar, the war in Chechnya is much older than its official ten years: ‘It has always been there, not explicitly, though.’ Two years after the war officially started in 1997, Oemar’s parents sent him away. Oemar’s father was in trouble, and his mother wanted to protect her fourteen-year-old son by sending him to stay with another Jewish family in the village of Katelnikovo, near Volgograd (Russia). There he could go to school quietly and be spared from war. According to Oemar:

Katelnikovo was so small and forgotten that there was not even an asphalt road to get there. I did not like it there at all. At school I was hated. This time not because my father was a Jew, but because I was from Chechnya. Katelnikovo was a small village where everybody knew each other. These people were not too bright and didn’t understand that although I am from Grozny, I am not necessarily a Chechen.

Oemar wanted to go return to his parents and his older brother, but he could not. His parents did not allow him to come back, and besides, the borders were closed. Three years later, in 2000, his mother suddenly arrived in the village. She told him the devastating news that his father and his brother had probably been killed. They had gone to the market, but had never come back home. One of his father’s friends had come to visit his mother, telling her he would take care of everything, in reference to the funeral, and advised her to go to her son as soon as possible. From Katelnikovo, the mother and son tried to arrange their trip abroad, since returning to Chechnya would probably mean they too would be killed. The decision to migrate and ask for asylum abroad was not a difficult one. Oemar’s mother found somebody
who was willing to smuggle them through the grandfather of a family they knew.

Oemar’s mother had decided to go to the Netherlands, but Oemar does not know why. He did not ask her – nor does he want to ask her now – because she is traumatised and trying to forget everything they went through. Another Jewish family were travelling with them, but they were bound for Germany. The smugglers were Russian and their method was simple – they went by car. In total, there were two cars and, in each, two smugglers. One drove while the other rested. The other family was always behind or in front of them. They only stopped to use a restroom or to get fuel. At the border, Oemar saw the smugglers pay money to the guards; they never experienced any problems. The smugglers had told them in advance that the most difficult part would be the border between Poland and Germany, but they did not encounter problems there either.

The Odra border

For a long time, the Polish-German border was a typical example of a border that could be crossed by simply avoiding checkpoints. With the Odra River forming a large part of it, local smugglers could help migrants by informing them of areas without the presence of border guards, in so allowing them to easily cross on their own. A trick frequently used at the Polish-German border was the so-called ‘fisherman’s way’. In this set-up, a smuggler sits by the river and fishes. He usually chooses a point from which he can observe everything. Then, using either a mobile phone or a radio, he informs the rest of the migratory group of the optimal moment to cross the border. Meanwhile, the immigrants in a group, which may comprise up to twenty, have been waiting in the bushes (Krupa & Pasztelanski 1999). This crossing at the Odra River is so well known that we came across a special name for it, richnaja visa. This literally means in Russian ‘visa for the river’. Everybody knows an ordinary visa is an impossible object to obtain in the former Soviet Union. The term richnaja visa correlates crossing the Odra River with getting a visa. In the Netherlands, around 10 per cent of ‘illegal’ immigrants claim to have travelled by themselves, with the majority of this group originally coming from the former Soviet Union or the former Yugoslavia (Engbersen et al. 2002).

When Oemar and his mother crossed the Polish-German border in 2000, the situation was different than it is currently. With expansion of the EU, the Polish-German border is now relatively open, as emphasis on control has shifted eastward. A tightly controlled, nearly impermeable, border on the eastern side of Ukraine was one of the prerequisites for the country to be given EU membership. As a result, Eur-
Europe's external border has shifted from the Odra River, dividing Poland and Germany, to the Buh River, dividing Poland and Ukraine. Citizens of Poland’s former Soviet Block allies (Ukraine, Belarus, and the Russian Federation) now need a visa to cross the Polish border. Along this new border, controls and surveillance have been intensified. For Ukrainians, Poland is perceived to be like ‘the West’. With salaries five to six times higher than at home, Poland draws in a large Ukrainian population (Bernstein 2004). Moreover, transit migrants in Poland have been deciding, more and more, to make what was just a transit point their end destination (Okólski 2000). Yet, there are also Ukrainians who keep moving – to actually reach the West. In Portugal, for example, Ukrainians are currently the third-largest immigrant group, after Cape Verdians and Brazilians (Baganha et al. 2004).

When Oemar and his mother arrived in the Netherlands, the smugglers gave them a piece of paper with the address of a reception centre in Rijsbergen. Oemar and his mother changed reception centres three times in almost four years and, in the meantime, received two negative replies from immigration officials. At the time of our interview with Oemar and his mother, their status was still uncertain. In complete contrast, the other family they travelled with was almost immediately granted refugee status in Germany where they stayed on.

Such stories show how context, as well as a migrant’s own personal position at the onset of travel, impact considerably on how an ‘illegal’ journey is organised and will evolve. The next sections will take a closer look at how age, gender, and the level of insecurity a person must contend with impact the way borders are crossed, as well as migrants’ social, economic, and human capital.

5.4 How age, gender, and levels of insecurity shape border crossing

Border-crossing processes differ considerably for men versus women, the young versus the elderly, and for political refugees versus economic migrants. From the smuggler’s point of view, children, women, the elderly, and sick or injured people are a ‘burden’: they hold back an entire group that is being smuggled and increase the chances of being caught by border police. As such, there are smugglers who refuse to take on the responsibility of ‘vulnerable’ people. However, there are always exceptions. One Iraqi respondent with back problems, who wanted to migrate in order to undergo surgery in the West was supplied a horse by his smuggler so that he did not have to walk the route. At the other extreme, there are smugglers and traffickers who specifically profit from people who cannot easily travel on their own.
OCHA\textsuperscript{49} reported in 2003 how the trafficking of Somali children occurs on a large scale (Hannan 2003). Women also find themselves at a similar disadvantage due to gender-specific dangers of border crossing. As an Iraqi woman said:

For me, as a woman, it was even harder to decide what route to take. There were fewer possibilities for me because I had heard that some smugglers refuse to take women and children. For example, I heard about a route which only men could travel because you have to run through a tunnel, and if you are too slow, you may get run over by a train. And then of course, it was important to choose a trustworthy smuggler – for a woman alone, there is the risk of getting raped by your smuggler. That’s why there are so few women travelling alone.

It must be noted that gender constructions also play a role. Most of our Kurdish respondents were Sunnite Muslims, which made it more difficult for them to migrate on their own (see also Schoorl et al. 2000: 60). Arab women often must travel with their fathers, uncles, or brothers – or at least pretend to do so. One of our female Iraqi respondents pretended to visit a brother in Iran, telling the border policemen that he would pick her up directly across the border. Though this was not true, the border policeman was reassured and the woman permitted to continue her travel. Hagan (1994) reports in her study on the Maya community in Houston, Texas, that female migrants often must rely on two ‘coyotes’: one to lead her through the highlands and across the Guatemalan-Mexican border, the other to take her through Mexico and across the US-Mexico border. Usually a friend or a relative from Houston meets her once she has crossed the border into the US. Men only need one smuggler to cross the Mexico-US border. As a result of the more complicated border crossings, women pay, on average, US $1,200 in fees, while men only pay US $500.

By contrast, smuggled female respondents from the Horn of Africa often travelled unaccompanied, and did not seem to encounter problems without a male family member on hand. This may be the result of differing gender roles: African women seem to be more in control than their Arab counterparts when it comes to decisions regarding the family. Reporting less border-crossing dangers may also have to do with different concepts of safety. Men from the Horn of Africa often said they wanted their wife and children to be safe, meaning they should migrate first. For Iraqis, the reverse sequence was considered safer: men migrated first, their wives later followed. Differences in border crossings might also play a role. Women from the Horn of Africa usually travel by plane on forged documents, which is a relatively safe
way of travelling, even though the initial part of the journey is often more risky because it is over land.

Migrants from the former Soviet Union, also often travel in documented ways. Of course, general visa policies have impact on migration options because it is easier for those migrants from the former Soviet Union to arrange a visa than those in Iraq or a Horn of Africa country. Furthermore, migration options are gendered, women from the former Soviet Union can travel relatively easily via a mail-order bride agency, or through the offer of specific jobs.

Tamara is a schoolteacher from Moscow who worked on the side as a photo correspondent. She is divorced, with a son from her first marriage. Immediately after her divorce, she started to think about finding a good father for her son, saying when interviewed: ‘If I had a girl I could have raised her myself, but I think a boy needs a father.’ In Russia, Tamara did not see any opportunities to find a ‘good’ husband. As she explained: ‘It is not easy in Russia; all the good men were killed or deported in the Soviet period. The ones left are alcoholics, and they’re very conservative.’ Tamara had the opportunity to migrate to the US because she has family there. But, as she explained:

They all live there, in their own closed community. The Russians there only have contact with other Russians. I believe when you move abroad you need to adjust, learn the language and culture, and communicate with the native people. It wouldn’t feel right for me to enter such a closed community. Besides, finding a job there and improving my English would not allow me enough time to find a husband.

Tamara thus decided to start searching the Internet for websites of Russian marriage agencies – one of which she registered at. As Tamara recounted:

I had a lot of responses from Western men. Some of them replied immediately with replies such as: ‘Come to my country and I’ll be willing to marry you.’ I did not buy into these kinds of things. These men just want to get you into their beds.

Because her mother’s best friend from school lives in the Netherlands, Tamara decided to concentrate her search for a good husband there. One day she bought a ticket, and was soon informing the marriage agency of her imminent trip to the Netherlands. She had made comfortable arrangements to stay with her mother’s friend, from whom she had already received an invitation. The agency then informed all its male clients in the Netherlands that Tamara was coming.
From that moment on, I started to get more letters from Dutch guys. I fell in love with one of the candidates, Jan. I fell in love with him from his second letter on. He was very romantic. He is 22 years older than I am, but I don’t care. When I would come to the agency I always asked for my favourite guy, so everybody knew I liked him the most. And we used to talk for four or five hours on the phone at night, when my son was already in bed.

The agency advised Tamara not to focus on just one person, but it soon became clear that she did not want to see men other than Jan.

Jan had been so clever to pick me up from the airport, to show me the beach, and from the second day on, I did not stay at my mother’s friend’s place any longer, but at his place. Together we cancelled all the other dates I had.

After Tamara went back to Russia, Jan started to visit her and her son in Moscow: ‘He came almost every month. And one day he suggested we could come to Holland, so that we could finally live all together.’ Tamara and her son first travelled on a three-month visa, but even before returning to Russia, they decided to apply for a permanent stay. All three now live together in the Netherlands.

Sometimes other, third parties contact smugglers so as to get people out of their country of origin as soon as possible. Obviously, migrants who must hide have fewer resources than people who are freer and less time-pressed to actively seek what opportunities there are in Westward migration. Local newspapers in former Soviet Union countries often publish advertisements on foreign travel and job opportunities. They sometimes even openly advertise travel visas and advise on the best way to emigrate to Western Europe. Apart from the fact that people may be forced to contact one specific smuggler without sufficient time to consider their other options, the route ultimately followed may also be influenced by a migrant’s past and related fears. For instance, one day Yuri, who worked at a top-secret military post in Azerbaijan, had to escape from the FSB (Russian Federal Security Service). But because he only had a military ID and held no passport, he could not book an international flight for himself. Moreover, the situation was risky – being caught travelling on his military ID would have led to prosecution by the Ukrainian government. Yuri was offered the opportunity to fly to Moscow on a forged passport and from there, he could take the train to the Netherlands. But sure that the Russian and the Ukrainian governments worked closely, he was terrified that he could be caught in Moscow. He thus refused to pass through the city. Yuri
consequently took an alternative route: from Dagestan passing through Belarus, Poland, and Germany, to finally arrive in the Netherlands. On a Dutch visa, with a forged passport, completely via bus, this route took far longer than if it would have if Yuri had flown. But, as his story exemplifies, personal fear can influence the way borders are crossed. Barsky (2000) and Collyer (2003) come to the same conclusion in their observation that some refugees specifically do not want to migrate to nations with which their own countries have good political relations, because they see such ‘good’ relations as increasing the likelihood of deportation.

5.5 How social, economic, and human capital shape border crossing

The importance of strong and weak ties

As chapter four revealed, at the time of our interviews with them, half the respondents had social connections abroad. Migration may be made possible when people abroad officially invite prospective migrants. For irregular migrants it was shown by Staring (1999) and Engbersen et al. (2002) that, more than other migrants, labour migrants made use of the ‘visiting’ option by becoming part of settled migrant communities. Most labour migrants entered under the classification of ‘visitor’ and then overstayed their visa. But it’s a different picture for newcomers. When more detailed questions were asked regarding the help our respondents received from the people they knew abroad, it became clear that what counts it is not so much if a migrant knows people abroad, but how well the migrant knows these people and whether they are in a position to assist in the migration process. Distant relatives or remote friends abroad might, for example, prefer to reserve help for their immediate family. This is illustrated by the story of a Russian couple we interviewed, who were faced with constraints because of their family’s unwillingness to support them:

The only problem is that it is necessary to find a person who is willing to take responsibility for you. I have a cousin in the United States, but this cousin has a brother who also wants to migrate. My cousin told me that she would rather take responsibility for her immediate family than for us, and she could not afford to support two families. I understood her attitude, but still, it made it very difficult for us to move.

Apart from those reluctant to help, some family members of our respondents found it very difficult to officially invite and/or support
others financially, as much as they would have liked to. These difficulties are often related to the financial and legal situation in which migrants abroad find themselves. In the Netherlands, the person who offers the invitation must legally reside in the country, have a permanent working contract, and earn more than 120 per cent of the minimum wage to guarantee the stay of his/her guest. Most of our respondents’ social ties abroad were ineligible to act as sponsors. To make matters more complicated, there are also migrants who specifically do not want to go where there is a large ethnic diaspora, so as to avoid socially stifling situations, for example in the case of Tamara. As such, these migrants may deliberately choose to go to places where they have no connections.

Those migrants who do not have a social network abroad – or cannot (or opt not) to make use of one – exploit such potential connections by relying on smugglers and/or other intermediaries. These connections can be called ‘migration-specific social capital’ (Massey & Espinosa 1997). The migration process is affected by whether a migrant might know an experienced migrant who has previously crossed the border in a clandestine way, is acquainted with a smuggler, or is in touch with somebody offering other relevant connections. One woman we interviewed, for example, made use of her mother’s connection to a stewardess working for Kenyan Airlines. It allowed her to leave the country free of charge and free of complications. Specific contacts may thus have considerable impact on the smuggling process’ evolution. Most of our respondents found their initial smuggler through family members, friends, or acquaintances. It is interesting to note that, rather than immediate relatives, it was more often the so-called ‘weaker’ ties (friend-of-a-friend sorts) who facilitated finding contacts to get in touch with smugglers. As Granovetter (1973) describes, ‘strong’ ties (family members, friends, etc.) seem eminent in sustaining one’s livelihood, because of the mutual trust and greater motivation to help each other. However, people benefit more broadly from contact with members of other networks – weak ties – because they span greater social distance that reach a larger number of people.

Those to whom we are weakly tied are more likely to move in circles different from our own and thus will have access to information different from that which we receive (Granovetter 1973: 1371). Often, money replaces social capital in these ‘alternative’ opportunities of a commercial nature.

‘I went as far as my money would take me’ (Van Hear 2004)

As our empirical data was collected in the Netherlands, little can be said about differences found when comparing those who only migrate
to neighbouring countries versus those who are forced to stay in transit countries. Nevertheless, research material shows that there are hierarchies of destinations for migrants, as designated according to the available resources of a country. For the majority of refugees, there is no other option than to stay within the region where they already find themselves. For those who do have the resources to migrate any farther, there is also a hierarchy of preferred destinations. In the Netherlands, we came across stories of people for whom the US or Canada was too expensive; Europe was their second choice. While there exists some data on related smuggling fees, it is very much a smattering across policy papers, migration bulletins, and the media. Furthermore, there are a number of impediments when it comes to comparing the data on smuggling fees already in existence (Petros 2005). First of all, little distinction has been made between smuggling and trafficking fees in the data. The perspective on costs may therefore also differ: sometimes there was an accounting for the price smuggled migrants paid, and in other cases, for the debt incurred from being trafficked. Secondly, the locational details with which fees are reported differs: some sources provide costs over specific countries, others reflect only the costs within broad regions. Thirdly, it is not clear who exactly is moving at such a price: a family or an individual. Fourthly, prices are often provided without situating related details of the journey. For example, it is very often unclear whether the fee was only to guide someone across a border, or if travel tickets, shelter, and food costs were also included. When several smugglers are used, it can be difficult to measure the total amount paid across various fields of service. Still, it remains interesting to compare the prices paid in different areas, by different people, using different smuggling methods. Van Liemt (2004) has compiled sources of information on smuggling fees.

Our data also shows that smuggling fees differ across destinations and according to smuggling methods (such as means of transportation, the use of documents or lack thereof). For people from the Horn of Africa, timing of travel also mattered. Of our interviewees who arrived during the early 1990s, migrants paid, on average, US $ 1,000 for a trip to the Netherlands. Those who came later paid around US $ 5,000. In the literature, there are indications that smuggling fees have doubled since 9/11, with the average amount Somalis pay increasing to US $ 7,000 per trip (Hannan 2003). Before 9/11, it was easier to get on a plane as a Somali traveller; now customers are checked more frequently, and at more places. Consequently, the need for higher-quality forgeries has driven the smuggling fees up.

Our interviewees from Iraq paid between US $ 4,000 and US $ 10,000, depending on the route taken and the method used. The two people who had paid US $ 10,000 came via plane on high-quality
forged documents, while all the others travelled over land and paid less. For people from the former Soviet Union, obtaining a visa was typically the most expensive part of the process. Although the standard price for a visa may not be so costly, travel agencies can charge additional money since there are so many people wanting to leave the country who do not fulfil the entry criteria. Again, prices varied over time. For example, people in Ukraine mentioned paying US $ 200 for a tourist visa in 1999, while in 2001, others paid US $ 300, and in 2002, someone paid US $ 500. A couple who travelled with a smuggler from L’vov, in western Ukraine, to the Netherlands paid US $ 10,000 altogether (US $ 6,000 paid in advance). From Chechnya, the price for two was ‘only’ US $ 4,000 (US $ 3,000 paid in advance). This shows how the prices paid for smuggling do not follow a distance-determined logic nor do they keep in specific accordance with the market.

Human smuggling and human capital

Singer & Massey (1998) have developed a theoretical model that views undocumented border crossing as a social process influenced by the kinds of capital migrants bring with them. Apart from social and eco-
nomic capital, they add human capital – in the form of personal experience and information – as an important social factor for the border-crossing model. Those who are informed can make better choices on where and with whom to cross. Being informed is also crucial in the sense that it can determine what route and destination migrants chose. At the Mexico-US border migrants often cross the border several times as they come and go. These so-called circular migrants can also profit from personal experience. ‘Although a person’s first crossing may be intimidating and fraught with difficulties, once entry has been accomplished, the prospect of undertaking another trip does not seem so daunting; and on the third or fourth trip, it may even seem routine’ (Singer & Massey 1998: 4). Repeat border crossings were atypical among our respondents, except for some people from countries in the former Soviet Union, who decided to cross the German-Polish border on their own after having previously crossed with a smuggler. Human capital, in this case, substitutes for economic capital – saved is the cost of hiring someone to assist with border crossing. In general, information plays a crucial role in almost all smuggling processes.

A commonly conjured image of the relation between smugglers and migrants is one that portrays the smuggler as out to collect as many clients as possible in order to make large profits. As a result, the contact phase between smugglers and migrants is often simplistically described as a one-way process (Salt & Stein 1997). Frequently overlooked in some cases is the possibility that migrants themselves might need – and consequently, contact – a smuggler. The empirical research collected in our study of the Netherlands shows that migrants themselves, actively look for smugglers, and that it is very important for them to find a ‘good’ smuggler to travel with in order to minimise risks. As previously stated, people can find smugglers through their own individual contacts. But according to our respondents, there are also certain spots renowned as places where one can find smugglers. The recruitment then is actually quite centralised. As one Iraqi man explained to us:

If you don’t know a smuggler yourself, or you don’t know anybody who knows smugglers, you can go to the bazaar or to a certain teahouse, both of which are known as meeting points for smugglers.

At such places, rumours may circulate about what it is like to travel in a given way, and who is or is not a good smuggler. An Iraqi woman explained to us that she heard a lot of miserable stories before she herself had left, well knowing the risks that could be involved in the smuggling trip.
I heard that many people get lost, that people pay too much money, and that they get cheated, for example by smugglers who drive in circles or who just sail for a while and then set ashore in the same country where they left from. And all these stories about leaking boats and people that drown. Horrible. The most horrible story I had heard was about a man who was in a small boat together with his pregnant wife, and when the boat capsized, his wife drowned in front of him. He himself had to swim for two days to reach shore.

For those who do not know smugglers personally, the most trustworthy information comes from other migrants who have previously travelled in a similar way themselves. The following fragment of an interview with an Iraqi man illustrates the important role of information for the continued evolution of the smuggling process.

Before I even left Iraq, a friend of my nephew already had given me the telephone number of a smuggler that I could contact in Istanbul. So, the first thing I did when I arrived in Istanbul was to look for a phone booth. When I called him, it unfortunately turned out that he was still in Van [Turkish city at the eastern border] with another group of people, and it would take him three more days before he was back in Istanbul. I was disappointed, but when I stepped out of the telephone booth, I met three men from Iraq, also waiting for their smuggler. They told me that their smuggler would bring them to Europe tomorrow, and they told me I could easily join them. The hostel I had to stay in was quite expensive. And, there was a danger of getting caught by the Turkish police and being sent back to Iraq, but still I decided to wait for the smuggler recommended by the friend of my nephew, as I thought that was more secure.

As this story demonstrates, some migrants really prefer a smuggler they have heard positive stories about, even when other ‘good’ offers are made. Most of our respondents from the former Soviet Union also first tried to gather information about travelling abroad through family and friends before deciding to contact an agency.

**Conclusion**

Inside perspectives make it possible to provide a more complex and dynamic picture of what smuggling is and how differently its process can evolve. Smuggling is often portrayed as a process in which all phases – mobilisation, en route, insertion – are connected and follow each other
in a linear way (Salt & Stein 1997). Hussein’s story, however, illustrates very well how dynamic the smuggling process can be. People may require several transits before reaching their end destination, or they might be detained, or even deported back home. Moreover, people in transit may come across information or meet other smugglers, which can impact their decision-making process. Moreover, the inside perspective makes it possible to consider country- and/or situation-specific opportunities and constraints to migration. For example, for people in refugee camps who are not considered the ‘most vulnerable’, resettlement is not an option. This exclusionary categorisation may turn such people into the hands of smugglers. Or, when people at a refugee camp may feel unsafe and/or fear deportation, they may also decide not to wait for official resettlement, thereby contacting a smuggler so as to migrate sooner. In other cases, it is not always easy to get out of a country, thereby forcing people to utilise smugglers. An extreme illustration of this came from an Iraqi woman who was allowed to enter the Netherlands, but could not leave Iraq to thus take advantage of the legal opportunity at the receiving end. This shows that it is not only the receiving country’s policies that may lead to smuggling, but also the country of origins’ policies.

In the case of former Soviet Union countries, it is often visa policy and related EU accession decisions that determine where, and under which heading, one can legally travel. Polish or Lithuanian passports, for example, give access into Europe, and altering one’s biography may be sufficient to travel in a semi-legal way. By looking at various border crossings, it also becomes clear that opportunities and constraints differ from place to place, and create variety in smuggling processes. For instance, corruption at Kenyan airports makes it possible to smuggle migrants by air, while collaboration amidst a long tradition by Kurdish smugglers in Iraq, Iran, and Turkey make smuggling over land possible. The lack of Somali embassies and the restrictions on Somali passport fuels the forged passport industry, whereas in former Soviet Union countries, there are more legal opportunities to migrate as well as a greater likelihood of finding a loophole within the legal framework.

Personal characteristics such as age, gender, and the level of insecurity faced by a migrant also impact the way borders are crossed. Women, minors, and reactive migrants – those who must leave immediately – make different calculations than men, adults, and those who have time to prepare their travel more carefully. The social, economic, and human capital migrants take with them also impacts how borders are crossed. If one has enough money, border crossing will be faster, safer, and more direct. The same advantages hold true if one has relevant contacts with family or friends already residing abroad. In addition, good contacts with smugglers, officials working at airports and
embassies, or border control authorities also affect how the migration process evolves. If migrants do not have any such contacts they can still try to become well-informed themselves; as such, human capital and migration-specific information play a crucial role. Smugglers and migrants often have mutual interest in this process, especially when smugglers are directly or indirectly part of the migrants’ social network. Migrants may actively look for smugglers and, simultaneously, smugglers may try to promote themselves. Smugglers may additionally have an interest in maintaining customer satisfaction if they are bound to the community back home. This situation makes the process’ evolution more complex than the stereotyped depiction of a merciless criminal exploiting a passive victim. The next chapter further addresses the relationship between the smuggler and the migrant and its importance for understanding human smuggling processes.
6 Different types of smuggling and internal dynamics

In addition to understanding why people use the services of smugglers, and how the starting position of a migrant impacts the smuggling process, it is also important to know more about who smugglers are and how they are organised. This chapter provides an overview of different types of smugglers found through our fieldwork in the Netherlands among smuggled immigrants from Iraq, the Horn of Africa, and the former Soviet Union. Interviews with smuggled migrants do not provide the full picture of how smuggling is organised, but an attempt is made to link the empirical findings to IOM’s classification, as described in chapter two. The empirical material allows us to take a look beyond the usual way smuggling processes are described and to have an inside perspective into the process of human smuggling. What we can then see is how internal dynamics evolve, and how different smugglers’ modus operandi have varying outcomes in smuggling processes.

Smuggled migrants who have ended up in the Netherlands may have gone through different smuggling experiences, and some may not even have opted for the Netherlands as their final destination. The Netherlands is famous for its effective and extensive transport infrastructure, including venues such as Schiphol Airport and the Rotterdam harbour, that make it an easy country to enter and a convenient place to transfer migrants (see also Bijleveld & Taselaar 2000; Staring et al 2005). Chapter seven takes a closer look at what it may mean vis-à-vis the position of migrants in Dutch society to arrive in a country, by chance, where one hardly knows anybody and/or where one may not have access to a legal status.

6.1 Classifications of smuggling types

Occasional smugglers and small-scale network

Chapter two presented IOM’s classification of smuggling types. Based on our data, we could say that the experiences from our Iraqi respondents fit the first and the second types of smuggling of this classification: the occasional smuggler and the small-scale network. In the literature, this is referred to as ‘mom-and-pop’ smuggling (Kyle & Liang
In the beginning of the journey, respondents from Iraq often used an occasional smuggler who worked in the border area between Iraq, Iran, and Turkey. Usually borders were crossed in clandestine, often dangerous ways. Clandestine crossings mostly occur on foot or by boat, in the middle of the night, and in isolated areas. Some smugglers walk with their clients across borders, but it may also be the case that the smuggler simply shows the migrants the way. In the latter scenario, the smuggler only provides information. Modern technology has made it easier for smugglers to have contact with other smugglers, as well as to guide their clients from a distance. Besides, most smugglers know exactly when and where the controls are placed.

Some smugglers only lead people across the border to leave them on their own afterwards, but there are also those who provide their clients with a phone number or ensure there is someone at the next stage to help them. A Kurdish smuggler interviewed in Icduygu's research explains how this works.

I usually handle the route between Van and Istanbul, but I also help the people in establishing contacts for the continuation of their journeys from Istanbul onwards, I can make arrangements from Istanbul to Italy by boat. I just call friends in Italy, to tell them that I am sending people who want to go to Italy. I can even make arrangements for them after Italy. (Icduygu 2004: 84)

This smuggler could be classified as being part of a small-scale network. However, the exact composition of the network and the intensity of the cooperation within it are not clear. How often does this smuggler really collaborate with his ‘friends’ from Italy? And are these friends, themselves, connected to one other, or do they each have their own business? Interviews with smuggled migrants provide little information on how smugglers may relate to other smugglers. Migrants usually only have contact with smugglers working on the ground, lacking insight into the hierarchy of smuggling organisations.

As part of these small-scale networks, besides the smugglers who actually do the transporting, there are also those who provide shelter and middlemen who bring migrants to the next smuggler. But attempting to place these smugglers or their roles in simple classifications is difficult; people may even work for several smugglers at one time. Additionally, migrants who are waiting to continue their journey might become part of the local ‘support staff’, blurring the line between who is a smuggler and who is a migrant. For example, in the refugee camp of Sangatte, in France, some migrants who had been there for a long time became the helpers – or more literally translated, the ‘dogsodies’ or
touts – of smugglers. The responsibility of touts is to recruit clients for smugglers. They spend most of their time at the camp’s entrance gate, and as soon as newcomers arrive, they explain the main features of the camp and arrange meetings with smugglers (Courau 2003). Potential migrants often place more trust in other migrants, and for those in transit, helping smugglers can be an easy way to make money to finance the rest of the trip.

Large-scale networks

We came across only two examples of smuggling organised by a large-scale third-party organisation. Of course there may have been discrepancies in our research, since people travelling in this way may be reluctant to speak about it. One example we found was in the case of Sheila, whose story was outlined in chapter four. Coming from Sierra Leone, Sheila did not pay anything for her trip to the Netherlands. A Dutch man arranged everything for journey, including forged papers, and she was brought directly from Sierra Leone to the Netherlands. However, upon arrival, she was forced to have sex with the man who transported her, and he also tried to force her to work in a brothel where he had connections with the owner. Apart from this trafficking case, we came across another example of smuggling by a large criminal organisation. A Russian family who lived in Tajikistan was forced to leave the country due to persecution. Through their neighbour, they managed to contact Russian smugglers who made their escape possible. As the son tells it:

One night, while we were sleeping all together in the bedroom of my mother, the apartment was torched. While the living room was burning, we escaped from the bedroom, and left the apartment through the entrance door. We then all went to my place and were hiding there for two months. We never left the building, afraid of being found. The neighbour, an older Russian lady, brought us food and kept us updated. It was a horrible time. We weren’t even turning the lights on in the evening. This old lady somehow managed to find smugglers who could bring us to Europe. I didn’t know how she found them. I only know that she didn’t know them personally, but found them through other people. They were professional smugglers. They were Russians. They smuggled weapons, drugs, and people – I would say, they would smuggle anything you ask, wherever you ask. I had to pay them a total of US $ 4,000, for the three of us. The entire amount had to be paid beforehand. And I didn’t know where they were taking us.
This description of Russian smugglers involved in other ‘illegal’ business reflects the possible relationship of smuggling with organised crime. However, in this case, this assumption was largely based on preconceived notions; the Russian family had no real contact with these smugglers and did not know who they were. The fact that they had to pay for everything beforehand but did not even know where they were going, however, may also reflect a more professional type of smuggling organisation. Both of these cases serve as examples of large-scale networks; for the Russian family, the whole migration trajectory was covered by one, clearly managed organisation consisting of several people. Moreover, it seems likely that the smugglers were part of a larger criminal network involved in activities other than smuggling, but this cannot be claimed for sure. Situations in which forged, fraudulent, or borrowed documents are used are more difficult to classify. If we apply the strict technical definition of smuggling to the entire process, many more of our respondents would fall under the category of ‘large-scale’ smuggling, even if they so much as used a forged passport.

6.2 A look at who else is involved in the smuggling ‘business’

By taking a broader look at human smuggling, different types of smugglers become evident (see also Van Liempt 2004). Ordinary enterprises, such as travel agencies, can make migration possible for people who do not have access to these options. IOM has neglected to address kinds of smuggling cases in which the borders between legal and ‘illegal’ activities are blurred. Should agencies involved in helping people without authorisation to cross the borders be classified as large-scale smuggling? Chapter four presented the story of Anna, a woman who entered the Netherlands as a tourist through the help of an agency and now works in the informal economy. Remarkably little is known about the exact involvement of these agencies in current migration processes. However, in many places in the world, their advertisements dominantly stress possibilities for work abroad (Kuptsch 2006).

Agencies involved in migration processes can be distinguished by the legal or ‘illegal’ nature of the agency and by the legal or ‘illegal’ nature of the service they provide. A distinction therefore can be made between legal travel agencies providing ‘illegal’ services on the side (as was the case with Anna’s agency) versus ‘illegal’ agencies providing ‘illegal’ services. Both could be prosecuted for their ‘illegal’ activities, such as forging the certificates from which visas are issued. Further complicating matters, agencies involved in the migration business may not know that their clients are misusing their services for other pur-
poses. A telling example may be found in the group holiday packages that people book, though they have already decided beforehand that, at a certain point, they will deliberately ‘lose’ the group. It can also be the case that smugglers – in the strict sense of the word – do not know they are part of a smuggling operation. In Greece, for example, many migrants try to sneak onto lorries waiting to make the crossing into Italy. Their drivers do not always know they are ‘smuggling’ someone. On the other hand, they may ask migrants for money when they find people have been hiding in their lorries. In these cases, mere transporters instantly become smugglers.

All sorts of people can earn money on the side by facilitating some part of the smuggling process, whether frequently or occasionally, professionally or individually. Some people might even be involved in smuggling without pay. Historical examples are easy to find, such as smugglers helping Jews escape Nazi persecution during the Second World War. Political parties may also be involved in smuggling, even though it is difficult to substantiate this claim since political parties are unlikely to admit this. They may be involved in smuggling people as a way to internationalise their party’s political struggle or to help their own party members escape danger. Papadopoulou (2002) found that some of the Kurdish asylum seekers in Greece had been helped by their party. In our interviews, we also came across an example of such smuggling, not from a Kurdish respondent, but an Eritrean woman aided by her party to leave the country.

One day a man approached me and told me that I had to hide for a while. Apparently, there were problems and my political group could be in trouble. I had never seen this man before, but this was the way we usually worked: we didn’t know each other, we only knew one person. If something would go wrong, yet you knew everybody in the organisation, it could be a real problem. Now, if they catch me, I can only talk about one person, because I only know one.

After a month, somebody came and told me that I had to leave now. I was not really surprised. He had bought a bus ticket for me to Asmara. In Asmara, somebody waited for me where the bus stops. I simply followed him. We then went to a house where we had lunch and where I was prepared for the trip. I was very nervous; there were so many things that could go wrong. You have no idea what can happen to you. I didn’t have any clothing with me, but they gave me some things from the house. I remember that I had two or three clothes; this is one of them [points at her sweatshirt]. I still wear it. They asked me to
get ready and I had to go to a place called ‘Nederland’. I didn't know anything about ‘Nederland’ – well I knew there was a place called like this – but I didn't know what it was exactly. They told me how I had to travel, I had to take a plane from Asmara to Cairo, and then to Frankfurt, and the last stop would be Amsterdam and that would be my destination. They paid for everything: the ticket, the passport. It was not my own passport I travelled on. It was a Djibouti passport, with my photo on it. I did not pay anything. They also told me that there would not be problems at the airport; I believe they had some connections. Usually it is very difficult to get out of the country, but I didn't have a problem, they simply said: ‘Go, go, go.’

At Schiphol Airport a man was waiting for me, I had to give the passport back to him, and he bought me a train ticket to Rotterdam. That was it. He did not tell me anything about asylum or anything. ‘Just ask people in the streets,’ he said, nothing more. I did not know anybody and I felt very lonely.

As Hussein's story illustrated in chapter five, bus drivers and policemen may also profit from the fact that migrants need to use their services to cross borders. For people coming from the Horn of Africa and taking an air route, airline employees and officials were also often involved in smuggling processes. This connection with institutional officials may also be a criterion on which to base the smuggling organisation a professional one.

6.3 How did migrants perceive their smuggler?

Before suggesting another way of classifying smuggling types, it is important to realise that from migrants’ perspectives, there is often little stigma attached to the smuggling business. As mentioned before, there are few migrants who would testify against their smuggler, either because they perceive him or her as a helper, or because they know of other migrants who will need the same services. The general pattern that emerged from the interviews we conducted with smuggled migrants is that most migrants perceive smugglers as a ‘necessary evil’. Smugglers offer alternatives to those who do not have access to documents, or cannot travel in a legal way because their country is at war. As a man from Iraq explains:
If you want to travel from countries in war you need a shield. For us, smugglers are like a shield. You only have to buy the shield. This shield however is quite expensive.

Smuggling can thus be ‘illegal’, but licit, or socially accepted, at the same time. It can also be part of a local tradition. In the Kurdish part of Iraq, the smuggling of human beings often takes place along the same routes where goods have been smuggled for years. As an Iraqi respondent said:

In this region smuggling is part of our economy. It is a way of life. On the thousand-years-old Silk Road, whatever item needed is smuggled, that is part of a tradition. In politically turbulent times, it is even people who are smuggled.

The Kurdish situation is even more particular: because state borders are not recognised by the Kurds, it is easier to justify smuggling activities. Kurdish smugglers at one end of the border work closely together with Kurdish smugglers at the other end.

By analysing the way migrants talk about their smuggler, it is possible to get a better idea of how smugglers are qualified, and what criteria are used to base these judgements on. Most of the migrants we interviewed did not use the actual term ‘human smuggler’, but talked about smugglers as professionals who offer alternatives to legal migration. From the Horn of Africa, people often used the word ‘carrier’. More specifically, among the Somali community, a smuggler was often referred to as mukhali. Mukhalis are described in the literature as alternative migration experts who reduce the chance of getting caught. The expression hambaar is also used. Hambaar refers more generally to ‘illegal’ border crossing and the ‘bringing in’ of ‘illegals’ (Farah 2000), but it is also used with regard to the trafficking of children (Hannan 2003).

Most of the Kurds from Iraq called their smuggler ‘qachaqchi’ or ‘muharrib’. ‘Muharrib’ comes from the word ‘harraba’, which means ‘to help someone run away’ (Doornbos & Shalmashi 2001). Although there may be fewer stigmas attached to smuggling than assumed, migrants are still proactive as they decide for themselves with whom to travel or not. One Iraqi woman, for example, made a clear distinction between qachaqchi and helpers. She explains:

The word qachaqchi means ‘bad person’ – I mean, it refers to a smuggler, or something like this, but it has a strong negative connotation. Actually, it means ‘I am going to ask you for a lot of money’. The people who helped me were simple guides, no
qachaqchi. My Turkish helper was really nice. He had a migration past himself. He was a real adventurous type, he did very exciting things, but I would not call him a qachaqchi. I paid money, yes, but if you go with qachaqchi you probably also have to sleep with him, as a woman, I mean. I did not have to do that.

The woman makes a connection between qachaqchi and profit-making, and between qachaqchi and rape. As such illustrations show, links made to the mafia or organised crime are not advantageous. It is better for smugglers to have the reputation of ‘helper’, rather than having any association with that of a criminal. Smugglers may also have ideological motivations to be in the business, such as wanting to help people escape dangerous situations or war. Of course, it is difficult to completely separate profit-making motives from others, as smugglers can conceivably be both criminals earning a lot of money from people’s despair, as well as lifesavers. Smugglers may also deliberately position themselves as ‘helpers’. Still, smugglers’ motives turned out to be an important factor on which migrants based their judgments. Usually people tried to avoid smugglers they believed were only in the business for money. Those who charged exorbitant prices, for instance, were perceived as harder to trust.

Other characteristics our respondents attributed to a ‘good’ smuggler were related to their nationality or ethnicity; someone with the same background was entrusted more easily than a ‘stranger’. In general, those who were helped by family members or friends usually had brighter memories of the smuggling process and spoke in a far more positive way about smugglers than those who travelled with unknown, anonymous people. Some migrants even used cultural arguments to motivate their smugglers’ behaviour:

He was a friend of the family, he is not a smuggler. He just helped us, that is something you do in our culture.

Another characteristic was related to the contacts smugglers had with officials or with other smugglers. An Ethiopian man explained how his first meeting with a smuggler took place and how important it was for him to know that this man had good contacts.

Some friends, or actually acquaintances, of mine had given me the telephone number of a smuggler in Kenya. I did not really know them, but they were the ones with contacts. When I was in Kenya I called this man and we made an appointment. He was very professional. At our first appointment, he did not show
Later, he told me that he had been there, at our first appoint-
ment, but that he was only observing me. He was very careful
with people he did not know personally. At the next appoint-
ment, he offered me a trip to Germany. I travelled as though I
were working for Ethiopian Airlines. He was a good smuggler
because he had good contacts.

Apart from the important qualification of having good contacts, this in-
terview fragment also shows that it is not only migrants who actively
orientate themselves to their circumstances. Smugglers also have an
interest in knowing who they are dealing with. Smuggling remains a
cover activity, and migrants may, at any point, turn their smuggler
over to the police.

A last interesting point that highlights the way people talk about
their smuggler is the actual smuggling experience. Those who spoke
negatively about smugglers had all had bad personal experiences with
smugglers. In one instance, an interviewee who had been promised
Sweden as a final destination but ended up in the Netherlands, had no
good word to say about smugglers.

They are criminals; they do everything for money. They cheated
me just for the money. They ruined my whole future.

6.4 The internal dynamics of smuggling and the role of trust

Our data suggests that it is not sufficient to only look at how smug-
glers cooperate among themselves. Migrants are not passive actors;
their relative power and their subsequent decisions may differ from
smuggling type to type. Moreover, as it turns out, trust plays a vital role
in the decision-making process of both migrants and smugglers (see
also Bilger et al. 2006, Van Liempt & Doomernik 2006b). In order to
include these elements in our classification of smuggling types, we
decided to focus on the internal dynamics of human smuggling. By in-
ternal dynamics, I refer specifically to the type of relations that exists
between smugglers and migrants, as well as the relative power mi-
grants hold within the smuggling process.

The relation between the smuggler and the migrant

Chapter five discussed how smugglers are often friends of friends, at
least in the initial phase of the smuggling process, and that the deci-
sions migrants make regarding smugglers are very often based on
trust. Personal relations make it less likely that smugglers will betray
their clients, which can impact the smuggling process considerably. In one of our interviews, a man from northern Iraq described his smuggler’s panic when something went wrong with someone he personally had known in the group.

Taha had a special status in the group because the smuggler knew his parents. He was the first to cross the river together with the smuggler. But before they had reached the other side, I saw the boat capsize, and Taha fell into the water. The river took him and he was gone – just like that. This image keeps coming back to me. It was horrible. The river was so cruel. I will never forget this. The smuggler completely freaked out. He wanted to go back to Turkey and kept mumbling: ‘What do I tell his family? How do I explain this?’ He told the group it was impossible to continue. We all went back to Istanbul. This was an expensive decision, because we went by taxi and the smuggler paid for it all.

This example clearly underscores how understanding the internal dynamics of smuggling can be crucial, adding another dimension altogether to the smuggling process. When migrants do not know their smuggler personally, they must rely on their reputed trustworthiness as well as assess risk-reducing strategies. Smugglers, therefore, also have an interest in presenting themselves as trustworthy. ‘Guarantees’ are one way a smuggler may strategise the gaining of migrant’s trust. When a guarantee is on offer, the condition is that, for a fixed price mutually agreed upon, a client may try as many times as needed to reach the goal destination. Guarantees are common at risky border crossings where the chance of getting caught is high. For instance, an Iraqi respondent who wanted to cross into Italy discovered in the harbour of Patras the existence of something like a guarantee.

There are people helping you to find a truck that will make the crossing into Italy, which you can then sneak into. If I failed to get aboard the boat, they said I could try again. That is what they call a ‘guarantee’, because you only have to pay once. But of course it is ‘illegal’, and there is in fact no guarantee. But anyway, I tried because otherwise I could not move at all, and I thought this was the safest way.

Offering a guarantee sends a strong signal to clients that their smuggler’s intention is not only to take their money; smugglers are also concerned about their clients’ migratory success rate.
Beyond guarantees, the price requested may also be a reflection of relations between the smuggler and the client. In some cases, the amount may decrease if the individual shares the same nationality as the smuggler. Lahlou (2002) found price fluctuations for crossing the Morocco-Southern Spain stretch; for Moroccans the cost was US $ 200 to US $ 350, and for non-Moroccans, the price went up five times, costing US $ 1,000 to US $ 1,200 (see figure 2 taken from Van Liemt 2004). In another example, two French journalists who wanted to make the crossing from Sub-Saharan Africa to Fuerteventura, to make a documentary on human smuggling paid € 2,000 each, twice the price refugees paid (Contrast 05/11/ 2004). These examples show that smugglers depending on only their own community for clients will take greater care in building up trust than those smugglers who work with numerous people and have a broader range of clients.

The payment method as a way to illustrate internal dynamics

Apart from the range of prices, the terms for payment transaction are also useful in illustrating the different relations that may exist between smugglers and their clients. For the smuggler, it is a risk to permit the migrant to pay only upon arrival, since the migrant might run away without having compensated anything, or the migrant may be apprehended by authorities along the way, which would also leave the smuggler empty-handed. However, when migrants pay everything in advance created is a relationship of financial dependence. Migrants may then run the risk of not getting what they paid for. They might be abandoned, dropped somewhere along the road, or lose everything should the smuggler not turn up in the first place. It may also be the case that smugglers offer to lend migrants money to finance the journey. But for the migrant, this could mean entering into a debt situation with the smuggler, and therefore increasing his or her risk of being exploited. Being in debt opens up the migrant to different levels of vulnerability, which may result in scenarios whereby paying off debts is connected to forced prostitution or other exploitative working conditions.

In our research, we did not come across migrants who had entered debt bondage contracts with their smugglers, apart from Sheila who had not paid anything though was promised a trip to Europe, and then forced to work in the sex industry upon her arrival in the Netherlands. All the others who needed money to finance their journey borrowed from family and friends. Contrary to the popular belief that the Chinese migration process relies on loan sharks, Chin (1999) found that most of the 300 smuggled Chinese migrants he studied had borrowed money from friends and family, rather than from people involved in
the business. As Chin reports: ‘Of the 264 subjects who borrowed money to finance their passage, 164 borrowed from relatives in China, 147 from relatives in the US, and 53 from friends in one country or the other. Only eleven respondents said they borrowed all or part of their smuggling fee from loan sharks in China’ (1999: 118).

The payment conditions most common among our respondents fell somewhere in between paying everything in advance and paying everything afterwards. Those who travelled step by step also paid step by step. For the migrant, this is not an ideal situation, because he or she must then travel with plenty of cash, trusting their luck to soon find a new smuggler in the neighbouring country. Moreover, robberies take place along smuggling routes and people may be bribed into handing their money over.

Some of our interviewees said they paid a certain portion of the fee beforehand, and the rest upon arrival. Payment upon arrival is usually conducted through an advanced system. The migrant gives the total amount of money to a middleman before leaving. This middleman then ensures that the money is paid to the smuggler. Both the smuggler and the smuggled migrant must trust this middleman. An Ethiopian man explained how this system worked for him:

I had made an agreement to pay US $ 4,300 for travel documents and a passport. My parents helped me to collect the money. I still have to pay them back. I paid all the money to my friend, and he paid the smuggler. My friend gave something more than half of it to the smuggler when I left, and I would give him a sign if I had arrived safely. Only then my friend would pay the smuggler the rest of the money.

This is, in fact, an old procedure already documented in the 1970s among Portuguese migrant workers travelling ‘illegally’ to northern countries. Berger & Mohr (1975) describe in their book, The Seventh Man, clandestine journeys along both the Spanish and the French frontiers. Smugglers in Lisbon arranged crossings, with a fee of US $ 350 per person. Many would-be migrants were cheated after having paid this sum. They were led into the mountains just across the Spanish frontier, only to be left there. Totally disoriented, some died of starvation and exposure; others found their way back, though US $ 350 poorer. These migrants then devised a system to protect themselves. Before leaving, they would have their photograph taken. The photograph was then torn in half; one half given to the guide and the other kept by the migrant. Upon reaching France, the migrant sent his or her half of the photo back to family in Portugal to testify having been safely escorted across the frontier. The guide then came to the family.
with his half of the photograph to prove that he had personally escorted the migrant. Only then would the family pay the promised US $ 350 (Berger & Mohr, 1975).

Icduygu & Toktas (2002) call this money-keeping middleman or friend the cashier. A cashier can be located in the country of origin, a transit country, or in the country of destination. Koser (2004) found that in Peshawar, Pakistan, the third party, or cashier, is usually a jeweller or one of the moneychangers at a bazaar in the old part of the city. He even issues formal receipts to the potential migrant, his or her family, and the smuggler, and a full refund is guaranteed if the migrant is deported.

6.5 Classifications of smuggling types along internal dynamics

To fully understand the impact of smuggling on the migration process, it is important to not only look at smugglers’ modus operandi, but also to analyse internal dynamics to the process: what migrants and smugglers, both, must consider and interactions between the two groups. An effective way to research the impact of smuggling is to evaluate the final outcome of the migration process. Robinson & Segrott (2002), in this regard, differentiate between positive and negative channelling to come up with three different types of interaction between smugglers and asylum seekers. In the first case, migrants have a fixed idea of where they want to go and the smuggler simply acts as facilitator. In the second case, it is the smuggler who decides where the migrant ends up. The final destination is based on the smugglers’ decisions only and the outcome is often negative for the migrant. In the third case, negotiations between the smuggler and the migrant take place. In this case, migrants have some degree of choice and smugglers can offer several options (Robinson & Segrott 2002: 20-22). This typology, especially of the third category, accommodates the idea of internal dynamics and migrants’ self-agency. The following section provides an empirical grounding of the different smuggling types.

The service type

The first type can be called the ‘service type’ of smuggling, because migrants have a fixed idea of where they want to go and the smuggler simply brings them there. The destination is clear from the beginning, and the migration pattern does not greatly differ from legal migration processes. Bringing to bear internal dynamics, relations between smugglers and migrants within the service type are usually based on trust. The destination chosen is often influenced by the existence of an al-
ready established community in the destination country and/or family members residing abroad. The ethnic community may also be involved in smuggling activities, for example by providing passports that can be used for smuggling people in. The Spanish police, to give a case in point, possess a large quantity of Dutch passports and residence permits that have been confiscated in the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, as well as the Spanish harbour Algeciras, where boats leave for Morocco. Most of these documents were used by Moroccans who were given by family members or friends already living in the Netherlands (Van Urk et al. 2003: 26). Another indication of document reuse is reflected in the number of lost passport reports made to Dutch authorities. Between 1996 and 2001, 682,000 passports in the Netherlands were reported stolen or missing. A proportion of these ‘lost’ documents were probably reused by other migrants in order to enter the country. The new Dutch Passport Law (Article 24b: 2001) made it possible to refuse a passport to someone with a ‘frequent-loss’ history, possibly leading to a decrease in passport reuse.

Previous colonial bonds and, to a lesser extent, language may also determine preferences for destination (see also Böcker & Havinga 1997). Moreover, job opportunities have an impact on migrant’s preferences. For respondents from the former Soviet Union, eight out of thirteen respondents had consciously chosen to migrate to the Netherlands, either because they had work opportunities or they had found marriage partners in the country. Some people had contacts that could help them find a job upon arrival or they received concrete offers already made back home. Others ‘bought’ contacts abroad that determined their choice of destination. One Russian couple paid for a contact in the Netherlands who could supposedly help them to find work.

We went to a friend who works at a travel agency and told her about our plans to leave Russia. We asked her which country she would recommend and whether she had contacts abroad. She told us she knew a woman in Spain who could help me (as a woman) to get a job, but it would be hard for my boyfriend to find work there. Then she also knew a woman here (in Russia) who was deported from the Netherlands, but who still had contacts there. This woman could help my boyfriend find a job; it was a job in the fields. For me it would be harder to find something in the Netherlands, she said. We did not know what to do, but in the end, decided to go to the Netherlands. We had to pay this woman € 400 just for the contact! This woman’s contact was an Afghan man and we only had his phone number. He was supposed to pick us up at the airport, but he never came. When we called him, he said he did not know that woman and
hung up. So there we were in the Netherlands, € 400 poorer and still without any contacts!

In the case of travelling through an agency, it is not trust that binds clients and service providers, but documents; these papers are what predict the migration's final outcome with a safe journey along the way.

**The directive type**

Cases in which the smuggler decides where migrants end up can be called ‘directive types’ of smuggling; this type of smuggling is frequently referred to in the literature. Koser (1997) concludes from his research that smugglers may choose destination countries that are not necessarily the first choice of prospective immigrants. Engbersen et al. (2002) interviewed 156 irregular migrants in the Netherlands, with 40 per cent having stated that they would have preferred to go to another country. In this case, the smuggled migrants had very little to no choice over where they flee, and the place they ended up in was often a matter of coincidence. In the directive type of smuggling, migrants have a low degree of autonomy within the smuggling process and the relation between the smuggler and the migrant is usually anonymous. Analysing various smuggling experiences, it became apparent that, within the directive type, there are actually several possibilities: smugglers may only offer one destination or misinform their clients, the migrant may have no preference at all, and so leave it up to the smuggler, or external interventions may determine the final outcome.

**Limited options**

First of all, smugglers may only offer one destination, which means that migrants’ options are limited. Robinson & Segrott (2002) analysed smugglers’ decision-making processes to also conclude that smugglers’ connections may play a vital role in selecting the final destination. The story of an Eritrean man illustrates this type very well.

I went to Italian school when I was a child and I knew a lot about Italy, I even spoke the language. Sometimes, I know it sounds funny, but sometimes I feel like an Italian. When I hear the Italian language I feel a connection. It was a pity I could not decide where I wanted to go. The mister who brought me here decided for me that the Netherlands was my destination. He had a business connection with the Netherlands and he took me with him. He did not even ask me where I wanted to go.
Wrong information

Secondly, the mismatch between a migrant’s preferences and the actual outcome of their migration may become clear only upon arrival when smugglers, who once seemed to speak frankly about destinations and prices, are discovered to be lying. The respondent who expressed his anger toward smugglers in chapter six told us that he found a smuggler who was willing to bring him from Iran to Sweden where he had family. Our respondent explained his journey to have begun on foot, walking with a guide from Iran to Turkey. Then in Turkey, a Turkish smuggler drove him to Ankara, and from there, he flew to Schiphol Airport in Amsterdam. The smuggler accompanied him and was in charge of the forged documents. The trip was safe and problem-free. But in Amsterdam he had to stay in a safe house to wait for the right moment to travel on to Sweden:

We kept asking when we could finally leave that place, but they were very vague about it. It was really getting on our nerves, because we just wanted to move on and they kept mumbling about car problems and other rubbish! Finally, after three days, we were woken up at six o’clock in the morning, and we were ready to go. First we drove towards Eindhoven, and there we went to a gas station, I think it was around eight o’clock. The smuggler bought coffee and cigarettes for us, and we were anxious to finally reach our goal. Now I realise that smoking back then changed my whole future. The smuggler went to the toilet and I smoked a cigarette outside. But then he never came back; he had left us behind! There we were somewhere near the motorway, close to Eindhoven. Now I am still here in the Netherlands. I never told my family in Sweden I was planning to come to them. They still do not know. The asylum procedure kept me here for a long time, and now it feels strange to move on again.

No preference

Thirdly, smuggled migrants may not have any preference at all. This is usually the case for asylum seekers. All our respondents from the former Soviet Union who ended up in the Netherlands, though without having chosen the Netherlands as their destination (which were five of the thirteen we interviewed in total), had asked for asylum. Their main concern was safety. This pattern is confirmed by others in the literature (Barsky 1994; Bijleveld & Taselaar 2000; Böcker & Havinga 1997; Robinson & Segrott 2002). One respondent from Cameroon expressed being guided more by emotions and concerns for her safety.
I was going like a blind man. When I think back, it was really dangerous what I went through, but at that moment, I didn't realise what I was doing. The only thing I had in mind was that I needed to be far away, far away from the danger, no matter where.

**Government interventions**

Fourthly, interventions from outside may determine the final destination outcome. Many of our respondents who travelled by plane did not plan to go to the Netherlands initially, but were intercepted at Schiphol Airport, for either possessing false documents or not having any documents at all. The risk of interception is the unavoidable consequence of migrating through unauthorized channels. The migrant’s choice is thus not only limited by what the smuggler can offer, but also by authority interventions in countries that may have been envisioned to be just places of transit, but become – even if only for a time being – the final destination. Migrants are often instructed by smugglers to destroy their documents so as to avoid deportation. If their nationality is unknown they cannot be sent back immediately. The same holds true if someone asks for asylum. Therefore, migrants are often instructed by smugglers or fellow countrymen to ask for asylum in an instance of apprehension, even if they had been en route to another place.

**The negotiable type**

In the third case, negotiations between the smuggler and the client will determine a destination, which is usually unknown beforehand and leads to travel in a step-by-step process. Within the process, migrants are free to shift from one smuggler to another, and for this reason, the role of carrying information is crucial. Hubs – those places where migrants seek new smugglers – are usually the same for many people, and they serve a vital need in the process. For example, in Istanbul, passport forgers and other document providers wait at hotels where they know people transit so as to offer their services, either directly to migrants or to their smugglers. In this case, smugglers have several options, each for a certain price, and the migrant is in the position to choose from among them. Illustrating this decision-making process is the following conversation relayed to us by an Iraqi man, who situated himself in Istanbul by inquiring at a shop as to where he should continue onto.
When I entered the shop in Istanbul there were a few boys and a woman sitting there. They offered me a cup of tea and then we talked a bit.

* Where do you want to go?
+ Europe

* Of course. Everybody wants to go to Europe. But which country in Europe?
+ I don’t know, somewhere where I can stay.

* OK, at this moment we can offer you Canada, Germany, and the Netherlands. But you have to know it costs a lot of money. With us, you pay a lot, but you will get what you want. If the first time fails we will try again, but this time on our expenses.
+ How much does it cost and how long do I have to wait?
* Canada costs US $10,000, and we can arrange [the trip] within two or three weeks. Germany is US $8,000, and this will also take two or three weeks. Holland is also US $8,000, but that we can arrange within five days.
+ OK, I will go to Holland.

This excerpt from a dialogue our interviewee conveyed illustrates how smugglers do not always completely control travel plans, and that migrants may have a say as well. It also highlights how crucial the role of information is, and that decisions are often made based on such little information. Sometimes smugglers even advise against certain destinations that could have a severe impact on the whole process, or even the future life of a migrant. A smuggler told an Eritrean woman who wanted to go to Sweden, but first travelled through to Sudan, that it was better to go elsewhere.

I wanted to go to Sweden because I have a girlfriend in Sweden. When I was in Sudan I called her, and the idea of going to Sweden had really settled in my head. Then those people who arranged the journey, they did not send us to Sweden. A document was made for my child and me. We were given a new name and date of birth and they sent us to Greece. The ticket was from Khartoum to Athens. They told me that Sweden was very difficult. They said you can try, but we predict that you will be sent back to Sudan very soon. It is better to go to the Netherlands. The Netherlands is fine. I believed them, what can you do? But I was worried, because I did not have any information on the Netherlands, and it would be very difficult to survive there, as I did not know anybody.
More generally, it must be acknowledged that the three types of interaction within the smuggling process are not static. People may shift from one type into another during the travel. Some smugglers might only say initially that they will bring the migrant to a ‘safe country’; this would be classified in the second category, the directive type. However, at a certain moment in the process, they may tell them which country they have in mind. If migrants are then offered several options, they shift to a type of relation that can be classified in the third category, the negotiable type. The migrant’s position may change if there are several defining moments for crucial decision making; this calls for different smuggling types and subsequently produces different outcomes. Apart from the capacity of smugglers to offer several service options, migrants can also inform themselves so as to be better fit for travel. Some of our respondents without prior preference for their destinations decided they would come to the Netherlands only once they were already in the EU and had heard about the Dutch asylum system. This meant they shifted from type two to type three in smuggling classifications. Smugglers can also provide migrants with jobs upon arrival. Employment may be voluntarily or forced, the latter of which turns smuggling into trafficking (as was probably the case for Sheila).

**Conclusion**

Seeing as smugglers have started to play an increasing role within the migration process of many migrants, it is vital to understand more about who the smugglers are and how they operate – they largely determine how a migration process evolves. Smugglers are often discussed as a static category and prejudice exists, often presuming smugglers are linked to organised crime. Taking a closer look at those participating in the smuggling business and how migrants relate to these people, it becomes apparent that classifying all types of smuggling as a form of organised crime is highly misleading. Contrary to popular belief, people who are involved in human smuggling can be embedded within a local culture. Therefore, it is hardly strange that migrants sometimes have personal relations with their smugglers. Furthermore, people are not always involved in the smuggling business for profit-making reasons. Political and humanitarian reasons might play a role as well. While en transit, migrants may even start working for smugglers, blurring the line between who may be classified as a smuggler versus a migrant. Moreover, if we take a wider look at the opportunities available to migrants who want – or need – to cross the border, many kinds of agencies surface uncommonly associated with smuggling. But they still provide the same service to shape thus the migration process.
This chapter devoted specific attention to the impact smugglers have on the migration process. Distinctions were made among smuggling as the service type, the directive type, and the negotiable type. In the first type, migrants have a fixed idea of where they want to go and the smuggler brings them there. Most of the time, a migrant’s preferences are based on family relations, but they can also be influenced by job opportunities. Because the destination is clear from the beginning, the migration pattern does not differ that much from legal migration processes. If we link this type to IOM’s classification, we could say that this type would be considered large-scale smuggling, in which the whole travel trajectory is covered by one organisation. However, if someone travels on a forged passport or on a visa obtained under false pretences, there is no need for a hierarchical organisation with a leading figure on top, thus making it problematic to classify this type as large-scale smuggling. Moreover, this type of smuggling is not necessarily linked with organised crime.

In the second type, migrants go where the smugglers take – or abandon – them. Known as the ‘directive type’ of smuggling, in this case, the migrants’ destination is primarily guided by smugglers’ considerations. However, a distinction can be drawn between those who have a destination in mind, but could not get their preference met, and those who, from the start, did not care where the smuggler would take them. Another option that came to the fore through our material was that the migration process could very well be interrupted by government interventions. Being at the wrong place at the wrong time thus can jeopardise the whole irregular migration process. As such the role of ‘coincidence’ should not be underestimated in these kinds of migration processes.

In the third type, the ‘negotiable type’ of smuggling, the role of information is crucial because it permits people to be in the position to choose from several options. Migrants can, in this case, measure the costs and benefits of risks involved, consider the existence of social contacts in certain destinations, and assess the degree to which they think they can trust this specific smuggler. In the negotiable type people travel step by step. In IOM’s classification of smuggling, migrants either travel with an occasional smuggler, who works in isolation, in geographically bound areas, or they travel within a small-scale network, which is flexible and loosely works together with others.
7 Impact of smuggling and legal limits to integration

This chapter raises the question of how smuggling affects the integration process. In the previous chapter it was shown that someone may end up in a country other than that of where one’s network resides. This may have a direct impact on the ease with which someone adapts to a new society. However, there is more to consider: adaptation and participation in a new society cannot be studied without examining someone’s legal position. When smuggled migrants come to the Netherlands, they are confronted with a system that categorises them as a specific type of migrant. The fact that they entered the country assisted by a smuggler may impact their classification, but there are other reasons as well why people are denied access to the legal system. The Dutch legal system will be explained in this chapter. Among our respondents from the Horn of Africa, Iraq, and the former Soviet Union, 49 of 56 had asked for asylum upon arrival in the Netherlands; seventeen were rejected asylum; and seven had cases still pending at the time of our interview. Those who did not ask for asylum came on visas, which they overstayed. Some later regularised their status.

Table 6: Legal status of our respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Horn of Africa</th>
<th>Iraq</th>
<th>Former SU</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Refugee status</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Still in procedure</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rejected</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entered on visa, now undocumented</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entered on visa, now legal status as marriage partner</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7.1 The Dutch asylum system

Until the early 1980s, it was mainly invited refugees who entered the Netherlands. The annual number of asylum applications was low. In 1981, for example, 750 applications were filed, and in 1982, 1,210. During this period, the Netherlands had been inviting two large groups of
asylum seekers, Chileans and Vietnamese (whose populations totalled 6,000) (Lucassen & Penninx 1994). These refugees were entitled social benefits, including the offer of enrollment in a Dutch language and integration course. Housing had to be arranged by the applicants themselves, though mostly with the assistance of volunteers and the non-governmental organisation Vluchtelingenwerk (Dutch Refugee Council)52.

From the 1980s on, asylum seekers started, more and more, to arrive spontaneously. In 1985, the number of asylum applicants (many who were Tamils from Sri Lanka) had reached 4,522. This unexpected surge marked the beginning of a shift in responsibility for asylum seekers, from local to state governments. The need for control arose and reception facilities were centralised. All Dutch municipalities had to make a certain number of houses and apartments available for the reception of asylum seekers, and they were also made responsible for providing benefits.

(Source: Statistics Netherlands (CBS))

Figure 3: Asylum request in the Netherlands over time

In the 1990s, the numbers of asylum requests started to rise, with its peak in 1994 of 52,576 requests. At this time, the Dutch government saw how it was faced with a new phenomenon: the so-called ‘asylum tourists’ from Eastern Europe. They were referred to as ‘tourists’ because they were believed to be only using the Dutch asylum system for cheap holidaying, not for protection (het Parool, 4/8/1994). This situation summoned a more careful distinction between different types of
asylum seekers. During the peak year of 1994, the 1965 Aliens Act was changed in order to centralise the asylum procedure. Application centres run by the Immigration and Naturalisation Service (IND) were established, and an accelerated procedure (which took 24 hours) was introduced to separate the ‘bogus’ asylum seekers from the ‘serious’ ones. Asylum lawyers voiced their concern about using this procedure for all sorts of cases across the board, but they were reassured that the accelerated procedure would only be used for asylum ‘tourists’ and ‘thin’ cases (NJCM 2003).

Apart from the relatively luxurious conditions found at Dutch reception centres, other possible explanations for the sudden rise in Dutch asylum applications can be found in the literature, where asylum policies in surrounding countries are mentioned (Jennissen & Van Wissen 2002). Politicians also often claim that the stricter measurements taken in Germany with regard to asylum seekers had an impact on the situation in the Netherlands. Van den Tillaart et al. (2000) emphasise another, yet related, explanation: namely the particularly attractive ‘safe’-countries list of the Netherlands. The Netherlands admitted asylum requests from a broader variety of countries than other European states did. For example Somali, Iraqi, and Iranian applicants enjoyed affirmative decisions in the early 1990s, which could have a chain of appeal to more people from these countries. However, a recent report by Grütters (2006) shows that the link between asylum policies aimed at specific countries and an increase of asylum applications from such countries cannot be precisely proven.

No doubt the Dutch asylum system also has its negative sides. The most obvious is that asylum seekers are only permitted to work while they are in procedure (a total of fifteen weeks a year after the first half-year). Further in this chapter more attention will be given to this specific condition and how our respondents experienced this system.

In 1998, the number of applicants reached such high levels that Dutch reception facilities became overcrowded, to the extent that people were being accommodated in leaky tents. Some politicians voiced their concern over human rights violations, while others claimed that it was a signal to show that Dutch reception centres were no paradise (Van de Beek & Sant 1998: 1-2). To smugglers, the Dutch asylum procedure before the introduction of the new Aliens Act was optimal – for its lengthy nature, a high recognition rate, numerous grounds for admission, free legal aid, and compared to other countries, the good quality of reception facilities (shelter, a weekly allowance, educational facilities, and free medical care). The lengthy nature of the Dutch asylum procedure, however, changed with the introduction of the new Aliens Act in 2001.
7.2 The new Aliens Act

A new Aliens Act was designed with the intention to shorten and streamline asylum procedures, solve the problem of overcrowded reception facilities, and decrease the workload of immigration officers. Juridically speaking, the most important changes implemented in the new Aliens Act were the introduction of one permit for a fixed, albeit temporary period\textsuperscript{53}, and abolishment of the chance to appeal. The latter prevented people from having the option to proceed for long times (Grüters 2003: 61).

The new Aliens Act has resulted in the larger-scale use of the accelerated procedure as a means to expedite asylum applications and a corresponding increase in the number of rejections. There are no specific criteria for channelling cases to the accelerated procedure. If it is thought that an application can be examined within 48 hours of processing – meaning no time-consuming investigations (such as investigations in the country of origin and medical examinations) – it will be processed in the accelerated procedure. It is difficult to say whether the high rejection rate is a consequence of an increase in ‘bogus’ applications, or of overly hasty, possibly negligent examinations by the authorities. Some researchers argue that asylum seekers are not offered enough time, space, or tranquility to make their claim under the new law (Chadbourn 2003: 11; Doornbos 2003: 254). Lawyers also complain about the limited time they have to collect evidence when cases are dealt with in the accelerated procedure, as well as the growing mistrust of asylum applicants (about, for example, whose ‘fault’ it is if a recent arrival has no documents) (expert interview 5/11/2002, see appendix I).

The new Aliens Act does not stand on its own; there are related laws that have been introduced to combat ‘illegality.’ The Benefit Entitlement Act (1998) was already mentioned in chapter one. More recently, reinforcement of the criminal discourse surrounding ‘illegal’ migration has emerged in the form of the Policy Document on Illegal Immigrants (Illegalennota 2004), the Policy Document on Return (Terugkeernota 2003), and the implementation of the expanded obligation to carry proof of identity (as of 1 January 2005). The Policy Document on Illegal Immigrants (Illegalennota 2004) laid down an expansion of the police’s capacity over the supervision of ‘illegal’ immigrants. The Policy Document on Return (Terugkeernota 2003) further increases prison cell capacity for ‘illegal aliens’ and focuses more attention on forced return. In previous years detention was only used as an emergency measure, but slowly it has become a central element of not only Dutch, but also greater European-wide immigration law (Autonoom Centrum 2004; Schuster 2004). This has led to people being detained on a lar-
ger scale than before, even though the structural difficulties surrounding return have not diminished. For a historical overview of detention of ‘illegal’ immigrants in the Netherlands see Autonoom Centrum (1998).

It is difficult to prove a causal relation between the introduction of these new laws to combat ‘illegality’ and the number of asylum requests. It is true that the amount of asylum requests has dramatically diminished in the Netherlands since the introduction of these measures. In 2001, 32,580 asylum requests were filed in the Netherlands, whereas in 2005, only 12,350 were filed (Central Agency for Statistics Netherlands). But in other European countries, the numbers have gone down, too. One explanation for the decrease in the Netherlands may be that smugglers, as well as asylum seekers themselves, no longer view the country as an attractive destination. Under the new law asylum, decisions in the Netherlands are made quickly – we observed how people were rejected and already put on the streets after 48 working hours, one workweek. Migrants and smugglers both may communicate this information back ‘home’, which may impact the Netherlands’ position, as it shifts from final destination to a place of transit. Robinson & Segrott (2002) have concluded that asylum – as well as deportation – policies play a role in a smuggler’s decision-making process. Another explanation for the decrease may be that fewer people ask for asylum in order to avoid expulsion: they avoid making themselves publicly known to the authorities and go underground immediately after arrival.

7.3 The Netherlands as a destination of coincidence

Chapter four relayed how our respondents knew few people in the Netherlands. Of our the respondents, around half, 26 out of 56, had family members, friends, and/or acquaintances living abroad. But of these 26, only eight had potentially supportive contacts who resided in the Netherlands. The limited opportunities available when determining the initial choice of a migrant’s destination may cause the discrepancy between where a migrant’s potential social support network is located, and where the migrant’s ultimate destination winds up being. It could have been the case that the smuggler had only one viable destination to offer. Or sometimes migrants might have been dropped off in the Netherlands by a smuggler who led them to believe they were heading elsewhere. In other cases, people were apprehended at Schiphol Airport because their documents were not valid. When apprehension occurs, most people ask for asylum immediately because it is the only way to avoid deportation. Migrants may also be misinformed by their smuggler about the prospects of moving within Europe, as shown in
the story of one Iraqi woman who had friends in the Netherlands and family in Sweden. Her smuggler had told her that he could bring her to the Netherlands and that she could easily travel to Sweden on her own from there.

I came on a Dutch passport, with a Persian name, to Schiphol. My flight was really comfortable. Upon arrival, my friends came to pick me up and they took me to Amsterdam. When I told them about my plan, that I wanted to go to Sweden because that is where my family lives, they gave me some crucial information. The first thing they said was that if you want to stay in the Netherlands you have to ask for asylum within 24 hours. That already made me nervous. Then they said that the route to Sweden was not an easy one, and especially the border between Denmark and Germany was supposed to be strictly controlled. I got frightened and thought about the possible scenarios. If I was caught at the German/Danish border I might end up either in Germany or in Denmark, where I do not know anybody. In the Netherlands, I at least have my friends. It was a really hard decision for me to make. I remember that day very well. In the end, I decided to stay in the Netherlands.

Limited information

Taking account of their many considerations, it becomes clear that migrants are not merely the passive bystanders to smugglers’ actions, but they can inform themselves regarding where it is best to ask for asylum. Sometimes the term ‘asylum shopping’ is used to describe this. As chapter one showed, the harmonisation of European asylum policy has still not been put into practice. Moreover, categorical protection policies differ considerably from country to country, thus making the strategy of ‘shopping’ around a plausible option to improve one’s situation. However, people may have limited information on how asylum works exactly, and many decisions are based on limited information. We learned about a family from Azerbaijan who had arranged their plane tickets to Moscow and train tickets to the Netherlands through a booking office. An employee of the booking office told them that she had heard of a building in Amsterdam called ‘Asiel’, which was she believed was situated next to the zoo. That was all she knew.

Because neither I, nor anybody else in my group, knew anything about asylum, we never saw any weak points in that story. We saw asylum like a certain kind of building, where you’ll be picked up. You’ll then be given a separate room, where you can
relax. After that, you’ll be asked about your problems, and they would carefully deal with your situation. We thought of an asylum like a sort of a hotel. But it turned out we came all the way from Baku to see the Dutch zoo!

A policeman the family encountered on the street explained that they should go to Schiphol Airport and ask for asylum there, adding, however, that it would not be possible after five p.m. But he advised them to go there anyway, so they wouldn’t have to remain outdoors. They spent that night at the airport and asked for asylum the next day. Then they were told that they would be sent to Italy, because they had registered their visas through the Italian consulate in Baku. According to the Dublin II Regulation, they should thus apply for asylum in Italy, a concept completely new to them. A corollary to the Dublin Regulation is that also constraints those who want to move onto other countries, but are stuck in the country where they are supposed to ask for asylum.

7.4 26,000 rejected asylum seekers

Another important change implemented in the new Aliens Act is that, during the appeal or subsequent proceedings, neither asylum seekers rejected in accelerated procedures (but who, theoretically, still have the right to appeal to the Council of State) nor those who have filed a second or a third application are granted any form of reception support. They become ‘illegal aliens’. Human Rights Watch claims that, in accordance with international agreements, the Netherlands must, at a minimum, ensure that all asylum seekers with claims still under consideration have access to basic assistance, such as accommodation and food. Rejected asylum seekers in vulnerable situations, such as families with young children, must also be able to appeal to Dutch authorities for continued material assistance (Chadbourne 2003). Nevertheless, rejected asylum seekers are also legally classified as ‘illegal aliens’ and expected to leave the Netherlands immediately after rejection. It is the Dutch government’s official policy that ‘illegal aliens’ are responsible for their own return home (IND 2005), with the argument that people can turn to the International Organization for Migration (IOM) to facilitate voluntary return. If a person is suspected of trying to evade expulsion, administrative detention may be ordered (Articles 57-59 of the Aliens Act 2000) to prevent ‘illegal’ residence or onward migration, and to further facilitate the removal of a rejected asylum seeker. Rejected asylum seekers still residing in reception centres may be moved
to ‘departure’ centres to prepare them for their return (Terugkeernota, 2003:19).

However, people may have straightforward reasons for why they cannot return home. A migrant’s lacking a passport may be due to the lack of time for gathering documents before having left home. Or a migrant can lose it along the way or upon arrival to destination. When people travel on forged documents, the smuggler usually keeps their original IDs. Sometimes smugglers promise to return these documents, but this promise may not be kept. As an Iraqi man explained to us:

When I had arrived in the Netherlands, I contacted the man who had given me the fake document I had travelled on – which I had flushed down the airplane toilet, as instructed. He had promised me that I could get back my own ID card, which was still in the safe house where I had been staying. But when I called him, he was making things up about why I could not get my ID back. One day the phone number was changed, and I could not reach him anymore.

In the case of missing documents, countries of origin have to cooperate with removal procedures to take their citizens back. Certain countries of origin, such as Algeria and China, may not cooperate with the return of citizens. Some migrants are presented at their embassies several times only to hear, over and over again, that their country of origin does not want them back. In practice, these people are put out on the street and disappear from the statistics. There even exists a special administrative category for these people: MOB, a Dutch acronym that stands for Met Onbekende Bestemming vertrokken ['left with unknown destination'] . Such migrants either remain living in ‘illegality’ in the Netherlands or depart for another country. It may also happen that people are caught several times, put in detention, and then again released (expert interview 24/6/2002).

In 2003, discussions began in the Netherlands regarding the problem of asylum seekers who had filed their applications before the introduction of the new Aliens Act of 1 April 2001, and had thus been residing in the Netherlands for a long period still without a final answer. Approximately 2,300 of the applicants had been granted permanent status under an amnesty programme. Their application was filed before 27 May 1998, but was still pending a final decision by 27 May 2003. But the problem was not solved through amnesty alone, and in January 2004, the Dutch Minister of Alien Affairs announced the intended removal of 26,000 rejected asylum seekers who had applied for asylum before the implementation of the new Aliens Act of 2000,
but remained residing in the Netherlands. In order to facilitate their return, ‘Project Return’ came into operation on 1 July 2004, with a plan to achieve its goal within three years. Regardless of all the efforts to send people back, on 6 April 2006 ‘only’ 698 people – of the 18,500 cases handled – (four per cent) were sent to removal centres, and 174 of them were deported. Of the 18,500 cases, 30 per cent were placed in detention centres and ten per cent were put back on the streets. Eventually 8,100 (44 per cent) people received a residence permit.

State responsibilities have no borders. Non-refoulement and the danger of deportation

Human Rights Watch not only criticised the lack of material assistance given to rejected asylum seekers, but also voiced concern that the deportation proposals represented a further degradation of the Dutch commitment to the right to seek asylum and the principle of non-refoulement. Article 33 of the 1951 Geneva Convention includes the following provision:

No Contracting state shall expel or return (refouler) a refugee.... to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.

Several reported incidents show how the Dutch government has not always applied the non-refoulement principle. There were even incidents reporting how people were put at greater risk because of deportation. For example, in July 2004 it was reported that Somali deportees were jailed upon repatriation, because the Dutch Immigration and Naturalisation Service had used forged documents to deport them to Somalia (De Volkskrant 5/7/04). Because there were no direct flights from the Netherlands to Somalia, two indirect routes were used for deportation: one via Nairobi, Kenya, and the other via Dubai, United Arab Emirates. For the first flights, standard European travel documents were handed out by the immigration authorities. For the last leg of the journey to Somalia, however, forged documents were sometimes used. It is even suggested that Dutch immigration officers used smugglers to accomplish these deportations (Autonoom Centrum 2004:157-160). In June 2005, a scandal arose surrounding the case of Congolese asylum seekers in the Netherlands. Dutch immigration authorities had apparently shared information on asylum cases with the Congolese authorities, placing the migrants’ lives in extreme danger – leaving the Congo and claiming asylum abroad is seen as an offence.
Return migration is a very delicate subject. Most people we spoke to were homesick and expressed wanting to return some day, but they could not at the present moment. As with migration in general, a low return rate for asylum seekers goes hand in hand with the ‘dream to return’. For migrants currently residing in the Netherlands, it seems hard to give up the lives many have already constructed. Some have fallen in love with Dutch citizens or have born children in the country. For these children who are raised in the Netherlands, speak Dutch fluently, and have built their social lives here, it would also be very hard to return to a country they hardly know. Parents are often concerned about not disrupting the education of their children. Nevertheless, differences in conceptions of ‘home’ often lead to difficult situations within families.

The fact that people have been smuggled may also affect the possibility to return home, seeing as many people have sold everything they possess in order to pay for their Westward journey. They have literally nothing left to return to. Shame and embarrassment can also play a role. The notion of shame comes up in interviews from a Dutch study on the possibilities of returning to country of origin after alien detention. One respondent stated:

... the longer I stay in Europe, the more the homefront expects from me. We want to return to our country of origin one day, but of course not empty-handed. I would be burning with shame to go back empty-handed. I’d rather die.

(Van Kalmthout et al. 2004: 11)

Additionally, the message sent by politicians in the West (or from the so-called Fortress Europe) is that it is very hard to re-enter the West after returning home. This makes repatriating a very definitive decision and constrains those who might wish to go back, just to see what it is like, and then decide whether they want – or even can – stay there or not. Research done in the US shows how intensified border controls have not prevented migration, but rather, promoted the transformation of shuttle migration into permanent settlement processes (Massey et al. 2002).

Also, it must be said that the impact of deportation differs by group. Some respondents from the former Soviet Union were deported several times, or they left voluntarily (with help and pocket money from IOM) before we interviewed them again in the Netherlands. This shows how, for those who really need protection and are immobile, return programmes are often unrealistic. For example, victims of trafficking may
be afraid their traffickers will find them again once they have been deported. After all, the traffickers usually work within transnational networks and have very close connections with the home countries. No doubt a moral stigma surrounding prostitution in a migrant’s home country may affect considerations regarding repatriation for someone who has worked in the industry (Van Eimeren 2004). When people are supposed to leave a country and are not permitted – or are too afraid – to return where they come from, situations of legal limbo often arise and make survival in the country of residence all the more difficult.

7.5 How to survive without state support or a social network to rely on

The earliest impressions of people who arrived to the Netherlands without previously knowing somebody in the country, usually relayed their impressions of the cold, the rain, and the “strange and difficult” language people speak. Those who arrived as such usually tried to seek out people from their native land. Interviews revealed that the flow of information about jobs, housing, and other necessities for those without a social network often came through chance encounters: speaking to someone on the street, at the train station, in a shop, or meeting people at churches, welfare, and/or political organisations. A migrant’s political or ethnic background might, however, also delimit finding support from the community. An Eritrean woman we interviewed who had worked for a radical political movement did not want to contact Eritrean organisations in the Netherlands because she was not sure who they were, what party they were affiliated with, and how they would respond to her. As a result of her suspicion and caution over whom to contact, she had no compatriots in the Netherlands and felt very lonely. Another example of how background may affect possibilities for integration was found among Somalis. For some people, clan structures were still of vital importance in the Netherlands. In one instance, a Somali man waited at Amsterdam’s central train station to find somebody from his country who could show him the ropes of Dutch society.

I did not see many Somalis, and there was a problem because the first one I met was not of my clan. And he told me to wait for a clan member, he refused to help me. The next man I met was from my clan. He asked me whether I knew certain people back home, and fortunately, I knew them. That’s how it works in our society. I had to wait eight hours till somebody passed by who was willing to help me. But then this man invited me to
stay at his place, and he was really nice to me. He was married to a Dutch woman, and they lived in Gouda. The next day, this man introduced me to other countrymen and another Somali man accompanied me to the police to ask for asylum.

Sometimes people were given contact details, either by friends or by their smuggler. However, if the police apprehend someone who is travelling in an irregular way, and contact details are found on this person, it can mean trouble. People are therefore often instructed to throw away notes, telephone numbers, and receipts revealing their earlier presence in other ‘safe’ countries. We also came across several examples where people had lost details of potential contacts.

Our contact person in France had given us an address in the Netherlands, in Rotterdam. But the problem was that it is not wise to have such a note with you, because these people [contacts] then can get into trouble if the police catch you. So we tried to remember the address, but we forgot it! At Centraal Station in Rotterdam, we met someone from Eritrea, and he helped us further.

*Where to find a place to stay*

Smuggled migrants often arrived penniless, not even able to buy a train ticket to reach a place where asylum may be requested; much less, can they afford a place to stay. One Somali woman we interviewed had to sell her jewellery at Rotterdam’s central train station to survive her first days in the Netherlands. Many people also experienced a downgrading of their social status. This often came as a complete shock, especially for those who belonged to more affluent parts of the population back home. Asylum seekers who are rejected, thus having no state support, as well as other ‘illegal’ immigrants who cannot rely on personal networks are dependent on alternative networks to find a place to live. In the Netherlands, there are several private organisations, NGOs, and churches that work at the local level to help people in vulnerable situations. For instance, in the Amsterdam squat scene, several initiatives have also been taken to support rejected asylum seekers and ‘illegal’ immigrants. In some squats and living communes, rooms are made available for rejected asylum seekers and undocumented immigrants. Sometimes these accommodations are even supported by local governments (Van der Leun & Rusinovic 2004). The Association of Netherlands Municipalities frequently debates the issue of legitimacy in national asylum policy, and the debates are likely to continue in the future. Some people are excluded from social assistance because their
case lacks legal validity, or, for a number of reasons, they may not wish to make use of it57. Thus, they must find a place to live on their own. There are also people who ‘rough it’, sleeping in parks or garages in De Bijlmer, a high-immigrant neighbourhood in south-east Amsterdam, while others find a place to sleep during the day in Internet cafés or libraries.

After a while, most people find a room or a house in the informal economy, usually through subletting. This may present problems, as exemplified by a Russian couple we spoke to. They had prepaid a huge sum of rent for a place in Utrecht, but after residing there for a month, came to find that the locks had been changed. Upon ringing the doorbell, the landlord opened the door and stated shouting that he had brought their clothes and other stuff to the police. He threatened that he would turn them in.

So there we were in our T-shirts (it was summer), in the middle of the street. Fortunately we didn’t trust him [the landlord] from the beginning, so we always took our passports and money with us when we left the house.

More extreme instances of profiting from people’s vulnerabilities are mentioned in a report by SIOD (Social Intelligence Investigation Department), such as the case in which someone paid €150 a month to rent a mere chair (SIOD 2005). Under the new Aliens Act, internal control has increasingly become a tool to combat ‘illegality’ (WODC 2004: 105). Should ‘illegal’ stay be suspected, it is now easier for the police to do house searches (Article 53) and to make arrests (Article 50). With the new Identity Law, effective 1 January 2005, everyone aged fourteen and above is required to carry official identification in the Netherlands. This law also makes it easier to stop people on the street and ask for proof of identity.

Finding a job

It is often assumed that smuggled migrants are still connected to their smugglers once they enter a country, relying on them to find jobs so as to pay back their debts. We did not come across any enduring contacts between smugglers and migrants, or people who had outstanding debts to their smuggler. If one finds a job within the informal economy, the lack of a fixed salary and no pressure for employers to pay means high risk of exploitation; sometimes migrant workers have to wait for a long time to receive their salary or they may not receive it at all. The job is always uncertain – ‘illegal’ immigrants can be fired at any given moment. Moreover, people working in the informal economy
are not insured, and employers have little incentive to uphold health and safety standards. Accidents are of major concern to many people working in this sector of the economy, seeing as they are often employed in relatively hazardous occupations, while being completely dependent on the money they earn day by day. As such, people may actually refuse certain jobs, such as those that present large health risks (Glerum & Glerum 1995: 154). Abusive and exploitative labour relations can be classified as forced labour or, under the new Dutch juridical article on trafficking, as trafficking\footnote{58}. In these terms, rejected asylum seekers may, over time, become victims of trafficking as they start working in the informal economy. The same counts for unaccompanied minors who are recruited outside reception centres for work in prostitution when, about to turn eighteen, they are sent back to their country of origin. It is unknown to what extent this happens exactly – and there may be a great deal of overestimation as a result of sensational reporting (Bronsveld 2004; Van Dijk et al. 2000) – but a number of incidents have in fact been documented (Van Dijk 2002; Kloosterboer 2004).

A problem with classifying all types of exploitative relations as trafficking is that it fails to take into account those cases in which people anticipated living as an ‘illegal’ migrant and doing a dirty job, so to speak. Again, when migrants’ self-agency is taken into account there emerges a different, more complex picture. When we asked a Ukrainian boy working in the flower bulb fields about his working condition:

Farmers shout at you ‘\textit{sneller, sneller}’ [‘faster, faster’], and they try to save every cent. For example, we had to use one teabag for four people, and over two breaks. I was shocked the first time, but then you get used to it. I never looked at the boss as some kind of slave driver, who never did anything himself and who walked around with a whip, no. He also worked hard himself; maybe he even worked harder than we did. I thought of it as just the way farmers live.

If people do not classify themselves as victims, is it appropriate to classify them as victims of trafficking?

Work in the formal economy is excluded for undocumented migrants. Asylum seekers still in procedure are, after the first half-year, allowed to work fifteen weeks a year. Many people we spoke to said that they felt that they had wasted what could have been the most productive years of their lives in the new country. They were eager to find a job, to rebuild their life, but were constrained by rules and regulations (see also Ghorashi 2005). These complaints also reinforce Harrell-
Bond’s claim that the way in which refugees are ‘helped’ may in and of itself undermine personal coping strategies (1999).

A way some migrants circumvent work restrictions is by working on other people’s documents. The unwritten rule in this case is that the work papers’ rightful owner keeps 30 per cent of the net salary earned by the undocumented migrant (Mazzucato 2005: 9). Another option is to obtain forged papers and work through those labour agencies known to turn a blind eye to false or forged papers. In the Netherlands, some labour agencies let people work even if they do not have the right documents (Van Urk et al. 2003). Most jobs fall below the skill level of highly educated asylum seekers and refugees. Even those who are granted status with subsequent access to work in the legal economy often have problems finding a job that matches their skill level. Several studies show how the integration of refugees in the labour market has had a problematic development (Klaver et al. 2005; Mattheijer 2000; Van den Tillaart et al. 2000). Employers often overlook the capabilities of refugees and discriminate against them as a group. Moreover, qualifications gained in their country of origin are not always recognised. It is no surprise, thus, that most refugees work below their level of aptitude.

7.6 Health problems among refugees

Refugees may suffer from social isolation, psychosocial problems, and sometimes even from psychotic disorders (Klaver et al. 2005; de Ruuk 2005). Many of our respondents also suffered from health problems. We interviewed people who had severe headaches, insomnia, and disordered eating due to the ongoing stress they experienced. Some people also had bad memories about the smuggling experience. An Iraqi woman we interviewed told us about a fellow refugee in the group with whom she travelled: a young girl so traumatised by everything that she had experienced on the journey that she stopped talking. The Iraqi woman still occasionally sees the girl and her family who ended up in Germany. She has been able to observe the girl’s health eventually improving, but for a long time, the girl did not talk and showed other signs of anxiety, such as bedwetting. No doubt, to find peace of mind it is important to live in the present and to come to terms with daily existence, but the insecurity migrants often face over their legal status, and the levels of destitution they experience does not make life easy. Research among refugees in the Netherlands shows that many asylum seekers become ill due to anxiety caused by boredom and, most of all, insecurity (Jongh & Van Ee 2002). A Syrian woman we interviewed
discussed the day that she, her husband, and her child were promised refugee status, but in the end, they did not receive it:

One day, they promised us a status. I didn't believe it, and so I went to the Dutch Council for Refugees to check. They said: ‘Yes, we were told that you would get a status’. When we went to the Foreign Police, it appeared they had made a mistake. I really did not understand anything. We were the only Syrian family in the reception centre, our data was in the computer, and the result shown on the screen after our name was to receive a status. But they did not give it; they said they had mistaken us for another family. I was really depressed after this occurred. My daughter was just one month old and, from that day on, I couldn't breastfeed her any longer. My body was simply refusing.

A life in isolation and homesickness may also impact a migrant’s mental state of being, especially if someone comes from a former life that is busy and full of social interaction. The pain of loneliness was apparent when we interviewed a woman who had to leave her daughter behind when she came to the Netherlands. She cried when showing us a video of her daughters’ birthday, regretting that she could not be with her on that day. She also said that she dreamt of being pregnant again, as a way to stave off her loneliness. She knew it was unrealistic to even think about raising a child in her insecure situation, but the intimacy of a mother-child relationship had such enormous appeal. Moreover, she said she missed caring for somebody – having a purpose in life:

I dream of getting pregnant, of being a mother again. I would love that. I just want to give meaning to my life. I feel so empty now. I have the feeling nobody is waiting for me, nobody needs me.

7.7 Here and there: how people stay connected

From the 1990s onward, ‘transnationalism’ has become more and more focused upon in the development of migration literature. Transnationalism criticises the ‘here or there’ dichotomy created through more traditional ways of viewing migration. It conceptualises migration as a continuous flow of people, goods, money, and ideas that simultaneously connect different physical, social, economic, and political spaces. Migrants are consequently more often ‘in between’ rather than
‘here or there’. Basch et al. define transnationalism as ‘the processes by which immigrants forge and sustain multi-stranded social relations that link together their societies of origin and settlement’ (1994: 7). The technological explosion in the domains of transportation and communication has made it easier to connect people. Nowadays, updates on how people back home are doing can be easily and quickly communicated through phone calls or emails. Transnational studies, in general, see migrants as self-managed and highly mobile, with an emphasis on how an increased international circulation of people, goods, and ideas opens up possibilities for empowerment and liberation. However, migrant and refugee communities are too often homogenised and presented in an undifferentiated manner (Al-Ali & Koser 2002: 5).

Guarnizo & Smith (1998) make a plea for studying transnationalism from below. One of the most important contributions of the study of transnationalism from below is its revelation that transnational mobility is not equally accessible to all migrants and may differ among groups. When people live in a precarious situation, links with their home country may, in some instances, become weaker instead of stronger. At the other extreme, forced migration may also lead to forced transnationalism (Al-Ali et al. 2001). Family responsibilities may push asylum seekers, refugees, or irregular migrants into greater involvement with their home country than they may wish for. Assisting families and friends financially, or in the form of goods, can thus also be perceived to be a responsibility, and occasionally, even a burden.

For many of our respondents, it was difficult to remain in touch with family and friends in their country of origin, which reinforced feelings of homesickness and social isolation. Some no longer had contact with those left behind because of the specific circumstances under which they left their country. One Somali woman, for example, lost contact with her husband during the war. For three years, they did not know each other’s location. Finally, the woman located him through the Red Cross. Moreover, the fact that asylum seekers, refugees, and undocumented migrants fall under separate legal categories can heavily complicate remaining transnational ties. People cannot easily travel abroad if they do not possess the right documents. Most of our respondents had not seen their families for a long time because of such travelling constraints. In addition, they often lived under impoverished circumstances, making it more challenging to pay for transnational communication, and all the more for travel. These obstacles have thwarted the development of transnational communities.
7.8 Strategies to secure one’s status

As already demonstrated in previous chapters, immigrants do not passively accept immigration policy, but instead interpret it for themselves and then base their actions on these interpretations. Undocumented migrants may attempt to find ways to ‘regularise’ themselves (see also Hagan 1994). Information about how to secure one’s own status often circulates within the migrant community. One of our Ukrainian respondents was informed as such of possibilities for regularisation when he became undocumented.

My friends didn’t want me to return to Ukraine. They suggested providing me with valid papers. They recommended two ways. One was they could provide me with an Italian residence permit for two years. I only needed to extend it once, for another two years, and then I would be able to receive an Italian passport. I wouldn’t even have to leave for Italy to arrange this. They had good contacts in Italy, and they could arrange it for me. It would cost me €8,000 in total. Another way was a marriage in Belgium. My friends would arrange it in a fast way and they suggested this as the best option. It would, however, cost me €10,000. In the Netherlands it was even more expensive: €15,000.

The first option meant showing a work contract (which in this case, would be fake), and then applying for a residence permit. This scenario emerges from the relative ease with which Southern European countries allow temporary labour migration. By contrast, in Northern European countries, the status of temporary protection is directly contingent to the need of protection for asylum seekers (Finotelli 2004). Along this same line of reasoning, we also came across examples of people who went to Spain, Portugal, or Italy, where they applied to regularisation programmes.

Marriage was the second option mentioned by the Ukrainian man in our interview. This is an attractive strategy for obtaining a residence permit. In the Netherlands, a residence permit is contingent on a spouse’s permit for the first three initial years of marriage. No doubt the precarious situations many migrants find themselves in creates the basis for relationships motivated by factors other than love, to say the least. In the Netherlands, one constraint to the marriage ‘solution’ is that even after a marriage proposal, foreign citizens often must wait from within their country of origin for an official MVV (Machtiging tot Voorlopig Verblijf) [‘Temporary Resident Permit’] before migrating to the Netherlands. For undocumented migrants who have already taken
up residency in the Netherlands, this poses a serious obstacle. Furthermore, there is an age limit and an income requirement imposed on anyone who wishes to bring over a marriage partner from abroad. In November 2004 these requirements became even more restrictive. To be able to invite a prospective spouse, a Dutch resident must now be twenty-one years old (previously the age was eighteen) and earn 120 per cent of the minimum income (which is approximately € 1,300 per month, after taxes). Another problem, possibly the most crucial, is that spouses may, in practice, be refused MVVs if their marriage is suspected of being fake. A flourishing business to circumvent these rules is underway. Mazzucato (2005) comes to the same conclusion based on her research among the Ghanaian community in the Netherlands. When obtaining a visa via legal means proves impossible, migrants will search for someone with papers who is willing to marry them. In 2003 and 2004, the going rate for a bogus marriage invitation was between € 10,000 and € 15,000 (Mazzucato, 2005: 9). Moreover, there is growing business in the Netherlands for forged papers (Van Urk et al. 2003). One interviewee bought an Israeli identity card in the Netherlands for € 500. The card was valid until 2010, and if stopped by authorities, he said he would claim to be a tourist. With the expansion of the EU, the passports of certain nationalities have become of great value on the forged passport market. Polish and Lithuanian passports, for example, have become valuable as they provide access to Western European countries. Among our respondents, we heard of prices varying between US $ 400 and US $ 1,000 for such passports. One extreme case was a Ukrainian respondent who possessed five different passports to be used according to the situation he found himself in.

Apart from individuals selling these documents, institutions are also involved. Lawyers themselves rely on loopholes in Dutch immigration rules. The simple fact that people have filed some kind of application for residence already gives migrants hope, regardless of what the outcome will be. In addition, it will also prevent deportation. These advantages have created a demand for ‘bastard institutions’ (Hughes 1971) that offer all sorts of legitimate and illegitimate services. Lawyers might offer migrants the opportunity to obtain a legal residency status, as one of our respondents relayed. He paid € 400 to a lawyer to register him with the police, but this registration was worth nothing. Another respondent paid € 1,000 for a lawyer’s service, but the lawyer never helped him either. In sum, there are many people making money off of immigrants who are desperate to find ways to secure their status, though may lack information to better steer their future. The migration business is thus not only at the work of bringing people into a country, but also of preventing their expulsion.
Moving on

When migrants end up in a country other than they had intended, as is often the case with the directive type of smuggling, or if they find themselves in a precarious situation they could not have anticipated, considerations to move again arise. Some of our respondents reported leaving a country before the result of their procedure was even announced. A man we interviewed from Chechnya, for example, told us that he witnessed many people depart from his reception centre:

I saw a lot of people stop their procedure and leave the Netherlands. [It is difficult] when they continuously tell you that you came here only for financial reasons – one day you will break down. If I had known the situation in the Netherlands, I would have chosen another country – France, Spain, or even Belgium. I hear people do get status there.

Some of our respondents who were rejected in the Netherlands now live in Belgium, the UK, or a Scandinavian country; a few have secured residency status in these countries. Differences in migration regulations may thus be seen as a way to secure one’s status. Criminal investigations have shown that human smugglers, very often themselves ex-asylum seekers, are active in reception centres, where they find people to smuggle out of the Netherlands (IAM 2000). The UK is popular as a second destination after the Netherlands. Some travel on forged documents by plane, others try to sneak onto boats. This is in keeping with unpublished figures from the Koninklijke Marechaussee border police. In 2004, 447 ‘illegal aliens’ were found hiding in trailers in the Dutch harbours of Vlissingen, Hoek van Holland, and Scheveningen, which held ships destined for the UK. The dual role of the Netherlands as a destination country as well as a point of transit illustrates that the smuggling process is very dynamic – and not, as Salt & Stein (1997) have suggested, a closed circuit. After some time, countries of destination may become departure points, and a whole new process for the migrant may start over again.

It is not only ‘illegal’ immigrants who leave the Netherlands; refugees with legal status may also decide that the Netherlands was not their ideal destination. From 1998 to 2003, it is estimated that 10,000 Dutch Somalis left for the UK: in particular, Birmingham, Leicester, Bristol, and London (Van den Reek & Hussein 2003). This is one-third of the official 30,000 Somalis residing in the Netherlands. Reasons for leaving the Netherlands point in two directions: limited social-economic participation and cultural-religious opportunities. Highly educated men especially complain that they cannot find decent jobs in the Neth-
erlands. A separate, albeit related, reason for leaving the Netherlands is that the Dutch system is perceived as patronising, offering too few incentives for migrants to participate. Moreover, women mainly mention the lack of large social networks in the Netherlands, and the difficulties they encounter to express their ethnic identity.

Conclusion

People without legal options to migrate may indicate that they cannot rely on people’s help to survive either. To some extent, this is true – most people who had to make use of smugglers had poor social networks upon arrival, or none at all. But the picture may be more complicated. Some people did have connections somewhere in Europe, though not in the Netherlands. They either ended up somewhere else because of their smuggler’s decisions or were apprehended at the Dutch border. They could therefore not benefit from their existing network, which led to situations of social isolation. No doubt this can have a direct impact on the ease with which someone integrates a new society.

Migrants who have to survive without social networks in the Netherlands face many difficulties, especially if they do not have access to gaining legal status. The fact that they entered the country assisted by a smuggler who instructed them on how to best handle authorities may have had an impact on the ultimate decision that refused their legal status, but there are other reasons as well. Respondents without a legal status are faced with all sorts of vulnerabilities. There are individuals and institutions that profit highly by subletting houses to people without papers, exploiting people at work in the informal economy, selling forged documents, and smuggling migrants out to other countries.

Moreover, under the old Aliens Act, asking for asylum in the Netherlands meant entering into a system that fostered dependency, while people were only allowed to work for a limited period of time, fifteen weeks per year and procedures could last for years. Research shows that such dependency on the state leads to frustrations and passivity among asylum seekers (Ghorashi 2005; Harrell-Bond 1999; Korac & Gilad 2001). Under the new Aliens Act of 2001, and within the shifting political context, asylum seekers’ situation has changed dramatically. In the Netherlands, many applications are now rejected within 48 hours, no longer to be supported by the state.

Apart from having an impact on migrants’ integration in a new country, smuggling, and the precarious situations people may end up in thereafter, can also impact return migration. Constraints on returning are usually fundamental, such as a lack of basic security in the
country of destination. But, it can also be the case that people lack travel documents, thereby making it impossible to be taken back by their countries of origin, even if migrants wish to return. Sometime sufficient funds can not be saved in the country of destination to return home with any hope for prosperity, especially with so much having been invested to migrate in the first place. Smuggled migrants usually arrive at their destination destitute, with all their money having been invested in their journey. Lack of financial means strongly constraints the decision to return. NGOs and churches play a vital role in the survival for those who cannot return and who were refused access to a legal status.
8 Conclusion

From the 1990s onwards, the map of migration changed considerably as more migration to Western Europe started to take place from countries with which no links existed before. It became apparent that migrants do not always move because they are invited by family members or even by governments, but that they, themselves, take initiatives – or are sometimes forced to do so. As a result, immigration processes have become more fragmented than they were during the relatively transparent guest worker and colonial migration era (Böcker et al. 1998; Brubaker 1994). Governments generally reacted to the increase of ‘spontaneous’ migration by tightening national restrictions and increasing European cooperation on border control. Despite tightened admissions policies, there does not seem to be a decline in the numbers of migration to Western Europe. The difference is that these ‘spontaneous’, ‘non-invited’, or ‘unwanted’ immigrants often depend on intermediaries in their migration process, which may impact the process considerably. Restrictive migration policies have therefore had limited effect on the continuation of migration processes, though they have affected the way migrants move, along with costs and risks involved.

This study has examined the migration processes of people from Iraq, the Horn of Africa, and the former Soviet Union who were dependent on intermediaries to reach the Netherlands. In this concluding chapter, the empirical findings of this study will be contextualised within the wider framework of migration theories. Migration is often conceptualised as a process that takes place between two countries. And it is either the decision-making process prior to migration or integration in the new country that receives most attention. How people move is often taken for granted, assuming that the destination, as well as the route taken, are clear and mostly predictable from the start. The underlying assumption is that movement is not constrained, but free for all; and conversely, when movement is constrained, no migration will take place.

This research has shown that the migration processes of those utilising smugglers can evolve very dynamically, with a number of unpredictable outcomes. The variance this research has uncovered compels migration theories to address the impact and the effects of constraints
on mobility. More attention should therefore be paid to the facilitators of the migration process, a subject often neglected in migration literature. While sometimes they may be mentioned as actors, little is known about how smugglers actually shape migration processes.

Although static assumptions are often made, ‘illegal’ migration actually includes a variety of types of movement, as well as statuses that conflict with migration laws in the sending, transit, and receiving countries. ‘Illegal’ migration encompasses ‘illegal’ entry, overstaying visas, and remaining in a country as a rejected asylum-seeker. Additionally, in a single process of migration, a migrant may move between legality and ‘illegality’. Our data shows that, in reality, the division between legal and ‘illegal’ migration is sometimes hard to draw. For example, ‘illegal’ migrants may very well use the services of legal agencies and thus travel in a regular way, but with intentions to overstay their visa, after a while they become ‘illegal’. The inverse also happens whereby ‘illegal’ migrants may become legal residents after a certain period of time. Therefore, ‘illegal’ migration is better understood as a process rather than a state of being. Institutions, moreover, working on the legal side of migration can simultaneously be involved in ‘illegal’ aspects of the migration ‘business’. More important in our research approach was the acknowledgement that what is considered to be ‘illegal’ may differ across settings (Van Schendel & Itty 2005). A broad understanding of smuggling was applied to move beyond the legal framework and incorporate the fact that something defined as ‘illegal’ by the state may still be licit.

The question raised in this research was: what does it mean for the evolution of the migration process if people’s mobility is constrained and they must thus make use of the services of intermediaries, such as smugglers? This question was answered by studying three concrete cases of human smuggling into the Netherlands through biographical interviews. Personal experiences of smuggled migrants provided valuable insights into the process of human smuggling that made it possible to come up with a more nuanced picture of what smuggling is, why people need smugglers to cross borders, the different types of smuggling that exist, and how these various types have different impact on migration processes.

8.1 The research method and its implications

In studies on smuggling, migrants’ self-agency is frequently overlooked. Most studies focus on the smuggling organisations, and smuggled migrants are usually seen as passive actors without agency. By contrast, this research makes people its central focus, strongly in
the spirit of Giddens (1984) who claims that people are not simply ruled by society, but have agency even when their options are limited. Adopting the agency perspective means acknowledging that smuggled migrants are themselves active decision makers. This study therefore addresses how individuals cope with mobility constraints. Questions that were raised were: how do people decide which smuggler to go with? And how much autonomy do they have within the decision-making? How do they negotiate prices, destinations, and routes taken? By putting migrants’ stories at the centre and moving beyond the legal framework, it becomes easier to understand the very complex phenomenon of smuggling without making rigid, static, or unfounded assumptions.

The research method of biographical interviews permitted us insight into how migrants choose their smuggler, how risks were calculated, and also how migrants exerted power in negotiations with their smugglers. Furthermore, this research method seems the most appropriate method to collect sensitive and in-depth data about individual experiences. It allowed for respondents to tell their own stories and present the issues that were of importance to them. It also created space for dialogues that made the interviewing process more like a ‘normal’ conversation. This turned out to be of vital importance, seeing as most respondents had negative experiences with official interviews (which most people qualified as ‘interrogations’ by immigration officers) before talking to us. A question asked in much research is how to build up trust with respondents: in this research setting, the vital question became how to best remove distrust.

8.2 Why do people need smugglers and who moves?

Reasons people need smugglers cannot be understood without a knowledge of the context in which people leave to begin with. Most of our interviewees turned out, for several reasons, not to have legal migration options. While revealing people’s motives for travelling with a smuggler, I realised that the very roots of the human smuggling ‘problem’ often escape our attention. Many researchers in the field of human smuggling have neglected systematic and structural causes of the demand for smuggling services. Upon arrival, people are forced into categorisations designed by policymakers in the West. Often overlooked is the fact that migrants may come from states where it is not possible to arrange travel documents, or that people may not be in the position to make themselves known to authorities and therefore cannot arrange for documents. For example, some of the respondents who came through ‘an ‘illegal’ means would have had to make themselves known
to UNHCR if they wanted international protection, but they decided instead to continue travelling with smugglers. They either did not see any future for themselves in the refugee camps, or did not feel safe enough while waiting for official procedures.

People may have various reasons for leaving their country, and political motives are not easy to judge as being ‘real’ or ‘bogus.’ Furthermore, the continuum between coercion and free will in migration decisions complicates classification. The research method of biographical interviews helps reveal migrants’ motives for using smugglers. It also demonstrates that immigrants may deliberately try to fit into simpler, state-defined categories, even when their actual motives for migration are far more complex. These constructed identities relate to migrants’ experiences of what is considered ‘real’ political persecution or ‘real’ countries of war. Such categorical thinking, and the reactions it provokes among policymakers and the public, simplifies the issue and deflects attention from the complicated ‘root’ causes of human smuggling.

**Migration: a selective process**

Chapter four showed how comparable structures in specific countries might have different outcomes at the individual level. The decision to migrate has to do with more than just structural conditions, such as political persecution or poverty. Personal factors, such as a sense of personal security and, to a certain extent, personality, are crucial if we look at the decision-making processes of migration. One migrates easier if and/or when willing to take certain risks, particularly during a time of fear or persecution. Social and economic capital is also crucial to the migration process. People are more likely to migrate if they already know people abroad. Our respondents, however, could seldom make use of their social network abroad. Although some did know people in Europe, the legal, financial, or priority-related constraints faced by their contacts made it impossible for them to benefit from such a network. We did, however, come across examples of migrants who wanted to escape the pressure of ethnic diaspora, thus deliberately choosing a destination with which their country of origin did not have strong connections. This preference indicates that the dominant focus in migration studies on families, households, and transnational communities might overshadow other significant motives for migration. Moreover, migration-specific social capital is, in this case, not only related to friends and family, but to good connections with smugglers or personal contacts at embassies and airports, who are in a position to facilitate the journey. People are also more likely to migrate if they can finance their trip. As such, it is usually not the poorest of the poorest who migrate.
This selection is reinforced when it comes to human smuggling, because migration with the use of a smuggler is usually more expensive than regular migration. It must be added here that migrants may make use of resources obtained through transnational networks to finance their journey.

It was interesting to note that in places of civil war, such as in the Horn of Africa, decisions made regarding issues of security sometimes led to migration patterns opposite from what is usually expected. Wives and mothers with their children, for example, sometimes migrated before their husbands, for in this specific context, it was considered safer for them to migrate than to stay. For the former Soviet Union countries, we came across specific gender constraints, as well as opportunities, to migrate; these included migrating for ‘love’ (that is, marriage migration) or job prospects specific to females. Women thus also were shown to take risks, travelling in ‘illegal’ ways as labour migrants, refugees, or as family unifiers or re-unifiers. Most analyses of irregular migration, however, stop at the assumption that women migrate to join men, and that they will only migrate once it can be done in a legal way.

8.3 The journey to the Netherlands: three case studies

Specific obstacles to migration require specific alternatives within migration processes. These alternative options have a considerable impact on the way the migration process evolves. In chapter five, three concrete border geographies (Iraq, the Horn of Africa, and the former Soviet Union) were described to give insight into how these alternative options shaped our respondents’ migration processes.

The Horn of Africa: travelling by air

All our respondents from the Horn of Africa entered Europe by plane, travelling either on a passport falsely relating them to the smuggler, or on forged or stolen passports. Some people did not know what documents they had travelled on because their smuggler held all the documents and took care of the contact that transpired with border guards. Travelling on documents usually meant that people only needed one smuggler; the journey evolved relatively quickly and safely. But very often there was corruption, as it was not enough to have a forged or borrowed passport. The fact that some people had to wait for just the right moment to travel indicated that smugglers often have connections at airports to facilitate the business.
We came across several different migration patterns from the Horn of Africa. The first was a direct flight to an intended destination. The second pattern was to fly initially to a country for which migrants could easily get a visa, and then make a regional move. The third pattern involved travelling first to a neighbouring country, and then continuing to the intended destination. The first option was not possible for everyone simply because there were not always direct connections to the Netherlands. While in Eritrea and Kenya there were such options, this route was more frequent among respondents who migrated in the 1980s. In general, very few of the more recent arrivals from the Horn of Africa were able to make a direct journey to the Netherlands. Destinations to which it is possible to get direct flights have diminished over time. As such, restrictive immigration policies have had a direct impact on how irregular migration processes evolve. The same holds true for the second pattern. Transit destinations have changed over time according to changing visa regimes. Some of our respondents flew to Paris, Frankfurt, Brussels, or an Italian city, and then travelled on to the Netherlands, mostly by train and without the assistance from smugglers. In some cases, friends or relatives picked people up in neighbouring European countries.

Our respondents most relied on the third pattern, but there was substantial difference between Somalis, in one group, and Ethiopians and Eritreans in the other. Most of our Somali respondents left the country completely unprepared and made the decision to further migrate once they were in a neighbouring country, whereas our Ethiopian and Eritrean informants generally had more time to prepare themselves before leaving.

*Iraq: travelling over land*

All our respondents from Iraq left the country over land, either directly exiting from Iraq, or via Iran to Turkey. The Iraqi-Turkish border is considered a dangerous border for clandestine crossing, and some of our respondents reported incidents of shooting by Turkish border police. The majority of people crossed the first border with small-scale smuggling organisations or independent smugglers earning some money on the side (in the literature, these are also referred to as ‘occasional smugglers’). Our interviews revealed traces of smuggling as tradition and smuggling as resistance, especially in Kurdish areas. In this region, smuggling was not necessarily considered a bad thing, and ‘qa-chaqchi’ (the word for smugglers used by our Iraqi respondents) were not automatically seen as criminals. A long tradition of smuggling goods into other parts of ‘Kurdistan’, in addition to the fact that certain
borders are not even recognised as ‘real’ borders, has made smuggling a regionally embedded business.

A typical step-by-step migration process for Iraqis meant that they used several smugglers to reach their final destination. Looking at the whole scope of this process allowed us to identify different types of smugglers and different forms of interaction between migrants and smugglers. Notably prevalent was a ‘chain of trust’. The first smuggler usually was a friend of a friend and therefore a relatively ‘safe’ contact. Later in the process, farther away from home, came more reported incidents of ‘unsafe’ travelling.

Istanbul functioned as an important hub for almost all our respondents from Iraq. It is both where people look for new smugglers and where they collect information. Most of our Iraqi respondents only decided, once they were in Istanbul, to which particular European country they wanted to go. From Istanbul, some took planes to the Netherlands, but the majority continued their journey over land. Most common was a route via Greece, that may be divided into a land section with a river crossing and a part by sea. Some of our respondents took the Balkan route (from Turkey via Bulgaria, Rumania, and Hungary to Austria, or via Poland to Germany) and hid in the backs of lorries. Many risks are involved in such step-by-step smuggling processes; people can drown in the middle of the sea or suffocate in the back of lorries where they hide trying to enter the EU.

Former Soviet Union: the blurring boundary between regular and irregular migration

The former Soviet Union is a very large and diverse region, and migration patterns from this region are difficult to map. The people we interviewed from Russia or Ukraine usually could arrange some kind of visa to travel on, which was impossible in Iraq or the Horn of Africa. These cases very well illustrate the blurring boundaries between regular and irregular migration. According to our respondents who travelled in this way, some agencies were fully aware of the ‘multiple’ use of their services. Apart from migrants who could prepare their migration process to some extent, we also interviewed asylum seekers from this region who had to leave in haste. Most of them came from more distant countries, like Chechnya, Azerbaijan, or Tajikistan, and their migration process differed; they used the services of smugglers in the strict sense of the word. They all travelled over land by car, bus, or lorry to enter the EU via Belarus and Poland. This was a very different journey compared to Iraqi smuggling: the whole process was over land, covered by one smuggling organisation, and managed from above, making it impossible for migrants to exert any power in the migration decisions.
8.4 Context matters: most migration theory is de-contextualised

There is an awkward – if not worrisome – gap in migration literature between descriptions of case- and country-specific migration and the formulation of more general, empirical theses. As a result, migration theory is often too generalised. By looking at three completely different cases of human smuggling, the importance of context becomes abundantly clear. A nation’s political climate and the relative safety of certain border crossing points acted as ‘area-specific elements’ that had a clear impact on migration processes. We also came across ‘state-specific elements’ that were vital for understanding migration processes. Examples include: the local administrative infrastructure, the availability of passports, and the issuing of – or refusal to issue – exit visas. More specifically, people may need a smuggler to get out of their country, as is often the case for Kurdish people from Iraq because their state requires an exit visa that is difficult to attain. Other document-related problems were found in Somalia, where no administration whatsoever exists and people cannot even get a passport. For migrants from the former Soviet Union, most constraints were related to migration policies in the receiving countries. Compared to Iraq and the Horn of Africa, it is relatively easy in the former Soviet Union to obtain a visa for travel. Though at the same time, there are (unwritten) rules for who fits the visa profile, thereby limiting prospects, such as making tourist visas only valid for three months. These conditions impact the migration process considerably.

Taking these different contexts into account, it also becomes clear that smuggling differs from site to site. Moreover, specific mobility constraints ask for specific alternative services offered by smugglers. The different conditions under which people migrate are often neglected in migration theory, even though they have a considerable impact on the evolution of the process. Salt & Stein (1997), as the first scholars to theorise the smuggling process, looked at smuggling from an economic point of view, as well as from the perspective of countries of origin, transit, and destination. They divided the smuggling process into three phases: mobilisation, en route, and insertion.

\[ \text{Mobilisation} \rightarrow \text{En route} \rightarrow \text{Insertion} \]

(Salt & Stein 1997)

Salt & Stein’s insights are still very useful, though today they seem rather narrow-scoped. The life stories we gathered in our biographical interview approach enabled us to trace migrants’ experiences from be-
ginning to end. Based on these related experiences, we propose that some nuanced adjustments could be made to the model. In the mobilisation phase, Salt & Stein deem smugglers’ action of recruitment as the most important element. By adding the migrants’ point of view, however, it becomes clear that contact between smugglers and migrants is a two-way process. Our respondents all went to look for smugglers themselves or asked somebody to do it for them, rather than being recruited by smugglers. Another assumption made in Salt & Stein’s model refuted by our findings is that smugglers lend money to their clients, reinforcing the idea of recruitment and deceit. However, none of our respondents are in debt to their smugglers. A valuable addition to the model would be to incorporate migrants’ agency as well as the internal dynamics between smugglers and migrants. Related to this, Salt & Stein’s focus on monetary aspects does not address the diverse experiences of migrants or smugglers who have mixed or other motives for being involved in the ‘business.’

8.5 Different types of smugglers

Migrants’ stories show how the boundaries between helpers and smugglers are fluid, and that there is no such thing as the prototypical smuggler. Many different people are involved in the business, including individuals or institutions one might not readily associate with human smuggling including travel agencies, political organisations, and churches. Political organisations and churches suggest that smugglers may not always have exclusively economic motives for being in the ‘business.’ It was also shown that smuggling could be organised in numerous different ways. For example, the Somali smugglers, known as mukhalis, arrange documents and bribe officials to get migrants out of the Horn of Africa in a different manner than the qachaqchi in Iraq, who clandestinely travel over land with a group of clients. Operations are altogether different among agencies in the countries of the former Soviet Union as they attempt to mould ‘migrants’ into certain profiles of ‘travellers’. The way smuggling is organised depends on all sorts of factors, such as distance that must be covered and the structural conditions that constrain people from moving and therefore compel them to seek a way out.

Another crucial finding that came to light from our interviews was that relations between smugglers and migrants differ. Some people knew their smuggler personally; others established contact with their smuggler via friends or acquaintances. In any case, a trustworthy reputation for the smuggler seemed to play a very important role in the decision over whom to travel with. This is not surprising when one
thinks about how migrants put their lives in the hands of a smuggler. We came across examples of preferences for a trustworthy smuggler – even over someone who could bring them to their top-choice destination – because they did not want to take high risks with someone they did not trust. But when the smuggler is not personally known, a risk-reducing strategy might take the form of collecting information on the smuggler’s reputation. Smuggling fees may also be an indicator of service. If a smuggler asks an extremely high fee, one may be suspicious of intentions. Smugglers themselves work to appear trustworthy, and their actions may be guided by concerns of maintaining their reputation. For example, a smuggler may offer guarantees which mean a migrant will be guided to reach the destination as often as needed for one price. Smugglers may also endeavour to bring migrants specifically to places where they will not be immediately deported, for this could harm the smuggler’s reputation.

The internal dynamics

Our data identified three different types of interaction between smugglers and migrants. In the first type, migrants have a fixed idea of where they want to go and smugglers simply bring them there. In this so-called ‘service type’ of smuggling, migrants’ preferences are often based on family connections, but sometimes agencies may offer an opportunity in a specific country which shapes their preference. In the second type, migrants go where the smugglers take them. Migrants in this so-called ‘directive type’ of smuggling can be split into three subcategories: those who could not go where they had intended and were overruled by smugglers, those who were misinformed, and those who had no preferences. From other research, it is known that asylum seekers often do not care where they are going, so long as it is to a safe destination (Barsky 1994; Bijleveld & Taselaar 2000; Böcker & Havinga 1997; Robinson & Segrott 2002). Another result for the directive type of smuggling may be because the migration process was interrupted by government interventions, such as an apprehension at the border. In the third type, migrants are in the position to look for opportunities and destinations. In this ‘negotiable type’ of smuggling, migrants measure costs and benefits of the risks involved, including the existence of social contacts in certain destinations, and the degree to which they think they can trust their smuggler. Here the role of information is crucial, as people often have to choose between several options and travel step-by-step.

These types may also function in combinations; a migrant can start his or her journey in a negotiable type of smuggling, but end up with a directive type, or the inverse may hold true if one is (wittingly or un-
wittingly) dropped off somewhere and needs to find a new smuggler. These three types are thus not static and migrants can shift from one type to the other, especially when they travel step-by-step. Salt & Stein’s model (1997) portrayed the smuggling process as a linear process. Such linearity begs for revision because, in practice, not all phases are clearly or chronologically linked to each other. More generally, the role of transit in migration processes needs to be better understood.

8.6 The role of transit

Irregular migration processes can evolve very differently than regular migration processes. Many of our respondents arrived in the Netherlands via transit countries or saw the Netherlands just as a transit country and wanted to move on. A lacuna in the theory is found in the little research conducted to explain for the time spent in between destinations. After the growing migratory flows passing through Central and Eastern Europe, IOM conducted a series of studies on transit migration in Romania, Bulgaria, Poland, Czech Republic, the Russian Federation, Ukraine, and Hungary. In 1995 another study was published on transit migration in Turkey, indicating that the experience of transit migration could be very long; with the average transit period in Turkey lasting four years (IOM, 1995). Besides these few studies, very little is yet known about the impact transit has on the evolution of migration processes.

Our data show that migrants may have to travel step by step because their smuggler only covers one stage of the journey, their smuggler leaves them somewhere along the way, or the police apprehend them. In all such cases, migrants are in transit and have to find a new smuggler if they wish to continue their journey. Migrants’ access to information is then crucial, as people have to decide whom to continue with and which route to take. Some people need several transits before they decide where they want to go, which makes the migration process unpredictable and sometimes very time-consuming. Upon arrival to a country, a combination of social, economic, and legal vulnerabilities may change people’s perspective, compelling them to move again, to another destination. At the time of this study, the UK was a preferred destination for secondary movements from the Netherlands. Continued mobility is left out of migration theory even though it seems well worth suggesting that the role of transit countries may be making direct migration more difficult. As chapter one showed, asylum policies and strict visa regimes divert asylum seekers to transit countries.
8.7 How did smuggling affect the migration process?

Smugglers who bring migrants to a place where they do not have a support network may create new links between countries. These links can affect the continuation of migration processes, whereby pioneers encourage others to come. But for the smuggled migrants who are in a country where they do not know anybody, it becomes increasingly difficult to find a house, a job, new friends. And in a country without access to a social network, the threat of social isolation looms large.

Smuggling may also have other consequences related to migrants’ integration. Many people arrive in a new country without any money, as it had been invested in the smuggling journey. In cases in where status is not granted to a migrant, their economic vulnerability is further reinforced. Legal insecurity may be the direct effect of smuggling. Negative outcomes of asylum procedures may be the result of inaccurate advice given by the smuggler regarding what story to tell immigration authorities. It may also be the result of implicit assumptions made between the smuggling process and ‘bogus’ asylum seekers. The act of smuggling, often implying that people have paid a lot of money and/or travelled on forged documents can work against asylum seekers as they present their cases, with a severe impact on their legal situation. In general, the current asylum system in the Netherlands determines quickly who is a ‘real’ refugee and who not (in the accelerated procedure a decision is made within 48 hours). This new policy appears very effective reducing numbers: in the peak year of 1994, there were 52,576 asylum requests; in 2004 only 9,782. The diminished rate of granting legal status has had serious consequences for the integration of migrants in their country of destination. It is harder to find a job, secure housing, open a bank account, and get medical support. Moreover, migrants are excluded from participating in society, such as by working in the formal economy, pursuing education, or voting.

The smuggling process may also affect return migration. If people have to face many obstacles in their migration process, chances are low that they will return to their home country, because they know how hard it is to migrate (Massey et al. 2002). In most cases, the time factor also plays a role for return migration. Once someone has settled somewhere for a while it becomes more difficult to return to one’s country of origin, because personal ideas of ‘home’ have been redefined. The asylum procedures in the Netherlands (at least before the new Aliens Act) also played a part in the reluctance to return. Many people felt they had built a new life in the Netherlands, thereby complicating a previous desire to return to their country of origin. In relation to smuggling, people could have sold all their possessions back home, making return difficult, in material and emotional terms.
constraints on return could be due to losing one’s documents during the smuggling process. Another significant factor is that current restrictive immigration policies send out the message that entry is very difficult. This policy’s intended effect is a decrease in asylum requests. Indeed, after the implementation of restrictive policies, numbers in the Netherlands have dropped dramatically. However, the unintended effect was that of forcing people who have come, despite such restrictions, to stay.

In current policy, a lot of emphasis is put on return migration, even though, practically speaking, most people cannot return due to missing documents, uncooperative home countries, or because it is unsafe or socially challenging, making it difficult for them to return. Interviews with people from the former Soviet Union showed how the effects of deportation differ for various groups. For most who organised their journey themselves, deportation was usually not seen as detrimental. People were used to travelling frequently between the sending and the receiving countries, even after being deported. As such, for people who come from countries where it is easier to come and go, the consequences of deportation are less severe than for those who will probably never again be able to return to Western Europe.

8.8 Implications of this research for policy

This research has shown that policies aimed at controlling migration are often based on inadequate understanding of migrants’ motives and the mechanisms underlying migration. From our interviews, it was clear that, for some migrants, smuggling was the only means to enjoy fundamental rights: to live in union with one’s family, to escape violence, to make a living. Policymakers, however, often miss the complexities at work to force people to travel with a smuggler or to contend they cannot return to their home country. Failing to recognise these important, yet sometimes less obvious, factors at work contributes to false impressions of the smuggling phenomenon. Moreover, it sometimes works to deny protection to those who – even in accordance with legal principles – should have access to it. It also feeds into the comforting illusion that irregular migration can be stopped. Smuggling is often seen as something that needs to be combated because it violates the law. Despite – or maybe because of – the fights against ‘illegal’ migration – the involvement of human smugglers has only been on the rise. And more people today currently enter the Netherlands in an irregular manner. In addition, policies may even be counterproductive. A case in point can be found in the restrictive migration regimes that have made it more difficult for migrants to return to their country of origin, thus
cutting off the circulatory movement of migration processes. These paradoxical results make more pressing the need for a new approach to dealing with irregular migration.

Finally, I would like to address some comments on the current movement towards a common European asylum system. As early as 1997, Muus (1997) had stated that, although member states still have very different asylum policies, it is clear that across the entire EU, asylum policies have become more restrictive. Over the past several years, the Netherlands has left behind its traditionally protective stance toward asylum seekers, instead promoting a restrictive approach. Human Right Watch voiced its concern with regard to the Dutch situation after the new Aliens Act was introduced in the Netherlands (Chadbourne 2003). Their report concluded that the Dutch government successfully tailored its asylum policies with an eye to stimulating efficiency in decision making and deterring manifestly unfounded claims, but it has also pursued such new asylum policies at the expense of fundamental asylum and refugee rights. The Netherlands’ restrictive asylum policies stand out among Western European countries and are looked to as an example in other European states. This downward spiralling brinkmanship may also be reflected in the common European asylum system.

The fact that it is currently very difficult to find protection in the EU as an asylum seeker encourages onward movement to states where people believe they can obtain a secure status, even if this means that they are not accepted as refugees but as labour migrants. This leads to more people living an ‘underground life’, especially those who are rejected status and cannot return home. This raises the question of how far European member states can go to exclude people within their own territories without damaging social cohesion, creating a host of humanitarian problems, and violating international obligations. To break the cycle of thinking in restrictions only, we need to rethink the very terms we are using and seek afresh alternative solutions.
### Appendix I  Overview of expert interviews

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Interview Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>13/6/2002</td>
<td>Interview with support group Women without Residence Permits (SVZV), Amsterdam.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24/6/2002</td>
<td>Interview with return officer at detention centre, Tilburg.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17/7/2002</td>
<td>Interview with intermediary for migrant prostitutes at Municipal Health Service, Amsterdam.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23/7/2002</td>
<td>Interview with volunteer at Jeannette Noël Huis, a living community for rejected asylum seekers based on Catholic Worker movement, Amsterdam.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/9/2002</td>
<td>Interview on the lift of the ban on brothels and trafficking with policymaker at Mr de Graaf Stichting, Amsterdam.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29/10/2002</td>
<td>Interview with head of research department on smuggling, Foreign Police Amsterdam.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/11/2002</td>
<td>Interview with head of Unit of Women Trafficking, Police, Amsterdam.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17/12/2002</td>
<td>Interview with coordinator of criminal investigations, Unit Human Smuggling (UMS), Zwolle.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14/01/2003</td>
<td>Interview with expert on Chinese human smuggling, Information and Analysis centre on Human smuggling (IAM), Zoetermeer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/02/2003</td>
<td>Interview with Amsterdam Support Committee for Refugees (ASKV), Amsterdam.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/02/2003</td>
<td>Interview with Chinese migration specialist who is a former employer of Stichting Valentijn (NGO for unaccompanied minors) and now works for Pharos, a refugees and health knowledge centre in Utrecht.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/02/2003</td>
<td>Interview with chairman of Vuurdoop, Christian support group for rejected asylum seekers, Tilburg.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
11/08/2003 Interview with research journalist on trafficking, Amsterdam.

4/9/2003 Interviews with experts on human smuggling and trafficking, with discussions about experience in a Nigerian trafficking case and a Chinese smuggling case, Foreign Police, Brabant.

30/6/2004 Interview with team leader of large criminal investigation on a Somali smuggling case, Royal Marechaussee, Enschede.

19/12/2005 Interview with immigration officer regarding new Aliens Act and use of accelerated procedures, Zoetermeer.
Appendix II
Overview of personal details of respondents

N = 56

Iraq

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of origin</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Date of birth</th>
<th>Marital status</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Profession</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Unmarried, no children</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>Unmarried, no children</td>
<td>Secondary school</td>
<td>Car tire company holder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Married, no children, wife still in Iraq</td>
<td>HVE</td>
<td>Teacher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Male*</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Married, three children born in Iraq, one has died</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Shepherd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>Married in NL, no children</td>
<td>University (Architecture)</td>
<td>Employed at technical university</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>Female**</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Married, one child born in NL</td>
<td>Secondary school</td>
<td>Photographer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>Unmarried, no children</td>
<td>Secondary School</td>
<td>Shopkeeper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>Unmarried, no children</td>
<td>Secondary School</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>Married, two children born there, now all here</td>
<td>Secondary School</td>
<td>Car dealer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>Unmarried, no children</td>
<td>University</td>
<td>Accountant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Married, two children born there, now all here</td>
<td>University</td>
<td>Engineer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Unmarried, no children</td>
<td>HVE</td>
<td>Shopkeeper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>1967</td>
<td>Married, wife and one child still in Iraq</td>
<td>University</td>
<td>Military service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>1965</td>
<td>Unmarried, no children</td>
<td>University</td>
<td>Shopkeeper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>1976</td>
<td>Unmarried, no children</td>
<td>Secondary School</td>
<td>Shopkeeper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>Married, wife and 4 children still in Iraq</td>
<td>University</td>
<td>Military service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>Unmarried no children</td>
<td>University (literature)</td>
<td>Shopkeeper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>Unmarried, no children</td>
<td>University (Geology)</td>
<td>Pressing company holder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country of origin</td>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>Date of birth</td>
<td>Marital status</td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Profession</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>Unmarried, no children</td>
<td>Secondary School</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>Unmarried, no children</td>
<td>HVE technical</td>
<td>Left before finishing university</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>Married, two children born in Iraq, now all in NL</td>
<td>HVE education</td>
<td>Shopkeeper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>Unmarried, no children</td>
<td>HVE technical</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>Married, one child, born in NL</td>
<td>HVE</td>
<td>Hairdresser</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>HVE Technical</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

HVE = Highly Vocational Education  
NL = Netherlands  
* Whole family was interviewed, but male did most of the talking; translator was also a male.  
** Whole family was interviewed, but female was telling the story and the one most involved in the conversation; she spoke Dutch, her husband did not.

### Horn of Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of origin</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Date of birth</th>
<th>Marital status</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Profession</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>1953</td>
<td>Married, 4 children, 1 was born in Somalia, 3 in NL</td>
<td>HVE Military</td>
<td>Military service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia*</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>1965</td>
<td>Unmarried, no children</td>
<td>University</td>
<td>Journalist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>1967</td>
<td>Unmarried, 1 child left in Ethiopia</td>
<td>Internal education at Musical theatre</td>
<td>Musical performer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>Unmarried, no children</td>
<td>University</td>
<td>Engineer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>1958</td>
<td>Married, 2 children 1 born in Sudan, 1 in NL</td>
<td>HVE</td>
<td>Accountant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>1954</td>
<td>Married, 6 children born in Somalia</td>
<td>HVE</td>
<td>Administrative employer for government and shopkeeper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>Married, 5 children born in Somalia, 2 have died</td>
<td>HVE</td>
<td>Nurse and helped in husband’s business of import of incense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>1959</td>
<td>Married, 4 children, two born in Eritrea, 1 still there, 2 born in NL</td>
<td>Not finished school because of war</td>
<td>Housewife</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>Unmarried, Dutch boyfriend</td>
<td>Secondary School</td>
<td>Involved in politics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>1955</td>
<td>Married in NL, 1 child born in NL</td>
<td>Secondary School</td>
<td>Military service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country of origin</td>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>Date of birth</td>
<td>Marital status</td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Profession</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Unmarried, no children</td>
<td>Not finished school because of war</td>
<td>No profession</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>1969</td>
<td>Divorced, 1 child in Saudi Arabia. Second wife in Saudi Arabia, 1 child and she is pregnant of second.</td>
<td>Secondary school</td>
<td>Military service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>Married, 4 children born in NL</td>
<td>University</td>
<td>Teacher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>1966</td>
<td>Unmarried, 1 child in Ethiopia</td>
<td>Secondary School</td>
<td>Agricultural business, selling goods in town</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia**</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>Unmarried, no children</td>
<td>University</td>
<td>Council chairman of district in Addis Ababa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>Married, 2 children born in NL</td>
<td>HVE Military</td>
<td>Inspector at Ministry of Defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>1954</td>
<td>Married, 4 children born in Somalia, 2 born in NL</td>
<td>HVE</td>
<td>Accountant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Unmarried, no children</td>
<td>Secondary School</td>
<td>Hairdresser and politically involved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>(Unofficially) married, 1 child back in Kenya</td>
<td>University (Agriculture)</td>
<td>National coordinator of NGO involved in environmental issues</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Born in Addis, Ethiopia, but raised in Asmara, Eritrea; mother is Eritrean and father is Ethiopian.
** Parents are from Eritrea, but have lived almost all their life in Ethiopia. He and his brothers were born in Ethiopia. In 1998 during the war, his parents and one brother were sent to Eritrea and forced to take Eritrean identity; he remained in Ethiopia.
## Former Soviet Union

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of origin</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Date of birth</th>
<th>Marital status</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Profession</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>Unmarried, no children</td>
<td>University</td>
<td>Neurologist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>Married to a Dutch man, 1 child here, but from other marriage</td>
<td>HVE</td>
<td>Teacher and photographer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>Unmarried, 1 child here, but from another marriage</td>
<td>HVE</td>
<td>Purchasing agent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Unmarried, no children</td>
<td>Polytechnic Institute</td>
<td>Military service: commandos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>Married to a Bosnian, 2 children, 1 born in Russia and 1 in NL</td>
<td>University</td>
<td>Office manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine **</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>Married, 1 child born in NL</td>
<td>HVE technical</td>
<td>Employer at power plant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>Unmarried, no children</td>
<td>Secondary School</td>
<td>Construction worker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>Unmarried, no children</td>
<td>University</td>
<td>Migrated before finishing university</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tadzhikistan ***</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>Unmarried, no children</td>
<td>HVE in NL</td>
<td>Worked for KGB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chechnya ****</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>Unmarried, no children</td>
<td>HVE in NL</td>
<td>Student</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>1948</td>
<td>Divorced, 1 child from previous marriage now new girlfriend</td>
<td>Military Academy</td>
<td>Worked for KGB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>Married no children (she was beaten up by SBU, therefore she is infertile)</td>
<td>HVE hotel and catering</td>
<td>Tailor at fashion house and model.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>Unmarried, no children</td>
<td>University (Physics and later Economy)</td>
<td>Started a business in neon-light advertisements</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Couple, though female participated in conversation more.

** A Russian minority with Ukrainian documents.

*** Has a Tadzhiki passport, but belongs to the Russian minority; his father is Russian and his mother is Armenian.

**** Mother is Azeri and father is Jewish.
Maps

Map of Horn of Africa
Map of Iraq
Map of the former Soviet Union
Notes

1. Water metaphors are often used in migration discourse: ‘waves’ of immigrants are ‘flooding’ Western countries and the ‘tide’ needs to be turned.
2. Nation-states also may exert control over who can exit their territory.
3. All EU countries (except Ireland and the UK), plus the two non-EU countries of Iceland and Norway, now share identical lists of countries whose passport holders must possess a valid visa.
4. The two pilots of the planes entered the US on valid visitor visas, and later applied for a change in status, to that of student. Their applications were granted; US authorities regard students as low-risk visitors.
5. Ceuta and Melilla were established as city fortresses after the expulsion of the Moors from Spain, around 1500. They originally served as military outposts to provide advance warning of an Islamic attack.
6. Prior to 1991 Moroccans could enter Spain as ‘tourists’, to then overstay their visas and work ‘illegally’.
7. Resettlement to a third country is possible through UNHCR for individuals who are not sufficiently protected in their original host country or who are considered to be particularly vulnerable for various reasons (e.g., being disabled, injured, or a ‘woman at risk’).
8. The non-refoulement principle is laid down in the Geneva Convention (1951): it states that ‘no refugee should be returned to any country where he or she is likely to face persecution or torture’.
9. Exceptions are made for ‘acute’ medical care, education for minors of school-age, and legal aid in relation to residence status.
10. The next chapter explains the difference between smuggling and trafficking.
11. Immigrants who have died in detention centres are also counted for the UNITED death list.
12. In economically and politically weak states, citizens may be viewed as valuable ‘commodities’ for export. (One case in point is the Philippines, a country whose main source of income comes from migrant remittances). As such, the sending side’s labour exporting agencies may be deeply embedded in society, involving actors from both the private and the public sectors.
13. Export of labour can be contrasted with the import of slavery-like labour. The key feature of such an operation is that the migrants lose their freedom and may become bonded labourers forced to live in servitude.
14. In this context, the term ‘servitude’ should be understood to include practices that have elsewhere been defined as contemporary forms of slavery.
15. In 1997, no division was yet being made between smuggling and trafficking. Such use of the term ‘trafficking’ would thus also encompass elements currently differentiated by the term ‘smuggling’.
16. The Research and Documentation Centre (WODC) reports biennially to the Dutch Parliament on the nature of organised crime with the so-called Dutch Monitor on Organised Crime.
17 Though it must be noted: Zhang & Chin (2002) found a surprisingly high percentage of women involved in Chinese human smuggling. Soudijn (2006) confirms this for Chinese smuggling to or through the Netherlands. Of the 178 instances in which people were suspected of involvement in a Chinese human smuggling case, 86 per cent were men and fourteen per cent, women.

18 The word ‘coyote’ is used colloquially to refer to smugglers working along the US-Mexico border. In mythical stories, this species of prairie wolf is often portrayed as a trickster who arrives to transform tranquillity into chaos.

19 See Appendix 1 for list of expert interviews.

20 See appendix 2 for list of respondents and an overview of their personal details.

21 Doornbos (2003) found similar examples in her research on asylum hearings.

22 As a minor, one is granted special protection and care, the most crucial factor being that one cannot be deported before age eighteen. This exception within the restrictive policy makes it attractive to claim that one is a minor.

23 Harrell-Bond (1986, 1991) claims that this leads to a certain state of apathy and dependency: what she calls the ‘refugee dependency syndrome’.

24 For more detailed information on the impact of trauma in life story research, see Rogers & Leydesdorff (1999).

25 According to the police, many women refer to the place where they met their trafficker ‘a hotel’, but in reality, it is often a brothel (interview with police expert working on trafficking cases, September 2003, Eindhoven).

26 With a Schengen visa one may enter one country and travel freely throughout the Schengen zone.

27 The ‘Horn of Africa’ is not an indigenous term, but rather a geographical one that springs from a glance at a map: the shape of this region looks like the horn of a rhinoceros penetrating the Indian Ocean. Initially, the Horn of Africa only comprised Somalia and Ethiopia, but later, Sudan was also included. One common denominator to the region is a perceived history of strife: disputes over borders, civil wars, economic recession, and environmental decay, in addition to the famines that seem to grow in scale and frequency. The term ‘Greater Horn’ has been used to include neighbouring East African states threatened by food shortages (Woodward 1996). Today the Horn of Africa includes Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Kenya, and Sudan.

28 Although they share a common ancestry, religion, culture, and language, the Somali people are highly divided, into clan, sub-clan, and family. Among the pastoralists (in semi-desert areas), four major clan families exist: the Darod, Haviye, Isaaq, and the Dir, while in the south, there are numerous descendant clans and sub-clans.

29 The campaign was repeated, twenty years later, in 2005, though this time with focus less on collecting money, and more on putting pressure on Western governments regarding debt remission and removal of trade barriers.

30 National service in Eritrea is compulsory for all men and women between eighteen and 40 years old; deserters are arrested.

31 In 1975, the Dutch government rejected permanent political asylum to Kurdish refugees from Iraq because the Netherlands had good relations with the country. These refugees had to sign a document testifying they would not participate in political action from the Netherlands (Stein 1999).

32 Anfal is the name of the eighth sura of the Koran, referring to the fight against the unbelievers.

33 The March 1991 Shi’ite Uprising was—in contrast to the Kurdish uprising—by and large cut off from Western press coverage because it was difficult to access Iraqi soil during the actual revolt. Western journalists had access to Kurdistan through Turkey,
though to get to the Shi’ite Uprising, they faced the nearly impossible task of passing the frontline of either the Republican Guard or the Iranian army. The omission from international news had unjustly negated much of the uprising itself, no doubt a great frustration of those who fought in it and survived its defeat (Sharif 2003: 51).

This family was rejected on the basis of a language test done by immigration services that indicated they were from Iraq. The family’s explanation for this ‘mistake’ was that the immigration officer didn’t know about an Armenian minority present in Iraq.

An internal passport was the document the average Soviet citizen possessed. This internal passport system ensured that all citizens were registered with the police.

In 1991, the Soviet Union dissolved into fifteen independent states, with twelve of these states reunited in the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States). The three Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) were not included. Altogether, the fifteen states were the Russian Federation, the western part (Moldavia, Ukraine, Belarus), Trans-Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia) and the Central Asian Republics (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan).

The fieldwork we conducted took place in the Netherlands between May 2003 and May 2004.

Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldavia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan.

Social ties abroad were defined as family, friends, or acquaintances (schoolmates, colleagues). We only counted whether they had ties or not. Most of our respondents’ social ties resided in Europe, others in the US or Canada. Social ties in neighbouring countries like Kenya, Saudi Arabia, or Yemen were not counted, as this research exclusively focuses on migration to the West.

Completion of highly vocational education and university were classified as higher education.

This is the Somali word for ‘smuggler’. Chapter six will give more information about how migrants refer to their smuggler.


At the other extreme, certain countries of origin lack the will to combat irregular migration, as the highest state income comes in the form of remittances received from overseas (Koser & Van Hear 2003).

In the mid-1980s, the Iraqi government destroyed several Kurdish villages along the border of Iran. Many villagers had to move to Majma (camps owned by the Ba’ath regime) close to the cities. The more wealthy people (like Hussein’s family) could move to the cities of, Sulemani or Irbil (Hawler to Kurds). After the attack on smaller villages, the bigger conglomeration of Kaladeze was also destroyed.

Sometimes smugglers advise people travelling over land to bring a set of new clothes to change into, so they do not appear to have just walked for a week across the mountains.

Many Iraqi Kurds cross via Van. A UNCHR office is located in the city and there is a substantial Iraqi population in Van.

Some smugglers guarantee migrants they will leave Istanbul within one week.

The Greek asylum application process is rather long, lasting between one and three years on average (including appeals), and the rate of asylum recognition is very low. In 2002 it was only 0.3 per cent, while in the rest of the EU it was 21.2 per cent (Papadopoulou 2004: 10). The accommodation infrastructure for asylum seekers in Greece remains insufficient. Moreover, the state does not grant social benefits to refugees and asylum seekers.

The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.
50 Because some borrowed money from relatives in China and the US both, the total number exceeds 264.
51 This payment required as much as a year’s earnings for the average Portuguese farmer.
52 For a historical overview of the Dutch asylum system see Bronkhorst (1990).
53 In the old procedure, there were several statuses and people could appeal until they were given better status. Convention refugees were given a permanent status known as A Status. The other two options of C Status and VVTV were temporary. C Status was a residence permit given on the basis of humanitarian grounds. The VVTV was a conditional residence permit that was given for a limited time period on the basis of the general situation in the country of origin.
54 Only Western countries, such as those in Europe, the US, and Canada, were included in the classification ‘abroad’. Regional ties like with Kenya or Yemen were not counted, as the research focuses on migration to the West.
55 The number 26,000 was used as this was the estimated number of affected cases.
56 Squatting is legally permitted in the Netherlands according to a verdict of the High Council in 1914. Unlike in other countries protected is the use of a house rather than the house itself. In the 1960s, part of Provo (a group of intellectuals, artists, and students that aimed to erupt authoritarian and conservative order by means of ‘provocation’), set up a squatting and organising bureau. After having squatted a few places successfully, the group became overwhelmed by massive amounts of requests for help in squatting. By the beginning of the 1980s, the squatting movement had boomed to include around 20,000 people. Bars, theatres, pirate radios, squatter information services, cinemas, popular kitchens, discos, bike workshops, and printing presses all provided the infrastructure for the thriving network of these autonomous spaces. When city regeneration and later gentrification, was practiced many neighbourhood facilities disappeared and the squatting movement became more isolated. It finally led to the squatting movement’s isolation and implosion (Duivenvoorden 2000). However, to this day, the city of Amsterdam still benefits from the movement’s legacy in the form of a rather extensive infrastructure.
57 While I was doing interviews at NGOs, it surprised me that so many people refused to accept second-hand clothes offered to them by social workers. One respondent explained the symbolic meaning of clothing in the following way: ‘It is a symbol of possibilities, of a belief that one day things will be better. It is about not giving up hope.’
58 The new trafficking article in the Netherlands came into force at 1 January 2005 and broadened the definition to sectors other than prostitution.
59 States are required to readmit their own citizens so as to avoid a situation in which the state of which a person is a national frustrates the expulsion by other states. But states may refuse to take citizens back if there is any doubt that the individual is a citizen of that particular state, so for readmission, a genuine passport is necessary.


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Summary

This book is the product of a doctoral study on human smuggling from Iraq, the Horn of Africa, and the former Soviet Union into the Netherlands. The central question it raises is: what impact does smuggling have on how the migration process evolves and, consequently, what choices do migrants make within this process?

Throughout the whole book a number of mistaken ideas about human smuggling are traced and nuanced. First and foremost, it becomes evident that the idea of human smuggling as a criminal offence highly depends on which perspective such a belief is viewed from. In the Netherlands, smuggling has been part of the penal code since 1993: before this time it was not considered a crime. Secondly, human smuggling is almost without fail linked to ‘illegal’ and ‘unwanted’ forms of migration. Not taken into account are migrants’ motives for using the services of a smuggler or the viable options for legal travel that migrants have or – as is more often the case – do not have. Chapter one gives an overview of recent migration laws and regulations and shows that for some people in the world it has become difficult to find legal ways to migrate to the West. Smuggling is in the Dutch penal code defined as: ‘any person who, for motives of pecuniary gain, assists another person in gaining entry to the Netherlands or in remaining in the Netherlands, where he knows or has serious reason to suspect that that person’s gaining entry or remaining is unlawful’. But if we take into account the recently reduced options for legal migration and increased controls on mobility, it does not seem appropriate to conflate people who enter a country unlawfully with those who do not have legitimate reasons to migrate. Thirdly, smuggling is often linked with the presumed existence of well-organised criminal gangs who rule the market and exploit their clients. This line of reasoning helps states justify the tough measures taken to combat human smuggling, but it also loses sight of the other ways smuggling may be organised. Fourthly, it is often assumed that smuggled migrants are passive actors who have little or nothing to say for themselves in the migration process. The fact that irregular migrants have less ‘state-recognised autonomy’ than regular migrants does not mean, however, that they do not exert any power in the process at all.
Chapter two demonstrates how the most powerful discourse surrounding human smuggling is one of criminality. Most research in the field of human smuggling is done from a criminological perspective, focusing on questions of how smuggling is organised, who the smugglers are, and how they cooperate with other smugglers. More theoretical perspectives are largely based on economics. Salt and Stein (1997) describe human smuggling as the ‘illegal’ side of the migration ‘business’. This economic model explains all decisions – that of migrants as well as smugglers – on the basis of economic gain and loss. Ignored is the possibility that non-economic considerations may play a role in a migrant contacting a smuggler, or conversely, a smuggler offering services to a migrant. Moreover, Salt and Stein’s model leaves little room for a migrant’s sense of self-agency. Accordingly, it is often assumed that smugglers recruit migrants, yet in this study’s fieldwork, it turned out that migrants actively seek out smugglers. Also ignored in Salt and Stein’s model are all the interpersonal interactions that take place between smugglers and migrants.

Human smuggling is seen from a totally different perspective when social perceptions are taken into account, particularly considering the fact that states may – and often do – define human smuggling as something ‘illegal’ or criminal. With the understanding that migrants’ reality can be very different from state perceptions, this research follows an alternative approach. The definition of human smuggling we use is more sociological in nature: ‘Every act whereby an immigrant is assisted in crossing international borders and this crossing is not endorsed by the government of the receiving state, neither implicitly nor explicitly’ (Doomernik 2001: 10-11). This definition makes a clear distinction between what is a state’s reality and what is a migrant’s reality, leaving room for other types of human smuggling to exist besides that which is well organised and profit-oriented.

Chapter three explains the research methodology on which this book is founded, the life story method. The data, gathered between May 2003 and May 2004, comprises a total of 56 life stories, mainly from (former) asylum seekers, which I collected with the help of three research assistants from the selected regions. Early in the fieldwork, I realised that my original plan to work with interpreters could be counter-productive, and I decided to train my research assistants to do the interviews themselves. Many respondents had had negative experiences with interpreters during their asylum hearings, so we had to ensure that our interview setting would be a contrast to their previous, often unpleasant interviews. Being able to decide on the order in which to relay the events of their story and the amount of time spent answering a question turned out to be important for this same reason. What quickly became clear in our fieldwork is that showing interest in a person’s
whole story makes a respondent more inclined to talk about sensitive
issues. Showing interest can completely change the interview setting,
especially if the respondent’s previous interview experience was
marked by distrust. The fact that my research assistants had all at one
time also migrated to the Netherlands, and they themselves knew a lot
about human smuggling helped to strengthen the trust relation be-
tween researcher and respondent. Of course it was also helpful that
most of the people we spoke with had been granted a status or were al-
ready rejected asylum seekers, thus leaving them unafraid to talk to us
openly.

Chapter four describes our respondents’ countries of origin so as to
establish the contexts in which people made the decision to migrate
and the reasons they needed a smuggler in their migration process.
Chapter five shows how differently smuggling processes can evolve.
From each region, one travel journey is described in detail so as to give
an exemplary overview of how people have travelled. Notable in our re-
search among Iraqi migrants is how their smuggling processes usually
evolve in less linear ways than the literature usually assumes. Very of-
ten, more than one smuggler is needed in order to reach their final
destination, though migrants may also cover certain passages of the
way on their own. How smuggling is organised also differs consider-
ably from region to region. For example, Kurds from North Iraq have
difficulty obtaining an exit visa, a fact that has fuelled the smuggling
industry considerably. Nearly no one we spoke with had left Iraq on his
or her own. This emphasises the need to study the entire smuggling
process, from beginning to end. From the Horn of Africa, most respon-
dents came to Europe by plane, travelling on forged documents. Since
1991, no passports – let alone visas – have been issued in Somalia,
therefore making it impossible to migrate in a legal way from the
country. This has exerted escalating pressure on the smuggling market.
By contrast, in the former Soviet Union, it is relatively easy to obtain a
visa, either by altering one’s background or by making use of the vari-
ous ‘bastard’ institutions that arrange documents for those who wish
to travel to Western Europe.

In chapter six, a characterisation of the different smuggling types is
given by analysing how smuggling can be organised. Migrants, how-
ever, are not always aware of such ‘behind-the-scenes’ aspects to the op-
eration; they may have contact with the people working on ‘the floor’,
yet they may not know who is beyond its coordination. But by choosing
to use the life story method and view things from a migrant’s perspec-
tive, we have gotten to know, in greater detail, what migrants experi-
ence in their travels and what choices they have made given their often
constrained options. We also get a picture of how smuggling has af-
ected their migration process as a whole.
If we look at different interactions between smugglers and migrants, as well as take the outcome of the smuggling process into account, three different types of smuggling can be identified. First is the service type of smuggling: migrants know where they are going and how much they have to pay for it. This process looks, apart from its risks and the high costs, quite similar to regular migration processes. Migrant communities often play an active role in this type of smuggling, as does the infrastructure established by 'bastard' institutions. Second is the directive type of smuggling: the smuggler decides how the process will evolve, leaving the migrants with no voice of their own, and often, in an unexpected destination. Third is the negotiable type: central to this process are the interactions between smugglers and migrants. Very often from the start, it may be unclear where the migrants are going, more than one smuggler is used, and various countries are passed through. Along the way, the migrant collects as much information as possible, constantly trying to become knowledgeable about ‘good’ smugglers, safe routes, and ‘good’ countries of destination. The data we collected makes visible the existence of a ‘chain of trust’. The farther away from home one is, the greater the chance of travelling with an anonymous smuggler and being exploited. Smugglers who depend on a community from which to find their clients are not apt to deliberately maltreat migrants. On the contrary, smugglers who work from points of transit, where many prospective clients from various countries convene, have a more profit-oriented attitude.

Chapter seven spends time looking at how smuggled migrants survive after having arrived to the Netherlands and being confronted with the Dutch migration and asylum system. Those forced to survive in ‘illegality’ were confronted with all sorts of problems. Finding employment and housing in the informal economy, for example, is not easy. The constant fear of being arrested and deported has also led many to live a daily life fraught with high stress levels. Paradoxically, restrictive migration policies and high costs involved in migrating with a smuggler have made it even more difficult for migrants to return to their home countries, something which has undoubtedly interfered with the dynamics of migration processes.

Finally, the last chapter posits an answer to the question of what migration with the help of a smuggler means for the migration process as a whole. Smugglers, besides being high-risk and costly, give direction to migration processes. As our fieldwork has shown, a diverse picture appears to show how smugglers affect the migration process; it is hardly always the case that migrants have lost complete control in the process. They endeavour to orient themselves along the way, while as much as possible reducing risks. Furthermore, our research made it apparent that there are consequential differences between travelling
with an anonymous smuggler and travelling with somebody who remains dependent on the community back home. Also of significance is the moment in the process a migrant contacts a smuggler; the farther from home, the more dangerous it usually gets. The advantage of an inside perspective is that the underlying dynamics of irregular migration processes can be studied and understood in its total complexity. No doubt when researchers and policymakers in the field of irregular migration only concentrate on the moment of border crossing they are missing essential parts of the picture.
Samenvatting

Dit boek is een weerslag van een promotieonderzoek naar mensen-smokkel vanuit Irak, de Hoorn van Afrika en de voormalige Sovjet-Unie naar Nederland. Centraal staan de vragen wat reizen met een smokkelaar betekent voor het verloop van het migratieproces en welke keuzes migranten zelf in dit proces kunnen maken.

In het boek wordt een aantal vooroordelen over mensensmokkel aan- gestipt en genuanceerd. Ten eerste blijkt de opvatting van mensen-smokkel als een strafbare aangelegenheid sterk afhankelijk van de con-text. In Nederland is mensensmokkel sinds 1993 opgenomen in het Wetboek van Strafrecht. Voor die tijd werd het niet als een delict ge- zien.

Ten tweede valt op dat er een verband wordt gelegd tussen mensen- smokkel en ‘illegale’ of ‘ongewenste’ migratie. Motieven van migranten om gebruik te maken van de diensten van een mensensmokkelaar en de mogelijke afwezigheid van legale migratiemogelijkheden worden niet in overweging genomen. In hoofdstuk een wordt aan de hand van recente migratiewetgeving en beleidsmaatregelen beschreven hoe het voor sommige mensen uit bepaalde delen van de wereld steeds moeilij- ker is geworden om op legale wijze naar het Westen te migreren. Men- sensmokkel wordt in het Nederlandse strafrecht als volgt gedefinieerd: ’het uit winstbejag illegaal binnenbrengen van, of onderdak verlenen aan, personen die niet de nationaliteit van het land hebben, noch in het bezit zijn van een permanente verblijfstitel.’ Als we de recent ver- minderde legale migratiemogelijkheden in ogenschouw nemen, is het mogelijk dat migranten die gebruik maken van deze ‘illegale’ diensten niettemin een legitieme redenen hebben om te migreren.

Ten derde wordt mensensmokkel vaak in verband gebracht met goed georganiseerde criminele bendes, die de markt beheersen en hun klanten uitbuiten. Op deze opvatting steunen de strenge maatregelen die worden genomen om mensensmokkel te bestrijden. Andere mogelijk- heden om mensensmokkel te organiseren blijven daardoor buiten beeld.

Ten vierde wordt vaak aangenomen dat migranten bij mensensmok- kel passieve actoren zijn die weinig tot niets te vertellen hebben in het migratieproces. Het feit dat migranten minder autonomie hebben in ir-

Een alternatief perspectief op mensensmokkel ontstaat als sociale percepties worden meegewogen. Mensensmokkel kan vanuit het perspectief van de staat wel als illegaal of crimineel worden gedefinieerd, maar als dit niet overeenkomt met hoe migranten het zelf zien en ervaren, wat bestuderen we dan? Voor dit onderzoek is gebruikgemaakt van een brede, sociologische definitie van mensensmokkel om bovengenoemde vooronderstellingen te vermijden. De definitie luidt als volgt: alle vormen van hulp van derden bij het overschrijden van internationale grenzen waarbij tegen de letter en/of de geest van het migratiebeleid (van landen van herkomst, transitie en bestemming) gehandeld wordt (Doomernik, 2001: 10-11). Deze definitie maakt duidelijk onderscheid tussen de werkelijkheid van de staat en die van de migrant, en zij laat ruimte voor andere praktijken naast de goed georganiseerde en op winst gerichte mensensmokkel.

In hoofdstuk drie komt de onderzoeksmethode die ten grondslag ligt aan dit boek aan de orde: de levensverhalenmethode. In de periode van een jaar (mei 2003 - 2004) zijn met behulp van drie onderzoekssassistenten 56 smokkelverhalen verzameld, veelal onder (voormalige) asielzoekers. Tijdens het veldwerk bleek al snel dat er een sterk contrast nodig was met de officiële interviewsetting van de Immigratie en Naturalisatie Dienst (IND), die de meeste respondenten zich nog levendig herinnerden. Velen hadden tijdens hun asielverhoren negatieve ervaringen gehad met tolken. Er is daarom besloten, anders dan aanvankelijk het plan was, om niet met tolken te werken. De ideale interviewset-
ting bleek een informele te zijn waarin de respondent zelf kon bepalen aan welke onderwerpen de meeste aandacht werd geschonken. Een interviewer die met oprechte interesse luistert, maakt het voor respondenten gemakkelijker om over gevoelige onderwerpen te praten. Het feit dat de onderzoeksassistenten zelf een migratieachtergrond hadden en veel wisten over mensensmokkel, hielp eveneens om de vertrouwensband te versterken. Ook speelde mee dat de meeste mensen die wij spraken op het moment van het interview al een verblijfsstatus hadden, of uitgeprocedeerd waren, waardoor zij makkelijker vrijuit konden praten.

In hoofdstuk vier worden de landen van herkomst van de respondenten beschreven om te begrijpen in welke context zij de beslissing hebben genomen om te migreren en waarom zij een smokkelaar nodig hadden.

In hoofdstuk vijf wordt uit elke van regio één smokkelverhaal verteld om aan te geven hoe verschillend migratieprocessen met behulp van een smokkelaar kunnen verlopen. Wat opvalt, met name in het verhaal van een migrant uit Irak, is dat migratie met behulp van een smokkelaar minder lineair verloopt dan in de literatuur wordt verondersteld. Er wordt bijvoorbeeld regelmatig met meerdere smokkelaars gereisd voordat de eindbestemming bereikt is, en sommige migranten leggen ook delen van het traject zonder smokkelaar af. De manier waarop smokkel georganiseerd is, verschilt ook aanzienlijk per regio. Voor Koerden uit Noord-Irak is het vaak onmogelijk om een uitlevertipsvisum te krijgen. Zij beginnen hun reis daarom bijna allemaal met behulp van een smokkelaar. Dit benadrukt nogmaals het belang van het bestuderen van de hele migratieketen, omdat migratieprocessen niet alleen beïnvloed worden door wat er in het ontvangende land gebeurt. In het Koerdische deel van Irak bestaat bijvoorbeeld een lange traditie van smokkelen wat het relatief eenvoudig maakt om in deze contie ren een smokkelaar te vinden. Vanuit de Hoorn van Afrika komen de meeste respondenten met het vliegtuig naar Europa. Zij maken meestal gebruik van valse papieren. Sinds 1991 worden er in Somalï geen paspoorten meer afgegeven waardoor het onmogelijk is om een visum te krijgen. Hierdoor is de druk op de smokkelmarkt aanzienlijk toegenomen. In de voormalige Sovjet-Unie bleek het juist vrij gemakkelijk om een visum te krijgen, hetzij door je biografie aan te passen aan de eisen die gesteld worden aan visumgebruikers, hetzij door gebruik te maken van zogenaamde 'bastard'-instituties die op relatief eenvoudige wijze papieren kunnen regelen om naar West-Europa te reizen.

In hoofdstuk zes worden de verschillende mensensmokkelprocessen getypeerd. Het is moeilijk om op basis van verhalen van gesmokkelde migranten uitspraken te doen over hoe mensensmokkelprocessen precies georganiseerd zijn, simpelweg omdat migranten niet altijd inzicht
hebben in de achterliggende organisatie en alleen contact hebben met handlangers of individuele smokkelaars. De gekozen onderzoeksmethode, het verzamelen van levensverhalen, levert echter wel inzicht op in de keuzes die gesmokkelde migranten onderweg hebben gemaakt en hoe het verloop van het smokkelproces de uitkomst van hun migratieproces heeft beïnvloed.

Wanneer we naar de interacties tussen smokkelaars en migranten kijken en de uiteindelijke uitkomst van het proces in overweging nemen, kunnen er drie types mensensmokkel onderscheiden worden: het dienstverlenende type, het sturende type en het onderhandelende type.

In het eerste geval is mensensmokkel puur een dienstverlening. Migranten weten van tevoren waar ze heen gaan en hoeveel ze daarvoor moeten betalen. Behalve de hoge prijs en het risico tijdens de reis verloopt dit migratieproces hetzelfde als reguliere migratieprocessen. In veel gevallen speelt de migrantengemeenschap een actieve rol bij deze vorm van mensensmokkel, maar ook de infrastructuur van ‘bastard’-instituties kunnen onder dit type vallen.

Bij het sturende type mensensmokkel bepaalt de smokkelaar hoe het migratieproces verloopt. Migranten hebben weinig tot niets te vertellen en komen vaak op een (voor hen) willekeurige plaats terecht, ook als ze een specifieke voorkeur hadden.

Bij het onderhandelende type staan de interacties tussen smokkelaar en migrant centraal. Vaak is van tevoren niet bekend hoe het proces gaat verlopen, en reist de migrant stap voor stap. Onderweg verzamelt hij zoveel mogelijk informatie om een weloverwogen keuze te kunnen maken voor zowel een ‘goede’ smokkelaar, een veilige reisroute als een ‘goede’ eindbestemming. In de verzamelde data valt een patroon op dat ‘de ketting van vertrouwen’ genoemd kan worden. Hoe verder men van huis is, hoe zwakker de ketting wordt en hoe groter de kans dat men met een anonieme smokkelaar reist en uitgebuit wordt. Smokkelaars die dicht bij huis werken en voor hun inkomsten afhankelijk zijn van verhalen die over hen de ronde doen, zullen minder snel hun klanten bedriegen. Smokkelaars die daarentegen op transitplekken werken waar veel migranten uit verschillende landen samenkomen, hebben vaker een meer winstgerichte houding.

In hoofdstuk zeven wordt besproken hoe het gesmokkelde migranten vergaat als ze eenmaal in Nederland zijn aangekomen en geconfronteerd worden met de Nederlandse migratie- en asielwetgeving. Degenen die in de illegaliteit moesten overleven, liepen tegen allerlei problemen aan: zij hadden moeite werk en huisvesting te vinden en liepen het gevaar opgepakt en uitgezet te worden naar een land waar ze of nog steeds gevaar liepen, of niet met lege handen naar terug keren. Paradoxaal genoeg hebben de restrictieve migratiewetgeving en de hoge kosten die gepaard gaan met mensensmokkel het voor mi-
granten moeilijker gemaakt om terug te migreren naar hun land van
herkomst.

In het laatste hoofdstuk wordt antwoord gegeven op de vraag wat de
hulp van een smokkelaar betekent voor het migratieproces. In het al-
gemeen kan gezegd worden dat reizen met een smokkelaar allerlei risi-
cos met zich meebrengt, en dat smokkelaars steeds meer richting ge-
ven aan de migratiestromen. Uit dit onderzoek blijkt echter dat het zel-
den voorkomt dat migranten helemaal niks te zeggen hebben. Gesmokkelde migranten oriënteren zich onderweg en proberen risico’s
zo veel mogelijk te beperken. Het onderzoek heeft ook aangetoond dat
het van belang is met welk type smokkelaar er gereisd wordt en niet al-
leen door het verschil in *modus operandi*, zoals uit criminologisch on-
derzoek naar voren komt. Ook de verhouding tussen de smokkelaar en
zijn cliënten en het moment in het proces waarop de smokkelaar wordt
ingeschakeld, verschillen. Het voordeel van het ‘insiders’-perspectief op
mensensmokkel is dat de dynamiek die ten grondslag ligt aan irregu-
liere migratieprocessen in zijn complexe totaliteit bestudeerd en begre-
pen kan worden. Als onderzoekers en beleidsmakers zich alleen rich-
ten op het moment van grensoverschrijding zien ze een belangrijk
gedeelte van het irreguliere migratieproces over het hoofd.