FRANCES GOUDA
with THIJS BROCADES ZAAALBERG

AMERICAN VISIONS
of the NETHERLANDS
EAST INDIES/INDONESIA

US Foreign Policy and Indonesian Nationalism, 1920-1949

AMSTERDAM UNIVERSITY PRESS
AMERICAN VISIONS OF THE NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES/INDONESIA
American Visions of the Netherlands East Indies/Indonesia
US Foreign Policy and Indonesian Nationalism, 1920-1949

Frances Gouda
with
Thijs Brocades Zaalberg

Amsterdam University Press
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This book is the result of a Fulbright senior research fellowship. In 1995, two unique grants, entitled “Renville Research,” were allocated to an Indonesian and an American historian in celebration of the simultaneous fiftieth anniversaries of Indonesia’s Proclamation of Independence and the genesis of the Fulbright scholarly exchange program. These Fulbright fellowships entailed the specific assignment of taking a fresh look at the US role in Indonesia’s nationalist struggle in the post-World War II era from a distinctly American perspective, in my case, while Mestika Zed, as the Indonesian Fulbright fellow, was asked to review the same events from an Indonesian point of view. I would like to express my appreciation to Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia (the Indonesian Academy of Sciences or LIPI), in particular to Prof. Dr. Taufik Abdullah, which served as official sponsor of this project. I am also grateful to the Council for the International Exchange of Scholars (CIES) in Washington DC, especially David Adams, for its administrative support. The same holds true for the American-Indonesian Exchange Foundation (AMINEF) in Jakarta. Collectively, the latter two organizations oversee the Fulbright program’s exchange of scholars, teachers, and students between Indonesia and the United States.

In the course of exploring archival materials in the US National Archives and Records Administration in College Park, Maryland (NARA), the George Meany Memorial Archives in Silver Spring, Maryland (GMMA), the United Nations Archives in New York City (UN Archives), the Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia in Jakarta (the National Archives of the Indonesian Republic or ANRI), the Algemeen Rijksarchief in The Hague (the National Archives of the Netherlands or ARA), and the Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde in Leiden (Royal Institute of Linguistics and Anthropology or KITLV), I benefited enormously from the help of many archivists and librarians who facilitated my work with dedication and kindness.

While researching and writing this book, I have relished Mestika Zed’s keen insights into the political history of the Republic of Indonesia, in general, and the unfolding of the nationalist revolution in West Sumatra, in particular. My intellectual debt to Thijs Brocades Zaalberg began as a family affair. Living in Washington DC in the United States until the summer of 1999, the ample Fulbright fellowship during 1995-1997 also provided my youngest nephew in the Netherlands with a chance to do original research in the archival records of the State
Department and US intelligence agencies in order to prepare his Master’s thesis in history at the University of Groningen. He arrived in Washington in early 1996. In the course of many months of shared daily research at NARA in College Park, Maryland, he became a valued intellectual partner. At a time when I was only beginning to immerse myself in the writing process, Thijs completed his MA thesis. When I read the incremental installments of his scriptie, it became clear that Thijs had influenced my thinking in ways that transcended the role of research assistant, as I had originally envisioned our scholarly relationship. As a result, *American Visions of the Netherlands East Indies/Indonesia: US Foreign Policy and Indonesian Nationalism, 1920-1949* has become a collaborative book, because I was able to incorporate many of his insights and findings.

In completing this project, I encountered a variety of people who are extremely knowledgeable about Indonesian culture and politics, Dutch political history in the twentieth century, or America’s foreign policy during the Cold War. They all provided new historical materials, useful references to archival sources, or valuable ideas. I would like to acknowledge the help, both direct and indirect, of Marga Alisjahbana, Henri Chambert-Loir, Pieter Drooglever, William Frederick, Paul Gardner, Marlene Indro Nugroho-Heins, Bambang Harymurti, Albert Kersten, Paul Koedijk, Melvyn Leffler, Jennifer Lindsay, Elsbeth Locher-Scholten, Robert McMahon, Rudolf Mrázek, Anna Nelson, Mien Sudarpo, and Sudarpo Sastrosatomo.

Audrey and George Kahin offered the warmest of friendships, intellectual counsel, and a cornucopia of original documents concerning the Indonesian struggle for independence, while I am also grateful to Audrey for reading and commenting on a large part of the manuscript with meticulous care. Before his death, I was able to correspond with Charlton Ogburn, whose recollections of his impassioned involvement in the Dutch-Indonesian negotiations during 1947-1948, sponsored through the Good Offices Committee (GOC) of the United Nations’ Security Council, clarified my understanding and provided new information concerning America’s visions of the Indonesian independence struggle. Gerlof Homan and Paul Gardner graciously provided access to their previous exchanges with Ogburn as well as other significant materials. Adji Damais in Jakarta granted me permission to review his father’s eye witness accounts of the Dutch-Indonesian conflict, as conveyed in Louis Damais’ letters during the period 1945-1947 to Claire Holt in Washington.

The two “Renville Research” Fulbright fellowships were the brainchild of Arthur Anthony Vaughn, the former cultural attaché of the American Embassy in Jakarta and a member of the AMINEF Board of Directors. While I was in Jakarta, Jo-Anne, Tony, and Andrea Vaugh also functioned as an agreeable source of distraction and delicious dinners. Similarly, Margie Bauer’s hospitality offered a peaceful haven in what remains for most of us an overwhelming city. I am grate-
ful to Margie for her generosity. Nelly Polhaupessy, the AMINEF program officer in charge of American Fulbrighters in Indonesia, helped me with a multitude of matters. From guiding me through the delicate negotiations with Jakarta’s bureaucracy to providing a free-floating stream of insights into contemporary Indonesian politics, Nelly made an enormous difference and became a friend in the process.

In the Netherlands, Gary Price, Elsbeth Locher-Scholten, Harry Poeze and Kees van Dijk read parts or all of the book manuscript and furnished constructive criticism and advice. My new colleagues at the Belle van Zuylen Institute at the University of Amsterdam provided intellectual companionship and especially good cheer. Saskia de Vries, Suzanne Bogman, and Jaap Wagenaar at Amsterdam University Press have all contributed to making the arduous process of transforming an unwieldy manuscript into a real book a pleasant one.

A book about the history of Indonesia is not complete without a note on orthography. I have chosen to use the spelling of modern–day bahasa Indonesia as much as possible, such as in references to the archipelago’s cities and regions or nationalist parties and other organizations. When citing a primary source, however, I have added the traditional, Dutch-inflected Malay. For example, even though I refer to the East Javanese city as Surabaya, when I mention a short story about events in the same city during the autumn of 1945, I also list the spelling “Soerabaja.” When erstwhile Dutch colonial names for particular topographical entities are completely different from contemporary ones — such as Borneo versus Kalimantan or Celebes versus Sulawesi — I have noted both. The greatest difficulty derives from the spelling of personal names. Some of the Indonesian protagonists during the independence struggle lived long enough to change their names in due course, which often entailed replacing oe with u (Sudarpo instead of Soedarpo), j with y, and dj with j (Sastroamijoyo instead of Sastroamidjojo). Other nationalists, however, clung to the original spelling of their names or used a mixture of both (such as Soedjatmoko, Budiardjo, or Djojohadikusumo). The important first Prime Minister of the Indonesian Republic, Sutan Sjahrir, died before the newest orthographical conventions of bahasa Indonesia were established; his name’s original spelling has therefore been maintained, although in contemporary scholarship he is occasionally referred to as Syahrir. In the English-speaking world, Soekarno and also his daughter, Indonesia’s brand new President Megawati Soekarnoputri, have become most widely known as Sukarno and Sukarnoputri; hence, the latter spelling is used throughout the text.

Frances Gouda, August 2001
The lion’s share of my contribution to this book, which is concentrated in the later chapters, was finished several years ago. In January 1997, I completed a Master’s thesis in history that focused on the turning point in the American role in the decolonization of the Netherlands East Indies/Indonesia. At that stage, I could not have imagined that the result of so many months of labor in the National Archives in Washington DC and afterwards, during the writing process in Groningen, would provide me with great opportunities to this very day. First and foremost I thank Frances Gouda for this. Without her generosity in providing me with the opportunity to do archival research in the United States I might not have become an historian. By coaching and inspiring me over the years she has played an important role in my professional and personal life. I also owe a lot to Gary Price for his support and hospitality on both sides of the Atlantic.

As my thesis adviser at the University of Groningen, I wish to thank Doeko Bosscher for allowing me to follow my own path, after giving me essential advice at an early stage. I am also grateful for his decision to nominate me for the thesis prize awarded annually by The Netherlands Association for International Affairs (NGIZ). I am much indebted to George Kahin, whose warm encouragement after reading my first chapters came at a time when I seriously questioned the value of all the extra time I was devoting to the writing of “Paving the Way to Independence: Nationalism, Communism, and the Changing American Role in the Indonesian Struggle for Independence.” Finally, I want to thank my grandfather, Hans Brocades Zaalberg. Despite his old age he never stopped looking forward to what the next day might have in store; he was the very first family member to read and comment on my thesis within only a few days of its final completion. Although he lived long enough to celebrate my graduation from the University of Groningen, he sadly missed a chance to see how most of my work ended up in this book.

Thijs Brocades Zaalberg, August 2001

Our book is dedicated to the memory of two men who personally experienced the events analyzed and chronicled in the following pages: George McTurnin Kahin and Hans Brocades Zaalberg. They are unlikely bedfellows. Had they encountered each other in post-World War II Java, it is likely they would have enjoyed each other’s company even though their political opinions would have clashed. However, both men cared deeply about Indonesia, its vibrancy as an independent nation and the well-being of its people. In their unique ways, these remarkable human beings have inspired our scholarly endeavor.
**Abbreviations and Glossary**

<table>
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<td>ABDA</td>
<td>Archibald Wavell’s American-British-Dutch-Australian Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFL</td>
<td>United States, American Federation of Labor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANETA</td>
<td>Netherlands, Algemeen Nieuws en Telegraaf Agentschap or General News and Telegraphic Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANRI</td>
<td>Indonesia, Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia or National Archives of the Indonesian Republic in Jakarta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANTARA</td>
<td>Indonesian News Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AP</td>
<td>United States, Associated Press</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARA</td>
<td>Netherlands, Algemeen Rijksarchief or Dutch National Archives in The Hague</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCS</td>
<td>United States, Combined Chiefs of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGT</td>
<td>France, Confédération Générale Travail or Confederation of Labor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>United States, Central Intelligence Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIG</td>
<td>United States, Central Intelligence Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIO</td>
<td>United States, Congress of Industrial Organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMI</td>
<td>Netherlands, Centrale Militaire Inlichtingendienst or Central Military Intelligence Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPN</td>
<td>Netherlands, Communistische Partij Nederland or Dutch Communist Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>Darul Islam</td>
<td>Indonesia, lit. “House” (or “Home”) of Islam or the movements aimed at establishing an Islamic State of Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECA</td>
<td>United States, Economic Cooperation Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECAFE</td>
<td>United Nations, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ED</td>
<td>United States, Economic Affairs Division in the State Department</td>
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<td>EUR</td>
<td>United States, European Affairs Office in the State Department</td>
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<tr>
<td>ERP</td>
<td>United States, European Recovery Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>FBI</td>
<td>United States, Federal Bureau of Investigation</td>
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<tr>
<td>FDR</td>
<td>Indonesia, Front Demokrasi Rakyat or People’s Democratic Front</td>
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AMERICAN VISIONS OF THE NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES/INDONESIA

FE United States, Far Eastern Affairs Office in the State Department
FPA United States, Foreign Policy Association
FRUS United States, (Documents of) The Foreign Relations of the United States
GERINDO Indonesia, Gerakan Indonesia or People’s Movement
GESTAPU Indonesia, Gerakan September Tiga Puluh or Movement of September 30, 1965
GOC United Nations, Security Council’s Good Offices Committee
GMMA United States, George Meany Memorial Archives, Silver Spring, Maryland
Hisbullah Indonesia, Anti-Republican, Pro-Independence Muslim Militia Units affiliated with Darul Islam (also Sabilillah)
Hokokai Indonesia, Japanese-sponsored Patriotic Service League in Java and Sumatra during World War II
ICP Vietnam, Indochinese Communist Party
IPR United States, Institute of Pacific Relations
JCS United States, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Jibaku Japanese term for Suicide Action
KITLV Netherlands, Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde or Royal Institute of Linguistics and Anthropology in Leiden
KNI Indonesia, Komite Nasional Indonesia or Indonesian National Committee
KNIL Indonesia, Koninklijk Nederlands-Indisch Leger or Royal Netherlands Indies Army
KNIP Indonesia, Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat or Central Indonesian National Committee
KPD Germany, Kommunistische Partei Deutschland or German Communist Party
KVP Netherlands, Katholieke Volkspartij or Catholic People’s Party
Masyumi Indonesia, Liberal Muslim Party
MemCon United States, Reference in State Department Correspondence to Memorandum of Conversation
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NARA United States, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland
NEFIS Netherlands Forces Intelligence Service
NIB Netherlands, Officiële bescheiden betreffende de Nederlands-Indonesische betrekkingen, 1945-1950 or Official Documents Concerning the Netherlands-Indonesian Relations, 1945-1950
NICA Netherlands Indies Civil Administration
## Abbreviations and Glossary

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<td>NOE</td>
<td>United States, Northern European Affairs Division in the State Department</td>
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<td>NAC/NPC</td>
<td>Netherlands, Nederlandse Aankoop Commissie or Netherlands Purchasing Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSC</td>
<td>United States, National Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OEEC</td>
<td>Organization of European Economic Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OMGUS</td>
<td>Germany, Office of Military Government of the United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPC</td>
<td>United States, Office of Policy Coordination or the CIA Covert Operations Branch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ORE</td>
<td>United States, Office of Research &amp; Evaluation within the CIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSS</td>
<td>United States, Office of Strategic Services during World War II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pancasila</td>
<td>The Indonesian Republic’s Five Foundational Principles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Buruh</td>
<td>Indonesia, Workers Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Murba</td>
<td>Indonesia, Proletarian Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partai Rakyat</td>
<td>Indonesia, People’s Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCA</td>
<td>United States, Progressive Citizens of America under the leadership of Henry Agard Wallace, which became the Progressive Party during the 1948 Presidential Elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCF</td>
<td>France, Parti Communiste Français or French Communist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PETA</td>
<td>Indonesia, Pembela Tanah Air or Japanese-Sponsored “Defenders of the Fatherland” Para-Military Units during World War II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PI</td>
<td>Indonesia, Perhimpunan Indonesia or Indonesian Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNI</td>
<td>Indonesia, Perserikatan Nasional Indonesia or Indonesian National Association, renamed Partai Nasional Indonesia or Indonesian Nationalist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PP</td>
<td>Indonesia, Persatuan Perjuangan or (Tan Malaka’s) Fighting Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>PPPKI</td>
<td>Indonesia, Permufakatan Perhimpunan-Perhimpunan Kebangsaan Indonesia or Federation of Indonesian Nationalist Organizations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Proklamasi</td>
<td>Indonesian Proclamation of Independence, August 17, 1945</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSA</td>
<td>United States, Philippines and Southeast Asian Affairs Division in the State Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PS</td>
<td>Indonesia, Partai Sosialis or Socialist Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSI</td>
<td>Indonesia, Partai Sosialis Indonesia or Indonesian Socialist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPS</td>
<td>United States, Policy Planning Staff in the State Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PvdA</td>
<td>Netherlands, Partij van de Arbeid or Dutch Labor Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>RAPWI</td>
<td>Recovery of Allied Prisoners of War and Internees</td>
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<tr>
<td>Savap Kiri</td>
<td>Indonesia, Left-Wing Political Factions</td>
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<tr>
<td>SARBUPRI</td>
<td>Sarekat Buruh Perkebunan Republik Indonesia or Plantation Workers Union of the Indonesian Republic</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
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<tr>
<td>SEAC</td>
<td>Louis Mountbatten’s South East Asia Command</td>
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<td>SecState</td>
<td>United States, Reference in State Department Correspondence to Secretary of State</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOBSI</td>
<td>Indonesia, Sentral Organisasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia or Central Indonesian Confederation of Labor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWNCC</td>
<td>United States, State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>SWPA</td>
<td>Douglas MacArthur’s South West Pacific Area Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R&amp;A</td>
<td>United States, Research &amp; Analysis Branch of the Office of Strategic Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TKR</td>
<td>Indonesia, Tentara Keamanan Rakyat or People's Security Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TNI</td>
<td>Indonesia, Tentara Nasional Indonesia or National Army of Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRIP</td>
<td>Indonesia, Tentara Pelajar Republik Indonesia or the Student League of the Indonesian Republic in East Java</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNCI</td>
<td>United Nations Commission on Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPI</td>
<td>United States, United Press International</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USDel</td>
<td>United States, Reference in State Department Correspondence to the US Delegation to the Security Council’s Good Offices Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USI</td>
<td>Indonesia, United States of Indonesia</td>
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<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Socialist Soviet Republics</td>
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<tr>
<td>VOA</td>
<td>United States, Radio Voice Of America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VOFI</td>
<td>Indonesia, Radio Voice Of Free Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WEDP</td>
<td>Western European Defense Pact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WAA</td>
<td>United States, War Assets Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WFDY</td>
<td>World Federation of Democratic Youth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WFTU</td>
<td>World Federation of Trade Unions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WWF</td>
<td>Australia, Waterside Workers Union</td>
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Introduction

This book examines American perceptions of the Netherlands East Indies/Indonesia and indirectly, the Dutch nation in northern Europe itself. It covers the period from the 1920’s through the end of the year 1948, when US foreign policymakers in the Truman Administration had completed their gradual political re-orientation from a residual pro-Dutch stance to a position that supported the imminent independence of the Indonesian Republic. Once this dramatic transition in Washington’s perspectives on the Indonesian archipelago’s decolonization had occurred, the transfer of sovereignty to the United States of Indonesia would take place exactly one year later, on December 27, 1949. The book does so by means of an inquiry into US foreign policy assessments of the political conditions in the Indonesian Republic – or the Netherlands East Indies – within the context of the Southeast Asian region in general. Its purpose is to place the American role in the Indonesian Republic’s postwar struggle for independence in a longer chronological framework, in order to enhance our understanding of the political background and changing rationale of America’s foreign policies.

In the imagination of a range of US politicians and foreign policymakers, as well as a segment of the American public since the early twentieth century, the Dutch East Indies and its record of what was generally viewed as judicious colonial governance occupied a special place in the annals of European imperialism in Asia. After praising Dutch colonial management to the high heavens during the 1920’s, it was true that American diplomatic judgments struck a different tone during the following decade, when US Foreign Service officers in Java and Sumatra issued pointed criticism of the Dutch colonial government for violating the principles of due process of law in its arbitrary treatment of Indonesian nationalists. Within the course of World War II, however, analysts in Washington DC resuscitated the relatively positive reputation of Dutch colonial administrators, particularly when compared with British civil servants in India, Burma, and the Strait Settlements, or with French colonial managers in Indochina.

The conclusion of World War II in Europe and Asia inaugurated a season of extraordinary political turmoil. In Germany, in the wake of the Western Alliance’s defeat of Hitler’s Nazi forces, this delicate moment was called Nullpunkt or zero hour. In Batavia and Hanoi, Japan’s abrupt unconditional surrender to the Western Allies generated a similar political vacuum. This sudden window of opportunity prompted nationalist leaders, backed by popular support at the grassroots
level, to jump into the fray – a situation that confounded as well as infuriated Dutch and French colonial authorities and residents. In postwar London, meanwhile, a newly elected Labor Party government soon proved willing, on its own terms, to face the consequences of a dynamic anti-colonial crusade in India, Burma, and elsewhere. In doing so, England’s Prime Minister, Clement Attlee, pursued policies that drew upon his predecessors’ willingness to listen, on a more or less equal basis, to the demands of India’s nationalists by organizing several round table conferences in London, even if the tangible results of these encounters were minimal. The Labor Party government’s readiness to engage, and eventually acquiesce to, Indian nationalists’ demands implied that the Truman Administration in Washington, hastily assembled in the wake of Roosevelt’s death in April 1945, was left with the anti-colonial challenges in the Netherlands East Indies and French Indochina as the possible trouble spots in Asia where American influence could make a difference.

In the process of shaping US foreign policy toward the Southeast Asian region, it seemed that the Netherlands East Indies deserved preferential treatment, in part because the Dutch nation had tried to offer more resistance against the Axis Powers than France had mustered during World War II. Moreover, before he died, Franklin Delano Roosevelt had regularly singled out Queen Wilhelmina’s pledge in 1942, “to grant the people of the Dutch East Indies dominion status, with the right of self-rule and equality” in the postwar period as a model for the French and British to emulate, as Roosevelt’s son Elliott remembered. In the case of the Netherlands, Roosevelt’s residual anti-imperialism may also have been tempered because of his family’s Dutch roots in the state of New York and his friendly relationship with Queen Wilhelmina. Equally significant, however, was his confidence that the Dutch colonial administration was sincerely committed to rectifying past abuse.

In the wake of Japan’s unconditional surrender in mid-August, precipitated by America’s atomic bombs, Truman’s State Department, for the time being, did not register any protest to the Netherlands’ reassertion of sovereignty over its colonial territories in Southeast Asia. Washington pursued the same policy towards the French in Indochina, despite Roosevelt’s strident criticism during his long tenure as US President of France’s exploitation of Indochina. While making it clear that the United States would not participate in forceful measures to resubmit Sukarno and Hatta’s Indonesian Republic or Ho Chi Minh’s Republic of Vietnam to European colonial authority, Washington did offer assistance in finding a peaceful solution if either the Netherlands or France requested such help. In the immediate post-World War II years, it therefore seemed appropriate for the Truman Administration to adopt a public posture of benevolent neutrality in the anti-colonial conflicts in the Indonesian archipelago as well as in Indochina on the Southeast Asian mainland.
The reason for this renewed scrutiny of the history of America’s changing political engagement with Southeast Asia, and particularly Indonesian nationalism from the 1920’s to the country’s formal decolonization in 1949, also stems from contemporary events and their representation in the US media. During the past few years, Indonesian society, as it was forged within *The World the Cold War Made*, to cite the title of the historian James Cronin’s valuable book, has more or less crumbled. In addition, an economic crisis in Asia has unleashed social hardships and political transformations since the late 1990’s, not only in Indonesia but, to a lesser extent, in countries such as Thailand, South Korea, and Malaysia as well. The Asian economic downturn of the past few years – in the Indonesian case, one could label it a meltdown – compromised that nation’s hope of evolving into a full-fledged world power at the beginning of the new millennium, as President Suharto had anticipated in 1995, on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the declaration of independence from the Netherlands on August 17, 1945.

Due to the political protests and social disorder that erupted in 1998 – and the brutality that has accompanied the contested independence of East Timor since then – Indonesia has received more attention from the international media than ever before. However, reports in most US and other Western newspapers or television programs have only sporadically risen above the level of cliché, with the exception, perhaps, of occasional Dutch commentaries and documentaries. Phrases such as “resource-rich Indonesia is the fourth most populous nation in the world,” “the largest oil-producing nation in Asia,” or “more Muslims live in Indonesia than in the entire Middle East combined,” appear over and over again, particularly in the American media. This book, therefore, also hopes to enhance the general historical knowledge regarding a nation in Southeast Asia that deserves the same kind of scholarly and journalistic inspection routinely devoted to China and Japan in Northeast Asia, or to the South Asian subcontinent.

This undertaking builds upon a voluminous body of Dutch-language scholarship on the Indonesian Revolution – documentary, bibliographic, and analytic – that historians, political scientists, sociologists, or scholars situated in other academic disciplines in the Netherlands, have compiled during the past fifty years. It also incorporates, as much as possible, the insights offered by more recent Indonesian examinations of the nation’s struggle for independence. As far as English-language scholarship is concerned, this study tries to engage in a dialogue with two distinguished precursors: George McTurnan Kahin’s path-breaking *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia* and Robert McMahon’s meticulous *Colonialism and Cold War: The United States and the Struggle for Indonesian Independence, 1945-1949*.

Kahin’s pioneering political diagnosis of Indonesia’s birth as a nation-state was grounded in research and interviews he conducted in Republican territory in 1948 and 1949. His book was published for the first time in 1952, and it was both
undisguised and unapologetic as a pro-Indonesian treatment of the struggle for independence. McMahon’s diplomatic history, based on an exhaustive review of the English-language documents available in the United States and Great Britain at that stage, appeared almost thirty years later, in 1981. The passage of time since then has allowed for new insights, if only because the entrenched bi-polarities of the Cold War have tentatively disappeared. As a result, a plethora of further documentation in archives of the United States, Indonesia, the Netherlands, and Australia has become accessible. During the past two decades, moreover, a variety of American, Dutch, and Indonesian participants in the fateful events that took place during 1945–1949 have published memoirs, released diaries or private papers, and written autobiographies – important new sources that were not yet within either Kahin’s or McMahon’s reach when they wrote their highly acclaimed accounts.

It is true that Ambassador Paul F. Gardner’s elegant narrative published in 1997, entitled Shared Hopes – Separate Fears: Fifty Years of US-Indonesian Relations, has incorporated much of this new material, especially the recollections, whether in writing or as oral history interviews, offered by Indonesians. The bulk of Gardner’s chronicle, however, concentrates on the troubled American relationship with Indonesia since independence, perhaps because he served as a political officer in the US Embassy in Jakarta during the turbulent mid-1960’s. Hence, the pre-World War II period and the drama of the independence struggle during 1945–1949 function more or less as a prelude to his more detailed analysis of the history of US-Indonesian Relations since 1950. Melvyn P. Leffler’s award-winning tome, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War (1992) has also been a dependable intellectual companion. Relying on the most comprehensive archival information available prior to 1992, Leffler’s insights have inspired but, at the same time, circumscribed the story told in this book. Similarly, Frank Costigliola’s fascinating writings during the past few years on the meanings of gendered rhetoric, cultural semantics, and the ways in which prominent US foreign policy analysts incorporated unexamined emotional biases into their policy prescriptions, have also stimulated this study indirectly.

While deeply involved in a last round of revisions of this manuscript, we had the great fortune to encounter a recently published book written by the Dutch historian H.W. van den Doel, Afscheid van Indië: de val van het Nederlandse imperium in Azië (Farewell to the Indies: the Demise of the Dutch Empire in Asia). After reading Van den Doel’s volume, he gave us no choice but to enter into a dialogue with him as well. Comprising a grand new synthesis, his study covers approximately the same time span as engaged in the pages that follow. His predominant focus, however, is on the entangled, and often impassioned, relationship between the Netherlands and the Dutch East Indies – a story in which American foreign
policy decisions and political pressures appear to some extent as *deus ex machina* variables.

This narrative, in contrast, analyzes from a distinctly American vantage point the same heart-rending connections between the Netherlands and its colonial possession in Southeast Asia in order to elaborate on the impressions, assumptions, and conclusions that informed Washington’s foreign policy establishment since the 1920’s. Hence, one of the book’s primary objectives is to clarify how Americans’ lingering convictions about the nature of Dutch culture overseas and the Netherlands colonial practices in the Indonesian archipelago collided with the legitimacy of a vibrant anti-colonial movement, on the one hand, and the realities of the emerging Cold War in the post–World War II era, on the other hand.

While exploring these issues, we must take notice of the scholarly Dutch debate between the so-called “traditionalists” and “revisionists.” This discussion among historians focuses on the different meanings that should be attached to the manner in which the Netherlands, in the period 1945-1949, responded to, or challenged, the unilaterally proclaimed Republic of Indonesia, as J.J.P. de Jong formulated it as recently as January 2001. The “traditionalists,” he pointed out, clinging to the view that the Dutch nation was an implacable colonial power intent on maintaining its political and economic hold on the Indonesian archipelago. The “revisionists,” in contrast, characterize the Netherlands political agenda in Southeast Asia during the post–World War II period as the earnest pursuit of a progressive but gradual policy of decolonization. For the purpose of the book at hand, however, this debate does not constitute a crucial interpretive dilemma, even if we are inclined to share the judgments of the “traditionalists.” American foreign policy was formulated for the purpose of protecting US interests throughout the world. As a result, whether or not Dutch officials in The Hague and Batavia were sincere in carrying out the project of an incremental decolonization of the Netherlands East Indies, exerted only limited influence on Washington’s foreign policy decisions and geopolitical strategies.

The book’s structure relies on what could be called a pattern of concentric circles, proceeding from a general overview to greater historical specificity. Since the emphasis of the analysis resides in the postwar period, the first two chapters concentrate mainly on the years 1945-1949. Beginning with chapter 3, however, the focus goes back in time to the decade of the 1920’s, to be followed in subsequent chapters by a somewhat chronological and more detailed examination of the changes in Washington’s visions of the Dutch East Indies/Indonesia up to the end of 1948. Accordingly, the first chapter provides a bird’s eye view of US foreign policy vis-à-vis the Indonesian Republic and the Netherlands in the postwar era, while the second chapter, entitled “It’s 1776 in Indonesia,” explores the ways in which both Indonesian nationalists and Dutch politicians in the period 1945-1949 mustered the historical model of America’s Declaration of Indepen-
dence in 1776 for their own instrumental purposes. Chapter 3 reviews the glowing American assessments of the Netherlands East Indies during the 1920’s, when the Dutch colonial government allowed US companies to invest freely in the archipelago’s profitable oil, rubber, and other industries. Chapter 4 investigates the years of the Great Depression and the early Roosevelt Administration, when American diplomats stationed in Java and Sumatra began to articulate their disapproval of the Dutch colonial government’s abrasive treatment of Indonesian nationalists as well as the suppression of freedom of speech. Chapter 5 concentrates on the period 1938–1945; during these years, American appraisals of Dutch colonial rule achieved a sense of balance, because the ominous threat, and subsequent reality, of Japan’s aggression in Asia prompted US foreign policy analysts to recognize, once again, the strategic and economic importance of the Indonesian archipelago.

Chapters 6 and 7 examine the social atmosphere, political culture, and governmental actions in both the Indonesian Republic and the United States in the immediate postwar years, when Cold War rhetoric was beginning to influence the perspectives of politicians and policymakers in Washington and The Hague, while Republican officials in Yogyakarta tried to steer a middle passage between the growing antagonism between the West and the Soviet bloc. Chapter 8 analyzes the role of Louis Mountbatten’s SEAC (South East Asia Command) forces in Java and Sumatra during 1945–1946, as well as the Australian Labor Party government’s involvement with Indonesia’s independence struggle, which coincided with the torturous Dutch-Indonesian diplomatic negotiations that yielded the fragile Linggajati Agreement signed in March 1947. A few months later, the Royal Netherlands Army’s shattered the feeble truce achieved at Linggajati through its military assault on the Republic. This first military confrontation provoked a United Nations’ Security Council resolution, thus marking the beginning of America’s formal involvement in the UN Good Offices Committee (GOC), established to help resolve the Dutch-Indonesian conflict peacefully. Accordingly, chapter 9 concentrates on the diplomatic efforts of the United Nations’ GOC, which culminated in another precarious but distinctly pro-Dutch settlement signed on board the USS *Renville*, docked in the harbor of Tanjung Priok near Jakarta.

Finally, chapters 10 and 11 analyze the volatile developments within the Indonesian Republic during the spring and summer of 1948, climaxing in the uprising in the city of Madiun in September 1948. These chapters also describe the US foreign policy community’s gradual reassessment of the Indonesian Question in the course of 1948, during its arduous efforts to bring about yet another diplomatic resolution. When these negotiations stalled once more, the Royal Netherlands Army mounted a second military attack on the Republic, which constituted the final straw and completed the conversion of the Truman admin-
istration from a pro-Dutch to a pro-Indonesian posture – a piecemeal political reorientation that had begun in the spring of 1948. The short epilogue chronicles the final dismantling of the Netherlands colonial empire in Southeast Asia by placing the US-inspired sanctions, imposed by the UN Security Council in early 1949, in the context of America’s new geopolitical strategies in Asia that would remain, more or less, in place throughout the Cold War era.
“Curiously enough,” George F. Kennan told US Secretary of State, George C. Marshall, on December 17, 1948, “the most crucial issue at the moment in our struggle with the Kremlin is probably the problem of Indonesia.” A friendly and independent Indonesia, the powerful director of the Policy Planning Staff in the State Department informed Marshall, was vital to US security interests in Asia. Kennan emphasized that America’s dilemma in mid-December 1948, was not merely the question of whether the Netherlands or the Indonesian Republic should govern the region and thus control the rich agricultural and mineral resources of the archipelago. Instead, the real issue boiled down to either “Republican sovereignty or chaos,” and he reminded the Secretary of State that it should be obvious that chaos functioned as “an open door to communism.”

In his counsel to President Truman and Secretary Marshall before December 1948, George Kennan had given precedence to the European arena as far as America’s confrontation with the Soviet Union was concerned. Until then, he had only sporadically focused his intellectual attention on the nationalist movements in South or Southeast Asia. In fact, due to the political views of his senior foreign policy advisers, among whom Kennan’s opinion weighed heavily, Harry Truman considered the anti-colonial upheavals in Asia to be an annoying little “sideshow.” In the immediate post-war years, Kennan and his colleagues on the Policy Planning Staff found it difficult to fathom that political developments in these distant colonial outposts could jeopardize America’s preeminence in the world. In some instances, Kennan even displayed a condescending “disregard for the weak and less developed world.” America’s showdown with the Soviet Union, he asserted in July 1947, would play itself out primarily in the European Theater, where the dangerous stream of communism threatened to inundate “every nook and cranny... in the basin of world power,” to cite one of the ingenious metaphors he crafted in his essay on “The Sources of Soviet Conduct.” His insistence on a US containment policy designed to curb Soviet political machinations in Western Europe earned him the critical designation of “sorcerer’s apprentice.” As Kennan personally remembered, it also reduced him on occasion to the role of “court jester” and “intellectual gadfly” within the State Department.

Washington’s obsession with Europe during the immediate postwar years fa-
cilitated the State Department’s initial indifference to the anti-colonial struggles in Southeast Asia. After President Sukarno appealed to Washington in October 1945, Sutan Sjahrir, as the first Prime Minister of the independent Republic, turned to Harry Truman again in early December with a plea of “in your capacity as [President of] a neutral and impartial nation, [we hope] the United States will afford us the helping hand we need.” However, the emerging US fear of the Kremlin’s sinister intentions in Europe predominated, and thus Sjahrir’s entreaty went unheeded because the recovery of the Dutch economy in a European context was paramount. Ho Chi Minh, the leader of the newly proclaimed independent Republic of Vietnam, asked for the same, but his requests were not answered either.

Despite avowals of neutrality and impartiality, US foreign policymakers quietly backed their trusted Dutch ally in its dispute with the Indonesian Republic, even though, as the year 1948 unfolded, increasingly louder voices from within the State Department began to interrogate America’s implicit pro-Netherlands stance. Washington pursued a similar tactic with regard to France’s suppression of Ho Chi Minh’s nationalist and communist insurgency in Vietnam, but US support for French policies in Indochina was not challenged from within the State Department to the same degree. As the American diplomatic historian, Melvyn Leffler, has characterized the situation, until the early 1950’s the Truman Administration thus continued to extend the same assistance and “platitudinous and self-serv[ing]” recommendations to the French as it had initially offered the Dutch. In doing so, the State Department could only aspire not to alienate and disillusion the Indonesians or the Vietnamese too egregiously, as the senior US ambassador, Stanley K. Hornbeck, summarized the situation.

The Truman Administration’s steadfast backing of the Dutch side in the Indonesian struggle for independence, at least until the summer of 1948, signified a conspicuous departure from Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s insistence that the right to self-determination should be granted to all people on earth. This stance eventually acquired an aura of anti-imperialism in the course of his long presidency. Due to ethnic antagonisms and the problem of defining national boundaries in the Balkans in the wake of World War I, the US President in 1919, Woodrow Wilson, had been the first to formulate the right to self-determination during the negotiations of the Versailles Peace Treaty. Within the course of the 1930s, however, Roosevelt’s New Deal government had taken Wilson’s notion one step further by asserting its universality. This logical leap could also be interpreted as implying America’s endorsement of the vibrant independence movements that had sprung up in colonized territories such as India, Vietnam, and Indonesia.

The Atlantic Charter, which Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill signed with great fanfare in August 1941, proclaimed the right of all
peoples to choose the form of government under which they wished to live. Roosevelt subsequently specified the Atlantic Charter’s scope in a radio broadcast on February 23, 1942, when he said that despite its name, the Charter was not only applicable to those parts of the world that bordered on the Atlantic Ocean. Instead, the Charter encompassed the entire world. Later in the same year, US Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, elaborated on the intentions and ramifications of the Atlantic Charter. He posited that Americans, remembering their ancestors’ anti-colonial revolution in 1776, had a natural affinity with people who “are fighting for the preservation of their freedom...We believe today that all peoples, without distinctions of race, color, or religion, who are prepared and willing to accept the responsibilities of liberty, are entitled to its enjoyment.”

Until his retirement in late 1944, Cordell Hull had nurtured many optimistic ideas concerning the dismantling of European imperialism in Asia and Africa, for which America’s so-called exemplary record of decolonization in the Philippines should serve as a model to emulate. Due to Hull’s virtual exclusion from the formulation of the major policy decisions and military strategies of World War II, as Dean Acheson recalled in his 1969 memoirs, the State Department languished in a dream world and became absorbed in the “platonic planning of a utopia,” while mired in a kind of “mechanistic idealism.” An array of politicians and a considerable portion of the American electorate, meanwhile, were attracted to such lofty designs for the postwar world. These hopeful projections conjured up a new political order that would put its trust in international cooperation; once the bloodshed was over, and the defeat of the Axis powers was finally achieved, old-fashioned diplomacy and balance-of-power politics should be relegated to the dustbin of history. This idealistic view of a cooperative international system in the post–World War II era also entailed a steady, but peaceful, demise of Europe’s empires in Asia and Africa according to an ill-defined set of timetables.

Not surprisingly, Cordell Hull’s predictions concerning the imminence of independence for all people, as long as they were “willing” and “prepared” to shoulder the burdens of liberty, found a receptive audience among many Indonesian nationalists who were more than willing. In fact, during the autumn of 1945, they were chomping at the bit, even if their Dutch colonial rulers had told them over and over again, prior to the Japanese occupation of the Dutch East Indies, that they were not yet intellectually prepared, politically ready, or socially mature enough for an independent existence. Nonetheless, with their own contrary convictions in mind, and with the resonance of the anti-colonial rhetoric of the Roosevelt Administration echoing in the background, Indonesia’s anti-colonial crusaders made the plausible assumption that America would applaud their desire for liberation from the Dutch colonial yoke.

The problem, however, was that toward the end of the war, American policymakers had become more circumspect in pursuing Roosevelt’s anti-imperialist
agenda. This reluctance was not necessarily prompted by Churchill’s truculent announcement in 1942 that the Atlantic Charter did not apply to England’s colonial possessions, because he had not been elected Prime Minister to preside over the dissolution of the British Empire. Instead, domestic political conditions in Europe at the close of World War II stimulated this new American reticence. Since postwar governments in countries such as France and Italy, and to a lesser extent, England and the Netherlands, confronted energetic communist parties aligned with radical labor unions, which could conceivably endanger the capitalist recovery of Europe, Truman’s State Department felt its hands were tied. If Washington were to announce an unambiguous approval of nationalist movements in Southeast Asia’s colonial territories, it might jeopardize its ability to influence political outcomes and economic practices in the European heartland.

American policymakers’ ambivalence on this score was already discernible at the San Francisco conference in the summer of 1945, where the US was one of the leading nations responsible for drafting the articles of the United Nations Charter concerning non-self-governing territories and the structure of UN trusteeships. Even though Roosevelt’s faith in the international custody of Europe’s colonies had been inextricably linked to his belief that European imperial mastery in Asia and Africa should be dissolved, American participants in the San Francisco negotiations proved unwilling to make explicit statements about the desirability of terminating the colonial system. The Truman Administration’s qualms about honoring the memory of Roosevelt’s anti-imperialism would become even more palpable in the American treatment of anti-colonial struggles in Southeast Asia. As far as Indochina was concerned, US Secretary of State, Edward Stettinius, who succeeded Cordell Hull in December 1944, informed French representatives at the UN conference in San Francisco that Washington had never, “not even by implication,” doubted France’s sovereignty in the region. America’s equivocal reaction to Indonesia’s struggle for independence was another case in point.

The Netherlands, after all, constituted one of America’s staunchest allies in Europe, exhibiting an “obstinate Atlanticism” after World War II that rendered the nation’s day-to-day relations with its European neighbors contingent on its “Atlantic policy, and not vice versa.” Dutch politicians also agreed with US opinions regarding the desirability of rebuilding Germany’s industrial capacity as a structural buffer between Western Europe and the Soviet Union. Germany should function as an economic shield, but as a barrier as well that ought to be firmly implanted in the democratic traditions and capitalist practices of the West. As a result of the Netherlands’ concurrence on such basic issues, the State Department pledged its support to an ally that was extremely loyal and a “strong proponent of US policy in Europe,” as Under Secretary of State, Robert Lovett, expressed it on New Year’s Eve in 1947.
A tell-tale sign of Washington’s backing of the Netherlands and the legitimacy of its colonial possessions was the Marshall Plan aid, earmarked specifically for the commercial revival of the Dutch East Indies, without acknowledging the economic needs of the territories in Java and Sumatra held by Indonesian nationalists. The Netherlands East Indies constituted the only European colony to be incorporated into the Marshall Plan’s blueprint. Inevitably, its financial assistance reinforced the Dutch political hold on the archipelago, if only because Marshall Plan aid buttressed The Hague’s ability to impose a strict economic embargo on the independent Republic in Yogyakarta.

Washington also tacitly allowed the Netherlands Army in Indonesia to deploy American Lend Lease material, which were thus added to the significant supply of British weapons already in Dutch possession. At an earlier stage, during the autumn of 1945, the State Department issued an order to remove American insignias from the equipment and outfits used by Louis Mountbatten’s South East Asia Command (SEAC) troops charged with the demobilization of Japan’s military in the Indonesian archipelago. In due course, when the Royal Netherlands Army ensconced itself in Java and Sumatra in the spring of 1946, numerous Dutch soldiers could still be seen in US Marine uniforms while driving US Army jeeps. In addition, the Dutch government diverted a 26,000,000 dollar credit granted by the US War Assets Administration (WAA) in October 1947, allocated for the purpose of building up the Netherlands Army in Northern Europe, to purchasing arms and supplies for its military forces in colonial Indonesia. Through the use of clever accounting techniques, the procurement of weapons destined for Southeast Asia was accomplished without publicly stated American objection. As late as December 1948, the US still voted against the Indonesian Republic’s associate membership in the UN Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE). According to the Secretary of Australia’s Department of External Affairs in Canberra, this negative American decision was interpreted by the Dutch as a “green light” to go ahead with their surprise military attack on the Republic in Yogyakarta on December 18, 1948. It is thus reasonable to conclude that without the rehabilitation funds received from the US through the Marshall Plan and earlier credits, the Netherlands would have been forced to make much greater sacrifices in order to finance its massive military enterprise in Southeast Asia.

During the course of 1948, however, it appeared as if the churning river of communism was shifting its course away from Europe by flowing, instead, in the direction of Southeast Asia, or so George Kennan and his colleagues on the Policy Planning Staff began to speculate. Thanks to the invigorating infusion of dollars provided by the Marshall Plan, several European economies were busily recapturing the stamina of the late 1930’s, when the devastating impact of the Great Depression had started to fade at long last. Despite the dire economic and human
consequences of the exceptionally cold European winter of 1947, the industrial and agricultural productivity of the Netherlands, for example, had more or less recovered pre-World War II levels, even before the Dutch received the windfall of US financial aid. A year later, when George C. Marshall’s brainchild, the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA), was thriving, the auspicious progress of the Dutch and other European economies continued at a steady pace.19 The European Recovery Program (ERP) – better known as the Marshall Plan – also laid the groundwork for an efficient European economic collaboration that was based on the uninhibited transportation of goods and capital across national borders, thus cultivating the evolution of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) and eventually the European Union.

Although eligible to do so, the Soviet Union and countries in Eastern Europe abstained from requesting Marshall aid. The Kremlin’s refusal, in turn, prompted Western Europe’s communist parties to oppose ERP assistance because it stipulated as a prerequisite that national economic agendas be submitted to US authorities for approval. The Office of Military Government in the American zone in Germany (OMGUS), as well as its German associates who were untainted by National Socialism, for instance, accused the German Communist Party (Kom- munistische Partei Deutschland or KPD) of trying to “sabotage” the Marshall Plan.20 The anti-Marshall Plan arguments mustered by communist parties in other Western European countries were also perceived as standing in the way of economic revival and growth, while illustrating, at the same time, European communism’s servility to Moscow. By the late 1940’s, however, the financial support provided by the ERP had begun to dilute the electoral strength of Western Europe’s communist parties, thus realizing one of Washington’s projected policy outcomes.21

As a result, the year 1948 produced a piecemeal reassessment among the State Department’s senior members of the most urgent foreign policy issues facing the United States. Actual political developments in the Indonesian Republic, Ho Chi Minh’s Vietnamese Republic, Burma, the Malay Peninsula, the Philippines, and especially Mainland China aided and abetted this reorientation in the outlook of policymakers in Washington. In the Indonesian Republic’s case, the political impressions gathered by US Foreign Service officers on location, who were professionally absorbed in the bitter realities of the ongoing struggle for independence since October 1947, also nurtured an incremental shift in the State Department’s sense of priorities. US representatives working in Batavia and Kaliurang maintained regular contacts with both Indonesian and Dutch officials, and they dutifully relayed their impressions to Washington.22 During their engagement with the anti-colonial conflict, a variety of “reasonable, intelligent, compatible” Indonesian nationalists were able to convince their colleagues from America of the righteousness of their struggle.23
Indonesian politicians succeeded in doing so by highlighting the harshness of Dutch efforts to strangle the independent Republic, both politically and economically. They also appealed to a shared belief in the peoples’ right to self-determination, or they swayed US diplomats’ opinions by emphasizing the common ground between the Indonesian Republic’s fight for national independence and America’s own anti-colonial origins. After the United Nations’ Security Council established a UN-sponsored Good Offices Committee (GOC) in late August 1947, to facilitate a resolution in the wake of the Netherlands Army’s first military attack on the Republic, Coert du Bois was appointed as the second American representative, replacing Frank Porter Graham in early 1948. Following in the footsteps of the pro-Republican Graham, Du Bois also became convinced soon after his arrival in Java that idealistic Indonesians were “engaged in a struggle resembling our own revolution against British rule.”

In a comparable vein, Charlton Ogburn, their younger State Department colleague assigned to the GOC staff in Java, wrote a letter to his parents on February 20, 1948, about an Indonesian “guerrilla leader,” with whom he had spoken at length near Jember in central Java. The young law student turned revolutionary soldier struck Ogburn as “very intelligent, well-educated, fresh, willing, and most attractive.” It should be noted that several Australian diplomats recorded equally complimentary views. One of them described Republican officials as “well-educated, restrained men,” while another admired Sutan Sjahrir’s “skillful political maneuvering.” A third Australian commentator portrayed Sukarno as a “beautiful-looking man with a dominant, vibrant personality.” Left-of-center Dutch observers also registered their appreciation for the “moderate, Western-oriented Indonesians” who were governing and defending the independent Republic. These “kindred souls,” wrote the Dutch social democrat, Jacques de Kadt, in December 1945 to his fellow Partij van de Arbeid (Labor Party or PvdA) member, the Indonesian Nico (Leonardus Nicodemus) Palar, “are becoming totally estranged from us, leaving them with nothing but contempt for all things Dutch.”

On the opposite side of the great divide, the Dutch officials who doggedly defended the Netherlands colonial viewpoint, were not as effective in enlisting personal sympathy for their cause among the American officials stationed in Java during the period 1945-1949. In fact, another deputy of Graham and Du Bois – State Department economist Philip H. Trezise – recalled a senior Dutch negotiator as an “intensely disliked character” or a “bully boy,” who did nothing but pursue a “hard line position that offered zero hope” for a mutually acceptable settlement. Later in life, he wrote that this particular Dutchman, Henri van Vredenburch, had treated Indonesians “most contemptuously” and was only happy when scoring “debating points.”

Van Vredenburch did not mince words on his own behalf either. In his mem-
oirs, he portrayed Graham, the first American representative on the UN Good Offices Committee, as either “intransigent and unmanageable” or as a “nervous and confused man, whose bias in favor of the Republic had blinded him.” He judged Ogburn to be an “unbalanced young fellow” who was a “sinister spirit” bent on seducing his superiors into joining the Indonesian camp. Furthermore, he characterized Du Bois’ conduct as the US representative to the GOC as one of the most “striking examples of substandard diplomacy” he had encountered in his entire career. Whether or not they were actually ornery, diabolic, or befuddled, in both subtle and more emphatic ways these American emissaries – with Ogburn and Trezise, or their senior colleagues Graham, Du Bois, and later H. Merle Cochran as the most prominent among them – communicated their pro-Indonesian opinions to startled superiors in Washington, many of whom had not before questioned America’s residual pro-Dutch standpoint.

Washington’s reception of such compelling reports favoring the Indonesian Republic in late 1947 and 1948, coincided with the State Department’s own reassessment of the strategic areas in the world where the “Cold” War with the Soviet Union might ignite into a “Hot” War. This combination of pressures thus encouraged Washington’s slow but steady reconsideration of potential flashpoints around the globe; it also moved the colonial struggles in Indonesia and Vietnam from the State Department’s peripheral vision to an area that was closer to the center of attention. Nonetheless, it took until the autumn of 1949 before a comprehensive US foreign policy for all of Asia would be formulated, if only because during the late summer of 1949 the Soviet Union had detonated its first atomic device. Soon thereafter, the victory of Mao Tse-tung’s communist forces in China over Chiang Kai-shek’s “selfish and corrupt, incapable, and obstructive” nationalist troops – as John Stewart Service had labeled them as early as 1944 – was imminent. As a result, the gradual changes that characterized the year 1948 would culminate in National Security Council Paper 68 (NSC 68), issued in 1949, which proposed an alarmist realignment of Washington’s global strategy.

In the case of the Indonesian archipelago, however, the slow but steady transfer of Washington’s loyalties from the Dutch to the Republik Indonesia was already completed when the Royal Dutch Army launched its second full-scale military offensive against the Indonesian Republic on December 19, 1948, or what Dutch officials called euphemistically the second “Police Action.” Earlier in the year, a leftist coalition (Sayap Kiri) within the Indonesian Republic, united under the umbrella of the Democratic People’s Front (Front Demokrasi Rakyat or FDR), was forged among disgruntled nationalists. Inevitably, this new alliance of socialists, communists, and radical labor unionists was disconcerting to the Policy Planning Staff and Asia specialists in the State Department. US Intelligence analysts noted that a range of political organizations had joined forces at “the crossroads of the left,” as the Indonesian historian Soe Hok Gie aptly described the new coali-
tion. The Democratic People’s Front released a barrage of criticism regarding Sukarno and Hatta in Yogyakarta – the two men Washington was beginning to appreciate as perhaps the only “moderates” who could withstand the Kremlin-directed intrigues in the Republic.33

The left-wing forces stubbornly defied Hatta’s warning that if “sentiments are fired to such heights,” supporters of the Republic might lose sight of “the fact that our independence can only be secure if we constitute a firm bulwark of unity.”34 In addition to blunt criticism voiced by the leftist opponents of the Republican government, a range of work stoppages and full-fledged strikes had erupted during the spring and summer of 1948, especially in densely populated central and east Java. In addition to social unrest in such towns as Solo, Sragen, Klaten, Boyolali, and Blitar, the most antagonistic labor actions took place in Delanggu, an economically important cotton-growing area in the vicinity of Yogyakarta, where the Republican government’s State Textile Board managed a network of plantations and factories. The drawn-out Delanggu strike resulted from real grievances with the allegedly corrupt practices of the State Textile Board. It was also a matter of people with hungry stomachs not being able to muster much patience. Workers suffered profoundly because wages were in arrears and food prices were rising, while the allocation of cloth as payment-in-kind had ceased.35

In fact, Charlton Ogburn was appalled by the human despair that prevailed in the Delanggu region. In the spring of 1948, he embarked on a journey through the central Javanese countryside with President Sukarno and Coert du Bois, a few months after the latter had arrived as the second American GOC representative. Ogburn wrote that “the men, women, and children we saw in the fields and villages resembled castaways – emaciated, hungry, ragged.” Blaming the harsh Dutch blockade for smothering the economic viability of the Republic, he was deeply disturbed by his encounter with people in rural areas, whose faces were imprinted with starvation and who wore clothes made of “goatskin and sisal fiber, intended for gunny sacks.”36 Recording similar outrage at the injustice of the Dutch economic embargo, George McTurnan Kahin, in an article in the Far Eastern Survey in November 1948, added that no medicine was available for the treatment of even the most ordinary tropical diseases, while the “anti-illiteracy campaign” launched under the auspices of the Republican government had come to a halt, due to a lack of books and paper supplies as a result of the Dutch embargo.37

It was clear to many observers that the genuine hardships endured by workers and their families had incited the Delanggu strike. The labor protests in the region became a “political football” soon after the National Confederation of Labor (Sentral Organisasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia or SOBSI) as well as other left-wing political groups became embroiled in the dispute.38 Moreover, conditions in Delanggu further deteriorated, to the extent that armed clashes became an al-
most daily occurrence, when units of the anti-Republican Hisbullah, whose efforts were dedicated to the establishment of an Islamic state in Indonesia, arrived on the scene to provide armed protection to strike breakers. In response, the Plantation Workers’ Union of the Indonesian Republic (Sarekat Buruh Perkebunan Republik Indonesia or SARBUPRI) threatened to call a general strike of 150,000 workers all over Java and Sumatra; SARBUPRI’s leaders called upon the Hatta government to remove the Hisbullah forces that terrorized the workers, because the armed Muslim units did not “respect the democratic rights” of people engaged in a legitimate labor protest.39

In addition to the social tensions generated by the labor strife in Delanggu and elsewhere, the domestic harmony of the Republic during the summer of 1948 was also under siege because of the Republican government’s efforts to improve and “rationalize” the efficiency of the Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI), the Republican Army. According to Prime Minister Hatta, the TNI’s unwieldy size, insufficient funding, and lack of discipline and coordination continued to undermine the Republic’s military effectiveness. On September 2, 1948, he argued that “an oversized army, far beyond the country’s means, will suffer from a bad spirit, poor morale among the ranks, and reduced fighting power.” As a consequence,
Hatta ruefully noted, many soldiers were resorting to undignified behavior such as “looting to provide for their own needs.”

From the beginning of the independence struggle, Prime Minister Hatta suggested, the existence of the people’s defense forces, consisting of numerous makeshift guerilla organizations and semi-autonomous militia units, had aggravated the situation. All of these unwieldy wildcat units had fallen under “the spell of a war psychosis,” because their members’ impulsive actions were difficult to regulate or restrain. He advocated policies that would encourage surplus TNI soldiers and volunteer guerilla fighters, who displayed an aversion to “ordinary work, looking down upon it as something humiliating,” to readjust to “normal peacetime occupations.” But leftist groups dismissed Hatta’s rationalization plans; instead, they fanned the flames of opposition by denouncing Hatta’s proposed reforms of the Republican armed forces with incendiary slogans such as “you’re discarded as soon as you have fulfilled your term.”

Not surprisingly, Dutch authorities monitored the volatile labor unrest in Java, the tensions within the Republican Army, and the growing political unity of Indonesia’s left-wing factions with eagle eyes. By recycling a series of long-winded and hyperbolic reports, Dutch intelligence officials and diplomats brought the burgeoning communist threat to the attention of American diplomats in Batavia, The Hague, and Washington. As if to lend credence to the Dutch proposition that Republican leaders were overly responsive to Moscow’s directives, a communist-inspired uprising on September 18, 1948, in Madiun in central Java, a city filled with sugar refineries and workshops engaged in railroad maintenance, temporarily shattered the internal unity of the Republic.

The outcome of the Madiun revolt, however, was not what Dutch intelligence operatives and politicians had envisioned. Sukarno immediately condemned the uprising as a coup d’état organized by the Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Kommunis Indonesia or PKI), and announced on Republican radio, “You must choose: it’s either me or Musso! (or Muso, the PKI leader).” Once the Republican government had demonstrated its willingness to take resolute action against the Indonesian Communist Party, the US foreign policy establishment began to dismiss Dutch representations of the Republic under the “moderate” leadership of Sukarno and Hatta as a hotbed of communism. The two Republican politicians, in other words, had proven they were not merely masquerading as the “fig leaves of democratic procedure to hide the nakedness of Stalinist dictatorship,” to invoke yet another colorful metaphor George Kennan used when depicting the role of Eastern European politicians in the postwar years.

Dean Acheson, for example, furnished an example of America’s increasingly positive view of Sukarno and Hatta. After succeeding George C. Marshall as Secretary of State on January 20, 1949, he articulated the State Department’s approval of the two Republican leaders’ repression of the Madiun insurgents in
straightforward language. In a personal letter to a friend in New York, he also wrote that he was “signally impressed with the effective and rapid suppression by the Republic of Indonesia of a communist-inspired revolt in September 1948.”

This, in turn, provoked further troubling questions during the late summer and autumn of 1948, about the political logic of Washington’s tacit support for its faithful Dutch ally. At the same time, The Hague’s intransigence in the continuing efforts to find a diplomatic solution became more and more annoying to State Department officials and to H. Merle Cochran, the third American GOC representative in Java – a discomfort that Australian diplomats, stationed in Batavia, Washington, and at the United Nations in New York nourished as well as they could. Even though Dutch negotiators tried to present themselves as reasonable peacemakers, they were behaving like “cornered cats,” to summon the vivid imagery conjured by the historian Pieter Drooglever. They had been maneuvered into a very tight space and the frightened felines could do little but hiss and scratch.

The Royal Netherlands Army’s second effort in December 1948, to resubmit the Indonesian Republic to its colonial authority, thus constituted the final act of Dutch aggression that completed Washington’s year-long process of reorientation. This fateful military strike proved decisive in solidifying the certainty of senior US policymakers that the Republic’s desire for independence was not only legitimate, but also essential to America’s global interests. The second armed attack prompted George Kennan to contemplate whether Marshall Plan aid to the Netherlands East Indies, and even the Netherlands itself, should be cut off as a not-so-subtle form of punishment. At the same time, it stirred up an anti-Dutch “hornet’s nest” within the United Nations.

The Dutch military offensive, in fact, helped to crystallize a new geopolitical vision in the State Department. Once Kennan and Acheson and their colleagues began to incorporate the Indonesian struggle for independence into their appraisal of America’s Cold War strategies, the Netherlands’ insistence on keeping a political and economic foothold in the archipelago became unacceptable. Within less than a year, on December 27, 1949, the Dutch government acceded to American pressure and relinquished its sovereignty over the archipelago. In this short period of time, US foreign policymakers managed to end the “foolish dithering,” to cite Alan Levine’s irreverent phrase, that had caused the Dutch-Indonesian conflict to drag on for too long and at too great a human cost.

This precipitous and traumatic outcome – as many people in the Netherlands saw it – was due, in large part, to America’s power to determine the shape of international relations during the years after World War II. The postwar settlements in Europe and the Pacific, as well as the creation of the United Nations, had accorded the United States a “hegemonic position.” Even if the Soviet Union contested US preeminence in as many places as possible, America emerged as the
“anchor” of a new world order by guaranteeing its “stability and routine workings.” An occasional levelheaded Dutch observer understood the implications of America’s incipient hegemony in world politics. Already at Christmas time in 1945, Henri van Vredenburch predicted that it would not be long before the US would throw its weight around in Southeast Asia; he cautioned that a successful Dutch resolution of the Indonesian question would have to accommodate the political demands and ideals of American policymakers.

Similarly, during the spring of 1947, when contemplating the Royal Netherlands Army’s contingency plan of mounting it’s first full-scale military attack on the Republic, yet another Dutch civil servant also prophesied that “without American approval, we can’t do anything.” If the US government does not endorse a Netherlands’ military strike against the Republic, Daniël van der Meulen anticipated, Dutch authorities in The Hague and Batavia will have no option but to “cease and desist.” Exactly fifty years later, the historian of American foreign policy, Gerlof Homan, again detailed Dutch perceptions of America’s meddling in the Indonesian question during 1948 and 1949. Many Dutch citizens in Europe and Southeast Asia were appalled, he noted, because Uncle Sam proved to be a fickle schoolteacher who had suddenly decided to take “the naughty little Dutch boy to the woodshed for some stern lecturing and a good spanking.”

Despite their anger at what they perceived as America’s deception, people in the Netherlands were forced to acknowledge that the victory of the Allied forces over Germany, Italy, and Japan had been sustained to a great extent by the economic, technological, and human resources of the United States. They also had to concede that as soon as the Allies had obtained their enemies’ unconditional surrender, America evolved into “the locomotive at the head of mankind,” as Dean Acheson remarked with uncanny hubris, while the rest of the democratic Western world was reduced to trailing behind like feeble carriages.

As Cold War polarities were taking hold of international relations, however, the independence struggles in colonial outposts such as the Dutch East Indies and French Indochina transcended their regional significance and became implicated in both the real and imagined duality of the postwar world. In 1947, drawing upon George Kennan’s apocalyptic language or replicating Averell Harriman’s “ferocious anti-Rouski attitude” – and anticipating the panicky American perspective that would entrench itself during the Eisenhower Administration in the early 1950’s – Dean Acheson had already portrayed the Soviet Union’s intrusions into different regions of the world as a contagious disease. Because he feared Republicans in the US Congress, spearheaded by the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Michigan Senator Arthur Vandenberg, might once again retreat into an isolationist stance and thus frustrate the Truman Administration’s commitment to “liberal internationalism,” Acheson occasionally exaggerated his anti-Soviet rhetoric. There were other reasons for Acheson’s
tendency to demonize the Kremlin by inadvertently inciting an “anti-Communist frenzy,” like having to camouflage the “unpalatable fact” that Washington was helping both the Dutch and the French maintain their neo-colonial occupations in territories in Southeast Asia. As a result, the political necessity to seek Congressional approval for his internationalist orientation sometimes obscured the fact that he was dedicated to a pragmatic resolution of the tensions between the US and Stalin’s Russia, if at all possible. Agreeing with George Kennan, in this regard, he objected to a growing trend towards the militarization of America’s antagonism with the USSR, arguing, instead, that the Cold War should be fought with economic weapons first. In his personal vision, however, communism was important primarily as an ideological medium of Stalin’s “deeper interest” in expanding the Soviet Union’s sphere of influence to the rest of the world. As he noted in 1947, communism was exploited as a “most insidious and effective instrument of aggression and foreign domination.”

The corruption of communism, Acheson suggested, resembled “one rotten apple” in a barrel that could gradually “infect” the whole lot. The Kremlin’s post-war contamination of France, Italy, and Greece might move in an eastern or a northern direction to the Balkans. It was also possible that the virus could migrate southward to Egypt and the rest of Africa. He added that communism’s “penetration” might also spill over into Iran and perhaps much further to the northeastern or southeastern regions of Asia, and only the US was powerful enough to arrest the contagion. Thus, when an authoritative State Department voice such as George Kennan’s referred to the second military assault on the Yogyakarta Republic in December, 1948, as an “incredible piece of Dutch stupidity,” the Netherlands’ attempt to maintain a viable presence in their lucrative colonial possessions in Southeast Asia was soon thereafter doomed to failure.

This American course of action in early 1949, however, did not emerge from a vacuum, even though many Dutch people were convinced that most foreign policymakers in Washington and the general public in the United States were woefully uninformed about the social and political conditions of the Indonesian Republic. Scores of Dutch critics charged that Americans simply lacked any form of cultural knowledge about the archipelago’s diversity of religions and ethnic groups. Such ignorance, they sneered, gave State Department officials the sophomoric impression that Indonesian nationalists could administer the vast archipelago and its rich resources by themselves. Americans’ “primitive sympathy” for Asian independence movements did not rely on any form of historical understanding, a Dutch historian wrote in 1946 in a tendentious booklet about the US press treatment of Indonesia’s anti-colonial struggle. Instead, to curry favor with the reading public for the purpose of selling newspapers and making profits, American journalists displayed a fondness for “exaggeration and oversimplification.” Reporters often wrote newspaper articles as if they were spectators at a...
sporting event who instinctively cheered on the “underdogs” in the hope they would put up an interesting fight.66 A few years later, however, the mushrooming fear of Kremlin-coordinated communism altered the tone of US journalistic assessments of the dangerous “red peril” the underdogs in the Indonesian Republic had to confront.

A high-ranking official from the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, deeply involved in the Dutch-Indonesian conflict, described Frank Porter Graham – the President of the University of North Carolina before he was appointed to the GOC – as a gullible if “well-intentioned” man. While Indonesian politicians in the Republic addressed Graham as a “trusted friend of the Indonesian people,” who championed their position during his service on the GOC in 1947 and as a US Senator in Washington DC in 1949, Dr. Hendrik N. Boon recalled him as a “typical” American, who did not have a clue about the world’s complexities. Boon noted that Graham made the basic assumption that “what’s good for
the US is good for everybody.” When asked in late 1947 how elections could be organized among an overwhelmingly illiterate population, Graham apparently answered that ballots could replace bullets by handing Indonesian citizens a small red-and-white flag and a little red-white-and-blue flag, after which “voters can announce their choice by enthusiastically waving the flag they prefer.” In Graham’s case, though, Dutch officials were bound to be dreadfully disappointed, regardless of his actual words and deeds, if only because they had expected the US government to name a GOC member who possessed the stature of either “General Dwight Eisenhower or Dean Acheson.”

Vitriolic critiques of America’s foreign policy, however, often concealed a self-serving judgment on the part of the majority of Dutch people who found it hard to believe that Indonesians, most of whom they continued to view as childlike and unskilled, were capable of managing an independent nation without the assistance of enlightened civil servants from the Netherlands. When hearing such patronizing arguments, the American diplomat on the Security Council’s GOC, Coert du Bois, reputedly dismissed these Dutch statements during the spring of 1948 in a gravelly voice. Whether Indonesians were ready for self-government was completely beside the point, he retorted, because autonomy could simply not be withheld from “people striving for self-rule.”

Nevertheless, scores of people in the Netherlands and the Dutch East Indies seized what they defined as America’s punitive anti-Dutch campaign as a convenient lightning rod. Because the incremental reevaluation of US views concerning the legitimacy of the Indonesian Republic had been an internal State Department debate rather than a public process, the Dutch community perceived America’s pro-Indonesian actions in early 1949 as a betrayal that came out of the clear blue sky. The State Department’s new policy was publicly conveyed by the US Ambassador-at-large, Philip C. Jessup, whose sympathy for the victims of European colonialism inspired the forceful proposal for UN Security Council’s sanctions after the second Dutch military attack on the Republic. Through the instigation of Jessup and the US delegation, the Dutch nation was suddenly treated as “the laughingstock and doormat of the world’s comity of nations,” an arch-conservative former colonial civil servant lamented. Even worse, he moaned, was that “our government did not offer any form of dignified resistance.” In a similar vein, Admiral Conrad Emil L. Helfrich, who retired from the Royal Netherlands Navy after World War II, wrote a bombastic “private and personal” letter to Dean Acheson’s home address in Bethesda, Maryland, after looking it up in Who’s Who in America. In clumsy English he chided Acheson in September 1949, that the State Department failed to realize that millions of Indonesians “fear and loathe the Republic and her communist backed or tainted, now everywhere infiltrating, elements.” He warned the US Secretary of State that the new impetus of Washington’s foreign policy would produce “a poor, ter-
rorized Indonesian people, an unsafe country [in Southeast Asia], and an impov-
erished little Holland on the west coast of Europe, contrary to any endeavor to
create a strong West European Union.”

During the postwar era, Dutch characterizations of America’s policies as wit-
less and capricious were in many instances the poignant expressions of an unwill-
ingness to concede that the era of European colonial mastery in Southeast Asia
and elsewhere was over. Scores of foreign observers, in contrast, saw the writing
on the wall. An Australian foreign policy analyst depicted Dutch residents in the
Southeast Asian colony in the postwar period as living in a “dream world bound-
ed by their prewar prejudices.” Similarly, the acting British Consul General in
Jakarta in June 1948, faulted the Dutch for stubbornly and foolishly trying to re-
vive a lost world. Several scholars in the Netherlands, many decades later, have
also characterized Dutch efforts to perpetuate the nation’s position in the In-
donesian archipelago as behavior reflecting an atavistic compulsion, which ac-
quired an aura of tragedy reminiscent of Don Quixote’s tilting with windmills.
The Dutch historian Cees Fasseur, in fact, has argued that only America was able
to pull the Dutch out of the murky “Indonesian quagmire” in which they had
become ensnared.

In reality, though, the American foreign policy establishment was not as unin-
formed about Indonesian society as many Dutch citizens, political or military offi-
cials, or the media chose to portray it in 1949. Ironically, on the rare occasion
that the US State Department in Washington actually complained about the lack
of intelligent analysis of the political situation in the Indonesian archipelago,
which occurred in 1947, the American diplomat posted in Batavia happened to
be a man who spoke both Malay (Indonesian) and Dutch. In fact, the US Consul
General in Batavia during 1945–1947, Walter Ambrose Foote, prided himself on
possessing a long record of Foreign Service assignments in Java and Sumatra since
the late 1920s. If his Dutch colonial friends and colleagues could have read his ca-
bles and dispatches to the State Department during the early postwar years, they
would not have objected, simply because he recapitulated their own political
views.

However, Washington encouraged its emissaries to apply only the most practi-
cal criteria as to what constituted useful knowledge. Desk officers in the State
Department often judged arcane cultural information about the ethnic com-
plexities or religious diversities of the archipelago to be immaterial in formulat-
ing appropriate foreign policies for Southeast Asia. It was likely that US Foreign
Service personnel posted in Batavia, Surabaya, and Medan saw their complicated
Indonesian environment as overly “pliable.” A peculiar American vision of inter-
national relations as a chess game that could be won by shrewdly manipulating
the most powerful pieces on the board through the use of proper strategy rein-
forced this impulse. Such US perspectives differed from the Dutch diplomat Van
Vredenburch’s view; he compared the formulation of foreign policy to a “game of chance,” which prompted players to make reckless decisions due to either deficient information or a lack of intelligent deliberation.70

Thus, many of the assessments sent back to the State Department may have skated on the surface of the cultural complexities of the archipelago, purely because American policymakers’ perceived such knowledge as esoteric and therefore irrelevant. For example, when the very same US Consul General, Walter Foote, mailed a lengthy dispatch from Batavia ten years earlier filled with social and cultural details on the subject of “Netherlands India in Crisis in 1937,” an official in the Office of Far Eastern Affairs scribbled in the margin that the report might contain “valuable material for a sociologist” but was utterly “useless to the State Department.”71 America’s international relations, resembling the diplomatic practices of most members of the world community, were forged for the purpose of preserving or enhancing the US position in the world and “to defend, not define, what America was,” as Walter McDougall wrote in 1997.72 Moreover, the memories of the nuclear annihilation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki endowed Washington’s management of its international relations with an aura of impunity. In the immediate postwar years, America’s atom bomb monopoly enabled Washington to protect its national security interests and to pursue foreign policy objectives in an almost peremptory fashion, rendering careful scrutiny of the impact of US measures in the international arena less urgent.73

As a result, in their efforts to make sense of the mineral-rich world of the Dutch East Indies, US analysts staked out a series of political and economic truth claims that served America’s national interest during the period 1920-1945: such partisan assumptions and definitions continued to prejudice Washington’s policies toward the Dutch-Indonesian conflict in the immediate post-World War II years. At the same time, deeply rooted affinities existed between American diplomats, US oil company executives, and plantation directors, on the one hand, and the many Dutch colonial administrators and captains of industry in the Netherlands East Indies, on the other, who had so profitably managed the productivity of the natural resources of the archipelago. This instinctive sense of US-Dutch compatibility in matters of business, democratic politics, and social values lingered on throughout the postwar period. Hence, Washington’s willingness to back the Dutch side was only gradually, and perhaps reluctantly, suspended as the year 1948 drew to a close, when Cold War calculations in Asia demanded America’s transfer of loyalty to the Indonesian camp.74

During the crucial year of 1948, the primacy of the State Department’s concerns with the Netherlands’ role in Europe was progressively overshadowed by the belief that Sukarno and Hatta could withstand Moscow’s ideological pushes and pulls, which would enable them to establish a pro-Western Republic on a strategically located archipelago in Asia. Washington’s new pro-Indonesian stance
was communicated to the Netherlands and to the world at large in increasingly explicit language in January of 1949. This was done only after the Truman Administration and the US Congress on Capitol Hill were reassured that it was plausible to expect that the “moderate” leaders of the Republik Indonesia – moderate having become a synonym for non-communist or better yet, anti-communist – would deliver and secure their independent nation as a Western-oriented bulwark against Asian communism in the future.
“The American people know how precious national freedom and human liberties are,” the Free Trade Union News of the American Federation of Labor (AFL) announced in a front-page editorial on January 7, 1949. Our American ancestors also fought a bold revolutionary war to gain our nation’s independence, the article stated. “We therefore view with the keenest sympathy” the dreams of millions of Indonesians striving for their own country’s sovereignty. The author, Andrew Woll, ended his editorial with a note of incredulity: “We simply can’t believe that the Dutch will condone the use of their forces and resources for depriving other people of their national independence and democratic rights.” 

This commentary, supporting Indonesia’s quest for freedom after the Netherlands Army had mounted its second full-scale military attack on the Republic’s headquarters in Yogyakarta in late December 1948, established a straightforward analogy with America’s struggle for independence in the late eighteenth century. In linking the two revolutions, the politically moderate and anti-communist Free Trade Union News was not alone. Other publications across the vast North American continent, whether they embraced a progressive perspective or harbored more conservative views, also invoked the analogy with the United States in 1776 with great frequency. A range of US newspapers and magazines, when reporting on the anti-colonial struggles in Southeast Asia, suggested that the Indonesians’ desire to live a self-governing existence revealed similarities with the birth of Americans’ own independent nation. The creation of the United States of America, after all, had also entailed the severing of colonial ties with a maritime nation located across the English Channel from the Netherlands.

Inevitably, the contrasts between the American Declaration of Independence in 1776 and the Indonesian Proklamasi in 1945 were striking. In fact, the dissimilarities were more profound than resulting merely from the different historical conditions under which North American colonists and Indonesian nationalists were compelled to draft their resolutions. The Indonesian proclamation of independence on August 17, 1945, was a brief apodictic statement issued by Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta, two of the paragons of the nationalist movement, who presumed to speak for a nation of 70 to 80 million people who were overwhelmingly illiterate. The census of 1930 revealed that only six percent of the In-
The Indonesian population could read and write, and there is no reason to assume that literacy rates substantially rose during the subsequent fifteen years. \(^2\)

Sukarno and Hatta’s terse communiqué on behalf of the Indonesian people had been cobbled together the night before, during a heated debate with a few fellow nationalists. Perhaps with the example of Philadelphia in 1776 in mind, Hatta asked the other Indonesians who had helped to draft the document to sign it, too, once the spare language was agreed upon. \(^3\) When they proved reluctant to do so, the Proklamasi was announced to the world only in the names of Sukarno and Hatta. The entire text contained no more than two simple sentences. Yet in Sukarno’s eyes, the Proklamasi’s two austere phrases celebrated the genesis of a free nation that would finally be cleansed of all the evils of imperialism, whether in a Dutch or Japanese guise. As he concluded with a flourish after reading the proclamation, “So it is, Brothers and Sisters!... There is not another single tie binding our country and our people!” \(^4\)

Soon thereafter, a Japanese witness claimed that Sukarno even asked Japan’s defeated military officials to participate in a ritual transfer of sovereignty. \(^5\) He envisioned the Proklamasi as a “golden bridge” that would enable Indonesians to embark upon a new life in a society entirely of their own making. \(^6\)

The American Declaration of Independence signed in Philadelphia in 1776, in contrast, constituted an exquisite political statement. The lengthy document presented cogent arguments that legitimized the North American colonists’ seizure of freedom. It also formulated lofty political principles that have defined America’s national identity and have served as a moral code ever since. Contrary to popular folklore, however, this text did not sprout forth in pristine form from the solitary brilliant mind of Thomas Jefferson. When the Continental Congress instructed a committee to compose a preliminary draft of the Declaration, Jefferson and his co-authors relied on a miscellany of earlier “declarations of independence” – homespun but learned texts that had been passed at both the state and local level during the spring of 1776. It was true that Jefferson produced a “pretty good” first draft in the weeks he and his fellow committee members had available, as American historian Pauline Maier noted. But an intense, last-minute effort of collective editing in early July 1776, on the part of delegates to the Continental Congress resolved into a Committee of the Whole, constructed the Declaration’s final version by displaying “a splendid ear for language,” as Maier further observed. Relative to Sukarno and Hatta’s unilateral and cryptic pronouncement, the elaborate American Declaration of Independence resulted from an almost communal resolution among citizens of the North American colonies “to leave the British Empire and take up the reins of government themselves.” \(^7\)

Nonetheless, the dubious but heartwarming assumptions about the comparable anti-colonial origins of the United States of America and the independent
Indonesian nation state indirectly bolstered the State Department’s resolve to finally announce its public support for the Indonesian Republic in January 1949. Eventually, these fuzzy notions settled in as commonplace. The US was the “first colony” to win independence on its own terms, President Eisenhower’s Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, boasted a few years after Indonesia’s independence; as a consequence, Americans could muster only “respect and admiration” for those who followed in their footsteps. Or as the well-known anthropologist, Margaret Mead, would argue in a letter in 1958 to the US Under Secretary of State, Christian Herter, the Indonesian nation resembled “the original thirteen colonies of the United States, because it came into being within the limits set by the conquest and administration of a single European state.” She added that Indonesia recapitulated the American model by exulting in the “common bonds of colonial status and successful resistance in the making of a nation.”

The legitimacy as well as the political value of the US-Indonesian comparison was obvious, too, to some of the savvy representatives of the Indonesian Republic who were busily trying to publicize its cause in America. One among them was Sudarpo Sastrosatomo, a well-educated press officer only in his mid-twenties, who had been dispatched to New York as public information officer by the embattled government of the Yogyakarta Republic. He recognized that George Washington, having helped to achieve America’s freedom by his steadfast leadership on the battlefield, had assumed almost mythical proportions. Sudarpo also understood that Washington was not the only one who lived on in Americans’ memory as a gallant leader in war and peace and as a champion in the hearts of his countrymen. Although some of them were initially a bit reticent, the rebellion against the mighty forces of King George III proved to be a shared effort on the part of an eclectic group of strong-willed men.

While Sudarpo knew that George Washington and Thomas Jefferson were the most beloved members in the pantheon of founding fathers, other flamboyant historical figures such Benjamin Franklin and John Adams had emerged as familiar characters in the historical imagination of many Americans as well. In addition, Sudarpo realized that during the course of the nineteenth century, the collectively written American Declaration of Independence had been converted into a revered document or “American Scripture.” Nearly two centuries later, in March 1949, Sudarpo distributed an elegant position paper to interested American journalists, public officials, and international delegates to the United Nations, entitled “It’s 1776 in Indonesia,” in which he tried to create a set of parallels between the American and Indonesian revolutions with intelligence and aplomb.

In the immediate postwar years, however, America was much more than just an inspirational model to the guardians of the Indonesian Republic. Since Indonesia’s independence had been proclaimed in Jakarta, the nationalists’ new
name for Batavia, on August 17, 1945, those striving for the country’s liberation from Dutch colonial bondage were acutely aware that in the immediate future, the United States would perform a pivotal political role in world affairs. Indonesian nationalists expected that America’s preeminence would be communicated primarily through its dominant voice in the newly established United Nations. They shared the widespread expectation that from the ashes of the fratricidal carnage of World War II and the resulting breakdown of Europe’s imperial control of Asia, a new structure of international relations would arise. This novel, cooperative alliance between the world’s nations would finally rescue Europe from its pathological habit of indulging in collective “suicide attempts,” as the Dutch Foreign Minister in 1948, Dirk U. Stikker, would express it in his memoirs. These recurrent acts of self-destruction on a massive scale, he noted, had brought Oswald Spengler’s Untergang des Abendlandes (The Decline of the West) steadily closer.12

It is no surprise, then, that many Indonesians shared the idealistic visions of many statesmen and ordinary citizens around the globe. They also looked forward to a postwar international community that would embrace all the independent countries in the world as active participants in the United Nations. Indonesian nationalists also placed their faith in the UN Security Council as a supra-national agency that might be able to monitor the world’s harmonious co-existence by settling disputes between member states. The Security Council’s permanent delegates, representing the world’s most powerful nations, would serve alongside a constantly shifting array of members elected to two-year terms, which inevitably would encompass Indonesia once its independence was achieved. Nonetheless, in the establishment of the UN General Assembly and Security Council or the definitions of their respective duties, observers in many corners of the globe conceded that the US played a part that was more significant than any other constituent, both ideologically and financially.

On the ground in faraway Java and Sumatra, an obvious awareness of America’s conspicuous position of power in postwar international relations entered the political calculus of avid nationalists. Many Indonesians also clung to the idea that most American politicians and citizens were proud of their own anti-colonial origins. America possessed both the moral authority and ideological heritage, Indonesian anti-colonial activists anticipated, that should prompt its foreign policymakers to channel the decolonizing tide sweeping across Asia since 1945 in directions it deemed most desirable. And to colonial subjects living in the Indonesian archipelago who were committed to the project of national independence, it was inconceivable that the formidable political colossus in the New World would not nurture the yearning for freedom among the millions of people in Asia who had suffered from European colonial exploitation for hundreds of years.

After a period of popular apprehension and political indecision had passed,
young nationalists could barely contain their enthusiasm in the wake of the unilat-
eral proclamation of their nation’s freedom. The pemuda (revolutionary youth) went to work at once because they were “full of vital energy” and “did not hesi-
tate for a minute,” as captions in Lukisan Revolusi Rakjat Indonesia (Illustrations of the Indonesian People’s Revolution), revealed. They created posters, decorated trams, and covered the walls of buildings in the city of Jakarta with idealistic slog-
gans. The intoxicating mantras Indonesia Merdeka (Indonesia Free, Indonesia In-
dependent), Tetap Merdeka (Forever Free, Independence Forever), or Merdeka atau Mati (Freedom or Death), were written on every conceivable surface, even if the hated Japanese military police (Kenpeitai) tried to remove the grafiti and banners as quickly as possible. It was striking, though, that a considerable number of mot-
tos were composed in English. An inventive mixture of the Jeffersonian language of the American Declaration of Independence in 1776 and Abraham Lincoln’s Gettysburg address of 1863 inspired the English texts that rapidly adorned the city. These high-minded slogans also incorporated Woodrow Wilson’s program-
matic Fourteen Points, proposed during negotiations of the Versailles Peace treaty after World War I, which had gained new currency in the optimistic rhetoric of Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s Atlantic Charter.

Indonesians were not alone in using the American prototype for their anti-im-
perialist purposes. In fact, the leader of the nationalist movement in French In-
dochina, Ho Chi Minh, liberally quoted from the US Declaration of Indepen-
dence when he promulgated the free and autonomous Republic of Vietnam on September 2, 1945. After verifying the correct wording with an American OSS officer (Office of Strategic Services) in Hanoi, with whom he had cooperated in an underground anti-Japanese campaign in the last stages of World War II in the Pacific Theater, the new President, speaking in Vietnamese, began: “All men are created equal. They are endowed by their creator with certain inalienable rights; among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.” Ho held his speech in Place Puginier, soon thereafter renamed Ba Dinh Square, which was decorated with flags bearing a gold star on a bright red background and streamers revealing slogans such as “Vietnam for the Vietnamese”; “Down with French Colonialism”; “Independence or Death,” and “Welcome to the Allied Mission.”

After Ho finished his speech, General Vo Nguyen Giap stepped forward and said to the crowd, “The United States of America has paid the greatest contribu-
tions to the Vietnamese fight against fascist Japan, our enemy, and so the great American Republic is a good friend of ours.” As if to pay their respects to the new government being proclaimed in Hanoi, in full view of the French Governor General’s palace, two American airplanes staged a noisy fly-by while Ho Chi Minh delivered his stirring address. An ominous harbinger of North–South dif-
fences in the future could be witnessed in the southern city of Saigon, howev-
er, where a large demonstration was taking place to celebrate the concurrent
declaration of independence being proclaimed in Hanoi. Sudden gunshots dis-rupted the joyous occasion in Saigon, killing several French people and turning the buoyant gathering into a destructive riot.16

A closer examination of the political situations and resulting American decisions vis-à-vis Indonesia and Vietnam at this specific historical juncture is instructive. For Ho Chi Minh, September 2, 1945, was a triumphant day. While proclaiming the Vietnamese Republic, he delivered an emotional speech to a hushed but electrified crowd of more than 400,000 people, as the same American OSS officer in Hanoi, Archimedes Patti, remembered.17 Having been galvanized into action by the highly disciplined efforts of the Viet Minh Front (or the League for the Independence of Vietnam, founded in May 1941, by the Indochinese Communist Party or ICP) and the Vietnamese Liberation Army (the formal name for the ICP resistance forces organized in December 1944), Ho’s audience probably rejoiced in this long-awaited moment. It signaled the end of a brutal Japanese occupation that had been facilitated by what the historian, David G. Marr, has called French colonial “sub-contractors.”18 After all, France’s civil servants in Indochina not only provided military support, food, and shelter to Japanese army units with “unseemly haste,” they also made available ample indigenous laborers who were compelled to work for the invaders from Japan.19 Perhaps French administrators had reluctantly cooperated, but they had little choice in the matter. In 1940 and 1941, the Vichy government in France advised its Governor General in Indochina, Admiral Jean Decoux, to accommodate Imperial Japan’s draconian demands.20

These agreements forced France to play along with Japan’s sinister war games in Asia. Conceding Japan’s special interests in Indochina while maintaining French sovereignty and administrative command appeared to be the only option available to the Vichy regime’s leader, Marshall Henri-Philippe Pétain, and his deputies. Since the Vichy government had acquiesced to the Nazi occupiers in France, it would have been contradictory to instruct the French colonial administration in Southeast Asia to take a firm stance against Germany’s ally. Besides, the French military establishment in Indochina was too weak to withstand an all-out Japanese attack.21

The Franco-Japanese marriage of convenience, however, did not last beyond March 9, 1945, when Japanese troops assaulted their French partners-in-crime. Soon after the attack, Ho Chi Minh sent a note to his comrades in the anti-Japanese underground, rejoicing in the fact that the “Japanese fascist hyena” had finally devoured “the French imperialist wolf.”22 On the battlefield, the Japanese army killed a total of 2,100 French officers and many more European and native soldiers. Among the latter, a large number had already been recruited into the Viet Minh Front. The Viet Minh had embodied Ho’s effort to unify all anti-colonial factions; during the Pacific war, the organization acquired an anti-Japanese stance
as well. By joining Ho’s organization, many indigenous people had also affiliated themselves with the small ICP, whether or not they had done so knowingly.23 When the fighting was over, Japan’s military rulers interned about 15,000 members of the Indochinese Armed Forces, although they exacted the continued bureaucratic complicity of the middle ranks of the French civil service. Soon thereafter, Free French leader, Charles de Gaulle, issued a declaration on March 24, 1945, promising that at the conclusion of World War II an Indochinese Federation ought to be created that would enjoy a certain degree of autonomy within the French Union. This limited freedom would be commensurate with the region’s “evolutionary stage,” De Gaulle proposed, to reflect its presumably low level of political maturity. The ultimate political power in Indochina, however, would continue to rest with a French governor general, while De Gaulle also studiously avoided all references to either independence or the name Vietnam.24 It should be noted that certain policymaking factions in Washington echoed De Gaulle’s views; as a US planning document during the war stated, the Vietnamese had “no organizing ability or initiative.”25 The Japanese, for their part, pompously announced that the era of colonial oppression was over and they encouraged the scion of Vietnam’s ruling family, Bao Dai, to declare his people’s independence. Soon thereafter, King Norodom Sihanouk in Cambodia and his royal counterpart in Laos, Sisavang Vong, followed in Bao Dai’s footsteps. On the whole, the French civilian population was left unharmed, except that they were restricted in their freedom of movement by being contained in designated neighborhoods until the US dropped the atom bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki and ended the war in the Pacific.26

The collusion of the French colonial administration with Japan’s brutal invaders during World War II – “the Franco-Japanese double yoke” – was viscerally clear to the ecstatic people listening to Ho Chi Minh’s speech in Hanoi’s central square, whether or not they had participated in the Viet Minh’s anti-colonial and anti-Japanese actions.27 In Hanoi, on September 2, 1945, Ho seemed to release the enormous crowd of long-suffering Vietnamese people from the shackles of two hated oppressors. Their embattled colonial rulers from France, however, reacted quickly to Ho’s provocative words. Cadres of French soldiers began to pour into the country without objection from South East Asia Command’s (SEAC) General Douglas D. Gracey, whose forces were charged with the post-surrender assignment of demobilizing and disarming the Japanese military in Indochina. Due to the nationalist ferment in the country, in general, and the rioting and deaths in Saigon in early September, in particular, Gracey also decided to deploy the French troops just released from Japanese detention to help SEAC in the task of restoring peace and tranquility. As Gracey announced in mid-September: “the question of the government of Indochina is exclusively French... civil and military control of Indochina by the French is only a matter of weeks.”28
French General in charge, Jacques Philippe Leclerc, was thus given a license to regain control of France’s fractious colony, whether by guile or by force. Less than a year later, the strategy of encircling the Vietnamese Republic by reasserting their power over Cambodia and Laos with the support of the French Navy was completed.

Still, Ho Chi Minh had high hopes that Roosevelt’s anti-colonial rhetoric would be translated into a pro-active policy pursued by the Truman government in the postwar era. One of the OSS officers, who had parachuted into the region to establish contact with the Viet Minh, signaled back to his superiors in Kunming in southern China that Ho would welcome “ten million Americans” but that he would not allow even one single Frenchman to enter his Republic of Vietnam. William J. Duiker’s massive new biography of Ho Chi Minh has shown that Ho initially managed to placate American observers’ fears about communism in Vietnam. The same OSS officer cabled his superiors in July 1945, “Forget the communist bogey. The Viet Minh Front is not communist. [It] stands for freedom and reforms from French harshness.” Ho also succeeded in convincing Mountbatten’s SEAC intelligence units that there was no reliable evidence that he “was at present under... communist or any other foreign influence.” Because Ho did not restrict his foreign appeals to the Soviet Union alone, he nurtured Stalin’s lingering suspicions about his communist loyalties, which delayed the Kremlin’s official recognition of the Vietnamese Republic until 1950.

On various occasions, Ho Chi Minh requested that Harry Truman and his foreign policymakers refrain from aiding the French. As President of the provisional government of the Vietnamese Democratic Republic he wrote to Truman on November 2, 1945, and telegraphed again on November 23rd “for strictly humanitarian reasons... during the winter of 1944 and the spring of 1945, 2,000,000 Vietnamese died of starvation owing to the starving policy (sic) of the French who seized and stored to rottenness (sic) all available rice.” But Truman and his senior aides ignored Ho’s pleas for political support and economic assistance. The situations in Vietnam and Indonesia, whether in a humanitarian or political sense, did not appear urgent enough to require State Department action.

Besides, Washington’s suspicions of Ho’s communist leanings lingered on. In the meantime the French army was allowed to use American Lend-Lease military equipment to suppress the nationalist movement, as the Dutch would eventually do in Java and Sumatra. While Ho and his Viet Minh comrades may have assisted the United States in anti-Japanese efforts, in American eyes his cooperation during the war was tarnished by his communist inclinations and fueled Washington’s ingrained fear of the French Communist Party’s strength in France’s domestic politics.

The French were as crucial as they were intransigent in the creation of a strong Europe. America urgently needed France’s cooperation because it occupied a
permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, which included veto power. After its initial hesitation, the State Department became convinced by 1948 that the French confronted anti-colonial forces in Southeast Asia that had established their bona fide communist commitments. A State Department report in October 1948 cautioned that the Soviet diplomatic post in Bangkok was being converted into a coordinating agency for the communist movement in Southeast Asia. Besides, US foreign policymakers suspected that the Kremlin had targeted Southeast Asia as particularly fertile soil for the cultivation of communism. As US Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, wrote to the American Consulate General in Hanoi in the spring of 1949, “all Stalinists in colonial areas are nationalists. With the achievement of national aims (i.e., independence) their objective necessarily becomes the subordination of the state to commie purposes.”35 Such conclusions resulted in Washington granting its French ally a free hand in pursuing its neo-colonial efforts, causing France to become embroiled in an increasingly bitter armed conflict that lasted well into the 1950’s. One could also argue that Washington’s decision to give a green light to France’s attempts to resubmit Vietnam to its imperial authority was one of the roots of America’s own disastrous involvement in a bloody civil war in the very same Southeast Asian country during the period 1966-1973.

Sutan Sjahrir, Indonesia’s judicious first Prime Minister, displayed a keen understanding of the political hurdles Ho Chi Minh confronted and how they deviated from the Republic’s international situation. When a Newsweek journalist, Harold Isaacs, arrived in Java during the autumn of 1945, carrying a letter from Ho to the Republican government proposing that the Vietnamese and Indonesian revolutions be coordinated, Sjahrir refrained from answering. The Viet Minh faced an entirely different situation when compared with Indonesia’s anti-colonial activists, he argued. France was still a major military power despite its battlefield losses during World War II, while he viewed the Dutch as incapable of conducting “a protracted war.” Besides, Sjahrir added, “our nationalist movement is led by nationalists – theirs by communists; therefore, they are bound to have more enemies than we do.” Sjahrir rightfully predicted that Indonesia would gain independence long before Vietnam, enabling it to help Ho in his anti-colonial efforts more effectively in the future than it could have done in a premature and misguided effort at coordination in 1945.36

The differences between the two Southeast Asian anti-colonial struggles also manifested themselves in the open expression of popular engagement with the proclamation of independence offered by Ho Chi Minh, on one hand, and Sukarno and Hatta, on the other. In comparison to the exhilarated crowd of more than 400,000 people in Hanoi that had been mobilized by local cadres of the Vietnamese Liberation Army, Sukarno’s declaration of Indonesia’s independence in Jakarta two weeks earlier constituted a lackluster, almost clandestine affair.
small size of Sukarno and Hatta’s audience, however, did not necessarily constitute evidence of Indonesians’ ambivalence about national independence. Rather, it was the result of the political confusion, even chaos, that permeated Jakarta during the weeks following the official Japanese surrender in mid-August 1945. Although young nationalists (pemuda) were actively trying to elicit popular support throughout the city, most people were petrified of Japan’s despised military police (Kenpeitai), who had imposed a reign of terror during the past three years and whose palpable presence remained. As a result, the majority of the city’s ordinary citizens were timid and distrustful. Some of them may have longed for the return of their former Dutch employers, hoping to reclaim their secure jobs in European households or government offices, if only to enjoy a full belly or an undisturbed night’s rest. Many others hedged their bets, anxious to protect their families but uncertain as to whom they could trust or what to expect from the future.37

To the extent that they were in a position to do so, the Dutch community in Southeast Asia and Europe actively fueled the prevailing uncertainty and second-guessing. Immediately after the Proklamasi, the Dutch media began a negative publicity campaign. As the Australian historian, C.L.M. Penders, recently noted, the Dutch media portrayed the new Republic as either a “sick joke” or a bad dream because it was a political entity created by Indonesians who had served Japan’s military henchmen. Aside from being Japanese puppets, Dutch-language newspapers in the Netherlands and Indonesia also emphasized that the self-appointed leaders of the Republic were politically inexperienced neophytes and therefore incompetent managers.38 The faithful supporters of the Republic, meanwhile, were depicted as the equivalents of fascists, Hitler Youth, communists, murderers, or leaders of criminal gangs whose loyalty to the Republic was only skin deep.39

In the capital of the United States, The Washington Post alluded to these pejorative depictions of the Republic and its leaders a few months later. It reported that Dutch officials and colonial residents wanted Americans to remember that Sukarno had rejoiced in a public bonfire only a year earlier, on November 7, 1944, when portraits of the hallowed leaders of the Western Alliance, Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill, had gone up in flames.40 Waging a war of words against the contemptible Republic and its architects, however, was all the Dutch could muster at this stage. While French armed forces were busily reaffirming their power in Indochina, Dutch military troops could not enter Java and Sumatra in full force until the spring of 1946. In the interim, Dutch politicians and citizens in the Netherlands or Southeast Asia were able to do little but fulminate and behold the sudden appearance of English-language revolutionary billboards all over the capital of the Dutch East Indies.41 At the same time, returning Dutch civil servants and European civilians in Java and Sumatra in 1945 were under the protection of British soldiers under Louis Mountbatten’s South East Asia Command
(SEAC), who were charged with the demobilization of Japanese troops.

It was interesting, though, that numerous young Indonesian nationalists viewed English as the language that could best express their ideals of national freedom. English appeared to be the most effective and resonant speech in which they could articulate their vision of a future without Dutch imperialist oppression. In the minds of many earnest revolutionaries, the English language embodied post-colonial modernity. They expected that English would become the international *lingua franca* of a brave new world, populated by nations that were co-equal regardless of their population’s race, religion, education, or level of economic development.

The provocative references to America’s heralded Revolution and its founding fathers also served an immediate, strategic purpose in late August 1945. The enthusiastic people who painted excerpts from Jefferson’s writings or Lincoln’s speeches on banners and city walls expected that such texts might appeal to US troops, whose arrival was eagerly anticipated. It was conceivable that they did not yet know that at the Potsdam Conference in late July 1945, the military jurisdiction over the demobilization of the Dutch East Indies had been transferred from General Douglas MacArthur’s Southwest Pacific Area Command (SWPA) to British Admiral Louis Mountbatten’s SEAC, despite MacArthur’s vociferous objections. Because of the secrecy surrounding the reassignment from SWPA to SEAC, which might have to occur at an accelerated schedule due to US intentions to drop the atomic bomb on Japan, Mountbatten could not engage in any formal planning of SEAC’s newly commissioned task in Indochina and Indonesia until mid to late-August. This may be the reason why Laurens van der Post’s secret report to the Foreign Office in London gave August 15th as the date of the reassignment of the responsibility for Java and Sumatra from SWPA to SEAC.

To the British, the Potsdam decision was not an unwelcome one, even though it represented an enormous logistical burden. However, the preparations for “Operation Zipper” in British India – the Allied landing in Malaya planned for September 1945 – had paved the way for SEAC’s expanded mission once the Japanese had surrendered. England was anxious to perpetuate its role as the dominant European player in the Asian arena in the postwar era. In a sly attempt to reinforce the bonds of brotherhood with his fellow imperialists in the Netherlands, Winston Churchill had offered the Dutch Prime Minister-in-exile in London during World War II, Pieter S. Gerbrandy, British assistance in Holland’s efforts to preserve its Southeast Asian Empire once the Allies crushed Japan. In this context, an American pundit had joked that the acronym SEAC really stood for “Save England’s Asian Colonies.” Probably unaware that the die had already been cast at the Potsdam meeting, the young Indonesian revolutionaries in Jakarta may still have hoped that well-equipped American soldiers, rather than relatively ill-prepared British troops, would take on the arduous duty of liberating the archipelago by
disarming and demobilizing the Japanese military establishment. Therefore, they wanted to welcome American soldiers with treasured and familiar texts.

In late August 1945, when the vision of Indonesian independence had made its “radiant entrance” and provoked “an epidemic rage for politics,” scores of ebullient Indonesians were carried along by a revolutionary “riptide,” as Pramoedya Ananta Toer described the situation. Sukarno likened the unfolding revolution to a runaway horse that pursued its own unpredictable path. “The task of the revolutionary leader,” he added, “is to stay in the saddle until the horse has run its course. Only then [can] he steer it in the desired direction.” After a period of hesitation following the proclamation of independence, the revolutionaries’ artistic handiwork began to alter the atmosphere of Jakarta. Billboards appeared everywhere with sayings such as “We Fight For Democracy: We Have Only To Win” or “For The Right Of Self-Determination.” The excited nationalists also painted on office buildings and city monuments the phrases “Life, Liberty, And The Pursuit Of Happiness,” “Indonesia Never Again The Life-Blood Of Any Nation,” “Every Nation Has The Absolute Right To Maintain Its Independence,” and “We Don’t Want The Dutch Again.” A variety of Jakarta trams, meanwhile, suddenly displayed mottos such as “[What] We Need Just Now: Independence” or “All People Are Created Equal.”

The latter was obviously a gender-neutral variation of the language of the American Declaration of Independence, perhaps in a subtle effort to mobilize not only politically engaged men but every Indonesian citizen, including women, into the nation’s revolutionary campaign. It could also be that Indonesia’s brown-skinned revolutionaries changed “men” into the more inclusive word “people” in an inchoate attempt to summon fellowship or encourage a sense of affinity with white, brown, and black soldiers from America, whom they hoped would set foot on Java’s soil within a few weeks.

Apparently an ad-hominem attack – “Death To Van Mook” – was scrawled on several city walls as well, while a Jakarta tram sported a banner on its side with a question posed in oddly colloquial English, “Van Mook, Whatcha Doin’ Here?” A British historian, John Keay, described Hubertus Johannes van Mook not long ago as a “shambling giant of a man,” who was a political progressive born and raised in the Netherlands East Indies, where he felt perfectly at home. A Dutch diplomat working alongside Van Mook in the immediate postwar era, Henri van Vredenburch, remembered him as “a solitary elephant with exceptional intellectual gifts coupled with an enormous capacity for hard work.” Although he conceded Van Mook’s complicated and ambitious personality – in his memoirs, Laurens van der Post wondered whether Van Mook may have been a manic-depressive – Van Vredenburch characterized the Lieutenant Governor General as a “portly giant, who was a born stoic and appeared phlegmatic, calm, contained, and healthy.” Despite his formidable intelligence and commanding physical
stature, though, the slogan “Death to Van Mook” startled the burly senior administrator when he finally returned to the Indonesian archipelago from Australia in early October 1945.52

The distribution of anti-Dutch revolutionary posters was not limited to Jakarta alone. They also appeared in Java’s second largest city, Surabaya, and a few places within the interior.53 In Surabaya, ardent nationalists supposedly appointed an eccentric Anglo-American woman named Vaneen Walker or Muriel Stuart Walker – or K’tut Tantri, Mrs. Manx, Molly McTavish, and Miss Daventry, to cite a few of the aliases she used throughout her unconventional life – as the “Mrs. Thomas Paine” of the Indonesia Revolution. As “Surabaya Sue,” following in the tradition of “Tokyo Rose” and “Shanghai Lil,” she became an English-language newscaster on Radio Revolusi.54 In her implausible 1960 autobiography, she claimed to have created white banners in 1945 with the phrase “Abraham Lincoln Walks Again In Indonesia” in red letters, while other slogans appeared on trams and buildings such as “Up Republic Indonesia” and “We Abominate Colonialism.” She also boasted that she wrote the text for President Sukarno’s first English-language speech. Not having any reference books at her disposal, she composed a medley of “the writings of Thomas Paine, Thomas Jefferson, and Abraham Lincoln” by relying on her self-proclaimed prodigious memory and her intimate knowledge of American history.55

In short, by late August 1945, with relish and dispatch, Indonesian nationalists and a few supporters from abroad borrowed some of the best-known passages written by America’s founding fathers. Less than five years later, when Indonesia’s independence was at long last an internationally acknowledged fact, these historical analogies were graphically represented once more. Soon after the negotiations concerning the terms of independence between Republic’s representatives and the Dutch government at the Round Table Conference in The Hague had come to a close, a series of stamps was issued for purely commemorative purposes. Everyone knew, as the Indonesian writer, Y.B. Mangunwijaya, observed prior to his recent death, that the outcome of the Round Table deliberations was “heavily determined by the USA.”56 To acknowledge this fact, the stamps displayed the images of the most important architects of the Indonesian Republic alongside their political ancestors in eighteenth-century colonial America as well as the mid nineteenth-century Civil War President, Abraham Lincoln, who managed to avert the break-up of the United States.

On the most expensive seal, George Washington loomed behind a stately picture of President Sukarno. The regal representation of Sukarno contrasted with the informal image of his indispensable partner in Indonesia’s revolutionary crusade. The next stamp in the series revealed a portrait of Mohammad Hatta – smiling broadly, which was a departure from his imperturbable expression in most of the photographs taken during the period 1945–1949 – in front of a stern Abra-
ham Lincoln. The latter, obviously, did not belong in the pantheon of the American nation’s eighteenth-century progenitors. But Lincoln was juxtaposed with Hatta because both men had provided uncompromising leadership during a turbulent civil war, which could have destroyed the unity of either the United States or the Indonesian Republic. Just as Lincoln had managed to prevent secession of the slave-owning Confederacy in the American South during the 1860s, Hatta had succeeded in defeating a coup staged by rebels in Madiun in September 1948, who had also threatened the integrity of the Republic.

The third stamp displayed the shrewd and pragmatic Republican Minister of Finance, A.A. Maramis, paired with the businesslike Alexander Hamilton. The Republic’s multi-talented Foreign Minister, Haji Agus Salim, was depicted on the fourth one with a mischievous look on his face; the American counterpart peering over his left shoulder was the equally gifted Benjamin Franklin, who displayed an impish smile. Ironically, the fifth and least expensive seal in the series portrayed a cameo of Thomas Jefferson, the most revered member of the quartet of America’s founding fathers. His picture floated behind a melancholy image of Sutan Sjahrir, who had served as the Republic’s first – and second and third – Prime Minister.57

The combination of Sjahrir and Jefferson was well-chosen. It might appear odd that the portraits of this illustrious duo were printed on the stamp with the lowest value, because both men had used their political sophistication and moral conscience to emerge as the guiding intellectual lights of their respective independence struggles. In modern historical memory, whether in Indonesia or the United States, the two have sometimes been anointed as *primus inter pares*. By the time the stamp collection was launched, though, Sjahrir’s role in Indonesian politics had diminished dramatically, despite the illusion of a subtle halo radiating around his head. Since he had retreated into the background of the revolution during its later phase, by dint of circumstance as well as personal choice, his photograph may have been printed on the cheapest one.

During the five years in between the decoration of Jakarta’s public buildings with such slogans as “Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness” and the release of the stamp collection, the analogies between the American and Indonesian Revolutions had served both ideological and pragmatic goals. Even though Indonesia’s struggle for national sovereignty occurred under profoundly different circumstances, representatives of the fledgling nation hoped that the parallels between the two events might curry the favor of US foreign policymakers and mobilize pro-Indonesian sentiments among the American public at large. Until the end of 1948, however, Indonesians, such as the bright press officer Sudarpo Sastrosatomo in New York, had a hard time swaying US sentiment or convincing American policymakers to openly support the Indonesian side. The Indonesians’ task was to challenge a set of highly positive clichés about Dutch history and
national identity, which had firmly settled into the imagination of many Americans.

Astute Dutch politicians, diplomats, and information officers, meanwhile, nurtured these flattering stereotypes in Americans’ historical memory. The Netherlands Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dirk U. Stikker, for example, issued an official statement after the Netherlands’ second military assault on the Indonesian Republic. His press release was designed to placate American criticism. Reproduced in full in the *New York Times* on December 22, 1948, he began with a disingenuous appeal to popular opinion in the US and a reference to America’s birth as an independent nation: “These are times of confusing thoughts. For many of you in America – the country whose freedom Holland was among the first to welcome and salute in the eighteenth century – it must be hard to understand why the Dutch, of all people, should take up arms against a Republic in Indonesia which is claiming its freedom.”

In his first paragraph, Stikker appealed to the presumably ambivalent attitudes of the US foreign policy establishment towards the Dutch-Indonesian conflict. The Netherlands was, after all, one of America’s oldest allies and friends. Its wealthy burghers had functioned as a significant source of financial credit during America’s own tempestuous formation as an independent nation. During his sojourn in Europe as a diplomatic envoy of the newly established United States of America, John Adams had solicited and finally secured two much-needed loans from friendly sources in the Dutch Republic during the 1780’s. The money was used to pay debts incurred during America’s armed struggle against the troops of King George III; it was also invested in the creation of a viable infrastructure in the new nation.

After his coy opening, Stikker made yet another comparison between America’s own political development and the political institutions fostered by the Dutch in their Southeast Asian colony. It should hardly be necessary to explain to an American audience, he noted, that the Republic’s refusal to accept equal status with the other political entities in the Dutch-created United States of Indonesia was unacceptable. Since the defiant Republic wished to become the “dominating force” in the federal union, it would “nullify the fundamental idea of federation.” He then posed a clever rhetorical question: “Would any of the forty-eight American states be willing to sacrifice its state’s rights to a unitarian republic and be dominated by one single state amongst them?”

At the same time, shrewd politicians in the Netherlands and Southeast Asia began to yoke the Dutch attempt to crush the Indonesian Republic to America’s growing fear of communism in the post-World War II era – a veritable phobia that found one of its outlets in the red-baiting crusade embarked upon by a disreputable group of Washington legislators. Dutch intelligence organizations and diplomatic sources either drafted or resuscitated hefty reports concerning the
dangers of Moscow’s intrusions into the Republic. They made sure these anti-communist dossiers landed on the desks of all State Department officials in Washington, who worried about America’s confrontation with the Kremlin. In addition, towards the end of 1948, the Dutch were indirectly supported by ordinary American citizens, whose letters to their representatives in the US Congress or to the State Department began to contain more frequent warnings about the menace of communism rather than emphasize Indonesians’ right to self-determination, as had been the case in the majority of letters the Department received in the period 1945–1947.

A personal friend of Secretary of State Dean Acheson, for example, wrote him in early 1949, “Moscow has capitalized steadily on the Pan-Asiatic movement.” After serving as “despicable self-serving tools of the Japanese” during World War II, he noted that Sukarno and Hatta had consistently refused to contain “hammer-and-sickle guerrilla-band organizations” or to prevent “communist sabotaging, scorched-earth destruction, and blood-spilling” since 1945. The obsessive fears of communism would grow uglier towards the late 1940’s, so it was no surprise that some US Senators and Congressmen shared the skeptical opinions of many Dutch people about the Indonesian Republic’s leadership.

One of the more outspoken American politicians on this score was a Congressman from Connecticut, John Davis Lodge. He held forth in a speech in the US House of Representatives on July 25, 1949, that many of the “so-called Indonesian Republicans are hardly imbued with the lofty spirit of 1776.” Instead of viewing them as modern reincarnations of George Washington and Thomas Jefferson in the exotic world of Southeast Asia, he counseled the American people to learn the truth about the upstart rulers of the so-called independent Indonesian Republic. All these devious and opportunistic men, he intoned, “have been enslaved by godless, communist imperialists.” When he delivered his ominous warning during the summer of 1949, however, the American foreign policy establishment had already turned a crucial corner, leading in a direction that differed from the one charted by Lodge and his red-baiting colleagues. After more than three years, America’s foreign policy establishment stopped hedging its bets by initiating a policy of forceful support for Indonesia’s quest for independence. Bolstering the “moderate” leadership of the Republik Indonesia as a non-communist entity in Asia superceded Washington’s loyalty to the Netherlands, a reorientation that the Republic’s astute Prime Minister, Mohammad Hatta, had fostered with great political skill as the year 1948 came to a close.

In August 1995, the Indonesian Republic observed its fiftieth anniversary with great fanfare. Public buildings and monuments in Jakarta were adorned with red-and-white banners. Mammoth signs attached to the awnings of government of-
fices congratulated the Republic on its birthday (*Dirgahayu RI*). In addition, the modest entry gates to urban neighborhoods and scores of rural villages received a fresh coat of paint and a cryptic sign – RI 1945-95 – reminding all inhabitants that 1995 was a milestone in their country’s history. At the same time, newspaper articles commemorated the intrepid actions of Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta, who had unilaterally proclaimed the nation’s independence.

In 1995, the Suharto regime also published a lavish, oversized volume, filled with glossy pictures and cheerful stories about social progress and economic development, entitled *Indonesia 1945-1995: The First Fifty Years*. Unaware that only three years later a devastating economic crisis in Asia would again reduce Indonesian society to poverty and political bedlam, this gigantic coffee table book extolled the dramatic transformation of the Indonesian archipelago from a Dutch colonial possession into an emerging world power. The ceremonial volume also recorded the official congratulations offered by an array of prime ministers, presidents, kings, and queens from around the world. In his celebratory message, American’s President Bill Clinton noted that “strong diplomatic support for your struggle for freedom came from President Truman and our Congress while your nation was being born.”

Clinton embellished the truth, even though it can be argued that his statement was not entirely incorrect. His advisers may have informed the President about the first American Ambassador to independent Indonesia, H. Merle Cochran, who had assiduously propagated this story during the early 1950’s, to the extent that it began to annoy President Sukarno.64 It is also plausible that Clinton was alerted to the presence of an occasional State Department official or American academic who had voiced enthusiastic support for the Republic during the early years of its valiant struggle. Within the course of their professional engagement with the Indonesian Revolution in the post-World War II era, these Americans could not help but admire the Republic’s efforts to establish its “hundred percent freedom” from all forms of Dutch colonial exploitation in the future. Whether intentionally or unwittingly, the same spirited Americans aided the Indonesian Republic’s efforts to gain legitimacy in world opinion as a sovereign nation.

One among them was a young State Department representative, Charlton Ogburn, who arrived in Indonesia in the autumn of 1947 with few prejudices against the Dutch colonial administration of the archipelago. During World War II he had served behind Japanese lines in Burma as a member of an Allied guerrilla unit that managed to capture one of Japan’s strategic jungle airstrips against great odds. In 1959, he fictionalized his war-time experiences in a novel entitled *The Marauders*, which was made into a Warner Brothers movie called “Merrill’s Marauders” in 1962.

When he returned to Washington from Burma after the war, Ogburn was assigned to the Indochina desk in the State Department.65 Being one of the few
specialists on Vietnam, Ogburn suggested he should be remembered as the “Cassandra” of American policymaking vis-à-vis that complicated part of the world, because his efforts to alert his superiors in the State Department to the fateful “drift of US policy” in Vietnam in the immediate postwar years and during the 1950’s fell on deaf ears.66

In the wake of the first Dutch military assault on the Yogyakarta Republic, which provoked the UN Security Council’s cease-fire resolution in August, 1947, including an offer from the United Nations’ “good offices” to the Netherlands and the Indonesian Republic to find a peaceful settlement, Ogburn was selected for service on the Good Office Committee (GOC) in Java. His knowledge of conditions in French Indochina did not automatically make him an expert in Indonesian matters, although it added comparative insight and intellectual depth to his analysis of the Indonesian problem. At that particular moment, however, the Department’s most suitable candidates – William Lacy and Frederick Nolting, who had monitored the Dutch-Indonesian conflict since 1945 and were pro-Dutch in their instincts and assessments – were not available. The former had recently undergone drastic surgery, whereas the latter’s fourth daughter had just been born.

The choice was then made for Ogburn. He arrived in Java with a charitable view of Dutch history; he could recite a sophisticated inventory of all the spec-
tacular deeds accomplished by enterprising Dutch burghers, sea captains, artists, and scholars since the seventeenth century. He also noted that in the past, the Dutch colonial civil service had given the Indonesian archipelago the “best administration it was ever likely to have,” because Dutch scholars and administrators were infinitely more knowledgeable about the archipelago’s cultures and social or political problems than Indonesians themselves. Despite the positive picture of Dutch culture he had brought with him to Indonesia, Ogburn became an ardent advocate for the Indonesian side in the conflict almost immediately. He startled his superiors with his intelligent and well-written pro-Republic dispatches. Already by late 1947 he was busily trying to shake them out of their complacency, urging the State Department to reconsider its residual pro-Dutch posture.

Dutch obstinacy in Indonesia, Ogburn asserted, did not stem from either “wickedness” or “stupidity.” Instead, he suggested that the Dutch were stricken with temporary blindness. Dutch people in the Netherlands and the Indonesian archipelago refused to recognize that since the summer of 1945, the world had fundamentally changed; their obsessive attachment to the Netherlands’ colonial possessions in Southeast Asia went against the grain of an inexorable decolonizing trend in post-World War II history. He could not help but admire the sight of “gentle and untrained” Indonesian men and women, who were “wresting the right of self-determination from the Netherlands almost with their bare hands.” Assisting the Dutch and Indonesians in trying to settle their differences, he remembered, was a “grueling” task but also an exhilarating experience.

Another American with an academic interest in the origins of nationalism, the process of decolonization, and patterns of state formation in Asia discovered a fertile, scholarly terrain in the nationalist struggle of the Indonesian Republic. George McTurnan Kahin arrived in Yogyakarta in central Java in 1948, to gather data for his PhD dissertation in political science at The Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, Maryland. During World War II, he volunteered for a special mission that would parachute him into the Japanese-occupied Dutch East Indies. Within the context of this anticipated assignment, Kahin began to learn Indonesian at Stanford University, although midway through the course, it switched to Dutch-language instruction. One explanation for this sudden shift, according to Kahin, was that Dutch intelligence operatives might have concluded that most GI’s in the program were lending too willing an ear to the anti-colonial rhetoric of the Roosevelt Administration. It may also have been linked to the Western Alliance’s strategy, still considered at that stage, that General Douglas MacArthur and his troops would be instructed to liberate Java, Sumatra, and New Guinea on their way to Japan, in which case access to Dutch military intelligence and familiarity with the region could help the General’s SWPA forces.

Although he never made it to Southeast Asia during the war, Kahin used his
veterans’ benefits to attend graduate school, studying with the renowned Asia expert, Owen Lattimore. Upon completion of his course work, Kahin traveled on board the Dutch ocean liners “Veendam” and “Oranje” from the east coast of the United States to Batavia. During the first leg of his journey across the Atlantic he became friends with Kees van Mook, the son of the Dutch lieutenant Governor General, who gave him Indonesian lessons while they strolled along the deck of the ship. This fortuitous friendship produced not only a burgeoning sense of linguistic competence upon his arrival in Java, it also yielded valuable contacts in the Dutch colonial community.

From Jakarta, Kahin crossed the border into Republican territory in a US Army jeep. He bought the jeep for 501 dollars. The leftovers of America’s Lend-Lease materials, first used by British SEAC troops and later by the Netherlands Army, were ultimately returned to the US Consulate General in Jakarta. These discarded items consisted of disheveled uniforms, rusty guns, battered jeeps, trucks, and tanks; not knowing what to do with this sundry equipment, the Consulate was eager to auction it off. In doing so they granted former US servicemen such as George Kahin priority in the bidding. Almost immediately his trip from Batavia to Yogyakarta in his jeep produced frightening moments. Presuming that any flag with the colors red, white, and blue – whether or not it displayed a distinct field of stars in addition to stripes – was a Dutch flag, an angry crowd surrounded his beloved vehicle in the nearby town of Kebumen. To prevent such occasions from happening again, upon his arrival in Yogyakarta the jeep was equipped with a prominently displayed red-and-white Indonesian flag, in addition to the American Stars and Stripes. Following August 1948, he used the capital of the Republic as a home base while conducting his research and working as a journalist for the Overseas News Agency.

While engaged in his fieldwork, Kahin developed close personal relationships with numerous Republican government officials, with whom he held informal political discussions as well as formal interviews “on the record.” He was invited, for example, to accompany a small group of high-ranking representatives from the Republic’s Ministry of Information on a study tour of various regions in Central Java just after the Madiun rebellion. When Kahin was given the opportunity to speak in the villages of Mlipak and Wonosobo, he reminded his audience of “America’s eight-year revolution to free themselves from English rule,” which had come to a successful conclusion once Americans realized they should be “united” and “industrious” in forming an independent nation, but one that also honored a reasonable amount of regional autonomy. Eventually, Kahin’s book on Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, published in 1952, was praised as “a masterpiece of committed scholarship” that exuded worldwide appeal because of his explicit sympathy for the nationalist cause. These two young Americans, along with an eclectic group of US journalists and other Westerners, whole-
heartedly supported Indonesians’ desire for independence. At the same time, various members of US Congress developed a particular interest in the Dutch-Indonesian conflict in Southeast Asia. A variety of issues motivated legislators’ concerns with Indonesia’s independence struggle. Some of them were committed Democrats in the tradition of Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt. They firmly believed in any nation’s right to self-determination, which obviously applied to the Indonesian Republic as well. Other members of the Senate and House of Representatives worried primarily about the recovery of substantial American economic interests that were at risk due to the postwar turmoil in Java and Sumatra. Such lucrative US investments ranged from elaborate oil refineries to prosperous rubber plantations, many of which had been deliberately destroyed during the early days of the Japanese attack on the Indonesian archipelago in order to prevent these valuable assets from falling into Japanese hands. The reconstruction of such American enterprises for the purpose of regaining their prewar profitability, various senators and congressmen in Washington contended, would probably be safeguarded more effectively if the Dutch colonial presence in the Southeast region were maintained, at least for the time being. Yet other Washington politicians, such as Congressman Lodge from Connecticut, presented themselves as anti-communist crusaders. Elected officials in this group were terrified that Indonesia’s leaders might not be able to withstand the manipulative tentacles of the Soviet Union, resulting in their emphatic endorsement of US measures that favored the Netherlands.

Hence, Bill Clinton’s assertion in 1995 that the American President and the US Congress provided “strong diplomatic support” to Indonesia as the “nation was being born” can be called an overstatement or evidence of wishful thinking. Harsher critics might call it an outright lie. Abandoning the memory of the Roosevelt Administration’s anti-colonial discourse and ignoring the impassioned pleas in favor of the Indonesian Republic articulated by a group of American Foreign Service officers and legislators, or journalists and academics, Harry Truman and his senior policymakers in Washington quietly enacted pro-Dutch policies behind the scenes until the late summer of 1948. Clinton’s entry in Suharto’s coffee table book, however, has emerged as a comfortable cliché. The mythology of unequivocal American support for the Indonesian Republic as soon as it was created is attractive. It is an inspiring story that appeals to Americans’ self image as champions of freedom and democracy around the world.

Clinton, in fact, repeated the same mantra as recently as October 5, 2000, after Yugoslavia’s opposition forces occupied the parliament building in Belgrade. During a press conference at the White House he claimed, “the United States stands everywhere with people who are fighting for their freedom.” This phrase implicitly harks back to the memory of America’s own struggle in the late eighteenth century against an arbitrary monarch on the other side of the Atlantic,
which Yugoslavia’s opposition was ostensibly recapitulating at the beginning of
the third millennium. Approximately fifty years earlier, Indonesian nationalists,
presumably with Washington’s tutelage and blessing, had also re-enacted Ameri-
can’s example of 1776 by rebelling against the Netherlands imperial governance of
the Indonesian archipelago.

Most historical myths gain their vigor and allure from an ability to persuade
and entice at the same time. Yet myths have a connotation of being half-truths at
best, whether or not ample documentary evidence is available.76 “As if by an
artist’s sleight of hand” the truths of one period become the mythology of subse-
quent eras.77 However, in the never ending project of converting history into se-
mi-truths or full-fledged mythologies, pragmatic political actors join hands with
artists and novelists, because fictions about the past are often concocted or dis-
mantled in order to pursue goals that are immediate and mundane.

Hence, both sides in the Dutch-Indonesian conflict chose to summon the
memory of the American Declaration of Independence in the eighteenth centu-
ry in order to mobilize US support and to justify their conduct. The imaginary
parallels between the United States in 1776 and the Indonesian Republic in 1945
may have influenced Bill Clinton, too, when he sent his congratulations to Presi-
dent Suharto in August 1995. How could his predecessor, Harry Truman, not
have nurtured a fledgling nation, Clinton may have wondered, when it issued a
declaration of independence from a European colonial power and celebrated its
newly proclaimed freedom with slogans such as “All People Are Created Equal”?

“IT’S 1776 IN INDONESIA”
CHAPTER THREE

The United States and the Dutch East Indies: The Celebration of Capitalism in East and West during the 1920’s

American policies toward the decolonization of the Dutch East Indies during the years following World War II did not emerge from an empty void. Throughout the decades of the 1920’s and 1930’s, members of the US diplomatic corps forwarded a steady stream of assessments from Batavia, Surabaya and Medan to the State Department. These dispatches reflected the geopolitical concerns of the foreign policy establishment in Washington, in which oil, rubber, tin, and tobacco interests as well as a range of other economic investments figured prominently. The impact of consular reports concerning the Dutch East Indies was muted as far as guiding the actual implementation of American measures in the Pacific region was concerned. Most often, US foreign policy tended to be crafted in the corridors of power of the State Department and the White House. Nonetheless, diplomatic reports from Batavia and other cities in the Dutch East Indies mirrored fluctuations in official attitudes and concerns in Washington. US Foreign Service officers in the field tried their best to respond to the issues that seemed to preoccupy their superiors.

The correspondence of US diplomats overseas reproduced conventional American impressions of distant or exotic places across the globe, even if their political insights were sometimes shallow. However, their dispatches echoed public sentiment regarding the legitimacy of European imperialism in general. In this regard, the US Consul General in Batavia or his deputy Consuls in Medan and Surabaya were not unique. In the process of defending America’s economic interests and defining the nation’s political aspirations in many regions of the world, Foreign Service officers relied not only on perceptions of “the official mind” but also heeded an array of more nebulous popular prejudices – which held true, of course, for the conduct of diplomatic relations by other democratic nations as well.1

Accordingly, US Foreign Service officers’ descriptions of the political and economic conditions in the Indonesian archipelago during the two decades before World War II served as a barometer, albeit an imprecise one, of shifting American visions of the Dutch East Indies. Their reports during the 1920’s expressed mostly admiration for the efficacious and profitable Dutch colonial management of the Indonesian archipelago. The 1930’s brought a change in the tenor of US of-
ficials’ reporting. During the era of the Great Depression and Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s presidency, American diplomats became more critical of the Dutch colonial government’s repressive policies towards native politicians; they routinely condemned Dutch tendencies to incarcerate or banish Indonesian nationalists without a process of formal adjudication. In the early 1940’s, however, when the Japanese military menace in the Pacific hovered ominously, American judgments about Dutch colonial rule changed yet again. At this anxious moment in time, US Consuls incorporated both positive and negative evaluations in order to make a realistic assessment of the Dutch East Indies as a credible American ally in a potential military clash with Japan, while acknowledging the legitimacy and strength of the Indonesian nationalist movement.

During the twenty years or so before the outbreak of World War II, a variety of factors affected the United States’ changing visions of the Dutch East Indies. America’s own colonial experience in the Philippines played a distinct role in Washington’s evaluations of the imperial policies of other Western nations, whether it was the Dutch in the Indonesian archipelago, the British in India, or the French in Indochina. A second influence on America’s diplomatic visions was linked to the necessity to protect its considerable investments in such enterprises as oil extraction and refineries as well as rubber and tobacco plantations in colonial Indonesia.

During the 1930’s, yet another ingredient was added. The new social commitments of President Roosevelt’s “New Deal” and the more liberal ideology of his State Department began to color US perspectives on the Dutch East Indies. The Roosevelt Administration inaugurated a new social policy idiom concerning the protection of the economic position and civil rights of poor and disenfranchised American citizens. This novel political vocabulary, emphasizing due process of law and social entitlements, also reverberated in US diplomatic messages from the Dutch East Indies. Of course, a final and decisive influence derived from the American government’s definitions of its strategic interests and the potential military perils it might face in the Pacific; such changing conceptions affected diplomats’ judgments concerning the validity of Dutch colonial rule and the pertinence of the Indonesian nationalist movement.

However, an array of cultural assumptions complicated these more or less concrete factors. American observers assigned to Batavia in the 1920’s and 1930’s also relied on their unique sense of history when they attempted to decipher the social and political realities of colonial governance in the Indies. In this context, we can more or less assume that the US Foreign Service officers assigned to the Dutch East Indies tended to be mid-level diplomats, whose outlook on the world revealed some of the limitations inherent in the average American’s understanding of Southeast Asian history and geography and the region’s place in international politics. In their regular correspondence with the State Department, Wash-
ngton’s envoys in colonial Indonesia occasionally created a story about Dutch history that was not necessarily informed by a careful analysis of political tensions in the Indies. Instead, they articulated a formulaic judgment about the history of the Dutch nation in the European metropole, which they often perceived through a flattering prism.

In popular American imagination, the picture of the Netherlands was a rather positive one, embodied in “good citizenship, stubborn courage, industry, resourcefulness and cleanliness.”2 Since the settlement of the New Netherlands on Manhattan Island in the seventeenth century, the historian Gerlof Homan has written, Americans presumably honored the Dutch nation as a “model of a stable and progressive democracy, inhabited by an industrious and peace-loving population.”3 In popular folklore, the Dutch Republic and its wealthy burghers were depicted as the staunchest supporters of the founding fathers’ struggle for American independence in 1776 and as friendly trading partners and fellow democrats ever since. Moreover, during the Victorian era, numerous political commentators, novelists, and writers of children’s books had shaped the fantasies about the meanings of Dutchness among the reading public in the United States. In many instances, the impact of these imaginative stories lingered on. Hence, the memory of such romanticized descriptions may have prompted consular officers in Southeast Asia to cling to a view of the Netherlands as a congenial democratic ally, inhabited by like-minded businessmen. These allegories tended to reflect Americans’ intuitive understanding of Dutch culture, in which story book characters such as Hans Brinker and Father Knickerbocker reinforced stereotypes about the Dutch nation’s sturdy ice skaters, capable seafarers, and crafty merchants. Archibald Steele, a foreign correspondent for The Chicago Daily News and The Washington Star, invoked a range of hackneyed images in his reports from Java as late as April 1941, when he wrote, for example, that “the Dutch are first of all businessmen and realists. Sentiment is one of their secondary qualities.”4

In American vernacular speech, though, the flip side of this imagery was expressed in phrases such as “going Dutch,” “to be in Dutch,” or “Dutch treat,” which associated the calculating business practices of Dutchmen with penny-pinching and hard bargaining. Thus, between the early 1920’s and the Japanese occupation of the Indonesian archipelago in 1942, American diplomatic observers in Southeast Asia combined a pragmatic political and economic agenda with more ambiguous cultural clichés. The ways in which these discrete elements either overlapped or sequentially dominated American perspectives in this pre-World War II era provides a historical background to the content of American policies towards the Indonesian struggle for independence during the years 1945-1949.

During the 1920’s, America’s Consuls General in Batavia painted an attractive picture of the affluent society of the Dutch East Indies and the glorious econo-
ic opportunities it provided. When they praised this colonial world as a steady fountain of profitability for Dutch or foreign investors, American observers often compared the Dutch East Indies with the nearby Philippines. As Consul General Charles A. Hoover wrote in 1925, “the Philippines are a mere incident in the life of the United States, while the continued possession of the [Indonesian] islands is essential to the very life and prosperity of the Netherlands.”

Hoover made a simple point. The role of colonial overlord of a string of islands in Southeast Asia was a new and unaccustomed one for the United States, although the few Americans who were familiar with their nation’s colonial performance tended to approve of its administrative record in the Philippines. Since America’s colonial expansion into the Philippines was primarily a project of the Republican party, supporters of a sequence of Republican presidents, beginning with William McKinley in 1900, embraced the goal of bringing “happiness, peace, and prosperity” to the Filipino people. In the public arena, the US intervention in the Philippines was legitimized by appealing to an evangelical sense of mission or the notion of Manifest Destiny.

But the simplicity of Hoover’s remark was deceptive. He implied that the possession of the Filipino nation was only tangential to Americans’ patriotic pride, whereas Dutch control of the Indonesian archipelago constituted an essential feature of its national identity. Besides, as far as America’s economic well-being was concerned, the Philippines represented a financial drain rather than an economic asset, whereas the Dutch East Indies, in contrast, constituted a veritable treasure trove for a small European democracy. Hence, during the 1920’s, many American observers could not help but be impressed by the economic profitability – what the French called *mise en valeur* – of their colonial neighbor in insular Southeast Asia.

In the daily discourse of Dutch citizens as well as analysts of European colonialism elsewhere in the world, the economic resources of Java and Sumatra resembled bounty-laden ships that skillful Dutch sea captains had commanded to a grand victory, or in the more truthful formulation of John Sydenham Furnivall, a British scholar of colonial administration, the Indies functioned as “the life belt that kept especially the Dutch treasury afloat.” Compared to other European imperial powers in Asia, the Dutch *Cultuurstelsel* established during the 1830’s – the system of compulsory cultivation of an array of valuable cash crops such as coffee, tea, and spices that were sold on the world market through state monopolies – had been extremely effective in generating government revenue.

The *Cultuurstelsel* had caused widespread famine in Java during the 1840’s, because the new policy had diverted local peasants from working in rice fields, preventing them from raising essential subsistence crops. Yet citizens in the Netherlands itself marveled at the magical wealth that suddenly poured in from Java. For example, during the period 1830-1850, nineteen percent of the overall Dutch
government revenue derived from the Indies, a figure that grew to 31 percent in 1851–1860.9 Towards the turn of the century, private enterprise and capitalist agriculture had replaced government monopolies, but the colony endured as a generous source of income for the Netherlands. During the two decades following World War I, the Netherlands relied on one-seventh to one-fifth of its aggregate national income – between fourteen and twenty percent – on the profits, dividends, salaries, pension payments, and income transfers of the Indonesian archipelago.10 In the imagination of a cross-section of the Dutch population, consisting of prominent businessmen and academically trained professionals as well as working-class people, the percentage of the nation’s overall income generated by the Indies was perceived to be as high as 40 or 50 percent.11

An entirely different economic situation obtained in the Philippines under US colonial tutelage. America’s commitment of capital to the Philippines was substantial. Relative to the infrastructural expenditures of the Dutch government in Indonesia, the US administration in the Philippines spent, proportionally, almost three times as much on education, social services, and public works. In 1929, for example, the American commitment of capital to the Philippines amounted to 80,000,000 million dollars. During that same year, the US invested 66,000,000 million dollars in the Dutch East Indies in moneymaking enterprises. In 1936, these numbers grew to 92,000,000 million dollars in the Philippines and 70,000,000 million dollars in colonial Indonesia.12 The salient difference, however, was that American expenditure of these substantial sums in the Philippines was used for social improvements such as education and healthcare, whereas the capital invested in the Dutch East Indies’ commercial establishments yielded a positive rate of return.13

After all, as soon as Americans were ensconced in their new position as colonial masters after the turn of the century, they went to work with indomitable optimism. While serving as the first US Governor of the Philippines during the period 1901–1904, future president William Howard Taft had championed a policy of “benevolent assimilation.” After defeating Theodore Roosevelt in the presidential election of 1908, President Taft justified America’s colonial presence in Southeast Asia as being dedicated to the welfare of the Filipino people. “We are the guardians” of the Filipinos, he proposed, but not for the purpose of improving the interests and social position of the region’s educated elites. Instead, as custodians of the Philippines, he noted, Americans were charged with “protecting the rights of the ignorant and uneducated who do not [yet] know their rights.”14

From the outset, the US Government tried to downplay its official role as an imperial power and avoided the addition of a separate colonial department to its bureaucratic structure. Instead, for the administrative oversight of the Philippines, President McKinley had created a Bureau of Insular Affairs, which became part of the War Department. The Secretary of War, Elihu Root, appointed in
1899, envisioned America’s mission as one that was embedded in the text and spirit of the US Constitution. America’s duty as a colonial power, he asserted, was to prepare Filipinos for their own “self government” that needed to attain a socio-economic basis and political viability as soon as possible.15

Accordingly, within a short period of time, US colonial caretakers in the Philippines could boast of a lengthy list of conspicuous accomplishments, such as the construction of longer roads and the digging of better sewers than any colonial power in Asia. Immediate American disbursements for improved medical care enabled the Filipino population to double in size between 1900 and 1920. The US Administration quickly established an educational system based on the American model, emphasizing individual skills and creativity among Filipino students. In the words of a sympathetic Dutch expert who wrote a comparative study of educational systems in the Philippines and the Dutch East Indies, American efforts were grounded in a curriculum that cultivated personal aptitude and fostered popular “autonomy” by strengthening the nation’s literacy rate from 20 percent to approximately 50 percent within one generation.16 Yet, at no time did the Philippines represent either a real benefit or a genuine threat to the lifeblood of the American nation.

Nonetheless, a discernible ambivalence about the nation’s role as colonial master already existed during the early years of the twentieth century. As a telltale sign of his political reversal concerning the wisdom of America’s imperialist control of the Philippines, President Theodore Roosevelt raised the possibility of Filipino independence as early as his State of the Union Address in 1908.17 Less than a decade later the Democratic Congressman, William Atkinson Jones, after having consulted the Filipino politician Manuel Quezon, drafted a Congressional Act that bore his name. Quezon served as one of two resident-commissioners charged with representing the Philippines Assembly in the US Congress in Washington DC; he helped to formulate the Jones Act’s stipulation that independence should become a reality as soon as Filipinos could establish a “stable government.”

The US Congress voted in favor of the Act and it was signed into law by President Woodrow Wilson in August 1916. In doing so, the American political establishment had thus accepted the ephemeral character of the relationship between mother country and her colonial possession.18 It also fostered the loyalty and cooperation of such nationalist organizations as the Filipino Partido Nacionalista, because the Jones Act proposed a feasible timetable for future independence. However, Wilson had cautioned that Filipinos, in order to achieve true political autonomy, should first accept American tutelage so they could be taught how to absorb a sense of “discipline and order” that was grounded in constitutional law. Through the completion of an “apprenticeship of obedience” under the auspices of their American mentors, Filipinos would eventually learn “to yield instinctively” to democratic rule.19
According to Raymond Kennedy, a professor of government at Yale University in the 1930’s, American dominance in the Philippines constituted a “deviation” from the universal pattern of colonial mastery elsewhere in the world. Or, in the somewhat disingenuous words of a political scientist at Harvard University, Americans had always harbored an inherent distaste for the imperialist system. This so-called “natural” abhorrence for imperialism was the reason that the United States had nurtured an independent Filipino nation from the very beginning. In short, the US venture in the Philippines was considered a “national aberration” by some Americans from the very beginning. “Must we kill millions of people,” as the distinguished descendent of John Adams and John Quincy Adams — and the author of the much-admired autobiography *The Education of Henry Adams* — asked as early as 1898, “to give them the comforts of flannel petticoats and electric railways?” The United States, however, tended to cloak its imperial venture in Southeast Asia in altruistic overtones. In popular lore, most US foreign incursions were presumably dedicated to bringing democracy and the American Dream to less fortunate people around the world. In reality, however, Americans were just as interested in garnering financial profit as their colonial neighbors in the Dutch East Indies. It was therefore not unlikely that the precocious US efforts to specify a chronological blueprint for Filipino independence resulted from the sober calculation that the Philippines might always be an economic burden rather than a wellspring of material benefits for the mother country.

Quite predictably, the passage of the Jones Act had caused some consternation among America’s colonizing neighbors in the Dutch East Indies. The prospect of Filipino independence would remove America’s political presence from the Southeast Asian region, and thus transform Japan into a potential threat to the Dutch East Indies. Worries about a Japanese expansion in a southward direction quickly arose after Japan’s unprecedented display of military might during the Russian-Japanese war of 1904-1905. Nonetheless, despite the positive assessment of the Jones Act offered by the renowned Dutch legal scholar, Cornelis van Vollenhoven, and a few others, the predominant Dutch East Indies response was either a cavalier or a patronizing one. The conservative and business-minded Dutch politician Hendrik Colijn — whom the *New York Times* hailed as “perhaps the greatest living expert in the government of Malay races” — stated in an interview published on February 14, 1916, that he was convinced the US would not prematurely abdicate its Filipino responsibilities because such an action might harm the security of all European settlements in Asia. The subtext of his viewpoint may have been a belief that America would never be so foolish as to jeopardize its commercial interests in the rubber, oil, and tobacco industries in any of the colonial territories in Southeast Asia.

The Netherlands Minister of Colonial Affairs, A.W.F. Idenburg, articulated a more circumspect opinion. Although he endorsed the American goal of using
public education as a means of boosting Filipinos’ positive sense of citizenship and civic duty, he worried about its “hectic tempo” or “frenzied pace.” Americans did not seem to have the patience to foster, in each ethnic group and at every level of indigenous society, the slow, organic growth of a civil society. He implied that the timetable for independence set forth by the 1916 Jones Act was impetuous—a concern Woodrow Wilson had also alluded to when he cautioned that Filipinos first had to fulfill the requirements of a distinctly American curriculum that would teach them to acquiesce “instinctively” to the demands of modern democratic citizenship. These reasonable Dutch responses, however, conflicted with the condescending judgments of a few Dutch colonial commentators in conservative circles. One Dutchman wrote that the Jones Act’s passage highlighted Americans’ fundamental lack of political intelligence, because they exhibited nothing but “obstinacy” and a refusal to bear in mind the social and cultural complexities of Filipino society. Another Dutch critic charged that the “dizzying speed” of US policy in the Philippines did nothing but sustain an indigenous “oligarchy” in its seizure of power, while completely failing to educate the Filipino “masses.”

If Americans were aware of these critiques, they might have attributed it to Dutch people’s obsessive attachment and economic indebtedness to their Southeast Asian colony. The prosperity of the Dutch nation was “almost wholly dependent on the colonies,” as American diplomat Richard Tobin, who served in the US Embassy in The Hague in the Netherlands, argued in 1927. As a corollary, Tobin wrote that the situation of the Indies was a subject of enormous anxiety among all sectors of Dutch society because “the loss of the colonial possessions might result in financial as well as political ruin” of the Netherlands. Nonetheless, he conceded that the nationalist agitation in British India in the late 1920’s had not caused great alarm among the Dutch, who were convinced that their country had governed its colonial empire “with more wisdom than the British and more vigor than the French.” This wisdom and vigor, one of Tobin’s colleagues in Batavia, Henry P. Starrett, noted a few years earlier, resided in a form of government that was “paternal and therefore not in any sense democratic.” While these conditions had provoked dismay among educated Indonesian and some European residents, he admitted that it had nevertheless served the best political and commercial interests of the colony. Dutch political practices had also protected the native population: “perhaps in no other way could these needs be so fully and completely met than by such an autocratic power intelligently applied.”

One of the secrets of Dutch colonial success, another American diplomat wrote to his superiors in Washington from Surabaya in 1924, is that they leave the indigenous peoples of the archipelago culturally unencumbered; Dutch colonial civil servants allowed the native residents of their districts to uphold and celebrate “their own customs or adat,” as long as they were peaceful and did not “interfere
with European exploitation.”28 A New York Times journalist, Nicholas Roosevelt, who was a scion of yet another famous political family, concurred. He suggested in his book, *The Philippines: A Treasure and a Problem*, that the Dutch always tried to improve the welfare of the natives and never interfered with their traditions and superstitions. While the average American or Englishman, he claimed, had little patience with habits that were impractical albeit deeply rooted in the practices and cosmology of various ethnic groups in either the Philippines or India, “the Dutch accept it and make the most of it.”29

It was likely that Consul General Charles Hoover, who served in Batavia when Nicholas Roosevelt published his comparative ruminations concerning the nature of colonial rule in 1925, would have agreed. In the same year, Hoover had written that the present government of the Dutch East Indies was the heritage of a long history of judicious policies. He tried to impress upon his superiors in the State Department that the Netherlands engaged in only the most even-tempered efforts to govern their multi-ethnic subjects in the archipelago “with a minimum expenditure of blood and treasure,” and that the Dutch administration constituted a remarkable accomplishment.30 There was little doubt in Hoover’s mind that throughout the past three centuries, this form of government in Java required “a toleration of features which were distasteful to the progressive, liberty-loving Dutch, but which had become fixed in the very lives of the apathetically conservative people of these islands.” In an effort to cure their lassitude, Hoover lauded Dutch colonial civil servants for encouraging the participation of a growing number of natives in the affairs of local government, while carefully respecting *adat* in “all matters not regulated by Dutch codes.” He added that experiments of this nature had not been “brilliantly successful” in other countries where people still functioned at a low level of development, but in the Dutch East Indies “the system of training for the responsibilities of self-government may be more intelligently directed than where it is attempted to clothe a people with powers of whose proper use they have not the slightest conception.”31

An occasional American disagreed with these fawning accounts. A US Navy officer, who recorded his impressions in an Intelligence Report in 1924, observed that the Indonesian population did not seem as “contented as [people] in the Philippines.” They were subjected to a paternalistic, if benevolent, despotism, but they “have no real voice in their government.” The half-hearted educational efforts, according to one of his Dutch informants, were kept to a minimum because they were deemed unnecessary: “look at your own Filipinos: you only educate them to shoot them!” Lt. R.H. Grayson added that the few Dutchmen who dared to be honest confessed that the “preparation for native self-government” would never be fully realized because the Indonesian people “will never be capable” of handling such complicated tasks.32

Grayson’s was a minority voice, however, muffled by the more resonant com-
mentary of Americans such as Charles Hoover and his successor as Consul General in the late 1920’s, Coert du Bois. In the post-World War II era, when he was already a seasoned diplomat with a distinguished State Department record behind him, Du Bois emerged in Dutch eyes as a diabolic character when he served in 1948 on the UN Security Council’s Good Office Committee (GOC). At that later stage, he transformed himself into an astonishingly forceful advocate for the Indonesian Republic; in the process, he placed himself in direct opposition to a large number of Dutch citizens who clung desperately to a continuation of the colonial connection with the Indonesia archipelago, even if it was constructed merely as a “loose relationship,” a “light union,” or a “soft link.” However, in 1929, during his first tour of duty in Batavia and long before he would be vilified by scores of Dutch men and women, Du Bois gave the Dutch colonial administration a ringing endorsement. In a series of bulky voluntary reports submitted to the State Department, he predictably highlighted the Dutch control of the archipelago’s economic and military resources. Probably most importantly, he wrote, “the whites – particularly the 30,000 Dutch who are doing it – are experts in the art of government.”

Du Bois specified that the term government did not refer only to the collection of taxes and the punishment of offenses. Instead, he praised the Dutch colonial administration for the magnificent construction and operation of irrigation projects, enabling the cultivation of sufficient rice for one of the densest population in the world. He also applauded the Indies government’s diligent provisions for public health such as inoculations to avert epidemics, the maintenance of public order among potentially hostile peoples, the suppression of piracy, the termination of the slave trade, and the prevention of abuse from native rulers. Dutch civil servants, Du Bois wrote to the State Department in Washington, gave “sympathetic” consideration and provided “paternal” care to people who were “incapable of planning it and carrying it out for themselves: the present Dutch government in the Indies would seem to deserve the wholehearted support of every Western government whose nationals have interests here.”

Du Bois’ admiration for Dutch colonial governance seemed boundless. He exalted the typical Dutch civil servant as honest, courteous, broad-minded, highly educated, and filled with compassion. Having achieved fluency in Malay and Javanese or other regional languages, each official brought to his work an infinite capacity for obtaining all the facts before making a decision, but “when he says no, he means it and resents being urged to reconsider.” The US Consul General concluded his paean to the Dutch colonial administration with yet another compliment to the many civil servants working in solitude in remote districts on islands far removed from Java and Sumatra, who were always willing “to meet, examine, and discuss with friendly interest the aspirations of the brown people to learn how to govern themselves.”
In the 1920’s, with only occasional exception, the solitary American Foreign Service officers stationed in the Indonesian archipelago articulated their appreciation for Dutch governance in the East Indies. Hence, the reputation of the Dutch colonial civil service in the State Department was a positive one, a respect that would linger throughout World War II. In 1942, Raymond Kennedy, who soon thereafter left his teaching position at Yale University to become a Southeast Asian intelligence analyst in the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in Washington DC, argued that the distinguished Dutch record of even-handed patience and cultural sensitivity in the crucial question of race relations had bestowed upon the Netherlands a highly respected voice in post-World War II plans for the Orient. In the near future, when West and East would finally meet on equal footing, Kennedy suggested that the Netherlands would serve as a shining example in “showing the way to the new era of tolerance and the brotherhood of man.”

And a year later, in 1943, a high-ranking member of the Roosevelt Administration, Sumner Welles, asserted that it was still a generally accepted opinion that in the vast arena of European imperialism in Asia and Africa “the Dutch have made the best colonial administrators.”

During the 1920’s, American diplomats in the Netherlands East Indies were not yet overtly worried about the strategic importance of the Indonesian archipelago, if only because the incipient military aggression of Japan and its eventual thirst for oil were still elusive as political factors. Thus, the operative words in their congratulatory assessments of Dutch colonial policies in the 1920’s were intelligence, paternalism, and especially “thoroughness,” a characterization that would prompt many a Dutch civil servant, planter, or businessman in the Indies to smile in agreement and burst with pride. Such rosy pictures seemed to validate the self-image of a large segment of the Dutch community in the Indies, who were convinced that “they were accomplishing something great over there!” Conversely, some critics of the Dutch colonial enterprise – ranging from committed Dutch socialists to Indonesian nationalists – dismissed these positive judgments as evidence of Americans’ desire to stay in the Dutch East Indies government’s good graces in order to safeguard the profitability of US oil, rubber and tobacco ventures.

Trade between the United States and Indonesia soared during the 1920’s; American imports from the Dutch East Indies in 1920 amounted to 167,000,000 dollars, while American exports to the Indies totaled 59,000,000 dollars. These figures continued to grow throughout the decade. In 1924, several American companies managed plantations and furnished about 20 percent of the archipelago’s gross rubber production, which represented a capital investment of 41,000,000 dollars, whereas approximately 45 percent of the total rubber exports from the east coast of Sumatra in the 1920’s was destined for the US to supply the flourishing automobile industry in Detroit. As the annual statistics of the inter-
national Rubber Growers Association revealed about the distribution of the world’s aggregate production of rubber, only British Malaya supplied more latex for the international market than the Dutch East Indies.44

Although not the leading foreign investors in colonial Indonesia – the British and Franco-Belgian stakes in the economy were greater – they comprised about 7 percent. Until the outbreak of World War II, Americans continued to purchase crucial raw materials from the Dutch East Indies, despite the fluctuations imposed by the Great Depression. Hence, amidst a range of other valuable commodities, the US bought 48.7 percent of Indonesia’s rubber, almost all its quinine, 84 percent of its palm oil, 80 percent of its cigar wrappers, 96 percent of its tea, 8 percent of its tin, and 81 percent of the raw green coffee grown mostly in Java. The aggregate value of Indonesian exports to the US would reach an all-time high of 242,000,000 dollars in 1941.45

Inevitably these impressive trade figures influenced, whether directly or indirectly, the attitudes of US diplomats in Batavia, who were charged with sheltering American economic interests in the archipelago. It is likely that the sizable volume of American trade with Indonesia also affected the formulation of US policy towards the region, especially during the Great Depression in the 1930’s.46

While the unfettered capitalist enterprise of the 1920’s lasted, however, a series of stereotypes about progressive and liberty-loving Dutch citizens played their part. During this decade, American Foreign Service officers expressed an almost instinctive admiration for Dutch commercial ingenuity, a vision of Dutchness that seemed to replicate the embrace of expansive big business in America itself during the conservative Republican presidencies of Warren Harding, Calvin Coolidge, and Herbert Hoover. The Dutch East Indies furnished yet another investment opportunity for daring American entrepreneurs, always hungry for higher earnings.

As the Wall Street Journal reported in November 1925, the Netherlands East Indies constituted a “marvelously wealthy colonial empire, excellently governed, with many modern facilities for comfortable living.” The islands, according to the Wall Street Journal, were rich in raw materials and offered “attractive opportunities for large-scale production.”47 Not surprisingly, an array of foreign companies had seized the chance to make handsome profits by engaging in such large-scale enterprises. Firms such as Harrison & Crosfield and Guthrie’s in Britain, the Franco-Belgian Société Financière des Caoutchouc, the US Goodyear Tire Company, and Italy’s Pirelli maintained major investments in colonial Indonesia.48 As the American Consul in Medan rejoiced as late as 1931, the growth of Sumatra’s pioneering tobacco industry, and later, the lucrative cultivation of rubber, palm oil, and sisal fiber as well as the exploitation of petroleum resources had flourished because citizens from many countries had been able to participate in their development: “British, American, Swiss, French, Belgian, Danish, and Ger-
man capital have all found a warm welcome, under the favorable auspices of equal opportunity.” What the Consul in Medan or the *Wall Street Journal* failed to address, though, was the ingenious way in which the Dutch colonial administration used and publicized the enormous international investments in the Indies economy as evidence of its broad-minded policies and skillful management of the archipelago.

In these primarily positive reports about the Dutch East Indies, America’s own colonial experience in the Philippines continued to play its part. Given the US efforts in the same decade to help Filipinos inaugurate a “stable government” – as stipulated in the Jones Act of 1916 – and to develop a viable economy, some American representatives in the Philippines were astonished, for instance, by the fact that the average annual rice production per hectare was 2,200 kilos in Java and 3,000 kilos in Bali, while this figure was only 1,200 kilos per hectare in the Philippines.

During the 1920’s, Americans in both colonial Indonesia and the Philippines inevitably echoed the racist views of other Western residents in Asia. US diplomats, therefore, scrutinized the indigenous populations in both Southeast Asian territories through the same colonial looking glass, and the “gaze of empire” affected their powers of observation, too. During this decade, they routinely concocted images of childlike native subjects – the Javanese or Filipinos – which disclosed not only their personal sense of superiority but also an ingrained Western bias. Some among them made statements that were crude, even within the context of racial sensibilities prevailing in the 1920’s. In 1924, for example, the US Vice-Consul in Surabaya, Eustace V. Denmark, commented after his visit to a nearby school that its “little brown children” were reminiscent of a “primary school of cornfield pickaninnies, playful, noisy, who gathered around this writer as soon as they discovered he had a camera.” In October 1928, the US Consul General in Batavia, Coert du Bois, also indulged in the simple-minded generalization that the Javanese could be divided into “aristocratic dreamers” or “land-grabbing peasants.” He recorded his respect for the Javanese *priyayi* (upper classes), whom he described as “polished and intelligent,” These gracious “gentlemen” displayed subtle forms of courtesy in their daily lives that were unfathomable to people in the West, he added. Du Bois depicted the average Javanese peasant, in contrast, as a “superstitious, docile, and half-hearted Muslim.”

In 1931, the American Consul in Medan, Daniel M. Braddock, painted an equally simplistic picture of Javanese men and women who were employed as contract laborers on rubber and tobacco plantations on the east coast of Sumatra. He lectured his superior in Batavia, and indirectly in Washington, that the average contract laborer resembled “a child, carefree, and improvident of the future. As long as he is well treated... he has little desire to leave the estate to seek work elsewhere. As with a child, he is apprehensive of the unknown.” On the other hand,
Braddock waxed effusively about the Herculean labors of European planters, noting that only those who have seen “the jungle being slashed away before the hand of the advancing planter and order being established where wilderness had once reigned” could fully appreciate what these Europeans had accomplished. He likened their performance to brave American pioneers, who had achieved similar heroic feats on the frontier of newly settled Western regions in the United States.55

Ironically, Americans’ assumptions about the backwardness of colonized peoples in both Indonesia and the Philippines prompted them to exalt the clever Dutch management of the Indies economy and its supposedly lethargic labor force. They wondered, on occasion, whether US administrators in the Philippines could learn to emulate the Dutch colonial model. The US Governor of the Philippines from 1929 to 1932, Dwight F. Davis, attributed the high annual yield of the rice harvests in Java and Bali, for instance, to Dutch confidence in “scientific” research and development. The Dutch East Indies government supported research centers for agricultural experimentation in conjunction with the private sector, he observed, and these scientific institutions were of particular interest to the Philippines because Java was “ahead by 30 or 40 years.”56

During the 1920’s, US envoys in the Dutch East Indies noticed the growth of the Indonesian nationalist movement, but they did not object to Governor General Dirk Fock’s “high-handed authoritarianism” in the face of popular nationalist agitation in the early 1920’s.57 Successive Consuls General in Batavia periodically sent lists of all the indigenous political parties to Washington with descriptions of their internal differences and political orientations. Yet they were loath to investigate and dissect the nationalist movement with any analytic depth or intellectual rigor. Since Dutch government measures, quietly reinforced by “efficient and highly centralized police, army, and navy,” were so effective, as Coert du Bois wrote in 1929, the authorities “are disarming the native agitators and the likelihood of anything resembling a general, open, armed, and organized rebellion against Dutch rule is remote.”58 A few years before, Nicholas Roosevelt had also dismissed anti-Dutch sentiments as the egocentric machinations of a tiny clique of “self-interested, upper-class natives” who wished to expand their personal power bases.59

While the US government itself was no stranger to an exaggerated fear of communism, American observers in colonial Indonesia offered wry commentary about certain members of the Dutch community, whose myopia caused them to interpret Indonesians’ desire for either dominion status or a complete liberation from colonial mastery as evidence of communist propaganda.60 About the communist uprisings in Western Java and the Minangkabau region of Western Sumatra in 1926 and early 1927, Consul General Hoover informed the State Department that he was convinced that anyone who participated in these actions...
barely knew that such a place as Russia existed and was completely ignorant about communist ideology. Instead, the communist insurrections had occurred because of the political rhetoric of “a few semi-educated firebrands,” who manipulated innocent peasants like a “dalang” (puppet master). These half-baked intellectuals had managed to mobilize the population only because, as Hoover observed, the average Indonesian “loves theatricals, is easily led, and has the mild hatred of the dark man for the white man and his oppressive civilization.” Hoover also speculated that it might be convenient for some Dutch officials, especially those who were frustrated with their slow rate of promotion within the colonial bureaucracy, to raise the “specter of communism to divert the attention from their own incapacity as administrators.”

His final conjecture may have been based on some solid information. Other critics even asserted that colonial authorities in either West Java or West Sumatra had provoked trouble solely “to gain [administrative] recognition and honors.” Nonetheless, until the next decade most US Foreign Service officers stationed in the Netherlands East Indies rarely questioned the legitimacy of Dutch colonial mastery; nor did they consider the popular strength of a multitude of nationalist organizations in many regions of the archipelago to be of great political significance.

This judgment was all the more surprising because the second half of the 1920’s was rife with political turmoil among the Indonesian population. These years witnessed the rise of innovative, even revolutionary, forms of collaboration between religious and political parties and also between local and national organizations. While communist uprisings were still being crushed by colonial authorities in 1926, for example, the seasoned nationalist of the first generation, Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo, summoned nationalists of all stripes to forge a common bastion of opposition against the Dutch colonial state. Instead of appealing to individuals, the twenty-five year old Sukarno – whose preeminence as a spokesman for the second generation of nationalists was about to soar – advocated toward the end of the same year that all communist, Islamic, and nationalist parties should cooperate and unify as an anti-colonial bulwark.

When he was still an engineering student at the Bandung Institute of Technology in 1926, and a pivotal member of a small circle of fellow nationalists who gathered regularly in the Bandung Study Club, Sukarno’s lengthy article, “Nationalism, Islam and Marxism,” appeared in the Study Club’s magazine Suluh Indonesia Muda (The Torch of Young Indonesia). In the article he euphorically announced “a new... youthful age has arrived, like the dawn of a clear morning” and he prophesied that the vessel that “will take us to a Free Indonesia is the Ship of Unity.” At more or less the same time yet another nationalist, Mohammad Hatta, who was studying economics at the University of Rotterdam and served as chairman of the association of Indonesian students in the Netherlands (Perhim-punan Indonesia or PI), also issued a clarion call for the collaboration of national-
ists with both communist and Muslim parties. The youngest member of the trio of political heroes of the second-generation nationalists, Sutan Sjahrir, also counseled harmony and consensus among the various indigenous organizations. These separate efforts eventually led to the foundation of the Indonesian National Association (Perserikatan Nasional Indonesia or PNI) in July 1927, which soon thereafter changed its name to the Indonesian National Party (Partai Nasional Indonesia). Only five months later the Federation of Nationalist Organizations (Permufakatan Perhimpunan-Perhimpunan Kebangsaan Indonesia or PPPKI) came into existence.66

But the Consul General in Batavia did not pay much attention to the emerging unity among nationalists of different ethnic backgrounds, or the unprecedented solidarity between Islamic associations and social-democratic nationalist groups. In part III of his voluminous report on “The Native Population of the Netherlands India,” which focused on “Political Development” and was mailed to Washington on December 31, 1928, Coert du Bois engaged in a perfunctory effort to explain the nature of the Indonesian nationalist movement. Halfway through the report, though, he revealed his true colors. After translating a passage of an article in Suluh Indonesia Muda, protesting the Indies government’s arbitrary banishment of nationalists to prison camps in outlying regions, he added, “it is unfortunate that the Dutch government spends so much money, time, and effort to teach the natives how to read – only to have them learn from their journals nothing but bitterness and bickering, garbled and erroneous facts and deliberately festered understandings.”67

One could say that during the 1920’s the intellectual caliber of US diplomats’ reporting from Batavia was mediocre. However, this situation would soon change. The Great Depression struck the Indonesian landscape like a bolt of lightning – dotted as it was with plantations producing cash crops that were exceedingly sensitive to price levels on the world market. The economic downturn of the 1930’s quickly reduced the generous financial revenues generated by Indonesia’s fertile soil to a mere trifle. The Depression, meanwhile, was caused in part by the US, where the intoxicating celebration of the free forces of capitalism ended abruptly in October 1929, when stock-market values on Wall Street crashed and American financial markets crumbled like a house of cards. A protectionist response followed in colonial economies, consisting of higher tariffs, production quotas, and preferential trade agreements. These new policy measures were designed to safeguard the interests of the mother countries. Such monopolistic impulses, in turn, generated anxieties in the United States about its dearly beloved principles of free trade. The Smoot-Hawley Act, however, had erected around the US one of the highest tariff walls in the world, and Washington’s concerns with free trade focused unilaterally – and hypocritically – on America’s unfettered access to markets throughout the world.
Free trade engenders goodwill and prosperity, wrote Secretary of State Cordell Hull about the worldwide economic crisis during the early 1930’s, whereas high tariffs, trade barriers, and unfair economic competition tend to unleash warfare.68 Throughout the Depression years, Cordell Hull focused his “fanatical, single-minded” attention on one central purpose, the liberation of international trade from all forms of constraint as a “prerequisite to peace and economic development.”69 However, it was not only protectionist economic practices that produced American forebodings of war. The dire straits of the world economy coincided with the rise of Japan as a palpable military danger in the Pacific.

As a consequence, the professional stature and intellectual acumen of US diplomats posted in Batavia improved during the 1930’s. They dispatched more astute analyses of Dutch East Indies society that struck an infinitely more critical tone. In the face of newly recognized political and economic hazards in the Pacific, American policymakers and diplomats began to perceive the Netherlands East Indies government not only as oppressive and greedy but also as being overly lax in its preparation to defend the archipelago against foreign aggression. Despite Indonesia’s strategic location and the archipelago’s possession of abundant petroleum and other mineral resources – which would be crucial if Japan were to mount an armed assault on the rest of Asia – Dutch military readiness to defend Indonesia, according to American analysts, revealed a pathetic sight. The US government, meanwhile, continued to prepare for the eventual independence of the Philippines. Hence, in the ominously altered world situation of the 1930’s, Dutch governance in colonial Indonesia began to pale in comparison to America’s infinitely more charitable colonial enterprise in the Philippines.70
CHAPTER FOUR

American Visions of Colonial Indonesia from the Great Depression to the Growing Fear of Japan, 1930-1938

The decade of the 1920’s unleashed a gold rush in the Dutch East Indies. These were the proverbial fat years, and in the imagination of shortsighted Western residents, this era of prosperity would last forever. Rather than preparing for the lean years that might follow, Europeans and Americans dreamed they could defy the Old Testament’s warning. Almost all Westerners in Sumatra who worked on rubber or tobacco plantations or in the expanding oil industry had grown accustomed to a life of hard work and generous financial rewards. They approached their ample incomes and their equally lavish spending habits with an attitude of “easy come, easy go,” as Madelon Székely-Lulofs wrote in her controversial novel, Rubber. When rubber prices started to drop ominously after 1925, she suggested that many heedless Europeans and Americans were “devoured by an unbridled passion for speculation.”

The story from the Hebrew Bible, however, would soon prove to be prophetic. The years of astronomical profits were followed by a decade of scarcity and suffering. In the wake of the stock market crash on Wall Street during the autumn of 1929, the Great Depression gradually attained worldwide proportions. Initially, the collapse of the stock market seemed to touch only the wealthiest speculators in the United States, whose handsome profits, in many instances, were reduced to a pittance. In the daily lives of ordinary people across the vast North American continent, though, trains continued to run on schedule and the shelves of grocery stores were as well-stocked as before Wall Street’s financial collapse. American farmers, whether on the Great Plains of the Midwest and in the Western or Southern regions of country, did not immediately worry about losing their cattle ranches or their corn, wheat, and cotton fields, nor did the average American worker harbor a sudden anxiety about the security of his or her employment. Banks opened on time and small-time depositors remained confident that their life savings were safe in local banks. As with previous financial panics that had shaken the capitalist system, the initial expectation was that the American economy would regain its balance and profitability once the super-rich investors in the stock market had absorbed their losses.

However, the stock market crash of 1929 turned out to be much more than a temporary financial slump. Instead, the economic crisis lingered and evolved in-
to the Great Depression that lasted for almost ten years. Millions of hard-working Americans lost both their jobs and their savings, while numerous farmers across the United States were forced to abandon their homesteads and land due to foreclosure. Despite the efforts of President Herbert Hoover’s Administration, the situation grew increasingly bleak. In “Hoovertowns,” as makeshift camps of timber and tin were baptized, homeless people tried to stay warm underneath piles of newspapers called “Hoover blankets.” Uprooted families, in a desperate search for work, food, and shelter, criss-crossed the North American continent. In the public’s imagination, Herbert Hoover and his wealthy Republican colleagues became the consummate villains, because their aversion to deficit spending and their stubborn commitment to a balanced budget failed to turn the economic tide.

In the end, the Great Depression upset social and economic conditions in many parts of the world. It also managed to exert a devastating effect on Indonesia’s export-driven economy. Between 1929 and 1933, the total value of Dutch East Indies exports plunged from 1,488,000,000 to 525,000,000 guilders. The market value of Javanese sugar production alone declined from 350,000,000 guilders in 1929, to a mere 19,500,000 guilders in 1934-1935. Although rubber prices had begun their gradual downward slide since 1925, the market price for tin, tea, and quinine plummeted with breathtaking speed in just a few years. In addition, the Great Depression also jeopardized the hefty earnings US oil companies had garnered in the archipelago during the 1920’s.

During this era of economic decline and human hardship, the assessments of American diplomats assigned to the Consulate General in Batavia and consular posts in Surabaya and Medan changed considerably. They no longer trumpeted Dutch colonial management of the Indonesian archipelago as a model of ingenuity. Instead, State Department emissaries began to articulate harsher judgments. The chronological proximity of the appointment of the new Governor General, Bonifacius Cornelis de Jonge, in 1931, on one hand, and the Republican Party’s loss of the American presidency after controlling it for twelve years, on the other, exerted an indelible impact on the increasingly critical reports that US diplomats sent from colonial Indonesia to Washington DC.

Governor General De Jonge established a repressive regime that proved to be almost atavistic in character. He envisioned his role as Governor General as if he were the father of an enormous number of little children; he believed there could be only one good system of governance, with himself as “boss” and the natives as recipients of his unilateral authorizations. Not surprisingly, the penultimate Governor General of the Netherlands East Indies did not exhibit much respect for the civil liberties of either Indonesian nationalists or Dutch critics of his government. His arbitrary policies also seemed to fly in the face of the socio-economic concerns of the American diplomats assigned to Batavia during Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s presidency.
Once the Roosevelt Administration was ensconced in power after the presidential inauguration in mid-January 1933, a concern with social justice became part of America’s political grammar, in both domestic and foreign policy; not long thereafter, this novel political vocabulary began to inflect the reports dispatched to the State Department from the US Consulate General in Batavia. The passage of the Tydings-McDuffie Act by the US Congress in 1934, which decreed the unequivocal independence of the Philippines in ten years, was yet another expression of such shifts in attitude, although an occasional cynic grumbled that the promise of Filipino independence only came about because of political pressures imposed by the “sugar lobby” – the powerful owners of sugar cane fields and processing factories in the American South. At a more mundane level, this new approach was already noticeable in 1931, during the official state visit to the Dutch East Indies of the US Governor of the Philippines, Dwight F. Davis, who was accompanied by two Filipinos serving as Secretary of Commerce and Secretary of Agriculture. At the last minute, the US Consul General in Batavia, Kenneth S. Patton, received a telegram from Manila, requesting that during the official segments of Davis’ tour “the American and Filipino flags should be displayed side by side.”

An additional influence on the political reporting of US diplomats in the 1930’s may have been the delayed effect of the Rogers Act of 1924, which had reorganized and opened up the United States Foreign Service. The Rogers Act was designed to attract better-trained personnel, men who would display the intellectual ability to conduct diplomacy in an expert manner. Introduced in Congress by a US Representative from Massachusetts, John Jacob Rogers, the Act unlocked the foreign service to all qualified applicants rather than restricting access to the privileged few whose wealth, political contacts, or social elitism had dominated the American diplomatic establishment until then. The Rogers Act expedited the “professionalization, democratization, and specialization” of the US Foreign Service, but the new law’s tangible impact on the State Department’s personnel decisions may not have changed the organization until the 1930’s.

During the 1920’s, the Republican Party’s policies had cultivated an unrestrained ebb-and-flow of the capitalist market without much government interference. The Dutch East Indies government, in conjunction with the business sector, had responded in kind, congratulating itself on having reached “the summit of free-trade policies” and enacting a pioneering role in “internationalization of economic life.” The Wall Street Journal applauded the Dutch East Indies government for welcoming foreign capital by offering reasonable assistance to American companies seeking to invest there. After 1929, however, the Great Depression forced capitalist nations across the globe to abandon the practice of unbridled free trade and the unrestrained access to markets, both at home and abroad. Instead, new protectionist policies were initiated in the United States, colonial Indonesia, and elsewhere. Such impulses affected US-Filipino relations...
as well. Complaints from both business concerns and labor interests in the United States were primarily directed at the unchecked trade in sugar and coconut oil from the Philippines, as well as the influx of Filipino workers into the US, all of which further accelerated the move towards Filipino independence.9

As early as 1930, the US Congress passed a revision of the Tariff Act, which was unofficially designed to safeguard American industry and agriculture from foreign competition. At the request of an American tobacco company that filed a formal complaint with the Treasury Department, section 307 of the new Tariff Act prohibited the importation of all goods that were produced on the basis of “slave labor or indentured servitude.” Section 307 specifically targeted the Dutch East Indies; it placed an embargo on imports of wrapper tobacco starting on January 1, 1932, as long as the coolie labor contracts with penal sanctions on the east coast of Sumatra remained in force. With such an American sword of Damocles hanging over the livelihoods of Sumatra’s tobacco growers – men who were already worried about their product’s declining prices – the penal sanction was quickly abolished.10 European residents in the Indies suddenly breathed easier again; they predicted that American buyers would most likely continue to appear in Amsterdam to purchase “our fancy grades of wrapper tobacco.”11

Afterwards, planters in Deli expressed their appreciation for the actions of Walter Foote, who served as America’s Consul in Medan, with regard to the US Congress’ deliberations concerning section 307 – the so-called Blaine Amendment – of the new American Tariff Act. Both the Deli Courant and the Algemeen Indisch Dagblad in early November 1931, complimented Foote for “having spared neither time nor energy” to remove Washington’s misconceptions regarding the exact nature of the penal sanctions imposed on contract laborers in Sumatra. Both newspapers congratulated him for having “rendered a great service to the Netherlands East Indies.”12

When he was again posted in the Indonesian archipelago as US Consul General in Batavia during 1945-1947, Foote would come under fire from State Department superiors for his erratic and unreliable reporting. Earlier in his career, though, when he was an eager US envoy in Medan in the late 1920’s, his senior colleague in Batavia, Consul General Coert du Bois, always rated Foote’s performance as either “excellent” or “very good.” For example in July 1929, when a Javanese coolie murdered a white planter’s wife on the Parnobolon estate on Sumatra’s east coast, by sneaking into her house and slashing her throat with a large butcher’s knife, Foote was commended for his “prompt action and good judgment.” His unruffled behavior had, to a large extent, prevented American residents in Sumatra from being swept up in the hysteria and political protests affecting the Dutch planter community. In an official evaluation submitted to the State Department in January 1930, Du Bois praised Foote’s political reporting as “uniformly timely, concise, and meaty.”13
During Foote’s tenure as US Consul in Medan, in order to protect the United States’ economy from foreign competition, the strict new Tariff Act was followed by additional measures. The Roosevelt Administration, in fact, carried the practice of government regulation much further. In the course of his electoral campaign against the embattled Herbert Hoover, Roosevelt reassured millions of Americans, via the magic of the new medium radio, that they need not fear the future if they elected a president who would take “Action, Action Now.” Once in office, he embraced a dynamic agenda of economic intervention and protective social legislation. A majority of America’s voters responded favorably and supported Roosevelt’s liberal commitments and public works programs by re-electing him in 1936, 1940, and 1944. At the same time, the imperialist practices of a variety of European nations became the object of ethical scrutiny and, in some instances, moral censure.

Since the Great Depression had ravaged the lives of millions of Americans, many had grown more aware of the social inequalities and inherent injustice of a society in which the prodigious wealth of a blessed few was juxtaposed with the material misery of the masses. It seemed logical to question, too, why a handful of Europeans lived in luxury, while millions of Asian men and women were forced to labor from sunrise to sunset for a wage worth a little more than a daily bowl of rice. Some segments of the US population during the Great Depression began to make a connection between the large number of downtrodden Americans, who had to scramble for food and shelter in Hoovertowns, and the legions of Asians whose toil did nothing but feed the already robust bank accounts of British, French, and Dutch colonizers.

Concerning colonial Indonesia, several articles appeared in important American newspapers in the 1930s. They raised searching questions regarding the small Dutch population’s manipulation of virtually all Indonesians purely for its own economic profit. Yet other reports investigated the specific reasons why the Indies government provided only the most anemic educational opportunities to the indigenous population. Similarly, a long feature in the Sunday New York Times condemned the Dutch government’s rejection of the 1936 Soetardjo petition, which modestly requested an official discussion within the next ten years about the structural relationship between the Netherlands and the Indonesian archipelago. This article raised readers’ awareness of Dutch refusals to contemplate even the mildest form of Indonesian autonomy in the near future. It should be noted, though, that the New York Times stated erroneously that the petition had been “unanimously” endorsed by the Volksraad, the pseudo-parliamentary body that seated both Indonesian and Dutch representatives, some of whom the Governor General appointed whereas others had been elected by a small number of eligible voters, consisting only of men. Such articles and editorials appeared all over the continental United States, and these newspaper reports managed to interro-
gate the moral legitimacy of European imperialism, in general, and Dutch colonialism, in particular. Such disparaging newspaper accounts culminated in John Gunther’s widely read book *Inside Asia*, which was first published in 1938. Gunther’s chapters on a variety of colonized Asian countries both echoed and reinforced American truisms about Asia and its inhabitants. Not surprisingly, his chapter on the Netherlands East Indies was entitled “Dutch Treat,” and the gist of his story was that “the Indies tail is what wags the Dutch dog,” because the Dutch nation “sucks all the wealth” out of its colonial possession in Southeast Asia. In the same vein, he wrote that the Dutch colonial government “deliberately starved” the Indies educational system, since its policies relied on the credo “keep the bellies of the people full” but leave their minds as “empty” as possible in order to prevent political upheaval. In the remainder of the chapter, he portrayed Dutch colonial rule in Indonesia by conjuring up an array of trite formulas about the miserly habits of the Dutch. Two years later he revisited yet another well-worn cliché in the newly revised war edition of his *Inside Europe*, reprinted seven times since its original appearance in 1933, when he referred to the Indonesian archipelago as “the precious life blood” of the Netherlands.

At the same time, Roosevelt’s personal criticism of European imperialism was more than a mere rhetorical posture, because he expressed genuine horror at the living conditions of colonized people in Asia and Africa. Roosevelt reserved his fiercest anti-colonial oratory for the French, whom he denounced for having “milked” Indochina for almost a hundred years without giving anything in return. With regard to Dutch colonial mastery in Southeast Asia he appeared more circumspect, at least in his public pronouncements. Roosevelt, after all, revealed in his Dutch *provenance*, and on various occasions he referred to the Netherlands as “the country of my origin.” In 1935, he claimed that Americans had inherited from their Dutch forebears “a quality of endurance against great odds — the quiet determination to conquer obstacles of nature and obstacles of man.” Whether his fortitude could be traced to his Dutch ancestry is doubtful. Until his death, however, Roosevelt mustered the strength of character and political savvy to restructure American society in the face of a catastrophic economic depression. Following the outbreak of World War II, he displayed similar perseverance as Commander-in-Chief of an enormous US military force that was instrumental in steering the Allies to victory over Germany and Japan.

In 1931, as De Jonge began his tenure as Governor General, the Indies gold rush of the 1920’s had obviously already been relegated to the realm of nostalgia. The Great Depression had caused the “phantasmagorical” prosperity of the Indies to evaporate with mind-boggling speed. In American as well as Indonesian eyes, it was curious that domestic manufacturers in colonial Indonesia could not even produce the most humdrum necessities of daily life, such as “textiles, paper, bicycle tires, plates, or cups.” Widespread suffering among the native population...
came in the Depression’s wake. Since consumer goods imported from Japan were less expensive than similar European-made products, US Consul General Kenneth Patton reported in 1933 that it created “a sympathetic feeling for Japan” among Indonesians and tended to destroy “the community of interest” with the Dutch. Two years later, according to the US Consul in Surabaya, Joel C. Hudson, the Japanese were trying “to secure the goodwill of the natives.” Although they did so mostly to gain “economic advantage,” he conceded that Japan would “welcome any successful Pan-Asiatic movement.” In the mid-1930’s, the US Consul General, Walter Foote, notified Washington that Dutch fears of Japanese aggression had reached “a virtual state of panic,” which did not yet provoke the kind of nervous response in State Department officials as such a message would generate only a few years later. He claimed that on various occasions colonial civil servants had called him at midnight to warn him about an imminent Japanese attack on either Celebes (now Sulawesi) or New Guinea. Foote also spun a cloak-and-dagger tale about several high-ranking Dutch officials, who were caught with “Japanese army uniforms” and a supply of Japanese “firearms, ammunition, and propaganda literature.” He declared that discoveries of subversive actions made by Dutch law enforcement agencies, turned Japanese assurances into a mockery. Japanese officials had tried to placate Dutch anxieties since the early 1930’s by repeating over and over again that their nation was not “actuated by a policy of aggression.” Japanese spokesmen insisted, instead, that they only wished to help the Dutch East Indies government in its efforts to “eradicate communism and to improve friendship,” while helping to “insure peace in the East.”

To make his report more vivid for his superiors in the State Department, Foote attached a cartoon from the Malay edition of the Chinese newspaper, Sin Po, depicting Uncle Sam lowering the American flag in the Philippines. The caption read, Bintang Toeroen, Matahari Naik!, which he translated with a creative flourish but in awkward English: “it is predicted that if the Stars and Stripes flag of the US is hauled down in the Philippine Islands, the ‘Sun’ flag of Japan will ascend there.”

More and more, Japan’s presence lurked in the background, and the Dutch East Indies government as well as policymakers in Washington observed its unpredictable actions in the Far East with alarm. As a result, Americans’ growing moral objections to the worst excesses of colonial rule were subsequently moderated by a broadening concern with Japan’s ascendancy in Asia. The desire to shield America’s financial holdings in the Indonesian archipelago also influenced US policy in Southeast Asia. Japan’s looming presence in the Pacific tempered the Roosevelt Administration’s intuitive anti-colonialism in the hopes that it might nurture a middle ground between extreme nationalists – who might hail the Japanese as their liberators – and the political and economic exploitation imposed by European imperialists. The US Consul General in Batavia, Kenneth...
Patton, reported in 1933 that after the Japanese occupied Manchuria, educated
Indonesians began denouncing the Japanese as imperialists who had “violated
the right to self determination.” However, because the dire economic conditions
of the Netherlands East Indies appeared to be getting even worse, Patton won-
dered whether Indonesian people might begin to believe that “Japan, being a
dominant and growing power in the Far East” could also offer the Indonesian na-
tionalist movement “a lever for action against the Dutch government.”26

Patton’s reports, however, reflected the reality that there was no consensus on
this score among the leaders of the Indonesian nationalist movement. While
Sukarno tended to articulate positive opinions about the possibility of Japan ac-
celerating Indonesia’s independence, Sutan Sjahrir expressed serious misgivings
about Japan in 1937. After Sjahrir’s incarceration in the Dutch internment camp
in New Guinea, Boven Digul, along with Mohammad Hatta and many other na-
tionalists, he was banished to the remote island of Banda. From there, Sjahrir
wrote that the Japanese were “no angels.” Instead, they resembled buccaneers
whose violation of Manchuria should be interpreted as “piracy writ large.” Al-
though many other Indonesians tended to think of the Japanese as nice and re-
ﬁned people – Sjahrir used an inventive combination of the Dutch phrase fijne
mensen and the Malay word halus to make this point – he emphasized that “yellow
imperialism” was no different from European colonialism.27 A few years later,
Mohammad Hatta still warned, too, that Japanese aggression might compromise
or even endanger the ideals of national independence. If that was the case, then it
would be “our duty” to defend Indonesia’s yearning for freedom, Hatta wrote,
because it would be more honorable “to stand tall and die rather than to live
while bowing in submission.”28

Obviously, when De Jonge assumed his position as Governor General, he was
not only confronting a bleak economic landscape but a volatile political climate
as well. Initially, when his appointment was announced, the US Consul General,
Kenneth Patton, informed the Secretary of State that the news was received as a
complete surprise in colonial Indonesia. De Jonge was viewed as a “dark horse,”
Patton noted, because he possessed no background whatsoever in colonial affairs.
His experience was as Minister of War during World War I and as the Managing
Director of the Royal Dutch Shell Company since then. The European business
community in the Dutch East Indies, Patton remarked, was “frankly delighted”
because they expected the new Governor General to represent “their interests
against those of the native population.”29 Social–democratic publications and
even the middle-of-the-road press, in contrast, were full of gloom. The progres-
sive media predicted that De Jonge’s appointment signaled the triumph of reac-
tionary forces, such as a right–wing “White Front” organization called the Vader-
landsche Club (Patriotic Club). Among the other arch–conservative factions that
might thrive during De Jonge’s tenure, Patton listed rubber and tobacco produc-
ers in Sumatra as well as oil companies in the Western world that operated drilling fields and refineries in the Indonesian archipelago. Patton, for his part, agreed with the left-leaning press, and predicted that De Jonge would implement policies “favorable to big business.” Patton feared that the new Governor General’s actions might very well spell disaster for all Indonesian nationalists, whether they were moderate or radical, because De Jonge was expected to be “less sympathetically inclined to native political aspirations.”

The Dutch government gave De Jonge detailed guidelines concerning his tasks in the Indies. Officials in The Hague had instructed him to balance the budget, to restructure the economy, to promote political decentralization, and, above all, to assure domestic peace by stifling all revolutionary agitation. De Jonge, despite his lack of familiarity with the complex problems facing Dutch East Indies society, expressed a host of arrogant opinions regarding the duties that awaited him in the Southeast Asian archipelago – at least as he remembered them a decade later when he wrote his memoirs. Rather than maintain its dignity, the newly appointed Governor General lashed out at the hyper-ethical administration of his predecessor, which had “flirted with the unreliable big mouths of the nationalist movement.” De Jonge blamed the previous Governor General for instilling a sense of resignation in his subordinates that the independence of Indonesia was not only acceptable, but simply a matter of time. The danger, De Jonge argued in his memoirs, resided not in the nationalist agenda of rebellious “natives” but in the defeatist and weak-kneed mentality of Dutchmen working in the colonial civil service. Instead, he proposed that the Netherlands East Indies government maneuver the nationalist momentum “into fixed channels” and forcefully oppose any and all attempts at revolution, however petty or insignificant they might initially seem.

De Jonge’s conservative regime, which lasted until 1936, provoked a new awareness among American diplomats that the stoic self-confidence of the colonial government had been rattled, due to the chorus of nationalist voices demanding to be heard. Ironically, De Jonge’s arbitrary suppression of native politicians, begun soon after settling into his position of power, actually made American observers more sensitive to the aspirations of the nationalist movement. They also began to listen more attentively to Dutch social democrats’ moral objections to colonial practices in the Indies; as a result, the tenor of their communiqués to headquarters in Washington often resonated a new, critical undertone. As the US Consul General commented, De Jonge not so much bludgeoned as mockingly patronized his Dutch critics on the political left – “only ridicule can kill,” he proclaimed in the memoirs he wrote during the early years of World War II. At the same time, he condescendingly silenced all Indonesians who wished to speak, even those who made their requests in fluent Dutch and in a polite manner. Patton reprimanded the Governor General for exhibiting a lack
of “good temper.” De Jonge had a bad habit of hiding behind his aristocratic haughtiness towards anyone who failed to support his peremptory actions, which hardly enhanced his prestige.37

As the 1930’s unfolded, US diplomats assigned to Batavia, Medan, and Surabaya began to employ an American legalistic idiom to record their reservations regarding the government’s ordinances, which censored the press and restricted freedom of speech and assembly. They also condemned De Jonge’s tendency to place nationalist politicians in preventive custody, without due process of law. When commenting on the arrest of Sukarno on August 21, 1933, for instance, Patton criticized De Jonge’s decision to incarcerate Sukarno, simply because the Governor General had decided that this popular nationalist leader should no longer be allowed to use his eloquence in public or engage in further political activities. He wrote to the Secretary of State that it was “essentially a political action, resting entirely on the discretion of the executive.” Patton noted as well that this imperious measure represented a departure from the policies pursued by the previous Governor General, who had judged it “not politic to use his arbitrary authority to intern native political leaders, and that it was preferable to prosecute [nationalists] for actual violations of the criminal code”; when he was nonetheless forced to impose his authority in such a manner during the late 1920’s, Governor General De Graeff did so with great moral qualms.38

While serving as political officer in the US Consulate General in Batavia, Sidney Browne wrote in 1934 about the arrests of Harjono, President of the Central Committee of the PNI-Baru (Pendidikan Nasional Indonesia or Indonesian Nationalist Party), and two fellow party members. He informed the State Department that the three nationalists would be interned, without a formal trial, in a place at a safe distance from the major population centers of either Java or Sumatra. Browne added with conspicuous disapproval that the government justified this decision by pointing to the fact that official “prosecutions might cause disturbances and it is more important to maintain public law and order than to determine whether or not troublemakers are legally punishable.”39

In 1935, the US Consul General, Walter Foote, offered the opinion that De Jonge’s despotic regime had forced native politicians to regroup and rethink their strategies, since any Indonesian nationalist, whether suspected of communist sympathies or not, was now “at risk of being summarily banished,” purely as a preemptive measure.40 The colonial administration had already designated certain prisons and internment camps for those it perceived as the most dangerous demagogues in the nationalist movement. The worst of the penal colonies was Boven Digul in New Guinea. Despite the availability of reasonable amenities, books, and a certain amount of freedom of movement within the camp, it proved to be, as Rudolf Mrázek described it in his biography of Sutan Sjahrir, a “debilitating” place because of the unwholesome natural environment in which it was
An occasional American observer may have guessed that it was a camp in a furtive and inaccessible “phantom world.” Yet it was unlikely that any of them grasped the full extent to which inmates were physically weakened or emotionally broken, even if they were not tortured or even treated badly by Dutch prison guards.

Dutch authorities, meanwhile, prided themselves on their supposedly humane handling of Indonesian political prisoners. As an American journalist for the Baltimore Sun reported, Netherlands officials in colonial Indonesia told him that the overly lenient British and Americans tended to “pardon all agitators,” whereas the French summarily “shoot them”; the Dutch, in contrast, pursued a policy that represented a judicious middle ground, because they merely exiled troublemakers to the highlands of New Guinea where they received reasonable treatment and medical care. A Dutch staff physician who worked in Boven Digul for two years, Dr. L.J.A. Schoonheyt, went even further in lauding the conditions that greeted political detainees in the remote New Guinea settlement. In 1936, he wrote that Boven Digul maintained a photography studio, a jazz band, and a wayang orang group (a shadow puppet theater featuring human actors). The camp also offered a music and opera society facetiously named “Liberty,” a gamelan orchestra, and a generous assortment of other clubs. In addition, spirited soccer games took place in the penal colony at regular intervals, pitting an “enthusiastic team” of military guards against an opposing squad made up of a combination of the most athletic prisoners and Dutch civil servants.

The cunning public relations efforts on the part of the Dutch East Indies government paid off. John Gunther, in his blockbuster, Inside Asia, made only a fleeting reference to Boven Digul as “an isolated camp in cannibal territory” where the most fanatical nationalists were left alone to construct “their own utopia.” And the article in the Baltimore Sun on April 7, 1940, entitled “Dutch Guard Empire With Aid of Cannibals,” described the secluded prison colony as a site where Indonesian nationalists, often in the company of their wives and children, “can build their own houses, plant their own gardens, dig their own wells, and attend to the cattle provided by the government.” Since prisoners did not have to work very hard and were subjected to “easy discipline,” foreign correspondent Marc T. Greene reported that incarceration in Boven Digul gave the prisoners “plenty of time and opportunity to debate their various plans for world revolution. They can extol Mr. Trotsky and denounce Mr. Stalin, or vice versa, as long as they please.”

It was not until the immediate postwar era that the American media publicized the conditions that had prevailed in Boven Digul, where residents had been held without due process of law. Ever since the first historical occurrence of such settlements around the turn of the century, when camps were created to imprison anti-Spanish Cubans in Havana or anti-British Boers in the Transvaal
province of South Africa, the incarceration of civilians without a formal process of adjudication has functioned as a definition of concentration camps. Both Dutch officials and Indonesian nationalists during the 1930's had not used this term; instead, they euphemistically referred to Boven Digul’s two camps, Tanah Merah and Tanah Tinggi, as either a detention camp or a deportation colony. Nevertheless, an editorial in the American news magazine, *The New Republic*, stated in October 1945 that Boven Digul was “one of the world’s most terror-ridden concentration camps in a malaria-infested jungle.” George McTurnan Kahin, in *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia* published in 1952, also used the term concentration camp when referring to Boven Digul.

In 1945, however, the labeling of Boven Digul as a concentration camp was newly informed by the harrowing discoveries of the concentration camps the Nazis had established in Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia during World War II. Hence, *The New Republic’s* article was hyperbolic and tendentious. The conduct of Dutch prison wardens in New Guinea’s Boven Digul during the 1930’s could not be compared to the behavior of Nazi guards in camps such as Auschwitz, nor did the Dutch colonial government pursue a policy of the systematic extermination of Indonesian nationalists. However, detaining nationalists in a malarial environment where disease was prevalent, proved quite effective in its own right – a recognition that dawned on an occasional American observer in the Dutch East Indies.

In an earnest attempt to disentangle the intricate web of Indonesian political parties and the varying degrees of radicalism they espoused, US Foreign Service officers in the 1930’s began to report on the nationalist movement with greater frequency. In order to walk the political tightrope, though, between the residual anti-colonialism of the Roosevelt Administration and the celebration by some Indonesian nationalists of the motto “Asia for the Asians” under Japanese tutelage, American diplomats in Batavia routinely downplayed, and sometimes openly mocked, the Dutch government’s tendency to conflate nationalism with communism. Instead, American diplomats blamed Governor General De Jonge’s antagonism towards the nationalist movement for actually abetting the “crystallization” of native political parties.

Notwithstanding Americans’ skepticism, Dutch fears of anti-capitalism and anti-Western sentiments grew at a steady pace, whether these apprehensions were projected onto Indonesian nationalists or the archipelago’s Chinese population. Walter Foote sent a peculiar story to the Secretary of State about the Dutch government’s adviser for East Asiatic Affairs, A.H.J. Lovink, who made an incognito visit to one of “the leading Chinese schools” in Batavia in early 1935. Before his presence was disclosed, he allegedly heard students of all ages repeat after their teachers that the Netherlands Indies “should belong to China! The Chinese should band together and drive the blond Dutchman out! Down with
Dutch rule in the Netherlands Indies! Down with capitalism!” Lovink then arranged with the school’s principal that he would return exactly an hour later. Upon his return, he was greeted by students lined up in orderly rows, who suddenly pulled out of their pockets “a small Dutch flag and waved it to the accompaniment of the blowing of horns and whistles.” This experience led to more rigorous government inspections of Chinese schools, although Lovink had told the US Consul General ruefully that it would probably produce no results other than drive “subversive teachings... into greater secrecy.”

The Dutch government interpreted all sentiments and actions in favor of independence, whether or not they revealed any affinity with communist organizations, as “entirely seditious.” Any such act of disloyalty warranted the government’s use of its unrestrained “police state methods,” and constituted a legitimate “ground for the arrest of its sponsors at any time.” In 1935, Consul General Foote wrote that Mohammad Hatta’s social-democratic concepts could be easily swayed by “a decidedly communistic strain,” but he did not accept the Dutch administration’s claim that all Indonesian politicians were communists in a nationalist disguise. And two years later, the same Walter Foote sent to the State another bizarre report about the burgeoning paranoia of Dutch colonial authorities. The Attorney General of the Netherlands East Indies announced he had discovered that “communist propaganda was being distributed under the guise of an advertisement for Kalzan,” a patented calcium-lacto-phosphate preparation that should be added to boiled drinking water in order to supplement the human body with minerals and salts necessary to thrive in a tropical climate.

The exposure of covert communist propaganda in the form of Kalzan advertisements, which the government had obtained, provided the Indies police with a presumably valid reason to summarily arrest approximately 80 people “in simultaneous raids” throughout the country. At about the same time, however, the colonial government made an offer to enhance its “economic cooperation” with Indonesia’s indigenous residents, because the archipelago’s export economy had recovered some of its former strength. Foote noted that most native politicians perceived this proposal as a call for the kind of teamwork that “exists between a draft horse and his owner-driver: cooperation by the whip.”

On the whole, American observers rejected the idea of a pervasive communist plot and they no longer touted the thoroughness, wisdom, and intelligence of the Dutch colonial civil service, as their predecessors in the 1920’s had done. Instead, they expressed their disapproval of Dutch violations of due process of law and the capricious infringement of the civil rights of critics of the colonial regime, consisting of Indonesian nationalists as well as the occasional Dutch social democrat. US Foreign Service officers notified the State Department that the Governor General’s hostility toward the native population had subverted the advisory character of the Volksraad by converting it into nothing more than an “organ of op-
position,” which eventually reduced the People’s Council to a “laughing stock” in Europeans’ eyes.\textsuperscript{54} De Jonge’s rampant abuse of his discretionary powers and the government’s practice of banishing individual Indonesians without formal adjudication was condemned as an infraction of standard, democratic legal procedures that should be the hallmark of all civilized societies.\textsuperscript{55}

In this context, the shrewd Dutch political strategy, during the 1930’s, of trying to divide the archipelago into more autonomous political regions was highly relevant. The training of the Indonesian population for “local and regional citizenship, expressed in the participation in, and care for, their own daily interests” would ideally quell intra-ethnic solidarity and prevent nationalist extremists from inciting a collective yearning for independence.\textsuperscript{56} This policy’s calculating logic was not lost on American observers, however, who noted that the emphasis on regional autonomy would “separate the goats from the sheep” and sabotage the momentum of the independence movement on a national scale, thus guaranteeing “Dutch sovereignty of the islands as a whole.”\textsuperscript{57}

US diplomats judged the government’s decision to require a declaration of loyalty from its civil servants, whether Dutch or Indonesian, to be “provocative without strengthening [its] hand,” since anyone who was “politically minded would falsely sign such declarations.” They denounced the Governor General’s “police-state” or “authoritarian” methods and commented on the fact that some progressive Dutch residents of the Southeast Asia colony now referred to the colonial administration as “the fascist government.” US diplomats constantly disparaged De Jonge’s measures of restricting the right of assembly and condemned his statutes that authorized censorship of the press. Americans held these decrees responsible for “driving the native political movement underground and into secrecy,” and they predicted that sooner or later the Indies government would find itself facing a “powerful movement which can’t be controlled by mere ordinances.”\textsuperscript{58} Of course, in a mere ten years, they were proven to be right.

Walter Foote’s successor was Consul General Erle R. Dickover, who wrote in 1938 that “pure communist doctrines” had never gained many adherents in the Netherlands East Indies. Aside from a small cohort of committed intellectuals, such ideologies were “beyond the comprehension” of a people who “know little or nothing of the modern industrial, financial, and political world.” He conceded that a sprinkling of “Malay communist agents from Singapore” had distributed some propaganda among the soldiers in the Royal Netherlands Indies Army (KNIL), but obviously without much success, because two years later, Dickover wrote to the State Department that the KNIL was reputedly “impregnated with National-Socialist ideas.”\textsuperscript{59} He concluded, however, that no “occidental communists” were present in the Dutch East Indies. At the same time, the Dutch government’s “small but efficient secret service” had gradually eliminated most of the Singaporean agents from the army and society at large.\textsuperscript{60}
In the same year, the political officer in the US Consulate General in Batavia, Albert E. Clattenburg Jr., reported that a native employee of the US Consulate was practicing his English lessons, which included the definition “brute = white man.” Clattenburg declared, however, that this did not mean that the Consulate’s Indonesian clerk was a communist, but merely that the white man in Indonesia was “losing his semi-deified status here, just as he lost it in the Philippines years ago.” Throughout 1938 and 1939, Clattenburg sent the Secretary of State monthly reports with “miscellaneous notes” on the mounting political tensions in the Indies. He created a mischievous ritual of including “a monthly Dutch communist story” which he introduced, each time, with a mildly sarcastic remark. Clattenburg’s favorite culprit was the reactionary Dutch journalist, H.C. Zentgraaff, who served as the editor of the Dutch newspaper, De Java Bode.

Zentgraaff was known to some of his colleagues and friends in the Netherlands East Indies, especially to those who did not agree with his arch-conservative politics, as a “journalistic bandit.” He filled the pages of the Java Bode with “blackmail, betrayal, and slander,” causing great misery in the lives of innocent targets. At other times, Zentgraaff indulged in “fuzzy sentimentality,” designed to arouse nothing but “crocodile tears.” Zentgraaff fulminated on the editorial pages of De Java Bode mostly against Indonesian communists, whom he saw sprouting up in every nook and cranny of Java and Sumatra’s landscape. On other occasions he took aim at American Pentecostal missionaries in the Dutch East Indies, who were “too oriented to the left,” or he would fire pot shots at Franklin Roosevelt. In the wake of the American President’s State of the Union Address to a joint session of the US Congress in January 1939, Zentgraaff opined in a headline, “Words, Nothing But Words,” that if a war were to break out either in Europe or in the Pacific, Roosevelt would probably do nothing but “sell American-made weapons.”

When De Jonge’s repressive reign was about to end in 1936, the appointment of his successor was disclosed; the choice had fallen on a man with what John Gunther called “the jaw-breaking name” of Jhr. Dr. A.W. Tjarda van Starkenborgh Stachouwer. As soon as the news broke, the US Consul General noted that the new Governor General’s reputation was a “very liberal” and “scrupulously honest” one. The State Department could thus anticipate a more enlightened and humane policy towards the native population in economic as well as political matters, although the Consul General added that one of his informants had allegedly told him that “too much honesty is bad” for the Dutch East Indies, whereas “political liberalism and humanitarianism are fatal.” By 1937, American Foreign Service officers in the Indonesian archipelago were already subjecting the new Governor General to less personal criticism than they had heaped upon his predecessor – and they relished the fact that his wife was born and educated in the United States. But they continued to raise moral objections to the
Indies government’s encroachments on the freedom of the press and the civil liberties of Indonesian nationalists.

At the same time, the Roosevelt Administration continued to support the evolution of an autonomous democracy in the Philippines. Since the passage of the Tydings-McDuffie Act in 1934, policymakers in Washington were nurturing as well as they could a viable political structure in Manila — a government that would be administered by indigenous politicians and elected through a system of universal suffrage. At times, such sincere American efforts in the Philippines produced invidious comparisons with Dutch policies in the Indonesian archipelago next door. However, the confluence of US sponsored decolonization of the Philippines with a range of other issues — the lingering effects of the Great Depression, the substantial US holdings in Indonesian rubber and oil production, the arrival of Tjarda van Starkenborgh Stachouwer as the new Governor General, and the growing menace of Japanese militarism — made American diplomats increasingly reticent to express their moral condemnation of the Dutch colonial regime.

Geopolitical considerations in Asia were gradually changing, and the United States would need Dutch military cooperation if a war with Japan erupted. It was also possible that Roosevelt’s personal pride in his Dutch ancestry may have made shrewd American consular personnel in the Indonesian archipelago — eager to safeguard their chances for promotion within the US Foreign Service — a bit more cautious in their moral censure of Dutch colonial rule, while daring to be more critical of the French in Indochina.

Nonetheless, some journalists in several US newspapers continued to use tough language in their characterization of the Dutch colonial government’s censorship of the press or the widespread illiteracy that prevailed among the Indonesian population. A foreign correspondent for the Chicago Daily News, Frank Mothers, for instance, observed that the Dutch were shamefully “laggard” in educating Indonesians, because only a “tiny minority was literate after 300 years of Holland’s rule.” He also reported that through the government-controlled news agency Aneta, “dangerous democratic information is culled and trimmed to safe proportions.” As an example, he cited the widespread publicity in the media that had surrounded the proclamation of the Commonwealth of the Philippines elsewhere in the world; in Indies newspapers, in contrast, this event was only “obscurely and briefly printed.”

At about the same time, the Christian Science Monitor gave space to a Japanese reporter to present his views on the Netherlands East Indies in June 1940. K.K. Kawakami quite predictably indicted Dutch colonial governance, but he did so by employing an inventive historical imagination: “Rule in the East Indies has not been benevolent. Read Douwes Dekker’s Max Havelaar, the East Indies counterpart of Uncle Tom’s Cabin, and you understand why throughout the nine-
teenth century the natives were in a constant state of rebellion.\textsuperscript{67} Also a year later, foreign reporter Archibald T. Steele wrote in the Washington Star that a Dutch official had reputedly told him that the gospel of the Indies administration was, “don’t educate the people and they won’t want things they don’t need and shouldn’t have; prevent the spread of subversive propaganda and you won’t have unrest; exile or imprison the worst of the radicals and you needn’t fear serious revolt.” He reported that the Dutch believed that Filipinos had been “spoiled” by too much education and too much prosperity – that they would have been a “happier and less restless people” had they been given fewer of the benefits of Western civilization.\textsuperscript{58}

In general, though, American reporting on the Dutch East Indies became more temperate as the decade of the 1930’s drew to a close. The possibility of Japanese aggression had settled in the minds of policymakers in Washington as the most significant factor in the Southeast Asian region. If a general war were to erupt in the Pacific, the Indonesian archipelago’s strategic location and its unique stature as the only territory in Asia with a sophisticated oil industry would make it a prime target for Japan’s imperialists. As a consequence, the State Department became preoccupied with Japan’s economic and political intrigues in colonial Indonesia. Foreign policy analysts in the Roosevelt Administration also began to worry profoundly about the Dutch East Indies’ inadequate military defenses in the event of a Japanese attack.
CHAPTER FIVE

The Specter of Japan and America’s Recognition of the Indonesian Archipelago’s Strategic Importance, 1938–1945

The State Department’s growing preoccupation with the belligerence of Japan compelled the US Consul General in Batavia, Erle Dickover, to respond to nervous inquiries concerning Japan’s commercial activities in the Dutch East Indies. In early 1939, he sent several elaborate reports to Washington, in which he detailed the scope of Japan’s economic enterprise in the Dutch East Indies. The Consul General described in great detail the more than “one hundred Japanese corporations” doing business in Java, Sumatra, Celebes (Sulawesi), and some of the smaller islands. He also informed his superiors in Washington that Japanese companies leased approximately 380,000 acres of land throughout the Indonesian archipelago for the purpose of cultivating rubber, palm oil, coffee, tea, and coconuts.1

In a similar vein, Dickover discussed the presence of approximately 2,000 Japanese fishing and pearling vessels operating in the region. He conceded that he had little doubt that Japan’s extensive commercial fleet sailing in between the thousands of islands of the archipelago, manned by capable Japanese crews of “natural-born” fishermen and pearl divers, possessed an enormous “military value.” These ships had most certainly “charted every foot of the waters of the archipelago, each shifting shoal and every submerged rock, for the Japanese Navy.” In order to illustrate Dutch perceptions of Japan’s shrewd economic infiltration of the Indonesian archipelago, he quoted a journalist in Makassar, who had written in the pages of the Java Bode on January 6, 1939, that Europeans should never forget that the Japanese tended to pursue their objectives in a single-minded fashion. Employing hackneyed Western stereotypes about supposedly inscrutable Asians, the Java Bode reporter asserted that the goal of the Japanese in the Netherlands East Indies was to herd Europeans “out the front door with long faces,” while they entered via the back door “with sphinx-like smiles.” Once the Japanese had settled inside the house, he concluded that it might be impossible “to drive them out again.”2 What he did not mention, however, was that the overall Japanese population in the Dutch East never exceeded 7,000 people at its peak in 1927 and gradually declined thereafter. Thus, he had created the impression that the Japanese presence in the archipelago was much greater than it actually was.3

In early 1939, Dickover was still inclined to placate the State Department’s anxieties about the likelihood of Japan’s military aggression towards the Nether-
lands East Indies. He quoted Dutch experts in Batavia, who speculated that the Japanese would not try to occupy the Indonesian archipelago by force, because Japan would not be “foolish” enough to provoke a war “against a strong combination of Western nations.” But Dickover anticipated that Japan would continue to foster economic “nuclei,” from which they could broaden their influence over the economy and civil society of the Dutch East Indies. The Japanese, he speculated, felt “subconsciously that all of East Asia is theirs by right, and therefore they are not pirating but simply taking what in fact belongs, or will soon belong, to the Japanese nation.” This phenomenon prompted him to send the Secretary of State a “familiar rhyme by Ogden Nash,” even though he had composed the doggerel himself, which expounded on a similar set of Western prejudices concerning the Japanese:

How courteous is the Japanese!
He always says, “Excuse me, please.”
He climbs into his neighbor’s garden
And smiles and says: “I beg your pardon.”
He bows and grins a friendly grin,
And calls his hungry family in;
He grins and bows a friendly bow:
“So sorry, this my garden now.”

After Nazi-Germany invaded Poland during the autumn of 1939 in a sudden, lightning attack, marking the beginning of the nerve-wracking *Sitzkrieg* in Europe during the winter of 1940, Dickover sent the Secretary of State another lengthy report regarding “Japanese Penetration in the Netherlands Indies” on November 17, 1939. This sequel struck a more disquieting tone. He suggested that Dutch East Indies officials had lost their complacency concerning the possibility of Japan’s military designs on the colony. Instead, they suffered from increasing anxiety about Japan’s covert attempts “to fish in the troubled waters in the Far East caused by the unsettled European situation.” He cited an article in a local Japanese newspaper, *Tohindo Nippo*, which stated on November 6, 1939, that the Netherlands now looked “to America for protection,” because England, “since ancient times the sheet-anchor of neutral states,” was embroiled in a war with Nazi Germany. *Tohindo Nippo* announced that the Dutch government was in the process of negotiating a secret agreement with the Roosevelt Administration in Washington, in an effort “to entrust to the United States” the defense of the Indies if it became a target of the “aggression of a third power.” As a quid pro quo, the Japanese newspaper reported that the Netherlands would ostensibly “grant the United States special facilities for trade and for the exploitation of the natural resources of the Indies.”

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Although the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in The Hague denied the existence of this clandestine accord and also dismissed the idea that the Dutch desired this type of agreement, Dickover cited local acquaintances who did not consider “the proposition as fantastic as it might appear at first glance.” According to his contacts in Batavia, the colonial government did not wish to appeal to England for assistance. He wrote that the memories of the early nineteenth-century English interregnum in Java, under the leadership of Thomas Raffles during the French Revolution’s aftermath, still rankled Dutch colonial residents. Perhaps the recollection of Raffles made them ambivalent about any British role in Indonesia because they suspected that the English might repeat their habit of exacting “too high a price for such an arrangement.” In contrast, the Indies government could “completely trust” the United States, based on the assumption that after training Filipinos for independence over the past few decades, America had no other “imperialistic ambitions.”

Moderate Indonesian nationalists, in fact, agreed with this Dutch assessment. For example, in early October 1939, a few days after the German invasion of Poland, the pro-independence Volksraad member from the Minahassa region in the northern Celebes (now Sulawesi), Dr. Sam Ratoe Langie, approached A.H. Hamilton, a medical doctor who was attached to the US Consulate General in Batavia. The two physicians had previously met at a medical congress, and Ratoe Langie suggested “that should the Netherlands be overwhelmed by a German attack, The United States might assume the protection of the Netherlands Indies if requested to do so by the people of the Indies through a plebiscite.”

According to Dickover, his Dutch acquaintances – as well as a few Indonesian ones – insisted that such a confidential treaty was credible, because it would be to America’s benefit to shelter the Netherlands East Indies from foreign hostility. After all, the colony constituted a prolific source of precious raw materials such as rubber, oil, and tin that were “of vital necessity” to the US economy. With a hint of annoyance, he informed the US State Department that he had a hard time convincing his Dutch friends and colleagues that the reality of such a clandestine agreement was “most unlikely,” because all foreign treaties concluded by the American government required formal ratification from the US Senate.

In general, Dickover’s dispatches began to reveal a prudent analysis of the situation in the Netherlands East Indies that no longer assailed the Dutch colonial government for violating Indonesians’ civil rights. His reports were in stark contrast to the highly critical accounts submitted by his predecessors in the early to mid-1930’s, who had expressed their dislike of the autocratic tactics of Governor General B.C. de Jonge in no uncertain terms. The tide was also turning in the American press, which began to produce an array of temperate articles about the Dutch East Indies in widely distributed magazines and newspapers such as Life,
the Christian Science Monitor, the New York Herald Tribune, and the Daily Mirror, reaching large American audiences.\(^{10}\)

In fact, Lothrop Stoddard, in a lengthy feature in March 1938, entitled “‘Spice Islands’: A Colonial Model,” published in The Christian Science Monitor Weekly, seemed to revive the American panegyrics of the 1920’s, replete with a recycled set of cultural clichés. His article was illustrated with a gorgeous photograph of peasants and water buffaloes at work in terraced rice fields that glistened in the hazy light of a Balinese sunset. In this idyllic world, he wrote, “sturdy Hollanders” had exploited their empire with “characteristic moderation.” Although on occasion “strict and stern,” Dutch civil servants were always “farsighted and solicitous” of the welfare of indigenous peoples and their rule had been “frankly paternalistic but wise and just.” He concluded that the Netherlands East Indies embodied one of the few colonial achievements that seemed to “merit survival from nearly every point of view.”\(^{11}\)

Stoddard cautioned, however, that this nimbly woven “fabric of empire” was the work of a “third-class European power,” which maintained only a third-rate army and navy. For Britain, however, the archipelago functioned as a “neutral buffer” and as a “strategic bridge.”\(^{12}\) If the Dutch failed to protect and preserve their Southeast Asian Empire, it would spell disaster for all Western powers in Asia, especially England. From an American perspective, too, the Netherlands’ inability to counteract a Japanese attempt to violate the status quo in their Southeast Asian colony would be “prejudicial to peace in the entire Pacific region,” as US Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, had already forewarned.\(^{13}\)

Thus, as the decade drew to a close, Dutch officials in Europe as well as in Southeast Asia, at long last, began to internalize their allies’ apprehensions about the colony’s lack of military readiness in case of a Japanese attack. Perhaps such Dutch anxieties were intensified by the news of the “Rape of Nanking” in December 1937, when Japanese troops systematically tortured and murdered perhaps as many as 300,000 Chinese civilians.\(^{14}\) Containing Japan’s imperialists might become even more difficult in the near future, Dutch military officials finally began to realize. It also dawned on many of them that the Netherlands East Indies, in particular, would be at risk if Japanese aggression were to continue, since nearly half of Japan’s regular petroleum supply was drawn from the Indonesian archipelago’s oil fields. If America were to cut off its sale of gasoline to Japan – in addition to the boycott on exports of scrap iron and steel, which had already been implemented with great popular support in September 1940 – an embargo would simply mean, according to Roosevelt, that the Japanese would invade the Dutch East Indies “sooner rather than later” to gain access to its rich oil deposits. As a result, the American government only prohibited the export of high-octane aviation gasoline in 1941, even though this partial embargo became a full-fledged boycott of oil exports to Japan, presumably because of bureaucratic inefficiency.
and political opposition. On their part, Dutch colonial authorities refused to give in to a demand, in the same year, that the archipelago furnish Japan with all the oil and other essential resources it needed; instead, the Dutch responded by curtailing petroleum exports to Japan in July.

Only a few weeks before the Japanese invasion of the Dutch East Indies became a reality, J. Edgar Hoover, the not yet controversial director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), made a prediction regarding Japan’s oil supplies and other crucial resources. Based on information provided by “a reliable informant” who had recently escaped from Tokyo, Hoover predicted that the Japanese would have enough “petroleum products on hand” to mount an “‘all out’ war for a period of approximately eighteen to twenty-four months.” Hoover added that the Japanese stock of gasoline and lubricating oil would be sufficient “to overcome any potential destruction of wells and refineries in the Netherlands East Indies” in case of Japan’s invasion of the Dutch colonial territory.

Before such demolitions in the face of a Japanese attack would become a necessity, the Minister of Defense in The Hague determined that the Dutch East Indies Navy “need be only one-tenth as strong as the Japanese.” In 1934, military strategists in the Netherlands had argued that Japan would always have to be “watchful of a vengeful China and a stealthy Russia.” As a result, Dutch military planners predicted that the Japanese would probably not dare to split their offensive power. A successful assault on the Netherlands East Indies would entail the mobilization of a considerable number of troops and naval forces, analysts calculated, which would render Japan too vulnerable to attacks from either China or the Soviet Union.

Toward the late 1930’s, however, it became clear that haphazard Dutch military preparations in Southeast Asia were utterly inadequate, despite England and America’s critical interests in the archipelago. The Dutch ambassador in London and a former Governor General of the Netherlands East Indies, Jean-Paul van Limburg Stirum, addressed this issue in 1938 with a wry sense of humor. He conceded that it might appear to the rest of the world that his fellow citizens had relied too heavily on the military assistance of their long-standing allies, because they had assumed that “if the rain seeps through our roof, yours will begin to leak as well.” However, he qualified this statement with the assurance that “we have not allowed ourselves to be lulled to sleep in the firm anticipation of help from a big brother.” Instead, “we are vigilant and make great sacrifices to guard our home.”

American journalists, meanwhile, wrote on various occasions during the next few years that the Netherlands was doing its best to build up its armed forces in Southeast Asia. The Dutch government’s defense appropriations in 1940 had risen substantially to a grand total of 75,000,000 dollars, both the New York Herald Tribune and Life Magazine reported in 1941. In the same year, additional funds were allocated for the construction of three battle cruisers.
cautious hopes expressed by Dutch officials and the American press, though, it would soon become evident that efforts to bolster the military defense systems of the Netherlands East Indies were too little too late. Although US military contingency planning for a potential war in the Pacific – the US Navy’s “Orange War Plans” as well as the five versions of the comprehensive “Rainbow War Plans” – assumed that America would ally itself with England and the Netherlands in order to fight Japan, the Netherlands East Indies government tried to maintain a neutral stance for too long, which fostered US policymakers’ misgivings about the reliability and commitments of the Dutch.21

In January 1940, to quote a memorandum written by Erle Dickover in Batavia, “many weird and unpredictable changes are taking place in the world today.”22 In light of the new configuration of global politics – with Hitler’s Germany threatening to assault Western Europe and Japanese military designs on the Dutch East Indies and other regions in Asia becoming more and more apparent – American appraisals of colonial society in the Indonesian archipelago appeared to have reached a sensible middle ground. A year or so earlier, the chargé d’affaires in the US Embassy in The Hague, George A. Gordon, had warned that the Japanese Army’s brutality in Manchuria in 1931 had appalled officers of the Royal Netherlands Navy. Yet it took Dutch army and navy planners until the end of the decade to fully recognize that Japan’s militarists harbored the ambition to increase “by the sword the glories and grandeurs of the Japanese Empire,” which might include an invasion of the Netherlands East Indies as well.23

No longer automatically counting on it, Gordon informed the State Department that the Dutch hoped and prayed for British support in the event that Japan were to overrun the Indonesian archipelago. He also suggested that many Dutch citizens, despite their “great disillusionment” and “bitterness” regarding America’s abandonment of the Philippines, anticipated that the US might also come to their rescue. As one of the US military attachés in the Netherlands, Warden McK. Wilson, mentioned earlier, officials in the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs and in the Defense Department had predicted that before the Filipino nation would obtain independence, Japan’s predatory course “will have turned southward.” He observed that as soon as Japan threatened either British or Dutch possessions in Southeast Asia, it would automatically involve America’s essential interests in the Philippines as well.24 As an article in New York’s Daily Mirror highlighted, without the Dutch East Indies supplies of rubber and tin, “America’s industry and our frenzied defense program would be throttled... and cracked open.”25 In summing up the Dutch attitude towards Japan, chargé d’affaires Gordon paraphrased Teddy Roosevelt’s well-known motto: “because the Dutch knew they did not carry a big stick, they spoke very softly indeed.”26

For the first time, it seemed as if America’s civilian and military policymakers became aware of the complicated links between the motherland and the Indone-
sian archipelago. They also began to appreciate the major financial burden that the Indonesian archipelago’s military defense entailed. Moreover, it finally dawned on US consular personnel that the enormous budgetary outlays for the military defense of the Indies functioned as a bone of contention between the government in The Hague and its Southeast Asian colony. In the European metropole, Erle Dickover wrote in 1939, Dutch people considered themselves citizens of a very small country, living in an atmosphere of “satiation and contemplation” as they calculated or consumed their generous savings. In the Indies, in contrast, “Netherlanders are toiling and sweating under the tropical sun, trying to build a vast empire and to hold it for posterity.” Dutch men and women in colonial Indonesia imagined themselves as belonging to a magnificently productive realm, filled with “exuberant youth and impetuosity,” well worth defending even if it exhausted the very last penny of the Netherlands’ financial resources. Without its lucrative Southeast Asian territory, many Dutch citizens suspected the Netherlands would quickly degenerate into “a small farm on the shores of the North Sea.” Most Dutch people in Northern Europe, though, even if they reaped the enormous dividends generated by the Indies with great relish, believed they could treat the Indies like “a stepchild – a child who might be the main source of income for the family, but who nevertheless may be starved and neglected with impunity.” People in the Netherlands continued to dismiss their compatriots in the Indonesian archipelago as “hysterical,” while the Dutch community in Southeast Asia accused the mother country of being “cowardly and imbued with defeatism.”

At the same time, US Foreign Service officers conveyed the political sensibilities of Indonesians with a compassion that was akin to their precursors in the early 1930’s; they discussed the ways in which the indigenous “underprivileged classes” naturally resented the prerogatives of either “native potentates” or “European overlords.” American observers supported Indonesians’ yearning for a system of government under which they might be able to obtain “equal rights with Europeans.” With more than a hint of self-satisfaction, scores of Americans like the editor of the English-language *Philippine Magazine*, Wilbur Burton, were convinced that from the perspective of a small but growing number of educated Indonesians, the Philippines constituted the “most inspiring political example in the world” even though Dutch officials, in contrast, viewed the Filipino nationalist leader, Manuel L. Quezon, as a more “subversive character than Marx, Lenin, and Trotsky rolled into one.” If the Indonesian nationalists could not realize their ideals in the shadow of the Dutch flag, this American pundit noted, “then the desired alternative is progress and security along with the Philippines under the American flag.”

America’s self-righteousness about its colonial record in the Philippines was a thorn in the side of other European colonial powers in Asia. In the minds of
many Americans, the “enlightened” process of the gradual decolonization achieved in the Philippines, embarked upon in 1916 and accelerated in 1934, functioned as a model all European countries should emulate. Once the former US colony emerged as an autonomous member of the world community, however, or as “an infant state that began to kick and bawl lustily, claiming spontaneous maturity,” America’s enormous military bases near Manila, as well as the economic concessions it exacted from the Philippines, gave rise to the term neocolonialism.

Manuel Quezon, while he suffered from the final stages of tuberculosis that caused his death towards the end of World War II, vented his anger at American “neo-imperialists” and “condescending bastards,” who would forever think that Filipinos were their “little brown brothers.” This attitude of superiority was confirmed by US politicians, such as Senator Robert Taft, who pontificated before the US Senate in April 1946, that America shall “always be a big brother to the Philippines” even after it had become an independent nation.

Some Indonesian nationalists agreed with their Filipino colleagues. In the caustic opinion of the Indonesian Republic’s representative to the UN Security Council, Nico Palar, or “Nick” to his American colleagues, the United States “gloated” a little too much about the supposedly magnanimous way in which it had granted freedom to its own colony in Southeast Asia. Although the Philippines had become a full-fledged member of the family of nations, Filipinos were nonetheless tied with “more than merely congenial relations” to their former colonial overlord in America. An occasional American newspaper picked up such criticism. As an editorial in the liberal St Louis Globe Dispatch opined, the Filipino response to the “American course of indoctrination” often boiled down to a perception that it was nothing but “another means of permanent enslavement.”

In 1940, when Burton suggested that Indonesian nationalists viewed America’s treatment of Filipinos as the brightest political model in human history, the threat of Japanese expansion into Southeast Asia was ominous but still only conjectural. As was the case with Washington’s foreign policy experts, Southeast Asia’s colonial authorities analyzed and appraised Japan’s military strategies and political designs in terms of their timing and plausibility. Obviously, the Japanese ruthlessness perpetrated in Manchuria and Nanking was a frightening precedent. In addition, Japan’s alliance with Nazi Germany made its impending aggression seem all the more likely, particularly after Hitler’s armies had invaded and defeated the Netherlands, Belgium, and France with lightning speed, each one being a colonial power with considerable overseas possessions.

Japan’s military might in Asia would erupt in full force in 1941 and 1942. With stunning ease and relatively few casualties the Japanese achieved victory after victory – from Hong Kong to Guam and Singapore, and from the Philippines to the Malay Peninsula, Indochina, Burma, and the Indonesian archipelago.
short time span, Japan gained control of a gigantic empire – deceptively labeled the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere – that counted a population of more than 100 million people and furnished 95 percent of the world’s rubber supply and 65 percent of the globe’s aggregate tin production. Of course, it was the Dutch East Indies that constituted the newly established Japanese Empire’s most highly valued acquisition, because it possessed a sophisticated petroleum industry capable of furnishing Japan’s Army, Navy, and Air Force with much-needed fuel.

In 1942, with some notable exceptions, many Indonesian nationalists observed, with a mixture of excitement and dread, that the “militaristic typhoon of a small yellow race” descended from the north and had swiftly brought the Dutch East Indies ill-equipped army to its knees. Most ordinary Indonesians were astonished by the sight of the Dutch regime crumbling so quickly. Toppling the Dutch colonial government required nothing more than a gentle breeze, because the Netherlands East Indies Army’s and Navy’s resistance was as pointless as the “war games played by boastful little boys,” a Japanese officer recalled afterwards. The Dutch colonial rulers were blown away as if they were tiny grains of “sand on a rock,” the pioneer of Indonesian nationalism and independent communism, Tan Malaka, recorded in his autobiography, because they could not withstand even the slightest gust of wind. After the war, in a memorandum written by the Indonesian Association for Independence in Egypt’s capital Cairo, the Dutch military defense of the archipelago was described as nothing but “the farce of offering resistance to the invaders,” because the KNIL troops caved in at once and simply “delivered 70 million Indonesians to the tender mercies of Japanese militarism.”

After their swift victory, Japan’s military rulers installed themselves as the absolute rulers of Java, Sumatra, and some of the archipelago’s outer islands. While many Indonesians had cautiously welcomed the Japanese, the honeymoon was to prove short-lived. As soon as they were firmly ensconced in the archipelago, Japan’s invaders quickly seized the powerful “instruments of oppression” left behind by the Dutch colonial state. The newly arrived “elder brothers” from Japan, however, wasted no time in revealing their true colors. They proved to be no different from their blue-eyed colonial predecessors. The Japanese were not “clever enough” to win the sympathy of the people, as a caption in the photographic retrospective of the Indonesian Revolution, *Lukisan Revolusi Rakjat Indonesia,* suggested. In West Sumatra, as an eyewitness remembered later, Japanese soldiers immediately “confiscated every bicycle they came across” and they also seized all the watches they spotted on people’s wrists; if anyone tried to resist, they were “certain to receive a kick or a punch.”

In fact, Japan’s military authorities managed to find ways to improve upon the instruments of power developed by their Dutch colonial forerunners. After the Dutch had so quickly surrendered the Indonesian archipelago to the “furious
The Indies must be liberated
Japanese, even hell could not have been a more terrible place” than the yoke the Japanese imposed on its inhabitants, a village official in Sumatra recalled melodramatically in the company of UN staff members who were visiting his region as guests of the Republican government in the late summer of 1948. Although the archipelago’s rice fields yielded abundant harvests, “thousands among us died of starvation.” He remembered with a sense of pathos that during these three years, he and his compatriots had suffered “terrible agonies” and humiliations, while piles of “dead bodies littered city streets and country roads.”

Those whom the Japanese invaders had not hauled off as forced laborers (romusha) to work on projects such as the construction of railroads, airstrips, or coalmines, tried to survive by any means possible. Japan’s military police (Kenpeitai) routinely used summary justice. Not only in the eyes of thousands of Europeans, locked up behind the barbed-wire fences of internment camps, but also as far as the Indonesian population was concerned, the Kenpeitai’s arbitrary punishments had become the paramount symbols of the menacing “bark” and deadly “bite” of Japanese rule in Southeast Asia.

At the same time, however, Japan’s military occupiers cautiously nurtured several organizations of a semi-public, semi-political type to help foster pride in Indonesians’ “nation/race” (bangsa/kebangsaan). They also provided a host of teenage boys and young men with basic military training, and tried to instill in them a visceral “anti-Western bias” that bordered on “sheer hatred.” According to an OSS report from July 20, 1944, the Japanese garrisoned in Western Java constantly impressed upon “the natives that they are the masters and white people are only dirt.” Noting that a large number of Indonesians were suffering and “angry” because people are “simply picked up in the streets and made to work as [forced] laborers,” the report mentioned an uprising in a village near Tasikmalaya, where the kampong people rebelled after the “Japanese had taken their rice crop away for a third time,” which provoked a Muhammadiyah protest led by a local Muslim cleric. Another popular protest occurred in the village of Indramayu.

In yet another instance, young Indonesians recruited into the Japanese military hierarchy, led by a daring Indonesian officer named Suprijadi, revolted against their Dai Nippon masters in the barracks in Blitar in February 1945. At the same time, their family members were dislodged from their customary livelihoods while suffering much degradation. According to Mohammad Hatta, the people’s “traditional communal spirit” had been shattered. He later reminisced that because so many Indonesian people were starving, the temptation to forsake their friends or relatives became overwhelming.

It took more than three years before the Allies secured victory over Japan. Not until August 1945, could the Indonesians who had survived the Japanese regime in the archipelago breathe freely again. Approximately 2 million people, perhaps even more, were killed during World War II. Immediately thereafter, Sukarno and
Hatta proclaimed Indonesia’s independence, which outraged Dutch residents who were being released from Japanese internment camps or returned from abroad. Accordingly, on October 25, 1945, the *New York Times* suggested that its readers might not be eager to read about anti-Western “quislings,” even if the “confused and misguided” Indonesian nationalist leaders should not be viewed as the equivalent of a bona fide Nazi-collaborator in Norway. In this context, the *New York Times* quoted Sukarno on October 25, 1945, who had stated that the Japanese had used the Indonesian nationalist movement “for their own purposes.” He charged that Japan had manipulated him and his anti-colonial colleagues who were preparing for national independence under “false promises, but we turned the tables on them. We prepared for the hour of liberty and then took the matter into our own hands. No power on earth can take that away from us.”

It is likely that few *New York Times* readers realized that both Sukarno and Hatta were at the forefront of the nationalist movement during the decades prior to World War II. Nor was it known among the reading public in the United States that these two men had undergone many humiliations at the hands of the Dutch East Indies regime. Both anti-colonial crusaders had been placed under lock and key in colonial prisons, or banished to various distant islands, for many years. The two seasoned veterans of the nationalist movement, however, managed to cling tenaciously to their anti-colonial stance during the Japanese occupation. After all, Japan’s propaganda during the 1930’s had cultivated nationalist sentiments throughout Asia by making “promises as high as mountains.” The oft-repeated propaganda that Japan might help to evict European exploiters from Southeast Asia appealed to Indonesian nationalists, despite an occasional warning that this motto really referred to the ideal of Japanese mastery over all of Asia. As the central Javanese poet, Noto Suroto, had admonished as early as 1920, the “tragedy” of Korea after Japan had “raped” and pillaged her, should serve as a cautionary tale for all Asian people who longed for an end to European colonialism.

Sukarno, however, only budged occasionally from his opinion that a war in the Pacific between Japan and the West would bring the dream of Indonesian autonomy closer. This expectation derived from his eclectic political visions and entailed a specific understanding of the unfolding of the capitalist system in the West. During the decades before the outbreak of the war in the Pacific, Sukarno had often used the catchphrase “capitalism-imperialism” in a generic sense, without specifically targeting the Dutch. According to some of his critics, he used this slogan as a “smoke screen.” Rather than morally interrogating the exploitation and injustice of the Dutch colonial system, he may have hoped to avoid the wrath of the Netherlands East Indies regime by attacking imperialism, in general, as an inevitable outcome of the capitalist system. However, his use of the term “capitalism-imperialism” represented a genuine intellectual conviction rather than operating merely as a diversionary tactic.
During the 1930’s, Sukarno had interpreted fascism as an epiphenomenon of monopoly capitalism in its ultimate stage, which would augur its collapse in the near future. In this final phase, a fully matured capitalist system ran the risk of transforming the state into a scourge, he wrote in 1941 in an article on “fascism as the political expression and inevitable outcome of capitalist degeneracy.” Anyone who had ever studied the writings of Karl Marx, he argued, “knows that fascist states should be characterized as bludgeons (knuppels). In Germany, in the most public fashion, the state has been transformed into a bludgeon, which is also true as far as Italy is concerned. The same could be said about Japan.” Although reluctantly, he acknowledged in 1941 that the Japanese state deserved the label fascist, too. Still, he clung to his viewpoint that a war in Asia between Japan and the West would function as a catalyst for Indonesian independence.

In Sukarno’s case, his implacable anti-imperialist posture prompted him to cooperate with Japan’s military administration in the Indonesian archipelago, in order to give the nationalist struggle “a broader legal scope.” Mohammad Hatta, with more political doubts and a great deal of personal turmoil in this regard, eventually followed suit. The internal division of labor among the nationalist movement’s three principal leaders meant that Sutan Sjahrir was entrusted with the role of organizing an underground network of “revolutionary resistance.” Whether or not this separation of tasks was a retroactive “fable,” concocted to obscure the reality of Sukarno’s collaboration with Japan, Sjahrir’s assignment placed him in an in-between space that was only loosely connected to the center of political activity. His assignment installed him, both literally and figuratively, in a solitary but agile position – a location where Sjahrir, perhaps with some regret, seemed to feel most comfortable.

In the cool mountain air of West Java, while living in his sister’s house hidden behind a lush orange grove – or a pineapple farm, as The Far Eastern Survey reported in November 1948 – he could observe with detachment the political maelstrom and human chaos unleashed by Japan’s regime. In his safe but isolated residence in the vicinity of Bandung, Sjahrir had a chance to listen to a clandestine radio; what he heard, of course, was the news of a steadily growing number of Allied victories over Japan in the Pacific Theater. The more impulsive Amir Sjarifuddin, meanwhile, was the one who took genuine physical risks in an effort to set up an anti-Japanese underground network, for which he eventually paid dearly, spending several years in a Japanese prison.

Before the war, in August 1937, Sjahrir had written that he was afraid he could “never be happy” in Indonesia. Dutch culture had saturated his mental life ever since he had learned to read and write, due to his thoroughly European education and the hundreds of Dutch schoolbooks and novels that had molded him intellectually during his youth. In the summer of 1929, as a young adult, he experienced the Netherlands for the first time. Once he had settled in Amsterdam he
recalled that “nothing seemed strange” to him, as if he could embark on a jour-
ney of discovery and recognition he had anticipated since his childhood. His
two-year sojourn in the Netherlands from 1929 to 1931 enabled him to see for
himself the personalities and places that had filled his imagination since he was a
young boy, brimming with intellectual curiosity and political interests.

Sjahrir could not help but recognize the deep-seated hatred that many of his
compatriots, whom he “loved more than he could ever love the Dutch,” felt to-
wards the Netherlands and its colonial rulers. However, despite his own involve-
ment in the anti-colonial crusade, he described himself as “half Dutch” and con-
fessed that he harbored “beautiful memories of that little country.” Such
equivocal feelings seemed to burden and distract him for the rest of his life. Thus,
it was auspicious for Sjahrir to be invested with the nebulous task of trying to
mobilize anti-Japanese sentiment among the Indonesian population during
World War II. It allowed him to remain aloof and find refuge in what Germany’s
Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, and other wary opponents of the Nazi regime
would later remember as an “internal exile” during the Hitler era.

The Japanese occupiers, for their part, chose to interpret Sukarno and Hatta’s
nationalist vision as unambiguously anti-Western in orientation. Even though
especially Hatta’s attitudes towards the West were infinitely more complex, in
1942 both nationalist politicians suspended their ambivalence. After Japan’s swift
victory, Sukarno marveled at how the Japanese had enabled him to see himself
“reflected in an Asian mirror” to reveal an honest picture of himself for the first
time in his life. Being able to behold his own image in an immaculate looking
glass – instead of facing the disfigured portrait he saw in the cracked mirror
Dutch authorities had placed in front of him – was a revelation to him.

What he alluded to was that the convex mirror of Dutch colonialism had
grotesquely magnified the master–servant relationships embedded in the feudal
culture of Java. During the colonial era, a slavengeest (slave mentality), as he called
it when writing in Dutch, was etched into the Indonesian soul as a reflection of
Europeans’ innate herengeest (master mentality). Indonesians had internalized this
compulsory servant spirit or jiwa budak, as he called it in Malay. Dutch colonial
culture had forged a complicity with the entrenched feudal patterns of lordship
and bondage in Java. This particular kind of collusion, the future President of the
Indonesian Republic asserted, had managed to endow Dutch East Indies society
with a gloss of coherence. Newly emboldened by the easy Japanese conquest of
the Netherlands East Indies, however, he called upon his fellow citizens in Sep-
tember 1942, to banish that slave mentality from their hearts and minds. True in-
dependence, he implored, could only happen when Indonesians learned to exult
in their jiwa ksatriya (noble spirit).

In contrast, Hatta’s personal reasons for collaborating with the Japanese mili-
tary administration during the war entailed a range of mixed emotions and con-

tradictory pushes and pulls. He was known as a devout Muslim and bookish person; his critics described him as an “insipid” public speaker and an “ornery” politician. Most of all, however, he was a highly capable economist, academically trained in Rotterdam in the Netherlands. He understood that in the long run, Japan’s industrial infrastructure and military capability would not be able to compete successfully with America’s immense human resources, enormous industrial potential, and technological sophistication. In relative terms, Japan comprised a small island nation with meager natural resources that was hampered, to a great extent, by its reliance on foreign oil and other imported raw materials. As a result, he suspected that the Japanese occupation was only an “interregnum.” Hatta speculated, though, that Japan’s temporary dominance could convert the quest for independence from a dream to the sphere of Realpolitik, allowing Indonesian nationalists to nurture a “state within a state” and bring the goal of an independent “new society” (masyarakat baru) within reach.

Tan Malaka expressed similar sentiments when he wrote in his autobiography that America’s “staying power” would be far greater than Japan’s. Although its population had been whipped into a feverish war spirit and its soldiers and sailors displayed astonishing “stamina, courage, and bravery,” Japan’s ability to contest America’s superiority in “geography, population, finance, production, raw materials, technology, and science” was limited. He predicted that Japan’s military strength resembled a “soap bubble” that would eventually burst. Tan Malaka, therefore, criticized the economics “expert” Hatta for collaborating with the Japanese occupiers. He also condemned Sukarno – whom he called banteng besar (great wild bull) – for aiding the predatory Japanese, who “devoured” Indonesia’s supplies of rice, precious metals, soldiers, and young women’s bodies even faster than the Dutch had done.

After the Western Allies finally managed to defeat Japan in August 1945 – in part thanks to America’s military and economic efficiency and the timely deployment of the atom bomb – Indonesian nationalists continued to believe that Roosevelt and Hull’s anti-colonial rhetoric would be translated into a public endorsement of the fledgling independent Republic. After all, as academics such as Raymond Kennedy and Rupert Emerson had argued, and as liberal journalists, labor union officials, and a range of progressive politicians in the US Congress had also maintained, the American public harbored a visceral dislike of colonialism. This sentiment not only prevailed among Democrats but was also an opinion embraced by a liberal segment of the Republican Party. As the defeated Republican candidate in the 1940 presidential elections, Wendell L. Wilkie, had announced upon his homecoming from a world-wide tour in 1942, colonialism had lost its legitimacy because millions of people in Asia were no longer willing to serve as “Eastern slaves for Western profits.”

The residual anti-imperialism of the Roosevelt Administration had provoked
contentious responses from politicians and citizens in Europe’s colonial powers, especially in Great Britain.68 Winston Churchill’s combative statement in 1942 – “I have not become the King’s First Minister in order to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire” – was echoed in other colonizing countries as well. As a disgruntled British Foreign Service officer, Maberly E. Dening, told a counterpart in the US State Department in 1943, many Americans seemed to think that the British Empire’s only purpose was to sustain the lifestyles of the fabulously rich “holders of rubber, tin, and oil shares” in London, Surrey, or Devonshire. Dening judged America’s handling of international affairs in Asia as “ham-fisted” and resembling “Anglophobic” behavior. While he was attached to Louis Mountbatten’s South East Asia Command (SEAC), Dening bitterly dismissed American proposals for postwar developments as an effort to push the English out of Asia by mounting a “smear campaign,” which belittled Great Britain and only attributed the meanest of motives to British actions overseas.69

Reading the American writing on the wall, however, the experienced and progressive Dutch colonial civil servant, Hubertus van Mook, was shrewd enough to anticipate that Washington would insist on having a voice in the postwar political settlements of the Southeast Asian region. He probably would have agreed with the assessment of the Indian nationalist, Nirad C. Chaudhuri, that Americans, in general, displayed an “utter ignorance of the Oriental mind.”70 Nonetheless, the negative communiqués issued by the US government concerning the future of European colonial power in Asia should be addressed. At the prodding of Van Mook, Queen Wilhelmina made a cunning gesture in an effort to placate American criticism – or, from a more cynical perspective, she offered a “royal sop to the Atlantic Charter.”71 In December 1942, she announced that the political union between the Netherlands and the Dutch East Indies would be reconfigured after the war on “the solid foundation of a complete partnership.” Whether her declaration was an honest or disingenuous one, Queen Wilhelmina’s statement achieved its desired effect. Throughout the remainder of the war, Roosevelt held up Queen Wilhelmina’s conciliatory promise as a model for England and France to imitate.72 As he told the Australian ambassador in Washington in late 1944, he would support the Netherlands attempts to hold on to the Dutch East Indies because he was convinced that the Dutch were genuine in their promise to grant democracy and dominion status to their Southeast Asian colony.73

US efforts to gather intelligence concerning the internal conditions of the Japanese-occupied Dutch East Indies constituted a clumsy process. In wartime Washington, the Research and Analysis Branch (R&A) of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) had attracted a few Indonesia specialists who focused their attention on the Dutch East Indies. The anthropologist Cora DuBois directed OSS/R&A’s Southeast Asia Division, which could also rely on Claire Holt’s ex-
pertise concerning not only the arts and culture of Java but also its political environment. After serving as dance critic for a major New York newspaper, this remarkable woman, born in Riga and educated in Russia, had spent many years in Yogyakarta during the 1930’s, where she acquired keen insights into the conventions and prejudices of the Dutch colonial community in the archipelago. Another young woman working for the OSS as a putative Indonesia specialist was Jane Foster, who had lived for several years in Java prior to the outbreak of the Pacific war. In addition, two military officers were assigned to OSS/R&A, on detail from the US Army. One was Richard K. Stuart, who had studied Malay while enrolled in a US Army Specialized Training Program at Yale University. The second one was Paul M. Kattenburg; although he had studied Chinese rather than Malay in a similar program at Harvard University, his knowledge of Dutch made him eminently suitable for R&A work on the Netherlands East Indies. An academic expert on Southeast Asia was Raymond Kennedy, who was drafted into the OSS Special Operations Division because he was the author of a scholarly book, entitled *The Ageless Indies*, about Dutch colonial practices in the Indonesian archipelago. The knowledgeable Amry Vandenbosch, meanwhile, provided the State Department with sophisticated insights into, among other things, Japan’s potential impact on postwar processes of liberalization and “Indonesianization” in the archipelago.

The Southeast Asia Division of the OSS/R&A produced an array of reports on the history of the Indonesian nationalist movement. One of the division’s arduous tasks was to explain to Washington’s policymaking establishment why Sukarno and Hatta were collaborating with the enemy during the war, at least to the extent necessary to strengthen the apparatus for their long-planned nationalist Revolution. In March 1945, an OSS research paper argued, however, that deep down Sukarno was “anti-Japanese at heart,” although he was “forced to collaborate” because he was “powerless to act independently.” Obviously, US intelligence operatives could only offer their best estimates, because they could not rely on actual contacts with Indonesian nationalists. As a result, they found it almost impossible to gather information concerning the personal relationships and political views that prevailed among Indonesia’s prominent nationalists. OSS’ lack of access and the resulting uncertainty, in turn, may have created the impression in Washington that the collaboration of Sukarno and Hatta with the Japanese represented a unified stance among all members of the prewar nationalist movement.

It was easier to gather information on the personalities and professional capabilities of various Dutch colonial officials who were either taken prisoner of war, were incarcerated in internment camps throughout the archipelago, or had fled to Australia and elsewhere. For instance, another hefty research report (R&A No. 2647), issued on March 15, 1945, provided exhaustive “Biographical Notes on
Prominent Individuals Connected With the Netherlands East Indies in Government Service and Business,” even though it failed to engage in a substantive political analysis.77The report provided an interesting piece of information, though, about a “first-class” Dutch film director with “left-wing political views,” Joris Ivens, who made a film about Asia in 1944 that was commissioned by the Special Services Division of the US War Department.78

As was often the case, these briefings relied on information furnished by self-professed Dutch experts on the Indonesian archipelago, who had repatriated to Britain or the United States during the war. Other Dutch East Indies residents, having fled to Australia, also presented themselves as old Indies hands when they mingled freely with American military, intelligence, and diplomatic personnel in Canberra, Melbourne, or Brisbane.79 Canberra, in particular, became a bustling community of Europeans and Americans, being the command center of the ABDA (American-British-Dutch-Australian) military establishment under the supreme command of British General, Sir Archibald Wavell; the Dutch Admiral, Conrad E. Helfrich, also acquired a commanding position in ABDA.80 The city constituted a makeshift headquarters, from which the Allied operations in the Southeast Asian Theater were guided and monitored.

Whether or not they qualified as genuine Indonesia specialists, eager Dutchmen in Australia fed facts, insights, and frequently, fantasies about the situation of the Netherlands East Indies to the US War Department’s Military Intelligence Division. American intelligence operatives could also rely on the support services of the Netherlands Forces Intelligence Service (NEFIS), founded in Australia by Colonel Simon Hendrik Spoor, the future Commander-in-Chief of the Dutch military forces during the Indonesian revolution. Another source of information for Washington policymakers was the experienced US diplomat, Walter Foote, who was once again serving in Batavia in 1942, when he managed to make his way to Australia. From the American Legation in Canberra, he forwarded numerous reports to the Secretary of State in Washington. Among these briefings was a lengthy one written by a senior Dutch colonial civil servant, Charles O. van der Plas, entitled the “General Situation in the Netherlands Indies, (Recent data up to January 4th, 1944, for Java).” This missive was filled with self-serv- ing pronouncements about the abiding affection Indonesians harbored for their former colonial masters, leading one to conclude that the Indonesian population unambiguously looked forward to the return of Dutch administrators as soon as the merciless Japanese would be defeated.81

In the autumn of 1945, however, political realities in Java and Sumatra proved to be very different from Van der Plas’ wishful diagnosis. Instead of welcoming the reappearance of Dutch colonial residents and administrators with open arms, millions of supporters of the newly proclaimed Republic celebrated their liberty. Armed with confiscated Japanese weapons, machetes, and home-made sharp-
ened bamboo spears, while being dressed in a colorful hodgepodge of military uniforms, Indonesians challenged anyone whom they judged to be an enemy of Indonesia’s independence. And their definition of the Republic’s adversaries was an all-inclusive one. Dutch colonial civil servants returning from Australia, the United States, or Europe – and members of the Royal Netherlands Indies Army (KNIL) – represented the opponents of freedom in a quintessential form. The enemy was also embodied in the gaunt Dutch women, men, and children just released from Japanese camps. At the same time, the enemy was encountered in the guise of fellow-Muslim soldiers from India, dispatched to Indonesia for the purpose of demobilizing the Japanese army and recovering Allied prisoners of war.
CHAPTER SIX

The Politics of Independence in the Republik Indonesia and International Reactions, 1945-1949

At 10 o’clock in the morning on August 17, 1945, in front of Sukarno’s house in Batavia (or Jakarta), the independence of the Indonesian Republic was broadcast to the rest of the world. Sukarno, looking feverish and tense, with a sedate Mohammad Hatta standing nearby, introduced and then read the official proclamation of independence. The document had been typed the previous night from a hand-written piece of paper, containing several hastily made corrections. The text itself was composed during a contentious discussion that took place at the residence of Japanese Navy Admiral Tadashi Maeda, whose role in the Indonesian archipelago after the Japanese surrender was diminished to the status of an adjutant at the beck and call of the Allied victors. At his insistence, the anti-Japanese rhetoric of an earlier draft had been removed during the course of the drawn-out nocturnal debate.1 When the time came to make the document public, the audience listening to Sukarno’s introductory comments and his reading of the proclamation was small in size, although some people in the crowd carried red- and-white Indonesian flags or a large white banner with the text “Satoe Tanah, Satoe Bangsa, Satoe Tekad: Tetap Merdeka!” (One Land, One People, One Will: Independence Forever).2

For a man who was known as a dazzling public speaker, capable of keeping his listeners spellbound for hours on end — or as the American war correspondent, Martha Gellhorn, remembered him, “a whizz-bang demagogue” — Sukarno’s message on August 17, 1945, was uncharacteristically brief.3 Before delivering the short proclamation, he offered a rousing homily to the resilience of the nationalist movement; he addressed his audience with “All Brothers and Sisters... now the moment has come when we truly take the fate of our actions and the fate of our country into our own hands. Only a nation bold enough... will be able to stand in strength.”4 Sukarno then proceeded to read the proclamation. “We, the Indonesian people, herewith proclaim the independence of Indonesia,” he declared in a straightforward opening phrase. Only one more sentence completed the entire text of Indonesia’s Declaration of Independence. “All matters pertaining to the transfer of power, etc., will be carried out efficiently and in the shortest possible time.”5 Later that day, news of the proclamation reached West Sumatra, after which the hallowed red-and-white flag was hoisted on top of the
town’s clock tower in the center of Bukittinggi. During the next few weeks, in Java’s regional capitals as well as in smaller towns and villages, local authorities spread the message by announcing their own version of the declaration of independence.

The promulgation of Indonesia’s independence on August 17, 1945, constituted an uncanny moment; in the words of one of Sukarno’s biographers, the German historian Bernard Dahm, it was a “surreal and sobering” occasion. However, neither Sukarno and Hatta nor the Japanese Admiral, Tadashi Maeda, was responsible for the event’s unnerving quality. Instead, the most restless members of a younger generation of nationalists injected the sudden sense of surrealism. Out of fear that independence might be perceived as “made in Tokyo” and bestowed upon Indonesians as a farewell gift by the Japanese, a group of impatient young men had abruptly kidnapped Sukarno and Hatta the day before and removed them to a military barracks in Rengasdengklok, a small town located in the vicinity of the capital.

Once they had isolated Sukarno and Hatta in a cloistered place, the students bullied the two elder statesmen of the nationalist movement into proclaiming Indonesia’s freedom at once. Even though it was a landmark event that both men had yearned for since the 1920’s, they feared that an official proclamation in mid-August might be precipitous and in need of more careful preparation. When one of the young revolutionaries implied that by not issuing an immediate declaration, he might forfeit his role as *bapak* (patron, leader, also father), Sukarno shouted in a burst of anger, “Here is my throat! Drag me into the corner and finish me off: Don’t wait until tomorrow!” As usual, Hatta’s reaction was more tempered; he eventually described his temporary abduction as proof of the bankruptcy of all forms of political action based on spontaneity and sentiment rather than rational judgment.

Nonetheless, the Rengasdengklok incident added a melancholy coda to the historic occasion that took place on August 17, 1945. Sukarno and Hatta’s announcement of their nation’s independence constituted the final destination of a nationalist crusade that had taken many decades to complete. During this perilous journey along their *via dolorosa*, as Sukarno described it in 1926, the two men, along with Sutan Sjahrir, had been the guiding lights. Issuing the proclamation should have been a triumphant moment that represented “the culmination of a series of revolutionary activities,” as Carl Becker wrote about its notable precursor, the American Declaration of Independence in 1776. Instead, when the milestone was finally reached, it was under conditions not of their own choosing, due to the disarray introduced by the Rengasdengklok episode. For his part, Lieutenant Governor General Van Mook, observing the events from Brisbane in Australia, erroneously concluded only three days later that it was the commander of the Japanese forces in Indonesia who had proclaimed the Repub-
lic. As he informed the Dutch government in The Hague, Japan’s humiliated military leadership in Batavia had anointed Sukarno and Hatta as the Republic’s President and Vice President in a final lame-duck act of belligerence against the victorious Western Allies.15

After an initial period of trepidation and uncertainty, the Indonesian people’s spirit became too boisterous to stifle. The desire for independence acquired the force of a flood that “could not be stopped, destroying all obstacles in its path.” Power had to be wrested from the hands of the Japanese, if need be, by force.16 According to a village head in Sumatra, approval from the furthest reaches of the archipelago had “vibrated through the sky, strengthened by our oath to live and die” with Sukarno and Hatta. This resulted from adroit Indonesian employees of the Domei Indonesian Radio and Telegraph Network broadcasting the proclamation throughout the archipelago.17

In Java’s second largest city, Surabaya, the Proklamasi did not immediately prompt much popular excitement during the week following August 17 either, in part because the wartime curfew and blackout regulations were not lifted until August 23, 1945. It took awhile before night markets reopened and people began to engage again in the social activities and business transactions that traditionally occurred during the cooler evening hours. Fortunately, the city’s public transportation system and electricity and water supply functioned normally, and thus the first hastily assembled pemuda gathering could take place on August 26, 1945. As occurred in Batavia and also in Padang in West Sumatra, former members of the Japanese-sponsored Hokokai (Patriotic Service League), as well as other wartime civic or military organizations, reconfigured themselves as the Indonesian National Committee (Komite Nasional Indonesia or KNI).18 In the subsequent months, the people in Surabaya began to show an unprecedented boldness, the Indonesian writer, Idrus, marveled in a short story entitled “Soerabaja,” describing their courage as a “snake slithering out of the bushes.” Young nationalists no longer used reason, he implied; instead, they followed nothing but their instincts and emotions. In trying to calm down Surabaya’s inflamed crowd during a radio address in late October 1945, Sukarno, for his part, compared the insurgent arek Surabaya (Javanese for children; native sons or “real”Surabayans) to a “grain of arsenic in a clear glass of water” that was poisoning the revolution. This analogy certainly did not endear him to the Republic’s supporters in the East Javanese city.19

Before the outbreak of the Revolution, a few movie theaters in the archipelago’s bigger cities such as Batavia, Surabaya, and Medan had shown American “Westerns,” familiarizing an urban segment of the Indonesian public with notorious outlaws and righteous sheriffs in Hollywood’s version of the Wild West.20 As a consequence, an array of fervent revolutionaries fancied themselves as cowboys in the American West, who were fighting against hordes of hostile bandits. Some
of them may have even indulged in the fantasy that they were impersonators of famous historical characters such as Jesse James or Billy the Kid. On November 12, 1945, a volatile meeting of the Tentara Keamanan Rakyat (People's Security Forces, the precursor of the Tentara Nasional Indonesia or TNI, the Indonesian National Army) that appointed the ex-Peta officer, Sudirman, as Commander-in-Chief, was described afterwards by one of the participants as rapat koboy-koboyan or a cowboy-like assembly. Two years later the Republican magazine, Kutipan Patriot (Patriotic Quotations), would complain that too many young men tried to emulate “the pistol-waving heroes they had seen in motion pictures with Humphrey Bogart or the Dead End Kids.”

The references to cowboys or bandits probably drew upon the rich heritage of Javanese, Malay, and Minangkabau chronicles about homegrown brigands or outlaws. These traditional narratives recounted the exploits of seemingly invulnerable jago (champions, lit. rooster), filled with mystical knowledge, who had deserted their fixed places “in the cosmologically sanctioned social order” and thrown themselves into a tramping life of adventure, fighting, and robbery. In other cases, these men’s wandering existence was aimed at searching for spiritual enlightenment. In Malay folklore in Java, a well-known character was Si Pitung, whose house in Marunda – today, a northeastern suburb of Jakarta – has been converted into a museum. Si Ronda, Si Jampang, and Si Tjonat were other champions who had captured the public imagination. Stories circulated about men called parèwa in West Sumatra (lit. someone living outside customary law), being “wild” members of the traditional Minangkabau community (alam), who chose to violate many of its rules and defy Islamic injunctions but, at the same time, served as the physical guardians of mosques. In addition, drifting bands of kecu (robbers, bandits) in Java grew in size during times of agricultural crisis, when hard-pressed peasants would sell their possessions in order to join them. Solitary satria lelana, or roving aristocratic warriors unattached to a particular domain, comprised other topos of Javanese legends, conjuring up Indonesian incarnations of folk heroes like Zorro or the Scarlet Pimpernel.

For example, the nationalist and communist Tan Malaka’s travels abroad and his time spent in foreign prisons were portrayed in a series of popular stories published in the 1930’s about Pacar Merah (the Scarlet Pimpernel), who performed “astonishing feats of romance and espionage” and was “a central figure in a web of international intrigue.” Tan Malaka’s adventures as Pacar Merah were published as roman picisan (dime novels), consisting of inexpensive, mass-produced books offering “light reading” that became available mainly in Medan, Padang, and Bukittinggi in the late colonial period. In eastern central Java, moreover, especially in the region around Ponorogo not far from Madiun, men called warok commanded popular acquiescence, and sometimes surreptitious admiration, because of an ambiguous and not always de-
served Robin Hood reputation. Warok were, according to Echols & Shadily’s Dictionary, “ascetic experts in the martial arts, often homosexual.” These men were the traditional leaders of highly disciplined armed groups, operating mostly in the countryside. The warok and his disciples constituted a kind of guild of thugs, who also provided intermittent protection to poor peasants in villages when they were victimized by landowners demanding larger shares of the harvest, or by rapacious merchants or tax collectors. The warok’s personal authority was grounded in his muscular strength and virtuosity in the martial arts. His presumptive magical powers and ascetic meditation practices further reinforced his authority over his followers. Opium-induced emotions of invulnerability probably played their part among the different warok and their entourage as well.

During the colonial era, the highest levels of opium consumption in Java occurred in the residencies of Madiun and Kediri – the same general area where warok operated. Although the warok’s leadership rested on their virile appearance and physical prowess, they were always accompanied by effeminate adjutants who, as second-in-command, catered to all the warok’s needs, including sexual ones. These bands operated in a murky terrain of semi-legal. In fact, during the colonial era some of these warok groups had managed to provide an alternative but violent form of political authority and re-distributive justice.

Obviously, the popular legitimacy of jago, kecu, warok, or paréwa went back much farther than the ubiquitous bands of pro-independence pemuda freedom fighters who appeared in towns and villages all over Java and Sumatra during the autumn of 1945. In early November, when Tan Malaka found himself in Surabaya in the middle of the pemuda struggle with British troops, he wrote that most young men among the arek Surabaya trying to forge a mature identity – he used the Minangkabau term paréwa rather than using the more familiar Javanese word jago – possessed a congenital “spirit of rebellion” that should be brought under “healthy leadership” and appropriate political discipline. Nonetheless, the rebellious pemuda among Surabaya’s native sons surrounding Tan Malaka in November 1945, blended into a social landscape populated with people already familiar with groups of macho men, who roamed the city or the countryside and challenged the prevailing legal and spiritual order whenever they judged such actions useful.

During the fall of 1945, the pemuda’s enemies in real life consisted of the Allied troops of Louis Mountbatten’s South East Asia Command (SEAC), which counted among them many Gurkhas from British India, against whom the pemuda formed a “wildcat army.” It was especially during the first months of the Indonesian Revolution that many high-spirited freedom fighters engaged in acts of “fanatical self-sacrifice,” Idrus noted in his short story about Surabaja, facing Sherman tanks armed with nothing but spears and daggers. Sometimes they ended up in skirmishes with nervous Japanese troops, which were waiting to surrender to Allied victors. At other times they confiscated the weapons of the
defeated Japanese soldiers through subterfuge and guile. They also fought a fierce battle with SEAC forces and killed the English Brigadier General, A.W.S. Malaby. Their defiant behavior achieved mythical proportions among Indonesian compatriots. Dutch colonial residents, in contrast, portrayed them as riffraff, outlaws, or brutes, because their exuberant embrace of the ideal of merdeka prompted them to strike out at Dutch and other white-skinned men, women, or children.36

Nationalist crusaders perceived all white residents as adversaries, even if they were ill, having just been released from Japanese internment camps. The Indonesian champions of independence had faith in little else but the slogan merdeka; as Idrus noted, they worshiped a new God Almighty in the “form of bombs, submachine guns, and mortars.”37 Soon thereafter, all living things in Java, even innocent creatures such as “tadpoles,” seemed to line up “in military formation” while brandishing machetes or sharpened bamboo spears, as a character in Y.B. Mangunwijaya’s novel, Burung-Burung Manyar (The Weaverbirds), imagined.38

In a mere three years, the sensibilities of the Indonesian population had changed radically yet again. In 1942, the hasty surrender of the Dutch East Indies military forces to the invading Japanese Army had left an indelible impression. In Medan in North Sumatra, a throng of Indonesians gathered in front of the Grand Mosque to receive the Japanese with curiosity. In various places in Java, people welcomed the invading army by hoisting both Indonesian and Japanese flags that had been dropped from Japanese airplanes. But Indonesians’ initial enthusiasm about an “Asia for the Asians” under Japanese tutelage – a kind of Japanese version of America’s Monroe doctrine – quickly turned into misery and hatred.39

Japan’s lightning defeat of the Dutch colonial army, however, gave rise to a recurrent and eminently logical argument invoked by several leaders of the Indonesian Republic throughout the period 1945-1949. The Republic of Indonesia was not “born as a result of a rebellion against the Dutch,” as Mohamad Rum would point out in a lengthy handwritten letter sent from the island of Bangka to the UN Good Offices Committee in Jakarta on January 20, 1949, and forwarded to the Security Council in New York immediately thereafter. Instead, the most salient historical fact was that the Dutch military establishment succumbed to the Japanese “without any shadow of a proper attempt” to defend the Netherlands East Indies. Since the Dutch colonial state had “completely neglected” its responsibility to safeguard Indonesians against foreign aggression, Mohamad Rum continued in his letter, the Netherlands’ “alleged historic right” had lapsed the very moment it proved unable to fulfill its obligation. He implied that by abandoning their colonial possession so rapidly and disgracefully in 1942, Dutch rulers had expedited Japan’s ability to convert the political and economic tools of colonial mastery into lethal weapons. As a result, the independent Republic sprang to life only after Indonesia had “paid a very high price” in pain and bloodshed, as great numbers of “her sons fell in their efforts to wrest
power from the Japanese." Hence, the preamble to the new Constitution, which was ratified one day after the Proklamasi on August 18, 1945, repudiated all forms of colonialism, whether in a Dutch or a Japanese guise. Indonesians’ quest for freedom had achieved a stage of glory, the Constitution’s prologue heralded, and “any form of subjugation in this world, being contrary to humanity and justice, must be abolished.”

In late August 1945, young people in Jakarta were ecstatic with revolutionary zeal. By mid-September, their idealistic slogans, which often invoked the spirit of 1776 in Indonesia, blanketed the walls of public buildings or were posted on billboards and city trams. These exuberant activities obviously changed Batavia’s (or Jakarta’s) dreary physical appearance. During the Japanese occupation, clean and orderly Batavia had quickly degenerated into a pock-marked place that was bathed in grime and ringed in barbed wire, resembling a “stinking political morass.” Whereas before the war, the capital of the Dutch East Indies had displayed the look of a well-preserved, “elegant dowager,” she now seemed “scarred and seedy” as if she was suffering from a dreadful disease. The striking modernist buildings that dotted the urban landscape, designed by Dutch architects who had tried to fuse progressive architectural styles from the West with discrete forms of Javanese ornamentation, were shabby or had fallen into complete disrepair during the Japanese occupation.

Having suffered under Japan’s harsh military regime, most Indonesians were hungry or ailing, whether or not they lived in the archipelago’s capital. During the week following August 6th and August 9th, when American airplanes dropped the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the city was still an urban wasteland filled with diffident inhabitants. The uncertainties surrounding the Japanese capitulation continued to cast a dark shadow, and the Japanese Army command directed the Kenpeitai, Japan’s military police, to uphold the strictest levels of order among the “high-spirited volunteer army” of Indonesian nationalists. However, several weeks after Japan had formally surrendered and independence had been proclaimed, the run-down city came to life again and began to buzz with a euphoric “spirit of the revolution.” In contrast, scores of Indo-Europeans – at least, those who had managed to stay out of the Japanese internment camps – harbored a very different perspective; in their eyes, the city became an even more dangerous “witches cauldron” redolent with fear and loathing. The most elusive member of the triumvirate of leaders of the Indonesian nationalist movement, Sutan Sjahrir, once described the city and its surrounding areas during this period as a “madhouse.”

Within a two weeks or so, the cream-colored exterior of the capital’s monumental buildings had been reconfigured as perfect surfaces for the display of insurgent slogans. Gradually, vendors, food stalls, bicycles, and some non-military vehicles began to reappear on Batavia’s streets. As night markets reopened, local
residents gathered and talked in public places without trepidation for the first time in several years. Soon, a few younger children would return to hastily re-assembled schools. Some teenage boys, meanwhile, subsisted by helping Dutch residents who were gradually trying to reassert themselves, while others survived by trading on the black market with the rough-and-tumble masculinity of adults. Yet a larger number of young men joined one of the ubiquitous groups of freedom fighters. Many among them emerged as dare-devils, while others envisioned themselves as “guerrilla leaders” who roamed the countryside and took the law into their own hands to further the cause of one-hundred percent merdeka.49

As was the case in Surabaya, Batavia’s infrastructure functioned properly. During World War II, albeit under Japanese supervision, the municipal government had already been placed in capable Indonesians’ hands. These new managerial responsibilities prompted them to recognize that civil administration did not require a range of arcane skills that only highly trained Dutchmen possessed.50 By late August, the control of basic city services such as the postal and telephone system, public transportation, and water and waste management was rapidly taken over by Indonesian administrators, whom the new Republican government had put in place. During the same time, newspaper editors and radio station employees turned the press and radio into “a mighty weapon of struggle.”51

Equally dramatic was the fact that several European neighborhoods of the city had been “orientalized” during the three years of Japanese rule. Many of the whitewashed villas in residential areas, nestled in enclosed gardens filled with ficus trees, lontar palms, and brightly colored bougainvillea, had belonged to Dutch and other Western inhabitants before the war. During the Japanese occupation, however, these houses changed hands. Indonesian and Chinese families moved into many of the more comfortable bungalows. In August 1945, others suddenly stood empty because Japanese officers, who had requisitioned the most luxurious homes during the war, were now forced to abandon them.52 The legal Dutch owners, of course, denounced the “natives” who had moved into their mansions as illegitimate squatters or thieves when they attempted to reclaim their properties upon release from Japanese internment camps.

In the next couple of weeks, Hatta and Sukarno embarked on the construction of a viable Indonesian government with great alacrity. On August 18, 1945, during a meeting of the already existing Independence Preparatory Committee, Sukarno was anointed President of the Republic by acclamation, while Hatta was named Vice President. On the same day, they instituted a commission of seven members, charged with adding the final touches to a national Constitution that had been drafted during the month before Japan’s capitulation. In addition, the two experienced politicians immediately appointed 16 trusted colleagues to take control of various government ministries.
At long last, Sukarno and Hatta obtained the latitude to try to institutionalize their visions of an autonomous Indonesia. Only a few months earlier, on June 1, 1945, Sukarno had sketched his picture of what independence would look like when he had formulated the Republic’s five basic principles of Pancasila. He envisioned the new state as emerging from a collective embrace of national unity, but he warned that nationalism should not be allowed to atrophy into “chauvinism” in the sense of “Indonesia über Alles.” Accordingly, an internationalist stance and a sense of humanity that was just, civilized, and inclusive would define the free nation in the future. He also insisted that Indonesia become a secular democratic state. Although a popular belief in an Almighty God should be central, independent Indonesia was not to become a theocracy. Instead, the wisdom of representative and consensual deliberation rather than Islamic injunctions would guide the post-colonial body politic. While anticipating that the independent Republic would provide a sympathetic infrastructure for polyglot forms of Islamic piety, Sukarno thought that politicized Islam should be shunned, thus reproducing the Islamic policies previously pursued by the Dutch colonial regime. But popular respect for spiritual injunctions, whether embodied in the major world religions such as Islam, Christianity, Hinduism, or Buddhism, would be promoted in schools and state institutions. In addition, he proposed that the sovereign Indonesian nation state was to dedicate itself to bringing about social justice for all its citizens.

With the third Pancasila principle of democratic representation in mind, a Central Indonesian National Committee (Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat or KNIP) with 137 members was established. Its two most prominent members were Sutan Sjahrir and Amir Sjarifuddin, who had steered clear of collaboration with the Japanese during the war. With equal dispatch, Sukarno directed all Indonesian civil servants to ignore Japanese decrees; instead, he urged them to heed only the instructions given by the new Republican government. And for the second time in three years, virtually every Indonesian civil servant transferred his loyalties once again. They repudiated their subservience to the “older brothers” from Japan by rushing, instead, to the side of the newly constituted Republican government.

Dutch observers, needless to say, watched all this activity with astonishment; the media in the Netherlands were filled with stories that registered disdain for the political activities in the unilaterally proclaimed independent Republic. In the United States, some newspapers paid attention to developments in the Indonesian archipelago, although serious coverage was scarce. US soldiers would not be involved in the military implementation of Japan’s surrender in the Dutch East Indies. As a result, newspaper editors focused on those regions of the world where American troops were still in action and at physical risk. During this early stage of Republican efforts at nation-building, the *New York Times*, for example,
relied on the UPI (United Press International) and AP (Associated Press) wire services for its desultory reporting on events in the Indonesian archipelago. When the *New York Times* published an article on November 13, 1945, referring to Sjahrir as the Chairman of the Central Indonesian National Committee (KNIP), he was called “Sultan Charir,” creating the inaccurate impression that the progressive, social-democratic Sjahrir was a traditional Muslim potentate. Although the *New York Times* managed to spell Mohammad Hatta’s name correctly most of the time, President Sukarno was initially presented to American readers with several combinations of first and last names such as Mr. Achmed Soekarno – the addition of Achmed being nothing but a journalistic invention – or Mr. So Ekarno and Mr. So Ekardo.

Once World War II was over, Sukarno and Hatta’s voluntary cooperation with Japan’s ruthless military administration of the archipelago earned both men the epithet “lackeys of the Japanese.” From the perspective of Dutch civil servants returning to Batavia and other places in the archipelago after the Allied victory over Japan, most other Indonesian nationalists seemed like disobedient schoolboys or adolescent roosters, who imagined that by crowing more loudly they could accelerate daybreak. However, politicians and many ordinary citizens in the Netherlands itself were also deeply invested in making the label “running dogs of the Japanese” stick to the Republic’s new President and Vice President; it was a rebuke that continued to haunt the two politicians in the postwar era.

The Dutch, however, were not alone in this opinion. People such as Tan Malaka and an array of younger nationalists, especially those who had shared Sutan Sjahrir’s reservations regarding Japan’s fascism or who had tried to help Amir Sjarifuddin in his underground anti-Japanese activities, were also disturbed by Sukarno and Hatta’s wartime cooperation with the Japanese. In fact, the young revolutionary, Chaerul Saleh, mocked some of Sukarno and Hatta’s early state-building efforts as giving off too much of a Japanese stench. The *New York Times* reported Sukarno’s response to these charges in late October 1945, when he defended himself by accusing the Japanese of duplicity in manipulating the nationalist movement for their own sinister objectives. This reaction, designed to exonerate himself retroactively, came across as a lame excuse. In fact, throughout World War II, even when the Allied forces had already begun to score a series of decisive victories in the Pacific war, Sukarno remained steadfast in his resolve to struggle alongside Japan. We “pine for independence” and in his and other Indonesians’ eyes, he proclaimed, this freedom was embodied in the “truth and justice” *Dai Nippon* defended. He had asserted at the height of the Pacific war that “we” – referring to Indonesians in alliance with Japan – “shall flatten the United States and break open Great Britain with a crow bar.” In a short story entitled “The *Alang-Alang* Field behind the House,” the contemporary Indonesian writer, Nh.Dini, remembered that in school during the war she was forced to chant,
“England we crush and the United States we shall level.” Later, after the Japanese regime had instituted a Study Committee for the Preparation of Independence, Sukarno repeated his opinion that only the anti-German and anti-Japanese Allies – America, Britain, and the Netherlands – obstructed the Southeast Asian colony’s freedom. “If we want to taste the sweetness of independence,” he noted during the early summer of 1945, “we will have to destroy this opposition.”

In a later phase of the independence struggle, when the Dutch had imprisoned both political leaders for one last time on the island of Bangka off the east coast of Sumatra, Sukarno was again forced to address the issue of his wartime collaboration with Japan’s fascists. He would tell a delegation of American journalists that the situation was not as simple and straightforward as it appeared. His life’s work had been dedicated to a single-minded pursuit of Indonesia’s freedom. For the sake of achieving independence, he conceded he had been willing to make a pact with the devil, whether in a “Japanese” or a “communist guise.” Sukarno impressed upon one of the American foreign correspondents, William R. Mathews, who was editor and publisher of *The Arizona Daily Star*, that he had done whatever was necessary to accomplish his life-long goal of Indonesia’s deliverance from Dutch colonial oppression.

As a member of a group of journalists from all over the United States who had embarked on a fact-finding mission in the Indonesian archipelago at the official invitation of the Netherlands government, Mathews was one of two members of the US delegation not on board the KLM airplane “Franeker” when it crashed on July 12, 1949, near Santa Cruz airport in Bombay, India, killing both passengers and crew. Their tragic deaths prevented the American reporters from publishing their articles upon return to the United States which, according to a range of commentators, would have been surprisingly pro-Dutch in tone and quite critical of the State Department’s policy of favoring the Indonesian Republic’s independence.

Sukarno’s imagery of an alliance with Satan, whether cloaked in Japanese or Soviet garb, prompted the group of American journalists to put him through a “merciless grilling” about communism during the interview on the island of Bangka on June 21, 1949. Sukarno – whom Mathews portrayed as a “legendary figure... with a quiet, commanding presence” and a “powerful personality with an unrelenting will” – responded deftly. He assured the visiting delegation that he was not a communist himself. “How could I be,” he asked rhetorically, “when I pray every day and one of the first principles of my government is a belief in the Almighty God?” He told the American correspondents that there were no more than 300 communists in Indonesia, although there were many fellow travelers. He also reminded his American interrogators that the Republican government had routed and slain scores of communists during late September 1948, in the
wake of the attempted coup in Madiun; Sukarno concluded that he would do so again if communists were to threaten his independent nation in the future.66

As far as Sukarno and Hatta’s complicity with Japanese fascism was concerned, the situation was, again, more complex than it may have appeared at first sight. Most of what the Dutch sociologist, Wim Wertheim, called the “antique priyayi” – the elite corps of indigenous civil servants drafted into the Dutch colonial bureaucracy before the war – had continued to function as “yes-men” during the Japanese occupation. These native retainers had genuflected before Japan’s military superiors with the same deferential and gracious demeanor they had displayed towards their Dutch colonial masters prior to the outbreak of World War II.67 In a certain sense, the collusion of Sukarno and Hatta with Japanese occupiers was merely the most visible manifestation of a general transfer of Indonesians’ loyalty from the Dutch to the Japanese, which affected people in the archipelago’s many different ethnic communities. In addition, the physical hardships the Japanese had imposed on the Indonesian population were dehumanizing, prompting an observer to write that cooperation with Japan’s military rulers was almost inevitable: any Indonesian who managed to get a hold of “a pair of pants” was automatically viewed as a “collaborator.”68

All of these factors combined to produce a chaotic, volatile, and often violent situation in Java during the autumn of 1945. Lieutenant Governor General Van Mook complained, soon after he had returned to Batavia from Australia in October 1945, that the prevailing conditions drove him to despair. “In between the churning river of power politics in the Netherlands and the banjir (flood) of terror unleashed by fanatical youth groups and armed bandits in Indonesia,” he wrote with an apt metaphor in mind, “the little [Dutch-Indonesian] dike of cooperation has quickly become slippery and feeble.” The task of guarding this crumbling avenue of cooperation, he continued, was assigned to foreigners from England and India who hoped to limit their casualties, which made them reticent to reinforce this brittle “dike.”69

Initially, Dutch government officials were loath to deal with either Sukarno or Hatta face-to-face because of their collaboration with the Japanese. This reluctance, in turn, bolstered the importance of Sutan Sjahrir. The Dutch perceived the latter as one of the few suitable negotiators on behalf of the Republic. Dutch acceptance of Sjahrir was influenced by his distance from Japan’s wartime regime. Yet it was also his self-described “half-Dutch” identity, as well as his Minangkabau origins in West Sumatra, that rendered him both familiar and tolerable in Dutch eyes. Within the course of the twentieth century, many Dutch colonial officials had developed a soft spot for Minangkabau culture. They routinely singled out the Minangkabau people as the most capable and reasonable of all the ethnic groups in the archipelago. Sjahrir’s emergence into the political limelight during the early postwar years mollified, to some extent, the intense hatred many
Dutch women and men harbored for the renegade Republic and its political leaders, whom they denounced to anyone willing to listen as “incompetent, doctrinaire anti-Western revolutionists.”

In the context of Republican state-building, Sjahrir’s unsullied record during the war also made him the proper choice for the post of Prime Minister, a role he performed in the second to fourth Republican cabinets. Hence, he served as the Republic’s chief representative in the first round of negotiations with Dutch antagonists, even though some of his more radical colleagues dismissed diplomacy as a useless effort that might dampen the revolutionary fervor. Nevertheless, despite his own compatriots’ mistrust of diplomatic efforts coupled with the cantankerous attitude of the Dutch, Sjahrir and his social democratic counterpart from the Netherlands, former Labor Party Prime Minister, Willem Schermerhorn, would eventually hammer out the fragile Linggajati accord in the spring of 1947.

Sutan Sjahrir, however, gradually withdrew from his engagement with the domestic politics of the independent Republican state, creating the impression that he feared his personal integrity would be impugned if he continued his involvement. Gradually the government in The Hague was forced to deal with Sukarno and Hatta, also because of pressure from SEAC officials as early as 1945–1946. When in mid-1947, the Netherlands first all-out military assault on the Republic provoked the creation of the United Nations’ Committee of Good Offices (GOC) and later the United Nations Commission on Indonesia (UNCI), thus accepting a mediating role in the Dutch-Indonesian conflict, the UN Security Council gave the Netherlands government no alternative option but to negotiate with Sukarno, Hatta, and their emissaries. Despite most Dutch people’s abiding antipathy towards the two men, they had no other choice because Sjahrir and then, in January 1948, Amir Sjarifuddin, were forced to retreat from their formal involvement in the Republican government.

During the unsettling years of Japanese occupation, a younger fraternity of enlightened nationalists had reached political maturity. Among them was a group of upper-crust, Western-educated men and also a few women, who had been inspired since childhood by the nationalist rhetoric of trailblazers like Sukarno, Hatta, and Sjahrir. Particularly the latter appealed to a younger cohort – angkatan muda or angkatan 1945 (the younger or the 1945 generation). Sjahrir’s untarnished integrity during the Japanese regime, his younger age, boyish good looks, and his soft-spoken style all marked him as different from the others. Of course, his sophisticated political ideas and social-democratic goals also played their part.

Sukarno embraced an eclectic political agenda that incorporated leftist ideas, but Sjahrir’s thoughtful blueprint for an independent Indonesia based on democratic socialism distinguished him from the Republic’s more flamboyant president. In this regard, Hatta was more of a kindred spirit to Sjahrir, not only because both men hailed from Minangkabau families in Sumatra but also due to their
greater affinity in temperament and political outlook. Besides, Sjahrir’s restless mind, combined with an enigmatic personal demeanor that enabled him to create intimacy while maintaining his reserve at the same time, had lifted Sjahrir to the status of a political mentor.

With some hyperbole, Sjahrir has been called a “cult figure.” Young people hovered around him in the hope of making his acquaintance. This was true for a twenty-two year old Indonesian woman who confided in her diary that she yearned to meet Sjahrir, even though she feared she might feel “very stupid” in his company. Sjahrir was in steady touch with his protégés during the months after August 17, 1945, and he tried to prevent them from slipping into anarchy. As the New York Times reported on November 14, 1945, his compelling pamphlet, entitled “Our Struggle,” had condemned Indonesian attacks on foreigners, because it proved to the “outside world that we are not a united people and that we are not ripe politically.” Sjahrir, nonetheless, seemed to float above the fray during the early stages of the Revolution, imbuing him with an aura of mystery that would persist throughout the independence struggle.

Most of Sjahrir’s followers embodied the hybrid character of the tiny elite that had risen to the top of the less-than-adequate Dutch educational system. Many of his admirers had been raised in Dutch-speaking homes and educated in European schools; because they belonged to Java and Sumatra’s upper crust, they were among the blessed few who had received solid academic training. These politically engaged young people were steeped in Western culture, history, and political theory, because they had more or less replicated the “half-Dutch” educational experience Sjahrir had scrutinized with such honesty in 1937. As one of these young men, Saleh Soedjatmoko Mangoendiningrat, described his adolescence and young adulthood in an “Intellectual Autobiography” in 1950, it meant growing up “between two worlds... being brought up in a psychic and mental no man’s land.”

This select small group often spoke with equal facility their own ethnic language, flawless Dutch, and excellent English; some of them had achieved fluency in French and German as well. Before the Japanese invasion, these bright young people had danced the foxtrot, lindy, or jitterbug to Benny Goodman’s Big Band sound. They had listened to American jazz but also appreciated Mozart concertos, Schubert quintets, or George Gershwin’s Porgy and Bess. In 1945, they discussed with intellectual fervor the military strategies of the Western Allies or the role the new United Nations Organization might play in the postwar world order. With equal zeal, they may have argued about the meanings of Hemingway’s latest novel or debated the esthetic appeal of a recent movie featuring such Hollywood stars as Ingrid Bergman, Gary Cooper, or Humphrey Bogart. As J.D. Legge and Rudolf Mrázek have described with insight and in exquisite detail, this small assembly of cosmopolitan young Indonesians exulted in their moder-
nity and wallowed in their “profound, passionate, and lyrical” existence.77

During World War II, many of these privileged and well-educated students were forced to take a crash course in Malay, which had been renamed bahasa Indonesia and served as the lingua franca of the Indonesian archipelago. Learning to communicate in Malay established a “shared culture” that, for the first time, rose above local solidarities and forged a genuine “common bond” among young people from diverse ethnic and linguistic backgrounds, as Sutan Takdir Alisjahbana noted in 1949.78 For example, Minarsih Wiranatakoesoema, the daughter of a well-educated Minangkabau mother from West Sumatra and a Sundanese father who hailed from an illustrious priyayi family in West Java, reconstructed the cultural and linguistic confusions she felt in 1942, when she was only eighteen years old: “I had been entirely Dutch educated; I knew very little about my own culture or the political structure of my country.” In her diary, written in Dutch, she had asked herself tough, honest questions. Immediately after the Japanese occupied Java in 1942 and an Indonesian became the first mayor of the Dutch East Indies capital, she wondered: “shouldn’t I be pleased with an exclusively Indonesian government, or am I indifferent because I see it as impossible? Have I grown up to be so Dutch? Don’t I have any ideals about a free Indonesia?”79

Three years later, however, the same shy and flustered Minarsih – or Mien, as she was known to her friends – had discovered her true nature by reinventing herself as a committed Indonesian nationalist, as did scores of her fellow students.80 Without altering her social position she suddenly saw herself, it seemed, as an autonomous individual and a fundamentally “new human being.”81 She had switched from Dutch to Indonesian when writing in her diary, thanks to two high school teachers who taught her the language in 1942-1944. Once the Japanese had formally surrendered and independence had been proclaimed, she worked as a self-reliant young woman for the cause of Indonesia’s freedom by serving as a Red Cross volunteer, an assistant to the editor of the nationalist magazine, Het Inzicht, and as an English-language news broadcaster for Radio Republik Indonesia. Eventually she married Sudarpo Sastrosatomo, who would soon thereafter be posted as the Indonesian Republic’s public information officer in New York City. But before his departure for the United States, Mien and Sudarpo’s household in Jakarta had become a regular meeting point for foreign correspondents in Java such as Stan Swinton, Arnold Brackmann, and Graham Jenkins, who dropped by “to chat for hours on end.”82

After August 17, 1945, many well-informed young people were anxious but hopeful about the future, and the modern lifestyles of Mien and Sudarpo epitomized the revolution’s excitement. Utopian dreams about an independent Indonesia energized young people’s daily existence. From their idealistic perspective, Sukarno and Hatta were too cautious; the subsequent impulsive abduction of the two leaders was an attempt to push them into immediate action. By mid-
August 1945, these bright Indonesians were wallowing in the wide-ranging political options that the Japanese surrender precipitated, as if it constituted an Indonesian version of what was called *Stunde Null* (zero hour, ground zero) in Germany at approximately the same time.83

In the imagination of these expectant young men and women, the Japanese capitulation established a similar ground zero, which could be inscribed with an entirely new political agenda. This magical moment produced an atmosphere pregnant with possibilities that would allow creative new forms of power to flourish. The younger generation anticipated that they would not have to stay on the sidelines of the Revolution but would be allowed, instead, to blossom at its political center. They assumed that such a *Nullpunkt* might produce turmoil, perhaps even chaos. Impassioned young nationalists, however, saw these kinds of tensions as a necessary precondition for their real participation in the political process, since young people would be the true “builders and defenders” of a free Indonesia.84

This circle of young enthusiasts surrounding Sjahrir was sustained by a much larger contingent of less educated but equally tempestuous Indonesian men referred to as *pemuda* (youth). Collectively, both in Java and Sumatra, the amorphous *pemuda* drew their rank and file from all age groups, whether they hailed from urban areas or rural villages.85 Other than their relative youth, the unifying characteristic of the *pemuda* resided in a shared spirit of exhilaration and a common outlook, which made them regard the returning Dutch colonialists with “hate-filled eyes.”86 In their day-to-day existence, *pemuda* had shifted priorities; they no longer considered their extended family, and the village in which they lived – or their plough and buffalo – as life’s most important elements.87 Instead, they viewed their contribution to Indonesia’s *merdeka* as a more pressing concern. In trying to communicate their political commitments to the world around them, many of the *pemuda* embraced a distinct new style, both a social and a sartorial one. A novel habit of “speaking bluntly” or ordering people around in a peremptory manner supposedly constituted signs of *pemuda* identity.88 In popular folklore, letting one’s hair grow to shoulder length and sporting a red bandanna or a black velvet cap were other markers of *pemuda* solidarity.89 Despite the steadily growing textile shortage in Java and Sumatra, casually wearing some kind of makeshift military-type uniform, regardless of its color or cut, also qualified as a badge of *pemuda* distinction. A Dutch eyewitness ridiculed such uniforms as “exotic carnival costumes” that only served to magnify the apprehensions of Dutch women and men about being delivered into the hands of an unhinged horde of Indonesians, who were drunk with power and inebriated with a desire for revenge.90

In the region surrounding the capital, some militia groups acquired a reputation of being “gangsters,” who only cared about acquiring material possessions.
As the Australian historian, Robert Cribb, has suggested, urban “criminals” were the only men who had experience with the use of violence. Because they had managed to elude the Dutch colonial police throughout the 1920’s and 1930’s, they were among the Indonesian men, in addition to jago, warok, kecu, and paréwa, who had not been systematically emasculated by Dutch colonial rulers and their law enforcement agents.91 Also in smaller communities beyond the few large cities of the archipelago, boys in their late teens as well as adult men – in many instances emboldened by the basic military training they had received during the Japanese occupation – became flamboyant local champions. They consciously tried to draw relatives and friends in their villages into the revolutionary struggle, and the toughness of the pemuda became legendary almost overnight. Indonesians’ newly found virility and resilience lead to attacks not only on helpless Dutch women, men, and children, but they also unleashed their aggression against the archipelago’s perennial scapegoats – the Chinese.

As had happened countless times before, and would occur again in 1965-1966 and 1998, the immediate victims of young Indonesians’ political mobilization in local communities were inhabitants of Chinese extraction. The official representative of the Chinese Red Cross in Indonesia in 1947 composed a massive memorandum, describing the “Acts of Violence and Inhumanity Perpetrated by Indonesian Bands Against Chinese during 1945-1947.” This detailed litany of accusations landed on the desks of the members of the United Nations Committee of Good Offices soon after their arrival in Java. The Chinese Red Cross Report recorded a poignant list of “beastly” acts committed by Indonesians throughout Java, who had “brutally murdered” innocent Chinese residents, “raped” their wives and daughters, and “plundered” their possessions. Atrocity against the Chinese was “piled upon atrocity, surpassing in savagery each previous event.”92

The Red Cross representative began his memorandum with an interesting bit of historical background. He wrote that the average Indonesian suffered from a very low standard of living. Their “economic backwardness” resulted from a “lack of energy and initiative” and was not, as many “have-nots” insisted, the fault of the relatively “wealthy group” of Chinese residents in the Indonesian archipelago. And soon after the Japanese arrived in 1942, the homes of Chinese became a favorite robbery target. This happened because the “Chinese were considered pro-Allies, while Indonesians were completely pro-Jap.”93

During the first few months after the proclamation of independence, however, the Indonesians’ demeanor became more “conciliatory.” This temporary suspension of anti-Chinese sentiment, the Red Cross representative suggested, was the result of several rumors. One unconfirmed story claimed that Chiang Kai Shek delivered a radio speech, pledging he would support any Asian country struggling against European colonialists. The Chinese warlord’s promise seemed
to fulfill Sukarno’s long-held hope that all Asian peoples would come to each other’s rescue when a Western enemy challenged one of them. Another rumor suggested that “should the Chinese be molested, the Allies would take reprisals.” Thus, during the fall of 1945, when Dutch nationals were being “hunted and killed,” a Chinese flag displayed in front of a house or a smaller version worn on one’s chest in public places provided protection.

However, this fleeting moment of peaceful behavior changed soon after British troops arrived in Indonesia. As the Chinese Red Cross official saw it, Mountbatten’s South East Asia Command had made the mistake of sending “Indian Muslim soldiers to this Islamic country.” Upon arrival to the Indonesian archipelago, he alleged that Gurkhas began to “plot” with Indonesians to victimize the Chinese. It also became apparent that Chiang Kai Shek’s promise was a hollow one, because China itself was not yet “strong or peaceful.” Chinese shop owners and businessmen living in non-Republican territory, meanwhile, could not boycott Dutch residents and officials who had resettled there, because such a step would have amounted to “economic suicide.” Hence, in Indonesian eyes, the Chinese were not “100% neutral” in the Dutch-Indonesian conflict.

All of these factors conspired to trigger the resumption of anti-Chinese actions, which began with “the deprivation of freedom, humiliations, extortions, arsons and demolitions” and escalated to “raping, kidnapping, and slaughtering.” These cruel exploits lasted long after the British troops had departed, the Chinese Red Cross official charged. In the suburb of Tangerang, it was either ragtag pemuda gangs or official Indonesian Army and Navy troops who had robbed and massacred Chinese residents, while submitting Chinese women to the “vilest of treatments.” The Tangerang tragedy, however, was only the beginning of an epidemic of violence that would spread to Cirebon, Banyumas, Purwokerto, and dozens of places further east. Some Dutch soldiers remembered that upon disembarking from the transport ship that brought them to the harbor Tanjung Priok, they were immediately put to work in an effort to prevent the “unsavory elements” among the nationalists from murdering residents of Chinese extraction in nearby Depok.

These well-orchestrated and focused campaigns revealed a continuity with the colonial past, because violence was an ingrained element of daily life among many ethnic groups in the archipelago. The Dutch colonial government, however, had closed its eyes to the endemic violence that prevailed in indigenous communities. Instead, civil servants and residents from the Netherlands had insisted on viewing Indonesians as childlike, gentle people who need not occupy themselves with anything but “gamelan music and wayang dramas,” all the while relying on the help of big brother from Europe to guide them in the immediate future. The Dutch as well as other Westerners, however, “had much to learn” in the profoundly altered postwar world, as America’s UN Good Offices Commit-
tee member, Charlton Ogburn, noted in retrospect. In terms of the two female wayang characters who were among the most familiar to an average Javanese audience, Sumbadra and Srikandi, it was clear that the Republic’s supporters had abandoned their affinity with the lady-like and pliable Sumbadra. Instead, they now preferred the “masculine” and “strong-willed” Srikandi. For instance, when Ogburn visited the official Indonesian fighting forces under the command of Colonel Latief in East Java in early 1948, he recalled he only noticed exceptionally “tough and competent blokes” – Indonesian soldiers who concentrated on winning their anti-colonial war against the Netherlands Army with steely-eyed resolve.

In the imagination of a handful of Western observers in Java, these powerful freedom fighters had liberated themselves from the stereotype of mild-mannered Javanese men. As a British military officer stationed in post-war Batavia, Laurens van der Post, observed early on, Indonesian nationalism was hardly a “shallow, effeminate, intellectual cult”; instead, he noted it was an “urgent affair.” These “tough blokes” did not care about the magic of all-night wayang performances. It was possible that some of them agreed with the maverick nationalist and communist, Tan Malaka, who scoffed at wayang stories because “none of their answers made sense” and their plots did not nurture logical, rational, or “intelligent thinking.” But Republican soldiers probably did not revel in the intricate stories derived from the Mahabharata and Ramayana or the Panji tales due to a lack of time and leisure. Instead, if they thought about wayang stories at all, Indonesian freedom fighters may have harbored the fantasy that they could personally reenact the wayang legends about heroic ksatria warriors; they may also have imagined they would soon defeat the Dutch in Indonesia just as Hanuman and his army of monkeys had routed the evil Rahwana in the Ramayana epic.

At the same time, such lofty ksatria dreams were being translated into down-to-earth military strategies and guerrilla tactics. The warriors operating in the Javanese or Sumatran landscape were tough as nails – or, in the words of an awestruck Dutch soldier who had seen TNI and volunteer units perform in the field: “I tip my hat to them, because they are as hard as metal.” The defenders of the Indonesian Republic had organized themselves into a coordinated and self-disciplined guerrilla force with no purpose other than to resist the reimposition of Dutch colonial control. According to one account, these rugged soldiers instructed ordinary citizens living in Dutch-controlled territory “to remain faithful to our Republic of Indonesia...and murder people who help the Dutch” because they were “traitors.”

Such commands emphasized the determination of the Republic’s guardians to battle their former colonial masters to the bitter end. In the process, they violated the various truce agreements with the same boldness as their European adversaries. Rather than conforming to enduring Dutch stereotypes about the sub-
missive and fey Javanese or the clever but reasonable Minangkabau, the defenders of the Indonesian Republic presented themselves as powerful and disciplined warriors. Some of them also hoped to subvert the feudal hierarchy of traditional Javanese communities, in which patterns of command and subordination were grounded in the putative superiority of the ancient priyayi (upper-class) and the diligence of peasants.

This was the atmosphere of commotion and confusion Dutch women and men found when they emerged from Japanese internment camps or returned from their wartime exile. Nonetheless, many among them presumed they could simply take up their prewar position of political authority again and go back to working and enjoying the creature comforts of colonial society. Among them were Lieutenant Governor General Van Mook, the senior civil servant and former Governor of East Java, Charles O. van der Plas, and the crusty old Admiral of the Royal Netherlands Navy, Conrad E. Helfrich, who all returned to Batavia from their wartime safe haven in Australia. Helfrich was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Dutch military forces in the Indies, even though some critics suspected that he had never been “involved in a skirmish, let alone a battle.”

The British officer in Java, Laurens van der Post, after encountering Helfrich during the autumn of 1945, dismissed the Admiral as “a presumptuous boaster and a natural bully,” whose actual battle experiences consisted of nothing but verbal ones. In Van der Post’s recollections, the Admiral emerged as one of the spokesmen for an arch-conservative cabal in Batavia that fought against the Indonesian nationalists tooth and nail. Both Helfrich and Van der Plas became disruptive sources of “mischief-making” by regularly bragging that the Indonesian Republic could be toppled by “a couple of whiffs of grapeshot.” Echoing these negative impressions, General William D. Leahy, who served as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff under both Roosevelt and Truman, also painted a damaging portrait of Helfrich in his memoirs.

As a result, it was obvious that Van Mook’s political assignment in the postwar Dutch East Indies – surrounded as he was by hard-nosed Indonesian politicians representing the Republic as well as a retrograde troupe of “screeching Blanda monkeys” – was a formidable one. However, his efforts to construct a workable solution were hampered even more dramatically by the Dutch government in The Hague. Many Dutch politicians did not have an inkling of what was actually going on in Java and Sumatra. Officials in The Hague – perhaps too preoccupied with maintaining the status quo – used the Indonesian Question for their own instrumental purposes. Since the potential loss of the Netherlands East Indies was such a terrifying prospect to a large segment of the Dutch electorate, politicians feared that voters would favor conservative parties that took a hard line against the Indonesian Republic.

When Dutch parliamentary elections occurred in May 1946, the results yield-
ed an uneasy coalition government of the Labor Party (Partij van de Arbeid or PvdA) and the Roman Catholic People’s Party (Katholieke Volkspartij or KVP) that was riddled with internal political differences. The Labor Party had lost a portion of its voters to the Dutch Communist Party (Communistische Partij Nederland or CPN), forcing the PvdA to cooperate with the Catholics. This development alarmed the Labor Party leadership because it strengthened the political hand of the right wing of the KVP but also legitimated “other conservative factions” on the Dutch political scene.¹¹⁰

In terms of domestic policies, the uneasy coalition partners in the cabinet managed to find common ground by forging a moderately progressive platform of economic reconstruction and social reorganization. These were the kinds of structural reforms that the Dutch economy and civil society badly needed, having been ravaged by five years of Nazi occupation. Coalition members agreed on a course of action that would enable workers to grow into sophisticated citizens of society who might contribute to a fruitful collaboration between the public sector, the private sector, and organized labor.¹¹¹ However, there were palpable political tensions in the cabinet that manifested themselves, above all, in the two parties’ different views concerning the appropriate Dutch response to the independent Indonesian Republic.

The Labor Party claimed to be “an unconditional supporter of [Indonesians’] right to self-determination.” The PvdA placed itself in an anti-imperialist genealogy that began with the ideas of the socialist H.H. van Kol, who shared his progressive agenda with the bourgeois radical Ch.T. van Deventer. Presumably, the anti-colonial spirit was then carried on by the renowned *adat* law expert, Professor C. van Vollenhoven, and other “ethical” scholars at Leiden University as well as the paragon of “Christian altruism” (*naastenliefde*), Professor H. Kraemer. As a result of the clamor of the reactionary anti-Republican forces in the Netherlands, however, the Labor Party began to fear that both the Dutch and Indonesian populations were “standing on the edge of an abyss.” Despite the fact that the two peoples desperately needed each other for their “mutual recovery” and the regeneration of “popular prosperity,” their intimate relationship threatened to disintegrate into a “disastrous struggle.”¹¹²

The seasoned Indonesian politician, Leonardus Nicodemus Palar, responded to the outcome of the Dutch elections with a thoughtful report written on June 3, 1946, entitled “Indonesia after the elections.” He began with a weary sense of resignation – “the voters have spoken” – but he immediately wondered what the election results augured for the Dutch government’s handling of the Indonesian Question in the future. Palar heard rumors that the new cabinet would continue with the policies advocated by pro-independence gradualists such as former PvdA Prime Minister Schermerhorn, Minister of Overseas Territories Logemann, and Van Mook. Yet as far as Palar was concerned, this raised two urgent
questions. In the first place, was the policy pursued until the spring of 1946 capable of resolving the Indonesian conflict in a mutually satisfactory manner? And secondly, could this political vision be maintained within the newly created government coalition in which conservative politicians now acquired a more prominent voice?  

The Indonesian question was a problem with worldwide repercussions, Palar argued, even if the Netherlands and the Republic were the only two parties directly involved. Neither country could “throw its punches in a clean and honest fight” because both were under enormous pressure from the international community, which had a real stake in the outcome of the Dutch-Indonesian dispute. What was happening in Indonesia was simply one manifestation of a phenomenon taking place all over Asia, he noted, because in postwar Asia all people longed for “national self-realization.” This primal force comprised the source of what was labeled the “Asian Problem.”

Palar then defined the nature and potential impact of these foreign interests on the resolution of the Dutch-Indonesian conflict. He noted that by following a tried and true recipe, Russia nurtured the consolidation of the nationalist revolutions in Southeast Asia with a fundamental social transformation. This kind of merger between nationalism and socio-economic revolution might give the Soviet Union a grip on Asian countries striving for independence. At the same time, the classic progenitor of European imperialism, Great Britain, attempted to bolster its deteriorating position in the world by maintaining a strong political voice in the not yet fully independent members of the British Commonwealth. France, meanwhile, resolved its colonial problem in Indochina by encircling the Republic of Vietnam.

Given these international pressures and pan-Asian efforts at decolonization, Palar asserted that the Netherlands could not afford to play the role of a diehard colonial power, if only because the world’s most influential nations insisted on a broad-minded resolution of the Indonesian Question. He argued that this was already discernable in US policy, which granted financial credits to the Netherlands for its domestic economic reconstruction, but only on the condition that the Dutch nation reach a satisfactory agreement with the Indonesian Republic. Besides, Palar optimistically predicted during the early summer of 1946 that the entire world was tired of warfare and bloodshed and would therefore not tolerate the outbreak of military strife in the Indonesian archipelago. In sum, all of these international constraints placed Dutch politicians in The Hague and Batavia in a very tight corner.

Palar’s astute analysis of the world situation – with America cast in a series of complicated roles that combined the duties of a generous benefactor, a moral arbiter, and a strict policeman – eventually proved to be grounded in wishful thinking. It was true that the US State Department admonished the Netherlands, be-
ing America’s faithful ally, to resolve the Indonesian-Dutch conflict peacefully; this caveat accompanied Washington’s allocation of generous financial credits, Marshall Plan assistance, and other forms of material support. However, when the Dutch violated their agreements with the Republic, or when they diverted US funds earmarked for the Netherlands’ economic recovery to purchase military hardware for the Netherlands Army in Southeast Asia, officials in Washington turned a blind eye. For the time being, America refused to play the role of Indonesia’s white knight in shining armor, as Palar and his nationalist compatriots had hoped. Instead, the US foreign policy establishment straddled the imperialist fence, not only with regard to Indonesia’s struggle for independence but also vis-à-vis Ho Chi Minh’s anti-colonial struggle in Vietnam. Washington’s assessment of its national security and self-interests in the world arena dictated an obsessive focus on the economic and political reconstruction of Europe. The State Department’s preoccupation with European recovery, in turn, legitimized at the same time a tacit backing of its French and Dutch allies in their showdown with Southeast Asian nationalism.
The Emerging Cold War and American Perspectives on Decolonization in Southeast Asia in the Postwar Era

On December 1, 1945, the US ambassador in The Hague, China specialist Stanley K. Hornbeck, sent a confidential telegram addressed to President Truman and the US Secretary of State, James Byrnes. In his lengthy cable, Hornbeck speculated about the ways in which developments in the Netherlands East Indies might negatively affect America’s interests. He thought that if Dutch political influence in the region were to become even more “tenuous” or vanish altogether, and if there was not an “adequately compensating substitution” of either British or American political power, then a political vacuum might very well emerge. Such a void, in turn, could easily invite an influx of political forces from a variety of “other quarters.” Hornbeck predicted that these new political incursions would emanate from an Eastern rather than a Western corner of the world – he mentioned the possibility of both China and Japan, in this context – but it was far from inconceivable, he added, that there might also be a “Soviet contribution.”

Hornbeck proceeded to paint a gloomy picture of a bifurcated world community in the near future. He divided the globe into two hostile blocks, thus anticipating Winston Churchill’s “Sinews of Peace” speech in Fulton, Missouri, when he coined the phrase “iron curtain.” In his address at Westminster College on March 5, 1946, where he received an honorary degree, Churchill concluded that the wartime anti-Hitler coalition forged between the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union had irrevocably fallen apart; he proposed that in the future, a rigid barrier would separate the democratic West from the Soviet-dominated world. Three months earlier, Hornbeck imagined a similar ironclad divide between an alliance of white-skinned “people of the occident, together with those ‘colored’ peoples in various parts of the world who remain under their influence and partake in their ways of thinking.” In the opposing camp, he placed all the defiant indigenous populations striving to be delivered from the command of “the ‘white’ and occidental peoples who entertain and commit to concepts contrary thereto...”

If the world were to split apart into two feuding coalitions, Hornbeck made the forecast that Soviet infiltration into Southeast Asia would figure on a par with the renewed evil that either Japan or China might perpetrate. He ended with the candid observation that important American interests were being “adversely af-
fected” by current developments in the Dutch East Indies. Hence, he recom-
mended that Truman pursue an assertive policy with regard to the situation in the
Indonesian archipelago, whether as “a ‘war’ or as a ‘peace’ measure.” Such a US
initiative would be greeted with gratitude by most countries that maintained
amicable relations with the United States.3

Hornbeck advocated the “Asianist” perspective within the State Department
— a vision of US policy that was often at odds with arguments expressing “Euro-
peanist” logic. If the anti-colonial struggles in Southeast Asia were to find support
in the State Department at all, it could be located among the staff of the Office of
Far Eastern Affairs (FE) or the smaller and subordinate Division of the Philip-
pines and Southeast Affairs (PSA). US foreign policy, Asianists argued, should not
align itself with regressive “Old World” endeavors in Asia, because it risked the
permanent estrangement of newly emerging nation-states in the region. Tying
the fate of fledgling and still fragile democracies to America’s national interest
could only benefit the free, democratic Western world in the future. If not, “this
part of the world might fall within the Soviet orbit.” As PSA senior official, Abbot
Low Moffat, counseled, Washington should “meet the natural aspirations of In-
donesian nationalism,” although he quickly attenuated his own bold advice by
calling for the conservation of “the Netherlands economic strength, which she
derives from her association with the Indies.”4

Despite their disagreements over nuts-and-bolts policy issues, however, Euro-
peanists and Asianists managed to find a common ground in the idea of “volun-
tary association” between the Netherlands and the Indonesian Republic. This
truce was possible because both State Department factions were convinced that
Indonesian nationalists were not yet ready to assume responsibility for immedi-
ate and complete independence.5 The mantra “voluntary association” actually
served as a vindication of Washington’s hands-off approach regarding the nation-
alist conflicts in Asia, which further reinforced the illusion of America’s political
neutrality.

At this early postwar stage, Southeast Asia was not yet considered a likely trou-
ble spot in the State Department’s scenario concerning the Soviet Union’s preda-
tory designs on the democratic and capitalist world. In fact, only a few months af-
ter his telegram of December 1945, Hornbeck attempted to placate whatever
ill-defined apprehensions American policymakers might harbor about Russian
intentions in Southeast Asia. He sent a short missive to the Secretary of State,
quoting a Soviet diplomat who had reputedly told a Dutch colleague that
Moscow had no interest whatsoever in the Indonesian archipelago. Although the
Kremlin was scornful of the retrograde Dutch effort to reassert colonial domi-
nance over the archipelago, it was only “concerned with the presence in the In-
dies of British troops.” According to the anonymous Dutch diplomat, the Soviet
leadership merely wished to see the SEAC forces withdrawn as quickly as possi-
ble.6 As the Russian historian, L.M. Efimova, wrote in 1998, the Southeast Asian Department of Moscow’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs determined that the Soviet Union’s foremost task was to curtail “the expansion of American and British influence in Indonesia and the Southeast Asian region as a whole.”

During the months following the Allied victory over the Axis powers, US policymakers were still struggling to comprehend Stalin’s true purposes in the international arena. The general American lack of understanding of Soviet culture was profound, even during World War II, when the two nations were military partners in the war against Nazi Germany. In a certain sense, this unfamiliarity echoed the State Department’s superficial intelligence concerning the ethnic diversities and cultural complexities of territories such as the Netherlands East Indies or Indochina. In the case of Southeast Asia, however, officials in Washington dismissed these esoteric cultural details as irrelevant to the formulation of proper US policies in the region. But when it came to the Soviet Union, American embassy officials in Moscow as well as diplomatic colleagues from Britain bitterly complained about their personal isolation; their inability to gain genuine insight into Russian society and political culture, they noted, was due to the restrictions placed on their access to Soviet civilians. During the war and a few years thereafter, Washington actively sought to gain such knowledge by trying to implement cultural exchange programs and by pursuing a higher level of intellectual contact with Soviet officialdom and ordinary citizens. In the Russian case, the State Department perceived cultural awareness as an extremely relevant factor in the future unfolding of US-Soviet relations.

In late 1943, for example, during his service as Washington’s Ambassador in Moscow, Averall Harriman had presented to the Kremlin several modest proposals for cultural and academic exchanges, without receiving any kind of response. Washington’s mounting frustration with its failure to enhance the cultural interactions between the US and the USSR prompted State Department official, John Paton Davies, to compose a memo in 1944 with the irreverent title “Why Soviet Culture Stinks!” that chronicled the many instances when American gestures of cultural and academic cooperation were greeted with stony silence.8 Half a year later, the British embassy in Moscow issued a fifty-page report, entitled “A Survey of Contacts between Russians and Foreign Residents in Moscow,” which recorded the Soviets’ shunning of all manner of contact with British and other Western residents, making English inhabitants of the city “feel themselves at every turn more of a stranger in a strange land than in any other foreign capital.”9

Once the war was over, US efforts to arrange academic exchanges continued at first, such as the Rockefeller Foundation’s offer to a group of Russian scientists to pay for their participation in the bicentennial celebrations of Princeton University. In a similar vein, Cornell University encouraged four Russian students and a professor to study and teach in Ithaca, New York, while the American Li-
brary Association spontaneously dispatched boxes of books to the Lenin Library in the hope of eliciting a *quid pro quo*. Despite the concrete evidence indicating Soviet disinterest in academic or cultural interaction with the US, the State Department’s appointee to the newly established post of Assistant Secretary for Public and Cultural Affairs, the liberal internationalist Archibald MacLeish, confirmed his faith in the enduring value of bilateral cultural communications with all nations across the globe, but above all with the Soviet Union. “If the people of the world know the facts about each other,” he told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee during his confirmation hearings in the winter of 1944–1945, “peace will be maintained.” This optimistic vision, however, already acquired less idealistic overtones during his successor’s tenure, which began in September 1945. William Benton viewed cultural exchange programs differently. He saw them primarily as a unilateral vehicle for “the projection of America to the world,” especially by means of popular technologies like the radio. It would not be long before disagreements on this score became a moot point. As Cold War semantics began to reverberate more noisily in the corridors of power in the White House, the State Department, and the US Congress, the idea of cultural exchanges with the USSR soon acquired the connotation of “communist infiltration and pro-Russian policy.” As a Congressman from Ohio gruffly noted in February 1946, the American people are getting “fed up with this cultural relations stuff [with the Soviets].”

On December 1, 1945, the day Stanley Hornbeck sent his lengthy telegram to Truman and Byrnes, the image of Russia as an insatiable bear, constantly rummaging in new territory while preying on innocent victims, had not yet fully settled in the consciousness of the average US government official or the general public. During the months following the victory over Germany and Japan, the Soviet Union’s epic struggle with Hitler’s armies was still freshly inscribed in many people’s memory. Ordinary American citizens and Washington policymakers alike could still conjure up a mental picture of Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin: three seemingly imperturbable old men seated next to each other in apparent harmony, all bundled up in warm coats to shelter them from the Russian winter at the close of their meetings in Yalta in February 1945. Meanwhile, the American public, in general, and activists on the political left, in particular, painted a portrait of the Soviet Union as a society that was utterly devastated by the Nazi assault. At this early stage, the “World Federalist” Cord Meyer peevishly remembered, the American left did not yet have an inkling of the “Byzantine terror” that prevailed in the Soviet Union during Stalin’s leadership. Most Americans initially clung to their conviction that Russia’s industrial infrastructure had been reduced to a mountain of debris, while its labor force had been decimated in the protracted, bloody battles at Stalingrad, Leningrad, and other Soviet cities. The eastern front during World War II produced an astronomical death toll estimated
at 25 million Russians. Many Americans thought that Stalin’s army had put up a
heroic fight against “Hitler’s hordes.” Once the war was over, they regarded the
Soviet bear as an innocuous and sickly animal, in need of a long period of conva-
lescence before recovering its stamina. From the perspective of the American left,
it was difficult to fathom why the US would so soon threaten this fragile creature
with “nuclear annihilation.” The former Secretary of Agriculture during the
New Deal and Roosevelt’s Vice President from 1940 to 1944, Henry Agard Wal-
lace, was one of the few politicians who favored a revival of the US-Soviet coop-
eration that had existed during World War II. To progressive Americans, it
seemed implausible that Russia would venture beyond its borders in order to fo-
ment revolutions elsewhere in the world. As Cord Meyer noted in his memoirs,
it took several years before he and his fellow World Federalists reluctantly reached
the conclusion that “Americans faced a formidable adversary in the Soviet
Union.” Meyer, in fact, would take this antagonistic relationship with Moscow
seriously enough to end up as the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) station
chief in London in the 1960’s, which invested him with the responsibility for the
entire CIA operation in Western Europe.

By the late 1940’s, left-of-center Americans who were engaged in politics,
government service, academia, and the arts were reduced to speaking in whis-
pers, not only because of internecine political disagreements but also due to Tru-
man’s executive order that imposed the signing of a loyalty oath on all federal
workers and eventually many university professors as well. These developments
combined with the growing anti-communist truculence exhibited by the House
Committee on Un-American Activities. The popular media, such as Henry
Luce’s Life magazine, also aroused the anti-communist paranoia by publishing
a front-page article with black-and-white passport photos of the Kremlin’s fifty
“dupes” in America. Most of the people featured in this photo gallery were
prominent intellectuals, novelists, and actors who had presumably “toyed with
communism.” The American left’s position would become even more precari-
ous when Joseph McCarthy, US Senator from Wisconsin, intensified the vitriolic
anti-communist crusade that further discredited anyone vaguely progressive.
Although Truman referred to him in private as “a pathological liar,” while he
called McCarthy’s colleague, Kenneth Wherry, a “blockheaded undertaker from
Nebraska,” these and other politicians managed to reopen a virulent “vein of
American nativism.”

In collaboration with unscrupulous publicists and other political allies, Mc-
carthy and his associates on the US Senate’s Permanent Investigating Sub-Com-
mittee of the Government Operations Committee mobilized a phalanx of “FDR
haters, Harvard haters, Wall Street haters, and Washington haters.” In a review of
a recent biography of McCarthy, which attempted to rehabilitate the Senator, an
expert on the American left during the Cold War, Sam Tanenhaus, portrayed Mc-
Carthy once again as a “potent rabble-rouser,” who caused numerous innocent Americans untold anguish and whose name became a “byword for demagogic slander.”

All of this fear and loathing, both in public and private, originated in a common anxiety regarding the evil influence of communism, which had allegedly germinated in the most unexpected corners of the vast American landscape. In this unstable world, all sorts of noxious communists, as Truman’s Attorney General, J. Howard McGrath articulated it, were bent on spreading “the germs of death for society.” Society, in this context, figured as a code word for the American way of life, which was presumably under communist siege. Despite the growing fear of communism, however, Henry Wallace, as he began to assemble a progressive movement in preparation for his campaign as a third-party candidate in the 1948 presidential elections, clung to the opinion that safeguarding world peace required a circumspect but aboveboard cooperation with the Soviet Union. Wallace’s vision of honest relations with the Kremlin also entailed the sharing of scientific knowledge concerning nuclear technology in order to prevent a nuclear arms race.

The progressive movement’s influence on US foreign policy, however, was negligible, because explicit social-democratic ideas, at this stage, appealed only to a small segment of the American public. Despite Wallace’s repeated warnings that Washington was permitting the Russians “to parade themselves before all the colonial peoples of the world as the only enemy of imperialism,” Truman’s State Department displayed a notable lack of concern for the anti-colonial struggles in Asia. America’s postwar interventions in the affairs of Western Europe, in contrast, were justified on a variety of grounds that mollified Americans on both the left and right.

Across the US political spectrum, the denazification of Germany, for instance, was initially viewed as an urgent moral imperative. Similarly, Washington’s economic aid to other Western European countries constituted a humanitarian rescue mission, designed to improve the health and material conditions of millions of democratic citizens whose lives had been ravaged by German fascism. Such support also revived Europe’s economies and reconstituted them as trading partners and consumer markets for American-made goods—a set of concerns that would soon overshadow the desire to redeem Germany’s civil society through a program of political and psychological re-education. As a result, the US Congress and American business interests began to put pressure on the executive branch to “stop slowing down German economic recovery with denazification.”

Ambassador Hornbeck, however, was not the first US diplomat to urge Washington to pursue an equally pro-active American foreign policy in regions far removed from the European Theater, in other words, in those countries that were in turmoil because of the simmering conflicts between colonial powers and na-
tionalist movements seeking political autonomy. In fact, John Carter Vincent, serving at that time as the Director of the Far Eastern Affairs Office in the State Department, caused quite a stir when he delivered a lecture to the Foreign Policy Association on October 19, 1945. In his speech, Vincent expressed America's intention “not to assist or participate in forceful measures for the re-imposition of control by territorial sovereigns” in their prewar colonial possessions in Asia. But he immediately qualified this statement with an addendum, offering that the United States would be “prepared to lend assistance, if requested to do so, in efforts to reach peaceful agreements” in these politically unstable regions.23

Many newspapers in both Europe and Southeast Asia covered Vincent’s address to the Foreign Policy Association and interpreted his announcement as a straightforward American offer to mediate the political tensions in the Dutch East Indies, Indochina, and elsewhere. Three days later, a representative from the Netherlands Embassy in Washington posed a pertinent question to a State Department official. The Dutch diplomat, Henri van Vredenburch, asked whether Vincent had donated “the good offices” of the American government, and if so, “to whom was such an offer extended: to the Netherlands government? The Netherlands East Indies government? Or to anyone else?”24 President Sukarno, for his part, construed Vincent’s remarks as a genuine invitation rather than an equivocal gesture. In late October 1945, he issued a plea to the Truman Administration “to act as mediator in the present political dispute in this part of the Pacific,” because he assumed that Vincent’s controversial statement had “strengthened” the hand of the Republican leaders in Indonesia.25

During the autumn of 1945, however, the US State Department was still uncertain and uninformed about the political orientation of Sukarno, Hatta, and Sjahir. British diplomats had warned their counterparts in Washington that the “sincere” Sukarno and the “clever” Hatta were “intellectuals whose personalities are not very forceful”; neither man, British intelligence warned, would be “capable of controlling the extremists.”26 Contradicting this lukewarm appraisal, however, Sukarno appealed resolutely to Americans’ national pride; emboldened by Vincent’s commentary, he declared that the United States had fought and won World War II “for the realization of the great human ideals of justice, freedom, and democracy.” He registered his hope that his appeal would convince the US government to help resolve the Indonesian Question in an impartial manner “in the interest of world peace.”27

The Asianist convictions of Hornbeck, Vincent, Moffat and others affiliated with the Office of Far East Affairs, advocating a more committed American foreign policy in Southeast Asia, were echoed by some voices in the US media, which supported this policy agenda. For example, a New York Herald Tribune journalist wrote on December 1, 1945, that Washington “should immediately do all it can to obtain a cessation of hostilities” in Indonesia.28 During these early postwar
months, however, Asianists’ advice was met with either indifference or ambiguity. Nonetheless, Vincent’s comments, or Hornbeck’s imagery of an emerging political vacuum in the Indonesian archipelago that ran the risk of being filled by a Soviet presence, turned out to be prescient. It would take a few more years, though, before the prognostication of a potential Soviet infiltration into Southeast Asia’s empty political spaces, created by a premature departure of Dutch or French colonial administrators, would begin to reverberate as a somber refrain in the State Department.

To be sure, most senior members of the State Department were aware that friction between the US and Stalin’s Russia had been brewing since 1944. After all, sophisticated American Foreign Service officers, having gained personal experience in dealing with the intractable Soviets during their diplomatic service in Moscow – most notably George Kennan, Charles Bohlen, and Averell Harriman – had already alerted President Truman and Secretary of State Byrnes to Stalin’s dubious intentions. All US-Soviet flashpoints, however, appeared to be located in either Europe, the Middle East, or somewhere in between, especially in Eastern European countries that eventually became satellites strung together into a protective cordon sanitaire around the Soviet Union.

Despite these initial warnings, some members of the Treasury Department as well as the Secretary of War, Henry L. Stimson, joined Henry Wallace, who served as the Truman Administration’s Secretary of Commerce until he was fired, to advocate a conciliatory stance vis-à-vis Moscow. In a lengthy memorandum written in September 1945, the 77-year old Stimson cautioned Truman against wearing the atom bomb too “ostentatiously on our hip” as a weapon of US diplomacy. He argued that preserving the “scientific secret of the atom bomb” was an impossibility; America should therefore engage in a “free interchange of scientific information” with appropriate UN members.

However, most of these people – with the exception of Wallace and his political soul mates, who clung to their dream of a fruitful US-USSR cooperation – were rudely awakened from such reveries by George Kennan’s “Long Telegram” dispatched from Moscow on February 22, 1946. Illusions of a congenial collaboration with Russia in the postwar era, he noted, were a sign of America’s naïveté. Kennan proclaimed that it was a complete waste of time and words “to talk of friendship with the Soviets.” Stalin’s Russia possessed a vested interest in an antagonistic outside world; besides, the Soviet regime was immune to any form of rationality or logic. Kennan was equally emphatic in arguing that it would be futile for Washington policymakers to rack their brains about the ways in which the US might oblige Soviet concerns, since none of them had any legitimacy. Trying “to act chummy” with the Soviets would only embarrass them and “deepen their suspicions.” There was no need to worry about Soviet power because the Kremlin was in reality nothing but a “paper tiger.” The Soviets, Kennan wrote,
were convinced that they would never achieve a “modus vivendi” with the United States because the Kremlin headed a fanatic “Messianic movement.” To obtain a vicarious sense of security, Kennan concluded, Moscow was driven to disrupt the political equilibrium of American society in order to destroy “our traditional way of life” and to subvert “the international authority of our state.”

Accordingly, when Harry Truman eventually announced his Containment Doctrine in an address to a joint session of Congress on March 12, 1947, he employed Kennan’s vocabulary and did not even mention the word communism; instead, he spoke of a struggle between two diametrically opposed ways of life, a democratic versus a totalitarian one. Half a year later, the newly retired Secretary of War, Henry Stimson, was more blunt when he wrote that America had emerged as the favorite scapegoat among a “very bad-mannered group of men” who slavishly acted out the Kremlin’s perverted policies. He emphasized that in the postwar world, foreign affairs had become “our most intimate domestic concern,” and dealing with the Russians demanded the pursuit of a middle passage between “uncritical trust” and “unmitigated belligerence.”

One of the supposedly ill-mannered characters Stimson may have had in mind was Andrei Zhdanov, who functioned as Stalin’s “ideological bulldog” and in September 1947, “laid down the law” for communist parties throughout the world. In Stalin’s eyes, any form of internal dissent among communists, wherever they lived and worked, represented a perfidious challenge to the unity of Marxist ideas and practices. In due course, his deeply rooted paranoia merged with Moscow’s intrusive strategy to manipulate the communist parties of many countries, regardless of unique local circumstances. Hence, US perceptions of Stalin’s efforts to forge a monolithic communist movement, global in scope, confirmed Americans’ worst nightmares.

As the new intellectual darling of Washington’s foreign policy establishment, Kennan’s combative words provided Truman’s State Department with a rationale for abandoning its vacillating posture towards Moscow. It was soon acknowledged that a full-blown economic and ideological struggle with the Soviet Union was looming. The Cold War had begun, and its principal battleground was located in the European arena. Urbane statesmen such as Averell Harriman and Dean Acheson, meanwhile, resorted to folksy metaphors to describe the inherent dangers of communism. In describing the Soviet Union, Acheson’s imagery of a rotten apple in a barrel was matched by Harriman’s depiction of the Kremlin’s foreign intrusions as a decomposing onion, in which the putrid outer layers slowly spoil the inner ones. It was the Washington journalist, Joseph Alsop, who conjured up the more persistent domino theory, which was used by President Eisenhower in 1954 when he told the White House press corps that as soon as Moscow’s intrigues toppled the first domino, the remaining ones would tumble down in quick succession.
Kennan’s apocalyptic language about the Soviet Union quickly settled in as foreign policy dogma. By the summer of 1947, the Truman Administration had already translated Kennan’s ominous assessments into the Containment Doctrine, only to be followed by the European Recovery Program (ERP), better known as the Marshall Plan. After Congress passed the National Security Act in July 1947, agencies were established that could serve as tools in the execution of the new Manichaean orientation of US foreign policy. The National Security Act assigned the coordination of political and military matters to the National Security Council (NSC). The newly established Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was charged with improving the quality of intelligence gathering around the world. The 1947 National Security Act did not explicitly empower the CIA to intrude in a clandestine fashion into the domestic affairs of other nations. The Act’s malleable phrases, however, authorizing the CIA to carry out “services of common concern” and “such other functions” as the National Security Council might deem necessary, soon thereafter seemed to legitimize the CIA’s drift into espionage, covert action, paramilitary operations, and “biological immobilization” tactics employed against foreign leaders deemed dangerous to the United States. The early years of the CIA created an atmosphere of the “Knights Templars,” mounting a crusade to rescue “Western freedom from Communist darkness.” As the CIA was emerging as an institution, the Secretary of State, George Marshall, also gave George Kennan a carte blanche to establish a think tank within the State Department. The new entity assumed the name Policy Planning Staff (PPS) and would concentrate on long-range policy issues; Marshall’s only concrete mandate to Kennan was “to avoid trivia.”

The Truman Administration’s adoption of a foreign policy doctrine that was embedded in a bi-polar vision of the world held serious repercussions. The National Security Act’s endorsement of new agencies and programs designed to contain, and thereby defuse, the Soviet menace also shifted the relationships between the various government bureaucracies vying for the President’s executive notice. Thus Washington’s embrace of Cold War ideas and semantics provided the State Department with effective ammunition in its lingering feud with the Treasury Department concerning the future of Germany. Articulating the Treasury Department’s position, Henry Morgenthau – or “Henry the Morgue,” as Roosevelt had reputedly nicknamed him during World War II – drafted a “Program to Prevent Germany from Starting a World War III.” In Morgenthau’s bleak conception, postwar Germany should be refurbished as a placid “agrarian pastureland”; in order to accomplish this goal he proposed, employing an apt term, a US strategy of Germany’s “industrial emasculation.”

Senior officials in the State Department, on the other hand, argued that Germany’s economic reconstruction was an indispensable component of America’s game plan to neutralize the Soviet Union’s stealthy designs on Western Europe.
Hence, Kennan’s premonitions concerning the inevitable intrigues of Stalin’s Russia bolstered the State Department’s authority and resolved, to some extent, the conflict between the two government agencies. He also challenged many liberal Americans’ still sanguine opinions about the Soviet Union. At the same time, Kennan’s projections sustained the tendency of American policymakers to continue their support of French neo-colonial efforts in Vietnam and to side with the Netherlands in its conflict with the Indonesian Republic. Washington pursued this foreign policy until US perceptions of the latter anti-colonial struggle began to shift during the course of 1948.

An ancillary result of the entrenchment of Kennan’s bleak visions concerning Russia was that until 1948, the small group of Asianists in the State Department who were still inclined to look favorably upon Asian nationalist movements, found their voices muffled. Recognition dawned in Washington that the formulation of US foreign policy could not afford to be an ethical or humanitarian mission. Instead, the maintenance of international relations should accomplish realistic goals in a complex world awash with pitfalls, deceptions, and ulterior motives. The changing realities of the postwar world order had forced Washington to forsake its self-proclaimed moral high ground, even though Winston Churchill, in addition to many other grateful European politicians, would eventually praise the Marshall Plan as the most “unsordid act” in all of human history. Because it became necessary to juggle multiple international commitments and to establish its own priorities during the early postwar years, the State Department placed its disingenuous and half-hearted commitment to Southeast Asian nations’ right to self-determination on the back burner. Europe’s perceived vulnerability overshadowed all other policy concerns. What this also implied was that in American eyes, it was not relevant whether or not the Dutch authorities in The Hague and Batavia embraced a genuine policy of decolonization. Instead, the proven ability of the Dutch to manage effectively the archipelago’s abundant economic resources emerged as paramount.

Washington’s new priorities and sense of emergency in 1947, which dictated that the Soviet infiltration into Western Europe should be curbed, justified the logic of America’s covert support of the Dutch side in Indonesia’s anti-colonial struggle, primarily because of the economic importance embodied in the archipelago’s oil, mineral, and agricultural resources. Extracting, cultivating, and exporting these products efficiently was not only beneficial to the Netherlands but might improve conditions in all of Western Europe. In mid-July 1947, the British Foreign Minister, Ernest Bevin, referring to the future availability of Indonesian palm oil on the British consumer market, promised the Labor Party’s radical constituency of mineworkers that as soon as the Dutch-Indonesian conflict would be settled, “every woman in Northumberland will have her fat ration increased.”
Alone among World War II belligerents, the North American continent had emerged unscathed, without dire food shortages or the destruction of homes and factories, whereas most of the major Western European democracies stood knee-deep in rubble. The economies of many European countries had been devastated by five years of Nazi occupation. The war had produced social conditions that rendered ordinary European citizens increasingly susceptible, or so American policymakers feared, to the false promises of communism. Moscow’s alluring proposition that a central state, through its ownership of the means of production, could redistribute the social surplus equitably and thus eradicate the differences between rich and poor, was nothing but a hoax in American eyes. In this context, a healthy infusion of American-style free enterprise might cure the lingering European tendency to put faith in the nationalization of key industries. Similarly, unfettered capitalism would yield economic growth, cause wage increases, and improve living conditions, which would effectively harness the political vitality of communist labor unions. As Secretary of State James Byrnes announced in his Stuttgart speech in September 1946, the economic rebuilding of Europe, including Germany, should most definitely occur “along capitalist lines.”

In this context, the Netherlands and especially France were essential pawns in America’s ideological chess game with the Kremlin, and American leadership in the world community could only be secured through a rapid recuperation of Western Europe’s economic vigor. In the imagination of Washington policymakers, an umbilical cord tethered the colonies in Southeast Asia to their mother countries in Europe. State Department planners were also convinced that the raw materials and mineral wealth generated by the Indonesian archipelago were a sine qua non for the restoration of Western Europe’s economic health. As a consequence, when President Truman presented the European Recovery Program to the US Congress in April 1948, the Netherlands East Indies was designated as the only colonial territory that would receive financial aid through the Marshall Plan.

The French situation, meanwhile, was delicate in a more distinctly political sense. As a result of the enduring significance of the nation’s agricultural sector, in terms of France’s Gross National Product as well as its human resource allocation, the material well-being of French society was less dependent than the Netherlands on economic ties with its overseas colonies. The French Communist Party (Parti Communiste Français or PCF), however, exhibited shocking growth in the immediate postwar elections, especially when compared with the modest number of voters the Netherlands Communist Party (Communistische Partij Nederland or CPN) had lured away from the Dutch Labor Party in the national elections held in May 1946. Once founded, the first sub rosa activities of the CIA transpired in France and Italy in 1947 and 1948, where well-financed communist parties and labor unions came close to scoring electoral victories. If US foreign
policy was seen publicly as buttressing the nationalist movement in Vietnam, consisting of what was increasingly recognized as a mostly communist force under Ho Chi Minh’s leadership, such conspicuous support might hamper the ability of pro-American politicians in Paris to confront the PCF and communist labor unions such as the Confédération Générale Travail (Confederation of Labor or CGT) in their own backyard.55

However, a tradition of American support for the nationalist aspirations of colonized people and their Wilsonian right to self-determination continued to resonate in popular opinion, albeit faintly. After the war, scores of American citizens expressed their negative feelings about European imperialism in Asia, in general, and the Netherlands efforts to perpetuate colonial rule in the Indies, in particular. Before the fear of communism and the practice of red-baiting had taken hold of many Americans’ imagination, the State Department received 465 letters from concerned constituents in almost every state of the Union. Except for two lonely pro-Dutch missives, these unsolicited letters articulated support for Indonesian independence and condemned the use of American weapons and military equipment by the British forces in Java.56 These expressions of public support for Indonesian independence eventually evolved into several small demonstrations.

In the wake of the Netherlands Army’s first military attack on the Indonesian Republic in July 1947, a protest rally took place in San Francisco, where demonstrators exhibited placards with slogans such as “The Nazis Ravaged Holland (1940) The Dutch Ravaged Java (1947),” “Imperialism is the Same in Every Language” or “Stop Use of US Material to Murder Indonesians.” The Independent Indonesia Committee of America had organized the ad hoc demonstration in San Francisco, which also featured a lecture entitled “Behind the Scenes of the Dutch Colonial War” by Ellis Paterson, a San Francisco resident and former member of the US House of Representatives. The Independent Indonesia Committee coordinated another spontaneous public protest in front of the residence of the Netherlands Consul in Los Angeles; here, demonstrators displayed signs imploring “The Netherlands Government to Withdraw from Indonesia” and reminding onlookers that “Holland Loves Freedom – So Does Indonesia.”57

The actual number of people who participated in these protests was small, despite the several pro-independence organizations that had sprung up on both the west and the east coast. In New York, the Indonesian Club of America, Inc., existed alongside The Indonesia League of America, Inc. The executive officers and members of the board of directors of the latter organization consisted mainly of Indonesian expatriates, but its Secretary-Treasurer was Julian Ross, a prominent official and foreign affairs expert in the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO).58 Ross’ role in the Indonesia League of America indicated that the CIO, representing the more progressive wing of the US labor movement despite its formal renunciation of communist principles at the CIO’s Eighth Constitutional
Convention in Atlantic City, New Jersey on November 18-22, 1946, was supportive of colonized people’s struggle for independence. The CIO Assembly ratified Resolution No. 43 regarding US foreign policy, which stated that “in the economically backward or colonial countries, people everywhere [should] be protected in their rights to self-determination and self-government – free from interference or coercion from any source – [whether] benevolent or despotic.”

Tangible evidence of this concern was the help CIO members had provided to Indonesian seamen in 1945 when they walked off Dutch ships in various American ports. As Charles Bidien, the editor of the Indonesian Review wrote to the CIO president, Philip Murray, “unions affiliated with the CIO, particularly the maritime unions which were most directly involved, indicated the support of the right of Indonesian people to establish their own Republic and resist the attempts of the Dutch to restore their colonial rule.”

The American Federation of Labor (AFL), more fiercely anti-communist than the CIO, also announced its support for independence struggles taking place in colonized countries, whether in Asia or Africa, because such societies could be easily “over-run by totalitarian communism and incorporated through so-called plebiscites into the USSR or turned into Soviet satellites.” In July 1947, the AFL sent a cable to the Netherlands Federation of Trade Unions. The telegram called upon the “liberty-loving Dutch free trade unionists” to urge the Netherlands government to focus on diplomacy instead of resorting to military action, because armed violence would “gravely injure world democracy and strengthen reactionary totalitarian forces everywhere.” In an editorial comment, the Free Trade Union News offered the opinion that the US government should exert outright pressure on the Dutch government rather than lobby in a desultory fashion while covertly supporting the Dutch side with copious American dollars.

Labor unions more radical than the CIO and the AFL also existed in the United States, such as Harry Bridges’ International Longshoremen and Warehousemen’s Union (ILWU), which various analysts of the American social and economic scene tarred with a communist brush. Whether or not they were genuine communists or radical social democrats, ILWU union leaders persisted in their political engagement with anti-colonial struggles throughout the world. When they decided that Dutch neo-colonial activities in the Indonesian archipelago had gone beyond the pale, they urged their members not to unload Dutch cargo ships in American ports. In 1948, moreover, an ILWU fact-finding commission traveling throughout Europe reported about their visit to the Netherlands that Dutch unions from across the political spectrum suffered from an “anti-Russian
war psychology" because they feared "their colonies [were] slipping away" due to "those terrible Russians."  

This uncanny rank-and-file study commission – including a Dutch-speaking member of ILWU local 34 in San Francisco named Herman Stuyvelaar – did not report approvingly on the status of labor unions in the Netherlands. The commissioners decided that in the Netherlands "voices of decency and sanity are weak," while the Dutch labor movement revealed a "sad portrait of division and disunity." Working conditions for longshoremen in the "mechanically efficient" commercial seaports of Amsterdam and Rotterdam "are much the same as they were on our Pacific coast prior to 1934." Although the ILWU commissioners spoke highly of the Netherlands social security system and the availability of modern housing in the big cities, they were "greatly disappointed" with the way in which only the "speeches of Marshall, Bevin, and Spaak" were covered in the media. In contrast, the Eastern European delegates to the UN conference in Paris "receive practically no mention and if they do, it is generally distorted." The commissioners made this point to bolster their overall conclusion that the Netherlands should be viewed as a "main fortress for international fascism," because the Dutch press and radio were perhaps more "venomous" in their anti-Soviet propaganda than the US media.

Regardless of internal ideological differences, it was clear that organized labor in the United States paid attention to the complex relationships between capitalism, imperialism, and the exploitation of indigenous workers in Asia. However, mobilizing a more general concern among Americans regarding Indonesians' right to self-determination was a tricky process, because the effective Netherlands public relations campaign mounted in the United States after World War II was designed, in part, to perpetuate certain preconceptions about the meanings of Dutch culture. In the imagination of many Americans, after all, the Netherlands continued to be characterized as an exceptionally loyal American ally. Many Americans viewed the Netherlands as the home of courageous anti-Nazis who had tried to save many Jewish compatriots from the gas chambers. In the process, these Americans glossed over the fact that an almost equally large percentage of the Dutch population had willingly collaborated with the German occupiers. Harking back to nineteenth-century imagery, the media still represented the Netherlands as a like-minded democratic society renowned for its cleanliness and industriousness, despite the disturbing information about neo-colonial activities in the Indonesian archipelago that began to capture the attention of organized labor, some journalists, and a few politicians in Washington. As a result, the average American citizen found it hard to believe that such a brave and tolerant country, home of the descendants of Hans Brinker and his fellow-skaters, was engaged in "Ravaging Java."

At the same time, in light of the generally limited training in world geography
in American public schools, Indonesia remained an unfamiliar place on the atlas
to most Americans. A significant portion of the US population may not have
known that Christopher Columbus, when he stumbled onto the North Ameri-
can continent in the late fifteenth century, was trying to discover a safe passage to
“The Indies,” where he had hoped to locate abundant supplies of spices and silk.
Even if an ordinary American knew about Columbus’s search for the Indies, he or
she may not have realized that Indonesia was a different name for the very same
chain of islands. While a reference to the Netherlands or Holland in 1946 or 1947
may have elicited an approving smile and summoned a sense of familiarity in the
average American citizen, it is likely that a newspaper article about Sukarno, Hat-
ta, or Sjahrir and Indonesia’s anti-colonial struggle produced either bewilder-
ment or a confession of ignorance about Asia’s political topography.

Nonetheless, the middle-of-the-road labor movement in America endorsed
the right of all colonized people to establish independence; the AFL, CIO, and
ILWU had placed Indonesians’ struggle for freedom on its political agenda. During
these early postwar years, organized labor in the United States could count
on the loyalty of approximately 35 percent of the nation’s work force, as it was ex-
periencing a short-lived golden age. By 1947, however, members of the US Con-
gress drafted legislation to restrain the growth of union membership. Legislators’
aim was to curtail the practice of collective bargaining that the 1935 Wagner Na-
tional Labor Relations Act had rendered legal. However, the Taft-Hartley Labor
Act, which the US Congress passed in 1947 by overriding President Truman’s ve-
to, amended the Wagner Act by setting new limits on union organizing and im-
posing more stringent controls on organized labor’s finances. Nonetheless, the
political support that the AFL, CIO, and ILWU offered to Indonesian nationalists
must have trickled down in a diffused manner to a fair number of America’s ap-
proximately 14 million union members.

There was yet another factor that influenced popular awareness of Indone-
sians’ plight at this time. Hundreds of thousands of American workers, whether or
not they were unionized, fought in the Asia-Pacific Theater during World War II.
Even if they had never set foot on Dutch East Indies soil, most of them were ca-
ple of imagining Japan’s brutal treatment of the archipelago’s hapless women,
men, and children, whose harvests and food supplies had been confiscated while
adult men had been compelled to work as forced laborers for the Japanese under
dire circumstances. Military service during 1942-1945 had broadened the intel-
lectual and emotional horizons of many American men. Numerous GIs who sur-
vived the war against a demonized Japanese adversary were still periodically
haunted by their frightening experiences in the Pacific. Thus, it seemed likely
that many of them could muster some empathy for Indonesians who had also
suffered at the hands of the Japanese.67

During the fall of 1945, most World-War II veterans had begun the process of
settling into their familiar hometown environments again, where they were busily reclaiming the jobs that women—or a colorful cohort of "Rosie the Riveter[s]"—had performed in their absence. As Averell Harriman noted, many American soldiers returned home to resume their life of playing baseball or watching football and relaxing with a bottle of "Coca Cola while going to the movies." Other ex-servicemen avidly cashed in their right to higher education by enrolling in the nation’s universities and community colleges in unprecedented numbers. The average US veteran hoped to reintegrate himself into a normal, civilian existence—a daily life that would envelop him again in the soothing ebb and flow of family, workplace, and local community. Nonetheless, it was also likely that countless former US servicemen could fathom the injustice of Indonesians having to struggle once more, but this time against an enemy who had been America’s trusted wartime ally. If Roosevelt’s disapproving terminology about European colonialism in Asia reverberated beyond August 1945, it was not the Washington policymaking establishment but the general public, with its significant share of recently demobilized veterans, that kept it alive.

While Roosevelt’s anti-imperialism was probably no more than a fuzzy concept in the minds of most ordinary American citizens, it produced acrimonious resentment among European nations that had long since dealt with increasingly powerful nationalist movements in their colonial possessions in Asia. In the wake of Roosevelt’s death, however, the Truman Administration’s evasive attitude on the issue of US anti-imperialism, in general, and the Indonesian independence struggle, in particular, provided relief to Dutch politicians and colonial administrators. But it created an awkward situation at the same time. Although Washington actively endorsed, in a material and political sense, the Netherlands side in the conflict in Southeast Asia, the US did not publicly acknowledge its support for the Dutch.

Economic motives played a considerable role in Washington’s behind-the-scenes support for its Dutch ally. The range of American financial assets and commitments in Southeast Asia was not only substantial, but also had the potential to recover their profitability after 1945 if stable conditions returned to the archipelago, even though these investments in especially Sumatra paled in comparison with US interests in the European arena. One of the tasks of the US foreign policy community was to maintain an equilibrium between the nation’s European and Asian interests. Political priorities and the limitation of military resources, however, tipped the scales. In this complicated balancing act, support for the European colonial powers clearly prevailed until Cold War realities forced Americans to redirect their focus. As Dean Acheson would tell a congressional hearing a few years later, the US could not fire its ammunition evenly across the globe, “because we haven’t got enough shots for that.” Thus, until late 1947, the US government successfully avoided any real entanglement in, or ideological com-
mitment to, the anti-colonial revolutions that had erupted in Southeast Asia after Japan’s surrender, although this alleged neutrality for three years or so was “more apparent than real.”

Washington’s inability to assess what they saw as the muddled political views espoused by the leaders of the Indonesian Republic hampered the formulation of a straightforward US policy concerning the region’s explosive political unrest. State Department officials were conscientiously trying to evaluate the political background of nationalist politicians who had risen to the top. For example, not long after Sukarno and Hatta proclaimed the independent Republic, the State Department’s chief archivist and watchdog concerning international communist issues, Robert E. Murphy, received an inquiry from a senior colleague in the European Affairs Office. The note referred to a report indicating that Sukarno, “leader of the uprising in the Netherlands East Indies, was once in Moscow, presumably at the Far Eastern University, together with his No. 2, Mohammad Hatta.” But the European Affairs official confessed to being confused and wondered whether this was an error, because he had double-checked OSS/R&A report no. 2512, which characterized Sukarno as “anti-communist,” while it referred to Hatta as a “left nationalist who had deserted the [communist] cause.”

At the same time, positive judgments concerning the Netherlands colonial administration had resurfaced towards the end of World War II, when some State Department pundits once again alluded to the distinguished Dutch record of tact, patience, and broad-minded cultural understanding in its governance of the Indonesian archipelago. Washington’s familiarity with this favorable reputation mingled with US policymakers’ uncertainties about the political orientation of the most prominent Indonesian nationalists. This combination lingered beyond the end of the war, because the State Department could only rely on intermittent intelligence reports concerning the Southeast Asian Theater. These erratic bulletins comprised the most earnest efforts the US intelligence community could muster in understanding the area’s conditions. Frequently, such reports relied on data or estimates provided by Dutch informants. Their counsel yielded contradictory conclusions, because Dutch assessments reached the State Department alongside reports from other intelligence sources.

It was likely that the lack of internal coherence in the research on Southeast Asia did not differ too much from the conflicting intelligence communiqués received from the European Theater. Soon after taking office, Harry Truman expressed his annoyance with the overwhelming quantity of political and military assessments that landed on his desk every day. He grumbled that many of these reports, even though they focused on the political situation in the exact same region, reached radically different conclusions merely because they were submitted by different intelligence agencies. However, compared to the flood of research reports about European conditions that inundated either Truman’s Oval Office
or random State Department desks, the available intelligence concerning the nationalist upheavals in Southeast Asia must have resembled a mere trickle.

In addition, more structural factors influenced the State Department’s “weak and negative” policies towards colonial Indonesia, as an official in the Philippines and Southeast Asian Affairs Division (PSA) formulated it, and this organizational imbalance became increasingly clumsy and disruptive in the postwar era. Aside from the State Department’s singular focus on European reconstruction, two practical problems hampered its ability to handle colonial conflicts in Southeast Asia. The first issue revolved around the organization of jurisdictional authority within the Department. The Philippines and Southeast Asian Affairs Division was responsible for safeguarding American interests in territories such as the Dutch East Indies, the Malay Peninsula, Burma, and Indochina. These regions, however, were still part of the colonial empires of the Netherlands, Great Britain, and France, even if the internal political conditions in these societies were highly unsettled due to vibrant nationalist movements that had unilaterally claimed their nations’ independence.

As a result, PSA had joint responsibility with several other divisions that fell within the orbit of the Office of European Affairs. In the case of colonial Indonesia, this entailed the powerful Division of Northern European Affairs. Also, the authoritative Office of Far Eastern Affairs (FE) wielded influence over policy propositions focusing on Southeast Asia. In practice, however, the shared jurisdiction over US policy towards the Dutch East Indies meant that before the Philippines and Southeast Asian Affairs Division could present a policy proposal to high-ranking officials in the Department, it required not only approval of the Northern European Affairs Division but also the fiat of the Director of the Office of European Affairs. The end result of these unwieldy and time-consuming procedures implied, as Abbot Low Moffat wrote to a superior, that “each Division has in effect a veto over the other and the net effect is frequently a completely negative decision.” In a bid for more independent authority of his PSA Division, Moffat suggested that the paralyzing system of overlapping responsibilities be reformed. He proposed, albeit in vain, that PSA be given sole custody over policy decisions concerning the Indonesian archipelago, without having to obtain the endorsement of colleagues in the powerful Office of European Affairs.

The second structural problem that affected the State Department’s waffling with regard to the Dutch-Indonesian conflict was related to the number as well as the caliber of US diplomats actually stationed in Southeast Asia. Foreign policymakers in postwar Washington increasingly relied on the regular political analysis of the volatile political situation in Southeast Asia provided by American Foreign Service officers on location. After all, these diplomats embodied the State Department’s eyes and ears, being firmly installed in the political trenches of the region.
of crisis-prone areas. However, American diplomatic posts in Southeast Asia were few and far between; moreover, all US missions in the region were miserably understaffed.

The US Consulate General in Batavia, for example, employed only six officers, who were responsible for covering the constantly shifting political and socioeconomic developments in an archipelago of 70 to 80 million people, populating a string of islands along the equator that stretched much farther than the distance from Washington to San Francisco. These six isolated and overextended diplomats were also in charge of safeguarding America’s sizable capital assets in the archipelago. These economic investments, embodied in US enterprises such as rubber and tobacco plantations and oil refineries, were valued in official sources at approximately 500,000,000 dollars on the eve of the Japanese invasion. According to the estimates of US consular personnel, however, the American holdings in the archipelago had a real financial worth that was ostensibly “much higher.”

After World War II, the Philippines and Southeast Asian Affairs Division experienced exceptional difficulties in obtaining officers for assignment to diplomatic and consular posts in Southeast Asia, as Abbot Moffat wrote to the Chief of the Far Eastern Office, John Carter Vincent, in May 1947. Our representation in the region, he noted, was “woefully inadequate to the demands of the situation.” He then proceeded to draw a fascinating comparison with US diplomatic missions in Latin America:

I cannot conceive that a realistic appraisal of the world political situation would justify anything as great as the disparity between the attention we give to our relations with the [Latin] American Republics and the attention we give to our relations with those of the Far East. The United States is no longer merely a Western Hemisphere power with the Monroe Doctrine as the basis of its foreign policy. The US is now a world power with a postwar doctrine that is worldwide in scope. All of southern Asia, where seven new nations are coming into being, is in a state of revolution. Economic and political developments now taking place in this vast region will be of the utmost consequence to the whole world, to its power balances and to our international relations and responsibilities. It is imperative that we be in a position to follow these developments closely and be able to cultivate relationships in all fields with the emergent nations — relationships that may determine the future orientation of those nations.

Moffat based his memorandum on a revealing internal policy paper that Charlton Ogburn had researched and compiled. In his inquiry, Ogburn had contrasted the US diplomatic presence in El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Chile, Peru, Ecuador, and Colombia to the US missions in Siam (Thailand), In-
dochina, Malaya, and the Netherlands East Indies. The number of Foreign Service officers in Latin American Republics had reached a grand total of 149, whereas a paltry 30 American diplomats represented the United States in Southeast Asia. The comparison revealed an even more cockeyed picture when demographic and economic data were taken into account. The total population of the Latin American Republics listed in Ogburn’s inquiry amounted to a mere 32 million, whereas close to 120 million people lived in the volatile Southeast Asian possessions of four Western imperial powers. In terms of the volume of US foreign trade, the State Department report determined that its value in Southeast Asia was two-and-a-half times greater than the overall worth of commercial transactions with Latin America. Right before the outbreak of World War II, American exports to, and imports from, Southeast Asia were worth a total of 770,000,000 dollars, while trade with Latin America had not exceeded 325,000,000 dollars.

It is curious, in this context, that Moffat’s complaints coincided with similar grievances concerning Washington’s indifference to the most pressing issues facing Latin America. Already in 1945, Adolf A. Berle – who was known as one of the more capable Latin-American specialists in the State Department – had lamented Washington’s “growing lack of interest” in either neighboring Mexico or other South American countries. By 1949, according to Berle, the situation had further deteriorated and he complained of “sheer neglect and ignorance,” despite the generous number of American Foreign Service officers serving in many Latin American capitals who presumably briefed the State Department on a regular basis.

As far as the Indonesian archipelago was concerned, an inefficient or, in the eyes of a few Southeast Asia specialists, a crippling decision-making process within the State Department combined with an insufficient and lackluster US diplomatic representation. The situation produced a sense of floundering as far as US policy in the region was concerned. Yet this lack of engagement in the immediate postwar years did not seem to bother the most senior officials in the State Department. The economic weakness and potential communist menace in European countries consumed their attention. During this era, the US military establishment concentrated on disabling Hitler’s legacy while also setting up an effective military bureaucracy in the designated US zone in Germany (Office of Military Government of the United States or OMGUS). At the same time, America’s political leadership had placed the responsibility for the disarmament of the Japanese Army and the liberation of the Dutch East Indies in British hands, a decision that indirectly conveyed the State Department’s single-minded preoccupation with Europe.

In the late spring of 1945, General Douglas MacArthur recommended to President Truman that US troops should push on to liberate the entire Indone-
sian archipelago. Truman and his advisers in both the Department of State and the War Department, however, rejected the proposal of “Mr. Prima Donna, Brass Hat, Five Star MacArthur,” as Truman called him in jest. Later, the General would seethe with anger at Truman’s “political meddling in what was essentially a military matter.” Although he assured Commander-in-Chief Truman and his political counselors in Washington that America’s campaign into Java and Sumatra would not only achieve “full success at a minor cost” but would also restore the Dutch government’s “orderly administration,” his proposal was summarily vetoed. Whether this decision stemmed from America’s reluctance to function as the liberator of European possessions in order to return them to their former colonial rulers is less than certain, even though an Asia expert in the State Department argued that US soldiers should not lose their lives for the sake of recovering the British colonial empire and its French and Dutch acolytes.

As a result, American and Australian manpower operating in New Guinea and on the east coast of Borneo (Kalimantan) under MacArthur’s command was officially ordered to stay away from Java and Sumatra. An Allied victory over the large number of Japanese troops stationed on the two main islands of the Dutch East Indies ran the risk of being too time-consuming, because such a military exercise would have postponed the attack on Japan itself. Following Japan’s unconditional surrender in August 1945, however, the fact that Mountbatten’s South East Asia Command was assigned the difficult task of disarming the Japanese Army and Navy and repatriating prisoners of war from the Netherlands East Indies must have struck American policymakers as a serendipitous gift. In October and November of 1945, the dramatic reports from East Java about groups of exuberant Indonesian freedom fighters, whose passionate embrace of Indonesian independence spilled over into attacks on British and Gurkha soldiers as well as unarmed Dutch civilians, strengthened Americans’ sense of relief. These alarming stories about the predicament of British SEAC troops reinforced the State Department’s apathy and justified its desire to stay above the fray. Yet whenever the opportunity arose, the US used its towering influence to create the appearance in world opinion, despite Washington’s formal posture of neutrality, that America rather than Britain was capable of saving peace in Indonesia.
CHAPTER EIGHT

Indonesia’s Struggle for Independence and the Outside World: England, Australia, and the United States in Search of a Peaceful Solution

On October 31, 1945, a telegram from the American Consul General in Batavia to the Secretary of State painted a picture of the chaotic situation in Java in rough brush strokes. Serious fights had just occurred in Surabaya, Semarang, and Batavia involving groups of Indonesian nationalists, armed Japanese troops, and Louis Mountbatten’s South East Asia Command (SEAC) forces trying to get a handle on the situation. A brigade of British soldiers had taken Surabaya “sans firing a shot,” the US envoy asserted, only to be attacked by bands of Indonesians with Japanese guns. In the ensuing battle, the young Indonesian men killed a British Brigadier-General “with knives and parangs.” The Allied soldiers, for their part, tried “to avoid bloodshed, but lawless armed looters and fanatics [were] out of control,” rendering the Dutch defenseless because they “lacked men, arms, and the authority to act.” Amidst all this confusion, President Sukarno attempted to appease the revolutionary youths in East Java by addressing the crowd in Surabaya, but he was “hooted down.” Nobody seemed able to restrain the “armed mobs of hotheaded Indonesian freedom fighters,” who were commanded by small-time “gang leaders,” holding allegiance to no one but themselves and their own vision of merdeka. The Indonesian Republic’s authorities, meanwhile, admitted they were not in control and Sukarno had agreed to discuss the Republic’s precarious position with General Christison.¹

A day later, on November 1, 1945, the US Consul General forwarded a summary to Washington of the stern communiqué that the Commander of the Allied Forces in the Netherlands East Indies (AFNEI), Sir Philip Christison, issued in the wake of Brigadier General Aubertin Walter Southern Mallaby’s death.² Christison warned that “the truce agreed upon in the presence of Sukarno and Hatta was broken by nationalists who foully murdered General Mallaby.” He threatened that unless the killers surrender to AFNEI, he intended to deploy the comprehensive weight of his “sea, land, and air forces and all the weapons of modern war against them until they are crushed.” As a postscript in his dispatch to the State Department, the American diplomat claimed that Christison had also personally furnished him with the startling but unconfirmed information that “five former German submarine commanders and some Japanese army officers are training and possibly leading the natives in East Java.”³
Before mid-October 1945, only fragmented and sometimes contradictory news about the political situation in Java and Sumatra had reached the American policymaking establishment and the newspaper-reading or radio-listening public in general. According to a telegram from the Netherlands embassy’s chargé d’affaires in Washington to the Dutch Foreign Minister, American correspondents for the AP and UPI wire services and the Herald Tribune created the impression that the “Sukarno movement was much stronger” than Dutch authorities in Java had heretofore acknowledged. US journalists had also transmitted a news story that a prominent Dutchman in the Indonesian archipelago – Charles O. van der Plas – was labeling the situation “explosive”; he had allegedly predicted the imminent outbreak of a “horrific racial conflagration.”4 In response to the chargé d’affaire’s request to be briefed, the Netherlands Foreign Minister, Eelco van Kliefens, reassured him that it was the Japanese Commander-in-Chief who had proclaimed the independence of Indonesia only eight days after Japan’s unconditional surrender, essentially as a last-ditch act of aggression toward the Western Allies. With Japanese assistance and by utilizing the occupiers’ wartime radio network, Sukarno had managed to evoke the false impression that the archipelago’s so-called independence relied on “Indonesians’ unanimous desire.” Van Kliefens added, however, that the Dutch government was convinced that peace and order could easily be restored by “forceful action against a limited number of extremists.”5

His compatriot Van der Plas, who had landed in Batavia from Australia on September 15, 1945, to make preparatory arrangements for the arrival of the Netherlands Indies Civil Administration (NICA), shared this view but added a curious level of concreteness. He prophesied that the slightest show of Dutch force “will cause eighty percent of the [nationalist] movement to collapse.”6 His numerical specificity was peculiar, but it could possibly have served as a crutch he held on to when facing the frightening and hostile environment of postwar Java, where few things reminded him of the rigid hierarchies of the colonial order he had left behind in 1942. In this context, the observations offered by the French expert on Javanese epigraphy, Louis Damais, may be enlightening. Throughout the 1930s, he had lived and worked in prewar Java, surrounded by Dutch intellectuals who devoted their lives to archeological and philological scholarship concerning Javanese and Balinese monuments and texts. In early October 1945, Damais wrote from Batavia to his old friend in Washington, Claire Holt, that because of “their inferiority complex they [the Dutch] are always afraid” even when there “is no reason to be afraid. And people who are afraid can do or say very stupid things.” In the next letter in mid-November, Damais noted that “the Dutch have the great talent to do exactly the wrong thing at the wrong moment” and on January 2, 1946, he criticized the Dutch again for behaving “awfully” as if “their intelligence is completely obliterated by racial and other prejudices.”7
Since America’s Consul General did not make it back from Australia to Batavia until the middle of October, Washington’s only discrete source of intelligence concerning the situation on the ground in Java came from several OSS officers. The first American to provide information on conditions in Java came from several OSS officers. The first American to provide information on conditions in Java was a woman, Jane Foster Zlatovski, who was only thirty-three years old. She reported that the Indonesian nationalist movement was “no master plan by Russians or defeated Japanese to overthrow Western imperialism, but was rather a natural eruption of the volcanic discontent that has been rumbling for decades.” She blithely predicted that Indonesians were “not planning a revolution. They want to talk peace.”8 She was also present, together with Allied Lieutenant Colonel K.K. Kennedy, at an interview with leading nationalists such as Sukarno, Hatta, Amir Sjarifuddin, Iwa Kusumasumantri, Kasman Singodimedjo, and Subardjo. It was reported afterwards that the “Republican government is most anxious to have American capital invested in Indonesia” and also “to resume the prewar export of basic raw materials.”9 Perhaps because she was married to a Russian-born man, however, her activities in the postwar period were shrouded in mystery; in 1957 a Grand Jury in the United States indicted Foster and her husband on charges of espionage for having passed on OSS documents concerning the situation in the Indonesian archipelago to Soviet intelligence agents in 1945.10

Richard K. Stuart was the next OSS officer to come ashore in Java. Having learned the Malay (or Indonesian) language, thus acquiring miscellaneous insights into the archipelago’s history and politics, in a US Military training course during World War II, he also tended to be favorably disposed towards Indonesian nationalism in his initial dispatches to Washington. In fact, Stuart was not the only OSS officer who was influenced by his wartime engagement with European colonies under Japanese occupation. “The longer we stayed in the [Asian] Theater,” an OSS intelligence specialist commented, “the more OSS became permeated with a suspicion and disapproval of Western Imperialism.” Sukarno’s collaboration with the Japanese, however, presented OSS agents with a dilemma. But a R&A research report towards the end of the Pacific War relieved their conscience a bit, because it concluded that Sukarno had only cooperated with the Japanese to protect and preserve the nationalist movement.11

While Richard Stuart was in Java, President Truman abolished the OSS, prompting most of the scholars and other well-educated professionals the wartime agency had recruited to return to civilian life. What also disappeared with these “O-So-Social” intellectuals, many of whom had Ivy League backgrounds, was the intuitive affinity with Asian nationalism that prevailed among members of the intelligence community during World War II. The President reassigned the remainder of the OSS Research and Analysis Branch (R&A) to the State Department. The War Department adopted the OSS clandestine and counter-intelligence branches, which became a transitional unit, known as the
Strategic Services Unit (SSU), instructed to preserve the assets and facilities of the OSS even though its capability to perform “subversive operation abroad” was suspended.¹² The Central Intelligence Group (CIG), a new entity created in January 1946 headed by Rear Admiral Sydney Souers, was only a shadow of the former OSS while Souers could hardly match the forceful leadership of OSS Director, William J. or “Wild Bill” Donovan. But the State-Navy-War Coordinating Committee (SNWCC) also furnished the Truman Administration with the necessary intelligence reports concerning strategically located regions, both in Europe and Asia. During these early Cold War days, however, Washington’s hunger for intelligence information increased exponentially, causing the CIG to expand rapidly and absorb the SSU; the merger of these two units became the basis for the CIA, once the US Congress passed the National Security Act in mid-1947.¹³

In their reports in the immediate post-World War II period, these different intelligence branches produced a variety of interpretations of Indonesian nationalism and its leaders, resulting in a murky picture that relied more on speculation than solid evidence. Even though there were no “true-blooded” communists in Prime Minister Sutan Sjahrir’s cabinet, the Strategic Services Unit tried to convince Washington policymakers that many prominent Indonesian politicians were reputedly former communists, who would undoubtedly wield their sinister influence in government circles.¹⁴ The SSU also emphasized the close relationship between the labor movement and the communist party; in fact, an SSU report repeated the rumor that before the arrival of the Allied SEAC forces, both Russian and Chinese communists had already visited Java and Sumatra. Also “young Australian troops with communist leanings” allegedly played a role in distributing leaflets containing communist propaganda to the inhabitants of the eastern Indonesian islands.¹⁵

President Sukarno and Vice President Hatta, other US intelligence sources suggested, were genuine “radical” nationalists. Despite their history of wartime collaboration, they should not be dismissed as mere “Japanese creations,” because both of them were astute politicians reaching for the goal of Indonesia’s merdeka that they had aspired to since early adulthood.¹⁶ An analysis from the R&A branch within the State Department, meanwhile, emphasized that Sjahrir’s cabinet was “composed largely of moderate officials and intellectuals.”¹⁷ In contrast, the influential expert on the worldwide communist movement in the State Department, Robert E. Murphy, labeled Sjahrir a Soviet fellow traveler. Murphy, after reading Sjahrir’s political meditations in his booklet Perdjoeangan Kita (or Perjuangan Kita, Our Struggle), scribbled on the cover sheet of the English translation of the pamphlet: “certainly a quasi-communist.”¹⁸ Yet other US intelligence sources appraised Sjahrir as reasonable and friendly to the West because of his desire to settle the anti-colonial dispute by diplomatic means. Sjahrir, who was a socialist dedicated to democratic principles, thus found himself in a posi-
tion full of contradictions. Various observers in the West feared he was a communist, while some of his fellow nationalists with bona fide communist credentials denounced him as a “tool of the British and Dutch” and a spokesman for “bourgeois intellectuals unable to lead a social revolution.” However, OSS officer Richard Stuart’s reports, once he had a chance to observe and analyze the actual situation in the Indonesian archipelago during the autumn of 1945, corroborated the more positive assessments regarding Sjahrir and his nationalist colleagues. He also concluded that the Republic was grounded in a legitimate anti-colonial movement, based on overwhelming popular support, that was neither a Japanese construction nor a Kremlin-guided conspiracy.

Soon after Walter Foote managed to resume the reigns of his hurriedly reconstituted diplomatic post in Batavia, the pro-Dutch Consul General’s early telegrams confirmed the vigor of the independence movement alluded to in intelligence reports and the American media, although his judgments concerning the blame for the prevailing lawlessness in Java differed from his compatriot, the OSS agent Richard Stuart. In his cables and dispatches, Foote conveyed the volatility of the situation in hyperbolic sentences. He confessed his astonishment at the apparent intensity of the Republic’s popular support, but he also underscored Republican politicians’ tenuous hold over “gang leaders” and their “hot-headed” followers in East Java. The remark in his telegram to the Secretary of State on October 31, 1945, about reticent British troops trying to forestall bloody confrontations, was another interesting issue. It is likely that he made this point after his good friend Van Mook, with whom he maintained almost daily contact once both of them had returned from Australia to Batavia, expressed his anger at SEAC troops’ reluctance to take decisive action, stemming from their wish to limit casualties.

To a great extent, Walter Foote’s pro-Dutch impulses originated from his intimate familiarity with the colonial community of the Dutch East Indies, thanks to his consular placements in Medan and Batavia since the late 1920’s. He had formed his patronizing convictions concerning the indigenous populations of the archipelago in the bygone days of Dutch culture, implanted and transformed overseas in the tropical soil of the Netherlands East Indies. An illustration of his views surfaced in 1944, when it was still plausible to expect that American and Australian troops under Douglas MacArthur’s command might be the liberators of the entire Dutch East Indies. In an effort to prepare the US General for his potential assignment in Java and Sumatra, Foote had offered his subjective opinions disguised as political advice. He tried to impress upon MacArthur that almost all natives of the archipelago were “polite, docile, friendly, and possess a sense of humor somewhat akin to our own.” But the only things in life that Indonesians truly cared about, he informed the American general, were limited to “their wives, children, rice fields, carabaos, chickens, a bamboo hut in a garden of banana and
coconut trees, an occasional visit to the moving pictures (especially when US ‘Westerns’ are shown) and a new sarong now and then, particularly around their new year.”

Once Foote was again ensconced in a comfortable bungalow in Hotel des Indes in October 1945, the tall, affable Texan resumed his accustomed existence as US Consul General. In his daily comportment – he preferred to be called “Uncle Billy” – he tried to look as dashing in his white linen suits and ten-gallon Panama hats as he did before World War II; he was, as Paul Gardner has aptly described him, “an old hand in a changed land.” He spoke Dutch, and his Indonesian was fluent enough to have published a textbook on Malay grammar during World War II that was used to train US military personnel. On Sunday mornings, he often invited Dutch, British, and American residents living in Batavia to “mint julep brunches” in his home. Even though Indonesians rarely attended his bourbon-soaked gatherings, he also communicated with Republican leaders and considered some of them his personal friends. In due course, he entertained Sukarno at his private residence and wrote to Washington that Sukarno was a “charming man – a good talker and a fine listener” who was “sincere” in his desire to reach a settlement with the Dutch. Nonetheless, he tended to treat young Republican officials in an avuncular manner, as if they were “immature boys” who should simply listen to their wiser “big brother” from the United States. He also could not refrain from addressing his eagerly awaited US Foreign Service secretary, a well-trained and capable woman, as “precious doll” or “my pretty little lady.” His natural affinities lay with his Dutch pals such as Lieutenant-Governor General Van Mook. Having relished the entitlements and creature comforts of the old “colonial atmosphere” of the Dutch East Indies for twenty years already, Foote was viewed by more progressive Dutch people as a reactionary colonial diehard, an opinion that London’s Consul General in Batavia, John L.M. Mitcheson, shared.

During his third tour of duty as chief of the US diplomatic legation in Batavia in 1945-1947 – after which he was reassigned to Colombo, Ceylon (now Sri Lanka), in 1948 – he tried to convince the State Department that most Indonesians were not anti-Dutch. On several occasions, he repeated the same banal viewpoints he had submitted to Douglas MacArthur in 1944. In a message to the State Department, he depicted the majority of the population as “entirely apathetic” regarding the question of independence, because they were content with their family life in ramshackle dwellings in rural villages, while tending to their water buffaloes and rice fields. When armed clashes became an endemic feature of daily life, Foote was quick to point his finger at the Republic as the guilty party. He informed the State Department that the political trend in the Republic leaned toward radicalism. Moderate leaders, he argued, were losing ground to extremists such as TNI Commander-in-Chief Sudirman, whom Foote described as
“a non-entity” – a characterization that illustrated his flawed insights into the important personalities and power relations prevailing within the Republic. He added that the Dutch, whose patience was being sorely tested, had difficulty restraining themselves because Indonesians interpreted their temperance as a sign of weakness.28

According to Foote, the Republic’s government also maintained close contacts with Soviet-trained communists, ties that dated back to the era before World War II. In May 1947, he informed Washington that the “present leaders of the Republic often [reveal] very little difference between their ideologies... [and] communism with its slogans, even outside the PKI organization, which penetrates into and continues to eat its way into the lower classes of the population...” He further emphasized “the strong influence of Moscow” on the PKI, even if at this stage it was still “limited to propaganda and moral support.” In an historical excursion, he added that “after the Jap[anese] surrender, these communist groups made fiery speeches which encouraged even the thinking and friendly Indonesians to oppose anybody who desired the return of the Dutch government.” Foote also stressed the orthodox communist reality behind the PKI’s nationalist façade, which he described as merely an instrumental phase in its goal to bring about a communist revolution. He concluded that despite its still clandestine character, there was a fanatic communist element among the Republic’s population, which, in a sudden change of opinion, he no longer depicted as apathetic. Worst of all, he warned the State Department, was that no one would bring them to a halt because the Republican government itself “is riddled with communists and fellow-travelers.”29

When challenged by Southeast Asia desk officers in the State Department about the erratic quality of his reporting, Foote professed few doubts about the value of the political assessments he forwarded. He responded to Washington’s criticism of his idiosyncratic dispatches by trying to persuade his colleagues in the State Department that he possessed excellent contacts in both the Dutch and the Indonesian camp. He emphasized that he could rely on his intimate local knowledge honed by twenty years of professional experience in the region, enabling him to separate the wheat from the chaff. In several cables he vented his anger at opportunistic journalists, whose insights into the complexities of Indonesian society were so shallow that they wrote stories for their various newspapers based on fantasy rather than fact. He warned the State Department that a motley group of Western reporters, and even worse, “some other foreign consuls” – his number-one culprit being English Consul General Mitcheson – were disseminating “many types of false rumors or unconfirmed reports.” He asserted that the American press corps was “poorly informed about the present nature of the Republic due to ignorance, bias, or false glamorizing by many correspondents.”30
In fact, Foote’s annoyance with foreign reporters as well as the local press was a recurrent theme. In a telegram to the Secretary of State in early 1947, he quoted a caustic statement allegedly made by Sjahrir, who had told him that all sorts of “sensational headline hunters” among journalists, both foreign and domestic, were “willing to sabotage peace for mere news.”†31 Foote displayed little appreciation for anyone who offered a more positive appraisal of the Republic and its leaders, and his tendency to denigrate the political viability of the Indonesian government headquartered in Yogyakarta was enthusiastically supported by the Consulate’s political officer, Glenn Abbey. Within the US Consulate, however, there was one dissenting voice; it belonged to the naval liaison officer, Captain McCallum, who often embarrassed Foote by openly expressing his pro-Indonesian sentiments. The Consul General was outraged when during a meeting McCallum proposed to ask Dutch authorities when they would finally “send some medicines and clothing to those poor Indonesians.” Foote thought that the Captain’s partisan pronouncements were responsible, in part, for the Dutch perception that the US government was “not neutral” and actually favored the Republic; as a demonstration of his annoyance with McCallum, he submitted a request to the authorities in Washington for the Naval Attaché’s replacement.†32

Inevitably, Foote encountered his own critics, too. Louis Damais, who stayed on in Batavia until the autumn of 1947 when he left for Paris, berated Foote’s behavior during the previous two years as “shameful” and “anything but polite... don’t even speak of diplomatic.”†33 Also ex-Prime Minister Willem Schermerhorn, in the fastidious diary he kept during his involvement in the negotiations with Republican officials during 1946–1947, did not perceive Foote as a harmless or inconsequential presence in Batavia either. The social democratic Schermerhorn had been appointed to the Dutch Commission General, authorized to negotiate with the Indonesian Republic on behalf of the government in The Hague during 1946–1947. He was a psychologically astute observer of people in his environment, and he displayed uncanny political insights into the Indonesian situation in the context of postwar international relations. Schermerhorn’s daily journal entries constituted a remarkable record, in which he portrayed the US Consul General as a devious and shady character. He further qualified his own observations, however, when he noted that Foote did not merely act out his personal prejudices; instead, he also conveyed the State Department’s Janus-faced pronouncements.†34

Whether knowingly or unwittingly, Foote replicated Washington’s ambivalence when it came to the national liberation movements in Indonesia and Vietnam. During the early autumn of 1945, a State Department report concerning “Problems Facing the Allies,” for instance, made the convoluted argument that even though Washington maintained its firm commitment to peoples’ right to self-determination, the US did not possess a license to intervene in the internal
affairs of its allies, just as Great Britain did not have the right to meddle in politi-
cal matters in Puerto Rico. In justifying this position, Washington could also
hide behind the provisions of the UN Charter, specifically Article 2(7) concern-
ing domestic jurisdiction and UN members’ legal and political defenses against
outside interference in internal affairs. However, the Truman Administration
dessembled in its public announcements in the immediate postwar months re-
garding America’s abiding support for the international doctrine of self-determi-
nation. In reality these were hollow statements, designed not only to pay lip serv-
ice to the Atlantic Charter but perhaps to honor the memory of Roosevelt as
well.

After World War II, Washington’s allegedly neutral position was contradicted
by the State Department’s decision in the early autumn of 1945 to grant permis-
sion, for instance, to a sophisticated Dutch military unit, trained at the US Marine
Corps’ base at Camp Lejeune in North Carolina, to depart for the Netherlands
East Indies. Consisting of more than 200 Dutch officers and almost 2,000 sol-
diers, the US Marine Corps had drilled the Dutch battalion residing at Camp
Lejeune into an auspicious fighting force. Their US Marine Corps instruction in
North Carolina had begun as a project designed to take advantage of Dutch mil-
itary expertise and local knowledge of the Southeast Asian archipelago, because
in 1944 and the first half of 1945 the US Marines’ arduous efforts in the war in
the Pacific still included the potential prospect of having to challenge the Japan-
ese in Java and Sumatra. Upon conclusion of the Dutch Marines’ training in the
summer of 1945, however, the post-surrender duties of demobilizing Japan’s
army in colonial Indonesia had already been transferred from MacArthur’s
SWPA to Mountbatten’s SEAC command. Hence, Washington’s decision to per-
mit the brigade to leave for Java from the US Navy port of Norfolk, Virginia, on
6 transport ships equipped with approximately 15,000 tons of ammunition,
tanks, trucks, communications technology, medical provisions and other indis-
pensable materials, was evidence of the Truman Administration’s equivocal posi-
tion vis-à-vis the Dutch-Indonesian confrontation brewing in the archipelago.

These inconsistencies also lend insight into US Consul General Foote’s mer-
curial reporting, even though his personal biases concerning Indonesians preced-
ed his friendship with influential Dutch authorities in postwar Batavia and were
not merely the result of a Netherlands propaganda campaign. Instead, during his
embattled tenure as Consul General in a radically altered environment, Foote ap-
peared to play a “double role.” In addition to his daily conversation with Van
Mook and his frequent encounters with other Dutch officials, it was rumored
that he also called on Sutan Sjahrir virtually every day when the latter served as
Prime Minister. During these habitual visits, he apparently presented “an ex-
tremely pro-Republican face” to his Indonesian political contacts. This kind of
personal duplicity was hardly surprising, Schermerhorn conceded in his meticu-
lous diary; instead, Foote’s two-faced behavior was a straightforward reflection of the hesitant and contradictory American policies towards the Dutch-Indonesian conflict.38

Foote’s homecoming to Batavia was preceded by the arrival of troops under Mountbatten’s South East Asia Command by approximately two weeks – a force that in due course consisted of a total of 92,000 British and Indian soldiers. SEAC squadrons had begun to pour into Java and Sumatra in a somewhat disorganized and desultory fashion in late September 1945. Their task was to disarm, demobilize, and repatriate the Japanese military.39 Their equally difficult assignment was to secure the recovery and release of the Allied prisoners of war, thus making it necessary to cooperate with the Republic’s newly established civil authorities in territories where those prisoners were held.40 An ancillary duty was to maintain law and order until Dutch civil servants would return and reassume this responsibility. Mountbatten’s initial plan was to use a “key area” approach by concentrating his troops on the occupation of Batavia and Surabaya in Java, and Medan and Padang in Sumatra; his intention was to transform those bigger cities into regional centers of SEAC’s logistical operations and military authority. However, the unstable circumstances on the ground in Java and Sumatra forced the Allied post-surrender forces to expand their control to the cities of Bandung and Semarang on Java and to Palembang on Sumatra.41 Aside from dire necessity, SEAC’s willingness to collaborate with Republican officials also reflected Mountbatten’s realistic assessment of the decolonizing trend in Asia, which implied that SEAC’s teamwork with nationalists at the local level, whether in the Dutch East Indies, Burma, or Indochina, was inevitable.42 Praised for his “wisdom” by Republican politicians such as Dr. Johannes Leimena – or “Oom Yo” – Mountbatten announced that as SEAC Supreme Commander he would not contribute to any settlement in the Netherlands East Indies unacceptable to world opinion.43 For the sake of SEAC troops’ security and efficiency, he advised the Dutch government in The Hague to issue “imaginative and generous” proclamations and to initiate “realistic and helpful negotiations” with the Indonesian Republic.44

Despite Mountbatten’s urging, the government in The Hague could barely conceive of entering into direct negotiations with Sukarno and Hatta. Even the subtlest hint, suggesting that Van Mook should meet with the Republic’s founders, was received with anger. In late October, when Dutch East Indies authorities felt compelled to meet with Sukarno due to British General Christie’s admonitions, it sent the Cabinet and Parliament in The Hague into a virtual tailspin. Because the Labor Party government, as well as the members of the Second Chamber of the Netherlands Parliament, felt on tender hooks until the general elections scheduled for May 1946 would grant a clearer political mandate, government officials and legislators in The Hague reacted with a combina-
tion of skittishness and negativity. Dutch doubts about the intentions of British forces in Java and Sumatra were also magnified when the Commander of the Allied Forces in the Netherlands East Indies (AFNEI) announced that “the present Indonesian authorities would remain responsible for the government in the areas under Republican control.” Agitated politicians in The Hague and Batavia interpreted AFNEI Commander Christison’s statement to imply a de facto recognition of the Republic. As the Dutch historian, J.J.P. de Jong, argued in a recent article, employing an exotic series of metaphors, Christison’s statement was so sensational that it constituted a “green light” for the release of “the cat among the pigeons” while encouraging “the revolutionary tiger” to escape from his cage. Nonetheless, having landed in the archipelago to carry out their post-surrender assignments, the British troops established a foothold in Java and Sumatra as well as they could, despite Dutch mistrust or the excitable nationalist crowds that greeted them. From a personal perspective, Sutan Sjahrir once described SEAC during this period as providing a protective shield, making its presence a source of relief especially when he contemplated the alternative nightmare “of being left alone in the dark with the Dutch.”

In their confrontations with vibrant pro-independence groups, whether or not they were armed, the British and Gurkha battalions dispatched to Java and Sumatra operated with circumspection. A basic human instinct for self-preservation, or a simple desire to return home to a regular life, motivated SEAC troops to proceed carefully after they had been deployed into the combustible political landscape of the Indonesian archipelago. The knowledge that the newly elected Labor Party government in London – as well as its constituents – did not really want British soldiers to die for the preservation of another European power’s colony, reinforced this cautious attitude. As an English diplomat impatiently noted, “our” troops were freeing the Indies for which “British taxpayers” footed the bill; London should therefore not brook any “nonsense from the Dutch.”

The Foreign Office worried that the risk of using English and US equipment and British and Indian troops to facilitate the reintroduction of Dutch colonial control in the Indonesian archipelago placed England in a double bind. Although the continuance of amicable Anglo-Dutch relations was important, the possibility that English and Gurkha soldiers might have to engage in a violent suppression of a legitimate national liberation movement in Java and Sumatra could trigger a political backlash in India and other parts of the British Empire. At the same time, an overly hurried withdrawal of SEAC troops from the Dutch East Indies could give nationalists on the South Asian subcontinent and elsewhere the idea that, by mustering a sufficient level of popular agitation and anti-colonial violence, they could succeed in the goal of attaining “complete independence.” Closer to home, the reliance of Dutch soldiers in Java and Sumatra on Allied transport ships, jeeps, trucks, and other British and American equipment held
awkward political consequences. In particular, England’s Foreign Minister, Ernest Bevin, faced acrimonious inquiries from government colleagues in London, MP’s in the House of Commons, and his Labor Party constituents.

As a result of such British compunctions, and because the available material and manpower proved inadequate in carrying out their complicated mission, SEAC troops could not always prevent caches of Japanese weapons from falling into the hands of Indonesian nationalists; this happened in some of the larger cities as well as in the interior, where a large number of Japanese soldiers sought refuge. In the small town of Wonosobo in central Java, a former schoolteacher and ex-Peta officer named Sudirman, the future Commander-in-Chief (Panglima Besar) of the Republican National Army (Tentara Nasional Indonesia or TNI), had gathered around him a group of young men with whom he attacked a Japanese military regiment and captured guns, ammunition, and other military gear. By late October, the city of Surabaya was transformed into a veritable weapons depot and militarized fortress, the Japanese having handed over in a series of skirmishes with revolutionary groups an estimated total of 200 cannons, 690 heavy and 700 light machine guns, 25,000 rifles, 1,240 tommy guns, 3,360 revolvers and large quantities of ammunition. According to a persnickety Japanese officer, Sadao Oba, who had been a ranking member of Japan’s Army Supply Department during the war, Indonesian nationalists captured, either by force or through negotiations, even more Japanese military equipment in Bandung. Their newly acquired military treasures consisted of, among others, “51,698 rifles, 1,804 machine guns...56 anti-tank guns, 201 trench mortars,...50 tanks, 159 armored cars, 5,431 trucks, 7,624 kilos of dynamite, 318,454 hand grenades and gun powder and materials for making gun powder.”

As SEAC troops were still pouring into the country during the first two weeks of October, fierce clashes also erupted between Indonesian revolutionary groups and Japanese military units in the cities of Garut, Solo, Yogyakarta, Bandung, and Semarang, resulting in Indonesians’ seizure of temporary control of Bandung and Semarang, while they maintained their authority over Yogyakarta until December 19, 1948. Pro-Dutch observers portrayed the Indonesian participants in these confrontations as “gangs of desperados” or “jahats” (criminals) who engaged in illegal behavior and random acts of aggression against innocent victims “while shouting merdeka.” At the same time, however, a threatening Dutch colonial presence resurfaced in the archipelago’s capital in the form of “roving patrols of trigger-happy KNIL soldiers,” as a staff assistant of AFNEI Commander Christie, US Major Frederick E. Crockett, labeled them. He described these Dutch sentries, some of whom also operated under the umbrella of the Netherlands Indies Civil Administration (NICA), as shooting “at anything that looked suspicious” and when the “hunting was poor” they simply broke into Indonesians’ houses in order to attack inhabitants and ransack the homes “without charges or
In the book of photographs of the Revolution accompanied by ample commentary, which the Republican government issued almost immediately after the official transfer of sovereignty from the Dutch to the Indonesians had occurred, the “cruelties” of these soldiers and the “NICA terror” were described in several captions such as “they killed for the sake of killing. Old men, women, even children became the victims... of NICA brutality.” As a Dutch eyewitness portrayed Indonesians’ visceral hatred of NICA in 1947, “to the mentally backward victims of Republican propaganda, the word NICA acquired a diabolical aura, comparable to ‘Gestapo’ or ‘Kenpeitai’.”

Nine KNIL companies arrived from Australia, along with some Royal Netherlands Army troops and a makeshift unit called the “Doorman Battalion,”
consisting of ex-prisoners of war recruited and mobilized in Singapore. Numerous members of the patrols cruising through the capital city, however, were not Dutchmen but Moluccan, Menadonese, or Indo-Dutch soldiers who had chosen the side of their prewar Dutch colonial officers and former military employers. The reason for this choice varied. Some of them disliked the Republic, because they viewed Sukarno as a “buffoon straight out of a comedy act,” as the protagonist in Y.B. Mangunwijaya’s *The Weaverbirds* called the architect of Indonesia’s independence. Others simply resumed their lives as KNIL soldiers for a lack of alternatives, even if they might have agreed with Mangunwijaya’s fictitious Dutch officer, who told his Indo-Dutch protégé that “the Royal Dutch Army is the true army of the Dutch Crown. The Dutch Colonial Army is nothing but a band of outlaws and hoodlums.”

Before March 1, 1946, SEAC’s High Command became increasingly reluctant to permit Dutch military units to re-enter, in part because the truculent KNIL patrols, particularly those operating in Batavia, were difficult to monitor and restrain. In fact, Mountbatten was highly critical of the Dutch troops already present in Java. Although “ridiculously small in number,” he noted that they were conducting themselves in a “reprehensible manner,” without being able to impose “their will by force of arms.” AFNEI Commander Christison was equally emphatic: “not one single further Dutch soldier” should be allowed to land in Java, because otherwise a civil war would erupt in which “British and Indian troops must certainly become involved.” Thus, when ships loaded with the Dutch Marine brigade trained at the US Marine Corps Camp Lejeune in North Carolina reached Southeast Asian waters, they were prohibited from disembarking in Surabaya, as the Netherlands Indies military leaders had planned. Since the unit had departed from Norfolk, Virginia, it could not simply be dismissed, in part because Washington’s political weight was implicated. Instead, the British reluctantly granted permission for only one battalion to come ashore in Batavia, while the remaining men and their valuable military assets were diverted to Malaya.

Substantial areas of Java and Sumatra were already in nationalist hands when, in the wake of Brigadier General Mallaby’s death, the situation in Surabaya reached a fever pitch. Steady shelling from Allied warships, docked in Surabaya’s harbor, killed city residents and demolished public buildings and residential neighborhoods, while Mosquito and Thunderbolt fighter planes dropped as many as 500 bombs between November 10th and 13th. SEAC forces were also in possession of Sherman and Stuart tanks, which Indonesian *jibaku* squads (Japanese for suicide action), with explosives strapped to their bodies, attacked. Although SEAC commanders asserted that the 5th Indian Division in Surabaya had used restraint and applied only minimal force, numerous unarmed Indonesians were killed by machine-gun fire, while Allied aircraft strafed the columns of fugitives and evacuees crowding the road leading south to Sidoarjo. The official esti-
mates of the number of casualties on both sides vary, but as many as 600 SEAC soldiers were killed during these urban guerrilla battles between late October and late November. The death toll on the Indonesian side may have been as high as 6,000 people.\textsuperscript{52}

The human and material costs of the bloody confrontation in Surabaya were obviously extensive, but they also carried symbolic significance for all parties involved. The memory of Surabaya’s courageous fighters became a “rallying cry” for Indonesian revolutionaries in years to come, whereas it made SEAC commanders acknowledge that protecting British national interests in the short-term required an assiduous commitment to neutrality and non-partisanship in the Dutch–Indonesian Question.\textsuperscript{63} For the Dutch, the battle of Surabaya represented a watershed, because it “shocked many of them into facing [the] reality” that Indonesian nationalism was more than just a gang of fanatics without a genuine popular following.\textsuperscript{64}

A similar but smaller conflict took place in Magelang, a strategically located city in central Java with a relatively comfortable climate because of its cool mountain air at night. The city accommodated large crowds of ex-internees of the Japanese camps, who had been repatriated to hospitals set up by RAPWI officials (Recovery of Allied Prisoners of War and Internees). Magelang was also filled with Indo-Dutch and Chinese residents, who had fled the revolutionary turmoil elsewhere in central Java. Emboldened by news from Surabaya, members of the People’s Security Forces (Tentara Keamanan Rakyat or TKR) and affiliated nationalist groups attacked Gurkha posts on October 31. At the instigation of SEAC authorities, meanwhile, Sukarno was again called upon to bring about a truce, as he had tried to do a short while before in Surabaya.\textsuperscript{65} All these events made clear that during the autumn of 1945, Indonesian nationalists showed themselves, their former colonial overlords, and the rest of the world that they possessed the resolve and ability to mobilize popular support, even if the appearance of total pandemonium persisted. Nevertheless, while this ongoing violence continued Washington maintained a studious silence, despite British pleas for some kind of public statement concerning the Indonesian–Dutch conflict.

Finally, on December 19, 1945, the State Department issued a circumspect press release that no longer referred to Indonesians’ right to self-determination. The communiqué articulated US apprehensions about the contentious situation in Java and Sumatra; it also expressed the Truman Administration’s disappointment with the failure of “a realistic, broad-minded and cooperative approach” and the apparent refusal on the part of the antagonists to “reconcile differences by peaceful means.” Washington’s statement proceeded to call for a settlement that legitimized the “natural aspirations of Indonesian peoples” as well as Dutch rights and interests in the Southeast Asian archipelago.\textsuperscript{66} Despite its relative blandness, the press release, as Robert McMahon has argued, constituted a “diplomatic tri-
umph” for the United States. Without alienating either party in the dispute, the brief communiqué encouraged both sides to return to the negotiating table. SEAC Commander Christison viewed it as a “perfect and well-timed document.” He noted that Washington’s statement not only reinforced the British position but had also aided Van Mook’s efforts to convince the Dutch government in The Hague that a resumption of diplomatic talks with the Indonesian Republic’s representatives was the best option.67

In the midst of these unsettling circumstances, it was conspicuous that Sutan Sjahrir emerged into the political limelight in mid-November as Prime Minister at the head of a new Cabinet, described by a sympathetic Dutch observer as consisting of “extremely gifted and mostly moderate” people “with immaculate reputations.” None of the new Republican leaders were tainted by a history of collaborating with the Japanese during World War II. This political transfer of authority from Sukarno and Hatta to Sjahrir also entailed a transition from an “American presidential” model to an “English parliamentary system,” which should effectively “diminish,” or even undermine, the personal stature of President Sukarno.68 Because Sukarno and Hatta accommodated themselves to more of a background role in the Republic’s new headquarters and safe haven in Yogyakarta during the late autumn of 1945, Sjahrir could positively engage the British call for a negotiated Dutch-Indonesian settlement, an agenda that was
bolstered on December 19, 1945, by the State Department’s press release. Thereafter, the new Prime Minister’s dogged efforts to pursue a diplomatic solution even won him admiration from an unlikely source such as the Netherlands Army’s Commander-in-Chief, Simon H. Spoor, who conceded that “this little man Sjahrir is indeed a great figure; he is a man who possesses an enormous amount of personal courage.”

Once he had formally settled in as Prime Minister, Sutan Sjahrir submitted a demand for the Dutch acknowledgment of the Republic’s sovereignty over the entire archipelago. This proposal was, of course, unacceptable to the government in The Hague. But on behalf of their respective governments, Sjahrir and Van Mook were able to reach a compromise by March, 1946. The Dutch recognition of the Republic’s de facto authority over those regions of Java and Sumatra already under its control would be reciprocated by the nationalists, who agreed to cooperate in the formation of an independent federal state of Indonesia. This federal political entity would be configured as a constituent part – or as a component of a Dutch-Indonesian Gemenebest (Commonwealth) – within the Kingdom of the Netherlands.

The agreement was brokered by a seasoned British diplomat, Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, who was London’s former ambassador to Moscow. The compromise established a common ground that could serve as the basis for further Dutch-Indonesian negotiations, which yielded guarded optimism. Van Mook and a delegation of Republican officials traveled with reasonable expectations to the Netherlands for a meeting with Dutch government officials that took place on the Hoge Veluwe in May, 1946. But their hopes were quickly dashed. Described by a conservative Dutch politician as “a week of disgrace,” the meetings proved to be a dismal failure because the Labor Party government in The Hague was convinced it could not muster the necessary parliamentary support to forge a settlement that would exact even a small degree of independence for the Indonesian Republic.

The abortive talks at the Hoge Veluwe, however, had a boomerang effect. The nationalist political parties represented in the Republican parliament (Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat or KNIP) now demanded that Sjahrir make no more concessions. Instead, some Republican factions – the right wing of Masyumi (Liberal Muslim Party) and most members of the Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI) as well as the smaller Partai Buruh (Labor Party) began to express their opposition to any diplomatic efforts as long as the Dutch were building up their military presence in the archipelago. Of course, Tan Malaka’s independent nationalist federation, Persatuan Perjuangan (Fighting Front or PP), was most outspoken in its objections to all forms of negotiations with an adversary who was nothing but “a thief in our house.” Or as an entry in Lukisan Revolusi explained it: “What is the point of negotiations? They are nothing but a downpour of cold water on the raging fire of the Revolution.”
Sjahrir and Schermerhorn signing a preliminary agreement on November 15, 1946
Having already survived a parliamentary challenge in early March 1946, Sjahrir’s second cabinet continued to pursue a diplomatic settlement, despite The Hague’s hardheaded refusal to take the Republican claim of sovereignty over parts of Sumatra seriously, or to assess all other Republican proposals in a constructive manner. The general elections in the Netherlands that took place in mid-May 1946, meanwhile, brought a changing of the guard. The electoral results put a more conservative coalition government in power, with Louis J.M. Beel as Prime Minister and the prewar expert on colonial affairs, Johannes A. Jonkman, as Minister of Overseas Territories. To jolt the two sides out of their entrenched positions, the British Foreign Office in consultation with US State Department colleagues applied renewed pressure, especially on the Dutch, to return to the bargaining table. In response, the government in The Hague authorized a Commission General, sanctioned by a Royal Decree, to negotiate with representatives of the Indonesian Republic.

The Minister of Overseas Territories, J.A. Jonkman, addressed the Commission General’s members as they were about to depart for Java in language that sounded hopeful: “As you leave, you carry within you the Dutch nation’s desire for peace. You depart to confirm emphatically that based on our historic calling, the Netherlands is willing and eager to construct a new political relationship in cooperation with the peoples of Indonesia.” The institution of the Commission General represented a placating gesture. It could also be seen, however, as a shrewd Dutch move to buy time and to secure leeway for the immense military preparations that were underway at the moment the Commission General departed for Java. The Foreign Office in London, at the same time, dispatched to Java yet another accomplished diplomat, Lord Killearn, to oversee a next round of Dutch–Indonesian talks. Under Killearn’s watchful eye – or in the company of his “witty and sagacious bulk” – new negotiations opened on October 7, 1946. During the course of the next month, on November 15, 1946, a preliminary truce was reached and further compromises were agreed upon in a draft agreement that eventually would become the Linggajati accord, formally concluded in the spring of 1947. The tentative agreement stipulated, for the first time, that the Netherlands conceded the legitimate existence of the *Republik Indonesia* in large parts of Java and Sumatra.

As these intensive discussions were transpiring in Southeast Asia, a curious event occurred on the other side of the globe in Washington DC, reported by the Chief of US Naval Intelligence, Rear Admiral Thomas B. Inglis, in a memorandum to the State Department. In his communication of late October 1946, Inglis recounted having met the Dutch Ambassador to the United States, Alexander Loudon, at a reception of Washington’s diplomatic community. Although the two had never been introduced before, Ambassador Loudon sought out Rear Admiral Inglis’ company in order to impart some very important information. Accord-
ing to the Naval Intelligence Chief, Loudon gave him a piece of his mind in “lan-
guage that was at times forthright and blunt to the point of being undiplomatic,
not to say unpleasant,” even though he emphasized that the Dutch Ambassador
was “stone cold sober,” despite the cocktail party setting.76

Loudon warned Rear Admiral Inglis that the situation in the Netherlands East
Indies was deteriorating to the extent “that nothing could be done about it now.”
He implied that both the United States and Great Britain “had let the Dutch
down.” Indonesia, after all, contained too many “different races, languages, reli-
gions, and ideologies” and the Dutch colonial government had embodied the
only “unifying” force in the archipelago. Loudon predicted that a “communist
infiltration into the vacuum created by the absence of Dutch influence” in the
Indonesian archipelago would inevitably occur. Many nations in the world
would “suffer,” and he ended his tirade with the prophecy that “blood would
flow.”77

In his outburst, Alexander Loudon vented his exasperation with the State De-
partment’s non-committal stance vis-à-vis the Dutch-Indonesian Question.
Loudon was known to some State Department officials as a “wrought up” char-
acter, who sometimes wore his emotions on his sleeve. Private feelings of frustration in his dealings with the State Department in 1946, therefore, may have played their part in his surprising tantrum. During the previous months, he had regularly visited both Dean Acheson as well as John Hickerson and his colleagues in the Office of European Affairs, but he was unable to break through the State Department’s reticence to define a clear cut US policy towards the Dutch-Indonesian conflict. In a meeting on July 11, 1946, for example, Dean Acheson had told Ambassador Loudon that it would be a “great disaster” if the situation were
to deteriorate to the extent that the Dutch would think military force was the only option. Such a course of action would be catastrophic and “could redound only to the benefit of communist propaganda.” Acheson then proceeded to flatter Loudon; he expressed his conviction that the Dutch would employ “all the resources of their colonial experience to reach political settlement.”

“In all frankness,” John Hickerson and his fellow officers in the European Affairs Office explained to Loudon about a month later, they thought that “as good friends of the Netherlands” they should nonetheless chastise the Dutch government “for being on a bad wicket as regards to worldwide opinion” in its dealings with the Yogyakarta Republic. Both Hickerson and his colleague Hugh Cumming offered the opinion that the Indonesian Question would “almost certainly be raised again in the United Nations, probably in the next meeting of the General Assembly.” Hence, they advised Loudon that he ought to encourage his government in The Hague to engage as soon as possible in “some constructive action” leading to a “satisfactory solution” prior to the next gathering of the UN Assembly.

John Hickerson was on good terms with Alex Loudon, as he called him. He later wrote that ever since Loudon began his tenure as the Dutch diplomatic envoy to Washington in 1938, the two of them had worked together productively and he harbored “a very high regard for his integrity.” Although Loudon had apparently experienced some “staff difficulties” in the Embassy and was currently “not in the good graces of the Netherlands Foreign Office,” Hickerson noted that these issues did not detract from his appreciation of Loudon as an honest Dutchman and a “good friend of the United States.” Hence, Hickerson’s avuncular advice was probably without ulterior motive. However, the State Department’s public stance of judicious neutrality – even if the appearance of impartiality masked the covert political and material support the United States provided to its long-standing Dutch ally – prevented Hickerson from giving the embattled Dutch ambassador any formal reassurances.

Until SEAC troops began to withdraw from Java and Sumatra in November 1946, most Dutch politicians and other observers had either mistrusted or resented the US-backed presence of SEAC in their colonial possession in Southeast Asia, although some army planners appreciated it as a blessing in disguise. SEAC’s discharge of its post-surrender responsibilities in the archipelago furnished the Dutch political and military establishment with a much-needed reprieve, enabling it to begin the huge efforts of raising a military force destined for the restoration of peace and tranquility in the Netherlands East Indies. In a relatively short period, the civilian and military authorities of the demographically small Dutch nation-state managed to mobilize a fighting force for the Southeast Asian Theater that in due course would swell to approximately 140,000 men, including the large number of KNIL soldiers already in place and functioning in Ja-
va and Sumatra. Some estimates have mentioned the even higher number of 170,000 Dutch troops in the archipelago. As the Dutch historian, Cees Fasseur, has highlighted, the enormity of this endeavor becomes even more striking when considering that the male population of the postwar Netherlands between the ages of twenty and forty-four was enumerated in the most recent census as consisting of 1,750,000. Thus, almost eight percent of the nation’s men in the prime of their productive and reproductive lives were drafted as conscripts; others enlisted as volunteers, only to be shipped to the other side of the globe for the purpose of restoring law and order and defending vulnerable Dutch women, men, and children against nationalists’ aggression. At the same time, their official charge consisted of protecting the overwhelming majority of presumably apolitical villagers in Java and Sumatra from a small gang of urban “extremists,” who were depicted as terrorizing their illiterate compatriots—a set of assignments that was justified as either a “mission of mercy” or “Peace Corps work avant la lettre.”

These Dutch troops would not be dispatched to the eastern regions of the archipelago or to the “great east” (De Grote Oost), however, because a contrasting situation existed there.

In August 1945, approximately 50,000 Australian troops, representing MacArthur’s South West Pacific Area Command, were still operating in areas such as Borneo (Kalimantan), Celebes (Sulawesi), the Moluccan islands (Maluku), and New Guinea (now the Indonesian Republic’s province of Irian Jaya in the western part of the island and the Republic of Papua New Guinea in the east). Australian forces tended to accept and then execute Japan’s unconditional surrender in a different way. They were inclined to dump Japanese weapons into the sea and turn over Japanese prisoners to returning Dutch authorities as quickly as was feasible. They not only facilitated the return of Dutch residents to the region, but also accommodated personnel representing the newly configured Netherlands Indies Civil Administration, who were sent from either the Netherlands and Java or from other places abroad. Australian officers tolerated, too, the active involvement in the region of a quickly assembled combination of KNIL troops and ex-prisoners of war. Mobilized almost singlehandedly by the Netherlands liaison officer at Australian headquarters on Morotai, these ad hoc forces descended upon the eastern archipelago for the purpose of assisting in the disarmament of the Japanese and to accelerate the restoration of Dutch colonial control.

In the case of Australian troops in eastern Indonesia, the newly elected Labor Party government of Joseph Benedict Chifley was actually trying to bring them back home by Christmas, 1945, because the Prime Minister was convinced that his country’s soldiers should not become embroiled in the suppression of a genuine national liberation movement. In the rush to return to the homeland down under, members of the Australian military could also take advantage of the concrete political conditions left behind in the outer regions of the archipelago,
where officers of Japan’s Navy had wielded principal control. Whereas Japanese Army commanders in Java and Sumatra had actively nurtured an indigenous fighting force – on the assumption that they would eventually join in the military battle with the Western Alliance – Japan’s naval hierarchy in eastern Indonesia had censored and repressed most local attempts to form military organizations. As a result, the nationalist movement in eastern Indonesia was still in its infancy. For instance, when Australian troops landed at Kupang on West Timor on September 21, 1945, the local population welcomed the accompanying NICA representatives with “exceptional enthusiasm.” According to a Dutch official who participated in the operation, Kupang residents went “wild with joy,” which apparently was an “eye-opener” to the Australians.86 Only on the west coast of Borneo (Kalimantan) and especially in Makassar in the southern Celebes (Sulawesi) could the Republik Indonesia depend on a groundswell of popular support, forcing the Australian commander in Sulawesi to engage in preemptive action and take into custody a prominent nationalist leader.87

Yet another issue affected Australians’ handling of the Japanese demobilization of Indonesia’s eastern regions. The communist-led Australian Waterside Workers Federation (WWF) had begun to organize an anti-Dutch labor action in early September 1945. As a gesture of solidarity with fellow workers in the newly proclaimed independent Republic next door, the WWF encouraged its members to refuse to load the cargo of Dutch ships that were destined for the Netherlands East Indies. By late September, the dockworkers’ boycott had spread to every Australian port; when a lonely Dutch ship transporting military personnel and equipment accidentally strayed into Sydney harbor within the course of the next year, it was “pelted with stones, prompting the ship’s crew to aim a fire hose at the stone throwers.”88 The embargo lasted for several years, until it would finally be lifted in early June 1947.89 The boycott was imposed again less than two months later, however, as a protest against the Netherlands Army’s first surprise attack on the Republic in late July.90 Thus, during the period 1945–1947, the WWF embargo forced Prime Minister Chifley – himself a former union organizer – to walk a precarious tightrope between support for his natural electoral base on the left, on one hand, and a need to curry the favor of constituents located closer to the political center or the right, on the other. Bringing Australian servicemen home as soon as possible might deflate the public controversy and media coverage surrounding the WWF boycott.

The troops’ rapid return could also deflect a difference of opinion brewing between Prime Minister Chifley and his outspoken Minister of External Affairs, Herbert Vere Evatt. The latter advocated that it would serve Australia’s national interest to intervene in colonial Indonesia by calling for a truce and sending an Australian military force to Java, most likely to be selected from the units still operating in the archipelago’s eastern districts. Australian soldiers, Evatt argued in
late November 1945, should assist the overburdened SEAC troops in their post-surrender tasks, after which they should stay on to function as peacekeepers while an Indonesian-Dutch settlement was being negotiated. The candid account of Australia’s first emissary to Java in November 1945, W. Macmahon Ball, may have motivated Evatt’s interventionist proposal. He warned the External Affairs Minister that Indonesians’ “bitter and deep-seated animosity” towards their former colonial masters was likely to smolder; he added that their anti-Dutch sensibilities could possibly escalate into a full-scale “conflict between East and West” with world-wide repercussions. Even though Prime Minister Chifley may have agreed with Evatt’s idealistic views concerning Australia’s political commitments to the fragile Republik Indonesia nearby, he wished to proceed at a slower pace. It thus made sense to arrange for an expeditious homecoming of Australia’s troops, enabling the Prime Minister to define his policies with regard to the valid anti-colonial sentiments that animated a large portion of the millions of people living in the neighboring archipelago, without having to worry about the physical safety of Australian servicemen still operating in the region.

All these Australian considerations combined to produce a viable Dutch colonial administration in the eastern archipelago that effectively re-established itself in early 1946. This result represented a paradox, however, because Australia’s definition of its geopolitical interests caused the Labor Party government to emerge as a forceful pro-Republican factor in the Dutch-Indonesian conflict. In doing so, Chifley and his colleagues faced the “tough, self-righteous indignation” of the Netherlands, which treated Australian support for the fractious Republic as a betrayal of both white-skinned solidarity and the memory of the sacrosanct Western Alliance. However, Labor Party politicians in Canberra anticipated that in the postwar era, national security and prosperity would depend to a great extent on Australia’s peaceful coexistence with a petroleum, rubber, and tin producing Asian giant next door rather than rely on its attachment to the British Commonwealth or the capitalist world in the United States or Western Europe.

Besides, Australia occupied a unique position within Asia’s geography and international relations. Many not-so-distant countries needed technical and educational assistance. Most of them, however, were reticent to request “one-time colonial powers” in Europe for help, nor did they wish to establish “too close a connection with US private enterprise.” Having the “inheritance of the West without being a colonial or financial power,” as a senior official in Canberra’s External Affairs Ministry noted, Australia could expect that its Asian neighbors might ask for all sorts of “friendly cooperation, advice, and assistance” that could be mutually beneficial; not responding positively to such pleas, in turn, would be “defeatist and selfish.”

Before Australia’s pro-independence pressure became a festering thorn in the side of the Dutch government, however, the situation in Java and Sumatra re-
mained infinitely more complex and turbulent than it was or would be in the eastern archipelago. Armed clashes on these two islands had become routine events. As SEAC was preparing its withdrawal from the archipelago during the autumn of 1946, thus paving the way for the arrival of the Netherlands Army in full force, America’s armament resources and weapons industry became a principal target of the Dutch effort to procure military equipment. Even though the State Department in cooperation with military planners in the Pentagon embraced as official policy that the United States would not approve any “transfers of arms, munitions, or implements of war to either of the disputants” in the Dutch-Indonesian conflict, the reality of US grants, loans, and weapons sales to the Netherlands revealed a contrary picture. Initially, the deployment by the Dutch military forces in Java and Sumatra of US Lend Lease equipment was defined as an “exception” to the rule rather than a “reversal of our policy.” Given the need to obtain military machinery for the Netherlands armed forces in Southeast Asia, however, Dutch officials could only turn to either the United States or England, because both countries were in the possession of large stocks of surplus equipment from World War II. Moreover, few nations in the democratic and capitalist postwar world other than the United States and Great Britain could boast of a weapons manufacturing industry able to fulfill Dutch demands.

In the period before the Netherlands Army’s first invasion of Republican-controlled territory in late July 1947, Britain had contributed the lion’s share of armaments and other materials to the Dutch, despite Australia and India’s almost daily interrogation of the British Foreign Minister, Ernest Bevin, regarding his responsibility for single-handedly supplying the Netherlands with weapons that enabled it to subdue Indonesia’s legitimate nationalist revolution. A large percentage of Dutch military resources deployed in the Indies, however, were of American origin. This violated US policy as it was formulated on October 19, 1945, in response to Sukarno’s protest submitted to Washington that the Dutch were abusing “American weapons and munitions, clothes and uniforms.” The Truman Administration had replied that it would put an end to transfers of “lethal” military equipment. In addition, vocal opposition from the American public and certain members of the US Congress prompted Secretary of State Byrnes to order the removal of American insignia from US Lend Lease equipment in the possession of SEAC troops – material that was eventually passed on to Dutch forces. Starting in January 1946, the Truman Administration tried to distance itself further from the appearance of favoring the Netherlands by refusing the Dutch access to US shipping vessels for the purpose of transporting troops and armaments to and from the Netherlands East Indies.

In the eyes of some members of the US House of Representatives or progressive journalists, these anemic initiatives were inadequate. The criticism of US policy concerning anti-colonial movements came from different ideological van-
tage points. The controversial and conservative Congresswoman Clare Boothe Luce, for instance, typified American actions vis-à-vis Indonesian nationalism as “moral laziness and moral cowardice.” At the same time, the progressive magazine, The Nation, labeled Byrnes' instructions a “Pontius Pilate” gesture. Besides, British and Dutch compliance with the State Department’s order to remove American badges, decals, and other symbols from Lend Lease equipment was more than lax. Sukarno complained to Truman during the autumn of 1945 that Asians’ “goodwill towards the Americans” was seriously strained by the fact that the Dutch continue to wear US Army uniforms and use canteens marked USA. A few years later, during the Netherlands Army’s second attack on the Republic in December 1948, the American political scientist George McTunran Kahin found himself in Yogyakarta as an eyewitness of the Dutch assault on the Republic’s capital. He noticed fighter planes in the air marked with the American white star on their fuselages; he also encountered Dutch officers wearing battle fatigues still emblazoned with the words “US Marines.” Kahin has suggested, in fact, that Byrnes’ request to remove the US emblems from military equipment was ignored so blatantly as to give rise to the suspicion that the Dutch were trying to make it appear that they enjoyed full American backing for their armed confrontation with the Republik Indonesia.

US Lend Lease equipment found its way to the Netherlands forces in Southeast Asia via SEAC’s discharge of its post surrender duties until late 1946. On November 30, 1946, the American government approved, free of charge, the transfer of 118 aircraft consisting of B-25 bombers, P-40 and P-51 fighter planes, 45 Stuart tanks, 459 jeeps, 170 artillery pieces, and an enormous array of firearms from SEAC to the Netherlands Army. Large numbers of army trucks and other surplus stock from the Pacific Theater also ended up at the disposal of the Dutch armed forces. A US-Dutch agreement enabled the Netherlands Army to purchase 65,000 tons of non-lethal military supplies located in a US Army dump in Finschhafen, New Guinea. The Dutch East Indies government paid 20,000,000 dollars for the US-equipment from a “surplus property credit” of 100,000,000 dollars granted by officials in Washington. A study, conducted by the State-War-Navy-Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) in 1946, revealed that a considerable portion of this loan, designated as financial “aid aimed at assisting Indonesia’s rehabilitation and the resumption of trade” ended up being used, instead, for the procurement of goods consisting of “wartime installations and army supplies in New Guinea and other areas. This property has contributed little to the economic rehabilitation of the Indies.” From this credit allocation, Netherlands officials had already expended 68,353,314 dollars by May 1947.

Even though the State Department had rejected a Dutch request for further US Marine Corps training of an additional 2,000 Dutch men, and also disapproved a transfer of more arms and equipment through a Land Lease accord to
the Dutch Marine Brigade already in the Indonesian archipelago, Washington did not object to a straightforward purchasing contract. Thus, the Netherlands Indies government was able to buy a large number of tanks and hundreds of other military vehicles. In late 1946, when the crack Dutch Marine Brigade needed replacement of “non-war type” materials, Under Secretary of State Acheson made no objection to the transaction—which included trucks, jeeps, spare parts, and personal gear—for which the Dutch paid from US loans. Although officially, this only concerned the purchase and sale of non-lethal equipment, but the Dutch Commander-in-Chief, Simon Hendrik Spoor, reported gratefully in December 1946, that Washington had also consented to a Lend Lease transfer of heavy tanks for his highly prized Marine Brigade. Although legally all this Lend Lease equipment was under America’s right of recapture, the US Secretary of State, George C. Marshall, reassured the Netherlands Ambassador in Washington in February 1947, that the US government had not in the past and did not intend in the future “to exercise its right of recapture,” thus effectively turning the Lend Lease material into a donation to the Dutch.

In July 1947, after the first Netherlands Army attack on the Indonesian Republic had shattered the hope that the cease fire agreement brokered at Lingga-jati would resolve the situation pacifically, London issued a strict boycott of all arms sales to the Netherlands East Indies. It is conceivable, though, that some British weapons were nonetheless delivered after the embargo was imposed, due to previously contracted agreements. Washington officially maintained its existing restrictions on weapons sales and loans, but the US government was less particular about enforcing them than the British. The Truman Administration, in fact, circumvented the self-imposed regulations issued earlier. In October 1947, a War Assets Administration (WAA) credit to the Netherlands East Indies government was denied on political grounds. At the same time, however, a WAA credit of 26,000,000 dollars to the government in The Hague was approved, after which Dutch officials immediately calculated the risks of secretly financing the acquisition of military material for its army in Java and Sumatra from these newly available American funds. Worrying about leaks to the press and the negative impact such disclosures might have on American public opinion, the recently appointed Netherlands Ambassador to Washington, Eelco van Kleffens, initially warned against these furtive plans; he admonished that such deceitful actions would inevitably encounter resistance from State Department circles. The Foreign Minister in The Hague, however, was demanding and persistent. He suggested in November that weapons could be financed through WAA credit and shipped to the Netherlands first, in order to avoid adverse publicity, before they were diverted to Southeast Asia. In the end, Van Kleffens relented, but only after he realized that he had underestimated Washington’s willingness to cooperate with the Dutch. In mid December 1947, the State Department informed him...
that it harbored “no objection to purchases for the Dutch East Indies from WAA credit allocated to the Netherlands government.”

A few weeks earlier, the KNIL Quartermaster General, Major General J.J. Mojet, conspicuously dressed “in civilian clothes,” paid a visit to Washington to try to arrange with the State Department’s Office of Foreign Liquidation the transfer of American trucks, jeeps, and other vehicles from US Army surplus material still located in the Pacific. During Mojet’s subsequent journey to Tokyo to meet with General Douglas MacArthur, the latter offered to donate this material, embodying only a fraction of the enormous supplies he controlled as strategic reserves in the Pacific, in the form of a “gift to a former ally,” pending the State Department’s approval. The formidable Allied Commander-in-Chief in Japan also told Mojet that, if given the green light by Washington, he would gladly transport the goods on board “American ships manned by Japanese crews.” He was willing to do so because he worried that if the Netherlands Army withdrew too precipitously from the Indonesian archipelago, the same atrocities might occur as were taking place at that very moment during the Partition of India, “where the loss of human life already exceeds the total casualty rate suffered by the United States during World War I and World War II combined.”

In the course of 1948, as the Dutch need for spare parts and military hardware mounted, the acting chairman of the Nederlandsche Aankoop Commissie (Netherlands Purchasing Commission or NPC) – a man with the surprisingly appropriate name of Colonel E. Baretta – revealed the NPC’s clever methods of acquiring American-made weapons for the Dutch Army in the Indonesian archipelago. It has been our practice, he wrote in a hand-written report addressed to the nervous Dutch ambassador in Washington, to ship “equipment of a somewhat ‘dubious’ sort first to the Netherlands. Among these are commodities of an undeniable military character,” such as “spare parts” for bomber and fighter planes, “light armaments,” and indispensable items for the “maintenance of tanks.” Baretta also wrote that “the NPC knows, of course, that this material is then exported again to the Indies.” He added a caveat, however, that “any form of [detrimental] publicity” generated by shipping these materials directly from the United States to the Indonesian archipelago could potentially “cause Washington’s sympathy and cooperation to vanish because of pressures exerted by the media.”

In addition, Colonel Baretta further cautioned that the State Department’s forbearance towards such questionable Dutch military appropriations could also waiver due to the partisan “political party emotions of the moment” because Democrats in the US Congress, who supported Truman’s re-election, faced Thomas E. Dewey’s Republican challenge in the close race for the US Presidency during the fall of 1948. Henry Wallace’s participation in the widely contested presidential election of 1948 as a Third Party candidate – while the “Dixiecrat” from South Carolina, Strom Thurmond, representing the States’ Rights Party, had en-
tered the fray as a fourth contestant – also mandated Dutch discretion concerning its habit of allocating US funds granted officially to the Netherlands, instead, to military purchases destined for the Dutch Army in the Indonesian archipelago. If this news were to reach the Progressive Party’s campaign staff, Wallace could possibly expose the complicity of Truman’s State Department and thus jeopardize NPC’s military procurement of American-made weapons for the Dutch East Indies in the immediate future.114

The acting chairman of the Netherlands Purchasing Commission, therefore, tried to reassure the Dutch Ambassador in Washington that no more than ten percent of the armaments and machinery deployed by the Dutch Army in Southeast Asia was of American origin. The truthfulness of this claim, however, was undermined when considering that five percent of Dutch combat forces already in Java and Sumatra consisted of an expertly US trained and superbly equipped Marine Brigade.115 The NPC’s acting chairman also alleged that Dutch air power in Southeast Asia consisted only of American aircraft bought during World War II. Colonel Baretta claimed that no new planes had been acquired after August 1945.116 This statement was a straightforward fabrication, as Van Kleffens must have known, because it was during his tenure as Dutch spokesman at the United Nations in New York that the State Department had approved, in late November 1946, the Lend-Lease transfer of 118 US aircraft from SEAC to the Dutch military forces in the archipelago. These fighters and bombers were both preceded and followed by the acquisition of sundry American-made vehicles and lethal equipment, for which the Dutch in many instances paid enormous amounts of money.

The military expenditures that the Netherlands government in The Hague contracted in 1946 were three times larger than the ones incurred by Dutch authorities in Batavia, clearly indicating that the Netherlands government proper bore the financial brunt of the military build-up in Southeast Asia. In 1947 the discrepancy in financial outlays between the two political entities became smaller, but The Hague still outspent Batavia by almost 200,000,000 guilders. Osten-sibly, the burden of the military costs was shared equally between The Hague and Batavia during 1948 and 1949, even though during these years the Netherlands government funneled substantial loans to the Dutch administration of the Indonesian archipelago. In fact, the Netherlands Parliament approved a loan of 850,000,000 guilders to Batavia in early 1949, at a time when US Marshall Aid for the economic recovery of Western Europe had already flowed freely for a year or so. Moreover, portions of the massive financial burdens assumed through the intensive military procurement program pursued in 1946, and on a smaller scale in 1947, relied on deferred payment schedules, thus allowing the Netherlands government to discharge a major share of its debts at a later date when the nation’s economy was functioning again, in part due to America’s ECA assistance. Moreover, the costs associated with the covert re-shipping of US-made military
hardware via the Netherlands to the Indies must have added to the financial burdens of the government in The Hague.

As complicated as the issue of tracing the financial sources of the military efforts of the Netherlands in the Indonesian archipelago during the period 1945-1949 may be, it seems reasonable to contend that outright American aid, unencumbered US loans allotted for the economic recovery of the Netherlands and its colony, or property surplus credits and other financial assistance granted by such agencies as the War Assets Administration, enabled the Dutch nation not only to rebuild its economy but also to disburse huge amounts of funds for its military campaign in Southeast Asia. Whether or not the Netherlands was “only kept afloat thanks to USA assistance,” as the State Department’s Chief of the Far Eastern Affairs Office told a visiting Australian diplomat in February, 1948, the net result was that America’s substantial support of the Netherlands may have created a sense of impunity in Dutch politicians and their constituencies with regard to the Indonesian Question.117

In a lengthy, classified memorandum composed by the State Department’s Economics Division (ED) during the early spring of 1949, entitled “The Drain of Indonesian Military Operations in Relation to ERP,” Harry H. Bell tried to decipher the financial details of the Dutch military campaign in Java and Sumatra in light of the European Recovery Program (ERP). He regretted that no data concerning the Netherlands “complete military appropriations” were published, although he made an attempt to reconstruct annual disbursements for the years 1946, 1947, and 1948. Even if such official Dutch data had been available, he continued, “it would be impossible to state what proportion of the expenditure should be attributed to the Indonesian operations and what proportion to ‘normal’ metropolitan defense programs.” In a sophisticated effort to calculate “the direct and indirect guilder cost” as well as “the foreign exchange cost of the Indonesian campaign in relation to ECA assistance,” Bell concluded that it would be “unjustifiable” to claim that the Marshall Plan allocations directly financed Dutch military operations in Indonesia. But Bell quickly qualified and undermined this comment with crucial observations articulated in terms of neo-classical economics:

The marginal importance of the resources supplied from abroad [i.e. US Marshall Aid], however, is such that there would be a multiple loss of Dutch national production resulting in inflationary pressure that would most severely affect civilian investment, consumption levels, political stability in the Netherlands, and the defense effort expected of the Netherlands by her Western Union and Atlantic Pact partners.118
Harry Bell continued his investigative report by citing published documents of the Second Chamber of the Netherlands Parliament since the creation of the Marshall Plan, which revealed that in 1948 the financial ordeal of maintaining the Dutch Army, Air Force, and Navy amounted to 1,578,000,000 guilders, which translated into almost 600,000,000 dollars at the prevailing exchange rate, fluctuating between 2.65 and 2.70 Dutch guilders per US dollar at that time. These expenses were almost equally shared between The Hague and Batavia. The amount of ERP assistance allotted to the Netherlands and the Dutch East Indies, since the Program’s inception, comprised a total of 651,000,000 US dollars, of which 84,000,000 dollars were granted directly to authorities in Batavia. These revealing numbers shed additional light on the concepts of “marginal utility” and “differential resource allocation” that Bell applied in his analysis of the political economy of the Dutch-Indonesian conflict. Without Marshall Aid, the Dutch government’s immense expenditures on the Indonesian military campaign would have seriously slowed down Dutch economic output. Washington’s financial assistance not only prevented growing inflation and encouraged both infrastructural improvements and civilian investments, it also cultivated consumption levels. According to Bell’s State Department memorandum, Marshall Aid funds also prevented the Netherlands government’s huge disbursements on army operations in Southeast Asia from plunging Dutch society into political instability. As a postscript, Bell added that US financial assistance also facilitated the Netherlands’ capacity to build up its regular defense programs in Northern Europe itself, as demanded by Western allies and partners in what would become NATO (The North Atlantic Treaty Organization).  

Until the summer of 1948, Washington maintained its illusion of neutrality, despite these ad hoc decisions that enabled the Dutch to purchase as many US-made weapons and other equipment as they needed for their military campaign in Java and Sumatra. Washington’s emissary in Batavia, however, probably did not know about the intricate decision-making processes within the State Department concerning the sales of American equipment to the Dutch. It was reasonable to assume, though, that Walter Foote was fully aware of the Netherlands Army’s use of US war materials in its confrontation with the Republic. Willem Schermerhorn, in fact, noted in his diary that “Foote knows precisely. If he has not seen it himself in Batavia, he must have received reports from Surabaya, where heavy [American] tanks and massive war materials are being unloaded.”

Foote’s service as US Consul General in Batavia was terminated in October 1947, when he abdicated his post under a cloud of allegations of improper conduct, even though he stayed on in Batavia until early 1948. Six months before Charles Livengood replaced him as US Consul General, Foote had mailed a long delayed dispatch to the Secretary of State in Washington concerning “The Signing of the Linggajati Agreement,” which had taken place on March 25, 1947.
It was odd that Foote did not submit his detailed report on the official ceremony, ratifying what seemed at that moment to be a major diplomatic breakthrough, until three weeks after the fact. His tardiness may have been related to a sense of being overwhelmed by the heavy burdens of his diplomatic tasks. In December 1948, when he had already moved to his new diplomatic assignment in the US Legation in Colombo, Ceylon (Sri Lanka), Foote wrote a defensive letter to Garret G. Ackerson, Jr., the Chief of the Division of Foreign Service Personnel in the State Department. Concerning his previous tour of duty in Batavia, he claimed he had been “harassed beyond words.” He complained that between 1945 and 1947, the US Consulate General in Batavia was miserably understaffed; he lamented he could not even rely on the services of an American stenographer or typist. This grievance seemed legitimate. At about the same time, the vocal Asianist in the State Department, Abbot Low Moffat, in a spirited attempt to strengthen US diplomatic missions in the Southeast Asian region, presented a similar argument by comparing America’s low key representation in Southeast Asia with the copious number of Foreign Service officers posted in Latin America.

In an effort to exonerate the sluggish discharge of his duties, Foote turned his lack of staff into a pathetic lament. In his letter, he claimed that he often had to type “until midnight or later” to file his reports. Nor did he have an American bookkeeper at his disposal in the Batavia Consulate, so he was forced to do his “own accounting” with the help of a Chinese clerk. At the same time, he had to keep abreast of developments in “the very chaotic political situation” from 1945 until his departure. He ended his missive with a pitiful, although not entirely believable, comment about his girth; he claimed that “the load of work almost broke me down. I lost 100 pounds in weight and was very ill, or overly tired, when I saw you in Washington.”

Ackerson had written a stern letter to Foote in Colombo, questioning him about reports that while he headed the US Consulate General in Batavia, he had allowed his employees to trade their dollars “at the open market rate,” yielding a much higher return than the official exchange rate regulated by the Java Bank. Since the State Department provided salaries and living allowances to Americans posted in Southeast Asia on the basis of the official exchange rate, Ackerson was perturbed. This practice could have doubled or tripled the income of Americans assigned to Batavia, which was unfair to colleagues who lived and worked in places where such options were not available. Besides, trading American dollars on the black market was a violation of Foreign Service protocol. The implication of Ackerson’s critical letter was that Foote had engaged in the black market exchanges himself, even though he had telegraphed the State Department on February 7, 1947, that “payment of contingent expenses and salaries are made by cashing drafts to the Java Bank at 2.65 guilders for one dollar.” If he had availed
himself to the black market, Foote had not only set an inappropriate standard of behavior for the rest of the Consulate’s staff, but had also deceived his superiors in Washington.

This was not the first time that State Department officials or other foreign observers had raised questions about either Foote’s competence or his ethics. In the postwar era, his superiors in Washington began to rate his performance as a mediocre and half-hearted one. The director of the Office of European Affairs typified Foote’s dispatches in 1947 as “scanty.”\textsuperscript{126} When asked to grade Foote’s accomplishments, a member of the Philippines and Southeast Asian Affairs Division (PSA) commented that his reporting was too disjointed. Although he occasionally managed to produce a political analysis of “some merit,” most other reports tended to be little more than a regurgitation of the self-interested views of his many Dutch acquaintances in Batavia, which he reproduced in his dispatches to the State Department without any form of critical appraisal.\textsuperscript{127}

Officials in the State Department’s Philippines and South East Asian Division were not the only ones to complain about the low quality of work delivered by the US mission in Batavia. During its preliminary diagnosis of problems in Southeast Asia in early September 1947, George Kennan’s recently established Policy Planning Staff (PPS) discovered a serious hiatus in the flow of information from the region. John Paton Davies, as a member of the new PPS staff, notified the Office of Far Eastern Affairs that he was struck by the contrast in analytic coverage from two “critical regions in that area – Indochina and Indonesia. The reporting from Indochina strikes us as penetrating and sound. The reporting from Indonesia leaves us with no clear picture of the forces at work in the region. For planning purposes, we feel that it is important that the Department receive far more information than it has thus far from Indonesia.”\textsuperscript{128} During this period, a Vice Consul normally represented the United States in Hanoi, whereas the US diplomatic mission in Saigon was no more heavily staffed than America’s Legation in Indonesia. It was clear that the Consulate General in Batavia during the Foote era was not at a structural disadvantage that could explain the low caliber of the dispatches concerning the political situation in the archipelago. In Foote’s defense, a State Department official argued that “such a long stay in one post without variety of experience...tends to destroy an officer’s objectivity and critical sense, and he becomes so familiar with the ideas expressed by his local friends that he proceeds to accept them as his own without [critical] inspection.”\textsuperscript{129} Pro-Dutch propaganda, as George McTurnan Kahin experienced a year later when he received an officious briefing at the US Consulate General in Batavia before crossing the border into Republican territory, had distorted the “intelligence gathering efforts” of American diplomats such as the Legation’s political attaché, Glenn Abbey, and revealed its “appallingly poor” quality.\textsuperscript{130} Hence, when Foote wrote his overdue report to the Secretary of State about the signing of the
Linggajati Agreement, policymakers in Washington had long since been briefed about the agreement by the US Embassy in The Hague, which was staffed with superior American diplomats.

In his tardy report, Foote noted that the weeks prior to the agreement’s ratification on March 25, 1947, had been “filled with doubt, suspicion, and no small degree of fear” that a full-fledged armed struggle might erupt if the Dutch and Indonesian delegations could not achieve a settlement. However, after daily rounds of intensive negotiations, Foote noted that the Linggajati Accord produced “an extraordinary improvement in the political situation,” if only because the Dutch and Indonesian press suspended their “bitter attacks” on each other. He commented on the reception held in the Governor General’s palace in Batavia after the signing ceremony as one of the most remarkable gatherings he had ever attended. The celebration was characterized by “an unusual air of cordiality and courtesy” that was crowned by a magnificent fireworks display at night. He reported that “relief and pleasure” prevailed among former colleagues and old friends in the Dutch and Indonesian communities, who had been estranged since the proclamation of Indonesian independence on August 17, 1945. Van Mook, for his part, joked about the ear-shattering noise of the fireworks at the reception’s end that it sounded as if “all the ammunition was being detonated, presumably because it is no longer needed” now that the Linggajati Agreement was concluded.

Curiously, only a week earlier Foote had rushed a telegram to the Secretary of State in which he claimed he had been approached with the question whether the signing ceremony of the Linggajati agreement could take place in the American Consulate. In his “most urgent” telegram, Foote asked the Department to “please instruct if such a request may be granted.” However, a very different story emerged from Schermerhorn’s diary, who maintained that Foote himself had extended the invitation to use the US Consulate for the ceremonial occasion, rather than the other way around. These contradictory statements raise the question whether Foote, without the State Department’s concurrence, tried to insinuate the United States into the Linggajati Accord that was generally viewed as resulting from arduous British diplomatic efforts from which the United States had remained aloof.
CHAPTER NINE

Armed Conflict, the United Nations’ Good Offices Committee, and the Renville Agreement: America’s Involvement in Trying to Reach a Settlement

In October 1947, Charles Livengood settled in as the new American Consul General in Batavia, with a reputation of being an accomplished diplomat of the highest caliber. Within the State Department, Livengood was known as a Foreign Service officer who did his presentation and reporting work impeccably. Upon his arrival in Java, it was expected he would convey a far more objective and evenhanded analysis of the situation in the Indonesian archipelago than his predecessor, Walter Foote. The latter, meanwhile, stayed on temporarily to serve as Chairman of the Consular Council in Batavia, charged with overseeing the implementation of UN imposed cease-fire regulations, while his colleague Livengood assumed control of the US Legation. Yet even during his final months in Java, Foote continued to make careless charges, such as his allegation on January 8, 1948, that the British should be blamed singlehandedly for the protracted Dutch-Indonesian conflict because they were “all-out-pro-Indo.”

Southeast Asia desk officers in the State Department feared, however, that Livengood would never truly interest himself in the political problems of the area, because he possessed neither “the preparation nor the inclination to do so.” His skills as a highly trained expert in economic affairs were wasted in colonial Indonesia. He assumed his position at a time when the archipelago’s economic reconstruction could barely be tackled, mostly because political negotiations, disrupted by armed clashes, superseded everything else. In addition, not possessing a strong physical constitution, the tropical climate would prove disastrous to his frail health. As predicted, Livengood in due course became increasingly unhappy with his assignment. After visiting the US Legation in Batavia in early 1949, the Philippines and Southeast Asia Division’s (PSA) senior official, William Lacy, concluded that Livengood’s gloomy attitude and lack of stamina had a “thoroughly depressing effect on the entire staff of the Consulate General.”

The American government had welcomed the Indonesian and Dutch signatures on the feeble Linggajati Agreement, concluded in March 1947, even if the accord did not resolve even the most basic interpretive details. Approximately one week after the endorsement of the accord reached at Linggajati, the United States recognized the de facto jurisdiction of the Indonesian Republic over Java, Madura, and Sumatra, which contained about eighty-five percent of the total
population of the archipelago. England, Australia, China, India, Egypt, Syria, and Iran acknowledged the de facto existence of the Indonesian Republic at more or less the same time. Toward the end of May 1947, however, the Republic’s deliberations with Dutch authorities had already reached another deadlock, because the two parties were miles apart in their views regarding the content and meaning of the accord signed at Linggajati. At the same time, mounting evidence suggested to policymakers in Washington that the Dutch were contemplating a military shortcut as an alternative to the frustrating, interminable negotiations.

Alarmed by this prospect, the US War Department’s Intelligence Division predicted that such a military strike would eventually result in a costly war of attrition. Emphasizing the moderate character of the Republic’s leadership, but expressing concern with the availability on the world market of the archipelago’s mineral and agricultural resources, Army Intelligence analysts were afraid of the “widespread scorched earth tactics” that would most likely follow Dutch military successes. They argued that armed conflict in Java and Sumatra could “retard [the archipelago’s] economic rehabilitation for decades.” Army Intelligence officials, therefore, recommended that Washington use its considerable leverage with the Netherlands in its time of need for financial assistance, not only for the economic recovery of the Dutch nation-state in Northern Europe but also to rebuild
the economic infrastructure of its Southeast Asian colony. The Export Import Bank based in Washington, for example, had originally authorized a loan of 100,000,000 dollars to the Netherlands East Indies in late 1945. These funds were subsequently blocked, however, due to the unstable political conditions prevailing in Java and Sumatra. The War Department’s intelligence report recommended that the Truman Administration make an offer of mediation to the government in The Hague; Washington should encourage a peaceful settlement, but a political arrangement that would grant a measure of autonomy to the Republican government. Although in the immediate future, maintaining a culturally knowledgeable and business-minded Dutch presence in the archipelago could not be avoided, the War Department’s Intelligence analysts concluded that Washington’s policies should foster, in due course, a gradual political development towards unencumbered Indonesian sovereignty.3

At the same time, an estimate of the Central Intelligence Group (CIG) – the precursor of the CIA – articulated the apprehension that an armed conflict in Indonesia would promote anti-Western sentiments in Asia. The report further warned that these smoldering negative opinions vis-à-vis the West would be inflamed if the Dutch-Indonesian conflict were to be raised as an official issue in the United Nations Security Council.4 In its own assessment of a potential outbreak of armed hostilities in the Indonesian archipelago, the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) communicated a similar warning about the deleterious effects such a military confrontation might exert on the relationship between Western democracies and the peoples of Southeast Asia. The policy paper issued by the SWNCC, an intelligence unit charged with the coordination of political and military affairs in the postwar era, took a long-range strategic view. The report dwelled on the American aid already donated to the Netherlands, such as the free-of-charge transfer of Lend Lease materials from SEAC to the Netherlands troops, which had bolstered the Dutch position at the bargaining table, while also strengthening the nation’s military muscle in the Southeast Asian region. The SWNCC intelligence report also addressed the resentment this might provoke; it suggested that an Asian population “hostile to the Western powers would make Indonesia particularly vulnerable in the event of war. A friendly and prosperous Indonesia might have great value as an arsenal in the Pacific.” But the final recommendation of the SWNCC analysis was startling, because it proposed a plan of action the Truman Administration had assiduously tried to avoid. “Should the efforts to find a solution by mediation fail,” the report put forward, “the US could take the initiative in bringing the situation to the attention of the UN and thus forestall its presentation for propaganda purposes by the Soviet Union or one of its satellites.”5

Until then, the US Secretary of State, George C. Marshall, had routinely dismissed such steps, mostly because they would jeopardize the Dutch position. The
Asianists in the State Department, however, were receptive to the SWNCC proposal, if only because they had long since advocated a more pro-active US policy toward the political emergencies in both colonial Indonesia and Indochina. Fearing a Soviet-bloc campaign in the United Nations, designed to curry the favor of nationalist movements in colonized countries in Asia struggling for independence, a State Department official in the Far Eastern Office tried to intervene. He presented the SWNCC intelligence document to Abbot Low Moffat, one of the State Department’s most prominent Asianists. He urged that the SWNCC advice should be implemented forthwith, because it was “our only hope of grasping and retaining political initiative” in the Southeast Asian region. He also recommended that the appropriate State Department offices should immediately begin with the bureaucratic and documentary preparation required for submitting the Indonesian case to the UN. Moffat, however, did not need further prodding to be convinced of the wisdom of this course of action. In a memorandum written two weeks earlier, he outlined a similar set of options to be pursued as a desirable strategy. He urged the Truman Administration to utilize what he dubbed America’s “unusual prestige” among Indonesian nationalists; US leverage should be mobilized as a means of either intimidating or raising anxieties among Dutch authorities regarding the detrimental consequences that could potentially arise from a military invasion of Republican-controlled territory. Washington, he admonished, should also call upon its worldwide influence in order to coax the leaders of the Republik Indonesia to cooperate in a constructive manner in the search for a peaceful solution.

The Netherlands government, at the same time, mounted a concerted diplomatic effort in the United States, in part because the financial circumstances of the Dutch East Indies government were in dire straits. This, of course, affected the Netherlands Treasury in equal measure because political authorities in The Hague, in the words of Foreign Ministry official Henri van Vredenburch, had to throw exorbitant amounts of “our available financial resources into a bottomless pit” of expenditures for the Netherlands Army in the Dutch East Indies and loans to the Batavia authorities. From Java itself, Willem Schermerhorn warned, though, that the Dutch threat of initiating a military action should be “sold” carefully to the US by “representing it only as an emergency measure of last resort that could be averted if American economic-financial aid is forthcoming.” To plead the Dutch case in Washington, and also to counter negative publicity in the US media, two Dutch emissaries departed for Washington to present the need for US financial support in the economic rehabilitation of the Netherlands East Indies under the guise of wishing to discuss “German affairs” (Duitse zaken) with the appropriate US officials.

On June 4, 1947, the Economic Ministry’s top man, H.M. Hirschfeld, in the company of Foreign Ministry’s senior diplomat Van Vredenburch, traveled to
Washington to consult with the Under Secretary of State, Dean Acheson. Having been convinced of the sincerity of Dutch intentions, Acheson subsequently instructed the US Consulate in Batavia that the Dutch proposals put forward in late May 1947, offered a “reasonable basis for effective government pending the formation of a sovereign United States of Indonesia and a Netherlands-Indonesian Union.” Acheson added that the “Indonesian Republic would be well advised to respond promptly in a spirit of good faith and compromise, thus demonstrating the sincerity of the pledges undertaken at Linggajati.”10 Flush with the success of their mission – the US government consented on June 27th to contribute financially to the reconstruction of the Dutch East Indies economy – the two Dutchmen were later told that the Netherlands press agency Aneta had mistakenly reported that they had been dispatched to Washington as “a team for sinister affairs” (duistere zaken).11

Another pair of Dutchmen, Max Weisglas and Herman J. Friedericy, journeyed to the United States a few days later to embark on a publicity campaign designed to educate US public opinion about Dutch policies in colonial Indonesia, or at least try to prevent the American press from “spewing too much venom in our direction.” Before talking with dozens of Dutch and American people in New York and Washington, among whom were the Directors of the Institute for Pacific Relations and the Foreign Policy Association and well-known journalists from reputable newspapers – such as the New York Times, the New York Herald Tribune, and the Wall Street Journal – the delegation had issued a press release. The statement stressed that “there will be no return to a colonial policy in the Netherlands relationship with Indonesia.” It declared further that “this emphatic statement, together with the unequivocal pronouncement... that the Linggajati Agreement... will remain the basis on which the Dutch government will shape its attitude” represented yet another effort to disarm potential criticism by the US media. The press release ended on a reassuring note: “whatever the outcome of these critical days will be, the Netherlands government’s policy is aimed... at the establishment of a sovereign United States of Indonesia, composed of free democratic states, which will be united with the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the West Indies as a fully equal partner in the Netherlands Indonesian Union.” The Netherlands Information Bureau in New York, in cooperation with the Dutch Embassy in Washington, forwarded the statement to 416 editors and foreign correspondents of national and local newspapers.12

In a retrospective account of his experiences and impressions, Max Weisglas mentioned that the first point of order in nearly all of their meetings in New York and Washington was the American apprehension about the Kremlin’s communist intrigues in the Indonesian Republic. Although Western Europe’s vulnerability on this score ranked as Washington’s top priority, at this point in time, Moscow’s evil intentions in other parts of the world were obviously a concern as well. Be-
forehand, the two Dutchmen had decided it would be “evidence of bad taste to cater too obviously to the strong anti-communist sentiments prevailing in the United States.” On the other hand, they also determined that it would be a “lost opportunity” to declare the subject of communism in the Republic “taboo, because the topic might considerably enhance the interest of the American public in the Dutch cause.” Accordingly, Weisglas and Friedericy emphasized in their previously rehearsed answers to questions about Soviet agitation that the Indonesian Republic contained within it “many contradictions and antagonisms.” These internal tensions reinforced, in turn, Moscow’s ideological goal of nurturing political antipathies by means of secret agents and assorted acts of infiltration for the purpose of creating as much political anarchy as possible, thus transforming the region into a fertile breeding ground for communism. The risk that such covert activities might surface as an “above-ground” communist assault was a genuine one, but only if the growing political upheavals within the Indonesian Republic were to produce a genuine “power vacuum.” The two Dutch representatives, therefore, impressed upon their American audiences that it served not only the interests of the Netherlands and the Republik Indonesia, but also the United States, if Dutch policy could help prevent the emergence of a leaderless void and thus an unmanageable situation in Java and Sumatra.13

Officials in The Hague and Batavia expressed their satisfaction with the accomplishments of these two missions, but the Executive Committee of the Democratic Party of the Caribbean island of Curaçao in the Dutch West Indies sounded a different note. Having learned of the presence of two sets of Dutch lobbyists in Washington in recent weeks, the State Department received a cable from Curaçao in June 1947, to register dissonant political concerns. The telegram raised the urgent question whether the purpose of the delegations’ round of visits to Washington was to “obtain the endorsement” of the US government for Dutch efforts to perpetuate the “existing semi-feudal system of the government in the Netherlands West Indies, and to re-establish by force the old colonial regime in the Netherlands East Indies.” If that was the case, then the Democratic Party of Curaçao expressed “its confidence in the great ideals” of the US government as the main source of fundamental principles of freedom and democracy in the world. The great American nation, the Curaçao Executive Committee implored, would “never tolerate any encroachment upon the rights and dignity” of the people of either the Dutch West or East Indies.14

These conflicting political views, submitted to the State Department and the US media, were rendered moot when the Netherlands Army launched its attack on the Republic on July 21, 1947. A week later, with the Dutch military “Operation Product” well under way and making rapid advances in an effort to tackle the “source of the plague” in Yogyakarta, as Netherlands military commanders referred to the Republic’s capital, an influential official in the Office of Far Eastern
Indonesians held
lieutenant
Governor General,
H.J. van Mook,
and Commander-
in-Chief,
S.H. Spoor,
responsible for
the first military
assault on the
Republic in July
1947
Affairs, John Vincent Carter, counseled Secretary of State Marshall. He suggested that it would be a propitious strategy for the US delegation to the United Nations to place the Dutch-Indonesian conflict on the agenda of the Security Council. If American emissaries to the UN could ingeniously raise the issue at exactly the right time, it might prevent the Soviet-bloc or India’s representatives to the UN from pushing the Indonesian problem to the foreground for their own ideological purposes. Fully aware of the deteriorating situation in colonial Indonesia, George C. Marshall, however, seized upon an option the London Foreign Office had put forward about six weeks earlier.

On June 6, 1947, London had inquired whether the United States was prepared to join Great Britain in an offer of Good Offices to help resolve the crisis before military violence would erupt. Good Offices entailed the willingness of a third party to be of service in bringing the two antagonists together for further discussions, even though it did not automatically imply mediation. The British, too, were prompted to make this proposal because of their anxiety that either a Soviet-affiliated country or India would take the initiative of raising the Indonesian Question in the UN. An additional concern motivating the Foreign Office was the considerable British stake in the archipelago’s economy. Even more so than their colleagues in Washington, officials in London believed that the Dutch intransigence in settling the dispute held negative economic consequences worldwide, because it disrupted the flow of desperately needed consumer goods such as palm oil, coffee, and tea as well as products such as rubber and petroleum to markets in the West. The Foreign Office suspected that a combined Anglo-American effort would impose sufficient pressure on the government in The Hague, thus urging the Dutch to abandon their preparations for a military invasion of the Republic.

On June 16th, however, the State Department released an aide mémoire to the British Ambassador in Washington rejecting a joint offer of Good Offices, despite senior officials in the State Department’s Offices of European and Far Eastern Affairs giving their endorsement of the British proposal. Immediately following the outbreak of armed hostilities in Java and Sumatra, London decided to proceed with the offer of Good Offices on its own, albeit with US approval. The Hague, however, declined the overture because it would hamper the ambition of the hawkish KVP (Catholic) members of the Dutch coalition government to eradicate the Indonesian Republic once and for all. With both the Indian and Australian governments already trumpeting their intention to bring the matter to the attention of the Security Council, though, Marshall finally backed the idea of extending America’s Good Offices. He explained to President Truman that the United States “would not be able to support the Dutch position involving the use of force, nor oppose the establishment of a United Nations committee for investigation or settlement, either of which would be bitterly resented by the Dutch.
and which could be exploited by communist propaganda.” In case the Indone-
sian Question came up before the Security Council, a Dutch acceptance of the
offer would make it possible to point out that methods of conciliation were al-
ready agreed upon, “and that Security Council discussion should be held in
abeyance pending their outcome.”

As authorities in The Hague began to acknowledge the magnitude of the op-
position against them, the Dutch military forces in Java and Sumatra that were
engaged in “Operation Product” had already attained most of their geographic
and economic objectives, with all important cultivation areas more or less se-
cured. As a result, the Dutch government was eager to keep its “internal matter”
off the Security Council’s official agenda, and thus the government in The Hague
decided upon the better part of valor and “warmly welcome” the American offer
of Good Offices. This time, however, the Indonesian Republic politely refused
the proposal. Strangely enough, Marshall had not considered this possible out-
come. However, the Security Council’s intervention would serve the Republic’s
purposes for the exact same reason that the Dutch tried to forestall it. Republican
authorities began to realize that the intercession of the United Nations would
better serve their interests, because it had become crystal clear to most Republic-
cans that America’s role until then had entailed a solid backing, both materially
and politically, of Dutch endeavors. Moreover, Indonesian politicians acknowl-
edged that if Washington had genuinely wanted to do so, the United States could
have prevented the attack on the Republic, thus making it painfully obvious that
the Truman Administration had long since discarded its Wilsonian or Roosevel-
tian mantle as champion of the right to self-determination and the anti-colonial
cause. UN intervention was therefore preferable, because America would have
to contend with other members of the Security Council who were ideologically
more inclined to provide support to the Indonesian side in the conflict.

From a short-term perspective, however, the Indonesian Republic would have
to swallow some bitter pills, even after the UN Security Council became official-
ly involved in trying to settle its anti-colonial struggle. The Security Council’s
cease fire order handed down in August 1947, forced the Yogyakarta government
to acquiesce to a demarcation boundary – what came to be known as the “Van
Mook line” – between Dutch and Republican territories that formalized the
Dutch military advances achieved during the military campaign of the previous
weeks. Furthermore, in defiance of the UN sanctioned truce, Dutch troops con-
tinued their mopping-up operations on either side of this boundary, ostensibly
to pursue the restoration of law and order. In addition, Netherlands troops com-
pleted their “police action” begun in Madura in August; they moved into the
eastern part of the island during the autumn, where a shortage of food, textiles,
and medicine prevailed and “dropsy, due to undernourishment, has claimed nu-
merous victims, [while] an explosion of malaria along the coast and in the salt

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producing regions has increased the misery of the people.” However, these presumably humanitarian motives behind the Dutch military intervention on Madura island were tied to political ones, according to Belgian observers sent in to investigate on behalf of the Security Council’s newly established Committee of Good Offices (GOC) in December 1947.

Taking part in the Security Council GOC’s first active inquiry in the Southeast Asian archipelago, the Belgian team took its cue from Dutch intelligence sources and asserted that the “incommensurable sufferings” of the Madurese people should also be blamed on “the terror exerted by the regular, and above all, by the irregular Republican troops operating on the island.” The Republic, in contrast, judged the Dutch action in Madura as a flagrant bid to expand its authority and considered it a violation of the UN imposed truce – a view that the combined American–Australian investigative team for the GOC underwrote in its dissenting opinion, noting that “the guilt was with the Dutch without any reservation.” As the Chairman of the Republic’s Special Committee to the GOC, Johannes Leimena, detailed in his “Chronological Résumé of Occurrences on the Island of Madura since August 4,” the Dutch advance into Madura relied on tanks, armored trucks, bomber planes, artillery fire from naval vessels, and infantry troops using mortars and heavy arms when killing innocent victims on the island and “looting their jewelry and other possessions.”

The Republican government claimed to obey the UN cease fire injunctions, although Indonesian Army and civilian militia units engaged Dutch troops wherever they felt threatened. While also continuing other guerrilla activities, the Yogyakarta government officially ordered its military forces to cease hostilities and desist in the hope of encouraging the Dutch to return to the bargaining table. But as Sutan Sjahrir, who had recently resigned as Prime Minister, wondered aloud in his address to the UN Security Council in mid-August 1947: “how can there be free negotiations when one party stands with a pistol pointed at the head of the other?” At the Security Council’s 214th meeting on October 27, 1947, India’s representative indirectly confirmed this allegation, when he concluded that the Republic had complied with the UN cease fire order while the Dutch side had “disregarded and circumvented” it. Soon thereafter, the Republic made an additional compromise by assenting to a compulsory withdrawal of its military troops from the regions the Netherlands Army had recently conquered. Equally egregious to the Republic was having to tolerate as a fait accompli the genesis of the Dutch-created federal units in territories previously under the Republic’s jurisdiction. In the eyes of Republicans, these negara (states) constituted nothing but political pawns that would remain at the beck and call of Dutch authorities, because they were established on the basis of the classic colonial principle of “divide and rule.”

While serving as an adviser to the delegates charged with advocating the Re-
public’s position in the UN and trying to set up an Indonesian Information Agency in New York, the young nationalist Soedjatmoko – or “Koko” for those who knew him well – analyzed the Republic’s bleak prospects in light of US policy and America’s towering influence over the United Nations at this historical juncture. He predicted that Washington would cling to its waffling “wait and see” attitude for the foreseeable future. Although he judged it unlikely that the Truman Administration would publicly proclaim its pro-Dutch stance, he warned that Yogyakarta should be prepared for “the possibility that Washington would take sides [with the Dutch] in degrading the Republic to a small territorial and political entity and in setting up an overall administration based on local administrative units headed by puppets.”

Other Indonesian emissaries on assignment in the United States, such as Ali Sastroamidjojo, conveyed a similar impression. Ali also hoped that more American policymakers would embrace the Indonesian point of view, if only because his nation’s struggle and emerging civil society was in “harmony with the democratic conceptions that had inspired the drafting of the American Constitution in 1776.” Once given the opportunity to do so, Indonesian leaders, he noted, intended to endow their post-colonial Republic with the same dignity, order, and democratic principles that had propelled the United States to its status as a world power. Although he would sadly concede about six months later that such aspirations were nothing but “wishful thinking,” due to the fact that Dutch prestige in America was difficult to challenge and “because the Western European problem seems to be the dominating issue in American foreign policy.”

Both Soedjatmoko and Ali Sastroamidjojo recorded a variety of fears and misgivings about the State Department. The two well-educated Indonesians feared that the increasingly palpable “hysteria” concerning the evil intrigues of international communism was obstructing their public relations efforts. The growing practice of “red-baiting” hampered the attempt to bring the legitimacy of Indonesia’s struggle for independence, grounded in its right to self-determination, to the attention of the American public and the US media. As Soedjatmoko wrote, the habit of “red-baiting” and America’s mushrooming fear of communism yielded an almost instinctive rejection of “all liberal groups.” Ever since Roosevelt’s death, he suggested, Wall Street financiers had solidified their grip on the foreign policy establishment in Washington to an unprecedented degree. He implied that any political movement anywhere in the world, if it advocated even the slightest deviation from a capitalist society based on a competitive free-market model, had become inherently suspect in the eyes of a State Department that was presumably dominated by Wall Street.

Given the emerging “red scare” in the United States, however, Soedjatmoko registered his surprise that “the possibility of the Indonesians and Asians going communist seems to be of much lesser importance to these American circles... In
[Washington’s] global foreign policy, it is quite evident, the first emphasis is laid on the combat of communism in Europe.” Asia only came into the picture, he surmised, when it could be mobilized to assist in America’s struggle against the Kremlin’s conspiracies in Europe. Because he was writing to his friend Subadio Sastrosatomo, a fellow Partai Sosialis (PS) member, he emphasized the danger of Indonesia’s progressive factions being dragged into the middle of the emerging Cold War. Soedjatmoko speculated that the palpable fear of the “red peril” in the United States was fostering a rhetoric of us-versus-them, which implied that any political group that did not want to join either camp would fall in between the cracks. He wistfully predicted that a publicly announced movement towards socialism in Indonesia’s internal politics would have disastrous consequences, because it would aggravate Washington’s fears of communism in Southeast Asia and thus prompt the State Department to embrace the Dutch side even more enthusiastically.29

At the same time, the tiny group of “lobbyists” for the Indonesian Republic, stationed mostly in New York City, was also aware of the State Department’s exposure to pressures emanating from sources far removed from Wall Street bankers. America’s covert support of the Dutch side, by means of arms sales and loans of millions of dollars on generous credit terms, had elicited a barrage of sarcastic comments from the Kremlin, which denounced the US foreign policy establishment with accusations focusing on its imperialist “betrayal of the Indonesian people” because the “Dutch have been selling Indonesian ‘futures’ to American monopolists who are covetous of the rubber, tin, oil, and other riches of Indonesia.”30 At this same juncture, the first attempts of the American entrepreneur, Matthew Fox, and his acquisitive business partners to make a lucrative deal with the Indonesian Republic for the export of costly, precious tropical products to the United States, began to raise the ire of the critical “Wallace group.” As indicated in a report that Dr. Sumitro Djojohadikusumo sent from New York to the Republican government in Yogyakarta, Henry Wallace’s alliance of Progressive Citizens of America (PCA), later the Progressive Party, voiced its criticism of the Truman Administration’s handling of the Dutch-Indonesian conflict. Sumitro, a wily economist trained at the University of Rotterdam in the Netherlands, served as the Director of the “Office of Financial and Trade Representative Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Indonesia” in New York. Despite Wallace’s misgivings, however, Sumitro wished to nurture Matthew Fox’s interest in concluding an exclusive contract with the Indonesian Republic. The business deal would not only have benefited Fox and his partners but the Republic as well, Sumitro suggested, because it would have filled the coffers of the government in Yogyakarta with valuable foreign exchange assets in the form of American dollars.31

Soedjatmoko, in sharing with his friend Subadio in Java his personal impres-
sions of the US State Department, echoed some of the ideas of their mutual political mentor, Sutan Sjahrir. In late October 1947, the French communist newspaper *l’Humanité* printed a story allegedly based on a personal interview with the former Prime Minister of the Republic. According to *l’Humanité*, Sjahrir vociferously criticized the Western world’s capitalist greed. Supposedly, he also denounced America’s obsessive pursuit of nothing but its own self-interest by asserting that “the Dutch colonialists were fighting their war... for Wall Street.”

Whether or not he had actually interviewed “Sutan Chahrir,” this statement was not merely an invention of an overly zealous *l’Humanité* journalist in Paris, who relished every chance he could get to disparage the predatory nature of American capitalism. After all, Sjahrir himself had written that “the United States and England... require the entire world as *Lebensraum* for their capitalist and imperialist economies.” England had earned Sjahrir’s particular contempt; he argued that the Dutch had been able to stay in Indonesia “not on the basis of their own strength but by favor of the English, on whose policies they have been wholly dependent.”

In his political reflections published exactly two years earlier under the title *Perdjoeangan Kita* (or *Perjuangan Kita*, Our Struggle), he had characterized the United States as “the Giant of the Pacific.” Indonesian independence, he prophesied during the earliest stages of Indonesia’s anti-colonial revolution, would hinge on the Republic’s ability to maintain harmony (*rukun*) with the ambitions of the American colossus on the other side of the Pacific Ocean. Most fundamental questions facing the postwar world, Sjahrir had proposed, revolved around a necessity to accommodate America’s wish to command the system of international relations after World War II. Yet he proved to be an astute practitioner of *Realpolitik*. In the postwar era, Sjahrir concluded, any nation trying to pursue a tangible goal, whether it consisted of the independence struggles in Southeast Asia or the economic recovery of European nations in the wake of the defeat of Nazi Germany, confronted a situation in which America’s political sensibilities and geopolitical strategies had to be accommodated.

Soedjatmoko, being a follower of Sjahrir and a loyal member of the democratically oriented *Partai Socialis*, thus incorporated some of his political guru’s ideas. While he engaged in “public relations efforts” on behalf of the Indonesian Republic in the United States, however, he faced yet another irritating obstacle. It was not only Wall Street that exerted notable political impact on the formulation of US foreign policy, even though it was difficult to figure out how financial tycoons manipulated the State Department for their own personal profit. Soedjatmoko was also forced to acknowledge that Dutch history and culture still maintained an exceptional hold on the American public’s imagination. In orchestrating his publicity ventures on behalf of the *Republik Indonesia*’s cause, he discovered over and over again that the Dutch nation’s reputation in the United
States continued to be characterized by positive conceptions about intrepid Dutch mariners and virtuous burghers, who had amassed their wealth and prosperity through hard work and honest dealings. Soedjatmoko, in fact, conceded during the fall of 1947 that his promotional activities on behalf of the Indonesian Republic also entailed the arduous chore of convincing Americans that the Dutch “were even capable of being bad.”

In this context, the State Department official, Charlton Ogburn, who would prove to be among the first eloquent advocates of the interests of the Indonesian Republic, constituted a good example. Before he arrived in Java in October 1947 as a member of the Security Council’s Good Offices Committee, he was imbued with only admiration for the history of the Dutch nation and its “sturdy burghers, whose honesty of dealing was proverbial.” In the sixteenth century, as a matter of conscience, Dutch burghers had “stood up to the murderous legions of Philip II of Spain,” he noted. In the seventeenth century the same “doughty mariners had sailed up the Thames with brooms at their mastheads, signifying that they had swept the English from the seas,” and he added that Dutch painters of this era “were among the world’s finest.” The Dutch had managed to push back the seas to make “a prosperous country of small, unpromising flatlands,” while their colonial administration in the East and West Indies was much admired as a “model” for other imperial powers. He concluded his complimentary list of the “outstanding talents” of Dutch sons and daughters with a reference to their “exemplary behavior” in resisting the Nazis during World War II. Not surprisingly, the Netherlands Information Agency in New York City, during the autumn of 1947 under the capable direction of the former colonial civil servant and elegant writer, Herman Friedericy, tried to foster and project as much as possible this complimentary imagery in its own public relations efforts in the United States.

When he still served as Prime Minister, Sutan Sjahrir had dispatched Soedjatmoko and the Republic’s press officer, Sudarlo Sastrodarmo – who was Subadio’s younger brother – to New York; their assignment was to enhance awareness regarding Indonesia’s struggle for independence among American politicians, the news media, and the general public. Both of them were methodical in their thinking about the factors that might influence American public opinion, and they hoped to provoke a shift in popular sentiment about the anti-colonial efforts in the Indonesian archipelago. They concluded that in addition to furnishing more sophisticated information to newspaper editors and radio broadcasters, accurate insights about the Dutch suppression of the Indonesian Republic should also be provided to “political parties, the most important church groups, women’s organizations such as the League of Women Voters, university professors teaching courses on Asia, and labor organizations such as the AFL and CIO.” By appealing to the American public for support of Indonesians’ independence struggle on moral grounds, they believed that Washington might for-
mulate policies that would endow the Republic’s position with political validity in the international arena. In order to publicize their cause, Sudarpo’s position paper entitled “It’s 1776 in Indonesia” was a clever memorandum that highlighted the analogies between England’s King George III in 1776 and the Netherlands Crown in the post-World War II period. As Soedjatmoko reminisced many years later, trying to communicate the Republic’s noble aspirations in the United States involved taking a “crash course” in the practice of political “lobbying”; stretching the truth a little or establishing overly imaginative parallels seemed to be an inevitable part of the arcane art of lobbying.

Soedjatmoko and Sudarpo enjoyed a variety of adventures during their time in the United States. Not knowing, for example, that the town of Lake Success on Long Island, where the UN Security Council held its meetings, was far away from the center of New York City, they hailed a taxi in Times Square. On their way to the UN Security Council building, while busily counting the cash in their pockets, the taxi ran out of gas on the Long Island Expressway. The two young men ended up pushing the taxi to a nearby gas station, where they refueled before they could make their way to the United Nations’ temporary offices. Once they reached the Security Council, Soedjatmoko and Sudarpo were forced to scramble for official papers that could establish their credentials as legitimate representatives of the Indonesian Republic.

These two impressive young men—being only in their mid-twenties—were handsome, bright, and well versed in Western political theory. Both had joined Sutan Sjahrir’s inner circle during the Japanese occupation of the Netherlands East Indies. They had embraced Sjahrir’s vision of social democracy. Alongside a group of like-minded young men and women, their ideal of a free Indonesia, once Dutch colonialism would be defeated, entailed a society that would not only embrace genuine democracy but also cultivate greater economic equality and social justice. Convincing the American public and Washington policymakers of the legitimacy of this vision, however, was an uphill battle at a time when Americans’ phobia about communist infiltration at home and abroad was burgeoning.

Despite Indonesians’ cynicism concerning America’s contradictory posture vis-à-vis their quest for independence, and regardless of Dutch resentment of any outside interference in their domestic problem, the United States was to become the key player in the Security Council’s Good Offices Committee (GOC), created in the wake of an American motion introduced in the United Nations on August 25, 1947. The Security Council passed a resolution the next day, expressing its readiness, if the parties so requested, “to assist in the settlement through a committee of the Council consisting of three [of its] members, each party selecting one, and the third to be designated by the two selected.” A crippling element of the US proposal was that the Committee should not be granted the power to en-
gage in genuine arbitration – a GOC prerogative that both Australia and the Soviet Union had recommended, which would also have been welcomed by the Indonesian side. Instead, the Security Council restricted the GOC’s intervention to providing only counsel and advice in the effort to facilitate and expedite the search for a peaceful settlement of the Dutch-Indonesian conflict. The Good Offices Committee, so to speak, was placed in the role of umpire in a Dutch-Indonesian soccer match without being allowed to blow a whistle. This soccer metaphor was invoked by the Dutch negotiator, Henri van Vredenburch, when he wrote in his memoirs that the score in November 1947 was “2-0 in favor of the Netherlands.”

Sutan Sjahrir and Haji Agus Salim meet US Government representatives
It was undeniable that the first Dutch military attack – or, in Indonesians’ historical memory, the first colonial war – had removed the Indonesian Question from the Security Council’s back burner by placing it on its official agenda. Solving the dispute, now, called for outside help. The friction between the Netherlands and the Indonesian Republic had escalated into a nasty, public fight, which entailed serious repercussions for the UN Security Council’s image of effectiveness. After August 1947, the conflict could no longer be treated as a “family affair,” representing little more than a rebellion of Southeast Asian subjects against their legitimate colonial “fathers” from Europe. Until the summer of 1947, the Netherlands government downplayed its antagonism with the Indonesian Republic to the outside world by representing it as a purely internal matter. When the UN Security Council created the GOC, however, Dutch authorities discovered that it became less credible, despite their continued best efforts, to portray their contested position in Java and Sumatra as nothing but a domestic problem, because Security Council measures had inaugurated the formal internationalization of the Dutch-Indonesian dispute.

The UN resolution passed in late August 1947, stipulated that both sides in the Dutch-Indonesian conflict would be entitled to select a representative to the
Komite Tiga Negara, or Committee of Three Nations, as Republicans referred to the GOC. Deliberately bypassing further British involvement in its affairs in Southeast Asia, the government in The Hague designated Belgium as its agent. Belgium’s former Prime Minister, Paul van Zeeland, was chosen to perform this role, even though at that very moment he was fully engaged in a domestic political crisis that compelled him to spend most of his time in Brussels rather than in Batavia, where the GOC-supervised meetings were taking place. In the Republican camp, the committed socialist Amir Sjarifuddin, who had succeeded Sutan Sjahrir as Prime Minister on June 26, 1947, first proposed Poland as the Republic’s designated representative on the GOC. Supported by Cabinet members on the political left, Sjarifuddin raised the candidacy of Poland because its emissary to the UN Security Council had eloquently objected to the Dutch military campaign; in all likelihood, he would be an effective spokesman for the Republic. But a majority of the Cabinet’s members worried about injecting the burgeoning Cold War rhetoric into the GOC’s proceedings, which would have occurred if Poland were to argue the Republic’s case. In its discussions, the Cabinet made a series of shrewd political calculations. The result was that Indonesia’s choice fell on Australia as its advocate, represented by Judge Richard C. Kirby.

Together, the two chosen countries were entitled to appoint a third member. In consultation with Dutch and Indonesian officials, Belgium and Australia jointly selected the United States. The combined preference for America’s participation made eminent sense. Whether directly or indirectly, everyone involved in the Dutch-Indonesian dispute recognized the towering influence of the United States on the UN Security Council and its pivotal role in postwar international relations in general. Enlisting America’s involvement, even if it was only a desultory one, seemed not only unavoidable but even desirable. Besides, Republican leaders hoped that a genuine US engagement in the Indonesian Question might bolster their side.

The Dutch had reluctantly consented to the offer of the UN Security Council’s Good Offices. Since the Proclamation of Indonesia’s independence on August 17, 1945, Dutch politicians had tried to avoid all outside meddling. The misguided selection of Belgium, rather than England, as their officially designated GOC representative was related to a lingering resentment regarding the forceful part Mountbatten’s SEAC had played in the Netherlands East Indies in the immediate postwar period. When UN intervention seemed inescapable, however, politicians in the Netherlands and Southeast Asia assumed that America’s official engagement in the GOC would buttress their position. The Foreign Affairs Ministry in The Hague, as well as Dutch authorities in Batavia, hoped that the US would finally convert the State Department’s tacit backing of the Netherlands into full-blown and publicly stated support of Dutch policies in Southeast Asia. The selection of the United States for the role of the third impartial party did not
surprise many people, even though Great Britain saw the choice as a crushing blow to its international prestige. The British had served as dedicated diplomatic go-betweens in the Dutch-Indonesian conflict during the previous two years; with their profound knowledge of the actual situation in the area, English emissaries would have been much better qualified for the job than American representatives. The Indonesian and Dutch preference for America’s participation in the GOC, however, was yet another sign of the US supplanting Great Britain as the new superpower in both Asia proper and in the post-World War II comity of nations in general. As the Dutch historian Pieter Drooglever aptly summarized this development:

It was a shift that marked once more the rapid decline of Britain as a great power, which had already become apparent on a number of occasions during the preceding months. Moreover, it was a step of historic importance, since Britain now actually had to retreat from its position as keeper of the power system that it had set up in Southeast Asia after the end of the Napoleonic wars.47

Albeit reluctantly, Washington had maneuvered itself into a pivotal position, from where it could monitor but also manipulate UN intervention to serve its own political objectives. Just as the task of the American representative on the Security Council had been in the preceding two months to prevent the adoption of resolutions unacceptable to the Dutch, these objectives continued to benefit its loyal European ally, at least in the immediate future, while at the same time “shrouding itself in the robes of the even-handed compromiser.”48 Through its permanent seat on the Security Council and its formal association with the GOC, Washington could also disrupt the efforts of Soviet-affiliated countries to mobilize and aggravate the Dutch-Indonesian antagonism in the United Nations for their own ulterior motives. Although the Truman Administration had been reticent to become directly involved in the colonial conflicts in Southeast Asia, and no matter how self-serving its incentives were for finally doing so, the results of America’s active new engagement with trying to settle the Dutch-Indonesian dispute would be of paramount importance. While not resulting in a policy more favorable to the Indonesian Republic in the short run, the crucial involvement of the US delegation in the GOC proceedings presented Washington with an entirely different and much more complete picture of the forces at work in the archipelago – insights that had up to now been blurred, perhaps even distorted, due to the shoddy and partisan reporting received from the US diplomats on location in Batavia.

The deepening US immersion in the Indonesian Republic’s anti-colonial struggle was rendered tangible with the arrival of the American deputation to the
Good Offices Committee in Java, which appeared at the same time as the new US Consul General, Charles Livengood. America’s participation in the GOC, in fact, proved to be an impetus for further policy entanglements, resulting in an unprecedented flow of valuable information to Washington. Instead of just receiving reports from the US Consulate General in Batavia that were often both slanted and insipid, starting in October 1947, State Department officials in Washington suddenly had access to detailed and sophisticated analyses contained in the frequent GOC communications sent to the Secretary of State. Through the agency of the American representative serving on the UN Security Council’s Good Offices Committee, who could rely on a capable and hard-working support staff, it also appeared as if for the first time the Republic could make its version of the story heard in Washington on a regular basis.49

Moreover, as they became deeply embroiled in the long and tedious process of negotiations, the American members of the GOC would display a change of heart similar to the transfer of allegiance their British predecessors had experienced, whether during SEAC’s task of demobilizing the Japanese or while chaperoning the negotiations preceding the Linggajati Agreement. From innate empathy with their Dutch ally that had rarely been interrogated in the past, American
GOC members also developed an infinitely more positive appraisal of the Indonesian Republic. They became increasingly critical of Dutch authorities in both The Hague and Batavia, who came across as being interested in little else but a settlement that would formalize and implement their own political demands. And these Dutch terms often boiled down to an attempt to eliminate the Republic as a viable political entity, or at least entailed an effort to marginalize it as thoroughly as possible. As the Republic’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Yogyakarta wrote to the UN Security Council in a report entitled “On the Military Situation in Java – Sumatra – Madura August 4 – September 4, 1947,” any agreement between the Netherlands and the Republik Indonesia “is only abided by so long as it suits Dutch purposes, and their action in breaking it is concealed behind a veil of hypocrisy (sic) and deceit.”

Having conquered the most vital territories of Java and Sumatra in the summer of 1947, while already controlling the outer islands since the winter of 1946, the Dutch were confident they bargained from a position of strength. The general feeling in the Dutch community in both the Netherlands and the Indonesian archipelago was that without the UN Security Council’s annoying intervention, they would have been able to deal effectively with the Republic by imposing and enforcing their own solution to the colonial problem. What they often failed to appreciate was that the United States had pursued, until then, a policy which had in most respects corroborated Dutch interests. Although opposed to the Netherlands military action resorted to during the summer of 1947, the Truman Administration had worked tenaciously to block Security Council decisions that could have done more damage to the Dutch political agenda. Even during the negotiations leading up to the Renville Agreement in January 1948, the United States would still tip the balance in favor of the Netherlands, resulting in disappointment, frustration, and a sense of humiliation in the Indonesian camp.

However, the American government’s patronage of its Dutch ally’s efforts to follow its own path of leisurely decolonization – a process that was envisioned as requiring many decades, which some Asianists in the State Department viewed as mere window dressing – would prove to be superficial and fractured. It was limited mainly to the highest and thus most powerful policymaking echelons of the Truman Administration, and especially among those responsible for the focal point of American foreign policy, Europe. A cross section of the American public and numerous members of the US Congress, however, were critical of Washington’s singular focus on Europe, even when such critics were not aware of the particularities of the Dutch military assault on the Indonesian Republic. Somewhere in between were the professional analysts of the State Department and other political bodies in Washington, who represented a broad range of opinions.

Even prior to the first Dutch military action, US officials in various government agencies had grown aware of the possible danger that the combustible situ-
ation in Indonesia posed to the United States, and they urged a more energetic policy of restraining the Dutch. In Washington, the opposition against the ambiguous role the Truman Administration had played thus far was slowly gaining strength, and the trend now seemed to move away from the lackluster US policy of non-intervention in order to maintain the illusion of neutrality. Beginning in October 1947, moreover, the United States’ own prestige had become implicated in the success or failure of the Security Council’s GOC. At the same time, Washington’s policymakers acquired a new and much clearer vision of the personalities, internal divisions, and aspirations of the Republican government, thus paving the way for an incremental, but in the end dramatic, reorientation of US foreign policy vis-à-vis Indonesia’s nationalist aspirations.

Once he arrived in Java in October 1947, as the first American representative to the UN Good Offices Committee, Frank Porter Graham quickly disappoint ed whatever private hopes Dutch politicians may have harbored. With equal speed, he exceeded the expectations of Indonesians because Graham, it seemed, could not help but admire their bold efforts to establish Indonesia’s sovereignty. Chosen because of his background in the arbitration of labor disputes, he was highly regarded as the President of the University of North Carolina in Chapel Hill. As a rare white North Carolinian who had become involved in the early 1940’s in the civil rights movement in the American south – an anti-racist struggle to improve the social and political status of African Americans, most of whom were former slaves – Graham’s liberal politics made his embrace of Indonesia’s quest for independence a natural one.

In 1949, when he settled into yet another role in Washington DC as US Senator from North Carolina, having been appointed to fill a vacant seat, Graham made an impassioned speech on the Senate floor in April 1949, in which he left little doubt as to which party should have commanded America’s moral and political support from the very beginning of Indonesia’s anti-colonial struggle. In due course, his undisguised liberalism would cut his membership in the US Senate short and thus prematurely terminate his role in national politics. In his North Carolina campaign for re-election to the US Senate during the autumn of 1950, he faced a mean-spirited opponent, who branded the Senator as a nigger-loving supporter of civil rights who was “out of step” with the culture of the American South. In the late 1940’s and throughout the 1950’s, the former slave-owning states of the United States adhered tenaciously to their uncompromising segregationist policies. As a result, Graham’s political platform, which included support for African Americans’ civil entitlements and voting rights in Dixiecrat territory, identified him as an outcast and a suspicious character in the eyes of North Carolina’s voters.

After all, during the US presidential elections held in 1948, the States’ Rights candidate from South Carolina, Strom Thurmond, had garnered more popular
votes than Henry Wallace received as standard bearer of the Progressive Party. Thurmond’s electoral success was due exclusively to voters in the American South who did not wish to see any changes in their states’ segregationist laws. Graham’s 1950 re-election campaign for the US Senate was thus frustrated by racist North Carolina voters. A few years earlier, however, when he served as the UN Security Council’s GOC delegate in Batavia, his broad-minded views on civil rights for African Americans also implied his support of Indonesian visions of an autonomous political future.

During his GOC service in Jakarta in late 1947, Graham’s impeccable record of championing progressive causes, including Indonesians’ right to self-determination, enabled him to make a first dent in the State Department’s residual pro-Dutch standpoint. He did so by confronting Washington policymakers with the clear-cut policy choice they should make: either strengthen the Dutch position or support the Republic. In response, the still staunchly pro-Dutch Assistant Chief of the Philippines and Southeast Asian Affairs Division, William Lacy, in consultation with a member of the Northern Europe desk, Frederick Nolting, drafted a memorandum proposing a formal statement concerning US backing of the Dutch side. Since it required the signatures of both the European and Far Eastern Affairs Offices’ Directors, John Hickerson and Walton Butterworth, however, the memo was not submitted to the Secretary of State, because the latter two refused to endorse the proposal.

Regardless of the idealism GOC members brought with them when they were selected for service in the Indonesian archipelago, the mission of Graham, Kirby, and Van Zeeland, as well as their dedicated staff members, was fated to confront the irresolution and lack of conciliatory intentions between the two parties that was already formalized at Linggajati. As earlier, the likelihood of failure again stemmed, in part, from the “bitter distrust” between the two parties, which appeared to entrench them in irreconcilable positions. The antagonists’ cynical attitudes and mutual hostilities hampered the GOC’s “faithful work” and extinguished its “stubborn hope.” In addition, the Security Council’s specific instructions to the GOC also curbed its effectiveness, because its mandate was not only limited to an advisory role but also required that the committee’s recommendations be unanimous. Although appointed to coax a resolution to a highly intricate dispute, the GOC was not invested with sufficient authority to act as a peacemaking body that could incorporate and resolve internal differences of opinion.

When the GOC began its task in Batavia in October 1947, Graham’s immediate infatuation with the Republican point of view startled his contacts in the State Department. Once in Java, Graham soon established bonds of friendships with an array of Republican leaders, to the extent that several Dutchmen accused him of being “in league” with the Indonesians. Because the Dutch Foreign
Ministry and the Netherlands delegate to the UN had speculated about the appointment of an American GOC representative of the stature of Dwight Eisenhower, Dean Acheson, Sumner Welles, or the elder statesman F.B. Sayre – the President of the UN Trustee Council and former High Commissioner of the Philippines – Dutch observers must have viewed the arrival of Graham in Java as an insult. Lieutenant Governor General Van Mook dismissed Graham as a “docile, diligent little man”; the Netherlands, the Indonesian Republic, the United States, and the UN Security Council, Van Mook sneered, would be better off if he quickly returned to his pristine ivory tower in North Carolina. Others called him an “amateur,” whose facile comprehension of the world’s complexities was confined to things American.

Unable or unwilling to acknowledge that Graham’s political beliefs or moral sensibilities, shaped by his involvement in the early manifestations of the civil rights movement in the American South, induced him to give his blessing to Indonesians’ right to self-determination, Dutch detractors attributed his support of the Yogyakarta Republic to his gullibility and lack of knowledge concerning Indonesian culture. Since the idealistic, if naive, history professor had no experience in Asia whatsoever, acerbic Dutchmen were convinced that Republican leaders had either seduced or brainwashed him, which prompted the US GOC representative to glorify Indonesia’s nationalists as modern-day reincarnations of America’s founding fathers. The Dutch Army’s Commander-in-Chief, Hendrik Spoor, indulged his layman’s interest in psychology when he diagnosed Graham of suffering from “a well-known sentimentality complex known as underdog sympathy.”

The Dutch, however, were not alone in expressing their irritation with Graham. Members of his own staff were also ill at ease with the idealistic, but scatterbrained, academic from North Carolina. Charlton Ogburn, the canny State Department official assigned to the GOC staff, described his association with Graham as having to work with an “elderly granny.” The lion’s share of the fussy professor’s past experience had revolved around the arcane politics of a large state university – a professional arena where ideological battles tend to be fought with passion even if the stakes are small. The academic world was miles removed from his sudden, “official involvement in an international mêlée.” Eventually, when the State Department recalled Graham in order to replace him with Coert du Bois in early 1948, Ogburn almost whooped with delight: “Praise Be,” he wrote to his parents on February 20, 1948. When seeing him off at the Batavia airport “with great relief,” Ogburn’s beloved wife, Vera remembered that Graham’s final clumsy act was to spill a cup of coffee all over her husband. The professor, Ogburn confessed to his parents, was “filled with lofty banalities.” Graham kept his staff on “tender hooks” during his stay in Java, as if he did not know “what he was going to do next.” Upon Graham’s return to the US, he gushed in the company of offi-
cials in Washington that his GOC participation in Batavia had been a magnificent “adventure in democracy.” Ogburn, on the other hand, noted with regret that Graham’s contribution to democracy had been handicapped by the fact that his mind was among “the most untidy” ones he had ever encountered.63

Criticism of Graham’s performance on the GOC in Java also came from a third source, since commentators in the Soviet Union were equally disparaging in their assessments. Radio Moscow, for example, made a standard Soviet accusation and dismissed him as nothing but a pawn of American capitalism. According to Russian news reports, Graham was bullying the Republicans into signing an agreement with either false promises of financial lucre or outrageous threats such as the use of atomic weapons and the full force of America’s military capability.64 While facing the bombardment of criticism descending on him from Dutch and Soviet sources – as well as the gentle exasperation experienced by members of his own staff – Graham nonetheless clung to his pro-Republican posture, which he continued to defend long after he had left his official position on the GOC in Batavia. Charlton Ogburn, too, despite his ambivalent memories of Graham’s clumsiness and chaotic style, credited him with having rendered a valuable service. He brought to policymakers in Washington a new “understanding of the incentives of the Indonesians and a genuine sympathy with their cause.”65 Graham’s “temperamental affinity” with the Indonesian independence movement had shaken the State Department’s “complacency,” Ogburn remembered later, and provided an initial push to reconsider its implicit pro-Dutch stance.66

After six weeks of trying to figure out how “the two parties [could] be brought face to face” in a constructive dialogue, diplomatic negotiations under GOC auspices began to ebb and flow on board the USS Renville, anchored in the harbor of Tanjung Priok in early December 1947.67 This was not only a moment of tension but also an occasion filled with hope, because America’s status and prestige as an effective world leader was now implicated in the peaceful settlement of the Indonesian Question. As was the case during the autumn of 1946, when a Commission General was appointed to negotiate with the Republic on its behalf, in preparation for the UN Security Council-sponsored meetings a year later, the Netherlands government in The Hague once again created an official commission by means of a Royal Decree rather than simply assign a delegation. This political decision was designed, once more, to preserve the myth that its conflict with the Indonesian Republic constituted a purely domestic matter.

Even though the Netherlands had conceded with the signing of the Linggajati Agreement that the Republic possessed de facto authority over Java, Madura, and Sumatra, it still maintained de jure sovereignty over the archipelago as a whole, thus relegating the Republic to a position of acting like a rebellious element within a unified nation-state.68 The appointment of the well-educated Indonesian Abdulkadir Widjojoatmodjo – who was Van Mook’s loyal protégé – as the
commission’s formal chairman embodied yet another cunning Dutch move to reinforce the appearance of the dispute between the Netherlands and the Indonesian Republic being nothing but a family affair. Articulating his personal perspective, Abdulkadir compared his Republican compatriots’ desire for immediate independence to an ill-conceived, impetuous marriage. “Why wait until... the house is completely furnished? Marry first. The household will take care of itself if the couple cooperates.” Not surprisingly, a Republican spokesman via a Voice of Free Indonesia (VOFI) radio broadcast denigrated Abdulkadir as a man who was not a “real and pure Indonesian.” Instead, he was an unknown personality of “dubious ability.”

Henri van Vredenburch, who was one of the chief negotiators on behalf of the Netherlands aboard the USS Renville along with Abdulkadir, also reinforced in his 1985 memoirs the idea of the GOC sponsored meetings as representing an attempt to adjudicate a family feud. He conjured up an elaborate trope to portray the complicated relationship between progressive colonial civil servants, like Van Mook, and Indonesian nationalists. His foray into allegory invoked an odd sequence of men embracing each other, to be followed by an apparently incestuous relationship between an uncle and his niece. Describing first the prewar friendship between neo-ethical Dutch civil servants and their highly educated Indonesian apprentices, he wrote in his memoirs: “It was inevitable that members of the progressive group De Stuw would dote on and indulge the Young Turks of the na-
tionalist movement who, for their part, relished the embrace... as long as they were callow and beardless.” Switching gender in his representation of Indonesian nationalism, Van Vredenburch continued:

It was not so much a marriage as a *liaison de raison* between the colonial uncle and his nationalist niece. It will not surprise anyone who has observed the world in a clear-eyed fashion that once she was released from the uncle’s custody and had acquired a taste of freedom, the niece was convinced she could get as many lovers as she might desire. For the uncle, however, it was and remained a tragic affair. With endless patience, exemplary determination, and attractive gifts in the form of concessions, the uncle attempted to regain the affection of the beautiful niece. Until one day he was forced to acknowledge that he no longer had anything to relinquish or to acquiesce, thus recognizing that all his efforts had been in vain. The uncle was furious at the lack of gratitude on the part of the niece, who had until recently been quite ignorant and silly (*onnozel*), and whose first steps on the path of emancipation the uncle himself had guided. It was a brief but sad story.71

Van Vredenburch was not entirely original in conjuring up these bizarre metaphors in his memoirs. He may have taken his cue from his close friend, Netherlands Army Commander-in-Chief “Siem” Spoor, who produced an equally eccentric parable contained in a document, entitled “Relevant Portion of a Con-
fidential Report of an Important Netherlands Source in Indonesia dated September 13, 1948,” that the Netherlands Embassy in Washington placed on the State Department desk of Frederick Nolting, whose solidly pro-Dutch stance had begun to waver in the course of 1948. The first three paragraphs of the text conjured up a well-connected bridegroom and his fabulously rich fiancée, who were being urged by relatives abroad to resolve their personal discord, chronicling “a family romance” gone awry.

The introductory section made General Spoor’s report extraordinary. His narrative depicted the Dutch-Indonesian confrontation as a nasty fight between a rational, if possessive, Dutchman and a neurotic Indonesian bride-to-be. In Spoor’s story, the Indonesian Republic emerged as a volatile woman, who had acknowledged that her relationship with her Dutch fiancé was a travesty. Since the birth of the Indonesian nationalist movement in the first half of the twentieth century, it had gradually dawned on her that any kind of union with the Northern European groom would always be based on exploitation rather than kindness or generosity. The newly liberated woman was adamant about receiving her official freedom, and she pursued her independence fiercely. As Spoor intimated, however, the ill-fated couple was under enormous pressure from the international community headed by the UN Security Council and its Good Offices Committee in Java to reconcile their differences.

Speaking in the House of Commons in December 1946, Mr. Churchill said with reference to India: “If either bride or bridegroom fails to appear in church, the result is not what one would call a unilateral marriage. It is absolutely essential that both parties be present.”

The present situation in Indonesia is even more unsatisfactory than the contingency described by Mr. Churchill. The bride not only refuses to appear in church; no, she has induced her friends and the best man to institute proceedings in court against the bridegroom; she allows her admirers to commence all sorts of unusual and unseemly acts in her bridegroom’s house; she repudiates and deceives him, engages constantly in flirtations with adventurous suitors, and has even allowed herself to be ensnared by a great-uncle, a real bear of a man, who is after her innocence and wealth. As if that were not enough, she contests the validity of the marriage settlement, although it was drawn up with the most scrupulous care, never hesitating at the same time to invoke the document when alleging fear that her bridegroom is about to assault her. Finally, she has shown such peculiar leanings in the field of business that the bridegroom and his family, and in fact the friends of both parties, have been utterly shocked thereby. In short: the bride’s mental equipment appears to be slightly out of order.

Normally the marriage would, of course, not take place. She would be en-
trusted to the care of a few competent doctors, who in all probability would suggest a period of treatment in a center for neurotic patients under the guidance and supervision of some husky nurses. On his part, the bridegroom would look for another bride, perhaps—so as to create the least possible scandal—from the mentally more normal sisters of the bride. But the Family Council—a family [council] with the widest ramifications throughout the whole world—has decided that, willy-nilly, the wedding has to take place, and to that end it has engaged a firm of lawyers rather than a neurologist, in order to keep the bride away from the sensuous great-uncle if at all possible, binding her at the same time to her groom by another marriage settlement. Small wonder that each day the latter feels more uncomfortable.77

After the Security Council—alias “Family Council”—had retained its “firm of lawyers” (GOC) in order to protect the feminine Indonesian Republic from the clutches of “a real bear of a man...the sensuous great uncle” (Soviet Union), the first plenary session on the USS Renville took place on December 8, 1947. It was an uncomfortable gathering, not only due to the friction between the two adversaries, but also because of the less than suitable conditions on board the ship. Seated in the sweltering heat of the Renville’s rear deck, a nearby ship wharf with workmen wielding pneumatic drills served as a distraction. At the same time, US sailors on the front deck were exercising with clanking guns, while siren-sounding naval vessels and horn-blowing pilot boats crisscrossed the Tanjung Priok harbor, inundating the participants with an additional cacophony of sounds.78

The meetings in the clammy, cramped, and noisy setting of the USS Renville proceeded for the next five weeks, during which time the negotiators tried to come to terms with acrimonious differences. The UN sanctioned truce, imposed in the wake of the Netherlands first armed assault on the Republic, had quickly degenerated into a constant series of incursions into enemy territory, whether on the part of Dutch military forces or by Indonesian army (TNI) units or bands of armed civilians. The autumn of 1947 was characterized by an avalanche of informal accusations and formal complaints, which weighed down the desks of the members of the UN Good Offices Committee in Batavia. Dutch military and civilian officials constantly denounced Indonesians for crossing the demilitarized zone along the “Van Mook Line” from Republican territory into Dutch-controlled regions, where they allegedly looted food and forced villagers into providing myriad goods and services. The Dutch flooded the GOC with English translations of Republican army dispatches and military orders, originally written in Malay (Indonesian) or Javanese, which they claimed to have intercepted.

None of the GOC members, however, could read or speak either language. Hence, their lack of linguistic skills made it difficult for UN representatives in Batavia to assess this deluge of Dutch protests concerning the widespread “Re-
publican acts of terrorization and sabotage” ostensibly taking place.\textsuperscript{79} In fact, the Republic’s Prime Minister, Amir Sjarifuddin, recognized the urgent need for impartial translators and interpreters; as he wrote to the GOC on December 11, 1947, “it is especially important that the GOC and its observation teams have the services of two interpreters, one to be selected by each of the parties.”\textsuperscript{80} Thus, in the English-language version of the allegations submitted to the GOC, the Netherlands Special Commission for the implementation of the cease-fire agreement called the UN representatives’ attention to a litany of atrocities perpetrated by TNI troops and so-called “Republican gangs” or “bands of gangsters,” as the Netherlands representative to the UN Security Council had called them.\textsuperscript{81}

Some reports were quite detailed on a day-to-day basis, like the “List of Subversive Acts – November 21, 1947,” which mentioned a range of offenses, from murder to assaults, such as the charges that “possessors of NICA money were manhandled by regular Republican soldiers at Wonotor. The personnel of the sugar factory Gending were threatened with death. To lend force to these threats a [foreman] in this factory was slaughtered before his house...”\textsuperscript{82} Other written accusations were submitted as quantitative evidence of many different types of incidents. An appendix to the transcript of a speech given by Van Vredenburch during the meeting on board the USS Renville on December 9, 1947, for example, offered a “List of [Republican] Subversive Activities from November 1 – 25, 1947.” In a footnote, the report noted that “in reality the list is much longer, but
we have selected only those cases which appear to be beyond doubt.” Under two separate sub-headings the following catalog of accusations appeared.83

<table>
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<tr>
<th>I. Intimidation and Terrorization of the Population:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Intimidation</td>
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<td>B. Abductions</td>
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<tr>
<td>C. Looting</td>
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<td>D. Arson</td>
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<tr>
<td>E. Murderous Attacks</td>
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<tr>
<td>F. Murders</td>
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<tr>
<td>a) Desa Policemen murdered</td>
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<td>b) Others</td>
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<th>II. Acts of Sabotage:</th>
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<tr>
<td>A. Works and Plantations (including cases of arson)</td>
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<tr>
<td>B. Irrigation works</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Communications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) Roads</td>
</tr>
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<td>b) Railways</td>
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<tr>
<td>c) Bridges</td>
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<tr>
<td>d) Telephone Lines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Mines and Booby Traps Placed</td>
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While Dutch officials were feeding a steady stream of alarmist memos to the GOC in Batavia, the same activity was replicated in Washington, where the Netherlands Embassy and the Office of the Netherlands Representative to the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) guided a similar flow of sensational information in the direction of the State Department. But the Republican side did not sit still either; the Indonesian delegation to the GOC submitted its own litany of grievances, accusing the Royal Netherlands Army of identical transgressions. The Indonesian side also tended to embellish the complaints it lodged against the Dutch in Java and Sumatra. While the very first GOC meetings were taking place on board the USS Renville, for instance, a controversial incident occurred in the village of Rawahgede in the Krawang area in the vicinity of Batavia on December 9, 1947, where “312 men were shot to death by the Dutch... and more than 200 other people were wounded.” Dutch forces attacked the village because it was allegedly “a stronghold of popular resistance.” On the basis of an eyewitness account, the tragedy was described as the Netherlands military approaching “with a force of about 300 men, using mortars and machine guns... Rawagede was badly damaged by mortar fire. Afterwards, Dutch soldiers wearing green barrets (sic) entered the village and rounded up the male population and murdered them... The victims were all innocent farmers.”85
But Rawahgede was only the tip of the iceberg, and the Indonesian delegation would continue to accuse Dutch military troops of committing an endless series of brutalities against the Republican population, including the violent rape of very young girls and pregnant women.86 On May 20, 1948, for example, a memorandum arrived at the GOC offices in Jakarta which bore the headline “Dutch Terrors and Barbarities.” It quoted from Merdeka, a publication issued by the Indonesian Information Service in Bombay, India. A list of alleged atrocities followed, highlighting the Dutch “massacre of 40,000 Indonesians in South Celebes, their suffocation of 46 Indonesian prisoners-of-war... in a railroad car [at Bondowoso], the machine-gunning of 300 Indonesians at Rawah Gede, the burning alive of Indonesians in Bandung, etc.” These appalling events happened after the Renville accord had been signed. To Republican partisans, it was self-evident that none of these agreements “have deterred the Dutch fascists from their inhumanities.”87 General Spoor, in a moment of honesty, admitted to a group of journalists during a quick visit to the Netherlands in January 1948, that “of course” his troops committed truce violations, too, because “we are not saints!”88

The GOC sponsored meetings on board the USS Renville yielded a truce agreement that was signed in mid-January 1948. The agreement accomplished no more than providing a basis for further negotiations towards a permanent settlement. As had happened after Linggajati, this newly formalized groundwork would prove exceedingly fragile. In its attempt to compromise on the question of ultimate sovereignty, it tried to do the impossible. From the Republic’s perspective, the agreement dealt severe blows, because the Renville truce forced the Indonesian side to concede Dutch sovereignty throughout the archipelago for a stated interval. After this period, as was previously stipulated in the Linggajati pact of March 1947, the Dutch promised to transfer sovereignty to a United States of Indonesia (USI). The USI, in turn, would enter into an equal partnership with the Kingdom of the Netherlands in the statutory arrangement of a Netherlands-Indonesian Union. The Republic of Indonesia was to become only a component state within the United States of Indonesia.89

Finally, the Yogyakarta government reluctantly acquiesced to the creation of additional federal states in territories formerly under the jurisdiction of the Republic. Dutch authorities had orchestrated these puppet-states while the GOC negotiations on the USS Renville were in progress. The American representative Frank Porter Graham, however, informed Secretary of State Marshall of his serious doubts about the sincerity of the Dutch. He cautioned Washington that he and fellow members of the US GOC delegation were far from convinced that the Dutch were willing to grant the Indonesian Republic an equal partnership within the Kingdom of the Netherlands, if and when the United States of Indonesia would be established as a viable political entity. The Americans on the spot were inclined to believe “that the Netherlands aim was a federation in which
the Netherlands itself will have ultimate voice, speaking through a hierarchy of subordinate Indonesian officials.”

The Soviet-bloc countries, as well as other supporters of the Republik Indonesia, reacted to the GOC sponsored accord in a scathing manner. In fact, Andrei Gromyko, who headed the Soviet delegation to the United Nations, excoriated the Renville agreement. He lectured in the UN Assembly in late February 1948, that the Security Council had brokered a settlement that ought to remind everyone of Mark Twain’s words: when a “hen [has] laid a normal-sized egg, she cackles as though she has created a small planet.” Gromyko also suggested that the Renville accord should be mounted as a “museum exhibit” of a “shameful” document, drafted because members of the United Nations had forsaken their interest in the plight of colonized people, purely to serve the capitalist greed of the United States and European colonial powers. Also Charlton Ogburn, who had labored day and night to bring the negotiations on board the USS Renville to a fruitful conclusion, would remember many years later that the agreement was nothing but “a lemon.” It should have been called “the Renville Non-Agree-
ment,” he wrote in 1985, because the Dutch signed it with “one understanding” and the Republic’s leaders with “quite another.”

Two fundamental flaws doomed the Renville agreement from the start. The first reality, which negotiators on all sides failed or refused to grasp, was that “sovereignty cannot be divided between two claimants: one or the other must have the deciding vote.” The second error that misguided the participants in the negotiations on the USS Renville, according to Ogburn, was an unwillingness to recognize “that the Dutch lacked the power to defeat the Indonesian uprising.” As a result, the murky compromise, reached on a ship anchored in the soggy heat and clamor of Tanjung Priok harbor, produced little more than a continuation of the litany of vitriolic complaints that both sides in the Dutch-Indonesian conflict filed with the Security Council’s Good Offices Committee.

Apart from temporarily ensuring its basic survival, the Republic scored one crucial victory on which it staked almost everything: within six months to a year after signing the agreement, free and unencumbered elections would take place. These plebiscites were to determine whether the territories of Java, Madura and

The Linggadjati-Renville Agreements: no more than a footnote of history. Indonesia once free, always free
Sumatra – the area over which the Dutch had recognized the *de facto* authority of the Republic under the Linggajati Agreement – would form part of the Republic of Indonesia or would merge into another political unit, or a Dutch-created *ne-gara*, within the United States of Indonesia. The Republic pinned all its hopes on receiving popular support in Dutch occupied territories by means of fair, UN monitored elections, because it was the only trump card it held.

Dean Rusk (UN Affairs), Walton Butterworth (Far Eastern Affairs) and John Hickerson (European Affairs), the three powerful chiefs of the State Department Offices most directly concerned with the Indonesian Question, were correct in their assessment that without the UN Good Offices Committee, it would have been likely that “the Republic of Indonesia would soon have been eliminated as a political factor in the Netherlands East Indies.” But in order to secure the survival of the Republic, the United States had permitted the Netherlands not only to legitimize but also to strengthen its strategically superior position. As the three senior officials articulated in a joint memorandum to the Secretary of State, it was now incumbent upon Washington to seize the momentum and push through a permanent settlement to be signed within six weeks at most, “before any opportunity arises for an exacerbation of the [negative] feelings between the two parties.”

Their primary fear – one can read in between the lines – was for the overconfident Dutch to dig themselves deeper into the political landscape of Java and Sumatra, as if the Republic or the popular Indonesian nationalist movement did not exist, purely because their superior bargaining position permitted them to do so.

While Dutch authorities needed time for the consolidation and expansion of their new federal structures, they had no interest whatsoever in popular elections in their recently conquered territories. Rusk, Butterworth, and Hickerson, therefore, urged Marshall to put pressure on the Dutch Ambassador during a meeting scheduled to take place in mid-February 1948, and tell him in no uncertain terms that Washington expected the Dutch authorities to show extraordinary restraint in their dealings with the Republic and, above all, not to hinder the preparations for the popular referenda. The Dutch side had received considerable US support during the Renville negotiations, but Washington’s forbearance with the Netherlands – the three chiefs’ memorandum conveyed in a not-so-subtle fashion – should be neither unconditional nor boundless. Again, America’s intuitive pro-Dutch orientation was questioned from within the State Department. Already at the time of the Renville negotiations, an intra-departmental diversity of views in Washington became apparent.

Before January 1948, from a Dutch perspective, it had been exceedingly difficult to obtain a straightforward impression of the Truman Administration’s standpoint concerning the Netherlands’ struggle with its wayward colonial subjects who, from a Dutch perspective, had disguised themselves as bona fide nationalists.
but were in reality nothing but “Republican rebels.” Washington’s lack of transparency, however, was not merely the result of internal dissension existing within the ranks of the State Department or Marshall and Lovett’s almost obsessive worries about the political and economic recovery of Western Europe. It was also due to the fact that Dutch politicians and the public-at-large, whether in the Netherlands or in the Indonesian archipelago, displayed little sensitivity to Washington’s delicate balancing act. They tended to interpret the Truman Administration’s compromises between its Asian interests, on the one hand, and its European policies, on the other hand – while placating the volatility of domestic public opinion in an election year – as an effort to undermine the Netherlands position.

Dutch observers also ignored the implications of Henry A. Wallace’s announcement on December 29, 1947, that he would run as a progressive third-party candidate in the 1948 US presidential race. Wallace’s “Gideon’s Army, small in number, powerful in conviction” would likely appeal to the most liberal wing of the Democratic Party, and virtually everyone expected that his votes would “come straight out of Harry Truman’s pocket.” Having served as Roosevelt’s Vice President during World War II, Wallace continued to advocate the right to self-determination and to champion the anti-imperialist cause. His consistent call for American support to the nationalist movements in Asia rendered Truman vulnerable to criticism from the left in the forthcoming elections, due to his record of sustaining Dutch and French neo-colonial efforts in the Netherlands East Indies and Indochina.

Truman’s election ordeal in 1948, however, would be even more daunting. Not since the US presidential elections of 1912, when Woodrow Wilson defeated three other opponents – the Republican Party’s Charles E. Hughes, Theodore Roosevelt at the head of the Progressive Party ticket, and Eugene V. Debs as the nominee of the Socialists – had a presidential election featured four formal candidates. In 1948, Truman also faced a challenge from the right, because traditional Democrats in the former slave-owning states in the South were mounting their own States’ Rights movement. A significant number of Southern Democrats were uniting behind Strom Thurmond’s anti-civil rights agenda. With the prospect of three candidates vying for the popular electoral base of the Democratic Party in the 1948 presidential race, Truman and his advisers worried that the Republican Party’s presidential candidate – which could be Governor Thomas E. Dewey of New York, Governor Earl Warren of California, or someone else to be nominated during the Republican convention planned for June 21, 1948, in Philadelphia – would confront a dangerously fractured Democratic Party. These internal cleavages, in turn, might make it possible for Republicans to secure an easy victory in the presidential elections in early November 1948. When contemplating his first nationwide political campaign, made infinitely more complex because of Wallace and Thurmond’s entry into the race, it therefore made
sense for Harry Truman and his foreign policymakers to become extremely circumspect in their political and material sponsorship of the Netherlands position in the Indonesian archipelago.

To the Dutch, however, the Renville negotiations seemed to mark a positive shift in US foreign policy. Two weeks after the agreement's signing, a government assessment in The Hague celebrated the success that had been booked “within the limits of the possible.” In particular, the conspicuous location of the cease-fire boundaries was hailed as a triumph because it implied Washington’s “endorsement of the Dutch Police Action. Within the UN line – with international sanctioning – we can mop up the situation because we have virtually secured a free hand. The possibility existed that we would have been forced to retreat to the July 20th line or even further, but now we have a chance to harvest the ample fruits of the Police Action and can thus consolidate [our authority], while conditions in the Republic radicalize – which is exactly what is going to happen.” Rather belatedly, some politicians in The Hague and Batavia as well as a portion of the Dutch public at large came to appreciate the extent to which the Truman Administration had backed Dutch interests in the Indonesian Question. Ironically, this recognition turned out to be ill-timed. Instead of being able to rely on the enduring support of Washington, while a Dutch-concocted and controlled United States of Indonesia was emerging as a credible political reality, the early months of 1948 revealed the first signs of the steady erosion of America’s pro-Dutch posture that would continue throughout the year.
Not being able to read the handwriting on the wall – the year 1948 marked the beginning of the end as far as the Truman Administration’s support for its faithful Dutch ally was concerned – authorities in The Hague and Batavia interpreted the Renville Agreement, concluded in mid-January 1948, as a tangible pro-Dutch breakthrough. An important factor in convincing Dutch politicians in both the Netherlands and the Indonesian archipelago that an auspicious shift in US foreign policy had taken place in their favor was a leak that occurred on January 5, 1948. E.F. Drumwright, a Far Eastern Affairs specialist in the US Embassy in London, provided a Dutch diplomat with a detailed description of the telegram that the US Under Secretary of State, Robert Lovett, had sent on New Year’s Eve to America’s GOC representative, Frank Porter Graham, in Batavia. Lovett’s cable, according to Drumright, made it abundantly clear that the Netherlands, because of its economic and political centrality in US plans for Europe’s economic recovery, should maintain control of the Indonesian archipelago for the foreseeable future.1

Lovett’s telegram was composed after a tentative but critical discussion had occurred among the different regional divisions within the State Department.2 The cable repudiated the pro-Republican course of action Graham had sketched out in his so-called “Christmas Message,” which had horrified Dutch authorities in The Hague as well as negotiators participating in the GOC meetings on board the USS Renville.3 Graham had drafted his Christmas proposal to advocate a Dutch-Indonesian settlement that in essence called for a return to the status quo ante bellum.4 Drumwright’s timely disclosure, therefore, effectively alleviated Dutch uncertainties about Washington’s appraisals of the legitimacy of their cause. As a result, the Dutch GOC delegation on the USS Renville suddenly mustered and projected a new self-assurance, because their secret knowledge of Lovett and Marshall’s analysis of the Indonesian Question seemed to tip the delicate balance of the negotiations in the Netherlands’ favor. Understandably, the message contained in Lovett’s telegram put the Dutch Ambassador in Washington, Eelco van Kleffens, in an exhilarated mood. “I believe I am correct,” he wrote to the Dutch Foreign Minister upon receiving the news, “when I register my belief that American policy has undergone an alteration in our direction.”5 Gra-
ham, who was despised in Dutch circles for what was called his primitive anti-
colonial stance, was finally forced to descend from his moral high horse.

The idea that American policy towards the Netherlands East Indies was only an
outgrowth of US plans for Europe’s economic rehabilitation must have entered
Van Kleffens’ analytical grasp before. He might have heard the story attributed
to Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, Willard Thorp. As the
Marshall Plan was being drafted, Thorp compared America’s European Recovery
Program to a rescue mission on the high seas, with the first life raft to be lowered
consisting of the Netherlands East Indies filled with oil, rubber, tin, coffee, and
tea, whereas the second one contained Argentina’s wheat and beef. However, the
Truman Administration had never demonstrated so unambiguously that, in the
immediate future, it wished for the Netherlands to remain in control of the In-
donesian archipelago. As a result, Van Kleffens impressed upon his colleagues in
The Hague that the Renville proposals should be accepted as quickly as possible.
He advised the Dutch Foreign Minister to stop the hairsplitting and “further
bickering” over minor details, such as Graham’s additional six principles that
were aimed at buttressing the Republic’s position. Consolidating Washington’s
support, while maintaining the leeway to be able to blame the Indonesian side for
the agreement’s potential failures, constituted a boost to the Dutch political
agenda. As the Ambassador admonished, The Hague ought to become fully cog-
nizant of the fact that without the approval of the North American colossus, lit-
tle could be accomplished by the Dutch in the Indonesian archipelago.

The Renville Agreement represented a dilemma with poignant consequences
for the Republic’s Prime Minister, Amir Sjarifuddin, who was forced to resign af-
after accepting the accord “under perceptible American pressure.” His left-wing
(Sayap Kiri) supporters recognized that Amir had no other option but to sign the
Renville settlement, particularly because Washington’s emissaries threatened to
abandon the involvement in the resolution of the Dutch–Indonesian conflict if
the Republic refused to accede to Renville’s legalistic principles. Graham con-
vinced the Republic’s delegation to the Security Council’s GOC negotiations
that by signing the truce, however reluctantly, it would opt for the wisdom of de-
ciding upon its future fate through “ballots rather than bullets.” This choice, Gra-
ham argued, would certainly appeal to the political inclinations of the Truman
Administration; he noted that it would compel Washington to recognize, at long
last, that while “the Dutch had the military strength, one thing that the Republic
could be confident of was the support of the Indonesian people.” But the more
centrist Masyumi party and the Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI) called for dogged
opposition to Dutch demands, only to withdraw their support from Amir’s cabi-
et and thus force his resignation.

Prime Minister Amir Sjarifuddin’s decision to sign the Renville agreement in
January 1948, also had profound implications for the future course of the poli-
The “left” and “right” factions on the Republican political scene seemed to switch roles immediately thereafter. After January 1948, Masyumi and the PNI would carry the torch for a resolution of the conflict within Renville’s legal constructions, whereas the left-wing groups, in due course, absorbed an oppositional stance by uniting in the Front Demokrasi Rakyat (The Democratic People’s Front or FDR). Soviet commentators, meanwhile, greeted Amir’s successor, Mohammad Hatta, with contempt, in part because he would be accountable only to President Sukarno rather than a parliamentary body, “until a measure of unity within the Republic could be restored.” As was scornfully reported in Moscow, “the rightist government under Mohammad Hatta... bears witness to the direct intervention of Wall Street into the internal affairs of the Indonesian Republic.”

During the early months of 1948, Dutch officials reveled in a new appreciation for America’s pro-Dutch posture, which yielded, in turn, an almost blustery assurance in the communications sent from the Netherlands Embassy in Washington to The Hague and Batavia. This positive outlook was further enhanced by the replacement of Graham as US representative to the GOC. His Indonesian friends watched their defender’s departure with sorrow, although they were gratified to hear that the former President of the University of North Carolina was appointed, upon his return to the United States, as the Secretary of State’s Special Advisor on Indonesian Affairs. The Dutch, on the other hand, were delighted to say goodbye to the naive and scatterbrained history professor.

Coert Du Bois, who had served as US Consul General in Batavia during the late 1920’s, succeeded Graham in early 1948. According to Van Kleffens, he was the exact opposite of his predecessor. Du Bois, who spoke Dutch, was “matter-of-fact and realistic and above all acquainted with the mentality of Asians, especially with that of the Indonesians.” Du Bois himself, however, was astonished to receive the invitation to serve on the GOC in Batavia. He was reluctant to accept the appointment because, as he informed the State Department official who extended the offer, he could never be an impartial adviser or mediator due to his deeply rooted pro-Dutch bias. A personal tragedy also made him reticent to depart for Southeast Asia. His two daughters had recently committed suicide by jumping out of an airplane after learning that their fiancés had died during a hiking trip on Mount Vesuvius in Italy. When he finally “took the hint” and accepted the GOC appointment, he departed for Batavia alone, leaving his grieving wife behind, who was reported to be mentally unstable since her daughters’ deaths.

At first, the Dutch enthusiasm for the new American representative appeared justified. Du Bois tended to accept uncritically their version of events. In his initial reports to the State Department and the UN Security Council, he expressed his conviction that the Dutch intended to carry out the provisions of the
The new American delegate, however, did not comply with The Hague’s interests for very long. Within three months after arriving in Java, his attitude would undergo a radical transformation in favor of the Republic. In early 1948, though, when the ink of the Indonesian and Dutch signatures on the Renville agreement had barely dried, there were few reasons in Dutch circles to doubt Washington’s “good intentions.” The State Department had posted a solidly pro-Dutch representative in Batavia, “who will not view the Republic’s leaders as the contemporary counterparts of the American Revolution’s freedom fighters” in 1776. Despite its proclamations of neutrality and non-partisanship in official statements, Van Kleffens was glad to report to Van Mook that the Truman Administration had moved over to the Dutch side without equivocation.14

With the Renville Agreement signed, the time seemed ripe to re-open discussions concerning the 100,000,000 dollar Export-Import Bank credit that the Netherlands East Indies government so desperately wished to invest in the economic recuperation of the archipelago.15 Dutch officials presumed that the release of the credit “was only hampered by technical difficulties.”16 What they did not suspect, however, was that State Department officials understood perfectly well that the Export-Import Bank loan comprised one of the biggest carrots the United States had in store to keep the Dutch in line and to prohibit them from further crippling the Republic. For the time being, Washington had no intention of actually appropriating the Export-Import Bank funds, because dangling the credit in front of the Dutch as a potential prize would enable US policymakers to push them in the desired direction. In contrast, the rose-colored picture that the Dutch Ambassador in Washington transmitted to The Hague and Batavia was of a State Department “totally prepared to help us, with no intention whatsoever to use the Export-Import Bank credit as a means of putting pressure on [us] as [we] proceed with political negotiations in Batavia, since there is a general concurrence with [our] point of view.”17 Van Kleffens interpreted the State Department’s stipulation it would release the 100,000,000 dollar loan only after “further political agreements” with the Republic were reached, as resulting from the Truman Administration’s task of having to justify the loan on Capitol Hill. Almost as an afterthought, Van Kleffens added that Truman also needed to accommodate popular opinion, the press, and political pollsters, “especially in this election year.”18

The Dutch envoy in Washington clung to such beliefs because of Marshall and Lovett’s pro-Dutch inclinations. He noted further that “the winds of benevolence, presently blowing in our direction in the State Department,” were also linked to the disbursement of Marshall Plan subsidies. Soon after ERP funds were allocated to the Netherlands, of which 84,000,000 dollars were earmarked for the reconstruction of the Dutch East Indies economy, State Department officials indicated that Secretary Marshall did not intend for such financial aid to be
used as a means to influence Dutch measures in Southeast Asia. “It is emphasized
over and over again,” Van Kleffens gleefully cabled The Hague, “that the Ameri-
can government wishes in no way whatsoever to put undue pressure on the
Netherlands government; the State Department disapproves of such a policy and
it is personally abhorrent to Secretary Marshall, especially when it concerns a
country like the Netherlands, which is considered a good and faithful ally.”

In early 1948, it was not surprising that Dutch diplomats in Washington were
thrilled with what they heard during their frequent visits to the State Depart-
ment. Nonetheless, even if the Dutch perception of solid American backing was
not a misguided one, Van Kleffens’ cheerful dispatches to his colleagues in The
Hague and Batavia revealed a certain degree of myopia. His vision was limited,
most of all, because he interpreted Washington’s endorsement of the perpetua-
tion of Dutch political and economic influence in the Indonesian archipelago in
the short run – “but no more than a few years” – as implying a general approval
of Dutch policies in Southeast Asia. He came to this positive conclusion because
he failed to pay attention to the international quandaries, and the resulting polit-
ical logic, of postwar US foreign policy. Approaching the Indonesian Question as
an integral aspect of Europe’s economic revival, as high-ranking members of the
Truman Administration tended to do, did not entail Washington’s approbation of
Dutch efforts to encircle the Republic, and thus strangle it, with a federation of
pro-Netherlands negara or semi-autonomous political units. Despite the reason-
able pro-Dutch policies set forth in the cable that Drumwright had leaked to a
Dutch diplomatic colleague in London, Lovett was hardly an advocate of a pro-
tracted Dutch dominance over the United States of Indonesia (USI), once it
would be established as a sovereign political entity.

The optimistic Dutch interpretations of America’s backing in early 1948 were
also ill-timed, because Netherlands Embassy officials in Washington seized upon
these reassuring signals at a time when US policymakers, even those who had
been the staunchest supporters of the Netherlands, started to second-guess and
criticize Dutch actions in Southeast Asia. This, in turn, had the uncanny effect of
exacerbating the Netherlands position, because the conviction that America
stood by its side made the Dutch overly confident in their dealings with the Unit-
ed States, while they also became more imperious in their treatment of the In-
donesian Republic. Henri van Vredenburch’s “tactlessness and lack of self-con-
trol,” exhibited in his conduct as one of the Netherlands chief negotiators at the
GOC-sponsored talks in Java, were increasingly deplored. Despite Van Kleffens’
warning to avoid creating the impression of “giving too little and asking too
much,” the Dutch Foreign Minister displayed an inappropriate audacity when he
insisted that the State Department should be told that the Dutch government ex-
pected to receive “much more positive support from the US than has been given
thus far.” In early May 1948, Coert Du Bois reported to Marshall that an almost
boastful attitude prevailed among Dutch residents in Java. In a future showdown with the Republic, according to a rumor that circulated in the Dutch colonial community, both the American GOC delegation in Batavia as well as American delegates to the UN Security Council would actively defend the interests of the Netherlands. When it finally dawned on Dutch officials in both The Hague and Batavia that they were overplaying their hand by behaving too arrogantly in their dealings with either the United States or the Indonesian Republic, the days of unequivocal American support were numbered.

At this time, it was evident that the Netherlands could always count on the US Secretary of State, George Marshall, and his Under Secretary, Robert Lovett, as long as “the Dutch pursued a solution based on the Renville principles.” Since the Renville settlement left almost all the crucial jurisdictional details to be worked out in future negotiations, the Netherlands was granted all the room it needed to maneuver into a dominant position in the future USI. In fact, the Renville accord resembled an empty shell of legalistic principles – a construction in which the Dutch felt more at home than the Indonesians. The Republic, in an effort to secure its very survival, was thus forced to hold back and stall, “in the hope of being rescued by the Security Council or a GOC with enlarged powers.” The Republic attempted to remain outside the provisional Federal Government – or the Interim Government – that had been agreed upon in the Renville talks, because the Kingdom of the Netherlands would maintain sovereignty in this newly created political entity. The Yogyakarta regime was not prepared to surrender its powers of self-government in this intervening period; in particular, it was unwilling to dismantle and relinquish the only means it had to defend itself, the Republican Army (Tentara Nasional Indonesia or TNI). This development, however, was at the core of the Dutch scenario for the interim phase. The Dutch feared that the Republic would function as a Trojan Horse in the new federal structure, unless the Yogyakarta government was stripped of its military muscle. The Republic, instead, preferred to transfer its attributes of sovereignty directly to the USI, which it believed it could dominate. After all, plebiscites were to be held in Java, Sumatra, and Madura to decide on the future status of these territories, either as part of the Republic of Indonesia or as elements of various Dutch-created negara within the USI. Washington, in the meantime, had affirmed its commitment to popular elections, or what Frank Graham called a graduation from mounting guerrilla battles to engaging in electoral struggles. Du Bois, in turn, had informed the State Department of his conviction that free elections, if adequately monitored by foreign observers, would almost certainly ensure a victory for the Republik Indonesia.

A meeting that took place in Washington on April 21, 1948, illustrated the ease with which the Renville principles could be bent to serve either party’s purposes. On this occasion, one of the Indonesian representatives in the United States, Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, had to explain to four State Department officials...
why the Republic was employing dilatory tactics in the post-Renville negotiations. If the Republic, they asked Sumitro, regarded Renville as “a phase” in the attainment of complete independence, how would he define perfect Indonesian autonomy? Sumitro answered that an independent United States of Indonesia was the Republic’s objective; an equal partnership with the Netherlands was not excluded from Republican concepts. Ostensibly surprised, the American policymakers noted that these goals were carefully specified in the Renville principles. Sumitro replied affirmatively, but qualified his statement with the caveat “if the Renville agreements are honestly carried out.” While it required more molding and shaping on the part of the Republic, the Renville accord could also be configured to fit their visions of the future. Without US backing, however, neither party could realize its particular objectives because Washington’s representatives occupied a key position not only on the GOC but also in the Security Council. For the Republic in particular, an American commitment to elections, and a firm US promise to be actively involved in supervising them, was a sine qua non.

The greatest challenge confronting both the Netherlands and the Republic, at this stage, did not emerge from the negotiations themselves. The talks under the guidance of the GOC tended to drag on at a snail’s pace; in fact, they were heading for yet another stalemate during the spring of 1948. Instead, garnering sufficient international support, primarily from the United States, became the ultimate contest. The Dutch felt they had righteousness on their side because the Renville accord had formalized, with America’s approbation, their stronger bargaining position. Still in an overconfident mood, Dutch officials harbored few doubts that Washington had an abiding faith in the trustworthiness and legitimate aspirations of its traditional friend and ally. The Indonesians, it was pointed out ad nauseam, could not be entrusted with the economic reconstruction of the archipelago; in addition, they were dangerously susceptible to the allure of communism. These arguments left their mark on Washington. As a result, the Republic was fully aware of the difficulty in mobilizing openly acknowledged support from Truman’s State Department. Yogyakarta therefore made its tactical move in different domains, namely on the floor of the Security Council and in the court of public opinion in the United States.

The Indonesian Republic proceeded with a well-timed appeal to the United Nations in late April 1948, seeking a hearing before the Security Council to explain its allegations that the Netherlands government was “sabotaging the Renville peace agreement.” The Indonesian Republic’s observers at the UN, L.N. Palar and Dr. Tjoa, publicized the appeal in an informal press conference, which the New York Times covered on April 30, 1948, with the headline “Indonesians Claim Dutch Break Pact,” an assertion few Americans would doubt after reading the article. The Voice of America also broadcast the charges, which were thus beamed via short-wave radio to the Indonesian archipelago. High on the
list of Dutch “acts of sabotage” was the naval blockade around the islands that was “slowly throttling the more than 70,000,000 inhabitants of Indonesia.” Other indictments included delaying the conclusion of a final settlement, establishing puppet regimes in the Republic’s neighboring territories, and suppressing Indonesians’ freedom of speech and right of assembly. Clearly aiming at America’s soft spot, Palar and Tjoa further emphasized the frustrating effects that the Dutch blockade exercised on the Indonesian Republic’s ability to export, “primarily to the United States,” much needed raw materials in exchange for capital goods, communications equipment, medical supplies, and the most basic consumer items needed by their compatriots, who were “virtually naked and in rags and without transportation means and other necessities for modern living.”27

These allegations elicited a strong reaction from Secretary of State Marshall. Palar and Tjoa’s methods in pressuring the Security Council, and indirectly, popular opinion in the United States, violated previous arrangements, which had stipulated that all formal communications should proceed via the GOC in Batavia rather than addressed directly to the Security Council. The Secretary immediately called upon Du Bois to approach the Republican leadership to point out “the invalidity of the bases of Palar and Tjoa’s charges.”28 Du Bois postponed his response until he returned from a three-day visit to Yogyakarta — a decision that turned out to have fateful consequences. From the Republican capital, in the company of Sukarno, Hatta, and other GOC members such as Charlton Ogburn and Thomas Critchley, he made trips to Prambanan, Borobodur, the Dieng Plateau, and other noteworthy archeological sites in central Java. During this visit, he also absorbed indelible impressions of the harsh social conditions prevailing in Republican territory, which marked a watershed in his perceptions of the Republik Indonesia and its accomplishments during the past few years.

When he finally responded to Marshall on May 10, 1948, Du Bois apologized that the American GOC delegation’s reporting to the State Department had been deficient if it had created the impression that the GOC could simply compel Hatta’s government to admit that Palar and Tjoa’s criticism of Dutch policies was neither valid nor appropriate. He dutifully called their publicity stunt inexcusable. At the same time, however, Du Bois emphasized that the “contentions that the Dutch are denying [the] freedoms of speech and assembly, are setting up puppet regimes, and are blockading the Republic, are anything but baseless.” He further pointed out that the Dutch “were living in a dream” if they thought that their negara embodied political entities that were comparable to the Indonesian Republic, because the Republic possessed a political strength and widespread popular support the Dutch consistently underestimated. The Netherlands, he made clear, would serve its best interests by not treating the Republic too harshly, since the Dutch were fortunate to be able to deal with the present Republican government rather than something much worse. Any internal political change in
the Indonesian Republic in the future, he predicted, would most likely augur a
decisive shift to the left. In an almost polemical manner, Du Bois summed up the
Republic’s struggles and virtues in ten points; his arguments ranged from the uni-
versal passion for national liberty, Sukarno’s charismatic leadership, and Hatta’s
political acumen, to the fraternal relationship that existed between the TNI and
the people at the grassroots level. Du Bois ended his homily with a snide com-
ment about the hate-mongering tactics of the Dutch.29

As a result of his preoccupation with European policies, Marshall preferred to
see the Dutch record as “unassailable, both in substance and in appearance.” He
was, therefore, not sure how to interpret Du Bois’ bold assessments, which re-
vealed that the Republic was not the only party engaged in stonewalling tactics,
implying, instead, that the Dutch were equally culpable. Marshall wanted to
know from Du Bois whether he deemed it necessary that America’s foreign poli-
cies toward the Indonesian Question be altered.30 Being an experienced diplo-
mat, who could muster enough self-knowledge to recognize he was not a politi-
cal visionary, Du Bois avoided a straight answer to Marshall’s question. He
admitted that the Republic had the most to gain from an obstructionist policy. In
his response to the Secretary of State, however, he concentrated in particular on
the issues that lay at the heart of the matter: who were the real political represen-
tatives of the millions of inhabitants of the Indonesian islands?

The answer to this question was simple enough. The Republic, Du Bois ex-
plained, was the culmination of a nationalist crusade begun earlier in the twenti-
eighth century, and it enjoyed the support of an overwhelming majority of the popu-
lation. Even if the Dutch succeeded in carrying out their intentions within or
without the framework of the Renville principles, they might emerge with a Pro-
visional Federal Government of the USI that would be a highly contrived politi-
cal organism. He anticipated that only Dutch military strength would be able to
preserve and protect this unnatural entity. Since the Dutch hoped to disarm the
Republic and thus render it impotent, the Netherlands delegation’s demands
and suggestions were “generally not realistic.” Du Bois then proceeded to make a
number of suggestions for the formation of the long-awaited Provisional Federal
Government – an interim political creation that would be essential to the estab-
ishment of the United States of Indonesia. As Du Bois proposed in his seven-
point program, the Republic, during the interim period, would continue to be re-
sponsible for security in the areas under its control, while the Republican Army
(TNI) remained in existence. This Provisional Federal Government should be es-
tablished on the basis of popular elections throughout the Indonesian archipelago.
Du Bois envisioned that the Dutch would endow the temporary political con-
struction with the powers of self-government, while the Republic would simul-
taneously transfer control over the TNI to this newly elected governing body.31

Robert Lovett’s response to his analysis of the situation, and his proposals for a
solution, bolstered the confidence of Du Bois. The State Department, the influential Under Secretary cabled, was impressed with his thoughtful diagnosis of the situation and with his proposed program, and complimented his “initiative and resourcefulness.” Without such a pat on the back from the powerful Lovett, Du Bois would probably not have gone beyond the limited mandate he had received as America’s GOC delegate. Lovett’s praise, in fact, prompted the elderly diplomat to begin with the drafting of a proposal for a new settlement.

Although direct talks between Van Mook and Hatta were still in progress, the two parties were again headed on a collision course. To avoid another diplomatic impasse, which also provoked fears of renewed armed conflict, Du Bois and the Australian delegation’s chief, Thomas Critchley, in cooperation with their respective staffs, prepared a working paper that contained a series of specific proposals for the creation of an interim government. The working paper’s suggestions conformed to Du Bois’ seven-point program, but also contained ideas about the creation of a sovereign USI. A Constituent Assembly would perform a central role. Created on the basis of popular elections, this body would constitute not only an interim parliament while the provisional government was being formed, but the Constituent Assembly should also serve as a constitutional convention charged with drafting and ratifying a USI constitution. Dutch sovereignty in the intervening period would remain in tact, albeit limited to the Lieutenant Governor General’s prerogative to exercise his veto power over acts of the provisional government that violated the statutes of the Dutch-Indonesian Union. The Netherlands would transfer sovereignty to the USI as soon as both parties had approved and ratified the constitution.

Once the working paper’s reasonable and thoughtful proposals were released to the outside world, however, they produced an uproar among Dutch authorities in Batavia and The Hague. The Dubois-Critchley Plan, as the recommendations became known, was sent to Washington on June 5, 1948. For obscure reasons the plan was dispatched via air mail rather than cable, causing the document to be delivered to the State Department two weeks later. It was nonetheless likely that the contents of the working paper were known in Washington earlier. Strategic considerations prompted the State Department to deny to the outside world, and most of all to the Dutch, that it enjoyed prior knowledge. Although the State Department wanted to avoid the appearance that it had initiated the working paper – which was, in fact, not the case – it was prepared to await the results of the “informal proposals.” By denying any previous involvement with the GOC working paper until it had become clear how both sides responded, Washington was able to escape the accusation of partisanship.

This hesitant “wait-and-see” attitude was also linked to the continued internal debates within the State Department. While the intra-departmental discussions throughout 1947 had focused on the degree of active engagement in the In-
donesian Question that the Truman Administration should embrace, rank-and-file State Department officials, who had since then migrated to the pro-Indonesian camp, were gaining strength and generating dissent. Even the Assistant Chief of the Division of the Philippines and Southeast Asian Affairs (PSA), William Lacy, a stalwart supporter of the Dutch position and sometimes referred to as “the darling of the Netherlands Embassy,” began to re-evaluate his views concerning the legitimacy of Dutch policies. During the summer of 1948, however, he made a dramatic 180-degree turn, to become one of the strongest advocates of Indonesian independence. Approximately eight months earlier, Charlton Ogburn’s dispatches from Java still infuriated Lacy, who ripped Ogburn “up and down the back with his very dexterous knife” as the latter’s pro-Indonesian views became increasingly apparent. A rumor had begun to circulate in the Department’s corridors that Ogburn had fallen in love with an Indonesian woman, which was the ostensible reason for his “apostasy.” Lacy managed to scotch the rumor by pointing out that the object of Ogburn’s affection was a US Foreign Service employee working in the Consulate General in Batavia, who would soon become his wife. Nonetheless, at that stage Lacy still saw “things strongly from the Netherlands point of view.” In July 1949, however, several Dutch sources in Washington denounced Lacy as “a rotten apple in the State Department, who only gives advice that is prejudicial against us.” They also described him as an “influential person, whose eloquence and ability to dissemble give him a palpable authority. He is really a dangerous figure, though, because he has been able to secure confidential information [from us] in order to exploit it [against us].”

The American-Australian proposals were informally submitted to both parties on June 10, 1948 – a decision that Coert Du Bois made only after many “sleepless nights and even a prayer or two,” as he confessed later. What must have convinced him to act was a recent cable from the State Department, urging the American GOC representatives to regard themselves as a “free agents, making such choices on the spot as the US delegation believes will lead to an agreement between [the] parties and in accordance with the larger interest of [the] United States.” The Secretary of State’s telegram did not fail to repeat Washington’s view that the Netherlands was to retain a certain amount of direct influence over the archipelago’s economic infrastructure. The cable also indicated, however, that the Secretary of State considered Du Bois’ seven-point program to be in accordance with the two basic tenets of US foreign policy pursued since the end of World War II. This policy agenda, Marshall rehearsed, focused primarily on the economic rehabilitation of Europe and certain crucial production areas in Asia in order to accelerate the resumption of normal international trade. Secondly, it also entailed a policy of providing the Indonesians with political and administrative experience through “voluntary association” so that both parties could rediscover their mutually beneficial interdependence.
Marshall’s assurance that the American delegation to the GOC was to consider itself a free agent came a day after Du Bois had cabled another vehemently anti-Dutch telegram to his superiors, ridiculing a Dutch proposal for a settlement and promoting the Du Bois-Critchley plan – which he still called the “US delegation plan” – as the best safeguard against communism in the region. If it were dropped and a Dutch solution should be implemented, he warned, “US prestige in Southeast Asia will plummet to a new low.”

The impact this would have on America’s political and economic leverage would be disastrous. Moreover, at this stage there was still a chance that the United States could halt the growth of communism in the Indonesian Republic. Although fear of communism was not Du Bois’ motivation for his shift in allegiance, he was aware of the critical effect this argument elicited from the Truman Administration. Marshall and Under Secretary Lovett, with some uneasiness, could not help but notice the profound change of view their man in Batavia had undergone, but they were faced with the usual dilemma of not wanting to abandon a faithful European ally.

The Dutch, of course, flew into a tantrum when the US diplomat – an envoy they had considered a blessing in disguise only five months earlier – turned against them so radically. Van Mook, who had been a personal friend of the American GOC delegate, now described him as “stupid and headstrong” and “in a transitional phase to tranquil senility.” The Governor General was sure that he was walking on the leash of the pro-Indonesian Australian GOC delegates, whom he depicted as “unimaginative people with a jealous and venomous back-yard mentality that is typical of the politicians and ordinary voters of the Australian Labor Party.” Du Bois was also under the influence of the young, astute, and “ethical” Charlton Ogburn, who had become Du Bois’ chief advisor earlier in the spring. The latter had earned Dutch people’s disdain because of his increasingly critical posture; Henri van Vredenburch, for example, remembered him as an emotionally unstable and sinister fellow. In contrast, the influential Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, Walton Butterworth, appreciated Ogburn’s personality and skills and portrayed him as “a personable young man with profound political sagacity.” In fact, Butterworth was the senior State Department official who had strongly recommended Ogburn for service on the GOC, also because of the latter’s expertise on Indochina and his wartime experience in Burma.

The presentation of the Du Bois-Critchley plan stunned the Dutch camp. From their perspective, the working paper possessed no validity whatsoever; instead, it flew in the face of the Netherlands Embassy’s optimistic dispatches from Washington about the State Department’s rock solid support for the Dutch side in the Indonesian Question. Van Mook concluded that Du Bois obviously “received either no clear assignments and instructions from Washington or that he had simply ignored them.” His first guess came closer to the truth. Another possibility that could not be excluded, the Dutch participant in the GOC negotia-
tions, Van Vredenburch, informed Prime Minister Beel in The Hague, was “that the American delegation had acted upon State Department directions, with the explicit instructions to create the impression that this had not been the case.” Personally, however, he did not believe Washington could be accused of such a Machiavellian scheme.42

The Republic seized the opportunity and swiftly accepted the proposals for consideration. If the Dutch played hardball and tried to coerce the Indonesian Republic into making concessions, Republican politicians responded in kind, as if wanting to remind their Dutch antagonists of Winston Churchill’s comment, “if you want to play rough, we can play rough too.” In response, by rejecting the Du Bois-Critchley plan out of hand and denouncing the working paper on procedural rather than substantive grounds, the Netherlands now switched sides with the Republic and assumed the public role of the obstructionist party. At the same time, Republican officials repeatedly expressed their hope that the Netherlands would pay due deference to the proposals, thus presenting themselves as the amenable compromisers in stark contrast to their former colonial masters, who were fuming with anger. With the Dutch desperately trying to sweep the proposals off the table, and Washington’s refusal to openly endorse their GOC representative’s initiative, the Du Bois-Critchley Plan appeared to be short-lived. In the month of July, as bilateral incursions and shooting incidents across the demarcation line notably increased, a complete deadlock of the negotiations followed. While the Dutch and the Indonesians were again busily entrenching themselves in their hostile positions, Washington’s policy agenda was adrift.

The State Department’s ambivalent, wait-and-see reaction to the Du Bois-Critchley proposals still constituted an example of the Truman Administration’s fence straddling with regard to the Indonesian Question, even though Washington’s policy priorities were slowly changing. When Under Secretary of State, Robert Lovett, answered Van Kleffens’ urgent questions regarding his prior knowledge of the Du Bois-Critchley Plan, he repeated several times that he was “baffled” by the proposals and that GOC procedures “left something to be desired.”43 Six months earlier, however, Graham’s reports from Java conveyed the same pro-Indonesian tenor as those the State Department received from Du Bois in May and June 1948, even if it was true that Graham had not put his full weight behind his “Christmas Message” in the way Du Bois had done with the working paper that carried his name. However, instead of putting its emissary on a tether, as Lovett had chosen to do in Graham’s case, the State Department now offered Du Bois ample space to maneuver; his superiors in Washington simply sat back and watched the results. When the outcome proved to be unwelcome to the Dutch – they angrily threw the proposals out soon after seeing the document for the first time – the State Department hurriedly dropped not only the Du Bois-Critchley Plan but also its American co-author.44
There were more reminders of Washington’s lingering support for the Dutch cause. In July 1948, the sum of nearly 100,000,000 dollars in Marshall Aid was appropriated to the Netherlands East Indies government for fiscal year 1948-1949, and it was not until the early autumn of 1948 that the Netherlands Purchasing Commission encountered problems in obtaining export licenses for weapons and military equipment acquired in the United States. In mid-1948, there were still some reliable indicators that the Truman Administration was not yet prepared to put its trust in the Indonesian Republic at the expense of its European ally. But Du Bois’ shift in allegiance had brought the message home to Washington that, whatever the political solution would be, the Republic with its widespread popular support was the embodiment of Indonesian nationalism and could not be neutralized or pushed aside, as the Dutch intended to do. Moreover, it also began to dawn on US policymakers that the Dutch inclination to ignore the legitimacy of Indonesian nationalism did not serve Washington’s interests. Within the State Department, Asianists began to speculate that Dutch attempts to incapacitate the Republic, whether politically or militarily, were doomed to failure. The less than auspicious developments in the Indonesian archipelago also alarmed the Europeanists, because the Dutch military campaign in its colonial territory in Southeast Asia drained the national Treasury in The Hague. These extravagant expenditures, in turn, undermined the rehabilitation of the Netherlands economy — a recovery that copious Marshall Aid was busily trying to expedite. Dutch policies in the East Indies, in other words, appeared to be counter-productive and hampered the revival of Europe’s free-market economy, which still ranked at the top of the Truman Administration’s list of foreign policy priorities.

As a consequence, the Du Bois–Critchley plan would not be as short-lived as it appeared at the moment Coert Du Bois abruptly left Batavia for the United States. Instead of burying it, the State Department would revive the plan during the month of July, when it was secretly re-drafted so that H. Merle Cochran, the next American GOC representative, could submit it once again. The second incarnation of the procedures for settling the Dutch-Indonesian conflict within Renville’s legalistic structure, which would become known as the Cochran Plan, did not differ in a substantive sense from its predecessor. The second time around, though, the proposal enjoyed the full-fledged backing of the State Department when it was re-introduced to the Dutch and Indonesians. Washington’s policy agenda may have had gone adrift, but it had taken more than an aging diplomat who had fallen under “the magic spell of Yogya” — and presumably also for the personal charms of Mohammad Hatta’s attractive mother-in-law, as Dutch intelligence sources insinuated — to convince the Cold Warriors in Washington that they had been misguided in following a singularly pro-Dutch path until then.

It was not simply a sudden recognition of the legitimacy or viability of the Re-
public, or a resurgence of idealism in US foreign policy, that occasioned the Truman Administration’s decision to accelerate the pace of Indonesia’s decolonization. Instead, the Policy Planning Staff and its influential Director, George Kennan, convinced the President and his foreign policymakers that the communist menace might soon disappear from Europe, where the generosity of the Marshall Plan was in the process of shrinking the popular appeal of communist political parties and their affiliated labor unions. As soon as the Kremlin was forced to concede its failure at mobilizing a considerable number of communist conscripts in the European arena, Kennan hypothesized, Moscow would re-direct its recruitment efforts elsewhere. And the most promising political environment for a new Soviet proselytizing campaign, he predicted, could be found in the combustible nationalist movements in Southeast Asia.

Kennan’s prognosis, at this stage, was not yet shared by a British observer in Java, who was generally viewed as quite knowledgeable. In a conversation on June 30, 1948, the chargé d’affaires of the British Consulate General in Batavia, Edward Thomas Lambert, assured an American colleague that communism was “not presently a serious issue in Indonesia.” Any suggestion that this was the case, as Netherlands officials in Batavia, The Hague, and Washington DC tended to argue incessantly, would accomplish little but weaken the Republic’s moderates. Undermining the stature of the reasonable, democratic leaders of the Republic would be “ruinous” for the Dutch, Lambert argued, because it might reinforce “a xenophobic, leftist extremist Indonesian regime” that would wreak havoc on the entire Southeast Asian region.48

Despite Americans’ begrudging admiration for the sophistication of Great Britain’s intelligence-gathering, Lambert’s assessment was challenged by a steadily growing pile of reports on State Department desks as well as an array of voices in the American media. Moreover, some of Lambert’s own colleagues in the Foreign Office in London were also developing an increasingly alarmist view of the communist threat in the Indonesian Republic, in particular, and Southeast Asia, in general. Nonetheless, the flow of conflicting evaluations produced by the different Western intelligence services tended to exacerbate the State Department’s irresolution concerning the true nature of politics in the Republik Indonesia.

A few days after Lambert had ventured his reassuring judgment, for example, an article in The Washington Star, written by Lothrop Stoddard on the 4th of July, 1948, attracted the attention of senior policymakers in the State Department, who circulated the newspaper clipping among themselves. Stoddard’s piece bore a catchy headline, “Communists Seem Ready to Stir Up Southeast Asia,” and it’s subtitle read, “Reds Increasing Activity, With Obvious Plan Being to Make [European] Recovery Programs Fail and Cash in on the Failure.” Stoddard began his sensational story with the observation that the communist movement in Southeast Asia was not a surprising “mushroom” phenomenon. Rather, its seeds had
been sown long ago and “the noxious weed” had been slowly germinating in fertile ground. During the summer of 1948, however, this poisonous vegetation was suddenly flourishing with abandon in the congenial Southeast Asian climate. Moscow provided the aggressive impulse, he argued, even if these Russian initiatives were carried out by “regional and local communist agencies.” The “red surge” in Asia was nourished by the Kremlin’s Eastern Political Department, staffed with veteran Communists from many Asiatic countries who allegedly dictated on-the-ground strategies.49

He declared that the Soviet Union’s tactics in Southeast Asia were all too transparent. Moscow’s first move consisted of a deliberate effort to inflame local nationalist movements. The Kremlin did so by encouraging anti-colonial leaders to oust European authorities, only to confiscate their capitalist holdings and to sever all economic ties with the West immediately thereafter. Moscow’s decision to give the green light to a communist campaign in Southeast Asia, Stoddard claimed, emerged from its determination to “paralyze” the undeniable progress of Western Europe’s economic reconstruction. By depriving industries in the Western world of Southeast Asian rubber, petroleum, tin, and foodstuffs, the Soviet Union might still be able to “deal a body blow” to American efforts at reinvigorating the wounded economies of Europe through the Marshall Plan. He quoted an anonymous State Department spokesman, who had ostensibly told him that the current stalemate in negotiations between the Netherlands and the Indonesian Republic was largely due to “communist influence seeking to wreck the program and prevent any agreement.”50

Stoddard’s article was one of the many stories and editorials in US newspapers during the late spring and summer of 1948 that familiarized the American reading public with George Kennan’s warnings. The communist monster, as Kennan had prophesied in early 1946 in his alarming reports from Moscow, had revealed itself to be “a malignant parasite that feeds on diseased tissue.”51 It would not be until mid-1948, though, that American journalists applied Kennan’s cautionary tale to the unfamiliar setting of Southeast Asia; they did so by writing articles about the phantom of international communism that was in the process of co-opting the nationalist and anti-colonial movements in Vietnam, Burma, the Malay Peninsula, and Indonesia.

In the immediate post–World War II years, State Department analysts as well as the news media were convinced that the Kremlin’s efforts to enlist disciples had prompted the Soviets to search for potential disciples especially in Western Europe. European communist parties, according to Averell Harriman’s Committee on the European Recovery Program, were nothing but loyal acolytes of the Soviet Union. If Western and Mediterranean Europe “were to sink under the burden of despair and become communist,” Scandinavia might also stumble into the same camp. Soon thereafter, the strategically and economically “vital” regions
of North Africa and the Middle East would follow down the same inexorable path. The repercussions of this worst-case scenario could be serious: the United States ran the risk of confronting a Europe that might be no less “hostile or dangerous to us than would have been the ‘New Order’ of Hitler’s dreams.”

As a result, Western Europe received the lion’s share of the State Department’s attention, a trend that had been reinforced by George C. Marshall after his appointment as Secretary of State in January 1947. Marshall’s conclusion concerning conditions in Western Europe was that the patient was critically ill, while the doctors did nothing but deliberate about the best treatment protocol. He recognized the urgency of the situation, and not long after he had assumed his position as America’s chief foreign policymaker, he outlined his plans for the rehabilitation of Europe in a commencement address at Harvard University on June 5, 1947. Although Marshall’s oratorical style was low-key and devoid of hyperbole, the message he delivered was momentous. He noted that Europe’s economies suffered from a “loss of life [and] the visible destruction of cities, factories, mines, and railroads.” Machinery had become antiquated or fallen into complete disrepair; traditional commercial partnerships, banks, insurance companies, and shipping firms had vanished from the economic scene through the loss of capital, nationalization, or physical devastation. Despite an initial upsurge in 1946, intra-European trade had not revived; the fragile postwar economy was paralyzed due to “bottlenecks and demoralization.” Moreover, food shortages were still endemic because the agricultural harvest of 1946 had yielded disappointment throughout Europe.

During the following winter, which was extremely harsh, most of the major European rivers froze, immobilizing the flotilla of barges transporting the coal supplies that were essential to the generation of electricity in factories. The frigid winter also underscored the importance of Germany’s coal deposits as a crucial source of energy in Europe’s industrial production. In early 1947, however, German coal exports still lingered at a mere 20 percent of their prewar levels. It was also obvious that Europe desperately needed American industrial components, trucks, steel, tobacco, wheat, and a range of other consumer products. None of the European countries, however, possessed enough foreign currency to buy such supplies. Even worse was the breakdown of the “entire fabric” of Europe’s business infrastructure, Marshall observed. The United States should help Europe recover its normal economic health, which he viewed as fundamental to the restoration of political stability and peace in the world. “Our policy,” Marshall proposed, “is not directed against any country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos.”

In the months following his commencement address in Cambridge, Massachusetts, Marshall’s vision gradually took shape, although in August 1947, some skeptics in the US capital still compared his plan to a “flying saucer – nobody knows what it looks like, how big it is, what direction it is moving in, or whether
it really exists.” But on April 3, 1948, President Truman finally presented the European Recovery Program to the US Congress, better known as the Marshall Plan. America offered a lifeline to European nations to prevent them from drowning, and their leaders grabbed it with both hands. The program elicited almost universal praise from European officials. Prince Bernard of the Netherlands, for example, lauded the Marshall Plan as a unique gesture, because never before in human history had a leading world power “made it a central objective of its foreign policy to create another strong power.”

By the early summer of 1948, the Marshall Plan had begun to pump millions of dollars into Europe. The steady influx of US financial support helped to relieve the economic hardships and social dislocations the Nazi occupation had caused, and most European countries, with the exception of Germany, had begun to approximate their prewar industrial output. The capitalist democracies of Western Europe, in other words, were gradually recuperating from their infirmities by regaining some of their former health which would render them, American policymakers anticipated, less susceptible to communism’s diabolic appeal. In addition, the political leadership of most European nations had found shelter under the umbrella of the Atlantic Charter and its successors, the Western European Defense Pact and finally, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The United States thus achieved a position from which to orchestrate, in case of a Soviet assault on the West, its counter-attack in concert with its European allies.

Representatives of the Soviet Union were also invited to a conference of European foreign ministers in Paris during the summer of 1948 – a meeting devoted to assessing and coordinating the continent’s economic needs. However, when political passions erupted and personal enmities flared up, Russia’s Foreign Secretary, Vyacheslav Molotov, stormed out of the meeting, denouncing the Marshall Plan as a not-so-secret plot aimed at undermining the integrity of the Soviet Union. Allegedly, he even issued the preposterous warning that American wheat was grown from seed that would cause sexual impotence in European men, and he announced that Russia would have nothing to do with America’s self-serving rescue mission.

A year later, as a result of the Marshall Plan’s apparent success in improving economic conditions in Europe, it dawned on Washington’s policymakers that the parasite of communism might be changing its predatory course by heading for Southeast Asia, where it could conceivably flourish in the rich breeding ground of the anti-colonial struggles in Indonesia and its neighbors. As a result, when American fears of the Soviet Union’s ideological success in mobilizing conscripts in Western Europe were beginning to recede, US policymakers became concerned that the communist cancer might metastasize instead, as George Kennan’s graphic figures of speech suggested, in the body politic of countries located on the opposite side of the world.
Before early 1948, however, British and American assessments characterized Moscow-directed communism as a force that did not constitute “a predominant or even a strong element in the Republican regime,” as the senior British diplomat and Netherlands East Indies expert, Maberly E. Dening, told a colleague in the US Embassy in London.\textsuperscript{60} An analysis prepared for the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee confirmed this judgment. “The Indonesian communist party, although active and represented by 35 out of 432 seats in the Republic’s provisional parliament, has little chance of gaining predominance, especially if Dutch-Indonesian cooperation develops successfully,” the SNWCC report asserted.\textsuperscript{61} And Charlton Ogburn, once he was firmly ensconced in his GOC staff position in November 1947, also reassured Secretary Marshall that in the Republic, “although government is based on a party system, it is clear that parties lack real definition. Haziness of principles and programs affect even the communist party.” Comparing the conditions in Java and Sumatra to Indochina, Ogburn added that the situation in the Indonesian Republic was infinitely better because of the absence of “dangerous communist influences.”\textsuperscript{62}

Starting in the spring of 1948, however, a steady stream of disconcerting reports regarding the Soviet influence in Southeast Asia trickled into the State Department, which contested the soothing assessments advanced during the previous year. The American foreign policy establishment suddenly imagined that the entire Southeast Asian region could fall victim to a shrewdly coordinated Soviet offensive, and the Indonesian Republic might figure as one of the Kremlin’s favorite targets. The Indonesian Communist Party was gaining “increasing control over labor unions” in Republican territory. The situation in Burma was also cited as a cause for “grave concern” to the State Department in late March 1948, because Stalinists were poised to force their way into the government. In Indochina, Kenneth Landon wrote to the head of Far Eastern Affairs Office, Walton Butterworth, “the communists, as you know, are firmly entrenched,” and in Singapore they had already established political dominance over the major labor organizations. In addition, the USSR was in the process of installing a legation in Bangkok “with an extensive information and propaganda staff,” and Landon concluded with a prediction that the Kremlin was becoming extremely “effective” in its feverish efforts to mobilize communist cadres throughout Southeast Asia.\textsuperscript{63}

In May 1948, disagreeing with the assessment offered by its own chargé d’affaires in Batavia, the Foreign Office in London also raised the specter of a new communist offensive in Southeast Asia that had adopted a stance of “uncompromising hostility” to the West and was manipulated by Soviets.\textsuperscript{64} A conference of Southeast Asian students “fighting for freedom and independence,” organized by the World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY), took place in Calcutta – England’s own backyard, so to speak – in February 1948. Although the Soviet Union had not officially sponsored the conference, the gathering displayed a dis-
tinctly communist character. In the wake of the first WFDY congress in London in November 1945, pro-Moscow factions had risen to prominence within the WFDY, as had occurred in a similar fashion soon after the inception of the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU). In Calcutta, the conference’s discussions focused on the question of how nationalist movements in Asia could secure a victory over the Wall Street-dominated, reactionary forces of imperialism in Asia, and at this time “Indonesia was declared to be on the side of the angels.”

With the pronouncements of Stalin’s “ideological bulldogs,” A.A. Zhdanov and E.M. Zhukov, concerning the two-camp doctrine freshly imprinted in Western minds, the Calcutta conference provided an ideal setting for the Kremlin to pass on its political instructions to anti-colonial idealists in different communist vanguards throughout Southeast Asia. Not surprisingly, the Kremlin’s two-camp doctrine was enthusiastically endorsed during the WFDY gathering in Calcutta. The resolution implied a condemnation of Javanese priyayi serving in the Yogyakarta government, as well as other Republican politicians from Sumatra or other islands, as reputedly embodying the “national bourgeoisie.” These officials were now reconfigured as “imperialist anti-democratic” forces that were only interested in safeguarding capitalism and fulfilling the demands of a US State Department controlled by puppet masters on Wall Street. Moscow promoted a “united front from below” as the only proper strategy to defeat stubborn European colonial powers in Asia, even though US imperialism constituted the greatest enemy because Great Britain, France, and the Netherlands had been indoctrinated to serve as America’s junior partners in Asia. Accordingly, both British and American intelligence analysts feared that the WFDY conference in Calcutta had “quickened perceptibly the tempo of all revolutionary movements in Southeast Asia” by proclaiming “action rather than method.”

Other reports concerning Soviet agitation in the region intensified Washington’s concerns. “Previously, communism in Southeast Asia acted independently from Moscow,” the Office of Far Eastern Affairs maintained, “because of poor communications and because the USSR was concentrating on its penetration of Europe. But recently, Moscow began to supervise and coordinate communist activities in Southeast Asia.” Because of the American tendency to perceive all communist activity as a “Moscow-directed plot,” however, the situation in Vietnam must have startled policymakers in Washington who were busily tracking the Soviet threat in Asia. Since Ho Chi Minh’s government represented a straightforward example of a nationalist movement dominated by communists, Vietnam should have been the focal point of the Soviets’ new Asian offensive. But the Office of Far Eastern Affairs Weekly Review Summary had to conclude, instead, that “there is as yet no conclusive evidence of direct contact between the Ho government and Moscow.” Even more awkward, “the only known attempt by one of the Vietnamese leaders in Bangkok to contact the Soviet minister was
unsuccessful.” Similarly, the Research & Intelligence Office of the State Department concluded that “evidence of a Kremlin-directed conspiracy was found in virtually all countries except Vietnam.”

While no proof of direct Soviet involvement in Vietnam could be identified, Indonesia provided American officials with a confirmation of their worst fears. On May 22, 1948, the Soviet Union announced its intention to establish consular relations with the Indonesian Republic, despite the fact that the Netherlands had not yet conceded its independence. Not surprisingly, this announcement shocked the foreign policy communities in Washington and The Hague. To the Republic’s Prime Minister, Mohammad Hatta, Moscow’s sudden move also represented an unpleasant surprise, not only because it coincided with his efforts to muster pivotal US support for the Republic, but also because the announcement was made while he was trying to mend fences with the left-wing Front Demokrasi Rakyat (Democratic People’s Front).

The architect of the Indonesian-Soviet diplomatic exchange was Suripno Wirjokarto, a young member of the Partai Kommunis Indonesia (PKI or Indonesian Communist Party) Politbureau, whom the Republic’s former Prime Minister, Amir Sjarifuddin, had dispatched to Czechoslovakia in the summer of 1947 to attend the WFDY-sponsored international youth conference in Prague. At the same time, Foreign Minister Haji Agus Salim had instructed him to establish an Indonesian Information Agency and to settle in Prague as the Republic’s representative in Eastern Europe. During the spring of 1948, the Republic was seeking diplomatic recognition from as many foreign countries as possible; thus Suripno’s contact with the staff of the Soviet legation in Prague made sense. The Russian Embassy’s encouraging response – coupled with some doubts regarding the young Indonesian’s diplomatic credentials – prompted Suripno to request a formal authorization from the Republic’s leaders in Yogyakarta that would allow him to negotiate a diplomatic arrangement with the USSR. On December 25, 1947, President Sukarno invested him with full powers to establish friendly relations with the governments of Central and Eastern Europe and the USSR, “and to conclude any agreement.” Having received these directives, Suripno quickly reached an accord with the Soviet Union on January 13, 1948, stipulating the exchange of consular representatives, after which he turned to the Yogyakarta government for further instructions. At that very moment, however, the Prime Minister, Amir Sjarifuddin, was still fully engaged in the Renville negotiations. Announcing Suripno’s controversial foreign policy venture could have jeopardized the Republic’s position during the negotiations. After Amir’s resignation, the newly established and middle-of-the-road Hatta government that came into power in late January, 1948, decided to shelve the Suripno agreement for obvious reasons.

The USSR had several reasons as well for delaying the formalization of the consular agreement with an Indonesian Republic that was now headed by a
more centrist Prime Minister. When Soviet officials finally chose to sign and publicize the accord in late May 1948, Moscow was trying to establish closer contact with the Republic, after an estrangement had occurred in the wake of Amir Sjarifuddin’s resignation. Moscow was also eager to break through Asian neutralism by provoking “a showdown with the Republic, demanding that the Indonesians declare themselves as either allies or enemies of the Russian camp.” The Soviet Union’s insistence on de jure recognition of the Republic, and Russia’s new assertiveness in Southeast Asia in general, may have been connected to Moscow’s desire to make a countermove in the face of US triumphs in Europe. Stalin and his advisors viewed Marshall’s European Recovery Plan as an egregiously offensive move aimed against the Soviet Union. Moscow also perceived the establishment of the Western European Defense Pact – the forerunner of NATO – as an anti-Russian provocation, which was further compounded by the integration of more than half of Germany into the capitalist body politic of Western Europe. Moreover, Soviet policymakers may have been tempted to stir up the Indonesian scene for the purpose of championing the nationalist cause in Asia, while lending moral and political support to the increasingly vocal Democratic People’s Front in Java and Sumatra. In short, announcing the USSR’s consular agreement with the Indonesian Republic in May 1948, could undermine Hatta’s “counter-revolutionary, Wall Street-dominated” political authority within the Republic and bolster the position of communist forces within the Indonesian Republic at the same time.

After Amir Sjarifuddin resigned as Prime Minister in late January 1948, Mohammad Hatta’s cabinet did not incorporate representatives of leftist parties in the new coalition government. As a result, for the first time since its creation on August 17, 1945, the new political leaders of the Republik Indonesia confronted an increasingly unified and powerful left-wing opposition. Hatta’s new centrist regime relied on the support of the Muslim party, Masyumi, the Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI), as well as the small Catholic and Protestant Parties. His cabinet also incorporated one lonely member of Sutan Sjahrir’s recently reinvented Indonesian Socialist Party (Partai Sosialis Indonesia), a split-off from the Partai Sosialis, which was now under Amir Sjarifuddin’s control. Heading a presidential cabinet, Hatta was only accountable to President Sukarno, which increased the vitriolic criticism voiced by the radical left wing. As a result, Hatta worried about the growing prominence of the Democratic People’s Front; he was also concerned about its negative implications for American visions of Indonesia’s struggle for independence. Having cultivated the image of being the more “willing compromiser” by welcoming the GOC’s Dubois–Critchley proposals, the Hatta government now embarked on a mission to convince Washington that its political regime embodied the best safeguard against communism in the strategically located Southeast Asian archipelago.
As a consequence, Washington’s intelligence community – now streamlined and centralized within the CIA – was put to the test as far as spotting communist movements in Asia that followed Kremlin guidelines. In the Indonesian case, this task was facilitated by the clear-cut split in Republican ranks. Instead of having to deal with foggy or arcane ideological differences, US intelligence analysts could approach the Indonesian political spectrum with a simple black-and-white – or red versus non-red – perspective. Since Washington was now convinced that the Soviet Union was mounting an effort to recruit communist membership in the fledgling independent nations of Southeast Asia, a rapid political settlement of the Indonesian Question became of paramount importance. At the same time, such worldwide tactical considerations made the Truman Administration’s foreign policymakers increasingly impatient with the intransigence of the Netherlands government.

After the consular agreement between Moscow and Yogyakarta was made public, the Hatta government quickly tried to reassure the United States. He called the Suripno affair an undesirable legacy of the previous cabinet; he also asserted that Yogyakarta had not been aware of the orders to Suripno. Although the first claim was truthful, the latter was obviously not. Hatta, however, did not harbor any faith in the possibility that Moscow might grant formal recognition to the Indonesian Republic. Hatta assured the State Department that as long as he was Prime Minister, “there would be no exchange of consuls with the USSR”; he also recalled Suripno from Prague. This decision was made with support of the coalition parties, but it provoked a further alienation of the Front Demokrasi Rakyat. The Suripno affair provided the Netherlands, on the other hand, with new ammunition to sully the reputation of the Republican government in American eyes. According to the Dutch interpretation of the Renville Agreement, the Republic was not allowed to conduct its own foreign policy, since the Netherlands was still legally sovereign in the Indonesian archipelago as a whole. Dutch officials wasted no time in exploiting the Suripno affair in their continuous effort to draw Washington’s attention to the unreliable character of the Republican leaders.

Dutch propaganda efforts in the United States left their mark on American perceptions of the communist threat in the Indonesian Republic. In 1946, the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington had already created a special file for the numerous reports they received from the Netherlands Forces Intelligence Service (NEFIS) through the agency of the Dutch Representatives to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. These often recycled reports denounced the Republic as a product of Kremlin-directed communism, thus insinuating that the Dutch struggle with the Republic was in fact an attempt to defeat the “red peril.” A report entitled “The Methods and Means of Soviet Russia in Asia and the Mid East” echoed George Kennan’s language. Trying to strike a familiar cord, the Dutch writer ex-
panded upon Russia’s infiltration strategies. In a further effort to enlist Washing-
ton’s support for Dutch policies in the archipelago, the author summoned an array of historical material before he slowly zeroed in on the Soviets’ covert tactics in the Indonesian Republic.75

In late 1947, the pro-Dutch US ambassador in The Hague, Herman Baruch, distributed to key foreign policymakers in Washington two Dutch propaganda pamphlets called “The Rising Soviet Star over Indonesia” and “The Indonesian Problem: Facts and Figures.” The first document was privately published by the conservative W.K.H. Feuilletau de Bruyn, whereas the second one constituted a semi-official release. The pamphlets, although “slanted from a distinctly Dutch viewpoint,” as a US military intelligence officer acknowledged, attracted a great deal of scrutiny, especially because they contained a large photo section. American commentators devoted particular attention to the pictures of the May Day celebrations in Yogyakarta in 1947, where large crowds carried banners with the hammer and sickle motif as well as huge placards displaying the faces of Marx, Lenin and Stalin. While little heed was given to the actual content of Feuilletau de Bruyn’s work, which repeated the usual sensationalized material, the photographs had a discernable impact. The many pictures seemed to “indicate how deeply the Soviets have penetrated into the Indonesian Republic”; they also underscored “that communist influence is something more than nominal” because they vividly illustrated “the real communist force behind the Indonesian Republic.”76

In due course, after it had become evident that the Hatta government was “positively anti-communist,” Dutch publicity efforts in the United States were forced to strike a more realistic tone. But the intensity of the anti-Republican propaganda proceeded apace.77 In March 1948, the Netherlands Embassy and the Dutch Representatives to the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington distributed the weighty “Melvill memorandum,” a comprehensive analysis of the history of communism in the Indonesian archipelago. The thick report was sent to George Marshall, virtually every relevant office in the State Department, all the military forces, the different military intelligence branches, the CIA, and to some agreeable members of the Security Council. Before he developed his highly critical attitude towards Dutch colonial policies, the Philippines and Southeast Asian Affairs Division’s senior official, William Lacy, recorded a reaction on his copy of the study that, “even after discounting the natural Dutch tendency to emphasize the communist menace in an effort to win US support,” the following points seemed irrefutable:

The real danger from communism in [the] NEI lies in the possibility that a well-organized and active Communist Party, championing the nationalist cause and employing infiltration tactics, may win such firm control of the
trade unions, leftist political parties, and the army that the nationalist leadership will be unable to dislodge them; the Indonesian leadership, lacking the political maturity and experience of the West, will be unable to resist communists from seizing control of an independent Indonesian state.\(^78\)

Even though this massive document, written in February 1948, made an honest distinction between the actual communist movement and the ruling Hatta government, the Suripno affair that erupted three months later provided the Netherlands yet again with gratifying opportunities to stir up negative imagery concerning the inseparability of nationalism and communism in the Indonesian Republic. Ambassador Van Kleffens contended that as a result of the Melvill memorandum, top officials in the State Department now understood that the Dutch Police Action during the previous summer had prevented the formation of a communist state in Indonesia that was beholden to the Soviet Union.\(^79\)

Whether American officials had actually expressed their retroactive enthusiasm about the Dutch military attack, as Van Kleffens claimed, was doubtful. Instead, the State Department was fully aware that the military assault on the Republic had further radicalized Indonesian nationalism and added major obstacles to the conclusion of a peaceful settlement.

After the Suripno affair provided yet another chance to cast aspersions on the Hatta regime and blacken it in American eyes, the Netherlands Embassy staff in Washington became convinced that the growing power and extremist character of the Indonesian left-wing forces could serve as an excuse to bypass the Republic as the embodiment of Indonesian nationalism in favor of the creation of a Dutch-dominated federal regime.\(^80\) This idea would further crystallize in the minds of those responsible for Netherlands foreign policy in The Hague. However, the effects of the communist threat on US foreign policy materialized in a different way than the Dutch had envisioned. Dutch efforts to curry the Truman Administration’s favor by feeding Washington every conceivable piece of evidence concerning Indonesian communism – true or false – fueled American fears of a “Moscow-plot.” Instead of mobilizing the United States to stand firmly by its Dutch ally, though, the diligent Dutch propaganda efforts in Washington would backfire.

Early in June, at the time of the Dubois-Critchley Plan being shuffled back and forth, the French Ambassador in Washington, Henri Bonnet, disclosed a piece of information concerning the Indonesian Question to his Dutch colleagues. According to his source in the State Department, the Truman Administration’s growing anxieties about the mounting communist menace in Republican territory had prompted Washington to initiate a new and more conciliatory policy toward the Yogyakarta government; at the same time, it intended to demand greater Dutch concessions. The chief negotiator of the Netherlands dele-
igation to the GOC, Henri van Vredenburch, who was already resentful of Du Bois’ pledge of allegiance to the Republican cause, was shocked by the report. He concluded that honesty was not to be expected from the State Department – “my impression is that we are being completely fooled” – and he immediately called Van Kleffens in Washington. He expressed his doubts about Bonnet’s assertion that the burgeoning fear of communism in Southeast Asia constituted the primary motive for such a drastic shift in US policy. Both the Netherlands Ambassador as well as the Dutch Foreign Minister shared his misgivings. Van Kleffens, for instance, concluded in a foolhardy fashion that it was simply impossible for the State Department to alter its policy “or even to think in such a manner.”

Despite the slowly emerging new orientation in US policy during the summer of 1948, Van Kleffens stuck to his heedless optimism. Since the Ambassador apparently could not fathom the State Department’s gradually changing attitude towards the Netherlands-Indonesian conflict, which was coupled with a continuing Dutch bluntness in trying to impose their own solutions in the face of American opposition, a blind spot was exposed. It could be attributed either to the Ambassador’s failure to grasp the true intentions of Robert Lovett, or to the State Department’s Machiavellian duplicity – a reality Van Vredenburch had considered unlikely a month or so earlier. In this context, a meeting that took place between the Dutch Ambassador and the influential Under Secretary on July 13, 1948, was revealing. On that day, Van Kleffens called upon Lovett to introduce Nico S. Blom, special advisor on constitutional law within the Netherlands Foreign Ministry. In the presence of William Lacy and Frederick Nolting, Under Secretary Lovett – whom Blom found to be extremely knowledgeable about recent developments – emphasized that the Truman Administration had become embroiled in the Indonesian Question against its will. It was clear to him, however, that both sides were becoming more intractable in the negotiations; hence, it did not appear likely that a Dutch proposal for a settlement had any chance of succeeding. A GOC compromise solution, therefore, offered the only way out of the Dutch-Indonesian predicament. Without mentioning the actual proposals, Lovett may have had the former Du Bois-Chritchley and the future Cochran Plan in mind. He then addressed the Dutch aspirations to proceed with the formation of the United States of Indonesia without the Republic, which he compared to the Partition of India. The State Department would view this outcome, he told Van Kleffens and Blom in no uncertain terms, as “highly undesirable.” It was odd that Van Kleffens, when sending his account of this “candid” and “lively” conversation to The Hague, did not mention Lovett’s stern warning; to the contrary, he noted that the option of creating the USI without incorporating the Republic “did not meet with any opposition from Lovett.”

Whether Van Kleffens did not, or chose not to, hear Lovett’s sharp commentary could be attributed, to some extent, to the State Department itself, which in-
advertently fostered the blurry picture that the Netherlands Embassy forwarded to The Hague. In its effort not to antagonize the Netherlands, at a time when Washington became increasingly concerned with the survival of the very same Republican government the Dutch were trying to neutralize, the State Department was perhaps deliberately vague about its true priorities in Indonesia. Policy makers in Washington, it seemed, were embracing a dual policy.

As the issue of communism in the Republic became more and more explosive during the month of August, Van Kleffens developed a renewed confidence that the “red peril” haunting Southeast Asia would revitalize US support for the Dutch cause. The events of July and August proved that his previous warnings had a basis in fact; even the American media now decried the danger that communism posed to the integrity of the Indonesian Republic. Concerning the presumed change of US public opinion as a result of the communist threat in the Indonesian Republic, Van Kleffens wrote to the new Dutch Foreign Minister in The Hague, Dirk U. Stikker, “the truth is on the march and nothing can stop her now.” In his cheerful mood over this long-awaited success he added:

Great patience must be ours ere we may know
The secrets held by the labyrinthine time;
The ways are rough, the journeying is slow,
The perils deep – till we have conquered these
And break at light upon the golden clime,
He serves us best who sings but as he sees.83

*John Drinkwater*

“Communism makes the Ambassador poetic,” a top Netherlands official in The Hague scribbled in the margin. But Van Kleffens miscalculated. Shortly before his jubilant mood inspired him to recite poetry, the US Secretary of State, George Marshall, had flown into a rage over Dutch attempts to reach separate agreements, resembling shady backroom deals, with the leaders of the various *negara*. Marshall expressed his anger at the Dutch, who apparently envisioned the *negara* leaders as pliable peons in a Netherlands-dominated USI, whereas they consistently ignored the Indonesian Republic. This manipulative Dutch attitude on display in the city of Bandung, he concluded, “seems to hasten the fall of the Hat- ta government, and the State Department fears the successor of that government will be strongly left wing if not Communist.”84

The State Department’s reticence to endorse the Du Bois–Critchley Plan was one of the reasons why the proposals had failed to make a substantive difference. As a result of Washington’s desultory, wait-and-see approach, the Dutch participants in the GOC-sponsored negotiations could summarily sweep the plan from
the table with a gesture of outrage. It also allowed the Dutch to pressure the State Department to recall the elderly American GOC representative who had helped to draft the proposals. Instead of breaking the impasse in the Dutch-Indonesian negotiations, the Du Bois-Critchley Plan only aggravated the palpable Netherlands mistrust of the UN Security Council’s interference, in general, and the meddling of the Good Offices Committee, in particular. Dutch authorities in Batavia and The Hague were once more persuaded that the inexperienced but appealing leaders of the Republic had managed either to bewitch or to brainwash Coert Du Bois and Thomas Critchley, as had happened to their predecessors, Frank Graham and Richard Kirby, before. The Dutch, in other words, again refused to believe that these two GOC delegates had forged a pro-Republican posture based on their personal integrity and independent moral judgment as well as their own political appraisal of the Dutch-Indonesian quagmire.

Despite Hatta and Van Mook’s arduous efforts to keep their communication channels open, negotiations between the Republic and the Netherlands came to a complete standstill during the summer. General elections in the Netherlands were scheduled for July 1948, thus temporarily paralyzing decision-making processes in The Hague. The result of the popular vote occasioned a slight shift to the political right, thereby stiffening the Netherlands Government’s resolve to push its own federal solution, while also enhancing the chance of yet another military strike. In the Indonesian Republic, meanwhile, the radicalized left wing parties and labor unions granted Hatta’s cabinet little room to steer its own course.

During the summer of 1948, ominous internal developments in the Indonesian Republic increasingly distracted officials in Washington, because it appeared as if Soviet-trained operatives were busily reconstituting the PKI’s vitality and solidifying the Democratic People’s Front’s opposition to Hatta’s “moderate” leadership. Generous Marshall Aid appropriations to both the Netherlands and its Asian colony, however, were tangible signs of the fact that the Truman Administration was not yet officially prepared to abandon its Dutch ally. Since Europe’s recovery continued to enjoy the highest priority, Washington still envisioned that the enlightened and business-minded Dutch, in voluntary association with Indonesians, would help in accomplishing the much-needed economic rehabilitation of the most valuable of all Southeast Asian territories.

At the same time, however, Washington became deeply preoccupied with the political future of the strategically located Indonesian Republic. The State Department, especially George Kennan and his colleagues on the Policy Planning Staff, was re-evaluating the regions of the world where the “Cold” War with the Soviet Union might cause the outbreak of a “Hot” World War III. Washington was slowly but steadily reconsidering the location of potentially dangerous flashpoints around the globe. Gradually, the State Department’s singular focus on
Berlin and East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Greece was expanded in scope to include the independence struggles in Southeast Asia and the advances of Mao Tse-tung’s forces in Mainland China. The Indonesian archipelago in particular, with its valuable resources – raw materials that might become crucial in the contingency planning for the next Great War – urgently needed to be preserved for the West. As a result, Washington’s natural tendency to back the Dutch side made less sense toward summer’s end. Instead, the State Department became increasingly convinced that the “moderate” Sukarno and Hatta – the term moderate functioning in this context as a euphemism for non-communist or better yet, anti-communist – could withstand Moscow’s ideological directives. It seemed imperative, therefore, for US foreign policy to lend a helping hand to these two leaders in their efforts to foster a pro-Western Republic in the strategically located archipelago in Asia.
CHAPTER ELEVEN

Rescuing the Republic’s Moderates from Soviet Communism: Washington’s Conversion to Unequivocal Support of Indonesia’s Independence

Coert du Bois left Batavia in late June 1948. In all likelihood, he was embittered by the failure of his mission; perhaps he was also annoyed with Dutch machinations in Washington that prompted the State Department to recall him. Du Bois vacated his position on the UN Security’s Council’s Good Offices Committee in Java without taking leave of old friends such as Van Mook, whom he had known since the late 1920’s. The ostensible reason for being summoned back to the United States was a recurrence of his long-standing problems with coronary disease.

His abrupt departure from the diplomatic scene in Java, however, gave rise to renewed Dutch hopes for his replacement with someone “of a very high caliber,” who would not disappoint the Dutch community for a third time. Rather than attributing Graham and Du Bois’ pro-Indonesian inclinations to their sincere political convictions concerning the legitimacy of Indonesian nationalism, Dutch cynics concluded that it was Americans’ lack of sophistication about the complexities of Southeast Asian societies that undermined their effectiveness on the Security Council’s Good Offices Committee.

The next US diplomat to be commissioned as US delegate to the GOC in Batavia was H. (Horance) Merle Cochran. Upon hearing about the appointment of the new American representative to the Good Offices Committee, the Dutch Ambassador in Washington cabled his findings concerning Coert du Bois’ successor to The Hague. Although Cochran was hardly a known personality to the Netherlands Embassy staff, the State Department had assured Van Kleffens that the Dutch would be dealing with a “first-rate man.” Cochran, who was in his mid-fifties and had been a US Foreign Service officer since 1919, had most recently served as an inspector of American diplomatic posts in Eastern Europe. The Dutch Ambassador informed his colleagues in Batavia that Cochran should be seen as a “dark horse” with a long-standing but obscure State Department history. In 1941, he had been sent on a special mission to China, whereas his latest assignment made him responsible for delivering top secret messages to US Embassies and Consulates in Moscow, Warsaw, Belgrade, Bucharest, and Vienna – confidential communications “that are not even entrusted to the most secret codes.” He should be regarded, therefore, as “a moon-like figure,” which flourished in the secrecy and anonymity of refracted light.1

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Van Kleffens, however, could not conceal his dissatisfaction with Cochran’s appointment, because he had once again expected the nomination of a more prominent American with a higher rank and more political prestige. Less than a year earlier, at the time when selecting the first American GOC candidate was at issue, Dutch political circles had bandied about extremely well-known names as potential appointees. Even before Frank Porter Graham was selected, however, the two distinguished American statesmen mentioned in addition to Dwight Eisenhower and Dean Acheson — retired Under Secretary of State, Sumner Welles, and the President of the UN Trustee Council, F.B. Sayre — could not escape the disparaging judgments of the Dutch Foreign Minister. He opined that neither would suffice, because Welles supposedly displayed peculiar but unidentified “personal tendencies,” while he considered Sayre too old to project a “youthful and vibrant personality.” After Cochran was designated as the third American GOC representative, disappointed Dutch authorities conceded they had to deal once more with what Van Kleffens called a “homunculus” or a dwarf-like figure. After meeting him in person, though, Van Kleffens described Cochran more kindly as “well-intentioned, not brilliant, not naïve, sociable, lots of common sense, aware of Indonesia’s inability to stand on its own two feet, and reasonably well-prepared.”

Before flying to Batavia, Cochran made a stopover in The Hague, where the Dutch Prime Minister and appropriate cabinet members briefed him. Inevitably, they seized upon this opportunity to try to indoctrinate the US diplomat with their own point of view concerning the situation in the Indonesian archipelago. The Dutch were pleasantly surprised with Cochran’s easy-going style and common sense approach; he seemed to have an intuitive understanding of the communist threat that they were so fond of exploiting in their efforts to muster US support. In addition, officers from the Netherlands Forces Intelligence Service (NEFIS) also devoted considerable time to briefing or rather, “preparing” Cochran, whom they described as having “the looks and physique of a peasant,” but who was undoubtedly an intelligent and perceptive man. His questions, they noted, did not rise above the mundane and superficial level, but he showed his curiosity about the complicated political situation in Southeast Asia because he was “a gentleman, normal, business-like, and unpretentious.”

For this special occasion, the two Dutch military intelligence officers were disguised in civilian dress, posing as experts on the Indonesian archipelago rather than revealing their true occupation. They managed to produce an English-language memorandum or policy paper on almost every topic that arose. They placed a pile of materials on the table, designed to convince Cochran that his GOC assignment in Java would bring him face to face with an Indonesian Republic that was a house of cards. They argued that the Republic was nothing but a political fantasy, which communist-infiltrated civilian militias and Moscow-
dominated TNI troops could disrupt and topple at any moment. During Cochran’s briefings in The Hague, his Dutch informants emphasized that the Kremlin’s infiltrations into the Indonesian Republic were aimed, above all, at undermining the international position of the United States, because the Netherlands constituted only small potatoes or merely an insignificant “sideshow” in Moscow’s surreptitious designs on the oil supplies and mineral resources of the archipelago. They also warned Cochran about Australia’s GOC staff, as well as some liberal Dutch residents, who would try to convince him of the need to make concessions to the Republic’s “moderates” in order to strengthen them in their struggle with Kremlin-orchestrated communism.6

This theory, Cochran’s Dutch handlers told him, was utter nonsense. Presenting him with a recycled English-language report, entitled “Communist Influences on Nationalism in Indonesia,” compiled in July 1948, the incognito NEFIS officers tried to impress upon Cochran that moderates in the Republic were few and far between. Even the rare Republican politician whom observers in the West often praised as a reasonable person, such as the ex-Prime Minister Sutan Sjahrir, was in reality a “true-blooded Marxist.” While serving as the Republic’s head of government and chief negotiator during 1945-1947, Sjahrir had reputedly organized “government-instituted Marx Houses, i.e. study centers and boarding schools for communist cadre-training in places throughout the Republic.”7 Although judging Cochran poorly informed on issues pertaining specifically to Southeast Asia, the NEFIS officers were pleased to note that he seemed surprisingly receptive to their ideas.8

Cochran, articulating his own point of view, told his Dutch hosts in The Hague that he preferred to operate as a “lone wolf.” He predicted he would be quite leery of many of the people he might have to endure “in his club” in Batavia, among whom he expected to find several “liberal internationalists” – a designation that served, from his perspective, as a code word for progressives who were soft on communism.9 Fearing potential leaks, he intended to establish his personal communications code with Washington that would be beyond the interference of his staff. He also planned to work closely with his own trusted secretaries and especially with his “good friend,” Consular Attaché Arthur (Arturo) J. Campbell, whom he described as “just as conservative” as he was. Campbell, in fact, was the first regular CIA agent operating in the Indonesian archipelago, who had been assigned during the summer of 1948. Cochran also asserted that he was on good terms with the powerful Under Secretary of State, Robert Lovett; equally useful was being able to count on the loyalty of Walton Butterworth in the Far Eastern Affairs Office, whom he had rendered a valuable personal service when his last State Department promotion was at stake.10

Merle Cochran left The Hague for Batavia on August 6, intent on initiating a more dynamic American policy through the UN Security Council’s GOC. Even
though he did not possess the high profile Dutch authorities had hoped to encounter in the new American representative, he was certainly a smooth political operator. His long-standing Foreign Service record and his experience with covert operations and classified documents fit the altered character of the GOC assignment, which now called for a more subtle dualistic approach. While working on a political agreement between the Dutch and Indonesian sides, the necessity to sustain the Republic in its struggle against communism, at the same time, demanded a type of diplomat different from either an idealistic history professor or a seasoned ex-Consul General. It was uncertain whether Cochran modified his political views concerning the Indonesian Question during his elaborate briefings in the Netherlands, but the Dutch had little reason to complain as he embarked on his mission in early August 1948. “No one could have come to Batavia with a more friendly attitude toward the Netherlands than I did,” Cochran wrote to the US Secretary of State in early November 1948, after he, recapitulating the pattern of Graham and Du Bois, also transferred his political support from the Dutch to the Indonesian camp within a short time after arriving in Java.11

Soon after settling into the GOC offices in Java, Cochran submitted an “oral note” to the two parties, advancing yet another American-style solution to an intractable problem that was becoming a thorn in the side of Washington’s policymakers. It represented a preliminary version of a working paper that ideally would be embraced by both sides as the basis for further negotiations. As he took care of immediate GOC business, he also had a chance to survey the political climate in Java, Sumatra, and the archipelago at large, only to conclude it was full of turbulence. Within a few weeks, Cochran had become fully aware of the increasingly brazen character of Indonesian communism, but he was also impressed with Hatta’s willingness to respond in kind.12 At the same time, his instinctive affinity with the Netherlands position disappeared almost as soon as he obtained first-hand knowledge of Dutch policies in the archipelago. His working paper, or the Cochran Plan as it would be labeled in due course, drew heavily on the Dubois–Critchley proposals that the Dutch had summarily swept off the table three months earlier. Despite assurances from the Far Eastern Office’s Chief, Walton Butterworth, that the US proposals in preparation would be new, different, and not simply a revival of the Dubois–Critchley Plan, the Dutch were thoroughly disappointed. One of the principal Dutch negotiators described the new American plan as “90 percent Du Bois, 5 percent better, and 5 percent worse.”13 Apart from submitting the proposal without any form of prior consultation with the Indonesian, Dutch, Belgian, or Australian GOC representatives, the Cochran Plan also paid only lip service to the substantive criticisms of the working paper’s previous incarnation the Dutch side had presented to the US GOC delegation on August 31, 1948.14

In fact, neither Cochran nor the State Department devoted much attention to
the Dutch objections to the new plan, because by the late summer of 1948, most American officials tended to dismiss the Dutch grievances as unrealistic, anachronistic, and most of all, self-serving. The Foreign Office in London praised the American plan as an excellent document, and a senior British official went as far as calling the Dutch reply to the earliest version of the new working paper “extraordinarily stupid.” He noted that the Dutch rebuttal “contained so many conditions as practically to emasculate the Cochran plan and to prevent acceptance from the Republic, if the Republic wished to remain in existence as a government.”

Most of the available evidence suggests that Cochran’s official proposal, submitted on behalf of the American GOC delegation on September 10th, had been drafted previously in the State Department, before Cochran left Washington. Moreover, an earlier version of this revised Dubois-Critchley Plan had already surfaced in the State Department in July. Although Cochran denied having written the GOC blueprint that bore his name, members of the Dutch political community never believed him.

The most salient feature of the Cochran Plan was not its content, however disappointing it may have been to Dutch authorities in Batavia and The Hague, but the fact that “all elements of the American Government concerned with this problem, both in the Netherlands East Indies and here [in Washington], are unanimous in regarding the proposals as fair and are of the conviction that it is of the utmost importance to act promptly,” as Marshall himself acknowledged. American officials presumed they were offering Hatta a “square deal,” but no more than that; they also thought that the Dutch political and economic stakes in the archipelago were treated fairly. Marshall and Lovett, however, were not the ones who had inspired this unprecedented consensus. In fact, the two elder statesmen of Washington’s foreign policy community embraced the wisdom of the State Department’s new geopolitical vision and altered course of action later than many of the Asianists, and an increasing number of the Europeanists, in the building at Foggy Bottom. Instead, several regional offices within the State Department and Army Intelligence branches, in concurrence with the American delegation to the GOC, had inspired this remarkable unanimity. Only when the reports concerning the threat of communism in Southeast Asia started to pile up in Washington, and after the hopelessness of the Dutch cause in the Indonesian archipelago had come to light, did Marshall and Lovett decide to steer a different course.

While both senior policymakers had encountered considerable difficulties in June in their attempts to iron out inconsistencies in US foreign policy by arguing that European considerations should prevail in the Indonesian Question, it took hardly any effort to bring everyone in line with this new approach in September. In this regard, a CIA report on September 16th simply noted that “although Europe will remain [Moscow’s] major objective, strategic areas elsewhere are available for profitable exploitation.”
After three years of ambiguity and vacillation in the Truman Administration’s approach to the Dutch-Indonesian predicament, the person most painfully confronted with America’s determined new vision was the Netherlands Foreign Minister, Dirk U. Stikker, who visited Washington in September 1948. Having previously served as the Executive Director of Heineken Breweries, Stikker was marked as an outsider in the Foreign Affairs Ministry in The Hague, because he possessed little experience with the making of foreign policy. This caused Van Kleffens, himself an ex-Minister of Foreign Affairs, to assume an annoyingly arrogant attitude towards his new boss, often using sentences such as “as former minister, I would like to observe,” only to follow them up with fastidious advice about the proper formulation of government policy. Although Stikker noted, in retrospect, that Van Kleffens did an excellent job in concealing Marshall’s reluctance to receive him, the Ambassador appeared to have given the Dutch Foreign Minister ample warning about the opposition to his Washington visit. Apart from jeopardizing Washington’s neutral position on the GOC – suddenly “valued” and protected as never before – there was no way that Marshall could be convinced he had to alter the proposals put forward in Cochran’s working paper. But Stikker decided to go to Washington anyway, hoping he could personally convince the Truman Administration’s foreign policymakers of the wisdom and propriety of Dutch plans for the future of the Indonesian archipelago.

A memorandum written by James W. Barco, himself a former GOC staff member in Batavia, on September 3, 1948, illustrated how far some Washington policymakers were prepared to go at the time of Stikker’s visit. Now working in the Division of United Nations Affairs, Barco made a series of recommendations to his superior, Dean Rusk, who would become Secretary of State in the John F. Kennedy Administration during the early 1960’s. Increasingly suspicious of Dutch intentions to launch yet another military assault on the Republic, Barco called for a more interventionist role on behalf of the GOC, “with simultaneous diplomatic pressure of the strongest sort [imposed] by the United States on the Dutch.” If Dutch negotiators were to reject the Cochran Plan, he felt that the United States should not hesitate to put the Indonesian Question on the Security Council’s docket again. Washington might also publicly blame Dutch intransigence for the GOC’s failure to bring about a settlement between the two parties. The Truman Administration could also contemplate a highly publicized withdrawal from the GOC. He further proposed that US policymakers should consider, too, whether a formal, *de jure* recognition of the Republic might not be an appropriate policy, at that stage, after which normal international trade relations could be established with a newly independent Indonesian nation-state. Although various State Department and UN officials judged Barco’s last recommendations as premature, it was clear at the time of Stikker’s visit that a US retreat from the GOC and the re-submission of the Indonesian Question to the Securi-
ty Council were appraised as genuine options if the Dutch refused to accept Cochran’s proposals.

Upon arrival in Washington, the Dutch Foreign Minister received an icy reception. Secretary of State Marshall allocated less than an hour for his meeting with Stikker; once it was over, he left the encounter visibly annoyed due to the lack of tangible results. When Stikker explained that some provisions of the Cochran proposals would meet insurmountable opposition in the Netherlands Parliament, the Secretary remained utterly unmoved, simply pointing to the difficulties he had to overcome in the US Congress in connection with the European Recovery Program – the very program that was allowing the Dutch to rebuild their shattered economy. In subsequent discussions with either Lovett or other State Department officials directly involved in the Dutch-Indonesian conflict, the issue of communism and its danger to the survival of the moderate Indonesian government were the primary topics. Although well aware of the importance of securing American support, Stikker found it impossible to agree with his American counterparts on some policy matters, but the issue that was particularly divisive was the question as to how to deal with the communist problem.

In practical terms, this conundrum boiled down to a basic disagreement between Dutch and American policymakers concerning the desirability and timing of general elections in the Indonesian archipelago, which should take place, as the Washington-backed Cochran Plan suggested, before February 1949. Immediately thereafter, an interim government should be formed, enabling the transfer of sovereignty to the United States of Indonesia (USI) to occur by July 31, 1949. While the Americans saw this as the best way to neutralize the communist threat, the Dutch perceived it as a nightmarish scenario. The Netherlands Foreign Minister told Robert Lovett that his government predicted, if elections were to be held in January 1949, that the communists would almost certainly win. Obsessed with “re-establishing law and order” in Republican territory prior to elections – which implied Dutch political and military ascendancy – Stikker and his colleagues in The Hague and Batavia either failed to see, or could not fathom, the logic and inexorability of Washington’s new policy position. The Truman Administration’s policymakers, in turn, were not able to convince their committed European allies that an Indonesian state, once having attained autonomy and international recognition, was a better safeguard against communism than the archipelago’s continued governance by white-skinned foreigners, whom most Indonesians despised because they had served as colonial masters for hundreds of years.

Dutch authorities could not comprehend that the United States, in a concerted effort to raise a barrier against communism in the Indonesian archipelago, would put its faith in an adolescent nationalist regime instead of supporting a friendly and pro-American country in Europe, which had earned its standing as
a capable economic manager and presumably represented the epitome of efficient and judicious colonial rule. Instead, State Department officials impressed upon Foreign Minister Stikker, during several meetings, that Washington now harbored a firm faith in the Hatta government as an effective tool in rooting out the “red menace” in the Republic. Stikker, however, creating the impression he was hard-of-hearing, proceeded to report to the Prime Minister in The Hague that, despite the State Department’s inflexible stance on the Cochran proposals, “due to the fear of communism, the general mood [here] is nevertheless more favorable to us.”25 It should be taken into account, of course, that only a week earlier, a euphoric Eelco van Kleffens had quoted John Drinkwater’s poetry when considering the possibility of mustering Washington’s support by emphasizing the hazards of communism in the Indonesian Republic. Even during and after the communist rebellion in Madiun, this notion would remain a Dutch idée fixe.

In addition to the communist threat, Washington also worried about its loss of prestige among the Indonesian people. Indonesian nationalists had cultivated their neutrality by clinging to the Republic’s impartiality in the bi-polar international order that had emerged since the end of World War II. They regarded the Renville Agreement, however, as an American betrayal of the Republic’s right to self-determination, thus fostering a temporary shift of popular political sentiment in the direction of the PKI and the Soviet Union.26 As the caustic Dutch diplomat, Henri van Vredenburch, wrote to the Prime Minister in The Hague during the early summer, ever since America had become involved in the GOC, it had sullied its reputation in Indonesian eyes. If the United States “wishes to regain this abandoned territory,” he advised, “it will not be able to do so by feeding the insatiable extremist crocodile, while appealing to the motto ‘Strengthen the Moderates’.” As experience has shown us, Van Vredenburch continued, the gluttonous crocodile only “adheres to its own motto: ‘Nothing Succeeds like Excess.’”27

In August 1948, Van Vredenburch’s communist reptile intensified its foraging in the political morass of the Indonesian Republic, creating what Washington interpreted to be a straightforward political split down the middle of the Republic’s ranks. A few months earlier, the growing polarization of communists versus non-communists had caught Washington’s attention, prompting the State Department to take a new look at the internal political dynamics of the Indonesian Republic. After July 1948, US Intelligence analysts conceded that efforts to arrive at a compromise between the left and the right within the Republic were becoming increasingly hopeless. Inevitably, the Suripno Affair had also contributed to the polarization of political visions and sentiments. Members of the Front Demokrasi Rakyat (Democratic People’s Front or FDR) continued to clamor for full-fledged Soviet recognition of the autonomy of the Republic and a consular exchange with the USSR, even though Hatta had frozen this option by recalling
Suripno from Prague. Yet another effort of the government in Yogyakarta, consisting of Mohammad Hatta’s rationalization program of the Indonesian Armed Forces (Tentara Nasional Indonesia or TNI), added even more fuel to the fire. The intended reorganization and streamlining of the TNI was a controversial initiative undertaken by Hatta’s government, because it entailed social and political consequences within Republican territory that were profound.28

When independence was proclaimed on August 17, 1945, nationalist leaders were not in a position to think systematically about the creation of an army of national liberation. As a result, it seemed as if the TNI had brought itself into existence through a process of parthenogenesis. The outcome was a massive, chaotic, and colorful armed force composed of regular and irregular units professing diverse political leanings. All members of these unwieldy TNI formations also displayed different degrees of loyalty to the central command in Yogyakarta. When the Republic’s ex-Prime Minister, Amir Sjariffudin, intensified his efforts to consolidate and expand left-wing control over the armed forces during the spring of 1948, his activities coincided with his successor Hatta’s rigorous rationalization program. Serving simultaneously as Prime Minister and Minister of Defense, Hatta aimed to reduce the TNI, consisting of approximately 463,000 badly trained and poorly equipped troops, to a tightly disciplined army of approximately 160,000 soldiers, all of whom were properly armed.29

Popular opposition to this massive demobilization effort was intense. Many young Indonesian men had found a new way of life and a sense of purpose in the armed struggle against the Dutch colonial rulers and their military forces. The prospect of having to return to civilian life, where educational institutions were in disarray and non-agricultural employment was scarce, produced personal discontent and political ferment, especially among those who had joined the Democratic People’s Front. Toward August, however, the Hatta government knew it could rely on the loyalty of the army’s central command headed by General Sudirman. This new certitude implied that the Hatta regime could depend on troops in Yogyakarta as well as on other highly disciplined and well-equipped units, such as the Siliwangi Division under the capable leadership of Colonel Nasution. Hatta recognized, too, he could rely on the elite Police Mobile Brigade. In contrast, the ebullient and irregular lasykar forces, more likely to be loyal to the FDR, were widely dispersed and disorganized.30

It was no surprise that the Sayap Kiri factions, representing the leftist political opposition in the Republic, took the most unforgiving posture towards the Dutch. During the early postwar years of Sutan Sjahrir and Amir Sjarifuddin’s political leadership, the PNI, Masyumi, and other splinter parties had relentlessly protested the concessions the Republican government had made when signing the Linggajati and Renville accords. In 1948, the radicalized left, united in the Democratic People’s Front – no longer hampered by government responsibilities
or burdened with having to conduct GOC-sponsored negotiations – took its turn at criticizing the Hatta government. Nonetheless, despite its radical rhetoric, the FDR constituted a nationalist movement, because the orthodox PKI element within its ranks was not the most influential voice.31

During the summer of 1948, as the Western powers increasingly worried about a “Moscow-directed plot” in Southeast Asia, the Indonesian press began to pay attention to this issue as well. In August, the communist revolts that had erupted in Burma, the Malay Peninsula, and the Philippines confirmed the fears of an international communist plot. A CIA report released in mid-July, entitled “Review of the World Situation,” mentioned that local communists in British Malaya, predominantly of Chinese extraction, were conducting a “campaign of destruction and terrorism against the operation of rubber estates and tin mines.” Although the link with the Soviet Union was established in the report’s appendix on “The World Economic Situation,” identifying Moscow’s “increasingly large purchases of Malayan rubber” in an apparent effort to stockpile the commodity, the CIA did not address the curious juxtaposition that Chinese communists’ actions contributed to the “premium prices” the Soviets had to pay.32 In addition, a rumor circulated that the Kremlin had made available 40,000,000 English pounds – at the 1948 exchange rate of 4.03 dollars to the pound, the equivalent of more than 160,000,000 US dollars – to the “oppressed peoples of Southeast Asia.”33 The majority of Indonesian commentators, however, saw little chance of a similar development occurring in the Republic, at least not in the near future, because of the perceived weakness of the Indonesian Communist Party.34

Prior to 1948, the main reasons for the timid PKI posture derived not only from the Kremlin’s ideological restrictions, but could also be attributed to a confused PKI leadership, which had failed to mobilize a communist organization at the grassroots level. When Moscow’s new Zhdanov agenda replaced the Dimitrov line as the credo of the international communist movement, however, a restriction on Indonesian communism had been removed. During August 1948, moreover, the “prodigal son” of Indonesian communism returned from his twenty-two years of exile in Moscow, where he had fled in 1926 after the abortive communist revolt against the Dutch colonial regime in Java and Sumatra.35 Disguised as Suripno’s assistant, Muso attracted no attention while journalists scrambled to interview his “boss” upon their arrival in the Indonesian Republic on August 11, 1948. Once his identity became known, however, Muso immediately embarked on an effort to reconstitute the communist party (PKI) in the Indonesian Republic, deploying all the political and organizational skills he had acquired as a Moscow-trained communist veteran. Not surprisingly, the lack of mass-based support would turn out to be Muso’s biggest challenge.

When Sukarno welcomed Muso two days after his arrival – the two were old
acquaintances from the early days of the nationalist movement – the Republic’s President described him as a jago. In reply to Sukarno’s question, whether he was going to lend his support to the Republic and its anti-colonial revolution, he reputedly answered affirmatively, adding in Dutch: “Ik kom hier om orde te scheppen” (I have come here to create order). Soon thereafter, it became clear that Muso did not intend to support the nationalist struggle as Sukarno and Hatta had managed it since August 17, 1945. First and foremost, he had come back to set things straight in the Indonesian Communist Party’s rank and file, where unity was lacking and indecisive leadership had allowed the communist vanguard to align itself with the so-called nationalist bourgeois forces. The example of Klement Gottwald’s recent communist strategy and success in Czechoslovakia inspired him. And without any real opposition, Muso was able to push through, almost immediately after his return, his new party program for the Indonesian revolution, entitled *A New Road for the Indonesian Republic*.

A British intelligence informant, who met the communist leader in Yogyakarta before the Madiun uprising, described him as “energetic and excitable.” Muso had adopted a flamboyant personal style that was out of tune with soft-spoken Javanese ways; during all meetings, “he kept a vacant chair reserved for Stalin on his left... and [he] invariably opened his discourse by turning to this vacant chair and addressing Comrade Generalissimo Stalin first.” Regardless of his admiration for Stalin, it is doubtful that Muso acted on orders from Moscow. Aside from his distinctive personal demeanor and his political dedication, however, he brought with him Zhdanov’s new party platform, which prescribed a focus on fostering popular democratic revolutions from below, aimed at undermining US capitalist domination throughout the world. Since Indonesia’s national revolution had been on the defensive since August 17, 1945, he called for an end to the Republican Government’s “pliable attitude” towards the Dutch, who were nothing but agents acting on behalf of Wall Street capitalists and imperialists. Instead, Muso insisted that Indonesians should form a “National Front Government in alliance with the Soviet bloc.”

Alarming as these particular developments were to Washington, more bad news concerning the Republic’s internal political scene was in store. On August 31st, the People’s Democratic Front took an official turn to the left, when it was subsumed by the PKI. Out of the blue, Amir Sjarifuddin announced that his Socialist Party had merged with the PKI. He also confessed that he had secretly been a member of the Communist Party since 1935. The prewar Gerindo Party (*Gerakan Indonesia* or Indonesian Movement) he had led was, as the Indonesian news agency Antara announced, “merely a cloak for communist aspirations.” As far as foreign policy was concerned, Amir now advocated that the Indonesian Republic “side with the anti-imperialist bloc spearheaded by the Soviet Union.” However, as Sutan Sjahrir told a member of the US consular staff, “Sjarifuddin
may have merged his party with the communists, but he is not a communist himself”; instead, he was merely trying to secure the survival of his own political career by aligning himself with Muso’s PKI.39 Another political colleague, Saleh Soedjatmoko Mangoendiningrat, agreed with Sjahrir by recalling his numerous conversations with Amir about “the relationship between Christianity and Marxism.” Because he was a deeply religious man who sang religious hymns at all hours of the day, Soedjatmoko also construed Amir’s sudden embrace of communism as a tactical move rather than a genuine conversion that had allegedly taken place a decade earlier.40

In contrast, Prime Minister Hatta offered an interpretation of Amir’s personality and conduct that registered more contempt. He argued that Amir was a volatile man, who engaged in social climbing and political opportunism by “changing his mind as often as he changes his shirt.”41 Similarly, yet another young nationalist official, Ali Budiardjo, remembered Amir’s behavior during 1948 as restless and anxious or on-the-edge and explosive (gelisah), which prompted him to be “unpleasant to his wife and family and to imbibe too much alcohol, producing many drunken outbursts” and erratic decisions.42 The truth about Amir’s metamorphosis as a communist was obviously contested, but the result was that he joined the newly enlarged PKI leadership, which set out on a speaking tour throughout the Republic that was designed to mobilize and energize a grassroots National Front. With the PKI-FDR fusion now a fact, and with Muso and his Politbureau colleagues delivering inflammatory speeches throughout Java in an effort to rally broad-based popular support, the Indonesian Communist Party was busily trying to optimize its revolutionary potential.

Such troubling reports emanating from the Indonesian Republic during the first half of September affected the awkward circumstances surrounding the visit of the Dutch Foreign Minister to Washington, when the Secretary of State, George Marshall, displayed so little patience with Dutch objections to the Cochran Plan. After the PKI had swallowed up the FDR, US Naval Intelligence painted a gloomy picture from Java, reporting that “[W]e believe Indonesians have lost faith in the power of the UN to secure for them a just settlement in their dispute with the Dutch. The trend is now towards communism, as evidenced by the incorporation of the Socialist Party into the Communist Party. [W]e consider large-scale guerrilla action in the near future almost a certainty, with Dutch military force being given carte blanche to suppress it.”43 If the Netherlands armed forces were to use the communist ascendancy or the fear of an outright PKI coup as a pretext for crossing the demarcation line between Republican and Dutch–controlled territory – the so-called “Van Mook” or Status Quo Line – it was generally acknowledged that this would bolster the strength of the communist movement. Such a Dutch military strike would enable Muso to place the Hatta Government and the Netherlands Army in the same US-dominated impe-
rivialist camp, while he and his PKI following could then pose as the only true embodiment of Indonesian nationalism.

As a result of American pressures, the Dutch refrained from launching a military action at this particular juncture. On September 6th, an authoritative Republican official informed a member of the American consular staff that “lines are now clearly drawn and they are generally non-communist versus communist rather than along old party lines.” Cochran, for his part, had little doubt about Amir Sjarifuddin’s genuine communist disposition, and he reported to Washington that Soviet infiltrations were becoming more frequent. In fact, rumors about Soviet-sponsored subversive activities were rampant. Because the Dutch still presumed they could strengthen their cause in American eyes by disseminating alarming news in Washington and Batavia about the danger of communism, they spread such stories with alacrity. Hatta, at the head of the Republican government, meanwhile, genuinely feared that Moscow might send Soviet aid to Muso, an apprehension that continued even after the communist rebellion in Madiun had erupted on September 18, 1948. US Naval Intelligence reported “that the Soviets are secretly flying Russian provisions and equipment into the interior, thereupon resulting in the noticeable strengthening of the Communist Indonesian forces.” Allegedly, the Soviets had also sent agents into Sumatra and many other islands. Although these rumors and fears held no basis in fact, such speculative stories had a profound impact on all parties involved in the Dutch-Indonesian conflict.

Under these tense conditions, reassurances such as Hatta’s preparedness “to take strong action against intransigent elements” were applauded in Washington. Hatta now wanted to know whether the Truman Administration was willing to grant assistance to the Republic in its battle against communism. On September 9, 1948, Cochran received, at his request, permission from Marshall to inform Hatta that the US government “would in every practical way assist the democratic non-communist government of Indonesia successfully to resist communist tyranny,” and that the State Department would “support the extension of financial help in which all states of a peaceful federation would share according to their needs...” Furthermore, the Cochran Plan had to be pushed through as soon as possible.

During the next few days, events succeeded each other with astonishing speed. Army units affiliated with the Democratic People’s Front, faced with the prospect of demobilization, attacked armed TNI forces loyal to Hatta and Sukarno in Solo (or Surakarta), the Republic’s second-largest city. By September 17th, Republican Army reinforcements faithful to the Yogyakarta government had crushed this insurrection. In the meantime, the Republican regime had for the first time in its history openly denounced Soviet communism. Hatta accused Muso of pursuing a “suicidal policy for Indonesia” by attempting to “drag the
Republic into the Soviet-American global conflict." The future of the independent Indonesian Republic, Hatta proclaimed, "does not rest with Soviet ideology." Obviously, the lines were now drawn; both sides were digging in their heels. From Batavia, the US Consul General, Charles Livengood, informed the State Department that Hatta’s ability to “hold the line against a communist uprising, in case Muso feels the time is ripe for such, is a matter of pure conjecture at this point.” However, he also articulated his belief that if the PNI and Masyumi would remain loyal to Hatta, the situation could probably be kept under control in the near future, “although smaller disorders throughout Central Java will inevitably occur.”

Contradicting Livengood’s cautiously optimistic message, however, the Republic’s resilience in the face of a communist threat would be tested sooner than anyone, including Muso himself, expected. Inevitably, because of the outbreak of communist rebellions elsewhere in Southeast Asia during the summer of 1948, Washington also followed developments in Indonesia with eagle-eyed scrutiny. During the early morning of September 18, 1948, local PKI sympathizers and communist cadres, in an ill-defined conjunction with opportunistic but presumably non-political warok groups, rose in revolt against the Yogyakarta government in the city of Madiun in Eastern Java. They rapidly defeated the Republic’s small contingent of troops loyal to Hatta and Sukarno and seized control of the

Newspaper headlines announcing the coup d’etat in Madiun on September 18, 1948, and Amir Sjarifuddin.
city. Twenty-two miles away from Madiun, Muso and his PKI colleagues were in the middle of a speaking engagement. This sudden insurrection on the part of local communist leaders probably caught the PKI chief and his entourage off guard. However, as he rushed to Madiun to take charge of the spontaneous revolt, Muso must have wondered whether this might not be the right moment after all.

The next move was up to Hatta’s government in Yogyakarta. Fortunately, despite the necessity of having to struggle against former colonial rulers and communist insurgents simultaneously, the Republic moved with even more vigor than most Americans had anticipated. Among the supporters of Sukarno and Hatta in Madiun, such as the local police and administrative hierarchy – many of whom were arrested and subsequently killed during the short-lived Front Nasional regime – the Yogyakarta government could rely on another surprising group of allies inside the city. Local members of the Indonesian Republic’s Student League (Tentara Pelajar Republik Indonesia or TRIP) were in possession of secret radio transmitters, enabling them to maintain steady contact with Yogyakarta. Moreover, on September 27th, when the political hold of the Front Nasional reign was palpably crumbling because it did not stand a chance against the Siliwangi Division’s crack troops and Eastern Javanese TNI forces dispatched by Hatta, the students dared to shout in public, Musso Terreur... cukup, habis (Muso Terror... enough, finished).

Regardless of the local details of the Madiun uprising, which were of little interest to most US foreign policymakers, the reality of a bloody armed conflict between followers of the Indonesian Communist Party and the Republican regime confirmed the Truman Administration’s worst fears about the future of Asia. While Ho Chi Minh’s communist-dominated Viet Minh was strengthening its popular base in Indochina, instability continued to prevail in Burma. Even more critical to Washington’s preoccupation with national security was the fact that Mao Tse-tung’s communist cadres were winning the struggle in China against the corrupt, US supported regime of Chiang Kai-shek. North Korea, meanwhile, appeared firmly in communist hands. The situation in Indonesia, therefore, appeared less bleak when compared with other Asian regions. Even though Washington was gravely concerned with the integrity and survival of the Indonesian Republic, the State Department also conceded that the Madiun crisis had presented the Yogyakarta regime with an opportunity to demonstrate its credentials as (non-communist) “moderate.” The United States had put its faith in the Republic of Indonesia, and now it was time for Republican leaders to prove whether or not they deserved such trust. As the State Department observed with gratitude during the next few weeks, Hatta and Sukarno passed the test with flying colors.
Sukarno and his wife Fatmawati, holding their oldest daughter, Megawati Sukarnoputri. In July 2001, Megawati became President of the Indonesian Republic.
In the wake of the Madiun revolt, there was virtually no progress in the negotiations between the Netherlands and the Republic. American policymakers assumed that for an Indonesian Republic haunted by internal instability, an expeditious and “generously” negotiated settlement of its dispute with the Netherlands was crucial to its endurance and ability to combat the threat of Soviet communism. The Dutch were now the obstacle. This, at least, was settling in as the predominant view in Washington. The Republican leaders, who emerged from the Madiun crisis stronger both domestically and internationally, did not necessarily experience the same immediate sense of urgency as far as reaching a settlement with the Netherlands was concerned. During the previous year, delaying a compromise solution with the Dutch had resulted in the Republic’s improved bargaining position due, in large part, to the gradual shift in American policy starting in the late spring and summer of 1948. Showing the Truman Administration that it was able and willing to suppress the communist rebellion in Madiun, in turn, prompted the Hatta government to speculate whether a temporary postponement of a settlement might not yield further advantages in terms of pro-Indonesian policy adjustments in Washington.

The day after the Madiun uprising began, Merle Cochran articulated his extreme irritation with Dutch obstructionist tactics, particularly because it was a time when a common enemy to all parties called for harmonious action. Despite the tense circumstances surrounding the events in Madiun, Dutch authorities suddenly announced their decision to evict twenty-two Republican officials from Batavia, amongst them the representatives to the GOC and their families. “Because we are giving poor Hatta such a hard time,” a Dutch official ridiculed, Cochran bitterly objected to these Dutch intentions. In fact, had this Dutch official known what kinds of conclusions Cochran drew from the obstinate Dutch attitudes he encountered as GOC delegate, he would have been shocked by the degree of distrust and exasperation Cochran harbored at this point in time. Cochran found that the “trend of provocative incidents emanating from Netherlands East Indies authorities at such a critical moment,” when an effort was being made to find a basis for resuming negotiations, gave rise to the suspicion that the Dutch were deliberately trying to exacerbate the political situation within the Republic. Cochran became convinced that the Dutch were trying to make it impossible for the Hatta government either to negotiate or to survive. When the US envoy read Dutch Commander-in-Chief Spoor’s proposed regulations for the future of the TNI during the interim period, he called elements of Spoor’s draft “surprisingly reasonable.” His sarcasm was not lost on the Dutch, who denounced his words as “unsurprisingly unreasonable.” Continuation of such tactics tended to confirm the allegations that the Netherlands Government searched for an excuse to take “police measures against subversive elements, which would include Republicans as well as Communists.” Even though Van
Kleffens dismissed the US apprehensions that the Netherlands might use the Madiun revolt as a pretext for a new military action by attributing it to Americans’ “inborn suspiciousness,” it was highly probable that the government in The Hague had given this option serious consideration.57

The Dutch went to great lengths in their efforts to downplay the Republic’s apparent success in handling the situation. In this context, they informed the American Consulate General in Batavia that TNI loyalty was down to a mere three brigades; they also claimed an “absence of effective action by the Republican Government.”58 However, upon his return to Batavia from Yogyakarta on the third day of the revolt, the Consulate General’s pro-Dutch political officer, Glenn Abbey, painted a completely different picture. He reported, instead, that the majority of TNI troops had remained steadfast in their commitment to Sukarno and Hatta in Yogyakarta and was closing in on Madiun from three sides. The mood among the Indonesian Republic’s government officials had much improved that morning, he noted, because they believed that “the people will rally to the government standard.”59

That same Monday, September 20th, Cochran met Hatta in Kaliurang, a small town near Yogyakarta at the foot of Merapi volcano, where he gave him a message that made crystal clear what Washington now expected from the Republic. While the American government regretted the communist uprising, he told the Republic’s Prime Minister that the insurgency gave him an opportunity to show his determination in suppressing communism within its boundaries. This, Cochran clarified, “should impress the world at a time when the Netherlands Foreign Minister has stressed to us the need for concerted action in the Far East against communism.” In addition, he would be glad to recommend that Washington search for “practical ways to assist the democratic non-communist government of Indonesia” in its hour of need, when it was in the process of suppressing a Soviet-directed communist plot. In response, Hatta expressed the Republic’s serious need for police force materials, which he had already discussed with a “US attaché,” and he added a request for regular military ammunition and weapons as well. Since these were for use against a common communist enemy, Hatta posited that the Dutch should not be overly dismayed if the Republic were to receive such US made materials.60

Since the GOC would return from Kaliurang near Yogyakarta to Batavia on September 22nd, not a single US observer would be present in Republican territory. Under Secretary Lovett, therefore, urged that at such a crucial time, further contacts with the Republican authorities ought to be maintained. He added that this should occur “in such manner as will not be misinterpreted or excite speculation.”61 Until Cochran could re-establish direct communications with Hatta and Sukarno, an interim solution had to be found. Lovett was eager to avoid Dutch complaints about American overtures to Yogyakarta; he also wished to
protect Hatta from potential criticism leveled by his Indonesian compatriots on the left, who viewed close relations with the United States with major misgivings. Officially, the Hatta government still pursued a foreign policy of non-alignment, because many Republican politicians held neutrality in high esteem. Fortunately, the ideal opportunity for establishing a low-profile contact with the Republic’s leadership arose soon thereafter, through the ongoing GOC process of Dutch-Indonesian negotiations.

After Cochran had offered the Dutch and Indonesian delegations to the GOC the formal plan that bore his name on September 10, 1948, the Republican leadership had quickly accepted the proposals as a basis for further negotiations. The Dutch, on the other hand, were dragging their feet, asking Washington first to consider its previously drafted revisions of the plan. This gave rise to a sense of annoyance among American GOC representatives, who suspected that the Dutch were “still hopeful of [a] shakeup or breakdown within the Republic,” and that they had no serious intention of accepting an agreement on anything but their own terms. Hatta had made clear to Cochran that if the Dutch would not reopen negotiations on the basis of the Cochran Plan by September 25th, he would instruct the Indonesian representative at the United Nations in New York, L. N. Palar, to file a complaint with the Security Council. Disturbed by this prospect, the Dutch nonetheless tried to delay the resumption of negotiations; they did so by letting Cochran know at the eleventh hour, the evening before the deadline, that a “substantial contribution to the resumption of the negotiations” would be forthcoming before October 1. Although the Americans on the GOC were loath to take responsibility for this particular continuance, Cochran offered, nevertheless, to have the message delivered to Hatta via airplane at once. At the same time, he seized the opportunity to resolve the liaison problem with Yogyakarta by dispatching his old acquaintance, Arthur J. Campbell, to the Republican capital, where, according to an official PKI source, he arrived in the company of Sutan Sjahrir.

Campbell officially held a post as attaché in the Consulate General in Batavia, where he had arrived during the early summer of 1948. In reality, however, he was the first CIA agent the Truman Administration posted in Java to lend covert support to the Republic’s anti-communist forces – what Dean Rusk later called “the back alley war” against communism. A great deal of mystery surrounded his mission, but Campbell had probably already met Hatta shortly before the Midiumi uprising. If this was so, Campbell was probably the “US attaché” with whom Hatta had discussed the Republic’s need for American police force materials as well as regular weapons that would be deployed in the struggle against the common communist foe.

The Dutch were still unaware of Campbell’s cloak-and-dagger activities. In fact, they were grateful to Cochran for his willingness to make the GOC airplane
available to convey their message to Hatta in Yogyakarta. It was not until much later, March of the next year, that Campbell appeared in a Dutch file labeled “unwanted American activities,” as an “intelligence officer” within the US Consulate General, although it did not mention his frequent trips to Yogyakarta.67 During his three-day visit to the Republican capital in the early days of the Madiun uprising, Campbell may have engaged in further discussions with Republican officials about potential US support, such as American “police training” for Indonesian officers, but the question whether the Republic might receive American-made weapons was removed from the agenda. This was simply too delicate an issue with regard to America’s foreign relations with the Netherlands. Moreover, American arms in the hands of Republican troops – soldiers who were still outfitted mostly with Japanese guns and sundry equipment left over from World War II – could be spotted at once. Dutch enemies would immediately recognize them because, ironically, they were also using military materials and weapons made in the USA.

Despite considerable handicaps, Sukarno and Hatta had been able to deal effectively with the PKI rebellion. The need for large-scale, and thus overt, US support for the Republic’s anti-communist campaign therefore withered away quite soon. If such aid had indeed been contemplated, the fact that there was eventually no demand for it must have been a great relief to the American officials involved, since it would have complicated US intercession in the Dutch-Indonesian conflict. The Republican leadership was similarly pleased that they had been able to deal with the Madiun situation by relying on its own human and material resources, without foreign assistance. Manifest American involvement would have dragged the Republic into the murky arena of East-West antagonism, thereby further polarizing the Indonesian political scene with harmful long-term consequences for the Yogyakarta authorities, whom the US foreign policy establishment had only recently learned to trust and support.

Washington informed Hatta and his colleagues that any attempt to reach an agreement with the communists within the Republic would not be appreciated. Instead, a straightforward delineation between communists and fellow travelers, on the one hand, and “genuine nationalists,” on the other hand, was a “most welcome development to the US government and American public opinion.” Cochran also received authorization to inform Hatta that “firm action against communists by the Republican government could hardly fail to accrue to the advantage of the Republic by giving it a clean bill of health in the eyes of the democratic governments and people” in the Western world. Lovett also allowed Cochran to hint to Hatta that “urgent consideration” was given in the State Department to the possibility of aiding the Republic with medical supplies and textiles. However, it was important that the Republic should not interpret the American offer of humanitarian assistance as a signal that it could now get tough
with the Dutch in the negotiations or give rise to the Republic’s “hope to bleed the US [dry].” Not surprisingly, in Dutch circles in Java and Sumatra, Washington’s stated intention to provide the Republic with medicine and textiles was greeted as “more evidence of [the Truman Administration’s] pro-Republican bias in the Indonesian Question.” Campbell, committed to slaying the communist dragon in the Indonesian Republic, was prepared to go further in offers of assistance than Cochran. Despite his distinguished anti-communist record, the GOC delegation chief had to balance the importance of the anti-Soviet crusade by linking it to his mediating role, which presumed a sense of objectivity toward both antagonists in the conflict. Although the CIA’s precise actions during the Indonesian struggle for independence leave considerable room for speculation, the Agency’s contribution was more than nominal and served as palpable evidence of Washington’s changed policy position toward the Dutch-Indonesian conflict.

In early October, authorities in the US State Department resolved that it was necessary to become firm with the Dutch. The “substantial contribution to the resumption of the negotiations” that the Netherlands GOC delegation had promised was, in the eyes of the American GOC staff, nothing but a pathetic and self-righteous document. This confirmed US fears that the Dutch were again stalling in the hope that the Yogyakarta government would collapse. Even worse, the possibility of another military action against the Republic, using the putative chaos inside Republican territory as a pretext, was often mentioned as yet another plausible Dutch option. Cochran regarded the Dutch reply to the proposals on October 4th as “tantamount to a rejection of the substance of the [US delegation’s] plan.” To present the Netherlands rebuttal to Hatta in such “brutal terms” would probably prompt the Indonesian Prime Minister to submit the Indonesian Question to the Security Council. In such a case, Lovett informed a member of the Netherlands Embassy staff, the State Department would support the Cochran Plan in the ensuing debate and request the Security Council to release the United States from its responsibilities on the GOC. Under those circumstances, Washington would recover its freedom of action vis-à-vis the Dutch-Indonesian conflict, only to re-evaluate further its policies. It was noted afterwards that the Dutch diplomat left the State Department “visibly shaken.”

The Netherlands Ambassador, Eelco van Kleffens, as well as Dutch authorities in The Hague and Batavia, considered Lovett’s threatened American measures as the worst possible contingencies. As Van Kleffens warned, “this would beyond any doubt lead to a shift from the benevolent-neutral American attitude to a neutral-neutral American attitude, or even a reluctant-neutral attitude.” He was correct in observing that the State Department’s benevolent neutrality toward the Dutch cause was coming to an end. The signs had become increasingly visible. During the autumn of 1948, American authorities balked for the first time at the Nether-
lands Purchasing Commission’s successful practice, thanks to Colonel Baretta’s wily stewardship, of procuring American-made weapons and other hardware destined for the Netherlands Army in order to supplement or replace its ample reserves of British military equipment, some of which was becoming old, rusty, and defective. Also, Dutch applications for “special project loans,” earmarked for the economic recovery of the Netherlands East Indies, were either shelved or rejected. Even so, the Dutch Ambassador in Washington was not prepared to give up hope. “The future will tell,” Van Kleffens maintained, “whether we can fully profit from the unmistakable gains that result from the communist action in Indonesia, especially in relation to the US Government and American public opinion.”72 In late September, the Ambassador still embraced such beliefs, despite America’s increasingly critical attitude, which he and his colleagues in The Hague and Southeast Asia were unwilling or unable to identify. When the Dutch refusal to accept the Cochran Plan as the basis for further negotiations became clear, the State Department began to escalate its pressure on the Dutch.

The two influential chiefs of the State Department offices most directly involved in the Dutch–Indonesian conflict, Butterworth and Hickerson, proposed that Washington, if the US were to be relieved of its UN Good Offices responsibilities, should offer economic assistance to the Republic. After all, Consul General Livengood had warned that, although the situation in the Republic seemed to be under control for the time being, “unless outside supplies and assistance in the form of economic and consumer goods [become] available soon, popular discontent will augment sharply,” thus conforming to Washington’s mantra about social and political chaos always yielding a growth of communism.73 American convictions regarding this causal connection may also have prompted the American offer of humanitarian aid in the form of textiles and medical supplies. Campbell’s mission, too, showed that the Truman Administration was prepared to come forward with financial support. The covert nature of his offer and the secrecy surrounding the creation of a US training program for Indonesian law enforcement personnel, however, also indicated that the State Department, while recognizing the necessity for a closer alliance with the Republic, was not yet prepared to use this rapprochement as a formal strategy to control or manipulate the Dutch.

Instead of caving in to such outside pressures, The Hague seemed to stiffen its resolve not to be coerced into a solution imposed by the Americans – or anybody else – to the point of resorting to military action. The deployment of armed force constituted an option that was seriously debated in the Netherlands during the autumn of 1948. The collision course thus contemplated would not be abandoned until all other avenues, still leading to a possible compromise, were effectively closed. Although US constraints compelled the Netherlands to accept, however reluctantly, Cochran’s proposals as a basis for trying to achieve a peace-
ful settlement with the Indonesian Republic, the amendments the Dutch attached to the document were of such far-reaching consequence that they crippled the American plan.

A last attempt to reach a compromise was undertaken by Dutch Foreign Minister Stikker. Upon his arrival in Batavia on October 31, 1948, Stikker informed Cochran that, although he had genuinely come to seek an orderly settlement, the idea that “only military action can fulfill Dutch goals” was gathering many supporters within the Dutch cabinet. In addition, the Foreign Minister warned that popular sentiment in the Netherlands had reacted negatively to his last-ditch efforts to reconcile the Dutch conflict with the Republic via peaceful diplomacy rather than military action. The conservative Dutch newspaper Trouw, as an example of harshly critical stories in many other newspapers in the Netherlands, described Stikker’s visit to Kaliurang, for the purpose of meeting with Hatta, as traveling down “the road to Canossa – a journey [that] will not do Dutch prestige any good.” Within the Dutch community in Java itself, some “slurring local whis- pers” branded the new Foreign Minister as “merely a beer baron who knows nothing of national and international affairs.”

One of the futile demands put forward in the Dutch reply of October 4, 1948, insisted that the Republican Government should be obliged to prohibit by law all forms of communism within its territory. Cochran, even though he was a fanatic anti-communist, had been cautious and open-minded in his approach to Indonesian communism, but he seriously doubted the wisdom of trying to outlaw communism in the Republic. Agreeing with Hatta’s idea that the communists’ proper place was in the parliamentary opposition but not in the cabinet, Cochran feared that the effort to legally prohibit communism, or to repress it to a breaking point, would be counter-productive. He told the Dutch Foreign Minister that “Hatta had done a good job in crushing Moscow-inspired communists with poor means at his disposal.” Shortly before, when questioned about this topic, the Indonesian Prime Minister had assured Cochran that he would put down, in an identical fashion, “[the] Tan Malaka communists if they should follow Muso’s example.” Hatta made this point after the State Department noted and recorded its concerns with the “ominous character” of the temporary coalition between the Hatta Government and Tan Malaka’s nationalist and independent communist movement – an alliance that was aimed at undermining the PKI. Predictably, Ambassador Van Kleffens used this “pact with the devil” as an additional piece of evidence that should alarm the State Department, because it revealed that Hatta was “by no means Simon the pure anti-communist” he claimed to be. The Dutch Ambassador’s diatribe, however, left Under Secretary of State, Robert Lovett, unperturbed. Such charges also persisted in the United Nations, where the Netherlands UN representative, J.H. van Roijen, tried to convince US Secretary of State, George Marshall, that the Hatta cabinet was not against
Although fears existed that by mobilizing the support of Tan Malaka and his followers, Prime Minister Hatta had taken a viper into his bosom, officials in Washington increasingly realized that this marriage of convenience had only a transitory character as far as Hatta was concerned. In due course, on July 1, 1949, the Policy Planning Staff (PPS) in the State Department praised the Republican leader’s cunning tactics displayed during the previous year. A PPS analysis noted that the Republicans’ “anti-Stalinism was dramatically proven, while they were subjected to a Dutch blockade, by the unexcelled skill with which they liquidated the communist revolt led by the Kremlin agent Muso; they enlisted the support of the Trotskyists to crush the Stalinists and, having done so, were in the process of suppressing the Trotskyists when the Dutch launched their recent ‘police action’.” Labeling Tan Malaka’s *Persatuan Perjuangan* (Fighting Force) a Trotskyist organization, though, revealed that the otherwise astute analysts on the PPS staff in the State Department had not yet figured out the sectarian rivalries prevailing within the political left of the Indonesian Republic.

Towards the end of 1948, the substantive intermediary role of the GOC was undermined; increasingly, the Good Offices Committee seemed to function more as a secretariat in charge of managing the exchange of demands and counter-demands between the Dutch and Republican camps. However, Cochran’s “indefatigable efforts” as the chief spokesman for both the United States and the United Nations remained paramount. In a conversation with Nico Blom, who accompanied the Dutch Foreign Minister, Dirk Stikker, on his visit to Java, the American diplomat articulated his negative impressions of recent Dutch behavior in a candid manner. Cochran expressed his annoyance with ornery politicians in The Hague and, in particular, with the new High Representative of the Crown, ex-Prime Minister Louis Beel, because the Dutch conveyed the impression that they no longer expected any productive negotiations to take place under the auspices of the GOC. The direct Stikker-Hatta talks had reinforced this perception. The Hague, Cochran surmised, was proceeding with its own arbitrary solutions. By creating a Dutch-controlled federal structure, authorities in the Netherlands and Southeast Asia “would soon close the door to the Republic or leave it so narrowly open that the Republic could no longer squeeze in.” Cochran admitted he was aware of rumors concerning a new military action, and he speculated that the actual purpose of Stikker’s visit to the Indonesian archipelago was to issue an ultimatum.

The Dutch Foreign Minister returned to Java once more on December 2, 1948, having learned during the month he was back in The Hague that attitudes in the Netherlands, among politicians as well as the public at large, had become even more rigid. A Dutch obsession with cataloguing and describing Republican truce violations – which the Indonesians as well as the US GOC delegation in-
terpreted as a tactic to avoid having to discuss genuine political questions – sugges-
ted that the government in The Hague was only searching for a justification and rationale to unleash its military might on the Republic. Britain’s Foreign Minister, Ernest Bevin, observed that even the Liberal Party’s Stikker – generally considered to be a more amenable figure next to Katholieke Volks Partij (KVP or Catholic People’s Party) war horses such as Beel and the Minister of Overseas Territories, Dr. E.J.M.A. Sassen – felt a military strike offered the only possible escape from the impasse.81 In his memoirs, Stikker would eventually reconstruct the Netherlands Army’s second assault on the Republic, and his own endorse-
ment of military violence, as a “direct result of Cochran’s meddling.”82 The latter, while continuing his unflagging efforts to resolve the stalemate by trying to con-
vince the Dutch to return to the negotiating table, watched the growing bel-
ligerence of the Netherlands side with dismay. In his daily cables to Washington, he denounced the inflexibility of the Dutch and recorded his worries about the dire consequences for the Republik Indonesia if the Netherlands Army were to mount another military assault. During December 1948, American trust in Dutch authorities’ sincerity in trying to reach a peaceful solution had plumm-
et to an all-time low.

The year 1948 had begun with a Truman Administration that fully backed the Netherlands in its conflict with the Indonesian Republic, because the Dutch na-
tion was viewed as a reliable, even pivotal proponent of Washington’s policy agenda in Western Europe. As late as December 1948, an article in the New York Times still observed that “the Netherlands are the very keystone of the military and economic security system in Western Europe that is vital to the United States.”83 As a result, in January 1948 the State Department had exerted consider-
able pressure on the Indonesian Republic through the agency of its GOC repre-
sentative, Frank Porter Graham, to sign the Renville Agreement, which stipulat-
ed principles extremely favorable to the Netherlands. As the year unfolded, however, Washington’s approach to the communist threat in the Indonesian Re-
public had become more dissociated from its European policy program. 1948, therefore, ended on an entirely different note. At the end of the year, US foreign policymakers engaged in serious, although unsuccessful, efforts to restrain Dutch saber-rattling in order to safeguard a nationalist regime that had earned its anti-
communist credentials by crushing a communist coup presumably backed by Moscow. Inevitably, Washington did not want the very same “moderate” government to become mired in a protracted guerrilla war or to disappear altogether at the hands of intransigent former colonial rulers.84

In fact, the year 1948 closed with an episode of “hardball diplomacy,” as the historian Gerlof Homan has labeled it. The implacable Dutch position prompted the State Department to present the Minister of Foreign Affairs in The Hague with an aide mémoire on December 7, 1948. The document called upon the Dutch
not to weaken Hatta’s position; it also contained an explicit warning that a military action against the Republic would “jeopardize continuance” of Marshall Aid, both to the Netherlands itself and to the Dutch East Indies. The Dutch reaction was one of “pained and angry surprise”; it caused the already embittered politicians in The Hague and Batavia to lose all faith in their American patron. The original version of the infamous aide mémoire can be traced back as far as November 5th, when it was sent to Cochran for approval. In the following month, several modifications were made to tone down the initial document. Hence, by the time Cochran gave the green light to go ahead with the presentation of the aide mémoire, its demands had already become more moderate, although the Foreign Minister in The Hague certainly did not see it as such.85

As a result of Van Kleffens’ rather blunt, yet effective, appeal to Under Secretary Lovett in Washington, the document, which the Netherlands Ambassador described as “unfortunate,” “unjust,” and “indecent” was withdrawn and replaced, the next day, with one that was more acceptable to the government in The Hague. This time it did not include the threat to withhold Marshall Aid from the
Netherlands, but great damage had already been done. Upon handing the revised aide mémoire to the Netherlands Foreign Ministry in The Hague, the US chargé d’affaires, Lloyd V. Steere, was rudely informed that it made more sense for Washington to impose its will on Yogyakarta if they wanted to contribute to a more accommodating atmosphere, and that such an appeal should occur within “a couple of days.” The Netherlands had previously been assured that Cochran had hit the Republicans “again and again with a baseball bat” and that the State Department would “give those fellows hell” if it was necessary to restrain the Indonesians. There is no evidence, however, that this was actually done. The United States, in fact, did not possess much leverage with the Republic. Moreover, the State Department, at this point, also judged it inappropriate to demand further concessions from Hatta. But the way Foreign Ministry officials in The Hague had addressed Steere—a “bullying tactic,” as it was reported back to Washington—was interpreted as an insult to the State Department.86

After US foreign policymakers had let themselves be browbeaten into rescinding the aide mémoire, the Truman Administration was forced to concede that the biggest stick it was willing to use had failed to impress the intractable Dutch government. For a super power such as the United States to retract a diplomatic note under such circumstances was quite remarkable, as Prime Minister Willem Drees confessed with a certain amount of glee.87 However, unless Washington was willing to compromise the integrity of the Marshall Plan, which constituted the foundation on which US policies in Western Europe were built, no other option remained but to return to the GOC negotiating table in the hope of preventing the Netherlands Army from attacking the Indonesian Republic. Washington did not want to risk the possibility that the Netherlands, as the fourth largest recipient of Marshall Aid, would publicly castigate the European Recovery Program as a coercive device designed to intimidate smaller European nations into submitting to the will of the United States.

The Dutch reply to the American aide mémoire, released on December 9, foreshadowed the possibility of an outbreak of armed hostilities in Java and Sumatra. Top-ranking State Department officials warned Lovett of this likelihood. On December 13, 1948, after being alerted to the possibility of a military strike, Hatta hastily presented Cochran with yet another a set of proposals to be forwarded to The Hague. The letter contained new sacrifices on the part of the Republic, which Washington viewed once more as evidence of “the conciliatory attitude of the Republican Government.”88 On the very same day that Hatta issued his appeasing reply, however, the Netherlands Council of Ministers decided it was likely that a military action would be launched. Heated debate within the Council of Ministers followed the reception of Hatta’s memorandum, which was coupled with America’s urgent advice to evaluate the concessions he had offered with due diligence and in a respectful manner. Instead of doing so, the Dutch cabinet re-
sponded to Hatta’s conciliatory gesture with a message that resembled an imperious dictate. In Batavia, Cochran categorized the document as an “unreasonable ultimatum” that called for a “complete capitulation” by the Republic’s Prime Minister. On December 18th, after having received no reply from Yogyakarta, Beel was authorized to set the military machine in motion at zero hours on December 19, 1948.
Epilogue

Approximately twenty-four hours before the Netherlands government in The Hague authorized its second military campaign against the Indonesian Republic, George Kennan had a confidential conversation in Washington DC focusing specifically on the Dutch-Indonesian conflict with the US Secretary of State, George Marshall, and his Under Secretary, Robert Lovett. Their discussion was based on a memorandum Kennan had previously submitted on behalf of the Policy Planning Staff. On December 17, 1948, Kennan stressed that the most significant issue facing the United States in its Cold War with the Soviet Union, at that very moment, was located in the faraway Indonesian archipelago. He reminded his senior policymaking colleagues that whatever they decided to do with regard to the Dutch-Indonesian confrontation “within the next few days may strongly influence the shape of things in East and South Asia for decades to come.”

Kennan sketched a bird’s eye view of communism’s future in Asia. He mentioned that both the American and British governments had gathered convincing intelligence, indicating that the Dutch could not successfully maintain their political authority over Sumatra, Java, and Madura. America’s policy dilemma, therefore, revolved around the social and political turmoil that threatened the Indonesian Republic, not only during the ongoing independence struggle but also after autonomy as a nation-state would be achieved; “chaos,” after all, always embodied “an open door” to communist infiltration.

Kennan then posed an appropriate rhetorical question: “What would a communist Indonesia mean?” He speculated that it might result in either Thailand’s or the Malay Peninsula’s failure to stay within the orbit of the West, because they would be wedged in between “the nutcracker of a communist China and Indochina and a communist Indonesia.” He also speculated that anarchy in the Indonesian Republic might result in a “bisection” of the world, which could, in due course, stretch from Siberia to Sumatra. If Marshall and Lovett were to take a quick glance at a world atlas, they should recognize at once that such a development could lead to “the communist denial of our East-West global communications.” Kennan also worried about Australia. If the Indonesian people were to fall prey to communism, it would render the position of the British Commonwealth outpost in Asia “critically vulnerable.” And if the Kremlin decided to usurp the
Indonesian Republic by taking advantage of the nation’s domestic upheaval, it would only be a matter of time before the “communist infection” might migrate eastward from Indonesia to Australia; it could also travel westward in order to contaminate the Asian continent all the way to India and Pakistan.3

Kennan proceeded to address another question: “What is the reverse of the coin, what does Indonesia constructively represent to us?” His Cold War logic suggested that the Indonesian Republic was to become part of an anti-Moscow barricade in a chain of islands spanning the distance from Hokkaido to Sumatra, which America should nurture as a “politicoeconomic counter force to communism on the land mass of Asia.” As a neighbor to the independent Filipino nation still very much indebted to Washington, Indonesia could potentially provide bases, too, from which the US Air Force and the US Navy, if necessary, could dominate mainland East Asia and South Asia. If the United States wished to secure the loyalty of the “Malayan beach-head and the Siamese salient” in an antagonistic Asian world, he argued that the US government should be able to rely on a friendly and pliable United States of Indonesia, once it had come into existence.4

With the worrisome examples of the leftist insurgency in Greece, Czechoslovakia’s communist coup, the Berlin blockade, and especially Mao Tse Tung’s increasingly successful campaign in China reverberating in the background, the eminent director of the Policy Planning Staff then offered a series of recommendations. The Dutch, Kennan noted, were not capable of delivering such a congenial, Western-oriented Indonesia; instead, only Hatta, Sukarno and the present moderate leadership could supply it. In order to do so, however, he suggested that Hatta and Sukarno should be allowed to give the Indonesian people what they had promised — independence, whether immediately or in the near future. If they failed to convince their supporters that merdeka was in the offing, or if they were suddenly “crushed” by the Dutch, he warned that “extremists [will] take over.” In terms of US national security interests, he predicted that the fall of the current Western-oriented Republican government in Yogyakarta “would be a more severe blow” to the United States than the potential collapse of the current Dutch cabinet.5

The influential Director of the Policy Planning Staff recommended that State Department officials should apply “all appropriate pressures” on the Dutch; the latter should be urged either to reach an agreement with the Indonesian Republic “along the lines of the Cochran proposals,” or acknowledge the Republic’s territorial claims in Java, Sumatra, and Madura, as set forth in the Linggajati and Renville Agreements. According to Kennan, two forms of persuasion might be employed: one economic, the other political. “We should not hesitate to cut off ECA appropriations earmarked for the [Dutch East Indies],” although Kennan urged that the Marshall Plan funds allocated to the Netherlands itself be contin-
ued without interruption, because their withdrawal might undermine the integrity of the European Recovery Program. He also proposed that the State Department should notify the intractable Dutch government that, if it did not reach an agreement with the Republic soon, the United States would be prepared to recognize the Republic “at such time as we consider necessary and propitious.”

“Time is of the essence,” Kennan cautioned on December 17, 1948, and these American actions should be taken as soon as possible, with due respect to tactical considerations. If the stubborn Dutch continued to sabotage negotiations, he argued, the United States should abdicate its pivotal role in the UN Security Council’s Good Offices Committee and mobilize, at the same time, other non-communist powers also willing to extend recognition to the Republic. However, if the Dutch were foolhardy enough to attack the Republic, we should “recognize both belligerents.” He concluded that America had to do everything in its power “to preserve Hatta, Sukarno, and other Indonesian moderates as the leaders of the Republic, whether in the Sumatran bush or in exile outside Indonesia.”

It was ironic that George Kennan briefed Marshall and Lovett more or less on the same day the Dutch Council of Ministers in The Hague decided to initiate a second military attack on the Yogyakarta Republic. One can speculate, of course, whether the Dutch cabinet of ministers in The Hague would have approved the renewed military offensive in the Indonesian archipelago if they could have heard the conversation between the three most powerful American foreign policymakers in Washington. Kennan’s frank discussion with Marshall and Lovett suggested that even before it started, the Netherlands Army’s campaign in December 1948 was doomed to failure. Political developments during the next year would prove that international public opinion, as mobilized by US as well as Soviet-affiliated representatives at the United Nations in a rare instance of political concord between East and West, stood squarely behind the Indonesian Republic’s right to self-determination and supported its quest for political independence.

In American political circles – as well as among politicians, journalists, and regular citizens in other parts of the democratic Western world – the Dutch army’s attack on the Republic was denounced vitriolically. The widespread abuse heaped upon the Dutch nation in the wake of the second full-fledged military assault caused infinite embarrassment. This acrimonious criticism, especially if the American media or politicians in Washington articulated it, also came as a surprise. In fact, the Dutch community, whether in Northern Europe or Southeast Asia, was bewildered when Americans expressed such outrage at the Dutch military action against the Republic in Yogyakarta. US Senator Claude Pepper, a Democrat from Florida whose staunchly liberal career in public service at the state and national level spanned more than fifty years, issued a statement urging that it was not “America’s role to strengthen the hand that wields the dagger against

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freedom.” He called for an immediate suspension of Marshall Plan Aid to the Netherlands itself. Elbert Thomas, who had served as a Mormon missionary in the Far East before his election as US Senator from the state of Utah, related the outbreak of the “Java War” to the Senate’s impending vote on the ratification of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). He suggested that the Senate’s Foreign Relations Committee might confront a “hard struggle before it approves a treaty linking the United States to the Netherlands.”

In addition, the popular American radio commentator, Walter Winchell, condemned the Dutch assault as an appalling “blunder,” whereas a scathing article in the Chicago Tribune proposed that Queen Juliana and the political figures in The Hague responsible for the attack on Yogyakarta ought to be hanged. When reporting on American politicians’ response to the Dutch military action against the Indonesian Republic, the New York Times noted that in the United States there “is little, if any, hostility toward the Netherlands as such: no country in the world is more respected and admired.” However, the New York Times editorial then posed a valid question, which focused on the wisdom of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization that was on the verge of being formalized. “If a people as sober as the Dutch can disregard international promises, fly in the face of warnings from their friends and involve themselves in a war without consulting any ally, will it be wise and prudent for the United States to give a blank check to anyone?”

Many decades later, the American Under Secretary of State for UN Affairs at the time of the Netherlands Army’s second assault on the Republic, Dean Rusk, could still remember his anger at the duplicity of the Dutch foreign policy establishment in Washington. Rusk recalled that Netherlands Embassy officials had repeatedly assured him that the military attack on Yogyakarta had come as a “complete surprise” to them, too. When he repeated to his wife Virginia that the Netherlands Embassy had denied any prior knowledge of the Dutch Army’s offensive against the Indonesian Republic, she responded: “Oh, perhaps I should have told you. I was at lunch with a group of Dutch ladies, last week, and they were freely discussing the upcoming second police action.” Many years later, Dean Rusk, who had nurtured a genuine interest in Asian affairs during his long service in the State Department, still expressed his retrospective anger at the fact that Dutch “protestations” on this score had been so “utterly false.”

When trying to identify the irrevocable turning point in American policy towards the Indonesian Question, historians have usually pointed to the second military invasion of the Indonesian Republic. This was the moment that the Dutch openly defied world opinion and, as a result, succeeded in irreversibly alienating Washington, London, and other previously supportive nations in the West; not surprisingly, Soviet-bloc countries also denounced the Dutch military assault. By marching on Yogyakarta, the Netherlands Army managed to dig the
nation’s own colonial grave. Indeed, the year that followed this “incredible piece of Dutch stupidity” – to repeat the irreverent description of the attack in a draft policy paper written by George Kennan’s staff – saw an end to Dutch colonial rule in the Indonesian archipelago.¹³ Notwithstanding the intensification of Republican guerrilla activity in 1949, which was responsible for almost half of the Dutch casualties during the entire conflict, the relative speed with which the Republican regime in Yogyakarta was restored, and Indonesia’s independence was realized, resulted to a large extent from Dutch recognition that bowing to American pressure was inescapable.

In the early days of the Dutch attack, the US State Department initiated through its representative in the United Nations Security Council a resolution aimed at restoring the status quo ante in the Indonesian archipelago. Washington had already announced its intention to suspend Marshall Aid to the Dutch colonial administration in Southeast Asia. This measure was largely symbolic, since it only affected a small remainder of the total amount already disbursed. Despite shrill public calls by the American media for also discontinuing Marshall Plan assistance to the Netherlands itself, those funds remained unaffected. The possibility that the Dutch government would vilify America’s European Recovery Program as a political whip, wielded to submit a small European nation to its will, was too great a risk to Washington’s Cold War policies in Europe. Nevertheless, the cancellation of financial aid for the rehabilitation of the Netherlands East Indies economy had a severe psychological impact on the Dutch community. The Hague was also aware that, if it would not accept Washington’s and the UN Security Council’s demands, the State Department could conceivably decide to exclude the Netherlands from future US financial aid for the modernization and build-up of Europe’s military forces.

An attempted counter-move by the Dutch Foreign Minister, Dirk U. Stikker, on March 31, 1949, to withhold his signature on the NATO agreement, hardly impressed the new US Secretary of State, Dean Acheson.¹⁴ After this last abortive attempt to induce the United States to relent its foreign policy pressures, the Dutch government could do nothing but yield and comply. The Netherlands had attempted to defy the historical forces at work in Southeast Asia, but the United States Government was determined to awaken its dutiful Dutch ally from the illusion it could do so.

In trying to trace the true source of American support for Indonesia’s independence, historians have also highlighted the Madiun revolt – and the Republican Government’s resolute suppression of the communist insurgents – as the crucial moment when US foreign policymakers realized they had been betting on the wrong horse. Once Washington acknowledged that aiding the Indonesian Republic served its own security interests, the Truman Administration increasingly swung its support behind the Hatta government. This was obvious at the level of diplomacy, but it was also revealed in the covert missions of the CIA’s
agent, Arthur Campbell, to Yogyakarta during the late summer of 1948. Yet another sign of Washington’s shifting policy priorities was the offer to bring Republican police officers to the United States for the purpose of attending a specially constituted training program for Indonesian law enforcement personnel. However, it was the lengthy process of political analysis and reorientation preceding the communist insurrection in Madiun, above all, that prompted Washington’s foreign policymakers – no risk-takers when it concerned America’s Cold War with the Soviet Union – to sustain Indonesian nationalism against a traditional friend and World War II ally.

In fact, it would have been equally plausible for the Truman Administration to assist the Netherlands in its containment of a chaotic, left-leaning Republic confronted with a presumably Moscow-inspired internal civil war. After all, this was the US policy pursued in Indochina, where the French benefited from America’s steady and actually burgeoning assistance in their struggle with Ho Chi Minh’s Republic of Vietnam. For fiscal year 1953, for instance, the US government promised the French an appropriation of 150,000,000 dollars, earmarked for their efforts in Indochina, and also agreed to equip them with transport planes and American mechanics to service the aircraft. 15 Initially, European considerations fostered Washington’s pro-French posture rather than a fear of Soviet machinations in the Republic of Vietnam. Since France could execute its veto power in the Security Council, the US urgently needed French cooperation in the United Nations in managing the West’s antagonistic relationship with the Soviet bloc. In addition, the explosive strength of the French Communist Party (PCF) and communist labor unions such as the Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT) impelled the Truman Administration to throw its weight behind its European ally, because democratic politicians in Paris needed to be sustained in their electoral struggle with Moscow-backed communism.

France, however, despite its tenacious efforts to maintain some form of colonial control in the region and to defeat Ho Chi Minh with America’s political and material support, was also forced to face the inexorability of the trend toward decolonization, not only in Indochina but eventually in Algeria as well. Moreover, by the time the French finally conceded defeat in Vietnam, Washington’s anxieties about communism’s ubiquitous threat in Asia – whether in Korea, China, Malaya, Burma, the Philippines, Vietnam, and eventually in Sukarno’s Indonesia again – seemed to leave no other option but to intervene. Although some senior State Department officials anticipated that such an intervention would entail a kind of Asian Marshall Plan, the militarization of the Cold War in Asia, begun during the Korean War, steadily proceeded. As a result, America’s own agonizing military involvement in the Vietnamese quagmire during the next decades stemmed, to some extent, from its decision in the immediate post-World War II years to stand squarely behind France’s neo-colonial policies.
In the case of the Indonesian Republic in 1948, however, Washington gradually came to a different conclusion during the course of that fateful year. This process of transition within the State Department and the CIA, and to a lesser extent within the War Department, evolved in a step-by-step fashion. The sequence of American appointees to the UN Security Council’s Good Offices Committee – Frank Porter Graham, Coert Du Bois, and H. Merle Cochran – as well as the newly assigned US Consul General in Batavia, Charles Livengood, played an important role in this incremental policy shift. By dispatching accurate and even-handed reports to the State Department after Graham and Livengood had arrived in Java in October 1947, policymakers in Washington received a more objective assessment of the Dutch-Indonesian conflict for the first time.

Nevertheless, as was clearly shown in Graham’s case during the Renville negotiations, the Secretary of State, George Marshall, and his increasingly dominant Under Secretary, Robert Lovett, were reluctant to alter their policy priorities, despite Graham’s pro-Republican stance. Nor were they swayed by the pleas of the Philippines and Southeast Asian Affairs Division’s Director, Abbot Low Moffat, articulating the Asianist rather than the Europeanist perspective, for a return to a more idealistic approach to formulating and implementing US foreign policy. More impressive to the State Department’s top men was Du Bois’ radical shift in attitude towards the Indonesian Question in the spring of 1948, only to be followed by Cochran’s even faster turn-about. In the case of Du Bois and Cochran’s tenure as US GOC representatives, however, their pro-Indonesian recommendations would not have received a receptive hearing in Washington if their advice had not coincided with the State Department’s engagement with a more fundamental set of international circumstances and geopolitical trends.

Two closely linked considerations, both originating in the same American fear of a potential confrontation with the Soviet Union, lay at the heart of the progressive shift in US policy during the late spring and summer of 1948. The bottom line was that Washington wished to interact with a stable and accessible Indonesian Republic, which would supply essential natural resources to the Western powers. The value of the archipelago’s ample oil and tin deposits and its extensive rubber production acquired renewed importance in 1948, when some factions within the Truman Administration’s became preoccupied with the details of contingency planning for a potential World War III. The stretched-out Indonesian nation-state was also crucial as a strategically located bulwark against communism in Mainland China and elsewhere on the continent. In the short run, US policymakers acknowledged that a Dutch political and economic presence would ensure the steady flow of these valuable raw materials to the United States probably in a more efficient manner than the Indonesians could guarantee. But in the long run, the perpetuation of Dutch colonial rule would be ruinous to the political future of the Indonesian archipelago. Policymakers in Washington understood
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Mohammed Hatta speaking in Jakarta, July 31, 1949
only too well that any form of Dutch political control of the archipelago, lasting longer than just a few years, would require an expensive military commitment. This, in turn, would mandate America’s financial support to the Netherlands in order to achieve a goal that could only be a temporary one, because “historical forces can be dammed-up for a time, but sooner or later they burst their bounds with redoubled havoc.” And it was common knowledge in the United States that in the wake of such upheaval, communism would flourish, especially in Southeast Asia, because the region as a whole had become “the target of a coordinated offensive plainly directed by the Kremlin.”

The fact that the United States went as far as it did in embracing the Republic, in defiance of its loyal Dutch ally, was a conspicuous feature of Cold War foreign policy. The baffling behavior of Dutch politicians in The Hague and Batavia further reinforced Washington’s conviction that lending support to Hatta and Sukarno was the appropriate US policy. Even in late October 1949, the Dutch Crown Representative in Batavia, now often called Jakarta as well, would still make the astonishing observation that an ongoing relationship with the Dutch constituted “the key to Indonesia’s future because we embody the optimal medium to preserve this country for our [Western] world. The Indonesians don’t fear us – between us and them there is in essence no animosity.” In all likelihood, officials in the Truman Administration might have shaken their heads in disbelief if they could have read this assessment. In Washington’s new devotion to Indonesia’s independence as part of the US confrontation with Moscow, policymakers hoped to bind the fledgling nation-state to their own Cold War strategies. Equally significant was Prime Minister Mohammad Hatta’s political finesse and his astute handling of Washington’s overtures and its subsequent reorientation during the second half of 1948. Since Hatta managed to earn Washington’s confidence and respect, US intervention helped to accelerate the process of Indonesian decolonization.

The Republic’s apparent willingness in 1948, however, to join the stronghold the United States wished to erect against the communist tide in Asia, was primarily a tactical move that was designed to muster US support at a crucial juncture in its national liberation struggle from Dutch colonial mastery. After independence was attained, more than anything else, the Indonesian nation-state wished to return to a foreign policy of non-alignment, even if the pursuit of neutrality was treated with suspicion in Washington, where the idea that “those who are not with us, are against us” was gaining ground. Moreover, the preeminent political role that Mohammad Hatta had performed during the precarious revolutionary years, and continued to play until September 1950, would come to an end soon thereafter. Once Indonesia’s autonomy had become a political reality, Sukarno and Hatta’s divergence of political visions and styles became increasingly apparent. As a result, the nationalist leader whom American foreign policy analysts...
had learned to trust most was quickly relegated to a background role. Because Sukarno believed that the inclusion of the communists in the Indonesian government was crucial for the social harmony and political stability of the newly inde-
pendent nation, America’s anti-communist surveillance of Sukarno’s Indonesia intensified during the 1950’s.

Indonesia would also become profoundly suspicious of the United States. To a large extent, this was the disheartening result of Indonesians’ expectations and the United States’ failure to live up to its own promises. Trying to compensate the Netherlands for the demoralizing loss of its beloved Dutch East Indies, the US-dominated Round Table Conference in The Hague during the late summer and early fall of 1949 had saddled the Republic with an enormous national debt – a financial burden that was almost exclusively incurred by the Dutch East Indies government. Indonesian leaders reluctantly accepted this monetary obligation due to American pressures, because H. Merle Cochran had pledged that US economic aid would be forthcoming as soon as sovereignty was transferred to the United States of Indonesia. However, only a tiny amount of US financial support actually reached Indonesia’s devastated political economy after independence was granted. Indonesians’ sense of betrayal caused a rupture in US-Indonesian relations in the 1950’s, which the Indonesian Communist Party’s growing influence on Sukarno’s government further aggravated. These domestic political developments prompted the Eisenhower Administration to implement an aggressively subversive policy towards the Indonesian Republic.18

In fact, as was more or less confirmed in July 2001, in Volume 26 of the documentary series chronicling the history of The Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), focusing on America's relations with Indonesia, Malaysia-Singapore, and the Philippines during the period 1964-1968, Lyndon B. Johnson’s Administration covertly supported Sukarno’s effective removal from power by means of a military coup that was initiated on September 30, 1965 (Gerakan September Tiga Puluh or GESTAPU, The September 30 Movement). Washington did so by making plans to funnel a modest sum of 50,000,000 rupiah, representing 1,100,000 US dollars at the official exchange rate in 1965, to the anti-PKI military and civilian forces – irregular units described in a recent article in the International Herald Tribune as “army-backed death squads.”19 Even more compelling was the decision made by officials in the US Embassy in Jakarta to supply detailed lists of PKI officials, compiled by the CIA, to “Indonesia’s security authorities, who seem[ed] to lack even the simplest overt information on PKI leaders.” In a wired message to the State Department on December 2, 1965, the American Ambassador in Jakarta, Marshall Green, stated that the risks of detection and a subsequent revelation of “our support in this instance are as minimal as any black bag operation can be.”20 About the death toll resulting from the purges in Java, Sumatra, and Bali during the mid-1960’s, the American Embassy cabled Washington on April 15, 1966, that “we frankly do not know whether the real figure is closer to 100,000 or 1,000,000, but [we] believe it wiser to err on the side of the lower estimates, especially when questioned by the press.”21
Thirty-six years later, foreign policymakers currently serving in the George W. Bush Administration are once again following the volatile political situation in contemporary Indonesia closely because, as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Ralph L. Boyce, noted in testimony before a Foreign Relations Panel in the US Congress on July 18, 2001, a democratic and stable Indonesia is of “vital importance” to the United States. In language that was reminiscent of the words George Kennan had used in his urgent conversation with George Marshall and Robert Lovett in mid-December 1948, Boyce warned that political “chaos” in Indonesia would not only threaten its neighbors, but could also jeopardize America’s strategic and geopolitical objectives. He no longer equated social chaos with an “open door to communist infiltration,” though, as Kennan and his State Department colleagues did in 1948. Instead, at the beginning of the third millennium a new, omnipresent enemy occupies center stage in Washington’s foreign policy deliberations; Boyce cautioned that social disarray in the “world’s largest Muslim nation” could offer a “regional entrée to Islamic radicalism and international terrorism.”

Nevertheless, on several critical occasions in 1948 and 1949, when the Republik Indonesia was valiantly struggling for its very survival, the United States and the Indonesian Republic shared a common goal, which resulted in the termination of Dutch colonial mastery of the Indonesian archipelago. US pressures did not bring about Indonesian independence. Instead, Indonesians’ own remarkable efforts were responsible for achieving the nation’s emancipation from colonial rule. What American political interventions in the Indonesian Question in 1948 and 1949 did accomplish, however, was not only to speed up the process of decolonization, but also to preserve both the Indonesians and the Dutch from an even longer guerrilla struggle that would have exacted many more human lives.
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Notes

CHAPTER ONE
American Foreign Policy and the End of Dutch Colonial Rule in Southeast Asia: An Overview

1 Oral communication from Kennan to Marshall and Lovett, December 17, 1948, Records of the Policy Planning Staff (PPS) 1947-1953, folder labeled “Indonesia,” RG 59, box no. 18, NARA.
2 Robert J. McMahon, The Limits of Empire: The United States and Southeast Asia Since World War II (New York, 1999), p. 28.
7 Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administrations and the Cold War (Stanford CA, 1992). For the fiscal year 1953, for example, the US appropriated 150,000,000 dollars in aid to the French in Indochina, pp. 166, 475.
9 McMahon, Colonialism and Cold War, pp. 54-55.
11 Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 88.

Ibid.

Colonel E. Baretta to Eelco van Kleffens, September 8, 1948, in S.L. van der Wal, P.J. Drooglever, and M.J.B. Schouten, eds., Officiële bescheiden betreffende de Nederlands-Indonesische betrekkingen (hereafter NIB), Vol. 15, p. 64 (fn).


Leffler, A Preponderance of Power, p. 159; Dirk U. Stikker, Memoires. Herinneringen uit de lange jaren waarin ik betrokken was bij de voortdurende wereldcrisis (Rotterdam, 1966), p. 149.


Charlton Ogburn used these adjectives to describe his 1948 impressions of Indonesians in a letter sent to Gerlof Homan on August 9, 1985.


Charlton Ogburn’s letter to his parents in New York, February 20, 1948.


J. de Kadt to L.N. Palar, December 17, 1945, Private Papers L.N. Palar, No. 002, ANRI.

Letter from Philip H. Trezise to Gerlof Homan, September 25, 1985. For a similar opinion, see Charlton Ogburn’s letter to Homan on September 9, 1985.


See, for example, a Memorandum of Conversation (hereafter MemCon) between a Republican emissary in the US, Soedjatmoko, and Reed (SEA) and Nolting (NOE) on September 1, 1948, in which the fusion “of the left-wing party led by former Prime Minister Amir Sjarifuddin, which thus led the bulk of the left-wing people into an alliance with the Communists” was discussed. 856D.00/9-148, RG 59, Box No. 6440, NARA.
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34 “Account of the Government’s Policy made by Prime Minister, Vice-President Moh. Hatta, to the Working Committee of the Central National Committee,” in Open Session, September 2, 1948, DAG13/2.0.0./#11, p. 5, UN Archives.

35 “For Indonesian Laborers, Bad News, Silver Lining,” *New York Times*, February 6, 1998, and “Empty Bowls Fill Indonesians With Fear,” *New York Times*, February 26, 1998. The journalist Seth Mydans used the phrases “very sensitive stomachs” and “stomachs have no patience” to describe the plight of poor workers in contemporary Indonesia who face unemployment and the spiraling costs of basic commodities, such as food and fuel, during the 1998 economic crisis in Indonesia.

36 Charlton Ogburn, “The Most Unforgettable Character I’ve Met,” unpublished biographical essay about Coert du Bois, p. 4. Coert du Bois was personally responsible for preventing this biographical essay from being published. In a handwritten letter to Ogburn on January 11, 1958, sent from Stonington, Connecticut, Du Bois refused permission. Although he was “terribly touched that you thought of me as that guy you wrote about,” it should not move into print because “I would die off if I saw that piece in Reader’s Digest.” He added: “Will you please not hate me for being an unappreciative prig?” On the social devastation caused by the Dutch blockade see also Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution*, pp. 251-255.


39 Arsip Kepolisian Negara 1947-1949, No. 501, ANRI.

40 “Account of the Government’s Policy made by Prime Minister, Vice-President Moh. Hatta, to the Working Committee of the Central National Committee,” in Open Session, September 2, 1948, DAG13/2.0.0./#11, p. 5, UN Archives.

41 “Account of the Government’s Policy,” September 2, 1948, DAG13/2.0.0./#11, pp. 10-11, UN Archives. Hatta had already raised the fear of unemployment within the Republic on February 16, 1948, when he stated in an address to the Working Committee of Parliament that “for every worker who has to be dismissed [from the Army] as surplus personnel, a new occupation has to be provided that assures him a fair living,” quoted by Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution*, p. 262.

42 As two examples among many others, see the lengthy report entitled “Communism in the Netherlands East Indies” sent by Butterworth to Lacy, April 5, 1948, in folder “Communism,” RG 59, PSA, Box No. 12, NARA; see also “Memorandum handed to Dept. officers by Dr. N.S. Blom, Special Adviser to the Netherlands Foreign Ministry, July 9, 1948,” 856D.00/7-948, RG 59, Box No. 6443, NARA, in which Blom shrewdly warns the State Department that “it may be true that the people in Indonesia by nature and religion are not inclined to embrace communism, but on the other hand they are very much inclined to let themselves be governed in a totalitarian way,” p. 1. Totalitarianism, by then, had become a pseudonym for communism in American discourse.

45 Dean Acheson to Louis B. Wehle, March 15, 1949, 856D.00/3-2849, RG 59, Box no. 6441, NARA. Wehle, a tireless defender of Dutch colonialism, served as the head of the Foreign Economic Administration in the Netherlands before becoming a Wall Street attorney; see McMahon, *Colonialism and Cold War*, p. 287.
49 Cronin, *The World the Cold War Made*, p. 64.
50 Van Vredenburch, *Den Haag antwoordt niet*, pp. 204-205.
53 Quoted by Steven E. Ambrose, *Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy, 1938-1970* (Baltimore, 1971), p. 297. Hubris was not an unfamiliar trait to Acheson. In the frontispiece of his autobiography, *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department* (New York, 1969), he quoted King Alfonso X, who ruled in thirteenth-century Spain: “Had I been present at the creation I would have given some useful hints for the better ordering of the universe.” The same sense of hubris is repeated in the title of James Chace’s recent biography: *Acheson: The Secretary of State who Created the American World* (New York, 1998).
59 Draft of a policy paper on Southeast Asia, in folder labeled “Policy Papers (miscellaneous),” RG 59, PSA, Box No. 5. In the final National Security Council’s policy paper No. 51, “US Policy Towards Southeast Asia,” this phrase was replaced with “this Dutch course of action,” RG 59, PSA, Box No. 7.
61 Letter from H.N. Boon, who served as the political adviser to Lieutenant Governor General, Hubertus J. van Mook, in 1947, sent on August 19, 1984, to Gerlof Homan; letter from Republican Minister of Education, Ali Sastroamidjojo, to Frank Graham, April 2, 1949, Frank Porter Graham Papers, Southern Historical Collection, Library of the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill.
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NIB, Vol. 11, p. 98, the Dutch Foreign Minister on September 14, 1947, discussed the potential US appointments to the GOC.

63 Quoted by Ogburn in “The Most Unforgettable Character I’ve Met,” p. 4.
65 In Memores M.B. van der Jagt, oud-gouverneur van Soerakarta (The Hague, 1955), Van der Jagt used the French word riëe and the Dutch word voetveeg to express his outrage, p. 330.
66 C.E.L. Helfrich to Dean Acheson, September 20, 1949; Acheson’s dismissive reply was sent on October 30, 1949, to the US Embassy in The Hague, to be forwarded to Helfrich’s home address. 856D.00/9-2049, RG 59, Box No. 6442, NARA.
68 Davies’ report to Butterworth and Lovett about his conversation with Lambert, June 30, 1948, RG 59, Records of the Policy Planning Staff, 1947-1953, folder “Indonesia,” Box 18, NARA.
71 Note attached to Foote to SecState, “Netherlands India in the Crisis,” No. 665, January 30, 1937, R.G 59, 1930-1939, 856D.00/97, NARA.
73 Donald E. Pease, “Hiroshima, the Vietnam Veterans War Memorial, and the Gulf War,” in Amy Kaplan and Donald E. Pease, eds., Cultures of United States Imperialism (Durham, NC, 1993), p. 567.
74 In his 2001 article, Gilbert Doré still repeats the American myth that from the early days of the Indonesian revolution, “the United States had been instrumental in assisting Indonesia achieve independence from the Dutch Crown, [while] in Indochina it did not choose to play such an active role until 1950.” See “Alternatives in United States Foreign Policy,” Historicol: The Online History Magazine (2001), p. 3.

CHAPTER TWO
“It’s 1776 in Indonesia”

Ig纳斯·克莱登，《新状态与新社会：印度尼西亚民族革命在比较社会学视角》，塔夫克·阿卜杜拉，编，《心声：印度尼西亚革命》(雅加达，1995)第295页。

鲍斯·梅尔，《美国经文：制作美国独立宣言》(纽约，1997)，第47-49、148-151页。

约翰·福斯特·杜勒斯，《美国国务院公报》，第30期(1954年6月21日)，第336页，由罗伯特·麦克马洪，编，《殖民主义与冷战：美国与印度尼西亚独立斗争，1945-1949》(伊萨卡/伦敦，1982)，第43页。

马格丽特·米德致克里斯托·赫特，1958年1月13日，RG 59，数码文件1955-59，656.56D13，盒号2636，NARA。

鲍斯·梅尔， 在《美国经文》中，最近提供了关于独立宣言被大陆国会议员确认为正确的缓慢过程的启迪性讨论；特别是在第1章，“独立”，第3-41页。

信件与附件来自苏达波·萨斯拉多摩，印度尼西亚共和国办公室，致弗兰克·普·格雷厄姆，1949年3月28日。弗兰克·波特·格雷厄姆论文，南方历史收藏，北卡罗来纳大学教堂山图书馆。

迪克·U·斯蒂克，回忆录。回忆在持续的世界危机中我所经历的岁月(鹿特丹，1966)，第147页。

路克桑·革命人民共和国第2版(雅加达，1950)，1945年版，n.p.苏达沃·特翁德龙戈罗戈担任编辑委员会主席，该委员会于1949年10月在日惹成立。第一版由Balai Pustaka出版，第二版由共和国出版。

引自尼尔·L·杰米森，《理解越南》(伯克利，1995)，第195-196页。

武元甲的回忆录，由威廉·J·杜伊克，《胡志明：一生》(纽约，2000)，第322页。

约翰·基，帝国的终结：远东历史：从殖民主义到香港(纽约，1997)，第220页；杰米森，《理解越南》，第196-198页。

武元甲记得，那些出现在越南语、法语、英语、中文和俄语中的口号，他在回忆录中称，有100万人在普吉尼耶广场，由杜伊克，《胡志明》，第323页。

大卫·G·马尔，《越南1945：较量与权力》(伯克利，1995)，第5页。

詹姆斯·E·克罗宁，《世界冷战制造：秩序、混乱和历史的回归》(纽约/伦敦，1996)，第24页。

马尔，《越南》，1945年，第530-538页。

马尔，《越南》，1945年，第16-18、28-30、60-64页；基，帝国的终结，第215-219页。

杜伊克，《胡志明》，第296页。

克罗宁，《世界冷战制造》，第24页；杜伊克，《胡志明》，第296-306页。

引自H.W·范登马尔，告别印度尼西亚：荷兰帝国的终结(阿姆斯特丹，2000)，第110页。

埃亚尔·普瑞，评论马克·菲利普·布拉德利，《想象越南和美国：后殖民越南的制作》(北卡罗来纳州夏洛特山，2000)，《纽约时报》，2001年1月22日。

马尔，《越南》，1945年，第16-18、28-30、60-64页；杰米森，《理解越南》，第190-196页；基，帝国的终结，第218页；杜伊克，《胡志明》，第294-297页。

威廉·艾普兰、威廉·麦考密克、洛伊德·加德纳和沃尔特·拉菲伯，编，《美国在越南：一个档案历史》(纽约，1985)，第33页。

杰米森，《理解越南》，第198-199页；范登马尔，告别印度尼西亚，第111页。

艾里森·托马斯，由杜伊克，《胡志明》，第300页。
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31 Secret Airgram from Yost at Headquarters SEAC to SecState, November 10, 1945, “Situation in French Indochina and Netherlands East Indies,” RG 263, Box No. 117, folder 1945, Murphy Collection, NARA.
33 Robert McMahon, *The Limits of Empire. The United States and Southeast Asia since World War II* (New York, 1999), p. 28.
41 Van der Plas to Van Mook, September 18, 1945, NIB, Vol. 1, p. 125.
47 McMahon, *Colonialism and Cold War*, pp. 76-77, 80.


52 Keay, Empire’s End, p. 130; Peter Schumacher, Ogenblikken van genezing, Indonésische ervaringen (Amsterdam, 1996), p. 80; see also the quote in Van den Doel, Afscheid van Indië, p. 57; Van der Post, The Admiral’s Baby, pp. 221, 229.


54 Keay, Empire’s End, pp. 256-257.


59 Ibid.

60 Memo from Percy Johnston, January 3, 1946, in folder labeled “Public Correspondence,” RG 59, PSA, Box No. 13, NARA.

61 Louis B. Wehle to Dean Acheson, received on March 28, 1949, 856D.00/3-2849, RG 59, Box No. 6441, NARA.


64 Personal communication from George Kahin, February 24, 1998.

65 Charlton Ogburn’s The Marauders was published by Harper in New York in 1959. When Ogburn’s request for a temporary leave of absence to devote himself to writing the movie script was denied by his superiors in the State Department, he resigned his position in 1958.

66 Letter from Charlton Ogburn to Gerlof D. Homan, circa August 20, 1985; Ogburn’s letter to Robert S. McNamara, September 11, 1993; see also Stanley Karnow, “Our
Presidents, not the CIA, led US to Vietnam,” Boston Globe, November 1, 1993; in an article in the New York Times on April 16, 1995, Karnow wrote that there were “experts like Raymond B. Fosdick and Charlton Ogburn, who dismissed as myth the conventional wisdom that Ho Chi Minh, the Vietnamese communist leader, was Mao Zedong’s surrogate.”


68 Personal letter from Charlton Ogburn to Gerlof D. Homan, August 9, 1985.


73 In 1948-49, Kahin interviewed many of the major politicians who were in the process of creating an independent Republic. During the early 1950’s, when Kahin’s application for a passport renewal was denied, the US State Department received a variety of warm and supportive letters from Indonesian officials; among the most significant ones were letters written by Sukarno, the President of the Republic, and Ruslan Abdulgani, Indonesia’s Minister of Information, on August 22, 1950; see also Memoranda of Conversation between Dean Rusk (Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs), Clark Clifford (Attorney for the Indonesian Government), and Mr. O’Sullivan (PSA), May 28, 1951, and another meeting between O’Sullivan and Kahin on June 20, 1951, regarding “Passport Application of George McTurnan Kahin,” dossier “General file for top secret papers,” Lot file No. 59D 233, office files of Asst. Secretary of State for European Affairs, 1943-1957, Box No. 22, RG 59, NARA.


CHAPTER THREE
The United States and the Dutch East Indies: the Celebration of Capitalism in West and East during the 1920’s


Chas L. Hoover to SecState, April 17, 1925, Report No. 14, M-682, Records of the Department of State relating to the Internal Affairs of the Netherlands, 1910-1929 (hereafter Records, 1910-1929), Microfilm Roll No. 30 (political matters), NARA.


Hoover to SecState, April 17, 1925; this opinion is confirmed by Theodore Friend, *The Blue-Eyed Enemy*, *Japan Against the West in Java and Luzon, 1942-1945* (Princeton, 1988), p. 19.


Friend, *The Blue-Eyed Enemy*, argued it was one-seventh, or approximately 14 percent of overall national income, p. 18; Audrey and George Kahin, *Subversion as Foreign Policy: The Secret Eisenhower and Dulles Debacle in Indonesia* (New York, 1995), suggest it was higher, i.e. one-fifth or 20 percent, p. 29.


Bootsma, *Buren in de koloniale tijd*, p. 16.


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21 Rupert Emerson, The Netherlands Indies and the United States (Boston, 1942), p. 72.
25 The section on Dutch responses to the Jones Act is based on Bootsma, Buren in de koloniale tijd, pp. 35-41.
26 Richard M. Tobin in the US Legation in The Hague to SecState, December 27, 1927, M-682, Records 1910-1929, Roll No. 28 (Bolshevism), 856D.00/12-2727, NARA.
27 Henry P. Starrett in Batavia to SecState, November 18, 1921, M-682, Records 1910-1929, Roll No. 28 (Bolshevism), 856D.00/11-1821, NARA.
28 Rollin R. Winslow in Surabaya to SecState, November 1, 1924, M-682, Records 1910-1929, Roll No. 46 (political matters), 856D.00/11-124, NARA.
30 Hoover to SecState, April 17, 1925, pp. 3-4.
31 Hoover to SecState, April 17, 1925, pp. 1, 3, 18.
32 Lt. R.H. Grayson, USS “Huron,” Intelligence Report, No. 208-44, forwarded to Office of Naval Intelligence, July 7, 1924, pp. 4, 8, RG 165, Records War Dept, General and Special Staffs, Mil. Intelligence Division, NEI, 1922-1944, Box 2631, NARA.
33 The phrase “loose relationship” was attributed to the conservative Dutch politician C.P.M. Romme; see US Ambassador Herman Baruch in The Hague to SecState, Telegram No. 274, reporting on a conversation with Romme, then the leader of the Catholic People’s Party (KVP) in the Second Chamber, March 23, 1949, RG 59, Box No. 644, 856D.00/3-2349, NARA; Romme favored a “Tight Union”. “Light Union” was the formulation of the Netherlands Embassy official in Washington D.C., H.A. Helb, in Memorandum of Conversation with Frederick Nolting, “Indonesian Developments and Netherlands-US Cooperation,” June 15, 1949, RG 59, Box No. 6441, 856D.00/6-1549, NARA. The phrase “The link between the Netherlands and its former colonies, however ‘soft’ it might be,” was used by Ali Sastroamidjojo in a letter to Frank Porter Graham, April 2, 1949, Graham Papers, Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill.
34 Coert du Bois to SecState, Voluntary Report, Part V, “The European Population of Netherlands India,” August 27, 1929, p. 26; M-682, Records 1910-1929, Roll No. 33, (social matters), 856D.00/8-2729, NARA.
39 Roosevelt, The Philippines, A Treasure and A Problem, refers to “that thoroughness, which is so characteristic of the Dutch colonial enterprise,” p. 135; Furnivall, in Progress and Welfare in Southeast Asia, also wrote that “thorough has always been the motto of the Dutch,” p. 32.
W.H. van Helsdingen and H. Hoogenberk, eds., *Daar werd wat groots verricht ... Nederlandsch-Indië in de XXste eeuw* (Amsterdam, 1941). This book of essays can be viewed as the epitome of the “ethical” idealism of the Dutch colonial enterprise in the twentieth century.


Although Rupert Emerson, in *The Netherlands Indies and the United States*, argued in 1942 that US financial investments in the Indies “did not determine American policy in that part of the world,” p. 62.


Keay, *Empire’s End*, p. 130.

Braddock in Medan to Patton in Batavia, forwarded to SecState on July 3, 1931, “North Sumatra’s Agricultural Laborers” RG 84, Post Records, Part 9, Class 842-855 (1931), NARA.


Fred G. Heins in Manila to Kenneth S. Patton in Batavia, April 17, 1931, RG 84, Post Records of the US Consulate General in Batavia (hereafter Post Records), April 17, 1931, Part 7, Class 800b-811.11 (1931), NARA.


Eustace V. Denmark to SecState, “Education in Netherlands India,” p. 24, December 20, 1924, Records, 1910-1929, M 682, Roll 33, (social matters), 856D.00/12-2024, NARA.

Coert du Bois to SecState, October 2, 1928, Voluntary Report, Part II of “The Native Population of Netherlands India,” “Races and Characteristics,” M-682, Records 1910-1929, Roll 33 (social matters), 856D.00/10-228, NARA.

Daniel M. Braddock in Medan to Kenneth S. Patton in Batavia, Voluntary Report No. 20, July 3, 1931, RG 84, Post Records, Part 9, Class 842-855 (1931), NARA.

Fred G. Heins to Kenneth S. Patton, April 17, 1931, NARA; see also Friend, *The Blue-Eyed Enemy*, p. 15.


Governor General A.C.D. de Graeff used the words “curse” and “shortsightedness” when discussing the Dutch colonial community’s tendency to conflate nationalism
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and communism; see P.J. Drooglever, De Vaderlandse Club, 1929-1942. Tótoks en de Indische politiek (Franeker, 1980), p. 53.
61 Chas L. Hoover to SecState, November 15, 1926, M-682, Roll 29, (Bolshevism), Records 1910-1929, 856D.00/11-1326, NARA.
62 The critic was a senior official of the Dutch colonial civil service, Resident Le Febvre, who had been forcibly retired for protecting local Minangkabau farmers from rice speculators during a period of food shortages in 1918-1919; see Mavis Rose, Indonesia Free. A Political Biography of Mohammad Hatta (Ithaca NY, 1987), Cornell University Monograph Series, Publication No. 67, pp. 33.
63 M.W.F. Treub, Het gist in Indië (Haarlem, 1927), p. 3.
64 Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo, Het communisme in Indonesië: naar aanleiding van de relletjes (Bandung, 1926); see also Shiraiishi, An Age in Motion, p. 341.
68 Cordell Hull, Memoirs, 2 Vols (New York, 1948), 1, p. 81.
70 Karnow, In Our Own Image, p. 255, and Bootsma, Buren in de koloniale tijd, pp. 13, 16, 40.

CHAPTER FOUR
American Visions of Colonial Indonesia from the Great Depression to the Growing Fear of Japan, 1930-1938

3 Rubber prices fell from 1.74 guilders per pound in 1925 to 0.54 in 1929, to reach their lowest point in 1932 at 0.08 guilders per pound. See G. Gonggrijp, De sociaal-economische betekenis van Nederlands-Indië voor Nederland. De Nederlandse volkshuishouding tussen de twee oorlogen (Utrecht/Brussels, 1948), pp. 11-17, and Colin Barlow and John Drabble, “Government and the Emerging Rubber Industries in Indonesia and Malaysia, 1900-1940,” in Anne Booth et al, eds., Indonesian Economic History in the Colonial Era (New Haven, 1990), p. 191.
5 Telegram from Dwight F. Davis to Kenneth S. Patton, March 5, 1931, RG 84, Post Records, Part 7, Class 800b-811.11 (1931), NARA.
7 Netherlands Chamber of Commerce in New York, “Foreign Capital in the Dutch East Indies,” October 20, 1924, New Series, No. 21, RG 165, War Department, General and Special Staffs, Military Intelligence Div, Regional File, 1922-1944, Netherlands East Indies, Box No. 2632, NARA.
10 From A.G.Vreede, in the government’s labor office (*Kantoor van de Arbeid*) to Patton, “Changes in the New Cooie Ordinance,” March 16, 1931, RG 84, Post Records, Part 9, Class 842-855 (1931), NARA.
11 Telegram from Acting SecState Castle to US Consul General in Batavia, “Complaint filed with the Treasury Department by An American Tobacco Company,” July 2, 1931. The Treasury Department ruled on June 25, 1931, that section 307 would not go into effect until January 1, 1932. See also Patton to SecState, August 24, 1931, “Penal Sanctions Labor with Particular Reference to such Labor on Tobacco Estates on the East Coast of Sumatra,” August 24, 1931; L.H. Gourley, US Consul in Medan, to K.S. Patton in Batavia, “Penal Sanction,” November 28, 1931, RG 84, Post Records, Part 9, Class 842-855 (1931), NARA.
12 “Een blijde dag voor de tabakscultuur. Geen invoerverbod in de Verenigde Staten,” *Deli Courant*, November 2, 1931, and a similar article in the *Algemeen Indisch Dagblad*, November 5, 1931. Submitted as addendum by Kenneth S. Patton to SecState, “Reaction to the Treasury Decision in Regard to the Admission of Sumatra Wrapper Tobacco,” November 10, 1931, RG 84, Post Records, Part 9, Class 842-855 (1931), NARA.
13 Coert du Bois to SecState, “Memorandum evaluating the political reporting of Walter A. Foote in Medan,” January 20, 1930, RG 84, Post Records, Part 7, Class 800-811.4 (1930), NARA.
15 Robert Aura Smith, “Java Asks For Dominion Status,” in the Sunday Edition of the *New York Times*, May 16, 1937; instead of unanimity in the *Volksraad*, the “petition had passed by a vote of 26 to 20 with 15 abstentions.” Foote to SecState, enclosing a letter of protest from John Warren Bicknell, President, US Rubber Plantations Co. in New York, October 1, 1937, RG 59, 1930-1939, 856D.01/26, NARA.
22 Djojohadikusumo, *Herinneringen*, p. 90, and Patton to SecState, August 21, 1933, RG 59, 856D.00/8-2133, NARA.
23 Hudson in Surabaya to Foote in Batavia, July 16, 1935, forwarded to SecState, RG 84, Part 7, Class 800-811.4 (1935), NARA.
24 Foote to SecState, “Netherlands India Relations with Japan,” May 11, 1936, RG 165, War Department, General and Special Staffs, Regional File, 1922-1944, Netherlands
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25 Foote to SecState, “Local Reaction to the Possibilities of Philippine Independence,” July 23, 1935, No. 161, RG 165, War Department, General and Special Staffs, Military Intelligence Div, Regional File, 1922-1944, Netherlands East Indies, Box No. 2634, NARA.

26 Patton to SecState, August 21, 1933, RG 59, 1930-1939, 856D.00/8-2133, NARA.


28 Quoted by Dahm, Soekarno en de strijd, p. 197.

29 Patton to SecState, May 12, 1931, RG 84, with enclosure of English translations of various Dutch newspaper articles, RG 84, Part 7, Class 800-811.4 (1931), NARA.

30 Coert Du Bois had first used the term “White Front” organization in “Echoes of the Government's Police Raids on the Nationalist Extremists in Netherlands India,” February 7, 1930, RG 84, Part 7, Class 800-811.4 (1930), NARA.

31 Patton to SecState, September 22, 1931, RG 59, 1930-1939, 856D.00/9-2231, NARA.


33 Herinneringen van jhr. mr. B.C. de Jonge, p. 79.

34 Herinneringen van jhr. mr. B.C. de Jonge, p. 105.

35 Article in Het Volk, May 9, 1931, based on an interview with a Dutch journalist upon De Jonge’s arrival in Hoek of Holland from Shell headquarters in London; English translation in Patton to SecState, May 12, 1931.

36 “Ce n’est que le ridicule qui tue,” Herinneringen van jhr. mr. B.C. de Jonge, p. 106.

37 Patton to SecState, October 13, 1931, RG 59, 1930-1939, 856D.01/29, NARA.

38 Patton to SecState, August 21, 1933, RG 59, 1930-1939, 856D.00/8-2133, NARA.

39 Sidney Browne to SecState, September 22, 1934, RG 59, 1930-1939, 856D.00/9-2234, NARA.

40 Foote to SecState, May 20, 1935, RG 59, 1930-1930, 856D.00/87, NARA.

41 Mrázek, Sjarir: Politics and Exile in Indonesia, p. 132.

42 See Takashi Shiraishi, “The Phantom World of Digul,” Indonesia, No. 61 (April 1996), pp. 93-94. Coert du Bois informed SecState about the commission of inquiry, chaired by the Governor of West Java, which issued the “Hillen Report,” into the conditions of Boven Digul’s two separate colonies, Tanah Merah and Tanah Tinggi; May 7, 1930, RG 84, Post Records, Part 8, Class 82-840.3 (1930), NARA.

43 Marc T. Greene, “Dutch Guard Empire With Aid Of Cannibals,” Baltimore Sun, April 7, 1940.

44 L.J.A. Schoonhuyt, Boven-Digoel (Batavia, 1936), pp. 182-183, 79.

45 Gunther, Inside Asia, p. 327.

46 Baltimore Sun, April 7, 1940.


49 Patton to SecState, June 7, 1932, RG 59, 1930-1939, 856D.00/6-732, NARA.

50 Foote to SecState, July 23, 1935, RG 59, 1930-1930, 856D.00/91, NARA.

51 Sidney H. Browne to SecState, September 22, 1934, RG 59, 1930-1939, 856D.00/9-2234, NARA.
52 The Kalzan scare and the arrests took place in 1936. Foote, strictly confidential report on “Political Parties and Revolutionary Activities,” to SecState, August 3, 1937, RG 59, 1930-1939, 856D.00/3-1139, NARA.

53 Foote to SecState, “Leadership of the Mother Country in Netherlands Indian Affairs,” July 31, 1937, RG 59, 1930-1939, 856D.00/7-3137, NARA.

54 Foote to SecState, “Netherlands India in Crisis,” January 30, 1937, RG 59, 1930-1939, 856D.00/97, NARA.

55 Patton, Foote, and Browne to SecState; dispatches sent between 1931 and 1936, RG 59, 1930-1939, 856D.00/(var), NARA.


57 Memorandum of Div. of Western European Affairs to Abbot Low Moffat in FE, June 20, 1935, in response to a dispatch from Foote in Batavia on May 21, 1935, RG 59, 1930-1939, 856D.00/67, NARA.

58 Patton, Foote, and Browne to SecState; dispatches sent between 1931 and 1936, RG 59, 1930-1939, 856D.00/(var), NARA.

59 Dickover to SecState, “Alleged Plan for a National Socialist Coup,” January 22, 1940, No. 456, RG 165, War Department, General and Special Staffs, Military Intelligence Div, Regional File, 1922-1944, Netherlands East Indies, Box No. 2629, NARA.

60 Dickover to SecState, October 31, 1938, RG 59, 1930-1939, 856D.00/109, NARA.

61 Clattenburgh to SecState, July 14, 1938, RG 59, 1930-1939, 856D.00/114, NARA.

62 D.M.G. Koch, Verantwoording. Een halve eeuw in Indonesië (The Hague/Bandung, 1955), pp. 149, 218. The latter criticism was also expressed by Charles Edgar du Perron.

63 Clattenburgh and Dickover to SecState, “Miscellaneous Political and Non-Political Notes From the Netherlands Indies, January, 1939,” sent March 14, 1939, RG 59, 1930-1939, 856D.00/114. Ibid, “May-June, 1939,” sent on August 22, 1939, 856D.00/121, NARA.

64 Gunther, Inside Asia, p. 326.

65 Foote to SecState, July 14, 1936, RG 59, 1930-1939, 856D.00/32, NARA.


CHAPTER FIVE
The Specter of Japan and America’s Recognition of the Indonesian Archipelago’s Strategic Importance, 1938-1945

1 A.H.J. Lovink, the government adviser on East Asian Affairs, estimated the overall number of Japanese ships at 2000; an article in Kaigai Iju (Overseas Review) in Tokyo in September 1938, quoting Mr. Kemio Kawamoto, the Chief of the South Sea Section of Japan’s Overseas Ministry, placed the number at 430 fishing ships and 160 pearling vessels. Erle R. Dickover to SecState, “Japanese Penetration in the Netherlands Indies,” No. 168, p. 8, Strictly Confidential, February 9, 1939, RG 165,
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War Department, General and Special Staffs, Military Intelligence Division, Netherlands East Indies, 1922-1944, Box 2629, NARA.

2 Dickover to SecState, “Japanese Penetration,” p. 11.


4 Dickover, “Japanese Penetration,” pp. 9, 12; The Dutch expert he had consulted was Lovink.


7 Dickover to SecState, “Japanese Penetration,” p. 3.

8 Hugh Cumming in European Affairs Division, “Summary of Dispatch No. 367, October 9, 1939, from the Consulate General in Batavia,” attached to RG 59, 1930-1939, 856D.00/122, NARA.


14 Iris Chang, in her controversial book The Rape of Nanking. The Forgotten Holocaust of World War II (New York, 1997), has written that despite Japanese efforts to censure news reports in December 1937, American journalists such as Frank Tillman Durdin of the New York Times, Archibald T. Steele of the Chicago Times, and C.Yates McDaniel of the Associated Press, produced lengthy, detailed articles for a variety of American newspapers. Foreign Intelligence organizations were also aware of the horrors that transpired in Nanking, pp. 143-150.


17 J. Edgar Hoover, personal and confidential letter to Adolf A. Berle, Jr., February 18, 1942, RG 165, War Department, General and Special Staffs, Military Intelligence Div., Regional File, 1922-1944, Netherlands East Indies, Box No. 2631, NARA.

18 George A. Gordon in US Embassy in The Hague to SecState, “Defensive Position of
Netherlands Indies,” February 4, 1938, No. 166, RG 165, Ibid., Box No. 2631, NARA.


21 Bussemaker, Paradise in Peril, synopsis p.5.

22 Dickover to SecState, January 22, 1940, No. 456, RG 165, War Department, General and Special Staffs, Military Intelligence Div., Regional File, 1922-1944, Netherlands East Indies, Box No. 2629, NARA.


24 Warden McK Wilson, US military attaché in The Hague to SecState, September 4, 1936, No. 533, RG 165, Ibid., Box No. 2631, NARA.

25 “Next on Jap Menu? The Prize Plum in the Coming Grab Game,” Daily Mirror, August 12, 1940.

26 George A. Gordon in US Embassy in The Hague to SecState, “Defensive Position of Netherlands Indies,” February 4, 1938, No. 166, RG 165, War Department, General and Special Staffs, Military Intelligence Div., Regional File, 1922-1944, Netherlands East Indies, Box No. 2631, NARA.

27 Dickover to SecState, January 6, 1939, No. 132, RG 165, Ibid., Box No. 2631, NARA.

28 Dickover to SecState, “Alleged Plan for a National Socialist Coup,” January 22, 1940, No. 456, RG 165, Ibid., Box No. 2629, NARA.


33 L.N. Palar, “Indonesië na de verkiezingen,” pp. 5-6, June 3, 1946, Private Papers of L.N. Palar, dossier No. 005, ANRI.

34 “Position Weak,” editorial in St Louis Globe Democrat, December 23, 1948. Enclosure No. 1 to Dispatch No. 33, from Leslie E. Reed, US Consul General in Curaçao, to SecState, April 7, 1949, RG 59, Box No. 6441, 856D.00/4-749, NARA.


37 Tan Malaka, From Jail to Jail, Vol. 3, p. 72.

38 Memorandum enclosed in SecState Byrnes to “Certain American Diplomatic and
NOTES CHAPTER FIVE

Consular Officers” in Aden, Jidda, Cairo, Baghdad, Tehran, and Jerusalem, December 6, 1945, RG 59, Box No. 6443, 856D 01/10-2445, NARA.
44  Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution*, p. 130.
45  Office of Strategic Services, Report No. M-212, July 20, 1944, “General Conditions,” p. 13, RG 263, Murphy Collection, Box No. 117, folder 1945, NARA.
59  Rose, *Indonesia Free*, p. 95.

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CHAPTER SIX
The Politics of Independence in the Republik Indonesia and International Reactions, 1945-1949


Anderson, *Java in a Time of Revolution,* p. 72; Dahm, in *Soekarno,* suggests that Sukarno’s outburst took place in Rengasdengklok, p. 279.


335
35 David Wehl, Birth of Indonesia, p. 66.
36 The most recent English-language example of these attitudes are expressed in the recollections gathered by Jan Krancher, ed., The Defining Years of the Dutch East Indies, 1942-1949 (Jefferson NC, 1996), passim.
38 Y.B. Mangunwijaya, The Weaverbirds, p. 112.
40 “Memorandum from Dr. Mohamad Rum, Chairman of the Republican Delegation to Chairman of the GOC, dated Bangka, January 20, 1949,” pp. 1-3. The original document, written by hand in Indonesian during his incarceration on Bangka island, was delivered for translation to the Secretariat of the Republican Delegation on January 25, 1949, and forwarded to the Security Council in English soon thereafter.
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It is listed in the UN Archives as “Roem Memorandum to the Security Council – January 20, 1949 (Conditions of Internment and Republican Positions),” DAG 13/2.0.0./#5, UN Archives, NYC.

Preamble to the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, in Lukisan Revolusi, p. 380.

Ton Schilling, Spoor, onze generaal, door zijn vrienden en soldaten (Amsterdam, 1953), p. 16.

Albert Cizauskas, quoted by Gardner, Shared Hopes - Separate Fears, p. 25.

The best-known Dutch architects in the pre-World War II era were Henri Maclaine Pont and Thomas Karsten, who founded architectural offices in Semarang and Surabaya, and Charles Wolff Schoemaker, whose design firm was located in Bandung. The largest number of offices, schools, churches, and public buildings such as the train station in Kota in Batavia were designed by Frans Johan Laurens Ghijsels. Recently, ir. Watse Heringa has catalogued the buildings his grandfather designed in the Dutch East Indies in the period 1910-1916, when Ghijsels worked as an architect for the Batavia Municipal Council and the Department of Public Works, and during the period 1916-1929, when he was the principal partner in the Algemeen Ingenieurs-en Architectenbureau (General Engineering and Architectural Bureau, or AIA) in Batavia. Since AIA had incorporated Indonesian architects as partners, the design firm could be handed over to two Indonesians, Ir. Tan and Ir. Soetono, in 1945, when the Revolution broke out. Today, AIA still has an office in Surabaya, P.T. Biro AIA. See R.W. Heringa, ed., Ir. E.J.L. Ghijsels, Architect in Indonesia (1910-1929) (Utrecht, 1996).


“Self appointed guerrilla leaders” was used by the Chinese Consul General in Batavia, Tsiang Chia-Tung, in a letter to UNCI, September 14, 1949, complaining about “the many Chinese residents [who] have been forcibly removed from their places of abode ... under the pretext of affording protection to the Chinese population,” DAG13/2.0.0./#6, UN Archives, NYC. The term “one-hundred percent merdeka” is associated with Tan Malaka.

Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution, p. 132.

Lukisan Revolusi, section on 1945, n.p.


*Sukarno’s speech in November 1943, Quoted by Dahm, Soekarno en de strijd*, p. 263.


William R. Mathews, “Dr. Soekarno’s Personality is Key to Legend (Indonesian Republic’s Top Figure is Destined to Win),” *The Arizona Daily Star*, October 3, 1949.

Louis Zweers, in *De crash van de Franeker. Een Amerikaanse persreis naar Nederlands-Indië in 1949* (Amsterdam, 2001) has suggested that the KLM airplane crashed due to sabotage, pp. 75-77, and passim. Gerlof Homan has also noted that some of the US journalists’ dispatches, published posthumously, were sympathetic to the Dutch position, but they had little impact on either Washington policymakers or US public opinion; see Homan, “The United States, the Netherlands, and the Indonesian Struggle for Independence,” in Drooglever and Schouten, *De leeuw en de banteng*, p. 60, fn. 4.


Charlton Ogburn to Gerlof Homan, August 20, 1985.


*Rose, Indonesia Free*, p. 94.


Soedjatmoko, “Intellectual Autobiography,” written as appendix to an application to the Humanities Division of the Rockefeller Foundation in 1950, while he was assigned to the Indonesian Embassy in Paris. Soedjatmoko attached his autobiography to a letter, handwritten in a combination of French, English, and Dutch, to Claire Holt in Washington DC, sent from Fontenay-aux-Roses, in 1950 (no further date). In Claire Holt Collection, Echols Collection # 14/27/2648, Carl A. Kroch Library Manuscript Collections, Box No. 7. Cornell University, Ithaca, NY.


From a review of Amir Hamzah Siregar’s poetry, which appeared in *Orgaan van USI* (Unitas Studiosorum Indonesiensis, an Indonesian Student Organization which may have been loosely modeled on the elite Students Corps “Minerva” in Leiden), January 1941, p. 10, quoted by Mrázek, *Sjahrir: Politics and Exile*, p. 277-29. The original text used the made-up French word *passionate* instead of *passionelle*.

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79 Sudarpo, Reminiscences, p. 47. I have translated the original Dutch diary entry.
80 Sudarpo, Reminiscences, p. 63.
82 Sudarpo, Reminiscences, pp. 65-70, 86.
84 For detailed discussions of these political as well as generational tensions, see Anderson, Java in a Time of Revolution, pp. 50-57; Legge, Intellectuals and Nationalism in Indonesia, pp. 94-97; and Mrázek, Sjahri: Politics and Exile, pp. 258-273. For a discussion of Stunde Null or Nullpunkt in Germany in 1945, see Rebecca Boehling, A Question of Priorities, Democratic Reform and Economic Recovery in Postwar Germany (Providence/Oxford, 1996), pp. 116-155.
87 Anton Lucas, “Revolutionary Youth,” in Carey and Wild, Born in Fire, p. 158.
89 Mangunwijaya, The Weaverbirds, p. 112.
90 Van den Doel, Afgezien van Indië, p. 90.
92 Representative of the Chinese Red Cross in Batavia, “Topics of Memorandum Relating to Acts of Violence and Inhumanity Perpetrated by Indonesian Bands Against Chinese Prior to July 21, 1947,” dated Purwokerto, August 18, 1947, pp. 4-6. Chung Hua Tsung Hui, the Federation of Chinese Associations in Batavia, produced a Foreword and apparently passed the memorandum on to the GOC. The report contained an introduction with subsections and a detailed chapter on the “Extent of Indonesian Criminalities Against Chinese,” citing specific dates and places. In DAG 13/2.0.0./#3, UN Archives, NYC.
93 Ibid.
94 In 1930, Sukarno wrote that “If an Asiatic people and English imperialism, for instance, were to challenge each other in a hostile fashion, I hope that other Asian peoples will offer them help,” quoted by Dahm, Soekarno en de strijd, p. 196.
96 Ibid., pp. 10-12.
101 “Ogburn recalls the early days of a new nation,” pp. 7-9.


104 In “Transmittal of Letters of Dutch soldiers in Indonesia published in *Vrij Nederland,*” the same Dutch soldier also wrote that “We reviled the Germans for their cruelty but a Netherlander is not a bit better in this respect.” Enclosure of translated passages in Air Pouch dispatch No. 71, February 28, 1949, from US Embassy in The Hague to Secretary of State, RG 59, Box No. 6441, 856D.00/2-2849, NARA.

105 “Extract from Instructions to a Kampong Head, 5th November, 1947,” Brataadismita, A.W.R.I. in Boelakamba, to the Loearah of Doekoehlo, November 5, 1947”; report translated and forwarded by the Dutch delegation to the UN Committee of Good Offices in Batavia. In DAG 13/2.0.0/#1, UN Archives, NYC.

106 Van der Post, *The Admiral's Baby.* pp. 165, 197. Nonetheless, in September, 1949, Helfrich would write in his personal letter to Dean Acheson that “in 1941/42 ... we fought the enemy with far inferior forces, to delay his southward advance as long as possible.” C.E.L. Helfrich to Dean Acheson, September 20, 1949, in RG 59, Box No. 6442, 856D.00/9-2049, NARA.


110 L.N. Palar, “Indonesië na de verkiezingen,” pp. 5-6, June 3, 1946, Private Papers of L.N. Palar, dossier No. 005, ANRI.


112 Letter P.2-58, No. C./206, June 23, 1947, Partij van de Arbeid to the governing councils of the *Partai Sosialis Indonesia, Partai Boeroeh Indonesia, Partai Pomoeda Sosialis Indonesia.* In Private Papers of L.N. Palar, No. 018, ANRI.

113 L.N. Palar, “Indonesië na de verkiezingen,” June 3, 1946, Private Papers of L.N. Palar, dossier No. 005, ANRI.


116 Palar, “Indonesië na de verkiezingen,” p. 3.

CHAPTER SEVEN
The Emerging Cold War and American Perspectives on Decolonization in Southeast Asia in the Postwar Era

1 Stanley K. Hornbeck to SecState and President Truman, Outgoing Airgram No. 1289, December 1, 1945, RG 59, Box No. 6439, 856.00/12-145, NARA.

2 Ibid.
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3 Ibid.
4 Memorandum by Moffat, July 8, 1947, “United States Policies: Indonesia,” folder labeled “NEI Relations with US,” RG 59, Records of the Division of the Philippines and Southeast Asian Affairs (PSA), Box No. 5, NARA.
6 Stanley K. Hornbeck in The Hague to SecState, March 8, 1946, RG 59, Box No. 6439, 856D.00/3-846, NARA.
10 Ninkovitch, The Diplomacy of Ideas, pp. 110-122.
16 For a personal description of the growing divisions in the American left, see Meyer, Facing Reality, pp. 35-50.
17 Saunders, Who Paid the Piper?, p. 52.
23 John Carter Vincent to John Hickerson in European Affairs Division (with a copy to Dean Acheson), October 22, 1945, RG 59, Box No. 6439, 856D.00/10-2245, NARA.
24 MemCon, Jkh. Henri E.L.K. van Vredenburch and John Hickerson, October 22, 1945, RG 59, Box No. 6439, 856D.00/10-2145, NARA.
25 Quoted by McMahon, Colonialism and Cold War, pp. 101-102.
26 Telegram from US Consulate in Kandy, Ceylon, signed by Yost, to SecState via War Department, October 26, 1945, RG 59, Box No. 6439, 856D/10-2645, NARA. The opinion about Sukarno and Hatta was offered by Maberly E. Dening.


32 George Kennan, in his memoirs, singled out the Treasury Department as the agency in which “hopes for postwar collaboration with Russia [were] more elaborate, more naïve, or more tenaciously (one might almost say ferociously) pursued.” Quoted by John Lamberton Harper, *American Visions of Europe. Franklin D. Roosevelt, George F. Kennan, and Dean G. Acheson* (Cambridge/New York, 1996), fn 30, p. 191.


41 Isaacson and Thomas, in *The Wise Men*, note that most historians identify “the onset of the Cold War in the cold winter of 1947,” but they argue that it broke out much earlier, p. 34. Leffler, in *A Preponderance of Power* has written that the Cold War began in “January–November of 1946,” p. 100.


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51 As in Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power*.
52 Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, W.L. Thorp, also made a link with the important export economy of Argentina; see, P.J. Drooglever, “From Coordination to Confrontation: The Netherlands and the United States of America in the Period between the Two ‘Police Actions’ in Indonesia,” in Cornelis A. van Minnen, ed., *The Decolonization of Indonesia: International Perspectives*, Roosevelt Study Center Publications No. 7 (Middelburg, 1988), p. 44.
55 Robert McMahon has written that “it might be the height of diplomatic folly” if the US seemed to “meddle” in French colonial affairs, in *Colonialism and Cold War*, p. 314.
56 Memo from Percy Johnston, January 3, 1946, in folder labeled “Public Correspondence,” RG 59, PSA, Box No. 13, NARA. For Secretary of State James Byrnes’ reaction to protests of US policy in Indonesia, see FRUS, 1946, Vol. 6, pp. 822-823.
58 Office Memo from Jack D. Neal to Mr. Hanson and Mr. Hendershott, “The Indonesia Club of America, Inc.,” May 19, 1948, RG 59, Box No. 3330, 856D.00/5-1948 CS/W, NARA; letter from John R. Andu, President of the Indonesia League of America Inc., to Phillip Murray, President of the CIO, February 20, 1948, RG 18-002, CIO International Affairs Division, Michael Ross Papers, 0035/013/17, Box 13, folder 17, “Indonesia, 1946-1950,” GMMA.
59 Final Proceedings of the Eighth Constitutional Convention in Atlantic City NJ, November 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 1946, p. 277. The same Resolution No. 43 on “Foreign Policy,” however, still called for a “fulfillment of the basic policy of our late President Roosevelt for friendship and unity among the great wartime allies – the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union.” At that stage the CIO rejected “all proposals for American participation in any bloc or alliance which would destroy the unity of the Big Three” because then the world “faces a war, which means the destruction of humanity itself ... in an atomic age,” p. 278. In RG 18-002, CIA/IAD, Ibid., GMMA. See also Denis MacShane, *International Labour and the Origins of the Cold War* (Oxford UK, 1992), p. 115.
60 Charles Bidien to Philip Murray, July 10, 1946, RG 18-002, CIO/IAD, Ibid., GMMA.
61 Letter from Phillip Murray to George C. Marshall, December 23, 1948. This letter elicited a four-page response from Marshall on January 3, 1949, in which he insisted that the US representatives to the UN Good Offices Committee “have exerted themselves strenuously to effect a settlement which would meet criteria entirely consonant with the declaration of your Portland convention.” RG 18-002, CIO/IAD, Ibid., GMMA.
“Report of Resolutions Committee on Italian Colonies,” substitute for Resolution No. 7, 1947 convention, RG 18-003, Box 4, file 24, AFL 1948, Jay Lovestone papers, GMMA. Matthew Woll, the chief of the AFL International Affairs Division, noted in the early 1950s that “anti-colonialism is the most dangerous agent of and virulent force for the communist fifth column . . .”, quoted by Philip Taft, *Defending Freedom: American Labor and Foreign Affairs* (Los Angeles, 1973), p. 203.


63 “The 1948 Tour of Europe by Four Members of ILWU: A Critical Examination of Whom they met, What they said, and What they reported,” November 10, 1948, RG 18-002, CIO/IAD, Ibid., Box 13, folder 19, 1947, GMMA.


67 Kahin,”The United States and Anti-colonial Revolutions,” p. 338.


71 Memo from Moffat to Vincent, May 19, 1947, NARA.

72 In a personal letter to Frances Gouda dated September, 10, 1997, Charlton Ogburn wrote that he was the author of the statistical analysis and the report.
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York/Oxford, 1996) claims that the US-Latin American import and export transactions in the postwar period were higher. Smith, however, does not cite any sources throughout his book, p. 123.

81 Quoted by Smith, Talons of the Eagle, p. 125.
82 Isaacson and Thomas, The Wise Men, p. 293.

CHAPTER EIGHT
Indonesia’s Struggle for Independence and the Outside World: England, Australia, and the United States in Search of a Peaceful Solution

1 Incoming telegram to SecState from Batavia, October 31, 1945, RG 59, Box No. 6439, 856D.00/10-2945, NARA.
2 McMahon and Gardner list his first name as William. John Keay in Empire’s End. A History of the Far East from High Colonialism to Hong Kong (New York, 1997) lists his full name as Aubertin Walter Southern Mallaby while Frederick and Van den Doel mention him as A.W.S. Mallaby.
3 Foote to SecState via War Department, November 1, 1945, RG 59, Box No. 6439, 856D.00/11-145, NARA.
4 Van Boetzelaer van Oosterhout to Minister of Foreign Affairs (Van Kleffens), October 3, 1945, NIB, Vol. 1, p. 236.
6 Ch. O. van der Plas to Van Mook, September 18, 1945, NIB, Vol. 1, (Appendix 1), p. 129.
7 Louis Damais Correspondence with Claire Holt, October 23, 1945; November 14, 1945; January 2, 1946. Private Collection Adji Damais, Jakarta.
8 Quoted by R. Harris Smith, OSS: The Secret History of America’s First Intelligence Agency (Berkeley, 1972), pp. 290-291.
9 CID report, September 20, 1945, No. XL 23085, RG 226, OSS Intelligence Reports, NARA.
11 CSC (EUR) to Robert E. Murphy, n.d., RG 263, Murphy Collection, folder 1945, Box No. 117, NARA. Repeated in State Department R&A report 1346.133, “Current Developments in Indonesia,” November 28, 1945, in the same folder.
12 Harry S. Truman, Memoirs II: Years of Trial and Hope (New York, 1965), pp. 73-76.
14 SSU rept. A-64389, “Communist Activities in NEI” January 3, 1946, RG 263, Murphy Collection, Box No. 117, folder 1945, NARA.
15 OSS/SSU report A-64126, December 25, 1945, RG 263, Murphy Collection, Box No. 117, folder 1945, NARA.
16 State Department R&A report No. 3417, “The Cabinet of the Republic of Indonesia,” November 30, 1945, RG 263, Murphy Collection, Box No. 117, folder 1945, NARA.
17 State Department R&A report 1346.133, “Current Developments in Indonesia,” November 28, 1945, RG 263, Murphy Collection, Box No. 117, folder 1945, NARA.
18 Handwritten note by Murphy, February 7, 1946, RG 263, Murphy Collection, Box No. 117, folder 1946, NARA.
19 DOS Office of Research and Intelligence (ORI) Report No. 3480.4, “Comments on current Intelligence,” February 20, 1946, RG 263, Murphy Collection, Box No. 117, folder 1946, NARA.
20 Quoted by Paul F. Gardner, Shared Hopes - Separate Fears. Fifty Years of U.S.-Indonesian Relations (Boulder CO, 1997), p. 8, and McMahon, Colonialism and Cold War, p. 75.
21 Gardner, Shared Hopes - Separate Fears, p. 25.
25 Letter from Charlton Ogburn to Frances Gouda, July 16, 1996. His wife Vera was the State Department employee assigned to Walter Foote as administrative assistant during the postwar period. Ogburn met her when he was assigned to the GOC.
27 Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1947, No. 6, pp. 894-96, 898.
29 Underlining in original; Foote to SecState, May 17, 1947, file No. 800, “Growth and Nature of Communism in Indonesia,” RG 59, PSA, Box No. 12. Also RG 263, July 3, 1947, No. 268, 856D.00/7-347, Murphy Collection, Box No. 117, NARA.
30 Foote to Butterworth, January 18, 1948, “PSA Division, 1944-1952,” RG 59, PSA, Box No. 1, NARA.
31 Telegram No. 84, from Foote to SecState, March 1, 1947, in RG 84, Miscellaneous Records of Walter A. Foote, 1947-1949, NARA.
32 Foote to Butterworth, January 18, 1948, “PSA Division, 1944-1952,” RG 59, PSA, Box No. 1, NARA.
35 McMahon, Colonialism and Cold War, p. 101.
36 Department of State Memorandum, December 26, 1945, FRUS, 1946, Vol. 6, pp. 787-789.
38 Dagboek van Schermerhorn, Vol. 1, p. 54.
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43 Dr. Johannes Leimena, *The Dutch-Indonesian Conflict*, pamphlet dated April 8, 1949, forwarded by Cochran to Acheson in RG 59, 856D.00/5-449, Box No. 6441, NARA. See also *Kewarganegaraan yang bertanggungjawab: mengenang Dr. J. Leimena* (Jakarta, 1995), p. 51.
51 Van der Post, *The Admiral’s Baby*, p. 32, claiming to rely on intelligence gathered by the Swiss Embassy in Jakarta.
54 Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution*, p. 141.
56 Quoted by Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution*, p. 143.
59 Schoonoord, *De Marinebrigade*, p. 75.
61 Quoted by Schoonoord, *De Marinebrigade*, pp. 74-75; see also pp. 81-84.
62 Frederick, *Visions and Heat*, pp. 278-279, who gives a lower figure for SEAC casualties; Van den Doel, *Afscheid van Indië*, pp. 103-105; Woodburn Kirby, *War Against Japan*, Vol. 5, p. 336, and especially the day-to-day chronology with eyewitness and
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66 McMahon, *Colonialism and Cold War*, p. 111.

67 McMahon, *Colonialism and Cold War*, p. 112.


70 Quoted by Anak Agung, *Renville* als keerpunt, p. 31.


76 Thomas B. Inglis to William A. Eddy, October 26, 1946, RG 59, Box No. 6439, 856D.00/10-2848, NARA.

77 Ibid.


79 MemCon, Alexander Loudon and Dean Acheson as acting Secretary of State, July 11, 1946, RG 59, Box No. 3329, 711.56/7-1146, NARA.

80 MemCon, Dean Acheson, John Hickerson, and Alexander Loudon, August 15, 1946, RG 59, Box No. 6439, 856D.00/8-1546, NARA. See also MacMahon, *Colonialism and Cold War*, p. 131.

81 Alexander Loudon was appointed the Netherlands Ambassador to Washington DC in 1938. See OSS Research & Analysis Branch, R & A No. 2647, “Biographical Notes,” pp. 77-78, NARA.

82 John Hickerson to Philip W. Bonsal in the US Embassy in The Hague, November 12, 1947, RG 59, Box No. 6439, 711.56/11-1247, NARA.

83 Cees Fasseur, *Indischgasten* (Amsterdam, 1997), p. 256. 170,000 soldiers on a population of 1,750,000 men between the ages of 20 and 44 constitutes exactly 9.7 percent; appropriately, Fasseur did not include in his calculation the 25,000 KNIL troops because they were already present in the Netherlands Indies/Indonesia.


85 Groen, *Marsroutes en dwaalsporen*, p. 27.

86 C.C. de Rooy about the landing in Kupang, September 21, 1945, NIB, Vol. 1, p. 145, fn. 3.


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90 Dorling, *Australia & Indonesia's Independence*, Vol. 1, Doc. 319, p. 299, and Doc. 89, p. 90, fn. 1, indicating that W.P. Ashley, the General Secretary of the WWF, had agreed to lift the ban “for the benefit of the Indonesian people” on June 6, 1947.


95 War Department, Intelligence Division, “The Situation in Southeast Asia as it affects the Availability of Strategic Raw Materials,” July 1947, in folder labeled “SEA 1946-1948, US Policy,” RG 59, PSA, Box No. 5, NARA.

96 “SWNCC Country Report on Indonesia,” in folder labeled “NEI, SWNCC Papers,” RG 59, PSA, Box No. 12, NARA.


98 US Embassy in The Hague to SecState concerning statement issued by Sukarno, October 24, 1945, RG 59, 856.00/10-2445, NARA; see also FRUS, 1948, Vol. 6, p.1164.

99 Memo from War Department to Moffat, December 8, 1945, in folder labeled “SEA 1946-1949, Military and Military Aid,” RG 59, PSA, Box No. 5, NARA.

100 Quoted by McMahon, *Colonialism and Cold War*, p. 103.

101 Quoted by McMahon, *Colonialism and Cold War*, p. 102.


104 SWNCC, case file No. 245, January 7, 1946, in folder labeled “CCS 400 NEI: Equipment and Supplies for NEI Forces,” RG 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. On the use of credit, see SWNCC Country Report on Indonesia in folder labeled “NEI, 1947-1948, UNO and Other Organizations,” RG 59, PSA, Box No. 5, NARA.

105 SEA Report on equipment for NEI and FIC (French Indochina), December 12, 1945, in folder labeled “NEI, Armys Surplus Property Disposal,” RG 59, PSA, Box No. 11; see also Acheson to Forrestal, December 10, 1946, in same folder, NARA.

106 Spoor to Beel, December 21, 1946, NIB, Vol. 6, p. 615.

107 SWNCC Country Report on Indonesia, RG 59, PSA, Box No. 5; Marshall to Loudon in folder labeled “Arms Surplus Property Disposal,” February 21, 1947, RG 59, PSA, Box No. 11, NARA.


112 Secret handwritten report from Colonel E. Baretta to Ambassador Van Kleffens, September 8, 1948, NIB, Vol. 15, p. 121, fn. (64)2.

113 Baretta to Van Kleffens, September 8, 1948.


115 Schoonoord, *De Mariniersbrigade*, pp. 311, 315.


118 Harry H. Bell to Mr. Labouisse (U/FAA), “The Drain of Indonesian Military Operations in Relation to ERP,” revised by Charlton Ogburn on April 4, 1949, RG 59, PSA, Box No. 12, folder labeled “Communism II,” NARA.

119 Bell to Labouisse, April 4, 1949.


123 Foote to Ackerson, December 8, 1948, RG 84, Miscellaneous Records of Walter A. Foote, 1947-1949, NARA.

124 Ackerson to Foote, November 8, 1948, RG 84, Ibid., NARA.

125 Foote to Chief, Division of Foreign Service Personnel, February 7, 1947, Telegram No. 42, quoted in Ackerson to Foote, November 8, 1948, NARA.


127 Penfield to Ackerson, August 29, 1947, in folder labeled “PSA division, 1944-1952,” RG 59, PSA, Box 1, NARA.

128 Davies to Penfield, September 5, 1947, in folder labeled “NEI relations to UN,” RG 59, PSA, Box No. 13, NARA.

129 Penfield to Ackerson, August 29, 1947.


133 Foote to SecState, Telegram No. 90, March 19, 1947, RG 84, Miscellaneous Records of Walter A. Foote, 1947-1949, NARA.


CHAPTER NINE
Armed Conflict, the United Nations’ Good Offices Committee, and the Renville Agreement: America’s Involvement in Trying to Reach a Settlement

1 Foote to Butterworth, January 8, 1948, in folder labeled “PSA Division 1944-1952,” RG 59, PSA, Box No. 1, NARA; see also FRUS 1947, Vol. 6, pp. 832-833.
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2 Lacy to Reed, May 10, 1949, and Reed to Butterworth, May 18, 1949, in “PSA Division 1944-1952,” RG 59, PSA, Box No. 1, NARA.
3 War Department, Intelligence Division, “The Situation in Southeast Asia as it Affects the Availability of Strategic Raw Materials,” July 1947, in folder labeled “SEA 1946-1948, US Policy,” RG 59, PSA, Box No. 5, NARA.
5 SWNCC Country Report on Indonesia, in folder labeled “NEI 1947-1948 UNO and Other Organizations,” RG 59, PSA, Box No. 1, NARA.
6 Fisher to Moffat, July 20, 1947, in folder labeled “NEI 1947-1948 UNO and Other Organizations,” RG 59, PSA, Box No. 1, NARA.
7 Memorandum by Moffat, July 8, 1947, in folder labeled “NEI Relations with US,” RG 59, PSA, Box No. 12, NARA.
9 Quoted by Max Weisglas, Aan de wieg van een natie. Herinneringen aan Indonesië (Amsterdam, 1995), p. 81.
10 Quoted by Van Vredenburch, Den Haag antwoordt niet, p. 258.
12 Weisglas, Aan de wieg van een natie, pp. 83-84.
13 Weisglas, Aan de wieg van een natie, p. 85.
14 E. Jonckheer, President of the Executive Committee of the Curaçao Democratic Party to SecState, June 7, 1947, RG 59, Box No. 3329, CS/A, 711.56/6-1647, NARA.
18 Memorandum from SecState to President Truman, July 1947, FRUS, 1947, Vol. 6, p. 997.
21 Security Council GOC, “Report Submitted by the Madura Observation Team to the Committee of Good Offices,” January 8, 1948, Part II, pp. 7-8, Part IV, p. 20, DAG 13/2.0.0/#5. In its own report submitted to Frank P. Graham by G.C. Stuyt on December 18, 1947, the Dutch side claimed to possess “documentary evidence of the Navy in which Chandra Hasan [the TNI commander in Madura] intended to apply systematic terrorism with the help of released criminals,” DAG 13/2.0.0/#1, UN Archives.
22 Leimena to GOC, December 14, 1947, DAG 13/2.0.0/#1, UN Archives.
23 McMahon, Colonialism and Cold War, pp. 188-190.
26 Letter from Ali Sastroamidjojo to Max and Robert Delson, June 18, 1948, Yogyadokumen, No. 5238, ANRI.


29 Ibid. The Republic’s foreign broadcasts, Soedjatmoko warned, were all monitored by the State Department and carefully read by the American Government. Publicity, especially by the Partai Sosialis, should be handled carefully, always keeping track of its possible effects on US policy. For the Republic’s awareness of Washington’s Cold War-induced, Eurocentric reasoning, see also Van Vredenburch to Van Kleffens, May 14, 1948, NIB, Vol. 13, pp. 661-664. Soedjatmoko’s message was intercepted by Netherlands Intelligence units, as were so many at that time.


31 Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, Report #6-13, April 26, 1948, “Notes of Meeting at 445 Park Avenue on Saturday, April 24, 1948,” and “State Department’s Attitude towards the Indonesian Question in General and our Agreement with Matthew Fox in Particular,” April 26, 1948, in Yogyakarta Dokumen, No. 5314, ANRI.


33 Sutan Sjahrir’s Our Struggle, as discussed in detail in Mrázek, Sjahrir: Politics and Exile in Indonesia, pp. 280-287.

34 Ibid.


36 Personal letters from Charlton Ogburn to Gerlof D. Homan, August 9 and circa August 20, 1985.

37 Yowono Dwi Priyantono, interview with Soedjatmoko, May 12, 1989, cassette No. VIII, ANRI.

38 “It’s 1776 in Indonesia,” in a letter from Sudarpo Sastrosatomo to Frank Porter Graham, March 28, 1949, in Frank Porter Graham papers, Southern Historical Collection, The Library of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.

39 Yowono Dwi Priyantono, interview with Soedjatmoko, May 12, 1989, cassette No. VIII, ANRI.

40 Ibid, and personal communication from Rukmini Soedjatmoko, May 22, 1996.

41 Soedjatmoko to Subadio Sastrosatomo, December 16, 1947.

42 UN S/514, quoted by Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution, p. 217.

43 McMahon, Colonialism and the Cold War, p. 193.

44 Van Vredenburch, Den Haag antwoordt niet, p. 290.


48 McMahon, Colonialism and Cold War, 190-192.
NOTES CHAPTER NINE

49 The majority of the documents printed in Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) from October 1947 onward are exchanges between the State Department and the US delegation to the GOC.


51 Sastroamidjojo, *Milestones on my Journey*, pp. 151-152.


57 “Statement of Senator Graham,” p. 3919. See also confidential preliminary draft, Frank Porter Graham Papers, Southern Historical Collection, The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.

58 Van Boetzelaer to J.W.M. Snouck Hurgronje at the UN, September 14, 1947, NIB, Vol. 11, p. 98.


60 Van Mook to Van Kleffens, January 21, 1941, NIB, Vol. 12, p. 304. Van Mook asked Van Kleffens to try to prevent Graham, who was in Washington on that date, from returning to Batavia; see also General Spoor to Chief-of-Staff, December 3, 1947, NIB, Vol. 12, p. 55, and Lovett to US delegation to GOC, February 13, 1948, FRUS, Vol. 6, 1948, p. 96.


62 Letter from Ogburn to his parents, February 20, 1948.

63 Ogburn to his parents, February 20, 1948. Ogburn used the word “relief” at Graham’s departure again in another letter to his parents dated April 7, 1948.


65 Ogburn to Gardner, August 14, 1994.


67 “Proposal for Initiation of Substantive Discussions,” n.d., GOC, DAG 13/2.0.0.#2, UN Archives.


70 “Republican Circles are not so Optimistic about the Indonesian-Dutch Negotiations,” December 12, 1947, Appendix (bijlage) III to letter from Leimena to GOC, December 24, 1947, DAG 13/2.0.0.#1, UN Archives.


72 “Relevant portion of a confidential report of an important Nethelands source in Indonesia, dated September 13, 1948,” RG 59, Box No. 6440, 856D.00/10-848, NARA. The original Dutch version, which began to circulate in Jakarta in mid-September, can be found in NIB, Vol. 15, p. 49.


Y.B. Mangunwijaya, in his novel, *Durga Umayi* (1991) has also used the figure of an “abused, angry woman” to “enact symbolically the trajectory” of the Indonesian Republic’s history; see Michael H. Bodden, “Woman as Nation in Mangunwijaya’s *Durga Umayi*,” *Indonesia*, No. 62 (October 1996), p. 69.


“Relevant portion of a confidential report,” September 13, 1948, RG 59, Box No. 6440, 856D.00/10-848, NARA.


“Plan for achieving a speedy and effective truce,” submitted to the Special Committees [of the Dutch and Indonesian delegations] by the Representatives of the GOC, December 20, 1947, DAG 13/2.0.0.#2, UN Archives.

Sjaariuddin to GOC, December 11, 1947, DAG 13/2.0.0.#1, UN Archives.


Annex II, “Speech by Jhr. Van Vredenburch at the sixth meeting of the Special Committee o/b the USS Renville on December 9, 1947,” Secretariat issue No. 12, Netherlands delegation, Special Committee, in DAG 13/2.0.0.#1, UN Archives.

Ibid, Annex III, Secretariat issue No. 12, DAG 13/2.0.0.#1, UN Archives.


“Concerning the Military Action at Rawahgede,” Annex III, Leimena to GOC, December 24, 1947, DAG 13/2.0.0.#1, UN Archives.

Report about the alleviation of rapes committed by “Green Berets” of 6 women, two of them “twelve-year old girls, still virgins and one woman who was 8 months pregnant, which took place in Kampung Passanggrahan, Desa Tjidjambu, Onderdistrik Rantjakalong, Distrik Tanjungsari, Kabupaten Sumedang on March 8, 1949, at 6 AM.” In “Milex 2B Reports (originals), January 1949 to June 29, 1949,” DAG 13/2.0.0.#10, UN Archives.

Netherlands Delegation (Security Committee) to the GOC, signed Major-General D.C. Buurman van Vreeden, May 20, 1948, No. 935, quoting from *Merdeka*, Nos. 17-18, March 30, 1948, DAG 13/2.0.0.#4, UN Archives.


Taylor, *Indonesian Independence and the United Nations*, pp. 82-96. The Renville Agreement was composed of twelve “political principles” put forward by the Netherlands; these were counterbalanced by “six additional principles” drafted by Graham.


Quoted by McMahon, *Colonialism and Cold War*, pp. 206-207.


Ibid.

Letter from Ogburn to Homan, August 20, 1985, p. 3.

Director of the Office of United Nations Affairs (Rusk), Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth) and Director of the Office of European Affairs (Hickerson) to Marshall, February 10, 1948, RG 59, 856D.00/2-1048, Box No. 3330, NARA.

CHAPTER TEN

Soviet Strategies in Southeast Asia and Indonesian Politics: US Foreign Policy Adrift in the Course of 1948

3. The State Department denied ever having given instructions to Graham. Officially, the GOC members were being placed at the disposal of the UN Security Council and were expected to act as independent agents, without interference from the State Department.
9. Ibid.
15. According to a State Department estimate, Indonesia had suffered most among all the European colonial dependencies during the war years. Its deficit was estimated to be 400,000,000 dollars, compared to a 460,000,000 dollar total for all other European colonies combined. Pierre van der Eng, “Marshall Aid as a Catalyst in the Decolonization of Indonesia, 1947-1949”, *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, Vol. 19, No. 2 (September 1988), p. 338.
18 Ibid.
24 FRUS, Vol. 6, pp. 106-107, 148, 181-182. Out of fear of being incorporated into a Dutch dominated super-state, the Republic gave absolute priority to the clarification of the constitutional form of the USI and its position within this new political entity.
25 Lovett to Dubois, April 23, 1948, FRUS, Vol. 6, pp. 155-156.
26 New York Times, April 30, 1948; MemCon, April 30, 1948, R.G 263, Records of the Central Intelligence Agency, Murphy Collection, folder 1948-I, Box No. 118, NARA.
28 Marshall to Du Bois, April 30, 1948, FRUS, Vol. 6, p. 161. Du Bois also asked whether the allegations had been made under instruction of the Republican government. If the answer was negative, an official disavowal of the statements should be requested. Hatta, of course, denied having given instructions, but he did not hesitate to confirm the allegations.
32 Lovett to Du Bois, May 27, 1948, FRUS, Vol. 6, p. 186.
34 McMahon, Colonialism and Cold War, pp. 221, 221f, 223; Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution, p. 248. Du Bois repeatedly referred to “the US Delegation Plan” and contrasted an excerpt from it to a Dutch plan. Denying any knowledge of the working paper became implausible after the confidential proposals were leaked to the American journalist Daniel Shorr in mid-June. While the Dutch were furious about the leak and blamed Du Bois, it is most likely that they themselves were responsible and used this as a pretext for breaking off all negotiations.
35 Letter from Charlton Ogburn to Gerlof Homan, circa August 20, 1985.
36 Memorandum (secret) from Netherlands Representatives to the Combined Chiefs of Staff to Captain Jhr. H.A. van Foreest, July 8, 1949; also Van Foreest to Prime Minister Drees, July 15, 1949, enclosing an intelligence report about William Lacy written by Major H.J.R.R. Baron Melvill van Carnbee, Ministry of Defense, Inv. No. 76, Dossier No. 7528-61/409, ARA.
What was most disturbing to the Dutch negotiators was the immediate effect the American delegation's changed posture had on the self-confidence of the Indonesian negotiators. Dutch delegation member Van Vredenburch, who was particularly hostile in his remarks about the Americans, called Du Bois a drunk; see, among others, Van Vredenburch to Beel, June 15, 1958, NIB, Vol. 14, p. 137; also Ibid, June 26, 1948, p. 204. This accusation had some validity in light of a story, of which Ogburn is the source, about Du Bois' remark that he never touched whiskey before noon, except on those rare occasions when he had run out of gin. Dutch insults at the American delegation's address were made only in Dutch company, but Van Kleffens became worried about the extremely negative press the American delegation members received in the Netherlands. He therefore urged the Dutch Foreign Ministry to issue some more positive and thankful messages. Van Kleffens to Van Boetzelaer, June 30, 1948, NIB, Vol. 14, p. 235.

Ostensibly, Du Bois was recalled in connection with heart problems. There is, however, little doubt that Dutch pressure influenced Washington's decision in recalling their representative to the GOC. Dutch pressures on the State Department to recall Charlton Ogburn were also palpable; Van Kleffens to Van Boetzelaer, June 8, 1948, NIB, Vol. 14, p. 334.

The sum was composed of a 64,000,000 dollar gift, a 15,000,000 dollar loan, and 20,500,000 dollars to be spent in other OEEC countries. Van der Eng, "Marshall Aid and the Decolonization of Indonesia," p. 342; Van Kleffens to Stikker, September 17, 1948, NIB, Vol. 15, p. 121, fn. 1.


P.J. Drooglever, "The United States and the Dutch Applecart during the Indonesian Revolution", in R. Kroes ed., Image and Impact: American Influences in the Netherlands since 1945 (Amsterdam, 1981), wrote about "the magic spell of Yogy, with its romantics of the revolution."

57 Ibid.
59 "The Marshall Plan," a Public Broadcasting System (PBS) television documentary concerning the 50th anniversary of the Marshall Plan. The program was broadcast for the first time on US television during the month of June, in 1997, when the US Secretary of State during the Clinton Administration, Madeleine Albright, gave the commencement address at Harvard University’s graduation ceremonies, commemorating Marshall’s speech fifty years earlier. In addition, PBS News Hour, “Remembering the Man and His Plan,” June 5, 1997.
60 Douglas (London) to SecState, June 25, 1947, RG263, Murphy Collection, Box No. 117, folder 1947, NARA.
61 Kenneth P. Landon, SWNCC paper, July 1, 1947, in folder labeled “NEI, SWNCC Papers,” RG 59, PSA, Box No. 12, NARA.
63 Landon to Butterworth, March 30, 1948, in folder “Communism in SEA,” RG 59, PSA, Box No. 5, NARA.
64 British Embassy in Washington to Reed, May 21, 1948, in folder “Communism in SEA,” RG 59, PSA, Box No. 5, NARA.
65 McVey, *The Soviet View*, p. 43.
67 FE “Weekly Review Summary,” July 21, 1948, in folder labeled “Communism in SEA,” RG 59, PSA, Box No. 5, NARA. Thailand, as an independent nation state, had exchanged ambassadors with the USSR in May 1948.
70 For the most complete account of the Soviet side of the Suripno affairs see McVey, *Soviet View*, pp. 47-53. The Stalin-Tito conflict, which would erupt in full force during the summer of 1948, was already smoldering at this time and hardened the Soviet line toward nationalism in general.
71 Ibid.
More than three weeks before the Soviet Union signed the agreement, the State Department was notified by the Dutch Embassy of Suripno’s activities and Sukarno’s authorization to conduct negotiations; MemCon, April 30, 1948, RG 263, Murphy Collection, folder 1948-I, Box No. 118, NARA.

Folder labeled “Reports from NEFIS – 141”, RG 218, Records of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Chairman’s File,” Admiral Leahy, 1942-1948, Box No. 22, NARA.

Folder labeled “Netherlands Indies Government Information Service: Indonesian Problem: Facts and Factors,” RG 319 Records of the Army Staff (“P” Files), Box No. 2535; WDGS Intelligence Report, January 14, 1948, RG 263, Murphy Collection, folder 1948-I, Box No. 118, NARA.

Even companies such as Royal Dutch Shell as well as private Dutch citizens wrote letters to the State Department in an effort to increase the understanding among US officials of the Dutch position vis-à-vis the red menace. Concerning the Shell report, a NEFIS official remarked that although it displayed “rather propagandistic tendencies,” it was nonetheless based on facts. NEFIS to Spoor, August 4, 1948, NIB, Vol. 14, p. 523.

Lacy to Butterworth, April 5, 1948, in folder labeled “Communism I”, RG 59, PSA, Box No. 12, reviewing “Communism in Indonesia” (February 1948) by Major drs. H.J.R.R. Baron Melvill van Carnbee, representative to the CCS. The more than seventy page long memorandum can be found (amongst many other locations) in folder labeled “CCS 381 NEI”, RG 218, Records of the JCS, “Chairman’s File,” Admiral Leahy, 1942-1948, Box No. 43, NARA.


MemCon, Reed and Helb, September 2, 1948, in folder labeled “Relations with the USSR,” RG 59, PSA, Box No. 12, NARA.

Van Vredenburch to Beel, June 8, 1948, NIB, Vol. 14, p. 51; Van Boetzelaer to Van Kleffens, June 8, 1948, Ibid, p. 54, and fn 2; Van Kleffens to Van Boetzelaer, June 9, 1948, Ibid, pp. 88-89, also fn. 5. According to information provided by the French Ambassador, the State Department also held the opinion that Dutch military forces would be insufficient to impose a successful military solution to their colonial troubles. Since it was repeatedly acknowledged in various reports that the Dutch could easily conquer the remainder of Republican territory, it is likely that the Americans referred, in this instance, to the Dutch incapacity to maintain control over areas that would descend into guerrilla warfare.

MemCon, Lovett, Van Kleffens, and Blom, July 13, 1948, FRUS, Vol. 6, pp. 282-283; Van Kleffens to Van Boetzelaer, July 13, 1948, NIB, Vol. 14, pp. 207; Blom to Beel, July 19, 1948, NIB, Vol. 14, p. 405, Appendix 2. Blom even wrote that in case a GOC proposed solution would fail, the Under Secretary had presumably said that proceeding with the formation of the USI without the Republic might be the right solution, Ibid, p. 405. See also McMahon, Colonialism and Cold War, p. 235.


Marshall to Livengood and Cochran, August 31, 1948, FRUS, Vol. 6, p. 312.

In an article in 2001, Gilbert Doré still repeated the American myth that from the beginning, “the United States had been instrumental in assisting Indonesia achieve independence from the Dutch Crown, [while] in Indochina it did not choose to play such an active role until 1950.” See “Alternatives in United States Foreign Policy,” Historicom: The Online History Magazine (Spring 2001), p. 3.
CHAPTER ELEVEN
Rescuing the Republic’s Moderates from Soviet Communism: Washington’s Conversion to Unequivocal Support of Indonesia’s Independence

2 Van Kleffens also suggested that the State Department should consider the appointment of Norman Armour as the third American GOC representative. Armour, a distinguished career diplomat, had served in St. Petersburg during the Russian Revolution, when he had helped a “Russian princess,” who would subsequently become his wife, to safety in the West. Thereafter, he was assigned, among other places, to US diplomatic posts in Spain, Chile, Japan, Italy, Argentina, and Canada. In 1947-1949, he was an Assistant Secretary of State; Van Kleffens to Van Boetzelaer, July 8, 1948, NIB, Vol. 14, p. 334.
3 Van Boetzelaer to Snouck Hurgronje, September 14, 1947, NIB, Vol. 11, p. 98.
5 NEFIS Officer Kiés to General Spoor, August 4, 1948, NIB, Vol. 15, pp. 521-524.
6 Ibid., and “Communist Influences on Nationalism in Indonesia,” The Hague, July 1948, 2.21.036.01, Collection 216, S.H. Spoor, 1946-1949, No. 52, ARA.
7 Ibid., and “Communist Influences on Nationalism in Indonesia,” The Hague, July 1948, 2.21.036.01, Collection 216, S.H. Spoor, 1946-1949, No. 52, ARA.
8 NEFIS Officer Kiés to General Spoor, August 4, 1948, NIB, Vol. 15, pp. 521-524. Cochran illustrated his “apprehension” regarding the interwoven character of US politics and international communism by pointing to recent developments in the United States. The prominent New Deal liberal, Henry Wallace, had formed the Progressive Party, which Truman compared to a bunch of traitors who had sold out their country. According to Cochran, Wallace was not at all a communist when he served as the New Deal Secretary of Agriculture during the 1930’s or as Vice President under Roosevelt from 1940 to 1944, but now he had become “completely entangled in communist nets.”
9 Cochran to Marshall, November 6, 1948, FRUS, Vol. 6, p. 467.
10 Van Boetzelaer to the Netherlands GOC delegation, August 6, 1948, NIB, Vol. 14, pp. 536-537.
11 Cochran to Marshall, November 6, 1948, FRUS, Vol. 6, p. 467.
14 Cochran cabled the State Department that he “endeavoured [to] preserve as much of the Netherlands draft political agreement as possible,” but Dutch objections hardly seem to have been taken into account. Instead, Cochran wrote, “US-Aus working paper as revised by Department drawn on importantly.” Cochran to Marshall, September 7, 1948, FRUS, Vol. 6, p. 322.
15 Dickover to Butterworth on conversation with Paul Gray, October 22, 1948, RG 59, 856D.00/10-2248, Box No. 6440, NARA. This document shows, once more, that the British were still deeply involved in the Indonesian Question and were well informed. Cochran seemed to be in touch with British Consul General Shepard in Batavia, who relayed all the news to the Foreign Office. The sophisticated knowledge of the British was evident from a number of documents. John Paton Davies, a prominent member of the Policy Planning Staff, considered British Acting Consul General Lambert to be
better grounded in the NEI than any of our own people.” Lambert, like most English diplomats, was critical of Dutch policies and held that “the Dutch had, when they returned to the islands, a problem susceptible to fairly easy solution. Their pride, their stubbornness, their folly ... are proving to be their undoing.” MemCon, Davies to Butterworth and Lovett, about a conversation with Lambert, June 30, 1948, R.G 59, Records of the Policy Planning Staff 1947-1953, in folder labeled “Indonesia”, Box No. 18, NARA. In June 1948, the Policy Planning Staff had shown explicit interest in the Indonesian Question for the first time. Far Eastern Intelligence in Singapore also kept a close watch on Indonesian developments, as evident from their SEALF/FARELF Intelligence Reviews, and a detailed report on the TNI from November 1948. This report, which the American liaison officer in Singapore received from MI-5, provided details varying from the two flame throwers in TNI possession to marriage allowances for soldiers. “Notes on the Army of the Indonesian Republic (TNI),” November 1948, R.G 319, Records of the Army Staff, Box No. 2564, NARA. Although the British thought they still had some influence with the Republicans, their offer to use it was refused by the Dutch. Gray wondered why, but it was likely that the Dutch mistrusted the British almost as much as they suspected the Australians. They even accused the British of aiding the Republicans. On British concurrence with the Americans on the Cochran Plan see FRUS, Vol. 6, p. 347.


18 MemCon, Marshall and State Department staff, September 17, 1948, FRUS, Vol. 6, pp. 343-345.

19 Gerlof Homan has argued that “perhaps the most important and decisive factor in Washington’s change in policy was Secretary of State Marshall’s support of those who had been suggesting a less pro-Dutch policy. It was he who was able to persuade various ‘elements’ in the State Department to support the Cochran Plan.” However, while Marshall’s turn-about made a difference, he certainly did not have to persuade anyone of the need for an alternative course, and even less so to convince them that supporting the Cochran Plan was worthwhile – a position that found little or no opposition in Truman Administration circles. See Homan, “The Netherlands, The United States, and the Indonesian Question”, pp. 130-132.


21 Jaquet, Minister Stikker, 35-36, 58; D.U. Stikker, Memoires; herinneringen uit de lange jaren waarin ik betrokken was bij de voortdurende wereldcrisis. (Rotterdam/The Hague, 1966); Van Kleffens to Stikker, September 14, 1948, NIB, Vol. 15, p. 84.


24 Lovett to Cochran, September 20, 1948, R.G 263, Murphy Collection, folder 1948-I, Box No. 118, NARA.


26 According to Kahin, the shift in public opinion in favor of Moscow was not deeply rooted. Muso’s arrival in Indonesia a month before the Madiun coup led to the general assumption that the Soviet Union was to be blamed for the short-lived civil war


28 For the most comprehensive accounts on the Republican Army see Abdul Haris Nasution, *Tentara Nasional Indonesia*, II Vols. (Jakarta, 1956, 1971).

29 Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution*, p. 262, noted that Hatta aimed at eventually reducing troop strength to 57,000 troops. A military intelligence report on the TNI similarly argued that the army was to be reduced to a figure somewhere between 45,000 and 60,000. According to this report only 40 percent of the troops in Java and 30 percent of the troops in Sumatra carried actual firearms. FARELF report “Notes on the Army of the Indonesian Republic (TNI),” November 1948, RG 319, Records of the Army Staff, Box No. 2564, NARA.


33 Spoor to Van Mook, July 21, 1948, 2.21.036.01, Collection 216, S.H. Spoor 1946-1949, No. 54, ARA.

34 Swift, *The Road to Madiun*, p. 50.


36 *Far Eastern Land Forces Intelligence Review* (FARELF) obtained from British Military Intelligence through US Military liaison office in Singapore, October 1948, RG 319, Records of the Army Staff, “P” files, 1946-1951, NARA.


38 Antara, September 1, 1948. Quoted by Livengood to Marshall, September 2, 1948, RG 263, Murphy Collection, folder 1948 I, Box No. 118, NARA.


40 Daftar Transkripsi Kaset Rekaman Wawancara, Sejarah Lisan, Soedjatmoko interview with Yowono Dwi Priyantono, casette No. V, ANRI.


43 Message from “Alusna,” Batavia, September 2, 1948, action CNI (Central Naval Intelligence), RG 263, Murphy Collection, folder 1948-I, Box No. 118, NARA.


45 Timperley (Australian secretary to the GOC) to Narayanan (chief secretary to the GOC) in New York, September 19, 1948, NIB, Vol. 15, p. 127, fn 4. Sukarno and Hatta expressed their fear of arms being sent to communists by plane because an airfield was conveniently located near Madiun.
Charles Reed, who was a senior official within the Philippines and Southeast Asian Affairs Division, registered his surprise at the relatively high reliability rating of the report, but he wondered whether supporting evidence could be obtained. There was probably none. However, as the Madiun uprising unfolded, Hatta again expressed his concerns to Cochran concerning the possibility that the Soviets would supply arms to the rebels by using an air strip near Madiun, since Muso had pledged support from Moscow. Cochran to Marshall, September 21, 1948, RG 263, Murphy Collection, folder 1948-I, Box No. 118, NARA.

For the American conviction that a rapid conclusion of a favorable agreement would strengthen Hatta’s hand against the communists, see FRUS, 1948, Vol. 6, pp. 307, 312, 323-325, 327, 345. The Americans seemed aware of Hatta’s fears that the PKI/FDR would resist an agreement with force. Swift, *The Road to Madiun*, p. 84; McVey, *The Soviet View*, pp. 65-68.

According to a report on October 2, 1948, written by a Republican Chief Police Commissioner, K. Sosrodanukusumo, and two colleagues (Memet Tanumijaya and Mujoko), entitled “Keadaan sebelum peristiwa Madiun terjadi,” an array of *warok* groups, “dressed in black trousers and shirts, armed with *klewang* and some with fire arms, had entered the city of Madiun on September 16th ... On the evening of September 17th, yet another unit of *warok*, under the leadership of Jaya Pantas, entered the city,” pp. 1-2. Police Chief Sosrodanukusumo noted that Jaya Pantas may have been a member of FDR. Arsip Kepolisian Negara RI, 1947-1949, No. 542, ANRI.

Scholars such as Kahin, McVey, McMahon, and Swift have argued that this uprising was caused by second-level party operatives, and not by the senior leadership of the party, who had not entertained any immediate plans for armed insurrection. Once the rebellion had broken out, however, the PKI leadership did assume control. There is also an apparent consensus regarding the Madiun rebellion not being the result of Cominform directives or the Calcutta Conference. However, the Yogyakarta Police Archives assign an additional role to civilian groups such as *warok*.

A member of the Madiun *Front Nasional* regime's Public Information Division was a “full-blooded Dutchman named Piet (Pieter) van Staveren, born in Rotterdam on June 9, 1925, who adhered to no religion but communism. During Muso’s reign in Madiun, he spoke several times in Dutch on Radio *Gelora Pemuda.*” Officially categorized as deserter by the Netherlands Army since October 1, 1946, he crossed over to the Indonesian side near Nyalindung – on the railroad from Padelaran to Sukabumi – on June 14, 1947, to avoid having to participate in the first Police Action, as he told TNI officers. Van Staveren, originally trained as a mechanic, joined the PKI and used his knowledge of electronic equipment during the Madiun Rebellion. After seizing radio transmitters from the nearby Moaspati airport, he not only fixed but also improved them. “When Muso c.s. were forced to flee into the mountains [after being routed by the Siliwangi Division], they carried with them several of Van Staveren’s
No. 5523, Yogya Dokumen, ANRI.
54 Sosrodanukusumo, et al., “Keadaan sebelum peristiwa Madiun terjadi,” p. 4. The stu-
dents’ contact with the outside world, and especially with Yogyakarta, was in violation of an order issued by the Front Nasional Military Commander of the city, Colonel Joko Suyono, on September 21st “that all forms of direct communication with institutions outside Madiun, both civilian and military, should cease.” Arsip Kepolisian Negara RI 1947-1949, No. 542, ANRI.
55 Meeting of Sassen, Stikker, and Neher in Batavia, December 4, 1948, NIB, Vol. 16, pp. 33. Cochran’s statement was distorted when his “surprisingly reasonable” comment resurfaced on December 8th; on that day Prime Minister Drees noted that apparently “Cochran had told Stikker that he found the general Dutch demeanor surprisingly reasonable.” NIB, Vol. 16, p. 72.
56 Cochran to Marshall, gocus 381, September 19, 1948, RG 263, Murphy Collection, 
folder 1948-I, Box No. 118, NARA; Neher to Drees, September 22, 1948, NIB, Vol. 
15, pp. 171-175; Van Kleffens to Stikker, September 20, 1948, NIB, Vol. 15, p. 161. The 
cables referred to here are found in the Murphy Collection; some of them are also 
published in FRUS. Since the intensity of telegraphic communications between 
Batavia and the State Department rose sharply in this period, amounting to several 
per day, telegram numbers are also mentioned.
57 Van Kleffens to Stikker, September 22, 1948, NIB, Vol. 15, p. 178; Livengood to 
Marshall, gocus 383, September 20, 1948, RG 263, Murphy Collection, folder 1948- 
I, Box No. 118, NARA. In Yogyakarta it was rumored at this time that the Dutch 
armed forces were going to move in. This, Livengood argued, “might swing many 
people over to Muso - however, [I] do not believe that the Dutch will commit such 
[a] faux pas at present time.” Livengood to Marshall, No. 811, September 20, 1948, 
received the following day, Ibid.
58 Livengood to Marshall, No. 811, Ibid; Mayer to Marshall, No. 807, September 20, 
1948, Ibid. The latter report also mentioned that stockpiling activity by the 
Netherlands Air Force in Semarang was evidence of the Dutch “preparation for air 
action or demonstration.”
59 Ibid. Lovink to Stikker, September 23, 1948, NIB, Vol. 15, pp. 197-198. This informa-
tion was forwarded to The Hague, where it became known to the Dutch Foreign 
Ministry.
60 Cochran to Marshall, gocus 384, September 20, received September 21, 1948, RG 
263, Murphy Collection, folder 1948-I, Box No. 118, NARA.
61 Lovett to Livengood, No. 443, September 22, 1948, Ibid.
63 Cochran to Marshall, gocus 384, September 20, 1948, Ibid; Cochran to Marshall, 
gocus 391, September 25, 1948, FRUS, Vol. 6, pp. 371-372; Elink Schuurman to 
64 Front Nasional, September 26, 1948. This official daily news briefing of the revolu-
tionary communist government at Madiun mentions nothing more than that 
Campbell was a staff member of the US Consulate General in Batavia; in George 
McTurnan Kahin Collection.
65 Arthur Campbell, or Arturo as he was also called, should not be confused with 
Duncan Campbell, who was a labor attaché in the Consulate General in Batavia. The 
only account of Arthur Campbell’s mission is given by George Kahin, who met him in 
person during another visit by the CIA agent to Yogyakarta in November of 1948.
Kahin refers only to this particular visit. Campbell appears in FRUS, 1948, Vol. 6, on pp. 372-374, but only in his capacity as attaché. McMahon and Mrázek briefly mention the event using Kahin’s experience. Kahin, “The US and the Anti-colonial Revolutions”, p. 350; Kahin, “Recollections and Reflections,” p. 6; McMahon, Colonialism and Cold War, p. 244; Mrázek, The US and the Indonesian Military, p. 73.

In 1947, the CIA had been created to coordinate the government’s intelligence operations and provide the President with quick, clear information. After the Czech coup in 1948, Truman extended CIA authority to conduct covert political operations, including “sabotage,” “subversion,” and “mendacity” if necessary. One of the first secret CIA operations was the extension of financial and practical support to Italy’s Christian Democrats who were facing the powerful Italian Communist Party. Walter LaFeber, The American Age: US Foreign Policy at Home and Abroad, 1750 to the Present (New York/London, 1994), p. 483.

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68 Lovett to Cochran, usgoc 149, September 27, 1948, RG 263, Murphy Collection, folder 1948-II, Box No. 118, NARA; Lovett to Cochran, usgoc 156, October 1, 1948, ibid.
69 Elink Schuurman to Stikker, October 9, 1948, NIB, Vol. 15, pp. 394-395.
70 The coordination between the GOC, the CIA, and the State Department concerning US policy towards the Republic – a task assigned to the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) – was slack at this point in time. Created at the instigation of George F. Kennan in June 1948, the OPC, which was in fact the covert operations section within the CIA, was controlled not by the Director of Central Intelligence but by the Secretary of State, albeit funded by the CIA. This awkward administrative construction, in combination with CIA’s director Roscoe C. Hillenkoetter’s lack of authority, contributed to OPC ineffectiveness. Christopher Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush (New York, 1995) pp. 173-174; John Ranelagh, The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA (New York, 1986), pp. 116 (fn), 133.
71 Cochran to Marshall, gocus 403, October 5, 1948, RG 263, Murphy Collection, folder 1948-II, Box No. 118, NARA, and Lovett to Cochran, gocus 157, October 6, 1948, ibid.
73 Hickerson, Butterworth, and Sanders (UN Affairs) to Lovett, September 23, 1948, RG 59, 856D.00/9-2348, Box No. 6440. The threat of possible US recognition of the Republic, contemplated by some, went too far for them; Livengood to Marshall, October 11, 1948, RG 263, Murphy Collection, folder 1948-II, Box No. 118, NARA.
74 Cochran to Marshall, gocus 425, November 1, 1948, RG 263, Murphy Collection, folder 1948-II, Box No. 118, NARA.
75 Livengood to Marshall, no. 448, November 19, 1948, RG 59, 856D.00/11-1948, Box No. 6440; Mayer to Marshall, November 8, 1948, RG 263, Murphy Collection, folder 1948-II, Box No. 118, NARA. The US Military Attaché, Colonel Mayer, seems to have misunderstood the gossip, labeling the former Heineken Director Stikker “a beef baron”.
76 Cochran to Marshall, gocus 403, October 5, 1948, RG 263, Murphy Collection, folder 1948-II, Box No. 118, NARA; Cochran to Marshall, October 10, 1948, FRUS, 1948, Vol. 6, p. 404.
77 During the early 1950's, this would cause a rift between Hatta and Sukarno, whose main occupation was national unity through consensus, and therefore insisted on PKI representation in the cabinet; see Kahin and Kahin, Subversion as Foreign Policy, pp. 42-43.

78 Marshall to State Department, October 13, 1948, RG 263, Murphy Collection, folder 1948-II, Box No. 118, NARA; Cochran to Marshall, gocus 425, November 1, 1948, Ibid; Lovett to Cochran, gocus 182, October 28, 1948, Ibid.

79 PPS51/NSC51, “US Policy towards Southeast Asia,” July 1, 1949, RG 273, National Security Council Policy Papers, Box No. 7, NARA. This PPS paper had been under consideration since late 1948, and appears to have been drafted mainly by George F. Kennan and John Paton Davies.


81 MemCon, British Embassy Counsellor H.A. Graves and Lacy, November 4, 1948, RG 59, 856D.00/11-448, Box No. 6440, NARA.

82 Dirk U. Stikker, Memoires. Herinneringen uit de lange jaren waarin ik betrokken was bij de voortdurende wereldcrisis (Rotterdam/The Hague, 1966), p. 131.

83 Quoted by Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution, p. 344.

84 Jaquet, Minister Stikker en de soevereiniteitsoverdracht, passim; J.G. de Beus, Morgen bij het aanbreken van de dag: Nederland driemaal aan de vooravond van oorlog (Rotterdam, 1977), passim; Gerlof D. Homan, “The Netherlands, the United States, and the Indonesian Question,” pp. 123-141.


87 Ibid.

88 McMahon, Colonialism and Cold War, p. 249.

89 Cochran to Elink Schuurman, December 18, 1948, FRUS, Vol. 6, pp. 571, 576.

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1 Kennan to Marshall and Lovett, December 17, 1948, RG 59, Records of the Policy Planning Staff, 1947-1953 (PPS), Box No. 18, dossier “Indonesia,” NARA. See also the discussion in Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power. National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford, 1992), pp. 260-61.

2 Ibid.

3 Ibid.

4 Ibid.

5 Ibid.

6 Ibid.

7 Ibid.


9 Ibid.

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12 Personal letter from Dean Rusk to Charlton Ogburn, September 9, 1985. In the 1980’s, Rusk served as Dean of the University of Georgia Law School.
13 Draft policy paper, February 28, 1949, in folder labeled “Policy Papers (Miscellaneous)”, RG 59, PSA, Box No. 5, NARA. In the final NSC-51 version, this phrase was replaced with “this Dutch course of action”.
15 Melvyn Leffler, A Preponderance of Power, p. 475.
16 PPS51/NSC51, “US Policy toward Southeast Asia,” July 1, 1949, RG 273, Records of the NSC Policy Papers, Box No. 7, NARA.
18 On this topic, see Audrey R. Kahin and George McTurnan Kahin, Subversion as Foreign Policy: the Secret Eisenhower and Dulles Debacle in Indonesia (New York, 1995), passim.
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