This book sheds light on the integration processes and identity patterns of Angolan, Brazilian and Eastern European communities in Portugal. It examines the privileged position that immigrant organisations hold as interlocutors between the communities they represent and various social service mechanisms operating at national and local levels. Through the collection of ethnographic data and the realisation of 110 interviews with community insiders and middlemen, culled over a year’s time, João Sardinha provides insight into how the three groups are perceived by their respective associations and representatives. Following up on the rich data is a discussion of strategies of coping with integration and identity in the host society and reflections on Portuguese social and community services and institutions.

João Sardinha is a researcher at the Centre for the Study of Migrations and Intercultural Relations (CEMRI) at Universidade Aberta (Open University) in Lisbon.

“This book makes a substantial contribution to our understanding of the role immigrant associations play in migrant integration processes and identity formation. João Sardinha provides rich new empirical evidence on Portuguese immigrant communities spanning three continents.”

Maria Lucinda Fonseca, Director and Senior Researcher, Centro de Estudos Geográficos, University of Lisbon

“A rich blend of theoretical insight and extensive field research, this book by João Sardinha shows that immigrant associations both foster ethnic identity and act as a channel for integration to the Portuguese host society.”

Russell King, Professor of Geography, University of Sussex and Editor, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies
Immigrant Associations, Integration and Identity
The IMISCOE Network of Excellence unites over 500 researchers from European institutes specialising in studies of international migration, integration and social cohesion. The Network is funded by the Sixth Framework Programme of the European Commission on Research, Citizens and Governance in a Knowledge-Based Society. Since its foundation in 2004, IMISCOE has developed an integrated, multidisciplinary and globally comparative research project led by scholars from all branches of the economic and social sciences, the humanities and law. The Network both furthers existing studies and pioneers new research in migration as a discipline. Priority is also given to promoting innovative lines of inquiry key to European policymaking and governance.

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Immigrant Associations, Integration and Identity

Angolan, Brazilian and Eastern European Communities in Portugal

João Sardinha

IMISCOE Dissertations

Amsterdam University Press
# Table of contents

**Acknowledgements**  
9

**List of figures and tables**  
13

**Abbreviations**  
15

## 1 Introduction  
1.1 Framing the research: Three questions  
22  
1.2 Choosing the groups to be studied  
25  
1.3 Outline of the thesis  
26

## 2 Integration and identity: Theoretical concepts and approaches  
2.1 Frameworks of integration  
32  
2.2 Immigrant integration and government forms  
39  
2.3 Citizenship, the politics of participation and mobilisation  
45  
2.4 Identity, ethnicity and the age of transnationalism  
50  
   2.4.1 Ethnic identities and ethnic group formation  
   51  
   2.4.2 Ethnic mobilisation  
   56  
   2.4.3 Ethnic identity options and the creation of multiple identities  
   57  
   2.4.4 Transnationalism and identity  
   61

## 3 The phenomenon of migrant associations  
3.1 Communities, voluntary associations and aspects of social cohesion: A theoretical review  
66  
   3.1.1 Tocqueville’s three-sector model  
   69  
   3.1.2 Civil society and social capital  
   71  
3.2 Immigrant associations: Roles and motivations  
76  
3.3 Immigrant associations, integration and identity  
81  
3.4 Immigrant associations and nation-states  
87
4 Characteristics and consequences of immigration to Portugal
4.1 Portugal’s position in the international migration cycle
4.2 Immigration history and demographic developments
4.3 Geographic and labour market distribution
  4.3.1 Geographical distribution
  4.3.2 Labour market distribution
4.4 Politicising immigration and integration
  4.4.1 State-based integration policies and institutional settings
  4.4.2 Municipal institutional settings and initiatives
4.5 Immigrant association movements in Portugal

5 Setting the scene: Research design and fieldwork methodology
5.1 Research aims and methodology: An overview
  5.1.1 Interview schedule, subject selection and conducting the interviews
  5.1.2 Data management and analysis
  5.1.3 Secondary sources: Literary data and participant observation
5.2 Mapping the fieldwork: The organisations and their locations

6 The associations: A typology
6.1 Association histories
  6.1.1 Angolan associations
  6.1.2 Brazilian associations
  6.1.3 Eastern European associations
6.2 Organisational structures, membership and the populations served
6.3 Scope of activities and primary areas of intervention
6.4 Material, economic and human resources
6.5 Organisational networks and forms of cooperation: ‘Bridging’ and ‘bonding’

7 The associations, integration and identity: Strategies for coping?
7.1 Community integration: Processes and problems
  7.1.1 The Angolan community
  7.1.2 The Brazilian community
  7.1.3 The Eastern European community
7.2 Differentiation of groups: Self-identification and host-society acceptance
  7.2.1 The Angolan community
  7.2.2 The Brazilian community
## TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7.2.3 The Eastern European community</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.3 Identity strategies: Assimilation vs. preservation</td>
<td>203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.4 The positions of the associations on integration and identity</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.5 The associations as transmitters of identity strategies</td>
<td>216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 The associations and Portuguese social and community services</td>
<td>223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.1 Regularisation and the Foreigners and Borders Services</td>
<td>223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.2 ACIME and the National Immigration Plan</td>
<td>228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.3 Employment, training and qualification recognition</td>
<td>231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.4 Housing</td>
<td>237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.5 Family reunification</td>
<td>242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.6 Immigrant descendents and education</td>
<td>247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.7 Health</td>
<td>252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.8 Associations and civic participation</td>
<td>256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Conclusion</td>
<td>267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.1 The immigrant associations in time and space</td>
<td>268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.2 Between the migrants and the host society</td>
<td>271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.3 Included, yet different: Integration, identity and citizenship</td>
<td>274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.4 Determinates to integration: Policies and social services</td>
<td>278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.5 ‘Only the future will tell …’</td>
<td>280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Epilogue</td>
<td>287</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix: List of interviewees</td>
<td>289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notes</td>
<td>295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bibliography</td>
<td>319</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Acknowledgements

My interest in immigrant associations originates from my very own upbringing – being raised the son of an immigrant association leader amongst the celebrations and camaraderie, on one hand, and the turmoil and politics, on the other, of a Portuguese immigrants’ association in Prince George, British Columbia, Canada. These were my first glances into a world that would, in years to come, inspire my life as a social science researcher.

The curiosity of wanting to learn about other similar organisations, however, beyond the one that I had gotten to know ‘from the inside’ in Canada, came about in Portugal. My initiation into the immigrant associative world in the Portuguese context came via my work with the Capeverdean community in the Lisbon Metropolitan Area for my MA thesis. Here I got to experience and learn about different realities and actions; associations driven by different objectives, representative of people with different characteristics. This, in turn, sparked further interest and research on the associative situations of other communities in Portugal. The result is this book that looks at Angolan, Brazilian and Eastern European associations in Portugal.

For this research the financial backing of two institutions has been crucial. First, a grant from the Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian made it possible for me to carry out the investigative work full-time during a three and a half-year period. Second, during the one year period I spent on fieldwork in Portugal, the travel and accommodation costs when doing research outside of Lisbon were financially supported by the Centro de Estudos de Geografia e Planeamento Regional, Universidade Nova de Lisboa. I wish to acknowledge both of these institutions.

I point out that this book is the outcome of collective work. Its realisation would not have been possible without the mutual help of friends, family, colleagues, participants – all those who in one form or another made it possible to ‘complete’ this study. It is thus the human support and collaboration of all who participated in this research that deserves more detail.
At the University of Sussex’s Sussex Centre for Migration Research (SCMR), where the thesis on which this book is bases was completed, I start by thanking my supervisor, Professor Russell King, for all his support, useful advice, time spent reading and helping me to structure my doctoral thesis, and challenging my thoughts whenever needed. Additionally, I am grateful to Professor Richard Black for his recommendations during the early development of my thesis and for his comments as internal examiner of the DPhil thesis. Equally, a vote of gratitude goes out to my external examiner, Professor Lucinda Fonseca at the Universidade de Lisboa, for her thoughtful comments and suggestions. Keeping within the academic realm, my appreciation is also owed to Professor Maria de Nazaré Roca at the Universidade Nova de Lisboa in Lisbon, and Professor Greg Halseth at the University of Northern British Columbia in Prince George, Canada, for their interest, openness and helpful advice. A vote of appreciation also goes out to my colleagues and friends at the Centro de Estudos de Geografia e Planeamento Regional, Universidade Nova de Lisboa for their fellowship, especially to Sergio Telésforo for helping produce the cartographic work presented in my thesis and Sara Encarnação for her helpful comments concerning the map layouts. Lastly, I’m thankful for having had the opportunity to work under the tutelage of the late Professor Maria Ioannis Baganha during the eighteen months I spent at Centro de Estudos Sociais, Universidade de Coimbra. Professor Baganha may no longer be among us, but her dedication and enthusiasm towards migration studies and the social sciences, in general, will surely live on, continuing to inspire all those who got the opportunity to work alongside her.

During the three and a half-year period that it took to write this study, mobility between Brighton and Lisbon occurred with regularity, for fieldwork, meetings, document or literature consultation, etc. I wish to thank those who provided me with accommodation during my stays in both Lisbon and Brighton. These individuals include my grandma Leopoldina and my friends Herman Pontes and Fernando Sequeira in Lisbon, and in Brighton, my University of Sussex colleague and friend Nina Marolt.

To my partner Susana Rodrigues, I am thankful for her support, patience and companionship; for listening and for helping me with the little bits and pieces along the way. I am also grateful to her parents Alpoim and Lucinda Rodrigues for all their hospitality.

To Maria Palmira Gomes and Arménio Sardinha, my parents, without whom none of this would be possible, I am fundamentally grateful for their unconditional support, for teaching me and for giving me this emigrant/immigrant life. As I often like to point out, I would be hard-pressed to find a more in-depth emigrant/immigrant fieldwork study than what has been our own lives.
I also wish to thank the staff at Amsterdam University Press and my IMISCOE colleagues for making this publication possible. I’m especially thankful to Karina Hof for her tremendous assistance during the revision process. Moreover, I am also grateful to the anonymous referees whose valuable commentary and suggestions were indispensable during revision of the manuscript. That said, I wish to emphasise that I am solely responsible for the final results presented in this book. Any errors or shortcomings are of my sole responsibility.

Last but not least, a heartfelt thank you to all those interviewees who shared their time and words with me, who invited me to celebrate special occasions with them – within the midst of their community – and who contributed to my learning experience. To those who, in the name of solidarity, work within and for their communities; who struggle against authoritarianism, bureaucracy, discrimination and xenophobia; who carry on everyday battles in the name of equal rights – this work is owed to them. These are their stories.
List of figures and tables

Figures

Figure 4.1 Portuguese international migration cycle 99
Figure 4.2 Evolution of the foreign population, 1960-2004 (with residence and permanência authorisations) 103
Figure 4.3 Stocks of foreign national populations residing in Portugal by region of origin/birth in 1970, 1980, 2000 and 2004 104
Figure 4.4 Geographical distribution of the total foreign population by district in Portugal, 2000 and 2004 106
Figure 4.5 Geographical distribution of the PALOP, Brazilian and Eastern European groups per district in Portugal, 2004 109
Figure 4.6 Foreign labour inflows in 2004 by regions of origin/birth and economic sector 110
Figure 5.1 Municipalities where the associations (headquarters and delegations) are located 137
Figure 6.1 Membership composition of the associations 164
Figure 6.2 Organisational relationship patterns of immigrant associations 176

Tables

Table 4.1 Most represented immigrant groups in Portugal in 2000 and 2004 105
Table 4.2 Foreign population growth rates per district between 2000 and 2004 107
Table 4.3 Work contracts of immigrants holding permanência authorisations by labour activity sectors and countries of origin in 2001 (per cent) 111
Table 5.1 Angolan associations interviewed and their locations 137
Table 5.2  Brazilian associations interviewed and their locations  139
Table 5.3  Eastern European associations interviewed and their locations  140
Table 5.4  Social and community service institutions interviewed  142
Table 6.1  The founding of the associations  146
Table 6.2  Legal constitutional status of the associations and other forms of recognition  163
Table 6.3  Groups of people catered to by the associations  165
Table 6.4  Areas of activity carried out by the associations  168
Table 6.5  Main association type  169
Table 6.6  Acquisition of central headquarters/clubhouse  172
Table 6.7  Sources of funding  173
Table 6.8  Degree of professionalisation  175
Table 7.1  Most referred to integration problems faced by the Angolan, Brazilian and Eastern European immigrants according to the respective association representatives  185
Table 7.2  Identity preservation and assimilation item mean scores  205
Abbreviations

AACILUS  Associação de Apoio à Cidadania Lusófona
AAMA  Associação Amigos da Mulher Angolana
ABEP  Associação de Pesquisadores e Estudantes Brasileiros
ABP  Associação Brasileira de Portugal
ABRUNA  Associação Brasileira da Universidade de Aveiro
ACIMA  Associação de Coordenação e Integração dos Migrantes Angolanos
ACIME  Alto Comissário para a Imigração e Minorias Étnicas
ADA  Associação de Defesa dos Angolanos
ADDIFA  Associação de Defesa dos Direitos das Famílias Angolanas
ADECKO  Associação para a Defesa dos Direitos da Cultura Backongo
AEAP  Associação dos Estudantes Angolanos em Portugal
AIAA  Associação Internacional Amigos de Angola
AMB  Associação Mais Brasil
AMI  Assistência Médica Internacional
ARACODI  Associação dos Residentes Angolanos no Conselho de Odivelas
ASAP  Associação de Solidariedade Angolana em Portugal
ASLI  Associação Apoio Sem Limites
BE  Bloco Esquerda
BRASUP  Associação da Comunidade Brasileira da Universidade do Porto
CBL  Casa do Brasil de Lisboa
CDVA  Clube Desportivo Veteranas de Angola
CEB  Clube de Empresários do Brasil
CEPAC  Centro Espiritano Padre Alves Correia
CGTP-IN  Confederação Geral dos Trabalhadores Portugueses – Intersindical Nacional
CICDR  Comissão para a Igualdade e Contra a Discriminação
CLAI  Centro Local de Apoio ao Imigrante
CMCEI  Conselho Municipal das Comunidades Étnicas e Imigrantes
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Name</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CMCIME</td>
<td>Conselho Municipal das Comunidades Imigrantes e das Minorias Étnicas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMCP</td>
<td>Conselho Municipal das Comunidades do Porto</td>
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<tr>
<td>CNAI</td>
<td>Centro Nacional de Apoio ao Imigrante</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COCAI</td>
<td>Conselho Consultivo para os Assuntos da Imigração</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DR</td>
<td>Diário da República</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAAP</td>
<td>Federação das Associações Angolanas em Portugal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAR</td>
<td>Frente Anti-Racista</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FNLA</td>
<td>National Liberation Front of Angola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSA</td>
<td>Fórum Social Angolano</td>
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<td>GAMA</td>
<td>Gabinete de Apoio ao Movimento Associativo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GARHC</td>
<td>Gabinete de Apoio ao Reconhecimento de Habilitações e de Competências</td>
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<td>GARSE</td>
<td>Gabinete de Assuntos Religiosos e Sociais Específicos</td>
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<td>GATAIME</td>
<td>Gabinete de Apoio Técnico às Associações de Imigrantes e Minorias Étnicas</td>
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<tr>
<td>IEFP</td>
<td>Instituto de Emprego e Formação Profissional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGT</td>
<td>Inspeção Geral de Trabalho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INE</td>
<td>Instituto Nacional de Estatística</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPSS</td>
<td>Instituição Particular de Solidariedade Social</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LLUANDA</td>
<td>Liga Luso-Angolana Demóstenes de Almeida</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LMA</td>
<td>Lisbon Metropolitan Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEBRAP</td>
<td>Movimento das Associações de Pesquisadores e Estudantes Brasileiros em Portugal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPLA</td>
<td>Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>non-government organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCPM</td>
<td>Obra Católica Portuguesa de Migrações</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PALOP</td>
<td>Países Africanos de Língua Oficial Portuguesa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAMA</td>
<td>Programa de Apoio ao Movimento Associativo</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAPMI</td>
<td>Professionalisation of Immigrant Doctors Support Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCP</td>
<td>Partido Comunista Português</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEHAPEI</td>
<td>Immigrant Nurses Professional and Academic Qualifications Equivalency Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PER</td>
<td>Programa Especial de Realojamento</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMA</td>
<td>Porto Metropolitan Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROSAUDESC</td>
<td>Associação de Promotores de Saúde, Ambiente e Desenvolvimento Sócio-Cultural</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSD</td>
<td>Partido Social Democrata</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT</td>
<td>Partido dos Trabalhadores</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEF</td>
<td>Serviço de Estrangeiros e Fronteiras</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEI</td>
<td>Setibá, Etnias e Imigração</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCAL</td>
<td>Secretariado Coordenador das Ações de Legalização</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIPEC</td>
<td>Sociedade Internacional de Promoção de Ensino e Cultura</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SJR</td>
<td>Serviço Jesuítas aos Refugiados</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNS</td>
<td>Serviço Nacional de Saúde</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOLIM</td>
<td>Solidariedade Imigrante – Associação para a Defesa dos Direitos dos Imigrantes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCI</td>
<td>União de Créditos Imobiliários</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UGT</td>
<td>União Geral de Trabalhadores</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UJAP</td>
<td>União da Juventude Angolana em Portugal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNITA</td>
<td>National Union for the Total Independence of Angola</td>
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The faces of Portugal are changing. Census data confirm what has become apparent on the streets, in schools, hospitals, health centres and so on. In the cities and suburban neighbourhoods new sounds are heard, new scents smelt, new tastes savoured and, above all, new faces seen. Flows of newcomers have come from various parts of the world – some from developing countries; others from industrialised parts of the globe. Some have migrated from countries with long colonial ties to Portugal; others from countries that have very few ties with the host country. Some have come through legal channels; others in an undocumented fashion. The characteristics that define the newcomers are also varied. Some arrive with professional and technical skills; others are unqualified. Some come individually without knowing anyone in Portugal; others join family or friends. And some come speaking Portuguese; others, not a word of it. Whatever the situation, these are ‘the new faces’ of Portugal and, very much like the general population, they share the same human needs. However, beyond the basic human needs, newcomers often also have special requirements related to language and cultural patterns, their customary lifestyles and perceptions of others. Furthermore, they experience the trauma of separation from their homeland and the problems of coping in a new environment. The special requirements often imply that special considerations have to be given, often in the form of policies and services to facilitate immigrants’ adaptation to the host society.

The study of processes and routes taken by immigrants when adapting to a ‘new’ environment, as is the case of this research, is, in fact, an issue that has come under a lot of scrutiny within migration-oriented literature. Although, in the Portuguese scenario, as described, I point out the traumas encountered on the part of immigrants once they’ve arriving in the host country, not to mention the pressures of adjustment and the often redefinition of the ‘self’, also worthy of consideration is the host society and the impact of immigration on it – how do governments deal with new cultures and religious diversity as well as the demands of immigrants? Debate around these issues and questions has been quite extensive. Theoretically, this study stakes out its territory in the literature on immigrant integration and identity (re)formation. Within this terri-
tory, some theoretical implications are worthy of some attention. First, in
the vast fields of knowledge concerning the concepts integration and
identity; where various arguments, approaches and interpretations exist.
Such multiplicity has also served to cause some mystification of the con-
cepts. The reality is that when speaking of immigrant integration and
identification issues, we are, in fact, aiming at a constantly moving tar-
get, as the vast literature on these issues has come to demonstrate. Dif-
ferent strategies and policies, ranging from multicultural approaches of
integration, to assimilationist tactics, have been studied and scrutinised,
defended by some, attacked by others. History has equally played a part
in such conceptualisation. A lot of the early research favoured assimila-
tion as the proper way to achieve a well integrated society. Identification,
in this case, is to be seen as a dimension of social integration, implying
the identification of an individual with that of the majority population.
Since the late 1960s, however, egalitarianism and respect for difference
has taken on greater importance. Policy-wise, this has been demon-
strated through the adaptation of multicultural principles, at national
and local levels, providing greater rights of citizenship and equal access
to host society institutions and services (Vermeulen and Penninx 2000).
Although the majority of Western states have today rejected assimilation
as a policy goal, adopting, in its place, variations of multicultural guide-
lines, it is worth highlighting that the concept of assimilation is, in fact,
far from being completely forgotten. A variety of authors, in fact, point
out its resurgence in recent years (Brubaker 2001; Heckmann 2004).
Setting this book within these theoretical frameworks, the overbearing
angle of this research will be to look closely at the role of, or that may be
attributed to, immigrant organisations when it comes to community in-
tegration, identity formation and participation, taking into consideration
negotiating tactics adaptation when dealing with the host society institu-
tions, etho-cultural differences and the general ‘warmth of the welcome’
on the part of society at large.

Accompanying the empirically based observations, this study sets it-
self within the theoretical mindset that integration and identity are not
only socially constructed, but mutually constructed by the immigrant
groups and the society they are becoming a part of. Within this frame-
work, I set out to defend the stance that integration is an objective to be
accomplished within an intercultural/multicultural framework. I per-
ceive integration as a mutable process, ever-changing in time and in
space. Integration processes do not see a conclusive result; instead it’s
the progression and the making of headway towards achieving the accep-
tance of difference within a democratic, multicultural state that is the
primary aim. I, therefore, support the premise that integration can only
start to take place once the granting of equal citizenship rights are ac-
complished, a step that should be guaranteed politically and administra-
tively for all members of society. I advocate the right to negotiate identity and difference, in turn, allowing all members of civil society the right to politically and actively belong and participate under the flagship of plurality.

Concerning the other principal topic of examination in this study – that of identity – I do not so much set out to defend a particular theoretical identity strategy, but simply to defend the right to freedom of choice. I argue that this should, again, be a guaranteed right, held under constituted laws, policies and programmes. As the Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor (1989) points out, modern identity is inherently political owed to the fact it demands recognition. Hence identity politics revolves around demands for recognition of collective identities – that is, affirmations of equality. My position resonates from this very argument. Hence, I do not set out to defend a segregationist viewpoint of integration nor, on the other hand, do I argue in favour of assimilation. Instead, I defend the establishment of outlets of participation; the providing of equal voices and the right to freely choose a path of integration and identification, collectively and independently. This I also apply to the debate on immigrant associations. Key to the concept of association is the term ‘voluntary’; this is to say ones self-intended choice to associate. I approach associativism from this point-of-view, as I defend that associative activity keeps democratic liberties in check. In the case of immigrant associations, this not only includes the right to associate, but also in keeping integration and identification liberties equally ensured.

That said, the intrinsic characteristics involved in migration processes, as well as the forms of integration activated by migrants upon settling into the new country, will influence the way they are inserted into the country’s social milieu. From one perspective, the new context immigrants find themselves in might lead to the alteration of identity patterns as a result of the adaptation experiences encountered in the ‘new’ physical, social and cultural space (Kolm 1980; Saint-Maurice 1997). On the other hand, the immigrants might be interested in preserving the elements that identify them as a collective group or community. It might be their goal to maintain their position as separate from ‘mainstream society’; to segregate themselves in order to preserve what defines them. With the goal of establishing networks of protection against elements that the group might collectively perceive as different and/or threatening to them, and to promote the cohesion and continuity of their particular community and ethno-cultural identity, immigrants will organise themselves through visible and invisible links (Rocha-Trindade 1995; Minghuan 1999). Yet another aspect of immigrant groups’ integration into a host society results from the extent to which the host society will permit immigrants to insert themselves into the ‘mainstream’ through its policies, programmes and integration initiatives. If those
policies and initiatives do not coincide with the desires of the immigrant groups; if community members feel that entry into the host society is not being facilitated and that they are being treated unjustly; then the natural outcome will often be to coordinate action and lobby for change.

Consequently, for these and other reasons, immigrants unite, create links and organise, leading to the creation of collective organisations, also termed associations. As Casey (1988: 240) points out, the study of immigrant associations will often reveal a strong link between social, cultural, political and service functions that, in the context of an immigrant community with perhaps an uncertain future in the host country, cannot easily be separated. For this very reason, associations commonly find themselves negotiating across receiving–sending country contexts in search of ‘the best of both worlds’. This considered, the role of immigrant associations in the delivery of what can loosely be defined as ‘services’, cannot be underestimated.

The close relations between immigrant organisations, the people they represent and the powers-that-be in the host country also implies that those who actively run the associations are also those ‘in the know’ when it comes to key issues and concerns. The privileged position of associations as ‘community insiders’, in conjunction with the fact that they often find themselves in a ‘middleman’ position, playing a crucial role as intervening actors in defending immigrant rights, and promoting and lobbying for their communities’ well-being, is the foremost reason why the gathering of opinions from those at the helm of immigrant associations and who maintain relations with them, is fundamental. Given these arguments, the undertaking of an analytical study on immigrant associations’ understanding of community integration and identity formation is of considerable importance.

1.1 Framing the research: Three questions

The context of this research, therefore, is the question of ‘fit’ between an immigrant group’s needs when it comes to preserving its identity, heritage and values, on the one hand, and its integration, citizenship rights and social service needs, on the other. The general hypothesis that I advance is that immigrant associations in Portugal can provide an important link between the ‘old life’ in the country of origin and the ‘new life’ in the host country by bringing together and offering the best of what both settings has to offer, and between primary-group ties and the formal bureaucratic structures of the host society.

The assumption that in order for immigrants to integrate into a receiving society they must shed the ethno-cultural identity they bring with them from their native country is, in fact, often proven wrong in
accordance with the patterns of immigrant collective organisations. In envisaging and exploring the relation between integration and identity, acquiring ‘the best of both worlds’ implies that preservation becomes just as important as assimilation (and vice versa). If, on one hand, immigrants are united by the ethno-cultural elements that identify them, searching out opportunities to practice, exhibit, celebrate and demonstrate, as well as expressing the freedom to do so, on the other hand, it is also their desire to become equal, active participants in the various societal realms of the receiving society. What may at first seem contradictory in the definition of objectives – in the sense that the desire of wanting to retain ethno-cultural forms, while simultaneously supporting community integration into Portuguese society seem to be opposing goals – are frequently proven logical, given the objective of wanting to obtain and to be a part of what both societies have to offer, both personally and collectively.

Within this logic, it is also pivotal to frame the transnational settings within which immigrants function. It is important to point out that once in a new country, immigrants do not abandon what they’ve left behind. Contacts are maintained, and in the present day, modern technologies and accessible travel opportunities facilitate interactions. Such interactive facilitation permits closer and deeper contacts with ethno-cultural elements and symbols which, in turn, may assist in fortifying one’s ethnic identity.

This considered, the extent to which immigrant organisations link and/or negotiate these two opposing ‘lives’ and/or the dual objectives of ethno-identity preservation and integration is a primary line of inquiry. In order to investigate these issues, the questions that frame the analysis presented in the chapters to come are:

– How do immigrant associations perceive and promote the needs of the community they represent given the dual settings (home country/host country) they negotiate with and within, and given the extent of participation permitted within these settings?

– Under the theoretical frameworks of a democratic, multicultural society, and granting that integration and identity freedoms and equal citizenship rights are a given scenario, taking into consideration the fact that insertion is often a ‘two-way street’ involving ‘give and take’ circumstances on the part of both the host society and the immigrants and that identity is not a stagnant element but instead in constant mutation, how do immigrant collective organisations perceive and contribute to community integration and identity (re)structuring?

– Within the logic that immigrant participation is often influenced by the platforms and opportunity given by the society that hosts them, along with the fact that the ‘warmth of the welcome’ influences the
degrees of integration’, how do the associations interface and negotiate with the Portuguese formal service structure and how do they perceive the host country’s social and community services?

Past empirical studies tying together the topics of immigrant associations, integration and the identity formation have concentrated mainly on countries with longer immigrant traditions (see Rex et al. 1987; Jenkins 1988). In the Portuguese case, although some studies have been carried out looking at immigrant associations (Carita and Rosendo 1993; Carita 1994; Gomes 1999; Marques et al. 1999; Albuquerque et al. 2000; Marques and Santos 2000; Mapril and Araújo 2002; Albuquerque 2002; Costa 2002; Marques et al. 2003; Horta and Malheiros 2005), very little has been done to tie together the concepts this study seeks to analyse. This research aims at filling this information gap. Furthermore, this research aims to provide new angles to the topics of integration and identity by looking at three distinct groups possessing very different historical ties to Portugal (if any), having arrived at different time periods, defined by different characteristics and possessing unique settlement patterns. Taking into consideration the argument that integration and identity are not static variables, the book offers a unique time/space comparison between the three different groups with the aim of demonstrating that with the changing and/or conception of policies and schemes, integration and identification strategies will equally take on different approaches and meanings. It is, above all, in this time/space analogy, taking into consideration the fact that integration and identity are fluid concepts, where this research breaks new ground. Through the theoretical debates this study combines (integration models, ethnic identity concepts, participation and citizenship, and voluntary associativism) a novel contribution to the understanding of immigrant organisations as key players when it comes to community integration and identity is presented. Taking on the approach of analysing immigrant integration and identity by gathering privileged testimonies from the leaders of immigrant associations, this study will provide important and strategic information on the aforementioned topics, allowing the data to be set alongside other perspectives drawn from other researchers, statistics on immigrant incorporation, and surveys of the ‘rank and file’ members of the immigrant communities.

Accordingly, in order to gather the data, a one-year fieldwork period was carried out in mainland Portugal (excluding the Azores and Madeira regions) from September 2004 to September 2005. In total, 110 interviews were carried out, 82 with individuals tied to immigrant associations, and the remaining 28 with persons affiliated with institutions that deal with immigrants and/or immigrant associations. Although other secondary sources (e.g. literary data, participant observation, statistics,
etc.) were also incorporated in this research, the information gathered from the interviews is the central focus of this thesis (see Chapter 5).

1.2 Choosing the groups to be studied

In designing this research, it was also recognised that the situation of the many immigrant groups in Portugal expresses both similarities and differences. These range from the ‘pushes and pulls’ that have motivated people to seek a better life in Portugal, the way in which they have been received by Portuguese society during different immigration phases, policy changes that have occurred, especially in the last fifteen years, that have had different sorts of impacts on different groups, and lastly, the degree of cultural difference or separation that may exist between a given group and the host society. Given this scenario, this book bases its research on three immigrant communities: Angolan, Brazilian and Eastern European (comprised mainly of individuals from Bulgaria, Moldova, Romania, Russia and the Ukraine).

In this study, the objective of my comparative analysis is to identify how different groups – representative of communities with distinct migration histories, assembled for different reasons and causes, and defined by distinct characteristics – outline their objectives, negotiate with the communities they represent and with host-society governments and public service sectors, and draw lines between identity preservation and cultural assimilation. From the analysis of the information gathered, we will see how the associations stand on these issues and if their objectives, beliefs and actions have altered through time, taking into consideration specific historical characteristics at different stages of community development.

Several reasons combine to justify my particular choice of these three immigrant communities. First, these groups have migrated to Portugal at different historical moments during the last 30 years. While the Angolan community has made its presence felt in Portugal since the 1970s, the other two groups have only started to make significant numerical as well as community impacts during the last decade. The respective communities thus find themselves at different phases when it comes to the integration question. Second, the social, cultural and historical differences that exist between the three groups are rather marked and, consequently, influence the processes of integration. And thirdly, integration-related policies and programmes that exist today might not have existed ten, twenty or 30 years ago. Thus, the resources one group might have, or have had available to them during a certain phase of their integration, might not have been readily available in the case of the other groups. These are just a few contrasts that permit a differential analysis. The
three communities find themselves composed of individuals with differing characteristics, goals and ambitions, and at different time-frames of integration and identity formation. A more detailed account of the differences between the three groups can be gained from the qualitative data collected in the interviews carried out and presented in the chapters to come.

1.3 Outline of the thesis

Having outlined the main hypotheses and questions that frame the research, I now use the remainder of this introductory chapter to delineate the structure of this thesis.

‘Integration’ and ‘identity’ are the two primary concepts that structure this study. However, in order to approach these two broad concepts, it is important to ask: what sort of integration and identity options exist within a migration context? In Chapter 2, a range of approaches to integration and identity specific to immigrants are reviewed. In approaching the concept of integration, it soon becomes clear that the term has many different meanings and uses in different contexts. For the purpose of this study, integration stands for the process of the inclusion of migrants in the core relations, statuses and institutions of the receiving society. My review of literature concentrates on integration from this perspective, observing the different paradigms, debates and associated concepts. Moreover, political philosophies of integration are also analysed, with debate focusing on specific models. Given that the politics of immigrant integration, more often than not, are in the controlling hands of the host nation, discussion on integration from the immigrants’ perspectives, or immigrant mobilisation for improved integration, will also take place as a counterbalance.

Chapter 2 then switches its focus to identity. As Edward Said explains in his autobiographical memoir Out of Place (1999), to show a diasporic immigrant’s efforts to rework the different parts of his or her heritage or ethnicity entails an ongoing, dialogical negotiation between the positions of feeling simultaneously assimilated, separated and marginalised. Confronted with the array of feelings Said speaks of, immigrants will often search out protection from other individuals who share the same ethnocultural background, and, above all, the same nationality. I approach the concept of ethnicity as an important factor in retaining identity; however, also taken into consideration are influences and elements from outside the ethnic group, which often lead to the construction of double or pluralist identities. Lastly, I discuss the role of transnationalism and its application to the identity concept – perhaps the one model that can contrib-
ute to challenging the ‘feelings’ referred to by Said, given that immigrants have at their disposal a variety of ‘playing fields’.

Chapter 3 is the second theory-based chapter, and is devoted to the literature on the phenomenon of immigrant associations. Alexis de Tocqueville and other authors are helpful in understanding the classical theories behind voluntary associations. However, the key objective is to discuss the development of societal networks and interactions, and cooperative activities. This will be done by analysing the connection between the concepts of civil society and social capital. If civil society can be described as the space of human association and the set of networks, then social capital constitutes the components that make up that space and set of relational networks. Local insertion strategies largely rely on the frameworks of social networks ranging from acquaintances to immigrant-representing institutions (Horta and Malheiros 2005). The stronger the networks, the more empowering will be civil society.

The latter part of Chapter 3 expands on the theoretical debate behind what motivates immigrants to create associations, and the role immigrant organisations play in identity and cultural preservation, on the one hand, and integration and mediation, on the other. The literature here reveals that immigrant organisations are often not static in their convictions and values, often changing positions over time – sometimes functioning as ‘safety-valve’ institutions, other times as a subversive group. Lastly, the political negotiating fields associations deal with and the political participation opportunities available to them will be analysed. The extent to which both home- and host-country governments possess control over immigrant associations is the overarching question here.

Portuguese immigration is a fairly recent occurrence. Chapter 4 looks at the characteristics and consequences of this phenomenon. What is Portugal’s position in the international migration cycle? From a country of emigration, why has it also become a country of immigration? Analyses of these questions are followed by an overview of immigration demographics. Two specific flows are worth highlighting: post-decolonisation immigration (mid-1970s onwards) from the former Portuguese African colonies, and more recent flows of Eastern European and Brazilian immigrants (initiating in the late 1990s). Along with the demographic aspects, geographic and labour market distribution are also looked at, with particular consideration given to the communities this study concentrates on.

Since the 1980s, the main conflict around Portuguese immigration has been based on legislation passed by central governments on the status of ‘foreigners’, dividing those immigrants from the rest of society (Morén-Alegret 2002). Since the early 1990s, however, issues related to immigrant integration have generated increased interest in Portuguese political spheres (Machado 1992, 1993). It was also during this period
that immigrant associations made their first appearance on the political scene. Chapter 4 also outlines these stages, taking into consideration programme and policy development and the growth of immigrant associations in Portugal.

Before analysing the results of my fieldwork, Chapter 5 describes the methodology utilised in the collection of data and in the presentation of the research results. This research is primarily qualitative. According to Denzin and Lincoln (2000: 3):

Qualitative research is a situated activity that locates the observer in the world. It consists of a set of interpretive, material practices that makes the world visible. [...] At this level, qualitative research involves an interpretive, naturalistic approach to the world.

Following this line, I use this chapter to describe the organisational aspects of the fieldwork, including the interview process, as well as data management and analysis. Additionally, in the second half of the chapter, I map out the logistics of the fieldwork, documenting the immigrant spaces and their geographical distribution.

Chapters 6, 7 and 8 present results from the fieldwork. First, given that the groups being studied possess different immigration histories, circumstances of arrival, cultural backgrounds, languages, national and racial origins, and legal statuses and entitlements, it was not surprising to find that the histories and objectives of these associations varied greatly. However, a number of causes, that affect immigrants as a whole, tend to bring associations together, irrespective of their origins. Chapter 6 presents a typology of the associations. By looking at a number of variables, including the histories of the three groups, the organisational structures of the associations, the range of activities and areas of intervention, the capacity to deliver services and achieve stated objectives, as well as the established organisational networks and forms of cooperation, this chapter will outline similarities as well as contrasts between the association groups.

Most associations are in fact performing a dual role. Identity preservation and integration, although they may appear to be opposite goals, are in fact both coping mechanisms that permit survival in the new society. However, although both goals are often expressed by associations, they are often not explicit; the relationship between identity preservation and integration is not always evident. Chapter 7 interrogates the ‘strategies for coping’ utilised by the associations within the host-country context. In order to carry out this task, this chapter starts by analysing the integration processes and problems experienced by the respective groups, as well as investigating self-perceptions of group and host-society acceptance. The degrees of integration and identity preservation are then ob-
served. This is done by measuring variables tied to the two extreme categories of preservation vs. assimilation, with the goal of identifying differences and similarities among the three groups in question. Lastly, the positions of the associations on the issues of integration and identity, as well as the transmission of ideologies and how they might be put into practice, are approached.

Chapter 8 analyses Portuguese social and community services from the perspective of the associations. When it comes to needs and services, there is often a differentiating factor – the type of service category (Jenkins and Sauber 1988). Immigrants are frequently faced with a variety of legal service needs, some of which they have in common with members of the host society, others of which arise because they are foreign residents. For those particular to immigrants, associations will often be able to offer direct help when the needs are in their activity domains. These may include education (i.e. language) or job training. However, associations, more often than not, play the role of facilitator and advocate, making referrals to public service institutions and programmes. This considered, this chapter looks at integration-facilitating public agencies and/or programmes that deal with immigrants and asks: to what extent do they serve immigrants properly and how can they be improved?

Transnational migration can place an immigrant in a number of contexts. The organisation of immigrants through associations can contribute to structuring and reacting to those contexts. In the Portuguese case, as with many other recent immigrant receiving countries, the process of immigrant insertion into the ‘new’ society and the transcendence of ethno-identities, assimilated into those of the host society, has hardly begun; and by no means is it certain that such processes will ever be strong enough to destroy resilient forms of ethnic identity and association (Rex 1987). At the same time, insertion becomes a question of host-country expectance, primarily demonstrated through its policies and programmes. Given the choice, immigrants will usually lobby for integration within the host countries’ system with the simultaneous right to express cultural identification freely. The following pages will outline where Angolan, Brazilian and Eastern European associations in Portugal stand and contribute to constructing these scenarios.
2 Integration and identity: Theoretical concepts and approaches

The way in which immigration states relate to and handle the meeting between immigrants and the national population is today at centre-stage. What conceptions are attached to the encounter, what economic and social factors influence these conceptions, what policy is developed on this basis, and how do these encounters affect the parties in question? These are just some of the central issues up for debate.

If one is to defend the view that those who dominate economically and politically will also have significant ideological and symbolic power, then one is also to believe that the majority forms the social order over time, and holds the power of definition when it comes to the ideological and symbolic universe (Brochmann 2003). The majority then have the power to set the premises for change processes in the multicultural society, and to define and establish an inclusion policy for immigrant newcomers, under the state auspices via democratic decisions. Power is thus a central dimension in this realm, but in reality, the power sphere is much more complicated. Besides not being a homogenous block, but instead a diversity of players with conflicting interests and political projects, the state is confined and influenced from a variety of opposing sides. As defined by Gramsci (1930-1935), hegemonies are dynamic entities in which struggles take place to change or shift established power relations. Thus immigrant minorities also possess power to challenge the legitimacy of the majority. The mere existence of minorities contributes to creating the majority, both in definition and in terms of self-consciousness (Brochmann 2003: 2). The majority discovers itself through ‘the other(s)’, or in other words, when established accounts and norms are challenged and existing institutions are put under pressure. Hence, majority/minority relations can disclose general power relations in society.

But in considering this argument, it should be noted that the common view is that, within a nation-state, the majority has the right to protect the economic and social system’s conditions for reproduction and to preserve the integrity of its forms of life (Waltzer 1983). What this argument might imply is much more controversial. The basic conditions, accord-
ing to Brochmann (2003: 3), can be given differing ideological significance, and as a consequence, a number of questions rise. Does support for a shared political culture and – in modern democracies – for the principles of the state in its legal and constitutional aspects, suffice? How should a liberal multicultural society protect the rights of minorities through democratic institutions? What should be the basis for solidarity and cohesion in a context where the interests of the citizens are increasingly differentiated? Is national/ethnic homogeneity a basic condition for reproducing a society’s form of life or should minority identities be equally recognised? Thus far, immigrant and minority policy approaches have not been particularly clear in relation to these fundamental questions.

Additionally, in current academic as well as political discourse, a particular conception dominates as to how immigrants should be incorporated into the receiving society: they should be integrated, in due course and process, into multicultural states. While literature favouring this argument, in one form or another, is vast, a key question that lies behind this debate is – what sort of approach should be taken to immigrant integration? And furthermore, what other factors are at play?

2.1 Frameworks of integration

Integration is one of the most central themes in social sciences, and one does not need to go through much of the literature on integration before it becomes clear that the concept has many different meanings and is used in many different contexts: from the classic texts of Marx, via the contributions of Tonnies, Spencer, Durkheim and Parsons to the ‘modern classic’ writings of Lockwood, Habermas, Giddens, Luhmann and Mouzelis; all have conceptualised differently on approaches to integration. In some of these approaches, the micro-macro dimension plays a central role or is an important, although sometimes rather implicit, principle of analysis (Habermas, Luhmann). Other approaches (here I follow the review of Møller 2002) turn on the actor-structure dimension as a most relevant distinction (Lockwood, Mouzelis), while yet others centre their focus on the duality of objective versus subjective (Weber) or face-to-face relations versus indirect relations (Giddens).

Through time, questions related to immigrant integration have generated a number of theoretical perspectives connected with the attempts to analyse the consequences of immigrant insertion into host societies. In this context, a plethora of concepts are commonly analysed in the scholarly literature, including: assimilation, incorporation, accommodation, acculturation, absorption, adaptation, inclusion as well as integration. Although I cannot trace and reconstruct (let alone deconstruct) the
meaning and context of all these concepts here, my account will centre on the concepts of integration and assimilation, which many of the concepts mentioned tend to overlap with.3

Integration, it has been argued, is often an intangible concept possessing various definitions and theoretical usages in academic circles (Bauböck 1994a). Hargreaves (1995: 33) argues that due to it having become a ‘catch-all term’, the meaning of integration is now ‘often ill-defined’. In defining the term in its broadest sense, ‘integration’ deals with how socialisation, through standards and formation of expectations, contributes to creating social cohesion and societal stability (Brochmann 2003: 4). Integration thus entails the learning of, and adjustment to, society’s values – processes that bind individuals to society culturally, economically and socially.

In the literature on integration, as it pertains to immigrants, the concept is approached from various perspectives. According to Audrey (2000: 6), integration can be defined as the interaction between relative newcomers and an existing population through which aspects of culture are adopted and shared. Heckmann (2004) goes a bit further, defining integration as a process of inclusion of migrants in the core institutions, relations and statuses of the receiving country. He further explains that integration of migrants refers to a process of learning a new culture, an acquisition of rights, access to positions and statuses, a building of personal relations to members of the receiving society. It is an interactive process between migrants and the receiving society. Favell (2003: 14) also follows this logic, emphasising that:

[... ] immigrant integration is what happens after [migration and settlement]; conceiving practical steps in a longer process which invariably includes the projection of both deep social change for the country concerned, and of fundamental continuity between the past and some idealised social endpoint. (emphasis in the original)

David Lockwood’s (1964) theory of social systems identifies two integration paradigms: ‘system integration’, which is the form of integration in a system that works relatively independent of the motives, goals and relations of individual actors, and frequently against their motives and interests; and ‘social integration’, standing for the inclusion of new actors in a system, the creation of mutual relationships among actors and their attitudes to the social system as a whole. In making the distinction between these two paradigms, the latter seems more suited for immigration research and thus worth analysing. Based on the contributions of various authors (Bauböck 1994b; Malheiros 1996; Entzinger 1997), social integration is seen as a gradual process through which individuals and groups become active participants in the civic, economic, political,

1. **Structural integration**: signifying the acquisition of rights and the access to positions and membership statuses in the core institutions of the immigration society: economic and labour market, education and qualification systems, housing system, citizenship as membership in the political community.

2. **Cultural integration or acculturation**: entails acquiring core elements and competences of the culture and society immigrants are migrating into. These preconditions of participation refer to processes and states of cognitive, behavioural and attitudinal change. This concerns not only the immigrants and their descendents, but it is also an interactive, mutual process that changes the receiving society as well, which has to learn new ways of relating and adapting to the migrants.

3. **Social integration**: is indicated by people’s private relations and primary group memberships. Indicators are social intercourse, friendships, partnerships, marriages and membership in voluntary organisations.

4. **Identification integration**: shows in feelings of belonging and identification, particularly in forms of ethnic, regional, local and/or national identification or in combinations of these.

To a certain degree, integration entails the learning of, and adjustment to, society’s values – processes that bind the individual to society, creating belonging and loyalty. Additionally, the integrationist approach is intended to make peaceful coexistence possible between different etho-cultural groups within one and the same polity. Clearly, however, integration is also dependent upon a number of conditions on the part of the receiving society which can best be described as its ‘openness’ to immigrant communities and the differences they bring with them. A popular way of expressing the complaint that liberal society is ‘inhospitable to difference’ is to say that it is ‘assimilationist’ (Barry 2001: 68-71).

It is to the Chicago School of Sociology, or more specifically, its member Robert Park, that the theory of assimilation is owed. Setting his writings in 1920s Chicago, Park postulated that, despite the often miserable conditions of newcomers struggling to survive and the conflict between different cultures, assimilation would be the eventual outcome of a cycle of immigrant/host society patterns of interaction, moving from contact to competition and conflict to accommodation and finally assimilation (Park and Miller 1921; Park 1950 in Schmitter Heisler 1992: 626).
Assimilation can be defined as the process by which individuals belonging to a minority group will, through time, adopt the lifestyles, attitudes, values and cultural patterns of the dominant group. The assimilationist view takes the nation-state as its ideal and believes that no polity can be stable and cohesive unless its members share a common national culture. Assimilationists, according to Parekh (2000: 197), believe that:

As a custodian of society’s way of life, the state is assumed to have the right and the duty to ensure that its cultural minorities assimilate into the prevailing national culture and shed all vestiges of their separate cultures. In the assimilationist view the choice presented to minorities is a simple one: if they wish to become part of society and be treated like the rest of their fellow-citizens, they should assimilate. If they insist on retaining their separate cultures, they should not complain if they are viewed as outsiders and subjected to discriminatory treatment.

In addition, assimilationist literature also implies that the process of assimilation signifies the loss of the original group identity and the absorption of characteristics belonging to the dominant group. We can see that there is also a strong connection between assimilation and identity that goes beyond cultural integration (Alba and Nee 1997; Gans 1997). In considering the relationship that exists between the process of acculturation and assimilation, one might think of assimilation as the state that can be reached when acculturation is so complete that members of the two groups become culturally indistinguishable (Barry 2001: 72-73). Still, we should acknowledge that if one is to regard complete acculturation as a necessary condition of assimilation, then it is still not sufficient. Bauböck (1998) points out that assimilation is different from acculturation in that the former requires some ratification by the host society. Thus, this author (1998: 40) advances the view that if acculturation is ‘the process by which an individual comes to acquire cultural practices belonging to the tradition of another group’, then assimilation ‘indicates a change of membership which makes an individual similar to a receiving community in the sense that the members recognize (him or) her as one of their kind’. Alba (1999: 6) contributes to this argument by emphasising that ‘assimilation need not be a wholly one-sided process: it can take place as changes in two (or more) groups, thus shrinking the difference and social distance between them’. From another perspective Bauböck (1996a) also uses the term ‘assimilation’ to describe any intake of new members which makes them similar to the established ones in aspects relevant for the internal cohesion of a community. From this perspective, the definition does not only apply to a shift in identity or even cultural membership but also to other vari-
ables such as naturalisation, which ‘assimilates’ aliens to citizens within the political community as well.

Since its birth, the theoretical framework developed by Park has gone on to inspire various reformulations, the most important of which is that of Milton Gordon’s *Assimilation in American Life* (1964). Gordon advances the interpretation that assimilation is a multi-layered process involving several stages moving from cultural assimilation (acculturation), to structural assimilation (participation), to amalgamation, moving on to identity assimilation (adjustment) and finally civil assimilation (free of power or value conflicts) (Lewis 1982: 183; Schmitter Heisler 1992: 120; Zolberg 1996: 59). Similar to Gordon, Sheila Patterson (1963) argues that integration is merely a stage of what she called ‘absorption’, which will culminate in the assimilation of immigrants.

The theories of assimilation set forth by Gordon and Patterson have – besides having generated a fair amount of controversy over the years, according to Bauböck (1996a: 9) – ‘almost become a “dirty word” for many proponents of multiculturalism, who identify it with coercive inclusion in a dominant culture’. Various researchers (Portes and Borocz 1989; Soysal 1994; Rex 1996; Parekh 2000; Barry 2001) have gone on to critique theories of assimilation. For example, Portes and Borocz (1989) point out that this approach ignores return flows and underplays variation among the immigrants’ patterns of adaptation. Parekh (2000) argues that minorities have a right to maintain their ways of life, and denying it to them is both indefensible and likely to provoke resistance. Furthermore, Parekh (2000: 197) adds that it is not clear what minorities are to be assimilated into:

The assimilationist assumes that society has a coherent and unified cultural and moral structure, [which] is rarely the case. Although the moral and cultural structure of a society has some internal coherence, it is not a homogeneous and unified whole. It varies with class, religion and region, is made up of diverse and even conflicting strands, and consists of values and practices that can be interpreted and related in several different ways. The assimilationist ignores all this, and either offers a highly abridged and distorted view of national culture or equates it with that of the dominant group.

In view of this argument, integration alternatives to assimilation are based on pluralistic forms. But it is also worth noting that the integration model brings about a certain amount of debate when it comes to integration into the different spheres (i.e. socio-economic versus socio-cultural). Vermeulen and Penninx (2000) argue that there is little disagreement about the aims of integration in the socio-economic sphere. The aim, in this case, can be described as ‘access and equity’, equal ac-
cess to the central institutions of society and equal membership in the economic and political spheres. On the contrary, there is much more disagreement about the goals of socio-cultural integration and about the way the socio-economic and socio-cultural spheres interrelate. To which extent do immigrants have to culturally assimilate to the indigenous population in order to achieve upward mobility, or will this be better accomplished through group cohesion and solidarity? This is a central issue in immigrant integration theories which also underpins, to some extent, my analyses of the Portuguese case in this study.

Additionally, Vermeulen and Penninx (2000) note that integration has also been defined as a two-stage process of assimilation, or as being neither pluralistic nor full assimilation, but something in between. Taking Vermeulen and Penninx’s argument into consideration, the concept of accommodation might find middle ground between integration and assimilation. Accommodation can be defined as the process by which all parts involved in a multifaceted situation, including nationals and other immigrant groups, develop modes of adjustment and mutual cooperation (Bach 1993). In this context, the term then applies to the ‘demands’ and the ‘yielding’ from both the immigrants’ side as well as that of the host societies in order to tolerate each others’ differences. The host society recognises the needs of the immigrant population in maintaining close ties with their origins and accepts their institutions. At the same time, mechanisms and institutions created by the dominant group are made available for all who live in that given society. Sub-groups accommodated in an integral framework thus accompany the process of adjustment while, at the same time, being only partially absorbed in various sectors of life. For example, there can be total economic absorption while only semi-cultural absorption (e.g. openness to consumer activities but religious isolation).

Integration research has traditionally concentrated on two distinct insertion trajectories: pluralism and assimilation. However, research also identifies a third trajectory immigrants increasingly tend to pursue, transnationalism. The literature on transnationalism conjures the image of transnational immigrants living simultaneously in two worlds. This notion, as Glick Schiller (1999) points out, embodies a pluralist way of being, abandoning any thought of assimilation. Kivisto (2001: 570-573), however, goes against this belief, setting forth the argument that it would be ‘most appropriate to consider transnationalism as one possible variant of assimilation’. Kivisto argues that the majority of immigrants are at any one time located primarily in one place. If the location where they spend most of their day-to-day lives is the host country, then over time the issues and concerns of that place will outweigh the more distanced issues and concerns pertinent to the homeland. Also, basing his arguments on the acculturative role that ethnic communities play in
helping their members adjust and fit into the host society, Kivisto (2001: 572) explains that the very act of participating in the lifeworld of transnational communities can facilitate acculturation into the receiving country.

So, while it has been made clear that the relationship between immigration and integration presents numerous questions and debate, the sheer scale of the issue is such as to risk confusing the analytical focus. Most integration research defines integration as a socio-economic good to be obtained, or as a policy objective. Whether the literature focuses on political integration (Ireland 1994; Vertovec 1996), economic integration (Portes 1995) or social integration (Waldinger 2001), these analyses present integration as an end to a process. Instead of studying how immigrants integrate themselves, most research focuses on how migrants are integrated through political institutionalisation (Koff 2002). For the purpose of this study, as I’ve previously drawn attention to, integration is not defined as the end of a process, but instead defined within the framework of the process itself. Whether defined in formal, legal terms, or substantive ones, ‘citizenship’ in liberal democratic societies guarantees the individual’s right to participate. Integration, as a key foundation of this study, asserts that a political system entail both laws and institutions which govern social interaction and the actors who participate in it. According to Hinich and Munger (1997):

preferences \times institutions = outcomes

where ‘preferences’ are the wants and desires of political actors, ‘institutions’ are the formal and informal rules that determine how collective decisions are made, and ‘outcomes’ the public policies that result from the interactions of these variables. As one of the main variables in my study, integration is not only seen as a social good and policy objective, but is also conceptualised within the context of competition for political, economic, social and cultural resources and benefits. Thus, integration is not only defined in terms of equality or utility, but also defined by levels of participation and negotiation in the host society.

However, the inequalities and barriers set up by the receiving society may thwart any attempt immigrants may make at integrating themselves. Such barriers may be institutional, coming in the form of unequal citizenship rights, exclusionary practices and policies, or structural barriers in different public spheres (i.e. the lack of recognition of occupational qualifications will not permit labour market integration). Additionally, they may also be societal or individual, coming in the form of racism, discrimination and distancing. Differences related to the immigrants’ culture of origin or professed religion, racist perceptions and linguistic differences are such barriers that can curtail integration. Immigrant Associations, Integration and Identity
grants cannot successfully be inserted unless the host society is ready to accept their differences and receive their contributions.

2.2 Immigrant integration and government forms

Integration occurs as the collective by-product of choices made by individuals to take advantage of opportunities to improve their social condition (Alba 1999: 6). But besides integration as a result of individual choices and decisions, there are also the politically promoted processes that set conditions and provide opportunities and incentives for such choices and decisions. These politically promoted processes are known as integration policies.

When applying the concept of integration to that of policy, the idea implies that the host country should be pluralistic, liberal and democratic. The varying types of policies are plenty, falling under such domains as employment, housing and education; re-dressing laws and administrative practices which are themselves discriminatory; prohibiting racial discrimination and harassment; and programmes for fighting social disintegration (Vertovec 1999b). We will here consider the three lines of integration presented by Bauböck (1994a) and consider their policy orientations:

1. Legal or political integration: integration cannot be realised without a common framework of citizenship, citizenship being understood as a set of substantive rights. Thus immigrants must be involved in public enquiries and consultations; consultative councils should be set up within the decision-making system of local authorities; the right to vote should be extended; and procedures for gaining nationality should be facilitated.

2. Social integration: calls out for a basic minimum social welfare for everybody in terms of income, education and accommodation; the absence of relations of total dependency in the family or at a workplace and a common sphere of public social life which is not segregated in ghetto areas. ‘Bottom-up’ processes are favoured over those of ‘top-down’ and local activities should encourage participation and mobilisation across group lines, including common projects. Efforts leading to continued opportunities for inclusion and full participation are to be made.

3. Cultural integration: must allow for different religious beliefs, political opinions, sexual orientations and cultural affiliations. Religious and cultural practices would have to respect human rights and pluralistic integration would not only make such differences acceptable but also redistribute resources between groups. This advocates a major reinforcement of local authorities’ actions to encourage accep-
tance of multicultural societies; a recognition by immigrant countries they are multi-ethnic and, therefore, must draw the legislative conclusions from this development in order to ensure and promote equal rights for all the people living in their territory; the support of ethnic minority cultures so that members of ethnic minorities can live as equal partners in the host country and yet at the same time maintain contact with their country of origin; freedom of choice for members of ethnic minorities in deciding to what extent they wish to assimilate or not.

Taking Bauböck’s suggestions into account, responses to these forms of integration have usually been most evident in laws, institutions and policies with regard to socio-political integration (a term open to a variety of interpretations, but generally referring to institutional regulations determining facets of status, opportunity, access to public resources and representation) (Vertovec 1999b: xxv). The range of research on this topic differs depending on approach. Portes and Rumbaut (1996) approach modes of integration by way of a typology that maps the complex forms by: the policies of the host government (receptive, indifferent or hostile); forms of social reception faced by immigrants (prejudiced or non-prejudiced); and the characteristics of the co-ethnic community. With regard to these variables, researchers need to analyse both vulnerabilities and opportunities surrounding the trajectory of immigrant individuals and groups, including the differential resources which pathways of integration present (Portes and Zhou 1993). In addition, as Brubaker (1989) points out, government policies will also tend to vary depending on whether the state is constituted by immigration, or if immigration has been an incidental process in nation-building.

Within the literature, immigration and integration policies have been set within several different paradigms (Baldwin-Edwards and Schain 1994; Ribas-Mateos 1997; Morén-Alegret 2002; Castles and Miller 2003). I will here delineate four main models.

First, the discourse on immigrant integration falls under the flagship of the ‘multicultural’ model. Before any further discussion on this topic takes place, it is worth pointing out that this concept itself contains a myriad of uses. The multiple application of the concept, in fact, has led a number of researchers (Schmitter Heisler 1992; Vertovec 1996; Jordan 2000; Pang 2000), to criticise it as one of the most over-used concepts in the entire field of immigration and ethnic minority issues, which, in turn, has brought about a state of confusion and vagueness rather than clarification. The multicultural concept can thus be: a basic demographic description of a society (the sheer presence of x number of immigrants from countries 1, 2 and 3 offered as evidence of cultural diversity); exotic otherness displayed in the observance of festivals, dances, cuisine and
costumes; a vague vision of how society, with its minorities should func-
tion (under such keywords as ‘tolerance’ and ‘respect’); public policy
aimed at minorities, including the promotion of equal opportunity; or
distinctive institutional arrangements designed to benefit, or called for
by, specific minority groups including special advisory offices, consulta-
tion boards, representatives and funding (Vertovec 1996). As pointed
out by Kymlicka (1995b), the multicultural concept is thus a term that is
both descriptive and evaluative, as well as also referring to the demo-
graphic co-presence of people from different cultural backgrounds or a
vision of society toward which a wide range of policies should be direc-
ted. Agnes Heller (1996: 28) adds that multiculturalism is the utopia of
equal life chances for all communities in a direct sense, and eventually
also for individuals in an indirect sense. According to her, it can only be
attained provided that entry into and exit from each and every culture –
native or chosen – is and remains a free act. Further this free act must be
repeatable, so that individual liberty and choice are preserved and even
promoted – not just within and against the overarching universal cul-
ture, but also within and against each and every particular culture.

The debate on multiculturalism may then be conceived as a discus-
sion of democracy that highlights the tension between equality and dif-
ference (Taylor 1994). The issue is the reconciliation of the right to be
different with the right to be equal, and the definition of the limits of
these rights. Multiculturalism implies a decentralisation of the political
community. It postulates a political space existing between the ideal de-
mands of all of the constituent ethnic groups within a society and the
inalienable rights of the individual. Its project is to establish within this
space solutions or policies which can meet the greatest number of de-
mands of the largest number of communities while preserving the core
rights of the person (Jordan 2000). In addition, it calls for a reformula-
tion of the relations between its cultural collectivities, in order to create
new forms of identity politics. Multiculturalism takes the form of a poli-
tical movement for cultural empowerment; hence, culture becomes the
idiom for resistance (Caglar 1997: 178).

In conceptualising his own multicultural model, Kymlicka (1995b) is
of the opinion that such a model should aim to combine liberal demo-
cratic principals with a theory of minority rights that accommodates the
cultural needs of minority groups. He argues strongly for group-specific
polyethnic rights ranging from anti-racism policies through funding for
the maintenance of group cultures to specific rights and exemptions for
minorities. None of these are time-limited because, as Kymlicka (1995b:
31) puts it, ‘the cultural differences they protect are not something we
seek to eliminate’, or in other words, assimilation is not the ultimate out-
come.
Underlying Kymlicka’s analysis is the assumption of an exclusive bilateral relationship between the individual and one specific culture. Commenting on Kymlicka’s theory, Martiniello (1997) suggests that this does not do justice to the complexity of cultural allegiances. Individuals may have developed multiple allegiances with which they are quite content. The nature of minority culture is further explored by Rex (1997b) who argues that, whilst some so-called multination cultures are authentically autochthonous, the cultures of polyethnic minorities in migration are not identical with those practised in countries of origin. He explains (1997b: 465):

What we loosely call cultural change in dealing with new problems and the migrant’s culture should therefore be thought of, not as reflecting simply his or her traditional ways, but also all those patterned forms of action which arise in the process of struggling for survival or success in the land of settlement.

The desired outcome of multiculturalism is thus a polyethnic state, containing non-dominant ethnic communities that have resulted from individual or familial immigration (Kymlicka 1995b). Different states have adopted different strategies for accommodating polyethnicity within a coherent social structure. This has been the case of Australia, Canada and Sweden, although this model also has some influence in Great Britain, the Netherlands and the United States. Castles and Miller (2003) outline two main variations. First, they refer to a ‘laissez-faire approach’ typical to the United States. Here cultural difference and the existence of ethnic communities are accepted, but it is not seen as the role of the state to ensure social justice or to support the maintenance of ethnic cultures. The second variant is multiculturalism as state policy, as in Canada, Australia and Sweden. Here, multiculturalism implies both the willingness of the majority group to accept cultural difference, and state action to secure equal rights for minorities.

Taking these forms of multiculturalism into consideration, notions of conceptual theory thus convey a picture of society as a ‘mosaic’ of several bounded, nameable, individually homogeneous and unmeltable minority cultures which are pinned on to the back of a similarly characterised majority culture. The different implicit or explicit ideals that a state administration holds regarding multiculturalism naturally have direct bearing on its structures and policies relating to the integration of immigrants and ultimately, the maintenance of cohesion in a plural society (Vertovec 1999b). Thus, under the multicultural rhetoric, diversity, according to Pang (2000: 55) ‘is not merely reality but also a cause for celebration since it engenders cross-fertilization of different cultures
and mutually enriching experiences for the different members of society.

But despite Pang’s ‘call for celebration’, it is worth noting that the multicultural model is not free of criticisms. To members of the dominant ethnic group, for example, multiculturalism is perceived as a threat to their culture and identity. The American researcher E. G. Schlesinger (1992) is particularly critical of the application of multicultural policies in the United States, describing them as policies that ‘disunite America’. Others criticise multiculturalism for leading to a superficial acceptance of cultural difference, without bringing about real institutional and therefore, political change (Joppke and Lukes 1999). Yet others claim that while multiculturalism promotes equality and difference, it does little to do away with economic disadvantages, social marginalisation and discrimination (Moodley 1983; Elliott and Fleras 1992).

A second integration policy model is what some authors refer to as the ‘republican’ or the ‘universalist’ model (Baldwin-Edwards and Schain 1994; Castles and Miller 2003). In some European states, for example, integration is thought of in individual terms, while the cultural and ethnic differences are sacrificed to defend the idea of equality. In this case, the mix of populations leads to a failure to recognise racial discrimination and to the cultural exclusion of minorities, often considered as nothing more than ‘simple traditional folklore’ (Morén-Alegret 2002). Additionally, this model has the *ius solis* (citizenship according to place of birth) as a norm which, in turn, implies that obtaining nationality would be relatively easy. France is an example of a republican or universalist country; however, it should be noted that, in the last decade, French legislation on obtaining citizenship has been hardened by a reform of the *Code de Nationalité*. Under this legislation, France became increasingly restrictive towards minorities, with entry conditions becoming stricter and deportation facilitated. This led to the mass deportation of *sans papiers* (undocumented individuals) in the summer of 1996 (Castles and Miller 2003).

The third model of immigrant integration is termed the ‘exclusionist’ model (Castles 1995; Castles and Miller 2003). This model is characterised by exclusionary immigration policies aimed at limiting family reunification, the concession of a permanent residency status and restrictive access to naturalisation. Additionally, exclusion means that immigrants are integrated into certain areas of society (i.e. the labour market) while they are denied access to others (i.e. welfare systems, citizenship and political participation); in other words, ‘differential exclusion’ (Castles 1995). Immigrants thus become part of civil society as workers, consumers and parents, but are excluded from full participation in economic, social, cultural and political relations, and thus from becoming citizens. The goal of the policy favours the temporary pre-
sence of immigrants and aims at preventing settlement. The exclusionist model is best represented by Germany, Belgium, Switzerland and Austria, the former ‘guestworker’ recruiting countries of Western Europe. In relation to Germany, nationality can be obtained based on *ius sanguinis* (according to ‘blood bonds’), making it difficult to acquire citizenship. This peculiarity makes Germany an ‘ethnic-nationalist’ country. Following this model, in 1993, Greece restricted access to nationality for foreigners in general, while Greek nationality was granted to all those of ‘Greek ethnic origin’ living abroad (Grammenos 2001; Morén-Alegret 2002).

Lastly, the fourth model worth noting is the ‘imperial’ model. This model allows the integration of diverse peoples into multi-ethnic empires, such as British, the Ottoman and the Austro-Hungarian, while simultaneously permitting the domination of one group over the others. Although this model is old, Castles and Miller (2003) point out how it could be useful to uncover the actual domination of one ethnic group or nationality over another.7

Parallel to the integration models discussed, Soysal (1994) formulates a typology of ‘regimes of incorporation’ represented by various European states. These include: the rules of membership, rights, statuses, provision and capacity for organisational activity, access and use of resources, and modes of participation in political affairs, commerce and the labour market. Soysal’s typology thus takes some of the integration features outlined in the aforementioned models and tries to go beyond them. She suggests four ‘membership models and incorporation patterns’, emphasising that these ‘membership models are intended not as categorical totalities but as frameworks within which to situate the particularities of state incorporation regimes and policies’. She describes the types of regimes which emerge from her analyses as: corporatist (Sweden, Netherlands), individualist (Switzerland, England), state-centralised (France) and mixed statist-corporatist (Germany).

In the case of Portugal, it can be argued that governments have developed a mixture of elements extracted from the multicultural model as well as the assimilation-oriented republican model, with variations at local and regional levels (Morén-Alegret 2002). Basing their analysis on Esping-Andersen’s classification of welfare regimes (see Esping-Andersen 1990), Fonseca et al. (2002b: 41) identify the Portuguese social integration regime as being a broad version of the corporatist-statist regime, albeit, according to the authors, in a somewhat rudimentary form. Soysal’s typology and its application to collective immigrant organisations will be re-visited in Chapter 3.

Beyond the administrative nation-state models, it is also important to analyse how immigrants fit into them: what citizenship rights do they
possess? To what extent do receiving counties permit immigrants’ participation? The following section addresses these questions.

2.3 Citizenship, the politics of participation and mobilisation

In host countries, immigrants are residents with legitimate needs and demands as well as rights and obligations. Over time, they also contribute to the receiving country through their labour, taxes, commercial services, participation in schools and neighbourhoods, and by enriching the socio-cultural landscapes (Penninx 2000). In practice however, immigrants are often excluded from key domains, namely from the political decision-making system, from enjoying equal socio-economic rights (i.e. through restricted access to the labour market, limited opportunities for self-employment, denial of social welfare resources), as well as having limited possibilities to satisfy cultural and religious needs. Mingione (1995) widens this argument by emphasising that immigrant groups and ethnic minorities have had their often dire economic and living conditions worsened by receiving-country measures, causing them to lose their representative voice and sink into a state of ‘subcitizenship’.

At the national and local levels, it is true, policies have been implemented and initiatives carried out which are specifically pertinent to the immigrant population. Yet all too often immigrants have little say in the public decisions, policies and resources which affect them, and therefore such measures often do not meet their needs. In explaining the lack of immigrant participation in policymaking decisions, this is often notably affected by the fact that many do not have the legal status of citizenship: even in those states where some form of legal citizenship is extended, other social and political factors prevent their participation (Vertovec 1999b; Penninx 2000). This socio-political exclusion of resident foreigners and ethnic minorities, according to Bauböck (1992: 59), not only presents circumstances ‘jeopardising basic democratic achievements’, but challenges fundamental issues of morality as well (Carens 1989).

By not being given full participatory rights, immigrants and ethnic minorities will not be fully accepted in the different societal domains. Penninx (2000: 6) explains that ‘if citizenship is taken as full participation in the public domain and the exclusion from citizenship is seen as the exclusion from participation in this domain, the concept of citizenship is not only relevant in the political-juridical sphere, but also in other spheres’.

Citizenship and its application to immigrants and ethnic minorities are thus central to this discussion. Citizenship is thought as being defined by bounded populations, with a specific set of rights and duties, excluding ‘others’ on the grounds of nationality; but non-nationals, who
are formally and empirically constituted as aliens within the national collectivity, now press for equal rights of citizenship and participation to be granted by host states (Soysal 1994: 2). The need to rethink the relation between immigrants, new diversities and exclusions, and the concept of citizenship has in recent years spawned numerous publications. Examples include Brubaker (1989); Layton-Henry (1990c); Soysal (1994); Kymlicka (1995a, 1995b); Martiniello (1995); Bauböck et al. (1996) Vertovec (1999b) and Penninx (2000). The aforementioned literature seeks to explore new meanings of membership and especially that of participation. As Hill (1994: 7) points out, citizenship as ‘effective participation’ ‘depends on appropriate structures and processes, and on access and information’. In addition, effective participation in a civil society also means full and equal engagement in the public sphere.

On the basis of the foregoing discussion, the obvious call is that equal citizenship rights be granted – not only for all members of the majority population, but for people of migrant origin as well. The central aim is to achieve equity for all members of society within a multicultural framework. Equity, in this case, according to Castles (1994: 15-16), implies resolving the tension between formal equality and real difference by means of mechanisms and policies to ensure participation of disadvantaged groups in decision-making. Basing these arguments on the main line of thinking behind the ‘liberal conception of citizenship’ as theorized by T. H. Marshall in his book Citizenship and Social Class (1950), citizenship is understood as a given set of rights which can be classified as civil, political, social and cultural rights (Castles and Davidson 2000: 103-155). However, it should also be noted that the liberal conception of citizenship, as conceived by Marshall, bases itself on the idea of a common civilisation and thus does not constitute a fully adequate response to pluralism (Miller 2000).

As a result, we come to the ‘republican conception of citizenship’, a model that conceives the citizen as someone who plays an active role in shaping the future direction of his or her society through political debate and decision-making (Walzer 1983; Miller 2000). A citizen identifies with the political community to which he or she belongs and is committed to promoting its common good through active participation in its political life. According to Miller (2000: 60):

The republican solution involves, paradoxically, the search for a higher level of agreement between individuals and social group, but it aims to achieve this in a more pragmatic way, through the give and take of politics. It does not require participants to subscribe to any fixed principles other than implicit in political dialogue itself – a willingness to argue and to listen to reasons given by others, abstention from violence and coercion and so forth.
Within the republican framework, immigrants are thus permitted to politically participate on an equal footing with other groups of the host society. Given the importance of this equal footing, it is also important to consider what aspects of citizenship most concern these populations. In his immigrant and ethnic minority citizenship model, Penninx (2000: 6-7) distinguishes between three different aspects of citizenship:

1. **Juridical/political aspect**: refers to the question of whether, and to what extent, immigrants and ethnic minorities possess different formal rights and duties from autochthones in relation to political participation opportunities; whether newcomers may (or not) acquire national citizenship and thus gain access to the formal political system; as well as the granting (or not) of political rights to non-nationals and their juridical status as aliens as far as this has consequences for political participation.

2. **Socio-economic aspect**: pertains to social and economic rights of residents, irrespective of national citizenship; includes rights to institutionalised facilities and benefits in the socio-economic sphere, including state-provided social security facilities.

3. **Cultural/religious rights**: concerns whether or not immigrants and minorities have equal rights to organise themselves as ethnic and religious groups; whether they are recognised and accepted, and possess rights to facilities.

Penninx (2000: 7) further points out that what is important in these three domains is not only the formal rules and regulations, but the practice and implementation of them.

So if we are to think of citizenship as equal participation between all groups of society, it is also important to look at the practice of citizenship and participation from two different perspectives, based on the assumption that ‘you need two partners to tango: the immigrants and the receiving society’ (Penninx 2000: 8). The two perspectives we here refer to are ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’. Under the top-down approach the institutional framework of the host society is taken as the starting point. The terms of inclusion/exclusion and the ‘opportunity structures’ are, in this case, key concepts in relation to the openness of the existing system. Given that measures taken to stimulate participation are established by state channels, the key question is just how open are the frameworks of the host society to the participation of immigrants and ethnic minorities. Under the bottom-up approach the central focus is on the initiatives taken by immigrants, ethnic minorities and their organisations to defend their political, social and cultural interests irrespective of institutional structures. The basic concept here is *mobilisation*. The analytical features of top-down and bottom-up allow us to look at the mismatches as well as possible interaction between the two.
In observing Penninx’s three different aspects of citizenship, one can here identify *channels of mobilisation* for immigrants and ethnic minorities for each of the citizenship domains (Penninx 2000). In the political-juridical domain immigrants may mobilise themselves as pressure groups, by establishing ‘immigrant parties’ or lobbying units. In the socio-economic domain immigrants may mobilise themselves around the bettering of social conditions or causes, namely dealing with housing, education, labour, etc.; or by taking up entrepreneurial initiatives or self-help groups. Lastly in the cultural sphere, one can suppose examples of mobilisation through religious or cultural organisations of immigrants and their efforts to establish places of worship, religious courses or courses of immigrant languages.

As various authors have pointed out (Baldwin-Edwards and Schain 1994; Rex and Drury 1994; Castles and Davidson 2000), identity and ethnicity have also become key factors in contemporary immigration politics. Identity movements, however, not only apply to immigrant groups who may mobilise ethnically, racially and/or religiously, but also to members of the host society who may organise nationalist movements. For the purpose of this study, we will here concentrate on the former.

Concerning identity movements, I first draw attention to their paradoxical effects. The reassertion of minority cultures may help to remodel mainstream life patterns (Castles and Davidson 2000) as exemplified by the influence of Afro-Caribbean and Afro-American culture (e.g. music, clothing, language, behaviour, etc.) on European youth cultures. The influence of external cultural factors, in turn, also affects political ideas and activity. Geographically, this phenomenon is most evident at a micro-scale, primarily in areas and neighbourhoods where there is a high concentration of immigrants and immigrant descendents and where social problems are frequently most evident.

The mobilisation for societal participation most commonly arises from the most fundamental of immigrant demands, which is the right to secure residence status, since this is the precondition for all other rights. As was shown in France in 1996 by the movement of the *sans papiers*, when immigrants threatened with deportation through changes in immigration laws occupied churches and carried out hunger strikes, many still lack this right (Castles and Davidson 2000). Once immigrants become more established, their political focus tends to shift. Wihtol de Wenden’s (1995) research on immigrant political mobilisation in France observes three phases of political awareness. In the first, immigrants tended to focus on homeland issues; in the second the primary concern was with the politics of community and identity; thirdly the emphasis moved to demands for equal participation in the wider society. The change, according to Wihtol de Wenden, is to a degree attributed to gen-
erational change, given that immigrant descendents are susceptible to discrimination and are often denied equal rights.

Although mobilisation may take place at both a local and national level, a distinction should also be made between the two. As Castles and Davidson (2000: 48) explain, community-based mobilisation may demand ethno-specific services or call for improvement in mainstream services. However, as these authors point out, at the local level, there is no clear division between political pressure and direct social action, and as a result, local movements are usually also part of broader social movements. The national or regional mobilisation, which brings community-based movements together, often has more direct political objectives. Furthermore, while national-level political movements are mainly concerned with the civil and political dimensions of citizenship: they claim full rights of political belonging for minorities; in contrast, community-level sectors preoccupy themselves primarily with the social dimension of citizenship: they demand participation in the welfare state. However, Castles and Davidson (2000: 48) further add that both types of movements have to address issues of culture and identity:

At the national political level, the inclusion of minorities without cultural assimilation requires a struggle against nationalist notions of belonging – for the right to be a citizen without being a national. At the community level, inclusion as social citizens means demanding the recognition of different cultural values and needs.

Summing up, and as a way of bridging the discussion to the following section, I maintain that democracy and social harmony are not plausible without political strategies that link cultural recognition with social rights for immigrant and ethnic minorities, and that seek to give them a legitimate voice in the polity. The challenge is to build measures and institutions that are suitable to all the groups that make up the society. This, however, does not imply being culturally neutral, but rather creating political instruments that reflect and respect multicultural principles and traditions. Ways of negotiating identity and difference, as I previously defend in the introduction of this book, ought to be advocated, permitting all members of civil society the right to politically and actively belong and participate under the flagship of equal citizenship rights. I now take these arguments and further develop the concept of immigrant identities and the consequent role of ethnicity.
2.4 Identity, ethnicity and the age of transnationalism

The place of immigrant minorities in democratic nation-states is at the present time distinguished by vital contradictions. The failure to make immigrants into full citizens, it is argued, undermines the inclusive principle of democracy and leads to divided societies, while at the same time, political inclusion without cultural assimilation may undermine cultural and national identity – a crucial factor of integration in nation-states. On the other hand, we recall that assimilation politics requires that immigrants abandon their cultural identity in favour of that of the host nations while, in the midst of this contradiction, ethnicity and ethnic identification to a group also plays a pivotal role in determining the degree to which immigrant minorities will interact and integrate into the receiving society.

Beyond the influences of host nations’ policies and immigrants’ ethnic affiliations, it is also worth pointing out that in the age of globalisation, and in this technological era, the space and time compendium has diminished (Glick Schiller et al. 1992; Basch et al. 1994; Faist 2000a). The speed and volume of migration; the continual nature of population mobility; the cultural and social diversity of the migrants; the ease with which they can remain in contact with their country of origin; along with rapid economic and cultural exchanges on the international stage – all this makes assimilationist policies harder to implement as immigrants now have readily available resources that permit stronger links to their home culture and their homeland. The remainder of this chapter will serve to discuss these variables. I start with a brief analysis of the concept of identity.

As human beings we all have multiple identities – gender, race, ethnicity, sexuality and religion are just some of the variables that make up one’s identity. Seldom, however, are identification variables fixed, in fact quite the contrary; identity is fluid and dynamic, self-constructed or constructed by others, by states or by processes such as mobility. As explained by Chambers (1994: 24):

Our sense of being, of identity and language, is experienced and extrapolated from movement: the ‘I’ does not pre-exist this movement and then go out into the world, the ‘I’ is constantly being formed and reformed in such movement in the world.

Perhaps the most salient point made by Chambers is that identity is ever-changing. Hargreaves (1995: 93-94) defends this same notion in defining identity ‘as the pattern of meaning and value by which a person structures his/her life, it is clear that this involves a dynamic process
rather that an immutable condition’. Identities, it can thus be argued, are prone to ‘detours’ throughout one’s lifecourse (Gilroy 1997).

Beyond its dynamic characteristics, identity also refers to lived experiences and all the subjective feelings associated with everyday consciousness; suggesting that such experiences and feelings are embedded in wider sets of social relations (Rose 1995). Individuals construct meaning and value with the aid of cultural codes shared by particular groups. Identity in this sense is inseparable from socio-cultural identity. As emphasised by Hall (1995), culture is one of the principle means by which identities are constructed, sustained and transformed. Hall (1990) approaches cultural identity from two angles: 1) identity is seen in terms of one, shared culture – ‘one true self’ – reflecting the common historical experiences and shared cultural codes, which provide its people with frames of reference and meaning; 2) the recognition that identity is formed in relation to the way we see ‘others’ as different from ourselves. Thus, immigrants’ identification with an imagined community is an essential aspect of identification.

Various authors (King 1995; Rose 1995; Basu 2001) also argue that the meaning of place is important to constructing identities. Rose (1995) identifies three distinct manners in which emotions felt towards a place can be connected to the notion of identity: 1) identifying with a place; 2) identifying against a place; 3) not identifying. For an immigrant, the first and third variables can take on deeper meaning, as the identification with a place implies their country or region or town of origin and the symbols and history that accompany that place. On the contrary, not identifying implies being a stranger in a strange land and possessing a feeling of not belonging and of not equating with the symbols and landscapes that compose the host society. The reality is that the idealisation of the place left behind frequently overlooks the reasons for having left in the first place. In the long run they become no more than imagined places for, as King (1995: 28) points out, ‘these places have been changed by the migrants’ act of leaving’.

Identity formation upon arrival in the host country takes these points into consideration. However, the ‘ethnic identity factor’ should also be considered in the equation.

### 2.4.1 Ethnic identities and ethnic group formation

Social-cultural ties based on collective origins distinct from those of other groups, it is argued, are the foundation of ethnic identities. Geertz (1963) describes these cultural codes associated with ethnic identities as **primordial affinities and attachments**. The primordial account of ethnic identity, according to Geertz, contrasts social relations which arise from kinship, neighbourhood, commonality of language, religious beliefs,
and customs, with those which are based upon personal attraction, tacti-
cal necessity, common interest or incurred moral obligation. Through
the years, this view has come under some criticism mainly because it
assumes that people have primal and unchanging attachments to a parti-
cular social category – however it is defined (Watson 1977). Geertz de-

fined the social relations as simply ‘given’ and as ‘unaccountable’ and as
having an overpowering force ‘in and of themselves’. Critics of Geertz’s
model (Banton 1983; Hargreaves 1995; Rex 1996), on the other hand,
argue that new codes can always be learnt in later life, and that in many
circumstances these new codes may supersede those acquired at an early
age. According to Rex (1996), at later stages of life, individuals enter a
wider world and end up heading down one of two differing paths: firstly,
through the socialisation process, external role players ‘enter the head’ of
the individual whose personal identity is then a social creation leading to
him/her acting as an ethnic individual; secondly, it is possible that an
individual will find out that there are larger groups outside his original
one which can give him/her some of the same feeling of belonging and
sacredness. These larger groups are what are commonly referred to as
ethnies.

The ethnie is differentiated from the simpler type of kin- and neigh-
bourhood-based group by the fact that there is no precise definition of
the roles of one member to another. Thus, the group is constituted, in
one form or another, by the following six main features (Schmerhorn
1978; Smith 1986; Hutchinson and Smith 1996): 1) a common proper
name, to identify and express the ‘essence’ of the community; 2) a myth
of common ancestry, rather than a fact, that includes a common origin,
giving an ethnie a sense of fictive kinship; also coined the super-family
(Horowitz 1985); 3) shared historical memories, or better, shared mem-
ories of a common past or pasts, including heroes, events, and their
commemoration; 4) one or more elements of common culture, which need
not be specified but normally include religion, customs, or language; 5) a
link with a homeland, not necessarily its physical occupation by the eth-
nie, only its symbolic attachment to the ancestral land, as with diaspora
peoples; 6) a sense of solidarity on the part of at least some sections of the
ethnie’s population. These features, however, do not mean that the eth-
nie claims something of the strong sense of emotional belonging and
sacredness that is to be found in the smaller group. At the same time,
that is not to say that the ethnie does not have its own structure of social
relations. Usually, there is some sort of status differentiation and com-
plementarity among its members, and there will be some type of role
differentiation of those who exercise authority of a political and religious
sort, for example (Rex 1996).

The primordialist view of the ethnie would be that it exists largely for
its own sake. In contrast, an alternative approach to primordialism is
anthropologist Frederick Barth’s (1969) model of *situationalism*, also referred to as the ‘boundary approach theory’ (Pang 2000). With his model, Barth suggested that whether any particular individual belongs to an ethnie or not, depends on the purpose in hand, or in other words, the project in which the group is engaged. According to his view, while it is still not claimed that ethnies are purposive associations, they are shaped by projects of one kind or another. Ethnic identity, under the boundary approach, it is then argued, arises to serve particular purposes, primarily when one is confronted with other ethnic groups.

The self-serving dimensions notwithstanding, an ethnic identity also implies affect, warmth and a sense of togetherness and sameness. Ethnic identity in this case signifies a ‘sense of belonging’. This is where the expressivist dimension lies. Yinger (1994: 45-46) states that in an increasingly rational and instrumental world, people (especially minority individuals) have difficulty in ‘identifying with a large, heterogeneous, rapidly changing society’. An ethnic attachment, he argues, ‘helps one preserve some sense of community, to know who one is, to overcome the feeling of being a cipher in an anonymous world’. This is especially true of newcomers to a society as such people will become increasingly ethnic-conscious and join ethnic groups to react to the ‘strangeness’ of a new environment.

Thus, in attempting to define ethnic identity one can say that it results from both the act of self- and other-ascription, while containing, at the same time, genealogical contents, whether tangible or imagined (Pang 2000: 45). This is to say that a well-integrated ‘ethnic’ person in the host society may be indistinguishable from a native person in terms of behaviour, attitudes and language, but yet s/he prefers to identify him/herself with others that share the same ethnic background in self-presentation. Nimmi Hutnik (1991) suggests the following quadric-polar model in studying ethnic minority identities:

- **the assimilative** – embraces the values of the majority group and has a substantially low level of its own ethnic identity,
- **the acculturative** – has a high level of identification with the majority and with its own group,
- **the dissociative** – reveals a weak identification with the majority group but abides by the norms of the own ethnic group,
- **the marginal** – oscillates between the two groups without knowing what to choose, which results in a weak identification with both groups.

Commenting on Hutnik’s typology, Pang (2000) promotes the notion that pure ‘types’ do not exist. Instead, a person shows a propensity to be more of one style, mixing types as a matter of degree.
Identifying one’s distinct level of ethnicity thus becomes the key point to consider. Keeping this in mind, it is important to briefly analyse the concept of ethnicity and its applications. Although much of the theoretical writing about ethnicity has been concerned with the attachment of an ethnie to a territory, and with theories of nations and nationalism, within the present context I deal with ethnicity as applied to international migration, which, as opposed to the previous arguments, implies detachment from a territory (Rex 1997a). As Eriksen (1997) points out, definitions of ethnicity within the literature often do not distinguish between these two approaches, or do so in a way in which is unhelpful.

Ethnicity has a ring of ‘minority issues’ and ‘race relations’ (Eriksen 1997: 34). According to Chapman and his colleagues (1989: 15), in its simplest form, the term can mean ‘the essence of an ethnic group’ or ‘the quality of belonging to an ethnic community or group’. Alternatively, the concept may also refer to a field of study: the classification of people and the relations between groups, in a context of ‘self-other’ distinctions (Eriksen 1993: 4). Lastly, Bell (1975: 156) adds that the concept can be either a residual category, designating some common group tie not identified distinctively by language, colour or religion but rather by common history and coherence through common symbols; or it may be a generic term which allows one to identify loosely any minority group within a dominant pattern, even though the particular unit of identification may be national origin, linguistic, racial or religious.

Taking these definitions into consideration then, it can be argued that ethnicity becomes the most common variable in the make-up of group identity (Glazer and Moynihan 1975; Roosens 1989; Eriksen 1997) primarily when that identity is derived from belonging to what is generally called an ethnic group (Isaacs 1975: 29-30). Although there is no agreed stipulative definition of the concept of ethnic group, we will here consider a few attempts by a number of distinguished writers. According to Schermerhorn (1978: 12), an ethnic group is a collectivity within a larger society that shares a common ancestry along with memories of an historic past. Culture is represented by symbolic elements that define the people; elements which are then the fundamental components of one’s ethnicity. In an additional contribution to the definition of ethnic group, John Rex (1986) provides the following three essential aspects: 1) ethnicity is made up of cultural patterns of behaviour within which the individuals satisfy their common necessities; 2) there exists a conscience of ‘type’ brought by the recognition of cultural and physical characteristics; 3) there is a similar cultural behaviour that is seen as a sign of biological relationships.

Expanding on Rex’s points, Brass (1989) proposes three ways in which to define ethnic groups: 1) in terms of objective attributes (distinguishing cultural features); 2) with reference to subjective feelings (identity
and belonging); and 3) in relation to behaviour (explicit codes and interactions that become characteristic and all-pervasive within a complex society).

A number of theoretical models (Barth 1969; Marger and Obermiller 1987; Yinger 1994; Hutchinson and Smith 1996) have also been constructed with the aim of explaining the processes that lead to ethnic group formation. Marger and Obermiller (1987) explain that individuals come together in the form of ethnic groups mainly due to reasons of culture, ecology and politics. The cultural model is explained by the way in which newly arrived immigrants, as well as long-time settlers, depend on their culture as a form of adapting to the unfamiliar environment. Cultural elements often play an important role as shock absorbers in relation to the adjustment process. The ecological model focuses on the ecology of urban environments as a base for ethnic group formation. In this perspective, ethnic groups develop as a response to urban conditions, often tied in with work and housing. This form of ethnic togetherness is most evident when observing work-related ethnic concentrations or residential clustering, as well as dependencies on certain services and institutions. In the third model, based on political reasons, ethnic group formation comes about when individuals start making demands of power, prestige and prosperity. Often these groups are made up of individuals who search out political and economic means. They come together as a response to external competition and to develop tactics in order to better their collective status when competing for resources, not only in the host country but in their homeland as well.

Along with these theoretical models, the issue of ethnic group is complicated by the level of incorporation that named human culture groups display. Don Handleman (1977) distinguishes four such levels, each one a categorisation of the degree of incorporation of individuals towards the group.

– First level: **ethnic category**, describes as the ‘loosest level of integration’, where there is simply a perceived cultural difference between the group and outsiders, and a sense of an existing boundary between them.

– Second level: **ethnic network**, when there is regular interaction between ethnic members such that the network can distribute resources among its members.

– Third level: **ethnic association**, where members develop common interests and political organisations to express these at a collective, corporate level.

– Fourth level: **ethnic community**, characterised by high degrees of institutional organisation.
It is this fourth level – the community level – that Handleman refers to the ethnic group as an ethnie.

The transition from ethnic group to ethnie starts when the corresponding group is big enough to reveal a social structure, determined by a spectrum of sexes, ages, family relations and social interactions that can grant a significant amount of unity and common feeling of belonging among members of the group (Rocha-Trindade 1995: 184). The institutionalisation of the ethnic group can function as a support unit and as a point of identification for its members. For the immigrant, the ethnic community becomes a ‘security blanket’ in a society that can be highly impersonal. The level of interaction, support and dependency is thus conditioned by a variety of factors such as the acceptance of the host society as well as the level of institutionalisation. The degree of group formation will depend on these variables as well as the propensity of the group and its individuals to organise. The movement from ethnic group to community is, thus, a transition that some groups never make, others make initially, and still others undergo repeatedly at different points in time (Brass 1991).

### 2.4.2 Ethnic mobilisation

Ethnicity, it is argued (Glazer and Moynihan 1975; Rex 1986; Fenton 1999), appears as a base for defending group interests in a society characterised by the domination of a majority culture over minority groups. In this scenario, ethnicity functions as a resource that can be utilised to serve objectives at a social, political or economic scale, in dealing with conflict situations, discrimination, exploitation or oppression. Ethnicity can be mobilised to the advantages of a social, cultural or racial category of people (Drury 1994: 14). Similarly, Machado (1992: 123-129) adds that a significant part of ethnicity can be summed up by the importance of what it can bring to an ethnic group and its members when it comes to social inequalities, cultural identities and forms of collective action. The key point made by Machado is that ethnicity can thus be used as an important mobilising factor.

The concept of *ethnic mobility*, according to Drury (1994: 15), can be defined as a four-step process: first, ethnic group members will develop a high conscience level of themselves as a group; second, the group will utilise cultural criteria (e.g. religion) to clearly define the boundaries between them and the ‘outside world’; third, they will organise, prepare and consolidate all their available resources; and fourth, set forth their actions, primarily on a political front, in order to promote their collective interests. By the fourth stage, it is common that competition may exist and, consequentially, differences among groups and political powers will occur. The effective ties between members, in conjunction with the sen-
timents of belonging, are an answer to certain occurrences and situations that can take on a special significance, and thus lead to ethnic mobilisation. It is under these circumstances that an ethnic group must then ‘transform itself from ‘a group in itself’ to ‘a group for itself’” (Drury 1994: 15).

In her research, Pang (2000) utilises the phrase ethnicity as a weapon in describing how ethnicity often reveals an elastic nature in the way that the principal agents of the ethnic group are frequently enmeshed in constant negotiations with other minority groups, representatives of the state, and/or other members of the majority group. From one side of the spectrum, one can say that ethnic minorities, in response to the general forces in the society under consideration and sensitivity towards the cause of disadvantages and oppressed minority people, alter (if not invent) their own ethnic identity in order to obtain compensations, social promotion and material gains. In other words, the formulation of ethnic identity is self-serving on the part of the ethnic minorities. From the other side of the spectrum, members of the host society can also use the previous argument of ethnic identity as a rigged fabrication to enhance personal interests – ethnicity as a weapon so to speak – to discredit the merits of minorities in order to maintain the status quo of society. Thus it seems obvious that this double-edged argument shows the mutability of the concept, which can be manipulated for their own interests by all parties in society (Pang 2000).

2.4.3 Ethnic identity options and the creation of multiple identities

We can here validate the argument that ethnicity exists as an organisational principal – a variable that can strengthen relations in collective terms. But beyond serving as a guide in terms of group behaviour, it is also important to note that the principles behind ethnicity assume different levels of importance to different individuals. Fenton (1999: 90-92) refers to the degree of ethnic sentiments and bonds as ‘hot and cold ethnicity’, where hot ethnicity refers to ‘blood and passion’ felt by an individual, and cold ethnicity to ‘calculation and instrumentality’, or in other words, ethnicity as interest-based. From a theoretical point of view, the literature identifies two poles of ethnic identification: ‘old-fashioned ethnic identity’ and ‘symbolic ethnic identity’ (Isajiw 1990; Elliott and Fleras 1992; Gans 1996).

In relation to the concept of old-fashion ethnicity, the principles of ethnicity are reflected and enforced by the group structure so that cultural values and social pressures continue to perpetrate influences on the lives of individual members. The identification with the past influences the way of thinking as well as the behaviour of group members. There is also very little contact or affiliation with those outside the group. Elliott
and Fleras (1992: 146) argue that for those who are anxious to derive full benefit from a society that extols the virtues of achievement, this form of ethnic identity no longer appeals. Thus, this branch of ethnic identification is particularly common to first-generation immigrants, but tends to diminish in future generations.

Symbolic ethnic identity, on the other hand, sees ethnicity as a symbol characterised by a sense of nostalgia in relation to the immigrants’ culture and country of origin. This form of identification is made up of a feeling of love and pride towards a tradition that can be felt without being incorporated in the everyday behaviour of an individual (Gans 1996). With the passing of time, immigrants and/or their offspring start acquiring certain practices and behaviours associated with those of the host country (e.g. consumerism, diet, etc.), yet, beyond these assimilative tendencies, these immigrants might also retain an emotional relationship with their culture of origin. In this case, one can argue that the individual does not belong to the ethnic group per se, but what actually exists is a voluntary affiliation with cultural symbols (Gans 1996). Elliott and Fleras (1992) refer to symbolic ethnic identity as ‘weekend ethnicity’, based upon the way in which individuals will affiliate with the behaviours and patterns of the host society for the benefit of ascending professionally and socially, but fall back on their culture of origin in their free time. This type of ethnicity thus functions as a strategic resource that permits individuals and groups to negotiate and enrich their life within a pluralistic environment. These continued ethnic bonds, according to Rex (2002: 109):

[…] help to provide the immigrants with an emotional and moral home which protects them from a situation of anomie while at the same time giving them the organisational means for collective action in support of their rights.

The decline of an ethnic lifestyle, however, does not necessarily diminish the intensity of ethnic experiences. As argued by Elliott and Fleras (1992: 148):

Our capacity for multiple identities, diverse loyalties, and numerous and overlapping memberships ensures an identification with the past over a range of situations and circumstances. It is the identification with select aspects of that cultural lifestyle – not the degree or intensity of involvement – that is crucial.

Often the outcome, in relation to that of identification, is that an individual will acquire a double identity that will satisfy his or her necessities and objectives. Thus, in order to cope with the new identity, ‘hyphenated
identities’ are created and used to represent the complex ethnic identity (Rex 1987; Bhabha 1994, 1996; Pang 2000). As suggested by Rex (1987), hyphenated identities tend to highlight the problematic nature of collective attachments: the clash of interests experienced by translocal groups which arise from their multiple and multi-scale attachments and commitments. The stress is on the hyphenation of ethnic identities to the exclusion of other forms of identification. Yet the latter may potentially cut across ethnic attachments and generate quite different forms of sociability and alliance, based, for example, on class, gender, lifestyle, religious zeal, political tendency and so forth.

The culmination of voluntary and involuntary migration in the recent cultural propulsion to ‘modernise, urbanise and capitalise’, as well as in the mobility of people and continuous interchange in cultural items and information has, over the years, transformed most societies. However, as argued by Rapport and Dawson (1998: 24-26), the result of these transformations is neither the integration of what were once separate societies and their features, now fitting together as one in an orderly fashion, nor pluralities whereby old distinct societies merely preserve their cultural uniqueness alongside each other. Rather, what results are socio-cultural combinations, in other words ‘creolisations’, implying that societies are no longer isolated social spaces with their own discrete sets of people and cultural standards. Instead they are now creole in nature: ‘combinations of ways of life, with no invariant properties or uniform rules. A series of bridges of transformation now lead across social fences and cultural divisions between people from one end of the continuum to the other: bridges which are in constant use as people swap artefacts and norms, following multiple and incompatible ways of life’ (Rapport and Dawson 1998: 24).

Going hand-in-hand with the concept of creolisation is that of ‘hybridity’. Various authors (Hall 1992; Bhabha 1994; Chambers 1994; Papastergiadis 2000; Kalra et al. 2005) have tied this term to migration, diaspora and globalisation. As applied to migration and diaspora, the most common accounts emphasise hybridity as the process of cultural mixing where the diasporic arrivals assume aspects of the host culture and rework, reform and reconfigure these traits in fabrication of a new hybrid culture or ‘hybrid identities’ (Chambers 1996: 50). Additionally, through the ‘sheer weight of repetition’ (Cohen 1997: 131), hybridity is ‘better conceived of as a process rather then a description’ (Kalka et al. 2005: 71). According to Bhabha (1994: 227), it is through this process that ‘newness enters the world’.

As applied to migrant communities, Hall (1992: 310-314) makes a strong link between the development of hybridity and the changing character of diasporas. According to him, the world is marked by two contradictory tendencies: 1) the globalisation route, which endorses homogeni-
sation and assimilation; and 2) localism – notably in the form of ethnicity, nationalism and religious fundamentalism. Although these tendencies appear incompatible, Hall emphasises that new cultural identities are emerging from this incompatibility, drawing on different traditions and harmonising old and new without assimilating or abandoning the past. Similarly, Papastergiadis (2000: 3) argues that cultural hybridity is the outcome of the ‘twin processes of globalisation and migration’ and, as a result, modern metropolitan societies are today more complex and move beyond the models of assimilating and integrating migrants into host societies. Papastergiadis explains that, as members of migrant communities come to prominence ‘within the cultural and political circles of the dominant society’, they begin to contend ‘in favour of new models of representing the process of cultural interaction, and to demonstrate the negative consequences of insisting upon the denial of the emergent forms of cultural identity’. Hybridity is thus a key component in this new modelling, intertwined within the coordinates of migrant identity and difference (Kalka et al. 2005).

Given this overview, it’s important to question the strategic and sociocultural nature of identity constructions and what role this may play in the processes of integration. Given that globalisation and the growth of multicultural societies play a central role in the recreation of identities and collective traditions, thus leading to hybrid forms of identification; it is important to consider the invention of new traditions (Hobsbawm 1992) within global and multicultural contexts. Eric Hobsbawm (1992: 1) defines ‘invented traditions’ as:

[...] a set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past. [...] However, insofar as there is such reference to a historic past, the peculiarity of ‘invented’ traditions is that the continuity with it is largely fictitious. In short, they are responses to novel situations which take the form of reference to old situations, or which establish their own past by quasi-obligatory repetition.

Furthermore, Hobsbawm (1992: 4) explains that invented traditions occur more frequently at times of rapid social transformation, when ‘old’ traditions are disappearing. He distinguishes between three types of invented traditions, each with a distinctive function (1992: 9): a) those establishing or symbolising social cohesion and collective identities, b) those establishing or legitimatising institutions and social hierarchies and c) those socialising people into particular social contexts.
Invented traditions use references to the past not only for the cementsation of group cohesion, but also for the legitimization of action. However, taking Hobsbawm’s points into consideration, it can be argued that identity may be limited to the creation of ‘inaccurate reinventions and/or redefinitions’, carried out for the purpose of drawing borders, separating those inside the group from those outside (Tajfel and Turner 1986), or for the purpose of shaping objectives aimed at facilitating insertion into the receiving society. Thus, what may be perceived as integration obstacles, drawn by the contrasting of those ‘who belong’ from those that ‘don’t’, may, in fact, be in defence of what Anderson (1991) coins an ‘imagined community’, linking social-psychological and socio-political approaches to integration. The moulding of what may be thought of as tradition and collectively defining is, in reality, redefined and structured for the purpose of finding one’s place in the broader society.

2.4.4 Transnationalism and identity

When it comes to immigrant identities, the concept of transnationalism also plays a major role in determining the available options. When we refer to sustained ties of persons and organisations across the borders of multiple nation-states, be they of a weak or strong institutionalised nature, we are here also referring to the transnational networks created by them. These networks, in turn, can be seen as the basis for, or as a form of, transnational social fields. Based on the definition of Basch et al. (1994), within transnational migration research, the term ‘social field’ can be summed up as a set of multiple interlocking networks of social relations through which ideas, practices and resources are exchanged, organised and transformed. This paradigm assumes the circulation of ideas, values and material culture within these networks of social relations, although in an unequal form and not necessarily in a symmetrical fashion. Social fields are multi-dimensional, encompassing interactions of differing forms, depth and breadths, such as organisations, institutions and movements (Basch et al. 1994).

As various authors point out (Faist 2000a, 2000b; Levitt and Glick Schiller 2003; Glick Schiller 2004), the concept of social field also calls into question the division of connections into local, national, transnational and global. In one sense, all are local in the manner that all connections penetrate the daily lives of individuals living within a specific geographical setting. But within this setting, a person may participate in personal networks, or receive ideas and information from another nation-state, without migrating. By conceptualising transnational social fields as crossing the boundaries of nation-states, it is also important to note that individuals within these fields are, through their everyday activities and relationships, influenced by multiple sets of laws and institu-
tions. Their daily rhythms and activities respond not only to more than one state at the same time, but also to social institutions, such as ethno-cultural associations or religious groups that exist within a variety of states and across their borders (Levitt and Glick Schiller 2003).

Within these social fields, Levitt and Glick Schiller (2003) argue for a differentiation between ways of being as opposed to ways of belonging. Ways of being refers to the social relations and practices in which individuals engage. Individuals can be rooted in a social field but not identify with any label or cultural politics related with that field. Social fields of various levels, however, contain institutions, associations and experiences that generate identity categories that are attributed to or chosen by individuals or groups. These are accessible or optional ways of belonging that individuals may or may not opt for at different phases of their lives or in different social frameworks. Individuals may have some kind of connection to a way of belonging, through memory, nostalgia or imagination, etc., which allows them to be a part of a social field. Thus, as Levitt and Glick Schiller (2003) say, when individuals self-identify with a particular way of belonging, they may associate with like-minded individuals and create a social field. When a transnational social field is both formed and named, it becomes a transnational social space. These connections mean that daily practices, as well as ideas, may be shaped by forces not confined to the nation-state. Forms of ways of being and ways of belonging are, therefore, transnational.

Additionally, the formation of transnational social spaces can vary from short-lived exchange relations to long-lasting transnational interactions. Whether or not individuals forge or maintain some kind of transnational connection depends on the extent to which they wish to remain attached, or in the case of immigrant offspring, on the way in which they are reared in a transnational space (Levitt and Glick Schiller 2003: 15). Transnational activities may not be as central to the lives of most of the second generation, and those who do engage in them might not do so with the same frequency and intensity as their parents. In fact, in their writings concerning the post-immigrant generation in the United States, Portes and Rumbaut (2001) argue that these ties will weaken among the children; since these individuals are only occasional transnational activists and their activities are confined to very specific arenas of social life, they are likely to have minimal long-term consequences.

Summing up, we then take our cue from Faist (2000b: 215) who argues that immigrant identities and culture ‘cannot be seen as baggage or a template, nor as something to be figuratively packed and unpacked, uprooted (assimilationists) and transplanted (cultural pluralists)’. Certainly, the ongoing dissemination of transnational meanings and symbols through social and symbolic ties in transnational social spaces helps to maintain the multi-fold transactions that traverse borders. Under aus-
picious conditions – such as modern technologies (distance-bridging mass communications, affordable short-term long-distance travel), liberal state policies (polyethnic rights and anti-discrimination policies), changing emigration state policies (remittances, investment and political support), and immigrant capacities to mobilise resources (organisational, social and human capital) – the transnational syncretism of identities and culture finds a fertile breeding ground (Faist 2000b).

* * *

This chapter has focused on the topics of integration, citizenship and identity. In relation to integration, a review of definitions and related concepts has been made. Although a central theoretical notion is that integration is an ongoing process by which immigrants are incorporated into a receiving society, an integral part of that process also involves the extent the host country will permit integration through its governance and policy frameworks. In discussing the constructed character of the idea of integration and its relation and (con)fuson with, for example, assimilation and identity preservation, a ‘false assumption’ is frequently raised, pinning what is often perceived as opposing models against each other (e.g. pluralistic integration and assimilation). Within this context there are some questions worth drawing attention to: Can integration be seen as assimilation? When we speak of assimilation or integration, we mean assimilation or integration into what? For the purpose of this research, the integration framework that guides the study’s structure is that integration ought to entail the freedom to retaining ethno-cultural forms, while simultaneously possessing the right to integrate into the social structures (economic, civic, political, cultural and spiritual) of the host society.

Similarly, citizenship and participation opportunities are equally dependent on the reception and opportunity structures provided within host-country frameworks. As Vermeulen and Penninx (2000: 216) point out, ‘it is important to realize that the focus on one’s own group and culture can be the result of external forces or of one’s own tradition and choice, and is often the outcome of an intricate, interactive process between both’. Thus, at the same time that host country policies and established citizenship rights (or lack there of) can determine the ‘placing’ and ‘positioning’ of a third-country national in a receiving country, identification (as a non-static variable) can also be influenced and moulded according to these determinates (Marques et al. 2003: 9). Alongside this scenario, however, it is important to remember that transnational network ties also play a supporting role in determining available identity options and directions, enabling the home-country perspective to be retained and deployed in various situations. In the words of Kastoryano (1996), identity is not a clear-cut, one-way process: it is ‘negotiated’.
This considered, given the different social fields immigrants engage in, the amalgamation of the various ethnic identity options will often result in the creation of a third identity – the sum of the identity options provided within the various social fields played in.

Building on these theoretical frameworks, and in order to assist in answering one of the key questions posed in this study – what role do immigrant associations in Portugal play in relation to the integration and ethno-socio-cultural identity preservation of community members? – it is important to explore the theoretical concepts related to voluntary associations and immigrant organisations. Chapter 3 is devoted to such a task.
As various authors in the field of migration studies have previously pointed out (see the review by Moya 2005), scholars are increasingly realising the importance of voluntary organisations founded by immigrants. Studies have demonstrated that migrant voluntary organisations are not only important for the immigrants themselves, but also for the study of their participation, integration and identity formation in the host society.1 Studying immigrant organisations, say Shrover and Vermeulen (2005: 823), ‘enables us to make better sense of the complex and dynamic developments that take place within immigrant communities’.

I start off by asking: what is a voluntary association?2 Michael Banton (1968) defines it as a voluntarily organised group of individuals that come together for the purpose of attaining and defending specific common interests. In a somewhat broader definition, Moya (2005: 834) identifies voluntary associations as ‘secondary organisations that exist between the primary links of kinship and the equally non-voluntary arrangements of tertiary institutions like the state’. Although this generic definition can be applied to all sorts of organisations, from global organisations to local school choirs, Moya (2005: 835) explains that immigrant associations, in contrast, are often reduced to more ‘confined spaces’. Although they can be wide-ranging, often being transnational in nature, immigrant associations, continues the author, ‘are more circumscribed than an entire society or the whole world’. Immigrant associations, it can then be argued, are defined by a people, a place, a cause or an identity – examples of the ‘confined spaces’ referred to by Moya.

Accordingly, the key to defining immigrant association – setting the term apart from the generic term association – is the fact that these institutions are either formed by immigrants or for immigrants.3 These institutions can carry out various functions and be of various types (e.g. secret societies, credit associations, religious groups, hometown associations, business associations, student organisations, women’s associations, solidarity institutions, political and advocacy groups, etc.), but when it comes to identifying the essence of an immigrant association, questions of what constitutes an immigrant organisation arise (Fennema 2004). As Shrover and Vermeulen (2005) ask: Should associations
founded by newcomers, but whose membership is mixed, be defined as
an immigrant organisation? How about those founded by natives but
whose membership is mostly immigrant? And when does the immi-
grant association stop being an immigrant association: after the second,
the third generation?

In light of this introductory discussion, this chapter will serve to map
out patterns of collective organisations among migrants. It will concen-
trate on organisational forms, goals and levels of operation as the major
constituents of migrant organisational patterns. The account will review
arguments and theories pertinent to the study of community and volun-
tary associations, followed by an outline of the phenomenon of the im-
migrant voluntary sector. Besides theoretical debate, the key central
questions to be tackled include: What motivates immigrants to organise
themselves formally and to associate? What functions do these organisa-
tions serve at the various phases of the migration process? What do
these associations mean to the people they represent and what identity
and integration options do these institutions offer? How do receiving
countries perceive the organisation of immigrant associations?

3.1 Communities, voluntary associations and aspects of social
cohesion: A theoretical review

Through the history of social sciences and the study of communities and
associations, many different approaches can be found to define and ana-
yse the collective gathering of individuals into organised groups to form
formal social groups, communities and associations. A review of the
classic theoretical contributions offered by Tönnies, Durkheim and Toc-
queville can be a starting point for this discussion.

Attempting to come to a conclusive and definite understanding of
what constitutes a community can be a self-defeating task. The various
explanations and definitions of society (or at least modern Western so-
ciety) are seeded in the very belief that promoting individual rights and
freedoms requires a determined and asserted denial of all considerations
of the common good (Etzioni 1995). As a result of this rejection of com-
munal themes in our everyday lives, definitions of community are often
relegated to being theoretical and to having no real application in our
society. So whether we believe that community originates from our un-
derstanding of our individuality or from our inherent tendencies to-
wards social organisation, we can learn much about implementing com-
munity in modern society by evaluating our past understanding and
involvement with it (Etzioni 1995).

Historically, sociologists have generally accepted that community re-
sides within the context of two major realms: those that can be described
as ‘structural’ and those described as ‘functional’. The structural elements of community are better understood as the types of interconnectedness that individuals feel to each other within the structure of non-obligatory social organisations (clubs, churches, neighbourhoods, etc.). The structural realm is thus concerned with the ‘nuts and bolts’ of how we coexist, with whom we choose to interrelate and what sorts of activities occupy our times. The functional realm, on the other hand, is associated directly with inevitable conditions, or, in other words, it can be best understood in the context of associations that are required by groups of people living or working together within a specific geographical space. It is Émile Durkheim to whom we owe the structural functionalist approach. As explained in Morén-Alegret (2002: 11), according to Durkheim ‘society is an organization, a more or less definite and permanent system of relations. It is association, interaction and communication; it is also system and unity’. The structural functionalist approach derived from Durkheim searches for patterns and regularities in community life, and looks for features, many below the surface of individuals’ awareness, that make for the smooth functioning of society. The emphasis is thus on consensus and social cohesion, on mechanisms of solidarity and the role of shared values and beliefs (Smith 1996).

When it comes to discussing the concept of community perhaps the most influential account is that of Tönnies’ duality between Gemeinschaft (community) and Gesellschaft (association) dating back to 1887. The notion of Gemeinschaft lies in social solidarity based on commonality of bonds of sentiments, experiences, sense of place and purpose, identity, emotional commitment and values along with dense social networks and inter-personal relations. Gesellschaft, on the other hand, is characterised by impersonal and superficial relations, normlessness and heterogeneous identifications. In both social formations, a kind of social cohesion is maintained, but by qualitatively different means – in the case of the former, consensus is promoted by informal institutions (i.e. family and peer group); in the case of the latter, social solidarity is governed by formal authority. For Tönnies a true community exists when institutions and individuals are drawn together, not because they require some sort of symbolic support from each other, but because of the need for social togetherness, and because a shared value system binds these separate parts to the unified whole. According to Tönnies, communities are socially organised around relationships and the felt interdependencies that nurture them and bind them together to an idea structure (Sergiovanni 1994).

Relevant to the study of associations, it is important that we should be clear about the contrasts which can be drawn between Tönnies and Durkheim. As expressed by Rex and Josephides (1987: 15), for Tönnies, association is comprised by the absence of the kind of commitment sug-
gested by the concept of identity, for example. Rex and Josephides go on to explain that, for Tönnies, it is in ‘community’ where the ‘the real will’ is involved that the individual has a sense of belonging. By contrast, associations rest upon the adoption and pursuit of specialised purposes or, in the words of Tönnies, they rest upon ‘artificial will’.

Durkheim, on the other hand, took what Rex and Josephides (1987: 16) refer to as a ‘more realistic and optimistic view’. For Durkheim, the contractual ties of modern society were thought of as nevertheless involving a kind of solidarity, both between the individuals and the group. Thus he idealised a society characterised either by ‘mechanical solidarity’ (common values, beliefs and experiences enabling persons to cooperate successfully) or ‘organic solidarity’ (social integration maintained through interdependence; that is, despite individualism and a complex division of labour, a shared conscience still rests in shared principles and expectations). Social cohesion is to be achieved not only through specialisation but also interdependence and reciprocity of individual social actors and segments, each somehow contributing to the whole.

In view of this, a special role is assigned to smaller and more immediate groups than a relatively amorphous community. These smaller groups may socialise the individual to perform a specialised role, but this specialised role has moral significance within a larger pattern of social solidarity. The smaller and more intimate grouping to which individuals belong, and through which they were socialised and received their identity, was first provided by the extended kinship group, but since such groups have declined in significance in advanced societies, their role would appear to have to be undertaken by occupational or other groups. Commitment to separate and specialised social groups was for Durkheim a way of belonging to the wider social system; he envisioned the possibility that occupational groups should have a central role in the socialization and moral education of the individual (Rex and Josephides 1987: 16).

As emphasised by Rex and Josephides (1987: 16-17), immigrant associations may perhaps be thought of as playing for immigrant populations something like the role which Durkheim assigned to occupational groups, perhaps even bring about an answer to the question – ‘Who am I?’ – in the socialisation of the individual. Rex and Josephides (1987: 17) posit the following:

At first sight they may perhaps be distinguished from occupational groups, as there is not necessarily any complementarity between immigrant associations and groups within the society of settlement. [...] Per contra, Durkheim would have argued that, although the complementarity and integration of minority groups was an ideal, as a matter of empirical fact they were often in conflict with one another. It
does make some sense then to see the immigrant associations and community structure as forming the intimate small-scale group which has moral influence over the individual and which yet integrates him with a larger society.

Parallel to these preceding arguments, Talcott Parsons (1960) distinguished between functional integration (specialisation and interdependence of individual social actors) and normative integration (society’s norms, values and morality, sanctions, roles and behaviours are highly internalised). Individuals living within the overarching, heterogeneous social system may form communities that serve functions like those of smaller scale societies (which is believed to be the case among immigrants and immigrant associations). Additionally, Parsons raised the possibility of observing the two modes together in ‘diffuse solidarity’ whereby a complex and functionally differentiated social system is nevertheless integrated through attachment to abstract, common normative values.

3.1.1. Tocqueville’s three-sector model

Half a century before Durkheim and Tönnies were to theorise their findings, Alexis de Tocqueville ([1835] 1945), on a visit to the United States, noted the prominent place of voluntary associations in American society. Tocqueville’s analysis of voluntary associations attributes two kinds of functions to them:

Not only do they empower individuals, enabling them to overcome their individual weakness, but they also function as a ‘learning school’ for democracy, where members learn to deliberate, to make compromises and to work for the common good. (quoted in Hooghe 1999: 3)

But above all, to Tocqueville, voluntary associations were important because they expressed the nation’s values, and in doing so, they sustained them and permitted them to be examined, reshaped and applied. By supplying assistance to the disadvantaged, voluntary organisations demonstrate to the community at large that caring and helping are values worthy of public attention. The numerous associations, Tocqueville argued, sustained not only the stated objectives of the groups, but also strengthened the values of community itself and, within each community, the diversity of individualism (Wuthnow 1991: 3-4). In short, to Tocqueville, voluntary associations are not only an important contribution to the cultural health of a nation, but they also harness the vibrant goodwill of the people that constitute the nation.
Implicit in Tocqueville’s discussion is the idea that society can be divided into three sectors: the state, the market and the voluntary sector. Under this scheme, known as the three-sector model, the state can be defined as the range of activities organised and legitimated by formalised coercive powers; the market as a range of activities involving the exchange of goods and services for profit based on a pricing mechanism linked to relative levels of supply and demand; and the voluntary sector – or ‘third’ sector – consists of activities that are indeed voluntary in the dual sense of being coercion-free and free of economic profits (Adams 1989; Wuthnow 1991). The third sector thus hinges on voluntarism, a principal that ultimately involves freedom of alliance for purposes of mutuality, camaraderie, or services rendered free of obligation or remuneration.

In social sciences, it has been common to distinguish the basic elements of societies in terms of major functions and the dominant institutions attending to them: the polity becomes an institutional domain concerned with setting the goals or policies for a society; the economy, an institutional realm oriented towards adapting social relations to the physical environment; the family, an institution concerned with nurturing children, passing along basic values and providing for intimacy and community; and so on. Institutions often regarded as having distinct purposes to be distinguished from others include: religion, education, health, communication and environment. The sectoral model, by contrast, recognises that these various functions may be provided by organisations in several different sectors. While in theory, relations between the sectors may seem to be in sharp contrast, in practice, as Wuthnow (1991: 10) explains, the line between the state and the voluntary sector is often blurred as a result of cooperative programmes between the two, government chartering of voluntary associations and government financing. The same applies in relation to voluntary and market-sector relations, namely when organisational schemes that bring for-profit and non-profit activities under the same administrative umbrella. Hence, it can be argued that the three sectors are related to one another, with transactions, cooperation, exchange of resources, as well as competition often characterising their relationships. Cooperative exchanges may come in the form of organisational and managerial expertise, facilities, legal protection and publicity, all of which may represent flows into the voluntary sector, and reciprocity flows of resources from this sector to the other, such as public relations, votes, monetary support of political candidates or social programmes, or means of altering government programmes. On the other hand, examples of competition come about when parallel services are being provided by organisations in more than one sector and where their sectoral locations make a difference in their access to the resources needed to provide these services.
So as Tocqueville had noted in his time, voluntary associations were one of the strengths behind 1830s America. In the present day, most at issue is the question of whether voluntarism itself is viable. At a time when market forces make it hard for people to give time and resources to voluntary associations, and these forces increasingly try to draw profitable services into the realm of the market economy; at a time when government agencies and political parties expand incessantly, leaving less and less room for voluntary projects to justly play an independent role; we must ask, can the virtues of individual freedoms, of community responsibility, of care and empathy, and of selflessness be maintained against the influences of market-oriented efficiency and state-oriented bureaucracy?

3.1.2 Civil society and social capital

The classical theories discussed in the previous sections, in their simplest forms, refer to different ways in which people can associate freely, including in family, neighbourhood, schools, clubs, communities or any other form of collective groups. What Tocqueville dubbed ‘voluntary associations’, what the political philosopher Edmund Burke (1756), before Tocqueville, called ‘little platoons’ or ‘subdivisions of society’, all have at their very core the concept of social cohesion, or in other words, the basic patterns of cooperative social interaction and the core set of collective values. Karl Deutsch et al. (1957 in Vertovec 1999b: xiii) described the essence of social cohesion ‘as cohesion indicated by the cultivation of mutual loyalties or ‘we-feeling’, trust, successful prediction of behaviour and the ability people have to engage in cooperative action’. Such ideas are today invoked in terms of civil society.

As a concept, civil society has been defined in many different ways (Skidmore 2005: 3). The idea behind civil society suggests that the quality of societal life depends on the fruitful interaction between people and between individuals and society (Odmalm 2004). Most commonly, the term refers to the varied forms of social organisation that lie between the individual and the state. In other words, civil society is an expression of the basic human desire to socialise with others through voluntary association, manifesting itself in an almost infinite variety of social groups.

To Walzer (1992: 89), civil society is ‘the space of uncoerced human association and also the set of relational networks – formed for the sake of family, faith, interest and ideology – that fill this space’. These networks include unions, churches, political parties, social movements, cooperatives and promotion and/or prevention societies. As pointed out by Vertovec (1999b: xiii), it is through such networks, and the multiplicity of people’s activities which they provide, that, ideally, state power is held in check. Therefore a ‘democratic civil society’, as suggested by Walzer
‘is one controlled by its members, not through a single process of self-determination but through a large number of different and uncoordinated processes’. The conviction behind civil society strategy is, rather, that mediating structures are the principal expressions of the real values and real needs of people in society. They are, for the most part, as Glenn (2000: 25) describes them: ‘the people-sized institutions’.

Additionally, according to Bauböck (1996b: 70), the concept contains the hope for a kind of equality that is more substantial – and more meaningful – than the formal and procedural equality of the law. It makes for a liberty that is not just the negative liberty of non-interference with individual choices, but also positive autonomy extending the range of choices and enabling people to choose in ways that are meaningful for their lives. It also creates the hope for solidarity that is not oppressive and not only exercised within narrow ‘we-groups’, but which underpins social integration in open, anonymous and heterogeneous societies.

In keeping with these ideals, calls for the promotion of civic renewal and civil society are often made by way of urging greater participation and ‘active citizenship’ through voluntary associations and services. In fact, it could easily be argued that participation through voluntary associations could be considered as one of the key features of civil society and an important form of citizen participation in public life, since such associations function as a supplement to the institutional arrangements of representative democracy and therefore keep the democratic culture going by bringing in new ideals and issues to the public sphere (Odalm 2004). In addition, participation in voluntary associations can potentially generate a number of socially valued skills such as habits of cooperation, solidarity and public-spiritedness, which, in turn, support the creation of a more tightly knit community (Putnam 1993).

In applying the notion of civil society to that of associational pluralism, Bauböck (1996b) argues that associations in civil society do not simply fill a social vacuum opened by functional differentiation between the institutions of state, market and voluntary associations, but also mediate between individuals and these institutions in a dual sense: by connecting them and by coming between them. Civic association, argues this author (1996b: 85-86), also creates a distance between individuals and the core institutions of modern society. In addition to the opportunities for switching between the roles of citizen, economic agent and family member, civil society also provides individuals with alternative roles that are less demanding. Its associations and organisations offer some respite from the strains to which individuals are subjected in a competitive economy, a state regulating ever more aspects of social life and the burden of family responsibilities. Furthermore, associations and party organisations create sheltered milieus where group representation relieves citizens from the difficult task of becoming politically active as
individuals (Bauböck 1996b). Civil society, thus, consists of a plurality of voluntary associations characterised by their particularities and diversity of interests, as well as by their organisational form. For example, some are merely transmitters of cultural dynamics generated within the core institutions. Others, such as religious congregations, have their own comprehensive system of values, the foundations of which transcend not only society but also the world. This may render them immune to the impact of cultural dynamics. They can thus be powerful cultural institutions in their own right, defining binding life goals and interpretations of the world for their members. Bauböck (1996b: 123) thus concludes that civil society provides immigrants with opportunities to practice and develop their specific cultures and to combine this in various ways with the established cultural traditions of the receiving country. The associational pluralism of civil society extends the sphere in which cultural differences can flourish far beyond the closed communities of family life, friends and ethnic milieus.

Another important feature of civil society is that it remains voluntary and autonomous under state regulations in order to permit the coexistence of diverging individual and collective interests (Odmalm 2004). Osborne and Gaebler (1992) describe the appropriate role of the democratic process, and consequently of government, as ‘steering’ rather than ‘rowing’ the boat. Berger and Neuhaus (1996) go further in saying that in order to provide more effectiveness in social service provision, ‘public policy should recognise, respect, and, where possible, empower these institutions’. The concern is that, in order to strengthen civil society and empower it, there is the need for government support through forms of funding and resource allocation. The line around organisational autonomy thus becomes blurred when the acquisition of that funding is conditional and when government reliance becomes essential. It can then be argued that dependency on the state often clashes with the notion of civil society (Fennema and Tillie 2002). The pursuit of autonomy on the part of voluntary institutions thus leads them to wage a war of formalisation against principles.

The primary and most dynamic mechanism that underpins a flourishing civil society is that of social capital. The OECD ‘Well-being of Nations’ report (2001) sums up social capital as ‘... networks together with shared norms, values and understandings that facilitate cooperation within or among groups’. Four key dimensions are generally recognised: political participation; community participation; information networks/sociability; and trust, norms and sanctions (Burns 2003). In other words, social capital is the building of connections between people and communities with the focus being placed on the creation of relationships of trust and tolerance through person-to-person contact, strengthening the social fabric of communities and society. Social capital functions on the
bases of people’s skills, knowledge and abilities to build relationships through social networks and groups.

The recent debate on the topic of social capital has been greatly stimulated by the work of Robert Putnam (1993) on regional inequalities in Italy. In defining the concept, Putnam (1993: 167) explains that social capital comprises ‘features of social organisation, such as trust, norms, and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating co-ordinated action’. According to Putnam, the effectiveness of political institutions is very dependent on the nature of civic community. As a result, the social capital that is embedded in civic community is perceived as an important predictor of social trust and civic engagement. Putnam (1993: 173) argues that:

[... ] networks of civic engagement (such as neighbourhood associations, choral societies, co-operations, sports clubs, mass-based parties) are an essential form of social capital: the denser such networks in a community, the more likely that its citizens will be able to cooperate for mutual benefit.

Moreover, these features can be cultivated, by social and political institutions or ‘virtuous circles’, which, in turn, serve to promote efficiency and economic dynamism. Social capital, in other words, can be seen as the dynamic ingredient for a thriving civil society (Vertovec 1999b).

Three different types of social capital can be identified (Baernholdt and Aarsother 2002; Burns 2003): 1) bonding capital – the formation of strong ties among individuals within a group; 2) bridging capital – the formation of cross-cutting ties between people from different groups; and 3) linking capital – the connections between those with different levels of power and influence and/or social status. In applying these conceptual approaches to the analysis of immigrants and immigrant institutions, Horta and Malheiros (2005) argue in the Portuguese context that it is valid to suppose that sustainability and community reproduction of migrant groups depend simultaneously on the level of embeddedness of the first two dimensions: the intra-group (bridging) and the extra-group (bonding) plus the transnational one. These authors (2005: 4) add that:

[... ] bonding capital refers to vicinity/short distance ties (inside the immigrant group but also with the non-ethnic neighbours), while bridging social capital is associated i.) to the ties with the individual and institutional representatives of the majority society and also of other ethnic groups and ii.) to the long distance relations established with the members of the ethnic group which are scattered in other places of the world.
The significance of social capital when it comes to the increased recognition of social networks has also become evident in the growing debate on political participation and ethnic society. In their research on the political participation of ethnic communities in Amsterdam, Fennema and Tillie (1999) advance the thesis that there is a link between the network of ethnic associations and the degree of political participation and political trust. In a comparative study of Turks, Moroccans, Surinamese and Antilleans in Amsterdam, the authors showed that Turks, who have a denser network of associations than that of Moroccans, also possessed higher scores in relation to political trust and participation. This same linkage between social capital embedded in associational networks, political trust and political participation was also found in another comparative study involving the Surinamese and Antillean communities (Fennema and Tillie 2001). The findings of Fennema and Tillie thus support the premise that the denser the networks between ethnic organisations, the higher their social capital and social trust will be.

Fundamental to the theoretical approach of Fennema and Tillie (2001) is the idea that the vigour of the ethnic civil community is an important predictor of the political involvement of migrants. This notion portrays the concept of civic community as ‘a set of interrelated civic organisations. These civic organisations may be related through overlapping membership or through interlocking at the elite level’ (Fennema 2004: 432). The supposition is that the denser the networks among ethnic organisations, the stronger are the ethnic civic communities and, therefore, the higher social capital will be at a group level. Additionally, the nature of the organisational structure of an ethnic community (including the number of organisations, the level of membership and the diversity of its activities) influences the amount of social capital generated at a group level, allowing for the achievement of certain collective goods which, otherwise, would not be attainable in its absence (Horta and Malheiros 2005). Also pivotal is the degree of connectivity in the network itself. ‘If the ethnic organisations show a high degree of connection among themselves’, explain Horta and Malheiros (2005: 6), ‘their members have higher access to a multiplicity of resources which otherwise would not be available if the network is fragmented’.

Lastly, as Fennema (2004: 439) argues: ‘There is no ethnic community without certain forms of embedded trust’. The conjecture, in this situation, is that ‘in a thriving ethnic community the members trust each other more than they trust other members of the society’. Identification with the group based on common ethnicity, along with a distinctive sense of diversity based on a common cultural traits, origin and descent, enhance the perception of an ‘us’ in contrast to a ‘them’ (Horta and Malheiros 2005: 6). Emotional attachments and affinities with the eth-
nic group, it can then be argued, promote assurance, solidarity, trust and loyalty among group members.

### 3.2 Immigrant associations: Roles and motivations

It is safe to say that when a community of immigrants is physically located in a country different from the one they originate from, while at the same time retaining links with their homeland, these immigrants may encounter identity issues, which, in turn, may lead to problems of integration in the host society. This considered, it is common for the obstacles that arise during the immigrants’ settlement process to influence the ways in which immigrants organise their collective interests in order to be able to construct a harmonious interactive relationship with the host society.

In characterising immigrant associations, one can describe them as a combination of an affective tie with that of a common interest (Bell 1975; Jenkins 1988). In other words, while it is common for immigrant associations to be founded in order to preserve the identity and culture of their members, inevitably these associations also end up playing a major role in the settlement processes of their members, either through pathways of assimilation or segregation. In addition, immigrants often come together and create formal associations in order to protect mutual interests, to mobilise support over issues of concern and to make representations to political authorities concerning their welfare. A distinction can thus be drawn between what an immigrant association is and what it does (Layton-Henry 1990b). In terms of what it is, an immigrant association can be defined as an organisation formed by individuals who consciously define themselves as members of an ethno-cultural group (based, for example, on such variables as country of origin, a common heritage, language, religion, consciousness of kind, etc.) within a larger context. In terms of what it does, on the other hand, an immigrant association may exist for a wide variety of reasons: social, recreational, political, cultural, religious, professional, business, service, citizenship or a combination of some or all of the above.

Immigrant associations may become an important instrument in understanding immigration and integration processes based on the degree to which immigrants cluster in organisations – a critical measure of collectively expressed and collectively approved identity. It is usually through these bodies that others can address immigrants as a collective, and, as such, these bodies have a say when it comes to delineating within and between immigrant groups, and between immigrants and the host society (Shrover and Vermeulen 2005). The perception of the existence of difficulties shared by the general immigrant population raises a con-
scious awareness of the need to pool resources and to carry out initiatives that will permit decreasing or hurdling these obstacles.

Immigrant associations are thus important instruments when it comes to the social integration of the individuals they represent. Schrover and Vermeulen (2005) utilise what they refer to as the ‘offensive-defensive dichotomy’ in describing the two opposing roles of associations when it comes to the social integration of the community. Immigrant institutions, explain the authors (2005: 824-825), ‘can be defensive – as a response to exclusion – or offensive – stemming from a choice of immigrants to set themselves apart from others’. Here a distinction can also be made between organisations that aim at imposing or encouraging integration and those aiming to differentiate members from the host society.

But as Rex (1973) points out, ‘immigrant associations cannot be merely understood as ‘social instruments’, susceptible to being mobilised when collective objectives arise’. Additionally, these institutions function as an instrument that permits the preservation of a group’s heritage and values. It is this shared heritage and values, as well as the common cultural identity shared by the members of the immigrant group, that becomes the fundamental attraction that steers individuals to associating. In exchange, associations become an essential part of the immigrants’ lives, providing an adaptation support system and creating a shield that, most often, functions as a barrier between their ethnic or national identity and the ‘other’ of the host society (Marquez 2001).

The Canadian researcher Raymond Breton (1964) suggests three sets of factors that stimulate the formation of ethnic organisations:
1. cultural differences with the native population;
2. the level of resources among the members of the immigrant group; and
3. the pattern of migration.

In a somewhat functionalist analysis on migrant associations, Rex (1973) suggests that they fulfil four main functions:
1. overcoming social isolation;
2. helping individuals to solve personal and material problems;
3. combining to defend the group’s interests in conflict and bargaining with the wider society;
4. maintaining and developing shared patterns of meaning.

Of the four points offered by Rex, the first two relate to community issues, dealing more precisely with members on individual bases, while the last two deal with objectives of a communal or associative nature. A strong balancing among functionalities, first tied to cultural identity fac-
tors and, second, tied to factors that deal with the resources and interests of the group, can here be identified.

In both categorisations, cultural differences between immigrants and members of the host society are important factors for encouraging the formation of immigrant associations. Moya (2005: 839-840) critiques this observation, arguing that there are difficulties in measuring similarities as well as differences. Additionally, he explains that immigrants who are culturally different from members of the host society have not set up more organisations than culturally similar immigrants have, explaining that the Portuguese in Brazil set up as many associations as the Japanese, just as the Spaniards in Buenos Aires developed denser institutional structures than those of their Italian counterparts.

More than a quarter-century after Breton and Rex published their schemes, migration scholars now believe that other factors need to be taken into consideration. In a re-categorisation of Breton’s model, Schrover and Vermeulen (2005) identify three ‘new’ sets: the migration process (similar to the migration pattern mentioned by Breton); the opportunity structure in the host society; and the characteristics of the immigrant community (of which level of resources is just one element). Different from Breton’s analysis, Schrover and Vermeulen put more emphasis on the relations between the associations and the government of the host society, as well as the importance as such variables as the size of the immigrant community and their organisational behaviour.

Taking these arguments into consideration, we now shift our focus of analysis and ask the question: what are the functions of voluntary immigrant associations? According to Albuquerque and her colleagues (2000) immigrant associations have two broad aims:

- conservation, cultural affirmation and the consolidation of the feeling of belonging based on an identity affiliation;
- objectives of a material order, the majority of which involve aspects of the desire to integrate into the host-society social order, primarily dealing with immigrants’ civic participation and rights.

In general terms, immigrant associations not only attend to issues of solidarity, recreation and culture, but also apply pressure and lobby the political, legal and economic powers-that-be, not only of the host country, but in the country of origin as well. These associative actions are what Layton-Henry (1990b) refers to as the mediating and bridging roles of associations. Along the same line of argument, Morén-Alegret (2002) states that associations fulfil a context of ‘survival’ and ‘resistance’, with ‘survival’ coming in the form of ethno-cultural preservation, and ‘resistance’ becoming a rallying point for collective action in the struggle for resources and power, or indeed to challenge directly the hegemonic policies of the host country.
Studies on immigrant associations have highlighted the fact that their roles are not static, but change during the various migration/integration phases. As pointed out by Zig Layton-Henry (1990b: 94-112), as migrant settlement takes place, immigrant associations are often transformed from isolationist havens to active participants in the political processes of the host countries. One of the primary reasons why immigrants organise themselves formally during the initial settlement stage corresponds with the need to lessen the impacts of the culture shock and social upheaval caused by the migration act itself and the initial process of adaptation to a society that is different. During the phase of social adaptation, associations become a space of conviviality and leisure with the aim of strengthening inter-group solidarity. The associations thus work as a reproductive mechanism of the social relationships existent in the country of origin with the goal of trying to compensate certain absences provoked by the migration (Rocha-Trindade 1986).

Given that one of the primary objectives is the conservation of the cultural wealth that group members identify with, the associations provide a space where individuals can communally be in touch with their etho-cultural roots (Albuquerque et al. 2000). In addition, they also promote the transmission of the cultural heritage to the next generations. It is with this form of routine contact that the migrants, in a more or less symbolic form, develop certain activities that permit cultural conservation and transmission. Some of those activities include mother-tongue maintenance in a communitarian or associative context, the formal teaching of the mother-tongue to the younger generations, the commemoration or celebration of symbolic dates (be they of a cultural or religious character), or the creation of cultural groups for the purpose of conserving and carrying out traditional cultural expressions (e.g. music, dance, traditional crafts, etc.). The extent to which associations manifest their cultural identities publicly not only depends on their willingness to do so, but also on the acceptance on the part of the host society which plays a pivotal role in determining the degree to which the group will manifest itself outside of the community context.

After overcoming the primordial adaptation phase, the process of social insertion starts taking on other forms, as other needs – which may not have been considered of primary importance during the initial stage – start to materialise (Layton-Henry 1990a; Rocha-Trindade 1995; Albuquerque et al. 2000). When the community starts encountering integration difficulties, and when social and cultural problems between the immigrants and the host society become more accentuated, the activities of the associations then start taking new directions. At this point the new focus becomes the relationship between immigrants and the host society, with the ultimate goal being that of social insertion and the right to active participation in the host country.
The dialogue that commences between associations and the host society is often born out of the social marginalisation and discrimination that are made real through the difficulties felt by the immigrants in accessing certain social services such as education, health, housing, social security as well as labour and political rights. A major factor that can lead to segregation and isolation is that of rejection by the authorities and the host population in general. Rex (1986) highlights the six following discriminatory situations which immigrants may often be victims of: 1) lack of access to the decision-making process; 2) unequal access to the job market, with migrants often being consigned to the positions of worse remuneration with little opportunity of ascending professionally; 3) high unemployment index; 4) residential segregation; 5) educational segregation; 6) differentiation before the law. These discriminatory situations, however, may be mobilising factors that lead the immigrant population to organise politically to defend their rights. Immigrant institutions, in this case, become a vehicle that promotes immigrant social integration and political participation, while, at the same time, they become a voice that represents the interests of their members in the political field – a mediator between the community and the political powers of the host society (Carita and Rosendo 1993).

The overall objective is thus to diminish the differences, at various levels, between the immigrants and the autochthones. Fernando Luís Machado (1992), referring to these differences as ‘contrasts’, explains that the more accentuated are the existing contrasts between an ethnic group and the host society, the harder the integration process will be and the greater the tendency for the group to become subject to discrimination and social marginalisation as well.

Consequently, in order to eliminate these contrasts, the most common and generalised vindication pursued by the associations can be summarised in two points: 1) trying to achieve concrete integration policies (with the goal of attaining certain citizenship rights for the migrating populations); and 2) pursuing the legal recognition of the specificities of the population (e.g. linguistic and religious).

Keeping in mind that associations are represented by those who lead them, it is important to analyse who ‘gives face’ to the associations. As explained by Albuquerque et al. (2000), association leaders are usually individuals who work as active members, defining modes of action and emitting their opinions; and who frequently exercise great influence on the community’s remaining members, given the responsibility of the position they occupy and the informal role they carry out. Additionally, Westin (1996) points out, immigrant organisations are governed ‘from above’, usually by people who have been settled in the host country for a substantial period of time and who often possess an extensive amount of knowledge in relation to the inner workings of the host society. Thus, the
leadership role is due to the specific personal qualities and abilities that leaders utilise as their own personal resource, namely: knowledge of the host country’s language, academic qualifications, level of income, political abilities and the credibility they possess in the eyes of the immigrant community (Labelle et al. 1994).

As associative leaders, these individuals become a natural selection to carry out the responsibility of group representation as their visibility and positioning as intermediaries logically places them in the role of community spokesperson. But often this positioning can have a negative slant on the group, especially if the association leader has a personal agenda that is placed before the association’s or the community’s agenda as a whole. In addition to the fact that the prestigious positioning as association leader can be used as a ‘trampoline’ to other positions within the political field, association leaders can also derive personal economic wealth from their positioning. The leadership role may be little more then an ‘ego trip’ for them.

Furthermore, even though community members may share the same ethno-cultural background and the same integration problems, this does not imply that interests inside the associations are all egalitarian. Within the immigrant organisations there can be a variety of interests and objectives that are not always shared by all of the members. For instance, political cleavages may be created that may divide the members. Factions may arise, putting personal positions, political aspirations or even the economic exploitation of other members at centre stage (Cheetham 1988; Elliott and Fleras 1992).

### 3.3 Immigrant associations, integration and identity

Taking into consideration the functions of immigrant associations as discussed, one must again observe that there is usually a double-edged argument when it comes to participation in immigrant associations and the way this participation may or may not affect the social integration of individuals. While some may argue that immigrant organisations have a positive influence on social integration and community insertion, others claim that immigrant associations, formed along ethnic lines, hamper the development of personal relationships with natives and slow down the process of cultural adaptation (Schoeneberg 1985).

In the first view, it is assumed that immigrant organisations have an integrative effect on the individual, and on society as a whole, and create a balance between different interests, and so play a positive role in assimilation (Lal 1983). Under this perspective, a balance between the needs and expectations of immigrants versus the interests, values and norms of the host society is met through what Schoeneberg (1985: 418)
refers to as ‘functionally differentiated subsystems’. The organisations of immigrants, therefore, perform these roles by providing social integration and mediation, as well as opportunities to meet the particular needs of the community.

Some of the research on immigrant groups, on the other hand, proceeds from the supposition that the creation and persistence of immigrant associations is an indication of segregation and an obstacle to assimilation. The creation of parallel institutions and instruments (e.g. schools, media, etc.) are proof of the maintenance and promotion of social and cultural segregation (Breton 1964; Reitz 1980). The existence of such ‘institutionally complete’ (Breton 1964: 193) sub-societies permits minimal exchanges between the immigrant community and the host society, limiting primary relationships to the immigrant group. With this being the case, insertion to the values and norms of the host society, beyond the minimum of required behavioural conformity becomes nearly unachievable (Schoeneberg 1985: 419).

Another reality is that associations may also be inward-looking and strongly fundamentalist and ideological. Associations might put forward an ideological programme to defend a cultural or religious stance. Ideological programmes project themselves into a host country’s cultural context often in different domains from those it pretends to defend. We can here provide the example of Muslim culture and identity in Western societies. As pointed out by Joly (1987: 79):

Because of the nature of Islam, Muslim identity is an all-embracing project which concerns everyday customs (eating and clothing habits for instance), religious practice, social relations (placing a high emphasis on sex roles and on the family).

In her research on Pakistanis in Great Britain, Joly (1987: 79) states that:

[...] it is a widespread view among Pakistani people that Islam is morally superior and that the looseness of western society (drinking, ‘revealing’ clothing, the mixing of boys and girls, etc.) creates a threat to the morality and good conduct of their children.

The primary role of associations, in this case, is ‘to find an echo among the first-generation settlers’ with the ultimate goal being that of maintaining Islamic values and making sure that the younger immigrant descendants abide by the ideological programme that is set forth. Associations, therefore, may be formed with the sole purpose of defining or redefining the community.

Undoubtedly, it can be argued that associations, their belief systems, ideologies and behaviours can play a major role in forming the identity
patterns of the group, with each individual association having its own particular nuance in the options which it offers. As a result, these variables can also determine the degree of integration into the host society. However, as conveyed by Rex and Josephides (1987), to say that the meaning system within an immigrant community or association movement offers identity options is by no means to say that any individual’s sense of identity is automatically determined by them. Still, all associations convey a certain identity message, whether explicit or implicit. Within this line of thinking, Camilleri et al. (1990) propose the notion of ‘strategic identity’ as a practical position set forth by an individual or collective actor with the objective of achieving a specific goal, defined by the differing determinants (i.e. social, historical, cultural, psychological) of interaction in which the actor finds him/herself in.

In the situation where the immigrant group is threatened by host-country pressures to assimilate, the tendency might be to mobilise around cultural specificities in order to affirm certain cultural elements, such as language, religion, gastronomy, clothing and traditional music. Institutionally, this will imply greater group affirmation. Certain activities constitute examples of practices that, at the institutional level, seek to endow a migrating community with a certain amount of visibility, and that, to a certain degree, translate a desire to participate socially in the host society, but in a non-assimilative fashion. For example, the creation of community and cultural centres; the foundation of spaces for the purpose of religious worship (e.g. churches, synagogues, temples, etc.); the development of native-country language courses; the publication of newspapers and/or magazines in the native-country language; the creation of radio and television programmes – all serve to demonstrate the wish to integrate the immigrant community’s ethno-cultural specificities and symbols into the host society.

Additionally, identity strategies can be expressed in the political domain, through the constitution of political pressure and lobby groups that have as their goal the transformation of certain social realities, namely when it comes to marginalisation and other exclusionary forms that immigrant and ethnic minorities may be subject to. Thus, associations, while organised forms of collective action, constitute an important promoting mechanism of mobilisation strategies of migrants’ identity.

Most commonly, activities developed by immigrant associations with regards to socio-political intervention are based on certain aspects inherent to community ethnic identity. We can here point out the role of immigrant associations when it comes to ethnic mobilisation, which is often a reliable sign of ethnic identification. But first, as Hargreaves (1995) notes, it is important to distinguish between mobilisation for ethnicity and mobilisation through ethnicity. Some associations – those promoting language teaching or religious observances, for example – draw on the
bonds of ethnic affiliation to further cultural objectives. Others may be organised by and for members of ethnicised or ethno-cultural groups, but not necessarily with the aim of strengthening ethnic identity. Membership of certain anti-racist organisations, for example, may be ethnically based, but the objective may be equality of treatment alongside the indigenous population rather than the promotion of distinctive cultural codes (Hargreaves 1995: 98).

Thus, as various authors point out (Elliott and Fleras 1992; Drury 1994), ethnic mobilisation can be presented in many forms and with different degrees of intensity, in accordance with a number of factors that determine the levels of fluctuations. Such factors include:

– the levels of reciprocal adaptation among migrants and natives (if the process of adaptation is well achieved, ethnic mobilisation will be of reduced intensity);
– the political, religious, social and cultural differentiation between the country of origin and the host society;
– the historical and temporary dimension of the immigration, which determines the way in which the social insertion of the immigrant populations will proceed;
– the implementation and interpretation, on the part of the governments, political parties, churches, labour unions, interest groups and media, of the existing policies.

The way in which these and other factors are executed will determine the intensity of ethnic mobilisation. If immigration policies favour the bettering of immigrants’ living conditions and integration independent of the social and cultural distance that may exist between them and the receiving society, mobilisation will be seen as less necessary on the part of the migrants. On the other hand, if the receiving country shows no effort or will in politicising the integration of the immigrant population, but instead opts for an exclusionary attitude, this will ignite the emergence of claims made on the part of the immigrant population, as well as a collective mobilisation in favour of changing the existing unfavourable situation.

We can then argue that ethnic mobilisation, orchestrated at the associative level, constitutes a strategy that may bring with it a significant amount of visibility and which has as its primary goals the materialisation of the two fundamental objectives: the preservation of ethnic identity and the political representation of the migrating communities and advancing members’ interests – promoting citizenship rights, civic participation, defending equality of opportunities, and combating discrimination.

Additionally, beyond the mobilisation of immigrants through their associations, another reality is that associations often find themselves mov-
ing across receiving-sending country contexts. The relationship between these contexts not only reflects distinct relations between resources and associations, it is also grounds for ongoing negotiation of rights as well as identities (Mapril and Araújo 2002). In these negotiations, associations may not end up belonging to this or that context as exclusive entities, but rather look for the opportunities to belong to more than one, often evaluating whatever suits the needs of the association, the members and its leaders, better. It is through these negotiations that immigrant associations acquire their spaces of power. Thus, one can describe immigrant associations as ‘opportunistic institutions’, often looking out for their own personal interests, or the interests of what the associations, or their leaders, believe are best for the community.

In analysing Odmalm’s (2004: 473) elaborate characterisation describing the organisational functions of voluntary organisations, we here see how associations function within the receiving-sending country contexts. Odmalm presents associations as serving the following:

1. Migrant organisations act as a link between the sending country and the receiving one in that they can provide advisory services for future migrants. This means that the organisation could potentially function as an intermediary or an alternative for the complex bureaucracy in that it can offer first-hand experience of the migration process of the host country.

2. Migrant organisations can function as a supplement to the state in terms of integration and adaptation to the new society. If the organisation has been able to set up a well-functioning relationship with authorities responsible for local integration, migrant associations can potentially facilitate integration procedures by providing information on the host country in the native language.

3. Migrant associations, if part of an established network, can serve as a unified voice for their particular ethnic group in relation to the host society. The concentration of migrants and their home-country-based social networks are viewed as crucial to their organising on the basis of ethnic attributes.

4. Migrant institutions play an important role in maintaining links between the ethnic group and the country or region of origin, especially in a diaspora type of situation. In addition, they can serve as contact points between ethnic communities in different settler countries.

Hence, besides functioning as intermediaries between community and host-society institutions (point 2), as well as being the focal point or ‘unified voice’ that unites and represents a community (point 3), also worth highlighting is the fact that associations play an important transnational role. This is identified in the first and fourth points where links between
the immigrant organisations, the country of origin as well as other communities in the group’s diaspora are highlighted.

In identifying immigrant associations as organisations placed within receiving-sending country contexts, immigrant associations can also be defined as transnational social spaces that function as transmitters of integration and identity options within a transnational social field. Associations carry back and forth institutional forms, bridging a diverse set of public spaces (Soysal 1999). Migrant institutions are sites where globally diffused models of social organisation and individuals’ local responses converge and produce new mixes of beliefs, values and practices. The study of transnational migration and associations provides an empirical window into ways of being and belonging that cannot be encompassed by a nation-state, while, at the same time, these practices and ideas can be mobilised for specific projects by the immigrant population.

In relation to ways of being and belonging, Cohen (1997) argues that the primary conceptual and organisational categories are gone – what we have now are ‘multiple subject positions’ that serve to define the individual. Within this framework, it is common for the individuals who compose associations – and therefore the associations themselves – to end up not belonging to this or that context as exclusive entities, but rather look for opportunities to belong to both the native and the host country. Another reality is that beyond group or associative identification, other purveyors exist. A different set of allegiances and identities are formed outside the group or the association; thus a homogeneous image of identity does not exist, no matter how much an association may work towards that goal. What emerges here is what Bhabha (1994) refers to as a ‘third space’ of identity belonging; a space that combines multiple identities and practices, where belonging, resources and rights from different national contexts are constantly negotiated. As a result, much like the individuals they represent, associations cannot be identified as representative of one single nationality (that of the country of origin), but instead as hyphenated associations, for they may end up pursuing what they consider to be the best of both worlds based on the opportunity structures ‘offered’ to them by the different national contexts they negotiate with.

To conclude, whether ethnic associations have a predominantly segregationist or integrationist outcome will not only depend on the primary orientation and activities they offer their members and on the position they may take towards the native population (Schoenerberg 1985), but also on the attitude of the receiving society and the positioning of the state towards the foreign population. Various authors have pointed out that, whatever their attitudes and activities, associations assist in the integration and settlement of their members (Layton-Henry 1990b). The primary factor that could lead to segregation or isolation – that of discrim-
mination and rejection by the host society and its authorities – can also mobilise the immigrant population, leading them to seek out allies and to organise politically in order to defend their rights. This may force governments to intervene and is likely to involve the recognition of immigrant and association rights. Paradoxically then, even associations that are opposed to integration and assimilation may well contribute in the long term to the integration of their members in the host society (Layton-Henry 1990b).

3.4 Immigrant associations and nation-states

In contemporary society, migrants are often seen, both by the sending and the receiving society, as still belonging to their country of origin. This hereditary immigrant status, according to Schrover and Vermeulen (2005: 827-828), ‘affects the way immigrants and their descendents organise, and it can give immigrant organisations greater longevity although the characteristics of the organisations will have to change’. While in the past, organisations were constituted by first-generation immigrants, now immigrant organisations become more broadly ethnic (Moya 2005) or they cater to a wider group of immigrants than the ones for which, or by which, they were originally established (Cordero-Guzmán 2005). Additionally, the need for some associations can cease to be due to developments in the sending or in the receiving societies (Schrover 2006). Thus, modifications or continuity, either in the sending or receiving country, can play a role in organisational development, with the final outcome being either the stimulation or the restriction of the number of institutions (Schrover and Vermeulen 2005).

The involvement of immigrant organisations in transnational politics shows how the politics of the country of origin plays itself out in the receiving country through the presence and engagement of migrants and refugees (Ostergaard-Nielsen 2003). Immigrant associations in receiving societies will not only mobilize in relation to immigrant political issues of equal rights, discrimination and citizenship in that society, but also in relation to the domestic and foreign political situation in the sending country. In this way they become a linkage group between the two settings. In her study on Turks and Kurds in Germany, Ostergaard-Nielsen (2003) points out that the sending-receiving country political involvement of these two groups in Germany is in many ways paradigmatic for how migrants’ transnational practices occur and are perceived in a European context, highlighting the ways in which migrants and their collective interests challenge and contribute to processes of democratisation in both their country of origin and settlement.
Governments of countries of origin, however, do not remain passive towards the formation of immigrant associations. They will often support the goals which immigrant associations promote; but they may also seek to supervise and police (and even prevent) the activities of the associations. This will particularly be the case if the migrants are seen as political refugees (Rex 1987: 10). Given this situation, the country of origin will be concerned that the migrant community does not become a political base for revolution. So, host countries frequently become a base for clandestine political parties and other organised revolutionary groups, which have the opportunity to flourish in exile.

In a similar manner, governments of receiving countries also set the boundaries within which immigrant organisations can operate. Consequently, political and institutional opportunities in the host and sending societies strongly influence immigrant organisations and, as a result, immigrant associations are dependent on the political opportunities offered by the nation-states.

In recent literature on social movements and collective organisations, it is assumed that organised groups will have a better chance to develop and to gain entrance to the political decision-making process if the political system provides a sufficient number of opportunities to do so (Geddes 2000; Hooghe 2005). This line of thinking brought about the concept of ‘political opportunity structure’. Political opportunities can be described as the degree to which powerful groups, including governments, are susceptible or sympathetic to the new demands made by groups that hold a marginal position in the political system. The model envisages that the level of organisations will strongly depend on the arrangement of political institutions and the configuration of political power in a given society (Koopmans and Statham 2000; Schrover and Vermeulen 2005). Koopmans (2004: 451), points out that the political opportunity structure includes both an institutional (political system, distribution of power) and a discursive component (who and/or what is deemed acceptable and legitimate). In describing these components as opportunities, it is here important to emphasise that immigrants and their collective organisations are not only subject to laws, policies and discourse, but also interest-pursuing agents (Bauböck 2005).

Parallel to the political opportunity debate, Soysal (1994) emphasises that it is important to note how participatory institutions often pattern the political organisation of groups. Soysal (1994: 86) points out that migrant organisations:

[...] define their goals, strategies, functions and level of operation in relation to the existing policies and resources of the host state. They advance demands and set agendas vis-à-vis state policy and discourses in order to seize institutional opportunities and further their
claims. In this sense, the expression and organisation of migrant collective identity are formed by the institutionalised forms of the state’s incorporation regime.

Patrick Ireland (1994) advocates a very similar approach. Ireland (1994: 248) explains that ‘immigrants develop participatory forms that reflect the political opportunity structures they face’. Furthermore, this author states (1994: 259) that:

[…] urban regimes present different templates for interest organisations (which) mould movements’ political tactics and groups’ collective identities and shape the terms in which they understand and couch their demands.

The governments of receiving countries, or more concretely, their policies, may stimulate, condone or forbid the development of immigrant associations or their activities (Soysal 1994; Schrover and Vermeulen 2005). In countries where migrants are viewed as temporary residents, immigrants are regarded as foreign nationals and the state restricts its integrating role to the basic legal procedures. Organisational activities of immigrants, in this case, may be regarded as undesirable or even menacing, and will likely be prohibited or strongly constrained. On the contrary, in countries considered to be immigrant societies, immigrants are seen as new citizens. In these countries, government policies focus on making quick use of the immigrants’ potential to stimulate integration. In these countries, immigrant associations and activities will be regarded as helpful in the process of integration; therefore financial support and access to resources are state-provided as are informal channels of participation for the immigrant population.

In relation to the incorporation of immigrant organisations in host societies, we here re-visit Soysal’s (1994: 86-118) ‘regimes of incorporation’ (corporatist, individualist, statist and mixed statist-corporatist) to identify where immigrant associations stand in relation to the host societies. Migrants’ organisational forms, goals, political tactics and strategies, as well as levels of integration and participation in the host society, reflect the nature of states’ incorporation policies. The differential incorporation of immigrant associations under Soysal’s regimes draw upon and are conditioned by quite differing national regimes as well as predominant models and organising principles of membership. Accordingly these regimes can be described in the following manner:

1. Corporatist regimes (Sweden and the Netherlands) assume that the integration of immigrants into the host society will be better accomplished through their own associations. Immigrant organisations are consolidated by the central government and government policies are
aimed at supporting them. Political participation and representation of the associations are also encouraged; thus the functional tasks assumed by the organisations are namely interest representation and policy formulation, with the goal of promoting rights and ethnic constituency status.

2. Under individual or liberal regimes (United Kingdom and Switzerland), the process of incorporation sees the individual as being central and not the organisations that represent them. Immigrants’ associations are not promoted by the state and no connections exist between the state and the immigrants’ organisations. The associations, in this case, function mainly as social service and advisory organisations, rather than as interest or advocacy groups, and thus carry out tasks not performed by the central political powers.

3. Lastly, statist regimes [including mixed statist-corporatist regimes (Germany) and state-centralised regimes (France)], similar to liberal regimes, also do not support collective ethnic identity and organisation. What distinguishes statist regimes from liberal is the fact that the state does provide some financial support to migrant organisations; however there is no systematic representation of, or consultation with, immigrant groups. Within a centralised political structure, the immigrants control their own actions with the aim of pressuring the state. Their activities are aimed at public authorities, not to gain recognition, but instead to redefine and re-establish political categories at the national level. Additionally, in relation to state-centralised regimes, the mention of ethnic categories is to a large extent absent from state policies, which refuse to recognise minority collective identities. The preoccupation with citizenship and nationality that shapes the predominant discourse undermines ethnic politics, which are primarily determined at the national level.

Beyond Soysal’s differentiation of institutional and participatory forms between nation-states, policy frameworks at various political scales – national, regional, municipal or at the neighbourhood level – have also mobilised migrants across Europe. Within and among differing nation-states, variation of such forms is exemplified by Rex and Samad’s (1996) comparison of Birmingham and Bradford in the United Kingdom; Blommaert and Martiniello’s (1996) study of Antwerp and Liège in Belgium; Ireland’s (1994) study concerning La Courneuve and Roubaix in France and La Chaux-de-Fonds in Switzerland; as well as Bousetta’s work (1997) on Moroccans in Lille in France and Utrecht in the Netherlands. These cases demonstrate ways in which various urban institutional regimes provide distinct institutional opportunities or, in other words, forms of ‘institutional channelling’ (Ireland 1994; Geddes 2000).
permit the shaping of political tactics as well as the collective identities and demands of immigrant groups.

In order to satisfy the collective needs of their members, and with the goal of achieving the objectives set out, the actions of the association movements can be conveyed in various manners, namely: negotiating with the various government levels (local, regional and national, etc.) with the goal of creating measures that will protect and promote the legal rights of migrants, primarily in relation to health, housing, employment, education and judicial matters; collaborating with administrative organisms and social assistance institutions such as local councils, schools and other public institutions; articulating with homeland organisations (i.e. labour unions, political parties, religious institutions or other civil society organisms); participating in consultative bodies designed to represent collective interests; and lastly, utilising confrontational means (demonstrations, strikes, etc.) (Miller 1989; Albuquerque et al. 2000).8

With the aim of being more precise in the evaluation of migrant lobbying activity, Geddes (2000: 137-148) also delineates three potential avenues for representation of migrants’ interests which the author labels as ‘technocratic’ (government commissions that possess powers of proposal and implementation), ‘democratic’ (parliamentary or council groups which possess powers of consultation on policy development) and ‘interest-based’ (pro-migration lobby groups at the national, regional or local levels).

According to Vertovec (1999c), perhaps the most common institution made available to immigrant associations are the consultative bodies established to create forms of liaison between local governments and immigrant communities. Although these organisms do provide a platform of participation, they do not offer full democratic participation rights. Uwe Anderson (1990) argues that although access to consultative bodies is similar to providing voting rights in the sense that immigrants can elect representatives to a formally constituted body which then allows them to press their views on policy makers, he then goes on to explain that city-based consultative institutions:

[...] are not part of the normal democratic process, and while they have some legitimacy, they have no power – only influence through argument and the size of their constituent groups. (Anderson 1990: 113)

In his study of consultative institutions in seven European countries, Anderson (1990: 119-120) points out that these institutions are often established with a very different raison d’être. Local authorities have set up such institutions for various reasons – as an alternative to voting rights, as a channel for immigrants’ and ethnic minorities’ opinions, as a kind
of educational step towards eventual full participation, as a symbolic gesture to encourage racial harmony and combat discrimination, or to avoid alienation and resentment, or simply because it is part of that country’s political culture (Anderson 1990; Vertovec 1999c).

Although immigrant community representatives on consultative bodies are regularly drawn from immigrant associations, often the question arises of who is chosen to represent this segment of the population, in other words, who is assigned the role of ‘ethnic broker’ (Werbner 1991) between the immigrant community and the powers-that-be. This leads Vertovec (1999c: 27) to pose the following questions:

Should [consultative body representatives] be self-selected as presidents of voluntary associations? Elected (from within associations, or within the ethnic minority communities – if the latter, according to what criteria of ‘belonging’)? Nominated (by local government, or trade unions, or other social welfare organisations)? Co-opted (again, by agents of political power outside or inside the so-called ‘community’)? Further should representatives’ support by third forces (governments of country of immigrant origin, international political movements, transnational religious bodies) be encouraged, forbidden, tolerated?

Furthermore, Vertovec (1999c) also argues that just because a specific self-conscious group has a person sitting in some kind of public forum does not mean (a) that the group’s views are being adequately voiced or responded to, or (b) that in addition to the likely symbolic value of such representation, some material benefits will accrue to the group.

Other authors equally express criticisms towards immigrant consultative institutions. Rex and Samad (1996: 28), for example, claim that such institutions may be allowed to exist purely for the benefit of ‘paternalistic white councils’, while Bjorklund (1986) argues that by co-opting ethnic leaders into state-sponsored structures, these leaders are made co-responsible for administrating state policies when in reality their role often does not go beyond an advisory position. Lastly, in Ralph Grillo’s (1985) observations concerning consultative bodies in Lyon, the author describes the centralising control of the French state, along with the local ‘power elite’ (the church, business individuals, senior politicians, etc.) in shaping the agendas of consultative bodies, leaving immigrant communities and ethnic minorities with very little room to negotiate. This determinacy was due to the organisational nature of the consultative bodies themselves, which were either branches of the state, state-created private associations, state-financed private associations or private associations in which the prefecture was included in their governing bodies.
There are, then, various ways in which nation-states can influence, as well as possess strategic powers of control over, immigrant associations. As Castles and Davidson (2000: 149) write: ‘governments may seek to co-opt minority movements and their leaderships, and build them into state strategies of surveillance and control’. One way of maintaining such control is by making government money available to the associations; often for the purpose of providing services to their community, carrying out cultural activities, among others. In receiving government funds, the associations often then become financially dependent on official government goodwill. In turn, this dependency implies that they also become puppets whose strings are controlled by the hands of governments. This being the case, governments can manage association movements by giving or withdrawing subsidies, they can control the motives and activities and even the survival of the associations.

Additionally, government initiatives, as well as those of non-immigrant organisations such as unions and churches, may also maintain competing institutions that serve immigrants in the same fashion that immigrant associations do. The congregation of these entities is what Melucci (1980) coins a ‘multi-organisational field’ of service delivery. With governments taking on the managerial duties of association movements, government institutions as well as other non-immigrant organisations’ initiatives can serve to eradicate the need for immigrants’ initiatives in favour of conformity with officially set policies. Similarly, leaders and community activists may be offered positions within welfare bureaucracies (Castles and Davidson 2000). Such jobs provide opportunities of representing community interests, but within rules and structures set ‘from above’. This ‘crowding-out affect’ caused by governmental interference may come from both the sending as well as the receiving country, or even from an opposing region or urban area, as cities can also crowd out initiatives in surrounding municipalities by catering to a larger surrounding community. The prevailing view is that state intervention acts in opposition to grassroots organising and, since democratic citizenship depends on a strong associational life, interventionist government policies work to weaken citizen participation (Joyce and Schambra 1996).

Immigrant organisations therefore need to consider whether they can achieve more through mobilisation outside the normal political structure instead of opting for inclusion in them. Dryzek (1996) argues that immigrant movements often tend to lose out through cooption, and that state inclusion only brings benefits when immigrant minority demands correspond to some extent with basic state essentials. In Dryzek’s view, immigrant associations would do better to further their goals through mobilisation in civil society, arguing that self-organisation in civil society
may extract reforms and concessions from democratic states more effectively than direct participation in state organs.

Contrary to this argument, Bloemraad (2005) states that government support, including funding, technical assistance and normative encouragement, plays an important role in building immigrant communities’ organisational capacity. In her comparative study on Portuguese and Vietnamese migrants in the American city of Boston and in Toronto, Canada, Bloemraad shows that state funding does not lead to the crowding out of immigrant initiatives, but instead, immigrant associations in Canada have benefited from state funding, which permitted the immigrant groups to establish a significant number of organisations compared to similar non-funded groups in the United States. The effect of government interference, in this case, depends on how state funding is structured.

On the other hand, in her study on institutional opportunities for immigrant associations in the Italian cities of Milan, Bologna and Naples, Tiziana Caponio (2005) describes how in Italy Catholic non-immigrant organisations benefit from state money, thereby profiting from policy changes to a greater degree than immigrant organisations. Thus, while Caponio’s analysis makes it clear that government policies can lead to the crowding-out of immigrant associations, Bloemraad explains that the opposite can also occur with increased government support stimulating immigrant organisations. Government policy is the key factor, as policy can differ by immigrant group within the same geographical area as well as time-frame.

A complicated relationship thus exists between nation-state interference and the founding or maintenance of voluntary immigrant associations. Acceptance and support, financial or through other means, can have a positive effect on the organisational structure of the immigrant community. Moreover, conditions attached to the offer of financial support may take the wind from under the wings of immigrant organisations (Bloemraad 2005). This may be the case if support is only given on the condition that organisations refrain from political activities. In that case, as explained by Schrover and Vermeulen (2005: 830), ‘organisational activity will pacify active political activity’, in addition to the fact that organisational structures and the functionalities of the associations will be affected under the controlling hands of government.

* * *

In this chapter, a theoretical review related to concepts of community, voluntary associations and aspects of social cohesion has been presented along with a detailed discussion focusing on immigrant voluntary associations. Immigrant associations, it was revealed, often serve a double
purpose. On the one hand, they work to bind the community, helping to conserve and transmit homeland culture and providing members with a sense of belonging, often in a land that is strange to them. On the other, they carry out goals related to the communities’ integration and desire to participate in civic life and obtain equal rights as citizens. Both tasks require not only negotiating within the immigrant group, but also with both the sending and receiving societies (dealing with such issues as measures of integration as well as identity reinforcement strategies).

With the goal of integrating the aforementioned factors and observations (in combination with those presented in Chapter 2) into a theoretical frame, to be held as a conceptual frame for the empirical analysis to come, I first take from such authors a Schoeneberg (1985), Rex and Joséphides (1987) and Camilleri et al. (1990), all of which, in their own way, set out to explain how associations often work with an identity message and an integration strategy, be it assimilationist or segregationist. Thus, while immigrants will time and again rely on their common or shared ethnicity to affirm themselves collectively in a receiving society, often mobilising under an ethnic banner, it is also common for them to simultaneously adapt identity strategies that will facilitate integration (Camilleri et al. 1990). Such identity strategies can be manifested in two overarching domains: cultural and political. In many situations, actions and activities carried out collectively will depend on the clash of expectations between the immigrants and the host society, as well as the opportunities and liberties given by the host society. Immigrant associations will mobilise if expectations do not play in their favour. As highlighted, immigrants, as participants, will get themselves involved in organisations to achieve specific objectives (social capital), be them of an offensive or defensive nature (Schrover and Vermeulen 2005; Triandafyllidou and Vogal 2005).

It is also important to remember, however, that immigrants and their collective organisations are seldom alone when it comes to negotiating identity strategies and integration processes. Taking from Portes and Borocz’s (1989) theory of host country receptivity, it is central to consider how determinants of integration (e.g. policies, social services, warmth of the welcome, etc.) will decide the fate of immigrants in the host society. Political opportunity structures, as they may be offered by receiving societies, are presented as crucial determinants of integration, as well as a key mobilisation factor for collective organisations. Going back to Sossal’s (1994: 86-118) ‘regimes of incorporation’, it is possible to identify where immigrant associations stand in relation to the receiving society, in turn, aiding to identify what opportunity structures exist and how they exist. Remembering that the Portuguese social integration model is broad version of the corporatist-statist regime, but in a somewhat rudimentary form (Fonseca et al. 2002b: 41), the political opportunity struc-
ture model is a theoretical research line worthy of further scrutiny in the Portuguese scenario, especially from the perspective of immigrant representing associations. Given that migrants’ organisational forms, goals, political tactics and strategies, as well as levels of integration and participation in the host society, reflect the nature of states’ incorporation policies, the empirical analysis will reflect this hypothesis, further taking into consideration existing relations between immigrant associations and the governments of the host society.

In addition to the aforementioned points, a number of key questions will further serve to supplement this line of enquiry: do immigrant associations in Portugal form for the same reasons as the ones presented in this chapter? Are their integrationist and identity roles similar to the reviewed approaches? Do they possess the same relationships with the nation-states as the examples discussed? These questions will be examined in the chapters to come. Before doing so, the next chapter will outline migration trends, the politicisation of immigration as well as an overview of immigrant association movements in Portugal.
4 Characteristics and consequences of immigration to Portugal

Although not possessing the same quantitative weight as the foreign-origin population in more traditional European immigration countries (e.g. France, Germany, the United Kingdom), the settlement of immigrants in Portugal within the last 30 years has reached noteworthy levels. This, in turn, has permitted net in-migration to compete with net out-migration (Malheiros 1996). This phenomenon finds parallels in other Southern European countries (Spain, Italy and Greece) as well (King and Black 1997; Fonseca 2000; King et al. 2000).

Hand-in-hand with Portugal’s new position as an immigration country, there has also been a greater politicisation of immigration-related issues. Taking into consideration the impact of immigration on Portuguese society over recent years, the aims of this chapter are twofold: first, to discuss the entry of immigrants into Portugal and to describe the various communities, taking into consideration key variables such as demographic development and territorial and labour market distribution; and second, to examine the insertion of immigrants into Portuguese society by looking at the politicisation of immigration and immigrant issues, the Portuguese institutional settings, and the development of immigrants’ associations.

4.1 Portugal’s position in the international migration cycle

Since the late 1970s, the European migratory system has become more geographically amplified and typologically diversified. The successive enlargement of the European Economic Community, together with world economic restructuring, the spread of competition at the global level and the worsening of regional development disparities, have increased the migratory pressure on Western Europe due to people coming from African, Asian and Latin American countries (Fonseca 2000). Consequently, this has led to Southern European countries – Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal – switching from being suppliers of labour to developed Europe, to becoming new immigration countries. In explaining this ‘mi-
migration turnaround’ in Southern Europe, King et al. (1997) provide five reasons for this phenomenon: 1) the ‘diversion effect’ caused by the increasing difficulty for most migrants to enter the countries of North-West Europe; 2) the ‘openness’ of Southern European borders; 3) ease of access for migrants arriving on tourist visas who ‘overstay’; 4) the operation of colonial, religious and cultural links to some sending countries; and 5) the strong economic growth of Southern Europe and the resulting development of labour shortages in certain temporary and ‘undesirable’ jobs such as construction work and low-grade service employment.

Given the situation that Portugal presently finds itself in – being both a country of emigration and immigration (Baganha and Góis 1999; Baganha et al. 2002) – it becomes essential to identify its positioning within the international migration cycle. As argued by various authors (Pires 1990; Machado 1997; Lopes 1999), Portugal presents itself simultaneously in a central and a peripheral position depending on the regional setting being analysed. In the words of the Portuguese sociologist Boaventura de Sousa Santos (1990; 2001), Portugal’s predicament comes from the fact that, historically, it has been both the core of a colonial empire and on the periphery of Europe, giving it a double characterisation of being simultaneously a colonial and a colonised country. So, while Portugal sends qualified manpower to the African Countries with Portuguese as the Official Language (PALOPs), since de-colonisation in 1974 Portugal has also become a country of destination for unqualified labourers who originate from these same African countries, and more recently from Brazil and Eastern Europe. At the same time, Portugal’s peripheral situation makes it a receiver of highly qualified labour originating primarily from EU countries and the North American continent; while being an exporter of unskilled Portuguese workers to those exact same countries. Portugal’s unique positioning within the migration cycle is illustrated in Figure 4.1.

In explaining the relationship between these opposing migratory flows, two hypotheses are highlighted (Lopes: 1999): the first affirms that Portugal suffers from structural dependency regulated by a logic of substitution; while the second sees this phenomenon as a more autonomous relationship regulated by the logic of labour market segmentation. The first scenario implies that while Portuguese emigrant workers leave to take up positions in foreign labour markets (in countries where they can receive higher wages than they would if they were to stay in Portugal doing the same work), immigrant labourers then come to replace them in the Portuguese labour market. The second theory, on the other hand, deals with labour market needs in sectors where there is a shortage of manpower in Portugal. Thus, the immigration of qualified individuals to take up managerial or technological positions, for example, may simply
be a reflection of the shortage that may exist in the internal labour supply of individuals trained in these areas.

It is most important to note that globalisation, along with geo-economic differences, at various levels, has reinforced Portugal’s semi-peripheral position based on its emigration-immigration dynamic. The intensification of globalisation processes has, in recent years, promoted industrial restructuring, redirected capital flows and created new patterns of competition at the international level. These processes have, consequently, contributed to a spatial reallocation of the labour supply. Portugal’s recent history as an immigration country has been, at least in part, determined by these geo-economic differences and by the intensification of globalisation (Baganha and Góis 1999). These are the key variables that place Portugal in an intermediate position; that sets the country up as a distributor as well as a final destination for migrant labour, depending on the parameters of the political space in question (the role of the EU is key here), as well as the necessities of the national and international labour markets.

### 4.2 Immigration history and demographic developments

In considering Portugal’s position as an immigration country, this section first attempts to track immigration flows to Portugal; and second, to quantify the immigrant population. Before approaching the former of these two objectives, I first wish to highlight the two difficulties that accompany the quantification of the immigrant population in Portugal: 1) lack of compatible data and 2) official statistics only account for documented immigrants, for the undocumented population is by its very na-
Furthermore, the attempt to create ethnic indicators, utilising such criteria as ‘nationality’ and ‘place of birth’, is not reliable. In this case, immigrant descendents who have acquired Portuguese nationality, such as those individuals born in the former colonies who opted for Portuguese nationality after de-colonisation, or the descendents of Portuguese emigrants who were born abroad but returned to Portugal, are excluded from the statistics. In relation to nationality, this criterion does not permit a distinction to be made between those born in Portugal but whose parents were born in another country (and therefore acquire their parents’ nationality) and those not born in Portugal but who have acquired Portuguese citizenship through marriage or through lineage.

The data presented in this chapter will thus refer to the legally documented foreign population in Portugal. For this, I draw upon the statistical data provided by the Foreigners and Borders Service (Serviço de Estrangeiros e Fronteiras (SEF)) and the National Statistics Institute (Instituto Nacional de Estatística (INE)). In presenting this data, however, two main issues arise: first, it is impossible to cross variables, because the database does not include such comparisons and does not take into account relevant demographic, social and economic factors; second, the data presented by SEF in comparison to the population census does not always match. This is mainly due to the fact that the census, which usually takes place throughout the country on a specific date, may include immigrants in an illegal situation and exclude those immigrants in a legal situation who did not answer the census questionnaire. This leads to various statistical discrepancies.

I begin with a brief overview of Portuguese immigration history. The existence of foreign populations on Portuguese soil is by no means a new phenomenon. In fact, as Lopes (1999) points out, immigration to Portugal has long been a reality since the nation’s founding to the present. However, even though immigration has been quite constant throughout Portuguese history, the phenomenon starts taking on new dimensions towards the end of the 1960s and during the 1970s, due to a number of key factors. The first of these comes about as a reflection of Portuguese emigration. Towards the end of the 1950s the main destination of Portuguese emigration switched from Brazil and, to a lesser extent, the United States and Argentina, to northern Europe. France was the main country of destination, with Germany, Belgium, Switzerland, Luxemburg, the Netherlands and the UK also becoming important receiving countries (Rocha-Trindade 1995). The economic growth taking place in these countries was the primary ‘pull factor’ that led to an emigration flow never before witnessed in Portugal.

Between 1960 and 1973, 1.4 million individuals left Portugal, one million of whom migrated to European destinations (Lopes 1999: 39-40).
With these momentous emigration flows, a deficit of workers is certain sectors of the Portuguese economy (for example, construction) started making itself noticed. In order to address the shortage, Portugal received its first contingent of Capeverdean immigrants in 1968/1969. As individuals coming from one of Portugal’s colonial holdings, these workers possessed Portuguese nationality and equal rights, and did not need any authorisation to live and work in Portugal (Esteves 1991; Perista and Pimenta 1993). Serving merely as an ‘immigration of substitution’ (Amaro 1985), these first Capeverdean labour migrants constituted the start of the PALOP immigration flows to Portugal.

The one single event that contributed the most to modifying the face of Portuguese migration was the ‘25th of April Revolution’ in 1974. This event brought about a major political change that put an end to the authoritarian regime and paved the way for the establishment of a democratic political system in Portugal. It also came at a time when the oil crises of the mid-1970s led central and northern European countries to restrict the entry of new immigrants and to even encourage the return of immigrants and their families to their countries of origin (King 1993; Malheiros 1996). As a result, Portuguese out-migration to these countries was drastically reduced (Rocha-Trindade 1995; Baganha and Góis 1999). Moreover, the 25th of April Revolution lead to the de-colonisation process of the Portuguese colonies in Africa, which, consequently, initiated a major inflow of retornados7 from the former colonies into Portugal (Silva 1984; Fonseca 1990; Fonseca and Cavaco 1997). Following decolonisation, it is estimated that 500,000 to 800,000 individuals returned to Portugal, two-thirds of whom came from Angola (Pires et al. 1987; Rocha-Trindade 1995).8

As a result of decolonisation, in present-day Portugal, a significant part of the African immigrant population includes Portuguese nationals of African descent who were either residing in Portugal or who came to Portugal between 1975 and 1981 as ‘refugees’ and who lost Portuguese nationality (Teixeira and Albuquerque 2005). Although this population does not fully fit under the term ‘immigrant’ per se (Baganha and Góis 1999), due to the lack of statistics that would permit singling out this group they are usually included in the total of the foreigners residing in Portugal (Teixeira and Albuquerque 2005). Additionally, the return of the retornado population had a very important role in the growing volume of economic migrants coming from the PALOP countries, owing to the fact that the African ‘refugees’ facilitated the development of interpersonal networks supporting the arrival and settlement of new immigrants (Esteves 1991; Malheiros 1996; Baganha et al. 1999; Bastos and Bastos 1999; Fonseca 2000).

Before going any further with the demographic analyses of the foreign population in Portugal, I feel it is important, at this juncture, to briefly
provide an overview of current immigration legal statuses according to Portuguese law. First, the most common form of authorisation is that of residence authorisation which can be of a temporary nature (valid for a period of two years and renewable for successive periods of three years) or permanent (without limit of validity and renewable every five years). Permanent-residence authorisations may only be acquired by foreigners who legally reside in Portugal for a minimum period of five consecutive years for Portuguese-speaking countries’ nationals, or eight years for nationals of other countries. In 2001, in order to address the existence of innumerable foreigners in an irregular situation in Portugal but who either possessed a labour contract or a contract proposal with a favourable assessment from the Ministry of Labour, a new status known as permanência authorisation was introduced. These authorisations are valid for one year and are renewable on a yearly basis. After five consecutive permanência authorisation renewals, a holder can then apply for residence authorisation status. Although the specific legal status of permanência authorisation ceased to exist at the end of 2004, holders can still renew and exercise all the rights granted with this status.

Figure 4.2 tracks the demographic increase of the foreign population in Portugal since 1975. The post-decolonisation period can arguably be considered the first significant stage in Portuguese immigration. In 1975 there were roughly 32,000 foreigners residing legally in Portugal, a number that nearly doubled to 62,692 by 1981. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the number of foreigners continued to increase steadily to 101,011 foreigners by 1989 and 191,143 by 1999. The steady growth of the African population is worth highlighting. Recent (2004) figures show 265,361 legal foreign residents in Portugal possessing residence authorisations. However, in addition to these numbers, the introduction of the permanência authorisation status in 2001 added 183,833 to the equation. Thus, comparing the total sum of the foreign population of 207,607 foreigners in 2000 (the year before permanência authorisation was introduced) to that of the recent 2004 figures (449,194, including both residence and permanência authorisations), we witness a 116 per cent increase in the total foreign population. The significant increase of the European population in Figure 4.2 is of particular interest, due, above all, to recent in-flows of immigrant workers from Eastern European countries.

The four time frames illustrated in Figure 4.3 point out the changing evolutionary patterns of immigrant stocks according to four very distinct years. In 1970 the immigrant population in Portugal was dominated by foreigners originating from Europe and North America (constituting three-quarters of the foreign population). By 1980 the situation had inverted with Africans now making up nearly half of the foreign population (48 per cent), followed by the European group (33 per cent). The
Figure 4.2 Evolution of the foreign population, 1960-2004 (with residence and per-manência authorisations)

Source: INE – Estatísticas Demográficas; Serviço de Estrangeiros e Fronteiras

The pattern of African growth that is witnessed in the 1980 graph is once again evident in the 2000 population with the African population still leading the way (49 per cent) followed by those originating from EU countries (27 per cent). Four years later, with the addition of those possessing permanência authorisations, the African representation is reduced to 34 per cent and the European Union to 17 per cent; this latter group is surpassed by the non-EU European group (25 per cent) now comprised primarily of immigrants from Eastern European countries.

Consequently, the introduction of the permanência authorisation status brought about a significant quantitative change in the documented immigration population in Portugal. Table 4.1 reflects these changes by comparing the most represented immigrant groups in Portugal in 2000 and 2004. Whereas in 2000 the traditional African PALOP countries, and to a lesser extent EU countries occupied the top positions, four years later this is no longer the case. Brazilians now lead the way as the biggest community in Portugal with 66,907 (14.9 per cent of the total population), followed closely by the Ukrainian community with 66,227 (14.7 per cent) and the Capeverdeans with 64,164 (14.3 per cent); all three of these communities share very similar values. Also noteworthy is the addition of Moldova, Romania and the Russian Federation to the list of most represented groups in 2004.

In comparing the demographic impact immigration has had on Portugal since the 1960s, the importance of previous immigration flows is of little numerical relevance compared to foreign population counts since the turn of the century. For example, in 1960, foreigners in Portugal accounted for 0.3 per cent of the population; in 1991 that number rose to 1.2 per cent and in 2000 to 1.9 per cent. In 2004 the total Portuguese
population was 10.5 million of which legal foreign nationals accounted for 4.3 per cent.

Lastly, beyond the quantitative changes caused by the introduction of permanência authorisations, the new migration flows from Eastern Europe and Brazil also brought about key changes in spatial distribution as well as labour market characteristics. The next section will analyse these two changes.

4.3 Geographic and labour market distribution

4.3.1 Geographic distribution

Figure 4.4 highlights the high concentration of the foreign populations in Portugal’s coastal districts. I analyse the years 2000 and 2004 for the
Table 4.1  Most represented immigrant groups in Portugal in 2000 and 2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Immigrant groups</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Immigrant groups</th>
<th>Total (residence + permanência authorisations)</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cape Verde</td>
<td>47,092</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>66,907</td>
<td>14.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>22,222</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>66,227</td>
<td>14.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>20,407</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>Cape Verde</td>
<td>64,164</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea Bissau</td>
<td>15,936</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>35,264</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>14,096</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>Guinea Bissau</td>
<td>25,148</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>12,232</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>18,005</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>10,384</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>15,916</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>8,026</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>13,689</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>7,194</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>13,128</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>São Tomé e Príncipe</td>
<td>5,437</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>12,155</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>4,619</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>São Tomé e Príncipe</td>
<td>10,483</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>4,077</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>9,312</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>3,501</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>P. R. China</td>
<td>9,218</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P. R. China</td>
<td>3,281</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td>8,211</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>3,032</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>8,061</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Serviço de Estrangeiros e Fronteiras

reason that 2000 was the year before permanência authorisation was implemented, thus the data refers exclusively to those with residence authorisations. Data pertinent to the year 2004, on the other hand, adds the permanência authorisation holders, from 2001 to 2004, to the residence authorisation holders.

Observing the two maps in Figure 4.4, it becomes clear that three points are noteworthy:

- First, the majority of the foreign population is located in the municipalities that make up the Lisbon Metropolitan Area (LMA) – districts of Lisbon and Setúbal. This phenomenon can be explained, first, by the fact that these urban settings offer immigrants more employment opportunities; second, by the important social and solidarity networks created here by earlier migrants (Malheiros 1996). However, in comparing the two years, a significant change is noticed in the relative reduction of the foreign population represented in the districts of Lisbon and Setúbal from 65 per cent of the total in 2000 to 54 per cent in 2004. This important geographical change is explained by the recent inflows of Eastern Europeans and Brazilians, as will be analysed later in more detail.
Second, the district of Faro, although much less important compared to LMA, has been a region in expansion where there has been significant demand for unqualified labour to occupy positions in the construction industry. Here, too, there are large concentrations of individuals from EU countries and from North America who chose this part of Portugal to retire.

Thirdly, the significant growth of the foreign population in a number of western districts such as Santarém, Leiria, Porto, etc., is explained by growing development and demand for unqualified labour, primarily in construction, manufacturing and the service industry.

Utilising the same years as Figure 4.4, Table 4.2 shows the growth rates per district with 2004 figures including both residence authorisations and permanência authorisations. In this figure, the district of Santarém stands out above the rest for its 946 per cent growth rate. Also worthy of note are the growth rates of the districts that make up the Alentejo region (Portalegre, Évora and Beja); these districts have seen a growing demand for agricultural workers in recent years. Although significant increases can be seen in all districts throughout Portugal, the lowest growth among all the districts is that of Lisbon. Considering the fact that the majority of those who obtained permanência authorisations were
from Eastern Europe or Brazil, this implies that members of these communities do not necessarily opt to stay in the LMA, as do the PALOP communities, but instead head for other locations, wherever work is available. The comparison of these three groups is made in Figure 4.5. It does need to be understood, however, that the growth rates portrayed in Table 4.2 and in Figures 4.4 and 4.5 are not so much ‘real’ as constructed by the availability of new data counts linked to new categorisations of migrants. The addition of permanência authorisations brought into the realm of statistical measurement immigrants who may have been in Portugal for some time. Many were, however, recent arrivals.

Table 4.2  Foreign population growth rates per district between 2000 and 2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Districts</th>
<th>Total 2000</th>
<th>Total 2004</th>
<th>Growth rate (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Viana do Castelo</td>
<td>1,475</td>
<td>2,959</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vila Real</td>
<td>649</td>
<td>1,843</td>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bragança</td>
<td>379</td>
<td>1,302</td>
<td>244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Braga</td>
<td>3,451</td>
<td>9,924</td>
<td>217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Porto</td>
<td>12,310</td>
<td>32,314</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aveiro</td>
<td>7,818</td>
<td>16,474</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Viseu</td>
<td>1,437</td>
<td>5,315</td>
<td>270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coimbra</td>
<td>5,331</td>
<td>14,065</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guarda</td>
<td>790</td>
<td>2,385</td>
<td>202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Castelo Branco</td>
<td>637</td>
<td>2,728</td>
<td>328</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portalegre</td>
<td>693</td>
<td>3,498</td>
<td>405</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leiria</td>
<td>2753</td>
<td>12,765</td>
<td>363</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lisbon</td>
<td>113,771</td>
<td>202,030</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santarém</td>
<td>1,647</td>
<td>17,220</td>
<td>946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Setúbal</td>
<td>20,204</td>
<td>42,280</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Évora</td>
<td>974</td>
<td>5,300</td>
<td>444</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beja</td>
<td>1,045</td>
<td>4,464</td>
<td>327</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faro</td>
<td>27,127</td>
<td>59,768</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madeira</td>
<td>2,532</td>
<td>7,580</td>
<td>199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azores</td>
<td>2,584</td>
<td>4,980</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>207,607</td>
<td>449,194</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Serviço de Estrangeiros e Fronteiras*

Figure 4.5 shows that, in relation to the population from the PALOP countries, there is a dense concentration of individuals in the two districts that make up the LMA, accounting for 84 per cent of the PALOP total. The concentration of the PALOP group in the LMA is explained by historical social networks and settlements created by these immigrants over the last 30 years, as well as the economic restructuring of the LMA during the 1980s and 1990s which permitted greater ease of finding
work in this area of Portugal. As well, as Malheiros (1996: 92-93) explains, the anonymity that comes with large urban settings facilitates the installation of racially and culturally different people, a reason for the higher concentration of the African population in the Lisbon area. Malheiros further notes that the great majority of the PALOP population entered Portugal through Lisbon, which has facilitated the establishment of these communities in the Portuguese capital, reducing any further costs of moving elsewhere.

The Brazilian and Eastern European\textsuperscript{14} populations, on the other hand, see a different distribution to the PALOPs. In fact in this three-way analysis, it could be argued that the Eastern Europeans lie at the opposite end to the PALOPs, with the Brazilian population between them. In the case of the Brazilian population, slightly more than half of the population resides in the LMA (53.1 per cent), followed by the districts of Porto (10.8 per cent) and Faro (7.8 per cent). In the case of the Eastern European population, only one-quarter reside in the districts of Lisbon and Setúbal, with the district of Faro also possessing a significant percentage (18 per cent). Also worthy of note are the districts of Santarém (10 per cent), Porto (9.2 per cent) and Leiria (7.1 per cent), forming a coastal belt of significant Eastern European presence.

In distinguishing the distribution of these two latter groups from the PALOPs, first in relation to the Brazilian community, this group is defined by two distinct immigration flows to Portugal (Padilla 2005): the first, prior to 1998, is composed primarily by middle to upper-class individuals who settled mainly in the urban centres of Lisbon and Porto; while the second, composed of those who immigrated to Portugal after 1998 (continuing to this date), is made up of unqualified individuals who have diversified the distribution of this group, searching out employment in other districts. Similar to the second flow of Brazilian immigrants, the Eastern Europeans have also come to Portugal to take up unskilled and low-skilled labour positions (Baganha et al. 2004a), wherever they may be found. Lacking the historical ties and solidarity networks possessed by the PALOP communities, Eastern European individuals, and to a lesser extent the second-flow of Brazilian immigration, have entered the country through smuggling and trafficking networks set up in the countries of origin,\textsuperscript{15} while others have come as clandestine migrant workers. In relation to the Eastern European population, once in Portugal, it is worthy of note that the residential mobility of this population is quite high. This only allows a snapshot of the settlement pattern at the time of applying for legal documents of stay, not taking into account the subsequent residential mobility of this population (Fonseca et al. 2002b). In summary, employment opportunities have thus become the determining factor of where these immigrants end up residing.
4.3.2 Labour market distribution

Since the 1980s, immigration to Portugal has been largely economic in nature. However, those who come to Portugal to work can be classified into two distinct groupings: highly qualified workers employed by multinational corporations or who work as independent professionals; and, at
the opposite end of the labour market spectrum, unqualified labour migrants who occupy secondary labour market positions in activities such as construction, domestic labour or in the service sector, often discarded by the host nation’s populations. The latter of the two types represents the majority of the foreign population. As well, in the Portuguese labour market, existing relations between supply and demand have been re-enforced by public works and the increasing number of immigrants in these sectors. The high representation of immigrant labour in grand-scale public works projects such as Expo 98, the Vasco da Gama Bridge, the Alqueva damming project, EURO 2004 as well as the extensions of the Lisbon underground network and the construction of the Porto underground, are examples of these synchronicities.

In terms of labour market insertion, although the construction sector is the most dominant industry, certain foreign groups are characterised by the different sector niches that the majority occupy. In analysing Figure 4.6, this graph shows a strong association between North Americans (57 per cent), Europeans (33 per cent) and South and Central Americans (34 per cent) and the professional, sciences and technologies sector. Equally, a strong association is visible in relation to Africans and the construction, manufacturing and industrial occupations (80 per cent). Domestic services also account for a significant share of the African (female) population, but this does not feature strongly in the statistical data due to the fact that work within this sector often takes place in the informal market.

Figure 4.6 *Foreign labour inflows in 2004 by regions of origin/birth and economic sector*

*Source: Serviço de Estrangeiros e Fronteiras*
According to estimates of the stock of foreign labour in 2004, 50 per cent of the active immigrant population with residence authorisations were Africans (or more specifically, from the PALOPs), with the other two main groups being the Europeans (32 per cent) and South and Central Americans (and, above all, Brazilians) (12 per cent). This sum, however, shows a biased picture, as it does not include those who possess *permanência* authorisations. By adding this population, the weight of South and Central American immigrants would rise well above the 12 per cent representation, as would be the case with the addition of Eastern European migrants to the European group as well.

Table 4.3 thus shows the activity sector distribution of the seven most important countries of origin that obtained *permanência* authorisations in 2001. First, in relation to the Brazilians, close to two-thirds work in the tertiary sector (12.1 per cent in commerce, 22.1 per cent in the hotel and restaurant industry, and 28.6 per cent in services), which are considerably higher figures than those of the other foreign communities. Their traditional friendliness, tolerance of low wages and long working hours, as well as the fact that they speak Portuguese, make these individuals an attractive workforce for commerce and restaurant sector employers.

**Table 4.3** Work contracts of immigrants holding *permanência* authorisations by labour activity sectors and countries of origin in 2001 (per cent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity sectors</th>
<th>Ukraine</th>
<th>Brazil</th>
<th>Moldova</th>
<th>Romania</th>
<th>Cape Verde</th>
<th>Angola</th>
<th>Russian Federation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture and fishery</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extractive industry</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing industry</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>28.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water, gas and electricity</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>41.3</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>54.1</td>
<td>53.4</td>
<td>43.4</td>
<td>33.7</td>
<td>32.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commerce</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restaurants and hotels</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transports and communications</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>34.9</td>
<td>37.7</td>
<td>16.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: General Labour Inspection (IGT) (10 January – 31 December 2001) in Fonseca et al. 2002b: 85*
As with the recent wave of Brazilians, the majority of Capeverdeans and Angolans also occupy low-skilled jobs in the Portuguese labour market, essentially taking up positions in two specific sectors: construction (43.4 per cent of Capeverdeans and 33.7 per cent of Angolans), in the case of men; and services (34.9 per cent of Capeverdeans and 37.8 per cent of Angolans), often primarily in industrial and house-cleaning services, in the case of women. Also worth highlighting, in relation to these two African communities, is their work in commerce, restaurants and cafes (accounting for 15.2 per cent for Capeverdeans and 22.2 per cent of Angolans).

The employment structures of the Eastern European immigrants, on the other hand, are more diversified, as are their levels of schooling and professional training – much higher than the African groups. Even though the construction sector remains the most significant (53 per cent and 54 per cent for the Romanians and Moldovans, respectively, 41 per cent for the Ukrainians and 32 per cent for the Russians), those working in sectors traditionally dominated by the Portuguese labour force (i.e. manufacturing and agriculture) have also been increasing.

To sum up, the labour market shortages since the turn-of-the-century have mostly occurred in the low-skilled labour segments – construction, the hotel and restaurant industry, retail trade, domestic services, agriculture and labour-intensive industry. In sectors where the internal labour supply could not fill available positions, this has been done with immigrants originating, above all, from Brazil, Eastern Europe and the PA-LOP countries.

4.4 Politicising immigration and integration

With the flows of immigrants into Portugal in recent years, the Portuguese state has had to react both to their arrival and to their long-term settlement. The goal of this section is to discuss the political steps that have been taken and to identify the institutional frameworks that serve to assist in the integration processes, at both the state and local level.

4.4.1 State-based integration policies and institutional settings

Up until Portugal's adherence to the Schengen Agreement in 1991, immigration policies were fragmented and almost non-existent. After the decolonisation process of 1974, immigration – understood as a relatively continuous entry of foreigners in response to factors such as the needs of the labour market – was a low-priority policy issue (Fonseca et al. 2002b: 44). At this time, foreign groups were hardly visible and in most cases their socio-economic status enabled them to solve their own prob-
lems in terms of employment, housing or access to education and health. Integration and participation were seen as unimportant issues in the receiving country.

This keeping of immigrant issues off the political agenda would be maintained for the next decade and a half until the start of the 1990s, when the immigration phenomenon started taking on a new importance. At this time, the Portuguese state was confronted with a number of issues associated with the presence and integration of foreign residents, including (Rocha-Trindade 1995; Fonseca 1998; Fonseca et al. 2002b):

1. the significant numerical growth of the foreign population, primarily during the second half of the 1980s, most of whom originated from the PALOP countries;
2. the increasing number of foreigners who remained in the country without proper legal authorisation;
3. instability brought about by the social marginalisation (poverty, poor housing conditions, clandestine labour) in which many immigrants now found themselves;
4. growing inter-racial tensions, as well as racist and xenophobic manifestations;
5. the emergence of organisations (namely immigrants’ associations, NGOs and political parties) aimed at promoting immigrant rights and lobbying government and civil society for a more proactive attitude towards foreign populations.

These factors, in turn, led to the first steps being taken to implement specific policies directed at immigrant and ethnic minorities (Machado 1992, 1993).

Along with these internal factors, a number of external factors also influenced the actions of the Portuguese authorities. The early 1990s brought a new era of European border control – as expressed in the idea of Fortress Europe – which had, as its main intention, the restriction of immigration flows and combating illegal migration. Portugal’s adherence to the Schengen Agreement forced the Portuguese government to tighten control over the entry, presence and exit of third-country nationals. At the same time, the EU had, as a primary goal, the promotion of immigrant integration policies, assuming that the fuller integration of those immigrant communities already present would be better accomplished by tightening the entry for new incoming migrants.

Portugal’s adoption of these restrictive European entry laws also brought about diplomatic tensions between Portugal and the Brazilian and PALOP governments (Santos 2004; Teixeira and Albuquerque 2005). Up to this point, immigrants originating from these countries were met with no restrictions when entering Portuguese territory, but
this was no longer to be. Portugal found itself in a double bind of complying with EU regulations while simultaneously trying to preserve the historical ties with its former colonies. As a result, the Portuguese state opted for implementing strategies that would benefit the citizens of Portuguese-speaking countries over other third-country nationals. Examples of special treatment came in the form of the different time periods required by law to obtain Portuguese permanent residence status, as well as in the signing of special bilateral agreements with these countries regarding visas, entry and stays in Portugal (Leitão 1997).

In order to comply with the EU frameworks, the first step to be taken was to address the human and social issues brought by irregular immigration status. In order to confront this matter, the Portuguese state organised the first special period of regularisation of undocumented immigrants from 13 October 1992 to 5 March 1993. Of the 39,166 immigrants who applied for legal status during this time-span, only 16,000 were granted residence permits (Malheiros and Baganha 2001; Rosa et al. 2003). The immigrants’ lack of information regarding this process and the difficulties in complying with the legal requirements explain the discrepancy between applications received and permits granted (Rocha-Trindade 1995). Thus, partly as a result of the number of regularisation requests denied, a second special period of regularisation took in 1996, between 31 March and 11 December. During this period, of the 35,082 requests for regularisation, 29,809 were granted (Rosa et al. 2003).

In obtaining legal status, the individuals were now given a new set of opportunities and rights in the host society, from economic (i.e. right to bank accounts, unemployment benefit rights) to social (i.e. housing) to juridical-political (i.e. limiting the risk of expulsion) (Fonseca et al. 2002b).

With the demands being made by NGOs and immigrant organisations at the start of the 1990s, along with the growing awareness of the social problems faced by the immigrant population (and, above all, those from the PALOP countries), the Portuguese government started taking its first institutional steps towards creating better integration conditions. The first measures came about in the area of education, with the creation of the Coordinating Secretariat of Multicultural Education Projects under the authority of the Ministry of Education in 1991 (replaced in 2001 by the Entreculturas Secretariat). This Secretariat’s mission was to assure equal access to educational opportunities, to promote the educational success of students of various ethnic backgrounds and to develop intercultural education at the elementary school level (Albuquerque et al. 2000; Santos 2004). However, according to Fonseca and her colleagues (2002b: 47), the fact that the very first initiative took place in the field of education somehow indicates a rather nationalistic approach, since the people who directly benefited from the programmes were
either Portuguese or potentially soon to become Portuguese, rather than immigrants or foreigners, whose socialisation process had taken place in another country.

After the implementation of this first measure, in April of 1993, under the Council of Ministers’ Resolution n. 38, the government implemented a programme aimed at combating social exclusion and promoting the integration of ethnic minorities in the social, labour and housing domains. In order to carry out the objectives set forth by Resolution n. 38, the Inter-departmental Commission for the Integration of Immigrants and Ethnic Minorities was created, bringing together representatives of three ministries: Internal Administration, Education and Social Security. It would be the duties of this commission to carry out an inquiry into the living conditions of immigrants and the actions being promulgated by various departments and institutions; define appropriate measures and strategies; support the implementation of programmes and actions aimed at bettering immigrant and ethnic minority integration; and evaluate the actions and results obtained (Rocha-Trindade 1995: 208-209).

It also became increasingly noticeable, throughout the 1980s, that there was a concentration of foreigners, above all from the PALOP countries, in clandestine housing and shantytown neighbourhoods. In the early 1990s, with the hope of bringing about changes to the housing situation and solving the problem of these shantytowns, a series of initiatives was launched by various civil society institutions (opposition parties, NGOs, the Catholic Church). Following the initiatives of these social movements, as well as that of the National Programme Against Poverty – underway since 1991 – the government launched, in 1993, a programme known as the Special Re-housing Programme (Programa Especial de Realojamento (PER))\textsuperscript{21} aimed at re-housing all individuals living in shantytowns in the municipalities located in the Lisbon and Porto Metropolitan Areas (PMA).\textsuperscript{22} With the ultimate goal of eradicating all the shantytowns in the two metropolitan areas by 2001, the PER consisted of a partnership between the central administration and various municipalities as well as NGOs, under the condition that they proved capable of promoting the creation and/or construction of housing (Guerra 1997/98; Fonseca et al. 2002b: 47-48). Although the programme was not exclusively designed for the foreign population, it did reach many underprivileged immigrants and ethnic minorities, especially those originating from the PALOP countries living in highly segregated shantytown neighbourhoods.\textsuperscript{23}

Three years after its inception, the PER programme was expanded with an upgraded version known as PER Families.\textsuperscript{24} Under this new model, immigrants were given the financial support to leave the shacks and return to their places of origin if they wished to do so. Once again, even though this was not specifically meant for foreigners (since it was
also applied to internal migrants who had left rural areas and lived in shacks in the metropolitan areas), it opened the doors for those who wanted to return to their countries but had no means to do so (Fonseca et al. 2002b: 50).

Building on the integration aims that had been initiated under the previous administration and to further recognise the issue of immigrants and ethnic minorities, when the Socialist Party took power in November of 1995, one of their first steps was the creation of a specific government body to handle these matters – the High Commissioner for Immigrant and Ethnic Minorities (Alto Comissário para a Imigração e Minorias Étnicas (ACIME)). This organism was set up to promote the integration of immigrants and ethnic minorities in Portugal, to coordinate the participation and collaboration of the different representatives of immigrants’ interests – NGOs, immigrant associations, municipalities, various government bodies and other civil society organisations – in determining the policies promoting social integration and eradicating social exclusion and also to oversee the application of legal tools aimed at preventing discrimination and eliminating xenophobia ( Albuquerque et al. 2000; Teixeira and Albuquerque 2005). Additionally, it was also the aim of ACIME to collaborate with various public offices, namely the Foreigners and Borders Service, in the control and surveillance of immigration flows in Portugal, and to suggest and promote policies aimed at supporting immigrants and ethnic minorities (Santos 2004).

Given that one of the ideas behind ACIME was to assure the participation of immigrant communities through their associations, permitting them to become social and institutional partners in delineating integration policies and in combating exclusion, in order for this to be accomplished, two semi-autonomous councils were created: the Consultative Council for Immigrant Issues (Conselho Consultivo para os Assuntos da Imigração (COCAI)), in 1998 and the Commission for Equality and Against Racial Discrimination (Comissão para a Igualdade e Contra a Discriminação (CICDR)) one year later. First, in relation to COCAI, this council would bring together representatives from each of the Portuguese-speaking immigrant communities, three representatives from each of the three largest non Portuguese-speaking immigrant communities, two representatives of institutions that work with immigrants, the two labour unions, various government bodies and business associations. Concerning CICDR, its primary goal would be the eradication of discrimination based on race, nationality or ethnic descent. It would also bring together a diverse group of representatives of the state and civil society, of which immigrant associations, anti-racist organisations and human rights groups are emphasised.
Since the turn of the century, further immigration policy changes have left researchers, such as Fonseca and her colleagues (2002b: 51), asking if this is now the real beginning of a true immigration policy for Portugal. At this time, pressure coming from the internal labour market, with sectors such as construction, tourism and services unable to meet labour demands, along with the changing face of immigrant labour now originating from Brazil and the Eastern European countries, many of whom were brought into the country by smuggling networks and settled illegally, forced the government to respond with three basic policy guidelines:

1. An effort to regulate the flows and to regularise the situation of the non-documented people already present in Portugal;
2. The decision to implement a more realistic immigration policy in congruency with labour market demands;
3. To further develop policies destined to promote the integration of immigrants.

The first two of these three points were intended to proactively confront the one aspect of immigration policy that, up until the turn of the century, remained to be addressed: the migratory flows (Fonseca et al. 2002b). Within this context, the Portuguese immigration law was altered, primarily in response to the new immigration flows from Eastern Europe and Brazil. Within these changes to the immigration law, Article 55 of the new legislation introduced the *permanência* authorisation permits for undocumented foreigners present in the country who possessed a work contract and were thus registered with the Portuguese General Labour Inspection. Changes in the new law were also accompanied by supplementary measures, such as the creation of the Cabinet Commission for the Follow Up of the Immigration Policy. The goal of this instrument would be to coordinate the various government bodies involved in the implementation of the immigration policy. In addition, the number of entries was restricted in accordance with a biannual report outlining the number of foreign workers needed in the various employment sectors.

To further develop policies destined to promote the integration of immigrants, the newly formed Social Democrat/Christian Democrat coalition government promoted through ACIME a series of initiatives under the National Immigration Plan. These initiatives can be summed up in six lines of intervention (Santos 2004; ACIME 2005a):

1. A *national information network for immigrants* – consisting of the diffusion of publications, the maintenance of the ACIME website, creation of the SOS Immigrant telephone line and the setup of multimedia stations in immigrant association headquarters and in parishes.
2. A national support system for immigrants – a set of micro-structures designed to provide localised support to immigrants and ethnic minorities. These include the Lisbon Information Centre (set up in 1999) and the National Immigrant Support Centres (Centro Nacional de Apoio ao Imigrante (CNAl)) located in Lisbon and in Porto since 2004, providing integrated services for immigrants (ACIME services, SEF, Social Security, Employment, Education and Training and NGOs). Within these centres, ACIME would also set up specialised offices such as the Recognition of Qualifications and Competencies Support Office (Gabinete de Apoio ao Reconhecimento de Habilitações e de Competências (GARHC)), the Family Reunification Support Office (Gabinete de Apoio ao Reagrupamento Familiar (GARF)) as well as translation services.34 Offering a less diversified range of services, ACIME also set up Local Immigrant Support Centres (Centro Local de Apoio ao Imigrante (CLAl)) in smaller urban centres. Currently over 50 CLAI offices can be found throughout Portugal,35 either located in municipal offices, in Catholic Church premises or in the headquarters of NGOs and immigrant associations.36

3. A support system for immigrant associations – accomplished with the setting up of the Immigrant Associations Technical Support and Grants Office (Gabinete de Apoio Técnico às Associações de Imigrantes e Minorias Étnicas (GATAIME)), with the aim of permitting immigrant and ethnic minority associations, recognised by ACIME, to develop their projects and initiatives.

4. An immigration observatory – a space dedicated to research on immigration and ethnic minority issues in Portugal in order to support informed integration policies, working in a network format with partner universities, research centres, work-groups and businesses.

5. Awareness campaigns – including organisation of meetings, debate forums and conferences, radio and television programmes and media campaigns.

6. Continuation of projects already implemented – including the Entre culturas Intercultural Education Programme, as well as the Choices Programme (Programa Escolhas) aimed at integrating the descendents of immigrants and ethnic minorities along with other disfavoured individuals of the host society.

Lastly, the government’s plans outlined in the Grand Political Options for 2003-2006 highlight the importance of the most recent flows of immigration to Portugal, and recognises that many of those who compose these recent waves do not share the same language nor historical ties. Emphasis is thus placed on combating illegal migration and on the integration of the immigrants already present,37 particularly when it comes to Portuguese language and cultural education, multicultural training,
rights and duties of Portuguese citizenship and the support of immigrant associations (Santos 2004: 132). Worth highlighting is the fact that these are policies aimed at integrating immigrants into Portuguese life, in contradi distinction to an intercultural policy that aims at protecting immigrant cultures.

4.4.2 Municipal institutional settings and initiatives

Despite their limited policy obligations towards immigrants and ethnic minorities, Portuguese municipalities have also developed their own sets of initiatives aimed directly or indirectly at this population (Silva 1999). This has particularly been the case with the municipalities of the LMA; the first to undertake such initiatives due to the fact that these have historically been municipalities possessing greater ethnic minority concentrations and where social and ethnic tensions have been more pronounced (Silva 1999; Malheiros 2000).

The main actions carried out by local municipalities or parishes are often geared towards bettering the living conditions of the local populations. Drawing on data from a study of measures and actions implemented by thirteen local municipalities of the LMA, carried out by Fonseca et al. (2002a), it is revealed that policies are aimed primarily at issues dealing with housing, social service provision and education, with a second group of priorities aimed at supporting cultural activities and immigrant associations.

In relation to the housing issue, the limitations of the market, along with the social and relational ties created among ethnic community members, led numerous immigrants to settle in shantytown neighbourhoods. In response to this problem, as previously discussed, the PER and PER Families programmes were implemented, with the goal of replacing the shantytowns with social housing. In the realisation of these programmes, it is the local authorities which administer and consult with the local population.

Additionally, identical to the PER programmes, the EU’s URBAN programme – which has as its main objective immigrant and ethnic minority community development and social and employment inclusion through the creation of local-level education and training programmes – calls for a coordinated approach between local authorities and immigrant bodies (Gomes 1999). In the case of specific neighbourhoods where there is an over-representation of immigrants and ethnic minorities, various municipalities in the LMA have undertaken and financed specific integration measures under the URBAN flagship (Fonseca et al. 2002a; Fonseca et al. 2002b). The majority of these initiatives, in the areas of social support and education, have been developed in order to
eradicate or minimise social, economic and cultural exclusion, and to prevent future situations of marginality and segregation.

In the field of social care, worthy of note are day-care and pre-school centres, recreation and workshop facilities for the youth population and senior citizen day centres. As well, various municipalities, within the ambit of the INTEGRAR (Inclusion) initiative and the EQUAL Programme, have put into action specific social initiatives such as leisure spaces and centres, often done so in collaboration with immigrant associations, NGOs and state institutions (Silva 1999).

In relation to education and training, local governments and schools work with the Entreculturas Secretariat’s Intercultural Education Programme, with the aim of promoting multicultural education and combating racism in schools. Additionally, initiatives dealing with labour and training areas have also been developed by some municipalities in partnership with the Institute of Employment and Professional Training, (Instituto de Emprego e Formação Profissional (IEFP)), which often also involve NGOs and immigrant associations.

When it comes to the second group of priorities identified, wherever a significant number of immigrants can be found, municipalities throughout Portugal encourage, promote and organise exhibitions, festivities, music, dance and gastronomy festivals, or theme days involving immigrants and ethnic minorities.

Partnership agreements between the municipalities and immigrant organisations can be of great benefit to the associations, not only in carrying out cultural events, but also in the sense that the municipalities can be a support unit, providing financial resources and material goods that permit social projects to be carried out, as well as physical spaces for the associations to set up clubhouses or headquarters. On the opposite end, for the local authorities, the associations can play a pivotal role in conveying information to the immigrant population as well as being a link between the powers-that-be and the immigrant populations. Fonseca and her colleagues (2002a) outline four types of relationships between the local authorities and immigrant associations:

1. **Proactive municipalities** – the municipalities that have the most active attitude and that encourage project submissions on the part of immigrant associations (i.e. Amadora, Oeiras and Sintra);
2. **Reactive municipalities** – those that welcome project submissions but it is usually the initiative of the immigrant associations to submit projects to the local authorities (i.e. Lisbon, Barreiro, Seixal and Moita);
3. **Non-preponderant municipalities** – those that set up an interactive relationship in which the associations and the local authorities submit projects to each other (i.e. Almada, Setúbal and Loures);
Occasional municipalities – contacts between the municipalities and the associations are rare with neither one being very active (i.e. Cascais, Montijo and Vila Franca de Xira).

These differences, in terms of procedures, are not only due to the willingness and capacity of the local governments, but also to the actual number, strength and leadership capacity of the immigrant associations.

In order for local authorities to carry out initiatives aimed at the local immigrant and ethnic minority population, a number of municipal departments, councils and resource centres have been developed throughout Portugal. The first of these municipal offices were set up by the municipalities of Loures and Lisbon in the first half of the 1990s. Loures established the Office for Religious and Social Issues (Gabinete de Assuntos Religiosos e Sociais Específicos (GARSE)) in 1993 with the aim of facilitating communication between immigrant communities and local offices, and to offer technical and logistic support for immigrant initiatives. That same year, the City of Lisbon created the Municipal Council of Immigrant and Ethnic Minority Communities (Conselho Municipal das Comunidades Imigrantes e das Minorias Étnicas (CMCIME)) with the objective of involving immigrant groups in policymaking decisions on issues related to immigrant social integration, citizenship rights, racism and xenophobia, among others (Rocha-Trindade 1995).

The municipalities of Amadora and Seixal then followed these examples, with the former creating the Municipal Council for Ethnic and Immigrant Communities (Conselho Municipal das Comunidades Étnicas e Imigrantes (CMCEI)) in 1995 (ceasing to exist in recent years), and the latter instituting the Cooperation Office (Gabinete de Cooperação) in 1997. Under the Cooperative Office, Seixal has also developed other centres, namely the Citizenship Space (Espaço Cidadania) – a citizenship forum in which the associations are members – as well as an Immigrant Homeless Shelter (Centro de Acolhimento de Imigrantes). Both of these municipalities have also set up support offices for associations located in their respective municipalities. In the case of Amadora, this municipality established the Association Movement Support Office (Gabinete de Apoio ao Movimento Associativo (GAMA)) with the aim of informing and helping associations organise project applications, as well as to coordinate, support and fund the projects. Similarly, Seixal established its Association Movement Support Office, which possesses a centre where associations can set up their own headquarters. Although both of the association movement structures in Amadora and Seixal are for all associations in general, immigrant association movements also benefit on equal footing from these institutional setups.

The turn of the century, however, brought with it a boom in the creation of these types of municipal offices (as a result of growing immigrant
populations in regions outside of the LMA and PMA). Within recent years, some of the newer and more active of these offices include: the Municipality of Santarém’s Immigrants and Ethnic Minorities Support Office (Gabinete de Apoio ao Imigrante e Minorias Étnicas) established in 2002; Setúbal, Ethnicities and Immigration Office (Setúbal, Etnias e Imigração (SEI)) set up within the Social Inclusion Division of Setúbal City Hall in 2004; and the Communities Municipal Council of Porto (Conselho Municipal das Comunidades do Porto (CMCP)) established within the City of Porto’s Social Development Foundation (Fundação para o Desenvolvimento Social) in 2005. In addition, and as previously mentioned, a number of municipalities possess CLAIs,46 some of them especially set up for the purpose, while others were offices already in existence that simply took on the duties of a CLAI (i.e. Seixal’s Citizenship Space).47

Still not all municipalities in Portugal have been keen on the idea of creating minority consultative bodies or formal support offices. In their analysis of the Municipality of Oeiras, Marques et al. (1999) and Marques and Santos (2000, 2004) reveal that the political orientations of Oeiras Town Hall have been clearly against the idea of creating these types of institutions. Instead what Marques and Santos (2000: 15) refer to as an “open administrative philosophy” has favoured a more direct, personal and individual search for solutions. This approach has come to imply that the political participation of immigrant collective organisations in Oeiras is best described as disperse, limited in scope and generally low (Marques et al. 1999: 7). Furthermore, according to Marques and her colleagues (1999), what little participation exists is as much sought by the activation (top-down) processes, as it is the result of mobilisation (bottom-up) efforts. While bottom-up mobilisation is confined to a reduced number of local associations, or more concretely, around a reduced number of key leaders (recognised by the local authorities as someone capable of rallying their community and being a respected interlocutor), top-down activation comes with secondary interests in mind, primarily associated with securing the votes of the immigrants and ethnic minorities in exchange for political participation.

Lastly, it is worth highlighting that almost all municipalities throughout Portugal have established redes sociais (‘social networks’) with the aim of bringing together the organisations in the respective municipality that work in the social realm. The aim of these networks is to get the organisations working alongside each other, and sharing resources and knowledge of the municipality’s social reality. For immigrant associations, this is an attempt at getting these organisations working alongside their Portuguese counterparts on like-minded issues (see Chapter 8).

To conclude this section, it is worth highlighting the institutional interdependency and coordination that exists between the different gov-
ernment levels, local, national or European. Within this milieu, it is also important to consider the role of the organisations that represent immigrant matters. The next section will thus look at immigrant association movements in Portugal.48

4.5 Immigrant association movements in Portugal

In giving this overview of immigrant associations in Portugal, I start off by providing a brief historical account of immigrant association movements and then analyse the social and political contexts that determined their evolution.

Immigrant associations are not a new phenomenon in Portugal. Their origins can be traced to the 1940s and 1950s, first with the creation of Casa dos Estudantes do Império in 1944, an association set up by African university students who came from the Portuguese colonies in Africa (Borges et al. 1997); and second, the Clube Marítimo Africano, founded in 1954 with the objective of offering sports, recreational and cultural activities to the African population in Portugal. It is from these two associations that the first generation of leaders in the campaign for independence of the Portuguese African colonies arose, serving as a mould for future nationalistic movements during the early 1970s. Later examples included the Casa de Cabo Verde created in 1970, its name changed to Associação de Caboverdeana e Guineenses in 1976 and to Associação Caboverdeana in 1981; and the Casa de Angola de Lisboa, created in 1971. Both were initially characterised by their nationalist and independent exaltations.

The post-colonial period, however, ushers in a new era of immigrant associations. Referring to the 25-year period from the mid-1970s to 2000, Albuquerque et al. (2000: 36-37) identify three different stages in the evolution of immigrant associations:

- The first phase, referred to as the emergency intervention phase, took place between the mid-1970s and the late 1980s and is characterised by associations that primarily carried out activities of a social interventionist nature.

- The second phase, which took place in the first half of the 1990s, is marked by an association boom whose priorities were as promoters of social, economic and political integration. The first political lobbying steps were taken during this period.

- The third phase refers to the second half of the 1990s, a time when associations started reaching a stage of maturity and professionalism, having succeeded in gaining recognition as social and political actors and partners on the part of host-society institutions.
In the period 1975 to the end of the 1980s, due to the de-colonisation processes, which led many ex-colonial residents to leave the PALOP countries in search of a better life in Portugal, Portuguese society took notice of the immigration issue for the first time. However, despite the growing immigrant flows, no integration policies were developed by the Portuguese state. As a result, immigrants relied on their own tight social networks as a resource to overcome the difficulties and the lack of government social policies. Residency, in particular, became an important issue with immigrant population clusters occupying shacks and illegal housing neighbourhoods in specific peripheral urban areas of Lisbon.\footnote{Associations created at this time focused on tackling the problems newcomers were facing, namely housing, work, social security, health care and legal issues. Along with their social interventionist role, associations also became places for newcomers to overcome the nostalgia and solitude of starting a new life in a new society. The associations established during this period became centres of cultural preservation, organising cultural and leisure events, dance groups, socialisation spaces (often a bar), as well as commemorating symbolic dates.}

The 1990s initiated a new era for immigrant associations. The rapid growth of the immigrant population along with the implementation of EU policies to combat illegal immigration and tighten border control, justified the execution of repressive measures and the reinforcement of police control in neighbourhoods inhabited by immigrants. Restrictive immigration policies, as well as the gap between the demands of immigrants and the ever-growing hostility on the part of Portuguese society towards them, served as motivation for the reinforcement of association movements. Thus, the immigrant organisations turned to political lobbying, in order to enlarge the citizenship rights of the immigrant communities, and started to confront the state, demanding the regularisation of ‘illegal’ foreigners, considered to be the first step to be taken in overcoming the complex cycle of exclusion (Teixeira and Albuquerque 2005). This demand led to the state constituting immigrant associations as partners in the first special period of regularisation of undocumented immigrants in 1992, with the creation of the Coordinating Secretariat for Legalisation Action (Secretariado Coordenador das Acções de Legalização (SCAL)). Under the coordination of the Portuguese Catholic Missions for Migration (Obra Católica Portuguesa de Migrações (OCPM)),\footnote{This umbrella organisation became the mediator between the associations and the government.} social intervention also continued to occupy a key role in the activities of the associations. Although the associations were not dependent on government to carry out their initiatives, they could now benefit from EU programmes primarily aimed at combating poverty and discrimination. These financial opportunities allowed for the development of a vari-
ety of projects in the fields of education, training, health as well as initiatives aimed at the youth population who were now becoming a major integration challenge, often tied to issues of violence, delinquency and high school drop-out rates. The available financial resources allowed the associations to establish medium- and long-term plans, and, consequently, to strengthen their role as agents of social, economic and political integration of the groups they represented.

With the positive impact of these early examples of intervention, the mobilisation of the immigrant groups was also stimulated, as more and more individuals began to organise around associations, with others empowering the ones that already existed. The response to this positive impact is visible in the increase of immigrant associations from 1990 to 1996. While at the start of the decade, ten associations existed, six years later there were 78, all but one of African origin (the other being Brazilian) (Correia 1997 in Albuquerque et al. 2000).

The second half of the 1990s brought about significant changes from two different yet connected perspectives: first, from the growing institutional relationship scenario, and second, the professionalisation of immigrant organisations. With the creation of ACIME in 1995, the associations now had a formal channel of communication to the government. The creation of COCAI and CICDR, for example, provided the associations with a forum where they could voice their concerns. However, for any association to have the right to participate in these councils, a piece of legislation, passed in 1999, required that they be legally recognised by ACIME. This formal recognition required several formalities (elected social bodies, published statutes, registration in the National Registry of Collective Bodies and having as their primary goal the promotion of immigrant rights) and entitled the associations to be consulted in matters that concerned immigration and ethnic minorities (including participation in the COCAI), to participate in the legislative processes of defining immigration policy, and to benefit from state financial and technical support.

During this period, EU social policies also reinforced budgets to combat social exclusion and promote social cohesion, singling out ethnic minorities as a priority target group. Partnership building became a key factor in European policies, often requesting the active participation of immigrant associations in carrying out programmes. Additionally, an array of host-society institutions – from local to national government, to NGOs to trade unions – now looked to immigrant associations to work together on common projects. While taking on a wide variety of programmes and projects, offering increasing intervention opportunities as well as bettering the quality of the intervention, considering that funding was available, they also demanded more responsibility. Associations were now expected to become more and more professional in order to
cope with the rigid norms of the funding institutions and to properly execute the work before them. These sets of conditions led to the professionalisation and maturity of the association movements, prompting some associations, considered weaker, not to succeed, while others, able to fulfil the growing responsibilities, became essential partners in the overall scheme of social policy (Teixeira and Albuquerque 2005).

Since the turn of the century, the participation of immigrant associations has been strengthened by new initiatives. Associations possessing ACIME recognition can now compete for technical support and grants offered through GATAIME. ACIME has also established organisation and management training courses for association leaders. Additionally, through protocols with ACIME, the associations can now employ individuals at the Lisbon and Porto CNAIs as social-cultural mediators, attending to immigrants (face-to-face and on the SOS Immigrant phone line) in their languages of origin. Under such protocols, the individuals are considered employees of the association, but are financially remunerated by ACIME.

In recent years, immigrant association movements along with other host-society organisms have also consolidated their ties, organising lobby groups with the intent of pressuring the state. In 2002, under the coordination of the Brazilian association Casa do Brasil de Lisboa, a secretariat known as Coordinating Secretariat of Immigrant Associations (Secretariado Coordenador das Associações de Imigrantes (SCAI)) was formed with the goal of uniting and empowering immigrant associations. This first attempt by the associations to organise themselves, however, would see its demise six months later due to lack of interest and coordination difficulties. Most recently, the creation of the Platform of Immigrant Organisations for Regularisation and Integration (Plataforma de Organizações de Imigrantes pela Regularização e Integração), created in 2005, brought together various immigrant, anti-racist and human rights associations, labour unions, religious organisations, social movements and civil society organisations. Under this umbrella organisation the associations, in conjunction with the other parties involved, lobbied government, demanding changes to four lines of immigration policy: 1) legalisation of all undocumented immigrants (demanding that the permanência authorisation be eradicated); 2) altering the nationality law (from jus sanguinis to jus soli); 3) calling for social integration policies; and 4) alterations to the current legal immigration framework.

From the mid-1990s to the present, the increased availability of project funds along with the increased recognition of the importance of the associations on the part of the powers-that-be, again stimulated the creation of more immigrant associations. In comparison to the 78 associations in 1996, in a more recent study carried out by Albuquerque (2002), 184 immigrant associations were identified. Of these, three-
quarters were PALOP associations with the remaining one-quarter defined as intercultural (14 per cent), Eastern European (3 per cent), Brazilian (1 per cent) and others (7 per cent). Beyond this numerical domination of PALOP associations, however, it is important to note that the diversity of immigrant associations has strongly increased since the turn of the century, with the emergence of more diverse national origins. Particularly worth highlighting is the growth of Eastern European associations.58

Another result unveiled by the Albuquerque study is that, in broad correlation with the distribution of the foreign population, of the 184 associations identified, 165 (90 per cent) were located in the LMA. Of the associations found in the LMA, however, it is essential to also highlight the fact that these movements differ in their characteristics and activities, depending on their geographical location and the populations they serve. According to Carita (1994), there are two types of associations: those tied to the shantytown or re-housing neighbourhoods, and those independent of them. The two types can be denominated ‘peripheral associations’ and ‘metropolitan associations’; the former has as its primary goal the establishment of dialogue between the neighbourhood residents and the local authorities, while the latter are made up of individuals who are already well integrated into Portuguese society and who are more interested in carrying out recreational and cultural activities. Carita’s associational typology has similarly been used by Horta and Malheiros (2005) whose study of immigrant associations in Lisbon, Amadora and Oeiras revealed that in the case of the latter two cities, associations are mainly grassroots-based neighbourhood organisations that function as social service agencies for their local constituencies, while in Lisbon, organised immigrant activities target cultural issues, combined with social-care activities. Additionally, Horta and Malheiros make the point that the mobilisation capacity and nature and scope of intervention are very much linked to the organisational model of associations. Organisations operating in migrant neighbourhoods tend to have a greater capacity to mobilise their constituencies than those functioning in Lisbon.59

* * *

This chapter has described the evolution and consequences of immigration in Portugal, paying particular attention to immigration policy development, institutional settings and the development of immigrant associations. Immigration to Portugal witnessed a steady increase from the end of the Portuguese Revolution of 1974 up till the late 1990s, consisting primarily of immigrants from the former Portuguese colonies. The turn-of-the-century, however, bore witness to the upsurge of a new immi-
gration boom, with new arrivals now coming largely from Eastern Europe and Brazil. Parallel to the fast-rising growth in foreign population, instruments and policies for integration also started to attract more attention. In turn, this stimulated the growth of immigrant associations, which consequently have become more political in nature, interfacing with more intensity and regularity with host society institutions as lobby and consultative groups.

The broad topics discussed in this chapter have served as an introduction into the more in-depth analysis that this study now sets out to accomplish, focusing on three different association groups. However, in order to preface my empirical research, a methodological reflection is needed. The next chapter outlines the methodological approach used for this study, as well as the concrete characteristics of the fieldwork.
5 Setting the scene: Research design and fieldwork methodology

In this chapter my objectives are twofold. The first is to describe the research design and fieldwork methods; how the research was carried out, focusing on the interview instruments, data management and analysis, and document research and use. The second is to describe the actual fieldwork, including its geographical distribution, immigrant physical spaces, participant observation, as well as difficulties and other relevant experiences in the field.

5.1 Research and methodology: An overview

The research findings which serve as the primary source of information for this thesis are fruit of a one-year fieldwork period in Portugal from September 2004 to September 2005. The key objective behind this fieldwork was to carry out in-depth, semi-structured interviews with immigrant association leaders, founders, influential members and volunteers tied to the Angolan, Brazilian and Eastern European communities and associations in Portugal. The last of the three groups comprised individuals from Bulgaria, Moldova, Romania, Russia and the Ukraine. The topics and questions where pre-selected and appeared in the interview in a structured order. In addition, the interviewees were asked to answer a series of closed questions on a continuum scale. Other questions were more open-ended. Beyond the interviews carried out with the associations, further interviews were also carried out with NGO representatives, religious leaders, trade union representatives, local and national level government officials, social service administrators and political party members. The goal was to interview individuals who possess some knowledge of the organisation to which they belong and/or the organisations they deal with.

In total, 110 interviews were carried out, separated into two groups: with individuals tied to associations (either as leaders, founders, members, workers or volunteers); and with individuals tied to institutions that deal with immigrants and/or immigrant associations. Some of the indi-
individuals interviewed, however, belong to both groups. For example, there are cases of interviewees who are public sector employees in bodies that deal with immigrant issues, and are, at the same time, association leaders as well as religious leaders who are also committee members of immigrant associations, etc.¹

5.1.1 Interview schedule, subject selection and conducting the interviews

Before the main fieldwork period, an interview schedule was designed and pilot-tested. The schedule contained three distinct lines of questioning: 1) questions that would generate a profile of the institutions being analysed; 2) questions concerning the role and stances of the associations in relation to community integration and identity preservation; and 3) questions relating to the associations’ interface with the Portuguese formal service structures and opinions held in relation to these structures. These lines of questioning were clearly directed at answering the hypotheses this thesis sets out to investigate. The common issues that guided the development of the interviews can be grouped into the following blocks:²

First, in relation to characterising the institutions:

– General characteristics: location of headquarters and other places/spaces of action; acquisition of physical space; date when the organisation was created and other forms of recognition; history of the organisation; membership numbers, criteria for membership and membership fees; geographical area of action; populations served; forms of funding; legal status; activities carried out; association type and degree of professionalisation (i.e. paid staff).
– Objectives: mission statement and objectives carried out by the organisation – past, present and future, as well as objectives effectively reached.
– Alliances and cooperative actions: other entities they relate with; types of existing relations; objectives and assessments of such relations; history of relations and cooperative actions.

In relation to integration and identity:

– Integration difficulties encountered by the communities.
– Cultural differences between ethnic groups.
– Identity and forms of integration favoured by the organisation.
– The ways in which the organisation helps the community/communities it represents.

Lastly, in relation social and community service mechanisms:

– Opinions in relation to social and community services and policies.
Suggestions to better improve integration conditions for immigrants in Portugal.

In order to select the subjects for interview, a list was compiled of immigrant associations, social organisations and government institutions on the basis of directories and listings already published, through web searches, and with the help of two immigrant association lists, one compiled by SOS Racismo (Albuquerque 2002) and a second by ACIME (list of ACIME recognised associations). Through word-of-mouth (‘snowball effect’), more institutions were then added throughout the fieldwork period. This was particularly the case with a small number of the associations that were actually created during the fieldwork period. In relation to public institutions and informants, the objective was to interview those institutions and/or individuals that the associations had meaningful working contact with.

The process of choosing the associations to be interviewed also brought about a problem of definition in a number of situations. Questions arose such as: why is an association that caters to Africans in general considered as an Angolan association, or why is an association that represents immigrants in general considered an Eastern European association? The principal criterion used, in this case, was that the majority of the population represented by the association was of the ethnic background in question. This considered, it can be argued that the associations analysed in this study are not only associations of immigrants, but also associations for immigrants.

The question of what constitutes an immigrant association was also defined before the fieldwork took place. An immigrant association was defined as a voluntary, non-profit organisation formed by immigrants, their descendents or host-country nationals that aims its activities at third-country nationals, their descendents or the immigrants’ home-country population. The immigrant voluntary associations chosen for this study can, therefore, be defined as private groups, public-interest groups, grass-root movements, intermediary organisations, goal-oriented associations, community-interest organisations or home-country movements; the underlining commonality is that they are associations of immigrants and/or for immigrants.

Once the associations were identified, interview management became the next step. First, in setting up interview times and locations, the interviewees were contacted via telephone in order to request a meeting. In a small number of cases, an e-mail requesting an interview or a letter of intent was requested by the interviewees. The majority of the interviews were carried out at the headquarters of the associations or the institutions (74). The remainder took place in various locations such as shopping centres, cafes, restaurants, universities, public parks, places of
work, places of residence, etc., always at the interviewees’ request. Although some interviews were carried out in neighbourhoods that might be characterised by ‘outsiders’ as ‘hostile’, at no time did I encounter any situations of risk or harm.

During the interviews, people were invited to collaborate in the research by sharing information and thoughts; they were given absolute freedom to answers questions or not. While some where very talkative, others were at times more reticent in expressing their views and in providing information. Taking into account that I, the interviewer, am a member of the host society, the connotation of ‘an outsider looking in’ attached to this position implied neutrality and impartiality in relation to the topics at hand during the interviews. As Arksey and Knight (1999: 103) point out: ‘the way we react to people influences the questions we ask, what we hear and how we interpret what is said’. Keeping this point in mind, I found that an impartial position was thus essential with every interview carried out in such a way as not to influence or distort answers and opinions given by the interviewees. Of course, I realise that complete neutrality is to some extent a myth, and unintentional biases (and their interpretation by interviewees) can never be totally, in every situation, screened out; however every attempt was made to avoid this.

Regarding the information provided, it was also essential to evaluate the degree of correctness or truth, as well as its relevance to the topic at hand. In order to verify that information given was correct, it was either compared across several interviewees, verified with the help of publications or confirmed through participant observation. Achieving relevancy to the questions asked, on the other hand, was often more a question of patience. In the case of ‘professional speakers’, for example, when asked about concrete issues, sometimes this kind of interviewee would try to evade specific, more ‘controversial’ topics with a general answer, or provide an answer not relevant to what was asked. In this case, patience became a virtue as it was often necessary to let the individual talk about what he or she wanted in order to relax him/her before asking the more ‘difficult’ questions in a more conversational context.

5.1.2 Data management and analysis

All interviews were recorded on audio cassettes. The average length of each interview was approximately one hour, with the shortest being 30 minutes and the longest three hours. All interviews were carried out in Portuguese. A translator was utilised in the case of three interviews with Eastern European individuals. Interview visits with the interviewees were done no more then twice, with 102 of the interviewees interviewed once, and follow-up interviews with eight of the interviewees.
All interviews were transcribed with additional notes being made when needed. Although transcriptions were to respect the original ‘oral life’ of the interview as much as possible, minor improvements to grammar were made as needed, in order to make the language of the interview more readable. This was especially the case when fluency in the language was precarious. In order to facilitate the writing of this thesis, especially in relation to quotations, all transcriptions were translated into English.

During the fieldwork and after its conclusion, I provisionally classified the transcripts’ raw data according to some of the main topics of the thesis, sometimes changing or merging groupings, or picking new topics and questions as needed. In order to analyse similarities, patterns and differences, the process of data triangulation (Arksey and Knight 1999) was undertaken utilising other forms of information – extracts from newspapers, journals, bulletins, pamphlets, diary accounts, oral and visual information gathered, event participation, gatherings, meetings, conferences, marches and other forms of public manifestation.

After the collection and categorisation of the information, a process of selection was necessary. The selection processes was governed by the goal of answering the key questions of the thesis, while, at the same time, picking up issues and new questions that could be explored further. It was important, I felt, to keep an open and flexible analytical structure so that unanticipated issues could be taken on board as these new questions arose during the data collection and management stages. In analysing these questions and issues, a mixed approach to description and explanation, using methods both of ‘story-telling’ and ‘explaining’ (justifying actions, giving reasons, supporting claims, etc.), was used. The analysis of this empirical data makes up Chapters 6, 7 and 8 of this study. These are, essentially, my ‘results’ chapters, and they constitute the heart of this book.

5.1.3 Secondary sources: Literary data, participant observation and statistics

Throughout (and before and after) the fieldwork period, literary sources were also collected and analysed. The literature primarily refers to previous academic research on immigration in Portugal and press research, which permitted the monitoring of the media discourse in relation to immigrant issues. In particular, two internet sites were consulted on an almost daily basis: the SOS Racismo blog which provides a daily compilation of media coverage related to immigration issues, and the ACIME website which also provides news and information on current immigrant affairs. Some associations also publish their own newspapers or newsletters, which I collected on a regular basis. Some of these publications include: A Nossa Kubata (Casa de Angola de Lisboa), Comunidade
Activa (União da Juventude Angolana em Portugal), Sábia (Casa do Brasil de Lisboa), Bereg (Movimento de Imigrantes Bereg), MICT (Associação dos Ucranianos em Portugal), BMECTE (Associação Apoio ao Imigrante – São Bernardo), to name a few. Additionally, immigrant print media aimed at specific immigrant communities was also monitored and collected.

Other materials provided by the different immigrant organisations and government bodies are also worth highlighting. These include, from the associations, various types of journals, bulletins, pamphlets, year-end and activity reports, constitutional status and mission statement documents, etc.; reports and journals of trade unions and employers’ organisations; religious publications from religious institutions; documents of NGOs and organised lobby groups; as well as activity reports, pamphlets, constitutional papers and other documents from public administration.

In addition, various forms of participant observation were carried out during the fieldwork period. This includes everything from attending association meetings and general assemblies, fairs and festivals, ceremonial events, and organised protests. Although numerous activities took place during my fieldwork year, it was not possible to attend every event that occurred or that I was invited to. However, I do wish to highlight some key ones. These include: the conference on the liberation of the Angolan enclave of Cabinda organised by the association Associação Tratado de Simulambuco – Casa de Cabinda; the Ukrainian Christmas mass held in the Lisbon ‘baixa’ (downtown) that drew hundreds of worshippers; the Moldovan Easter Festival organised by the Centro Cultural Moldavo; the Núcleo PT’s monthly board meetings; the Sant’Iago Fair of Setúbal, where, during a two-week period (last week of July and first week of August), immigrant associations tied to Setúbal City Hall’s immigrant support centre Setúbal Etnias e Imigração got to promote the associations and display community culture; and lastly, participating in the protest march organised by the Platform of Immigrant Organisations for Regularisation and Integration.

In the case of associations that have close ties to specific neighbourhoods, field observation of these geographical areas was also undertaken. I highlight five neighbourhoods visited where a number of Angolan association headquarters or delegations can be found: the Terraços da Ponte Urbanisation (better know as Quinta do Mocho, the name that existed before re-housing took place) and Quinta da Fonte in Loures, Quinta Grande in Lisbon, Outurela/Portela in Oeiras, and lastly, Vale da Amoreira in the municipality of Moita. Visits to these neighbourhoods permitted observation of the interrelations and networking that exist between the social service providers, day-care centres, leisure centres, cafes, residences, etc. located in the neighbourhood. The social and phy-
sical spaces and environment of these neighbourhoods were investigated and triangulated with information provided by the associations interviewed in the neighbourhoods, as well as literary sources and previous research on these areas.

To assist me with recording and explicating my fieldwork, a fieldwork diary was kept throughout the year I was in Portugal; not only to keep track of the interview dates, locations, etc., but also to take account of my own thoughts, reflections and experiences as well as those shared by the interviewees. The use of a dairy was particularly useful in recording visual impressions and other experiences and emotions felt at particular moments in order to reflect on them later.

Lastly, although statistical data is not central to this fieldwork research, it is of significant support. The majority of the statistical data used for this study was collected from INE, SEF, ACIME as well as other publications during the fieldwork period. This data has been referred to in Chapter 4.

5.2 Mapping the fieldwork: The organisations and their locations

In order to get a broad representation of the associations, it was thought necessary that the fieldwork take place at the national level. The reason behind this decision lies in the fact that, in the case of the Brazilian and Eastern European associations, like the people they represent, these organisations are spread throughout Portugal. On the other hand, in the case of the Angolan community, clustering is more evident: the overwhelming majority of the associations are located in the LMA. Accordingly, fieldwork was carried out in the Lisbon Metropolitan Area (including the municipalities of Amadora, Barreiro, Cascais, Lisbon, Loures, Mafra, Moita, Odivelas, Oeiras, Seixal, Setúbal and Sintra) and Porto (including the municipalities of Gondomar, Porto and Vila Nova de Gaia), as well as in the cities of Braga, Guimarães, Ilhavo, Aveiro, Coimbra, Fátima, Évora, Beja, Faro, Loulé, Tavira, Portimão and Lagos. Figure 5.1 maps these municipalities in Portugal. During the fieldwork period, since I was based in the city of Lisbon, all interviews in the LMA were never more than a one-day trip. For interviews outside of the LMA, trips of between one and four days were taken.

Since this study involves three distinct immigrant association groups, I provide a separate overview of the fieldwork done with each of the immigrant groups and their associations.

First, in relation to the Angolan group, a total of 39 Angolan associations were identified for this study. Of these 39 associations, 27 interviews with individuals representing 28 associations were carried out
(see Table 5.1). Additionally, three of the individuals interviewed belonged to the board of directors of two Angolan associations.

**Figure 5.1** Municipalities where the associations (headquarters and delegations) are located

Source: Author’s own compilation

Concerning the other eleven Angolan associations not interviewed, in three cases, interviews were set up with representatives but never carried out, either due to cancellation on the part of the interviewee who then did not wish to reschedule, or due to the associations’ lack of interest in participating in the research. In relation to the other eight associations not interviewed, while efforts were made to track them down and contact them, it was learnt along the way that some no longer existed, while others were merely ‘paper organisations’ (some of which had been quite predominant in their time – e.g. Clube Marítimo Africano).

In mapping the 28 associations represented in this study, 24 have their central headquarters located in the LMA, two in the PMA, and the other two in the cities of Coimbra and Braga. The fact that the majority of the Angolan associations are found in the LMA is of no surprise since the majority of the Angolan population residing in Portugal also lives in this part of the country.

It is worth highlighting that a number of the associations found in the LMA are either located or work in shantytowns or in re-housing neighbourhoods. Such associations include: Associação de Promotores de
Table 5.1  
*Angolan associations interviewed and their locations*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Association</th>
<th>Location (by municipality)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Associação Africana do Barreiro</td>
<td>Barreiro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associação Amigos da Mulher Angolana (AAMA)</td>
<td>Oeiras</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associação ANGOCORO</td>
<td>Lisbon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associação Apoio Sem Limites (ASLI)</td>
<td>Lisbon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associação Casa dos Estudantes do Império</td>
<td>Lisbon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associação de Coordenação e Integração dos Migrantes Angolanos (ACIMA)</td>
<td>Lisbon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associação de Defesa dos Angolanos (ADA)</td>
<td>Lisbon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associação de Defesa dos Direitos das Famílias Angolanas (ADDIFA)</td>
<td>Lisbon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associação para a Defesa dos Direitos da Cultura Backongo (ADECKO)</td>
<td>Amadora</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associação dos Estudantes Angolanos em Portugal (AEAP)</td>
<td>Lisbon (delegations in Braga, Porto, Aveiro, Viseu, Covilha, Coimbra, Évora, Faro)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associação Internacional Amigos de Angola (AIAA)</td>
<td>Lisbon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associação Kamba</td>
<td>Seixal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associação Kambariange</td>
<td>Amadora</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associação Luso-Africana dos Metodistas no Porto</td>
<td>Porto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associação N’Angola</td>
<td>Vila Nova de Gaia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associação de Promotores de Saúde, Ambiente e Desenvolvimento Sócio-Cultural (PROSAUDESC)</td>
<td>Loures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associação Quizomba – Associação Recreativa e Cultura</td>
<td>Sintra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residentes nos Municípios de Amadora e Sintra</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associação dos Residentes Angolanos no Concelho de Odivelas (ARACODI)</td>
<td>Odivelas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associação de Solidariedade Angolana em Portugal (ASAP)</td>
<td>Amadora</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associação Tratado de Simulambuco – Casa de Cabinda</td>
<td>Sintra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casa de Angola em Coimbra</td>
<td>Coimbra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casa de Angola de Lisboa</td>
<td>Lisbon (delegations in Loures, Moita)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casa da Angolada da Região do Minho</td>
<td>Braga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clube Desportivo Veteranas de Angola (CDVA)</td>
<td>Oeiras</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federação das Associações Angolanas em Portugal (FAAP)</td>
<td>Lisbon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fórum Social Angolano (FSA)</td>
<td>Sintra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liga Luso-Angolana Demóstenes de Almeida (LLUANDA)</td>
<td>Loures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>União da Juventude Angolana em Portugal (UJAP)</td>
<td>Loures</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Author’s own compilation*

Saúde, Ambiente e Desenvolvimento Sócio-Cultural (PROSAUDESC) and União da Juventude Angolana em Portugal (UJAP), these two being
located in the Urbanização Terraços da Ponte neighbourhood, Loures; Associação de Defesa dos Angolanos (ADA) and Associação Apoio Sem Limites (ASLI), both found in the neighbourhood Quinta Grande in Lisbon; Associação Kambariange in Casal da Mira, Amadora; and lastly Club Desportivo Veteranas de Angola, sited in the neighbourhood of Outurela/Portela, Oeiras.

In the case of one particular association – Casa de Angola de Lisboa – although this association’s main headquarters is found in Lisbon, it also possesses two delegation offices in social housing neighbourhoods, one in Quinta da Fonte in Loures, and the other in the Vale da Amoreira in the municipality of Moita. This same pattern applies to the student association Associação dos Estudantes Angolanos em Portugal (AEAP): although its central headquarters are located in Lisbon, delegations are also found in the university cities of Braga, Porto, Aveiro, Viseu, Covilhã, Évora and Faro.

In relation to the Brazilian associations, eighteen Brazilian organisations were identified, all of which were contacted and interviewed (see Table 5.2). In total, 25 individuals belonging to these institutions were interviewed. Of the 25, there was one interviewee in the board of directors of one association who was also co-founder of one of the other Brazilian organisations analysed in this study.

Geographically, unlike the Angolan associations, only half of the Brazilian associations are found in the LMA. The remainder are in the PMA (5), Guimarães (1), Aveiro (1), Coimbra (1), Loulé (1). Among the eighteen associations, two particularities associated with three of the associations are worth pointing out. First, in relation to the association Abadá – Associação Brasileira de Apoio e Desenvolvimento à Arte Capoeira, although the headquarters are in Guimarães, there are other nuclei in the cities of Lisbon, Setúbal and Coimbra; the same situation applies to Torcida Brasil which has a delegation in the city of Porto. Second, the association Solidariedade Imigrante – Associação para a Defesa dos Direitos dos Imigrantes (SOLIM) is not specifically a Brazilian association, but an intercultural association. Although SOLIM is headquartered in Lisbon, it also has delegations in other centres – Ericeira, Cascais, Beja and Albufeira. For this analysis, the delegation located in Ericeira was identified as a Brazilian organisation due to 95 per cent of this delegation’s members being Brazilians.

In the third target group, the Eastern Europeans, a total of 24 associations were identified. Out of these 24 associations, 30 individuals tied to 21 associations where interviewed. The 21 organisations are listed in Table 5.3.

As with my interviews with the Angolan community, there were two situations of individuals interviewed who belonged to the board of directors of two different associations. In relation to the three associations not
Table 5.2  *Brazilian associations interviewed and their locations*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Association</th>
<th>Location (by municipality)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abadá – Associação Brasileira de Apoio e Desenvolvimento à Arte Capoeira</td>
<td>Guimarães (delegations in Lisbon, Setúbal, Coimbra)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associação de Apoio à Cidadania Lusófona (AACILUS)</td>
<td>Porto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associação Brasileira de Portugal (ABP)</td>
<td>Seixal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associação Brasileira da Universidade de Aveiro (ABRUNA)</td>
<td>Aveiro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associação Carinho Brasileiro</td>
<td>Cascais</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associação da Comunidade Brasileira da Universidade do Porto (BRASUP)</td>
<td>Porto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associação Luso-Brasileira de Saúde Oral</td>
<td>Porto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associação Mais Brasil (AMB)</td>
<td>Porto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associação de Pesquisadores e Estudantes Brasileiros em Coimbra (ABEP Coimbra)</td>
<td>Coimbra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associação Pineal – Associação de Assistência Social</td>
<td>Loulé</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casa do Brasil de Lisboa (CBL)</td>
<td>Lisbon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clube de Empresários do Brasil (CEB)</td>
<td>Lisbon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fundação Luso-Brasileira para o Desenvolvimento do Mundo da Língua Portuguesa</td>
<td>Lisbon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grupo Brasil¹⁶</td>
<td>Setúbal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Movimento das Associações de Pesquisadores e Estudantes Brasileiros em Portugal (MEBRAP)</td>
<td>Porto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Núcleo PT (Partido dos Trabalhadores) de Lisboa</td>
<td>Lisbon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solidariedade Imigrante – Associação para a Defesa dos Direitos dos Imigrantes (SOLIM)</td>
<td>Lisbon (delegation in Mafra)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Torcida Brasil</td>
<td>Cascais (delegation in Porto)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Author’s own compilation*

interviewed,¹⁸ it was learnt early in the fieldwork period that they no longer existed; two of them had folded under circumstances involving criminal charges and ties to organised crime.¹⁹

The decision to group all Eastern European immigrants into one category has to do with the fact that the majority of the associations cater to immigrants originating from this part of Europe as a whole. One does not have to go far to see evidence of this. Surveying the names of the associations, words such as ‘Eastern European immigrants’, ‘Russo-phones’ or ‘Orthodox’ stand out, implying that the activities are often aimed at citizens of the former Soviet states or Eastern European immigrants in general. Chapter 6 will analyse this categorisation and group division in greater detail.

Geographically speaking, like the Brazilian associations, Eastern European organisations also tend to follow a dispersed pattern. Of the 21 associations interviewed, 13 have headquarters in the LMA, with the rest...
being found in Aveiro (2), Porto (1), Braga (1), Ilhavo (1), Albergaria-a-Velha (1) and Portimão (1).

In the case of the Ukrainian association, Associação dos Ucranianos em Portugal, this organisation was unusual in having three levels of geographical organisation: the national level headquartered out of Lisbon; a regional level divided into north, centre and south Portugal (delegated

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 5.3</th>
<th>Eastern European associations interviewed and their locations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Association</td>
<td>Locations (by municipality)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associação de Amizade – Associação de Apoio aos Imigrantes de Leste</td>
<td>Gondomar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associação Apoio ao Imigrante – São Bernardo</td>
<td>Aveiro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associação CAPELA – Centro de Apoio à População Emigrante de Leste e Amigos</td>
<td>Portimão</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associação Casa da Língua e Cultura Russas</td>
<td>Lisbon (delegation in Aveiro)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associação Cristã Ortodoxa de Aveiro</td>
<td>Albergaria-a-Velha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associação Cultural dos Romenos Mircea Eliade</td>
<td>Lisbon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associação dos Imigrantes do Leste Europeu</td>
<td>Vila Franca de Xira (delegation in Lisbon)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associação Romena e Povos Amigos</td>
<td>Lisbon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associação Sodrújestvo – Centro de Apoio às Crianças Russófonas e aos seus Pais</td>
<td>Lisbon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associação de Solidariedade Social e Intercultural da Federação Russa em Portugal</td>
<td>Aveiro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associação Tavirense de Apoio ao Imigrante</td>
<td>Tavira</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casa do Leste – Associação de Solidaridade Social</td>
<td>Braga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centro Cultural Moldavo</td>
<td>Cascais</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edinstvo – Associação dos Imigrantes dos Países do Leste</td>
<td>Setúbal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frăţia – Associação dos Imigrantes Romenos e Moldavos</td>
<td>Setúbal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Movimento de Imigrantes Bereg</td>
<td>Lisbon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nach Dom – Associação de Imigrantes</td>
<td>Ilhavo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respublika – Associação dos Imigrantes Russofonos</td>
<td>Lisbon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sobor – Associação dos Imigrantes Ucranianos</td>
<td>Lisbon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solidariedade Imigrante – Associação para a Defesa dos Direitos dos Imigrantes (SOLIM)</td>
<td>Lisbon (delegations in Cascais, Beja, Albufeira)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s own compilation
out of Porto, Lisbon and Faro, respectively); as well as fourteen other sub-delegations spread out throughout Portugal. Also worth pointing out are the organisations Associação Casa da Língua e Cultura Russas and Associação dos Imigrantes do Leste Europeu which, besides having their central headquarters set up in Lisbon and Vila Franca de Xira, respectively, also possess delegations in Aveiro, in the case of the former, and Lisbon in the case of the latter.

In observing the list of Eastern European associations interviewed, the association SOLIM is once again present. Although an intercultural association, as previously mentioned, two primary reasons explain why this association is, above all, an Eastern European association: first, outside of its Ericeira nucleus (which is mainly Brazilian), in the remaining three nucleuses as well as the Lisbon headquarters, the association primarily caters to Eastern Europeans. This is especially true of its Beja and Albufeira nuclei where over 80 per cent of the members are from Eastern European countries. Second, the president of SOLIM, although a Portuguese national, was, up until December 1995, the representative of the Eastern European community in the ACIME’s Consultative Council for Immigrant Affairs (COCAI).20

Besides the analysis of the associations themselves, it was also necessary to get important insights from representatives of institutions that deal with the immigrant associations and also work towards integrating immigrants. The organisations of this nature interviewed for this project are just a small percentage of the institutions, offices, centres, etc. working with immigrants and immigration issues in Portugal today. When selecting the representatives and institutions to interview, the primary consideration was their connection to the communities being studied. Additionally, it was considered imperative that these be institutions working in the same geographical areas as the associations in question in order to permit an analysis of synchronicities and inter-institutional relations between all parties involved.

With the goal of highlighting a number of particularities in relation to the institutions and their spokespersons, I here provide a brief introspective into the nine institutional categories outlined in Table 5.4. First, in relation to the state government institutions, one interview was carried out with a representative of SEF, with the remaining interviews being done with individuals tied to offices, councils or centres under the onus of ACIME. In relation to the COCAI, five immigrant community representatives were interviewed – the Capeverdean, Angolan, Brazilian, Eastern European and Romanian – all of whom association leaders, with the exception of the Angolan community representative who was not affiliated to any immigrant association. Interviews were also carried out with individuals employed to work within the various ACIME organisms (through the employment protocol with the associations – see Chapter
who are either association members or a part of the board of directors of immigrant associations.

In respect to local government institutions, although various municipalities throughout Portugal now have offices that deal with immigrant issues, the seven offices interviewed for this study were chosen primarily...
because they deal directly with many of the associations interviewed, or in the case of municipal councils, because they provide an outlet where immigrants, through their representative associations — or more precisely, through their association leaders — can voice their concerns. Concerning the local organisation Organização Não Governamental para a Cooperação e Desenvolvimento (NÓS), the interest in interviewing the representative of this organisation was mainly due to the fact that the interviewee was co-founder of the now-defunct Eastern European association Associação Drujba and now continues with similar work within this parish-level organisation.

The Catholic Church in Portugal and its various NGO institutions have also been very dynamic in working with the immigrant populations and associations. Besides the four church-run NGOs interviewed (Obra Católica Portuguesa de Migrações (OCPM), Centro Espiritano Padre Alves Correia, Serviço Jesuítas aos Refugiados (SJR) and Caritas), two Catholic Church social service centres — the Secretariado Diocesano das Migrações — Casa de Vilar in Porto and the Centro Social Paroquial Vera Cruz in Aveiro — were also interviewed. The latter also functions as a Local Immigrant Support Centre.

Interestingly, the Portuguese Catholic Church has also assisted the Eastern European communities in setting up churches of the Orthodox faith. The Romanian and Ukrainian Orthodox churches in Portugal, for example, are also a part of the OCPM. The Russian Orthodox Church, on the other hand, although not a member of OCPM, also uses Catholic churches to celebrate mass. Seven Orthodox priests, belonging to the three different orders, were interviewed.

Four interviews were also carried out with individuals tied to three labour unions. Of these three unions, two were with the migration departments of the two main trade unions in Portugal: União Geral de Trabalhadores (UGT) and Gabinete de Apoio aos Imigrantes Confederação Geral de Trabalhadores em Portugal (CGTP-IN). The other was the Sindicato dos Operários da Construção Civil (Construction Workers Labour Union), a body that works closely with the immigrant population due to the fact that many immigrants are employed in this field of work. The importance of interviewing these institutions lies in the fact that workers’ unions often coordinate activities and actions with the association movements in the battle for equal labour rights for immigrants, a philosophy that also applies to anti-racist NGOs, who also coordinate activities with the immigrant associations in the fight against discrimination, racism and xenophobia. With the two anti-racist organisations in Portugal (Frente Anti-Racista and SOS Racismo), three interviews were carried out.

Concerning commission/lobby groups, the Plataforma de Organizações de Imigrantes pela Regularização e Integração is an umbrella organisa-
tion that brings together various immigrant, anti-racist and human rights associations, labour unions, religious organisations, social movements and civil society organisations to lobby the government on immigrant issues. The individuals interviewed belonging to these organisations also belonged to some other institutions already mentioned. This also applies to the three political party members interviewed, all of whom are also association leaders.

Two community centres with very different objectives were also studied during the fieldwork period: the Centro de Acolhimento no Poço do Bispo, and Interculturacidade – Centro de Apoio à Comunidade. The first of these is a homeless shelter that has mainly housed Romanian immigrants. The representative of this centre, who is also president of the association Associação Romena e Povos Amigos and the Romanian community COCAI representative, was living at the centre at the time of the fieldwork. Concerning the second centre, Interculturacidade, this space was created in order to recognise and celebrate the intercultural life of Portugal’s first immigrant neighbourhood known as Triângulo do Poço dos Negros. Interculturacidade serves various functions: from being an immigrant information centre, to providing a multimedia space, to offering Portuguese classes, among others.

Lastly, an interview was also carried out with a volunteer worker of the medical organisation Medicos do Mundo (‘Physicians of the World’), which provides medical assistance to immigrants throughout the city of Lisbon through its equipped mobile unit.

* * *

This chapter has described, firstly, the field instruments and the research methods utilised in my thesis, especially during the main year-long fieldwork period in Portugal. Attention was drawn to the questions that framed the fieldwork techniques as well as the use of secondary sources. In addition, the account also briefly described data management processes. In the second half of the chapter, I introduced and mapped the three selected groups of immigrant associations, and provided information about the range of interviews sampled.

This chapter has thus set the scene for the three ‘results’ chapters to come. Chapters 6, 7 and 8 will now analyse the field data gathered in Portugal, taking into consideration the associations’ typologies (Chapter 6), the roles and views of these immigrant organisations in relation to the processes of integration and identity formation (Chapter 7), and the relationships and perspectives of the associations concerning the social and community service mechanisms available to them and the people they represent (Chapter 8).
The 67 Angolan, Brazilian and Eastern European associations interviewed for this study covered immigrant groups with very different immigration histories and circumstances of arrival, cultural backgrounds, languages, national and racial origins, as well as legal statuses and entitlements. This, in turn, reflects the histories, objectives and other characteristic differences and special circumstances of the associations in question. Keeping this point in mind, this chapter will show – among many other things – that diversity is paramount, not only between the respective immigrant groups’ associations, but also among the associations that represent each immigrant group.

The primary aim of this chapter is to examine the organisational characteristics of the associations interviewed. In order to carry out this task, I consider the following indicators: the founding of the associations and their histories; organisational and legal statuses, size, membership, populations catered to; association types, activities and areas of intervention; material, economic and human resources available; and lastly, alliances and/or cooperative actions with other entities. The chapter’s analysis relies on the ‘raw material’ of the interviews I carried out. Henceforth, all interview quotes are in italics. All translations of interview material are mine.

6.1 Association histories

As highlighted in Table 6.1, the overwhelming majority of the associations have been founded since the 1990s (93 per cent), a pattern that can be explained by the growing population at different time scales for each of the communities in question (Angolans, in the early part of the 1990s; Brazilians, a first phase before 1997 and a second phase after; and the Eastern Europeans since 2000). Also important has been the increasing political awareness given by the host society to immigration issues, which, in turn, has encouraged association development. Concerning the histories of the associations and their characteristics, there are particularities surrounding the creation of the associations that demand a separate analysis of each of the ethnic groups. This section aims
at tracing the histories of the association groups using specific cases to exemplify patterns. Analysis will be based on two questions: why were the associations founded, and what special circumstances motivated their creation?

6.1.1 Angolan associations

Table 6.1 shows that 85 per cent of the Angolan associations analysed for this study have been created in the last decade and a half. The oldest association, however – the Casa de Angola de Lisboa – dates back to 1971. Having existed since the period Portugal was governed by the dictatorship, the circumstances of its creation is explained by one of its current leaders in the following manner:

The association was founded back in the colonial days with the perspective of controlling the activities of Angolans in Portugal. At that time this association had some important figures as members, such as General Silveira Marques, who was governor of Angola, for example, as well as a number of other individuals who had nothing to do with the Angolan people. They were Portuguese who had been in Angola, either doing their civil or military duties, and were in the association promoting the (dictatorship) system. We cannot say, however, that all Angolans were supporters of the regime, although there were those who were just as colonially minded as the colonisers themselves. At that time, many Angolans had no other alternative and would simply 'lean on' those connected to the regime so they could get Casa de Angola (de Lisboa) off the ground and go on with other initiatives that dealt primarily with issues at home. Things then got 'cleaned up' after the 25th of April (1974) when Angolan students with left-wing ideologies, studying here in Portugal, took over Casa de Angola (de Lisboa). Various personalities tied to the Popular
Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), that had taken over power in Luanda, were members of Casa de Angola (de Lisboa), among them Agostinho Neto. Then, in 1976, a radical faction of retornados bombed the headquarters. After that the building was squatted by Capeverdean families who remained until 1996; until they were re-housed by the City of Lisbon and then the building returned to Casa de Angola (de Lisboa) in October of that year (A).3

Accordingly, during the 1970s, the Casa de Angola de Lisboa went from being an organisation controlled by the Portuguese dictatorship, in the first half of the decade, to an MPLA support organisation, after the 25th of April Revolution.4 Casa de Angola de Lisboa remained the only recognised Angolan association in Portugal until 1986. That year a number of Angolan university students founded the União de Estudantes Angolanos,5 which changed its name in 1991 to Associação dos Estudantes Angolanos em Portugal (AEAP). At birth, just as today, the objective behind AEAP was to represent and promote the interests of Angolan students who came to study at Portuguese universities:

There was a need to create an organism completely unattached from the [Angolan] government, from political movements or any other entity whose objectives were completely against the goals of a student movement. The idea behind the movement took form in the 'voices' of the first students with studentships to come to Portugal from Angola after Independence. The protests and interests of these individuals dealt primarily with the fact that on many occasions they would go long periods of time without receiving any money from their studentships. There were demonstrations in front of the Embassy that would often last for days (A).

However, even though AEAP was based explicitly on student interests, some of its founding members had been involved in organising underground political initiatives that backed the MPLA. The roots of AEAP, or more precisely the activities of those who founded the organisation, actually date as far back as 1981 when the group started functioning as a clandestine organisation possessing transnational ties to other Angolan students with ties to MPLA studying in universities in the former Soviet Union.

Up until the end of the 1980s, the existing Angolan associations were considered elitist movements, made up primarily of the mixed-race intelligentsia originating from Luanda, often tied to the MPLA and possessing links to the Portuguese Communist Party. Heading into the 1990s, however, this pattern was to change as the new decade would bring with
it a wave of Angolan associations that concentrated their activities on the integration of poor Angolan refugees and immigrants, living in shanty-town neighbourhoods and in other forms of illegal residence. The 1990s thus brought about a new era of associations as political lobby groups, focusing their attentions on bettering immigrant policy in order to benefit the Angolan community in Portugal. This decade accounts for the creation of half of the Angolan associations analysed in this study.

The creation of the Coordinating Secretariat for Legalisation Action (SCAL) at the start of the 1990s also permitted the associations to become partners of the state for the first time (see Chapter 4). This, in turn, brought about more visibility for a number of Angolan associations (and immigrant associations in general) that had been informally working in the field. Associations such as Associação de Solidariedade Angolana em Portugal (ASAP), Associação de Defesa dos Angolanos (ADA), Associação Amigos da Mulher Angolana (AAMA), Associação de Coordenação e Integração dos Migrantes Angolanos (ACIMA), União da Juventude Angolana em Portugal (UJAP), among others, were formed during this period and became partners in SCAL. Regularisation, integration, citizenship rights and housing became the primary concern of this new batch of associations that began to function as representative organisms of local Angolan or PALOP communities living in specific municipalities or neighbourhoods. The association UJAP is an example of such a movement. UJAP was started by individuals who were a part of the Angolan migration wave to Portugal (most of whom were war refugees) in the latter half of the 1980s and the early 1990s. With very few resources, many of these families ended up finding residence in the peripheral areas of Lisbon, in neighbourhoods primarily inhabited by Cape-verdeans. The neighbourhood of Alto da Cova da Moura in Amadora was one of those neighbourhoods, and is also where UJAP was founded. The history of this organisation is dominated, above all, by struggles in the housing sector as the association’s representative explains:

There was this group of Angolans that arrived as refugees at the end of the 1980s and settled in the neighbourhood of Alto da Cova da Moura. Basically we could rent rooms there cheaply from the Cape-verdeans. These Angolans started an association called Núcleo de Angolanos da Cova da Moura. There were about 50 people at that time. In the early part of the 1990s, with the constitution of the re-housing programmes that were being implemented nationally, since the Angolans of Alto da Cova da Moura were renters, when the Municipality of Amadora started doing the survey of who could be re-housed and who couldn’t, we were left out because only those with home ownership had the right to get re-housed. We tried to work things out with Amadora City Hall but there was no consensus (A).\textsuperscript{6}
Forced to move out of Alto da Cova da Moura, the families squatted in unfinished and abandoned buildings located in Quinta do Mocho in the municipality of Loures.

At the time, four of the twelve lots were unoccupied and we occupied them. From there we started our battle with another City Hall – the City of Loures. They had also done a survey of how many people were residing there at the time which was around 1,500 people, over 400 families. We were 50 people and so we started battling to get registered in their re-housing projects. There were times when certain political figures and institutions threatened to kick us out and we started making contacts with anti-racist movements, the Angolan embassy and churches to help us with our cause. We were paying our taxes, our children were going to local schools – yet we were being excluded, and as time kept passing, the number of people moving to the neighbourhood kept growing and eventually doubling in size. We kept pointing out to Loures City Council that while they were dragging out this process, other consequences were going to have to be dealt with such as the growing number of people. So finally one day in 1997, the City of Loures along with National Housing Institute decided to meet with the associations here in the neighbourhood in order to resolve the situation. We, as residents, had nothing at the time – no water, no electricity – just a roof over our heads. So we presented our initiatives in front of the Republican Assembly in Parliament asking that a new survey be done to include all the new residents and that a special and specific PER for Quinta do Mocho be created since we were not living in shacks but unfinished buildings. When we finally came to a consensus there were over 3000 people included in the new survey (A).7

Beyond the newly acquired attention given to integration issues during the 1990s, however, the Civil War that continued to ravish Angola remained central to the associations and their activities. Many of the associations, in fact, took on double functions, concerning themselves with Angolans in Portugal and Angolans ‘at home’. The Associação Amigos da Mulher Angolana (AAMA) was one of them. In 1991 a group of Angolan and Portuguese women – sensitive to the hardships being brought by the war, primarily to Angolan women, many of whom had lost children, husbands and fathers – started this association:

... the original objective was to gather support and donations so we could send supplies back to Angola, to help the people there and to shed light on the war with the aim of somehow contributing to a peace resolution. AAMA did various campaigns and activities to gath-
er goods and set up key partnerships with the Red Cross and the Child Support Institute with the aim of setting up aid and getting resources out to Angola. We then found out that the donations we were providing weren’t getting to the people they were meant for, which was happening with other organisations as well, so we altered our target population and started concentrating on immigrants and refugees with difficulties here in Portugal, distributing food and medication mainly (A).

Similarly, the association ASAP also took on this double role, supporting and providing Angolan street children with supplies, while at the same time carrying out activities aimed at integrating Angolan youth in Portugal. In fact, with the settling of Angolans in shantytown and re-housing neighbourhoods during the 1990s, the offspring of immigrants and refugees living in these neighbourhoods became a priority area for the associations. I here take the examples of the associations Associação Apoio Sem Limites (ASLI) and Associação dos Residentes Angolanos no Concelho de Odivelas (ARACODI), both of which were originally founded to assist the integration of second-generation youth. First, in the words of the founder and president of ASLI:

The association was started in 1993 due to the social problems that existed with the residents and the youth population of Quinta Grande. We had a lot of children being neglected in schools mainly due to their own behaviour. These were children being brought up in bad homes, in poverty, who were left abandoned by their parents and were not being properly guided in school. I started analysing this situation at that time and decided to call the schools and they told me the problems they were having integrating these youth. From there I contacted the parents of these children and asked for their permission to take care of them and follow them in their schooling. I analysed their lives, their worlds, and noticed that they were very limited; they had no activities that could contribute to their educational growth. So I started organising events. I would take them to the beach, museums and other fieldtrips, etc... Slowly they started doing better in school; their outlooks became different, and the schools started noticing these differences as well. Then the local Parish called me to talk about the work I was doing with the youth. They were aware of the positive results of the work that was taking place so they offered me access to one of their vehicles and provided me with a substantial amount of money to continue with the activities. From there I spoke with some colleagues to see if there was any interest in starting an institution and so we started an association called FRAC Africana. Our first goal after that was to get the children legalised and
Similarly, the leader and co-founder of ARACODI recounts the story of this organisation in the following manner:

In the early ’90s we started noticing that a lot of the youth in the neighbourhood [Arroja] had nothing to do and that delinquency was on the rise. Also we noticed the way they were being treated, having no proper identity, being discriminated against by society, in school, and so, from there, we started talking to them and decided to start an association working towards creating activities for them. We went and talked to the Parish and told them of the idea and from there the first activities were developed for children aged eight to fifteen; to get them involved in sports activities. For the first three years our only activities were sports, and during that period, we started noticing a difference with the youth population. More and more kept showing up and then Portuguese children started showing up and then gypsy children started coming and all of a sudden we had these multicultural sports teams. From there we started dance groups and other cultural activities and we started assisting the first generation with legalisation and other legal matters, but the children have continued to be the primary concern (A).

Although the 1990s was the pivotal decade in the creation of Angolan associations, 36 per cent of the associations identified were founded after the year 2000. In the current decade, associations of Angolan origin have surged in locations with significant Angolan representation where no collective representation had previously existed (i.e. Associação Kamba in Seixal, Associação Quizomba in Sintra and Associação N’Angola in Porto). These associations now combine two different activity streams: on one hand there is the well-being and integration of community members; on the other the promotion of Angolan cultural activities.

However, as in the previous decade, the objective of reaching out to and assisting those in the peripheral re-housing and shantytown neighbourhoods is still of primary importance. This has led the oldest of the Angolan associations, Casa de Angola de Lisboa, to enter its third phase, the social solidarity phase (after having gone through a political and then a cultural-elite phase during the 1970s, and 1980s and 1990s, respectively). As the spokesperson of this association highlights:

Although Casa de Angola [de Lisboa] is the oldest institution of its kind, we are at an embryonic stage when it comes to our proximity
to the community. This is due to the fact that we haven’t been geographically close to the people, which, in turn, hasn’t created an intimacy between us. By opening up delegations we can begin that proximity. It’s not a matter of coincidence that our first affiliate was set up in [the neighbourhood of] Quinta da Fonte, and that we’re concluding the setup of a second, with the help of Moita City Hall, in [the neighbourhood of] Vale de Amoreira. These are neighbourhoods with large concentrations of Angolans and it is important to be close to our people. From there we can then start helping in resolving social issues, economic issues, and every other kind of issue (A).

Lastly, worth mentioning is the re-creation of the Federation of Angolan Associations in Portugal (Federação das Associações Angolanas em Portugal). Originally founded in 1997 but ceasing to exist shortly after, the Federation was revived in 2004. It currently coordinates the work of 32 associations. Its primary goal is to pool resources and the creation of networks in order to permit exchanges at various levels.

6.1.2. Brazilian associations

The founding of Brazilian organisations in Portugal runs parallel to the immigration patterns of the Brazilian population itself. The first wave of associations founded before 1997 were either professional or cultural organisations that aimed their activities at an elite, basically the population that characterised Brazilian immigration up to that period.9 Of the eighteen associations identified for this study, eight were founded prior to 2000 with the other ten created after.

The first Brazilian association, the Clube de Empresários do Brasil (CEB), was founded in 1989 by Portuguese-Brazilian businessmen. This was a businessmen’s club with the goal of creating bilateral relations of an economic nature between the two countries. Formed around the Luso-Brazilian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (Câmara de Comércio e Indústria Luso-Brasileira),10 the circumstances of the club’s creation were as follows:

Those who were already members of the Câmara de Comércio [e Indústria Luso-Brasileira] were invited to become members of the Clube de Empresários do Brasil. The duties of the Câmara de Comércio are to support companies, to provide information and help set up businesses. The Clube de Empresários do Brasil is different in the sense that it was set up to promote relations between its members. We set up communication forums and networking opportunities among the Luso-Brazilian business community (B).11
Primarily made up of managers and professionals linked to transnational companies as well as self-employed businessmen, the Clube de Empresários do Brasil thus caters to the capitalist class among the Brazilian and Portuguese communities in Portugal.\textsuperscript{12}

One year after the creation of the Clube de Empresários do Brasil, another class of professionals – Brazilian dentists – set up their own organisation which they named Associação Brasileira de Odontologia – secção Portugal, today known as Associação Luso-Brasileira de Saúde Oral. This association came about as a result of the dispute concerning Brazilian dentists in Portugal at that time.\textsuperscript{13} As explained by the association’s current leader:

\begin{quote}
In 1990 the association was started to provide support for Brazilian dentists who couldn’t work in Portugal at the time. The reality was that since a lot of Brazilian dentists were coming to Portugal, the Portuguese Medical Dentistry Association didn’t want to legalise us. We were creating competition. In the 1990s our association was a very strong united front since as we were all dependent on the Accord, on getting the legal documents; we were all fighting the same cause. Unfortunately as soon as the dentists were given recognition and allowed to practice freely, almost everyone lost interest in the association (B).
\end{quote}

Today the association remains, although without any major cause or battle to fight. Having changed its name, objectives and aims, it now concentrates its activities on holding seminars, bringing specialised professors and professionals from Brazil to give training courses, as well as going to rural and impoverished areas with an equipped vehicle with the aim of providing dental services for those who are unable to afford them.

Beyond the creation of these elitist organisations, the year 1992 saw the founding of what would become the first generalist Brazilian association which, till this day, remains the organisational reference-point of the Brazilian community in Portugal – Casa do Brasil de Lisboa (CBL). CBL grew out of a meeting between two groups of friends: one group belonging to Núcleo PT (Partido dos Trabalhadores) de Lisboa (Brazilian Worker’s Party) who had been meeting regularly since 1988 in order to organise a campaign at the Lisbon embassy to get Lula da Silva (PT’s presidential candidate in the 1988 elections and current President of Brazil) elected;\textsuperscript{14} and another group who used to get together for the sake of comradely friendship. That first year CBL started publishing its monthly newspaper Sabiá and organised various well-attended Brazilian themed festivities. Over time, however, CBL has had to change its objectives according to community needs and concerns:
We’ve had to increase our social and political intervention in the fight for equal rights while other aspects such as culture have been set aside. Until we resolve the political issues, until all immigrants are given equal rights as citizens in this country, we can’t be worrying about anything else. The work of the association has become a hard struggle in the last few years because we’ve had to dedicate ourselves a lot more to the serious social and political problems, due to the population having increased and the laws not favouring immigrants. The association has had to become a louder voice in the struggles of the people it represents. I’ve been in the spotlight a lot more, the media searches us out, everybody wants to get our opinions. We are after all the biggest form of representation of the Brazilian community in Portuguese society (B).

CBL would become a highly politicised organisation and ‘the voice’ of the Brazilian community on various fronts. For example, it helped to legalise thousands of undocumented Brazilians during the two legalisation processes (1992/1993; 1996). As well, it would become the Brazilian community’s representative in COCAI and in the Lisbon City Hall’s Municipal Council of Immigrant and Ethnic Minority Communities, positions still held to this day. More recently, CBL was the primary lobby group in getting a special legalisation processes for its community, leading to the creation of Reciprocal Contract of Nationals (Contratação Recíproca de Nacionais), better known as the Lula Accord.15

No other Brazilian association working in the fields of integration, equal rights and social solidarity was created during the 1990s. However, other collective organisations centring their activities primarily on culture and sports were created. Such is the case of Torcida Brasil. Founded on the day Brazil beat Italy in the final of the 1994 Football World Cup, this organisation does not go beyond being a supporters club of Brazilian national sports teams and athletes. Similarly, capoeira martial arts started growing in popularity in Portugal throughout the 1990s. One capoeira association worth highlighting is Abadá – Associação Brasileira de Apoio e Desenvolvimento à Arte Capoeira, created in 1999.16 Besides preaching the philosophies of capoeira to its participants, it is also the goal of this association to show Portuguese society and all the communities this fundamental piece of Brazilian culture and to explain all the social aspects involved in the art of capoeira.

With the coming of the second Brazilian wave of immigrants (post-1997), new movements started sprouting up in new locations where Brazilians were now beginning to concentrate, to help with issues of integration and equal rights. In the LMA, three new movements were created: first, to support the ever-growing Brazilian population on the Lisbon Metropolitan Area’s south bank, the Associação Brasileira de Por-
tugal was started in Seixal; second, to cater to the heavy representation of Brazilians in the parish of Ericeira in the municipality of Mafra, SOLIM created an important delegation to serve this population; thirdly, the City of Setúbal, another area of heavy concentration, saw the creation of Grupo Brasil. Beyond these organisations in the LMA, 2004 also saw the creation of two Brazilian associations (Associação Mais Brasil and Associação de Apoio à Cidadania Lusófona (AACILUS)) after several failed attempts at organising the community in Porto.

There was this association called Movimento Brasil but it never took off. Part of the members of Movimento Brasil then formed Associação Amigos do Brasil but because of ideological differences, that association didn’t last long either. Some wanted an elitist organisation for doctors, dentists, engineers and people with degrees, while the other half wanted the association to be for everyone. Those who wanted the association to be for everyone then broke away and formed Associação Mais Brasil. We decided to start Mais Brasil on the day Lula was elected president when we were at the consulate office voting (B).

AACILUS, on the other hand, grew out of the Brazilian university students’ association Associação de Cidadãos Brasileiros na Universidade do Porto (BRASUP). As the president of AACILUS states:

BRASUP is an association for Brazilian students attending the University of Porto. It is very specific. We were interested in catering to the other non-student sector which is even larger. The idea was also to create an association that attended not only to Brazilians but to the ‘Lusophone world’ in general. That’s why we started AACILUS (B).

Meanwhile, in the southern Portuguese region of the Algarve, a group of Brazilians, tied to the Evangelical Church, noting the ever-growing social imbalances and deprivation taking place primarily in the parish of Quarteira in the municipality of Loulé, decided to organise themselves with the goal of providing social assistance to the needy. The association Pe-niel – Associação de Assistência Social was thus born in 2002. As this association’s president explains:

Under the guidance of our [evangelical] church here in Quarteira we first started providing assistance to children and adults in precarious situations in 1999. Through the church we started a daycare centre but we were advised to bring it to an end and to separate ourselves from the church in order to become an IPSS (Private Institution of Social Solidarity); this for financial reasons. So we separated every-
thing and created an association, and from there we began to grow with more and more members being added and more and more people searching out our services – 80 per cent of whom are immigrants, 60 per cent Brazilian immigrants (B).

Beyond the founding of these social assistance and welfare associations, the start of the new millennium also witnessed the phenomenon of Brazilian student associations. Brazilian students at the University of Aveiro were the first to organise themselves in 2001 with the creation of the Associação Brasileira da Universidade de Aveiro (ABRUNA), followed by Brazilians as the University of Porto one year later (BRASUP) and lastly, the University of Coimbra (Associação de Pesquisadores e Estudantes Brasileiros em Coimbra – ABEP Coimbra) in 2004. These student movements formed an umbrella organisation in 2004 known as Movimento das Associações de Pesquisadores e Estudantes Brasileiros em Portugal (MEBRAP) under the coordination of BRASUP. As BRASUP’s president and head coordinator of MEBRAP explains:

There were these three associations that deal with the same issues, the same type of people. [...] It was only natural that we create this forum for discussion and start working together and organising common events (B).

To conclude this historical review of Brazilian associations in Portugal, I wish to highlight the feminisation of Brazilian movements in Portugal. In 2002 a group of nine women joined forces and formed the association Carinho Brasileiro with one single objective in mind: to help Brazilian female prisoners in Portugal. For these women, however, Carinho Brasileiro was not the first associative experience. Many had belonged to another Brazilian women’s organisation called Grupo das Amigas do Brasil. The story goes as follows:

The former president of the Grupo das Amigas do Brasil (wife of the former Brazilian ambassador in Portugal) went to visit Tires Correctional Centre (a female prison located in the municipality of Cascais) and when she was there, she was surprised by the large number of Brazilian female prisoners there. After that visit, she approached some of us in the Grupo das Amigas do Brasil and we started working with the association Dar a Mão a Portuguese association that works with female prisoners in general. Grupo das Amigas do Brasil came to an end when the association’s president moved back to Brazil but the rest of us continued on. From there we thought it would be better to create this association to work with the Brazilian inmates exclusively (B).
From the review of the Brazilian associations in Portugal, it can be concluded that many are specific in nature when it comes to their activities and people catered to. But there has also been one strong association that has been the associative backbone of the Brazilian community in Portugal.

6.1.3 Eastern European associations

Of the three association groups in question, the Eastern European is the most recent phenomenon (parallel to the fact that Eastern European immigration is also new in the Portuguese context). Of the 21 associations interviewed, all were created in the current decade. The first two associations, created in 2000, were the Romanian association Associação Cultural dos Romenos Mircea Eliade and the now-defunct Associação Soyuz. Compared to other immigration flows from the former Soviet states, the Romanian community had started its flow a few years previously. Leaning strongly on the Romanian Orthodox faith, the Romanian community started lobbying the Romanian embassy in Lisbon to provide them with a priest. Having been granted that wish in 1999, members of the church along with the priest decided that the next step would be the creation of an association. Associação Cultural dos Romenos Mircea Eliade was thus born. In the words of the association’s president:

We acquired a church from the Catholic Church of Portugal and our church serves as the main point of attraction for the community to meet. We set up the association with the church; the association office is upstairs and everything. The association worked well in the first couple of years, but after that the priest took over. The association now only works in special situations, when special events come up or if certain situations arise. We’ll put the associations’ name forward in those situations. In other situations, our priest works with the community on all kinds of matters from legalisation to bureaucratic matters. The association is losing its reason for being in many ways, and that is why we are not as active as we once were (EE).

In relation to Associação Soyuz, although this association would be dismantled a few years later with accusations of ties to illegal activities, it nevertheless did serve as the ‘mother-association’ for other Eastern European associations to come (Pires n.d.).

In 2001, problems associated with immigrants coming from the former Eastern block started taking on new dimensions. Many immigrants had made their way to Portugal in an unregulated fashion, many through smuggling schemes, not knowing what they would find in Por-
not knowing the laws of the host country nor their citizenship rights, and worse still, many would remain in the hands of the traffickers that brought them into the country. That same year, in order to address the existence of numerous foreigners in an irregular situation (many of Eastern European origin), Portugal introduced the *permanência* authorisation scheme permitting many undocumented labour migrants to regularise themselves.

In order to assist immigrants with these issues, the first two years after the introduction of *permanência* authorisations (2001-2002) saw the creation of a number of associations such as Respublika, Associação dos Imigrantes do Leste Europeu, Movimento de Imigrantes Bereg, Associação Romena e Povos Amigos, Edinstvo and SOLIM, all established in the LMA, together with Associação Apoio ao Imigrante – São Bernardo in Aveiro, Casa do Leste and the now-defunct Associação Drujba in Braga and, lastly, the Associação Tavirense de Apoio ao Imigrante in the city of Tavira. The president of Respublika recounts what was occurring with Eastern European immigrants in Portugal that led to the creation of her association:

> I would travel the country and see a lot of Eastern European immigrants in every corner and I would come across situations of Russians and Ukrainians exploiting other Eastern European immigrants and Eastern European immigrants exploited by their Portuguese bosses. Exploitation occurs when there’s no information, when people are scared. People are cheated when there’s no information. So we started the association to provide information to our people, to provide them with strength and support to help avoid this exploitation. The exploitation was happening because the people didn’t know the rules, the laws, the language, and by providing information and letting them know the channels, the services, the laws, by teaching them Portuguese – we could combat the mafias and the exploiters and people could start building their own lives (EE).

Work issues also became a key focus of these associations with many taking on the task of combating labour exploitation and other labour-related issues. As the leader of the association Associação Tavirense de Apoio ao Imigrante recalls:

> The association was founded to help integrate and fight for the equal rights of immigrants in the labour market. Here in Tavira we have a large Bulgarian population and when a couple of them died on the construction site, no one took responsibility; there was no money to send the bodies back to Bulgaria. So we had to do something about it and that’s how everything got started (EE).
Beyond the common objectives shared by the associations, however, some associations are worth highlighting for other motives that led to their foundation. The Associação Romena e Povos Amigos was established to combat a housing issue. In the words of this association’s leader:

The Centre de Acolhimento Poço do Bispo [Poço do Bispo Homeless Shelter] is home to a lot of Romanians and the City of Lisbon wanted to close it down back in 2001. The Associação Romena e Povos Amigos was founded to fight this decision. What would become of us? Where would we go? The City had no answers to these questions. After we formed the association, we then started to work on legalising the residents of the Centre. Some had work problems, their bosses didn’t pay them, so the association also served to help resolve these situations (EE).

While the first two years after the introduction of the permanência authorisations saw the founding of associations primarily created for the purpose of addressing immigration issues and problems, the associations created after 2003 brought with them new objectives, primarily aimed at integration, political mobilisation and cultural preservation. Moreover, many existing associations also started broadening their scope of intervention into these fields of action. As one interviewee explains:

After regularisation, after settling down, after learning the basics of the Portuguese language and the systems of this country, we started pushing for other things such as equal rights. At the same time, the people started feeling that they were missing aspects of their social and cultural lives that they had in their homeland, so things started changing in order to accommodate these sentiments (EE).

Many qualified workers who were fulfilling unqualified labour-market positions were taking their first steps towards having their qualifications recognised by the host society. Family reunification started to take place, and with this, concern around the children of immigrants started growing. The children of immigrants thus became a driving force behind the creation of a number of associations whose primary objective was the establishment of a school for the immigrant descendents. Associação CAPELA – Centro de Apoio à População Emigrante de Leste e Amigos, an association created by teachers and parents, and Associação Sodrújestvo – Centro de Apoio às Crianças Russófonas e aos seus Pais, a breakaway association of Respublika whose members wanted to set up an association aimed at supporting parents and children, are examples.
With the legalisation and immigration issues behind them, the first cultural associations also began to appear. Centro Cultural Moldavo is an example of such a movement:

We needed an organisation to help preserve our traditions and carry them on. There are now children who are born here and don’t know Moldova and aren’t in contact with our culture, and that is the main reason why the Cultural Centre was started – to display and celebrate our culture and help keep it alive among our people. This is how we help our community to integrate by making our culture part of the landscape of this country. It’s a way of bringing down borders – by sharing (EE).

A second example is the Casa da Língua e Cultura Russa. Created by individuals tied to, or who had helped create the associations Respublika, Edinstvo and Associação Apoio ao Imigrante – São Bernardo in Aveiro, this organisation was established for the purpose of what one of its co-founders refers to as: ‘…supporting each other morally and intellectually’ (EE). Conceived as an idea to bring together various organisations of the former Soviet states, its creation is explained in the following manner:

The idea behind Casa da Língua e Cultura Russa is to create relations and exchanges, to coordinate the work of the various schools – language, dance, music, etc. – that exist throughout the country, and provide the possibility for the associations to create ties with Russia and with homeland institutions. Second, the reality is that the Portuguese don’t know our countries. People say our culture is rich, the literature is rich, the history is rich, but they know nothing more. We have a lot of people here who are tied to theatre, music, dance, literature who can help display our culture for the Portuguese. Third, we want to open-up Portugal to our immigrant population. We want to provide them with opportunities to learn about Portuguese history and culture, we want to organise outings and excursions to museums and to historical locations. For those who are going to stay here it is important that they like the country, otherwise life will be a sacrifice. It is better that they learn about the place where they live (EE).

The Casa da Língua e Cultura Russa now shows the first signs of an elitist movement, claiming that it is their intention to set up a business club with the goal of developing relations between Portugal and Russia.

The Orthodox churches also became a uniting factor for a great number of Eastern European immigrants in Portugal. The Associação Cristã Ortodoxa de Aveiro, for example, came together as a result of individuals
congregating around their faith. The association is a religious association, having as its primary goal the manifestation of the Orthodox faith in Portugal, providing the immigrant communities with opportunities to practice their faith, as well as providing them with spiritual guidance.

Additionally, the Associação dos Ucranianos em Portugal also came together through the Greco-Roman Orthodox Church in Portugal:

The association was started in Fatima during a religious gathering for our community. Some of the individuals [who started this association] had been in other countries where there are big Ukrainian communities, such as Canada, and they started discussing building a Ukrainian association for the community here. We have a church in Fatima and our priest there said there would be no problem in having our first meeting there. We organised around our church. A lot of people wanted this association because we didn’t want to lose our history, our traditions, our culture and our religion (EE).

Beyond its strong ties to the Greco-Roman Orthodox Church, political activism in the country of origin has also been a major area of concentration with the association having carried out a major mobilisation campaign, first to set up a voting station in Lisbon, and second, in helping to get current Ukrainian president Viktor Yushenko elected during the 2004 Ukrainian presidential elections.

Lastly, in ending this section, while Eastern European associations have developed at a steady pace and while aims and objectives have been modified in the associations’ short histories, it is also important to highlight one particularity in relation to Eastern European associations. In comparison to the Angolan and Brazilian movements, the great majority of which have been set up by individuals of the respective nationality,19 six of the 21 Eastern European associations are under the guidance of both Portuguese and foreign nationals, while an additional two have been established by Portuguese individuals.20 A partial explanation relates to what Raymond Breton (1991) terms ‘social demand’. This means that individuals in certain positions will utilise their strengths to set up an institution that can be seen as not only bringing benefits to the group it represents, but also to those in power as well. This phenomenon can be explained by the fact that Portuguese individuals in these positions possess the administrative and political knowledge that newcomers do not, as well as the fact that they can ‘provide a voice’ for the community given their Portuguese fluency, something newcomers will need time to adapt. At the same time, their investment in such a scheme can also bring them personal benefits, in terms of economic resources, status, etc.
6.2 Organisational structures, membership and the populations served

From the histories of the associations discussed, one pattern that is common to the majority is that they had existed and carried out activities before becoming legally recognised institutions. Presently, the majority of the associations interviewed possess legal constitutional statuses published in the *Diário da República* (DR)*21* where their ambit of activities and areas of intervention are outlined. The legal nature of the majority of the legally constituted organisations falls under the orienting guidelines of the Legal Regime of Immigrant Associations. Constitutionally, the majority of the associations possess similarly defined general objectives including protecting the rights and interests of immigrants, contributing towards integration and community well-being, and promoting cultural expressions and exchanges.*22* Specific objectives are outlined in the case of associations with specific goals or target populations. Although the majority of associations are legally constituted as non-profit organisations, independent of government, political party, ideology or religious faith, there are a few exceptions (religious associations, political party nuclei).

As Table 6.2 points out, 96 per cent of the Angolan associations, 83 per cent of the Brazilian and all of the Eastern European organisations are constitutionally recognised. Concerning the Angolan and Brazilian organisations with no legal recognition, while the Brazilian movements Associação Carinho Brasileiro and Grupo Brasil were in the process of formulating a legal constitution at the time of the interviews, the Brazilian organisation Torcida Brasil and the Angolan association ANGOCORO expressed the view that there was no need for legal frameworks, given that the organisation was internet-based, in the case of the former, and that legal recognition was not of primary importance in order for the association to carry out its initiatives, in the case of the latter.

In relation to the legal recognition of the associations under the ACIME framework, as also highlighted in Table 6.2, half of the Angolan associations possess this status, as do 43 per cent of the Eastern European organisations, and 22 per cent of the Brazilian associations. Additionally, two Angolan associations (Associação Apoio Sem Limites, Associação Luso-Africana dos Metodistas no Porto), one Brazilian (Associação Pineal – Associação de Assistência Social) and one Eastern European (Associação Tavirense de Apoio ao Imigrante) pointed out their positions as an IPSS, with one Angolan (PROSAUDESC) and two Eastern European (Casa do Leste – Associação de Solidaridade Social and Associação Apoio ao Imigrante – São Bernardo) waiting to be granted this status. Lastly, two Angolan associations reported being recognised
In order to ascertain the size of the associations interviewed, representatives were asked to estimate total membership. In grouping the associations according to membership composition, I employ the membership size criterion used to define the territorial ambit of immigrant associations according to ACIME. An association must have a minimum of 100 members in order to be registered as a local association, 500 to be recognised as a regional association and 1,000 to be recognised as a national association.

Figure 6.1 shows that most associations have 100 to 499 members, implying that the majority are to be considered local organisations. Also noteworthy is the fact that one association from each of the three groups reported not having a membership base as of yet, due to the embryonic stage they find themselves at (Associação N’Angola, Grupo Brasil and Associação Casa da Língua e Cultura Russas). Additionally, in the cases of Associação ANGOCORO, Federação de Associações Angolanas e Amigos de Angola, MEBRAP and Fundação Luso-Brasileira, these organisations did not report membership numbers due to the fact that they do not possess a membership strategy, and therefore have no records.

In analysing the associations which did provide membership numbers, the composition of Angolan associations ranged from 35 individuals (Associação de Defesa dos Direitos das Famílias Angolanas (ADDIFA)) to 3,000 members (AEAP) with the average number of members per association being 399 individuals. The Brazilian associations showed the largest range of difference (Associação Carinho Brasileiro with 9 members and Torcida Brasil with 7,800 members). The average per Brazilian association was 795. This number, however, is misleading due to the fact that Torcida Brazil defines its members as those who sign up through their website. If the 7,800 members of Torcida Brazil are not taken into account, the next largest membership was CBL with 2,000.

Table 6.2  Legal constitutional status of the associations and other forms of recognition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legal constitutional status and recognition</th>
<th>Angolan</th>
<th>Brazilian</th>
<th>Eastern European</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legally registered (DR)</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recognised by ACIME</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPSS (Private Institution of Social Solidarity)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s own compilation

NGOs (Casa de Angola de Coimbra and Associação Tratado de Simulambuco – Casa de Cabinda).

In order to ascertain the size of the associations interviewed, representatives were asked to estimate total membership. In grouping the associations according to membership composition, I employ the membership size criterion used to define the territorial ambit of immigrant associations according to ACIME. An association must have a minimum of 100 members in order to be registered as a local association, 500 to be recognised as a regional association and 1,000 to be recognised as a national association.

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The average then drops to 383. In relation to the Eastern European associations, the organisation SOLIM possessed the highest number of Eastern European immigrant members – approximately 5,000. In this case, the average number of members per Eastern European association was 795 individuals. Again, if SOLIM is taken from the list, the next association is Associação de Apoio ao Imigrante – São Bernardo with 2,000. This reduces the average number per association to 407 members.

Figure 6.1  Membership composition of the associations

The membership compositions presented by the associations tend to reflect the different objectives and activities carried out by them. Those which are the most dynamic in their activities – that offer a greater variety of services – tend to have greater membership numbers than those organisations that aim to satisfy a certain community niche. Many of the associations that provide social services provide them on the condition that the client takes up membership, thus the high membership number frequently reflects one-time users of the association who became members in order to receive the service. In fact, a common concern among a number of association leaders is that immigrants often possess a utilitarian outlook towards the work of the association, only seeking them out when they have issues that need resolving, but playing no part when it comes to the workings of the organisation. Lack of participation in immigrant associations is, however, not new, for as Ireland (1994: 277) points out, immigrant associations seldom represent more then 10 per cent of the immigrants.

Additionally, in relation to associations tied to specific neighbourhoods, although they might possess a membership base, many will fre-
quently consider all residents of the neighbourhood in which they operate as their constituency. Some Angolan neighbourhood associations employ this criterion.

Beyond the size of the associations, it was also important to identify the people the associations cater to. What particular ethnic groups are the activities aimed at or do the associations represent? In observing Table 6.3, the Brazilians stand out for having the highest percentage of associations (67 per cent) that cater exclusively to their own community, with the other one-third of the organisations representing either Brazilians and Portuguese alike, Brazilian and PALOP community members, immigrant communities in general or all members of society as a whole.

### Table 6.3 Groups of people catered to by the associations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Groups</th>
<th>Angolan</th>
<th>Brazilian</th>
<th>Eastern European</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angolan community</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PALOP community</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PALOP and Portuguese communities</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabinda region community</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Backongo region community</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighbourhood residents</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazilian community</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazilian and Portuguese community</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazilian and PALOP communities</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern European communities</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romanians</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainians</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russians</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldovans</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romanians and Moldovans</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants in general</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All citizens</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>28</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Author’s own compilation*

In contrast, 57 per cent of the Eastern European movements cater specifically to all individuals from that part of Europe, with 29 per cent serving the nationals of a specific Eastern European country. One association represents both Romanian and Moldovan nationals, while two others cater to immigrants in general.

There is greater diversity among Angolan associations. Half identify themselves as representatives of Angolans in general or of individuals...
who originate from the Angolan regions of Cabinda and Backongo. The other half define themselves as representatives of a wider and more diversified group of individuals, with those who serve a specific neighbourhood and its residents accounting for one-quarter of the associations, 11 per cent catering to the PALOP communities in general, and another 11 per cent serving PALOP and Portuguese communities.

Also worth highlighting is the correlation between associations founded by the immigrants themselves and the people catered to, and associations founded by Portuguese nationals and the communities these associations serve. While associations founded by immigrants are more inclined to serve those of their own nationality, those created by Portuguese nationals tend to cater to a greater diversity of ethnic groups. This is particularly the case in relation to the Eastern European organisations in Portugal (Pires n.d.). By considering itself an ‘African’ or an ‘Eastern European’ association, the organisation is affirming itself as serving no single nationality, but instead defines a larger population niche.

It is, therefore, often made clear, through the name of an association, just who the clientele is. In fact, most often then not, it is the name of an association that provides the first sign of an identity reference. These may be broad, such as the pan-ethnic labels of ‘Eastern European’ or ‘African’ associations, or more specific, as is the case with regional associations. While an association that confines itself to a specific regional population also confines itself to a specified shared identity, an association that labels itself in a broad fashion, sets itself up for a restructuring of national identities in the new immigration context, given that it is poised to amalgamate the various ethno-cultural identities it deals with. Considering this latter scenario, it is important to contemplate why do associations label themselves in such a broad manner, and how they cope with the streamlining of identities? The Eastern European and Angolan interviewees (representing of the two groups in which more then 50 per cent of the associations cater to a larger variety of ethnic groups) highlighted a number of key overarching factors: the Russian language, the fact that they came former Soviet states and common integration difficulties, in the case of Eastern Europeans; racial factors, the fact that the majority come from the former Portuguese colonies as well as, once again, common integration difficulties, in the case of Angolans. What is evident is that ethno-cultural identities become secondary to certain commonalities and shared issues. This, in turn, serves to elucidate the restructuring of national identities in the new immigration context.

Associations are created in a specific time/space compendium, driven by specific aims, objectives and concerns. What shapes the associations today may not be what shapes them in the future. While, presently, national bonding may not be the exclusive binding feature of the associations, this may become the scenario after certain integration-oriented
objectives are accomplished. Still other associations may simply cease to exist after realising their goals. The changes in identity references of the associations, as if the sole regard of the immigration groups constituted the associations as such from the very beginning, deeply restructuring previous differently articulated references, may be considered temporary – while other current (integration) matters force identity related issues to take on secondary position.

Lastly, beyond the internal motives and interests, external factors may also influence the associative clustering of people of different nationalities. As various authors point out (Ireland 1994; Soysal 1994; Danese 2001), the grouping of immigrants may be influenced by the available resources and policies set out by the governments of the host country that may promulgate strategies with the intent of ‘having a say’ in the lives of the immigrant association movements. It is of the association’s best interest, therefore, to generalise their membership base, given that this will permit greater proximity to the powers-that-be.

6.3 Scope of activities and primary areas of intervention

In order to characterise the scope and nature of the associations’ activities, respondents were asked to answer yes or no to a list of twenty pre-selected activities. Additional space was provided for the interviewees to add any activities not included on the list. From the responses given, I have re-grouped the activities into eight domains: social assistance and health; neighbourhood and housing issues; youth; education and employment; culture; hobbies and leisure; immigrant ‘legalisation’ and bureaucratic matters; and home-country issues. The primary activities within these domains are listed under each domain heading. Table 6.4 illustrates these results.

Three areas are of major importance – culture; social assistance and health; and immigration, ‘legalisation’ and bureaucratic matters. Of particular importance are cultural activities as, with the exception of one Brazilian organisation, all associations carry out some sort of activity in this realm. In relation to social assistance and health, and to immigration, ‘legalisation’ and bureaucratic matters, over 60 per cent of the associations in all three nationality groups carry out activities in these two realms. However, worth highlighting are the different activities within the spheres according to group. Concerning the social assistance and health domain, for example, while the Angolan associations express greater commitment to distributing food and medical supplies, the Eastern European associations concentrate on providing medical and psychological support services. In relation to immigration, ‘legalisation’ and bureaucratic matters, while the majority of the Eastern European and
Angolan organisations provide judicial services, carry out regularisation, anti-discrimination and human rights campaigns, and provide document support, bureaucratic assistance and translation services, the ma-
jority of the Brazilian associations, on the other hand, do not fulfil all of these activity areas.

In the other domains, a number of additional contrasts are also worth stressing. For example, the majority of the associations carry out activities associated with the country of origin and/or other communities in the diaspora. Particularly important in this domain is the Angolan associations’ involvement in aid projects. Second, with over half of the Angolan associations and two-thirds of the Eastern European organisations developing initiatives in the youth-related domain, this illustrates the preoccupation of these two groups in helping to integrate their communities’ youth. Lastly, worth noting are the Eastern European associations’ commitment to education and employment support, primarily in the form of establishing Portuguese language classes.

Beyond the activities carried out, another variable is the identification of their primary area of intervention; in other words, the association type. In connecting these areas of intervention to the activities carried out, two questions arise: 1) Do associations’ activities correlate with their description? 2) Do the processes of categorisation intersect with the areas of associational intervention, or is self-description based on different criteria?

Table 6.5 classifies the associations interviewed. Before discussing this typology, it is important to mention that even though an association may describe itself as a social assistance association, this does not imply that it does not carry out activities in the cultural or political realm, or

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types</th>
<th>Angolan</th>
<th></th>
<th>Brazilian</th>
<th></th>
<th>Eastern European</th>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social assistance</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>46.4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>71.4</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>50.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>19.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sports/leisure</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business/professional</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prisoner solidarity</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s own compilation
that a youth association is not culturally based, etc. The intent, in this case, is to highlight the primary target area of each association. Keeping this in mind, 51 per cent of the organisations are defined, first and foremost, as social assistance institutions, 19 per cent as cultural associations, and the remaining 30 per cent as either student, sports and leisure, business or professional, political, development, religious, youth or other.

There are, however, significant differences among the association groups. For the Eastern European group, three types of associations are identified: social assistance, accounting for the overwhelming majority of the movements (71 per cent); cultural organisations (24 per cent), and one religious institution based on the Orthodox faith.

The Angolan associations, on the other hand, show greater diversity. The majority of are either social assistance (46 per cent) or cultural (25 per cent) organisations, with the remaining being defined as sports and leisure, university student associations, as well as youth, political solidarity, homeland development, religious and, lastly, one federation of Angolan associations.

The widest degree of distribution is found in the Brazilian group. In this case, while one-third of the associations are defined as social assistance organisations, there are also four student associations, two sports and leisure organisations, two business/professional organisations, a cultural association, a political party organisation, a development foundation and lastly an association that works exclusively with Brazilian female prisoners in Portugal.

From this observation, it can be argued that the nature and scope of the associations’ activities are, in large part, context-bound – implying that the groups’ associations are primarily a reflection of the problems, issues and characteristics of the people and the community itself. The Brazilian associations are somewhat of an exception to this rule.

In the case of the Eastern European community, given that integration is at an embryonic stage, with immigrants still learning the systems, habits, language, etc. of the host country, it is no surprise that the associations function primarily as welfare agencies combining social and integration services (legalisation, socio-economic assistance, language classes, etc.) with cultural and recreational activities.

Concerning the Angolan associations, the fact that a large number concentrate heavily on social and community care reflects the living conditions of many members of this community, especially those who reside in shantytown and re-housing neighbourhoods. Along with the social aspects, cultural and recreational activities are also of key importance.

Lastly, the target-specific Brazilian association types are due to the fact that a greater percentage of the associations cater to specific sub-popula-
tions within the community. For example, there is a greater differentia-
tion between the social classes of the organisations, with the develop-
ment of business and professional organisations catering to an elite sec-
tor of the population already well integrated into Portuguese society. It is
important to note that although Brazilians are the largest national immi-
grant community in Portugal, they do not possess the associative dy-
amics that other communities do.26 In attempting to explain this phe-
nomenon, one Brazilian leader expressed the following:

Brazilians are individualistic. They don’t want to mix and that’s the
reason why there aren’t too many associations. [...] Brazilians tend to
stick within their own group, within their network of friends. They
don’t want the world to know of their social problems; they don’t
search out that kind of visibility. Plus, Casa do Brasil [de Lisboa] is so
powerful that I think a lot of people don’t see the need for more asso-
ciations (B).

The monopolisation of social services aimed at the Brazilian community
on the part of Casa do Brasil de Lisboa, has thus left little need for other
associations to work in this sector. Other Brazilian associations that have
been created do not generally go beyond niche organisations aimed at
specific populations or activities.

6.4 Material, economic and human resources

The material, economic and human resources available to the associa-
tions are a good indicator of their capacity to deliver goods and services
to their members. This section will begin by analysing what is often a
fundamental material good of any association – a physical space, head-
quar ters or clubhouse. As shown in Table 6.6, three-quarters of the asso-
ciations possess a physical space they can call their own. The 22 per cent
of the associations that do not have a clubhouse or office space will often
meet in private residences owned by board members; the majority also
borrow or rent a space when carrying out events.

The donation of space by local municipalities is the most common
way of acquiring a physical space, except for Brazilian associations. Mu-
nicipal spaces take two different forms: 1) some associations have an
office space in city-owned office or cultural centres;27 2) others are given
a building where they can set up the association at a low-cost rental. In
analysing the three groups, 48 per cent of the Eastern European organi-
sations acquired their spaces through local city halls, in comparison to
29 per cent of the Angolan associations and 17 per cent of the Brazilians.
This is particularly interesting considering the fact that the historical
presence of Eastern European associations is much shorter than the other association groups, which have been dialoguing with local powers for longer periods of time – particularly the Angolan associations, some of which claim to have requested a space from their local municipality some time ago but have yet to hear a response.

Beyond the municipal-provided spaces, other forms of acquisition include self-funded, private rental or by private donation. With only two Angolan and two Brazilian associations claiming to having acquired their spaces though self-finance, rental has been more favoured by the Brazilian associations. Acquisition through private donation is more popular among the Eastern European associations. Through the form of private donation, this often also implies sharing with another institutions, businesses, etc.\textsuperscript{28}

In addressing the economic resources of the associations, the financial and material wealth available to each often reflect the type of association, their activity plans and recognition from the authorities. For example, in Table 6.7, the sources of finance are rather different when comparing the Angolan and Eastern European cases to the Brazilian associations. In relation to the first two, there are more associations financed by public monies, through ACIME as well as other government ministries, civil governments and local city halls and parishes. In relation to ACIME, while all associations recognised by this government institution can compete for funding through project bids, three-quarters of the Eastern European associations recognised by ACIME have been financed, as have half of the Angolan associations, but only one of the four Brazilian associations. Funding from other ministries comes in the form of accords between the specific ministry and the association which carries out activities in that realm. For example, IPSSs can receive

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of acquisition</th>
<th>Angolan</th>
<th>Brazilian</th>
<th>Eastern European</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-funded</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donated by municipality</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rented</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>22.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donated privately</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>22.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No headquarters/clubhouse</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>22.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s own compilation
monies from the Ministry of Labour and Social Solidarity, associations working in the field of health can receive funding from that ministry, etc.

Home-country governments, represented through local embassies and/or consulate offices, are other resource options. In the case of the Eastern European movements, 48 per cent of the associations have received material goods (primarily in the form of literature – i.e. schoolbooks), but very little real financing from home-country institutions.

One-quarter of the Angolan associations reported the financial and material assistance from the Lisbon embassy and the consulate office in Porto. And 17 per cent of the Brazilian bodies (all of them student associations) also have received some monetary assistance and material goods from their embassy in Lisbon or the consulate in Porto.

Outside of the government and public institution realm, many associations also obtain income from private donations, from businesses or through individual donations made by elite association members. This form of resource acquisition is more popular with the Brazilian (two-thirds of which claim to receive private donations) and the Eastern European associations (52 per cent) than with the Angolan (39 per cent). In relation to private sponsorship deals with businesses, these range from dealings with multinational corporations (e.g. Western Union, Coca-Cola, Dancake, Nestle, etc.); firms of the same origin as the association movements in question (e.g. the Angolan and Brazilian oil companies Sonangola and Petrobras, the Brazilian bank Banco do Brasil, etc.); Por-

---

Table 6.7  Sources of funding

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sources</th>
<th>Angolan N</th>
<th>Angolan %</th>
<th>Brazilian N</th>
<th>Brazilian %</th>
<th>Eastern European N</th>
<th>Eastern European %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACIME</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>28.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Various government ministries (e.g. social solidarity, education, sport, sciences and technologies, health)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil governments</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipalities and parishes</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>71.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home-country government, embassy, consulate</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>47.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU organisations and project funding schemes</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural, recreational and sports activities</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>78.6</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>72.2</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>80.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sale of goods and services</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>57.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private donations (e.g. private, business, sponsorships, elite members)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>39.3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>52.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Membership fees</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>64.3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>71.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s own compilation
tuguese nationally based companies (e.g. Banco Espírito Santo, Caixa Geral de Depósitos, etc.); as well as local businesses. Individual donations, although not as common as business sponsorships, often ‘come out of the pockets’ of board members or elite associates within the association who may have interests in the organisation.

Beyond the acquisition of resources from secondary sources, associations also attain finances through the organisation of cultural, recreational and sports activities, as well as through the sale of goods and services. Examples are festivities, dances, concerts, excursions and sports tournaments. The sale of goods and services includes profits made from bar or catering services, merchandise sales, advertising (e.g. on websites, newspapers, etc.) and, above all, through the services provided by the associations such as judicial services, consultation and representation issues (i.e. acting as intermediary on bureaucratic matters ranging from legalisation and family reunification to academic equivalency processes), translation services (especially in the case of the Eastern European associations), classes and lessons (e.g. languages, dance, etc.).

One final financial source worth highlighting is membership fees. Although this is the source that might come to mind first when it comes to economic resources, the majority of the associations point out that they cannot depend on them. This is because they are either of a symbolic nature and therefore do not turn a profit, or because members simply do not keep up with the payments. Taking first the Angolan associations, 64 per cent charge a membership fee ranging from ten to 30 euros annually, with Casa de Angola de Lisboa charging elite members 50 euros annually. Of the eighteen Brazilian organisations, half charge membership fees. The Brazilian associations, however, have the most diverse of membership schemes. For example, the university student association APEB Coimbra charges the annual donation of a book or article, preferably published by the member, as its membership fee, while the membership payment method set up by Núcleo PT is that of 1 per cent of members’ annual earnings without exceeding ten euros annually. The elitist CEB, on the other hand, has the highest fees, charging its members 150 to 250 euros annually. In relation to the Eastern European associations, fees charged by the 71 per cent of the associations that possess a membership payment scheme range from six to 30 euros. Beyond these annual charges, some associations also have sign-up fees ranging from three euros to 75 (the CEB). Finally, some of the associations have member-client schemes where fees are kept up-to-date only when a service is needed from the association.

The third indicator reflecting the capacity to deliver goods and services is human resource availability and the associations’ degree of professionalisation. Table 6.8 shows that not too many associations possess paid staff (one-third of the Brazilian associations, 29 per cent of the Eastern
Although the degree of professionalisation is relatively low among all three groups, some specific associations do possess several paid individuals. The Angolan organisations, the association ASLI stands out as having seven employees, the Brazilian association CBL pays eight staff members as does the association SOLIM, accounted for under the Eastern European and Brazilian groups.

In relation to associations’ paid staff, it is important to note that employees are in large part not the full responsibility of the associations, but are instead employed through protocol schemes with other institutions, namely ACIME (CBL, Associação Mais Brasil, Edinstvo, Associação Tavirense de Apoio ao Imigrante and SOLIM); Ministry of Labour and Social Solidarity (ADA, ASLI and Peniel – Associação de Assistência Social); Employment and Professional Training Institute (IEFP) (ADA, ASLI and SOLIM); local municipalities and parishes (Edinstvo with the Setúbal, Etnias e Imigrantes (SEI); Associação de Apoio ao Imigrante – São Bernardo with the Parish of São Bernardo); Drug Addiction Support Centre (Associação de Apoio ao Imigrante – São Bernardo); and Portuguese internet search engine solidarity programme Clix Solidário (ADA). A number of organisations, however, also have paid staff under their full responsibility, in the form of secretaries, lawyers, educators, etc.33

The low levels of professionalisation are, above all, due to the very limited financial capacity of immigrant associations to hire individuals. This leaves associations dependent on volunteer work, something that many associations claim is not readily available owing to people’s lack of free time and willingness to participate. Thus, a general call on the part of the associations is that of greater intervention, primarily on the part of host-society political institutions, demanding that more financial opportunities be available to the organisations in order to guarantee more professionalised services.35

Table 6.8  *Degree of professionalisation*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Angolan</th>
<th></th>
<th>Brazilian</th>
<th></th>
<th>Eastern</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of associations that employ paid staff (full-/part-time)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>28.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed staff, total number (all associations)</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associations with the highest number of employed staff</td>
<td>ASLI – 7</td>
<td>CBL – 8</td>
<td>SOLIM – 7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Author’s own compilation*
6.5 Organisational networks and forms of cooperation: ‘Bridging’ and ‘bonding’

In this last section, I look at the organisational networks and cooperative forms among the associations, an analysis that will permit an evaluation of the degree of social capital possessed by association leaders. Figure 6.2 shows that the organisational relationship patterns of immigrant associations exist at four levels: inter-associational relationships; relations with non-immigrant organisations; government and state institution relations; and transnational relations.

Figure 6.2 Organisational relationship patterns of immigrant associations

The associations were asked if they maintained regular collaborative relationships with either immigrant and/or non-immigrant organisations, national and/or local government institutions, or any organisation within the groups’ diaspora; and, in the case of yes, which ones. First, in relation to contacts with other immigrant associations, the great majority of the associations do indeed maintain collaborative relations both inside and outside their own ethnic group. However, many of the collaborative efforts are not initiated by the associations themselves, but are generally due to the impulse of other agents outside of the immigrant association sector. In other words, activity or project collaborations between immigrant bodies frequently occur under the coordination of projects of initiatives set forth by ACIME, by the local municipality or parish, by the embassies or consulates, or by platform groups which may also include non-immigrant civil society organisations. So, even though the majority of the associations claim to have working relations with other immigrant associations, this is somewhat misleading as the collaborative forms are most often not of the associations’ own initiative.

Furthermore, concerning the lack of ‘one-on-one’ intra-associational coordination, this is blamed on the fact that the associations are each other’s competitors for available resources. The concentration of associations serving the same people, in the same geographical area – the same
city or neighbourhood – creates competition. These associative rivalries are, in fact, a concern that leaves a number of leaders favouring ‘associative monopolisation’ as opposed to high numbers of organisations serving the same population. The following quote from a Brazilian association leader attests to this:

I encourage people not to form associations, at least not in the same district or city. I ask them if they’d rather have ten small groups in one space or one group that already has a base that can become very strong. If what they want to do is run an association, I tell them to come join the board of directors of this association, not to form another one that will compete with this one. If they want to form an association where they live, I tell them to take the name Associação Brasileira de Portugal. This association is ‘de Portugal’ [of Portugal], not ‘de Seixal’ [of Seixal], not ‘de Lisboa’ [of Lisbon] (B).

Also worth highlighting in this particular situation is the case of the Eastern European associations. Although the majority claim to have working relations with associations of the same origin (primarily in the form of exchanging experiences, given that many share the same objectives and lobby for the same common causes), the same associations demonstrate a heightened awareness and mistrust between themselves, primarily due to the collapse of some organisations alleged to have ties to illegal activities (i.e. Associação Soyuz). As a result, some associations have taken on an accusational role in relation to the activities of their counterparts.36

Some associations promise things like legalisation, family reunification; they take money from people, they promise them these things, but then they don’t do what they promise. I prefer not to deal with these people and I try to warn people of these individuals. There are other interests behind some of these quote/unquote associations, some are just a cover-up for other illegal activities (EE).

This mistrust and air of suspicion has led some Eastern European associations to ‘turn their backs’ on some organisations, while maintaining closer ties to a reduced number.37

Generally speaking, however, most associations in the three groups claim to have working relations with other immigrant associations both inside and outside their own group. The Eastern European organisations, for example, show a greater tendency to work with counterparts of the same origin, even if limited to certain associations.

The development of ‘bridging ties’ with the local/national institutional fabric takes place on two fronts: with civil society institutions and with
government organisms. Civil society institutions can be classified into five groups: labour unions, NGOs (human rights, anti-racism, social solidarity, etc.), churches and church organisations, schools and training institutions, and political parties.

First, in relation to labour unions, collaborative ties are maintained, above all, with the two labour union confederations: General Workers Union (UGT) and General Confederation of Workers (CGTP-IN), both of which possess migration departments. Given that both of these labour institutions are also represented in COCAI, it is primarily those associations that also belong or participate in this consultative council and that share similar initiatives to those of the labour unions (i.e. protecting labour rights), that maintain relations with them. Beyond these central unions however, relations also exist with specific employment sector unions where immigrants make up a significant percentage of the labour force. Key here are the Construction Workers Labour Union and the Labour Union of Receptionists, Vigilance, Cleaning Services, Domestic and Similar Activities (Sindicato dos Trabalhadores de Serviço de Portaria, Vigilância, Limpeza, Domésticas e Profissões Similares).

Concerning associations that work with individuals who are discriminated against and who live in situations of poverty, these maintain relations with NGOs that carry out initiatives in these fields too. Some of the most active include: the anti-racism and human rights movements SOS Racismo, Frente Anti-Racista and Olho Vivo; health and humanitarian organisations such as the Red Cross, ABRAÇO (HUG), International Medical Assistance (Assistência Médica Internacional (AMI)) and Médicos do Mundo; the social solidarity and charitable organisations Child Support Institute (Instituição Apoio à Criança) and the Portuguese Food Bank; as well as the Portuguese Council for Refugees.

In addition to these NGOs, the Catholic Church and its social solidarity institutions, and to a lesser extent churches of other denominations, are also strategic partners with associations. Close relations exist between the Eastern European organisations and the Catholic as well as the various Orthodox churches: Romanian, Ukrainian (Byzantine Rite) and Russian. Relations between the associations and the Catholic Church are of two differing natures: solidarity and spiritual. From a solidarity point-of-view, a number of associations coordinate initiatives with the various dioceses throughout the country, with Caritas, with the Obra Católica Portuguesa de Migrações (OCPM) and with the Serviço Jesuítas aos Refugiados (SJR). From a spiritual standpoint, the associations coordinate masses and other religious events with the Orthodox churches. The OCPM also plays a crucial role in these relationships in the sense that this Catholic Church organism assists the various Orthodox churches in Portugal and Orthodox priests are also tied to the OCPM. Additionally, OCPM has a seat in COCAI so working relations are kept
with this institution through the consultative council, a form of liaison that applies to all associations (Angolan and Brazilian included) and bodies involved in COCAI.

For the Angolan and Brazilian cases, ties to religious institutions are less significant. Nonetheless, a few collaborative relationships are worth highlighting. Beyond contacts with OCPM, the Angolan associations name the Spiritual Centre Padre Alves Correia (CEPAC) and the development organisation OIKOS as the two mainly Catholic Church organisations they work with. Associations working with CEPAC guide individuals in need to this solidarity institution that works primarily with Africans, while relations with OIKOS are carried out through common solidarity and development projects in Angola. Beyond Catholic Church institutions, there are also working ties with the Methodist Church. This is particularly true of the Associação Luso-Africana dos Metodistas no Porto, Casa de Angola de Coimbra and PROSAUDESC, whose representatives are also ordained ministers. Brazilian relations are kept with OCPM as well as a number of local dioceses, with one Brazilian association (Peniel – Associação de Assistência Social) also possessing working ties with the Evangelical Church.

Relations with schools and training institutions are three-fold, with primary or secondary schools, with universities or with IEFP. The Angolan organisations are the most dynamic, taking on various actions on all three fronts: with local primary and secondary schools in exchanging information concerning pupils who frequent the associations’ after-school activities and attend local schools; with universities in trying to integrate Angolan students and set up scholarship schemes; plus some associations having protocols with IEFP. The Brazilian associations, on the other hand, limit their dealings primarily with universities. The Eastern European associations are negotiating with universities to get academic equivalencies recognised, as well as also having set up protocols with the IEFP primarily with the goal of working side-by-side in providing Portuguese language classes.

Although contacts with political parties are quite common, only a small minority regard political parties as strategic working partners. The low levels of working contacts with political parties can be explained by the political negotiating tactics that favour pragmatic lobbying and gaining access to resources over political partisanship. In other words, associations pick and choose who they negotiate with depending on what best suits the associations’ interests or the interests of those who run the association. Thus, the associations tend to deal with the left-wing parties (PCP and BE) at the national level due to the fact that these political parties share similar agendas, and with the left-centre Socialist Party (PS) and the right-centre Social Democratic Party primarily due to the fact that these two parties possess the most political power. At the
local level, party relations will vary depending on who is in power in which municipality. Such relations, however, are not a one-sided dependency relationship, as political parties will also lobby associations, especially during local election campaigns, in order to gain votes (Horta and Malheiros 2005). Nonetheless, the lack of wanting to maintain work ties with a specific party is best expressed in the following statement:

Collaborating or supporting certain political movements will get you labelled, so we never accepted any ties to political parties. We’ve received phone calls to promote and campaign for certain parties but we don’t accept any of them because we want to be open to everyone (A).

Concerning collaborations with government institutions at the national level, ACIME and its various bodies accounts for the majority of the relations (especially in relation to the Angolan and the Eastern European organisations, given that more of their associations are recognised by ACIME than is the case with Brazilian associations). Relations with ACIME are channelled through COCAI and through project partnerships and other initiatives coordinated by the High Commission. As stressed by Virginie Guiraudon (2000), immigrant associations must work simultaneously with various ministries and government services in order to better incorporate their community members in the various sub-systems of the host country. Thus, beyond ACIME, the associations also claim collaborative relations with other government ministries and their respective services such as the ministries of Internal Administration, Foreign Affairs, Labour and Social Solidarity, Justice, and Education and Sport; as well as other government institutions, namely SEF and the General Labour Inspection (Inspeção Geral do Trabalho (IGT)).

The closest contacts with government institutions, however, are at the regional and local level. Regionally, the associations highlight their ties with civil governments and the civil registry, while at the local level collaborative actions are carried out with city halls and parishes. Working relations with the municipalities and parishes can arguably be seen as the strongest among all relations, considering that many of the issues the associations, as well as those of the people they represent, can only be resolved through dialogue and collaboration with local authorities. In addition, municipal governments will involve associations, through consultation or participation, when it comes to dealing with immigrant issues and projects.

Relationships between immigrant associations and civil society institutions will depend on the density of the networks and the centrality of organisations in the web of cooperative relations. For example, while a number of municipalities have established local social networks (which
often also include immigrant associations) aimed at coordinating organisations that work in the social service sector at the municipal level, associations in smaller urban centres may not have the privilege of being part of such a dense network of relations. Thus cooperative relations also depend on the strength and number of other institutions that together make up the network.  

The last dimension of organisational networks concerns the density of transnational contacts. Often long-distance bridging ties have as intermediaries the local embassies and consulates. Cases dealing with legalisation, family reunification, document certification and voluntary return, imply that associations (as representatives of their members) are in constant contact with the embassies and consulates.

Although a large and well-organised diaspora provides associations with further possibility for pooling resources, as well as acting to reinforce ethnic collective identity (both important factors in social capital and in the creation of transnational social spaces), in the case of the three association groups in question, only a small minority maintain diasporic and/or home-country relations of this nature. Of those who do maintain some type of cross-national relations, religious institutions, political, social and international interest organisations, and academic institutions rank first. Various examples exist such as the Angolan association Associação para a Defesa da Cultura Backongos’ (ADECKO) elaboration of a protocol for exchanging Kikongo and Kibondo language teaching experiences and resources; the membership of the three Brazilian university student associations in the European Brazilian Students Federation; the role of the Eastern European association Edinstvo in the Russian Fellow Countryman’s Union, a transnational umbrella organisation that unites the Russian diaspora in Europe, and of which Edinstvo’s president is member of the directive council; the ties of the Associação dos Ucranianos em Portugal to two Canadian umbrella organisations – the Ukrainian World Congress, uniting Ukrainian association movements throughout the world, helping to fund them, setting up newspapers and radio programs and cultural events; and the organisation Fourth Wave which unites the most recent wave of Ukrainian associations (post-1989). At the EU level, some associations belong to networks – examples are the European Anti-Racist Network, the European Social Forum and the European Anti-Poverty Network.

Concerning relations with home-country institutions, local, political and charity organisations stand out, such as the Associação Tratado de Simulambuco – Casa de Cabinda’s relations with the Catholic Church in Cabinda (in distributing food, medical supplies, clothing, blankets, etc.); Núcleo PT’s dealing with various social movements in Brazil such as Movimento Sem Terra (Landless Movement); Casa da Língua e Cultura
Russas’ relations with Moscow City Hall, a major financial contributor in the setup of the association.

Although by playing within transnational social fields, associations are expanding their scope of activities, while at the same time strengthening their ethnic identification and group solidarity, the majority of the associations interviewed preferred to have privileged contacts within the national context where social capital is considered to be of greater value, given that many of the issues and concerns the associations are confronted with are best tackled at the national level.

* * *

In this chapter, a typology of the three association movements has been presented. The fact that the three groups are different from each other is clearly evident; however, there are also commonalities, especially when it comes to activities and objectives dealing with community integration and identity preservation. In the broadest sense, the associations were founded either to assist people with ongoing issues, to provide them with a support network and unite them under the banner of a common culture or ethnicity. It was also demonstrated that the associations often reflect the sub-sectors within the larger immigrant group which, in turn, also reflect differences in activities and actions, as well as class and other differences between the associations and those involved in them. Relations maintained by the associations often involve closer ‘bridging’ and ‘bonding’ ties with like-minded institutions that may play a part in the obtaining of a given objective. Chapter 8 will further discuss these ties. But first, taking into consideration the characteristics that define the associations, Chapter 7 will now analyse the relationship between the associations, community integration processes and identity formation.
In this chapter discussion will centre on the topics of integration and identity and the strategies adopted by the associations when it comes to these two key concepts. In relation to integration, it can be assumed that immigrant associations will encourage an integrative approach on the grounds that, to succeed in the host society, adaptive skills and mechanisms must be developed. On the other hand, associations, by definition, also have a stake in the preservation of identity, if only because their membership is primarily made up of persons from one ethnic, religious or interest group who often originate from the same country. Once organised, however, the degree to which associations will encourage members to retain their identity and transmit it to future generations will vary. Even though these two options may appear to be opposite target objectives, it can be argued that integration and identity preservation are, in fact, both coping mechanisms that can be co-opted and play equal roles in the immigrants’ survival in the new society (Jenkins and Sauber 1988).

While various integrative and identification strategies may often be expressed and desired, to which point they are explicit (if at all) is a key question. Three overarching questions will thus be the central focus in this chapter. They are:

- How do immigrant associations view the integration processes and problems of the communities they represent?
- How do immigrant associations perceive the preservation of ethno-cultural and socio-cultural identity versus host-country assimilation?
- What role do immigrant associations play in relation to the integration of their members and what forms of integration do they work toward?

### 7.1 Community integration: Processes and problems

The goal in this section is to discuss the problems and hardships encountered by the immigrant communities when it comes to their inte-
gration. Thus, the primary question posed to the association representa-
tives was:
– What are the most significant integration difficulties encountered by community members?

In analysing this question, it is first important to draw attention to the fact that the three groups – Angolan, Brazilian and Eastern European – find themselves at different integration stages. The fact that different flows at different time periods have encountered different problems, as well as different policies designed by the host society’s governments, implies that one group may be experiencing integration difficulties that other communities, with longer migration histories, have gone through in the past.

Table 7.1 provides a summary of the most referred to integration problems according to the respective association representatives. The data illustrates both communalities and problems unique to the specific groups. Given the differing integration situations, I now provide an analysis of the most significant problems outlined by each group, as well as highlight specificities. In doing this, I will take into consideration the manner in which these integration problems often intertwine (e.g. how being undocumented might lead to labour exploitation or how low levels of education and job market qualifications will often correlate with residing in low-cost, marginalised urban areas). Differential shading of the cells in Table 7.1 enables a visual impression of the differences between the three immigrant groups.

7.1.1 The Angolan community

The history of Angolan emigration differs somewhat from the traditional economically driven model of migration, being instead closely linked with social-political factors such as the social instability and climate of insecurity experienced in Angola (Possidónio 2005). These factors and insecurities (incited by the process of decolonisation and the civil war that followed) brought about two different immigration waves, composed of individuals of different classes, qualifications and citizenship rights; the main commonality among them being that, in both cases, the majority came as refugees. The two flows I refer to can be defined as the decolonisation wave (post-1974) and the civil war wave (early 1990s).

The decolonisation wave was, in large part, made up of retornados. The remainder of this flow (and of a lesser numerical significance) was made up of Luso-Angolans, individuals who were of Angolan descent, but who possessed Portuguese citizenship.
Table 7.1  Most referred to integration problems faced by the Angolan, Brazilian and Eastern European immigrants according to the respective association representatives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of integration problem</th>
<th>Angolan (N=27) Frequency</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Brazilian (N=25) Frequency</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Eastern European (N=30) Frequency</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Housing issues</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>70.4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low levels of education and job market qualifications</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>70.4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discrimination/racism/stereotyping</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legality/documentation/nationality/rights</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>83.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work issues (e.g. labour contracts, exploitation)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>83.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limited access to services (e.g. social, health, education and training programmes)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>63.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homesickness/loneliness/distance from family</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of acceptance/closed society</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Climate/geographical aspects</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>50</td>
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<tr>
<td>Academic/qualification equivalency</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>50</td>
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Source: Author’s own compilation

In relation to the civil war wave, the vast majority of the individuals who came to Portugal in the early part of the 1990s did not hold Portuguese citizenship. Coming to Portugal in an undocumented fashion – as refugees escaping the civil war that ravaged Angola – this group was, in large part, young and unqualified, with few or no resources or social network ties in the host country.8

Taking these sub-communities into consideration, distinct paths of integration are thus identified. While the retornados are, in large part, now well-integrated into Portuguese society, it is those who occupy the lower socio-economic ranks that experience the greater difficulties (primarily consisting of the Luso-Angolan element of the first wave and those belonging to the second wave). Naturally, the greater part of the debate focuses on these individuals.

In discussing the integration difficulties outlined by the interviewees, the housing variable serves as a good indicator of integration, given that it can serve as a measuring stick of the financial wealth of an individual or family, as well as providing clues with regard to other characteristics,
namely the level of schooling and socio-professional status. In other words, low levels of education and unqualified job market occupation reflect a lack of resources. This, in turn, is also reflected in the residential occupation – in low-value, marginalised urban areas such as slums, social housing and run-down neighbourhoods. Table 7.1 clearly demonstrates that housing problems remain paramount for the Angolan community, to a far greater extent than for the other two immigrant groups surveyed.

The following quote helps to explain the roots of the spatial segregation and socio-economic exclusion experienced by Angolan and Luso-Angolan families:

People were marginalised right from the start. They got their first job in an illegal fashion, in cleaning or in construction and those are the jobs many still have today and the kind of job they’ll have tomorrow because they have no qualifications. [...] With no money, no rights, where were these people going to live? They ended up living in these abandoned buildings and living in shacks because they had no other options. They never had any rights to social housing; they were ‘illegals’. Then they [the government] came forward with the processes of legalisation and re-housing in the ’90s. Many got their documents, others did not. Meanwhile, with the re-housing projects that took place, the housing problem was resolved for some, but still this didn’t improve integration for most (A).

The integration problems felt are thus not only rooted in the illegal manner in which many arrived in Portugal in the past, compounded by the lack of qualifications and low educational levels of the immigrants, but also owed much to the fact that Portuguese (national and local) governments were not prepared to receive these immigrants, leaving many Angolans still marginalised in many aspects of their lives.

The coexistence of poor housing conditions and social problems (e.g. poverty, illiteracy, etc.) renders the residents of these areas especially vulnerable to social exclusion, limiting their chances of finding a better job or of developing social relations with others from outside the neighbourhood. As argued by Zhou (1997), the high concentration of immigrants in segregated and run-down neighbourhoods leads to the fostering of contact with other individuals – often their neighbours – who are equally unprivileged and marginalised. Their social networks are thus limited, as their expectations are shaped by a surrounding environment in which poverty and the lack of opportunities for upward mobility are widespread. This is well articulated by an association representative:
In many cases there are various generations living under one roof. Many have no way of leaving these neighbourhoods because they have no resources that could help them leave. They have their lives here; many have had the same neighbours since the first day they arrived. That is why many people would rather live here than be re-housed elsewhere. Once they’re re-housed, the neighbourhood networks come to an end. They may be poor but at least they have who to count on – their neighbours, their family members who brought them to the neighbourhood when they arrived in this country, and so on... (A).

Issues of discrimination and racism against the community are also emphasised as a major integration obstacle. However, respondents expressed this as a problem not exclusive to black Angolans, but to people of colour in general. Such discrimination and racism are pointed out as coming in various forms and in various life sectors:

There is racial discrimination against black individuals. Take the real estate market, for example: a black person wants to buy an apartment in a new building, we know of situations of agents telling people that the apartments are already sold because they are afraid that other buyers won’t like living next to black people and that having black people in the building will devalue the properties. [...] The same applies to labour discrimination. We might be qualified people, and even possess more qualifications than a Portuguese person, but we will never get that management job or that supervisor’s job because those are for white people. We’re stereotyped as being unqualified and that’s how we’re suppose to remain (A).

As this statement implies, discrimination thus means the lack of acceptance and of equal treatment, both reflected in numerous areas of integration, such as employment and the housing market. This phenomenon is by no stretch of the imagination unique to the Portuguese situation, for, as various studies have pointed out (Brown 1984; Williams 1987; Solomos 1988, 2003), minorities of other discriminated categories are often met by both overt and indirect racism which further impedes their opportunities and capacity for social mobility.

Other integration obstacles stressed by the Angolan interviewees include document acquisition, legality and rights, work-related issues and having no access to public services or information. These concerns, however, often fall under the banner of legalisation, often seen as a solution that would remedy the other problems. Although the regularisation schemes of the 1990s legalised many Angolans, questions remain:
We have some Angolans who went through the initial phases of legalisation in the 1990s whose documents have expired and, for whatever reason, they have not been able to renew them. It is important to find out if these people are today considered legal or not. This must be analysed. Then there are those who keep coming – the newly arrived who can’t do anything because they are illegal and might end up with employers who will take advantage of them (A).

Issues dealing with regularisation and labour, however, are not as central among the Angolan associations as they are among the other two more recently arrived groups, as I will now show.

7.1.2 The Brazilian community

Brazilian immigrants in Portugal are historically profiled in a similar fashion to Angolans. Here too there are two distinct groups that must be taken into consideration before community integration issues are to be discussed, each group tied to different immigration flows. These two groups can be characterised as the qualified wave (pre-1997) and the unqualified wave (post-1998).

The first Brazilians to migrate to Portugal were either political refugees, Portuguese descendents and their families, or highly trained professionals who came to take up positions in the areas of telecommunications, computers, advertising and dentistry (see Chapter 6). It is these individuals that make up the qualified wave.

The year 1998 is considered to be the start of the second wave of Brazilian immigration to Portugal (Casa do Brasil de Lisboa 2004): the unqualified wave. In Casa do Brasil de Lisboa’s (2004) study on post-1998 immigrants, the results identified the greater majority as young (75 per cent between the ages of twenty and 35), 64 per cent were males, 60 per cent had completed secondary school while seven per cent has a university degree. The most typical occupations were in retail and sales, restaurants and catering, and construction.

Once again, in similar fashion to the Angolan community, distinct paths of integration are identified in relation to these sub-communities. While the qualified pre-1997 group is today generally well integrated, the recently arrived post-1998 sub-community experience greater difficulties. Unsurprisingly, the greater part of the debate presented by the association representatives focused on the individuals comprising the second flow.

According to Table 7.1, documentation and employment issues are the problems that most preoccupy the Brazilian community. It is worth highlighting that the majority of Brazilians have entered Portugal as tourists. Although they are not illegal upon entry, they are not
authorised to work during their stay. Many, however, end up prolonging their ‘visit’ and ignore this regulation. After obtaining a job, they find out that they are not eligible for a work visa and that in order to acquire one, they must return to Brazil. Thus many Brazilians end up working clandestinely in the Portuguese labour market, possessing no labour or social rights. Obtaining documentation and rights is also made difficult due to what the associations refer to as ‘lack of knowledge and know-how’ in obtaining legal status and the steps involved in the acquisition process. In the words of one interviewee:

People don’t know too much about the laws; they don’t know how to go about renewing their visas and legalisation procedures. The bureaucracies and all the papers involved is an issue that people find hard to understand. But immigrants are not totally at fault for this. Access to information is a problem, be it from Portuguese institutions or from our own embassies; we are not informed. Immigrants don’t know their rights; they contribute to social security but don’t know what advantages they can gain from their contributions. Sometimes I ask myself if it’s really worthwhile being documented in this country considering all the trouble one has to go through. I mean all you need is a social security number and your passport and you can work. All they (the Portuguese government) want is for the people to pay their taxes. Anybody can get a social security number. Legalisation is one bureaucratic hassle after another. People will do it if they can take benefit from it, but a lot of people come here with the intention of working, making money and returning. They don’t want to wait to get their papers to come here legally and they don’t want to take numerous days off work to become legal. If they get caught, it doesn’t really matter because nobody is going to put them on an airplane and send them back to Brazil. They’ll just be back doing what they were doing the day before (B).

For the short-term immigrant, quick financial gain often outweighs any sort of citizen rights and legality proceedings the host country may have to offer (Jordan and Duvell 2002; Weinstein 2002). Equally, the thoughts conveyed in the quote is that the manner in which the system is set up favours illegality and expresses that Brazilian immigrants don’t have a lot to lose when running the risk of being undocumented.

One area where being undocumented may bring about problems, however, is the employment sector. As previously highlighted, being in an illegal situation implies not having the right to a work contract. This, in turn, puts immigrants in a more susceptible position when it comes to being exploited. The following statement exemplifies this notion:
The biggest problem is arriving here illegally and having no rights. This exposes individuals to being exploited and when they’re exploited, they can’t even go to the police. If he or she has no documents and no contract, how’s that person going to prove that he or she’s being exploited? An employer can retain wages or not pay them at all and there’s nothing an undocumented immigrant can do. This leaves many [undocumented immigrants] one step away from a life of delinquency and poverty. There are a lot of Brazilians who are finding it hard to survive now; they are illegal and unemployed and can’t even feed themselves. Then, due to this situation [being undocumented and having no labour rights], they also have no privileges, no rights to accessing services. It’s a vicious cycle. People come here thinking they’re not going to have any problems – that Portugal accepts Brazilians as if they were their own sons – but they quickly find out that that is not so (B).

Two points are worth noting in this quote. First, being an undocumented worker implies that the immigrant’s life is ‘in the hands of the employer’. Working under this status is often a gamble that may not pay off, along with the fact that proving exploitation may often be an unattainable goal (Jordan and Duvell 2002). Second, the interviewee is making a connection between illegality, labour problems and other consequences such as having no rights of citizenship and rights to social services, referring to this connection as ‘vicious cycle’ whereby one issue will often have consequences on the next. The Brazilian community, however, is not unique to this pattern.

Secondary integration problems also worth highlighting include homesickness and loneliness, lack of acceptance on the part of the host society, and climate differences. These three factors are expressed in the following extract:

There’s this problem of feeling alone; of being in a strange place. Brazilians don’t have the experience of leaving their country – of living in another countries – so for many, this is a frightening experience, namely because we leave behind those elements that provided us with the safety we need, emotionally, psychologically and culturally. Here we are among people who are different from us so we can never be fully integrated because we can’t completely be ourselves; we can never feel at home here. As well, the climate here is hard for us and we have a hard time adjusting to it. You can’t imagine how hard it is for us when it’s the middle of winter here and its ten degrees, while back in Brazil it’s 35 and everybody’s at the beach. So I mean these are the culture shocks that make it hard to adjust and integrate into this society (B).
These problems are based on feelings of integration. Measuring ‘felt’ integration is, however, a more complex process than measuring integration according to instruments, policies, programmes, etc. Of the three groups, the Brazilian associations seemed to express the greatest difficulty in adjusting psychologically to the new environment. Nonetheless, in the words of one association leader: ‘Brazilians, sooner or later, get used to new situations and new environments – what is needed is a little bit of time’ (B).

7.1.3 The Eastern European community

Similar to the most recent flows from Brazil, nearly all Eastern European immigrants in Portugal arrived on an irregular basis. With the introduction of permanência authorisation status in 2001 (see chapter 4), many today possess this kind of documentation. As highlighted in Table 7.1, this group’s associations also emphasise legality – not only the difficulties and bureaucracies that involve obtaining documentation but also the annual renewing of the legal status – along with work issues and problems in accessing social services as the most significant integration barriers encountered. The interconnectedness between the three issues is highlighted in the following statement:

Illegality is the most serious issue. It affects everything else. If you want to legalise yourself, you can’t do it if you don’t have a work contract. The problem is that there are still a lot of employers interested in hiring people who will work without a labour contract; workers they can exploit. Now if you’re illegal, you’re nobody within the system. If you have health problems you’re not going to get proper treatment even if the hospitals are obligated to treat you. Health is just one example. Even now many of us have permanência authorisations but this doesn’t give us full rights; it doesn’t help us to fully integrate as citizens. We can’t get a bank loan; we are not entitled to child support, among other things... (EE).

The problem, in this case, is not just based on the situation of illegality but also on the lack of rights that come with possessing permanência authorisations. The associations primarily blame this form of documentation as not providing the conditions of integration.

Beyond the issues of legality, employment and limited access to social services, the Eastern European associations highlight a second set of three integration problems which are unique to this group (in comparison to the other two communities). These are: language differences, unifying the family in Portugal and obtaining academic equivalencies. Reflecting their presence in a different ‘linguistic territory’ (Bommes and
Maas 2005), many of the interviewees highlighted language as the first integration obstacle encountered upon arrival. In the words of one interviewee:

It’s hard to adapt when you don’t know how to speak the language. Many don’t understand the laws of this country and have trouble understanding when people are explaining things to them. That is a big problem when wanting to resolve bureaucratic issues. Still, two or three months after arriving here, most are able to string four or five words together. They must learn fast – it’s essential for their survival (EE).  

The importance of acquiring knowledge of the Portuguese language is thus pivotal for this community. In doing so, they will be strengthening their own capability of understanding the rules and regulations of the host country and gaining the capacity to make progress in other areas such as employment (Baganha et al. 2002) without requiring the assistance of friends, family networks or the associations.

One of the primary characteristics of the Eastern European immigrants in Portugal is that many are highly qualified individuals. However, it is the lack of recognition of these qualifications that the associations feel obstructs insertion into Portuguese society and, above all, the job market. One association leader tells of the situation of an individual employed by the association to illustrate the outcome of the non-recognition of academic and professional diplomas:

The person I have working here part-time for the CLAI, she’s from the Ukraine and her Portuguese is not very good. She’s taking classes three times per week. I asked her husband about her lack of Portuguese and he told me that she always says ‘to clean apartments I don’t need to learn Portuguese’. This is her other job when she’s not working here. She has a university degree and has a lot of capacity to do things. Not being able to do what you were trained to do though, is very discouraging. It makes no sense to have civil engineers hauling cement on construction sites when they know just as much or more about engineering than the engineers working on the same site, or surgeons cleaning the floors of hospitals who have the capacity to be carrying out operations. But this is happening and we need to start paying attention to this and start taking advantage of the capacities of these individuals (EE).

Lastly, I briefly point out the issue of loneliness and family distance, seen by many leaders as a ‘destabilising factor’ in the lives of many Eastern Europeans in Portugal:
There are a lot of men working here without families, they work and after work they come back to the house or room they live in, they eat something and then what do they do? Their circle of friends consists of other Ukrainians or Russians in the same position, so what do they do? They drink. Their families are in their native country and they’re here alone. It’s a sacrifice being far away. They are here physically trying to make a better living for their family, but their minds are not here. Now many want to bring their families over but they have so much trouble because of all the bureaucracies. It’s not easy to live this way (EE).

The interviewee thus emphasises the hardships that come with being ‘far from home’ and away from family. Although family reunification is pointed out as a factor that could help ‘ground’ the immigrants, it is the difficulties in carrying out the reunification process that is criticised. Chapter 8 will further expand on this topic.

7.2 Differentiation of groups: Identification and host-society acceptance

Integration is a process that might be carried out in different ways by the various communities according to their cultural and social perceptions and values. In this section my goal is twofold: first, to show how the associations perceive their own group as socially and culturally different from Portuguese society; and second, how these differences are accepted (or not) by the host society and if this acceptance (or lack of it) differentiates the treatment of the groups.

7.2.1 The Angolan community

Most interviewees expressed the opinion that socio-cultural differences between Angolans and the Portuguese are few. They took the view that the coloniser/colonised relationship that was imposed on Angolans during the 500 years in which the Portuguese were present in Angola forced Angolans to assimilate:

We had a Portuguese education and we weren’t allowed to speak our dialects. That is why we lost our languages and our dialects... The schools were for the assimilated and for the Europeans. If you wanted to go to school, there was no other choice – you had to assimilate. The Portuguese turned us into Portuguese. That is why many Angolans don’t care about being a part of an association of this nature [an Angolan association] because they don’t feel Angolan. They
have felt Portuguese all their lives; even before they came here they felt Portuguese... They don’t feel like they’re immigrants here. The only thing that makes some feel that they are immigrants here is that they don’t have the same rights as other Portuguese citizens (A).

The most significant socio-cultural difference between Angolans and the Portuguese, according to the respondents, lies in the way Angolans express themselves in comparison to the host population: more communicative, outspoken and energetic. The Portuguese are seen as being more morose.

Angolans in general are very agitated people who like music, who like to speak in a loud manner and like to express themselves. Portuguese society, on the other hand, is melancholic; Fado is an example of that. We have Kizomba and Kuduro, the Portuguese have Fado. I think that says it all (A).

The interviewee here utilises the styles of music and dance to make an analogy of how the two societies differ, referring to the Angolan population as sensual, up-tempo and energetic, and the Portuguese as sad and gloomy individuals, similar to Fado music. However, this outspoken manner of being and behaving is also perceived as a drawback to community integration, for as one spokesperson puts it:

Angolans speak in a loud manner. They are an anxious people who make demands; they demand more rights, demand being treated equally, and so on. This makes them less favoured in a lot of sectors and in a lot of things in life (A).

In order to exemplify how close their community is to Portuguese society, the respondents compared their own group to other PALOP groups in Portugal, highlighting that while the other communities maintain strong cultural traits that set them apart from the Portuguese, their own community does not possess any significant cultural elements that differentiate them. The following two quotes illustrate this:

[...] in comparison to the Capeverdeans, for example, one thing you’ll notice is that they are proud of their culture and there is more solidarity between them here in Portugal. They are different from us in the way that they are more culturally aware of themselves. They speak Creole to each other and they maintain that solidarity and close contact with each other. It’s probably due to the fact that they’re islanders cut off from other people and cultures. Angolans, on the other hand, aren’t like that (A).
The Guineans, for example, if they’re in a group of people and Creole is not the spoken language, they will back off from that group. They identify with Creole more so than they do with Portuguese. If there are two of them in a group they will speak Creole among themselves. Also their religious faith is very different which also sets them apart (A).²⁷

Beyond the cultural closeness, to further exemplify their proximity to Portugal, the interviewees pointed out how Angolans do not send remittances back to Angola, often preferring to invest their earnings in Portugal, most frequently spending on material goods that upgrade their self-esteem and image.

Even though the Angolan associations consider socio-cultural differences (to Portuguese ways) to be quite low in comparison to other PAFP communities, when it comes to the acceptance of the community by the host society, quite the opposite is expressed. The coloniser/colonised mentality that still exists, combined with perceptions and stereotypes held by the host society, was brought up by one leader to explain how his community is negatively accepted:

Portugal and Angola – because of decolonisation; because the Portuguese [residents] were expelled from Angola – had their backs turned to each other during the war. The Portuguese returned from Angola felling very hurt. Angola was a goldmine for them. Since the independence of Angola, the mentality of a lot of Portuguese is: ‘what are you doing here if you didn’t want us there?’ This attitude has reflected on the treatment of the Angolan community here. Portugal started by not legalising many Angolan citizens here and those who were legalised were made to pay higher legalisation fees which they still do. Angolans are hit by a double discrimination here in Portugal. On one side they are seen as people from a country rich in resources. ‘They don’t need anything, so what are they doing here?’ is what Portuguese people think. Obviously that is not true. We are one of the poorest countries in the world. Then we are discriminated against for having the reputation of being vain – that we don’t like to work – and because of that we are stereotyped and employers will prefer workers from other countries (A).

This quote refers to the Portuguese stereotype of Angolans as not being disciplined workers, a label that has been strengthened by the coming of other immigrant groups who compete in the same job markets (i.e. construction and domestic labour) and are positively viewed as conscientious and hard workers. In turn, that has created further discrimination towards the African populations in general:
We don’t like to see ads in newspaper that say: ‘Worker needed for this or that job, Eastern European preferred’. That is just saying they prefer the worker to be white. It has nothing to do with what that worker can or cannot do. Africans, and especially Angolans, are branded more so than Brazilians or Ukrainians when it comes to their socio-economic integration. The Portuguese now prefer them to us (A).

This extract mentions yet another variable which, according to the associations, is a drawback to their community’s acceptance – skin colour. Racist and ethnocentric attitudes become a factor when the host society, or certain sectors of it, does not allow them to assimilate and compete on equal footing (Rocha-Trindade 1995). Consequently, Africans suffer the consequences of racist attitudes; something other specific communities (especially Eastern Europeans) do not suffer.

When it comes to the treatment of their community by Portuguese society, the Angolan representatives feel that their community is at the bottom of the hierarchy:

I can point out various types of differences: first, anything of good the Eastern European community does of good is news. The Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation now works for the equivalency of academic diplomas for this population when we Angolans sent out thousands of students to universities in the former Soviet Union, Cuba and other places and our community never got this treatment here in Portugal. The Africans are now trying to ride on the coat-tails of the Eastern Europeans. As well, it has now become fashion to provide language classes for Eastern Europeans but there has never been any preoccupation concerning the Africans here that don’t speak Portuguese. With the Brazilian community, there is more tolerance and why? Because it’s the land of soap operas, the land of the Brazilian accent which is sweet and cute. They even get their own legalisation process like they’re different from everyone else in this situation. With the Capeverdean community as well, there is a differentiated treatment when compared to other PALOP countries. They are the only PALOP country who gets to vote in local elections, there’s been all this talk lately of having them join the EU and it’s well known that they were ‘the right hand of the Portuguese during colonialism’ (A).

It is thus expressed with some bitterness that the special attention given today to new immigrant groups coming to Portugal has never been given to the Angolan community. This is exemplified in the way Portuguese
society gives preferred treatment to other groups through the setting up of special accords, rights and programmes.

7.2.2 The Brazilian community

Even when it is thought that the society of origin and that of destination might share similar patterns, the process of immigration often proves otherwise. This is especially true of Brazilians who have a romantic idea of Portugal before they arrive – as a country with common cultural roots, with a shared language and historical migration ties. However, upon arrival, the process of re-socialisation, in the words of Padilla (2005: 9), can often be ‘traumatic and drastic’:

Brazilians come here thinking that since flows upon flows of Portuguese went to Brazil decades and centuries ago, that Portugal should now be welcoming them. There is this sentiment that greater absorption should exist on the part of the Portuguese. The reality is that this is not the case. Instead they find a country that is still very conservative and in a lot of ways refuses to change. Once these differences are felt, cultural shock becomes a reality for many. They quickly realise that this is nothing like Brazil and that these people are nothing like Brazilians are. They are not welcoming; ... they’re pessimistic and closed-off (B).

This quote points out that the most frequently mentioned socio-cultural difference between the Brazilians and the Portuguese concerns Portuguese being characterised as cold, unhappy and unreceptive, the opposite to Brazilians who are described as warm, friendly and happy individuals. This difference is also expressed in the way Brazilians have had to re-construct certain cultural behaviours if they wish to fit in to Portuguese society:

We are generally happy people and that’s who we are. This is probably the biggest difference between us and many of the other cultures. Life is a celebration for us and this is not so much the situation for other cultures. We want everybody to come join our party, but the Portuguese are not like this so here we have to moderate this constant partying (B).

Additional responses to what distinguishes Brazilians from the host society deal with personality traits: the Portuguese are narrow-minded and judgemental, while Brazilians are viewed as being more open-minded and non-judgemental. The Portuguese are seen as willing to accept ele-
ments of Brazilian culture, but when it comes to accepting Brazilians there is often intolerance:

Portuguese people still see Brazilians as being friendly and warm, but even that image has been deteriorating, because there is this view of Brazilians being everywhere now; Brazilians are at the tills of the fast food restaurant, they’re waiters, they work in the stores where you shop, so now you hear people say, ‘Brazilians are everywhere, all you hear is Brazilian being spoken’. If it’s not that it’s our behaviour or the way we dress. It’s as if people feel threatened by us. On the other hand, I think Brazilian culture has also changed the lives of the Portuguese. We’ve contributed to making Portuguese society more at ease, we’ve brought more colour into it; more joy. The people here have watched Brazilian soap operas on television their whole lives; they love our food, our music and so on. This is what I mean by a love/hate relationship that people have towards us. Let’s not forget the vision people have of Brazil – of football, beaches, parties, samba, that whole image of Copacabana. Those aren’t exactly images associated with work, but those are the first images of Brazil that come to the mind of people; that they see on television. Of course this is going to be the image of Brazilians as well (B).

In this case, while the qualities that define Brazilians as friendly and warm people have led to the positive selection of Brazilian workers in employment sectors that require contact with the general public (e.g. restaurants, catering, retail sales, etc.) and in leisure-related work (e.g. dancers, musicians, etc.) – labour markets referred to by Machado (2003) as the mercado da alegria (‘market of joy’) – their placing in these highly visible labour niches has created resentment, with the tag of ‘invasion’ often applied. The representations of Brazilians in Portugal, which are derived from the images that are attached to Brazil – football, samba, exotic women, etc. – are accentuated by the exoticism often attached to that imagery. Those images, in turn, can also bring about negative representations, with Brazilians being viewed as uncivilised, lascivious, lazy, irresponsible and incapable (Machado 1999, 2003).

To some extent, the stereotypes attached to Brazilians have created a negative image of the community. It is in this stereotyping and labelling that the interviewees refer to Portuguese society as passing judgement on Brazilians, and especially on Brazilian women who are often labelled as prostitutes:

The mentality towards Brazilian women is: there are 50,000 Brazilian women; this means that there are 50,000 Brazilian prostitutes. If one Brazilian woman being a prostitute means all Brazilian wo-
men are prostitutes, does that mean that one Portuguese prostitute implies that all Portuguese women are prostitutes as well? What differentiates the two is that Brazilian prostitutes are illegal here and when they get arrested the whole country knows about them exactly for that reason – because they are illegal prostitutes. When a Portuguese prostitute gets arrested they are not illegal therefore nothing is ever mentioned. That’s not newsworthy (B).

The image of Brazilian women as prostitutes is not exclusive to Portugal. Studies carried out Margolis (1993) in New York City and by Bassanezi and Bógus (1998) in Italy, also point out that Brazilian women in these locations are pigeonholed with the mark of prostitution. The stereotypes of Brazilian women as prostitutes, according to Machado (1999) and Padilla (2005), are currently propagated by: 1) the Portuguese press, with its frequent news stories on illegal Brazilian sex workers plying their trade in nightclubs throughout Portugal, as well as Brazilian prostitutes blamed for the destruction of families; 2) Brazilian soap operas that have helped to proliferate the cult of the body in Brazil, creating, in turn, the myth of Brazilian female sensuality. The Portuguese association of Brazilian women with prostitution is demonstrated in a recent study carried out by the Observatório da Imigração (2003), which reveals that 57 per cent of the Portuguese population possess this view.

In comparison to other immigrant groups in Portugal, however, the Brazilian associations are also conscious of what they consider to be favourable treatment towards their community on the part of the host society. This is expressed, first, in the legalisation accord that has been established between the two countries (Lula Accord) to facilitate obtaining legal status for this community, and second, from the long history and close cultural and political proximity between the two countries. The following quote takes note of this:

We have one obvious advantage, which is the legalisation accord that exists between Portugal and Brazil. No other country has this sort of accord with Portugal, so maybe there has been some favouritism. This is due the ties that connect us and the history that exists between Portugal and Brazil. Brazilians and Portuguese are viewed as brothers. Racism is another thing that concerns some but not so much Brazilians. It is also felt in our community but it’s a lot worse with the African communities, I believe. The question of racism and xenophobia probably leads the Africans to turn inward, all because of the racial discrimination they’ve felt down through the years. We don’t suffer this. We also have an advantage over the Eastern Europeans basically because they don’t speak Portuguese. Plus, there’s
absolutely no history between Portugal and the Eastern European countries (B).

So, while in the previous section we saw that the Angolan representatives drew upon cultural and lifestyle variables to demonstrate their proximity to the Portuguese population, the Brazilians here draw upon their racial and linguistic proximity as a resource that can permit an easier integration over other immigrant groups in Portugal.

7.2.3 The Eastern European community

Representatives of the Eastern European associations expressed the broadest variety of differentiation factors to the host society. Particularly stressed were cultural differences, with language as well as cultural values and habits (love of literature and the importance of classical music) being singled out.

However, along with cultural differences, personality traits and behaviour patterns were also stressed. Eastern Europeans immigrants were considered to be patient, reserved and unassertive, while at the same time, cold, self-centred, mistrusting and ambitious; the Portuguese to be aggressive and disorganised, but also kind and open-natured. The word ‘discipline’ was very prominent in respondent narratives about themselves; the associations view their own community members as serious, hardworking individuals, as opposed to the Portuguese who are thought of as being relaxed and leisurely. The following two quotes illustrate these characteristics. The first statement is from an association leader of Portuguese descent, the second from a Ukrainian national:

[...] it’s almost like they are all hiding something and everything and everyone is suspicious of them. I guess it’s because of the system they were brought up in. Their education is different from anyone else’s. It’s very intense. They come from a system where at the end of the month they get paid for their work and the boss is someone you can’t even talk to. Everything’s mechanical. The shadow of the old Soviet system still hangs over many of these immigrants. Because of these cultural characteristics they bring with them from their countries of origin, they have a bit of trouble figuring out what is voluntary work, what is an organisation that battles for a cause. They come here with university degrees and once they get here, those degrees don’t exist ... They’re brought over by these mafias ... They get cheated by their bosses ... The fact that they don’t trust anyone and that they look sideways to everyone is not surprising. They don’t know who to believe or if the next person is going to cheat them (EE).
The difference is we have different sociability patterns and habits. The difference between us and Portuguese society is that we are more disciplined. Portuguese are kind; more so than Eastern Europeans who are cold and not as kind, but we came here with a goal and that is to make money. Our personalities are determined by our ambitions (EE).

So, while the first quote reflects upon the social-cultural characteristics that community members bring with them (based on the cultural and disciplinary regimes in the countries of origin), along with the experiences many have gone through in Portugal, the second extract also points to the issue of ‘discipline’ and how these immigrants’ personalities are (supposedly) driven by their objectives.

The interviewees also made it clear that, in many aspects, Eastern European immigrants have been favoured in Portuguese society when compared to other groups. The following statement attests to this. However, this same statement also sheds light on what is becoming a fallout between the Portuguese and this community:

When the Eastern Europeans first started arriving, everyone put together a Portuguese course for them: the church, the municipalities, everybody... There no arguing that there has been preferential treatment and favouritism... Portugal is a racist country and that is why the Eastern Europeans have been received better than the rest, while the rest were set aside. However, the Eastern Europeans, due to the fact that they are more qualified and due to their professional abilities, are now making a lot of people think twice about them. A lot of Portuguese people now have the mentality: ‘they are here to take my place’, especially now with the current economic crisis. So now there’s no longer that charity-like support that there was initially. At first the attitude was: ‘Oh these poor fellows, they don’t know how to speak, they need to send their money back to support their family that are starving to death, and so on...’ Now people aren’t thinking this way. Now everyone knows about the existence of these mafias; they see that they are a bunch of disoriented drunks going around causing trouble. There have been cases of Ukrainians in small interior towns that have caused trouble; that got into fights and ended up stabbing and killing someone from the town. When this has happened, people haven’t revolted against the individuals that caused the problems; they have revolted against all the Ukrainians or all the immigrants from Eastern Europe. Because of one or two individuals, everyone pays the price (EE).
Priority towards these migrants has thus occurred at an institutional level, with language programmes being set up for them. In fact, many of the interviewees (in this case, including Angolan and Brazilian association leaders as well) are of the opinion that the Portuguese state started paying more attention to immigrants and to integration issues with the arrival of migrants from Eastern Europe. As stated by one leader: ‘the Portuguese government has done more for Eastern Europeans in three, four years than it ever did for any other immigrant group in 30 years’ (EE). This has contributed to the creation of ‘bad blood’ and jealousy between the various immigrant groups.

However, as the previous interview extract also conveys, certain images and stereotypes have been developed towards this group. The myth of all Eastern Europeans having mafia ties is one such example. In the same fashion that the media contributes to the myth of Brazilian women being tied to prostitution, the same media coverage contributes to the myth that Eastern European immigrants are criminals tied to illegal activities, exploitation and violence.33 Second, similar to the way Brazilian stereotypes are gender-biased, a similar preconceived notion is also applied to the Eastern European community; the difference being that it is the male population who are branded, as heavy drinkers and alcoholics in this case.

The majority of the respondents, nonetheless, do express the opinion that in some integration spheres, such as the labour market, for example, Eastern European favouritism has been obvious. However, the sentiment of this workforce being a ‘throw-away’ workforce is also prominent. In other words, during the time when immigrant labour was in need,34 Eastern European immigrants were seen as valuable contributors to economic growth. Once the current economic downshift came about, this population became a perceived threat to the job security of Portuguese nationals.

Lastly, while labour market preference has been given to Eastern Europeans, the respondents also say that other communities are favoured in other areas of integration. In the words of one interviewee:

We [Eastern Europeans] are seen as hard workers. This is the main reason why we are liked. When it comes to legislation, we are probably less favoured because we don’t have legislation in our favour like the Capeverdeans and the Brazilians, for example, who also get to vote locally. Now I also don’t accept that my tax contributions are going towards the re-housing of the African communities. I might not have money for even a house but they get provided with the opportunity to move out of their shacks and into new apartments (EE).
This account thus takes note of how the idea of favouritism towards Eastern Europeans may not be always accurate, considering that other groups are given special privileges or rights in other integration spheres. This, in turn, may lead to feelings of resentment between the immigrant groups, as evident in the quote.

To conclude this section on group differentiation, self-identification and host-society acceptance, I ask the question: How can these responses be interpreted? A hasty reading of the analysis provides a litany of stereotypes, clichés, prejudices and jealousies, which may or may not be valid. The responses, in this case, are useful in terms of their sources — they are the perceptions of immigrant leaders of their own groups and also of others. Accordingly, I do sustain that these perceived differences and opinions concerning community acceptance are of particular importance when it comes to the integration of third-country nationals, and should be taken into consideration by all parties, immigrants, the host society, and/or its institutions, especially when it comes to formulating service strategies or designing integration programmes.

### 7.3 Integration and identity strategies: Preservation vs. assimilation

In this section I explore patterns of integration and identity strategies preferred and adopted by the associations. I here assume *identity preservation* and *assimilation* as being two extreme categories of integration: preservation signifying retaining one’s socio-cultural identification and the core elements and competences of that culture; assimilation implying the acquisition of the core elements and competences of the culture and society immigrants have migrated into.

In order to secure comparable responses on identity strategies from the association representatives, I opted to include a list of fourteen fixed items in the interview. These consisted of the seven items assumed as being related to the preservation of identity:
1. retaining the native language and/or way of speaking
2. retaining cultural forms
3. passing on the customs and language of the native country to future generations
4. passing on customs and culture to members of the host society
5. celebrating holidays/commemorative days of the country of origin
6. belonging to an association of people of the same ethnic group
7. maintaining close relations with people of the same country.

The above seven come in addition to a further seven related to assimilation:
1. learning (or adapting to) the language of the host society
2. adapting to the cultural forms and patterns of the host society
3. celebrating holidays/commemorative days of the host country
4. getting involved with organisations of the host society
5. blending socially and culturally into the host society
6. obtaining citizenship of the host country
7. voting in host country elections.

The respondents were asked to check on a Likert-type scale from 1 to 4 how important they felt each item was for their community members. The legend in response to the items was: 1 = not important, 2 = moderately unimportant, 3 = moderately important, and 4 = very important. Although the items were presented in a counter-balancing manner in the interview schedule, I will analyse them according to their functions, either as an ‘identity preservation’ item or an ‘assimilation’ item (as listed).

Table 7.2 outlines the mean scores of the items according to the three groups. In observing the mean scores of all three groups combined (3.33 for identity preservation and 3.30 for assimilation), what becomes clear is the fact that the associations consider both the items listed under the identity preservation column and those in the assimilation column as being moderately important to very important: responses that might at first sight be contradictory. For example, the associations consider variables such as maintaining cultural forms and patterns, passing on the customs and language of the native country to future generations and maintaining close relations with people of the same country and/or ethnic group as important to the community. These items are clearly connected with the retention and promotion of ethnic identity. At the same time, respondents also attach great importance to learning (or adapting to) the language of the host society, blending in socially and culturally with the host society, as well as voting in host-country elections. Given these responses, the associations see no contradiction or paradox in their inclinations, given their belief that proper settlement in Portuguese society and contributing to it under a framework of equal rights as citizens, also comes more easily and more effectively from a basis of firm ethnic identity.

In comparing the overall mean scores of the three groups, the most noticeable difference lies in the fact that the Angolan assimilation score is higher than that of identity preservation, while the Brazilian and Eastern European results show the opposite. This can be explained by a number of factors. First, the Angolan migrants have been in Portugal for a longer period of time than the other two communities in question and, as previously argued in this chapter, feel that their assimilation into Portuguese society is a process that has been occurring for centuries (since Angola became a Portuguese colony). Second, contrary to the
Table 7.2  *Identity preservation and assimilation item mean scores*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>'Identity preservation' items</th>
<th>Angolan</th>
<th>Brazilian</th>
<th>Eastern European</th>
<th>Mean score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Retaining the native language and/or way of speaking</td>
<td>3.07</td>
<td>3.52</td>
<td>3.56</td>
<td>3.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retaining cultural forms and patterns</td>
<td>3.30</td>
<td>3.80</td>
<td>3.27</td>
<td>3.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passing on the customs and language of the native country to future generations</td>
<td>3.19</td>
<td>3.20</td>
<td>3.67</td>
<td>3.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passing on customs and culture to members of the host society</td>
<td>2.93</td>
<td>3.56</td>
<td>3.27</td>
<td>3.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Celebrating holidays/commemorative days of the country of origin</td>
<td>2.89</td>
<td>3.24</td>
<td>3.07</td>
<td>3.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belonging to an association of people of the same national/ethnic group</td>
<td>3.11</td>
<td>3.60</td>
<td>3.30</td>
<td>3.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintaining close relations with people of the same country and/or ethnic group</td>
<td>3.19</td>
<td>3.56</td>
<td>3.67</td>
<td>3.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Overall mean score</strong></td>
<td>3.10</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>3.40</td>
<td>3.33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| 'Assimilation' items                                                                            |         |           |                  |            |
| Learning (or adapting to) the language of the host society                                     | 3.85    | 2.88      | 3.93             | 3.55       |
| Adapting to the cultural forms and patterns of the host society                                | 3.70    | 3.08      | 3.17             | 3.32       |
| Celebrating holidays/commemorative days of the host country                                    | 3.30    | 3.24      | 2.97             | 3.17       |
| Getting involved with organisations of the host society                                        | 3.11    | 2.80      | 2.20             | 2.70       |
| Blending in socially and culturally with members of the host society                           | 3.74    | 3.56      | 3.47             | 3.59       |
| Obtaining citizenship of the host country                                                      | 3.74    | 3.04      | 3.56             | 3.45       |
| Voting in host country elections                                                               | 3.70    | 3.20      | 3.17             | 3.36       |
| **Overall mean score**                                                                         | 3.59    | 3.11      | 3.21             | 3.30       |

*Source:* Author’s own compilation

other two groups, the Angolan group is not a community that thinks of returning to their country of origin. Their general intention is to remain in Portugal. Reflecting on the integration of Angolans into Portuguese society, one interviewee stated:

[... ] many have been here a long time; they no longer feel the problems or issues of their homeland. When they want to eat muamba, they eat muamba; it is here for them. The issues of their homeland become weekend conversations held around a few drinks, but they
are no longer problems for them. This is because their version of Angola was the Angola that existed in the '60s or the '70s, different from the way Angola was in the '80s and '90s; the way it is now. From the moment that an individual leaves his homeland, his homeland becomes part of his past and the longer that person is away, the vision of his homeland becomes diluted. If I’ve been away from my homeland for a decade I know less about it than the Portuguese tourist who just returned from there last week. We have mental images of the way it used to be: there was this field there and there was that house over there, but they haven’t seen that field nor that house in years, so who knows, maybe that field and that house aren’t even there anymore. So ‘my Angola’ now only exists in the festivities I go to, in the food I eat once in a while, and in the stories of the past, but I no longer live the dramas and the problems that exist, that I know nothing about. Now we must forget our homeland and get connected to the battles here, with those we share our neighbourhoods with. We must incorporate ourselves in the battles for our new spaces, our neighbourhoods, our workplaces. Angola is music and dancing and food and so every weekend we celebrate that. If you’re poor, you celebrate it in the shantytowns, in the re-housing projects. If you belong to the bourgeoisie, they will recognise the same culture, but won’t mix. They celebrate the ‘white side’ of Angolan culture (A).

This eloquent description falls into Elliott and Fleras’s (1992) ‘weekend ethnicity’ concept. One’s ethno-cultural identity, in this case, becomes secondary to that of ‘everyday life’ encountered in the host country – in the workplace, in the neighbourhood, where he or she lives, etc. The ethnic culture, on the other hand, becomes a recreational occupation to be enjoyed as a free-time activity.

This sentiment, however, is not shared by the other two groups in question, as both the Brazilian and Eastern European associations claim that the majority of immigrants view themselves as temporary immigrants intending to return to their country of origin as soon as they have accomplished the economic goals that brought them to Portugal in the first place. This is particularly true of the Brazilian community:

Many come with the intention of leaving and don’t even think about integrating themselves. People never lose the reference of being Brazilian. Even those who have been here for decades – who have dual nationality – they don’t feel more Portuguese than they do Brazilian because the cultural traits are too strong to just be abandoned. Brazilians really value their identity and it’s something nobody wants to let go of. Brazilians adapt but are indifferent of the circumstances because the great, great majority come here with a goal which is to
make money and return. Cultural integration and identity and things like that are never on their minds. Being integrated into society by being provided equal rights and legalisation, now that is another story (B).

While the same phenomenon holds true in relation to the majority of Eastern European immigrants, a number of respondents point out that this is starting to change, with many immigrants now opting to stay, especially those who have reunited their families in Portugal. The following quote exemplifies:

> From one year to the next they become different people with other work conditions, other lives, better salaries, they become consumers. When I ask them: ‘Do you want to return or not?’ Many are unsure now. What I tell them is: ‘While you are here in Portugal, live 100 per cent of your life here’. The reality is that many are living two realities: they work here and send more than half of their money home to maintain their families. They don’t do anything here and they don’t do as much as they’d like to do back home either, this because they are divided and their money is divided. Now those who have their children here will stay, those who have no family here will return. For those who stay, if the socio-economic conditions and acceptance is favourable, many will integrate and will become a part of society like anyone else (EE).

Both of the two previous informants emphasise the immigrants’ intentions of staying in Portugal, or not, as determining factors which, in turn, will also be a determinant in their adaptation to the host country. Additionally, the conditions for integration offered by the host country will also be pivotal in that decision-making process.

Beyond the overall mean scores as discussed, responses given to the individual questions show further diversity, and are worthy of comment. Scrutinising the results, we see varying tendencies among the three groups. The Angolan group, for example, shows higher averages under those ‘assimilation’ items relating to learning the Portuguese language, adapting to the cultural forms and patterns of the host society, as well as obtaining citizenship and voting rights. By contrast, the Brazilians give greater value to items under the identity preservation section such as retaining the ways of speaking Portuguese, passing on cultural patterns to the host society, belonging to an association of Brazilian people and maintaining close relations with other Brazilians. Lastly, the Eastern European group shows a more balanced mixture of both tendencies, wishing to retain its own language while at the same time learn the language of the host country, passing on the customs and language to the
future generations, maintaining close relations with other Eastern European individuals as well as obtaining citizenship of the host country.

Now I wish to highlight a few particular aspects. The questions pertaining to language, for example, show that Eastern Europeans and Angolans give greater importance to learning or adapting to the Portuguese language than do the Brazilians. However, very different perspectives are given in relation to this topic. While both Brazil and Angola are Portuguese-speaking countries, Angolans consider it imperative to learn to speak ‘correct’ Portuguese, while not giving the same weight of importance to maintaining their old-country dialects. The Brazilians, on the other hand, feel that there is no need to abandon Brazilian-Portuguese pronunciation and vocabulary. On their part, Eastern Europeans give particular importance to acquiring the Portuguese language while at the same time maintaining their own, especially when it comes to transmitting it to their children. This same pattern is shown in relation to retaining cultural forms as opposed to adapting to Portuguese culture. Here the Angolans give Portuguese culture greater importance while the Brazilians express the opposite. The Eastern Europeans maintain a more neutral stance.

In relation to belonging to an association of people of the same ethnic background, as opposed to getting involved with a host-society organisation, figures are particularly low in relation to the latter, with respondents saying, in effect, that it is not an essential part of the integration process. While the Brazilian interviewees express the highest score when it comes to community members belonging to a Brazilian association, this number is in fact misleading for, as was previously stated in Chapter 6, Brazilians tend not to organise under formal associations, but instead often meet in an informal manner within select groups (most frequently consisting of friends). Why the high level of importance in belonging to a Brazilian association then? As one respondent put it:

I think a lot of people find this to be an essential service because they know this is where they can come when they have an issue and they need to have it resolved. They want to be attended to and they want answers but they don’t care about anything else. That is the only reason why I think they find it important to be a member here. So we can help them with issues they can’t handle by themselves. After that they don’t care about the association... (B).

Thus, it is not the process of joining an association for the purpose of preserving one’s identity that is important, but instead the associations’ roles as political representatives and problem-solving institutions.36
Concerning Portuguese versus ethnic customs and culture, I here opt for a triangular comparison between passing these elements on to future generations and to the host society, as opposed to adapting to the customs and culture of the host society. It is interesting to note how the three groups value the three items outlined. Concerned about their children’s lack of cultural contact with the ethnic culture and the influence of Portuguese language and culture, the Eastern Europeans express greater interest in passing these elements on to their children. The Brazilians, on the other hand, show greater concern in passing on their culture to Portuguese society. As one interviewee puts it:

[...] it’s important that the Portuguese possess a positive image of Brazilian culture for if they do, if they like our samba, our food and so on, that’s positive for us and we are viewed in a positive manner as well (B).

The preoccupation is thus to have their culture accepted by the host society so that the community, in turn, can have greater freedom of expressing it publicly. For the Angolan group, greater importance is given to adapting Portuguese cultural forms and patterns, something that is not only expressed in relation to first-generation migrants but in relation to the offspring as well. The stance is that in order to ascend socially, professionally and politically, it is important to integrate in the various dimensions of Portuguese life.

Lastly, obtaining Portuguese citizenship and voting in Portuguese elections is especially important to the Angolan group. As a number of their leaders expressed, it is through these outlets that the community can become stronger and contribute to making changes in Portuguese society:

[...] I say to the youth: while you’re sitting here saying that it’s racism, racism, racism, inventing rap [songs], ... it’s necessary to take other steps... We, a lot of times as association leaders, say: ‘Yeah, they don’t integrate blacks into the Municipal Assembly, into Parliament...’ Now if we, the black community, get into a party and if we are a group – a significant group – and if we can manage to influence, then we will be visible. Then we will be in Parliament. We will be in various places. This is a necessary step, but it’s not easy. It’s a question of us wanting it. And it’s also a question of knowing how to get there. We must be contributing citizens and we must act politically (A).

While the Eastern European respondents also maintain that their community values obtaining Portuguese nationality, it is also explained that, in obtaining Portuguese nationality, one is also obtaining European
Union nationality. Thus what is here considered important is becoming European: ‘it is important because then we can go anywhere in Europe and work anywhere without having any problems with documents’ (EE).

Generally speaking then, what emerges from this analysis may, at first glance, seem paradoxical. I refer here to the parallel commitment of retention of ethno-cultural forms, while simultaneously supporting people to settle and integrate into Portuguese society. What is witnessed is neither a cut-and-dried rejection of Portuguese society, nor an open-armed espousal of it, while, simultaneously, the majority of the association leaders propose that the most effective route to contented settlement and active contribution to the host society is via the fostering and promotion of their ethnic identity under a flag of equal rights, freedoms and respect. There is an awareness that culture, and therefore identity, should not be unilateral but instead a trade-off of experiences and practices including both the immigrant groups as well as the society that hosts them. What is endorsed is an inter-marriage of cultures:

[...] integration is a two-way street where both Portuguese society and immigrants, have to be willing to accept each other’s differences. What you bring with you, you teach, and, in return, you also adapt to elements of the new society. This is integration (B).

7.4 The positions of the associations on integration and identity

This section will analyse the integration and identity strategy model as promoted by the associations. To carry out this analysis, discussion centres around two central questions:

– What sort of integration model does the association propose?
– What sort of collective identity strategy does the association work for?

Arguments presented by the interviewees tended to fall under Schrover and Vermeulen’s (2005) dichotomy of the two opposing roles carried out by associations when it comes to community social integration: ‘offensive’ and ‘defensive’. The ‘offensive’ arguments included the integration side of the issue, with the associations calling for rights to legalisation, labour, housing, education, health, etc. The ‘defensive’ point-of-view was expressed on topics related to identity and ethno-cultural issues. This clear-cut distinction was often also expressed in setting out the ideals of the associations.

As was discussed in the first section of this chapter, the respective association groups highlight different integration problems. Unsurprisingly, it is also these same integration problems that determine the stances of the associations and their ‘offensive’ debates. I cite three ex-
cerpts from the three respective groups that I feel best exemplify the general stances of the associations. I commence with a Brazilian perspective:

[...] for us [the association], it is more a question of integrating them [the immigrants], in getting everyone legalised, in acquiring their rights – this is what’s important at this stage. All the other issues can start being taken care of after that. Family rights, labour rights, human rights – this must be taken care of first if a person is to integrate into this society. [...] Now something else that’s important: abolish class status categories. If you go to the Casa do Brasil, we have a very successful issue of Sabiá that asks the question: ‘You’re an immigrant of which class?’ You’ll find ten classes there. The classes are drawn up in relation to rights. You would place the majority of Brazilians in the lower classes. So that is the philosophy – to eliminate those class differences. How can this be done? By eliminating these different forms of legalisation. We support one form of legalisation – resident authorisation. We want legal citizen, legal worker and equal social rights for all (B).

In its simplest form, integration is thus an issue that can be accomplished with changes to migration legalisation. This is an issue that moulds many of the associations’ arguments on the integration front; change to immigrant legalisation policies will lead to greater rights being given as citizens and workers. Also worth noting, however, is the socialist debate of wanting to reduce class differences. A great number of associations, in fact, base their discourse on socialist militancy tactics, basing their integration models on left-wing ideologies. A second statement similarly reflects this position:

I would prefer first that Portugal gives all immigrants the same equal rights and opportunities, access to housing, language classes, professional training and equal access to the labour market. They should not be treated like repressed second-class citizens. It’s the social exclusion and the ghettoisation that leads to conflicts with the host population. Now if the example of social exclusion and ghettoisation comes from above; if the governments are the ones promoting this, what are we supposed to expect from the rest of society? Portugal should be promoting the insertion of these individuals because people will include themselves into Portuguese society and share their know-how and experiences if allowed and welcomed. Through their jobs, immigrants become citizens like any other person and as equal citizens they respect each other’s differences. Conditions should be set to allow every individual to be free to chose and to be a part of the
whole. Intercultural citizenship is what we favour; not multiculturalism since that implies this sort of tolerance where people think: ‘Poor them, let’s just keep them over there where they can be who they want to be, do what they want to do and won’t bother us’. That is what this association represents (EE).

Beyond the call for equal rights and opportunities, this affirmation demands that government take responsibility for its actions when it comes to integrating immigrants and, at the same time, set an example for the rest of the country. The quote also emphasises the importance of governments creating policies and initiatives that will permit immigrants to integrate within an intercultural framework. The following statement from an Angolan leader sheds further light on this same topic. The position of government policies, it is stressed, should be one of incorporation without forcing assimilation or promoting strategies that can lead to segregation.

We are against the mass congregations of people of the same ethnic or racial background in one place. We are against the politics of ghetto creation. This doesn’t help any immigrant; in fact it marginalises them even more. Just look at these neighbourhoods here in Amadora where the majority are Capeverdeans – these ‘African villages’. Our community has them too, like, for example, in Quinta do Mocho. These are problematic neighbourhoods and they’ll continue to be just that. From their very origins these neighbourhoods were left on their own. [...] There is a strong division between them and the rest of the city. This isn’t integration! This is abandonment! In relation to culture, something must be understood – there is confusion between identity and culture. Culture is the essence of the person – what they know, their behaviour and attitude with others, where they are from, what they eat and so on. Identity is perception. Now if you don’t perceive me the right way, and you are the majority, will you allow me to integrate if that is my wish? (A).

In addition to the appeal to do away with ghettoisation policies, the interviewee also questions the host society’s perception of ethnic identities and the role of this perception when it comes to integration. In fact, respondents from all three association groups often made reference to greater openness to difference as a key component to integration, highlighting the importance of equality and the abolition of racism and xenophobia. Accordingly, from an ‘offensive’ standpoint, the integration models promoted by the associations are also what shape their lobbying tactics and demands. Key words in their intervention include: legality, equality, rights, acceptance and respect.
From the ‘defensive’ viewpoint, the associations stand firm on defending the freedom to maintain, practice and transmit ethnic identities. Feeling heavily marked by historical colonial relations and often holding a bitter perspective concerning the past and the loss of many key cultural elements, the Angolan associations emphasise how not to assimilate immigrants, frequently reflecting on what 500 years of Portuguese presence in Angola did to their ethno-cultural identity:

What Portugal tried to do during the 500 years they were in Angola should never happen. They did everything to assimilate the population into becoming Portuguese. That is impossible because that means cutting out our roots and when you do that, people stop being what they are because they are forced, but don’t become what you want them to be either because its against their will. Who are we to try to change the way others are? That should never be done. In South Africa they segregated people ... no mixing. In Angola they forced us into becoming Portuguese; to speak Portuguese in order to eradicate our languages. They did a good job. Many of our dialects [dialectos] are gone. That is a crime! We should be free to identify ourselves with our country and culture of origin without being criticised and discriminated (A).

From the perspective of this quote, what the Angolan people went through in the past is thus something to learn from and not to be repeated.

Accordingly, the associations articulate a variety of ways in which ethno-cultural identity issues should be handled, expressing a range of efforts to help maintain the community’s ethnic identity. However, the degree to which acculturation, assimilation or cultural identity retention should take place does not see parallel or identical responses from the three groups. In large part, what was mutually agreed on was the importance of cultural freedom of choice, expression and display. To exemplify, I again cite a few chosen excerpts from the respective groups.

I start with the perception of an Angolan association and its view that integration must also include what the association’s spokesperson referred to as ‘bits of assimilation’ within a framework of liberty to practice one’s own ethnic culture:

Integration has to be, on one hand, a bit of assimilation such as the case of Angolans who have been here for a long time that have assimilated their lifestyles, their values, their culture into that of being Portuguese. This happens with time. People are also aware that they live in this society; that they have to behave according to the social patterns of this society. They must assimilate into those patterns and
norms. But outside of those norms, they turn to their own culture and are proud of displaying that culture and the fact that they are Angolan and African. So they dress in their traditional clothing, organise their own spaces and environments with symbols of their Angolan and African origins. They practise and feel their identity without feeling threatened. They live within a Portuguese mass culture but preserve their own culture as individuals. With time, there are integration dynamics that go through a process of assimilation and there are those that go through a process of cultural coexistence. We defend the freedom to have this choice; the freedom to bring individuals who share the same culture, or who respect that culture, together to celebrate it (A).

Two points are evident in this statement: first is the call for a division between the ‘Angolan or African world’ and the generalised ‘Portuguese world’, where the community member is a transient, free to circulate between the two; second, is the autonomy to identify or participate in a culture (or in certain elements of a culture) one may choose.

As previously observed, when it comes to the mentality of community members, the Brazilian associations explained that identity retention and cultural exclusion is the most common strategy. Some of the Brazilian interviewees, however, discourage this approach. As one association leader explains:

If we pick a different country to live in – to work in – we should automatically become a part of the customs of that country and do our best to make ourselves feel like we’re at home. The only way to do that is to be at peace with the culture of the host society and join in and learn from it. So in football, for example, if Portugal is playing we should cheer for Portugal, unless they are playing Brazil of course. At the same time, we can’t forget where we are from, although with time we start forgetting as well. Any Brazilian that is here in Portugal should try to live his or her life on a daily basis as if he or she were 80 per cent Portuguese, 20 per cent Brazilian. You can’t ask that the host society change for you; after all it is the majority. You have to be flexible when you’re an immigrant. This philosophy of only dealing with our own is not the best, but a lot of Brazilians come here and the only people they know are other Brazilians – they live with other Brazilians, they work with other Brazilians... But Brazilians can’t come here thinking: ‘I’m not going to talk to Portuguese people; I’m not going to eat what they eat’. It can’t be like that. You have to mould yourself around the lifestyle that exists here (B).
The philosophy presented in this statement is that, in order to feel integrated, the immigrant should adapt to the cultural identity of the host society. Similarly, an Eastern European leader explains the importance of interacting with both the native and the host-country cultural worlds:

Our goal is to educate and develop people and give them a base from which they can grow here in Portugal. So it is important to educate, to learn the language, to learn about Portuguese culture and traditions. To be a citizen, a person must adapt and must integrate into the community, along with knowing who he or she is and where he or she’s from – knowing classical music, knowing Tchaikovsky, Chopin and Beethoven; knowing Russian literature – Tolstoy, Dostoyevsky, etc. [...] These will be the ideal individuals who will have an advantage; that will know Russian, Ukrainian and Portuguese; that will know Camões as well as Russian poets and Russian writers. We want our children to learn Portuguese, to learn alongside Portuguese students; we want them to learn English, but we also want them to learn the language of their country of origin. This is capital for them. It’s a privilege to be able to draw from two cultures, from the best that both worlds have to offer (EE).

Both of the two previous interviewees support the view that cultural, intellectual and social aspects of identity are a resource that can be utilised to enrich a person. Cultural options should be seen as a means to an end with the end being one’s fulfilment as an individual.

From the narratives presented by the association representatives, it can thus be argued that a ‘dual identification’ is in large part promoted by the associations. In fact in the words of an Angolan interviewee, ‘taking the best of what both worlds have to offer’ (A) is a sentiment that universalises what many of the associations strive for. The negotiating of identity components is also seen as a ‘weapon of integration’, as, by adapting to Portuguese culture, while simultaneously maintaining one’s ethnic affiliation, an individual is preparing him/herself to satisfy his or her ethno-cultural necessities, as well as acquiring the ‘cultural tools’ that best suit the given environment, and keeping open options for the future, which might include a return home.

Ultimately, it can be argued that the associations advocate ‘hyphenated identities’ and the right to be able to acquire that hyphen. However, in what sectors of life is the right side or the left side of the hyphen supposed to weigh heavier? This will depend on the interests and sentiments of each individual and what he or she can gain socially, culturally, economically and/or politically from each identity positioning.
7.5 The associations as transmitters of identity strategies

Given that associations defend a pluralistic and intercultural form of integration, as well as an identity strategy that favours both preservation and assimilation, it is also important to discuss how the associations transmit these ideologies and how they are put to practice. In order for this to be accomplished, the interviewees were asked to discuss what their association is doing to help community members become ‘more Portuguese’ in terms of identity; and, to the contrary, what they are doing to help members retain their ethno-cultural identity.

In all three groups the associations pointed to the organisation of festivities to celebrate traditional culture, often involving music, dance and food. In addition, many held events to commemorate home-country holidays, organised other events to promote community artists, and established forms of media; yet others founded cultural groups ranging from music and dance to spiritual help and sports clubs. These were the most common forms of passing on culture mentioned.

On the other hand, when it comes to adapting to elements of Portuguese identity, some of the associations (Angolan and Brazilian in particular) highlighted preparing Portuguese dishes alongside their own ethnic gastronomy whenever festivities take place. They also emphasised partaking in activities, events and festivities either organised by or in collaboration with host-society organisations. Celebrating Portuguese commemorative days alongside Portuguese organisations is a common occurrence, with the main goal being that of displaying ethnic culture together with Portuguese culture to encourage community mixing. The latter of these two aims, however, as one Eastern European spokesperson explains, is not always a successful task:

[...] what we end up seeing is that they [Portuguese and the immigrant community] divide themselves. There are always two parts in these festivities because the two groups will keep to their own (EE).

Amongst this identity preservation/adaptation dichotomy, one particularity common to the Eastern European group is that of language. The associations here refer to their double role in both teaching Portuguese to the first generation of immigrants and the native languages to their offspring. One interviewee explains that, in providing language classes, the associations are minimising the inter-generational clash of identities:38

Our association provides the opportunity to learn both the Eastern Europe languages and the Portuguese language. For example, for the children, we have a teacher who teaches them Portuguese songs to
sing, so it’s not only Russian or Ukrainian songs they learn. This is the cultural integration we want. The children need to learn the language of their parents because they are not in daily contact with the Ukraine or Russia. They learn Portuguese at school and many are forgetting how to speak their native language. With the parents, it’s the other way around. They are learning Portuguese with the passing of time. The associations, by teaching the children their native language and the parents Portuguese, are helping to avoid this communication barrier that can end up taking place (EE).

The associations thus function as a bridge between the two linguistic worlds and between two generations, providing opportunities for one linguistic form to be retained and the other to be learned.

Most associations claim that it is almost impossible to work exclusively with a single identity strategy in mind. The option of being more Portuguese or Angolan, Brazilian, Ukrainian, etc., is primarily left up to each respective community member, for, as was pointed out by a number of the leaders, the associations cannot control the identity strategies of their members who, obviously, have a life outside of the associations. The alternative, as one Angolan leader explains, is to provide options:

Our association has as its primary strategy to help people reflect and ponder their cultural and social origins within a new society; within a new context that has different patterns of organisation. So we try to help people value their identity while at the same time not putting up borders that might stunt their process of integration. Only those who are secure in their identity and values will have an easier time in dealing with the values and identity patterns of other societies including this [Portuguese] society. There are those who prefer to assimilate because they see this as an easier route to integration. But there are also those who resist, who are set in their ways of being and tend to isolate themselves and create their own spaces of identity, proximate to their homeland and their compatriots, without venturing too much out of that closer circle. We don’t promote or discourage any of these options. What we do is provide the opportunity for them to see the other side if they want to. As an association we do not isolate ourselves. In fact, the association works towards bringing value to the various cultural identities it works with in order to show that cultural diversity can enrich our society (A).

The availability of ethno-cultural options in order to permit community members to partake and adapt as they may see fit is thus highlighted. Emphasis is also placed on the non-exclusionary role this particular asso-
Association carries out, offering activities and opportunities for members to insert themselves in both Angolan and Portuguese culture.

Brazilian and Eastern European associations expressed the same notion; however, the intertwining of cultural elements and intercultural exchanges can also be seen as an integration strategy, along with being a defining element of the associations. The following two accounts draw attention to this pattern:

Some Brazilians have married Portuguese partners and have settled faster into a Portuguese lifestyle. They bring their wives to our events; and their kids now speak with Portuguese accents. But what takes place is that when we’re abroad, we’re defined by where we live and where we make our home and not our country of origin. Some Brazilians are identified as Brazilians here in Portugal and Portuguese back in Brazil, for example. I founded this organisation to support the Brazilian National Team but we also support Portugal, after all we have Deco\textsuperscript{39} and Filipão\textsuperscript{40} on the Portuguese National Team. This shows the proximity that exists between both societies. One of our members who married a Portuguese woman got a banner made for the Portugal-Brazil football game that took place here in Lisbon two years ago [2002] that read: ‘Brazil-Portugal: Two countries one heart’ – I think that’s a beautiful way of putting it (B).

We are helping our community to integrate by making our culture part of the landscape of this country. I think we try to live arm-in-arm with both our culture and Portuguese culture. We are here at this fair celebrating Saint António’s Day.\textsuperscript{41} We are sharing cultures here. People come here to celebrate a day typical to this country and they find us here in the middle of all this. The majority of all this is typically Portuguese: music, food, etc. – and we’re participating alongside each other. So you see people coming here – Romanians, Moldovans – who maybe just ate some sardines\textsuperscript{42} and if they want they can go next door and have a Brazilian drink from one of the Brazilian stands. This is what our association is. It’s part of Portugal (EE).

These excerpts show that other purveyors exist; different sets of loyalty and influences which will also ingrain themselves into the associations’ make-up. This is exemplified by association members marrying into Portuguese society or participating in Portuguese organised events. As a result, no different from the individuals they represent (and the philosophies that they represent), the associations also acquire ‘multiple subject positions’ (Cohen 1997) through dealings outside of the associations’ structure, and with individuals and organisms outside the ethnic circle. This, in turn, implies that a homogeneous image of identity is non-exis-
tent, no matter how much an association may work towards the goal of ethnic identity maintenance.

With the cultural interactions that take place and the influence of this interaction in negotiating identity strategies, these organisations become what Bhabha (1994) coins as a ‘third space’ of identity belonging. The associations cannot be identified as associations representative of one single ethnic identity, but instead as hyphenated associations, for they may end up pursuing what they consider to be the best of both worlds, based on the opportunity structures ‘offered’ to them by the different national contexts they negotiate with. The result is thus the amalgamation of the two primary identities: the ethnic identity and the host country’s one. The ‘third space’ is defined by the union of these ‘worlds’, with the end result being the establishment of Angolan-Portuguese, Brazilian-Portuguese and Eastern European-Portuguese organisations.

Two further contexts are also affecting identity. Jenkins and Sauber (1988) refer to the ‘jet age’ and the ‘electronic age’, two primary contributors to time/space compression. Immigrants can today return to their native land in less then 24 hours; long-distance telephone calls can be directly dialled at accessible rates; international television channels can provide live images, sounds and news coverage of the latest events taking place back home, while the internet can provide information and e-mail can be sent at the touch of a button. In the case of the associations interviewed, contributions to this time/space compression are accomplished through the creation of information outlets, namely internet stations, international television channels, exchanges with ancestral-country organisations, travel agency services, etc.

As entities placed within receiving-sending country contexts, these associations thus function as what Levitt and Glick Schiller (2003) describe as transnational social spaces. They are transmitters of integration and identity options within a transnational social field. This is exemplified by the receiving-sending country contexts of associative activities (i.e. Angolans serving Portuguese dishes alongside ethnic dishes when hosting parties; the Brazilian associations organising their own Carnival group in order to participate in Carnival activities organised by a local municipality; the Eastern Europeans establishing native language classes as well as Portuguese classes) as well as transnational dealings (i.e. host and native country as well as diasporic connections with political institutions, religious organisations, cultural groups). The cultural activist repertoire that is presented by the associations constructs new forms of cultural expression that bring together different cultural influences on a transnational level. The associations thus construct forms of ‘transcultural capital and/or transcultural and transnational networks’ related to cultural expression which, in turn, influences identity formation (Meinhof and Triandafyllidou 2006).
Accordingly, the associations take advantage of strong local and transnational ties within and across the migrant and native communities (maximising their social capital) and capitalise on their involvement within the bi- or multi-cultural settings within which they negotiate (maximising cultural capital). The organisations may retain their roots in their countries and cultures of origin, but blend these with new attachments in Portugal. They thus adopt the role of transcultural, and therefore trans-identity mediators, developing and using their cultural capital to act as channels of communication and bridges between the country/countries of origin and Portuguese society. In addition, they also become agents of transcultural capital as well as giving voice to new forms of expression and identity, creating new blends of local, national and global interactions which, in turn, are reflected in the communities they represent.

* * *

Within the kaleidoscope of topics relating to diversity presented in this chapter, two key issues emerge. The first is the centrality of the twin concepts of integration and differentiation. From the information presented and discussed, it is possible to conclude, first, that the extensive exclusion problems faced by the three immigrant communities are major barriers to their integration into Portuguese society. The three association groups identify specific problems unique to their community, determined by the integration conditions set by the Portuguese governments at the time when the immigration flows took place, on the one hand, and by the characteristics of the immigrants themselves (e.g. low levels of education, lack of qualifications, not knowing Portuguese) on the other. The asymmetry of social relations and identification between the individual groups and the host society are also contributing factors to the degree of integration. This is demonstrated through existing stereotypes and myths as well as discriminatory and racist acts. The degree to which a foreign community integrates into a society that is not their own also depends on the host society’s openness to differences. From the perspectives of the associations, both ‘real’ socio-cultural differences and stereotypes have contributed to hampering integration. Lack of equal treatment and opportunity is pointed out as a primary obstacle.

The second common theme is that, although assimilation and identity preservation may at first seem opposite goals, the associations support both and aim their activities in mutually accomplishing them. Integration, first off, is seen as being a part of Portuguese society in terms of equal rights and duties. When it comes to moulding identity, however, it is argued that immigrants should not have to abandon their cultural roots in order to integrate into Portuguese society. The acquisition of
components from both the respective ethnic culture and Portuguese culture is promoted as an ideal. Associations work with these aims in mind. The vitality and commitment of the immigrant associations in coordinating their involvement in both the receiving and sending contexts demonstrates their willingness to work within both ethnic and host-country systems. Thus, through their cultural events, festivities, seminars and workshops, on the one hand, and through their political engagements, often in the form of demonstrations, petitions, public statements, media contacts and parliamentary lobby tactics and hearings, on the other, the associations invest in embedding the communities they represent into Portuguese society, while at the same contributing to what is most desired – a pluralistic, intercultural way of living.
8 The associations and Portuguese social and community services

Given the privileged positioning of immigrant associations as interlocutors between the communities they represent and the various social and community service mechanisms operating at national and local levels, the key focus of this chapter is to analyse the views of the associations on these services and other integration instruments available to immigrants in Portugal. The data focuses on two central questions posed to interviewees representing the associations:

– What is your opinion of the various Portuguese social and community services when it comes to the integration and needs of community members?
– What changes would you suggest for improving the Portuguese social and community services and the conditions of integration?

In this chapter, I shift the structure of the analysis from looking at immigrant association groups to looking at specific problem areas. However, when needed, national group specificities will also be looked at. Although there are an almost infinite variety of immigrant integration topics to be analysed in the Portuguese case, I opted to question the associations on eight areas, which I consider of primary importance. These areas are: regularisation and the Foreigners and Borders Services; ACIME and the National Immigration Plan; employment, training and qualification recognition; housing; family reunification; immigrant descendants and education; health; and lastly, associations and civic participation.1

8.1 Regularisation and the Foreigners and Borders Services

In order to gain rights and privileges, it is essential that an immigrant first be recognised as a legal citizen residing in the country that hosts him or her (Powers et al. 1998; Lyberaki and Maroukis 2005; Malheiros 2006). In Portugal, different inflows of undocumented immigrants at different stages during the last 30 years have brought about a number of
regularisation processes (including the following special periods of regularisation: 1992/1993, 1996, 2001 – *permanência* authorisation, 2003 – Lula Accord and 2004 – CTT process). Interviewees were asked for comment on these processes of regularisation, along with observations on the administrative service that oversees the regularisation of immigrants and document renewal in Portugal – the Foreigners and Borders Services (SEF).

Considering that the three immigrant groups in question have experienced flows at different time periods, and therefore have seen their communities go through different documentation processes at different times, it is no surprise that the tendency was for the associations to comment on the schemes they knew best.

Accordingly, having gone through the first two campaigns in the 1990s, the Angolan associations, and, above all, those which had been members in the Coordinating Secretariat for Legalisation Action (see chapter 4), commented on the difficulties in getting these first campaigns ‘off the ground’, especially in terms of providing information and ‘getting the word’ out to the community. However, in the words of one Angolan leader: ‘The first two campaigns in the ’90s were serious regularisation campaigns. These ones now aren’t regularisation campaigns. They’re authorisation campaigns’ (A). The interviewee is here referring to the campaigns that have taken place since the introduction of the 2001 *permanência* authorisation campaign. Different from the first two processes – which in large part regularised immigrants originating from the PALOP countries – the last three schemes have primarily regulated Brazilian and Eastern European nationals. However, all three groups are equally critical of the most recent regularisations.

In relation to the *permanência* authorisation scheme, the consensus among the associations is that this form of authorisation should not exist. The associations want its abolition, stating that in its place, if an immigrant meets the requirements (is registered with social security, has a labour contract and has no criminal record in the country of origin or in the host country), that individual should be given residential authorisation, as was offered by the 1990s schemes. In addition, the call is to keep regularisation open, instead of the sporadic regularisation periods or protocols favouring specific communities (such as the Lula Accord) that have taken place thus far.

As it currently stands, however, the *permanência* authorisation scheme is criticised for being introduced to serve the short-term economic needs of the country:

They are trying to tell us that we are welcome here under their conditions. We are only here for one reason and if for whatever reason you go without working and contributing to this society then we don’t
want you [the immigrant] here! That is why permanência authorisation exists, so every year when the time comes to renew, if we meet all the conditions that are needed, we can leave our 75 euros there and stay for another year. If not, then leave (EE).

This interviewee thus feels that the creation of the permanência authorisation scheme is a way of controlling the immigrant labour force – maintaining immigrants as a ‘throw-away work force’, only needed on a short-term base. The quote also makes reference to the annual renewal of the permanência authorisation, a process that is criticised for being bureaucratic, slow and expensive. The renewal process was explained in the following manner:

People start lining up outside SEF at sundown the day before to try to resolve their issues, and sometimes it’s all for nothing. When we finally get attended to they say: ‘You need this paper’, or ‘You have to ask for that in writing’ ... Seldom does anyone get it right the first time. People line-up for hours, they lose an entire day of work to come and do this and if things aren’t in order, they’ll have to come back another day and they’ll lose another day. And let’s not forget that this will happen every year during a five year period. Beyond that, things take forever to resolve – to have the necessary papers in our hands: work contract certified, social security contributions and so on... And it’s all because they’re government workers who are not efficient. Many don’t know what they are doing, and others simply don’t want to work! They have the power in their hands and that’s it (A).

This statement is just one of the many criticising SEF’s handling of regularisation and document renewal. Many of the interviewees referred to SEF staff’s incompetence, using such adjectives as: ‘unqualified’, ‘untrained’, ‘uninformed’, ‘disorganised’, ‘disrespectful’ ‘unproductive’ and ‘unaccountable’ to describe their handling of the regularisation processes. SEF offices are viewed as being ‘under-staffed’, ‘under-equipped’ and ‘unprepared’; accused of often possessing poor working conditions and lacking management and supervision. The Eastern European associations, in particular, pointed out the communication problems often encountered in SEF offices, as they do not have translators. Many also pointed out the lack of coordination between the SEF head and regional offices, with each one often left to interpret the immigrant laws as they wish. As one leader states:

The criteria used by the SEF office in Setúbal, for example, are not the same criteria in Lisbon. Lisbon is not the same as in Santarém. It
seems that it all depends on who the regional service director is and how he views immigration and immigrants (EE).

Most of the negative remarks concerning SEF offices, however, were aimed at the SEF central office in Lisbon. When it comes to regional offices in smaller and medium-sized urban centres, the opinions of the associations are more positive. The following testimony from an association leader in Beja attests this:

The SEF here is not like in Lisbon. The thing is here if you want to talk to the person on top you can do just that because there aren’t that many people. People don’t line up early in the morning or the day before; they just show up and get attended to. The behaviour of the people who work there at the SEF office is nothing like the way it is in Lisbon because they [the employees] aren’t under as much stress here. Things are facilitated here to the point that people from other districts come here. In particular, people from the district of Setúbal who are close to the [district] border will find a way of coming here (EE).

The overall negative view of SEF, however, also leads many leaders to believe that the Foreigners and Borders Service should not be the administrative unit in charge of documenting immigrants. This is due to the fact that SEF is, above all, a security department in charge of enforcing laws:

I don’t go to the police to take care of my identification card. Thus it makes no sense that immigrants should have a policing unit to take care of their identification. They should take that away from SEF. If a border police is needed, ok, fine... then let them be a border police. A police to take care of immigrant issues is not what is needed but it’s what we have... (I).

Thus, when asked who should take on the duties of regularisation, document renewal and granting nationality, it was suggested that this is a job better suited to ACIME. Another suggestion is that the municipalities take over this responsibility. As one interviewee put it: ‘The administrative services of city halls have the capacity to manage services. They are closer to the issues, the sources, the problems and the people’ (EE).

The composition and handling of the two most recent regularisation processes, the Lula Accord and the CTT process, were heavily criticised by the interviewees. The associations critiqued the eligibility requirements, the bureaucracies involved, as well as the processes’ failure. First, in order to be eligible, the candidate must have arrived in Portugal prior
to 11 July 2003 in the case of the Lula Accord and between 30 November 2001 and 12 March 2003 for the CTT process. The candidate has three weeks to register in the case of the Lula Accord and 40 days in relation to CTT. The candidacy must then include: the expired visa (renewed and penalty paid), labour contract certified by the General Labour Inspection (IGT), social security payments (minimum 90 days), criminal record (host country and country of origin), medical exam, proof of appointment with Portuguese consulate in Spain, and a Schengen Visa request form. Lastly the candidate must visit a Portuguese consulate office in Spain to acquire a visa (Padilla 2006). The following two statements express the discordance with these processes:

[...] once you’re under the (Lula) Accord awaiting your case, you can’t leave the country; so if you have to go to Brazil for something, you lose your right. Some people have been waiting a year and a half. Theoretically, the Accord was well put together but in practice, it’s been terrible. You have to go to Spain to visit a consulate office. Doesn’t make sense either. You spend all this money to go to Spain, take time off work; not everybody can afford this. The numbers speak for themselves: 30,000 in total, many don’t fit the requirements, many without work visas. If SEF ‘calls my number’, my employer has to collaborate in handing in my contract to the IGT. If I don’t have a contract I can present a complaint, but IGT has difficulties in investigating because they don’t have the resources and will take a long time. This ends up draining a person (B).

[...] Who is the illegal immigrant paying social security? – Only if by mistake. They are illegal – nobody is interested in giving them contracts. 53,000 registered and there are about 10,000 who had the 90 days with the CTT process. The others have to come up with proof which slows the process down. Two years have passed and probably another 100,000 have entered since so there are probably 200,000 illegals now, so there’s going to have to be another law of some sorts to regularise these new individuals (EE).

These two quotes make reference to the lack of success of these regularisation campaigns. The Lula Accord received 30,000 applications, 13,998 (46 per cent) of which where successful. The CTT campaign has seen even weaker results with 53,000 candidacies received, 13,000 (25 per cent) of which were granted. Due to the lack of success, the campaigns remain open with a new call for candidacies having been made (Padilla 2006).
8.2 ACIME and the National Immigration Plan

From an institutional standpoint, the integration of immigrants at the national level is under the responsibility of the High Commission for Immigrant and Ethnic Minorities (ACIME). The associations were asked for their opinions on the work of ACIME and the National Immigration Plan (or more specifically, the national information network and the national support system for immigrants – see Chapter 4).

Opinions on ACIME were mixed: certain initiatives and institutional arrangements were praised; other schemes were viewed in a negative manner. Generally speaking, the existence of ACIME was viewed in a positive manner; an important mediating instrument between the migrant communities and government. However, due to the fact that ACIME possesses no power to legislate, the general consensus was that this institution should have its status elevated to a Secretariat of State on immigrant affairs:

It [ACIME] should be something with more political power, more effective and decisive. It should have its own autonomy instead of being dependent on the Council of Ministers and the state budget. It should not be recognised simply as a public service institution but be responsible for immigration policies. Political questions related to immigration are under the control of the Ministry of Internal Administration, which should be taken away. This Ministry has as its instrument SEF, which manages immigration. However the existence of a public institution – that has a wider view of immigration matters and politics – this should be an institution with the authority for management; a true Secretariat of State on this matter. The High Commissioner should be a Secretary of State and be treated as such when it comes to all governmental aspects (B).

Many of the interviewees thus possess a ‘better than nothing’ outlook in relation to ACIME, affirming that it is an indication that the state is concerned with the integration of immigrants and ethnic minorities, although not to the point of making it a priority area in Portuguese politics.

ACIME is also praised for the inclusion of immigrants and ethnic minorities when it comes to providing services, especially with the hiring of personnel through the protocols that have been established with the associations (see Chapter 4). According to one interviewee:

ACIME has now integrated immigrants into their services and the communities can relate to this, and this creates a closer proximity between the service and the attendee. Communication, for example,
can be simplified when the same language is spoken. The people on the other side working with them [the attendees] also understand the issues because they too have gone through the same, so they understand the spirit, the fight that’s involved (EE).

However, on the other side of this same issue, the associations criticised the lack of immigrants and/or ethnic minorities in decision-making positions:

ACIME is an organism based on domination policies. The strategy, from the ideological standpoint, is a colonialist one. An article in an ACIME Bulletin recently stated that ‘the state is in the hands of the immigrants’, referring to the immigrants who work for ACIME. This is an example of this colonialist ideology. The reality is that, with ACIME, the pawns, the workers, are the immigrants, but you won’t find one immigrant in a decision-making position or in a place of power. The immigrants are on the front lines but they’re not running anything (B).

The lack of immigrants and ethnic minorities in power positions within ACIME led some to argue that this institution is nothing more than a forum for Portuguese individuals to affirm themselves at the expense of immigrants. The call is to see more immigrants and ethnic minorities in higher positions within ACIME in order to provide the ethnic and immigrant communities with greater opportunities to be closer to the matters and decisions pertinent to them.

In relation to the ACIME-spearheaded National Integration Plan, the associations praised the initiatives of the national information network and, in particular, the SOS Immigrant telephone line (highlighting the benefits and convenience of having questions and doubts answered in an variety of languages over the telephone), the efforts of the High Commission office in disseminating information (through different forms of media, through the associations, etc.), and the campaigns ACIME have carried forward with the goal of promoting tolerance, interracial respect and the acceptance of immigrants in Portugal.

The most commented-on ACIME initiative, however, was the creation of the Lisbon and Porto National Immigrant Support Centres (CNAI), commended, above all, for being a bureaucracy-facilitating initiative in the way they unite a variety of services ‘under the same roof’. The centralisation of services that is accomplished through the two CNAIs is thus seen as particularly useful for those immigrants who reside in the two urban areas where they are located. However, a common complaint (mainly from associations outside of Lisbon and Porto conurbations), is that many individuals still have to go to the various public service offices
nearest to them to handle the different issues. Although Local Information Support Centres (CLAI) have been set up in smaller urban centres throughout Portugal – and are considered by the associations as being an important step in decentralisation of information – they do not reduce time spent going from one service to the next. In having to do this ‘running around’, the disparity of answers (because the technical and service workers often possess limited knowledge in relation to the legislation that regulates immigrant rights) as well as the lack of inter-institutional coordination, complicates immigrant-social service relations and, above all, the efficiency of getting responses and seeing a situation properly handled (Malheiro 2006: 15). One interviewee expressed this frustration in the following manner:

A lot of times in these services – behind those counters – we deal with people and services that just complicate things. We are immigrants, we are new here and we learn how things work along the way. They are supposed to be specialists trained to carry out what they do but sometimes you wonder if they were trained at all (E).

Greater articulation between social services and civil society institutions, more improved training of service workers as well as stricter recruitment selection of employees for the services are, therefore, considered essential in order to improve the lives of those who have to deal with these services.

Although the CNAIs are viewed as facilitating the lives of many by amalgamating services, another view, however, is that the CNAIs should not even exist:

These services (provided by the CNAIs) should be framed into the services provided by the host society. Where immigrants go to resolve their issues should be where the Portuguese go. The services provided at the CNAIs should be provided at the Loja do Cidadão [Citizen Shop] where the immigrants would go through what the Portuguese go through. The CNAIs are another form of ghettoisation. There is no doubting that the results have been positive, but the philosophy that is behind the creation of these centres is a positive form of discrimination that leads the immigrant nowhere. So I am critical of these programmes and the philosophy behind them. [...] These are specific services, but they should be included with the rest. Social security is just as needed for immigrants as it is for the Portuguese (EE).

The integration of services into the same programmes used by Portuguese citizens, as is suggested, is thus considered by some associations
to be an important ‘top-down’ step in the integration of immigrants in Portuguese society.

Concerning the CLAIs, as has been pointed out, their primary limitation is that they fail to go beyond being information-providing bodies, often existing only to tell the immigrants where they should go to handle their bureaucratic issues. However, other limitations were also pointed out, relating to their poor functionality and organisation and in relation to people’s identification with the respective office. To exemplify these limitations, I turn to one leader’s opinion concerning the CLAI office in Braga:

The CNAIs are a good idea, but locally they don’t cater for people the way they should. [...] If they attend to two or three immigrants a day, that’s a good day. I think it’s a waste of money. They don’t know our language so they can’t respond to our problems. What are they doing there then? There are associations that need this money; that could use it in a better way. They could distribute it among us or do something else with it instead of having this CLAI. They’ve held one festival, The People’s Festival [referring to the CLAI in Braga], which was actually the work of the associations, and they didn’t provide us with any money at all for our services. It’s not a matter of bureaucracies or coordination. It’s a matter of not wanting to open up to society, of wanting control. The Diocese of Braga controls everything; it controls the Red Cross, social security, the CLAI... Indirectly everything belongs to the church. We work for them and they control us (EE).

In this excerpt the interviewee highlights the often better positioning of the associations to carry out the work that the CLAIs do. It is also pointed out that the CLAI is under the control of the Catholic Church. This institutional competition, in this case between associations, the government as well as the church, exemplifies the ‘crowding-out effect’ of government and non-government bodies and initiatives, which may lead to the obliteration of immigrant associations when it comes to service delivery. What can thus be referred to as the intrusion of CLAI offices in certain urban centres throughout Portugal correlates with the findings of Caponio (2005) in relation to Catholic organisations’ encroachment on immigrant associations in Italian cities.

8.3 Employment, training and qualification recognition

The degree of professional and economic integration of immigrants into a host society is determined by several variables. These include the qualifications held by the immigrants upon arrival, the degree to which the
host society permits professional integration (i.e. through the recognition of qualifications), and the opportunities provided by the host society in obtaining further qualifications. Taking these points into consideration, the objects of this section are twofold: first, to analyse the institutional instruments that work to facilitate the integration of immigrants in the Portuguese labour market; and second, to evaluate the opportunities and programmes available to immigrants that permit them to progress professionally. In order to accomplish these goals, the interviewees were asked for their opinions on instruments such as the IGT, the Employment and Professional Training Institute (IEFP) as well as the qualification recognition programmes that have been established in Portugal.

As a number of studies have pointed out (Salt 1992; Fakiolas 1999; Anderson 2000; Hjornø 2003), undocumented migrants are often more prone to labour market exploitation than those who settle in a host country in a legal fashion. In Portugal, with the government’s hesitation in legalising undocumented migrants (many of whom are already inserted into the labour market), it has been easy for employers to exploit undocumented migrants, pay them lower wages (or not pay them at all), deprive them of their rights, and not comply with their fiscal obligations and social security payments (Peixoto 2002). The Portuguese government body in charge of inspecting labour conditions and looking out for the rights of workers is the IGT. Reactions to its work were mixed. While some interviewees commended the IGT for always being ready to collaborate when called upon, others claimed that the institution, and, above all, its inspectors, discriminate and don’t always favour the immigrant. A common accusation, however, is that inspectors frequently turn a blind eye to irregularities.

They [the IGT inspectors] have a lot to do but don’t do a lot of it. They should inspect more; after all that is their job. If they did that they could avoid all these labour accidents [interviewee shows me a file]. There are cases of construction companies that say they have insurance coverage when they don’t. If the IGT were to inspect these things, stuff like this would not happen as much as it does. Sometimes I think: ‘To what extent are inspections really done?’ These things should be transparent but they’re not (B).

The lack of transparency comes from the fact that construction companies not only possess power over the immigrants, but over labour inspectors as well. Some interviewees accuse inspectors of taking part in illegal dealings in order to protect the construction companies. ‘Those who have the money, have the power’, explains one interviewee, ‘and that’s why some things are covered up’ (EE). Yet another leader explains that:
inspectors are often ‘hunting’ for undocumented migrants and not those who hire them. When you do see labour inspections being done, it’s the workers who often end up paying the price since the inspectors are usually accompanied by SEF inspectors, while the employer is not even remanded; often he gets away without even paying a fine (EE).

Beyond the lack of scrutiny and clarity of results when it comes to the inspections, another major concern, shared by many of the interviewees, is that the IGT does not possess the manpower to properly inspect. In the words of an Eastern European respondent:

With the IGT it’s harder to keep up with inspections, for, in some districts, there are only three or four inspectors handling cases, as is the case with the Alentejo and the Algarve. This means fewer inspections are done as the case load increases (EE).

This complaint, however, extends beyond the IGT’s labour inspection functions. Outside carrying out labour inspection and protecting the labour rights of workers, another of the IGT’s functions is to authenticate labour contracts before they are forwarded to SEF as part of the immigrant’s legalisation process:

A worker gets here and signs a labour contract. That contract by law is supposed to be handled by the IGT. They’re supposed to recognise it. They take four, five, six months to put the stamp on that contract. Does this make sense?! Just to verify that the contract is real and to place a stamp?! Then, no matter which IGT office you go to, they all have the same arguments: ‘we don’t have the manpower’. But is it a question of manpower? Or is it a question of competence? Again the immigrant pays the price. There’s a lack of respect here! (EE).

Consequently, in order to improve these services, the associations suggest more manpower and more rigour when it comes to carrying out labour inspections, and greater monitoring of inspectors. The associations claim that the IGT must change its perceptions and strategies when dealing with immigrant workers, for it is believed that, although in theory the IGT exists to protect workers, in practice it is the interests of employers that often come first.

As already noted, immigrants in Portugal primarily occupy unskilled positions. However, if they are to progress professionally, it is important that skill-acquiring opportunities be made available to them. In Portugal, one of the primary institutions in charge of establishing professional training, as well as language courses for immigrants, is the IEFP and its
immigrant integration programme Portugal Acolhe (‘Portugal Welcomes’). Interviewees’ responses on the topic of IEFP training initiatives were, by and large, of a positive nature (with many saying that any training initiative is good). However, IEFP’s functionality and organisation did come under some criticism.11

First, in relation to the Eastern European associations, many of which have established protocols with their local IEFP branch in order to establish language courses for adults, many describe their relations as straightforward, with each partner playing a specific role. As one leader explains: ‘[...] we (the association) get the students and do the enrollment and the IEFP does the training’ (EE). Beyond this straightforward relationship, a number of obstacles were also pointed out, including the fact that financial cutbacks experienced by some IEFP’s have led to some courses being eliminated, the fact that the undocumented are not allowed to register leaving many without the possibility of learning Portuguese, the number of students who sign up for a course will often determine if the course will go ahead or not, and the fact that language courses are not available in all localities.

In relation to professional training courses, it was, above all, the Angolan organisations that claimed to have participated in initiatives established by the IEFP, or who have themselves established projects with the backing of the IEFP. Although the intentions of the IEFP are praised, the following quote highlights a few concerns:

[...] I don’t think it’s so much the training itself or the lack of it, but the lack of people knowing of its existence and what’s available and where. The IEFP offices should do more locally, they should network more with other organisations, in disseminating their projects, their courses and so on. In fact, I think it should be the organisations, that are closer to those who need these courses, running the projects. There should be more action and more knowledge of what’s available, and this should be carried out closer to the people that need it most, so let the organisations who work with the people control the operations (A).

Two suggestions are thus worth highlighting: first, training opportunities should be ‘taken out to the people’ so that training can take place in the neighbourhoods where people reside; second, the feeling is that organisations that work with the immigrants should be the ones with greater control over the implementation and coordination of courses and projects.

Outside the initiatives of the IEFP, the associations also highlighted the importance of European Union funded programmes, such as the Equal Programme and the ACIME-coordinated Choices Programme,
and the way these schemes allow the associations to set up their own programmes, or work in conjunction with other local groups in setting up training courses. It was additionally pointed out that being a Private Institution of Social Solidarity (IPSS) can be beneficial to associations working in this realm, as they will have greater accessibility to financing, through the funding schemes of the Ministry of Labour and Social Solidarity:

The financing offered by ACIME to the associations doesn’t compare to what the Ministry of Labour and Social Solidarity makes available for the IPSSs. It’s important that the associations that work in the field become IPSSs for once they do; they can do these things like organise courses and provide education for those who need it. This is fundamental! We must search out opportunities at all levels so we can provide options (A).

Going hand-and-hand with providing training, the associations naturally emphasised the importance of finding work. Some interviewees highlighted the importance of the Insertion into Active Life Units (Unidade de Inserção na Vida Activa (UNIVA)), especially for the youth population. Although a number of the associations had, at the time of the fieldwork, made attempts to institute a UNIVA within their premises, only three actually possessed one. According to the leader of one of those associations: ‘Having a UNIVA is good because we aren’t waiting for the unemployment centre (IEFP) to find work. We can do it ourselves and do our own research’ (EE). Some of the organisations that had failed in their attempts, on the other hand, pointed out that the IEFP often create obstacles in setting up UNIVAs. Some wanted to possess their own UNIVA due to their dissatisfaction with the way that other institutions run UNIVAs, claiming that some do not possess the same sensibility towards immigrants and ethnic minorities as an immigrant associations do.

Another issue of wide concern dealt with the recognition of academic and professional diplomas obtained in the countries of origin. Although all of the three groups drew attention to the problems encountered in obtaining such recognition, a difference lies in the fact that the Angolan and Brazilian interviewees paid greater attention to the equivalency problems faced by students when coming to continue their studies in Portugal, while Eastern European leaders highlight the problems encountered in obtaining the recognition of an existing Eastern European qualification in order to insert themselves into the labour market.

First, the associations highlighted a series of primary obstacles:
It’s crazy what you have to go through here to get your university education recognised. You have to wait a long time, you have to pay lots of money and then they tell you that you have to repeat a year or two to actually have it recognised. None of this should exist. I mean if I come with a university degree in my hands, why shouldn’t they recognise it? Portugal needs to re-organise its system of recognising competencies and qualifications. The system is completely out of date. The equivalency processes should not just be a course-by-course analysis. It’s not the courses; it’s the qualification that’s important (B).

First, you have to go and get papers to fill out and you pay for those. After that, you hand in your paperwork to get the equivalency and you wait a long time. A lot of people choose not to do them [recognition processes] because of the expenses and the bureaucracies. Then there are people who graduated from institutions that no longer exist and therefore can’t get their academic records. For those who do, they then have to get them translated and the people aren’t going to spend money on things like this (EE).

Many of the obstacles named in these testimonies transcend the groups. Bureaucracy, expenses and the system utilised to assess qualifications are considered major problems to all three groups. And just as Eastern Europeans claim to no longer have access to academic records, Angolans also point out that, in some cases, records were destroyed or never kept.

When it comes to labour market integration, interviewees complained that, by not having recognition of qualifications, immigrants are not permitted the right to properly insert themselves; remaining, instead, on the periphery of the Portuguese labour market. This has been the case with the highly qualified Eastern European community. With a significant percentage of these migrants possessing post-secondary qualifications from the country of origin, very few are actually employed in the profession that they have been trained for, due to difficulties in obtaining recognition of qualifications. The general feeling is that, by not facilitating the equivalency processes, Portugal is losing out on a qualified manpower supply that could be of benefit to the country. The following statement reflects this:

[…] Portugal needs qualified labour. At the same time there are a high number of qualified individuals who are already here. Why not take advantage of this? The government would rather advertise in Spain to bring Spanish doctors to Portugal. Why? They have doctors working on the construction sites and as janitors here. I can find you specialists in all areas at this very moment. I don’t only want to refer to the
bettering of life conditions of immigrants, but also to bettering conditions in Portugal. This would help both sides. Portugal would be receiving these professionals without having to spend money on training them and, at the same time, these professionals are going to work in the field they were meant to be working in (EE).

An essential step forward in the recognition of qualifications was considered to be the constitution of the Professionalisation of Immigrant Doctors Support Project (PAPMI) and the Immigrant Nurses Professional and Academic Qualifications Equivalency Project (PEHAPEI). However, these programmes favour only two professions (doctors and nurses), leaving professionals in other areas to fend for themselves; the engineers, computer specialists, university professors, etc. who do not get the opportunity to benefit from specific professional integration programmes. This leads one leader to declare that:

[...] qualified jobs in Portugal are protected from the ‘inside’, by the orders and labour unions, and are destined for nationals and not for immigrants. Just in areas where there’s a real need will immigrants be helped, otherwise we are not permitted to take jobs away from the Portuguese, even if an immigrant has more qualifications. Only the jobs the Portuguese don’t want are we allowed to have (EE).

Under the line of thought that a controlled labour system will lead to a fixed proletariat (Esping-Andersen 1993), the interviewee points out that the extent to which immigrants are allowed to ascend professionally is controlled by institutions that regulate the quotas of immigrants needed in a given sector. This, in turn, may serve to explain the difficulties in obtaining the recognition of qualifications.

8.4 Housing

According to the Portuguese Constitution, housing is a fundamental basic right. However, this has not been the case for everybody, as marginalised groups (among them immigrants and ethnic minorities) are frequently found living in precarious conditions – in poor and inadequate living spaces (Raposo 2002). Parallel to this argument, since the second half of the 1970s, social segregation in Portugal has become more accentuated, having also become increasingly of a socio-ethnic nature (Malheiro 2000). During the 1980s and 1990s, with the coming of PALOP immigrants to Portugal, the majority, possessing limited economic resources, encountered a limited housing market driven by high rental prices and a tight supply (Fonseca et al. 2002b). Consequently, many
settled in clandestine and shantytown/shack housing, primarily in the peripheral areas of Greater Lisbon. With the goal of eradicating the shantytowns that had sprouted in the Metropolitan Areas of Lisbon and Porto, the government launched in 1993 the Special Re-housing Programme (PER) (see Chapter 4). Of the three groups analysed in this study, only the Angolans took part in this programme. Arriving later, the Brazilians and Eastern Europeans have dispersed themselves throughout Portugal with no community clustering taking place as with the PA-LOP communities in the LMA. Thus, the former two groups have gone for other housing market options, mainly in the form of renting and, to a lesser extent, buying. Bearing in mind this background, interviewees were asked to comment on the PER programmes and their outcomes, as well as the renting and mortgage schemes available to immigrants through financial institutions.

As for the PER programme, most interviewees held the view that the programme is of great value, helping to provide people with an opportunity to acquire a more ‘dignified’ residence. Additionally, PER is praised for not discriminating, giving (legalised) immigrants equal opportunity to obtain social housing. However, there were also a number of negative reactions. To exemplify some of the less positive critiques, I select two interview excerpts, the first from a leader of an Angolan association situated in the re-housing neighbourhood of Quinta Grande in the municipality of Lisbon; and the second from a cultural intermediary with the municipality of Loures’ GARSE office who works closely with the former residents of the Quinta do Mocho, now the inhabitants of the Urbanização Terraços da Ponte re-housing neighbourhood:

The re-housing process in this neighbourhood was a political initiative around the time of a municipal election period. So what does that tell you? Sadly, the way it was done, it left a lot of people out. Some of the problems this process had concern fundamental things that were not done. First, the lack of planning – there are simple things missing such as outdoor bench seating. The elderly have no one to depend on them like they did when they lived in the shacks. The plots of land for gardening are gone. The social spaces were never created. So all the social work that was done in the days when there was a shantytown; with the children, with the elderly, the relationships between neighbours, etc., all went down the drain and, three years later, we’re still starting over (A).

This may seem a little shocking but it was easier to work with the population of Quinta do Mocho before they were re-housed. The neighbourhood had its own dynamics before. The people had chosen their own living spaces, everything was organised by them, in one
building there was more Guineans, in another Angolans, in another São Tomese, etc... There were a lot of places for people to gather. People had created their own patterns of sociability. For these people, there is the need for references, to know ‘where we belong’, ‘to speak our language’, and these variables function as defence mechanisms and instruments of integration for it’s their fellow countrymen who will provide them with help and a job – it’s only natural that they become a part of a network. With re-housing, things became forced. The patterns of sociability were not respected, the residents were mixed up [in the neighbourhood] without the creation of residential pockets – Angolans in one section and Guineans in another – while the ‘business’ spaces that existed – as people had small cafes in their homes and hairdressing salons, etc. – were lost as well. These were socialisation spaces and they disappeared. So people now feel a certain resentment as their own interests were not taken into consideration. Different generations of families that lived together were broken up, social relationships, etc... So now we must ask: is this integration? We are now told to leave (the neighbourhood) when, in the old neighbourhood, people felt more at ease and we were less of a threat to them, perhaps because we weren’t meddling in their lives. [...] The Casa da Cultura de Sacavém was created to provide a space where they could carry out their activities, but it’s different from what they had before. There are rules to follow, there are hours to abide by, these are things that didn’t exist before and that the African communities don’t follow. People can’t identify with what exists now. The new neighbourhood has facilities but it means nothing to the people. [...] These are not things that they built themselves (I).

From these two extensive quotes, various points are worth reflecting upon. First, the fact that re-housing leaves out individuals and families is something various association leaders condemn. Although the PER surveys were done in 1993, re-housing did not take place until years later; in many cases, it has still to take place. Those who move to the neighbourhoods after the surveys do not have the right to be re-housed. Second, the ad-hoc manner in which re-housing is carried out, with no consideration for the social networks that previously existed, is viewed as a form of social violation given that, under these circumstances, their freedoms are taken away and their desires are in no way accounted for. Third, the extent to which the PER programmes are actually designed to satisfy the residents is questioned. Imputed economic motives behind re-housing are expressed, with municipalities allegedly opting for a re-housing scheme in order to free up the land where the shantytowns are located, which may be of commercial value to the city. This is one of the reasons frequently given for the lack of planning when
it comes to building the new neighbourhoods, as the municipalities want to keep the cost of construction low. Additionally, re-housing implies an expense because the re-housed must pay rent for their new home. This is something that is also imposed on the residents; before, living in the shacks or squatted dwelling had no costs.  

Beyond the PER programmes, acquiring accommodation through the private sector becomes another option. However, as a number of Angolan interviewees point out, one overbearing obstacle frequently encountered by community members is that of discrimination and racism (also see Chapter 7). In the words of one leader: There are people who want to rent a house, they phone ahead, but once they get there, they’re rejected. Once the landlords see they are black, they refuse rent to them (A). The problem of racism and discrimination in the housing sector, however, is not unique to the Angolans, or to the African communities in general, as both the Brazilian and Eastern Europeans claimed that their respective communities experience this problem. As one Brazilian leader stated:

Once they hear our accents, it’s like all the negative things they’ve ever heard about us comes to the forefront, so they think we’re going to bring problems; that we’re going to make lots of noise and party all the time (B).

In this case, stereotypical attitudes held by landlords are seen as prejudicial, as it is believed that landlords will not rent to Brazilians because of what is perceived as their constant ‘partying’ lifestyles.

Beyond discriminatory and racial problems faced by these communities, other rental market problems encountered include inflated market prices, poor residential conditions and refusal of signing rental contracts. In relation to this last variable, not having a rental contract is of particular concern for it may have implications in other areas of integration. As explained by the leader of one of the Brazilian student associations:

Many immigrants have trouble legalising themselves because one of the things SEF asks for is proof of residency, which means a rental receipt. To get a receipt as proof of payment, that basically means you have to have a rental contract. Well, good luck trying to get receipts from landlords who rent to students in this city [Coimbra]. It’s impossible! But this is also not only the case with students; it’s a problem that many immigrants encounter because the majority of the landlords don’t want to declare this money! (B).

The lack of legislation to protect the renters is another issue highlighted. Association leaders feel that the lack of control and monitoring is bene-
ficial to the landlords who can ‘use and abuse’ the system and those they rent to. To exemplify this argument, I recount the situation of the Brazilian community in the parish of Ericeira:

In relation to housing, there is a big problem here in Ericeira, which has to do with the fact that this is a summer beach town. Apartment owners are only interested in renting until May and then from May to September they want the inhabitants out because during the summer months the apartments are rented out through agencies to people who come to Ericeira to spend the summer. The inhabitants already know this when they rent the apartments and then in the summer they move in with other Brazilians. As it’s well known, it’s not uncommon to find nine, ten Brazilians living together in the same house to share the rent. But this is not a good situation (B).

Having a significant number of people living in an often small and cramped house in order to share rental costs and maximise their savings is in fact very common among the Brazilian community in Portugal. This is often a money saving strategy, for it permits sharing rental costs. The Brazilian associations point out that the great majority of migrants think of themselves as short-term migrants; thus, investing in real estate is not considered an option by many.

The Eastern European respondents expressed different views when it came to home acquisition. The impression here is that those who came to Portugal to work, make money and leave are now beginning to do so. Others, on the other hand, are now considering family reunification as an option (see next section) and are making a longer-term commitment to staying in Portugal. However, as a number of interviewees point out, although a growing number of families and individuals are interested in acquiring a home, it is the obstacles and the few opportunities that exist when it comes to obtaining financial credit from banks, which keep them from doing so.

In January 2005 the first housing credit scheme was developed for non-EU citizens residing in Portugal (*Credito Habitação para Estrangeiros Extra-comunitários*). Created by the joint venture group Real Estate Credit Union (*União de Créditos Imobiliários* (UCI)) and involving various partners, ranging from real estate agencies, ACIME, embassies and consulates, as well as immigrant associations (Costa 2006), the initiative helps to overcome the obstacles previously mentioned. The Eastern European association Associação de Apoio ao Imigrante – São Bernardo was one of the first organisations to establish a protocol with UCI. In the words of the association’s spokesperson:
Eastern European immigrants can get credit without having residence authorisation and a guarantor to back them up. The association will stand behind them. This is the first time something like this has been developed. This is a sign that more people are interested in investing here. They now want to stay here in Portugal. This is a very important step forward and these protocols are going to help a lot of people (EE).

The role of this association as a mediator and guarantor is important.\footnote{24} This, in fact, is something a number of associations feel should be coordinated between immigrant associations or NGOs that work with immigrants (e.g. Catholic Church organisations) and banking institutions, in order to allow more immigrants the possibility of acquiring their own residence.

Lastly, a number of interviewees made reference to the existing housing stock, drawing attention to the fact that many homes and buildings, not only in the major urban centres, but in lesser-populated areas as well, lie empty and abandoned. The associations call upon the authorities to develop projects with the aim of reclaiming these living spaces and turn them into low-income, affordable housing not only for immigrants, but for all citizens who do not have the economic resources to solve their own housing needs.

### 8.5 Family reunification


> Family reunification is a necessary way of making family life possible. It helps to create sociocultural stability facilitating the integration of third country nationals in the Member State, which also serves to promote economic and social cohesion.

As the declaration suggests, family reunification plays an essential role in the integration process of third-country nationals. Many immigrants, nevertheless, are deprived of this support structure, especially in the first phase of immigration, for they migrate alone, leaving their families behind in the country of origin. Sooner or later, many wish to be joined by their family members in the country of destination. But this task is not always easily accomplished, due to the fact that a host of challenges often obstructs the reunification process, not only in the host country but in the country of origin as well.
In Portugal, family reunification has affected some groups more than others, and at different time periods (Fonseca et al. 2005: 107-112). In the case of the three groups researched for this study, two different patterns emerge: 1) that of the more established Angolan community (which can be applied to the PALOP groups in general), and 2) that of the recently arrived Brazilian and Eastern European communities. Concerning the Angolan community, although there was a higher expression of family reunification in the late 1990s and at the start of the current decade, presently family reunification is not highly contemplated by many community members. In the words of one leader:

> With this economic crisis [in Portugal] Angolans aren’t thinking of bringing family over. More important is the family they have in other countries like England, Holland, France or the United States because many Angolans here in Portugal are now moving to those countries where conditions are better. A lot of Angolans that used to live here in Seixal have emigrated to England, for example. Also with the coming of peace to Angola, and the fact that it’s a country under reconstruction, many are returning and beginning to see that there are now opportunities there that no longer exist for them here. Bringing family over here no longer goes through the minds of many (A).

Thus, having been more common at a time when Angola was still at war and when Portugal was going through a more prosperous period, this statement explains that socio-economic changes in both Angola and Portugal no longer encourage family reunification. In comparison, Eastern Europeans and Brazilians have had low levels of family reunification, due to the fact that immigration from these countries has, to date, been labour-oriented. Fonseca et al. (2005) consider these groups to be at the ‘pre-family reunification’ phase of immigration. These same researchers exemplify how, in the case of the Eastern Europeans, while a significant percentage of immigrants wish to reunite family members in Portugal (of the 36.4 per cent that have their husband/wife or partner in the country of origin, 22.2 per cent wish to be reunited with them in Portugal, and of the 57.5 per cent with children 40.5 per cent wish to do the same), in the case of the Brazilians the same desire is not demonstrated (of the 25.7 per cent that have their husband/wife or partner in Brazil, 7.8 per cent wish to be reunited in Portugal, and of the 52.1 per cent with children 11.4 per cent wish to do likewise). Given this scenario, it is of no surprise that, in the interviews, it was the Eastern European associations that were most vocal on the issue of reuniting the family in Portugal.

In analysing immigrants’ rights to reunifying the family, however, there was a general consensus among the three groups that the reunifi-
cation processes has drawbacks and pitfalls. To exemplify, I start with the critique of the most recent alterations made to the Law on Immigrant Family Reunification. Praised for bringing greater clarification to some issues (e.g. the visas for family members, the possibility of family members being able to carry out a professional activity in the host country, etc.), there were, however, points of disagreement:

We know that the family is privileged above all in the Constitution of the Portuguese Republic in the name of emotional and psychological stability. But the immigration laws don’t permit these privileges for the immigrants that are here in Portugal. In the past, children up to 21 could join their parents. Now, once they turn eighteen, they can no longer join their parents here. Then you have to wait a year before family reunification is considered. One year! These laws serve to show that these immigrants aren’t to be trusted. They aren’t trusted to the point that Law-Decree 34/2003 of 25 February says that, if needed, DNA testing will be done to prove family relations... (E).

This quote highlights the issue of who has the right to be reunited with their family and who does not. Article 57 of the aforementioned Law-Decree considers the following to be eligible for family reunion: spouses, children who are minors or handicapped under the responsibility of one or both spousal members, adopted minors, parents of the resident or spouse if under their responsibility and lastly, brothers and sisters who are minors and are wards of the resident. The primary dissatisfaction with this criterion lies in the fact that, in essence, only minors are permitted to join their parents. This is condemned based on the general argument that children are often still dependent beyond the age of 18, as the growing tendency is for young people to prolong their studies which, in turn, puts off entrance into the labour market to later ages (Malheiros 2006).

The time period an immigrant is required to wait before applying for family reunification is another major area of criticism. Also problematic is the time period an immigrant must be in the country before he or she is granted the right to family reunification. According to the legislation, an immigrant must have been in possession of a residence authorisation permit for at least one year before having this right. For those immigrants possessing permanência authorisations, legislation specifies that family reunification is granted to immigrants who have held a work permit for an uninterrupted period of three years or through having been holders of permission to stay status for an uninterrupted period of five years. This different criterion for different citizens is condemned by the associations. Many feel that this is something that can only be remedied...
by doing away with the *permanência* authorisation status and providing everyone with residence authorisation and, thus, equal rights.

Another family reunification hurdle is the bureaucratic-administrative processes immigrants go through before they are reunited with their family members. In explaining the difficulties encountered, one Eastern European association leader reflected on his experience:

> I want to bring my wife and children to come here to live with me but you have to go through so much and there are so many papers you need to get. Not only that, you have to wait for this to happen here [in Portugal] and then for it to happen there [in the Ukraine]. I can control things here but I can’t control things there. The doors have to open for those who want to reunite the family. I would like to see easier access to family reunification without all the bureaucracy, but in the end, you see how things function and you just give up... (EE).

The paperwork, the often unjustified long periods of waiting for a response, the request for officially recognised translated documents, the demands for additional, often unneeded, documents and the cost involved in the reunification process, are just some of the factors that make many immigrants demotivated and ultimately disinclined to take action.\(^3\)

As the quote also suggests, not only are bureaucratic-administrative dealings in Portugal a major impediment, they are equally so in the country of origin. This is blamed on the obstacles put up by the Portuguese consulates as well as government institutions and services belonging to the country of origin. Concerning Portugal, in the words of Pires de Lima (in Ferreira 2002: 267-268):

> One of the most severe charges that Justice can be accused of in Portugal is the wait one has to go through in relation to passing judgement and decision. Exercising the right to family reunification confirms this rule of Portuguese Justice. Processes take over two years to be decided. Because of its tardiness, justice becomes unjust. The right to family reunification loses its meaning. It doesn’t meet its aim – to permit family union as a social, human and cultural instrument of immigrant integration.

Justice, in this case, is left in the hands of SEF, for the decision regarding the requests for family reunification falls under the sphere of activity of the Regional Directors of this body.

In relation to institutions in the country of origin, the associations complain of the lack of cooperation and slowness in processing the paperwork. Portuguese consulate offices abroad are specifically pointed out...
as being incompetent, with other accusations of illegal proceedings taking place in order to be able to take care of issues:

The Portuguese embassy in Kiev is terrible. We’ve received hundreds of complaints concerning the Portuguese embassy there. People have to book two, three months in advance for an appointment. They have terrible working conditions and the embassy has created a type of Ukrainian mafia that is working with the embassy. We talk to people who know and tell us. We know about the sale of passes just to get into the embassy there. We know it cost 100 euros to get a pass to get into the embassy. So that is one of the primary problems – the Portuguese embassy in Kiev. Even they are controlled by mafias. The Ukrainians, if they want to take care of any issues, such as taking care of family reunification or any other, it is done through the embassy in Kiev. Before it was in Moscow or in Warsaw; older embassies with more work experience. There weren’t any problems with these embassies, at least in comparison to the embassy in Kiev. With that embassy, if I ask for my child to join me at the age of sixteen, the way the embassy works in Kiev, it will take years to get the paperwork accepted, and by the time he or she is eighteen they still haven’t arrived here and then what happens? (EE).

The appeal is, therefore, to see greater monitoring of embassies and consulates located in the countries of origin with the goal of identifying existing deficiencies, and to do away with the bureaucracies and other hold-ups that complicate reunification. In addition, it is urged that relations and coordinated actions between all parties involved, in both the host country and country of origin (and especially between SEF and the embassies and consulates), be improved in order to facilitate and speed up the reunification process.

I end this section with a brief note on ACIME’s Family Reunification Support Office (Gabinete de Apoio ao Reagrupamento Familiar). Only a small number of the associations had dealt with this office and, as a result, very few commented on its work. Those who did make reference to it spoke of it in a neutral manner, with a common opinion being that its role is to inform and not to approve or disapprove who gets to come and who does not. Overall, its existence was praised, as many of the associations consider this office important when it comes to clarifying matters and in assisting those immigrants who wish to bring their family members to Portugal.
8.6 Immigrant descendents and education

Although many variables can be used as indicators of the degree of success of immigrant descendents when it comes to their integration, for this study, I choose to concentrate on education and schooling, given their importance in the lives of all immigrant children, irrespective of nationality or origin. Of the three groups in question, the topic of immigrant descendents' integration was of greater concern to the Angolan and Eastern European communities than to the Brazilian community. This is due to Angolans and Eastern Europeans possessing higher immigrant descendant numbers (already born in Portugal in the case of Angolans, coming to Portugal via family reunification in the case of Eastern Europeans). For this reason, discussion in this section will focus on these two communities.31

In immigrant receiving countries, the integration of children into the school system is an issue that faces numerous challenges. As schools become more multicultural in nature, the call is for multicultural or intercultural forms of education.32 In Portugal, as Nunes et al. (2006) argue, schools are increasingly multicultural entities that have maintained the same academic curricula, having done very little to adjust to the new multicultural reality. Asked to comment on the integration of their respective youth community into the Portuguese public school system and on the adaptation of school curricula, the majority of the interviewees emphasised the importance of creating an intercultural environment within schools, while, at the same time, taking into consideration the different educational needs each group encounters. The following testimony from an Angolan leader attests to this:

When an African student speaks differently he is not to be made to feel that he is a lesser person. We have to be realistic. These are poor children with great difficulties and we have to reinforce the support these children deserve and be sensitive to them. Education should imply teaching these disfavoured children how to read and write and educate them on being good citizens and showing them what equal respect means, first and foremost. A multicultural form of education where students are provided with knowledge of the country their parents are from – you’re Angolan, you’re Capeverdean and so on – is not what’s wanted. No... We should be teaching the children that there are other people of other cultures and that these differences can be of value to society. With the ever-growing contact and learning about one another, we are creating a generation that will respect each other now and in the future. The schools are then creating a healthy school environment, giving value to difference and, at the same time, doing away with xenophobic and racist attitudes. All will then be wel-
comed as citizens in their schools and in society. It’s important that the schools set an example (A).

This statement – utopian in spirit but not unachievable, surely – calls for an intercultural form of education as opposed to a multicultural model. According to the UNESCO thesaurus (in Fonseca and Malheiros 2005: 68), intercultural education is preferable to multicultural education as the concept implies comparison, exchanges, cooperation and confrontation between groups. It is viewed as more proactive and action-oriented. In the previous statement, multicultural education is viewed as being segregationalist in nature, for it does not involve cultural sharing.

The general sentiment is that schools should teach respect and that all peoples should be treated equally, something that can be accomplished by setting up situations of cultural interaction. Still, an opinion shared by Angolan leaders, above all, is that ethnic or cultural differentiation should not serve to alter the Portuguese curriculum:

I know of initiatives of getting other cultures into the school systems. Here in Algés [where the association is located], I know the school brought in an African poet, for example, to read to the children, to provide them with another perspective on Africa and Africans. This is good. This helps to bring down barriers. But on the other hand, we are also talking about students that are expected to speak correct Portuguese in the classrooms when, at the end of the day, they go home and speak Creole. I think there should be something done to resolve this situation. Programmes should be set up to help them learn better Portuguese. There’s no need to learn the language of their parents at school because the parents take care of this at home (A).

Thus, while the exchanging of ethno-cultural elements and experiences is viewed in a positive manner, the call is to set up programmes and classes to assist in special areas, such as speaking the Portuguese language correctly.

From the Eastern European perspective, the call for a multicultural or intercultural form of education was seldom voiced. In fact, the majority of Eastern European leaders declared that there is no need for the Portuguese school system to adapt elements of the Eastern European cultures in order to facilitate integration for, it was declared: ‘the associations can be held responsible for the integration of the children into our cultures if they can get the help and support in setting up schools for the youth’ (EE). A number of associations have, in fact, set up weekend schools to teach the native languages and cultures as well as other academic disciplines such as mathematics, sciences, arts, among others.
For the Eastern Europeans, the primary concern deals with the quality of the teaching and what many leaders consider ‘a weak academic system’. Having higher expectations in relation to academic learning, and to the work and discipline demanded of the students, the associations maintain that Portuguese schools are of little challenge to the youth in their community:

When our children go into the Portuguese schools everything is a lot easier for them, to the point that they become the best students in their grade. Statistics show this already. They know from an early age that learning is working. But here in Portugal it’s very different as students here learn by playing. One of the big worries parents have concerning their children is that they’ll become undisciplined in their work habits because school doesn’t teach them to be disciplined. In our country, if a student fails a year, that is a disgrace for the entire family. That means he or she didn’t work. Here they fail and it’s no big deal; they’ll just repeat it. Some parents, after having their children here for a couple of years, send them back to live with their grandparents once they see that the schooling here is not as good and not as disciplined. A lot of youths quickly become a part of Portuguese society and the parents have a hard time in maintaining that discipline over them, so instead of having them become undisciplined and not doing well academically, they prefer to send them back to the country of origin (EE).

The Eastern Europeans not only feel disillusioned with the Portuguese schooling system and academic curricula, but also feel that teachers are not trained and do not work towards maintaining proper discipline over the pupils. Instead school is viewed as a sort of ‘playground’. Additionally, the comparison between Eastern European academic culture and that of the host societies, demonstrates that Eastern European parents care for their children’s education more so than their Portuguese counterparts. As a result of what is considered to be ‘an undisciplined school system’, a common result is to send the children back to the native country where parents feel they will get a better education.

A second area of concern is learning the Portuguese language in the case of newly arrived children. As one interviewee declared: ‘[The Portuguese] language is an obstacle, but they learn as they go along. It’s hard for them at first, but they learn fast and they learn without anybody’s help’ (EE). It is argued that many Eastern European students are, in fact, entering the public school systems without any extracurricular Portuguese language learning classes or special accompaniment and are often expected to learn class lessons just like their Portuguese-speaking peers.
(see Fontes 2006). Many are thus left to learn Portuguese through daily contact with the language and in dealing with their peers.

In charge of implementing intercultural projects in Portuguese schools is the Ministry of Education and the Entreculturas – Coordinating Secretariat of Multicultural Education Projects (see Chapter 3). The interviewees were also asked for their opinions in relation to these bodies and to provide recommendations on how these institutions should approach integrating immigrant students and students of immigrant descent.

Although Entreculturas was praised for encouraging change, initiating debate as well as structuring and implementing programmes in schools (and, above all, in those schools possessing high number of minority youth), one primary criticism deals with the lack of innovation:

Questions concerning education will continue to surface like they have in the past with the African communities and will continue with Eastern Europeans. We have Entreculturas but I don’t see any difference on how we deal with Eastern European students than they did in the past with the Africans. The school system style doesn’t know how to support them, so the student is left alone to structure his or her own identity: Is he or she Ukrainian? African? Portuguese? A mix? Are there identity conflicts? Does the school bother with a diagnosis of individual situations? If there isn’t a national policy – a support structure – the schools won’t know what to do. So what should be done? Separate these children? Put them in separate classes? ACIME is an important partner in structuring policies but they are not alone. They can work to implement programmes together with the Entreculturas Programme, but it’s up to the Ministry of Education to define a strategy, but, thus far, I think it’s been ignored (I).

As the quote suggests, more important than the work of Entreculturas is that of the Ministry of Education, for it is this Ministry that must delineate a policy strategy so bodies like Entreculturas can then carry out the initiatives. The general view is that no specific strategy has been delineated, but instead a patchwork of individual initiatives. This often leaves each school free to carry out strategies on their own terms, or to not carry them out at all.

What areas and issues are thus considered priorities, according to the respective communities? The two groups I concentrate on here delineate very distinct areas. First, scholastic integration for immigrant and ethnic minority youth may not always be a straightforward process, considering that many may be confronted with barriers such as discrimination and/or racism, language difficulties, cultural difference, among others. In
addition, immigrant children raised in poverty – under conditions of poor hygiene, health and nutrition and poor housing conditions – will often retain poor scholastic integration and success (Rocha-Trindade 1993). From the interviews carried out with the Angolan associations, these factors often seem to explain the lack of success among Angolan second-generation young (and among the PALOP second-generation youth in general). The following statement is an example of the views shared by many Angolan leaders:

They [the youth] come from homes where there are social problems – alcohol, poverty or homes where their parents are absent twelve, fourteen hours a day because they might have more than one job and might need to work long hours in order to support the family. These are not regular students. These are poor children. Now I don’t believe every African kid is a dumb kid that can’t get into university. I follow some of these kids and they are smart kids, but once they reach the ninth grade, they don’t want to study anymore. I think this is a question of their integration as well. I think they feel discriminated against, they feel rejected; they feel that nobody’s present to help them. It’s not only the parents but society as well. The school is to blame as well. The teachers discriminate against African students and they stereotype them as being drop-outs (A).

The lack of scholastic success of Angolan youth (and African youth in general) can, therefore, be described as being double-edged: on one hand, there is the family and home environment in which they are raised, which does not always provide the necessary support and conditions; while on the other, a school system that is blamed for being discriminative and stereotypical of African youth. Considering the former point, there is the fact that many parents are often themselves uneducated and do not feel that they play a role in their child’s education. The creation of strong family-school relations is considered essential (see Nunes et al. 2006), something that can be accomplished through greater contacts and interchange between schools and parents. In relation to the latter point, the associations emphasise that it is important that teachers learn the reality in which many African students live. In order to accomplish this, it is recommended that teachers come into the neighbourhoods and that they be provided with intercultural training.

As regards the Eastern Europeans, as noted, this group demands academic discipline and a more arduous curriculum from the Portuguese public school system. A common recommendation was that schools maintain a higher learning rhythm and that they promote student success instead of what some interviewees consider to be ‘indifference’ on the part of the schools and teachers. In order for this to be accom-
plished, similar to the Angolan associations, the call is to get parents more involved in the education of their children. Lastly, it is recommended that extracurricular Portuguese classes be established so that non-Portuguese-speaking students can learn the language quickly and correctly. In order for this to be done, it is suggested that teachers be trained and that courses be set up specifically for this role.

### 8.7 Health

Some health problems and risks may be common to immigrants in general, others are more specific to particular communities. This is exemplified by the activities carried out by associations and other organisations that work with the different immigrant groups in this field. Health problems associated with specific immigrant communities in Portugal have been identified by Fonseca and her colleagues (2005: 189-191) who note the following:

- Nutritional problems and hunger, as well as diabetes among the younger generations, are a major area of concern among immigrants of African origin; these problems stem from their situation of poverty and the living conditions (in shantytown neighbourhoods often without proper sanitary conditions) many find themselves in.

- High birth rates among first-generation Eastern Europeans, Brazilians and Asians have exposed immigrant women to greater pregnancy-related risks as they appear to request and receive less health care during and after pregnancy.

- Depression, psychological problems and alcohol abuse are identified as major problems among Eastern Europeans, often leading to (although it could also stem from) unemployment and homelessness.

- Domestic abuse has been observed among immigrants of all origins with many of the women often having no option but to remain with their abusive spouses/partners due to legal and/or economic dependency.

- HIV/AIDS is primarily an area of concern for the African population. While immigrants make up 10 per cent of all HIV/AIDS cases in Portugal, Africans account for 8.4 per cent (Faria and Ferreira 2002). This, however, is a growing area of concern among immigrant prostitutes (notably Brazilian female sex workers) who are frequently limited when it comes to seeking health treatment often having as their only options mobile units that offer supplies and anonymous HIV and STD testing in areas associated with prostitution.
Lastly, work-related incidents are primarily associated with Eastern Europeans and, above all, to those who work in the construction industry and often possess no labour insurance.

Portuguese legislation specifies that all immigrants who are in Portugal and who feel ill or need any kind of health care have the right to be attended in a National Health Service (Serviço Nacional de Saúde (SNS)) health centre or hospital (for emergency cases) without these services being able to refuse to treat them on the basis of any reason connected with nationality, lack of economic means, lack of status or any other (ACIME 2002: 3). Such refusal is punishable by law under anti-discrimination legislation. Furthermore, while documented immigrants have the right to receive an SNS card, giving them access to the SNS and a family doctor, undocumented migrants only have the right to temporary SNS registration. However, such registration is not always an easy task, for in order to do so, an immigrant must present a document issued by the local parish proving their place of residence to their local health centre. This is often not easy to accomplish considering that many cannot prove their residency (they have no housing contracts); moreover, some parishes have refused to issue the necessary document.40

In addition, the immigrant must prove that he or she has made social security deductions, something again very uncommon among undocumented migrants. As a result, while legal immigrants are more likely to be registered at health centres and use them, as Portuguese nationals do, for consultations, undocumented migrants are far less likely to use these services, turning to the hospital emergency unit only when their state of health is truly threatened (De Freitas 2003). Given this scenario, interviewees were asked to comment on the provision of health services for immigrants taking into consideration variables such as regulations, access, and obstacles encountered.

As noted, the process of accessing health care is not equal to all immigrants. Despite lawful entitlement to health care, a common accusation is that undocumented migrants are often denied care at health centres and hospitals:

Illegal immigrants don’t know they need a health service card and no one has explained that to them. They learn [this only] when they get sick; when they need some sort of treatment and have to go to a health centre or hospital and find out that this right doesn’t exist for them, even if according to law it [right to treatment] should exist. The problem is that the people at the hospitals and health centres don’t see things the same way. This is illegal. Constitutionally, everyone has the right to health treatment. […] Then there are some who don’t have money to pay the hospital fees and at the hospital they then tell
them that they can’t come back until they pay what they owe. We get cases here [CEPAC] of people who are told to leave [the hospitals and/or health centres] because they have no documents. I think that’s a bigger crime than being an illegal immigrant who can’t pay his hospital fees or who has no documents (I).

If you’re an immigrant and you’re illegal, you have no money, no family, no one to help you with the language, you have nothing and you end up in a hospital, they’ll leave you in a corner and they won’t bother with you. Myself, as a volunteer worker with Medicos do Mundo, I know what they go through. Many would have no other alternative if it wasn’t for us because the hospitals ignore them; they won’t treat them. For those who live out here on the streets it’s even worse. There are people out here whose life hit rock-bottom, they drink a lot and have mental problems and we hear their stories. I know stories of immigrants who spent two days in a hospital in a corner without getting treatment. This is not human. For some of these people, if it wasn’t for organisations like Medicos do Mundo they would not have another option (EE).

A number of points are worth highlighting in these quotes. First, the lack of knowledge of the Portuguese health system, and not knowing their rights, implies that many undocumented immigrants will only turn to hospital emergency wards as a last-ditch solution when needing to treat severe health problems (De Freitas 2003). However, due to their undocumented status – in conjunction with not wanting to be noticed by the authorities – many also opt not to seek any medical help at all. Second, despite lawful entitlement, undocumented immigrants are often denied care or neglected at emergency wards. Third, since undocumented immigrants cannot register with SNS, this implies paying medical care fees in full. However, many cannot afford to do so, and are often not permitted follow-up treatment until what is owed from previous visits is paid.

As the two quotes also point out, the work of NGOs and associations often becomes the only alternative for many immigrants who have no other means or solutions. This is highlighted by the work of the two organisations mentioned in the two citations (CEPAC and Medicos do Mundo). Equally, the associations highlight the importance of reaching immigrant communities with health information, supplies and care. Territorial proximity to the community, i.e. establishing services and units in locations where the immigrant populations are found, is considered essential. This is emphasised by one of the Angolan associations that carries out its work within the context of a low-income re-housing neighbourhood:
This association was founded by a group of health workers with the aim of promoting and improving public health. [...] But we [the association] have encountered great difficulties because of bureaucracies and because of the lack of willingness and understanding of those dealing with the immigrants in the field of health. Now if we encounter these difficulties, we can imagine what the people go through, right? This is one of the reasons why this association exists – to help people with their rights; to make sure they get the right treatment and to provide a healthy environment for this neighbourhood. There are a variety of problematic issues here in the neighbourhoods: from people who aren’t able to care for themselves or for their children, to drug problems, to hunger, to people who need counselling for whatever reason. It’s very important to be near the people. It’s important for the people and for the neighbourhood (A).

The importance of being ‘in the field’ is thus considered vital for the well-being of many, for if it were not for the mobile units and health promoters and counsellors working with the immigrants, many would have no alternative. Bureaucracy, lack of willingness, and the often total disregard of the laws on the part of health workers found in health centres and hospitals are pointed out as the primary culprits:

A lot of times it depends on the willingness of the individuals who are handling the [medical] issues in the hospitals or health centres. Some health centres are better than others and more open to immigrants. The word gets around among the immigrants and there are even schemes between immigrants, to go to this health centre or that health centre and register themselves there where they know they’ll be well received and attended to (I).

Beyond the aforementioned obstacles in accessing health care and treatment, the interviewees (and, above all, the Eastern European organisations) also drew attention to a further set of barriers concerning communication problems – language. Linguistic barriers can be an impeding factor, first, if the patient cannot explain his or her health problem correctly to the medical professional, and vice versa, when it comes to remediying the problem, if the patient does not understand the instructions of the health professional on how to go about treating the problem after consultation. Second, a number of interviewees also referred to such obstacles as long waiting period, the poor quality of care and/or treatment during and after consultation, as well as lack of awareness and sensitivity to diversity, and immigrants and ethnic minorities in general. Some interviewees accused medical professionals of discrimination.
In order to get over some of the obstacles pointed out, a number of suggestions were made by the interviewees. First, it was recommended that campaigns be carried out with health professionals with the aim of creating awareness of immigrant issues and cultural diversity, and deterring hospitals, health centres and medical professionals from turning away immigrant patients. Second, the interviewees also argued the need for interpreters in hospitals in order to facilitate doctor-patient communication. Lastly, all individuals possessing an SNS card have the right to discounts on pharmaceutical prescriptions. Those without an SNS card, however, have to pay full prices. The interviewees point out the importance of having this regulation changed, for, in the case of undocumented migrants, many cannot afford the price of prescriptions.

8.8 Associations and civic participation

For this final section, the objective was to gather opinions on participation and decision-influencing opportunities made available to the associations and their respective community members. In order to accomplish this, associations were asked to comment on bodies or instruments that promote their participation, namely ACIME’s Consultative Council for Immigrant Issues (COCAI), and local-level forums and consultative councils. Second, the aim was to collect opinions concerning the opportunities and obstacles to immigrant civic participation encountered by the communities. In this case, the issue of voting rights was highlighted.

Immigrant consultative councils, as various studies have pointed out (see Chapter 2), seldom go beyond what their name proposes – being a consultative instrument with no power to legislate. This, in fact, is one of the main criticisms in relation to COCAI:

COCAI [...] has no power whatsoever. Many times the laws are approved and only after do they come to us at the COCAI meetings to ask for our opinions. We give our opinions, but the great majority of the time, these aren’t even heard. [...] We propose things and bring up problems we have from our dealings with immigrants on a daily bases. If they listen, they listen, if they don’t, they don’t. In the end, nothing changes anyway (EE).

This quote exemplifies a common frustration shared by many associations – the fact that COCAI serves for very little when it comes to influencing policy decisions.

In relation to representation within COCAI, it was also said that this consultative council functions in an unequal form; given that, of the 26
COCAI board members, only eight are representatives of immigrant associations. This, in the voice of a COCAI board member: ‘takes away any sort of power and legitimacy the immigrant communities could have’ (I). This leads some leaders to ask to what extent immigrants, through their associations, are really supposed to play a part in a council that exists to handle issues that, above all, concern the communities they represent. Some also question if keeping immigrant association representatives off the COCAI board is not done purposely, as a way of maintaining power over the immigrant groups. As one interviewee points out:

[…] even if the associations want to change something, and go against the government representatives, they can’t because things have been set up in a way in which the immigrant community leaders will always be the minority. It’s a controlled political farce (A).

With some of the leaders referring to the associations as ‘frequently being the loudest voice immigrants have’, the call is thus for the restructuring of COCAI in order to allow greater representation of immigrant associations. Beyond the call for more representation, however, another interviewee adds:

[…] what is needed is more participation on the part of the associations. If the associations were more dynamic, ACIME and COCAI would function differently and would be a more positive and dynamic force. We may be a minority within COCAI, but if we have more associations pressuring for change – pressuring ACIME, pressuring through COCAI – we will have greater capacity to influence (I).

The reality is that only a small group of migrants and autochthonous associations regularly participate in COCAI, despite the fact that all ACIME-recognised associations are permitted to do so. Given this scenario, it is important to question the extent of interest in having change occur, and who, in fact, the interested parties are.

This leads to another topic of concern that is not only applicable to COCAI, but to other political realms involving immigrant matters as well. As various authors have noted (Westin 1996; Danese 2001), often at the helm of immigrant associations are community elites who, in turn, are often co-opted into more institutional roles. In Portugal this is no different (Marques et al. 2003). As active members in other institutions – often of a political nature – some association leaders also possess political ambitions and will often use their role as association leaders to boost their own political stock. In the words of one informant:
We have community leaders who utilise their position, not for the promotion of community interests, but for their own self-promotion. This makes it hard for an individual to decide which side he or she should turn to. For example, for an individual who is in a political party, he or she might be willing to abandon his or her role as someone who fights for ‘what is best for my community’ in favour of moving up in the party by, instead, taking a side that will benefit him/her; often even going against the needs of the community that he or she should be representing (I).

The concern, therefore, is that the immigrant issues that some associations pretend to defend are often a cover-up for objectives of a personal nature. This, in turn, may also serve the needs of the political powers, seeing that it may also be in their interest to have migrant leaders ‘playing in their favour’.

Beyond possessing power over associations by controlling accessibility to political platforms, it is also important to recall that associations often suffer from what Danese (2001: 87) coins ‘a chronic lack of autonomy’, due to the fact that seldom are they economically self-sustained. As Danese additionally argues: ‘The destiny of an organisation is linked to that of its patron, and its survival is directly dependent on the will of the patron’. In many cases, that patron is the host country’s government. By controlling which associations get funding and which ones do not, the state again possesses control over the immigrant associations:

In Portugal there are a few instruments that help, such as ACIME, but the support given, and the extent to which the associations are allowed to participate, is conditional. The support is given with the object of controlling the associations. The governments, when they make subsidies available for the associations, their first objective is not to support the associations – not to value or serve the associations – but to control the associations; to control their goals, their interests, what they say and don’t say. I am against this. In the associations that I’m a part of, I prefer that they don’t receive help from anybody. I prefer, purely and simply, to have the association live off its own work instead of being conditioned by the interests of party A or party B. Associations, just as their constitutional statuses usually state, should be independent, self-governed, self-guided and should not function under the orientations of governments or political parties. Sadly in Portugal that’s not how it is and this is a problem that must be corrected if we are to be successful in pressuring the political powers. What we are seeing is the ‘funnelling’ of these associations – they must fall in line. But it should not be like that. Associations must have broad visions and relations and must deal with all of so-
society. It can't be viewed in a narrow manner as if it were a political party. This is a problem and there's a long way to go still in getting over this obstacle. In Portugal, sadly, the support that we all know of is controlled. With ACIME, you have to be recognised and fit the criteria. This is the first controlling step for, if you don't get the recognition, you don't have access to the money that they have. We can't think that ACIME is innocent because they too are a political instrument (I).

ACIME thus determines the extent to which associations are allowed to participate, first by granting recognition, and second, by providing or extracting funds. As a result, government subsidy dependency is frequently the outcome, which, in turn, leads to loss of flexibility and of the freedom of protest.

In comparison to participating politically at the national level, the majority of the associations emphasise that communication is easier when it comes to dialoguing at the local level. As an Angolan leader stated: ‘There is a practical way of doing things at the local level you don’t find at the national level. They are more readily available to work and talk with us’ (A). In fact, some leaders point out that the smaller the city or parish hall, the greater the accessibility to the powers-that-be. One association recounted its experience in dialoguing with various local municipal halls in the following manner:

We did a campaign and tried to talk with a number of municipalities about organising activities, Portuguese language courses and so on. I tried to organise these things through city halls like Cascais, Sintra and Lisbon and, in the end, I got a call from Santarém City Hall. I don’t know any Romanians in Santarém. There might be two or three there [laughs to highlight the exaggeration]. But they were more attentive than the municipalities we actually approached. Here in Lisbon it's very off-putting. You have to pressure constantly. You have to know somebody who works there so that person can get you a meeting with someone. That’s how things are with the municipalities here in the Lisbon area. Then you get these smaller municipalities like Santarém who call us and say: ‘We want to do things for your community’. I tell them: ‘But we have no Romanians in Santarém’, but they insist (EE).

When it comes to participatory institutions and instruments made available to the associations at the local level, while some are viewed in a positive manner, others are seen as ineffective. From the positive perspective, a number of associations praised their inclusion into social networks (redes sociais) established by municipalities throughout Portugal.
(municipalities referred to by the associations include Aveiro, Loures, Oeiras, Seixal, Loulé, among others). As explained by one spokesperson:

When [Oeiras] City Hall invited us to be a part of the social network, which brings together all the organisations that work in the social realm, and gets them working alongside each other, we were extremely pleased to be given this opportunity – to be partners. We’ve had various meetings with City Hall, we clarified everything with them … our difficulties … we asked for their help and are waiting for answers, although they’ve made us aware of their difficulties as well. What’s important is that we’ve been listened to, and now, as partners of the Oeiras social network, we can maintain continuous contact and know that we are welcomed (A).

For the associations located in the two Portuguese metropolises of Lisbon and Porto, it was also considered important to get their reflections on the two active consultative councils these municipalities possess: Lisbon’s Municipal Council of Immigrant and Ethnic Minority Communities (CMCIME) and the Communities Municipal Council of Porto (CMCP). First concerning the CMCIME, this organism is described by many member associations as being ‘a great failure’. The council’s municipal leaders are accused of ‘not consulting with the immigrant associations’ and of allowing the Council to become inactive. In defence, the municipal leader of CMCIME accuses the associations of being disorganised and possessing no clear objectives:

I understand when people say the Municipal Council has been dead for years or that it doesn’t exist anymore, but this is not true. The last meeting was last summer (2004). Now the problem is I can’t sit at a table and discuss things with an association that holds its meetings in a café or at a bench in the park. So what we [the City] agreed on is that we’d first find spaces for the associations, help them get organised, provide conditions and then we’d start dialoguing. I think that’s what’s most important, and I know this for a fact because I am also director of an association. I do the fieldwork and I know the importance of a physical space for an association. In the past, we’d call the associations for meetings; there’d be food and coffee, tea but conclusions – zero. So now I ask the directors of the associations if this is what’s needed. I don’t think so. What exists here is a clash of objectives and interests between City Hall and the immigrant associations. I am not in favour of holding meetings where objectives are not defined and conclusions are not reached (A).
Contrary to CMCIME, the more recently established CMCP is praised by many of the partner associations, although, due to the embryonic stage this council found itself at the time of the fieldwork, some of the interviewees held a more reserved ‘wait and see’ perspective. The majority, however, eulogised the council establisher – the Social Development Foundation – for providing the associations with a platform where they can express their concerns and become partners alongside the City when it comes to debating immigrant and minority issues. The comments of a Brazilian association representative reflect this:

I have to be cautious with what I say at this stage because the Communities Municipal Council [of Porto] is just now initiating its activities. We’ve presented a few proposals that will be discussed. Up to this point they’ve been very attentive, they’ve opened up dialogue with the associations and have created some good initiatives especially in the cultural area. City Hall has set forth a plan to create a space where immigrant associations will be able to divide up this space and then they can have their own rooms. This project will be one of the main issues discussed at the next meeting (B).

The participatory opportunity model foresees that the level of organisation will closely depend on the strength of the structure of political institutions and the configuration of political power within that structure (Schrover and Vermeulen 2005). The two examples given demonstrate two different degrees of willingness to allow immigrant associations to participate in issues pertinent to their community. In the Lisbon case, the participation of immigrant associations in that city’s consultative council is weakened due to what CMCIME municipal leaders consider to be the weaknesses of the associations. In the case of Porto’s municipal council, while some of the same problems are identified to that of Lisbon (i.e. spaces for the associations), the aim is to encourage participation at all levels, including the resolution of issues encountered by the associations within the municipal council.

Beyond the aforementioned instruments – all of which permit collective participation and representation – when it comes to immigrants participating at the individual level, as various authors have pointed out (Freedman 2000; Entzinger 2001; Garbaye 2004), the most common form is through the process of voting and running for office. In Portugal, although third-country immigrants acquired the right to vote and become elected at the local level in 1996 (Law 50/96), the law imposes two major restrictions. First, reciprocity between states must be observed. Currently, thirteen such agreements exist. Second, only legal residents residing in the country for a minimum period of two years (if they are nationals of Portuguese-speaking countries) or three years (for
other nationals) may exert their right to vote. The conditions are identical when it comes to running for local office, the only difference being that the minimum periods of residency are raised to four years for nationals of Portuguese-speaking countries and five years for other nationals (Teixeira and Albuquerque 2005).

Given these restrictions, many immigrants are, therefore, still not permitted to vote. It is exactly these restrictions that the associations argue against. The primary demand is that reciprocity be done away with, allowing instead all immigrants, who possess legal residential statuses, the right to vote locally. Of the three groups analysed in this study, this is of particular concern to the Angolans who have made their presence felt in Portugal longer than the other groups but still do not possess the right to vote (this in comparison to the Brazilians, for example, who do share a reciprocity agreement with Portugal). One Angolan leader expresses displeasure over his community not being given this right in the following manner:

In the case of Angola, reciprocity shouldn’t be taken into consideration. There isn’t a democracy system in Angola – there hasn’t been one in our lifetimes – so no one gets to vote. Because of what’s gone on in Angola, we suffer the consequences here?! We shouldn’t be excluded from democratic participation in Portugal because of that, but that is the reason why we are excluded. All these other countries that get to vote here; what kind of ties do they have with Portugal that gives them this right to participation that we don’t? So I defend citizenship rights and participation rights without reciprocity being considered (A).

For the Eastern European community, the association leaders point out that, in large part, immigrants do not even conceive of the notion of voting, given that their thoughts still lie with their homeland and the idea of returning. It was also highlighted that other priority areas in the realm of citizenship rights must be dealt with first.

Legalisation and labour rights continue to be a priority issue that must be resolved first. Only after that, can we start worrying about things like voting rights. But I do think I deserve the right to vote for my local representative. After all he does represent my neighbourhood and the area where I live. I drive through the same pothole on my street as my Portuguese neighbours do. We have the same problem that we want to see resolved, so I think we should both have the same right to protest (EE).
Thus, as the quote points out, rights to participation at the local level should be based on residence within that locality, and not nationality (or reciprocity). Consequently, by not being granted voting rights, the general feeling is that immigrants are cast aside completely. It is felt that politicians do not have the incentive to campaign with the aim of capturing the immigrant vote. Given this situation, candidates are also not compelled to put immigrant issues on their agendas.

The people governing Portugal, their mentality is: ‘There’s no point in paying attention to them [the immigrants] because they don’t vote’. Under this situation, of course things will get worse, their marginality will worsen and this will continue because the governments don’t campaign on their behalf. They are completely forgotten. This goes to show how the government is against them and there’s nothing that the immigrants can do about it (EE).

Thus, in the same sense that all citizens in a given society should have the right to participate in the decision-making processes, and that this is a fundamental democracy-defining principal, the interviewees express the view that, as citizens and residents, immigrants should have the right to vote in order to be given the opportunity to influence and decide their own destinies. This right will equally contribute to curbing diverging interests between immigrants and the receiving society as well as strengthen the immigrant’s capacity to bring value to other socio-political rights also not granted (such as documentation and automatic naturalisation, among others).

*   *   *

In sum, just how far integration is permitted to happen is by and large under the control of the host society. This chapter has deliberated over issues of integration in eight spheres. From the evidence and impressions gathered, when it comes to integration-impeding obstacles, it was emphasised that these are often the result of host-country institutional malfunctioning, and/or due to policy structures that do not facilitate insertion. The interviewees referred to bloated bureaucracies and improper management, uncooperative attitudes and lack of training and/or manpower on the part of social services staff, as well as regulations that do not facilitate integration, as the primary factors that add up to what many consider to be institutionalised discrimination towards immigrants. Although it was also expressed by some of the key informants that important steps are being taken to curtail at least some of the hardships involved in integrating immigrants into the structures of the host society (e.g. the creation of ACIME, housing credit schemes, etc.), the
recommendations and suggestions made by the immigrant interviewees are a sign that numerous changes are desired by the immigrant associations across the three groups.

Furthermore, considering the fact that foreign communities often share the same concerns and difficulties (although there are also specificities), it is natural that the associations should assemble their resources in order to lobby for change. This resource amalgamation, however, also extends outside the immigrant associative realm, as ties with individual and institutional representatives of the majority society, fortifies lobbying initiatives. Given the dealings of the associations with and within the eight areas discussed, their ‘brokering’ positions, as well as their ‘bonding’ and ‘bridging’ capital dimensions, become pivotal variables (Baernholdt and Aarsother 2002). Linking the findings of this chapter with those previously discussed in Chapter 6, the analyses has shed light on the existing proximities and dealings in the specific problem areas. It is of no surprise that the associations should unite with local and national non-immigrant organisations to carry out actions that may be of concern to both. For example, when it comes to employment and labour rights, labour unions become key partners; housing and neighbourhood issues, neighbourhood associations and social solidarity organisations join forces with the associations; health, organisations such as Medicos do Mundo and Catholic Church organisations unite to carry out similar initiatives; discrimination and racism, anti-racist organisations become cohorts; and the list goes on. These bridging dimensions do tend to overlap. Non-immigrant organisations in the role of political brokers for migrants’ interests, very much like immigrant associations themselves, will frequently possess a global vision of integration and the granting of equal rights as citizens as an overarching interest and goal. Thus all problematic areas often become areas of intervention in one form or another. For the associations, however, the relational network will naturally depend on interests and resources. Take, for example, political parties, often seen as important channels to accessing scarce resources (Horta and Malheiros 2005). Although this might be the case, to which extent the associations will ‘bridge’ interests with specific parties will naturally depend on the values and political philosophies of the party, and if they are in the best interest of immigrants.

Given the fact that it’s the political institution responsible for immigrant integration issues, ACIME was, unsurprisingly, the first ranked collaborative institution mentioned by the interviewees. The associations see in this institution the most direct line in having their issues and concerns reach the powers-that-be – given that ACIME is responsible COCAI – and an important avenue in obtaining financial resource, and being a key project partners. When it comes to political lobbying, however, it is important to remember that participation opportunities made
available to associations, and foreigners in general, are frequently ‘controlled’ by the governments the immigrants often lobby against, in addition to that fact that the lack of equal participation rights often puts some groups at a disadvantage. Although political structures, such as ACIME, may provide a platform where collective organisations may voice opinions, these platforms are often controlled, be it through limited access, paternalistic governance, conditioned participation, or through the granting or detaining of resources. Given this situation, it is essential that associations find other lobbying tactics without permitting government influence or manipulation. The concluding chapter that follows will further reflect on ‘determinants to integration’, taking these factors into consideration.
9 Conclusion

The primary objective of this study has been to analyse how Angolan, Brazilian and Eastern European associations in Portugal go about providing the link between the ‘old life’ in the country of origin and the ‘new life’ in the host society; between primary-group ties and the formal bureaucratic structures of the host society. Three questions – how do immigrant associations perceive and promote the needs of the community they represent; how do they contribute to community integration and identity preservation; and how do these organisations interface with the Portuguese formal social service structure – have served to frame the research. This concluding chapter will summarise the findings to these central questions.

Although questions of objectivity can arise in relation to inquiries pertaining to integration, identity and the associations’ roles, the aim of the study was to express the views of the association leaders, above all. Nonetheless, it is important to remember that conflicting arguments do exist. To counterbalance the arguments and to get outsiders’ perspectives on the associations, interviews were also carried out with various key informers.

Taking ‘immigrants’ as a starting point, wider issues have also been approached in this study. A variety of debates have been analysed and elaborated in order to get a better understanding of current situations and developments. The main theoretic approaches have taken into account the possible interaction and fusion, through time and across space, between the key concepts of immigrant associations, integration and identity. The following sections will bridge the theoretical debates with the results gathered from fieldwork with the Angolan, Brazilian and Eastern European associations.

Lastly, with the aims of raising further questions and of attempting to map out what the future might hold for immigrants and immigrant organisations in Portugal, I pose the question: what next for immigrant associations and the collective interests of immigrants?
9.1 The immigrant associations in time and space

Immigrant associations are multidimensional and prone to change in character over time. As studies on the formation of these organisations have revealed, in the initial migration stage, associations function to lessen the impacts of the social upheaval caused by migration, becoming spaces of social adaptation and solidarity, as well as aiming to function as a reproductive mechanism of the social relationships that had existed in the country of origin. At this stage, immigrant organisations serve as ‘safety-valve institutions’, turning their activities inward and establishing themselves as safe-havens for their members. As migrant settlement proceeds, and as increased contact with the host society starts to take place, immigrant associations then begin concentrating their attention on community integration and will start ‘taking up arms’ as active political lobby groups looking out for the best interests of their community.

This somewhat simplified pattern, however, is not always straightforward, for not all groups follow such a pattern. In a more elaborated analysis, Cox (1985) presents four variables that affect immigrant group settlement: the characteristics of the immigration, the socio-economic and political contexts on arrival, the nature of previous contact and the prevailing host-society attitudes. Taking Cox’s approach into consideration, the three association groups in this study also display different historical backgrounds and experiences, show different organisational characteristics and patterns, and have arrived in Portugal at different time-frames under different host-country regulations, policies and programmes.

The Angolan community started arriving in Portugal in mass numbers ‘on the heels’ of the 1974 de-colonisation process; a migration flow best described as of a socio-political nature due to the social instability and the climate of insecurity experienced in Angola. The initial establishment of Angolan associations was a reflection of these characteristics. The early associations were transnational in nature – acting, first, as a political front for Angolan political party activities in Portugal and, second, taking on the task of being charity organisations, supplying aid to an Angola that remained at war for 22 years. In the host country, although solidarity and cultural initiatives remained at the forefront of the work of associations since the early stages, their roles as political interventionists did not come about until the early 1990s, a time when immigration-related issues started to gather more attention and associations were ‘permitted’ to become political partners on issues pertinent to them.

Very different from the Angolan community are the recently arrived groups from Eastern Europe, present in Portugal since the late 1990s, and characterised, above all, as a labour-oriented migration flow. As Layton-Henry (1990) points out, in the first phase of labour migration most
migrants are usually male workers who frequently possess close ties with their homeland for they are often supporting family and relatives there. In the host country, they tend to work and live with fellow-nationals; their needs are limited, as their main objective is to earn and save as much as possible and then return home. This is a fitting description of early Eastern European migrants in Portugal. Many came and easily found work, primarily in construction. However, the overwhelming majority arrived in an illegal fashion, often through smuggling networks, subjecting themselves to exploitation and extortion. Consequently, the first associations were formed to assist with documentation, labour rights and countering exploitation. It is particularly in the case of the Eastern European organisations where the logic of associations as ‘safety-valve institutions’ first, and campaigning instruments second, has reversed its order. Associations as instruments of cultural reproduction and transmission have only come about in recent years with the settling of immigrants into Portuguese society and with the intensification of family reunification.

In the study of immigrant associations, the question of who is at the receiving end of their objectives and initiatives is also key to perceiving collective needs. Associations, very much like the community members they represent, are seldom uniform. They might be formed for more generalised purposes such as protecting a common cultural heritage or as a ‘social instrument’ of integration. However, other factors, such as class divisions or specific interests within the community, might lead to a multiplicity of institutions that cater to specific sectors and/or needs within the larger immigrant community. This is particularly the case of the third group analysed – the Brazilian. This community finds itself divided by two migration phases with very distinct characteristics. While the first, pre-1997, group was primarily composed of qualified individuals who arrived in a legal fashion, most recent arrivals have been young, unqualified and undocumented. The associations established have reflected these divisions, with the founding of professional and cultural associations in the early part of the 1990s, turning to interventionist and solidarity organisations with the arrival of the second wave since the late 1990s.

Consequently, immigrant associations will promote the needs of their respective clientele, pursuing actions and objectives based on the perceived needs of their members at specific stages of the immigration process and in accordance with the interests and characteristics of the individuals they represent. From the three groups outlined, different strategies and different interests at different stages can be identified. Associations may, on the one hand, be established to take on the task of preserving culture, language, religion and ethnic identity; and on the other, to lobby the institutions of the country of settlement to create con-
ditions that will permit the immigrants to be a part of the wider society. Some associations may take on these tasks simultaneously; others may concentrate in one area first before moving to the others at a later stage; and others may simply involve themselves in one sphere of intervention or actions, having nothing to do with other areas.

But associative action also depends on the host society’s reaction to immigrant communities. The attention given to immigration and integration issues, as well as attitudes taken up by the host society, are crucial factors in the migrant’s insertion. The outlook towards foreigners may change, depending on the scenarios and situations at different time frames. Immigrants may be seen as a necessary resource in times of labour shortages, but attitudes towards them may quickly change if unemployment starts rising. Refugees may be welcomed on arrival and then abandoned shortly thereafter. In the same sense, immigrant associations may be tolerated and even supported if their work is seen to be congruent with the interests of the government. However, that support may be withdrawn once the organisations start adapting strong advocacy or adversarial positions.

It is common that host-country governments will only react to immigrant issues when they become more pronounced or when immigrants start demonstrating and pressurising in the name of their own interests. In Portugal, ethnicity and immigrant issues had very little political bearing before the early 1990s due to immigration being a recent phenomenon up to that point, as well as the somewhat imperceptible contrasts between immigrants and the host population (Albuquerque et al. 2000). However, the growing presence of foreign populations and the integration difficulties new arrivals were experiencing changed this scenario. The early 1990s brought about an increase in the politicisation of immigrant issues, with the host country’s political authorities (at both national and local levels) giving immigrant associations the opportunity to participate in decisions and actions concerning their community. Since the turn of the century, the articulation between the state and civil society over migrant issues has continued to intensify. This is due to the new migrant flows from Brazil and Eastern Europe that have brought new demands, along with the unresolved problems associated with the PALOP communities.

For the immigrant associations, the pioneering work of organisations tied to the PALOP communities, in which we include Angolan associations, must be acknowledged. It is these organisations that paved the way for future associations through their dialogue with and pressure on the host society’s political institutions in order to be recognised as legitimate partners in the decision-making process and in service delivery. Time and space have thus determined the degree of associative strength and positioning. Before the first half of the 1990s, at a time when the
state and civil society ‘had their backs turned to each other’ (Albuquerque et al. 2000: 67), when integration policies and initiatives were of little importance, associations, possessing very few resources, struggled to be recognised. Today, associations can be legitimate partners of the state; they have access to resources that facilitate the carrying out of various activities, with some becoming highly professionalised institutions.

9.2 Between the migrants and the host society

The association typologies show organisations ranging from semi-professionalised service agencies to community or neighbourhood associations, to self-help social, cultural or professional groups, and to transnational organisations that deal on a multitude of fronts. Some are broadly ranging when it comes to their activities and target groups; others are specific with their initiatives and aim them at a particular sector of the population. Some have been ‘in the field’ for decades and have established themselves as recognised names in the ‘world’ of immigrant issues; others are just initiating their activities and have still to get a full grasp on their organisational setup. Beyond these typological differences, however, there are a number of needs (e.g. ethno-cultural, services, etc.) that immigrants have in common which, in varying degrees, are met by the associations. Across the three groups, both similarities and contrasts were witnessed when it comes to community issues, interests and actions carried out. The following points briefly sum up these similarities and differences:

- The Angolan associations described the lack of integration measures at the height of Angolan immigration to Portugal and the discrimination on the part of the host society as major barriers to community insertion. The organisations themselves were founded primarily to work at the local level (and, above all, in the LMA) with local service providers and municipal authorities. Problems such as housing, employment, discrimination and the integration of immigrant descendants dominate many of the associative initiatives.

- The Brazilian organisations pointed out that their community is primarily hampered by the lack of legal rights, which comes with being undocumented in the host country. This, in turn, also leads to labour market exploitation. Also stressed were the discrimination experienced in various sectors of society (i.e. housing and work) and the prostitution labelling experienced by Brazilian women. Not all Brazilian associations, however, deal with these issues. Many exist to serve specific goals and target groups. The more generalist associations concern themselves with political initiatives, with the goal of combating the integration problems noted.
The Eastern European associations, similar to the Brazilian community, referred to the problems that come with being undocumented (labour market exploitation, limited access to social services, etc.). Associations were formed to combat these issues and to assist immigrants with their integration (e.g. establishing language classes). Most recently, other concerns such as helping immigrants get their academic or professional qualifications recognised, family reunification and issues concerning children, have also taken centre-stage.

Given the importance of culture to all three groups, this is worth highlighting in a separate point. All three groups express the importance of their culture in a dual sense: first, as a way of preserving and celebrating their ethno-cultural roots and identity and passing it on to future generations; second as a way of transmitting their culture to Portuguese society and contributing to the creation of a multicultural society. This latter strategy also has the additional objective of facilitating the acceptance and integration of the immigrants. The associations thus organise and participate in cultural events, festivities, workshops, etc.

One similarity between the three groups is the fact that the majority of the associations work in the field of service provision – as information or welfare providers. As Jenkins (1988) points out, given that immigrant-representing organisations are broader than primary groups (i.e. families) but smaller than the bureaucracy, they can function as a link between these two systems, serving to reduce the social distance between them. The organisations thus take on mediating roles between the people they represent and the host society’s community and social services. In addition, in order to be able to carry out initiatives – be they of a social solidarity, cultural or political nature – it is often with the help of external relations that associations are able to do so. The four fronts the Angolan, Brazilian and Eastern European associations deal on (inter-associational, non-immigrant organisations, government and state institutions and transnational networks) permit the organisations to maximise their resources and create partnerships when it comes to promoting common interests.

However, as the literature on associations points out, their essence is, above all, based on voluntary principles. In the case of some of the associations studied, due to the tasks and work-load they are confronted with, it is preferable that voluntarism be replaced with professionalism. The majority do not opt for this strategy due to financial restrictions. The reality is that money is often restricted to carrying out defined projects and initiatives, and thus voluntarism is key to service provision. Still, a problem encountered is that participation in associations is frequently limited to a small number of individuals. While a small group, mostly
volunteers, work for the well-being of others, a third group of people receives (passively) the fruits of this work. This passiveness frequently extends to political actions that favour immigrants. Taking into account Tocqueville’s notion of voluntary associations being ‘empowering’ and functioning as ‘a learning school for democracy’, if associative involvement is kept to a minority group of individuals, Tocqueville’s notions are to be questioned. This is the case of immigrants in Portugal, for if participation and voluntarism through voluntary associations are to be considered a key feature of civil society, it can then be argued that the civil society of immigrant associations in Portugal is in no way robust.1

In addition, although in Portugal the number of immigrant associations has grown in recent years, it is important to take into consideration the strength and dynamism of these organisations as well as the external influences (e.g. host-country governments) that may enhance or inhibit the functioning of the organisations. It is a matter of fact that immigrants and receiving society’s institutions are very different types of actors given that they are ‘fundamentally unequal in terms of power and resources’ (Penninx and Martiniello 2004: 142). Naturally the later has the upper hand in this comparison. This is equally pointed out by Koopmans (1999: 100) who defends, in his explanation of variations in level and forms of collective action, that macro-structure factors are more decisive than micro-factors. Given this imbalance, it is of no surprise that social life has been losing ground in social organisations in favour of ‘systemic processes’; through the increasing ‘top-down’ provision of services instead of mutual help among community members.2 This considered, it is important to question the role of the state in controlling associations and their participatory opportunities. For host-country governments, it is often useful to have just a minority of the population involved in organisations. As Morén-Alegret (2002: 232) explains:

[...] if everybody was participating in these kinds of organisations, the system would collapse. This is because governments work on the basis that the majority of the population is politically inactive during daily life, and that a number of organisations [and government itself] may be useful in order to ‘auscultate’ [listen to] society. [...] governments benefit from people’s participation in associations, but of a determined kind [perverse or converse], in a determined way (as obedient volunteers or salaried), and, moreover, not in great numbers for a long period of time. Otherwise, governments can fear people may live in a self-managed way, without the need of government.

It is thus useful for governments to have control of associations. This can be done by controlling funding, which, in turn, also controls the degree of professionalisation (without money, one cannot have a paid
staff). In addition, the extent of associations’ participation in issues that concern them is also under the controlling hands of the state. For example, there may be a variety of reasons behind the creation of a consultative council such as COCAI, however the final decisions are kept in the hands of government. Also important is the issue of institutional discrimination on the part of the host society, which needs to be carefully examined. Such an examination should not only be concerned with the structural and cultural absorption of immigrants, but with the openness of host-society social institutions to the demands and conflicting interests of associations. When only second-class status is offered, associations not only struggle to develop and deliver services to the community, but may also be ignored when it comes to developing integration strategies and policies that, above all, concern the people they represent.

Nonetheless, given that the efforts of the associations have been increasingly recognised by government authorities and other organisations that make up the social welfare community, the issue arises of whether or not there will be a shift in the traditional pattern of service delivery as between public/voluntary services and secular/sectarian services. In addition, the extent to which associations might become so ‘grant-driven’ and ‘subsidy-dependent’ that they veer toward a bureaucratic stance rather than retain their ‘linkage’ or ‘interventionist’ position, is a question that needs further scrutiny.

9.3 Included, yet different: Integration, identity and citizenship

The most explicit reason for the existence of associations is that their respective communities have certain needs to which they cater. Associations may seek to maintain an ethno-cultural identity by explicitly or implicitly stressing divisions along ethnic lines and by driving the idea that their group has common unique interests. Associations, under this logic, become protectionist institutions by providing a framework for the display and preservation of identity and ethnicity. Additionally, the goals of immigrant associations might often reflect the concept that equality can only be achieved from a base of being separate. The rationale is that a sense of identity and ethnic purpose can be the platform for political bargaining to achieve more favourable access to opportunities in the larger society. On the other hand, an opposite view is that immigrant groups will fall into favour with the host society if they are to align with them socially and culturally; that is, if they assimilate. However, as assimilationist theory points out (Barry 2001), this also implies the loss of original group identity.

Given these two opposing perspectives, one of the central questions that framed this study is: how do immigrant associations perceive and
contribute to community integration and identity preservation? To try to answer this question, the perceptions of association leaders with regard to the aforementioned topics were analysed. A summary observation of the results gathered reveals that one of the principal traits of the life of the associations is their all-embracing character – the capacity to surround the aspirations of the membership and to transcend these aspirations through common reference to the shared ethnic and/or national identity. This, however, does not imply that the leaders in all three groups perceive cultural practice and identity formation as a one-sided affair where values and patterns from the country of origin are of the essence and host-country cultural traditions are completely discarded.

The two apparently opposing roles developed secure comparable responses to both identity preservation and assimilation issues. In reality, as my results have indicated, speaking the native language and passing it on to future generations is just as important as learning Portuguese; participating in the cultural events of the host country is just as important as passing on customs and culture to members of the host society; and maintaining close relations with people of your own ethnic group is just as important as blending in socially and culturally with members of the host society. Hence preservation is just as significant as acculturation. At the same time, it is also the desire of the associations to see their migrants become active participants in the economic, civic, political, cultural and spiritual life of the receiving country under the flagship of equal rights as citizens, including the right to vote. Thus, the at-first-sight paradoxical commitment to retaining ethno-cultural forms, while simultaneously supporting community integration into Portuguese society, is seen to be logical and not so paradoxical after all.

So, as Danese (2001: 86) points out, a separation-inclusion model seems to develop in which immigrants live and work in a parallel society linked to the host society by means of the discontinuous bridges that are the migrant associations. The relationship between host-society contexts and the fragmented or unified structures of the immigrant associations not only reflects distinct relations between resources and opportunities, it is also grounds for ongoing negotiation of rights as well as identities (Mapril and Araújo 2002). It is, therefore, common for associations, as ‘the face’ of the people they represent, to end up not belonging to this or that context as exclusive entities, but rather to look for the opportunities to negotiate their belonging to both the home-country setting and the host country, depending on beneficial interests. The findings from the interviews confirmed this Janus-faced notion. Such premeditated tactics is further confirmed through the notion of ‘strategic identity’ (Camilleri et al. 1990) as the associations will adjust and operate in accordance with the situations established by the receiving society, the finalities they wish to accomplish and the resources at their disposal.
In observing the positions of the associations on the topics of integration and identity, my results resonated within Schrover and Vermeulen’s (2005) offensive-defensive dichotomy. The offensive strategies are primarily framed around resolving the integration problems the communities face (e.g. legalisation, employment, housing, education, health, etc.), as well as discrimination and xenophobia. From the defensive position, although the associations stand firm on defending the freedom to maintain, practice and transmit their ethnic identities, from the narratives presented, as well as through their identity transmission strategies, the associations support a type of ‘dual identification’, adapting elements of Portuguese culture as seen fit and amalgamating these with their ethnic identity. In explaining this tendency, as Kivisto (2001: 568) states:

[...] transnational migrants forge their sense of identity and their community, not out of a loss or mere replication, but as something that is at once new and familiar – a *bricolage* constructed of cultural elements from both the homeland and the receiving nation. (italics in the original)

The associations thus provide a space that combines identities and practices, where belonging, resources and rights from different national contexts are constantly negotiated. This ‘third space’ of identity belonging (Bhabha 1994) draws from the different sets of loyalties. There is no doubt that cultural expressions from the ‘homeland’ emerge (through cultural symbols, music, dance, gastronomy, etc.), but other aspects of associative life reflect its existence within Portuguese society. What is brought into the associations (the Portuguese language, mixed marriages, integration trajectories, etc.), however, is Portuguese in nature. From the findings, it is thus evident that retaining ethnic and/or national identity and seeking integration into the systems of the host country are not antithetical. If desired and achieved, both efforts may complement each other in the struggle for a satisfactory coexistence in the new environment. The association leaders across the three groups universally characterised their community as having cultural traits they wish to preserve. The more established immigrants may cling to their native cultures for historical reasons, while the recently arrived may rely on it for the purpose that it provides the social support that makes adaptation possible. However, the leaders also recognised the need for community members to adapt in order to survive and to take on aspects of ‘being Portuguese’ in order to do so. So, if a ‘hyphen’ is to be used to amalgamate the ‘double identity worlds’ the immigrants, as well as their associations, find themselves in, it is also the case that this hyphenated identity is utilised for the purpose of systemic identification – for the purpose
of acquiring survival resources – more so than to truly define themselves.

Additionally, it is also important to remember that the extent to which integration or identities are negotiated also depends on the degree to which the host society, through its policies on granting rights of citizenship, will allow immigrants to participate and be full members of the broader community. As we saw in Chapter 2, the debate on the topic of citizenship calls for equity for all members of society within a multicultural framework. However, given that measures taken to stimulate participation are most often established through channels governed by the state, the central question is just: how open are the frameworks of the host society in allowing immigrants to participate and possess equal rights as citizens? In other words, how genuine and spontaneous are immigrant voices allowed to be, or are they constrained by what they are ‘allowed’ to say, or by the venues and platforms at which their voices can be heard?

In the Portuguese case, although a variety of policies and programmes have been put into action with the intent of integrating foreign populations, the immigrants themselves have had little say in public decisions, policies and resources on issues that concern them. The result has been the implementation of measures that do not always meet their needs in the way they would want them to. The critiques presented in Chapter 8 are proof of this. The lack of not having a say in policymaking decisions is, first and foremost, due to the fact that legal status of citizenship is not facilitated, as well as to the limited avenues for participation available to immigrants. As was pointed out, obtaining the right to residence status is considered the most fundamental of immigrant demands – viewed as a precondition for all other rights. In Portugal, beyond the difficulties involved in obtaining residence status, considering that regularisation is not a continuous process, some authorisation types, such as the permanência authorisation, do not grant equal right to all citizens. In addition, remembering Penninx’s (2000: 6-7) three different aspects of citizenship – juridical/political, socio-economic and cultural/religious – one can here witness the lack of citizenship rights in some of these domains. For example, in the juridical/political sphere, the right to vote only exists through reciprocity, which leaves many immigrants without the right to vote. Furthermore, the jus sanguinis-based Nationality Law has left many Portuguese-born immigrant descendents without equal rights.4 In the socio-economic sphere, the lack of consultation and participation over re-housing, for example, puts residents in a state of sub-citizenship. On the other side, the creation of home-language schooling and the passing on of ethnic values to future generations demonstrate the desire to have equal organisational rights via their ethnic identity, and for those rights to be recognised by the host society.
Beyond these aspects of citizenship, it is also important to recall that the few collective forms of representation made available to immigrants are of a consultative nature (e.g. COCAI) with no political decision-making rights being given. It is thus important that immigrants take into account strategies for citizenship mobilisation, not only by exploiting the channels at their disposal, but also searching out other lobbying tactics without government influence or manipulation. In Portugal, besides applying pressure through the available administrative instruments, immigrants, primarily through their associations, create platform groups, lobby governments and political parties, carry out public protests and establish relations with other host-society institutions in order to strengthen their causes. Such mobilisation has centred on calls for legalisation, the granting of nationality and voting rights, improved integration measures in such sectors as housing, education and labour, as well as linguistic, religious and ethnic identity preservation rights, to name just a few. The call for rights of citizenship, as witnessed in the demands set out, is considered of a ‘double-edged nature’: rights and freedoms to integration without assimilation, on one hand; and rights to politically and actively belong and participate under the banner of equal citizenship rights, on the other.

9.4 Determinates to integration: Policies and social services

Without being aware of the factors that hinder integration, one cannot attempt to start resolving them. This book took on the task of observing the way host society organisational patterns, service delivery and opportunity structures influence and determine the degree of the immigrants’ integration into Portuguese society. In studying the linkages between the immigrant associations and the formal service structure, it can be concluded that such articulation is essential, considering the positioning of the associations as intermediaries between the community and social services. However, the associations are particularly critical of this articulation, in addition to the lack of credibility, the over-bureaucratised service delivery and what many consider to be negative policies that govern the delivery of specific services.

The perceptions of the associations with regards to eight areas of integration considered of primary importance were reported in Chapter 8. The main conclusion reached is that immigrants are dependent on the services, policies and the work of the service providers when it comes to their integration. Another important finding is what can be referred to as the ‘policy domino effect’. This alludes to one policy area being the downfall of accessing rights in other societal areas. Such is the case with not being a documented immigrant, often leading to not possessing
rights in such areas as employment, health and housing. Thirdly, the rules, attitudes and behaviour in the public service institutions erect obstacles in achieving the same rights. This comes in the form of excessive bureaucracy, unequal treatment, lack of information, segregated services, etc. It is, above all, this treatment and the routines of action (and inaction) on the part of community and social services that demonstrate the institutionalised forms of discrimination that immigrants encounter (Wrench 2007).

The integration of immigrants into Portuguese society thus depends on improving services, smoothing their coordination and de-bureaucratising them, proper training of those who deal with immigrants and their respective issues, greater articulation between the services and the immigrant organisations that are better positioned to inform their community members, and, above all, facilitating integration by not creating obstacles that do not grant equal rights and thus place immigrants on the periphery of society.⁵

Additionally, the lack of a coherent immigration policy must also be considered. Highlighting Portugal’s position as a recent country of immigration, it is important to remember that integration issues and subsequent problems are also new phenomena. Due to the suddenness and massive nature of some of the inflows (e.g. post-colonial African immigration including the ‘returnees’, and most recently the Eastern European and Brazilian flows), the Portuguese state has had to deal with large numbers of migrants entering the work-force and utilising community services with very little preparation and a lack of experience. Although Portugal has been dealing with the arrival of foreign individuals, especially since the Revolution of 1974, integrating these individuals has only recently become a political concern. In 1992, Machado wrote that the Portuguese state had had, up to that period, a non-interventionist attitude towards immigrants and ethnic minorities. Although this situation has certainly changed since, it is important to point out that the Portuguese state has never defined a clear immigrant integration strategy. What have thus far been created are patchwork policies, often with no interconnectedness at higher government levels, with local-level powers left to conceive their own integration measures. The mixture of elements extracted from both the multicultural model as well as the assimilation-oriented model, with variations at local and regional levels (Morén-Alegret 2002), adequately demonstrates the lack of clarity when it comes to an integration strategy.⁶

At a time when both pluralistic freedom and the equality of rights and opportunities are ideals of utmost importance, when there is an urgent need to create and implement effective strategies to deal with the current problems that obstruct the implementation of such goals, not only should greater dialogue be taking place but prompt action as well, keep-
ing in mind the improvement of immigrant and ethnic minority integration measures. This study has sought to draw some conclusions that will hopefully prove useful in understanding the process of integration of immigrants in Portuguese society, with special reference to eight areas of analysis. However, I also wish to point out that the subject matter of immigrant integration is far from fully understood.

In order to carry out the research presented in this book, a ‘privileged’ voice was given to association leaders. As touched upon in the introductory chapter of this study, I justify choosing immigrant association leaders as study subjects due to their obvious strategic positioning as ‘community insiders’ and as ‘middlemen’ when it comes to immigrant community/host-society relations. However, in choosing to study immigrant association representatives, I am also aware that one is running the risk of presenting a one-dimensional argument. It is important to acknowledge the fact that, by focusing on the ‘voices’ of the association leaders, one may obscure the views of the ‘rank-and-file’ members, let alone the views and experiences of immigrants who are not association members. However, in the context of the pluri-vocal design of this thesis, it is important to remember that other parallel as well as conflicting arguments were elicited from numerous sources, such as community members, immigrant social service workers, members of the host society, and various other key informants for this study. Having said this, it is hoped that some of the findings and suggestions that have been put forward in this study will be subject to further research in the field of immigrant integration.

9.5 ‘Only the future will tell...’

In this study I have offered a detailed picture of Angolan, Brazilian and Eastern European immigrant associations, basing my analysis on the views of their leaders and other individuals close to these institutions on the topics of integration and identity. In the same manner as social situations and political scenarios are prone to changes through time, so are feelings and opinions in constant change, often reflecting current circumstances and state of affairs. As Hall (1990: 222) writes: ‘We all write and speak from a particular place and time, from history and a culture which is specific. What we say is always “in context”, positioned’. Such is the positioning of those whose views and opinions were analysed in this thesis; reflecting a specific time and space. The perceptions possessed by the individuals interviewed may not be the same in five, ten, twenty years from now, which, in turn, will reflect the actions and positions of the associations they will then represent or not. Clearly, the future of the associations is dependent on changes – changes that may come from the
host society (in the form of policies, changing attitudes, etc.) as well as the immigrants and their offspring (through assimilation, mobilisation, etc.). So what will become of the immigrants’ associations in the future? In the words of one interviewee: ‘only the future will tell...’ (EE).

At the present time, it has been demonstrated that associations assure their members a dependable space as an identity resource and for the expression of solidarity, while simultaneously acting as mediators vis-à-vis Portuguese society. Their goal is not to segregate their respective communities, but instead to make them a part of Portuguese society; to have them recognised and treated as equal citizens and, at the same time, have their cultural differences respected and accepted by the host society.

Integration implies the intake of new members and making them similar to the established ones in aspects relevant for the internal cohesion of society as a whole. Given this, the host society, through its immigration and integration policies as well as its openness to acceptance of newcomers, plays a major role in determining the degree of insertion into the receiving society. Given the hardships experienced by community members when it comes to such aspects as obtaining citizenship rights, dealing with the Portuguese bureaucratic systems or simply being accepted by the host society on a day-to-day basis, many are left in the margins of Portuguese society.

The future thus depends on changing these variables – facilitating integration by designing policies aimed at doing so, reducing bureaucracies, promoting the differences that exist between foreigners and Portuguese society, and campaigning for a positive outlook on the presence of immigrants in Portugal. As long as this is not accomplished, the general feeling among the associations is that their presence and actions will persist and demands for change will continue to be made.

But what if the socio-political issues that the associations are concerned with were to be resolved? As one Eastern European association leader explained:

At the moment the associations work to better the integration of the people but I hope that in the years to come there won’t be a need for these associations and that all of this will come to an end. We want people to adapt as quickly as possible. That’s what we’re here for – to help people, because the people need this. I don’t want this association to transform itself into an association for the creation of ghettos. I hope that in ten, fifteen years the Eastern European people who stay will assimilate. If people want to continue on with a cultural association, that’s good, we will do that. People can participate if they want to or they can celebrate their culture at home or not participate at all. The choice is theirs. But right now these associations exist for rea-
sons such as legalisation, combating exploitation and the bureaucracies that don’t allow people to get on with life. The future of the immigrants, of these associations, as they exist at this moment – it’s all out of our hands (EE).

Referring to the typology of Saskia Sassen-Koob (1979), the modes of articulation of immigrant associations appear as two opposites: ‘expressive’ – as cultural mediating agents, and ‘instrumental’ – as political mobilising entities. The citation describes the current need of associations for their instrumental function; a role that will be less felt if or when integration problems are overcome. However, the proliferation of expressive associations and the promotion of cultural differentiation are viewed as secondary to having community members assimilate to Portuguese society. Does this logic apply to all three groups? The answer is yes and no. As noted, if individuals are to be a part of the receiving society, ‘degrees of assimilation’ are encouraged by the associations. Across the three groups, the majority consider it to be at least as important to participate in host-country activities as it is to participate in the activities of the country of origin.

Nonetheless, in order to evaluate the future of the immigrant communities and their associations, it is also necessary to take into consideration the present scenarios for these communities. In this case, the Angolans are in a very different situation from the other two groups. Similar to their PALOP counterparts, this community is already into the third generation. Research has shown that the longer the period of residence in the host country, the greater the propensity for community members to be influenced by the social, cultural and institutional pressures of the host society (Hily and Poinard 1987). In the Angolan case, however, assimilation has not been a given in the case of recent generations born in Portugal. Factors such as the lack of equal rights (primarily due to not being recognised as Portuguese nationals), class and racial discrimination, as well as the ‘cycle of poverty’ many find themselves in, are leading second- and third-generation Angolans to rebel against ‘being Portuguese’. As Contador (1998, 2000) reveals, many are finding themselves through the culture of their parents as well as other cultural forms, namely through variations of African culture. Associations thus take on the ‘expressive’ role in order to satisfy the cultural needs of ‘new’ generations. In this case, it can be argued that Angolan organisations are contributing to their communities’ maladaptation by promoting ‘cultural separatism’. However, it can equally be upheld that this is due to the failure of Portuguese society to establish the conditions that would permit proper integration.

The Brazilian and Eastern European communities, on the other hand, are mainly composed of recently arrived individuals. It was made clear
in many of the interviews that the majority of their respective community members are short-term migrants who have come to Portugal to work, save money and return home. Cultural maintenance is often secondary to the economic objectives. In order to assist immigrants with the initial problems many have experienced on arrival (dealing with documentation, employment issues, citizenship rights, etc.), the associations of these communities have primarily taken up ‘instrumental’ roles. However, as family reunification starts taking place (as is currently the case with Eastern Europeans) and as the propensity for long-term settlement grows, other ethno-cultural concerns begin to take centre-stage.

The proliferation of expressive associations can be seen as a way in which immigrants adapt to the new milieu by reproducing traditional institutions in the new setting. Associations build ‘replication structures’ to compensate the loss of traditional life or to provide for the community what the host society cannot. The reproduction of such replication structures is as much out of need to continue to be attached to the country of origin as it is a response to the needs generated in the new setting. Evidence of the step from instrumental to expressive associations is most evident in the Eastern European organisations where replication structures such as weekend schooling for the school-age population have been established not only to keep the youth in contact with the culture and language of the countries of origin but also to compensate for where the Portuguese schooling system is seen to fail. The reproduction of traditional institutions and the affirmation of a collective identity are, in many cases, a response to the needs generated in the new host-country context.

Also concerning the Eastern European group, although my decision to group the various nationalities (Bulgarian, Moldovan, Romanian, Russian and Ukrainian) into one collective unit was made before commencing the fieldwork, it was learnt along the way that many factions and differing (identity) characteristics among these communities undoubtedly exist. Although such differences were not so marked, or at least not given much weight, in the initial stage of immigration to Portugal, due to the broad commonality that linked the individuals (e.g. originating from the former Soviet states, perceived as sharing a common political and cultural background, having arrived during the same time period and possessing the same immigration problems, etc.), with the passing of time and with integration taking place into Portuguese society, the distinctiveness of each community under the Eastern European banner has become more pronounced. The approach of grouping these nationalities together is thus a decision worth rethinking as the communities originating from Eastern Europe now start to mount their own adaptive strategies and reveal ethno-cultural differences through religious, linguistic, symbolic or other cultural forms.
Bringing the three groups back into the fold, as mediating agents, the associations also carry out the function of cultural transmitters. Given that the associations analysed in this thesis favour the creation of an intercultural Portugal, it is also their responsibility, and of those who govern them, to see this model become a reality. The interviewees explained that this can only be done if both the host society and the immigrant populations are to accept and respect each other’s cultural differences. As one association leader put it, doing away with people’s ignorance is key to a ‘harmonious future’:

When I was going to university a lot of times colleagues of mine, in a playful manner, would ask me: ‘What do you guys eat in Africa, just banana tree leaves?’ They would say this jokingly, but it would always get me thinking that perhaps the people here in Portugal really didn’t know. Eventually I started thinking to myself, ‘I can’t spend every single day answering the same questions. What do you eat? How do you live? And so on.’ Now I know that the best way to clarify these questions is by promoting my culture; through cultural events, gastronomy, music, literature, cinema... If I promote the elements of my culture, I am helping people to acquire more knowledge and I am also contributing to getting people to be more accepting of our differences. These are little things that play a large part in our integration and this is the only way we can have a harmonious future here in Portugal (A).

Thus, the ‘life’ of the associations depends not only on the immigrants’ desire to continue affirming a collective ethnicity and maintaining and manifesting their cultural separatism, but also on the receiving society’s acceptance of those differences. The impact of immigration on the host society’s cultural life and social institutions is what Kivisto (2001: 571) considers ‘the new version of assimilation’. Immigrants do not assimilate into a society that is fixed and given, but rather one that is fluid and subject to changes brought about by their very presence.

Moreover, if the organisations are to allow for mutual compatibility of cultural membership, they also run the risk of being trapped by ‘identity indecisions’ (Hily and Poinard 1987: 161). This may especially be true if the descendent generations – born and raised in Portugal, possessing different values and perceptions, and capable of crossing social and cultural boundaries – are to take up the leadership role of these organisations. Consequently, as Hily and Poinard (1987: 162) point out, the two axes become apparent within the framework of the associations since they will lose their capacity to express the ‘global character’ of the community to reconcile between ‘warmth and experience’ and to accord stature to future leaders.
It is also important to bear in mind that immigrant communities have ever-expanding mobility opportunities offered by new technologies of time-space compression (Harvey 1989). Furthermore, the acceleration of global flows by communications technologies means that cultural forms are available for worldwide consumption on a mass scale (Gillespie 1995), in addition to there being a greater propensity for a worldwide economic, political, social and cultural interconnectedness among people (Hannerz 1996; Croucher 2004). The analysis that I have carried out in this study has also revealed that the associations are entities positioned within receiving-sending country contexts, taking on transnational roles and negotiating within social spaces where globally diffused models of social organisation and individuals’ local responses converge and produce new mixes of beliefs, values and practices. The dealings of transnational immigrant associations within transnational social spaces requires an examination of these institutions in terms of the rates of circulation and communication between homeland and migratory setting, and the production of institutional activities within these two settings, through time (Portes et al. 2007).

The question of whether transnationalism favours ethnic pluralism and multiculturalism (Glick Schiller 1999) or assimilation (Kivisto 2001) is one that needs to be transposed from theoretical debate to practical analysis and to be further problematised. Future research will determine whether globalisation and transnational involvement will persist over time and across generations (Kivisto 2001), and in turn, what impact might it have on the future of immigrant associations. Many questions arise. Will associations opt to work in poverty eradication projects in their homeland, or will they instead choose to invest in improving neighbourhood conditions in Portugal? Will they send remittances back home or will they set their money aside with the aim of setting up studentships for immigrant descendents in Portugal, for example? Will political involvement focus on social reform in the homeland or on lobbying government to legalise all undocumented migrants or urging the local municipality to promote the enforcement of fair housing measures? Will the association social gathering include Portuguese dishes or will it exclusively be food from the homeland? The question of which transnational issue weighs heavier will, in turn, influence the degree of community integration. In constructing such a research agenda (with the aim of attempting to answer the outlined questions), a number of issues need to be addressed. While not meant to be exclusive, some of these factors include:11

- frequency of contact with the homeland, physical and otherwise;
- salience of homeland political issues or economic conditions versus the immediacy of similar concerns in the host society;
– impact of discrimination in limiting access to the institutions of the receiving country’s civil society;
– sustainability over time of involvement in institutions of the homeland’s civil society;
– level of involvement over time in the institutions of the receiving country’s civil society;
– impact of popular culture in preserving ethnic identity, sustaining hybridised transnational identities or in assisting with the assimilating process;
– role of nation-states – both the homeland and the receiving nation – in migration policies and defining citizenship;
– extent of participation and interests of descendant generations in the cultural institutions and civil societies of both their country of origin and the country of their parents or grandparents.

In summary, this book, based on qualitative research, has looked at immigrant associations, analysing the perspectives they possess as well as the roles they carry out when it comes to community integration and collective identity. First, in order to understand what is occurring in the highly variegated organisational scene, it has been necessary to study the evolution of the immigrant organisations, the politicisation of immigrant affairs in Portugal and the relations that have existed over the last three decades. These relations, along with the political affairs, policies, initiatives and the overall ‘welcomeness’ of immigrants on the part of Portuguese society, have played a large role in determining the extent of integration and identity strategies adapted. The integration of immigrants is dependent on a productive dialogue maintained between the immigrant communities (primarily through the organisations that represent them) and the institutions of the host society. Only through this open debate – with the intent of creating policies and initiatives that will permit immigrants to insert themselves, while at the same time, working towards the creation of a much-desired pluralistic, intercultural society – will these individuals feel a part of Portuguese society. It is thus through these political struggles, acts of solidarity, and cultural interactions, on behalf of the people they represent, that the immigrant associations can provide an important link between the ‘old life’ and the ‘new life’, and, at the same time, break the boundaries between primary-group ties, the formal bureaucratic structures of the receiving society, and society at large.
Epilogue

The writing up of a body of work such as this one required numerous hours of isolation. In one way or another, all researchers and/or authors will attest to this. My own experience in preparing this body of work – from the reviewing of literature, through all the tasks associated to analysing materials, to the writing itself – seemed, at times, a labourious, time-consuming endeavor. In the midst of these duties lay the field experience – the getting to, being amongst and returning from the immigrants and the associative worlds. Memories of wandering around, killing time after arriving early for a meeting in another city, the overnight stays, the territorial observations – often carried out keeping the immigrant experience in mind; permitting plenty of solitary time to reflect. A time when the landscapes and geographies of a ‘foreign land’ (to immigrants and often even to me) was mixed with stories of being and feeling foreign. Scientifically, one seldom gets to dissect these periods of isolation.

So as I rode the 7:30 AM train from Porto to Guimarães on that cold March morning in 2005, making my way through the heavily industrialised Ave Valley; as I looked out over the houses bellowing smoke from their chimneys, leaving a dark fog over the river valley, I thought about the Brazilian immigrant who would be awaiting me at the end of my train journey and where he might fit in the midst of this scenery.

As I rode the bus from Faro (where I had spent a few days interviewing Eastern European community representatives) to the city of Beja in the Alentejo region (where another immigrant association leader awaited me); as the bus made its way down the narrow cork tree-lined road that connects the villages of Castro Verde and Aljustrel on a sweltering Alentejo Summer afternoon, I looked out over the flat, dry agricultural landscapes and thought about the contrasts: +40°C Alentejo Summers, -40°C Kiev Winters ... and that's just scratching the surface of the contrast barrel.

As I walked around the neighbourhood of Urbanização Terraços da Ponte (Municipality of Loures), the neighbourhood that was built to house those individuals who occupied the unfinished buildings that made up Quinta do Mocho, it became essential to me to walk over to ‘the other side’ – the other side of the avenue that divides the ‘new’ Ur-
banização Terraços da Ponte and the ‘old’ lands where Quinta do Mocho was once located, just a rock’s throw away. Since I never got the opportunity to stand among the unfinished buildings that once stood and were ‘home’ to a large number of people from the former Portuguese colonies, the next best thing was to stand on the soil that once supported those buildings, look back and see what exists now. Those lands are today home to new, modern middle-class apartments.

These are just a few examples of the ‘lived’ and often ‘felt’ experiences — away from other individuals, away from books, away from other opinions — just what I saw, and what I already knew or didn’t know; where spontaneity of thought and observation took over. I’m, above all, appreciative for these moments of isolation, the ones I’m pretty sure I’ll never forget.
Appendix: List of interviewees

Angolan association representatives (A)

- President of Associação Tratado de Simulambuco – Casa de Cabinda – 20/9/04
- Secretary of Casa de Angola de Lisboa – 23/9/04 and 3/2/05
- President of Associação Quizomba and president of the Federação das Associações Angolanas em Portugal – 24/9/04
- President of Associação Internacional Amigos de Angola – 29/9/04
- President of Club Desportivo Veteranas de Angola – 7/10/04
- President of Associação dos Estudantes Angolanos em Portugal – 8/10/04
- President of ANGOCORO – 8/11/04
- President of Associação para a Defesa dos Direitos da Cultura Backongo – 14/11/04
- President of Associação de Solidariedade Angolana em Portugal – 22/11/04
- President of União da Juventude Angolana em Portugal and director of the publication Comunidade Activa – 1/12/04
- President of Casa de Angola em Coimbra – 3/12/04 & 5/12/04
- President of Associação de Coordenação e Integração dos Migrantes Angolanos – 9/12/04
- President and co-founder of Associação dos Residentes Angolanos no Concelho de Odivelas – 11/12/04
- President of Associação Kamba – 18/12/04
- President of Associação Amigos da Mulher Angolana – 3/1/05
- President of Fórum Social Angolano – 5/1/04
- President and founder of Associação Apoio Sem Limites – 5/1/04
- President of Associação Kambariange, President of Frente Anti-Racist and volunteer at Interculturacidade immigrant support centre – 11/1/05 and 1/2/05
- Vice-President of PROSAUDESC – Associação de Promotores de Saúde, Ambiente e Desenvolvimento Sócio-Cultural and technical worker, ACIME’s Choices Programme (Programa Escolhas) – 17/1/05
- President of Associação Luso-Africana dos Metodistas no Porto – 25/1/05
- First secretary on the board of directors and head coordinator of the Loures delegation of Casa de Angola de Lisboa, and president of LLUANDA – Liga Luso-Angolana Demóstenes de Almeida – 3/2/05
- President of Associação Casa dos Estudantes do Império and former member of the board of directors of Casa dos Estudantes do Império from 1953 to 1961 – 11/2/05
- President of Associação Africana do Barreiro, and member of the board of directors and head coordinator of the Moita delegation of Casa de Angola de Lisboa – 23/2/05
- Treasurer of Associação de Defesa dos Direitos das Famílias Angolanas – 1/3/05
- President of Associação N’Angola – 9/3/2005
- Member of the board of directors of Associação de Defesa dos Angolanos, co-founder of the now defunct Associação Cultural e Recreativa Angolana, PPD/PSD political party representative in the City of Lisbon’s Municipal Assembly and head of the City of Lisbon’s Municipal Council of Immigrant and Ethnic Minority Communities – 16/3/05 and 7/9/05
- President of the general assembly of Casa de Angola da Região do Minho – 21/6/05

Brazilian association representatives (B)
- Director of Fundação Luso-Brasileira para o Desenvolvimento do Mundo da Língua Portuguesa – 12/10/04
- President of Torcida Brasil – 18/10/04
- Committee member of Associação Carinho Brasileiro – 5/11/04
- Member of the board of directors of Casa do Brasil de Lisboa – 10/11/04
- President of Associação de Pesquisadores e Estudantes Brasileiros em Coimbra – 3/12/04
- Member of Casa do Brasil de Lisboa – 11/1/05 and 20/1/05
- Joint coordinator of Núcleo PT – Partido dos Trabalhadores – 14/1/05
- President of Associação de Cidadãos Brasileiros na Universidade do Porto, coordinator of Movimento das Associações de Pesquisadores e Estudantes Brasileiros em Portugal and member of Núcleo PT – 24/1/05
- President of Associação Mais Brasil – 25/1/05
- Treasurer of Associação Mais Brasil – 25/1/05
- President of Associação Brasileira de Portugal – 1/2/05
- Joint coordinator of Núcleo PT – Partido dos Trabalhadores – 3/2/05
Member of Associação Mais Brasil and employed at the Porto CNAI – 9/3/05
Head-director and coordinating instruction of Abadá – Associação Brasileira de Apoio e Desenvolvimento à Arte Capoeira – 10/3/05
President of Casa do Brasil de Lisboa – 18/3/05
President of Clube de Empresários do Brasil and Câmara do Comércio Luso-Brasileiro – 4/4/05
President of Associação Brasileira da Universidade de Aveiro – 15/4/05
Member of the board of directors and head of the Ericeira delegation of Solidariedade Imigrante – Associação para a Defesa dos Direitos dos Imigrantes – 13/5/05
Judicial councilor of Casa do Brasil de Lisboa and with the Lisbon CNAI – 18/5/05
Treasurer and former president of Casa do Brasil de Lisboa, founder of Núcleo PT – Partido dos Trabalhadores and Brazilian community COCAI representative – 23/5/05 and 15/9/05
President of Associação Luso-Brasileira de Saúde Oral – 31/5/05
President of Associação Brasileira de Setúbal – 7/6/05
Vice-president of Associação Brasileira de Setúbal and employed at SEI – Setúbal, Etnias e Imigrantes – 7/6/05
President of Associação de Apoio à Cidadania Lusófona – 22/6/05
President of Associação Pineal – Associação de Assistência Social – 30/6/05

Eastern European association representatives (EE)

President of Associação dos Imigrantes do Leste Europeu – 29/9/04
President of Associação Cultural dos Romenos Mircea Eliade – 30/9/04
President of Movimento de Imigrantes Bereg – 1/10/04
Member of Associação dos Ucranianos em Portugal and director of the associations newspaper MICT – 6/10/04
President of Associação Romena e Povos Amigo and caretaker of the Centro de Acolhimento no Poço do Bispo – 20/10/04
President of Sobor – Associação dos Imigrantes Ucranianos and volunteer worker with Medicos do Mundo (‘Physicians of the World’) – 21/10/04
President of Solidariedade Imigrante – Associação para a Defesa dos Direitos dos Imigrantes and COCAI representative of the Eastern European communities – 25/10/04
President of Associação dos Ucranianos em Portugal – 26/10/04 and 30/7/05
– President of Casa do Leste – 27/10/04
– President of Centro Cultural Moldavo – 19/11/04 and 13/6/05
– Co-founder and member of the Associação Cultural dos Romenos
  Mircea Eliade, and priest of the Roman Orthodox Church in Portugal
  – 10/1/05
– Founder and president of Edinstvo – Associações dos Imigrantes dos
  Países do Leste, co-founder and president of Casa da Língua e Cultura
  Russas and employee at Setúbal, Etnias e Imigração – 17/2/05
– President of Frăţia – Associação dos Imigrantes Romenos e Moldavos
  – 17/2/05
– Co-founder and collaborator of Associação de Solidariedade Social e
  Intercultural da Federação Russa em Portugal, president of Sindicato
  dos Operários da Construção Civil and former Partido Socialista De-
  mocrático MP from 1988 to 1991 – 11/4/05
– President of Respublika – Associação dos Imigrantes Russofonos
  – 12/4/05
– President of Amizade – Associação de Apoio aos Imigrantes de Leste
  – 13/4/05
– Porto delegation representative of the Associação dos Ucranianos em
  Portugal – 13/4/05
– President of Associação Apoio ao Imigrante – São Bernardo and co-
  founder and secretary of Casa da Língua e Cultura Russas – 14/4/05
– Secretary of Associação Cristã Ortodoxa de Aveiro – 15/4/05
– Co-founder and vice-president of Associação Casa da Línguas e Cul-
  tura Russas and former coordinator (until 31 March 2005) of
  ACIME’s Gabinete de Apoio ao Reconhecimento de Habilitações e
  de Competências – 20/5/05
– Member of board of directors and head of the Albufeira delegation of
  Solidariedade Imigrante – Associação para a Defesa dos Direitos dos
  Imigrantes – 31/5/05
– President of Associação Tavirense de Apoio ao Imigrante – 1/6/05
– Member of board of directors and head of the Beja delegation of Soli-
  dariedade Imigrante – Associação para a Defesa dos Direitos dos Imi-
  grantes – 3/6/05
– Presidential candidate of Associação de Solidariedade Social e Inter-
  cultural da Federação Russa em Portugal – 21/6/05
– President of Nach Dom – Associação de Imigrantes – 23/6/05
– Faro delegation representative of the Associação dos Ucranianos em
  Portugal – 30/6/05
– Vice-president of Associação CAPELA – Centro de Apoio à População
  Emigrante de Leste e Amigos – 1/7/05
– Lagos delegation representative of the Associação dos Ucranianos em
  Portugal – 2/7/05
– President of Associação Sodrújestvo – Centro de Apoio às Crianças
Russófonas e aos seus Pais – 4/7/05
– Vice-president and Lisbon regional director of Associação dos Ucranianos em Portugal – 30/7/05

**Social and community service institution informants and others (I)**

– Priest of the Greek Orthodox Church (Byzantine Rite) and member of *Obra Católica Portuguesa de Migrações* – Dioceses of Évora and Beja – 15/10/04
– Priest of the Greek Orthodox Church (Byzantine Rite) and member of *Obra Católica Portuguesa de Migrações* – Dioceses of Évora and Beja – 15/10/04
– General Secretary of *NÓS* – *Organização Não Governamental para a Cooperação e Desenvolvimento* and co-founder of the now defunct Eastern European association *Drusha* – 28/10/04
– Assistant coordinator of GATAIME – 3/11/04
– Priest of the Greek Orthodox Church (Byzantine Rite) and member of *Obra Católica Portuguesa de Migrações* – Dioceses of Leiria-Fátima, Coimbra and Santarém – 12/11/04
– Capeverdian community COCAI representative and president of Associação Caboverdeana – 22/11/04
– Coordinator of *Gabinete de Assuntos Religiosos e Sociais Específicos*, Loures City Hall – 29/11/04
– Director of *Obra Católica Portuguesa de Migrações* and COCAI representative – 7/12/04
– Judicial councilor of UGT – *Gabinete de Apoio aos Imigrantes* – 9/12/04
– Collaborator and a cultural animator of *Gabinete de Assuntos Religiosos e Sociais Específicos*, Loures City Hall – 13/12/04
– Priest of the Greek Orthodox Church (Byzantine Rite) and member of *Obra Católica Portuguesa de Migrações* – Dioceses of Lisbon and Setúbal – 5/1/05
– Director of *Gabinete de Apoio ao Movimento Associativo*, Amadora City Hall – 15/3/05
– Social Assistant of *Centro Espiritano Padre Alves Correia* – 22/3/05
– National leader of CGTP-IN, coordinator of CGTP-IN – *Departamento de Migrações* and labour union representative in COCAI – 23/3/05
– Social Services Manager of *Serviço Jesuítas aos Refugiados* – 31/3/05
– President of the general assembly and former president of the board of directors (until 1 April 2005) of *Frente Anti-Racista*, member of *Comissão para a Igualdade e Contra a Discriminação Racial*, member of the board of directors of the *Associação dos Moradores e Proprietários do Bairro do Zambujal*, executive committee member of CGTP-IN and member of CGTP’s *Departamento de Migrações*, Portuguese

– Angolan community COCAI representative – 19/4/05
– Coordinator of the social services division of Centro Social Paroquial Vera Cruz – 27/4/05
– Director of Fundação para o Desenvolvimento Social, Porto City Hall – 28/4/05
– Coordinator of Secretariado Diocesano das Migrações – Casa de Vilar, Porto – 28/4/05
– Member of the executive committee SOS Racismo and the Comissão para a Igualdade e Contra a Discriminação Racial – 3/5/05
– Coordinator of Gabinete de Cooperação and Espaço Cidadania, Seixal City Hall – 10/5/05
– Superior Inspector of Serviço Estrangeiros e Fronteiras and Head of the Immigration and Human Trafficking Information and Research Unit – 11/5/05
– Priest of the Russian Orthodox Church in Portugal – 11/5/05
– Director of the publication Brasil Revista – 18/5/05
– Priest of the Russian Orthodox Church in Portugal – 26/5/05
– Coordinator of Setúbal, Etnias e Imigração, Setúbal City Hall – 7/6/05
– President of Caritas – 8/7/05
Chapter 1

1. In this study a ‘privileged’ voice is given to association leaders. In doing so, it is also worth noting that one is running the risk of presenting a one-dimensional argument. Although questions of objectivity can arise in relation to inquiries pertaining to integration, identity and the associations’ roles, the aim of the study is to express the views of the association leaders, above all. Nonetheless, it is important to remember that conflicting arguments do exist. To counterbalance the arguments and to get outsiders’ perspectives on the associations, interviews were also carried out with various key informers (see Chapter 5).

2. I here wish to highlight that the study of ethnic associations and their relations with the welfare state carried out by Jenkins and Sauber (1988) and applied in four other countries served as a major source of inspiration for this study. Although not a methodological replica, a number of concepts and ideas have been transferred into this study.

3. My own previous work with Capeverdean associations in the Metropolitan Area of Lisbon also approached the issues of integration and identity, but only from the perspective of Capeverdean association leaders (see Sardinha 2002).

4. The decision to group these nationalities together lies in the fact that, first, associations that cater to these individuals usually do so under the flagship of Eastern European associations (see Chapter 6), and second, immigration from Eastern Europe to Portugal is most often viewed collectively, as the mass movement of individuals from Eastern European countries to Portugal occurred at the same time, initiating at the end of the 1990s.

5. According to Daniele Joly (1996), amongst others, this form of discrimination can be labeled ‘institutional racism’.

Chapter 2

1. According to the Italian philosopher Antonio Gramsci (1930-1935), to hold power a ruling class must achieve hegemony over society, meaning its political, intellectual and moral authority or leadership must be predominant. A new ruling class takes and holds state power by establishing hegemony over allied classes and by using force or coercion against antagonistic ones.

2. See, for example, Rex 1996; Modood and Werbner 1997; Carens 2000; Kymlicka and Norman 2000; Touraine 2000.
3. The term ‘incorporation’, for example, defined by Isajiw (1997: 82) as ‘a process through which a social unit is included in a larger unit as an integral part of it’, is often proposed as an alternative to that of integration (Portes and Rambaut 1996; Isajiw 1997). Others, on the other hand, argue that integration is preferable precisely due to its flexibility which permits it to function as an umbrella concept (Bauböck 1998; Vermeulen and Penninx 2000). For the purpose of this study, the concept will be applied in this sense.

4. A well-known and often quoted pluralist definition is given by the British Home Secretary, Roy Jenkins, who in 1966 described the ideal of integration as ‘not a flattening process of assimilation, but as equal opportunity accompanied by cultural diversity in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance’ (Vermeulen and Penninx 2000).

5. Various definitions can be applied to the term transnationalism. We will here utilise Vertovec’s (1999a: 449-456) six uses of the term as a starting point: 1) as a social morphology focused on a new border spanning social formation; 2) as diasporic consciousness; 3) as a mode of cultural reproduction variously identified as syncretism, creolisation, bricolage, cultural translation and hybridity; 4) as an avenue of capital for transnational corporations, and in a smaller way, in the form of remittances sent by immigrants to family and friends in their homeland; 5) as a site of political engagement, both in terms of homeland politics and the politics of homeland governments vis-à-vis their émigré communities, and in terms of the expanded role of international non-governmental organisations; and 6) as a reconfiguration of the notion of place from an emphasis on the local to the translocal. For further readings on the topic of transnationalism see: Glick Schiller et al. 1992; Basch et al. 1994; Portes 1999; Faist 2000a, 2000b; Kivisto 2001; Glick Schiller 1999, 2004.

6. Kymlicka (1995b) distinguished between multination and polyethnic states. The former are societies which result from federation of individual nations into a new composite, for example, Switzerland, or from the voluntary incorporation (or otherwise) of one nation or more into another, perhaps by conquest (the United Kingdom). On the contrary, a polyethnic state is one which contains non-dominant ethnic communities resulting from immigration. Adding on to Kymlicka’s typology, Jordan (2000) explains that while there are respects in which Germany is a multination state, with reunification in 1990 being an interesting case in point, it also doubles over as a polyethnic state with its significant immigrant non-German population.

7. Although the republican and imperial models are two different policy approaches, they can be merged together into the ‘assimilationist model’ of incorporation (Castles 1995; Castles and Miller 2003). France, the UK and the Netherlands all have aspects of both models, but France can best be defined as coming closest to exemplifying the assimilation model. Although France introduced the notion of citizenship as a political community after the 1789 Revolution, its policies towards colonised peoples maintained elements of the imperial model. The central idea is that immigrants should be integrated into the political community as French citizens, and that this will bring about cultural integration.

8. Hutnik’s model is based on a similar model presented by Bochner (1982) and his analysis of the psychological outcomes for individuals who are in contact with people from other cultures.

9. Various explanations have been presented for the ethnic mobilisation of minority groups. Some believe that a considerable weakening of the position of a minority leads to an ethnic revival, organisation and protests. Others believe that an improvement in the position of a minority is the reason for ethnic movements. It is, however, a fact that an increasing number of states have begun to grant funds to reforms easing the position of minorities. It has been suggested that this development is connected with the attempt of states to regulate conflicts: in order to avoid conflicts, the states have consid-
ered it best to grant at least some concessions to immigrant minorities (Jaakkola 1987: 203).

10. Transnational social spaces, according to Faist (2000b), can be distinguished in three different forms: 1) transnational reciprocity in small groups (usually kinship collectives), 2) transnational exchange in circuits and 3) solidarity within transnational communities. Different forms of transnational exchange, reciprocity and solidarity based on immigrant kinships and communities are common primarily among first-generation labour migrants and refugees; they are seen, for example, in the form of business contacts, homeland-oriented associations and political organisations. Transnational circuits, on the other hand, imply mutual obligations and expectations of the actors. These circuits seem to be most developed in cases of circular international migration, such as immigrants involved in business activities in the country of origin. Transnational communities go beyond narrow kinship and family relations, as they also possess symbolic ties of common ethnicity and nationhood. The creation of such communities is owed, above all, to individuals sharing parallel geographical and national backgrounds, or possessing colonial ties, defined by shared conventional references and interests. In order for a viable transnational community to be established and sustained over time, Faist (2000b: 208) advances that a continual pattern of attachments with both government and civic institutions in the homeland and receiving country are indispensable. This is due to the fact that transnational immigrants are frequently engaged in activities that define and boost their position in the receiving nation, while simultaneously seeking to remain rooted in the daily affairs of the homeland community. Furthermore, as Faist (2000b: 207-208) writes, transnational communities go beyond individuals being connected to two places:

Transnational communities characterise situations in which international movers and dense and strong social and symbolic ties connect stayers over time and across space to patterns of networks and circuits in two countries. [...] Such communities without propinquity do not necessarily require individual persons living in two worlds simultaneously or between cultural worlds in a total ‘global village’ of de-territorialized space. What is required, however, is that communities without propinquity link through exchange, reciprocity, and solidarity to achieve a high degree of social cohesion, and a common repertoire of symbolic and collective representations.

11. Many second-generation migrants, for example, are more committed to adopting their home culture than many of those brought up in the home country who may hanker after other (e.g. Western) ideals (Jordan 2000: 103).

Chapter 3


2. Moya (2005: 834) points out that the array of terms utilised throughout the literature in place of voluntary association does not facilitate a clear definition. Other terms may include: private groups, public-interest groups, grass-roots movements, intermediary organisations, goal-oriented associations, community-based organisations and nonprofit associations.

3. Immigrant associations created for immigrants implies ‘generalist’ organisations of the arrival society who may offer services to society in general, but also opt to dedicate part
of its resources to immigrants' integration, as well as 'specialist' organisations of the arrival society, defined as those which are dedicated exclusively to the needs of immigrants and 'ethnic' minorities. Immigrant associations created by immigrants, on the other hand, entails organisations created by their immigrant groups or its members (see Morén-Alegret 2002: 57).

4. The sectoral model suggests that not only does it make a difference whether or not religious, health or educational services are provided, but also which sector provides that function. In a comparative analysis between the United States and Germany, Barbara Elliot (2004) emphasised that due to the fact that most social services in Germany are administered through public funding, as well as the greater tendency for the German population to remain territorially rooted and thus maintain the sense of community, Germany's third sector is at an advantage over that of the American one.

5. Although historically, voluntary associations were considered to be one of the 'quiet strengths of America', comprising a relatively small government sector, a relatively free economic system, and a relatively robust third sector, today it is argued that this is no longer the case. In Robert Putnam's (2000) analogy, the author writes of how the Moose and Elks Lodges, the Salvation Army, the Knights of Columbus and various other organisations that emerged in America are all indications of its civic engagement, a phenomenon that has been besieged with the move from an agrarian society towards urbanisation. Over time the balance among the three sectors has shifted toward a centralised state. A nation that at one time volunteered together, that according to Putnam, 'bowled in leagues', has today abandoned these activities, as America now finds itself 'bowling alone'. Other observers of the voluntary association thematic, on the other hand, have argued that the call for the impending death of voluntary associations has been premature (Wolfe 1989; Glenn 2000). Wolfe (1989: 86-87) points out the importance, to a healthy society, of a sense of moral obligation, nourished by a variety of voluntary organisations, as it cannot be by government provision of social services, much less by reliance upon the market, to provide those functions. The third sector, sustains the author '... is continually being rediscovered because it serves as a symbol of obligation to strangers'.

6. Jacobs et al. (2004) point out the following four key limitations of the arguments ofPennema and Tillie (2001): first, attention remains limited to 'ethnic' social capital (embedding in ethnic associations) without taking into account forms of cross-cultural social capital (embedded in mixed and more mainstream organisations) and the relationship between these two types of social capital; second, potential differential effects according to the type of organisations are disregarded; third, the possibility of gender differences is not taken into account; and lastly, there is no attention is paid to the importance of forms of social and cultural capital.

7. It is important to point out that in some cases, immigrant associations go beyond the ethnic dichotomy, such as the case with religious, hometown or alumni associations, which tend to cut across ethnic lines.

8. Although the articulation between the associations and the public institutions is of particular importance, one cannot avoid highlighting the importance of the alliances that are created between associations, with the outcome often being the creation of umbrella organisations or federations. These alliances are often created with the goal of uniting resources, with the idea of fighting the same causes, as well as to collectively negotiate with the institutions of the host society.

9. Writing on immigrant associations in Spain and Italy, Danese (2001: 74) explains that these institutions are supported as a barrier against the development of social conflicts, 'perceived to be the outcome if no room at all is given to the expression of cultural differences and to a shared knowledge of both national and foreign cultures'.
Chapter 4

1. The 1990s were marked by a migration turnaround that saw inflows clearly exceed outflows. According to 1991 Census and the 2001 Census, 8 per cent of the population growth registered during this decade was explained by net migration: approximately 360,000 individuals.

2. The PALOP countries are Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique and São Tomé e Príncipe.

3. Although it is difficult to offer an exact estimate on the number of illegal immigrants, estimates suggest that there were between 30,000 and 100,000 undocumented immigrants in Portugal in 2003.

4. In Portugal, it is the work of SEF to collect the statistical information and the job of INE to render it publicly available.

5. Numerous timeframes highlighted by the presence of foreign populations can be identified in Portuguese history. These include: the existence of Jewish communities in various parts of the country during the Middle Ages; the presence of a significant African community, from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries, brought to Portugal through the slave trade and concentrated mainly in Lisbon (Tinhorão 1988); the existence of the Romani population, present in Portugal since the fifteenth century; the arrival of foreign citizens from Western European countries, notably Spain, England, Germany and France, as well as from Brazil and the United States, in the nineteenth century, tied to economic activities such as the commercialisation of wine or the mining industry; or others who simply came for its attractive climate and lifestyle (Esteves 1991; Rocha-Trindade 1995).

6. Esteves (1991: 21) explains that since migration flows between Portugal and the colonial territories, as well as between the colonies themselves, during the colonial era, were considered as inter-regional movements and, therefore, were not considered in the statistical data, an accurate count of this migration flow is not possible.

7. Retornado is the Portuguese word for ‘returnee’. Those individuals who returned to Portugal from the former African colonies are referred to by this term.


9. The statistical data does not differentiate between those possessing temporary-residence authorisations and those who hold permanent-residence authorisations.

10. Permanência authorisation implies permission to stay on temporary bases.

11. In 2006 the first permanência authorisation holders were permitted to apply for residence authorisations. Out of the 183,813 individuals possessing permanência authorisations, 126,901 are able to apply for residence authorisations during this year.

12. Additional immigrant visas recognised by law are the short-duration visa, residence visa, student visa, work visa, temporary stay visa (Decree-Law 34/2003) and asylum visa (Law 15/98). However, it is worth pointing out that the number of immigrants holding these types of visas is very low when compared to those who possess residence and permanência authorisations.

13. The Metropolitan Area of Lisbon was created in 1991 as a two-tier municipal association – with a Metropolitan Assembly and the Metropolitan Board. It is made up of eighteen municipalities located on both banks of the Tejo River; ten on the north bank (Amadora, Cascais, Lisbon, Loures, Mafra, Odivelas, Oeiras, Sintra and Vila Franca de Xira) and nine on the south bank (Alcochete, Almada, Barreiro, Moita, Montijo, Palmela, Seixal, Sesimbra and Setúbal). These same municipalities also make up the districts of Lisbon (north bank) and Setúbal (south bank).

14. For this analysis, the Eastern European group is represented by the five most important Eastern European countries in Portugal: Bulgaria, Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation and the Ukraine.
15. In the case of the Brazilian community, trafficking schemes primarily involve women sex workers who are trafficked into Portugal to work in strip clubs and other types of bars, and as prostitutes.

16. Results of two studies carried out by Baganha et al. (2004a, 2004b) identified over 55 per cent of Eastern European immigrants as having completed post-secondary education (university degree or technical-professional diploma).


19. During the 1992/93 special regularisation period 72.4 per cent of the requests came from PALOP nationals, while during the 1996 regularisation period, those originating from the PALOPs accounted for 66.7 per cent of the requests (Malheiros and Baganha 2001). Angola was the most represented country in both periods with 32 per cent of the total applications presented in 1992/93 and 26.4 per cent in 1996, respectively.

20. To assist in developing an intercultural education, in 1993 the Coordinating Secretariat of Multicultural Education Projects launched the Project of Intercultural Education, which involved 52 schools and offered long-term intercultural training for roughly 200 teachers.


22. The PMA is composed of the following fourteen municipalities: Arouca, Espinho, Gondomar, Maia, Matosinhos, Porto, Póvoa de Varzim, Santa Maria da Feira, Santo Tirso, São João da Madeira, Trofa, Valongo, Vila do Conde and Vila Nova de Gaia.

23. For an analysis of the ‘African’ shantytown neighbourhoods located in the LMA up until the mid-1990s (many of which have since ceased to be), see CEPAC (1995).


26. Worth highlighting are a number of key initial protocols that ACIME established with other institutions, namely: the International Organisation for Migration (15 December 1997) with the implementation of the voluntary return programme; the Institute of Employment and Professional Training (IEFP) (27 January 1999) aimed at promoting the access of immigrants to employment centres and training programmes financed by the IEFP; and with the Ministry of Sciences and Technologies, the Municipalities of Setúbal, Amadora and Oeiras and various immigrant associations (30 October 1999) in implementing the Digital Cities Programme and the Pelas Minorias (‘For the Minorities’) Project, both aimed at facilitating the access of minorities to information technology and the diffusion of information regarding the various minority groups and their organisations on the internet (Albuquerque et al. 2000: 58-59).

27. The Foreigners and Borders Service is a state organism, under the aegis of the Ministry of Interior Administration, that works from various perspectives: 1) managing immigration flows; 2) implementing immigration policies; 3) combating illegal migration and criminal activity related to human trafficking (e.g. falsification of documents, mafias, etc.); 4) managing and controlling borders; 5) dealing with refugees and asylum seekers; 6) documentation and document renewal.


30. The three largest non Portuguese-speaking immigrant communities currently considered by COCAI are the Chinese, Eastern European (representing Ukrainians, Russians and Moldovans) and Romanian.


33. The legal framework of the National Immigration Plan was constituted in 2002/2003 under the administration of the Social Democrat/Christian Democrat coalition government that took office in April 2002.

34. Available in the Creole, English and Russian languages.
35. For a list of CLAIs, see: www.acime.gov.pt/modules.php?name=Content&pa=showpage&pid=11 (as of December 2006).
36. According to ACIME’s Activity Plan 2005 – 2008 (ACIME 2005b), the intention is to extend the CLAI network to 80 centres by 2008.
37. Parallel to the proliferation of measures aimed at the integration of immigrants, official state legislation also brought about a juridical regime of entry, stay, exit and removal of foreigners. The implementation of Decree-Law 34/2003 of 25 February, which incorporated both the Community Directive n. 2001/517/CE of the Council of 28 June – which contemplated the dispositions of article 26 of the Application Convention of the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 – and the Community directive n. 2002/90/CE from the Council of 28 November on the responsibility of help given to entry, transit and residence of non-documented immigrants set forth the ruling that the legalisation of immigrants would be prioritised when done in the country of origin with the presentation of a labour contract in Portugal. The new law would not only be more restrictive in terms of entries, but also in terms of family reunification, which would only be permitted one year after the immigrant had been given residence authorisation (also see Chapter 8). All the efforts on the part of the Portuguese governments, both to better regulate immigrant flows and to employ new immigration policies, have thus been done in accordance with the spirit of European Commission rulings (Fonseca et al. 2002b: 50-51).
38. The parish (freguesia) is a second tier of government within the municipalities.
39. Examples of URBAN projects carried out by various municipalities in the LMA include: Amadora City Hall’s Lusociulo Project and the programme Educate to Grow, both aimed at providing scholastic assistance at the primary school level, and social-cultural (dance, theatre, arts and crafts, etc.) and sports activities; the parental education initiative in the neighbourhood of Outerela/Portela, administered by Oeiras City Hall in conjunction with the Ministry of Education; and African Week in Vale da Amoreira (administered by the Urban Rehabilitation Programme of Vale da Amoreira – Municipality of Moita) (Fonseca et al. 2002a; Sardinha 2002). Outside of the LMA, the projects Porto sem Fronteiras (‘Porto without Frontiers’) and Porto Partida, Porto Chegada (‘Porto of Arrivals, Porto of Departures’) are two URBAN-funded initiatives aimed at the immigrant communities implemented by the City of Porto.
40. Subsidised by the European Social Fund, the INTEGRAR initiative has as its main goals the bettering of professional integration conditions, promoting entrepreneurship and reinforcing equal opportunity policies for immigrants and ethnic communities.
41. Co-financed by the European Social Fund, the EQUAL Programme develops initiatives in the area of employment, development and human resources. Its primary beneficiaries are those who suffer discrimination or unequal treatment, be it based on race, ethnic origin, religion, deficiency, sexual orientation or age.
42. For Amadora case studies, see Horta (2002, 2003).
43. For Oeiras case studies, see Marques et al. (1999) and Marques and Santos (2000).
44. Recent projects carried out in these municipalities (and especially in Cascais) demonstrate a greater awareness towards local immigrant communities and ethnic minorities.
45. Seixal’s immigrant homeless shelter is the only one of its kind run by a municipality after the closing of the shelter run by the Municipality of Lisbon.
46. As of February 2006, the following 21 municipalities had a municipal CLAI office: Azambuja, Barreiro, Cadaval, Coruche, Faro, Fundão, Figueira de Castelo Rodrigo, Macedo de Cavaleiros, Lisboa, Lourinhã, Mealhada, Montijo, Obidos, Odivelas, Oliveira de Azeméis, Ponte de Barca, Santa Maria da Feira, Seixal, Silves, Valongo, Vouzela.
47. I wish to point out here that the institutional set-ups discussed up to this point are just a few of the more significant examples of what has taken place at the local level
throughout Portugal. Some of these examples will be revisited in Chapter 8, with other cases, not mentioned here, also being discussed.

48. Throughout this study, the concepts of ‘immigrant associations’ and of ‘immigrant association movements’, as they apply to the Portuguese case, will imply associations created by either third-country nationals living in Portugal, their descendents (whether they possess Portuguese nationality or not), by Portuguese nationals of immigrant origin or by the Portuguese themselves.

49. For accounts of the formation of immigrant clusters and neighbourhoods, see Letria and Malheiros (1999) and Malheiros (2001). Horta (2003) looks at the migrant neighbourhood of Alto da Cova da Moura in Amadora and the grassroots neighbourhood organisations that were established in the later years of the 1970s and 1980s.

50. OCPM is a branch of the Catholic Church in Portugal created in the early 1960s to help Portuguese emigrants abroad. Although this population is still their concern, since the 1980s the organisation has also taken on the task of assisting immigrant communities and ethnic minorities in Portugal, providing social, legal and spiritual help.

51. The early part of the 1990s also brought about the creation of a number of immigrant descendent youth associations. Intervention centred on combating racism and xenophobia, offering free-time activity and cultural alternatives as well as combating delinquency and scholastic failure and absenteeism (Albuquerque et al., 2000: 47-48; 53-54).


53. Until then, immigrant associations were not regulated by a special status and could be formed as non-profit cultural associations or Private Institutions of Social Solidarity (Instituição Particular de Solidariedade Social (IPSS)). In relation to the latter, any association that constitutes itself as an IPSS (Decree-Law 119/83 of 25 February 1983) has the right to compete for project funding from the Ministry of Labour and Social Solidarity.

54. As of January 2006, 91 associations had been recognised by ACIME (see www.acime.gov.pt/docs/Assoc/BD_94a_Assoc.xls). According to the ACIME activities report, from July 2002 to February 2005, 88 financial requests were granted (43 of which were one-off, while the remaining 45 were annual) to 44 immigrant associations, adding up to a total sum of 962 million euros being distributed (ACIME 2005a).

55. Two different courses are worth highlighting: 1) the Association Leader Course – running since 2004 in collaboration with the Technical University of Lisbon, with the intent of better preparing participants in the fields of leadership, communication and decision-making, as well as project management and finances; and 2) the Immigration and Rights Course – running since 2003 in collaboration with the Catholic University of Lisbon, centred on training participants in the field of citizenship and rights (judicial, social, labour, penal, etc.).

56. This platform was of a temporary nature, created to lobby government for the objectives delineated at that time. During the write-up of this study, another platform organisation – the Platform of Representative Structures of Immigrant Communities in Portugal (Plataforma das Estruturas Representativas das Comunidades de Imigrantes em Portugal (PERCIP)) – was being created in Portugal (established in September 2006).

57. Alterations to the Nationality Law were approved by the Portuguese government on 16 February 2006. With these changes, certain requirements that, in the past, prevented many descendents from acquiring nationality (i.e. a declaration of will from the time of birth, something that prevented many descendents from acquiring nationality given that many parents fail to provide such a statement at the time of birth), as well as overly bureaucratic interpretations of the previous law (Silva 2004), were done away with. Under the current law, nationality is now automatically attributed to third-generation immigrant descendents (born in Portugal and whose ‘foreign’ parents were also born in Portugal) and granted to second-generation when at least one parent has been resid-
ing legally in Portugal for at least five years (under the previous law, it was six years for foreigners from Portuguese-speaking countries and ten for all other third-country nationals, and only those with residence authorisation were accepted). Naturalisation is also given to immigrant second-generation youth born in Portugal whose parents have been in legal residence for five years or who complete the first cycle of elementary school in Portugal. Lastly, naturalisation will also be granted to second-generation immigrant descendents born in Portugal upon reaching the age of maturity as long as they have resided in Portugal during the last ten years (even if in an undocumented situation).

58. In comparing the current list of ACIME recognised associations to that of the Albuquerque (2002) study, of the 91 associations recognized by ACIME, 11 per cent are Eastern European associations compared to only 3 per cent in the list compiled by Albuquerque. This illustrates the further growth of Eastern European movements since the early part of the current decade.

59. It is important to highlight that although the analogies put forth by both Carita (1994) and Horta and Malheiros (2005) refer to the Capeverdean association movements, the patterns outlined correspond to the PALOP communities in general, as will be attested in the Angolan case study presented in this study.

Chapter 5

1. See Appendix for the list of interviewees and interview dates.
2. In the case of interviews with individuals tied to institutions that deal with immigrants and/or immigrant associations, I wish to emphasise that the interview schedule was not always strongly followed due to the fact that not all the questions were applicable. Thus, with these interviews, certain sections or topics presented in the interview schedule were focused on more so then others, as was seen fit.
3. Before commencing each interview, interviewees were notified that the data provided would be used exclusively for academic purposes, with the confidentiality of the information given and the anonymity of the respondent respected as much as possible. The interviewees were then asked to sign a consent form as a way of yielding ‘ownership’ of the interview data to the interviewer.
4. I also wish to highlight that encounters and conversations with interviewees outside the interview context (e.g. at conferences, social events, etc.) often permitted further exchanges on topics discussed during previous interviews. Outside of the interview setting, some interviewees would sometimes expand on thoughts that they had had reservations in commenting on during the more formal interview setting itself.
5. In the case of one interview, an interpreter was used during the first meeting held in October 2004. A follow-up interview was then carried out with the same interviewee in July 2005 without the assistance of an interpreter.
6. The SOS Racismo blog can be found at www.sosracismo.blogspot.com. The ACIME homepage is found at www.acime.gov.pt.
7. During the fieldwork period, beyond the association-run newspapers and bulletins, I also compiled a list of print media (as well as having collected issues) aimed at the three groups in question. The Eastern European community is particularly worth highlighting due to the fact that, since 2001, a number of newspapers and magazines have been created by Eastern European nationals for Eastern European nationals, all of which are either in Russian, Ukrainian or Romanian. The following publications are worth highlighting: Familiar, Imigrante, Maiak Portugalli, Slovo, Timpul and Troika Lusa (this last is the only publication published in both Portuguese and Russian). A little less significant in number, Angolan publications (or, in some cases, aimed at the PALOP
communities) include África Hoje, Seminário África and Angola Informação (this last one published by the Angolan Embassy in Lisbon); while Brazilian print media include O Brasileirinho and Brasil Revista.

8. These examples are only some of the events and cultural manifestations that I was able to be a part of during the fieldwork year. However, I wish to highlight these particular events for their importance to my research. I also got to experience smaller-scale cultural events, ranging from the performance of music and dance groups to poetry readings to gastronomical events, etc.

9. I wish to highlight that these neighbourhoods are not Angolan neighbourhoods per se, but are instead highly populated by individuals from the PALOP countries in general, with the Capeverdean population being the most numerous in the majority of cases.

10. In four situations, interviews with representatives were carried out in different cities from where the organisations they represent are located or carry out their activities. In these four situations, while the institutions were located in the cities of Porto, Faro, Albergaria-a-Velha and Aveiro, the interviews with their representatives took place in the cities of Loulé, Amadora, Aveiro and Braga, respectively. This was due to the fact that the interviewees lived, worked or studied in these cities.

11. Figure 5.1 shows where the associations’ headquarters and delegations are located in Portugal. I wish to point out that, in the case of the delegations, only in a few cases were some of these visited.

12. Note that the goal was not to interview every association found but to interview a large and wide-ranging sample. The attempt to contact as many as possible, however, was considered essential in order to get a better understanding of the movements in question.

13. The three organisations were: NOVAGER – Associação dos Angolanos Residentes em Portugal, Liga dos Africanos e Amigos de África – LIAFRICA, and Acácia Rubras – Associação dos Naturais e Amigos da Provincia de Benguela, all located in the LMA.

14. The other eight Angolan associations identified but whose contact was not possible are: Clube Marítimo Africano, Casa de Angola no Algarve, Associação Imbondeiro, A MU-LEMBA – Associação Centro Comunitário, Associação dos Antigos Estudantes de Nova Lisboa (Huambo), SOS Angola – Liga Angolana de Paz, Desenvolvimento e Solidariedade, União dos Angolanos no Exterior and Fraternidade Cristã Angolana em Portugal.

15. According to 2004 statistics from the Foreigners and Borders Services, 28,222 of the 35,264 Angolan nationals residing in Portugal lived in the LMA, 80 per cent of the population. These figures include both those possessing residence and permanência permits.

16. Grupo Brasil has the intention of officialising its name as Associação Brasileira de Setúbal once they become a legally constituted organisation. However, throughout the fieldwork period, the association remained under the name Grupo Brasil.

17. Ericeira is a parish within the Municipality of Mafra.

18. The three organisations were the Lisbon-based Associação Soyuz de Imigrantes Eslovacos and Associação de Cidadãos de Língua Romena, and Associação Drujba found in Braga.

19. The two associations here referred to are the Associação Soyuz and the Associação Drujba. In relation to Associação Soyuz, this association ceased to be after accusations of ties to illegal activities were brought upon the association, and, above all, its president. Associação Drujba, on the other hand, came to an end after its leader and co-founder died at Lisbon International Airport when attempting to escape extradition back to his country of origin – the Ukraine – where he was being accused of various crimes (see SOS Racismo 2004: 30-31).

20. For any statistical analysis concerning the associations, SOLIM will be accounted for as both a Brazilian and Eastern European association.
Chapter 6

1. I wish to point out that in the case of more than one interview done with the same association, it was usually the highest ranking member of the association to answer the association typology questions, with a few exceptions being made in situations where another individual within the association was pointed out as possessing greater knowledge of the association’s inner workings.

2. As already noted in Chapter 4, two Angolan associations – Casa dos Estudantes do Império and Clube Marítimo Africano – date back to 1944 and 1954, respectively. In relation to the former, although it ceased to be in 1965, some of its former members formed the Associação Casa dos Estudantes do Império, in 1993, with the aim of resurrecting its memory. Concerning the Clube Marítimo Africano, although this association is still considered to be in existence, it is currently inactive.

3. The interviewees have been classified in four categories: Angolan association representatives, Brazilian association representatives, Eastern European association representatives, and Social and community service institution informants and others (see Appendix). The letter appearing at the end of the interview quotes (A, B, EE and I) stands for a respondent under the respective groups.

4. MPLA was one of the three political movements in Angola (the other two being the National Liberation Front of Angola (FNLA) and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) that, since 1961, had been battling the Portuguese for independence. With the coup d’état in Portugal in 1974, power in Angola was handed over to a coalition of the three movements, a coalition that quickly broke down, leading to civil war. The Soviet Union and Cuba-backed MPLA declared independence on 11 November 1975, the day the Portuguese abandoned the capital, appointing Agostinho Neto as the first President of Angola. However, the United States, Zaire and South Africa backed FNLA and UNITA and created a joint government under the flag of UNITA in the zones controlled by the two and on 24 November 1975 founded the Democratic Republic of Angola. Civil war between UNITA and the MPLA continued up until 2002, the year UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi was killed in a military operation, leading to the signing of a ceasefire on 4 April 2002 between the two factions bringing an end to the 28 year-long dispute.

5. Besides União de Estudantes Angolanos, the cultural and recreational association Associação Cultural e Recreativa Angolana (ACRA) was also founded that same year. ACRA, however, ceased to exist in the early part of the current decade.

6. Despite re-housing surveys carried out by the Municipality of Amadora, the residents of Alto da Cova da Moura have never been re-housed.

7. The re-housing of the residents of Quinta do Mocho took place in 2000 under the PER initiative. The new social housing units (Urbanização Terraços da Ponte) are located next to the old Quinta do Mocho site.

8. Neighbourhoods, such as Quinta Grande in Lisbon, saw the founding of associations such as ADA and Associação Apoio Sem Limites (ASLI), as did the neighbourhood of Outurela/Portela in Oeiras (Club Desportivo Veteranas de Angola), the neighbourhood of Arroja in Odivelas (Associação dos Residentes Angolanos no Concelho de Odivelas (ARACODI)), and Azinhaga dos Bezouros in Amadora (ASAP), all of which were founded in the 1990s. Other associations to follow suit with the coming of the new millennium included: Associação Kambariange in Casal da Mira, Amadora, as well as Associação de Promotores de Saúde, Ambiente e Desenvolvimento Sócio-Cultural...
9. Câmara de Comércio e Indústria Luso-Brasileira was established in 1948 primarily to support Portuguese investment in Brazil. As of 1998, it had around 125 Portuguese and Brazilian companies associated (Moren-Alegret 2002: 180).

10. It is worth highlighting that the interviewee is president of both the Clube de Empresários do Brasil and the Câmara de Comércio e Indústria Luso-Brasileira.

11. Three years after the creation of the Clube de Empresários do Brasil, a similar institution – the Fundação Luso-Brasileira para o Desenvolvimento do Mundo da Língua Portuguesa – was created, combining the same goals as that of the Clube de Empresários do Brasil and its sister organisation Câmara de Comércio e Indústria Luso-Brasileira. These institutions maintain close ties (and are even located in the same building).

12. Although a reciprocity accord between Portugal and Brazil permitted any Portuguese individual to work at their trained profession in Brazil and a Brazilian to do likewise in Portugal, when Brazilian dentists started coming to Portugal in large numbers in the late 1980s, the Portuguese Medical Dentistry Association/Order of Dental Practitioners would not accept these professionals due to what were considered to be training curriculum differences between the two countries, claiming that the Brazilian dentists were not properly trained. The dispute lasted until 1997 when the labour accord between the two countries was eliminated, permitting those who had arrived before the elimination of the Accord to freely practice dentistry in Portugal (Machado 2003).

13. This group of friends that belonged to the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) would go on to form this party’s nucleus in Lisbon in 1993 – Núcleo PT de Lisboa.

14. The headquarters of CBL was one of the sign-up locations during the initial Lula Accord registration process (along with the embassy and consulate). See Chapter 8 for further discussion on this Accord.

15. Abadá – Associação Brasileira de Apoio e Desenvolvimento à Arte Capoeira was actually imported from Brazil where this association has existed since 1989. Today the Abadá name can be found globally, with nearly 50,000 members existing worldwide.

16. Another municipality with a significant Brazilian population is that of Cascais where SOLIM also set up a delegation.

17. There is one association in Portugal by the name of Associação Portugal/USSR that dates back to the days of the former Soviet Union. Although this association possesses objectives aimed at countries of the former Soviet Union, and, above all, Russia, it was not considered in this study due to the fact that it does not deal with issues of Eastern European immigrants in Portugal.

18. The only exceptions being two Angolan associations – Associação Internacional Amigos de Angola run by Portuguese nationals, and PROSAUDESC led by individuals from various PALOP countries; and the two Brazilian organisations Fundação Luso-Brasileira para o Desenvolvimento do Mundo da Língua Portuguesa and Clube de Empresários do Brasil, both of which are run by Portuguese nationals.

19. The six associations under the orientation of both Portuguese and foreign nationals include: Associação de Amizade – Associação de Apoio aos Imigrantes de Leste, by Ukrainians and Portuguese individuals tied to a social support organisation called Afa-gos – Associação de Formação e Apoio Gondomar Social; Associação Apoio ao Imigrante – São Bernardo, run by workers of the São Bernardo parish and Ukrainian women; Associação Cristã Ortodoxa de Aveiro under the orientation of Eastern European immigrants and one Portuguese individual; Associação de Solidariedade Social e Intercultural da Federação Russa em Portugal, run by individuals belonging to the Construction Workers Labour Union of Aveiro and Ukrainians; Associação Tavirense de Apoio ao Imigrante, led by one Portuguese individual who also runs the CLAI and and a group of Bulgarian and Ukrainian individuals; Casa do Leste – Associação de Solidar-
idade Social Centro, constituted by Eastern European immigrants and individuals from the Archdiocese of Porto and Braga; and Cultural Moldavo founded by a Moldovan woman with the help of a lawyer. The two associations founded and run by Portuguese individuals are SOLIM, created by former members of the non-government association Olho Vivo (‘Live Eye’); and Associação dos Imigrantes do Leste Europeu, founded and run by a lawyer of Portuguese origin.

21. The Diário da República is the official journal of the Portuguese Republic, and is where governing laws are made public.

22. As defined in article 2 of Law 115/99 of 3 August.

23. Note that the membership numbers given by interviewees were not verified by any official sources.


25. According to information provided by SOLIM, of its 7,500 members, two-thirds (approximately 5,000) originate from Eastern European countries.

26. According to a study carried out by Albuquerque (2002), the Guinea Bissau community possessed the most associations in Portugal with a total of 42, one association per 599 nationals of Guinea Bissau. The Brazilian community, by comparison, possesses one association per 3,717 Brazilian nationals.

27. For example, the Associação Kamba has an office at the Seixal municipality-owned Association Movement Office; UJAP has its space at the Loures municipality-owned cultural centre Casa da Cultura de Sacavém, Grupo Brasil has its offices in the Setúbal municipality Setúbal, Etnias e IMigrantes (SEI) offices, as does Edinstvo; and lastly, Associação de Apoio ao Imigrante – São Bernardo is located in the São Bernardo Parish Hall.

28. For example, the Angolan association Associação Kambariange uses a local neighbourhood café as its headquarters, the Brazilian association AACILUS shares with the Porto division of SOS Racismo and with the São Tomé students association Associação dos Estudantes de São Tomé, just as the Eastern European Nach Dom – Associação de Imigrantes has its headquarters at the coffee machine and supplies shop owned by the association’s president.

29. Companies will often benefit from putting money into those sorts of associations by way of tax exemptions.

30. What some association representatives refer to as ‘private donations’ are often an investment made with the goal of recovering that money later on. The intention of putting money into the association privately is often either to keep it ‘afloat’ at a time when it is might be going through hard times or when it is just starting off.

31. Many of the associations claimed to be going through financial crises at the current moment.

32. Although the association Abadá – Associação Brasileira de Apoio e Desenvolvimento à Arte Capoeira does comprise paid individuals in the form of capoeira instructors, these individuals are not included in this count due to the fact that they get paid by the lessons they provide outside of the association context.

33. These associations include: Casa de Angola de Lisboa, Associação Luso-Africana dos Metodistas no Porto, PROSAUDESC, CBL, CEB, Respublika – Associação dos Imigrantes Russófonos, Fundação Luso-Brasileira para o Desenvolvimento do Mundo da Língua Portuguesa and Casa da Língua e Cultura Russas.

34. The seven SOLIM employees accounted for under the Eastern European category include those who work at the associations’ central headquarters in Lisbon or at the delegations in Cascais, Beja and Albufeira. The one paid employee at the Ericeira delegation is accounted for under the Brazilian associations.

35. Chapter 8 expands on this argument.

36. I wish to stress that a lot of the accusations and ‘finger-pointing’ cannot be backed up in any legal form. A lot of the allegations, therefore, do not go beyond speculation.
37. In her study of Eastern European voluntary associations in Portugal, Pires (n.d.) draws attention to both competitive rivalries and the close ties of associations created by Eastern European immigrants. In relation to Eastern European associations created by Portuguese individuals, the author points out that these movements are very critical of those associations created by Eastern European immigrants.

38. In this section the goal is to draw attention the network relations between the associations and these institutions. For a more retailed critical analysis of some of these organisms and institutions as seen through the eyes of the associations, see Chapter 8.

39. While some associations may work with all Orthodox churches, other associations will work with the church that represents the majority of the constituency, so Associação Cultural dos Romenos Mircea Eliade and Frăția deal with the Romanian Orthodox Church, Republika and Edinstvo with the Russian Orthodox, while the Associação dos Ucranianos em Portugal and Sobor – Associação dos Imigrantes Ucranianos work with the Greco-Roman Church.

40. At the time of the fieldwork, six Greco-Roman (Byzantine Rite) priests (Lisbon, Fatima, Viseu, Faro and two in Évora), two Russian Orthodox (Lisbon and Faro), one Romanian Orthodox (Lisbon), as well as the Spanish and Portuguese Bishop of the Greek Orthodox Church (Order of Constantinople) (Porto) were working in Portugal. Of these ten individuals, eight were tied to the OCPM.

41. In 2004, 95 per cent of the people CEPAC helped to were of African origin, the most represented group being the Angolan community with 42 per cent.

42. One member of OCPM is a Brazilian priest who works primarily with the Brazilian Catholic community in Portugal.

43. While four of the Brazilian associations are student associations, the association ACCI-LUS also carries out initiatives primarily with the University of Porto while the Associação Brasileira de Portugal has established a protocol with the International Society of Learning and Cultural Promotion (Sociedade Internacional de Promoção de Ensino e Cultura (SIPEC)) that permits members reduced tuition fees at two universities: Universidade Internacional and Instituto Superior Politécnico International, one in Lisbon and the other in Figueira da Foz.

44. Four associations have board of director members either affiliated to or with strong connections to political parties in Portugal. These are: the Angolan ADA with ties to the Social Democratic Party (PSD) and Associação Kambariange connected to the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) and the Left Block (BE); the Brazilian Workers Party nucleus Núcleo PT which also collaborates with PCP and BE; and the Eastern European movement Associação de Solidariedade Social e Intercultural da Federação Russa em Portugal with ties to PSD. Overall, however, the majority of the associations interviewed highlighted the fact that they are apolitical.

45. All the associations, with the exception of the Brazilian political movement Núcleo PT, constitutionally define themselves as apolitical.

46. The fact that individuals will sometimes use associations as a springboard into political life (Castles and Davidson 2000) is a phenomenon also witnessed in the Portuguese case. The interviewee representative of the association ADA is such an example, now an active party representative of PSD in the City of Lisbon’s Municipal Assembly and head of the City of Lisbon’s Municipal Council of Immigrant and Ethnic Minority Communities.

47. I also here draw attention to collaborative relations, primarily in the form of protocols, with the private sector, highlighting two different institutional forms: law and banking services. In relation to the former, I refer to the Ordem dos Advogados (‘Order of Attorneys’) as well as various banks (i.e. Banco Espírito Santo, Milênio BCP and Banco Santander), both of which have signed protocols with associations, with the main goal of providing reduced costs and banking privileges to members.
48. In Portugal the associations deal with the Angolan, Brazilian, Bulgarian, Lithuanian, Moldovan, Romanian, Russian, Ukrainian embassies and consulates in Lisbon and Porto. A number of Eastern European associations are also in contact with the embassies and consulates of Belarussia, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in Madrid and Paris.

49. The University of St. Petersburg is the only institution outside Africa that provides Kikongo and Kibondo language courses.

Chapter 7

1. See Annex 1, part 2 of the interview schedule for a list of the questions that frame this section.
2. Given that the question posed was an open question, the table created in this section is constructed classifying non-exclusive responses.
3. The analysis covers all members of the immigrant community making no distinction between the first generation and their descendents. However, I do wish to highlight that integration difficulties relating to the youth population were mentioned by many of the interviewees, especially in the case of the Angolan and Eastern European groups. In the case of the former, the respondents drew attention to the high school drop-out rates of this community, problems of delinquency and crime, as well as the fact that this group, although born in Portugal, does not have the right to Portuguese nationality. In the case of the latter group, integration problems deal primarily with academic integration, with many of the interviewees highlighting that the Portuguese school system does not captivate the interest of the pupil population. Living between two cultures and two languages is also seen as a hindrance to their integration. This topic will be revisited later in this chapter and in Chapter 8.
4. The fact that the Angolans are so highly differentiated by class, colour and citizenship led one interviewee to assert that ‘you can’t refer to an Angolan community. Instead, you must always refer to the Angolan communities’ (A).
5. Although quite insignificant in number compared to the other two groups, a third group could also be outlined, university student immigration, a continuous flow that dates as far back as the 1940s (Borges et al. 1997). Supposedly a flow of a temporary nature, many ended up staying in Portugal, integrating well into Portuguese society, often as professionals in their field of study. During the 28-year civil war period in Angola, many of the Angolan associations were solidarity and lobbying institutions on behalf of the Angolan student population who would go long periods of time without receiving any studentship money, and often going through great difficulties in their survival.
6. The concept of ‘Luso-Angolan’ has been adapted from Machado (1994). This population is, in large part, mestizos – the result of high levels of racial miscegenation due to the significant number of marriages between Angolans and Portuguese settlers. Possidonio (2005: 44) maintains that it was this group of individuals that laid the foundations for the migration flows from Angola to Portugal and who subsequently ensured the consolidation and persistence of these flows. The Luso-Angolan population is thus pivotal to my analysis due to the fact that this group has maintained close ties to Angolan immigrants. My research verified that many of associations are led by members of the more established Luso-Angolan community who work closely with Angolan immigrants.
7. Post-decolonisation statistical data is not clear when it comes to distinguishing those born in the former colonies (Angolan naturals) and resident foreigners (Angolan nationals), as is the case between statistics collected by the Ministry of Internal Administration (MAI) and INE in 1981 (Baganha and Góis 1999).
8. Traditionally characterised as being different from its PALOP counterparts, Baganha and her colleagues (2002) explain that these differences have steadily decreased, highlighting that the characteristics of the Angolan community have come to resemble the typical characteristics of the economic migration flows originating in Africa – young population, over-representation of labour migrations, lower levels of formal qualifications and predominance of occupations in unskilled activity sectors such as construction, house cleaning and cafes and restaurants.

9. In a survey carried out by Possidónio (2005: 47-51), the author estimates that over 50 per cent of Angolan or Luso-Angolan families in the LMA live in slum areas, social housing areas or run-down neighbourhoods located in parishes known for being socially problematic. These parishes include: Sacavém in the municipality of Loures (where Urbanização Terraços da Ponte – former Quinta do Mocho is located); the parish of Vale de Amoreira in the municipality of Moita (where the Vale de Amoreira social housing neighbourhood is also found); and the parish of Monte Abraão in the municipality of Sintra (where the Monte Abraão neighbourhood is found).

10. Ironically, although the Angolan interviewees consider housing to be a primary integration issue to be dealt with, only a minority of the associations carry out activities dealing with housing issues (see Chapter 6).


12. Even though social housing neighbourhoods allow for better living conditions than shantytowns or abandoned buildings, they frequently overlook the real problems of the people for whom the houses are intended. In the LMA (where the majority of Angolans reside), social housing neighbourhoods are predominantly located in peripheral areas of the city, far from the main urban fabric. Moreover, these neighbourhoods are usually easily discerned from other neighbourhoods due to their monotonous and often dense characteristics. This has led to social housing neighbourhoods often being labelled ‘neighbourhoods of the poor’ and being subject to various types of discrimination (Guerra 1994; Possidónio 2005).

13. Access to credit for first-home young buyers (credito bonificado) requires that they possess Portuguese nationality, which many of the immigrant descendents do not have.

14. Similar to the Angolan community, Brazilian university student immigration could also define a third movement. However, different from the Angolan student community, many Brazilian university students return to Brazil upon the completion of their studies.

15. Many ‘on the run’ from the military-controlled governments that maintained power in Brazil from 1964 until 1985.

16. The data presented by Casa do Brasil de Lisboa, as Padilla (2005) points out, could be biased due to the adoption of quota sampling based on official labour statistics. Those biases include the fact that some professions, and, above all, female professions, tend to be hidden and undeclared (domestic services as well as entertainment).

17. With a tourist visa, the legal period of stay is three months, with the possibility of having it extended for another three months.

18. Many have come to Portugal thinking that legalisation and the acquisition of a labour contract is a much simplified processes for Brazilians after the signing of the Reciprocal Contract of Nationals (Lula Accord). However, those who came after are excluded from the accord.

19. The associations blame the lack of information and the swollen bureaucracies created by the Portuguese state for this. Chapter 8 further debates this issue.

20. The interviewee is here referring to the fact that Portugal does not extradite undocumented immigrants.
21. This has similarly been argued in relation to other Southern European countries. See, for example, Fakiolas (1999, 2003) in relation to Greece; Quassoli (1999) concerning Italy and Calavita (1998); Higginbottom (2000) on Spain.

22. However, it is interesting to note that the Eastern European associations provide more psychological assistance to their members (see Chapter 6).

23. Many of the associations, however, also drew attention to the fact that the language barrier does not exist for an extended period, with many immigrants learning the Portuguese language at a steady rate. In their study on the social insertion of the Eastern European community in Portugal, Baganha et al. (2004b) found this same result.

24. Fado is a Portuguese music genre marked by mournful music and lyrics. Fado songs are universally sorrowful, often conveying messages of nostalgia, longing, sadness and pain, as well as happiness and love.

25. Kizomba is a popular style of Angolan dance and music known for its sensual flow and mix of African rhythms. Although originating in Angola, the dance form takes its influences from ragga, hiphop and other Afro-based music and dances.

26. It is estimated that 55 per cent of Guineans are Animists, 40 per cent are Muslims and the remaining 5 per cent are Christians.

27. In 2002, the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation along with the Catholic Church organisations Santa Casa da Misericórdia and the Jesuit Refugee Services, in collaboration with the Lisbon Faculty of Medicine, Fernando Fonseca (Amadora-Sintra) Hospital and Francisco Gentil Nursing and with the financial backing of the EU Equal Community Initiatives Programme, initiated two professional integration programmes aimed at Eastern European doctors and nurses. These programmes are known as the Professionalisation of Immigrant Doctors Support Project (Projecto de Apoio à Professionalização de Médicos Imigrantes (PAPMI)) and the Immigrant Nurses Professional and Academic Qualifications Equivalency Project (Projecto de Equivalência de Habilitações Académicas e Profissionais de Enfermeiros Imigrantes (PEHAPEI)). Chapter 8 will further touch upon these projects.

29. This is due to a reciprocity agreement between Portugal and Cape Verde.

30. Padilla (2005) also points out that the Portuguese stereotypical association of Brazilian women being sensual, extroverted and licentious has existed since the fifteenth century, since the first images of native populations walking around naked; images that still remain today, but that have been readjusted to a new reality.

31. The most renowned example of Brazilian prostitution blamed for the destruction of families is the case of Bragança. In this northern Portuguese city a group of Portuguese women organised a group calling themselves Mães de Bragança (‘Mothers of Bragança’), claiming that Brazilian prostitutes were stealing their husbands and destroying their families. The case of the Mães de Bragança gained international recognition after the magazine Time Europe published a controversial article about their case.

32. This does not, however, mean that the Brazilian community is happy with the implementation of the Lula Accord, as will be discussed in Chapter 8.

33. For studies on the media treatment of immigrants and ethnic minorities in Portugal, see Cunha et al. (2004) and Cunha and Santos (2006).

34. Often cited is the four- to five-year period leading up to the EURO 2004 football tournament held in Portugal, when a number of stadiums were either built or remodelled for the tournament.

35. I am aware that the discussion of scale scores on identity preservation and assimilation, in this case, has some limitations. First the samples could be considered as being too small, and second the leaders are being asked to reflect on their community’s
members (as opposed to asking community members directly). However, in defence of
the latter limitation, it was thought worthwhile to collect the opinions of association
leaders due to their constant contact and knowledge of the community they represent.

36. Of course, the issues of representation, representativeness and ‘who speaks for whom’
are highly pertinent here, as they are throughout much of my analysis. In the introd-
ductory chapter I placed a question mark against association representatives truly being
representative voices of their membership and the importance of counter-balancing
perspectives. Even more potentially problematic, however, are leaders who claim to
speak for their entire national immigrant populations, association members and non-
members. I come back to this important issue in Chapter 9, the concluding chapter.

37. The Angolan interviewees referred to their African identity as much as their Angolan
identity which, in this context, can also be perceived as a more generalised black iden-
tity. Reference to such a generalised categorisation is frequently driven by the way Afri-
ca is perceived by the people of the host country, who tend to view an African or black
common culture or folklore tradition.

38. Language is often viewed as a divider between first- and second-generation immigrant
identities, especially if the parents do not learn the language of the host country. Ac-
cording to Portes and Rumbaut (1996), this situation often leads to the switching of
paternalistic function, where the first-generation, who do not know the language and
therefore will not possess enough knowledge of the host country’s social systems, be-
come dependent on their children’s orientation. Thus, in the words of Portes and Rumb-

39. Deco is a Brazilian-born, Portuguese-naturalised footballer who is a current regular on
the Portuguese national football team.

40. Filipão is the nickname of Luis Filipe Scolari, a Brazilian national who is currently
manager of the Portuguese national football team.

41. Saint António’s Day is celebrated in various municipalities throughout Portugal on the
13th of June. This interview was at a Saint António’s Day fair held in the Parish of São
Domingos de Rana in the Municipality of Cascais.

42. It is typical to eat barbequed sardines on Saint António’s Day.

43. Identity formation, however, is not completely exclusive to the country of origin and
the host country. As Contador (2000) exemplifies in his study on African youth iden-
tity in Portugal, the identity strategies adopted by this community are the result of
various influences, ranging from Portuguese culture, Afro-Americanism, variations of
African culture and blackness.

Chapter 8

1. Not all of the associations surveyed for this study carry out activities within all these
integration spheres. I here refer to the elitist or capitalist organisations (Móren-Alegret
2002) such as the Brazilian Clube de Empresários do Brasil and the Fundação Luso-
Brasileira, as well as recreational associations, namely Torcida Brasil or Liga Luso-An-
golana Demóstenes de Almeida.

2. CTT is the Portuguese postal service. With the 2004 CTT regularisation scheme, can-
didates would complete their regularisation candidacy through a local CTT outlet.

3. I here refer to associations such as ASAP, ADA, AAMA, ACIMA and UJAP.

4. The annual permanência authorisation renewal fee of 75 euros along with other forms
of revenue (e.g. visas, fines, residence authorisation renewals, etc.) makes SEF the gov-
ernment institution with the highest annual revenue in Portugal (estimated earnings
in 2002 were over 8.1 million euros). The associations are also against what many
consider to be ‘exaggerated fees’ or what Falcão (2002: 204) refers to as a ‘gold mine’.
Concerning the 75-euro renewal fee, the Portuguese leader of an Eastern European association poses the following question: ‘We have to renew our Portuguese identity cards every five years and we pay seven euros. Why do they have to pay such a high price?’ (EE)?

5. This is primarily due to the heavier concentration of immigrants in the Lisbon area, where problems dealing with queues, bureaucracies, etc. are magnified.

6. It is not uncommon for associations to deal with SEF offices outside of the districts where they are headquartered. Many of the associations situated in Lisbon, for example, deal with SEF offices outside of the Portuguese capital.

7. Padilla (2006) makes a comparison between the requirements needed for the Lula Accord and the CTT process and Spain’s 2005 regularisation process. The author highlights Spain’s less bureaucratic process with the candidate having to supply a legalisation candidacy form, labour contract, municipal Empadronamiento certificate (proof of residence) and criminal records (host country and country of origin). The 2005 Spanish regularisation process was open to all arriving before 8 August 2004. The candidates had a three-month registration period. Now finalised, the process received 690,679 requests with 88 per cent receiving legal documents, 9 per cent pending (awaiting documentation), with and only 3 per cent of the applications rejected.

8. The article referred to by the interviewee is entitled ‘Quando o Estado está nas mãos dos imigrantes’, authored by Ricardo Dias Feldner and published in the ACIME’s Boletim Informativo n. 27. See: www.acime.gov.pt/docs/Publicacoes/BI/BI_27.pdf.

9. Referred to, above all, was the publicity campaign carried out through billboard advertising that was initiated by ACIME in 2004.

10. The CNAIs have been recognised by the European Commission as an example of good integrative practices at the EU level (see Niessen and Schibel 2004).

11. As discussed in Chapter 6, it is, above all, the Angolan and Eastern European associations that have had greater contact with this institution. In explaining the reduced contact between the Brazilian associations and the IEFP, I resort to the words of one interviewee:

   I don’t know if there is even one Brazilian registered [with the IEFP]. Nobody comes here for training courses. To this date, we have never been contacted by the IEFP to collaborate, and that’s probably because they don’t come across many Brazilians for that sort of thing (B).

12. Under the coordination of the IEFP, UNIVAs are established through protocols with both government and non-governmental institutions that have as one of their aims the insertion of individuals into active life.

13. ADA, Associação Apoio ao Imigrante – São Bernardo and SOLIM.

14. The battle faced by the associations when it comes to the recognition of professional qualifications is not new. The struggle faced by the Brazilian dentists in the 1990s is one such example (see Chapter 6).

15. The first phase of this project (2002-2005) consisted of 120 doctors, 106 of whom were granted recognition; and 59 nurses, with 45 being granted equivalencies. See www.jsportugal.pt.

16. According to Article 65 of the Portuguese Constitution:

   1. Everyone has the right, for themselves and for their family, to housing of adequate dimensions, with hygienic and comfortable conditions and that preserves personal intimacy and family privacy. […] 3. The State will adopt policies with the intent of establishing a rent system compatible to family income and access to proper housing.

17. According to Fonseca et al. (2005), 73 per cent of Ukrainians and 68 per cent of Brazilians in Portugal live in a rented room or house. The average of immigrants is 57 per cent.
18. Some surveys, however, were repeated in later years (i.e. Quinta do Mocho in the municipality of Loures).
19. To this date, of the 32 municipalities that constitute the LMA and the PMA, only four have completed the PER programme (Instituto Nacional de Habitação 2005, cited in the article ‘Programa de Realojamento está por concluir 13 anos depois’, Dinheiro Digital, 1 February 2006).
20. During the fieldwork and write-up stage of this study, two PER processes were implemented: the neighbourhood of Azinhaga dos Besouros in the municipality of Amadora and the neighbourhoods Marianas and Fim do Mundo in the municipality of Cascais. In both situations, while the majority of the residents were registered under the PER surveys, a number were not. The recent demolition of homes in the aforementioned neighbourhoods in the summer of 2006 left unregistered residents without a home. An activist group within the association SOLIM known as Direito à Habitação ('Right to Housing') became the primary lobby group against the demolition of shacks and shantytowns, demanding a housing solution for all residents before their current homes are dismantled.
21. Some associations that work with residents of re-housing neighbourhoods expressed that some families have trouble in paying the rents that have been defined by the respective city hall. As one interviewee explained:

[...] rents are according to the aggregate income of the family, and since many residents have unsteady work, the income they registered in 2000 and 2001, when they moved in, might be a lot lower today. To reset the rent, the residents must provide their IRS discounts from the previous year which might not correspond to their current income as well (A).
22. Since this initiative was developed and launched during the time the fieldwork for this study was being carried out, very few of the interviewees knew of its existence. Only in the later stages of the fieldwork, did more interviewees start making reference to the initiative.
23. UCI is a joint venture initiative between two financial groups: Banco Santander and BNP Paribas.
24. Financial institutions have up to this point made the demand that the guarantor be Portuguese. In addition, banks will often ask immigrants for payment guarantee, not always asked from Portuguese nationals (Meireles et al. 2003).
25. It is estimated that between 1999-2002, one-third of new arrivals from the PALOP countries came to Portugal via the route of family reunification (Fonseca et al. 2005). However, in the inquiry carried out by Fonseca and her colleagues (2005), the Angolans scored the lowest in comparison to their PALOP counterparts with only 2.3 per cent having reunited a family member in Portugal.
26. As Fonseca et al. (2005: 158) note, family reunification often takes place within a one-to five-year period after the arrival of the first family member who will then sponsor the reunification of additional family members. Given that Angolan immigration has a longer history, this can thus be a contributing factor to the reduction of family reunification.
28. Article 67 of the Portuguese Constitution consecrates this principal in stating: ‘The family, as a fundamental element of society, has the right to societal and State protection, and to all conditions that will permit the personal fulfilment of each member’.
29. Legislation specifies that ‘as soon as possible, and in no event more then nine months counting from the date the application was submitted, SEF Regional Director will notify the applicant in writing on the decision taken’ (ACIME 2004: 42).
30. The following documents are required when applying for family reunification: a request addressed to the Director-General of SEF identifying the applicant and the family
members involved, residence permit of the applicant (original and photocopies), passport containing valid stamp verifying residence authorisation, proof of relationship – valid marriage certificate or birth certificates (originals and photocopies; in case of doubt, supplementary items such as medical or legal testimony are requested), and lastly, authenticated copies of the relatives’ identification documents (ACIME 2004).

31. Although Brazilian interviewees were also asked to comment on the education and schooling of their younger members, the general consensus was that very few integration difficulties existed, as language and cultural differences were not pronounced in the same way they are with the other two groups. Furthermore, the respondents also highlighted that, numerically, Brazilian school-aged children were not very significant given the labour migration characteristics of this group.

32. Although the concept of ‘multicultural education’ is preferred in the literature of North America, Great Britain and Australia, in Europe, the notion of ‘intercultural education’ is more commonly found.

33. Similarly to the arguments presented by the interviewees, in a study on immigrant families and their relations with the Portuguese public schools, Nunes et al. (2006) conclude that, while African parents feel dissatisfied with the Portuguese scholastic system – blaming teachers for not even being able to teach the ‘basic rules’ to their children – Eastern European parents blame Portuguese schools for not being demanding enough for their children.

34. Teenagers with problems adapting to school are prone to developing further problems related to unspecific adaptation problems in the future, such as criminal behaviour, illegal drug use, dropping out of school, etc. (Janosz and LaBlanc 1996).

35. According to the Ministry of Education’s Entreculturas database, school failure and drop-out are much higher among the students of the Angolan community (with the exception being that of the first cycle of elementary school where Angolan figures are equal to that of national population figures) – and the other five PALOP communities – than the average for the Portuguese student population as a whole. Also see Bastos and Bastos (1999) and Rosa (2002).

36. Similar research carried out with Capeverdean associations in the Metropolitan Area of Lisbon revealed these same feelings in relation to Capeverdean descendents (see Sarinha 2002).

37. This ‘indifference’ may be caused by the instability of teachers in Portuguese public schools, for there is a high turn-over rate of teacher replacement from one year to the next in Portuguese public schools.

38. For instance, the work of the Centro Espiritano Padre Alves Correia (CEPAC) with PALOP immigrants and Serviço Jesuítas aos Refugiados (SJR) with Eastern Europeans. Medicos do Mundo work closely with illegal and homeless immigrants and with Eastern European immigrants in particular.

39. Also see Fonseca and Malheiros (2005: 114-115).

40. This has led ACIME to publicly announce to all parish councils that they must cooperate by law (Fonseca and Malheiros 2005: 115).

41. Seeking emergency care in public hospitals allows undocumented immigrants to receive treatment that is often more anonymous in nature. As Fonseca et al. (2005) point out, it is common for undocumented immigrants to use pseudonyms and give false addresses in order to avoid any sort of follow-up contact with the hospital where they received treatment.

42. Difficulties in paying medical fees, however, is not exclusive to irregular migrants as documented immigrants who do not contribute to and/or are not covered by social security may also have difficulties in paying their medical fees. In this case, health centres will often wave the payment or allow the patient to pay at a later date (Fonseca and Malheiros 2005).
43. In his analyses of health care and the Ukrainian community in Portugal, Sousa (2006: 132-137) identified three obstacles along these same lines which he sub-categorises as: problems in being attended to (e.g. immigrant/health professional relations, waiting period, etc.), treatment (e.g. quality of care, etc.) and post-medical therapy (e.g. medicine, exams, further consultations with the specialist, etc.).

44. This is in line with the findings of Grillo (1985), Bjorklund (1986) and Rex and Samad (1996) in their respective case studies (see Chapter 2).

45. Gaia Danese (2001: 78) argues that:

 [...] migrants have not always been socialized in western democratic notions of citizenship of the formation of interest groups. [...] In Anglo-Saxon countries – leaving aside trade unions and political parties, which are not always deeply rooted in society – the majority of individuals do not traditionally form associations to further their interests.

Given this scenario, it is important to question the extent to which immigrant associations are indeed ‘the loudest voice immigrants have’.

46. Municipal social networks involve both government and non-government social institutions in a given municipality.

47. The right to vote and be elected locally is applicable to the nationals of Argentina, Brazil, Cape Verde, Chile, Estonia, Israel, Norway, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela, with the nationals of Argentina, Israel and Norway only being entitled to vote but not permitted to run as candidates.

48. Moreover, the number of foreigners who are actually registered to vote is very low. According to National Census Commission data, the number of third-country foreigners registered to vote in 2003 was 17,922, distributed among the following nationalities: Cape Verde (15,635), Brazil (1,974), Venezuela (168), Argentina (61), Peru (28), Norway (25), Uruguay (sixteen), Chile (twelve) and Israel (three). See www.stape.pt/recensel/quadro14.htm.

Chapter 9

1. In sharp contrast, it is essential to remember that other institutions which also carry out the same activities as the associations, namely government bodies, NGOs, church organisations etc., often have people employed as salaried workers.


3. This does not necessarily imply that an Angolan, Brazilian, Russian or Ukrainian identity welds together the status of the immigrant group under one national or ethnic representation in the country of residence, leaving as secondary the allegiances to different regional backgrounds. In fact, such regional allegiances often lead to the creation of regional associations, as has been exemplified in this study with a couple of the Angolan associations (Associação para a Defesa dos Direitos da Cultura Backongo and Associação Tratado de Simulambuco – Casa de Cabinda). Although it often does not exist in practice, due to different cultural characteristics that compose the individuals who make up the associations, the organisations will often externalise a homogeneous image, promoting a ‘national identity’ in detriment to ‘regional identities’ (Hily and Poinard 1987). The strategy of cultural unity often will represent a strategy developed with the purpose of attaining collective objectives such as the integration of the community in the receiving society (Albuquerque et al. 2000).

4. Recent changes to the Nationality Law, however, aim to facilitate the acquisition of Portuguese nationality (see Chapter 4, footnote 57).
5. It is also important to note that the public service network deficiencies are not unique to immigrants in Portugal, for it is also common for the Portuguese population to encounter a variety of obstacles as well.

6. Currently, the result of the collective work of all ministries with contributions taken from civil society organisations during a period of public debate (having taken place in January of 2007), has resulted in a document that mirrors the sensibilities of Portuguese society towards the integration of immigrants and demonstrates the intent of creating a clear path for immigrant integration. This document, known as the Plan for Immigrant Integration, outlines 122 measures ‘covering diverse vertical and transverse sectors and assuming as main goal to bring to conclusion the complete integration of immigrants into Portuguese society’ (ACIDI 2007: 4).

7. This fact applies to the PALOP communities in general.

8. In this sense, I refer to the concept of cultural separatism as meaning disarticulation and disengagement. However, as Sassen-Koob (1979: 326) points out, ‘historically, cultural separatism has been one of the modes in which immigrants or racially distinct communities become articulated with the receiving or dominant society’.

9. For the notion of ‘replication structure’ and how voluntary associations represent collective efforts to compensate for the loss of communal life, see Anderson and Anderson (1959) and Rogler (1972).

10. Reasons for grouping these nationalities into one collective group are given in Chapter 1, footnote 4.

11. These points are also presented by Kivisto (2001: 572-573) in his attempt to map out a number of issues to be addressed in constructing a research agenda designed to assess the existence and viability of transnational social spaces in the face of the inevitability of varying levels of acculturation.


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