Prince Dipanagara and the end of an old order in Java, 1785-1855

National hero, Javanese mystic, pious Muslim and leader of the ‘holy war’ against the Dutch between 1825 and 1830, the Yogyakarta prince, Dipanagara (1785-1855), is pre-eminent in the pantheon of modern Indonesian historical figures. Yet despite instant name recognition in Indonesia, there has never been a full biography of the prince’s life and times based on Dutch and Javanese sources. The power of prophecy is a major study which sets Dipanagara’s life history against the context of the turbulent events of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century when the full force of European imperialism hit Indonesia like an Asian tsunami destroying forever Java’s ‘old order’ and propelling the twin forces of Islam and Javanese national identity into a fatal confrontation with the Dutch. This confrontation known as the Java War, in which Dipanagara was defeated and exiled, marked the beginning of the modern colonial period in Indonesia which lasted until the Japanese occupation of 1942-1945.

The book presents a detailed analysis of Dipanagara’s pre-war visions and aspirations as a Javanese Ratu Adil (Just King) based on extensive reading of his autobiography, the Babad Dipanagara as well as a number of other Javanese sources. Dutch and British records, in particularly the Residency Archives of Yogyakarta and Surakarta currently kept in the Indonesian National Archives, provide the backbone of this scholarly work. The book will be read with profit by all those interested in the rise of Western colonial rule in Indonesia, the fate of indigenous cultures in an age of imperialism and the role of Javanese Islam in modern Indonesian history.

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THE POWER OF PROPHECY
Dedication

For the family and descendants of Pangéran Dipanagara
In honour and respect

‘You alone are the means,
but that not for long,
only to be counted amongst the ancestors.’

Parangkusuma prophecy, circa 1805

‘History says:
“Don’t hope on this side of the grave.
But then once in a lifetime,
The longed for tidal wave of justice can rise up
And hope and history rhyme.”

So hope for a great sea change,
On the far side of revenge.
Believe that a further shore
Is reachable from here.’

Seamus Heaney

Cover illustrations:
Eruption of Mount Merapi, painted by Radèn Sarif Salèh in 1865
(Photograph by courtesy of the Rijksmuseum van Geologie en Mineralogie, Leiden)
Dipanagara during the Java War (1825-1830)
Herman Willem Daendels (Photograph by courtesy of the Iconografisch Bureau, The Hague)
PETER CAREY

THE POWER OF PROPHECY

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The Java War (1825-1830) was a watershed in the history of Java and of all Indonesia. For the first time a European colonial government faced a social rebellion covering a large part of the island. Most of central and east Java, and many of the pesisir (north coast) areas were affected. Two million Javanese, one third of the total population, were exposed to the ravages of war, one fourth of the cultivated area of Java sustained damage and about 200,000 Javanese died (Carey 1976:52 note 1). In securing their pyrrhic victory over the Javanese, the Dutch also suffered: as well as 7,000 Indonesian auxiliaries, 8,000 of their own troops perished and the war cost their exchequer an estimated 20 million guilders (De Graaf 1949:399). The end of the conflict left the Dutch in undisputed control of the island and a new phase of colonial rule began with the inception of Governor-General Johannes van den Bosch’s ‘cultivation system’ (1830-1870). This proved immensely profitable for Holland. The war thus marked the end of a process, maturing since the period of Marshal Herman Willem Daendels (1808-1811), involving the change from the era of the Dutch East Indies Company, when contacts between Batavia and the south-central Javanese kingdoms had had the nature of ambassadorial links between sovereign states, to the ‘high colonial’ period when the Principalities occupied a clearly subordinate position to the European power.

This transition should be borne in mind by those who approach the early chapters of this book expecting the Dutch to loom large as the colonial masters of Java (Chapters I-IV). In the late eighteenth century, the island was not a Dutch version of the British Raj. A declining power in Europe, Holland seemed to be on its way out in Java while the south-central Javanese rulers enjoyed de facto sovereignty. The Fourth Anglo-Dutch War of 1780-1783 was the turning point for the Dutch as a colonial power. Faced with mounting debts, which peaked at 134 million guilders, the VOC was declared bankrupt and its assets taken over by the Dutch state on 1 January 1800 (Boxer 1979:101-2).

For the purpose of this volume, the term ‘Indonesia’ will be used to refer to the Netherlands Indies, and ‘Indonesian’ to the inhabitants of the archipelago. The colonial capital will, however, be referred to as ‘Batavia’ throughout rather than ‘Jakarta’.

Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie or VOC, 1602-1799, see Boxer 1979.
Four years earlier control of the Dutch possessions in the East had been taken out of the hands of the Directors of the VOC, the so-called ‘Heeren XVII’ (Gentlemen 17), and vested in the new Committee for the Affairs of East Indies Trade and Colonies. The fact that during the international crises which led to the VOC’s demise the governor-general and Council of the Indies in Batavia had to turn to the south-central Javanese rulers to help them to defend their colonial capital against possible foreign attack, illustrates the scale of the courts’ military and political independence. Such requests for assistance occurred during the British attack in 1781, and again in 1793 when the Dutch Republic entered the War of the First Coalition (1792-1797) against France. Following the occupation of Holland by the French Army of the North in December 1794-January 1795, the Republic became a satellite of the grande nation. This had implications for Java. As one of Holland’s overseas possessions, it was included in the policy announced by the exiled Dutch Stadhouder (head of state). This stated that the Republic’s colonies should be handed over to the British to prevent them falling into the hands of the French. So began a twenty-year period in which Indonesia was drawn into the global conflict between Britain and France. Fought out during the Revolutionary (1792-1799) and Napoleonic Wars (1799-1802, 1803-1813, 1815) in Europe, the archipelago became a battle ground on land and sea. Between 1795 and 1797, British naval forces operating from Madras and Pulau Pinang captured most of the Dutch possessions outside Java. Although returned to Holland under the terms of the Peace of Amiens (1802), all were recaptured by the British in the seven years which followed the renewal of hostilities in Europe (May 1803) when Indonesia was placed under strict naval blockade. So tight was this interdiction that when Marshal Herman Willem Daendels received his appointment

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3 Control was exercised first through the Batavian Republic’s (1796-1806) Comité tot de Zaken van de Oost-Indische Handel en Bezittingen (Committee for the Affairs of East Indies Trade and Colonies) (1796-1800) and then through its Raad der Aziatische Bezittingen en Etablissementen (Board of Asiatic Possessions and Establishments) (1800-1806).

4 On the 1781 situation, see UBL, BPL 616, Port. 3 pt. 1, W.H. van IJsseldijk (Yogyakarta) to P.G. van Overstraten (Semarang), 8-10-1793. On the Dutch response to the sighting of French warships in the Sunda Straits in September 1793, see W.H. van IJsseldijk (Yogyakarta) to P.G. van Overstraten (Semarang), 28-9-1793, 5-10-1793, 8-10-1793, 30-10-1793 and 4-11-1793. Hamengkubuwana II had insisted that his 1,000 men should be considered as ‘auxiliaries’ (hulptroepen) not as mercenaries, even though they were being paid at the rate of four Spanish dollars a month per man by the VOC. In 1781, during the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War, the VOC had paid five Spanish dollars a month per head for Hamengkubuwana I’s troops who were being kept on standby to defend the colonial capital against possible British attack.

5 The exiled Dutch Stadhouder (head of state), Prince William V of Orange (reigned 1766-1785 and 1787-1795), had sanctioned these British conquests through his so-called ‘Kew letters’. Signed in his place of exile in England in February 1795, these ordered VOC officials to place the Company’s possessions in Asia in British hands in order to prevent them falling to the French.
as governor-general from Napoleon’s younger brother Louis6 in January 1807, he was sent out to Java with a replacement governor-general, Rear-Admiral A.A. Buyskes, following on a separate fast frigate in case the marshal fell into British hands (Chapter V note 46). As we will see in Chapter V, the parlous financial and military situation of the Dutch was well understood by the south-central Javanese rulers. So much so that one senior former VOC official even suggested in 1808 after Daendels’ arrival that the European government should employ some holy men and ascetics to make favourable prophecies on behalf of the Dutch to disguise their vulnerability. In the same year, an unusual event at one of the regular tiger and buffalo fights staged in honour of the visit of a high Dutch dignitary to the Yogyakarta court may have been interpreted as an indication that Holland would soon be placed hors de combat in terms of their rule in Java (Chapter V).

The tragedy for the Javanese was that just as all the signs seemed to be pointing in the direction of a Dutch collapse, half a world away in Europe events were taking place which would change the Javanese ‘old order’ for ever. The twin political and industrial revolutions then tearing the ancien régimes of eighteenth-century Europe apart would hit Java with the force of an Asian tsunami. In the space of just four years (1808-1812), the relationship between the European government7 and the south-central Javanese rulers was transformed. Yogya bore the brunt of these changes. In quick succession, the re-energised Franco-Dutch regime of Marshal Daendels (1808-1811) and the British-Indian administration of Thomas Stamford Raffles (1811-1816), forced open Yogya’s eastern outlying territories (Chapter VI), plundered its court and exiled its reigning monarch (Chapter VII). After the fall of the kraton (fortified royal capital; court) in June 1812 and the imposition of new treaties, the relationship between Batavia and the princely states came to resemble that of the post-Plassey era in India when the British replaced the Mughal emperors in Lower Bengal (Chapter VIII). The returned Dutch administration of Governor-General G.A.G.Ph. van der Capellen (1816-1826) continued this process. Its desperate need for money

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6 Louis Bonaparte had been installed by his elder brother as king of Holland, reigning from 1806 to 1810, when the former Batavian Republic was annexed to France, see Chapter VII.
7 Since there were so many changes of colonial regime involving different European powers (Dutch, British, French, Belgian) in the period covered in the present volume, it has been decided for the purposes of succinctness to refer to the colonial power in Batavia as the ‘European government’ throughout. The principle regimes which governed Java in the period 1785-1855 were: 1. the Dutch East Indies Company (to 1796); 2. the Batavian Republic (1796-1806) through its two Committees (note 2); 3. the Franco-Dutch kingdom of King Louis of Holland (1806-1810) and the French Empire (1810-1813), when Holland was annexed to Napoleon I’s France; 4. the British-Indian interregnum of lieutenant-governors T.S. Raffles and John Fendall (1811-1816), when Java was under the authority of the governor-general of India; 5. the returned Dutch administration of the three commissioners-general G.A.G.Ph. van der Capellen, C.Th. Elout, and Rear Admiral A.A. Buyskes (1816-1818), who reported directly to the Director-General of Trade and Colonies (Johannes baron Goldberg, in office 1815-1818) of the new United Kingdom of the Netherlands (present-day Holland and Belgium) (1814-1830); and finally 6. the government of the Netherlands Indies (from January 1818), which from 1830 was under the direction of the Dutch crown and – from 1848 – the States-General.
and lack of understanding of the effects of its policies on ordinary Javanese prepared the ground for the Java War (Chapter IX). Adverse environmental and health conditions, in particular the May 1821 cholera epidemic, coupled with soaring rice prices provided the triggers for the massive popular uprisings of July-August 1825 which heralded the outbreak of the Java War (Chapter X).

For the Javanese, this five-year conflict had far-reaching implications: for perhaps the first time a rebellion had broken out at one of the south-central Javanese kraton which had at its heart social and economic grievances rather than dynastic ambitions. The emergence of a strong charismatic leader in the person of Pangéran Dipanagara (1785-1855), who took the title of the Javanese messianic Ratu Adil (‘Just King’), served to bring many disparate social elements under the single banner of Javanese Islam. Widespread millenarian expectations caught the imagination of the peasantry and acted as a catalyst for social and economic grievances, accumulating since the beginning of the nineteenth century. The concept of holy war (prang sabil), imagery from the Javanese shadow-play (wayang), and Javanese nativist sentiments, made up of an intense longing for the restoration of an idealized traditional order – which Dipanagara described as ‘restoring the high state of the Islamic religion in Java’ 8 – all helped to forge a common identity amongst the prince’s followers. In this fashion, nobles, dismissed provincial officials, religious teachers, professional bandits, porters, day labourers, tax-paying farmers (sikep) and artisans were brought together briefly in a common cause (Chapter XI). The Java War was thus of immense significance for Indonesia’s future. The subtle interplay of economic grievances and millenarian hopes created a movement of unique social breadth which in some respects anticipated the nationalist movement of the early twentieth century (Carey 1976:52-3). These nationalist antecedents were noted by F.G. Valck (1799-1842), a senior Dutch official who served in a number of residency postings in south-central Java during the two decades which spanned the Java War and its immediate aftermath (Christiaans 1992-93:129-30). Writing in 1840, he observed:

[My] nearly twenty years of administrative service in various Residencies has taught me that the spirit of the ordinary Javanese is against us, not because we Netherlanders treat him badly but because he is imbued with a feeling of nationality [...]. Despite all the benefits which he gets from us, he cannot suppress the wish to be governed by his own rulers and chiefs even though they would administer him worse [than we would] [...]. He continues to see in us foreign tyrants, who in morals, customs, religion and clothing etc differ so much from his own [...]. The sight of every European reminds him of his humiliating situation [and] he cannot refrain from giving him looks of hatred or contempt whenever he feels he can get away with it without incurring punishment.9

8 The Javanese phrase used by Dipanagara and his supporters was: mangun luhuripun agami Islam wonten ing Tanah Jawi sedaya, see Carey 1974b:285.
9 Dj.Br. 18, F.G. Valck, ‘Geheime memorie behoorende bij het algemeen verslag der residentie
Valck’s views were not alone. Acute observers like the lawyer, Willem van Hogendorp, who served as a senior official in Commissioner-General L.P.J. du Bus de Gisignies’ administration (1826-1830) during the Java War (De Prins 2002:113), confided similar misgivings in his correspondence with his father, in 1827-1829 (Van Hogendorp 1913:170):

It is not the war as such or the number of our enemies which constitutes my greatest concern about Java and our rule here […] but it is the spirit of the whole population of Java from one end to the other, and I include here the spirit of [the inhabitants of] our most important outer island possessions in Borneo, Makassar and throughout Sumatra […]. They are tired of us.

This strand of anti-Dutch ‘nationalism’, if such it can be called at this early date, will be explored more fully in the chapter which deals in detail on the Java War (Chapter XI).

The cultural dislocation wrought by the impact of the new European imperialism of the early nineteenth century on south-central Java is one of the key themes of this book. It also seeks to explain events through the eyes of its central protagonist, Dipanagara. A key transitional figure, he lived through the shift from the old order of late eighteenth century Java to the new ‘high colonial’ era based on the twin political and industrial revolutions which were transforming Europe in his lifetime. In many ways a traditional figure steeped in the values of pre-modern Java, particularly the world of the south-central Javanese courts, Dipanagara also pointed to the future. One thinks here of his use of Javanese Islam, particularly its millenarian traditions, as a way of forging a new identity for Javanese Muslims in an era when the old Javanese order was crumbling. Dipanagara lived in a world increasingly divided between those who were prepared to accommodate themselves to the new European dispensation and those who saw the Islamic moral order (agami Islam) as the lodestar in a society which had lost its traditional moor-
ings. The Java War gave impetus to a process which is still working itself out in modern Indonesian society today: namely, the integration of Islamic values into contemporary Javanese and Indonesian identity. Dipanagara’s world view also came to encompass a distinctly contemporary concern with how Javanese Muslims should live in an age of Western imperial domination. For Dipanagara, unlike present-day Indonesian Muslims, the answer seemed to lie in the waging of holy war and the development of a clear distinction, which developed during his five-year struggle, between the wong Islam (‘people of Islam’; Muslim believers), the European kapir laknatullah (heretics accursed by Allah), and the Javanese kapir murtad (apostates; Javanese who had allied themselves with the Dutch). But there was also a deep concern on the prince’s part for the preservation of specifically Javanese values as expressed in language, dress and cultural codes which can be seen most clearly in his treatment of Dutch prisoners during the Java War. We will see in the chapter on the war (Chapter XI), how they were expected to adopt Javanese dress and speak to their captors not in the reviled language of the new colonial state – ‘service Malay’ – but in High Javanese (krama), the medium of the court elite. Despite his adoption of Ottoman dress and titles such as ‘Ali Basah’ (‘The High Pasha’) for his military commanders (Chapter III), Dipanagara was no Islamic reformer. Instead, he was a traditional Javanese Muslim for whom there was no inherent conflict between the spirit world of Java, and membership of the international ummat (community of Muslim believers) and its spiritual and politico-cultural centres in the Hejaz (present-day Saudi Arabia) and Ottoman Turkey. Dipanagara did not prevail in achieving his goal of restoring the high state of the Islamic religion in Java. Indeed, the dignity and integrity which he fought for on behalf of the Javanese ummat would only be achieved in outward form ninety years after his death with the declaration of political independence from the Dutch in 1945. His wider moral vision of securing an honoured place for Islam in the life of the nation, however, is still being negotiated at a time of unprecedented global conflict between what the Islamic community see as the ‘materialistic’ values of the West and the fissiparous loyalties of the worldwide Muslim ummat.

In any other culture, such a key figure would have been the subject of numerous biographies and historical studies. Every aspect of Dipanagara’s life would have been researched in detail, his understanding of Islam and of his Javanese inheritance the subject of weighty monographs. Indeed, one might have expected that his own writings, in particular his impressive autobiography written while in exile in Manado (1830-1833), the Babad Dipanagara, which runs to over 1,000 pages in manuscript, would have long since appeared in a copiously annotated modern text edition. The situation is unfortunately very different. History seems to have little honour in present-day Indonesia and

11 On this Dienstmaleisch, see Hoffman 1979:65-92.
the results of this have been painfully evident in Jakarta’s abysmal handling of its East Timor adventure (1975-1999) and its belated understanding of the particular society, politics and culture of Aceh. There is little money for research or government funds – let alone the scholarly attention and respect needed – for the preservation of manuscripts. The result is that the original pégon (unvocalised Arabic script Javanese) copy of Dipanagara’s babad in the National Library – equivalent to Oliver Cromwell’s common place book or George Washington’s diary – is crumbling to dust (Carey 1981a:lix-lx note 76). As for the voluminous Dutch Residency reports in the Indonesian National Archives (Arsip Nasional), the backbone of the present study, who can be bothered to use them today? The result is an historiographical void. It is as though the clock stopped at the time when the Dutch military historians P.J.F. Louw and E.S. de Klerck completed their magisterial six-volume work on the Java War (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909) or the Rusche edition (1908-09) of the Babad Dipanagara was published in Batavia before the First World War. Indeed, since independence in 1945, only a handful of studies have appeared in Indonesian: one thinks here of Yamin (1950), Tanojo (n.y.), Soekanto (1951a, 1952), Sagimun (1965), and Djamhari (2003). These have all afforded access to aspects of Dipanagara’s life and times to a post-independence Indonesian readership, but apart from the last, which is primarily a history of the Dutch bentheng stelsel (system of fortified strong points) in the last three years of the Java War, none have been based on primary research.

The present study should have appeared thirty years ago in the immediate aftermath of its acceptance as a doctoral thesis at the University of Oxford (1975). At that time, on the recommendation of the late Professor M.A.P. Meilink-Roelofsz, the thesis manuscript was accepted as the basis for a monograph publication in the ‘Verhandelingen’ series of the Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land en Volkenkunde (KITLV, Royal Institute of Southeast Asian and Caribbean Studies) in Leiden. But Professor Meilink-Roelofsz made three important recommendations which were in fact conditions needing to be met before publication could proceed: first, that the text edition of the Surakarta version of the Babad Dipanagara with its extensive annotations, and the thesis preface, which dealt primarily with the Javanese sources for the early nineteenth-century history of Yogyakarta, should be published separately; second, that much more attention should be paid to the social and economic origins of the Java War. In particular, she urged that I investigate further the role of the Chinese in south-central Java and the economic relations between Javanese and Europeans, as well as the workings of the Javanese apanage system. Third, she recommended that the entire structure of the thesis should be recast to allow for shorter chapters and greater thematic coherence. These three conditions were all valid, but they constituted a considerable challenge involving extensive additional research just at a time when I was embarking on
an academic career in the University of Oxford teaching British and European history. In 1976-1977 and 1978, however, before my teaching duties began in earnest with my tutorial Fellowship at Trinity College, I was able to carry out some important further research at the Arsip Nasional in Jakarta by kind permission of the former Director, Dra Soemartini and her staff, in particular the late Pak Sundoyo whose knowledge of the Dutch East Indies colonial archive never failed me. During this period of fieldwork, the British Academy supported me through the provision of a British Academy Travelling Fellowship in Southeast Asia (1976-1977). The bulk of the Dutch archive material used in this study, in particular the letters in the Residency archive of Yogyakarta preserved in the Arsip Nasional, were gathered in that period (Carey 1978). At the same time, the British Academy’s Oriental Documents Committee tasked me with preparing a text edition (Carey 1980; Carey and Hoadley 2000) of all the documents of a non-literary nature collected by the scholar-administrator John Crawfurd, and his close associates in the British administration of Java (1811-1816), Lieutenant-Governor Thomas Stamford Raffles (in office 1811-1816) and Colonel Colin Mackenzie, surveyor-general of Madras and chief engineer officer to the British invasion force. These documents derived in the main from the plundered archive of Yogyakarta (Chapter VIII). This allowed me to meet two of Professor Meilink-Roelofsz’s conditions: namely, the publication of the Surakarta version of the Babad Dipanagara (Carey 1981a), and the elucidation of the social and economic background to the Java War (Carey 1986, 1997). I still struggled, however, to meet Professor Meilink-Roelofsz’s third and perhaps most important condition: namely, to recast the whole work in a more readily accessible format with shorter chapters and greater thematic coherence. This daunted me for the best part of twenty-five years from the early 1980s. During that time, I was also involved in researching and publishing on a much more present-day concern, namely, the Indonesian occupation (1975-1999) of the former Portuguese colony of East Timor (now the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste). It has only been since Timor-Leste’s independence in 2002, and in particular during a recent six-month period of sabbatical leave (2006), that I have been able to give my undivided attention to recasting and rewriting my original thesis for the purposes of the present publication. Although a considerable amount of new material has been added and the format and chapter headings of the present volume differ considerably from that of my 1975 Oxford dissertation, I have not had the opportunity to conduct sustained research on the period of the Java War itself. There are literally thousands of letters in the General State Archives in The Hague which deal with the conduct of the war, some of which contain important Javanese material. The private collection of the former Dutch commander, Lieutenant-General Hendrik Merkus de Kock (1779-1845), alone could be the basis for a new study of the conflict, as could the numerous Javanese and Malay letters in the De Renesse-Breidbach family archive in the
Algemeen Rijksarchief in Brussels, which contains most of the correspondence of Burggraaf L.P.J. du Bus de Gisignies during his period as commissioner-general of the Netherlands-Indies (1826-1830) (De Prins 2002:262). The French historian Henri Chambert-Loir’s work on the 600-page war diary of Du Bus’ fellow Belgian, Comte Édouard Errembault de Dudzeele (1789-1830), has also opened up a new and highly personal insight into the life of an infantry captain on the Dutch side during the war (Chambert-Loir 2000:267-300). Since fully two-thirds of Dipanagara’s own published autobiography is devoted to the war years (Rusche 1908-09), there is clearly scope for a new analysis of this crucial colonial conflict which could draw on both Dutch and Javanese sources. But I am not a military historian and my focus has remained throughout on the political and economic history of pre-1825 Yogyakarta as well as on Dipanagara’s own life history until his death in exile in Makassar in January 1855. Louw and De Klerck’s magnum opus together with the numerous books on the Java War in Dutch as well as Djamhari’s recent Indonesian publication (Djamhari 2003), all make the five years of the war the most extensively researched period of the prince’s life. It thus seemed otiose to attempt a new survey of such a comparatively well studied topic. But I recognise that some readers may still consider a study of Dipanagara without a detailed chapter on the Java War as a bit like Hamlet without the Prince of Denmark. If so, then there will clearly be scope either for a second volume or an updated and revised second edition of this work in which greater space is given to the war itself. A new study will also need to be made of the original pégon manuscript of Dipanagara’s autobiographical babad in the A.B. Cohen Stuart collection in the Musium Nasional in Jakarta (Carey 1981a:xxv, lix-lx note 76).

Another consideration for not embarking on new research at this stage has been the need to get this book out in time for the 2008 Research Assessment Exercise (RAE). This UK Government Higher Education Funding Council body grades every Faculty in the country every seven years according to their publication record and research output. At the last RAE in 2001 Oxford History Faculty famously scored only a 5, compared to its much smaller former polytechnic rival, Oxford Brookes, which achieved a coveted 5*. Since there is a 31 December 2007 cut-off point for the next RAE, I have been under considerable pressure to complete on time. In a sense, the RAE assessors should be recognised as the immediate inceptors of this publication and I owe them thanks, as well as my RAE adviser in the History Faculty, Professor Richard Carwardine, and the Faculty chairman, Dr Christopher Haigh, for forcing me to see a long-delayed research project through to the publication stage. But I must also acknowledge here many other even more important debts. First and foremost to the KITLV Press, in the person of its principal commissioning editor for the ‘Verhandelingen’ series, Dr Harry Poeze, for having stood by me all these years and kept the opportunity for publication...
open. *Wat in het vat zit, verzuurt niet* (‘what sits in the vat, never goes sour’) was his own pithy comment when he learnt that after twenty-five years of constant postponement, I might at last be serious about getting something into print. I would also like to thank the marvellous editorial team of the KITLV Press, Kees Waterman, Bregtje Knaap, Marjan Groen, and Dan Vennix, who saw a monstrous manuscript into print.

Second, I am grateful to Professor Merle Ricklefs, now of the National University of Singapore, for having acted as my informal supervisor when my thesis was first written in 1974-1975, and then having continued to inspire me with his remarkable flow of works on the history of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Java, most recently on the process of Islamisation since the fourteenth century (Ricklefs 2006). Third, I owe a considerable obligation to the late Kangjeng Radên Tumenggung Puspaningrat, sometime *wedana* of Bantul, who undertook all the preliminary transliterations of the Javanese documents and chronicles which I have used for my work. It was also thanks to Pak Puspaningrat that I was put in touch with Pak Sastrasuganda of Daengan Lor in Yogyakarta who transliterated all the Javanese texts in *pégon* script. These included the two volumes of Dipanagara’s Makassar manuscripts dealing with the history of Java and Javanese legends and his own disquisitions on Islam, as well as the proclamation from Kyai Iman Sampurna which I discuss in Chapter IX. Such relationships between Western scholars and Javanese scribe-informants have not always been a happy one: in the days of Raffles and Crawfurd and the subsequent ‘high colonial’ period in Java (1830-1942), it was often downright exploitative. I trust that it has not been so in this case.

In Leiden, I was privileged to receive help and encouragement from a distinguished older generation of Dutch scholars of Java, amongst them Professor C.C. Berg†, Dr Th.G.Th. Pigeaud†, Professor G.W.J. Drewes†, Dr H.J. de Graaff†, Dr B.J. Boland†, Rob Nieuwenhuys†, and Dr J. Noorduyn†, as well as those who have only recently retired such as Professor Cees Fasseur, or are currently in post such as Professor Leonard Blussé, Dr Dick van der Meij (Leiden University/Universitas Islam Negeri Syarif Hidayatullah, Jakarta), and Professor Vincent Houben (now of the Humboldt University of Berlin). Besides having the thankless task of reading through my original manuscript, Professor Meilink-Roelofsz was also quite extraordinarily helpful as head of the Tweede Afdeeling of the Algemeen Rijksarchief (now Nationaal Archief, General State Archives) in opening out to me the vast resources of their colonial collections, as were her colleagues Mr M.G.H.A. de Graaf and Francien van Anrooij. The bibliographic treasures of the KITLV were made available courtesy of Dr E. van Donzel, acting head of the KITLV when I returned from my first period of fieldwork in Indonesia in June 1973, and by F.G.P. Jaquet† and Dorothée Buur, both of whom greatly extended my knowledge of Dutch colonial life and literature. At the same time, the incomparable Javanese ma-
nuscript holdings of the Universiteits Bibliothek in Leiden were facilitated through the former adiutor interpretis of the Legatum Warnerianum, Dr R. Roolvink† and Mrs E.M.L. Andriessen-Lück†, to both of whom go my sincere thanks. In Indonesia in 1971-1973, I was honoured to receive the assistance and cooperation of His Royal Highness, the late S.D.I.S. Kangjeng Sultan Hamengkubuwana IX, who made available to me the historical resources of his court. His Royal Highness Bendara Pangéran Harya Poeroebajo, Drs Mudjanattistomo, and Kangjeng Radèn Tumenggung Widyakusuma, all now deceased, also enabled me access to certain manuscripts in the Widya Budaya (Yogya kraton) library, and in Drs Mudjanattistomo’s case taught me Javanese. While in Yogyakarta and Jakarta, I also received important assistance from Professor Stuart Robson, Professor P.J. Zoetmulder S.J.†, G.J. (‘Han’) Resink†, Professor Sartono Kartodirdjo†, Aji Damais and Dr Onghokham†.

Professor Oliver Wolters†, Professor Ben Anderson, and Professor George McT. Kahin† of Cornell University were the first to open my eyes to the possibility of becoming an historian of Southeast Asia during an unforgettable year spent at Cornell University (1969-1970). It is an honour to be able to acknowledge my debt to them here.

My research in England, the Netherlands and Indonesia from 1970-1978 was made possible by generous support from the aforementioned British Academy fellowship, as well as the UK Social Science Research Council and the British Council. The Bryce and Arnold Funds of the Modern History Faculty at Oxford enabled me to employ the exceedingly talented Dr Soe Tjen Marching, a scholar of modern Indonesian literature, as my research assistant in transferring all the appendices onto computer-text format, as well as seeing that the entire manuscript was read through by an expert copy editor, Michael Perrott. Trinity College, Oxford, sustained me as a graduate student when I was conducting my initial historical research in the Netherlands and Indonesia in 1970-1973, and Magdalen College, Oxford subsequently gave me a Prize Fellowship (1974-1979) which supported the writing up of the subsequent Jakarta archive materials. The present book was finished in the spacious beauty of the Sléibh Bearna mountains in rural East Clare in the former county constituency of Ireland’s independence heroes, Daniel O’Connell and Eamon de Valera, during the long dry summer of 2006, as good a place as any to contemplate the passing of colonial regimes, the fate of born leaders in changed times, and the abiding influence of the past on humanity’s increasingly uncertain future. It is being published exactly 200 years after Marshal Daendels set foot in Batavia to begin what Dipanagara had been warned by a disembodied voice heard while sleeping at Parangkusuma during his circa 1805 pilgrimage to the south coast of Java would mark ‘the beginning of the ruin of the Land of Java’ (Chapter IV). That prophecy, whose accuracy would be startlingly fulfilled in the following years of Franco-Dutch (1808-1811), British (1811-1816) and
post-1816 Dutch rule, has suggested the title of the present volume.

For the encouragement, advice, criticisms and unstinting support of all those named above I shall always be grateful. That this preface resembles a First World War battlefield in the sheer number of crosses for the deceased indicates that a whole generation of scholars, archivists and librarians has passed on before they could even be properly thanked for their assistance through the presentation of a copy of this volume. I hope I have done justice to their memory. Those who read this book should realise that I stand on the shoulders of giants. My own shortcomings, particularly in the field of military history, remain all too obvious. For these I beg your indulgence. Nuwun pangapunten gunging pangaksami!

Preface to Second Edition

A bare four months has elapsed since the first edition of this book was launched at the KITLV in Leiden on 19 December 2007 with a celebratory glass of Dipanagara’s favourite South African white Constantia wine. A second edition then seemed a distant prospect. A volume of 964 pages on Indonesia’s national hero hardly seemed destined to be a bestseller. Yet so it has proved.

Unfortunately, time has not permitted a detailed revision of the text beyond correcting some infelicities of style, adding a few more cross-references and replacing two of the maps (xxvi-xxx) and one of the illustrations (Plate 31). Two reviewers, Roy Jordaan and Amrit Gomperts, kindly suggested some small improvements. Cornelis P. Briët, sometime judge of the Joint High Court of Justice of the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba, now researching a history of the Supreme Court of the Dutch East Indies (1819-1849) and of the Rijk van Prehn affair (1819), also shared with me his impressive knowledge of the genealogical and family histories of early nineteenth-century VOC and Dutch East Indies personnel. The corrections in this second edition to the dates and names of these officials owe much to his expert guidance. Readers who would like to know more about the protracted genesis of the present book and my original interest in its stormy petrel protagonist can read an interview in Itinerario, the Bulletin of the Leiden Centre for the History of European Expansion, conducted by Leonard Blussé at the time of the original book launch (Itinerario 2008:7-18). This adds some personal details to what I outlined briefly in the preface to the first edition.

I wish to place on record once again my continuing appreciation for the support of the KITLV Press director, Harry Poeze, and his brilliant editorial team, in particular Kees Waterman and Dan Vennix.

Matur nuwun sèwu!
**Abbreviations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AD</td>
<td>Anno Domini, the Christian era</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AH</td>
<td>Anno Hijrae, the Muslim era</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AJ</td>
<td>Anno Javano, the Javanese era</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AN</td>
<td>Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia, Jakarta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AvJ</td>
<td>Archief van Jogja (KITLV H 698a-b, 699, Rouffaer collection)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AvS</td>
<td>Archief van Soerakarta (KITLV H 698a-b, Rouffaer collection)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BD (Manado)</td>
<td>Babad Dipanagara (Manado version), LOr 6547 a-d, 4 vols</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.Ng.</td>
<td>Babad Ngayogyakarta. Sana Budaya MSS. A135 A136, A144, 3 vols</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baud</td>
<td>J.C. Baud private collection (Nationale Archief, The Hague)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BL Add.</td>
<td>British Library (London) Additional manuscript</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPL</td>
<td>Bibliotheca Publica Latina (Western language MS in the Leiden Universiteits Bibliotheek)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dfl.</td>
<td>Dutch florin (Generaliteits gulden containing 9.61 grams of fine silver, see also sub: f below)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dj.Br.</td>
<td>‘Bundel Djokjo Brieven’ (volume of letters in the Yogyakarta Residency archive, Arsip Nasional, Jakarta)</td>
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<tr>
<td>dK</td>
<td>H.M. de Kock private collection (Nationale Archief, The Hague)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eur.</td>
<td>Raffles European MS (British Library)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f</td>
<td>Dutch East Indies florin (Indische gulden/Java rupee) containing 10.91 grams of fine silver, which, until 1826, when the Dutch guilder (Dfl.) became the standard coin in Indonesia, was exchanged at an agio of 1:1.25 against guilders minted in Holland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GG</td>
<td>Governor-General of the Netherlands Indies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GKA</td>
<td>Geheim en Kabinets Archief (Nationale Archief, The Hague)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOL</td>
<td>India Office Library (British Library, London)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOR</td>
<td>India Office Records (British Library, London)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jav.</td>
<td>Javanese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Java NOK</td>
<td>‘Java's Noord Oost Kust’ (volumes of letters in the archive of the government of Java’s Northeast Coast, Arsip Nasional, Jakarta)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J.r.</td>
<td>Java rupee (see also sub: f above)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kab. Miss.</td>
<td>Kabinet Missive (Algemeene Secretarie archive, Arsip Nasional, Jakarta)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KGPAA</td>
<td>Kangjeng Gusti Pangéran Aria Adipati</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KITLV</td>
<td>Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde (Leiden)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Abbreviations

KITLV H  Western language MS (H = Hollands) in the library of the Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde, Leiden

KITLV Or  Oriental language MS in the library of the Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde, Leiden

Knoerle 'Journal'  J.H. Knoerle, 'Aanteekeningen gehouden door den 2e Luit Knoerle betreffende de dagelyksche verkeering van dien officer met den Prins van Djocjakarta, Diepo Negoro, gedurende eene reis van Batavia naar Menado, het exil van den genoemden Prins', Manado, 20-6-1830. MS 391 of the Johannes van den Bosch private collection in the Nationaal Archief, The Hague

LOr  Leiden University Library Oriental MS.


MvK  Ministerie van Koloniën (Ministry of the Colonies archive in the Nationaal Archief, the Hague)

NA  Nationaal Archief (General State Archives), The Hague

NBS  Netherlands Bible Society (Nederlands Bijbelgenootschap) manuscript, Leiden University Library

NvB  H.G. Nahuys van Burgst private collection (BPL 616, Leiden University Library)

P.  Pangéran

Port.  Portfolio (Nahuys van Burgst private collection)

pt.  part

r.r.  'ronde real' (worth about Dfl. 2.80)

R.  Radèn

R.A.  Radèn Ayu

RAI  Royal Artillery Institution (London)

RAS  Royal Asiatic Society (London)

R.Ng.  Radèn Ngabèhi

R.T.  Radèn Tumenggung

Sal. Kadanoerejan  Serat Salasiah para loeloehoer ing Kadanoerejan. Panti Budaya (Sana Budaya Museum, Yogyakarta) MS B. 29

SB  Sana Budaya Museum manuscript (Yogyakarta)

S.Br.  ‘Bundel Solo Briefen’ (volumes of letters in the Surakarta Residency archive of the Arsip Nasional, Jakarta)

Schneither  G.J.Chr. Schneither private collection (Nationaal Archief, The Hague)

Sp.D.  Spanish dollar (worth about Dfl. 2.56)

vAE  Van Alphen-Engelhard private collection (Nationaal Archief, The Hague)

Valck, 'Overzigt'  F.G. Valck, 'Overzigt der voornaamste gebeurtenissen in het Djokjokartasche rijk sedert dezelfs stichting in den jare 1755 tot aan het einde van den door de opstand van den Pangeran Ario Dhipo-Negoro verwekten oorlog in den jaren 1825 tot en met 1830', 1-8-1833. MS in Dj.Br. 9A (and 19¹) of the Arsip Nasional, Jakarta

VOC  Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie (Dutch East Indies Company, 1602-1799).

VROA  Verslag omtrent ’s-Rijks Oude Archieven
Maps of central and east Java
Map of the Yogyakarta area in the early nineteenth century showing the main roads and villages. Map outline taken from Louw and De Klerck, IV: 1894-1909, adapted by J. Wilbur Wright of Oxford.
the main roads and villages. Map outline taken from Oxford.
Map of central and east Java showing the apanage provinces belonging to the central Javanese courts pre-1811. Map outline taken from Louw and De Klerck, 1894-1909, adapted by J. Wilbur Wright of Oxford.
courts pre-1811. Map outline taken from Louw and De Klerck, VI: 1894-1909,
CHAPTER I

The south-central Javanese world
Circa 1792-1825

The ‘Versailles of Java’: Yogya in the early nineteenth century

Willem van Hogendorp (1795-1838), a Leiden trained lawyer and eldest son of Gijsbert Karel van Hogendorp, was a member of Commissioner-General Du Bus de Gisignies’ inner cabinet and served as his right-hand man (De Prins 2002:112-3). On a visit to Yogyakarta in 1828 after nearly three years of warfare had laid waste many of its finest buildings, he wrote: ‘Sala [Surakarta] had already made an unusual impression on me, but Djocja [Yogyakarta] in its glory must have been the Versailles of Java. Not a tenth of it remains, but [what it once was] is visible from the massive stone ruins’.¹

In the view of a mid-nineteenth century Dutch Resident of Yogya, the sultan’s capital had reached its apogee in about 1820, some five years before the outbreak of the Java War (1825-1830):

Then Yogya was prosperous, rich and beautiful, the land fertile and fortunate, the capital clean and handsome, boasting many beautiful buildings, fine gardens and magnificent hunting lodges. Everywhere there was an abundance of food and water. Then trade, handicrafts and production flourished. Then the Javanese [of Yogyakarta] had pride in the place of [their] birth.²

Although this mid-nineteenth century official was about ten years too late in dating the sultanate’s zenith given the events of 1811-1812 (Chapter VII), it is true that as a city pre-1825 Yogya was almost unique in Java at this time because nearly a quarter of its buildings were constructed of stone brought

The power of prophecy

Plate 1. View of the Yogyakarta kraton from the northern square (alun-alun) sketched by A. de Nelly, one of Johannes Rach’s pupils, in circa 1771. Courtesy of the Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam.

from the limestone quarries at Gamping to the west of the town. Even Dipanagara’s country residence at Tegalreja was built in this fashion much to the wonderment of a post-Java War Dutch visitor. Even those houses built of bamboo and wood were kept whitewashed and clean, often being surrounded by low stone walls enclosing a yard with fruit trees and shrubs. Another perceptive traveller and high Dutch government official, Jan Izaäk van Sevenhoven, also commented on the cleanliness and orderliness of the place on a visit in 1812. At that time, the main avenue leading to the kraton was lined with tall and shady banyan trees with the residences of the princes and court officials as well as the dwellings of the ordinary Javanese inhabitants being set back at some distance on either side of the road. Further down the avenue was a row of Chinese shop-houses which to the west gave onto

3 On the limestone quarries and ovens at Gamping which were run by Chinese workers and produced some 600 pikul (1 pikul = 61.761 kgs) a month in 1820, see Carey 1981a:238 note 21. The control of these quarries and their Chinese labour force would become one of the casus belli between Dipanagara and his opponents in the Yogya court in July 1825, see Chapter IX.
4 See Chapter II.
5 Nahuys van Burgst 1852:135; KITLV H 503, Jan Izaäk van Sevenhoven, ‘Aanteekeningen gehouden op eene reis over Java van Batavia naar de Oosthoek in […] 1812’ (ed. F. de Haan), 6-4-1812 – 2-8-1812 (henceforth: Van Sevenhoven, ‘Aanteekeningen’), 107, noted that the only other towns in Java with a large proportion of stone houses were Batavia and Gresik.
the site of the spacious residency house, seat of the senior Dutch representative in the sultan’s capital, fronted by an ornamental garden and three large ponds. Immediately opposite stood the fort, Vredenburg, completed in 1795 with cannon mounted on its four triangular bastions, the whole giving an impressive appearance. In the thoroughfares around the fort, there were also tall banyan trees in whose shade the main market of the city was held.

Less impressive, according to Van Sevenhoven, were the Chinese and European quarters behind the fort where the narrow houses, shut off from the street by very tall brick walls, seemed jumbled on top of each other, the streets outside small and dirty. The Indo-European burgers (‘citizens’) domiciled there appeared to live very poorly, eking out a bare existence from money-lending and petty retail trade. At the same time, the local Chinese inhabitants, who engaged mainly in money-lending and petty trade, were, in Van Sevenhoven’s view, neither as numerous nor so well established as their compatriots in Surakarta. The situation in the European and Chinese quarters thus formed something of a contrast with the Javanese urban settlements (kampung), each clustered around the residence of one of the Yogya princes or senior court officials, which were intersected by broad shady roads and had large squares planted with trees. Each kampung formed a community in its own right, often having its own mosque and being surrounded by a low stone boundary wall. The Javanese inhabitants of Yogya, in Van Sevenhoven’s estimation, were cleaner, better clothed and had much more sense of their own worth than the inhabitants of the rival court city of Surakarta. There were also fewer bands of ‘shabby idlers and beggars whiling away their time in games of chance or at roadside food stalls’, a situation the Dutchman ascribed to the better police force in the sultan’s capital, an explanation we will have occasion to reconsider later in this chapter.

6 Sometimes referred to in contemporary accounts as ‘Rustenburg’.
7 Lettres de Java 1822:100; Van Sevenhoven, ‘Aanteekeningen’, 105-10. The market is now called Pasar Beringhardjo (‘Prosperous Waringin Market’). On the completion of the buildings in the Dutch fort in 1795, AvJ, Wouter Hendrik van Ijsseldijk (Yogyakarta) to P.G. van Overstraten (Semarang), 4-3-1795.
8 Van Sevenhoven, ‘Aanteekeningen’, 110; Dj.Br. 52, A.H. Smissaert (Yogyakarta) to President Hooge Raad van Justitie (Batavia), 7-4-1823, mentioned that the value of the 70 houses in the European quarter ranged from 4,000 to 220. The number of ‘European’ males over the age of 16 in Yogya in 1819 was 102, MvK 3124, ‘Register van het Europese personeel op Java en Madoera (Djokjokarta)’, 1-1-1819.
9 According to Van Sevenhoven, there were only two or three Chinese houses worth f 1,500, the rest were small shop-houses of very simple construction, Van Sevenhoven, ‘Aanteekeningen’, 110. In 1808, there were 758 Chinese males over the age of 14 in the sultan’s capital compared to 1,282 in Surakarta, Carey 1984a:16.
The Yogya kraton itself stretched across the southern boundary of the northern maidan (alun-alun), an open field some 1,200 metres wide which had been cleared on the first sultan’s orders but which had since been encroached upon by European and Chinese houses to the north and east. The fenced banyan and other trees near the paséban or meeting place for the Yogya officials outside the kraton, were well maintained and carefully trimmed by the court coolies. The whole approach formed a marked contrast to that of Surakarta which appeared ‘extremely messy and neglected’. The great fortified wall of the kraton with its extending buttresses (pojok baluwerti; Carey 1992:399 note 4a, 400 note 6) dominated the approach from the north. Encircling the entire area of the court, it contained within its girth the numerous dwellings of the sultan’s retainers (abdi-dalem) and the members of his bodyguard regiments, whose houses formed a veritable city in miniature clustered around the court pavilions. This was the nagari, the royal capital proper, impressive even to the supremely confident British Lieutenant-Governor Thomas Stamford Raffles (in office 1811-1816) who wrote (Raffles 1817, I:84):

The circumference of the wall of the kraton of Yúgya-kérta [Yogyakarta] is not less than three miles, and it was estimated that at the time of the [British] assault in [June] 1812, it did not contain fewer than from ten to fifteen thousand people. That of Súra-kérta [Surakarta] is neither so extensive nor so well built.

Close by the kraton to the west, stood the great Taman Sari (Water Palace) complex, which had been built supposedly by Portuguese architects during the reign of the first sultan (1749-1792) for religious and military purposes (Dumarçay 1978:589-623). Although its structure was fast falling into decay as a result of earthquakes during the first decade of the nineteenth century, its massive walls and secret passageways still afforded many natural defensive positions in case of attack. Prior to the British assault in June 1812, the sultan’s armaments foundry was situated in its grounds (Thorn 1815:185, Plate XIX no. 5; see p. 334 Map 5).

13 AvJ, A.H. Smissaert (Yogyakarta) to Algemeen Secretaris (J. Bousquet) (Batavia), 24-4-1823.
15 Ricklefs 1974a:84-6; D’Almeida 1864, II:128-32. A serious earthquake caused by the eruption of Gunung Guntur in west Java on 7 September 1803 damaged the Taman Sari’s foundations draining the water from the ponds, although Hamengkubuwana II again went boating there on 9 November 1803, Dj.Br. 49, Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 8-9-1803, 9-11-1803. A further earthquake struck on 19 March 1806 which destroyed much of the Yogya fort, IOL Mack.Pr. 2, ‘Surakarta Sengkala list’, entry for 28 Besar AJ 1732; vAE (aanwinsten 1900) 235, Nicolaus Engelhard, ‘Speculatieve Memorie over zaken betreffende het bestuur over Java’s N.O. Kust’ (henceforth: N. Engelhard, ‘Memorie’), 14-5-1808. Another earthquake damaged the fort at Klatén on 28 February 1808, so it is possible that this might have had similar effects in Yogya a mere 30 kilometres away, Dj.Br. Lieutenants Schraag and Detelle (Klatén) to Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta), 1-3-1808. It was not used after 20 June 1812, when British cannon fire damaged its superstructure, Thorn 1815:292. By the time Willem van Hogendorp visited in 1828, it was infested with thousands of bats, Van Hogendorp 1913:175.
The Yogya military establishment

The architecture of many of the principle buildings of Yogyakarta underlined the military spirit which animated the sultan's court and administration, itself the outcome of the fashion in which the first sultan had secured his kingdom by conquest (Van Hogendorp 1913:141). Although in Raffles's view, this military spirit had been gradually subsiding between the end of the mid-eighteenth-century wars of succession and the British interregnum (Raffles 1817, I:84-5), the court establishment in Yogya in the first decade of the nineteenth century was still overwhelmingly military in character. In 1808, for example, the second sultan had at his disposal some sixteen kraton regiments numbering 1,765 men, of whom 976 were armed with muskets and the rest with pikes. These regiments formed the personal bodyguard of the ruler and were salaried in land and domiciled in the immediate proximity of the court. Some of the members of these elite companies were Balinese or Bugis soldiers of fortune who had taken service with the Yogya ruler. The sultan also had an entourage of female soldiers, a sort of Amazon corps of about 300 women, known as the prajurit keparak êstri, who were drawn from the daughters of prominent officials or village gentry families. They were armed with spears and were agile on horseback.

By the early nineteenth century, many of the functions of these bodyguard regiments were of a ceremonial nature, but they could still take to the field as witnessed during the expedition against Radên Rongga Prawiradirja III in November-December 1810, and the defence of the kraton against the British in June 1812. Apart from these elite bodyguard troops, the sultan could also call on a quasi-feudal levy of 7,246 men from the princes of the blood, in particular his heir apparent (Pangéran Adipati Anom), who had anapages or land given in fief in the core districts (nagara agung) close to the court. A further 2,126 men were provided by the district administrators (bupati) from the eastern outlying districts (mancanagara). Until June 1812, when many of these areas were annexed by the British, the sultan could also use these levies for construction work on various court buildings and fortifications when the eastern mancanagara administrators came to the royal capital to celebrate the major Javanese-Islamic festival of The Prophet's Birthday – known as the

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16 The entire Yogya military establishment in 1808 is listed in dK 145, Matthijs Waterloo, 'Memorie […] van het Hof van Djojocarta […] aan zijn Successeur […] P. Engelhard' (henceforth: Waterloo, 'Memorie van Overgave'), 4-4-1808. Two of the court regiments, the daēng Secadipura and the Bugis with 106 and 40 men apiece, were recruited from South Sulawesi (Bugis, Makassarese), whereas the Blambangan sepuluh and panakawan Blambangan, both with 100 men each, were recruited from Bali and the Oosthoek. See further Remmelink 1994:20.

17 Thorn 1815:293; Carey 1992:413 note 73. See also Chapter II note 29.

18 See Chapter VI.

19 See Chapter VII.
Plate 2. Lithograph of a member of the sultan of Yogyakarta’s bodyguard in the early nineteenth-century. Taken from J.J.X. Pfyffer zu Neueck, 1829: Plate IX. Photograph by courtesy of the KITLV, Leiden.

In cases of military emergency, the sultan could thus muster a force of about 10,000 men within a short space of time to guard the kraton and take part in offensive operations. Some of these troops were undoubtedly of limited military value, but Raffles commented favourably on the quality of the body-guard regiments and levies which were mustered to provide an honour guard for his official entrance into the capital on 27 December 1811 (p. 309):

The roads and streets were lined with about ten thousand armed men of various descriptions, mostly cavalry, dressed and accoutred according to the fashion of the country, but by no means making as a body that despicable appearance which I had been led to encounter.20

Although most of the troops were mounted and some carried muskets, cavalry carbines and other firearms, the most effective armaments were the more traditional Javanese weapons such as pikes, slings and stabbing daggers or kris with intricate meteorite metal inlays. The majority of the muskets used by both Javanese and European soldiers in Java at this time were antiquated flintlock models dating from the mid-eighteenth century which were difficult to load, susceptible to damp conditions, and usually jammed after a number of rounds (Chapter XI, note 7). Contemporaries noticed that Javanese soldiers were not skilled in musket drill but were far more dexterous in the handling of their long Javanese pikes. During engagements with European troops, especially cavalry, Javanese pikemen operating in disciplined formation were often found to have a distinct military advantage over their European adversaries. They could sometimes dismount their assailants and engage them in hand-to-hand conflict before the latter had had time to reload their small cavalry carbines.21 Slingers were also reasonably accurate at short range and they were used to good effect against the British in June 1812 (Raffles 1817, I:295; Carey 1992:406 note 34a) and the Dutch during the Java War (Van der Kemp 1896a:405). At the same time, the kris culture of the central Javanese courts had been carried to such a sophisticated art by the early nineteenth century that Javanese smiths (empu) could forge a wide range of stabbing and cutting blades for use in every exigency of hand-to-hand combat.22

20 BL Add MS 45272, T.S. Raffles (Batavia) to Lord Minto (Calcutta), 21-1-1812.
22 Tanojo 1938:1-20. On Dipanagara’s heirloom (pusaka) kris and other weapons, see Appendix XI.
Artillery was also known and used by the Javanese; prior to the fall of the Yogya kraton in June 1812, the second sultan had cast iron and brass cannon, probably at the royal foundry at Taman Sari, and at Kutha Gedhé where gunpowder and small shot were manufactured during the Java War. Light cannon of Javanese manufacture known as kalantaka, about the size of a half-pounder, were occasionally used by the sultan’s troops on military expeditions. Heavier brass cannon were imported from Gresik in east Java where there was a thriving armaments industry supervised by the local Arab and Chinese communities who could draw on traditional skills in the field of ballistics. Large numbers of cannon were later captured by the British from the battles of the Yogya kraton in June 1812, but it seems that during the British assault itself the sultan’s gunners were not effective in the use of their artillery pieces and some of the guns disintegrated when fired (Carey 1992:206-7, 400 note 8). This suggests that many of the sultan’s heavier cannon were acquired as much for ceremonial as for battlefield use (Ricklefs 1974a:304; Crucq 1938:78:93-110, 1940:80:49-59).

The landed base of the military establishment

The basis for the upkeep of this large military establishment was the tribute and corvée services produced by the agricultural population. Some of the income from the lands administered directly by the sultan (bumi pamajegandalem) in the core regions was used to maintain and equip his personal bodyguard. At the same time, the grants of land made to the sultan’s family and officials specifically stipulated that armed levies were to be produced whenever the sultan required them (Raffles 1817, I:294; Carey 1986:67-70). This essentially military foundation of the central Javanese apanage system can be discerned in the ancient official titles of the district officials, panèwu, panatus, panèket, penglawé, namely chiefs of 1000, 100, 50 and 25, titles which referred not so much to units of land but to equivalent numbers of armed men (Carey 1986:67). Even some of the older names for the districts and bupati of south-central Java, such as ‘land of the pikes’ (tanah sulastrī) for Bagelèn,
Arung Binang (‘lord of the red pikes’), and Sawunggaling (‘the golden fighting cock’) for its local bupati, underscored the original military character of the Mataram polity (Rouffaer 1905:610 note 1, 620; Ricklefs 1974a:423 note 1; Carey 1992:93). So too did the tumbak (lance length) name for the one rood (1,210 square yard) land measurement in the Principalities, supposedly derived from the fifteenth-century kingdom of Demak (Rouffaer 1905:617).

By the early nineteenth century this military basis had been somewhat modified and martial exigencies no longer loomed so large. The term cacah, for example, had come to refer more to the numbers of cultivators or their families – usually reckoned as comprising five active members – who could be maintained on a particular plot of irrigated rice-land, rather than to the number of armed men that area could sustain. It was thus no longer so much a military term as a unit of economic measurement.25 But the princes of the blood (putra sentana), high Javanese nobility and the sultan’s senior officials, literally the ‘younger brothers’ (para yayi) of the ruler, who were often linked to him by ties of marriage and blood, were still required to parade with their troops on important ceremonies such as the Garebeg, the thrice-yearly Javanese-Islamic feasts, and to take part in major military exercises and reviews. One such was held at the royal retreat at Rajawinangun (Arjawinangun) to the east of Yogya on 1 June 1808 in which the young Dipanagara (then Radèn Antawirya) participated (pp. 179-80). This involved over 5,000 men including troop detachments from the eastern outlying districts and was held as a response to Daendels’ military manoeuvres in central Java aimed at strengthening the island’s defences against the British.26 Later, during the Java War (1825-1830), Dipanagara was able to make use of some of these levies, brought over by the princes and officials who rallied to his cause, in his struggle against the Dutch and what he termed their ‘apostate’ local supporters. Thus the original military character of the central Javanese apanage persisted until 1830 when the annexations and reforms of the post-Java War period dismantled it for good (Houben 1994:17-69).

The royal apanage system

According to the Javanese concept of sovereignty derived from Java’s Hindu-Buddhist past, the ruler was the overlord of all the land in his kingdom. But this right was delegated by him to his officials and family members in order that they could support themselves together with their household, retainers, subordinate officials and assorted hangers-on. The apanage or ‘seat’ (lungguh) varied in size according to the seniority of the official or his relationship to the

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26 Dj.Br. 23, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia), 2-6-1808.
ruler. Quasi-hereditary rights to certain apanages were sometimes admitted in the case of close family members or of trusted officials who were linked to the sultan by ties of marriage. They were also accorded to scions of eminent ‘spiritual’ dynasties such as the Sérang family in north-central Java, who supposedly traced their lineage back to the famous apostle of Islam (wali) Sunan Kalijaga and who would become strong supporters of Dipanagara during the Java War.27

But officials, however senior and well-favoured in terms of marriage alliances with the ruler, were liable to lose their landholdings and their means of family support when they were dismissed from office. This happened with Radèn Tumenggung Purwadipura, a favourite of the second sultan who was appointed as a nayaka, senior official in charge of the court administration, in 1797, whose landholdings were completely broken up when he was dismissed from office in December 1810 for illegal currency deals and trading in opium during the military expedition against Radèn Rongga in Madiun (Carey 1980:189-90). Similarly the dependants of Radèn Tumenggung Danukusuma, another nayaka and a member of the prominent Danurejan family, were reduced to penury after his murder on the sultan’s orders in January 1812. The fact that Danukusuma’s wife was a daughter of the first sultan and well connected in Javanese-Islamic circles afforded them no protection.28

The precariousness of office holders and their utter dependence on the ruler’s favour can be seen in the Javanese words – gadhuhan (‘a temporary [land] grant’), anggadhuhi (‘to loan provisionally’), and anggadhuhaké (‘to give as a provisional grant’) – which were written into their official letters of appointment (Carey 1986:74). In the central apanage regions, the Javanese landed system was thus firmly subordinated to the requirements of the royal administration and never acquired the character of a contractual relationship between ruler and ruled such as could be found in Tokugawa Japan (1603-1867), still less the status of private property which had begun to develop in Europe since the fifteenth century (Neale 1981:91). At the most, it was a classic usufruct system which allowed officials rights of appropriation of produce (Hall and Whitmore 1976:222) without the prospect of allowing them to acquire full-blown ‘feudal’ tenure such as had grown up in medieval Europe where prominent families held ‘fiefs’ on behalf of the ruler (Rouffaer 1905:621; Carey 1986:74). The only possible area where such a ‘feudal’ system operated in early-nineteenth-century Java was in the eastern outlying districts to which we shall come shortly.

The apanages granted to the sultan’s blood relations and his senior officials were all in the core districts which were governed directly from Yogya.

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27 See Chapter VI and Chapter XI.
In the early nineteenth century, these districts included parts of the provinces of Banyumas, Bagelen, Kedhu, Mataram, Pajang, Sokawati and Gunung Kidul (Rouffaer 1905:589-92), areas which had come under early seventeenth-century Mataram’s control by treaty arrangements and marriage diplomacy in contrast to the eastern outlying districts which had been largely acquired by military conquest (De Graaf and Pigeaud 1974:116; Carey 1992:93-4). The apanages granted in these core areas were never contiguous but were spread out over a wide area. John Crawfurd, the Resident who served in the sultan’s capital throughout most of the British interregnum (1811-1816), remarked that it was common for a senior court administrator holding over 1,000 cacah (units of land cultivated by productive peasant families), to have as few as twelve cacah grouped together and the rest scattered in small pieces over a distance of 200 miles. Dipanagara’s 700 jung granted to him in July 1812 when he received his princely title (Carey 1992:284, 442 note 211), spanned the western and south-central Javanese districts of Banyumas, Bagelen, Kedhu, and Sokawati, as well as core areas to the south of Yogya in the vicinity of Bantul (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:745; Carey 1981a:238 note 20). Even Pangéran Natakusuma (post-22 June 1812, Pangéran Adipati Pakualam I), who was accorded 4,000 cacah of hereditary tenure by the third sultan under orders from the British, found that his holdings were parcelled up between Bagelen and Mataram with many being situated in infertile, marshy or inaccessible areas. Only at the end of the Java War, following the 1830-1831 revision of the boundaries of the Principalities, were the Pakualaman landholdings grouped together in the Adikarta area of southern Kulon Praga.

One of the main reasons for this highly dispersed nature of apanage allocation in the central districts was to prevent a prince of the blood or influential high-ranking official from establishing a power base from which he could challenge the position of the ruler. Indeed, all those holding lands in the core areas, including the central area bupati, were required to reside in

29 Banyumas refers here to the post-1830 district of that name: the older and much smaller area of Banyumas proper around the district capital was under Surakarta administration in this period and was the seat of the chief administrator (bupati wedana) of the Surakarta western mancanagara regions until 1773, Rouffaer 1905:591.
31 Land measurement usually reckoned at 600 square feet of irrigated sawah (ricefields) but variable according to the quality and productivity of the land. Other sources give Dipanagara’s land grant in July 1812 as 500 cacah, see Chapter VIII.
the capital where they could be supervised by the ever suspicious monarch.\textsuperscript{33} 

The only exceptions to this rule were the eastern outlying bupati, who were given contiguous areas to govern and allowed to reside in their kabupaten for two-thirds of the year (Carey 1986:71-2). But even these officials were constrained to journey to the sultan’s court once a year on the occasion of The Prophet’s birthday to pay the yearly tribute in cash and kind which were due from their districts. As we will see in more detail at the end of this chapter, they were also required to bring a sizeable labour force with them to work on royal building projects in the royal capital and its environs, for three or four months, a period which under the second sultan was nearly doubled (Onghokham 1975:44; Carey 1986:71 note 43). On these occasions, the eastern bupati were entirely dependant on the sultan’s favour and could be relieved of their office if their labour force deserted. Many were also heavily in debt to the ruler, another way in which the sultan kept them under control.\textsuperscript{34}

The rather unique position of the administrators of the eastern districts owed something to the historical rivalry between the kingdoms of east Java (especially Surabaya) and Mataram in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries (Carey 1992:93-4; Ricklefs 1993a:41-2). At the same time, the sheer distance between Yogya and Madiun, separated as they were by nearly 200 kilometres of difficult terrain with execrable dirt roads which turned to mud in the rainy season (Milaan 1942:205-39; Schrieke 1957, II:105-11), gave the eastern bupati, especially the chief administrator of the eastern outlying districts at his administrative centre of Madiun, a certain feeling of independence. Cut off from the sultan’s capital by the towering bulk of Mount Lawu, the tiger-infested forests of east Java\textsuperscript{35} and the broad expanse of the Sala River valley, the influential bupati families in these sparsely populated regions developed a strong sense of local identity even though they hailed originally from other regions. None more so than the family of Radèn Rongga Prawiradirja III (in office 1796-1810), whose low-born grandfather Mas Rongga Wirasentika, also known as the ‘champion’ (gegedhug) of Sokawati, had served as the first sul-

\textsuperscript{33} Dj.Br. 86, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia), 8-6-1808, stating that the Yogya bupati of Kedhu (also known as Bupati Bumija), Bagelèn, Mataram, Sokawati and Pajang, all resided in the sultan’s capital.

\textsuperscript{34} See Chapter V; and Remmelink 1994:17 for examples from the eighteenth century.

\textsuperscript{35} On the tiger-infested forests of east Java in early to mid-nineteenth century, Dj.Br. 23, Corporal Pieter Gulin (Bunder, Surabaya) to Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta), 19-7-1808 (reference to travelling for two days without seeing people but many tigers in the forests of Kertasana during his investigation of 25-5-1808 attack on the Chinese trading community at Bunder); D’Almeida 1864, II:32 (Ngawi and Madiun countryside so full of tigers that often seen by inhabitants crossing the road and lapping water from the ditches besides the main highway); KITLV H 395, ‘Rapport van de assistent-resident [P.F.H.] Chevallier over de werking der tolpoorten’, 15-6-1824 (henceforth: Chevallier, ‘Rapport’; reference to Surakarta bupati of Nganjuk being more afraid of the Chinese-run tollgates on the main roads than the tigers in the forests through which he had to pass in order to get to round these tax-posts). See further pp. 475-8.
tan’s army commander during the Giyanti War (1746-1755) and had married his sister. He had been sent to Madiun to replace an unsatisfactory predecessor deemed too close to the previous Kartasura (post-1745, Surakarta) court, and had founded a dynasty whose members would continue to administer Madiun until well into the nineteenth century. Prophesied as a future ruler (Adam 1940:333), the gifted but headstrong third Radèn Rongga, as we will see below, would chose to die in rebellion rather than agree to be delivered into the murderous hands of Marshal Daendels in November 1810.

A more basic reason for the scattered nature of the apanage holdings in the central districts as opposed to the contiguous character of the administrative units in the eastern areas was the nature of the territorial settlement at the treaty of Giyanti in 1755. This stipulated that lands and even villages in the richer central regions should be divided up in a haphazard fashion between the courts of Yogyakarta and Surakarta, a situation which was complicated still further by the creation of the Mangkunagaran and Pakualaman semi-independent Principalities in 1757 and 1812. Just why the Giyanti settlement should have been so complicated is not entirely clear. Dipanagara later ascribed it to the devious tactics of the Dutch and their ‘divide and rule’ policy. But, according to a Dutch report, it was the first sultan himself who insisted on the minute sub-division of land in the core regions, first in order to ensure that the most fertile areas were shared equally and secondly to make it impossible for the Sunan to plot an invasion of his territory without his prior knowledge (Van der Kemp 1896b:545-6). Whatever the reason, the administrative results were chaotic. The ‘patchwork quilt’ of landholdings and villages, sometimes internally divided between the two courts, created insuperable problems for irrigation, agriculture and law enforcement. Rouffaer pointed out some of the more serious effects in his famous article on the princely territories, namely, the sub-division of ricefields and common lands in the villages, the increase in the number of local officials from both courts salaried in land, the heavier tax burdens and the aggravation of the security situation in country areas due to the multiplication of disputes about land and offices (Rouffaer 1905:624 quoting Nahuys van Burgst 1835, I:205). It is undeniable that the Giyanti settlement exacerbated these difficulties by involving the courts in a complex process of redrawing village and territorial boundaries in south-central Java: in Bagelen, for example, the local peasantry in the mid-nineteenth century referred to Giyanti as the *tumpang paruk*, the time when everything was ‘heaped together’

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36 Balé Poestaka 1939:14 sub: ‘Gaτa’; Adam 1940:331-2. See also Appendix Vb.
37 See Chapter VI.
(Kollmann 1864:354). But there were perhaps some concealed advantages for the common man not touched on by Rouffaer.

The most important of these advantages was the very fact that especially after Giyanti most of the larger apanage holders resided in the royal capital. They thus had less scope for living off the land than they might have done had they actually resided on their landholdings. According to Crawfurd, some apanage holders never bothered to visit their usufruct lands and others were even ignorant of their geographical location.39 Indeed, with landholdings spread out over a wide area, the actual process of visiting them at a time when communications were so poor, would have been quite an undertaking. Conscientious landlords, like Radèn Mas Said (Mangkunagara I, reigned 1757-1795), and his successor Pangéran Prangwedana (Mangkunagara II, reigned 1796-1835) in Surakarta, or Dipanagara in Yogya, who took a personal interest in the lands under their charge and visited them regularly, were the exception not the rule.40

The role of the tax collectors

Apanage holders domiciled in the *kraton* towns left the administration of their lands to local tax collectors (*bekel*), who collected the land-rents (*pajeg*) and other levies on their behalf and exercised some judicial authority in their name (Carey 1986:75). They were usually responsible for one village or part of a village with areas of agricultural land ranging between a half and six *jung*. They were entitled to retain one fifth of the land-rent as well as a portion of the other taxes, including the *pacumpleng* or ground rent tax for houses. They also had rights over personal services: it was customary, for example, for *bekel* to take a few villagers with them when they visited the capital in order to enhance their own authority and enable them to undertake small tasks for the apanage holders when they made the half-yearly tax payments at Mulud and Puwasa (Rouffaer 1905:625; Carey 1986:75). On festive occasions celebrated by the apanage holder’s family, such as marriages, circumcisions and births, the tribute-paying peasant cultivators or *sikep* – sometimes referred to as *kuli sikep* – were expected to make presents of chickens, eggs, coconuts and other farm produce. They also undertook, or delegated their dependant lodgers (*numpang*) to undertake, the above-mentioned personal services for the landlord.41 Building materials such as wood, bamboo, rattan and thatch were also demanded for the upkeep of the apanage owner’s residences (Raffles

39 Crawfurd, ‘Landed tenures’, 229. See further p. 521 on the Yogya regional *bupati*’s ignorance of the lands under their administration; and further Remmelink 1994:26-7 for earlier examples.
40 Pringgodigdo 1950:18 note 2. On Dipanagara’s supervision of his lands, see Chapter II.
41 GKA, Exhibitum, 20-9-1830 no. 56k, geheim verbaal, interview with Panembahan Mangkubumi, 18-4-1830; interview with Haji Ngisoh [Ngisa], 21-4-1830.
It was these fringe benefits, as well as the ‘homage’ of their peasant cultivators, which caused apanage holders to resist accepting money payments from the courts during the post-1812 period when the British annexations drastically reduced the area of land available, and to desist from leasing their lands to European and Chinese land-renters in the period 1816-1823 when foreign capital began to flow into the Principalities to fund cash crop production of coffee and indigo.42

In Crawfurd’s view, the modicum of authority which the bekel possessed was not such as to render their power dangerous or oppressive. It was rather in their interests to treat the local cultivators with moderation and consult with them over the yearly division of village land or on matters of irrigation.43 On these occasions, the tax-collectors would address the tribute-paying farmers as ‘comrade’ or ‘colleague’ (kanca). Indeed, their social position does not seem to have set them apart from their village neighbours since for the most part the bekel were drawn from the tax-paying farmer class or from established village-head ( lurah) families (Carey 1986:76).

It is likely that Crawfurd was drawing too favourable a picture of the village tax collectors as a group in order to persuade his superior Raffles to use them as the basis for his land-rent scheme in 1812-1813 rather than settle directly with the peasant cultivators themselves (Bastin 1954:94-104, 118-9; Day 1972:180 note 3). Even Crawfurd admitted that the bekel’s insecurity of tenure and the practice of paying part of the tribute payments in advance encouraged some tax collectors to resort to unscrupulous methods.44 Furthermore, it was often the case that, on the replacement of an apanage holder, the former incumbent’s bekel would be removed by the new appointee in order to make way for his own tax collectors. On such occasions, it was not uncommon for the old bekel to refuse to accept the authority of the new man and for a local conflict to break out in the village. The issue would then frequently be settled by force of arms. These disputes over tax-collectorships were the most common reason for the numerous ‘village wars’, or prang désa, which scarred the face of the south-central Javanese countryside in the decades preceding the Java War (Van Kesteren 1887:1268-9; Chapter X note 132). One Dutch traveler referred to them as an almost daily occurrence in the months leading up to Dipanagara’s rebellion.45 Another contemporary witness, a Yogya prince,

42 According to Van Sevenhoven, ten jiang of Mangkunagaran land brought in an annual tribute (pajeg) of 500 Spanish dollars, but fringe benefits such as the additional services and presents were worth another 200 Spanish dollars, S.Br. 55, J.I. van Sevenhoven, ‘Nota over de landverhuringen aan particulieren in de Vorstenlanden op Java’, 16-3-1837. On land-rent by Europeans, see Chapter IX.
45 Büchler 1888, II:3. Numerous references to these village wars can be found in the Surakarta Angger Gunung (Village Police Law Code) of 1840, especially articles 80-2 and 89, the last stipu-
stressed the numerous differences of opinion between the apanage holders, the bekel and the villagers themselves over questions of tribute payments and corvée demands during these years, a situation compounded by the fact that no village wars were to be allowed without the permission of the first minister (patih) and the Resident. Copy in AN, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal, 17-2-1841 no. 16. See also Soeripto 1929:163-7.

Figure 1. The Javanese apanage system in the early nineteenth century showing the major administrative levels of land tribute division.
that the villages themselves were frequently divided up between the various apanage holders who each appointed their own bekel to look after their interests. According to Onghokham (1977:632-4), the tax-paying peasants also switched their loyalties and played court official apanage holders off against each other. In his words, ‘factionalism was so rife in the dynastical politics [of the central Javanese courts] that the peasant could switch his loyalties among the [members of the] elite in order to get [the best] terms from his overlord’. In Onghokham’s view, ‘a sort of frontier society’ was created at this time due to the deep instability in the Javanese countryside.

We will return to this insecurity shortly when we consider the criminal world of rural south-central Java. In the meantime, the system of using bekel as the direct agents of the apanage holders in the villages seems to have been a lot less onerous than the practice of administering those areas through various intermediate officials. The latter arrangement arose because many landowners resident in the royal capitals were either too indolent or too disinterested in having dealings with the numerous bekel on their lands. Instead they appointed intermediate tax-collectors, known as demang or mantri désa, who gathered in the rents from between ten to thirty bekel according to the size of their apanage. In return, they were allowed to retain one-fifth of the rents as their own remuneration becoming in this fashion the main link between the apanage holder and the bekel, a situation which presented great opportunities for personal enrichment. According to Crawfurd, some demang administered as much as 100 jung of agricultural land in rich core provinces such as Kedhu. They were also rather more distant socially from the peasant cultivators than the bekel since they were often drawn from the families of lower officials with court connections (Carey 1986:77-8). Social distance seems to have made them less constrained in their use of rapacious administrative methods.

A particularly egregious example of such a man was the Surakarta mantri désa of Karang Bolong on the south coast of Java within the boundaries of the pre-1825 province of Bagelen, an area known for its birds’ nest rocks on the coastal cliffs. The local inhabitants protested to the Surakarta chief minister (patih) that this official, known as Juni, had refused to cooperate with his colleague. He never placed the proper offerings on the ceremonial bed of the goddess of the Southern Ocean (Ratu Kidul), an omission which, in the villagers’ view, had caused a series of exceptionally poor birds’ nest harvests.

46 GKA, Exhibitum, 20-9-1830 no. 56k, geheim verbaal, interview with Pangéran Mangkudiningrat II, 13-4-1830.
48 The details are taken from S.Br. 131, ‘Translaten en Verbalen Solo, 1816-1819’ (Surakarta Notarial Archive annotated by J.W. Winter; henceforth: ‘Verbalen Solo’), 1-2-1817 (complaint against Demang Juni of Karang Bolong). He was eventually dismissed in June 1825, AN, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal in rade, 12-6-1825, no. 22. On the weaving industry in Karang Bolong, see further Chapter V note 88.
during the period of his tenure. Furthermore, he always insisted that the villagers offer him any large fish which they might catch and ordered them to purchase rotting buffalo flesh when one of his animals died. At the same time, he forced all the local families to weave coarse striped linen cloth (ginggang) which he bought at scandalously low prices in order to make a handsome profit when he traded them in Surakarta. He also expected villagers to purchase provisions – such as pungent fish paste (trasi) and gambir, a plant with astringent leaves used in the preparation of betelnut – at inflated prices when he returned from these trading journeys to the capital. Finally, he was said to have constantly adulterated the supply of opium for the coolies at Karang Bolong, to have paid their wages tardily in debased copper coinage and to have been hand-in-glove with local bandits. This litany of abuse, overdrawn though it may have been by local villagers successfully seeking Juni’s dismissal, gives an insight into the sort of practices an unscrupulous sub-district tax collector could become involved in.

Even more miserable, according to Crawfurd, who sometimes had difficulty disguising his sinophobic prejudices, was the plight of those peasant
cultivators who were subjected to the extortions of Chinese *demang*. Such men were often appointed by impecunious apanage holders at the courts, who had either contracted debts to Chinese moneylenders or mortgaged their lands or both. Chinese tax-collectors were also sometimes preferred to Javanese because, in Crawfurd’s words, ‘their skill, frugality and extortion’ enabled them to pay higher rents. 

Large tracts of fertile provinces like Kedhu were let to them (*Afdeling Statistiek* 1871:78; Carey and Hoadley 2000:111, 155, 176-9), and they were also numerous in the eastern outlying districts (Louw and De Klerk 1894-1909, VI:379; Carey 1986:79; Carey and Hoadley 2000:259-61). Crawfurd urged Raffles to modify their leases as much as possible, a plea which was later heard from contemporaries in Yogyakarta at the end of the Java War. We shall see below, how similar complaints were levelled against European land-renters, who moved into the Principalities in larger numbers after 1816 and effectively assumed the role of ‘white’ *demang* for court apanage holders. Their harsh corvée demands and their introduction of cash crops in a predominantly rice-growing economy created localised hardship for peasant cultivators and was one of the precipitating factors for the growing peasant unrest in the build-up to the Java War.

**The western mancanagara: Banyumas**

Despite all the difficulties, Javanese peasants in the core areas were undoubtedly better off than their countrymen in the outlying districts. Not only were they spared the demands of the resident *bupati*, but the scattered nature of the apanage holdings shielded them from the grosser aspects of fiscal exploitation. The situation in the eastern outlying areas of the sultanate will be described at the end of this chapter, but a comparison between Banyumas and Bagelèn may be illustrative here of the very different conditions prevailing in the central and outlying districts in the half century before the Java War.

Banyumas proper had been administered as a western outlying province of Surakarta until 1773 when its status was changed to that of a core region in order to assuage Sultan Mangkubumi who resented the fact that Yogya had very little land in the western extremity of the old Mataram polity (Rouffaer 1905:591). The official population of the province in that year when a new land register, the *Serat Ebuk Anyar* (‘New Book’), had been drawn up, 

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51 GKA, Exhibitum, 20-9-1830, no. 56k, geheim verbaal, interview with Pangéran Mangkudiningrat II, 13-4-1830; interview with Haji Ngisoh (Ngisa), 21-4-1830.
52 See Chapter IX.
53 The registers were signed and sealed by the *patih* and the Residents on behalf of the rulers in Semarang on 2-11-1773 and ratified by the rulers on 26-4-1774, see Ricklefs 1974a:158.
numbered some 6,160 cacah (productive family units) or 30,800 inhabitants if one cacah is reckoned as supporting a family of five (Rouffaer 1905:591), but this was a gross underestimate, the real population being probably closer to 260,000.54 Banyumas’s change of status, essentially an administrative sleight of hand, did not alter its style of administration. It continued to all intents and purposes to be governed as an outlying area given its distance from the capital and the structure of its administrative hierarchy.

Captain Godfrey Phipps Baker of the 7th Bengal Light Infantry Volunteer Battalion, who surveyed the area for Raffles in 1815,55 commented on the willful rule of the Surakarta ngabèhi (sub-district heads) of Ayah and Adipala. Their extortions had led to the emptying of half the twenty large villages along the fertile valley of the Serayu River. In Baker’s words:

Not only are their pajegs [land-rent/taxes] too high in money, but besides there is no end to every species of extortion under the head of ‘feudal services’, that is contributions of cattle, provisions and materials […] whatever [in fact] the Ngabehis [ngabèhi] think fit to call them.56

These sub-district officials collected a money rent of 1,000 Spanish dollars, but were able to retain another 800 Spanish dollars for themselves out of the profits of their administration. They had some twenty village heads and 100 bekel under them charged with policing and revenue matters.

In a potentially rich area like southern Banyumas, it is no surprise that the ‘vexatious services and contingents’ demanded by the ngabèhi were greatly complained of by the local inhabitants.57 Furthermore, the population suffered terribly from the depredations of Balinese, Bugis and Timorese pirates, who anchored their ships in the lee of the great island of Nusa Kambangan and paddled up the creeks and inland waterways in their small dug-out canoes

54 On this gross under-estimate, see Raffles 1817, II:289, who reckoned the population at 176,947 in 1815, and the Resident of Surakarta, D.W. Pinket van Haak, who put it at 261,090 in 1816 (report in S.Br. 37:1213). By the time of the administrative reorganisation in 1830-1831, the population stood at 370,000, AN Kab, 13-9-1832 no. 1599, J.E. de Sturler (Banyumas) to Johannes van den Bosch (Batavia), 5-9-1830.

55 Baker’s survey had a political aim in that Raffles ordered the survey to identify places where a British-Indian force could be put ashore on the south coast of Java in the area of the Principalities in order to link up with the central Javanese rulers in the event of renewed hostilities with the Netherlands following the end of the Napoleonic Wars, T.S. Raffles (Batavia) to G.P. Baker (Surakarta), 20-5-1815, in IOL Map Room MS no. 24, G.P. Baker, ‘Memoir of a survey of the prince’s dominions of Java’, Calcutta, 25-11-1816 (henceforth: Baker, ‘Memoir’). This seems to justify Dutch concerns, expressed most forcibly by Johannes van den Bosch in private correspondence with King William I during his period as governor-(post-1832, commissioner-)general (1830-1834), that prominent exiles like Dipanagara should be sent back to the Netherlands to prevent them falling into British hands in the event of a conflict over Belgium in Europe, AN, GKA, Exhibitum, 9-12-1834 La Regeheim, and Chapter XII.


to carry off people and provisions, the former being pressed into service to crew the pirate vessels or for sale to British sea captains in Melaka. Baker reported that only three of the twelve villages around the important market centre of Jeruk Legi, which once had a population of 13,000, were still inhabited, the rest having ‘never recovered from the invasion of pirates’ twelve years earlier. Since that time, two Hungarian sergeants had been posted to Nusa Kambangan to give advance warning of further attacks, although the local inhabitants suggested that the lack of incursions over the three-year period prior to Baker’s 1815 visit was more due to the fact that there was nothing left to take than to the watchfulness of the Central European NCOs.

Banyumas district capital was described by Baker as the most important of the western outlying district towns in terms of population and resources. Governed by two influential local bupati, it suffered severely from the misrule of the bupati wedana, the head of the erstwhile outlying province administration. This official, Radèn Tumenggung Yudanegara, who was to be relieved of his office in the aftermath of the September-October 1815 Sepoy conspiracy in south-central Java (Carey 1977:308), was described in the blackest terms by the British Resident of Surakarta, Major Jeremiah Martin Johnson:

When he is in Banyumas his whole time is spent either in gambling or with tandak [tandhak; dancing women, prostitutes], whilst the duty of the district, the largest in the emperor’s [Sunan’s] territory, is totally neglected or left to sons and dependants, men as profligate as himself, whose whole study is how to exact money from the population in order to supply their own extravagance.

In the face of such administrative irresponsibility, the agriculture and trade of the province languished. Reports from the immediate post-Java War period indicate that there was little money in circulation and outside the fertile river valleys, where there some wet-ricefields, the local inhabitants existed mainly

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58 A Javanese, who escaped by swimming ashore from a pirate ship at Segarawedhi (Rawa), described how he had been captured on the Cirebon coast with twenty others, mostly women and children. His captors were Timorese pirates who spoke Malay and were commanded by two captains who may have been Bugis, Raja Datuk Namak and Raja Datuk Unus. More Javanese were captured at Cilacap, Dj.Br. 38, Relaas of Mas Reksamerta, in Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 8-5-1805. See further Chapter V note 20.

59 Dj.Br. 86, Relaas of Sarip Husein, 12-12-1805, Husein, an Arab, on a voyage from Java to Trengganu (east coast Malaya) described how Javanese captured by Riau and Lingga pirates in Cirebon and Banyumas were sold for 16 ronde real a head to British sea captains at Melaka to make up their crew complements. They were said to have been well treated and had no desire to return to Java.

60 Baker, ‘Memoir’, 28-9, 107; AvJ, Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to Bogislaus Friederich von Liebeherr (Surakarta), 27-10-1807. Baker noted that the former Chinese tollgate keeper of Jeruk Legi, who had amassed a 2,000 Spanish dollar fortune by trading in pearls, had lost all his assets in the same pirate raid.


62 Dj.Br. 23, Major J.M. Johnson (Surakarta) to T.S. Raffles (Batavia), 6-3-1816.
Plate 4. A Javanese singer-dancer (ronggèng or talèdhèk). Taken from Hardouin and Ritter 1853-55:219. Photograph by courtesy of the KITLV.
on mountain rice or root crops such as potatoes and tubers. Rice even had to be imported from neighbouring Bagelèn and the north coast residencies in order to feed the population. In the lowlands, particularly in the marshy areas (rawa) during the dry season (Toestand van Bagelen 1858:72), important quantities of raw cotton were produced, but this was mainly exported to the thriving cottage industries of neighbouring Bagelèn, the cloth woven in Banyumas being used only for local consumption. Even Chinese traders, a sure yardstick of the prosperity of an area, were few in number and those who had settled in the region were generally very poor. The province’s economic potential, which was widely recognised by contemporaries (Raffles 1817, I:20; Lettres de Java 1829:73), was thus far from being realised.

The western nagara agung: Bagelèn

How different indeed was the prospect which greeted Baker as he journeyed to the east across the broad expanse of the crocodile-infested Cingcingguling River into the neighbouring central apanage province of Bagelèn, the so-called kaki-tangan (arms and legs) of the Principalities. During his sixty-mile ride to the ferry town of Brosot on the Kali Praga, the sepoy captain was struck by the ‘most luxurious and highly populous country’ through which he passed, and the well-maintained coastal high road with its good level surface, ‘the finest in Java’ in his estimation. In his words:

The population is truly surprising, it being in fact an almost continuous village the whole way. On the northern side [of the high road] there is scarcely an interval or boundary between the villages which run in an almost uninterrupted line the whole distance […] the country is a perfect garden.

63 AN Kab 13-9-1832, J.E. de Sturler (Banyumas) to Johannes van den Bosch (Batavia), 5-9-1832.
65 Baker, ‘Memoir’, 33, noted that Banyumas women wove considerable quantities of striped cloth (lurik), batik and white cloth (kain putih).
66 AN Kab 13-9-1832, J.E. de Sturler (Banyumas) to Johannes van den Bosch (Batavia), 5-9-1832.
67 The term kaki-tangan is difficult to translate because it has different meanings in different contexts: in contemporary Indonesian idiom it means ‘accomplice or henchman’, Echols and Shadily 1968:161, but in the early nineteenth-century it referred to ‘coolies, porters and labourers’ who were sent from Bagelèn to work in the porters’ guilds (gladhag) at the courts.
68 Baker, ‘Memoir’, 109. For a less favourable view of the road, AN Kab 18-4-1837 no. 62 geheim, F.G. Valck (Yogyakarta) to D.J. de Eerens (Batavia), 11-3-1837, who warned the governor-general on the occasion of Prins Hendrik De Zeevaarder’s visit to central Java in 1837 that the numerous sand dunes on the road sometimes made it difficult for carriages. See further Toestand van Bagelen 1858:72.
69 Baker, ‘Memoir’, 109. The total population of Bagelèn at this time is not known: Raffles (1817, II:289-90) estimated the Yogya areas including Rêma (modern-day Karanganyar), the patrimony of the Danurejan family, at 122,214 persons in 1815, but the figures for the Surakarta districts are amalgamated with other provinces.
Nearly the entire district seemed to be under cultivation except at the height of the rains and there was pasture in the immense rawa or fens, which lay to the northward, for great herds of cows and buffalo. These fens also abounded in fish which were dried locally and traded extensively along the south coast and as far west as the mouth of the Serayu River.\(^{70}\) Salt was likewise produced in the coastal villages for local consumption and export to landlocked sub-districts like Ledhok (present-day Wonosobo) and Gowong in the northern part of the province, and to Kedhu.\(^{71}\) The strength of the local economy derived primarily from its rice production and thriving village cloth industries. Western Bagelèn, in particular the area around the Rawa Tambakbaya, produced major surpluses of rice as well as soybean, and together with Kedhu, was the principal exporter of grain and foodstuffs to the more easterly regions of south-central Java such as Mataram and Pajang.\(^{72}\) At least a quarter of western Bagelèn’s rice crop was exported or traded internally to parts of eastern Bagelèn, which were subject to harvest failures as a result of droughts and floods due to the poor drainage on the local red clay soils (\textit{Toestand van Bagelen} 1858: 75-6; Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:234, 245-7). Surprisingly little use was made of the rivers for bulk transport outside the province, although there was some internal riverine and cross-fen (rawa) traffic for locally traded goods (\textit{Toestand van Bagelen} 1858:71, 76).

Cotton and linen weaving were the mainstay local industries: linen cloth, batik cotton shawls, ladies blouses, head-dresses and sarongs made up in Bagelèn villages were traded to all parts of Java as well as to the islands of eastern Indonesia via the north coast port of Semarang.\(^{73}\) The three most important weaving centres in pre-Java War Bagelèn were Jana, Wedhi and Tangkilan (near Gombong) all of which were home to considerable numbers of Chinese involved in the cloth trade.\(^{74}\) When Baker visited in 1815, the province was nearing the peak of its prosperity as a cloth-producing region. But its glory days were drawing to a close. Already in late 1814 and early 1815, British machine-manufactured textiles had begun to enter the Javanese market

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\(^{70}\) Raffles 1817, I:20; \textit{Toestand van Bagelen} 1858:70; Baker, ‘Memoir’, 109. The main rawa were Tambakbaya in the west and Wawar in the east, Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:Map. Coastal fishing was difficult because of the heavy surf on the south coast. On the fish-farming of \textit{guramé} (a kind of carp), which were caught in pools at the junction of the Opak and Oyo rivers, and raised in fish farms at Kutha Gedhé from whence they were sold to Kedhu and Semarang, Dj.Br. 3, ‘Algemeen Verslag der Residentie Djocjocarta over de jare 1833’, 30-11-1834.

\(^{71}\) AvJ, H.G. Nahuys van Burgst (Surakarta) to Inspector of Finances (Batavia), 31-8-1820.

\(^{72}\) AvJ, Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 29-12-1804.

\(^{73}\) Toestand van Bagelen 1858:74; Dj.Br. 61, R.C.N. d’Abo (Yogyakarta) to H.A. Parvé (Semarang), 4-12-1818. On \textit{ginggang}, Gericke and Roorda 1901, II:641.

\(^{74}\) Raffles 1817, I:20; \textit{Toestand van Bagelen} 1858:70; dK 145, Matthijs Waterloo, ‘Memorie van Overgave’, 4-4-1808. Jana later became part of the apanage of the Yogya kapitan cina, Tan Jin Sing, when he was appointed as a Javanese \textit{bupati} in December 1813, see Carey 1992:484 note 399; Chapter VIII.
with printed batik patterns based on models supplied by British Residents of Crawfurd’s ilk to Paisley and Lancashire cotton masters. Although the local market proved surprisingly resilient, especially when many of the early British imports were found not to be dye fast (Raffles 1817, I:216-7; Chapter VIII), the local weaving industry would be severely damaged by the disruption caused by the Java War, the flight of the local Chinese merchants (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, II:332-3, V:433), and the post-war import of textiles from the nascent Dutch cloth industry around Twenthe. Interestingly, given the strong anti-Chinese sentiments evinced at the time of the outbreak of the Java War, the local population of eastern Bagelèn were soon begging the Chinese cloth merchants to return not as ‘market tax collectors but as traders, saying that they now [June 1829] had problems producing their goods […] having to pay over the odds for the [inputs] required’ (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:433).

The province also produced special labour services for the courts – hence its ‘arms and legs’ epithet. The most important of these were recruits for the porters’ guilds (gladhag) in the royal capitals, where Bagelèn labourers served for a six-month period before returning to their villages (Kollmann 1864:355, 359, 361). In return for their labour services, the local areas which produced such recruits were given a remission in the level of land-rent (Toestand van Bagelen 1858:74). The heavily afforested and sparsely populated northern districts, such as the Yogya area of Gowong, were liable for blandhong or forest services and the supply of building materials to the courts. Other regions, like the Surakarta territories of Wolo (Ambal) and Tlogo, which were directly taxed for the upkeep of the ruler’s court, paid part of their yearly tribute to

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75 On the sale of English cloth printed with Javanese patterns in Semarang on 15 February 1815, see S.Br. 23, Charles Assey (Batavia) to Major Jeremiah Martin Johnson (Surakarta), 24-12-1814. The British government’s sale of such imported cloth in other locations in Java is mentioned in IOL, G21/26, Java Public Consultations, 22-12-1814, 1298-9. Crawfurd had apparently sent parang rusak and kembang cina patterns as well as Javanese head-dresses to British manufacturers and these had been copied and found a good market in Yogya, where they were imported by the British firm Deans, Scott & Co in Semarang and sold through Chinese middlemen. Local consumers apparently prized them because the colours did not run, see Dj.Br. 51A, H.G. Nahuys van Burgst (Yogyakarta) to G.A.G.Ph. van der Capellen (Batavia), 10-12-1819. On the small role played by Dutch textile producers in this trade, see AN, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal, 4-9-1819 no. 9. See further Rouffaer 1904:6-7; Van Deventer 1891:cxvi.

76 Burger 1939:102-3. By 1838, public sales of European-manufactured cloths in Yogya, especially high quality Dutch chintzes, had begun to cut into the Javanese market, Dj.Br. 3, ‘Verslag van de Resident ter gelegenheid der inspectie reis der Gouverneur-Generaal in de maand Juni 1838’. During the Java War itself, Gent in the southern Netherlands (post-1830, Belgium) was the main source of textile exports to Java, see De Prins 2002:236.

The power of prophecy

Map 1. Central Java showing the main areas of cash crop production in the pre-Java War period. Map outline taken from Raffles 1817, I and adapted by J. Wilbur Wright of Oxford.

the Sunan in local delicacies for the Sunan’s table: the first in dried fish and trubu (salt roe or shad, a type of Javanese caviar) and the second in dhèndhèng or dried deer flesh (Kollmann 1864:360-2). We will see how, on the eve of the Java war, Sunan Pakubuwana VI (reigned 1823-1830) became especially exercised over the Dutch annexation of the Surakarta area of Jabarangkah between Kedhu and Pekalongan on the north coast because of the loss of its durian dodol, a fruitcake delicacy sent every year in the pikul load to Surakarta in lieu of tax (Chapter X note 168).

Given all these assets, it is hardly surprising that the courts should have considered Bagelèn a central part of their patrimony. So much so that in 1824, when the Dutch government made a move to annex the province as part of a proposed indemnity for the abolition of the tollgates in the Principalities, both first ministers at the courts protested strongly to the Dutch negotiators. The latter reported (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:19):

They pointed out to us that [...] Bagelen especially, was considered in their naive expression the arms and legs [kaki tangan] of the kingdoms of Surakarta and Yogyakarta, for the various chiefs and nobles [at the courts] derived their livelihood from it [and] it served for the production of men for the gladhag [porters’ guilds].
Similar sentiments were expressed at the end of the Java War by the Surakarta patih, Sasradiningrat II (in office 1812-1846), when the Dutch were again considering the annexation of the area. On this occasion, Sasradiningrat observed that he was prepared to surrender Banyumas and the eastern mancanagara, but not Bagelen because, if that province was lost to the court, it would be as though the Surakarta grandees had forfeited their key means of support – again the ubiquitous epithet ‘arms and legs’ was used. In his view, the people of the region were uniquely well suited for work in the porters’ guild for although other Surakarta areas – for example Banyumas – produced many dependable soldiers, this was one of the few districts which produced really good coolies. Official kraton recognition of the importance of this heavily populated province can be seen in its formal administrative appellation as the siti sêwu (the ‘thousand land’), and of the senior bupati in charge of it as the wedana bumi sêwu (the chief administrator of the ‘thousand land’).

Social groups and the village community

In view of the striking prosperity of Bagelen at this time, it is pertinent to consider the situation at the village level in the core regions such as Bagelen to build a picture of the village structure and the key social groups who made up the village or désa in the core regions before the Java War. Material from other central territories such as Kedhu, Mataram and Pajang will also be referred to.

Most contemporary observers were agreed that each village constituted a separate entity during this period embracing a population of between 50 to 200 people. In Raffles’ words (Raffles 1817, I:81-2):

> Every village forms a community in itself, having each its village officers and priest, whose habitations are as superior to those of others as their functions are more exalted.

On the basis of the statistics available to him for Kedhu, Raffles came to the conclusion that the average Javanese village in the core regions comprised about twelve families, each numbering four to five adult members, and that the total amount of irrigated rice-land available for each village was about seven jung (Raffles 1817, I:146). This would indicate that an individual peasant cultivator had at his disposal one quarter of a jung or one hectare of ricefields, although Crawfurd, who supervised the land-rent survey in Kedhu in 1812,

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79 Rouffaer 1905:609. One of the most prosperous districts (near the post-Java War provincial capital of Purwareja) was also known as Urutsèwu, Dumont 1917:400; Toestand van Bagelen 1858:69.
pointed out that it was often as little as one sixteenth of a *jung*. Moreover, the size of these *jung* varied considerably according to the fertility of the area, the availability of irrigation and population pressure in a particular area. In the western core regions, for example, where there had been a great increase in cultivation since the mid-eighteenth century, the *jung* had been frequently subdivided. Smaller areas of land now had to support a much larger population than in the poorly governed outlying regions where it was possible to traverse large tracts of land without finding a single peasant cultivator.

In similar vein, the Yogya Resident, Matthijs Waterloo (in office 1803–1808), remarked that in Mataram at least as many as fifty peasant cultivators could get their livelihood from a well irrigated *jung* in the vicinity of the royal capital, whereas a corresponding quantity of land would only support between two to four farmers in the impoverished southern hills (Gunung Kidul). Although some *jung* in this mountainous district were barren and infertile, Waterloo was of the opinion that there was enough land in the Yogya area for every villager to have rights over a small strip of wet ricefield or *sawah*. He pointed out that the only truly landless members of south-central Javanese society at this time were the mountain dwellers, those who worked in the royal teak forests (*blandhong*), and the porters on the roads who often took up their occupation in order to escape from onerous village obligations.

Waterloo certainly gave too favourable a picture of the structure of landholding in the central district villages in the first decade of the nineteenth century. He glossed over the fact that there were distinct classes or groups in the south-central Javanese *désa* in this period, classes which enjoyed hugely unequal shares and access to village ricefields and local labour. A Surakarta report of 1832, for example, referred to three main social groups: the *sikep* (literally ‘users of the land’), who bore the tax burden in the form of land-rent (*pajeg*) payments for the village; *ngindhung*, often close relations of the *sikep*, who owned their own houses and yards, but had no access to the village ricefields; and finally the *wong numpang*, unmarried strangers, who lived in the yard (*pekarangan*) or the house of the *sikep* and performed a range of agricultural, corvée and menial duties for him.

This last group approximated most closely to a class of landless labourers in south-central Java at this time. Unlike the *ngindhung* who could often

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80 Crawfurd, ‘Landed tenures’, 221.
81 Crawfurd, ‘Landed tenures’, 220. See also Van Kesteren 1887:1267 note 1, quoting Nahuys van Burgst, who noted that *jung* became smaller and more productive the closer to the royal capitals.
82 On Waterloo’s career see Chapter V note 15.
83 Dj.Br. 86, Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 28-2-1806.
84 Dj.Br. 86, Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 28-2-1806.
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improve their lot by marrying into sikèp families, the numpang had very little chance of raising their social status unless they were prepared to leave the village entirely and open up new ricefields in hitherto uncultivated areas. But such opportunities were becoming increasingly rare in the pre-Java War countryside of south-central Java as perceptive observers like Waterloo himself acknowledged when he noted that although there was some ‘waste’ ground in the more remote parts of Mataram, most of the land was scrupulously cultivated.86 Indeed, Crawfurd reported from Kedhu in 1812 that population pressure had led to a much greater use of dry crop fields (tegal) in the poorly irrigated central plain and that mountain rice was being cultivated at ever higher reaches of the foothills of the volcanoes surrounding the province.87

Besides this shortage of suitable agricultural land in the core regions, Crawfurd noted that even if an enterprising numpang did open up new ricefields in a waste area, his right of possession after three successive harvests as laid down in the Javanese agrarian law codes was not assured.88 Good land pioneered in this fashion would often be claimed back by the sultan (Carey 1986:82 note 81). Furthermore, numpang and other landless peasants were often deterred from trying to set themselves up as peasant cultivators (sikep) because of the prospect of having to meet the onerous corvée and tax requirements which sikèp status necessarily involved. For these reasons, numpang who wished to break out of the cycle of poverty and rural servitude as day labourers to well-established sikèp families would sometimes adopt the course of leaving the land entirely. Some drifted into marginal employment as porters on the main trade routes, others joined the numerous bands of vagabonds and robbers which terrorised the Javanese countryside, still others took service in the entourage of influential noblemen, who sometimes used them for criminal activities, a phenomenon which persisted right into the late nineteenth century as Isaac Groneman (1832-1912), kraton cognoscenti and personal physician to the seventh sultan, so vividly portrayed in his short story ‘A robbers’ history’ (‘Een kêtjoegeschiedenis’) depicting links between court officials and the criminal underworld of Yogya in the mid-1880s.89

In Kedhu alone, Crawfurd estimated the number of porters at 20-30,000 or nearly ten percent of the total population.90 In his words:

86 Dj.Br. 86, Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 28-2-1806. Crawfurd observed in 1812 that a traveller could journey over 100 miles in south-central Java without encountering an uncultivated spot, IOL Mack.Pr. 21 pt. 4, ‘Sultan’s country’ by Mr Crawfurd in 1812. Observations on the nature and resources of the territories under the authority of the Sultan of Mataram’ (henceforth: Crawfurd, ‘Sultan’s country’), 71, 148.
88 Crawfurd, ‘Sultan’s country’, 73.
90 Crawfurd, ‘Report on Cadoe’, 283; MvK 3054, ‘Statistieke beschrijving der residentie Kedoe’, 1836, estimated the total population at 300,000.
Plate 6. A Javanese woman of the lower class. In her left hand she holds a skein of cotton (the most important manufacture in the central Javanese villages in the early nineteenth century). To the right of the picture there is a rice stamper (alu) and block, and in the background a country ox cart (pedhati). Taken from Raffles 1817, I: p. 86 facing.
They have no fixed abode, and by the wandering and unsettled life they pursue, [they] have contracted the most inveterate habits of idleness, dissipation and profligacy. No sooner is their hire paid to them than they may be seen in groups to gamble it away and they are altogether so improvident that they go nearly naked. With such habits it is no wonder that they are accused of being the principal agents of crime and irregularities which are so prevalent in the countryside […] a good road would dispense [with] such people.\textsuperscript{91}

The golden age of the sikep?

The structure of landownership in the core regions in early-nineteenth-century south-central Java seems to have been heavily weighted in favour of a small but influential sikep class of peasant cultivators. They held rights over the fields cultivated by the village in common since they were either the first farmers of the land (cakal-bakal) or their immediate descendants. As such they were directly responsible for the land-rent and the payment of the other village taxes in money and kind to the apanage holders through their tax-collectors (Carey 1986:84). At the same time, they provided the candidates for the position of village head and other offices. They also exercised joint control over the yearly division of the communal ricefields as well as the village commons which often covered extensive areas of woodland and pasture (Carey 1986:84 note 87). They also appear to have had a say in the appointment of the local tax-collectors and, as we have seen, many of these bekel were drawn from the sikep class.

The lands cultivated by the sikep were often passed from father to son and sikep families of long-standing were found in many south-central Javanese villages.\textsuperscript{92} Lands controlled by the sikep were of two sorts: tanah pusaka or ‘heirloom’ lands, which were part of the original patrimony of the village and could be bequeathed to their heirs – hence the pusaka (heirloom) epithet (Carey 1986:84) – and tanah yasa or individually developed lands. These last had been opened up on the initiative of the sikep themselves using their resident labour force of family dependants/boarders (ngindhung) and numpang.

As far as the heirloom lands were concerned, the sikep only had usufruct rights and not full ownership for their tenure was conditional on their performance of corvée services and payment of the land-rent/tribute to the ruler or his apanage holder. The central Javanese sovereigns retained residual rights over the eventual disposition of the land and a sikep could in theory be dispossessed if he failed to meet his labour and tax obligations. Thus his tenure of tanah pusaka was more akin to the lungguh or land grants given to the royal officials at the courts than to any species of private property. Such insecurity of tenure on heirloom lands was a major hazard for the sikep but


\textsuperscript{92} Dj.Br. 86, Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 28-2-1806.
unlike the situation at the courts where, as we have seen, there are frequent references in the records to the dismissal of apanage holders and the redistribution of their lands (Carey and Hoadley 2000:144-5, 153, 155-6), the sources are largely silent on the dispossession of sikep.

The individually developed lands, on the other hand, were more truly the sikep's own property since these had been established by their own endeavours. Although the ruler could sometimes seek to reclaim such lands or impose new tax burdens on them, this was seldom done because, as we will see at the end of this chapter, the cadastral registers of the royal administrations were not revised after 1773-1774 to take account of the changes in land use at the village level (Carey 1986:109). The numpang and other dependants or rayat were extremely important for the sikep in this context: their labour was at his sole disposal and could be used at will to carry out daily agricultural duties, to perform the required corvée duties, and to extend the sikep's rights over adjacent waste lands. Indications that the numpang and rayat were used extensively to develop new land can be seen from a late-nineteenth-century Dutch report on landrights. This stated that in circa 1830 there were quite a few sikep with as much as ten bau of irrigated ricefields or about seven hectares of which only about a fifth was tanah pusaka (Onghokham 1975:170, 186 quoting Bergsma 1876-96, I). Just how wealthy an individual sikep could be at this time is illustrated by a list of stolen possessions drawn up after a robbery in 1808 at the village of Pedhalangan in the Béji district near Klathèn, a fertile and well-irrigated area where much cotton was grown. Amongst the individual losses reported by one sikep was a cache of 180 silver ducatoons, a very sizeable sum, then worth £ 65, which calculated at £ 3,000 in the money of the mid-1980s (Carey 1986:86 note 93).

The period of the most rapid extension of agricultural land by the sikep appears to have been the latter part of the eighteenth century when population pressure was less intense than it came to be in the immediate pre-Java War decades as we will see shortly. Although much more research needs to be done on the subject, it is clear that sikep acted in an independent fashion in their localities and exercised great control over their numpang. A Dutch writer spoke of the quasi ‘patron-client’ which prevailed in Bagelèn before the Java War where a small number of sikep had rights over most of the ricefields and enjoyed the services of large numbers of dependants who had no hope of setting themselves up as independent cultivators (Kollmann 1864:368), observations which were echoed by Willem van Hogendorp in Kedhu in 1827 when he commented on the large amount of ‘private property’ belonging to peasant cultivators and the practice of inheritance in peasant families, both of which, in his view, contributed to the prosperity of the province.93

Such a system permitted sikep to act as virtually self-sufficient farmers

having only the loosest of links with the local village community. In Kedhu, Crawfurd noted that each cultivator farmed the lands which he had rented for his own advantage, shared no property in common and only gathered together in village associations in order to get some protection in a deeply insecure countryside: ‘peasants who live as close neighbours in the same village’, he wrote, ‘often have as little to do with each other as those who live at a distance of twenty miles’. Crawfurd’s remarks may have been exaggerated and the situation in Kedhu somewhat unique, but it is clear that the pre-Java War village with its loose association of peasant cultivators and dependants was a very different entity from the closely ordered community of the late nineteenth century, shaped as the latter was by the economic exigencies of the Cultivation System (1830-1870) and the administrative policies of the late Dutch colonial government with its passion for uniformity and social control (Kâno 1977:34-5; Breman 1980:38-9; Carey 1986:87). It was also different because of the steps taken in the post-Java War period to break up the more extensive peasant farms and extend ownership to a wider group of cultivators in order to make more people liable for tax responsibilities and corvée services to the colonial administration (Onghekham 1975:185; Fasseur 1977:146). In this fashion, the golden age of the *sikep* came to an end and with it a unique peasant ‘landowning’ society which was such a salient feature of the core regions of south-central Java in the years before the Java War.

*Extension of ricefields and development of irrigation*

The golden age of the *sikep* was mirrored in two linked developments in Javanese agriculture in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries: the rapid extension of irrigated ricefields and the construction of ever more elaborate irrigation systems in the core regions. European observers of rural Java were unequivocal about the impact of this great enlargement of *sawah* in the aftermath of the 1755 Giyanti treaty which had brought peace to south-central Java after nearly seventy years of war. In another of his prolific reports to the governor of Java’s Northeast Coast, Waterloo reported that the increase in rice production was visible everywhere in the central regions: ‘one only has to direct one’s eyes to those lands which [now] produce rice and which just twenty years ago were still waste and uncultivated’. In particular, he was impressed by the wooded areas of the Jambu hills on the northern border of Kedhu and neighbouring Semarang which had recently been turned into the most magnificent *sawah*. Similarly, many ricefields had been laid out in the adjacent province.

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94 Crawfurd, ‘Landed tenures’, 221.
95 Dj.Br. 38, Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 31-1-1804; AvJ, Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 29-12-1804; vAE, Nicolaus
of Grobogan which had become a major rice producer for the Dutch establish-
ments on the north coast.96 Commenting on the same phenomenon just under
a decade later, Crawfurd was struck by the amount of recently opened sawah in
the vicinity of the sultan’s capital in areas which older inhabitants remembered
as having been ‘impenetrable jungle and the haunt of tigers’.97

The first two sultans had led the way in encouraging their subjects to open
up new land in the recently established Yogyak kingdom. A report penned
shortly after Sultan Mangkubumi’s death on 24 March 1792 by the governor
of Java’s Northeast Coast, J.G. van Overstraten (De Jonge and Van Deventer
1884-88, XII:260) praised the tireless zeal of the inhabitants of the sultanate in
restoring ruined lands at the end of the Giyanti Wars and quietly appropriat-
ing unclaimed areas, zeal which stood in marked contrast to the nonchalance
of their neighbours in Surakarta. In particular, Sunan Pakubuwana IV (reigned
1788-1820), had shown gross dereliction of duty of his care as ruler by allowing
a key aqueduct built by his father, Pakubuwana III (reigned 1749-1788), which
 carried water from Pengging and the old kraton of Kartasura to his capital, to
fall into disrepair.98 Mangkubumi’s large stone dam in the Winongo River to
the south of Yogya provided much needed irrigation for the royal ricefields at
Krapyak and lasted until the great storm of 22 February 1861.99 His successor,
Sultan Hamengkubuwana II, followed suit, constructing a number of irrigation
channels and dams to the east and west of the royal capital in areas adjacent
to his numerous royal retreats.100 Most notable here was the dam in the Kali
Bedhog between Gunung Gamping and Ambarketawang which irrigated
‘numerous skillfully laid out sawah’,101 which were under the supervision of a
kraton official known as mantri jurusawah (‘ricefield inspector’), who doubled
as the manager of the royal limestone ovens at Gamping.102 These irrigation

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96 Raffles 1817, I:268-9; Dj.Br. 22, G.W. Wiese (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia), 12-9-
1809.
97 Crawfurd, ‘Sultan’s country’, 146.
98 De Jonge and Van Deventer 1884-88, XIII:129. On this aqueduct, see further Mack.Pr. 86 (1),
99 Dj.Br. 1, C.P. Brest van Kampen, ‘Politieke verslag der Residentie Djokjokarta over het jaar
1861’, 24-3-1862, mentions the destruction of this dam in a great storm on 22-2-1861. Dj.Br. 18,
‘Statistieke der Residentie Djocjokarta’, 1838, indicates that this dam at Badran irrigated 120 bau
of ricefields.
100 Dj.Br. 86, Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 28-2-1806.
Dj.Br. 18, ‘Statistieke der Residentie Djocjokarta’, 1838, gives a total of 2,870 bau of sawah as hav-
ing been irrigated by these newly laid out dams and channels, including Hamengkubuwana I’s
dam at Badran. See also Appendix VI.
18, ‘Statistieke der Residentie Djocjokarta’, 1838, mentions two dams in the Kali Bédhog in the
Bantul Karang sub-district: Pendhawa and Gesikanreja irrigating 600 and 1,000 bau respectively.
102 Carey and Hoadley 2000:48-9. See also note 3.
systems, built partly on the second sultan’s initiative, had led, in Waterloo’s estimation, to a 25 percent increase in wet-rice cultivation in the Mataram region in the space of a decade (1796-1806). On a tour to Gamping, the Resident noticed that the main road westwards was so thronged with traders and pack-horses making for Yogya that he could hardly get through on horseback.103

Royal initiatives in irrigation were paralleled at the local level by the efforts of thousands of peasant cultivators who laid out their own simple networks. In the remote district of Pacitan on the south coast, many new ricefields had been pioneered in this fashion along the fertile valley of the Grindulu River.104 Meanwhile, in the sub-districts of Lowanu in northern Bagelèn and Menorèh in southern Kedhu, the cultivators living along the main Brèngkèlan to Magelang highway had been so zealous in the construction of new sawah that they had even dug up the road and planted it in many places!105 North of Yogya, the greater part of the irrigation systems based on the flow from the Merapi-Merbabu watershed were the work of farmers living in the Słèman and Kalasan districts, and similar activities were noted in Pajang and Kedhu.106 In the latter province, Crawfurd pointed out that most of the best sawah was produced by simple irrigation ditches at the foot of the western volcanoes (Mount Sumbing and Mount Sundoro), writing:

The whole [of this area] has the appearance of an extensive and beautiful garden [irrigated by] numerous streams and rills which have their source in the high mountains and which, with some art, are directed into a thousand little canals and water courses [...] thus fertilis[ing] the [entire] country.107

Not all the core apanage lands were so fortunate and Waterloo’s assertion that nothing more needed to be done in the Yogya area in terms of opening out new ricefields was clearly wide of the mark.108 There were still many potentially productive areas which continued to be dependant on rain water to irrigate their fields: the Sendhang Pitu region between Słèman and the Kali Praga, for example, only began to receive adequate irrigation in the early part

103 Dj.Br. 86, Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 28-2-1806. Apart from the trade in rice to Yogya, many cloth merchants from Bagelèn passed through the tollgate at Gamping, Dj.Br. 27, Tan Jin Sing (Kapitan cina of Yogya) to J.W. Moorrees (Yogyakarta), 22-5-1810.

104 Baker, ‘Memoir’, 54-5, who estimated that the total amount of sawah developed by these initiatives was 108 jung supporting a population of 8,000. Further details can be found in Dj.Br. 81, A.H. Smissaert (Yogyakarta) to Radèn Adipati Danureja IV (Yogyakarta), 20-8-1824.

105 Dj.Br. 45, Wouter Hendrik van Ijsseldijk (Yogyakarta) to P.G. van Overstraten (Semarang), 13-1-1793.

106 Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:242-3; Dj.Br. 86, Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 28-2-1806.


108 Dj.Br. 86, Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 28-2-1806.
of the twentieth century. The same was true of both Gunung Kidul and Kulon Praga where only the most basic irrigation was attempted during the course of the nineteenth century and where water was still mainly obtained from the few available wells and dew ponds.

An 1836 report on the post-Java War Residency of Yogyakarta observed that whereas nine-tenths of the available agricultural land in Mataram proper was under cultivation, two-thirds of it sawah, only one hundredth of Gunung Kidul was farmed. The forest corvée services in the royal teak forests in the southern hills bore hard on the local population and many were forced to seek seasonal employment on the Mataram plain during the east monsoon (May-September) rice harvest. Other areas which depended on locally built irrigation systems, suffered severely from flooding during the rainy season (November-April). This was especially the case with the low-lying lands of Bagelèn in the vicinity of the great marshes (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:246), the Adikarta area of southern Kulon Praga between the town of Wates and the sea, and many parts of Grobogan and the eastern mancanagara which were under water for months on end. In these regions irrigation walls and dikes had to be strengthened and rebuilt nearly every year. Even when good drainage and irrigation networks had been established in productive areas such as Ampèl near Boyolali, the system of dividing water was often so complicated that numerous disputes had to be referred for arbitration to court officials from the patih’s office or special irrigation supervisors like the Surakarta pengulu banyu (‘water overseer’).

Despite the many shortcomings, developments in irrigation during this period from the Gyianti treaty (1755) to the Java War wrought a profound change to the agriculture of the central districts. Whereas in the pre-Gyianti period, dry fields, mountain rice and rain-fed ricefields (sawah tadhahan) had been the norm, by the eve of the Java War many of the lowland areas of

109 Proyek Irigasi Kali Progo 1973:1. Attempts had been made as early as 1847 to irrigate this area (Dj.Br. 3, ‘Algemeen Verslag der residentie Djokjokarta over het jaar 1847’), but the engineering work was too difficult and it only received an irrigation channel in 1909 when the Van der Wijk canal was opened.

110 Dj.Br. 5, ‘Algemeen Verslag der residentie Djokjokarta over het jaar 1876’ (on the wells and dew ponds in Gunung Kidul); ‘Algemeen Verslag’, 1889, 1890 (on the construction of a banjir canal in the Adikarta area of southern Kulon Praga in 1888 and the opening of the irrigation channel at Sélagiri in Gunung Kidul in 1890).


112 Dj.Br. 86, Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 28-2-1806.

113 Soeripto 1929:142, 145-6, 251-2; Dj.Br. 37, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to W.N. Servatius (Surakarta), 16-9-1810; Dj.Br. 27, Kyai Muhamad Jayiman (Ampèl) to Radèn Adipati Danureja II (Yogyakarta), 13-9-1810, relating a quarrel over water supplies to Jacob Andries van Braam’s estate at Ampèl (later taken over by J.A. Dezentjé), supplies which had to be divided up equally between Yogya and Sala and the porters’ guild (gladhag) at Ampèl. On the pengulu banyu, see art. 61 of the Angger Gunung (Village Police Code) in AN, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal, 17-2-1841 no. 16.
south-central Java boasted large areas of irrigated sawah. This shift can be seen most clearly in the Javanese tax system and the method of rendering the land-rent in two instalments at Mulud and Puwasa, which according to Rouffaer (1905:617-8) was only introduced in the mid-eighteenth century in response to the changing agricultural patterns in the core regions. Whereas earlier only one harvest a year had been produced on dry ricefields, the considerable extension of irrigation systems in the core regions had permitted an additional harvest of secondary crops (maize, cassava) to be gathered in many places. The central Javanese rulers had exploited this to raise the tax obligations of the sikep, who were also required to meet the costs of the additional journeys of the tax-collectors (bekel) to the royal capitals. In the eastern outlying regions, however, where irrigation systems had not been so widely developed, the tribute was paid only once a year at Mulud, and the produce of any second harvest was kept by the cultivator (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, VI:380).

In the light of the available evidence, it is thus possible to modify the statement of a recent historian of Madiun who wrote that ‘the Java we know today covered with ricefields was mainly the achievement of the nineteenth-century peasantry’ (Onghokham 1975:200). While this may have been the case for certain depopulated parts of east Java (p. 59), which only began to undergo significant agricultural expansion after the end of the Java War, south-central Java was really transformed by the labours of the three generations of peasant cultivators who lived during the seventy years of peace which followed Giyanti.

**Demographic growth, 1755-1825**

The opening up of new lands and extension of sawah in the core regions mirrored a steady population growth in the south-central Java in the seventy years between 1755 and 1825. Although reliable population figures for the Principalities are not available for this period or indeed for any period up to 1940 (Gooszen 1999:9), most European accounts point to a figure of between 1.4 and 1.6 millions in the decade 1806-1816.114 In fact, this was probably somewhat of an underestimate. Crawfurd spoke of one million inhabitants in Yogya alone even after the British territorial annexations of August 1812,115 which would suggest an overall figure well in excess of two million for the Principalities given Surakarta’s greater density of population. Estimates of general demographic trends, however, can be established by comparing the number of households recorded at the time of the cadastral survey (‘Book

114 Daendels 1814, I:13; Raffles 1817, I:62. Dj.Br. 86, Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 28-2-1806, suggested a total population of 1.4 millions for the Principalities in 1806.

115 Crawfurd, ‘Sultan’s country’, 150.
of Klepu’, 1756) which followed the Giyanti settlement (1755) with those registered in the ‘New Book’ (Serat Ebuk Anyar) of 1773-1774. This shows an increase of seventeen percent over eighteen years or around 0.9 percent per annum (Ricklefs 1974a:159-60). However, if this is projected for the period until 1795 on a compounded annualised increase basis, then a growth of more than 58 percent is indicated.

As Ricklefs has pointed out, however, the 1755 cacah figures were undoubtedly too high since they were based on conventionalized figures from the mid-seventeenth century and bore no relationship to the demographic realities of mid-eighteenth century Java when the population had declined sharply due to years of warfare and political instability between 1675 and 1755 (Ricklefs 1986:28-9). Given this artificially inflated 1755 figure, Ricklefs suggests that the population in the Javanese kingdoms and the European-controlled areas of the north coast was certainly growing in excess of one percent per annum and probably substantially more than that in many areas in the late eighteenth century.116 This may have some important implications for recent scholars of Java’s demographic history who have tried to explain the island’s remarkable ‘population explosion’ entirely in nineteenth-century (especially post-1830) terms (Peper 1970:71-84; Widjojo Nitisastro 1970:1-26; Boomgaard 1980:35-52).

European observers were particularly struck by the age structure of the population in the Principalities and the large number of children born between 1785 and 1805, exactly the same period which, as we have seen, witnessed the greatest extension of agricultural land and the foundation of new villages in the core regions. In these two decades, live births in the Yogya area had apparently exceeded deaths by a factor seven to five. Children under the age of five seemed especially numerous although it was precisely this age group which was most prone to the very high rate of infant and child mortality in Java during these years.117

In the outlying provinces, however, the population actually fell by about five percent between 1755 and 1773. This was partly due to the fact that these regions were never able to recover from the depredations caused by the warfare of the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. It was also a result of the move to include large areas of the mancanagara such as Banyumas in the core regions in order to provide more apanage land for the growing court populations. This redesignation of territory, which occurred in 1773-1774 (Ricklefs 1974a:159), also had an effect on the demography of the outlying areas. But even if this had not taken place, the figures for population growth

116 Ricklefs 1986:29-30; Dj.Br. 86, Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 28-2-1806, estimated (on the conservative basis of five adults per cacahi) that the population of the Principalities had risen from 905,000 in 1755 to 1.4 millions in 1806.

117 Dj.Br. 86, Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 28-2-1806. In 1823, about two-fifths of the estimated 328,921 inhabitants of Kedhu were said to be children under the age of twelve, Baud 91, P. le Clercq, ‘Copie-verslag der Residentie Kadoe over het jaar 1823’ (henceforth Le Clercq, ‘Copie-verslag’), 30-3-1824.
in the outlying areas would still show a slower rate of increase than the central districts. Raffles’ statistics in his *History of Java* seem to confirm this. Thus in 1815 the ‘eastern mancanagara and distant areas’ only accounted for ten percent of the total population in Surakarta and slightly under twenty percent in Yogyakarta (Raffles 1817, I:62, 228). The densest population at the time of the British government census of 1815 was Semarang with 281 inhabitants per square miles, followed by Kedhu with 239. Yogyakarta and Surakarta, both with a population of 147 per square mile came sixth in density after Pekalongan, Batavia and its environs (Bataviasche Ommelanden), Priangan and Rembang. The average for Java as a whole was a little over 100, but the mancanagara regions were even below that. The causes for their demographic deficit were probably local: the prevailing insecurity in the outlying territories which we will explore in more detail shortly, and the structure of the royal administrations which delegated power to the *bupati* in the outlying areas but ruled directly through the *patih* in the core districts.

**Public health**

Apart from the long period of peace which followed the Giyanti settlement together with the incentives for farming and opening up new land, the steady population growth in south-central Java in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries seems to have been encouraged by a number of benign conditions: first, the lack of large-scale epidemics and the health of the peasant populations; second, the availability of adequate food supplies and the balanced diet of families in country areas; third, the very early marriages in rural communities and the importance of children in the Javanese peasant economy.

The generally healthy condition of the Javanese peasantry at this time was referred to by Raffles (1817, I:69). Although he was attempting to draw a favourable picture of the five-year British interregnum (1811-1816), it is clear that there were no large-scale epidemics until April 1821 when the first of a cycle of virulent Asiatic cholera infections reached Java from Bengal and the Malay Peninsula. The only serious ailment in terms of mortality in pre-1821 south-central Java was smallpox, which wrought such havoc amongst infants and children that it was nicknamed the ‘child’s disease’ or *lara bocah* by the Javanese (Winter 1902:78; Peper 1975:51). A Dutch report on Kedhu in 1823 noted that although two-fifths of the total population of 330,000 were under twelve, one-third of these children succumbed to smallpox and other related diseases before their twelfth birthday. Forty-five percent of all deaths in the province were apparently accounted for by children.

118 Muller 1832:1-111; Schillet 1832:115-81; Crawfurd 1971:120-1; Carey 1986:123, 132.
Despite its virulence, smallpox never reached serious epidemic proportions as in some European countries in the eighteenth century because of the fact that the Javanese rural population mainly lived in scattered village settlements and large and densely inhabited urban centres were rare. Moreover, Javanese parents usually made provision for the high infant mortality by having more children (Raffles 1817, I:72). In the words of the aged patih (first minister) of Yogya, Danureja I (in office circa 1755-1799):

Too long a period of peace was just as disastrous as a time of [prolonged] warfare for the inhabitants [of south-central Java] and people regarded child deaths as a wise provision of Providence.120

A start was made on smallpox vaccination in the Principalities in 1804, although the number of children immunised remained extremely small until well after the Java War.121


121 Peper 1975:49-70. The second sultan of Yogya supported vaccination when it was first
Diet and peasant lifestyles

This absence of pandemics until the third decade of the nineteenth century was partly the result of good fortune: Java’s situation as an island was certainly important here. But it was also due to a greater resistance to disease amongst the Javanese population as a whole, itself the outcome of the greater availability of foodstuffs in this period. In this respect, it is no coincidence that the cholera epidemics of the 1820s should have occurred during years of drought, harvest failure and warfare. The localised famines which resulted from the deteriorating agricultural situation during this third decade of the nineteenth century led to a sharp decline in the health and dietary patterns of the rural populations of south-central Java. In the 1820s, for example, observers noted an increased consumption of less nutritious secondary food crops such as maize, cassava as well as other tubers and vegetables gleaned from forests and waste lands. But until that decade of economic crisis, disease and conflict, most of the inhabitants of the south-central Javanese countryside could enjoy a mainly rice diet and times of dearth were rare. The only exception was the yearly ‘hungry gap’ when the new season’s rice crop was being planted with the onset of the rains in November. At those times, according to a report from Bagelèn, the price of padi (unhusked rice) could exceed by 200-300 percent that which a farmer could get for his crop at the time of the rice harvest (Toestand van Bagelen 1858:76).

A detailed insight into the dietary habits of the various social classes in Java at this time was given by J.W. Winter who served as Residency translator introduced from Mauritius in December 1804, but a failed vaccination on the fourth sultan in 1820 turned the court against it, Dj.Br. 49, Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 27-12-1804; Dj.Br. 51B, H.G. Nahuys van Burgst (Yogyakarta) to Inspector of Vaccine (Batavia), 10-8-1820; Dj.Br. 52, A.H. Smissaert (Yogyakarta) to Radèn Adipati Danureja IV (Yogyakarta), 22-7-1823. Governor-General G.A.G.Ph. van der Capellen’s 1820-1821 decrees on smallpox vaccination (Reglementen op de uitoefening der koepokinenting in Nederlandsch-Indië in Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal in rade, 11-4-1820, 19-4-1821 no. 16) had some effect on vaccinations in government-administered areas: the number of children vaccinated in Kedhu rose from 1,745 in 1820 to 5,273 in 1832, but in Yogyakarta vaccinations were completely halted during the war years and hovered at between 1,300 in 1830-1847 when there was still great distrust of the measure, Dj.Br. 58, J.F.W. van Nes (Yogyakarta) to Commissarissen ter regeling der vorsten-landen, 16-6-1830; Dj.Br. 3, ‘Algemeen verslagen over der residentie Djokjokarta’, 1833-1847. See further Winter 1902:78; Chapter VIII.

122 Raffles 1817, I:123; Winter 1902:49; Dj.Br. 51c, R.C.N. d’Abo (Yogyakarta) to Director of Finances (Batavia), 26-6-1821. Dj.Br. 4, ‘Algemeen Verslag der residentie Djokjokarta over het jaar 1855’, on the consumption of palawija crops after a long drought and the failure of the rice harvest.

123 Raffles 1817, I:99, 108, 123. There is no evidence to support the assertion by Sollewijn Gelpke and Scheltema that palawija crops and not rice were the staple food of the Javanese peasantry in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, Peper 1975:42-3. For general observations on food consumption amongst peasants in early nineteenth-century Java, see Crawfurd, ‘Landed tenures’, 237; and Raffles 1817, I:99.
The power of prophecy

at both Yogyakarta (1799-1806) and Surakarta (1806-1820). Winter reported that the usual food of the Javanese ‘middle class’, by which he probably meant the inhabitants of the court towns, was rice with some dried fish and vegetables. This fare would be considerably more lavish on festive occasions when chicken and meat were consumed (Winter 1902:47). The ‘common’ Javanese, meanwhile, had a much more ‘sobre’ lifestyle, but still possessed enough to purchase a sufficient quantity of daily sustenance. According to Winter, 12 duit (copper farthings) a day were adequate for an unmarried man. These would be spent as follows: three duit on betelnut and tobacco, three duit on vegetables, salt and soybean cake, and six duit on rice. A farmer with a wife and children could exist on 25 duit a day with the wife contributing about four duit a day to the family budget by her activities at the loom or by acting as a tradeswoman carrying goods produced by the family to the local market (Winter 1902:47-8). In this context, the sale of produce from the farmer’s fruit and vegetable gardens was often of some economic significance in supplementing the family budget as Raffles noted (Raffles 1817, I:110):

What can be spared of the fruits of their joint industry […] is carried to market and exchanged for a little salt fish, dried meat or other trifling comforts, hoarded as a store for the purchase of an ox or buffalo, or expended in procuring materials for repairing the hut and mending the implements of husbandry.

Although Raffles mentioned the purchase of salt fish and dried deer meat, these did not form a staple part of the ordinary Javanese peasant diet except in areas close to the sea coasts such as Pacitan and Bagelèn or in the more heavily afforested outer regions where there was an abundance of livestock (buffalo), as well as wild deer and game. Only rice and salt were regarded

124 Payments for day labourers varied considerably at this time: Yogya coolies working on the post road (postweg) in Pekalongan received two duit a day with one kati of rice (1 kati = 0.617 kgs) and one-tenth of a kati of salt; Dj.Br. 52, A.H. Smissaert (Yogyakarta) to Radèn Adipati Danureja IV (Yogyakarta), 3-4-1823; workers in the Chinese-run sugar factories at Ampèl were given 15 duit (18 cents) a day and government coolies in Semarang as much as 25 duit (30 cents), Dj.Br. 30, Dr Daniel Ainslie (Yogyakarta) to T.S. Raffles (Batavia) 30-11-1815; Journal 1854:158; whereas those working in the Chinese-run sugar factories in Kedhu earned 25-30 duit, and those in Bagelèn 35 cents a day. Residentie Kadoe 1871:103. Members of the porters’ guild (gladhag) in the court towns were paid a retainer of eight duit (10 cents) whether they worked or not, Van Sevenhoven, ‘Aanteekeningen’, 49-50. During the Java War, daily wages for coolies rose to 30 duit (40 cents) in Yogya and 25 duit (30 cents) in outlying Dutch forts (bènthèng), but fell back to half those figures in 1830, Dj.Br. 58, J.F.W. van Nes (Yogyakarta) to Commissarissen ter regeling der vorstenlanden, 3-6-1830. See further Chapter IX note 72.

as being the two necessities of life in south-central Java and of the latter, the local inhabitants preferred the stronger tasting south coast variety to the cheaper product from the north coast.\footnote{126}{Dj.Br. 3, F.G. Valck, ‘Algemeen Verslag der residentie Djokjokarta over het jaar 1836’, 31-3-1837, where Valck noted that even though south sea salt was almost ten times as expensive as the north coast variety (a government monopoly since 1814, IOL G21/69, Order of Lieutenant-Governor [T.S. Raffles] in Council establishing salt monopoly, 29-11-1814), Javanese in the Principalities preferred it because of its greater flavour. One can only speculate that both these ‘staffs of life’ – rice and south sea salt – would have had a spiritual resonance for Javanese coming as they did from the realms of the rice goddess, Déwi Sri, and the goddess of the southern ocean, Ratu Kidul. See further Houben 1994:89; Chapter VIII note 126.}

There were, however, many regional differences in eating habits: in Kedhu, for example, where a wide range of local fruit and vegetables were grown, the inhabitants were noted as having a better diet than in some of the neighbouring districts such as Karang Kobar, Ledhok, Gowong and Sélanamik where such commodities were scarce.\footnote{127}{Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:234-7, 245-6; Hogendorp 153¹ pt.b, Willem van Hogendorp, ‘Over den Staat van Java’ no. 1 (Kedhu, 1827), 80 (better diet of Kedhu population and export of onions and cauliflowers to northeast coast/pasisir); Crawfurd, ‘Sultan’s country’, 75-7 (on fruit, vegetables and peanuts [kacang] grown in Merapi-Merbabu area). See further Chapter IX note 80.}

More specialised delicacies, such as fish and shrimp sauces, prepared on the north coast, were eaten widely in south-central Java at this time as were chicken and duck eggs, particularly salted Muscovy duck eggs which were useful on long journeys (Raffles 1817, I:98-9). The only foodstuffs which do not seem to have been properly exploited were dairy products for which the Javanese apparently had an aversion.\footnote{128}{Raffles 1817, I:96; Crawfurd, ‘Sultan’s country’, 90; ‘Report on Pachitan’, 194 (on astonishingly low milk yield of Javanese cows and lack of dairy products in diet); Carey 1977:310 (on dairy trade between Kedhu, Boyolali and the courts by ex-Sepoy soldiers).}

A description of the ‘sobre’ lifestyle of the Javanese peasant cultivator and day labourer in early nineteenth-century south-central Java is given by Winter in his account of Surakarta between 1806 and 1820 (Winter 1902:49). He related how a farmer would usually leave singing for his fields before sunrise at five o’clock every morning. His first meal would be eaten at noon. A second repast would be taken shortly before sunset on his return home, but some cultivators only ate once a day. He would rarely burn an oil lamp, but would rely instead on the light of his hearth fire which was usually situated in the centre of the house and was lit both for night-time warmth and to protect him from the clouds of mosquitoes. The houses and huts used by the Javanese peasantry at this time were usually of a very simple construction: the single-hipped roof dwelling (omah limasan) being preferred. In this respect, the style of peasant architecture in the central and eastern parts of Java was less elaborate than in the mountainous western (Priangan) regions because of the greater scarcity of suitable building materials. This was also partly due to Dutch encroach-
ments on the teak forests in the eastern mancanagara regions bordering the north coast, an issue to which we shall return in later chapters. According to Winter, the ambitions of the average Javanese peasant cultivator were very modest, being limited to saving enough money for the purchase of a buffalo which would give him sufficient independence to work his lands by himself for half a day. ‘Then’, in Winter’s words, ‘he [counts himself] rich and more satisfied than the wealthiest man’ (Winter 1902:48).

The lifestyle of a Javanese coolie or member of the porters’ guilds in the court towns was even more spartan. Winter noticed that they would often sleep out in the open at night when they were carrying loads on the highways, and even when their duties were discharged they would only have a tumble-down shed or hut to return to. Their bed was usually a coarse mat of woven coconut leaves laid out on the bare ground. A simple set of clothes comprising a head-dress, jacket and breeches, all woven out of rough cloth and purchased once a year from a second-hand clothes dealer, would constitute their entire wardrobe. When these were being washed in a convenient river once every two months, the coolie would stretch himself out in the sun until his clothes had dried. Despite the simplicity of his attire and livelihood, the porter was better off, in Winter’s view, than the impoverished mountain dweller in the isolated hill regions whose only dress was a simple loin cloth (Winter 1902:48).

Early marriage and the value of children

Although the Javanese peasant lived in a plain fashion, there were few restraints against marriage and European observers noted that it was customary for Javanese in country areas to marry early: the men at around sixteen and the women at between thirteen and fourteen. This was because marriage had distinct financial advantages: women were generally recognised to be more dexterous than men in money matters and they would usually make an important contribution to the household budget by their marketing activities (Raffles 1817, I:353). Celibacy was also viewed with distaste in Javanese peasant culture: Crawfurd related that ‘an old maid is quite unknown amongst Javanese women because however old or ugly, they never find difficulty getting a husband’. Divorces were also frequent in Javanese rural communities and couples would part with very little ceremony in order

129 See Chapters V and VI.
130 Raffles 1817, I:70; Crawfurd, ‘Sultan’s country’, 149; ‘Report on Pachitan’, 169. The same situation was true of the court communities, see Chapter II on the age profile of Dipanagara’s mother and father at the time of his birth on 11-11-1785. Geertz 1961:56, describes early marriages amongst women in contemporary Java.
131 Crawfurd, ‘Sultan’s country’, 149.
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The practice was apparently so common that on his inspection journeys Crawfurd was shown individuals of both sexes who had had as many as ten or twelve different ‘marital’ (namely, sexual) partners.132

Modern rural sociologists have pointed out that frequent divorces usually mean fewer births per woman and longer gaps between them, but it is clear that children were highly valued by peasant cultivators in rural south-central Java at this time and played a vital role in the Javanese peasant economy (White 1975:127-46). According to Raffles (1817, I:70, 109), most peasant cultivators would raise families of between eight and ten children, only half of whom would survive into adolescence. Infants were an economic burden on their parents for only a very short time and, provided they survived the scourges of endemic diseases like smallpox, they soon became valuable assistants in the houses and fields. Boys were sometimes given a short period of Qur'ānic education with a local kaum or modin (village ‘priest’), but most started work immediately after they reached the age of eight.133 At that stage, boys were taught the rudiments of agriculture, while girls received instruction from older female family members in spinning and weaving, an occupation at which they would be active, in Winter’s words, ‘day and night’, turning out coarsely woven clothes for their families and more finely worked materials for the local market (Winter 1902:50; Raffles 1817, I:86; Lettres de Java 1829:101). Some also took part in agricultural duties, particularly the transplanting and harvesting of rice, activities which were regarded as the particular preserve of women. Thus a large family was an undoubted asset to peasant cultivators who had opportunities to open out new land but continued to face increasingly onerous fiscal and corvée demands from the rulers and apanage holders (Raffles 1817, I:70).

Rural criminality, social bandits and fighting cocks

Two elements, however, were working against the prosperity of the core regions in this period: the lack of security in the countryside and the increasingly burdensome demands of the royal administrations, especially in the second sultan’s Yogya. The issue of insecurity has already been touched on

132 Crawfurd, ‘Sultan’s country’, 150; Jourdan, ‘Report on Japan and Wirosobo’, 349 (on the frequency of divorces and the unfaithfulness of the women in the eastern mancanagara).

133 Dj.Br.1911, F.V.H.A. de Stuers (?), ‘Inleiding tot de geschiedenis van den oorlog op Java’ (henceforth: De Stuers, ‘Inleiding’), n.y., 37 (on the education of village boys in Qur’ān repetition [turutan], Arabic prayers and the study of Arabic letters [alip-alipan] from their seventh year); AN, Kabinet 1431, 19-9-1831, Secretary of Kedhu Residency (Magelang) to Johannes van den Bosch (Batavia), 29-9-1831 (on the reluctance of parents to leave their children long at local religious boarding schools [pesantrèn] because they needed them for agricultural duties); Winter 1902:49 (on neglect of formal education for children by peasant families and concentration on instruction in agriculture and weaving).
in connection with the volatility of tenure arrangements, the village wars, and the activities of the *numpang* or day labourers. We have seen how some of these landless labourers drifted into semi-criminal activities after they had left their villages. Others joined the bands of robbers and highwaymen which roved country regions. These were often led by men of local influence and charisma. Known as *jago* (‘fighting cocks’), they had a popular reputation for magical invulnerability (*kebal*) and innate spiritual power (Onghokham 1975:63-9; Anderson 1972:9). In the years before the Java War, such village *jago* provided local leadership in the numerous village wars, or helped to expand village boundaries and defend its interests. During the war itself many were appointed as army commanders in their local areas by Dipanagara (Carey 1981a:243 note 36). A few of these men were what Eric Hobsbawm has called ‘social bandits’: rural leaders ‘who remained within peasant society, and were considered by their people as heroes, champions, fighters for justice, perhaps even leaders of liberation’. Oppressive landlords and government agents, especially Chinese tollgate keepers or *bandar*, were their natural enemies and it would have been unthinkable for them to snatch the peasants’ harvest in their own territory. Others were more clearly freebooters, rural criminals who were prepared to commit any crime on the orders of a superior or for personal gain. They thus lacked the special relationship with the local population which made banditry social (Hobsbawm 1969:13-5).

A good description of a *jago* figure, probably based on a real character who became one of Dipanagara’s henchmen in Kedhu,\(^ {134}\) can be found in the Surakarta version of the *Babad Dipanagara*. During the confrontation with the prince’s supporters over the construction of the road across his estate at Tegalreja in July 1825, the immediate casus belli for the Java War,\(^ {135}\) this man is depicted in the chronicle boasting of himself in bravado fashion (Carey 1981a:28-9):

III.18  Come on men of the Dipanagaran
fall back immediately!

19  It is as if you have not heard the news yet
    that I am a picked champion,
    a [robber] chieftain [and] leader in Kedhu
    of the bandits of Parakan.
    No forged weapon is strong enough for me!

The elements of bombast and magical invulnerability which lay at the heart of the *jago*’s charisma are here nicely depicted. A more historical example of a *jago*

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134 For a description of a bandit chief in northeastern Kedhu who rallied to Dipanagara and on whom this figure may have been based, see Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, III:90-1.

135 See pp. 597-600.
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figure and the popular awe which he could arouse can be found in a Dutch report on a rebel leader or kraman from Cirebon who took refuge in Bagelèn in 1808. Described as being small in height with long sideburns and dressed in a flowing tabard of checked linen cloth (kabaya ginggang), this man evoked respect because of his presumed magical power and the royal authorities found it difficult to get locals to touch him still less cooperate in his arrest.\textsuperscript{136}

Some local jago held important positions in the provincial administration and the Dutch Resident of Yogya complained in 1807 that a number of district chiefs were placing themselves at the head of robber bands.\textsuperscript{137} The martial and energetic spirit of the Yogyakarta inhabitants when compared to their more easygoing compatriots in Surakarta was noted by a later Dutch official who remarked that most of the successful bandit leaders in south-central Java were from the sultan's dominions (Van der Kemp 1897:14 note 1). Demang Jayamenggala, the tax-collector of the rich désa of Samèn to the south of Yogya, was an example of just such an enterprising sub-district official who doubled as a social bandit. Renowned as an expert in gunpowder manufacture, he later became leader of all Dipanagara's bandit supporters to the south of the sultan's capital (Carey 1981a:243 note 36, 275 note 166).

Some villages strategically situated on roads, river crossings and border areas, where opportunities for smuggling and plunder were great, were used as the headquarters of brigands and highwaymen. One of these villages in the foothills of Mount Merbabu, which belonged to Yogya and had a sizeable population, was apparently so totally controlled by robber leaders that all the inhabitants, even down to the village 'priest', were involved in sorties into adjacent Dutch-controlled territory.\textsuperscript{138} The désa of Témpèl in the Slèman area athwart the main Yogya-Magelang post-road was another such bandit centre: its inhabitants apparently preyed on the busy highway traffic (the stone walls on each side of the post-road providing convenient hiding places) and later terrorised European leased estates and villages on the flanks of Mount Merapi in the years immediately preceding the Java War.\textsuperscript{139} It was the same with the settlements along the Praga River, which commanded certain key crossing points, such as Mangiran and Kamijara whose local bandits were supposedly

\textsuperscript{136} Dj.Br. 23, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia), 2-8-1808; Nagtegaal 1996:190-1, 209-12 (on the role of the santri as kraman and bandit leaders).

\textsuperscript{137} Dj.Br. 38, Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to Radèn Adipati Danureja II (Yogyakarta), 10-12-1807.

\textsuperscript{138} Dj.Br. 38, Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 3-12-1807. On the greater incidence of banditry in frontier regions, see Hobsbawm 1969:16-7; Nagtegaal 1996:182-3, 190-1, 209-12.

\textsuperscript{139} Dj.Br. 52, A.H. Smissaert (Yogyakarta) to Algemeen Secretaris (Batavia), 5-9-1823; A.H. Smissaert (Yogyakarta) to Hendrik MacGillavy (Surakarta), 6-9-1823. The stone walls were later taken down during the Java War to prevent Dutch convoys being ambushed by Dipanagara's troops, Dj.Br. 81, A.H. Smissaert (Yogyakarta) to Radèn Adipati Danureja IV (Yogyakarta), 11-8-1825.
summoned by Dipanagara in mid-July 1825 to coordinate resistance before the outbreak of the Java War (Carey 1981a:243 note 36). Jelegong and another settlement further to the north, which had inhabitants who were feared and respected, were also reported to have rendered assistance to the prince (Carey 1981a:262 note 112, 282 note 197). Known as ‘elders of the hunt’ (tuwa buru), they made their living by trapping tigers for the tiger spearing or rampog macan contests at the courts, a difficult and dangerous occupation which involved the use of secret charms and great personal bravery (D’Almeida 1864, II:35-7; Brandes 1900:184; Kartomi 1976, V:9-15, VI:7-13; Carey and Hoadley 2000:31).

The numerous links between the local jago/bandits in the Yogya area and Dipanagara – links which are even today the subject of critical comment by Yogya contemporaries – underline an important aspect of rural criminality in Java in the early part of the nineteenth century, namely the close association between certain robber chiefs and court notables. Certain members of the sultan’s family earned themselves notorious reputations as paymasters of bandits in the early nineteenth century. One young nobleman, Pangéran Mangkudiningrat II, a nephew of Dipanagara, who would later report the support given his uncle by the criminal elements in Javanese rural society (Chapter IX), even had some of his lands confiscated during the reign of the fourth sultan (1814-1822) because of his brazen use of jago in raids on Chinese-run tollgates. Although most of the connections established between priyayi and bandits were for financial gain, some had a political purpose. Dipanagara’s reliance on bandits as auxiliaries during the Java War has already been noted. They were also implicated in his uncle, Pangéran Dipasana’s, revolt in Kedhu in February 1822.

The second sultan himself employed bandits for both purposes. An 1801 report noted that he seemed loathe to curb his father-in-law, Kyai Adipati Purwadiningrat, the bupati of Magetan’s (in office 1797-1810) sponsorship of bandits in his district because he derived such a substantial cut from them.

Dipanagara is still compared unfavourably with his great-grandfather, Sultan Mangkubumi, in some Yogya circles because the latter did not rely on bandits during his war against the Dutch (1746-1755), interviews with B.P.H. Adinegara, Yogya, 8-12-1971; W.S. Rendra, Yogya, 24-2-1972. Dj.Br. 38, Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 3-2-1807; Waterloo, ‘Memorie van Overgave’, 4-4-1808, refer to the following Yogya pangéran as having had links with bandits: Ngabèhi, Pamot, Demang, and Abubakar/Dipawijaya I. On their relationship to the sultan’s family, see Appendix VIII.

GKA, Exhibitum, 20-9-1830 no. 56k, geheim verbaal, interview with Pangéran Mangkudiningrat II, 13-4-1830; Dj.Br. 9B, F.G. Valck (Yogyakarta) to Johannes van den Bosch (Batavia), 22-4-1831; AN, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal, 6-12-1831 La F, Note of F.G. Valck, 22-10-1831; Meinsma 1876:131. NA, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal in rade, 7-3-1822 no. 34.

Dj.Br. 48, J.G. van den Berg (Yogyakarta) to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 8-11-1801, 29-9-1802, 22-11-1802, where Van den Berg noted that robber bands were more active in the dry monsoon (May-November) than in the rainy season (November-April).
Six years later, the sultan was suspected of having been involved with a particularly well accoutred robber band which was rounded up by Dutch cavalry after an attack on a Chinese tollgate keeper at Salatiga. Meanwhile, the ambush by a group of bandits in the area of the Jambu hills in northern Kedu of the unpopular and sickly Yogya Resident, Pieter Engelhard (in office 1808, 1810-1811) as he journeyed to Semarang to relinquish his post in mid-November 1811 was clearly a politically motivated action sanctioned by the ruler.

In the eastern mancanagara districts the political authority of the local bupati was largely dependent on their use of criminal elements in the countryside. Here robbery for profit was widespread and bandit leaders were less selective about their targets. As we have seen, the prestige of the powerful Yogya bupati wedana of Madiun, Radèn Rongga Prawiradirja III (?1779-1810; in office 1796-1810), himself the grandson of an influential jago figure from Sokawati was largely derived from his adroit use of robber bands. Indeed, the scale of bandit activities in the eastern provinces was so extensive that in some areas such as Jipang the population had begun to fall drastically. In 1813, the British Resident, Lieutenant George Richard Pemberton, reported that ‘family after family’ had quit the district because ‘it was so infested with thieves that it was unsafe to sleep’. Good agricultural land had reverted to an uncultivated state leaving the area ‘most wild and desolate’ in many places. It was apparently the same in the neighbouring Surakarta mancanagara province of Jagaraga where robber bands, based in the mountain regions, plundered local villages and smuggled opium. An insight into the sheer scale of the banditry in these eastern outlying districts can be gained from the description of an attack on a Chinese-run customs’ post and settlement referred to as ‘Bunder’ (from the Javanese-Malay bandar, tollgate, customs’ post) on the borders of Kertasana and Surabaya on 25 May 1808 which involved no less than 250 bandits armed with pikes, clubs and blazing torches. The security situation in these areas was rendered even more critical by the second sultan’s policy of banning all petty

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145 Dj.Br. 23, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to Radèn Adipati Danureja II (Yogyakarta), 15-6-1808, who reported the capture of a fine musket worth 200 Spanish dollars as well as numerous Japanese (samurai) broadswords.

146 Hageman 1857:414; BL Add MS. 45272, T.S. Raffles (Batavia) to Lord Minto (Calcutta), 21-1-1812. On a similar action by a Yogya band which was suspected of plundering the baggage train of the British Resident of Surakarta, Hugh Hope, in November 1812, S.Br. 24, John Crawfurdf (Yogyakarta) to Hugh Hope (Surakarta), 2-11-1812.

147 See pp. 219-21; and Nagtegaal 1996:184-5 for use of armed guards by north coast priyayi and Madurese rulers in early eighteenth century.

148 Mack.Pr. 21 (9), G.R. Pemberton, ‘Report on Djiepan [Jipang]’ (henceforth: Pemberton, ‘Djiepan’), 1-4-1813, 335-6; IOL Eur. F 148/23 (Secret & Political no. 1), T.S. Raffles (Batavia) to Lord Minto (Calcutta), 6-8-1812. On the disposition of the Jipang population, which P.H. van Lawick van Pabst described as being ‘amongst the worst and most difficult to rule in the whole of Java’, Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, III:360.


150 Dj.Br. 38, Relaas of spy Ranawijaya (Bunder) to Radèn Adipati Danureja II (Yogyakarta), 31-5-1808. On this Bunder raid and its aftermath, see pp. 195-6.
criminals from Yogya to the eastern districts, and making the *bupati wedana* responsible for their supervision.\textsuperscript{151} We will see below how, during the period of Marshal Daendels’ administration (1808-1811), the whole issue of rural criminality and the border raids into adjacent European-government controlled territories would involve the Yogya court and the head of the eastern *mancanagara* districts in a crisis which would cost the *bupati wedana* his life.\textsuperscript{152}

The forces of law and order

Few steps were taken by the courts or even by the European government to establish an effective system of police.\textsuperscript{153} In 1808, Daendels, drawing on Majapahit precedent (Stutterheim 1948:65), established a corps of mounted constabulary known as Jayèng Sekar, which was recruited from the sons of well-to-do Javanese court official families and was trained by European instructors. But it was organised on far too small a scale to have much impact in rural areas. Indeed, the duties of the Jayèng Sekar were mainly restricted to mounting night patrols in European-controlled towns, serving as escorts for prisoners and treasure convoys and accompanying officials when they went on inspection journeys. When serious trouble broke out, as for example in February 1822 in Kedhu when the sultan’s uncle went into revolt, a regular cavalry unit of European hussars had to be called up from the nearest Dutch garrison in Semarang in order to reinforce the meagre constabulary forces in Magelang.\textsuperscript{154} Police methods in both the Principalities and government areas relied heavily on a network of police informers and spies. Judicial torture rather than detective work was used to extract confessions, particularly in the Principalities where trial by ordeal was a common feature of the judicial process up to its abolition by Raffles in August 1812 (Van Deventer 1891:319, 329; Carey 1987:296; Chapter VIII). An insight into the police methods used in the Principalities at this time can be seen from the Surakarta version of the *Babad Dipanagara*’s account of the behaviour of the Macanan (‘tigers’) police unit responsible for security in the sultan’s capital (Carey 1981a:20-1, 28-9, 249 note 55):

\begin{quote}
II. 15 They did exactly as they wished
Their duty was to make the rounds at night [and] make tours inside the capital.
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{151} Dj.Br. 86, Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 28-2-1806, who noted that Radèn Rongga was so afraid of incurring a heavy fine if any of the banished criminals slipped back to Yogya that he put most of them to death.

\textsuperscript{152} See Chapter VI.


\textsuperscript{154} Raffles 1817, I:299; *Lettres de Java* 1822:20; Van der Chijs 1895-97, XV:164-6, XVI:545-6; pp. 495-9 (on Pangérán Dipasana’s revolt in Kedhu in February 1822); Baud 91, P. le Clercq, ‘Copie-Verslag Kedoe’, 1823, 8-9 (on the 35 Jayèng Sekar stationed in Magelang at that time).
The evil folk they saw,
if it was daytime, were prohibited
from [playing] giner, keplèk and kubuk [games of chance with
dice and coins].
As a matter of fact they were old hands at the trade,
[and] if the alarm sounded
at the first thump, a Macanan would arrive,

16 and at the third thump
the Macanan would descend like drizzle:
[...] young Macanan all at once
would be ready to gather evidence,
in high spirits,
as if they expected to encounter
gold dinars of a dhacin in weight.
[...]

III.16 [...] They were puffed up with flattery and self-glorification.
Their daily task
was to strike people guilty of theft and robbery
when they lay face down and bound on a bench,
[then] they hit them time and again.
The south-central Javanese world

The courts also appointed a special group of officials, known as gunung in Surakarta and tamping in Yogyakarta, to oversee policing in the countryside. But they were required to combine these duties with a range of other responsibilities and their salaries were paid out of the taxes they raised in their assigned districts. They were thus more often a burden than a help to the local population and moves were undertaken to abolish them completely during the administrative reforms of the third sultan in 1812-1814.\textsuperscript{155} Police matters were likewise complicated by the close juxtaposition of Yogya and Sala lands in the core districts which meant that criminals could easily slip across jurisdictions and seek asylum in lands belonging to another court. Investigations of crimes committed in areas situated far from the royal capitals also usually entailed the dispatch of lengthy commissions by the patih. This was the case with all incidents of a serious nature in the outlying districts and was sometimes necessary in the central regions as well. As we will see in greater detail in Chapter V, some attempts were made to establish better cooperation between officials of both courts in security matters during this period, most notably by the agreements signed between the Yogya and Sala chief ministers at Klatèn in 1804 and 1808.\textsuperscript{156} But there was no lasting improvement until the complete separation of the territories owned by the courts in the core regions in 1830-1831 (Houben 1994:143-50).

Security matters were thus left largely in the hands of private individuals and communities. Most villages in south-central Java were fortified with thick bamboo palisades which were sharpened when bandits were reported to be in the vicinity. In the district of Prabalingga in southern Kedhu, the security situation was so bad that the villages were ringed by stone walls.\textsuperscript{157} Many local communities also had their own stocks of weapons and Javanese farmers would often carry a kris (stabbing dagger) with them for personal protection when they went to their fields. They were also usually well versed in the use of traditional Javanese weapons such as clubs, pikes and slings, and this local military expertise later proved of immense value to Dipanagara during the Java War.\textsuperscript{158} Chinese tollgate keepers in isolated areas depended for protection on their own private bodyguards who were drawn from the mixed race Chinese coolies attached to the tollgate. In the troubled eastern provinces, for exam-

\textsuperscript{155} Toestand van Bagelen 1858:77; Gericke and Roorda 1901, II:550-1; Winter 1902:33; Rouffaer 1905:614.


The Yogya taxation system and the eastern outlying districts

Besides the endemic security problems, a second problem for peasant cultivators in this period was the increasing burden of taxes imposed by the rulers. They were liable for four main royal imposts, the first of which we have already encountered, namely, the pajeg (from the Javanese ajeg = ‘fixed’), a fixed tax on the produce of the land usually rendered in kind and referred to as ‘land-rent’ (Rouffaer 1905:618; Onghokham 1975:171; Carey 1986:75-6). We will return to this shortly in connection with the revisions introduced by the second sultan to boost his revenues in the early 1800s.

In addition, there were three lesser levies: the pacumpleng (‘door tax’ from the Javanese compleng = ‘an opening’), a tax on each sikep household which in the eastern mancanagara districts at least was paid partly in hanks of weav-

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159 KITLV H 395, Chevallier, ‘Rapport’, 15-6-1824; Crawfurd, ‘Report on Cadoe’, 281, referring to the great expenses incurred by the Chinese tax farmers in protecting their lives and property ‘in a country where they are neither liked nor respected’; S.Br. 89¹¹, H.J. Domis (Semarang) to J.I. van Sevenhoven (Surakarta), 25-4-1824, on the 40-strong Chinese and Bengali bodyguard maintained by J.A. Dezentjé on his Ampèl estate.

160 Nahuys van Burgst 1858:102; Bataviaasche Courant 41, 12-10-1825:1; S.Br. 131, ‘Verbalen Solo’, entry for 8-2-1819 (on axes used to chop down the door of the house of the widow of the Brunswick-born surgeon, Friedrich Willem Baumgarten, in Yogya); Dj.Br. 51B, R.C.N. d’Abo (Yogyakarta) to H.G. Nahuys van Burgst (Surakarta), 23-6-1820 (on axes carried by wong durjana plundering European estates on Mount Merapi).


162 Crawfurd, ‘Sultan’s country’, 93-4, who noted that the rulers also benefited from the privilege of customs’ free lighters (prau pengliput) on the Bengawan Sala and oxen to carry loads to Semarang.
ing cotton or cotton yarn; the *kerigaji* (literally ‘ruler’s gathering or attendance’, hence ‘royal corvée’), a labour obligation for the upkeep of roads in the Principalities which was usually commuted to a money payment fixed at one Spanish dollar per *jung* in the *mancanagara*, but only half or a quarter of that in the core regions (Carey and Hoadley 2000:339-44); and finally a variety of irregular taxes and corvée duties known by a number of names such as *taker tedhak*, *wang bekti*, *gugur gunung*, and *pegawéyan* (Winter 1902:68, 108-9; Rouffaer 1905:625-6; Carey and Hoadley 2000:344-8). There are indications that these last were not unduly onerous in the core districts, but did constitute a very heavy burden in the outlying areas where they were administered by the local *bupati*.

As we have seen, before August 1812, when the corvée duties of the eastern *mancanagara bupati* in the royal capitals was abolished, very heavy labour demands were made on the work forces from the outlying regions. This was particularly the case in Yogya where the second sultan undertook ambitious construction projects. In August 1803, the outgoing Yogya Resident, J.G. van den Berg, informed his successor that whereas the first sultan had only detained the *mancanagara* administrators for four – or at the most five – months in the royal capital following the Garebeg Mulud festivities, the second sultan would often keep them for double that period. The labourers were extremely hard worked and Van den Berg noticed that when the sultan grudgingly delegated about 200 men to carry out repairs on the Dutch fort and other government buildings, they executed their tasks ‘with the lethargy of an exhausted people’. Moreover, their long sojourns in the royal capital meant that the men from the eastern districts could not return home in time to attend to the rice harvest, which in turn had an adverse affect on agricultural production in the *mancanagara*. Although the total numbers of cultivators brought to Yogya each year for these labour services from the eastern regions was not large – in 1808 they amounted to just over 2,000

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163 Raffles 1817, I:134; Kollmann 1864:365; Rouffaer 1904:12-3; Carey and Hoadley 2000:240, 244, 257; Crawfurd, ‘Landed tenures’, 223.

164 UBL BPL 616 Port. 22 no. 4, H.G. Nahuys van Burgst, ‘Montjonegorosche-Djocjokartasche Landen’, n.y. (? 1826) on the abolition of these corvée duties in 1812, possibly at the instigation of the third sultan. See also Chapter VIII.

165 KITLV H 97 (8), J.G. van den Berg, ‘Memorie op het Hof van Djocjocarta, onder den Sultan Hamengcoebœana den tweede […] aan zijn Successeur […] M. Waterloo’, 11-8-1803 (henceforth: Van den Berg, ‘Memorie’). The *mancanagara bupati* were required to arrive in Yogya in the Javanese month of Sapar, ten days before the Garebeg Mulud, when they were ordered to render their *pajeg*, and they would sometimes not be allowed to return to their districts until Puwasa or Besar, a full 6-9 months after their arrival, AvJ, Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to J.G. van den Berg (Surakarta), 24-1-1805; Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to B.F. von Liebeherr (Surakarta), 12-11-1806.

men spread throughout the entourages of fifteen separate bupati\textsuperscript{167} – this still amounted to about six percent of the adult male inhabitants given the small population of the eastern regions at this time (Raffles 1817, II:290).

The eastern bupati also experienced difficulties in supporting themselves during such extensive periods away from home. Van den Berg remarked that they would almost always return to their districts in an impoverished state. Indeed, it was sometimes only due to the help of their relatives in Yogya that they could make the journey at all, often travelling back like ‘common men’ stripped of their money and escort.\textsuperscript{168} Faced with these demands, the bupati tried to meet the very heavy financial burdens placed on them by requesting increases in the journey money paid by the mancanagara inhabitants to assist their district administrators in their sojourns in the royal capital.\textsuperscript{169} Thus the local population found themselves doubly burdened: both by the corvée requirements and the increased fiscal demands of their bupati. This left a legacy of bitterness which manifested itself in the region’s political affiliations in the early nineteenth century. Radèn Rongga Prawiradirja III’s revolt in Madiun in November-December 1810, for example, attracted considerable local sympathy because it was a regional movement directed as much against Pakubuwana IV (and to a lesser extent the second sultan) as against the Dutch.\textsuperscript{170} At the same time, many of the mancanagara bupati supported Dipanagara’s father, the Yogya Crown Prince (later Sultan Hamengkubuwana III) against the second sultan during the power struggles at the court in 1810-1812,\textsuperscript{171} because the former was much more lenient in his corvée demands (Carey 1992:508-9 note 532). Even as late as August 1826, when the second sultan was briefly reinstated as ruler during a difficult period for the Dutch in the Java War, his exactions were still remembered. In the Yogya Resident, Jan Izaäk van Sevenhoven’s words (Louw and De Klerck, 1894-1909, II:421-2):

One [only has] to visit the sixteen or eighteen country seats which he constructed, mostly with stone buildings, ponds with brick sides and other extensive pieces of masonry, and to think how these constructions as well as a large part of his kraton were put up at the cost of the sweat and tears of the inhabitants of his entire kingdom.

\textsuperscript{167} Dj.Br. 45, Matthijs Waterloo, ‘Accuraate aanthooning van zodanige contingent troupes […] die gezaamentlylv uitmaaken den sulthan’s oostersche of mantjanagarasche regenten’, 22-3-1808, gives a total of 2,126 men, of whom 1,025 were pikemen, 1,025 musketeers, 38 pennant bearers, 19 drummers and 19 pipers.

\textsuperscript{168} Van den Berg, ‘Memorie’, 11-8-1803.

\textsuperscript{169} Van den Berg, ‘Memorie’, 11-8-1803. Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, VI:382-3 for the list of the wang pesangon levies given in P.H. Lawick van Pabst’s 21-8-1830 report on taxes in the eastern districts, full citation, note 172.

\textsuperscript{170} See Chapter VI.

\textsuperscript{171} See Chapter VII and VIII.
Hardly surprising then, in view of the continuing memory of the second sultan’s labour requirements, that the *mancanagara* inhabitants as a whole showed little sympathy for Dipanagara’s rebellion in 1825-1830, which they probably saw as essentially a ‘Mataram’ affair.

Besides the burden of the labour obligations to the rulers, the population of the outlying regions also had to contend with a number of more minor levies and labour services to local dignitaries, impositions which the cultivators in the core regions did not experience so acutely. The main reason for this was because the *bupati* and their subordinate officials actually resided in their districts whereas the apanage holders in the *nagara agung* lived mostly in the royal capitals. The former thus had more opportunity to insist on a wide variety of personal services and taxes.\(^{172}\) When the Dutch annexed Madiun in 1830, they found some 65-70 separate impositions rendered by the local inhabitants besides the main taxes due to the rulers and the provincial administrators.\(^{173}\) Although none of these impositions were levied on all taxable members of the local communities, the Dutch calculated that a wealthy *sikep* in the eastern districts rendered the equivalent of f 50-60 a year in corvée, kind and money taxes, a substantially higher fiscal burden than for peasant cultivators in adjacent government-controlled areas (Onghokham 1975:173).

Many of these minor taxes, such as those paid for the slaughter of livestock (*tugel gurung*) or levied by irrigation officials for the use of water (*pamili toya*), as well as the craftsmen’s patents and tribute in lieu of building materials (*wilah welit*), were common throughout the core and outlying regions (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, VI:381-4). But the amount of corvée and special duties associated with the upkeep of a *bupati* and his entourage were almost certainly greater than the services demanded by resident officials in the *nagara agung*. Throughout the eastern districts, for example, it was usual for district administrators to demand that *sikep* work for certain periods without payment in their fields, an obligation sometimes commuted to a

\(^{172}\) S.Br. 127, Pieter Merkus, ‘Verslag’, 21-8-1830, in ‘Oostelijke montjo-negorosche landen’ (henceforth: Merkus, ‘Verslag’), quoting a report of P.H. Lawick van Pabst, who noted that the *bupati*’s scope for demanding personal services and taxes was ‘virtually unlimited’. They also had sole responsibility for the appointment of lesser officials and controlled justice in the area, see Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, VI:378-84; P.H. Lawick van Pabst, ‘Beschrijving der onderschiedene belastingen welke in de oostelijke montjo-negorosche landen geheven worden’, 21-8-1830 (henceforth: Van Pabst, ‘Beschrijving’).

\(^{173}\) Merkus, ‘Verslag’, 21-8-1830; Van Pabst, ‘Beschrijving’, 21-8-1830; Onghokham 1975:172. According to Merkus, the total amount of taxation paid by the population of the eastern *mancanagara* (estimated at 56,540 families or about 281,700 people) in 1830 was f 725,657. Of this f 126,758 was paid to the courts, f 186,162 was given to subordinate officials and f 408,747 kept by the *bupati*. The total figure was certainly much larger because the local tax collectors took substantial cuts at source. The average amount of taxation per head worked out at f 2.34 compared to f 1.10 to f 2.00 in adjacent government areas. The fiscal demands of the Surakarta court were apparently more onerous than those of Yogya.
money tax known as kuduran. Moreover, the residences (dalem) of the bupati also required considerable labour for their maintenance (Nagtegaal 1996:187), especially in the case of a dalem such as that of Raden Rongga Prawiradirja III at Maospati just to the west of Madiun, which had been laid out ‘like a kraton with thick stone walls‘.174 Special tributes in rice were likewise levied from the sikep for the support of members of the bupati’s personal staff such as grooms, gardeners, dancers, musicians, goldsmiths, saddle-makers and payung (state parasol) carriers (Onghokham 1975:140-1 note 71). Indeed, the lifestyle of many of the senior officials in the mancanagara emulated that of the central Javanese rulers albeit on a reduced scale and had to be maintained by numerous extra levies on the local inhabitants. We will see below how one of the principal grievances against Rongga was that he had used a local bandit to furnish him with fine Javanese gamelan orchestras which he had carried off from the adjacent Surakarta-controlled territory of Panaraga.175

The ‘pancas’ revisions of the second sultan and their impact

If the tax-paying peasant cultivators in the core regions escaped some of these extra levies and labour demands, they were still faced with major fiscal challenges. The key problem for the sikep in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries was that the level of tax payments demanded by the rulers was steadily increasing. This was especially the case in Yogyakarta, where the second sultan instituted a practice known as pancas – literally ‘cutting through’ or ‘pruning’ – whereby the size of the jung in his dominions was diminished while the tax obligations on each land unit remained at the same level (Rouffaer 1905:593; Carey 1986:115-6).

The background to this initiative lay in the lack of up-to-date cadastral registers at the courts. This meant that there could be no annual reassessment of tax burdens which took account of the rapid extension of sawah and irrigation systems in late eighteenth-century south-central Java (Rouffaer 1905:618; Carey 1992:440 note 205). We have seen above how no new cadastral surveys were compiled by either of the courts after the completion of the ‘New Book’ (Serat Ebuk Anyar) in 1773. Both the second sultan and his Surakarta counter-

174 UBL BPL 616 Port. 22 pt. 4, Nahuys van Burgst, ‘Montjonegorosche-Djokjokartasche landen’, n.y. (? 1826) (on various dalem built by Yogyakarta bupati wedana at Wanasari and Maospati); Merkus, ‘Verslag’, 21-8-1830 (on their maintenance); S.Br. 37:87, Relaas of Surakarta spy, 9-12-1810; Dj.Br. 27/ Dj.Br. 46, P.H. van Lawick van Pabst (Rembang) to Carl von Winckelmann (Inspector General of Forests), 30-11-1810, 1-12-1810; Carey 1980:38 note 1, 39 note 4; Madioen 1855:3. Adam 1940:334 (on Rongga’s stronghold at Maospati with its stone perimeter wall or pager banon armed with cannon, which in 1940 was still known to locals by the name of ‘kraton’, a toponym which appears on the 1922 Dutch ordnance survey map of the eastern side of Maospati near the old posting station).

175 Pp. 220-1.
part, Sunan Pakubuwana IV, steadfastly refused to countenance a new survey proposed by the Dutch in April 1792 because they feared that the Dutch East Indies Company would either seek to even out the landholdings between the courts or annex to itself all the new lands opened up since the 1773 measurement (De Jonge and Van Deventer 1884-88, XII:260; Rouffaer 1905:591; Carey 1978:123, 146). Even the Dutch seem to have treated this cadaster and its predecessor, the ‘Book of Klepu’ (1756), as quasi-*pusaka* (heirlooms) keeping them both in a locked secret chest in the archives of the governor of Java’s Northeast Coast in Semarang. Although subsequent attempts were made both by the British (1811-1816) (Blagden 1916:107-12) and the post-1816 restored Dutch administrations to compile accurate statistical accounts of the Principalities, they proved abortive. Indeed, it was not until 1865-1866 that the first detailed topographical maps of Surakarta and Yogyakarta were completed. Eighteenth-century land registers were thus all the central Javanese rulers and the European government had to go on until well into the nineteenth century.

The accounts kept by the sultan – at least in the form they have come down to us – give the impression of a somewhat disordered administration (Carey 1980:4-5; Carey and Hoadley 2000:441-3). Land grants to royal officials and lists of revenue payments are mixed up with documents of a very eclectic nature: political correspondence between the sultan and the Dutch Residents, royal prohibitions on apparel and etiquette, notes on disputes over villages, payments for *pradikan santri* (tax free benefices for men of religion) and court activities.

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177 Van der Kemp 1913:24; Avj, A.H. Smissaert (Yogyakarta) to G.A.G.Ph. van der Capellen (Batavia), 19-4-1823 (on the difficulty of compiling statistical survey of region because of juxtaposition of landholdings in *nagara agung*); A.H. Smissaert (Yogyakarta) to Curator Militaire School (Semarang), 26-10-1823 (on the absence of key maps of the Yogyakarta *kraton* and landholdings which were thought to have been sent to Semarang prior to the British attack in June 1812).

178 Dj.Br. 1, ‘Politieke Verslag der residentie Djokjokarta over het jaar 1865’, on topographical survey of Yogyakarta by K.F. Wilsen (1865). A similar map was produced for Surakarta by Beijerinck and Okerse in 1866. Copies of these maps can be found in BL, IOR X IX 3 (Wilsen), IOR X IX 7 (Beijerinck and Okerse).

179 S.Br. 14B, Col. Alexander Adams (Surakarta) to T.S. Raffles (Batavia), 20-7-1812 (dispatch of Surakarta copy of ‘Book of Klepu’, *Serat Buk Kalepu*, drawn up in 1756-1757 after the Giyanti treaty, to help Raffles form an impression of the landholdings in the Principalities before his negotiation of August 1812 treaties with the courts); Dj.Br. 58, J.F.W. van Nes (Yogyakarta) to Commissarissen ter regeling der vorstenlanden, 25-6-1830 (reporting that Radèn Adipati Danureja IV had admitted that the Book of Klepu given to Van Nes by Panembahan Mangkurat [ex-Pangéran Mangkubumi] gave more detailed statistics for landholdings in Pajang and Mataram than he could provide from his own archive). See further Houben 1994:45.
haji, reports from spies in government districts, letters from provincial officials to Yogya senior court bupati, as well as items of a more intimate nature such as challenges to cockfights, instructions on fasting and personal letters with imagery from the wayang.

We have the looting British to thank for much of this mess given the disorder in which everything was carted off from the kraton after its fall on 20 June 1812 (Carey 1980:12 notes 1-4, 1992:94-6, 248-51, 421 note 111-2). But the nature of the sultanate’s administrative system was also to blame. As Mason Hoadley has pointed out, it was in no sense a Weberian rational bureaucratic polity. Instead, its underdeveloped administrative structure and lack of functional chain of command meant that orders from the sultan were filtered through a whole hierarchy of intermediaries, none of whom had autonomous authority over a region or an administrative department. The final version of a royal command could thus be very different from the original, a system made even more perilous by scribal error in the cross-checking of documents. Temporary absence of key intermediaries with privileged access to the ruler due to sickness, and the existence of a number of ministers known as miji answerable directly to the sultan and thus outside the normal bureaucratic hierarchy compounded these problems (Carey and Hoadley 2000:442). This meant that the strength and weakness of the kingdom depended very much on the character of the monarch: a strong authoritarian ruler could overcome the system’s centripetal tendencies, a weak one would fall prey to them (Remmelink 1994:23).

What is clear is that post-June 1812, the already disordered Yogya administration of the second sultan began to sink into even greater disarray under a succession of short-lived (Hamengkubuwana III, reigned 1812-1814), and under-age rulers (Hamengkbuwana IV, reigned 1814-1822; Hamengkubuwana V, reigned 1822-1826, 1828-1855). Even the most basic land registers and revenue lists were not maintained. In September 1823, the parlous state of the kraton archive was graphically illustrated in a letter from the mother of the fourth sultan, Ratu Ageng, to Pangéran Dipanagara in reply to the latter’s request for the copy of a legal document from the British period (Chapter VII notes 235-6; Chapter IX note 170) which he had originally lodged with the court. Ratu Ageng excused herself as follows:

As regards the letter of contract from the British, which came from you, I do not know where it is because the stack [in the kraton archive] consists of many letters which are in complete disorder spread here and there.  

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180 See Carey and Hoadley 2000:302, 365 (for care taken by court scribes, carik-dalem, in drawing up land grants and revenue lists and references to use of rough drafts, serat rèngrèng, as well as cross-references to financial registers – buk); Carey 1980:152-3 (for letters from carik begging forgiveness for scribal errors).

181 vAE (aanwinsten 1941), A.H. Smissaert (Yogyakarta) to G.A.G.Ph. van der Capellen (Batavia), 25-11-1824.

182 Yogya kraton MS A.62 (Babad Dipanagaran), 62, Ratu Ageng to Dipanagara, Sura, Dal AJ
Indeed, it was not until the early years of the twentieth century that an effective reform of the sultan’s treasury and financial affairs was carried out under the supervision of a Jewish accountant appointed to the kraton staff on the recommendation of the Dutch Resident.183

This combination of administrative disorder and reliance on antiquated cadastral surveys proved an insuperable barrier to the functioning of a fair taxation system at the central Javanese courts in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. However, whereas in Surakarta, the financially incompetent Sunan, Pakubuwana IV, took no new fiscal initiatives beyond demanding forced loans from his subjects to pay off his debts,184 in Yogya, the second sultan wished to see the great increase in the productiveness of his lands reflected in steadily rising tax returns, and was prepared to use arbitrary methods to achieve his ends. This led eventually to the twin fiscal revisions of 1802 and 1808-1811, the background to which is necessary to consider in some detail.

Amongst his royal officials, the Yogya ruler disposed of a handful of ‘village surveyors’ known as abdi-dalem priksa dusun or mantri papriksan negara whose main task was to supervise the tax-collectors to see that they did not take too much land.185 They may have had a wide knowledge of agrarian conditions, but they were far too few in number to keep the sultan fully informed about developments in land use in his far-flung dominions. The Yogya ruler thus had to rely on reports from individual apanage holders and mancanagarapupati as to the productivity of the lands under their charge (Carey and Hoadley 2000:65-6). This led to frequent notifications regarding cacah which had become uncultivated or depopulated, especially in the eastern outlying areas, where a distinction began to be made in land grants between cacah gesang (inhabited or cultivated cacah), and cacah pejah (depopulated or uncultivated cacah; Carey 1986:11; Carey and Hoadley 2000:69-74, 240-50), but understandably few admissions concerning increased productivity on established sawah or the opening up of new lands. And naturally so – every one of the sultan’s subjects from the grandest apanage holder to the lowliest sikep was loathe to face new fiscal demands. This was remarked on by the Dutch Resident, W.H. van IJsseldijk (in office 1786-1798), in Pacitan where peasant cultivators had made a point of not informing the courts about the great increase in irrigated

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1751 (AD 9-1823): bab layang kuntrak pranjanji nawarawan Inggris kang saka sira, ingsun nora weruh pangonané, amarga tumpukan layang luwih akèh, sarta pating balèngkrah kalèwèran. See further p. 545 for confirmation of the state of the kraton archive in 1823.


184 vAE (aanwinsten 1900) 235, N. Engelhard, ‘Memorie, 14-5-1808, refers to Pakubuwana IV’s forced loan of 100,000 Spanish dollars in 1807-1808, but states that the Sunan kept most of it for himself rather than pay his creditors.

185 Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:594; Carey 1986:110-1; Carey and Hoadley 2000:81, 310-1; GKA, Exhibitum, 20-9-1830 no. 56k, geheim verbaal, interview with Mas Tumenggung Sindujaya (mantri papriksan negara), 13-4-1830.
sawah along the Grindulu River in the late eighteenth century because they were afraid that new lands would be appropriated by the rulers.  

Faced with this situation, the sultan responded by threatening the apanage holders with royal disfavour if they refused to send in accurate reports. In the Yogya archive, there is an important royal order, unfortunately undated but probably issued around the time of the first fiscal revision in July 1802, in which recipients of lands were commanded to inform the ruler within two months of any discrepancies between the lands listed in their piagem (official land grants) and the actual extent of their apanages after new clearances had been accounted for. If no replies were forthcoming in the appointed time, the sultan warned that he would dispatch his village surveyors to make independent enquiries, a threat he must have known he could not enforce given the limited number of them available to him (Carey 1986:110-1; Carey and Hoadley 2000:81).

In a vain attempt to address the issue, the second sultan continued the resurveying of some of the most fertile landholdings in the Mataram area begun by his predecessor in 1791 when the old agrarian unit of the Majapahit rood had been reintroduced into the core regions (Rouffaer 1905:593, 617; Carey 1986:114). The second Yogya ruler had encouraged the extension of this measure in order to create more ‘unity’ in the size of the Yogya fields and to discover undeclared apanage ground, thus enhancing his tax income. The survey seems to have aroused little opposition amongst the apanage holders but it proceeded too slowly to make any real impact on revenue returns. The impatient sovereign thus embarked on a much more drastic plan: sometime before the Garebeg Mulud of 14 July 1802, he carried out his first fiscal revision. Known as the panceas, this reduced the size of the old Majapahit rood considerably while making the new measure applicable throughout all Yogya territories both in the core regions and the outlying areas (Carey 1986:114-5). According to Nahuys van Burgst (1835, I:8 note 1) and Jan Isaäk van Sevenhoven, who both served as commissioners for the land settlement in the Principalities after the Java War (Houben 1994:17-71), a further revision followed some years later during the period of Daendels’ governor-generalship (1808-1811).

The effects of these – possibly two – fiscal revisions was the artificial creation of twenty percent more apanage land in the sultanate from the pared off landholdings of members of the sultan’s family and Yogya officials. Crawfurd estimated that at least 10,000 new size Yogya cacah were added by the measure and in the pajeg returns of 1808, the Yogya ruler is listed as having


187 S.Br. 55, J.I. van Sevenhoven, ‘Nota over de landverhuringen aan partikulieren in de vorstenlanden op Java’, 16-3-1837. The usual Majapahit land measurement was the fathom (dhepa), the length of the chest whit both arms outstretched, Gericke and Roorda 1901, II:360; Carey 1981a:26-7. Rood may be a Dutch translation of this.

188 Crawfurd, ‘Sultan’s country’, 120.
I The south-central Javanese world

enjoyed an extra 20,000 *ronde real* (1 *ronde real* = £ 2)\(^{189}\) in rent from the new royal domain grounds created by the first *pancas*.\(^{190}\) From this time onwards a considerable discrepancy existed between the size of Yogya and Sala *jung*, which was commented on by a number of European land-renters in the Principalities during the course of the nineteenth century.\(^{191}\)

The *pancas* revisions were the equivalent of a debasement of the currency as Rouffaer (1905:593) pointed out and they aroused bitter opposition amongst Yogya apanage holders, who were quick to pass on the fiscal burdens entailed by the new measure to their *sikep* when resistance proved useless.\(^{192}\) This undoubtedly led to a significant increase in the amount of tax borne by *sikep* in Yogya areas and compounded the difficulties faced by poorer farmers and *numpang* who had ambitions to set themselves up as independent cultivators. Most important of all, the *pancas* sharpened the inherent differences in the tax burdens on individual *jung* which were already fixed in a most hap hazard fashion by the apanage holders and the sovereign. Thus, in the lands around Nanggulon in the Kulon Praga area, which were administered directly by the Dutch government between 1833 and 1851, government surveyors found huge discrepancies both in the size of *jung* and the *pajeg* levied on each unit, with no obvious connection being made between population density, the fertility of the soil and the level of *pajeg* payments (Carey 1986:112). Even then, the new land measurement inaugurated by the *pancas* does not seem to have been applied to all Yogya lands even in the core regions and as late as 1830 there is evidence that the old measurement of the Majapahit rood was still being used in some Mataram villages.\(^{193}\) In this context, the third sultan’s attempts to revert to his grandfather, Sultan Mangkubumi’s,

\(^{189}\) The value of the *ronde real*, a silver coin also known as the *real batu* or rix dollar (*rijksdaalder*), had a notional exchange rate of 64 stuivers or \(f \ 3.20\), although the value varied according to the silver content (it was usually worth between \(f \ 2.40\) and \(f \ 2.56\)). The sterling (English currency) equivalent was four shillings and sixpence, Carey 1980:200.

\(^{190}\) Van Kesteren 1887:1315; dK 145, Matthejs Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 22-3-1808.

\(^{191}\) Dj.Br. 51C, H.G. Nahuys van Burgst (Surakarta) to H.J. van de Graaff (Batavia), 18-5-1821 (estimated that Sala *jung* were four times as large as those of Yogya after *pancas*); S.Br. 88\(^{11}\), Dr Harvey Thomson (Rajawinangun) to R.C.N. d’Abo (Yogyakarta), 6-1-1823 (reckoned that *pajeg* from a *jung* of *sawah* in Surakarta averaged 120 Spanish dollars as opposed to 50 Spanish dollars in Yogya); MvK 3054, ‘Statistieke beschrijving der residentie Kedoe’ (1836), 29 (reported on two sizes of *jung* in the province – 2,000 and 1,952 square roods – which may have originated in different Yogya and Sala land measurements); Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal, 15-9-1844 no. 3 (land grant of 80 Yogya *jung* – equivalent of 64.25 Surakarta *jung* – to European land-renter Timmerman Thyssen in Sléman).


\(^{193}\) GKA Exhibitum, 20-9-1830 no. 56k, geheim verbaal, interview with Tumenggung Malangnegara, 15-4-1830.
administrative methods, both during his period as Prince Regent (Raja Putra Naréndra) in January-September 1811 and during his brief reign (1812-1814) (Carey 1980:21), must have created yet further complications in the already dizzyingly complex Yogya tax structure. Local migrations away from areas of high taxation to those regions where the fiscal burdens were lighter can be seen as partly the outcome of this fiscal imbalance. Although the _pancas_ enabled the second sultan to tap some of his subjects’ additional wealth, it was implemented in such a rough and ready fashion that it exacerbated agrarian problems at the village level and in the longer term prepared the ground for the widespread rural uprising in south-central Java which accompanied Dipanagara’s revolt in July 1825.194

**Conclusion**

In assessing the taxation structure of the Principalities at the beginning of the nineteenth century, certain key themes can be singled out. The most obvious was the difference in tax burdens between the core regions and the _mancanagara_. This goes far to explaining the declining population in the outlying districts in the latter part of the eighteenth century and provides insights into the area’s affiliations after 1800. Another important theme was the general trend for corvée services to be replaced by money taxes. This was happening nearly everywhere in the Principalities except in the _mancanagara_, and it was a development which appears to have been welcomed by the independent peasant cultivators (_sikep_). It also suggests a lively cash economy in some rural areas of south-central Java at this time. A third theme was the inexorable rise in _pajeg_ demands, especially in Yogya where the second sultan’s _pancas_ revision had drastic effects at the local level. Taken together with the numerous extraordinary levies such as the _taker tedhak_ and _uang bekti pasumbangan_ raised by both the apanage holders and the rulers, they amounted to sharply increasing tax burdens on the _sikep_. Despite these difficulties, it is certain that many independent peasant cultivators were able to hang on to much of their wealth in this period. The inefficiencies of the royal administrations, the lack of accurate cadastral surveys and the paucity of village surveyors all meant that their newly opened lands could be concealed. It was only in the five years preceding the Java War when harvest failures were common and the operation of the Chinese-run tollgates began to have a devastating effect on local trade that agrarian conditions in south-central Java became intolerable for cultivators. These conditions would precipitate the widespread agrarian uprising in south-central Java which was the most significant feature of the outbreak of the Java War in July 1825.

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Socially and culturally, Yogyakarta and its Surakarta counterparts presented a generally confident and prosperous aspect in this period. They were still predominantly military societies, but martial requirements were assuming less prominence in an age when there were fewer major conflicts. In this respect, Yogya retained more of its original character than the Surakarta court in large part because of the legacy of the first sultan. But even here there was a tendency for cacah to become units of economic measurement rather than the basis of general military enlistment, and the calling up of auxiliary levies declined except in situations of emergency. In the countryside, besides the existence of a class of more or less wealthy peasant cultivators, the main features were numerous landless labourers (numpang) and an even larger group of tax-collectors (bekel, demang) acting on behalf of apanage holders resident in the royal capitals.

This was the world into which Dipanagara was born in 1785. It was a place full of tensions and dynamism, at once violent, insecure and prosperous where one could encounter great social differences and extreme geographical variety. In the span of just under five hundred kilometres from the furthest western to the most easterly outlying provinces, one could traverse abandoned landscapes as well as fertile and densely populated core regions where Java seemed like a tropical Eden. This was a society where a wealthy sikep could have a personal fortune in silver ducatoons kept for display under his bed and where a landless labourer or porter had but the second-hand clothes he wore on his back. This was frontier Java, a very different world from the ordered agrarian society of the post-Java War era with its cultivation systems (1830-1870) and Delft and Leiden-educated colonial administrators, a society no longer geared for war but for the world market in international cash-crop production. Culturally too, the days were numbered when the high court etiquette of the south-central Javanese kraton set the tone, a place where the villages had their customs and the court centres their order.195 This would soon give way to a new native elite exemplified by the post-1830 Dutch-appointed priyayi, an indigenous bureaucratic class more at home in the butchered cadences of ‘Service Malay’ than the refinements of high court Javanese (Sutherland 1979; Hoffman 1979:72). For the Europeans too, as we will see in Chapter IX, the post-1816 returned Dutch government would mark a social and cultural watershed. The great Indies families, who had dominated the higher echelons of the Dutch East Indies Company administration in the eighteenth century, would be swept aside by the flood of placemen, adventurers and former Napoleonic War officers who came to the Indies on the coat-tails of Governor-General G.A.G.Ph. van der Capellen’s administration (1816-1826). The days of the mestizo, mixed race slave-owning Indo-Portuguese elite, evoked so vividly by Jean Gelman Taylor (1983) in her study

195 The original Javanese expression is: dus mawi cara, nagara mawi tata.
of colonial Batavia, were numbered. Soon, a new type of Dutch Indies official, members of the post-Revolutionary Dutch bourgeoisie, born and educated in the Netherlands, would rule Java. Over a century would pass before the Indonesians, led by those who had benefited from a Dutch education, would have the opportunity to shake them off.

For a Javanese prince born fifteen years short of the new century, how was it possible to surmise all this? For such a person it must have seemed that the Javanese ‘old order’ of the south-central Javanese Principalities, successor states to the once mighty Mataram Empire of the seventeenth century, was a fixed entity, culturally secure even if politically and socially turbulent. In the imaginings of such a man, especially if like Dipanagara he was brought up to be a pious Javanese Muslim, the faded glories of the Ottoman Empire and the holy mosques (haraman) of Medina and Mecca, the very places trod by the feet of The Prophet, were what mattered. If there was a sacred centre on this earth, it was in Arabia where the heart of the Muslim community of Believers beats. In such a universe, who could have imagined that it would not be the Sublime Porte or the holy places of the Hejaz (present day Saudi Arabia) which would shape his future, but the political and industrial revolutions even then germinating in the bleak mill towns of Lancashire or the teeming artisan quarters of Paris? Protean energies would flow from these twin revolutions leading to what historian Kenneth Pomeranz has aptly termed ‘The Great Divergence’ (Pomeranz 2000), when the technical efficiency and standards of living in Europe and Asia – in particular China – began to part company. But at this early stage it would take a genius to perceive them.196

In the meantime, before the two divergent worlds smashed into each other and south-central Java felt the full force of the new European order, it would be vouchsafed a brief period in which its own ancien régime would remain intact. In those twenty-three years, Dipanagara would grow to manhood and find his own place in the spiritual and cultural universe of his native Yogya. That coming of age in the unusual surroundings of his great-grandmother’s country estate at Tegalreja will be the subject of the next three chapters.

196 One such genius was the German Romantic poet, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (died 1832). Surveying the surprise rout of the Prussian army at the battle of Valmy (20 September 1792) at the beginning of the Revolutionary Wars by the newly engineered precision field artillery of Jean-Baptiste Vaquette de Gribeauval, he wrote that he had told the Prussian generals: ‘This spot and this day mark the beginning of a new epoch in world history, and you can say that you were there’ (‘Von hier und heute geht eine neue Epoche der Weltgeschichte aus, und ihr könnt sagen, ihr seid dabei gezeuget’), J.W. von Goethe, *Campagne in Frankreich 1792* (1822), in: Erich Trunz, *Goethes Werke, Hamburger Ausgabe in 14 Bänden. X: Autobiographische Schriften II*, p. 235. Hamburg: Wegner. 14 vols. I am grateful to Dr Kevin Hilliard of St. Peter’s College, Oxford, for this reference. The application of reason and experiment to the development of a new weapons system which could bombard targets accurately at up to 1,100 yards, the range of the advancing Prussians at Valmy, combined with the industrial capacity of late eighteenth-century France and the nationalist zeal of the French Revolutionary armies had transformed the nature of warfare, McNeill 1982:170-1, 197.
CHAPTER II

Dipanagara’s youth and upbringing
1785-1803

A prophetic birth

Dipanagara – who was given the childhood name of Bendara Radèn Mas Mustahar (Dwidjosoegondo and Adisoetrisno 1941:102) – was born in the Yogyakarta kraton on 11 November 1785 just before sunrise.1 In Javanese chronology, the date of the future Java War leader’s birth was especially auspicious because it fell in the Javanese month of Sura, the first month of the Javanese year when traditionally new kingdoms are founded and new historical cycles begin (Carey 1981a:261 note 108). The day was also significant in modern-day Javanese almanac literature because the combination of the day of the week and that of the five-day Javanese market week, Jumungah Wagé (Friday Wagé), is said to indicate a person of great fluency and power of speech, generosity of heart, and the character of a sage, but one who would encounter great hindrances in his life because of his frank and argumentative manner.2 It is interesting to note here that Indonesia’s first president, Soekarno (1901-1970), was also a child of the dawn and of the new century and saw himself as being endowed with a special destiny because of it.3 Even the Arabic year of the prince’s birth – AH 1200 – seems to have been significant: it is mentioned in some of the more self-consciously Islamic versions of the prophecies traditionally ascribed to the twelfth-century king of Kedhiri, Prabu Jayabaya, as

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1 BD (Manado) II:114, XIV (Sinom) 44. ‘In the year Bé/ just in the month of Muharam/ on the date the eighth. The day being/ Friday Wagé/ in the [Javanese year] Alip/ in the wuku [one of 30 seven-day periods which make up 210-day Javanese year] Kulawu/ his delivery was at saur [Muslim meal just before daybreak in the fasting month]’.

2 Tanojo 1966:31. Tanojo’s description for no. 20 (Friday Wagé birthdays) reads: wong lamun lair ing dina Juma’at Wagé, wataké bisa amicara juwèh rècèh pratitis watak pandhita, cetha nanging ceng-kiling, lilan nanging kerep kesandhung.

3 Adams 1965:17, who quotes Soekarno as saying: ‘We Javanese believe that one born at the moment of sunrise is pre-destined […] with me [Soekarno] it wasn’t only the dawn of a new day, but also the dawn of a new century’.
the year in which the Javanese Ratu Adil (‘Just King’) would appear.4

Dipanagara’s father was the eldest son of the second sultan of Yogya, Hamengkubuwana II (reigned 1792-1810, 1811-1812, 1826-1828), by his official wife (garwa padmi), Ratu Kedhaton (circa 1750-1820), who was of Madurese royal ancestry and distinguished in court circles for her Islamic religious piety (Carey 1980:173-4, 1992:187, 382, 401 note 12). His father was a little over sixteen at the time of Dipanagara’s birth, but already had the reputation of being a charming and prepossessing young man beloved by many for his mild character and quiet sense of humour. As a keen amateur historian and a budding littérateur in his own right, Dutch sources report that he was often called by his grandfather Sultan Mangkubumi, the first sultan (reigned 1749-1792), to read to him from old Javanese tales and histories.5 It is not known how much influence Dipanagara’s father had on the young prince during his youth because at the age of seven he was taken away from the women’s quarters in the kraton to live with his great-grandmother at her estate of Tegalreja, some three kilometres to the west of Yogya across the ricefields.6 But later the two were to be close during the 1811-1812 crisis, precipitated by the confrontation between the Yogya court and the European government, and during his father’s own short reign (1812-1814).

It is possible that through his father – the favourite grandchild of the ageing first sultan – Dipanagara was brought to the notice of the founder of the Yogya kingdom when he was still a baby in arms. In his autobiography, Dipanagara described how he was presented to Sultan Mangkubumi by his mother, and the ageing ruler had foretold that he would cause the Dutch greater destruction than he had done during the Giyanti War (1746-1755), but that only the Almighty knew the outcome.7 The anecdote provides an insight into the

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4 Drewes 1925:167. The particular recension of the Jayabaya prophecies referred to by Drewes derived from west Java and was of late nineteenth-century origin. Ricklefs notes that although the prophecies were traditionally ascribed to Jayabaya, a real twelfth-century king, he may have had nothing to do with them, Ricklefs 2006:92.

5 KITLV H 97 pt. 7, W.H. van IJsseldijk, ‘Korte schets van de gesteldheid van Sultans Hoff, tot narig van den pl. Opperhoofd I.G. van den Berg’ (henceforth: Van IJsseldijk, ‘Korte schets’), 31-8-1798, quoting from his predecessor, J.M. van Rhijn’s (in office 1773-1786) final memorandum, ‘Beschrijving der toestand van Sulthan’s hoft’, 21-2-1780 (Ricklefs 2006:159). So taken was the first sultan with his grandson that, according to Van IJsseldijk, he placed himself in charge of his education and taught him to appreciate Javanese history and legends, drawing, painting and the courtly arts of literary composition and the chanting (macapat) of chronicles (babad). For a less sympathetic view, see Thorn 1815:291, quote cited in Chapter VII note 242.

6 Veth 1896-1907, III:572 noted that Javanese royal children were usually kept in the women’s quarters (keputrèn) in the kraton until they were circumcised.

7 Carey 1974a:30-1; BD (Manado) II:114, XIV (Sinom) 45-6. Kangjeng iku ingkang bektal prapt prangsaning Sang Ajil/ pinarak Prabakasa/ pan lajang iling-iling/ Jeng Sultan ngandika ris/ Bok Ratu buyutirèku/ besuk wruhanira/ wus karsaning Hyang Widehi/ pan pinasthi iya karya lampahan. 46. Pan iku luwihi lan ingwang/ rusaké Walonda bénjing/ wekasan Walahu Alam. See further Chapter VIII.
importance which Dipanagara attached to the charismatic figure of the first sultan, and the way in which Mangkubumi’s example inspired family members who were close to the prince during the Java War (1825-1830). The first sultan’s prophecy can also be linked to another prediction, ascribed to the great seventeenth-century ruler of Mataram, Sultan Agung (reigned 1613-1646), which Dipanagara also relates in his autobiography. This had foretold that after the death of Agung in February 1646, the Dutch would rule in Java for 300 years and that although one of the Mataram ruler’s descendants would rise against them, he would be ultimately defeated. It seems almost certain that Dipanagara identified himself with this descendant indicated by Agung, thus providing what might be seen as a prophetic context in which to understand his later failure against the Dutch. We will see below how these predictions would be reinforced by the enigmatic prophecy of the disembodied voice heard by the twenty-year-old Dipanagara as he slept at Parangkusuma on the south coast: ‘You alone are the means, but that not for long, only to be counted amongst the ancestors’.

Female relatives and influences

Although Dipanagara’s male forbears were of considerable significance to the

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8 Pangéran Jayakusuma I (Ngabèhi) (circa 1787-1829) (Chapter III note 3), one of Dipanagara’s principle commanders during the Java War, almost certainly echoed the prince’s opinion about the first sultan when in a letter to Hamengkubuwana II in 1826 he referred to the founder of Yogya as a ‘wandering knight’ (satria lelana), whom they had sought to emulate during their five-year struggle, Dj.Br. 42, Jan Izaäk van Sevenhoven, ‘Nadere toelichting en vervolg van de nota bevattende een kort overzicht van den staat der vorstenlanden en van het rijk van Jocjocarta in het byzonder […],’ 4-12-1826, enclosing a report from Mas Selaya, a Javanese spy employed by the Dutch, 17-10-1826. See also AN, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal, 10-10-1834 no. 4 (Decision by Governor-General Jean Chrétien Baud to exile Dipanagara’s eldest son to Sumenep), Report of Mas Sumadipura on Pangéran Dipanagara II, 10-1833, reporting the latter to have said: wataké wong Mentaram […] telung prakara […] kang dhingin bisa simpen, kapindho gelem mbuwang, kaping telu kenceng agamané. Niku adaté sok dadi becik. Sinuwun Swarga mawan kadospundi, ngliowihi saking gerah, nanging kenceng agamané, katrima dadi nurunaké; ‘The people of Mataram [Yogya] have three characteristics: first they can keep things to themselves, second they are generous, and third they are strict about their religion. That is the sort of adat [custom] which frequently produces quality. [As for] the late sultan [Hamengkubuwana I] how about him? He suffered great pains, but was firm in his religion – something which has been received as a transmission [to this day].’

9 Carey 1974a:30. The present author was wrong to ascribe the phrase in Dipanagara’s babad, bénjing sapengker kula, as referring to the date of the failure of Agung’s second siege of Batavia (1629), when the Mataram ruler attempted to force the Dutch out of their fortress. It is clear that Agung is referring instead to the period after his death. This would in fact fit better with the period of foreign rule in Java which lasted well beyond the Japanese capitulation on 15 August 1945 and the Indonesian declaration of independence two days later (17-8-1945) to the Dutch ‘police actions’ (politionele acties) of July 1947 and December 1948, when large areas of Indonesia were taken back under temporary Dutch control. See further Tjantrik Mataram 1966:76-8.

10 See Chapter IV note 58.
The power of prophecy

young prince on a personal and inspirational level, his female relatives were perhaps even more important in moulding his unique social outlook during his childhood and young adolescence. This outlook was rooted in deep religious convictions and extensive connections with the santri (pious Muslim) communities in south-central Java, connections which were somewhat unique for a person of his birth. Both were to be critical to his style of his leadership during the Java War and the nature of his personal charisma. The fact that Dipanagara was mainly brought up under the care of strong females until the age of eighteen may also have contributed to the development of those feminine aspects of his character which were to mark him out as unusual amongst his Javanese contemporaries. One thinks here of his sensitivity and intuition which manifested in his gift for the reading of character through the study of facial expression – what the Javanese call ngelmu firasat (p. 108) – as well as his physical resilience. It may even have informed his supposed disgust at the bloody nature of battle to which we will return in the next chapter.

Through the female members of his family Dipanagara could claim blood links with some of the most prominent kyai (country gentlemen, and teachers of religious and spiritual disciplines) in Java. Some of these could trace their ancestry back to the legendary wali sanga or ‘nine apostles of Islam’ of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Others were renowned as religious leaders and scholars in their local communities. Dipanagara’s mother, Radèn Ayu Mangkarawati, an unofficial wife (garwa ampéyan) of the future third sultan, who gave birth to him at the age of fifteen,11 was descended from Kyai Ageng Prampèlan, a revered contemporary of the first Mataram ruler, Panembahan Sénapati (reigned 1575-1601). Another of her forbears was Sunan Ngampèl Dentha of Gresik, one of the first wali in Java, who had founded an Islamic community in east Java before the final fall of the Hindu-Buddhist kingdom of Majapahit in circa 1527.12 Although the evidence about his mother is somewhat fragmentary, she appears to have been born in the pradikan (tax-free

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11 In 1849, when there was talk of her coming out to Makassar to join Dipanagara in exile (pp. 74, 747-52), she is mentioned as having been 82 years of age, AN Kab Geheim La V, 11-5-1849, P.J.B. de Perez (Surabaya) to Governor-General Jan Jacob Rochussen (Batavia), 20-3-1849. If this refers to Javanese years – which is likely – she would have been born in AJ 1696 (AD 1770-1771). She would thus have been barely 15 at the time of Dipanagara’s birth.

12 Padmasusastra 1902:209-10; BNG I, 13:III (Pangkur) 15. sing Dyah Mangkarawatyai trahing Kyageng Prampélan rumuhun. The information that Ki Ageng Prampélan lived at the time of Panembahan Sénapati was provided by the jurukunci (keeper of the keys) of Ki Ageng’s gravesite which lies nine kilometres to the south of Sragèn near Surakarta, interview, jurukunci pasaréyan Ki Ageng Prampélan, 2-4-1973. See also Serat salasilah para lelohoer ing Kadanoerejan n.y.:27, which mentions a Kyai Tumenggung Prampélau of the kraton of Pajang who became a ‘true believer’ (mukmin kas) with the title ‘Ki Ageng’; Mandoyokusumo 1977:15, who refers to a ‘Tumenggung Parampan’ [sic] as amongst the immediate ancestors of Hamengkubuwana I’s mother, Mas Ayu Téjawati; Padmasusastra 1902:210 who lists a ‘Ki Ageng Prempuhan’ of the Karang Lo dynasty as a tenth generation descendant of Sunan Ngampèl Dentha.
II Dipanagara’s youth and upbringing

village set aside for men of religion) of Majasta close to the famous religious centre of Tembayat in the Pajang area. Both these places had been settled by descendants and supporters of Panembahan Kajoran, a major opponent of the Mataram dynasty in the seventeenth century. The area had apparently remained a potential centre of opposition to the central Javanese courts right up to the time of Dipanagara’s birth. The fact that Dipanagara’s father had chosen a wife from this potentially troublesome region is a good illustration of the courts’ policy of containing the threat to their authority from the independent-minded religious communities by marriage alliances and generous grants of tax-free land and villages. These ties of family and courtly patronage were later to produce considerable support from this area for Dipanagara during the Java War.

Dipanagara made few references to his mother in his autobiography beyond mentioning that she was ‘strong’ (kuwat) and ‘unusually beautiful’ (luwih bagus), but he seems to have been attached to her: between 1825 and her capture on 14 October 1829 while hiding in a village in the Adikarta area of Kulon Praga, they shared the vicissitudes of war together, and immediately after the war, when she had returned to the kraton, there is a touching description of her weeping bitterly at the homage paid by five of Dipanagara’s children to the dowager queen, Ratu Ageng (formerly Ratu Kencana), the mother of the fifth sultan, rather than to herself as their grandmother, when they made their formal submission in April 1830. As late as 1849, when the

13 Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 6, where he reported Dipanagara as saying that his mother was born in the village of Madèsta in het district van Padjitan [sic], which immediately suggests the remote south coast district of Pacitan, but is more likely to have referred to Pajang, see Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 24, where he uses the phrase in het Padjitaansche to refer to Kyai Maja’s campaign in Pajang in 1828. ‘Madèsta’ was almost certainly Majasta. On the location of the latter, which is often referred to as ‘the hill of Majasta’ see Rinkes 1911:449; and IOR X IX 7, ‘Topographische Kaart der Residentie Soerakarta opgenomen ingevolge gouvernements besluit dd. 9 Junij 1861 no. 6 en 13 November 1862 no. 26’, where Majasta is placed almost exactly due south of Surakarta on the Kali Dangkang in the Tawangsari sub-district, see further Balé Poestaka 1939:66.


15 Carey 1981a:258 note 101. Rinkes 1911:454 and Mandoyokusumo 1977:21 no. 31, both mention that one of Hamengkubuwana II’s daughters married the spiritual lord of Tembayat, Sayyid Ngabdani, who later joined Dipanagara during the Java War, see Bataviasche Courant, 22-12-1827. See further Remmelink 1994:18 on marriage politics in early eighteenth-century Mataram.

16 Carey 1974a:23. There were reports at the beginning of the Java War that Dipanagara would go to Majasta to rally support, Avj, Haji Ali (Tembayat) to Danureja IV (Yogyakarta), 18-7-1825. See also Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, II:532; Bataviasche Courant, 29-11-1826, on the campaign of Radèn Mas Papak (later Pangéran Adipati Natapraja) around Tembayat in 1826; and Batavi-
asche Courant, 20-12-1827, on the campaign of the ‘priestly’ Pangéran Sumendi, a relation of the family of Pangéran Sérang, around Tembayat in 1827.

17 BD (Manado) II:240, XVIII.154 (on Mangkarawati’s appearance and character); Louw and De Klerck 1984-1909, V:412-3 and Chambert-Loir 2000:274 (give details of Mangkarawati’s capture along with one of Dipanagara’s daughters, Radèn Ayu Gusti [Appendix IV pt. 1], at the village of Karangwuni near Wates in the Adikarta area of Kulon Praga); Houben 1994:23 (on obeisance
prince had been in exile for nearly twenty years first in Manado (1830-1833) and then Makassar (1833-1855), he received correspondence from her which caused him to hope that she would come out to join him in exile (she declined saying that at 82 Javanese years she was too old to make the sea voyage from Semarang to Makassar).18 She apparently died of dropsy in Yogya in 1852 only three years before her son passed away in Makassar (8 January 1855).19

During his boyhood and adolescence, Dipanagara probably saw less of his mother than he would normally have done had he remained in the kraton. But his great-grandmother’s estate at Tegalreja lay within easy reach of Yogya so it is likely that frequent family visits were made and they remained in close contact. Dipanagara appears to have been her only son by the future third sultan according to the official Yogya genealogy (Mandoyokusumo 1977:29-33).

Another female relative mentioned above who may well have helped to shape Dipanagara’s outlook in his youth was his grandmother, Ratu Kedhaton, a descendant of Panembahan Cakraningrat II of Madura (reigned 1680-1707). In his autobiography, Dipanagara refers to her with respect.20 Her staunch attitude towards Islam, for which the Madurese are noted, may have impressed him. At the same time, according to a contemporary Dutch Resident, the Ratu had ‘a strong Madurese spirit which seemed to flag little in her old age’. Her husband, the second sultan, according to this same source, ‘with his usual Javanese thought patterns’, was completely unable to understand her.21 As an unwavering protagonist of her son, the future third sultan, she had a spectacularly volatile marital relationship with the Yogya ruler, who favoured his offspring from another queen.22 On four separate occasions in January-June 1812, she was subjected to twenty-four hour detentions in the Bangsal Kencana (Golden Hall) in the kraton to try to break her spirit and force her to divulge the nature of the ‘intrigues’ between the British and her

made by Dipanagara’s children to Ratu Ageng, the mother of Hamengkubuwana V). There seems to be a mistake in Houben, or in the sources he cites, because when Dipanagara’s children made this obeisance in April 1830, neither of the mothers of the previous two rulers (Hamengkubuwana III and Hamengkubuwana IV) were still alive: Hamengkubuwana III’s mother, Ratu Kedhaton (post-1814, Ratu Ageng), had died on 12 July 1820 (Avj, H.G. Nahuys van Burgst (Yogyakarta) to G.A.G.Ph. van der Capellen, 12-7-1820), and Ratu Ibu (post-18-5-1822, Ratu Ageng), the mother of Hamengkubuwana IV, had died on 20-6-1826, Chapter VIII note 46. There is even a question as to whether Hamengkubuwana V’s mother, Ratu Kencana (post-August 1826, Ratu Ageng) was still living as she is known to have suffered from a severe psychological illness (p. 412) and may have died before the end of the Java War.

18 AN Kab, 11-5-1849 no. La V, Dipanagara (Makassar) to Radèn Ayu Mangkarawati (Yogyakarta), 25 Rabingulakir AJ 1777 (AD 20-3-1849); Radèn Ayu Mangkarawati (Yogyakarta) to Baron A.H.W. de Kock (Resident of Yogya), 24 Jumadilawal AJ 1777 (AD 11-4-1849). See also Appendix XIII.
20 BD (Manado) II:164, XV.135.
21 Dj.Br. 49, Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 12-2-1807.
22 See pp. 322, 331.
son (Chapter VII), but this only hardened her resolve. Her son’s Madurese ancestry was also remarked on by European observers. In early September 1811, for example, when news of the capture of Madura by the British invasion force reached Yogya (p. 286), it was said by the Dutch Resident to have ‘fermented his Madurese blood’. The fact that Dipanagara was himself one quarter Madurese through his father’s family may well have had an effect on his personality and contributed to his volatile temper and sudden rages, which we will encounter quite often in these pages.

Easily the most important influence on the young prince was his great-grandmother, Ratu Ageng, sometimes referred to as Ratu Ageng Tegalreja. When Dipanagara was seven, she became his guardian. Her motives for adopting him are not discussed in the sources. Perhaps she recognised in him a certain spiritual depth which set him apart from other family members and made him fit for serious religious study. Perhaps the youth of Dipanagara’s mother – still in her mid-teens when she gave birth to him – influenced the old lady’s decision, although in this pre-modern era in Java teenage brides were the norm, at least in court circles. Perhaps she just wanted to have the company of a young child as she set off to open out new lands – part of the late eighteenth-century expansion of sawah in the core regions which we discussed in the previous chapter – around the royal estate where she settled just to the west of Yogya. Certainly the practice of ‘adoption’, or more accurately ‘lending’ children, was not unusual in Javanese society (Geertz 1961:36-41). Dipanagara’s own father, as we have seen, was largely brought up by his grandfather, the first sultan, and there were many instances of royal children being lent to older relatives to ensure they received an education.

Whatever the reason, Dipanagara found himself as a pre-pubescent boy living with a remarkable old lady who had a very critical view of developments at the Yogya court under the wayward and unskilful rule of her son,
the second sultan. The daughter of a prominent kyai in the Sragèn district – the same district where Dipanagara’s mother hailed from – Ratu Ageng Tegalreja could trace her descent to the sultan of Bima in Sumbawa, a fiercely independent Islamic principality in eastern Indonesia (now province of Nusa Tenggara Barat) (Serat salasilah para lelehoer in Kadanoerejan n.y.:127). Other close relations were linked to the court religious hierarchy in Yogya: Ratu Ageng’s sister, for example, was married to the Yogya pengulu (head of the religious hierarchy), Pekih Ibrahim (Appendix Vb), and another family member was a Yogya santri, Haji Ibrahim, who carried secret messages between the central Javanese rulers during their doomed attempt to mount a conspiracy against the British in 1811-1812 and later travelled to Sumbawa to engage in the slave trade where he was again suspected of acting as a secret emissary for the then exiled second sultan. These latter relations – less than scrupulous though some undoubtedly were – stood Dipanagara in good stead when he began to forge closer links with established religious officials in the sultan’s capital as a young man.

By all accounts, Ratu Ageng was an exceedingly tough lady: she followed the first sultan throughout all his campaigns against the Dutch during the Giyanti War (1746-1755), and gave birth to the future second sultan while her husband’s forces were bivouacked on the slopes of Mount Sundoro in Kedhu – hence the future second sultan’s childhood name of Gusti Radèn Mas Sundoro. After the foundation of Yogyakarta in 1755, she became commander of the elite female bodyguard or royal Amazon corps, the only military formation to have impressed Marshal Herman Willem Daendels during his visit to the Yogya court in July 1809 (p. 210). At the same time, she was

26 This was Ki Ageng Derpayuda, see Serat salasilah para lelehoer ing Kadanoerejan n.y.:125-7 (which gives an account of Ratu Ageng Tegalreja’s ancestry); Mandoyokusumo 1977:11 and Appendix I. Very little is known about Derpayuda apart from the fact that his burial site at Majangjati near Sragèn is visited by pilgrimages sent out from the Yogya court and that in Yogya he is revered as the patron saint of gamblers, Museum Nasional (Jakarta), MS 933 Dj, Ir Moens, ‘Platen Album’ no. 8 (‘Slametan cèmbengan bij de Gunung Gamping [Jogja] met offers’), 42 (picture 25) and 90 (picture 86). Further details can be found in Sumahatmaka 1929. De Graaf 1961:61, refers to a Kyai Demang Derpayuda at the time of a VOC ambassadorial mission to Mataram. See further p. 190.

27 Serat salasilah para lelehoer ing Kadanoerejan n.y.:127; Carey 1980:55 note 1. While in Sumbawa, Haji Ibrahim was suspected by the Dutch authorities of carrying secret messages from Hamengkubuwana II, then in exile in Ambon (1816-1826), to the Sultan of Tidore, S.Br. 87, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal, 10-10-1818 no. 13, cited in Assistant-Resident Caspers (Ambon) to H.J. Domis (Semarang), 15-4-1823. See further Chapter VII note 87.


29 Poens 1903:144. The one-hour of mock tournaments performed by the Amazon corps (pasukan Langenkuwu) before Daendels on the morning of 30-7-1809 is mentioned in Dj.Br. 24, J. Groenhoff van Woortman, ‘Dagverhaal van het voorgevallene ter gelegenheid van de komst alhier van Z.E. den Heer Maarschalk en Gouverneur-Generaal, Herman Willem Daendels’, 17-9-1809 (henceforth: Groenhoff van Woortman, ‘Dagverhaal’). Presumably, this ‘tournament’ was performed on horseback on the northern alun-alun, because Daendels later mentioned how
renowned, according to one Yogya court chronicle, for her Islamic piety and the pleasure she took in reading religious texts, as well as her firm insistence on preserving traditional Javanese adat (customs) at court.\(^{30}\) Her unshakeable commitment to Javanese adat would pass in full measure to her great-grandson who would later be described by the veteran VOC official Nicolaus Engelhard as ‘in all matters a Javanese [who] followed Javanese customs’ (Van der Kemp 1896a:415; p. 510). By the time Dipanagara was taken away to live with her at Tegalreja, she remained even in her mid sixties an exceedingly strong-willed lady who must have been quite redoubtable for a young boy of seven. There is an interesting passage in the Surakarta version of the Babad Dipanagara where the prince is made to comment that ‘in my childhood people used to make me afraid when giving an order’, a reference which has a brief resonance in his own autobiographical account (Carey 1981a:78-9, 271 note 145). If Ratu Ageng did indeed occasionally act the stern step-mother, the portrait which Dipanagara draws of her in his babad is overwhelmingly affectionate. In two short verses, he evoked the rigorously simple life she led amongst the farming communities around Tegalreja and the numbers of visiting santri who were drawn there:

\[\text{XIV.50} \quad \text{We describe the Ratu [Ageng]:}
\]
\[\text{[how] she delighted in farming}
\]
\[\text{and in her religious duties.}
\]
\[\text{She made herself anonymous}
\]
\[\text{in her profession of her love of God.}
\]

\[\text{51} \quad [...]
\]
\[\text{Tegalreja became extremely prosperous}
\]
\[\text{for many people came to visit.}
\]
\[\text{All sought food}
\]
\[\text{[while] the santri sought [religious] knowledge.}
\]
\[\text{There was much devotion and prayer,}
\]
\[\text{moreover, there were also farmers.}\]

impressed he had been by the female bodyguard’s handling of their cavalry carbines while on horseback, Poensen 1905:144. A vivid description of the appearance of the Surakarta Amazon corps in 1821 is given in KITLV H 788, ‘Verzameling van documenten, meest brieven aan Jos. Donatien Boutet, particulier te Jogjakarta’, H.G. Nahuys van Burgst (Resident Surakarta) to J.D. Boutet (Yogya), 5-1-1822, \textit{une quarantaine de femmes assises en rang immédiatement en dessus du trône et littéralement armé jusqu’aux dents: outre une ceinture garni de kris chaqu’une tena à la main un sabre ou un fusil […]. Il faut avouer qu’elles sont une singulière garde de corps; ‘forty or so women seated immediately below [the Sunan’s] throne and literally armed to the teeth: besides a belt with a kris tucked into it, each one held in their hand a sabre or a carbine […] one has to admit that they are a remarkable bodyguard’. For an early reference to Hamengkubuwana II’s interest – while still Crown Prince – in this corps, see Ricklefs 1974a:304 note 42; and on his unscrupulous methods of recruitment, see Carey 1992:413 note 73.

\(^{30}\) Yogya kraton MS A62 (Babad Dipanagaran):3 (on Ratu Ageng’s study of the \textit{wédha}).
\(^{31}\) BD (Manado) II:116, XIV (Sinom) 50-1. \textit{Kangjeng Ratu winarni/ pan tetanèn remenipuni/ sinambi lan ngibadahi kinarya namur puniki/ lampahira gên brongta marang Yang Sukma. 51. […] / langkung kerta
The atmosphere in which Dipanagara was brought up could not have been more different than that of the Yogya court under the second sultan. The rural simplicity which was late eighteenth-century Tegalreja taught him from an early age to mix easily with all levels of Javanese society and to do so in an easy and unpatronising manner. Ratu Ageng's careful administrative methods and her willingness to engage in trade may likewise have made an impression on him.32 We know from later Dutch accounts that Dipanagara was nearly unique amongst contemporary Yogya princes in that he derived substantial income from his lands without having to engage in extortionate practices, and that his personal wealth later helped him to finance the early stages of the Java War.33 He was also careful with his money to the point of miserliness in the estimation of the Dutch Resident of Manado, D.F.W. Pietermaat (in office 1827-1831), who first oversaw his exile (Van der Kemp 1896a:331; Chapter IX note 64). European contemporaries were likewise struck by his ‘common touch’. In the words of Willem van Hogendorp (1913:154):

A special characteristic about Dipanagara in the view of the Javanese, who are always extremely exalted and distant in their dealings between superiors and inferiors, is that he consorts as easily with the common man as with the great ones. Because of this he has made himself much loved everywhere.

Dipanagara later mentioned that ‘in emulation of what the priests do, I often went to Pasar [Kutha] Gedhé, [Ima]giri, the south coast [Guwa Langsé] and to Selarong […] to the [last] two places I always took a large mounted escort with me […] to help cut and plant padi [rice] which [helped] popularise the chiefs with the people’ (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:744; Carey 1981a:240 note 27).

From the point of view of the contemporary Yogya court, Dipanagara may have been regarded as a village dweller because he was brought up outside the bounds of the sultan’s capital.34 But for the rural inhabitants of south-central

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32 For details of the produce of the Tegalreja estate, see Carey and Hoadley 2000:135-6; and for references to Ratu Ageng’s trading factors (juragan-Dalem) and business agents (abdi-Dalem sudagar), see Carey 1980:118-26; Serat salasilah para leloehoer ing Kadanoerejan n.y.:307. It is clear from the murder of one of her agents in northern Kedhu that she was trading the produce of the Tegalreja estate as far afield as the pasisir (northeast coast of Java).


34 Interview with B.P.H. Adinegoro, Yogyakarta, 10 December 1971; and Kota Jogjakarta 200 Tahun 1956:23 on the western boundary of the old royal capital which lay to the east of the Tegalreja estate and the Kali Winonga, see Map 2.
Java at this time the prince's unusual upbringing only enhanced his charisma as a popular leader. Furthermore, the country gentry origins of Dipanagara's female relatives who had the most influence on him in his youth, namely his mother and great-grandmother, were a distinct advantage when it came to assuming a leadership role during the Java War. Not only did it relate him to influential village-based religious leaders, but it almost certainly endowed him with some robust genes. In general, marriages between scions of ruling dynasties and country gentry produced more enterprising offspring than the inbred alliances between families of high court nobility. It is no coincidence in this respect that some of the most effective leaders in Javanese history during this period were children of unofficial wives - most of whom hailed from rural gentry stock. One thinks here of the first sultan Mangkubumi, of Dipanagara himself and of his cavalry commanders, Ali Basah Senthot and Pangèran Jayakusuma (Ngabèhi), Dipanagara's kinsman. In the post-Java War period, two other sons of low-born wives, one a daughter of a court puppeteer, Pangèran Suryanagara (1822-circa 1886), and Radèn Gandakusuma (Patih Danureja V), both made important contributions to the cultural and literary life of mid-nineteenth century Yogya (Behrend 1999:388-415; Carey 1974a:8 note 23, 9-10, 1981:xxviii-xxxix). Even amongst Dipanagara's own offspring this same pattern was visible. Thus his eldest son, Pangèran

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35 On Jayakusuma (Ngabèhi), who was killed in September 1829 together with his sons in a bloody encounter in the Kelir mountains, see Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:393-5; Carey 1974b:275-6. On Senthot, see Soekanto 1951a:5, 1959:10-1; Serat salasilah para leloehoer ing Kadanoerejan n.y.:130-1. These all mention that Senthot was the child of Radèn Rongga Prawiradirja III by a selir, something which I have accepted in Appendix III. However, it should be noted that a contemporary source from the Java War period indicated that Senthot's mother was a sister of Ratu Maduretna, Hamengkubuwana Ii's daughter who died on 16-11-1809, dK 119, 'Reports of spies: Note of Ngabèhi Nataraja on Radèn Mas Tumenggung Rongga (Senthot)', 15-5-1826. This would mean that Radèn Rongga Prawiradirja III married two daughters of Hamengkubuwana II, his second marriage thus dating from post-1809. The Pakualam babad does indeed state that soon after Ratu Maduretna's death, Hamengkubuwana II offered Rongga another of his daughters, Radèn Ajeng Suratmi, so that he would remain as his son-in-law. This young woman (born circa 1797), who was only thirteen at the time of her betrothal to Rongga, was the second daughter of Hamengkubuwana II by his third and favourite consort, Ratu Kencana Wulan, dK 145, Waterloo, 'Memorie van Overgave', 4-4-1808; Poensen 1905:154-5, 188-9. But even though the ratu provided Rongga a substantial dowry in the shape of jewels and other precious ornaments, which he took with him when he went into rebellion (Chapter VI note 166), it does not seem that the marriage was consummated. There is also no mention of this second marriage in the official Yogya court genealogy, Mandoysukumo 1977:24 no. 58, where Ratu Kencana Wulan's second daughter, Ratu Timur, is cited as having married the Yogyo bupati, Radèn Tumenggung Jayawinata (Appendix VIII) and after his death (?) during the Java War), Pakualam II (reigned 1829-1858), the husband of her deceased elder sister, Ratu Anom. Even if Rongga had married this other daughter of Hamengkubuwana II in 1810, she could not have been the mother of Senthot, who was born in 1808. Senthot's mother may well have been the bibi ('aunt', low-born unofficial wife) Dayawati whose demise Rongga reported to his brother-in-law Radèn Tumenggung Sumadiningrat on 12-3-1810, Carey 1980:35.

36 On Danureja V who served as patih from 1847-1879, see LOr 11089 (1), R.M.P. Santadilaga, Lelampahanipoen Kangjeng Pangèran Arja Djoeroe:1; Appendix II.
Dipanagara II, born of an unofficial wife at Tegalreja, whom we shall meet below, was apparently the most impressive of his children, far outshining his younger brothers, who had mothers of more eminent lineage.\(^{37}\)

**A Tegalreja childhood**

The reasons why Ratu Ageng left the Yogya *kraton* so suddenly in the early part of the second sultan’s reign are not entirely clear. According to Dipanagara, she had become saddened and embittered by the conflicts with her children and the incessant domestic intrigues of the court. As he put it in his *babad*:

\[\text{XIV.49} \text{ We now tell of the Ratu Ageng}
\text{how she was often at odds}
\text{with her own sons.}
\text{She therefore broke away in anger and cleared new land:}
\text{the waste fields were opened up,}
\text{[and] then she settled there.}
\text{The distance from the town of Yogya}
\text{was a journey of one hour [on foot].}
\text{When it was ready,}
\text{it was called Tegalreja ['Fields of Prosperity'].}^{38}\]

\(^{37}\) On Pangérân Dipanagara II, see AN, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal, 3-4-1834 no. 19 (Governor-General Baud’s decision to exile Dipanagara II to Sumenep), F.G. Valck (Yogyakarta) to Jean Chrétien Baud (Batavia), 15-3-1834, who described him as ‘the only one of Dipanagara’s five sons who played an important role in the Java War. During the last year of the war, according to Valck, ‘he showed signs of enterprise, courage and perseverance in the Ledhok [northern Kedu] area’. Dipanagara’s second son, Pangérân Dipaningrat was referred to by Valck as ‘insane’ (he had apparently tried to murder his housekeeper and his wife – a daughter of Radèn Tumenggung Danuningrat – had separated from him); Dipanagara’s third son, Dipakusuma, was in Valck’s opinion ‘through and through a bad character who gambles away all his possessions’; and his fifth son, Radèn Mas Jonèd, also behaved ‘strangely’ and was later killed in a brawl with a Dutch officer in 1837 (see further Hageman 1856:412). Only Dipanagara’s fourth son, Radèn Mas Raib, showed signs of ‘good character’; according to a Dutch report, he later became a pious Muslim during his period of exile in Ambon (post-April 1840) where he lived apart from his two elder brothers (Dipaningrat and Dipakusuma), AN Ambon 1189b, ‘Staat der te Amboina aanwezige staats gevangenen onder ultimo December 1841’. For a discussion of Dipanagara’s two surviving adult sons, Radèn Mas Kindar (born 4-1-1832) and Radèn Mas Dulkabli (born circa 1836), born to him in Manado and Makassar respectively by his official wife, Radèn Ayu Retnangingsih, a daughter of a Madiun bupati, see pp. 731, 753-4; and Appendix IV note 1.

\(^{38}\) BD (Manado) II:116, XIV (Sinom) 49-50. Kangjeng Ratu Geng winarna/pan sering selayanèki/lan kang putra pråbådi/ dadya mutung adudhukuh/ babad kang ara-arå/ mapånp lajeng dèndaleml tebi- hira saking nagri ing Ngayogya. 50. mapan lampahan saelim/ mengkana pan sampun dadi/ wimestan'an Tegalreja. See also BNg I:13-4, III.17-20, where Ratu Ageng is described as having lived in a small pavilion (*pacangkraman*) called Tegallbener before the fields were cleared and the residence (*dalem*) of Tegalreja constructed, see further Map 2. The ‘one hour’s journey’ which Dipanagara referred
It is likely that Ratu Ageng did not approve of the lifestyle of her son, the second sultan, in particular his nonchalant attitude towards Islamic religious observance. He appears to have rarely visited the great mosque, Mesjid Ageng, the official worshipping place of the Yogya rulers, although he seems to have been rather more diligent about dispatching court santri to undertake pilgrimages to Mecca and to various holy sites in south-central Java and the north coast. The Dutch Resident's report about the deathbed speech which Ratu Ageng addressed to her son before her demise on 17 October 1803 affords an insight into her disapproving attitude towards the Yogya ruler and his entourage. It also casts light on Ratu Ageng's exceptional humility and deep-rooted faith, a rare combination indeed in the court circles of her day:

Sultan! The path I have to lay aside is difficult and now I feel that I am essentially no more than an ordinary person. My son, keep that in view and do not believe that, although you are now ruler, after your death you will be anything more than a common coolie. So live accordingly!

is the journey on foot from the kraton. J.F.G. Brumund, who visited Tegalreja in the 1840s, mentioned that the carriage journey took 'a good half-hour' perhaps because of the state of the roads in the rainy season when he visited (Brumund 1854:181).

It is possible that Hamengkubuwana II may have attended Friday prayers at his private (Suranatan) mosque in the kraton, but there is no record of this. On his greater diligence in attending Friday services (salat Jumungah) at the Mesjid Ageng during the Java War after his second restoration (1826-1828), see Van den Broek 1875:284.

Carey 1980:171-4. Pilgrimages from Yogya to Mecca are recorded in the years 1788 (Ricklefs 1974a:313), and in 1805-1806. In the latter year, the pilgrims encountered great difficulties with shipping because of the stringency of the British naval blockade and the opposition of the Dutch authorities, see Van der Chijs 1895-97, XIV:194-5; Besluit, 12-7-1805, which refers to nine 'priests' sent by Hamengkubuwana II in an entourage of 35 who were brought from Semarang to Batavia by the VOC at Company expense because the Raad van Indië was unwilling to allow them to have too much contact with local traders by travelling on 'native' ships. They were still in Batavia in January 1806 and seven of the pilgrims asked to be allowed to go back to Yogya because they had heard that the grave of The Prophet had been 'destroyed' by the Wahhābi (in fact, they had destroyed the grave of The Prophet's companion, Zayd bin al-Khāṭṭāb). The remaining two with an undisclosed number of followers eventually departed on an Arab brig bound for Jeddah from Tegal, Dj.Br. 86, Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 29-7-1806, A.A. Cassa (Tegal) to Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta), 4-8-1806. Amongst the duties performed by the Yogya pilgrims when they eventually reached Mecca was the religious feast (sedhekah) to mark the thousand-day memorial for the recently departed Ratu Ageng (Tegalreja). This was held on the plain of Arafat, a particularly auspicious location. The cost of the ceremony was partly borne by Ratu Kedhaton and other female members of the Yogya court, Carey 1980:173; Carey and Houben 1987:31. In June 1811, another 24 kraton santri asked permission to go on the haj, but the Franco-Dutch government refused to allow them to take ship from Semarang because of the British blockade and the threat of imminent invasion, see Dj.Br. 27, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to J.W. Janssens (Batavia), 10-6-1811, 24-6-1811.

Ratu Ageng apparently used the expression batur (porter, coolie).
In his autobiography, Dipanagara later reflected on the religious climate in Yogya at this time and the way in which many of its inhabitants ignored the precepts of Islam. In particular, he was highly critical of the second sultan’s three sons-in-law, Radèn Tumenggung Sumadiningrat, Radèn Adipati Danureja II and Radèn Rongga Prawiradirja III, all of whom were to meet violent ends.\(^{42}\) In his babad, he described these three as ‘incorrigible sinners’ even though he had close family relations with at least two of these men’s families:\(^{43}\)

\begin{verbatim}
XIV.56  The three officials were all young; 
the desires of the sultan
were greater than those of his father
as also were [the desires] of these three officials,
who all sinned
against religion.
The pengulu and
all the people in Yogya as well,
from the highest to the lowest, rarely followed the truth.\(^{44}\)
\end{verbatim}

It is likely that Ratu Ageng’s bitterness towards the frivolity, religious laxity and self-serving politics of the Yogya court left a lasting mark on the mind of the young prince. At the very end of the Java War, he was to confide to the senior Dutch officer accompanying him to Batavia that ‘if I had continued to insist on my known demands [to be recognised as the regulator of religion] then it was out of the conviction that people at the courts did not follow the old customs as scrupulously as before [and] above all that people neglected religion’ (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:744). Indeed, in his babad he was to speak of it being ‘the will of God’ that ‘he should follow his great-grandmother, for it was his wish to be absorbed in religion’.\(^{45}\)

\(^{42}\) Sumadiningrat, who served aswedana jero (1797-1812), was killed on 20-6-1812 in his residence when the British stormed the kraton (Chapter VII; Carey 1992:90-1, 419 note 94), Danureja II, thepattih of Yogya (1799-1811), was murdered in the kraton on Hamengkubuwana II’s orders on 28-10-1811 (Chapter VII; Carey 1980:60-1, 76-7, 184), and Radèn Rongga, thebupati wedana of Madiun (1796-1810), was hunted down and killed on 17-12-1810 during a brief rebellion in east Java in November-December 1810 (Chapter VI).

\(^{43}\) Dipanagara was later (1814) married into the Prawiradirjan family, and two of his younger brothers and two of his children married into the Danurejan, see Appendices II and III.

\(^{44}\) BD (Manado) II:118, XIV (Sinom) 56. katigay samia nemira/ déné karsanya Sang Aji/ pan lang-
kung saking kangi ramai/ tanapi purunggaya katiri/ maksiyat carub samili/ kalawaan agamanipun/ Ki Pangulu
menkana/ kahèh lan wong Ngagoyga samili/ ageng-alit awis ingkang lampah nyata.

\(^{45}\) BD (Manado) II:119, XIV (Sinom) 49. wus karsaning Suksmal/ Pangèran Dipanagaril/ kedah mumuri kang eyang/ buyut mapan karsanèki/ kerem marang agami.
Already in her mid-sixties when she moved to the Tegalreja estate in the early 1790s, Ratu Ageng seems to have led an active life almost until the end. Then in late September 1803, when she was long past seventy, she developed a serious fever after falling heavily by one of the ponds at Tegalreja. This was a rather dramatic time for the inhabitants of Yogya for the great volcano behind the city, Mount Merapi, had started to erupt on 22 September with more minor eruptions noted on the twin Kedhu volcanoes of Mount Sumbing and Mount Sundoro – the last especially appropriate given Ratu Ageng’s experience of giving birth there in March 1750 when she had been delivered of the second sultan. Although she was moved to the crown prince’s quarters in Yogya and rallied somewhat in early October, her condition soon deteriorated. The end came at three o’clock on the afternoon of 17 October after she had whispered the previously noted trenchant last words to her son, the second sultan. She was then laid in state in the kadipatèn (the crown prince’s residence) and buried at sunset the following day at the royal graveyard at Imagiri some four hours journey on foot to the south of Yogya. Her cortège was followed by all the members of the sultan’s family (including no doubt the young Dipanagara), with the exception of the second sultan himself and Dipanagara’s father, the crown prince, who accompanied his grandmother’s coffin only as far as the southern meeting place on the alun-alun (open square) before the court.

Inheriting the Tegalreja estate

The Dutch Resident reported that both the sultan and the crown prince were very distressed at the old lady’s passing, but it must have been a particularly heavy blow for the eighteen-year-old Dipanagara. He now remained alone.

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46 If it is assumed that Ratu Ageng was in her late teens when she gave birth to the second sultan on 7 March 1750, she would have been in her early sixties when she moved to the Tegalreja estate in circa 1793. She would thus have been in her early seventies by the time of her death in October 1803. AvJ Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 27-9-1803 referred to Ratu Ageng as already an ‘old woman’ by the time of her last illness in September-October 1803.

47 AvJ, Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 27-9-1803; Mandoyo kusumo 1977:17.


49 Dj.Br. 49, Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 18-10-1803.

50 Dj.Br. 49, Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 25-10-1803, 29-10-1803.

51 Dj.Br. 49, Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 25-10-1803.

52 Dj.Br. 49, Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 29-10-1803. Dipanagara had turned 18 (Javanese) years on 15 April 1803, although according to the Western calendar he was still just over three weeks short of his eighteenth birthday when Ratu Ageng died on 17 October 1803.
Map 2. Plan of Tegalreja estate and its surroundings, circa 1830, on a scale of one inch to 100 metres. Adapted from Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I: ‘Plattegrond van de hoofdplaats Jogjakarta omstreeks 1830’, by J. Wilbur Wright of Oxford.
II Dipanagara’s youth and upbringing

at Tegalreja and succeeded his great-grandmother in charge of the estate. Although he was soon to marry the daughter of a local kyai and was even threatened for a time with having yet another elderly female relative – his grandmother, the redoubtable Ratu Kedhaton – sent out to live with him, his life in Tegalreja continued to run its quiet course.

What then of Tegalreja itself? What did this estate which went by the auspicious name of ‘Fields of Prosperity’ look like? By the time of Ratu Ageng’s death in 1803, it was probably already an impressive complex including an extensive residence with gardens, orchards and ponds (one of which Ratu Ageng had fallen besides at the start of her fatal last illness), as well as many hectares of adjacent ricefields. A Dutch visitor who inspected the ruins (the residence had been burnt at the start of the Java War) in the 1840s described it in admiring terms (Brumund 1854:184-5):

The princes of Yogyakarta were apparently better lodged than at present. At least I know of no princely residence in Yogya which can compare to the earlier one at Tegalreja. The [princes’] houses are [now] mostly [built of] wood [and are] low, small and insignificant. Dipanagara’s [residence], [however], was large, spacious, high and entirely built of stone. On both sides there ran rows of no less large and spacious stone outhouses. There [Dipanagara’s] friends lodged and the priests who came to visit him. There were also his warehouses and repositories [for storing the products of the Tegalreja estate], and the places where his immediate followers and retainers lived. The other followers lived in the village which surrounds the dalem [princely residence].

The visitor went on to describe in detail the lay-out of the house itself, which included the remains of a large open-sided pavilion/audience hall and an adjoining gallery suitable for staging shadow-puppet performances which, along with the Javanese gamelan orchestra of stringed, wood-wind and percussion instruments, we know from other sources were much appreciated by Dipanagara. The visitor also noticed the high stone wall which surrounded

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53 BD (Manado) II:118, XIV.57-8.
54 See Appendix IV pt. 1. It is not known when this marriage took place, but a pre-25 February 1807 date (when Dipanagara married his second wife, the daughter of the Yogya bupati of Pano- lan) is clear, and judging by Dipanagara’s eldest son’s study at Kyai Maja’s pesantrèn in the period 1816-1822, he must have been born in circa 1803. So an 1803 marriage – when Dipanagara would have been nineteen Javanese years old – is likely.
55 Dj.Br. 49, Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 5-4-1805. Hamengkubuwana II apparently made an attempt to give the Tegalreja estate to Ratu Kedhaton to get her away from the kraton, but nothing came of this because the redoubtable Ratu refused to move.
56 According to Brumund 1854:191-2, part of the estate was being used at the time of his visit as a fruit and vegetable garden by Dipanagara’s uncle Panembahan Mangkurat (pre-1825, Pangéran Mangkubumi). It was later used as grazing land for horses by the Dutch Resident of Yogyakarta, R. de Fillietaz Bousquet (in office 1845-1848), AN, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal, 24-11-1848 no. 1.
57 Carey 1974a:10-6. On Dipanagara’s gamelan orchestra which he kept at Tegalreja, see Knoerle,
the yard of the residence and the many fruit trees which were planted on the estate (Brumund 1854:185).

Although the original residence and estate garden were laid out on Ratu Ageng’s orders, Dipanagara seems to have had a hand in some of its later features. In his babad, he related how many of the buildings were improved and enlarged after his great-grandmother’s death, presumably to house the increasing number of visitors, especially wandering santri and other Islamic divines who came to engage in prayer and religious discussion. According to the prince, the amount of religious observance at Tegalreja ‘exceeded that of his great-grandmother’s days’. It was probably at this time that plans were laid to build a stone mosque at Tegalreja, a building which had been almost completed at the time of the outbreak of the Java War. As Dipanagara later reflected (Louw and De Klerk 1894-1909, V:744; Van der Kemp 1896a:418; Carey 1992:495 note 464):

I always had the desire to have a really fine mosque [and] I spent much money on the one I had at Tegalreja which was very nearly completed when I had to leave [in July 1825] […] a mosque has always been a delight for me: one does not always have to pray in it, but it directs the heart towards religious sincerity.

Like the Ratu Ageng before him, Dipanagara took an interest in the arrangement of the trees and ponds on the estate, and later built himself a retreat at Sélareja just outside the northeast wall of Tegalreja, where he often withdrew to meditate and pray (see Map 2). This was encircled by a moat filled with different kinds of fish, and the island where Dipanagara’s meditation seat was placed was planted with various types of fruit trees, especially kemuning (Brumund 1854:192-4; Carey 1981a:236-7 note 14). With its white pungently scented flowers, this tree, which is favoured in Java for shading graveyards
and holy sites, would have spread a ‘canopy of white flowers’ over the prince’s head as he sat meditating (Brumund 1854:188; Van Raay 1926-27:51). There was also apparently a banyan tree (waringin) which gave its name to the island, Pulo Waringin (Chapter X note 208).

The prince took similar pains to lay out fruit orchards, vegetable gardens and shrubberies on his lands at Selarong near the cave of Secang in the Bantul district to the south of Yogya which he likewise used as a place of retreat during the fasting month Puwasa and which he would later extend significantly in terms of its facilities (Carey 1981a:238-9 notes 20-5; Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:435-7; Chapters VIII and X). He subsequently boasted that ‘there is nothing on earth that does not grow luxuriantly on the soil of Java’.61 Like many Javanese, Dipanagara had a great affinity with nature: some of the most lyrical passages in his autobiography describe the retreats which he set up in caves, mountain fastnesses or in the midst of fast-flowing streams, or at his garden in Selarong, where a Dutch report noted the construction of a wall the height of a man.62 He also referred with affection to the different types of animals which kept him company during his periods of silent withdrawal: the fish at Sélareja, the turtles, turtle-doves, crocodiles63 and tigers during his jungle retreats during the Java War, and his beloved cockatoos while in exile in Manado and Makassar.64 Such affinity with nature and the animal kingdom, in the Javanese view, was a reflection of the sensitivity and spiritual wholeness of a human being, a state best expressed in the descriptions of the wandering knight (satria lelana) in Javanese wayang literature (Boedihardjo 1923:28).

Dipanagara’s preoccupation with religious matters and the development of his own spiritual practice through periodic retreats and meditation clearly placed a strain on his relationship with the Yogya ruler, Hamengkubuwana II. By his own admission, the prince rarely attended audiences at the court and only brought himself to come to Yogya for the thrice yearly Garebeg ceremonies which celebrated The Prophet’s birthday (Mulud), the end of the fasting

62 Carey 1974a:24. On the small prayer house (langgar alit) which Dipanagara had constructed in a river (Kali Praga?) under the sloping flanks of a mountain where he undertook ascetic practices (tapa) in the Kulon Praga area after the death of his beloved wife, Ratu Kedhaton (pre-1825, Radèn Ayu Maduretna) in February 1828, see BD (Menado) III:320, XXX.78-80; and Carey 1974a:25 note 82. On his use of a white gauze veil to hide his face during his journey into exile, see Van Doren 1851, II:328 note 1. See further p. 701 (on Dipanagara covering his face with the end of his turban).
63 On the crocodiles which Dipanagara used to watch besporting themselves in the Kali Cincinggulung during his campaigns in Bagelèn towards the end of the Java War, see BD (Menado), IV:110, XXXV (Dhandhanggula) 30. Sang Nata winuwus/ nèng Bagelèn apan lamal/ sring meng-ang/ dhateng lèpèn Cincinggulung/ apan ningali bayu.
64 Kielstra 1885:408; Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:151; Carey 1974a:26-7. Turtle-doves are used for divination in Java (Pigeaud 1967-80, I:269, 277); and tigers are believed to harbour the souls of men at night (when they are known as macan gadhungan), Winter 1902:85. See further Chapter IX note 138.
month (Puwasa), and Abraham’s willingness to sacrifice his son as well as the Great Day (Ari Besar) of the pilgrims in Mecca (Besar) (Groneman 1895:40; p. 373). These latter attendances, Dipanagara described as a ‘great sin’, perhaps because the Garebeg were more Javanese than Islamic in character. But he forced himself to take part out of fear for his grandfather, the second sultan, and his father, the crown prince. He also relates how he came to the capital on certain special occasions such as on 3 September 1805 when at the age of twenty (Javanese years), he received his adult name and title of Radèn Antawirya, and on 25 February 1807 when he married the daughter of a Yogya outlying region bupati, an unhappy union to which we will return shortly.

The Tegalreja circle: early contacts with the Islamic religious communities

Dipanagara clearly grew up in an environment dominated by religious discussion. Already, during his boyhood in the kraton, he had probably mixed with santri. The Suranatan corps, a group of armed religious officials at

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65 For a discussion of whether Dipanagara really meant to refer to the Garebeg or to his frequent absences from the court as the principal reason for his ‘great sin’ (dosa ageng), see Ricklefs 1974b:231 note 17, who argues for the latter pointing out that Dipanagara’s absence would have been a destabilising factor in court affairs. The present author favours the former explanation, on the basis of the stress in Dipanagara’s babad that the Garebeg were major court festivals when all members of the sultan’s family were required to be present. On the role of the Garebeg as traditional fertility ceremonies, see Lind 1975:30-5. See further p. 406 on Dipanagara’s annoyance at the magico-religious practices used by one of his great-uncles at the time of his father’s death on 3 November 1814.

66 BD (Manado) II:119, XIV.60.

67 AvJ, Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to Johannes Gerardus van den Berg (Surakarta), 3-9-1805. Dipanagara was appointed Radèn at the same time as two of his younger brothers: Bendara Radèn Mas Said, who became Radèn Sumawijaya (later Pangéran Adinagara, post-1825, Pangéran Suryêngalaga), and Bendara Radèn Mas Sabandi, who became Radèn Poncakusuma (later Pangéran Purwadiningrat, post-1825, Pangéran Suryabrangta).

68 Dj.Br. 21, Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 5-9-1807, ‘List of marriages in Yogya since 1801’; and on Dipanagara’s father-in-law, Radèn Tumenggung Natawijaya III, bupati of Panolan (also known as Jipang-Kepanolan; in office 1803-1811), at that time one of the most depopulated districts in east Java (it was later annexed by the British in June 1812), which suggests that he was either a very poor administrator or just rather unlucky with his allocated kabupatèn, see Carey 1992:255 note 264; Carey and Hoadley 2000:240-4. Dipanagara’s bride’s name was Radèn Ajeng Supadmi and the wedding took place on 27-2-1807. Natawijaya III’s official wife – and the putative mother of Dipanagara’s bride, Radèn Ajeng Supadmi – may have been a daughter of Hamengkubuwana II by one of his favourite unofficial wives, Mas Ayu Sumarsonowati, who was of partly Chinese descent and was renowned for her beauty, Mandoyokusumo 1977:23 no. 47; Carey 1984a:20-1. According to Lor 6488 (Babad Dipanagara, Surya Ngalam):5, I.15-6, Dipanagara had only met her three months before his marriage and, as he never mentions her in his babad, it does not seem to have been a very happy union. She became known as Bendara Radèn Ayu Antawirya (also spelt ‘Ontawirya’) and is mentioned as in receipt of an annual court allowance of six seka (f 3) in circa 1807, see Carey and Hoadley 2000:395-6.
the Yogya court, for example, formed part of the military establishment of Dipanagara’s father’s residence, the *kadipatèn*, and there were also members of the *kaum* (firm Islamic community) in receipt of tithe (*zakat*) payments from the court who are listed in the *kraton* records as having been domiciled at both the *kadipatèn* and at Tegalreja in the late 1790s (Carey 1980:170).

Ratu Ageng had also encouraged members of the Yogya religious hierarchy to visit or take up residence at Tegalreja. Amongst these were her own *pengulu* (head of religious establishment), Kyai Muhamad Bahwi, after August 1825 known as Muhamad Ngsusman Ali Basah, who had previously served as the presiding *ulama* (religious scholar) of the Suranatan mosque (the sultan’s private mosque) in the *kraton*, and Haji Badarudin, a commander of the Suranatan corps who had twice made the pilgrimage to Mecca on behalf of the Yogya court and was considered knowledgeable about Ottoman administrative practice in the holy cities. Furthermore, both the two Yogya *pengulu*, who served in the sultan’s capital during Dipanagara’s youth, were attached to the Tegalreja *ulama* circle through their links with the Suranatan. One of them, Kyai Rahmanudin, even came to live with Dipanagara for a year at Tegalreja after his abrupt dismissal in September 1823. We shall see below (pp. 626-9) how these contacts, formed between the young prince and the Yogya religious establishment in the late 1790s and 1800s, operated during the early stages of the Java War when many kraton *santri* rallied to Dipanagara’s cause.

Besides the members of the court religious hierarchy, Dipanagara almost certainly met many of the main independent teachers in the Yogya region.

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70 Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, II:468. BD (Manado) II:341, XXI.11; see also Appendix VIIb.

71 BD (Manado) III:55, XXIV.90, 95, XXV.42; Knoere, ‘Journal’, 21; dK 165, ‘Translaat-verhaal van Prins Adiwinotto van hetgeen den opstand van Diepo Negoro heeft veroorzaakt’ (henceforth ‘Translaat-verhaal Adiwinotto’); see also Appendix VIIb. It is not known when Haji Badarudin made the *haj*, but there are records of Yogya court-sponsored pilgrimages to Mecca in 1788, 1805-1806 and 1811. In 1788, Haji Abdul Wahid was dispatched with four others to the Holy City to seek ‘priestly investiture’ for Hamengkubuwana I and to repair a ‘consecrated house’ (possibly a mosque or *langgar* for Yogya pilgrims) (Ricklefs 1974a:313), returning in June 1792 via Ceylon, UBL BPL 616 Port. 3 no. 1, Wouter Hendrik van Ijsseldijk (Yogyakarta) to J.G. van Overstraten (Semarang), 21-6-1792. On the 1805-1806 pilgrimage which numbered four Yogya *haji* under the leadership of Haji Mataram, see note 40. Badarudin may have been one of these. Although there was an attempt to send pilgrims in 1811, the enterprise was cancelled because of the strength of the British blockade. There are no records of further court-sponsored pilgrimages in the post-1811 period.

72 BD (Manado), II:316, XX.21-33, 330-4, XX.59-68; Appendix V pt. 3.

73 Carey 1981a:259 note 103; BD (Manado), II:316, XX.22-3. On Rahmanudin’s appointment as *pengulu*, see p. 370, and on his dismissal in September 1823, see pp. 545-7.

74 See Appendix VIIb.
during his boyhood at Tegalreja. The estate was close to three of the four main centres for scholars of Islamic law known as pathok negari (literally ‘pillars of the state’), namely those at Kasongan (near Bantul), Papringan (between Yogya and Prambanan), and Melangi.\(^{75}\) Dipanagara would later marry the daughter of the kyai guru (revered teacher) of Kasongan during the Java War\(^{76}\) and may well have passed through the centre on his way from Tegalreja to his lands at Selarong to the south of Yogya. But compared to Kasongan and the other pathok negari, Melangi seems to have been by far the most important at this time. It lay just three kilometres north of Tegalreja and the land was part of the patrimony (tanah tiyasa) of the Danurejan family with whom Dipanagara had close family ties (Appendix II). They maintained a religious teacher at Melangi, who served as mentor to members of the Yogya court community. One teacher in particular, Kyai Taptajani, whose family may have hailed from Sumatra, achieved considerable local recognition as a scholar and translator of difficult Islamic texts (Carey 1974b:272-3). We know from Dutch sources that Dipanagara greatly respected this kyai, whom the Dutch described as a ‘prominent priest’ whom the prince always took care to treat well. Taptajani’s pathok negari at Melangi was intentionally spared any damage during the Java War on Dipanagara’s express instructions and the prince accepted the kyai’s sons into his wartime service. In October 1826, when Taptajani was involved in brokering the first peace negotiations with Dipanagara’s key religious adviser, Kyai Maja, he was said to have been in his ninetieth year.\(^{77}\)

It is unclear whether Dipanagara ever studied under him, but there is a reference in the prince’s autobiography to the locally renowned teacher as the guru of his younger brother, Pangéran Adisurya, who took the name of Ngabdurakim during the Java War and was said to have died a ‘remainder-less’ (moksa) death on Mount Sirnabaya in Bagelen in 1829 (Carey 1974b:273). In the Surakarta version of the Babad Dipanagara, there is also a passage in which Taptajani is described as having visited Dipanagara at night at the head of all the ulama from the tax-free (pradikan) areas, as well as the mosque officials and experts in Islamic law, and having given him advice as to the right moment for the Ratu Adil (‘Just King’) to proclaim himself and for the prang sabil (holy war) to begin (Carey 1981a:43-7, 261 note 108; Chapter IX). Although there is nothing in the contemporary Dutch sources to confirm that particular visitation, the links which Dipanagara maintained with Taptajani’s family during the early stages of the war indicate that the ageing kyai continued to command the prince’s respect.

After Taptajani fled to Surakarta in 1805 following a dispute with the Yogya pengulu regarding his influence over the princes of the court (Carey 1981a:258 note 99. See Appendix VIIa, where other minor centres listed as pathok negari in a pre-1832 list include Plasa Kuning, Purwareja and Dhongkelan.\(^{76}\) See Appendix IV pt. 2.\(^{77}\) J.F.W. van Nes (Surakarta) to L.P.J. du Bus de Gisignies (Batavia/Bogor), 13-10-1826.)
1974b:273) – in itself a telling reflection on his local renown – he settled in the Sunan’s territory and continued to maintain contacts with his family relations scattered throughout central and east Java. These included prominent religious scholars residing in tax-free areas in Kedhu,78 and a highly placed royal official in Madiun who had links with the famous pesantrèn (religious boarding school) of Tegalsari.79 Furthermore, he was also on intimate terms with Kyai Maja’s extensive family, who were settled in the tax-free villages of Maja and Badhèran in the Pajang area just to the north of Delanggu, and at Pulo Kadang near Imagiri to the south of Yogya.80 These far-flung connections, which pivoted around Taptajani’s influential position as a legal scholar and teacher, were clearly vital for Dipanagara when he appealed for support from ulama in Pajang, Madiun, Kedhu, Bagelèn and Pacitan at the start of the Java War (Chapter X note 124; pp. 626-9).

During the time Dipanagara was reaching early manhood in Tegalreja, it seems that Surakarta was much more important than Yogya as a spiritual centre. One of the reasons for this may have been that there were more generous patrons of the religious communities at the Sunan’s court than in the sultan’s capital. Pakubuwana IV himself was described by the Surakarta Resident J.G. van den Berg in 1806 as ‘a great friend of the ulama who can get him to do anything’.81 In 1812, he was said to have no less than 24 court haji (returned Mecca pilgrims) and some 51 ulama in his pay.82 At the same time, a senior Dutch official who was travelling through Surakarta just before the British attack on Yogya (20 June 1812) spoke of ‘the priests who are here [in Surakarta] in large numbers’.83 The Garebeg Mulud and Garebeg Puwasa ceremonies, appear to have attracted droves of haji, kaum (lower ranking village religious officials), and pradikan (men of religion from tax-free areas) who made their way to the Sunan’s capital from all over Java.84 This was not the case in Yogya which only attracted santri from the immediate neighbourhood, probably because the sultan was less generous than the Sunan about

78 These were Kyai Musa and his son, Kyai Gajali, see Jayadiningrat, ‘Schetsen’, 100; LOr 2168 no. 108, ‘Kiai Modjo, zijne afkomst’, n.y.; Appendix VIIb.
79 This was Radèn Suradirja, who was serving as chief minister (patih) to the bupati wedana (senior bupati/administrator) of Madiun, Pangérán Adipati Prawiradiningrat (in office 1822-1859), in 1828, LOr 2168 no. 46, ‘Report on the mission of Tunenggung Sasradilaga to Madiun’, 5-8-1828. According to Madioen 1855:15-6, there were 42 pesantrèn in the Madiun area before the Java War with upwards of 1,800 students (santri). This number increased greatly during the period of the war itself when religious fervour was at its height in central and east Java.
81 vAE (aanwinsten 1900), J.G. van den Berg, ‘Copia memoria op het hoff van Souracarta’ (henceforth: Van den Berg, ‘Copia memoria’), 8-1806.
82 S.Br. 14B, Colonel Alexander Adams (Surakarta) to T.S. Raffles (Yogyakarta), 17-6-1812.
84 vAE (aanwinsten 1900), Van den Berg, ‘Copia memoria’, 8-1806.
Plate 10. Kyai Maja (circa 1790-1849), Dipanagara’s principal religious adviser during the Java War, who came from the Surakarta pradikan village of Maja just to the north-east of Delanggu, and died in exile in the Kampung Jawa, Tondano, Sulawesi Utara. Although he had never made the pilgrimage to Mecca (haj), he commanded great authority amongst Dipanagara’s santri followers because of his intimate knowledge of the Qur’ān and his forceful character. Uncoloured lithograph by Jean Augustin Daiwaille (1786-1850) and Pieter Veldhuizen (1806-1841) based on a sketch made by the Dutch army officer, Major F.V.H.A. Ridder de Stuers (1792-1881), in Salatiga in December 1828 after Kyai Maja had given himself up to the Dutch with over six hundred of his followers who later accompanied him into exile in Minahasa (North Sulawesi). Taken from De Stuers 1831. Photograph by courtesy of KITLV, Leiden.
II Dipanagara’s youth and upbringing

bestowing largesse at religious feasts.

Nor was it only the Sunan, who gained a reputation for largesse. The Surakarta patih, Radèn Adipati Danuningrat (in office 1804-1810), was renowned as a ‘great friend and champion of santri’ and took part in daily prayers as well as going to the Great Mosque every Friday.85 Another such patron was the Sunan’s younger brother, Pangéran Buminata. Described in a French source as ‘a tall dessicated man with an officious and artful manner’ (Lettres de Java 1829:70), he was known for his generous support of religious teachers, amongst whom was Kyai Maja. The kyai guru apparently held the Surakarta prince in high esteem and often discussed religious matters with him.86 Indeed, so wide was Buminata’s renown in santri circles that even before he fled to Surakarta, Kyai Taptajani (known as Bagus Taptajani in the Surakarta kraton) decided to send his sons to study in Surakarta where they received minor positions from the prince.87 Reflecting on this case, the Yogya Resident, Matthijs Waterloo (in office 1803-1808), remarked that when young men left the Yogya area to receive a religious education in Surakarta, they usually became more attached to the Sunan’s capital than to the area of their birth.88 Much later, another Yogya Resident, A.H. Smissaert (in office 1823-1825), whose behaviour so alienated Dipanagara on the eve of the Java War, would remark that there were many more princes in Surakarta than in Yogyakarta who were known by the Dutch authorities to be ‘fanatical’ about their religious duties.89 It is perhaps relevant here that Dipanagara’s eldest son, Pangéran Dipanagara II, who subsequently adopted the santri name of Radèn Mantri Muhamad Ngarip and who was almost certainly the most intelligent of his offspring, decided after long peregrinations to sit at the feet of a Surakarta teacher, Kyai Maja, rather than one of the many guru he had visited in the vicinity of the sultan’s capital. The favoured position which Kyai Maja later acquired amongst the ranks of Dipanagara’s numerous religious supporters underscored Surakarta’s ascendancy as a centre of

85 vAE (aanwinsten 1900), Van den Berg, ‘Copia memorie’, 8-1806.
86 Dj.Br. 49, Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 22-6-1805; dK 111, H.M. de Kock, ‘Beschrijving van het karakter en die hoedanigheid van de keizer, de prinsen en de rijksoor-der van Soerakarta’, 21-11-1829; Büchler 1888, I:419 (where Buminata is described as ‘the best educated and most intelligent member of the Surakarta court’), II:32 (where Büchler speculated that he might have been of Dutch descent!); Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, III:62. Buminata later played a major role in the secret correspondence between the courts in 1811-1812 by negotiating with the Yogya santri messengers, see IOL Eur F148/24 (Raffles-Minto correspondence, vol. 24), ‘Information given to Mr [Herman Warner] Muntinghe by Radèn Adipati Tjokro Negoro [Cakranagara], the late prime minister of Surakarta’, n.y. (? late July 1812). See further Chapter VII.
87 Dj.Br. 49, Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 22-6-1805.
88 Dj.Br. 49, Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 22-6-1805.
religious instruction in the early nineteenth century.\textsuperscript{90} It would also help to fuel the latent tensions between the prince’s aristocratic and santri followers. The former, nearly all Yogyanese, tended to view Kyai Maja and his Surakarta fellow ulama and pradikan with deep suspicion, an attitude which was reciprocated amongst the Sala santri (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:744; Carey 1987:279-84; Chapter XI).

In the early 1800s, however, all this lay in the future. At this time, the prince’s personal links seem to have been largely confined to the immediate Yogya area. They remained this way until the period of H.G. Nahuys van Burgst’s residency (1816-1822) when, according to Dipanagara’s own testimony, he travelled out of the Yogya area for the first time on foot along back country roads to the village of Maja to seek out his eldest son (born circa 1805), who had then become a pupil of the kyai guru, later the prince’s bane and inspiration during the Java War (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:744; Carey 1981a:261 note 110; Chapter III, Chapter X note 184, Chapter XI). Shortly thereafter, Kyai Maja visited Dipanagara at Tegalreja, arriving according to the prince of his own accord and unbidden shortly after the prince himself had returned from one of his personal retreats at Selarong (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:744-5), probably during one of his fasting month (puwasa) sojourns at Guwa Secang.

Conclusion

Dipanagara’s upbringing at Tegalreja under the formidable and pious Ratu Ageng fixed the bearings for his future life. The old adage ascribed to the Jesuits, ‘give us a child until he is seven and we will have him for the rest of his life’ did not quite hold in Dipanagara’s case since he only joined his great-grandmother at her country estate at the age of seven in the early 1790s, but even before his departure from the Yogya kraton it is very likely that he began to feel the influences which would later shape his character and personality. The links between his father’s establishment, the kadipaten, and the court santri communities may have already begun to tell. At the same time, the young prince would have certainly been influenced by the presence of his mother and great-grandmother, both offspring of prominent kyai, during his young boyhood in the female quarters. These influences would become even more pronounced during the critical 1793-1803 decade when he grew into a young man under Ratu Ageng’s watchful and discerning eye. A prince raised

\textsuperscript{90} Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:742, where Dipanagara remarked that, although Kyai Maja had never been to Mecca so perfect was his knowledge of the Qur’ān and the rules laid down in it that even santri who had made the haj (pilgrimage) deferred to his authority. For a list of Dipanagara’s religious supporters, see Appendix VIIb.
in a village environment and instilled from his youth with a sense of shared identity with the common man; an offspring of the ruling family with an intimate knowledge of the life of the Javanese peasantry as well as the world of the rural santri and religious teachers, these were indeed rare combinations. Is it any wonder that such a young person would have had an unusual destiny? While the prophecies supposedly uttered by the first sultan and subsequently during the prince’s pilgrimage to the south coast in circa 1805, to which we will come shortly, foretold tragedy – ‘You alone are the means but that not for long, only to be counted among the ancestors’\(^91\) – the shadows which these evoked still lay some way ahead. The immediate future for the eighteen-year-old,\(^92\) who now had sole charge of the Tegalreja estate, seemed bright. Living comfortably removed from the incessant intrigues of the Yogya court, and beginning to come into his own as a young adult with a growing sense of commitment to the religious path, Dipanagara could look forward to a life of spiritual and personal fulfilment sustained by his ever widening circle of santri and pious priyayi associates. It is to these links and the formation of the prince’s intellectual character and understanding of Islam that we must now turn.

\(^{91}\) BD (Manado), II:125, XIV (Sinom) 80. tan ana malih-malih/ nanging sira sranaipun/ mapan iku tan dawa/ nanging kinarya leluri. See further Chapter IV.

\(^{92}\) I am continuing to calculate Dipanagara’s age at the time of Ratu Ageng’s death in Javanese years, see note 52.
CHAPTER III

Young manhood: marriage, education, and links with the santri community, 1803-1805

First marriage and development of the Tegalreja community

It is likely that in the period immediately following his great-grandmother’s death in October 1803, Dipanagara deepened his connections with a number of intimate associates among the ulama who resided in the villages around Tegalreja. Some of these he would later dispatch on pilgrimages to local shrines and holy sites in the period before the Java War. Such relationships were undoubtedly strengthened through the prince’s first marriage (circa 1804) to the daughter of a prominent religious teacher from the Slèman area to the north of Yogya.

This young woman, Radèn Ayu Retna Madubrangta, was the second daughter of Kyai Gedhé Dhadhapan from the village of Dhadhapan near Tempèl in the Turi sub-district close to the Yogya-Kedhu border. She was the mother of Dipanagara’s eldest and most able son, whom the prince always favoured amongst his other children (Javasche Courant 92, 6-8-1829), and who would later take his father’s young adult name of Radèn Mas Antawirya, subsequently being appointed as Pangéran Dipanagara II in August 1825. Under his post-war Javanese Muslim name of Radèn Mantri Muhamad Ngarip, he would write a prophetic-historical account of his life and times – the Babad Dipanagara Surya Ngalam – in which his mother is described in glowing terms as a very devout woman who took pleasure in accompanying her husband in his religious duties. According to Dipanagara II, they remained close until the elder Dipanagara was prevailed upon by his father, the third sultan, to make a more prestigious ‘political’ marriage to Radèn Ajeng Supadmi (post-1807, Radèn Ayu Retnakusuma), the possibly part-Chinese daughter of the Yogya bupati of Panolan, Radèn Tumenggung Natawijaya III, on 25 February 1807.

1 See Plate 14 and Appendix VIIb, sub: Jaèlani, Muhamad, Jayamustapa (alias Sukbatuliman), Mopid, Mudha. One of Dipanagara’s sons, Radèn Mas Alip (see Appendix IV note 1), mentioned the names of two other close associates, Wiryakusuma and Jaya Muhamad, Nahuys van Burgst 1835-36, I:13.

2 LOr 6488 (Babad Dipanagara, Surya Ngalam):14, I.14.

3 The bride’s mother may have been a daughter of Hamengkubuwana II by one of his favour-
This was an elaborate affair – a double wedding ceremony in fact since the prince's younger sister was also married on that day – and the gifts from the Surakarta court alone amounted to over 1,600 kati (one tonne) of rice, 16 buffaloes and 200 ronde realen (480 guilders). The Dutch Resident, Matthijs Waterloo (in office 1803-1808), even gave the prince and his younger sister 21 ells (just under five feet) of parchment in addition to his other more predictable wedding presents such as lengths of chintz and prestigious silk patola cloth from the former Dutch trading post of Surat in western India, the last of which was often used as bride wealth. This gift of parchment must have assumed a certain level of literacy on the part of the newly weds.5

This second wife had only met Dipanagara three months before their marriage and their union does not seem to have been a particularly happy one since the prince never once referred to her in his autobiography. She also behaved, according to Dipanagara II, in an arrogant and unjust way towards his more lowly-born mother; and one can only surmise that this may have driven the latter to an early grave. The elder Dipanagara made only one mention of Madubrangta in his babad and that was late in the Java War, when he wrote that she had died during his time at Tegalreja (namely, pre-July 1825), referring to her as bibi (auntie), a term often used in Javanese court circles to designate mothers of less elevated social standing. Her father Kyai Gedhé...
Dhadhapan is not specifically mentioned in Dipanagara’s *babad*, although there are references to a certain Kyai Dhadhapan in the group of close *ulama* (Islamic scholars) around Kyai Maja in 1828. He is even mentioned as Maja’s key ‘adviser and confidant’ at this time. It is possible this may have been the same man, although the Kyai Dhadhapan referred to in the prince’s autobiography is described as a pupil (*murid*) of Kyai Maja, which would not seem to fit Radên Ayu Madubrangta’s father who already appears to have been an eminent kyai by the mid-1800s and could hardly have been the ‘pupil’ of a man seven years’ Dipanagara’s junior.

Besides the village-based *ulama*, Dipanagara also had friends among the Yogya court official and royal related families who were interested in Islam and had private collections of Islamic texts. The Danurejan family, whom we have met above, was particularly important here. They were to provide all but one of the chief ministers in the nearly two centuries following the sultanate’s establishment in 1755, and their links with the *pathok negari* (centre for experts in Islamic law) at Melangi and its locally renowned kyai, both of which connected them with the circle of *ulama* at Tegalreja, put them at the very centre of the santri world of south-central Java. One family member in particular, Radên Ayu Danukusuma, a daughter of Sultan Hamengkubuwana I and the mother of Danureja II (in office 1799-1811), seems to have been especially appreciated by the prince. She is mentioned in his *babad* as his chess partner, a game he greatly enjoyed. More significantly, she was known for her knowledge of Javanese-Islamic literature and her facility with *pégon* (Carey 1992:157, 343, 489 note 425), both skills which would have resonated with Dipanagara, who likewise wrote in *pégon*. Amongst the texts in her private collection were Nūruddīn ar-Rānīrī’s Malay work *Bustān as-Salat*.

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9 He is reported to have been a leading participant in the negotiations which led to Maja’s surrender to the Dutch with a 600-strong force on 12 November 1828, Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, IV:604; BD (Manado) IV:94-5, XXXIV.89-90.

10 Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, IV:628 (quoting General H.M. de Kock). A certain Kyai Gajali from the village of Dhadhapan is listed along with other followers of Kyai Maja who were captured by the Dutch at this time, Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, IV:889; Appendix VIIb.

11 Kyai Maja is thought to have been born in circa 1792, see De Stuers 1833:15, who refers to Maja as 36 years old in 1828, and Roorda van Eysinga 1832, IV:327, writing in February 1830, gives his age at 38. So it would have been almost impossible for him to have been the teacher of Kyai Gedhé Dhadhapan, whose daughter married Dipanagara in circa 1803.

12 The original family name was Gandakusuma, but they also used the name Yudanagara after the title of the district administrator (*bupati*) of Banjarnegara in Banyumas, which office the first Yogya chief minister, Danureja I (1755-1798), had held before his appointment in circa 1755, see Appendix Va.

13 Pigeaud 1931-32, 11-4:126-32, 12-1:34-40; Carey 1975:347-9; Appendix II. The only *patih* who was not from the Yudanegaran line was Danureja IV (in office 1813-1847), see Appendix Va. The family continued to provide all the subsequent Yogya chief ministers until the abolition of the post in 1943, see Selosoemardjan 1962:51.

The power of prophecy

(‘Garden of kings’; Ricklefs and Voorhoeve 1977:48) and Muhammad ibn Faḍl Allāh al-Burhänpūrī’s al-Tuhfa al-mursala ilā rūḥ an-Nabī (‘Gift addressed to the spirit of the Prophet’; Ricklefs 1973:347-9; Carey 1975:341-4), precisely the sort of texts which Dipanagara is reported to have studied in his youth.

Other priyayi dynasties with strong interests in Islam included the Wiragunan and Kertadirjan families, both of whom were closely connected with the prince by virtue of their service as senior officials of his father’s establishment, the kadipatèn (see Appendix Vb). Radèn Tumenggung Wiranagara, the son of Mas Tumenggung Wiraguna I, the much respected patih of the kadipatèn in Dipanagara’s youth, ‘could write letters in the style of a priest (santri)’, namely had mastered pégon script, and was the pupil of Kyai Taptajani, with whom he had studied Islamic legal and mystical texts (Carey 1981a:245 note 41). He was described in a Dutch source as a ‘lettered Javanese, acquainted with the history of his land and well versed in the Qur’ān’ (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:599). His santri name was ‘Mas Mukidin’. Many of his relatives were santri and some joined Dipanagara during the Java War (Carey 1981a:245 note 41). Married for a time to the prince’s eldest sister, we will see below (Chapter VIII, Chapter IX) how he would later incur Dipanagara’s bitter enmity by conducting an affair with his stepmother, Ratu Ageng (official wife of the third sultan), and by taking her side and that of the Yogya chief minister, Danureja IV (in office 1813-1847), against the prince in political disputes over the land-rent and other matters in the troubled decade preceding the Java War.

The prince’s relations with the Kertadirjan family, who briefly succeeded Mas Tumenggung Wiraguna in the office of patih kadipatèn (Appendix Vb), appear to have been rather closer and more mutually supportive. A member of this family, Mas Tumenggung Kertadirja II, who served as one of the Yogya bupati in the Sokawati area (1812-1821), had many Islamic works in his possession at the time of his dismissal in December 1821. A personal friend of Dipanagara, he subsequently took up residence at Tegalreja and became

15 dB 412, J.F.W van Nes (Surakarta) to Commissioner-General (L.P.J. du Bus de Gisignies), 30-10-1826. Wiranagara (post-1829, Pangérán Adipati Prabuningrat), also had various other leading Javanese ulama as his teachers, friends and counsellors, including Kyai Muhamad Ngarip (also known as Ahmad Ngarip) of Melangi (Appendix VIIb), Kyai Melangi (Kyai Iman Ngali) (Appendix VIIb), Haji Usman (Waru, Surakarta), Haji Asro (Gabudan, Surakarta), Haji Idris (pengulu of the landrad/Javanese-Islamic religious law court), Kyai Plasa Kuning, Kyai Karang (Appendix VIIb), Kyai Daud (Gegulu, Kulon Praga, former apanage of Dipanagara) and Kyai Pekih Ibrahim (also known as Kyai Muhamad Kusèn, pengulu of Dipanagara [1828-1830], Appendix VIIb), AN, Exhibitum, 20-9-1832 no. 1, interview with Kyai Ahmad Ngarip, 11-8-1832.

16 Kertadirja II was the son of the patih of the kadipatèn, Mas Tumenggung Kertadirja I (in office 1807-circa 1810), and served as Yogya bupati of Kerja and Masaran (Sokawati) until his dismissal in December 1821, see pp. 543-4.

one of his principal army commanders in the Madiun area of east Java at the
time of the outbreak of the Java War lasting out six months before his capture
on the slopes of Mount Lawu in January 1826 (p. 544; Louw and De Klerck

The prince also had non-Javanese priyayi connections amongst his intimate
circle at Tegalreja. One such was Sèh Abdul Ahmad bin Abdullah al-Ansari
(alias Ahmad Ansar Sharif, alias Sèh Habib Ahmad al-Ansari), an Arab from
Jeddah who had married into the family of Pangéran Blitar, a son of the first
sultan (Nahuys van Burgst 1835-36, I:13; Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909,
III:570-1; Carey 1974a:35 note 116). Sèh al-Ansari apparently earned his liv-
ing as a trader between Semarang and Yogya, and there are references to
him travelling between the two cities in January 1824. He may have kept
Dipanagara informed of developments outside the Principalities.18 As a
Sharif (presumed descendant of the Prophet) he may even have exercised
some religious influence over him. His son-in-law, also known as Ahmad,
was likewise part of the prince’s pre-Java War Tegalreja circle and later died
defending Dipanagara’s headquarters at Selarong in October 1825.19 One
of Dipanagara’s sons, Radèn Mas Alip, claimed that these two Jeddah-born
Arabs were amongst his father’s most important councilors in the lead up
to the Java War and both supported him during the war itself, Sèh al-Ansari
only giving himself up to the Dutch early in 1828.20

Unsurprisingly, Dipanagara is silent in his autobiography about another
group of ‘friends’ who may have formed part of his wider Tegalreja circle,
people who would be of considerable assistance to the prince at the time
of the outbreak of the Java War. These were the members of the Yogya
criminal underworld made up of local jago (literally: ‘fighting cocks’, thugs),
wong durjana (highwaymen, robbers) and ‘social bandits’, men like Demang
Jayamenggala, the tax-collector of Samèn to the south of Yogya, who was

18 Sèh al-Ansari’s travels between Semarang and Yogya are referred to in Dj.Br. 67, H.J. Domis
(Semarang) to A.H. Smissaert (Yogyakarta), 23-1-1824. He gave himself up to the Dutch in early
1828 and was rewarded with a pension of f 250 a month after the Java War, see Javasche Courant
31(11-3-1828), 80 (5-7-1828), 82 (10-7-1828), Bijvoegsel (11-8-1828); GKA, 20-9-1830 no. 56k, inter-
view with Ahmad Ansar Sharif, 15-4-1830. His wife, Radèn Ayu Sèh Ansari, appears on a Dutch
list of stipends and incomes paid to members of the Yogya court in February 1830 as receiving
f 100 a month, a very high stipend, and being domiciled (? with her husband) in Palembang,
Dj.Br. 19¹¹, F.G. Valck, ‘Voordragt voor de uitgaven ten behoeve van Z.H. den sultan zoomede
van de inkomsten en toelagen aan de prinsen, hoofden en andere personen tot het hof van Djok-
19 Dipanagara mentioned the death of a ‘Sèh Ahmad from Jeddah’ in the fighting around
Selerong on 25-10-1825, see BD (Manado), III:22-3, XXIII.146-52.
20 UBL BPL 616 Port. 9 no. 2, ‘Proces-Verbaal van Radeen Maas Alip’, 3-8-1825; Louw and De
Klerck 1894-1909, III:570-1, 573, on Sèh al-Ansari’s surrender to the Dutch, his request to settle in
Surakarta and the f 600 given to him by Nahuys to pay for a house for himself and his family. See
note 18.
renowned as an expert in gunpowder manufacture, and who would later become the leader of all Dipanagara’s bandit supporters to the south of the sultan’s capital (Carey 1981a:243 note 36); or the ferry-crossing bandits of Mangiran and Kamijara on the Praga River who were reported to have been summoned to Tegalreja to give the prince assistance during his mid-July 1825 confrontation with the Yogy a authorities over the planned road across his property (Carey 1981a:243 note 36); or even the tiger hunters of Jelegong who were ordered to prepare their arms and give him lodging at the time of the outbreak of the Java War (Van der Kemp 1896a:390; Carey 1981a:262 note 112; 282 note 197). Some of these people seem to have come from apanage lands controlled by the prince or from villages adjacent to his landholdings or from areas through which he may have passed during his many journeys and pilgrimages through the countryside to the south of Yogy a (Carey 1981a:238 note 20; Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909:744-5; Chapter VIII). Others, like local robber chieftain in northeastern Kedhu, Wirapati, who joined him during the course of the war (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, III:90-1), were clearly not part of his pre-1825 Tegalreja ‘circle’. Even today, as we have seen, Dipanagara is compared unfavourably to his great-grandfather Sultan Mangkubumi in some Yogy a circles because the latter eschewed the use of such elements in his campaigns against the Dutch during the Gyi anti War (1746-1755), criticisms which are found too in the babad literature (Carey 1981a:244).

Education and literary interests

These then were some of the prince’s friends, advisers and underworld associates during his youth and early manhood at Tegalreja. What now of his education and intellectual formation over the same period? Compared with the upbringing of most of the sons of the Javanese nobility at this time, Dipanagara’s intellectual and spiritual development at Tegalreja was unusual: a post-Java War Dutch report mentioned that the education of the Javanese nobility at the time was normally arranged on an informal basis whereby a ‘house’ ulama (Islamic scholar) would teach Arabic prayers and Qur’ān exegesis, but we know from J.W. Winter’s description of the kraton of Surakarta in 1824 that

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21 See Chapter I note 140.  
22 MvK 3055, ‘Beschrijving en statistieke rapport betreffende de Residentie Djokjokarta’, 1836. For a list of religious teachers in Yogy a in circa 1831, see Appendix VIIa. The Dutch government conducted two surveys of local Javanese-Islamic education in Java in 1819 (AN Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal, 8-3-1819 no. 9) and 1832 (AN Kabinet 2065, 31-12-1832), which elicited reports from Residents throughout Java to governor-generals G.A.G.Ph. van der Capellen (in office 1816-1826) and Johannes van den Bosch (in office 1830-1834), some of which can be found in Van der Chijs 1864:212-323.
the education of the court elite at that time was rather a hit and miss affair (Winter 1902:39-40). The situation in the Yogyakarta krtaton must have been the same. Against this background, Dipanagara’s education in Javanese-Islamic literature and his more formal pesantrèn (religious boarding school)-style instruction at the hands of visiting ulama in the Qur’ān and Hadith (traditions of The Prophet) at Tegalreja was considerably more impressive. Indeed, it was something he took care to try to pass on to his own children both at Tegalreja and in Makassar, at least four of whom – Pangéran Dipanagara II, Radèn Mas Raib, Radèn Mas Kindar and Radèn Mas Dulkabli – followed in his footsteps by gaining a pesantrèn education and devoting themselves to Islam (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:744; Sagimun 1965:359-60; Carey 1981a:lxiii note 112; Chapter II note 37). Dutch contemporaries, would later remark on the greater ‘refinement’ of Dipanagara’s family when compared to others in the Yogya court in the Java War period, and no less a person than Governor-General Johannes van den Bosch would conclude that only a ‘narrow-minded person’ like the pre-Java War Resident of Yogya, Anthonië Hendrik Smissaert, could have misjudged such a man.23

From Javanese sources, it is possible to gain a glimpse of the sort of texts Dipanagara may have studied at Tegalreja with his circle of friends and associates.24 Amongst his favourite Islamic works was the Kitab Tuhfah, a Sufi ontology on the doctrine of the ‘seven grades of being’ which was much appreciated by the Javanese when speculating on God, the world and man’s place in it (Drewes 1966:290-300). He also seems to have been familiar with treatises on Islamic theology and mysticism, such as Uṣul and Tasawwuf, as well as Javanese mystical poems such as suluk. The history of the prophets (Serat Anbiya) and Tafsir, a Qur’ān exegesis, likewise formed part of his literary curriculum,25 as did didactic works on Islamic political philosophy such as the Şirāt as-salāṭin and the Tāj as-salāṭin. The latter was even prescribed by the prince as a text for his younger brother, the fourth sultan (reigned 1814-1822), when he was completing his education in the krtaton.26

Another special area of interest seems to have been Muslim jurispru-

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23 Van Nes 1844:136; dK 111, ‘Beschrijving van het karakter en de hoedanigheid van den Sultan, de prinsen en den Rijksbestierder van Djokjokarta’, 20-12-1829; dK 161, J.F. Walraven van Nes, ‘Korte verhandeling over de waarschijnlyke oorzaken die aanleiding tot de onlusten van 1825 en volgende jaren in de vorstenlanden gegeven hebben’ (henceforth: Van Nes, ‘Korte verhandeling’), 28-1-1830; Van der Kemp 1896a:416 (on Van den Bosch’s comment).24 References in Javanese sources can be found in BNg, II:149, XXXVI.15-9; and KITLV Or 13 (Buku Kedhung Kebko):47-8, IV:32-8.25 BNg, II:149, XXXVI.17; KITLV Or 13 (Buku Kedhung Kebko):47, IV:35-6. See also Ricklefs and Voorhoeve 1977:69, where a copy of the Serat Anbiya (IOL Jav 74) which originally belonged to Ratu Ageng (? Ratu Ageng Tegalreja, the great-grandmother of Dipanagara) is described.26 BNg, I:388, XC:26-7; II:149, XXXVI.18, where Dipanagara is described as having read the texts at Tegalreja. The Tāj as-salāṭin was one of the first works re-copied in the Yogya krtaton after the library had been plundered by the British in 1812, Mudjanattistomo 1971:63 no. 235 (copied in 1831).
The power of prophecy

dence: the Taqrīb, Lubāb al-fiqh, Muḥarrar and Taqarrub (a commentary on the Taqrīb) were all known to Dipanagara, and he later mentioned with pride his personal collection of Javanese-Islamic law codes which had been kept for him by a friend in Yogya during the Java War. In this connection, he was extremely critical of the 1812 legal reforms introduced by the interim British administration of Thomas Stamford Raffles (1811-1816) which curtailed the power of the Javanese religious courts (surambi) in criminal cases (Carey 1987:299-301; pp. 386-7). Such works on Muslim jurisprudence, scholastic theology, grammar and explanations of the Qurʾān seem to have been in general use for instruction in religious boarding schools (pesantrèn) in Java during this period according to the official surveys on vernacular education conducted in 1819 and 1832. Amongst these, the Taqrīb, Uṣul, Nahwu and Tafsir featured prominently. We also know that these texts were consulted in the various centres for Islamic law with which the prince was connected. His special interest in works on Muslim jurisprudence was thus not so unusual given the context of contemporary pesantrèn education in south-central Java just before and immediately after the Java War.

Despite the range of his reading and supposed expertise in Javanese-Islamic legal matters, it is striking that Dipanagara did not feel secure enough in his own knowledge of the holy scriptures to carry out the mandate given him by his pre-war vision of the Javanese Ratu Adil (‘Just King’) to fight on the basis of the Qurʾān. Instead, he decided to summon ulama whom he judged especially well versed in the Qurʾān to his headquarters at Selarong at the beginning of the war to give him the necessary advice. Lacking confidence in the scholars and religious teachers whom he had met and studied with in the immediate vicinity of Yogya, he decided to invite Kyai Maja and another much older Pajang-based ulama, Kyai Kuwaron, to join him as his senior religious advisers (Chapter X note 184), a decision which later sparked many jealousies amongst his local supporters (p. 634).

Besides these Javanese-Islamic texts, Javanese sources relate that Dipanagara also studied – or had read to him – works of a more moralistic and Javanese literary nature. These included edifying tales on kingship and statecraft adopted from Persian and Arabic classics such as the Fatāh al-Muluk (‘Victory of kings’), the Hakik al-Modin and the Naṣīḥat al-Muluk (‘Moral lessons for

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27 Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 30-1, where Dipanagara mentioned that ‘these lawbooks [...] contain everything that had been instituted in an excellent and exalted spirit by The Prophet and his caliphs [wali]. They were particularly made for Java and have been in use for a thousand years’. It is likely that Dipanagara was referring to compendia of jurisprudence of Old Javanese origin such as the Jugul Mudha, Surya Ngalam, and Praniti Raja Kapa-Kapa, see Pigeaud 1967-80, I:308; Raffles 1817, I:279-80; pp. 387-8.


29 AN, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal, 8-3-1819 no. 9, F.E. Hardy (Resident of Kedhu) to Algemeen Secretaris (Jean Chrétien Baud), 15-4-1819.

30 See Chapter II.
kings’), as well as Modern Javanese versions of Old Javanese classics like the Serat Rama, Bhoma Kāwya, Arjuna Wijaya and Arjuna Wiwaha. The prince was likewise well versed in Modern Javanese wayang (shadow puppet) literature and made numerous allusions to characters in the Javanese show theatre in his autobiography (Carey 1974a:12-37). It is interesting in this respect that amongst the texts which Dipanagara asked the Dutch government to copy in Surakarta for the education of his children who had been born to him in exile in Manado (1830-1833) and Makassar (1833-1855), was the whole of the Purwa cycle of wayang plays down to the great ‘brothers’ war’ (Bratayuda). Other texts requested by the prince at this time included the famous Islamic epic tale, Ménak Amir Hamza, the Asmara Supi, a romance related to the Ménak cycle, the Serat Manikmaya, a text on cosmogony dating from the Kartasura period (1680-1745) which deals with agricultural myths and wayang traditions (Pigeaud 1967-80, I:154; Carey 1992:495 note 466), the Serat Gandakusuma (Angling Driya) and the Serat Angrèni, an episode from the Panji cycle.

A copy of the popular Javanese romance, Jaya Lengkara Wulang, written on treebark paper was found at Dipanagara’s headquarters at Selarong in October 1825 and may have formed part of the prince’s private collection. The text deals with various aspects of statecraft in the form of a tale of a young prince wandering (lelana) through Java and meeting many masters of secular, religious and arcane lore. This was a theme which had universal appeal amongst the courtly elite at this time epitomising as it did the ideal education of the young satria (warrior nobleman) (Pigeaud 1967-80, I:230; Ricklefs 1998:271). We shall see below how Dipanagara gave practical expression to this satria lelana ideal during his pilgrimage to the south coast in circa 1805.

Character, intellectual ability and relations with Europeans

While the list of works on Islam, Javanese-Islamic law and Javanese literature reportedly studied by Dipanagara seems impressive, their bare enumeration affords few real insights into the prince’s character. How really intelligent and discerning was he? Can we believe the post-Java War Dutch sources which
suggest that he was somewhat unique amongst his Yogya contemporaries? How much formal education did he really have? Could he read and write? What was his understanding of Islam, and how deep was his spiritual commitment?

The answers to some of these questions can be found in the records of some of the European officers who spent time in his company, in particular the diary of Second-Lieutenant Julius Heinrich Knoerle, the German officer who accompanied the prince for seven weeks on his journey into exile in Manado. Knoerle, a lawyer by training, who had been born in Stargard in West Pomerania (Prussia), had been in Java for just four years (1824-1828) before personal sickness forced him to return to Holland. The veteran VOC official Nicolaus Engelhard, who got to know him during his three-month recuperative stay at Engelhard’s villa at Pondhok Gedhé near Cililitan in the Bataviasche Ommelanden in 1828 (Heuken 2000:280), spoke well of Knoerle’s character and recommended him to the minister of the Colonies, C.Th. Elout (in office 1824-1829), describing him as a man closely acquainted with the language, manner and customs of the Javanese, as well as with the colonial system and the current political situation in Java. This seems to have had the desired effect for the second-lieutenant had apparently come back to Java with Governor-General Johannes van den Bosch (in office 1830-1834) on 2 January 1830 as his military adjutant. However, P.J.F. Louw and E.S. de Klerck (1894-1909, V:604, 752-3), the Dutch military historians of the Java War, are contemptuous of his character and abilities describing him as a pushy and dishonest ‘careerist’. They noted that he had risen to only the most junior commissioned rank in the colonial army, and referred to an official govern-

36 For a discussion of Knoerle’s journal, whose full title is, ‘Aanteekeningen gehouden door den 2e Luit. J.H. Knoerle, adjudant van Z.E. den gouverneur-generaal van Nederlandsch-Indië, betreffende de dagelyksche verkeering van dien officier met den prins van Djocjakarta, Diepo Negoro, gedurende eene reis van Batavia naar Menado, het exil van den genoemden prins’, Menado, 20-6-1830 (‘Notes kept by 2nd Lieutenant J.H. Knoerle, adjutant of His Excellency the governor-general of Netherlands-Indies, concerning the daily contacts of the above officer with the prince of Yogyakarta, Dipanagara, during a journey from Batavia to Manado, the exile of the aforementioned prince’), a copy of which, with underlining by Johannes van den Bosch, is in the Van den Bosch private collection no. 391 in the Nationaal Archief in The Hague, see Carey 1981a:xxxv.

37 NA, Ministerie van Koloniën 3195, ‘Rapporten en andere stukken van A. de Wilde en N. Engelhard betreffende de cultures op Java, houtbosschen, afstand van land &c, 1816-30’, Nicolaus Engelhard (Pondhok Gedhé) to C.Th. Elout (The Hague), 30-9-1828. After a period of leave in Europe (1828-1829) to restore his health (‘Journal’, 45), Knoerle appears to have accompanied Van den Bosch to Java on the sailing ship Z.M. Rupel which sailed from Texel on 24-7-1829 arriving in Batavia on 2 January 1830, see Chapter XII note 38.38

38 As a second-lieutenant, Knoerle had served briefly (2-2-1826–16-6-1827) as an infantry officer in the 19th National Infantry Division during the Java War before returning to Batavia to work as assistant editor of the government newspaper, the Javasche Courant (1827-1828). His request to be given an honourable discharge from military service on health grounds – he was suffering from a liver complaint – was refused partly because of his dishonest representation of his war record, see Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:752-3. By 9-7-1830, was signing himself as
ment decision which censured Knoerle’s fitful grasp of Javanese (even his Dutch was far from perfect) which made it difficult for him to command native troops in the field (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:752). The young German also had problems in dealing with the local population more generally. He would later meet a violent end while serving as Assistant-Resident in Bengkulu in July 1833 at the hands of the local chiefs and inhabitants who had been goaded to murder by his ‘hot-tempered and wilful’ character and by his ‘often brutal and immoral’ actions which may have included the embezzling of $4,000 earmarked for the relief of famine in his district (Sartono Kartodirdjo 1971:99; Carey 1981a:lxvi note 147; Fasseur 1993:81-2). All this means that his record of his conversations with the prince needs to be treated with circumspection. But the fact remains that his journal – part of which has been published (Knoerle 1835:137-85) – is by far the most complete European account of day-to-day encounters with Dipanagara over an extended period (May-June 1830), so it needs to be cited.

At the time of his mission to Manado with Dipanagara, Knoerle was still serving as military adjutant to Van den Bosch, and his journal was personally written for the governor-general who had to consider the pressing political implications of the prince’s exile at a time of looming war in Europe over Belgian independence. According to Knoerle, the prince ‘appeared as a noble, but at the same time proud man, gifted with shrewdness, a strong [and] enterprising character, and penetrating judgement such as is rarely found amongst high-born Javanese’ (Knoerle 1835:171). He seems to have little formal education and his writing – at least in Javanese characters – was extremely untidy and full of grammatical errors (De Hollander 1877:192-6; Kielstra 1885:408; Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:151). Similarly, in Knoerle’s words, the prince’s style of speech was ‘unusually unmannerly […] and inaccurate’. But the force and vitality of his personality showed through in the vividness of his ideas, which were, according to Knoerle, ‘in themselves rich, powerful and very clear’ (Knoerle 1835:172). This enabled him to make a deep impression on people after even a short meeting: at the Magelang ‘peace conference’ in March 1830, the Dutch supreme commander, Lieutenant-General Hendrik Merkus de Kock, and his staff, none of whom were initially well disposed towards the prince, all spoke with praise about his ‘open-hearted and intelligent’ character when they had been in his company for only a few days. The prince apparently spoke some Malay, but always avoided using the

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39 See pp. 734-8, where fears of a European conflict over Belgium, and a possible British attack on Indonesia, caused Van den Bosch to recommend Dipanagara’s transfer to the Netherlands.

40 Van der Kemp 1896a:416; Johannes van den Bosch (Batavia) to Minister of Marine and Colonies (Den Haag), 14-3-1830, in GKA, 30-7-1830 no. 32k.
language in European company because he found it so distasteful and was not fluent in it.  

He also had an excellent memory: during his conversations with Knoerle he was able to recall developments in pre-Java War Yogyakarta with great clarity and he later set down the whole of his life history in *babad* form during his exile in Manado. This was apparently done in under nine months (May 1831-February 1832) entirely without notes, but with remarkable chronological rigour and attention to detail (Carey 1981a:xxiv-xxvi). Another facet of Dipanagara’s intelligence was his intuitive ability to discern other people’s characters from their facial appearance (*ngèlmu firasat*; the science of physiognomy and physical traits, from the Arabic *ilm al-frāsa*, Drewes 1966:335-6, 356-7). At the beginning of the Java War, he is depicted in one of the *babad* as having picked his officials, army commanders (*basah*), and religious advisers entirely on the basis of his *ngèlmu*, his choice of subordinates usually being a good one. Even his uncle, Pangéran, known after August 1825 as Panembahan Mangkubumi, is described as deferring to his superior judgement. Dipanagara also appears to have been rather careful and astute with money, as we will see in his negotiations for the indemnification of the European land-renters in Yogya in 1823 (pp. 537-43) and his management of his administration and finances during the Java War and subsequent exile (pp. 606-7, 650-3, 726-7).

The prince’s judgement of European officials with whom he came into contact during his pre-Java War life in Yogya and subsequently was also penetrating and critical. Huibert Gerard Nahuys van Burgst (1782-1858), the bluff Harderwijk lawyer, administrator and ‘pseudo-military’ man (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, III:386-7; Chapter IX), who served as Resident of Yogya immediately after the Dutch restoration in 1816, he dismissed as a person who ‘merely enjoyed eating and drinking and the spreading of Dutch ways’, and he correctly described the hapless Jonkheer Anthonië Hendrik Smissaert (1777-1832), the Yogya Resident (in office 1823-1825) immediately preceding the outbreak of the Java War as a ‘good man but weak’ (Louw and

41 On Dipanagara’s distaste for Malay, see Major F.V.H.A. de Stuers to Johannes van den Bosch, 31-3-1830 Kab. no. 65, in GKA, 20-9-1830 no. 58k; and on his poor command of the language, see vdB 391, ‘Voorstellen [van den] Pangerang Diepo Negoro aan den Luitenant Adjutant Knoerle in de tegenwoordigheid van den […] Luitenant [C.] Bosman’, Manado, 19-6-1830.
43 BD (Manado), II:271, XVIII (Kinanthi) 130-1. *Inggris wus salin Walanda/ Résidhèn Nahis namèki. 131. karemía mangan-minium/ lan anjrah cara Walandi.*
De Klerck 1894-1909, V:743). As for Frans Gerhardus Valck, who served as Resident of Kedhu (in office 1826-1830) at the time of his meeting with De Kock at Magelang in March 1830, the prince found him ‘extremely wearing because of his stupid and piffling questions [...] he commanded no respect and [...] had not the appearance of a Resident who has to govern large numbers of Javanese’.\(^{44}\) Dipanagara reserved his highest praise for John Crawfurd (1783-1868), who served as Resident of Yogya (in office 1811-1814, 1816) during the British interregnum, stating that:

> He had never known any Dutch [official] endowed with the same love of his fellow man and with the same noble-hearted character as Crawfurd. [...] Crawfurd spoke about everything with his father or with himself, and he had made the Javanese language his own in under six months because the Malay language is the language of chickens which no ruler in Java wished to hear.\(^{45}\)

Perhaps in the dour but talented Scotsman, Dipanagara had found a kindred spirit, someone who was as abstemious and frugal as Nahuys van Burgst was hearty and bombastic?\(^{46}\) ‘In everything he said,’ Knoerle later noted, ‘Dipanagara’s attachment to Crawfurd shines through and the latter must have been particularly well suited to win the esteem and attachment of the rulers of Java’.\(^{47}\)

On another level, it is clear that Dipanagara had an enquiring mind and a wide-ranging knowledge of eclectic topics, especially Javanese history and legends. This can be seen in his Makassar notebooks which deal with wayang, Javanese mythology, legendary heroes and holy sites (Carey 1981a:xxx-xxxi). In his conversations, Knoerle noted that the prince talked at length about the goddess of the southern ocean (Ratu Kidul), the kingdoms of Pajajaran and Majapahit, the first sultan of Demak, Radèn Patah (reigned circa 1500-1518), and the late seventeenth-century Balinese mercenary-adventurer, Untung Surapati (circa 1645-1706), as well as more general topics of commerce, navigation, and European dynastic history.\(^{48}\) At the same time, he showed a lively interest in the illustrations of books lent to him during his voyage into exile which covered topics as diverse as Singhalese Buddhism and the First Crusade (1095-1099).\(^{49}\) On all occasions, Dipanagara showed himself perfectly

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\(^{44}\) Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 17.

\(^{45}\) Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 41. Knoerle’s text reads: *dat hy nog geenen Hollander had gekend die met het menschlievend en hooghartige karakter van Crawfurd was gesmeekt geweest*. Since Knoerle’s first language was German not Dutch, it is certain that he used *hooghartig* not in the Dutch sense of ‘arrogant’ or ‘haughty’, but in the German sense of *hochherzig*, ‘dignified’ or ‘noble’. *Gesmeekt* is likewise a neologism derived from the German *geschmückt*, ‘adorned’. I am grateful to the late Dr Th.G.Th. Pigeaud for these clarifications.

\(^{46}\) See Chapter IX.

\(^{47}\) Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 41.

\(^{48}\) Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 8, 21, 25, 32, 45.

\(^{49}\) Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 11, 19. Amongst the books lent to him during his voyage to Manado were Edward Upham, *The history and doctrine of Buddhism popularly illustrated with notices of Kappoism*
at ease in the company of Europeans and his first escort, Major François Vincent Henri Antoine Ridder de Stuers, De Kock’s son-in-law, even spoke of his ‘genteel manners’ (in zijn omgang zeer fatsoenlijk) (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:746).

Understanding of Islam

Dipanagara’s understanding of Islam can be best assessed from the vantage point of his own writings, most notably his autobiographical babad and his Makassar notebooks. We will look at these shortly, but first it may be helpful to hear how those Europeans with whom the prince came into contact at the end of the war saw his practice and understanding as a Javanese Muslim. Knoerle, for example, commented favourably on his understanding of Islam and the depth of his religious commitment:

Dipanagara is very closely acquainted with the spirit which pervades the religious system of [The Prophet]. I believe he judges all miracles achieved by Muhammad from a fair point of view and knows very well how to distinguish [their supernatural aspects from] the [historical] circumstances in which Muhammad found himself.50

Later, during a discussion about the Old Testament prophets, the German officer declared himself surprised by the prince’s ‘correct opinions’.51 Towards Christians, Dipanagara evinced a certain tolerance, although he viewed their concept of the trinity as a ‘blasphemy’ and bitterly blamed them for persecuting other religions. In his words:

No matter who should be given preference between Jesus and Muhammad, the spirit of patient endurance was to be found more in the Qur’an than in [...] [Christian] works. Muslims had included many of the teachings of Jesus in the Qur’an [...] [and] they also considered him a man chosen by God and born from the breath of the Almighty. Christians, on the other hand, had soiled the Divine Sending of Muhammad with contumely and sought to show the Prophet as an impostor.52

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or Demon worship and of the Bali, or planetary incantations of Ceylon (1829); and a Dutch translation with illustrations of Torquato Tasso’s epic poem set at the time of the First Crusade, Geruzaleme Liberata (‘Jerusalem delivered’) (1581). Dipanagara seems to have favoured books with illustrations and later asked that the wayang texts and other MSS which he ordered for his children in Makassar should be copied with the original drawings and figures, see AN, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal buiten rade, 25-10-1844 no. 6, P.J.B. de Perez (governor of Makassar) to Governor-General (Pieter Merkus), 29-1-1844.

50 Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 46. For a less favourable view, see p. 676.
As regards Dipanagara’s doctrinal position as a Muslim, it can be seen from his writings that he was more a typical Javanese mystic than an orthodox Muslim reformer. This was recognised early in the Java War by his principle religious adviser, Kyai Maja, himself a possible adherent of Shatātārīyya mystical brotherhood (tarekat), who pointed out that the prince seemed to be striving for the mystical unity of the Sufi.53 Despite an impressive display of quotations from the Qur’ān in his Makassar notebooks, Dipanagara laid the greatest stress on the use of dhikr (short prayers for the glorification of Allah which are endlessly repeated in ritual order) and on various forms of meditation (Carey 1981a:xxx-xxxi). In the same passages where he praises the efficacy of dhikr, he also refers to daérah (diagrams for regulating breathing during prayer) and to some of the rituals adopted by the Naqsīhabāndīyya and Shatātārīyya mystical brotherhoods.54 Similarly, when he was giving advice to his younger brother, Pangérán (Ngabdurakim) Adisurya, on religious matters he recommended him to use the fourfold dhikr (napi-isbat, isim, isim gaib, isim gaib-ginaib), which befitted the ‘perfect man’ (insan kamil) and would lead to the end of separation between Lord and servant (kawula lan gusti).55

According to Dipanagara, the repeated use of such dhikr would enable the ‘name of majesty’ (isim jalalah), which is Allah, to become ‘engraved’ on the innermost heart (ati sanubari).56 Finally, he took a mystical view of the fundamental dogma of Islam, namely tokid (Arabic tawhīd), the profession of Allah’s unity and uniqueness. He considered that all man’s efforts should be directed towards living up to this profession of unity by denying being to all that exists, inclusive of himself, and striving after union with the Eternal and

53 BD (Manado), IV:13, XXXII (Maskumambang) 85-6. Ki Maja malih turira. Paduka Ji kekad-hangan jalmna Supi/ kantaweis punika/ kung kresia naming satunggil. On Kyai Maja’s doctrinal position, see further LOr 8652k, Diponegoro, ‘Salasilah Kiai Modjo Tondano’, Manado, 15-12-1919. This genealogy, drawn up by a descendant of Dipanagara (?) son of Radèn Mas Raib) who had been exiled to Ambon, purports to show that Kyai Maja and his father Kyai Abdul Ngarip had used the teachings of the Shatātārīyya tarekat in their religious instruction. The same source also refers to the possible presence of Qadiriyyah and Naqsīhabāndīyya tarekat in Ambon in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. For a modern reference to Kyai Maja’s older brother, Kyai Hasan Besari, as a member of the Shatātārīyya tarekat, see Hamka 1973:5.

54 Makassar MS, II:26. istilah Naksabandiah wus nora nganggo obah badané, déné kang dènpandhhang sarupané zhikir thoriq iku, iya wus nora ana liya daérah Satariyah iku. For references to contemporary Shatātārīyya salsilah (genealogies) in MSS collections made by the British in 1811-1816, see Ricklefs and Voorhoeve 1977:69 (IOL Jav. 69), 70 (IOL Jav. 83).


56 BD (Manado) IV:212-3, XXXVIII (Mijil) 67-8. iya isim mangko/ mapan isim jalalah arané/ iya ingkang anèng jronèng ati/ mapan dènaranèki/ sanubari iku. 68. pan ing janthung mengko lahirnèki.

Only Being (Kang Jati Purbaning Sukma). The development and progress of the mystic, in the prince’s view, ran from iman (faith) via tokid and ma‘ripat (gnosis) to true islam, the most absolute surrender of the individual, and the effacement of the human personality and its being in the Divine. Significantly, there was no mention of the shari‘a (Islamic law) as the container for such mystical striving, precisely the sort of oversight which so struck the teachers of the Jáwah (Indonesian) community in Mecca in the later nineteenth century (Snouck Hurgronje 1931:271) and led to the trial of the pasisir mystic, Kyai Haji Ahmad Mutamakin, in early 1730s Kartasura for having ‘disclos[ed] the essence of the mystical science of Reality [haq] […] but [having] reject[ed] the stage of the law [shari‘a]’ (Ricklefs 1998:127-62, 2006:115-7).
As Dipanagara put it in his autobiography:

XXXIII.27 *Iman* means ‘acceptance’
because man is granted life
by God Most High.
The meaning of *tokid* is truth
that one has to observe
God’s ordinations [as stipulated in the law]
be they onerous or light to fulfill.

28 *Ma’ripat* means to reject duality;
as this body is bound to perish,
do not take it into account.
Its [being] is an illusion, too absurd to endure.
Strive only after the primordial
Essence of the All-Pervading One.
The meaning of *islam*

29 is surrender, the avowal of man’s nullity.
All comes from God,
man has only to accept humbly.
Equally in this world and the hereafter,
there is nothing but the grace of God, Lord of the Worlds,
creature being transitory.
That is my view.

30 These four together are [also] called *tokid*.
They are evidence of earnest application [to the striving after God].

For readers familiar with Javanese mystical literature, it will be evident that there is nothing unusual about this fourfold path towards unity propounded by Dipanagara. Indeed, it is typical primbon (divination almanac) material. Moreover, the prince’s repeated references to the mystical practices of the *tarekat* cannot be taken as an indication that he was in touch with the centres of the mystical brotherhoods in the Middle East. Both the Naqšabândiyya and Shatṭārīyya had long been established in Indonesia – the latter having been introduced by the great seventeenth-century Sumatran Sufi Abdurrauf of Singkil (circa 1615-1693) and spread in Java by his pupil Shaikh Abdul

57 BD (Manado), IV:40-1, XXXIII (Durma) 27-30. inkgang iman tegesé pan panarimal réhning pinar-ing urip/ mring Alah Tangala/ tokit tegesé sang nyata/ olohe angelakoni/ maring paréntah/ abot-enthèng tan nampik. 28. kang makripat wus ora roro paningal/ badan pan rusak iki/ tan tinolih ikai/ cipta mongsa kariya/ nging karep maring Kang Jati/ Purbaning Sukma/ islam tegesnèki. 29. mapan pasrah wus tan derbé apa-apa/ kabèh Purbaning [Widi]/ nging karya sunmongga/ dunyakèrat wus padha/ nging sihing Rahil Ngalamin/ [makluk wus sirna/ iku pangrasa mami]." 30. kumpulira papat tokid aranira/ pratondha wus nganepi. The last two lines of this verse in brackets (*) are missing in the BD (Manado) MS so I have taken them from Rusche 1908-09, II:42.
Muhyi (circa 1640-1715) – and by the early nineteenth century the Shaṭṭārīyya in particular had become degenerate, serving as a receptacle for many old-fashioned mystical teachings as can be seen from a study of the *Serat Centhini* (1815), the great encyclopaedia of Javanese manners, history and belief systems in the early nineteenth century (Ricklefs 2006:195-206). It had also died out in Arabia by this time. Thus Dipanagara drew on traditional sources for his religious inspiration and remained unaffected by the fanatical Wahhābī reform movement which for nearly a decade (1803-1812) in the early nineteenth century controlled a large part of the Arabian peninsula including the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, and which later had such a profound influence on the course of events in West Sumatra both before and during the Padri War (1821-1838). There was nothing in Dipanagara’s vision which involved the creation of an Islamic society along the lines of the Padri reformers, nor did he have any problems with reconciling his experience of the Javanese spirit world with his own unshakeable commitment to Islam. Even his desire to end his days in Mecca after making the *haj* (pilgrimage) should be seen more as a way of arranging an honourable retirement in the aftermath of the Java War than a wish to imbibe the teachings of leading Islamic divines in the holy city. This is what Ricklefs has termed the ‘mystic synthesis’ of pre-colonial Java, a synthesis which reached its most remarkable flowering in the life and career of the young Dipanagara (Ricklefs 2006:206-20).

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59 The Wahhābī were a fanatically puritan and fundamentalist Muslim sect founded in the 1740s by Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhāb which by the beginning of the nineteenth century controlled much of Arabia: in 1793, the Wahhābī leader Abd al-Aziz had taken control of Nejd and later (1803-1804) captured the holy cities (Mecca and Medina). These were only reconquered by Muhammad Ali Pasha, Ottoman governor of Egypt in 1812-1813, see Dobbin 1983:128-30; and on the impact of the Wahhābī on the Padri movement in West Sumatra, see Dobbin 1974:319-56. See also Ricklefs 2006:231.

60 Van Hogendorp 1913:159 (reporting from Du Bus’ peace negotiations with Kyai Maja in Salatiga in late September 1827 that Dipanagara would be prepared to make peace if he was to be allowed to make the *haj* to Mecca); Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 4, 33 (refers to Dipanagara’s intention to ask Governor-General J. van den Bosch for a boat and money to make the journey to Mecca and to settle there permanently after buying land from the Sherif of Mecca); AN, Exhibitum 2-7-1831 no. 15, J.P.C. Cambier (Manado) to Johannes van den Bosch (Batavia/Bogor), 22-4-1831 (reporting that Dipanagara had confided to his scribe, Tirtadirana [Appendix XII no. 4], that he was still hoping that Captain Johan Jacob Roeps would come with a boat to take him to Mecca and that he was saving money from his 600 a month stipend for the trip); BD (Manado) IV:418-9, XLIII.249-50 (Dipanagara reports that shortly after his capture at Magelang on 28 March 1830, he had been told by Captain Roeps that Van den Bosch had a problem with his making the *haj* because no one of his status in Java had made the pilgrimage before and that he would have to seek permission from the Dutch king, William I: yèn bab kaji ika/ ingsun tan wani ngrampungi/ sawab durung ana iya. 250. ingkang adat yèn wong gedhe munggah kaji/ ingsun ayun nerangi/ mring nagara Londa dhingin).
Appearance, personality, family and pleasures

Apart from the nature of Dipanagara’s religious convictions, what were the main traits of his personality? What did he look like as a young man and was he attractive to women? Did he have a sense of humour? Did he have any special interests or pleasures? Was his religious zeal tempered by compassion and humanity?

A sketch of the prince drawn by a Yogya court artist when he was about twenty years old, possibly at the time of his second marriage to the daughter of the Yogya bupati of Panolan on 27 February 1807, shows him dressed in an iket (head-dress) and high-collared Javanese jacket (surjan) fastened at the neck with six gold buttons. A gold cord hangs over his shoulders on which a pen-knife may have been fastened and tucked into his jacket. The face is still young with tightly pursed lips, a slightly splayed nose and powerful downcast eyes. Even in advanced old age, according to a witness who met Dipanagara in exile, the prince’s eyes still retained the fire and energy of his youth (Schoemaker 1893:409; Van der Kemp 1896a:358). The whole appearance gives the impression of concentrated energy and cahya (internal spiritual power; personal radiance). The sketch is unique: it is the only drawing from life by a Javanese artist showing the prince in Javanese dress. All the other known portraits are by Dutchmen and show him in santri garb, in particular the dress which he adopted during the Java War, namely, the open-necked kabaya (tabard), black jacket, shawl and turban under which one can just discern that the prince has shaved his head in the manner of the paras Nabi (The Prophet’s tonsure). They also unwittingly give the prince’s face a European cast, although the sketch by the bailiff or chief magistrate of Batavia, Adrianus Johannes Bik (1790-1872), which now hangs in the Musium Kota (Jakarta), is especially fine.

According to Dutch sources, the prince was heavy in build and of middling height. But he apparently had great reserves of energy and a remarkably

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61 The original sketch to which this description refers was owned by Ibu Dr Sahir of Kota Baru, Yogyakarta, a great-great-granddaughter of Dipanagara (descended through his eldest son, Pangéran Dipanagara II, who was exiled to Sumenep in 1834). I am grateful to Ibu Dr Sahir for allowing me to take a photograph of this sketch, September 1972.

62 The best known sketches of Dipanagara by Dutchmen are those by Major F.V.H.A. de Stuers and A.J. Bik, the first drawn at Semarang on 2 April 1830 before Dipanagara’s departure for Batavia on the steamship ‘Van der Capellen’ (De Stuers 1833:Atlas) and the latter at the Stadhuis (Town Hall) in Batavia before Dipanagara left to board the Pollux on 1 May 1830 (Plate 75). A number of prints and lithographs were subsequently made of these sketches, see Bastin and Brommer 1979:13-4, 139 note 228, 140 nos. 230-2, 141 nos. 236-7.

Dipanagara's robust constitution and ability to endure great privations, including severe bouts of tropical malaria at the end of the Java War, made
III Young manhood: marriage, education and links with the santri community

him a firm believer in traditional medical treatments. During the Java War, he had his own personal physician, a Muslim Bengali by the name of Nurngali who may have perhaps been a former Bengal sepoy who had stayed on in Java after the British departure in 1816 (Carey 1977:310, 322 note 117; Chapter VIII). He ministered to the needs of the prince and his family as well as his key army commanders.68 Later, during his voyage to Manado, Dipanagara expressed his contempt for Western medicine to Knoerle:

How can you speak to me about your Dutch doctors and medicines [...] [when] every day we have dead men on board this vessel who are thrown into the sea? How suspicious [you] Europeans are about [your] doctors!69

Throughout the journey, he continued to treat himself with Javanese herbal potions (jamu) such as beras-kencur and kedawung70 and restricted his diet on some days to dry sweet potato to counteract the effects of sea sickness.71

In terms of physical appearance, Dipanagara could not be described as handsome in the sense that Arjuna – the wayang hero with whom the prince particularly identified – can be recognised as good-looking in Javanese terms (Carey 1974a:16). But it is likely that he had a strong personal magnetism which made him attractive to women and enhanced his personal charisma. Dipanagara himself related that one of the main ‘impeding qualities’ (sipat ngaral) in his youth was that he was ‘often tempted by women’ and during the Java War, as we will see shortly, he ascribed one of his most serious defeats (Gowok, 15 October 1826) to an illicit dalliance he had had with a Chinese girl, who had been taken as a prisoner-of-war at Kedaran and acted as his masseuse.72 Even in exile, he apparently boasted of his conquests: the Resident of Manado, Daniel François Willem Pietermaat (in office 1827-1831), reported that ‘his greatest conversation is about women of whom he seems to have been a great

68 On Dipanagara’s Bengali doctor, referred to in BD as Benggala Nurngali or dhukun Nurngali and his ministrations to Dipanagara’s mortally wounded bodyguard commander, Ali Basah Iman Muhamad Ngabdulkamil, who died in early August 1828, see BD (Manado) IV:21-3, XXXII.145-55. There is also a ‘Nurngaliman’ mentioned as one of those who came to Tegalreja along with a number of kyai and ulama from Dipanagara’s close circle of santri advisers on 18-7-1825 just before the outbreak of the Java War, see BD (Manado) II:350, XXI.52. It is not clear whether this is the same man.

69 Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 11, to which Knoerle had reflected ‘I did not know quite how to answer him because in the space of five days we had had four dead on board’.

70 Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 32. Kedawung is the Javanese name for the tree Barkia roxburghii G., the seeds and leaves of which are used as a well-known Javanese remedy for colic and other stomach ailments, see Sastroamidjojo 1967:196 no. 160, illustration 51.


72 BD (Manado), II:120, XIV.62. nanging sipat ngaral maksih asring kenging ginodha dhateng wano-dya. See further Carey 1974a:15. On Dipanagara’s dalliance with his Chinese masseuse, see Louw and De Klerk 1894-1909, II:517 note 1; Carey 1981a:260 note 106, 1984:2 note 6. There are significant issues involved with this episode which will be explored in greater detail in Chapter XI (pp. 618-20). See also Carey 1984:1-47.
Plate 12. Charcoal sketch of Dipanagara as a young man probably made by a Yogya kraton artist at the time of his marriage to his first official wife (a daughter of the Yogya bupati of Panolan, in east Java, Radèn Tumenggung Natawijaya III, ? died 1811) in March 1807. It is the only known sketch of the Pangéran which shows him dressed in Javanese kraton style in a surjan and blangkon. Photograph by courtesy of Ibu Sahir (great-great granddaughter [canggah] of Dipanagara), Jl. Nyoman Oka 7, Kota Baru, Yogyakarta.
lover’ (Kielstra 1885:408; Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:151). He even made an attempt to marry a local woman, the daughter of a leading Muslim citizen of Manado, Lieutenant Hasan Nur Latif, who objected to the union – as did the Dutch authorities – saying that it would bring his child ‘ill fortune’.73

Certainly, in his pre-exile period, as we have seen, Dipanagara had an active family life. During his time at Tegalreja, he had four wives, whose names are known, and perhaps some unofficial ones as well (Brumund 1854:188). One of these latter was attractive enough to catch the roving eye of the Dutch Assistant-Resident of Yogyakarta and serial lecher, P.F.H. Chevallier (in office 1823-1825), who took her as his mistress for a few months (Chapter X). The prince had nine children (five sons and four daughters) by his wives, at least two of whom died young at Tegalreja. During the Java War, he took three new consorts, one of whom, Radèn Ayu Retnaningsih, a daughter of the Yogya bupati of Kenitèn in the Madiun area, Radèn Tumenggung Sumaprawira, accompanied him into exile where she bore him two sons. She was quite a beauty according to Knoerle, who met her while she was still in her early twenties during the voyage to Manado in May-June 1830, and had a beautifully formed face and large eloquent eyes.74

Although Dipanagara clearly had a great deal of personal charm, which may have enhanced his attractiveness to the opposite sex, the sources are silent about his sense of humour. European contemporaries in particular tend to portray him as a rather dour and forbidding figure: Willem van Hogendorp (1913:146), the lawyer son of Gijsbert Karel van Hogendorp who served in Commissioner-General L.P.J. du Bus de Gisignies’ administration (1826-1830), spoke of his ‘sombre and intense’ character, and A.M.Th. de Salis, a pre-war Resident of Yogya (in office 1822-1823), described his appearance as ‘stupid and mysterious’.75 But neither knew Dipanagara well. In fact, Van Hogendorp had never met him. A Javanese contemporary, the prince’s great-uncle, Pangéran Panular, author of a major chronicle on the British interregnum (1811-1816), referred to the prince as ‘behaving almost like a ruler’ and ‘making himself little liked generally’ (Carey 1992:144, 327). But his testimony is contradictory; in other passages he describes his great-nephew in rather flattering terms (Carey 1992:119, 290; pp. 373-4). Dipanagara later acknowledged that very few of his relations in the kraton dared to make jokes with him.76 But he did have a light-hearted side. His clown-retainers constantly

73 AN, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal in rade, 2-7-1831 no. 15, J.P.C. Cambier (Manado) to Johannes van den Bosch (Batavia/Bogor), 22-4-1831. There is a tradition in Manado that the Ménot family are descended from Dipanagara, but I have not been able to substantiate this.

74 Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 8-9. See Appendix IV note 7 on Retnaningsih’s possible family connection with the Prawiradirjan family.

75 GKA, 11-10-1828 no. 208 L geheim, De Salis, ‘Pro Memorie’, 8-5-1828, where he described Dipanagara as dom en raadsig.

76 BD (Manado), II:319, XX (Dhandhanggula) 29, where Dipanagara’s uncle, Pangéran Mangkubumi’s eldest wife, Radèn Ayu Sepuh, is described as one of the very few who dared to make jokes with him: mapan Dèn Ayu Sepuh/ ingkang purun gujengan ikil/ lawan Kangjeng Pangéran.
engaged the prince in frivolous banter and Knoerle noted that occasionally Dipanagara infected those in his company with a sense of irrepressible joy. He was also able to see the comic side of the most awkward situations: one such was when he found the Yogyakarta Resident, Nahuys van Burgst, a true ladies man, in a rather compromising position with the wife of his Assistant-Resident at his country house at Bedhaya on the flanks of Mount Merapi. At the time, the prince showed acute embarrassment, but when he related the incident to Knoerle, he laughingly asked whether it was not a rather eccentric ménage when two prominent European officials shared the same woman in common. On another occasion, he wrote humorously in his babad about an episode during the disastrous battle of Gawok (15 October 1826), when he found himself contesting a hiding place behind a very small fruit tree with a rather stocky uncle. But frequently the prince’s humour was tinged with savage irony: during the Java War, he seems to have had the habit of sending women’s clothes to his army-commanders deemed guilty of cowardice with handwritten notes pointing out that these became them better than the

78 Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 20: ‘A bark hove into view [and] Colonel Eeg [captain of the vessel on which Dipanagara was travelling] sent a sloop with an officer on board to the vessel. Dipanagara went up to the fore-deck and asked me to accompany him. The speedy passage of our sloop, which cleft, as though it were flying, through the mirror-like surface of the calm sea, aroused the attention of the prince and he laughed at the picturesquely fine view of the crew all dressed in white, transmitting his joy to all of us.’
79 Houben 1994:108; Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 7. The woman in question, née Anna Louisa van den Berg, a lady from Padang, was the wife of the Eurasian assistant-resident, Robbert Christiaan Nicolaas d’Abo (in office 1816-1823, died in Padang 1824). She was the daughter of J.G. van den Berg (1762-1842), the former Resident of Yogyakarta (1798-1803) by his wife Maria Elisabeth Coert (1772-1848), Genealogie Van de Berg 1918:32. She had married D’Abo in April 1805 and was later reported to be involved in divorce proceedings with him, see KB, Cornets de Groot private collection, Ixe pt. 4:39, A.D. Cornets de Groot Jr (Surakarta) to A.D. Cornets de Groot Sr. (Gresik), 26-11-1822. After her estranged husband’s death in Padang in early 1824, she married Nahuys van Burgst on 12-9-1824 in Yogyakarta, accompanied him to Europe where she gave birth to a son who died short after delivery. She died soon after in Passy (Paris) on 8-8-1825, Genealogie Nahuys 2000:1-39. Her younger brother, C.L. van den Berg, who was brought up in Padang and had been trained as an élève voor de Javaansche taal in Yogyakarta (1826-1832), served with intermissions as acting translator in Yogyakarta between 1847-1849 and 1851-1862, but his career was compromised by the fact that he was seen as too close to the Javanese and exercised too much local influence even as an élève, Dr.Br. 17, ‘Minuten van Sevenhoven’, J.I. van Sevenhoven (Yogyakarta) to Johannes van den Bosch (Batavia/Bogor), 2-2-1831 no. 5 (suggesting he be sent to Kedhu as assistant-resident of Jetis); Houben 1994:121, 123-4. There is an interesting reference to D’Abo in Dj.Br. 48, J.G. van den Berg (Surakarta) to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 6-9-1803, stating that D’Abo, who ‘has a ready intelligence [for a Eurasian] […] had insinuated himself’ into Van den Berg’s entourage in Surakarta and that he would be kept on to learn Javanese and ‘copying’.
Javanese prajuritan (fighting dress) they wore into battle.\textsuperscript{81} He was also feared for his ability to place curses on those who did not deliver on their promises or who otherwise betrayed him (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, VI:251; Chapter VIII). Even the places frequented by him, such as his Guwa Secang retreat at Selarong (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:435-7), and his personal belongings such as his walking staff, were thought to be kramat (supernaturally charged) and imbued with power, misfortune being the fate of those who wittingly destroyed them or abused their owner (see note 66; Van Rees 1867, II:66-8; Van den Broek 1873-77, 22:40-2). During the period of his exile in Sulawesi, the very leftovers of his food were considered to have the capacity to cure sickness (Kielstra 1885:409). Here was a man not to be trifled with, a spiritually powerful individual steeped in the Javanese mystical arts.

Popular belief in his spiritual powers also extended to the battlefield, where he was thought to be invulnerable to bullets. The Resident of Manado, Pietermaat, noted that although he was struck twice, once above the left chest and once in his right hand during the battle of Gawok (15 October 1826) (p. 634), none of the shots had left a trace on his body (Kielstra 1885:409; Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, II:517). According to Dipanagara the bullet that hit his left chest bounced back (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, VI:745) and that which penetrated his right hand had already broken into fragments by the time it reached him (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, II:517). There was speculation in Dutch sources that the prince may have been wearing body armour (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, II:517, quoting Hageman 1856), although there is no mention of the use of such protective devices anywhere in the Javanese sources. In the section of his babad which deals with this incident, Dipanagara has a revealing take. In particular, he seems to have been keen to stress the lightness of his wounds to reassure his wife that he had not been unfaithful to her, Javanese popular belief holding that invulnerability and other powers would be neutralised if the individual possessing them indulged in immoral or unsuitable acts (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, II:517 note 1). Since he had indeed been unfaithful just before this battle when he had slept with his Chinese masseuse (note 72), he was anxious that his wife, Ratu Kedhaton (formerly Radèn Ayu Maduretna) would not make the link between his wounds, his battlefield defeat and his sexual conduct. We will return to this issue in the chapter on the Java War (Chapter XI).

Dipanagara’s pleasures were modest and typically Javanese. His two main ones have already been alluded to, namely gardening and the keeping of song birds, especially turtle-doves (perkutut) and cockatoos. Even in exile he spent much of his time in the company of his cockatoos (Louw and De Klerck

\textsuperscript{81} Dj.Br. 18, Valck, ‘Geheime memorie’, 31-3-1840, reporting on Dipanagara’s dispatch of such clothes to his younger brother, Pangéran Suryèngalaga, during the war. For a modern account of the dispatch of such ironic presents in time of war, see Anderson 1972:142.
The power of prophecy

1894-1909, I:151) and while in Manado he was given permission to lay out a garden retreat on a nearby river and a meditation pavilion on the hill overlooking it. As we have seen, he was also an avid chess player, and like many of his kraton contemporaries was an accomplished horseman, keeping a large stable at Tegalreja. This expertise in the saddle later stood him in good stead during the Java War when he was frequently able to elude pursuers over difficult terrain. Betelnut chewing was one of his few habits; he appears to have done this constantly, so much so that he even reckoned the passage of time by how long it took him to masticate mouthfuls of the lime, leaf and betelnut mixture. Indeed, amongst the few personal belongings to survive from his time of exile in Makassar (1833-1855) there are some heavily stained patterned scarves which the prince used to wipe the betelnut juice from his mouth. Later, it appears he drank wine in European company though he never took this habit to excess as so many other princes did at the central Javanese courts at this time. According to Knoerle, he held that it was not an offence against the Qur’an to drink sweet white wine in view of the fact that Europeans at the time drank it as a form of ‘medicine’ whenever they were intoxicated with Madeira or red wine, a view which indicates that Dipanagara had his own independent interpretation of The Prophet’s injunctions. Knoerle also noticed him smoking Javanese rokok (hand-rolled thick cigarettes/cigarillos made of local tobacco wrapped in maize leaves). As for opium, which during Radèn Adipati Danureja IV’s administration (1813-1847) came to be more widely used in Yogya kraton circles (Chapter VIII note 147) and was later sup-

82 AN, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal, 12-4-1831 no. XI, D.F.W. Pietermaat (Resident Manado) to Johannes van den Bosch (Batavia/Bogor), 13-1-1831.
83 Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 19, who related that Dipanagara had some 60 grooms to look after his horses at Tegalreja, where the large stone drinking troughs to water his horses could still be seen on a visit by the present author in January 1972. On the training of the sons of the Javanese nobility in horsemanship from the age of twelve, see Winter 1902:43. At the time of his flight from Tegalreja on 20 July 1825 at the start of the Java War, Dipanagara’s superb black mount (Kyai Githayu) and dexterity in the saddle were both noted by a European observer, Payen 1988:51, 96 note 49. See further p. 602.
84 Carey 1981a:277 note 170; Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 14 refers to Dipanagara’s request to purchase sirih at Surabaya or Madura during his voyage to Manado.
85 Interview with Radèn Mas Jusuf and Radèn Saleh Dipanagara, Jalan Irian no. 83, Makassar, 8-9-1972.
86 Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:743. Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 35-6, quoted Dipanagara as saying that he had drunk ‘much sweet wine at the Loji [Residency House] and that Resident Smissaert on the occasion of every midday meal had also given him sweet wine’. See further Chapter X.
87 Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 35-6, citing Dipanagara’s use of the word tomo for ‘medicine’. Knoerle’s text reads: ‘Dipanagara told me that he would willingly drink some sweet [white] wine because he felt weaker daily, and that although it was forbidden by The Prophet to drink wine, that could be applicable only to wines which had an intoxicating quality such as Madeira and red wines’.
88 Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 37; see also Gerick and Roorda 1901, I:332 sub: rokok; ‘thick Javanese cigars with maize-leaf covering (wiru) which the Javanese high court nobles smoke’.
plied by Chinese to the prince’s followers during the Java War itself,89 there is no evidence that the prince ever touched the drug.

Despite his religious zeal, Dipanagara gave Knoerle the impression that his spiritual commitment was tempered by a deep sense of humanity and compassion. When he heard of the suicide of a Dutch sailor who had killed himself on the voyage to Manado rather than undergo punishment for a crime he did not commit, the prince expressed pity and indignation, asking:

How was it possible to punish a man of whose guilt people were unconvinced? In Yogya, when either his father [the third sultan] or himself had tried to bestow justice on the Javanese, they had always started from the principle that no one should be punished who was not clearly convicted of committing a crime.90

‘In everything Dipanagara said during the course of our conversation about this matter’, Knoerle noted, ‘he gave evidence of deep religious feelings. He steadfastly pitied the sailor whom he said must be a man with a pure heart who could certainly reckon on God’s mercy.’91 The prince also told Knoerle that he had never been able to bring himself to bear arms during the Java War and was revolted by the sight of battlefield carnage. After an ambush at Kasuran (28 July 1826) in the Slèman area when all but seventeen of a fifty-strong Dutch-Indonesian platoon had been killed (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, II:380-3), Dipanagara described how ‘he had rode over the [battlefield] and was deeply moved by the sight of the dead and wounded’. Indeed, so terrible was the scene, he said, that he covered his eyes.92 He also stated that he had always given orders to his army-commanders to spare Dutch prisoners but that his commanders had not always obeyed him strictly enough.93 Later, we will see how in his visionary encounter with the Ratu Adil (‘Just King’) in May 1824, he begged to be excused from his summons to lead the Ratu Adil’s armies because he was ‘unable to fight’ and ‘could not bear to see death’.94 The prince’s credentials as a wartime leader were even questioned by the Dutch military historian, E.S. de Klerck, given his reluctance to involve

89 Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:263, 450, II:215; Carey 1984:35. See the report of the captured Mangkunegaran legion cavalry officer, Captain Radèn Mas Suwangsa, about the situation at Dipanagara’s headquarters at Selarong at the beginning of the war, ‘the princes usually sleep until nine or ten o’clock in the morning and several are enslaved to the smoking of opium’, cited in Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:263; original in dK183, ‘Verklaring van den Radeen Maas Soewongsso, Kapitein der Dragonders, bij het Legioen van Pangerang Adipati Ario Mangkoe Negoro’, Surakarta, 7-8-1825.
91 Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 30, referring to Dipanagara as having said that the sailor’s heart was ‘pure’ (ingkang manah wonten suci).
94 BD (Manado), II:314, XX (Dhandhanggula) 16-7. amba nuhun tan kuwawa jurit/ lawan tan saged ika. 17. aningali dhumateng pepati. See further Chapter X note 181.
himself in any of the fighting (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, IV:676-7). But this is perhaps to miss the point. In the eyes of his followers, it was as the living embodiment of the Ratu Adil – a human jimat (amulet) – rather than as a battlefield commander per se that his leadership was prized.

At the same time, there may have been some special pleading on Dipanagara’s part when he talked of his compassion and abhorrence of violent death. True, Dutch prisoners were spared and some offered ranks and responsibilities, but in the latter case only after they had agreed to embrace Islam. As for bearing arms, Dipanagara may well not have fired a gun in anger or wielded a sabre in a cavalry charge, but he omitted to mention that he had an extensive collection of pusaka (heirloom) weapons most of which he distributed amongst his close family members, but one of which – the kris (stabbing dagger) Kyai Ageng Bandayuda – he forged from other pusaka in the second year of the war more perhaps as a jimat (amulet) than as a fighting weapon. He also had inherited a kris, Kyai Abijaya, from his father probably at the time of his appointment as Radèn Antawirya in September 1805 (Appendix XI note 2). So the idea of a weaponless prince is stretching the truth a bit, especially when it is clear from his babad that he was conscious to the last of his dual rule of Ratu Tanah Jawa (‘ruler of Java’) and as a prajurit (soldier), and even considered what the consequences might be of an amok attack on General De Kock at Magelang at the time of his arrest on 28 March 1830 (Carey 1982:14, 22). Finally, according to Dutch sources, there is evidence that Dipanagara was not averse to demanding sanguinary punishments against civilian officials and others who aided and abetted the Dutch cause: De Stuers, for example, relates the supposed order given by the prince in late 1825 to behead all the village chiefs to the west of the sultan’s capital who had assisted in the rebuilding of the main highway from Yogya to the ferry town of Brosot on the Praga River. Their severed heads were even reported to have been displayed on long bamboo poles as a warning to others (De Stuers 1833:58-9; Chambert-Loir 2000:284-5).

**Conclusion**

Separating man and myth in Dipanagara’s case is difficult. The most valuable sources are the rarest, namely Javanese babad written by contemporaries who knew the prince before fame or notoriety – depending on perspective.

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95 Carey 1981a:259 note 106, 294 note 244. The process required for Dutch prisoners embracing Islam apparently involved circumcision and the learning of the confession of the faith (sahadat) and other Islamic prayers.

96 See Appendix XI. Kyai Ageng Bandayuda (Sir Duelling without Weapons) is now part of the divisional emblem of the Central Javanese Diponegoro Division.
III Young manhood: marriage, education and links with the santri community

– skewed his image for ever during the Java War. One such is his great-uncle’s chronicle of the British interregnum (Carey 1992). But there are no others known to the present author. Instead, we have been forced to construct a portrait of the prince and his world from the most varied material. That so much of this derives from the Java War and its immediate aftermath should not surprise us given the seismic shock of that event both for the Dutch and the central Javanese courts. But it remains inevitably coloured – if not flawed – by hindsight. It has also required us to range far beyond early-nineteenth-century Tegalreja and the prince’s world as a young man. In so doing, we have built a portrait of the prince which is almost like a pointilliste sketch of the Post-Impressionist school, a number of tiny dots which put together give an illusion of depth, movement and colour but which at the end of the day is just that, an impression if not a trompe l’œil. The fact that since Indonesian independence in 1945, Dipanagara has become an official Indonesian pahlawan nasional or ‘national hero’, his name gracing the main thoroughfares of numerous Indonesian towns and cities, not to speak of the Indonesian army (Tentara Nasional Indonesia/TNI’s) Central Java division, makes the task of the contemporary historian even more difficult. A flawed and all too human prince is certainly not in accord with ‘national history’ in present-day Indonesia.

The present work is, however, about early nineteenth century realities, not contemporary myth making. Indeed, just as there is but one truly contemporary chronicle presently known to this author in which the prince features, so there is but one contemporary sketch – that by the unknown Yogya court artist of circa 1807. All the others are of Java War vintage and by Europeans – iconic but distorted. It is now time to return to the period of that early sketch and take up once again the prince’s own story as he set out for one of the most significant journeys of his life – his pilgrimage to the south coast in circa 1805 and his encounter with the guardian spirits of Java and some of its greatest rulers. These encounters would provide further prophetic perspectives on the prince’s future as a born leader in changed times, a leader who would also be counted among the ancestors even if for such a brief and tragic time.
CHAPTER IV

Pilgrimage to the south coast, circa 1805

Lelana: spiritual wanderings as rite de passage

Dipanagara’s emergence into manhood, as we have seen, was marked by a number of significant events: the passing of his great-grandmother on 17 October 1803, his inheritance of the Tegalreja estate, his investiture with his new adult name of Radèn Antawirya on 3 September 1805, and finally his lavish kraton nuptials with the daughter of the Yogya bupati of Panolan on 27 February 1807. These last could be perceived as something of an official court rite de passage between his teenage years under the tutelage of Ratu Ageng and the beginning of his young adult life as a Javanese nobleman. But, whereas for most of his contemporaries such a young adult life would most likely have entailed family and official responsibilities around the Yogya kraton, for Dipanagara there was an added dimension. A second and more meaningful rite de passage – this time an extended form of lelana¹ or spiritual wandering – was now required for him to come into his own and confirm the spiritual practices of his youth as well as to clarify his prophetic destiny. Just exactly what this entailed has been well expressed by the celebrated historian of pre-colonial Java, Soemarsaid Moertono (1976:20-1):

To set off on wanderings when one’s age was approaching adulthood meant to find wisdom in the sense of finding a teacher who could guide one’s development in a fashion in which one’s powers would outstrip those of ordinary men. It also sometimes entailed acquiring tranquility […] so that on one’s return one would be able to withstand all temptations. It was even occasionally a time of testing of the knowledge and wisdom which one had already acquired [through youthful spiritual and meditative practice]. This tradition was continued during the Islamic period in Java when people set off on long journeys – sometimes from west to east Java and back again – to find esoteric knowledge at religious schools.

We have already seen how the first sultan, Mangkubumi’s, image as a satria lelana (wandering knight), so impressed Dipanagara’s contemporaries.² We

¹ For a general discussion of lelana in Modern Javanese literature, especially wandering student romances, see Pigeaud 1967-80, I:227-35.
² See Chapter II note 8.
also know from inscriptions on Radèn Mas Said (Mangkunagara I’s) heirloom sword (*pedhang*) and his court *gamelan*, Kyai Kanyut-Mèsem (‘Venerable Attempted to Smile’), that he also set great store by his wanderings in the time before his appointment as an independent ruler in 1757. Such testing journeys were the making of both his and Mangkubumi’s spiritual power. So it was with Dipanagara.

The exact timing of the prince’s wanderings away from Tegalreja and his pilgrimage to the south coast is unclear. In his autobiography, he states that he started visiting *pesantrèn* at the age of twenty (Javanese) years, hence sometime after April 1805, visits which led on to his pilgrimage. The next events related in his *babad* after his return to Tegalreja following his description of his journey to the south coast are the description of the changes in the position of the Dutch Residents (post-July 1808, ministers) at the courts brought about by Marshal Herman Willem Daendels’ (in office 1808-1811) decrees – Ordnance on Ceremonial and Etiquette – of 25 February and 28 July 1808. If the chronology in Dipanagara’s *babad* is correct – and we have no reason to doubt it – then his journey to the south coast must have taken place sometime before the early months of 1808. In the present author’s view, it is likely to have occurred even earlier, namely before his 27 February 1807 marriage after which date he may have spent more time at Tegalreja and visited Yogya more often. We can thus surmise that his journey took place in circa 1805, probably in the dry season (May-October) when travelling was easiest.

*Preparations for a pilgrimage*

In preparation for his journey to the south coast, Dipanagara described in his *babad* how he departed at the age of twenty (Javanese years, post-April 1805) on a series of visits to mosques and religious schools in the Yogya area. The importance of these visits was to complete his education as a student of religion and to find appropriate teachers to guide his further spiritual and religious development. The prince also prepared himself for his spiritual quest by taking a new name, Śeh Ngabdurahim, which he was to use on his wanderings. This was derived from the Arabic Shaykh ‘Abd al-Rahim (Ricklefs 1974b:231-2), and may have been suggested to Dipanagara by one of his re-

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3 Gomperts and Carey 1994:22. See S.Br. 37, 719, for a reference to the special Mangkunagara pusaka pedhang with the inscription *Jeng Gusti Pangéran Adipati ingkang rawuh saking lelana* (‘His Lordship the Pangéran Adipati who has returned from his wanderings’); and the Kyai Kanyut Mèsem *gamelan* inscription on the bronze bars of the *saron demung*, *satriya kang lalana*, 1700 (‘the knight who went on his wanderings, A J 1700 [AD 1774-1745]’). Radèn Mas Said’s original *nom-de-guerre* in 1745 when he began his campaigns in the Panambangan area to the east of Surakarta was: Sultan Adiprakasa Lalana Jayamisésa, Pringgodigdo 1950:354.

4 BD (Manado) II:120-5, XIV.62-5, 84.
religious advisers – perhaps even Sèh al-Ansari – at Tegalreja. The adoption of such a second ‘Islamic’ name – which became the norm for Dipanagara’s princely and priyayi supporters during the Java War – was not so unusual amongst members of the Javanese nobility at this time especially those who wished to apply themselves to religious study or undertake the pilgrimage to Mecca. Thus one Surakarta prince adopted the ‘religious’ name of Pangéran Abdul Arifin when he came to Yogya to study theology under the Yogya pengulu, Mas Muhamad Sapangi, in 1807, and another prince, this time from Yogya, changed his name from Pangéran Dipawijaya I to Pangéran Muhamad Abubakar in preparation for making the haj to Mecca in 1810. Dipawijaya I/Abubakar also shaved off his hair – which was traditionally worn long by the Javanese nobility at that time (Carey 1981a:254 note 79, 1992:462 note 300a) – as a sign that ‘he wanted to become a santri’, something which both Dipanagara and his followers also emulated during the Java War.

Although there is no reference to this in his babad, the prince may well have shaved his head before setting out on his wanderings to pesantrèn in order to pass unnoticed in the communities of common santri. Certainly, he seems to

5 See Chapter III. Perhaps the prince knew of the name from his study of Javanese literature, in particular the well-known romance of the three brothers – Abdurahman, Abdurahim and Radèn Aji – who set off in search of a cock which crows the name of God, but this story is perhaps better known in west Java rather than the Principalities, see Pigeaud 1967-80, I:221, 226.

6 dK 158, ‘Lyst der personen die zich als muitelingen hebben opgeworpen’, n.y., gives some of the Arabic names and titles (Basah, Dullah) adopted by the Yogya princes and high officials who fought for Dipanagara, see further Appendix VIII.

7 Dj.Br. 38, Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to Bogislaus Friederich von Liebeherr (Surakarta), 18-2-1807; Radèn Adipati Danureja II (Yogyakarta) to Radèn Adipati Danuningrat (Surakarta), 10 Besar AJ 1733 (AD 18-2-1807), and see Padmasusastra 1902:162, who gives Natapura’s genealogy as a son of Pakubuwana IV (reigned 1788-1820). There is also a reference to a certain Pangéran Ngabdularipin receiving an allowance from the Yogya court pre-January 1803 but it is unclear whether this is the same man, see Carey and Hoadley 2000:411.

8 Carey 1992:291-2, 336, 340, 400 note 5. See also Appendix VIII. Dipawijaya I/Abubakar was not allowed to embark on his haj by Hamengkubuwana II because there was ‘no past precedent’ (ing kina datan ana) for members of the sultan’s close family undertaking it, Carey 1992:291.

9 Dj.Br. 36, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia), 3-11-1810. Engelhard also related that he had made the move to hold himself aloof in the coming conflict between Radèn Rongga Prawiradipra III and Daendels, see below Chapter VI.

10 Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, II:497. Dipanagara apparently cut his hair in honour of a vow he had made before the battle of Kasuran on 28-7-1826 that he would shave his head if he was victorious. His supporters then followed suit as a sign of their commitment to Islam and to distinguish themselves from the ‘apostate’ (murtad) Javanese with their flowing locks who still supported the Dutch. Dipanagara wrote that even the grooms/grass-cutters, day-labourers and beggars followed suit even though they had received no express order, see BD (Manado), III:205, XXVII (Pocung) 114-7. Kangieng Sultan nulya sampun paras iku/ ing bakda Jumungah/ dadya sanya bèla iki/ saqung Islam pan sampun cukur sadaya. 115. ing Mentaram Pajang kalawan ing Kedhul/ Pagelèn sadaya/ Ledhok Gowong Jawi-kori/ pan weradin samya bèla cukur ika. 116. myang pakathik buruh kéré samya cukur/ punika sadaya/ dany watai dèndhavuhui/ kadya sampun karsaning Allah Tangala. 117. saqung Islam tinengeran samya gundhul/ murtad réyab-réyab/ bathilan saqung wong kapiri/ wektu iku mengkana tenggeranira.
Map 3. Dipanagara’s pilgrimage to the south coast of Java (circa 1805), showing the main places he visited. Adapted from Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I by J. Wilbur Wright of Oxford.
have disguised himself in simple attire so that few people would recognise him. Thus he discarded his princely clothes – the high-collared Javanese jacket, hand-drawn batik wrap-around and head-dress – for the coarsely woven sarong, buttonless open-necked white coat (kabaya) and turban which were the normal dress for nineteenth-century santri. After the Java War, his eldest son, Pangéran Dipanagara II, would seek to emulate his example by going around in Kedu dressed in the garb of a common farmer to emphasise his closeness with the people.

When the preparations were complete, Dipanagara departed from Tegalreja and began to lead a typical wandering santri existence visiting many religious schools and mosques, and living together in the same pesantren dormitories with students of humble background. It is not certain which religious schools he visited but they may have included Gadjing, Grojogan, Sèwon, Wanakrama, Jejeran, Turi, Pulo Kadang and the two pathok negari of Kasongan and Dongkèlan, all of which are to the south of Yogya.

Tirakat: solitary withdrawal and first visions

After a time, according to the testimony in his babad, the prince ceased visiting pesantren and departed far from inhabited areas to engage in asceticism and meditation. There now began a very crucial stage in Dipanagara’s wanderings during which he sought out some of the most important shrines and holy places associated with the Mataram dynasty (Ricklefs 1974b:232). This period of withdrawal and self-negation, as we have seen in the passage from Soemarsaid Moertono, had much of the quality of tirakat, the retreat from the world of a man who wished to prepare himself for a serious undertaking (Winter 1902:87; Carey 1974a:15). It afforded an interval of solitude in which to purge himself of pamrih (selfish or concealed personal motives and ambitions) and to legitimize his actions by contacts with his departed ancestors and the spiritual guardians of Java.

11 BD (Manado), II:120, XIV.63. *angagem kang sarwa gaib*; KITLV Or 13 (*Buku Kedhung Kebo*), 21, II.46 also mentions that Dipanagara wore ragged clothes: 46. *tampa busana ēndah/ luwas kang rinasuk*.
12 Raffles 1817, I:90; Djjadiningrat 1936:20. For references to the ‘priestly’ clothes used by Dipanagara during the Java War, see Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, II:384; Carey 1981a:276-7 note 169; Payen 1988:51, 95-6 note 48.
13 AN Kab, 8-3-1834 no. 166, C.L. Hartman (Magelang) to Jean Chrétien Baud (Batavia), 22-2-1834.
14 The passage in Dipanagara’s autobiography (BD [Manado], II:121-6, XIV.65-83) which deals with his wanderings in 1805-1806 has been extensively analysed by Ricklefs 1974b:227-58 with some clarifications in Carey 1974a:12-36, 1981:237 note 17-9.
15 See Appendix VIIa and VIIb (Map).
Dipanagara’s first vision occurred at the cave of Song Kamal in the Jejeran district to the south of Yogya (see Map 3). Sunan Kalijaga, one of the nine apostles of Islam (wali), appeared before the prince in the shape of a man ‘who shone like the full moon’. He informed the prince that it had been determined by God that in the future he would become king (ratu). After delivering this warning prophecy, the vision immediately disappeared.\(^\text{16}\) The appearance of Sunan Kalijaga and his prophecy of kingship was clearly of great importance for Dipanagara. Not only was the wali especially revered in south-central Java as the adviser of kings and the spiritual protector of Mataram, appearing in visions to royalty and commoners alike,\(^\text{17}\) but legend has also ascribed him a key role in the spread of Islam in the area (De Graaf and Pigeaud 1974:28-30; Solichin Salam 1963). Moreover, in Javanese political history, he was viewed as the agent who had presided over the division of Java at Giyanti (1755) (Ricklefs 1974b:233-7), something which does not seem to have weighed particularly heavily with Dipanagara who saw himself as transcending such political divisions by aspiring to govern the whole of Java as a pandhita-ratu (priest-king).

Sunan Kalijaga’s grave at Kadilangu, together with the great mosque at Demak, were regarded by Javanese rulers as the two indispensable pusaka (heirloom) of Java and pilgrimages from the courts were regularly dispatched there.\(^\text{18}\) During the Java War, distant descendants of the wali, namely Pangéran Sérang (circa 1794-1854) and his mother, the redoubtable Radèn Ayu Sérang (circa 1769-1855), were both held in high esteem by Dipanagara’s followers as

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\(^\text{16}\) BD (Manado) II:121, XIV.66-7; Ricklefs 1974b:232-7. The last two lines (XIV.67, verse 11 in the Ricklefs translation) should read: 67. lamun sirã ing bénjing/ dãi ratu ngiring-inging nuli musna; ‘that in the future you/ shall become king. Warning, he vanished’. There is thus no need to speculate, as Ricklefs does (1974b:236 note 27), on the term Ratu Ngiring-iring as indicating some sort of special ruler (Ratu Ngérang-ngérang), see further Gercke and Roorda 1901, I:65, sub: ngiring-iring, I:66, sub: ngérang-ngérang; Carey 1974a:16 note 56. I am grateful to the late Professor P.J. Zoetmulder S.J. for having pointed this out to me.

\(^\text{17}\) For a post-Java War description of a vision of Sunan Kalijaga, who is said to have appeared to Bagus Santri, a wandering mystic who headed a brief religious rebellion in south-central Java, see Dj.Br. 19¹¹, Interview with Bagus Santri, 10-1832, who described the wali as appearing to him in a green turban, green jacket and black sarong, and ordering him to distribute letters calling for a religious rebellion. He had also given him a three-pronged (trisula) lance head, the weapon of Wisnu, which Bagus Santri had turned into a pike. On the weapon received by Dipanagara during his pilgrimage, see below note 68. On Panembahan Sénapati (reigned circa 1574-1601), the first ruler of Mataram’s, visionary encounter with Kalijaga as related in the Babad Tanah Jawi, see Olthof 1941a, I:82, 1941b:79.

\(^\text{18}\) Carey 1980:171. For another reference to a Yogya court pilgrimage to Kadilangu in 1804 during a tour by court santri (ketib, modin and members of the Suranatan) from Tegalurum (site of the grave of Sunan Amangkurat I, reigned 1646-1677) to Madura to strew flowers (sajèn) and present money for the upkeep of the holy gravesites, see AvJ, Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 22-10-1804. On Hamengkubuwana II’s dispatch of money to repair ‘the great mosque’ at Demak, see Dj.Br. 48, J.G. van den Berg (Yogyakarta) to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 19-4-1803. See further Chapter IX note 152.
persons imbued with unusual kasektèn (inner spiritual power) (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:361-3; Carey 1981a:284 note 205).

Indeed, there was even a rumour that Dipanagara was preparing to delegate some of his authority to one of Radèn Ayu Sérang’s grandsons – Radèn Mas Papak (Pangéran Adipati Natapraja) – in the event of his victory over the Dutch.19 This was because the descendants of the Kali jaga line were regarded as being most fit to wield spiritual power in Java. Thus the vision of the revered wali and the support of his descendants helped to legitimize Dipanagara’s subsequent rebellion.

But the vision was important on another level for the style of political leadership represented by Sunan Kalijaga and the other eight wali served as an example for the prince, who came to see himself not merely as a temporal ruler but also as a spiritual overseer of the sovereigns of Java much in the same fashion as the legendary wali were said to have acted in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries (Carey 1974a:16-7, 21-2, 1974b:285-8). Indeed, the example of the wali, especially those of Kudhus, Demak and Giri, were often debated by Dipanagara and his advisers when they were striving for consensus during the war regarding their overall political and religious aims (Carey 1974a:19-22). Furthermore, the dream which Dipanagara had just before the outbreak of the Java War in which he described meeting eight wali wudhar, namely wali exercising both temporal and spiritual office, confirmed him in his conviction that he had been chosen to rule as a latter-day wali or priest-king in Java.20 Dipanagara’s experience at Song Kamal must therefore be interpreted in the light of later developments, pointing as it did to the sort of state which the prince would have striven to establish in Java had he been successful in the Java War.

Following his stay in the Jejeran district, Dipanagara walked across the countryside to Imagiri, the royal gravesite or pasaréan of the Mataram rulers. There at Bengkung by the pond at the top of the great stairway leading to the royal graves, he spent a week in meditation. He then observed the Friday prayer at the mosque at Jimatan, the mosque of the keepers of the keys (jurukunci), known officially as jimat, of the royal graveyard which stands some 230 feet below the summit of the hill at Imagiri. In his babad, Dipanagara related that all the jurukunci recognised him despite his ragged appearance and ‘paid him honour with all they possessed’.21 It was perhaps an indication

19 DjBr. 18, F.G. Valck, ‘Geheime Memorie’, 31-3-1840; on an earlier occasion at the time of the arrest of Pangéran Mangkudiningrat II in Yogya in December 1831, there had been a rumour that Natapraja would be made ‘Sultan of Demak’ by Mangkudiningrat if the latter had ascended the Yogya throne, see AN, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal buiten rade, 6-12-1831 no. 1, interview with Tumenggung Prawirasenjaya, Yogya, 16-11-1831.
20 See below Chapter X.
21 Ricklefs 1974b:237-8, 254-65; BD (Manado) II:122-3, XIV.71. On the lay-out of the royal gravesite, see LOr 8987 no. 1 (Babad Alit), pt. 13, map. For a reference to the five jurukunci from the central Javanese courts at Imagiri at this time, see Winter 1902:74 and Van den Broek 1873-77,
Plate 13. Radèn Ayu Sérang (Nyai Ageng Sérang), circa 1766-1855. A scion of the prestigious Sunan Kalijaga wali (apostle of Islam) family, and an ex-official (para nyai) of the Yogyakarta court during the reign of Sultan Hamengkubuwana II (reigned 1792-1810, 1811-1812, 1826-1828), she led a cavalry squadron in the Séorang-Demak area during the first months of the Java War. Her fame as a lady of unusual spiritual power (kasektèn), acquired through meditation at isolated caves on the south coast, enabled her to continue to exercise an influence over the local population of her home (Sérang-Demak) region long after formal hostilities finished in March 1830. Painting by Anyool Subroto (Institut Teknologi Bandung). Photograph by courtesy of Radèn Mas Boedi Oetomo, Nataprajan, Yogyakarta (DIY).
of how much Dipanagara was admired by the royal religious officials, many of whom were to support him during the Java War.\textsuperscript{22}

Apart from visiting the graves of his immediate and recently deceased relations, especially those of Sultan Mangkubumi (Hamengkubuwana I) and Ratu Ageng, Dipanagara's meditation at Bengkung was almost certainly directed to Sultan Agung (reigned 1613-1646), the famous seventeenth-century Mataram ruler. We know from the description of the construction of the royal graveyard in the prince's babad that he understood that Bengkung had been Agung's special place of retreat.\textsuperscript{23} In a Javanese source written shortly after the Java War under the orders of one of the prince's pro-Dutch protagonists,\textsuperscript{24} Dipanagara is depicted sending an intimate retainer to Sultan Agung's grave at Imagiri to beg for a sign. After a night spent in meditation, the account states that a dark red spot about the size of a plate appeared on the curtains surrounding the tomb. The Yogya jurukunci, Kyai Balad, then explained that this meant that God had decreed that warfare should break out in Java and that much blood would be shed.\textsuperscript{25}

In his own description of his visit to Agung's grave as reported in his autobiography, Dipanagara makes no mention of having received a sign. But, as we have seen, the prince did refer to one of Sultan Agung's prophecies relating to the 300-year period of Dutch rule in Java which had a connection with his own career.\textsuperscript{26} Furthermore, in other sources he gave evidence of his great admiration for the seventeenth-century ruler referring to him as 'a spi-

\textsuperscript{22} See Appendix VIIb.

\textsuperscript{23} BD (Manado), I:403-4, XI (Pocung) 86-8. sampun dadya langkung asri yèn dinulu/ ingkang papethètan/ cengkèh jawi nagasari/ saking Ngambon cengkèh iku wijilira. 87. Kangjing Sultan sigra anim-balî sampun/ Kyai Manglar Monga\textsuperscript{a}/ kang kînên tengga punikî/ Kyai Kebo Kemili maksih tinilar. 88. kantun tengga pesaréyan ing Mentarum/ kawarna jeng Sultan/ avis kondur dhateng purî/ anèng Bengkung punika panepènira. * Kyai Manglar Munga is the tutelary spirit of Imagiri which has the shape of a peacock and gives out piercing shrieks when one of the rulers of the central Javanese courts is about to die, see Winter 1902:74; Lettres de Java 1822-99; Museum Nasional (Jakarta) MS 933 DJ, Ir Moens, 'Slametan Cembèngan', 112 picture 110; S.Br. 131, 'Translaten en Verbalen Solo, 1819', entry of 27-8-1819, for a report on such a cry before Pakubuwana IV's death on 1-10-1820, see further Chapter IX note 169. On Sultan Agung's construction of Imagiri in circa 1624, see further De Graaf 1958:289-90.

\textsuperscript{24} For a description of this post-Java War source – the Buku Kedhung Kebo ('Book of the Buffaloes' Watering Hole' [a previous name for the seat of the bupati of Bagel at Purwareja] – written under the orders of Radèn Adipati Cakranegara I, the first Dutch-appointed bupati of Bagel (1830-1862), see Carey 1974b:259-88, 1981:xxvi-xxvii.

\textsuperscript{25} KITLV Or 13 (Buku Kedhung Kebo):69-70, VI.32-9; Carey 1974a:38-9; Van der Kemp 1896a:372-3, and for a reference to Kyai Balad in a contemporary source (circa 1794-1796), see Carey and Hoadley 2000:34, and further Van de Broek 1877:137.

\textsuperscript{26} See page 71.
The power of prophecy

ritual man who did as I did travelling around everywhere' and as ‘a consummate Islamic ruler who had established the five pillars [rukun] of Islam'.

One European account even relates that at the time of the siege of Yogya by Dipanagara’s troops in August 1825, Agung appeared to Dipanagara in a dream to instruct him regarding the most auspicious time to launch an attack on the sultan’s capital (P’ayen 1988:65, 120 note 161).

There is nothing to confirm this report – the result of the heated imaginings of Yogya’s fearful European inhabitants during the first anxious weeks of the war when they were closely besieged – but there are many other links between Dipanagara and Agung which suggest that the latter did serve as a major source of inspiration for the prince. It is no coincidence, for example, that the prince’s crucial vision of the Javanese Ratu Adil (‘Just King’) on 21 May 1824 occurred on Mount Rasamuni, a hill on the western escarpment of Gunung Kidul traditionally associated with Sultan Agung (pp. 566, 571), and that some of the caves visited by Dipanagara during his journey to the south coast were close to similar caves and holy sites traditionally thought to have been frequented by Agung, and in one case – Guwa Langsé – actually visited by him.

Dipanagara’s links with the holy site of Tembayat and his attempt to set up his standard of revolt there on 15 August 1825 (AJ 1 Sura 1753) (Carey 1974a:23), likewise revived memories of Sultan Agung who had been closely involved with the place in the latter part of his reign (Ricklefs 1974a:17). Finally, during the war itself, Dipanagara appears to have visited Agung’s gravesite frequently (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, III:76, 219, V:744; Bataviasche Courant 44, 2-11-1825; Javasche Courant 143, 29-11-1828) and also took care to bury his favourite wife, Radèn Ayu Maduretna (pp. 401-5; Appendix IV), at the royal gravesite at Jimatan in late February 1828 despite the problem of having to cross through Dutch-held territory to do so.

The figure of the great Javanese ruler thus had a continuing importance for Dipanagara throughout his life.

27 Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:744; Carey 1974a:17. There is a similar reference to Agung in Makassar notebooks, I:168. For a later reference to the popular belief in Agung as a great Islamic ruler, see LOr 8987 no. 1 (Babad Alit) pt. 14 (henceforth: ‘Babad Alit’). The five ‘pillars’ (rukun) of Islam refer to the shahādah (confession of the faith), salāt (five daily religious observances), zakāt (religious offerings), haddj (pilgrimage to Mecca), and the observance of the fast during the month of Ramadhān known in Java as Pasa (or Puwasa), see Juynboll 1930:45.

28 Sumahatmaka 1981:84-5, 124-5. The caves mentioned in this source, Sumhatmaka’s précis of the Serat Cenithini, are Guwa Manganti on the Kali Oyo and Guwa Songpati, both caves in the Paliyan sub-district of Gunung Kidul, and Kanigara, also in the Paliyan sub-district where Agung is supposed to have built a mosque, see Schoel 1931:151.

29 On the burial of Radèn Ayu Maduretna at Jimatan in late February 1828, see BD (Manado), III:366-7, XXXI.143-5.
At the south coast: meetings with Ratu Kidul

After staying at Imagiri, Dipanagara made his way to the south coast, breaking his journey to spend one night at the cave of Seluman, home to the spirit Genawati (Ricklefs 1974a:406 note 89 no. 85, 2006:209) near the Oyo River, and a further two nights at the cave of Suracala, also known as Guwa Sigalagala, on the left bank of the Kali Opak in the Gamelan sub-district of Gunung Kidul. Both these places seem to have been well known to the kraton elite at the time and were probably frequented by them as places of retreat and meditation. The second sultan, for example, had built a small pavilion at Seluman and maintained two royal site guardians or abdi-Dalem kemit-siti to look after the place, which is referred to in contemporary court documents as the kelanganen-dalem, the ‘royal retreat/pleasure ground’ of the ‘river source/spring’ of ‘Guwa Seluman’. Later, one of Dipanagara’s heirloom kris, subsequently presented to the Dutch king, William I, as a war trophy, was said to have borne the name of Kangjeng Kyai Naga Siluman (Kraus 2005:280-1; Appendix XI note 2). At Suracala, there are two hewn rock chambers in the grotto which are said to have been used by Sunan Amangkurat I’s (reigned 1646-1677) son, Radén Mas Tapa (later Pangéran Aria Mataram/Sunan Panutup), when he was contemplating rebellion against the Kartasura court. Both caves have associations with the Javanese spirit world and with Javanese legends. The first is mentioned in the Kidung Lalembut (‘Song of the spirits’) as a part of the ‘palace of the spirits’ ruled over by the goddess of the southern ocean, Ratu Kidul, through her deputy, princess Genawati. The second is referred to in the Bima Raré series of shadow-plays, which deal with the wayang hero Bima’s exploits as a young man, as the cave in which he had meditated while searching for the ‘water of life’ and in which he had undergone a test by fire.

30 BD (Manado) II:123, XIV.72; Ricklefs 1974b:238; and for a description of the site of the cave of Suracala, see G.P. Rouffaer’s note to Winter 1902:166 note 77. Both Seluman and Suracala are marked on the 1861 Residency Map of Yogyakarta, see IOR X IX7, K.F. Wilsen, ‘Topographische Kaart der Residentie Djojokarta’.
31 Carey 1980:112; Carey and Hoadley 2000:409. See also Appendix VI.
32 G.P. Rouffaer’s note in Winter 1902:166 note 77, refers to the name of Kangjeng Susuhunan Ratu Amangkurat being cut into the rock wall of one of the cave chambers with the date AJ 1624 (AD 1700-1701). For the history of the last days of Pangéran Aria Mataram (Sunan Panutup), see Ricklefs 1978:197-9.
33 Ricklefs 1974a:406 note 89 no. 85, 1974b:238-9. A cognate manuscript in the Moens collection, the Sejarah setan lan jinn (‘History of devils and jinn’) describes the term seluman as referring to the spirit world, an invisible society, which is an exact replica of human society and like it divided into nations and races each ruled over by their individual spirit kings and queens, see Musium Nasional (Jakarta), MSS 933 DJ (Ir Moens coll.), pt. 2; and see also Gericke and Roorda 1901, I: 835, who give the meaning of bongsa siluman as ‘invisible beings’.
34 LOr 12576 (Ir Moens coll. pt. 2):757-820, Bima Raré series of wayang plays as created by the Yogya dhalang Kyai Widi Prayitna: Wéja Séna kahesmi wonten Guwa Sigala-gala (‘Wéjaséna endures fire in the cave of Sigala-gala’). See further Piéaud 1967-80, I:205. The name ‘Sigala-gala’ like-
Plate 14. Pangéran Dipanagara (dressed in black) giving instructions to his two grimage (ziarah) to Nusakambangan. Dipanagara is sitting under a kemuning Sélareja just to the north-east of Tegalreja. KITLV Oriental MS 13, Buku Kedung
followers, Kyai Jayamustapa and Kyai Mopid, before they set out on their pilgrimage (ziarah) to Nusakambangan. Dipanagara is sitting under a kemuning tree (wit kemuning) on his meditation stone (sèla gilang) at his retreat (panepèn) of Kebo, f.81v. Photograph by courtesy of the KITLV, Leiden.
It is also mentioned in the *Serat Centhini*, the great early-nineteenth century encyclopaedia of Javanese history, lore and legends written in the form of a wandering knight romance, as one of the sites visited by its scabrous hero, Sèh Amongraga (Sumahatmaka 1981:80-1). In neither of these two caves did Dipanagara receive any visitations, however.

The prince then walked across the Gunung Kidul foothills to the cave of Langsé which overhangs the thunderous Indian Ocean and is only reached by a steep and precipitous path down the limestone cliffs and through an entrance which is almost at sea level.35 The cave, and the adjacent sites of (Pa)mancingan, Parangtritis, Parangkusuma and Prangwédang, a warm-water spring, are places of great importance in the local cult of Ratu Kidul, the spiritual protector and consort of the rulers of the central Javanese *kraton*.36 Mancingan, from example, is known as one of the eight principal residences of the spirits (*lalembut*) of Java and the home of the female hermit, Cemara wise recalls the Balé Sigala-gala (Wax Palace) episode in the Mahabharata cycle of *wayang* plays, see Pigeaud 1967-80, I:205, 245, 256, II:160 (sub: LOr 3917), 603 (sub: LOr 9821); Rajagopalachari 1970:52-4.

35 On the site of Guwa Langsé, see Babad Alit, pt. 28. The cave probably takes its name from its particular natural location whereby its entrance is entirely covered by a sheet of rock overhanging the Indian Ocean. The word *langsé* in Javanese means a curtain or drape, see Gericke and Roorda 1901, II:173.

36 See Jordaan 1984:99-102, 107, 2006:14, who equates the sick princess with the primeval fertility goddess of the Javanese, Śri Devī, and with the Hindu goddess of death Durgā (Ra Nini)/Kālī. He argues that her connection with fertility is shown especially by her linkage with the waxing and waning of the moon (see below) and with the Nagini serpent goddess. See also Stange 1975:1-2, 26 note 3, on the supposed association of this part of the south coast with the spirit world (*lalembut*), a connection which, he argues, dated back to the establishment of small kingdoms by former officials of the Majapahit empire following its fall in circa 1527. According to this theory, Nyai Lara Kidul (Ratu Kidul) was the ruler of a small ‘ tantric’ state in the Imagiri area who subsequently became the overseer of the spirit kingdoms of the south coast. Other traditions (Soemarsaid Mertono 1968:148; De Cock Wheateley 1929:205-11) associate Ratu Kidul with the Pajajaran princess, Déwi Retna Suwida, the daughter of Prabu Mundingsari and a descendant of the king of Sigaluh, namely the ruler of the spirit kingdoms of west Java. According to legend, she was exiled from her father’s court either because she refused to marry or because she had contracted leprosy in her feet and had had to be confined either to a leper colony on the south coast or to an offshore island. Despairing of her fate she had committed suicide by flinging herself from the high cliffs into the sea. She was then restored to her beauty by the curative power of the sea water on condition that she remained as queen of the underwater spirit realms until the Day of Judgement. She took the name Ratu Kidul and had magical powers appearing young or old according to the waxing and waning of the moon. In Javanese popular tradition, she is sometimes referred to as Nyai Rara (or Lara) Kidul, an allusion either to her virginity and maidenhood (*rara*) or to her suffering (*lara*) from leprosy, Hadiwidjojo 1972:126. In other traditions, Nyai Lara Kidul refers to one of Ratu Kidul’s *patih* (chief officials), see further Poerbatjaraka 1962, V:20-4, VI:17-23; and Mulyadi 1983:30, where she is known as *nènèk penjaga tasik* (‘the old lady guardian of the sea’). Dipanagara appears to have viewed Ratu Kidul as a Pajajaran princess who had been exiled from her father’s court to an island variously named as Pulau Toris, Pulau Putri or Pulau Oonrust, see Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 25. For a discussion of the connection between Ratu Kidul and the Dutch, see Ricklefs 1974a:375-6.
IV Pilgrimage to the south coast, circa 1805

Tunggal, who is closely identified with Ratu Kidul. The same place is also associated with Sèh Maulana Maghrribi, a wali said to be from the Demak period, who lived and was buried at the top of one of the small hills overlooking the sea. Parangtritis, so called because of the water which gushes out of the rocks in a petrified grotto, is the spot where Sénapati set out to meet Ratu Kidul in her underwater court and where on his return he encountered Sunan Kalijaga, and from the twin rocks on the seashore at Parangkusuma, an offering – known as the labuhan (from Javanese labuh, ‘to throw into the water’) – is made each year by the sultan of Yogya to his spiritual consort, the south sea goddess (Van den Broek 1873-77, 24:143; Groneman 1888:13-4; Adam 1930:157-8). The whole site is thus deeply connected with the Javanese spirit world and still attracts visitors in their hundreds from all over Java.

At the time Dipanagara visited the place in circa 1805, it was already a major pilgrimage site, especially for the Yogya court. The second sultan made regular trips there during the first part of his reign and had the habit of residing at Mancingan for a number of days. Small open pavilions, known in Javanese as pondhok, had been constructed by the sea at Parangkusuma, Parangwédang and Parangtritis for meditation and the ceremonies associated with the goddess of the southern ocean, as well as a larger wooden pesanggrahan or overnight residence at the last place to house the sultan and his retinue during their periodic visits. There was also some land set aside for the men of religion (wong putihan, literally ‘people [dressed] in white’) who tended the grave of Sèh Maulana and saw to the upkeep of the pavilions. In 1812, 37

37 De Graaf and Pigeaud 1974:248 note 18; Ricklefs 1974a:375 note 33. For references to the various tutelary spirits guarding the sites around Mancingan, see Museum Pusat (Jakarta), MS 933 DJ, Ir Moens Platen Album no. 8, ‘Slametan Cèmbengan bij de Gunungamping met offers’ (henceforth: ‘Slametan Cèmbengan’):114-6; Ricklefs 1974a:405 note 89 nos. 54-7). See also Appendix VIIa.
38 Adam 1930:158-9. See also Babad Alit, pt. 26; Ir Moens coll., ‘Slametan Cèmbengan’, 90 Plate 87, which refers to the sajen (offerings) placed on Sèh Maulana Maghrribi’s grave by those who wished to become priyaï (court officials); Appendix VIIa.
39 Olthof 1941a, I:82, 1941b:79. On the spirit Nyai Gadhung Mlathi, who is the tutelary spirit of Parangtritis, see Ir Moens coll., ‘Slametan Cèmbengan’, 116 Plate 120; Babad Alit, pt. 24. For descriptions of the site in circa 1812, see KITLV H 503, Van Sevenhoven, ‘Aanteekeningen’, 126-30; Thorn 1815:295. See also Appendix VIIa.
40 See Gericke and Roorda 1901, II:163 sub: labuh.
41 Dj.Br. 49, Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 24-10-1805, 28-10-1805, 20-11-1805, referred to three visits made by Hamengkubuwana II to the south coast in the space of just two months. On the first visit, the clothes and other offerings made by the sultan were thrown back on the beach by the tide supposedly because a slametan (dedication ceremony) had not been held before the labuhan (commitment of offerings to the sea), and because Hamengkubuwana II had insisted on standing on the beach with a gold payung (sovereign’s state umbrella) over his head, thus appearing in an arrogant and unseemly posture to Ratu Kidul. See further Groneman 1888:14 for a description of a three-day visit to Parangtritis by Hamengkubuwana VII (reigned 1877-1921).
42 Van Sevenhoven, ‘Aanteekeningen’, 125, 131; Thorn 1815:295; and see below Appendix VIIa.
Plate 15. Painting by A.A.J. Payen entitled ‘Onweder aan de Zuidkust van Java’ (Storm on the south coast of Java), executed after his return to Europe in 1826. From the Payen painting collection of the Rijksmuseum voor Volkenkunde, Leiden (Inv. No. 200/2). Photograph by courtesy of the Rijksmuseum voor Volkenkunde, Leiden.
Storm on the south coast of Java), executed after his return to Europe in 1826. From (Inv. No. 200/2). Photograph by courtesy of the Rijksmuseum voor Volkenkunde,
a Dutch visitor noticed some of these *wong putihan* meditating with a young Javanese ‘in a religious attitude’ at Parangtritis, and was told that people often came there to pray for things which they desired or if they were in difficult circumstances. He was likewise informed about a cave in the mountains, perhaps Guwa Suracala or Guwa Langsé, which was frequently visited and where the names of those who had meditated there were cut into the rock.

Dipanagara was therefore following a well worn route when he arrived at the south coast as a young man of twenty. His aim was to prepare himself for a meeting with Ratu Kidul and in his *babad* he described how he remained in the cave of Langsé for two weeks ‘striving to purify his desires’. As his physical and mental state grew calmer, he began to enter a deep meditative trance, ‘a condition that cannot be described’ and was visited by Ratu Kidul whose presence was heralded by an aura of light. However, the prince was so sunk in his meditation that the goddess realised ‘he could not be tempted’ and withdrew, promising that when the time was right she would come to him again.

Twenty years would elapse before the time to which Ratu Kidul referred arrived. The Java War was then at its height and Dipanagara was encamped at Kamal on a tributary of the Praga River in the Kulon Praga district. The exact date is unclear in his account, but it seems to have been in mid-July 1826, possibly on the night of the full moon which fell on 20-21 July. The following is the description of this second encounter as given in the prince’s *babad*:

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45 Van Sevenhoven, ‘Aanteekeningen’, 133-4. It appears that Van Sevenhoven was referring to Guwa Suracala because he mentioned a certain Javanese ‘sultan’ who had stayed there many years earlier, seemingly a reference to Pangéran Aria Mataram (Sunan Panutup), see note 32. There are, however, many other caves in the area which were used as retreats, see Carey 1981a:284 note 205, on Radèn Ayu Sérang’s use of the cave of Trisik (?Sirisik) on the south coast during the Java War, and Dj.Br. 17, ‘Minuten van der uitgaande brieven aan den Gouverneur-Generaal van den Kommissaris aan de hoven van Souracarta en Djocjocarta, Jan Izaäk van Sevenhoven, van 1e Januari tot en met December 1831’ (henceforth: ‘Minuten Van Sevenhoven’), J.I. van Sevenhoven (Surakarta) to Johannes van den Bosch (Batavia), 5-5-1831, for a reference to the cave of Suralanang supposedly used by Dipanagara in 1825, and from whence Smissaert attempted to summon him for a meeting before the outbreak of the Java War. See further page 543.
47 Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, II:346-8, V:Map. The fact that Dipanagara was encamped by a tributary of the Kali Praga when the second visitation occurred may be significant. In Javanese popular belief, Ratu Kidul uses the two main rivers (Praga and Opak) as her means of transport and outbreaks of disease or sudden deaths in the village communities living along the river banks are associated with her sorties, interview with R.W. Hardjanta Pradjapangarsa, Surakarta, 14-2-1972.
48 Ratu Kidul’s beauty and youth are dependant on the waxing and waning of the moon. When she is young, namely before the middle of each Javanese month, she is also known as Retna Déwati, see Ricklefs 1974a:200.
Then the sultan [Dipanagara] was sitting at night in his pavilion unattended by anyone, for they were all asleep.

He was sunk deep in meditation with his back against a pillar, for heavy was his heart. Now it is told that swiftly someone came. It was as though a falling star had descended on the pavilion. Immediately sitting before the sultan was the form of a woman.

Two accompanied her, both women with a similar appearance which cannot be described. But, of the three, one was slightly different from those who escorted her. For long the sultan did not address her, dumbfounded he gazed and closely observed her. She was sitting but did not touch the ground. The sultan said softly: ‘I ask [your name] for I am quite mystified.’ Ratu [Kidul] said: ‘Earlier I made a promise to you that in the future, when the time had come, [I] should not fail to meet you.’ The sultan understood in his heart. Thus were his thoughts that perhaps her name was Ratu Kidul for she was exceedingly young.

The sultan spoke quietly:

49 These refer to Ratu Kidul’s two lieutenants (patih), Nyai Rara (or Lara) Kidul and Radèn Déwi, the tutelary spirit of Guwa Langsé, see Ir Moens coll., ‘Slametan Cèmbengan’, 73, 116.

50 The fact that Ratu Kidul is depicted as sitting ‘above the ground’ is interesting: one meditation leader (pamong) in Java described a visitation from the goddess at night at Parangkusuma in which she appeared as a very young woman dressed in wayang costume but invisible from the knees downwards, interview with Bapak Darno Ong, Surakarta, 20-3-1972. It is possible that this invisibility of her lower body had a connection with those parts of her body affected by leprosy, see note 36.
‘I now recall it.’
Ratu [Kidul] then said gently:
‘If I am allowed to help you,
I beg a firm promise
that once they have all disappeared
the unbelieving devils [the Dutch],

you will intercede for me
with Allah the Almighty
that I may return again
to be a human being.
Moreover, all your army
let there be none who join the battle,
for it is I who promise

to [bring about] the disappearance of the devils.’
The sultan said softly:
‘I do not ask your help
against my equals [fellow human beings],
for in religion there is only the assistance of the Almighty.’
Ratu [Kidul] immediately disappeared.\(^{51}\)

It can be seen from this account that Ratu Kidul’s appearance before Dipanagara
at Guwa Langsé and later during the Java War had a specific objective. As the
queen of the Javanese ancestral spirit underworld, she was offering her help
to the prince on condition that he interceded with the Almighty to enable
return to the world as a human being and thus bring about her karmic

\(^{51}\) BD (Manado) III:92-4, XXV (Pangkur) 63-70. mengkana kangjeng sultan/ dalu lenggah anèng
pesanggrahanipun/ tan ingandhep déning jalma/ [pan] wus samya nèndra iki. 64. pitekur sèndhéyan sakal/ apan saking sungkawa ing tyasnékti/ mengkana ingkang ninausés/ nulya ana kang prapta/ kadya daru
dhateng pesanggrahanipun/ nulya lenggah ngarsanira/ jeng sultan werni pawèstri. 65. kàlih ingkang ngir- 
ing ika/ samya èstri dèné kàng iwarra samal/ pan wus tan kena cinatur/ mapan katiga pisan/ undha-usuk 
lawan kang dèniring iku/ jeng sultan dangu tan nyapa/ kamitenggengen ningali. 66. lawan mespaosken 
ika/ gènnya lenggah datan kangerah ing siti/ kangjeng sultan ngandika rum/ nilakrama kawula/ langkung 
tambet kangjeng ratu lon turipun/ rumyin mapan kawula/ lan paduka sampun jangji. 67. ing bénjing yèn 
sampun mengsa/ lan paduka boten wandé kepangghé/ jeng sultan ènget tyasipun/ mengkana ciptanira/ 
baya iki kang inggaran Ratu Kidul/ dèné banget anonira/ kangjeng sultan ngandika ris. 68. pan sampun 
ènget kawula/ kangjeng ratu aris aturirèki/ yèn pareng amba tetulung/ inggih dhateng paduka/ nging 
kawula anuwun jangji satuhu/ yèn sampun sirna sada/ sagung ingkang lanat kapir. 69. kawula Tuwan 
[siwuna]/ dhateng Alah Ingkang Raburlgalimin/ mantuka mahlih puniku/ inggih dados manungséa/ dèné 
sagung wadya paduka sedarum/ sampun wonten tumut yuda/ kawula ingkang nyagahi. 70. sirnanipun 
lanatolah/ kangjeng sultan mapan ngandika aris/ kawula tan nedha tulung/ inggih mring [sama-sama]/ 
yèn agami aming pitulung Hyang Agung/ kangjeng ratu nulya musna. Words in square brackets in 
the text indicate that because of the demands of the macapat metre a small correction has been made 
on the basis of Rusche 1908-09, I:190-2.
IV Pilgrimage to the south coast, circa 1805

deliverance.\textsuperscript{52} This is a request which the goddess makes to all her royal lovers. In the Babad Tanah Jawi she is described imploring Sultan Agung to help her in similar terms. But, as this text explains, no one can interfere with her fate for it has been decreed by the Almighty that she will not escape from the spirit kingdoms until the Ari Kiyamat or Day of Judgement when all the different planes of existence will be united together as one.\textsuperscript{53} Such is the Will of God. It does not, however, prevent Ratu Kidul from constantly beseeching her royal lovers to intercede with the Almighty to alleviate her fate. Indeed, for all her magical powers and beauty, the goddess of the southern ocean is more a tragic and pathetic figure than is commonly recognised. She is as much in need of help herself as she is capable of helping others. Certainly, Dipanagara viewed her in this light and resolutely refused her offer of assistance perhaps because he thought at the time that he was close to achieving a complete military victory against the Dutch.\textsuperscript{54}

What then was his purpose in including this episode in his babad? One explanation is that he wished to put himself on a par with Sénapatí and Sultan Agung, both monarchs who had enjoyed a special relationship with Ratu Kidul and who had brought the Mataram state to the pinnacle of its power. We have seen above how Dipanagara was especially keen to draw a parallel between himself and Agung in terms of the exercise of spiritual and temporal power. At another level, the prince may have referred to his meeting to stress that he had no use for the assistance of the spirit realms or unorthodox magical powers in his struggle against the Dutch. As a true Muslim, he placed his faith in the Almighty. Moreover, as he constantly pointed out in his autobiography,

\textsuperscript{52} According to popular Javanese belief (Poerbatjaraka 1962:20), the soul of Ratu Kidul and those who have sought her help for the purposes of personal power or worldly gain, are entrapped (\textit{dikurung}) in the Javanese ancestral spirit underworld until the Final Day of Judgement. See further Stange 1975:21-2.


\textsuperscript{54} In July 1826, when Ratu Kidul's second visitation occurred, Dipanagara was poised to break out of the Kulon Praga area and win a series of victories against the Dutch and their Surakarta allies which brought his forces by mid-October 1826 to within striking distance of the Sunan's capital, see Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, II:368-520; p. 642.
his primary aim during the Java War was the furtherance of religion, specifically ‘the raising up of the high state of the Islamic religion throughout Java’, which included not just formal Islamic practice but the moral order in general (Carey 1974b:285).

The prince’s refusal to accept help from Ratu Kidul underscores this ideal for which he made so many sacrifices during the war. He nevertheless remained fascinated by the ever beautiful goddess and the legends which surrounded her. A Javanese to the core, he drew inspiration from the ancestral spirit world of the Javanese heartland just as much as from his devotion to Islam and the esoteric teachings of the Shâtârîyâ, precisely the type of ‘mystic synthesis’ which Ricklefs has described as reaching its epitome in early nineteenth-century Java (Ricklefs 2006:195-220). On his journey into exile, he referred to her at length in his conversations with Knoerle, and later his eldest son, Pangéran Dipanagara II, would produce a very similar account of his own encounter with Ratu Kidul in his allegorical chronicle of the Java War.55

Final instruction at Parangkusuma and return to Tegalreja

After his first wordless encounter with Ratu Kidul at Guwa Langsé, the prince described in his babad how he descended to the sea shore and walked back along the beach to Parangtritis where he bathed at the fresh water spring grotto. He then slept at Parangkusuma presumably in the small open pondhok constructed by the second sultan. During the night a final visitation occurred.56 A disembodied voice, perhaps that of Sunan Kalijaga, addressed Dipanagara telling him of the coming destruction of Yogya and ‘the beginning of the ruin of the Land of Java’ (wiwit bubrah Tanah Jawi) in just under three years’ time. He was instructed to change his religious name from Ngabdurahim to Ngabdulkamit and was informed that a sign would be accorded him in the shape of the arrow Sarutama. This eventually appeared to him like a flash of lightning piercing the stone on which he was leaning as he rose from his slumber. He was also enjoined to watch over his father, the crown prince, at the time of his accession as sultan and was sternly warned not to accept the Pangéran Adipati Anom or crown princely title himself from

55 Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 25: ‘Dipanagara told me in an interesting tone about the history of Ratu Kidul, elaborating about the exile of the second daughter of [Prabu] Munding Wangi [Mundingsari] to Pulau Toris’, see further note 36. The meeting which Pangéran Dipanagara II recounts in his post-Java War chronicle follows that in Dipanagara’s babad very closely, see LoR 6488 (Babad Dipanagara, Surya Ngalam):24-8, VII.3-VIII.12.
56 Ricklefs 1974b:240-7, 256-8; BD (Manado) II:124-6, XIV.76-81. The way the disembodied voice manifested to Dipanagara at Parangkusuma points to a form of wangsit or interior prompting, see Gericke and Roorda 1901, II:76; Chapter X note 182.
the Dutch ‘for that would be definitely sinful’. Finally, the voice ended on this enigmatic note:

XIV.80 There is no other: you alone are the means, but that not for long, only to be counted amongst the ancestors. Ngabdulkamit, farewell, you must return home!

This final statement may have a connection with Sultan Agung’s prophecy mentioned at the beginning of Chapter II during the discussion about Dipanagara’s babyhood, in particular Agung’s prediction that the Dutch would rule in Java for 300 years following his death in 1646 and that although one of his descendants would rise against them he would be defeated, a prediction which was relayed to Dipanagara’s mother by the ageing Sultan Mangkubumi.

The implications of the other passages are slightly more straightforward. The reference to the destruction of Yogya in under three years’ time perhaps presaged the arrival of Marshal Herman Willem Daendels as governor-general in January 1808 and his humiliation of the sultan’s court in the aftermath of the November-December 1810 revolt of the bupati wedana of the eastern mancanagara, Radèn Rongga Prawiradirja III, which we shall consider in more detail in the next two chapters. This set in train a whole series of events which eventually culminated in the fall of the kraton (20 June 1812) to a British-Indian army during the administration of Thomas Stamford Raffles (1811-1816), and the plundering of the court by the British and sepoys troops. The desecration wrought by the theft of the invaluable court heirlooms (pusaka), the removal of the entire court archive and manuscript collection, and the unceremonious deposition and exile of the second sultan really marked the beginning of ‘the destruction of the land of Java’ prophesied by the disembodied voice at Parangkusuma.

The change of name from Ngabdurahim to Ngabdulkamit was of great significance. The latter was the name which Dipanagara bore throughout the Java War and which he incorporated prominently in his royal title as Sultan Èrucaakra in August 1825 (Carey 1981a:287 note 218; Ricklefs 1974b:244). He also used it in exile in Manado, where immediately after his arrival he asked to be only addressed as ‘Pangeran Ngabdulkamit’ rather than

57 BD (Manado) II:125, XIV (Sinom) 79-80. ywa gelem sira kinardii ya Pangéran Dipati. 80. mapan wus pesthi duraka. See further Ricklefs 1974b:245-6, 257. On the full title of the Yogya Crown Prince, see Chapter V note 121.
58 BD (Manado) II:125, XIV (Sinom) 80. tan ana malih-malih/ nanging sira srananipuni/ mapan iku tan dawa/ nanging kinarya leluri/ Ngabdulkamit wus poma sira muliya.
59 BD (Manado) II:125, XIV (Sinom) 77-8. kurang telung taun iki/ ing bubrahé iya Ngara Ngayo- gya. 78. mapan wus karsaning Sukma/ wiwit bubrah Tanah fawil/ iya kurang telung warsa. See further Ricklefs 1974b:240-1, 256.
‘Pangéran Dipanagara’ a title which he had passed on to his eldest son, and in Makassar where he styled himself as fakir (the religious mendicant) Ngabdulkamit in his religious writings. According to Ricklefs, the choice of this name may have a connection with ‘Abd al-Hamid I, the late eighteenth-century Ottoman sultan (reigned 1773-1787), who was the first Turkish ruler to lay claim to the authority of caliph, the protector of all Muslims throughout the world (Ricklefs 1974b:241, 2006:210). We will see below how ‘Abd al-Hamid I’s pretensions, which were not very vigorously pursued by him, may have especially attracted the attention of Dipanagara and his haji advisers because, as Ricklefs has recently pointed out, in advancing this claim the sultan was behaving like the Sultan Rum of Javanese legend, like an Islamic universal monarch (Ricklefs 2006:210).

The attempts by ‘Abd al-Hamid I to reform the Ottoman army and his tentative pretensions to the caliphate may have been reported to Dipanagara by returned Mecca pilgrims: Haji Badarudin, for example, who had twice made the haj on behalf of the Yogya court and served Dipanagara throughout the Java War, is reported to have been consulted by Kyai Maja about examples of Turkish administrative practice in Mecca, presumably in the period either before or after the occupation of the holy cities by the Wahhābī in 1803-1812/3. Moreover, many Javanese admired the Ottoman Empire at this time as a bulwark of Islamic power in the Middle East and as a potential protector against the expanding might of Christian Europe (Carey 1979:217 note 93). Dipanagara even copied some of the ranks and regimental names used in the Ottoman army for his own military formations. Thus his elite bodyguard troops, who wore turbans of different colours and had regimental banners with serpents, half-moons and inscriptions from the Qur’ān (Van Doren 1851, II:328-9), were arranged in companies with names such Bulkio, Turkio and Arkio, which were directly modelled on the Bölüki (from bölük, a squad or troop), Oturaki, and Ardia Janissary corps regiments of the Ottoman sultans just then undergoing major changes between the failed Nizam-i-cedit (‘New Order’) reforms of Sultan Selim III (reigned 1789-1807) and the establishment of the new model army of the ‘trained victorious soldiers of Muhammad’ (muallem azakir-i mansuri-i Muhammadije) by Sultan Mahmud II (reigned, 1809-1839) in 1826.

At the same time, his most outstanding military commanders, such as the sev-

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61 Makassar notebooks II:67.

62 Carey 1974a:36 note 117. See also Chapter II note 71; Chapter III note 59.

63 Marsigli 1732:68-9; Louw and De Klerk 1894-1909, II:277; Booms 1911:34; Aukes 1935:74 note 1; Shaw and Shaw 1977, II:22-4. For a reference to similar emulation of Ottoman military formations in eighteenth-century Holland, where some schutterij (local shooters’ companies) used the name Turkiye, see Schama 1977:81. Even the Javanese term tambur (battalion) derives from the Turkish tabur, see Shaw and Shaw 1977:24.
IV Pilgrimage to the south coast, circa 1805

enteen-year-old Senthot, received the title of Ali Basah, which is derived from the Turkish ‘Ali Pasha (the ‘High’ Pasha) (Carey 1974b:287 note 6). The prince also mentioned the example of the Ottoman sultan in his babad as the supreme authority in Mecca contradicting Kyai Maja who saw this authority as vested in the heads of the four law schools or madzhab. Dipanagara’s own personal battle standard – a three cornered green pennant with a solar disc at the centre and crossed arrows (Plate 65) – was also perhaps inspired by Ottoman military precedent (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, II:283).

Apart from these contemporary contacts with Turkey, the figure of ‘Sultan Ngrum’ – from the Arabic Rūm (eastern ‘Rome’ or Byzantium, hence Constantinople, Turkey, the Ottoman sultanate) – was well known in Javanese mythical literature. In several Javanese texts, such as the Aji Saka tales and the messianicJayabaya prophecies, Sultan Ngrum appears as a king who organized the civilising and peopling of Java, and later dispatched a force to drive out the foreign oppressors (Pigeaud 1967-80, III:366; Ricklefs 1974b:242-4). Such texts incorporating traditions concerning Sultan Ngrum were available in the Yogya kraton at the time when Dipanagara was reaching manhood at Tegalreja (Ricklefs 1974a:393, 1974b:242-4). Indeed, the prince himself later rewrote a version of the Aji Saka tales dealing with Sultan Ngrum’s peopling of Java and ridding the island of evil spirits during his period of exile in Makassar (1833-1855).65 We will also see how in January 1817 just eight years before the outbreak of the Java War, a millenarian movement occurred in eastern Bagelèn which looked to the arrival of Sultan Ngrum as the first step in the process of the purification of Java from the illegitimate rule of the Yogya sultan (pp. 483-4). It is possible to conclude therefore that the assumption of the name Ngabdulkamit had a deep significance for Dipanagara both because of its contemporary associations with the temporal and religious power of the Ottoman Empire, and because of its links with the numerous mythical tales in modern Javanese literature featuring Sultan Ngrum.

The gift of the arrow Sarutama, which came to the prince like a flash of lightning, again recalls Arjuna, the wayang figure with whom he most closely identified (Carey 1974a:12-6; pp. 403-5). In the shadow-play tales drawn from the Mahabharata, the same magical weapon was associated with the Pandhawa prince during his meditation at Lake Tirtamaya.66 It may also have a connection with the period of destruction that Dipanagara would bring about in Java as predicted by the disembodied voice at Parangkusuma,

64 BD (Manado) III, XXIII (Durma) 104. nadyan Mekah […]/ papa iku badan/ déné nyawané iku/ samengko anèng Ngrum nagri/ pan Kangjeng Sultan/ ing Ngrum kang misésani.

65 Makassar notebooks I:50-3.

66 LO 12544 (Ir Moens coll. pt. 2), no. 3, Punika caryios Sarutama murca dados Ratu Janaka tapa wonen ing Sendhang Tirtamaya. The usual arrow associated with Arjuna is Pasopati, see Poerbatajaraka 1926:263; Hardjowirogo 1965:262; the Ratu title for Arjuna (Janaka) also reads slightly oddly here, one would have expected Radèn. See further Plate 65 for Dipanagara’s incorporation of the arrow motif on his personal battle standard.
in much the same fashion as Arjuna’s arrow, Pasopati, served as the agent of
destruction against the demonic forces in the poem _Arjuna Wiwāha_ (‘Arjuna’s
victory’; Poerbatjaraka 1926:288-90). Certainly, Dipanagara treasured the
weapon. On his return to Tegalreja, he fashioned it into a small stabbing
dagger or _cundrik_, which was later carried by his fourth wife, Radén Ayu
Maduretna (post-August 1825, Ratu Kedhaton), during the Java War. In
about 1827, it was melted down together with two other _pusaka_ belonging to
Dipanagara to make a single heirloom _kris_, named Kyai Ageng Bandayuda,
which was used to rally his troops’ morale during a difficult stage in the fighting
against the Dutch.

Finally, the voice’s injunction to the prince to watch over his father in
facilitating his accession as sultan and the stern warning to refuse the title of
crown prince if it was offered by the Dutch had immediate relevance. They
referred to the political revolution which was about to engulf Yogya between
the arrival of Marshal Daendels in January 1808, and the gutting of the Yogya
_kraton_ by Java’s new colonial masters, the British, with their British-Indian
army as their battering ram, in June 1812. During this four-and-a-half-year
period, according to the account given in his _babad_, Dipanagara did indeed
play a role very similar to that predicted in the prophecy. As we shall see in
the next chapters, he helped to mediate between his father and his grand-
father, the second sultan, both rivals for political power at court, and later
acted as a negotiator between his father and the British which resulted in
the former’s accession as third sultan on 21 June 1812. At the same time,
according to the prince’s testimony, he was able to deflect attempts made
by the British to appoint him as crown prince by getting them to recognise
his younger brother – the future fourth sultan (reigned 1814-1822) – whose
mother was better born than Dipanagara’s, as heir apparent.

The visitation at Parangkusuma was the last which Dipanagara received
on his south coast pilgrimage. His period of _tirakat_ was now over. The prince
made his way on foot back to Tegalreja, stopping for a short while at
Sawangan, a marshy area at the mouth of the Opak where the river flows
into the sea. He then went on to Lipura, probably by way of the second sul-
tan’s pavilion at Samas right on the seashore close to Sawangan. At Lipura,
he spent a night at Séla Gilang, the holy black stone – probably a meteorite
– which is watched over by the spirit Kyai Jangga. According to historical
legend, this stone had descended over Sénapati’s head as he lay asleep, and

67 BD (Manado) II:126, XIV (Sinom) 83. _lajeng dènbusanani/ Ki Sarutama puniku/ rinèka cundrik ika_. See also Appendix XI.
68 See Appendix XI note 2. The three major _pusaka_ were: Kyai Sarutama (_cundrik_), Kyai Barutuba (pike), and Kyai Abijaya (_kris_).
69 Ricklefs 1974b:247; BD (Manado) II:126, XIV.82; and see p. 229 and Appendix VI.
70 On Kyai Jangga, the tutelary spirit of Séla Gilang who is given offerings by Javanese who wish to become _priyayi_ (officials), see Ir Moens coll., ‘Slametan Cèmbengan’, 90 no. 88.
had announced that it was God’s Will that he should become king of Java. The place thus had important associations for Dipanagara with the founder of the Mataram dynasty and it is still revered today as a site where holy kris blades are sometimes struck (Ricklefs 1974b:247 note 59; Chapter IX). Although Dipanagara made no mention in his babad of any visionary experiences there in circa 1805, his association with the Sénapati would be reinforced later in the context of his final vision before the outbreak of the Java War (p. 579). The following day he went on to the cave at Secang situated on what would become his lands in the Selarong area to the west of the Kali Bédhog (p. 369), a spot much frequented by him as a place for withdrawal and meditation, especially during the fasting month Puwasa. It would later become his first headquarters during the Java War. The ground around the cave had been converted into a garden and a special rock chamber hewn out of the cave wall with a stone niche for sleeping. Here the prince passed the night before setting out on the last stage of his journey back to Tegalreja.71

Dipanagara’s return from his pilgrimage in the latter part of 1805, marked the end of a crucial stage in his life. The period of his youth was over, his spiritual apprenticeship complete. He had learnt much from his great-grandmother in terms of self-discipline, religious devotion and the ability to mix with all classes of Javanese society. Living at Tegalreja had also taught him the advantages of distancing himself from the Yogya court and had turned him into an intensely private person, a lover of solitude and that inward peace which comes from silent reflection. The prince was now a capable young man, whose sense of self-importance was tempered by the insights gained on his pilgrimage. In particular, he had begun to understand the significant but fleeting role he would be called upon to play in the great events which were about to unfold in his native Yogyakarta. As we shall see (p. 543), he would return again to the south coast to meditate in its caves and grottos on the eve of the Java War as part of his spiritual preparation for his great rebellion. But by then he would have received new visions which would make his destiny all the clearer.

Conclusion

The passages in his babad relating to the visions Dipanagara received on his south coast pilgrimage in circa 1805 afford an insight into the way he perceived his place in Java’s spiritual destiny. Much is still obscure, but certain key themes stand out. The first is the importance of the historical example of the wali or apostles of Islam, especially Sunan Kalijaga, the wali most closely associated with the proselytisation of south-central Java, both in legitimizing Dipanagara’s subsequent rebellion and in prefiguring the style of leadership

The power of prophecy

which the prince would aspire to during the Java War. The second is the influence of Sultan Agung, whom Dipanagara viewed as the Mataram ruler most worthy of emulation on account of his success in combining the exercise of temporal and spiritual power. The third is Dipanagara’s conscious rejection of help from the Javanese spirit kingdoms – as represented by Ratu Kidul – and his stress on his faith as a Javanese Muslim in the Almighty, references to whom are frequently rendered in his autobiography by the Sanskrit-derived Hyang Agung (‘The Great One’), Hyang Suksma (‘The Immaterial One’) or Hyang Widi (‘The One Who Leads’) rather than the more Islamically orthodox Allah Ingkang Rabulngalimin (‘God the Forgiving One’) or Allah Tangala (‘God the Sublime’). This was yet another indication of the strength of Dipanagara’s Hindu-Javanese cultural inheritance. It can be seen too in the final theme of the prince’s identification with the wayang hero Arjuna which would be a leitmotif throughout his life. Dipanagara was clearly fascinated by the shadow-play hero’s role in the Arjuna Wiwāha tale, particularly the actions undertaken by the Pandhawa prince to prepare himself through asceticism to achieve invincible power in the world. We shall see below how Dipanagara’s brief period as a Javanese Ratu Adil (‘Just King’) bearing Arjuna’s weapon, Sarutama, which he had emblazoned on his personal battle standard, would be linked with a time of purifying destruction similar to that carried out by the wayang hero in the Arjuna Wiwāha story. These four themes, in the view of the present author, formed a framework within which the prince’s career would later develop.

At the time of his return from his pilgrimage in late 1805, all this lay in the future. What was clear, however, was that he would now return to the world with a clearer sense of his prophetic destiny and his place in Javanese history. But he would do so just as the old Javanese order in which he had grown up was about to be overwhelmed by the forces of a new and hugely destructive European imperialism. Born of the twin forces of industrial and political revolution in late eighteenth-century Europe, it would reshape the world of Dipanagara and his contemporaries in ways beyond their wildest imaginings.
CHAPTER V

The beginning of the ruin of the Land of Java
Yogyakarta and Daendels’ new order, 1808

Daendels’ new order

The ‘beginning of the ruin of the Land of Java’ had been the prophetic warning delivered to Dipanagara at Parangkusuma just before his return to Tegalreja from his south coast pilgrimage in circa 1805. Specifically, the disembodied voice had foretold that this would start in just under three years’ time. As though on cue, on 5 January 1808, Marshal Herman Willem Daendels arrived in Batavia to take up his post as governor-general to which he had been nominated exactly a year earlier by King Louis (Lodewijk I) of Holland (reigned 1806-1810), the younger brother of Napoleon Bonaparte (Stapel 1941:77). ‘The last of the tyrants’ in Colonel Henry Yule’s words (Boulger 1897:112), Daendels was very much a product of the new Europe forged by the French Revolution. Lawyer, revolutionary, politician and career soldier, he had been involved with the ‘Patriot Revolt’ against the Stadhouder in Holland (1786-1787), and had helped set up (and commanded) the Batavian Legion (1792-1795) which had fought alongside French Republican forces in the 1794-1795 invasion of the Dutch Netherlands. Later, as head of the pro-French Unitarian Party, he had earned himself a reputation as a ‘headstrong, sentimental and obstinate’ character (Schama 1977:342-3). A man of few scruples, great energy and a penchant for using force to achieve his ends, he was destined to make a lasting mark on the history of Java, in much the same fashion as the almost equally ruthless Johannes van den Bosch (in office 1830-1834) in the aftermath of the Java War.¹

¹ Stapel 1941:77 (on Daendels, who took over from his predecessor A.H. Wiese on 14-1-1808), 85 (on Van den Bosch); De Haan 1935a:557, quoting P.A. Goldbach, a senior VOC official, who described Daendels as a ‘monster’. On Van den Bosch’s personal brutality, which rivalled that of Daendels, see NA, Exhibitum 8-8-1832 no. 1342, Javanese report of Mas Jayasanta about a boat trip of Van den Bosch down the Bengawan Sala, 27-7-1832, relating that when the governor-general’s boat had got stuck in the shallows in lands abutting Prangwedana (Mangkunagara II’s) territories in the Kadjawung area, a pair of demang and their followers had come to push his vessel off, but
Plate 17. Posthumous portrait of Herman Willem Daendels (1762-1818), painted by Radèn Saleh in 1838. Daendels’ hand points to a map of the Mount Megamendhung (West Java) section of the famous postweg (highway) which ran from Anyer on the Sunda Straits to Panarukan in the Eastern Salient (Oosthoek) of Java, and which was built during his administration. Photograph by courtesy of the Iconografisch Bureau, The Hague.
Such character traits were precisely what had recommended him to Napoleon who had tasked him – the only non-French marshal – to secure Java as a military base against the British in the Indian Ocean. Fortuitously avoiding the stringent British naval blockade, Daendels arrived to find the island nearly defenceless. In October-December 1806, a British squadron commanded by one of Nelson’s former captains, Admiral Sir Thomas Trowbridge (1760-1807), had destroyed the remnants of Vice-Admiral Pieter Hartsinck’s fleet in the roads of Batavia and disabled a large part of the former Dutch East Indies Company’s merchant marine. A year later, another squadron under Admiral Sir Edward Pellew (1757-1833) had landed in Gresik to destroy the shore batteries and defences, and had attacked remaining Dutch ships in the Oosthoek, briefly preventing the vital trade along the Sala River by blockading the Madura Straits.²

Although the marshal’s immediate task was a military one, he was also vested with sweeping powers to reform the corrupt former Company administration, the VOC itself having recently passed under the control of the Dutch state following its bankruptcy in 1799. The new Colonial Charter of 1803 envisaged considerable changes to the system of colonial rule in the Indies (Day 1972:127-48), and Daendels brought to his new post all the ruthlessness and determination which had been the hallmark of his previous political and military career. The three years of his administration (1808-1811) laid the foundations for the modern colonial state in Indonesia (Van’t Veer 1963:107-86).

One of the marshal’s primary strategic considerations in planning Java’s defence was the position of the independent courts. Their power and influence marked them out as potential rivals to the European government and as dubious allies in the event of an enemy attack. In this respect, the court of Yogyakarta constituted a far more redoubtable threat by virtue of its military resources and substantial cash reserves, the latter the outcome of the second sultan’s ruthless fiscal innovations and heavy tax demands.³ Writing in early 1812 after his first bruising encounter with the Yogya court, Raffles reckoned that the sultan was the main power in the eastern outlying districts. In a

² Boulger 1897:80; Van Kesteren 1887:1276-7. References to British naval operations can be found in Dj.Br. 86, Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang) to Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta), 28-10-1806 (capture of Dutch frigate Maria Reigersbergen by HMS Caroline [Captain Peter Rainier] in Bay of Batavia as well as other VOC ships at Pulau Onrust and Middelburg); Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 3-11-1806 (reappearance of Trowbridge’s squadron – 8 ships of the line – in the bay of Batavia and further destruction of VOC shipping); Dj.Br. 38, Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to B.F. von Liebeherr (Surakarta) 17-12-1807 (Pellew’s attack on Gresik and destruction of remaining VOC ships in the Oosthoek), 24-12-1806 (final withdrawal of Pellew’s squadron).

³ See Chapter I.
secret dispatch to Lord Minto, he speculated that if the European government was withdrawn the Surakarta ruler would be unable to maintain his authority and the sultan’s power ‘would [then] at once extend over the whole of the eastern districts of Java including the sea coasts’.\(^4\) Such considerations may have already weighed with Daendels. According to Nicolaus Engelhard (1761-1831), then governor of Java’s Northeast Coast (in office 1801-1808), even before he left Holland, the marshal (Engelhard 1816:257-8):

> already had a prejudice against the sultan […] he had the wish to make [him] feel his superiority and to attack him at the first opportunity […] some officers [in Daendels’ entourage] were of the same opinion and spoke from the moment they landed of the sultan and when they could give him a good hiding.

Engelhard also shrewdly observed that Hamengkubuwana II’s well-stocked treasury had aroused the jealousy not only of Daendels, but also of the other independent rulers in south-central Java – namely Sunan Pakubuwana IV (reigned 1788-1820) and Pangéran Prangwedana (post-1821, Mangkunagara II, reigned 1796-1835) – who showed themselves only too willing to side with the European government to further their designs against the sultan.\(^5\)

While Engelhard’s views of Daendels should be treated with caution given his later position as a bitter critic and opponent of the marshal, it does seem that from the start of his administration Daendels was anxious to place the relationship between the government in Batavia and the courts on a new footing. As early as 24 February 1808, he had informed Engelhard of his wish for detailed information concerning the south-central Javanese kingdoms and intimated that the VOC official’s position as governor and director of Java’s Northeast Coast would soon be abrogated. Daendels wished to correspond directly with the First Residents, namely the senior Dutch representatives at the courts, without the interference of the Semarang-based governor.\(^6\) In the same letter, he recalled the incumbent Residents, Matthijs Waterloo from Yogyakarta and Bogislaus Friedrich von Liebeherr from Surakarta, and replaced them with more dependable figures, Pieter Engelhard and Jacob Andries van Braam, the latter a close political ally and friend.\(^7\) These new appointees had been fully

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\(^4\) BL Add MS. 45272 (Raffles secret correspondence with Lord Minto, January-March 1812), T.S. Raffles (Batavia) to Lord Minto (Calcutta), 21-1-1812.

\(^5\) Engelhard 1816:257; Dj.Br. 38, Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to Danureja II (Yogyakarta), 16-12-1805, referred to an Arab ‘priest’ who had fled from Yogya to Semarang and had joined the British navy (see Chapter I note 59) helping to spread rumours overseas about the size of Hamengkubuwana II’s treasure. See also Chapter VI.

\(^6\) Daendels 1814: Bijlage 1, Organique stukken 3.

\(^7\) For a less than flattering description of Van Braam’s character (‘a coward, toady, huckster and smuggler’, R.G. van Polanen) and his money-grubbing conduct (‘one of the few to make a mint out of this most despicable regime’, P.A. Goldbach), see De Haan 1935a:507-9. On Van Braam’s peculation of the revenues of the opium and tobacco farms, which he managed in Surakarta on behalf of Pakubuwana IV, see Eur F 148/17, Captain William Robison (Yogyakarta) to Lord Minto
briefed on the new administration’s attitude to the courts and on 25 February 1808 they received their instructions. The fifth article summed up the great importance Daendels attached to the honour and prestige of the European government stating that:

They should exert themselves in an impassive [ongevoelige] enough way to give the rulers an impression of the power and splendour of the present Royal government in Holland and of the protection of the great Napoleon, and to inspire them with awe and respect for [said] government.

We will see shortly how this new policy, almost calculated to arouse the indignation and suspicion of the rulers, played out at the courts in the course of the following year. But first it is necessary to turn aside for a moment to consider the new territorial division between the European government and the courts which the outgoing Yogya Resident and others were pressing on the new governor-general in the early months of 1808.

**Plans for annexation of territory in central and east Java**

Before they left their posts in central Java, both the outgoing governor of Java’s Northeast Coast, Nicolaus Engelhard, and the Yogya Resident, Matthijs Waterloo, advanced plans for the annexation of territory in central and east Java at the expense of the courts. Engelhard suggested a new boundary between the districts controlled by the government on the north coast and the Principalities so that productive lands could be brought under Batavia’s control. In particular, he urged the annexation of the pepper and indigo producing areas of Pacitan and Lowanu (Bagelèn) as well as the linen weaving district of Tanggung near Kedhung Kebo (post-1830 Purwareja) in Bagelèn. Even distant Malang, then part of the Surakarta eastern *mancanagara*, a region which had been extensively depopulated by the wars of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries (Ricklefs 1986:28), was slated for take-over in Engelhard’s scheme. Noting
the reluctance of north coast bupati families to marry their daughters into the courts on account of the great danger and expense involved.\textsuperscript{12} Engelhard urged Daendels to ‘break the connection between the courts and the north coast for good’. This should be done once a sufficiently redoubtable military force had been put together to overawe the courts. The incorporation of the annexed districts into government-controlled territories could then proceed by dismissing all the court-appointed bupati who had family relations with the south-central Javanese rulers, but keeping on those who were not bound by such ties, precisely the policy adopted by the Dutch administration after the Java War (Carey 1974b:276-7; Houben 1994:54-7).

The outgoing Yogya Resident, Waterloo, was even more detailed in his proposals. Before he relinquished his post in mid-April 1808, he sent an exhaustive list of the sultan’s revenue and military strength to Engelhard.\textsuperscript{13} He also committed some of his thoughts to paper in a long letter to the governor intended for Daendels’ perusal.\textsuperscript{14} Drawing on his twenty-year experience in central Java,\textsuperscript{15} he reviewed the whole relationship of the VOC with the Yogya district of Antang – into Surakarta territory through Daendels’ treaty with Pakubuwana IV of 6 January 1811, Daendels 1814:Bijlage 2, Additionele Stukken 27, art. 6. There it remained until 1830, when it was annexed by the Dutch along with all the remainder of the Surakarta mancanagara territories.\textsuperscript{12} According to Engelhard, pasisir bupati families complained that marriage into the ruling families of south-central Java meant that they never saw their daughters again because they were kept ‘locked up’ in the princely residences (dalem) or at the courts; that the marriage expenses were huge and that their children had to show ‘inordinate respect’ to their royal-born spouses. Moreover, they were constantly being pestered to send produce from their kabupatèn to the kraton. In Surakarta, there were also cases of children of pasisir bupati being so badly treated that they died prematurely, see further ‘Verslag der reis van N. Engelhard naar de hoven van Souracarta en Djocjocarta, naar den Oosthoek en de Residentiën Japara, Rembang en Joana’, 27-5-1803 in De Jonge and Van Deventer 1884-88, XIII:147, relating the fate of the two daughters of the bupati of Pathi, Radèn Tumenggung Megatsari, who were married to Pakubuwana IV’s ‘tyrannical’ younger brother, Pangéran Buminata (Chapter II note 86). Another Surakarta source related how Pakubuwana III’s daughter Ratu Timur (Ratu Kudhus), refused to allow the daughter of a north coast bupati, Radèn Adipati Panji Padmanegara of Kudhus, to return to be with her father after he had fallen seriously ill in February 1811, S.Br. 37, Radèn Adipati Cakranagara (Surakarta) to W.N. Servatius (Surakarta), 28 Sura AJ 1738 (AD 22-2-1811); Padmasusstra 1902:157 no. 35.

\textsuperscript{12} vAE (aanwinsten 1900) 235, N. Engelhard, ‘Memorie’, 14-5-1808. According to Engelhard, pasisir bupati families complained that marriage into the ruling families of south-central Java meant that they never saw their daughters again because they were kept ‘locked up’ in the princely residences (dalem) or at the courts; that the marriage expenses were huge and that their children had to show ‘inordinate respect’ to their royal-born spouses. Moreover, they were constantly being pestered to send produce from their kabupatèn to the kraton. In Surakarta, there were also cases of children of pasisir bupati being so badly treated that they died prematurely, see further ‘Verslag der reis van N. Engelhard naar de hoven van Souracarta en Djocjocarta, naar den Oosthoek en de Residentiën Japara, Rembang en Joana’, 27-5-1803 in De Jonge and Van Deventer 1884-88, XIII:147, relating the fate of the two daughters of the bupati of Pathi, Radèn Tumenggung Megatsari, who were married to Pakubuwana IV’s ‘tyrannical’ younger brother, Pangéran Buminata (Chapter II note 86). Another Surakarta source related how Pakubuwana III’s daughter Ratu Timur (Ratu Kudhus), refused to allow the daughter of a north coast bupati, Radèn Adipati Panji Padmanegara of Kudhus, to return to be with her father after he had fallen seriously ill in February 1811, S.Br. 37, Radèn Adipati Cakranagara (Surakarta) to W.N. Servatius (Surakarta), 28 Sura AJ 1738 (AD 22-2-1811); Padmasusstra 1902:157 no. 35.

\textsuperscript{13} Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 24-3-1808, letter bound in dK 145, Waterloo, ‘Memorie van Overgave’, 4-4-1808.

\textsuperscript{14} Dj.Br. 21, Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 21-2-1808. Many of Waterloo’s ideas were taken up by Engelhard in his memoir for Daendels dated the day after he relinquished his post, vAE (aanwinsten 1900) 235, N. Engelhard, ‘Memorie’, 14-5-1808.

\textsuperscript{15} Waterloo, born Amsterdam 1769, had studied at the naval college at Semarang (1785-1788), starting his career at the age of 19 as a marine cadet and 3rd-class instructor at the college before moving to Surakarta in 1789 as an ensign (pennist) and then to Banda as book-keeper (boekhouder) (1795-1798). In 1798, in an unexplained career promotion, he was made Second Resident in Yogyakarta and then First Resident in 1803. In May 1808, he became a member of the Forestry Administration (Administratie der Houtbosschen) and the following year was appointed Resident of Cirebon (1809-1812) where he served until his death on 6-5-1812, De Haan 1935a:662. During his time in Cirebon, he helped to save the life of Pangéran Natakusuma and his eldest son, R.T. Natadiningrat, who were in his care and whom Daendels wished to see murdered, pp. 277-8.
V The beginning of the ruin of the Land of Java

...court, referring to the *strandgeld* payments (rent for VOC-annexed north coast areas) made by the Company for the territories ceded by Sunan Pakubuwana II (reigned 1726-1749) in 1743 and the terms of ceremonial address used in correspondence with the *kraton*. He stressed the deep suspicion and jealousy of the two Surakarta courts towards Yogya, in particular the hatred of Pangéran Prangwedana (Mangkunagara II) for the sultan, an outcome of the memory of a previous political crisis in 1787-1790, and referred to the ‘expansionist tendencies’ of Yogyakarta during that episode. He concluded, as Raffles would do in 1812, that if an enemy force landed in Java the attitude of the sultan was most to be feared. In a prescient passage, the Yogya Resident surmised that once the British had opened up secret relations with the Javanese courts prior to an attack things would go badly for the Dutch – all of which indeed came to pass during the course of the British invasion of Java in August 1811.

In terms of internal court politics, he portrayed the second sultan as a fearful and selfish man preparing to meet the challenges of old age. Neither Dipanagara’s father, the Crown Prince, nor the Yogya patih (first minister), Danureja II, in Waterloo’s estimation, had the courage to stand up to him although they bore him little affection. The Yogya first minister could perhaps, in Waterloo’s opinion, be induced to work more closely with the European government, but besides him, the only two really important princes in Yogyakarta for the Dutch were Natakusuma (Pakualam I, 1764-1829, reigned 1812-1829) and Mangkudiningrat (circa 1778-1824), a son of the second sultan by his well-born second official wife, Ratu Mas (Carey 1992:401 note 10), a granddaughter of Pakubuwana II (reigned 1726-1749). Both were hugely talented and ambitious, but in Waterloo’s estimation, they would not act in anything where their political advantage was not assured.

He ended his letter by pressing for a new division of central Java between the courts and the government. His proposal was for an annexation of all land

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16 The 1787-1790 political crisis, also known as the Pakepung affair after the ‘encirclement’ of Surakarta, was precipitated by Pakubuwana IV’s attempt to bring about a change in the balance of power in central Java by forcing Dutch recognition of Surakarta as the senior *kraton* and pressing the claims of Mangkunagara I (reigned 1757-1795) to the throne of Yogya. The young Sunan was persuaded to this course by his *sautri* advisers, who wielded an important religious influence over him, although suggestions that they had connections with the fundamentalist Wahhābī sect have been proved groundless. The situation was made more serious for the Dutch by the duplicity of their First Resident in Surakarta, Andries Hartsinck. Eventually the sultan (Hamengkubuwana I) was able to convince the Dutch to act on Yogyaa’s behalf and, after joining in a rapprochement with the Mangkunagaran troops, both courts took part with a Dutch contingent in the encirclement of Surakarta in November 1790. The pressure on the Sunan forced him to part with his advisers, but contrary to the first sultan’s expectations it did not lead to any marked change in Yogyakarta’s status, nor did the Mangkunagaran receive the recognition it expected for its part in the affair. Although the upshot was a resounding vindication for the system of the division of Java between the three courts (Yogyakarta, Surakarta and the Mangkunagaran) built up so painstakingly since the 1755 Giyanti treaty, it left a legacy of bitterness which later manifested itself in the hostile attitude of the Surakarta courts towards Yogyakarta during the second sultan’s reign, see Ricklefs 1974a:285-340.
north of a line running from Boyolali – a key strategic point for the Dutch (Houben 1994:111) – as far east as the borders of government-controlled regions of Surabaya and the Oosthoek. This would include the Yogya districts of Gagatan, Sélang, Seséla, Wirasari, Grobogan, Waru, Teras-Karas (Ngawèn), and the Surakarta areas of northern Sokawati and Jagaraga, as well as the whole of Blora and Caruban. Part of the sultan’s eastern outlying districts to the north of Madiun was also to be included, including most of the mancanagara province of Jipang, which along with Blora,\(^{17}\) would, in Waterloo’s view, help to alleviate the desperate shortage of timber in the Dutch-controlled areas of the north coast (Map 3). This need to secure new supplies from the teak forests of the adjacent eastern mancanagara districts to prevent the closure of the Rembang shipyards had been constantly stressed by senior VOC officials from the seventeenth century (Nagtegaal 1996:193-9). With the effects of the British blockade of Javanese coastal waters now being keenly felt, it was essential that these yards continue to function.\(^{18}\)

To the west of Boyolali, Waterloo’s proposed annexation plans were even more ambitious. He suggested the annexation of parts of the core districts of Pajang, Mataram, Kedhu, Bagélèn and Banyumas, together with the whole island of Nusa Kambangan and the port of Cilacap. These last were of particular strategic interest, in Waterloo’s view, for the western entrance to the strait which divides Nusa Kambangan from mainland Java called Kali Bujang provided the only deepwater anchorage for seagoing vessels along the whole of Java’s south coast.\(^{19}\) Furthermore, several of these western districts, in particular Kedhu and Bagélèn along with Grobogan, provided vital rice supplies which the European government relied on to feed their garrisons on the north coast and in eastern Indonesia (Nagtegaal 1996:199-204). Like Engelhard, Waterloo also recommended the annexation of the south coast district of Pacitan to enhance government-sponsored pepper production there and to

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\(^{17}\) On the location of these districts, see Map of central and east Java on pp. xxviii-xxx.

\(^{18}\) NOK 1, Van Overstraten, ‘Memorie van Overgave’, 13-10-1796, 34-5; Carey 1984a:9 note 39 (on the problems of the ship-building industry in Rembang, where three-master schooners had been laid down, because of exhaustion of local supplies and the need to import wood from Blora); Dj.Br. 48, J.G. van den Berg (Yogyakarta) to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 18-12-1802 (on attempts to get Hamengkubuwana II’s agreement to felling of timber in Jipang); De Jonge and Van Deventer 1884-88, XIII:211-33 (Nicolaus Engelhard’s report of 27-5-1803 on the desperate need for new sources of timber, the Dutch-controlled areas of Rembang, Lasem and Tuban having become completely worked out and needing 25 years to recover); Dj.Br. 49, Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang) to Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta), 20-11-1803 (on encroachments being made on wood in Jipang and Blora despite resistance of local bupati); Raffles 1817, I:39-41 (on great importance of timber reserves in eastern mancanagara, which was reflected in local toponyms like Walikukun and Kadawung – both of which referred to tree species – for local districts); IOL G21/65, ‘Memo- randum respecting Java’, 1813 (on decline in teak production since 1777 and creation of Forestry Board by Daendels in 1808). See further Nagtegaal 1996:193-9 (on VOC exhaustion of pasisir teak forests in the seventeenth century); Remmelink 1994:13-4 (on the timber yards of the VOC).

\(^{19}\) For further discussion, see Crawfurd 1971:303.
improve the road network and fortifications both as a deterrent against enemy landings and to prevent pirates from using the bay of Pacitan as a smuggling base.20 Some improvements in the fortifications in Yogyakarta and Surakarta were also advocated to provide more protection to the European and Chinese communities in the event of a British attack. The outgoing Resident likewise urged Daendels to demand an increase in the number of porters supplied by the rulers to carry goods between the princely territories and Semarang, and criticized the chaotic distribution of land between the courts in the core areas of Pajang and Mataram which gave rise to so many village wars and criminal activities.21

Waterloo’s letter was lengthy and persuasive. Together with the final memorandum of his Semarang superior, Engelhard, it constituted a blueprint for annexation which, if followed, would have completely refashioned the political face of Java. It is uncertain how much direct influence it had on Daendels, but it served to highlight many of the key issues which drove the European government from this point to the end of the Java War. These included access to strategic resources (timber, cash crops, manpower), the security of Java’s vulnerable south coast in time of war, annexation of rice-producing districts (Kedhu, Bagelen and the western mancanagara), greater clarity of boundaries between Surakarta and Yogyakarta in the core regions, and tighter military and political control of the courts. In fact, many of the Yogya Resident’s recommendations regarding annexations in east Java were acted upon in the treaties which Daendels later ratified with the courts on 6 and 10 January 1811.22 But, there were other measures, such as the annexation of Pacitan and Kedhu, which did not take place until the British period (Carey 1980:97-9, 1992:447 note 232; Van Deventer 1891:100), and still others, such as the redistribution of land in the central apanage districts and the annexations of the remaining eastern and western mancanagara which did not occur until after the Java War (Houben 1994:41-69). However, the basis of a possible new division of Java and changes in the relationship with the courts had been laid out and they were to remain a blueprint for many of the policies pursued by the European government over the next four years.

20 Apparently Pacitan Bay and other parts of the south coast were regularly used as smuggling bases by pirates from Bali, Sulawesi and other parts of eastern Indonesia: in April 1805, 32 small ships were sighted off the south coast in the Surakarta area of Segarawedhi (Zandzee or Sand Sea) by the patih of the bupati of Pacitan, AvJ, Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to J.G. van den Berg (Surakarta), 16-4-1805. See further Chapter I note 58, Chapter VI note 179.
21 See pp. 15, 48.
22 Daendels 1814: Bijlage 2, additionele stukken 27-8; Dj.Br. 27, ‘Map of government acquisitions in January 1811’. The measures for the demarcation of the boundaries, however, were not finalised before the fall of the Franco-Dutch government in September 1811, see Dj.Br. 22, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to J.W. Janssens (Batavia), 29-7-1811; NvB Port 4 pt. 12, Jacob Andries van Braam (Semarang) to T.S. Raffles (Batavia), 13-12-1811.
Daendels’ edicts on ceremonial and etiquette and their impact

While these suggestions for a new territorial division of Java were being weighed in Batavia, Daendels’ initiatives for a new relationship with the courts began to be implemented. His first move had already been trailed in his communications with Nicolaus Engelhard, namely, the abolition of the position of governor and director of Java’s Northeast Coast which Daendels carried out in person in Semarang on 13 May 1808 (De Haan 1910-12, IV:78). The way was now open for direct communications between the governor-general and the Residents at the courts. This was a key part of Daendels’ plan to centralise government on Batavia. Following up his original instruction to the newly appointed Residents, Pieter Engelhard and J.A. van Braam, to impart to the rulers ‘a striking impression’ of the prestige of the new administration, Daendels proceeded on 28 July 1808 to promulgate his celebrated Edict on Ceremonial and Etiquette (Valck 1844:140; Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:33; Van der Chijs 1895-97, XIV:63-5). This did away with some of the ceremonial functions previously performed by the Residents for the rulers which Daendels considered degrading (Daendels 1814:94) and accorded them various privileges more in accord with their new positions as direct representatives of the governor-general and the royal government in The Hague. Thus the First Residents now received the title of ‘minister’ with new uniforms (blue coats with high collars braided in gold with olives, olive branches and flat gold buttons, white breeches with embroidered knee bands and white silk stockings, tricorn black hats with black straps and cockade), and were allowed to carry a blue and gold state parasol or payung emblazoned with the arms of the king of Holland (Van der Chijs 1895-97, XIV:63-5). On official occasions, they were not to remove their hats when approaching the ruler, who was to rise to greet the Dutch representative and make space for him immediately to his left on his throne, thus allowing him to sit at exactly the monarch’s level. Likewise, they were no longer required to serve the ruler in a menial fashion with drink and betelnut. Various other articles regulated the new forms of greeting when saluting the ruler both inside and outside the kraton: the minister, for example, was now accorded a military escort of mounted dragoons on all official visits to the court and was no longer expected to stop his coach when passing that of the ruler on the high road.23 A subsequent edict on 16 August 1808 regulated the position of the Second Resident, now renamed ‘secretary’ (Van Kesteren 1887:1278-9; Van der Chijs 1895-97, XV:87).

The changes in ceremonial amounted to a very substantial alteration to the position of the Dutch representatives at the courts which struck at the

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23 For a full description of the changes in ceremonial, see S.Br. 55, ‘Ontwerp van een vast ceremonieel van de residenten aan de hoven van Sourakarta en Djokjokarta, 1808’.
heart of the Javanese understanding of the Dutch presence in Java. This Javanese political philosophy has been extensively analysed by Ricklefs (1974a:362-413) on the basis of two late eighteenth-century texts, the Babad Kraton and the Serat Surya Raja, and an early nineteenth-century version of the Serat Sakondhar which deals with the highly mythologized Javanese account of the history of Alexander of Macedon. Briefly, these provide evidence that by the late eighteenth century the Yogyakarta court had legitimised the Dutch presence in west Java, roughly in the Pasundan area, by regarding them as legal descendants of the Sundanese kingdom of Pajajaran. This kingdom, which was roughly contemporaneous with the great east Javanese kingdom of Majapahit (1292-circa 1527), has an obscure history but its memory is nevertheless preserved in a mythical fashion in the modern Javanese babad literature. For the Javanese, Pajajaran had two important characteristics: first, it was a foreign kingdom since it lay in the Sundanese-speaking area of west Java, and second it ruled the high mountains of the Priangan region, a place closely associated in the Javanese view with the spirit world, hence the derivation of the place name ‘Priangan’ from the Javanese parahyangan or prajangan, meaning the ‘abode of the spirits’ (Ricklefs 1974a:375). This area had an important association for the rulers of Mataram for their spiritual consort, Ratu Kidul, was, according to courtly tradition, a princess of Pajajaran. This same tradition held that the Dutch too, by virtue of Governor-General Jan Pieterszoon Coen’s (in office 1618-1623, 1627-1629) foundation of Batavia on the site of the Sundanese fishing port of Sunda Kelapa (Jayakarta) in 1619 and his mythical descent from another Pajajaran princess, who carried the signs of legitimacy in the form of flaming female pudenda, were now the lawful successors of the foreign kingdom of Pajajaran and rulers over the spiritually significant Priangan region (Ricklefs 1974a:399-413). Even Dipanagara in his writings in exile in Makassar (1833-1855) reflected this dichotomy between Majapahit and Pajajaran as representatives of two royal traditions in Java when he related the well-known story of the twin cannon, Kyai Setoma and Nyai Setomi, representing the Dutch and the Javanese, and specifically stated that Dutch-ruled Batavia had assumed the mantle of Pajajaran.

In political terms this meant that the Dutch governor-generals who stemmed from Coen – Daendels included – were regarded as being very senior sovereign partners in Java, but rulers who carried no rights over the Javanese kingdoms of central and east Java. The practical expression of this political philosophy lay in the Javanese view of a dualistic hegemony on the island with the Dutch ruling the west and the Javanese supreme in the centre and east, namely the kejawen or area of Javanese settlement. While the Dutch

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24 See Chapter IV note 36.
governor-general was referred to respectfully by the south-central Javanese rulers as ‘grandfather’ (ingkang éyang), this did not indicate a close personal relationship. On the contrary, although the governor-general was revered as a senior ruler, he was not expected to involve himself personally in the affairs of the courts and on nearly all occasions when a governor-general visited the Principalities up to the outbreak of the Java War difficulties ensued.26

At the same time, it was considered inappropriate for an incoming governor-general to receive the sultan’s felicitations at any place except Batavia for in the Yogya ruler’s eyes this had the nature of an embassy to a neighbouring kingdom (Ricklefs 1974a:247-54, 373). In these circumstances the Dutch representative at the courts occupied a position of particular importance for, in the Javanese view, he was seen to fit into a dual position consisting of two men, the patih (first minister) and the Resident, who owed loyalty both to the Dutch and the Javanese. Thus the Resident was treated by the Javanese rulers as an ambassador of the Dutch East Indies Company who fulfilled certain ceremonial functions at their court, and even at times acted as their servant, hence the pouring of wine and serving of betelnut at state receptions. Conversations between the rulers and the Residents, which are recorded in the babad, reflect this attitude, for the ruler is usually portrayed addressing the Resident in Low Javanese and the Resident replying in High Javanese (Van Kesteren 1887:1280; Ricklefs 1974a:368). The VOC even appeared to condone this view of the Resident as the joint servant of the Javanese ruler and the Company by accepting the ruler’s suggestions for promotions at the kraton garrisons or for nomination as Resident. Thus in April 1792 at the time of his accession, the newly installed second sultan pressed the governor of Java’s Northeast Coast, P.G. van Overstraten, to allow Wouter Hendrik van IJsseldijk (in office 1786-1798) to remain as First Resident because, as the governor reported, Van IJsseldijk ‘had a special talent for getting on with the Javanese and making himself beloved by them’, a highly important recommendation given the circumstances of his position.27 Furthermore, the Resident even appears to

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26 Ricklefs 1974a:40, 373 refers to Governor-General G.W. Baron van Imhoff’s (in office 1743-1750) disastrous May 1746 visit to Surakarta which occasioned Mangkubumi (Hamengkubuwana I’s) rebellion. Political difficulties also arose over Daendels’ visits to the courts in July 1809 and December 1810-January 1811 and again during Raffles’ visits in December 1811 and June 1812, the last to accompany the British force which stormed the Yogya kraton. Even Governor-General G.A.G.Ph. van der Capellen’s (in office 1816-1826) 29-31 August 1819 and 3-5 September 1822 visits proved problematic because of his insistence that his wife should take her place beside him on the throne during the official receptions (Chapter X note 63), his subsequent decision to abolish the European-leased estates and his incautious remarks in Surakarta about his administration’s plans for further annexations, Van der Kemp 1897:23-4; Carey 1984b:58; Houben 1994:13 note 14.

27 De Jonge and Van Deventer 1884-88, XII:259. Dutch contemporaries were not so charitable: R.G. van Polanen criticized his ‘good nature and desire to be in everyone’s favour, [which] always stood in the way of his better judgement’ (Poensen 1905:87 note 1), and Daendels dismissed him as ‘the weakest man and worst financier in Java’ (De Haan 1935a:667). According to the Dutch histo-
have taken an oath of allegiance to the ruler to whose court he was assigned and as late as September 1810, long after Daendels’ edicts, Pieter Engelhard was still referring to the sultan as ‘my prince’ in a letter to his colleague in Surakarta. It was also the case that the Residents were usually in debt to the ruler given the exceptional demands of their position at the courts. Waterloo, for example, owed Hamengkubuwana II some 8,000 Spanish dollars by the time of his departure in April 1808, and the Yogya ruler refused to allow him to leave for Batavia until the debt – along with the accumulated compound interest of nine percent per annum – was cleared by his successor, who was himself constrained to borrow some 50,000 Indies guilders from the sultan to cover his costs. It was the same in Surakarta, where Waterloo’s counterpart, B.F. von Liebeherr, lamented his heavy personal losses due to the European war and the fact that his 15,000 Spanish dollar salary was paid in paper while his debts to the Sunan had to be serviced in silver.

Nevertheless, Daendels’ edicts effectively destroyed the finely balanced political structure whereby Dutch rule in Java had been sanctioned at the courts. If the articles of the edicts were carried out as Daendels wished there could no longer be any pretence that the Resident was a joint servant of the European government and the ruler. The second sultan’s reaction, as recorded in both the Dutch and Javanese accounts, was one of dismay. The "rian François de Haan, he was a ‘good-looking man but a weak character’ (knappe kop, slap karakter; De Haan 1935a:667). Even with the second sultan, he eventually fell out of favour in 1796 over his involvement in a quarrel between the ruler and his elder brother, Pangéran Ngabèhi, and the Semarang governor was asked to replace him within the year, Van Kesteren 1887:1280; De Jonge and Van Deventer 1884-88, XII:435. See further Neve 1995:176-8 (on Van Ijsseldijk’s family).

28 Dj.Br. 37, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to W.N. Servatius (Surakarta), 1-9-1810. Servatius was acting Resident in Surakarta at this time in the absence of his superior J.A. van Braam in Semarang.

29 Dj.Br. 23, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia), 14-4-1808. Hamengkubuwana II refused to accept the financial guarantee of the Yogya kapitan cina (captain of the Chinese), Tan Jin Sing (in office 1803-1813), and only allowed Waterloo to depart when Engelhard himself stood surety for him, a poor guarantee given the new Resident’s financial incompetence. In fact, when he received notification of his own replacement by Gustaf Willem Wiese in August 1808, Engelhard begged to be allowed to extend his term as Resident by a few months so that he could benefit from the profits of the annual autumn birds’ nests harvest from the south coast (see Chapter I, Chapter VII note 219), which could double a Resident’s income of 15,000 ronde realen (silver reals) a year. He told Daendels that his salary as a ‘minister’ was ‘not enough to run an economical household and he could not even pay for his daily bread’, Dj.Br. 23, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia), 11-8-1808. Engelhard’s loan of 50,000 Indies guilders from the sultan is mentioned in Dj.Br. 22, J.W. Janssens (Batavia) to Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta), 15-7-1811. It appears to have been covered by a loan for a similar sum which Engelhard obtained from his uncle, the former governor-general, Johannes Siberg (in office 1801-1805) and which he later repaid, De Haan 1910-12, I pt. 2:97.

30 S.Br. 55, B.F. von Liebeherr (Surakarta) to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 1-11-1806. Von Liebeherr remarked that only the profits from the annual birds’ nests harvest enabled him to make ends meet, neither the administration of the Sunan’s tax-farm nor the VOC opium monopoly affording him much financial return. See note 29, Chapter VII note 219.
The power of prophecy

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XVI. 42 The sultan was disturbed at heart
XVI. 42 The sultan was disturbed at heart
earnestly pondering over the difficulties.
earnestly pondering over the difficulties.
He already felt quietly about the future
He already felt quietly about the future
[that] the Dutch would rule,
[that] the Dutch would rule,
push aside his royal dignity
push aside his royal dignity
[and] break his authority.
[and] break his authority.
In the end, they would gather up Java
In the end, they would gather up Java
like gold carried along by water.
like gold carried along by water.

In his own babad, Dipanagara briefly mentioned the lengthy discussions after
In his own babad, Dipanagara briefly mentioned the lengthy discussions after
the news of Daendels’ edicts was received in Yogya. In particular, he referred
the news of Daendels’ edicts was received in Yogya. In particular, he referred
to the new seating arrangements and the right of the minister (Resident) to
to the new seating arrangements and the right of the minister (Resident) to
carry a state umbrella,33 an arrangement which was described in the Surakarta
carry a state umbrella,33 an arrangement which was described in the Surakarta
version of the Babad Dipanagara as putting the Resident on an equal footing
version of the Babad Dipanagara as putting the Resident on an equal footing
with the sultan (Carey 1981a:234-5 note 9). Despite the succinctness of his
with the sultan (Carey 1981a:234-5 note 9). Despite the succinctness of his
references, it is clear that it is the profound changes wrought by Daendels un-
references, it is clear that it is the profound changes wrought by Daendels un-
settled him as much as his Yogya contemporaries. Indeed, we will see below that
settled him as much as his Yogya contemporaries. Indeed, we will see below that
one of his war aims was to return Java to the state it was in before the 1808
one of his war aims was to return Java to the state it was in before the 1808
reforms. Thus, in the negotiations with the Dutch officer who arranged the
reforms. Thus, in the negotiations with the Dutch officer who arranged the
initial ceasefire arrangements with Dipanagara in December 1829, one of the
initial ceasefire arrangements with Dipanagara in December 1829, one of the
prince's senior commanders gave the Dutch four options in terms of a politi-
prince's senior commanders gave the Dutch four options in terms of a politi-
cal settlement all of which harked back to the pre-Daendels era. The most
cal settlement all of which harked back to the pre-Daendels era. The most
significant of these was that they should restrict themselves to the north coast
significant of these was that they should restrict themselves to the north coast
(pasisir) – including west Java and the Oosthoek – if they wished to remain in
(pasisir) – including west Java and the Oosthoek – if they wished to remain in
Java in a private trading capacity.34
Java in a private trading capacity.34

31 Ricklefs 1974a:371-2; Dj.Br. 41, Hamengkubuwana II (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Bata-
31 Ricklefs 1974a:371-2; Dj.Br. 41, Hamengkubuwana II (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Bata-
via), 22 Jumadilakir AJ 1735 (AD 15-8-1808) (on the minister now having to be treated on the same
via), 22 Jumadilakir AJ 1735 (AD 15-8-1808) (on the minister now having to be treated on the same
level as the erstwhile Semarang governor); S.Br. 23, Hugh Hope (Surakarta) to T.S. Raffles (Bata-
level as the erstwhile Semarang governor); S.Br. 23, Hugh Hope (Surakarta) to T.S. Raffles (Bata-
via), 1-8-1812 (on Pakubuwana IV’s willingness to receive him as ‘governor of Semarang’ given
via), 1-8-1812 (on Pakubuwana IV’s willingness to receive him as ‘governor of Semarang’ given
his previous position as ‘civil commissioner of the Eastern Districts’ and landdrost of Semarang);
his previous position as ‘civil commissioner of the Eastern Districts’ and landdrost of Semarang);
BNg, I:62, XVI (Dhandhanggula) 34. Minister sinebut/ pangwasa Delèr Semarang.
BNg, I:62, XVI (Dhandhanggula) 34. Minister sinebut/ pangwasa Delèr Semarang.
32 BNg, I:63, XVI.42. Sang Nata kampitèng tyasè/ ngacipuh ngèsthi kéwuh/ wus rumaos sinangkak
32 BNg, I:63, XVI.42. Sang Nata kampitèng tyasè/ ngacipuh ngèsthi kéwuh/ wus rumaos sinangkak
ririh/ Kumpeni mangrèhira/ andheseg keprabun/ anggegempil panguwasa/ wusanana ngepak ngepel pulo
ririh/ Kumpeni mangrèhira/ andheseg keprabun/ anggegempil panguwasa/ wusanana ngepak ngepel pulo
Javui/ ir mas kentaring toya.
Javui/ ir mas kentaring toya.
33 BD (Manado), I:126-7, XIV.83-4.
33 BD (Manado), I:126-7, XIV.83-4.
34 Carey 1974b:285-8, the other options were: 1. to remain as soldiers in the pay of the Javanese
34 Carey 1974b:285-8, the other options were: 1. to remain as soldiers in the pay of the Javanese
rulers as in the VOC period; 2. to return home to the Netherlands and trade with Java on condi-
rulers as in the VOC period; 2. to return home to the Netherlands and trade with Java on condi-
tion that they paid the right market prices for Javanese products or the right rent if they wished
At first a head-long conflict was avoided. The new Yogya Resident, Pieter Engelhard, a cousin of the last Semarang governor and a member of the same immensely able Swiss-Dutch family, was according to both Dutch and Javanese sources an accomplished diplomat and a person of excellent character (bèrbudi). During his time in office, he did much to temper the impetuosity and arrogance of Daendels' demands (Poensen 1905:126; De Haan 1910-12, I pt. 2:97-8). However, it was clear that the changes in the position of the courts with regard to the European government could not be disguised by diplomatic niceties. Engelhard's pretence that the higher rank accorded to the Resident – the same rank, he pointed out, which was accorded to VOC ambassadors to the Manchu court in Peking – did the sultan more honour than that of the title of opperhoofd ('chief') borne by the Residents in the days of the Company, and better reflected the new monarchical constitution in Holland, was not accepted by the Yogya ruler. In a letter to Daendels, he protested vigorously about the 'minister' taking his place to his left at the same level, on a par with the former governor of Java's Northeast Coast, and indeed seated beside him on his throne on official occasions. As for the Resident not stopping his carriage when he crossed that of the sultan, this would not happen, the sultan informed Daendels, because he would personally alert the Dutch representative to his intended sorties from the kraton so their paths would never cross!35

The Yogya babad describes how immediately upon receipt of the edict, the sultan ordered his throne to be changed in order to maintain his more elevated position during state functions. This involved making the dhampar narrower so that only the ruler could sit on it,36 and having a wooden footstool placed under it so that he would always sit higher than the Resident even when he went to visit him in the Residency.37 We will see in a subsequent chapter how this procedure nearly resulted in an armed clash between the sultan's entourage and British officers in the Residency 'throne room' at the time of Raffles' visit to Yogya on 27 December 1811.38

The reactions of the Surakarta court to the 28 July edict were apparently much more accommodating than those in Yogya. On 11 August 1808, Van Braam reported that the Sunan had agreed to all the clauses of the new edict 'without demur' and had ordered the court gamelan to play on the Sitinggil ('High Ground') at the entrance to the kraton as a sign of his acceptance, even delegating one of his aged nyai (female retainers) to carry the 'minister's' gold-

to lease lands; or 3. that they should embrace Islam in which case their livelihood and positions would be improved. See further below Chapter XII.

35 Dj.Br. 23, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Semarang), 3-8-1808; Dj.Br. 41, Hamengkubuwana II (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Semarang), 22 Jumadilakir AJ 1735 (AD 15-8-1808).
36 B.Ng. I:64, XVII.19-20.
37 AvJ, G.W. Wiese (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia), 10-6-1809; Houben 1994:11.
38 See Chapter VII note 174.
Plate 18. Nicolaus Engelhard (1761-1831), governor of Java’s Northeast Coast, 1803-1808. Frontispiece from De Haan 1910-12, III.
V The beginning of the ruin of the Land of Java

and-blue state umbrella on his official visits to the court. He also lost no opportunity to make disparaging remarks about his Yogya rival always seeking to cast himself in a more positive light with the European authorities. On receiving the news that Daendels had written a letter to the sultan telling him about the reason for his troop build-up in Semarang, he declared archly, ‘That gives me real pleasure; now he will at last be convinced of the honest sentiments of the Hollanders’. Five years’ earlier, during his May 1803 inspection tour through south-central and east Java, Engelhard had noticed that the Sunan’s court was beginning to dress ‘in European style’ despite the huge debts this entailed (De Jonge and Van Deventer 1884-88, XIII:128; Chapter VI note 165), an indication perhaps that the Sunan could see the value of adopting the sartorial as well as the political fashions of Java’s foreign rulers.

For those who knew the true character of the Surakarta monarch, this behaviour was hard to credit. In his final memorandum as Semarang governor, Nicolaus Engelhard had warned that although Sunan Pakubuwana IV might appear outwardly friendly, he was in fact a cruel and revengeful character, brimming with suspicion and a master of disguise. Painting a horrific portrait of his murderous conduct, which included the poisoning or attempted poisoning of senior Dutch officials and the strangulation of his own younger sister, Engelhard described the Sunan as a dissembling barbarian. Indeed, in May 1803, two years after his appointment as Semarang governor, Engelhard had already observed that (De Jonge and Van Deventer 1884-88, XIII:128):

for the Company it is always more preferable to have dealings with a resolute court like that of the sultan, provided there is an alert Resident there, rather than the Sunan’s court, which follows the wishes of the Resident as long as it is able to cajole and use him for its own purposes.

39 Dj:Br. 23, J.A. van Braam (Surakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Surabaya), 11-8-1808.
40 Dj:Br. 23, J.A. van Braam (Surakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Semarang), 22-5-1808.
41 vAE (aanwinsten 1900) 235, N. Engelhard, ‘Memorie’, 14-5-1808. Engelhard drew on reports by the Surakarta Residents, in particular those of B.F. von Liebeherr, for his final memorandum.
42 vAE (aanwinsten 1900), N. Engelhard, ‘Memorie’, 14-5-1808, related Pakubuwana IV’s attempted poisoning of the Surakarta Resident, B.J. van Nieuwkerken genaamd Nijvenheim (in office 1796-1803), and his strangulation of his sixteen-year-old younger sister, Radèn Ayu Sumiyah (Padmasusastra 1902:157 no. 26), for an illicit affair after seven attempts to poison her had failed and he had pretended to give her a public pardon. Her lover was apparently dismembered and one of his ears eaten raw by Pakubuwana IV’s younger brother, Pangéran Mangkubumi, after he had been dissuaded from eating his heart and genitals, see also Stockdale 1812:156. On the probable poisoning of an earlier Surakarta Resident, Willem Adriaan Palm (in office 1784-1788), see Ricklefs 1974a:297. The reference in Stockdale 1812:318-9, to the poisoning of thirteen unofficial wives of Pakubuwana III by the administration of poison from the upas tree in February 1776 is, however, a fabrication, see Bastin 1985:29-44. A more favourable view of Pakubuwana IV can be found in Java NOK 1, Van Overstraten, ‘Memorie’, 13-10-1796, who described the Sunan as ‘young, shrewd and full of fire’ and not nearly as credulous and superstitious (bijgeloovig) as Van Overstraten’s predecessor, Jan Greeve (in office 1787-1791), had made him out to be in 1790, see Ricklefs 1974a:328-30. For another contemporary assessment of Pakubuwana IV, see Chapter VIII note 195.
In the event of open hostilities, he concluded that there was more to be feared from Surakarta than from Yogya. The sultan, in his view, would be easily provoked into strong arm tactics, whereas the Sunan would always act more underhandedly and once plans were afoot, as in 1790, it would be very difficult to deter him (De Jonge and Van Deventer 1884-88, XIII:143). Engelhard's opinions reflected the views of senior VOC officials who had served at the courts during the late 1790s and early 1800s: thus J.G. van den Berg (1762-1842), a fluent Javanese speaker, who served as First Resident at both Yogyakarta and Surakarta, observed in 1801 that 'despite all his whims and caprices, the sultan [Hamengkubuwana II] pleases me better than that hypocrite of a Sunan', and that although less urbane and well-bred than the Sunan he found him altogether more engaging. Van den Berg's predecessor in Yogya, Van IJsseldijk (1757-1817), concurred. Writing of the Sunan as a 'master of guile who in his heart had an aversion to all Europeans', he suggested that the Surakarta ruler's whole reign from 1788 had been dominated by plans to bring about a lessening of European power in Java.

The views of these Dutch officials, steeped as they were in an understanding of court politics and with lengthy careers in Company service in Java behind them, counted for little with the new administration. Neither Daendels nor his close associates heeded their warnings. Indeed, given his own blood-drenched career, the odd strangulation or poisoning was hardly something that Daendels would have lost much sleep over. What did concern him was the prestige of his government. So when both Van Braam and the marshal's deputy, Rear-Admiral Arnold Adriaan Buyskes, who visited the

43 Engelhard had used the phrases altoos met de zaaken voor de vuist uit zal komen and altoos met listen zal te werk gaan, De Jonge and Van Deventer 1884-88, XIII:143. On the 1790 affair, see note 16.
44 Dj.Br. 48, J.G. van den Berg (Yogyakarta) to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 6-12-1801, 5-7-1802. For biographical details of Van den Berg, see Genealogie Van den Berg 1918:31-4.
46 Buyskes had been sent to Java by Louis Napoleon on a separate fast frigate so that in the event of Daendels' capture by the British – a strong possibility given their naval blockade of Indonesian waters – Java would have a replacement governor-general. Since both Buyskes and Daendels arrived safely in Batavia, for the first year of the marshal's administration, the rear-admiral was given the position of lieutenant governor-general, which involved him in chairing the Council of the Indies (Raad van Indië) and acting as Daendels' deputy during the marshal's frequent absences from the colonial capital, Dj.Br. 23, Hamengkubuwana II (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Semarang), 26 Rablingulawal AJ 1735 (AD 23-5-1808). In 1809, he was replaced by Daendels' ally Van Braam who, while remaining Resident ('minister') of Surakarta, was also appointed to serve as president der Hooge Regeering, the highest administrative post which Daendels had to bestow, and – from 25-10-1809 – as governor-general ad interim in the event of Daendels' death. In the Yogya babad he is sometimes referred to as the 'little [governor]-general' (jéndral cilik) to distinguish him from Daendels himself. He lost both these positions on 17 July 1811 after J.W. Janssens had taken over as governor-general, see Van der Chijs 1895-97, XVI:712. At that time, Janssens decided to abolish the post of President der Hooge Reegering for good, De Haan 1935a:507; Van Kesteren 1887:1288 note 1; B.Ng. I:75, XX.28-9.
sultan on 19 November 1808 in his capacity as lieutenant governor-general, reported the contrast in the attitude of the Yogya court when compared to that of Surakarta, he took notice.

According to the Yogya babad, Buyskes was put out by the less honourable way he was received in the sultan’s kraton. Van Braam, meanwhile, was struck by the ‘astonishing difference’ in the friendliness of the two courts when he visited Yogya in mid-October, pointing out that ‘the sultan cannot speak Malay and it is difficult to converse with him. He has a sort of wild look in his eyes which indicates suspicion and fear.’ We will return to Van Braam’s visit at the end of this chapter in view of the Surakarta Resident’s bruising encounter with the young bupati wedana of the eastern mancangara, Radèn Rongga, soon to become Daendel’s particular bête noire and the extraordinary events which attended the traditional tiger and buffalo fight staged in his honour. Meanwhile, his report and that of Buyskes helped to confirm Daendels’ antipathy towards the Yogya ruler which had already been evident at the time of his first arrival on the island. In his subsequent official account of his governor-generalship, the marshal wrote that whereas the Sunan had accepted the new ceremonial (Daendels 1814:94):

It was quite otherwise with the Sultan of Yogya. The contempt he felt for the Dutch Government caused him to disapprove of the new ceremonial […] he easily led himself to cause much unpleasantness to the government and he had supposedly designed a plan to rid himself of the Dutch.

So the stage was set for Yogyakarta’s confrontation with the ‘Thundering governor-general’ or Gubernur-Jéndral Guntur as he was known in Malay literature (Carey 1992:461 note 299). Contrary to Daendels’ expectations, however, the sultanate would survive the encounter rather better than the Dutch government.

Military manoeuvres: Javanese and Dutch

The problem for Daendels was that his government was bankrupt because of the British blockade and the military forces at his command were unreliable: ‘a hastily put together rabble’ (Aukes 1935:28) was how one Dutch military historian described the marshal’s army of nearly 18,000 mainly Indonesian

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48 Dj.Br. 23, J.A. van Braam (Surakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia), 17-10-1808, referring to Hamengkubuwana II’s verwilderd opslag van het oog.
troops who by December 1810 were deserting at the rate of 70 a day (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:33; Chapter VI note 82). Not entirely tongue in cheek, Nicolaus Engelhard had proposed in his final memorandum of May 1808 that the government should hire some holy men and ascetics, whom he referred to as tapa, to make favourable prophecies for the Dutch given the parlous situation which now confronted the former VOC. 49 Meanwhile, in Yogya, his cousin, Pieter Engelhard, was desperately trying to find out ‘at third or fourth hand’ what the second sultan’s reactions might be to the government’s financial plight, ‘a situation which is now known by many Yogya courtiers’. 50

With the defence of the island a priority, Daendels spent much of the first year of his administration attempting to strengthen his military position in central and east Java. In early May, he had notified the south-central Javanese rulers that he would be arriving in Semarang with a substantial military force and required delegations from the courts to meet him there in early to mid-June. 51 According to the Yogya chronicle, Daendels had informed the sultan that he would be going on from there to make a ‘tour of [central and east] Java’, news which brought the inhabitants of Yogya into uproar (oreg). 52 The same account describes how the sultan proceeded to make military preparations, exercising his own troops and calling up the levies or prajurit arahan from the eastern mancanagara bupati and the Crown Prince’s establishment. 53 This description is also confirmed in Dipanagara’s babad, where he adds the detail that many in Yogya regarded it as unheard of that a governor-general was to come any further than Salatiga: 54

50 Dj.Br. 23, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia), 10-10-1808.
51 Dj.Br. 23, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Semarang), 21-5-1808; Dj.Br. 41, Hamengkubuwana II (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Semarang), 26 Rabingulawal AJ 1735 (AD 23-5-1808). Daendels arrived in Semarang on 12 May 1808 and used it as his base until late September while he inspected fortifications and defensive positions along the north coast (pasisir) and in east Java (Surabaya, Oosthoek).
52 B.Ng. I:65, XVII.42.
53 B.Ng. I:65-6, XVIII.1-14. The babad gives the date of 6 Rabingulakir AJ 1735 (AD 2-6-1808), but it is clear from the Dutch reports (note 51) that the news reached Yogya in early May. On the calling up of the prajurit arahan from the eastern mancanagara, see Dj.Br. 23, Radén Rongga Prawiradirja III (Yogyakarta) to Danureja II (Yogyakarta), 29 Jumadilakir AJ 1735 (AD 22-8-1808), who states that he had given orders to his subjects in Madiun to get arms and horses ready before he departed for Semarang on 12 June 1808 so he would have sufficient escort for his journey as part of the Yogya delegation to meet Daendels. See further note 69.
54 BD (Manado), II:127, XIV (Sinom) 84-5. nulya Gurnadur ngejawai mapan Jéndral Dhandles iku namanira. 85. sampun prapta Surakarta/ yun lajeng mring Ngayogyëki/ kangjeng sultan datan arsa/ sabab dérèng wonten iki/ adat kang dhingin-dhingin/ Jéndral ngejawiyal nanging k Kendall nèng Semawis/ setun tebhèh mapan Kendall Salatiga.
Then the governor-general came to central Java
His name was General Daendels.

He arrived in Surakarta
[and] wished to proceed to Yogya.
But the sultan did not wish it
for there was nothing about it
in previous custom
that a governor-general should come to south-central Java.
Although some had come to central Java,
they had stopped in Semarang,
or at the very furthest, they had halted in Salatiga.

Dipanagara was, of course, conveniently forgetting here Baron G.W. van Imhoff’s May 1746 disastrous visit to Surakarta which had occasioned his great-grandfather Mangkubumi’s rebellion, although this would have been beyond the living memory of nearly all in Yogya in the late 1800s. Nevertheless, Dipanagara’s description fits nicely with the Yogyakarta court view of the dual division of Java in which the governor-general was expected to reside in Batavia and not involve himself in the internal affairs of central Java.

In fact, the prince’s account confuses events which took place over a rather longer period between 12 May and mid-August, the time when Daendels threatened to come to Yogya with his newly raised cavalry and mounted artillery given that the sultan had shown a lack of ‘steadfastness in his feelings’ towards the European government. Even the Yogya chronicle is somewhat garbled. The military preparations in Yogya may have been in part a response to Daendels’ arrival in central Java, but they were also presented by the Yogya patih, Danureja II, as practical evidence of the sultan’s intention to come to the aid of the Dutch government should Java be attacked by the British, the new Daendels’ administration having to rely heavily on locally raised auxiliaries to make up its military requirements. Moreover, at least some of the troops of the eastern mancanagara bupati were in Yogya anyway, the Garebeg Mulud (Festival of The Prophet’s Birthday) having just occurred on 8 May.

By mid-May, troop inspections were apparently taking place two to three times a week, according to Engelhard, and he could see Radèn Rongga’s eastern levies parading along the great avenue which ran past the Residency House, half armed with pikes and the rest with muskets. The ruler’s orders

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55 See note 26.
56 Dj.Br. 23, Hamengkubuwana II (Yogyakarta) to Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta), 22 Jumadi-lakir AJ 1735 (AD 15-8-1808). The Dutch translation of this letter refers to Hamengkubuwana II’s lack of vastigheid in zijn sentimenten.
57 Dj.Br. 23, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Semarang), 12-5-1808.
58 See notes 53 and 63.
59 Dj.Br. 23, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Semarang), 12-5-1808.
were for half the 10,000-strong military establishment of the sultanate to be ready to take part in a grand review at his country seat at Rajawinangun just to the east of Yogya on Wednesday, 1 June. Dipanagara’s father, the Crown Prince, was to oversee the general troop muster in the presence of Engelhard, the Yogya garrison commander, and the army chief-of-staff and head of the Semarang military division, Colonel F.C.P. von Winckelmann, who had come down to Yogya especially for the event. We know from a kraton source that the young Dipanagara – then still styled Radèn Antawirya – was part of this parade commanding a detachment of fifteen mounted troops in the Crown Prince’s 763-strong contingent. His father-in-law, the Yogya bupati of Panolan, Radèn Tumenggung Natawijaya III (in office 1803-1811), was also present with eighty mounted pikemen and musketeers.

Although those taking part were not to know it, this great review at Rajawinangun, would be one of the last set piece displays of Yogya military might before the dismemberment of the sultanate at the hands of the British in June 1812. The beginning of the ruin of the Land of Java would have as its curtain raiser a final mustering of at least half the gorgeously caparisoned Yogya mounted troops, an event which should have been captured in the sepia tint portraits of a court photographer like Kassian Cephas (1844-1912), or a great Woodbury and Page daguerreotype.

What we do have is a vivid report from Pieter Engelhard of the events of that June day. This started in the early morning for him at the Crown Prince’s residence in the north-eastern corner of the kraton where he was joined by nine young unmarried noblemen or panji – bachelor confidants of the ruler – who were dressed in yellow silk shirts and trousers over which they sported


61 Dj.Br. 23, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Semarang), 28-5-1808. Like many senior officers in Java at this time, Von Winckelmann (1757-1820) was a German, born in Saxony and a member of the Württemberg regiment, which had been sent out as a reinforcement by the VOC with Vice-Admiral Pieter Hartsinck’s squadron in 1805, De Haan 1935a:665-6. He was promoted as brigadier-general by Daendels in 1809.

62 Carey and Hoadley 2000:296-7. The Dutch translated list (full bibliographical citation see note 60) gives a figure of only 600 for the Crown Prince’s contingent. It should be noted that the spelling of ‘Antawirya’ and that of his official wife, the daughter of the Yogya bupati of Panolan, is always given as ‘Ontawirya’ in kraton documents, Chapter II note 68.

63 Dj.Br. 23, Dietrée, ‘Translaat notitie’, 2-6-1808 (34 of these troops were armed with cavalry carbines and the rest with pikes); Carey and Hoadley 2000:296, gives the smaller figure of 69.
green velvet cuff-less jackets trimmed with gold and black velvet caps. Astride beautiful greys, they rode out with him to the paséban, the official meeting place on the northern alun-alun, to see the troops file out of the kraton, and then to the southeast bastion where the sultan was sitting with his official consorts and court ladies on top of the battlements watching his army as it marched out to Rajawinangun. After receiving the ruler’s unusually friendly greeting, Engelhard and his exotic bodyguard rode out around the kraton to follow the troops to the sultan’s country seat where they took their places in the central pavilion (pagelaran).

After the princes had come forward one by one to pay the Resident their respects, a midday meal was served at which Engelhard was able to observe the Crown Prince at close quarters, commenting on the pleasing combination of the future Yogya ruler’s good character and distinguished and friendly appearance ‘which made him loved by great and small’. Profiting from this rare occasion when he was away from his father’s jealous gaze and in temporary charge of proceedings, the Crown Prince sought to prove his pro-Dutch sentiments by insisting that his tea should be served with milk like that of his Dutch guests and crying out at the top of his voice that the Yogya courtiers and officials should speak nothing else but Malay on that day ‘because that was the language which the sultan’s friends, the Dutch, used with their people!’ In this fashion, the politics of the Daendelian era began to be played out at the level of language and taste as pro and anti-Dutch sentiments became increasingly fixed in the factional alignments of the Yogya court.

Following the midday collation, the Crown Prince then ordered the regiments to assemble on the great open field before the country seat and to engage in two hours of military exercises and mock battles which allowed them to show off their skills with pikes and muskets to the watching Europeans. Yet again, according to Engelhard, the Javanese troops were shown to be seriously deficient in the use of their firelocks although their handling of their long Javanese lances was second to none. At 4 p.m. the muster party came to an end and the weary Resident rode back to Yogya bringing to a close what in retrospect would prove one of the last full-scale reviews of the Javanese ‘old order’.

While these events were taking place in Yogya, Daendels, now ensconced in Semarang with a 3,000-strong contingent of cavalry and mounted artillery

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64 Dj.Br. 23, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Semarang), 2-6-1808.
65 On the significance of this in Surakarta in the mid-nineteenth century as a way of ‘bowing to European taste’, see D’Almeida 1864, II:79. When he succeeded as sultan, the Crown Prince (Hamengkubuwana III, reigned 1812-1814) continued his custom of serving European style food by including wheat bread (rati gandum) and butter (matèga), foods normally only eaten by Europeans at this time, during entertainments in the kraton, Carey 1992:467 note 320.
66 Dj.Br. 23, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Semarang), 2-6-1808.
67 Djj.Br. 23, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Semarang), 2-6-1808.
(12 May), decided to impress the sultan’s court with his own display of military might. He wrote to the Yogya ruler requesting him to send some of his nobles to Semarang ‘to witness the measures he was taking for the defence of Java’ and ‘his sentiments towards the Javanese’.\(^\text{68}\) What the second sultan made of that last phrase is not recorded. What we do know from the Javanese accounts is that the Yogya visit to Semarang between 12-20 June\(^\text{69}\) was not a success. The delegation met with Daendels and were invited to witness his troop manoeuvres (15 June), but the head of the Yogya party, Radèn Rongga, is reported to have scarcely concealed his lack of interest in the military display (Poensen 1905:131). Daendels supposedly reciprocated by refusing to bid him farewell in person or send a message of greeting to the sultan.\(^\text{70}\)

This was all very different from the reception given to the Surakarta delegation which had spent a week in Semarang in early June, and had enjoyed a meeting with the governor-general which, according to Van Braam who accompanied the party, was marked ‘by the greatest friendship and respect’. A particular hit was the presence of the Sunan’s youngest son by his official consort, Ratu Kencana, a daughter of Panembahan Cakradiningrat IV of Pamekasan, whom Mrs Van Braam had educated in Surabaya. Her eleven-year-old boy, Gusti Timor (Radèn Malikan Salèh, later Pangéran Purbaya), who would later reign as Pakubuwana VII (1830-1858), was subsequently invested with a commission as lieutenant of cavalry by Daendels, a mark of esteem which deeply touched the Sunan and his consort.\(^\text{71}\) At the same time, the marshal elevated the Surakarta ruler’s father-in-law, Cakradiningrat IV, as Sultan Sepuh of Madura and wedana (titular head) of the bupati of Gresik, Sidhayu, and all the Oosthoek districts as far east as Banyuwangi. He announced that this was in recognition of the Panembahan’s services in providing Madurese troops for the Dutch garrisons in Batavia, Ambon and

\(^\text{68}\) Dj.Br. 41, Hamengkubuwana II (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Semarang), 26 Rablingulawal AJ 1735 (AD 23-5-1808).

\(^\text{69}\) Dj.Br. 23, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Semarang), 28-5-1808, 4-6-1808, mentions that the Yogya delegation, comprising Radèn Rongga, Pangéran Dipakusuma and the Yogya bupati of Rawa, Radèn Tumenggung Pringgakusuma, was due to depart on 12 June. Due to sickness, Pringgakusuma was replaced by the aged Pangéran Adinagara (died 1812), a nephew of Hamengkubuwana I, who was then serving as a nayaka (Bupati Keparak).

\(^\text{70}\) B.Ng. I67, XVIII.32-3.

\(^\text{71}\) Dj.Br. 23, J.A. van Braam (Surakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Semarang/Surabaya), 24-5-1808, 11-8-1808. On Gusti Timor (Pangéran Purbaya; Pakubuwana VII’s) ancestry, see Padmasusastra 1902:159, 163 no. 23; Rouffaer 1905:599; Chapter VIII. On Ratu Kencana’s education in Surabaya under the aegis of Mrs van Braam (née Ambrosina Wilhelmina van Rijk), see Royal Asiatic Society (London), Raffles collection vol. 3. ‘Miscellaneous memorandum on Surakarta’, circa 11-1811. Besides Van Braam and Gusti Timor, the Surakarta delegation consisted of Pakubuwana IV’s younger brother, Pangéran Mangkubumi, and his recently appointed army commander, the youthful Pangéran Cakrakusuma. They were in Semarang from 31 May to 6 June.
Plate 20. Pangéran Prangwedana (post-1821, Kangjeng Gusti Pangéran Aria Adipati Mangkunagara II) was in office as head of the Mangkunagaran royal house from 25 January 1796 until his death on 26 January 1835. The portrait, which was painted sometime between 1833 and 1835, shows him dressed in Dutch-style military uniform as colonel commandant of the Mangkunagaran ‘legion’. On his chest hang the medals of the Militaire Willems Orde (Third Class), awarded to him on 30 January 1832 in recognition for his services to the Dutch during the Java War, and the Orde van de Nederlandsche Leeuw (Order of the Netherlands Lion) bestowed on him by the Dutch king, William I (reigned 1813-1840), in 1833. Only his headdress (blangkon) is still recognizably Javanese. Photograph taken from Pringgodigdo 1950:20 facing.
the Groote Oost (eastern Indonesia), but the singling out of this Surakarta-linked Madurese ruler for such a high honour appears to have played badly in Yogya where the sultan was reported to have felt humiliated by the news.

Daendels' increasing reliance on locally raised auxiliaries to strengthen his garrisons in south-central Java is reflected in his official edict of 19 June 1808 (Van der Chijs 1895, XIV:836), which refers to the dispatch of 1,000 Bugis from Makassar and the purchase of 750 Balinese slaves through the good offices of the district commissioner of the Oosthoek, Frederik Jacob Rothenbühler. But a rather more reliable local force lay closer to hand. These were the troops of the Mangkunagaran.

In late May, Pangéran Prangwedana (Mangkunagara II) was informed that he was to come to Semarang to receive a new commission from the hands of the governor-general. This was a promotion to full colonel in the King of Holland’s armée and his formal investiture with the newly established Royal Order of Holland. Henceforth, Prangwedana’s 1,150 troops were to be constituted as a ‘legion’ in emulation of Daendels’ own Batavian legion, and tasked with reinforcing the garrisons in Klatèn and in Yogya. In this fashion, the forty-year-old Prangwedana’s position as a ‘Company Prince’ was given official recognition by the new administration. Apart from the single case of Radèn Rongga’s rebellion in the eastern mancanagara in November-December 1810, he would serve the European government loyally through its many vicissitudes and campaigns until his death in January 1835. Henceforth, his state dress was to be his European officer’s uniform, his hair cut short in

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72 Dj.Br. 41, Pakubuwana IV (Surakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Surabaya), 7 Jumadilawal AJ 1735 (AD 21-7-1808). Daendels had made the announcement after meeting Cakradiningrat IV during his visit to Surabaya in mid-July.

73 Dj.Br. 23, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Surabaya), 22-7-1808.

74 Dj.Br. 23, J.A. van Braam (Surakarta) to Daendels (Semarang), 22-5-1808, reported that Prangwedana had already been informed of Daendels’ plans for him on Van Braam’s return from Semarang on 21 May and had shown great pleasure, particularly in the provision of two three-pounders for his mounted artillery. Van Braam later regretted Prangwedana’s departure from Surakarta because his source of malicious ‘gossip’ about Yogyakarta dried up, Dj.Br. 23, J.A. van Braam (Surakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Semarang), 23-8-1808.

75 Van der Chijs 1895-97, XIV:775 (on the Koninklijke Orde van Holland), XV:66; Pringgodigdo 1950:19-20; Soebardi 1971:31 (on the establishment of the Prangwedanan – post-1821, Mangkunagaran – ‘legion’ by Daendels’ besluit of 29-7-1808); Van der Chijs 1895-97, XV:66; Rouffaer 1905:604-5 (on the troop strength of the legion: 800 infantry, 100 riflemen, 200 cavalry, 50 mounted artillery; and Daendels’ besluit of 1-8-1808 fixing Prangwedana’s personal allowance at 4,000 Spanish dollars in addition to 6,540 Spanish dollars pay as colonel); IOL Eur. F 148/18, ‘Memoirs of Java at the time of the capture collected by Captain [William] Robison’, J.A. van Braam (Surakarta) to J.W. Janssens (Batavia), 11-7-1811 (on Prangwedana’s investiture as colonel in the King of Holland’s armée); S.Br. 55, H.W. Daendels, ‘Instructie voor Lieutenant-Colonel Reinking en W.N. Servatius’, 22-6-1808; Dj.Br. 23, W.N. Servatius (Surakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Semarang), 28-6-1808 (on dispatch of Prangwedana’s troops from Surakarta to Klatèn and Yogya). For further details, see Aukes 1935:23-4; Carey 1992:418 note 93.
the European military fashion, and his social style that of a regimental commander on constant campaign.\footnote{Carey 1992:409 note 57; Van Hogendorp 1913:169: ‘This Mangkunagara dynasty is a strange phenomenon especially in such an effeminate court as Surakarta. They are all heroes, who do not know what it is to retreat. Their troops of all types, who are completely accoutred, armed and commanded in the European way, have been thoroughly instilled by the same spirit.’ See also Lettres de Java 1829:86, on a visit with Prangwedana (then Mangkunagara II) at his country estate at Karangpandhan on the slopes of Mount Lawu in August 1822, ‘one hardly slept, the prince in his colonel’s uniform remained standing all night, only sitting down in his armchair to snatch some rest from time to time’. On Prangwedana’s extremely equivocal behaviour during Radèn Rongga’s rebellion, see pp. 243, 253.}

If Daendels thought that the dispatch of Prangwedana’s troops to Yogya was a clever way of making the most of his scarce forces on the ground in south-central Java, however, he was sorely mistaken. Nothing could have been more calculated to arouse the indignation of the Yogya court where news of the legion’s imminent arrival caused utter consternation. The Javanese chronicles depict the sultan as feeling like a buffalo goaded into anger by the stinging branch of the kemadhuh tree, a metaphor which also has an allusion to the tiger-and-buffalo fights in the kraton where the buffalo is driven to attack its feline adversary through the application of the kemadhuh’s excruciating leaf.\footnote{B.Ng. I:69, XVIII.48; Poensen 1905:132; De Clercq 1909:267 (for a botanical description of the kemadhuh); Gericke and Roorda 1901, I:541; Berlin SB MS Or 568, Cakranagara, ‘Diary’, 9; Veth 1896-1907, III:635 (on its use in tiger-and-buffalo fights).} We will see shortly how these fights also had a deeper symbolic significance for the Javanese, with the tiger being equated with the Dutch and the buffalo with their own more resilient fighting capacity. At the same time, the Yogya ruler’s suspicion of the designs of the European government was particularly focussed on the newly built fort at Klathèn ‘that place of rendez-vous centrally situated to overawe the two courts in consequence of the suspicion entertained of them’ in John Crawfurd’s words.\footnote{IOL Eur F 148/24, John Crawfurd (Yogyakarta) to T.S. Raffles (Batavia), 14-5-1812. Permission to build a fort at Klathèn on land owned by the courts had been negotiated by Nicolaus Engelhard while governor of Java’s Northeast Coast in 1802. According to Engelhard, the construction by Engineer Captain H.C. Cornelius under the direction of Lieutenant-Colonel Karel von Wollzogen was completed by April 1806, vAE (aanwinsten 1900), Engelhard, ‘Memorie’, 14-5-1808; Dj.Br. 39, Captain H.C. Cornelius (Klathèn) to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 8-4-1806. Mack.Pr. 2, Surakarta Sengkala List, 185, gives the completion date of the fort as AJ 1731 (AD 1804-1805). Considerable repair work was needed following the 28 February 1808 earthquake (Chapter I note 15), and this had still not been completed by late 1810, the Yogya court having been especially dilatory in providing assistance, Dj.Br. 39, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to Danureja II (Yogyakarta), 14-9-1810. The fact that the government planned to use troops from the Mangkunagaran to garrison it made the strongpoint even more threatening from Yogya’s perspective.

By mid-August, Engelhard was reporting that the sultan had given instructions that all his troops should remain in the capital in order to fend
off the danger posed by Prangwedana. The Yogya babad even refers to some of these forces being deployed to forward defence positions in the ruler’s pesanggrahan of Wanacatur, Ngawatreja (Pengawatreja) and Rajawinangun, which, with their underground passages and – in the case of Ngawatreja – hilltop location, also had potential as military strong-points. According to Engelhard, the Yogya ruler was convinced that the Surakarta prince had ‘evil intentions towards Yogya’, and he was not assuaged by Daendels’ guarantee that as colonel commandant of his legion, Prangwedana would only deploy under strict government orders. Even when the prince’s forces were reassigned to guard the south coast port of Cilacap after participating in the operations to quell Bagus Rangin’s revolt in Cirebon (1808-1812), the Yogya ruler was still not completely appeased: Engelhard had to use all his diplomatic skills to get him to rescind orders to send out a Yogya expeditionary force to Bagelèn and Kedhu to keep an eye on the passage of the legion from Cirebon to the south coast. Perhaps the sultan was right to be concerned. News may have reached him of the behaviour of the Surakarta patih, Radèn Adipati Danuningrat (in office 1804-1810), who had accompanied Daendels down the Sala River in one of the Sunan’s barges during his journey to Surabaya in early July. According to the Yogya babad, this garrulous official had exceeded his sovereign’s instructions and inadvertently told Daendels that in the event of war with Yogyakarta, his monarch hoped to unite all of south-central Java once more under his rule. We will see in the next chapter that such hopes were not far from Sunan Pakubuwana IV’s mind at this time but to articulate

79 Dj.Br. 23, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Surakarta), 14-8-1808, referring to Daendels’ letter of 12-8-1808 to Hamengkubuwana II written from Surakarta.
80 B.Ng. I:70, XIX.12; Dj.Br. 24, Woortman, ‘Dagverhaal’, 17-8-1809, for a description of the underground passages cut into the hills in some of these pesanggrahan inspected by Daendels on his visit to the Yogya court on 31 July 1809. See also Appendix VI.
81 Dj.Br. 23, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Surakarta), 14-8-1808.
82 On these disturbances in Cirebon, see Thorn 1815:124-5, 190; Veth 1896-1907, II:259-62; Van den Broek 1891:368-83; Lawick van Pabst 1902:412; Carey 1992:418 note 93. 500 of Prangwedana’s troops had been shipped to Cirebon from Tegal in late July 1808 to take part in operations against Rangin, who was only captured in early 1812, Dj Br. 23, W.N. Servatius (Surakarta) to J.A. van Braam (Semarang), 25-7-1808. On the 1,000 silver ducatoon reward placed by the government on Rangin’s capture, see Dj.Br. 23, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to Hamengkubuwana II (Yogyakarta), 5 Puwasa AJ 1735 (AD 6-10-1808).
83 Dj.Br. 23, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Surabaya), 11-8-1808; Hamengkubuwana II (Yogyakarta) to Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta), 23 Jumadilakir AJ 1735 (AD 15-8-1808).
84 Dj.Br. 23, J.A. van Braam (Surakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Surabaya), 11-8-1808, reference to Pakubuwana IV asking whether Daendels still needed his royal barge or prau pengluput for another journey because if not he wanted to bring it back to Surakarta from Gresik laden with merchandise, see further note 122. Mack.Pr. 2, Surakarta Sengkala List, 185, mentions Daendels’ journey down the Sala River to Surabaya via Gresik after his visit to Surakarta in early July.
85 B.Ng. I:70-1, XIX.16-20.
them in this fashion, if this is indeed what the Surakarta patih did, betrayed a stunning political naivety.

Throughout the dry season of 1808, the Residency letters are full of the toing and froing of Daendels’ quartermasters and officials as orders were placed for cavalry horses, saddles, uniform cloth, whips, boots, rice, dried deer flesh or dhèndhèng and other military necessities.\(^{86}\) Even, the corrupt Surakarta sub-district administrator of Karang Bolong\(^{87}\) was brought into the act when the Surakarta translator, J.W. Winter, recommended that a skilled weaver from his south coast district might be sent to Semarang to help produce the dark blue linen cloth needed for uniforms.\(^{88}\) Pressure was also put on the courts to allow the felling of timber in the eastern mancanagara. Just for six months said Daendels. The courts knew that it would be for much longer: the construction of fortifications in east Java and the supply of large diameter hardwood pillars and stakes needed for the building of the marshal’s coastal strongpoint at Fort Lodewijck (Surabaya) guarding access to the harbour of Surabaya and the Straits of Madura were long-term projects.\(^{89}\) These demands particularly affected the Yogya bupati wedana, Radèn Rongga, who was now placed at the forefront of the sultanate’s increasingly fraught relationship with the European government. But the Surakarta court was also feeling the pinch: Daendels’ request for 500 labourers from the Surakarta district of Banyumas to participate in the construction of the Batavische Bovenlanden section of his island-length post-road caused Sunan Pakubuwana IV much displeasure.\(^{90}\)

\(^{86}\) Dj.Br. 23, W.N. Servatius (Surakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Bedharan), 5-7-1808 (on arrival of Ridder Colonel Gordon to get examples of cloth patterns from Surakarta); Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to Hendrik Veeckens (Semarang), 11-7-1808 (on Lieutenant Detelle of Klathèn garrison’s search for 98 horse pack kits for cavalry); Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Surabaya), 19-7-1808 (departure of Second Resident Groenhoff von Woortmann to Semarang to deliver 60 black leather cavalry saddles, boots and whips); 29-7-1808 (receipt of 25 corsjes – twenty lengths (De Haan 1910-12, IV:503) – of Javanese cloth sent from Semarang to Yogya for turning into military uniforms); Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Surabaya), 18-8-1808 (dispatch of 380 Javanese kledje to Semarang for uniforms); Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Semarang), 21-8-1808 (visit of Colonel A.J.A. Gerlach, Semarang cavalry regiment commander, to Yogya for provisioning); J.A. van Braam (Surakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Semarang), 31-8-1808 (purchase of rice and dhèndhèng in Surakarta for army); Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Semarang), 16-9-1808 (340 lengths of linen from Yogya to Semarang for uniforms).

\(^{87}\) See Chapter I.

\(^{88}\) Dj.Br. 23, J.W. Winter (Surakarta) to W.N. Servatius (Surakarta), 2-7-1808; W.N. Servatius (Surakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Bedharan), 5-7-1808. Winter reported that the mantri désa could not send a skilled weaver because no-one in Karang Bolong was able to make the required cloth, but that there were enough weavers in the Tanggung district near Kedhung Kebo in Bagelèn to undertake the order (on Tanggung’s location, see Map 1 on p. 26).

\(^{89}\) Dj.Br. 23, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to Hamengkubuwana II (Yogyakarta), 24 Jamadi-lawal Aj 1735 (AD 23-7-1808); Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to Hendrik Veeckens (Semarang), 27-7-1808; Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Semarang), 21-8-1808.

But if the courts were planning resistance, Daendels’ military methods might have given them pause: when two of the Cirebon rebels, Kyai Kulur and Durrahman, were apprehended in early October, their end was swift. The first was cut to pieces by Dutch hussars in his hiding place, the second burnt alive.91 Meanwhile, hundreds of troops, many of them locally raised Indonesian auxiliaries, poured into the south-central Javanese garrisons: two companies of grenadiers and three infantry regiments, partly made up of Ambonese, arrived in Klatèn and Yogya, where many promptly fell sick because of the dampness of the fort.92 Even more were sent to Surakarta where the Sunan was forced to build special bamboo barracks to house the 700 riflemen and 150-strong mounted artillery unit dispatched from Ungaran.93

Inevitably, with so many troops billeted in the heart of the old court towns, problems occurred. During the over-exuberant celebrations in Surakarta to mark the 25 August accession of Louis Bonaparte to the Dutch throne, four riflemen attempted to procure a dancing girl/prostitute (ronggèng) for the night in the Javanese quarter behind the fort. But their quest ended in disappointment when the girl’s husband slammed the door in their faces after receiving the money for her hire. Returning with thirty of their comrades, all unarmed, the riflemen were fallen upon by the local inhabitants and four of them badly wounded. When the Surakarta patih’s investigations identified two of the culprits, both members of the Sunan’s bodyguard, Van Braam reported that a public military punishment and execution would take place at the meeting place before the court: the two were to walk a gauntlet of 400 soldiers all armed with canes and were then to be krissed to death. Fearing that this might be too mild for Daendels’ taste, Van Braam anxiously asked whether the marshal demanded a more severe punishment.94 Daendels’ reply is not extant, but since the punishment was carried out he does not seem to have ordered any additional torture on this occasion.

The emergence of an anti-Dutch party in Yogya

The Yogya elite, steeped as they were in the martial culture of Mangkubumi’s court, probably needed no reminding that Daendels’ terrifying new order posed a challenge to their very existence. While the Crown Prince’s response

91 Dj.Br. 23, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to Hamengkubuwana II (Yogyakarta), 5 Puwasa AJ 1735 (AD 6-10-1808).
92 Van der Chijs 1895-97, XIV:836, besluit of 19-6-1808; Dj.Br. 23, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Surabaya/Surakarta), 9-8-1808, 14-8-1808.
93 Dj.Br. 41, Pakubuwana IV (Surakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Bedharan), 11 Jumadilawal AJ 1735 (AD 5-7-1808).
94 Dj.Br. 23, J.A. van Braam (Surakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Semarang), 26-8-1808, 29-8-1808.
– as evidenced at the Rajawinangun military review – had been to stress his pro-Dutch sentiments, others were deciding on a very different course of action. The second sultan was central here. In early August, at the height of the crisis over the arrival of Prangwedana’s troops, he had quietly re-appointed a tough military man, Radèn Tumenggung Sumadiningrat, to the post of First Inner bupati or patih jero. This was a key position because the patih jero in effect controlled access to the sultan. Indeed, in both the Javanese chronicles and Dutch final administrative reports, he is sometimes referred to as ‘the gatekeeper’ regent (bupati kori).95 Pieter Engelhard for one had no illusions about what Sumadiningrat’s re-appearance in the Yogya administrative firmament meant, referring to him as ‘the notorious general’.96 But he was not prepared to endorse Daendels’ demands that he should be banished from the court.97

A man of high noble birth descended on his mother’s side from the first sultan and on his father’s from an old line of Mataram bupati (Carey 1980:191, 1992:419 note 94), Sumadiningrat had married one of the second sultan’s daughters by his Madurese official wife, Ratu Kedhaton (Mandoyokusumo 1977:18 no. 8). This made him a full brother-in-law of two other key court officials who, like himself, would lose their lives as the crisis with the European government unfolded over the next four years: the Yogya patih, Danureja II, and the bupati wedana of the eastern mancanagara, Radèn Rongga (Mandoyokusumo 1977:19 no. 14, 20 no. 22). He was also the guardian of Dipanagara’s younger brother, Pangéran Adinagara (Chapter II note 25), so it is very likely that he was well known to the prince. Although he had been briefly demoted from his post as patih jero in March 1807 on account of his addiction to strong drink, gambling bouts with common Javanese and partiality to cockfighting,98 he remained in the words of Van IJsseldijk, until his death during the British attack on the Yogya kraton on 20 June 1812, ‘the strongest pillar of the sultan’s administration’.99 His very appearance betrayed his aggressive and martial spirit. The Chronicle of the Fall of Yogyakarta refers to his moustachioed face (Carey 1992:91, 242), while the Yogya court babad states that:

I. 16  His actions were like those of a singa-barong (a monstrous mythical lion) terrifying to behold.100

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95  AN Algemene Secretarie archive, J.R. Couperus, ‘Memorie van Overgave’, Yogyakarta, 3-3-1908; Rouffaer 1905:615; Carey 1992:492 note 439.
96  Dj.Br. 23, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Surabaya), 3-8-1808, 11-8-1808, referring to Sumadiningrat as Hamengkubuwana II’s beruchte veldoerste.
97  Dj.Br. 23, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Surakarta), 14-8-1808.
98  Dj;Br. 49, Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 13-3-1807 (on Sumadiningrat’s temporary replacement as patih jero by Natadiningrat); dK 145, Waterloo, ‘Memo- rie van Overgave’, 4-4-1808; and on Sumadiningrat’s love of cockfighting, Carey 1980:145-6.
100  B.Ng. I:4, I (Dhandhanggula) 16. lir singa-barong solahé ngajrihi yen dinulu.
Sumadiningrat made no secret of his anti-European sentiments and his zeal in the upkeep of the sultan’s troops had caused the former Residents at the Yogya court real concern. Van den Berg, for example, had characterised him as a ‘very turbulent and bold man’ governed by his ‘dim intelligence’. He apparently could neither read nor write and needed the help of other officials in the conduct of his business, yet he adopted a hostile attitude towards the young *patih*, Danureja II, and rarely took part in discussions with the other Yogya court *bupati* or *nayaka*. Instead, he used his position to dominate affairs of state and remained the main channel through which all matters had to pass before they could be discussed with the sultan. But he often delayed for long periods before acting on vital issues which greatly complicated Dutch dealings with the court.

The return of this pugnacious xenophobe to the sultan’s inner council was almost immediately reflected in a tougher attitude over such matters as the new ceremonial. On 3 August 1808, Engelhard was reporting that the sultan had had a meeting with the *nayaka* at which Sumadiningrat had counselled rejection, warning that the new ceremonial would bring humiliation to the Yogya ruler. ‘This affair is still not settled’, Engelhard observed, ‘and very much uneasiness reigns [at court].’ In fact, the council was split right down the middle with Danureja II and three of the *nayaka* urging acceptance, and two key officials remaining silent. One of these was Radèn Rongga. ‘That sly fox’ in Engelhard’s words, ‘came out of the meeting with a tearful face and dejected look indicating that he was prepared to counsel acceptance even though he was hugely embarrassed about it.’ For much of the next two and a half years until his death in rebellion in December 1810, Rongga would be at the heart of Yogya’s confrontation with Daendels. So how did it happen that this youthful official – he was still only thirty-one at the time of his death – came to play such a key role in the politics of the sultan’s court and through the example of his all too brief life become such an inspiration for Dipanagara?

The youngest and most charismatic of the sultan’s three sons-in-law who had married daughters of his Madurese consort, Ratu Kedhaton, Rongga saw himself as the scion of martial ancestors whom he revered as ‘warrior kings’ (ratu pinarjurit). Contemporaries also seem to have regarded him as

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101 KITLV H 97, Van den Berg, ‘Memorie’, 11-8-1803, referring to Sumadiningrat’s *doff begrijp*.
103 Dj.Br. 23, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Surabaya), 3-8-1808. The other key official was Natakusuma’s son, Radèn Tumenggung Natadiningrat (Pakualam II, reigned 1829-1858), who had been appointed a *nayaka* in 1805 and whom Waterloo described as ‘an exceptionally smart and intelligent young man’, dK 145 Waterloo, ‘Memorie van Overgave’, 4-4-1808.
104 Dj.Br. 46, Radèn Rongga Prawiradirja III (Maospati) to Radèn Tumenggung Natadiningrat (Yogyakarta), 20 Sawal AJ 1737 (AD 17-11-1810), where he refers to his desire to have the blessing of his royal ancestors who were ‘warrior kings’ (leluhur-Dalem ingkang sami ambeg ratu pinarjurit).
a courageous fighter: thus the Pakualam babad refers to him as ‘bellicose’, and Dipanagara later wrote that he was the only ‘champion’ (banthèng) of the Yogya state and a person who had the calling to die as ‘a commander in battle’. Through his mother, Rongga was descended from the first sultan whom he greatly admired (Mandoyokusumo 1977:12 no. 9; Appendix III, Vb). His grandfather, Kyai Rongga Wirasentika was, as we have seen, Sultan Mangkubumi’s most trusted army commander and served as his bupati wedana of Madiun (circa 1760-1784; Ricklefs 1974a:86-7) where he founded a dynasty of eastern mancanagara administrators. As the son of Kyai Ageng Derpayuda, an influential kyai in the Sokawati area, Wirasentika was a full brother of Ratu Ageng, Dipanagara’s guardian at Tegalreja. This formidable spiritual and royal ancestry, combined with Rongga’s sudden elevation as bupati wedana in 1796 at the age of seventeen due to his father’s blindness, seem to have temporarily turned his head. Writing in 1802, after the murder of a Surakarta inhabitant at the hands of Rongga at Delanggu, the Yogya Resident, J.G. van den Berg, remarked that the young bupati wedana was a ‘lawless, proud and turbulent young man’ who had a very high opinion of himself. Violent incidents continued to occur and three years later, the

Poensen 1905:162, 179, refers to Rongga as agul-agul. See also De Graaf 1958:148, where one of Sultan Agung’s (reigned 1613-1646) commanders during the siege of Batavia in 1628 is named ‘Sura Agul-Agul’.

BD (Manado), II:134, XV (Asmaradana) 8. saicalé Radèn Ronggu nenggih nagri Ngayogya weus tan ana banthèngipun. After the disappearance of Radèn Rongga / in truth the state of Yogya/ no longer had a champion. The word banthèng literally means ‘buffalo’ but can be translated figuratively as ‘champion’, Gericke and Roorda 1901, II:660. In fact, the ‘buffalo’ reference is apt given that the traditional arms of the town of Madiun and its principal bupati family is a black bull with a large hump couchant on top of a square pillar at a cross-roads, D’Almeida 1864, II:26; Naber 1938:73-4.

Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 16, where Dipanagara refers to Rongga’s son, Senthot Ali Basah, as a young man who had ‘the calling to die as a commander in battle, just as his father […] during the period of Marshal Daendels’. This calling is also reflected in the title taken by Rongga during his rebellion, Susuhunan Prabu Ingalaga (‘The king, ruler in war’), see p. 248.

Chapter I.

Chapter II; Chapter II note 26; Appendix III.

KITLV H 97 pt. 7, Van IJsseldijk, ‘Korte schets’, 31-8-1798; Rongga’s age was mentioned as 23 in 1802, Dj.Br. 48, J.G. van den Berg (Yogyakarta) to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 17-6-1802. He had earlier been a page (panakawan) of Hamengkubuwana II.

Rongga’s young daughter – possibly the same person who later married Dipanagara in September 1814 (Chapter VIII) – had wanted a baby goat she saw as the bupati wedana’s entourage passed through Delanggu on the Surakarta-Yogyakarta road on its way to the sultan’s capital for the Garebeg Mulud of 13 July 1802. Rongga had set his dogs to warn off the ewe and then taken it for her. When the deputy village head (wakil demang) attempted to remonstrate, he was attacked and one of his colleagues, Kyai Kartasari, killed with seven pike wounds to his body. Rongga then plundered some of the local houses, Dj.Br. 48, Radèn Adipati Mangkupraja (Surakarta) to Danureja II (Yogyakarta), 27 Sura AJ 1720 (AD 30-5-1802).

Dj.Br. 48, J.G. van den Berg (Yogyakarta) to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 17-6-1802, where he refers to Rongga as een kwajongen.
sultan had to fine his son-in-law heavily for wounding a royal official, the second time he had been involved in such an attack on a colleague. On this occasion, the sultan ordered all the subordinate mancanagara bupati to report any further actions on Rongga’s part which transgressed Javanese administrative tact (yudanegari) (Carey 1980:33-5).

But these impulsive acts of youth were gradually tempered by a more responsible attitude on Rongga’s part. Subsequent Residents’ reports indicate that despite his often arrogant and humiliating attitude towards his subordinates, Rongga was an intelligent man who ran a good administration in Madiun and never used extortion on his subjects. A later source related that during the eight years (1802-1810) Rongga had his seat at Maospati just across the river from Madiun, the surrounding area increased greatly in population. One Dutch official even thought him ‘well-disposed towards Europeans’ though Daendels’ treatment of him would soon change that. Rongga’s charisma as bupati wedana was enhanced by his strikingly handsome features and his fiery temperament, both characteristics later inherited by Ali Basah Senthot Prawiradirja, Rongga’s son by a secondary wife who became one of Dipanagara’s foremost Java War commanders.

Like many of his Yogya contemporaries, Rongga was a minor litterateur. A later Javanese source mentions him as the author of one of the tales in the Damar Wulan cycle which were especially popular in east Java. He also maintained close contacts with many of the religious teachers in the Madiun and Panaraga areas and had numerous haji and other ‘men of religion’ in his entourage at Maospati. He apparently built a mosque at his residence at Maospati (Kutha Pethik), which was well stocked with religious works, and also endowed a pradikan village at Giripurna to look after his wife’s grave following her early death on 16 November 1809 (D’Almeida 1864, II:4; Adam

113 dK 145, Waterloo, ‘Memorie van Overgave’, 4-4-1808; Dj.Br. 46, J.W. Moorrees (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia), 28-4-1810, who wrote that Rongga has ‘a very lively mind’ (zieer vlaug en vatbaar van begrijp is) and ‘here in Yogya, he is considered a very good bupati’.
114 UBL BPL 616, Port. 22 no. 4, H.G. Nahuys van Burgst, ‘De Montjonegorosche-Djocjokartasche landen’, no date (? 1826).
115 Dj.Br. 46, J.W. Moorrees (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia), 28-4-1810.
116 Rongga’s good looks are mentioned in dK 119, ‘Notes of spies: Ngalêhi Nataraja on Radèn Mas Tumenggung Rongga (Senthot)’, 15-5-1828.
117 Chapter II note 35.
119 Dj.Br. 46, Radèn Mas Aria Wiryadiningrat, Radèn Tumenggung Prawiradirja and Radèn Tumenggung Bratanegara (Surakarta eastern mancanagara bupati) to Radèn Adipati Cakranagara (Surakarta), 20-5-1810, reported that messengers sent by Radèn Rongga to investigate a raid in neighbouring Surakarta territory in Panaraga include 40 ‘priests’ headed by two haji, one of whom was Kyai Hasan Besari of Tegalsari, see Chapter VI note 70.
120 S.Br. 37, Report of a Surakarta spy, 9-12-1810, referring to Rongga’s kitab.
Plate 21. Ali Basah Abdul Mustapa Prawiradirja (Senthot) (1805-1855), son of Radĕn Rongga Prawiradirja III, *bupati wedana* of Madiun (in office 1796-1810) by an unofficial wife (*garwa ampёyan*). Senthot became one of Dipanagara’s most effective cavalry commanders during the Java War, but gave himself up to the Dutch in October 1829 because of the increasingly desperate military situation. Uncoloured lithograph by Jean Augustin Daiwaille (1786-1850) and Pieter Veldhuizen (1806-1841) based on a sketch drawn by the Dutch army officer, Major (later Major-General) F.V.H.A. Ridder de Stuers (1792-1881) in Yogyakarta, in April 1830, after Senthot had been given the rank of lieutenant-colonel (*overste*) and placed in charge of his own column of troops (*barisan*). Taken from De Stuers 1831, photograph by courtesy of the KITLV, Leiden.
1940:333). According to the Babad Pacitan, Rongga’s own religious teacher was a kyai from the Pacitan area known as Kyai Kaliyah who had a considerable influence over him (Adam 1940:333-4).

In terms of court politics, Rongga was not aligned with either of the main kraton factions which were emerging in this period around the person of the second sultan and the Crown Prince, and which would later become known as the kasepuhan and the karajan.121 His position as bupati wedana was partly responsible for this because he had his own interests in Madiun and was heavily involved in a number of private quarrels with Surakarta whose territories closely abutted his in the eastern mancanagara and whose customs’ free barges or prau pengluput had to pass through his lands on their way down the Sala River to Gresik.122


121 These epithets refer to the party of the ‘old’ sultan (Sultan Sepuh, the moniker of Hamengkubuwana II), and the party of the Crown Prince, which took its name from his title ‘Raja Putra Naréndra Pangéran Adipati Anom Amangkunagara’ and was also sometimes known as the kanoman. The kasepuhan faction, in particular, backed the claims of Pangéran Mangkudiningrat to the Yogya throne over and above those of the Crown Prince.

122 These river craft, of which the Sunan had ten, could weigh up to 200 tons fully laden and had such a deep draft that they could only make the journey to Gresik once a year: they usually left Surakarta in December or January when the river was in flood and returned before the onset of the dry season in May. The downstream passage, when they carried pepper, rice and other bulk goods such as wood, only took eight days, but the return journey when the boats were laden with salt, coal and paddy chaff, necessitated at least four months because the heavy lighters had to be laboriously warped upstream by teams of men or buffalo, Raffles 1817, I:18; Louw and De Klerk 1894-1909, I:560; Dj.Br. 49, Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 19-4-1805; Dj.Br. 22, G.W. Wiese (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia), 9-12-1808. Hamengkubuwana II did not use his prau directly but rented them out to Radên Rongga who in turn leased them to Chinese merchants.
Sunan Pakubuwana IV in particular was an implacable enemy and later helped to turn Daendels against him. Although he remained a favourite of the second sultan right up to the time of his rebellion in November-December 1810, the Yogya ruler undoubtedly harboured fears about his son-in-law’s ambitious character. Prophecies that Rongga would one day rule as a king in his residence at Maospati (Poensen 1905:110; Adam 1940:333), coupled with tangible evidence of his royal style in the eastern provinces, prompted speculation that he might indeed set himself up as a rival to his Yogya sovereign. The only people at court he remained close to were Pangéran Natakusuma (post-1812, Pakualam I), who was a full brother of Rongga’s mother (Mandoyokusumo 1977:12 no. 9, 13 no. 11), and his son, Radèn Tumenggung Natadiningrat (Pakualam II), who was six years his junior. Rongga and Natakusuma shared common aims in so far as their private aspirations lay outside the emerging court factions. Indeed, at the time of Rongga’s revolt, the Dutch even suspected the two men of coming to a secret understanding about the future of Yogya with Natakusuma preparing to take control of the core regions as sultan and Rongga exercising authority over the mancanagara as an independent local ruler in the event of the uprising’s success. But this assumption was never proven. The other Yogya princes kept aloof from the bupati wedana, and only called on him out of necessity. Like the Yogya patih, Danureja II, Rongga had many debts and spent lavishly. Furthermore, Rongga and Danureja II found themselves in much the same position with regard to the Dutch. The issue of Batavia’s access to the teak concessions in the eastern mancanagara and Daendels’ pugnacious reaction to border raids on the pasisir and government lands in East Java left them both politically exposed. The bupati wedana’s response to what was for him an intolerable situation was a characteristic one and, as we will see in the next chapter, he died fighting, the first victim of the years of crisis between 1808 and 1812.

**The Javanese buffalo confronts the Dutch tiger**

During the early part of August 1808, as evidence of the second sultan’s reluctance to accept the new ceremonial began to mount, Daendels threatened to come to Yogya with an armed force to impose his will. Accusing the Yogya ruler of a ‘lack of steadfastness’, he suggested that everything would be sorted out if he could come to talk with the sultan in person. But with 3,000 troops at

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124 dK 145, Waterloo, ‘Memorie van Overgave’, 4-4-1808.
his back Daendels’ tête-à-tête would hardly have been a meeting of minds.\textsuperscript{125} The diplomatic Pieter Engelhard seems to have persuaded the marshal that such a visit was unnecessary at this time, so Daendels continued his journey to Semarang from Surakarta rather than proceed on to the sultan’s capital.

Meanwhile, the governor-general’s newly appointed president of the Forest Administration Board, Gustaf Wilhelm Wiese (1711-1811), wrote from Rembang (note 58) to request that the Yogya mancanagara bupati of Padhangan and Panolan, whose lands the Dutch authorities needed access to for the felling of timber, to present themselves in Yogya along with Radèn Rongga – whose Madiun district was also timber rich – to hear Daendels’ instructions regarding the provision of hardwood supplies to the pasisir. It is significant that one of these two bupati, Mas Tumenggung Sumanegara of Padhangan, would later go into rebellion with Rongga and die fighting alongside him. The other, Radèn Tumenggung Natawijaya of Panolan, was Dipanagara’s father-in-law. It is likely that through him the young prince would have been apprised of the political pressures now being applied on the sultanate to open up its timber reserves to unrestricted logging by the European government particularly in a district as heavily afforested as Panolan.\textsuperscript{126} Wiese himself, a former VOC official, was a younger brother of the former governor-general, Albertus Henricus Wiese (in office 1805-1808), would later come to Yogya as Resident to replace Engelhard in early December bringing with him his special knowledge of the government’s timber requirements in the eastern mancanagara.

Besides securing access to hardwood, Daendels was also anxious to restrict raids by the inhabitants of the eastern mancanagara on neighbouring government territories. As we have seen,\textsuperscript{127} on 25 May 1808, a particularly spectacular raid involving 250 ‘bandits’ (wong durjana) had taken place across the border into Surabaya from Yogya-administered district of Kertasana against the Chinese-run customs’ post of Bunder on the Brantas River, home to many Chinese who were involved with the tax office there and with local trade particularly in cloth. Several Chinese houses had been burnt and much property looted.\textsuperscript{128} Investigations conducted by a commission comprising

\textsuperscript{125} Dj.Br. 23, Hamengkubuwana II (Yogyakarta) to Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta), 22 Jumadi-lakir AJ 1735 (AD 15-8-1808); Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Semarang), 18-8-1808.

\textsuperscript{126} Mack.Pr. 21 (9), Pemberton ‘Djiepan’, 324 (on Panolan’s importance as a regional mart for timber and its extensive teak forests); Dj.Br. 23, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Semarang), 21-8-1808; Radèn Tumenggung Natawijaya (Yogyakarta) to Danureja II (Yogyakarta), 23-8-1808; Mas Tumenggung Sumanegara (Yogyakarta) to Danureja II (Yogyakarta), 23-8-1808; both the latter wrote that they had not given orders to their followers to assemble with arms and horses, namely as prajurit arahan, but had only brought their usual ‘workforce’ to Yogya on this occasion.

\textsuperscript{127} Chapter I notes 35 and 150.

\textsuperscript{128} Dj.Br. 38, Relaas of spy Ranawijaya (Bunder), 31-5-1808, mentions amongst the items stolen five bales of cloth (kapas), five pieces of Surat cloth and five lengths of white mori for making batik.
junior officials (mantri) from the Yogya and Surakarta kepatihan (chief minister’s departments) together with a European sergeant, had met with a complete lack of cooperation from the local Javanese population. Despite a joint letter from the patih being read out to the approximately 500 inhabitants of Bunder appealing for information about the raid, no-one had come forward and the local Chinese had complained bitterly that their Javanese neighbours had offered them no assistance during their difficulties.129

The problems of establishing effective cooperation between the courts over such criminal investigations and the seeming ease with which the perpetrators of bandit raids could seek asylum in the jurisdictions of neighbouring kraton had convinced Daendels that a new law-and-order agreement, known in Javanese as the Angger Gunung law code, was necessary even though the last had been ratified between the courts as recently as 27 September 1804.130 This was eventually signed on 26 September 1808 by the patih in Klahèn, the midway point between the two courts always used for such joint agreements, in the presence of the two Residents, Engelhard and Van Braam.131 As befitted a document which had Daendels’ imprimatur, a number of fierce sanctions were provided for should local officials or the inhabitants of a village fail to find the culprits of a raid. Henceforth, if a tollgate was robbed or burnt, the local inhabitants would be answerable for the damage. In the event that the villagers could not find the robbers or their goods, the local village tax-collector would be staked out in the sun on the village meeting place for a week between 7 and 11 o’clock every morning. If the selfsame bekel allowed robbers to escape into a house, he was allowed 40 days to apprehend them during which time his wife and family would be taken from him as hostage until he had made the necessary arrests. In the event that local officials, including bupati, were shown to have conspired with robbers they were to be punished with death and their wives and children taken as booty to the kraton.132 Perhaps the very severity of the punishments reflected the impossibility of getting any meaningful law-and-order measures to work until the hopeless administrative confusion of the south-central Javanese courts had been thoroughly reformed. And this was not to happen until after the Java War when a comprehensive land settlement separated the territories of the courts for good.133

129 Dj.Br. 23, Sergeant Pieter Gulin (Bunder) to Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta), 19-7-1808; Radèn Adipati Danuningrat (Surakarta) to Danureja II (Yogyakarta), 7 Jumadilakir AJ 1735 (AD 31-7-1808); Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Surabaya), 9-8-1808.
131 Chapter I note 156.
133 Chapter I.
Just over a month after this agreement, another joint understanding between the courts was signed at Klathèn regulating the working of the porters’ guilds. The provision of labourers from Surakarta to work on Daendels’ postweg had already caused problems with the Sunan’s court, and there was pressure to get a binding agreement between the south-central Javanese kraton on the labour issue as quickly as possible.

The European government needed access to the necessary manpower to complete its ambitious building and defence projects ahead of the seemingly inevitable British invasion. But even with these two agreements signed, Daendels had not quite finished with the patih. Throughout the early dry season months when the marshal had been based in Semarang, there had been talk of sending the usual delegation from the courts led by the respective Surakarta and Yogyakarta patih to greet the incoming governor-general so that they could present their usual ‘homage’ and gifts to him on behalf of their sovereigns. Due to Daendels’ extensive travels in July and August, it was only in early October that this could be completed. But by then he had departed for Batavia, leaving his secretary-general, Hendrik Veeckens, to receive their ‘homage’ in his stead. He also instructed him to read out a statement on his behalf to the patih regarding the recent political changes in Europe.

According to Hageman (1855-56:254), this contained such difficult concepts, particularly with regard to the abolition of feudalism, that the official Javanese translator in Semarang, C.F. Krijgsman (De Haan 1935a:592-3), had great problems rendering the text into Javanese. Indeed, even with the faulty translation, the two patih appeared not to understand what was being said. If they had understood, it is likely that the mere mention of the terms ‘vassal’ (leenman), ‘paramount lord’ (leenheer) and ‘feudalism’ (leen), which appeared in the Dutch original, would have sent the second sultan into apoplexy. In 1799,
Plate 23. Oil painting by A.A.J. Payen of the governor-general’s carriage being drawn up Daendels’ postweg with the aid of a yoke of buffalo in the Priangan highlands at Mount Pola near Sumedhang, Payen painting collection, Rijksmuseum voor Volkenkunde, Leiden, no. 200/22. Photograph by courtesy of the Rijksmuseum voor Volkenkunde, Leiden.
at the time of the appointment of Radèn Adipati Danureja II as Yogya patih, he had strongly objected to the phrase – apparently taken from Danureja I’s letter of appointment shortly after the recognition of the Yogya state by the Dutch at Giyanti in 1755 – that the Yogya prime minister was to be patih of all the lands which the Yogya ruler ‘held in fief from the Dutch East Indies Company’. So strong had been Hamengkubuwana II’s objections at this time that Danureja II had functioned without a letter of appointment from the Dutch for several years following his elevation on 9 September 1799.138

So what was this proclamation which was the cause of so much incomprehension and acrimony? The original does not seem to be extant, but the following is an English translation made by a Dutch-speaking British officer from a version provided him in September 1811 by Sunan Pakubuwana IV:

I receive with much pleasure and sincerity the homage of the Susuhunan through his prime minister and further ambassadors.

I do not consider this solemnity in the light of homage by a vassal to his lord paramount, the feudal system having been abolished in Europe, but I look upon the same as congratulations on my safe arrival on this island and on the commencement of the administration of His Majesty’s possessions in India.

The [Dutch] East Indies Company and the Republic of the United Provinces had lost their former influence in Europe. But the election of the Emperor’s brother to the throne of Holland has caused the political influence of that country to be re-established by adopting a more energetic mode of administration and by a most intimate union with the mightiest Empire in the world. It is the wish of King Louis to promote the happiness of his subjects on the island of Java and he offers them peace, prosperity and a benevolent government.

And I do solemnly declare in the name of His Majesty, the friend and protector of the princes and inhabitants of Java, that I will endeavour to maintain peace and to render the island of Java as prosperous as possible.139

As Danureja II and his party made their way back to Yogya with Veeckens’ declaration in their hands and Daendels’ compliments to pass on to the sultan (the governor-general had not forgotten such niceties this time) ringing in their ears, they must have wondered what exactly was going on. A post-


139 Copy of Memorial delivered by Pakubuwana IV to Captain William Robison, 24-9-1811, in IOL Eur F.148/18 (‘Raffles-Minto Collection’). Dutch original signed H.W. Gezelschap, English translation made by Captain Robison.
feudal Java? The happiness of subjects? The mightiest empire in the world? How to make sense of all this in the context of an ‘old order’ in Java which seemed so immutable? Luckily, symbolic explanation was at hand. No sooner had the Yogya delegation returned home, than Van Braam – soon to replace Buyskes as Daendels’ deputy¹⁴⁰ – came over from Surakarta on an official visit with his wife.¹⁴¹ It was usual on such occasions for the court to honour their distinguished guest with a tiger and buffalo fight on the southern alun-alun (open field behind the kraton) and Van Braam was not disappointed.

However, the particular fight he witnessed had an interesting denouement: in the first round of the contest, the tiger severed the leg tendons of the buffalo and then refused to fight further. In the second, when a new tiger was introduced, it jumped clean out of the ring of guarding spearmen and was only caught and killed behind the elevated platform on which the sultan was sitting with his Dutch guest. ‘This situation, which had never occurred before,’ Van Braam reported, ‘caused the Javanese to make many conjectures with regard to me […] and the sultan made me a compliment and said that it had occurred in my honour!’¹⁴²

Some compliment, some honour! What Van Braam did not realise was that these contests had a deeper meaning. Whereas for a visiting European dignitary like himself, a tiger and buffalo fight might have been seen as a rather gruesome form of entertainment, the equivalent of bear-baiting in Europe perhaps, for the watching Javanese the contests had a much more profound significance. They equated the Europeans with the quick and deadly tiger and themselves with the powerful wild buffalo. Although the former was ferociously aggressive, it had little staying power and was nearly always defeated by the slower, more cautious and resilient beast (Ricklefs 1974a:274-6, 303-4, 345-6; Carey 1992:467 note 321; Houben 1994:81-2). In this particular case, both rounds had shown the Dutch ‘tiger’ in a rather unflattering light: in the first, although able to move in for the kill with the buffalo’s tendons severed, it had not done so. In the second, the tiger had jumped clean out of the ring. Did this not mean that the Javanese could expect some unusual developments in terms of their Dutch adversary? At the time of Van Braam’s visit, the British invasion still lay nearly three years away. But when it happened, those Yogya courtiers who still recalled the October 1808 tiger-and-buffalo fight on the southern alun-alun might have been forgiven for surmising that it presaged a time when the once mighty Dutch and their now defunct East Indies

¹⁴⁰ Note 46.
¹⁴¹ Ambrosina Wilhelmina, née Van Rijk. Daendels was supposed to have been in love with her, although he had many other liaisons of a more professional kind while in Java, Poensen 1905:237, 239; De Haan 1935a:507, 613; and was even accused of forcing a married woman on the very day of her marriage to become his mistress, Van Polanen 1816:40.
¹⁴² Dj.Br. 23, J.A. van Braam (Surakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia), 17-10-1808.
Company would be placed completely hors de combat as far as their rule in Java was concerned by a new and more formidable European enemy.

As if in presage of the tragedy to come, Van Braam’s last day in the sultan’s capital was marred by an ugly diplomatic incident. As the Surakarta Resident and his wife were being driven out from the Dutch fort in his carriage to make the short journey to the Residency House just opposite, his gold-and-blue payung (state sunshade) clearly visible behind him, who should be riding down the main avenue but Radèn Rongga making for the meeting place in front of the kraton. Instead of stopping, however, to let the high Dutch official pass as the new ceremonial demanded, the bupati wedana cut straight across Van Braam’s path forcing his coachman to pull up short. Here was an affront indeed. Engelhard ever the diplomat suggested that his colleague just mention the incident to the sultan as he took his leave later that day and ask Rongga to make a personal apology. This he did and Rongga’s apology swiftly followed. Was this enough – cukup – the sultan asked in Malay? No, Van Braam wanted the bupati wedana to make a public apology in front of the entire court. This created a sensation. Amazement was written on every courtier’s face as Radèn Rongga, his own visage puce with embarrassment intoned the formal Javanese apology in Malay. Then toasts were drunk and Van Braam departed. Scarcely a day later at Klatthèn (16 October) at the time of the signing of the Angger Gladhad (agreement on the porters’ guilds), the Surakarta Resident’s path again crossed with that of Rongga who was part of the Yogya delegation. Van Braam pretended that nothing had happened, but Rongga’s face was a mask of discomfort. ‘That dangerous, irascible, resentful and enterprising man who gives in to nothing’, as Van Braam put it in his report to Daendels, was now the government’s public enemy number one. The denouement would not be long in coming.143

Conclusion

As the year 1808 drew to a close, the Yogya court may have wondered just what more lay in store for them. For Dipanagara, the beginning of the ruin of the Land of Java promised by the disembodied voice at Parangkusuma was every bit as real as his darkest forebodings. With each new humiliation visited on the court and with every slight made to its ruling family and senior priyayi, the brash new world of Revolutionary Europe, which Daendels personified, was becoming more evident. This was not just about changing a few archaic practices, a little tinkering at the edges to bring the old Dutch

143 Dj.Br. 23, J.A. van Braam (Surakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia), 17-10-1808, contains the complete report on the incident which occurred on the last day of Van Braam’s official visit (13-15 October 1808).
Plate 24. Sketch of a fight between a tiger and a buffalo, taken from
Pfyffer zu Neueck 1929: Plate XV. Photograph by courtesy of the KITLV, Leiden.
East Indies Company into the modern world. This was root and branch change. Henceforth, the Javanese political philosophy of two sovereigns and the reassuring divide between the kingdoms of Batavia/west Java and Java proper – namely the *kejawèn* – would be well-nigh impossible to maintain. In everything that touched the relationship between south-central Java and Batavia, from the political demands of the colonial administration, to access to labour and economic resources, to military and defence requirements in an era of global conflict, it was clear that Java had entered a new age. And yet, it was not so easy for those like Dipanagara, born when the Javanese old order was still intact, to make this shift in consciousness. Much more would have to happen before such a change would be seen either as necessary or inevitable. Amongst the south-central Javanese elite few indeed would begin to make the necessary adjustments to the new colonial order before the Java War. But by then it would be too late. The time for making changes the Javanese way would have passed. The colonial government would do it for them. Daendels was just a beginning.
CHAPTER VI

The old order’s last champion
The origins and course of Radèn Rongga’s rebellion, 1809-1810

The despoliation of Yogya

On 3 December 1808, Gustaf Wilhelm Wiese was installed by Pieter Engelhard as ‘minister’ (Resident) in Yogyakarta a day before the latter’s departure for Batavia. Although Wiese himself had no previous experience of the south-central Javanese courts, the fifteen months of his Residency saw a continuation of the careful diplomacy of his predecessor. Introduced to the second sultan by Engelhard as a man ‘of soft character and a true heart’, the Javanese babad concur that during his incumbency matters proceeded ‘calmly’. But this hardly seems an accurate depiction of the increasingly turbulent relations between the Dutch and the Yogya court as the second year of Daendels’ administration dawned.

One of the first problems was the delicate matter of Daendels’ demand for money from the sultan. On 22 December, Wiese wrote to the Yogya ruler asking him to provide a sum of money ‘as a sign of his attachment to the [Dutch] government’ for the war treasury the governor-general was setting up. The sultan’s response is not recorded. But we know from other sources
The power of prophecy

that Daendels obtained some 200,000 Spanish dollars from Yogya during the course of his administration, the bulk (196,320 Spanish dollars) of which was taken as an indemnity to pay for his army and his civilian officials in December 1810 after his expedition to Yogya in the wake of Radèn Rongga’s revolt. According to the Yogya babad, the sultan had already given 50,000 Indies guilders worth of gold ornaments which were sent to Semarang along with various other official presents with the Yogya patih at the time of the joint court delegation to Daendels in late September 1808 when the chief ministers paid their ‘homage’ to him as an incoming governor-general. Wiese’s predecessor, Engelhard, had apparently arranged this particular gift, but if he did there is nothing in the Dutch sources to confirm it. It may be that the babad writer has confused this with the personal loan of 50,000 Indies guilders which Engelhard received from the sultan to cover his debts during the course of his two incumbencies as Yogya Resident.

Although the full details elude us, it is clear that Daendels began a process which the British, who must take first prize as asset strippers and looters during their brief five-year administration of Java, completed, namely, the despoliation of the Yogya treasury. Built up by the second sultan during the first sixteen years of his reign, and reckoned by Matthijs Waterloo to exceed one million Spanish dollars in gold and silver coins by February 1808 not counting ‘a very large sum in diamonds’, this entire sum was removed from Yogya by force and diplomatic diktat during the course of the next four years (1808-1812). Plunder on this scale gave the lie to Daendels’ protestations in his declaration to the patih in Semarang in early October 1808 that his administration represented the new enlightened government of post-Revolutionary Europe, a government which had the ‘happiness’ of its subjects at its heart. We will see shortly, how the same gap between rhetoric and reality would be the hallmark of the British interregnum (1811-1816). Small wonder that Dipanagara would later insist in the preliminaries to his March 1830 ‘peace

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5 IOL, Raffles-Minto collection (Xerox copies of holograph letters), IV:76 (reference to 200,000 Spanish dollars); Poensen 1905:135-6; Bataviasche Koloniale Courant 6, 8-2-1811; Daendels 1814: Bijlage 2, additioneele stukken 24 (on 161,260 Spanish dollars taken as an indemnity in January 1811 for his officers and men; and 35,000 Spanish dollars for his civilian officials); Carey 1992:414-5 note 80. See further Chapter VII.

6 B.Ng. I:74-5, XX.16-22; p. 199.

7 Chapter V note 29.

8 IOL, Raffles-Minto collection (Xerox copies of holograph letters), II, T.S. Raffles (Batavia) to Lord Minto (Calcutta), 1-5-1812 (reference to six million Spanish dollars worth of stores captured by British prize agents in Batavia after the British invasion); T.S. Raffles (Semarang) to Lord Minto (Calcutta), 14-7-1812, on the just under 800,000 Spanish dollars taken by the British after the fall of the Yogya kraton. At least half of this was shipped back to Bengal, Carey 1992:414-5 note 80.

9 dK 145, Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 21-2-1808. On the collection of diamonds and jewelry owned by Hamengkubuwana II’s third consort Ratu Kennca Wulan, see Carey 1992:403 note 21.
negotiations’ with the Dutch at the end of the Java War that the only trade which would henceforth be allowed with Europeans would be one in which they paid the right market prices for Javanese products and the only land leases those in which they paid the right market rents.\textsuperscript{10}

\textit{Military preparations and Daendels’ July 1809 visit}

While these negotiations over the Yogya contribution to the marshal’s war chest were proceeding, the issue of the new ceremonial introduced by the 28 July 1808 decree remained deadlocked. Wiese warned the \textit{patih} that he would not be able to pay the sultan any official visits in the \textit{kraton} unless a stool were provided for him thus enabling him to sit at the same height as the Yogya ruler. But the monarch remained adamant that he had to remain at a more elevated position than the Resident through the insertion of a low wooden bench under his throne.\textsuperscript{11} This argument over ceremonial would continue right through to the end of Daendels’ administration in May 1811 and beyond into the British period (1811-1816). It would also bedevil the arrangements for the marshal’s own visit to Yogya in late July as we will see shortly.

Meanwhile, the military situation in Yogya was giving the Dutch authorities cause for concern. In late January 1809, news reached the sultan’s capital of an unusually large military exercise in Surakarta. This had apparently been occasioned by the Surakarta ruler’s jealousy of the respect paid by senior Dutch artillery officers to Prangwedana (Mangkunagara II) during a recent inspection visit to the south-central Javanese courts.\textsuperscript{12} The Sunan’s decision to stage his own manoeuvres was thus an attempt to demonstrate his independent military capacity and his position in south-central Java as the senior ruler.\textsuperscript{13} But it was interpreted badly in Yogya. The sultan gave orders for all male inhabitants of Yogya to turn out for a military review and instructions were sent to the eastern \textit{mancanagara bupati} to hold themselves in readiness.\textsuperscript{14} Wiese hurried to remind the sultan of the warning given the previous year by Daendels that any such manoeuvres would be interpreted as a declaration of war against the Dutch government.\textsuperscript{15} There was also talk of sending Prangwedana’s forces to Klationen.

\textsuperscript{10} Chapter V note 34.
\textsuperscript{11} Dj.Br. 39, G.W. Wiese (Yogyakarta) to Danureja II (Yogyakarta), 31-1-1809.
\textsuperscript{12} Dj.Br. 25, ‘Dagregister gehouden der comptoire Djocjocarta betreffende het voorgevallene sedert primo Januari tot ultimo Wintermaand [December] 1809’ (henceforth: ‘Dagregister 1809’), entries of 17-1-1809 to 26-1-1809, referring to visits to Yogya of ‘battle commander’ (\textit{commandant van oorlog}) Lieutenant-Colonel Baillard and Artillery Captain Rauws. Their visit to Surakarta appears to have taken place earlier in the month immediately before their arrival in Yogya.
\textsuperscript{13} Dj.Br. 22, G.W. Wiese (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg), 26-1-1809.
\textsuperscript{14} Dj.Br. 39, G.W. Wiese (Yogyakarta) to Danureja II (Yogyakarta), 31-1-1809, 5-3-1809; Dj.Br. 22, G.W. Wiese (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg), 1-2-1809, 2-2-1809.
\textsuperscript{15} Dj.Br. 39, G.W. Wiese (Yogyakarta) to Danureja II (Yogyakarta), 31-1-1809.
‘in order to keep the peace in Java’. This seems to have had the desired effect. But, although the mobilization orders were rescinded, troops continued to pour into the capital. On 1 March, the Yogya Resident was reporting an unusually large turnout for the previous Saturday weekly tournament (Setonan) on the southern alun-alun with over 2,000 cavalry taking part drawn from the contingents of the sultan, the Crown Prince and other Yogya princes. By early April, large detachments were beginning to arrive from the mancanagara as the eastern bupati made their way to Yogya for the Garebeg Mulud (Celebration of The Prophet’s Birthday) which that year fell on 27 April. Dipanagara reckoned that by this time there were upwards of 10,000 troops in the city not counting those from the sultan’s own apanage lands. The Yogya babad gives even more inflated figures. Many of these soldiers were deployed to guard the sultan’s pesanggrahan. At the same time, the eastern bupati, who did not have residences in the capital, were given temporary accommodation in small pavilions constructed of bamboo and palm-leaf.

According to the Yogya chronicle, almost daily exercises took place on the great square to the south of the court and the tensest expectations were aroused when news came through in early April of Daendels’ intention to make an official visit to the south-central Javanese courts later in that dry season. Many Yogyanese went about dressed permanently in battle array (prajuritan) and Dipanagara describes how he was called upon to take command of the kadipatèn (Crown Prince’s establishment) forces numbering some 1,000 men. Only two of the smaller kadipatèn regiments, the Suranatan and the Trunasmara, the latter comprising panakawan (young unmarried companions) and grooms (gamel) were left under the Crown Prince’s orders. When the day of Daendels’ arrival (29 July 1809) dawned, Dipanagara summoned two of his father’s military commanders, and together with his two younger brothers, Adinagara and Suryabrangta, rode out to Kalasan as part of the Crown Prince’s delegation tasked with greeting the governor-general, who

16 AvJ, H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg) to G.W. Wiese (Yogyakarta), 21-1-1809.
17 Dj.Br. 39, G.W. Wiese (Yogyakarta) to Danureja II (Yogyakarta), 13 Sura AJ 1736 (AD 1-3-1808), 26 Sura AJ 1736 (AD 14-3-1809), citing report from the commander of the Yogya garrison, Lieutenant-Colonel L.B. de Chasteauvieux regarding the 25 February 1809 Setonan. On the Saturday tournaments, see Carey 1992:467 note 320.
19 BD (Manado) II:131, XIV.97-8; B.Ng. I:87-9, XXIV.39-54.
20 B.Ng. I:88-9, XXIV.49-54; Dj.Br. 39, G.W. Wiese (Yogyakarta) to J.A. van Braam (Surakarta), 2-4-1809, 11-4-1809; Dj.Br. 25, ‘Dagregister 1809’, entry of 27-4-1809.
21 BD (Manado), II:129-30, XIV.91-5. Dipanagara may have exaggerated the kadipatèn troop strength: according to Dutch figures compiled at the time of the 1 June 1808 Rajawinangun review (Chapter V), the total establishment was 600, half armed with pikes and half with muskets, Dj.Br. 23, J.G. Dietrée, ‘Translaat Notitie’, 2-6-1808. On the Suranatan, see p. 89.
was attired in the full dress uniform of a Napoleonic marshal.\textsuperscript{22}

Although Dipanagara makes no allusion to this in his babad, it is clear that the protocol for Daendels’ reception caused many problems for the Yogya Resident. A project ceremonial for the five-day visit (29 July-2 August 1809) visit seems to have been sent to Yogya for approval in late May.\textsuperscript{23} But, in early June, Wiese was reporting that the sultan was only prepared to come out as far as Demangan near Kalasan to greet the marshal. This was the same distance as he had travelled the previous November to receive Daendels’ deputy, Rear-Admiral Buyskes, a visit which, as we have seen, occasioned much displeasure.\textsuperscript{24} A compromise was eventually reached when the Yogya ruler agreed to travel somewhat further out to Bantulan near his royal orchard at Jenu (present-day Ambarrukmo) to make his first meeting with the governor-general.\textsuperscript{25} At the same time, the question of seating arrangements in the official receptions in the Residency House and the kraton required much delicate negotiation. The sultan was not prepared to allow the Resident to stand in his presence, but suggested that he should be seated on a stool next to his throne. He also asked that his heir apparent, the Crown Prince, should be allowed to sit in a similar fashion rather than remain on the floor as he normally did in court receptions. These requests were allowed.\textsuperscript{26} The sticking point was reached, however, when the Yogya ruler insisted that he sit higher than Daendels in the kraton reception by having a bench placed under his throne.\textsuperscript{27} It was one thing for the sultan to attempt to sit higher than the Resident at official meetings, quite another when he tried the same protocol with the governor-general himself. It was at this point that Daendels threatened to cancel his visit to Yogya altogether and restrict himself to the Sunan’s court if his project ceremonial was not approved.\textsuperscript{28} The sultan seems to have acquiesced, but it is clear from the Javanese accounts that the visit mortified him deeply.

When Daendels did eventually arrive in Yogya, his presence occasioned much curiosity and interest amongst the local population. It was the first ever visit by a governor-general to Mangkubumi’s capital (Carey 1984b:58), and it raised many expectations as to what it might achieve. The fact that Daendels

\textsuperscript{22} BD (Manado), II:129-30, XIV.91-5. The two commanders were Radèn Wiriyapuspita and Radèn Jayaminarsa. Daendels had travelled to Kalasan after an early breakfast at Prambanan and an inspection of the temple ruins.

\textsuperscript{23} Dj,Br. 39, G.W. Wiese (Yogyakarta) to Hamengkubuwana II (Yogyakarta), 10-6-1809.

\textsuperscript{24} Chapter V. Dj,Br. 22, G.W. Wiese (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg), 2-6-1809. On the location of Demangan, which is the Kenaran sub-district of Kalasan, see Schoel 1931:84.

\textsuperscript{25} Dj,Br. 22, G.W. Wiese (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg), 13-6-1809. On the location of Jenu, see Carey 1984a:45 note 4.

\textsuperscript{26} AvJ, G.W. Wiese (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg), 10-6-1809; Dj,Br. 22, G.W. Wiese (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg), 13-6-1809.

\textsuperscript{27} AvJ, G.W. Wiese (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg), 10-6-1809.

\textsuperscript{28} Dj,Br. 39, G.W. Wiese (Yogyakarta) to Hamengkubuwana II (Yogyakarta), 10-6-1809.
had brought a sizeable military force with him to the Principalities once again underscored the mailed fist nature of his regime. 29 But efforts were made to turn the visit into a diplomatic success through the scheduling of various ‘discussions’ between the sultan and Daendels in the kraton and in the throne room at the Residency House. Some of these focussed on cash-crop production and agriculture in the princely territories, others on the sultan’s duties as a ruler.30 At the same time, there were the usual official visits to the sultan’s family, tours of four of the royal pesanggrahan (Ngawatreja, Rajawinangun, Purwareja and Wanacatur), a rampog macan (tiger spearing), a firework display organised by the kapitan cina, Tan Jin Sing (in office 1803-1813), on the grounds of the Residency House, serimpi dances and a mock one-hour tournament conducted by forty of the Yogya ruler’s cherished Amazon corps, the prajurit èstri, on the southern alun-alun.31 This latter display is said to have especially impressed Daendels who subsequently expressed his amazement that women could ride so adroitly on horseback (Poensen 1905:144). One wonders if the male chauvinist governor-general realised that these viragos were not just for show but had real fighting capacity as the British would later discover when they stormed the Yogya kraton on 20 June 1812 and had their only officer casualty, a Scots lieutenant of a British line regiment, knifed to death by a court lady whom he had unwisely tried to carry away as booty (Carey 1992:414 note 78; p. 349).

Despite the formal compliments and outward display of friendship, no deeper understanding was reached. Dipanagara laconically dismissed the visit in a single sentence in his babad, noting that ‘there was much talk but nothing came of it’.32 The other Javanese accounts dwell on the humiliations which the sultan underwent concerning the seating arrangements and the lack of respect paid to him by the governor-general.33 At the end of the day, the visit probably confirmed the sultan in his conviction that he should not give an inch on matters of ceremonial.

On 2 August at 4.30 a.m., the early start allowing travel in the cool of the morning and suited to the governor-general’s military routine, Daendels departed for Semarang accompanied as far as Secang in Kedhu by Wiese, Radèn Tumenggung Natadiningrat, and Mas Tumenggung Sindunagara (the

29 Mack.Pr. 2, ‘Surakarta sengkala list’, entry for AJ 1736 (AD 1809), refers to Daendels’ bringing with him ‘many gentlemen’ and an army of 600 made up of 300 cavalry and 300 infantry.
31 Dj.Br. 24, Groenhoff van Woortmann, ‘Dagverhaal’, 17-8-1809 (gives a detailed diary description of the visit). A rampog macan involves the spearing to death of a number of tigers or panthers who are released into a circle of lancers and are then speared when they attempt to break out of the circle, Ricklefs 1974a:275-6; Houben 1994:82; Gericke and Roorda 1901, I:365. The spectacle had a serious military purpose since it tested the courage of the kraton spearmen. On the prajurit èstri and pesanggrahan, see Chapter II note 29 and Appendix VI.
32 BD (Manado), II:130-1, XIV (Sinom) 96. mapan kathah bicara kang nora dadya.
33 B.Ng. I:89-90, XXV 9-16; Poensen 1905:142; Hageman 1855-56:255.
future *patih*, Danureja III, in office 1811-1813). There, according to the Pakualam *babad*, Daendels made efforts through his interpreter, C.F. Krijgsman, to attach Natadiningrat to the Dutch cause by warning him about what might happen if the Crown Prince succeeded to the sultanate (Poensen 1905:144-5). There is nothing in the Dutch records to bear this out and it seems that far from cultivating relations with Natadiningrat and his father Natakusuma, the future Pakualam I (reigned 1812-1829), Daendels went out of his way to give his full support and interest to Dipanagara’s father, the Crown Prince.\(^{34}\) The marshal’s subsequent actions in favour of the Crown Prince against Natakusuma and the sultan bear this out as we shall see later in this chapter.

The struggle over the teak trade and the crisis in the eastern mancanagara and pasisir

While these events were taking place in Yogya, the situation in the eastern *mancanagara* and the districts bordering the Dutch territories on the north coast (*pasisir*) was deteriorating. As we have seen, increasing pressure had been applied on the courts by Daendels from July 1808 onwards to gain access to the eastern outlying region’s timber reserves, particularly in key districts such as Panolan and Padhangang.\(^{35}\) Initially, his demands had been limited to hardwood stakes for the construction of his new naval defences at Fort Lodewijk in Surabaya.\(^{36}\) But by early 1809, these requirements had broadened out to include a ban on the private sale of teak across the border into the Dutch-held pasisir territories and the establishment of a de facto government timber monopoly. In Blora, for example, the whole of the teak trade was taken out of the hands of the local Surakarta-appointed *bupati* and turned over to Dutch forestry officials who relied on European and Chinese contractors to extract the hardwood.\(^{37}\) Much the same situation prevailed in the Yogya districts of Jipang and Japan (Majakerta) where a consignment of over 500 logs was demanded through contracts negotiated directly with the local *bupati* by the acting Inspector-General of Coffee Culture Carl von Winckelmann.\(^{38}\) This was naturally resented by the *mancanagara bupati* who stood to lose a very valuable source of revenue from their farming out of the rights to fell timber to local Chinese and Javanese entrepreneurs from the pasisir.\(^{39}\) In Jipang and

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\(^{35}\) Chapter V.

\(^{36}\) Chapter V.

\(^{37}\) AvJ, G.W. Wiese (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg), 17-4-1809; Dj.Br. 22, G.W. Wiese (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Semarang), 30-6-1809.

\(^{38}\) Dj.Br. 22, G.W. Wiese (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Surakarta), 24-7-1809; Dj.Br. 39, G.W. Wiese (Yogyakarta) to Hamengkubuwana II (Yogyakarta), 31-5-1809, 29-7-1809.

\(^{39}\) AvJ, G.W. Wiese (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg), 17-4-1809.
Plate 25. A Javanese of the lower class, one of those who suffered directly from the restriction on sales of wood from the eastern *mancunagara* to the *pasisir* during Daendels’ administration (1808-1811). Taken from Raffles 1817, I:84 facing. Photograph by courtesy of the Bodleian Library, Oxford.
Japan (Majakerta), for example, the 500-log consignment was later prevented from reaching the coast by the local bupati.\textsuperscript{40}

When they arrived in Yogya for the Garebeg Mulud festival of 27 April 1809, the eastern bupati explained the situation to the sultan and also alerted him to the desperate plight of the wood-cutter forest population whose entire livelihood depended on their ability to glean wood from the sultan’s forests and sell it across the border.\textsuperscript{41} The effects of the rigid enforcement of the teak monopoly by Daendels were later noted by Raffles and other British officials. The British lieutenant-governor wrote of the ‘size and comfort’ of local houses being ‘very essentially contracted’ by the closure of the teak forests ‘which were formerly open to natives of all classes’ (Raffles 1817, I:81), and the first British Resident of Jipang after its annexation in August 1812 reported a steep drop in population, especially in timber-rich areas like Panolan, with much land lying waste.\textsuperscript{42} The closure of the timber market to the local bupati likewise led to a sharp decline in the level of forest maintenance. Even Prangwedana’s beautifully maintained teak forests at Karangpandhan on the slopes of Mount Lawu felt the impact, his pro-Dutch allegiance affording him no exemption (Hogendorp 1913:167).

In this affair, the sultan apparently took up the cause of the forest inhabitants, stipulating that although the teak forests would be leased to the European government, the common people should still be allowed to sell wood to the pasisir.\textsuperscript{43} Coming from a ruler who had gained such a notorious reputation for his harsh fiscal policies during the first sixteen years of his reign this was a change of heart indeed. But it was a change which seemed to be replicated elsewhere: even the curmudgeonly Residency translator in Surakarta, J.W. Winter, remarked that since Daendels’ arrival, the princes and bupati of the south-central Javanese courts seemed to have discovered a newfound compassion for the wong cilik (little people) (Winter 1902:51).

Despite this high-level solicitude, the situation for the forest-dwelling populations of the eastern mancanagara and the districts close to the north coast was not improved. In desperation, many took to petty crime and there were a number of incursions across the border. Small affrays took place between the inhabitants of the court districts and those in the Dutch-controlled pasi-
sir. These were regularly reported to Daendels by Dutch officials. As chief administrator of the eastern outlying districts, Radèn Rongga was blamed for many of these incidents. According to Dipanagara, the *bupati wedana* was constantly singled out by the Dutch as a scapegoat and often summoned to Semarang to answer for the growing number of infringements of government territory. But an open break was avoided:

XIV.89 So gradually there was even more talk, yet it was Radèn Rongga who was constantly discussed. So they piled up the affairs of Radèn Rongga [and] he was often invited to Semarang.

90 But Radèn Rongga Prawiradirja was wary: he understood in his heart that he was being picked upon by the Dutch, so he was continuously [and] exceedingly cautious of danger.44

The sense of being picked on aroused in Rongga a smouldering resentment which was transformed, as we will see shortly, into a fatalistic resignation following the early death of his beloved consort, Ratu Maduretna, in mid-November.

Difficulties between the sultanate and the Dutch government continued throughout the long dry season (May-October) of 1809. In early September, the Yogya *bupati* of Grobogan, Radèn Tumenggung Sasrakusuma, was accused of holding up rice supplies to the *pasisir* and a local *kyai* (religious leader) in neighbouring Surakarta-controlled Blora, Kyai Haji Minhaj, who had collected a large group of adherents, was reported to be ‘terrorising’ government forestry officials in the area.45 The involvement of ‘men of religion’ in these activities and complaints from the Sunan about ‘the many priests who pretend to be descendants of The Prophet, begging and wandering in Surakarta lands’ would lead a year later to a decree by Daendels banning the circulation of ‘priests’ between


Surakarta and Dutch-controlled territories unless they carried a government travel pass, as well as those from the Principalities who wished to trade with the north coast. All those ‘priests’ without such a pass would be sent in chains to work at the fortifications in Merak Bay on the Sunda Straits.46

The borders with Tegal and Pekalongan were also the scene of constant tension. A returned Mecca pilgrim, Haji Mustapa, who may have witnessed the British naval build-up in Pulau Pinang and the Melaka Straits during his sea voyage to the Middle East, spread rumours in Pekalongan of an imminent British attack on Java.47 At the same time, numbers of pasisir inhabitants fled to the princely territories to avoid being conscripted for labour duties on Daendels’ trans-Java post-road which was just then being laid through the Dutch-held areas of the north coast.48 Some 12,000 Javanese, it was later estimated, would lose their lives in the construction of this infamous highway (Thorn 1815:208; Van Polanen 1816:73). In the ensuing confusion a number of small incidents and raids on villages and customs posts in government areas took place.49 Some of these were more serious: in September, a major incursion occurred in the government-administered district of Brebes near Tegal involving a bandit group estimated to be between 500 to 700 strong.50 The forest of Kadhawung in the small Yogya-administered Kedhu enclave between Pekalongan and Kendhal was reported to be providing cover for numbers of these wong durjana (robbers) who preyed on the north coast highway.51

46 Dj.Br. 41, Danureja II (Yogyakarta) to Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta), 14 Sawal AJ 1737 (AD 12-11-1810), reporting receipt of letter from Engelhard of 22-10-1810 enclosing Daendels’ order of 16-9-1810 in which all those crossing into pasisir henceforth would be required to have passes even if they were importing goods for ‘Europeans, Chinese and Moors [? Arabs]’. See further Van der Chijs 1895-97, XVI:404-5, 409. On the banishment of Kyai Muhamad Kastuba from Bagelen, who pretended that he could fly, see S.Br. 87, A.H. Smissaert (Yogyakarta) to A.M.Th. de Salis (Surakarta), 2-4-1823.

47 UBL BPL 616, Port. 5 pt. 7, D.W. Pinket van Haak (Surakarta) to G.A.G.Ph. van der Capellen (Batavia), 22-1-1817. Mustapa was arrested and sentenced to six years imprisonment in chains (presumably at Merak Bay) by Pinket van Haak, who was then serving as Prefect of Pekalongan (in office 1809-1810).


49 AvJ, G.W. Wiese (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg), 30-11-1809, G.W. Wiese (Yogyakarta) to Hamengkubuwana II (Yogyakarta), 28-12-1809, H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg) to Hamengkubuwana II (Yogyakarta), 30-12-1809; DJ.Br. 27, G.W. Wiese (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg), 8-1-1810, H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg) to G.W. Wiese (Yogyakarta), 10-1-1810, G.W. Wiese (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg), 13-1-1810, G.W. Wiese (Yogyakarta) to D.W. Pinket van Haak (Pekalongan), 26-1-1810, Danureja II (Yogyakarta) to G.W. Wiese (Yogyakarta), 26-1-1810, Hamengkubuwana II (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg), 5-2-1810, G.W. Wiese (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg), 6-2-1810, 12-2-1810.

50 Dj.Br. 39, G.W. Wiese (Yogyakarta) to Danureja II (Yogyakarta), 24-8-1809.

51 Carey 1980:73 note 2; AvJ, H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg) to G.W. Wiese (Yogyakarta), 11-10-1809.
The rising tensions underlined the fact that the temporary lull brought about by Daendels’ recent official visit was not to last. Sensing that a major showdown with the Dutch government could not long be delayed, the sultan decided to increase his military preparedness. Shortly after the celebration of the Garebeg Puwasa festival marking the end of the fasting month on 13 November 1809, he took advantage of the presence of Radèn Rongga’s workforce from the eastern mancanagara in the royal capital to strengthen the kraton defences. The four main bastions were projected by between fifteen to eighteen feet, and new cannon cast in Gresik and the royal gun foundries at Kutha Gedhé to defend them.

The sultan was right to be concerned. On 30 December, Daendels wrote to complain about the repeated incursions and robberies by Yogya inhabitants into Pekalongan. In his view, the Yogya bupati in the area were hand in glove with local bandits and were receiving stolen goods. He had given ‘ample signs of friendship’ by meeting the sultan in person during his recent official visit and by greatly reducing his troop strength in Semarang. Now he expected the Yogya ruler to reciprocate in kind by taking resolute steps against robber bands in the border areas and by handing over the officials responsible to ‘Minister’ Wiese (Carey 1980:72-3). He warned that if another robbery occurred in this enclave, the sultan would be held personally responsible. The marshal’s army in Semarang was in a position to occupy the sultan’s territory within fourteen days, and he intended to annex the Kedhu enclave on the north coast if there was any repeat of the border incursions. But he hoped it would not come to that (Carey 1980:72-5).

In the face of such an ultimatum, the sultan sought to buy time. He replied in emollient terms stating that he had sent out a Yogya mission accompanied

52 AvJ, G.W. Wiese (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg), 14-11-1809. Wiese reported that Danureja II had told him that Hamengkubuwana II had made the changes to copy the Dutch fort and that Hamengkubuwana I had put up the original kraton wall in less than three months in early 1785. In fact, it had been put up in less than two weeks and Hamengkubuwana II (then Crown Prince) rather than his father had been the driving force behind the fortifications which were seemingly modelled on the Dutch military headquarters in Batavia, which the patih of the kadipatèn, Mas Tumenggung Wiraguna (in office circa 1780-1807), had seen during a visit to Batavia in the early 1780s. Hamengkubuwana II’s former bodyguard commander, Pangéran Dipakusuma, was also in Batavia at that time, Dj.Br. 27, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to J.A. van Braam (Surakarta), 14-11-1810, Ricklefs 1974a:278-83. B.Ng. I:95, XXV.69 gives 2 Sawal AJ 1736 (AD 13-11-1809) as the date when the bastions referred to in the Javanese accounts as the pojok balowerti were extended.

53 Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, II:283 note 1 (on the capture of an iron cannon from the old kraton at Plérèd on 29-5-1826 during the Java War which bore the sengkala (chronogram) inscription suwaraning dahana sabdanèng ratu, AJ 1737 (AD 6-2-1810 – 25-1-1811); on Hamengkubuwana II’s casting of cannon in Gresik, see Gomperts and Carey 1994:26 note 10. On the 92 iron and brass cannon captured from the Yogya kraton on 20 June 1812, including 8 eighteen-pounders and 7 twelve-pounders, see Thorn 1815:192.
by a Dutch officer\textsuperscript{54} to arrest those engaged in criminal activities in the border areas. He also promised that if heads of villages dared to ignore the recently agreed regulations regarding the suppression of criminals,\textsuperscript{55} they would be arrested and handed over to the Resident who could pass them on Daendels if he so wished.\textsuperscript{56} While this exchange was taking place, on 8 January 1810, Daendels gave proof of his determination to enforce his new hard-line policy by dismissing the Surakarta patih, Radèn Adipati Danuningrat (in office 1804-1810), for his dilatoriness in investigating Surakarta official involvement in the Pekalongan disturbances.\textsuperscript{57} He also sought to strengthen the government position in Yogya by appointing a tough new Resident, Johannes Wilhelmus Moorrees (in office 9 March-24 August 1810), to take over from Wiese when the latter was moved back to his old post as inspector-general of Forests in early March.\textsuperscript{58} Moorrees, who as prefect of Banten (November 1808-April 1809), had been severely wounded during an attack on his carriage and forced to flee in the disturbances which had followed Daendels’ abolition of the Banten sultanate,\textsuperscript{59} came to Yogya with a reputation as a bruiser: the Yogya babad refers to him as a ‘minister who exuded forcefulness’,\textsuperscript{60} while the Pakualam account describes him as ‘brawny’ (jarot) (Poensen 1905:147). But forcefulness alone was not going to advance the cause of the European government in the sultan’s capital as Moorrees would discover in the five unhappy months of his residency, a period when all the mistakes of his equally short sojourn in Banten would be repeated.

No sooner had Moorrees settled into his new post in early March than a new attack occurred on the Pekalongan village of Wonodadi.\textsuperscript{61} This was said to involve a ‘well-known robber band’ which was operating out of the Yogya district of Tersana in the above-mentioned Kedhu enclave.\textsuperscript{62} Daendels

\textsuperscript{54} This was Lieutenant Willem Driessen (born Yogya circa 1760), a fluent Javanese speaker with experience of participating in such commissions, Dj.Br. 27, G.W. Wiese (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg), 8-1-1810. See note 110.

\textsuperscript{55} This was the Angger Gunung of 26-9-1808 agreed jointly by the patih at Klathèn, see Chapter V.

\textsuperscript{56} Carey 1980:72-5; Dj.Br. 27, G.W. Wiese (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg), 13-1-1810.

\textsuperscript{57} Van der Chijs 1895-97, XV:10-4. The Surakarta ngabèhi of Delimas, Jayèngpati, was the official implicated in the cross-border raids and he was later murdered under pressure from Daendels. On the location of Delimas in present-day Limpung sub-district, Batang kabupatèn, Pekalongan, see Schoel 1931:105 sub: ‘Dlimas’.

\textsuperscript{58} Poensen 1905:147 note 3. Wiese appears to have combined his post as Inspector of Forests with that of Resident of Rembang. He died in Semarang on 7-10-1811 (Dudok van Heel 2002:142), his widow, Catharina Gasparina Beijlon (or Beijlen) (1776-1821), remarried on 19-11-1816, De Haan 1935a:614.

\textsuperscript{59} Hageman 1864:227; Dj.Br. 39, G.W. Wiese (Yogyakarta) to Hamengkubuwana II (Yogyakarta), 29-4-1809.

\textsuperscript{60} B.Ng. I:95, XXV,73, referring to Moorrees as the Minister bèr purun.

\textsuperscript{61} Bandar sub-district, Batang kabupatèn, Pekalongan, see Schoel 1931:444.

\textsuperscript{62} Dj.Br. 27, J.W. Moorrees (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg), 18-3-1810, 23-3-1810, 26-3-1810.
demanded that the leader be caught. In the margins of the Yogya Resident’s dispatch reporting the incident, he wrote that ‘this affair has become so serious that I am withdrawing my trust in the sultan and the patih [...] I will take action if the fugitives are allowed to escape as before’.\textsuperscript{63} When the inevitable happened and the robbers slipped away over the border, the Yogya demang of Tersana, Radèn Tirtawijaya, was summoned to the royal capital to take responsibility. Daendels demanded that the sultan put him to death, but the Yogya ruler was loathe to oblige given that the demang was closely related by marriage to two leading figures at the Yogya court, namely, his favourite consort, Ratu Kencana Wulan, and his former bodyguard commander, Pangéran Dipakusuma (Poensen 1905:149-50; Carey 1980:185). The most he was prepared to do was to send him into exile. But this was not acceptable to Daendels. He continued to demand his head. So the unfortunate official was bound and delivered to the Resident who sent him in chains to Semarang. From there he was taken out on the new postweg and shot at Weleri, his body being left by the side of the road until, according to the Pakualam babad, it was collected by his children and grandchildren for decent Javanese-Islamic burial (Poensen 1905:148-9).

Moorrees reported that the sultan was deeply ‘ashamed’ at having to hand over the demang and he registered his displeasure by refusing to receive the Resident with the new ceremonial at the time of the Garebeg Mulud on 18 April 1810.\textsuperscript{64} The only concession he made was to agree to drink to the health of Moorrees’ wife immediately after the official toasts to the ‘minister’ and the Crown Prince, a concession which infuriated Daendels who declared that ‘women have no place in the drinking of toasts – theirs is entirely a private affair!’ In the same marginal note, he also insisted that Moorrees adhere to the 28 July 1808 ceremonial in all future dealings with the Yogya ruler.\textsuperscript{65}

\textit{The scapegoating of Radèn Rongga}

Daendels clearly intended Radèn Tirtawijaya’s miserable end to serve as a warning to all those in Yogya who refused to cooperate with his government. But his tactic of using Moorrees to enforce his strong line against the sultan in terms of the new ceremonial and the punishment of those responsible for cross-border incursions would backfire badly. As far as the Yogya ruler was
concerned the time for making concessions to the Dutch government had passed. The governor-general’s pressure only served to coalesce all those groups in Yogyakarta who either out of self-interest or through genuine anti-European sentiments were moving towards a policy of open resistance.

Radèn Rongga was a central figure here. Immediately following his return from the mid-November 1809 Garebeg Puwasa in Yogyakarta, when his workforce had helped to extend the kraton bastions, he had been plunged into inconsolable grief at the sudden death on 16 November of his beloved official wife, Ratu Maduretna. Said to be the most beautiful of the three daughters of the second sultan by his part Madurese consort, Ratu Kedhaton, and still in her early thirties at the time of her death, she seems to have been much more than the trophy court princess for her rather younger husband. Certainly, Radèn Rongga’s reaction to her loss as recorded in the Pakualam babad was dramatic: interring her at his family graveyard at Gunung Bancak, which he renamed Giripurna in her honour, a prominent hill overlooking the site of his new residence at Maospati, he is said to have spent day and night at her gravesite. He even gave out that he wished to follow her beyond the grave until his subordinate bupati admonished him to come to his senses (Poensen 1905:154; Adam 1940:333-4).

No sooner had Rongga recovered somewhat from this bitter personal loss than he was implicated in a cross-border raid into neighbouring Panaraga on 31 January 1810. This left two dead, one wounded and the entire population of the Surakarta-administered sub-district of Ngebel close to Madiun numbering some 181 souls forced to flee their homes. According to Rongga, the inhabitants of this area were notorious criminals who had repeatedly robbed Yogyakarta inhabitants in Madiun. He claimed he had been given permission by his Surakarta opposite number in Panaraga, Radèn Mas Aria Wiryadiningrat,

66 AvJ, G.W. Wiese (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg), 20-11-1809; B.Ng. I:95, XXV.71. Ratu Maduretna’s title recalls the residence of Trunajaya – Madu Retna near Pacuran in west Madura – and may have been chosen by Maduretna’s Madurese mother, Ratu Kedhaton, to recall the great seventeenth-century Madurese rebel, who was also known as Panembahan Maduretna, see De Graaf 1961-62:60, 110, 118-9, 124, 132, 175-9.

67 Van den Broek 1873-77, 20:480. Ratu Kedhaton was the daughter of Hamengkubuwana I’s former army commander and later bupati of Magetan, Radèn Tumenggung Purwadiningrat, who was of Madurese descent from Panembahan Cakradiningrat II of Madura (séda Kamal) (reigned 1680-1707), see Chapter II. Her other daughters, Ratu Bendara and Ratu Anggèr, were married to Radèn Tumenggung Sumadiningrat and Radèn Adipati Danureja II respectively, see Mandoyo-kusumo 1977:18 no. 5, 19 no. 14.

68 Dij.Br. 46, Report of C.F. Krijgsman (Semarang Residency translator) and E. Diepen (Panaraga) to P.A. Goldbach (Semarang and Demak), 1-10-1810, enclosing statement of Mas Bangsataruna (wounded Surakarta inhabitant of Ngebel), 23-9-1810. The published sources place the attack in February which is too late, Valck 1844:145; Poensen 1905:192.

69 On the location of Ngebel in the Gunung Ngebel sub-district of Pulung, Panaraga, see Schoel 1931:249.
to trace the robber band back into adjacent Surakarta territory. Acting on this permission, he had sent out a sizeable 800-strong search party, which had tracked them down to the village and sub-district of Sekedok in the Gunung Ngebel area. Finding the village deserted except for a number of cripples, his investigating force had then been ambushed in what he described as an ‘amok attack’ by three of the bandit group and it was during this affray that the two Surakarta assailants had lost their lives and the third had been wounded. The adjacent district of Ngebel had been subsequently ‘ruined’ in retaliation by the investigating party. He offered to arrange a meeting with the three Panaraga bupati after the Garebeg Mulud of 18 April 1810 to sort out the problem.

This comparatively small incident would begin a process which would ultimately lead to the bupati wedana’s rebellion the following November. The Surakarta ruler, who had an intense personal antipathy for Rongga, eagerly seized on the affair to make a formal complaint to Daendels. Wiryadiningrat for his part levelled a number of counter accusations at Rongga, one of the most intriguing being that he had retained a military deserter from Panaraga named Bratasena (also known as Bratasentana), as a bandit leader, whom the Surakarta bupati wedana said was especially admired by Rongga as a descendant of Bathara Katong, the founder of Islam in Panaraga. This man had been appointed a lurah mantri (senior local official), given the title of Radèn Prawirabrata and provided with light cannon from Rongga’s own residence at Maospati which allowed him to operate freely across the border in Panaraga where there was no such ordnance. He had apparently specialised in capturing sets of Javanese gamelan (orchestras) from the adjacent Surakarta territories for the bupati wedana, no less than five such orchestras having been carried off to Rongga’s residence in the past four years.

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70 Dj.Br. 46, Radèn Rongga Prawiradirja III (Yogyakarta) to Danureja II (Yogyakarta), 29 Jumadilakir AJ 1737 (AD 1-8-1810), referring to the delegation of 40 religious scholars (para ulama) lead by Haji Hasan Besari of the famous pesantrèn of Tegalsari (Panaraga) (Appendix VIIb) whom he had sent to meet with the Surakarta bupati wedana of Panaraga following this letter to Radèn Mas Aria Wiryadiningrat of 29-1-1810. See further Chapter V note 119.

71 Dj.Br. 46, Radèn Rongga Prawiradirja III (Madiun) to Danureja II (Yogyakarta), n.d. (circa 5-4-1810).

72 Dj.Br. 46, Radèn Mas Aria Wiryadiningrat, Radèn Tumenggung Wiradirja, Radèn Tumenggung Bratanegara (Panaraga) to Radèn Adipati Cakranagara (Surakarta), 24 Sura AJ 1737 (AD 1-3-1810); Radèn Rongga Prawiradirja III (Madiun) to Danureja II (Yogyakarta), 26 Sura AJ 1737 (AD 3-3-1810).

73 Dj.Br. 46, Pakubuwana IV (Surakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg), 5 Rabingula-wal AJ 1737 (AD 12-4-1810).

74 Dj.Br. 37, J.W. Moorrees (Yogyakarta) to W.N. Servatius (Surakarta), 11-3-1810, 22-4-1810, 28-4-1810, J.W. Moorrees (Yogyakarta) to J.A. van Braam (Surakarta), 12-5-1810; Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to W.N. Servatius (Surakarta), 30-1-1811 (acknowledging news of recent arrest of Bratasentana in Panaraga); B.Ng. I:146, XXXVII.5-6; Daendels 1814:96; Poensen 1905:189; Carey 1980:175 note 2.

75 Dj.Br. 46, Radèn Mas Aria Wiryadiningrat, Radèn Tumenggung Prawiradirja, Radèn Tumenggung Bratanegara (Panaraga) to Radèn Adipati Cakranagara (Surakarta), 20-5-1810.
Such activities speak more of cultural kleptomania – of the kind practised by the British between 1811-1816 – rather than the usual round of cross-border plunder, but this weighed not a whit with Daendels for whom a gamelan and a kettle drum were probably one and the same. Moorrees meanwhile had decided to drag out the proceedings and increase pressure on the bupati wedana by refusing to send out the normal commission of enquiry from Yogya. This reflected the governor-general’s desire to make an end to Rongga’s influence, if necessary by using the same fateful methods as he had applied to the luckless demang of Tersana. ‘I would have hung a European for such vexatiousness!’ he wrote in reply to Moorrees’ dispatch informing him of Rongga’s actions. He ordered the Resident to deliver a letter to the sultan pointing out that unless Rongga was punished the Yogya ruler risked falling out with both Daendels and Pakubuwana IV at one and the same time. He was also told to cite the marshal’s public hanging of a European in Banten during Moorrees’ previous residency there as proof that he meant business.

The sultan was incensed. He saw the Surakarta ruler’s actions as a way of putting bad blood between himself and the governor-general, and he recalled the misunderstandings between the sultanate and Daendels during the marshal’s first year in office, misunderstandings which he laid squarely at the door of the Sunan. After hearing Rongga’s report delivered during his stay in Yogya at the time of the Garebeg Mulud, the sultan concluded that the bupati wedana had been well within his rights to strike down three notorious robbers. Until further reports were forthcoming from Surakarta about the affair, he would accept Rongga’s version as substantially correct. Henceforth, the sultan went out of his way to protect and favour his former son-in-law. Anxious to have him linked once more to his family by marriage, he offered him a new bride, the thirteen-year-old Radèn Ajeng Suratmi, his second daughter by his favourite official wife, Ratu Kencana Wulan. Although the marriage was never consummated, Rongga remained close to the sultan. He was not called upon to answer further for the Panaraga incursions, and in other matters too he was shown indulgence. These included the ongoing government investigation into the alleged camp for deserters from Daendels’ army in Japan (Majakerta) and the construction of barges on the Sala River for the transport of teak to the pasisir. In both cases, Rongga adopted a dila-

76 Dj.Br. 46, J.W. Moorrees (Yogyakarta) to W.N. Servatius (Surakarta), 3-4-1810, W.N. Servatius (Surakarta) to J.W. Moorrees (Yogyakarta), 7-4-1810.
77 Dj.Br. 46, H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg) to J.W. Moorrees (Yogyakarta), 10-4-1810.
78 Dj.Br. 46, J.W. Moorrees (Yogyakarta) to Hamengkubuwana II (Yogyakarta), 22-4-1810.
79 Dj.Br. 46, J.W. Moorrees (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg), 28-4-1810.
80 Chapter II note 35.
81 Radèn Ajeng Suratmi, later Ratu Anom, would later marry the son of Pangéran Ngabèhi, Radèn Tumenggung Purbakusuma, Poensen 1905:261-2, below note 98; Chapter II note 35.
tory policy in which he was fully supported by his monarch. He was also allowed back to Madiun, as we will see shortly, to attend to the one-year commemoration of his wife’s demise during which time preparations were secretly laid for his future rebellion.

The April-August 1810 crisis in Dutch-Yogya relations

While Rongga’s stock continued to rise at court, Moorrees’ attempts to bring pressure to bear on the Yogya ruler proved increasingly ineffectual. In particular, his refusal to forward the letters from the Sunan and the three Surakarta mancanagara bupati regarding Rongga’s Panaraga incursions until the sultan received him at court with the stipulated ceremonial eventually led to a complete breakdown in Dutch-Yogya relations (Poensen 1905:178). The main point of dispute remained the question of the sultan’s throne and his right to sit higher than the Resident. On this the Yogya ruler would not budge. All Moorrees’ threats were in vain and the Resident’s forceful policy only undermined the position of the Yogya patih, Danureja II, whose task it was to convey the unpalatable messages to the sultan. Naturally he was seen by those close to the sultan like the bupati wedana and Sumadiningrat as being too closely identified with the Europeans. In fact, Moorrees’ public support for Danureja did him much harm. The Yogya ruler for his part complained bitterly that his patih’s conduct was markedly different from that of his grandfather, Danureja I (in office 1755-1798), who had been able to act in a more even-handed fashion as his father Sultan Mangkubumi’s trusted prime minister.

82 Dj.Br. 27, H.W. Daendels (Semarang) to J.W. Moorrees (Yogyakarta), 20-6-1810, J.W. Moorrees (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Semarang), 2-7-1810, 4-7-1810, J.W. Moorrees (Yogyakarta) to Hamengkubuwana II (Yogyakarta), 28 Jumadilawal AJ 1737 (AD 1-7-1810) (on rounding up of deserters from Daendels’ army, who included Madurese, Sumeneppers, Makassarese, Malays, Bugis, Dayak and Balinese, all of whom could be recognised by their short hair – sampun sami katengaran kapagas); Radèn Rongga Prawiradirja III and Danureja II (Yogyakarta) to J.W. Moorrees (Yogyakarta), 5 Jumadilakir AJ 1737 (AD 8-7-1810) (on Daendels’ demands for laying down shipyards (pegalangan baita) on Sala River for construction of river craft to carry teak from interior to north coast and for pasisir inhabitants, especially Chinese, to be allowed to settle in the mancanagara to provide skilled labour for this process; and on Danureja II and Rongga’s concern that ‘little people’ (tiyang alit) be allowed to continue to sell their wares on the north coast although the sale of teak logs/planks (balok) would be henceforth banned); Danureja II (Yogyakarta) to J.W. Moorrees (Yogyakarta), 6 Jumadilakir AJ 1737 (AD 9-7-1810) (relating that both he and his fellow senior bupati were too afraid to deliver Moorrees’ letter to Hamengkubuwana II requesting Radèn Rongga’s immediate departure for Japan (Majakerta) to clear up the ‘camp’ of deserters); Poensen 1905:172.

83 Dj.Br. 37, J.W. Moorrees (Yogyakarta) to J.A. van Braam (Surakarta), 12-5-1810, 19-5-1810; Dj.Br. 27, J.W. Moorrees (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Semarang), 5-7-1810, stating that Hamengkubuwana II would not agree to abandoning his footstool/bench (voetbankje) which he had taken to placing under his throne, see p. 171.
On 30 April 1810, the sultan went so far as to address a letter to Daendels seeking the governor-general’s permission to dismiss Danureja II, whom he described as still a ‘boy’, and to replace him by the Outer bupati, Mas Tumenggung Sindunagara (post-November 1811, Danureja III, in office 1811-1813).84 The ruler’s proposal was rejected out of hand by Daendels who stated that Sindunagara was far too old and lacking in administrative talents for such an important post.85 The Surakarta Resident, Jacob Andries van Braam, who had now also been appointed Daendels’ deputy,86 was tasked with undertaking a commission to Yogya to effect the full restitution of the patih, who had apparently been restricted in his duties by the sultan in the meantime. But Van Braam’s mediation did little to restore confidence in Danureja II.87

So just what sort of man was Danureja II and why did he so entirely lose the confidence of his monarch? We have already met him in the context of Dipanagara’s circle at Tegalreja where his family’s strong interest in Javanese Islamic mysticism and links with the important religious school and centre for fiqh scholars at Melangi brought them into close contact with the young prince.88 Indeed, the patih’s connections with religious teachers in Melangi, in particular Kyai Taptajani (Carey 1974b:272-3), appear to have elicited criticisms in some quarters in Yogya that he was rather too close to the santri in much the same way that Dipanagara would be later ridiculed by critics at the time of the Java War (Carey 1974a:50, 1975:342 note 7). Danureja II’s mystical interests, his friendship with Europeans and his easygoing character made him a natural ally of Dipanagara’s father, the Crown Prince. He would remain a staunch supporter of the Crown Prince’s karajan party89 until his death in October 1811. According to Van Ijsseldijk, he always passed on information

84 Dj.Br. 27, J.W. Moorrees (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Semarang), 4-7-1810; Dj.Br. 22 pt. 4 (‘Correspondentie tusschen den Minister aan het hof van Djokjokarta en den Gouverneur-Generaal in anno 1811’, June-August 1811), Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to J.W. Janssens (Batavia), circa 6-1811; Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:34-5. Hamengkubuwana II had referred to Danureja by the familiar and rather derogatory Javanese expression, tholé (‘little boy’).
85 Dj.Br. 27 pt. 4, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to J.W. Janssens (Batavia), circa 6-1811; dK 145, Waterloo, ‘Memorie van Overgave’, 4-4-1808, described Sindunagara as fifty years of age in 1808 ‘but with the appearance of an eighty year old’. See further Carey 1992:490 note 429.
86 Chapter V note 46.
87 Although Daendels (1814:Bijlage 2, additionele stukken 6; Bataviasche Koloniale Courant 6, 8-2-1811) confirms that Van Braam made two visits (the latter from 10-13 November) to Yogy in 1810 as his commissioner to sort out the political problems at the court, there is some confusion over when exactly he made his first visit: Dj.Br. 22 pt. 4, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to J.W. Janssens (Batavia), circa 6-1811, states that he came in July, whereas Dj.Br. 37, J.W. Moorrees (Yogyakarta) to W.N. Servatius (Surakarta), 30-4-1810, indicates that he was due to arrive from Semarang on Friday, 4 May. See further Poensen 1905:178-81. There is nothing in the available Residency letters for May-July 1810 period to confirm this first visit, but I tend to favour Engelhard’s dating.
88 See pp. 99-100.
89 Chapter V note 121.
about affairs of state to the Crown Prince, and the fortunes of the two men became inextricably linked: as the Crown Prince fell from favour in the 1800s so the position of the patih was increasingly jeopardised. Two of his daughters by his royal-born wife, Ratu Anggèr, a daughter of the second sultan and his part-Madurese consort, Ratu Kedhaton, married sons of the Crown Prince (p. 371; Appendix II), and the close family ties between the Danurejan family and the karajan, subsequently produced considerable support for Dipanagara during the Java War (Appendix VIII).

The patih’s main faults were that he was politically naïve, administratively inexperienced and lacked the strength and decisiveness to stand up to his critics at court. Many of these weaknesses stemmed from his youth: he was barely twenty-eight when he succeeded his grandfather as prime minister. But at heart he was too mild a man to shoulder the responsibilities and burdens of his high office. While he was still assistant to Danureja I in the 1790s, Van IJsseldijk remarked on his ‘blind obedience and great fear of the sultan’, which meant that affairs of state were handled ‘more by the petulant ideas of the ruler than by the rules of equity and justice’. Second Resident of Yogya Van den Berg likewise observed that Danureja II was a ‘terrible bungler’ as a young administrator, and although he later grew into his position as patih, he remained wanting, in Van den Berg’s view, ‘in that degree of firmness necessary to support his dignity […] he is a man of pleasure in the pursuit of which he frequently neglects his business’. His heavy drinking bouts at Residency parties and the bad example he set other Yogya officials on such occasions, greatly incensed the sultan who fined him heavily. This kept him poor which was an additional disadvantage when it came to manipulating court patronage. The Pakualam babad, which is a hostile source, even speaks of him acting as a ‘procurer’ of young girls for the Crown Prince who had a reputation as a womaniser (Carey 1980:86 note 1; Poensen 1905:118). One of

90 KITLV H 97 (7), Van IJsseldijk, ‘Korte schets’, 31-8-1798. See also Poensen 1905:111-2; B.Ng. I:35, VIII.61-4.
92 KITLV H 97 (7), Van IJsseldijk, ‘Korte schets’, 31-8-1798.
93 Dj.Br. 48, J.G. van den Berg (Yogyakarta) to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 6-12-1801; KITLV H 97 (8), Van den Berg, ‘Memorie’, 11-8-1803.
94 Dj.Br. 48, J.G. van den Berg (Yogyakarta) to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 11-1-1802 (on the 2,000 ronde real fine imposed by Hamengkubuwana II on Danureja II and other court officials who had enjoyed the New Year’s eve party in the Residency so much that they had been too drunk to attend the religious feast (slametan) the next day for the recently deceased Ratu Bendara, daughter of Hamengkubuwana I and estranged wife of Mangkunagara I); Dj.Br. 86, Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 28-2-1806 (on poverty of Danureja II and heavy fines imposed on him by Hamengkubuwana II); B.Ng. I:100-1, XXVII.1-30; Van Kesteren 1887:1316; Poensen 1905:118, 124.
these was supposedly ‘carried off’ from the Surakarta *kraton*, which if true might have been expected to create some sort of diplomatic incident with the Sunan. But the sources are silent.

He also had powerful enemies at court. One of these was Pangéran Natakusuma, the future Pakualam I (reigned 1812-1829), who lost no opportunity to turn his elder brother, the sultan, against him. He it was who related the supposed incident regarding Danureja II’s kidnapping of the girl from the Surakarta court, which he had originally heard from Radèn Rongga, to the sultan. Another was the sultan’s third consort, Ratu Kencana Wulan (circa 1776-1859) (Carey and Houben 1987:23, 26), the low-born former commander of his Amazon corps, whose eldest daughter (born circa 1793) had married Natakusuma’s eldest son, Radèn Tumenggung Natadiningrat, in September 1805.

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95 Dj.Br. 46, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg), 27-10-1810.
96 Dj.Br. 46, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg), 27-10-1810 (referring to Natakusuma as a ‘keen enemy’ of Danureja II whom he hoped to replace by his own son Radèn Tumenggung Natadiningrat); Poensen 1905:117, 124.
97 According to John Crawfurd, British Resident of Yogyakarta (1811-1813, 1814-1816), Ratu Kencana Wulan’s father, a descendant of the famous sixteenth-century Mataram *kyai*, Ki Gedhé Karang Lo (B.Ng. I49-50, XIII.22-7), had kept a stall in the Yogya market at which she served and where she was noticed by Hamengkubuwana II when he was wandering through the *pasar* surrounded by his retinue, IOL Mack.Pr. 21 pt. 3, ‘State of the court of Djojacarta by Mr Craufurd’, 6-12-1811. This tale of Hamengkubuwana II visiting the main Yogya market has a ring of truth to it given Pangéran Natakusuma’s remark to Crawfurd in May 1812 that ‘[the sultan’s] conduct is in all respects like that of a child. He goes in person to look at his market at Gadhing which he has enlarged. He is quickly angry with his people, but readily forgives them on their asking his mercy’, IOL Eur F148/24 (Raffles-Minto collection vol. 24), John Crawford (Yogyakarta) to T.S. Raffles (Batavia), 14-5-1812.
98 Dj.Br. 49, Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 7-9-1805; Carey and Hoadley 2000:368-80, on the marriage of Natadiningrat to Ratu Anom (born circa 1793), eldest daughter of Ratu Kencana Wulan on 5-9-1805. According to Daendels (1814:Bijlage 2, additionele stukken 6), Ratu Anom was notoriously lascivious (*ontuchtig*) and he suggested in November 1810 that Natadiningrat was coming under pressure from his father to seek a divorce. The Pakualam *babad* partially confirms this by speaking of the pressure which Ratu Anom was under at this time to re-marry, but according to this source she would have none of it remaining constant to her husband during this difficult period of his exile when both she and her two children were in the care of Hamengkubuwana II. See also Dj.Br. 46, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to W.N. Servatius (Surakarta), 12-12-1810, on Ratu Anom throwing herself at Hamengkubuwana II’s feet and begging his compassion. She was promoted to the more senior title of Ratu Ayu in early 1811, her previous title going to her younger sister Raden Ajeng Suratmi (born circa 1797), who later married Pangéran Purwanegara (formerly Radèn Tumenggung Purbakusuma), a son of Hamengkubuwana II’s elder brother, Pangéran Ngabèhi, note 81; Poensen 1905:261-2; Mandoyokusumo 1977:23 no. 52. Their daughter became the principal consort of Hamengkubuwana V in circa 1834 with the title Ratu Kencana, Mandoyokusumo 1977:43; B.Ng. III:81, XX.45, III:377-8, LXIII.1-5. Meanwhile, Ratu Ayu, who subsequently bore the title Ratu Pakualam, outlived her husband and saw her fourth son, Pangéran Suryasasraningrat, succeed as Pakualam III in 1858. She died on 14-9-1859, Padmasusastra 1902:308; Rouffaer 1905:603; Mandoyokusumo 1977:24 no. 58; Dj.Br. 1, C.P. Brest van Kempen, ‘Politieke Verslag over de Residentie Djokjokarta voor het jaar 1859’, 24-3-1860.
Described as ‘the only female in Java whom Daendels was afraid of’ (Journal 1853-54, 8:241) and by the marshal himself (Daendels 1814:95) as ‘a woman of outstanding beauty and unusual intelligence who had no difficulty in dominating the sultan whose favourite she remained’, the Ratu made no secret of the fact that she hoped to see her son-in-law installed as the new *patih* following Danureja II’s fall from favour (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:34; Poensen 1905:166-7). Meanwhile, the birth of a son to Natadiningrat and his bride in 1807 gave rise to prophecies that he would one day have a royal destiny. All these personal and factional challenges meant that Danureja II was singularly ill-equipped to act as a channel between the European government and the second sultan during a crucial period in the sultanate’s history. We shall see in the next chapter how the additional pressures imposed by the policies of the European government between 1808 and 1812 would later cost him his life.

Despite Van Braam’s mediation, the restrictions placed on the *patih* by the sultan in late April were not significantly ameliorated. By October, Engelhard was reporting that Danureja II had been stripped of all responsibilities for internal administration which were now placed in the hands of Natadiningrat. The Yogya first minister was left with the regulation of affairs in the *mancanagara* and relations between the Yogya *kraton* and the Surakarta court and with the European government. But even here his room for manoeuvre was heavily circumscribed because on all visits to the Residency he had to be accompanied by Natadiningrat and Sindunagara who were to act as his deputies. At the end of August, the sultan appointed another close confidant and former personal retainer, Radèn Tumenggung Purwadipura, to shadow Danureja II as his official assistant, thus further restricting his competence (Carey and Hoadley 2000:78).

Events in the *kraton* were now moving rapidly in the direction of a consolidation of Natakusuma’s power and there were even rumours that this politically ambitious prince had offered a large bribe to secure his son, Natadiningrat’s, appointment as *patih*. It was clear that the Crown Prince and his *karajan* party were no longer able to exercise any influence over the sultan and it would be only a matter of time before he was finally edged aside. Already at the start of Daendels’ administration, the Crown Prince’s

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99 Poensen 1905:140-1; B.Ng. I:84, XXIV.9-13, relate that an Arab sayyid (descendant of The Prophet), a trader from Semarang who was a friend of Danureja II, had prophesied that the child would one day be Crown Prince (*patut lunggyèng kadipatèn*). In fact, this child, Radèn Mas Mahmud (later Pangéran Suryaputra), does not seem to have succeeded to any royal title, being passed over in favour of the Ratu’s fourth son Pangéran Suryasasraningrat, see note 98.

100 See p. 292.

101 Dj.Br. 46, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg), 27-10-1810.

102 Dj.Br. 22 pt. 4, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to J.W. Janssens (Batavia), circa 6-1811; Dj.Br. 9A pt. 8, Valck, ‘Overzigt’, 51; Poensen 1905:166-7 (reference to Sindunagara and Natadiningrat acting as Danureja II’s *kliwon*); Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:34.

103 Dj.Br. 22 pt. 4, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to J.W. Janssens (Batavia), circa 6-1811.
position had been marginal: according to a Dutch source, he had rarely been invited to royal state meetings in the Srimenganti pavilion or to the assemblies of high court officials. When he did make an appearance he was usually dispatched with routine business to the prime minister’s office or just as summarily dismissed according to the caprice of the sultan.\textsuperscript{104} Now his situation was even more precarious. Although he seemed to submit to this cavalier treatment with ostensible patience, an insight into his true state of mind can be ascertained from the admission of a local religious teacher who later confessed that he had been paid a sizeable sum – 7,000 Spanish dollars – by the Crown Prince to ensure the sultan’s speedy demise by poison.\textsuperscript{105}

Meanwhile, the relationship between the sultan and Moorrees was descending into open confrontation. In late June, when the Resident was about to leave for Semarang to confer with Daendels about the vexed issue of the new court ceremonial, his wife was held up in her carriage during an outing to the countryside by an armed band operating under the sultan’s orders and forced to turn back to Yogya.\textsuperscript{106} When Moorrees eventually met the governor-general, he was urged to make no concessions to the sultan. But already relations with the court were in crisis. In May, the Resident had held up the official messenger from the Sunan to the Yogya court announcing the appointment of Radèn Adipati Cakranagara as the new Surakarta patih in place of the recently dismissed Danuningrat. Pakubuwana IV’s letter was dated 9 May (4 Rabingulakir AJ 1737), but by mid-July this had still not been delivered.\textsuperscript{107} Both sides refused to give way: Daendels rejected any idea of compromise over the seating arrangements and the sultan remained adamant, for if he gave ground, as Sumadiningrat pointed out to the Resident, this would constitute too great a blow to his prestige.\textsuperscript{108} In the ensuing deadlock, Moorrees found himself, in the words of the Pakualam babad, ‘like an egg caught between two sharp stones’ (Poensen 1905:178).

Finally, Daendels wrote to the hapless Moorrees ordering him to deliver an ultimatum to the sultan demanding concessions over the question of the height of his throne. If this was not accepted, he should withdraw to Semarang.

\textsuperscript{104} dK 145, Waterloo, ‘Memorie van Overgave’, 4-4-1808.
\textsuperscript{105} UBL BPL 616, Port. 5 pt. 2, J.D. Kruseman, ‘Procès-verbaal of Kyai Murma Wijaya’, 13-11-1816. The sum was eventually paid when the Crown Prince temporarily replaced Hamengkubuwana II as Prince Regent in January-September 1811. A further 3,000 Spanish dollars, which made up the total of 10,000 Spanish dollars originally promised to the kyai, was handed over after Hamengkubuwana III’s death in November 1814 by his widow, Ratu Ibu. See further pp. 444-5.
\textsuperscript{106} Dj.Br. 27, J.W. Moorrees (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Semarang), 22-6-1810. The same fate later overtook Moorrees’ successor, Pieter Engelhard, Chapter I note 146.
\textsuperscript{107} Dj.Br. 37, J.W. Moorrees (Yogyakarta) to W.N. Servatius (Surakarta), circa 23-5-1810 (arrival of Surakarta gandhèk Prayamenggala with Pakubuwana IV’s letter); Hamengkubuwana II (Yogyakarta) to Pakubuwana IV (Surakarta), 16 Jumadilakir AJ 1737 (AD 19-7-1810) (official Yogya reply acknowledging receipt of letter).
\textsuperscript{108} Dj.Br. 27, J.W. Moorrees (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Semarang), 6-7-1810.
taking the patih with him. Moorrees duly delivered the ultimatum, but the sultan paid it not the slightest attention, departing with Sumadiningrat to his pesanggrahan at Samas on the south coast for three days by the sea. At the same time, despite considerable pressure on Danureja II, including from Moorrees’ Assistant, Bartholomeus Jacobus Driessen, and his elder brother, Lieutenant Willem Driessen, acting commander of the Yogya garrison, both fluent Javanese speakers, the patih refused to budge. He needed no reminding that to have accompanied the Resident to Semarang at such a time would have been more than his life was worth. So Moorrees made the journey alone on 13 July. Daendels had been outfaced by the sultan. Although Moorrees returned briefly to Yogya in early August, his residency was at an end. He was replaced by Pieter Engelhard on 1 September after a week’s interregnum in which affairs were left in the hands of the Driessen brothers. The marshal had decided to make concessions and the sultan was allowed to receive the

109 Dj.Br. 27, J.W. Moorrees (Yogyakarta) to Hamengkubuwana II (Yogyakarta), 6 Jumadilakir AJ 1737 (AD 9-7-1810) (requesting a meeting before Hamengkubuwana II’s departure for Samas), Danureja II (Yogyakarta) to J.W. Moorrees (Yogyakarta), 7 Jumadilakir AJ 1737 (AD 10-7-1810) (conveying Hamengkubuwana II’s refusal to allow Sumadiningrat to meet Moorrees at the Residency given that it was not his business to deal with the issues Moorrees’ had raised, demanding that the Surakarta messenger should be allowed to deliver Pakubuwana IV’s letter according to the old ceremonial, and refusing to negotiate further on the height of his throne: wondéné prakawis palenggahan-Dalem gilang, timbalan-Dalem, inggih boten éwah kados ingkang sampun wangsul-wangsul), Danureja II (Yogyakarta) to Lieutenant Willem Driessen (Yogyakarta), 11 Jumadilakir AJ 1737 (AD 13-7-1810) (complaining of Moorrees’ neglect in answering his letter of 6 Jumadilakir (AD 9-7-1810) before his departure for Semarang regarding the various issues including the delivery of Pakubuwana IV’s letter, Lieutenant Driessen now being left in charge of the Residency: kang dados chulman wonten ing ngrik), Bartholomew Driessen (Yogyakarta) to J.W. Moorrees (Yogyakarta) 10-7-1810 (referring to Hamengkubuwana II’s return from Samas on 12-7-1810). It is likely that Hamengkubuwana II’s visit to Samas was for his personal pleasure: Dj.Br. 27, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to P.A. Goldbach (landdrost of Demak and Semarang), 17-9-1810, referred to Hamengkubuwana II’s departure for Beliga (Bli) in the Salam district of southern Kedu at the confluence of the Praga and Kalijengking rivers (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, II:339, III:Map Plate 1; Carey 1984:44) for a spot of fishing. See note 205.

110 Bartholomew Driessen (born Yogya, circa 1766) appears to have been a younger brother of Lieutenant Willem Driessen (note 54) and they are both mentioned in an 1819 list of Yogya inhabitants as burger (citizen) and ‘lieutenant’ respectively, MvK 3124, ‘Register der Europese personeel op Java en Madoera, Djokjakarta’, 1-1-1819. He took temporary charge of the Residency office when Moorrees finally departed with his family for Semarang on 24-8-1810, his brother Lieutenant Willem Driessen having overall responsibility for security, Dj.Br. 37, J.W. Moorrees (Yogyakarta) to W.N Servatius (Surakarta), 25-8-1810.

111 Dj.Br. 27, H.W. Daendels (Semarang) to J.W. Moorrees (Yogyakarta), 5-7-1810, J.W. Moorrees (Yogyakarta) to Danureja II (Yogyakarta), 6 Jumadilakir AJ 1737 (AD 8-7-1810), Danureja II (Yogyakarta) to J.W. Moorrees (Yogyakarta), 7 Jumadilakir AJ 1737 (AD 9-7-1810), Bartholomew Driessen (Yogyakarta) to J.W. Moorrees (Yogyakarta), 10-7-1810, J.W. Moorrees (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Semarang), 10-7-1810, Danureja II (Yogyakarta) to Lieutenant Commander Willem Driessen, (Yogyakarta), 11 Jumadilakir AJ 1737 (AD 13-7-1810), Bartholomew Driessen (Yogyakarta) to J.W. Moorrees (Yogyakarta), 13-7-1810.

112 Note 109.
The power of prophecy

new Resident in the Srimenganti hall seated on his throne in the old style (Poensen 1905:184-5). The diplomatic Engelhard was also instructed to calm the sultan’s ruffled feelings.

The ‘piling up’ of affairs and preparations for Rongga’s rebellion

The lull was very short. On 10 September, a bare ten days after Engelhard’s arrival, news came through of an attack on a Chinese tax-farmer in Demak by a band of Yogya robbers from the village of Gabus in the Grobogan-Wirasari area. Opium, cash and ornaments worth some 10,000 Spanish dollars had been taken, and it was suspected that some of the members of this gang were deserters from the Semarang garrison regiment who had earlier gathered in the province of Japan and against whom neither the sultan nor Radèn Rongga had taken any action. Daendels was exceedingly angry. Writing in his usual ebullient style on 15 September, he instructed Engelhard to press for ‘sensational satisfaction’, the ‘complete return of the stolen goods’ and the arrest of the robbers within fourteen days otherwise he would occupy the Yogya area from which the robbery had originated. The least sign of resistance from the Yogya ruler, the governor-general announced, would be taken as ‘a declaration of war’.

Engelhard’s reply gives an insight into just how invidious the position of Yogya Resident had now become as an emissary between two such immovable protagonists, one of whom had perfected the art of procrastination. At 5.30 on the evening of 21 September with Daendels’ letter in hand along with the original report on the robbery from the bailiff (landdrost) of Demak and Semarang, P.A. Goldbach, Engelhard attended the usual state meeting in the Srimenganti pavilion. The Resident asked for a private meeting with the

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113 This was a village in the Kayumas district of Wirasari kabupaten.
114 The list of stolen property included: 31 kati of opium (1 kati = 0.617 kg), 2,000 Spanish dollars in gold and silver ornaments, 2,700 ronde real in silver, 1,650 ronde real in copper duit (Javanese dhuwit/copper coins [farthings]), 80 ronde real in Japanese red copper coins and 34 ronde real in kepèng (half duit), Dj.Br. 39, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to Danureja II (Yogyakarta), 26-9-1810; Dj.Br. 41, Danureja II (Yogyakarta) to Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta), 1 Ramelan AJ 1737 (AD 1-10-1810).
117 Engelhard did not have the Residency interpreter Johannes Godlieb Dietrée with him because he had joined the Yogya commission to Grobogan-Wirasari, Dj.Br. 39, Danureja II (Yogyakarta) to Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta), 28 Ruwah AJ 1737 (AD 28-9-1810). But it is likely that he brought along his Javanese-speaking secretary. Hendrik Willem Gezelschap, see note 155. Many Residents of the pre-1808 VOC period spoke Javanese, some like J.G. van den Berg (p. 174; Fasseur 1993:66) very fluently.
sultan and the Crown Prince:

[The sultan] fell silent for a moment and placed his hand behind him on his royal [throne] stool. The bupati wedana [Radèn Rongga] and Inner and Outer regents [Natadiningrat, Sasradiningrat II and Purwadipura] opposite us were summoned to approach him without the sultan answering me anything, so I was obliged to repeat my question whether the sultan wished to deliberate on the [Demak] issue in the presence of the regents. The sultan then spoke to Natadiningrat and the latter relayed what he had said stammeringly to me. I took the letters out of my bag and handed them to the sultan who passed them on immediately to Natadiningrat to read them out loud in the presence of the other regents [...]. The sultan heard the governor-general’s letter very calmly and afterwards promised to give me a written reply.\footnote{Dj.Br. 27, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg), 22-9-1810.}

The Yogya ruler then departed for four days to his pesanggrahan at Pengawatreja, the second such visit out of town since news of the Demak raid had reached him.\footnote{Note 109.} Returning briefly to Yogya in mid-week, he left once again for his country estate. In the meantime, nothing was decided about the Demak affair beyond the dispatch of the usual long-winded commission of enquiry which took nearly a month to complete its investigations. Finally, on 30 September, Engelhard was vouchsafed another interview. Again the sultan and Crown Prince were asked whether they wished to hear Daendels’ ultimatum out of earshot of the four court bupati (nayaka). This time the sultan agreed. Calmly listening to the governor-general’s threat to occupy the Yogya villages in Grobogan-Wirasari in the event that a single man involved in the robbery was allowed to escape, the Yogya ruler conferred with his son, the Crown Prince, and then summoned the nayaka to give their views. Eventually, the Resident was told through his secretary, who was interpreting, that the sultan was content with Daendels’ communication, that he would indeed give him ‘satisfaction’, but that he would feel ‘ashamed’ if the governor-general ordered his troops to enter Yogya territory. In any case, nothing could be done until the return of the Yogya commission from Grobogan-Wirasari, at which an exasperated Daendels wrote in the margins of Engelhard’s dispatch: ‘I will await one more post, but then I will await the outcome of this Yogya commission no longer!’\footnote{Dj.Br. 27, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg), 30-9-1810.} It would be nearly another two weeks and many more posts before the commission returned.\footnote{Dj.Br. 39, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to Danureja II (Yogyakarta), 13-10-1810. The mission, which comprised the ’old’ Residency translator, J.G. Dietrée, the bupati of Grobogan-Wirasari, Radèn Tumenggung Sasrakusuma, and Mas Ngabèhi Sindujaya, official assistant (kliwon) of the Keparak Kiwa (treasury) department in the kraton, had departed on 16-9-1810, Dj.Br. 27, Pieter Engelhard
In the meantime, on the very evening of the kraton meeting, Engelhard was surprised by a night-time visit by Radèn Rongga to his residence. The bupati wedana had come to inform the Resident of his imminent departure for Madiun where he would remain until after the end of the fasting month (Puwasa). Engelhard was suspicious: ‘This seemed to me very strange because usually it is in the Puwasa month [which that year fell from 1-30 October] when the mancanagara regents make their annual return home and they usually come in state to the minister [Resident] to take their leave together’. Unbeknowns to the Resident, the first steps in Rongga’s rebellion had begun. On his arrival in Madiun, subsequent reports indicate that the still unfinished walls of his kraton-like residence at Maospati were fortified with sharpened bamboo spikes and cannon, and contacts made with Pangéran Prangwedana (Mangkunagara II), a personal friend, who may have given assurances that if his legion was deployed against him, his soldier’s guns would have no live rounds in them. Rongga also wrote to all his subordinate Madiun bupati informing them that he would probably not appear at court the following Garebeg Mulud in late April 1811 when the eastern mancanagara administrators travelled to the royal capital.

Although Engelhard attempted to prevent Rongga leaving Yogya by pointing out to Danureja II that it was highly improper for the bupati wedana to absent himself from the royal capital while the official report into the Panaraga incursion of the previous January by the joint Yogyakarta-Surakarta commission was still awaited, none of the patih’s official assistants dared to take the message to the sultan. Rongga was thus allowed to leave unhindered.

(Yogyakarta) to P.A. Goldbach (Semarang and Demak), 13-9-1810. On the establishment of an official postal service in Yogya during the Residency of A.H. Smissaert (1823-1825), see below Chapter X note 46. At this time all posts and dispatches were carried by messengers (oppasser).

122 Dj.Br. 46, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to Hamengkubuwana II (Yogyakarta), 1 Ramelan AJ 1737 (AD 30-9-1810), Hamengkubuwana II (Yogyakarta) to Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta), 3 Ramelan AJ 1737 (AD 2-10-1810), Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg), 2-10-1810.

123 Dj.Br. 46, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to W.N. Servatius (Surakarta), 25-11-1810, Radèn Tumenggung Purwadipura (Cemara, Madiun) to Danureja II (Yogyakarta), 25-11-1810, (on Rongga’s contacts with Prangwedana through Radén Ngabèhi Sumadiwirya (note 218), and Purwadipura’s report that Prangwedana had gone hunting deer near the village of Sarèn in the Sragèn district on the road which Rongga was taking on his way to Madiun after his flight from Yogya, and the two ‘had conveniently not met’ which he surmised was due to their prior agreement, see further Poensen 1905:203-4, Dj.Br 9A, Valck, ‘Overzigt’, 78, who states that Rongga and Prangwedana in fact met at Sarèn); P.H. van Lawick van Pabst (Rembang) to Brigadier-General F.C.P. von Winckelmann (Semarang), 1-12-1810 (on fortifying of Rongga’s dalem at Maospati); S.Br. 37, p. 103, Prangwedana (Surakarta) to Pakubuwana IV (Surakarta), 16-12-1810, 22-12-1810 (Prangwedana’s acknowledgement of Dutch suspicions).

124 Dj.Br. 46, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg), 28-11-1810, relaying a report from the bupati of Rawa, Radèn Tumenggung Pringgakusuma, who had met Rongga at Delanggu on his return journey to Yogya from Madiun in early November 1810 when he was coming back to attend the Garebeg Puwasa. On The Garebeg Mulud of 1811, see p. 269.
dered at midday on 1 October. It would not return until 8 November by which time preparations for his rebellion were already well advanced. It seems that he had been warned by Natadiningrat that the official report of the commission, which confirmed that Rongga’s Madiun inhabitants had violated Surakarta territory, was about to be received and that there would be serious consequences for him. This was prescient. In the margins of Engelhard’s dispatch informing him of Rongga’s departure, Daendels had written that the report, which he had subsequently received from Goldbach, showed Rongga’s guilt in the affair and that he would be demanding that the sultan ‘inflict the necessary punishment’. ‘But the partiality [of the sultan] for Rongga in this case shines through clearly’, the governor-general noted, so other steps would need to be taken including involving Sunan Pakubuwana IV, the aggrieved party in the affair, to cooperate with the European government in ‘bringing pressure to bear’ on Yogya. Given what had happened to the demang of Tersana and what would soon befall the Yogya bekel of Gabus, who was handed over to the Dutch authorities in Demak in late November and executed by a firing squad for his role in the September raid, there could be few illusions about what Rongga’s fate would be should he ever be entrusted to the tender mercies of Daendels’ government.

‘So they piled up the affairs of Radèn Rongga’, Dipanagara noted in his babad description of the situation in Yogya at this time. In that month of October as the bupati wedana paid his last peacetime visit to his Maospati residence, the sultan was confronting no less than four separate demands for satisfaction from the European government in the resolution of cross-border issues in the pasisir and mancanagara. In chronological order, they were: Rongga’s Panaraga incursion of 31 January 1810 as evidenced in the recently submitted joint Surakarta-Yogyakarta report, the extradition of three assistants (patih) to the bupati of Japan (Majakerta) for their supposed role in conspiring at the ‘camp for military deserters’ in their mancanagara district, the ‘sensational satisfaction’ involving the surrender of the bekel of Gabus and restitution of 10,000 Spanish dollars worth of stolen goods from the Chinese

125 Dj.Br. 46, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg), 2-10-1810.
126 Dj.Br. 46, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg), 9-11-1810.
127 It was sent to the landdroost of Demak and Semarang, P.A. Goldbach, on the very day Rongga left Yogy, Dj.Br. 46, C.F. Krijgsman (Residency translator Semarang) and E. Diepen (Panaraga) to P.A. Goldbach (Semarang and Demak), 1-10-1810.
128 Dj.Br. 46, Daendels’ marginal notes on letter of Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg), 2-10-1810.
129 Dj.Br. 46, H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg) to Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta), 25-11-1810; Dj.Br. 27, A.H. Smisaert (acting landdroost of Semarang and Demak) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg), 1-12-1810, on the ‘ fusillading’ of the bekel of Gabus in Semarang.
130 The Yogya commissioners, Pangéran Dipakusuma and Radèn Tumenggung Jayadipura, had refused to sign this joint report for fear of incurring Hamengkubuwana II’s wrath by implicating Radèn Rongga in the attacks, Dj.Br. 46, C.F. Krijgsman and E. Diepen (Panaraga) to P.A. Goldbach (Semarang and Demak), 1-10-1810.
bandar in Demak following the early September raid. And, as if these were not enough, a demand from the landdrost of Rembang and member of the Forestry Board, Pieter Herbert Baron van Lawick van Pabst, for an enquiry by Radèn Rongga into attacks by another robber band of Yogya provenance on the first government forester of Rembang and a local Surakarta demang in the Blora teak forests in early October. In vain, the sultan pointed out that there was not even proof that Yogya inhabitants were responsible for the Demak raid, still less that it involved military deserters, nor yet that the three Japan (Majakerta) patih – one of whom had been in Yogya since the 18 April Garebeg Mulud – had had anything to do with the so-called ‘camp’ for fugitives from the Semarang garrison regiment. In fact, he steadfastly refused to hand over the three officials, reserving the right to punish them himself if they were found guilty of any misdemeanour by staking them out in the sun each morning on the official meeting place in front of the kraton.

Small wonder, that by the time of the celebration of the Garebeg Puwasa on 30 October, relations between the Resident and the sultan had reached breaking point. They were not improved when Engelhard refused to fire the customary 21-gun salute from the fort (Daendels had discouraged the firing of such salutes to conserve gunpowder) when the traditional ‘rice mountain’ offerings (gunungan) were carried in procession from the kraton to the Great Mosque (Mesjid Ageng). The sultan in turn declined to receive the Resident standing up as the new ceremonial demanded. He also ordered all his troops for the usual Garebeg parade to turn out on horseback (they were normally on foot) to meet the Resident at the paséban and overawe him.

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131 Dj.Br. 39, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to Hamengkubuwana II (Yogyakarta), 6 Puwasa AJ 1737 (AD 6-10-1810); Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to Danureja II (Yogyakarta), 29-10-1810, 6-11-1810.
132 Dj.Br. 41, Hamengkubuwana II (Yogyakarta) to Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta), 16 Ramelan AJ 1737 (AD 16-10-1810), stating that the stepmother and brother-in-law of two of the men accused of being military deserters from the district of Kayumas (Grobgoban-Wirasari) had travelled to Yogya to vouchsafe their credentials as civilians.
133 Dj.Br. 41, Danureja II (Yogyakarta) to Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta), 18 Ruwah AJ 1737 (AD 18-9-1810), Hamengkubuwana II (Yogyakarta) to Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta), 23 Ruwah AJ 1737 (AD 23-9-1810), 6 Ramelan AJ 1737 (AD 6-10-1810), Danureja II (Yogyakarta) to Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta), 11 Ramelan AJ 1737 (AD 11-10-1810); Dj.Br. 39, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to Danureja II (Yogyakarta), 18-9-1810, 26-9-1810, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to Hamengkubuwana II (Yogyakarta), 3 Puwasa AJ 1737 (AD 3-10-1810), Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to Danureja II (Yogyakarta), 11-10-1810, 12-10-1810, 13-10-1810, 16-10-1810.
134 Dj.Br. 41, Hamengkubuwana II (Yogyakarta) to Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta), 16 Ramelan AJ 1737 (AD 16-10-1810).
135 Dj.Br. 46, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg), 4-12-1810, referring to Daendels’ orders of 19-1-1809 and 21-2-1809 restricting the yearly delivery of gunpowder for the firing of salutes to 500 lbs for Hamengkubuwana II and 100 lbs for the Crown Prince.
with their mounted presence. Following the ceremony, a curt note was delivered to Engelhard stating that the failure to fire the customary salute ‘showed a lack of friendship’ on the part of the Resident and the patih would suffer four days’ house arrest unless the custom was immediately restored. Engelhard refused to receive the communication, summoning Danureja II and his assistants to remind them of their duties to maintain the prestige and honour of the Dutch in the presence of the sultan and the same with regard to the ruler in the presence of the ‘minister’ (Resident). The patih remained silent. His standing at court had already been fatally compromised: he alone amongst the sultan’s family and high officials had just been refused permission to approach the ruler to pay the usual act of obeisance or sungkem on the day of celebration and absolution at the end of the fasting. There could not have been a more public humiliation.

‘I sense more and more that the sultan is hurrying to his fall’, Daendels minuted on the back of Engelhard’s dispatch relating the humiliations of the recent Garebeg celebrations. But the marshal resolved to give the sultan one last chance by sending his deputy Jacob Andries van Braam to Yogya bearing letters. These would demand satisfaction from the Yogya ruler about the three outstanding cases involving Rongga, the three Japan (Majakerta) patih and the Demak attack, and would warn him about the political ambitions of his brother, Pangéran Natakusuma. In the event that this approach failed, the same marginal minute indicated that the governor-general had made the necessary military preparations: Brigadier-General F.C.P. von Winckelmann, the Semarang divisional commander, had been ordered to march two infantry companies and half an artillery company with six cannon each to Surakarta and Klaten thus freeing up the Ambonese garrisons to move to Yogya.

The rise of powerful anti-European sentiments was now evident in the sultan’s capital. Both Javanese and Europeans alike sensed it. In the days immediately preceding the Garebeg, as members of the sultan’s family began to split along pro and anti-government lines, one prince, Pangéran Dipawijaya I, a son of the first sultan, shaved off his hair and adopted an Islamic name, Muhamad Abubakar, in order to become a ‘priest’ (santri) and thereby remain aloof from the approaching conflict between the Yogya ruler and the Dutch

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137 Dj.Br. 36, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg), 31-10-1810.
138 Dj.Br. 36, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg), 31-10-1810, 2-11-1810, referring to the lebaran puwasa, the day of celebration and forgiveness at the end of Puwasa.
139 Dj.Br. 36, marginal minute of Daendels on Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg), 31-10-1810. Daendels later ordered the Ambonese troops to Surabaya, and replaced the garrisons at Klaten and Yogya with 80-90 Javanese troops each, Dj.Br. 46, H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg) to Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta), 17-11-1810.
140 Also referred to in the Residency letters as Pangéran Adiwijaya, Dj.Br. 36, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg), 3-11-1810. The name Dipawijaya I is given in Mandoyokusumo 1977:13 no. 16.
(Carey 1992:400 note 5). The Crown Prince, meanwhile, felt constrained to issue orders to his retainers to avoid giving gratuitous insults to Europeans in public and remonstrated with Sumadiningrat to keep his mouth shut rather than constantly urge the sultan on to ever bolder steps against the government. But this was not enough for Engelhard who made preparations to send his wife out to Semarang to avoid her suffering the same indignity which had befallen Resident Moorrees’ partner when she was attacked in her carriage four months previously. News that the sultan had given orders for a general mustering of his troops on the southern alun-alun the day after the Garebeg indicated that an armed confrontation would not long be delayed.

All eyes were now fixed on the arrival of two individuals on whom the immediate fate of the sultanate seemed to depend: Daendels’ deputy, Van Braam, and the stormy petrel of Madiun, Radèn Rongga, whose return from the eastern mancanagara via Surakarta was daily tracked in the Residency letters from early November onwards. Rongga slipped into Yogya unobtrusively with a small escort on 8 November just over a day after the one-year commemoration feast for his late wife, Ratu Maduretna, had taken place in the kraton. Two days later, almost equally without fanfare, Van Braam arrived bearing a letter from Daendels to the sultan, which bristled with demands for ‘sensational reparations’ and eclatante satisfactie (sensational satisfaction) in the three outstanding cases of Panaraga, Japan (Majakerta) and Demak.

But no sooner had Van Braam begun to settle into his three-day commission (10-13 November) than a second letter arrived from the governor-general for the Yogya ruler. This missive dated 3 November – the postal service still took a week from Batavia even with the benefit of Daendels’ post-road – was altogether more politically explosive. Its central message was to warn the sultan against his brother, Pangéran Natakusuma, who was accused of having designs on the sultanate. To this end, the prince, in Daendels’ view, had worked to discredit both the patih and the Crown Prince in the eyes of the ruler and was intriguing to have his son, Natadiningrat, appointed in the latter’s place. The marshal likewise averred that both Radèn Rongga and Ratu

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141 Dj.Br. 36, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg), 2-11-1810, 6-11-1810.
142 Dj.Br. 36, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg), 31-10-1810, 2-11-1810.
143 Dj.Br. 46, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg), 31-10-1810.
144 Dj.Br. 46, J.A. van Braam (Surakarta) to Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta), 5-11-1810, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to J.A. van Braam (Surakarta), 6-11-1810, J.A. van Braam (Surakarta) to Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta), 6-11-1810, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg), 9-11-1810 (announcing arrival of Rongga in Yogya on 8-11-1810).
145 Dj.Br. 46, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg), 6-11-1810, referring to the sedhekah for Ratu Maduretna. On Rongga’s arrival, see note 144.
146 Text of Daendels’ letter dated Buitenzorg (Bogor) 24-10-1810 in Daendels 1814:Bijlage 2, additionele stukken 5; Poensen 1905:183-4; Valck 1844:156.
Kencana Wulan were involved in this plot. But, according to Daendels, the prince now had it in mind to break the marriage of his son to the Ratu’s daughter on account of her ‘lewd behaviour’\(^\text{147}\) and have him married off to a more appropriate Yogya princess who would bind him closer to the leading families of Mataram and Kedhu where Natakusuma’s principle apanage holdings lay. To back up his accusations, the governor-general included extracts about Natakusuma’s ambitions from the final administrative reports of the previous VOC Residents of Yogya from Jan Matthijs van Rhijn (in office 1773-1786) to Matthijs Waterloo (in office 1803-1808).\(^\text{148}\) Here the sultan could read such choice passages in Javanese translation as Van IJsseldijk’s report, submitted at the time of Sultan Mangkubumi’s death on 24 March 1792, that Natakusuma might withdraw from the capital to lead a rebellion in Kedhu to prevent his brother succeeding to the throne,\(^\text{149}\) or J.G. van den Berg’s well-aimed historical comparison which likened Natakusuma to Pangérán Puger (the future Sunan Pakubuwana I, reigned 1704-1719), the prince whom the VOC had adopted as a more suitable candidate for the Mataram throne than his intransigent nephew, Sunan Amangkurat III (reigned 1703-1708).\(^\text{150}\) But he would have been spared Governor of Java’s Northeast Coast Nicolaus Engelhard’s succinct summation: ‘A wink would be enough to incite this Pangérán and his following, whom I am closely informed is large and powerful, to topple his brother from the throne’ (De Jonge and Van Deventer 1884-88, XIII:142).

Daendels’ aim was to place both Natakusuma and Radèn Rongga ‘out of commission’ by getting them handed over to the European government. Once this had happened, the marshal expected no further opposition from the Yogya court and felt confident that the Crown Prince could be supported as the government’s key ally against all potential enemies, including his father.\(^\text{151}\) He would begin with Rongga. He thus sent instructions with Van Braam that the *bupati wedana* be placed ‘at the disposal of the government’ and come to his new administrative centre at Buitenzorg (Bogor) to answer for his depredations in Panaraga.\(^\text{152}\) Given the sizeable entourage which Rongga intended to bring with him (2,000 according to Engelhard, half that

\(^{147}\) Note 98, reference to Ratu Anom’s *ontuchtig gedrag*.


\(^{149}\) KITLV H 97 (7), Van IJsseldijk, ‘Korte schets’, 31-8-1798, remarks also published in De Jonge and Van Deventer 1884-88, XII:245.

\(^{150}\) Dj.Br. 37, J.G. van den Berg (Yogyakarta) to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 21-11-1801; KITLV H 97 (8), Van den Berg, ‘Memorie’, 11-8-1803.


\(^{152}\) Dj.Br. 46, Pieter Engelhard and J.A. van Braam (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg), 12-11-1810.
number according to Dipanagara), these orders were later changed: instead of Bogor where there was nowhere for the bupati wedana and his following to lodge, he would be asked to proceed straight to Batavia. Since the governor-general had it in mind that the eastern mancanagara administrator would not be long for this world, the size of his entourage and their long-term lodging was hardly going to be a problem.

To get the sultan to cooperate, Daendels suggested that he should be given ‘a large dose of fear’. Regretting that Van Braam had not waited for his second letter detailing his accusations against Natakusuma before leaving on his commission, he suggested that the presence of Von Winckelmann’s troops in Semarang be used to instil a sense of impending threat. Rumours were thus spread – and not denied by Engelhard – that 2,000 Dutch soldiers were on the march and had reached Boyolali. The sultan himself was said to be convinced that a hostile military force was moving south. It was against this background that Daendels’ letters were handed over to the sultan by the Residency secretary on 10 November.

According to Danureja II, none of the Yogya bupati and princes in the council of state meeting opposed Rongga’s removal to Bogor. Even Rongga with swollen face and angry demeanour had answered sandika (‘as you order!’) as the decision was taken. Likewise, none of the courtiers had protested at the handover of the three Japan (Majakerta) patih or the bekel of Gabus, although the sultan had made difficulties with allowing the return of the stolen goods. As for Daendels’ 3 November letter detailing the threat posed by Natakusuma, this had been read in a very low voice by the Residency secretary until he reached the passage ‘while the patih has once again fallen into disgrace’. The sultan had then seized the letter and dismissed the secretary, instructing Danureja II to read the passages from the final administrative reports of previous Yogya Residents. But when the name ‘Natakusuma’ appeared, the sultan got up from his throne, took the letter and its enclosures, and accompanied only by the Crown Prince went into his private apartments to peruse them out of sight of the council of state.


154 Dj.Br. 46, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg), 9-11-1810; J.A. van Braam (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg), 10-11-1810; marginal minute of Daendels on Van Braam’s letter.

155 Dj.Br. 46, J.A. van Braam (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg), 11-11-1810, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg), 11-11-1810, 12-11-1810, 7-12-1810. Engelhard had feigned illness in order not to suffer the indignity of meeting the sultan under the old-style ceremonial. The letters had been taken in by the Residency secretary, H.W. Gezelschap, who had considerable mastery of Javanese.

156 Dj.Br. 46, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Semarang), 7-12-1810.
Whether the sultan was genuinely shocked by Daendels’ revelations or just felt it politic to make some concessions we may never know. Engelhard later remarked that the Yogya ruler had ‘become quite another person’ when reading the second letter from the governor-general, although how he came by this information given that the letter and its enclosures were studied in private is hard to fathom.\footnote{Dj.Br. 27, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to Brigadier-General F.C.P. von Winckelmann (Semarang), 20-11-1810. Engelhard’s main source on the reaction of the sultan and the Yogya Council of State to the receipt of Daendels’ letters was Danureja II, but he was not present in the private apartments when Hamengkubuwana II read Daendels’ second letter and conferred with the Crown Prince. The patih’s report is cited in Dj.Br. 46, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Semarang), 7-12-1810.} Certainly, by the time Van Braam met the sultan two days later (12 November) a complete change had taken place. As well as allowing the surrender of Rongga and the Yogya officials, the sultan announced that Danureja II was being reinstated in full in his prime ministerial duties and that Natadiningrat would return to his old position as First Outer bupati. The following day, a date was even set for Rongga’s departure – Monday, 26 November – a day deemed auspicious for the Yogya ruler by the court santri. The royal instruction issued to the four bupati designated to accompany the bupati wedana to Bogor even contained special instructions that if Rongga tried anything on the way they were to force him to continue his journey.\footnote{Dj.Br. 27, J.A. van Braam and Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg), 13-11-1810; Dj.Br. 46, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg), 7-12-1810.} On 14 November, the court gamelan played on the Sitinggil (High Ground) to signify that the differences of opinion between the sultan and the governor-general had been resolved.\footnote{Dj.Br. 27, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to J.A. van Braam (Surakarta), 14-11-1810, J.A. van Braam (Surakarta) to Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta), 14-11-1810, 15-11-1810.} As Van Braam rode back to Surakarta, he may have thought that his commission had been an outstanding success. His Yogya colleague was certainly celebrating, signing off his dispatch to the divisional commander in Semarang to stand down his troops with his own epigram concocted from two famous authors of Latin epic: \textit{nulla salus bello, pax optima rerum} (‘there is no deliverance in war, peace is the best of things’).\footnote{Dj.Br. 27, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to Brigadier-General F.C.P. von Winckelmann (Semarang), 20-11-1810. Engelhard was obviously well versed in Classical literature because his ‘epigram’ is a mélange from two different authors of Latin epic, \textit{nulla salus bello} is from Virgil’s \textit{Aeneid} (Book XI line 362), and \textit{pax optima rerum} from Silius Italicus’ \textit{Punica} (Book XI line 592). I am grateful to Dr Peter Brown, Fellow and Tutor in Classics at Trinity College, Oxford, for his assistance with this identification.}
Map 4. Central and east Java in 1810 showing the route taken by Radèn Rongga Prawiradipra III on the banks of the Sala River on 17 December 1810. Taken from De Graaf 1971. Redrawn and
after his flight from Yogyakarta on 20 November 1810 until his final battle and death at Sekaran rearranged by J. Wilbur Wright of Oxford.
Cleansing Java of defilement: Radèn Rongga’s eastern mancanagara rebellion

At 3.30 in the morning of 21 November, Engelhard was roused from his bed with the news that Radèn Rongga had departed earlier that night for Madiun accompanied by 300 followers. Although he wrote immediately to the Assistant-Resident in Surakarta to ask the Sunan and Prangwedana (Mangkunagara II) to cut off Rongga’s march, it was too late: the bupati wedana had already passed Delanggu.  

The following morning the sultan assembled a 1,000-strong expeditionary force under Radèn Tumenggung Purwadipura and sent a circular order to all Yogya mancanagara bupati to cooperate in hunting Rongga down. The royal decree specifically sanctioned Rongga’s death should he refuse to return to Yogya. This order was subsequently overtaken by a further instruction.

Plate 27. A ferry crossing in Java similar to that which Radèn Rongga would have used to transport his 300-strong band across the Sala River on 22 November as he made his way from Kartasura to Masaran on the first stage of his journey to Madiun. Watercolour by John Newman, circa 1811-1813. Photograph by courtesy of the British Library, London, WD 953, f.78 (89).

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161 Dj.Br. 27, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to W.N. Servatius (Surakarta), 21-11-1810, W.N. Servatius (Surakarta) to Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta), 21-11-1810, reporting that Rongga had passed Delanggu at 10 o’clock in the morning with 250 men.

162 Dj.Br. 27, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to J.A. van Braam (Surakarta), 21-11-1810, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg), 21-11-1810, Hamengkubuwana II (Yogyakarta) order to mancanagara bupati, 23 Sawal AJ 1737 (AD 21-11-1810). The senior officials attached to the Yogya expeditionary force are listed as the wedana (heads) of the Gedhong Tengen department, Radèn Tumenggung Purwadipura and Radèn Ria Sindureja, the Outer bupati, Radèn Tumenggung Wiryanegara and Radèn Tumenggung Mertalaya, the kraton troop commander (wedana prajurit), Radèn Panji Suryèngrana, the wedana of the prajurit kadipatèn (Crown Prince’s forces), Radèn Ngabèhi Jayasentika, and the head of the Yogya police (Tumenggung Tamp-
given to Pangéran Dipakusuma, who was sent to reinforce Purwadiipura and the Yogya expeditionary force on 27 November, to the effect that even if Rongga was taken alive he should be immediately killed. According to Danureja II, this was because the sultan did not want the embarrassment of Rongga being brought back to Yogya alive, mindful as he was of the promise made by his father, Sultan Mangkubumi, to Rongga’s grandfather, his army commander during the Giyanti War (1746-1755), that he would never harm any of his descendants or shed their blood, and if they transgressed he would always grant them forgiveness.163 The Yogya force was accompanied by a Dutch officer, Lieutenant Thomas Paulus, and a Batavia-born Eurasian NCO, Sergeant Lucas Leberveld, who was serving at the time as the sultan’s coachman. Both were said to be fluent Javanese speakers, with thorough knowledge of the country.164 They were to play a critical role in the operations against Rongga over the next four weeks.

Although Rongga had departed hastily from the sultan’s capital, he had clearly prepared his move long in advance. We have already seen how he had used his time in Maospati (Madiun) during the fasting month to strengthen the fortifications of his walled residence, contact his subordinate bupati and supposedly come to an agreement with Prangwedana (Mangkunagara II). On his return to Yogya, he had also taken care to gather the necessary cash and clothing for his troops: 800 Spanish dollars’ worth of garments had been obtained on credit from a French textile merchant in Yogya, Louis Marcus.165
At the same time, he had been loaned a large amount of cash, jewelry and gold ornaments from the very wealthy Ratu Kencana Wulan for his journey to Bogor, which he took with him when he left for Madiun. Along with the outstanding eastern mancanagara taxes which the bupati wedana still owed the sultan from the previous Garebeg Mulud, Engelhard reckoned that Rongga’s departure had left the Yogya ruler and his favourite consort at least 20,000 ronde real out of pocket.

He had also written almost identical letters three days before his flight to Natadiningrat and Sumadiningrat laying out his reasons for his rebellion. These letters, which were never delivered to their intended recipients, give an insight into some of Rongga’s key objectives. The following is that to Natadiningrat:

Younger brother Tumenggung Natadiningrat, I beg leave to inform you that I now wish to take my leave of you to lead a roving life intending to destroy those who constantly deceive the Javanese. Even though they do this in the name of the [European] government, they too are Javanese. I will indeed pick and choose those who are attempting to bring about my destruction. Indeed, I will certainly destroy them. As for the territories of Surakarta or of the north coast, I will quickly usurp them all so that if possible I will set them against the government and against the forces of Surakarta. Moreover, after my departure, it is you who must watch over the court of Yogyakarta in a proper manner so that if I have succeeded in usurping the territories of the [Dutch] fortress in Yogyakarta, and of the court of Surakarta, they will certainly not dare to disturb the court of Yogyakarta. Furthermore, I am absolutely not rebelling against His Highness [the sultan of Yogyakarta] and will not exceed the royal blessings which I implore, together with the blessings of the

by peasants in Kedhu in 1812: ‘one sees in the remotest parts of the country, the most grotesque and extraordinary figures habited in shoes and stockings, small clothes and cocked hats, while the rest of their dress is after the custom of the country’. IOL Mack.Pr. 21, Crawfur, ‘Report on Cadoe’, 289. See also Raffles 1817:85-6. On the European dress style adopted by the Surakarta court under Pakubuwana IV, see De Jonge and Van Deventer 1884-88, XIII:128. On the use of European clothes in battle during the Java War, Louw and De Klerk 1894-1909, III:80.  

Dj.Br. 46, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg), 25-11-1810, 7-12-1810, related that Ratu Kencana Wulan had declared strongly against Rongga after his flight on account of her substantial losses. On her wealth acquired through trade in opium, gold ornaments and precious stones between Yogya, Kutha Gedhé and Semarang, see Carey 1992:403 note 21.

Dj.Br. 46, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg), 25-11-1810.

Poensen 1905:203-6, states that the letters were found by a young lad in Rongga’s Yogya residence when it was searched on 21 November following his flight and were given to Danureja II who in turn presented them to Hamengkubuwana II to read. The patih then insisted that they should be passed on to Pieter Engelhard. The Resident, however, reported that they were found by Ngabèhi Pusparana, a court mantri attached to the Outer Left (Jaba Kiwa) department (Carey and Hoadley 2000:195, 206-7) in his search of Rongga’s dalem under other ‘dirty and used papers’. They were opened and taken straight to Hamengkubuwana II without being delivered to their intended recipients, Dj.Br. 46, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg), 28-11-1810. The originals, together with their envelopes with broken seals which bear the imprint of Rongga’s personal stamp (pratandha Rahadèn Rongga Prawiradireja) in dark purple wax are in Dj.Br. 46 in the Arsip Nasional.
ancestors who were warrior kings. And don’t let it go so far that it should happen that His Highness entertains the wish to cause me misery. I urgently and deeply beseech this with all my heart and soul. For truly, I earnestly intend to take away the uncleanness from Java and I will thank God all the more if I can do that which will bring good to the court and pleasure to His Highness’ heart.

This, younger brother Tumenggung Natadiningrat, I entrust you to bring to the knowledge of His Highness.

Written on Saturday, the twentieth of the month Sawal in the year Wawu [AJ] 1 7 3 7 [AD 17 November 1810].

Purging ‘uncleanness’ and defilement from the land of Java caused by the administration of Marshal Daendels was clearly central here, but it was a purification targeted as much against the Sunan in Surakarta and those Javanese who had taken the side of the European government as against the Dutch. Here one can find echoes of the disembodied voice heard by Dipanagara at Parangkusuma in circa 1805 which spoke of ‘the beginning of the ruin of the Land of Java’, although in Dipanagara’s case, unlike that of Rongga, his call to restore the moral order during his own purifying struggle at the time of the Java War was very much linked to the teachings of Islam with the Dutch and their Javanese allies being dismissed as ‘unbelievers’ (kapir) and ‘apostates’ (kapir murtad) respectively. Despite his extensive connections with the Javanese-Islamic communities in east Java, the idea of a distinction between the people of Islam and the European kapir or Javanese apostates is wholly missing in

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169 Dj.Br. 46, Radèn Rongga Prawiradirja III (Yogyakarta) to Radèn Tumenggung Natadiningrat (Yogyakarta), 20 Sawal AJ 1737 (AD 17-11-1810) (punctuation as in original):

Adhi Tumenggung Natadiningrat, kula anyanthélaken unjuk dhateng adhi yen sapunika kula nuwun pamit ngumbera, sumedya angrisak dhumateng ingkang tansah adamel kiyanan ing titiying Jawi amargi saking namaning Gupernemèn sanajan bangsa Jawi, kula inggih amilih-milih, pundi ingkang sumedya adamel karisakan kula, amasthi inggih kula risik, kadosta bawah ing Surakarta, punapa déning bawah pasisir, inggal kula rayut sadaya, ingkang sipados kenginga kula aben kalah Gupernemèn, sarta kula aben kalah dedamel ing Surakarta. Wondéning sapenger kula, kraton-Dalem ing Ngayogya, tuwin keraton ing Surakarta, yen sampun kalampahan sami kula rayut bawekipun, amasthi boten purun anganggu ing kraton-Dalem. Wondéning kula boten pisan-pisan yun baléloha ing sampéyan-Dalem, boten langkung pandong-Dalem ingkang kula sawun, sarta berkah panjurung-hipun ing leluhur-Dalem ingkang sami ambeg ratu pinarjurit, nanging sampéyan-Dalem sampun ngantos kelajeng-lajeng gadhah kersa adamel ing kemlaratan kula, sakelangkung atas sanget ing purun kula, mila sayektos, kula temen-temen sumedya angrimpili susuker ing Taranah Jawi, sokur maliy ing tembé kula saged adamel ingkang dados écanipun ing kraton-Dalem, tuwin suka ing nala-Dalem.

Ingkang punika adhi Tumenggung Natadiningrat, kunjukipun kahuningan ing sampéyan-Dalem kula pitajeng dhateng adhi.

Sinerat ing dinten Saptu tanggal ping kalah-dasa wulan Sawal ing taun Wawu angkaning warsa 1 7 3 7.

170 Chapter XI.
Plate 28. A Javanese regent (*bupati*) in full dress, drawn between 1830-1850. A dwarf-like *panakawan* (attendant) can be seen in the background holding a *payung* (state umbrella), the *bupati*'s symbol of office. Taken from Hardouin and Ritter 1855:121.
Rongga’s rebellion. Instead, the spirit of the Hindu-Javanese shadow play (wayang) and the ghost of Sultan Mangkubumi seem to hover over his enterprise. Van IJsseldijk, who had known Rongga in the mid 1790s when he was still serving as one of the second sultan’s intimate retainers, remarked that he had the conceit that he was Bathara Guru, the supervising deity in the wayang to whom all the other shadow-play puppets are notionally subservient. The bupati wedana also drew on examples from the Ramayana epic when he came to appoint his troop commanders in Madiun in late November. Thus his leading general was given the name of ‘Dasamuka’, a moniker for the giant-king of Lanka (Ceylon), Rawana, in the Ramayana, and his deputy the nom-de-guerre of Dirgananda. Much like a ruler in the wayang, Rongga set about turning his family and entourage into a court-ordered hierarchy by bestowing royal titles on his mother, wives and other female relatives, as well as appointing his son, cousins and leading bupati as heir apparent, patih and senior officials respectively of his new kraton at Maospati.

The payung (state parasol) makers in Madiun were worked overtime to turn out the requisite regalia: all gold for the new ruler, green with gold bands for his deputies, and blue for those local officials who rallied to his cause. Even at the end, when Rongga had been deserted by all but a handful of his followers, he still had with him three payung carriers together with his pennant bearers, drummers and trumpeters. Indeed, on his penultimate night

172 S.Br. 37, p. 93, Opgave (report) of Kartakusuma (patih of Radèn Ngabèhi Kartasari of Caruban) to Radèn Adipati Cakranagara (Surakarta), 19-12-1810. ‘Dirgananda’ may be a variant of ‘Durgandana’ (the ‘vile smelling one’), the ruler of Wirata and father-in-law of Abimanyu in the wayang purwa. On similar wayang allusions during the Java War, when the Dutch supreme commander, Lieutenant-General Hendrik Merkus de Kock (1779-1845), was compared by the Javanese to Dasamuka (Rawana), and Major (later Colonel) Bernard Sollewijn (1785-1864), to a red-bearded buta sabrang (overseas ogre), see Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, III:618 note 1; Van den Broek 1873, 20:535.
173 Carey 1980:38, Radèn Ayu Sepuh (Radèn Ayu Rongga), the widow of Radèn Rongga Prawiradirja II and a daughter of Hamengkubuwana I, became Ratu Ibu, his wives and female relatives became Radèn Ayu with names such as Radèn Ayu Anggèr, Radèn Ayu Rusti and Radèn Ayu Retnawaruju. His brother, Radèn Ngabèhi Prawirapraja, became Radèn Rongga Prawiradinigrat (see Appendix Vb), and his patih, the former low-born Mas Ngabèhi Puspadiwirya, became Radèn Adipati Suryanegara.
174 Dj.Br. 46, Radèn Tumenggung Purwadipura (Cemara) to Danureja II (Yogyakarta), 25-11-1810 (mentioning that the payung of Rongga’s deputies were blue with gold bands); Lieutenant Thomas Paulus (Gabugan, Sragèn) to Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta), 26-11-1810 (indicating that these payung were green with gold bands), Sergeant Lucas Leberveld (Sekaran) to Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta), 17-12-1810 (on the capture of two pennants, two gold payung and one green payung with gold bands belonging to Radèn Rongga and Mas Tumenggung Sumanegara respectively after their deaths at Sekaran). Senior local officials who rallied to Radèn Rongga were given new names all of which bore the title of ‘Rongga’, Dj.Br. 46, Radèn Tumenggung Purwadipura (Magetan) to Danureja II (Yogyakarta), 1-12-1810.
175 Dj.Br. 46, Sergeant Lucas Leberveld (Sekaran) to Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta), 17-12-1810.
at his encampment at Cabéyan, a day’s march from Sekaran where he would be cut down in a final skirmish on the banks of the Sala River, Rongga was signing a proclamation as ‘Susuhunan Prabu Ingalaga of the court of the warrior kings at Maospati who is now wandering about to wage war’. As for the shade of the first sultan, this was evoked by Rongga’s use of such phrases as ‘to lead a roving life’ and his invocation of ‘the blessings of his ancestors who had been warrior kings’. Even the royal title he subsequently adopted, ‘Kangjeng Susuhunan Prabu Ingalaga’ (‘His Highness the king, ruler in war’), and that which he gave to his principal deputy, the bupati of Padhangan, Mas Tumenggung Sumanegara, ‘Panembahan Sénapatininingprang’ (‘The Lord High Commander in battle’) recall the title taken by Mangkubumi when he first went into rebellion in Sokawati in 1746. The fact that Sumanegara was a grandson of Mangkubumi’s famous Balinese army commander, Tumenggung Malangnegara, further strengthened this connection with the first sultan.

There were also practical suggestions contained in Rongga’s letter to Sumadiningrat which showed a strategic grasp of the routes which Daendels might use to move in military reinforcements to attack Yogya and crush his uprising in the east. These included the breaking of the bridges over the Kali Codhé and Winonga in Yogyakarta, and the bridge over the Kali Tuntang on the highway eight kilometres north of Salatiga whose destruction would hold up troops marching from Semarang to the Principalities. Similarly, the bridge at Merbung five kilometres to the west and slightly south of Klatèn, which Rongga also asked to be broken, was part of the highway from the sultan’s

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176 Dj.Br. 46, Proclamation of Susuhunan Prabu Ngalaga (Raden Rongga) (Cabéyan) to kapitan cina of Lasem and Rembang, 18 Dulkangidah AJ 1737 (AD 15-12-1810). Dj.Br. 46 only gives this proclamation in Dutch translation, but we can reconstruct the original Javanese text from Rongga’s other extant letters (Carey 1980:37, above note 168) to give: Ingkeng Sinuhun Kangjeng Susuhunan Prabu Ngalaga, ingkeng angrenggani kraton pinarjurit in Maospati, ingkeng angumbara amangun jurit.

177 Dj.Br. 46. Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg), 24-11-1810 (indicating that Rongga was already styling himself by his new title when he passed through Kartasura on 22-11-1810); Proclamation of Radèn Rongga, 21 Sawal AJ 1737 (AD 18-11-1810) (bestowal of title of ‘Sénapatininingprang’ on four deputies (kalipah) including Sumanegara). See also Carey 1980:38 note 2.


179 Carey 1980:38 note 2. Sumanegara’s Balinese connections were the source of much speculation by Engelhard that the large number of Balinese pirate prau (ships) seen coming and going to the Bay of Pacitan in early December might have been an indication that Rongga was receiving reinforcements from Bali. The prau of Rawa (Tulung Agung), Radèn Tumenggung Pringgakusuma, disabused him saying that no Balinese prau could land presumably because of prevailing sea conditions, Dj.Br. 46, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to Lieutenant Thomas Paulus (Maospati/Madiun), 13-12-1810, Lieutenant Thomas Paulus (Maospati/Madiun) to Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta), 18-12-1810. See further Chapter I note 58, Chapter V note 20, Chapter XI note 46; Remmelink 1994:21.

180 On Merbung’s location in the Kembangarum sub-district of Klatèn, see Schoel 1931:233.
capital to Surakarta across which the Dutch forces would have to move.181

One aspect of Rongga's rebellion which was markedly different from that of Dipanagara fifteen years later was his appeal to the Chinese communities in east Java and the *pasisir*. Prior to his uprising, Rongga had enjoyed close relations with these communities principally through his position as the sultan’s chief tollgate-leaser in the Madiun area (Carey 1984a:21-2). As we have seen, he also shared their deep misgivings about the threat posed to their local economic interests especially in the timber trade by the indiscriminate activities of European loggers and entrepreneurs. It was largely on the strength of these shared concerns that Rongga declared himself ‘protector’182 of all the Javanese and Chinese who had been ‘mistreated by the [European] government’ and urged them to work together to ‘exterminate’ the Dutch officials who had undermined the prosperity and well-being of Java (Carey 1980:36-8, 1984:22). His appeal was also specifically directed to the wealthy mixed-blood or *peranakan* Chinese communities on the north coast in places such as Lasem, Tuban and Sidhayu, whose support he hoped to enlist in a series of strikes against the main Dutch garrisons in the area between Rembang and Surabaya. He thus urged the *pasisir* Chinese to take control of the offices and posts of evicted Europeans and guard them against possible counter-attacks (Carey 1980:37, 1984:22). One of Rongga’s initial objectives was the Dutch shipyard at Teleng which was being laid out at a village on the Sala River just upstream from Bojanegara. Local officials from Blora operating under Rongga’s orders attacked this yard in late November and gutted the Dutch manager’s house with the help of the manager’s assistant, a Lasem-born Chinese.183 On 15 December 1810, just two days before the European-officered flying column closed in on him at Sekaran, Rongga made one last desperate plea to the captains of the Chinese of Lasem and Rembang, promising them that once the Europeans had been destroyed, they would enjoy his special protection and their descendants would inherit their official positions (Carey 1980:40 note 1, 1984:22 note 100). Even as he prepared to fight the last battle of his life, twelve

181 Dj.Br. 46, Radèn Rongga Prawiradirja III (Yogyakarta) to Radèn Tumenggung Sumadinin-grat (Yogyakarta), 20 Sawal AJ 1737 (AD 17-11-1810). Rongga also encouraged Sumadinigrat to break any other bridges in south-central Java which might be strategically significant to prevent enemy forces advancing on Yogy (tuwin ing saliyanipun malih, énggal sampéyan bubrahi sedaya, ingkang supados yen wonen mengsah, sampun ngantos lumebet ing kraton-Dalem). He may have had the bridge over the Kali Elo in Kedhu in mind, Poensen 1905:204.

182 Carey 1980:37, the full Javanese text reads: ingkeng kinuwasaaken angrayud serta angayumi tuwin atutulung ing kasusahaning titiyang bongsa jawi utawi bongsa Cina.

183 Dj.Br. 27, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to Brigadier-General F.C.P. von Winckelmann (Semarang), 1-12-1810; P.H. van Lawick van Pabst (Rembang) to Brigadier-General F.C.P. von Winckelmann (Semarang), 1-12-1810; Dj.Br. 46, Pangéran Raja Suria Adiprakasa (Radèn Rongga) (Cabéyan) to Baba Sun (? Rembang), 18 Dulkangidah AJ 1737 (AD 16-12-1810), asking the Chinese to meet him at Teleng ‘to take council about destroying the Europeans’. The shipyard manager, Verhaagen, was not present at the time of the attack. On Teleng’s location see Map 4.
Chinese were reported amongst the much depleted band of a hundred or so military retainers who still remained with him (Carey 1984a:22).

Rongga’s appeal to the Chinese showed his shrewd understanding of their economic and social importance in the eastern mancanagara. Indeed, specifically mancanagara grievances against the Dutch played a critical role in generating local support for Rongga’s rebellion. Thus the forest-dwelling people of Tuban, Sidhayu and Lasem, who had suffered most from the government teak monopoly, were amongst the first to rally to him as he made his way to Madiun in the last rainy days of November. Rongga’s demand that the pasisir areas of the north coast should once again be delivered up to the Javanese was also a goal which was very dear to the hearts of the south-central Javanese rulers and was one of their foremost objectives following the collapse of the Franco-Dutch government in mid-September 1811.184

Short-lived though it was, Rongga’s revolt and his continuous attempts to involve the Chinese in his cause stand in marked contrast to the situation which pertained during the Java War. How to explain this contrast? The paucity of Chinese tollgate keepers in the eastern mancanagara when compared to the situation which pertained in south-central Java in the nine years preceding the outbreak of the Java War may partly account for this.185 It should also be noted that it was precisely the long-established Chinese Muslim communities on the north coast which gave Dipanagara’s local commanders the most consistent support in his struggle against the Dutch (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, III:444-5, 452, 525). The invidious role of the Chinese in south-central Java as the public face of Dutch fiscal oppression through the opium farm, market taxes and tollgates in the post-1816 period certainly changed local Javanese attitudes towards them, particularly at the elite level (Chapter IX). Traditionally, inter-marriage with those of partly Chinese descent had not been seen as a problem.186 By 1825, however, this attitude had begun to change and a new perception took its place that relations with the Chinese, particularly those of a sexual nature, brought misfortune in time of war (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, III:525; Carey 1984a:2, 32).

Rongga’s revolt also had significant Javanese messianic undertones which again prefigured Dipanagara’s uprising in 1825. Thus the Yogya babad describes how Rongga’s deputy, Mas Tumenggung Sumanegara, received the inspiration

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184 Recognition of royal jurisdiction over the holy graves at Ampêl, Giri, Tuban, Bonang, Kudhus, Kadilangu, Demak and Tegalarum, was specifically demanded by Sunan Pakubuwana IV from the new British administration in late September 1811, IOL Eur F 148/17, ‘Captain Robison, Java 1811’, Pakubuwana IV (Surakarta) to Lord Minto (Batavia), 5 Ramelan AH 1226 (AD 23-9-1811). In previous Javanese history, the mosque at Demak and the long graves at Kadilangu were regarded as the two vital pusaka (heirlooms) of Java, Olthof 1941a, II:301.

185 See pp. 467-8, 617-21.

186 Chapter II note 68 on the possibility that Dipanagara’s first wife, the daughter of the bupati of Panolan, was of partly Chinese descent.
that the *bupati wedana* should rule as Sunan Ingalaga at the *kraton* of Kutha Pethik in the ‘kingdom’ (*praja*) of Ketangga.\(^{187}\) We know from other sources that Kutha Pethik was another name for Maospati, which had been chosen by astrologers as the most auspicious place for Rongga’s new *dalem* when he moved from Madiun in the early 1800s (Ongkokham 1975:60). This seems to suggest that Rongga may have viewed himself as a Ratu Adil, a Javanese messianic ‘Just King’. In the Jayabaya prophecies ascribed to a legendary twelfth-century king of Kedhiri, the kingdom of the Ratu Adil is usually located at Kutha Pethik near the Ketangga River in the forest of Budhak four kilometres to the south of Ngawi.\(^{188}\) Ketangga would remain throughout the nineteenth century a focus for popular gatherings of a pronounced messianic character with particularly large assemblies being reported in 1817, 1819 and 1888.\(^{189}\) During the Java War after Dipanagara had proclaimed himself as the Ratu Adil by taking the title of Sultan Èrucakra, fierce fighting also took place around this site involving a close ally of the prince.\(^{190}\) The fact that Rongga’s rebellion occurred in the Javanese year Wawu, the seventh year of the eight-year Javanese cycle, which was supposedly the appropriate time for the Ratu Adil to appear – Dipanagara would also take his Èrucakra title at the beginning of a Wawu year (Carey 1981a:261 note 108) – might also have enhanced its popular appeal in the eastern *mancanagara* and might partly explain why his rebellion made such a deep impression on so many members of the Yogya court, particularly the young Dipanagara.

It seems almost certain that Rongga enjoyed the tacit support of many of the south-central Javanese rulers and princes who hoped to use his rebellion

\(^{187}\) B.Ng. I:160-1, XL.32-5. In the Dutch reports there are also references to Rongga preparing to defend himself at ‘Pethik’ in the Madiun area; *Dj*.Br. 27, Brigadier-General F.C.P. von Winckelmann (Semarang), 29-11-1810, Wangsadran (Semarang) to Radên Panji Natahdiningrat (*bupati* of Semarang), 30-11-1810, W.N. Servatius (Surakarta) to Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta), 30-11-18210, Kyai Tumenggung Adimenggala (*bupati* of Demak) to A.H. Smissaert (acting *landdrost* of Semarang and Demak), 1-12-1810.\(^{188}\) Dwijosoegondo (*Tjantrik Mataram*) 1966:51-2; Sartono Kartodirdjo 1972-96. The following is the description in the Reksapustaka (Surakarta) *Serat Centhini*, IV:1813, II.7 *wedi wilalating Nata/ adil-asih paramarta/ bumi Pethik akukutha/ parek lan Kali Ketangga/ ing sajroning Budhak wana.*

\(^{189}\) *Dj*.Br. 60, H.A. Steijn Parvé (Semarang) to H.G. Nahuys van Burgst (Yogyakarta), 11-7-1817, relaying report from *bupati* of Grobogan that 4,000 Javanese from all over the eastern *mancanagara* had gathered in Ketangga ‘because of an old prophecy that a new and mighty ruler would establish himself there’; *Dj*.Br. 62A, J.C. Ellinghuijsen (Pasuruan) to H.G. Nahuys van Burgst (Yogyakarta), 13-11-1819 (on gathering in Ketangga on the orders of the ‘General above the wind’ (*Jéndral diatas angin*) from Turkey (Rum) prior to the establishment of a new ruler in Malang who would fall on Pasuruan, Bangil and Surabaya); *S*.Br. 4, ‘Algemeen Verslag der Residentie Soerakarta over het jaar 1888’, 8-9, on the so-called ‘Sri Katon’ incident involving a mass meeting at Ketangga. See further pp. 484-5, 491-2.

\(^{190}\) dK 183, A.D. Cornets de Groot Sr (Gresik) to G.A.G.Ph. van der Capellen (Batavia/Buitenzorg), 25-11-1825 (on Mas Tumenggung Kertadirja’s abortive attack on Ketangga in November 1825). See also Carey 1974a:28.
The power of prophecy

for their own ends. We have seen how in Yogya, both Pangéran Natakusuma and his son, Natadiningrat, had already fallen under suspicion even before Rongga’s flight from Yogya. Pieter Herbert van Lawick van Pabst in Rembang even speculated that Rongga and Natakusuma had come to a prior agreement about the division of Yogyakarta in the event that the bupati wedana’s uprising proved successful.191 It was thus no surprise that as soon as news of Rongga’s rebellion reached Engelhard that Natakusuma’s residence was placed under guard,192 and orders issued by Daendels for the prince and his son’s arrest.193 On 17 December, on the very day of Rongga’s death, they were sent overland to Batavia where they were held in the fort at Meester Cornelis (present-day Jatinegara) and downtown Batavia before being transferred to Cirebon, where Daendels subsequently sought their death.194 The position of the sultan was also extremely delicate. He had been very supportive of Rongga and the marshal automatically assumed his complicity in the uprising.195 But Daendels’ demand that Engelhard consider arresting the sultan along with his key military adviser, Sumadiningrat, was rejected by the Resident. He was not prepared to execute such drastic measures given the Yogya ruler’s seeming cooperation in the days following Rongga’s flight.196 Dipanagara even thought the sultan had turned against his former favourite, accusing him in his babad of giving in too easily to Daendels’ demand that he be sent to Buitenzorg (Bogor). He stated that this was ‘the cause of Yogya’s later destruction’.197 Furthermore, he described the sultan’s decision to send an expeditionary force under Purwadipura to track down Rongga as ‘a great sin’.198 In fact, far from cooperating with the Dutch, this force achieved little and Purwadipura was later dismissed from his court position for spending his time trading in opium and engaging in currency deals.199 In the end Rongga had to be hunted down by a flying column of 150

191 Chapter V note 123.
192 Dj.Br. 27, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg), 21-11-1810.
193 Dj.Br. 27, H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg) to Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta), 29-11-1810.
194 Daendels 1814:Bijlage 2, additionele stukken 17; Mack.Pr. 2, ‘Surakarta sengkala list’, 185 (gives Monday, 20 Dulkangidah AJ 1737 as the date of their departure) ; B.Ng. I:183-5, XLV.7-23. On Daendels’ instructions for their assassination, see pp. 277-8.
195 Dj.Br. 27, H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg) to Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta), 29-11-1810, Daendels’ marginal note in Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg), 30-11-1810 stating ‘even before Rongga’s flight his actions were equivocal’.
196 Dj.Br. 27, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg), 30-11-1810.
197 BD (Manado), II:132, XIV (Sinom) 102 Kangjeng sultan teka gamipil/ pan ika kang dadya margal rusaké Ngayogya iki.
198 BD (Manado). II:133, XV (Asmaradana) 4. kangjeng sultan kang winawus! kalangkung ing durakanira.
199 Carey 1980:189-90; great profits could be made at this time in the eastern mancanagara by changing silver ronde real into ducatoons and Chinese merchants employed Javanese women as money changers in many of the local markets, Dj.Br. 39, G.W. Wiese (Yogyakarta) to Danureja II (Yogyakarta), 22-10-1809. Purwadipura and the other Javanese commanders of the Yogya expedi-
men commanded by Sergeant Lucas Leberveld. Several years afterwards, however, evidence came to light that far from being innocent in the affair, the sultan had plotted with Sunan Pakubuwana IV to coordinate a general uprising in the Principalities against Daendels in the event of a successful attack by Rongga on the pasisir. This evidence came from a respected local kyai, Kyai Murma Wijaya, who had extensive contacts at both courts as a teacher and religious adviser, and had apparently been employed as a messenger and go-between carrying secret communications between Surakarta and Yogyakarta at this time. If this source is sound, then it is clear that the Sunan played a duplicitous role because he also wrote to Daendels denouncing the sultan for having been ‘at one’ with Rongga. Prangwedana (Mangkunagara II) likewise adopted a highly equivocal stance as we have seen. At the start of Rongga’s rebellion, his legion was in Semarang, and although he later marched with 600 of his troops to clear Rongga’s supporters out of Blora, he does not seem to have taken very active measures against the rebel bupati wedana. One source even alleges that he killed the messengers sent by Lieutenant Paulus from Maospati so that he would not have to coordinate his actions with the Dutch supported expeditionary force. This general collusion of the rulers of south-central Java, specifically Sunan Pakubuwana IV and the sultan, was to be repeated in the period October 1811 to May 1812 against the British (Carey 1980:54-70; Chapter VII), and underlines the fact that while each hoped to gain from a successful attack on the European power they continued to pursue their own personal political ambitions against their royal rivals.

Rongga’s rebellion did not, however, offer such an opportunity. Daendels moved with considerable speed and firmness to quell the uprising. An expeditionary force of 3,000 infantry was disembarked in Semarang on 2 December and they were followed by two squadrons of cavalry and two companies of horse-drawn artillery – 200 men in all – which left Batavia on 1 December to march overland to central Java. The governor-general followed them by sea
on 6 December arriving in Semarang four days later.\textsuperscript{204} Fearing that the sultan might withdraw from Yogya to the mountain fastnesses of Merapi or the twin volcanoes of Sumbing and Sundoro in Kedhu to lead a guerrilla resistance,\textsuperscript{205} the marshal ordered Engelhard to place a corps of the Crown Prince’s troops between Yogyakarta and the Jambu hills to prevent such a retreat. He also instructed the Resident to form a party at court against the sultan consisting of the Crown Prince, Danureja II and the elderly Pangèran Ngabèhi (the elder brother of the sultan).\textsuperscript{206} The Yogya ruler, meanwhile, acquiesced in the appointment of the Crown Prince as temporary commander of the Yogya forces and agreed that Natakusuma and his son should be sent to Semarang for the duration of Rongga’s rebellion as a ‘guarantee of peace’ in south-central Java and to prevent any threat to the sultan’s person.\textsuperscript{207} As a further proof of his willingness to cooperate, he declared his intention to dismiss Purwadipura from his position as head of the Yogya expeditionary force because of his dilatory tactics and appoint new commanders.\textsuperscript{208} Sumadiningrat was, however,

\textsuperscript{204} Dj.Br. 46, Brigadier-General F.C.P. von Winckelmann (Semarang) to Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta), 6-12-1810.
\textsuperscript{205} Dj.Br. 27, H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg) to Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta), 29-11-1810. There is no evidence that Hamengkubuwana II was contemplating such a move at this time, although later during the British attack on Java in August 1811, the sultan consulted a Bagelen-based haji, Haji Mukidin, to see what would become of the Yogya kraton if the British prevailed. Mukidin replied that the kraton seemed ‘very dull’ and that it should be transferred to the north-west. Whereupon, Hamengkubuwana II considered retiring to his bodyguard to Beliga (Bligo) in southern Kedhu (note 109) and sending his valuables (heirlooms or pusaka, gold and jewelry) to Mancingan on the south coast in the event that the kraton was taken by the British, IOL Eur F148/24, ‘Translations of secret letters between Surakarta and Yogyakarta’, no. 25, ‘Abstract of letters found in the house of the Radèn Adipati (Cakranagara)’, no. 5, Radèn Tumenggung Sumadiningrat (Yogyakarta) to Radèn Adipati Cakranagara (Surakarta), undated. According to the Javanese babad, such a move was supposedly suspected by the British, Poensen 1905:303-4, B.Ng. I:296, LXXII.24.
\textsuperscript{206} Besides Pangèran Ngabèhi, Engelhard also expected support from Hamengkubuwana I’s sons Demang, Panular (Adiwijaya I) and Adikusuma, as well as from Hamengkubuwana II’s children, Mangkudiningrat and Adiwinata, Dj.Br. 46, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Semarang), 4-12-1810. On these see further Ricklefs 1974a:352 note 31.
\textsuperscript{207} Poensen 1905:207; Carey 1992:284, 441 note 209; B.Ng. I:166-7, XLI.28-32. Hamengkubuwana II sent up reinforcements to Maospati under Pangèran Dipakusuma, Pangèran Adinagara (a nephew of Hamengkubuwana I), and Radèn Tumenggung Wirayakusuma, an unattached court bupati (bupati miji), whose father was Pangèran Demang, a son of Hamengkubuwana I (Ricklefs 1974a:352) on 27 November. The Yogya mancanagara bupati led by the bupati of Rawa (Tulung Agung), Radèn Tumenggung Pringgakusuma, were also ordered to assist and special clearance arranged for them to pass through Surakarta lands in Pacitan on their way to Madiun, Dj.Br. 27, Danureja II (Yogyakarta) to Radèn Adipati Cakranagara (Surakarta), 26 Sawal AJ 1737 (AD 24-11-1810). They arrived in Maospati around 6 December. Hamengkubuwana II’s plan to send a new expedition commanded by his sons Pangèran Jayakusuma (Ngabèhi) and Pangèran Santawijaya, his son-in-law, Radèn Tumenggung Natadiningrat and his troop commander (wedana prajurit), Radèn Panji Jayèngrana (post-1811, Radèn Tumenggung Ranadiningrat), with Danureja II attached as political counsellor, was rejected on 7-12-1810 by Engelhard as unnecessary and inappropriate given the need to keep the patih in Yogya, Dj.Br. 46, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Batavia/Buitenzorg), 26-11-1810, 7-12-1810.
cleared of any implication in Rongga’s rebellion and his name was dropped from the group which Daendels had demanded should be delivered up to him in Semarang.209

Meanwhile, Rongga was being relentlessly pursued. After his departure from Yogya on the night of 20-21 November he had made his way under unseasonably heavy rain back to his dalem at Maospati arriving on 28 November (see Map 4). En route, he had burnt various Surakarta villages and tollgate posts including Masaran and Sragèn, and fought a pitched battle at Magetan on 27 November where his troop commander Dasamuka, according to one report, was killed in the capture of the bupati’s residence.

The town was then set on fire.210 Once Rongga had reached Maospati, he attempted to win over the Yogya mancanagara bupati to his side, but the only one who rallied to him wholeheartedly was Mas Tumenggung Sumanegara, the bupati of Padhangan, who was reported to have been his long-time friend and confidant.211 With a few exceptions,212 most of the others seem to have tried to distance themselves from the conflict only emerging when Rongga and Sumanegara had been safely dispatched.213 The attitude of Dipanagara’s father-in-law, Radèn Tumenggung Natawijaya III of Panolan, is not specifically clarified in the sources. It is known that his district afforded Rongga some military assistance,214 but at the same time his immediate superior, the bupati of Jipang-Rajegwesi, Radèn Tumenggung Sasradingrat, was expecting him to guard the woods and roads of Panolan so that Rongga should not break

209 Daendels 1814:Bijlage 2, additionele stukken 15; Poensen 1905:206.
210 Dj.Br. 46, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to W.N. Servatius (Surakarta), 26-11-1810; Radèn Tumenggung Purwadiopura (Maospati) to Danureja II (Yogyakarta), 4 Dulkangidah AJ 1737 (AD 1-12-1810); S.Br. 37, Radèn Tumenggung Wiradininingrat (Panaraga) to Radèn Adipati Cakrana-gara (Surakarta), 5-12-1810. See further note 220.
211 Dj.Br. 46, A.H. Smisaaert (acting landdrost of Semarang and Demak) to Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta), 3-12-1810.
212 Those who gave support to the Dutch included the following bupati: Radèn Tumenggung Pringgakusuma (Rawa, present-day Tulung Agung), Radèn Tumenggung Yudakusuma (Wiras-ari), Radèn Tumenggung Mangundirana (Kalangbrèt), and the two Yogya bupati of Grobogan, Radèn Tumenggung Sasrakusuma and Radèn Tumenggung Sasranegara, Dj.Br. 46, A.H. Smisaaert (acting landdrost Semarang and Demak) to Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta), 3-12-1810, Lieu-tenant Thomas Paulus (Maospati/Madiun) to Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta), 7-12-1810, Relaas of Sergeant Lucas Leberveld in Leberveld (Sekaran) to Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta), 17-12-1810.
213 Dj.Br. 46, Relaas of Sergeant Lucas Leberveld in Leberveld (Sekaran) to Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta), 17-12-1810, who described how all the Jipang bupati only appeared two hours after Rongga and Sumanegara had been killed and he was still standing by their bodies. These included Radèn Tumenggung Sasradingrat (Jipang), Radèn Tumenggung Prawirasentika (Bauwerna), Radèn Tumenggung Natadwiria (Dhuri/Wanaseraya), and Radèn Tumenggung Prawirayuda (Pasekaran). Two others, Radèn Tumenggung Sasradipura (Magetan) and Radèn Tumenggung Pringgalaya (Kertasana), had fled from their respective kabupatèn once Rongga’s force arrived.
214 Dj.Br. 46, P.H. van Lawick van Pabst (Rembang) to Brigadier-General F.C.P. von Winckel- mann (Semarang), 1-12-1810, referring to ‘200 men under arms’ who were available to Rongga in Panolan.
through to the *pasisir*.\(^{215}\) Just over six months after Rongga’s revolt, however, his son, Raden Tumenggung Natawijaya IV, was appointed in his place, so it is possible that the older Natawijaya had either died in the intervening time or fallen into disgrace because of his conduct during the *bupati wedana*’s uprising (Carey and Hoadley 2000:72, 240-4; Chapter VII).

Certainly Rongga’s rebellion seems to have thrown the *mancanagara* into confusion. We will see in the next chapter how the administration of the eastern outlying districts was changed to prevent another such challenge ever occurring to the south-central Javanese rulers. Although Rongga made a specific appeal for support from the local Chinese communities, many fled to the European-controlled *pasisir*. The great Chinese-run tollgate (*bandar*) at Ngawi at the confluence of the Sala and Madiun rivers was deserted as were the Chinese quarters of Maospati and Madiun. Reports reaching the Dutch from these places spoke of the ‘great commotion’ amongst the local Chinese population and the ‘awe and fear’ which Rongga evinced amongst ordinary Javanese inhabitants of the eastern *mancanagara*.\(^{216}\) But these sentiments did not prevent the extensive looting of Rongga’s *dalem* at Maospati once the *bupati wedana* had decided to move on. When a Surakarta spy reached the *kraton*-like residence on 9 December, a week after Rongga’s departure, he found that all the fruit trees had been cut down by robbers and the main mosque looted. The chests containing Rongga’s extensive library of religious texts had been forced open and their contents scattered on the mosque floor, while the incumbent Sundanese ‘priest’, Nuryemangi, with 29 of his pupils was on the road heading back to his village at Sukapura in west Java.\(^{217}\)

When Rongga abandoned his plans to attack Panaraga and decided to make for the *pasisir*, he clearly hoped to avail himself of help from the Chinese communities at Lasem, Tuban and Sidhuyu. But he found that this support was not forthcoming. Starting out with a 150-strong escort from Maospati on 2 December, he still had nearly 100 left (including twelve Chinese) when Leberveld’s flying column of some 150 men caught up with him at Sekaran on the night of the 16-17 December. In the final encounter on the morning of 17 December close to the Sala River, most of Rongga’s army slipped away into the adjacent woods, leaving only his deputy, Sumanegara, his *patih*, Mas Ngabéhi Puspadiwirya, and their pennant and *payung* carriers on the field of battle. After the first exchange of shots, the *bupati* of Wirasari, Radén

\(^{215}\) Dj.Br. 46, Lieutenant Thomas Paulus (Maospati/Madiun) to W.N. Servatius (Surakarta), 9-12-1810.

\(^{216}\) Dj.Br. 46, P.H. van Lawick van Pabst (Rembang) to Brigadier-General F.C.P. von Winckelmann (Semarang), 1-12-1810, Lieutenant Thomas Paulus (Maospati/Madiun) to Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta), 7-12-1810.

\(^{217}\) S.Br. 37, *Relaas of Wangsataruna* (Surakarta spy sent to watch Rongga’s movements) (Maospati) to Raden Adipati Cakranagara (Surakarta), 9-12-1810. Sukapura would appear to be a village in the Singaparna district of Tasikmalaya residency, see Schoel 1931:353.
Tumenggung Yudakusuma, who was accompanying Leberveld’s force, cried out to ask what Rongga wanted. The _bupati wedana_ replied that he intended no harm to the Javanese but wished to kill all those who were being a burden on the Javanese and Chinese in the _mancanagara_. Thereupon he dismounted and tried to thrust out with his pike. In the ensuing encounter, one of the junior Yogya officials, a _magang_ (aspirant _bupati_), Sumadiwirya,\(^{218}\) managed to wound him in the chest and Leberveld ordered his foot-soldiers to move in and finish him off. Much the same fate befell Rongga’s deputy, Sumanegara, who was shot with a matchlock by the same Yogya _bupati_ of Wirasari and then stabbed to death by the _bupati_’s armed men. The only one of Rongga’s entourage to escape was his _patih_ who, although wounded, managed to flee with the _payung_ and pennant bearers. The bodies of the two slain rebels were then washed in the Sala River, wrapped in white linen and eventually handed over to Purwadipura for transport to Yogya. Once this sad cargo had reached the royal capital, according to the Javanese sources, the sultan ordered the corpses to be hung in open coffins at the Pangurakan crossroads near the guardhouse on the northern _alun-alun_, where the bodies of executed criminals were publicly displayed (Poensen 1905:262; Carey 1980:125-6). There they may have been seen by the young Dipanagara on one of his journeys to the court. They were then cut down and interred on 22 December at the traitors’ graveyard at Banyusumurup to the southeast of Imagiri on the abutments of Gunung Kidul.\(^ {219}\) Soon afterwards, Rongga’s mother, Radèn Ayu Rongga, and two of his younger brothers, Radèn Ngabèhi Prawirapraja and Radèn Ngabèhi Sumaprawira, were brought back to Yogya under armed guard along with the severed head of Rongga’s army commander, Dasamuka.\(^ {220}\)

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\(^ {218}\) Sumadiwirya appears to have been rewarded for his services during this expedition against Rongga by being appointed to the post of _bupati miji_ (unattached _bupati_) with 400 _cacah_ of apanage land, some of it derived from the redistributed landholdings of the disgraced Radèn Tumenggung Purwadipura, Carey and Hoadley 2000:182-3. This happened in early 1811. He subsequently (3-7-1812) followed Hamengkubuwana II into exile in Pulau Pinang and Ambon after the sultan’s deposition in the aftermath of the British attack on the Yogya _kraton_ (20-6-1812). His role in the firing of the powder magazine in the fort during the British assault on the Yogya _kraton_ on 20 June 1812 had made him _persona non grata_ with the British, see Carey 1992:438-9 note 201; pp. 335, 337, 363.

\(^ {219}\) Dj.Br. 46, _Relaas of Sergeant Lucas Leberveld_, in Leberveld (Sekaran) to Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta), 17-12-1810, gives a detailed account of Rongga’s final hours. See also Daendels 1814: Bijlage 2, additionele stukken 4 (Daendels’ official report on the military operations against Rongga, 7-1-1811), no. 16, Hamengkubuwana II (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Semarang), 30 Dulkangidah AJ 1737 (AD 26-12-1810) (reporting details of Rongga’s end based on Leberveld’s _relaas_. This printed version is incorrectly dated 10 Dulkangidah AJ 1737). On the hanging of the bodies at the Pangurakan and their subsequent interment at Banyusumurup on 22-12-1810, see Van Mook 1972:18; Hageman 1955-56:269-70; B.Ng. I:185-92, XLVI.1-6-XLVI.7, XLVIII.1-3; LOr 8987 no. 1 ( _Babad Alit_ ), pt. 21.

\(^ {220}\) Dj.Br. 46, Lieutenant Thomas Paulus (Maospati) to Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta), 17-12-1810. One report suggests that Dasamuka had been killed in the battle for Magetan on 27 Novem-
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to the ‘Chronicle of the fall of Yogyakarta’, a contemporary Javanese source, Rongga’s mother, a younger sister of the second sultan, was particularly badly treated by Purwadipura on her journey from Madiun and this was one of the reason’s for the Radèn Tumenggung’s subsequent exile during the brief regency (January-September 1811) of the future third sultan (Carey 1992:116, 284, 441 note 206a; p. 268).

Conclusion

Despite the pathos of Radèn Rongga’s end, his rebellion was a major event in the pre-Java War history of the south-central Javanese courts. Prior to 1810, notwithstanding Daendels’ bluster and military threats, the balance of power had not yet swung decisively in favour of the European government. The ability of the sultan to resist the imposition of the new ceremonial and his skill in spinning out the responses to the governor-general’s demands for ‘satisfaction’ in the numerous border disputes involving the sultanate and Daendels’ administration in the three years before Rongga’s uprising showed that there were limits to the government’s power. In south-central Java proper these limits would continue until the time of the British attack on the Yogya kraton on 20 June 1812 when the remaining constraints on the government from the court-based militaries were finally swept aside. The situation in the mancanagara, however, was somewhat different. Here Rongga was indeed the ‘last champion’. His death accelerated the transformation of these eastern outlying districts into an economic zone under the decisive influence of the European government. Daendels’ demands in 1809-1810 for the eastern districts to be opened up for unrestricted – monopoly – supply of timber, rice, and other key commodities to the north coast, as well as European capital investment in the establishment of new shipyards and logging enterprises, were bitterly resisted by Rongga and some of his fellow bupati. Although they couched their resistance in terms of protection for the wong cilik (‘little people’), in particular those who earned their living from the teak forests, the so-called blandhong people, in large part their motivation was to preserve their own economic position. In this they received the tacit support of the sultan, and, if we believe the testimony of figures like Kyai Murma Wijaya, of the Sunan and Prangwedana (Mangkunagara II) as well.

ber and his body thrown into a nearby river. If so, it had clearly been fished out by Purwadipura’s expedition and the head cut off as a trophy to bring back to Yogya, Dj:Br. 46, Relaas of Secameng-gala (Magetan) to Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta), 4-12-1810. Another report states that he was only wounded at Magetan, living on to fight another skirmish at Balong Tjok (Panaraga) where he was defeated (and presumably killed) along with his fellow commander Dirgananda, S.Br. 37, p. 93, Opgave of Kartakusuma (patih of Radèn Ngabèhi Kartasari of Caruban) to Radèn Adipati Cakranagara (Surakarta), n.y. (? 16-12-1810).
The failure of Rongga’s eastern rebellion marked the point when the balance of power in the territories bordering the Dutch-controlled *pasisir* swung decisively in favour of the European government. Henceforth, these eastern outlying districts would be pulled inexorably into the European orbit. Within the space of two short decades, the whole of the *mancanagara* would be annexed by the government, starting with the treaties imposed by Daendels on the courts in January 1811 and followed by those dictated by Raffles in the aftermath of the British attack on Yogya in June 1812. The political significance of all this was not lost on Dipanagara. His admiration for Rongga shines through in his *babad*. Here was a young Yogya nobleman, who was almost his contemporary, a man like himself who enjoyed strong links with the local Javanese-Islamic communities and who was prepared to go down fighting rather than die miserably as a prisoner of the European power. In many respects, Rongga was the *satria*, the warrior prince, whom Dipanagara had in mind as an example when he confronted a similar set of economic and political circumstances in the south-central Javanese heartland in the decade before the Java War. With his close family ties to Rongga, ties which were enhanced by his later marriages to the former *bupati wedana*’s daughter and niece (Appendix III), and a remarkable reliance on his teenage son, Senthot, as his principal cavalry commander, it is hardly surprising that Dipanagara should have made so much of his kinsman as the ‘last champion’ of the Yogya sultanate. When the prince’s turn came to step forward to defend the moral and spiritual integrity of the Javanese old order, he would do so under the much broader banner of Javanese Islam and with a messianic appeal unmatched by that of Rongga. But the ghost of the slain *bupati wedana* and his evocation of the warrior kings (*ratu pinarjurit*) of Mataram would still hover over his enterprise just as that of Mangkubumi had over Rongga’s own doomed uprising.
CHAPTER VII

The end of the beginning
The last months of the Franco-Dutch government and the British rape of Yogyakarta, 1811-1812

Introduction

In the eighteen months which elapsed between Radèn Rongga’s death on 17 December 1810 and the fall of the Yogya kraton to British-Indian troops on 20 June 1812 ‘the beginning of the ruin of the Land of Java’ prophesied to Dipanagara at Parangkusuma in circa 1805 would reach its fruition. This would see the effective evisceration of the military and political power of the south-central Javanese courts through the imposition of a series of treaties and land annexations which would make it impossible for the rulers ever again to challenge the power of the European government. Although they retained some residual capacity to mount resistance through their patron-client networks, which were part of the traditional Javanese apanage system, by the time of the Java War (1825-1830) the limits of these kraton-based power arrangements would be all too evident. Dipanagara’s struggle would thus have to draw on a much broader social and political base and would use the mobilising force of Javanese-Islam and Javanese national identity in ways unimaginable to his royal-born and noble predecessors, men such as Sultan Mangkubumi, Radèn Mas Said (Mangkunagara I) and Radèn Rongga. This process of evisceration will be the subject of this chapter. It would complete the Parangkusuma prophecy and would bring to Java’s shores a new and far better resourced enemy than the threadbare Franco-Dutch administration of Marshal Daendels and his luckless successor, Lieutenant-General Jan Willem Janssens. The Javanese elite would now experience the full force of Britain at its imperial zenith, what historian C.A. Bayly has termed the island nation’s ‘imperial meridian’ (1780-1830; Bayly 1989). They would also find that they had exchanged one form of colonial tyranny for another, no longer a Napoleonic Marshal this time but a ‘virtual Napoleonic philosopher’ and instinctive authoritarian, Thomas Stamford Raffles, a man ‘who had a strong distrust of the [native] chiefs and a desire to rule autocratically’ (Bastin 1957:xx, quoting C.Th. Elout).
The power of prophecy

Even before Rongga’s death, Daendels had decided on a radical alteration to Yogya’s governance. Following his arrival in Semarang on 10 December, he had summoned Pieter Engelhard and Willem Nicolaas Servatius, acting Resident of Surakarta, to a meeting to hear what he had in mind. The patih of both courts were also bidden to Semarang. In Danureja II’s case, he was specifically informed that he should not come as a representative of the sultan but rather in his capacity as an appointee of the European government. He was also ordered to send his large ceremonial retinue back from Ungaran and proceed on to Semarang with only the smallest personal escort.1 When the conference eventually took place,2 the two chief ministers were informed that the marshal had resolved to force the sultan to resign his throne in favour of the Crown Prince who would henceforth rule as Prince Regent.3 On 26 December, Daendels marched on Yogya with a force of 3,200 men. He had already travelled as far as the old Mataram tollgate at Kemlaka between Tempèl and Pisangan on the main Yogya-Magelang highway4 when news reached him of Rongga’s death. Although there was now no necessity to continue on with such a large military force to Yogya, especially given the sultan’s cooperation in the period leading up to the killing of the rebellious bupati wedana, the marshal persisted in order to provide substantial prize money for his officers and men from the sultan’s treasury at a time when his army was haemorrhaging at the rate of 70 desertions a day because of lack of pay.5 Some of the prize hand-outs were substantial: Daendels’ deputy, Van Braam, for example, received 10,000 Spanish dollars ‘to indemnify him for the third visit he had made at his own expense to Yogya’,6 while Pieter Engelhard and the former Resident, Inspector-General of Forests Gustaf Wilhelm Wiese, both of whom were tasked along with Van Braam with drawing up the new boundary demarcation between the pasisir and the Principalities, were allocated some 5,000 Spanish dollars each. The

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1 Dj.Br. 39, H.W. Gezelschap (Yogyakarta) to Kyai Tumenggung Sindunagara (Yogyakarta), 22 Dulkangidah AJ 1737 (AD 20-12-1810).
2 No specific date is available, but the conference appears to have taken place around 22-23 December 1810.
3 Daendels 1814:Bijlage 2, additionele stukken 18-19; Dj.Br. 46, H.W. Daendels (Kemlaka) to Hamengkubuwana II (Yogyakarta), 27-12-1810, Hamengkubuwana II (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Yogyakarta), 1 Besar AJ 1737 (AD 28-12-1810).
4 Daendels 1814:Bijlage 2, additionele stukken 17. On the location of Kemlaka, see S.Br. 170, map of old Mataram tollgates; Carey 1984:44; Map 1; and Map 1 in this volume.
5 Batavische Koloniale Courant 6, 8-2-1811; Daendels 1814:Bijlage 2, additionele stukken 24, gives the breakdown of the distribution of the 196,320 Spanish dollars; Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:33, reference to desertions amongst Indonesian – especially Javanese – troops on Daendels’ Yogya expedition. See also Chapter VI.
6 Batavische Koloniale Courant 6, 8-2-1811. Van Braam had come to Yogya twice on commission in circa July 1810 (Chapter VI note 87) and 10-13 November 1810 (pp. 236-9), so this late December visit with Daendels was his third in under six months.
VII The end of the beginning

senior officer commanding the force, Brigadier-General Hendrik Merkus de Kock, whom we shall meet again below as supremo of Dutch military forces during the Java War,7 received a similar sum (Bataviasche Koloniale Courant 6, 8-2-1811). These were not quite as lavish as the moneys distributed by the British prize agents following the storming of the Yogya kraton on 20 June 1812, when the British commander, Colonel Robert Rollo Gillespie, walked away with £15,000 (74,000 Spanish dollars/165,000 guilders; Carey 1980:12 note 4), but they were still substantial. They constituted the first step in the bankrupting of the sultanate and the impoverishment of its elite, both of which would be evident to the eye of former VOC officials who had known Yogya in its heyday when they travelled to the Principalities in the period after the Dutch restoration in August 1816.8

Daendels arrived in Yogya on 28 December and went straight to the Residency House, summoning the sultan to meet him there without paying the customary courtesy visit to the kraton first. Although, he had already warned the Yogya ruler that he would be coming ‘in the strictest incognito’ and that he would be dispensing with all ceremonial,9 such a gross breach of etiquette appears to have evinced bitter feelings at court. Dipanagara described in his babad how preparations were made for military resistance and we know from another source that the ever bellicose Sumadiningrat was urging the sultan on towards a more aggressive response.10 But, according to Dipanagara, the sultan was too conflicted to act even though his close family and bodyguard were prepared for war.11 The most the Yogya ruler was prepared to do was to write to Daendels while the governor-general was still at Kemlaka to express his disquiet at the prospect of such a large troop presence in his capital. To which the marshal replied that his ‘small’ force was only being brought for the ruler’s own protection and that if he had intended hostile operations against Yogya he would have mobilised a much larger army of 15-20,000 men.12 Moreover, the force would leave, Daendels assured the

7 Chapter XI.
8 Baud 306, Van Ijsseldijk, ‘Rapport’, 11-12-1816, commented on the ‘greater poverty’ of Yogya which, when compared to Surakarta, was ‘everywhere visible’ amongst the kraton elite. See further Van Deventer 1891:97-8, on the poor quality silver and Chinese clay plates which had replaced the gold platters and beakers in use for Yogya kraton receptions before 1812. On the sale of jewelry and gold ornaments from the court during the fourth sultan’s reign, see Chapter X note 135.
9 Daendels 1814:Bijlage 2, additionele stukken 19, letter of H.W. Daendels (Semarang) to Hamengkubuwana II (Yogyakarta), 23-12-1810.
12 Daendels 1814:Bijlage 2, additionele stukken 16-7 (the date of Hamengkubuwana II’s letter is wrongly given as 10 Dulkangidah in the printed version); Dj.Br. 46, Hamengkubuwana II (Yogyakarta) to H.W. Daendels (Kemlaka), 30 Dulkangidah AJ 1737 (AD 26-12-1810), H.W. Daendels (Kemlaka) to Hamengkubuwana II (Yogyakarta), 1 Besar AJ 1737 (AD 27-12-1810).
sultan, once all the political changes had been agreed and completed.

According to the Yogya babad, this potentially dangerous situation was only resolved by the careful diplomacy of Danureja II, an unlikely tale given the lack of respect the patih commanded at court and his poor record as a negotiator.13 In fact, the sultan refused to go in person to the Residency House to confer with Daendels, sending his son, the Crown Prince, as his representative. There, in the presence of Daendels, Van Braam, Wiese and Engelhard, the new political arrangements were agreed. On 31 December, the sultan finally acquiesced to the governor-general’s demands and signed a proclamation giving up the administration of Yogyakarta to the Crown Prince, who was to rule as Prince Regent bearing his previous title of Raja Putra Naréndra Pangérán Adipati Anom Amangkunagara.14 Superficially, it seemed that Daendels had effected a political revolution in Yogyakarta, and he immediately boasted that this was the case in a dispatch to the Council of the Indies in Batavia.15 In fact, nothing had changed. True, the exile of Pangérán Natakusuma and his son had served to strengthen the party of the Crown Prince and Danureja II. But the Javanese accounts make it quite clear that the Crown Prince was acting with the sultan’s permission when he accepted the position of Prince Regent.16 Thus, although he now had control of the sultan’s seal, presided over the council of state with the senior court bupati in the kadipatèn, and sat on the sultan’s right side at the Garebeg ceremonies,17 the centre of influence remained with the old sultan who retained control of finances and apanage lands.18 He was also allowed to stay on in the kraton. This was a concession accorded by Daendels at the express request of the Crown Prince19 and was tantamount to

13 B.Ng. I:208-9, LII.30-LIII.6.
14 Daendels 1814:Bijlage 2, additionele stukken 20 and 21; De Jonge and Van Deventer 1884-88, XIII:cvxi (gives partial text of Hamengkubuwana II’s proclamation); the original copy is in Dj.Br. 42 pt. 2, ‘Kopij boek van contracten Djokjo, 1755-1812’ (henceforth: ‘Kopij boek contracten’), 101. See also KITLV H 696c ‘Archiefstukken (Vorstenlandse)’, ed. G.P. Rouffaer, no. 82.
15 Daendels 1814: Bijlage 2, additionele stukken 4, H.W. Daendels (Surakarta) to Raad van Indië (Batavia), 7-1-1811.
18 IOL Eur F148/18 (Raffles-Minto collection, vol. 18), Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to Captain William Robison (Yogyakarta), 27-9-1811, where Engelhard is quoted as saying that: ‘the [old] sultan retains a very great influence in the administration and extorts from his son the most considerable part of the revenues. I am even informed that out of the last half yearly revenues, the latter had only been allowed an amount of 10,000 rix dollars [Spanish dollars]’.
permitting affairs to continue as before given that the heir apparent did not have the character to gainsay his father on any matters of political importance. The old sultan’s favourite consort, Ratu Kencana Wulan, whom Daendels had considered marrying off to ‘some distant désa head’ and who was now heavily pregnant with her third child (a girl, born 29 January 1811), was also permitted to remain in the keputrèn (women’s apartments in the kraton). In fact, the measures imposed by Daendels changed little of substance politically. Instead, they added hugely to the public humiliation of the sultan. So why did he agree to them? Perhaps the old ruler felt it was necessary to bend before the wind. The presence of 3,200 troops in Yogya must have given him pause. But it was clear that once the opportunity presented itself, such as the disordered period which followed the collapse of the Franco-Dutch government in late September 1811, he would move to take back the trappings of office and seek revenge against all those who had helped the Crown Prince.

The treaties imposed by Daendels on the courts provided for the annexation of areas bordering on the government districts on the north coast. Some of these contained important grave-sites regularly visited by court-sponsored pilgrimages. One such area was Séla (also known as Seséla), where both the courts maintained tax-free benefices set aside for religious officials. Known as abdi-Dalem pamutihan magersari, these officials tended the gravesite of Ki Ageng Seséla, the Prometheus figure in Javanese mythology who had bound the lightning, and who was also revered as the grandfather of the founder of Mataram, Kyai Ageng Pamenahan (Rouffaer 1905:598; Carey 1980:137; Carey and Hoadley 2000:86, 382). Despite its curious blend of veneration and worldliness – Séla was also renowned as a haunt of gamblers – the prospective loss of this district caused much bitterness at the courts and numerous demands.

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20 Dj.Br. 9A, Valck, ‘Overzigt’, 74 (on Daendels’ idea of getting Ratu Kencana Wulan married off to a ‘distant désa head’); Daendels 1814:Bijlage 2, additionele stukken 19, H.W. Daendels (Semanrang) to Hamengkubuwana II (Yogyakarta), 23-12-1810, warning Hamengkubuwana II about the danger if Ratu Kencana Wulan gave birth to a son; Dj.Br. 37, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to W.N. Servatius (Surakarta), 30-1-1811 (referring to Ratu Kencana Wulan giving birth at midday on 4 Sura AJ 1738). This third daughter of Ratu Kencana Wulan, the future Ratu Sasi, married Radèn Adipati Danureja IV (post-1847, Pangéran Kusumayuda; in office as patih 1813-1847), Mandoyokusumo 1977:26 no. 75. See also Chapter VI note 98.

21 The text of the treaties is given in Daendels 1814:Bijlage 2, additionele stukken 27 (treaty with Surakarta, 6-1-1811), 28 (treaty with Yogyakarta, 10-1-1811); Dj.Br. 27, contains a map of the European government’s acquisitions under these January 1811 treaties. These included Japan (Majakerta), Wirasaba, Bauwerna, Dhuri, Rajegwest (Jipang), Padhangon, Sekaran, Panolan, Wirasari, Blora, Sèla, Warung, Grobogan, Sèrang, Sima, Gagatan, and the Kedhu enclave on the north coast bounded by Kendhal, Batang and Pekalongan. This last district – also known as Jabarangkah (literally ‘the area outside the [old Mataram] tollgate’) – was annexed to permit a more direct route for Daendels’ post-road (postweg) between Batang and Kendhal through the teak forests of Subah-Weleri rather than along the less direct coast route, see Rouffaer 1905:592; Nagtegaal 1996:169-70.

22 Chapter IV note 18.
were made by the rulers, including the newly installed Prince Regent, for it to be left out of the land acquisitions. Even when it was eventually taken over following the British annexations in August 1812, these requests and complaints about the alienation of the ‘graves of the ancestors’ remained so persistent that those parts of the district deemed *tanah pusaka* (‘heirloom’ land) were eventually given back to the courts in the post-Java War territorial settlement of 1830-1831.23

Another point of dispute involved the *strandgeld* payments, or ‘rent’ for the north coast districts originally part of the Mataram patrimony (Chapter V). These had been fixed at 20,000 Spanish dollars by the 1746 treaty between Pakubuwana II (reigned 1727-1749) and the VOC (Veth 1896-1907, II:163), half of which was paid to Yogyakarta following the 1755 Giyanti settlement (Soekanto 1952:185; Ricklefs 1974a:62). Under the terms of Daendels’ January 1811 treaties, these payments were now ended. This meant that both the Sunan and the sultan lost valuable revenue besides being denied nominal sovereignty over the *pasisir* with its many important ancestral tombs and pilgrimage sites (Chapter IV note 18). The abolition of the *strandgeld* removed one of the main incentives for the south-central Javanese courts’ toleration of a European presence in Java and strengthened the resolve of its rulers to regain control of the north coast areas as we will see shortly in this chapter. In order to soften the blow of this loss of land and revenue, Daendels made some territorial concessions to the courts by ceding to Yogya some Dutch-controlled lands around Boyolali in the east and the areas of Galuh and Cauwer Wétan in the west on the borders of Banyumas. At the same time, Surakarta was to receive the districts of Malang and Antang which had earlier been considered as lying within the territory claimed by the VOC (Daendels 1814: Bijlage 2, additionele stukken 27 art. 6; Ricklefs 1974a:106-7; Chapter V note 11). Daendels also agreed to pay the debts of the Sunan to private individuals amounting to the sum of 96,875 silver reals.24

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23 Dj.Br. 27, Hendrik Veeckens (Batavia) to Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta), 15-7-1811, on the Prince Regent’s complaints. On the demands for the return of the gravesites at the end of the Java War, see NA MvK 4220 Exh. 20-9-1830 56k geheim; Dj.Br. 17, Jan Izaäk van Sevenhoven (Surakarta) to Governor-General Johannes van den Bosch (Batavia), 8-11-1831 no. 102; Houben 1994:65. For references to court pilgrimages to Séla, see Museum Nasional (Jakarta), MS 933 Dj, ‘Ir J. Moens Platen Album’ no. 8 (*ngintun leluhur-Dalem dhateng Seséla*). On Séla’s subsequent history, see Rouffaer 1905:598-9.

24 Daendels 1814:Bijlage 2, additionele stukken 27 art. 3; IOL Eur F148/18 (Raffles-Minto collection vol. 18), Radèn Adipati Cakranagara (Surakarta) to J.A. van Braam (Surakarta), 9-7-1811 (listing Pakubuwana IV’s debts as 25,000 Spanish dollars to Mr Blanck at 250 per month interest, 50,000 to Mr Samuel also at 250 per month interest and 21,000 to the widow of Mr Michaelis at 210 per month interest), J.A. van Braam, ‘Memorial of existing relations between Souracarta and the former [Franco-Dutch] government’, 24-9-1811; UBL BPL 616, Port. 4 pt. 12, J.A. van Braam (Semarang) to T.S. Raffles (Surabaya), 13-12-1811.
The new land settlement had the effect of making Yogya a more westerly based power and Surakarta a more easterly one by adding territory to their western and eastern *mancanagara* territories respectively. But, as far as Yogya was concerned, the concessions were not valued. Galuh and Cauwer Wétan were notorious as hideouts of robbers and bandits and the Prince Regent had no wish to accept responsibility for them. At the same time, the old sultan was aggrieved at the annexation of Jipang and Japan (Majakerta), the latter district being the birthplace of the mother of Ratu Kencana Wulan and an area where many of her family still lived. The treaties also seemed to bear more heavily on Yogya, which had to cede 1,600 *cacah* as opposed to the 1,500 *cacah* relinquished by Surakarta. Since the measures for the final demarcation of the new boundaries had not been finalised before the fall of the Franco-Dutch government in mid-September 1811, however, this difference would in the end prove somewhat academic.

Although these eastern *mancanagara* territories were not ceded, major changes were introduced into the administration of Radèn Rongga’s old fiefdom in Madiun. In January 1811, the office of *bupati wedana* was divided between two new appointees who would henceforth share responsibility as acting *bupati wedana* (Carey and Hoadley 2000:67-8, 232-6, 244-50). These were Pangéran Dipakusuma, who had distinguished himself in the November-December 1810 campaign and who was married to a daughter of the second Radèn Rongga (Radèn Rongga Mangundirja, in office 1784-1790, 1794-1796), and Radèn Rongga Prawirasentika, an uncle of Radèn Rongga, who was notorious for his stingy and money-grubbing administration (Carey 1980:189). They were to remain in office until the majority of Rongga’s son who would govern as sole *bupati wedana* from 1826 to 1830 under the name of Pangéran Rongga Prawiradiningrat and from 1830 to 1859 under the more elevated title of Pangéran Adipati Prawiradiningrat (Appendix Vb). At the same time, in order to reduce the previous concentration of power on Maospati/Madiun,

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25 Dj.Br. 22, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to J.W. Janssens (Batavia), 29-7-1811; IOL Eur F148/42, (Raffles-Minto collection vol. 42), ‘Report on the state of Java by Messrs [J.] Knops and [P.H. van Lawick] van Pabst’, Semarang, 29-6-1812, described the situation in Galuh thus: ‘through the invasion of pirates and heavy servitude imposed on the inhabitants, many of them have left the country for that of the princes [namely, the Sunan and sultan]’. A similar situation was noted by Captain Godfrey Phpips Baker in 1815, Baker, ‘Mémoire’, 104-7. The first Dutch Resident of Banyumas after the Java War, J.E. de Sturler (in office 1830-1835), wrote of Dayeuh Luhur as a ‘very poor district’ whose 34,396 population ‘had little visible means of subsistence’ and only paid 85 cents per head annual *pajak* (tax), AN, Kabinet 13-9-1832 no. 1599, J.E. de Sturler (Banyumas) to Johannes van den Bosch (Batavia/Bogor), 5-9-1832.

26 Dj.Br. 22, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to J.W. Janssens (Batavia), 29-7-1811, stating that the birthplace of Ratu Kencana Wulan’s mother was in Japan (Majakerta), and various family graves were there. See also Poensen 1905:187; Hageman 1856, V:258.

27 Dj.Br. 22, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to J.W. Janssens (Batavia), 29-7-1811; UBL BPL 616, Port. 4 pt. 12, J.A. van Braam (Semarang) to T.S. Raffles (Surabaya), 13-12-1811.
the number of kabupatèn in the Madiun area was greatly increased. New appointments were also made to those districts (Sekaran, Kertasana) where the incumbent bupati had been deemed to act in a disloyal or ineffective fashion at the approach of Rongga's troops (Carey 1980:41-4; Carey and Hoadley 2000:64-74, 232-72).

One of those dismissed at this time for his less than effective leadership during Rongga's revolt was the commander of the Yogya expeditionary force, Radèn Tumenggung Purwadipura. His closeness to the sultan had afforded him some initial protection, but following the Crown Prince's elevation as Prince Regent he had been exiled to the woods of Sélamanik near Wanasaba where, according to the report of a Surakarta spy, he was to be murdered. But the tenacity of Purwadipura's wife, the youngest daughter of the first sultan, apparently saved his life: according to a Javanese account she refused to let go of his belt until she had received explicit assurances from the Prince Regent's uncle, Pangéran Panular, that he would not be murdered (Carey 1992:116, 284, 441 notes 207-9). There was also talk of his family being sent to Pacitan where the local bupati was his 'mortal enemy' according to Danureja, but even this appears to have been averted. After a mere seven months of banishment (February-September 1811), Purwadipura was allowed back to Yogya when the old sultan seized back power from his son in late September and reinstated many of his former officials (Carey 1992:441 note 209).

Meanwhile, in Madiun, the new bupati wedana were ordered to obliterate the last vestiges of Radèn Rongga's royal pretensions. Even while Rongga was still being hunted down, the sultan had sent instructions that his son-in-law's kraton should be broken up and his recently deceased wife's gravesite at Gunung Bancak, which had been restyled as Giripurna and smacked too much of a Madiun version of Imagiri (also known as Girilaya), should revert to its original name. Under explicit instructions from Yogya, Dipakusuma also moved the seat of the bupati wedana back from Rongga's ruined residence

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28 Dj:Br. 6, P.H. van Lawick van Pabst (Yogyakarta) to Hendrik MacGillavry (Surakarta), 1-2-1826, who listed seven new kabupatèn in Madiun, including Kutaarja (Panggungan), Tunggul-Wanakerta, Maospati, Purwadadi, Banget, Kenitèn, and Nguning; three each in Rawa (Tulung Agung) and Magetan, and two in Goranggarêng. See further Onghkham 1975:62; Chapter VIII note 89.
29 S.Br. 46, Anonymous Javanese letter (reports by spies about Yogya), 9 Sura AJ 1738 (AD 20-2-1811). Sélamanik appears to have been part of the royal domain lands (bumi pamajegan-Dalem), areas which delivered products exclusively for the ruler's household, in this case presumably high-quality wood, see Kollmann 1864:361.
30 Dj:Br. 27, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to J.W. Janssens (Batavia), 21-6-1811 (on Prince Regent's consideration of possible exile of family of Purwadipura to Pacitan).
31 S.Br. 37, p. 1091, Radèn Adipati Sasradiningrat II (Surakarta) to Kyai Adipati Danureja III (Yogyakarta), 12-1-1813 (on burning down of mosque at Girilaya (Imagiri) on 25 Besar AJ 1739).
32 Dj:Br. 46, Danureja II (Yogyakarta) to Radèn Tumenggung Purwadipura (Maospati/Madiun), 15 Duilkangidah AJ 1737 (AD 12-12-1810).
at Maospati to Madiun where the old dalem of the second Radèn Rongga at Wanasari was restored. Curiously, amidst all this administrative activity and reform in the eastern mancanagara, Daendels’ proposed annexations under the terms of his January 1811 treaty were effectively ignored. Many of the new appointments made in the January-June 1811 period were to districts like Panolan, Padhangan and Sekaran which were slated for hand-over to the European government. In order to regularise this situation, Danureja II wrote to Engelhard at the start of the month of Mulud (25 March-23 April 1811) to ask that the mancanagara bupati be still allowed to come to Yogya to pay their usual respects to the Prince Regent and the old sultan when the next Garebeg Mulud was celebrated on 20 April and that they should continue to do so until such time as the new boundaries had been worked out. He likewise suggested that the tax-farmers of those western districts ceded to Yogya – namely, Galuh and Cauwer wétan – should continue to pay their revenues to the European government as before. Danureja’s proposals were accepted. In fact, on 30 April Engelhard wrote to the Prince Regent informing him that, given the imminent British invasion (based on firm intelligence about their naval and troop build up in Pulau Pinang and Melaka), all further work on the new border demarcation would be suspended until after they had been fought off.

What could not be ignored, however, was the very large indemnity demanded by Daendels and which he insisted was paid before he withdrew his troops from the sultan’s capital. This was eventually sent in silver coin from the kraton treasury to the fort on 4 January in 66 large chests to be counted. But the Dutch military auditors – perhaps at the marshal’s instigation – made problems about the type of specie in which the indemnity had been paid, demanding an additional sum calculated down to the last quarter dollar to cover the difference. The Prince Regent agreed to this, but warned that ‘the wantonness

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34 Carey and Hoadley 2000:64-74; Dj.Br. 41, Danureja II (Yogyakarta) to Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta), 1 Mulud AJ 1738 (AD 25-3-1811), relating that the Prince Regent had ordered Radèn Tumenggung Yudakusuma of Grobogan-Wirasari to return to his kabupatèn ‘to place himself at the disposal of the Dutch’.
35 Dj.Br. 41, Danureja II (Yogyakarta) to Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta), 1 Mulud AJ 1738 (AD 25-3-1811). The border demarcation was being undertaken from the Yogya side by a joint survey team led by the former Yogya Resident, Gustaf Wilhelm Wiese, and the Yogya bupati, Mas Tumenggung Sindunagara (later Kyai Adipati Danureja III, in office 1811-1813).
36 Dj.Br. 41, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to Raja Putra Naréndra (Yogyakarta), 5 Rabingulakir AJ 1738 (AD 30-4-1811), Raja Putra Naréndra (Yogyakarta) to Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta), 9 Rabingulakir AJ 1738 (AD 4-5-1811).
37 Since the 196,320 Spanish dollar sum was paid in silver half ducatoons (worth f 1.60) and Java rupees (rupiyah) worth f 1.20, rather than whole silver ronde maaten (Spanish dollars), it was found to be 2,977 and a quarter Spanish dollars short and Daendels insisted that this money should be paid before he removed his army from Yogya, Dj.Br. 39, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to Danureja II (Yogyakarta), 11 Besar AJ 1737 (AD 7-1-1811); Dj.Br. 41, Danureja II (Yogyakarta) to Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta), 13 Besar AJ 1737 (AD 9-1-1811).
and lawlessness’ of Daendels’ forces necessitated their immediate withdrawal from Yogya because any longer stay ‘would cause extreme unpleasantness with the local inhabitants’.\textsuperscript{38} Danureja II, who had direct responsibility for the safe delivery of the indemnity, was later accused of embezzling some 20,000 \textit{ronde realen} of the moneys taken to the fort, a charge which further intensified the sultan’s bitter hatred of him and contributed to his later murder.\textsuperscript{39}

Daendels’ visit to Yogya thus left the sultan with a triple humiliation: a disastrous treaty, the loss of a fifth of his state treasure and an almost impossible situation at court. The sultan’s jealousy was further aroused when Daendels sent the Prince Regent a letter from King Louis (Lodewijk I) of Holland congratulating him on his new appointment and an order, referred to in Dipanagara’s \textit{babad} as a \textit{bintang} (star), which was almost certainly the Orde van de Unie (Order of the Union), which had been created as a new Dutch nobility by King Louis on 14 February 1807. This was set in an eight-pointed gold star studded with diamonds.\textsuperscript{40} A similar honour seems to have been sent to Sunan Pakubuwana IV at the same time.\textsuperscript{41} According to Dipanagara, another of the reasons why the \textit{patih} was put to death on the Yogya ruler’s orders in October 1811 was because Danureja II had persuaded the Prince Regent to wear this order in public at the celebrations for Napoleon’s birthday on 15 August despite the old sultan’s intense jealousy.\textsuperscript{42}

\textsuperscript{38} Dj.Br. 41, Danureja II (Yogyakarta) to Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta), 13 Besar AJ 1737 (AD 9-1-1811).

\textsuperscript{39} Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:37; Dj.Br. 27, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to J.W. Janssens (Batavia), 28-6-1811.

\textsuperscript{40} According to Van Braam, this order (\textit{ridderorde}) was delivered to Pakubuwana IV and the Prince Regent sometime in May, presumably along with King Louis’ letter, S.Br. 25, J.A. van Braam (Surakarta) to Pakubuwana IV (Surakarta), 8-5-1811. Dipanagara mentioned that the star was as big as Daendels’ own but did not have any diamonds (\textit{18. Jéndral mantuk mring Batawi/ datan lami kintun bintang/ dhumateng jeng rama mangko/ pan sinami agengira/ lan bintangé priyangga/ pan Jéndral Dandles punikul namung kantun mawi sela}), BD (Manado) II:136-7, XV.18-9. This suggests that the Prince Regent’s was also the Grand Cross (\textit{grand croix} or \textit{grootkruis}) which went to men of ministerial rank or Raad van Staat as well as top foreign ministers, princes of the empire and allies like the Prince Regent, personal communication Professor Simon Schama, 22-3-1976. Despite Dipanagara’s testimony, it was in fact set in diamonds, see Groneman 1895:23, who describes the eight-pointed star sent by Daendels which was worn by Hamengkubuwana VII (reigned 1877-1921) at Garebeg celebrations; and Plate 54 (p. 460) on the 1938 depiction of Hamengkubuwana IV with the star in his official portrait.

\textsuperscript{41} Gericke and Roorda 1901, II:654, S.Br. 25, J.A. van Braam (Surakarta) to Pakubuwana IV (Surakarta), 8-5-1811, on the \textit{bintang kadhaton}, the gold star set with jewels sent by Daendels to Pakubuwana IV.

\textsuperscript{42} Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 27, Dj.Br. 22, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to J.W. Janssens (Batavia), 29-7-1811 (referring to Hamengkubuwana II’s jealousy over this order); Dj.Br. 24, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to J.W. Janssens (Batavia), 16-8-1811, referring to the Prince Regent wearing a ‘brilliant star’ to a Residency party to celebrate Napoleon’s birthday (15-8-1811).
Incipient civil war in Yogya

Reports of spies in the pay of Engelhard and Sunan Pakubuwana IV give a deeply troubled picture of the sultanate in the months leading up to the British invasion on 4 August 1811. Already on 17 January, just over two weeks after his appointment as Prince Regent, Engelhard was writing to the former Crown Prince to ask why he had never appeared outside the kadipatèn for the usual Saturday tournaments on the southern alun-alun. He pointed out that as the new de facto ruler he should be presiding over them while his father, the old sultan, should only come ‘as a spectator’: ‘Your subjects will begin to wonder whether you are really the ruler of Yogya if you do not attend these Saturday tournaments’, the Resident counselled, ‘You should not be so afraid of your father!’ Wonder they might. If Engelhard had been reading his spies’ reports properly he would have known better than to urge such a foolhardy step on his government’s protégé, who sensibly only attended one such Saturday tournament in the whole of the first six months of his regency.

In February, these reports were speaking of ‘impending civil war’ in Yogya. An unbridgeable chasm had seemingly opened up between the followers of the Prince Regent and the old sultan. On the one side were Danureja II and his family, who were always in the kadipatèn. On the other were the former ruler’s favourite son, Pangéran Mangkudiningrat, his elder brother Pangéran Ngabèhi and his quirky younger brother, the santri prince Pangéran Muhamad Abubakar (Dipawijaya I), who had special responsibilities for mobilising the Yogya officials in receipt of tax-free benefices in support of the former monarch. According to the reports, these three were ‘day and night’ in the kraton. Many were the prakara (issues) between the old ruler and his son, but none were ever cleared up with the result that the Yogya princes were in confusion not knowing which way to turn. According to a Dutch source, the enmity

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44 Dj.Br. 41, Danureja II (Yogyakarta) to Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta), 28 Sapar AJ 1738 (AD 22-3-1811) (on the ‘party’ on the southern alun-alun at the time of a Monday tournament (Senenan) when Hamengkubuwana II and Raja Putra Naréndra had ridden out together, something which had never happened before in ‘old adat’); Dj.Br. 39, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to Danureja II (Yogyakarta), 9 Rabingulakir AJ 1738 (AD 2-5-1811), Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to Raja Putra Naréndra (Yogyakarta), 20-6-1811, complaint that Prince Regent had only attended one Saturday tournament or Setonan since January.
45 Referred to in the secret report as priyayi pradikan or pethakan, literally the ‘white ones’, namely those who had adopted the white garb of the santri, Dj.Br. 46, Anonymous Javanese letter (reports of spies about Yogya), 9 Sura AJ 1738 (AD 20-2-1811) (copy in S.Br. 37).
between the party of the ‘old sultan’ (kasepuhan) and the Prince Regent (kara-
jan) really dates from this time.\textsuperscript{48}

One of these issues concerned the distribution of the goods and chattels of the dead Radèn Rongga, and the three exiled members of the court: Pangéran Natakusuma, his son Natadiningrat, and the recently dismissed Purwadipura.\textsuperscript{49} The old sultan wanted their belongings (and presumably apanage holdings) distributed amongst his children, but the Prince Regent did not wish it.\textsuperscript{50} Both sides apparently refused to make concessions. At the same time, they started recruiting new soldiers (prajurit)\textsuperscript{51} and acquiring new weaponry. The former ruler was reported by Danureja to have placed an order for cannon to defend the walls of the kraton against attack and his ever loyal supporter, Sumadiningrat, was rumoured to be purchasing horses and muskets on his sovereign’s behalf to equip his new cavalry squadrons.\textsuperscript{52} The old monarch was now exercising these recently raised cavalry and infantry formations on the southern alun-alun every Wednesday. On Mondays and Thursdays, if these same confidential reports can be trusted, he was engaged in an altogether more sinister activity, namely attending special prayer meetings and religious meals (sedhekah) in the house of Tuwan Haji Muhammad Idris, the senior Yogya court ‘priest’ and 40 other returned Mecca pilgrims, where prayers were supposedly being said for the ‘taking from this world of those of the sultan’s children who had proven themselves disobedient’, an

\textsuperscript{48} Dj.Br. 18, F.G. Valck, ‘Geheime Memorie behoorende bij het Algemeen Verslag der Residentie Djocjocarta over het jaar 1839’, 31-3-1840. See also Chapter V note 121.

\textsuperscript{49} Purwadipura’s apanage lands (\textit{sabin ingkang ampas saking Purwadipuran}) were also retrenched and redistributed at this time, in part to Yogya officials like Radèn Tumenggung Sumadiwirya, who had distinguished themselves in the campaign against Raden Rongga, see Carey and Hoadley 2000:144-5, 155-7, 182-3, 187-8, 189-90; Chapter VI note 218.

\textsuperscript{50} Dj.Br. 46, Anonymous Javanese letter (reports of spies about Yogya), 9 Sura AJ 1738 (AD 20-2-1811). See further B.Ng. I:229-30, LVIII.12-15; Poensen 1905:276-7; Carey 1992:210, 219, on the revenge plundering of Pangérán Adikusuma’s 	extit{dalem} by Pakualam forces at the time of the storming of the Yogya kraton by the British on 20 June 1812 because of his role in robbing Natakusuma/Pakualam I’s residence in January 1811.

\textsuperscript{51} Dj.Br. 46, Anonymous Javanese letter (reports of spies about Yogya), 9 Sura AJ 1738 (AD 20-2-1811), which gives the following new troop numbers enrolled: Hamengkubuwana II (600), Mangkudiningrat (500), Prince Regent (400), Danureja II (200), Sumadiningrat (100). The two brothers of Danureja II, Radèn Tumenggung Mertawijaya (post-June 1812, Danukusuma II) and Radèn Tumenggung Mertadiwirya, were appointed as the Prince Regent’s troop commanders, see further Carey 1992:342, 489 note 424. Hamengkubuwana II was said to have recruited his new prajurit in part from amongst his cousins, grandsons and \textit{panakawan} (intimate personal retainers) who had no ricefields (\textit{sawah}) or apanage lands of their own, Dj.Br. 41, Danureja II (Yogyakarta) to Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta), 12 Sura AJ 1738 (AD 6-2-1811).

\textsuperscript{52} Carey 190:20; Carey and Hoadley 2000:Dj.Br. 41, Danureja II (Yogyakarta) to Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta), 12 Sura AJ 1738 (AD 6-2-1811). Engelhard recommended that Hamengkubuwana II’s order for ordnance be allowed but the cannon be handed over to the Prince Regent after they had been cast, presumably in the royal gun foundries at Taman Sari and Kutha Gedhé, and in the Chinese and Arab-run foundries in Gresik, see Thorn 1815:185, Plate XIX no. S; Chapter VI note 53.
obvious reference to the Prince Regent and those royal family members who were supporting him. The old sultan’s assiduity in attending Friday services at the Mesjid Ageng or Great Mosque, something which he had only done extremely rarely during the previous nineteen years of his reign, was also remarked on by the Resident. It seemed to Engelhard that the ruler was up to some ‘plot’ with the court santri. At the same time, his decision to send a 24-strong party of Yogya ‘priests’ on a court-sponsored pilgrimage to Mecca in early June, despite the obvious difficulties of the British naval blockade of Javanese ports, was seen as highly inappropriate by the Dutch authorities and the party were not allowed to proceed to Semarang.

For his part, the Prince Regent tried to establish his own administration through the appointment of new court bupati, but he had no joy when he asked his father to provide them with the necessary ricefields (sawah) to maintain them in their new offices. The old sultan replied that he had no sawah to give them, but that there was plenty of land in Surakarta and in the Dutch-controlled districts of the north coast so his son should ask there for the necessary apanage holdings for his new officials! All seven of the Prince Regent’s bupati appointed at this time would later be stripped of their offices by the old sultan in May 1812 just before the British attack on the kraton. Indeed, there was even speculation in the British reports at the time that the Yogya ruler intended to put them to death.

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53 Dj.Br. 46, Anonymous Javanese letter (reports of spies on the situation in Yogya), 9 Sura AJ 1738 (AD 20-2-1811); S.Br. 37, Report of Yogya spy to Radën Adipati Cakranagara (Surakarta), 25 Sapor AJ 1738 (AD 19-3-1811). These reports were denied by Danureja II who gave out that the Kyai Pengulu of Yogya (head of the religious hierarchy), pradikan priests and santri in receipt of tax-free benefits, as well as court haji, had the duty of praying for the long life of Hamengkubuwana II and the Prince Regent. For a reference to a certain Haji Muhammad Idris, who supposedly brought ‘seditious communications’ from Mecca to the south-central Javanese courts in the 1770s and may have been a pupil of the famous Sumatran teacher in Mecca, ‘Abd al-Samad al-Palimbani, see Ricklefs 1974a:153-4; Drewes 1976:274. See further Chapter IX note 129.

54 Dj.Br. 27, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to J.W. Janssens (Batavia), 28-6-1811; Dj.Br. 9A, Valck, ‘Overzigt’, 96. On Hamengkubuwana II’s greater assiduity in attending mosque services during his 1826-1828 restoration to the Yogya throne at the height of the Java War, see Van den Broek 1875, 22-284.

55 Dj.Br. 27, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to J.W. Janssens (Batavia), 10-6-1811, 28-6-1811. Chapter II note 71.

56 Dj.Br. 41, Danureja II (Yogyakarta) to Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta), 28 Sapor AJ 1738 (AD 22-3-1811). The new court bupati were: Radên Tumenggung Kusumareja, Raden Tumenggung Natayuda III, Radên Tumenggung Sumadiwirya (note 49; Chapter VI note 218), and Radên Tumenggung Wiradiwura, while the unattached bupati (bupati miji) were: Radên Tumenggung Tirtadiwira, Radên Tumenggung Mertawijaya (later Danukusuma II) and Radên Tumenggung Mangkuwijaya. Two of these (Kusumareja and Mertawijaya) were brothers of Danureja II, while Tirtadiwira was his uncle, see Appendix II.

57 Dj.Br. 41, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to Danureja II (Yogyakarta), 28 Sapor AJ 1738 (AD 25-3-1811), Danureja II (Yogyakarta) to Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta), 28 Sapor AJ 1738 (AD 25-3-1811).

58 IOL Eur F148/24 (Raffles-Minto collection vol. 24), John Crawfurd (Yogyakarta) to T.S. Raf-
By June 1811, there were rumours that the second sultan was preparing to appoint his younger son Mangkudiningrat as his heir apparent in place of the Prince Regent who was considered to have forfeited his previous position. According to Dipanagara, this move was urged on the former ruler by various princes and by two of his consorts: Ratu Kencana Wulan and Mangkudiningrat’s mother, Ratu Mas. Certain pusaka (heirlooms) belonging to the kadipaten were demanded back, presumably in preparation for his investiture. Mangkudiningrat, meanwhile, conducted himself in an outwardly friendly fashion towards the Prince Regent, but it was clear that he secretly coveted the heir apparent’s position regarding it as his by right of birth. His candidature was also undoubtedly being used by the former monarch as a means of bringing pressure on the Prince Regent, quite apart from the fact that he genuinely hoped that Mangkudiningrat would succeed him on the throne of Yogya as by this time he had become his favourite son. Engelhard, meanwhile, could do little to support the Prince Regent as he was often incapacitated by recurrent fevers which by late September had so seriously undermined his health that he asked the new British administration to be immediately relieved of his post.

As the royal government descended into disarray in Yogya, the number of robberies and violent attacks in the countryside around the sultan’s capital increased. The old sultan’s hand was thought to be behind many of these. If true, it was an extremely effective way of unsettling his son’s administration.
Meanwhile, the troubles encountered by the Prince Regent reached the ears of Daendels, who in early May 1811 even threatened to come once again to Yogya with as many troops as he had brought on the previous occasion to sort out the situation, but only after he had ‘dealt with the English’. This was an idle threat. Daendels was then in the very last days of his administration: he would be replaced by Jan Willem Janssens on 16 May, who owed his promotion to the high favour he enjoyed both with the Emperor Napoleon and his step-daughter, Hortense de Beauharnais (1783-1837), the wife of King Louis of Holland (Stapel 1941:79). As for his motley army of locally raised troops, it would prove no match for the 11,000 seasoned soldiers drawn from British line regiments, Bengal sepoys battalions, and Madras artillery units which were even then being readied in Melaka for the invasion of Java in early August.

The collapse of the Franco-Dutch government

While Yogya stood on the cusp of civil war and the threat of invasion grew ever more real, the former Dutch government in Java underwent its final transformation. At seven o’clock in the morning of 27 February the ‘momentous and joyful’ news reached Yogya of the proclamation of the annexation of Holland by France on 9 July 1810. Daendels’ dispatch with the announcement was brought to the kadipatèn by Danureja II and the following day a brief ceremony was held to mark the event. ‘Minister’ Engelhard and his secretary, Hendrik Willem Gezelschap, in their full dress uniforms accompanied by their mounted dragoon escort processed by coach to the Crown Prince’s residence where all the princes and notables had foregathered to be told of the annexation. One of the royal bodyguard regiments, the Ketanggung, then shot off three salvos of musket shots as a signal to the gunners in the fort to fire their cannon which were promptly answered by the thunder of the sultan’s ordnance from the kraton battlements. As the reverberations died away, the health was drunk of ‘His Majesty, Emperor of the French, King of Italy, Protector

64 Dj.Br. 41, Raja Putra Naréndra (Yogyakarta) to Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta), 9 Rabingulakir AJ 1738 (AD 4-5-1811).
65 Poensen 1905:255; Abdullah 1970:86-7; Stockdale 1812:2-3, 6, who relates that the First Division of the British expeditionary force under Colonel Robert Rollo Gillespie had sailed from Madras on 18 April and had docked at Pinang on 18 May on their way to Malaka which they reached on 1 June 1811. The Bengal troops had landed in Malaka ‘six weeks previously’, namely on 20 April. Troop numbers are given in Thorn 1815:17, which lists 5,344 European and 5,777 ‘native’ troops with 839 pioneers or lascar, giving a grand total of 11,960 of whom 1,200 had fallen sick in Malaka and another 1,500 on landing in Java, thus leaving approximately 9,000 to fight the campaign.
66 Vink 1892:444. The news – referred to in Daendels’ letter as the gewigtige en heuchelijke tijding – was contained in a letter from the marshal to the Prince Regent dated 20-2-1811. Vink’s description is based on Pieter Engelhard’s letter of 2 March 1811 to Daendels which is no longer in the Residency archive.
of the Rhineland Association, Mediator of the Swiss Confederation’, titles which would have meant as much to the assembled Javanese as Daendels’ previous grandiloquent statements about the ‘mightiest Empire in the world’ and the ‘great Napoleon’ which had so bemused the patih in Semarang in early October 1808 (Chapter V). The Prince Regent then joined Engelhard, Gezelschap and Pangéran Ngabèhi in the Resident’s coach for the short return trip to the fort where thousands of ‘Chinese, Moors (non-Indonesian Asians), Malays and Javanese’ had gathered in the square in front of the main gate to hear the reading of the proclamation. The Dutch flag was lowered and the French tricolour raised as a 45-gun salute boomed forth from the fort (Vink 1892:444-7). Napoleon’s France was now direct ruler of Java. Henceforth all civil and military officials would be required to take an oath of loyalty to the emperor (Nahuys van Burgst 1858:46-7). But it would not be long before another flag flew over Mangkubumi’s capital. As for the reaction of the Dutch inhabitants of Java to the news that their country had been absorbed into la grande nation, the future Yogya Resident, Huibert Gerard Nahuys van Burgst probably caught the mood when he wrote that ‘for the most part it created feelings of great distress and grief’ (Nahuys van Burgst 1858:47).

Two members of the Yogya elite who were not at the flag raising ceremony and for whom a change in political regime could not come soon enough were Pangéran Natakusuma and his son, Natadiningrat. In late December 1810, they had been taken under armed escort from Yogya to Semarang and then overland via Sumedhang and Bogor to Batavia (Poensen 1905:227-31), where they were held first in Daendels’ fortress at Meester Cornelis and then in a private house in the Kantor Baru district of Batavia. According to Daendels (1814:97 note 1), plans to send them into exile in Makassar – Dipanagara’s later place of banishment – could not be acted upon because of the stringency of the British blockade, so they were sent instead to Cirebon where they were placed in the care of the bailiff, Matthijs Waterloo. As an erstwhile Resident of Yogyakarta, he was well acquainted with the two men from his time in the sultan’s capital. Government enquiries about whether the prince and his son should be returned to Yogya met with a negative response from the Prince Regent, the patih and members of the karajan party, who did not disguise the fact that they would like to see them dead. The old sultan, on the contrary, was reported to be fervently hoping that if the British invasion went ahead, Natakusuma and his son would be allowed back to his capital.69

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67 Poensen 1905:231; Dj.Br. 27, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to J.W. Janssens (Batavia), 21-6-1811.
70 Dj.Br. 41, Raja Putra Naréndra (Yogyakarta) to Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta), 10 Rabingu-lakir AJ 1738 (AD 4-5-1811).
It is possible that the Prince Regent and his party were successful in persuading Daendels that the two prominent Yogyanese should be severely treated. We know from the extant Residency letters, that there was a rumour in late April 1811 that Natadiningrat had returned to Yogya. This had elicited an emphatic denial from Waterloo in Cirebon. He confirmed that both Natakusuma and his son were still in his care, but since a large amount of writing materials had been found in their baggage, they had been split up and had been placed in stocks in separate cells in the dungeon of Cirebon fort where they had contracted ‘heavy malarial fevers’. Their five female servants (one of whom was Chinese), who had accompanied them from Yogya, had also been separated from them. According to Waterloo’s friend, Nahuys van Burgst, who was then lodging with the bailiff while he conducted his duties as a member of Daendels’ Forest Administration, Waterloo’s reference to ‘heavy malarial fevers’ was part of a delaying tactic which they had worked out together to prevent his two detainees’ immediate execution. They had calculated that they could buy time by arguing that the sudden deaths of two such prominent members of the Yogya elite would play badly in the sultan’s kraton, so reports should be sent that Natakusuma and Natadiningrat were very sick, then that there was little hope left for them, and finally – if no other options were open to delay further – that they had expired (Nahuys van Burgst 1858:49-52; Van Kesteren 1887:1305 note 1; Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:36 note 1).

All this was to counter Daendels’ secret instruction sent to Cirebon on 20 April and written in his own hand on a small piece of paper and slipped into a letter from his deputy, J.A. van Braam to Waterloo, which read (Van Polanen 1816:264; Poensen 1905:249):

Notto Coesoemo [Natakusuma] and Notto Diningrat [Natadiningrat] are the sole supporters of Kentjono Woelang [Ratu Kencana Wulan] who rule her. The government cannot openly bring these people to death, but it longs to learn that they are no more.

According to the Pakualam babad, it was Van Braam’s wife who had secured the marshal’s promise that they should be executed due to the personal influence she exercised over the governor-general. Other reports speak of the advice being received from Engelhard stressing that the two were ‘most extremely dangerous’ for the peace of the Yogya court (Van Polanen 1816:263). Probably Daendels needed no outside persuasion and had already made up

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71 Dj.Br. 39, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to Danureja II (Yogyakarta), 12 Rabingulakir AJ 1738 (AD 5-5-1811); Dj.Br. 41, Danureja II (Yogyakarta) to Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta), 13 Rabingulakir AJ 1738 (AD 6-5-1811) referring to Matthis Waterloo’s dispatch from Cirebon of 30-4-1811.

72 Dj.Br. 41, Danureja II (Yogyakarta) to Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta), 13 Rabingulakir AJ 1738 (AD 6-6-1811) had strongly urged that they should not be sent back to Yogya but kept under close watch in Cirebon.

73 Poensen 1905:239, 242-52; Chapter V note 141.
his mind to do away with the two Yogya notables before they could be used by the British following a successful invasion. Whatever the case, the situation of the detainees was desperate. Only the delaying tactics of the bailiff supported by his friend Nahuys ensured that their execution was averted until the new governor-general, J.W. Janssens, had replaced Daendels on 16 May. Neither Natakusuma nor his son would ever forgive the Prince Regent for his role in their year-long exile and near execution. Their implacable animosity would lie at the root of the suspicion which poisoned relations between the Pakualaman and the Yogya court during the Prince Regent’s reign as Hamengkubuwana III (1812-1814) and beyond into the nineteenth century (Carey 1992:458-9 notes 286, 288).

The arrival of Janssens led to a significant liberalisation of Daendels’ administration, and his honest character formed a sharp contrast to the brutality of his predecessor. A Malay text, the Hikayat Mareskalek (‘The marshal’s chronicle’), speaks of him as a ‘gentle ruler and beloved father’ (Van Ronkel 1918:872). During his brief tenure, he took some important initiatives such as the establishment on 20 July 1811 of a new training scheme for young European administrators in Javanese known as the élèves voor het civiele (pupils for the civil service), later to be renamed élèves voor de Javaansche taal (pupils for the Javanese language; Van der Chijs 1895-97, XVI:715-7; Houben 1994:119-22). But such steps had little immediate impact given that he had inherited an insolvent administration from Daendels, and assumed the governor-generalship only in time to preside over the submission of Java to the British, the second occasion in his colonial career when he had been forced to undergo such a humiliation. Although Daendels had done much to organise the island’s military defences and increase the number of troops, the government’s financial situation was desperate. The supply of silver money had dried up

74 When news of Daendels’ imminent replacement had reached Java in late April, Waterloo had written to enquire whether the marshal’s order still stood. ‘Absolutely’, stated Daendels in another handwritten note sent by Van Braam in a letter of 3 May, ‘the execution is still awaited, while the circumstances [of Janssens’ arrival] have changed nothing in this matter’ (Van Polanen 1816:256). Janssens landed in east Java sometime in the second week of May and took over from Daendels on 16 May, Nahuys van Burgst 1858:50-2; Stapel 1941:79.

75 NA, G.K. van Hogendorp private collection 147b, ‘Memorie van Dirk van Hogendorp over de geschiktheid van Generaal Janssens; Redeerende memorie te onderzoeken of de Generaal Janssens geschikt is om also gouverneur-generaal naar Oost-Indiën gezonden te worden’ (henceforth: Dirk van Hogendorp, ‘Memorie’), n.y. (circa 1814). Despite acknowledging Janssens’ eerlijkheid (honesty), Van Hogendorp argued that he was totally unfit to be sent back as governor-general in 1816: 1. as an officer’s son he had had no education; 2. he was a weak character and lacked firmness in carrying out his plans; 3. if criticised he could be passionate and hot-tempered (driftig); 4. he spoke no Indonesian languages and had no knowledge of local customs; 5. he had no judgement of men and wanted for the cold-bloodedness necessary to govern a large colony (unlike Daendels!).

76 Janssens had been forced to hand over Cape Colony to the British on 23 January 1806 when, according to Van Hogendorp, ‘he had lost his head’ even though the military aspects were well planned, Dirk van Hogendorp, ‘Memorie’, n.y. (circa 1814); Stapel 1941:79.
and debased copper coinage produced at Daendels’ new mint at Tawangsari in Surabaya had caused a flight of good coinage from the local markets. The resulting inflation created great hardship for the local population, particularly in the Principalities where Chinese tax-farmers exported silver specie to the *pasisir* and allowed devalued coins to reappear in circulation. Javanese specie traders in Kutha Gedhé also appear to have ‘cashed in’ on the situation by minting coins for export. At the same time, the British blockade had prevented the sale of coffee, the government’s main export crop, and by July 1811 only 84,000 Spanish dollars remained in the treasury with outstanding debts to local *bupati* in west Java for the payment of crop contingents totalling well over 300,000 Spanish dollars. Janssens warned Engelhard that he feared widespread insurrection unless these contingents were paid and urged the Resident to secure a loan from the old sultan or the *patih* for 500,000 Spanish dollars, or at the very least 300,000. ‘Accord the [old] sultan all the privileges you can, but do not allow him to gain too great an influence over affairs of state’ the new governor-general suggested. How Engelhard was going to arrange such a loan from the former monarch, who still controlled the purse strings in Yogya, without allowing him back into his previous estate as *de jure* ruler Janssens did not say. But even the suggestion that the new Franco-Dutch government was now dependant on Yogya for the provision of financial assistance in order to survive must have emboldened the old sultan. Not only would Janssens’ administration be unlikely to prevail against a British invasion, the former Yogya ruler would calculate, but the time was not so far distant when he himself would be able to seize back his full royal powers. He thus had no difficulty in refusing the governor-general’s request.

79 Dj.Br. 27, J.W. Janssens (Batavia) to Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta), 30-6-1811; Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to J.W. Janssens (Batavia), 12-7-1811. On the royal mint at Kutha Gedhé, see AN, Exh. 17-2-1841 no. 16; and on seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Javanese coinage, see Netscher and Van der Chijs 1864:141-7.
80 Dj.Br. 22, J.W. Janssens (Batavia) to Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta), 15-7-1811, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to J.W. Janssens (Batavia), 22-7-1811. Tea and sugar were also important export crops at this time.
The sense that great changes were afoot was seemingly mirrored in the natural world on 27 June when the east Java volcano, Mount Kelut, erupted. The heavy earthquake and falls of ash and sand which accompanied the eruption blanketed south-central Java for days on end turning day into night. Another portent of coming political change were the Malay-language letters dispatched by the future British lieutenant-governor of Java, Thomas Stamford Raffles (in office 1811-1816), from Melaka to the rulers of the Indonesian archipelago, including Surakarta and Yogyakarta. These announced that the British would be coming to help them make an end of everything associated with the Dutch and the French in Java and the eastern archipelago. As far as the sultan was concerned, Raffles’ letter promised him that he would be restored to his full dignity as monarch in accord with previous contracts thus overturning the changes which the Dutch had made. Moreover, the rulers were urged not to enter into any further treaties or agreements with the Dutch but were to await the arrival of the British in Java.

Raffles’ correspondence, which reached Surakarta by way of the head of the senior branch of the Cirebon royal house, Sultan Kasepuhan, and the Ngabèhi of Dayeuhluhur, a Surakarta mancanagara district in Banyumas, opened up a secret connection between the south-central Javanese courts which would continue almost until the fall of Yogyakarta in June 1812. The contacts were maintained through two separate channels: first, through backstairs communications between the Surakarta patih, Radèn Adipati Cakranagara, and the sultan’s confidant, Radèn Tumenggung Sumadiningrat, which were established in late September 1811 when Raffles’ letter of 20 December 1810 was forwarded to Yogya. Second, through the links which

82 Dj.Br. 27, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to J.W. Janssens (Batavia), 28-6-1811; IOL Mack. Pr. 2, ‘Surakarta serengkala list’, 186, 4 Jumadilakir AJ 1738 (AD 6-7-1811) on the rain of ashes from Gunung Kelut falling on Surakarta.

83 Raffles 1830:31-2; Boulger 1892:90-1; Adam 1971:xii, 62; Carey 1980:201-2; UBL BPL 616, Port. 4 pt. 10, C.F. Krijgsman (translator), ‘Het geheim verhandelde in de bijeenkomst van eenige rijksgrooten’ (henceforth: Krijgsman, ‘Het geheime verhandelde’), Surakarta, 23-9-1811; BL Add MS 45272 (Raffles secret correspondence with Lord Minto, January-March 1812), T.S. Raffles (Rijswijk/Batavia) to Lord Minto (Calcutta), 21-1-1812.

84 Carey 1980:201-2, the relevant parts of the Malay text reads: dengan pertolongan Kompeni Ingriss akan menbuangkan sekali-sekali segala Holandis dan Perangsis yang didalam Tanah Jawa sekalinannya dan segala negeri timur, karena beta hendak memuaskan segala martabat kebesaran sahabat beta dan kelabuan seperti ngadat yang dahulu-dahulu dan tiada beta membuat bagaimana sekali seperti ngadat Holandis itu […] dan apabila sahabat beta telah mendapat ini melainkan janganlah sehabat beta membuat surat perjanjian lagi dengan Holandis sedekar sahabat beta bernantikan orang Ingriss datang ke Jawa.


were opened up through a number of court santri, in particular returned Mecca pilgrims, who kept the monarchs closely informed of developments and even carried messages for them to other Indonesian rulers in Bali and the eastern archipelago. According to Cakranagara’s testimony, the sultan had confided in his secret emissary, Haji Ibrahim, that he proposed not to declare in favour of either the British or the Dutch in the event of a decisive outcome to the British invasion. He advised the Sunan to do likewise. It is certain that the old sultan entertained the secret hope that in the event of a collapse of the Franco-Dutch government, he would be able to regain complete control of the Yogyak administration. Indeed, he had been encouraged in that expectation by Raffles himself.

Meanwhile, the British invasion took place. On 3 August, their landing fleet of 57 transports and ships-of-the-line appeared off Batavia and by 8 August the town had fallen. Janssens entrenched himself with the bulk of his troops at Meester Cornelis, the great redoubt built by Daendels just outside Weltevreden, but it was clear that resistance would be difficult given that the British had overwhelming military superiority (Thorn 1815:16-32; Stockdale 1812:15-7; Aukes 1935:31-2). News of the British attack was received impas-
Plate 29. Jan-Willem Janssens (1762-1838), governor of Cape Colony (1803-1806) and of Java (May-September 1811). Photograph by courtesy of the Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam.
sively in Yogya. ‘The court is very tranquil’, Engelhard wrote, ‘as far as I
could judge the appearance of so many English ships made not the slightest
impression.’ In fact, the old sultan seemed to be more interested in exercising
his Amazon corps on the southern alun-alun than learning anything further
about the military situation in Batavia where Janssens was now besieged at
Cornelis.89 On 15 August, accompanied by a number of Yogya princes and
officials, the former ruler attended a party in the Residency House with his
son, the Prince Regent, to celebrate the birthday of the Emperor Napoleon.
‘The old gentleman is in extraordinarily good spirits’ (bijzonder wel), Engelhard
reported, although, as we have seen, the Prince Regent’s wearing of his new
Dutch order of knighthood irked him deeply.90 Meanwhile, preparations were
made to equip Yogya troops to march to Semarang in case they were needed.

News of the fall of Meester Cornelis on 26 August in a bloody battle in
which the British suffered over 500 casualties during their destruction of
Janssens’ defending force, was relayed to Yogya via the Semarang divisional
commander, Brigadier-General F.C.P. von Winckelmann, on 1 September. The
same dispatch brought the news that Janssens had moved his seat of govern-
ment to Semarang.91 The death toll on theFranco-Dutch side at Cornelis had
been so high – fifty percent amongst their European and Ambonese troops and
far higher when it came to their Javanese and Madurese auxiliaries – that the
rumour reaching the Principalities at this time was that the victorious British-
Indian troops had behaved with extreme brutality, destroying everything in
their path and giving no quarter (Aukes 1935:35). On the day of the fall of
Cornelis, Lord Minto, the governor-general of India (in office 1807-1813), who
had accompanied the expedition to Java, issued a proclamation setting forth
the liberal and enlightened principles on which the new British government
would be based. In particular, he promised the Javanese an amelioration in
their condition:

89 Dj.Br. 24, (Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to J.W. Janssens (Meester Cornelis), 12-8-1811.
90 Note 40. After the 9 July 1810 annexation of Holland to France, this order was renamed as
the ‘Orde van de Reunie’ (‘Order of the Reunion’).
91 Dj.Br. 24, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to J.W. Janssens (Semarang), 1-9-1811. The 550
British dead and wounded included 48 officers and represented a fifth of their total invasion
force; the losses on Janssens’ side were considerably greater: 6,000 prisoners were taken amongst
them 250 officers of whom two were generals; 280 pieces of artillery were captured (1,500 overall
during the campaign), Thorn 1815:41-63, 108; Aukes 1935:33. On the very high casualties on the
Franco-Dutch side, see Nahuys van Burgst 1858:60-1; Dj.Br. 1911, De Stuers, ‘Inleiding’, n.y. who
gives the figures for those killed in the entire campaign as 9,600 Europeans and Ambonese (out of
21,500 mobilised), 1,715 Javanese and Madurese (out of 2,296 mobilised) and 609 auxiliaries from
the courts (out of 12,577 mobilised). The majority of the two former categories died at Meester
Cornelis, a very high casualty rate comprising nearly 50 and 80 percent of those mobilised. They
were forever after remembered in the name given to that area of Batavia near Meester Cornelis:
Rawabangké (the swamp of the corpses; Schoel 1931:313) so called because of the mass graves in
which the Franco-Dutch and Indonesian dead were hurriedly buried, personal communication,
Ibu Paramita Abdurrahman, Jakarta, October 1976. The site is today the location of the Univer-
sitas Indonesia at Rawa Mangun.
Plate 30. Gilbert Elliott, first Lord Minto (1751-1814), governor-general of India (in office July 1807-October 1813), who accompanied the British expedition to Java in 1811. Portrait by George Chinnery (1774-1854) made in Calcutta in late 1811 or 1812, showing him in his earl's robes with maps of Java, Bourbon and Mauritius. Photograph by courtesy of the National Portrait Gallery, London.
The inhabitants of Java now touch the fortunate moment when they will be placed under the protection of a power which will keep the calamities and sufferings of war far from their shores and under the guardianship of a just and beneficent government whose principle it is to combine the interests of the state with the security, prosperity and happiness of every class and denomination of the people. Let the people prove itself worthy of those blessings by a timely display of grateful zeal and obedience.92

This was followed up on 6 September by a further announcement specifically targeted at the south-central Javanese rulers sent by Minto’s aide-de-camp, Captain William Robison, from Cirebon, which spoke of the whole province of Cirebon as well as Jaccatra (Batavia) and west Java now being in the hands of the British. All further resistance by ‘French fugitives’ from the rout at Meester Cornelis would be in vain, the announcement declared, so the rulers should not be deceived by the ‘ministers’ at their courts into providing further assistance to Janssens; rather they should understand that Lord Minto desired good relations with them.93 It is doubtful that these proclamations had any effect in swaying the allegiance of the Yogya court. The Prince Regent especially feared that any abrupt political change would undermine still further his already precarious position, and Engelhard remarked on his ‘incomprehensible fear of his father’ at this time. In the deliberations which took place in the kadipaten about the number of Yogya troops which should be sent to assist Janssens in Semarang, it was clear that the Prince Regent could not decide anything without the approval of his father.94

On 4 September, 2,400 Yogya troops left for Semarang to join the forces of the Sunan and Prangwedana (Mangkunagara II) in Janssens’ second line of defence in central Java.95 But the Franco-Dutch position was hopeless; Janssens had lost all his artillery at Meester Cornelis and his attempt to hold the line in central Java had more to do with personal honour than with military realities.96 Moves by the old sultan to have his favourite son Mangkudiningrat

92 IOL, Eur E105 (Raffles collection vol. 3), 301, Proclamation of Lord Minto, Weltevreden, 26-8-1811.
93 IOL Eur F148/17, Proclamation of Captain William Robison to the rulers of Surakarta and Yogyakarta, Cirebon, 6-9-1811.
94 Dj.Br. 24, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to J.W. Janssens (Cirebon), 31-8-1811.
95 Dj.Br. 22, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to J.W. Janssens (Semarang), 5-9-1811. The size of the 2,400-strong Yogya contingent and the names of the commander (Radèn Tumenggung Danukusuma I) and the other senior court and mancanagara bupati who led it are given in Dj.Br. 24, Hamengkubuwana II and Raja Putra Narendra (Yogyakarta) to J.W. Janssens (Semarang), 17 Ruwah AJ 1738 (AD 6-9-1811) in reply to Janssens’ request of 1-9-1811.
96 Napoleon had warned Janssens that there should be no repetition of his loss of Cape Colony to the British in January 1806: ‘souvenez-vous monsieur qu’un général français ne se laisse pas prendre pour une deuxième fois!’ (‘Remember Sir that a French general does not allow himself to be taken a second time!’), Thorn 1815:103. He had thus rejected Lord Minto’s summons to him to surrender after the fall of Meester Cornelis on 26 August with the words: ‘Tell Lord Minto that he has not more than a tenth of the island [of Java] in his possession and that I shall continue to defend it.
appointed as the Yogya commander were frustrated by Janssens who rightly judged that this would strengthen his position in the kraton. At the same time, the presence in Semarang of Pangéran Natakusuma and his son, who had been brought with Janssens as free men from Cirebon on 1 September, made the Prince Regent extremely apprehensive. He urgently besought the governor-general through Engelhard not to let them fall into the hands of the British and he attempted to dispel the favourable impression of the two Yogya nobles entertained in some European circles. On 11 September, the news of the capture of Sumenep and the promotion of the Panembahan of Sumenep to the title of sultan by the British caused the Prince Regent even greater distress, mainly, so Engelhard noted, because of his close family connections with Madura through his mother (Thorn 1815:93; Chapter II). He refused to believe the news, stating that it was a trick of the British enemy to get the ‘Sumeneppers’ on their side. In an attempt to bring him round firmly to the cause of the Franco-Dutch government, Engelhard promised that the lands annexed by Daendels in the 10 January treaty would be returned to Yogya. But the fate of the Prince Regent and his party was already sealed. On 12 September, 1,600 British troops landed at Semarang and four days later at Jati Ngaleh near Serondhol on the heights above Semarang, Janssens and his Javanese allies were comprehensively defeated (Thorn 1815:97-101; Aukes 1935:38-47). Amongst the Javanese troops, only the horse artillery of Prangwedana’s legion and the Surabaya regiment acquitted themselves with any bravery (Thorn 1815:100; Aukes 1935:43-4). Reports on the conduct of the Yogya troops, who had been the first to bear the brunt of the surprise British early morning attack on Janssens’ left flank (Aukes 1935:43), were more mixed. But after their initial pell-mell flight, they appear to have fallen back in some semblance of order to Bojong in Kedhu where the Prince Regent, who was deeply disturbed by news of Janssens’ defeat, demanded an explicit demobilisation order from the governor-general before he would

and I will not enter into negotiations with him as long as I can field a single soldier against him’, Aukes 1935:33.

97 Dj.Br. 24, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to J.W. Janssens (Semarang), 5-9-1811 (second letter of Engelhard on 5-9-1811). Danureja II’s father Radèn Tumengung Danukusuma I, appears to have served as Yogya commander.

98 Dj.Br. 24, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to J.W. Janssens (Semarang), 4-9-1811, 5-9-1811.

99 Dj.Br. 24, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to J.W. Janssens (Semarang), 11-9-1811, referring to the Prince Regent’s use of the term *akal* (trick). The Panembahan later became a close friend and scholarly collaborator of Raffles.

100 Dj.Br. 24, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to J.W. Janssens (Semarang), 11-9-1811.

101 Dj.Br. 46, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to J.W. Janssens (Salatiga), 18-9-1811, 19-9-1811, reporting that the news of Janssens’ negotiations with the British for a capitulation affected the Prince Regent deeply as he had pinned his hopes on Franco-Dutch success at Jati Ngaleh and wanted to remain with the Franco-Dutch government. The prospect of an agreement with the British was unpleasant for him.
allow them to return to Yogya. The rest of the Javanese auxiliaries collapsed in a miserable fashion, turning on their officers and fleeing back to Surakarta (Thorn 1815:100; Hageman 1856, VI:409; De Jonge and Van Deventer 1884-88, XIII:547-8; Poensen 1905:258; Aukes 1935:43).

Following his defeat, Janssens retreated to the eighteenth-century Dutch fort, ‘De Hersteller’, at Salatiga, but further resistance was pointless. On 18 September, at the bridge at Kali Tuntang, which Radèn Rongga had ordered destroyed at the start of his rebellion on 20-21 November 1810 (Chapter VI) and which the Prince Regent was even now expecting to be broken by the vanquished Janssens, the second and last of the Franco-Dutch governor-generals signed the articles of capitulation. This allowed all civilian officials, who had held office under the Franco-Dutch government, to offer their services to the new British administration, while all those with military commissions became prisoners-of-war (Thorn 1815:101; Soekanto 1952:83-7). The British were now the undisputed masters of Java and its eastern dependencies. It was the start of a five-year interregnum which would witness remarkable changes in colonial policy, but would also see the principles so confidently proclaimed by Minto at Weltevreden on 26 August sacrificed on the altar of political expediency.

The squaring of accounts

A very confused period now ensued in the wake of the Franco-Dutch government’s collapse. In the countryside, bands of robbers, some no doubt acting on the orders of the south-central Javanese rulers, terrorised travellers and plundered the homes of Europeans. Janssens’ last military headquarters at Salatiga was amongst the places targeted and his cipher correspondence with the minister of the colonies taken (De Jonge and Van Deventer 1884-88, XIII:548). Captain Robison, Lord Minto’s Dutch-speaking aide-de-camp, who undertook an unauthorised mission to the courts from 21-27 September,

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102 Dj.Br. 9A, Valck. ‘Overzigt, 97 (on the praise of the Dutch colonel, Kiverlijn, who was attached to the Yogya contingent, for the conduct of the Yogya troops); Aukes 1935:38 (on desertions amongst Yogya and Sala troops many of whom had brought their wives with them); J.W. Janssens (Batavia) to Minister of the Colonies (Paris), 5-10-1811, in De Jonge and Van Deventer 1884-88, XIII:547-8 (on the complete collapse of the Javanese troops and the horrors committed by them, including the murder of their European officers); Dj.Br. 46, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to J.W. Janssens (Salatiga), 18-9-1811, 19-9-1811 (on insistence of the Prince Regent for written orders from Janssens to the Yogya commander, Radèn Tumenggung Danukusuma, before Yogya troops allowed back from Bojong, in absence of these orders he was shown a copy of the 18 September articles of capitulation of Kali Tuntang). See also BD (Manado) II:138-9, XV,25-30.

103 Built in the mid-eighteenth century and named in honour of Governor-General Baron van Imhoff (in office 1743-1750), whose flagship ‘De Hersteller’ (‘The Repairer’) inspired his own sobriquet, Stapel 1941:59.
Plate 31. Boats of His Majesty's Sloop Procris attacking and capturing six French gunboats off the coast of Java at Indramayu on 31 July 1811. Engraving by Charles Rosenberg (flourished mid-19th century) after a painting by the celebrated naval artist, William John Huggins (1781-
the coast of Java at Indramayu on 31 July 1811. Engraving by Charles Rosenberg (flourished 1845). Photograph by courtesy of the British Library, London.
noticed groups of roving bandits on the road as he set out for Surakarta.\footnote[104]{IOL, Eur F148/17 (Raffles-Minto collection, vol. 17), Captain William Robison (Yogyakarta) to Lord Minto (Batavia), 26-9-1811. On his gebrekkig soort Nederlandsch (‘imperfect sort of Dutch’) which he had acquired through marriage to a Cape Dutch woman, see De Haan 1935a:630-1. He also mentioned that he could speak ‘poor Malay’ and was eager to learn both Dutch and Malay properly. During his mission, he used an interpreter, IOL Eur F148/17, Captain William Robison (Cirebon) to Lord Minto (Batavia), 6-9-1811.} By the time he reached the Sunan’s capital, however, advanced units of the Buckinghamshire regiment (14th Regiment of Foot) were an already visible presence watched by thousands of curious onlookers who crowded the streets for their first glimpse of Java’s new conquerors.\footnote[105]{IOL Eur F148/17 (Raffles-Minto collection, vol. 17), Captain William Robison (Yogyakarta) to Lord Minto (Batavia), 26-9-1811.}

Robison’s task, given to him by the British commander-in-chief, Sir Samuel Auchmuty, was to assure the Surakarta and Yogyakarta rulers of the friendship of the new British government and to sound out their views.\footnote[106]{Robison’s explicit instruction from Auchmuty was to ‘carry tidings of the armistice [with the Franco-Dutch government] to Surakarta and Yogyakarta’ and to communicate Lord Minto’s desire to continue the same relationship with the courts that the previous (pre-1808) Dutch government had enjoyed, IOL Eur F148/17, Captain William Robison (Ungaran) to Lord Minto (Batavia), 20-9-1811. Raffles later wrote that ‘Auchmuty’s [sic] authority could not extend to the places in question [namely, Yogyakarta and Surakarta]’ and that ‘the only instruction Robison had received from Lord Minto on leaving Batavia was to render assistance in the Dutch language on further instructions from the senior officer Colonel Wood’. Robison’s agreements with the Sunan were thus repudiated by the lieutenant-governor, IOL, Mack.Pr. 2, 32, T.S. Raffles (Semarang) to Colonel Alexander Adams (Surakarta), 6-12-1811. See further De Haan 1935a:630. Pakubuwana IV’s reply to Auchmuty’s letter of 17 September can be found in Dj.Br. 24, Pakubuwana IV (Surakarta) to Sir Samuel Auchmuty (Semarang), 2 Ramelan AJ 1738 (AD 21-9-1811).} On 22 September, he had a secret meeting with the Sunan in the house of the Surakarta Resident, J.A. van Braam, in the presence of twelve of his senior court officials. The Surakarta ruler articulated a number of grievances with the former government of Daendels, which give a good indication of the issues which had built up at the courts over the previous three years. In particular, he singled out the marshal’s withdrawal of the strandgeld payments (which he wished to have paid in good copper coin), the despoliation of the most important royal tomb on the north coast, that of Sunan Amangkurat I (reigned 1646-1677), and the change in court ceremonies and etiquette, ‘from which’, according to Robison, ‘His Majesty’s dignity has suffered not a little’. Henceforth, he asked that the pre-July 1808 ceremonial be restored for the reception of the Resident and all other European officials in the kraton.\footnote[107]{UBL BPL 616 Port. 4 pt. 1, Krijgsman, ‘Het geheime verhandelde’, 23-9-1811; IOL Eur F148/17, Captain William Robison (Yogyakarta) to Lord Minto (Batavia), 26-9-1811. Daendels had apparently cleared some ground around the grave of Sunan Amangkurat I at Tegalarum for a park, IOL Eur F148/18 (Raffles-Minto collection, vol. 18), Raja Putra Nārāndra and Hamengkubuwana II (Yogyakarta) to Lord Minto (Batavia), 7 Ramelan AH 1226 (AD 26-9-1811). The other demands voiced by Pakubuwana IV were: 1. the return of burial grounds, kramat (holy places)
Similar demands were made in Yogya by the old sultan and the Prince Regent in a joint audience with Robison, where they especially complained of the suffering of the Yogya inhabitants in areas bordering on the European-controlled pasisir during Daendels’ administration.\textsuperscript{108}

Although the demands made to Robison at the two courts were similar, the infantry captain noticed that the political atmosphere in Surakarta and Yogyakarta was very different. Whereas it would be an easy matter to maintain a good understanding with the Sunan ‘who is well-disposed and pliant’, he reported, the old sultan was a different story. He appeared to Robison both headstrong and difficult to deal with, all the more so because of the indignities heaped on him by Daendels. ‘So jealous is the old sultan of his prerogatives’, he wrote, ‘that he is constantly interfering with the Prince Regent who is too weak and fearful to resist.’ The Regent himself was ‘on the contrary more tractable and, if established beyond the control of the sultan, things should go well enough’.\textsuperscript{109} Robison’s shrewd judgement, based on extensive discussions with Engelhard, foreshadowed Raffles’ later policies. But for the time being, the old sultan had the upper hand. In his babad, Dipanagara described how the former monarch was ‘overjoyed’ that the Dutch had been defeated for he now felt able to carry out his plans.\textsuperscript{110} Thus, he wrote to Lord Minto immediately after his meeting with Robison to request the return of Pangéran Natakusuma and his son from Surabaya where they were being held under British protection.\textsuperscript{111} He also seemed poised to take back full administrative responsibilities from

\textsuperscript{108} IOL Eur F148/18 (Raffles-Minto collection, vol. 18), Raja Putra Narénda and Hamengkubuwana II (Yogyakarta) to Lord Minto (Batavia), 7 Ramelan AH 1226 (AD 26-9-1811).

\textsuperscript{109} IOL Eur F148/17 (Raffles-Minto collection, vol. 17), Captain William Robison (Yogyakarta) to Lord Minto (Batavia), 26-9-1811.

\textsuperscript{110} BD (Manado) II:139, XV (Asmaradana) 29. kangjeng sultan geng tyasipun/ déné Walanda wus sirna. 30. mapan sampun salin Inggris/ pan samana kangjeng sultan/ lajeng arsa datengaké/ ingkang dadya teleng ing tyas.

\textsuperscript{111} IOL Eur F148/18 (Raffles-Minto collection, vol. 18), Hamengkubuwana II (Yogyakarta) to Lord Minto (Batavia), 6 Ramelan AH 1226 (AD 25-9-1811). There is a copy of this letter in S.Br. 37. See further Poensen 1905:259-60.
the Prince Regent, although there is no specific reference to this in Engelhard’s letters until 7 November when the Prince Regent reported that the differences between himself and his father had been ‘resolved’. 112

In early October, Engelhard began to notice an unusual atmosphere in Yogya. ‘There are strange happenings here’, he wrote, ‘and I do not know what to ascribe them to.’ The patih refused to visit him in the Residency where he lay bedridden with a chronic heart condition and consumptive fever which would later kill him. At the same time, the countryside continued to be disturbed by marauders who appeared below the very walls of the newly built fort at Klathèn where on two successive nights they attacked the house of a retired Dutch sergeant. 113 Unbeknownst to the Resident, who had fortified his residence and garden with cannon, 114 the old sultan was preparing to take action against the patih to clear the way for his own re-seizure of power and to avenge the indignities he had suffered. His favourite, Purwadipura, was recalled from his forest exile at Sélamanik and orders were given to his court bupati to have as few dealings with European officials as possible. 115

Then, on 28 October, Danureja was summoned to a morning meeting in the kraton. On entering the Purwaretna pavilion, the place where the court pusaka (heirlooms) and the eternal flame from Séla were kept (De Graaf and Pigéaud 1974:30), he was seized from behind by seven senior officials led by Radèn Tumenggung Mertalaya (the so-called ‘killer’ bupati because of his role in hunting down Radèn Rongga), Purwadipura, Radèn Tumenggung Prawirawinata, a brother of Ratu Kencana Wulan (Carey 1992:413 note 72) and Jaya Ngusman, who is described in the sources as a ‘man of religion’. 117 An hour later, Danureja was strangled with white cloth – the usual method of execution of members of the Javanese elite because it did not draw blood or leave marks on the body. 118

112 Dj.Br. 24, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to T.S. Raffles (Rijswijk/Batavia), 7-11-1811; B.Ng. I:232, LVIII.34-6, gives 20 Ramelan AJ 1738 (AD 7-10-1811) as the date for the hand-over of power, which is also mentioned in the Pakualam babad as occurring immediately after Robison’s departure from Yogy on 26 September, see Poensen 1905:264. Dipanagara places the event after Danureja II’s murder on 31 October, see BD (Manado), II:156-7, XV.100-2.

113 Dj.Br. 24, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to Captain William Robison (Semarang/Batavia), 14-10-1811.

114 Dj.Br. 24, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to Lieve Willem Meijer (Batavia), 18-11-1811, the arming of the Residency House and garden with cannon had been ordered by Janssens’ besluit of 7-9-1811.


117 This may be Kyai Amad Ngusman, later head (lurah) of the Suranatan corps, see Appendix VIIb. But since this man is listed as a retainer of the kadipatèn, his presence in the group ordered to murder the Crown Prince’s staunch ally, Danureja II, does not really fit.

118 Dj.Br. 48, J.G. van den Berg (Yogyakarta) to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 25-5-1803, 31-5-1803, on the strangulation of the Mataram bupati, Radèn Tumenggung Cakradiwirya I, with
At daybreak the following morning, his body was taken south for interment at the traitor’s graveyard just beyond Imagiri where Radèn Rongga’s hacked corpse had been laid to rest just ten months previously.\(^\text{119}\)

On 31 October, Engelhard received a report from Pangéran Dipakusuma, the joint acting bupati wedana of the eastern mancanagara who was in Yogya for the Garebeg Puwasa, to the effect that Danureja and his father, the gallant but dim Radèn Tumenggung Danukusuma, who had just returned from commanding the Yogya forces at Jati Ngaleh (Serondhol), had been ‘dismissed’.\(^\text{120}\) In fact, Danureja had been dead for three full days and, as we will see shortly, his father would not be long in following him. Danureja’s uncle, Kyai Tumenggung Sindunagara, the prematurely aged Outer bupati had been appointed to take Danureja’s place.\(^\text{121}\) Within an hour of his meeting with Engelhard, Dipakusuma was back at the Residency with a short official letter from the sultan confirming the patih’s ‘dismissal’ and referring to his many defects. These included besmirching the Islamic religion (angresahi agami Islam), demeaning the sultan’s royal dignity, and violating both his injunctions as sovereign and those of the late Sultan Mangkubumi. His father, Danukusuma, had been ‘struck’ (tiwas) by his son’s misfortune (Carey 1980:76-7). Two references in the old sultan’s white thread on the orders of Hamengkubuwana II; AN, Besluit van den gouverneur-generaal, 19-3-1822 no. 11, on the commutation of the death sentence by strangulation passed against Hamengkubuwana I’s son, Pangéran Dipasana, for leading a rebellion in Kedhu in February 1822. See further Chapter IX.

\(^\text{119}\) There are a number of accounts of Danureja II’s death and those that took part in it. I have followed John Crawfurd’s description given in IOL, Mack.Pr. 21, ‘State of the court of Djocjacarta’, 6-12-1811, 47. Both LOr 11089 (I), ‘Lelampahanipoen Kangdjeng Pangeran Arja Djoeroe R.M.P. Santadiiga Lempeoelengan (Djokjakarta)’, 1, and B.Ng, I:236, LIX:53-4 give 13 Sawal AJ 1738 (AD 1-11-1811) and 14 Sawal AJ 1738 (AD 2-11-1811) as the dates of his death and burial. His body was later disinterred from Banyusumurup and moved to the family graveyard at Melangi (see Chapter III) during the reign of Hamengkubuwana VI (1855-1877), Carey 1992:430 note 151. The inscription on Danureja II’s grave at the family graveyard at Melangi reads: sumaré ing ngriki saking Banyusumurup 14 Besar [AJ] 1 7 9 3 (‘interred here from Banyusumurup on 11 May 1865’), personal visit to the dhusun perdikan of Melangi, Yogyakarta, 14-5-1977. Danureja II was just 39 when he was murdered.

\(^\text{120}\) Dj.Br. 24, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to T.S. Raffles (Rijswijk/Batavia), 31-10-1811; Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:38.

\(^\text{121}\) Dj.Br. 24, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to T.S. Raffles (Rijswijk/Batavia), 31-10-1811. It is clear from Hamengkubuwana II and the Crown Prince (future Hamengkubuwana III’s) joint letter to Pakubuwana IV of 14 Besar AJ 1738 (AD 30-12-1811) that Sindunagara was officially invested as patih on 19 Sawal AJ 1738 (AD 7-11-1811); Pakubuwana IV’s reply dated 18 Besar AJ 1738 (AD 3-1-1812) to this letter is in S.Br. 37, p. 1025. According to Dipanagara (BD (Manado) II:158-9, XV.107-12), Sindunagara was invested on Monday, 12 November in the presence of the Residency Interpreter, J.G. Dietrée, and the Commander of the Fort, Lieutenant Willem Driessen, but he was never officially recognised by the British government as a legitimate patih (Appendix Va) and only bore the title of Kyai Adipati Danureja, see further Rouffaer 1905:608, on the ‘hill-billy’ – berg Javaan – title of ‘Kyai Adipati’. On the willingness of the British to accept his allegiance without officially recognising his status, see IOL Eur E105/3 (Raffles collection, vol. 3), John Crawfurd (Yogyakarta) to T.S. Raffles (Rijswijk/Batavia), 22-1-1812.
letter leap off the page: his evocation of Mangkubumi’s legacy underscores once again what a massive and enduring influence the founder of Yogya had on the younger generation who governed his kingdom in the early nineteenth century. Even more significant, however, was the way in which the Islamic religion (agami Islam) appears in the text. It may be that the sultan had the syariah (Islamic law) in mind. We have seen above how the political crisis of the past ten months had led to a greater assiduity on his part in attending the Friday services at the Great Mosque as well as the twice weekly prayer meetings of the court santri. But there is something larger being evoked here: Islam seems to be being used as a shorthand for the Javanese-Islamic moral order in general. Indeed, we will see how this equating of agami Islam with the moral order would become an especially salient feature of Dipanagara’s struggle during the Java War.

Confirmation of Danureja’s death only reached Engelhard on 7 November and the Resident was later much censured for allowing the sultan to perpetrate his murder (De Haan 1910-12, I pt. 2:98). Certainly, the ruler’s action was in direct contravention of two of the key articles of his contract with the VOC agreed at the time of his accession on 2 April 1792 (Carey 1980:76 note 1). But given Engelhard’s very poor physical health, he was in no position to do anything at the time. Besides, he himself was in some personal danger and was later attacked by a band operating under the second sultan’s orders as he made his way in a sedan chair through the Jambu hills to Semarang after relinquishing his post to Crawfurd in mid-November. Both in this attack on the Resident and the brutal murder of Danureja six weeks previously, the old sultan was taking revenge for the humiliation of Daendels’ policies during the previous three years.

The position of the Prince Regent was now desperate. With his main supporter murdered and the Resident in such a sickly condition, nothing appeared to stand in the way of his own destruction. Engelhard noticed how at this time, the Regent – who had de facto returned to his previous rank as Crown Prince given the sultan’s re-seizure of power – appeared to be sunk into a state of deep grief for a number of days. In his babad, Dipanagara also gives a graphic account of his father’s plight, describing how he was summoned from Tegalreja on 1 November to find the great outer doors of his father’s residence, the kadipatèn, bolted and guarded by members of the

122 Dj.Br. 24, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to T.S. Raffles (Bogor), 7-11-1811.
123 Hageman 1857:414; Dj.Br. 9A, Valck, ‘Overzigt’, 106, who suggests that there was no intention of murdering Engelhard, arguing that the attack was intended to shake him up and bring home to him the sultan’s anger at the his role in the ruler’s recent political humiliation. No attempt was made to investigate the attack, according to Valck, because more weighty political events intervened. The attack is confirmed in BL Add MS 45272 (Raffles’ secret correspondence with Lord Minto, January-March 1812), T.S. Raffles (Rijswijk/Batavia) to Lord Minto (Calcutta), 21-1-1812.
124 Dj.Br. 24, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to T.S. Raffles (Rijswijk/Batavia), 31-10-1811.
The prince adds a description of his own mediating role which appears nowhere else in the sources and cannot be verified. His father, he says, informed him of Danureja’s death and asked what he should do in the event that the sultan summoned him to the kraton. Clearly, he feared that he would meet the same fate as the patih. Dipanagara gave him the advice not to go that night. Instead, he, the prince, would accompany his father to the kraton when he was next bidden to an audience with the Yogya ruler. Meanwhile, he told his father that he had thrown away the bolts to the outer doors of the kadipatèn and dismissed his Suranatan bodyguard in order to avoid any misunderstanding with the old sultan. If we are to believe Dipanagara’s account, he succeeded in mediating a potentially dangerous situation.

Four days later (5 November), the erstwhile Regent (now Crown Prince) made his attendance on the sultan surrounded by all his relations, including the twenty-six-year-old Dipanagara – then still styled Radèn Antawirya – who was now fast emerging, according to his own testimony and that of at least one of his Yogya contemporaries, as his father’s chief political adviser. The former Regent accepted the sultan’s explanation for the patih’s death and made his peace with him. On 7 November, Engelhard reported that the differences between the Prince Regent and his father had been overcome. In a secret letter to the Surakarta patih written around this time, Sumadiningrat also mentioned that the ex-Regent, now Crown Prince, was ‘completely obedient’ to the sultan. Sometime later, the ex-Regent wrote to the sultan formally relinquishing his previous position and was reinstated once again as Crown Prince. By this action, Dipanagara suggests in his babad, he hoped to forestall any move to appoint Mangkudiningrat in his father’s place and to present a united front against the British. Indeed, Raffles would later remark on the extraordinary ‘filial piety’ of the Crown Prince for his father at this time, a judgement clearly based on Crawfurd’s own assessment that ‘the Crown Prince’s conduct to his father has been marked by a tenderness

125 BD (Manado) II: 140, XV.33-34. Dipanagara refers to kaum which I have translated as ‘firm Islamic community’.  
126 BD (Manado) II:146, XV.53.  
127 BD (Manado) II:147-9, XV.57-69. The first independent reference to Dipanagara’s crucial role as his father’s political adviser comes in Pangérān Panular’s babad of the British occupation of Yogya, when in circa August 1812 he is described as the ‘one who is made foremost’ (ingkang kinarya pangarsa) by his father, see Carey 1992:119, 290, 450 note 244; Chapter VIII.  
128 Dj.Br. 24, Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to T.S. Raffles (Batavia), 7-11-1811.  
131 IOL, G21/65, Raffles, ‘Memorandum respecting Java’, 1813, 36.
Plate 32. Portrait of John Crawfurd (1783-1868), who served as Resident of Yogyakarta with intermissions from November 1811 to August 1816 and was centrally involved with the political arrangements relating to the British attack on Yogyakarta in June 1812. Study in oils painted in Edinburgh by Sir John Watson Gordon, R.A. (1790-1864) at the request of the European inhabitants of Singapore who commissioned the portrait for their new town hall. It was first exhibited at the Royal Academy in London in 1858. Photograph by courtesy of the National Museum, Singapore.
and deference not usual under such circumstances as those in which he has been placed’ (Carey 1980:85 note 1). Something of this same deference would also be evident in Dipanagara’s actions at the time of the sultan’s death on 3 January 1828 when he went out of his way to show respect for his late grandfather despite the vicissitudes of war.132 But events were soon to undermine the precarious unity of the Yogya court.

The British attempt at compromise and Raffles’ first visit to the courts

On 14 November, the new British Resident,133 John Crawfurd, arrived in Yogya with an escort of 300 sepoys drawn from the Bengal Light Infantry Volunteer Battalion then in transit at Semarang. The British-Indian soldiers’ immediate task was to relieve the garrison of 70 Ambonese cavalry,134 but during the next four years they would undertake lengthy tours of duty at the courts until their involvement in the sepoy conspiracy of October-November 1815 necessitated their immediate and permanent withdrawal from south-central Java (pp. 415-28). The following day, Engelhard formally handed over the Residency seals to his successor.

Crawfurd was undoubtedly one of the most able officials to serve in the sultan’s capital in the four decades when Dipanagara was living in Yogya before the Java War. As we have seen, the prince would later place him above all the Dutch Residents he met in terms of character and ability (p. 108). He was also by all accounts a rather popular Resident with the local Javanese elite who appreciated his willingness to learn to speak fluent High Javanese and to allow his horses to participate in the English-style horse races in the town (De Haan 1935a:529; Carey 1992:296, 420 note 106, 453-4 note 262, 524 note 617). But he did not start off well in his new post. Within days he had managed to

132 Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, III:532; B.Ng. III:201, XXIX.9-11, on Dipanagara’s order to his followers to recite the *salat gaib* (prayer for the dead) at the passing of Hamengkubuwana II on 3 January 1828, and his instruction to his younger brother Pangéran Suryawijaya (Basah Ngabdulsamsu), who was commanding his forces to the south of Yogya, to get his troops to line the route to Imagiri when his funeral cortège passed. Because of the security situation, Hamengkubuwana II ended up being buried in Kutha Gedhé instead. See Chapter XI.

133 The title of ‘minister’ had been abolished by the British. Henceforth all the senior official representatives at the south-central Javanese courts until the late 1920s (when they were given the title of ‘governor’) would be known as ‘Resident’ and their deputies as ‘Assistant-Residents’ (post-1824, ‘secretaries’).

anger not only the sultan, but also his immediate superior, Raffles, and the new commander-in-chief of the army, Colonel Robert Rollo Gillespie, three of the most important men in Java. Crawfurd’s instructions had been to spend time in Semarang and Surakarta before proceeding to Yogya. However, the news he received while in the two central Javanese towns from the Dutch Residents at the courts and from the Sunan about the actions of the Yogya ruler was so grave that he decided to take along a sizeable sepoy escort for his own safety. There were even rumours that he would himself be attacked en route by the sultan’s forces. In direct contravention of Raffles’ and Gillespie’s orders, he also detained the Light Infantry Volunteer Battalion, which was destined for Surabaya, in Semarang in case he needed to call on further troops. On 18 November, Raffles wrote deprecating Crawfurd’s action for which he had no superior authority. The irascible Gillespie’s reaction is unrecorded, but it would certainly have been vivid and unprintable. In fact, far from being attacked, the Scotsman was met at Prambanan by the second sultan’s ambassadors who presented him with their ruler’s compliments and went out of their way to show him the customary respect. Once safely arrived in Yogya, however, he ignored Raffles’ explicit instructions that he should not to bring any further disharmony into European government-Yogya relations, and in particular that he should thoroughly investigate the possibility of restoring the sultan and maintaining the Regent as Crown Prince (Van Deventer 1891:307-8).

The new British Resident seems to have arrived in Yogya with his mind already made up against the old sultan and his supporters. ‘The sultan is a sulking old rogue’, he confided to his Surakarta colleague, Colonel Alexander Adams, on his first full day in office. A curt note almost calculated to offend was sent that day to the court with the Resident’s official seal at the bottom rather than in the usual place at the top left-hand corner:

The undersigned elected British Resident to the court of Djocjocarta has learnt with much surprise the unwarranted steps pursued by that court without the knowledge or sanction of the legitimate representative of the British Government, Mr [Pieter] Engelhard.

The undersigned is in duty bound to enter his solemn protest against all the measures of the court of Djocjocarta since the 31st October and to decline all intercourse with it until he receive the commands of that Government which manages the affairs of the conquerors of Java.

135 IOL, Raffles-Minto collection (Xerox copies of holograph letters), vol. 2, T.S. Raffles (Rijswijk/Batavia) to Lord Minto (Weltevreden/Batavia), 19-9-1811 (on the embarkation of the Light Infantry Volunteer Battalion for central Java).
138 S.Br. 24, John Crawfurd (Yogyakarta) to Colonel Alexander Adams (Surakarta), 15-11-1811.
The British Resident avails himself of this opportunity to assure the royal family of Djocjocarta of his high esteem and consideration.

Done at the Residency House of Djocjocarta this fifteenth day of November 1811.139

With almost Daendelian brazenness, Crawfurd toyed with the idea of capturing the second sultan by surprise, and re-appointing his son as Prince Regent.140 On 17 November, he wrote to Raffles stating that he thought both Hamengkubuwana II and Mangkudiningrat should be exiled from Java.141 ‘Fear and not affection are now the tie of the people’, he confided in his survey of the leading figures at the court in early December, ‘for the conduct of the sultan has of late been very oppressive […] fines are levied on the rich on the most trivial pretexts […] [and] sons are seldom allowed to succeed to their fathers’ [estates] without the payment of heavy costs’.142 The Regent was, however, ‘a man of good sense and conduct and of mild manners and disposition’.143 He also formed a high opinion of the absent Natakusuma, whom he had met before arriving in Yogya, though not of his vindictive son, Natadiningrat, and urged the lieutenant-governor that they might be used as secret and confidential agents of British policy should their services be required.144

Crawfurd declined to meet the sultan in the kraton for nearly two weeks after his arrival.145 He also refused to accept Sindunagara as patih because his appointment had been made without official British approval. Indeed, it was not until 22 January 1812 that the acting patih was able to take the official oath of allegiance to the British government.146 All the aged Sindunagara’s attempts to get Crawfurd to have an audience with the Yogya ruler were rebuffed. The Yogya monarch for his part was confused. Raffles’ letter of 20 December 1810 from Melaka had spoken of his being ‘restored’ to his full dignity as ruler. He was thus under the impression that the new British

139 S.Br. 24, John Crawfurd (Yogyakarta) to Hamengkubuwana II (Yogyakarta), 15-11-1811.
141 AvJ, John Crawfurd (Yogyakarta) to T.S. Raffles (Rijswijk/Batavia), 17-11-1811, quoted in A.H. Smissaert (Yogyakarta) to G.A.G.Ph. van der Capellen (Batavia/Bogor), 5-8-1824. See also Hageman 1857:415.
142 IOL, Mack.Pr. 21, Crawfurd, ‘State of the court of Djocjacarta’, 6-12-1811, 41. Crawfurd appears to have drawn heavily on his conversations with Engelhard before the latter’s 18 November departure from Yogya and on a perusal of the memorie van overgave (final administrative reports) of the previous Dutch Residents such as W.H. van Ijsseldijk (in office 1786-1798), J.G. van den Berg (1798-1803) and Matthijs Waterloo (1803-1808), copies of which were available in the Residency archive, before writing his report.
143 IOL, Mack.Pr. 21, Crawfurd, ‘State of the court of Djocjacarta’, 6-12-1811, 44. IOL, Mack.Pr. 21, Crawfurd, ‘State of the court of Djocjacarta’, 6-12-1811, 43; Van Deventer 1891:309, John Crawfurd (Yogyakarta) to T.S. Raffles (Semarang), 6-12-1811.
government had accepted his political revolution. Indeed, he believed that the relevant dispatches from Minto and Raffles recognising his \textit{fait accompli} had been intentionally hidden by Engelhard and Danureja II. This was one of the reasons, according to a later Dutch commentator, why the \textit{patih} had been murdered and the Resident attacked on his journey to Semarang.\footnote{Dj.Br. 9A, Valck, ‘Overzigt’, 111.} Now the new British appointee was formally protesting his actions. What was he to make of all this? In response, he sent a joint letter with the Crown Prince pointing out that Crawfurd, referred to as ‘the minister who appended his seal to the bottom of his letter’, was not allowed to meddle – literally ‘act as a guardian angel for’ (\textit{ambauerek}) – in the events which had taken place in the \textit{kraton} since 1 November (Carey 1980:77-9).

Meanwhile, Raffles had become seriously alarmed about his subordinate’s actions. He feared that they were leading the newly established British government into a showdown with Yogya just at a time when troops were thinly spread\footnote{Dj.Br. 9A, Valck, ‘Overzigt’, 117.}; the bulk of the invasion force was being withdrawn from Java after completing their operations against the Franco-Dutch forces and those that remained were being readied for deployment elsewhere in the archipelago.\footnote{On troop levels and withdrawals, Thorn 1815:123-4, 200; IOL, G21/65, Raffles, ‘Memorandum respecting Java’, 1813, 43, citing Gillespie’s concern that the attack on Yogya should occur as early as possible because European regiments were about to be withdrawn to Bengal. On the need to mount an expedition, comprising 750 European troops and 375 sepoys, against the Sultan of Palembang, which eventually sailed on 20 March 1812, see Thorn 1815:127-73; Raffles, ‘Memorandum respecting Java’, 1813, 41; IOL, Eur F148/24 (Raffles-Minto collection, vol. 24), T.S. Raffles (Bogor) to Hugh Hope (Surakarta), 2-4-1812.} The onset of the rainy season was also a consideration. A campaign in central Java at this time would be particularly difficult.\footnote{IOL G21/65, Raffles, ‘Memorandum respecting Java’, 1813, 37; Van Deventer 1891:313-4.} ‘It must be laid down as a principle in all our dealings with the native courts’, he wrote in a secret dispatch to Crawfurd on 15 December, ‘that in no case must we demand what we cannot enforce in case of refusal’ (Van Deventer 1891:313). In fact, the lieutenant-governor’s demands at this time were quite minimal and in part almost as politically naive as those of his Yogya representative. In late October, he had already assured Minto that the second sultan’s reinstatement seemed ‘practicable […] without endangering the tranquillity of the country’,\footnote{IOL, Raffles-Minto collection (Xerox copies of holograph letters), vol. 2, T.S. Raffles (Rijswijk/Batavia) to Lord Minto (Caldcutta), 28-10-1811.} and he reiterated this view in another secret dispatch to Crawfurd in early December, adding the condition that the Yogya ruler should write a letter of atonement for his recent actions. Then came a remark of stunning ignorance: if he still proved intractable Yogya should be placed under the administration of the Sunan\footnote{AvJ, T.S. Raffles (Semarang) to John Crawfurd (Yogyakarta), 6-12-1811, Secret; Van Deventer 1891:312. See also Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:37 note 3, 39; Valck 1844:28.}. 

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\item On troop levels and withdrawals, Thorn 1815:123-4, 200; IOL, G21/65, Raffles, ‘Memorandum respecting Java’, 1813, 43, citing Gillespie’s concern that the attack on Yogya should occur as early as possible because European regiments were about to be withdrawn to Bengal. On the need to mount an expedition, comprising 750 European troops and 375 sepoys, against the Sultan of Palembang, which eventually sailed on 20 March 1812, see Thorn 1815:127-73; Raffles, ‘Memorandum respecting Java’, 1813, 41; IOL, Eur F148/24 (Raffles-Minto collection, vol. 24), T.S. Raffles (Bogor) to Hugh Hope (Surakarta), 2-4-1812.
\item IOL G21/65, Raffles, ‘Memorandum respecting Java’, 1813, 37; Van Deventer 1891:313-4.
\item IOL, Raffles-Minto collection (Xerox copies of holograph letters), vol. 2, T.S. Raffles (Rijswijk/Batavia) to Lord Minto (Calcutta), 28-10-1811.
\item AvJ, T.S. Raffles (Semarang) to John Crawfurd (Yogyakarta), 6-12-1811, Secret; Van Deventer 1891:312. See also Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:37 note 3, 39; Valck 1844:28.
\end{thebibliography}
Plate 34. Aquatint by William Daniell (1769-1837) of a Light Infantry Volunteer Battalion sepoy who took part in the British attack on the Yogya kraton in June 1812 and the sepoy conspiracy of 1815. Taken from Williams 1817; 331 facing. Photograph by courtesy of the Bodleian Library, Oxford.
Even before these secret dispatches were written and prior to his own arrival in Semarang, Raffles had instructed Crawfurd to climb down and meet with the sultan and the Crown Prince. The audience took place on 26 November and seems to have passed off well enough under the circumstances, although the Resident noticed with dismay that instead of sitting next to his father or on a stool, the Crown Prince sat on the floor with the other senior officials, and the second sultan’s throne was once again raised above his own seat by the insertion of a wooden bench. The Yogya ruler was clearly determined to return to the pre-July 1808 status quo, something which Raffles again appeared to have encouraged in his Melaka dispatch.

Soon after this initial meeting, however, relations between the British Residency and the court came under renewed strain due to a series of incidents involving members of the sepoy garrison. Over a period of six days (29 November-4 December), Yogya inhabitants, particularly those who worked in the main market Pasar Beringharjo, reacted to what they perceived as the offensive habits of the Bengali soldiers by acting in Crawfurd’s words in ‘a publicly insulting fashion’ towards them. In at least one case a knife was drawn, and in another stones were hurled at a sepoy who was visiting the main market (Carey 1980:79-81). A later Dutch source even speaks of a mortal wounding of one of the sepoy guards at the fort, but this is not confirmed in the official correspondence. Nahuys van Burgst, who had access to the Residency archive during his own six-year tour of duty in the sultan’s capital (1816-1822), subsequently wrote that the ‘immorality’ of the garrison at this time nearly caused a mass local uprising against the Europeans in the sultan’s capital. Raffles recognised that the ‘habits and manners’ of the sepoys were offensive to the Javanese and ‘often produced disturbances’, but he also stressed that they were
‘of the best service’ because ‘the Javanese stand in great awe of them’.\textsuperscript{157} Since British power in Java was to a large extent based on their Indian – particularly Bengali – soldiery, the sepoys were not easily replaceable with European or Indonesian troops,\textsuperscript{158} especially at a time when intense debate was taking place in the lieutenant-governor’s council about force levels in British-occupied Java and the need to make economies (Thorn 1815:200; De Haan 1935a:553).

Another source of conflict in mid-December had to do with the dispatch of a customary letter of greeting and ambassadorial mission led by the acting patih to Raffles in Semarang as the incoming ‘governor-general’. Since Raffles held the title of lieutenant-governor, this may have confused the Yogya court into thinking that they were dealing with a British version of the defunct governor of Java’s Northeast Coast (Chapter V). It is clear from an extant letter from the sultan and the Crown Prince to Raffles dated 19 December that the lieutenant-governor was being addressed as a ‘good friend’ and ‘brother’ (Carey 1980:86-7) rather than the more customary ‘grandfather’ (éyang) (Ricklefs 1974a:373). Crawfurd had protested that the usual forms of address had not been followed and the letter was not allowed to be sent.\textsuperscript{159} In particular, he objected to the opening phrase in the letter ‘from the sultan holding court in Yogyakarta’ because he felt the Prince Regent was brought into degradation by the expression (Carey 1980:83 note 2). He thus insisted on dictating a revised letter and ordering that a new mission should be sent under the acting patih to present it.\textsuperscript{160} But it seems that both Crawfurd and Raffles, who was then travelling to Surabaya before proceeding on to Surakarta,\textsuperscript{161} expected this ambassadorial mission to meet the lieutenant-governor in the Sunan’s capital rather than at Semarang. This neither the sultan nor the Crown Prince would accept (Carey 1980:83-5). Again Raffles and his representative in Yogya had shown a

\textsuperscript{157} IOL, G21/65, Raffles, ‘Memorandum respecting Java’, 1813, 141. ‘From the fear entertained of them by the Javanese’, he wrote to Lord Minto, ‘[the sepoys] are hardly in any respects inferior to the Europeans’, IOL, Eur F148/23 (Raffles-Minto collection, vol. 23), T.S. Raffles (Salatiga) to Lord Minto (Calcutta), 6-8-1812. See also Carey 1977:296.

\textsuperscript{158} British line regiments were expensive and by late 1812 only the 14th Regiment of Foot (Buckinghamshires), 59th Regiment of Foot (2nd Nottinghamshires), 22nd Dragoon Regiment and two companies of the 78th Regiment of Foot (Ross-shire Buffs) were still in Java. As for Indonesian troops, Raffles disposed of two ‘colonial corps’, one of Javanese and one of Ambonese, with only the latter in the lieutenant-governor’s view being serviceable, IOL, G21/65, Raffles, ‘Memorandum respecting Java’, 1813, 141.


\textsuperscript{160} IOL, Eur F148/24, ‘Secret correspondence’, pt. E no. 3, Radèn Tumenggung Sumadiningrat (Yogyakarta) to Radèn Adipati Cakranagara (Surakarta), n.y. (? 19-12-1811). See further Hageman 1857:416, who stated that sultan used the expression saudara (‘friend’) in his letter.

\textsuperscript{161} IOL, Mack.Pr. 2, 29, T.S. Raffles (Semarang) to Colonel Alexander Adams (Surakarta), 6-12-1811, refers to Raffles’ travel plans for mid-December which involved the following itinerary: 11-13 December: in Surabaya, 14 December: back to Semarang, 15-17 December: in Surakarta and 18-19 December: in Yogyakarta. But this appears to have been delayed by a week.
basic misunderstanding of court politics in south-central Java.\textsuperscript{162} Eventually, Sindunagara was sent to the north coast with the revised letter only to find that Raffles had already departed for Surakarta (20 December) on the first stage of his December visit to the courts (Hageman 1857:416). Sumadiningrat reported at this time to his Surakarta counterpart, Radèn Adipati Cakranagara, through the secret back channel which had now been opened between the two courts, that the Resident's actions had united the sultan and the Crown Prince ‘as one person’ against the opinionated Scot.\textsuperscript{163}

On 16 December, Natakusuma was returned to Yogya from Surabaya by the British government after deeply impressing Raffles with his understanding of political affairs in the sultan’s capital.\textsuperscript{164} He had an immediate audience with the sultan and told him of the lieutenant-governor’s concerns about the ruler’s slighting of the previous Franco-Dutch government – a reference to the Yogya monarch’s unilateral resumption of his full royal powers – and the appointment of a \textit{patih} without the approval of the government. Before Raffles arrived in Yogya, Natakusuma informed the sultan, he would have to return political arrangements to what they had been under Marshal Daendels by placing the Crown Prince once more in charge of the \textit{kraton} as Regent. Then when the lieutenant-governor came, he would formally reinstate Hamengkubuwana II to his previous position as ruler (Carey 1980:66-8, 90-1). We know that while he was still in Surabaya on 15 December, Raffles had instructed Crawfurd that the sultan should formally resign the royal government into the hands of the Crown Prince before he could be reinstated. But what Natakusuma had not told his elder brother was that this would involve the British Resident dictating a letter which would, as Raffles put it, ‘express […] in such words as to adequately answer the purposes of atonement intended. The letter should contain the best excuse for his conduct that can be adduced […] [this] will in my opinion be sufficient […] on the part of the sultan and a justification for my again placing him in power’ (Van Deventer 1891:312-3; Carey 1980:85 note 1).

The intended letter was eventually written on 19 December, although the sultan refused to cleave exactly to Crawfurd’s draft text. In suitably contrite tone, the Yogya ruler begged the forgiveness of the ‘high officers’ of the British government and stated that he had only acted ‘high-handedly’ against the previous Franco-Dutch government because it had lost all authority after


\textsuperscript{163} IOL, Eur F148/24, ‘Secret correspondence’, pt. E no. 3, Radèn Tumenggung Sumadiningrat (Yogyakarta) to Radèn Adipati Cakranagara (Surakarta), n.y. (? 15-12-1811).

\textsuperscript{164} Dj.Br. 9A, Valck, ‘Overzigt’, 116; IOL, Eur F148/24, ‘Secret correspondence’, pt. F no. 12, Radèn Tumenggung Sumadiningrat (Yogyakarta) to Radèn Adipati Cakranagara (Surakarta), n.y. (? 19-12-1811) (both give Monday, 16 December as the date of Natakusuma’s return); AvJ, T.S. Raffles (Surabaya) to John Crawfurd (Yogyakarta), 14-12-1811, Secret (on Raffles’ view of Natakusuma’s political acumen).
Plate 35. Portrait of Colonel Colin Mackenzie (circa 1754-1821), chief engineer to the British Forces in Java, who planned the assault on the Yogyakarta kraton in June 1812, surrounded by his three South Indian pandits who served as his cartographers and language teachers. Painting by Thomas Hickey (1741-1824). Photograph by courtesy of the India Office Library and Records, London.
the unconditional capitulation of Janssens at Kali Tuntang (18 September). Moreover, the former Prince Regent had not acted unpleasantly towards him, but had always behaved with extreme obedience and respect. It was quite otherwise with the deceased patih, however, who had conducted himself evilly, grieving the sultan’s heart and angering him greatly. He had also behaved badly towards the wives and children of leading Javanese, a reference to Danureja II’s supposed role as a procurer of young girls for the ex-Regent (Chapter VI). The sultan declared himself well pleased to confirm his son once more in control of the affairs of state but craved the ‘justice and fairness’ of those now in charge of the administration of Java – a clear echo here of Minto’s 26 August proclamation from Crawfurd’s pen – and hoped that they would return him to his full royal dignity once again (Carey 1980:86-7, 89).

At his 16 December audience, the sultan had already told Natakusuma that the Crown Prince and himself were now as one together and stood by their previous actions. But despite this apparent solidarity, Natakusuma’s return could not have been a pleasant development for the heir apparent who had so recently extricated himself from a perilous political impasse. The sultan’s younger brother had returned to Yogya seething with resentment against his nephew whom he considered as the chief architect of his exile and near assassination. These feelings were undoubtedly heightened when Natakusuma learnt of the plundering of his residence during his absence (Poensen 1905:276-7; Carey 1992:250, 404 note 30). The next six months until the fall of the Yogya kraton to British assault on 20 June 1812, were thus a period of very delicate manoeuvring on the part of the future Pakualam I and the Crown Prince. On the one hand, they needed to protect themselves against the sultan, on the other they had to maintain their good relations with the British government, a difficult combination. In this fine balancing act, the rivalry between the two men was to assume great importance for the prize was nothing less than the throne of Yogya.

Preparations were now set in train for Raffles’ first visit to the sultan’s capital. A three-man commission comprising the lieutenant-governor’s exceptionally able Dutch assistant, Harman Warner Muntinghe, and two Malay-speaking Bengal army officers, Captain L.H. Davy of the 4th Bengal Volunteer Battalion, and Captain W.E. Phillips, arrived in Yogya on 23 December to make the necessary political arrangements for the visit by entering into pre-

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165 IOL, Eur F148/24, ‘Secret correspondence’, pt. F no. 12, ‘Radèn Tunengung Sumadiningrat (Yogyakarta) to Radèn Adipati Cakranagara (Surakarta), n.y. (?19-12-1811), reference to Natakusuma and Hamengkubuwana II feeling as one salira kalih dados satunggil.

166 Dj:Br. 9A, Valck, ‘Overzigt’, 117; and for biographical sketches of Davy and Muntinghe, see De Haan 1935a:533-4, 614-7; Dudok van Heel 2002:161 (who indicates that Muntinghe’s first name is a Groningen version of ‘Herman’); and on Phillips, who later developed special interests in Malay literature and wrote a report on the native states of Boné and Gowa in South Sulawesi, see Blagden 1916:91; Ricklefs and Voorhoeve 1977:120, 124.
liminary treaty negotiations with the sultan (Van Deventer 1891:313-4; De Haan 1935a:615; Carey 1980:91). There they liaised closely with Crawfurd who had returned with them from Surakarta where he had conferred with Raffles about the political goals of the visit. They were also joined by Colonel Colin Mackenzie of the Madras Engineers, Raffles’ chief engineer officer, whose expertise was necessary to provide a detailed assessment of the sultan’s military capacity and the strength of his kraton fortifications should a subsequent British assault be required.

Crawfurd had apparently pressed his superior to come in person to Yogya with a large military escort to overawe the sultan with British military strength. But, as we have seen, the lieutenant-governor wished to act extremely cautiously because of the limited number of troops at his disposal. At the time of his first visit to the courts, British forces in central Java numbered just over a thousand men, less than half of whom were Europeans, the rest being Bengal sepoys from the central Javanese garrisons. Of these Raffles took 400 with him (100 cavalry and 300 infantry) when he arrived in Yogyakarta on 27 December. On 25 December, he wrote to Crawfurd laying out his views in clear and uncompromising terms. In effect, he reminded his Resident just who was in charge:

It will be for me to effect by force what may not be managed by negotiation, but I sincerely trust that your influence added to the measures taken by the Commission [of Muntinghe, Davy and Phillips], without whose concurrence you are in no case to act, may supersede the immediate effect of hostilities which under no circumstances short of the most absolute and peremptory necessity can be admitted.

The issue of the size of the lieutenant-governor’s military escort was also something which greatly exercised the sultan and his eldest son. On 21 December, they sent a joint letter to Crawfurd enquiring whether Raffles would bring a
large or a small force with him (Carey 1980:87-8). The Yogya ruler – for it was he who was the principal author of the letter – begged the Resident to tell his superior not to bring a large retinue because this would certainly cause him feelings of unease and unpleasant surprise, feelings which would be shared by the Crown Prince and all the other members of his family. Both the sultan and his heir apparent stressed that they did not want their intimate relations with the British government and its new lieutenant-governor to be sundered or to have to engage in hostilities with them. But if Raffles insisted on bringing a large escort they would interpret this as a sign that he did not trust them, the implication being that this would almost certainly lead eventually to armed confrontation. On 24 December, they reiterated this message in another letter to the Resident (Carey 1980:89). The fact that Raffles insisted on being received in Yogya with the full prerogatives and ceremonial of a visiting governor-general much in the same fashion as Daendels had been during his 29 July-2 August visit of 1809 even though his rank was only that of lieutenant-governor undoubtedly compounded these feelings of unease in Yogya.\(^{173}\)

Such preliminaries were hardly an auspicious beginning to Raffles’ arrival in the sultan’s capital on 27 December when he was forced to make his official entrance down the principal avenue (future Jalan Maliabara) with the Yogya ruler’s troops massed on each side bristling with pikes and loaded muskets, as many as 10,000 according to the lieutenant-governor’s subsequent dispatch to Minto (Chapter 1 note 20). In fact, it was clear that he was negotiating from a position of weakness and his visit was almost marked by tragedy. At the first official meeting between himself and the sultan in the throne room of the Residency, the latter refused to sit on the chair provided for him, insisting instead on using his silver throne under which the inevitable wooden bench had been placed so he could sit higher than the lieutenant-governor. Raffles’ aide-de-camps apparently kicked the bench away with their feet, whereupon some members of the sultan’s entourage drew their krises. British officers then entered the room, which was now so full that if it had come to a fight, weapons could not have been used. Just in time the Crown Prince stepped between the lieutenant-governor and his father and the two men came to their senses.\(^{174}\)

\(^{173}\) AN, Kabinet, 2-3-1838 no. 30, F.G. Valck (Yogyakarta) to Algemene Secretarie (Batavia), 18-2-1837, on the historical precedents for the ceremonial arrangements for Governor-General Dominique Jacques de Eerens’ (in office 1836-1840) visit to the Yogya in 1838. See further Houben 1994:81-2. On Daendels’ 1809 visit, see pp. 208-11.

\(^{174}\) There are various descriptions of this incident in the European and Javanese sources. Amongst the European sources I have used: Dj.Br. 9A, Valck, ‘Overzigt’, 118 (the most complete account); UBL BPL 616, Port. 5 pt. 5, H.G. Nahuys van Burgst (Yogyakarta) to Commissioners-General (Batavia), 14-9-1816 (who states that Raffles himself kicked the sultan’s wooden bench away with his foot); BL Add MS 45272 (Raffles’ secret correspondence with Lord Minto, January-March 1812), T.S. Raffles (Rijswijk/Batavia) to Lord Minto (Calcutta), 21-1-1812 (Raffles own account of his visit); Raffles 1830:125 (Lady Raffles’ memoir stating that if the order had been
The situation was saved, but the incident provided a vivid illustration of the tensions which lay just below the surface, tensions which had been exacerbated on the Javanese side by nearly four years of humiliation and indignity.

On 28 December, a new treaty was signed between Raffles and the sultan. This allowed for the return of all the lands ceded to Daendels under the 10 January treaty except for Grobogan, with its 3,000 cacah and 19,400 Java rupees in annual rents, which was reserved for Natakusuma. But the strandgeld payments were not reinstated. The tollgate and market taxes were also slated to be taken over by the British government on payment of 80,000 Spanish dollars a year (Van Deventer 1891:318 article 6). This clause, which was not acted upon because of the second sultan’s subsequent opposition in the early months of 1812, later opened the way to much fiscal oppression by the returned post-1816 Dutch administration in the years leading up to the Java War. The cash-strapped Netherlands East Indies government’s attempt to raise as much money as possible from this source regardless of the problems caused for local trade occasioned much hardship and would be one of the rallying points for popular support for Dipanagara’s rebellion in the Principalities in 1825 (Chapter IX). Meanwhile, Pacitan was annexed to the government, mainly for strategic and commercial reasons, and the sultan was required to lend assistance in the construction of a highway from Yogyakarta to Pacitan Bay. Raffles wanted access to Pacitan’s harbour and good communications with the interior of Java in the event of a future landing by British-Indian troops on the south coast (Chapter I note 55). A further article attempted to make the Yogyakarta region more accessible to the import of manufactured articles, especially English cotton piece goods. This carried a stage given to Hamengkubuwana II’s entourage to use their drawn krises ‘given the manner in which the English were surrounded not a man would have escaped’; Veth 1896-1907, II:303. The Javanese sources are: BD (Manado), II:172-3, XVI.6-10 (who stresses key role of the Crown Prince); B.Ng. I:254-5, LXIII.1-13.

Grobogan’s 3,000 cacah (productive peasant family) capacity is listed in the Serat Ebuk Anyar (New Book) of 1773, see Dj.Br. 43, ‘Register der landen van den Sultan opgemaakt te Semarang Aº 1773’, 2-11-1773; its 19,200 Java rupee annual rental assessment is mentioned in S.Br. 23, Hugh Hope (Surakarta) to T.S. Raffles (Buitenzorg), 9-5-1813. 1 Java rupee was worth £1.20 or 24 pence in contemporary English currency, Carey 1980:199-200; Appendix XVI.

Van Deventer 1891:319 articles 8-9; UBL BPL 616, Port. 5 pt. 11, H.G. Nahuys van Burgst, ‘Rapport over de residentie Djokjokarta’, 6-2-1817. See further pp. 164-5.

Van Deventer 1891:319 article 10. This sought to abolish the sumptuary laws (awisan-Dalem) on the wearing of certain types of batik cloth which had been earlier reserved to the ruler and his close family. One of these was the parang rusuk pattern, which was very much sought after in Yogyakarta. Crawfurd later had examples of this and other batik patterns sent to British textile manufacturers in Paisley (Glasgow) and Lancashire so they could produce piece goods for the Yogyakarta market, see Chapter I note 75. On the awisan-Dalem in Yogyakarta in the period 1755-1812, see further Carey 1980:177-82; Carey and Hoadley 2000:85-6, 94-5; IOL, Mack.Pr. 79, Johan Knops, ‘Description of the city of Samarang [Semarang] of its campongs [kampung], of its environs & of its population’, 280-5. See further Chapter VIII note 99.
VII The end of the beginning

further the opening up of Java’s interior to the newly industrialising world economy of which Britain was at this time the global leader. It also led to significant developments within Java’s own domestic waxed-dyed fabric (batik) industry designed to counter competition from European textile imports, most notably the greater use of hand block printing (Rouffaer 1904:21-2).

Although Raffles had belatedly abandoned any idea of placing Yogya under Surakarta control, the political clauses in the treaty were not without their problems. In fact, they showed that the lieutenant-governor continued to labour under significant misconceptions with regard to the south-central Javanese court system. Thus, although the Yogya treaty was nearly the same as that concluded with the Sunan on 23 December, it significantly did not include a clause continuing the sultan in his administration such as had been incorporated in the treaty with Pakubuwana IV (Van Deventer 1891:315 note 1 article 2). Instead, the relevant clause of the Yogya treaty envisaged that the Resident, John Crawfurd, would fulfil the role of patih (Van Deventer 1891:317 article 2). Perhaps Raffles hoped that this would keep the sultan in check. But if so, he made a grave blunder. In the Javanese view, it seemed to admit that the Resident was now the servant of the sultan, much in the same fashion as the earlier representatives of the VOC at the courts (Chapter V). Crawfurd must have realised that a cardinal error had been made because shortly after the treaty was concluded the only signed copy ‘disappeared’ from the Residency archive.178

In return for his political advice and assistance, Natakusuma was given an immediate stipend of 6,000 Spanish dollars a year – which was never in fact paid – with a smaller sum of 1,000 Spanish dollars a year being allocated to the Yogya kapitan cina (captain of the Chinese) Tan Jin Sing (in office 1803-1813), who had also provided invaluable services to Crawfurd.179 But Raffles later noted that his previous idea of employing Natakusuma as a secret British agent had been sabotaged by Crawfurd’s actions in grooming him as a rival to the sultan and the Prince Regent so that he had already become the object of the greatest jealousy on the part of the court.180

The treaty was destined to be short-lived. Neither side had any intention of abiding by its clauses. According to the Pakualam babad, Raffles had assured

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178 Van Deventer 1891:317 note 1, 319-20 note 2, called this clause a ‘gigantic blunder’ (een reusachtige blunder) and speculated that this may have been one of the reasons why the signed copy of the treaty had been removed the Yogya Residency archive.
179 Van Deventer 1891:xv note 1; AvJ, T.S. Raffles (Yogyakarta) to John Crawfurd (Yogyakarta), 28-12-1811, who stated that the payments were to be made out of the secret service fund. According to Van Deventer 1891:102, they were never paid.
180 BL Add MS. 45272 (Raffles’ secret correspondence with Lord Minto, January-March 1812), T.S. Raffles (Rijswijk/Batavia) to Lord Minto (Calcutta), 21-1-1812. Raffles’ judgement was coloured by his prejudice against Crawfurd. It is clear that Natakusuma still enjoyed the confidence of the sultan.
Natakusuma that at the onset of the next dry season (May-October) affairs in Yogya would be reconsidered (Poensen 1905:278). In a subsequent dispatch to Lord Minto written after the fall of the Yogya kraton and the subsequent exile of the second sultan to Pulau Pinang in early July 1812, Raffles admitted that ‘the terms [of the 28 December 1811 treaty] were acceptable to me rather as the best, which under the existing circumstances could be procured, rather than […] what I would have wished’.181 The sultan immediately set about making preparations for resistance. In Crawfurd’s words:

The laxity and moderation of British conduct was mistaken for fear […] After the signature of the treaty, an immediate start was made on the collection of troops, the manufacturing of arms and the strengthening of the defences of the craton [kraton].182

As we have seen, Raffles himself noticed large numbers of troops in the sultan’s capital during his December visit and he remarked on the hostile attitude of the local population towards the British.183 Both sides were soon preparing for war. It was evident that a military showdown between the British government and the sultan could not be long delayed.

Preparations for war

Just as in a Greek tragedy hubris leads on inevitably to nemesis, so it was with the Yogya ruler in the early months of 1812 as he prepared to confront the emerging imperial superpower. Daendels had already written that he sensed that ‘the sultan was hurrying towards his fall’ during the crisis over Raden Rongga in 1810 (Chapter VI). However, the inherent weaknesses of the Franco-Dutch government and the pressure of world events associated with the Napoleonic Wars, in particular the British invasion of Java in August 1811, had given Hamengkubuwana II a chance to recoup his political position. But once the new Raffles’ administration felt militarily strong enough to confront

181 IOL, Eur F148/23 (Raffles-Minto collection, vol. 23), T.S. Raffles (Salatiga) to Lord Minto (Calcutta), 6-8-1812. IOL, G21/65, Raffles, ‘Memorandum respecting Java’, 1813, 38, where the treaty was described as ‘merely [a] temporary arrangement calculated to promote the immediate effect of tranquillizing the country but without providing effectively again hostile views which the Sultan might supposed to entertain against the European power in Java’.

182 IOL, Eur F148/24 (Raffles-Minto collection, vol. 24), John Crawfurd (Yogyakarta) to T.S. Raffles (Bogor), 21-3-1813. See also IOL, G21/65. Raffles, ‘Memorandum respecting Java’, 1813, 38, where the lieutenant-governor remarked that he was by no means satisfied with the Yogya ruler despite his outwardly friendly demeanour; IOL, G21/39, Java Separate Consultations, 8-3-1814, 177-9, Fort William (Calcutta) to T.S. Raffles (Bogor), 2-10-1813, on Hamengkubuwana II’s attitude towards Crawfurd and pretensions of establishing himself as an independent power through armed resistance.

183 BL Add MS. 45272 (Raffles’ secret correspondence with Lord Minto, January-March 1812), T.S. Raffles (Rijswijk/Batavia) to Lord Minto (Calcutta), 21-1-1812, 30-1-1812.
the Yogya ruler and the dry season allowed more favourable campaigning conditions, the settling of accounts with the sultanate would not be long delayed. Once again, the inability of the Yogya elite to read the runes of world history and adapt to the fast changing international order would lead to disaster.

Soon after Raffles’ departure from Yogya on 29 December 1811, Natadiningrat arrived from Semarang.184 His presence doubtless strengthened the position of his father for the Yogya babad remarks on the particularly good relationship which developed between Natakusuma and the sultan at this time.185 Raffles too reckoned that Natakusuma was adeptly serving both parties and interests by ingratiating himself with his elder brother, the sultan, while ensuring his links with the European power: ‘It is necessary to keep him loyal to the British government if possible’, he wrote, ‘but not to encourage him in the expectation of the sultanate.’186 According to Dipanagara’s autobiography, the sultan’s main enmity was now directed against Dipanagara’s father, for he feared that he had come to a secret understanding with the British.187 Moves were thus made against the Crown Prince and his supporters, particularly those who had helped him into power under Daendels. As we shall see shortly, Dipanagara himself was seen as a threat and his life was said to be in danger.

On 15 January, Radèn Tumenggung Danukusuma was sent into exile in Pacitan and strangled in a small wayside prayer house by his kraton escort, his body being interred in a nearby forest before being brought back for ignominious burial at the traitor’s graveyard at Banyusumurup which was now rapidly filling up with the sultan’s victims.188 News of the old man’s ‘exile’ had been broken to Crawfurd by Natadiningrat. This announcement and the fact that the event had occurred so soon after the future Pakualam II’s return, caused the Resident to associate the deed with his influence: ‘It has left upon my mind an impression of Natadiningrat less favourable than I was willing to entertain of him’, he wrote to Raffles.189 Subsequent Dutch sources also link Natadiningrat to the murder citing his anger at the fact that the aged royal counsellor had been given one of his pusaka (heirloom) krises which had been taken from

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184 IOL, Eur F148/24 (Raffles-Minto collection, vol. 24), John Crawfurd (Yogyakarta) to T.S. Raffles (Rijswijk/Batavia), 15-1-1812. See further Poensen 1905:278-9, who states that the first went to pay his respects to Crawfurd and then had an audience with the sultan, who allowed him to take his wife, now Ratu Ayu (see Chapter VI note 98), back from the kraton to his plundered residence.

185 B.Ng. I:259-60, LXIV.3-9.

186 IOL, Eur F148/24 (Raffles-Minto collection, vol. 24), T.S. Raffles (Bogor) to John Crawfurd (Yogyakarta), 2-4-1812.

187 BD (Manado), II:76, XVI.21-2.


Plate 36. BL Add. MS. 12341 f.35r, original note of Kyai Nitimenggala to Radèn Tumenggung Sumadiningrat regarding preparations in Surakarta for the reception of Raffles in December 1811 (Sec. I, pt. 6, doc. VI). Photograph by courtesy of the British Library, London.
his residence by Danukusuma’s son, Danureja II, in late December 1810 after Natadiningrat and his father were exiled to Semarang. Danukusuma’s close family ties to Natakusuma – he was the prince’s brother-in-law – were apparently of no avail in this instance (Mandoyokusumo 1977:12 no. 7, 13 no. 11). After nearly four years of unrelenting political pressure from the European government, feelings were running so high in the kraton that a de facto civil war was now being fought out. Brothers were prepared to kill brothers, and fathers murder sons.

Following the strangulation of Danukusuma, there began a series of moves against the Crown Prince which had as their object his removal and even death. His mother, Ratu Kedhaton, was confined on four separate occasions in the Bangsal Kencana (Golden Hall), a kraton pavilion, because she had protested so strongly against the sultan’s plans to appoint Mangkudiningrat in her son’s stead as Crown Prince (pp. 74-5; Van der Kemp 1896a:321-2). In March, twelve members of the Crown Prince’s entourage, who had been instrumental in effecting the transfer of power in January 1811, were demanded by the sultan to be delivered up to him. Crawfurd also reported that the Crown Prince’s life was in imminent danger: ‘there is little doubt […] that it is the wish of the Sultan to deprive him of the succession and the shortest mode of accomplishing this will be to take away his life by a dose of poison’. Crawfurd envisaged that the Crown Prince would soon need to be brought under British protection.

Throughout this dangerous period, Dipanagara apparently afforded his father constant advice and support, often journeying in from Tegalreja for secret meetings in the kadipatèn. In his babad, he describes how he felt keenly the dilemma of having to choose between his father and his grandfather, counselling the Crown Prince to act with extreme caution. We know from a subsequent Dutch source that the second sultan was well aware of Dipanagara’s actions in support of his father at this time and intended to have him murdered. It is striking, however, that Crawfurd in his many dispatches to Raffles during this

191 Dj.Br. 9A, Valck, ‘Overzigt’, 119-20; IOL, Raffles-Minto collection (Xerox copies of Holograph letters), vol. 2, T.S. Raffles (Bogor) to Lord Minto (Calcutta), 21-3-1812 (who reported ‘I believe four were immediately strangled and the remainder will no doubt share in the same fate’). See also note 56 on the original appointment of these bupati in March 1811.
192 IOL, Eur F148/24 (Raffles-Minto collection, vol. 24), John Crawfurd (Yogyakarta) to T.S. Raffles (Bogor), 6-3-1812. See also Dj.Br. 9A, Valck, ‘Overzigt’, 120.
193 IOL, Eur F148/24 (Raffles Minto collection, vol. 24), John Crawfurd (Yogyakarta) to T.S. Raffles (Bogor), 6-3-1812.
195 Jan Izaäk van Sevenhoven, ‘Nota eerbiedig aangeboden aan de hooge commissie, die benoemd is om den oud-Sultan van Jogjakarta in zijn waardigheid te herstellen’, 23-8-1826, quoted Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, II:422.
period never once mentions the Crown Prince’s eldest son. Indeed, nowhere in all of Crawfurd’s voluminous correspondence during his three separate tours of duty in the sultan’s capital (Appendix IX) is there any reference to a Radèn Antawirya (Dipanagara’s pre-July 1812 name) or a Pangéran Dipanagara. This omission is all the more strange given Dipanagara’s boast that the Scotsman had discussed ‘everything in person with his father and himself’ (p. 109) and that he had been charged by his father with responsibility for delicate negotiations with Crawfurd through the Crown Prince’s *patih*, Radèn Ngabèhi Jayasentika from mid-April 1812 onwards (Louw 1894:36-7). The problem for the historian of the British period in Yogya is that a subsequent Dutch Resident and amateur historian, Frans Valck (in office 1831-1841), who wrote a detailed survey of Yogya history from Giyanti (1755) to the Java War, which was partly published in *Tijdschrift voor Nederlandsch-Indië* in 1844, used the Residency archive for his research and then appears to have kept many of the letters for his personal collection. A large number of these were apparently from the British period (note 155). We are thus dependant on his testimony and have no means of independently verifying his sources. Valck states unequivocally, however, that according to the Residency archive, Dipanagara was indeed used as a go-between between his father and Crawfurd and was ‘in general very highly regarded by Europeans’ at this time,\(^{196}\) a view which was confirmed by a number of Dutch officials at the time of his appointment as a guardian to the child sultan, Hamengkubuwana V, in December 1822 (pp. 509-510). So, until evidence appears to the contrary, we may assume that Dipanagara did play an important role despite his comparatively young age and lack of standing in court councils.\(^{197}\)

While these murderous intrigues were moving towards their conclusion, the central Javanese courts came to a secret understanding against the British. The initiative seems to have come from the Sunan who used the back channel which had been kept open between his *patih*, Radèn Adipati Cakranagara, and Sumadiningrat in Yogya. On 25 March, there is a reference in one of Sumadiningrat’s secret missives to his Surakarta counterpart, quoting the Sunan as writing ‘that he wished to enter into a league and union with his “father” [the sultan] which might descend to their latest posterity’.\(^{198}\) The

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\(^{197}\) Dipanagara was 26 in European years and 27 in Javanese years in April 1812. Since the age of legal majority in Java at this time was 16 Javanese years, then Dipanagara’s age was perhaps not so young. Even in Europe at this time there were instances of very young men assuming positions of considerable importance in their respective countries when they were still in their mid-twenties, one thinks here of William Pitt ‘the Younger’ (1759-1806), who became British prime minister in 1783 at the age of 24, and Louis Antoine de St. Just (1767-1794), who became a member of the Committee of Public Safety (1793-1794) and was executed before his 27th birthday.

The end of the beginning

The treaty itself took the form of two documents exchanged between the courts. Each document read as follows:199

The contract of Raden Adipati Cakranagara and Tumenggung Sumadiningrat bearing the royal seal200 of His Highness the Susuhunan Pakubuwana IV and also that of His Highness Sultan Hamengkubuwana II and binding upon their posterity. Let this instrument be held by Tumenggung Sumadiningrat in token of the engagement entered into between him and Raden Adipati Cakranagara.

In the first place, whereas our two sovereigns the Sunan and his father, the Sultan, have now united as one person and exchange expressions of sincerity, it is agreed between them that the country of Java, in the same manner as heretofore possessed by them, shall forever be possessed, viz. one half by His Highness the Susuhunan and the other half by His Highness the Sultan descending to their respective posterity.

In the second place, it is agreed that should any one of the princes of Surakarta rebel against the sovereign, the same shall be considered an enemy of His Highness the Sultan as well as of His Highness the Susuhunan, and that should in like manner any of the princes of Yogyakarta act disloyally towards His Highness the Sultan, they shall be treated as enemies of His Highness the Susuhunan as well as His Highness the Sultan.

The second clause of the treaty was clearly directed against the Yogya Crown Prince, as Crawfurd later pointed out.201 The first, however, seemed to be a reaffirmation of the old division of Java between the courts such as had existed before the changes wrought by Daendels. Pakubuwana IV’s aspirations to be recognised as the senior ruler in Java, which he had put forward in 1790, were also ostensibly abandoned (Chapter V note 16). It thus mirrored the profoundly conservative desire to maintain the division of Java which had been built up so painstakingly since the late eighteenth century (Ricklefs 1974a:339-40). The European government was not specifically mentioned, but the document was clearly aimed against outside interference in the affairs

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199 A recension of the original treaty in English translation is in IOL, Eur F148/24 (Raffles-Minto collection, vol. 24), pt. F. See also IOL, G21/39, Java Separate Consultations, 8-3-1814, 171, Fort William (Calcutta) to T.S. Raffles (Bogor), 2-10-1813. The quotation given here is from the official English translation of the sultan’s copy of the treaty made by G.P. Rouffaer in AvJ, ‘Secret contract established in the beginning of 1812 between the Sunan and the Sultan’ (henceforth: ‘Secret contract’), n.y. (? March 1812).

200 Neither of the treaties was ever sealed by the rulers. Apparently neither the Sunan nor the Sultan wished to be the first to append their seals to the document. They would also not entrust their seals to a subordinate so the sealing could be done simultaneously, S.Br. 55, Van Pabst, ‘Nota betreffende de conspiratie’, 13-6-1827.

201 AvJ, ‘Secret contract’, includes the note by Crawfurd, ‘the last article is levelled at the Hereditary Prince [Crown Prince] and the European power which vested him with the Regency, and is meant to secure to the Sultan, without reference to the European Government, the power which he had recently usurped’.
of south-central Java. In a later letter, Sumadiningrat described the recent December treaty with the British in this fashion to his colleague in Surakarta:

> in my opinion, my son, the situation of our sovereigns resembles that of two people secretly engaged in wedlock. Should you consider it in that light then the treaty [with the British] is of no consequence.\(^{202}\)

He also advised Cakranagara that there should be no etiquette of ‘high’ and ‘low’, a reference to the use of the *krama* (High Javanese) and *ngoko* (Low Javanese) speech levels, ‘thus all difficulty will be avoided between us two’.\(^{203}\)

According to P.H. van Lawick van Pabst, who wrote a subsequent note on the conspiracy during the Java War, the secret agreement involved more than just a mutual aid treaty. Instead, it was specifically targeted against the British with an understanding that, in the event of an attack on Yogya, the Sunan would fall on the British forces from the rear. There were also plans, Van Pabst alleged, for a general massacre of the European inhabitants in the *kraton* towns, although this is not confirmed elsewhere in the European sources. Preparations for resistance were apparently well advanced by the time the British began to assemble troops for their campaign in late May and early June.\(^{204}\) The Sunan used his family connections with Madura to send secret emissaries to the court of his father-in-law, Sultan Sepuh of Madura, the former Panembahan Cakradiningrat IV of Pamekasan (p. 181), as well as to make contacts amongst the north coast *bupati* who were linked to the court by ties of marriage.\(^{205}\)

There were even rumours that the Javanese (‘colonial’) corps in Surabaya were preparing to join the uprising.\(^{206}\) In the event, Pakubuwana IV left Yogya to its

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\(^{202}\) IOL, Eur F148/24, ‘Secret correspondence’, pt. C no. 5, Radèn Tumenggung Sumadiningrat (Yogyakarta) to Radèn Adipati Cakranagara (Surakarta), 10 Rabingulakir AJ 1739 (AD 25-3-1812). Pakubuwana IV had apparently been particularly worried about article 9 of his 23 December 1811 treaty with the British which reiterated the provision in previous Dutch/VOC treaties forbidding correspondence with foreign and domestic powers without the express permission of the government, IOL, G21/39, Java Separate Consultations, 8-3-1814, 169, Fort William (Calcutta) to T.S. Raffles (Bogor), 2-10-1813; Van Deventer 1891:316 article 9.

\(^{203}\) IOL, Eur F148/24, ‘Secret correspondence’, pt. C no. 5, Radèn Tumenggung Sumadiningrat (Yogyakarta) to Radèn Adipati Cakranagara (Surakarta), 10 Rabingulakir AJ 1739 (AD 25-3-1812). S.Br. 55, Van Pabst, ‘Nota betreffende de conspiratie’, 13-6-1827. On Raffles’ arrival in Semarang on 1 June 1812, where he was joined by the 600-strong force under Colonel Gillespie seven days later, see IOL, Raffles-Minto collection (Xerox copies of holograph letters), vol. 3, T.S. Raffles (Cipanas) to Lord Minto (Calcutta), 22-5-1812; T.S. Raffles (Semarang) to Lord Minto (Calcutta), 2-6-1812, 15-6-1812.

\(^{204}\) IOL, Raffles-Minto collection (Xerox copies of holograph letters), vol. 3, T.S. Raffles (Semarang) to Lord Minto (Calcutta), 2-6-1812, 15-6-1812. On the marriage links between Surakarta and the *pasisir bupati*, see Chapter V note 12.

\(^{205}\) Thorn 1815:184-5; Gerlach 1859:211. Raffles spoke with contempt of this corps: ‘they do not even make a return of their numbers: they are one day reported to be near 800 strong and the next they appear by the general return only 200. The men who have been enlisted are of the most worthless cast and I fear will never be good for anything. The Jayeng Sekar [Jayèng Sekar:
fate. Indeed, once the scale of the conspiracy was fully confirmed following the fall of the Yogya kraton and the capture of its archive,\textsuperscript{207} he ‘drew in his horns’ in Van Pabst’s words and sacrificed his patih, who was exiled to Surabaya. Two other Surakarta officials, the bupati of Blora, Radèn Tumenggung Mertanegara, and a clerk of the Surakarta patih’s office, Radèn Ngabèhi Ranawijaya, who had served as a secret courier, were also briefly imprisoned in Semarang by the British for their part in the affair.\textsuperscript{208}

In his babad, Dipanagara gives a short but rather accurate description of the affair:

XVI.23 So His Highness the Sultan
was certain to be the enemy of the English.
Tumenggung Sumadiningrat
was burdened with the task,

24 [and] made contact with Surakarta.
But His Highness the Sunan trusted in his younger brother
Pangéran Mangkubumi
and in the patih,
Radèn Adipati Cakranagara.
So there was an agreement
that in future, if it came to battle

25 with the English, Surakarta
undertook to fall on them from behind.
Thus they swore together
and exchanged documents
with their signatures as an undertaking,
indeed for all time.
Thus was the agreement.\textsuperscript{209}

\textsuperscript{207} It appears that Raffles was already aware of the secret correspondence between the courts and the breach of article 9 of his 23 December 1811 treaty with the British in late April (note 238), but the full extent of the conspiracy and Pakubuwana IV’s involvement in it only became clear after the capture of Yogya archive (20-6-1812). Corroborating evidence was found in the house of the Surakarta patih, Radèn Adipati Cakranagara, in late July, S.Br. 23, Charles Assey (Batavia) to Hugh Hope (Surakarta), 4-8-1812.

\textsuperscript{208} S.Br. 23, Hugh Hope (Surakarta) to T.S. Raffles (Rijswijk/Batavia), 10-8-1812. When the goods and chattels of these three men were sold at public auction in Surakarta in late July 1812, the previous British Resident was shocked to discover a very large quantity of arms (pikes, muskets, carbines and swords) amongst their personal effects, S.Br. 14B, Colonel Alexander Adams (Surakarta) to T.S. Raffles (Semarang), 22-7-1812.

\textsuperscript{209} BD (Manado) II:176-7, XVI (Pangkur) 23-5. mengkana Kangjeng Sultan! mapan nemah mengsah lawan Inggris iku! Dèn Menggung Sumadiningrat/ ingkang binobot ing kardi. 24. ate pang lan Surakarta/ uging Jeng Sunan pitajeng mring kang rayl! Pangran Mangkubumi iku/ lawan ingkang Papatyal! Dèn
Dipanagara’s reference to the key role played by the Sunan’s younger brother, Pangéran Mangkubumi (Chapter V note 42), is fully borne out in the European sources. Known for his virulently anti-European views and forceful character, the prince was subsequently exiled first to Batavia (1816-1818) and then to Ambon (1818-1824) following his involvement in a second major conspiracy in Surakarta in 1815 linked to the local sepy garrison (Carey 1977:299, 321 note 104; Chapter VIII). Another of the Sunan’s brothers who played a part in the conspiracy was Pangéran Buminata (Chapter II note 86). As we have seen, both the Sunan and Buminata maintained close links with the religious communities in Surakarta (Chapter II), and these became of increasing concern to the British authorities as the date of their attack neared. On 17 June 1812, the British Resident in Surakarta, Colonel Alexander Adams urged Raffles to caution the Sunan about allowing ‘priests and Arabs’ free access to his kraton, and permitting them to rove the countryside ‘in disguise’ without official passes. His fears were justified. Not only did court santri carry out important tasks as the secret emissaries between the courts at this time (note 87), but it appears that Pakubuwana IV gave clandestine instructions to his kraton religious hierarchy that in the event of a British attack on Surakarta they were to take to the hills to lead the resistance against the occupying forces. Public prayers were also said for the safety of the sultan at the Friday service in the Great Mosque.

Despite the clear evidence of the Sunan’s hostile intentions towards the British, which included the strengthening of his military positions and the stoning of the British cavalry post at the Srimenganti gate by his intimate

Dipati Cakranagara punikul mapan lajeng prajangjèyan’ ing bëning kalamun jurit. 25. lawan Innggris Surakarta’ mapan sägah anyabet saking touri apan samya sumpah sampun’ kang sarta luru putru’ tondha nama wus dahya ubayanipunj’ mapan ing samongsa-mongsal mangkana ingkang ubanggi. In 1946, when Muhammad Yamin (1903-1962) was preparing his biography of Dipanagara (Yamin 1950), a romanised copy of the Rusche text edition of Dipanagara’s babad was prepared for him by Kangjeng Radèn Mas Tumenggung Tirtodiningrat in Surakarta, but the whole section dealing with Surakarta’s treachery was omitted from this transliteration. The relevant sections are Rusche 1908-09, I:32-3, XVI:23-38 (LOr 6547b, 176-81). This is an interesting case of the past as present reality, and may have reflected the conflicted loyalties of the Surakarta kraton in that first turbulent year of the Indonesian Revolution (1945-1949), see Anderson 1972:351-64. The two-volume romanised copy was given to the present author by the late Professor C.C. Berg in Leiden in 1971. Muhammad Yamin had originally asked Professor Berg for his assistance with his Dipanagara biography.
VII The end of the beginning

retainers (panakawan) on 1 June, he does not seem to have been seriously committed to providing Yogya military help. He flattered the sultan by the use of the title ‘father’ in his letters and urged him on against the British, hoping that this might lead to his own advantage. But, as Raffles pointed out, ‘the Susu[h]nan has been timid and wavering throughout, anxious to join in anything which could shake the European power, yet afraid to adopt the avowed and open tone of the Sultan’. From March onwards, soldiers from the eastern mancanagara flooded into the Sunan’s capital until on the eve of the British attack on Yogya some 7,000 troops were available and appeared to ‘await only on instructions from Yogya to commence hostilities’. But when Colonel Gillespie’s force took up their positions in Yogya on 17 June, the Sunan merely placed a part of his army across their line of communications to Semarang thereby hoping to profit from any military reverse or protracted campaign. It is uncertain too just how far the sultan placed his trust in the Sunan’s promises. In early May, the Crown Prince remarked to Crawfurd that:

[There is] little danger to be apprehended from this intended cooperation of the courts, for […] such was the impression the Sultan had of the Emperor’s [Sunan’s] character that [he] placed little reliance on his professions and, as for his part, he conceived that on the first appearance of danger, the Susu[h]nan would endeavour to recommend himself to the British Government by making a disclosure of the whole circumstances.

There seems to have been no attempt on the part of the sultan to appeal for help from Surakarta during the actual attack on his kraton. Indeed, after its fall, the author of the Babad bedhah ing Ngayogyakarta (‘Chronicle of the fall of Yogyakarta’), Pangéran Panular, remarked that even with the Sunan’s assistance, Yogya would still not have been able to withstand the British (Carey 1992:107, 267, 433 note 167).

According to Dipanagara, immediately after the late March 1812 secret agreement with Surakarta, the sultan was in two minds about whether to

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214 IOL, Raffles-Minto collection (Xerox copies of holograph letters), vol. 3, T.S. Raffles (Bogor) to Lord Minto (Calcutta), 23-4-1813; S.Br. 25, Colonel Alexander Adams (Surakarta) to Pakubuwana IV (Surakarta), 1-6-1812 (on the Srimenganti gate incident).
215 IOL, Eur F148/24 (Raffles-Minto collection, vol. 24), T.S. Raffles (Bogor) to Lord Minto (Calcutta), 18-4-1813.
216 IOL, Eur F148/24 (Raffles-Minto collection, vol. 24), Colonel Alexander Adams (Surakarta) to T.S. Raffles (Semarang), 15-6-1812; Hugh Hope (Surakarta) to T.S. Raffles (Rijswijk/Batavia), 2-4-1813. On the Sunan’s military preparations, see also IOL, G21/39, Java Separate Consultations, 8-3-1814, 182.
217 IOL, Eur F148/23 (Raffles-Minto collection, vol. 23), T.S. Raffles (Semarang) to Lord Minto (Calcutta), 12-8-1812.
218 IOL, Eur F148/24 (Raffles-Minto collection, vol. 24), John Crawfurd (Yogyakarta) to T.S. Raffles (Rijswijk/Batavia), 8-5-1812.
implement his plans against the British or to seek a peaceful solution by soliciting their approval for the murder of the Crown Prince and the appointment of his favourite son, Pangèran Mangkudiningrat, in his stead. The prince states in his babad that the Yogya ruler initially decided on the second course of action and tasked Natakusuma with handing over a letter to Crawford detailing the sultan’s demands. Unbeknownst to the future Pakualam I, however, the meeting was secretly monitored by the Crown Prince’s patih, Radèn Ngabèhi Jayasentika, who, according to Dipanagara, hid in the spacious attic over the throne room, which a previous Dutch Resident had built for storing the highly valuable birds’ nests, so he could overhear Natakusuma’s conversation. The prince was later reported by the British Resident to have said that ‘the main intention of the Sultan is that the Pangeran Adipati [Crown Prince] should not succeed to the throne’. He also denigrated the Crown Prince by stating that ‘the crimes of the Hereditary Prince are his intrigues’, going on to explain the background of his enmity in the following terms:

During the lifetime of the late Sultan [Hamengkubuwana I, reigned 1749-1792], the Hereditary Prince loved me as a father, but he has since acted treacherously [towards] me […] My own opinion of him now is that he is at present in fear and difficulty. He will in all respects obey the [lieutenant]-governor, but he is not liked by the prajurit [troops], by the princes or by the nobility […] [his] crimes are his intrigues amongst the women of the chiefs, his breach of the oaths he has taken and his presumptuous behaviour to his father upon whom he has grossly imposed.

But Crawford noted that Natakusuma’s opinion was ‘deeply tinctured with prejudice and by his aversion, […] even detestation of the [Crown] Prince’. Moreover, the prince was equally dismissive towards his own elder brother, the sultan, whose attitude towards him, he averred, had also undergone a radical change after the death of Sultan Mangkubumi in March 1792: ‘[all] the accounts are [now] that he is in great trouble. He hardly eats or sleeps. To hide his situation he feigns to employ himself with his troops. His conduct is…’

219 The attic was built by Resident Jan Lapro (in office 1764-1773) specifically for storing birds’ nests, AvJ, A.H. Smissaert (Yogyakarta) to G.A.G.Ph., van der Capellen, 2-5-1823. On the importance of income from this source as a supplement to the previous Dutch Residents’ modest salaries, see Chapter V notes 29-30. According to Pieter Engelhard, half the profits of approximately 30,000 ronde realen (silver reals) from the birds’ nests in Yogyakarta were kept by the Resident (thus doubling his official salary) and the rest went to Daendels, IOL, Eur F148/18 (Raffles-Minto collection, vol. 18), Pieter Engelhard (Yogyakarta) to Captain William Robison (Yogyakarta), 27-9-1811. Raffles took the decision to take over the entire income from this source for the government (IOL, Mack.Pr. 2, Raffles’ remarks on Colonel Alexander Adams’ secret memoir, Semarang, 6-12-1811, 20) and post-1816, special government inspectors of the birds’ nest rocks, opziener der vogelnestklippen, were appointed, see KITLV H 263, P.D. Portier, ‘Verklaring’, Surakarta, 1826.

220 BD (Manado) II:177-80, XVI.26-35.

221 IOL, Eur F148/24 (Raffles-Minto collection, vol. 24), John Crawford (Yogyakarta) to T.S. Raffles (Rijswijk/Batavia), 14-5-1812. Natakusuma’s report was received by Crawford on 13-5-1811.
in all respects like that of a child.\footnote{IOL, Eur F148/24 (Raffles-Minto collection, vol. 24), John Crawfurd (Yogyakarta) to T.S. Raffles (Rijswijk/Batavia), 14-5-1812.} 

In fact, without disclosing anything to Natakusuma, as early as the beginning of April, when evidence of the sultan’s bad faith was plain, Raffles had ordered Crawfurd to open out a secret channel of communication to the Crown Prince. He was told to warn him about the forthcoming concentration of troops at Semarang, a military arrangement which in fact had to be delayed by nearly two months because of the need to mount an expedition against the Sultan of Palembang, Mahmud Badarrudin (reigned 1804-1812, 1813, 1818-1821).\footnote{IOL, Eur F148/24 (Raffles-Minto collection, vol. 24), T.S. Raffles (Bogor) to John Crawfurd (Yogyakarta), 2-4-1812, no. 15.} In Raffles’ words:

The immediate object of assembling so large a force in the neighbourhood of Semarang is […] to impress upon the Sultan an idea of the means we possess for enforcing our demands and thereby effect such a treaty as may be consistent with the interests and dignity of the British Government […] it will therefore be your policy to endeavour by every possible means to attach the Prince Regent [Crown Prince] personally [to our cause] and if practicable [to] separate him from the interests of his father.\footnote{IOL, Eur F148/24 (Raffles-Minto collection, vol. 24), T.S. Raffles (Bogor) to John Crawfurd (Yogyakarta), 2-4-1812, no. 15.}

Crawfurd thereupon contacted the Crown Prince, who in turn designated Radèn Ngabèhi Jayasentika as his representative. Of partly Madurese descent, Jayasentika had been one of the junior commanders of the 1,000-strong Yogya force sent to Batavia in October 1793 to help strengthen VOC defences at the time of the outbreak of the war between the French Republic and Holland.\footnote{AvJ, W.H. van IJsseldijk (Yogyakarta) to J.G. van Overstraten (Semarang), 4-11-1793. Jayasentika appears to have been a member of the Katanggel kraton infantry regiment in the pre-April 1792 period, see Carey and Hoadley 2000:214.} He appears to have spent several months in the colonial capital and this may have given him experience of dealing with Europeans. He had also curiously been one of the Yogya officials involved in facilitating the secret correspondence between the courts (note 86) so he would have been able to inform the British Resident in detail about what had transpired over the period from late September 1811 when the exchanges began. A man of unusual courage, according to Dipanagara, he would later pay for his loyalty to the Crown Prince with his life.\footnote{BD (Manado) II:142, XV (Asmaradana) 41. nenggih Radèn Jayasentika/ kaduk purun kéwala.}
The first meeting between Jayasentika and Crawfurd took place on the night of 11 April in the house of the retired Residency surgeon, the Brunswick-born Friedrich Willem Baumgarten. Crawfurd assured the Crown Prince’s *patih* in general terms of Raffles’ friendship for the Crown Prince and gave him to understand that if the heir apparent’s life was in danger the Residency House would be placed at his disposal. The Crown Prince for his part declared through Jayasentika his willingness to subscribe to any of the terms dictated by the British which would relieve him from his dangerous and irksome situation. The part Madurese official then gave Crawfurd a list of the Crown Prince’s friends and supporters. After looking this through, Crawfurd wrote to Raffles: ‘the general impression of this [list] is that the Prince has many secret but few declared friends, a circumstance which may be readily supposed from the general dread of the Sultan’. But, unlike Natakusuma, the Crown Prince made no attempt to denigrate either his father or his uncle, even speaking well of the bellicose Sumadiningrat. Only Pangéran Mangkudiningrat and the new joint acting *bupati wedana* of Madiun, the second sultan’s former army commander, Pangéran Dipakusuma, were described as resolutely inimical to the Crown Prince’s interests. ‘The Prince’s conduct’, declared Crawfurd later, ‘and his greater humanity makes him more generally liked amongst the chiefs than the Sultan, his father’.

As we have seen, Dipanagara claimed that he was himself entrusted by his father with responsibility for these negotiations with Crawfurd. He did not meet the British Resident in person at this time, according to his *babad*, but continued to act through Jayasentika and the Yogya *kapitan cina*, Tan Jin Sing, who served as his interpreter helping him to draw up a letter to Raffles declaring that the Crown Prince was prepared to enter into a contract with the British. Shortly afterwards, on 1-6 June, Crawfurd travelled to Semarang for a meeting with Raffles ahead of the British attack on the kra-tan. According to Dipanagara’s *babad*, the lieutenant-governor declared his

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228 IOL, Eur F148/24 (Raffles-Minto collection, vol. 24), John Crawfurd (Yogyakarta) to T.S. Raffles (Rijswijk/Batavia), 12-4-1812.
229 IOL, Eur F148/24 (Raffles-Minto collection, vol. 24), John Crawfurd (Yogyakarta) to T.S. Raffles (Rijswijk/Batavia), 14-5-1812.
230 BD (Manado) II:180-2, XVI.39-82; Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 22, where he mentions Dipanagara’s description of Tan Jin Sing as his ‘interpreter’ during this period. See further Van der Kemp 1896a:323.
231 IOL, Raffles-Minto collection (Xerox copies of holograph letters), vol. 3, T.S. Raffles (Semarang) to Lord Minto (Calcutta), 2-6-1812, mentions Raffles’ meeting with Crawfurd and Colonel Alexander Adams, the British Resident in Surakarta, in Semarang on 2 June. Crawfurd returned to Yogya on 6 June and it is possible that he had the Yogya *kapitan cina*, Tan Jin Sing, with him, IOL, Eur F148/24 (Raffles-Minto collection, vol. 24), John Crawfurd (Yogyakarta) to T.S. Raffles (Semarang), 8-6-1812, no. 15.
plans at this meeting to depose the sultan, appoint the Crown Prince in his place and recognise Dipanagara as the new Pangéran Adipati (heir apparent). But Dipanagara refused to accept the position, taking an oath before two members of the Suranatan who were his close friends, Kyai Rahmanudin, the future pengulu of Yogya (in office 1812-1823), and Kyai Amad Ngusman, later head of the Suranatan and personal tutor of Dipanagara’s younger brother, Hamengkubuwana IV (reigned 1814-1822) (Appendix VIIb). According to his babad, he spoke as follows:

XV.78 Be my witnesses
79 if I should forget.
   I make [you] witnesses of my firmness of heart:
   let me not be made
   Pangéran Adipati [Crown Prince].
   Even if I were later to be made sultan,
   even if it were done by my father
   or grandfather,

80 I myself do not wish
   to have to repent to the Almighty.
   No matter how long I am upon this earth,
   I would constantly be sinful.232

Dipanagara thereupon confirmed that the position of Pangéran Adipati (Crown Prince) should pass to his younger brother, Bendara Radèn Mas Sudama (also known as Bendara Radèn Mas Ambiyah and Gusti Radèn Mas Ibnu Jarot; Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:115; Mandoyokusumo 1977:37), who unlike himself had been born from an official wife.233 But the prince agreed, according to his own testimony, that if the latter came to the throne when he was still a minor, which in fact happened – the future Hamengkubuwana IV was

232 BD (Manado) II:191, XVI (Pangkur) 78-80. padha seksènana mami. 79. menawi lali ta ingwang/ pan sun karya dling ugering ati/ aja tan kimarya insun/ iya Pangran Dipatya/ nadyan silih sun banjur
   kinarya ratu/ lamun karya kangjeng rama/ utawa jeng éyang mami.* 80. sun dhéwé mapan tan nedya/ tobat
   marang Pangérang Ingkang Luawhi/ pira lawas neng doŋjeki/ tan wurung mapan dosa. * I have followed
   the Rusche edition here (1908-09, I:39), LOr 6547b has utawa kangjeng yang mami. It is useful to
   compare this with the remark made by Dipanagara to Major F.V.H.A. de Stuers after his capture
   at Magelang on 28 March 1830: ‘On another occasion he [Dipanagara] recounted how, during the
   period of the British administration, it was left up to his choice whether he wished to be raised to the
   sultanate, but he did not wish to take upon himself that status for too many worldly preoccupations
   were attached to it’, Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:744. See further Van der Kemp 1896a:324.

233 This was the daughter of the deceased Yogya bupati of Jipang-Rajengwesi, Radèn Tumeng-
   gung Sasradinginrat I (in office 1794-1807), who was married to a daughter of Hamengkubuwana
   I, Mandoyokusumo 1977:12 no. 8, 29. Known as Ratu Kencana (post-3-11-1814, Ratu Ibu), she was
   apparently Hamengkubuwana III’s favourite wife, Dj.Br. 21, Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to
   Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 5-9-1807; dK 145, Waterloo, ‘Memorie van Overgave’, 4-4-1808.
only ten years old when he ascended the throne on 10 November 1814 – he would assume the responsibilities of state. Just before the British attack on the kraton, Dipanagara also seems to have received a copy of the 12 June secret treaty authorised by Raffles confirming the British government’s undertaking to remove the second sultan and appoint his father as ruler in return for the payment of a massive indemnity ‘defraying the whole expense [sic] of every description incurred by the British Government’ for its military expedition, and the agreement by the Crown Prince to enter into a new treaty with the British. This later gave rise to speculation that Dipanagara’s rights to the sultanate had been recognised either by his father or the lieutenant-governor.

The whole episode as it is related in Dipanagara’s babad and the rumours which later surrounded the affair are deeply baffling. As we have seen, Dipanagara’s supposed role in the correspondence between the British and his father is nowhere acknowledged in the extant letters which passed between Crawfurd and Raffles in this period. We only have Valck’s authority that his contribution was known and appreciated by the British authorities. Besides, according to Matthijs Waterloo, Bendara Radèn Mas Sudama had already been recognised by the Crown Prince as his lawful successor and was very much loved by him. It would have been quite out of character for Dipanagara to have coveted this position which he knew was not his by right of birth and which he had been specifically warned not to accept by the disembodied voice at Parangkusuma in circa 1805 (Chapter IV). Nor indeed did Dipanagara wish to assume the responsibilities which such a position entailed. The only possible explanation is that either Crawfurd or Raffles misunderstood the Javanese distinction between royal sons by official (garwa padmi) and unofficial (garwa ampéyan or selir) wives. Aware that Dipanagara was the eldest son of the Crown Prince and now an increasingly known quantity in terms of his negotiating skills, they may have automatically assumed that the succession should be secured to him in the event that his father became sultan. Despite Dipanagara’s emphatic rejection of the proposal, rumours thus continued to
circulate in the kraton concerning his ambitions which were later to poison relations between the prince and the court during the reign of his younger brother, Hamengkubuwana IV (Van der Kemp 1896a:324; Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:744; Carey 1976:61, 1981a:269 note 134). We will see later how these rumours even convinced some less well-informed Dutch officials at the time of the outbreak of the Java War that the true reason for Dipanagara’s rebellion was thwarted political ambition (p. 645).

Crawfurd’s negotiations with the Crown Prince continued throughout April and May, but it was already evident that action would have to be taken against the sultan. Rumours of the Yogya ruler’s correspondence with the Sunan were known about by Raffles on 23 April and the news was corroborated by both Natakusuma and Jayasentrika in the latter’s interview with Crawfurd on 8 May.238 At the same time, the Crown Prince’s life seemed in more imminent danger than ever. Early in May, seven senior officials closely associated with the prince were taken into custody and degraded by the sultan. There were even rumours that he intended to have them strangled.239 This gave rise to speculation that the Crown Prince himself would be assassinated. Indeed, on Friday, 9 May, when the sultan and his eldest son were attending the Friday service in the Great Mosque, the former pointed at his son and declared to all assembled that matters would not go right in Yogya until he had been done away with.240 Although Crawfurd pressed the Crown Prince to take refuge in the Residency House, he refused to contemplate such a step which in his opinion would irritate the sultan beyond all measure.241 Instead, he seems to have continued to attend ceremonial occasions in the kraton together with his uncle, Natakusuma, in order to dispel any suspicions the sultan might have had that the two were contemplating going over to the British.

On Sunday, 18 May, a former Dutch official, Jan Izaäk van Sevenhoven, who was at this time temporarily out of favour with the new British administration because of his pro-French views (De Haan 1935a:646) and who was making a private journey from Batavia to the eastern salient (Oosthoek) of

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238 IOL, Eur F148/24 (Raffles-Minto collection, vol. 24), John Crawfurd (Yogyakarta) to T.S. Raffles (Rijswijk/Batavia), 8-5-1812, 14-5-1812; T.S. Raffles (Bogor) to Lord Minto (Calcutta), 18-4-1813; S.Br. 14B, John Crawfurd (Yogyakarta) to T.S. Raffles (Rijswijk/Batavia), 12-5-1812.

239 IOL, Eur F148/24, John Crawfurd (Yogyakarta) to T.S. Raffles (Rijswijk/Batavia), 8-5-1812, 12-5-1812; Dj.Br. 9A, Valck, ‘Overzigt’, 120. Later, in his proclamation of 22 June 1812 recognising the Crown Prince (Hamengkubuwana III) as ruler of Yogya, Raffles announced that all seven had been executed, Java Government Gazette, 4-7-1812, 3 no. 5. Poensen 1905:279, however, states that six of the seven, who were of the rank of lurah (chief) and hailed from the Crown Prince’s personal ‘priestly’ regiment, the Suranatan, were later released with only one being killed.

240 IOL, Eur F148/24 (Raffles-Minto collection, vol. 24), John Crawfurd (Yogyakarta) to T.S. Raffles (Rijswijk/Batavia), 12-5-1812.

241 IOL, Eur F148/24 (Raffles-Minto collection, vol. 24), John Crawfurd (Yogyakarta) to T.S. Raffles (Rijswijk/Batavia), 14-5-1812. See also Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:113-4, on the refusal of Dipanagara to contemplate taking refuge in the Yogya fort.
Plate 37. Aquatint by William Daniell (1769-1837), of a grenadier sepoy, a member of one of the Bengal volunteer battalions which took part in the British attack on the Yogyakarta kraton in June 1812. From Williams 1817:171 facing. Photograph by courtesy of the Bodleian Library, Oxford.
Java, had a personal audience with the sultan at which both the Crown Prince and Natakusuma were present. He described the Yogya ruler as already an old man with a very stiff Javanese appearance and a bad facial twitch, who spoke little and then only through his patih, and who was not nearly as friendly as the Sunan. The Crown Prince, however, had an innocent but kind expression, but appeared prematurely aged for his forty-three years. According to the Pakualam babad, the sultan was lulled by these court appearances on the part of his younger brother and his son into thinking that they were still on his side: ‘Thank goodness’, he is supposed to have exclaimed, ‘my younger brother still has long hair!’ (Poensen 1905:291), a reference to the fact that Natakusuma had not gone over to the Europeans who were distinguishable from the Javanese by their short-cropped hair (Carey 1981a:254 note 79). But not for long: no sooner had Natakusuma and his son, Natadiningrat, taken shelter in the Yogya fort early on the morning of 18 June than their appearance would undergo the sort of sartorial and physical make-over already evident when Pangéran Prangwedana (Mangkunagara II) received his Colonel’s commission from Daendels in July 1808 (pp. 183-4): namely, the donning of a European cavalry officer’s uniform and the close cropping of their flowing Javanese locks (Carey 1992:80, 226, 409 note 57, 462 note 300a). Meanwhile, the sultan continued with his military preparations: additional guns were mounted on the kraton walls, new embrasures cut and his troops drilled silently and regularly on the southern alun-alun. Raffles was kept in close touch with these developments by Crawfurd, whom he now praised highly for his abilities and discretion. Although the lieutenant-governor had hoped to march on Yogya in early May, the delay of Colonel Gillespie’s force in Palembang meant that the British expedition could not be concentrated at Semarang before June (see also note 223).

242 KITLV H 503, Van Sevenhoven, ‘Aanteekeningen’, 111-2, referring to Hamengkubuwana II having slechte trekken in zijn gezicht, and the Crown Prince as being reeds bejaard. See also Thorn 1815:291, who described the future Hamengkubuwana III as ‘tall and stout, but without having anything prepossessing or dignified in his manner’.

243 IOL, Eur F148/24 (Raffles-Minto collection, vol. 24), John Crawfurd (Yogyakarta) to T.S. Raffles (Rijswijk/Batavia), 12-5-1812, 14-5-1812. According to reports made to Raffles by Crawfurd and used by Valck, Hamengkubuwana II assembled 8,380 troops of which 1,180 were kraton ‘regulars’, namely members of the elite bodyguard regiments. Only these last offered any real resistance to the British, Dj.Br. 9A, Valck, ‘Overzigt’, 125.

244 IOL, Raffles-Minto collection (Xerox copies of holograph letters), vol. 3, T.S. Raffles (Semarang) to Lord Minto (Calcutta), 2-6-1812, ‘I have the highest opinion of Mr Crawfurd’s abilities and place the utmost confidence in his discretion.’
Plate 38. A Javanese chief in war dress, taken from Raffles 1817, I:90 facing.
The fall of Yogyakarta, 20 June 1812

By early June, the British expeditionary force numbering some 1,000 of their best troops, of which half were Europeans and half sepoys, was already encamped in temporary barracks in Semarang, Ungaran and Salatiga.

Various advanced parties had been sent down to strengthen the garrisons in Surakarta, Klathèn and Yogya. By 13 June, the main body was on the march to the sultan’s capital. They arrived surreptitiously in Yogya in small groups, entering the fort by night. But the sultan’s suspicions were soon aroused. He enquired of Crawfurd the purpose of this massive reinforcement of the Yogya garrison and was given the reply that these were ‘new troops’ who needed experience of the south-central Javanese kraton and that the lieutenant-governor had ordered it. According to Dipanagara, the sultan still continued to believe in the assurances of his court haji who assured him that the lieutenant-governor was on the march to take the Crown Prince prisoner and banish him from Java. Indeed, until the very end, the sultan hoped that he could persuade the British to recognise Mangkudiningrat as his successor in place of Dipanagara’s father (Poensen 1905:306; Carey 1992:75, 218). Meanwhile, his own military preparations continued: additional guards were placed on the kraton gates, watch towers were built on the ramparts and sentries posted on the principal avenues leading to the kraton.

Sumadiningrat was apparently the adviser who pressed the sultan most strongly to resist the British. In Dipanagara’s words, ‘he steadfastly expressed his joy that [at last] it should come to battle’. The Babad Spèhi (‘Chronicle of the sepoy war’), written by Pangéran Mangkudiningrat while in exile in Pulau Pinang (1812-1816), adds the detail that the Yogya ruler was also encouraged in his actions by various local Dutch and Eurasian residents of Yogya who relished the prospect that the British might suffer a defeat. This is partly corroborated in the private letter of a British artillery captain who wrote to his father in
England that ‘the Dutch [inhabitants] had laboured to persuade the natives that ours were not troops of any great enterprise’. But the sultan still expected to be able to arrange suitable terms. Thus he dispatched his patih, Sindunagara (post-January 1812, Kyai Adipati Danureja III), to negotiate with Raffles when he arrived in Semarang on 1 June. But the Yogyakarta chief minister halted at Jambu in northern Kedu, ostensibly to await a similar mission from Surakarta, and missed both the lieutenant-governor during his stay in Semarang (1-16 June) and the beginning of the British attack on the Yogyakarta kraton arriving back in the sultan’s capital just as the court was coming under sustained bombardment from British guns in the fort (Carey 1992:71-2, 75-6, 220, 213, 402-3 note 19a, 405 note 32). On 17 June, Raffles himself arrived in Yogyakarta, and two days later all the British detachments, along with 500 men of Pangéran Prangwedana’s legion commanded by the prince himself, were in the fort.

Meanwhile, Natakusuma and his family were preparing to go over to the British. The prince refused the sultan’s summons to attend a general meeting in the kraton on the morning of 17 June because he had received word from Crawfurd’s Malay Indian orderly, Encik Ahmad, that he should meet Raffles on his arrival at the Residency. At five o’clock in the morning of 18 June, he thus took refuge in the fort with his wives and children. His followers were thereupon distributed with flashes for their left arms so that they could be easily recognised by the British troops during their forthcoming assault. At the same time, according to Dipanagara’s account, attempts were made to contact the Crown Prince. Although summoned to the Residency to meet with Crawfurd, Dipanagara refused to go so as not to jeopardise his father’s position. Instead, the faithful Jayasentika was sent and received a copy of the 12 June contract certified by Crawfurd, which had been previously authorized by Jayasentika on the Crown Prince’s behalf. Despite the Crown Prince’s highly vulnerable position, both the ‘Chronicle of the fall of Yogyakarta’ and Valck’s historical overview make it quite clear that he never intended any treachery towards his father, but stood by in the kadipatèn to afford the sultan assistance in the event of a British attack.

News of Natakusuma’s defection, however, greatly incensed the sultan who had seemingly placed his trust in his younger brother to the end. He now gave orders for the further deployment of kraton troops, amongst

253 Royal Artillery Institution, London, MD/143, Captain William Colebrooke (Yogyakarta) to his father (henceforth: ‘Colebrooke letter’), 8-7-1812.
254 Hageman 1857:422-3; Colebrooke letter, 8-7-1812 stating that his Royal Artillery detachment was one of the last to arrive at nine o’clock on the morning of 19 June.
255 BD (Manado), II:194, XVI.92-3; Poensen 1905:298.
256 BD (Manado), II:194-5, XVI.92-6. The copy which Jayasentika was given appears to have had the date changed to 18 June to reflect the time of his meeting with the Resident, Carey 1980:95-6.
258 LOr 6791 (S) (Babad Spelti):110, I.44-5; BD (Manado), II:194, XVI.92.
VII The end of the beginning

which were detachments from the western mancanagara districts of Bagelèn, Lowanu and Gagatan, as well as the core region of Pajang. Large numbers of Bugis and Balinese were also mobilised.259 The mosque officials and all the ‘men of religion’ from the tax-free areas took up their positions around the Great Mosque and were said by Mangkudiningrat to be ‘preparing for holy war’ (sumedya sabil utama).260 The sultan’s santri younger brother, Pangéran Muhammad Abubakar, who was still intending a pilgrimage to Mecca, apparently donned his white haji robes for duty on the kraton battlements, but was soon forced to divest himself of these and renounce his intention of waging ‘holy war’ because his dress made him an all too conspicuous a target for the British gunners in the fort when they began their bombardment on the afternoon of 18 June (Carey 1992:68, 208-9, 400 note 5).

Already, various skirmishes had broken out. Small parties of pikemen, musketeers and cavalry, described as ‘banditti’ in the British sources, were sent out by the sultan to mount ambushes, burn bridges, lay waste the countryside and generally impede the British line of march (Raffles 1830:126). One of the sultan’s ablest commanders, Radèn Aria Sindureja II (circa 1770-circa 1814),261 was dispatched to lead such a harassing force. He attempted to cut off Prangwedana’s legion just outside Yogya as they were trying to enter the sultan’s capital by night, but his small troop was worsted in the encounter.262 The following day, however, he had his revenge when an advance party of British dragoons, who were clearing the road ahead of Gillespie’s main force, fell into a clever ambush he had laid at the ravine of the Kali Gajahwong at Papringan. The 25-strong squadron suffered heavy losses: five dead (‘mangled most shockingly’ in the words of a British artillery officer who came on the scene)263 and thirteen severely wounded including their British officer. The action once again proved the effectiveness of Javanese pikemen operating in disciplined formation using their very long spears to dismount European cavalrymen before they could reload their cumbersome cavalry carbines (Thorn 1815:177-8; Carey 1992:427 note 238; p. 7). Sindureja’s action would not be repeated. If it had, the British assault on Yogya might have taken a rather different course, resulting in the sort of casualty levels (twenty percent of the attacking force) sustained by the British at Meester Cornelis. Instead,

260 LOr 6791 (3) (Babad Spèhi):111, I.49, sagung ing pamutihan [...] sumedya prang sabil. On the understanding of the meaning of ‘holy war’ (prang sabil) at this time in south-central Java, see Carey 1981a:241 note 30.
261 A son of Hamengkubuwana I, Sindureja II was a court bupati (nayaka) renowned for his skill and astuteness, Carey 1980:191.
262 B.Ng. I:288-9, LXXI.6-9.
263 Colebrooke letter, 8-7-1812. Raffles later mentioned that 18 dragoons had been killed by ambush before the assault, IOL, Raffles-Minto collection (Xerox copy of holograph letters), T.S. Raffles (Semarang) to Lord Minto (Calculta), 25-6-1812.
the British lost twenty-three killed and seventy-four wounded, including one officer who subsequently died of his wounds, out of a total attacking force of just under 1,000 men. This gives a casualty rate of just under ten percent, small if compared to the many hundreds – ‘dreadful’ losses according to Raffles – who died on the Javanese side (Carey 1992:415 note 95).

On the same day that Sindureja laid his successful ambush (Thursday, 18 June) Raffles dispatched the Semarang Residency interpreter, C.F. Krijgsman, who had accompanied him to Yogya, to take in a letter to the sultan giving him an ultimatum: unless he abdicated in the next two hours (the ultimatum was to start at noon) in favour of the Crown Prince the British would begin their artillery bombardment. Krijgsman was received in the Srimenganti pavilion by the sultan with his relations and senior court officials seated on the floor around him in full battle array. Sumadiningrat was directly opposite. Turning to the Crown Prince, the sultan asked if he was prepared to accede to the demands of the British government. According to Mangkudiningrat’s account, the Crown Prince resolutely refused to accept them, whereupon the sultan drew up a letter detailing the impossibility of agreeing to Raffles’ demands and asking that Natakusuma should immediately explain why he had gone over to the fort.

The British artillery bombardment began that afternoon and would continue until late in the night of Friday, 19 June, the eve of the British assault. According to Raffles, the lengthy cannonade had two purposes: to allow time for the main body of the British assault force to reach Yogya, and to afford the sultan space to reconsider his position and negotiate. Far from being intimidated, however, the sultan appeared set on hostilities and waved aside Mangkudiningrat’s warnings about what had happened at Kartasura when the kraton had been stormed by the Chinese in 1742 during the Chinese War (1741-1743). According to Valck, he later changed his tune when the British attack proper got under way early on the morning of 20 June and his cowardly behaviour at that time undermined the fighting morale of the kraton defenders.

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264 IOL G21/65, Raffles, ‘Memorandum respecting Java’, 1813, 44.
266 LOr 6791 (3): 114-5, I.63-6.
267 IOL. G21/65, Raffles, ‘Memorandum respecting Java’, 1813, 45. The main body of the British assault force under Lieutenant-Colonel Alexander Macleod (C.O. 59th Regiment of Foot, 2nd Nottinghamshires) only reached Yogya on 19 June. Colebrooke letter, 8-7-1812, gives a description of the cannonade: ‘the 19th was taken up in bombarding and cannonading with a view to annoying and distracting their attention which we kept up during the night [of 19/20 June]. The enemy returned it but so feebly that the loss was very trivial. Many were, however, severely hurt by an unlucky explosion in our battery’.
The ‘Chronicle of the fall of Yogyakarta’, which takes up the story at the start of the British bombardment, gives a vivid account of the low morale amongst the kraton defenders, especially the Javanese gunners when faced with the accuracy of the British fire. Many of the princes, who were supposed to set an example on the battlements by leading the defence, merely cowered in the shelter of gateways or pretended they were sick (Carey 1992:67-8, 204-6, 208-9). Others slipped away from the kraton over the walls to take refuge in surrounding villages where their wives had close blood relations, a number going with their families to Imagiri, the site of the royal graveyard. Only a handful of princes and senior officials, amongst them Sumadiningrat and Pangéran Jayakusuma (post-1825, Ngabèhi), Dipanagara’s future cavalry commander (p. 79), led the defence with any resolution. Some of the areas to the north of the kraton, especially the kauman, the vicinity around the Great Mosque where many santri lived, and the Pangurakan and Gladhagan doorless gateways between the fort and the northern alun-alun, were damaged by fires started by stray artillery shots. At the same time, many of the inhabitants of Yogya fled from the town and there was much plundering by the troops of Prangwedana’s legion, the followers of Natakusuma, as well as sepoys. Only to the east of the Kali Codhé, on both sides of Natakusuma’s residence – the future Pakualaman – were the houses left untouched.

The kadipatèn, to which both Dipanagara and his father had gone after the sultan’s defiant meeting with Krijgsman in the Srimenganti pavilion, was particularly badly damaged by cannon fire as it was positioned in the northeastern part of the kraton closest to the batteries in the fort (Carey 1992:67, 69, 205, 210). The British also seemed to be preparing for an assault, for the main gate of the kadipatèn was nearly battered down by cannon balls. Twice the Crown Prince sent word to the sultan via his uncle, Pangéran Aria Panular, that reinforcements were urgently needed to prevent the kadipatèn falling to the besiegers. But the sultan remained in one of the pavilions of the inner kraton during the cannonade surrounded by members of his Amazon corps who were always in attendance on him (Thorn 1815:293; Carey 1992:68, 207-8). Twice, he deferred to his son Mangkudiningrat’s advice that there were already enough soldiers in the Crown Prince’s establishment and that only a few gunners and some gunpowder could be spared to stiffen resistance there. Eventually, the Crown Prince’s younger brother, the heavily goitred Pangéran Mangkubumi, was sent over to help but he was deemed too irresolute to be of

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270 Carey 1992:75, 76-7, 219-20, 221; Colebrooke letter, 8-7-1812 also mentions the escape of the kraton defenders.

271 LOr 6791 (3) (Babad Spèhi):119, II.19, 120, II.23; Carey 1992:69, 210, 401 note 15; Mackenzie, ‘Report’, 7-6-1813, 252, stated that all the Javanese workmen and artificers fled the town on 20 June. The fact that Natakusuma’s residence and neighbourhood was left untouched was certainly due to his position as an ally of the British.
any use.\footnote{272} The author of the chronicle, Pangérán Panular, however, urged the Crown Prince to stand by his father in life and death despite his seeming lack of cooperation citing the plight of Sunan Amangkurat I (reigned 1646-1677) during the rebellion of the Madurese prince Trunajaya (1649-1680) when his kraton at Plérèd was overrun (1677) by rebel forces and he died as a fugitive on the north coast (Carey 1992:69, 210; Ricklefs 1993a:74-6). Indeed, the situation in the kraton proper was hardly more favourable than in the Crown Prince’s establishment. The same chronicle describes the sultan as being profoundly disturbed: many of his personal retainers and female bodyguard were reciting prayers and incantations (dhikr) (Carey 1992:70, 211). Only the successful firing of the powder magazine in the fort (note 267) by three Bugis soldiers commanded by the same court bupati, Radèn Tumenggung Sumadiwirya, who had struck the first blow at Radèn Rongga at Sekaran (p. 257), caused the sultan to shout for joy and pace the floor excitedly (Thorn 1815:181; Campbell 1915, I:381; Carey 1992:70, 211-2).

At nine o’clock in the evening the British guns fell silent. In the kraton, many of the defenders fell asleep, thinking that the fighting had died down. But at three o’clock the following morning, the cannon thundered forth again with redoubled power.\footnote{273} At daybreak (about five o’clock in the morning), parties of British and sepoy troops dispersed around the walls of the kraton together with the followers of Natakusuma (Hageman 1857:424-5; Thorn 1815:184-7; Carey 1992:72, 214). Some bore flimsy bamboo scaling ladders, apparently prepared under the direction of the kapitan cina, Tan Jin Sing, whose Yogya Chinese community were reported to be strongly in support of the British attack, an attitude which fuelled powerful anti-Chinese sentiments in the aftermath of the British operation.\footnote{274} Although Raffles would later report that the assault was made ‘by escalade’,\footnote{275} many of the troops...
Plate 40. Colonel (later Major-General) Sir Robert Rollo Gillespie (1766-1814), who commanded the British forces during the assault on Yogya in June 1812. Miniature by George Chinnery (1774-1854) made in Calcutta in circa 1814, showing him in the dress uniform of his regiment, the 25th Light Dragoons. Taken from Wakeham 1937. Photograph by courtesy of the publisher and the Bodleian Library, Oxford.
had to stand on each other’s shoulders in order to climb the walls (Thorn 1815:186-7). The kadipatén seems to have been the first to fall: the Pancasura gate in the northeast bastion was blown up by a unit of the Madras horse artillery\(^{276}\) and its battlements were overrun by sepoys who turned the kraton guns on the defenders (Thorn 1815:185, Plate XIX no. F; Carey 1992:72, 214).

The Crown Prince and his supporters, including his eldest son, Dipanagara, thereupon resolved to flee into the kraton to join the sultan, but at the Srimenganti gate they were refused entrance by Pangéran Jayakusuma, who stated that he was acting on the explicit orders of the Yogya ruler not to allow any armed men into the court.\(^{277}\) An altercation took place in which Dipanagara was instructed by his father to unsheathe his kris. Sensing that a fight was brewing, the Crown Prince then told his son that they should move on (Carey 1992:73, 215). The party made their way south under continuous musketry fire from sepoys, who were already on the battlements. They tried to enter the kraton by other gates, but to no avail. Eventually, as they were nearing Pasar Ngasem near the Taman Sari, the branches of the tamarind trees lining the street blown into their path by British cannon shots, they were caught up with by a detachment led by the commanding officer of the Bengal Light Infantry Volunteer Battalion, Major Dennis Harman Dalton (Carey 1992:512 note 543), and John Deans, the Malay-speaking secretary of the Yogya Residency (in office 1811-1813).\(^{278}\) He asked the Crown Prince to come under armed guard to the Residency. This the Crown Prince agreed to, but his party was first roughly disarmed by Dalton’s sepoys who gave Dipanagara a light bayonet wound as they were relieving him of his kris. Tan Jin Sing, who was with Deans, had to intervene personally to save the party from further humiliation, rescuing three of the Crown Prince’s pusaka (heirloom) pikes and his gold state parasol from being divided as spoil amongst the exultant Bengali soldiery.\(^{279}\) Eventually, the Crown Prince and his group reached the Residency where they were received by Raffles and Crawfurd. But Natakusuma treated them icily, hardly deigning to speak with his nephew (Carey 1992:78-9, 224-5). It was half past six in the morning (Hageman 1857:425).

News that the Crown Prince had been taken prisoner by the British was received with feelings of dismay in the kraton. Even the sultan forgot the many differences which had estranged him from his son and began to fear for his safety. The strong resistance which the British had first encountered

\(^{276}\) Colebrooke letter, 8-7-1812.

\(^{277}\) BD (Manado), II:204-5, XVI.129-31; Carey 1992:72-3, 215. Jayakusuma was at this time a staunch supporter of the sultan’s party (kasepuhan) and had also taken part in the secret correspondence with Surakarta.

\(^{278}\) Later founder of the Semarang-based firm, Deans, Scott & Co, and a close associate of Crawfurd who called him ‘my acute and intelligent friend’, see De Haan 1935a:534-5.

\(^{279}\) BD (Manado) II:206-10, XVII.1-13; Thorn 1815:188; Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:765; Campbell 1915, I:390; Carey 1992:77-8, 222-4.
as they entered the *kraton* had now begun to fade. The sultan, meanwhile, continued to take council with his younger brother, Pangéran Demang, who was known for his expertise in Javanese-Islamic mystical lore and cleverness with words (Carey 1992:84, 187-8, 383), but, as the ‘Chronicle of the fall of Yogyakarta’ put it, he was like a *wayang* puppeteer who had been caught by the morning never knowing when to round off his conversation at the appropriate time (Carey 1992:87, 232-3, 411 note 68).

Meanwhile, the southern *alun-alun* had already been overrun and Sumadiningrat, deserted by his troops, would shortly be killed in his own residence to the south of the kraton while trying to avoid capture, the third and last of the sultan’s and Ratu Kedhaton’s sons-in-law to die violently within the space of just eighteen months. With the British now poised to make a frontal assault on the *kadhaton* (inner court) and realising that further resistance would only result in more bloodshed, the sultan resolved to hoist a white flag, recall his commanders and instruct them to order their troops to lay down their arms (Carey 1992:83, 231-2). He hoped that by this voluntary submission, the *kraton* proper would be spared by the British (Carey 1992:83, 232). But, on seeing the flag, the British commander Colonel Gillespie immediately entered the *kadhaton* and according to the Pakualam *babad* continued to fight fiercely sabreing the *kraton* defenders to right and left. There was still some isolated resistance and Gillespie was wounded in the upper left arm by a musket shot fired from the Suranatan mosque to the west of the Srimenganti pavilion where the sultan and his retainers were waiting to make their formal surrender (Raffles 1830:128; Carey 1992:79, 225, 409 note 53).

When the vanguard of the British force reached the Srimenganti pavilion, they found the sultan and his relations dressed in white with many of the chairs also covered with torn strips of white cloth, in a scene which, if the

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280 Colebrooke letter, 8-7-1812, speaks of the centre of the *kraton* putting up the fiercest resistance; Raffles 1830:128 (on wounding of the British commander, Gillespie in the inner *kraton*); IOL, Raffles-Minto collection (Xerox copies of holograph letters), vol. 3, T.S. Raffles (Semarang) to Lord Minto (Calcutta), 25-6-1812, commenting on the ‘steadiness with which the enemy received our attack’.

281 The others had been Radèn Rongga (p. 257) and Danureja II (p. 292). Accounts of Sumadiningrat’s death vary: Thorn 1815:187; Campbell 1915, I:385, both mention that he was killed by Lieutenant Colonel James Dewar’s (commanding officer 3rd Bengal Volunteer Battalion) troops near the southern *alun-alun* before the main assault on the *kraton*, but Carey 1992:90-1, 242-3, 418-9 note 94; *Serat salasilah para leloehoer ing Kadanoerejan*, n.y., 207, both state that he was killed in his residence by the combined forces of Prangwedana’s legion and sepoys commanded by John Deans and I have accepted these. According to the last accounts, his body was stripped of its clothes and mutilated, subsequently being buried at the Sumadiningrat family graveyard at Jejeran, two kilometres to the south of Yogyakarta near the Kali Codhé at 10 p.m. His residence was thoroughly looted and burnt. No folk memory of the site of his residence survives at the present time, personal visit to location of former Sumadiningrat, Yogyakarta, April 1978.

VII The end of the beginning

Yogyakarta ruler’s mind had been set on death rather than surrender, might have prefigured the *prang puputan* (‘final battle/ending wars’) in Lombok and Bali in 1894 and 1906-1908 when some of the rulers, their families and followers met their deaths at the hands of the invading Dutch armies dressed in white with all their ceremonial finery. In the case of Yogyakarta, the monarch and his entourage made no attempt at such a desperate last stand. Instead, they allowed themselves to be immediately disarmed and their hands held at their sides by their British and sepoy guards. Even the sultan’s person was secured by a British officer, Lieutenant Henry N. Douglas of the 78th Highland Regiment of Foot (Carey 1992:85, 234-5, 412 note 69a). Although he was not forced immediately to surrender his personal *kris*, his request to bring his *pusaka* (heirloom) weapons from the *kraton* was refused and they were taken by Gillespie. Under these humiliating circumstances, the sultan and his relations were marched to the Residency between a row of British and sepoy soldiers with drawn swords and fixed bayonets. As the party entered the Residency House, the ‘Chronicle of the fall of Yogyakarta’ describes how Raffles noticed with pleasure that only a couple of *pangéran* tried to get down from their chairs to pay the sultan their customary respects. He motioned these to remain seated. The Crown Prince himself hid his feelings, although he felt acutely the pathos of the moment. In tears, the sultan and his followers were now forced to give up their personal *kris* and gold ornaments (Carey 1992:86, 236), the sultan’s sword and stabbing dagger later being sent by Raffles to Lord Minto in Calcutta as a symbol of ‘the entire submission’ of the Yogyakarta court to the British. Even the small diamond buttons of the sultan’s dress jacket were subsequently cut off by his sepoy guards as he lay asleep in his place of detention (Nahuys van Burgst 1835-36, I:131). The Yogyakarta ruler

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284 Carey 1992:85, 234-5; Campbell 1915, I:390, mention that Hamengkubuwana II was forced to leave behind the following *pusaka kris*: Kyai Paningset, Kyai Sangkelat, Kyai Urub, and Kyai Jingga. B.Ng. I:320-1, LXXXVIII.11-13, Carey 1992:105, 264, state that these *kris*, together with Kyai Gupita, Kyai Jaka Piturun, and Kyai Mesèm, were taken by Colonel Gillespie but later returned at Hamengkubuwana III’s coronation ceremony on 28 June 1812. See also KITLV H 76, ‘Boedel van [Sultan] Hamengkoe Boewana IV’ n.y. (circa 1823-1826), which refers to many these *kris* in 1823-1826.

285 IOL, Raffles-Minto collection (Xerox copies of holograph letters), vol. 3, T.S. Raffles (Semarang) to Lord Minto (Calcutta), 16-7-1812, where Raffles added the following postscriptum to his dispatch to Lord Minto stating that he presents ‘by Captain Elliott […] the sword of the late Sultan of Djocjocarta delivered to me by Colonel Gillespie with two krises [*kris*] which according to the custom and usage of these Eastern Isles are intended to represent the entire submission of the courts of Surakarta and Djocjocarta’.
was thereupon led into a small side room of the Residency where he was held prisoner with Mangkudiningrat until their exile from Yogya on 3 July.\textsuperscript{286} It was eight o’clock in the morning.\textsuperscript{287} As far as the sultanate was concerned, the Parangkusuma prophecy had been fulfilled.

\textit{Conclusion}

So the \textit{kraton} of Yogyakarta fell to the British nearly fifty-seven years after it had been first occupied as Mangkubumi’s capital on 6 November 1755 (Ricklefs 1974a:80). As we have seen in previous chapters, it was perhaps the inevitable outcome of the Yogya elite’s inability to come to terms with the reality of the new European colonialism born of the twin revolutions of industrialisation and bourgeoise democracy which had convulsed Europe in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. The changes had been introduced into Java too rapidly and in too brutal a fashion. In the space of just under four years, the south-central Javanese courts had been forced to accommodate themselves to a new form of centralised colonial government which stood in direct contradiction to their own political philosophy of divided sovereignty in Java. Given time, they might have been able to reshape their political conceptions to legitimize the changed realities, but they could not do it in the quick fire way demanded by Daendels and Raffles. The result was disaster. This was particularly the case for Yogya, which had entered on this period of cataclysmic change with ostensibly the most powerful and prosperous court, but in fact hopelessly divided against itself and ruled by a vain and inflexible man. The rapid germination of intrigues within the \textit{kraton} literally tore it apart just at the time when it needed its undivided energies to cope with the new challenges posed by a resurgent Europe. Mangkubumi’s kingdom had been founded by the sword, in June 1812 it could be said to have perished by the sword.

For the British colonial government in Java, there was little doubt about the significance of their victory. Muntinghe hailed it as an event of similar significance to Clive’s victory at Plassey on 23 June 1757 which had opened up the whole of northern India to British rule (Carey 1992:60 note 102). Raffles echoed this in a dispatch to his patron, Lord Minto, when he stated that ‘the European power is for the first time paramount in Java. […] we never till this

\textsuperscript{286} LOI 6791 (3) (\textit{Babad Spëhi}):(141, II.46; Carey 1992:86-7, 236.

\textsuperscript{287} There are conflicting times given: Thorn 1815:189, states the sultan was captured at seven o’clock in the morning which seems too early; Raffles gives nine o’clock for the completion of the operation against the court, IOL, Raffles-Minto collection (Xerox copy of holograph letters), vol. 3, T.S. Raffles (Semarang) to Lord Minto (Calcutta), 25-6-1812. I have followed the ‘Chronicle of the fall of Yogyakarta’, Carey 1992:87, 237.
moment could call ourselves masters of the more valuable provinces in the interior, nay, our possessions on the sea coasts would always have been precarious and, had [our] military force been materially reduced, much eventual danger was to be apprehended.\textsuperscript{288} Although both Yogyakarta and Surakarta would continue as dismembered states after 1812, they were never again capable of posing a threat to the position of the European government. When a new challenge did materialise under Dipanagara’s Javanese-Islamic banner in July 1825, it would owe its inspiration and energies to influences outside the great court traditions. The support given to the prince by the religious communities and the Javanese peasantry, both groups who felt themselves increasingly excluded from the new colonial order, was more important than the traditional foci of court patronage and loyalty. In many ways, June 1812, rather than the end of the Java War, should be seen as the date when the new colonial era dawned in Java. Out of this collapse and the legacy of bitterness which it left, however, a new and more potent combination of elements in Javanese society would emerge. It is with these social, political and economic developments in the thirteen years following the British attack on Yogya that the next three chapters are concerned.

\textsuperscript{288} IOL, Raffles-Minto collection (Xerox copies of holograph letters), vol. 3, p. 129, T.S. Raffles (Semarang) to Lord Minto (Calcutta), 25-6-1812.
CHAPTER VIII

Into a new era
The British interregnum, 1812-1816

Lineaments of a new order

The four years which followed the British storming of the Yogya kraton ushered in a new era in the relationship between the south-central Javanese courts and the European government. The balance of force had now shifted decisively in favour of the colonial state. Never again would a governor-general have to fear the countervailing military power of the independent rulers, still less their combined forces which the sorry episode of the un-ratified March 1812 secret treaty had been shown to be a chimera. The treaties imposed by Raffles on the courts in the aftermath of the Yogya attack would strip them forever of their independent military capacity through the imposition of limits on their court bodyguard regiments. At the same time, the annexation of the key central apanage province of Kedhu and parts of their respective mancanagara territories would also end forever their potential for calling up military levies to augment their court-based military establishments. Indeed, so secure did Raffles feel following the 20 June operation and the speedy submission of the Yogya chiefs that he did not even consider it necessary to order the destruction of the Yogya kraton fortifications, although the gun batteries were demolished with the approval of the third sultan.1 The city wall around Batavia was also allowed to fall into ruin during this decade, and some of the stone from Daendels’ fortress at Meester Cornelis was shipped off to build the new defences at Muntok on the island of Bangka which guarded the sea approaches to Palembang along the Musi River.2

This fundamental shift in the balance of power is reflected in the extant Residency letters which are now full of the minutiae of colonial administration

1 IOL, G21/65, Raffles, ‘Memorandum respecting Java’, 1813, 48. On Colonel Mackenzie’s survey of the fortifications in the aftermath of the British attack, see Chapter VII note 168.
2 IOL, Raffles-Minto collection (Xerox copies of holograph letters), vol. 3, T.S. Raffles (Salatiga) to Lord Minto (Calcutta), 5-8-1812. The sudden and unexpected outbreak of the Java War in July 1825 would, however, lead to a hurried revision of this policy of neglect, new defences being thrown up to protect the colonial capital as the tide of war lapped at Dutch-controlled cities along the north coast, see Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:177.
rather than the urgent litany of threat and procrastination which characterised the Daendels’ era (1808-1811). Although the Residents themselves would still retain an important political role, their official responsibilities were now increasingly bureaucratic and predictable, a world away from the complex – and at times dangerous – ambassadorial functions of their pre-June 1812 predecessors. No longer would there be any question that the demands of the European government in Batavia would trump the expectations of the sovereigns to whom the Residents were accredited. At the same time, there were important changes in the economic field: just as the collapse of Radèn Rongga’s rebellion in December 1810 had swept aside the last barriers to the economic exploitation of the eastern outlying provinces so now the Principalities themselves were opened out to western capital. This was evident in the small beginnings made during the British interregnum in the leasing of landed estates by European entrepreneurs for the production of cash crops such as indigo and coffee, leases which would become a source of considerable political friction during the post-1816 Dutch restoration regime of Governor-General G.A.G.Ph. van der Capellen (in office 1816-1826). In this process of land lease, the Residents led the way, in particular, Crawfurd and his Dutch successor in Yogya, H.G. Nahuys van Burgst (in office 1816-1822), both of whom leased lands and had other business interests in the Principalities.³

The present chapter will assess the impact of this shift in the balance of power on the politics and economic life of the south-central Javanese courts. It will also attempt to reconstruct the history of the four years of the British interregnum from the fragmentary Residency archive of Yogyakarta whose contemporary letters were purloined by a subsequent Dutch Resident (Chapter VII note 155).

The plunder of the Yogya kraton

Before the new era could dawn, Colonel R.R. Gillespie’s force took the Yogya kraton apart in a wholesale looting of the court and its contents. In India, booty was one of the major perquisites of East India Company officers and the British army in India had fought for the right to keep everything in fortresses, courts and strong points taken by assault. Yogya was no exception. Raffles referred briefly to this process in a dispatch to Lord Minto written soon after the fall of the kraton:

³ For Crawfurd’s interests in opening the Yogya market to the import of British textiles, for which he received a commission, see Chapter I note 75; Chapter VII note 177. Nahuys’ business interests so greatly augmented his official salary that an official enquiry was made into his conduct, see Houben 1994:104-6.
The whole of the tangible property of Djojocarta fell to the captors [...] but in the immediate distribution they took more upon themselves than was justifiable. [...] I had no reason to expect so hasty and hurried a measure on their part, but the mischief being once done, it was useless to object or condemn. [...] The universal opinion [has been] that in places carried by assault, the army was entitled to make an immediate distribution of treasure and jewels, and the authority of Lord Cornwallis [governor-general of India 1786-1793, 1805] as well as the precedent of Lord Lake [commander-in-chief of the Indian Army and conqueror of Scindia during the Second Mahratta War, 1803-1805] were considered decisive. 4

In vain, did the lieutenant-governor cite the example of Lord Wellesley (governor-general of India 1797-1805), who had tried – but failed – to prevent the army helping itself to the massive booty from the treasure of Tipu Sultan of Mysore (reigned 1782-1799), when his fortified capital at Seringapatam was stormed in 1799 at the end of the Fourth Anglo-Mysore War (1798-1799). Gillespie refused to heed his warnings and proceeded to an immediate division of the estimated 800,000 Spanish dollars worth of prize money. 5 As we have seen (p. 263), he helped himself to close on £ 15,000 (74,000 Spanish dollars/ f 165,000) of this sum, and his fellow officers acquired windfalls greatly in excess of their annual salaries: a captain left Yogya £ 1,250 (5,000 Spanish dollars/ f 12,000) richer and a subaltern took away £ 750 (3,200 Spanish dollars/ f 8,250). 6 Much of this money was remitted in mid-July from Semarang to Bengal so that officers could draw bills of exchange for the support of their families in India. 7 At the same time, 7,000 Spanish dollars was given to Pangéran Prangwedana (Mangkunagara II) out of the Yogya prize money in recognition of the services of his legion during the attack. 8

Meanwhile, Raffles’ hopes, as expressed in the second clause of his 12 June secret treaty with the Crown Prince (post-21 June, Hamengkubuwana III),
that he would be able to defray the whole cost of the expedition were disappointed. Indeed, when he came to ask Pakubuwana IV and the newly appointed third sultan to make a contribution of 200,000 Spanish dollars each, both pleaded poverty, the sultan stating that the only wealth that was now left to him was his personal collection of jewellery.\(^9\) Faced with this situation, Raffles made the best case possible to Minto:

The Craton [kraton] having fallen by assault, it was impracticable to make any provision for Government to [re]cover the expences [sic] of the undertaking; consequently, the whole plunder became Prize to the Army. It is considerable, but it could not have fallen into better hands. They richly deserved what they got. I cannot speak too highly of the conduct of the Army in its relation with Government: every officer has behaved like a gentleman. Majors [Archibald] Campbell and [Jeremiah Martin] Johnson accompanied me and will both improve their fortunes considerably. They are appointed Prize Agents.\(^10\)

He then went on to some special pleading intended to soothe Minto’s fears that the army had got above itself:

in the present instance [the army] has a special claim to indulgence, it is on the score of the moderation and forbearance evinced by all classes [? ranks] and the earnest desire that was evident in all to render the effects of victory as little disgusting and ruinous to the vanquished as possible.\(^11\)

As little disgusting and ruinous to the vanquished as possible? All officers behaving like gentlemen? Did this reflect the reality on the ground in the kraton proper? The ‘Chronicle of the fall of Yogyakarta’, the only contemporary Javanese source we have, takes up the tale. According to this account, the British and sepoy troops went roughly to work plundering the court. Many of the princes were forced to hand over their personal jewel encrusted kris and were sent under armed guard to the Residency. Even the aged Pangéran Ngabéhi, the seventy-four-year old elder brother of the second sultan, who was then suffering from dysentery, was forced to leave the inner court, being transported to the Residency in a chair by his retainers. Still dressed in their white robes of surrender, the crowds of captured junior kraton officials looked like so many herons as they gathered at the fort (Carey 1992:89, 240).

\(^9\) IOL, Mack.Pr. 2, 78-9, Hugh Hope (Surakarta) to T.S. Raffles (Semarang), 12-7-1812; S.Br. 23, Hugh Hope (Surakarta) to T.S. Raffles (Salatiga), 1-8-1812; IOL, G21/65, Raffles, ‘Memorandum respecting Java’, 1813, 48. Pakubuwana IV was forced to agree to the annexation of the Surakarta parts of Pacitan in lieu of the 200,000 Spanish dollar indemnity.

\(^10\) IOL, Raffles-Minto collection (Xerox copies of holograph letters), vol. 3, T.S. Raffles (Semarang) to Lord Minto (Calcutta), 25-6-1812. Majors Archibald Campbell and J.M. Johnson were both serving as aide-de-camp to Raffles at the time of the assault on Yogya.

\(^11\) IOL, Raffles-Minto collection (Xerox copies of holograph letters), vol. 3, T.S. Raffles (Semarang) to Lord Minto (Calcutta), 14-7-1812.
Meanwhile, the ladies of the court were handled roughly and robbed of their valuables, even though the chronicle noted that it was not like the fall of the kraton at Plérèd (1677) and Kartasura (1742) during the Trunajaya rebellion (1675-1680) and the Chinese War (1740-1743) when the younger and more beautiful women and female servants were raped before being carried off as war booty (Carey 1992:88, 238, 415 note 84; Ricklefs 1993b:41). This is to some extent confirmed in the account of Major William Thorn, who served as quartermaster-general to the British forces at the time of the assault. He remarked on the ‘great forbearance’ of the British and sepoy troops in the women’s apartments (Thorn 1815:190). But it is clear that some violence was involved. This can be seen from the fate of the one British officer to die of wounds sustained during the attack: Lieutenant Hector Maclean of the Buckinghamshire Regiment, who expired on 25 June and was buried in Yogya, was apparently fatally stabbed by one of the court ladies whom he rashly tried to pick up and carry away as booty after finding her alone in the female quarters (Carey 1992:414 note 78). Another kraton female who was roughly handled at this time was Radèn Ayu Wandhan, an official wife of the Crown Prince and a daughter of Radèn Tumenggung Yudakusuma of Grobogan-Wirasari. She was stripped of all her official ornaments (upacara) and state clothes by British and sepoy looters and later cut a pitiable figure when she was eventually brought back to the kadipatèn on the evening of 21 June following the Crown Prince’s return as the newly appointed Sultan Hamengkubuwana III.12

According to the chronicle, a rigorous search was conducted for articles of jewellery. Ratu Kencana Wulan was particularly singled out as she was rumoured to be inordinately rich, disposing of large amounts of gems and having in her possession one diamond the size of a big toe. The ratu vigorously denied it, but, on being threatened, she not only handed over her pouch belt filled with precious stones, but also a large diamond ring, which had been hidden down a well. The finder was later supposedly paid 500 Spanish dollars by Raffles himself.13 Tan Jin Sing’s arrival from the Residency shortly after nine o’clock on the morning of 20 June with the news that the Crown Prince was to be raised as sultan, seems to have helped to calm the fears of the court women and most were eventually escorted to safety in the Residency with their children in palanquins (Carey 1992:92, 244). Others, such as Ratu Kencana Wulan and

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12 Carey 1992:103, 111, 261, 272, 428 note 142. For a list of the upacara of one of the daughters of Hamengkubuwana II, which came to 488 ronde realen, see Carey 1980:150-2. It is possible that Radèn Ayu Wandhan was the court lady responsible for Lieutenant Maclean’s fatal stab wounds, although D’Almeida (1864, II:136-7) indicates she was a daughter of Hamengkubuwana II. There is nothing in the Javanese and European sources to confirm either suggestion. On the carrying of women as war booty in pre-colonial Java, see Creese 2004:53.

13 Carey 1992:88, 237-8, 415 note 83. It is likely that Raffles’ prize agent, Major Jeremiah Martin Johnson, rather than the lieutenant-governor himself was the recipient of this diamond ring because there was an advertisement placed by Johnson in the Java Government Gazette of 22 August 1812 for the sale of a string of large diamonds, De Haan 1935a:588.
the members of the former ruler’s Amazon corps, apparently found temporary accommodation in the residence of Pangéran Natakusuma, soon to be known as the Pakualaman (Carey 1992:113, 278). A few, however, were left behind as we have seen with the case of the unknown court lady whose encounter with the Scots lieutenant proved so fatal for the latter.

The plundering of the kraton continued, according to the chronicle, for more than four whole days, an unending stream of booty being carried to the Residency on ox-carts and on the backs of porters. Many of the old sultan’s retainers and members of his elite bodyguard regiments were forced to act as common kuli. No heed was paid to rank or status: even the former ruler’s brothers-in-law, Radèn Tumenggung Prawirawinata and Radèn Prawiradiwirya, younger siblings of Ratu Kencana Wulan, who had attempted to take refuge in the women’s quarters after the fall of the kraton, were forced to participate in transporting the heavy chests normally used for storing the court heirlooms to the Residency (Van den Broek 1875:69; Carey 1992:94, 248, 421 note 111). Amongst the major items taken were most of the kraton ordnance, sets of shadow-play puppets, all the court gamelan (Javanese orchestras) and the court archives and manuscripts (with the exception of a solitary Qur’ān) (Java Government Gazette 5, 4-7-1812; Thorn 1815:192; Carey 1980:12-3 notes 1-5, 1992:94, 248). The manuscripts included literary works such as babad (Javanese chronicles), as well as land registers detailing the apanage holdings of the members of the sultan’s family and officials in the core regions. Crawfurd and C.F. Krijgsman, the official Javanese interpreter from Semarang, had the task of going through the manuscripts in the Residency office (Carey 1980:12 note 3; Ricklefs and Voorhoeve 1977:62). In this work, they were helped by Natakusuma, who explained to them that one particularly beautiful babad, bound in gold leaf and set with jewels, which listed all the rulers of Java, had originally been drawn up on his orders but had been seized by the old sultan from his residence when Daendels had exiled him and his son from Yogyakarta in December 1810 (pp. 276-8; Carey 1992:96, 250-1, 421-2 note 115). The chronicle adds the detail that Raffles himself was especially delighted and intrigued by Natakusuma’s literary knowledge. As a token of his esteem for him, he is said to have returned the manuscript to the prince (Carey 1992:96, 251). This episode in which the future Pakualam I helped Crawfurd sort through the kraton library and supposedly impressed the lieutenant-governor with his literary knowledge is intriguing. We cannot confirm it in the European accounts, but we know from independent sources that a special friendship did indeed grow up between Natakusuma/Pakualam I and the British Resident. This was based on common literary interests and later resulted in the loan of various manuscripts to the Scotsman from the Pakualaman (Ricklefs 1969:241-2; Ricklefs and Voorhoeve 1977:52). When the time came for Crawfurd to leave Yogyakarta on 10 August 1816, he was unstinting in his praise of his Javanese friend to his Dutch successor, Nahuys van Burgst: ‘Pakualam is for
a Javanese a man of superior mind. He has a comprehensiveness of understand-
ing to which among the natives there is no parallel.’

Another such relationship of mutual literary and scholarly esteem can be
seen in the friendship of both Crawfurd and Raffles for the family of Kyai
Adipati Sura-adimanggala IV (died 1827), who served as bupati of Semarang be-
tween 1809 and 1822, and whose two sons were sent to Calcutta (Durrumtollah
Academy) in July 1812 for two years ‘to become Englishmen’ (Raffles 1817,
I:273 note; Crawfurd 1820, I:48-9; De Haan 1935a:636-9; Soekanto 1951b:30-2;
Carey 1992:438 note 201). However, although such friendships were based on
shared literary and scholarly interests, they also had their exploitative side.
The expertise of men such as Natakusuma/Pakualam I, Sura-adimanggala and
the Panembahan of Sumenep (p. 286 note 99), enabled scholar administra-
tors like Raffles and Crawfurd to draw on local sources for their histories. All
too often, however, the acknowledgement they received in their published
texts was not commensurate with their contribution. In Sura-adimanggala’s
case this was considerable, particularly in the field of Javanese law (De Haan
1935a:635-6 note 1; Raffles 1817, II:61, 82). As for the Yogya kraton manus-
cripts, almost none were returned to their original royal owners as seems to
have happened with the Pakualaman text. Indeed, it is clear that a number
were taken as booty by British officers and prize agents. The foundation of
Crawfurd’s own private collection of Indonesian manuscripts appears to have
been laid at this time with a personal haul of at least 45 Javanese MSS from the
kraton library, most of which he subsequently sold to the British Museum
in 1842 (Ricklefs and Voorhoeve 1977:48; Carey 1980:2, 13 note 17). A slightly
larger group of 55 manuscripts was claimed by Raffles for the British govern-
ment. These were sent to him in Bogor in November 1814 and formed the
core of his own personal collection of Javanese and Indonesian MSS, the bulk

14 UBL, BPL 616, Port. 5 pt. 5, John Crawfurd (Yogyakarta) to H.G. Nahuys van Burgst
(Yogyakarta), 9-8-1816; Van der Kemp 1911:248.

15 This can be seen from the names which appear on some of the Yogya MSS where there are
references to Dr Studzze, Swedish surgeon who served with the British expedition, Lieutenant
Colonel James Watson, commander officer of the 14th Regiment of Foot (Buckinghamshires), and
Major J.M. Johnson, one of the prize agents, Ricklefs and Voorhoeve 1977:58 (IOL Jav. 7), 71 (IOL
Jav. 92), 60 (IOL Jav. 19), 64 (IOL Jav. 45), 67 (IOL Jav. 54). See further Colebrooke letter, 8-7-1812
(on Studzze). The largest single collection owned by a British officer was that of Colonel Colin
Mackenzie, Blagden 1916:vi-vii. The bulk of this collection, which had been brought back to
Bengal with him in July 1813 and which was subsequently known as the Mackenzie Private Col-
lection, was purchased from his estate in 1822 by the East India Company through its government
in Calcutta and deposited in its archive in London. At least 66 of these MSS are in Javanese.

16 Dj.Br. 29, John Crawfurd (Yogyakarta) to James Dupuy (Batavia), 20-9-1814; Captain R.C.
Garnham (Yogyakarta) to George Augustus Addison (Bogor), 11-11-1814, ‘List of the records of
the Djocjocarta Residency delivered to Captain Garnham by John Crawfurd Esquire, on making
over charge of the Residency’, 20-9-1814, lists a. ‘notes of hand, 1-29, granted by sundry persons
to the late sultan’ (a reference to kraton archival materials from Hamengkubuwana II’s reign); b.
‘Papers delivered to J. Crawfurd by Paku Alam’.
of which were presented by Lady Raffles to the Royal Asiatic Society in 1830 after his death (Ricklefs and Voorhoeve 1977:xxvii-xxviii). In this fashion, the private and public archives of Great Britain were swelled by the plunder of its soldiers and colonial administrators; intellectual booty capitalism in its purest form, invaluable for subsequent Western scholars, but deeply impoverishing for those non-European societies who fell victim to its depredations. The present volume owes much to that imperial grand larceny.

The appointment of Hamengkubuwana III and kasepuhan-karajan rivalries

The rapid humiliation of the old sultan and the preparations for the appointment of the Crown Prince as Hamengkubuwana III seem to have intensified the feelings of bitterness amongst the party of the former ruler, the kasepuhan. The exile of the old sultan and his principal supporters by the British government on 3 July (Carey 1992:438 note 201) did not spell the end of the kasepuhan. Indeed, when Nahuys van Burgst became Resident in August 1816, he was so aware of this rivalry that he attempted to bring about some sort of reconciliation by inviting supporters from each faction in pairs to a series of private dinner parties which he held at his country estate at Bedhaya on the flanks of Mount Merapi. But these parties in themselves do not seem to have made much of a lasting impact. During the Java War it was noticeable that there were many more princes of the party which supported the third sultan – the karajan – than those from the kasepuhan who rallied to Dipanagara’s cause or afforded him support at some point during the conflict. Even after the end of the war, during the reign of the second sultan’s great-grandson, Hamengkubwana V (reigned 1822-1826, 1828-1855), kasepuhan and karajan loyalties continued to be detected amongst the younger generations of Yogya princes and officials.

Prominent amongst the old sultan’s supporters was, of course, his favourite son, Pangéran Mangkudiningrat. He had apparently asked the British for a 3,000 cacah apanje and the title of Pangéran Adipati, which, if accorded,
would have put him on a par with the Crown Prince. The official British government view is unknown, but it is unlikely to have been favourable. The granting of such elevated status to a known rival of their ally would have been political folly. As for Mangkudiningrat, it is clear that he was not prepared to accept his sudden loss of political influence at court and seems to have cast around for ways to revenge himself on the Crown Prince. His hand was soon thought to have been behind a grievous incident which occurred at the house of the Yogya captain of the Chinese (kapitan cina) on the night following the fall of the kraton. Crawford gives a succinct account of this in his History of the Indian Archipelago (Crawfurd 1820, I:69):

In the year 1812, [on] the very day on which the fortified palace of the Sultan [...] was stormed, a certain petty chief, a favourite of the dethroned Sultan, was one of the first to come over to the conquerors and was active in the course of the day [20 June] in [...] the pacification of the country. At night, he was with many other Javanese hospitably received into the spacious house of the Chief of the Chinese [kapitan cina] and appeared perfectly satisfied with the new order of things. The house was protected by a strong guard of Sepoys. At night without any warning, but starting from his sleep, he commenced havock [sic], and before he had lost his own life, he killed and wounded a great number of persons chiefly his countrymen, who were sleeping in the same apartment with him. I arrived on the spot a few seconds after this tragic affair [...] and found it as usual on such occasions a very difficult matter to obtain a true account of.

The ‘petty chief’ in question was Mas Ngabèhi Gandadiwirya, one of Mangkudiningrat’s panakawan (intimate confidants; retainers). According to Dipanagara, the last straw for Mangkudiningrat had been Crawford’s announcement at a party in the Residency House on the evening of the day of the fall of the kraton (20 June) that the part Madurese patih of the kadipaten, Raden Ngabèhi Jayasentika, who had played such a key role as an intermediary during the negotiations between the British and the Crown Prince (pp. 323-4), would shortly be appointed Yogya chief minister. Mangkudiningrat had left the party at that point and instructed Gandadiwirya to carry out the attack. There is nothing in the other sources to confirm this, although the ‘Chronicle
of the fall of Yogyakarta' indicates that the prince’s movements on the night of 20-21 June were suspicious (Carey 1992:98-101, 256-8, 424 note 126). Crawfurd (1820, I:69) for his part goes some way to confirm this by stating that opium and strong drink had been served by Tan Jin Sing during the evening, and that Gandadiwirya, who was at the party, had taken deep offence at some of the remarks made by supporters of the Crown Prince regarding the kasepuhan. He had controlled his anger at the time, but during the night, when most of the Crown Prince’s party had left, he had run amok with his pike and stabbed to death Jayasentika and another of the prince’s senior officials.23 Despite the presence of a strong sepoy guard at the house, several others had been seriously wounded, among them Tan Jin Sing, who received stab wounds in the arm and the side before Gandadiwirya could be overpowered and killed (Carey 1992:424 note 126).

We know of the superhuman strength which can possess men and women in such an amok state (De Zoete and Spies 1973:67, 262-71). But certainly in this case, the attack was not blind. Gandadiwirya’s targets were very specific. We have seen how the kapitan cina and the wider Yogya Chinese community, over whom the captain of the Chinese exercised authority, had made themselves the butt of ethnic Javanese resentment because of their strong support for the British during their operations against the kraton (Chapter VII). We will see shortly how Tan Jin Sing would become even more of a bête noire amongst local Javanese when he was elevated as a bupati with the title of Radèn Tumenggung Secadiningrat under pressure from the British in December 1813. At the same time, threats to his life continued. Indeed, so fearful was the kapitan cina after Gandadiwirya’s amok assault that a sepoy guard had to be permanently stationed at his house to prevent any further attack on him.24 It is clear that both Jayasentika and his kadipatèn colleague were targeted because they were thought to be destined to play important roles in the future third sultan’s administration. In the longer term, Jayasentika’s death was a tragedy for Yogya for if he had lived and been appointed to the chief ministerial position, the later quarrel between Dipanagara and the man who did eventually become patih in December 1813, the part Balinese, part east Javanese bupati of Japan (Majakerta), Mas Tumenggung Sumadipura, might never have happened (Chapters IX and X). In view of Jayasentika’s importance, it is thus hard to escape the conclusion that he was specifically singled out by Gandadiwirya as his principal victim. On the other hand, the rather hasty implication of Mangkudiningrat in the affair could have been engineered by the third sultan to do away with his most serious rival. This was certainly the gloss that the exiled pangéran put on it in his own babad.25

23 This was Radèn Tumenggung Citradiwirya, see Carey 1992:425 note 128.
25 LOr 6791 (3) (Babad Spèhi):148-50, III.68-78. Mangkudiningrat was sent into exile in Pulau Pinang along with the old sultan on 3 July 1812, Carey 1992:438 note 201.
The episode of Gandadiwirya’s murderous attack serves to underscore the very delicate political situation in Yogya after the fall of the kraton in which various sons of the old sultan acted in a hostile fashion towards his British-sponsored successor. This hostility was apparently very much in evidence during the third sultan’s appointment ceremony at half past four in the afternoon on Sunday, 21 June.26 According to the chronicle, during the official banquet which followed the ceremony, many of the older princes merely gazed in a bored fashion out of the windows and took not the slightest notice of the new sultan despite the efforts of the chronicle’s author, Pangéran Panular, one of Hamengkubuwana III’s strongest supporters, to arouse their attention (Carey 1992:109, 269, 434 note 172).

The ceremony itself, however, seems to have taken place without mishap in the presence of the sultan’s relations, leading court officials, and senior British officers (Java Government Gazette 19, 4-7-1812:3; Carey 1992:103-4, 261-5). Natakusuma and Prangwedana (Mangkunagara II) were also seated in prominent positions amongst the assembled company. Captain William Colebrooke of the Royal Artillery described the proceedings as ‘extremely impressive’.27 Raffles’ official proclamation, which had been drawn up on 18 June before the British attack and posted up around Yogya after the fall of the kraton, was read out (Carey 1992:89, 241). This contained the official notification of the government’s intention to appoint the Crown Prince as ruler and had already been announced by public declamation at nine o’clock that same morning at the Residency House (Carey 1992:416 note 91). The full text was now read out by the official Javanese interpreter, C.F. Krijgsman. First came the statement of the British government’s grounds for action against the second sultan, who ‘by his crimes and violation of [the 28 December 1811] treaty [has] shown himself unworthy of the confidence of the British Government and unfit to be further entrusted with the administration delegated to him’ (Carey 1992:416 note 92); second followed the shorter section whereby the government in the person of ‘the Honourable the Lieutenant-Governor of the whole island of Java and its dependencies’ formally ‘reassumed’ control over the ‘one half of the high lands of Java known by the name of the kingdom of Mataram’ and then ‘delegated’ the same to the ‘Pangéran Adipati’ [Crown Prince] who was ‘hereby proclaimed Sultan of Mataram under the title of Hamengkubuwana III’. Then came a warning to the members of the kasepuhan and would-be supporters of the old sultan: ‘all who presume to abet the dethroned Prince in his pretensions to government will be considered as traitors to their country and dealt with accordingly’ (Carey 1992:417 note 92).

26 On the confusion over the dates and time of Hamengkubuwana III’s elevation as sultan in the Dutch secondary sources, see Carey 1992:430 note 147 referring to Levyssohn Norman 1857:72; Veth 1896-1907, II:305; Rouffaer 1905:599.
27 Colebrooke letter, 8-7-1812.
For perhaps the first time since Sunan Pakubuwana II’s reign (1726-1749) formal cession of his kingdom to the Dutch East Indies Company by his treaty of 11 December 1749 a European government was in place in Java which could give de facto substance to the claim that they were ‘sovereigns’ over Mataram. As Ricklefs has pointed out in his study of Sultan Mangkubumi’s reign (1749-1792): ‘only men and gunpowder could accomplish that and of these commodities the Dutch supply was inadequate until the nineteenth century’ (Ricklefs 1974a:52). The British with their Indian army victorious on land and their navy unchallenged on the high seas could now announce that they were ‘delegating’ half the high lands of Java and had the military muscle to make that delegation real. The third sultan was a client sovereign in fact as well as name. Those who opposed him were traitors not just to Yogya but also to the British government. This was a changed world indeed.

After the proclamation had been read out in Javanese and English, Dipanagara’s younger brother, Bendara Radèn Mas Sudama was proclaimed as Crown Prince, whereupon the appointments were acclaimed by all those present and the lieutenant-governor came forward to bestow his greetings and kiss on the new sultan. According to the author of the chronicle, this kiss looked more like the fighting of quails with their beaks – a reference to the contests between quail hens which were very popular amongst the ladies of the Javanese courts at this time – rather than a warm embrace (Carey 1992:105, 264, 431 note 155). The official ornaments of state were handed over together with some of the court heirlooms, which intriguingly did not include any of the great regalia or pusaka ageng which had not been found during the plundering of the kraton (Carey 1992:105, 264, 431 note 156-57a). A nineteen-gun salute then boomed forth from the fort and the military band of the sultan’s Eurasian and Ambonese dragoon guards struck up, after which those Javanese nobles and senior court officials present came forward to pay their respects led by Natakusuma and Prangwedana (Mangkunagara II), the last greeting the new ruler by shaking his hand European-style a further sign – along with his short-cropped hair and European military uniform – that he was now a ‘Company’ (European government) prince (Carey 1992:105, 264, 432 note 159). At this point, according to the chronicle, some unpleasantness occurred when two of the older princes, who had favoured the former sultan, gave Raffles and the new ruler the usual two-handed Muslim greeting rather than the full act of homage by kissing their feet. As uncles of the third sultan, their greeting was in fact the correct one, and as for paying respects to a governor, the full act of homage was unheard of. But, according to the chronicle, when they appeared unwilling to make this obeisance to the lieutenant-governor, Crawfurd seized their necks and forced their heads down arousing in them feelings of acute embarrassment (Carey 1992:105, 264-5, 432 note 159a). We have nothing in the European sources to confirm this, but if true, the epi-
sode is a vivid one and was another reflection of the changed political world in which the princes of Yogya were now living.

The official ceremonies in the Residency over and the sun just about to set, Raffles invited the sultan and his party to come outside and inspect the British and sepoy troops, who were drawn up in fifteen long rows in the front square between the Residency and the fort (Carey 1992:106-8, 265-8, 429 note 146). We have both Javanese and Dutch accounts to corroborate the description of the show of massed force put on by Gillespie’s army ostensibly to celebrate the third sultan’s appointment, but also to underscore the military capacity of the new British government in the event that any in Yogya might contemplate a return to the sort of confrontational politics which had been the hallmark of the old sultan’s reign. In front were troops of the three king’s line (infantry) regiments which had taken part in the assault: the 14th (Buckinghamshires), 59th (2nd Nottinghamshires), and the two rifle companies of the 78th Highland Regiment of Foot (Ross-shire Buffs), one of whose officers had secured the person of the sultan at the time of the surrender of the kraton (p. 341).

Dressed in red jackets, green cotton trousers and knobbled helmets with circlets of gold, the three-faced blade of their bayonets glinted in the light of the setting sun as they presented arms. Behind them were the sepoy troops with green jackets and breeches, white camisoles, silver-braided shoulder bands and epaulettes, and fez-like mob caps. Many were heavily bearded and, according to both Raffles and the chronicle, they created a terrifying impression amongst the watching Javanese. Indeed, all the British and sepoy troops, including the detachment of HM 22nd Dragoons with their red-plumed cavalry shakos, who performed elaborate manoeuvres on horseback and were described as appearing like mounted demons, deeply impressed the author of the chronicle. In his view, it was fitting that Yogya had been conquered by such warlike enemies and that even with the help of Surakarta, the Javanese would not have been able to withstand them. The Yogyanese, in his estimation, had been at odds with each other and the ulama (Javanese-Islamic religious scholars), who should have been setting an example by devoting themselves to mystical sciences, had been motivated more by the pursuit of greed and material gain like merchants (Carey 1992:267, 434 note 168). Amongst the common Javanese there were some men of mettle, but it was as though they had not been fired up or given any proper direction by the Yogya men of rank, who

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28 Carey 1992:429 note 146. The Javanese source is Pangéran Panular’s ‘Chronicle of the fall of Yogyakarta’ (Carey 1992); the Dutch source is the official interpreter, C.F. Krijgsman’s, report in Dj.Br. 60, C.F. Krijgsman (Semarang) to H.G. Nahuys van Burgst (Yogyakarta), 16-10-1817.

29 Carey 1992:106-8, 265-8. On Raffles’ remark on the fear of the Javanese for the sepoy, see Chapter VII note 157. For contemporary aquatints by William Daniell (1769-1837) of Bengal sepoy in service with the British at this time, see Plates 34, 37, 42, 48.
had done much wrong. All had been responsible for the debacle for they had not cooperated or worked together (Carey 1992:107-8, 266-8).

It was not only the Javanese who experienced this shock in contemplating the new military power in their midst. The Dutch inhabitants of Java too had registered its impact as we have seen from the behaviour of the Indo-European ‘Free Burghers’ who longed to see the British humiliated by the Yogyanese at the time of the 20 June attack (Chapter VII; Carey 1992:404-5 note 31, 449 note 239). The memoirs of the future Yogya Resident, Nahuys van Burgst, are also interesting here. As a prisoner of the British after the fall of Meester Cornelis on 26 August 1811 (De Haan 1935a:620), he had observed: ‘how much greater and more impressive was the alteration I saw in that place [Meester Cornelis]. […] Instead of our small, weak, native soldiers, the repudiated stepchildren of the god of war, my eye met everywhere the gigantic Saxon warriors in their red uniforms whose proud bearing announced the Rajaput [Rajput], the lawful progeny of Mars’ (Nahuys van Burgst 1858:60).

These impressions are all the more striking for only fifteen years earlier, the Governor of Java’s Northeast Coast Pieter Gerardus van Overstraten (in office 1791-1796), had referred to the VOC’s Madurese auxiliaries as ‘even bet-
ter troops than the famed sepoys', and in some kraton circles the Madurese remained the very epitome of indigenous military prowess, their presence a barometer of the seriousness with which the post-1816 Dutch government viewed a particular revolt. Thus in August 1825, Pakualam I was supposed to have observed that ‘if the Sampang [West Madurese] troops come to Yogya then Dipanagara’s revolt is a revolt of importance, if not then it is insignificant’ (Van den Broek 1873, 20:489-90).

The British military also left a lasting impact on the cultural life of the post-1812 south-central Javanese courts. The Scottish sword dance, for example, was introduced by some of the many Scots officers then serving in British line regiments in Java (in particular the 78th Highland Regiment). It was then choreographed and adapted at both the Mangkunagaran and Pakualaman (Carey 1992:460-1 note 297, 524 note 619). At the same time, both at the Pakualaman, where the princes of the court took to wearing British cavalry uniforms (Travers 1960:70-1), and at the Mangkunagaran, where the dress of the post-1812 legion was fashioned according to that worn by English East India Company troops (Carey 1992:418 note 93), British military models were closely emulated as a way of distancing these minor courts from their more culturally traditional senior counterparts in the main Yogyakarta and Surakarta kraton.

Creation of the Pakualaman, exile of the old sultan and the disposal of kraton plunder

Before Raffles left Yogya early on the morning of 23 June to make the thirteen-hour journey on horseback to Semarang via Kartasura, he appears to have presided over three other important ceremonies. The first was the formal invitation made to the third sultan to ‘repossess’ the kraton. This occurred immediately after the ‘coronation’ banquet in the Residency House on the evening of 21 June. Bidden godspeed by the lieutenant-governor on the steps of the Residency House, the new ruler set out for the court in the same carriage with Crawfurd and the newly appointed Crown Prince. He was accompanied by a large British mounted escort and a torch-lit procession which included the court princesses and the young female state regalia bearers transported in palanquins (Carey 1992:109, 268-9). But this was something of a sham ‘repossession’. The plundering of the court was still in full swing so Raffles designated the kadipatèn as the third sultan’s temporary royal residence (Carey

31 Raffles took this route in order to have the chance to confer at Kartasura with the British Resident in Surakarta, Colonel Alexander Adams, about the appropriate steps to be taken with regard to Pakubuwana IV, his role in the secret correspondence and the March secret treaty having been recently confirmed following the capture of the Yogya court archive, S.Br. 23, William Robinson (Yogyakarta) to Colonel Alexander Adams (Surakarta), 22-6-1812; Carey 1992:437 note 198.
Plate 42. Aquatint by William Daniell (1769-1837) of a sepoy havildar (sergeant), a non-commissioned officer of one of the Bengal volunteer battalions which took part in the British attack on Yogya on 20 June 1812 and the sepoy conspiracy of 1815. Taken from Williams 1817:178 facing.
It was not until the evening of 24 June, four full days after the British assault, that the thoroughly looted and partially burnt kraton could be reoccupied (Java Government Gazette 15, 4-7-1812:3; Carey 1992:111, 272).

The second ceremony took place on the afternoon of 22 June when Hamengkubuwana III met Raffles and Crawfurd in one of the still intact court pavilions, the Bangsal Kencana, along with senior British officers and the ruler’s uncles and younger brothers. During this meeting, in which the lieutenant-governor gave formal notice of the annexation of Kedhu and a third of the Yogya mancanagara by way of repayment for recent British operations – the kraton treasure having been taken by the army – he announced the appointment of Natakusuma as an independent prince with the title of Pangéran Pakualam. The prince’s two eldest sons, Radèn Tumenggung Natainingrat and Radèn Mas Salya, were also given the new names of Pangéran Suryaningrat and Pangéran Suryaningprang at this time (Carey 1992:112, 274). The details of Pakualam’s apanage holdings were not worked out until much later, partly owing to the difficulties in drawing up the boundaries with the sultan’s lands and partly due to the fact that most of the prince’s previous apanage lands had been in Kedhu which was now in the process of being taken over by the British.

Natakusuma’s promotion was both a reward for his services to the British during the previous nine months, in particular during the attack on the kraton, and a token of Raffles’ own feelings of personal friendship towards him. The creation of the Pakualaman marked an important stage in the political division of Yogyakarta and served as another tangible sign of the sultana-te’s defeat. The first Pakualam now owed his allegiance exclusively to the European government, a fact which was registered clearly in the Javanese sources where he is referred to alternatively as a miji (directly subordinate of-

32 Carey 1992:112, 274, 435-6 note 181; Van Deventer 1891:101; Poensen 1905:310 (which gives the wrong date); KITLV Or 188 (Babad Pakualaman), leaf no. 1, on the official government proclamation (tulis ingkang Parintali) read out by C.F. Krijgsman in the presence of Raffles. Although he arrogated himself the title of Pangéran Adipati, he was not in fact confirmed in that title until 7-3-1822 by the returned Dutch government and the title was not allowed to devolve on any of his sons or later successors until they had reached the age of forty, Rouffaer 1905:603. The same arrangement had been made with the Mangkunagaran in the previous year, Rouffaer 1905:602.

33 Van Deventer 1891:333 note 1, 334; Carey 1992:458 note 286; Rouffaer 1905:603. Several eminent Dutch secondary sources (Levyssohn Norman 1857:76-7; Veth 1896-1907, II:307 note 3 citing Van Deventer; Rouffaer 1905:603) have confused the 17 March 1813 British contract with Pakualam, which stipulated the size of his apanage holdings and the establishment of his 100-strong cavalry corps, as the date when he was officially appointed as an independent prince. It is clear from the Javanese sources that this occurred soon after the fall of the kraton, most probably on 22 June 1812.

34 Carey 1980:1, 1992:435 note 181. Raffles’ friendship for Pakualam influenced his decision to appoint him Regent on the death of Hamengkubuwana III in November 1814 despite the opposition of the British Resident, Captain R.C. Garnham, and the entire court, see below pp. 408-10.
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Of the Europeans, or as a ‘servant’ of the British government, or as a ‘Government person’ (wong Gupermèn). Although the prince was sometimes critical of the policies of the European government, especially in the period immediately preceding the Java War, he remained throughout essentially loyal to the government realising that his own interests were best served by such a course of action. At the same time, his relations with the sultanate continued on a distinctly cool and uneasy level, a state of affairs which, as we will see shortly, was greatly exacerbated by his conduct as regent during the minority of the fourth sultan from December 1814 to January 1820 (Carey 1992:517-9 note 577). In Crawfurd’s words:

[The prince has] a clear insight into the character and resources of the European government and it enables him to calculate upon the probable result of any contest between it and the natives. This is the best antidote to a large share of ambition which he no doubt possesses, but it is not the only one. For if I am not mistaken, he is not possessed of that hardihood and intrepidity which would make ambition dangerous. Those qualities in a word to which his father [Sultan Mangkubumi] owed his success and which plunged the country for years into so much misery.

And not just Sultan Mangkubumi: if Crawfurd’s briefings by his predecessor Pieter Engelhard had been more complete and he had been given the opportunity to extend his stay in Java by another decade, he might have added two more names to place alongside that of the first sultan when he considered Javanese noblemen in whom hardihood and intrepidity were rendered fatal by a large dose of personal ambition: Radèn Rongga and Dipanagara.

The third and final public event ordered by Raffles before his departure appears to have been an oath-taking ceremony. This involved the public swearing of allegiance to the British government and the Yogya ruler by the sultan’s relations and members of his court administration at a function attended by the lieutenant-governor, the Resident and senior British officers (Carey 1992:114, 281). The evident reluctance of the old sultan’s supporters to accept the new monarch and the continuing rift between kasepuhan and kara-jan may have inspired this initiative. But it did not in itself change the political realities in a deeply divided and now suddenly impoverished sultanate.

35 Carey 1992:125, 304, 458 note 280. The title miji usually referred to an official under the direct orders of the sultan, see p. 62.
36 Carey 1980:97, where the phrase: sampun lumebet dados rençané Gupermèn Inggris occurs in an undated letter (? mid-July 1812) from Hamengkubuwana III to John Crawfurd on the terms of the 1 August 1812 treaty with the British.
37 Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, II:425, reference to Pakualam referring to himself as Gupermèn punya orang; BD (Manado) II:222, XVII.72, where Dipanagara states that Pakualam and his family had become ‘British Government people’ (dadi wongnya Gupermèn Inggris).
38 UBL, BPL 616, Port. 5 pt. 5, John Crawfurd (Yogyakarta) to H.G. Nahuys van Burgst (Yogyakarta), 9-8-1816.
On 3 July, at the same time as the departure of the main body of British troops with the treasure from the kraton, the old sultan and his two sons, Pangérán Mangkudiningrat and Pangérán Mertasana, were taken to Semarang on the first stage of their journey into exile in Pulau Pinang. They were accompanied by the former mancanagara bupati, Radén Tumenggung Sumadiwiry, who had been responsible for firing the powder magazine in the fort during the British attack (p. 335 note 267, and p. 337). According to the chronicle, they were carried in Chinese-style palanquins with dried palm-leaf rooves, except for Sumadiwiry who was forced to follow on foot (Carey 1992:115, 282-3). They cut pitiable figures. As we have seen, Mangkudiningrat had been forced to share his father’s exile because of his supposed involvement in Jayasentika’s murder, but the two others apparently went voluntarily out of love and respect for the old ruler. Neither Sumadiwiry nor Mangkudiningrat would ever return to Yogya. Both died in Ambon in circa 1822 and 13 March 1824 respectively. As for Mertasana, his own homecoming would be tragically brief: barely nine months after his return in late October 1825, just after he had taken Dipanagara’s place as a guardian of the child sultan, Hamengkubuwana V, he was cut down in a Java War ambush along with many of his princely relatives at Nglèngkong in the Slèman area on 30 July 1826 (Carey 1992:438-9 note 201).

As for the old sultan, he appears to have withstood both his journey into exile and his initial period of banishment in Pulau Pinang with fortitude. According to the Malay translator to the Pulau Pinang government, both the exiled ruler and his party conducted themselves with ‘the greatest propriety and consistency’ (Carey 1992:438 note 201). Indeed, he would live long enough to be reinstalled on the Yogya throne in August 1826 during the darkest period of the Java War. By then, however, he had lost much of his fierce energy. According to P.J.F. Louw, fourteen years of sorrow and humiliation had taken their toll (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, II:435). Ruling as a Dutch ally until his death on 3 January 1828, his last period as ruler would not be a happy one for the sultanate. Nevertheless, his presence both in exile and in Java, would remain a living inspiration for his religious and royal supporters in the kasepuhan party who flocked to see him in Batavia and Surabaya between his return from Pinang in April 1815 and his re-exile to Ambon in January 1817 (Carey 1992:438 note 201). Raffles reported that when he met the deposed Yogya monarch again in Semarang after his arrival on 4 July, and appraised him of his more lenient sentence of temporary banishment in Pulau Pinang, he reacted with unfeigned relief:

> even the unfortunate Sultan has been considered of late comparatively happy, for on his first apprehension he certainly expected to have been put to death. That

fear removed, transportation to Banda for life appeared inevitable and as bad as a second death. On his arrival here [in Semarang] this has since been mitigated to Pinang with a promise that if all things remain quiet, he shall in a few years be permitted to return and end his days in the land of his forefathers [Java].

The former ruler eventually sailed for Pinang on 16 July on a fast frigate bound for Calcutta under command of Lord Minto’s son, the Honourable George Elliott. Also on board were the bupati of Semarang, Sura-adimanggala IV’s, two sons, Salèh (born circa 1800) and Sukur (born circa 1802), who, as we have seen, were being sent to Calcutta for their education (Carey 1992:438 note 201). Part of the frigate’s cargo consisted of some 68 chests containing 408,414 Spanish dollars in silver coin from the plundered Yogya treasury which was now being sent to Bengal as prize money for the credit of the officers and men of the victorious British expeditionary force (Carey 1992:414-5 note 79). In this fashion, much of the wealth extorted by the sultan through his harsh fiscal policies of the first eighteen years of his reign travelled with him into exile. But it would not be his to enjoy. The blood and sweat of a nameless generation of south-central Javanese peasants was now the spoil of a foreign conqueror. As for Salèh and Sukur, they represented Java’s conflicted future. As members of the first cohort of the nineteenth-century Javanese elite to receive a European education, their prospects seemed bright. Salèh, in particular, who had won prizes in geometry, algebra and drawing, was made assistant bupati of Semarang when he was still only fifteen years old and took his father’s place for a period in May-August 1816 during a dispute between Sura-adimanggala and the British Resident, William Boggie. But both his career and that of his brother were blighted by the Java War and the pull of their identity as Javanese Muslims. Sukur’s trenchant report on the immiserisation of the Javanese peasantry in Kedhu in the immediate pre-war period (Chapter IX notes 82-3), his decision to rally to Dipanagara early in the conflict in late August 1825 and his adoption of a new Muslim name – Radèn Hasan Mahmud – implicated his whole immediate family who suffered degradation, imprisonment and exile (De Haan 1935a:641; Carey 1988:139 note 239). The same torn loyalties would be evident in the career of their first cousin, the celebrated painter Radèn Salèh Syarif Bustaman (circa 1811-1880), whose personal life and artistic oeuvre would intersect in interesting ways with that of the exiled prince during his last years in Makassar (Kraus 2005:278-88; p. 742). Significantly, Prangwedana (Mangkunagara II) specifically forbade his sons to study in Europe, even though urged to by Raffles and the post-1816 Dutch administration, because he feared that they would return neither as Europeans nor Javanese (Büchler 1888, II:15).

IOL, Raffles-Minto collection (Xerox copies of holograph letters), vol. 3, T.S. Raffles (Semarang) to Lord Minto (Calcutta), 16-7-1812; Carey 1992:438 note 201.
On the day before the old sultan sailed for Pinang, the last British military detachments left Yogya and an uneasy calm descended on the ravaged city.\textsuperscript{41} According to the Javanese accounts, most of those who had fled from the town before the British attack returned within two months from the outlying villages: traders once again began to visit the capital and the santri came back to their partially burnt homes in the kauman (firm Islamic community) near the Great Mosque (Carey 1992:118, 288-9, 448 note 237). In the Yogya market, the price of rice returned to its pre-June level (Appendix X) and copper-smiths, iron-workers, makers of gamelan instruments and forgers of weapons began to make a prosperous living again. This was especially the case with the kris makers who apparently had a busy time replacing the numerous pusaka (personal heirloom) daggers which had been confiscated and sold by the British and sepoy troops as part of their prize money following the fall of the kraton.\textsuperscript{42}

So many jewels, fine clothes, weapons and other valuables looted from the court or seized from its defenders could now be purchased cheaply at the market outside the fort, that quick profits were made according to the chronicle by those skilled at trading on commission. Prominent amongst these were the better-off local European and Indo-European ‘Free Burghers’ who bought directly from the British and sepoy soldiers. For more than a month these commercial opportunities continued and many became rich overnight on account of this unexpected benefaction from the state, so much so that special ritual offerings were made in honour of the exiled sultan by those who had been beneficiaries of his windfall gifts (Carey 1992:118, 289).

\textit{The third sultan’s new order and Dipanagara’s role}

In Javanese history, a new reign offered the opportunity for a major reordering of the administrative personnel of the court as well as the distribution of titles and offices to the new ruler’s blood relations. Brief though it proved to be and sadly diminished in terms of its financial resources, the third sultan’s two-and-a-half-year rule opened with the same wholesale recasting of the kraton hierarchy. His mother, the sixty-five-year-old Ratu Kedhaton, who had suffered so much at the hands of her exiled husband, was appointed as Ratu Ageng (senior dowager queen), a title which had been vacant since the death of Dipanagara’s great-grandmother in October 1803 (Chapter II). She was given charge of the

\textsuperscript{41} IOL Mack.Pr. 14, Mackenzie, ‘Report’, 7-6-1813, 253.
\textsuperscript{42} Carey 1992:118, 288-9; BD (Manado) II:222-3, XVII.75, 227, XVII.96. On the importance of kris making, which, along with batik manufacture, were the two most important indigenous industries in Yogya in the mid-nineteenth century, see Dj.Br. 4, A.H.W. de Kock, ‘Algemeen Verslag der Residentie Djokjakarta over het jaar 1850’, 3-1851. On the royal smiths (abdi-Dalem pandhé) who were employed by the court, see Carey and Hoadley 2000:30-1, 119, 166-7, 219, 289, 338, 382.
The power of prophecy

Plate 43. Ratu Ibu (?1780-1826; pre-1816 Ratu Kencana, widow of Sultan Hamengkubuwana III, reigned 1812-1814, and mother of the boy-ruler Sultan Hamengkubuwana IV, reigned 1814-1822) conferring with Radèn Adipati Danureja IV (in office 1813-1847) in the Yogya kraton. A female servant (nyai keparak) holding a spittoon (tempolong) looks on. Taken from KITLV Or 13 (Buku Kedhung Kebo), f.66v. Photograph by courtesy of the KITLV, Leiden.

kadipatèn with special duties as carer for the young Crown Prince who was to live with her until shortly after his appointment as sultan in November 1814 (Carey 1992:113, 277). Crawfurd noted that she was treated with great attention and respect, the Crown Prince showing her particular honour.43

Two of the sultan’s official wives were also raised in rank: the mother of the Crown Prince was appointed Ratu Kencana (post-1816, Ratu Ibu), and the sultan’s second wife, the childless daughter of Radèn Rongga Prawiradirja I of Madiun (in office circa 1760-1784), received the title of Ratu Mas (Carey

43 UBL, BPL 616, Port. 5 pt. 5, John Crawfurd (Yogyakarta) to H.G. Nahuys van Burgst (Yogyakarta), 9-8-1816.
Crawfurd later commented that the latter was the favourite wife of Hamengkubuwana III, but was less ‘respectable’ than Ratu Kencana, who was a plain woman with considerable influence over the mind of her son. The Belgian artist, Antoine Auguste Joseph Payen (1792-1853), who met Ratu Kencana (then Ratu Ageng) in Yogyakarta at the time of the outbreak of the Java War, described her as a person of great dignity (Carey 1981a:265 note 120, 1988:58), a view echoed in the chronicle which thought she acted ‘like a man’, both at the time of the British attack when she had been lightly wounded in the foot by sepoy sniper fire as she accompanied her husband in his flight from the kadipatèn (Carey 1992:77, 222), and on the occasion of his final illness and death in November 1814 (Carey 1992:187, 382). During the minority (1814-1820) of her son, the fourth sultan (reigned 1814-1822), she came to exercise an important sway over kraton politics deciding most of the significant issues with her key advisers. Crawfurd thought highly of her: ‘[Ratu Kencana’s] moderation and discretion renders this power very safe in her hands’. But this was not the view of her stepson, Dipanagara. He came to despise her loose morals – she apparently had an affair with a court dancer who specialised in masked dance (topèng) performances (Hageman 1856:39) – and her close association with two of his bitterest enemies within the kraton administration. These were the patih, Danureja IV (in office 1813-1847), and the commander of the sultan’s bodyguard, Radèn Tumenggung Major Wiranagara, with whom the ratu was also romantically linked (Chapter III).

The latter, known in his youth by his santri name of Mas Mukidin, was a descendant of the late seventeenth-century Balinese adventurer, Untung Surapati (died 1706), and a son of the former patih of the kadipatèn, Mas Tumenggung Wiraguna (died 1807; Appendix VIIb). He was married for a time to one of the prince’s younger sisters, Radèn Ayu Gusti (Mandoyokusumo 1977:30 no. 8), and rose high in the court of Ratu Kencana’s son, Hamengkubuwana IV, because of his gift for making jokes and acting the court jester, skills which Dipanagara despised. Appointed royal bodyguard commander in 1819, he took the Dutch side during the Java War despite having promised Dipanagara that he would join him and bring the child sultan, Hamengkubuwana V, over to the prince’s Selarong headquarters in late July 1825. Cursed by the prince for breaking his word (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, VI:251), he was richly rewarded by the Dutch at the end of the war with the title of Pangéran Adipati Prabuningrat and a quasi-independent landholding in the Nanggulon area of Kulon Praga (Rouffaer 1905:597-8; Carey 1981a:245 note 41, 278 note 178). But his fall was equally swift: ambitious to get his wife recognised as a ratu (royal consort) and constantly intriguing against the fifth

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44 UBL, BPL 616, Port. 5 pt. 5, John Crawfurd (Yogyakarta) to H.G. Nahuys van Burgst (Yogyakarta), 9-8-1816.
sultan and his younger brother, the Crown Prince (the future sixth sultan, reigned 1855-1877), he was exiled to Banda in 1832 where he ended his days (Sartono Kartodirdjo 1971:57 note 16). Yogya contemporaries attributed his misfortune to Dipanagara’s curse, the prince being renowned for the power of his maledictions (Louw and De Klerk 1894-1909, VI:251). Ratu Ageng would also have an unhappy end, dying in the second year of the war (20 June 1826) of an illness brought on by what the Yogya babad describes as deep emotional affliction which had overwhelmed the sultanate. In a famous article, the Dutch historian, P.H. van der Kemp, compared Dipanagara to the Shakespearean tragic hero, Hamlet, and based an important strand of his argument on this enmity-filled relationship between the prince and his stepmother with her politically ambitious younger lover fulfilling the role of the usurping king of Denmark (Van der Kemp 1896a:310-3).

At the same time as the new titles were accorded the sultan’s female relatives, the older male offspring of the ruler also received new names and ranks. Three of Dipanagara’s younger brothers were appointed as pangéran (princes) and his uncle, Pangéran Panengah, was accorded the new name of Pangéran Dipawiyana. Both the Javanese accounts and contemporary Residency letters mention that the latter became one of the third sultan’s most trusted advisers and was a great favourite in the meetings of the nayaka. Dipanagara himself later commented that ‘the Pangéran was very much attached to the rule of the British [...] [and] was a philosopher who followed all the commands of The Prophet and died as a wali [apostle of Islam].

46 B.Ng. III:48, XV.1-2. Jeng Ratu Ageng tansahl sungkawa ing kalbu kéhang sewaya Naréndra/ maksih timur rasaking praja ngranuhir ginagas saya krasa. 2. cipta ngenes kapepes sru atis/ kutusing ing yatas tenah nandhang gerah/ lestari tumekèng layon. The Yogya babad states that she died shortly before 10 Sura, Jimakir AJ 1754 (AD 14-8-1826) as the date of her death, which is not confirmed in the Yogya Residency archive giving the date as 20-6-1826, Dj.Br. 6, ‘Vergadering van den raad uitmakende het bestuur van het rijk van Djokjokarta’, 20-6-1826.

47 These appear to have been Pangéran Adinagara (post-1825, Pangéran Suryèngalaga; born circa 1788), Pangéran Suryabrangta (post-1830, Pangéran Purwadiniringrat; born circa 1789), Pangéran Adisurya (circa 1803-1829), see Appendix VIII; Schneither 111, ‘Naamlijst van de in de maand October 1823 nog in leven zijnde prinsen en princessen van de vorstelijke bloed in het ryk van Mataram’. A.H.W. de Kock described Adinagara (Suryèngalaga), subsequently Hamengkubuwana V’s father-in-law, as ‘a great supporter of Dipanagara’ and ‘not an honest man, but peaceful, stupid and fanatical’, whereas Suryabrangta (Purwadiniringrat), who served as ‘treasurer’ to Hamengkubuwana V (reigned 1822-1826, 1828-1855) after the Java War, was ‘peaceful, stupid and simple’ and ‘a man of little influence’, Dj.Br. 19’, ‘Memorie van overgave’, Yogya, 17-5-1851. Pangéran Adisurya, who shared Dipanagara’s interest in Javanese-Islamic mysticism (Chapter III), died during a period of solitary retreat on Mount Sirmabayu (Bagelèn) in 1829 during the Java War and achieved a moksa (remainderless) death according to Dipanagara, Carey 1974b:273; BD (Manado) IV:209, XXXVIII.44-6. See further p. 663 note 22.


Dipawiyana’s son, was married to one of Dipanagara’s sisters and both later accompanied the prince into exile in Manado remaining with him for the first two years of his banishment (Appendix XII).

Shortly after his father’s appointment, Dipanagara (then still styled Radên Antawirya) received his new princely title of Bendara Pangérân Aria Dipanagara (Carey 1992:116, 284, 442 note 211). As we have seen, his previous name devolved on his eldest son, the future Pangérân Dipanagara II, who had been born of a secondary wife at Tegalreja (Chapter III). The elder Dipanagara also received an enhanced 500 cacah anpanage at this time with a personal stipend of 700 Spanish dollars a year from the court paid out of the annual gratuity of 100,000 Spanish dollars given to the Yogya kraton by the British government for the tax-farm of the tollgates and markets in the sultan’s territory under the terms of the soon to be signed 1 August 1812 treaty (Van Deventer 1891:322-3; Appendix VIII). Many of the lands in his July 1812 anpanage grant appear to have been situated to the south of Yogya, particularly in the Kulon Praga and Bantul districts (Van der Kemp 1896a:405; Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:432, V:745; Carey 1981a:238 note 20; Chapter III). Amongst these may have been the area around Selaorang immediately to the west of Bantul where the prince created his personal retreat. This had earlier belonged to the slain Radên Tumenggung Sumadiningrat, the second sultan’s army commander, who had been the guardian of Dipanagara’s younger brother, Pangérân Adinagara (Chapter II note 25; Carey 1981a:238 note 20). Others were situated in Bagelèn, Banyumas and Sokawati. They replaced lands which Dipanagara had previously held in Kedhu and which had now been annexed to the British government (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:745). By the time of the outbreak of the Java War, the prince’s landholdings had apparently doubled to 1,000 cacah all of which were given to his uncle, Pangérân Panular, who replaced him as a guardian of the child sultan, Hamengkubuwana V, in August 1825.\footnote{Dj:Br. 6, ‘Vergadering bij den raad uitmakende het ëstuur over het rijk van Djocjakarta, 1825-1826’, entry for 19-11-1825.}

Given the fame – or rather notoriety if one takes the view of the south-central Javanese kraton – that the name ‘Dipanagara’ would later acquire following the Java War (no Javanese prince since that time has ever been given that title), it is worth recalling that it was not such an unusual moniker for a Javanese prince in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. One of Sunan Pakubuwana I’s (reigned 1703-1719) sons, who had been involved on the rebel side in the Second Javanese War of Succession (1719-1723; Ricklefs 1993a:87), had borne this epithet, as had the second husband of Sultan Mangkubumi’s daughter, Ratu Bendara (circa 1750-1786), who had died in July 1787.\footnote{This prince was a son of Pangérân Ngabèhi Saloringpasar and grandson of Sunan Amangkurat IV (reigned 1719-1726), who had joined Sultan Mangkubumi during the Third Javanese War of Succession/Giyanti War (1746-1755), see Ricklefs 1974a:117-8, 296; Carey and Hoadley 2000:145.}


51 This prince was a son of Pangérân Ngabèhi Saloringpasar and grandson of Sunan Amangkurat IV (reigned 1719-1726), who had joined Sultan Mangkubumi during the Third Javanese War of Succession/Giyanti War (1746-1755), see Ricklefs 1974a:117-8, 296; Carey and Hoadley 2000:145.
same title had also been held by a younger brother of Pakubuwana IV (reigned 1788-1820), who passed away in April 1811. It was the norm at the south-central Javanese courts that only one prince at a time would bear a particular name, but since the title had been vacant in Yogya since 1787 and the former bearer had been held in high regard by the first sultan (note 51), the third sultan may have deemed it an appropriate style for his eldest son. Later, on his journey into exile, when he had passed his princely title to his own eldest child (Chapter III), Dipanagara gave an interesting etymological analysis of his name to the German officer, Second Lieutenant Julius Heinrich Knoerle, who accompanied him to Manado. In Knoerle’s words:

‘Dipa’ [from the Sanskrit ‘dīpa’] means someone who spreads enlightenment or who possesses life and force. It was in this sense that Dipanagara understood his name. ‘Nagara’ means a country or a province and ‘Dipanagara’ is thus a man who gives enlightenment, power and prosperity to a country.

The prince went on to stress that the particular etymological explanation was unique to his name and not to that of his cousin and brother-in-law, Radèn Tumenggung Dipawiyana, who was travelling with him. This indicates that he may have been linking his new moniker with his grandfather Sultan Mangkubumi’s prophecy about his future historical significance as the descendant who would rise against the Dutch and cause them even more destruction than he had done during the Gyianti War (1746-1755) but that only the Almighty knew the outcome (p. 71).

Other changes mainly affected the sultan’s officials. The former ruler’s pengulu (head of the Yogya religious establishment), Muhamad Sapingi, an ulama of Sundanese origin, who had fled back to west Java at the time of the British attack, was replaced by Dipanagara’s friend, Kyai Rahmanudin, a member of the Suranatan corps (Carey 1992:118, 284, 441-2 note 210). Meanwhile, Sumadiningrat’s old position of patih jero (First Inner bupati) was filled by Radèn Tumenggung Pringgakusuma (circa 1750-1815), the former bupati of Rawa (Tulung-Agung) and brother-in-law of the third sultan, whose services during Radèn Rongga’s rebellion in leading the loyal mancanagara bupati had been particularly appreciated by the court (Chapter VI notes 208, 212). He was given the new title of Radèn Tumenggung Pringgadiningrat

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52 Padmasusastra 1902:158 no. 40; Dj.Br. 37, Hamengkubuwana II and Raja Putra Narendra (Yogyakarta) to Pakubuwana IV (Surakarta), 2-5-1811 (official Yogya commiserations on death of Pakubuwana IV’s younger brother).
54 In the case of his cousin, Radèn Tumenggung Dipawiyana, Dipanagara held that the epithet ‘Dipa’ meant an elephant rather than someone who spreads enlightenment, Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 10.
55 Mandoyokusumo 1977:18 no. 3. Pringgakusuma’s wife was a daughter of Hamengkubuwana II by his favourite unofficial wife, Bendara Radèn Ayu Sepuh, and almost the direct contemporary of Hamengkubuwana III (born 20-2-1769).
and remained until his death in May 1815 an important counsellor of both Hamengkubuwana III and his son. Indeed, he was even put forward as a replacement for the acting Yogya patih, Mas Tumenggung Sindunagara (Kyai Adipati Danureja III), when the latter was forcibly retired in December 1813 (Carey 1992:116, 285, 442-3 note 213, 490 note 429).

Many of the new appointments involved those who had afforded the third sultan the most support during his turbulent last months as Crown Prince. Prominent amongst these were, of course, the members of the Danurejan family. Two in particular were singled out for special favour: the first was Radèn Tumenggung Mertawijaya, Dipanagara’s brother-in-law (Appendix II), who replaced his father, the murdered Radèn Tumenggung Danukusuma I, as one of the Outer bupati or nayaka with the title of Radèn Tumenggung Danukusuma II. The other was Radèn Ria Mandura (post-1813, Radèn Tumenggung Sindunagara II), the acting patih, Sindunagara I’s son, who was appointed as head of the porters’ guild.56 Crawfurd remarked that although good men, neither had any real qualifications for their new positions other than their ancestry, adding caustically ‘but such is the dearth of talent for business amongst the Javanese chiefs, that I am not sure that Djocjocarta [Yogyakarta] would afford from their class men who would fill these positions better’.57 The chronicle is even more disparaging, speaking of Danukusuma II’s younger brothers as idle lay-abouts who spent their time smoking opium and sleeping, giving their mother, Radèn Ayu Danukusuma, an avid reader of Javanese-Islamic mystical literature or sastra pégon (pp. 99-100), no support in her penurious widowhood (Carey 1992:157, 343).

Important new links between the third sultan’s immediate family and the Danurejan were also established through the marriage of two of Danureja II’s orphaned daughters to the new monarch’s sons: the eldest, Radèn Ajeng Kapilah (born circa 1800) was betrothed on 28 June 1813 to Pangéran Suryabrangta (post-1830, Pangéran Purwadiningrat) and the second (post-1816, Ratu Kencana, born circa 1802), became the consort of the ruler’s heir, Hamengkubuwana IV, on 13 May 1816 (Carey 1992:163-4, 199-201, 352, 396-8, 493 note 452, 504-5 note 509, 526 note 627; Appendix II). The latter marriage effectively set the seal on the rehabilitation of the Danurejan family fortunes after the vicissitudes of the second sultan’s reign. The return of Radèn Tumenggung Danukusuma I’s body from the traitor’s plot at Banyusumurup to the family graveyard at Melangi on 27 November 1812 (Chapter VII note

56 UBL, BPL 616 Port. 5 pt. 5, John Crawfurd (Yogyakarta) to H.G. Nahuys van Burgst (Yogyakarta), 9-8-1816; Carey 1992:285, 443 notes 214-5. Van Ijseldijk suggests that another of Sindunagara’s sons, Radèn Tumenggung Jaganagara, had become head of the porters’ guild (wedana gladhag), but that his addiction to opium rendered him unsuitable for the post, Baud 306, Van Ijseldijk, ‘Rapport’, 11-12-1816.

57 UBL, BPL 616 Port. 5 pt. 5, John Crawfurd (Yogyakarta) to H.G. Nahuys van Burgst (Yogyakarta), 9-8-1816; Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, II:422.
188), although curiously not that of his son, also helped to efface the previous stigma of treachery. Ties between the two families thus continued on a cordial and intimate level and would result in substantial support from the Danurejan for Dipanagara during the Java War (Chapters III, VI, and XI).

Amongst the eastern mancanagara officials, both Pangéran Dipakusuma and Radèn Rongga Prawirasentika were continued as acting bupati wedana. The former had earlier been denounced to Crawfurd as one of the third sultan’s principal opponents (Chapter VII), but he seems to have quickly established better relations with the new ruler resulting in the marriage of one of his sons with a daughter of Hamengkubuwana III on 28 June 1813 (Carey 1992:493 note 452). Both the chronicle (Carey 1992:113, 277, 402 note 18a) and Crawfurd confirm his role as one of the monarch’s trusted confidants, the Resident observing that:

[he] is an experienced chief well acquainted with the whole history of the relation [of Yogyakarta] with the European power. He is a man of good understanding, and although I had once imbibed an unfavourable opinion of him, I am now convinced of his fidelity and discretion.

Later Dutch officials were more cautious. W.H. van Ijsseldijk, who served as ambassador extraordinary (buitengewoon gezant) to the courts in August-October 1816, was concerned that Dipakusuma should be kept in Yogyakarta rather than be allowed to spend too much time in Madiun. The combination of his administrative talents and high birth – his grandmother had been a sister of Radèn Mas Garendi, the ‘Yellow Sunan’ (Sunan Kuning), so-called because he was installed on the Kartasura throne during the Chinese war (1740-1743; Remmelink 1994:176), and his father had been a direct descendant of Sunan Amangkurat III (reigned 1703-1708) – meant, in Van Ijsseldijk’s view, that he ‘could do much harm’. He noted that some of Dipakusuma’s relatives, like himself born in Ceylonese banishment, had been brought back to Madura by the British, and speculated that the proximity of Dipakusuma in Madiun and his recently returned relatives in Madura could be the nexus of a new eastern mancanagara rebellion. But this was far-fetched. The days of Radèn Rongga were over. The pangéran would remain scrupulously loyal to the European government until his death in 1822, even leading the fourth sultan’s dele-

58 Danureja II’s body remained at Banyusumurup until Hamengkubuwana VI’s reign (1855-1877), see Chapter VII note 119. It is unclear why Hamengkubuwana III moved Danukusuma’s body but not that of his politically more significant son.
59 UBL, BPL 616 Port. 5 pt. 5, John Crawfurd (Yogyakarta) to H.G. Nahuys van Burgst (Yogyakarta), 9-8-1816.
60 Baud 306, Van Ijsseldijk, ‘Rapport’, 11-12-1816. The British had seized control of Ceylon from the Dutch in 1795-1796 and had made it a crown colony in 1802. Some of the high-born Javanese exiles, whom the Dutch had transported there during the course of the eighteenth century for political reasons, were allowed back to Java at the time of the British occupation (1811-1816).
gation to greet the incoming Dutch commissioners-general in Batavia at the
time of the hand-over of the colony in August 1816.\footnote{UBL, BPL 616, Port. 5 pt. 2, H.G. Nahuys van Burgst (Yogyakarta) to Commissioners-General (Batavia), 13-8-1816; B.Ng. I:406, C. 1-3, states that Dipakusuma departed on 5 Ruwah AJ 1743 (AD 1-7-1816) accompanied by four Yogya bupati.}

Within a few months of the third sultan’s accession most of the important changes in the kra
ton had been made. In his babad, Dipanagara describes how,
shortly after Raffles’ departure on 23 June, he had begged his father to allow him to return to Tegalreja, but his request had been refused. Instead, he was lodged in the kra
ton at one of the pavilions called the Gedhong Kuning (Yellow Building). A few weeks later in mid-July, he again approached the sultan about granting him permission to return to his estate because he felt distinctly ill at ease in the court environment. But his father, fearing that if he moved back to his residence he would be too far away to help him with the conduct of daily affairs, assigned him a small lodging at Mijen on the western outskirts of Yogya half way to Tegalreja.\footnote{BD (Manado) II:223, XVII.76-80, reference to Dipanagara’s feelings of ‘great unease’ (sanget rikuh) in the kra
ton.} It is unclear how long he remained there. Certainly, by late 1813, he had moved back to Tegalreja because he describes in his babad how Tan Jin Sing was sent out to him with a shortlist of two names from which to select the new patih in early December 1813 (p. 396). The prince also mentions how he still came to Yogya for the thrice yearly Javanese-Islamic Garebeg festivals (pp. 87-8), as well as making special journeys when matters of particular importance had to be discussed. According to Dipanagara, the third sultan likewise journeyed out to Tegalreja from time to time to talk over minor affairs with his eldest son.\footnote{BD (Manado) II:228, XVII.99-101.} The prince’s claim that he acted as one of his father’s closest advisers during this period is confirmed in the chronicle, which gives the following description of him in these months immediately after the third sultan’s appointment (Carey 1992:290):

XXIV.21 Of the sultan’s sons, the one who was made foremost was Pangéran Dipanagara, for he was the eldest, [and] his heart was at one with his father.

22 He was shrewd, generous [and] of a lively and spirited manner, not afraid in front of the multitudes. He spoke easily [and] sweetly with a friendly countenance, [and] took pains with all the people of the kingdom, for he was invested by his father. Great [and] small, young [and] old, all were under his authority.
He took charge of affairs with the Residency: on each Monday [and] Thursday the Pangéran visited the Residency accompanied by Pangéran Dipawiyana, The younger brother of the sultan.

The fact that Dipanagara took charge of the negotiations with the Residency is also mentioned in the prince’s babad where he relates that he was particularly tasked with discussing the terms of the new treaty between Yogyakarta and the British government. This does not seem to have involved him going to the Residency in person. This was the job of Pangénéran Dipakusuma and the acting patih, Mas Tumenggung Sindunagara (Kyai Adipati Danureja III). But, according to the prince’s testimony, every time Sindunagara had met with Crawford, he, Dipanagara, would see him in the Kemandhungan pavilion in the kraton to talk over any outstanding matters in the company of the nayaka. The third sultan himself was also involved as we know from Crawford’s report that he had personally approved the article in the draft treaty abolishing torture, mutilation (the chopping off of arms under Islamic law) and the pitting of criminals against tigers and other wild beasts (Carey 1980:99; note 101). He was said to have observed at that time that torture was ‘certain injustice to the innocent and a double punishment even to the guilty’, at which Crawford noted,

His Highness is possessed by a degree of humanity [which is] not a usual concomitant of the Javanese character. During the reigns of the last two sultans [Hamengkubuwana I, 1749-1792, and Hamengkubuwana II, 1792-1810, 1811-1812] torture and mutilation were constantly practised and the combat of criminals with tigers and other animals often occurred [in] circumstances of aggravated horror.

Discussions over the treaties occupied slightly over two weeks and on 14 July, Raffles submitted a draft to Lord Minto which was to serve as the basis for negotiation with the courts. The final treaties were concluded a fortnight later (1 August 1812), eventually being ratified by the governor-general of India in council on 2 October 1813. We will return to the political significance of

64 D.Br. 14B, John Crawfurd (Yogyakarta) to T.S. Raffles (Semarang), 15-7-1812. For an interesting reference by Dipanagara to the administration of justice during Hamengkubuwana III’s reign, see Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 30, ‘Dipanagara spoke about the way he and his father [Hamengkubuwana III] had always tried to bestow justice on the Javanese […] starting on the principle that no one should be punished who was not clearly convicted [found guilty] of committing a crime.’
65 BD (Manado) II:224, XVIII.80-3.
66 S.Br. 14B, John Crawfurd (Yogyakarta) to T.S. Raffles (Semarang), 15-7-1812.
67 IOL, Raffles-Minto collection (Xerox copies of holograph letters), vol. 3, T.S. Raffles (Salatiga) to Lord Minto (Calcutta), 5-8-1812; Eur F148/23 (Raffles-Minto collection, vol. 23), T.S. Raffles (Salatiga) to Lord Minto (Calcutta), 6-8-1812, Secret & Political no. 8; Van Deventer 1891:12, 326 note 1; Carey 1980:97-9.
68 IOL, G21/39, Java Separate Consultations, 8-3-1814.
these contracts shortly. But first we need to consider the trustworthiness of Dipanagara’s account of his key role in these treaty negotiations. We have already seen (pp. 315-6) that nowhere in Crawfurd’s extant letters is there any mention of the prince’s contribution as a plenipotentiary on behalf of his father prior to the British attack on the kraton. Given that Valck retained many of the Residency letters from this period for his own private collection, his statement that the prince was indeed used as a go-between has been accepted for this earlier period. But for the subsequent treaty negotiations there is a problem: if Dipanagara did indeed enjoy the close and cordial relationship with Crawfurd which the prince later boasted about to Knoerle (p. 109), why did the Scotsman make no mention at all of Dipanagara to his successor, Nahuys van Burgst, when he drew up his list of the main personalities at the Yogya court a day before his departure from the sultan’s capital on 10 August 1816? Since Dipanagara had returned to Tegalreja by this time and rarely visited the court, it is possible that Crawfurd overlooked him. But on one particular detail, it can be proved beyond a shadow of doubt that the influence, which the prince claimed he had with Crawfurd, had no basis in reality. This was the matter of the appointment of the Scotsman’s Dutch successor. According to Dipanagara, on apprehending that Java would be handed back to the Dutch in August 1816, he expressed his concern to the British Resident over the character of his replacement. Crawfurd was then supposed to have asked the prince what sort of Dutch Resident he would prefer: one who had already served in Java under the Dutch East Indies Company (VOC), namely before Daendels’ arrival in January 1808, or one more recently arrived from Europe? Dipanagara had opted for the latter, whereupon Crawfurd was reported to have said that he had a good acquaintance in Batavia by the name of ‘Major Nahuys [van Burgst]’, and that he would try to get him as his replacement. Soon afterwards Nahuys did indeed arrive in Yogya which confirmed Dipanagara’s view of the power and influence of the British.

But this does not accord with the Dutch sources. According to P.H. van der Kemp (1911:223), Jan Tiedeman, an experienced administrator and landowner, who was a close friend and business partner of Daendels’ Secretary-General Hendrik Veeckens (De Haan 1935a:654) was appointed by the returned Dutch government as Resident designate of Yogya. But at the last moment he asked to be excused from the post for pressing family reasons. The incoming Dutch governor-general, G.A.G.Ph. van der Capellen, then sought a replacement and Nahuys van Burgst was eventually appointed by executive decision of 22 July 1816. The choice of Nahuys also had much to do with the help he had given to Pakualam I (then Pangéran Natakusuma) and his son, Natadiningrat, when

69 UBL, BPL 616 Port. 5 pt. 5, John Crawfurd (Yogyakarta) to H.G. Nahuys van Burgst (Yogyakarta), 9-8-1816.
they were in danger of their lives in Cirebon in early May 1811 (Chapter VII). As C.T. Elout, one of the Dutch commissioner-generals charged with overseeing the takeover of the Netherlands-Indies in 1816-1819 observed, Nahuys’ residence at the court of Jogjakarta [Yogyakarta] seemed very promising: ‘[he will be] extremely useful [to us] not only for his well-known and much to be praised diligence and attachment to his king [William I, reigned 1813-1840] and fatherland, but particularly for the serendipitous service which he was able [to provide] earlier to the regent [Pakualam I]’ (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:36 note 1). Pakualam himself was naturally delighted at the decision, and relieved that the former Daendelian, Tiedeman, had not taken up the post (Van der Kemp 1913:321).

Fortunate though Nahuys’ appointment may have been for some members of the Yogya elite, Dipanagara’s unsubstantiated claim that he was in some way responsible for his selection indicates that he may have greatly exaggerated his friendship with Crawfurd. His role as his father’s principal link with the Residency at the time of the treaty negotiations must also be questioned. Perhaps this exaggeration may have been prompted by the prince’s later difficulties as a guardian of the fifth sultan during the two years before the Java War. Indeed, when he came to dictate his autobiographical babad in exile in Manado in 1831-1832, he may have looked back on the British interregnum as something of a golden age when he had enjoyed a prominent and privileged position as his father, the third sultan’s, principal confidant.

Although he may not have been as close to Crawfurd as he later pretended, this does not gainsay the fact that he clearly appreciated the Scotsman’s style and abilities. As we have seen in the previous chapter (pp. 297-303), after a difficult start, Crawfurd turned into a remarkably successful Resident of Yogyakarta far outshining his Dutch predecessors and immediate successors in the scope of his scholarly activities and the incisiveness of his administrative skills. His rather dour and parsimonious character (Abdullah 1970:223-4; pp. 109, 437) appear to have made him especially well suited to the stiff charm of the Yogyanese, amongst whom was the young Dipanagara whose ‘sombre and intense’ personality was noted by Dutch contemporaries (Van Hogendorp 1913:146). Certainly Crawfurd’s own persona stood in sharp contrast to that of his ebullient Dutch successor as can be judged from a brief comparison of their very different styles as dinner party hosts (p. 437). But even Nahuys, who was as different from Crawfurd as chalk from cheese, noted on the first day of his incumbency as Resident that his predecessor had come to be ‘very much loved and esteemed at the [Yogya] court’ (Van der Kemp 1911:248, 1913:320-1), a judgement later echoed by the Dutch historian, François de Haan (1935a:529). His willingness to allow his horses to take part in races sponsored by the Yogya court undoubtedly endeared him to the inhabitants of Yogya, especially Dipanagara and his father who both shared the usual kra-
The literary and historical knowledge of the third sultan (p. 70) and Dipanagara’s own familiarity with Javanese-Islamic texts (pp. 103-4, 743-5) may well have formed common ground for friendship with the British Resident, although direct references to this are lacking. Crawfurd’s presence in Yogya throughout most of the period of British rule (Appendix IX) undoubtedly contributed to the restoration of good relations between the Yogya court and the European government after the twin traumas of Daendels’ December 1810 treaty and the British attack on the kraton.

The 1 August 1812 treaties and their implications

The treaties signed between the British government and the courts on 1 August 1812 gave legal title to the radically altered political environment in which the south-central Javanese kraton were now forced to exist. In his letter of 6 August 1812 to Lord Minto, Raffles gave a useful summary of the treaties as they appeared in their final form. He remarked first that he had all along regarded the 28 December 1811 treaty with Yogya as a temporary measure forced on him by his disadvantageous political and military position at the time (p. 301). The new treaties, the lieutenant-governor averred, would place the south-central Javanese courts ‘on such a footing as might no longer endanger the tranquillity of the country’ and would open up their administrations to significant liberalisation and reform. Despite the manifest treachery of the Sunan in cutting the British lines of communication with

71 On the Javanese nobility and royalty’s admiration for English bloodstock, see IOL Mack. Pr. 21 pt. 4, Crawfurd, ‘Sultan’s country’, 91; Dj.Br. 49, Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 15-9-1803 (on Hamengkubuwana II’s love of English horses); Winter 1902:43 (on the practice of riding instruction from the age of twelve as de rigueur for Javanese courtiers); D’Almeida 1864, II:57; Carey 1992:418 note 93 (on Raffles’ gift of fine English horses to Mangkunagara II); dK 161, Van Nes, ‘Korte Verhandeling’, 28-1-1830 (on the gift of a 700 Spanish dollar horse to John Deans, secretary of the Yogya Residency (in office 1811-1813), from Hamengkubuwana III for facilitating his accession); Carey 1981a:247 note 45, 277 note 172, 278 note 175, 280 note 187 (on Dipanagara’s horsemanship and mounts during the Java War); Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 11 (on Dipanagara’s bitterness at the way the thoroughbred horses which had been presented to him by various Dutch officers had been taken from him at Magelang after his 28-3-1830 arrest), 21-2 (on the 60 grooms Dipanagara maintained at Tegalreja to look after his horses). Two large stone drinking troughs, which were used to water Dipanagara’s horses at Tegalreja, were still visible in 1971-1973 when I was doing my fieldwork research in Yogyakarta.

72 Javanese originals of the treaties with Dutch and English translations are in Dj.Br. 42 (i). Published versions based on these English translations are in Van Deventer 1891:321-31. See also IOL, Eur F148/23 (Raffles-Minto collection, vol. 23), T.S. Raffles (Semarang) to Hamengkubuwana III (Yogyakarta), 1-8-1812.

73 IOL, Eur F148/23 (Raffles-Minto collection, vol. 23), T.S. Raffles (Salatiga) to Lord Minto (Calcutta), 6-8-1812.
Semarang during the British attack on Yogya and the discovery of the secret correspondence in which the distinctive handwriting of Pakubuwana IV was clearly visible,\textsuperscript{74} Raffles had not thought it necessary to mount an expedition against Surakarta. Instead, he had sought to place the Sunan on the same level as the third sultan by the terms of the new treaty, ‘a measure essential for the welfare and stability of the country’. In order to ensure the Surakarta ruler’s agreement he had remained in Semarang throughout the month of July with a sufficiently large military force at his disposal to give the impression that he was prepared to march on Surakarta at a moment’s notice.\textsuperscript{75} At the same time, he reckoned that if the Sunan’s personal vanity was flattered by the attentions of the Resident, he would remain content.\textsuperscript{76} The Surakarta patih, Radèn Adipati Cakranagara (in office 1810-1812), who had played such a prominent role in the secret correspondence with Yogya (p. 319), was, however, dismissed from his post and banished to Surabaya where he had family connections.\textsuperscript{77} 

Regarding the detailed clauses of the treaties, Raffles made a number of interesting observations to Minto. The second article, which forbade the rulers to maintain any military forces except for that permitted by the British government ‘to protect their persons and territories’, was particularly directed against

\textsuperscript{74} AN, Kabinet Missive 17-5-1846 no. 134, ‘Troonsopvolging in het rijk van Soerakarta’, Baron W.R. van Hoëvell (Surakarta) to J.J. van Rochussen (Batavia), 4-3-1846 (on the very distinctive handwriting of Pakubuwana IV); IOL Eur F148/24 (Raffles-Minto collection, vol. 24), Hugh Hope (Surakarta) to T.S. Raffles (Bogor), 2-4-1813, remarked that amongst the papers found in the Yogya kraton were the originals of the secret correspondence and Pakubuwana IV’s handwriting had been immediately recognised.

\textsuperscript{75} IOL, Mack.Pr. 2, 73-81, Hugh Hope, ‘Minutes of a conversation with His Highness the Soosoohoonan [Susuhunan]’, 10-7-1812; Hugh Hope (Surakarta) to T.S. Raffles (Semarang), 12-7-1812, on the pressure exerted on Pakubuwana IV and his agreement to cede Blora, Wirasaba, and the Surakarta areas of Kedu and Pacitan in lieu of the 200,000 Spanish dollar bill which Raffles had presented him as the cost of preparing an expedition against Surakarta.

\textsuperscript{76} BL Additional MS 45272, T.S. Raffles (Rijswijk/Batavia) to Lord Minto (Calcutta), 21-1-1812; Dj.Br. 29, Major Jeremiah Martin Johnson (Surakarta) to T.S. Raffles (Rijswijk/Batavia), 1-1-1814, relating that one of the most important duties of the Resident at the Surakarta court was to supply the Sunan every day with food from the Residency kitchen at his own expense. Fresh bread, milk, butter and cheese were provided together with strong drink, mainly port, Madeira, claret, beer and spirits, at an annual cost of 1,128 Spanish dollars. Earlier, Colonel Alexander Adams (in office 1811-1812) had tried to put a stop to the practice declaring bitterly that ‘he was no restaurant keeper’, but it had led to much bad feeling and was one of the reasons for Adams’ removal, De Haan 1935a:483-5; IOL, Raffles-Minto collection (Xerox copy of holograph letters), vol. 3, T.S. Raffles (Semarang) to Lord Minto (Calcutta), 16-7-1812, where he observed: ‘Colonel Adams, altho’ a very ready man with the pen and a man of very general observation and ready comprehension, managed to completely bungle matters at the court’.

\textsuperscript{77} Dj.Br. 29, Lieutenant Richard Hart (Surakarta) to T.S. Raffles (Bogor), circa 15-8-1813; Rouffaer 1905:607. On Cakranagara’s family connections in Surabaya, see Hageman 1855-56:260. The British Resident at Surakarta, Hugh Hope, later wrote to Raffles that Cakranagara should remain in his Surabaya exile and even mooted the thought of sending him further afield to Banda, IOL, G21/38, Java Separate Consultations, 1-11-1813, Hugh Hope (Semarang) to T.S. Raffles (Bogor), 4-10-1813.
VIII Into a new era: the British interregnum, 1812-1816

Yogya. According to the lieutenant-governor, the second sultan had kept up a considerable military establishment of 8-9,000 men, some paid in land and appropriations (pp. 5-9), others in cash stipends. Many of these had been permanently based in the royal capital. They had never, in Raffles’ view, been used for maintaining peace in the countryside or in police duties in Yogya, and the individuals composing the force ‘were the most idle, profligate and worthless part of the community’. Once they had been disbanded, he suggested, it would only be necessary for the government to maintain half a battalion of sepoys in the Yogya garrison to ensure security (Chapter VII note 157). The Sunan, however, was specifically allowed to retain 1,000 men as a guard of honour for the Surakarta troops, in Raffles’ estimation, ‘were more suited for the purposes of state than for hostilities and did not pose the same threat as those in Djojoe [Yogya]’.

The disbandment of the major part of the sultan’s bodyguard almost certainly caused hardship to many families in Yogya. As late as December 1813, the Assistant-Resident of Yogya wrote that most of the ex-members of the kraton regiments could find no suitable employment ‘work not being a fashionable employment at this place’. He suggested that they should be sent to Semarang rather than remain in Yogya to cause trouble. Crawford also remarked on the large number of Bugis and Balinese who had lost their livelihood as soldiers of fortune. At Raffles’ instigation, his governing Council in Batavia ordered that these men should be sent to Banjarmasin (south Kalimantan) to work in the estates of the lieutenant-governor’s friend, Alexander Hare, whose vaulting ambition to carve out a personal colonial fiefdom in eastern Borneo ultimately met with disappointment. But many seem to have remained in the sultan’s capital, engaging in small-time banditry and robbery and later affording Dipanagara substantial support during the early stages of the Java War (Carey 1981a:243-4 note 36, 252-3 note 72; pp. 623-6).

The third article of the treaties provided for the annexation of various mancanagara and core region territories. These included Japan (Majakerta), Jipang and Grobogan from Yogya; Blora and Wirasaba (Maja-agung) from Surakarta; and Kedhu and Pacitan which were held jointly by both courts.

78 See further IOL, Mack.Pr. 2, ‘Miscellaneous memoranda & notes [made] at the court of Solo or Souracarta [Surakarta] on the Susuhunan’s family, establishments, civil & military forces, revenues &c &c and customs of the court and people’, 1813-16, 209 (on Pakubuwana IV’s honour guard post-August 1812).
79 Dj.Br. 29, Lieutenant Richard Hart (Yogyakarta) to T.S. Raffles (Batavia/Bogor), 9-12-1813.
80 Dj.Br. 29, John Crawford (Yogyakarta) to Charles Assey (Batavia/Bogor), 21-3-1813; S.Br. 23, Charles Assey (Batavia/Bogor) to Hugh Hope (Surakarta), 13-3-1813. On Hare’s grandiose but ultimately unsuccessful scheme in eastern Borneo, see De Haan 1935a:562-5. Hare served as Resident of Banjarmasin (1812-1816) and political commissioner for the Native States of Borneo (1815-1816) during the British interregnum. See further note 124.
81 These included Jipang’s six component districts, namely Panolan, Padhangan, Rajegwesi, Sekaran, Dhuri (Wanaseraya) and Bauwerna, Carey 1992:455 note 265. On these annexations more generally, see Bastin 1954:94-104.
Raffles wrote that Kedhu was without doubt the finest province in Java producing upwards of 150,000 Spanish dollars each year in tax returns and occupying a strategic position with regard to the north coast. In the immediate post-Java War period, it was referred to as the ‘corn granary’ of the Principalities, and traditional Javanese cosmology held that the small hillock to the south of Magelang, Gunung Tidhar, was the ‘navel of Java’ whose destruction would lead to the whole island breaking into two and sinking into the sea (Carey 1992:454 note 263). More importantly, Kedhu’s acquisition rounded out government territory in central Java and ended the threat to security which had always been posed by rebels who had used the province as their base, a problem already identified in the Daendels’ period (p. 216; Chapter VII note 21). Dipanagara noted in his babad, probably on the basis of his conversations with the acting patih, Kyai Adipati Danureja III, that the province had been annexed primarily to pay for the costs of the recent military operations against Yogya. Once these had been met, its return to the south-central Javanese courts might be considered. This was, however, a vain hope; what the European government took it did not intend to return. Dipanagara also stated that in his negotiations with Crawfurd, he had stipulated that the taxes and dues in the annexed areas should continue to be paid to the previous landowners, a stipulation accepted by the British Resident. Again, this seems of dubious validity, although it may just have reflected Crawfurd’s own thinking on the introduction of Raffles’ flawed land-rent scheme.

Continuing with his survey of the annexed outlying districts, Raffles described Pacitan as a small fertile province important for its harbour which exported rice, salt, cotton, indigo and pepper. Its port facilities could also be used to prevent smuggling and piracy (Chapter V note 20). The other mancanagara provinces were all of economic interest because of their extensive teak forests and the easy transport afforded by the rivers, especially the Bengawan Sala which passed through the length of Jipang. The distance of these provinces from the courts had meant, according to Raffles, that they had been allowed

82 Thorn 1815:291, put the net landed income from Kedhu even higher at 600,000 Java rupees (300,000+ Spanish dollars). See further the figures in Raffles 1817, II:266-7. The land tax in Kedhu was fixed at 112,000 Spanish dollars in the first three half-yearly collections after its introduction in late 1812, see Bastin 1954:101.
84 BD (Manado) II:226, XVII.89-90.
85 BD (Manado) II:225, XVII.86-9.
86 On this, see IOL, Mack.Pr. 21, Crawfurd, ‘Landed tenures’, 245-8, 293-4; Day 1972:171-80. In opposition to Raffles, Crawfurd advocated that the bekel (village tax collectors), but not the demang (p. 15), should be considered as the permanent landowners and settlements made directly with them. In his view, if the Javanese official class were set aside, they would become drones and vagabonds. But the lieutenant-governor overruled him.
to fall into decay. Because of this they contained much less cultivated land than they had done sixty years’ previously in the aftermath of the Giyanti settlement (p. 51). By 1812, their total yearly revenue was a mere 57,000 Spanish dollars and the extensive uninhabited regions and mountainous areas had become the haunt of bandits who subsisted by plundering local villages and engaging in the smuggling of opium. 87 During the Java War, the population of Jipang in particular was noted for their disaffected attitude towards the Dutch government. Their long-held desire to return to Yogya administration (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, III:360) was one of the reasons for the overwhelming popular support for the rebellion of Dipanagara’s brother-in-law, Radèn Tumenggung Aria Sasradilaga, a son of the former Yogya bupati of Jipang and captain of the sultan’s bodyguard, who brought the whole of Rembang and Jipang into the war against the Dutch in 1827-1828 (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, III:490; Chapter XI).

The annexation of these eastern outlying provinces, many of which had earlier been demanded by Daendels, meant that numerous – but not all – Yogya and Surakarta bupati lost their positions and livelihood, for the British government only wanted to retain officials from the rank of sub-district head (demang, mantri désa) downwards. 88 Most of these bupati returned to the kraton where they eked out an impoverished existence (Carey 1992:122, 296, 454-5 note 264). Only a few from the eastern mancanagara, were reassigned to newly created – and much smaller – kabupatèn in Madiu. 89 The grievances of these prematurely dismissed bupati, the so-called bupati dhongkol, encouraged many to join Dipanagara in 1825 (Carey 1981a:240 note 28, 244-5 note 39). At the same time, the loss of Kedhu, the richest apanage area for the court princes

87 IOL, Eur F148/23 (Raffles-Minto collection, vol. 23), T.S. Raffles (Salatiga) to Lord Minto (Calcutta), 6-8-1812. In 1813, Hugh Hope, then serving as British Resident of Surakarta, estimated the likely government revenues (in Java rupees) from the annexed districts as follows: Grobogan (19,400), Jipang (19,300), and a combined revenue of 19,300 for Japan (Majakerta) and Wirasaba, S.Br. 23, Hugh Hope (Surakarta) to T.S. Raffles (Bogor), 9-5-1813.

88 IOL, Mack.Pr. 21 pt. 8, Crawfurd, ‘Report on Cadoe’, 308, mentioned that three Yogya bupati in charge of police duties had been allowed to remain in post in Kedhu because they had no political influence. On the newly appointed British bupati of Kedhu, Radèn Tumenggung Danungrat I (in office 1813-1825), who had earlier served as the demang of Bojong in Kedhu (in office 1810-1811) and was killed in battle outside Magelang in September 1825 by Dipanagara’s forces, see Carey 1992:439-40 note 203; Sutherland 1974:5-6. On the impact of the annexation on Yogya and Sala apanage holders and their respective senior bupati, the bupati bumija (Yogya) and bupati bumi (Sala), see Rouffaer 1905:593, 612, 620.

89 Dj.Br. 6, P.H. van Lawick van Pabst (Yogyakarta) to Hendrik MacGillavry (Surakarta), 1-2-1826, on the creation of new kabupatèn in Purwadadi, Kenitèn and Goranggarèng, for the prematurely dismissed bupati (bupati dhongkol) of Jipang, Japan (Majakerta), Grobogan and Wirasari. On the earlier creation of these new kabupatèn in Madiu in the aftermath of Radèn Rongga’s revolt in November-December 1810, see Chapter VII note 28. Since Daendels’ annexations had not been carried out because of the British invasion, it was only in the post-1 August 1812 that these new districts came into being as separate kabupatèn. See further Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:520; Carey 1981a:244-5 note 39.
and officials was, in many respects, even more serious since it affected a greater number of people and led to considerable difficulties over the redistribution of apanage lands in the remaining provinces (Rouffaer 1905:593; Van Deventer 1891:100). This was especially the case in Surakarta where even the British government’s close ally, Pangéran Prangwedana (Mangkunagara II), was forced to relinquish his 28 cacah landholding. Curiously, it appears that Crawfurd later leased these lands from Prangwedana and derived a handsome annual income of 150 ducats (just over £147 in contemporary money) from the annual crop yield. This was the equivalent of over half a month of his salary as Resident. Whether he used the opportunity of his September-December 1812 land survey of Kedhu to obtain the lease (Blagden 1916:109; Carey 1992:440-1 note 205) or struck some sort of personal bargain with Prangwedana is unclear. What is certain is that grievances over the loss of the province and hopes for its return would emerge as one of the key reasons for the Surakarta court’s support for the sepoy conspiracy of October-November 1815 as we will see shortly (Van der Kemp 1913:324-5; Carey 1977:322 note 120).

In Yogyakarta too there were problems. Pakualam I, who had substantial landholdings in Kedhu in the pre-August 1812 period, was said to have been planning a show of force against the Residency and the Chinese quarter. This was because of the loss of his apanage in the rich nagara agung district and his disappointment at his indemnification with poor quality ricefields in Bagélèn (Carey 1992:127-30, 308-10, 458 note 286, 459-60 note 292). The bitterness over Kedhu’s takeover remained raw for years afterwards: W.H. van IJsseldijk was struck by this during his commission as ambassador extraordinary to the courts in August-October 1816: in an interview with the second sultan’s elder brother, Pangéran Ngabèhi, then in his late seventies, complained that ‘as a sentana or prince of the old lineage, he had lost much of his means of subsistence because of the annexation of Kedhu’ (Van Deventer 1891:100). We also know from the official records and witness statements of the robberies which took place in Yogyä in the period leading up to the Java War that at least one was carried out by a prematurely pensioned official from the annexed districts.

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90 S.Br. 23, Hugh Hope (Surakarta) to T.S. Raffles (Bogor), 3-5-1813, explained that the lands held by Mangkunagara II had originally belonged to Ratu Bendara I, a daughter of Hamengkubuwana I and divorced wife of Mangkunagara I (Chapter II note 25). They brought him 700 Spanish dollars a year paid in two instalments at Mulud and Puwasa.

91 Houben 1994:104. On the value of the Dutch/Venetian gold ducat coin which circulated in Java at this time and which is variously given as f 5.76, f 4.32 and f 11, see Appendix XVI. I have used the highest value (f11) to calculate Crawfurd’s additional income. His initial monthly salary of 750 Spanish dollars with a further 250 Spanish dollars as commission from revenue collection during his period as Resident of Yogyä is given in De Haan 1935a:527.

92 The attacks were supposed to have been planned for October-November 1812. The pacinan was targeted because it was the home of the Yogyä kapitan cina, Tan Jin Sing, against whom Pakualam I bore a particular personal hatred, Carey 1992:462 note 304.

93 This was the case with the January 1819 attack on the home of the widow of the former Residency surgeon, Friederich Willem Baumgarten, which was led by a demang dhongkol (prematurely
The introduction of Raffles’ land tax scheme into these annexed regions and the lieutenant-governor’s over-optimistic view of their productive capacity – Kedhu in particular – resulted in great hardship for the local population. Not only were the tax demands pitched too high, but the population – particularly those with dry fields – were also forced to pay in cash – preferably silver – rather than in kind. This forced them into the hands of Chinese moneylenders who charged extortionate interest. At the same time, many of the previous dues and personal services expected by the local Javanese officials remained in force. Indirectly, Raffles’ land annexations in August 1812 exacerbated social problems at the courts and in Javanese society more widely. These would later manifest in the breadth of local support for Dipanagara at the time of the outbreak of the Java War (Carey 1981a:260 note 106). We will return to this issue of the land tax and its consequences during the post-1816 Dutch administration in the next chapter (Chapter IX).

The fourth article of the treaties dealt with the vexed question of the cession of the tollgates and markets in return for an annual payment of 100,000 Spanish dollars by the British government. This had already been allowed for in the December 1811 treaties (Chapter VII), but the clause had been the bone of much contention between Crawfurd and the second sultan, the latter refusing to negotiate their surrender to the British in the early months of 1812. In Yogya at this time, there were some thirty-four tollgates, with another four in the eastern manceanagara. In addition, there were four markets on which taxes were levied in the environs of the royal capital (Rajawinangun, Kuncèn, Gadhing and Pasar Beringharjo) together with others in Pacitan, Kutha Gedhé, Imagiri and Klatèn, the last attached to the porters’ guild. Of these only those in Yogya and Pacitan were taken over. Finally, there were two tobacco warehouses at Gunung Tawang and Sibebe (see Map 1 on p. 26) where dues were levied on the export of tobacco from Kedhu and Bagelèn to the north coast areas. These last would later be abolished during the period of the returned Dutch administration (Appendix XV). According to Raffles, the main duties at pensioned demang, by the name of Jowanto, who had lost his post (? in Kedhu) in 1813, S.Br. 131, ‘Verbalen Solo’, 8-2-1819. See further Chapter 1 note 160.

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97 IOL, Eur F148/23 (Raffles-Minto collection, vol. 23), T.S. Raffles (Salatiga) to Lord Minto (Calcutta), 6-8-1812, referred to 70-80 tollgates in the sultan’s lands but this is an exaggeration, see Appendix XV. AvJ, H.G. Nahuys van Burgst (Yogyakarta) to Director of Finances (Batavia), 12-7-1820, lists 34 tollgates in the Yogyakarta territories before the Java War.
98 AvJ, H.G. Nahuys van Burgst (Yogyakarta) to Director of Finances (Batavia), 12-7-1820; A.H. Smisnaert (Yogyakarta) to G.A.G.Ph. van der Capellen (Batavia/Bogor), 30-6-1824.
The tollgates were levied on rice, cotton and piece goods destined for the pasisir, and salt, oil and indigo which were traded internally. In his letter to Minto, the lieutenant-governor stressed the ‘injurious and arbitrary’ duties levied by the courts and suggested that these should be rationalised: grain should not be taxed, but trade in Javanese cloth should be discouraged by high ad valorem duties in order to facilitate the import of textiles from Bengal and England.\(^9^9\) Raffles’ attempts to encourage foreign cotton imports met with only limited success in the short term, mainly because early imports of Javanese batik patterns manufactured in Britain were found not to be dye-fast (p. 25). But the period of British rule did see a revival of trade in foreign piece goods, many of them from Bengal, which had fallen off so drastically during the British naval blockade (1795-1811). In the longer term, Raffles’ measure struck a blow at the local Javanese cotton industry which had been enjoying a decade and a half of unprecedented expansion due to the absence of foreign competition. By 1817, the Dutch Resident of Yogya, Nahuys van Burgst, noted that most of the indigo being grown in the sultanate and in Pacitan, which was reported to be of exceptionally high quality, was sold abroad. Since indigo was a primary dye ingredient in making Javanese batik and colouring other cloth such as lurik, the export of the crop as dry indigo cake may well have indicated a falling off in the Javanese trade in locally produced piece goods.\(^1^0^0\)

Raffles’ declared aim in taking over the markets and tollgates was to ensure a regular supply of provisions in central Java. But yet again the lieutenant-governor’s laudable intentions were compromised by his insatiable need for revenue: far from rationalising the scale of duties levied on the tollgates in the Principalities, both the British and the post-1816 returned Dutch government raised revenue from the tollgates out of all proportion to the realities of local commerce (Appendix XV). Even the British government’s decision to abolish excise posts along the Sala River in February 1814 in order to facilitate commerce between south-central Java and the pasisir rebounded. Pressure on the tollgate keepers to raise their annual lease payments led to an increase in the number of tollgates on the access roads leading to the river.\(^1^0^1\) By the eve of the Java War rice prices in the eastern mancanagara had climbed steeply.\(^1^0^2\) The

99 The eleventh article of the treaties which forbade the imposition of sumptuary laws by the courts was also an obvious attempt to open out the Javanese market to the import of cotton goods from Bengal and Europe, Van Deventer 1891:324. See further Chapter I note 75; Chapter VII note 177.


101 IOL, G21/69, Java Public Consultations, 11-2-1814; Dj.Br. 29, Major Jeremiah Martin Johnson (Surakarta) to T.S. Raffles (Rijswijk/Batavia), 21-2-1814 (refer to the abolition of tollgates on the Sala River/Bengawan); KITLV H 395, Chevallier, ‘Rapport’, 15-6-1824 (reference to increase in tollgates on access roads).

102 S.Br. 170, A.M.Th. de Salis (Surakarta) to Director of Finances (Batavia), 8-8-1822 (on impact of reimposition of tollgates on Sala River by Dutch government in 1818 on rice prices in manca-
fact that most of the tollgate keepers (bandar) were Chinese also exacerbated
ethnic tensions. The system of leasing the tax farms to the highest bidder
meant that the bandar were under pressure to extract the greatest profit from
the farms under their control. During the British period the tax farm receipts
showed significant yearly increases, but the restored Dutch government’s at-
ttempt to milk the system after 1816 caused catastrophe in the pre-Java War
years as we will see shortly (Chapter IX, Appendix XV). Local commerce was
affected and strong anti-Chinese feelings were aroused as Javanese traders
and farmers were forced to meet the increasingly arbitrary demands of the
Chinese bandar. The origins of the later social and economic difficulties in
south-central and east Java can thus be traced back directly to Raffles’ 1812
treaties, which opened the Principalities to direct European governmental in-
terference in local commerce and taxation.

If all this was not enough, there was one further clause in the treaties which
bore even harder on the local population of the princely states. This was
article eight, which stipulated that all foreigners and Javanese born outside the
Principalities should henceforth fall directly under European government ju-
risdiction and be tried according to government law.103 Raffles stressed that
the article was specifically designed to afford protection to the Chinese and
to ensure that they received their legal rights.104 But this seemingly innocuous
provision had far-reaching consequences for the inhabitants of south-central
Java. After February 1814, when the Resident’s courts were established, all
litigation between these inhabitants and the Chinese, as well as foreigners
or subjects born outside the territories of the south-central Javanese kraton,
was tried under government law and not under Javanese-Islamic law.105 This

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103 G.J. Resink defined ‘government law’ as a mixture of adat (customary) law and Dutch colo-
nial law; personal communication, G.J. Resink, Jakarta, 18-10-1976. Raffles in a letter to the chair-
man of the East India Company (IOL, G21/67, 19-3-1812) defined colonial law as ‘the laws of the
Dutch States General and the statutes passed in Holland and Batavia with particular application
to Java’. He considered the use of this colonial law as more practical than introducing British
common law. The only modifications he made were with regard to the abolition of torture and
the death sentence in minor cases.
104 IOL, Eur F148/23 (Raffles-Minto collection, vol. 23), T.S. Raffles (Salatiga) to Lord Minto
(Calcutta), 6-8-1812.
105 The Residency courts had been set up under Raffles’ regulation of 11-2-1814, IOL, G21/69,
Java Public Consultations, ‘Regulation passed by the Hon. Lieutenant Governor in Council on
11 February 1814 for the more effectual administration of justice in the provincial courts of Java’.
Earlier, Raffles had placed the regional criminal courts (Raad van Justitie) in Semarang and Sura-
baya on nearly the same footing as the supreme court in Batavia, and introduced the trial by jury
system. The former Dutch sheriffs (landdrost) were relegated to police duties, IOL, G21/65, Raffles,
‘Memorandum respecting Java’, 1813, 137-9 (section on ‘Judicature and police’); Raffles 1830:293
(Lady Sophia Raffles’ comment on the purpose of Raffles’ reforms, which were ‘for examining and
revising the judicial proceedings and for affording to the native inhabitants that facility of appeal’);
meant that Javanese plaintiffs and defendants hailing from the sultan’s and Sunan’s dominions, who became involved in litigation with non-Javanese or those Javanese born in government territories, were forced to have their cases tried under legal norms – the trial by jury system for example – and under law codes of which they had no personal knowledge or understanding. Moreover, after 1817, all cases concerning tollgate disputes were referred to the regional criminal court (Raad van Justitie) in Semarang, necessitating a costly journey and a long period of waiting for the case to be heard. This was usually well outside the means and capacity of most Javanese farmers. And it must be remembered that such cases involving locally-born Javanese from the Principalities and foreigners, especially Chinese, were numerous at the time because of the large number of suits which arose out of the corrupt and oppressive administration of the tollgates (Carey 1976:67). Long absences from agricultural duties were disastrous for Javanese cultivators and Dutch officials were frequently constrained to settle cases out of court to avoid unnecessary hardship (Carey 1987:298 note 66).

Raffles may have been building on previous contractual precedent. As early as 1677, in a treaty signed with the VOC, Sunan Amangkurat II (reigned 1677-1703) had allowed the principle of European jurisdiction over foreigners and non-Javanese Muslims in areas under Mataram rule (De Graaf 1971:16-7) and the same terms had been confirmed in the second sultan’s ‘coronation’ contract with the Dutch on 2 April 1792. But until 1812, the stipulation had been largely ignored by the Javanese rulers. Hamengkubuwana II, for example, was reported to have refused to allow his subjects to journey to Semarang to have their cases heard or reviewed by the Raad van Justitie, and in Surakarta, Pakubuwana IV had constantly pressed to have the Chinese communities placed once more under his jurisdiction, complaining about the trouble and expense which cases between Surakarta inhabitants and foreigners entailed (Carey 1987:298 note 65; Chapter VII note 107). While the Javanese rulers resented the restrictions on their judicial authority, particularly their right to order the death penalty, and Javanese farmers struggled with an increasingly alien judicial system, the religious communities were outraged by the fact that the surambi, the religious court presided over by the

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106 UBL BPL 616, Port. 5 pt. 2, J.D. Kruseman (Yogyakarta) to Commissioners-General (Batavia), 24-12-1816 (report on Resident’s court to returned Dutch government). See further Ball 1982:143-54 (on reforms of the provincial courts; Thorn 1815:226-31 (on the British judicial system as applied in Java). On the origins of the Islamic court system in Indonesia, see Lev 1972.

107 MVK 2439, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal buiten rade, 14-9-1817 no. 9; UBL BPL 616 Port. 7 pt. 6, H.G. Nahuys van Burgst (Yogyakarta) to A.M.Th. de Salis (Surakarta), 12-4-1822. Dejonge and Van Deventer 1884-88, XII:251-2 (English translation in IOL, Eur F148/18, Raffles-Minto collection, vol. 18). Articles 12-13 of this contract stipulated that besides non-Javanese inhabitants, Javanese born in areas controlled by the government were also to remain under European jurisdiction even though temporarily domiciled in the Principalities. See further Nagtegaal 1996:215-6, who describes how death by hanging was especially resented by the Javanese.
The [European] authority in Java was a great misfortune for the Javanese people for they had been taken away from the Holy Law of The Prophet and been subjected to European laws. 108

He also pointed out that every ulama in Java who could read the Qur‘ān was deeply disturbed by the abolition of the penalties of Islamic law. 109 The importance which both Kyai Maja and Dipanagara attached to this point can be seen during the abortive peace negotiations initiated by Commissioner-General Leonard du Bus de Gisignies (in office 1826-1830) and brokered by the Javanese-speaking Scots landrenter William Stavers in late September 1827. On that occasion, Maja explained to the Scotsman that Dipanagara’s demand to be recognised as the ‘regulator of religion’ (panatagama) also included the right to pass judgement in all cases involving Javanese and Europeans according to Javanese-Islamic law, although as a special concession he was prepared to allow the governor-general to regulate disputes between Europeans according to government law (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1904, III:263). The former governor of Java’s Northeast Coast, Nicolaus Engelhard, then approaching the end of his life but with his faculties undimmed, also warned the Dutch commander-in-chief, Lieutenant-General Hendrik Merkus de Kock, in March 1829 that the prince would only reopen peace negotiations if the criminal law which had existed before the arrival of the British was restored (De Haan 1910-12, IV:855; Ball 1982:153). ‘People know that I long to have authority over criminal law’, Dipanagara later remarked to the two Dutch officers who accompanied him from Magelang to Semarang following his arrest on 28 March 1830, ‘by which he meant’, the latter explained, ‘that he wanted to have the right to appoint one “priest” [pengulu] in Djocjo [Yogya] and [one in] Solo, who could enforce the criminal law according to the Koran [Qur‘ān] and not according to our [European] laws’ (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:744; Carey 1987:300 note 72).

Raffles’ 1812 treaty, his subsequent legal reforms and the question of the sovereignty of Javanese-Islamic law in criminal cases thus proved highly significant in the later context of the Java War. Unlike the issue of Islamic religious practice which tended to divide Dipanagara’s kraton and santri supporters, the former favouring a rather less strict observance than the latter, British moves against the competence of the royal and religious courts in criminal cases united these two groups. Javanese law codes, derived from Indic traditions, such

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109 NA, Geheim en Kabinets Archief, 20-9-1830 no. 58k, Johannes van den Bosch (Batavia/ Bogor) to Pieter Merkus (Surakarta), 19-4-1830. See further p. 706.
as the Serat Raja Kapa-Kapa, Jugul Mudha, and Surya Ngalam (Pigeaud 1967-80, I:308-10; Carey 1987:300-1; Chapter III note 27), had long been used side by side with Islamic fiqh in the Javanese law courts and over the years an effective symbiosis between Indic and Islamic legal traditions appears to have taken place imbuing the legal culture of south-central Java with a syncretic character accepted by the court elite and men of religion alike. In this sense, Dipanagara’s demands to be recognised as the regulator of religion with special competence over issues of criminal justice had widespread resonance.

The 1812 treaties were a disaster for the south-central Javanese courts. Not only did they involve a significant reduction in their territory, but they also left a potentially dangerous long-term social and economic legacy, especially in Yogya. Here the combination of the fall of the kraton, the plundering of its treasury, artefacts and archives, and the imposition of Raffles’ treaty, all dealt a shattering blow to the prestige and charisma of the court. Besides the financial and territorial losses, the looting of the kraton was undoubtedly felt at a very deep psychological level by most Yogyanese. In previous Javanese history, such an event had usually signified that the court had been irredeemably defiled. The loss of magical power, which such a defilement entailed, usually necessitated the removal of the court site to another place. This had happened after the fall of Plérèd in June 1677 and Kartasura in June 1742 (De Graaf 1949:225, 259; Soepomo Poedjosoenarto and Ricklefs 1967:88-108; Ricklefs 1974a:20, 39; Remmelink 1994:240). But there seems to have been no attempt to move the Yogya kraton after June 1812, a seemingly fateful month for the fall of Javanese courts. Besides, the sultanate did not have the financial resources even if it had wished it. The sense of shame and disappointment at the events of 1812 persisted however. There are references in the Javanese sources that even before the British attack some held the view that the lustre (cahya) of the kraton had been so tarnished that a move was essential (Chapter VI note 205). In his babad, Dipanagara also wrote that the court’s cahya had been very much dimmed.110 Meanwhile, his father is described in the Javanese chronicles as having felt especially keenly the humiliation undergone by the sultanate at the hands of the British.111 The aged Pangéran Ngabèhi, elder brother of the exiled second sultan, probably spoke for many when he referred to the surrender of his personal kris (stabbing dagger) at the time of the British assault as a form of castration.112

110 BD (Manado) II:164, XV (Asmaradana) 133. mapan nagari Ngayogya kalangkung surem cahy- ané.
111 LOr 6791 (3) (Babad Sphéhi):207, VI.9-11; KITLV Or 13 (Buku Kedhung Kebo):9v-10r, II.1-3.
112 Carey 1992:90, 241 (Ngabèhi’s reference to abedhogolan; Gericke and Roorda 1901, II:372 sub: dhogol, ‘male member’). The British confiscation of all the kris of the senior Yogya priyagyi (officials) and princes in the aftermath of the fall of the kraton would certainly have been experienced as a form of unmanning given the special symbolic importance of the kris in Javanese culture, where the weapon can represent the presence of its male owner at a wedding.
Later, following the second sultan’s restoration (17 August 1826) and return to the kraton (21 September 1826) during the Java War, some of the letters written to him by Yogya princes, who had joined Dipanagara, dwelt on the sense of shame they had experienced in witnessing his treatment at the hands of the British and the humiliation of the plunder of the kraton. These feelings of humiliation and bitterness towards the Europeans were to deepen during the fourth sultan’s reign when the political and economic influence of the European government in the princely territories became ever more pronounced. They put in perspective the attempts by Dipanagara early in the war to bring about the final destruction of the Yogya kraton and to establish a new undefiled kraton at another site, initially at Selerong (Carey 1981a:241 note 29, 282 note 197). ‘All Java knows this’, Willem van Hogendorp would later write, ‘how the Dutch allowed the kraton [of Yogya] to be turned into a brothel and how Dipanagara has sworn to destroy it to the last stone and expel the [European] landowners who have driven out the Javanese officials.’

The yearning for moral regeneration under the banner of Islam and the restoration of the sultanate’s prestige became significant themes in the years preceding the Java War and go far to explain why so many members of the Yogya court rallied to Dipanagara in 1825.

Positive developments during the third sultan’s reign

Despite the great difficulties with which the third sultan began his reign, his brief twenty-nine-month rule was one of peace and modest prosperity for Yogya. In terms of the royal administration, significant improvements seem to have been made over the costly and burdensome rule of his predecessor. The latter’s extensive construction of rural hunting lodges and country pavilions was halted, and stiff economies imposed on court expenditure in

113 NA, MvK 4192, Geheim en Kabinets Archief no. 243k, 30-10-1826, Pangéran Ngabéhi (pre-August 1825, Pangéran Jayakusuma) (Sambirata, Kulon Progo) to Hamengkubuwana II (Yogyakarta), 3 Mulud, Jimakir AJ 1754 (AD 11-10-1826); Pangéran Mangkubumi (Panembahan Ngabdulraup) (Rejasa, Kulon Progo) to Hamengkubuwana II (Yogyakarta), 7 Mulud, Jimakir, AJ 1754 (AD 15-10-1826); 21 Mulud, Jimakir, AJ 1754 (AD 26-10-1826), in Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, II:685-7, where the Javanese date is given wrongly.


115 See Appendix VI; KITLV H 97 pt. 7, Van IJsselidijk, ‘Korte schets’, 31-8-1798, related that even when Hamengkubuwana III was still Crown Prince, he declined to follow his father’s example in indulging in large-scale building projects. This drew from Hamengkubuwana II the sarcastic remark that ‘his son wished to make himself beloved by the inhabitants of his kingdom’. See fur-
order to replenish the looted treasury. By the time of Hamengkubuwana III’s death in November 1814, some 60,000 Spanish dollars had been accumulated in the *kraton* coffers and the pensions of the sultan’s family amounting to an annual sum of 50,999 Spanish dollars were being paid regularly at Mulud and Puwasa. In ensuring the regularity of these payments, the fixed annual grant of 100,000 Spanish dollars from the British government to the sultan for the annual rent of the markets and tollgates proved to be a critical resource.

Plans were also laid to curb the activities of the country tax-collectors and rural police (*gunung*). The establishment of a ‘regular and permanent system of police’ had been stipulated under article 7 of the 1812 treaties (Rouffaer 1905:644-5), and in his *babad*, Dipanagara described how he had asked his father that all the *gunung* should be dismissed because of the burden they imposed on the common people. He suggested that money payments previously demanded by the second sultan should be commuted to corvée labour and the costs of the court entirely covered by the British government’s annual market and tollgate rent. Furthermore, the prince envisaged that the village administration (*paréntah désa*) should return to what it had been under the first sultan, a suggestion which his father apparently agreed to provided that one year was allowed to elapse before the changes were implemented in order to restore *kraton* finances. Unfortunately, he died on 3 November 1814 before this administrative reorganisation could be put into effect. Again, one has to wonder whether the prince was investing himself with rather too much influence over his father’s administration and whether these initiatives to return to the practices of Sultan Mangkubumi’s reign were really all his idea. Just three years earlier in February 1811, the third sultan, then Prince Regent, had already issued an administrative order instructing that all labour services on royal apanage lands should return to what they had been under Sultan Mangkubumi (Carey 1980:21), so it is unclear what exactly Dipanagara himself contributed. This is especially relevant when we consider the detailed nature of his father’s previous instruction which stated that the unpaid levy of building materials (stones, whitewash, teak roofing tiles), previously demanded by the second sultan, was to cease, and that if building materials were required by the court they would be paid for out of general corvée mo-

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- Van Nes 1844:131; Van der Kemp 1896a:359, who commented that pretenders to the throne were always seen as lighteners of fiscal burdens by the general population.
- Dj:Br. 29, Captain Robert Clement Garnham (Yogyakarta) to Charles Assey (Batavia/Bogor), 1-12-1814, 25-2-1815; R.C. Garnham, ‘Statement of annual expenditure in the craton by the late sultan – Hamengkubuana the 3rd’, 1-12-1814. See further Appendix VIII. Rouffaer noted that the payment of court pensions increased the influence of the *bupati* in charge of the treasury department, the so-called *bupati gedhong*, Rouffaer 1905:613, 620 (on pension payments).
- BD (Manado) II:275-6, XIX.2-3.
- BD (Manado) II:275-6, XIX.2-3.
- BD (Manado) II:276, XIX.3.
neys. The order even dealt with military service requirements stipulating that they should revert to their former levels, another reference to the first sultan’s reign.\(^{120}\)

Confirmation that the third sultan’s reign marked a change from that of his fiscally rapacious predecessor was given by Captain Robert Clement Garnham, John Crawfurd’s replacement as Resident of Yogya in 1814-1815, who wrote of a ‘new epoch’ in the administration of the sultanate after June 1812,\(^ {121}\) a view echoed by Captain Godfrey Phipps Baker during his survey of the western *mancanagara* and south coast during the dry season (May-September) of 1815.\(^ {122}\) Garnham stated that the second sultan’s *pancas* land measurement revisions of 1802 and circa 1808-1811 (pp. 60-6) had been so oppressive that many Javanese farmers had been ruined and the personal bodyguards of the Yogya *bupati* had caused serious depredations in the countryside.\(^ {123}\) This insecurity had reached a peak in 1811 (p. 274) and the state of the sultanate had remained very troubled until Hamengkubuwana II’s deposition in June 1812. Since that time, there had been far fewer large-scale robberies an outcome perhaps of the ending of royal sponsorship of criminal gangs (Chapter I). This was, however, later contradicted by Van Ijsseldijk when he came on commission to the courts in August-October 1816 (Chapter VII note 63), and by reports from Kedhiri in March-April 1813 of a local uprising led by a Surakarta official, Radèn Panji Suradiningrat, who seems to have been protesting the surrender of Surakarta *mancanagara* territory to the British.\(^ {124}\) But Garnham glossed over these inconvenient facts. The harsh sentences passed on anyone molesting the property of the sultan, in his estimation, had served as a deterrent. At the same time, the British government’s ban on gaming and cockfighting in July 1813 had also contributed to the peace of the countryside.\(^ {125}\) True, there had been some administrative disasters such as

\(^{120}\) Despite the changes, apanage holders were still expected to produce soldiers for military exercises (*geladhi*), for the Garebeg ceremonies and to take part in expeditions ordered by the Prince Regent, the last provision presumably now made redundant by the military restrictions placed on the courts by the 1 August 1812 treaties, Carey 1980:21.

\(^{121}\) Dj.Br. 29, Captain R.C. Garnham (Yogyakarta) to T.S. Raffles (Batavia/Bogor), 22-6-1815.

\(^{122}\) Baker, ‘Memoir’, 94, referred to the Principalities as ‘much more prosperous than Government territories since 1812’; and the British period as ‘the happiest era in their [Javanese] recorded history’. See further Chapter I.

\(^{123}\) Dj.Br. 29, R.C. Garnham (Yogyakarta) to T.S. Raffles (Batavia/Bogor), 22-6-1815.

\(^{124}\) On this revolt, which resulted in Radén Panji Suradiningrat’s exile to Bangka and the forced transfer of eight of his followers to Kalimantan to work in Alexander Hare’s estates in Banjarmasin (note 80), see S.Br. 24, John Crawfurd (Yogyakarta) to Cornet Ernst (commanding Hamengkubuwana III’s bodyguard detachment in Kedhiri), 31-3-1814; John Crawfurd (Yogyakarta) to Hugh Hope (Surakarta), 1-4-1812, 2-4-1812, 4-4-1812; Hugh Hope (Surakarta) to T.S. Raffles (Bogor), 6-10-1813, on the exile of Suradiningrat and transfer of his followers to Kalimantan.

\(^{125}\) S.Br. 23, Hugh Hope (Surakarta) to T.S. Raffles (Bogor), 5-7-1813; John Crawfurd (Yogyakarta) to Charles Assey (Batavia/Bogor), 30-7-1813 (on abolition of gaming and cockfighting); Charles Assey (Batavia/Bogor) to Major J.M. Johnson (Surakarta), 7-11-1815 (on absence of capital crimes
Plate 44. Captain (later Lieutenant-Colonel) Robert Clement Garnham (1782-1827), aide-de-camp and confidant of Raffles, who served as Resident of Yogyakarta from 20 September 1814 to 31 August 1815. Portrait by Samuel Lane (1780-1859), first exhibited at the Royal Academy (London) in 1818, showing him dressed in his personally designed aide-de-camp’s uniform with his head turned to one side to hide the large birth mark which covered his left cheek. The kris presented to him by the Yogya court at the time of his departure in 1815, can be seen to his right. Photograph by courtesy of Mrs. Patricia Gadsby, a direct descendant of Garnham.
Crawfurd’s ill-advised (and later abandoned) attempt to create a government monopoly on south sea salt, but this was the exception that proved the rule. In Garnham’s view, the combination of enlightened British laws and the sagacious administration of the third sultan had combined to improve the condition of the people.

Two other measures taken by the British government shortly after the third sultan’s death in November 1814, promised long-term amelioration of the physical health and social situation of a number of inhabitants of Java. These were the government’s decision to introduce more widespread smallpox vaccination and the banning of the slave trade under the terms of the British abolition legislation of 1807 and article 131 of the Treaty of Vienna. Neither measure had any immediate effect: the level of smallpox vaccination remained low until after the Java War (Chapter I note 121), and neither the handful of government slaves, nor the very much larger number belonging to private individuals would achieve emancipation in their lifetimes. We know from the annual general report of the Yogya Resident for 1846 that there were still some slaves in Yogya some thirty years after Vienna.

Perhaps nature rather than human agency was more important in the short-term in leading to tangible benefits for the local population in the Principalities. The massive eruption of the Gunung Tambora stratovolcano in Sumbawa between April and July 1815, the most powerful in recorded history (four times greater than Krakatau in 1883), which left 92,000 people dead and turned 1816 into ‘the year without a summer’ in the northern hemisphere, ap-

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126 S.Br. 23, George Augustus Addison (Bogor) to John Crawfurd (Yogyakarta), 5-8-1814; IOL, Eur E107 (Raffles collection vol. 5), 219-28. Report of J.J.A.G. Bauer (accountant-general and auditor), George Augustus Addison (assistant-secretary to Government in Revenue Department), and William Ainslie (postmaster-general) (Yogyakarta) to T.S. Raffles (Bogor), 6-8-1814 on working of government salt monopoly and Crawfurd’s failed attempt to force south coast salt producers to sell to the government at a purchase price 40 stuiver for sale by government at 99 stuiver per 100 pound pikul. The high expense involved, poor quality of south coast salt compared to better north coast variety, problems for south coast producers and complaints from Surakarta led to the abrogation of the scheme, see further Chapter I note 126.

127 Dj.Br. 29, R.C. Garnham (Yogyakarta) to T.S. Raffles (Batavia/Bogor), 22-6-1815.

128 Dj.Br. 29, R.C. Garnham (Yogyakarta) to T.S. Raffles (Batavia/Bogor), 19-6-1815; Dj.Br. 30, Major J.M. Johnson (Surakarta) to T.S. Raffles (Batavia/Bogor), 25-10-1815 (both refer to the measure to expand availability of smallpox vaccination in the Principalities); Dj.Br. 86, 1-10-1815, regulation on slaves and smallpox vaccination. See further above Chapter 1 note 121.

129 IOL, G21/65, Raffles, ‘Memorandum respecting Java’, 1813, 157, lists the number of slaves in 1815 as 281 government slaves and 27,142 belonging to private individuals in Java. The accuracy of the latter statistic must be in doubt. On the emancipation of slaves, see further Raffles 1830:227-8.

130 Dj.Br. 3, R. de Fillietaz Bousquet, ‘Algemeen Verslag der residentie Djokjokarta over het jaar 1846’, 4-1847, stating that although most slaves had died since the 1815 abolition, there were still some surviving slaves in Yogya.
The power of prophecy

... apparently had remarkable short-term beneficial effects on the 1815 rice harvest in south-central Java. Unlike the June 1811 eruption of Gunung Kelut (Chapter VII), which led to cattle murrain, the full force of the Tambora eruption was experienced late in the growing cycle and helped to bring on a bumper harvest. In Surakarta, the Resident, Major Jeremiah Martin Johnson, spoke of ‘such a season of abundance as the present has not been known for many years [...] by the many persons conversant with the grain [harvest]’. Indeed, the short-term effect on the climate seems to have been dramatic with mean temperatures falling by some five to seven degrees Fahrenheit in the immediate aftermath of the eruption.

Political and administrative changes

In the second half of the third sultan’s reign, further political and administrative changes occurred which were to be of consequence for the future. On 17 March 1813, the Pakualam land settlement was finally concluded. This recognised that the independent prince and his family were ‘under the immediate protection’ of the government and that they would pay Pakualam ‘during his lifetime and while he conducts himself to their satisfaction’ a monthly stipend of 750 Spanish dollars (Van Deventer 1891:334). The government also undertook to make arrangements with the sultan whereby the prince would be ‘placed in possession of lands to the full amount of 4,000 cacah, to be in like manner held during his lifetime and good behaviour, and to descend to his eldest son, the prince Suryaningrat, to be held on similar terms and conditions’ (Van Deventer 1891:334). The phrase ‘the full amount’ in connection with the cacah meant that Pakualam received the land according to the old land measurement re-valued by the first sultan in circa 1790-1791 rather than the devalued measurements introduced by Hamengkubuwana II in 1802 and in the 1808-1811 period (pp. 60-6). The area was also to be held as hereditary landholding and not as an apanage from the senior court like the lands of the Mangkunagaran in Surakarta. Most of the landholdings given to Pakualam at this time were scattered throughout Bagelèn and Mataram, and were of

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131 IOL, Mack.Pr. 2, Major J.M. Johnson (Surakarta) reply to, ‘Points of Enquiry – Circular of the Hon’ble [T.S. Raffles], the lieutenant-governor of Java [on the circumstances and consequences of the eruption of Mount Tambora]’ (henceforth: Johnson, ‘Points of Enquiry’), 198.
132 Johnson, ‘Points of Enquiry’, 195, relating that the temperature fell to 75° Fahrenheit on 12-4-1815 in the aftermath of the initial eruption from 5-4-1815 to 11-4-1815.
133 Rouffaer 1905:590, 603, 605. The Mangkunagaran rulers were technically pangéran miji, princes under the direct orders of the Sunan, until 1896 when they were recognised as pangéran amardhika, independent princes from the Kasunanan, but still pangéran miji of the Dutch. This was never the case with the Pakualam who from the first were pangéran amardhika from the sultanate, although always pangéran miji with regard to the government.
very poor quality. Both the Residency letters and the Javanese sources relate how this haphazard allocation of marginal land caused some bitter affrays between the Pakualaman and the sultanate. Moreover, the prince's record as a stingy landlord made him a figure of hate and loathing amongst the local Javanese peasantry causing the Dutch many difficulties during the Java War (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, II:411). As we have seen (Chapter I), it was only in the aftermath of the war, that his landholdings were grouped together in the Adikarta area of southern Kulon Praga. The original British sponsored land grant was also given with conditions attached. One of these was that the prince ‘support and maintain for the British government a corps of one hundred horses’ which would be ‘armed and clothed by the British government in such manner as they may deem the most expedient, the prince on his part supplying horses, accoutrements and necessaries’. Another was that he would pay the monthly salaries of the privates and non-commissioned officers (Van Deventer 1891:335). This corps later assisted the European government in putting down local uprisings in the Yogya area and played a part as government auxiliaries against Dipanagara during the Java War. But it never assumed the importance of the Mangkunagaran legion. Described by a wartime Flemish officer as ‘only good as showpieces as long as there is nothing more exacting to do than to keep the coolies together’ (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, II:402; Carey 1988:110 note 114), it became during the course of the nineteenth century, in Rouffaer’s words, ‘little more than a troop of salaried opium smokers’. In 1892, it was ignominiously disbanded (Rouffaer 1905:606). In terms of short-term prestige, however, it was undoubtedly of some importance in the immediate post-1813 period as another outward sign of Pakualam’s new-found independence from the sultanate.

Another significant administrative change was the appointment of a new patih. The background to this appointment lay in the increasingly urgent need to replace the acting patih, Mas Tumenggung Sindunagara (Kyai Adipati Danureja III) who was in his dotage and often made mistakes in discussing affairs with the Resident. According to Dipanagara, Crawfurd urged the sultan to change his chief minister and two names were considered by the prince and his father: the first, Pangéran Dipakusuma, was supported by Dipanagara but rejected by the third sultan because of Dipakusuma’s earlier opposition to him and his advanced age (he was then in his mid-sixties and

136 AvJ, Lieutenant Arthur Aston Homer (Yogyakarta) to T.S. Raffles (Semarang), 2-12-1813.
137 BD (Manado) II:228, XVII.101-2. Crawfurd had earlier referred to Sindunagara/Danureja III as over seventy in December 1811 and ‘age having blunted his faculties’, this rendered him ‘at present unfit for the transaction of business’, Carey 1992:490 note 429.
only had a few more years to live), the second, Crawfurder’s own choice, Radèn Tumenggung Pringgadiningrat, the patih jero, was not accepted by the prince. There matters rested until Crawfurder began to grow impatient and the sultan dispatched the kapitan cina, Tan Jin Sing, to Tegalreja with a shortlist of two names for Dipanagara to make his final decision. The two proposed were Pringgadiningrat and Mas Tumenggung Sumadipura, the erstwhile bupati of Japan (Majakerta), who had lost his position during the British annexations of 1812 (Carey 1992:454-5 note 264). The prince chose the latter much to the astonishment of his father who pointed out that the bupati was still young and was of common birth. Moreover, he had little experience of giving orders to the senior priyayi and when he spoke his east Javanese accent marked him out as a provincial (Carey 1992:173, 368, 500 note 492). But Dipanagara stuck by his decision and Sumadipura was appointed as Radèn Adipati Danureja IV on 2 December 1813. He was to remain in office for the next thirty-four years (Pigeaud 1931-32, II:130; Appendix Va).

Such is the description in Dipanagara’s babad and there is nothing in the Residency letters to confirm it, although another Javanese source states explicitly that Sumadipura became patih through the good offices of the prince and that the latter’s patronage later aroused the new chief minister’s intense resentment. In many respects, it is understandable why Sumadipura was chosen for there were no suitable candidates from within the Danurejan family to fill the post. Furthermore, the bupati of Japan was undoubtedly well known to both Dipanagara and his father because he was the son of a previous head of the Crown Prince’s establishment (kadipatèn), Mas Tumenggung Sumadirja (in office circa 1807-circa 1810; Appendix Vb), and was closely related to the third sultan’s mother, Ratu Kedhaton, through the family of the Yogya bupati of Magetan.

This blood link with the sultanate was strengthened by Sumadipura’s own mar-

138 BD (Manado) II:228-9, XVII.102-3.
139 BD (Manado) II:228-33, XVII.102-24; Appendix Va. The old patih, Mas Tumenggung Sindunagara, was given the title of Kyai Adipati Adipurwa and a 1,000 cacahapanage in Rèma (Karanganyar), but he did not live long to enjoy it, dying within the year (1814) at the age of seventy, B.Ng. I:344, LXXXV.9-12; Serat salasilah para lelohoer ing Kadoarejan, n.y.:480.
140 KITLV Or 13 (Buku Kedhung Kebo): 40r, III.69. Dipanagara also confirmed his role in Sumadipura’s appointment in his conversations with Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 21. On Sumadipura (Danureja IV’s) hatred for Dipanagara, see Louw and De Klerck 1894-1901, II:429.
141 Baud 306, Van Iljsseldijk, ‘Nota voor den Provisionele Resident te Majoor Nahuys to Djocjocarta’, 22-10-1816, who noted that the third sultan mooted the possibility of appointing the outgoing patih’s son, Radèn Ria Mandura, but was overruled by Crawfurder who pointed out the latter’s complete lack of administrative skill.
142 Pigeaud 1931-32, II:39, gives a family tree indicating that Mas Tumenggung Sumadirja (referred to as ‘Tjumengung] Soemadipoera (Soemadirjan] Djapan’), who had served as bupati of Japan from 25-2-1796 to 30-4-1807 (Carey and Hoadley 2000:64-5), was a brother of the mother of Ratu Kedhaton (referred to erroneously by Pigeaud as ‘K[jangjeng] R[atu] Kentjana’), Nyai Adipati Purwadiniringrat of Magetan.
riage to a daughter of the second sultan by his favourite consort, Ratu Kencana Wulan, shortly after his appointment as patih (Mandoyokusumo 1977:26 no. 75). It is also understandable that Hamengkubuwana III wished to reward him, along with other members of the karajan, following his accession to the throne as a long-time supporter of his faction.143

Despite the notorious reputation which Sumadipura (Danureja IV) later acquired (Louw and De Klerk 1894-1909, III:493-4; Carey 1992:499 note 486), it seems that he was initially a well liked and capable official. The ‘Chronicle of the fall of Yogyakarta’, for example, refers to the excellent impression he made at the time of his official inauguration (Carey 1992:172-3, 368), and Crawfurd wrote of him in rather positive terms to his successor, Nahuys:

I can safely recommend him both as a good and an intelligent man peculiarly fitted for the office he holds. You will receive from him candid and impartial opinions, for I never knew him to say anything with the intention to mislead. His greatest defect is one which, as it is all too universal, I need not dwell upon – a share of indolence more consistent with the national [Javanese] character than with that activity which ought to belong to his important office.144

His ‘unbounded attachment to the British’ was noted by Captain Baker during his May-September 1815 survey of the south coast,145 and his Surakarta colleague, Radèn Adipati Sasradiningrat II (in office 1812-1846), spoke of him as ‘a clever man who, as well as being acquainted with the Javanese laws, customs and habits, was also mindful of the needs of the […] Government and his prince’ (Carey 1981a:257 note 97). His appearance also seems to have been rather striking: General Hendrik Merkus de Kock wrote of him in the last year of the Java War as ‘a fine Javanese, who dresses well, rides magnificent horses, has beautiful women and is attached to the opium pipe’.146

Over time, however, these self-indulgent qualities began to have a corrosive effect: in November 1825, some four months after the outbreak of the Java War, Van Sevenhoven remarked that the patih’s addiction to opium had caused the use of the drug to become ever more widespread amongst senior officials and members of the Yogya social elite ‘from which further immorality follows’.147 By the fourth sultan’s reign (1814-1822), he was already being

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143 Dj.Br. 18, Valck, ‘Geheime memorie’, 31-3-1840, reference to Sumadipura (Danureja IV) still remaining loyal to the karajan faction in the 1830s.
144 UBL, BPL 616 Port. 5 pt. 5, John Crawfurd (Yogyakarta) to H.G. Nahuys van Burgst (Yogyakarta), 9-8-1816.
146 dK 111, De Kock, ‘Over het karakter van den Soesoehoenan, den sultan van Djokjokarta en de prinsen en rijksgrooten’, Magelang, 10-12-1829.
147 J.I. van Sevenhoven (Yogyakarta) to General H.M. de Kock (Surakarta), 10-11-1825, quoted Louw and De Klerk 1894-1909, I:450. On elite opium addiction in Yogya at this time, see Carey 1984:33-5; Chapter III.
described by Yogya contemporaries as a man with ‘an unclean heart’.\footnote{148} His fondness for pleasure and unscrupulous personal ambition led him to abuse his position to demand sexual favours and cases decided in his court at the ke-
patihan were always open to extensive bribery (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:85-7). As his political influence grew, so his capacity for extortion and cor-
rupion increased. His control of key royal monopolies such as the limestone 
oves at Gunung Gamping, which he seized from Dipanagara during the lat-
ter’s period (1822-1825) as guardian of the child sultan Hamengkubuwana V, 
as well as the Gunung Kidul teak forests, combined with his heavy financial 
demands on new apanage holders for sealing their title deeds, and his own 
property deals in Yogya, turned him into an exceedingly wealthy man (Carey 
1992:499 note 486). But his behaviour had disastrous consequences: the Yogya 
administration began to operate fitfully and discord amongst senior officials 
became rife: one contemporary Javanese text even referred to him as a ‘devil in human clothes’ who ‘robbed people while sitting down’.\footnote{149}

One problem was that despite his close connections with the kadipatèn and 
the family of the third sultan, the new patih was something of an outsider 
in Yogya court circles. Indeed, he was not even of full Javanese blood since 
both his parents were of Balinese ancestry: his father was a fourth-genera-
tion descendant of the late-seventeenth century Balinese bupati of Surabaya, 
Tumenggung Jangrana (Kyai Anggawangsa), and his mother a similar ge-

eration scion of the famous Balinese adventurer, Untung Surapati (died 
1706; Pigeaud 1931-32, I:130, II:39; Carey 1992:498 note 486). Furthermore, 
Sumadipura also had close Chinese connections through one of his aunts 
on his mother’s side who had married a rich Chinese businessman in east 
Java, Bah Co, the manager of extensive cubeb pepper estates and provider 
of loans to the British government to meet the wages of local sepoy troops. 
This combination of Balinese ancestry, east Javanese provenance and wealthy 
Chinese business links accentuated Sumadipura’s separateness from other 
high Yogya officials. It also perhaps made him more willing to cooperate with 
the European government for the advancement of his own career, a course 
facilitated by the fact that he was in office for long periods during the mi-

ority of under-age rulers.\footnote{150} Indeed, during the reign of the fourth sultan, 
an influential clique would establish itself at the court around the patih, his 
sister-in-law, Ratu Kencana (post-1816, Ratu Ibu; post-1820, Ratu Ageng), and 
the commander of the sultan’s bodyguard, Major Wiranagara, Sumadipura’s
third cousin and like himself a descendant of Surapati. This group would ally itself strongly with European estate interests in Yogya and would gravely exacerbate political tensions at the Yogya court on the eve of the Java War, thus helping to precipitate Dipanagara’s rebellion in July 1825.

Four days after Sumadipura’s inauguration as *patih*, another official elevation took place which was to have consequences for the future. This was the appointment of the *kapitan cina*, Tan Jin Sing, as Radén Tumenggung Secadiningrat with an apanje of 800 *cacah*, much of it in Lowanu and other parts of eastern Bagelen. This included Jana with its important Chinese weaving centre (Chapter I). This was given to him and his family ‘in perpetuity’ by the sultan (Rouffaer 1905:594; Carey 1992:483-5 note 399). The letter of appointment from the sultan was signed by Crawfurd on 6 December 1813 and stated specifically that Tan Jin Sing had been given the title and apanje as a reward for his services to the British government and the third sultan in 1812 (Carey 1992:484 note 399). The grant also included valuable urban property within Yogya itself, including a stretch of land to the north of the kraton which Tan Jin Sing leased out to other Chinese for building purposes. Yet the appointment was clearly only made by the third sultan under duress. For a Chinese to be given such a prominent title and extensive apanje at the Yogya court was unheard of. Although there had been cases of Chinese tax-farmers administering north coast administrative districts on behalf of the Mataram empire in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries (Remmelink 1994:25), this had not been repeated in the post-Giyanti period. Indeed, Sultan Mangkubumi appears to have taken a strong line on not allowing Chinese to have too close a relationship with the royal family, stating that this would be a prescription for internal discord within the kraton (Carey 1992:462 note 304). Moreover, as we have seen, anti-Chinese feelings had run high in Yogya during the British attack in June 1812 (Chapter VII note 274) and would again play an important role in the early stages of the Java War. So Tan Jin Sing’s appointment as a Yogya *bupati miji* (official under direct orders of the sultan) attached to the department of the head of the tollgates and markets, Kyai Tumenggung Reksanegara, did not come at a very favourable time in Sino-Javanese relations.

The *kapitan cina* hailed from a well-established Hokkien family of Amoy extraction but long settled in the Banyumas area, who had earlier served the sultanate with distinction as tax-farmers in Kedhu. Although he had em-

151 His grant letter stated that this was equivalent to 1,000 *cacah urip*: ‘living’, namely cultivated, *cacah*.
152 AvJ, A.H. Smissaert (Yogyakarta) to G.A.G.Ph. van der Capellen (Batavia/Bogor), 24-4-1823.
153 AvJ, Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 27-9-1803 (on Tan Jin Sing’s appointment as Yogya *kapitan cina* after serving for many years in the same capacity in Kedhu); Veth 1896-1907, II:307; Interview with Kangjeng Radén Tumenggung Tirtodiningrat, lineal descendant of Tan Jin Sing (Secadiningrat), Yogyakarta, 13-6-1972.
braced Islam – namely professed the articles of The Faith and was circumcised – he was resented both in conservative court circles and by the Chinese communities in south-central Java (Carey 1992:485 note 399). The latter shunned him because of his unique political position and his abandonment of Chinese customs, whereas the former resented his arrogation of special privileges such as the keeping of female bedhaya dancers in his house, sitting on a chair with senior princes at court receptions, styling his wife, a low-born Javanese, as a Radèn Ayu (princess), and insisting that kraton messengers perform the sembah (gesture of kneeling respect with hands placed together in greeting) to him (Carey 1992:485 note 399). The former kapitan cina’s strange position suspended uneasily between three worlds – the Chinese, the European and the Javanese – was well summed up by the clever Yogya ditty ‘no longer a Chinese, not yet a Dutchman, a half-baked Javanese’ (cina wurung, londa durung, jawa tanggung) to describe his chameleon state at this time (Meinsma 1876:132; Carey 1984:30-1). He thus had to live on his wits of which he was richly endowed. Reported ‘to know everything that goes on at the courts and in the countryside’, he was far too closely identified with the European government ever to be accepted in Yogya court circles. Dipanagara described him as having been favoured by the British ‘only with the intention of keeping a better eye on the activities of the Yogya court [and this] had done much harm to the trust which [the court] placed in the Government’. Crawfurd inadvertently substantiated this claim when he introduced Tan Jin Sing to Nahuys in August 1816:

There is an individual at this place, Tan Jin Sing, late Captain of the Chinese, whose intelligence and experience will materially aid you. With much of the acuteness of his countrymen, he possesses all the local knowledge of a native, and I may safely refer you to him as the very best source of information and advice which this place affords. His very existence depends on that of the European power whatever it be and it may be assured of his zealous support. In return I venture to recommend him to the generosity and protection of the new administration.

154 Purwosugiyanto (Yogyakarta), personal communication enclosing ‘Silsilah R.T. Secadiningrat (Tan Jin Sing)’, 15-9-1985, states that Tan Jin Sing/Secadiningrat’s wife was a daughter of Danureja I (in office 1755-1799), but this is not confirmed elsewhere. Indeed, Purwosugiyanto 1985:10, states more plausibly that he had two wives: a Chinese who bore the title Nyonya Kapi tan, and a Javanese known only as Radèn Ngantèn Secadiningrat, who presumably was the low-born wife whom he wished to see appointed as a Radèn Ayu.


156 Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 22. Dipanagara’s views on Tan Jin Sing/Secadiningrat’s role are partly confirmed by NA, Ministerie van Koloniën 4497, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal geheim, 18-10-1816 no. A.

157 UBL, BPL 616 Port. 5 pt. 5, John Crawfurd (Yogyakarta) to H.G. Nahuys van Burgst (Yogyakarta), 9-8-1816.
Nahuys for his part made great use of Tan Jin Sing as his informant and later took him with him when he served as commissioner to the coast of Borneo (21 November 1818-5 May 1819) charged with sorting out the problems of the Chinese miners and praised him ‘for his industry and readiness to give information on which much of the succession of [my] mission depended’. Despite his anomalous position as a trusted informant of successive Yogya Residents, Tan Jin Sing managed to remain on rather good terms with Dipanagara, whose personal bodyguard he helped to maintain in the years immediately preceding the Java War (Carey 1981a:253 note 73). He also seems to have adopted a neutral attitude to the court intrigues which so plagued the sultanate during this period, although he was a strong advocate of the policy of renting land to Europeans in the princely territories which became such an issue in the 1816-1822 period. His appointment must have been viewed by many in Yogya as yet another facet of the decline of the sultanate’s prestige and independence in the years following June 1812.

Dipanagara’s second marriage and the death of the third sultan

Sometime before the third sultan’s death in November 1814, Dipanagara married again, this time to the orphaned daughter of his hero, Raden Rongga Prawiradirja III and his consort, Ratu Maduretna (died 1809; p. 219; Appendix IV). The description of the prince’s betrothal and marriage marks a charming interlude in his babad and affords an insight into the very deep affection which Dipanagara felt for his second official wife. In his account, he described how his father had constantly pressed him to marry again but that he had always refused. Eventually he was summoned to the kraton and instructed by the third sultan to ask for the hand of Ratu Bendara, the childless widow

158 NA, Ministerie van Koloniën 2447, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal buiten rade, 18-5-1819 no. 11; Ministerie van Koloniën 2454, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal buiten rade, 13-5-1820 no. 33; Winter 1902:124 note 1.
160 Baud 306, Van IJsseldijk, ‘Rapport’, 11-12-1816, referred to the hatred evinced by many Yogya bupati towards Tan Jin Sing when he visited Yogya in September 1816.
161 The date of Dipanagara’s marriage is obscure: B.Ng. I:356, LXXXVII.34-6, gives 11 Sawal, Jimaval, AJ 1741 (AD 28-9-1814). Dipanagara himself, however, stated (BD [Manado] II:243, XVIII.2) that it took place in the month Besar (wulan haji). As his father attended, this could only mean that the wedding occurred sometime in Besar AJ 1740 (AD 25-11-1813 – 24-12-1813) rather than Besar AJ 1741 (AD 16-11-1814 – 14-12-1814), when his father was already dead. Yet the chronology in Dipanagara’s babad suggests strongly that he was married right at the end of the third sultan’s reign (BD [Manado] II:234, XVII.125) because he referred to his father’s final illness afterwards (BD [Manado] II:263, XVIII.94, see further note 167), so the date given in the Yogya babad is probably correct. On the importance of the months of Besar and Jumadilakir as ‘marriage months’ for the Javanese, see Winter 1902:66.
of the slain Radèn Tumenggung Sumadiningrat. The prince thereupon made his way to the keputrèn (female quarters) in the kraton to meet the ratu, a dutiful son making the next step in what might have seemed would be a politically expedient but loveless second marriage. Then Cupid shot his arrow: as Dipanagara was passing the entrance to the religious retreat area (panepèn) in the kraton he describes how he caught sight of Ratu Maduretna’s daughter framed in the doorway and immediately evinced an overpowering physical attraction for her.162 This chance encounter and the prince’s reaction to it, was immediately reported to the sultan by the two nyai keparak (personal female retainers of the ruler) who had accompanied him to the keputrèn. Once Ratu Bendara had confirmed that she was not minded to remarry, a betrothal between Dipanagara and the Radèn Ayu, who had taken her mother’s name of Maduretna, was arranged. The marriage ceremony took place in the kraton. A feast and all-night wayang performance followed at Tegalreja (Chapter II note 57). We do not know the particular lakon (wayang plot) chosen, but in his babad Dipanagara makes an interesting comparison of his marriage with that of Wisnu and Déwi Sri, with his father as Bathara Guru and the sultan’s consorts as the heavenly nymphs Ratih, Supraba and Tilottama.163

The prince’s evocation of Wisnu can be read at a number of levels: as Ricklefs (1974a:81) has suggested, the Hindu god was especially connected in Java with the warrior class (satria). His eighth incarnation as Kresna epitomised this satria ideal and was very familiar to Javanese from the wayang theatre. Wisnu’s role as a saviour of the world in troubled times was also well known and in Modern Javanese babad literature Wisnu is often depicted as the first ruler of the island. Perhaps in Dipanagara’s case, the figure of Arjuna, another of Wisnu’s reincarnations, may have had more resonance.

We have already seen how he drew a close parallel between himself and the handsome wayang hero when receiving the dagger Sarutama during his final meditation at Parangkusuma on his pilgrimage to the south coast in circa 1805 (Chapter IV). This analogy was also taken up after his exile in his eldest son, Pangéran Dipanagara II’s mystical allegorical babad, which deals

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162 BD (Manado) II:235, XVII.131-3. It is not known how old Ratu Maduretna’s daughter was when Dipanagara married her. According to the Serat salasilah para lelohoer ing Kadanoerejan n.y.:130, she was the third of the Ratu’s four daughters – her elder sister later married Dipanagara’s younger brother, Pangéran Adinagara, post-1825, Pangéran Suryèngalaga. If the reference to the female child, whose request for a young goat had led to Radèn Rongga’s bloody affair in Delanggu in July 1802 (Chapter V note 111), is to her and we assume that her age at that time was between four or five then she would have been sixteen or seventeen when Dipanagara first saw her in the kraton in circa September 1814. Her younger brother, Radèn Tumenggung Natardirja (post-1825, Iman Muhammad Ngabdul Kamil Ali Basah), became one of Dipanagara’s most prominent army commanders during the war (Appendix IV), along with one of her half-brothers, Senthot, born of an unofficial wife (Chapter II note 35). On love at first sight in pre-colonial Java, see Creese 2004:186.

163 BD (Manado) II:249, XVIII.28-34; Carey 1974a:11 note 33.
Plate 46. Arjuna, the third and most handsome of the five Pandhawa brothers in the Mahabharata cycle of wayang plays, with whom Dipanagara appears to have identified himself in his autobiographical babad (*Babad Dipanagara*, Manado version). Taken from Kats 1923:268 facing. Photograph by courtesy of the KITLV, Leiden.
with the elder Dipanagara’s life, the Babad Dipanagaratan Surya Ngalam, where the lakon Dora Weca (‘The mendacious prophecy’) is specifically mentioned with the prince cast in the role of Cekel Amongraga (Arjuna) and his father as Prabu Indrapuri (Indra; Pigeaud 1967-80, II:383, III:208; Carey 1974a:12 note 37). This comparison between the prince and Arjuna would be further elaborated during the last months of the Java War when Dipanagara was wandering nearly alone in the jungles of Bagelèn, Banyumas and southern Kedu (November 1829-January 1830) accompanied only by his two panakawan (intimate retainers), Banthèngwarèng and Rata, the first of whom he described as a mischievous young rogue and a dwarf.\(^{164}\) This description recalls the deformed servitors of Arjuna and the other Pandhawa brothers, who also followed their masters off into the jungles after Yudistira had lost the kingdom to the Kurawa in a game of dice. The analogy is made even clearer in Dipanagara’s babad when the names of Semar, Garèng and Petruk were given to three local bekel (village tax-collectors/heads) from the surrounding area who had temporarily attached themselves to the prince’s party. Dipanagara adds the detail that the names suited the physical appearance of the bekel and the latter found them good.\(^{165}\)

At the practical level, it is clear that Dipanagara’s marriage gave him a sensitive and sympathetic partner in whom to confide in the troubled years which followed his father’s demise and who gave him her full support right up to the time of her death in February 1828 in the penultimate year of the Java War. Of all the prince’s wives, Radèn Ayu Maduretna was the only one whom Dipanagara mentioned often in his babad with real warmth and affection. His marriage to her also sealed his family link with Radèn Rongga which even before 1814 had been close: as we have seen, his guardian, the formidable Ratu Ageng Tegalreja, had been a younger sister of the third Radèn Rongga’s grandfather, the founder of the line of Madiun bupati wedana (p. 190) and there were many other blood ties between the Yogya ruling house and the Prawiradirjan (Appendix III). But his marriage brought him even closer to the family of the famous rebel of 1810, whom he viewed as the ‘last champion’ of Yogya (Chapter V note 106). The fact that two of Radèn Rongga’s sons would become his most trusted commanders during the Java War was of a piece with this family relationship (note 162), although curiously when questioned by Knoerle during his voyage into exile he sought to deny his kinship with Rongga perhaps to protect the latter’s son, Pangéran Rongga Prawiradiningrat, who was then serving as bupati wedana in Madiun (in office 1822-1859).\(^{166}\)

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164 BD (Manado) IV:229, XXXVIII (Mijil) 150. Laré bajang apan kang satunggil/ sanget beleringon/ pinaring nama Banthèngwarèng/ kang satunggil pun Rata namèki.


166 Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 11; Appendix Vb.
In October 1814, the sultan contracted a cold which, according to Dipanagara, lasted for a month.\textsuperscript{167} A similar condition is mentioned in the \textit{Buku Kedhung Kebo} (‘Chronicle of the buffaloes’ watering hole’) although in this account death followed almost immediately.\textsuperscript{168} The sultan had never enjoyed good health and the intrigues of the latter part of his father’s reign, in particular the events leading up to the storming of the Yogya \textit{kraton} in June 1812, had doubtless taken their toll on his weak physique. As we have seen (p. 329), Jan Isaäk van Sevenhoven, while on a private visit to the Yogya court in May 1812, had noticed how old and drawn the future third sultan had looked for his forty-three years. Despite his illness, the sultan continued to go out for tours of the \textit{kraton} battlements, but as November dawned, it was clear that his final sickness had begun. The ‘Chronicle of the fall of Yogyakarta’ gives a vivid description of the deathbed scene in the ruler’s private apartments in the \textit{kraton} where \textit{dhukun} (herbalists, traditional medical practitioners) were called to administer potions while healing incantations followed one after the other and some of the older princes intoned \textit{dhikr} (short repetitive phrases from the \textit{Qur’ān}; Carey 1992:186-7, 383). Interestingly, the author of the chronicle noted that Dipanagara took particular exception to the special lustration ceremony performed by his great-uncle, Pangérán Demang, over the sultan’s dying body. This involved Demang exposing the sultan’s navel and licking it in order to facilitate the exit of the life force while magical incantations were intoned. Dipanagara apparently stopped forward at this point to replace the coverlet firmly over his father’s body and force his embarrassed great-uncle to desist his ministrations (Carey 1992:187-8, 383). This is a telling vignette, which indicates that although in many respects a typical Javanese-Islamic mystic the prince did not hold with some of the more arcane aspects of the magico-religious lore of his day.\textsuperscript{169}

Meanwhile, the British Resident, Captain Garnham, and the Residency doctor, Dr Harvey Thomson (1790-1837),\textsuperscript{170} were roused from their sleep and

\textsuperscript{167} BD (Manado) II:263, XVIII (Kinanthis) 94. \textit{kangjeng sultan kang winarni/ pan sampun karsaning Suksmal agerah celeb puniki/ pan sampun angsal sacandra}.  
\textsuperscript{168} KITLV Or 13 (Buku Kedhung Kebo) 11r-v:II.8-9.  
\textsuperscript{169} Carey 1992:513-4 note 555. This can be compared to Dipanagara’s reluctance to attend the Garebeg ceremonies (pp. 87-8), although it is worth noticing that in his Makassar MS Book II, there are numerous references to \textit{dhikr} and \textit{daérāh} (diagrams for regulating breathing during prayer [\textit{sujud}]) although most of these seem to have been based on the \textit{Qur’ān} and other Islamic texts. On the use of \textit{dhikr} in south-central Java at this time, see further Winter 1902:65. Dipanagara may have objected to the mantra chanted in the \textit{kraton} at the time of his father’s death because they were not drawn from the \textit{Qur’ān}.  
\textsuperscript{170} For a biography of Thomson, see Van Enk 1990, 1999, neither of which refer to Thomson’s position as Residency doctor in Yogya at this time. He is mentioned in this capacity in Dj.Br. 9B, ‘Geheime stukken van 1836’, ‘Ceremonieel in acht genomen bij gelegenheid der pleeglijke installatie van Z.H. den Sultan Hamangkuboewono der vierde te Djojokarta den 9 Nov. 1814 opgemaakt door den Heere Resident R.C. Garnham’ (henceforth: Garnham, ‘Ceremonieel’), 9-11-1814. He
sped to the *kraton* to render assistance (Carey 1992:186-7, 381). But it was all to no avail. At six o’clock in the morning of 3 November after a reign of just 865 days, the third sultan died.\(^{171}\) According to the chronicle, Garnham immediately ordered the sepoy garrison commander and Residency staff to remain on the highest alert, and oversaw the sealing and padlocking of the royal treasure chambers in preparation for the new reign (Carey 1992:187-8, 382, 384). The *babad* accounts suggest that the third sultan’s sudden demise caused considerable anxiety in the *kraton*: Ratu Ageng, the mother of the late sultan, feared that her grandson (the future fourth sultan), who was still a minor, would not be able to rule and Dipanagara stated that no one in Yogya had expected the sultan to die so young. Garnham himself, who had recently arrived in Yogya to take up his post (20 September 1814), is also described as having been visibly moved and upset during the deathbed scene in the *kraton*.\(^{172}\) In his official correspondence with Raffles, however, Garnham made no mention of this sense of unease, speaking instead of the ‘great tranquillity’ which prevailed in Yogya after the sultan’s death.\(^{173}\) Raffles for his part determined to mark the Yogya ruler’s passing with due respect, ordering all the Union flags to be flown at half-mast at the main military stations in Java and the minute guns at each fort to be fired forty-five times to indicate the late sultan’s age at the time of his demise.\(^{174}\) Meanwhile, the body of the sultan was washed and laid out in the Bangsal Kencana pavilion so that the members of the royal family could take their leave before its removal on the afternoon following his death to the royal graveyard at Imagiri and interment besides the grave of the late ruler’s beloved grandfather, Sultan Mangkubumi.\(^{175}\)

had previously been assistant surgeon to the British expeditionary force, see S.Br. 14B, Colonel Alexander Adams (Surakarta) to Military Secretary of Commander of Forces (Colonel R.R. Gillespie), 10-12-1811. Nahuys van Burgst described him as having been ‘already four years’ settled in the princely territories in September 1822, S.Br. 122, H.G. Nahuys van Burgst (Yogyakarta) to G.A.G.P. van der Capellen (Batavia/Bogor), 29-9-1822; and we know from the list of European inhabitants in Yogya in 1819 that he had been settled in Yogya since November 1817 and started his lease of the royal lands at Rajawinangun in March 1818 (p. 456), Ministerie van Koloniën 3124, ‘Register van het Europese personeel op Java en Madoera (Djokjakarta)’, 1-1-1819. See also Van Enk 1990:8; 1999:161.

\(^{171}\) Dj.Br.29, Captain R.C. Garnham (Yogyakarta) to Colonel Alexander Adams (Semarang), 3-11-1814; BD (Manado) II:268, XVIII.119; Carey 1992:188-9, 383-4; B.Ng. I:356-7, LXXXVII.44-8. All the *babad* accounts and Mandoyokusumo 1977:29, give the day of the sultan’s death as Kemis Paing (Thursday Paing), although the dates vary between 19 and 20 Dulkangidah and the years vary between AJ 1741 (which is correct) and AJ 1743, Carey 1992:515 note 563.

\(^{172}\) BD (Manado) II:268-9, XVIII.119-20; Carey 1992:186, 382, where Garnham is described as not being able to bear to watch the administration of medicines and chanting of incantations at the sultan’s deathbed (LVI [Asmaradana] 8-9. usadèng montra matumpa. 9. Mestèr tan saged ninga li).\(^{173}\) Dj.Br. 29, Captain R.C. Garnham (Yogyakarta) to T.S. Raffles (Batavia/Bogor), 8-11-1814, 14-11-1814, 1-12-1814.

\(^{174}\) IOL, G21/70, General Orders of the Lieutenant-Governor in Council, Batavia, 14-11-1814.

\(^{175}\) BD (Manado) II:269, XVIII.120-1; Carey 1992:189, 384, 514-5 note 560.
Accession, regency and marriage of the boy sultan, Hamengkubuwana IV

In many ways the third sultan’s untimely passing augured ill for the future of Yogya, coming as it did just as hopes were growing that the fortunes of the sultanate might be restored after the disasters of the second sultan’s reign. The fact that Yogya was now to be ruled by a minor opened up further possibilities of intrigue and corruption in the kraton. Such fears for the future of the sultanate are mirrored in the chronicle where the text’s author, Pangéran Panular, is described as having had a dream of four half moons engaging in a fierce battle with a large full moon. The half moons shone with a very pale light and the explanation of the dream given in the babad was of the coming eclipse of the kingdom due to ambition amongst the sultan’s leading advisers which would create a situation whereby the state would be ‘dismembered and torn to shreds’.176

Such premonitions were not, however, justified by the immediate circumstances of the fourth sultan’s accession which took place amidst general rejoicing on 9 November after Garnham’s prior announcement of his elevation three days earlier.177 A brilliant firework display laid on by the former kapitan cina, Tan Jin Sing (now Radèn Tumenggung Secadiningrat), and a dinner in the Residency House opened by a seventeen-gun salute from the fort concluded the accession festivities. The regency council established by Garnham after consultation with the sultan’s family also found widespread approval in the kraton. Danureja IV, the aged First Inner bupati or patih jero, Radèn Tumenggung Pringgadiningrat, and two of the senior court bupati (nayaka), Radèn Tumenggung Ranadiningrat and Radèn Tumenggung Mertanagara, were appointed, the last two being tasked with touring Pajang and Bagelèn respectively to distribute copies of Garnham’s proclamation and apprise the populace of the change of ruler.178 Meanwhile, it seemed that the third sultan’s style of administration would be continued for when the eastern mancanagara bupati arrived in the royal capital for the Garebeg Besar on 25 November 1814, shortly after the fourth sultan’s inauguration, the two acting bupati wedana (Appendix Vb) were instructed by the boy ruler to continue as before.179 Unfortunately, Garnham’s choice of regency council was not accepted by Raffles who sent back instructions that his friend Pakualam should be

177 Dj:Br.9B, Garnham, ‘Ceremonieel’, 9-11-1814.
178 Dj:Br.29, Captain R.C. Garnham (Yogyakarta) to Charles Assey (Batavia/Bogor), 23-11-1814; IOL, G21/42, Java Separate and Political Consultations, 6-1-1815, Captain R.C. Garnham (Yogyakarta) to T.S. Raffles (Batavia/Bogor), 17-12-1814; Carey 1992:190, 385. 517 note 575; Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:42-3.
179 Dj:Br.29, Captain R.C. Garnham (Yogyakarta) to Charles Assey (Batavia/Bogor), 23-11-1814, 24-11-1814, 26-11-1814, 4-12-1814; UBL, BPL 616, J.D. Kruseman (Yogyakarta) to Commissioners-General (Batavia/Bogor), 24-12-1816; Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:43 note 1.
appointed as sole regent. The independent prince was officially installed on 17 December.\textsuperscript{180} The lieutenant-governor’s decision caused consternation in Yogya. Garnham wrote back to his superior stating that he had received the order ‘with much anxiety and apprehension’, hoping that the measure might be a provisional one (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:43 note 1):

The Pangeran is a man of ability and acquirement, but devoid of sincerity and principle: his ambition is great and if personal timidity did not restrain his passion he would most assuredly endeavour to give it full scope … the people also report this Pangeran to be avaricious and … those under his immediate authority must boast the protection of the Resident to prevent exactions and unjust practices.

But Raffles stood by his decision stating that ‘although part of the character given him by the late Resident [John Crawfurd] may no doubt be correct, it is on the other hand to be recollected that this Pangeran also has claims on the Government not only for the fidelity which he showed to our cause at the time of the war against the ex-sultan […] but also on account of the promises then held out to him’ (Louw and De Klerck 1894, I:43 note 1).

Raffles last phrase is enigmatic. What were these promises? Pakualam was already an independent prince answerable directly to the British government. What more did he expect? The sultanate? This was certainly the gloss put on the lieutenant-governor’s decision in Yogya where it seemed that Raffles might even be contemplating a new division of the kingdom which would leave the sultanate even weaker than before. Moreover, the suspicions concerning Pakualam’s avaricious character were amply borne out when he began to misuse his position as regent to buy up lands on his own account and lead a more extravagant life style in his Pakualaman residence (Carey 1992:519 note 577).

At the same time, many smaller actions aroused resentment and underscored Pakualam’s overweening political ambitions: thus he demanded to be styled Pangéran Adipati, a title refused him previously by the British government, and asked for the line of succession to be determined in the event of the fourth sultan’s sudden death expecting that the government would confirm him as the heir apparent. Instead, he was chagrined to find that the boy ruler’s mild-mannered uncle, Pangéran Mangkubumi, was designated instead.\textsuperscript{181} He also insisted on greeting the sultan ‘in European fashion’ with a handshake on those few occasions when he met him in the kraton in the company of the Resident. As for the meetings of the council of state, he held these in his own residence rather than at the paseban or meeting place at the kraton as he was required to

\textsuperscript{180} IOL, G21/42, Java Separate and Political Consultations, 22-3-1815, 6-1-1815, Captain R.C. Garnham (Yogyakarta) to T.S. Raffles (Batavia/Bogor), 17-12-1814; Van Deventer 1891:344-5; Carey 1992:198, 385-6, 517 note 575, 517-8 note 577.

\textsuperscript{181} IOL, G21/42, Java Separate and Political Consultations, 22-3-1815, Captain R.C. Garnham (Yogyakarta) to T.S. Raffles (Batavia/Bogor), 1-3-1815.
do under the terms of the regency (Carey 1992:519 note 577).

It soon became apparent that he could not be allowed to continue to exercise authority over court finances and sometime before the Dutch restoration in August 1816, the queen mother, Ratu Ibu (former Ratu Kencana), assisted by the patiñ, Danureja IV, took over all his duties. Only the great seal (cap ageng) remained in Pakualam’s hands until he formally relinquished the regency on 27 January 1820 when the fourth sultan reached his age of majority (sixteen Javanese years). At that time, Pakualam was paid a gratuity of 3,000 Spanish dollars by the Dutch government in official recognition of his ‘services’, the only official payment he received for his regency which left a legacy of bitterness in the Yogya kraton which took years to dissipate (Carey 1992:519 note 577).

Meanwhile, the private education of the sultan remained throughout in the hands of his mother, Ratu Ibu, who exercised great influence over him. She chose Dipanagara’s friend, Kyai Amad Ngusman, the head of the Suranatan, as his tutor in Arabic and Qur’ān studies. The latter instructed his pupil each morning in the Gedhong Kuning pavilion in the kraton and gave him special guidance in the reading of the Qur’ān. Since it proved impossible to identify a Malay tutor of the right calibre in Yogya, Garnham asked the British government to send one down from Batavia or Semarang. Eventually a sepoy officer by the name of Lieutenant Abbas, who had served as official Malay interpreter at the time of the Sambas expedition in May-June 1813, was chosen for the post and he gave the sultan lessons in Malay literature and language. Dipanagara also seems to have taken an active interest in his younger brother’s education: according to the Buku Kedhung Kebo he often came over from Tegalreja to the kraton to tell him edifying stories from the Fatāh al-Muluk (‘The victory of kings’) dealing with the exploits of the legendary rulers of Syria (Ajam) and Arabia. The Yogya babad confirms this and relates how the prince recommended certain texts for his brother’s reading amongst which were the Serat Ambiya, Taj as-Salātīn, Hikayat Makutha Raja (‘Mirror of princes’), Serat Ménak, Babad Kraton, Arjuna Sasrabahu, Serat Bratayuda and Rama Badra, at least one of which, the Serat Bratayuda, Dipanagara would

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182 IOL, G21/42, Java Separate and Political Consultations, 12-2-1815, Captain R.C. Garnham (Yogyakarta) to Charles Assey (Batavia/Bogor), 19-12-1814, stating that the education of Hamengkubuwana IV was entirely in the hands of Ratu Kencana (post-1816, Ratu Ibu).

183 Dj.Br.29, Captain R.C. Garnham (Yogyakarta) to Charles Assey (Batavia/Bogor), 1-12-1814; B.Ng. I:383, XCIV.12.

184 Dj.Br.29, Captain R.C. Garnham (Yogyakarta) to Charles Assey (Batavia/Bogor), 1-12-1814, Captain R.C. Garnham (Yogyakarta) to T.S. Raffles (Batavia/Bogor), 20-3-1815; B.Ng. I:383, XCIV.13. Sang Minister anyaosi mistir/ bangsa encik nama Litnan Abas/ mulang basa Lumajuné.

185 KITLV Or 13 (Buku Kedhung Kebo): 21-4, II.47-55; on Dipanagara’s own study of the Fatāh al-Muluk, see Chapter III.

186 B.Ng. I:388, XCV.26-7. The Babad Kraton referred to may be a later recension of BL Add MS 12320, dated 1777-1778, which was plundered from the Yogya kraton in June 1812. This babad covers legends and history from the time of Adam to the fall of Kartasura in 1742, Ricklefs 1974a: xxiii, 212-9.
also ask to be copied by the Dutch government when he was educating his own children in Makassar in the 1840s (Carey 1981a:lxiii note 112; p. 743). The same Javanese chronicle adds that in his attitude towards the boy sultan, Dipanagara was like Kresna giving advice to Arjuna. Sometimes, the young ruler also visited Tegalreja and on the occasion of his circumcision of 22 March 1815, it was Dipanagara who held his hands over his brother’s eyes when the ceremonial operation took place.

Despite the educational advantages which the fourth sultan enjoyed he does not seem to have been a very diligent student. Nine months after the appointment of Abbas as his private tutor, he could still not string together enough words in Malay to respond to Raffles when the latter paid a brief official visit to Yogya from 12-14 January 1816 (Carey 1992:198, 394, 524 note 617). The Yogya babad also describes how he was more interested in the martial arts, and in riding and listening to the court gamelan than in reading Javanese literature. The celebration of his marriage to the eldest daughter of the murdered patih, Danureja II, on 13 May 1816 was a magnificent affair with three full-length shadow play performances held in the kraton together with other forms of entertainment, and the inevitable firework display arranged by the former kapitan cina on the northern alun-alun. Shortly afterwards when Crawfurd was penning his final political summary for Nahuys van Burgst, he contrived to give a rather favourable impression of the young sultan’s character and capabilities:

the sultan is now about thirteen years of age but has the appearance and I think the understanding of a youth of three or four years beyond it. His disposition as far as it has yet shown itself is unexceptional, and his understanding promises to be sound and respectable. He has displayed no ambition which can interfere with the European interest and in short he is likely to turn out a prince as well suited to the relations in which he is placed as could be desired.

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188 Carey 1992:195, 391-2, 521-2 note 597 (on Garnham’s central role in the circumcision proceedings and inappropriate reactions); BD (Manado) II:270, XVIII.123-4; Dj.Br.191, F.G. Valk, ‘Onder-sschillen stukken gedient hebbende om der geschiedenis van Djokjokarta optemaken’, ‘Summary of Yogya letters, 1814-25’, entries for 15-3-1815, 20-3-1815, 23-3-1815; Mack.Pr. 2, ‘Surakarta sengkala list’, gives 10 Rabingulakir AJ 1742 (AD 23-3-1815), which is one day out; Winter 1902:60, for a description of circumcision ceremonies in the kraton at this time which involved one close relative holding the arms of the young prince from behind and one covering his eyes.
189 B.Ng. I:383, XCVII.11.
190 B.Ng. I:401-2, XVIII.36-42; Carey 1974a:9 note 25 on the other types of wayang performance staged at this time which included: gedhog (Panji cycle), krucil (Damar Wulan cycle using flat wooden puppets), jemblung (Ménak cycle), topèng (masked dances), jenggi (Chinese masquerades), and gambyong (round wooden puppet brought forward by a female dancer at the end of a wayang performance).
191 UBL, BPL 616 Port. 5 pt. 5, John Crawfurd (Yogyakarta) to H.G. Nahuys van Burgst (Yogyakarta), 9-8-1816.
His marriage had been a useful political match. According to the chronicle, it had been urged by Raffles during his previous official visit to Yogya with his late wife, Olivia Mariamne (1771-1814), from 8-12 December 1813, when the lieutenant-governor had pointed out that having a rather older partner was no bar to a successful union.\(^{192}\) This seems a bit far-fetched. As Crawfurd pointed out the marriage had long been in the mind of the third sultan and the British ‘stood pledged to its taking place for which reason it was solemnized a few months ago notwithstanding the tender age of His Highness’. As for the young ruler’s bride, now styled Ratu Kencana, Crawfurd described her as ‘an interesting pretty young woman from which circumstance and her superiority of age […] [note 192] she is likely to have considerable influence over the mind of His Highness’ (Carey 1992:504 note 509). She would later, however, suffer severe psychosis, which in one instance manifested in the stabbing of one of her husband’s former unofficial wives, following the young ruler’s sudden death in December 1822 (Van den Broek 1873, 20:480; Carey 1992:504-5 note 509).

Later, after the return of the Dutch administration in August 1816, less sympathetic accounts were given of the fourth sultan by European officials. Thus the acting Resident of Yogyakarta, Johan Diederich Kruseman (in office 1816-1817), related rumours that despite his young age the sultan had been encouraged by his mother to have sexual congress with some of his father’s and even some of his grandfather’s and great-grandfather Sultan Mangkubumi’s unofficial wives, something that was strictly forbidden under Javanese royal custom (Carey 1992:463 note 309, 505 note 509). Similar stories are related in the Javanese accounts which describe how the ruler’s mother, Ratu Ibu, had ordered his nurse, Radèn Ayu Puspitawati, a former unofficial wife of the third sultan (Mandoyokusumo 1977:32 no. 22), to instruct him in sexual matters by sleeping with him when he was barely thirteen years old and how this action had caused Dipanagara to write a stern letter of rebuke to the ratu.\(^{193}\) Following his first official visit to Yogya from 24-26 August 1817, Governor-General G.A.G.Ph. van der Capellen (in office 1816-1826) wrote in deprecating terms about the Yogya ruler:

The sultan is seventeen years old [sic, thirteen] and very stupid. He is ruled by his mother [Ratu Ibu] and stepmother [Ratu Mas], the wife of the banished sultan [Hamengkubuwana II] […] some time ago his wife presented him with a son.\(^{194}\)

\(^{192}\) Carey 1992:177, 373, 504-5 notes 509-10. In fact, there was a ten-year age gap between Raffles and his much older first wife, as compared to a mere two-year age gap between Hamengkubuwana IV and his bride.

\(^{193}\) Van der Kemp 1896a:311, 1911:268-9. This was the same selir who was attacked by Hamengkubuwana IV’s consort, Ratu Kencana, after his death.

\(^{194}\) G.A.G.Ph. van der Capellen (Batavia) to Johannes Goldberg (Minister of the Colonies, The Hague), 15-10-1817, quoted in Van der Kemp 1911:261-2. The son mentioned here was born on 8 September 1817 but died at 15 weeks, Mandoyokusumo 1977:37 no. 1; Van der Kemp 1911:262 note 2; Dwidjosoegondo and Adisoetrisno 1941:104; UBL, BPL 616, Port. 5 pt. 11, H.G. Nahuys van
This unfavourable impression was later echoed by Adriaan David Cornets de Groot Junior (1804-1829), at that time élève in de Javaansche taal (pupil for the Javanese language) in Surakarta, who remarked after a visit to Yogya in the company of Nahuys van Burgst in October 1819 that the sultan was ‘like a country lad: tall, fat, thick-headed and very ungainly and unman-nered. In fact, toute bête [completely stupid] […] the very opposite of the Sunan [Pakubuwana IV] who is so urbane’.195

It is possible that these post-1816 Dutch accounts of the fourth sultan were rather overdrawn. When the Dutch historian Jan Hageman later interviewed surviving members of the Yogya kraton for his history of the Java War, these all stated that although the sultan had become very corpulent at a young age, he was also an extremely lively person and very facetious (Hageman 1856:29). Likewise, Frans Valck in his ‘Overview of the principal events in the Yogya kingdom from 1755 to the end of the war with Dipanagara’, saw the fourth sultan as a ‘good and virtuous ruler generally well respected by his subjects’, although he had the drawback of being too pro-Dutch and too besotted with European military uniforms.196 It is no coincidence that his official kraton portrait shows him on horseback attired in the full-dress uniform of a Dutch general with the eight-pointed diamond-studded star of the Order of the Union, given to his father by Daendels in 1811, on his chest (Chapter VII note 40; Mandoyokusumo 1977:35; Carey 1992:Plate 27). This equestrian portrait could serve as an icon of the new European-dominated age in south-central Java following the British attack.

Although the fourth sultan may have had some positive personal qualities, he lacked the intelligence and application to govern Yogya effectively.197 He was thus easily led both by his mother, who doted on him and gave in to all his wishes, and by her supporters in the kraton. The post-1816 Dutch administration in the person of the new Resident, Nahuys van Burgst, compounded this situation by taking advantage of the sultan’s youth and inexperience to further his own plans for European economic influence in the Principalities (Chapter IX). The roots of the sultanate’s descent into the mo-

195 KB, A.D. Cornets de Groot private papers, IXe, 72/8/F (box 12), pt. 2:25, A.D. Cornets de Groot Jr (Surakarta) to A.D. Cornets de Groot Sr (Gresik), 5-10-1819, reference to Hamengkubuwana IV as a bobbekop. For a much more unfavourable impression of Pakubuwana IV’s character, see above p. 173 note 42 and Winter 1902:38-9, who wrote that Pakubuwana IV ‘had little learning and was extremely fickle, apprehensive and credulous, because of which everyone duped and feared him’.

196 Dj.Br.9A, Valck, ‘Overzigt’, 152. See further Chapter IX.

197 Baud 306, Van Ijsseldijk, ‘Rapport’, 11-12-1816, remarked that Hamengkubuwana IV was too inexperienced to stand up for himself.
ral abyss, which Van Hogendorp later referred in his telling reference to the Dutch transformation of the Yogya kraton into a brothel, can be traced to this period. So too can Dipanagara’s implacable conviction that Yogya needed to be destroyed and the Javanese apostate rulers stripped of their political power along with their unbeliever (kapir) European patrons in order for a new moral order based on the precepts of Islam and traditional Javanese values to be established. In many ways the lack of a firm and experienced ruler proved disastrous for the sultanate in this period just as it had been at the time of the second sultan’s confrontation with Daendels and Raffles between January 1808 and June 1812.

The Sayyid Kramat disturbance in Madiun and the sepoy plot of 1815

As British rule drew to a close, various local disturbances and plots troubled the surface political calm of south-central Java. The first incident involved a local millenarian movement in Madiun which came to a head during the absence of the Yogya mancanagara bupati in Yogya during the fourth sultan’s accession ceremony and the celebration of the Garebeg Besar in November 1814. A certain Sayyid Muhammad, who may have been an Hadhrami Arab, attempted to win the support of the local population for an uprising against the sultanate’s provincial officials. This Sayyid had apparently fled from Mecca during the disturbances which followed from the capture of the city by the Wahhābī in 1803 and had settled in Aceh.198 From there he had passed through Pulau Pinang, where he had met the exiled second sultan and had talked with his sons, Pangéran Mangkudiningrat and Pangéran Mertasana about the post-Wahhābī situation in Arabia and the coming of the Javanese ‘Just King’ (Ratu Adil).199 He had then arrived in Surabaya on a fishing boat and had begged his way to Gresik and Madiun where he had set himself up in the village of Gedhung Putri. There, he took over the village administration from the local tax-collector, Tirtawangsa, and built a mosque. He then urged the local inhabitants to refuse to obey any further orders from the Yogya-appointed priyayi. Amongst the local inhabitants, Sayyid Muhammad became known as Sayyid Kramat, the ‘holy Sayyid’ or ‘the Sayyid with magical powers’, and he informed them that he would go to Magetan to get a large mosque drum (bedhug) to call the faithful to prayer and that he would cleanse the village from ‘all Javanese impurities’, a reference to the pre-Islamic syncretic accretions of Hindu-Buddhism and Javanese animism on con-

198 LOr 6791 (3) (Babad Spèhi):221, VII.1-2. On the Wahhābī and their conquest of Mecca and Medina in 1803-1804, see Chapter III note 59. On the importance of Arab immigrants from the Hadhramaut in Java at this time, see Van den Berg 1886:111-29, 192-229.

199 LOr 6791 (3) (Babad Spèhi):221-3, VII.3-21.
temporary Islamic practice. Once the village had been purified, he stated that it would be immediately transported to Mecca and would become ‘as great as Majapahit’, the east Java-based empire which had flourished between the thirteenth and the fifteenth centuries. Soon afterwards, following his attempt to hoist two white flags as a symbol of revolt, the Sayyid was captured by one of the joint acting bupati wedana, Radèn Rongga Prawidisentika.200 The whole affair created no more than a temporary disturbance, but it serves as an interesting illustration of contemporary millenarian expectations in the Javanese countryside in the decade before the Java War.201 It also shows just how fragile the royal provincial administration had become in the mancanagara areas in the aftermath of the British annexations. The same combination of millenarian hopes and anti-priyayi sentiments would be seen again in the Umar Mahdi movement in Bagelen in January 1817 (Chapter IX).

Exactly a year later, in November 1815, a much more serious and far-reaching affair was uncovered in Yogyakarta which involved the Surakarta court and the local sepoy garrison. According to reports which reached Raffles in November and December 1815, a plot had been hatched between the Sunan, Pakubuwana IV, and members of the Light Infantry Volunteer Battalion who had been involved in garrison duties in south-central Java since November 1811 (Chapter VII). The aim of the plot was to massacre all the Europeans in Java and destroy the court of Yogya. In return for the help afforded by the sepoy, one sepoy junior commissioned officer (JCO), a subadar (captain), was to be appointed as the new lieutenant-governor and the administration of west Java and the north coast districts would probably have been entrusted to the care of the British-Indian troops.202 Valck even reported that the Sunan was prepared to give one of his daughters in marriage to this sepoy captain.203 Since the implications of the plot were potentially so serious for the safety of the European community in Java – this being a time of great uncertainty as the British prepared to relinquish control of the island to the newly liberated Dutch204 – there seems to have been an active attempt on the part of the European government to shroud the affair in secrecy (Carey

200 Dj.Br. 29, Lieutenant Edward Taylor, ‘Interview with Sayyid Muhammad’, 23-24-12-1814; IOL, G21/42, Java Separate and Political Consultations, 11-1-1815, Captain R.C. Garnham (Yogyakarta) to Charles Assey (Batavia/Bogor), 24-12-1814.
201 On the Ratu Adil expectations associated with Radèn Rongga’s November-December 1810 uprising in Madiun, see Chapter VI, and on similar expectations in Madiun in 1817 and 1819, see Chapter VI note 189.
204 Napoleon’s defeat at the Battle of Leipzig (15-19 October 1813), the so-called ‘Battle of the Nations’, had opened the way for Holland’s liberation from direct French rule (1810-1813), and the restoration of Dutch sovereignty under a new monarch, the son of the former stadhouder (head of state), Prince William V (Preface note 5), who ruled as King William I (1813-1840).
1977:295). Thus Dr Thomas Horsfield (1773-1859), the American naturalist who was resident in Surakarta at this time (De Haan 1935a:583), later wrote that (Levysohn Norman 1857:79-80):

of this mysterious event the European inhabitants [of Java] remained almost totally unapprised, although their existence probably depended on the prompt decision of a moment which under Providence was displayed by the British officers in the garrison of Djocjocarta [Yogyakarta].

Despite this official silence, however, it is still possible to recount the main features of the plot. The conspiracy against the British government and the court of Yogya seems to have originated with the Sunan whose penchant for intrigues of this nature had already manifested itself during the crisis of 1788-1790 (Chapter V note 16) and the secret correspondence with the second sultan in 1811-1812 (Chapter VII). Within the Surakarta court, there were also others who seized on the affair as a means of working out their personal animosities and ambitions. Principal amongst the Surakarta nobles involved in the plot was Pangéran Mangkubumi, the Sunan’s younger brother, whose hatred of Europeans was well-known (Chapter V note 42, Chapter VII). He was intriguing with the Sunan’s principal consort, Ratu Kencana, to exclude the Surakarta Crown Prince, the future Sunan Pakubuwana V (reigned 1820-1823), as heir apparent and have him replaced by Pangéran Purbaya (p. 181). This last, described alternatively in later Dutch reports as a man with a gentle disposition bordering on the naive and as impotent,205 was the son of the ratu in question and a son-in-law of Mangkubumi. He would later succeed to the Surakarta throne as Pakubuwana VII (reigned 1830-1858). According to Raffles, Mangkubumi had (Van Deventer 1891:59):

for a long time been in a state of honourable restraint within the Palace and, marked for his turbulent character, is in fact a madman [who] appears to be the native chief with whom the leaders of the conspiracy in the Light Infantry Battalion were chiefly in concert.

But although Mangkubumi was later made the scapegoat and exiled for six years to Ambon (1818-1824; Carey 1977:321 note 104), it is almost certain that the Sunan was throughout directly involved in the affair. Thus, Lieutenant Richard Hart, the Assistant-Resident of Surakarta, who helped to investigate the plot on behalf of his superior, Major Jeremiah Martin Johnson (in office

205 AN, Kabinet Missive, 17-5-1846 no. 134 (on Pakubuwana VII’s naiveté), 15-4-1847 no. 106 (on Pakubuwana VII’s later impotence). Padmasusastra 1902:163-5 no. 23 indicates that although he had two official consorts, he had no children by his first wife, Ratu Pakubuwana, from Madura; and only three children, who all died young, from his second, Ratu Kencana (pre-1830, Radèn Ayu Dipati Purubaya), the daughter of Pangéran Mangkubumi. His only surviving child, Radèn Ayu Pangéran Panji Suryaningrat, was by a selir (unofficial wife), Radèn Retnadiluwih. By the late 1840s, when the Dutch report was written, he was no longer sexually active.
1813-1816, wrote a rather breathless account of the Surakarta ruler’s meetings with the sepoys in early November 1815 (Van Deventer 1891:58 note 1; Carey 1977:302, 317 note 60):

Several meetings have been held by the men of Light [Infantry Volunteer] Battalion, determined not to leave this island [italics in original], and have received large presents from the Emperor [Sunan]. The Emperor [Sunan] had been received in the Fort three times. The first visit, some months ago [mid-1815], I can get no regular account of; the second visit was to see a religious ceremony; the last time was very lately […] the sepoys were [also] in the Craton [kraton] with the Emperor [Sunan], even in his most secret apartments. No exception from the native officers down to the bheesty [Persian bihishti, domestic servant who fetches and carries water] Hindoos [Hindus] talked to him of their Hindoo [Hindu] forefathers, and the Musulmen of their Prophet. In gold, diamonds and money, the amount is incredible what they have received from him.

This fascination on the part of the Sunan for Hindu ceremonial was later stressed by Raffles as having been one of the main reasons why such close initial contacts were made between the Surakarta court and the sepoys.206 In a letter to the governor-general of India, Lord Moira (in office 1813-1823), he pointed out that most of the conspirators were Hindus of the higher castes who ‘appear to have been gratified at discovering relics of their ancient religion and faith [in Java] and to have received without dislike a country in which they found themselves so much at home’.207 Although Raffles’ idea that the success of the sepoy conspiracy might have led to the immediate re-conversion of the Javanese to Hinduism was fanciful, the existence of extensive Hindu remains in south-central Java and the influence of Indic traditions on Javanese court culture probably contributed directly to the early intimacy between Pakubuwana IV and the sepoys. Indeed, the sepoy conspirators in Surakarta were at pains to emphasise to the Sunan that Java had a special Hindu heritage which in their view should be once again revitalised.208 Thus in conversations with the Surakarta ruler, ‘the sepoys always pointed out that Java was the land of Brama. This they would say was the country in which their gods took delight; this must be the country described in their sacred

206 Raffles 1817, II:5: ‘The intimacy between this prince [Pakubuwana IV] and the Sepoys first commenced from his attending ceremonies of their religious worship, which was Hindu, and assisting them with several idols of that worship which had been preserved in his family. The conspirators availing themselves of the predilection of the prince for the religion of his ancestors, flattered him by addressing him as a descendant of the great Ráma [Rama], and a deliberate plan was formed, the object of which was to place the European provinces once more under a Hindu power. Had this plan been attended with success, it would probably have been followed by the almost immediate and general reconversion of the Javanese themselves to the Hindu faith.’
207 T.S. Raffles (Batavia/Bogor) to Lord Moira (Calcutta), 8-2-1816, quoted Carey 1977:301, 316 note 51.
208 T.S. Raffles (Semarang) to Colonel N. Burslem (Batavia), 16-1-1816, quoted Carey 1977:301, 316 note 52.
Plate 47. Sketch by Engineer Major H.C. Cornelius (1774-1833) of Dutch engineers Sêwu complex to the north of Prambanan in 1807. Photograph by courtesy of the
supervising the cleaning and restoration of the main temple at the Candi India Office Library and Records, London.
Plate 48. Aquatint by William Daniell (1769-1837) of a sepoy *subadar* (captain), a junior commissioned officer (JCO) of one of the Bengal Volunteer Battalions which took part in the British assault on Yogya in June 1812 and the sepoy conspiracy of 1815. Taken from Williams 1817, frontispiece. Photograph by courtesy of the Bodleian Library, Oxford.
books and not Hindustan, which, if ever the abode of the gods must have since been strangely altered, and that it was a sin and a shame that the land of Brama should remain in the hands of infidels [Europeans].\footnote{209}

The fact that many of the Hindu temples and archaeological remains of Java's Hindu-Buddhist past were in the process of being cleaned and surveyed by the British government at the time may have also served to awaken an interest amongst the south-central Javanese nobility in their Indic inheritance (De Haan 1935a:492; Carey 1977:301, 316 note 54, 316-7 note 55, 1992:470-1 note 336). In Yogyakarta, for example, there is evidence that Dipanagara and other princes took statuary away from the Hindu and Buddhist temples such as Kalasan, Prambanan and Candhi Sèwu to the east of the city to decorate their residences.\footnote{210} But when the sepoy conspirators in Yogya later tried to capitalise on this interest to win the fourth sultan over to their cause they met with a rebuff. According to the testimony of a spy, a sepoy officer had visited the \textit{kraton} to speak – presumably in Malay – with the boy ruler and had told him that ‘the images [from the Hindu temples] in Java were the same as those worshipped by [our] forefathers in India, consequently we must be from the same stock. Thus, if you feel uneasy under the British let me know and I will settle the matter for you.’ But the sultan had immediately reported the matter to his mother, Ratu Ibu, who had in turn informed the Resident, Captain Garnham (Carey 1977:317 note 56). Although the sepoys made no headway with the Yogya court, many British-Indian soldiers appear to have deserted in the sultan’s capital where they married into Javanese families. Some took service in the court as mahouts (drivers) for the royal elephants or as members of the sultan’s bodyguard regiments, others based themselves in Kedhu and Boyolali where they kept dairy cattle and produced milk and ghee for consumption in the court cities (note 75; Carey 1977:302, 310, 317 note 57), still others became involved in the cloth trade\footnote{211} or hired themselves out as bodyguards to wealthy Eurasian landrenters like J.A. Dezentjé (Chapter I note 159).

In Surakarta, however, the Sunan immediately responded to the sepoys’ overtures by lending them Hindu images from the court collections and by providing money for the decoration of the statues and to light up the ghāt (platforms) on which they were placed. He also attended various ceremonies inside the fort, usually alone and dressed as a common Javanese, but some-

\footnote{209} T.S. Raffles (Semarang) to Colonel N. Burslem (Batavia), 16-1-1816, quoted Carey 1977:301, 316 note 53.  
\footnote{210} Chapter II note 60. The third sultan also instructed one of his uncles to make sketches of the standing image of Lara Jonggrang and all the adjacent statues, temple reliefs, gateways and ruined temple buildings during a visit to Prambanan in the company of John Crawfurd in December 1812, Carey 1992:136-8, 320-2.  
\footnote{211} Dj.Br. 60, H. F. Lippe (Surakarta) to H.G. Nahuys van Burgst (Yogyakarta), 9-6-1817, on three deserters of the Light Infantry Volunteer Battalion who ‘pretended to be engaged in the cloth trade’.
times also accompanied by members of his family when he would arrive by carriage (Carey 1977:302). In return, the Sunan welcomed leading sepoy conspirators into his court, sitting with them in the evenings at the Randingan, the place set aside for archery practice in the kraton, where he would interrogate them on the manner and customs of India and watch their gymnastic displays (Carey 1977:303, 317 note 61). The sepoys also told him about the history of Bengal, the strength of the British army in India and their victories there, stressing that the power of the farang (British) was entirely dependant on their British-Indian troops (Carey 1977:303, 317 note 62).

During the early period of their contacts in 1813-1814, neither the Sunan nor the sepoys appear to have devised any firm plans for a conspiracy against the British or the Yogya court. The most that the Sunan appeared to hope for at this stage was to be able to retain some sepoys in his service in the event that the British handed Java back to the Dutch, and to build up a connection with the inhabitants of British India with the intention of perhaps using these connections to further the existing intrigues in the Surakarta court for the elevation of Pangéran Purbaya as Crown Prince (Carey 1977:303, 317 note 65). The Sunan’s cautious and non-committal attitude can be gauged from a conversation which took place between him and the subadar (captain), later designated as the potential sepoy governor. On asking about news from Bengal, the Surakarta ruler had been told that the ‘Hindus’ were opposing the British there and that unless the British allowed the subadar and his battalion to return home, ‘he would make a start with them in Java’. Whereupon the Sunan replied that he was now a child of the English and that those who wished to oppose them could do so, but that he wanted no say in the matter (Carey 1977:303, 317 note 66).

The sepoys for their part were not interested in the Surakarta kraton family intrigue. Instead, they seem to have hoped to secure for themselves positions and material advancement in the event of a successful rising against the Europeans in Java. They were also probably motivated by anti-European sentiments brought on by long tours of duty in south-central Java (Van Deventer 1891:62-3). Unlike their fellow sepoys in the Madras and Bombay presidencies, they were not allowed to take their family with them while on active service, having to rely instead on remitting a substantial part of their pay to support their relatives (Kaye 1880, I:333-4). Colonel N. Burslem, the commander of the eastern military division of Java, who later investigated the plot, pointed out that the Light Infantry Volunteer Battalion had remained at the courts for the best part of four years and the lack of European officers212 had led to a signi-

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212 In theory each Bengal infantry battalion numbering 800 sepoys was supposed to have seven European officers, Kaye 1880, I:212. The Light Infantry Volunteer Battalion had at the most five officers present who had to divide their duties between both courts. Two of these were subsequently withdrawn for other tasks, Carey 1977:297, 314 note 25.
significant breakdown in discipline (Van Deventer 1891:58 note 1). Dissatisfaction had begun to manifest as early as July 1813, when the Java Light Cavalry, which had only recently arrived from Bengal, was withdrawn from garrison duty after a very short posting in south-central Java (Carey 1977:297, 314 note 22). The Light Infantry Battalion sepoys, then garrisoned in the court towns for over twenty months, began to declare openly their annoyance at having been passed over in their tour of garrison duty and at having been parted from their families for so long. The considerable difficulties they experienced in making cash remittances to Bengal compounded these feelings (Carey 1977:297). Connections with the Surakarta court began at this time, but serious plans had not been laid until mid-1815 when the 59th infantry regiment (2nd Notts), a European regiment, had been withdrawn. The general running down of the British military presence in Java at this time in preparation for the Dutch arrival may have encouraged the sepoys into thinking that they could defy the authority of the British government with impunity. Rumours also spread amongst the British-Indian troops that the kings of England and Holland had negotiated a marriage between their children and Java was to be given as a dowry to the Dutch ruler, King William I (reigned 1813-1840). These reports reawakened all the old fears amongst the sepoys that their battalions were about to be sold to the Dutch and the idea grew that preventive steps should be taken. Some of the conspirators suggested that the European officers should be seized and forced to take the sepoys back with them to Bengal. Others put forward more ambitious plans for murdering their British superiors and replacing the European administration in Java with a sepoys one. In connection with this latter plan, the Surakarta conspirators proposed to build a residence for the subadar designated as governor on the heights overlooking the Sunan’s capital – presumably Mount Lawu. Some even appear to have expected help to be forthcoming from the French, news of Napoleon’s escape from Elba (26 February 1815) just having reached Java (Carey 1977:304). We will see in the next chapter how a similarly garbled account of European politics in the aftermath of the Congress of Vienna (1815) was circulated in Surakarta one year later by a certain Radèn Kaap (’the nobleman from the Cape’), a great-grandson of the exiled Pangéran Arya Mangkunagara.213

Contacts were made between one of the sepoys plotters in Yogya and the sepoys garrisons in Weltevreden (Batavia) and Surabaya to coordinate plans in the event of a successful uprising in south-central Java. Close links were also maintained with the British Indian troops in the garrisons at Klathèn and Magelang, as well as the numerous sepoys deserters in Kedhu. Another sepoys

213 Pangéran Arya Mangkunagara was the younger brother of Sultan Mangkubumi and Pakubuwana II, and father of Radèn Mas Said (Mangkunagara I). He had been banished to the Cape of Good Hope via Ceylon in the mid-eighteenth century, Van der Kemp 1913:231 note 2; De Graaf 1949:249-50; Ricklefs 1974a:38, 109. See further p. 500.
captain promised that he would use his influence to win over the Malay battalions in Batavia and secure the capital for the conspirators. In the same month, September 1815, reports were received from members of the Fourth Volunteer Battalion, who had deserted in south Sulawesi, that the Raja of Boné had taken them on as mercenaries in his campaign against the British and had given them command of a separate battalion with the pay of 500 Java rupees a month (Carey 1977:304). These reports were relayed to the Sunan with the words ‘now will you believe that sepoys are fit to command armies? Give [us] money and men and leave the rest to us!’ (Carey 1977:305). The Sunan was asked for 400 of his bodyguard troops and 4,000 Spanish dollars in cash to indemnify the sepoys involved in their pay which still remained unremitted in the government treasury in Batavia. The Sunan agreed, provided that Purbaya was placed on the throne of Yogya. At the same time, Pangérán Mangkubumi gave the sepoys an undertaking that their monthly pay would be guaranteed until such time as they wished to return to Bengal after destroying the British administration in Java. From late September onwards, frequent meetings began to be held between the leading conspirators in Purbaya’s residence, which were mainly attended by Mangkubumi. The Sunan also circulated letters to his kinsman, Sultan Sepuh of Madura (p. 181), and the bupati of Semarang and Surabaya informing them that the European officers in the Yogya garrison were about to be murdered (Carey 1977:305, 318-9 note 77).

The Surakarta ruler’s motives for implicating himself in this fashion in the plot are difficult to decipher. It is clear that he was unhappy with the sepoys plans for massacring their British officers just as in 1812 he had been reluctant to participate openly in an attack on the British when Raffles moved against Yogya (Chapter VII) and had given specific instructions that there ‘should be no murder and the spilling of blood’ (Carey 1977:319 note 78, 1980:69). But he may have been overruled by his younger brother, Mangkubumi. Furthermore, the latter played on his fears that when the Dutch returned to Java they might suspend the 1812 treaty and end the payments for the tollgates and markets which constituted such an important source of revenue for the Surakarta court (Carey 1977:305, 319 note 79). Rumours were also circulating at this time that Marshal Daendels was about to return as the new Dutch governor-general and this must have caused the Sunan deep concern. On the other hand, the Sunan seems to have entertained the hope that a successful sepoy uprising in Yogya would not only place the sultanate under his control but also win him back the rich apanage lands in Kedhu which had been annexed

214 Van der Kemp 1911:44. In fact, in October 1815 Daendels had been appointed Governor-General of the Netherlands colonies on the Guinea Coast (Nederlandsche Bezittingen aan de kust van Guinee) (west Africa), where he died on 2 May 1818, Stapel 1941:77. Health conditions, in particular endemic yellow fever, were so bad that it was said in the early nineteenth century that the Dutch needed three governor-generals of the Guinea (Gold) Coast: one being buried, one in post, and one sailing from Texel to take his place in the event of his imminent death.
in August 1812. The prospect of establishing Surakarta supremacy once again in south-central Java was probably so enticing that the Sunan was prepared to sanction any means to achieve this end.

What the relationship would have been between the Sunan and the sepoys after the destruction of the British administration in Java was never clarified. It is possible that Pakubuwana IV expected them to return to Bengal eventually or at the most establish themselves along the north coast or in west Java, which had always constituted a foreign kingdom in the view of the Javanese (p. 166-8). But it seems that the sepoys intended to settle in south-central Java and their plan to build a governor’s residence in the vicinity of Surakarta points to this fact. Indeed, as the intrigue progressed, the Surakarta court began to assume an increasingly subordinate role in the eyes of the sepoys conspirators and had their uprising been a success they would probably have had little compunction about ridding themselves of the Surakarta ruler. As one conspirator was overheard to remark: ‘Never mind about that now, he may be of use to us on the present occasion […] when we have established ourselves we can easily settle that point. One house does not make a bazaar!’ (Carey 1977:306). The Sunan for his part was thought to have been contemplating his own double-dealing by betraying the sepoys to the British and cooperating with them in putting down their uprising in return for territorial concessions, in particular in Kedhu (Van der Kemp 1913:324-5).

The discovery of the conspiracy was not quite the fortuitous event which later commentators like P.H. van Lawick van Pabst have made out.215 Although the main plans were laid in Surakarta, the actual uprising was to take place in Yogya where a series of meetings took place between the conspirators from 12 October onwards, one of which involved 29 sepoy officers and men and took place in the Taman Sari. As the day of the uprising approached, constant postponements were asked for by the leaders in order to be sure of more support. Eventually, news of what was afoot reached the ears of the acting commanding officer, Lieutenant Steel, who paraded the battalion and warned that anyone involved in the plot would be blown away from the mouth of cannon, a usual punishment for mutineers in the Indian army at this time.216 Two of the leading conspirators took fright at this threat and tried to make their way to Surakarta to confer with the court, but to no avail. On the hasty return of the battalion commander from Semarang, an immediate commission of enquiry was instituted (9-16 November 1815) during which members of the battalion gave evidence against the conspirators. The ringleaders were thereupon arrested along with about twenty others and sent under armed guard to the British military post at Serondhol above Semarang to await the convening of a general court-martial in January 1816. Further arrests were

216 Kaye 1880, I:206, it had earlier been a Mughal practice.
made in Surakarta. Following the court martial, 17 were shot by firing squad at Semarang and about 50 shipped back in irons to Bengal (Van der Kemp 1911:45; Carey 1977:321-2 note 112).

Although the prompt action taken by the British officers in Yogya appears to have been entirely successful in scotching the intrigue, Surakarta remained unsettled for some time afterwards. It took the Surakarta Resident, Major Jeremiah Martin Johnson, nearly two months to make a full enquiry into the extent of the court’s involvement with the conspirators. The fact that he had been an absentee Resident in the last half of 1815, either on sick-leave at the Surakarta hill station at Séla on the saddle between the twin volcanoes of Mount Merapi and Mount Merbabu, or in Batavia on civilian assignments, inter alia as deputy paymaster-general, meant that he was woefully out of touch with developments in Surakarta. It was not until the end of December that he was able to submit his report to Raffles. During this time the Surakarta court was in a state of turmoil, fearful that the lieutenant-governor would proceed with military measures against the Sunan and making half-hearted attempts at resistance. Thus the Sunan sent around to all villages under Surakarta control in the Mataram area to order the mustering of muskets and men. Spies were also posted around the Surakarta fort to give the court advance warning of the approach of any loyal sepoy and European troops. Meanwhile, various Surakarta princes and officials were said to have entered into an agreement to go to the rescue of Pangéran Mangkubumi in the event that the British government attempted to exile him (Carey 1977:308).

Mangkubumi was inevitably at the centre of these preparations and was in close contact with the Surakarta bupati of Banyumas, Radèn Tumenggung Yudanegara (Chapter I). This official was tasked with coordinating resistance in the western mancanagara and preparing a base for him should he be forced to slip away from Surakarta. In connection with these arrangements, two local santri, Muhamad Ali and Mahdi Sayyid, who styled themselves Pangéran Jayakusuma and Pangéran Anom, gathered some 200 followers and ‘kept a royal state’ in the words of the Surakarta Assistant-Resident with a large train of armed followers. Prangwedana (Mangkunagara II) was also said to have been gathering his retainers from Karangpandhan on the slopes of Mount Lawu under the pretext of adjusting rents, moves which were almost certainly aimed at self-defense in the event of a clash between the Sunan and the British. While these events were taking place, Raffles came to a swift decision in early January 1816, based on Johnson’s reports, not to proceed to an attack on Surakarta but to pardon the Sunan on condition that he surrender his younger brother and put an end to further intrigues against the Crown Prince. Raffles’ decision may have been prompted by an awareness of his disadvantageous military position at the time (shades of December 1811, p. 301), but as it turned out he had judged the Sunan correctly and the latter made no at-
VIII Into a new era: the British interregnum, 1812-1816

tempt to prevent his younger brother being handed over to him in Semarang on 7 January 1816. Two days later Raffles travelled to Surakarta for a series of talks with the Sunan and the patih during which he issued strong warnings against any further intrigues and insisted that the Surakarta ruler should ‘retire’ and hand over the day-to-day running of kraton affairs to his heir apparent (Pakubuwana V). At the same time, he gave the Sunan promises that the Dutch would not tamper with any existing treaty arrangements when they arrived to assume the government from the British the following August under the terms of the Convention of London and the Treaty of Vienna to which we will return shortly. Similar promises were also extended to the fourth sultan and the regent, Pakualam, when Raffles visited Yogya on his return journey (Van Deventer 1891:61-2; Carey 1977:309, 1992:197-8, 394).

Although the evidence given by the sepoys at the Serondhol court martial in mid-January implicated the Sunan even more heavily in the conspiracy than Raffles had at first supposed, he did not go back on his decision. Moves were nevertheless taken to tighten up security arrangements in south-central Java. In Yogya, a new corps of 25 mounted troops was formed to guard the kraton and to keep an eye on the activities of the court, much in the same fashion as the small dragoon detachment which was maintained by the Sunan in Surakarta (Carey 1977:309, 321 note 109). These troops were recruited from Dutch and German residents in the court towns who had Javanese mothers, and were commanded by a European officer seconded from the local garrison. There were also some Ambonese soldiers seconded to the corps to give it an additional Indonesian presence. Most of these men spoke Malay and some even a little Javanese so that they were in a position to report back any developments in the kraton to the Resident. Every day six of these troops under a brigadier (NCO) and a sergeant did sentry duty in the kraton with two soldiers guarding the door of the sultan’s private apartments (Carey 1977:321 note 110). Meanwhile, the ineffectual British Resident of Yogya, Dr Daniel Ainslie (in office 1815-1816), was required by Raffles to hand over his post on 22 January to the much more experienced John Crawfurd who returned for his fourth and last tour of duty as Resident at the sultan’s court.

This was not, however, quite the last which was heard of the sepoys in south-central Java. Ironically, the Light Infantry Volunteer Battalion, which had proved so unreliable in 1815 and which Raffles had demanded should be immediately sent back to Bengal, was one of the last British units to leave the island because of the acute shortage of troops during the British transfer of Java to the Dutch. Furthermore, a detachment of about 100 Bengal lancers was ta-

217 Although Raffles later assured the Dutch that the number of British troops had never fallen below 7,000 men, C.Th. Elout, one of the Dutch Comissioners-General (in office 1816-1819), reckoned that there were only 3,000 soldiers on the island at the time of the transfer, of whom only 1,200 were Europeans, Van der Kemp 1910:195-6, 369.
The power of prophecy

ken on by the new Dutch government as Jayèng Sekar (mounted constabulary; *Bataviasche Courant* 31, 12-5-1827) and later proved mutinous when the Dutch tried to use them against Dipanagara in 1825.\footnote{Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:176, 501-2. Some, however, later showed their courage on the battlefield: one of the officers, Captain (later Lieutenant-Colonel) Johan Jacob Roeps (1805-1840), who was later present at Dipanagara’s arrest in Magelang on 28 March 1830 and would accompany the prince on the first stage of his journey into exile, owed his life to the personal bravery of his Bengali troop sergeant in a skirmish on 4-5-1827 near Klatèn, Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, III:80.} The number of deserters who had settled in south-central Java also caused the Dutch government concern: in 1817, Nahuys van Burgst warned Batavia about ‘the presence of some many of these inhabitants of Bengal in the interior of Java, which must be regarded as a danger to the local inhabitants […] for their greater intelligence and ambition sets them above the Javanese as leaders’ (Carey 1977:310, 322 note 118). His warnings appeared justified when in February 1822, a Bengali, Dul (Abdul) Gang Singh, played a role in the revolt of the fourth sultan’s great-great-uncle, Pangéran Dipasana (p. 498), and during the Java War, a man by the name of Nurngali, described in Dipanagara’s *babad* as a *dhukun Benggala* (Bengali physician and herbalist) served as the prince’s personal physician and fought with him against the Dutch.\footnote{BD (Manado) IV:22-3, XXXII.147, XXXII.153-7; 28-9, XXXII.195-9; 31, XXXII.216; Chapter XI.} In the same period, the great banking house of Palmer & Company in Calcutta, which had arranged a six million Sicca rupee loan to Governor-General G.A.G.Ph. van der Capellen’s cash-strapped government before the Java War and had demanded as collateral an option over all the Dutch possessions in the Indies (De Prins 2002:108), even offered to send sepoys to help turn the tide of battle in favour of the Dutch. Although the British had no desire to see the Dutch driven out of Java, the proposal was eventually vetoed by the British foreign minister, George Canning (in office 1822-1827), as being an inappropriate use of the military resources of the Bengal Presidency (Hogendorp 1913:182-3). A similar demand for 3,000 British-Indian troops was contemplated by the Dutch commander-in-chief, Hendrik Merkus de Kock, in May 1826, but the memory of the 1815 events seems to have caused him hurriedly to reconsider his proposal (Louv and De Klerck 1894-1909, III:134). ‘Beware of the Greeks bearing gifts’ was Van Hogendorp’s prescient epitaph for this abortive offer by the Calcutta bankers. Over a century later in 1945-1946, the British would again find that using Indian troops in Java against nationalist forces would have its drawbacks (Thorne 1988:117-8).

Conclusion

The sepoy plot of 1815 was the last important event to mark the period of British rule in Java. In five short years it had effected remarkable changes in the political balance of power in south-central Java. Its legacy would live on
in the leading British agency houses in Java, particularly Jessen, Trail & Co (agents for the Ganges Insurance Company of Calcutta and the English East India Company, 1820-1825), Deans, Scott & Co (agents for Calcutta Insurance Company and Lloyds, until 1823), Macquoid, Davidson & Co. They flourished briefly in the subsequent two decades (De Haan 1935a:534-5, 607-8, 643-4, 647-8; Broeze 1979:262; Enk 1999:119-86), but the British government itself would not reap the benefits. In May 1815, the final decision had been taken by the British foreign minister, Lord Castlereagh, and the administration of Lord Liverpool (in office 1812-1827) to evacuate Java under the terms of the Treaty of Vienna and the 13 August 1814 Convention of London, which had agreed the return of all the former Dutch colonies (with the exception of Cape Colony and Demarara) captured by the British since 1803. This decision formed part of a wider British policy of rebuilding Dutch strength to counter-balance the possible threat of a resurgent France in the aftermath of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. Napoleon’s Hundred Days, which ended with his 18 June 1815 defeat at Waterloo, caused this order to be postponed for six months. But on 27 October 1815, the Dutch commissioners-general – Mr C.Th. Elout, Vice-Admiral A.A. Buyskes and G.A.G.Ph. van der Capellen, the last invested as the new Dutch governor-general designate and travelling on two different vessels to ensure that all three would not be lost in the event of shipwreck – set sail from Texel for Java where they arrived on 27 April and 11 May 1816 respectively. The official ceremony of the rendition of the island took place in Batavia on 19 August 1816. With their constitutional regulation (regerings-reglement) of January 1818, the commissioners-general would jointly preside over the birth of a new colonial entity: the Netherlands Indies. This marked the beginning of the modern era of Dutch colonialism.

In Yogyakarta, Crawfurd’s replacement, Nahuys van Burgst, had arrived on 9 August and the Dutch tricolour had flown again again over the court cities on the fourteenth of that month (Van der Kemp 1911:248). Crawfurd assured Nahuys that:

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220 Founded by Raffles’ close friend, the Irish-born Thomas Macquoid, who went bankrupt in Batavia in 1826, his firm going into liquidation the following year, De Haan 1935a:607; Broeze 1979:262.

221 Others, which were involved in both shipping and trade, included Skelton & Co, Maclaine Watson & Co, founded by the former Surakarta landrenter, Gillean Maclaine (died 1840), Thornton West & Co (until 1836), and Miln Haswell & Co (until 1837), see further Broeze 1979:262.
The European ascendancy at this place [Yogya] is surrendered to our successors unimpaired and in as complete an exercise as the existing arrangements can admit of. […] The country [likewise] enjoys as much tranquillity and prosperity as under the present frame of society can reasonably be hoped for. The vigour and character of the European Government counter-balance the usual weakness of a minority, while the latter is favourable to that moderation and freedom which encourage industry and prosperity. A thorough and favourable revolution has taken place in the relations of the European and Native governments within the last five years which render the former […] indisputably paramount.\textsuperscript{222}

Although Nahuys acknowledged that Crawfurd had handed over the Residency ‘in the greatest peace’, it remained to be seen whether the principles of economic liberalism referred to by Crawfurd would sit comfortably with a returned Dutch government fixated on securing immediate profits from their erstwhile colony. Once again, the years ahead would prove troubling and testing ones for Dutch and Javanese alike. Far from being the doorway to a new era of industry and prosperity, the conflicted period of the Dutch restoration would open a high road to war in south-central Java. This time the destruction of Java referred to in the Parangkusuma prophecy would encompass more than the ruined sultanate of Yogya.

\textsuperscript{222} UBL, BPL 616 Port. 5 pt. 5, John Crawfurd (Yogyakarta) to H.G. Nahuys van Burgst (Yogyakarta), 9-8-1816.
CHAPTER IX

Binding on the iron yoke
The returned Dutch administration, the impoverishment of the south-central Javanese peasantry and the rise of millenarian expectations, 1816-1822

Squaring the circle

The period which followed the formal British handover of Java and its dependencies on 19 August 1816 saw a doomed attempt by the returned Dutch administration to square the circle between the demands of economic liberalism and the interests of the local population. The new governor-general, G.A.G.Ph. van der Capellen (in office 1816-1826), took the task of protecting the indigenous inhabitants from foreign exploitation particularly to heart. During a voyage to Maluku in 1824, he noted in his diary that Dutch colonialism ‘could no longer go forward solely with an eye to making profit, but should secure the welfare of the people and uplift them from [their] state of degradation and contempt’ (De Prins 2002:140, citing Nieuwenhuys 1973:82). These were words which might have passed the lips of any early twentieth-century Dutch ‘ethical’ official inspired by the notion of Holland’s ‘Debt of Honour’ in which the wealth drawn from the Indies was to be repaid by giving primacy to the local population in colonial policy (Ricklefs 1993:151). The problem for Van der Capellen was that he was almost a century before his time. And he recognised this fact. In the same year in which he was committing his private thoughts to his diary, he burst out in a lament to the Dutch Minister of the Colonies, his former commissioner-general colleague (1816-1819), C.Th. Elout, that ‘whenever I see that in the Netherlands people understand liberalism to mean the protection of European landowners at the cost of the native population, and that the latter, who are so dear to me, are completely lost from view in order that a few [European] speculators and adventurers can succeed in their plans, then I must declare myself an ultra-anti-liberal’ (De Prins 2002:140, citing Mijer 1878:190). Even Nahuys, diametrically opposed as he was to Van der Capellen in so many areas of economic
policy, acknowledged the genuiness of his intentions, writing that he was ‘an enlightened and virtuous governor-general […] who more than any other […] I have known between 1806 and 1839 […], devoted all his time from early dawn until late at night with very little intermission to the duties of his high station’ (Nahuys van Burgst 1852:103).

In the years leading up to the outbreak of the Java War the balance between speculators and adventurers on the one hand, and Dutch ethicists *avant la lettre* like Van der Capellen on the other, was firmly weighted in favour of the former. Indeed, the lead came from the very top as Raffles himself noted after a conversation with the new Dutch monarch in Brussels in July 1817: ‘the King himself [William I, reigned 1813-1840] and his leading minister [Secretary of State Anton Reinhard Falck, in office 1813-1818] seem to mean well, [but] they have too great a hankering after profit, and immediate profit, for any liberal policy to thrive under them’ (Raffles 1830:235). Dipanagara’s seemingly apocryphal conversation with Crawfurd about the type of Dutch Resident he might favour as the British official’s replacement – namely one who had served the VOC or a newcomer from Europe (Chapter VIII) – pointed to an all too present reality: the unstoppable tide of former Napoleonic War soldiers and fortune seekers of all sorts ‘whose former vocations no one had the slightest inkling of’ who now descended on Java to make a career for themselves (Van den Doel 1994:49). Well over half of those who made their way to Java at this time claimed to have special recommendations from the new governor-general (Van den Broek 1893:3). As a keen-eyed traveller, who visited Java shortly after the handover, wrote, Van der Capellen was literally overwhelmed with whole boat loads of ‘aged paterfamilias who, instead of knowledge of Indies affairs, only brought over with them a numerous and needy progeny, and who had no other intention […] than to restore in the shortest possible time […] their dilapidated affairs in the mother country so that, without having to trouble themselves further with the Indies, they could return home with their nests nicely feathered’ (Van den Doel 1994:49, citing Olivier 1830, III:425). *Baroe datang* (‘one who has just arrived’) would soon become a veritable refrain amongst the great Portuguese-Indies-Dutch mixed race families in Batavia as they contemplated this unwelcome tide of newcomers whose arrival heralded the transformation of Dutch colonial society into a tropical *beambtenstaat* (bureaucratic state; Taylor 1983:116). A telling example of the degree of hopeless disorder which accompanied the sending of officials to Java at this time and the utter ignorance of the new government in The Hague of the colony which had now been restored to them, was that no one knew enough Malay even to translate the inscription on the new Java rupee banknotes which were being printed in 1815 in the government mint prior to the handover of the colony from the British (Van der Kemp 1907:1400-1, 1914:178).
Plate 50. Huibert Gerard baron Nahuys van Burgst (1782-1858), the ‘bigwig with a pair of big thick epaulettes’, who served as Resident of Yogyakarta between 1816 and 1822 (a post which he combined with that of acting Resident of Surakarta between 1820 and 1822). Dipanagara described him in his autobiographical babad (that is, the Babad Dipanagara, Manado version) as a resident who ‘enjoyed eating and drinking and the spreading of Dutch ways’ (karemannya mangan minum/lan anjrah cara Welandi). Lithograph by Jean-Baptiste Ambroise Marcellin Jobard (1792-1861) based on a painting by the Belgian artist J.B. Madou made in circa 1831 when Nahuys was back in Holland on leave after the end of the Java War. Photograph by courtesy of the late W.G.I.C. Rissink of Leiden, a descendant of Nahuys.
A Resident who enjoyed eating and drinking and the spreading of Dutch ways

Although the new Dutch Resident of Yogyakarta, Nahuys van Burgst (in office 1816-1822), was no stranger to Java – he had spent a year (1806-1807) there during the governor-generalship of A.H. Wiese (in office 1805-1808) and returned to serve a two-year stint as a member of Daendels’ Forest Administration in 1809-1811 (p. 277; De Haan 1935a:620) – he belonged in his political affiliations and outlook to the post-1816 generation of Dutch officials. François de Haan described him with some justification as a gambler who had come out to Java secure in the knowledge that he enjoyed the favour of the Dutch king through the political influence of his brother-in-law, Rutger Jan Schimmelpenninck (1761-1825), erstwhile Grand Pensionary of Holland (1805-1806).1 Like his monarch, Nahuys also had very definite views about the appropriate economic policies which should be pursued in the Indies. He was himself a persuasive advocate of the opening up of the Javanese hinterland to western capital. In particular, he advocated an increase in the number of privately owned western estates and land leases in the Principalities as a method of bringing Java’s feudal society into the modern world. In this respect, Nahuys was a ‘liberal’ and stood in opposition to ‘conservatives’ such as Nicolaus Engelhard, Van der Capellen and his close adviser, H.J. van de Graaff (1782-1827) – the ‘scourge of the colony’ (Van Hogendorp 1913:29) – who were for more government control of the economy.2 Nahuys’ strong views on this question, in which his own financial interests were later directly involved, was to be of great significance for his period as Resident. Although some of his contemporaries found him both honourable and impressive,3 most censured him for making private profit out of his position.4 He was also, as we will see later in this chapter, not above plagiarising the work of his subordinates and publishing it as his own (note 170). The judgement of the

1 Biographical details on Nahuys can be found in De Haan 1935a:620-1; Handelingen en geschriften van het Indisch Genootschap 1859, VI:91-110; Genealogie Nahuys 2000-1:38-9. He was not styled ‘van Burgst’ until after he was ennobled as baron in 1836.

2 vAE (aanwinsten 1941) 20, H.J. van de Graaff (Batavia) to Mr J. Fabius (Holland), 26-7-1823; Day 1972:203-42; Nieuwenhuys 1973:76-87.

3 Recommending him to Lord Minto, Raffles remarked on the great kindness shown by Nahuys to British prisoners of war formerly held in Semarang (prior to the collapse of the Franco-Dutch government on 18-9-1811) and stated that ‘he bears a very high character among his countrymen for honour and uprightness’, IOL, Eur F148/29 (Raffles-Minto collection vol. 29), T.S. Raffles (Bogor) to Lord Minto (Calcutta), 8-4-1813. Willem van Hogendorp thought him one of the most remarkable personages he had encountered during his four-year stay in Java (1826-1830) writing of him as a ‘decided calm man [whose] features denoted a person of action and ambition’, Van Hogendorp 1913:142.

4 Dj:Br. 9A, Valck, ‘Overzigt’, 148; dK 23, Johannes van den Bosch (Batavia/Bogor) to H.M. de Kock (Batavia), 29-4-1830 (commenting on Nahuys’ lack of delicatessen and stating that he possessed great qualities of spirit which were not always ruled by greatness of soul). See further Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:56 (on his personal enrichment), 621-4 (on the profits made by Nahuys from his estate at Kalitan near Surakarta which he rented from the Surakarta patih, Sasradiningrat II).
Dutch historians of the Java War, P.J.F. Louw and E.S. de Klerck, is damning in this respect (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:58):

In everything we have read from his hand [...] there arises in our imagination the image of a man who was at heart an autocrat. [A person] who was able to demand from the native princes a very salutary respect and assure himself of their friendship, in which endeavours he was aided by the ample experience and the great knowledge he possessed of the Javanese courts. [But] he was [also] extremely pleased with himself and did not really know how to value the services of others. Skilful with his pen, he advanced fine theories, but in practice he did things which a more fastidious person would have omitted, actions which make us doubt the inner worth of his motto, *non sibi sed patria* [not for himself but for his country].

Nahuys’ personality certainly set him apart from his predecessor, Crawfurd. If the latter had been retiring and austere, Nahuys was bluff and supremely self-confident. He shared none of Crawfurd’s scholarly attributes and had little interest in Javanese culture, but he made up for this by his boldness, energy and administrative capabilities. In many ways a product of Holland’s Patriot Revolution, he placed great faith in the importance of the individual and in European superiority. But perhaps like Julien Sorel in Stendhal’s *Le rouge et le noir* (1830), he believed more in the idea of equality for all but distinction for himself. Characterised by another historian (and veteran) of the Java War, F.V.H.A. Ridder de Stuers, as a ‘pseudo military man’ (De Stuers 1833:19), his one attempt at leading troops in the field during Radèn Tumenggung Sasradilaga’s uprising in Rembang in December 1827 ended in ignominious failure when he was put to flight during a skirmish on the Panolan-Padhangan road. The sight of a *Tuwan Besar met een paar dikke epau- letten*, ‘a bigwig with a pair of thick epaulettes’ in De Stuers’s telling phrase, fleeing from the field of battle before a band of Javanese rebels, no doubt did wonders for the morale of Sasradilaga’s troops but hardly reflected well on the wisdom of the Dutch high command in using uniformed civilians and pantomime officers like Nahuys in battle against a resolute foe (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, III:386-7, 386 note 1). On a social level, however, ‘Major’ Nahuys did seem to get on famously with members of the Javanese nobility, especially in Surakarta where H.M. de Kock noted how ‘puzzlingly well loved’ the Resident was with the princes.5 Nahuys’ reputation as a *bon vivant* was well known (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, III:572) and during his travels through south-central Java at the time of the Java War, Willem van

5 NA, G.K. van Hogendorp private collection 91, H.M. de Kock (Surakarta) to L.P.J. du Bus de Gisignies (Batavia), 31-8-1827, referring to Nahuys as *onbegrijpelig bemind* in Surakarta. Prominent amongst the Surakarta princes whom Nahuys struck up a friendship with were Pangéran Prangwedana (Mangkunagara II; note 10) and Pangéran Buminata, Kyai Maja’s court patron (Chapter II).
Hogendorp would memorably record the Resident’s behaviour at a dinner party which he gave for some fifty members of the Sunan’s family and senior court officials (Van Hogendorp 1913:165-6):

I had this opportunity to observe Nahuys in his full glory and I could perceive what a great talent he has for getting on with the natives [Javanese]. For three hours at a stretch he kept the assembled company roaring with laughter and each toast he proposed was taken up and drunk amidst enthusiastic cheers.

The contrast with his abstemious predecessor could not have been more marked. Although there is no record of any dinner party given by Crawfurd during his time in Yogya, he subsequently achieved a notorious reputation for his parsimony during his three years as Resident of Singapore (1823-1826) where his dinners were the talk of the town. Here is the diary entry of one of the Scotsman’s particularly disgruntled guests:

Description of a dinner given by John Crawfurd, Resident, to all Europeans in the settlement. Began to assemble at 7 p.m., all sat down, no conversation or sparkle […] Once Mr Crawfurd amused us not a little: he requested us to fill our glasses as he was about to propose a toast. At the smaller table we made shift by frugality to get so much as served and were sitting all ready to hear the coming toast, silent as usual, and at last we waited so long we were beginning to whisper that the Resident had drunk too much and forgot himself. But the truth came out by his turning to the person next to him at our table and requesting the loan of a bottle of claret as theirs was all done. The quiz and wink passed from one to another around the table at the ill-timed frugality of the Resident. It is the same on private and public occasions […] It is the talk of everyone and serves to promote a laugh when other subject is scarce.6

When it came to ebullience and abstemiousness, the choice was easily made as far as Dipanagara was concerned. He would later, as we have seen (p. 108), compare Nahuys unfavourably with Crawfurd and would dismiss the former laconically in his babad as a Resident ‘who [merely] enjoyed eating and drinking and the spreading of Dutch ways’. He also noticed with displeasure how the younger members of the sultan’s family followed Nahuys’ example, forgetting the prohibitions of Islam.7 Dutch contemporaries noted that the Resident and his Eurasian deputy-cum-business partner, Robbert Nicolaas Christiaan d’Abo, were as one when it came to developing a culture of gambling and hard drinking amongst the Yogya elite.8 Although a taste for the bottle was

6 Singapore 1883:4-5 (entry of 6-2-1824 on the [annual] celebration of the hoisting of the British flag). I am grateful to Professor John Bastin for this reference.
7 BD (Manado) II:271, XVIII.130.
8 Dj.Br. 9A, Valck, ‘Overzigt’, 119 (on D’Abo’s role); S.Br. 170, A.M.Th. de Salis (Surakarta) to Director of Finances (Batavia), 8-8-1822 (on large imports over European alcoholic beverages, especially jenever [Dutch gin], into the Principalities); Van Hogendorp 1913:152; Van der Kemp 1896a:308-9, quoting Nicolaus Engelhard and J.I. van Sevenhoven. On the consumption of alco-
nothing new in the Principalities— even Dipanagara indulged occasionally— the behaviour of the post-1816 Dutch representatives at the courts appears to have been quite remarkably bibulous and dissolute: in one of the last of the grand VOC-style corruption scandals, both the Surakarta Resident, Rijck van Prehn (in office 1818-1819) and the Residency translator, Johannes Wilhelmsus Winter (in office 1806-1820), were dismissed from their posts and banished from central Java in 1820 for making large sums of money out of ensuring that certain Javanese received appointments to high office at the Sala court (Winter 1902:18-20; Houben 1994:104). Even when they were not engaging in wholesale embezzlement, the social behaviour of Dutch officials left much to be desired. Nahuys may have kept his Surakarta guests laughing, but was this really what well-born Javanese expected of their social encounters with Europeans? Willem van Hogendorp, who had been so struck by Nahuys’ skills at the dinner table, was not so sure (Van Hogendorp 1913:179-80):

The Javanese are always reserved never giving themselves up to exuberant laughter and jokes [...] but they have seen us drinking every day, laughing all shyness aside and asking our conversation – every word of which is utter nonsense – to be interpreted to them. [...] We have played around the Pangerans in their state clothes like [so many] spoilt children.

The sexual mores of senior Dutch officials also became a source of comment in the Principalities. Nowhere more so than in Yogya where Dipanagara and his kraton contemporaries were shocked by the behaviour of the new Resident in particular. Although the prince later admitted to a certain attachment for Nahuys, he immediately qualified this by pointing out his puzzlement at the curious ménage à trois in which the Resident and his deputy appeared to be sharing the same woman in common. He was alluding here to Nahuys’ rather public affair with D’Abo’s wife, née Anna Louisa van den Berg, whom he would later marry (Chapter III note 79). In December 1822, she would return hol amongst the Madiun bupati during the Java War, and the kelder (cellar) of Dutch gin used by Lieutenant-Colonel Bernard Sollewijn to retain Pangéran Adipati Natapraja’s loyalty following his defection from Dipanagara’s side in June 1827, see Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, II:220 note 3, III:576.

The one major exception was the teetotal Pangéran Prangwedana (Mang kunagara II) who, according to Van Hogendorp, was ‘Nahuys’ greatest friend and a handsome man who, whenever he sits opposite our Commissioner-General [L.P. du Bus de Gisignies] at table, in tone and manner completely puts him in the shade’.

9 IOL, Mack.Pr. 21, Crawfurd, ‘Sultan’s country’, 114, noted how Javanese nobles drank wine during the British period. On the absence of alcohol at traditional Javanese festivities, where cool water drunk from earthenware kendhi (water carafe with pouring spout) would be the usual refreshment, see Winter 1902:47.

10 On Dipanagara’s consumption of wine, see Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:743; Chapter III note 86; p. 524. Van Hogendorp 1913:162 noted that in Surakarta many of the princes ‘drank like Templars’. The one major exception was the teetotal Pangéran Prangwedana (Mang kunagara II) who, according to Van Hogendorp, was ‘Nahuys’ greatest friend and a handsome man who, whenever he sits opposite our Commissioner-General [L.P. du Bus de Gisignies] at table, in tone and manner completely puts him in the shade’.

to Padang in west Sumatra as divorce proceedings were commenced by her estranged husband of seventeen years (Chapter III note 79; Van Hogendorp 1913:149). He may also have been aware of the Resident’s penchant for liaisons with professional women (Houben 1994:108), although Nahuys never quite reached the level of his opposite number in Surakarta, Diederik Willem Pinket van Haak (in office 1816-1817), a strong supporter of the former Franco-Dutch regime, who went through a whole series of relationships with Eurasian mistresses, and left behind a bankrupt estate and ten illegitimate children by the time of his death in Surabaya in 1840 (De Haan 1935a:558-9).

Eurasian mistresses and dalliances with the wives of junior officials were one thing, seducing and appropriating the womenfolk of well-born Javanese quite another. Yet this appears to have been increasingly the norm amongst Dutch officials in central Java in the years leading up to the Java War. In Van Hogendorp’s words, ‘the hatred and contempt’ which the Javanese felt for Europeans in these years ‘were certainly quickened by what both senior and junior officials permitted themselves with regard to native women: a number of Residents known [to me] by name forced the [Javanese] chiefs under their authority to surrender their legal wives [and daughters] to them’ (Van Hogendorp 1913:40). We will see in the following chapter how the sexual conduct of the Yogya Resident, Anthonië Hendrik Smissaert (in office 1823-1825), his Assistant-Resident (‘secretary’), Pierre Frederic Henri Chevallier (in office 1823-1825), and the official Residency translator, Johannes Godlieb Dietrée (in office 1796-1825), would contribute directly to the breakdown of relations with Dipanagara. So much so that it would be cited by one of the prince’s relatives, the chief pengulu (senior religious official) of Rembang, as amongst the four key issues which the Dutch needed to address before the Java War could be brought to an end (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, III:494). In the view of the later Dutch Resident of Yogya, Frans Valck (Appendix IX), the decline in morals amongst the women of the Yogya court could be dated back

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12 Naber 1938:45: ‘Mr Pinket van Haak was a tall handsome man of about 30 years of age. He was unmarried, but had various Eurasian mistresses of whom there was always one sitting on a sofa in the rear gallery [of the Residency]’.

13 Amongst the Residents Van Hogendorp seems to have had in mind were P.H. van Lawick van Pabst (Provisional Resident of Surabaya, 1817, and Resident successively of Rembang, 1823-7; Yogyakarta, 1827; and Semarang, 1828; Civiel Gezaghebber of Banyumas, 1828-1830 (post-1829, Bagelen and Banyumas), and Commissioner for the annexed districts [of the Principalities], 1830-1833), and H.J. Domis (acting Resident of Semarang, 1820-1822; and Resident successively of Semarang, 1822-1827; Pasuruan, 1828-1831; and Surabaya, 1831-1834), see Baud 177, Willem van Hogendorp, ‘Extract-Rapport […] over den toestand van Java, den particuliere eigendommen aldaar en den staat der zaken in de Residentie Kadoe’, 1827 (original in G.K. van Hogendorp 153). For a description of Van Pabst at this time, see Van den Broek 1873-77, 22:288, referring to him as ‘big, broad and strong […] one wouldn’t say looking at him that he had a quick understanding, but it would be difficult indeed to find a Resident who equalled [him] in skill’.

14 See pp. 548-51; Van Hogendorp 1913:40: ‘All Java knows that what happened at the Yogya court can never see the light of day and has rightly provoked Dipanagara’s just rage’.
to the British conquest of June 1812. Although none of the Yogya Residents during the British interregnum itself (Appendix IX) appear to have taken advantage of their position to have such liaisons, after 1816 a moral rot seems to have set in. The influence of the fourth sultan’s mother, Ratu Ibu (Chapter VIII), and her lover, Major Tumenggung Wiranagara, who acted as a ‘procurer’ of court women for European officials, like Chevallier and Dietrée, clearly contributed to this. Valck’s comments are interesting given the recent work on gender, sexuality and race by feminist anthropologists like Ann Stoler who have argued that sexual control was fundamental to the way in which colonial policies operated in the high colonial period (Stoler 2002:78). In Valck’s case this would also involve him using his own position as Resident of Yogya in the post-Java War period to force the fifth sultan to part with his favourite unofficial wife (selir) whom he made his new mistress (Houben 1994:109) and, according to one hostile source, even to impose one of his former mistresses on the sultan as his consort (Houben 1994:199-200).

In the utterly altered epoch in which elite Javanese were now living after June 1812, such sexual exploitation of their womenfolk by powerful Europeans may have seemed yet another humiliating aspect of their colonial status. But they might have reflected on the changes which had occurred since the eighteenth century when relationships between well-born Javanese and senior European officials had been altogether more equal. One thinks here of the passage in the ‘Chronicle of the fall of Yogyakarta’ in which the text’s princely author relates how his mother, a woman of Balambangan origin from the eastern salient of Java, came to Sultan Mangkubumi’s court as one of the ruler’s wives. She had apparently been given to the first sultan by the Javanese-speaking governor of Java’s Northeast Coast, Nicolaas Hartingh (in office 1754-1761) (Remmelink 1994:273), in return for Mangkubumi’s personal gift of his own favourite unofficial wife, Radèn Ayu Sepuh, whom the Yogya monarch had presented in recognition of the governor’s skill in brokering the Gyaniti treaty (13 February 1755; Carey 1992:5-6). This had paved the way for the foundation of Mangkubumi’s kingdom, hence the first sultan’s gratitude. Whatever one may think of the use of women as pawns in an elaborate system of exchange between powerful eighteenth-century men, at least in this case a degree of respect appears to have existed between Mangkubumi and the Semarang governor. In the years preceding the Java War there were no such feelings. The relationship between Europeans and Javanese was now one of exploitation: the raiding of kraton treasuries and archives now had its counterpart in the raiding of the bodies of the radèn ayu (court princesses).

15 Dj.Br. 9A, Valck, ‘Overzigt’, 166; Van Hogendorp 1913:40, who remarked that with regard to such sexual relationships the ‘British administration gives a completely different picture’. On the apparent practice in the pre-colonial Javanese and Balinese kraton of allowing Chinese and European visitors access to lower-ranking court women who functioned as prostitutes, see Creese 2004:70; Andaya 1998:16.’
The early challenges of Nahuys’ Residency

Two matters complicated Nahuys’ assumption of his new post as Resident of Yogya in August 1816. The first was the arrival in Batavia of the exiled second sultan, who had been returned from Pulau Pinang by the British in order to be handed over to Dutch keeping. Rather unwisely, the British seem to have allowed some of the former ruler’s wives – including Ratu Kencana Wulan (now styled Ratu Wétan) – to join him. But this measure only encouraged others to profit from the opportunity of the former ruler’s stay in the colonial capital to make their way there to pay him their respects. The new Dutch administration soon became alarmed by the number of kasepuhan supporters and ‘priests’, presumably Yogya kraton santri, who started turning up in Batavia (Carey 1992:438 note 201). The old monarch’s presence in Java was deemed to pose a threat to stability. When enquiries in Yogya as to whether he should be returned there met with a resolutely negative response on the part of Pakualam and the other Yogya princes (Van der Kemp 1911:269), the commissioners-general decided to banish him again, this time to Ambon where he remained until March 1824 (Carey 1992:438-9 note 201). In all these consultations between the European government and the Yogya court, both Nahuys and the Dutch ambassador extraordinary to the courts, W.H. van IJsseledijk (in office August-October 1816), played a central role.

The second matter threatened to have even more serious consequences for the prestige of the returned Dutch government. This was the dispatch by the fourth sultan of Pangéran Dipakusuma, the joint acting bupati wedana of the eastern mancanagara, to greet the new Dutch governor-general and to take secret messages to his great-grandfather, the second sultan, in the colonial capital. As we have seen (Chapter V), the question of sending an emissary to convey the sultan’s compliments to an incoming governor-general had long been a point of conflict between Yogya and the European government. By 1816, this conflict had been mitigated to some extent by the changed reality of the relationship between Batavia and the south-central Javanese courts. But it is significant that the new Dutch administration felt strongly enough about it to try to prevent Dipakusuma from even sailing from Semarang. The commissioners-general pointed out that they had nominated the former Yogya Resident, W.H. van IJsseledijk, to act as ambassador extraordinary at the courts after the official handover of the colony on 19 August 1816, and that it was not necessary for any envoys to be sent from the kraton to Batavia.

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16 LOr 6791 (3) (Babad Spēhi):335, XI.22; Carey 1992:328 note 201.
17 UBL, BPL 616, Port. 5 pt. 2, H.G. Nahuys van Burgst (Yogyakarta) to Commissioners-General (Batavia), 13-8-1816; B.Ng. I:406, C.1-3, states that Dipakusuma departed on 5 Ruwah AJ 1743 (AD 1-7-1816) and that he was accompanied by four bupati.
18 UBL, BPL 616, Port. 5 pt. 2, H.G. Nahuys van Burgst (Yogyakarta) to Commissioners-General (Batavia), 13-8-1816; S.Br. 23, Major J.M. Johnson (Surakarta) to Charles Assey (Batavia/Bogor),
Plate 52. Portrait of Hendrik Mauritz MacGillivray (1797-1835), who served as acting Resident and Resident of Surakarta (with intermissions) from 1823 to 1827 and 1830 to 1834, and later attempted to have Dipanagara and his uncle, Pangéran Mangkubumi, murdered in July 1825 (page 595). Photograph by courtesy of the Stichting Iconografisch Bureau, The Hague.
The affair provided a clear indication that, despite the revolution in political relationships wrought by Daendels and Raffles between 1808 and 1812, the Yogya court still fostered the hope that the old ideal of the division of Java between the Dutch and the Javanese still had some relevance. And Yogya was not alone. As we have seen, the Sunan, Pakubuwana IV, had counted on attaining similar objectives during the abortive sepoy conspiracy of 1815 (Chapter VIII). Both episodes thus highlighted the continuing unwillingness or inability of the south-central Javanese rulers to accommodate themselves to their changed political status. The old Javanese concept of the political division of Java between the foreign kingdom of west Java and the Javanese heartland (kejawèn) died hard. It may explain too why so many members of the Yogya court rallied to Dipanagara in 1825. He seems to have held out the hope for them that their conservative aspirations for a return to the idealized pre-Daendelian political order might be realized. This was a concept which Dipanagara himself would hark back to in his February to March 1830 peace negotiations with the Dutch (pp. 663-4; Carey 1974b:285-8).

Meanwhile, Dipanagara himself appears to have begun to feel himself increasingly isolated in the new political alignments which had developed at the Yogya court after his father’s death. The passing of the late sultan’s closest adviser, Pangéran Dipawiyana, in January 1815 (Chapter VIII note 49) and the demise of the aged patih jero, Raden Tunemmungg Pringgadiningrat, five months later (25 May 1815; Carey 1992:522 note 600), deprived him of the administrative and personal support which he had enjoyed during his father’s brief reign. Two events occurred which may have contributed to the prince’s increasing hostility towards the returned Dutch administration and their kraton allies, in particular the clique around the queen mother. The first was the sudden arrest and banishment in November 1816 of Kyai Murma Wijaya, a rich and respected religious teacher who lived in the village of Kepundhung in the Pajang area.22-7-1816, note of Assey telling Johnson to inform Pakubuwana IV that the Dutch commissioners-general had nominated W.H. van Ijsseldijk to go as ambassador extraordinary to the courts after the formal handover on 19-8-1816 and that it was not necessary for Pakubuwana IV’s envoys to go to Batavia.

The exact location of Kepundhung is unclear: it may have been situated to the north of the royal graveyard of Imagiri, see Dj. Br. 12, ‘Notulen van de raad uitmakende het bestuur van Djocjocarta, 1830-31’, 15-12-1830, ‘Opgave der Solosche landen tot onderhoud der graven te Imagiri, Giriloyo, Banyusumurup en tot onderhoud dienende van de Raden Wirakusuma met zijn onderhebbende grafbewakers en welke landen gelegen zijn bezuiden de rivier Opak en beoosten dezelve en benoorden de rivier Ojo’, where it is cited as a Surakarta royal gravesite on the abutments of Gunung Kidul; or it may have been near Delanggu, see Dj. Br. 63A, H.G. Nahuys van Burgst (Yogyakarta) to H.F. Lippe (Surakarta), translation of a Javanese letter referring to the village of Kepundhung near Delanggu, 8-3-1820. I have opted for the latter given the kyai’s wealth and influence at the courts, which would have been more difficult to sustain if he had lived in the more remote Gunung Kidul location. See further Soebardi 1975:4; Carey and Hoadley 2000:8, 10, where Kepundhung is mentioned in Yogya apanage grants.
try tax-collectors and police officials (gunung) between Dipanagara and certain members of the Yogya court.

As we have seen, Murma had earlier played an important role in relaying messages between the sultan and the Sunan during Radèn Rongga’s rebellion in November-December 1810 (p. 253). The kyai was a typical example of the sort of rural religious teacher who was held in high favour by the south-central Javanese courts as well as being revered by the local populace. The latter seem to have regarded him with special awe and considered that he possessed magical powers given that he had such ready access both to the Yogya court and the sultan’s funds. Born in the pradikan (tax-free) village of Maja, home to Dipanagara’s religious adviser, Kyai Maja, Murma had moved at a young age to Kepundhung. The exact location of this village is unclear because there are at least two such villages in the Yogyakarta area which had tax-free status as religious centres. It is likely to have been the one near Delanggu close to the Surakarta-Yogya highway. According to Dipanagara, it was amongst the richest pradikan villages in Yogyakarta. As the birth place of the first sultan’s mother, Mas Ayu Tejawati, it had been freed of all labour services and taxes by the Yogya court. Given this connection with the first sultan’s family, it is possible that Kyai Murma might have been one of the religious teachers whom Dipanagara’s great-grandmother, Ratu Ageng, invited to visit her at Tegalreja while he was growing up and studying Islam under her care in the mid- to late 1790s (Chapter II). It is known that Murma had close ties with Dipanagara’s father for in 1809 he had been promised a sizeable sum (Chapter VI note 105) to pray for the swift demise of the future third sultan’s own father, Hamengkubuwana II. For over two years (1814-1816) following her husband, the third sultan’s, death, Ratu Ibu was said to have continued to maintain connections with Murma, paying him sums of money and lending him state clothes in order that he should devise ways – both material and spiritual – to

20 UBL, BPL 616, Port. 5 pt. 2, J.D. Kruseman (Yogyakarta) to Commissioners-General (Batavia), 8-11-1816.
21 Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 6, states that Dipanagara described the village as the birthplace of the ‘wife’ of Hamengkubuwana I; Mandoyokusumo 1977:15, however, indicates that Kyai Cikakak, the great-grandfather of Hamengkubuwana I’s mother, Mas Ayu Tejawati, lived there, so it may be that Knoerle misheard stri (wife) for bibi (low-born mother/aunt) in his conversation with the prince. This is indeed how she is described in Mandoyokusumo: Sarasilahipun Mas Ayu Tejawati ingkang bibi ngarsaladem sumpayandalem Sinuhun Kangjeng Sultan Hamengku Buwono I. It is significant that Kepundhung does not occur in the list of Yogya pradikan villages (Appendix VIIa), but in those pertaining to Surakarta (note 19), so Dipanagara may have been wrong to ascribe its tax-free status to Hamengkubuwana I’s initiative. Instead, it would have been originally allocated as a pradikan desa by the Kartasura court given that Mas Ayu Tejawati was a wife of Sunan Amangkurat IV (reigned 1719-1726). Its administration would have been taken over by the Surakarta court after the move from Kartasura in 1745, although it is clear from the acting Resident of Yogya, J.D. Kruseman’s report (note 22), that by 1816 Kepundhung was a village in the Yogya nagara agung (core apanage region) in Pajang. On Kepundhung’s location, see note 19.
lessen the power of the European government and place it on the same footing that it had been before Daendels’ arrival in January 1808. Other religious teachers and local leaders were similarly employed by the Yogya court at this time with Ratu Ibu using some of the funds provided by the British for the annual rent of the tollgates and markets to pay for their services.

Murma’s connections with Surakarta were also of very long standing. They dated back to about 1792 when Pakubuwana IV had lost a court heirloom, a *pusaka kris* by the name of Kangjeng Kyai Birawa, said to have been of Majapahit vintage. Murma had been instructed to pray for its return and when this was achieved after four years, he was rewarded with a 2,000 Spanish dollar gift. This appears to have been a down payment for the original 10,000 Spanish dollars promised by the Sunan. Relationships between the *kyai* and the chief ministers of the Surakarta kingdom (Appendix Va) as well as the Sunan’s younger brother, Pangéran Buminata, a great patron of men of religion (pp. 93-4), became particularly close and at various stages Murma had received further financial gifts from the Surakarta court. In early 1812, just before the British attack on Yogya, Murma had been visited by a certain Sêh Abubakar, a Sumatran from Palembang, who had been sent by the Sunan to ask Murma to pray for his success against the British in June 1812 (pp. 316-21, 377-8). Murma is reported to have replied with the words that ‘Allah and the [British] government are too great to undertake such a thing’. Despite this refusal, the *kyai*’s Surakarta court connections appear to have been maintained right up until his arrest in October 1816. Pakubuwana IV had consulted with him shortly after the special envoy, W.H. van IJseldijk’s, visit to the courts in September 1816. At that time, he had apparently paid for the construction of Murma’s house.

Murma was thus a figure intimately connected with the internal political and spiritual life of the south-central Javanese kraton. So much so, that his arrest may well have been precipitated by court rivalries. Ratu Ibu, for example, suspected that a Surakarta prince, perhaps Pangéran Buminata, had used the affair to bring discredit on Yogya. But it seems that the Assistant-Resident of Yogya, Johan Diederik Kruseman (in office 1816-1817), who was covering

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22 UBL, BPL 616 Port. 5 pt. 2, J.D. Kruseman (Yogyakarta) to Commissioners-General (Batavia), 8-11-1816; Van der Kemp 1911:127, 271 note 1. Since Kruseman’s source was Pakualam I, who had his own reasons for casting Ratu Ibu in a bad light, the testimony may be suspect. Nahuys’ subsequent report to the Commissioners-General suggests that Ratu Ibu was not so involved with Murma, AN, Besluit van den Commissarissen-Generaal, 25-2-1817, La A, H.G. Nahuys van Burgst (Yogyakarta) to Commissioners-General (Batavia), 14-2-1817.

23 UBL, BPL 616 Port. 5 pt. 2, J.D. Kruseman (Yogyakarta) to Commissioners-General (Batavia), 8-11-1816.


25 UBL, BPL 616, Port. 5 pt. 2, J.D. Kruseman (Yogyakarta) to Commissioners-General (Batavia), 8-11-1816; S.Br. 37:1231, Surakarta reports on Murma’s arrest.
IX Binding on the iron yoke

for Nahuys during his absence on sick leave in Batavia (7 October 1816-23 January 1817), first heard about the expected ‘revolt’ of Murma from sources in the Yogya kraton hostile to the queen mother and her son, the fourth sultan. Prominent amongst these was the regent, Pakualam I. Later during his journey into exile, Dipanagara would express his bitterness about the affair stating that Murma had been exiled ‘only in order that [the Dutch] could make themselves masters of [his] treasure and plunder the désa of Kepundhung’, and that ‘Pakualam had set the Government against Murma to bring [them] and the princes of Yogyakarta into discord’.26 On his return to Yogya, Nahuys broadly confirmed this view, pointing out that the seizure of Murma’s property had created a very bad impression in the Yogya kraton and suggesting that Pakualam was largely to blame for precipitating the kyai’s arrest.27

In his report to the commissioners-general in Batavia, however, Kruseman justified his armed attack on Kepundhung on the morning of 6 November 1816 by pointing out that a quantity of arms had been found in Murma’s house (10 pikes and 10 rifles) and that Murma’s brother, Abdullah, had offered armed resistance in the Kepundhung mosque with fifteen men.28 Given the insecurity of the Javanese countryside at this time and the amount of valuables which Murma had acquired over the years from the court princes and officials, valuables which included fine heirloom kris, state clothes and jewellery, it is hardly surprising that he had weapons in his désa for self-protection. The Dutch government compounded their violent action by selling most of the valuables at public auction and keeping the proceeds. Only a few were returned to the kyai before he was exiled to Ambon in 1818.29 Furthermore, the treatment of the aged religious teacher seems to have been unduly severe. Although the case against him – that he had engaged in political intrigues with the courts against the European government – rested on hearsay evidence and referred back to the British period, he was still charged with a criminal offence. His personal rebuttal of the charges in the Yogya Resident’s court availed him little. Indeed, during the kyai’s absence in the sultan’s capital for the trial proceedings, the Dutch authorities took the opportunity to impound his house and seize his remaining valuables, even attacking his relations in the local mosque when

27 AN, Besluit van den Commissarrissen Generaal, 1-5-1817 no. 1; Knoerle, ‘Journal’, p. 6 (on Dipanagara’s view).
28 UBL, BPL 616 Port. 5 pt. 2, J.D. Kruseman (Yogyakarta) to Commissioners-General (Batavia), 8-11-1816, 12-11-1816. Kruseman took with him a troop of 80 dragoons drawn from Pakualam’s corps and the 25-strong mounted contingent from the Yogya kraton. He was unable to arrest Murma immediately because he appears to have escaped into adjacent Surakarta territory and was apprehended later in the Sunan’s capital.
29 UBL, BPL 616 Port. 5 pt. 11, H.G. Nahuys van Burgst (Yogyakarta) to Commissioners-General (Batavia), 14-2-1817; AN, Besluit van den Commissarissen Generaal, 25-2-1817 La A; AN, Besluit van den Secretaris van Staat der Gouverneur-Generaal, 14-3-1818 no. 6; AvJ, H.G. Nahuys van Burgst (Yogyakarta) to Commissioners-General (Batavia), 1-6-1818.
they tried to resist (Carey 1987:294). His sentence of banishment and the six years he spent in Ambon at his advanced age (he appears to have been in his late sixties) were reported to have brought on severe psychological problems. By the time he was allowed back to Semarang in September 1824 he was in the last stages of a chronic mental illness (senile dementia). He died soon afterwards without ever returning to his village or seeing his family again.30

Nahuys’ reports from south-central Java in the pre-Java War period indicate that the treatment meted out to Kyai Murma was far from being unusual. He even boasted to his superiors about his ‘strong-arm’ tactics in ordering an ulama to be seized while giving a lesson in his religious school. Similar actions were taken against ‘recalcitrant’ religious teachers in Salatiga by the Assistant-Resident there with ‘excellent results’ according to Nahuys.31

Contemporary Residency reports are peppered with the phrase ‘sly priest’, an interesting reflection on the way in which Nahuys’ attitudes and those of his Dutch contemporaries were shaped by Calvinist hatred of Roman Catholicism. Indeed, it seems that Islam came to be seen in the mind of many early nineteenth-century Dutch colonial officials as a hierarchical religion. Like Roman Catholicism, it was thought to owe its authority to a central figure – be it the Ottoman sultan or the Sherif (chief religious authority) of Mecca – who functioned as a sort of pope (Carey 1987:292 note 51). These attitudes hardened still further following the outbreak of the Java War. ‘Santri’ – pious Muslims and students of religion – then became a term of abuse (Payen 1988:120 note 260). Those suspected of harbouring santri – namely pro-Dipanagara – sympathies were singled out for special treatment as the Belgian painter, Antoine Auguste Joseph Payen (1792-1853), noticed during the siege of Yogya in August-September 1825 (Payen 1988:65):

This morning [18 August 1825] various vagabonds suspected of being bandits [brandhal, namely followers of Dipanagara] were brought in. They were put in chains. The white soldiers were allowed to have their fun: I saw an officer hit one of these men, said to be a santri, as hard as possible. Another, who remained in the hands of the soldiers, was mistreated in the most cruel way. Trampled under foot, he was taken away dying, blood pouring from his mouth. What I have written, I have seen.’

The Murma affair and the government’s subsequent actions seem to have marked an important stage in the deterioration of Dipanagara’s relationship with the new Dutch administration. The exile and subsequent death of such

30 AN, Besluit van den Secretaris van Staat der Gouverneur-Generaal, 18-4-1818 no. 5 (on Murma’s exile); AN, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal, 10-4-1824 no. 10 (decision to allow Murma back to Java); Dj.Br. 81, A.H. Smissaert (Yogyakarta) to Danureja IV (Yogyakarta), 15-9-1824 (reporting Murma’s return from Ambon to Semarang); Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 6 (on Murma’s death soon after his arrival).
an influential and well-respected kyai, who may perhaps have been one of the prince’s religious mentors in his youth, was undoubtedly felt at a deep personal level. It may have convinced him that the new breed of post-1816 Dutch officials and European estate leasers were completely lacking in sensitivity and understanding towards Islam. As Knoerle later noted in his conversations with Dipanagara during his journey to Manado:

[The prince] was especially incensed that Europeans in the Principalities were without any religious feelings and always ridiculed the religion [of The Prophet]: he said that drunken soldiers [? sepoys] had defiled the temple of Muhammad in Klatheh. He was so fired up with rage that I could not follow the swiftness of his words.32

Dipanagara’s view that Europeans were devoid of religious feelings was not unusual. The post-Java War Dutch Assistant-Resident of Pacitan, J.T. Cantervisscher (in office 1838-1842), related how a revered local official, the seventy-year old pensioned bupati, Kyai Tumenggung Jagakarya, an erstwhile modin (mosque official) renowned for his devotion to Islam, had only begun to show signs of friendship towards his family when he observed one of Canter Visscher’s sons saying a Christian grace before a meal. The aged former bupati had remarked that up to that moment he had thought all Europeans were entirely without religion (Carey 1987:291 note 48).

Sometime after the arrest of Murma, a serious administrative issue arose in Yogya concerning the appointment of rural police officials or gunung33 who also had tax-raising powers. This was not a new problem because, as we have seen (Chapter VIII), the role of the gunung and their impact on village society had already been discussed between Dipanagara and his father, the third sultan, during the early part of his reign. The incident of the post-1816 appointment of more police officials by the patih, Danureja IV, and the commander of the sultan’s bodyguard, Major Tumenggung Wiranagara, is only related in the prince’s babad, but later Dutch and Malay reports dwell on the misuse of powers by the gunung acting under the chief minister’s orders so it is likely the incident is well founded.34 Dipanagara had originally put for-

33 Also known as tamping in Yogya, the term gunung was more common in Surakarta and appears to have derived from their role in bearing the gunungan (rice mountain) offerings at the time of the Garebeg ceremonies at the courts, AN, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal, 17-2-1841 no. 16; Rouffaer 1905:614.
34 Dj.Br. 52, A.H. Smissaert (Yogyakarta) to Algemeen Secretaris (J. Bousquet) (Batavia/Bogor), 18-3-1823; Van Nes 1844:139; AN, Geheim Kommissorial, 16-9-1846 La N6, ‘Bevinding van Soeracarta in de maand Juli van het jaar 1846’ (on tax-raising powers of gunung and their oppression in Sala); Raden Adipati Jayadiningrat, ‘Schetsen over den oorlog van Java 1825-30’ (henceforth: Jayadiningrat, ‘Schetsen’), 2-2-1857, 8-9; Carey 1981a:249 note 55; Winter 1902:33, 107 note 47, 153. On the murder of one of Danureja’s gunung by Dipanagara’s supporters during the early stages of the Java War, see Carey 1981a:289 note 226.
Plate 53. Radèn Adipati Danureja IV (in office, 1813-1847) being hit over the face with Sultan’s family) looks on. From Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde of the KITLV.
a slipper by Dipanagara as a result of an argument. A *sentana* (member of the Sultan's family) looks on. From Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde (Leiden), Oriental MS 13 (*Buku Kedhung Kebo*), f.55v. Photograph by courtesy
ward the plan to abolish the police officials entirely in order to alleviate the
tax burden in country areas, but nothing came of this because of his father’s
early death. It is possible that the activities of the gunung were supervised
more stringently in the interests of just government during the early period of
the fourth sultan’s minority. But shortly after 1816, forty more of these police
officials were appointed under the command of two lurah (chiefs). They drew
their salaries directly from the royal tax moneys and had the special task of
collecting the pacumplèng – a door tax levied at ten to twenty cents per house
entrance (Gericke and Roorda 1901, I:297) – in the villages at half-yearly
intervals, namely at Mulud and Puwasa. When not engaged in this fashion,
the gunung apparently gathered at the kepatihan (the chief minister’s residence
and office), serving as messengers and police officials for Danureja IV much
in the same fashion as the members of the Macanan (‘tiger’ corps) described
so vividly in the Surakarta version of the Babad Dipanagara (pp. 53-5).

In his chronicle, Dipanagara describes how the appointment of these po-
lice officials was made without his approval or prior knowledge and how he
was only informed about it in a roundabout way through some of the older
members of the sultan’s family and senior court bupati. The prince then con-
fronted his younger brother, the fourth sultan, with a choice: either accept
his advice that the gunung constituted a serious tax burden on the country
districts and withdraw the royal letter of appointment or allow the letter to
remain in force and thereby side openly with the prince’s two major court
adversaries, Danureja IV and Wiranagara. The sultan apparently decided
to rescind the letter but an angry scene then occurred between Dipanagara
and Wiranagara in which the latter defended his actions and argued strongly
against the annulment. When Ratu Ibu heard that the appointment of the
gunung had been withdrawn, Dipanagara related how she chided her son in
his presence:

XIX.16  ‘Sultan, I tell you in truth
that the person who rules the state
of Yogyakarta is in reality
your elder brother Dipanagara,

17  for I was already ordered
by your father [Hamengkubuwana III] earlier
when he was still in the kadipatèn.
Thus was his instruction:
“Radèn Ayu, I tell you

35 Also a tax of four skeins of cotton yarn and 40 cents per junc. See further pp. 56-7.
36 BD (Manado) II:274-5, XVIII.144-XIX.1.
37 BD (Manado) II:272, XVIII.134; Van der Kemp 1896a:359.
38 BD (Manado) II:275-80, XIX.1-15; Van der Kemp 1896a:359-61.
do not hope too much for your son,
for the one my heart is fixed on
is in truth my eldest son [Dipanagara].”
I replied: “As you wish”.

18 The sultan showed embarrassment
because many people [now] knew [of this].
Thus was his speech:
‘Your tale
is already known to me
[for I am aware of] my father’s instructions
to me.’
Pangérán [Dipanagara] smiled [and] spoke calmly:
‘Ratu Ibu is like a child, My Lord,

19 in telling this secret
so that many people know of it.’

The whole incident of appointment of the gunung, Dipanagara’s intervention
and Ratu Ibu’s reaction to it, provides a striking illustration of the growth of
the tacit rivalry between the prince and the court clique around the queen
mother which began to split the kraton during the fourth sultan’s reign. On
the one hand, Ratu Ibu and her supporters entertained deep suspicions of
Dipanagara and his motives. On the other, the prince felt that he was being in-
creasingly excluded from a say in affairs of state to which he felt entitled as a
senior member of the sultan’s family. The final break did not come until much
later during the initial years of the minority of the fifth sultan (1822-1836;
Chapter X), but the rivalries and suspicions which were later to erupt into
such poisonous and open hostility were already coming to the surface. As for
the gunung, Dipanagara’s intervention seems to have availed little because
there were still complaints about their fiscal oppression and misuse of their
powers just two years before the Java War.
The power of prophecy

Nahuys’ land-rent initiative in the Principalities and its problems

The arrest of Kyai Murma and the dispute over the gunung were events which signalled growing tensions between Dipanagara and the European government as well as the pro-European court faction in Yogya. They were soon overshadowed, however, by the question of the land-rent and Nahuys’ proactive role in its implementation. The situation in the Principalities regarding the renting of land to Europeans and Chinese was as follows. Before 1816, in particular during the period of the Dutch East Indies Company (VOC), but also during the administrations of Daendels (1808-1811) and Raffles (1811-1816), only very small plots of land had been rented out to Europeans as vegetable plots and country retreats and then only for strictly limited periods of time (Van der Kemp 1897:16; Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:49; Carey and Hoadley 2000:317-20). The Dutch Residents at the courts, for example, had access to certain properties, but these were held directly from the rulers themselves much in the same fashion as the apanage land bestowed on the princes and priyayi. Furthermore, all land grants were closely supervised by the rulers and no large-scale rents or long-term leases were allowed. Apart from such senior officials, all Europeans domiciled in the Principalities were restricted to the court towns. Both Daendels and Raffles had sought to continue these restrictions on the settlement of Europeans in the Javanese interior, the first by his decree of 18 June 1808 forbidding the renting out of villages to Europeans (Van der Chijs 1895-97, XIV:803) and the second by his proclamation of 21 April 1815 requiring all Europeans to seek prior permission from the lieutenant-governor before entering into land leases. This last proclamation had been reconfirmed by the commissioners-general in 1818. Daendels’ legislation did not cover the Principalities and Raffles’ constant revenue requirements had led to the alienation of extensive government lands, most notoriously in the case of the extensive Ciasem and Pamanukan estates in Krawang in west Java (Levysohn Norman 1857:293-300; Bastin 1954:80-6). After mid-August 1816, however, the situation in Yogyakarta and Surakarta began to change (note 53). There were two reasons for this. First, and most important was Nahuys’ personal influence

41 Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:61 (quoting A.M.Th. de Salis who stated that three-year leases were the maximum); LOr 2168, Pakubuwana IV (Surakarta) to Colonel Alexander Adams (Surakarta), 6 Sapar AJ 1739 (AD 14-2-1812; on the renting of lands at Ampèl, Klèca, and Sèla on the high saddle between Gunung Merapi and Gunung Merbabu, as country retreats and kitchen gardens by the Surakarta Residents); Dj.Br. 29, John Crawfurud (Yogyakarta) to T.S. Raffles (Surabaya), 4-1-1814 (on the Yogya Resident’s estates at Melathèn worth 1,100 Spanish dollars in rents a year – about half his monthly salary – Karang Bolong on the south coast where the annual birds’ nests harvest was collected (pp. 17-8) and at Sana Pakis, which all remained the property of the sultan); KITLV H 503, Van Sevenhoven, ‘Aanteekeningen’, 115 (on Hamengkubuwana II sometimes leasing land but never selling it). See further De Haan 1935a:576-7; Carey 1980:91 note 2.
42 S.Br.122, H.J. van de Graaff (Batavia) to G.A.G.Ph. van der Capellen (Batavia), 23-3-1822.
43 NA, Besluit van den Commissarissen-Generaal, 28-8-1818.
as Resident of Yogya, an office which he later combined briefly with that of Surakarta (Appendix IX; pp. 501, 517 note 40). Second, European planters and estate owners were actively looking for land to lease in the Principalities as a way of escaping the restrictions imposed by the European government on the extension of private landholdings and the registration of new leases in lands under their direct administration (Day 1972:231-7). As we have seen, both Governor-General Van der Capellen (in office 1816-1826) and his principal adviser, Hendrik Jan van de Graaff, took an increasingly tough line on this issue, considering the indiscriminate leasing of land to European and Chinese landowners detrimental to the interests of Javanese cultivators.44 In De Graaff’s view, the Cirebon disturbances of 1803-1806, had been largely precipitated by the settlement of Chinese in the villages of the interior,45 and he blamed the more recent agrarian unrest in Krawang on the extortionate practices of the European landowners in taking more than their usual fifth of the rice harvest (Levyssohn Norman 1857:297). As the President of the Board of Finances Harman Warner Muntinghe (1773-1827) explained in a letter to Nahuys in July 1817, the government had fears that:

If [Western] planters were allowed a completely free hand in agriculture in the Principalities, the Javanese would be brought under a new yoke, which will weigh on them even harder than all the bribery and corruption of the Javanese [royal] administrations. We think […] that a steady decline in the welfare of the Javanese peasant and a fall in his personal wealth will be the inevitable outcome of such a policy.46

Nahuys’ return in late January 1817 from Batavia, where he had been on leave for four months to restore his health, marked the beginning of his efforts to broaden the scope of the land rent in Yogya. On 1 May 1817, he wrote to the commissioners-general pointing out the poor state of the old pepper plantations laid out by the VOC in Pacitan and Lowanu (Bagelèn), which in the 1790s had been producing some 300,000 avoirdupois pounds from 37,000 pepper bushes. Given high global prices for cash crops like pepper, coffee and indigo, he wished to encourage the extension of cultivation of these crops in south-central Java.47 In particular, Nahuys asserted that an increase in the land-rent

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44 UBL, BPL 616, Port. 5 pt. 11, H.G. Nahuys van Burgst (Yogyakarta) to Commissioners-General (Batavia), 15-9-1817; vAE (aanweinen 1941) 20, H.J. van de Graaff (Batavia) to J. Fabius (Holland), 26-7-1823.
45 S.Br. 122, H.J. van de Graaff (Batavia) to G.A.G.Ph. van der Capellen (Batavia), 23-3-1822.
46 Quoted in UBL, BPL 616, Port. 5 pt. 11, H.G. Nahuys van Burgst (Yogyakarta) to Commissioners-General (Batavia), 19-9-1817. See further Van Deventer 1865-66, I:344-9.
47 UBL, BPL 616, Port. 5 pt. 11, H.G. Nahuys van Burgst (Yogyakarta) to Commissioners-General (Batavia), 1-5-1817. See Van der Kemp 1913:24-5 (for text of Nahuys’ original letter of 14-4-1817 on land rent). On the productive capacity of the VOC pepper gardens in Pacitan and Lowanu (Bagelèn) in the early 1790s, see Df.Br. 45, W.H. van IJsseldijk, ‘Eerbeidige bericht aangaande de landen van Z.H. den Sulthan van Djocjocarta’, in W.H. van IJsseldijk (Yogyakarta) to P.G. van Overstraten (Semarang), 15-1-1793.
would help ‘the many poor princes and priyayi [high officials]’ in Yogya and
that corruption by village officials and the sale of local offices would decline
if European estate managers took up residence in the Javanese interior.48 He
even cited the passage in Adam Smith’s Wealth of nations (1776), where ‘feudal
government’ is blamed for the miserable state of the occupiers of the land in
ancien régime Europe.49

The following July, he led the way by persuading the young sultan to grant
him the hereditary lease of Bedhaya, an open area high on the flanks of Mount
Merapi with four adjoining villages to provide labour for the cultivation of
coffee (Lettres de Java 1829:100; Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:602-3; Payen
1988:46). In September 1817, Nahuys again wrote to the commissioners-general
refuting Muntinghe’s arguments that the renting of land would harm the
local inhabitants and pressing the case for the lease of a large area of Pacitan to
a Dutch resident, Carl Hendrik Coster, for the extension of the old pepper
gardens.50 During the course of the following year (1818), large numbers of other
grants were organised in Yogya, some negotiated directly by Nahuys with the
sultan. This was the case with the 40 jung of royal land at the second sultan’s
former country estate of Rajawinangun (also known as Arjawinangun) to the
east of Yogya (Chapter V; Appendix VI), which were rented out to Nahuys’
friend, Dr Harvey Thomson, the former Yogya Residency doctor for whom
the Javanese would coin the punning name ‘Tuan Tom’ (‘Mr Indigo’) for his
zeal as a dyestuff producer.51 Further leases of royal and princely land were

48 UBL, BPL 616, H.G. Nahuys van Burgst (Yogyakarta) to Commissioners-General (Batavia),
1-5-1817.
49 S.Br. 122, H.G. Nahuys van Burgst (Yogyakarta) to G.A.A.G.Ph. van der Capellen (Batavia),
2-12-1821, citing Adam Smith, An enquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations
(London, 1776), Book III, Chapter 3 (‘Of the accumulation of capital, or of productive and unproductive
labour’).
50 UBL, BPL 616, Port. 5 pt. 11, H.G. Nahuys van Burgst (Yogyakarta) to Commissioners-General
(Batavia), 19-9-1817; AN, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal, 10-1-1817 no. 55 (original
government rejection of Pacitan land lease); Van Deventer 1865-66, I:347, Herman Warner Muntinghe
(president of Board of Finances) to Commissioners-General (Batavia), 14-7-1817, rejecting
the request for the fifteen-year lease of land in Pacitan by two Yogya inhabitants, G.J. Koops and
C.H. Coster, but allowing them to make contracts with the local inhabitants for the delivery of
pepper. Coster appears to have died of cholera in Magelang on 30-5-1821, Dj.Br. 64, F.E. Hardy
(Magelang) to H.G. Nahuys van Burgst (Yogyakarta), 30-5-1821.
51 On Harvey Thomson, who had served as assistant surgeon to the British expeditionary force
and Residency doctor in Yogya during the latter half of the British period, see Chapter VIII note 170;
Van Enk 1999:137-8. His epithet ‘Tuan Tom’ is mentioned in B.Ng. II:63, XIV:22. See also Raffles 1817,
1:38 (on the Javanese word for indigo). Although only 40 jung were declared in the contract for the
lease of Rajawinangun, it seems that Thomson had access to over 100 jung, see Dj.Br. 60, Dr Harvey
Thomson (Yogyakarta) to H.G. Nahuys van Burgst (Yogyakarta), 25-10-1817 (notification that lands
in vicinity of Yogya suitable for indigo production and requesting clarification whether private
individuals could rent lands on indefinite term lease from the sultan); Dj.Br. 62, Dr Harvey Thom-
son (Rajawinangun) to R.C.N. d’Abo (Yogyakarta), 26-5-1819 (on leasing of local sawah around his
estate). See further Van Enk 1990:8, who cites Thomson’s letter and Nahuys’ reply.
entered into by Chinese and European land-renters in the period 1818-1819. Indeed, by the time Nahuys retired in April 1822 from his joint office of Resident in Yogya and Surakarta no less than 115 separate plots of lands and villages (with their inhabitants) had been rented out in the sultanate and a further 189 in the territory of the Sunan.52 A comparison of the various years in which these properties were leased and Nahuys’ incumbency as Resident first in Yogya (1816-1820) and then jointly in both Yogya and Surakarta (1820-1822; Appendix IX), clearly indicate that his presence was critical in securing the contracts.53 Many of the Europeans who rented lands in the Principalities at this time were personal acquaintances or business associates of the Resident.54 Indeed, in a political tract penned in the Netherlands in 1826, he referred to them patronisingly as ‘my planters’.55 He also boasted that he lent them money out of his own pocket to encourage them in their undertakings (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:53). Despite his criticism of the government’s economic policies, Nahuys appears to have had influence in Batavia, managing to have his Batavian business partner, D’Abo, appointed as Assistant-Resident in Yogya (in office 1817-1823) when his former deputy, J.D. Kruseman, was transferred to Batavia early in 1817 to await posting to a new appointment as Resident of Ai and Run in the Moluccas. This was the same business partner through whom Nahuys arranged the rent of an entire district – Blitar – in east Java, an action which was specifically singled out for censure by Governor-General Van der Capellen before his abolition of the land-rent in May 1823.56

52 Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:59 (Nahuys had given a total of 166 leases but this was 23 short as his successor in Surakarta, A.M.Th. de Salis, pointed out).
53 The numbers of estates and the dates they were rented out are as follows: A. Yogya: 1814: 1; 1815: 3; 1816: 20; 1817: 30; 1818: 55; 1819: 1; 1820: 1; B. Surakarta: 1816: 6; 1817: 6; 1818: 9; 1819: 16; 1820: 52; 1821: 75. The figures are taken from Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:604-14, but note the caveats entered by Veth on the reliability of Louw’s figures, Veth 1896-1907, II:349 note 2.
54 In a letter to Governor-General Van der Capellen in 1822, Nahuys reported that out of the 32 ‘Christians’ (Dutch, Eurasian and other Europeans), two-thirds had been born in Java or were Dutchmen or Eurasians of part Dutch parentage who had settled a long time in Surakarta. Only three were of foreign birth and nationality: Joseph Donatien Boutet (born Nantes, circa 1790), William Stavers (born Scotland) and James Shand (born Aberdeen, died Yogya, 28 June 1824). In Yogya, he cited only Dr Harvey Thomson (born Aberdeen, 11-1790, died Batavia, 17-1-1837) and the Frenchman J.M. Tissot (born Marseilles circa 1784), S.Br. 122, H.G. Nahuys van Burgst (Yogya) to G.A.G.Ph. van der Capellen (Batavia/Bogor), 29-9-1822. But he was either misinformed or being deliberately misleading because there were many other non-Dutch Europeans who rented land in the Principalities at this time, see Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:604-14; Van Enk 1999:257.
56 S.Br. 122, H.G. Nahuys van Burgst (Yogya) to G.A.G.Ph. van der Capellen (Batavia/Bogor), 29-9-1822 (referring to letter of complaint about this lease from A.M.Th. de Salis to Van der Capellen, 22-4-1822, just prior to his assumption of the Residency of Surakarta from Nahuys on 29-4-1822); Dj.Br. 81, G.A.G.Ph. van der Capellen (Batavia/Bogor) to Guardians (Pangéran Dipanagara and Pangéran Mangkubumi) of Hamengkubuwana V (Yogya), 14-1-1823, Van der Capellen’s statement of his opposition to the long leases (5-20 years) of lands in the Principalities to Chinese and Europeans.
Such a rapid extension of the land rent had important consequences for the Javanese not all of which were as advantageous as Nahuys chose to make out. Although the princes and priyayi renting land benefited from higher cash incomes and were relieved of some of the duties of personally administering their estates through their often fractious local tax collectors (bekel, demang; pp. 14-9), the old paternalistic link between the Javanese anahage holder and his rayat (peasant cultivators, retainers) was broken. According to Rouffaer, the Javanese agrarian law code, the Angger Sepuluh, was even modified in October 1818, seemingly under Nahuys’ influence, to facilitate this increase in land rent and give the European and Chinese land renters the same rights as the previous Javanese fief holders. Village tax collectors (bekel) and Javanese cultivators alike were affected (Winter 1902:123-8, 172; Rouffaer 1905:627-8). Indeed, European and Chinese land-renters now began to adopt Javanese names. They also decided which cash crops were planted on which ricefields (sawah). At harvest time, they reaped the main profits leaving the peasant cultivators to shoulder the burden of the tribute payments. In the event that a cash-crop harvest could not be gathered in before the Mulud and Puwasa half-yearly tribute payments, the land-renters were still not left out of pocket according to Nahuys’ successor, A.M.Th. de Salis (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:60-1). De Salis also pointed out that few land-renters had any knowledge of Javanese agriculture, profit being their sole motive (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:61). Smissaert, who replaced De Salis in Yogya, agreed. He stated that the peasant cultivators on the estates always regarded the Europeans as ‘domineering foreigners’, sentiments which were echoed by Javanese contemporaries. Haji Ngisa, one of Dipanagara’s principal religious advisers (Appendix VIIb) and an exceedingly able man according to the Dutch commissioners tasked with enquiring into the causes of the Java War, complained that foreign land-renters had acted too much the Tuwan Besar (European lord and master). This had caused great difficulties for the local population and put the renters at odds with the local police officials. Similar concerns were expressed by Dipanagara’s uncle, Pangéran Mangkubumi and his nephew, Pangéran Mangkudiningrat II. ‘Better be bitten by a Javanese cat than a foreign tom cat’ was Mangkubumi’s view. The fact that few European land renters spoke Javanese and most could only manage broken Malay –


59 GKA, Exhibitum 28-9-1830 no. 56k, geheim verbaal, Pangéran Mangkudiningrat II interview, Yogyakarta, 17-4-1830; Pangéran Mangkubumi interview, Yogyakarta, 19-4-1830.
IX Binding on the iron yoke

despite the figment of their adopted Javanese names – added to their problems of communication with their tenants.\(^{60}\)

Another key consideration was that Javanese much preferred land to money. Indeed, their impoverished state meant that they could not handle the influx of ready cash which suddenly came their way from the land-rent payments.\(^{61}\) All too often, this money was used by the fief holders not for capital improvements but for the purchase of luxury goods imported from Europe. Although the available evidence is hard to evaluate, it seems that not only did the consumption of alcohol increase at the courts in the years after August 1816 (note 8; Carey 1981a:269 note 137), but that the use of European furniture, carriages and card games amongst the kraton elite also rose.\(^{62}\) In this respect, the Yogy a nobility probably remained more traditional in their tastes than their Surakarta counterparts (Van Hogendorp 1913:91; Carey and Houben 1987:30 note 26), yet even here there were changes in style. Thus, the fourth sultan, perhaps at Nahuys’ instigation, equipped new companies of kraton troops with European military uniforms. He also enjoyed wearing the outfit of a Dutch major-general on sorties outside the court (Plate 54).\(^{63}\) Indeed, it was said that the young ruler was so attached to this uniform that had he not been dissuaded by his closest advisers he would have worn it when presiding over those most quintessential of Javanese-Islamic court festivals, the Garebeg (Van Nes 1844:164).

Dipanagara’s reaction to the land-rent issue was predictably hostile. He did not himself rent out any of his apanage holdings, although some of his brothers did. Moreover, unlike most of his kraton contemporaries, he was renowned for his careful administration, his close ties with his peasant cultivators and his land improvements, which made him at this time one of the richest landow-

\(^{60}\) Van Hogendorp 1913:160. A striking exception here, according to Van Hogendorp, was the ‘English’ (sic, he was in fact Scots) land renter, Captain William Stavers, a former sepoy officer and fluent Javanese speaker, a language he had acquired through his marriage to a Eurasian woman of part Javanese parentage, S.Br. 122, H.G. Nahuys van Burgst (Yogyakarta) to G.A.G.Ph. van der Capellen (Batavia/Bogor), 29-9-1822. He served as aide-de-camp (ordonnans) to Pangéran Prangwedana (Mangkunagara II) and helped to broker the September 1827 Salatiga meeting between Commissioner-General L.P.J. du Bus de Gisignies and Kyai Maja, see pp. 387, 644. He was then serving (1826-1830) as Captain Adjutant (aide-de-camp) to Du Bus. On Dipanagara’s view of Malay as ‘the language of chickens (basa pitik) which no ruler in Java wished to hear’, see p. 109.


\(^{62}\) UBL, BPL 616, Port. 6 pt. 14, will of Pangéran Purbanegara (Kedhiri), 31-3-1821 (listing two carriages, one four-wheeled, the other an open two-wheeled brougham); Journal 1853-54, 8:18; Van der Kemp 1896a:308; Van Hogendorp 1913:169.

Plate 54. Equestrian portrait of Sultan Hamengkubuwana IV (reigned 1814-1822) of Yogyakarta showing him dressed in his Dutch major-general's uniform and wearing the eight-pointed star set with diamonds of the Order of the Union (Orde van de Unie) given to his father, Hamengkubuwana III (reigned 1812-1814), by Daendels in May 1811 after he was appointed Regent of Yogyakarta. Portrait by the Javanese artist, Soebardjo, based on an original oil painting and completed in February 1938. Photograph by courtesy of the Musium Karaton Ngayogyakarta.
ners in the sultanate. But both Valck’s historical survey of events in Yogya from Giyanti (1755) to the Java War and a near contemporary Javanese source indicate that the prince was profoundly disturbed by the developments instigated by Nahuys. Valck referred to him ‘often remonstrating’ with his younger brother, the fourth sultan, about the inappropriateness of renting land to Europeans. The *Buku Kedhung Kebo*, meanwhile, relates how shortly before the death of his grandmother, Ratu Ageng (pre-1812, Ratu Kedhaton), at the time of the Garebeg Puwasa of 12 July 1820, Dipanagara publicly rebuked the chief minister, Danureja IV, in the *kraton* for allowing the renting out of the royal *sawah* (ricefields) at Rajawinangun. When the chief minister answered the charges frivolously, the prince took off his slipper and struck him hard across the face. The affair is reminiscent of Dipanagara’s contretemps with Wiranagara over the appointment of the royal police officials and may well have been apocryphal. But it was certainly symbolic of his hostile attitude and the widening gap between himself and the court clique around his stepmother, Ratu Ibu. This split is likely to have become even more pronounced after his grandmother, Ratu Ageng’s, passing. Her stubborn Madurese character and religious piety had commanded widespread respect and obedience amongst different members of the sultan’s family, not least from the young sultan for whom she had acted as principle guardian prior to his elevation to the throne in November 1814 (pp. 365-6). Significantly, one of Dipanagara’s first actions as a guardian (*wakil-Dalem*) of the child sultan, Hamengkubuwana V (1822-1826, 1828-1855), in early 1823 just before Van der Capellen’s 6 May decree abolishing the land-rent (p. 529), was to launch an attack on the whole policy. ‘Must we continue to burden our people, who suffer so much’, he is supposed to have said in a meeting of the Yogya regency council, ‘with the renting out of their lands [while we] acquiesce with those who rent them?’ (Van Nes 1844:147).

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64 Chapter II. On Dipanagara’s careful financial administration, which the Dutch labelled ‘avariciousness’, see Van der Kemp 1896a:331; Kielstra 1885:409, 411 (on improvements to his estates); Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 4; Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:743; Carey 1981a:282 note 198 (on the f3,000 in ready money and large amounts of unhusked rice [*padi*] from the Puwasa taxes of 21 May 1825 which he had to leave behind in his residence at Tegalreja at the time of his flight on 20 July 1825); AN, Exhibitum 2-7-1831 no. 15, J.P.C. Cambier (acting Resident Manado) to Johannes van den Bosch (Batavia/Bogor), 22-4-1831 (on the estimated f4,000 which Dipanagara had saved from his initial government allowance of f600 in Manado). See further p. 726 note 212.


66 AN, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal, 21-7-1820 no. 13, states that Ratu Ageng’s death occurred on 14 July 1820.

67 KITLV Or 13 (*Buku Kedhung Kebo*), 52-56:IV.69-75. Hageman 1856:45 relates a similar incident. See further Van der Kemp 1896a:308, 313-4, 362; Plate 53. On the royal ricefields at Rajawinangun which were rented out through the intermediary of Danureja IV, see KITLV H 696g (*Archiefstukken [diverse] over de Vorstenlanden]:75; Carey and Hoadley 2000:301-2.

68 This was known as the ‘Raad uitmakende het bestuur over den rijk van Djokjo’ and functioned as the supreme governing council of Yogya during Hamengkubuwana V’s minority, see further Dj.Br. 6 pt. 18.
Dipanagara’s first cousin, Mangkudiningrat II, would later report that one of the principal causes of support for the prince after the outbreak of the Java War was the dislike of ordinary Javanese at seeing lands rented out to Chinese:

Amongst the village people who gave assistance to Dipanagara, there were those who had nothing to eat, and those whose means of livelihood were crime, robbery and theft. These assisted him out of their own evil designs. As for those who were not engaged in criminal activities, such as village officials and village tax-collectors, [most followed him] because of their grievances against the Chinese whose behaviour was very different from what it had been previously. They now expected people to make a sembah of humble greeting to them and they sat high up [namely on chairs] while the village officials had to sit cross-legged on the floor in front of them.69

Mangkudiningrat’s observation underscores the fact that the impact of the land-rent on the village communities was even more important than the changes it wrought on kraton lifestyles or the reaction it provoked from the disapproving Dipanagara. The renting of land not only entailed the alienation of property but also in most instances the local population. In the case of coffee, which was usually grown at high altitude (3-6,000 feet), villagers were often constrained to work as day labourers in remote mountain and elevated plateau locations.70 Although some may have welcomed the opportunity to earn money as hired hands, most resented the intrusion into their customary village life. This was the case, for example, with the eighteen Javanese families who were uprooted from their villages to work on Nahuys’ coffee estate at Bedhaya.71 They apparently agreed to the move under duress and although they did not dare to complain openly to the Yogya court, they conveyed their misgivings about their future to their friends and relations (Van Nes 1844:142). They were not alone. Other reports stressed the resentment of the local Javanese at the heavy labour demands of European land-renters. Roads, irrigation systems, drying sheds, processing factories and coffee gardens all had to be laid out and maintained.72 And all this was on top of the fourth sultan’s own mania for road building which caused the destruction of many kampung (urban quarters) and the flight of population in the immediate vicinity of Yogya (Carey 1992:506-7 note 516). Indigo was especially hated. We know

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69 dK 131, Pangéran Aria Mangkudiningrat II (Yogyakarta) to F.G. Valck (Magelang), n.y. (1828). See further Carey 1984:40-1.
70 S.Br. 122, H.G. Nahuys van Burgst (Surakarta) to G.A.G.Ph. van der Capellen (Batavia/Bogor), 29-9-1822, stating that most coffee plantations in the Surakarta area were looked after by day labourers. See further note 74.
71 Dj.Br. 52, Pangéran Dipanagara and Pangéran Mangkubumi (Selarong) to A.H. Smissaert (Yogyakarta), 25-7-1825, referred to the problems of the villages attached to Bedhaya.
from post-Java War reports that its forced cultivation under the Cultivation System (1830-1870) caused population movements in Bagelèn and other districts.\textsuperscript{73} Not only did the indigo plant exhaust the soil, necessitating the opening up of new land further from established villages, but the preparation of the dye in small factories involved an unpleasant fermentation process. This required workers to wade and slosh in the vats, resulting in long-term discolouration of their skin (Van Niel 1992:76). The wages paid to the workers on the estates were also not particularly generous even by the low standards of the day.\textsuperscript{74} Finally, the juxtaposition of cash crops with the sawah of neighbouring villages caused problems of irrigation control. This was particularly the case with Dr Thomson’s indigo plantations at Rajawinangun.\textsuperscript{75} There were also fears amongst the local population that too much land was being taken away from rice cultivation thus jeopardising food supply. Post-war Dutch reports on the land-rent suggested that, given the choice, Javanese peasant cultivators would plant all their fields to rice and abandon cash crops altogether. Only pressure from the Resident forced them to turn sawah over to indigo or sugar, and even then particular problems would arise when the indigo harvest failed, as it appears to have done in 1819 and 1821,\textsuperscript{76} or sugar prices collapsed and mills closed down as they did in Kedhu and Bagelèn in the latter year as we will see shortly. Significantly, one of the most prosperous post-war landholdings in the Yogya area was that of Pakualam II in the Adikarta district of southern Kulon Praga – not a particularly fertile region – which went from


\textsuperscript{74} Van Nes 1844:149, mentioned that the eighteen families who worked on Nahuys’ Bedhaya estate were paid f 15 a day in total. On the conservative estimate that there were two able-bodied workers per family, this would have worked out at 42 cents a day each, but some of this money would have been taken by the overseers (mandur). The wage structure on P.M.M. Bouwens van den Boyen’s coffee estate at Kebangarum on the flanks of Mount Merapi in the Slêman district of Yogya can be seen in the report of Carl von Winckelmann, the inspector of Coffee Culture, in April 1825. This stated that the workers were a mix of local villagers and day labourers. They were paid 10 duit (13 cents) for every 100 trees cleaned and weeded (there were 105,000 coffee trees on the estate) with two free meals of rice a day. The mandur were paid 30 duit (40 cents) a day. Local villagers from Kebangarum were also required to do labour services (kerigan) two days a week, the first paid and the second unpaid. The usual payment for a day’s kerigan was 6 duit (8 cents) for villagers and double that for mandur, see S.Br. 19, Carl von Winckelmann (Semarang) to H.M. MacGillivray (Surakarta), 22-4-1825; Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, II:269-74. For comparative wages for day labourers in central Java at this time, see Chapter I note 124; Van Enk 1990:16-7 (on Dezentjé’s estate at Ampèl and Thomson’s at Rajawinangun, where workers received 15 cents a day). On Bouwens and Kebangarum, see further Chapter X note 99.

\textsuperscript{75} Carey 1986:129 note 268, quoting Thomson as stating that ‘those lands [at Rajawinangun], which were given to me in rent for the cultivation of indigo, are so intermixed with those of other Javanese [farmers] that my indigo crops have been injured by the cultivation of their fields lying contiguous to mine’. See further KITLV H 699 (Archiefstukken over de Vorstenlanden, 1820-1889):76-81; Van Enk 1990:14; 1999:155.

\textsuperscript{76} Dj.Br. 3, A.A. Buyskes ‘Algemeen verslag der residentie Djokjokarta over het jaar 1841’, 3-1842; Van Enk 1990:9, 12-3 (on the effects of heavy rainfall on the 1819 indigo harvest); KITLV H 699 (Archiefstukken over de Vorstenlanden, 1820-1869):78 (on the failure of the 1821 indigo harvest).
strength to strength according to a later Dutch Resident’s report because the independent prince set his face against renting any part of it to Europeans. 77

As conditions deteriorated in south-central Java in the years leading up to the Java War, so popular resentment of the land-rent deepened, resulting in a growing number of attacks on isolated estates in which local estate workers, vagrants and professional bandits (wong durjana) took part (pp. 535-6).

Raffles’ land tax, coffee plantations and the situation in Kedhu

The problems associated with the land-rent were mirrored in the newly annexed territories. Here the impact of the land tax introduced by Raffles in 1812-1813 was principally to blame (Bastin 1954:93-112). In theory, this taxation system was designed to work to the advantage of the local population by relieving them of labour services and forced dues in return for the payment of a single land tax. This in turn was supposed to be levied fairly on the productive value of individual landholdings thus enabling Javanese farmers freedom of cultivation and an incentive to raise production (Van Deventer 1891, I:cxvi; Burger 1939:62; Day 1972:172-6). In practice, as we have seen (p. 383), the land tax was often raised unfairly and unevenly on the local population because of the absence of detailed cadastral surveys and trained revenue collectors. Furthermore, Raffles’ original expectation that the tax could be paid in cash rather than in kind, particularly by farmers who produced maize from dry fields (tegal), betrayed an inadequate understanding of the local Javanese peasant economy which was based extensively on the barter system. 78 His tax demands thus drove the Javanese peasant even further into the clutches of the local Chinese money-lenders (Bastin 1954:101). At the same time, the abuses of the old Javanese fiscal and administrative systems were unwittingly maintained. How could it have been otherwise? The land tax itself was nearly always collected by Javanese officials (demang, bekel) – many of them former members of the royal administrations – who insisted on traditional services and forced deliveries (Levyssohn Norman 1857:192; Bastin 1954:179).

Nowhere was this more apparent than in Kedhu, once one of the most prosperous apanage districts of the south-central Javanese courts (Chapter VIII). In a report on the region in 1816, the new Dutch Resident of the joint residencies of Kedhu and Pekalongan, A.M.Th. de Salis (in office 1816-1817, 1825-1826), asserted that the hurried introduction of the land tax had resul-

78 IOL, Mack.Pr. 21, Crawfurd, ‘Report on Cadoe’, 304; Chapter I. Much local trade appears to have been done by barter, especially in areas where wet-rice (sawah) cultivation was less developed, Carey 1986:100. Curiously, it was the sinophobic Crawfurd who had persuaded Raffles that the land tax should be collected in money rather than in kind in Kedhu, Bastin 1954:101.
ted in a decline in production and even in population.\textsuperscript{79} This observation was confirmed some years later by a French estate owner who visited both Kedhu and Pekalongan and commented on the very difficult conditions of the peasantry in those residencies. He described how they were forced to sell tobacco, their principal cash crop, to pay the land tax and how they lived on a meagre maize diet:

Any excess profit is very rare for the Javanese peasant for besides the high land tax, the Javanese tax-collector plagues him and his greatest problem is his own Javanese chief […] and he is lucky if he only has one.\textsuperscript{80}

He noticed too that although the Javanese \textit{bupati} were supposedly salaried by the European government, they still made use of the peasantry to squeeze extra profits from them. Some of these officials were brought to trial in the years before the Java War, but for the most part the Frenchman lamented that ‘God is very high and the king is far’.\textsuperscript{81} In years in which plagues of mice and rats attacked the rice crop (1819, 1822) or the tobacco harvest failed (1823), the local population were reduced to eating leaves and weeds according to Radèn

\textsuperscript{79} Day 1972:208 note 1; MvK 3054, ‘\textit{Statistieke beschrijving der residentie Kedoe}’ (1836), 6, indicates that the population continued to decline by nearly 14 percent between 1819 and 1821, when there was a brief revival prior to the Java War, see note 80.

\textsuperscript{80} KITLV H 788 (‘Boutet correspondence’), Joseph Donatiën Boutet (Surakarta) to Lucien Boutet (Nantes), n.y. The date of this letter is unclear. Boutet, a wine merchant had left his native Nantes on 13 April 1818 and had arrived in Java via Mauritius (Île de France) on 4 September 1818 after trying to reach land in a sloop launched from the French brig \textit{La Legère}, which was attempting to reach Surabaya via Bali. He was washed up on a beach in the Urutsèwu district of eastern Bagelèn together with three other Frenchmen Louis, Berceau and Salaun, the last two of whom died, D:\j:\Br. 83, H.G. Nahuys van Burgst (Yogyakarta) to G.A.G.Ph. van der Capellen (Batavia/ Bogor), 10-9-1818. He arrived in the south-central Java in circa 1820 and rented land in Surakarta in 1821 (Louw and De Klerk 1894-1909, I:613 no. 162). He was a friend of his fellow land-renter, Dr Harvey Thomson of Aberdeen. The letter was apparently written during a visit to Thomson in the period when the Scotsman was working at the Karangjati indigo factory in Pekalongan (1828-1834). See further Enk 1999:236-9. Boutet’s remarks about the diet of the Kedhu peasantry directly contradict Willem van Hogendorp’s comments (Chapter I note 127) and may reflect the post-war situation, which we know was especially difficult, MvK 3054, ‘\textit{Statistieke beschrijving der residentie Kedoe}’ (1836), 6, which shows a dramatic fall in the population in 1829 to 281,261 compared to 333,584 in 1824, the last year in which statistics are available before the war. On tobacco production in Kedhu, see IOL, Mack.Pr. 21, Crawfurd, ‘\textit{Sultan’s country}’, 81-2. It was one of the few cash crops – the other was sugar – grown in any quantity in Java by the local population as it could be rotated with rice (two years of rice harvests to one year of tobacco). In Kedhu, a variety known as Pinang tobacco was grown and the annual harvest in the mid-1800s was 2 million ponden (1 pond = 453.6 grams) or just over 900,000 kilograms. Most of this was sold on the north coast, see D:\j:\Br. 38, Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 31-1-1806.

\textsuperscript{81} KITLV H 788, Joseph Donatiën Boutet (Surakarta) to Lucien Boutet (Nantes), n.y. (1831). Boutet’s quote – \textit{Dieu est bien haut} […] et le roi est loin – seems to be drawn from Le Clerc 1783, I:45, which, in the section on Russian proverbs, gives the phrase \textit{Dieu est bien haut, et le Czar est loin}. Denis Diderot had also used this proverb in his \textit{Mélanges II}, ‘\textit{Au Roi de Prusse}’, section entitled, \textit{Sur la civilisation de la Russie}. I am grateful to Dr Ursula Haskins Gonthier, Lecturer in French Studies at the University of Birmingham, UK, for these references.
Sukur, the younger son of the bupati of Semarang, Sura-adimanggala IV, who later joined Dipanagara.\(^82\)

In addition to the burden of the land tax, as Sukur pointed out, the local population also had to contend with heavy labour demands associated with coffee production.\(^83\) After 1816, coffee plantations were introduced over a wide area of the Kedhu plateau and by 1827 these apparently covered between two-fifths and three-fifths of all the cultivated high altitude land in the province, producing over one million guilders each year for the Netherlands Indies government.\(^84\) Travelling through south-central Java in 1827, Willem van Hogendorp was particularly struck by the extreme hatred evinced by peasant cultivators in Kedhu for the heavy labour services demanded by the Dutch planters on the coffee estates. These corvée demands, in his opinion, were one of the principal reasons for the widespread local support for Dipanagara in Kedhu during the early years of the Java War. Indeed, he rec-

\(82\) Sukur's report, which seems to have been referring to the situation in Kedhu at the time of Pangeran Dipasana's February 1822 uprising, reads: de beklagenswaardige toestand van den gemeenen Javaan, die thans zoo arm en ellendig was, dat hij zijnen honger met bladeren en onkruid moet stillen, 'the pitiable state of the common Javanese, who at present is so poor and miserable that he must still his hunger with leaves and weeds', is cited in Soekanto 1951b:29. Sukur's clandestine disappearance from his father's house in Semarang in 1822-1823 to meditate at Gunung Prau on the Dieng plateau on the border between Semarang and Kedhu, may have a connection with this report and his knowledge of the living conditions of ordinary Javanese in the Kedhu area, see vAE (aanwinsten 1941), 'Stukken Smissaert', A.H. Smissaert (The Hague) to King William I (The Hague/Brussels), n.y. (? 9-1828), mentions that the government tracked him down to his hiding place, but the affair was not treated very seriously, which in Smissaert's view was a mistake given that Sukur was an 'extremely dangerous man', all the more so because of his education in Bengal (1812-1814) and his fluency in English, see further p. 364. The consumption of root crops by the local Yogya population when the price of rice was too high is cited in Dj.Br. 3, A.H.W. Baron de Kock, 'Algemeen verslag der residentie Djokjokarta over het jaar 1850', 31-3-1851. On the failure of the 1823 tobacco harvest because of heavy rains which followed the 28 December 1822 eruption of Mount Merapi and the lava flows which directly damaged tobacco fields in Prabalingga district, see Baud 91, Pieter le Clercq, 'Copie-verslag over de residentie Kadoe', 30-3-1824, 39; Residentie Kadoe 1871:97. On attacks on the rice harvest by rats and mice in 1819 and 1822, see Residentie Kadoe 1871:89.

\(83\) Den Javaan [die men] hout [liet] kappen en slepen en koffij planten op het tydstip dat hij zijn rijstvelden moest bewerken om voor het bestaan van hem en zijn huisgezin te zorgen; dat men gevoeglijk ook eerlang al om oproer zoude uitbreken, 'the Javanese who is expected to fell and haul timber and plant coffee just at the time when he should be working his ricefields in order to provide for his own and his family's upkeep; [and] who might well before too long burst into insurrection', Soekanto 1951b:29.

\(84\) Baud 177, Willem van Hogendorp, 'Extract rapport betreffende Kadoe', 1827. This can be compared to the 150,000 Spanish dollars (\( \$ 400,000 \)) which Raffles' estimated as the province's tax return in 1812 (Chapter VIII note 82), and the 7-800,000 which the former Resident, A.M.Th. de Salis, reckoned as the profits from the province in 1825-1826, De Salis, 'Pro Memorie', 8-5-1828. For statistics on the growth of coffee cultivation in Kedhu between 1820-1824, see Residentie Kadoe 1871:109, which indicates that just over two million coffee trees were planted in that four-year period. Kedhu has extensive areas of high ground (over 3,000 feet) on the flanks of the Merapi-Merbabu volcanic range to the east, Sumbing-Sundoro to the west and Gunung Prau and the Jambu hills to the north bordering Pekalongan and Semarang residencies, Atlas 1990:15a-b.
konied that the province was three times more heavily burdened with tax and labour services than adjacent districts. So invasive had been the impact of coffee cultivation on village commons that Van Hogendorp worried that the Dutch ‘had overthrown [in a decade] the principle of common village ownership which has been evolved over centuries’.85 Hardly surprising then that the coffee estates were one of the first targets for attack by Dipanagara’s supporters during the Java War with many coffee bushes being uprooted.86 In fact, Radèn Sukur had given a clear warning in 1822 of the serious agrarian disturbances which he felt were imminent if nothing was done to alleviate the plight of the ordinary Javanese. This materialized in July 1825 when the inhabitants of the southern Kedhu district of Prabalingga, which had a population of around 35,000, rose *en masse* after a major failure of the tobacco harvest and news of Dipanagara’s own rebellion in the sultanate (Carey 1981a:266 note 123). As with the destruction of the coffee estates in central and northern Kedhu, so the main targets for popular vengeance in the south showed the intense hatred of the local population for alien economic domination and fiscal oppression. Thus the first attacks were made on land tax posts, tollgates, the houses of European land tax inspectors and estate overseers, and on the resident Chinese community, most of whom fled for their lives to the provincial capital of Magelang or the north coast (Carey 1981a:260 note 106).

*The working of the tollgates*

The plight of the Chinese in southern Kedhu in July 1825 was due in large measure to another aspect of the post-1816 European administration which had contributed so materially to the rising unrest in the south-central Javanese countryside prior to the Java War. This was the working of the tollgates (*bandar*). In the space of just twelve years (1812-1824), following the British take-over in August 1812, the revenue received by the European government from the *bandar* in the Yogya territories alone nearly quadrupled (Appendix XV). Before dealing with the post-1816 situation in greater detail, we need to turn aside for a moment to consider how the tollgates and their Chinese keepers came to be so ubiquitous in the south-central Javanese countryside in the years before the British annexation.

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86 Dj.Br. 3, F.G. Valck, ‘Algemeen verslag der residentie Djokjokarta over het jaar 1833’, 3-1834; MvK 3054, ‘Beschrijving en statistieke rapport betreffende de Residentie Kedoe’ (henceforth: ‘Beschrijving der Residentie Kedoe’), 1836:25-6, on the uprooting of coffee bushes during Java War: an estimated 755,000 coffee bushes out of a pre-war total of 2 million were destroyed.
The original tollgates had apparently grown up at wayside stopping places and overnight shelters (*pesanggrahan*) for travellers on the principal highways of seventeenth and early eighteenth-century Mataram and the pasisir (Nagtegaal 1996:167. These stopping places, which were positioned a day’s journey on foot from each other, were frequented by Chinese merchants, some of whom had bought the right from the local captain of the Chinese or *kapitan cina* to levy tolls from other travellers for looking after their goods and belongings overnight. Over time, a fully fledged *bandar* would be established run by a Chinese tollgate keeper. Sometimes a market would also develop from the wayside stalls (*warung*) serving the overnight shelter. Then, as the Chinese *bandar* became more familiar with the surrounding countryside and greater pressure was put on him by his *kapitan cina* to pay higher rents, smaller tollgates (*rangkah*) would be set up on adjacent country lanes. Observation posts (*salaran*) were also constructed on the borders of the customs’ districts controlled by the separate *bandar* to check that the requisite taxes had been paid before traders passed into a new zone. These developments were accelerated by the rise of regional trade in the seventy years of peace which followed the Giyanti treaty of the mid-eighteenth century. So much so that just before the outbreak of the Java War, in the words of the Dutch commissioners charged with enquiring into the administration of the Principalities, ‘there was a tollgate at the entrance of nearly every village and hamlet’. 87

Beginning with the thirty-four established *bandar* in 1812 (pp. 383-5; Appendix XV), an additional 106 *rangkah*, 45 *rangkah-cum-pasar* and 187 smaller markets were counted in Yogya alone by 1821. 88 In addition, there were two tobacco warehouses (*gedhong tembakau*) in recently annexed Kedhu, where tobacco consignments were weighed, inspected and assessed for customs’ duties prior to their export to the north coast (p. 383). Other monopolies and indirect taxes administered by the *bandar* were also established: in the court towns every *gamelan* (Javanese orchestra) was taxed and failure to meet such payments could result in arbitrary imprisonment. As we have seen (Chapter I), many *bandar* maintained their own prisons and stocks. 89 Copper coins imported from Surabaya and the north coast also paid heavy duty with

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88 Dj.Br. 64, ‘Extract uit den algemeenen staat der amfioen kitten behoorende bij de resolutie van den 29 Juli 1820 no. 11, aantoonende de plaatsen alwaar in deze Residentie [Yogyakarta] door den amfioen pachter in het klein zal mogen worden verkocht met aanwijzing van het aantal kitten op elke plaats’, 1821, list showing tollgates and *pasar* in Yogya where opium could be retailed. See also Appendix XV.
89 KITLV H 395, Chevallier, ‘Rapport’, 13-6-1824. On taxing of *wayang* which dated back at least to the British period, see IOL, G21/26, Java Public Consultations, Report of Willem Jacob Cranssen, 21-12-1814.
the result that specie in the Principalities was more costly than in other areas. Indeed, such high tax was paid on north coast salt that this essential commodity was said to be virtually unobtainable in some parts of the eastern mancanagara on the eve of the Java War.

In theory, the tollgate system worked according to certain rules. Thus full dues were levied on certain products at the bandar which would then be exempt from all but a token payment – wang peniti (literally ‘pin money’) – at adjacent rangkah. If, however, a load was only going a short distance and merely needed to pass through a subordinate tollgate or rangkah, then half the toll was charged. The receipts of the toll payments were stamped on the hands of the Javanese traders and peasant cultivators in slow-fading blue indigo dye and these were inspected at the observation posts (salaran) before the loads were allowed to pass through to the next customs’ area. One problem was that a main tollgate and its subordinate rangkah might sometimes be sub-farmed by two different Chinese who would each levy full dues instead of the usual wang peniti of two cents a horse load. Tariffs were fixed on the main trade goods from the Principalities. These included rice, raw cotton (kapas), cotton thread, piece goods, tobacco, peanut oil, and indigo, all of which were exported to the north coast. At the same time, imports of iron, gambir (catechu), ginger, beeswax for the batik industry, benzoin (a fragrant gum resin used in the manufacture of perfumes and incense), spices, opium, silks and foreign cloths were imported from the north coast and the eastern outlying provinces. These were also liable to tax. So too were special products from the craft centres in the Principalities, such as the finely woven mats or klasa pesantrèn from the tax-free villages of Pesantrèn and Bendha in southern Kedhu, and Javanese tree-bark paper or dluwang from the famous religious

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90 Dj.Br. 60, Besluit van den Commissarissen-Generaal, 20-4-1818 (on import of copper coins from the Tawangsari mint in Surabaya); vAE (aanwinsten 1900), 283, Hendrik Mauritz MacGil-livray (Surakarta) to Director of Finances (Batavia), 1-5-1825. Smisraert later noted that opium tax-farmers in particular made vast profits out of exporting silver money from Yogya and changing it for government notes in Semarang or Kedhu, vAE (aanwsten 1941) 28, A.H. Smisraert (Yogyakarta) to G.A.G.Ph. van der Capellen (Batavia/Bogor), 7-1-1824. See further pp. 278-9 (on export of silver specie from Principalities in 1811); Van den Broek 1893:14-6 (on minting of copper coins during Van der Capellen’s administration, 1816-26).

91 KITLV H 395, Chevallier, ‘Rapport’, 13-6-1824. See further Chapter I note 125, Chapter VIII.

92 S.Br. 170, Commissioners (Yogyakarta/Surakarta) to G.A.G.Ph. van der Capellen (Batavia/ Bogor), 24-10-1824; S.Br. 170, H.G. Nahuys van Burgst (Surakarta), Report on the working of the tollgates (henceforth: Van Burgst, ‘Report’), 29-5-1830.

93 AvJ, G.A.G.Ph. van der Capellen (Batavia/Bogor) to A.H. Smisraert (Yogyakarta), 9-5-1824. A horse load varied between 100 to 150 kilograms: Smisraert reckoned such a load at 180 ponden (or 82 kilograms; 1 pond = 453 grams), but we know from other sources that it could weigh nearly double that, see page 473.

94 See Sastroamidijojo 1967:150-1. Catechu was often used to treat dysentery and other stomach ailments.
school of Tegalsari in Panaraga in east Java.\textsuperscript{95}

The rates on all these goods were determined by the sub-farmers of the individual \textit{bandar} in consultation with the principal tax-farmer in the area and the European Resident. The amount of tax was based on the status of the tollgate and the general level of prosperity in the district. Thus a \textit{pikul} (62 kilograms) of rice paid a toll of 44 cents at the old established Mataram era tollgate of Ampèl on the Surakarta-Salatiga road, 15 cents at the \textit{bandar} of Panaraga, eight cents in Pacitan town and a mere two cents at the sub-tollgate (\textit{rangkah}) of Pager Watu in the same south coast district.\textsuperscript{96} However, tariff rates were hardly ever properly displayed. Indeed, as most Javanese were illiterate, they would not have been able to read them anyway.\textsuperscript{97} Chinese merchants were supposed to pay three times more duty on their merchandise than Javanese. In practice, they were often able to get by with only token payments because of preferential treatment from their countrymen.\textsuperscript{98}

Besides such invidious ethnic preferences, the greatest problem faced by the ordinary Javanese peasant cultivator was that there were no fixed duties on common foodstuffs and agricultural produce. These included the fruit and vegetables grown in his orchard or garden which were frequently sold in the local market. The level of tax levied on those goods was left at the discretion of the tollgate keeper who raised a percentage levy. In effect, this meant that he took as much money as possible. Indeed, the \textit{bandar} were often constrained to act harshly because they themselves had sub-rented the tollgate from various intermediaries and needed to recoup their cash outlay as soon as possible.\textsuperscript{99}

Van Sevenhoven, who considered the tollgates along with the porters’ guilds as the two greatest evils of pre-war Javanese peasant society, gave a depressing account of the sort of scene which became an all too familiar occurrence at tollgates throughout south-central Java in this period. He described how a Javanese on the way to market would be forced to wait for hours in a queue before his load was inspected. If his buffaloes grazed on the tollgate keeper’s land during this time, he was fined and if this fine was not paid his draught animals were impounded so that at harvest time it was not uncommon for a Javanese farmer to surrender the bulk of his profits to

\textsuperscript{95} Dj.Br. 48, J.G. van den Berg (Yogyakarta), Report on tollgate regulations, 10-2-1802 (on trade in \textit{klasa pesantrèn} mats by Chinese and Javanese merchants between Kedhu and Semarang); MvK 3054, ‘Beschrijving der Residentie Kedoe’, 1836:34, 38 (on export of mats); Raffles 1817, I:166-7; Crawfurd 1971:327-8; Raffles 1817, I:175; Kooijman 1963:58-60; S.Br. 170, Panaraga and Madiun tollgate rates, 1830, on trade in \textit{dluwang}.

\textsuperscript{96} S.Br. 170, Van Burgst, ‘Report’, 29-5-1830.

\textsuperscript{97} KITLV H 395, Chevallier, ‘Rapport’, 15-6-1824.

\textsuperscript{98} S.Br. 170, Van Burgst, ‘Report’, 29-5-1830.

\textsuperscript{99} KITLV H 503, Van Sevenhoven, ‘Aanteekeningen’, 70-1; AvJ, G.A.G.Ph. van der Capellen (Batavia/Bogor) to A.H. Smiessaert (Yogyakarta), 9-5-1824.
cover the rent of his own animals from the local *bandar*. When the peasant cultivator’s turn came for his load to be inspected, the tollgate keeper would browbeat him and demand that he hand over a large percentage payment on his goods for right of passage. The peasant cultivator would then throw himself at the tollgate keeper’s mercy: ‘Ampun tuwan [‘Have mercy, Sir!’], my family is poor!’ But if he refused payment, he ran the risk of having his entire load confiscated. During the long hours of waiting, the farmer would often be tempted to take opium which was readily available at the *bandar* and usually retailed by the keeper as an additional income source. In the event of an overnight stay, there would be the added beguilement of *ronggèng* (dancing girls, prostitutes) and gambling parties which would further eat into the farmer’s meagre savings. If he had serious ill-luck at cards, the farmer would often be forced to part with his clothes and even the money, which many Javanese traders and peasant cultivators borrowed from their village heads to cover the cost of the toll dues. In such a situation, it was not uncommon for a peasant cultivator to take to a roving life as a bandit or porter on the roads rather than face the ignominy of returning empty-handed to his village.

The impact of the tollgates on internal trade and Sino-Javanese relations

Appeals to local Javanese officials about abuses of power by the tollgate keepers were usually unavailing because the officials themselves were given cash gifts (*wang pesangan*) to ensure they overlooked extortionate practices. In addition, a journey to the court towns to put a case before the Residency court was usually beyond the means of the average farmer (p. 386). The only way a ‘little man’ (*wong cilik*) could revenge himself on a tollgate keeper would be by enlisting the help of local bandits and getting them to plunder the *bandar* or burn it to the ground. Such cases of burglary and arson occurred with increasing frequency in the years before the Java War as can be seen from the rising value of goods stolen from the tollgates. Many Chinese tollgate keepers also lost their lives. This situation became desperate following the

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100 This detail was pointed out by Van Sevenhoven’s colleague as commissioner, Hendrik Mauritz MacGillivray, who served as acting Resident of Surakarta (1823-1824) just before Van Sevenhoven’s one-year incumbency (1824-1825), see MvK 4132, MacGillivray, ‘Nota om trent den staat der Javaasche vorstenlanden, de thans bestaande onlusten en de middelen welke tot herstel en verzekering der rust kunnen worden aangewend’ (henceforth: MacGillivray, ‘Nota’), Surakarta, 13-5-1826. MacGillivray’s report was later published, Van Kesteren 1892:973-96.


outbreak of the war when all the tollgates in the vicinity of Yogya were burnt to the ground. But popular retribution such as this often spelled disaster for the inhabitants of neighbouring villages, which, under the terms of the Javanese criminal codes, were liable to pay an indemnity amounting to two-thirds of the value of any stolen goods or a ‘blood price’ (diyat) – which was double the amount for a dead Chinese than for a Javanese – to the family of the murdered man if the crime could not be resolved satisfactorily (Soeripto 1929:88, 268; Carey 1980:126-8, 130 note 1).

Faced with the threat of constant attack, the tollgate keepers began to organize their own ‘private armies’ of bodyguards and thugs, some of them recruited from former sepoys (p. 421), thus adding another twist to the spiral of violence in country areas as the Java War loomed (Carey 1981a:243 note 36; Chapter I). Even when Van Sevenhoven was first writing just before the British take-over of the tollgates in August 1812, the potential that they might develop into a serious impediment to trade in south-central Java was already evident. Twelve years later, when he served as commissioner enquiring into the administration of the Principalities, the bandar had become so effectively sited that nothing could be transported on the roads without going through one. If a Javanese tried to evade a tollgate by taking a cross-country route, the tollgate keeper’s spies would usually report his action resulting in the forfeiture of his goods. The increase in customs’ posts had a significant effect on the price of foodstuffs in south-central Java. Nowhere was this more evident than in Yogya where prices of rice and other necessities were nearly double those in Surakarta, which benefited from cheap transport costs for bulk goods along the Sala River (Plate 22; p. 193 note 122; Appendix X).

In 1812, Crawfurd had written that ‘the abundance and cheapness of Cadoe [Kedhu] rice is such that it will bear a journey of 100 miles and heavy imposts at the tollgates without becoming too expensive’. But this was fanciful. Eight years earlier, the Yogya Resident, Matthijs Waterloo, had worked out that a journey from the main rice market at Pasar Payaman in northern Kedhu to Yogya would add at least forty percent to the cost of rice retailed in the sultan’s capital. He cited the case of a local trader who purchased a horse load of rice weighing 240 kati (148 kilograms) for £6 in Kedhu and sold the same amount for £9.60 in the main market in Yogya (Chapter I note 7) after the market taxes (58 cents), tollgate dues (98 cents) and the hire of the horse (£1.60) had been paid for. The trader himself would barely retain a 34 cent profit – a miserable three percent on his original outlay – for himself.

103 dK 197, A.H. Smissaert (Yogyakarta) to H.M. de Kock (Surakarta), 30-7-1825. On the situation in the eastern mancanagara, see further Carey 1984:1-2.
104 S.Br. 170, Commissioners (Yogyakarta/Surakarta) to G.A.G.Ph. van der Capellen (Batavia/Bogor), 24-10-1824.
after a gruelling eleven-hour day travelling over wretched roads in constant fear of bandit attacks.\textsuperscript{106} It was for this reason that rice imports from other productive areas such as Banyumas, Bagelèn, Rèma and Ledhok were rarely undertaken. Indeed, the price of rice would become an important barometer of political discontent with times of high prices coinciding with periods of dearth and agrarian unrest, especially in 1821-1822 and 1824-1825 (pp. 475, 493-4). The fact that Yogya was so dependant on rice imports made it especially vulnerable in this respect.

The European government was perfectly aware of the harmful effects of the tollgates and it made some moves to restrict their influence before 1825. As we have seen (p. 384), the British abolished the \textit{bandar} along the Sala River in February 1814 and the Dutch followed suit in Kedhu in 1824, a move which led to an immediate increase in the number of markets and the level of trade in the province.\textsuperscript{107} In the same year, Van der Capellen appointed a three-man team of commissioners headed by the Residents of Yogyakarta and Surakarta and including Van Sevenhoven, soon to take over as Resident of Surakarta (in office 1825-1827), to enquire into the working of the tollgates in the Principalities. The team reported back in October 1824 unequivocally recommending the abolition of all internal customs posts and suggesting that the European government should indemnify itself for the lost revenue – estimated at about a million Indies guilders – by annexing the western outlying provinces of Bagelèn and Banyumas (p. 562). They also urged that all Chinese resident in villages and hamlets should be ordered to move to the royal capitals, that every unmarried Chinese who had been in the Principalities for less than two years should be expelled forthwith, along with those who were unemployed or guilty of extortion, and that no new Chinese immigration should be allowed.\textsuperscript{108} As one of the commissioners, Hendrik Mauritz MacGillivray, later put it:

\begin{quote}
The Chinese are our work tools and although each year we rejoice over the increased [tax revenues] which are ascribed to [increased] prosperity and welfare, we bind the iron yoke more firmly on the shoulders [of the Javanese] […]. For a million guilders a year worth of taxes we compromise the welfare and happiness of almost two million inhabitants who are not immediately under our protection […] but whose interests are so clearly linked to ours.\textsuperscript{109}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{106} Dj.Br. 49, Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 29-12-1804.
\textsuperscript{107} Schneither 92, Pieter le Clercq, ‘Algemeen verslag der Residentie Kadoe over het jaar 1824’, 30-5-1825. The \textit{bandar} along the Brantas and Madiun rivers were also abolished in December 1823, KITLV H 395, Chevallier, ‘Rapport’, 13-6-1824. On the importance of river networks in east Java for trade, see Raffles 1817, I:196; p. 193 note 122.
\textsuperscript{108} S.Br. 170, Commissioners (Yogyakarta/Surakarta) to G.A.G.Ph. van der Capellen (Batavia/Bogor), 24-10-1824.
Only the ‘good nature and peacefulness’ of the Javanese, in the commissioners’ opinion,\textsuperscript{110} had enabled the oppression of the tollgate system to continue for so long. They ended with a fearful prophecy:

\begin{quote}
We hope they [the Javanese] will not be awoken out of their slumbering state, for we reckon it as a certainty that if the tollgates are permitted to continue, the time is not far distant when the Javanese will be aroused in a terrible fashion.\textsuperscript{111}
\end{quote}

Despite the dire warnings of imminent agrarian unrest from nearly every official who studied the problem, the post-1816 Dutch administration felt it could not forego the lucrative tollgate revenues from the Principalities (Van der Kemp 1896b:44-5). The nearly threefold rise in annual profits from the tollgate farms in Yogya between 1816 and 1824 seems to have made the senior officials in the Finance Department in Batavia blind to the fact that the \textit{bandar} were inexorably paralysing trade. Writing in November 1824, a mere two months after taking over the once profitable tollgates of Bantul and Jatinom to the south of Yogya, the local Chinese tollgate keeper reported that he had become bankrupt.\textsuperscript{112} A prolonged and severe drought since the beginning of the year had destroyed the cotton crop and basic foodstuffs such as castor-oil plants, soy beans and maize were in short supply. Rice prices were soaring (Appendix X) but little trade was being carried on in the local markets because commerce had effectively collapsed.

We will see in the next chapter (Chapter X), how in these terrible months before the Java War, the south-central Javanese countryside became a place of suspicion and terror. Armed gangs operated with virtual impunity, murders were rife and the daily activities of the local peasant cultivators took place under the ever-watchful eyes of the tollgate keepers’ spies who were positioned on every village and country road to prevent the evasion of toll dues. Even the dead on their way to burial were liable for imposts, and mere passage through a tollgate even without dutiable goods, would expose the traveller to what the Javanese sarcastically came to refer to as the ‘bottom tax’ (\textit{pajak bokong}).\textsuperscript{113} Neither were high-placed Javanese officials exempt. Chevallier remarked how the grey-haired \textit{bupati} of Nganjuk, a district in the Surakarta eastern \textit{mancanagara}, remarked wrily that he was less fearful of the tigers infesting the teak forests on his cross-country journeys to the Sunan’s capital to attend the Garebeg festivals than he was of the bare-faced thugs who manned

\textsuperscript{110} The commissioners’ remarks about the ‘good-natured and peaceful Javanese’, who were liable to run amok if aroused, constitute a classic expression of the widespread and self-deluding Dutch colonial view of \textit{de Javaan als het zachtste volk ter aarde} (the Javanese as the gentlest people in the world). See Carey and Houben 1987:13.
\textsuperscript{111} S.Br. 170, Commissioners (Yogyakarta/Surakarta) to G.A.G.Ph. van der Capellen (Batavia/Bogor), 24-10-1824.
\textsuperscript{112} Dj.Br. 59, Gan Hiang Sing (Bantul) to A.H. Smissaert (Yogyakarta), 9-11-1824.
\textsuperscript{113} KITLV H 395, Chevallier, ‘Rapport’, 13-6-1824.
Plate 56. An opium den in Java in the early nineteenth century. Taken from Hardouin
Plate 56. An opium den in Java in the early nineteenth century. Taken from Hardouin and Ritter 1853:27 facing. Photograph by courtesy of the KITLV, Leiden.
the tollgates on the Nganjuk-Surakarta highway (Chapter I note 35). Other Javanese officials spoke with scarcely concealed contempt of the obscene way in which their wives and daughters were physically searched for items of jewellery by Chinese bandar newly arrived from the maritime provinces of China who were barely conversant in Malay.\footnote{KITLV H 395, Chevallier, ‘Rapport’, 13-6-1825.}

The Dutch now began to refer to the Chinese as ‘a race of customs house keepers’ in their reports echoing the common Javanese expression for them as ‘tollgate people’.\footnote{S.Br. 170, Commissioners (Yogyakarta/Surakarta) to G.A.G.Ph. van der Capellen (Batavia/Bogor), 24-10-1824. The expression in the Dutch original was linie van douanen. The Javanese phrase was bangsa bandar.} Nahuys, meanwhile, noted that barely one Chinese in twenty who came to Java from China ever returned to the place of their birth so rich were the pickings in the Indies.\footnote{S.Br. 122, H.G. Nahuys van Burgst (Yogyakarta) to G.A.G.Ph. van der Capellen (Batavia/Bogor), 29-9-1822.} Yet not all Chinese were by nature oppressors. Before the post-1816 Dutch administration had ratcheted up its fiscal demands to intolerable levels, there were a number of favourable reports of the behaviour of Chinese tax-farmers. During the British period (1811-1816), the principal Chinese land-renter in Wirasaba in east Java, Lib Sing, who controlled over 200 villages, was reported to have been ‘a kind and indulgent master’ under whom the wong cilik or common people liked to take service because ‘the lands and villages in his area were better looked after than elsewhere’.\footnote{IOL, Mack.Pr. 21 pt. 10, Lieutenant H.G. Jourdan, ‘Report on Japan and Wirosobo’, 28-4-1813, 361.} Similar reports were made of the Chinese land-renters of Ulujami near Pekalongan on the north coast, the ‘rice granary’ of Semarang (Ong Tae-hae 1849:13; Carey 1984:17 note 76). Even Chinese tollgate keepers were praised. In May 1812 during his journey across Java, Jan Izaäk van Sevenhoven noted that the Chinese bandar at the ferry crossing at Kreteg on the Opak River to the south of Yogya ‘seemed the very best sort of tollgate keeper’, whose subordinates ‘appeared healthy and robust’.\footnote{KITLV H 503, Van Sevenhoven, ‘Aanteekeningen’, 135-6.} What had changed in the post-1816 period was not the character of the Chinese but the character of the fiscal regime they served. And for this the post-1816 Dutch administration must take full responsibility.

The effects of the opium monopoly

Although Van der Capellen’s government was principally responsible for the sharp rise in tollgate and market revenues after 1816, the British were the midwives to another equally disastrous development – the rapid extension
of the opium retail trade. The greater ease of opium imports from Bengal following the lifting of the British blockade of the Archipelago in August-September 1811 and the financial pressures on Raffles’ government were the key reasons (Hasselman 1858:18-37). Once again, the Chinese came to assume a prominent and invidious role as farmers and retailers, opium retail and tollgate farming often going hand in hand.

The statistics for official opium sales in the Principalities reflect the sharp increase in opium consumption which began in the British period. Between 1802 and 1814 sales doubled from 40 chests of 148 avoirdupois pounds to 80, by which time the wholesale value of a chest had increased twofold due to the effects of inflation, the tightness of the British naval blockade (1804-1811), and the more stringent British enforcement of the opium monopoly after they assumed control of Java in August 1811 (Appendix XV note 7). During the 1814-1824 decade, revenue from the Yogya opium farm multiplied five times. As we have seen (note 88), by 1820 there were 372 separate places licensed to retail opium in the sultan’s territories, namely, nearly every major tollgate, sub-tollgate and market in the sultanate. The exact number of opium addicts is difficult to ascertain. On the basis of consumption figures compiled in the late nineteenth century, a Dutch official estimated that some sixteen percent of the 20-million strong Javanese population took opium (Wiselius 1886:6). But if one counts all those who inhaled and digested ‘poor men’s’ varieties of the drug, such as opium-soaked cigarettes, opium-seasoned coffee, and opium-laced betelnut, the incidence of narcotic consumption was almost certainly very much higher (Rush 1977:20). Raffles, for example, distinguished between the crude opium or *manta* ‘eaten’ by people in the interior of Java, particularly in the Principalities, and the prepared opium, referred to as *madat/candu*, smoked extensively along the north coast (Raffles 1817, I:102-3). During his journey through south-central Java in May 1812, Van Sevenhoven remarked on the widespread use of opium amongst the members of the porters’ guilds and unemployed labourers in the court towns. He also noted how the tollgate opium outlets had spread the habit amongst Javanese in the countryside.119 As he passed through the usually bustling market of Klaten one morning, he noticed how full the opium dens were and how threadbare their inhabitants: some were barely clothed, others were dressed in worn-out *kain* (wrap-arounds).120 One and a half cents was enough, on average, to purchase a small wad of opium-soaked tobacco, containing at the most 76 milligrams of opium, which represented about 15 percent of a porter’s daily wage at this time (Carey 1984:35 note 160). For many it offered the only release from a life of unrelieved toil and hardship. In Pacitan, in the immediate post-Java War period, a huge religious feast would be held to celebrate the end of the coffee

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harvest when crop payments would go on ‘opium eating’ (Kern 1908:163). The drug was also used widely as a stimulant and as a valued part of the Javanese pharmacopoeia for treating various ailments (Rush 1977:25). During the Java War, there were reports that many of Dipanagara’s troops had ‘fallen sick’ for want of opium, and Chinese peddlers did a brisk trade behind the prince’s lines when the violent sinophobe sentiments of the first months of the war had abated somewhat (pp. 610, 617; Louw and De Klerck 1897-1909, II:215-6; Payen 1988:68, 123-4 note 179). As we have seen (Chapter III note 89; Chapter VIII), several Yogya princes and high officials also acquired a taste for the opium pipe, and princely addicts were noticed amongst Dipanagara’s followers at his headquarters at Selarong in late July and early August 1825.

A pastime for the rich, opium addiction was a disaster for the poor. Even the slightest predilection for the drug would exhaust the scarce savings of the Javanese peasant and made his already difficult economic position even more precarious. The road to social degradation and crime was ever present as Nahuys recognised during the Java War when he called for the rounding up of the thousands of landless labourers and footloose vagrants in south-central Java, ‘men with no ricefields whose [thin] shoulders and smooth hands bear no marks of labour and whose eyes, lips and colour betray the habitual use of narcotics’. The social consequences of opium addiction and the increasingly salient role played by the Chinese as retailers were yet another strand in the rapidly deteriorating socio-economic conditions in south-central Java in the post-1816 period. Along with the tollgates, the opium farm lay at the heart of the rise in anti-Chinese sentiments amongst the Javanese population in the decade before the Java War. Attacks on Chinese tollgate keepers and merchants would become an increasingly prominent feature of popular movements in south-central Java as the war neared. This will be dealt with in the next section.

*Popular millenarian movements and prophecies in south-central Java*

The gathering socio-economic crisis in south-central Java was reflected in the increasingly turbulent situation in country areas. In contrast with the last four years of the British administration, when few events of significance had troubled the surface calm of the Javanese countryside (Chapter VIII), the post-1816 period witnessed a number of millenarian movements and an elite-led revolt in Kedhu in February 1822. These were all portents for the future. In January 1817, the so-called Umar Mahdi affair occurred in eastern Bagelèn. Named after an inhabitant from the Yogya village of Sambirata in the Nanggulon district of southern Kulon Praga (Dumont 1931:321), which would later serve as

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a base for Dipanagara and a number of his leading supporters during the Java War and which was mentioned in Javanese millenarian prophecies as the place where a new kraton would be founded, this man took the title of Radèn Mas Umar Mahdi and proclaimed that he was the coming Ratu Adil (‘Just King’). He came to the notice of the Yogya authorities when he summoned a meeting of some fifty of his followers, including four women, armed with pikes, short sabres and kris. The meeting appears to have taken place at the village of Sanèpa near Tanggung in the Karanganyar regency just to the east of Purwareja in Bagelèn on 2 January 1817. All those attending were reported to have been dressed in white tabards (jubah) with different coloured turbans. Prior to the meeting, Mahdi had written to a sub-district official in Tanggung – a Yogya administered area (Karanganjar 1931:6) – ordering him to construct overnight lodgings and a meeting place or paséban. Flattering him with the title of ‘Tumenggung’, he asked him to attend the gathering in person bringing with him as many of his followers as possible, all mounted on horseback. Ten white banners, referred to in the reports as umbul-umbul – long vertical pennants attached to bamboo poles – were erected at the local mosque. Mahdi then announced to his supporters that Mas Tumenggung Sawunggaling, the local Yogya bupati of eastern Bagelèn (Chapter I), would be asked to lay down his authority. The Javanese date 18 Sapar AJ 1744 (AD Thursday, 9 January

122 dK 158, ‘Lyst der personen welke zich als muitelingen hebben opgeworpen’ (with annotations by H.M. de Kock), Magelang, 12-1829. Besides Dipanagara himself and one of his sons, the list gives the following names of figures on Dipanagara’s side who took refuge in Sambirata at some stage during the Java War: Pangéran Jayakusuma (Ngabèhi) and his son, Radèn Mas Sadikin (Pangéran Jayakusuma II), Pangéran Adinagara, Pangéran Purbaya and Pangéran Suryadi (sons of Hamengkubuwana III), Pangéran Natadipura and Pangéran Suryadipura (sons of Hamengkubuwana II), Kyai Maja, Kyai Hasan Besari, Haji Badarudin and a certain ‘Kyai Guru’ (possibly Muhammad Pekih, Kyai Guru of Melangi, a leading religious adviser of Dipanagara, see Appendix VIIb), as well as fourteen former Yogya bupati. See further Appendix VIII. Sambirata was also close to Karangwuni where Dipanagara’s mother and daughter were captured in October 1829, Chapter II note 17. On the millenarian prophecies associated with Sambirata, see Houben 1994:22, citing Van Deventer 1865-66, II:424.

123 Dj.Br. 60, D.W. Pinket van Haak (Yogyakarta) to H.G. Nahuys van Burgst (Semarang), 9-1-1817; UBL, BPL 616 Port. 5 pt. 7, D.W. Pinket van Haak (Yogyakarta) to Commissioners-General (Batavia), 10-1-1817, including a translated Javanese report of Ibnu Iman, religious official (pengulu) of the Yogya district head of Tanggung, Mas Ngabèhi Sumatirta, 11 Sapar, Bé, AJ 1744 (AD 31-12-1816), translated by J.W. Winter. There is a brief reference to this affair in Tijdschrift van Nederlandsch Indië 23 (1861):298. Sanèpa is also sometimes referred to as Snèpa in the reports.

124 AN, Geheim Besluit van den Commissarissen Generaal, 21-1-1817 no. 1, Umar Mahdi (Sambirata) to Mas Tumenggung (sic) Sumatirta (Tanggung), n.y. (31-12-1816). According to Karanganjar 1931:6, there were four Yogya officials in the eastern Bagelèn kabupaten of Karanganjar before the Java War who were entitled to bear the title of Tumenggung and Sumatirta was not one of them. They were: 1. Radèn Tumenggung Sawunggaling (Semawung district, 8,000 cacah); 2. Radèn Tumenggung Tirtanegara (Tanggung district, 6,000 cacah); and 3. the district heads of Batusapi and Bapangan districts (each with 3,000 cacah). In addition, there was the Surakarta tumenggung of Kutawinangun (6,000 cacah), Radèn Tumenggung Arung-Binang (‘the lord of the red pikes’, see p. 9).
The power of prophecy

1817) was fixed as the day on which he would proclaim himself as the Ratu Adil and all the Javanese and Chinese inhabitants of Bagelen ‘would be brought to obedience’. A later report by the acting Yogya Resident, J.D. Kruseman suggests, however, that Mahdi issued more sinister orders. These were supposed to have instructed his followers to make for the weaving centre of Jana further to the west, where there was a sizeable Chinese population of traders and cloth merchants (p. 24). All the ‘rich Chinese’ found there were to be murdered. His followers were then to proceed across the Menoreh mountains to Magelan from whence they were to make their way to Yogya to demand the fourth sultan’s abdication. In a private report submitted by a local religious official in Tanggung who had met Umar Mahdi, the future Ratu Adil was described as having declared himself to be a soldier of the Ottoman sultan, whom he referred to as Sultan Rum. He gave out that the sultan had ordered him to guard Sambirata since he would shortly be arriving there accompanied by Sel Sayidina Muhamad, Sel Rahman Waliyullah (alias Umar Mahdi) and thirty other sheikhs (sèh), all coming out of Arab lands. The aim of the sultan was to appoint Sel Rahman Waliyullah (Umar Mahdi) as the new ruler of Java, an appointment which would be made in the Javanese month of Sapar (22 December 1816–20 January 1817). He would be assisted by one of the previous apostles of Islam (awali) in Java, Sunan Bonang, who would set himself up as a ‘field marshal’ in Semarang. Another follower of the Ottoman sultan, Umar Maya, would do likewise in Kedhu. Both would then assist in the purification of Java. Announcements were also be sent to the previous Javanese rulers along the following lines,

Order from me the Ratu Adil to Tuwan Haji Idris instructing all the haji under him to be gathered together and told that those who had lived in Mecca should return there and likewise those who had lived in Medina. For gold should become gold again, and silver silver.

Shortly after this meeting, Umar Mahdi was taken prisoner along with 36 of his followers. After being cross-questioned by the acting Yogya Resident,

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125 UBL, BPL 616 Port. 5 pt. 7, Mas Ngabèhi Sumatirta (Tanggung) to Mas Ngabèhi Kertareja (Surakarta), n.y. (? January 1817); Dj.Br. 40, J.D. Kruseman (Yogyakarta) to Secretaris van Staat (Batavia), 9-1-1817.
126 UBL, BPL 616, Port. 5 pt. 11, J.D. Kruseman (Yogyakarta) to Secretaris van Staat (Batavia), 14-1-1817.
127 UBL, BPL 616 Port 5 pt. 7, Report of Ibnu Iman (Tanggung), n.y. (? January 1817), where Mahdi is described as a prajurit of the Ottoman sultan. On the Javanese view of the Turkish ruler as Sultan Rum (Sultan of [Eastern] Rome), see p. 153.
128 This was the month in which the ‘king of Mecca’ was expected to make his appearance in Java in 1788, Ricklefs 1974a:293.
129 AN, Geheim Besluit van den Commissarissen Generaal, 21-1-1817 no. 1. The reference to Haji Idris appears to be to the head of the Yogya court haji during Hamengkubuwana II’s reign, see further Chapter VII note 53.
Umar Mahdi was declared not to be able to speak a word of Arabic, only Javanese with a thick Yogya accent. Initially condemned to death, his sentence was later commuted to exile to Ambon for life on account of his ‘madness’. His followers were punished by flogging.

The Umar Mahdi affair is striking in that many of the key themes of his movement can be traced through to Dipanagara’s great rebellion of 1825-1830. First, the juxtaposition of Javanese traditions and messianic expectations is especially noticeable. Thus, the names Umar Mahdi and Umar Maya seem to have been taken from the great Javanese-Islamic epic, Ménak Amir Hamza, which relates the fantastic legends of the uncle of The Prophet Muhammad, in which the hero’s intimate retainers or *panakawan* bear the same monikers (Pigeaud 1950:235-40, 1967-80, I:212-6, III:420; Carey 1992:487 note 414). In a Surakarta version of the Jayabaya prophecies, the predictions ascribed to the eponymous twelfth-century ruler of Kedhiri (pp. 69-70), Umar Maya in particular occupied an important place as the warrior who would defend Medina against the attacks of the false prophets of the last hour, Jamajuda and Dabatul Arli. As we have seen, the reference to Sultan Rum (or Ngrum) arriving in Java with *sèh* from Arab lands can be traced back to the traditions of the Aji Saka tales and Jayabaya prophecies which held that the Ottoman sultan had organised the peopling and civilizing of Java (p. 153). Indeed, in the next chapter the reader will note references that the Ratu Adil himself was thought to have originated in Arab lands (p. 588). The return of the *haji* to the holy cities may also have had a connection with the tradition that the Javanese Just King should have two *kraton*, one in Java and one in Arabia (Wiselius 1892:188). The use of Sunan Bonang’s name was a direct allusion to the famous Sino-Javanese apostle of Islam or *wali* of the Demak period in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries who was considered to have played a crucial role in the spreading of Islam to central and east Java (Solicihin Salam 1963:35-8; De Graaf and Pigeaud 1974:48-50). Furthermore, the traditions concerning the *wali* had close links with the Ratu Adil; in one version of the Jayabaya prophecies the latter is described as ‘a descendant of the *wali*’ who would be raised as a priest-king, and in another as a *waliyullah*, a messenger of Allah (Brandes 1889:386-7; Wiselius 1892:188).

130 UBL, BPL 616 Port. 5 pt. 11, J.D. Kruseman (Yogyakarta) to Secretaris van Staat (Batavia), 14-1-1817.
131 AN, Besluit van den Secretaris van Staat der Gouverneur-Generaal, 14-3-1818 no. 6.
132 Because of strictures against representing The Prophet Muhammad, the legends of Amir Hamza are used in Java as surrogate tales about The Prophet himself, see further Petersen 1999:268, who points out that ‘Hamza legends in one form or another can be found in almost every culture that has had contact with Islam [and] their popularity is […] due to their capacity to incorporate local myths thereby making Islam more familiar and accessible’.
Second, in its practical aspects the Umar Mahdi affair seemed to be a microcosm of the events of Dipanagara’s rebellion. In both cases, an attack on Chinese merchants and tollgate keepers was regarded as a preliminary to the ‘purification’ of Java before the just rule of the Ratu Adil could be established. Moreover, the white tabards and multi-coloured turbans adopted by Dipanagara and his troops during the Java War (Carey 1981a:276-7 note 169) were also evident in the earlier movement. It is interesting too that the use of Javanese titles such as Radèn Mas alongside Umar Mahdi’s millenarian name was not considered incongruous. The same juxtaposition of aristocratic titles and Arabic holy war names was common during the Java War. The only significant difference was the timing. In 1825, most Javanese accounts state that the Ratu Adil was traditionally expected to declare himself in Sura, the first month of the Javanese year, rather than in Sapar, the second month, as was the case in Umar Mahdi’s uprising (Carey 1981a:261 note 108; Payen 1988:65, 120 note 161). The Javanese year was also different; Dipanagara announced his just King title in the spiritually significant seventh year – Wawu – of the Javanese eight-year Windu cycle (Appendix XIV), supposedly on the instructions of his spiritual adviser, Kyai Taptajani (p. 90), whereas Umar Mahdi made his pronouncement in the previous Bé year.

The Umar Mahdi affair was not the only millenarian movement to occur in Java in 1817. In July of that year, Nahuys received news from his colleague, the acting Resident of Semarang, H.A. Steijn Parvé (in office 1816-1819), to the effect that 4,000 Javanese had gathered at the Yogya village of Ketangga in the Madiun area, a place renowned in Javanese literature as the site where the Javanese Just King would establish himself. Coming from Madiun and other eastern outlying districts, including adjacent north coast territories (Chapter VI note 189), they had brought unhusked rice (padi) from the recent harvest and congregated at the village ‘because of an old prophecy that a new and mighty ruler would establish himself there’, a clear reference to the Ratu Adil. Although enquiries by Nahuys turned up no evidence that such a gathering had taken place, it seems hard to imagine that the bupati of Grobogan, who was the original source of the acting Resident’s report, could have conjured the event out of his imagination.

Two years’ later, a similar gathering was reported by the Resident of Pasuruan,134 J.C. Ellinghuijsen (in office 1818-1826), this time in the ‘forest of Ketangga’. This involved people from adjacent Yogya and Surakarta outlying districts, in particular Japan (Majakerta), Rawa (Tulung Agung) and Malang. They were said to have been summoned ‘to undertake a great work’ (gawé gedhé) – what the Dutch reports refer to in Malay as a pekerjaan besar – namely the establishment of a new ruler in Malang who would attack the adjacent

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134 The Resident of Pasuruan in the period 1816-1861 also had charge of the adjacent districts of Malang and Bangil, see Hageman 1864:253.
north coast districts of Surabaya, Bangil and Pasuruan, presumably to clear out the local Chinese and Europeans. As with the Umar Mahdi affair, the orders were said to emanate from the Ottoman sultan, who bore the title of ‘General above the wind’ (Jéndral ing atas angin) and who resided in Rum (Turkey). Ellinghuijsen reported that the main Chinese tollgate keeper in Kedhiri was sufficiently alarmed by the presence of an 80-strong band in neighbouring Rawa that he had taken the precaution of arming himself and his assistants. Although orders were said to have been given to the local Javanese officials to support the movement, none had done so. According to members of the Rawa group, who had made their way to Malang, Kyai Sidul Aku, a Gresik-based religious teacher was the chief instigator of the movement. He was said to reside in one of the kauman (firm Islamic communities) and specialised in instructing the local population in dhikr (short prayers for the glorification of Allah which are repeated in ritual order), practices which may have been linked to one of the mystical brotherhoods (tarekat) like the Nāqṣ̱abandiyā and Shafṭīrīyya which were popular in early nineteenth-century Java (pp. 111-4). But the sources are silent about his fate and whether or not he was ever apprehended by the Dutch authorities.

A remarkable glimpse into the mental world of two contemporary Javanese mystics can be seen in reports from the Surakarta Residency archive dating from 1819 and 1822. The first, which appears in the translations and legal proceedings of the Surakarta civil (pradata) and religious (surambi) courts for 17 February 1819, is the translation of the prophetic utterances of a certain Kyai Iman Sampurna – ‘the sage of perfect faith’ – who lived in a former Brahmin temple which he had turned into a mosque in the forest of Lodhaya, a place situated in the Surakarta mancanagara district of Sṛṇgat to the south of Kedhiri. Known, along with the Tengger highlands further to the east, as ‘heathen’ territory at this time with many of the local inhabitants still practising pre-Islamic religions (agama Buda) and belief systems (Winter 1902:35, 102 note 15), Lodhaya was an unusual area. Directly administered by the Sunan as part of his royal domain land (Rouffaer 1905:614 note 1), it was linked with various mystical beliefs, one of which was the appearance of men in the form of tigers. We will see how Kyai Iman Sampurna’s instruction made direct

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135 Kyai Sidul Aku was said to have had two places of residence: désa Blawi in the sub-district/district of Karangbinangun (Dumont 1931:63) and désa Selempit in the Benawan Jero district, Djj.Br. 62A, J.C. Ellinghuijsen (Pasuruan) to H.G. Nahuys van Burgst (Yogyakarta), 13-11-1819.

136 Kyai Sidul Aku’s dhikr included four described as panatagama (‘regulator of faith’), slamet bener (‘true safety’), kawin bathin (‘the marriage of the inner’) and dhikr sir (‘the wish dhikr’), Djj.Br. 62A, J.C. Ellinghuijsen (Pasuruan) to H.G. Nahuys van Burgst (Yogyakarta), 13-11-1819.

137 The only report on these events is in Djj.Br. 62A, J.C. Ellinghuijsen (Pasuruan) to H.G. Nahuys van Burgst (Yogyakarta), 13-11-1819.

138 On this so-called macan gadhungan (‘were-tiger’) phenomenon in which tigers are thought to harbour the souls of men at night, see Winter 1902:85, who also suggested that the belief was
reference to these practitioners of the *agama Buda* when he refers to the *wong jahil*, idol-worshippers and people without a revealed religion (note 144).

According to the Resident of Kedhu who arranged for the sage’s instruction to be translated by the Arabic-speaking *bupati* of Kedhu (note 140), Iman Sampurna hailed originally from the village of Ampél in Surabaya. He seems to have undertaken extensive pilgrimages to holy sites for the Resident described how he had often slept on Mount Lawu, home to the ‘king’ of the Javanese spirit world, Sunan Lawu. During one of his meditations on the mountainside he had received his instruction and had then gone to the forest of Lodhaya where he had turned a former Brahmin temple (*sanggar*) into a mosque. This became his overnight resting place. He also found a Javanese *gamelan* orchestra and a set of shadow-play puppets there – both usually regarded as quintessential symbols of pre-Islamic Javanese culture. He meditated, prayed and held religious ceremonies (*sedhekah*) at which consecrated food would be distributed to the local villagers, all of whom were supposed to be able to turn themselves into tigers (note 138). His temple residence was held in high reverence by these people, who believed that by means of offerings they could achieve riches and high official positions. None, however, dared approach the place alone for fear of being devoured by the tigers which guarded it. Sampurna was eventually inspired to make his instruction public giving orders to the locals to make copies on pain of being devoured by the same man-eaters which patrolled his residence. He seems to have been helped at this stage by various men of influence in Sréngat, most notably the local Surakarta joint *bupati*, Radèn Tumenggung Mertadiningrat, the district *pengulu* (senior religious official), Muhamad Besari, his son Kyai Soljak, and another respected teacher, Ajar Rawana alias Imanreja. All were found to have hidden copies of Sampurna’s instruction in their houses. After hearing news of the sage’s activities for several weeks, the Surakarta authorities in the person of the aged Sunan, Pakubuwana IV, and the Dutch Resident, Rijck van Prehn, decided to act. In mid-February, they ordered his arrest and that of the other men of religion. Mertadiningrat was dismissed. After being interrogated by the Resident, Iman Sampurna was handed over to the Surakarta *pengulu* who gave him to his son, a mosque official (*ketib*), for further intense occasioned by the sheer number of tigers in the area some of which became man-eaters. But in Javanese belief systems the tiger is also seen as a mystical animal linked with those adept in meditation and ascetic practices. See further Chapter II note 64; and Ricklefs 1993:60 on the many tigers in the Lodhaya area in the late seventeenth century.

139 S.Br. 131, F.E. Hardy, ‘Eenige berigten wegens de uitgever van dit geschrift [Iman Sampurna]’ (henceforth: Hardy, ‘Eenige berigten’), Magelang, 11-2-1819, in ‘Translaten en verbalen van den jaar 1816 tot 1819’ (henceforth: ‘Translaten en verbalen’), entry of 17-2-1819, states that Iman Sampurna had said that if anyone asked where he was from, they should ask at the house of Kyai Abdul Rahman of the village of Ampél in Surabaya. This is likely to have been situated in the Nyamplungun sub-district of Surabaya, Dumont 1931:32.
questioning. Considered highly dangerous, the authorities petitioned the governor-general to banish Iman Sampurna from Java and he was sent to Batavia to await a decision on his ultimate destination. At the same time, the Sunan gave orders to all senior court officials, village heads and members of the Surakarta religious establishment that whoever believed in Iman Sampurna’s prophecies or were found to have copies of his instruction in their houses would suffer the same punishment as the sage.

The second document in the Surakarta archive was the deposition of a wandering ascetic who had links with Lodhaya, Sunan Waliyullah (He who is made Lord, The Messenger of Allah), which, as we have seen, was another of the names of the Just King. His testimony, which is dated 15 February 1822, gives an insight into the peregrinations (lelana; p. 127) of a Javanese mystic just a few years after the Serat Centhini, the great compendium of Javanese history, prophetic lore and manners was completed in Surakarta. Arrested by the Surakarta bupati wedana of Kedhiri after he had been discovered gathering disciples around him during his journey through the eastern mancanagara, he was brought down to Surakarta along with four of his followers for cross-questioning. Idiosyncratic, inspired, and richly allusive all at once, Sunan Waliyullah’s testimony, along with Kyai Iman Sampurna’s instruction, provide yet another window on the millenarian expectations and sense of foreboding in the Javanese countryside on the eve of the Java War.

The fragment of the Javanese original of Sampurna’s instruction which has been preserved in the Surakarta archive opens as follows:

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140 S.Br. 131, ‘Eenige berigten’, 11-2-1819. Hardy appears to have obtained a translation from the pégon original from the bupati of Kedhu, Radén Tumenggung Danuningrat (also known as Sayyid Alwi; in office 1813-1825), who, as the son a sayyid (descendant of The Prophet; Carey 1992:439-40 note 203), was well versed in Javanese-Islamic literature and could read Arabic. He made a Malay translation which was then rendered into Dutch by Secretary of the Kedhu Residency F.G. Valck.


142 On the probable reworking of the Serat Centhini, and Serat Cabolang, the part of the Centhini which originated in the pasisir, written by carik Sutrasna and which deals with the pralambang or prophecies of Jayabaya, in AJ 1742 (AD 1814-1815) in Surakarta in the circle around the Surakarta Crown Prince, the future Pakubuwana V (reigned 1820-1823), see Pigeaud 1933:1-2.

143 UBL, BPL 616, Port. 22 pt. 4, H.G. Nahuys van Burgst (Surakarta) to G.A.G.Ph. van der Capellen (Batavia/Bogor), 18-2-1822, containing a report and proces verbaal of ‘Sunan Waliyullah’, from Pangérán Aria Cakradiningrat (Kedhiri) to H.G. Nahuys van Burgst (Surakarta), 15-2-1822. Cakradiningrat was an older cousin of Sunan Pakubuwana V (reigned 1820-1823), see S.Br. 129, ‘Naamlijst der bij Z.H. den Soesoehoenan [Pakubuwana V] dienst doende regenten en kliwons te Soerakarta’, 1820-23.
From °O° – This is a letter of proclamation from the sage of former times Iman Sampurna.

In the coming Javanese year Alip (AD 21 October 1819-8 October 1820), there will be a very great epidemic in Java from the place of the spirit Taragnyana. This is the instruction from the sage Iman Sampurna.

In the coming Javanese year Alip, there will be a very great epidemic from the western part. The army of the spirit Taragnyana will be like a mist; the forms will be various, some in the shape of poisonous millipedes, scorpions, snakes and tigers, all of whom will be venomous. The plague from the east will be brought by Nyai Rara Kidul and her army, Sunan Lawu and his army and all the spirits of Java. Various sorts of weapons will come from the east; some with weapons such as bodkins and augers, pikes, muskets, barbed pitch forks [and] halters. That is to say they will deal with everyone according to his kind, just as the heathen struck by the tahlil [confession of faith], arrogant people [will be] speared by pikes, for gamblers dice will be thrown by the spirits, arrogant people will be clawed by the spirits, greedy people will be destroyed by the spirits. After the epidemic has come, Java will become a sea of blood with drifting corpses. That which will be the [protector] charm of people who observe the five daily prayers and people who pray using dhikr; they both should have religious feasts [sedhekah] with balls of rice and count the helpers. He who is praised is the King of Religion. The meat must be chicken meat, the soup must be made from small grains of rice, the prayer must be one for warding off catastrophe and at the end of the religious feast, the plates must be covered by a yellow cloth. And, moreover, they must know the confession of the faith of the King of Religion. If they know it, every night it must be read 44 times. This is the inner knowledge: ‘I know of the confession of the faith of the Maintainer and Regulator of Religion; he who has the “spirit of relation”, who is in the centre of the heart, who is the kernel of life, who is the outer aspect of God, who faces towards God, whose shadow is [The Prophet] Muhammad, really a man in perfect form, blessed in this world and in the hereafter, Ya ‘Hu’ Ya Allah.’ That is the true instruction. Furthermore, the men and women of Java absolutely must observe the instruction of the religious scholars from the Kitab Musarar [the text of the prophecies of King Jayabaya]: ‘I seek the protection of Allah, the All-Seeing, the All-Knowing, from the cursed Satan. The pleasure of the world is nothing but vanity. Who calls besides Allah another god of whom he has no proof, he is accountable to his Lord; the unbelievers will not flourish. Say: “My Lord, forgive and have mercy, thou art the best of the merciful.”’

144 S.Br. 131, ‘Translaten en verbalen’, entry of 21-2-1819, proclamation of Iman Sampurna, 1819:

Saking °O° punika layang pituduh saking pandhita kang dhiihin-dhiihin Iman Sampurna.

Ba bésuk in taun Alip Tanah Jawa pageblug luwih gedhé saking anggèné aran dhemiti Taragnyana punika pituduh saking pandhita Iman Sampurna.

Bésuk ing taun Alip Tanah Jawa pageblug luwih gedhé saking kilènan aran dhemiti Teragnyana balané kaya pedhut warna-warna rupané sawenèh ana rupa kaya kelabang, kala-jengking, ula lan macan, iku padha ana dhuwèni upas sedaya. Anadéné pageblug kang saking wełan Nyai
Despite being one year out, the Iman Sampurna’s prophecies seemed to fo-
retell in graphic detail the coming of the first great Asiatic cholera epidemic
of May 1821 which reached Java from the west, namely from India by way of
Pulau Pinang and Melaka. He suggested ways whereby those who practised
the true faith as Javanese Muslims could ward it off. Written in pégon script –
the unvocalised Arabic script favoured by those steeped in Javanese-Islamic
literature (Chapter III) or who espoused the world view of the santri – the
proclamation contains much that would have resonated with members of the
Javanese mystical brotherhoods and with the community of religious scho-

lers. One thinks particularly here of the kyai’s reference to the need to hold
religious ceremonies at which food would be distributed (sedhekah), to recite
dhikr (litanies) and prayers, as well as to observe the prophetic beliefs as-
associated with the Kitab Musarar text ascribed to the real life twelfth-century

Roro Kidul sabalané, Sunan Lawu sabalané miwah dhemit Tanah Jawah sedaya. Warna-warana gegamané
kang saking wetan sawenéh ana gaman kaya uncek lan kaya jara, tumbuk, bedhul, canggha, dhadihug, iku
padha amadha sedaya maring wong jahil* padha katahihi, wong ladak padha katunbak, wong both padha
kabotoh dèning dhemit, wong dir padha kacakir dèning dhemit, wong murka padha sinnia dèning dhemit.
Sangartané** pageblug pulo Tanah Jawa dadi segara getih, sarah mayat. Déné ingkang dadi tambale wong
salat limang wektu lan wong muji dikir kalih wong padha sedhekahara segogolong ngêtung batur kang
dènmu Ratu Agama, ana déné iwké iwkak pitik, jangganané jangan menir, dongané tulak bilahi, wekasan
slanet, kalih malih ambengé ditutupi serbet kuning, kalih malih wajib angaweruhana ing sahadaté Ratu
Agama, lamon wersuh ing sahadat iku saben-saben wengi dènung batur wong jahil* padha sedhec
kang saking wétan sawenéh ana gaman kaya uncek lan kaya jara, wong ladak padha katahihi, wong

*Roro Kidul sabalané, Sunan Lawu sabalané miwah dhemit Tanah Jawah sedaya. Warna-warana gegamané
kang saking wetan sawenéh ana gaman kaya uncek lan kaya jara, tumbuk, bedhul, canggha, dhadihug, iku
padha amadha sedaya maring wong jahil* padha katahihi, wong ladak padha katunbak, wong both padha
kabotoh dèning dhemit, wong dir padha kacakir dèning dhemit, wong murka padha sinnia dèning dhemit.
Sangartané** pageblug pulo Tanah Jawa dadi segara getih, sarah mayat. Déné ingkang dadi tambale wong
salat limang wektu lan wong muji dikir kalih wong padha sedhekahara segogolong ngêtung batur kang
dènmu Ratu Agama, ana déné iwké iwkak pitik, jangganané jangan menir, dongané tulak bilahi, wekasan
slanet, kalih malih ambengé ditutupi serbet kuning, kalih malih wajib angaweruhana ing sahadaté Ratu
Agama, lamon wersuh ing sahadat iku saben-saben wengi dènung batur wong jahil* padha sedhec
kang saking wétan sawenéh ana gaman kaya uncek lan kaya jara, wong ladak padha katahihi, wong

* This refers to the Jāhilīyah, the time before the Arabs had a Prophet, as well as to idol-worship-
ners and people without a religion.

** This word is obscure, it may be a corruption of sakartané (Low Javanese/ngoko, sa-olehè), ‘after
it’s done [happened]’

*** This refers to the spirit of holiness – ṛūḥ al-Kudus, ṛūḥ idhāfī – which is discussed in detail in

**** Common prayer formula drawn from Qur’ānic phrases, including Qur’ān 3:185 (end),
12:117-8, verse numbers refer to official Cairo edition, Padwick 1961:83. I am grateful to the late
Professor G.W.J. Drewes for this reference.

I am grateful to the late Bapak Sastrasuganda of Daengan LOr III/31, Yogyakarta, for his translit-
eration of this pégon letter, and to Professor Merle Rickfles and Dr Johan Meulemann of Leiden for their
invaluable help on the translation and explanation of the original text.

145 S.Br. 4, A.J. Spaan, ‘Algemeen verslag der Residentie Soerakarta over het jaar 1887’, 3-1888,
specifically refers to the dhikr ‘ya hū, ya Allah’ as being regarded as dangerous at a time in the
1880s when the mystical brotherhoods (tarekat), especially the Nāqs ḍabāndīyya and the Qadari-
yyah, were gaining adherents and a tarekat-influenced peasant revolt was about to break out in
Banten. See further Sartono Kartodirdjo 1966:158-61. See further on dhikr hū which is said to be
recited in the soul with the affirmation being held constantly in mind, Johns 1957:29.
The power of prophecy

king of Kedhiri, Prabu Jayabaya (Chapter II note 4). The same amalgam can be seen in Dipanagara’s own Makassar manuscripts, in particular his reference to the ‘perfect man’ (insan kamil; Chapter III), which looms so large in the last part of Iman Sampurna’s instruction. We also know from a Dutch report written just a year after the outbreak of the Java War that belief in the Jayabaya prophecies was widespread and unshakeable both at the courts and amongst the wider network of men of religion of which Iman Sampurna was a part (Carey 1981a:lxiv note 122):

At the courts a prophecy exists [...] from a certain ruler Jayabaya that [...] a Javanese kraton cannot stand for longer than a hundred years. The rulers, courtiers, scholars and men of religion all have a deep respect and belief in this prophecy and are of the firm opinion that the term of the Yogyakarta court has been fulfilled and that of Surakarta will soon be ended. They are all the more confirmed in this conviction because, so they say, the prophecies have never failed.

We will return to the belief in the hundred year cycle later (p. 516). There is, however, an interesting link which Iman Sampurna made in his deposition to the Surakarta authorities (note 144) which has relevance to Dipanagara. He connected the coming of the Just King with the establishment of a monarch who would be a [Ratu] Paneteg Panatagama, a ‘Maintainer and Regulator of Religion’. This person, he stated, would be a ‘most winning personality, a true Mataram man’. Both these observations seem to suggest that Iman Sampurna might have had someone very much like Dipanagara in mind. Not only was he a prince of the royal Mataram line by virtue of his birth as the eldest son of the third sultan, but he also saw himself as a ‘Maintainer and Regulator of Religion’. This was a central aspect of his calling as a Just King as we will discover shortly (Carey 1974a:29; Chapter X).

Just three years after Iman Sampurna’s instruction came into the hands of the Surakarta authorities, a twenty-three year-old inhabitant of the Yogyakarta village of Karangnangka in Sokawati, who styled himself Sunan Waliyullah, turned up in Madiun. After wandering for three days in open fields around the capital of Yogyakarta’s eastern mancanagara, he set off for the southern districts of Rawa (Tulung-Agung) and Kalangbrêt, passing through Lodhaya en route. There he stole some clothes from the local mosque, the same place where Iman Sampurna had taken up residence. These garments, he later gave out, belonged to him as a descendant of the former ruling dynasty of Majapahit, shades again of the Serat Centhini epic whose scabrous heroes are depicted in similar guise as scions of the great east Javanese imperial house (Pigeaud 1933:189). One of the four followers whom Sunan Waliyullah gathered on his wanderings, reported that the young Sokawati-born Javanese had instructed him to read the Qur’ān and had promised him that he would make him invulnerable to sickness – the great cholera epidemic of May 1821 having just
occurred. But after ten days, his period of instruction was cut short by Sunan Waliyullah’s arrest in Kedhiri by the bodyguards of the Surakarta bupati wedana. His succinct deposition, drawn up in Surakarta on 15 February by the same mancanagara head, is only available in Dutch translation. It reads as follows:


Space does not permit a lengthy consideration of all the references in Sunan Waliyullah’s enigmatic deposition, which bears interesting comparison with that of Iman Sampurna. But certain themes stand out. First, there are his
long periods of bodily purification or tirakat. Besides meditation and prayer, he would probably have lived on water and white rice, a practice known in Java as amutih (existing on a ‘white’ food fast) or patigeni (asceticism). This was often embarked on by Javanese mystics who wished to acquire supernatural powers such as the ability to fly. Second, there are what may have been real life periods of study at the great religious school of Banjarsari in east Java, and his meetings with men of spiritual power in Javanese society such as the kris maker/blacksmith (empu) at Wanakerta – presumably a village in his home district of Sokawati – whom he refers to as his ‘grandfather’. Linked to these is his intriguing reference to his desire to see – and presumably meet with – Javanese workers and peasants. One thinks here of Dipanagara and his comment that he always helped to cut and plant padi (rice) as a way of popularising the ‘chiefs with the people’ (Chapter II). Sunan Walijullah was no chief like Dipanagara, but his desire to get close to the Javanese wong cilik (‘little people’) stands out in its social concern. Third, there are the professed encounters with the Javanese spirit world, in particular the ‘king of the spirits’ Sunan Lawu, whom Iman Sampurna had also sought out and been inspired by. A wind god of terrifying size whose voice was said to be like thunder, he usually manifested in gales and tempestuous storms (Ricklefs 2006:134). Fourth, there are the visits to places of historic importance, like the small pavilion (pondhok) of the ratu, possibly a reference to the grave site of Raden Rongga’s beloved consort, Ratu Maduretna, at Gunung Bancak, earlier styled Giripurna (p. 219), and Ketangga, which we have seen was closely linked with Javanese millenarian expectations of the Just King. Finally, his quest to be named as ruler over all the lands east of Mount Lawu harked back to an older Javanese concept of the division of the island between central and east Java. This was already evident in the rebellion (1718-1723) of Dipanagara’s early eighteenth-century namesake, the Kartasura Prince Dipanagara who took the ‘Èrucakra’ title147 of the Javanese messianic Just King and proclaimed himself ruler over all the lands east of Mount Lawu (Brandes 1889:371, 380; Olthof 1941b, II:332-3; Ricklefs 1993:180, 2006:92). According to the Babad Tanah Jawa (‘Chronicle of the Land of Java’), he later ‘disappeared’ at Lumajang in east Java148 when the tide of battle turned against him in order

not liable to death. Allah is my being and my presence, all of it conformable to the Messenger of Allah. From where do you hail man of a certain age [and] whom do you follow? I follow Raden Putra as my lord. You and I are as it were [no more than] containers the size of a pounded pepper-corn. I am Mbok Partimah [Fatima, the daughter of The Prophet also known as ‘Fāţima al-zahrā’ (Fatima ‘the comely’)], the winsomest lady in this world and the hereafter. Your innermost being is identical with mine. But be careful!’

147 Brandes (1889:399) translates this title as ‘jewel of the world’. It is equally possible that the cakra in the title refers to the solar-disc/discus weapon of Wisnu, the world preserver, see Plate 65 on pp. 598-9.

148 In fact, he was exiled to the Cape of Good Hope in July 1723 after the rebellion, which he had led with his brothers Blitar and Purbaya, was defeated by an alliance of Dutch (VOC) and Kartasura forces, Ricklefs 1993:180-82, 188-201, 2006:95.
to wait for a more appropriate moment for his task as Just King to be fulfilled (Brandes 1889:386-7; Olthof 1941b, II:360). Just over a century later, Pangéran Dipanagara of Yogyakarta would take up the Kartasura prince’s mantle.

The crisis in the Javanese countryside, the cholera epidemic of 1821 and Pangéran Dipasana’s revolt

During the five years which elapsed between the Umar Mahdi affair of January 1817, and the arrest of Sunan Waliyullah in Kedhiri in February 1822, agrarian conditions in south-central Java appear to have deteriorated rapidly. Some of the evidence for this we have already considered in connection with the impact of the tollgates and problems in Kedhu, to which we will return shortly in connection with Pangéran Dipasana’s abortive February 1822 revolt. Conditions were compounded by a run of poor rice harvests and a crisis in the indigenous sugar industry. Writing in 1820, Nahuys pointed out that although commerce and cultivation seemed to have been increasing with more woodland being converted into wet-rice fields, the state of the Javanese sugar industry had precipitated a short-term production crisis. In his view, the industry was too old-fashioned, particularly in Yogya, relying as it did on charcoal furnaces and wooden cylinders for boiling sugar, as well as power from draught animals rather than water.149 In the rush to capitalise on high international prices for sugar in 1819-1820, too much land had been converted from sawah to sugar production with the result that when sugar prices collapsed in 1821-1822,150 the price of rice – which had been climbing since 1818 – did not come down (Appendix X).

Although the temporary difficulties in the sugar industry were eventually overcome by the introduction of more modern equipment and the use of water power, rice prices remained stubbornly high (Appendix X). The situation was exacerbated in 1821 when the harvest failed in many areas due to an unusually long drought in the early months of the year. Farmers were

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149 AvJ, H.G. Nahuys van Burgst (Yogyakarta) to P.H. Lawick van Pabst (Surabaya), 17-2-1818; H.G. Nahuys van Burgst (Yogyakarta) to G.A.G.Ph. van der Capellen (Batavia/Bogor), 12-7-1820. On the working of the indigenous sugar industry at this time and the role of the Chinese in boiling sugar cane syrup in large woks, see Residentie Kadoe 1871:102-3; Knight 1975:322-4; Fasseur 1977:284. For an unfavourable comparison of the Javanese sugar industry with that of Mauritius, see IOL, Eur F148/4 (Raffles-Minto collection, vol. 4), T.S. Raffles (Melaka) to Lord Minto (Calcutta), 24-1-1811, 10-2-1811. On the buying up of iron for the construction of sugar factories in Surakarta, see S.Br. 37:1073, Raden Adipati Cakranagara (Surakarta) to Kyai Adipati Sura-adimanggala IV (Semarang), 6-5-1812. The crisis in the sugar industry in 1821, which led to a sharp fall in sugar prices and a temporary halt in production, is mentioned in Residentie Kadoe 1871:103.

150 AvJ, H.G. Nahuys van Burgst (Yogyakarta) to G.A.G.Ph. van der Capellen (Batavia/Bogor), 12-7-1820; Baud 91, P. le Clercq, ‘Copie-verslag Kadoe’, 30-3-1824, 36 (on low prices for Kedhu and Bagelen sugar in 1822); Residentie Kadoe 1871:103 (on collapse in sugar prices in 1821).
encouraged to plant potatoes and other root crops, but it was hardly realistic to expect that this would bring a solution to the crisis in rice production. Writing in April 1821 after nearly four months without a drop of rain, the local Dutch overseer (opziener) of cultivations in southern Pacitan reported that his district was ‘a very dismal sight’ with many ricefields unworkable for lack of water and those that had been planted drying out quickly under the parching wind from the sea (Kern 1908:162, 173-4; Carey 1986:123 note 237). In June 1821, the first Asiatic cholera epidemic struck Pacitan causing many fatalities amongst the already weakened population; every day farmers had to be pulled from the pepper and coffee estates dead from exhaustion and fever (Carey 1986:123 note 238). By November of the same year, the overseer was writing of the ‘total demoralization’ of the local work force, many of whom, especially those without access to irrigated rice lands and most at risk from famine and disease, were eking out a miserable existence on roots and leaves (Carey 1986:123 note 239). Neither bribes nor physical coercion, such as the whip lashes to the face and buttocks administered to recalcitrant village officials who reneged on their labour obligations, could keep sufficient workers in the estate fields. Whole villages moved to adjacent areas controlled by the courts to avoid such forced labour, and the population of government lands declined by nearly ten percent in the space of just two years (1819-1821; Kern 1908:166, 173; Carey 1981a:293 note 243, 1986:124 note 240). Little revival took place before the end of the Java War.

When it came, the Asiatic cholera epidemic of April-August 1821 was every bit as terrible as Kyai Iman Sampurna had predicted in his February 1819 instruction. In Java, it struck a ‘virgin population’ who had no inbuilt immunity to the disease (Boomgaard 1983:13). Nahuys, at the time acting Resident of Surakarta, recalled the lethal virulence of the cholera attacks with many people succumbing in the Sunan’s capital after only a few hours and some even falling dead on the spot as though felled by an apoplectic fit (Nahuys van Burgst 1858:123-4). Brought by sailors from Pulau Pinang and Melaka, where it had broken out in late 1819, the epidemic first manifested itself in the Malay kampung (urban quarter) of Torbaya in Semarang. In the last week of April 1821, 1,225 people died (Muller 1832:2-3). By early May, the disease had spread along the entire north coast of Java with the most devastating attacks occurring in the colonial capital, Batavia (156 reported deaths a day at the height of the epidemic) and Surabaya (76 reported deaths a day in mid-June; Muller 1832:3). The main wave of the disease appears to have spent itself by early August, but in some parts of east Java, serious outbreaks persisted until the end of the year, especially in Surabaya, Madura, and the eastern

151 ‘S.Br. 170, Handelingen van den Resident van Soerakarta 1821’, entry of 20-6-1821 (on Surakarta inhabitants being urged to plant potatoes and other root crops). See further Winter 1902:49 (on consumption of tubers, leaves and forest fruits at times of harvest failure).
salient (Oosthoek), where a total of 110,000 people or seven percent of the population are estimated to have succumbed (Carey 1986:133 note 288). The number of fatalities in inland districts appear to have been slightly lower, although in Surakarta during the worst phase of the epidemic in late June about seventy deaths a day were reported (Muller 1832:4; Nahuys van Burgst 1858:123; Carey 1986:133 note 289). The situation was exacerbated by the exceptionally dry weather and prolonged drought, the scarcity and expense of all foodstuffs, and the fact that the epidemic was at its height during the fasting month (Puwasa; 23 May-22 June 1821) when resistance to disease on the part of the population at large was probably lower. Nahuys as acting Resident of Surakarta even issued a letter of instruction to the local inhabitants not to fast because of the cholera epidemic (Carey 1986:133 note 290), but whether it was heeded is unclear. We know that the newly installed Sunan, Pakubuwana V (reigned 1820-1823), took his own precautions by dispatching a group of Surakarta court santri to the north coast to clean the graves of the ancestors and spiritual guardians of the Mataram dynasty and its south-central Javanese successor states, and to pray for their intercession.¹⁵²

For the lucky ones who survived, the memory of those terrible hot months of 1821 must have been profoundly disturbing. The virulence of the disease and its manifestation at one of the holiest and most religiously intense periods of the year must have betokened to many an upheaval in the natural order, a time of cosmic disturbance, what in the Javanese shadow-play is known as the gara-gara (commotion in nature) and in Javanese millenarian literature as the ‘time of wrath’ – the jaman kala-bendu. This would inevitably precede the coming of the Just King who would institute an age of justice and plenty and whose coming would be heralded by natural portents and disasters (Brandes 1889:374; Carey 1986:131 note 279). We will see in the next chapter how the famine and cholera pandemic of 1821 would be followed just a year later by the massive eruption of Mount Merapi, the volcano overlooking Yogyakarta, which many in the sultanate saw as a potent omen of coming change.

It was against the background of these events that a series of local uprisings occurred in south-central Java in late January and February 1822. The instigator of these movements was a son of the first sultan, Pangéran Dipasana, who, according to Dipanagara, was a small, crippled man who had suffered from a form of mental sickness since childhood and whose heart was set on evil.¹⁵³ Apparently skilled at augury and well versed in primbon (divination

¹⁵² S.Br. 170, ‘Handelingen van den Resident van Soerakarta, 1821’, entry for 24-5-1821. For references to court-sponsored pilgrimages to the grave of Sunan Amangkurat I (reigned 1646-1677) at Tegalarum and other holy sites on the north coast, see further Chapter IV note 18; Carey 1980:171.

¹⁵³ BD (Manado), II:283, XIX (Sinom) 25-6. déné langkung boten rukun/ Pangéran Dipasana/ répot jompo lawan alit/ lan kelangkung kang manah remen maksiyat. 26. nanging ragi gerah mansah/ duk kala tinturirék/ marna datan linegêwa.
manual) literature, he attempted to use his contacts in the spirit world to further his aims against the Dutch and the Chinese, and to replace the fourth sultan on the throne of Yogya. Through the intermediary of a Surakarta adventurer named Jakamulya, who later took the title of Bendara Radèn Mas Sinduratmaja, he recruited the help of various robber chiefs in Kedhu and a wandering female dhukun (clairvoyant, magic practitioner), Embok Kajèn (alias Embok Kertamenggala), who styled herself as Radèn Ayu Guru. Her daughter became Sinduratmaja’s partner. Two simultaneous uprisings were planned: one in southern Kedhu around Bendha, a tax-free village set aside for religious scholars (ulama) renowned for its finely woven mats, and another to the south of Yogya at Gadching Temahan and Lipura, the latter being a place of considerable historical significance for would-be pretenders to the throne of Mataram and its successors (pp. 154-5). Dipasana’s plan was to draw troops away from Yogya by the initial uprising in Kedhu, and then fall on the sultan’s capital (Nahuys van Burgst 1852:134). But his strategy failed. Support from local officials was limited and the Dutch were able to

154 B.Ng. II:87, XXIII.14-16, describes him as pinandhita nujum (skilled at augury), and ‘married’ to a female spirit, Dèwi Kenangsari, the daughter of the spirit ruler of Mount Merapi, Sapu Jagad, on whom see further De Graaf 1958:129-30; Ricklefs 1974a:404 no. 89. Dipasana’s contacts with the Javanese spirit world – such as his pleas to an invisible protector spirit who lived in a jackfruit (nangka) tree and his imprecations to Ratu Kidul for the success of his uprising and the slaughter of all Europeans in Kedhu and Yogya – are also mentioned in Nahuys van Burgst 1852:180. He was born in circa 1778 and bore the childhood name of Bendara Radèn Mas Suramar before assuming his princely title on 14 March 1795. He married a sister of Radèn Rongga Prawiradirja II, bupati wedana of Madiun (in office 1784-1790, 1794-1796; Appendix Vb) on 25 December 1795, Dj.Br. 85, W.H. van IJsseldijk (Yogyakarta) to P.G. van Overstraten (Semarang), 14-3-1795, 25-12-1795. A priombok manuscript (IOL Jav 42) belonging to him is in the British Library, Ricklefs and Voorhoeve 1977:63. There is also a Puja Kusuma romance, bearing a eulogy to Dipasana, in the Berlin Staatsbibliothek (Berlin SB M5 quart. 359), see Pigeaud 1975:212-3.

155 Ministerie van Koloniën 2776, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal in rade, 2-4-1822 no. 3; B.Ng. II:90-3, XXV.11-25; Dj.Br. 65, ‘Inkomende stukken Djokjo 1e en 2e kwartaal 1822’, Pieter le Clercq (Magelang) to H.G. Nahuys van Burgst (Yogyakarta), 24-2-1822, refers to the Javanese woman ‘Simanggala’ also known as ‘Radèn Ayu Guru’. See also Ministerie van Koloniën 2776, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal in rade, 2-4-1822 no. 3, where Radèn Ayu Guru is referred to as ‘Embok Kertamenggala’. Nahuys van Burgst 1852:180, likewise mentions the ‘sly dukun’ who advised Dipasana.

156 On Radèn Ayu Guru’s daughter, Bok Loro, who was later picked up along with her husband by the Assistant-Resident of Yogya, F.F.H. Chevallier, at the village of Kinhèlan 20 kilometres from Yogya in June 1825, see Dj.Br. 11, ‘Register inhoudende korte aantekeningen der dagelyksche bevelen en verrigtingen van den Res. van Jokjkarta, tweede trimester 1825’, entry of Saturday, 25-6-1825. She was ordered to reside in Yogya and placed under surveillance. Her husband was sent back to Surakarta.

157 Local officials who rallied to Sinduratmaja included Radèn Ngabèhi Kartawijaya, temporary demang of Menorèh and Radèn Ngabèhi Wiryawijaya (alias Mertawijaya), bekel of Bendha. He escaped capture in February 1822 and joined Dipanagara in 1825, Carey 1976, 1981a:266 note 123. Another local Kedhu official who rallied to Dipanagara and appears to have been sympathetic to Sinduratmaja’s revolt was Radèn Ngabèhi Jayabrata, the dismissed penatus of Tinggol in Menorèh district, Bataviasche Courant 42, 7-6-1827.
overcome Sinduratmaja’s 27-28 January 1822 movement without recourse to reinforcements from Yogya. Sinduratmaja’s followers had begun by massing at the village of Warayu near Bojong in the Temanggung district of northern Kedhu and breaking the bridge over the Kali Elo to prevent reinforcements being brought in from Semarang to defend the district capital, Magelang. They attacked local Chinese merchants and European officials, murdering a Chinese tollgate keeper at Brayut and killing the acting Dutch secretary of the Kedhu Residency, Schnetz, whom they had ambushed. A European estate overseer was also severely wounded. But the Resident of Kedhu, Pieter le Clercq, moved quickly using his own 150-strong mounted constabulary (Jayèng Sekar; Chapter I) and summoning a squadron of European hussars from Semarang who arrived in Kedhu on 28 January. This was enough to turn the tide. With the assistance of Nahuys and members of his Residency bodyguard and Javanese dragoons, the ringleaders were captured at the village of Menayu near the great Hindu-Buddhist temple complex of Barabadur and Mendhut after being betrayed by one of their circle. The rest were put to flight.158 Some of those who escaped made their way over the Menorèh mountain passes into eastern Bagelèn. There they continued to harass Chinese tollgate keepers and cloth traders in the weaving settlements of Wedhi, Jana and Ungaran, killing a Chinese merchant in the last place and forcing the rest to barricade themselves in their houses. Despite heavy rains, Nahuys, still accompanied by his small force and now assisted by two European landrenters, William Stavers and Joseph Donatiën Boutet (notes 54, 60 and 80), the first a former sepoy officer with extensive military experience, was able to follow up this remnant of Sinduratmaja’s group. Their ringleader, Sudik Iman, was captured and hanged at Ungaran on 20 February.159 After this, Dipasana’s own uprising in Yogya collapsed quickly around Lipura in early February. He was brought to Yogya to suffer the usual death penalty reserved for members of the ruling family, namely garrotting by white cotton cloth (Chapter VII note 118). But the fourth sultan did not want his aged uncle done to death in his capital and asked that the sentence be carried out elsewhere. Nahuys suggested the prince be sent to Magelang to face a firing squad. After all, in Nahuys’ view, his rebellion had broken out there and his public execution would serve as a ‘lesson for the Javanese chiefs in this valuable Residency’,

158 B.Ng. II:97-100, XXVI.32-XXVII.29; Dj.Br. 19¹¹, Summary of Yogya Residency letters, 1814-25, R.C.N. d’Abo (Yogyakarta) to H.F. Lippe (Surakarta), 29-1-1822; Ministerie van Koloniën 2464, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal buiten rade, 7-2-1822 no. 7, 9-2-1822 no. 3, 13-2-1822 no. 9, 16-2-1822 no. 6, 16-2-1822 no. 10; Ministerie van Koloniën 2776, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal in rade, 19-3-1822, 2-4-1822 (stating that the ringleaders were given away by Amad Petaja of Menayu); Nahuys van Burgst 1852:101. The locations of Bojong in Temanggung district and Menayu in the Mendhut sub-district of southern Kedhu are given in Dumont 1931:66, 231.

159 Ministerie van Koloniën 2776, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal in rade, 7-3-1822 no. 34; Nahuys van Burgst 1852:101-2; Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:73.
but he was overruled by Governor-General Van der Capellen who, out of consideration for the great loyalty and services of the sultan, commuted his sentence to banishment for life in Ambon.\textsuperscript{160} This commutation was also extended to his twenty-three followers, one of whom, Dul (Abdul) Gang Singh, appears to have been a Bengali sepoy deserter (p. 429). Their death sentences were set aside. Instead, they were ordered to be branded, put in chains and exiled to Bangka for terms of hard labour ranging from ten to twenty years.\textsuperscript{161} Sinduratmaja, who was given a ten-year sentence, appears to have escaped his captors, for he is described being picked up with Radèn Ayu Guru’s daughter in the Yogya area in June 1825 (note 156).

The events of January-February 1822 were the most serious disturbances to trouble the reign of the fourth sultan. In many respects, they could be classified as a traditional revolt by a member of the sultan’s family against the royal authority. As we have seen (Chapters I and III), the use of local bandit leaders and criminal elements was a typical way of gathering support for members of the kraton elite. The assumption of titles of nobility such as Bendara Radèn Mas and Radèn Ayu by the low-born Sinduratmaja and his mother-in-law, Bok Kajèn (Radèn Ayu Guru), were also part of this tradition as noted above in connection with the Umar Mahdi movement of January 1817. Yet, despite these traditional elements, the strength of popular hatred against the Chinese and Europeans was a portent of the times. Indeed, according to the Yogya chronicle, Jayabaya style prophecies foretelling the end of European rule in Java even played some part in the affair.\textsuperscript{162} Again, it can be said that Dipasana’s revolt constituted an important forerunner of Dipanagara’s own great rebellion three years later. It was certainly no coincidence that in July 1825, a massive popular uprising took place against the Europeans and the Chinese in southern Kedhu, precisely the area which had been at the epicentre of Sinduratmaja’s uprising three years previously (Van der Kemp 1896a:388; Carey 1981a:266-7 note 123). Despite his reservations about Dipasana’s character, Dipanagara also appears to have gone out of his

\textsuperscript{160} Ministerie van Koloniën 2776, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal in rade, 19-3-1822 no. 11, decision to exile Pangéran Dipasana to Ambo; Ministerie van Koloniën 2469, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal buiten rade, 2-3-1823 no. 8, acknowledging letter from Resident of Surabaya reporting that Dipasana, accompanied by four people including a child, presumably Dipasana’s daughter who may have subsequently married in Ambon (see note 161), had sailed on the brig ‘Aurora’ from Surabaya on 17 February 1823.

\textsuperscript{161} AN, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal, 19-3-1822 no. 11. One of Dipasana’s daughters is supposed to have married the exiled Surakarta Sunan, Pakubuwana VI (reigned 1823-1830), a strong supporter of Dipanagara in 1825, interview with B.P.H. Djatikoesoemo, Jakarta, 23-4-1977. There is no confirmation of this and it seems more likely that the exiled Surakarta prince, Mangkubumi (Chapter VIII), who overlapped by one year with Dipasana in Ambon, was the bridegroom. Mangkubumi eventually returned to Surakarta in 1824 and died there two years later, Winter 1902:30.

\textsuperscript{162} B.Ng. II:90, XXV.4.
way to honour members of the exiled prince’s family by investing a number of his brothers with the title of Pangéran in the first few months of the war and giving them military commands close to the southern Kedhu border in December 1825 (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:487).

Events at the courts in the last years of Pakubuwana IV and Hamengkubuwana IV’s reigns

Whilst these events were taking place in the south-central Javanese countryside, life in the kraton had not stood still. On Sunday, 4 October 1818, the revision and renewed codification of four of the most important Javanese law codes in the princely territories was completed when the chief ministers of the two courts met in Klatèn for their ratification (Winter 1902:123-5; Rouffaer 1905:637-43; Soeripto 1929:121-6). The law codes in question were the Angger Ageng (‘Great Law Code’), regulating relations between Surakarta and Yogya subjects, the Angger Arubiru (‘Law on Disturbing the Peace’), covering land claims between the courts (Ricklefs 1974a:161-5), and two codes which affected Surakarta alone: the Angger Sepuluh (‘Agrarian Law Code’) and Nawala Pradata (regulation of the law courts). Although the Angger Sepuluh had been partially codified in 1771, it was not until 1818 that it received its great enlargement as an agrarian law code (Rouffaer 1905:627, 638). As we have seen, it was also modified at this time – perhaps under Nahuys’ influence – to facilitate the increase in land-rent and to give the European and Chinese renters the same rights as Javanese apanage holders. But these developments were soon overshadowed in Surakarta by various plots and administrative scandals. Since Pinket van Haak, the beau garçon Resident with his serial mistresses, had been transferred to Pekalongan in April 1817 following a quarrel with the commander of the Surakarta garrison, Lieutenant-Colonel Le Sueur (Van der Kemp 1913:231-2), the situation in Surakarta had been very fluid. Van Haak had been succeeded by the sixty-one year old Wouter Hendrik van IJsseldijk who died in post scarcely a month after taking up his appointment in May 1817.163 For nearly a year after this the Residency was left in the hands of the Assistant-Resident, Hendrik Ferdinand Lippe (1783-1822), and the official translator, J.W. Winter. In January 1818, Daendels’ former military adjutant, Rijck van Prehn (1779-1843) (De Josselin de Jong 1945:219-33), was appointed as Resident, but, as we have seen, he proved himself quite outstandingly corrupt even by the lax official standards of the day and on 3 March 1820 he was dismissed along with the Residency translator for sitting on cases in the Sunan’s court in which he had a pecuniary interest. Even though the Dutch East Indies Company had

163 Ministerie van Koloniën 2437, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal buiten rade, 14-3-1817 no. 25; AvS, D.W. Pinket van Haak (Surakarta) to Commissioners-General (Batavia), 15-4-1817; Appendix IX.
long ceased to exist, this could be seen as the last *ancien régime* trial in the style of the old VOC involving as it did former Company personnel such as Winter (Winter 1902:17-20).

The absence of a responsible Resident for a long period and the very public humiliation of Van Prehn created an uneasy and unfavourable atmosphere in the Sunan’s capital. Partly as a result of this, a number of intrigues continued to flourish in the aftermath of the 1815 sepoy conspiracy (Chapter VIII). One such incident centred around the somewhat curious figure of Radèn Singgunkara, who styled himself as ‘Radèn Kaap’ – the nobleman from the Cape – because as a great-grandson of the exiled Pangéran Arya Mangkunagara (Chapter VIII note 213) he had been brought up in the former Dutch colony of the Cape of Good Hope.\(^{164}\) In 1816, with the Cape colony now a decade under British rule, he had returned to Java speaking fluent Cape Dutch and giving out that because of political developments in Europe, Java would shortly be taken back by the British.\(^{165}\) He seems to have enjoyed great influence in the *kraton* and developed close contacts with the Surakarta garrison commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Le Sueur, whom he befriended through taking service as his cook.\(^{166}\) It was this same officer who was at loggerheads with the Resident, Pinket van Haak, and intriguing to have himself appointed in his place (Van der Kemp 1913:30, 230-1, 231 note 2).

The uncertain aftermath of the Van Prehn affair may have convinced Pakubuwana IV that he should take the opportunity to repudiate the treaty he had previously signed with the British government in August 1812 (Chapter VIII). The fact that the returned Dutch government had made it quite clear to the court that its provisions would remain in force was conveniently ignored (Chapter X note 151). He did this soon after he learnt of Van Prehn’s exile from Surakarta on 11 February 1820 when his case was still being heard in the Dutch supreme court sitting exceptionally in Semarang, sending his chief minister to tell the astonished Assistant-Resident that the governor-general had allowed him to take back all the rights he had previously enjoyed under the

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\(^{164}\) UBL, BPL 616, Port. 5 pt. 7, D.W. Pinket van Haak (Surakarta) to Commissioners-General (Batavia), 22-1-1817; Van der Kemp 1913:233 note 4. See further Ricklefs 1974a:109, 287-8.

\(^{165}\) On Radèn Kaap’s garbled version of European politics, which he presented to the Surakarta court, see UBL, BPL 616 Port. 5 pt. 7, D.W. Pinket van Haak (Surakarta) to Commissioners-General (Batavia), 22-1-1817. This involved a dispute between the Russian tsar, Alexander I (reigned 1801-1825), and the British over the French throne which the tsar was supposed to have suggested should be offered to King William I of the Netherlands and which the British opposed, thus threatening war between Britain and Holland in Europe and opening the way for a new British attack on Java, see further pp. 734-5. A similar rumour was related by W.H. van IJsseldijk when he was serving as special envoy to the courts in August-September 1816, Baud 306, Van IJsseldijk, ‘Rapport’, 11-12-1816, 11, stating that the British had spread the word in Surakarta and other places in Java that the return of the island to the Dutch was entirely dependant on British goodwill and that in two to three years’ time they would be returning.

VOC before the end of the Batavian Republic (1795-1806). This was an imaginative interpretation of a letter recently received from Van der Capellen, the translation of which had been conveniently ‘disappeared’ from the Residency archive.\footnote{UBL, BPL 616, Port. 6 pt. 13, H.F. Lippe (Surakarta) to Algemeen Secretaris (J.C. Baud) (Bataavia/Bogor), 11-2-1820, 25-2-1820; Nahuys van Burgst 1852:93-6.} If we can believe the ever boastful Nahuys, it was only his sudden appearance as acting Resident of Surakarta in early March which caused the Sunan to rescind his order (Nahuys van Burgst 1835-6, I:24-30, 1852:93-6; Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:73). But the affair provided yet another indication that the Surakarta court – or at least the incorrigible Pakubuwana IV – had never given up the hope that the political structure of the pre-Daendels period could be re-established (Chapters VII and VIII). It was, however, the Sunan’s last political act. On 1 October 1820, after suffering from a severe bout of diarrhoea,\footnote{This had apparently exacerbated an existing asthmatic condition, which manifested in a tightness of the chest and fevers, S.Br. 122, Nahuys van Burgst, ‘Verhaal van de ziekte, afsterven en begrafenis van Z.H. den Soesoehoenan van Soerakarta’ (henceforth: Nahuys, ‘Verhaal’), 1-10-1820; Nahuys van Burgst 1821:298.} he died. He was fifty-four. Sensing that his life was at an end, he had apparently refused all Nahuys’ offers of medical assistance from the Residency doctor until he was on his deathbed (Nahuys 1821:298). According to Javanese tradition, his passing had been foretold over a year earlier by the invisible bird *malar munga*, whose piercing night-time cry, heard at the royal graveyard at Imagiri, presaged the demise of Javanese rulers.\footnote{S.Br. 131. ‘Translaten en verbalen’, Radèn Panji Suradilaga (Surakarta) to Radèn Adipati Sasradingrat II (Surakarta), 5 Dulkangidah AJ 1746 (AD 27-8-1819), reporting that the jurukunci of Jimatan (Imagiri), Mas Mangkuwijaya, had reported the invisible bird’s loud shrieks above the grave of a former sultan of Cirebon – Sultan Sepuh – just east of the village of Genilaya in a very old durian tree at three o’clock on the morning of 4 Dulkangidah AJ 1746 (AD 26-8-1819). On the *malar munga* belief, see Winter 1902:74, 161 note 59; Lettres de Java 1829:99. See further Chapter IV note 23.170} He left behind fifty-six children by two official and twenty-six unofficial wives, and 146 grandchildren (Padmasusastra 1902:159-68). His eldest son, who had a reputation as a great lover of women, money, horses and Javanese literature – probably in that order – succeeded him on 10 October.\footnote{Nahuys 1821:298-300, is a published account of Pakubuwana IV’s death and burial, which Nahuys had originally written as a report for the Governor-General, S.Br. 122, ‘Verhaal’, 1-10-1820. This almost certainly drew on original material from J.W. Winter (1902:74), which was used without acknowledgement. See further Chapter X note 2. On Pakubuwana V’s character, see De Salis, ‘Pro Memorie’, 8-5-1828; Hageman 1856:25; Winter 1902:39, who wrote that ‘he was in all respects shrewder [than Pakubuwana IV], and didn’t let people hoodwink him. But [he was] covetous, viewing money as a fountain-head of temporal welfare. He was very strict, proud, and exceedingly amorous’. His reputation as a lover is also mentioned in Dj.Br. 48, J.G. van den Berg (Surakarta) to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 6-9-1803, referring to the fact that one of his ‘concubines’ (*selir*) was pregnant and the young prince *wat veel naar de vrouwen begint te zien* (‘is taking a lot of interest in women’). His love of horses is mentioned by the French land-renter, J.D. Boutet, see KITLV H 788, Boutet, ‘Memorandum on Surakarta’, 1821.}
Meanwhile, in Yogya the period after Dipasana’s abortive revolt in February 1822 witnessed a revival of the old intrigues and quarrelling which had so poisoned relations between Dipanagara and the court. In his babad, Dipanagara remarked that these caused him deep pain, but one incident in particular raised tensions to breaking point. This involved the document, mentioned earlier (Chapter VII note 236), written by Dipanagara’s father, the third sultan, which may have recognised his eldest son’s rights to the Yogya throne and which had already been the subject of an altercation between the prince and his stepmother at the time of the dispute over the appointment of new police officials. According to the prince, the fourth sultan came out to Tegalreja sometime in late 1822 to ask for this document which Dipanagara had preserved in his personal archive together with all the other political agreements relating to the British period, including the 12 June 1812 secret treaty (Chapter VII note 235). The document was apparently handed over to the sultan by Dipanagara under the strict injunction that it should be kept safely. According to various accounts, however, the young ruler burnt it shortly afterwards to destroy any evidence which could be compromising to his own position. The prince did not find out about this until nine months after the sultan’s death in December 1822, when he wrote to the queen mother – then styled Ratu Ageng – to ask for the document as a guideline for the guardians of the child sultan, Hamengkubuwana V, of which he was one (Van der Kemp 1896a:335-7; pp. 62, 545). The prince’s reaction was said to have been one of extreme anger which later precipitated his refusal to continue to perform his guardianship duties and led to his complete break with the kraton. Thus, one of the last acts of the fourth sultan’s reign had disastrous consequences for the future.

Shortly afterwards, on 6 December 1822 in the mid-afternoon the young monarch died after returning to the kraton from a tour of one of his country estates (pesanggrahan). The manner of his death was extremely violent – he appears to have succumbed to a sudden fit while eating – and his body immediately swelled up, an indication, some contemporaries thought, that he had...
been poisoned.\textsuperscript{175} But there is nothing in the sources to confirm this. In fact, it seems that his corpulence, love of highly spiced food and excessive exertions in the saddle had brought on a heart attack at the remarkably young age of eighteen.\textsuperscript{176} His indulgent lifestyle – encouraged by the likes of Nahuys and his assistant, R.C.N. d’Abo – had brought him to an early grave. He could be seen as the first royal victim of the inexorable westernising tide which had swept over the south-central Javanese courts in the aftermath of the Dutch restoration in 1816. And he would not be alone. The fourth sultan’s own son, who reigned as Hamengkubuwana V (1822-1826, 1828-1855), was already a syphilitic wreck in his twenties due to over-indulgences in alcohol and women in part encouraged by unscrupulous European merchants and suppliers in Yogya (Houben 1994:154, 200-2).

Conclusion

So ended the reign of Dipanagara’s younger brother. It closed a lamentable chapter in Yogya’s history. Within the kraton, the incipient rivalry between Dipanagara and the group around the queen mother was rapidly hardening into open conflict. A complete rift was only months away. Meanwhile, the return of the Dutch in August 1816 had greatly accelerated the processes begun by the British. One of the most important of these was the integration of Java into the global market and the opening of the island’s interior to western private capital. The arguments over the land-rent reflected deep doubts on the part of Van der Capellen’s administration over the long-term benefits of the latter. This would result in his decision to prohibit the leasing of land to private European and Chinese investors in May 1823. But in the short term, as we will see in the next chapter, this would create more problems than it solved. At the same time, his administration’s insatiable demand for revenue, coupled with what Raffles had correctly surmised as a ‘hankering af-

\textsuperscript{175} KB, Cornets de Groot private collection, IXe pt. 4, 41, A.D. Cornets de Groot Jr (Yogyakarta) to A.D. Cornets de Groot Sr (Gresik), 6-12-1822; KITLV Or 13 (Buku Kedhung Kebo):30-2, II.29-36; BD (Manado), II:289, XIX.44; Hageman 1856:29-30; Van der Kemp 1896a:311-2. Dipanagara later gave credence to these rumours by observing to Captain J.J. Roeps, one of the two Dutch officers who accompanied him from Magelang to Batavia in late March/early April 1830, ‘’When he [Hamengkubuwana IV] died he swelled up in a horrible manner.” “Then he was certainly poisoned,” said Captain Roeps, whereupon Dipanagara, without the least emotion and continuing in the same voice, said: “He received rice and Javanese food from the patih [Danureja IV] and just an hour later he was dead,”’ Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:744.

\textsuperscript{176} Dj.Br. 9A, Valck, ‘Overzigt’, 154, pointing out that Hamengkubuwana IV never ate food unless prepared by his unofficial wives (selir) and there was no sign of poisoning on the body. Dipanagara partially corroborated Valck’s view, stating that whenever he was with Hamengkubuwana IV, the young ruler insisted that Dipanagara eat first and he would take the left-overs, Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:744. See further Kronijk van Nederlandsch-Indië 1842, I:206-7.
The power of prophecy

The immediate profit on the part of the royal government in The Hague and Brussels, meant that those in charge of colonial policy were becoming increasingly oblivious to the plight of the Javanese peasantry. In July 1825, Van der Capellen would report that the news of Dipanagara’s rebellion had reached him ‘completely unexpectedly’ (Capellen 1860:363; Carey 1981a:283 note 201). Yet only the most inveterate optimist could have possibly put such a gloss on events. The ever more urgent reports of Dutch officials regarding the crisis in the Javanese countryside in the early 1820s all pointed to one conclusion – a major popular uprising was imminent. Only the timing and leadership were unclear. The combination of the land tax, poor harvests, the 1821 cholera epidemic, the tollgates and the renting of estates to Europeans had turned south-central Java into a powder keg. The popular disturbances of 1817-1822 with their quirky millenarian hopes were a symptom of this deepening despair. In Yogya, in particular, many were united in a powerful sense of humiliation at the outcome of the events of 1812, a humiliation made all the more acute by the events of the fourth sultan’s reign. The desire for regeneration and the re-establishment of the old political order governing relations with the European government had begun to fuse with messianic expectations of a golden age of justice and plenty. What was now required was for a leader of sufficient stature to proclaim himself and bind the discontented to his cause.
In the two and a half years which elapsed between the death of the fourth sultan in December 1822 and the outbreak of the Java War in July 1825 the crisis in the Javanese countryside deepened. The main outlines have already been described in the previous chapter. As we have seen, during the 1817-1822 period several movements and uprisings had occurred, some of a pronounced millenarian character, but none had involved figures of true stature and authority in Javanese society. Apart from the quirky Pangérán Dipasana, the other leaders who had emerged in these years, such as Radèn Mas Umar Mahdi, Kyai Iman Sampurna, Sunan Waliyullah, Bendara Radèn Mas Sinduratmaja, and Radèn Ayu Guru, were all commoners. Despite their assumption of impressive names and titles, they lacked the influence to turn their movements into wider regional uprisings. Their appeal was thus limited. They could certainly not be compared to the mercurial Radèn Rongga who had so deeply influenced the young Dipanagara during his November-December 1810 rebellion (Chapter VI). It is likely that apart from his great-uncle Dipasana, whom he mentions specifically in his babad, the prince was unaware of these other self-appointed prophets in the Javanese countryside. The time was coming, however, when he himself would be summoned by prophecy and visions to step forward from the obscurity of Tegalreja and stand centre stage as the long hoped for Javanese Ratu Adil or Just King. Iman Sampurna for one had already indicated in 1819 that the next such person would be a prince of Mataram blood (pp. 490, 491 note 146), and he may well have had someone of Dipanagara’s stature in mind.

The past five chapters have mainly focussed on the history of the Yogya sultanate since the arrival of Marshal Daendels. In this tale, the prince has been a somewhat shadowy figure, making brief and frequently disapproving appearances at the Yogya court. The sources for his early life have been limited forcing us to rely on his remarkable autobiography. In the present chapter, however,
the situation changes. Dipanagara will now become the main protagonist and the sources for his life will become ever more abundant. The period foretold by the Parangkusuma prophecy – ‘you alone are the means, but that not for long only to be counted amongst the ancestors’ (p. 151) – was at hand. The next two chapters will describe how the prince’s destiny was fulfilled.

The aftermath of the fourth sultan’s death and Dipanagara’s guardianship

The fourth sultan’s unexpected fit on returning from his riding tour caused scenes of shock and grief at the court, especially amongst the kraton women-folk. Dipanagara was hastily summoned from Tegalreja, but when he arrived in the kraton his younger brother was dead. The head of the Yogya religious establishment (pengulu) and members of the Yogya religious hierarchy were already in attendance at the Srimenganti pavilion in order to wash the sultan’s body and to pray over it. According to Dipanagara, the Yogya Assistant-Resident R.C.N. d’Abo attempted to postpone this lustration ceremony until the arrival of the Surakarta Resident, Baron Adriaan Mauritz Theodorus de Salis, who was then combining his Surakarta post with the additional duties of acting Resident of Yogya, but he was overruled by the prince. The body was washed and placed in a wooden coffin in the sultan’s private apartments still surrounded by the religious officials who chanted the Usali prayer for the dead.

1 BD (Manado) II:290, XIX.45; B.Ng. II:119, XXX.25-6; KB, Cornets de Groot private collection IXe pt. 4:41, A.D. Cornets de Groot Jr (Yogyakarta) to A.D. Cornets de Groot Sr (Gresik), 6-12-1822.
2 KB, Cornets de Groot private collection IX pt. 4:41, A.D. Cornets de Groot Jr (Surakarta) to A.D. Cornets de Groot Sr (Gresik), 6-12-1822.
3 BD (Manado) II:290, XIX.46-7; KITLV Or 13 (Buku Kedhung Kebo):33-4, III.43-6. The Usali prayer is a special Arabic formula used at burials, Gericke and Roorda 1901, I:97. During the ceremony for Pakubuwana IV’s death described by Nahuys (1821:298-300), the Sunan’s body was washed for two hours with water mixed with tamarind and burnt rice straw. During this time the body itself was enveloped in a large cloth and laid on the knees of the Sunan’s relations. Only the Crown Prince was allowed to clean the genitals and the cloths used for washing were afterwards distributed as magically powerful heirlooms or pusaka. Meanwhile, sandalwood was poured into the mouth, nose and ears and the body was then wrapped in five large pieces of white linen and laid in a teakwood coffin made without the use of nails. At the bottom of the coffin, earth, sand and water from Mecca had been placed along with the Sunan’s nail clippings, hair and teeth, which had been kept during his lifetime. Prayers were then said over the body and it was guarded by priests. Later, it was carried out, under four gold state sunshades (payung) for the Sunan’s relations to pay their last respects. The couch on which the Sunan had died was also strewn with flowers and incense burnt over it for forty days. A similar ceremony is likely to have taken place in the case of Hamengkubuwana IV. See further Van der Kemp 1896a:357.
countenance it, stating that it was against Javanese-Islamic practice for a body to be mutilated after death. One recalls here the prince’s equally adamant refusal to accept the arcane magico-religious practices for releasing the life force proposed by his great-uncle, Pangéran Demang, at his father’s deathbed in November 1814 (p. 406). The queen mother, however, still entertained hopes that her son might recover so she brushed Dipanagara’s objections aside. The incision was made, but no blood flowed – a clear indication that circulation had long since ceased.4 One of Dipanagara’s sons would later reflect that his father had shown pleasure at his younger brother’s death stating:

Thank God! How could it be otherwise than that he should die in such a fashion? Since he could not bring himself to make war to regain his kingdom or even to rule it properly, it is good that he no longer remains in this world. Now everything will go better.5

But there is no corroboration for this in any other source. The following day the sultan’s body was buried at Imagiri near the grave of his father.6

Meanwhile, in Surakarta De Salis had received word of the sultan’s death and departed in the middle of the night to make the three-hour journey on horseback to Yogya, taking his student in the Javanese language, the eighteen-year-old Adriaan David Cornets de Groot Junior, with him (note 2). Arriving in the Yogya kraton early on the morning of 7 December, he was met by D’Abo who informed him that both the queen mother, Ratu Ageng, and the late sultan’s official consort, Ratu Kencana, together with a number of Yogya nobles, had ‘fervently beseeched’ him to confirm the two-year-old Crown Prince on the throne. They also requested that the Dutch authorities should on no account re-appoint Pakualam I as regent during the sultan’s minority or allow him any authority over the Yogya court. Ratu Ageng told De Salis directly that if no suitable guardians could be found in Yogya, then the European government itself should take over the guardianship.7 If this had happened, the sultanate would have been turned into a de facto government protectorate, the last scintilla of the sultan’s authority soon being extinguished. As we shall see, the decision of the Yogya Resident to occupy the throne during the

4 B.Ng. II:119-21, XXX.28-35; KITLV Or 13 (Buku Kedhung Kebo):32-3, III.38-42.

5 UBL, BPL 616, Port. 9 pt. 2, ‘Proces-Verbaal van Radeen Maas Alip’, 3-8-1825. See further Nahuys van Burgst 1835-6, I:12. See also Van Nes 1844:145, who seems to be repeating Alip’s testimony.

6 B.Ng. II:121-2, XXX.43-52, states that Hamengkubuwana IV’s body was buried three days later on 9 December which must be incorrect given the Muslim requirement that bodies are buried before sundown on the day on which the death occurs. In Hamengkubuwana IV’s case, he had died too late on 6 December to be buried on that day. Instead he was almost certainly interred on 7 December.

7 A.M.Th. de Salis (Yogyakarta) to G.A.G.Ph. van der Capellen (Batavia/Bogor), 9-12-1822, cited in Ministerie van Koloniën 4497, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal geheim, 14-12-1822 no. 1.
Garebeg ceremonies as the official ‘representative’ of the child sultan would already be seen by Dipanagara and other senior figures in the kraton as an unacceptable sign of the European government’s new and dominant role in court affairs during Hamengkubuwana V’s minority.

To all these requests, the cautious De Salis replied that he would await Governor-General Van der Capellen’s instructions before proceeding to the Crown Prince’s coronation or the appointment of guardians. In the interval he stated that he himself would take charge of the Yogya administration and the great seal of state. He then proceeded to consult the Residency archives to ascertain precisely what had happened in similar circumstances after the third sultan’s death in 1814. During his researches he came across Garnham’s letter to Raffles of 24 November 1814 (p. 409) concerning Pakualam’s previous appointment as regent and he swiftly came to the conclusion that the independent prince should not serve in that capacity again. The queen mother, Dipanagara’s uncle, Pangéran Mangkubumi, and the chief minister, Danureja IV, were informed of this decision during a conference in the kraton. De Salis assured them that the European government would listen to his advice with regard to Pakualam. In the meantime, he instructed Danureja to continue the administration of the sultan’s lands and ordered the court bupati (nayaka) that no changes were to be made in the government of the kraton without the Resident’s express approval. He also took the decision to recognise the Crown Prince as his father’s official successor and stipulated that the great seal should remain in the keeping of the Yogya Resident until the child sultan had reached his majority on 20 January 1836. Pakualam, who was in attendance at the kraton at this time, declared himself well satisfied with these arrangements, observing that ‘earlier [during his regency, 1814-1820] his good name had been exposed to the designs of the chief minister and the intrigues of the court so that he had become a mere figurehead and had enjoyed no real power’. His sentiments appear to have been genuine given the way he had been treated during his previous incumbency (pp. 409-10). At the same time, De Salis’ letter to the governor-general and various appendices referring to Garnham’s earlier correspondence with Raffles were read out to the informal governing group in the kraton and won universal approval.

There was some urgency in ensuring a speedy succession given the uncertainties of a prolonged interregnum. On 13 December, there were reports of a number of fires being set at various places around Yogya and other localised disturbances. The day after this worrying news was registered, Van der

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8 De Salis was described in a Dutch source as a person of ‘shrewd and courageous spirit and [a man] well acquainted with Indies affairs’, Van der Kemp 1901, I:145, citing Mijer 1878.
9 See note 7. The non-appointment of a regent had drawbacks, however, because there was no one to represent the sultan at the Garebeg ceremonies and various other important court occasions, Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:449-50, 453 (on Pakualam’s attitude).
Capellen endorsed De Salis’ recommendations in a secret government resolution. The *patih* was ordered to administer the sultan’s lands, but to undertake nothing of importance without the approval of the Resident. Everything else concerning the guardianship and education of the young sultan together with the governance of the *kraton* and its private finances was to devolve on four guardians: Ratu Ageng, Ratu Kencana, Mangkubumi and Dipanagara, the first two being concerned with the child sultan’s upbringing and care in the *kraton*, and the two last being principally responsible for the management of the sultanate during his minority. The yearly sum of 100,000 Spanish dollars from the rent of the tollgates and markets was to be paid directly to these guardians without the intervention of Danureja IV and the *patih* was instructed to give an account of the financial situation of the sultan’s lands to them every three months and pay the moneys for the guardianship directly into their hands. Moreover, the governor-general’s resolution specifically stipulated that the *patih* would only be permitted to interfere in the internal administration of the *kraton* if the guardians were found by the Resident to be lax in the discharge of their duties.  

News of Van der Capellen’s secret resolution reached Yogya on 18 December and on the following day – Thursday, 19 December 1822 – the Crown Prince was appointed as Hamengkubuwana V. The Resident’s proclamation was read out in the Prabayeksa, the sultan’s private apartments, and the oaths of the guardians of the child sultan and the *patih*, accepting full responsibility for their new task, were signed and sealed by the parties concerned. Writing six years later, De Salis commented that the establishment of the guardianship had occurred ‘with the general approval of the *ratu* and the most important courtiers in Yogya; Pangéran Dipanagara also seemed outwardly pleased about it’. General de Kock later confirmed this, giving an account of the esteem in which Dipanagara was held at this time by the European government:

Earlier one heard nothing but good about him. He was on cordial terms with Nahuys and did not seem to have a bitter heart against the government. [The fact]
that this [happened] was entirely due to the disdain heaped on him by Resident [A.H.] Smissaert and [the Yogya Assistant-Resident/Residency Secretary P.F.H.] Chevallier. His authority, moreover, was hampered inside the kraton by Ratu Ageng and outside by the patih.14

Dipanagara largely endorsed De Kock's observation stating that ‘I was on especially good terms with De Salis, with him affairs went well. But, as soon as the others came – he meant Smissaert [and Chevallier] – everything was plunged into disorder’.15 Separately, in his conversations with Knoerle, the prince stated that ‘he had always followed the straight path without deviousness in his dealings with the European Residents’.16 Both Nahuys and the veteran VOC official, Nicolaus Engelhard, were of the same opinion. Writing of Dipanagara and his fellow guardian, Mangkubumi, Nahuys would later remark that they were both men ‘who on all former occasions of misunderstanding [between the Yogya court and the European government] had stood quite neutral and were universally considered as good quiet persons without the least ambition’.17 Engelhard, as we have seen (p. 77), characterised Dipanagara as ‘a respectable prince […] who in all matters was a Javanese and followed Javanese custom’ (Van der Kemp 1896a:415).

Despite the antagonism between Dipanagara and his two principal rivals, Ratu Ageng and Danureja IV, he seems to have discharged his guardianship duties to the best of his ability for nearly a year after his appointment. It was only after Smissaert’s arrival in mid-February 1823, and that of his assistant, Chevallier, on 26 August of the same year, that these personal antagonisms began to make cooperation impossible. By then the whole issue of the abolition of the land-rent and the indemnification of the European planters had soured relations between the guardians and the Dutch authorities in Yogya. There is thus nothing in the European sources to confirm the highly coloured Javanese accounts of Hamengkubuwana V’s coronation and Dipanagara’s own description of his intense disappointment at being appointed a guardian of his young nephew. Although he does not mention it in his babad, he is likely to have had a hand in the choice of the personal tutor for the child

15 Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:743. Dipanagara’s admiration for De Salis was apparently not reciprocated by the former Yogya Resident who wrote in 1828, of Dipanagara’s ‘stupid and mysterious’ appearance, his portly build and the ‘lazy and indolent life’ he led at Tegalreja, which made him ‘the play puppet of his entourage’, De Salis, ‘Pro Memorie’, The Hague, 8-5-1828. Since De Salis’ remarks were penned towards the end of the Java War, they are likely to have been coloured by wartime events and may not have reflected his feelings in 1822-1823 when he was serving as acting Resident of Yogya. See further Chapter III note 63.
17 UBL, BPL 616, Port. 11 pt. 13, Nahuys van Burgst, ‘Memoir on causes of Java War’ (English translation of Port. 9 pt. 3, ‘Onlusten op Java’), Maastricht, 2-1826.
sultan, an Arab from the former Dutch trading post of Surat in western India, Sayyid Hasan, who later taught Hamengkubuwana V to read the Qur'an and schooled him in Arabic.18

Once the Java War had broken out, however, senior Dutch officials were quick to point out the drawbacks of the guardianship arrangements. Van Sevenhoven, who replaced Smissaert as Resident of Yogya in October 1825, argued that it placed too much responsibility on the shoulders of the patih and the Resident. The idea of giving the Resident a leading role in the guardianship was in principle sound as it would allow him to gain more influence in the internal affairs of the sultanate and learn more about the royal administration. But there was a problem. The Resident’s guardianship duties were not properly defined and in the hands of an incompetent official matters could turn out disastrously.19 This in fact happened when Smissaert failed to give due respect to Dipanagara and Mangkubumi and refused to recognise their competence as guardians thus fatally alienating them from the European government.20

The ever insightful Dutch historian of the Principalities, Gerrit Pieter Rouffaer, would later put it succinctly: why place a child of barely three years

18 KITLV Or 13 (Buku Kedhung Kebo):38-42, III.59-IV.11; B.Ng. II:128-36, XXXII.18-XXXIV.10; Yogya kraton MS. A. 62 (Babad Dipanagara):14-16, all state that Dipanagara was purposely not invited to the coronation ceremony by Danureja IV, on which see further LOr 8552a, 320-1, exchange of letters between Dipanagara and A.M.Th. de Salis in January 1823. In his babad, however, Dipanagara specifically stated that he was present at the ceremony but experienced such mortification at being sworn in as a guardian that he accidentally tore his state clothes (kampuh) and was unable to sign his name on the guardianship document or affix his seal to it, BD (Manado) II:295-7, XIX.61-5. On his return to Tegalreja, he described how he even contemplated suicide but was restrained by his wife, Radèn Ayu Maduretna, BD (Manado) II:297-303, XIX.65-84. Afterwards, he wrote, that he returned his seal to Mangkubumi, refusing to take part in his financial duties as a guardian and giving out that he would henceforth be called by his religious name – ‘Ngabdulkamit’ – not Pangérán Dipanagara, BD (Manado), II:304-6, XIX.86-94. None of this accords with the available historical evidence and is even contradicted earlier in this passage in his babad where he appeared once again to have renounced any rights he may have had to the Yogya throne, BD (Manado), II:294, XIX.57-9. See further Van der Kemp 1896a:315, 325-7, 350, 353-6; Kumar 1972:90-9. On Sayyid Hasan al-Habāshi, see Lettres de Java 1829:83, where he is described as ‘a very intelligent man whom the [European] government often uses for its missions to neighbouring islands’. He later helped the Dutch in the negotiations with Kyai Maja at Salatiga in September 1827 and ‘worked tirelessly’, according to Nahuys, ‘for the surrender of the rebels’, see Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, III:572-3. He was given a pension of f 100 a month from the Yogya court and a personal landholding of 25 cacah (which brought in an income of f 300 a year), along with a similar land grant for his ‘priestly following’ of five ulama, see Dj.Br. 1911, Valck, ‘Voordragt’, 20-2-1830 (full reference Chapter III note 18). On his Surat origins, see Dj.Br. 71, J.F.W. van Nes (Yogyakarta) to L.P. du Bus de Gisignies (Batavia/Bogor), 27-11-1828. The British had been in undivided control of Surat from 1800.

19 Dj:Br. 6, J.I. van Sevenhoven (Yogyakarta) to H.M. de Kock (Surakarta/Semarang), 10-11-1825.

20 Dj:Br. 6, Lawick van Pabst, ‘Nota ter betoogen der gelijkmatigheid van den oorlog van den jare 1746 met dien van den tegenwoordigen tijd’ (henceforth: Van Pabst, ‘Nota ter betoogen’), 5-11-1828.
on the Yogya throne just because he was born from an official consort when in neighbouring Surakarta just a year later the son of an unofficial wife was elevated as Susuhunan Pakubuwana VI (reigned 1823-1830)? And why fail to recognise and respect Dipanagara’s own rights as the eldest born son of a ruler, rights which he should have been allowed to assert with all the honour due to him as Hamengkubuwana V’s eldest uncle and guardian? At the very least why not accord him the title of Pangéran Ngabèhi, the name usually reserved for the eldest son of a ruler by an unofficial wife? In Rouffaer’s view much of the reason for the Java War lay there, in the dreadful mishandling of the prince by incompetent Dutch officials (Rouffaer 1905:600).

The December 1822 eruption of Mount Merapi and the Jayabaya prophecies

Shortly after the fifth sultan’s coronation, an important event occurred in the natural world which almost certainly had a deep psychological effect on the inhabitants of Yogyakarta. This was the violent eruption of Mount Merapi, the volcano overlooking the city, between 28 and 30 December 1822. In his babad, Dipanagara related how on Friday, 26 December, he had been to the house of his younger brother, Pangéran Suryabraganti, whose son was being circumcised, a ceremony known in Java as supitan. He had supervised the supitan ceremony and had then remained overnight playing chess with his old friend and fellow cognoscente of Javanese-Islamic literature, Radèn Ayu Danukusuma, widow of the murdered Radèn Tumenggung Danukusuma.21 The following morning, the prince had returned to Tegalreja, but he was so tired that he slept right through the day and well into the following night. Then, early on the morning of Sunday, 28 December at approximately two o’clock, according to one Dutch report, after a series of heavy earth tremors, which had started the previous evening, Mount Merapi began to erupt.22 By the morning of 29 December streams of glowing lava could be seen pouring down the mountain on the Kedhu side with a heavy column of smoke thrown up to a great height and rains of ash and sand covering an extensive area as far as Mount Sumbing in the west.23 According to Dipanagara:

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21 On Radèn Ayu Danukusuma’s love of Javanese-Islamic literature, see pp. 99-100. On the fate of her husband, see p. 313. On chess playing in the archipelago at this time, see Crawfurd 1971:93 sub: ‘chess’. There are also references to the game in contemporary Javanese literature, Ricklefs 1974a:393.

22 Dj.Br. 52, R.C.N. d’Abo (Yogyakarta) to Captain J.Th.A. van den Busch (commandant Klatèn), 3-1-1823.

23 Residentie Kadie 1871:15. This report states that there were eighteen earth tremors in 30 hours, the heaviest being on the evening of 28 December. The last eruption was on 30 December and the volcano was calm again on 3 January.
XIX.98 Mount Merapi caught fire
   as though its peak reached to the heavens.
   Yogyakarta seemed filled with it.
   The sky became fire
   [and] the noise of it was terrifying;
   it thundered and roared,
   the fires radiating everywhere.
   In great commotion, together,
   everywhere people desperately sought refuge.24

The prince states that he slept through the beginnings of the first eruption,
which only became serious between half past four and five o’clock in the morn-
ing, when he was awakened by the screams of his female servants. He then
went outside into the front courtyard with his wife, Radèn Ayu Maduretna,
and looked up into the sky; seeing the burning mountain and the heaving
earth, he described how he smiled inwardly to himself knowing that this was
a sign of God’s anger.25

The Dutch reports confirm that the eruption was just as violent as
Dipanagara made out in his babad. Thus, D’Abo wrote that there were three
major eruptions, two on the Sunday morning at five and seven o’clock, and
the last at eleven o’clock on Monday, 29 December. He described how a
huge pall of smoke and ash was blown in a south-westerly direction from
the mountain and stones as large as coconuts were flung as far as twelve
kilometres, the ash being carried three times that distance. On the flanks of
the mountain, people fled their homes and three villages – Bulu, Deles and
Pringlegi – on the Kedhu side were completely destroyed.26 The rivers which
rose on the Merapi-Merbabu watershed became clogged with hot mud and
huge boulders, overflowing their banks (Residentie Kadoe 1871:15). In the
southern Kedhu district of Prabalingga, the Kali Pabélan was especially badly
affected. Localised flooding here damaged 144 jung of fields planted to rice
and tobacco. Even six years after the Java War, the amount of cold lava in the
river bed, and its constantly changing flow, made bridge building almost im-
possible.27 A Dutch travel diary from this period speaks of the whole western
flank of the mountain, which before 1823 had been intensely cultivated half

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24 BD (Manado), II:307-8, XIX (Sinom) 98. ardi Mrapi murup ika/ angliir sundhul ing wiyati/ kadya kèbekan* Ngayingga/ kang akasa kadi geni/ kang suwara gigirisil/ gemleger lawan gumludhug/ brama pating
pacurati/ kelangkung gègèr pan sami/ ting kudhangdhang ngupados pangungsèn samya. MS. kébyukan,
I have followed Rusche 1908-09, I:98.

25 BD (Manado) II:308-10, XX.1-4. Earlier, Dipanagara had described the eruption thus: BD
(Manado) II:307.XIX (Sinom) 97. nulya dhawah tiwas bendunira Hyang Sukma.

26 Dj; Br. 52, R.C.N. d’Abo (Yogyakarta) to Captain J.Th.A. van den Busch (Klathèn), 3-1-1823.

27 Baud 91, P. le Clercq, ‘Copie-verslag over de Residentie Kadoe’, 30-3-1824, 27-8, 30-1; Minis-
terie van Koloniën 3054, ‘Statistieke beschrijving der residentie Kedoe’ (1836), 10. See further
Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, II:555, on the deep ravines gouged out in the Pabélán and the
river’s periodic flooding.
way up to its summit, now covered with igneous rocks, lava flows and ash (Büchler 1888, I:426-7). Cornets de Groot, who watched the eruptions from Surakarta, gave a magnificent description in a personal letter to his father:

> It was beautiful to behold; a thick column of smoke rose violently from the top and the thunderous noise was heard clearly in Solo [Sala]. I could see glowing rocks hurled up into the sky, falling right and left around the mountain. Around the peak, there were numerous flashes of lightning caused by the electric attraction of the eruption.28

Heavy rain fell for two weeks after the eruption, washing all the ash – with its trace elements and nutrients – off the sawah. After the last volcanic activity on 3 January 1823, Merapi continued to be wreathed in smoke for days. Much damage was done by the lava flows which gouged two deep valleys in the side of the mountain, flowing in a south and south-westerly direction. Roads were blocked by walls of steaming mud three metres thick and the waters in the rivers, which had their source on the mountain, became boiling hot.29 Bodies were washed down the Praga River and were found as far afield at the

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28 KB, Cornets de Groot private collection IXe pt. 4:44-5, A.D. Cornets de Groot Jr (Surakarta) to A.D. Cornets de Groot Sr (Gresik), 31-12-1822.
29 Dj:Br. 52, A.M.Th. de Salis (Yogyakarta) to Algemeen Secretaris (J. Bousquet) (Batavia/Bogor), 12-1-1823. The important cross-country trading route between Pisangan on the Yogya-Slèman road and Boyolali was completely severed, Baud 91, P. le Clercq, ‘Copie-verslag over de residentie Kadoe’, 30-3-1824, 14.
rich salt-making village of Sirisik near the mouth of the river as it flowed into the Indian Ocean. Although the damage to agriculture was not as serious as at first feared – with the exception of southern Kedhu – the short-term difficulties caused by the eruption were registered by the rise in rice prices which touched a high of $6.10 per pikul (62 kilograms) in late January compared with an average of $5.00-5.50 in the preceding quarter and $4.00-4.50 in the following year and a half (Appendix X). The 1823 Kedhu tobacco harvest, as we have seen, was also poor (Chapter IX note 82). According to Cornets de Groot, the eruption itself was the first for over three decades (fifty years in fact) and the worst in living memory.

Besides the physical damage caused by the eruption, the event almost certainly helped to raise millenarian expectations on the eve of the Java War. The mountain itself occupies a special place in local Javanese mythology and its protector spirit, Kyai Sapu Jagad (‘Honourable Sir Sweeper of the World’), is regarded along with Ratu Kidul (Chapter IV note 36) as one of the two most powerful guardian spirits of the sultanate (Ricklefs 1974b:233 note 21). Any volcanic activity on Mount Merapi, not least a violent eruption such as occurred in late December 1822, would have been viewed by the population of south-central Java as a tangible portent of coming change. Dipanagara’s inward reflection that it was a sign of divine wrath would have been shared by many. The fact that it was followed up by a number of subsequent earthquakes in December 1823, January 1824 and September 1825, would have been taken as further proof that Java was about to enter a new era. Thus in 1770, the apparent eruption of the mountain in that year (note 31) and the ash rains which preceded it, were considered to be two of the important natural phenomena which heralded the end of the Javanese century and the expected fall of the kraton (Ricklefs 1974a:186). We have already seen how the eruption of Mount Kelut in east Java in late June 1811, coming as it did just over a month before the British invasion of early August 1811, may have been taken as a sign that major changes were afoot (p. 280). Later, at the end of the nineteenth century, the terrific explosion of Mount Krakatau in the Sunda Strait in August 1883,
clearly heightened expectations of the coming Day of Judgement which was linked in the popular mind with Mahdi beliefs in Banten before the short-lived peasant revolt of 1886 (Sartono Kartodirjo 1966:167). In south-central Java, as we have seen (Chapter IX), popular millenarian hopes centred around the figure of the Just King rather than the Mahdi. In contemporary versions of the Jayabaya prophecies, the Ratu Adil’s coming is described as being preceded by various natural occurrences including rains of ash, earthquakes, flashes of lightning, thunderbolts, heavy rain, gusts of wind, and eclipses of the sun and moon. The visitations of disease such as the 1821 cholera epidemic and the tangible breakdown of society as reflected in the high prices of food, corrupt administration, the aimless wandering of the rural population and the rise in robberies and violence, all of which were features of pre-Java War life in the Principalities, would have been easily connected in the popular mind with the time of madness or jaman édan which was to precede the coming of the Just King. We have already seen how the Jayabaya prophecies held great sway at the courts at this time (p. 483), particularly the belief in the hundred-year cycle for Javanese dynasties. These beliefs would persist long after the Java War, resurfacing strongly in the period immediately before and after Hamengkubuwana V’s death in June 1855 when the prophecy that Yogyá’s century had been fulfilled was believed by many. As the Yogyá Resident, A.H.W. Baron de Kock (1808-1891), put it at this time, ‘The prophecies of Jayabaya live in the minds of every Javanese and they do not doubt that they will come to pass’. Even during Indonesia’s struggle for independence in 1945-1949, their continued influence would be noted in the areas where Dipanagara had once fought (Simatupang 1972:41, 72, 89).

Shortly after the outbreak of the Java War, the Jayabaya prophecies seem to have been rewritten to correspond more closely to recent events. Thus in a Malay version provided by a Javanese informant to General de Kock at his Magelang headquarters, the Javanese year AJ 1753 (AD 15 August 1825-3 August 1826) is referred to as the time when Java ‘would begin to be destroyed’ – shades of the Parangkusuma prophecy – and when good people would be set aside by men of no principle. In this final age of disorder – the kaliyuga – before the establishment of the era of the Ratu Adil with its peace and plenty, the world would be turned upside down: fathers would

33 Reksapustaka (Mangkunagaran), Serat Centhini, IV:1812, I (Pucung) 32-3. krep grahana surya/kalawan grahana sasi/jawah auw lindu gelap clèrèt warsa. 33. prahara guung/salah mangsa dresing susuri/ agung prang rusuhan/mungsuhe boya katawis/tangèh lamun seneng tentreming wardaya. For a later nineteenth-century version, see Wiselius 1886:186.
34 Carey 1981a:4-7; Reksapustaka (Mangkunagaran), Serat Centhini, IV:1812-3, L34-42.
forget their children, children their parents, masters would neglect their servants and servants their masters. The Javanese themselves would be like winnowed rice. In another Javanese babad version of the events surrounding Dipanagara’s rebellion, Jayabaya is depicted as having prophesied that Yogya would be destroyed after ten windu (eight-year cycles) or eighty Javanese years (Appendix XIV), and after four changes of ruler. Signs that this time was at hand were to be seen, according to this text, in the corrupt rule of the patih who robbed people while sitting down and was like a devil in human clothes (Chapter VIII note 149). Meanwhile, in the Buku Kedhung Kebo, the author described how in the early stages of the Java War, when Dipanagara was still at his first headquarters at Selarong (July–September 1825), many of the common folk who rallied to the prince believed that he was the Ratu Adil who would carry out the Jayabaya prophecy by driving the Dutch from Java. But, the author asserts, in reality the time had not yet arrived and few understood the true meaning of the prophecies.

A small, fat and shy man; Yogyakarta’s new Resident

Just as these events were taking place in Yogya and popular expectations of coming millenarian events were on the rise, important changes were occurring amongst the Dutch official personnel at the courts. As we shall see, these were destined to have a direct influence on the course of events in the sultanate during the coming two and a half years. In late April 1822, Nahuys had been forced to relinquish his position as acting Resident in Surakarta because of growing opposition to his economic policies amongst Van der Capellen’s close advisers, in particular H.J. van de Graaff. Baron A.M.Th. de Salis, himself an eloquent opponent of Nahuys’ schemes, was chosen as his successor. Then
Plate 58. Jonkheer Anthonië Hendrik Smissaert (1777-1832), Resident of Yogyakarta between 1823 and 1825, whose bungling and ineptitude were directly responsible for the outbreak of the Java War. One Dutch contemporary, Willem van Hogendorp, described him as a ‘small, fat and shy man’ (klein, dik en verlegen), and another, the Belgian painter A.A.J. Payen, compared him to Sancho Panza, one of the most archetypal panakawon figures in European literature. Portrait attributed to the Dutch artist W.G.F. Heymans, and probably painted in 1827 after Smissaert had returned to The Hague in disgrace. From the private collection of the Baron van Tuyll van Serooskerken (Kasteel Heeze). Photograph by courtesy of the Stichting Iconographisch Bureau, The Hague.
in November 1822, Nahuys also gave up his official post in Yogyakarta to return to the Netherlands to argue his plans for economic development in the Principalities with the Dutch king and Minister for the Colonies C.Th. Elout (Nahuys van Burgst 1858:129; Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:51 note 2, 52-3, 74). The vacancy in Yogyakarta was not filled immediately, but D’Abo continued as Assistant-Resident and De Salis functioned as acting Resident coming over from Surakarta for important events such as the death of the fourth sultan and the installation of his successor. There was, however, something of an administrative vacuum in Yogyakarta during these months which must have created much the same sort of uncertain atmosphere which had prevailed in Surakarta before Pakubuwana IV’s demise in October 1820 (pp. 500-1).

Eventually, on 3 January 1823, Van der Capellen nominated the forty-five year old Resident of Rembang, Jonkheer Anthonië Hendrik Smissaert, scion of a long-established Indies family and son-in-law of a former VOC Resident of Surakarta,42 to fill the vacancy left by Nahuys’ departure. The reasons given by the governor-general for his unusual choice – Smissaert had no experience of service at the south-central Javanese courts – are significant. First, the former Rembang Resident was appointed to afford him the extra emoluments which the Yogyakarta post entailed and which the financially canny Smissaert had requested in order to provide for his large family.43 Second, the governor-general clearly made the appointment in the hope that he would have a senior official in Yogyakarta who would act more obediently than Nahuys had done with regard to the land-rent. He also had in mind the need for an official with extensive administrative experience in Java to undertake a far-reaching investigation of the Yogyakarta territories with an eye to facilitating further territorial annexations. As we shall see shortly, the western mancanagara provinces

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42 Smissaert had married Clara Elisabeth von Liebeherr, daughter of Bogislaus Friedrich von Liebeherr, who had served in Surakarta between 1806 and 1808, on 5 October 1800, see De Haan 1935a:648-9 (who gives a brief biography of Smissaert’s early career up to the end of the British period), Campbell 1915, I:434; pp. 160, 169, and Appendix IX. His later career is referred to in Campbell 1915, I:433-6. See also Carey 1981a. Born in Batavia in 1777 and educated in Holland, he died in disgrace in The Hague in 1832 following his removal from his Yogyakarta post on 26-9-1825 and subsequent dismissal from government service.

43 Van der Kemp 1896a:380; Ministerie van Koloniën 4132, ‘Bijlagen Smissaert’ (henceforth: ‘Bijlagen Smissaert’), G.A.G.Ph. van der Capellen (Batavia) to A.H. Smissaert (Rembang), 4-1-1823, referring to Smissaert’s letter of 28-11-1822 requesting the Yogyakarta post. Van der Capellen’s official decision to appoint him is in Ministerie van Koloniën 2778, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal in rade, 3-1-1823 no. 21. As Van der Capellen put it in his 4 January 1822 letter, ‘the higher income which goes with the post […] and the circumstances of the young sultan’s minority should place you in a more advantageous position’. See further Van der Kemp 1896a:377 note 1, 379. Although there is no proof that Smissaert used his new position for illicit financial gain, De Haan (1935a:648-9) noted that, when he was serving as magistrate in Semarang in 1812, Raffles had to write him a special letter warning him not to sit on cases in which he had a personal financial interest. On Smissaert as a shrewd financier, see Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:277 note 1. On the salary and perks of the Yogyakarta post, see Chapter V note 29 and Chapter VIII note 91.
of Banyumas and Bagelen were now in the government’s sights. Smissaert with his nearly twenty years’ service in Java seemed to fit the bill. As Van der Capellen pointed out in his letter of appointment:

I consider the post of Resident at Djokjo [Yogyakarta] in the present circumstances above all as very important. I wish to see an official placed there whom I trust entirely and who in every department of the service gets on with his colleague in Surakarta […] your knowledge of Javanese affairs, your long standing relations with all classes of Javanese and your diligence in the public service are reason enough to convince me that I will not regret my choice.44

Finally, Van der Capellen added that under no circumstances would Nahuys’ business associate D’Abo be allowed to stay on in Yogya. Instead, he would find Smissaert a ‘capable official’ as his assistant (Van der Kemp 1896a:379). This man would later be identified in the governor-general’s inner circle of friends and erstwhile staff. The son of his children’s tutor and one of his former military adjutants, Pierre Frederic Henri Chevallier’s personal influence on the affairs of the sultanate would be almost as disastrous as that of his immediate superior.45 D’Abo, meanwhile, stayed on in Yogya attending to Nahuys’ coffee estate at Bedhaya and other matters before returning to Padang, his birthplace in west Sumatra, where he died in May 1824 (Van Enk 1999:218 note 68). It was an unhappy end for a man who had hitched his wagon to Nahuys’ star, but had seen both his marriage (Chapter III note 79; pp. 438-9) and his business projects fail as a result of his superior’s actions.

From the start of Smissaert’s Residency, there was a fundamental difference between what the former Rembang Resident hoped from his position and what Van der Capellen expected of him. Whereas Smissaert had in view a quiet and lucrative appointment to feather his nest before retirement, the gov-

44 ‘Bijlagen Smissaert’, G.A.G.Ph. van der Capellen (Batavia) to A.H. Smissaert (Rembang), 4-1-1823.
45 Ministerie van Koloniën 2779, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal in rade, 26-1-1823 no. 2, Van der Capellen’s official appointment of Chevallier on 26-8-1823. Chevallier took over from D’Abo on the same day, Dj.Br. 191, Summary of Yogya Residency letters, 1814-25, entry for 26-8-1823. For biographical details, see Van der Kemp 1896a:400; Carey 1981a:241-2 note 31. A former officer of the 7th Dutch hussars who had seen action at Waterloo, Chevallier had resigned his officer’s commission shortly after arriving in Java in 1820 and entered government service in 1821. He then made a good career, serving as secretary of Banten Residency before moving to Yogya in August 1823. Van der Capellen clearly thought highly of him – not without reason according to Louw (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:306) – and there is a telling annotation on the original copy of his June 1824 report on the working of the tollgates in the Arsip Nasional in Jakarta (Dj.Br. 52, Chevallier, ‘Rapport’, 15-6-1824, full reference Chapter I note 35) where a senior official, perhaps the governor-general himself, had written in pencil: ‘What does the government want with such tax-farmers and their scandalous conduct? Mr Chevallier must become Resident of Banyumas. This report and the refusal to follow it lies at the background of the present disturbances’. This was written sometime after the outbreak of the Java War on 20-7-1825 and Chevallier’s death on 11-11-1825. Highly ambitious, Chevallier seems to have put his own name forward for the Yogya post confident that his close personal ties with Van der Capellen would ensure his selection.
ernor-general thought foremost of the imminent policy changes relating to the land-rent and incorporation of princely territory. And for this latter purpose Smissaert was manifestly unsuited. This was particularly so when one considers the highly delicate political situation then prevailing in Yogya. Although he did take some administrative initiatives – the establishment of an official Residency postal service in Yogya may have been his work – Smissaert was a man of distinctly mediocre talents. Willem van Hogendorp described him as ‘a person more suited to the outdoor life than the position of Resident at one of the [south-central Javanese] courts’ (Van Hogendorp 1913:143), while Van de Graaff himself considered his appointment a temporary one, ascertaining correctly that he had little knowledge of kraton affairs. He also appears to have had difficulties getting on with his subordinates (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:280; Van der Kemp 1896a:377). Added to this, his physical appearance and manner were distinctly unprepossessing. A fat, balding, middle-aged man of small and stocky build, Smissaert was shy and diffident in conversation (Van Hogendorp 1913:146; Carey 1981a:255 note 87, 273 note 152). Such a combination of poor capabilities and unimpressive physique was doubly unfortunate for a Resident at one of the kraton for the Javanese were shrewd judges of men and attached great importance to the bearing and physiognomy of Dutch officials (Ricklefs 1974a:27-31; Carey 1981a:255 note 87).

Despite his limitations, Smissaert seems to have made a genuine effort from the start of his Residency to follow up Van der Capellen’s instructions regarding the collection of statistics about Yogyakarta, in particular its lands, population and administration. He received little cooperation, however, from the sultan’s officials, writing to the governor-general that the regional bupati were distinctly especially unhelpful in providing him the necessary information:

> There is a certain reserve and dourness in Yogyakarta [compared to Rembang] which makes one too despondent to ask them anything […]. None of the bupati seem to know their areas well […] and the patih himself has visited many places near Yogya for the first time with me.48

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46 Dj.Br. 58, J.F.W. van Nes (Yogyakarta) to Commissarissen ter regeling der vorstenlanden (Yogyakarta), 30-6-1830, on the establishment of a brieven posterij (letter post) during Smissaert’s Residency to convey letters and official dispatches between Yogya, Surakarta and Semarang; before that all letters had been taken by messengers (oppasser), see Chapter VI note 121. Since all the archives relating to this postal service were destroyed after the outbreak of the Java War by Chevallier, who ordered that they be dumped into one of the canals outside the Yogya Residency house, there is no possibility of confirming Smissaert’s role in its establishment. It is equally likely that Chevallier himself was the initiator of this scheme. See further above Chapter VI notes 120-1.

47 vAE 20 (aanwinsten 1941), H.J. van de Graaff (Batavia) to J. Fabius (Holland), 26-7-1823. See further Van Nes 1844:153-4. For Harvey Thomson’s view of Smissaert whom he described as ‘that little wretch’ on account of his failure to return his rare first edition of Raffles’ History of Java), see Van Enk 1990:34.

48 vAE 28 (aanwinsten 1941), ‘Stukken Smissaert’, A.H. Smissaert (Yogyakarta) to G.A.G.Ph. van der Capellen (Batavia/Bogor), 7-1-1824. Smissaert reported great difficulties in compiling an
He soon began to form a poor opinion of the *patih* and the child sultan's two guardians, Mangkubumi and Dipanagara, as well:

They are good people but lazy. They know very little about the administration [of the sultanate] for no registers have been kept since the sack of the *kraton* [by the British] in [June] 1812. Thus, they merely receive the income from the sultan's lands when the *bupati* choose to give it to them. Danureja, [moreover], is much taken up with women on whom he spends all his money. [But] he is prepared to serve the Dutch government as much as possible.49

Later, following the outbreak of the Java War when he was casting around for scapegoats on whom to lay blame for the disastrous turn of events, Smissaert wrote more harshly of the *patih*, claiming that he was 'a dull, stupid and luke-warm man when it came to affairs of importance for the Netherlands Indies government'.50 Yet it was precisely this man on whom Smissaert came to rely so heavily for help and advice during his period as Resident. So why did he do this? If he knew about the chief minister’s character faults and lack of capacity, why choose to delegate so much to him? The answer seems to be that Smissaert was out of his depth, was frequently absent from Yogya and depended on subordinates like Danureja to carry out a large part of his work. As a result the *patih* was given far too many responsibilities, lacked the necessary support to carry out his tasks, and took advantage of the Resident's weakness to further his own interests. That these interests included a love of the opium pipe, fine clothes and beautiful women hardly served to hone his administrative zeal (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:450). It was the same with the Residency translator J.G. Dietrée and the new Assistant-Resident P.F.H. Chevallier, both

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of whom needed the guidance of a capable superior to get the best out of them (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, l:306 note 2). In fact, on a personal level Smissaert does not seem to have got on particularly well with either of them, especially the latter. Yet he still delegated a number of key duties to them (Kielstra 1885:410). How could it be otherwise? For Smissaert was for certain key periods to all intents and purposes an absentee Resident.

On arriving in Yogya in February 1823, he had found the Residency House in a grave state of disrepair. It had been left vacant for several months following Nahuys’ departure, had suffered earthquake damage during the eruption of Mount Merapi in December (Payen 1988:8 note 6) and needed a new roof. In the end, it was decided to pull much of it down and begin again. But it was not until November 1824 that work on redesigning and rebuilding the entire structure could commence under the capable direction of the Belgian artist-architect, Antoine Auguste Joseph Payen. Even then work was stopped until the end of the rainy season and only resumed at the end of June 1825 when Payen returned to the sultan’s capital. It was still proceeding when the Java War broke out on 20 July. This situation, so enriching for the historical record given the diary which the ever observant Payen kept of the dramatic events of Dipanagara’s siege of Yogyakarta between late July and mid-September 1825 (Payen 1988), proved fateful for Smissaert and for Dutch interests in Yogya. Given the need to tear down the old residency house to enable the new building to be constructed, Smissaert and his family moved into the house of the former kapitan cina, Tan Jin Sing, in the Chinese quarter of Yogya. They stayed there for just over a year between August 1823 and September 1824, when temporary lodgings became available in the Dutch fort, Vredenburg. During this period, Smissaert frequently took his family up to Bedhaya, Nahuys’ former estate on the flanks of Mount Merapi (pp. 537-40; Plate 60). According to his own testimony, he only remained there for short periods and always informed the patih of his absence. But General de Kock remarked that he was there ‘for months on end’, a view confirmed by Lawick van Pabst who stated that Residency office affairs

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51 Nahuys had departed from Yogya on 1 November 1822. In the interim, De Salis only used it occasionally and seemingly not at all after it suffered earthquake damage in late December 1822. Smissaert arrived to take up his posting on 11 February 1823, and moved over to Tan Jin Sing’s house in August 1823 when the old Residency House was pulled down prior to rebuilding work.

52 vAE 28 (aanwinsten 1941), ‘Stukken Smissaert’, A.H. Smissaert (Yogyakarta) to G.A.G.Ph. van der Capellen (Batavia/Bogor), 10-1-1825.

53 Dj.Br. 67A, A.H. Smissaert (Yogyakarta) to Lieutenant-Governor-General (H.M. de Kock) (Batavia), 4-10-1824. Smissaert stated that he could not move into the fort immediately because an officer’s mess was being constructed there, see vAE 28 (aanwinsten 1941), ‘Stukken Smissaert’, extract of letter of A.H. Smissaert (Yogyakarta) to G.A.G.Ph. van der Capellen (Batavia/Bogor), 7-1-1824.

54 vAE 28 (aanwinsten 1941), ‘Stukken Smissaert’, A.H. Smissaert, comments on the Besluit of Minister of Marine and Colonies, C.Th. Elout, 13-10-1829 La 4 no. 90, upholding Smissaert’s dismissal from government service as per Governor-General’s Besluit of 20-12-1825 no. 1 (henceforth: Smissaert, ‘Comments’).
were left in the hands of a clerk. Indeed, we know from Smissaert’s own correspondence that in the critical weeks before Dipanagara’s rebellion, he was in semi-permanent residence at Bedhaya, returning to Yogya only on Mondays and Thursdays to transact Residency business (Van der Kemp 1896a:382-3 note 1). He even planned a climbing holiday for himself and his family in late June 1825, involving the ascent of Mount Lawu and a visit to the fifteenth-century Hindu-Buddhist temple at Sukuh, ordering the Yogya patih to ensure that the roads were in a good state of repair to accommodate his carriage. This was tantamount to having yet another absentee Resident in Yogya. The delays caused to the transaction of official business were considerable given the over thirty kilometre round trip required for every journey to and fro to the Resident’s country seat. Smissaert’s absence during the critical weekend before Dipanagara fled from Tegalreja, as we will see shortly, severely handicapped Dutch efforts to open immediate negotiations with the prince after his intentions had become known (note 257).

Initial reactions to the new Resident on the part of the Yogyanese are not known. But Dipanagara afterwards wisely observed that Smissaert was ‘a good man but weak’ (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:743; Chapter III). The prince also had kind words to say about his wife’s hospitality, remarking that ‘I used to go now and then to Bedhaya […] [and whenever] I went there, Mrs Smissaert [Clara Elisabeth, née Von Liebeherr] out of the goodness of her heart used to come to me offering [me] a bottle of sweet [Cape Dutch] wine which she knew I liked at the time’. It is also seems that Smissaert was well viewed amongst the Yogya Chinese community, not least by Tan Jin Sing who let him live in his house rent free. At the time of his departure from Yogya in late September 1825, the former kapitan cina and the other elders of the Chinese community provided him with two glowing testimonials vouching for his goodness of heart and special consideration towards them.

56 Between March 1820 and April 1822, when he had served as acting Resident of Surakarta (Appendix IX), Nahuys had been more often away in the Sunan’s capital than in Yogya. On Smissaert’s planned climbing holiday to Mount Lawu, see Dj.Br. 81, A.H. Smissaert (Bedhaya/Yogyakarta) to Danureja IV (Yogyakarta), 23-6-1825. It is unclear whether this took place as Smissaert stated that it depended on the amount of work at his office. Since he was only there on Mondays and Thursdays, it cannot have been too onerous.
57 Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:743. On Dipanagara’s fondness for sweet Cape Dutch – Constantia – wine which he regarded as ‘medicinal’ and thus not forbidden under Qur’anic law, see Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 35-6, Chapter III note 87.
58 In the end, Smissaert offered him f 88 a month as an ex gratia payment, Dj.Br. 67A, A.H. Smissaert (Yogyakarta) to Lieutenant Governor-General (H.M. de Kock) (Batavia), 4-10-1824.
59 Van der Kemp 1896a:389 note 1. Tan Jin Sing’s testimonial for Smissaert was also signed by other family members and business associates: Qué Hok Sing, Qué Bok Sing, Lien Tjo Tjing, Tjoa In Yoe, Tan Jun Kam, Hoen Lo, and Tian Hok.
One of Smissaert’s first public acts, however, seems to have caused great resentment in the Yogya kraton. This concerned his ‘agreement’ – as he put it – to represent the young sultan at the Garebeg Puwasa festivities of 9 June 1823 by sitting in person on the vacant Yogya throne, the dhampar. Given that this had earlier been the focus of such intense dispute during the second sultan’s reign (Chapters V-VII), it seems strange that the new Resident was not more sensitive to its significance. Even the most cursory perusal of the Residency archive would have informed him to leave well alone. Ever the conscientious bull in a china shop, however, Smissaert pressed ahead and came to his own inappropriate conclusion. According to him, the fifth sultan was still too young and shy of people to take part in the Garebeg ceremony. Although he had initially thought of cancelling the celebrations, he was overruled by the four guardians, who told him that by right one of their number should represent the sultan. But, as this choice would give rise to jealousy and suspicion amongst them – one can imagine that neither Ratu Ageng nor Ratu Kencana would have been happy to see Dipanagara sit on the throne – they invited Smissaert to act as their representative. Whether this truly reflected their jointly held views, or only the opinion of Ratu Ageng, who had already indicated her willingness to see the European government act as sole guardian for her grandson, we will probably never know. What is certain is that Smissaert’s subsequent action caused Dipanagara in particular feelings of intense grief and heartache.

The Resident had decided that if the dhampar remained unoccupied, ‘it would look as though the Netherlands Indies government was not well disposed towards Yogya’. The governor-general, who had made his own faux-pas with the regard to the Yogya court over this very issue during his 29-31 August 1819 official visit, ratified Smissaert’s decision, merely adding the

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61 Du Bus 402, H.M. van de Poll (hoofd baljuw, Batavia) and William Stavers (translator), ‘Verhoor van Kijaji Modjo in de boeijen van Batavia’ (henceforth: ‘Verhoor Modjo’), 11-10-1829, testimony of Kyai Rosali (Gajali), one of Dipanagara’s leading santri supporters, who is said to have reflected that Smissaert’s action caused Dipanagara een vreselijk hartzeer. It is unclear which Kyai Gajali is being referred to here, but it is likely that it was the ulama from Dhadhapan, whom some sources cite as Kyai Maja’s brother, Appendix VIIb; Babcock 1981a:293. During his capture by Dipanagara’s forces in late 1826, the Dutch official, Paulus Daniel Portier, heard a similar report when he was being brought to the prince’s headquarters at Kemusuh in Kulon Praga. Apparently, Dipanagara particularly resented sitting on a stool while the Resident sat on the dhampar, KITLV H 263, ‘Verklaring […] houdende een verhaal van zijn gevangenschap bij de muitelingen’ (henceforth, Portier ‘Verklaring’), n.y. (? 9-1826).

62 See above note 60.

63 AN, Kabinet, 2-3-1838 no. 30, F.G. Valck (Yogyakarta) to Algemeen Secretaris (Batavia/Bogor), 18-2-1837 no. 134, stating that during his 29-31 August 1819 visit to the court, Van der Capellen had created great displeasure in Yogya by insisting that his wife, Baroness van der Capellen [Jacqueline Elizabeth, née Tuyl van Serooskerken], should sit beside him on the throne prepared for him.
rider that the young sultan should be shown to the public even if only for a very short time.\textsuperscript{64} This meant that at the five Garebeg ceremonies during Smissaert’s thirty-one months as Resident, he represented the child sultan by sitting on the throne and even received the homage of the mancanagara bupati when they came to Yogya to hand over their tribute and pay their respects to the sultan. In mitigation, one could argue that Smissaert was a victim of the European government’s decision not to appoint Pakualam or another senior prince – perhaps Dipanagara himself – as regent. If they had, there would have been no debate about who should ‘represent’ Hamengkubuwana V at the Garebeg (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:449-50, 453). Subsequently, the veteran Indies official, Jan Izaäk van Sevenhoven, who served as acting Resident of Yogya between October 1825 and March 1827, followed Smissaert’s action during the swearing in ceremony for the new guardians of the child sultan on 17 November 1825.\textsuperscript{65} So, the practice of the Resident occupying the Yogya throne at important state functions was apparently continued, at least until the restoration of the second sultan in August 1826. Smissaert’s action was thus not so unique. But, it still caused deep offence. And not just to Dipanagara. It is significant that at the Garebeg Mulud of 16 November 1823, a particularly important occasion since it fell in the Javanese year Dal, the fifth in the Javanese eight-year windu cycle (Appendix XIV), which was supposed to correspond with the year in which The Prophet was born,\textsuperscript{66} Smissaert noticed that the mancanagara bupati refused to answer his questions concerning their districts. Small wonder too that the Resident remarked on the ‘reserve and dourness’ in Yogya at this time for his own action must have greatly contributed to these sentiments. Later, Pangéran Mangkudiningrat II would complain about Smissaert’s action to General De Kock when the latter was commanding the Dutch forces in central Java during the war.\textsuperscript{67} The Resident’s behaviour was also censured by Minister of Marine and Colonies C.Th. Elout, who referred to his decision to represent the sultan at the Garebeg as one of the principal reasons for his dismissal from government service.\textsuperscript{68} Van Sevenhoven would later write his epitaph, speaking of Smissaert’s,

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  \item at the official receptions. She was apparently the first wife of a governor-general ever to sit on a ‘throne’ on the occasion of such a visit.
  \item \textsuperscript{64} vAE 28 (aantwisten 1941), ‘Stukken Smissaert’, A.H. Smissaert (The Hague) to King William I (The Hague/Brussels), n.y. (? 9-1828).
  \item \textsuperscript{65} Dj.Br. 81, J.I. van Sevenhoven (Yogyakarta) to H.M. de Kock (Surakarta), 17-11-1825.
  \item \textsuperscript{66} vAE 28 (aantwisten 1941), ‘Stukken Smissaert’, A.H. Smissaert (Yogyakarta) to G.A.G.Ph. van der Capellen (Batavia/Bogor), 9-11-1823. The Prophet Muhammad was supposed to have been born on Monday Pon, 12 Mulud, in a Javanese Dal year.
  \item \textsuperscript{67} Baud 305A, ‘Geschrift van Prins Mangko Diningrat over de oorzaken van den opstand op Java’ (henceforth: ‘Geschrift van Mangko Dinningrat’), n.y. (12-1826).
  \item \textsuperscript{68} vAE (aantwisten 1941), ‘Stukken Smissaert’, A.H. Smissaert (The Hague) to King William I (The Hague/Brussels), n.y. (? 9-1828); Ministerie van Koloniën 2791, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal in rade, 20-12-1825 no. 1 (decision to uphold Smissaert’s dismissal from his Yogya post, see further note 54).
\end{itemize}
complete ignorance of [the manners and] customs of the Javanese. For a Resident who had spent so many years in Java and had served in so many different posts, one cannot but suppose that he was in the highest degree blameworthy and that he must always take responsibility for this.69

Poor Smissaert, one cannot escape the conclusion that he was the wrong man in the wrong place. As he reflected much later in his justificatory letter to the Dutch king in September 1828 (Van der Kemp 1896a:380):

I came to Yogya in 1823 much against my will. I perceived that the arrangements which had been made for the return of the rented lands would cause much discontent and I was entirely satisfied with [my posting as Resident of] Rembang, wanting nothing else than a slightly higher income, which I believe I had the right to ask for having been so long in the Indies.

The abolition of the land-rent and its consequences

As Smissaert intimated, even before his arrival in Yogya in February 1823, the government was preparing to take a decision of very great consequence: namely, the ending of all land-rent contracts to non-Javanese in the Principalities. Both Van der Capellen and his principal adviser, the Surat-born Van de Graaff (1782-1827) had long been concerned about the proliferation of privately leased estates in the territories controlled by the south-central Javanese courts since it conflicted with their views on the European government’s central role in economic affairs and the need to protect the welfare of the local population (p. 455). In 1816, on the arrival of the Dutch commissioners-general in Java, of whom Van der Capellen was one, it had been decided to observe the status quo with regard to the lands already leased by Daendels and Raffles to private individuals. In the following year, Van de Graaff had taken part in Van der Capellen’s first journey through Java as a councillor for the Board of Finances. On the basis of data collected at that time, Raffles’ land tax system was endorsed as the best groundwork for a comprehensive taxation structure on the island. Meanwhile, the old system of contingents and forced deliveries of cash crops by peasant cultivators was allowed to continue in the Preanger highlands in west Java for the production of coffee and in the Bataviasche Ommelanden (Batavian Environs) for sugar, where private individuals – mainly Chinese – were still permitted to lease land. Sometime after Van de Graaff’s 1817 journey,

69 Dj:Br. 17, ‘Minuten van Sevenhoven’, J.I. van Sevenhoven (Surakarta) to Johannes van den Bosch (Batavia/Bogor), 8-5-1831 no. 47, commenting on the Memorie (Memorial) of A.H. Smissaert to C.Th. Elout, n.y. (? 9-1828) thus, eene volslagen onkunde van de gewoonten van den Javaan, by eenen Resident die zoo veele jaren op Java in verschillende betrekkingen gediend heeft, niet altoos niet te veronderstellen, maar hoogst laakbaar en waarvoor hy steeds verantwoordelijk moet zijn.
The Inspectorate of Finances was set up under P.H. van Lawick van Pabst with Van de Graaff as his assistant. Both concurred in the view that grants of land to other than Javanese owners should be refused unconditionally, except for special concessions to those European owners already in occupation. As late as 1818, Van der Capellen was still not convinced of the Inspectorate’s arguments, and tried to persuade Van Pabst and Van de Graaff to rethink their position on the question pending a personal consultation with King William I, who had begun to take an active interest in colonial affairs. Van de Graaff, however, persisted in his attitude and when he became acting inspector general of Finances in 1819, he refused point blank to allow any more renting of land until the king had pronounced on the issue. At the same time, Van der Capellen journeyed yet again to the south-central Javanese courts in late August and September 1819 and discovered that Nahuys, as Resident of Yogya, had arranged land leases in Yogya and Surakarta for his friends. The extent of these leases was not at the time very striking (Chapter IX note 53), but the governor-general asked both Nahuys and his opposite number in Surakarta, Rijck van Prehn, to prepare a report about the situation, an order which both Residents appear to have ignored.70

After this, events began to move very rapidly in favour of a complete repeal of the land-rent. In 1821, Van de Graaff made his second journey to south-central Java and in his own words, ‘saw the evil [of the land-rent] grow to enormous proportions; British, German, French and Dutch planters had taken over extensive lands right in the middle of the princely territories’.71 Immediately following his visit, he wrote to Van der Capellen urging him to put an end to the land-rent and to promulgate firmer rules regarding the residence of Europeans in the interior of Java. This resulted in the governor-general issuing an order at the end of October 1821 prohibiting further land-rent in the Principalities until a final decision had been taken by the government.72 Again this was ignored by Nahuys, who in that very same year registered the highest number of land leases in Surakarta of any of the years since his arrival in August 1816 (Chapter IX note 53). On 23 March 1822, Van de Graaff’s influential report on the land-rent to Europeans in the Principalities was completed (Van der Kemp 1890:148-94). It was then, according to Van de Graaff, that Van der Capellen began truly to understand the ‘highly illiberal nature’ of

70 Hageman 1856:21; Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:49 note 7, 53-5; Van der Kemp 1901, I:193, 199, who pointed out that there was not even a copy of the governor-general’s decree in the Yogya Residency archive.
71 vAE (aanwinsten 1941), H.J. de Graaff (Batavia) to J. Fabius (Holland), 26-7-1823; Van der Kemp 1901, I:149; Rouffaer 1905:628. De Graaff’s subsequent report on the land-rent to Europeans in the Principalities dated 23 March 1822 is published in Van der Kemp 1890:148-94. See further Veth 1898, II:349; Van Enk 1990:20-1.
72 Ministerie van Koloniën 2777, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal in rade, 30-10-1821 no. 15.
the land-rent which ‘deprived the Javanese peasant of his property rights and debased his status to that of a coolie’.\footnote{VAE (aanwinsten 1941), H.J. van de Graaff (Batavia) to J. Fabius (Holland), 23-7-1823. There is useful overview of the main arguments for and against the land-rent deployed by Van de Graaff, Van der Capellen, and Nahuys van Burgst, in S.Br. 122, H.G. Nahuys van Burgst (Surakarta) to G.A.G.Ph. van der Capellen (Batavia), 2-12-1821; H.J. de Graaff (Batavia) to G.A.G.Ph. van der Capellen (Batavia/Bogor), 23-3-1822 (Van de Graaff's comments on Nahuys' letter).}\footnote{Van der Kemp 1897:23, referring to De Salis’ report of 30 June 1822. See further Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, 1:512, 59-70 (which cites the whole of De Salis’ report).} Shortly after his arrival as Resident of Surakarta in late April 1822, De Salis also came independently to the same conclusion. In his own report to the governor-general, he stressed that in his view the land-rent was fundamentally at odds with both European government policy and with Javanese custom.\footnote{VAE (aanwinsten 1941), H.J. van de Graaff (Batavia) to J. Fabius (Holland), 26-7-1823; Van der Kemp 1897:22-3.} With these reports still fresh in his mind, Van der Capellen made his third and last journey to the courts in late August and early September 1822. After lengthy discussions with the chief ministers and the leading members of the kraton administrations, he returned to Bogor full of disapproval of the existing situation. A commission was immediately established under the chairmanship of General De Kock, then serving as lieutenant governor-general (in office 1822-1830), which was instructed to investigate the whole issue of the property rights of Europeans in the territories under European government control, one of the key questions being ‘whether the renting of land to Europeans in the Principalities with their désa [villages] and inhabitants is liberal and necessary for the Netherlands-Indies government’. On this point, the commission reported negatively, stating that the government had no means of controlling the activities of the European planters, nor of alleviating the manifest oppression of the Javanese cultivators by the former.\footnote{Ministerie van Koloniën 2778, Besluit van den Gouverneur Generaal in rade, 6-5-1823 no. 1, 20-5-1823 no. 1, both decrees are printed in Staatsblad van Nederlandsch-Indië 17 (1823) and the first is reprinted in Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:621-4. Article 13 of the 20 May edict stipulated...} According to Clive Day, the American historian of the Dutch administration in Java, the decision by the Dutch monarch to back the planters and order the Netherlands Indies government to raise the price paid to private producers of coffee also persuaded Van der Capellen to act quickly (Day 1972:234-5). This meant that even before the commission’s decision was known, Van der Capellen in consultation with his council, decided to promulgate his fateful decree of 6 May 1823, ordering that all land rented by Europeans and Chinese in the Principalities should be returned to their original owners not later than 31 January 1824. This was followed up by a further decree on 20 May 1823, which laid down very strict rules regarding the travel and residence of Europeans, Chinese and other foreigners in Java, especially in the princely states.\footnote{Ministerie van Koloniën 2778, Besluit van den Gouverneur Generaal in rade, 6-5-1823 no. 1, 20-5-1823 no. 1, both decrees are printed in Staatsblad van Nederlandsch-Indië 17 (1823) and the first is reprinted in Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:621-4. Article 13 of the 20 May edict stipulated...}
Plate 59. Official portrait of Lieutenant-General Hendrik Merkus de Kock (1779-1845), the commander of the Dutch armies in the field during the Java War, and Lieutenant-Governor of the Dutch Asian Possessions (s Rijks Aziatische Bezittingen) (1822-1825) and of the Netherlands Indies (4 February 1826-16 January 1830). Painted circa 1830. Photograph by courtesy of the Musium Kota, Jakarta.
This abrupt and radical decision by the governor-general caused mixed feelings at the courts. In Surakarta, De Salis had already noted how, on the receipt of an earlier letter from Van der Capellen reporting his more stringent rules regarding the land-rent\textsuperscript{77} – an interim measure prior to complete abolition – Pakubuwana V had appeared very perturbed (Van der Kemp 1897:26):

His Highness after reading the letter was greatly dismayed. Although fully alive to the importance of the measure, he raised many objections with me about the execution of the order. In particular, His Highness pointed out that the rent contracts from the leased lands bore the authorisation of his royal seal and that, by breaking the contracts, his seal would be much degraded and it would be very difficult to come to terms with the lessees.

According to Van de Graaff pressure had been put on the Sunan by European land-renters to protest the measure (Van der Kemp 1901, I:193). The Dutch historian, P.H. van der Kemp, even suggested that one letter of protest written to Nahuys in Batavia by the Surakarta prince, Pangéran Buminata, was actually concocted by Nahuys himself with the assistance of a Eurasian land-renter, J.A. Dezentjé, who leased a large estate from Buminata at Ampèl some 40 kilometres west of Surakarta on the Boyolali-Salatiga road.\textsuperscript{78} There is nothing to confirm this. It is clear, however, that several senior Surakarta princes were heavily in debt to the European government at this time and the land-rent may have come at a difficult time. Pangéran Purbaya, the future Sunan Pakubuwana VII, was said to owe 300,000 Spanish dollars and Mangkunagara II around 200,000 Spanish dollars.\textsuperscript{79} But debts alone were not in themselves a cause for opposing the abolition. Mangkunagara II, for example, declared himself fully satisfied that no foreigners should reside further than two leagues (three kilometres) from the Residency capitals if they resided in the ‘interior’ of Java (namely, inland from the north coast). Articles 15 and 18 laid down that all foreign visitors to the princely states had to obtain special passes from the Residents of Surakarta and Yogyakarta before making their journeys. On 26 August 1823, Van der Capellen recapitulated the measures taken by the Residents at the courts to place the Chinese under closer supervision, Ministerie van Koloniën 2779, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal in rade, 26-8-1823 nos. 21-22. See further Van der Kemp 1901, I:146; Rouffaer 1905:628.\textsuperscript{77}

\textsuperscript{77} Van der Kemp 1901, I:194-9, referring to Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal, 14-1-1823 La B, forbidding rental of lands for more than three years, ordering all such rentals to be registered with the Resident within two months and insisting that a six-month rent advance was paid by the lessee. It was this decision which was communicated to Pakubuwana V. The governor-general also wrote to Hamengkubuwana V’s guardian at this time, Dj.Br. 81, G.A.G.Ph. van der Capellen (Batavia/Bogor) to Hamengkubuwana V (Yogyakarta), 14-1-1823.

\textsuperscript{78} Van der Kemp 1897:30-2. On Dezentjé’s estate at Ampèl, see Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:610; Houben 1994:320-1. He also rented 17 other parcels of land amounting in total (including the 11 jung Ampèl estate) to 29 jung. See further Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, IV:482, on Nahuys’ 28 August 1828 letter to Commissioner-General Du Bus de Gisignies which describes the impact of Van der Capellen’s 6 May 1823 decree in Surakarta.

with the governor-general's measure and even offered to help the government with the liquidation of the estates. Likewise, the Surakarta patih, Radèn Adipati Sasradiningrat II, promised to act swiftly to bring the affairs of the land-rent to a conclusion after the Garebeg Mulud of 16 November 1823.80

In Yogyakarta, Van der Capellen's decision initially met with a favourable reception when it was communicated by Smissaert to the guardians in early June 1823.81 Mangkubumi seemed to speak for his fellow princes and all those who had rented lands in the kraton when he observed: ‘everyone was pleased about it. It was as though we had been showered with water. We had been hot, now we were refreshed.’82 Such feelings of euphoria were soon dashed, however, by the financial realities of the compensations which the government stipulated should be paid to the planters.83 In making these payments, Yogyakarta was more heavily burdened than Surakarta. Whereas the estates in the latter kingdom were to be reimbursed according to the yearly amount produced by the plantations and the payments spread out over a long period, the Yogyakarta indemnities had to be made directly from the sultan's treasury and income, the estates being immediately taken back by the Yogyakarta ruler before being returned to the original fiefees (Van der Kemp 1897:32-4; Van Hogendorp 1913:147). Why this distinction was made is not entirely obvious. It may be that Europeans who had leased lands from the Sunan's family in Surakarta soon came to the realisation that they had no prospect of getting immediate compensation from their impecunious landlords. They thus successfully petitioned Van der Capellen to enact a special decree allowing them to hold on to their estates until they could be reimbursed through the sale of the coffee produced on their lands.84 In Yogyakarta, where the land-rent was

80 Ministerie van Koloniën 2737, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal buiten rade, 8-6-1823 no. 3, referring to De Salis' letter of 29-5-1823 in which both Mangkunagara II and Radèn Adipati Sasradiningrat II's reactions were described. According to Willem van Hogendorp, however, the land-rent continued in Mangkunagara II's domains on the recommendation of Mangkunagara II's aide-de-camp (ordonnans), William Stavers, who rented lands at Singosaren from him, Van Hogendorp 1913:156; Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:609 (on Stavers' Singosaren estate).
81 Ministerie van Koloniën 2737, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal buiten rade, 17-6-1823 no. 4, referring to Smissaert's letter of 5-6-1823.
83 The compensations were later overseen by a three-man commission set up on 3 February 1824 consisting of J.I. van Sevenhoven (first Resident of Surakarta), Hendrik MacGillivray (second Resident of Surakarta), and A.H. Smissaert, Van der Kemp 1897:32-5; Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:75-6.
84 Ministerie van Koloniën 2781, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal in rade, 3-2-1824 no. 13, citing a petition received from J.A. Dezentjé, P. Hamar de la Brethonnière, F.Ph.F. Darlang, Gillean Maclaine, F.M. Kuiper, Frederik Hoff, Christoffel Nolte, Frederik Hartmann van Vlissingen, Carel Eugenius Hoff, François Deux and F. Havinga. See further Van der Kemp 1901, I:197-8; Van Hogendorp 1913:147.
more bitterly resented (Van Hogendorp 1913:147), the decision was taken to adopt a system of immediate compensation. It is possible that pressure from Ratu Ageng and Danureja IV forced this policy on the reluctant guardians, Mangkubumi and Dipanagara (Van der Kemp 1901, I:197-8). According to Valck, Ratu Ageng in particular thought it better to obey the instructions of the government because her grandson the fifth sultan was still so young and Yogyakarta was in such dire need of government protection. Whatever the case, it soon became clear that the depleted Yogyakarta treasury had no capacity to meet the payments out of existing funds. The indemnity for Dr Harvey Thomson’s Rajawinangun estate alone – f 99,000 – was nearly half the total annual income received by the sultanate from the European government for the rent of the markets and tollgates, and special arrangements had to be made to pay it off in instalments. Given the size of the indemnities demanded – that for Thomson’s neighbour, J.M. Tissot, renter of the Jumagatan coffee estate, topped f 110,000 (Van Enk 1999:210) – the kraton was soon facing bankruptcy. Small wonder that Dipanagara was forced to sanction a loan of f 37,000 from the Yogyakarta kapitan cina, Qué Wi Kong (in office 1813-1827), a close relation of Tan Jin Sing (Secadiningrat), to defray the ordinary running expenses of the court. Indeed, the burden of the repayments on the Yogyakarta exchequer was so onerous that in November 1824, nine months after the last financial indemnities had been agreed, Smissaert was writing that the guardians were far behind with their repayments. Because of low prices for coffee, he reported that the estates would never produce sufficient income to meet these reimbursements. In the same year, the European government was forced to give the

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85 The only allowance made was that, if the indemnities were worth more than six months’ rent, they could be paid off in instalments at Mulud and Puwasa, and the term of the repayments was extended to January 1824, Van der Kemp 1901, I:198.
87 Ministerie van Koloniën 2779, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal in rade, 10-5-1824 no. 25. Thomson’s f 99,000 indemnity had been accepted by Hamengkubuwana V’s guardians, Dipanagara and Mangkubumi, see A.H. Smissaert (Yogyakarta) to G.A.G.Ph. van der Capellen (Batavia/Bogor), 26-3-1824 cited in Van der Capellen’s 10-5-1824 Besluit; Van Enk 1990:27, 1999:210. Given the Yogyakarta treasury’s inability to pay, the government agreed to advance Thomson f 90,000 out of its public treasury (landskas) and indemnify itself at the rate of 8,000 Spanish dollars a month from the ‘pension’ paid to Hamengkubuwana V for the rent of the markets and tollgates. Since the value of one Indies guilder was Dfl 1.20 at this time, and that of the Spanish dollar was Dfl 2.56 (Appendix XVI), Harvey’s f 99,000 (Dfl 118,800) indemnity was worth nearly half the Dfl 256,000 (100,000 Spanish dollars) paid annually for the markets and tollgates.
88 Dj. Br. 17, ‘Minuten Van Sevenhoven’, J.I. van Sevenhoven (Commissioner to the courts of Surakarta and Yogyakarta) (Yogyakarta) to Johannes van den Bosch (Batavia/Bogor), 18-2-1831 no. 13, reporting Danureja IV’s remark that whenever there was no ready money in the kraton to meet daily expenses in the 1824-1825 period, this was borrowed from the kapitan cina and Dipanagara as guardian had sanctioned a loan of f 37,000 from Qué Wi Kong, which was eventually paid off in instalments over three years after the Java War.
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guardians an advance of £45,000 to repay the planters and a further £18,333
to meet the daily requirements of the kraton.90 Subsequently, moveable goods
and family heirlooms (pusaka) were sold to meet the costs of the court and
further sizeable sums were deducted from the annual government stipend to
meet the payments to the previous estate owners (Van Nes 1844:152).

It seems clear that the indemnities demanded were too high, and many
Yogya princes and senior court officials soon began to suspect fraud on the
part of the European land-renters.91 At the same time, they suffered acute per-
sonal financial embarrassment. Many had become almost wholly dependent
on land-rent payments for their daily sustenance. They had also used the cash
income to finance the imported European luxuries to which they had grown
accustomed (pp. 437-8, 459). Within eighteen months of Van der Capellen’s
6 May 1823 decision, according to J.F. Walraven van Nes, who would subse-
quently serve as acting Resident of both Yogyakarta and Surakarta (Appendix
IX), the Yogya pangérán and court retainers were reduced to a state of abject
poverty.92 General De Kock also remarked that the indemnification process
had ‘brought many Javanese into extreme distress and even forced village
tax collectors (bekel) to resign their posts because they were unable to raise
sufficient taxes’.93 The few surviving debt lists from this period indicate that
certain members of the Yogya kraton owed large sums to local European and
Chinese moneylenders in the two years before the Java War.94

The case of a noble such as Pangérán Blitar (circa 1784-1827), a great-uncle
of Dipanagara, who would himself be one of the first to rally to the prince
at Selorong in late July 1825, was probably typical of many of his contempo-
raries. He claimed that he had pawned all his valuables, including his pu-
saka, stating that his monthly interest payments came to 110 Spanish dollars
whereas the highest income he could expect from his lands was 80 Spanish
dollars a month.95 Smissaert also noted with concern the rapid impoverish-
ment of the Yogya elite and wrote early in 1826 that,

90 Ministerie van Koloniën 2783, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal in rade, 18-5-1824 no.
25, 19-7-1824 no. 10.
91 KITLV H 699g (Archieftukken Vorstenlanden, Rouffaer notes on Yogya Residency archive),
78. See further Louw and De Klerk 1894-1909, I:59.
94 Ministerie van Koloniën 4132, ‘Bijlagen Smissaert’, lists of debts in Yogya, 5-10-1825; Van
der Kemp 1896b:567-70. A number of these debts were owed to Smissaert himself who had made
much profit out of receiving pawned goods from Europeans and Chinese, as well as lending
money to the commander of the sultan’s troops, Major Tumenggung Wiranagara, and others,
Louw and De Klerk 1894-1909, I:277 note 1.
95 Louw and De Klerk 1894-1909, I:600-1, III:109 note 3 (for an unfavourable report on Blitar
after he had gone over to the Dutch in 1827); dK 111, ‘Over het karakter van den Soesoeheoenan,
den sultan van Djokjokarta en de prinsen en rijksgrooten’, Magelang, 20-12-1829; Dj.Br. 54, A.H.
Smissaert (Yogyakarta) to Hendrik MacGillivray (Surakarta), 29-7-1825 (stating that Blitar had
joined Dipanagara at Selorong on 29 July 1825). See further Appendix VIIIa.
The princes and regents [bupati] here are very poor. One is doing them a great service if one lends them 100 Spanish dollars, for interest rates here are very high, they pay three percent [a month] sometimes more when they borrow money.96

Such men later gravitated towards Dipanagara, who had earlier indicated his strong personal opposition to the land-rent (Chapter IX), and who, as a guardian, soon became outraged at the size of the indemnities offered to the European planters.97 We will return to this shortly, but first we must consider the impact of Van der Capellen’s decrees at the village level.

One side effect of the abolition of the land-rent seems to have been an increase in lawlessness in the countryside, particularly on the part of bandits and other criminal elements (wong durjana) who specialised in making attacks on properties leased by Europeans. The knowledge that these estates would shortly be returned to their original owners and the fact that many lay far from populated areas seem to have emboldened the wong durjana who joined up with disgruntled estate workers eager to square accounts with their erstwhile masters.98 Despite Nahuys’ warnings to Smissaert to redouble his vigilance in the months immediately following the publication of Van der Capellen’s May decrees, a number of local attacks were made on European leased estates. Nahuys’s own country seat at Bedhaya, as well as Sempu, Babadan and Kembangarum, coffee estates on the flanks of Mount Merapi nearer to the Yogya-Kedhu border, were amongst those initially targeted.99 Indeed, many

96 vAE (aanwinsten 1941), A.H. Smisaaert (Yogyakarta) to G.A.G.Ph. van der Capellen (Batavia/Bogor), 7-1-1824. According to Chevallier and other contemporary sources, the rates of interest sometimes reached as much as four percent a month, Kronijk van Nederlandsch-Indië 1845:37; Van der Kemp 1896b:569; Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:600.

97 Baud 305A, ‘Geschrift Mangko Diningrat’, n.y. (12-1826), remarked that those princes who had borrowed money from the Chinese were among the first to join Dipanagara at Selarong. This was largely confirmed by Smissaert, vAE (aanwinsten 1941), A.H. Smisaaert (The Hague) to King William I (The Hague/Brussels), n.y. (9-1828).

98 On the flight of workers from the coffee estates laid out by Dr Harvey Thomson at Raja-winangun and the French land-renter, J.M. Tissot, at Kasihan (? Jumagatan) near Gamping in Bantul district to the southwest of Yogya (Schoel 1931:168) on 23-7-1825 just after the outbreak of the Java War, see Dj.Br. 81, A.H. Smisaaert (Yogyakarta) to Hendrik MacGillivray (Surakarta), 23-7-1825. Tissot’s wife, a Javanese, had refused to move from his Jumagatan estate in early 1824 because she had just given birth to their first child, Dj.Br. 53, A.H. Smisaaert (Yogyakarta) to G.A.G.Ph. van der Capellen (Batavia/Bogor), 27-1-1824.

99 UBL, BPL 616, Port. 8 pt. 2, William M. Cotes (Salatiga) to H.G. Nahuys van Burgst (Batavia), 31-5-1823; Port. 9 pt. 3, Nahuys van Burgst, ‘Onlusten op Java’, Maastricht, 2-1826 (on Nahuys’ warnings). For the geographical location of Sempu, Babadan, Kembangarum and Bedhaya, see Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, IV:Map. Sempu was leased by J.D. Boutet (who seems to have taken it over from another French land-renter, Simon Roze d’Infreville, Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:611 no. 89; Payen 1988:109-10 note 112), Babadan by the Amsterdam-born Dutch estate owner, P.M.M. Bouwens van der Boyen, and Kembangarum jointly by Bouwens and the Scotsman Robert Shand. Since Bouwens had been sent to Java for political reasons and had contacts with the Dutch court, he was exempted from Van der Capellen’s 6 May 1823 decree, see Van Enk 1999:203-6, 219 note 89. He later married one of Smisaaert’s daughters, Payen 1988:46, 86-7 note 6.
of these places would later become focal points of support for Dipanagara during the war – what Dutch military commanders would term ‘bandit’ centres. The most serious incidents involved the property at Babadan leased by the much-hated Amsterdam estate owner, Jonkheer (Baron) Pierre Marie Mathieu Bouwens van der Boyen, who had been sent to Java as a de facto political exile and set up by the government as an estate owner because of fears that he might use his insider knowledge of a recent conspiracy involving the Dutch Crown Prince (future King William II, reigned 1840-1849) to blackmail the Dutch monarch. With important political connections in the Netherlands, but no skill in estate management, Bouwens appears to have regularly abused his estate workers (note 99; Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, II:269-71; Van Enk 1999:204-6). Indeed, he was so intensely disliked that the Residents in the sultan’s capital had to issue him with a special allocation of gunpowder from the Yogya fort so that he could use light cannon against would-be assailants. His workers responded in kind, recruiting local wong durjana to mount a series of attacks on his property in 1823-1825 and eventually razing his estate to the ground following the outbreak of the Java War.

100 dK 181, A.H. Smissaert (Yogyakarta) to H.M. de Kock (Surakarta), 13-8-1825 (on Demang Nitikrama of Sempu who joined Dipanagara and turned Boutet’s former estate into a ‘bandit’ centre); Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:461 (on Bedhaya), II:268-71 (on Kembangarum); 465-6 (on William Stavers’ estate at Singosarèn where Dipanagara’s supporters burnt his house). The word used by Dutch commanders for rebel supporters of Dipanagara was brandhal which roughly translates as bandit, scoundrel, predator, rebel, freebooter, good-for-nothing, see Carey 1981a:290-1 note 232.

101 This involved a plot to place the Dutch Crown Prince on the throne of France (and Belgium) aided by politically discontented elements in France, Van Enk 1999:205, 220 notes 103-4, citing Nieuwenhuyzen 1907:1521. See further Chapter IX note 165 for a possibly garbled report of this conspiracy to the Surakarta court.

102 Dj.Br. 53, A.H. Smissaert (Yogyakarta) to Commander of Yogya garrison (? Captain Menso Johannes Bouwensch), 14-2-1824. This special issue of gunpowder dated back to 1818, see Dj.Br. 52, A.H. Smissaert (Yogyakarta) to Algemeen Secretaris (J. Bousquet) (Batavia/Bogor), 10-9-1823, referring to Ministerie van Koloniën 2441, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal buiten rade, 11-3-1818. A similar provision of three ponden of gunpowder and one eight-pounder cannon was made to the Yogya interpreter, J.G. Dietrée, to defend his rented village at Pogang to the east of Yogya, Dj.Br. 63, A.H. Smissaert (Yogyakarta) to Commander of Yogya garrison (? Captain M.J. Bouwensch), 14-2-1824.

103 The first attack on Babadan occurred in September 1823 when Bouwens’ bamboo warehouses (pakhuizen) were put to the torch and an attempt made to fire the main house. Europeans were in the house at the time and one of them, Lieutenant Pieters of the Yogya garrison, was killed attempting to fight off the assailants with his bare hands. According to Smissaert, the ringleader of the attack was a certain Pak Panji from the Yogya village of Tempèl on the Yogya-Magelang road which had earlier been a bandit hideout in the British period. Those mounting the attack all had palm-leaf jimat (protector amulets), inscribed with magic formulae as head wrappers to provide them with invulnerability against Bouwens’ cannon. The local police official (oppasser) was very reluctant to investigate the incident and the officials dispatched from the patih’s office in Surakarta (Babadan was in Sala territory) took six days to make the short journey from the Sunan’s capital travelling in Smissaert’s words ‘like the troops of his Holiness the Pope’, Dj.Br. 52, A.H. Smissaert (Yogyakarta) to Algemeen Secretaris (J. Bousquet) (Batavia/Bogor), 5-9-1823; A.H.
Dipanagara’s role as guardian and the land-rent indemnities

As a guardian of the young sultan with special responsibilities for the financial administration of the kraton, Dipanagara was called upon to play a leading role in the negotiations for the indemnification of the European land-renters. The first case involved Bedhaya, for which Nahuys requested the astronomical sum of f50,000 by way of financial compensation. The former Yogya Resident had already demanded (and secured) an equally inflated figure for the out-of-town retreat of the Surakarta Residents at Kalitan just to the west of Surakarta close to the old royal capital of Kartasura. This country seat had been established by the disgraced Rijck van Prehn (in office 1818-1819) and completed by Nahuys following his appointment as acting Resident at the Sunan’s court in March 1820. He had also been able to profit from the sale of jewelry and gold ornaments from the Yogya kraton during the fourth sultan’s reign (note 135). He now expected to make a similar profit out of his Yogya property investment.

Smissaert wrote to Dipanagara and his fellow guardian, Pangéran Mangkubumi, on 25 July 1823, stating that the amount stipulated by the former Resident included reimbursements for the house, the warehouses, the 110,000 coffee trees, 30,000 pepper bushes and the yearly rent of 120 Spanish dollars which he had paid the deceased fourth sultan since July 1817. As Nahuys was on the point of departing for Europe, immediate compensation was demanded. The two guardians came to see Smissaert and asked if they might travel to Bedhaya to inspect the buildings and the grounds. Permission was granted, and Smissaert immediately instructed D’Abo, who was then at Bedhaya overseeing the coffee plantations, to show the princes everything. Accompanied by the patih, Major Tumenggung Wiranagara, and two senior kraton bupati, the guardians made their visit on 29 July. After close inspection of the house and its immediate environs, they came to the conclusion that the
Plate 60. Bedhaya, the country house on the flanks of Mount Merapi, which was built for Nahuys A.A.J. Payen as *une jolie casino* (a pretty country retreat) and was used by Resident A.H. Smissaert.
van Burgst by the Assistant-Resident of Yogya, R.C.N. d’Abo. It was described by the painter during the weeks before the outbreak of the Java War. Sketch from NvB 22.
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price demanded by Nahuys was far too high. According to Van Nes, who interviewed Mangkubumi and other kraton members in 1829, the guardians only agreed to the very small figure of 800 Spanish dollars for the buildings (Van Nes 1844:150). Valck even suggested that their offer was lower at 700 Spanish dollars, a sum which D’Abo himself reckoned the house and ware-houses to be worth. Payen, who visited Bedhaya in early July 1825 inferred that these much smaller sums were probably nearer the mark than Nahuys’ inflated figure. In his diary, he wrote scathingly that the land around Nahuys’ ‘pretty little house’ comprising a long gallery with rooms off both ends were (Payen 1988:46):

arid cinders in which the miserable coffee plantations which surround this estate languish. Seeing them, one is amazed at what they must have all cost to lay out. In buying them back, the sultan will only ever get a bit of wood to burn. Already, some of the [coffee] trees are dead. Mr D’Abo, who set up this establishment, was only too happy to let it go in such a [financially] advantageous way.

It was precisely this realisation that caused the guardians to make their modest bid. As Dipanagara is reported to have said:

How can Smissaert order us to take over all the land and coffee plantations from Nahuys? The house itself is perhaps an exception because that can be of use to the sultan, but what possible profit can we expect from the coffee and other plantations? The arrangement would amount to nothing more than debts for us [because] we cannot make the same profits from the plantations which the Europeans did.

Mangkubumi supported his co-guardian in this opinion. But Smissaert, who later acknowledged the difficulties of harvesting the coffee to his deputy, Chevallier, refused to accept it. He summoned the guardians to a meeting in the old Residency House with the patih present, pressing the guardians on the question and asking Danureja to provide details of the amount of money which Nahuys spent on the daily wages of his labour force (Chapter IX note 74). The figures were given and Smissaert suggested that the sum offered was far too low. Whereupon Van Nes reported the following observations on the part of the guardians:

108 dK 161, Van Nes, ‘Korte verhandelingen’, 28-1-1830. The printed version also contains much the same material but with some cuts, Van Nes 1844:148-50. See also Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:603, where Dipanagara and Mangkubumi made a similar point in their official letter.
109 Dj.Br. 81, A.H. Smissaert (Bedhaya) to P.F.H. Chevallier (Yogyakarta), 13-6-1825.
‘Yes’, answered Mangkubumi, leaning his head back on his chair, ‘if you want to reckon everything together, but what possible value does it have for the young sultan?’

Dipanagara stared straight ahead of him for a while and eventually spoke in a rather surly way:

‘If my father hadn’t died, he would still be alive. If Nahuys hadn’t spent so much money, he would still have it in his pocket.’

Afterwards he spoke not a word more and shook his head.110

But Smissaert held out for the original figure, telling the guardians:

You should be content with that sum. If it was my own property, I would not relinquish it for such a small price.111

Mangkubumi proposed that the property be returned to D’Abo’s care for two years so that he could make the necessary profits from the sale of the coffee and pepper harvests, precisely the arrangement made in Surakarta with the European land-renters (page 532). But this was not accepted by Smissaert, who, in a private conversation with Danureja, agreed a compromise sum of 26,000 Spanish dollars. When the guardians again refused, Smissaert cited the former Resident’s friendship with the fourth sultan as a reason for their agreement, whereupon Dipanagara is supposed to have burst out:

My God! Nahuys may well have been a friend of the sultan, but he never did him a favour. Now does he want his friendship paid for in money? He never put the sultan on the throne! Mr [John] Deans [secretary of the Yogya Residency, 1811-1813] was a good friend of [my father] Sultan Raja [Hamengkubuwana III]; he even facilitated his accession […] but he never received any repayment for his efforts other than that the sultan bought him a horse for 700 Spanish dollars.112

At this point, the meeting broke up in acrimony, tempers frayed on all sides. The guardians went straight to the kraton to discuss the matter with Ratu Ageng, pointing out the catastrophic effect it would have on court finances if the sum negotiated by Smissaert was agreed to. But the ratu, on her own initiative and mindful of the need to keep the European government on the right side, instructed Danureja to accept the sum proposed by the Resident.113

Afterwards, the guardians were again summoned to the Residency with instructions to bring their seals with them. According to Mangkubumi, they were then ordered to authorize an official letter handing over 26,000 Spanish

112 dK 161, Van Nes, ‘Korte verhandelingen’, 28-1-1830. This is not in the printed version.
113 dK 161, Van Nes, ‘Korte verhandelingen’, 28-1-1830. This is not in the printed version.
dollars without even being given an opportunity to peruse its contents. On their return to the kraton, the guardians realised that they had been duped. But they were constrained to make arrangements whereby 6,000 Spanish dollars was paid immediately out of the sultan’s treasury with the remainder being met by surrendering one-twelfth of the yearly rent paid by the European government for the markets and tollgates.

 Shortly after this, in February 1824, the question of reimbursement for Dr Thomson’s indigo factory at Rajawinangun came up (note 87). But, Dipanagara refused to have anything more to do with the liquidation of the land-rent. According to his cousin, Pangéran Mangkudiningrat II, he was especially exercised by the fact that notwithstanding the hefty financial reimbursements agreed with the European land-renters many of them still remained on their estates in order to ensure repayments from the annual coffee harvests. The prince now began to appear rarely in the kraton and it was with the utmost difficulty that Smissaert could get him to come to Yogya for meetings. He also began to see his co-guardian, Mangkubumi, very seldom and affairs of state were decided in his absence by Smissaert or his Assistant-Resident, Chevellier, in consultation with the patih, the commander of the sultan’s bodyguard, Major Tumenggung Wiranagara, the Residency interpreter, J.G. Dietrée and Ratu Ageng. Indeed, the prince is supposed to have delegated all his responsibilities to Ratu Ageng at this juncture with the words: ‘I wish to have nothing more to do with it [the guardianship]. Handle it in whatever way you choose!’ Later, when he was being escorted into exile, he reflected bitterly on this period (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:743):

As a guardian, I always had nothing to do. We were usually informed about the money paid into the sultan’s treasury because I had to give my seal for that, but we never had any knowledge about the money paid out […] and only that which was earmarked for payments within the kraton was given to Wiranagara. When I

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114 dK 161, Van Nes, ‘Korte verhandelingen’, 28-1-1830; Van Nes 1844:151 note 1, where he quoted Mangkubumi as saying that ‘[the letter] indeed bore our seals, but its contents were never made known to us’. The letter referred to is almost certainly that printed in Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:602-3. Smissaert reported the sale to Nahuys in late September, Dj.Br. 52, A.H. Smissaert (Yogyakarta) to H.G. Nahuys van Burgst (Batavia), 22-9-1823.


116 dK 161, Van Nes, ‘Korte verhandelingen’, 28-1-1830; Van Nes 1844:151-3 for the printed version. It seems that by the end of February 1824, all the lands rented by Europeans in Yogyakarta had been reimbursed, see Dj.Br. 6, Ratu Ageng (Yogyakarta) to A.H. Smissaert (Yogyakarta), 28-2-1824, referring to the lands rented by Dr Harvey Thomson (Rajawinangun), J.M. Tissot (Jumagatan), N. Nogues (Kanangan) and Captain De Ceuvelaire (Karanganyar).


was outside [at Tegalreja], I heard there was no longer any money in the treasury, although everyone knew there must be still much left. [But] the patih [...] needed money, first with this, then with that excuse [and] things were always being built. That Dietrée [...] he was always busy with the secretary [Chevallier] and the patih and anything of importance was decided without us.

We will see shortly how the ensuing period before the outbreak of the Java War would be an exceptionally significant one for Dipanagara in terms of his spiritual development. Between May 1824 and May 1825, the prince would experience a series of visions which would help to clarify his understanding of his calling as a future Ratu Adil. Even Smissaert seemed to sense that Dipanagara’s focus was now no longer on the mundane concerns of guardianship. In his subsequent justificatory memorial to the Dutch king, he pointed out that ‘the opportunities to see and speak with him [Dipanagara] were very rare [after February 1824] because he was always concerned with his spiritual duties and lived a very isolated life [at Tegalreja’]. As it became clear that Dipanagara might be preparing to oppose the Dutch authorities, the ever sanguine Yogya Resident tried to summon him back from one of his retreats at the cave of Suralanang on the south coast for a meeting at his temporary office in the Yogya fort (Chapter IV note 45). The image of the ascetic prince in his cave plotting rebellion and the senior Dutch official in Yogya sending a runner down to the south coast to persuade him to turn up for a conference at the Yogya fort, speaks volumes for Smissaert’s naiveté. Van Sevenhoven, who saw a lot of the Yogya Resident during this period in connection with their joint duties as commissioners enquiring into the working of the tollgates and preparing for further territorial annexations in the Principalities, remarked that his colleague was always blithely unconcerned about any possible threat from the Yogya princes, dismissing them as too ‘indolent and stupid’ to ever start an uprising against the government.120

Dipanagara’s break with the court

Although Smissaert refused to read the signs, all the evidence indicates that Dipanagara’s break with the court had already occurred by early 1824.121 By the latter half of 1823, two of Dipanagara’s close friends had been dismissed from their offices due to the machinations of Danureja and Ratu Ageng. It is certain these moves aroused the prince’s deep indignation. The first dismissal involved the bupati of Kerja in the Sokawati area, Mas Tumenggung Kertadirja

120 Dj.Br. 17, ‘Minuten Van Sevenhoven’, J.I. van Sevenhoven (Surakarta) to Johannes van den Bosch (Batavia/Bogor), 5-5-1831 no. 47.
121 There is no evidence to back Dipanagara’s assertion in his babad (note 18) that the break occurred much earlier at the start of Hamengkubuwana V’s reign.
II (born 1779, in office 1812-1821). This man, who had an extensive family (he later admitted to having no less than twenty-nine children and grandchildren), was well known to the prince because his father had served as the *patih* of the Crown Prince’s establishment (*kadipaten*) during Dipanagara’s early manhood in the 1800s (Appendix Vb). As we have seen, the younger Kertadirja seems to have shared the prince’s interest in Javanese-Islamic religious literature (p. 100) and he subsequently took up residence at Tegalreja after his dismissal. On the outbreak of the Java War, he became one of Dipanagara’s principal army commanders in the Madiun area before being captured on the slopes of Mount Lawu in January 1826. After the Java War, he expressed a strong interest in making the pilgrimage to Mecca and ending his days in Arabia as a *haji*, stating that if it was God’s Will such an end would be the ‘crowning blessing’ of his life.122 One of his early letters, written after Dipanagara had restored him to his previous post as *bupati* of Kerja in August 1825, stated that he was waging war to attack Yogya, to improve the practice of the Islamic religion in Java and to restore peace in the country. He specifically blamed Danureja IV for starting the war pointing out that he had pitted men against each other, in particular new village heads against old ones (note 132; Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:523 note 2). Certainly, his own dismissal was patently engineered by Danureja in order that his father-in-law, Mas Tumenggung Sasrawirana, an uncle of Ratu Ageng, could be appointed in Kertadirja’s place. Kertadirja went as a supplicant to the Residency early in 1823, but although Smissaert ordered a reinvestigation, the original judgement was upheld in the religious court. Again Danureja appears to have influenced the proceedings, for the head of the Yogya religious establishment, Pengulu Rahmanudin, complained bitterly to Dipanagara about it.123

122 Bataviasche Courant 3, 18-1-1826 (on Kertadirja’s capture); AN, Exhibitum 15-11-1831 no. 20, Mas Tumenggung Kertadirja (Yogyakarta) to Radèn Adipati Danureja IV (Yogyakarta), 21 Jumadilawal AJ 1759 (AD 28-10-1831; on his desire to go on the *haj* and die in Arabia); Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:523 note 2, 559, 576; Carey 1981a:284-5. After his capture by the Dutch on 9-1-1826, he was taken on by Mangkunagara II as a supplier for his troops in the Sokawati area, but did not fulfil his duties properly. Mangkunagara II asked that he should be banished from Java and his previous district of Kerja be incorporated in his own territories after the Java War, Büchler 1888, II:8; AN, Exhibitum 3-5-1830 no. 6, 29-5-1830, Kabinet no. 189. Kertadirja was sent to Ambon in November 1831 so that, in the words of Governor-General J. van den Bosch’s official decision, the government ‘could see Java shot of this spiteful man once and for all’ (*om in eens deze wrevelige man op Java ontslagen te zien*), Dj.Br. 17, ‘Minuten Van Sevenhoven’, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal, Bogor, 4-11-1831 no. 100, 15-11-1831 no. 20 (decision on annual allowance). There is a reference to him and his two remaining family members in Ambon in 1841 ‘living quietly and modestly’ on his f 50 monthly allowance, which was paid by the Yogya court, AN, Brieven Ambon 1189b, ‘Staat de te Amboina aanwezige Staats Gevangenen onder ultimo December 1841’. It is unclear whether Mangkunagara II received the former Yogya district of Kerja which was a Yogya territorial enclave surrounded by his lands in Sokawati.

123 Dj.Br. 81, A.H. Smissaert (Yogyakarta) to Danureja IV (Yogyakarta), 18-6-1825; B.Ng. II:157-8, XXXVIII.20-5. The term used for ‘suppliant’ in the Yogya *babad* is *pépé*, which refers to the prac-
Shortly afterwards, in September 1823, the pengulu himself was dismissed, doubtless because he was viewed by Danureja as being far too closely allied with Dipanagara, whose friend he had been since the days when he had served as head of the Suranatan corps under the name of Kyai Rahmanudin (Chapter VII; Appendix Vb; Carey 1992:442 note 210). He was replaced by his religious assistant (ketib), Abuyamin, who, according to Dipanagara, was insufficiently grounded in an understanding of the Qur’ān and Hadīth (Prophetic traditions) to serve as pengulu.124 The Yogya kraton version of the Babad Dipanagara, relates how the prince immediately wrote a letter to Ratu Ageng pointing out that the appointment of the new pengulu was not legal because of his deficiencies in textual knowledge and because the question had not been discussed beforehand in the council of the senior court bupati (nayaka). In the same letter, as we have seen (Chapters VII notes 235-6; Chapter IX), he also asked the ratu to give back the contract from the British which had earlier been lent to the fourth sultan and which had subsequently been burnt. Ratu Ageng replied, declaring that the contract had been ‘mislaid’ given the hopeless disorder of the kraton archives (p. 62), an admission which so incensed Dipanagara that it contributed directly to his final break with the court. Concerning the appointment of the new pengulu, the Ratu wrote as follows:

Secondly, as for the replacement of the pengulu, Rahmanudin, that is settled. I don’t want to talk about it; let us not bother to discuss it again. I was also ashamed at what people would say if the post were left vacant for a long time. As for the matters of the Qur’ān [?] and Hadīth [?], I don’t know. Therefore, he has been replaced by [Ketib] Abuyamin because this has the approval of Resident Smissaert of Yogyakarta, who after all now has authority over the Dutchmen [Europeans] here. Now stop constantly making trouble. If you wanted to change this you could hardly do it; if you could, you would scarcely dare; if you dared you could barely carry it out; in the end it is best [just] to accept it.125


125 Yogya kraton MS. A.62 (Babad Dipanagaran):79: Bab loro sèlèhé Pangulu Rahmanodin iku wis kena katembungaka lumuh, ora susah rinembug maneh, lan aku isin ucaping jalm a yen ngantiya louok suwa-suwe, déné prakara dolal-dalil kodas-kadis aku ora weruh, jaragan wektu saiki wis ngintén si Abuyamin, krana antuk idining Tuwan Residhèn Semisaret ing Ngaugyahakarta, jer kang wus kuwasa saiki wong Welonda, wis aja dhemen kangelan, Pangérân arep angowahi mangsa bisa, bisa mangsa waniya, waniya, mangsa nguwisana, wusana becik anarima. For further details on the background to Rahmanudin’s dismissal, see Ministerie van Koloniën 4204, Pangérân Blitar (Sambirata) to Hamengkubuwana II (Yogyakarta), 10-10-1826 La C no. 3 (henceforth: Blitar, ‘Report’, 10-10-1826; Van der Kemp 1896a:328.
Ratu Ageng’s letter with its barely concealed impatience with her stepson – ‘now stop constantly making trouble’ – neatly encapsulates the clash between Dipanagara and the court at this time. On the one side, the clique around Ratu Ageng seemed determined to keep on the right side of the Dutch authorities at all costs, financial and moral; on the other, the stormy petrel of Yogya, Dipanagara, was rapidly becoming exasperated with the direction which the dowager queen and her allies were now taking the sultanate.

Meanwhile, the affair of the new pengulu, Abuyamin, dragged on. According to the Buku Kedhung Kebo, the Yogya religious scholars, the powerful group of court-salaried ulama, disputed Abuyamin’s rights to allow marriages between the pinggir people, a class of royal inhabitants in the kraton. Eventually, the new pengulu went to Tegalreja to seek Dipanagara’s authorisation for his appointment, thus legalising his position in Yogya.\(^\text{126}\) It is significant too that despite the fact that Abuyamin had been backed by Danureja and Ratu Ageng to replace Rahmanudin as pengulu, he still joined Dipanagara with most of his entourage of ulama and mosque officials when the prince was at Selarong in July-September 1825 (Carey 1981a:249 note 103). This indicates that the prince’s influence amongst Yogya religious hierarchy was well nigh unassailable, far outweighing any pressure which the patih and the dowager queen could bring to bear. At the same time, the former pengulu and old friend of the prince, Kyai Rahmanudin, took up residence at Tegalreja, which was now fast becoming a centre for those who had fallen foul of the new regime of Ratu Ageng, Danureja and the ineffectual Smisaert in Yogya. Rahmanudin stayed for nearly a year at the prince’s residence from May 1825 until just before the outbreak of the Java War when he departed on a pilgrimage to Mecca. He was thus on hand, as we will see shortly, to give Dipanagara much valuable advice during this crucial period when the prince was experiencing his visions and his plans for rebellion were rapidly taking shape.\(^\text{127}\)

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**The moral rot: Danureja IV’s rule and the conduct of senior Dutch officials in Yogya**

According to Kyai Maja, Dipanagara had told him when he arrived at the prince’s headquarters at Selarong in August 1825: ‘Uncle, I left Yogyakarta because I was repudiated by the Europeans and by Danureja [IV]’.\(^\text{128}\)

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\(^{126}\) KITLV Or 13 (Buku Kedhung Kebo):57-64, IV.75-V.83. On the pinggir people, see Gericke and Roorda 1901, II:342. Their origin seems to have been as prisoners-of-war captured by the Mataram kingdom from Blambangan during the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The women became unofficial wives (selir) of the rulers and court elite, whereas the men were employed in handicrafts, Winter 1902:84; De Graaf 1958:62, who also mentions the Gajahmati people who were marched to Mataram from east Java.

\(^{127}\) BD (Manado), II:316-7, XX.22-3.

'Repudiated' was perhaps a rather mild way of describing what Dipanagara experienced at the hands of the senior Dutch officials in Yogya and the *patih* in the period following his withdrawal from his formal guardianship duties in February 1824. Humiliation might be a better word. Just how this came about is the subject of the present section.

The dismissal in quick succession of Kertadirja and Rahmanudin was an outward sign of Danureja IV’s increasingly corrupt and onerous administration. The lack of any proper oversight on the part of the new Yogya Resident has already been mentioned. But even Smissaert was sufficiently concerned by the issue of the chief minister’s appointment of new police officials (*gunung*; pp. 452-3) to make a formal complaint to Batavia shortly after his arrival in post in mid-February 1823. Lawick van Pabst, who had taken over Smissaert’s old post as Resident of Rembang, also drew the attention of the European government to the ‘wilful and corrupt’ rule of the Yogya chief minister at this time. He referred in particular to Danureja’s sale of offices, his dismissal of officials and his embezzlement of kraton revenues, which included paying the sultan’s guardians in devalued paper money while he received the tax moneys and European government rent for the markets and tollgates in good silver coin. Jayadiningrat (Appendix VIII part 2), the author of the mid-nineteenth century Malay text ‘Sketches on the Java War’ and a personal enemy of Danureja, would later give a biting description of the *patih*’s corruption of the judicial processes in Yogya and its consequences for the sultanate’s officials. Moreover, in his personal conduct Danureja seems to have grossly...
infringed court etiquette, for he falsely claimed the right to hold dance dramas (wayang wong) in his residence. Since the maintenance of such classical dance troupes was the exclusive preserve of the sultan, he was forbidden from holding any further performances in Yogya. So he took his dancers to Pajang where he gave performances to the inhabitants of Surakarta instead, thus continuing to display his illegally assumed prestige as a patron of the arts.\textsuperscript{133}

Dance dramas could be seen as an enrichment of the cultural life of south-central Java during a particularly testing time economically and socially. But it was quite otherwise with the patih’s behaviour as a serial philanderer. According to Van Nes, the chief minister’s conduct with the ladies of the court was ‘improper’, and he mentioned that the patih ‘sometimes took women from the court to the villages to debauch them’.\textsuperscript{134} Danureja’s behaviour in this respect had its counterpart in the actions of the Residency interpreter, Dietrée, and the new Assistant-Resident (Residency secretary), Chevallier. The former had already incurred much bitterness in the kraton during the fourth sultan’s reign by purchasing European goods for the sultan and then retailing them to him at four or five times their original price (Van Nes 1844:154-5; Houben 1994:124). He also seems to have kept some of the jewelry and gold ornaments which had been entrusted to him by the sultan to pay for these goods. Like many other Eurasian and European inhabitants in Yogya he made considerable profits by lending money at high rates of interest to impoverished members of the court.\textsuperscript{135} According to Dutch and Javanese sources, Dietrée,

\begin{itemize}
\item thus for one jung of sawah, which was taxed at five réyal or f 12.50-15.00, the stamp duties would be f7.75. As for the official who received the sawah by being prepared to pay such sums, he [reimbursed himself by] collecting the money from the village tax-collector. If the latter was willing and able to pay, then afterwards three or four times the amount would be collected. If the village head refused to pay, then he would be dismissed and replaced by another who was prepared to pay such sums. Because of this [rule of] the strongest, there were numerous village wars [prang désa]. For the full text, see Jayadiningrat 1855-57:4-5, part of the text is given in Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:85-6. For a comparative reference to the purchase of justice in Madiun in this period, see Madioen 1855:3.
\item 133 Van Nes 1844:153; Du Bus 402, Van de Poll and Stavers, ‘Verhoor Modjo’, 11-10-1829, testimony of Kyai Rosali (Gajali; on Danureja’s taking his dance troupe to Pajang). On the sumptuary laws (awisan-Dalem) restricting the holding of wayang wong, see Carey 1980:181, 1992:479-80 note 379. The only dance performance allowed in the kepatihan was the ‘lance dance’ (beksan lawung), Groneman 1888:51-2; Kota Jogjakarta 200 Tahun 1956:145-6.
\item 134 dK 111, J.F.W. van Nes (Yogyakarta) to H.M. de Kock (Magelang), 16-12-1829.
\item 135 Van Nes 1844:154-5; Schneither 108 pt. 3, J.I. van Sevenhoven, ‘Stukken rakende de herstelling van Zijn Hoogheid Sultan Hamengkoeboewana den tweede’, 8-1826, which states that Hamengkubuwana IV had sold jewels and gold ornaments from the kraton, which were not heirlooms (pusaka), to Nahuys for between f 10-20,000. Some of these may have been disposed of through Dietrée. They later came into the possession of the government at the time of Hamengkubuwana II’s restoration in August 1826 and some appear to have been given back to the court, see Dj.Br. 81, Pangéran Mangkukusuma, Pangéran Natadiningrat, Radèn Adipati Danureja IV (guardians of Hamengkubuwana V) to Hamengkubuwana II, 10 Sapar AJ 1754 (AD 12-9-1826), 24 Sapar AJ 1754 (AD 26-9-1826), on five sealed boxes containing treasure being placed for safekeep-
a convert to Islam and, according to one source, pious about his religious duties, maintained clandestine relations with various women of rank in the court, amongst whom was a sister of Dipanagara’s co-guardian, Pangéran Mangkubumi, named Radèn Ayu Wiryataruna.\textsuperscript{136} News of these affairs between the court radèn ayu and the patih and the Residency interpreter is reported to have been relayed to Dipanagara by his stepmother, Ratu Ageng, but he is supposed to have told her, ‘I do not wish to know anything about them, I leave them all to your ordering!’\textsuperscript{137}

The prince’s unwillingness to intervene, understandable perhaps given that Ratu Ageng and the child sultan’s mother, Ratu Kencana, had been charged with the household affairs of the court at the time of the establishment of the guardianship in December 1822, opened the way for even more scandalous behaviour on the part of senior Dutch officials. Seemingly with Danureja and Dietrée’s encouragement, Chevallier also joined in the debauch. Indeed, when it came to relations with court women, the patih and the Residency interpreter’s actions were soon surpassed by the Assistant-Resident, who seems to have been driven by an erotic energy which bordered on the manic. This was rendered doubly abusive by his overweening arrogance and contempt for the inlander (native) which was evident, according to Smissaert, in all his contacts with the Javanese.\textsuperscript{138} A typical product of the brash new Europe of the post-Revolutionary era, and with little understanding of Indonesian society – like so many who made their way to Java in the post-1816 period (p. 433) – this unscrupulous and amoral man could perhaps be seen as a classic illustration of Ann Stoler’s arguing with the Yogya Resident, J.I. van Sevenhoven, and reference to jewels, gold and silver held by Ratu Ageng. Most of these jewels and gold ornaments were subsequently sold during the Java War to meet the expenses of Hamengkubuwana II’s court, see Dj.Br. 3, F.G. Valck, ‘Algemeen verslag der residentie Djokjokarta over het jaar 1836’, 31-3-1837, who spoke of the ‘complete impoverishment of the Yogya court’. Commissioner-General Du Bus also complained to the minister of the Colonies about European wives of colonial civil servants in Java buying up some of these court jewels at a pittance, Exhibitum, 17-3-1827 no. 35k, L.P.J. du Bus de Gisignies (Batavia/Bogor) to C.Th. Elout (The Hague), 6-11-1826. On the rates of interest charged see note 96.

\textsuperscript{136} Du Bus 402, Van de Poll and Stavers, ‘Verhoor Modjo’, 11-10-1829, testimony of Kyai Rosali (Gajali), spoke of Dietrée seducing court women and princesses ‘inside and outside the court’. Van Nes 1844:154 note 1, mentions Radèn Ayu Wiryataruna, but he must have been misinformed; Dwidjosoegondo and Adisoetrisno 1941:99-102, do not give any radèn ayu by that name as sisters of Mangkubumi. Instead, Van Nes may have been referring to Radèn Ayu Wiryawinata, a daughter of Hamengkubuwana II by a selir, Dwidjosoegondo and Adisoetrisno 1941:99. See further Van der Kemp 1896a:313. On Dietrée’s conversion to Islam, see Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 15; Carey 1981a:260 note 106.

\textsuperscript{137} dK 161, Van Nes, ‘Korte verhandeling’, 28-1-1830.

\textsuperscript{138} vAE (aanwinsten 1941). ‘Stukken Smissaert’, A.H. Smissaert (The Hague) to King William I (The Hague/Brussels), n.y. (? 9-1828), who spoke of his ‘rude and unfriendly’ (ruw en onvriendelijk) manner towards the Javanese on the many tours which he did with the patih through the countryside. He would also drink alcohol out in the open on these tours (Carey 1981a:256 note 89) and, according to Smissaert, behaved inappropriately with the court elite, treating the Yogya princes and nobles with disdain.
ment regarding the relationship between colonial authority and sexual control (p. 440). In Chevallier’s case, however, unbridled lust rather than control seems to have been the essence of his dealings with the court radèn ayu. His superior, Smissaert, who later attempted to shift most of the blame onto him for the outbreak of the Java War – not so difficult given that he had conveniently died in the meantime – wrote that Chevallier had constantly engaged in love affairs with kraton princesses and the wives of Javanese nobles, stating that ‘in general his conduct with numerous Javanese women and girls was not only extremely improper but sometimes even attended by insults’. Interestingly, Smissaert himself admitted candidly to the Dutch monarch that although he had strictly eschewed love affairs with court women ‘long experience in Java having taught him the risk that this entailed’,

It would be hypocritical to pretend that in a land where it was generally known that there was more laxity over the rules of decency towards women than in the Netherlands, and where the [local] women themselves were not of the highest virtue, he [Smissaert] had excelled over his predecessors and contemporaries in his [sexual] conduct.

As for Smissaert’s deputy, it seems he even boasted of his conquests (Van Hogendorp 1913:143; Van Praag 1947:266), brushing aside all his superior’s warnings about the dangers of relationships with the kraton princesses. According to Pangéran Blitar, Chevallier had mistreated one of Dipanagara’s sisters whom he had found bathing in a river and had lived for several months with one of the prince’s unofficial wives. When the unofficial wife (selir) in question had tried to go back to Tegalreja, according to Blitar, Dipanagara

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139 Chevallier died in Yogya on 11-11-1825, see further Van der Kemp 1901, II:275; Van der Kemp 1896b:570.
140 vAE 28 (aanwinsten 1941), ‘Stukken Smissaert’, A.H. Smissaert (The Hague) to King William I (The Hague/Brussels), n.y. (? 9-1828). The names of some of the Javanese women living outside the kraton who were seduced by Diettrée and Chevallier are given by Kyai Gajali. They included the daughters of Pangéran Mangkukusuma (a son of Hamengkubuwana I; Appendix VIII), the wife of Radèn Tumenggung Danuatmaja, a member of the Danurejan family (Appendix II), and Radèn Ayu Mertanagara, a daughter of Hamengkubuwana II who was married to a son of the murdered Radèn Adipati Danureja II (Appendix II), Du Bus 402, Van de Poll and Stavers, ‘Ver- hoor Modjo’, 11-10-1829, testimony of Kyai Rosali (Gajali). On Van Nes’ reference to one of the court radèn ayu said to be involved, see note 136.
143 vAE 28 (aanwinsten 1941), ‘Stukken Smissaert’, A.H. Smissaert (The Hague) to King William I (The Hague/Brussels), n.y. (? 9-1828), reported that the incident with Dipanagara’s sister occurred after the outbreak of the Java War in the period August-October 1825. Chevallier had forced the local bupati to bring her to him and had then given her a diamond ring presumably in return for services rendered. She had later reported the incident to Dipanagara. It is unclear which of Dipanagara’s selir was involved with Chevallier, Appendix IV. See further Kielstra 1885:410.
had refused her entry because she had slept with a European. Chevallier himself is then said to have gone to the prince’s residence to ask why she had not been admitted, to which Dipanagara had replied – understandably – that he did not maintain his selir for the pleasure of the Assistant-Resident, whereupon Chevallier had become angry stating that ‘he would do what he liked with native women’ and had hit the prince over the head.\textsuperscript{144} Blitar’s report seems so outrageous that it would be hard to credit, especially as it was retailed to the Dutch monarch by Smissaert, but for separate pieces of evidence that Dipanagara’s treatment by Chevallier and the Residency interpreter was quite unbelievably awful. A key witness here was Kyai Gajali, a senior \textit{ulama} in Kyai Maja’s entourage who may have been his brother (note 61). In an interview with the chief magistrate of Batavia, H.M. van der Poll, and William Stavers, the Javanese-speaking Scots landowner and former sepoy officer who served as translator with the help of Maja’s Javanese scribe, Mas Ngabèhi Tirtadran (Appendix XII no. 4), he related an incident at a Residency reception in the Dutch fort at which both the two Dutch officials went out of their way to be rude to Dipanagara, sneering and scoffing that he was a ‘madman’, a ‘priest’ and ‘a queer cove’ (\textit{grove vent}). Even Smissaert appears to have failed to observe the normal social niceties referring to the prince by name rather than the using his honorific title – Kangjeng Gusti (‘your lordship’) – as might have been expected when addressing a \textit{pangéran}. Seeing the prince become steadily more enraged and fearing a scene, Major Tumenggung Wiranagara, according to Gajali, had brought his own carriage and conducted Dipanagara home to Tegalreja.\textsuperscript{145} The date of this reception is not entirely clear. It may have been that which followed the Garebeg Mulud of 4 November 1824, or it could have been that held on 21 May 1825 just after the celebration of the Garebeg Puwasa (note 203), when we have a number of other sources which relate that the expressions of contempt were mutual and that Dipanagara also used very insulting Low Javanese (\textit{ngoko}) expressions to his Dutch hosts calling Smissaert ‘the bald-headed one’ (\textit{si buthak-ngelathak}) when asking the Resident to drink with him (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:47 note 1; Schoemaker 1893:414-6; Carey 1981a:273 note 152; Payen 1988:49). But even if the date is uncertain and Dipanagara did indeed trade insult for insult, the picture this gives of Dutch relations with Dipanagara and other members of the elite on the eve of the Java War is unedifying.

\textsuperscript{144} vAE 28 (\textit{aanwinsten} 1941), ‘Stukken Smissaert’, A.H. Smissaert (The Hague) to King William I (The Hague/Brussels), n.y. (? 9-1828).

\textsuperscript{145} Du Bus 402, Van der Poll and Stavers, ‘Verhoor Modjo’, 11-10-1829, testimony of Kyai Rosali (Gajali) (on Chevallier and Dietrée’s expressions of contempt for Dipanagara and Wiranagara’s action in taking Dipanagara home to Tegalreja in his carriage); Ministerie van Koloniën 4204, \textit{geheim verbaal} no. 159, Blitar, ‘Report’, 10-10-1826 (on Smissaert’s disrespectful way of addressing Dipanagara).
Understandably, the memory of the way he had been treated remained vivid for the prince. During his voyage to Manado, he was reported to have burst out in a torrent of abuse against the Dutch officials of the pre-war period and their inability to speak anything but market Malay, describing how ‘Chevallier and other Dutchmen had trotted into our kraton as though it was a stable and had shouted and called as though it had become a market’.146 This recalls what the astute lawyer, Willem van Hogendorp, had written when he commented on the Dutch turning the Yogya kraton into a ‘brothel’ and Dipanagara’s vow to ‘destroy it to the last stone’ and expel the land-renters who had driven out the Javanese officials (p. 389). Van Hogendorp’s pithy summary of the root cause of the problem, inspired in part by a memoir by Nicolaus Engelhard, would have found a strong echo with Dipanagara (Van Hogendorp 1913:142):

The feeling of unrest is extremely great throughout Java […]. As concerns the cause [of this] it is nothing else than that the Dutch government […] has made itself over the past ten years most vile in the eyes of the Javanese.

The only satisfaction which Dipanagara might have derived from this was that all three of the Dutch officials who had caused him so much grief would meet unhappy ends: Chevallier, seemingly an alcoholic (Carey 1981a:256 note 89), expired of a liver abscess in Yogya in November 1825 when he was just thirty, Dietrée suffered a lingering death of wounds received when storming Dipanagara’s fortified position at Plérèd in April 1826 (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, II:261 note 1; Carey 1981a:242 note 31), and Smissaert succumbed to the sorrow of his public disgrace in reduced financial circumstances in The Hague in 1832 in his fifty-fifth year.147 As for the prince’s main Javanese protagonists, Ratu Ageng would die of a broken heart in June 1826 (Chapter VIII note 46), Major Tumenggung Wiranagara would end up in exile on distant Banda Island (p. 368), and only Danureja IV would see out his full term as chief minister of Yogyakarta, retiring in 1847 with a princely title and dying in his native Majakerta two years later (Appendix Va; Carey 1992:499 note 486). It is clear from references in his babad during the war years that Dipanagara’s hatred for both Wiranagara and the chief minister remained undimmed.148

147 Carey 1981a:235 note 9; vAE 28 (aanwisten 1941), ‘Stukken Smisaaert’, contains the official papers of his dismissal and review by the minister of the Colonies, C.Th. Elout, who maintained the original decision of Van der Capellen to strip him of his post in Yogya (26-9-1825) and expel him from the colony (25-12-1825). Smissaert’s financial problems are alluded to in Dj.Br. 17, ‘Minuten Van Sevenhoven’, J.I. van Sevenhoven (Surakarta) to Johannes van den Bosch (Batavia/Bogor), 5-5-1831 no. 47, suggesting that the government give him a pension ‘to save him from poverty’, which the minister of the Colonies partially agreed in his Besluit of 13-10-1829, when some money was advanced to the former Resident, see vAE 28 (aanwisten 1941), ‘Stukken Smissaert’. See further page 755 on the fate of the senior Dutch officials under whom Dipanagara was incarcerated in Makassar.
148 BD (Manado), III:262, XXXIX (Dhandhangula) 2-3. dhateng Jéndral Dhe Kok mangko/ kinèn anerang tuhu/ ingkang datan dados karsa jil' sumongga dêndhawuhna/ pan Jéndral tumurut/ déné ingkang
Waiting for the Just King

The government’s annexation plans and their impact

Just as the European presence in Yogya was being fatally compromised by the behaviour of the senior Dutch officials charged with maintaining relations with the Yogya court, government policy once again began to move in a direction guaranteed to increase the growing sense of unease in the south-central Javanese kraton. This stemmed from Van der Capellen’s desire to effect further territorial annexations in the Principalities to increase government revenue and bring what he regarded as the benefits of an enlightened European administration to the wider Javanese population. Early in 1821, even before he had decided on the abolition of the land-rent, the governor-general had tried to take advantage of the financial difficulties of the Sunan to force the latter to hand over some Surakarta territory bordering on the government Residencies of Kedhu, Pekalongan, Tegal and Cirebon. This area included the two districts of Jabarangkah and Karangkobar, both renowned as unusually fertile.149 Van der Capellen had written to Nahuys enquiring what Pakubuwana V’s reaction might be to surrendering these lands as a ‘surety’ for a government loan of 80,000 Spanish dollars to pay off the debts of his father, the fourth Sunan.150 Nahuys’ reply had been an emphatic negative, stating that the newly appointed Sunan ‘would rather forego all financial help than suffer such a loss of territory […] Your Excellency could ask as a surety a small piece of ground, but not rich and prosperous provinces’.151 Nahuys also drew the governor-general’s attention to the bitter complaints he had heard from both south-central Javanese rulers concerning the annexations of Daendels (pp. 265-7) and Raffles (pp. 377-89):

The cession of so many rich areas under various pretexts, which is referred to by the Sunan as ‘wrapping up’, has always been regarded by them as a sign of bad

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149 On the fertility of Jabarangkah and Karangkobar when compared to other adjacent areas of Bagelèn, Kedhu, Banyumas, Pekalongan and Semarang, see Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:76. Jabarangkah appears to have derived its name from the region bordering the north coast which had formerly been situated outside (jaba) the old tollgate (rangkah) of Mataram (see Map of central and east Java).

150 dK 9, H.G. Nahuys van Burgst (Surakarta) to Algemeen Secretaris (J.C. Baud) (Batavia/Bogor), 19-2-1821, replying to Van der Capellen’s letter of 10-2-1821. The financial situation in the Surakarta kraton was so desperate at this time after Pakubuwana IV’s death (1-10-1820) that Chinese creditors had to be turned away daily from the gates of the court. On Daendels’ payment of Pakubuwana IV’s bad debts in January 1811, see Chapter VII note 24.

151 dK 9, H.G. Nahuys van Burgst (Surakarta) to Algemeen Secretaris (J.C. Baud) (Batavia/Bogor), 19-2-1821.
times and often references are made to the promises [respecting existing frontiers] which were given by Ambassador Extraordinary, Wouter Hendrik van IJsseldijk, in September 1816.\textsuperscript{152}

Finally, the acting Surakarta Resident warned that if the government did proceed to take over more land from the south-central Javanese courts, the population of those areas would prove restive and difficult subjects for the government and ‘the least spark of displeasure could blaze up […] and bring the whole land into fire and flame’. Again we have the same apocalyptic refrain which MacGillivray and Van Sevenhoven would later express in their reports on the tollgates (pp. 474-5) and which Nahuys was now pointing to in his warning to Van der Capellen over the prospect of further territorial annexations. In Nahuys’ view, the government should only attempt such a policy ‘when the rulers do not have such a great influence on the people and when the average Javanese is more accustomed to the fairer and gentler treatment of the Europeans, and when their loyalty to their chiefs shall have lapsed slightly’.\textsuperscript{153}

In attacking the governor-general’s annexation policy, Nahuys’ own interests were clearly foremost in his mind since further government annexations would restrict the territory available for private European land-renters in the Principalities. But he had a point. His analysis of the sensitivity of the independent rulers to any new take-over of land was an accurate reflection of sentiments at both Surakarta and Yogyakarta at this time. His arguments eventually persuaded Van der Capellen to drop his annexation ideas for the time being. Instead, it was agreed that money should be advanced to both Pakubuwana V and Mangkunagara II (page 531) without using land as collateral.\textsuperscript{154} But the following year, when Van der Capellen made his third and final journey to the courts, he returned to his annexation theme.\textsuperscript{155} By this time Nahuys had been replaced by De Salis as Resident of Surakarta. A strong supporter of the complete incorporation of the princely territories by the government, De Salis is likely to have exercised a strong personal influ-

\textsuperscript{152} dK 9, H.G. Nahuys van Burgst (Surakarta) to Algemeen Secretaris (J.C. Baud) (Batavia/Bogor), 19-2-1821, referring to the government’s policy of inpakken (‘wrapping up’). On Van IJsselldijk’s August-September 1816 visit to the courts, see pp. 372, 441. One of his diplomatic tasks as ambassador extraordinary was to assure the rulers that the new Dutch government would not effect changes in previous British policy and would respect the treaties signed with the courts. See further Van Deventer 1891:97-104; Van der Kemp 1911:266-8.

\textsuperscript{153} dK 9, H.G. Nahuys an Burgst (Surakarta) to Algemeen Secretaris (J.C. Baud) (Batavia/Bogor), 21-2-1821.

\textsuperscript{154} dK 9, G.A.G.Ph. van der Capellen (Batavia/Bogor) to H.G. Nahuys van Burgst (Yogyakarta/Surakarta), 10-3-1821; Ministerie van Koloniën 2873, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal in rade, 6-3-1821 no. 21.

\textsuperscript{155} An account of Van der Capellen’s 1822 journey to south-central Java is in Kern 1941:283-99. There are also interesting references in Lettres de Java 1829:65-93 (on Surakarta), 94-103 (on Yogyakarta).
ence over the governor-general. According to Nahuys, Van der Capellen went so far as to air his views in public at a small gathering of Dutch officials and Javanese notables, by remarking to the Surakarta patih how much luckier the island of Java would be if, instead of being ruled jointly by the Dutch and the Javanese, it was governed solely by the former. He even intimated that Surakarta should look to a future when it would be like the former independent courts of Banten and Cirebon, which had been abolished by Daendels (Van der Kemp 1897:23-4). The reactions of the Surakarta court to these highly tactless remarks are not recorded but they are certain to have been ones of dismay and apprehension. Again Van der Capellen did not proceed to active measures, but early in 1823 De Salis spoke once more with the governor-general urging that in the event of Pakubuwana V’s death, provision should be made to take the administration of the police, justice and finance entirely out of the hands of the Surakarta ruler. In his view, this should be done either by entering into a new contract with Pakubuwana V’s successor or, if no acceptable heir could be found, by splitting Surakarta up between Pakubuwana IV’s younger brother, Pangérán Buminata, and various other Surakarta princes, each of whom would sign a separate agreement with the government.

Soon afterwards, on 5 September 1823, the Sunan died of consumption and was succeeded by his eldest surviving son by a secondary wife, Radèn Mas Saperdan. In quick succession, the seventeen-year-old Saperdan was appointed Crown Prince on 14 September and then Sunan the following day. His appointment caused consternation amongst the senior pangérans in the Surakarta kraton who had confidently assumed that Pakubuwana IV’s son by an official consort, Pangérán Purbaya, would succeed. According to Dipanagara, many in Yogya expected Saperdan’s extraordinary elevation to spark a rebellion of the Surakarta princes against the European government, but in his view the princes of Sala were ‘not courageous’ (berani) enough for

157 Ministerie van Koloniën 4497, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal geheim, 9-9-1823 La A, referring to De Salis’ interview with Van der Capellen in July 1823 (a copy of this extract made by G.P. Rouffaer from the Surakarta Residency archive is in KITLV H 696f, Stuk XV, 414-25). De Salis’ influence, however, was brief because he was forced to return to the Netherlands in that same month of July 1823 because of his wife’s health. His Assistant-Resident, Hendrik Mauritz MacGillivray, replaced him, see Ministerie van Koloniën 2779, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal in rade, 15-7-1823 no. 5 and Appendix IX.
158 Saperdan’s mother, Radèn Ayu Sasrakusuma, who had died giving birth to him on 27-4-1806, was a sister of the Surakarta patih, Radèn Adipati Sasradiningrat II, who brought him up and pushed him strongly as a candidate to succeed Pakubuwana V. See further Rouffaer 1905:599; Padmasusstra 1902:170 no. 11.
Plate 61. Pakubuwana VI (reigned 1823-1830) of Surakarta conferring with his patih, Radèn Dutch in the Java War. Taken from KITLV Or 13 (Buku Kedhung Kebo) f.148v. Photograph by
Adipati Sasradiningrat II (in office 1812-1846) about whether or not to help the
courtesy of the KITLV, Leiden.
The power of prophecy

This step. One can only surmise that in making this remark, Dipanagara may have himself been reflecting on the curious paradox in which the eldest son by an unofficial wife was chosen as the legal successor in Surakarta but that he, who enjoyed a similar position in Yogyakarta, had been passed over just nine months previously when the two-year-old Hamengkubuwana V had come to the throne (Van der Kemp 1896a:303). The difference, however, was that in Yogy, there was a legitimate successor to the fourth sultan, albeit still a toddler, whereas in Surakarta the consumptive Pakubuwana V had died without an heir by any of his official consorts. The Dutch also seem to have fixed on Saperdan because he was his father’s favourite – an interesting mirror of Dipanagara’s own position viz-à-viz his father, Hamengkubuwana III (pp. 373-6, 443). The other two possible candidates, Buminata and Purbaya were ruled out, the first on account of his age and the second because the recently deceased Sunan had not wanted him as his successor.

Although Saperdan had passed his sixteenth birthday, the age of majority at the south-central Javanese courts, he was still treated as a minor by the Dutch. As in Yogyakarta, the Resident took charge of the seal of state, with the patih continuing the administration of the Surakarta lands and Buminata and Purbaya supervising the new Sunan’s education. Fluent with the pen, and a great cognoscente of Javanese history and

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160 Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 28. Dipanagara specifically mentioned Pangéran Buminata as too old, and Pangéran Ngabèhi, as too closely connected, through the marriage of his daughter, with Pakubuwana VI (on this marriage, see Ministerie van Koloniën 2781, Besluit van den Gouverneur Generaal in rade, 3-2-1824 no. 1). Both were senior surviving brothers of Pakubuwana IV. He also remarked (Knoerle. ‘Journal’, 27-8): ‘The princes of Sala, Buminata, Ngabèhi and Purbaya, had always firmly doubted the royal birth of [Radèn Mas] Saperdan and as a result of this pressed for the appointment of Purbaya to the Sunanate. The patih of Sala, Sasradiningrat [II], bore a deathly hatred against the said princes to whom he attributed the loss of his father, a previous patih of Sala, Radèn Adipati Mangkupraja II [in office 1796-1804], who had been put to death by Sunan Bagus [Pakubuwana IV] during the British interregnum [1811-1816], because of their persecution and in particular because of the intrigues of Buminata. Sasradiningrat was [then] able to accomplish the appointment of Saperdan as Sunan.’ This whole passage in Knoerle’s journal of his voyage to Manado with Dipanagara, which refers to the political situation in the Surakarta kraton in 1823 has been underlined three times in the margin most likely by Johannes van den Bosch himself. He clearly had a particular interest in Surakarta court politics given the arrest of Pakubuwana VI on 6-6-1830 at Mancingan on the south coast (and subsequent exile to Ambon, 16-12-1830) and the appointment of Purbaya as Pakubuwana VII on 14-6-1830. See further Houben 1994:29-37.

161 Pakubuwana V had had only one surviving child, a daughter, by an official consort, Ratu Mas, and she had married the future Mangkunagara III (reigned 1835-1853), successor to Prangwedana (Mangkunagara II). Out of Pakubuwana V’s 45 children, 25 had died young. Three others, including Pakubuwana VI, were exiled, Padmasusastra 1902:168-74.


163 Ministerie van Koloniën 2779, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal in rade, 9-9-1823 no. 45; Van der Kemp 1897:10-13. Assessment of Pakubuwana VI’s character can be found in Winter 1902:39; Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, IV:475-87; and S.Br. 122, J.I. van Sevenhoven (Surakarta) to Lieutenant Governor-General (H.M. de Kock) (Batavia/Bogor), 22-10-1824. De Kock himself
customs, the new Sunan proved a difficult and ultimately disastrous choice for the Dutch. He clearly harboured secret sympathies with Dipanagara and admitted that but for the speedy arrival of General De Kock in Surakarta on 30 July 1825, shortly after the outbreak of the Java War, he would have gone over to the prince’s side with most of his court (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:274-6, II:362-6, 474, III:7-14; Van der Kemp 1896b:543-56; Carey 1981a:292-3 note 241; Houben 1994:24). Furthermore, his own conduct at the end of the war, when he left his kraton in secret to travel to the south coast via Imagiri to meditate at the grave of Sultan Agung and to contact the goddess of the southern ocean, Ratu Kidul (6-8 June 1830), seemed to mirror Dipanagara’s own spiritual preparations for rebellion and led to his exile to Ambon (Houben 1994:35-6). He was replaced by Purbaya who reigned as Pakubuwana VII (1830-1858). Although even the artless Purbaya had maintained his own contacts with Dipanagara and Kyai Maja during the war years (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, III:248, 496), he subsequently proved a loyal and dependable ally of the post-war Dutch administration.

The change of ruler in Surakarta in 1823 coming so soon after the appointment of a child sultan in Yogya, seemed to many in the European community in Java a golden opportunity to take administrative responsibilities away from the courts (Büchler 1888, I:414). But Van der Capellen did not feel it advisable to proceed with any sweeping changes at this juncture. The recent problems with the land-rent were still vivid in his mind. He was also aware that any new arrangements which affected only Surakarta and not Yogyakarta would tend to unbalance the political situation in south-central Java. He thus decided to act cautiously. But he reminded the Residents at the courts that he still hoped to place the rulers of Surakarta and Yogyakarta under the immediate control of Batavia, much in the same fashion as the north coast bupati had been in the
late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. As a start, he urged the Residents to look for opportunities for the European government to take over areas distant from the courts but bordering government territory in the _pasisir_. In particular, he advised the acquisition of land near the frontiers of Tegal and Pekalongan in the west, and around Pasuruan and Surabaya in the east.\footnote{Ministerie van Koloniën 4497, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal geheim, 9-9-1823 La A. A land swap had already been arranged with Surakarta during De Salis’ Residency (1822-1823), when Surakarta had given up some land at Tingkir near Salatiغا, in return for some territory in Semarang Residency around Boyolali, see S.Br. 55, A.M.Th. de Salis, Radên Adipati Sasradinigrat II, Acte on land transfer of Tingkir district, 24-4-1823.}

Van der Capellen’s secret policy decision of 9 September 1823 set the tone for government activity right up to the Java War. It caused great anxiety not only at the courts but also amongst the populations of those territories which the government was seeking to incorporate. The first areas taken over were Jabarangkah, which was divided between Surakarta and Yogyakarta, and Karangkobar, the northeastern tip of Banyumas which was held solely by the Sunan. These were needed mainly for strategic reasons to round out government land along the post road between Semarang and Pekalongan. As we have seen (Chapter V), this had originally been laid out by Daendels, but by 1823 it was again under reconstruction. Jabarangkah lay directly athwart this vital artery and both provinces posed frontier and police problems, situated as they were so far from the _kraton_ that little could be done by the _patih_ to maintain order there.\footnote{Dj.Br. 52, A.H. Smissaert (Yogyakarta) to Algemeen Secretaris (J. Bousquet) (Batavia/Bogor), 1-3-1823; Van der Kemp 1897:38. Daendels had previously complained about the raids by _wend durjana_ from the forest of Kadhayung, for reference see Chapter VI note 51. On the annexation of Jabarangkah, see further Rouffaer 1905:595. On the geographical position of the two districts, see Map of central and east Java.}

The government seems to have also seen them as partial territorial compensation for the abolition of the tollgates in the Principalities which was being considered in December 1824.\footnote{AN, Exhibitum, 28-12-1824, G.F. Meylan (Director of State Revenue/Directeur van Landelijke Inkomsten) to G.A.G.Ph. van der Capellen (Batavia/Bogor), 11-12-1824.} On 1 January 1825, the two districts were placed under government control for a 30-year lease at an annual rent of $100,000 to Surakarta and $26,000 to Yogyakarta, the amount of the rent payments reflecting the size of the respective territory held by the courts. Just over a month later (25 February 1825), they were divided up and incorporated into the adjacent government Residencies of Kedhu, Pekalongan and Semarang (Rouffaer 1905:595). A year later, with the Java War raging and the European government hard pressed for cash, the payment of rent to the Yogya court was quietly dropped as part of the 17 August 1826 contract restoring the second sultan to the throne. The Yogya lands in the two districts then became official government territory (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:523 note 2, II:440-1; Van der Kemp 1897:38-9).

Despite the apparent ease with which this annexation had been made, the move was viewed with deep misgivings at the courts. In Yogyakarta,
Dipanagara was particularly incensed by the fact that he was not even consulted over the Jabarangkah ‘lease’, and that the rent term had been signed for 30 years, when as guardian he had a personal responsibility not to commit his five-year-old charge, Hamengkubuwana V, to any undertakings which exceeded January 1836 when he would reach his age of majority (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, II:441). In Surakarta, the new Resident, J.I. van Sevenhoven, remarked (Van der Kemp 1897:40):

I cannot hide the fact that when I negotiated with the Surakarta court about this rental, they let me feel that they would rather not lease out these lands. Then, because I was able to refute their arguments, they eventually agreed.

The Sunan himself advanced no objection to the sum of $100,000 but, in Van Sevenhoven’s words, ‘His Highness […] was indeed worried where in the future he would be able to get his dodol, a Javanese delicacy [of] fruitcake, because the most delicious sort was produced in that district’. Quite apart from these gastronomic concerns, it was obvious to the south central Javanese rulers that the ‘rent’ of the provinces by the government was a mere fiction. Their incorporation into the adjoining Residencies so soon after the initial negotiations had been completed was proof enough of Van der Capellen’s new annexationist policy. Moreover, the fact that the first rent payment for these areas was only made at the end of 1825 and then only partially (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:76-7) caused great difficulties for the kraton at a time when they needed every scrap of income to support themselves following the abolition of the land-rent (Van der Kemp 1896a:388, 1897:41, 47-8). In December 1826, the Surakarta patih, Radèn Adipati Sasradiningrat II, would unburden himself to a senior Dutch official, the former Surakarta Resident, Pinket van Haak, who was on a special commission to the Sunan’s capital, complaining that the court had been brought into ‘a crushing poverty […] by the loss [of income] from the lands [formerly] rented by Europeans and [by the takeover of] Jabarangkah and Karangkobar, regions which all witnesses are agreed were not given freely in lease by the Sunan […] but on the contrary were extorted’ (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, III:5). The inclusion of Jabarangkah and Karangkobar also occurred when negotiations were taking place for much larger annexations of territory in the western mancanaagara and


168 Van der Kemp 1897-40. Jabarangkah’s role in the export of this delicacy is mentioned in S.Br. 55, J.I. van Sevenhoven, ‘Nota over de land verhuringen’, n.y. (? 1824), who stated that every year a number of pikul (man loads of 62 kilograms) of dodol were sent to Surakarta and that the delicacy had a very high durian content. He allowed the delicacy to continue to be delivered to the court and also arranged for the transfer of a grave at Séla (p. 265-6) on the borders of Semarang. On the special produce from parts of Bagelèn for the Sunan’s table which was accepted in lieu of tribute (pajeg), see pp. 25-6.
nagara agung, namely the takeover of the two rich provinces of Banyumas and Bagélèn as a way of replacing the estimated f 1,000,000 income which the government would have to forego if it proceeded with the abolition of the tollgates. Chevallier, never the most diplomatic of officials, had conducted preliminary surveys of both the provinces in the latter part of 1824 and his journeys had awakened widespread local concern. As we have seen (p. 27), the patih had protested to the Dutch commissioners enquiring into the working of the tollgates that Bagélèn and Banyumas were vital pillars – literally ‘hands and feet’ (kaki tangan) of the Principalities – providing valuable produce, apanage land and labour for the porters’ guilds. Meanwhile, the government was also shown to have acted in bad faith because, whilst these negotiations were going forward, including a discussion of the Jabarangkah and Karangkobar districts, plans had clearly been made to annex them (Van der Kemp 1897:46). In Yogya, Smissaert must have sensed the heated feelings which this had aroused for on 14 December 1824, he wrote to his co-commissioner, Van Sevenhoven, asking (Van der Kemp 1897:46):

When Banyumas and Bagélèn have not been taken over from the princes, why has Jabarangkah been annexed? […] I must stress most strongly that I do not think it advisable to annex the Yogya lands in Jabarangkah. Yogya territory is much smaller than that of Surakarta and it has lost much more during the period of Daendels and Raffles.

Furthermore, he urged the government to make a quick decision about the reimbursement of taxes in the recently annexed districts in order to reassure the local population, writing that ‘the uncertainty of the government in this matter and the thus floating position of the average peasant, I regard as [extremely] dangerous [at the present time]’. Van Sevenhoven replied that the government’s plans for further annexations would be shelved until after the return of the recently sailed expeditionary force to Makassar, where Major-General Joseph van Geen (1775-1846) had been sent with a 10,000-strong army of European and Sumenep troops to defeat a hostile coalition of Bugis states led by the queen of Bone. The lack of European soldiers in Java at

169 Van der Kemp 1897:46; De Salis, ‘Pro Memorie’, The Hague, 8-5-1828. The government’s attention had been drawn to the tollgates by Chevallier’s report of June 1824 (full reference Chapter I note 35). But, although the tollgates were abolished in Kedhu in 1824, nothing was done about those in the Principalities until 1827. See further note 45.

170 Ministerie van Koloniën 4132, ‘Bijlagen Smissaert’, A.H. Smissaert (Yogyakarta) to J.I. van Sevenhoven (Surakarta), 14-12-1824. On Van Sevenhoven’s reply, which was written from Batavia on 29-1-1825, see Van der Kemp 1896a:387. The effects of government policies are also considered in Van Hogendorp 1913:141.

this time\textsuperscript{172} and the absence of the governor-general on an inspection visit to Maluku (July-October 1824; Chapter IX) seems to have caused the acting governor-general, H.M. de Kock, to counsel caution. In fact, the Dutch were lucky in that Van Geen’s force returned to Java in late August 1825 just in time to help in the defence of central Java against Dipanagara’s north coast allies and turn the tide of battle in the areas of Semarang and Demak in early September (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:334-9; Van der Kemp 1901, II:271-3; Payen 1988:126 note 190). Smissaert’s plea with regard to the remission of taxes and the problems of the local population in the leased districts was ignored. The result was that by March 1825 various disturbances had already broken out on the borders of Jabarangkah and Pekalongan. Indeed, the whole area remained in a disturbed state right up to the outbreak of the Java War.\textsuperscript{173} Thus, on the eve of Dipanagara’s great rebellion in Yogyakarta, the government had plunged into a series of measures which could only have a profoundly unsettling effect on the south-central Javanese courts. The first of these, the abolition of the land-rent in May 1823, had been rapidly followed by the partial implementation of Van der Capellen’s ideas about further territorial annexations in the Principalities. He saw this as a necessary first step towards the complete incorporation of the \textit{kraton} under government control. Both these measures were political dynamite. Not only did they spell financial ruin for the courts, but they also – in the case of the Jabarangkah and Karangkobar leases – reawakened all the old memories and fears regarding land takeovers which dated back to the annexations of Daendels (Chapter VII) and Raffles (Chapter VIII). Meanwhile, in Yogyakarta itself, the internal tensions in the \textit{kraton} and the \textit{patih}’s corrupt style of administration had both worsened due to the lack of leadership and control shown by senior Dutch officials. Indeed, the Assistant-Resident and Residency interpreter had both cooperated closely with the \textit{patih} in advancing his designs. Finally, the guardians of the child sultan were themselves in disarray and both Mangkubumi and Dipanagara were effectively cut off from any say in the administration of the sultanate. The way was thus open for the final build up to the Java War and Dipanagara’s own emergence as the longed for Ratu Adil.

\textsuperscript{172} On the eve of the Java War, European troop strengths in Java were at least 1,000 or 10 percent below the complement fixed for the Netherlands Indies army, see Van der Kemp 1896b:540; Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:612.

\textsuperscript{173} Ministerie van Koloniën 4132, ‘Bijlagen Smissaert’, J.I. van Sevenhoven (Batavia) to A.H. Smissaert (Yogyakarta), 29-1-1825 (see also Van der Kemp 1896a:388); Dj.Br. 53, P.F.H. Chevallier (Yogyakarta) to Hendrik MacGillivray (Surakarta), 15-3-1825.
Dipanagara’s pre-war visions

By early 1824, as we have seen, the break between Dipanagara and his protagonists in the Yogya court had become very nearly complete. The difficulties over the land-rent indemnities and the patih’s dismissal of two of his close friends had been the catalyst. Throughout this time, the prince had continued to lead an active spiritual life engaging in periods of silent retreat in his cave of Secang at Selarong especially during the fasting month (puwasa; Carey 1981a:246 note 43) and even going down to the south coast to commune again with the goddess of the southern ocean in places like the grotto of Suralanang which seem to have been associated with her cult. According to Dipanagara’s babad, the fifteen months which preceded the Java War from May 1824 to July 1825, were a very crucial time for him. During this period, a whole series of dreams and visions occurred which helped to clarify still further the prince’s view of himself and the role he would be called upon to play in the coming upheaval in central Java. To some extent, these later visions confirmed and elucidated those which the prince had received as a young man (Chapter IV), but they also pointed at another level to the irrevocable course which Dipanagara was now about to embark upon and which would lead directly to the Java War.

The first vision took place during the fasting month (puwasa) of 1824 on 21 Ramelan AJ 1751 (AD 19 May 1824), when the prince was at his cave of Secang at Selarong. The following is the description in the prince’s babad:

XX. 7 Now we tell
how in the year Dal
in the month of Ramelan
on the date, the twenty-first,

8 the prince was in a cave
the name of which was Secang.
Every month of Ramelan
thus was the inclination
of the prince: to associate with the Almighty in prayer
inside the cave
without returning home [to Tegalreja].
Such was his goal.
He was sitting on a séla gilang [a stone which radiated light] called
Ambarmaya.175

174 Dipanagara’s withdrawal to the cave of Suralanang on the south coast in early 1825, is mentioned in Dj.Br. 17, ‘Minuten Van Sevenhoven’, J.I. van Sevenhoven (Surakarta) to Johannes van den Bosch (Batavia/Bogor), 5-5-1831 no. 47, who reported Smissaert’s attempt to get him to come from there to a meeting in Yogya ‘some months before the outbreak of the Java War [in July 1825].’ The location of this cave is unclear to me.

175 Both séla gilang and Ambarmaya are names for a special stone for performing asceticism
9 These were his pleasures.
The interior of the cave he regarded as his residence;
there was a bathing pool in a trough
and next to it a pond [formed by] water oozing [from the rock]
designed like a well.\textsuperscript{176}
There was a fenced \textit{widara} tree.\textsuperscript{177}
Now the audience place
had a great doorway and steps made of \textit{gebang} palm trunks.\textsuperscript{178}
The prince's eyes were half-closed as though asleep,
then there was

10 a man who appeared before him
accompanied by a wind.
He stood in front of him
and his clothes
were like those of a \textit{haji} [returned Mecca pilgrim].
The prince was amazed
and spoke softly:
'I do not know you,
where are you from?' The one asked made a gesture of respect
and said:
'I have no home.'

\textit{(tapa)} which literally 'radiated light'. The name \textit{Séla} Gilang also recalls the holy black stone associated with the first ruler of the Mataram dynasty (Chapter IV), but the name seems to have been used quite loosely by Dipanagara to refer to any stone on which he meditated or performed \textit{tapa}. Thus the stone at his own retreat at Sélareja in the grounds of his Tegalreja estate is referred to by the same name, Chapter II note 60. Dipanagara would certainly have been aware of the connections with \textit{Sénapati}. See further Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909:437.

\textsuperscript{176} The meaning of lines d-e in this verse are not very clear. The bathing place in a trough to perform ablutions before the five daily prayers is no longer visible at Selarong, but there was still a spring on the hillside above the cave of Secang which was used by the local inhabitants when the present author visited on 12-12-1971. There was also a waterfall close to the cave with a shallow pool at its base. The 'oozing' pond may refer to a shallow pool formed by water oozing from the adjacent rock which is described by Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:436. They also mention a small depression in the rock floor of the second 'cave', which formed a shallow (0.35 metre) deep pond. For a description of Selarong in 1825, see Van den Broek 1873-77, 22:40, who mentions 'water which dropped onto a stone which had the shape of a cup; although it dropped continuously the water did not overflow the edges of the cup neither did it go down'; and for a rather more fanciful and poetic description dating from the 1860s, which makes Dipanagara's cave complex seem like a veritable underground palace, see Rees 1867, II:63, 66-8. Louw's reservations on this, together with his own much more accurate measurements, in part drawn from the survey carried out in the early 1890s on his behalf by the \textit{controleur} of the Yogya Residency, O.E.V. Hermens, can be found in Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:435-7.

\textsuperscript{177} A \textit{Jujube} tree (\textit{Zizyphus Jujuba Lam.}), a low tree, the fruit of which can be eaten, De Clercq 1909:347. Dipanagara adds the detail that it was fenced in order to create the impression that it was like the \textit{waringin kurung} (enclosed banyan trees) on the northern \textit{alun-alun} before the Yogya kraton thus giving it a royal aspect, see further Carey 1981a:6-7, 238 note 23, 1984b:54.

\textsuperscript{178} \textit{Corypha Gebanga Bl.}, a palm tree with fan-shaped leaves which grows everywhere in Java. Steps are frequently made out of its sawn trunks in rural Java, De Clercq 1909:210.
I have come because I have been ordered to summon you, Noble Sir.’
The prince said:
‘What is the name of the one who sent you
and where is his dwelling?’
The man said calmly:
‘Indeed, he has no home;
all the land of Java
is regarded as his residence.
He it is who bears the title of Ratu Adil,
he is the one who sent me
in truth to call your honourable self.
At present he stands
at the top of a mountain,
which from here
lies in a southeasterly direction.
Mount Rasamuni is its name.
But, my lord,
you are not permitted to take any retainers.’
The prince set out immediately, accompanied
by the man,
as was the wish of God,
which the prince merely followed.
In a short time they arrived
at the foot of the mountain.
The one who had summoned him disappeared from sight.
Now we tell
of the Ratu Adil who
stood at the mountain top,
competing in brilliance with the lordly sun
which for long glowed but palely.\footnote{For an interesting comparison in the Christian mystical tradition of this perception of the sun’s paleness compared to the visionary experience, see Underhill 1961:289-90, St. Teresa of Avila’s (1515-1582) vision of the Hands of Christ, ‘It is not a brightness which dazzles, but a delicate whiteness, an infused light giving excessive delight to the eyes […] It is a light so different from any light here below that the very brightness of the sun we see, in comparison with the brightness and light before our eyes, seems to be something so obscure that no one would ever wish to open her eyes again.’}

\footnote{179}
white trousers [and] a red shawl. He faced to the northwest

15 standing at the summit of the mountain on top of a smooth stone. There were no shadows and the grass could not be seen. It was as clean as if it had been swept.
The prince from below looked upwards facing to the southeast. Then the Ratu Adil spoke in a friendly way: ‘Ah, you Ngabdulkamid,

16 the reason I have summoned you is for you to set my army fighting. Let Java be conquered immediately! If anyone should ask you for your mandate, it is the Qur’ān. Order them to seek it [there]!’ Ngabdulkamid said: ‘I beg leave [for] I am unable to fight and I cannot

17 bear to see death. And, moreover, earlier I in truth have already carried out tasks which were exceedingly [heavy] amongst my fellow men.’ The Ratu Adil said: ‘That may not be. It is already the wish of the Almighty, [for] the fate of Java has been determined by Him; he who will perform this role is you

18 for there is no-one else.’ Afterwards there was a shattering sound as though a dish had been struck by a stone. Then he disappeared. Thus it was impossible to describe this [further]. So thus were the feelings of the prince as he stood upon the mountain;

19 his stance was no different [from that of the Ratu Adil] facing to the northwest then did he stand.
Great was the prince’s astonishment and his chest felt as if fireflies were flickering everywhere, and he was shaken to the core. Then Bocah-Becik and Puthutlawa screamed, the sea flamed, the noise thundered

20 and roared like Mount Merapi. The prince descended and departed from there looking around him immediately. But we say no more of this.

There seems to be some confusion here because earlier in his vision he was instructed to take no companion with him when he went to meet the Ratu Adil. The description here may in fact refer to Dipanagara’s earlier experience during the eruption of Mount Merapi on 29-12-1822 when he had been awakened by the screams of his servants. Both Bocah-Becik (literally: ‘the good lad’) and Puthutlawa were personal retainers (panakawan) of the prince at Tegalreja, BD (Manado), II:327, XX.50. The term *panakawan* in Javanese usually refers to the personal retainer of an ascetic or the follower/pupil of an adept, Gerick and Roorda 1901, II:332. The name Puthutguritna, in fact, occurs in the Pragolamurthi *lakon* in the *wayang* repertoire in this context. The name was also given to one of Dipanagara’s own panakawan as well as a close supporter, Rongga Puthutguritna, during the Java War, BD (Manado), III:125-6, XXV.176-9.

There was a period of some confusion where it was unclear what to do because he had been instructed to take no companion with him when he went to meet the Ratu Adil. The description here may in fact refer to Dipanagara’s earlier experience during the eruption of Mount Merapi on 29-12-1822 when he had been awakened by the screams of his servants. Both Bocah-Becik (literally: ‘the good lad’) and Puthutlawa were personal retainers (panakawan) of the prince at Tegalreja, BD (Manado), II:327, XX.50. The term *panakawan* in Javanese usually refers to the personal retainer of an ascetic or the follower/pupil of an adept, Gerick and Roorda 1901, II:332. The name Puthutguritna, in fact, occurs in the Pragolamurthi *lakon* in the *wayang* repertoire in this context. The name was also given to one of Dipanagara’s own panakawan as well as a close supporter, Rongga Puthutguritna, during the Java War, BD (Manado), III:125-6, XXV.176-9.
Such is the striking description of Dipanagara’s meeting with the Ratu Adil as it is related in his *babad*. It is without doubt the most crucial vision of the prince’s life and the one that had the most influence on his subsequent actions.\(^{182}\) A question still remains, however, about whether the prince now saw himself as the Just King or whether he considered he would merely be a temporary agent of destruction preparing the way for a later Ratu Adil who would institute an age of justice and plenty. We will return to this issue in a moment, but first we must consider the peculiar mixture of Javanese-Islamic traditions and beliefs which made the vision so remarkable. First, there are the specifically ‘Islamic’ elements of the Ratu Adil’s call to arms. Thus, Dipanagara was summoned by someone wearing the clothes of a *haji* and the vision itself took place on the evening of the twenty-first of the fasting month, the so-called *malem slikur*, which together with the evening of the twenty-seventh of the same month – *malem pitulikur* – is particularly celebrated in Java, probably in remembrance of the *lailat al-kadar*, the night of the heavenly dispensation when the Holy *Qur’ān* was believed to have begun to have been imparted to The Prophet Muhammad by the Archangel Gabriel (Juynboll 1930:106-8; Carey 1974a:34-5). We will see shortly how another of Dipanagara’s dream-state visions at the end of this period (16 May 1825) – that of the eight *wali wudhar*, prophets who held two offices from God, namely, the administration of temporal justice and the exercise of spiritual duties – would similarly occur on a *kador* night, the evening of the twenty-seventh. Then, when the Ratu Adil himself appeared, there are other details which give an Islamic cast to the vision. Thus, the Just King is described as having his face turned towards the northwest, the direction which forms the *qiblah*, the position in which Javanese Muslims set their faces when they perform the five daily prayers (*salat*) to Mecca (Juynboll 1930:59, 67). Interestingly, this was not the direction which most mosques in south-central Java were...
aligned in the early nineteenth century. The Mesjid Ageng (Great Mosque) in Yogya, for example, faced due west and it was only in the early twentieth century that the qiblah was changed to the correct position under the influence of the Modernist Muslim Muhammadiyah (the Way of Muhammad) organisation. One can only surmise that Dipanagara’s vision of the Ratu Adil facing in the right direction may have reflected his stricter approach to the practise of Islam which set him apart from his more traditionalist kraton contemporaries. Finally, the order given by the Ratu Adil is described as having been authorised by the Qur’ān, thus underscoring Dipanagara’s mission as a Javanese Muslim to raise up the high state of the Islamic religion in Java and to carry out the duties of a ratu paneteg panatagama, a ruler who would stand firm as the regulator of religion (Carey 1981a:241 note 30). Indeed, during the Java War, he would frequently stress his Qur’ānic mandate, citing it as the reason for his summons to Kyai Maja to join him at Selarong at the start of the war when the prince felt the need for the advice of a religious scholar well versed in the Qur’ān, and referring to it again in September 1827 as the basis for his negotiations with Commissioner-General L.P.J. du Bus de Gisignies at Salatiga which Kyai Maja undertook on the prince’s behalf.

Besides these Islamic aspects, there are others, not necessarily in conflict with the first, which have more to do with traditional Javanese beliefs and historical ideas. Thus the clothes worn by the Ratu Adil seem to identify him with Sultan Ngrum, the mythical ruler of Turkey who, as we have seen, organised the peopling and civilising of Java (pp. 159, 483), and from whose

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183 Noer 1973:74. The right qiblah had in fact been indicated in chalk on the floor of the Mesjid Ageng by the founder of Muhammadiyah, Kyai Haji Ahmad Dahlan (1868-1923), who hailed from the kauman (firm religious community) of Yogya, much to the consternation of the more traditional members of the kauman.

184 BD (Manado) II:392-3, XXII (Asmaradana) 72-7. rumiyin kawula èstu/ mapan kinèn ngangkat Kur’an. 73. tan kengkap lamun ngèwah/k dhating paréntahing Kur’an/li nging kawula saèstuné/k dèrèng sumerep sedaya/ Kur’an paréntahira/ marma tyas kula kelangkung/ arijh bilih kalepatan. 74. Kangjeng Pangran Mangkubumi/ mapan aris angandikal/ kulup tan ngapaa kuet/ mapan akèh pra ngulama/ kong sunurup jayanya/ ing Kur’an paréntah iku/ wong nanging derma kéwala. 75. kulup marang ing sèrèndi/ endi kong sira kersakna/ wong ngalim Ngayogyga akèh/ mèsem ri sang kong misésa/ aris dènnya ngandikal/i kidi leres puniku/ nging kula kirang precaya. 75. kyai sampéyan réncangi/ nenuwun dhating Hyang Sukma/ rumiyin kawula anon/ tiyang kakalih punika/ amulang wonten Majal/ ing Kwaron satunggilipun/ punika kula precaya. 77. déné sawangipun kalihi/ pan samya pekik lakung/k kados arijh mring Hyang Manon/ kalaman angéwahana/ mring Kur’an paréntahnya/ Kwaron tiyangipun sepahu/ ing Maja anêm punika (where Dipanagara explains why he summoned Kyai Maja and the much older Kyai Kuwaron to Selarong because he trusted their understanding of the Qur’ān); III:297-9, XXIX (Dhandhanggula) 92-3. Sri Naléndra aris angandikal/ sampun kyai kajeng/k lamun dalil saèst/ ingkang nyesah paréntahnek/k saèstuné punika/ Kur’an kong kula nut/ Ki Maja mapan mengkana/ langkung bungah ing ngilonan kajengnèk/k ngaos sèn angsal karya. 93. kangjeng sultan ngandika malih/hèh Ki Maja paran prayogal/ ing dalil Kur’an surupè/ mapan sun iki tahu/ ingkang dadya esthining galih/ nanging derma kéwala/ angakoni ingsun/ sabarang paréntahira/ lamun Kur’an ingsun tan nedya gingsiri (where Dipanagara stresses to Kyai Maja that he is most concerned to follow the injunctions of the Qur’ān at the time of the negotiations with Du Bus). See further Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, III:267-8.
territories the Javanese Just King was thought to originate. On another level, the Ratu Adil’s supernatural appearance standing on a mountain top strongly suggests the manifestation of an old animistic Javanese mountain god, such as Sunan Lawu or the guardian spirit of Mount Merapi, Kyai Sapu Jagad (‘Sir Sweeper of the World’). Furthermore, the hill of Rasamuni has interesting links with Sultan Agung (reigned 1613-1646), the great Mataram ruler of the seventeenth century whose spiritual and temporal achievements Dipanagara so much admired and whose actions he may have sought to emulate (Chapter IV). Rasamuni also lies close to the artificial lake formed by a dam across the River Opak constructed on Agung’s orders which later gave its name to the kraton of Plérèd, first used by Sunan Amangkurat I (reigned 1646-1677) and taken over by Dipanagara as a stronghold in 1826 during the early stages of the Java War (Gandhajoewana 1940:214-5; Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, II:279-99). The site of the mountain on the western abutments of Gunung Kidul to the east of the Opak, may also have had some significance in the Jayabaya prophecies for in some later recensions a descendant of Sultan Èruca kra from Rum (Turkey) is described as returning to Java to set up his residence ‘to the east of the Opak River’ in order to rule over a prosperous kingdom. According to a Dutch official, the inspector of birds’ nests at Rongkob in southern Gunung Kidul, who was captured by Dipanagara’s forces early in the war, the prince himself had the intention of becoming ‘sultan of the south coast of Java’, indicating that he might have been aware of this particular prophecy. As we will see shortly, he would reiterate this demand for a south coast kraton at the end of the war.

The theme of Arjuna, which has been discussed earlier in connection with Dipanagara’s first visions in circa 1805 (Chapter IV) and his marriage to Radèn Ayu Maduretna in September 1814 (pp. 401-5), can perhaps be discerned again here too. The way in which the prince is summoned from his cave retreat at Secang recalls Arjuna’s encounter with the Hindu god Indra, dressed in the

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185 I am grateful to Dr Th.G.Th. Pigeaud for this insight. It is perhaps significant here that some of the palaces of the early Islamic rulers of Java were situated on hills and holy mountains such as Giri and Tembayat, De Graaf and Pigeaud 1974:142, 260 note 76.

186 Gandhajoewana 1940:215-7. According to popular belief, Agung used the hill as a place of meditation and prayer. Certain rocks on the hillside are connected with him and his magical horse, jaran Sembrani, which was supposed to have carried Agung to Mecca for his Friday prayers. There is also a tradition about a meeting between Agung and Ratu Kidul at the same place. A lonely grave on the hillside is supposed to be that of Agung’s son by the south sea goddess. On the jaran Sembrani (also sometimes referred to as Janggi Gandan), which clearly has a resonance with The Prophet Muhammad’s winged horse al-Burak which took Him up into heaven, see further Mulyadi 1983:35.

187 Reksapustaka (Mangkunagaran) Serat Centhini:1814, IV, II (Girisa) 13. ing kono Sang Jayêng-ranal wira ing Rum kayà nata/ trah Sultan Èruca kra/ mungguh dènmira akukutha/ ana tanah sawétanya/ ing Kali Opak sanyata.

clothes of a wandering mendicant in the *Arjuna Wiwāha*. At the same time, Dipanagara’s initial refusal to lead the Ratu Adil’s army in battle because he could not bear to see death mirrors Arjuna’s own unwillingness to consent to Kresna before his fight with his kinsman Karna in the *Bratayuda*, the great ‘brothers’ war’ in the *Mahabhārata* (Chapter III; Carey 1974a:13; pp. 123-4).

There remains the question of just how Dipanagara saw himself as fulfilling the role ordained for him by the Ratu Adil. This can best be answered after a consideration of the remaining dreams and visions which occurred before the outbreak of the Java War. Thus, after the prince returned to Tegalreja from his fasting month retreat at Selarong, he described how his stepmother, Ratu Ageng, had the same dream three times. In it, she heard a voice telling her:

XX.24 ‘Ratu Ageng, Ratu Kencana
must marry a wali wudhar
whose residence is to the northwest.
If this does not take place,
it is certain that Java will be devastated
and I will take your life.’

According to Dipanagara’s *babad*, Ratu Ageng was as exceedingly afraid as she might have been if her own life was under threat (she would in fact live for just two more years). She summoned Pangéran Mangkubumi to discuss the matter with him and both seemed to have assumed – although this is not stated directly in the *babad* – that the residence to the northwest of the *kra-ton* must refer to Dipanagara’s estate at Tegalreja, which was indeed situated in that direction. Mangkubumi agreed to help in persuading his nephew to comply in marrying Ratu Kencana and he dispatched his senior wife, Radèn Ayu Sepuh, a daughter of Radèn Rongga’s companion in arms, Mas Tumenggung Sumanegara, to broach the subject. She apparently had a rather good relationship with Dipanagara and, as we have seen (Chapter III note 76), was one of the few in the Yogya court who dared to make jokes with him. Interestingly, rumours of this proposed marriage between Dipanagara and Ratu Kencana seems to have reached the ears of European residents in Yogya for both Smissaert and Payen mention it in their writings in August 1825.

Nothing came of Radèn Ayu Sepuh’s mission, however. Dipanagara ridiculed

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189 BD (Manado), II:317, XX (Dhandhanggula) 24. *Ratu Ageng Ratu Kencanekil temokena lawan wali ikal wudhar* lor kulon wismané yèn tan kelakon ikul pasthi rusak ing Tanah Jawi sun pundhut nyawennira. * MS. has wedhar, I have followed Rusche 1908-09, I:103.

190 The direction of Dipanagara’s residence was also that of the *qiblah* to Mecca.

191 The former *bupati* of Padhangan who had been killed with Rongga in revolt on 17-12-1810, Chapter VI. She had married Mangkubumi on 30-3-1804, dK 145, Waterloo, ‘Memorie van Overgave’, 4-4-1808.

her attempts to make him consider taking another wife, telling her bluntly that in his view there was no woman in Java equal to the daughter of Radèn Rongga whom he had married in September 1814. Indeed, the fact that Ratu Kencana was already in the advanced stages of a severe psychological illness at this time, which would later provoke her into a frenzied attack on one of her late husband’s unofficial wives (Hageman 1856:40; Van den Broek 1873-77, 20:480; Carey 1992:504 note 509) and bring her to an early grave (1827), could hardly have encouraged Dipanagara to consider her as a potential partner.

Sometime after this, Dipanagara described in his *babad* how he went himself to the *kraton* to visit Ratu Mas, the childless consort of his late father and daughter of Radèn Rongga Prawiradirja I, who was then suffering from a minor illness, and how Ratu Ageng and Mangkubumi had decided to divulge the nature of his stepmother’s dreams to the prince. When he heard about them, Dipanagara said that in his view they were only a ‘trial’ (*kados jajal*), but that if they really proved to be a warning, then the next time Ratu Ageng had a similar dream she should tell the voice to address itself to him. Nevertheless, in his heart the prince was troubled and he asked his uncle about the meaning of a *wali wudhar*. Mangkubumi replied that, in his view, it meant an apostle of Islam who had failed in his task as a *wali*.

On hearing this, Dipanagara described in his autobiography, how he felt increasingly perturbed, sensing that he had been shamed before God. He returned home to Tegalreja, but his feelings of shame were so overwhelming that he did not even call at his residence but went straight to his retreat at Sélareja where he remained in isolation for the best part of three days. His friend, Kyai Rahmanudin, the former Yogya *pengulu*, who was then staying at Tegalreja prior to his planned pilgrimage to Mecca, noticed that the prince had not come to the verandah (*surambi*) of his nearly completed Tegalreja mosque (p. 86) to recite the Qur’ān with him as usual and understood that he was troubled at heart. He, therefore, sought him out and found him sitting before his small brick pavilion at Sélareja on the *sèla gilang* stone on which he performed meditation and asceticism (*tapa*).

The former *pengulu* then asked Dipanagara about the cause of his sorrow and when the prince told him about his uncle, Mangkubumi’s, explanation for Ratu Ageng’s recurrent dream, he replied that the meaning of *wali wudhar* was quite otherwise. According to the erstwhile *pengulu*, it meant a *wali* who had two offices in that the Almighty had given him power to administer temporal justice as well as exercising his spiritual duties. It is clear that what Rahmanudin

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193 BD (Manado), II:319-21, XX.29-33.
194 BD (Manado), II:322-3, XX.38. It is possible that Mangkubumi stated this negative view on purpose to deflect his nephew’s intentions to rebel.
196 BD (Manado), II:324, XX (Dhandhanggula) 42-3. *pan tegesé wali w[udhar punika yekt][i] inggih wali angiras. 43. cinepengan adil mring Hyang Widi. MS. wedhar, I have followed Rusche 1908-09, I:106.
understood by the term *wali wudhar* here were prophets (*nabi*) rather than *wali* in the usual sense of ‘friends of God’ or saints such as is found in the Sufi teachings which orthodox Islam came only grudgingly to accept.\(^{197}\) Thus he went on to say that amongst the 124,000 prophets, there were only six in his view who merited the title of *wali wudhar*, namely, Adam, Noah, Abraham, Moses, Jesus and Muhammad, the final one being the last of the great prophets (*nabi pungkasan*).\(^{198}\) To these six prophets, Rahmanudin added two from Java – Sunan Giri and Sultan Agung – stating that these had also held the double office characteristic of a *wali wudhar* as well as being beloved of God. The former *pengulu* then suggested that Dipanagara might be the ninth but that ‘God alone knows what the end shall be’.\(^{199}\) Whereupon the prince remembered his recent meeting with the Ratu Adil and thought to himself:

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XX.45  ‘So it is not possible that I can escape it.’
       But he did not speak this out,
       [but] kept it hidden and smiling said calmly:
       ‘Thanks be to God!

46  What do men in this life wait for
    if, grandfather, they are not awaiting
    some exceptionally important task?’
    The Kyai Pengulu said:
    ‘Indeed, lord, if they are strong enough [for it]
    then even more excellent
    is the true grace [they receive].’
    The prince said:
    ‘Grandfather, let us render up thanks to God,
    may it prove successful.’\(^{200}\)
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Thus Dipanagara appears to have accepted Rahmanudin’s explanation and to have connected it with the mandate given to him earlier by the Ratu Adil in

\(^{197}\) I am grateful to Professor Merle Ricklefs for this point. See further Hitti 1974:438-9.

\(^{198}\) Interestingly, Dipanagara would later refer to this line of prophets in his conversations with Lieutenant Knoerle on his voyage into exile in Manado, Knoerle, *Journal*, 14-5, ‘the prince spoke to me about Adam, Noah, Abraham, Moses, Isa [Jesus] and ended with Muhammad. I am very surprised by the correct opinions of Dipanagara’.\(^{199}\)

\(^{200}\) BD (Manado), II:325-6, XX (Dhandhanggula) 45-6. *dadi wus ora kena/ gumingsira ingsun/ nanging datan angandika/ pan sinamur mèsem angandika aris/ kaki alkandulillah. 46. pan wong urip punapa dènanti/ lamun kaki datan angantiya/ pakarya kang luwih abot/ Kyai Pangulu matur/ inggih gusti lamun kuwawi/ pan langkung utamin/ nugrahan satihu/ kangjeng pangèran angandika/ dawek kaki padha sokur mring Hyang Widi/ muga denlestarèkna.*
which he had been ordered to combine secular and spiritual responsibilities in ruling over Java. Indeed, this idea of Dipanagara being chosen as the ninth wali wudhar would become much clearer just under a year later when, as we shall see shortly, he had his final pre-war vision at Sélareja and eight wali wudhar appeared to him in a dream. It also puts in perspective Dipanagara’s strong personal admiration for Sultan Agung whom he almost certainly regarded as his immediate spiritual predecessor in Java. The former pengulu’s explanation thus holds the key to the whole series of visions and dreams which occurred to the prince on the eve of the Java War and which appear to constitute a unique Javanese historical tradition. It also provides a telling illustration of the particular Javanese-Islamic outlook which Rahmanudin and Dipanagara both shared, but which in this instance amounted to a major Islamic heresy.201

After his conversation with his friend, Dipanagara describes how his confidence was restored and how he was able to pray again with an undivided mind, coming out early every morning to the surambi to recite the Qur’ān with the former pengulu.202 The following year, between 18 April and 18 May 1825 during the fasting month, Dipanagara related how he again went to the cave of Secang to meditate and pray.203 In order to solace his troubled heart, he wandered through the garden by the cave and sat down beneath the spreading shade of a banyan tree. It was just after the midday prayer and the garden where he sat was called ‘Modang’.204 Then Dipanagara described how he heard a remote but clear voice speaking to him:

XX. 48  ‘Ah, you, Ngabdulkamid,

49  you have been given the title
by the Almighty
of Sultan Ngabdulkamid
Èruca kra Sayidin
Panatagama of Java
Kalifat Rasulullah.
Blessings be upon you!’
Following which the voice vanished.205

201 Thus, although the Qur’ān allows that some prophets are more important than others (Arberry 1955, I:308, XVII.57 ‘and we have preferred some Prophets over others’), the idea that there were any major prophets after Muhammad is not permitted. Thus one of the most fundamental tenets of Islam had apparently escaped Rahmanudin despite his position as a legal scholar and former head of the Islamic religious hierarchy in Yogya.

202 BD (Manado), II:326, XX.47.

203 BD (Manado), II:326, XX.48, The Garebeg Puwasa in that year fell on 18-5-1825, see AvJ, A.H. Smissaert (Yogyakarta) to G.A.G.Ph. van der Capellen (Batavia/Bogor), 18-5-1825.

204 On the possible meaning of this term, which Gerick and Roorda 1901, II:495 describe as a ‘white or evenly coloured rectangle or square in the middle of a headscarf’, see Carey 1981a:238-9 note 24.

205 BD (Manado), II:326-7, XX (Dhandhanggula) 48-9. leh Ngabulkamid[d] sira. 49. aranira mengko
Afterwards, the prince returned to Secang where, after the clamorous prayers \textit{(trawèh)}\textsuperscript{206} which traditionally followed the evening religious observance during the fasting month, he emerged to sit on his \textit{séla gilang} meditation stone flanked on both sides by his intimate retainers, Puthutlawa and Puthutgurit. Other personal retainers were in the kitchen in the Secang cave complex preparing the evening meal.\textsuperscript{207} It was the night of the 27 Ramelan AJ 1752 – \textit{malem pitulikur} – in the Javanese year Bé (AD 16 May 1825). Dipanagara ate his evening meal and then slept on top of the meditation stone, his two retainers keeping watch, although soon they too fell asleep. A dream then came to the prince:

XX. 51 Now the prince
dreamt in his sleep in the cave [of Secang]
as though he were [back] at Sélareja.

52 He was sitting on the \textit{séla gilang} there
in the Pulo Waringin [banyan tree island].\textsuperscript{208}
Then suddenly
eight men arrived,
the ends of their head-dress all hung down.
The one in front bore a letter
which he carried in both hands.
The prince stared [at them]
[and] came forward intending to greet them,
looking fearful of the eight, whose radiance
was like the full moon.

53 The prince stood before them in respectful greeting
[but] the arrivals paid no heed to [him]
and went straight to the pond.
The prince followed them.
Then all [eight] stood at the edge,
Five to the east

\textit{dènapiringi' iya marang Rabilingalimina/ Jeng Sultan Ngabdulchamidé/ Èruakra Sayidul/ pan Panatagama
ing Jawi/ Kalipah Rasulolah/ sánta sira ikul/ risampun ical kang swara.} On the types of voices heard by mystics, see note 182 above.
\textsuperscript{206} The \textit{trawèh} usually involves repeating the phrase \textit{Muhammad Rasulallah} (‘Mohammad, the Messenger of Allah’) twelve times. Sometimes other \textit{dhikr} are used, see Gericke and Roorda 1901, I:630-1.
\textsuperscript{207} BD (Manado), II:327, XX.50. On Dipanagara’s kitchen (\textit{pawon}) in the Secang cave complex whose location could still be identified by the smoke marks on the cave wall when the former military officer turned writer, W.A. van Rees (1820-1898), visited for his research on his book on Toontje Poland (Colonel Theodorus Poland, 1795-1857), Van Rees 1867, II:66-8, cited in Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:436.
\textsuperscript{208} Pulo Waringin refers to the banyan tree island at Sélareja which Dipanagara had created as part of his personal retreat space at Tegalreja, see pp. 86-7.
Waiting for the Just King

and three to the south.
The prince joined those
to the south, making four
who all faced north.

54 Those to the east faced westwards.
The one who bore the letter was in front,
the others flanking him on both sides.
Then the letter was read out
[and] its meaning was the same
as the voice at [the garden of] Modang.
It read: ‘His Highness
Sultan
Ngabdulkamid Èruacakra Sayidin
Panatagama

55 Kalifat Rasulullah
of the land of Java.’
Then together [the others] responded:
‘alaihi ’s-salām [peace be upon him]!’
The one who had read [the letter] corrected them sharply with a
calm speech:
‘That is the wrong response!’
Those he had reprimanded said:
‘How so, Panembahan?’
The reply of the reprimanding one was delivered quietly:
‘This is a matter which exists:
young friends, the response ‘alaihi ’s-salām
is for what shall be. But for what already exists
only the takbīr209 is the response.’
Then all
eight recited the takbīr together,
and the ninth was the prince
who joined in [the recital of] the takbīr.
After this, the letter
was dropped into the pond, sank into the water
and was seen no more.

57 The eight men [then] vanished from view.
From where they had been standing
[they had evaporated] like smoke
The prince
was left standing alone.210

209 The takbīr is the glorification of God by the recital of the phrase Allahu Akbar (‘Allah is Great!’), see Gericke and Roorda 1901, I:644.
210 BD (Manado), II:328-9, XX (Dhandhanggula) 51-7. mengkana kangjeng pangérani jroning néndra supena tan néng guwéki kadja néng Sèlar[e]lja. 52. lenggah anéng séla gilang ikil Pulo Wringin
This dream of the eight wali wudhar completed the series of visions received by Dipanagara before the outbreak of the Java War. It brought to a close a period of testing and preparation which had begun when Dipanagara as a young man had engaged in an extensive withdrawal from the world and asceticism (tirakat) to achieve spiritual power and insight. He had continued this process of tirakat throughout his adult years by his strictly ordered life of prayer and meditation at Tegalreja and Selarong (Carey 1981a:236-7 note 14; Chapters II-IV). In simple terms, Dipanagara had been tested and found to be a suitable vehicle for divine grace. As the Ratu Adil had told him, his fate had been fixed by the Almighty for there was no one else capable of undertaking the task which the Just King had in mind. Although the prince would have preferred to be exempted from the early stages of the establishment of the Ratu Adil’s reign since these necessarily involved a period of purging warfare and bloodshed, he nevertheless resigned himself to them for they fitted in with his philosophy of life as expressed by him to Kyai Rahmanudin that men must undergo great trials to achieve God’s grace and that life itself is a constant preparation for cosmic responsibility.211 In many respects, as the Javanese historian Soemarsaid Moertono would have recognised, Dipanagara’s attitude reflected a quintessentially Javanese acceptance that everything in eternity has been fixed by the Almighty.212 It was in this context that he accepted the former
pengulu’s explanation of the term wali wudhar. Following this explanation, the dream of the eight wali wudhar came as final confirmation of the favour which Dipanagara had found as God’s tool on earth.

As was the case with Dipanagara’s vision of the Ratu Adil a year earlier, the setting in which this final dream occurred is of considerable importance for an understanding of the prince’s aspirations. Thus the description of Dipanagara falling asleep on his sela gilang in the cave of Secang, strongly recalls the historical traditions concerning Sénapati, the first ruler of Mataram (reigned circa 1574-1601), which is related in the Babad Tanah Jawi (‘Chronicle of the Land of Java’), when in similar circumstances a falling star descended over Sénapati’s head prophesying that he would become king of Java (Olthof 1941, I:75-6, II:78-9; Ricklefs 1974a:398). Indeed, the history of Sénapati was familiar to Dipanagara for he described it at length in the opening section of his babad and in his Makassar notebooks.213 He was thus certainly aware of the relevance of Sénapati’s history for his own situation. Secondly, the directions in which the wali wudhar face in Dipanagara’s dream are important for like the earlier vision of the Ratu Adil, the northern and westerly directions once again make up the qiblah of Java to Mecca. Even the turbans worn by the eight men seemed to be associated both with the famous apostles of Islam in Java such as Sunan Kalijaga (Chapter IV note 17) and with great Javanese-Islamic rulers such as Sultan Agung.214 Particularly interesting too is the gesture of casting the letter into the pond for in a different way this also had the significance of confirming Dipanagara’s new position by contact between the living water and the eternal underworld.215

In his handbook of Sjāfi‘i Islamic law as practised in Indonesia, Th.W. Juynboll mentions a particular belief in the efficacy of water to ward off evil during the second month of the Muslim calendar, Sapar.216 On the last Wednesday of that month (rebo wekasan), he describes how (Juynboll 1930:115):

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214 De Graaf 1958:138. Interestingly, one of the pieces of evidence used by the Dutch against Dipanagara’s major kraton protagonist, Major Tumenggung Wiranagara (post-1830, Pangéran Adipati Prabuningrat), when he was exiled to Banda in August 1832, was that according to an informant he had had a dream in which four men dressed as haji with turbans on their heads had appeared and bowed to him, announcing that he would later become a ruler of Java, see AN, Exhibitum 20-9-1832 no. 1, F.G. Valck, interview with Tumenggung Tirtawiguna, Yogyakarta, 6-8-1832. See further Louw and de Klerck 1894-1909, VI:247-52; Houben 1992:241-2.
215 I am grateful to Dr Th.G.Th. Pigeaud for pointing this out. In many countries in the world, the pre-Christian belief of casting coins into ponds or wells in order to establish an undertaking such as marriage, or to pledge a future wish, is still maintained. In Java, water has a special significance because it is the realm of Ratu Kidul.
216 Sapar is thought to be a badly aspected month because it was then that the sickness which would ultimately kill The Prophet Muhammad in the third month (Rabingulawal/Mulud) began to manifest, Juynboll 1930:114.
One tries to strengthen oneself against malevolent forces by drinking water, or by bathing in the sea, a river or a well. Particular blessings are thought to accrue from water which has been brought into contact with the seven verses in the Qur’ān in which Allah has pronounced the words ‘salvation’ or ‘peace’ on particular individuals. One gets these verses written on a piece of paper by an expert, which is [then] thrown into water, this water [subsequently] being drunk or bathed in. In Java, it is usual that this blessed water (banyu jimat) is held in readiness on this day in the mosques for the many who ask for it.

Finally, the titles which Dipanagara received and which were read out by the leading wali wudhar – presumably The Prophet Muhammad himself – prefigure those which he would later assume on the 1 Sura AJ 1753 (AD 15 August 1825) after the outbreak of the Java War when he was at Selarong (Carey 1981a:261 note 108, 287 note 218). Roughly translated they can be taken to mean ‘Sultan Ngabdulkamid, the Just King (Èruca)ra), Lord of the
Faith (Sayidin), Regulator of Religion (Panatagama), Caliph of The Prophet of Allah (Kalifat Rasulullah). On other occasions the prince appears to have interchanged these titles with others such as ‘The First among the Believers (Kabirulmukminin), ‘Hamengkubuwana’ – the title of the Yogya sultans – and ‘Commander in the Holy War in Java (Sénapati Ingalaga Sabilullah ing Tanah Jawi)’. Both these last employ phrases which are used in the official title of the Yogyakarta rulers, such as Sayidin Panatagama Kalifatulah. They even include the sultan’s own name by the use of the words Hamengkubuwana Sénapati Ingalaga. The assumption of these royal epithets should be understood against the backdrop of Dipanagara’s attempt to create a new kraton and an alternative administration (Carey 1981a:241 note 29), both important facets of any major Javanese rebellion as we have seen in the case of Radèn Rongga in Madiun (Chapter VI). Thus, the prince later gave out various royal titles to members of his family, and he also used many of the administrative ranks which had earlier been bestowed in the sultanate. Indeed, in many cases the incumbents of these posts hailed from families who had served the Yogya sultans in a similar capacity. Like most of the Yogya nobility, Dipanagara was deeply concerned about procuring titles and good marriages for his children and relations. It was said that after the Java War he was

217 Cohen Stuart 1872:286; Ricklefs 1974b:244-5. Dipanagara’s full title is also given in Makassar MS, Book I:171.

218 Ricklefs 1974b:245 note 1. The full title of the Yogya sultans is Sultan Hamengkubuwana Sénapati Ingalaga Ngabdurahman Sayidin Panatagama Kalifatulah. It should be noted that there is a substantial difference between the term Kalifatulah (‘Caliph of Allah’) and Kalifat Rasulullah (‘Caliph of The Prophet of Allah’) which Dipanagara normally used after 15-8-1825. The former epithet, used by the Yogya rulers, is a rather extravagant title adopted earlier by the ‘Abbasid dynasty in decline (Hitti 1974:317), which suggested that the ruler was the caliph (successor) of Allah, thus naturally smacking of heretical closeness to the Divine. Kalifat Rasulullah (‘Successor of Allah’s Messenger’) is regarded as being more doctrinally correct.

219 dK 221, ‘Bekendmaking van titels aan verschillende vrouwen verleende’, n.y. (? 2-11-1825 – 10-12-1825), which contains an original note (? by the Resident of Kendhal, O.C. Holmberg de Beckfelt) describing the titles given to Dipanagara’s wives. Thus the prince’s first wife, Radèn Ayu Maduretna, was styled as Ratu Kedhaton (Appendix IV), and his mother, Radèn Ayu Mangkarawati, as Ratu Ageng. Other titles given to Dipanagara’s relations can be found in dK 158, ‘Naamlijsten van Djokjosche hoofden, die aan het Nederlandsch gezag zijn getrouw gebleven of de partij van Diepo Negoro houden of zich weder aan ons gezag hebben onderworpen’, Mage-lang, 3-1829 – 12-1829.

220 Thus a member of the Danurejan family became Dipanagara’s patih (Appendix II); a son of the Yogya jaksa (magistrate) became his chief magistrate; a descendant of Yogya’s first pengulu, Pekih Ibrahim (Appendix Vb), became the head of Dipanagara’s religious hierarchy after Kyai Maja had refused the office stating that he was not from a pengulu family (BD [Manado], III:47, XXXIII.65); and Ali Basah Senthot, great-grandson of Hamengkubuwana I’s famous army commander, Radèn Tumenggung Rongga Prawiradirja I (Appendix Vb, Chapter II note 35) became his sénapati (commander-in-chief), see Ricklefs 1974a:87; BD (Manado), III:9-10, XXXII.52-7, III:110, XXXV.28-9.

221 See Van den Broek 1873-77, 22:69; Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 34 (on Senthot’s marriage to Dipanagara’s niece, a daughter of Pangéràn Prawiradiningrat, Appendix VIII); Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, III:370, 488, 493 on Dipanagara’s use of marriage politics and family relationships with Radèn Tumenggung Sasradilaga and other leaders in Jipang-Rajegwesi in 1827.
Plate 63. Piagem (letter of appointment) from Dipanagara to Amad Dalem Ripangi (the keeper of the royal graves at Kutha Gedhé) appointing him bupati of Kutha Gedhé with the title of Amad Dullah Tumenggung Resasentana. Dated 16 Shaban, AH 1241 (AD 26 March 1826). Taken from the H.M. de Kock private collection no. 127 (Nationaal Archief, The Hague).
bitterly disappointed that his requests that his eldest son should be allowed to keep his wartime title of Pangéran Adipati had been refused by the Dutch authorities.\(^2\) Traditional hopes for status and continuity in office for families who had previously served the sultanate could thus be said to have loomed large for Dipanagara and the members of the Yogya aristocracy who fought on his side. We will see in the next chapter how Dipanagara’s actions particularly dismayed his leading santri supporters leading eventually to a complete break between the prince and Kyai Maja (pp. 629-39).

The prince’s use of the official name of the Yogyakarta sultans did not mean, however, that he wished to succeed them. He had made this quite clear by his refusal to accept the title of Crown Prince in place of his younger brother (p. 325), a refusal which he later stressed emphatically during his journey into exile. As Knoerle reported:

Dipanagara told me that he had never aimed at the title of Sultan of Yogyakarta [for] he said there was already a lawful ruler on hand for this throne and that it had never occurred to him to act against the institutions of The Prophet and expel the young sultan.\(^2\)

\section*{Dipanagara’s understanding of his role as a Javanese Just King and his attitude towards the Europeans in Java}

As for his personal aspirations as a Ratu Adil, Dipanagara referred to them succinctly in the same passage when he informed Knoerle that ‘he had always felt the calling to become a “supreme priest” of Java’,\(^2\) a position which William Stavers would later translate as \textit{raja Islam} (ruler of Islam) in an exchange of letters with Kyai Maja during the preliminaries to the abortive September 1827 peace negotiations (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, III:249). We have already seen what this might have entailed in terms of Dipanagara’s demand to adjudicate in cases between Europeans and Javanese on the basis of Javanese-Islamic law, thus reversing the legal reforms introduced by Raffles (pp. 385-8). The issue would come up again at the end of the war in correspondence between Dipanagara’s close adviser, Ali Basah Pengalasan, and the Flemish officer, Colonel Jan Baptist Cleerens (1785-1850), in mid-December 1829, which led up to the prince’s agreement to come to Magelang to meet with General De Kock in March 1830. The prince’s demand to exercise unlimited rights of intervention in neighbouring states and district administrations to ensure that local rulers and \textit{bupati} were performing their religious duties satisfactorily and setting a good example for their subjects was

stressed. Pengalasan also indicated that Dipanagara would establish a new *kraton* in the territory of the south-central Javanese rulers away from the lands controlled by the government (Carey 1974b:288). We know from other sources that his erstwhile headquarters at Sambirata in the Adikarta area of Kulon Praga to the west of the Opak River might have been a favoured place for this royal capital (pp. 480-1; *Bataviasche Courant* 109, 12-9-1829). Both of these developments would naturally have curtailed the traditional powers of the Yogyakarta and Surakarta monarchs as the heads of the Islamic religion and independent rulers in south-central Java. And it was on this technicality that the ‘peace negotiations’ in Magelang later foundered (Chapter XII). In truth, however, the issue was used by De Kock as a convenient pretext for taking Dipanagara prisoner, the prince’s fate having been decided long before the Magelang conference by the newly arrived governor-general, Johannes van den Bosch, who had told the Dutch army commander that ‘if it is possible to capture Dipanagara or kill him that would be very desirable [...] do not enter into any agreement with him’.

An order from Kyai Maja to the former sub-*demang* of Sumawana in the Ambarawa district of Semarang gives an indication of the sort of instructions being issued in Dipanagara’s name to local officials who had declared their support for him. This stated that the former sub-*demang* – now styled *penatus* (administrator of one hundred tax-paying peasant cultivators) – should observe four strict rules: first, he should follow the precepts of Islam on pain of severe penalties; second, he should shave his hair as a mark of his adherence to the Islamic faith; third, he should hand back any goods which he had stolen or plundered in the event that the rightful owners came forward to reclaim them; and fourth, he should make no changes to the local irrigation systems or impose new taxes. The concern to hold down taxes was central to Dipanagara’s self-image as a Ratu Adil and was something on which he issued public undertakings, promising that in the event of victory he would not raise more than four Spanish dollars on a *jung* of land regardless of whether

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225 dK 23, Johannes van den Bosch (Batavia) to H.M. de Kock (Magelang), 6-1-1830. Further references can be found in the Van den Bosch-De Kock correspondence in NA, J. van den Bosch private collection 384. Van den Bosch’s ruthlessness is mentioned in Chapter V note 1.

226 *Bataviasche Courant* 18, 12-4-1827, report on Secawinangun, sub-*demang* of Sumawana (Ambarawa), who had taken the title of the former *penatus*, Kertayuda Wirapatih, whom he had murdered. On the location of Sumawana, see Dumont 1931:364. On head shaving as a mark of adherence to Islam and Dipanagara’s cause during the Java War, see Chapter IV note 10. The earliest reference to the practise is in May 1826 when, during the celebration of the Garebeg Puwasa of that year, Dipanagara had ordered all the *bupati*, *demang* and *bekel* loyal to him to shave their heads prior to his five-day meeting with Kyai Maja at Imagiri, dK 119, ‘Berichten aangaande de verblijfplaatsen van de opstandelingen door verschillende personen en spionnen verstrekt, 1826-1828’, report of a Javanese spy working for the Dutch at Dipanagara’s headquarters at Pideksa (?Deksa, Kulon Praga district), 30 Puwasa AJ 1753 (AD 5-5-1826).
that *jung* was ‘fat’ (fertile/productive) or ‘thin’ (infertile/unproductive).\(^{227}\) He also ordered the public flogging of officials who had demanded more taxes than they were officially allowed (*Javasche Courant* 67, 6-6-1829), and instructed that booty captured by his forces should be distributed amongst the people on a two thirds one third basis, the chiefs only being allowed to retain a third.\(^{228}\) We will return to this theme of wartime taxation in the next chapter when the thorny issue of military involvement in fiscal administration – an early instance of *dwifungsi* (dual role of the armed forces in military and civil affairs) – was hotly debated between Dipanagara and his commanders.

The key to an understanding of the prince’s political and religious aims as a Javanese Just King must start with his assumption of the titles of Sultan Ngabdulkamid Èrucakra and his reference to himself in his *babad* as *sang murtining ngajurit* (‘the embodiment of the fight’).\(^{229}\) They indicate that he clearly saw himself fulfilling the role of the Javanese messianic Ratu Adil who would lead a purging war in Java to establish a new moral order. His *babad* reference once again recalls the Hindu god Wisnu whose seventh incarnation as a world ruler bearing the *cakra* (solar discus) symbol may well have had a connection with the Èrucakra title.\(^{230}\) The prince’s lyrical description in his own autobiography of the situation at Selarong after he had set up his headquarters there at the beginning of the Java War strongly echoed the passage in the Jayabaya prophecies dealing with the period of justice and plenty for the common people inaugurated by the Ratu Adil (note 227):

XXII.36 So [Selarong] had become a capital.
Yogyakarta had moved there.
Its market was very large.
Everything to be bought was cheap and readily available there;
[quickly] sold were the goods of the traders,
thus all were greatly pleased.
They were no lies or deceit.\(^{231}\)

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\(^{227}\) Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, II:502-3. For a reference to the golden age of justice and plenty which the Ratu Adil (Just King) was expected to institute, see (Mangkunagaran), *Serat Centhini*, IV:1813, II (Girisa) 6-7. *bumi sakjung pajegira / amung sadinar sawarsa/ sawah sèwu pametunyai/ sawang ing dalem sadina/ wus resik nir apa-apa/ marmané wong cilik/ ayem enaké tyasira/ déné murah sandhang tedha.* 7. tan ana dursila durjana.

\(^{228}\) *Bataviasche Courant* 18, 12-4-1827, order of Kyai Muhamad Kastuba, former *ulama* of the district of Prapak in southern Kedhu.

\(^{229}\) BD (Manado), II:392, XXII.72.

\(^{230}\) Carey 1974a:32 note 106. On *murti* as one of the names of Wisnu, see Gericke and Roorda 1901, II:483. On Dipanagara’s walking staff, supposedly made for a sixteenth-century ruler of Demak and which he received in circa 1815, had a handle fashioned in the shape of Wisnu’s *cakra* weapon, see Chapter III note 66.

The term Èruca kra, the etymology of which is still rather unclear (Cohen Stuart 1872:285-8; Pigeaud 1947:270-3), almost certainly fitted in with Dipanagara’s view of himself as a latter-day wali wudhar, a wali who would combine both temporal and spiritual functions. For this particular position of priest-king, Dipanagara’s meditative and charismatic character seems to have admirably suited. Thus, as we have seen (p. 87; Carey 1974a:26), a number of references to the prince withdrawing from the day-to-day business of fighting and administration in order to meditate by himself, usually at auspicious places at the junction of rivers, or close to waterfalls and ponds, many of them sites of Hindu antiquity. During the war itself, he apparently had the habit of sending his gold state umbrella (payung) out to villages to raise support for his cause while he himself resided in places far removed from the actual conflict (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, II:244). At the end of the war, when he came under closer scrutiny by Dutch and Indonesian observers, his penchant for keeping himself out of the public gaze by hiding his face behind the end of his turban or by using a white gauze veil were also mentioned (Van Doren 1851, I:328 note 1). Both during his time at Metésih, the island in the Praga River which was his temporary residence during the March 1830 peace negotiations at Magelang, and at Semarang and Batavia as he boarded and disembarked from the steamer, the SS Van der Capellen, which took him on the first stage of his journey into exile, he was careful to cover his face from the scrutiny of the crowds of curious onlookers who had gathered to see him (Van den Broek 1873-77, 24:99; Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:746).

Besides this ascetic and secretive side, the awe-inspiring nature of the Èruca kra ruler was undoubtedly projected by Dipanagara’s widely believed powers of invulnerability and his intuitive judgement of character through his mastery of the science of physiognomy (ngèlmu firasat) which enabled him to choose capable advisers, officials and military commanders (p. 72). The respect in which Dipanagara and his family were held by the local population can be seen in the report of the large numbers of Javanese who flocked to join his entourage as he journeyed from Rêmakamal to Magelang in February 1830 prior to his March meeting with De Kock.232 At the same time, his third son and heir apparent, Pangéran Adipati Anom (post-1830 Dipaningrat) (Appendix IV), drew similar crowds when he was brought from from Mangiran in the district of Bantul south of Yogya to the sultan’s capital after his capture on 1 August 1829. As the Javasche Courant (8-8-1829) reported:

lishment of a large market in Selarong during the time Dipanagara used it as his headquarters between late July and late September 1825 and the discovery of a huge store of unhusked rice (padi) is confirmed in the Dutch sources, dK 197, H.M. de Kock (Surakarta) to G.A.G.Ph. van der Capellen (Batavia/Bogor), 1-10-1825; Bataviaseche Courant 40, 5-10-1825.

232 dK 209, Colonel J.B. Cleerens (Menorèh) to Colonel F.D. Cochius (Magelang), 28-2-1830, reporting that Dipanagara’s ‘chiefs [were] writing letters daily […] to summon the population from Bagelèn and Mataram to Menorèh, so that I must suppose his following will grow by the day’.
Particularly striking is the great influence of Dipanagara on the population. His captured son, although bearing no payung [to indicate his status] on the road from Mangiran to Yogyakarta, a distance of some fifteen leagues, received much respect from the local inhabitants who everywhere prostrated themselves in front of him.

Although it is likely that Dipanagara was personally conscious of the implications of the Èrcak ра title and of the role which he was required to play, what is not so clear is just how he saw himself in the longer cycle of the Jayabaya prophecies. Did he regard himself as the designated Ratu Adil or rather as the agent of a short spell of purifying destruction such as had been foreshadowed in Ratu Ageng's dream? Did he conceive his task as preparing the way for the establishment of another Just King at a subsequent date, perhaps over a century later when Indonesia stood on the brink of complete liberation from Dutch rule? Might he even have had his Kartasura namesake in mind as an example of a previous failed Èrcakra ruler who, according to tradition, had seen himself as a path breaker for a later Ratu Adil following the failure of his 1718-1723 rebellion and his attempt to establish his authority as a Just King east of Mount Lawu (p. 492)? It is possible that this question will never be answered satisfactorily. At times, Dipanagara clearly believed that he would be successful against the Dutch and would be able to establish himself as an independent religious ruler – a raja Islam – in south-central Java. Yet, at other times, particularly at the end of the Java War, he looked back in terms which suggest that he had known from the outset that his uprising would be doomed to failure. Thus, as we have seen (Chapter II note 9), Dipanagara later referred to the prophecy of Sultan Agung that the Dutch would rule in Java for three hundred years following the seventeenth-century Mataram ruler's death in February 1646 and that although one of his descendants would rise against them he would be defeated. This prophecy was apparently reiterated when the prince's great-grandfather, Sultan Mangkubumi, saw him as a baby in arms and foretold that he would cause greater destruction for the Dutch than he himself had done during the Giyanti War (1746-1755), but that only God knew the outcome (p. 71). The fact that Dipanagara felt almost instinctively that his early battlefield successes against the Dutch would be short-lived can perhaps be gauged by the enigmatic Parangkusuma prophecy (Chapter IV note 58):

XIV.80 ‘You alone are the means, but that not for long only to be counted amongst the ancestors.’

It might be seen as a natural reaction to the bitterness of defeat and the day-to-day humiliation of exile for Dipanagara to have justified his failure in this fashion. Furthermore, such an explanation would have fitted into the historical cycle outlined in the Jayabaya prophecies in which the rule of the first
Èruçakra ruler would give way to a period of confusion in which a foreign king from Nusa Srenggi – the land of the overseas ogres or Christians\(^{233}\) – would hold sway in Java and from which the island would eventually be freed by the appearance of a descendant of the Èruçakra from Rum (Turkey).\(^{234}\)

Finally, as regards the Dutch, Dipanagara’s plans for them and those advanced by his adviser, Ali Basah Pengalasan, seem to have amounted to a return to the situation which had prevailed in Java before Daendels’ arrival in January 1808. Thus, in the letter which Pengalasan sent on Dipanagara’s behalf to Colonel Cleerens, the Dutch were given two main choices: either return to the Netherlands and maintain amicable relations with the Javanese through trade, or remain as settlers in the pasisir areas of west Java and the north coast, areas which had been traditional places of European settlement since the seventeenth century (Carey 1974b:285-8). Two subsidiary options were also advanced: namely, that Dutch military personnel should remain as soldiers serving Dipanagara as defenders of the ‘divine order’,\(^{235}\) an idea which harked back to the late Mataram (circa 1574-1677) and Kartasura periods (1680-1745) when VOC troops had been used in support of reigning Javanese monarchs against seditious movements such as the Kajoran faction (Ricklefs 1993:55), and second that Dutch soldiers and officials should consider converting to Islam as some Portuguese and Dutch prisoners-of-war had during Sultan Agung’s reign (1613-1646; De Graaf 1958:233-8). In this case their positions would be enhanced and they would be given increased authority over both Javanese and their fellow countrymen.\(^{236}\) This was the case with the Dutch inspector of birds’ nests at Rongkob, Second Lieutenant Paulus Daniel Portier. He was captured by Dipanagara’s forces on the south coast in May 1826 and went through a public conversion ceremony to Islam in which he proved that he was circumcised and had learnt various Islamic prayers including the confession of the faith (‘There is no God but Allah and Muhammad is His Prophet’). Appointed by Dipanagara as tumenggung (district administrator) of Rongkob, he was given a new Muslim name – Mas Nur Samidin – and instructed to wear

\(^{233}\) See Gericke and Roorda 1901, I:781, where srenggi is seen as deriving from the Sanskrit c\(\text{r}^2\)\(\text{r}^2\)\(\text{g}\)g\(\text{i}\), literally ‘the horned one’ (Iskandar du’l-Qarnayu). It might also be a version of prenggi (Frank, Frankish, hence European), or even an error or word play on Nasarani (Christian), see Gericke and Roorda 1901, I:233-4, II:252; Van Praag 1947:230.

\(^{234}\) Reksapustaka (Mangkunagaran) Serat Centhini, IV:1813, II (Girisa) 11-3. ing ngantara taun nu\(\text{lu}\)ya/ ana ratu sabrang sakal/ nungs\(\text{a}\) Srengg\(\text{i}\) praja\(\text{n}\)ira. 12. jumeneng sri Tanah Jawal kuku\(\text{t}\)ha\(\text{n}\) l\(\text{e}\)w\(\text{t}\)ann\(\text{y}\)a/ Girindrana naman\(\text{i}\)ra/ suku Wukir Candramuka/ ing ngantara taun nu\(\text{lu}\)ya/ ana wira saking pra\(\text{j}\)ai/ ing Rum u\(\text{g}\)luru\(\text{g}\)i sang nata/ nungs\(\text{a}\) Srengg\(\text{i}\) kang ngajawa. 13. sirna a\(\text{k}\)as\(\text{ar}\)an yuda/ sirna sawadya-bala.

\(^{235}\) The phrase used in Pengalasan’s letter is dados pedhangipun ing agami, see Carey 1974b:285, 287.

\(^{236}\) Carey 1974b:285, 287. For a slightly different list of options offered the Dutch at the time of the abortive September 1827 Salatiga peace negotiations between Du Bus de Gisignies and Dipanagara through the joint intermediary of William Stavers and Kyai Maja, see Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, III:270.
Javanese dress and use only Javanese in conversation with his superior the bupati of Pacitan. His special task was to convert his countrymen in Rongkob and Pacitan to Islam. Dipanagara told him in a personal interview that even though he was answerable to the bupati, he placed more faith in his administration than that of a Javanese. His colleague in Pacitan, J. Wörmer, the nineteen-year-old inspector of the government pepper and coffee estates and a distant cousin of the former Yogya Resident, Nahuys van Burgst, likewise saw which way the wind was blowing and pretended a public conversion to Islam making good his escape across the southern mountains to Surakarta dressed in the garb of a returned Mecca pilgrim.

It is doubtful that Dipanagara ever entertained the notion that the Dutch should be expelled from Java completely, even though some of his more xenophobic religious advisers, such as Kyai Maja, undoubtedly held this view. Thus during the disastrous Battle of Gawok on 15 October 1826, when Dipanagara suffered a major defeat just to the west of Surakarta, the prince remarked that ‘it was as though something within me told me to spare the Europeans because we could not be in Java without them’ (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:745). Throughout the conflict, Dipanagara’s principal focus was on the independent Javanese rulers themselves and only through them with the Dutch. If the latter had allowed the prince a free hand in south-central Java to exercise jurisdiction over Javanese-Islamic law and religious practice, there seems no reason to doubt Pengalasan’s assertion that all Dipanagara asked of the Dutch was that (Carey 1974b:288):

he would not be appointed nor take orders from the government, except that they [Dipanagara and the European government] would be good friends, neighbours and brothers, just like children who have not been on speaking terms and who now talk with one another again. They should not order each other, nor should they be ordered by each other.

Kyai Gajali, however, declared in an interview with Stavers in October 1829 that as long as the Europeans in Java were not under Javanese-Islamic law, the war would be continued. Only once they had agreed to submit to the syariah would Dipanagara’s santri supporters agree ‘to live with them as friends’.

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237 These were mainly Eurasians working in the pepper and coffee estates.
238 KITLV 263, Portier, ‘Verklaring’, n.y. (? 9-1826). See further Carey 1981a:294 note 244, where his new Javanese-Islamic name is wrongly given as ‘Nur Salim’.
Given that Dipanagara, at the urging of Senthot, was toying with the idea of extending his conquests beyond Java and recreating a latter-day eastern Indonesian empire along the lines of fourteenth-century Majapahit, it is unlikely that such co-existence with the Dutch would have been of long duration. Indeed, the times were long past when the European government could have contemplated a return to the pre-Daendels status quo when the European presence in Java had been largely confined to the ‘foreign kingdom’ of west Java and contacts with the south-central Javanese kraton had had the nature of ambassadorial relations between sovereign states. They could also not have countenanced Dipanagara’s establishment as an independent ruler in south-central Java with special religious powers and spiritual dignity. Given the prince’s awareness of historical precedents and Qur’ānic example, it is likely that he would have sought to exercise a form of theocratic authority akin to the priest-kings of Giri in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries which had given so much trouble to the VOC and their Mataram allies (De Graaf and Pigeaud 1974:137-55; Ricklefs 1993:76). As with Giri, Dipanagara presented the Dutch with a formidable foe: a Javanese leader of great personal charisma and an ability to bind many disparate social elements to his cause. If successful, Dipanagara would have spelt the downfall not only of the European government but also of the Javanese kraton.

It was partly the ineptitude of the Dutch representatives in Yogya in the critical months before the outbreak of the Java War which prevented the government in Batavia from realising the full scale of the challenge they were facing. This meant that when war did engulf much of central Java in July and August 1825, it was almost too late. Only the serendipitous return of General Van Geen’s expeditionary force from South Sulawesi in early August 1825, as we have seen, helped to turn the tide of battle. Even then more than four bitter years of fighting would be needed before the threat from Dipanagara’s forces would be fully lifted. During this time, the Dutch would

241 Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 39-40 reported Dipanagara as saying: ‘[he] asked whether Flores, Sumbawa, Lombok and Bali did not stand completely under our immediate government. To my answer that these islands were beneath our interests, Dipanagara remarked: ‘How gladly would I have gone to these islands with Senthot, Mertanagara, Sumanagara, Dipanagara the Younger together with 3,000 prajurit [soldiers] from Java if I had known more closely about their condition. Bali, which [even] the English did not dare to conquer, would have fallen into my hands immediately and afterwards the other islands. My Basah [army commanders] are brave and strong […]. Senthot [in particular] had shown signs of an enterprising spirit and in recent times had suggested the plan to […] try conquests outside Java.’ Dipanagara spoke once again about the conquest of the four islands of Bali, Lombok, Sumbawa and Flores and said that he could have founded there a great and mighty empire for the satisfaction of The Prophet.’

242 The success of Van Geen’s troops over Bone was reported in Batavia on 13-5-1825 (Bataviasche Courant 13-5-1825) and the news reached Yogya three days later, Dj.Br. 11, ‘Register inhoudende korte aanteekeningen der dagelyksche bevelen en verrigtingen van den Resident van Jogjakarta, A.H. Smissaert, tweede semester 1825’, entry of 16-5-1825. The official celebrations were held on 19-5-1825 just after the Garebeg Puwasa, see Van der Kemp 1901, I:163.
have considerable difficulty coming to terms with the Javanese-Islamic and millenarian aspects of his rebellion. Most thought that this was just another rebellion in a long line of dynastic rebellions by disgruntled Javanese noblemen. Even an Indies official as experienced as Jan Izaäk van Sevenhoven misjudged the situation, advising that Dipanagara’s family influence be undermined by fielding the well-born Surakarta prince, Kusumayuda, in battle against him,243 and suggesting that confidence in the Yogya sultanate be restored by re-appointing the aged former second sultan to the Yogya throne in August 1826 (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, II:410-35; Carey 1992:439 note 201). Given just how out of touch many senior officials were, it was perhaps not so surprising that Smissaert and his junior colleagues in Yogya were poorly briefed. Much depended on the capacity of the local representative. The fact that news of Dipanagara’s rebellion reached the Dutch authorities from Surakarta rather than direct from the sultan’s capital indicated that the acting Resident, MacGillivray, had his ears much closer to the ground than his Yogya colleague (Büchler 1888, II:29; Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:252; Carey 1981a:292-3 note 241; Payen 1988:91-2 note 26).

Just how the prince prepared for war under the very noses of these insouciant Dutch officials in Yogya will be the subject of the next section.

Preparations for rebellion

Even before Dipanagara’s last vision in May 1825, there is evidence that the prince had begun to have a series of meetings with Yogya pangéran and officials from the Yogya kraton who expressed their concern about recent economic and political developments. The post-Java War bupati of Karanganyar in Bagelèn, Jayadiningrat, described the first meeting as having taken place at Tegalreja as early as 29 October 1824 just before the 4 November Garebeg Mulud, although some of those attending were not in favour of outright rebellion and many counselled patience.244 As we have seen, there were also rumours that unpleasant incidents had occurred between Dipanagara and the Dutch at the official Garebeg ceremonies and at various Residency parties. Jayadiningrat recalled that there were even fears that Dipanagara would be poisoned or exiled by the Dutch. This is echoed in the Buku Kedhung Kebo which describes a

243 Dj.Br. 7, J.I. van Sevenhoven (Yogyakarta) to H.M. de Kock (Surakarta/Semarang), 17-11-1825. On Kusumayuda’s pedigree, see Padmasusastra 1902:161, which shows that he was the third surviving son of Pakubuwana IV, his two elder brothers succeeding to the Surakarta throne as Pakubuwana V (reigned 1820-1823) and Pakubuwana VIII (reigned 1858-1861) respectively. His high birth was later cited as the main reason for his removal by the Dutch as army commander in Bagelèn in January 1829, Carey 1974b:275-6.

party given by Smissaert at Bedhaya to which Dipanagara is supposed to have brought a large retinue in order to ensure his protection. Even though the evidence is largely circumstantial, it does seem certain that Dipanagara began to shun the kraton during the latter months of 1824 and the first half of 1825. As Chevallier later reported (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:599):

At the time of the presentation of the Emperor’s [Sunan’s] letters in the kraton or on the occasion of Javanese festivities [the Garebeg], or recently [19 May 1825, note 242] for the official announcement of the triumphal victory of Dutch troops over the Bonenese, Prince Dipanagara never appeared in the kraton and time and again the patih brought this to the Resident’s attention.

In February 1825, Dipanagara may have lent his seal to sanction the payment of f 5,000 from the kraton treasury which was sent to Surabaya at the request of the exiled second sultan to pay for his eighty-strong entourage. Pangéran Adiwinata, one of the second sultan’s sons who joined Dipanagara at Selarong in late July 1825 after the outbreak of the war but later went over to the Dutch, related how Dipanagara entered into secret negotiations at this time with some of the second sultan’s allies in the kasepuhan faction and with the ‘old’ sultan himself. Pangéran Jayakusuma, one of the former Yogya ruler’s staunchest supporters during the British attack in June 1812 (p. 336) and

245 Jayadiningrat 1855-57:17; KITLV Or 13 (Buku Kedhung Kebo):84-6, VIII.23-30. See further Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:47 note 1; Van der Kemp 1896a:340, 364. There is a Javanese text of a letter from Smissaert to Dipanagara in Yogya kraton MS. A.62 (Babad Dipanagaran):105, which seems to have been written early in July 1825, in which the Resident invited Dipanagara to attend a party in the main hall of the Yogya fort (bètèng Loji Ageng), but warned him not to bring more than two escorts because a larger entourage would cause ‘misunderstandings’ with the senior Dutch officers present (angampila abdi pandhèrèk kalih kêmañan, awit manawi kathah dhèrèk, mboknenawi angagèt-agèti, adadosaken salah panggraitanipun para Welandi Ageng). See further Van der Kemp 1896a:364.

246 Dj.Br. 53, A.H. Smissaert (Yogyakarta) to Algemeen Secretaris (Batavia/Bogor), 13-2-1825; Ministerie van Koloniën 2480, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal buiten rade, 23-2-1825 no. 3; Dj.Br. 59, Hamengkubuwana II (Surabaya) to Hamengkubuwana V (Yogyakarta), 25 Jumadilawal AH 1240 (AD 18-12-1824) (announcing his arrival in Surabaya from Ambon); Yogya kraton MS. A.62 (Babad Dipanagaran):33, Hamengkubuwana II (Surabaya) to Pangéran Mangkubumi and Dipanagara (Yogyakarta), n.y. (? 2-1825) (requesting money from the guardians to pay for his 81-strong entourage). On Van der Capellen’s decision to allow Hamengkubuwana II back from Ambon and the appointment of a commission to ascertain the appropriateness of returning him to Yogya, see Ministerie van Koloniën 2477, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal buiten rade, 15-7-1824 no. 3. Smissaert was immediately informed (Dj.Br. 67, Algemeen Secretaris (R. Dozy) to A.H. Smissaert (Yogyakarta), 24-7-1824), and later reported the concerns aroused by Hamengkubuwana II’s possible return to Yogya and restoration to the Dutch king, vAE 28 (aanwinsten 1941), ‘Stukken Smissaert’, A.H. Smissaert (The Hague) to King William I (The Hague/Brussels), n.y. (? 9-1828).

247 dK 165, ‘Translaat-verhaal Adiwinotto van hetgeen den opstand van Diepo Negoro heeft veroorzaakt’ (henceforth: ‘Translaat-verhaal Adiwinotto’), n.y. (? 1826). Adiwinata joined Dipanagara briefly at Selarong at the beginning of the war, but soon after submitted to the Dutch and was killed at the ambush at Nglèngkong in the Slèman area on 30-7-1826 when many Yogya princes loyal to the Dutch lost their lives, see Carey 1981a:240 note 28, 263 note 113; Appendix VIII.
soon to be Dipanagara’s most trusted army commander (Chapter III note 3), is reported to have visited the prince at Tegalreja at this time. Furthermore, two court santri, Haji Abdulgani and Haji Badarudin, the former an intimate of Jayakusuma and the latter the head of the priestly Suranatan regiment who later served Dipanagara in the same capacity (Appendix VIIb), were reportedly sent to the north coast residencies and to Surabaya to seek the erstwhile monarch’s advice. One of Hamengkubuwana II’s closest counsellors, Haji Amattahir, who had apanage lands at Jatingarang in Kulon Praga, apparently encouraged Dipanagara’s plans and kept the old Sultan informed. He was even supposed to have told Sultan Sepuh that, in the event of a successful uprising in Yogya, he might be reinstated as sultan in the place of his great-grandson, something which did indeed occur in August 1826 but not under Dipanagara’s auspices. In June 1825, Amattahir travelled to Yogya where he stayed at Jayakusuma’s residence and was given the news of Dipanagara’s imminent rebellion which was scheduled to begin in the following month of Sura (16 August-15 September 1825). At the same time, according to kraton sources, Dipanagara held meetings with Jayakusuma and his younger brother to coordinate arrangements for calling up supporters from their various apanage villages in the event of an uprising. Dipanagara’s son, Radèn Mas Alip, stated that these preparations were in train some two months before his father’s planned rebellion and we know from other reports that the prince was remitting the May Puwasa taxes from his tenants so that they could purchase arms and food (Carey 1981a:262 note 112, 290 note 229).

Adiwinata’s statement that by June 1825 Dipanagara was irrevocably committed to military action is confirmed in a variety of other sources. Thus the former kapitan cina, Radèn Tumenggung Secadiningrat, seems to have warned the Dutch authorities in Yogya as early as May about Dipanagara’s intentions and we have already described the incident at the Residency.

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251 dK 165, ‘Translaat-verhaal Adiwinotto’, n.y. (? 1826); Carey 1981a:242 note 34. A court haji, Haji Ali, apparently confided to Danureja IV that the prince was planning to leave Yogya to go to his mother’s birth-place at Majasta in the Pajang area on the 8 Sura AJ 1753 (AD 22-8-1825), AvJ, Haji Ali (Yogyakarta) to Danureja IV (Yogyakarta), 18-7-1825. On Dipanagara’s mother’s birth-place, see Chapter II note 13.


254 dK 165, ‘Translaat-verhaal Adiwinotto’, n.y. (? 1826); Carey 1981a:242 note 34. Tan Jin Sing/Secadiningrat’s knowledge of what was happening at Tegalreja would have been enhanced by his involvement in the upkeep of Dipanagara’s bodyguard, see p. 401.
party following the Garebeg Puwasa ceremony on 18 May 1825 which sealed Dipanagara’s breach with the Dutch. At this Residency function, Chevallier is reported to have publicly given out that the prince was ‘mad’ and had gone out of his way to ridicule the prince’s entourage following Dipanagara’s early departure from the party by refusing to partake in the official banquet. The attitudes of local Dutch officials towards Dipanagara at this time are well reflected in Smissaert’s bemused letter to Van der Capellen written on 19 July just a day before the prince’s flight from Tegalreja.

Prince Dipanagara appears for some time now to have given himself over to fanaticism [...]. He is known as someone who from time to time is tormented by madness [...] in which state he had previously, more than once, embarked upon stupid steps and forced religious duties [...]. All the princes, the patih, the bupati and the other nobles strongly disapprove of his actions and ascribe them to zealotry. By the time this letter was dispatched, Smissaert had already been informed about Dipanagara’s remittance of the Puwasa taxes to his tenants and his contacts with bandit groups (wong durjana) to the south of Yogya (Van der Kemp 1896a:332; Carey 1981a:243 note 36, 262-3 note 112). His colleague Hendrik MacGillivray in Surakarta had also warned Smissaert on 16 July that a large force of armed supporters from Dipanagara’s lands in Pajang had gathered in the hilly area around the village of Sepikul and that the demang of Grojogan near Surakarta, a tenant of the prince, had rendered him no taxes for the past three to four months. By 19 July, this same demang together with about 100 followers was on the march to Tegalreja and he arrived just in time to take part in the skirmish with the Dutch at Dipanagara’s residence on the following day.

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255 Ministerie van Koloniën 4194, Geheim en Kabinets Archief, 13-3-1827 Litt. 31 no. 35, Ratu Ageng and Radèn Ayu Hascuran (Yogyakarta) to Hamengkubuwana II (Yogyakarta), n.y. (pre 20-6-1826); Pangérán Mangkumbu (Rejasa, Kulon Praga) to Hamengkubuwana II (Yogyakarta), n.y. (? 10-1826). See further Van Nes 1844:156. The incident involving the banquet appears to have taken place after Dipanagara had been driven home from the party early to Tegalreja in Wiranagara’s carriage.


257 Carey 1981a:262-3 note 112, 292-3 note 241. UBL, BPL 616, Port. 9 pt. 2, Hendrik MacGillivray (Surakarta) to A.H. Smissaert (Yogyakarta), 16-7-1825; A.H. Smissaert (Yogyakarta) to Hendrik MacGillivray (Surakarta), 18-7-1825; Ministerie van Koloniën 4132, ‘Bijlagen Smissaert’, Hendrik MacGillivray (Surakarta) to A.H. Smissaert (Yogyakarta), 19-7-1825. MacGillivray’s crucial letter of 16-7-1825 reached Smissaert when he was at Bedhaya (BPL 616, Port. 9 pt. 2, P.F.H. Chevallier, ‘Dag-Register van den Assistant-Resident van Djokjokarta inhoudende aanteekeningen nopens het gebeurde van 16 Juli tot en met 5 Augustus 1825’, entry of 17-7-1825), but he did not see fit to return to Yogya until the following Monday (18-7-1825), an inexcusable delay which was later cited as one of the grounds for his dismissal by De Kock, dK XLV, ‘Verhaal’, 10-1825.
The rapid development of events between May and July 1825 is also reflected in Dipanagara’s babad. Thus he described how he returned from his cave at Secang at the end of the fasting month and was greeted by the former pengulu, who was still residing at Tegalreja, with the news that the Dutch were seeking ways to take the prince prisoner. Rahmanudin lent force to his warning by stating that large numbers of Dutch troops had recently arrived in Semarang and that these would be used against Dipanagara. This was certainly a false piece of information. Whilst there may have been a concentration of troops in Semarang in January 1825 when reinforcements were sent to South Sulawesi to support Van Geen’s Bone expedition (Van der Kemp 1901, II:226 note 5), the bulk of this force did not return to central Java until early August (Louw and De Klerck 1894, I:367-9). Moreover, although similar rumours were circulating in Yogya, there was no substance to them. Indeed, it was not until the very eve of the Dutch attack on Tegalreja on 20 July that suggestions were put forward that Dipanagara should be arrested (Carey 1981a:256-7 note 92). Then, following Dipanagara’s flight, MacGillivray went a step further by sending out secret assassins to try to murder the prince and his uncle, Mangkubumi, at Selarong, a mission which proved abortive (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:289 note 4).

Dipanagara appears to have taken Rahmanudin’s warnings seriously and he told his friend that he was not afraid but that he would await the outcome of events. Whereupon, the former pengulu urged him to give way and, like his grandfather Sultan Sepuh, undergo all the ill-treatment which the Dutch intended for him. Stating that he himself was not afraid of suffering or death, Rahmanudin said that he was already an old man and would not be strong enough to join in outright warfare should Dipanagara decide on that course of action. At this, Dipanagara smiled, and in a clear reference to what he now saw as his duty to prepare for a martyr’s (shahid) death a forthcoming holy war, spoke softly:

XX.64 ‘Grandfather, I will take pleasure in war: death [in battle] is good, so they say.’

See further Van der Capellen 1860:363, 395; Van der Kemp 1896a:393; Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:252. Smissaert later said that he had sent the letter on to Chevalier to deal with on the evening of 17-7-1825, vAE 28 (aanwinsten 1941), A.H. Smissaert (The Hague) to King William I (The Hague/Brussels), n.y. (9-1828). Neither Sepikul or Grojogan are in Dumont 1931, but it seems from MacGillivray’s letter that the former was close to the abutments of Gunung Kidul because he refers to the gebierge (hilly area) of Sepikul.

258 BD (Manado), II:330-1, XX.59-60.
259 BD (Manado), II:332, XX.62-3.
260 BD (Manado), II:332-3, XX (Dhandhanggula), 64. kula kaki mapan remen yuda/ matiya becik ucapé. Dipanagara’s jihad mentality is mentioned in dK 119, Pangérán Bintara report to De Kock, 27-8-1828, in which he referred to Dipanagara’s speech to local chiefs at his Sambirata headquarters in Kulon Praga: ‘You must realise that the paths to Heaven and Hell are open: those of you
Plate 64. Drawing of a meeting between A.H. Smissaert (Resident of Yogyakarta), Radèn Adipati Danureja IV and Major Tumenggung Wiranagara (commander of the Sultan’s bodyguard) in the Yogyakarta Residency house. The sketch may depict them planning an attack on Dipanagara’s residence at Tegalreja on 20 July 1825. Taken from KITLV Or 13 (Buku Kedhung Kebo), p. 51a. Photograph by courtesy of the KITLV, Leiden.
The former head of the Yogya religious establishment then begged leave to depart on a pilgrimage to Mecca, a request which Dipanagara readily acceded to, remarking that it was fitting that Rahmanudin should spend the rest of his days in Arabia. He urged his friend to seek the intercessions of The Prophet as he bowed before the Ka’bah (the tomb of The Prophet), and to invoke the prayers of all the imām, presumably the heads of the four fiqh law schools in Mecca, that his efforts to serve The True Faith should be successful. The venerable kyai thereupon took his leave and set out to take ship for the Holy Land in Semarang.

The outbreak of the Java War

The pengulu’s departure took place soon after Smissaert had taken the decision to repair some of the side roads around Yogya, one of which skirted the eastern fence of Tegalreja (Carey 1981a:245-6 note 42). On 17 June 1825, this began to be staked out by the Yogya patih’s men. The subsequent blocking off of the road caused considerable inconvenience for Dipanagara and for those who lived on his estate and the surrounding villages (Carey 1981a:251 note 64). Moreover, Danureja IV had not informed the prince of Smissaert’s order and the first he knew of it was the planting of the marker stakes (Carey 1981a:246 note 43). Danureja’s omission, which was almost certainly deliberate, amounted to a gross breach of etiquette and inevitably small fights broke out between Dipanagara’s retainers and the road workers in which the inhabitants of the villages adjacent to Tegalareja were also involved (Carey 1981a:247 note 47). This situation lasted through the end of June and into July, when the skirmishes over the road took on a more serious aspect as Dipanagara’s supporters and tenants from his more distant apanage lands began to arrive in Tegalreja to defend the prince (Van der Kemp 1896a:389-90; Carey 1981a:247 note 47, 262-3 note 112). Dipanagara’s plans for a general uprising in Yogya who go over to the Europeans will go to Hell, while those who die waging war against them will attain to Heaven’. Bintara reported Dipanagara’s concerns that if he made a deal with the Europeans he would suffer too much shame. In particular, he feared that those who had died as shahid in the Holy War, like his late son-in-law, Radèn Tumenggung Natadirja (Gusti Basah; Appendix IV), would speak against him in Heaven. According to Bintara, he believed that Natadirja and other shahid lived in the neck of the malar munga bird of ill omen, Chapter IX note 169.

261 BD (Manado), II:332-4, XX.64-8. The imām to whom Dipanagara referred were the four heads of the fiqh law schools in Mecca: Shāfi’i, Hanafi, Māliki and Hanbali, Juynboll 1930:19-23. Dipanagara later enumerated them on his voyage to Manado in conversations with Knoerle (‘Journal’, 43), pointing out that the Shāfi’i school held sway in Java. Dipanagara himself had plans to settle in Mecca should his efforts in Java fail, Carey 1974a:29-33.

262 Carey 1981a:259 note 103. Rahmanudin probably departed in the Javanese month of Besar which in that year started in mid-July since that was the traditional time for pilgrimages to be made, hence its supplementary name of wulan haji (the month of the pilgrims).
Plate 65. A Javanese sketch of the fighting between Dipanagara's followers and Dutch troops at Selarong in either September or October 1825. Dipanagara's personal battle pennant with his Èruçakra ('Just King') symbol of crossed arrows and solar discus can be seen by courtesy of the KITLV, Leiden.
Plate 65. A Javanese sketch of the fighting between Dipanagara’s followers and Dutch troops at Selarong in either September or October 1825. Dipanagara’s personal battle pennant with his Èrucakra (‘Just King’) symbol of crossed arrows and solar discus can be seen on the left. Taken from KITLV Or 13 (Buku Kedhung Kebo), f.136r-v. Photograph by courtesy of the KITLV, Leiden.

Selarong in either September or October 1825. Dipanagara’s personal battle on the left. Taken from KITLV Or 13 (Buku Kedhung Kebo), f.136r-v. Photograph
in mid-August were now brought forward, the dispute ending any lingering doubts in Dipanagara’s mind about the need for immediate military action. He is supposed to have ordered that the stakes marking the road to be replaced by pikes as a sign that he considered the unannounced highway construction a *casus belli*. He also appears to have sent his wives, children and older retainers away from Tegalreja to Selarong with money and valuables to pay for his troops. Meanwhile, Mangkubumi noticed that the prince had begun to wear his favourite kris, presumably Kyai Abijaya (Appendix XI), which he seldom carried (Van Nes 1844:156, 158; Carey 1981a:277 note 169).

By the middle of July, Danureja’s secretary, Mas Ngabèhi Wiraprana, began to make detailed reports about the concentration of Dipanagara’s supporters at Tegalreja, indicating that his plans for rebellion were now far advanced. But immediate action could not be taken against the prince because of the *patih*’s absence from Yogya overseeing the construction of a road near Klatèn. Smissaert, meanwhile, was in his inevitable recess at Bedhaya. So a crucial weekend (15-17 July) passed and when the harassed Dutch and Javanese officials came together again in Yogya on Monday, 18 July, the initiative for opening immediate negotiations with Dipanagara had been lost. Even if this initiative had been taken, however, it is still very doubtful whether Smissaert would have acceded to Dipanagara’s main demand that Danureja should be dismissed. In fact, the Resident’s handling of the situation, in particular his insistence that the prince should come to Yogya, left Dipanagara with very little room to manoeuvre. The prince was now a prisoner of his own supporters, who had pledged themselves to fight and who refused to allow him to go to Yogya to confer with Smissaert (Van der Kemp 1896a:394; Carey 1981a:272 note 146). Why then did Smissaert not go directly to Tegalreja in his own carriage to pick Dipanagara up as some of his contemporaries thought his predecessor, Nahuys, might have done (Van Hogendorp 1913:147-8)? The hapless Resident subsequently justified his behaviour by recalling what had happened to a former Resident, Pieter du Puy, in Banten, who had been killed trying a similar action against a rebel leader in the *kraton* of Banten in November 1808, his death being the signal for a general uprising against

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263 Dj.Br. 17, ‘Minuten van Sevenhoven’, J.I. van Sevenhoven (Surakarta) to Johannes van den Bosch (Batavia/Bogor), 5-5-1831 no. 47.
264 Carey 1981a:277 note 170; Payen 1988:50, 93 note 36. There is some doubt about when Dipanagara’s wives and children were sent to Selarong. Payen states this occurred on or before 19-7-1825, but Dipanagara in his *babad* indicates that it was only shortly before the Dutch expedition arrived on 20-7-1825.
Europeans in the residency (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, IV:618 note 1; De Graaf 1949:368; Carey 1981a:273-4 note 153):

I felt I must stay in Djokjo [Yogya] to confer with the military commander and to keep the peace. […] if I had gone [to Tegalreja] and been killed, my death would have put the whole European community in Djokjokarta [Yogyakarta] in danger […] [It] would have worked the Javanese up into a murderous frenzy.266

Thus the age-old European fear of the Javanese in an amok state was cited as the problem. After describing Dipanagara as a fanatic, Smissaert was now suggesting that the prince and his followers were in danger of running amok as well, although he acknowledged his political importance:

This was not a question of [arresting] a common Javanese or even a robber leader, but a man of extreme importance in the Djokjcartan [Yogyakarta] kingdom – a prince who had been appointed as a guardian of the young sultan by the Netherlands Indies government itself.

Given these predictable views, it was hardly surprising that the various missions dispatched by the Resident, Danureja and others in Yogya failed between 18 and 20 July. The last of these led by the senior court bupati (nayaka), Radèn Tumenggung Sindunagara II and Mas Arya Mandura, departed for Tegalreja on the afternoon of Wednesday, 20 July. It was backed up by a mixed Dutch and Javanese kraton troop detachment organised by Chevallier (Carey 1981a:271 note 145, 278 note 186, 280 note 185). It seems that the Assistant-Resident had hoped to take both Dipanagara and Mangkubumi prisoner thus ending the incipient rebellion, but the prince had already been alerted to the dispatch of the force by blacksmiths in Yogya who had helped in the shoeing of the cavalry horses and the preparation of weapons (Carey 1981a:257 note 92, 274 note 156). The arrival of this force precipitated an open conflict with Dipanagara’s armed supporters at Tegalreja. After a hard-fought skirmish, the prince’s residence fell to the Dutch-led expedition and was immediately put to the torch. The princes, however, made good their escape with the majority of their followers through the western gate of Tegalreja. Making their way across small paths over the unseasonally inundated ricefields, they swiftly outtrode their pursuers (Carey 1981a:280 note 186, 188). They were even able to observe the evening prayer before overnighting in a village just north of the Yogya-Sentolo road (Carey 1981a:280 note 188, Map A). Payen, who received a full report of the failed military operation from his friend and fellow Walloon, Lieutenant Jean Nicolaas de Thierry (1783-1825), who commanded the 25-strong hussar detachment, gave a vivid description of the princes’ flight:

With the cavalry on one side and the infantry on the other, the [Dutch-led force] went round the village which enclosed the estate. They could see the rebels withdrawing slowly across the ricefields. Pangueran [Pangérán] Dipo Negoro [Dipanagara] was not very far away mounted on a beautiful black horse [Kyai Githayu] with a superb harness. He was clad entirely in white in the Arab style. The end of his turban flapped in the wind as he made his horse prance. The reins attached to his belt, he [seemed] to be dancing in the midst of his lance-bearing bodyguard.  

The following day, Thursday 21 July 1825, Dipanagara and his uncle arrived at Selarong and there near the cave where the prince had so often meditated and spent days in seclusion they set up the standard of revolt. The Java War had begun (Büchler 1888, II:25-9; Van der Kemp 1896a:400; Carey 1981a:282 note 197).

Conclusion

Who could fail to be moved by the poignancy of this moment? Dipanagara dressed for the holy war fleeing across the ricefields while the flames rose from his beloved Tegalreja. As he unfurled his battle standard as Java’s long awaited Ratu Adil in the limestone hills to the south of Yogya the next day, he was certainly under no illusions about what this meant. A Rubicon had been crossed. There could be no turning back. Ahead lay nearly five years of war which would cost the lives of perhaps as many as 200,000 Javanese and disrupt the existence of two million more. During this time the last remnants of Java’s old order would be consumed. Just over a century would have to pass before Java would again know freedom as part of an independent Indonesia. This was history as tragedy as Dipanagara himself would later acknowledge in the opening lines of his babad when he spoke of the suffering and shame he had been forced to endure (pp. 733-4).

Could it have been otherwise? The rapid deterioration in the living standards of the rural populations of south-central Java in the years following the Dutch restoration in 1816 (Chapter IX), meant that there would have been continued peasant uprisings in the latter half of the 1820s even if the Java War had never happened. We have already seen how such revolts, many of which had a pronounced millenarian character, were becoming more ubiquitous in the period 1817-1822. What was unclear was whether a leader of Dipanagara’s stature would emerge to give them with focus. Here the actions of Smissaert and his Assistant-Resident were clearly critical in tipping the balance. If there had been more experienced officials in Yogya, men like Nahuys or Van

267 Payen 1988:51, referring to Dipanagara seeming to perform a tandhak (dance) in the midst of his bodyguard. Payen’s description of Dipanagara’s attire and mount is very similar to that given in the Surakarta version of the Babad Dipanagara, Carey 1981a:86-9, 276-7 note 169, 277 note 172.
Sevenhoven, it is possible that some of the more egregiously offensive actions which forced Dipanagara into rebellion might have been avoided. Even then, any post-1823 Resident of Yogya would have had his work cut out convincing the kraton elite of the government’s good intentions. The combination of the land-rent indemnities and Van der Capellen’s annexationist policies deepened the prevailing sense of uncertainty in the south-central Javanese kraton. The days of the independent courts seemed to be numbered. Nowhere more so than in Yogya where the rapid decline in living standards of the elite, internal court rivalries and the problems of minority rule, all undermined confidence in the sultanate. With events in the natural world – in particular the late December 1822 eruption of Mount Merapi and the previous year’s cholera epidemic – seeming to portend a coming cataclysm, is it any wonder that Dipanagara’s emergence as a Ratu Adil elicited such widespread popular support? The legendary prophecies of King Jayabaya seemed about to be fulfilled. It was against this background that Dipanagara’s pre-war visions and dreams occurred. They confirmed what he may have already surmised from his youth that he had been chosen as the vehicle for the purification of Java. With the image of the Javanese Just King still vivid in his mind and with the Qur’ānic mandate of his selection as a wali wudhar seemingly confirmed by the support of the south-central Javanese santri communities, the prince went to war in July 1825 confident that his prophetic visions would stand the test of battle. The vicissitudes of war and the loneliness of exile lay before him. During this time, he would come to revise his views about his destiny. Instead of seeing himself as the promised Ratu Adil who would drive the Dutch from Java, by the end of the war he was indicating that he would be content with the restoration of a pre-Daendelian status quo in which the Dutch would be allowed to remain on the island as traders and settlers along the north coast. By this time his break with the santri communities meant that his hopes of gaining recognition as a regulator of religion were fast receding. He still failed to realise, however, that it was now impossible to put the clock back. A new age of imperialism had dawned. Johannes van den Bosch, the governor-general under whom the prince’s fate was sealed, was in no mood to compromise. Aware of the international dangers occasioned by the Belgian revolt of 1830 and committed to the establishment of a pax neerlandica in the Indies, he would ensure that a third of Dipanagara’s life would be spent in exile. By the time of the prince’s death in Makassar in January 1855, the Dutch colonial regime would be unassailable and Holland, flush with the profits of the Javanese Cultivation System, well on the way to its transformation into a modern industrial state. Just how Dipanagara experienced the bitterness of these years will be the subject of the next two chapters.
CHAPTER XI

The last stand of the old order
Reflections on the Java War, 1825-1830

Introduction

The past ten chapters have described the history of south-central Java from Dipanagara’s birth in 1785 through his upbringing at Tegalreja to the outbreak of the Java War. They have drawn on the detailed official testimony of the Residency archives as well as the rich and often idiosyncratic Javanese babad, in particular Dipanagara’s own autobiography. With the outbreak of the Java War, however, we enter new territory. Instead of the daily reports of Dutch Residents and their staff on the economic and political developments in south-central Java, the post-July 1825 record is dominated by the military dispatches between the Netherlands Indies army commander, Hendrik Merkus de Kock, and his senior officers in the field. These military archives, in particular the records of the Dutch East Indies general staff, have been the subject of much detailed study by Dutch historians. P.J.F. Louw and E.S. de Klerck, both serving officers of the Nederlands Oost-Indisch Leger (Netherlands East Indies Army), are the undisputed authorities here. Their magisterial six-volume history of the Java War (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909) covers the conflict from the Dutch and the Javanese side, drawing extensively on Dipanagara’s babad in Dutch and Malay translation. In addition, there are a number of works which deal with aspects of the war by other former members of the Dutch colonial army (De Stuers 1833; Weitzel 1852-53; Lagordt Dillie 1863; Kielstra 1885, 1896a, 1896b; Schoemaker 1893; Hooyer 1895-97; Booms 1902, 1911; Aukes 1935), as well as amateur historians and littérateurs (Hageman 1856; Van der Kemp 1896a, 1896b; Somer 1938; Van Praag 1947), former Indies officials (Nahuys van Burgst 1835-36, 1852, 1858; Van Nes 1844), not to speak of

1 Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, II:345 note 1; Carey 1981a:xxv-xxvi, lxi note 85. For a good description of the rather chaotic and much delayed process of preparing the Dutch and Malay translations of the BD (Manado) in the 1864-1874 decade under the aegis of the Batavian Society (Bataviasch Genootschap van Kunsten en Wetenschappen), see Van Praag 1947:20-3. Of the two authors, Louw (1856-1924) was much more sympathetic to Dipanagara and his babad than his younger colleague De Klerck (1869-?), who wrote the last three volumes covering the period 1828-1830.
more recent Indonesian studies (Yamin 1950; Sagimun 1965; Iskandar 1970; Djamhari 2003). So it would serve no purpose to go over the same ground here. Instead this chapter will adopt a thematic approach looking in turn at aspects of Dipanagara’s war effort. The first section will consider Dipanagara’s methods of mobilization, armaments and taxation. The second and third will deal with the role of women in the conflict, and Javanese cultural and linguistic issues as seen both in the prince’s treatment of Dutch prisoners and in his attitudes towards the Chinese. Two further sections will consider leadership and regional loyalties, and the support received by Dipanagara from the santri communities. The core of the chapter focuses on the breakdown in the prince’s relationship with two of his key supporters, namely Kyai Maja and Senthot, both of whom decided to make their own peace with the Dutch in November 1828 and October 1829 respectively. It will seek to probe the origins of the conflict between Dipanagara’s kraton and santri followers and assess the impact of the prince’s disastrous concession to Senthot over tax revenues. This, it will be argued, allowed Senthot’s commanders to exercise a form of wartime ‘dual function’ as a military and civilian administrative force leading to the alienation of the local population from the prince’s cause. Dipanagara’s own decision to enter into negotiations with the Dutch four months after Senthot’s defection in October 1829 must be looked at in the context of this loss of popular support. Given that there are no readily accessible accounts in English of the Java War, a brief synopsis of the main events will be included in the penultimate section dealing with Dutch military and political tactics.

The next chapter (XII) will consider the prince’s decision to meet with the Dutch army commander, De Kock, and gives a description of his capture at Magelang on 28 March 1830, his subsequent journey into exile (28 March-12 June 1830) and his period of incarceration first in Manado (13 June 1830-20 June 1833) and then in Makassar (11 July 1833-8 January 1855), ending with his death. Much of the material used here has previously appeared in print in the present author’s journal articles and his edition of the Surakarta version of the Babad Dipanagara (Carey 1981a).

Mobilization for war: finance, peasant manpower and armaments

By the time Dipanagara and Mangkubumi set up the standard of revolt\(^2\) at Selerong on 21 July 1825, a number of preparations had already been made to mobilize the prince’s peasantry and retainers for war. We have seen in the previous chapter how a good three months before the Dutch attack on Tegalreja, the prince had begun to remit the Puwasa taxes on his estates and to gather

\(^2\) Dipanagara’s personal standard is described in Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:208. See also plate 65.
funds to sustain his campaign (p. 594). He later reflected that his unexpected flight from Tegalreja on 20 July had caused him to abandon $3,000 in cash and much unhusked rice as well as various other personal items, one of which was his official seal (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:743; Carey 1981a:266 note 122), which had been readied for use at the outbreak of war.

The early organization and financing of the war seem to have followed along wholly traditional lines (Carey 1981a:xl). In the opening stages of the conflict, the princes and senior priyayi, who rallied to the prince, contributed their own valuables such as jewellery, cash and other high value portables (ornaments, jewel-encrusted kris sheaths, gold belts). These were often carried into the war zone by their wives and daughters.3 Along with the capture of Dutch treasure convoys – such as the one ambushed at Pisangan in the Tèmpèl district to the north of Yogyakarta on 24 July 1825 when $24,000 in cash intended for the Dutch garrison in Yogya fell into Dipanagara’s hands (Carey 1981a:255 note 83, 290 note 230) – these assets were used to finance the initial campaigns. Periodic distributions of cash to the prince’s supporters also seem to have occurred although some were unhappy at the amounts given out. Radèn Sukur, the son of the bupati of Semarang, Sura-adimanggala IV (pp. 364, 465-6), who joined Dipanagara early in the war, complained that he had only received two silver réyal (one réyal = $2.40) from the prince up to the time when he, Sukur, had surrendered to the Dutch in August 1829 and that he had been forced to sell his official clothes and ornaments to maintain himself (Carey 1981a:255 note 83). We will return to this issue of finance later in the final section of this chapter in the context of the prince’s arguments with Senthot over his involvement in fiscal administration (pp. 649-51).

As regards armaments, the prince only began to gather weapons after he had arrived at Selarong (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:745; Carey 1981a:275 note 166). However, it seems that many of his followers had prepared for battle by arming themselves with traditional armaments such as slings and catapults, as well as staves and lances made of sharpened bamboo (Payen 1988:53; Carey 1981a:275 note 166). In late July and early August, bands of armed men from villages in the Yogya area appear to have made their way to Selarong to receive orders from Dipanagara leaving immediately after they had been informed of what was required of them (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:262. 400; Aukes 1935:79-81; Carey 1981a:285 note 208).

The style of warfare favoured by Dipanagara made full use of these local levies: thus villagers were ordered to fell trees to block roads as well as burn

3 Carey 1981a:52; Dj:Br. 7, A.H. Smissaert (Yogyakarta) to H.M. de Kock (Surakarta), 9-8-1825. For an interesting comparison with General Sudirman’s use of similar methods of war finance following the Second Dutch Police Action in December 1948, see Simatupang 1972:52, 152: ‘Panglima Besar Sudirman ordered two men to enter the city [of Yogyakarta] and ask Bu Dirman for jewelry to finance him during the guerrilla war’.
down the wooden bridges and dig up road surfaces or plant them with sharpened bamboo stakes (Payen 1988:53, 55, 102 note 79). Disruption of communications to prevent the Dutch bringing in reinforcements was critical just as it had been at the time of Radèn Rongga’s rebellion in November-December 1810 (pp. 248-9) and during the British attack on Yogyakarta in June 1812 (p. 321). Dipanagara also understood the importance of keeping his own lines of supply open; he appointed one of his uncle, Mangkudiningrat I’s, sons as his captain of ferryboats on the Praga River and ensured that the bandit communities at Kamijara and Mangir, which controlled the key river crossing points, were summoned to Selarong in late July 1825 to receive his instructions (Carey 1981a:243 note 36, 267 note 124). His tactics of disrupting enemy communications while maintaining his own supply lines continued throughout the war. Indeed, as late as August 1828, the Dutch even suspected that a British or American smuggling brig, which had been observed at anchor in the mouth of the Praga River, had supplied the prince with firearms (Carey 1981a:275-6 note 166; Djamhari 2003:xviii).

By delaying the passage of Dutch mobile columns, Dipanagara’s forces were able to mount a number of effective ambushes (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, II:486, III:442; Bataviasche Courant, 1-1-1828). According to De Stuers, the favoured tactic for these surprise attacks involved the prince’s troops hiding in the long grass by the side of the roads, and then deploying in semi-circular fire attack formation like French franc-tireurs (snipers).4 Senthot, Dipanagara’s youthful cavalry commander, also developed techniques for camouflaging his horsemen behind bamboo fences and smearing the tongues of his mounts with salt to keep them still as they lay in wait for the enemy (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, II:381). In cases of successful ambushes, neighbouring villagers, who had seemed to engage in peaceful agricultural activities, would take up their farm implements and join in the fray, at times cutting off the retreat of Dutch columns which would run the risk of being overwhelmed unless they could retreat to the safety of a Dutch military stockade or bènthèng (De Stuers 1833:7). In Kedhu, as we have seen (p. 55), many of the villages had stone walls, built earlier to prevent pillaging by roving robber bands, and these rudimentary fortifications were used to great effect by Dipanagara in the early stages of the war along with other fortified places such as Sunan Amangkurat I’s former kraton of Plérèd to the

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4 De Stuers 1833:6-7. See further Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, III:98, on Dipanagara’s troops hiding in long alang-alang grass in southern Kedhu during an operation against Major (later Major-General) A.V. Michiels’ forces in May 1827. Besides De Stuers’ book, various other studies deal with the military tactics used by Dipanagara’s forces during the war, amongst the most important being Lagordt Dillié 1863; Iskandar 1970 and Djamhari 2003. On the destruction of the stone walls besides the main roads between Yogya, Magelang and Surakarta to prevent ambushes by Dipanagara’s troops early in the war, see Chapter I note 139.
XI The last stand of the old order

southeast of Yogya. Even villages protected only by bamboo thickets could be turned into formidable defensive positions, especially when the prince’s supporters ringed them with skilfully concealed mantraps (borang) in which lethally sharpened bamboo skewers had been set.

Dipanagara’s regular troops had firearms and there are references in the Yogya archive to the prince ordering the purchase of rifles. It is also clear that captured Dutch weaponry, including cannon, were used by his forces (Djamhari 2003:80). As one Dutch mobile column commander reported following the capture of a fortified strongpoint defended by Dipanagara’s white-clad and shaven-head regulars at Mergalunyu near Gombong in western Bagelèn (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, III:115):

never had they shown me such resistance. Their weapons were all good and of the usual European model. [...] The sole artillery piece, which they had left behind in their fort, was a fine one pounder.

It is clear that European artillery techniques were also studied; one of the prince’s commanders, who had taken part in the siege of Yogyakarta in July-September 1825, noted that Dutch cannon invariably fired too high because the defending artillerymen used too much gunpowder. Although captured Dutch supplies were extensively used, Dipanagara also obtained propellants from local villages in the districts to the south and west of Yogya. These included Samèn in the Pandhak sub-district near Bantul to the south of the sultan’s capital (Carey 1981a:243 note 36, 275 note 166; pp. 49, 101-2), Into-Into on the Praga River (Javasche Courant 111, 16-9-1828; Lagordt Dillié 1863:32), and the villages of Geger (Samigaluh) and Deksa in Kulon Praga, an area where tin cannonballs were also cast for the prince’s artillery (Javasche Courant 129, 28-10-1828). Experiments were even made in the Menorèh district with the manufacture of bullets made out of tightly packed rush matting (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, III:243), the materials presumably being obtained

5 De Stuers 1833:2; p. 571. On the construction by Dipanagara’s troops of earthenwork ramparts and bamboo stockades as defensive positions in Banyumas, see Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, III:126.
7 On the Prussian infantry flintlock musket with ball shot, which was in general issue in the Netherlands Indies Army during the Java War, see Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:226-8. It generally failed on every fifteenth round. In 1828, 200 new percussion rifles, which were being introduced into the French army for the 1830 Algiers expedition, were brought to Batavia for fire testing purposes. Although they were found to be much more reliable, failing only on every 290th shot, they arrived too late for general use in the Java War.
9 On the involvement in villagers in the manufacture of gunpowder in Kulon Praga, see AN, Exhibitum, 6-12-1831 no. 1 (papers relating to the exile of Mangkudiningrat II), La F. J. Jansen, Report of Spies (Note of F.G. Valck), 22-10-1831.
The power of prophecy

from the neighbouring pradikan (tax-free) villages of Pesantrèn and Bendha in southern Kedhu which specialised in mat weaving (p. 469). The former in particular was mentioned in the Dutch reports as a staunch centre of support for the prince during the war (*Bataviasche Courant* 33, 17-5-1827).

According to the Dutch military historian, P.M. Lagordt-Dillié (1863:32), the gunpowder produced locally for Dipanagara, particularly that manufactured in Into-Into, was of very high quality, women often helping in its preparation. A former indigo factory at Tegalweru to the west of Yogya appears to have been used as a production centre (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, III:562-3), but the main armaments centre was Kutha Gedhé (p. 8). The presence in the town of a large community of artisans, and metalworkers – known locally as the kalang (Carey 1992:473 note 348) – provided the skilled labour force for the manufacture of shot, flints and gunpowder. Moreover, its status as a neutral city – militarily inviolate by virtue of its joint Surakarta and Yogyakarta administration and the presence of its ancient royal graveyard (burial site of Panembahan Sénapati) – made it a place where people could take shelter.10 The four bupati tasked with the town’s administration – two each from Surakarta and Yogyakarta – had the duty of ensuring that no supplies from the main market reached the sultan’s capital.11

Certainly, there were good profits to be made from supplying Dipanagara’s forces. After the initial sinophobic attacks of the early months of the war had abated, the Chinese in Jana in eastern Bagelèn appear to have done a brisk trade selling gunpowder and opium to the prince’s troops (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, II:215-6). Enterprising Semarang-based suppliers even smuggled gunpowder in loads of dried salted fish at the time of Dipanagara’s campaign against Surakarta in October 1826 (Carey 1981a:276 note 166). Sulphur from the Ijen plateau near Banyuwangi on the Bali Straits appears to have been used in gunpowder manufacture in Java at this time (Raffles 1817, I:180), but rumours that Dipanagara sourced supplies from as far afield as Lombok and Sumbawa, where he had family connections (p. 76), would seem to be without foundation, as were reports that he had received armaments from American or British smugglers (Carey 1981a:275-6 note 166).

Porters, who earned their livelihood on the roads of south-central Java, were the main conduit for the transport of military provisions with gunpowder being moved and stored in heavy leather bags (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, III:557). Professional bandits, the scourge of the pre-Java War coun-

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tryside, also served as auxiliaries (Carey 1981a:243-4 note 36). Meanwhile, traditional weapons were frequently used in action against Dutch troops and their Indonesian allies. In a report from eastern Bagelèn in July 1826, a Dutch mobile column commander related that:

The ordinary village people here are at one with the rebels so much so that they immediately joined the enemy and assailed our men with sling shots with the result that some on our side were [badly] bruised.

According to De Stuers, the most ubiquitous weapon was the Javanese stabbing dagger (*kris*). Mounted at the end of a length of thick bamboo, this made a very serviceable pike or lance which could be used to dismount Dutch cavalry before they could reload their carbines (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, II:380; pp. 7, 332). De Stuers went on to describe how Javanese peasants could move easily from their agricultural duties to participating in local ambushes of Dutch and Indonesian troops. They did this by keeping their *kris* blades always at their side, usually secreted in the folds of their short trousers or loin cloths while they worked their fields. During a military action they would prepare themselves as pikemen by mounting this weapon on a bamboo stave. When the ambush was over, they would break the haft of their weapon, remove the *kris* blade and melt back into the countryside resuming their previous identities as peaceable peasant cultivators. The war thus took on the aspect of a classic agrarian insurgency, part peasant *jacquerie* (uprising) as in the Vendée in the west of France in 1793-1795, part organised military campaign (De Stuers 1833:4-10; Tilly 1964:331-9). At the same time, the tactics adopted by the Dutch to overcome this type of guerrilla warfare were also, in De Stuers’ view, inspired by the famous French Revolutionary general, Lazare Hoche (1768-1797), whose ruthless counter-insurgency operations in the west of France had broken the back of the Vendéan revolt in the mid-1790s. We will return to these Dutch counter-insurgency tactics in the penultimate section of this chapter.

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12 dK 197, A.H. Smissaert (Yogyakarta) to H.M. de Kock (Surakarta), 30-7-1825 (on the use of slingers); Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:401 (on villagers from Mangir, a village close to the confluence of the Kali Bedhog and Kali Praga, killing members of the Mangkunagaran legion with cudgels). On the weapons used by Dipanagara’s troops, see further Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:630-1.

13 Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, II:364, report of Lieutenant-colonel Johan Diell (1776-1827), Waja (Bagelèn), 22-7-1826.

14 Dj.Br. 19th, De Stuers, ‘Inleiding tot de geschiedenis van den Java-oorlog’, n.y., 5. For a reference to the sadistic methods supposedly employed by Dutch commanders to punish Dipanagara’s civilian supporters, see Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 32, ‘Dipanagara told me about a ‘cannibalistic’ habit of which an officer [Lieutenant-colonel Joseph Le Bron de Vexela, commander of the 3rd Mobile Column based at Pisangan, Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:644] of which an officer of our army at Pisangan [to the northwest of Yogyakarta on the main Yogya-Magelang road] was guilty. This officer had buried an aged Javanese woman, who had gone to Pisangan to buy *padi* [unhusked rice], up to her breast in a pit and had given her as a prey to ants and other creeping creatures. Dipanagara told me about this inhuman act with gestures which portrayed his horror.’
The role of women

In February 1831, when the Dutch authorities were deciding what to do with Kyai Maja’s part-Balinese wife, Radèn Ayu Maja (note 46), who had remained in east Java following her husband’s capture by the Dutch in mid-November 1828 and had subsequently moved to Yogya after his exile to North Sulawesi in February 1830, the Resident of Kedhu, F.G. Valck, suggested she be sent to join her husband. This advice was in no way inspired by compassion; rather it was based on the conviction that she was ‘enterprising and dangerous’. In Valck’s view, and that of his colleague, Lawick van Pabst, the Radèn Ayu was a ‘restless woman of enterprising character who could reawaken old discontents’ if allowed to remain in Yogya. The Resident of Kedhu then made an interesting observation:

When one calls to mind the scenes of the recently ended war and takes a moment to dwell on the harm and mischief wrought by various wives of prominent Javanese chiefs, one can in particular list [certain] women who excelled themselves in committing acts of cruelty.17

Radèn Ayu Maja, Valck hastily added, was not in the same category as these viragos. But she needed to be dealt with nevertheless.

Who then were these women whom Valck was referring to? He had two in mind: Radèn Ayu Sérang, also known as Nyai Ageng Sérang (circa 1769-1855), the mother of Pangéran Sérang II, whom we have already come across as a scion of the prestigious Kalijaga line of wali (apostles of Islam) in central Java (Plate 13; Mashoed Haka 1976), and Radèn Ayu Yudakusuma, a daughter of the first sultan (Mangkubumi), who was married to a Yogya eastern man-canagara bupati, who served initially as district administrator of Grobogan Wirasari (circa 1792-1812) and then (1812-1825) Muneng.18

As regards the first, she appears to have been a female official of the Yogya court who had moved following her marriage to her much older husband, Pangéran Sérang I, to his family seat in the enclave of Sérang near Demak on

15 Valck served as Resident of Kedhu from 1826 to 1830 and was in post when Dipanagara was taken prisoner in Magelang on 28-3-1830, Carey 1982:25.
16 Van Pabst was serving at this time (1830-1834) as commissioner for the annexed districts of the Principalities, see Houben 1994:54.
17 Dj.Br. 17, F.G. Valck (Yogyakarta) to J.I. van Sevenhoven (Yogyakarta), 12-2-1831, in J.I. van Sevenhoven (Yogyakarta) to Johannes van den Bosch (Batavia/Bogor), 16-2-1831. Valck’s rather convoluted Dutch text reads: dan wanneer men zich de toonelen van den jongst geindigden oorlog in het geheugen terug roept en daarbij een oogenblik blijft stil doen bij het kwaad en de onheilen welke eenige vrouwen van aanzienlijke Javaansche hoofden hebben bedreven en in het bijzonder kunnen worden gerangschiktd de moeder van Pangerang Serang en de Radeen Ajoe Joyo Koesoemo van Muneng die in het plegen van wredeheden hebben uitgemunt.
the north coast. Following the outbreak of the Java War, she took up arms in support of her son, Pangérán Sérang II, and is mentioned in the Dutch military reports as having led a 500-strong force in the Sérang-Demak area in the first months of the war.\(^\text{19}\) She was also, as we have seen, renowned for her spiritual power (\textit{kasektèn}) acquired through lengthy periods of meditation in isolated caves of Java’s south coast (Carey 1981a:284 note 205; Carey and Houben 1987:21, 35 note 15). In mid-1826, the captured Dutch official, Paulus Daniel Portier, referred to her son, Pangérán Sérang II, travelling down from the \textit{pasisir} to consult with her while she was ‘performing \textit{tapa} [asceticism] in a south coast grotto’.\(^\text{20}\) Her fame as a member of the celebrated Kalijaga \textit{wali} family, not to speak of her life as a fighter and female ascetic, enabled her to continue to exercise a significant influence over the populations of her home region of Sérang-Demak long after formal hostilities had ended in March 1830. In August 1831, for example, she was interviewed in Ungaran\(^\text{21}\) and cautioned by the Assistant-Resident of Semarang about her ‘magical practices’, in particular her distribution of metal \textit{jimat} (amulets) made out of thin strips of welded copper, tin and silver three inches long and one inch across which were covered in sacred texts (\textit{rajah}). These had apparently been given to people in Demak who had known her late husband, Pangérán Sérang I.\(^\text{22}\) Surviving into her late eighties, she outlived both her son and her kinsman, Dipanagara, eventually passing away on 10 August 1855 much to the relief of the Dutch authorities in Yogya who had kept a close eye on her during her last two decades.\(^\text{23}\)

The second of Valck’s prominent Java War female fighters was Radèn Ayu Yudakusuma. Married to the Yogya \textit{bupati} of Grobogan-Wirasari, one of the eastern \textit{mancanagara} districts annexed by the British in July 1812 (p. 379), she is said to have refused to depart from her \textit{kabupatèn} without express instruc-

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\(^{19}\) Ricklefs 1974a:241-4 (references to Radèn Ayu Sérang’s association with the Yogya court under Hamengkubuwana I); Dj.Br. 7, Captain H.F. Buschkens (Demak) to Major-General Joseph van Geen (Semarang), 3-9-1825 (on Radèn Ayu Sérang’s leading role in her son, Pangérán Sérang II’s, attacks on Purwadadi and Demak in late August early September 1825). See further Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:369-91; Carey and Houben 1987:21, 35 note 14.

\(^{20}\) KITLV H 263, Portier, ‘Verklaring’, n.y. (? 9-1826). The cave appears to have been that of Trisik (? Sirisik), whose location is unclear, see further Chapter IV note 45, Chapter X note 30; Carey 1981a:284 note 205.

\(^{21}\) She was staying at the time with her grandson Pangérán Natapraja (Radèn Mas Papak) who had been given command of his own \textit{harisan} (troop) by the Dutch which was then posted at the Dutch fort at Ungaran. It was disbanded on 16-6-1832 in accord with the governor-general’s \textit{besluit} of 19-5-1832 no. 22 and both Natapraja and Radèn Ayu Sérang, who was given a lifetime allowance of f 100 per month paid by the Yogya court in addition to the f 1,000 in jewels she had received at the time of her surrender on 21-6-1827 (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, III:573), were brought to Yogya to live in Pangérán Mangkubumi’s erstwhile \textit{dalem} (princely residence).

\(^{22}\) AN, Exhibitum 6-12-1831 no. 1, H.M. Le Roux (Assistant-Resident Semarang) to Pieter le Clercq (Semarang), 19-8-1831.

tions from the third sultan and resolutely stood her ground against the British officer, Lieutenant George Richard Pemberton, dispatched by Raffles to take over the administration of the province. After the arrival of the royal messenger from Yogyakarta confirming the annexation, she reluctantly agreed to depart but had to take charge of all the removal arrangements for her household because of the indisposition of her husband. This she did according to the ‘Chronicle of the fall of Yogyakarta’ because ‘she was a lady of shrewd intelligence, outstanding ability and manly ingenuity’ (Carey 1992:122, 297, 456 note 272). These qualities were much in evidence during the Java War when from her base at Muneng her husband’s new kabupaten to the east of the Madiun River, she masterminded the attack on the Chinese community in Ngawi on 17 September 1825.24 Although the descriptions of this attack as a full-scale ‘massacre’ seem to be overdrawn,25 she soon gained a reputation as a ruthless fighter. ‘A clever but much dreaded woman’ in Louw’s words (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, III:510), she became one of Dipanagara’s senior cavalry commanders in the eastern mancanagara and joined forces with Radèn Sasradilaga in Jipang-Rajegwesi during his 28 November 1827-9 March 1828 rebellion (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, III:510). At the time of her eventual surrender to the Dutch in October 1828, it was noted that, along with other members of her extensive family, she had shaved off all her hair as a sign of her dedication to the holy war against the kafir Dutch and their ‘apostate’ Javanese allies (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, III:514-5).

Although Valck does not give more details of the other wives of prominent Javanese chiefs who made a name for themselves during the war, we can surmise that they would have included erstwhile members of the elite prajurit èstri (Amazon) corps. As we have seen (p. 5), they provided close protection for the rulers and security for their private apartments at night. Given their proficiency with weapons, which had impressed no less a figure than Marshal Daendels when he witnessed their adroit manoeuvres on horseback at the time of his official visit to the Yogya court in July 1809 (p. 210), and sealed the fate of the one British officer to die during the Raffles’ attack on the kraton in June 1812,26 they were well placed to assume leadership positions as

24 Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:525; Carey 1984:1-2. Her husband’s extensive debts to Chinese moneylenders in east Java and the oppressive role played by Chinese customs post keepers (bandar) in the years before the Java War clearly did not endear the inhabitants of the Middle Kingdom to the feisty Radèn Ayu, see further Carey 1992:456 note 271.
25 See Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:525, 545, 560-1; Carey 1984:1-2, both appear to exaggerate, especially the latter. It is clear from the available contemporary sources that only about 12 of the 40 strong Chinese community were killed during the 3 a.m. attack, the rest managing to barricade themselves in their houses and attic storage areas. Their houses were eventually set alight and the survivors taken prisoner to Purwadadi on the road between Ngawi and Maospati in Madiun.
26 See p. 349 for a reference to the female defender whom the British officer, Lieutenant Hector Maclean of the 14th Regiment of Foot (Buckinghamshires), unwisely tried to pick up and who literally went for the jugular with her stabbing dagger.
battlefield commanders during the war.

Nor was it only well-born Javanese women who took the initiative: in Ngawi and the adjacent customs’ post of Kudur Brubah, a peranakan Chinese woman was apparently instrumental in setting up a local police force to ensure security following Radèn Ayu Yudakusuma’s 17 September attack. In Semarang, meanwhile, the wife of the pensioned bupati, Kyai Adipati Sura-adimanggala IV, a highly educated and intelligent lady of part Arab descent (Crawfurd 1820, I:48-9; De Haan 1935a:640-1), had apparently been the driving force in persuading her youngest son, Radèn Mas Sukur, to join Dipanagara by going over to Pangérán Sérang II’s forces in Demak in late August 1825. Her action may have contributed to the arrest of both her husband and her eldest son, Radèn Mas Salèh, during the first year of the war, an ordeal which certainly hastened her husband’s death in 1827. At the end of the war, the mother of one of Dipanagara’s key commanders in eastern Bagélèn, Ali Basah Jayasundarga, was reported to have refused to follow her son and daughter-in-law into surrender and had to be shot dead by Dutch forces when they stormed her hiding place in the Gunung Persada area. So the reports of women helping in the preparation of gunpowder in the villages to the west of Yogya (Lagordt Dillié 1863:32), bringing cash and valuables into the war zones (p. 607) and being found in full male battle dress (prajuritan) amongst the slain during the siege of Yogya in August 1825 (note 50) seem to be consistent with what we know of their pre-war role in Javanese society (Carey and Houben 1987:12-42). These were very definitely not the simpering radèn ayu of late nineteenth-century Dutch colonial literary fiction (Carey and Houben 1987:13), nor would their destiny as warriors be forgotten when Indonesia at last had the opportunity to fight for its independence in the mid-twentieth century (Carey and Houben 1987:21).

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27 Dj.Br. 7, Hendrik MacGillivray (Surakarta) to P.H. van Lawick van Pabst (Rembang), 30-12-1825.
28 UBL BPL 616 Port. 12 no. 8, ‘Verklaring van Radèn Mas Machmoed, een gevangen muiter’, 1-8-1829. Sukur claimed that he had overheard a conversation between his mother and his elder brother, Salèh, in which the former had declared that, ‘Soekoer is not courageous enough to stand by the Javanese and drive the Europeans from Java’. He had thus been shamed into leaving Semarang and joining Pangérán Sérang II’s forces in Demak, but see Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:365 note 2, where Sukur’s mother’s actions are put in a rather different light: she was reported to have urged her husband to report Sukur’s disappearance to the Dutch authorities, but he had postponed doing so, an oversight which was one of the reasons for his and his eldest son’s internment on a Dutch warship in Semarang harbour, Soekanto 1951:35-8.
29 dK 49, Colonel J.B. Cleerens (Gunungpersada) to H.M. de Kock (Magelang), 17-11-1829, reporting the shooting of Jayasundarga’s mother in her hideout at Paningran. It should be noted that there is both a Gunung Persada (Mount Persada) and a village by the name of Gunungpersada, see Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:Map. Cleerens’ base was at the latter.
Xenophobia and identity: changing attitudes towards the Chinese and issues of Javanese language and culture

Radèn Ayu Yudakusuma’s involvement in the attack on the Chinese community in Ngawi also underscored another salient feature of the early months of the Java War, namely the intense xenophobia which gripped many who rose in support of Dipanagara, a xenophobia which often went hand in hand with a form of Javanese cultural and linguistic chauvinism. This was most tellingly displayed in Dipanagara’s treatment of Dutch prisoners-of-war and in his attitude towards the Chinese, and it is to these subjects that we must now turn.

Given the invidious role which the inhabitants of the Middle Kingdom had been called upon to play by the returned Dutch administration in the years immediately preceding the outbreak of the Java War (pp. 467-80), it is understandable that they should have been singled out in the opening months of hostilities as objects of particular popular vengeance. In all, some 25,000 mainly mixed blood (peranakan) Chinese were thought to be at risk (Carey 1981a:260 note 106). Payen observed in his diary on 10 August 1825 that ‘everywhere the Chinese are massacred, they spare neither women or children’ (Payen 1988:62, 116 note 141). Besides the communities at Ngawi and other customs posts along the Sala River, the large Chinese weaving settlements in eastern Bagelèn such as Jana and Wedhi on the Lèrèng River were also targeted. For a time, the population in Jana managed to hold out by constructing their own fortified redoubt (bènthèng) where they could shelter from the initial attacks (Payen 1988:74, 131-2 note 215). They also attempted, as we have seen, to come to a modus vivendi with Dipanagara’s forces by supplying them gunpowder and opium. But eventually in 1827 the entire community of 147 men, 138 women and 185 children had to be evacuated to Wanasaba from whence most made their way to the greater safety of Semarang and Magelang (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, III:86, 108-9). Although the local Javanese population later begged for their return in June 1829 stating that they wanted them back as traders rather than as market tax collectors so that they could dispose of their products more cheaply (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:433), it does not seem that the community was ever re-established.

The fate of the Jana Chinese was replicated in many areas of south-central and east Java during the course of the war, but it would be wrong to draw the conclusion that Dipanagara’s prang sabil was an anti-Chinese battue. True, there were some like Kyai Maja who were diehard xenophobes said to be given to gratuitous acts of cruelty (De Stuers 1833:15; Carey 1979:73, 1981a:260 note 106), but as the war progressed the picture became more varied. Not only did Chinese merchants supply arms and money (Van den Broek 1873-77, 20:561), but some even fought alongside Dipanagara’s forces. This was the case in Tuban and Lasem on the north coast during Radèn Aria Sasradilaga’s
abortive campaign from late November 1827 to early March 1828, where the local Chinese community, most of them converts to Islam and descended from mixed-blood Chinese families long resident on Java’s *pasisir*, collaborated closely with the Javanese and were threatened with dire reprisals by the local Dutch authorities after Sasradilaga’s defeat.  

In inland areas, however, such instances of Sino-Javanese cooperation were rare. The bloody events of the first months of the war had traumatized the Chinese and a deep suspicion of Javanese intentions remained an abiding legacy of this period. These attitudes of fear and distrust were reciprocated by the Javanese. Dipanagara himself led the way by forbidding his commanders to have intimate relations with the Chinese. Here he was only reflecting what his great-grandfather, Sultan Mangkubumi, had said about not allowing Chinese to have too close a relationship with the ruling family in Yogya since it would occasion discord in the *kraton* (p. 399). These warnings were echoed by Pakualam I during a conversation with the Dutch Ambassador Extraordinary Wouter Hendrik van Ijsseldijk in September 1816 when he had complained about Tan Jin Sing’s elevation to the position of a Yogya *bupati*. But Dipanagara went even further, instructing his commanders to desist from all forms of sexual relations with the Chinese and forbidding them to take *peranakan* mistresses and wives from the local population. He regarded such alliances as bringing inevitable misfortune (Carey 1984:2). Here he was putting forward a prescription which had definitely not been insisted on in pre-war *kraton* circles. Indeed, liaisons between Javanese rulers and attractive Chinese *peranakan* women had been so frequent that they barely rated a mention in the Javanese sources (Carey 1984:14-5). One striking example of this was the prince’s own grandfather, Hamengkubuwana II, whose favourite unofficial wife was of partly Chinese descent. She had given birth to none other than Dipanagara’s closest Java War commander Pangéran Ngabèhi, that ‘well built, intelligent and discerning nobleman’ who had inherited the pale yellow skin of his mother (Van den Broek 1873-77, 24:83). As we have seen, it may have even been the case that Dipanagara’s first official wife, Radèn Ayu Retnakusuma, hailed from the same part-Chinese lineage (Chapter III note 3).

So why the radical change in Dipanagara’s attitude? Much can be explained by the context of the Java War and its antecedents, in particular the

30 Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, III:444-5; Carey 1984:2 note 5. The Resident of Rembang, F.E. Hardy (in office 1827-1828), wanted to hand them over to the military authorities to be shot and their houses and personal belongings burnt, but De Kock refused. Instead, he proposed that Chinese who misbehaved should be handed over to their own constituted authorities (*kapitan cina*), or if they were found with weapons in hand fighting for Dipanagara, they should be dealt with by the relevant Dutch military commanders in the same way as all other Javanese prisoners-of-war.


32 This was Mas Ayu Sumarsonawati, Mandoyokusumo 1977:21 no. 30; Van den Broek 1873-77, 24:87. See further Carey 1984:20-1.
role of the Chinese as tax collectors, but the prince also seems to have had a personal reason for warning against such sexual liaisons. In his *babad*, he relates that he himself had succumbed to the charms of a captured Chinese girl from the Pajang area who had been brought to him as a masseuse just before the disastrous battle of Gawok in mid-October 1826. The following is the brief and rather coy passage in which he makes his admission of sexual infidelity:

XXXVIII. 13 in Kedarèn
at night, the one who was ordered to provide a massage
was a female prisoner, a Chinese woman [*nyonyah*].
His Highness the sultan behaved wrongly.
Because of his feelings for his wife [*Ratu Kedhaton*]
confused was the [sexual] solace.33

Dipanagara implicitly suggests that his subsequent defeat in this key battle was in part due to this moment of weakness. He may also have reflected that the two wounds he received on the battlefield were an indication that his invulnerability and other spiritual powers had been temporarily neutralised by his sexual indulgence, something which he took care to hide from his wife on his return to his Kulon Praga headquarters (p. 121). He reverted to this theme later in his *babad* when he blamed his brother-in-law, Radèn Aria Sasradilaga’s, successive defeats in Rembang and Jipang-Rajegwesi in January 1828, the last of which effectively ended his rebellion, on his blatant breach of his instructions prohibiting sexual congress with Chinese females. According to Dipanagara, Sasradilaga had forced himself34 on one of the *per-anakan* ladies from Lasem after that coastal town to the east of Rembang had fallen briefly under his control on 31 December 1827.35

Underlying these cross-racial sexual insecurities, another important theme may be discerned – what Valck would later characterise as a ‘feeling of [Javanese] nationality’ (*gevoel van nationaliteit*; Preface note 9). This can be seen most clearly in Dipanagara’s treatment of Dutch prisoners whom he insisted should speak High Javanese (*krama*) rather than Malay, that ‘language of chickens which no ruler in Java wished to hear’ (p. 109), dress in Javanese not European dress, and consider conversion to Islam.36 This last was some-


34 The term used by Dipanagara in his *babad*, *anjamahi*, also has the meaning of ‘rape’. See also note 35.

35 BD (Manado) IV:11, XXXII (Maskumambang) 71-3. *cina ing Lasem sadaya. 72. mapan sampun sama manjeng agamii Dën Sasradilaga/ dadya supé weling aji/ anjamahi nyonyah ciina. 73. pan punika ingkang dadi margo̱ntiki/ apes juritra.*

thing which the prince also expected of Chinese who came over to his side, the process of ‘becoming a Muslim’ for them being quite simple: namely, having their pigtails cut off, undergoing circumcision and uttering the declaration of The Faith (sahadat) ‘There is no God but God and Muhammad is His Prophet’ (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, III:465; Carey 1981a:259 note 106).

Perhaps this was really not so unusual. After all, in the early seventeenth century, Sultan Agung (reigned 1613-1647), whom Dipanagara took as a model in so many things, made efforts to have Dutch prisoners circumcised in preparation for their conversion to Islam (De Graaf 1958:102). But the insistence on Javanese sartorial and linguistic codes which went with this conversion process, was rather striking. It can perhaps be seen as a reaction to the powerful Europeanising influences which had been sweeping over the south-central Javanese courts following the Dutch restoration in 1816 (page 459, Plate 54). Paulus Daniel Portier, the inspector of the birds’ nest rocks at Rongkob, who was captured on the south coast in mid-1826 and wrote a remarkable report on his two months’ captivity (August-September 1826),37 gave some insights into the pressures which were placed on Dutch prisoners to adopt Javanese cultural and religious norms. Told that he must convert to Islam to save his life, Portier was assured that if he did so he would be appointed a troop commander with the appropriate pay and privileges. Since he was already circumcised, his ‘conversion’ was not so difficult. Indeed, we have already seen how that was handled at Dipanagara’s Kulon Praga headquarters (pp. 588-9). In the meantime, he promised to fight on the prince’s side. Given the new Muslim name of Nur Samidin, he was immediately invested by the pensioned bupati of Pacitan, Kyai Tumenggung Jagakarya (p. 589), with his ‘symbols of office’, namely a horse, a kris with a gold sheath and a Javanese striped (lurik) cotton jacket. Contemplating his changed appearance, Portier wrote that ‘he had [now] become just like a Javanese even down to my dress’. Brought across the Praga River to Dipanagara’s headquarters at Kemusuh by way of the village of Rejasa where the prince’s uncle, Pangéran Mangkubumi, was looking after the women and children of Dipanagara’s senior commanders, he was greeted by Mangkubumi’s exclamation: ‘Well, that European! One would scarcely give him that name. He looks just like a Javanese, in fact he bears a close resemblance to [the Yogya Residency interpreter] Dietrée!’

We would need many more accounts like Portier’s to build up a full picture of how Dutch prisoners were treated. Javanese sartorial codes, for example, were not always insisted upon: after his surrender in mid-October 1829, Senthot apparently forbade the soldiers of his barisan (troop) from wearing Javanese dress (Van den Broek 1873-77, 24:93), although the Dutch had hopes

of persuading him otherwise. Furthermore, some Dutch prisoners were clearly not as fortunate as the inspector of birds’ nests from Rongkob. The government inspector of cultures in Pacitan, F.H. van Vlissingen, for example, who was a particular object of the pensioned bupati’s hatred, was summarily beheaded. There was even an attempt to drink his blood. Another European, a French landowner by the name of François Deux (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:609, 612-3; Chapter X note 84), who lived like a Javanese and went around with a peci, a small black hat often worn by Javanese males especially on Friday visits to the mosque – an indication that he had become a Muslim – was likewise detested by the bupati as a lackey of the decapitated inspector. Conversion to Islam on its own was thus no guarantee of acceptance. According to Portier, Jagakarya himself lost no opportunity to express his hatred for Europeans in general. As we have seen, he considered them completely lacking in religious feelings (p. 449) and he now no longer feared them because in his view the balance of force had shifted decisively in favour of the Javanese.

Leadership and regional loyalties

The role of the pensioned bupati of Pacitan during Portier’s two-month captivity raises questions about the nature of leadership on the Javanese side during the war. Although the part played by local officials was crucial to the success or failure of Dipanagara’s cause in certain areas, in the early stages of the conflict the main leadership initiative was provided by the Yogya princes and senior officials who rallied to Dipanagara (Appendix VIII). Members of the rural Islamic communities were also important here. As regards the first group, many came to Selarong to receive their commands from Dipanagara in late July and early August 1825. According to Payen and Willem van Hogendorp, most set fire to their Yogya residences before going over to Dipanagara to prevent them falling into enemy hands (Payen 1988:56, 105 note 95; Van

38 dK 49, Colonel J.B. Cleerens (Banaran/Panjer) to H.M. de Kock (Magelang), 3-1-1830, stating that ‘the turban is now going out of fashion [de tulbaan […] zijn reeds lang buiten de mode]. […] I think that Senthot will also abandon the turban. He wrote me a polite letter in which he called himself Kangjeng Radên Ali Basah’. Cleerens made strenuous efforts to persuade Dipanagara’s captured commanders in Bagelên to give up wearing their turbans and re-adopt the Javanese ‘national’ head-dress – namely the blangkon – by pointing to three examples of ‘well-dressed Javanese’ in his entourage: Pangéran Blitar II, Radên Tumenggung Sawunggaling, the serving Yogya bupati of Bagelên, and the ‘old’ Kyai Wangsasetra, presumably a pensioned Yogya bupati.

39 KITLV H 263, Portier, ‘Verklaring’, n.y. (? 9-1826), stated that Van Vlissingen was beheaded on the orders of Radên Mas Papak (Pangéran Natalpraja’s) younger brother, Radên Tumenggung Setradipura, but a mistake was made and instead of drinking Van Vlissingen’s blood that of a recently executed Javanese was drunk instead.

The power of prophecy

Hogendorp 1913:173-4). While he was still at Tegalreja, Dipanagara had apparently sent out letters of authority (piagem) mandating various princes and senior priyayi to act on his behalf as military commanders. These letters carried his princely seal and were intended as declarations of war. The *buku* adds the detail that Dipanagara announced his intention of waging a holy war and urged the local commanders, whom he had appointed, to gather the village people together and make known that they would be participating in a *prang sabil*. According to this source, Dipanagara proclaimed himself as the head (imam) of the Islamic religion in Java.41

During his flight from Tegalreja, Dipanagara’s personal seal which bore his full princely title of ‘Bendara Pangéran Aria Dipanagara’ was, as we have seen, left behind and he had a new one made in pégon (Javanese written in unvocalised Arabic) script with the inscription ingkang jumeneng Kangjeng Sultan Ngabdul Khamid Èruca kra Kabirul Mukminin Sayidin Panatagama rasullahi s.a.w. ing Tanah Jawi (He who is raised as His Highness Sultan Ngabduulkamid Èruca kra, the First among the Believers, Lord of the Faith, Regulator of Religion, [Caliph] of The Prophet of God, may peace be on Him, in Java; pp. 580-1; Carey 1981a:266 note 122). This inscription would later appear in bold black Arabic calligraphy on his yellow silk standard. So much in demand were these letters of authority with Dipanagara’s seal that the prince’s followers from as far afield as the north coast and the eastern mancanagara, begged him for them. One of these, Pangéran Sérang II, who claimed kinship to the famous south-central Javanese apostle of Islam, Sunan Kalijaga (pp. 132-3), was invested by Dipanagara, while he was at Selarong, as a commander in the holy war in his home district of Sérang near Demak and given the title of ‘he who fixes firm the Islamic religion’.42 Both Dutch and Javanese sources also indicate that Dipanagara appointed a number of princely and senior priyayi commanders in the areas around Yogyakarta to coordinate the siege of the city in the first weeks of the war. At the same time some of these well-born commanders were used to take the banner of rebellion into adjacent districts like Pajang and Sokawati further to the east (Carey 1981a:53-5, 266-7 notes 123-5, 124, 284 note 206). The majority of the letters of authority (piagem) bearing Dipanagara’s seal were, however, distributed by members of the religious communities, in particular leading ulama, who helped spread news of Dipanagara’s revolt to the furthest reaches of the princely territories (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:629-30). The process of mobilization thus had a formal aspect which depended on the receipt of letters from Dipanagara written both before and after his flight from Tegalreja. This pattern would continue throughout the war with the prince investing his commanders with

41 KITLV Or 13 (*Buku Kedhung Kebo*):89, IX.7-8.
42 Sénapatining prang sabilollah ingkang anetepaken agami Islam, see Carey 1981a:241 note 30.
XI The last stand of the old order

...titles such as ali basah (‘The High Pasha’; p. 153) or dullah\textsuperscript{43} and new Muslim names, and using members of the religious communities to maintain contacts with his far-flung supporters and to encourage others to join the holy war against the Dutch.

The war also appears to have had strong regional aspects, based as it was in south-central Java with only limited campaigns in other areas such as Demak (1825), Madiun (1825-1826) and Rembang and Jipang-Rajegwesi (1827-1828). It is clear that regional rivalries undermined the prince’s war effort at crucial moments. This was the case when frictions arose between Kyai Maja’s Pajang troops and Mataram levies loyal to Dipanagara during the prince’s advance on Surakarta in early October 1826 (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, II:499, 520). There were also tensions inspired by such regional loyalties involving Dipanagara’s commanders. Senthot, for example, apparently objected strongly in early 1829 to the marriage of Radèn Tumenggung Mertanagara (Ali Basah Ngabdulkamil II),\textsuperscript{44} to Dipanagara’s daughter, Radèn Ayu Basah, the widow of Senthot’s half-brother, Radèn Tumenggung Natadirja (‘Gusti Basah’), who had died of battle wounds in early August 1828 (Appendix IV), because the bridegroom hailed from Rèma (Bagélèn) rather than Mataram.\textsuperscript{45} The situation was complicated later in the war when Dipanagara began recruiting Balinese soldiers from Klungkung and Buleleng through the contacts of Radèn Ayu Mangkubumi, the divorced part Balinese wife of his uncle, Mangkubumi, who later married Kyai Maja.\textsuperscript{46} A number of Bugis from South Sulawesi also fought for the prince. Hailing from the Bugis regiments which had served in the Yogya kraton before 1812 (pp. 5, 379), at least two of these soldiers of for-

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\textsuperscript{43} Seemingly a shortened version of ‘Abdullah’. This junior commander title is sometimes rendered in the Javanese sources as amad dullah, see Carey 1982:5 note 22.

\textsuperscript{44} Mertanagara was a son of the former Yogya patih, Danureja II (in office 1799-1811), by an unofficial wife, see Appendix II.

\textsuperscript{45} BD (Manado), IV:129, XXXV.85. See further Appendix IV.

\textsuperscript{46} Carey 1981a:250 note 58; Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 23. In his babad, Dipanagara mentioned that Maja’s previous official wife, Nyai Maja, had died in childbirth in early 1828, leaving behind many young children, who were now motherless because Maja’s two other secondary wives had also died. Dipanagara had taken pity on them and given Maja a cousin of his own recently deceased wife, Ratu Kedhaton, as a bride. According to Dipanagara, who had an eye for such things (Chapter III), she was a rather attractive young woman with yellow skin, a rich widow with no children of her own, BD (Manado) IV:45, XXXIII (Sinom) 44-5. mapan nalya dêntërimani/ ingkang santana kanggeng ratu kang swargi. 45. randa anom inggih derêng gadhah anak/ ayu kuning tur sugih. In his conversations with Knoerle (‘Journal’, 23), she is referred to as the ‘granddaughter’ (? great-granddaughter) of Hamengkubuwana I’s Balinese army commander, Mas Tumenggung Malangnegara, and a daughter of Mas Tumenggung Sumanegara, the former Yogya bupati of Padhangan who had died in rebellion with Radèn Rongga on 17-12-1810, see p. 248. According to Dipanagara, she had been divorced from his uncle, Pangéran Mangkubumi, for three years and had remained a divorced Radèn Ayu in Dipanagara’s following during the war. However, in his babad (BD [Manado] IV:45, XXXIII.45), her previous name is mentioned as Radèn Ayu Prawiradiningrat, which indicates that she may have been married to Dipanagara’s younger brother, Pangéran Prawiradiningrat. On the role of Balinese and Bugis mercenaries in Java, see further Remmelink 1994:20.
Plate 67. Pangéran Natapraja, Pangéran Sérang II and Pangéran Purwanegara discussing their attack on Demak in late August 1825. KITLV Or 13 (Buku Kedhung Kebo).

Photograph by courtesy of the KITLV, Leiden.
their attack on Demak in late August 1825. KITLV Or 13 (Buku Kedhung Kebo).
tune, Rangga Daèng Makincing and Ngabèhi Daèng Maréwa, rose to become military commanders of Dipanagara’s elite troops and are mentioned in the prince’s babad (Carey 1981a:253 note 72).

According to Dipanagara, the fighting quality of his troops varied considerably from district to district and he later observed to De Stuers that (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:743):

> the people of Madiun are good at resisting a first attack and they acquit themselves well, but afterwards they are not much use. The people of Pajang are also brave, but likewise for a short space of time. The people from Bagelèn are better, but they must fight in their own area; if they are outside they collapse quickly. But the people of Mataram are the best of all: they fight well, they persevere and they know how to withstand the hardships of war.

This echoed what Dipanagara’s eldest son, Pangéran Dipanagara II, was reported to have said after the Java War about the qualities of the men of Mataram; namely, that they could keep secrets, had a generous heart, and were strict about the observance of their religion (Chapter II note 8). Interestingly, similar observations about the regional variations in fighting capacity amongst the populations of south-central Java were made later during the Indonesian Revolution (1945-1949), when military commanders from Kedhu and Bagelèn were singled out for praise, along with those from Banyumas who were dubbed the ‘Prussians of Java’.47

**The role of the santri communities**

The second group which rallied to Dipanagara at Selarong were the ‘men of religion’ or santri. A rough survey of the available Dutch and Javanese sources has yielded a list of some two hundred men and women who afforded Dipanagara assistance at some stage during the war (Appendix VIIb). Amongst these were some Arabs and mixed blood Chinese (peranakan). The majority had affiliations with the rural based religious communities and with the south-central Javanese kraton, a sizeable number originating from the strict religious community (kauman) in Yogya. They included court santri who were members of the official religious hierarchy or the special corps of religious officials like the Suranatan and Suryagama serving in the kraton, as well as inhabitants of the Yogya-administered tax-free villages (pradikan) and

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47 Simatupang 1972:76. The fact that the Indonesian army commander General Sudirman hailed from Banyumas was not coincidental. See further Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, VI:109, who cite the description in the archive of the 1830 commissioners for the regulation of affairs in the princely territories (commissarissen tot regeling der zaken in de vorstenlanden) that Mataram, Pajang and Sokawati were producers of soldiers in contrast to Bagelèn which was seen as a source of coolie labour.
religious schools in the Mataram area. Another large group was brought over by Kyai Maja when he joined the prince at Seralong in early August. These included members of his extensive family and students from his pesantrèn at Maja and Badhèran in the Delanggu area (pp. 91-2, Plate 10).

Of those whose titles can be readily identified, twenty-two were returned Mecca pilgrims (haji) and seventeen are listed as sèh (Syeikh) or sarif (Sherif), an epithet which was usually only given to Arabs of good birth or those who claimed kinship to the family of The Prophet. In Java, however, it was often used at this time to denote men of influence in religious affairs. The descendants of the families of the wali or apostles of Islam in Java were frequently referred to by this title. Leaving aside Kyai Taptajani, the former head of the centre for scholars of Islamic law at Melangi, and Mas Lurah Majasta, the head of the small Islamic religious boarding school at Majasta near Tembayat, only three of those on the list – namely, Sèh Abdul Ahmad bin Abdullah al-Ansari and his son-in-law, also known as Sèh Ahmad, both of whom hailed from Jeddah, and Sarif Samparwedi (Hasan Munadi), who commanded Dipanagara’s ‘priestly’ Barjumungah bodyguard regiment – can be clearly identified as Arabs. In addition, there were some eighteen religious and mosque officials (pengulu, ketib, modin) as well as keepers of holy sites and graveyards (amad-dalem, jimat/jurukunci). At least ten on the list were religious teachers (kyai guru), namely heads of pesantrèn from Bagelèn, Kedhu, Mataram, Pajang, Panaraga and Madiun. A further three, Nyai Maja, Kyai Maja’s official consort who died in childbirth in 1828, Nyai Gedhung Gubah, the wife of Maja’s former pupil Haji Imamraji, and Nyai Muhamad Hasan, Maja’s sister from Pulo Kadang, were respected female members of these same religious communities (Carey 1987:277).

The remaining 121 were referred to as kyai, a term used loosely in Java as an honorific epithet for old men or revered country gentlemen as well as for teachers of religious and spiritual disciplines. All those listed as kyai in the Dutch reports, which form the basis for the present survey, may not have been men of religion in the strict sense although most undoubtedly were. They included several kyai who were adept in the mystical ‘sciences’ (ngèlmu) and had special skills in the instruction of their followers in the esoteric arts of warfare, ranging from the inculcation of warlike virtues (ngèlmu kadigdayan) and the art of striking fear (ngèlmu kawedukan) to invulnerability to bullets and sharp weapons (ngèlmu kaslametan; Carey 1981a:253 note 75). Amongst the special charms and amulets (jimat) they specialised in were pieces of wood and strips of paper with intricately written sacred texts or rajah. These were carried into battle in the folds of turbans or sewn into the white tabards of Dipanagara’s elite troops (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:208; Aukes 1935:74; Carey 1981a:276 note 168). Widely considered to confer protection from danger, they were believed to have the power to turn Dutch gunpowder
and lead into water (Payen 1988:72, 129 note 200). Likewise, the banners carried into battle by the prince’s troops were also seen to have magical powers. Blessed by the ulama, they were decorated with crescent moons, snakes and sentences from the Qur’an (Javasche Courant, 20-10-1829; Booms 1911:34; p. 152). Every unit of 150 men had a separate battle banner in red, black, white or yellow colours.

Dipanagara’s own personal standard, as we have seen, was a large yellow silk square with his royal titles as Sultan Èrucakra inscribed in black Arabic lettering. When he took to the field, however, a green triangular pennant with a black disc in the centre appears to have indicated his presence amongst his troops. Senthot’s was red (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:208; p. 153, Plate 65). It is clear that the prince himself was considered to have magical powers as a living jimat. According to Smissaert, some in Yogya thought he could fly, make it rain or be dry (Carey 1981a:276 note 168), while other sources refer to his invulnerability to bullets and intuitive capacity to tell people’s character through the study of their faces (ngèlmu firasat; Carey 1981a:276 note 168; Chapter III). Not surprisingly, many desired to develop closer links with him. In September 1826, Kyai Banjarsari, the head of the well-known religious school in the Madiun area, wrote to him begging him for a ‘jimat of his blood’ in the person of his sister, Radèn Ayu Sasradiwirya, to reinforce his kinship ties with the prince’s family (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, II:568; Carey 1981a:276 note 168).

Dipanagara’s status in the eyes of his santri supporters was greatly enhanced by the religious character of his struggle against the Dutch and their ‘heathen apostate’ Indonesian allies. As we have seen (pp. 583-91), this took on many of the aspects of a ‘holy war’ or prang sabil, something which the Dutch Minister of the Colonies C.Th. Elout (in office 1824-1829), pointed out in a March 1827 letter to the king, when he rejected the idea of buying Dipanagara out with a separate principality made up of lands taken from the Yogya sultanate. Underscoring how religious influences had played a crucial role in the fighting, he described how in nearly every engagement groups of religious scholars or ulama, clad in their distinctive white or green tabards and turbans, had helped to stiffen the resolve of Dipanagara’s troops through chanting endlessly repeated phrases from the Qur’an.48 Elout’s description was confirmed by Lawick van Pabst, who mentioned that both men and women, who joined Dipanagara, had shaved their heads, wore ‘priestly’ dress and went into battle chanting dhikr.49 In fact, the cutting off of hair only seems to have become a mark of the holy war following Dipanagara’s victory at Kasuran on 28 July 1826 (Chapter IV note 10), and not all the prince’s

48 NA, Ministerie van Koloniën 4194, GKA 46k, C.Th. Elout (The Hague) to King William I (The Hague/Brussels), 19-3-1827.
supporters, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, were clad in tabards and turbans; during the siege of Yogyakarta in early August 1825, the body of one of the female fighters, who may have been a member of the court Amazon regiment (*prajurit èstri*), was found to be clothed entirely in male Javanese fighting dress (*prajuritan*).\(^50\) Dutch field commanders, however, were sufficiently concerned about the role of the *ulama* on Dipanagara’s side in the fighting that they took the precaution of attaching religious scholars to their own mobile columns, ordering them to lead the chanting of *dhikr* before their men, who included many Madurese and other Indonesian troops, went into battle (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, III:293). They also included prominent religious figures, often *sayyid* (descendants of The Prophet) or those who passed themselves off as such, in their various negotiations with Dipanagara before 1830 in the hopes that this would enhance their negotiating position (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, III:248-50, V:584-5; Carey 1987:278 note 19; p. 511 note 18, p. 676). After the war, they likewise took care to find places for many of Dipanagara’s leading religious supporters as *pengulu* and assistant *pengulu* in the newly created government regencies (*kabupatèn*) carved out of the territories annexed from the courts in 1830 (Carey 1987:278 note 20).

It was precisely the marked religious character of the war which caused Elout to reject suggestions made by some senior Dutch officials that hostilities should be brought to an end by recognising Dipanagara as an independent prince in the same way that Mangkubumi (Hamengkubuwana I), Radèn Mas Said (Mangkunagara I) and Natakusuma (Pakualam I), had been recognised in 1755, 1757 and 1812 respectively. In Elout’s view, Dipanagara’s claim to be recognised as a protector and regulator of religion, and his intimate associations with the religious communities made any such concessions impossible. The war in his opinion threatened the very foundations of Christian European authority in Java, the religious factor alone setting it apart from the dynastic struggles of previous centuries.\(^51\)

*Satria and santri: the breakdown in relations between Dipanagara and Kyai Maja*

Why did the *santri* rally to Dipanagara in 1825? The question is worth asking because if one considers the course of Javanese history up to the Java War, relations between the court and the religious communities in south-central Java had been marked more by hostility than cooperation. One thinks here of

\(^50\) Dj:Br. 7, F.D. Cochius (Magelang) to H.M. de Kock (Surakarta), 3-8-1825 (on the discovery of the body of a female soldier dressed in full male battle dress [*prajuritan*] on the outskirts of Yogya). See further Carey 1981:xlili.

\(^51\) NA, Ministerie van Koloniën 4194, GKA 46k, C.Th. Elout (The Hague) to King William I (The Hague/Brussels), 19-3-1827.
the bloody events of Sunan Amangkurat I’s reigned (1646-1677) when thousands of ‘men of religion’ and their families had been put to the sword on the northern alun-alun (great square) of the kraton of Pléred in circa 1650. The so-called Javanese ‘Succession Wars’ of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries had also highlighted the inherent tensions between the kraton and the kauman (firm religious community). This saw religious scholars and revered ‘saints’ like Panembahan Rama of the Kajoran religious dynasty near Tembayat participating in major rebellions against royal authority such as that led by the young Madurese nobleman, Radèn Trunajaya, a man with strong religious convictions, in 1676-1680 (De Graaf 1940:273-328; Ricklefs 1993:30-57).

Why should the Java War have been different? The uniqueness of Dipanagara’s upbringing at Tegalreja (Chapter II) may have counted for something here. Certainly, his personal commitment to Islam and his extensive contacts with the santri communities in south-central Java (pp. 98-101) marked him out as a rather unusual product of kraton society. But this was not without its problems. Just where did his loyalties lie? Did he remain at heart a Yogya nobleman who had experienced an unusual childhood and exposure to the teachings of Islam? If this was the case, was he no more than an ascetic version of Pangéran Buminata, the pious Surakarta grandee renowned as a patron of religious teachers in the Sunan’s capital (Chapter II)? Or had he abandoned entirely the respect due to him as a satria (warrior prince; member of the Yogya ruling family), in order to throw in his lot with the santri? For the author of the Surakarta version of the Babad Dipanagara the answer was not in doubt: Dipanagara was an ‘egg-saint’, a hypocrite santri, white outside but inside all yellow (Carey 1981a:19):

II. 8 ‘It is a sham his giving himself over to religion,

9 and often going away to perform asceticism.
He is hand in glove with the santri.
He has given up the sense of honour of the satria,
for he has accepted the sense of honour of the santri.
[…]

10 […]
He mixes with the scum of the nation
[and] is arrogant enough to invite battle.
But these santri, what do they amount to?

Another contemporary Javanese source, the Buku Kedhung Kebo, put it slightly differently. The problem for the author of this text was not so much the

52 On the authorship of this text, see Carey 1981a:xvii-xix.
53 On the authorship of the Buku Kedhung Kebo, see Carey 1974b:259-84.
The genuineness of Dipanagara's commitment to Islam, but rather the appropriateness of his decision to vest political power in the santri. Again the reply was unequivocal:

XIV.35 The santri cannot govern the state
for that is the character of the santri.
They seek themselves.
They cannot wield political authority
for their minds are narrow.
Very different is the charisma of a king.

Dipanagara himself seems to have been deeply conflicted. On the one hand, he was waging a holy war and for this he needed the support of the santri, not least to ensure that he interpreted his Qur’ānic mandate correctly (Chapter X note 184). On the other hand, he was a traditional Javanese, quintessentially so as Nicolaus Engelhard, the veteran former VOC official, had pointed out (p. 510). As a prominent member of the Yogya royal house, he naturally thought in terms of setting up a kraton with all the trappings of monarchy, albeit one with a distinctive Javanese Islamic hue. This was clear to Dutch captives like Portier, who was brought to Dipanagara's temporary headquarters at Kemusuh in Kulon Praga district in mid-1826, and rode with the prince to the neighbouring village of Kepurun. In Portier's eyes, the journey had all the aspects of a royal progress with Dipanagara attired in full state regalia, drummers going before him, his elite Bulkio bodyguard regiment with lances providing his personal guard of honour, and Kyai Maja in his signature 'priestly garb' (dark green tabard and white turban; Somer 1938, II:443), and the Yogya princes riding immediately behind. The Dutchman had the impression that as many as 10,000 armed men were on the move but this must have been an exaggeration. On their arrival at Kepurun, the prince held court on a bamboo throne in a traditional Javanese pendhapa (open-sided pavilion), giving out letters of authority (piagem), approving battle plans and questioning Kyai Maja about progress on the Salatiga-Boyolali front. Maja and the assembled princes, the latter all dressed in white 'priestly' clothes, sat on the floor before him as in a formal kraton audience, answering his questions. This was a traditional style of governance, a kraton in the wilderness.

54 All references from Portier, 'Verklaring', n.y. (7-9-1826).
55 For the location of Kemusuh see US NIMA Geonames Server (S 7° 42' 0" E 110° 17' 16"), which gives its position between Nanggulon and the Praga River, close to the village of Resaja, where the wives and children of Dipanagara and his top commanders were kept. I am grateful to Amrit Gomperts for this reference.
56 For descriptions of Dipanagara's attire as Sultan Èrucakra and leader in the holy war, see Carey 1981a:276-7 note 169; Payen 1988:95 note 48; Chapter X.
57 For another description of Dipanagara's personal bodyguard of 3-400 turbaned 'priests' (presumably members of priestly Barjumungah regiment) and as many cavalry, all armed with lances, see Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, II:553.
much like Sultan Mangkubumi’s wartime residence at Yogya in 1749 or his temporary pavilion (pesanggrahan) at Gamping (1755-1756) where he lived prior to the occupation of his newly built Yogya kraton (Ricklefs 1974a:79-80). Dipanagara reinforced this image of a court by conferring titles on his close family (Chapter X note 219; Appendix IV), marrying key supporters to members of his family,\(^{58}\) distributing traditional largesse to his supporters at the time of the Garebeg ceremonies,\(^{59}\) having one of his santri advisers act the court jester (Chapter XII note 75), and giving yellow payung (state umbrellas) to his princely followers and military commanders as a mark of their status in the holy war.\(^{60}\) The fact that these quintessential kraton symbols of office were described in the Javanese sources as ‘signs of the holy war’ (pratandha prang sabil) is a measure of the confusion which seems to have prevailed about what Dipanagara was doing. Was he establishing a kraton or fighting for something entirely different – a new moral order in Java in which the high state of the Islamic religion would be restored? This is what the prince and those close to him said they were doing,\(^{61}\) but it was certainly not how Kyai Maja came to

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\(^{58}\) Amongst these marriages was that of Kyai Maja to the divorced wife of Dipanagara’s uncle, Pangéran Mangkubumi, see note 46.

\(^{59}\) See Bataviasche Courant 44, 2-11-1825 (on preparations for Dipanagara’s celebration of Garebeg Mulud when he gave out the same presents to the ‘priests’ [ulama] as the Yogya sultan); Dj.Br. 7, H.M. de Kock (Surakarta) to G.A.G.Ph. van der Capellen (Batavia/Bogor), 27-10-1825 (on Dipanagara’s celebration of the Garebeg Mulud at Dagèn to the south of Selarong, reporting that ‘the priests from the royal burial ground at Mangiran [on the Praga River] who usually go to Yogya to pay their respects to the sultan [will now pay their respects to Dipanagara], for there is now the general belief that if the rebel [Dipanagara], who has recently been raised as sultan, is able to celebrate this holy feast undisturbed, this will gain him a great following amongst the floating masses’); Javasche Courant 53, 1-5-1828 (on Pangérân Dipanagara II celebrating the Garebeg Puwasa in the company of his army commanders with ‘princely lustre’ at the village of Alang-Alang Ombo in western Bagelèn, the local inhabitants bringing him presents of tribute cash [pajak], meat, fruit and rice, and decking his house out ‘in the usual style with palm fronds’).

\(^{60}\) Carey 1981a:285 note 209, 286 note 215. See also Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, II:244 on Dipanagara’s practice of sending his personal payung out to the villages to raise support.

\(^{61}\) Carey 1987:279-81. As a senior ulama who went over to the Dutch with Kyai Maja in mid-November 1828 put it: ‘The conduct of Dipanagara is due to the fact that both princes [the Sunan of Surakarta and the Sultan of Yogyakarta] have forgotten to protect the Islamic religion. Many [Javanese] Muslims cannot read the shahadat [confession of The Faith] and forget to pray five times a day. They do not fast and do not give to the priests the lawful tithe of their income [zakat]. Moreover, they do not go on the pilgrimage to Mecca. Besides these five points, some [Javanese] Muslims use strong drink and associate with women without being married to them. Both [south-central] Javanese rulers are entirely indifferent to this and do not complain about these shortcomings’, Carey 1987:279-80. This rather orthodox statement of Dipanagara’s war aims was later underscored by the prince himself in his various negotiations with the Dutch officers who arranged his surrender in early 1830 (Carey 1987:281). Speaking to De Stuers on his journey from Magelang to Semarang in late March and early April 1830, he remarked: ‘If I insisted on [my] known demands then it was out of the conviction that people at the courts did not follow the old adat [custom] so scrupulously as before and above all neglected religion’ (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:744).
perceive Dipanagara’s wartime priorities. When the kyai surrendered to the Dutch on the slopes of Mount Merapi on 12 November 1828, it soon became apparent to the Dutch officers negotiating with him that relations between the prince’s kraton and santri supporters had irretrievably broken down. As Maja himself put it to his Dutch captors (Carey 1987:282):

The first proposal which won me over to waging war was that Dipanagara promised me the restoration of our Faith. Believing this, I joined him wholeheartedly, but later I discovered this was not his real aim as he speedily began setting up and organising a kraton. I made representations to him which he took very much amiss so much so indeed that we exchanged bitter words. Since that time I was in disagreement with Dipanagara, which led to him ordering me to bring the war to an end in one way or another.

De Stuers would later corroborate this after discussions with Dipanagara following his capture in Magelang (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:742):

That occasion confirmed what [we] had often heard tell formerly by various Javanese – namely, that when Kyai Maja was lowered in rank and regard, matters had less cohesion amongst the rebels [brandhal] as that priest [Maja], who passed for being very learned in knowing the Qur’ān completely by heart, had succeeded by the exact rules laid down in it in establishing his influence and authority among the people to such an extent that even priests who had often been to Mecca had shown themselves in everything inferior to Maja.

When Dipanagara learnt before his departure for Batavia in early April 1830 that two of his closest religious associates – Mas Pengulu Kyai Pekih Ibrahim, who had served as his pengulu (in office 1828-1830), and Haji Badarudin, the erstwhile head of the Suranatan regiment in Yogya (Appendix VIIb) – both of whom he had known from his youth up and who had followed him throughout the war, had decided not to share his exile, he burst out bitterly (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:742):

These are the men who should have been the first to adhere loyally to me […] for what do I know of the Holy Books except what they taught and told me? They are thus the people I have always relied on […] they are now the ones who desert me!

Such clear evidence of a complete rift between the two principal leaders of the Java War, a war which had earlier impressed men like C.Th. Elout with the strength of its religious zeal and the degree of cooperation between the prince’s kraton and santri supporters, raises important questions about the nature of Dipanagara’s leadership. How can we explain the unravelling of this once mutually supportive relationship?

One element relates to the regional rivalries already referred to. Dipanagara’s base was Mataram, whereas Kyai Maja’s loyalties lay in Pajang. After Maja had
rallied to the prince at Selarong in August 1825, many of the *ulama* in his entourage joined the prince's elite bodyguard regiments (Turkio, Arkio, Bulkio) and were appointed to important positions in the civil administration under Dipanagara’s control (Carey 1987:287). In late August 1826, following a string of victories by the prince’s forces, which had resulted in much of Pajang falling under his sway, Maja began to press for an attack on those places which had yet to be overrun (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, II:469-70). These included Kalitan and Boyolali, but his ultimate prize was Surakarta. The *kyai* saw this as his natural sphere of influence. As Dipanagara relates in his *babad*, he boasted that the previous generation of princes in Surakarta had studied under his father, Kyai Badhèran, and now their sons were all his pupils. At the same time, he belittled the prince's own standing in Surakarta, stating that although the court was generally well disposed towards him in the early stages of the war, he received little support from the Sunan's *kraton* as the conflict had developed. Dipanagara describes how he became increasingly irked by this arrogant attitude. As we will see shortly, the momentum of his military advances was held up by these disputes and precious weeks were lost so that when on 15 October 1826 the prince’s 5,000-strong army began to move into position for an attack on Surakarta, he suffered a major defeat at Gawok just to the west of the city. Bitter recriminations followed. His *kraton* and *santri* supporters blamed each other for the disaster. In particular, Kyai Maja and his family were accused of having recklessly pressed the attack on the Sunan’s capital to further their own interests (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, II:496-520; Carey 1987:287). What had been a festering rivalry, noted as early as May 1826, when the minister of the colonies’ Malay-speaking son, Major C.P. Elout, had relayed a report from the village head of Tèmpèl in the Slèman district that Dipanagara had not wished to remain with Kyai Maja following the end of the fasting month, was now an open conflict.

This appears to have widened in August 1827 at the time of the peace negotiations brokered by William Stavers and Kyai Maja (Louv and De Klerck 1894-1909, II:267, quoting C.P. Elout (Tèmpèl) to H.M. de Kock (Mage-lang), 15-5-1826. Major Elout did not mention the end of the fasting month, but it is clear from the date of his letter that the Carebeg Puwasa had just taken place. Maja, according to Elout, had departed in the direction of Magelang with the majority of the ‘priests’ (*ulama*) while Dipanagara had made for the former coffee estate at Kembangarum on the slopes of Mount Merapi (Chapter X). On Elout’s knowledge of Malay, see Van der Kemp 1914.
1894-1909, III:264-76), when a major dispute arose between Dipanagara and his chief religious adviser over the nature of political authority. According to the account given in the prince’s babad, Maja attempted to challenge the prince’s position as Sultan Èruckakra by asking him to consider dividing his sovereignty into four parts, that of ratu (king), wali (apostle of religion), pandhita (one learned in the law) and mukmin (the believers). Maja suggested that Dipanagara should choose for himself one of these four functions, implying that if he chose that of ratu, he, Maja, would take that of wali and enjoy undisputed religious authority. This Dipanagara refused stating that Maja – whom he addressed as ‘uncle’ (paman) thereby acknowledging his status as a senior kyai despite the fact that he was seven years his junior – clearly wished to exercise authority over him. He even drew a comparison between Maja and the prominent spiritual lords of Giri in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries who, according to Dipanagara, had exercised power over the sultans of Demak.64 Later, when the prince tried to curb Maja’s ambitions by suggesting that he should take over as his pengulu or head of his religious establishment from his first appointee Haji Imamraji (in office 1825-1828; Appendix VIIb), he cited the example of the early sixteenth-century Sunan Kudus, a wali whom Dipanagara averred had acted more like the pengulu of the sultan of Demak, and who was thought by the prince to have been amenable to carrying out the temporal demands of the Demak rulers.65 This time Maja refused stating that he was not from a pengulu family anyway and thus could not possibly contemplate such a post. Instead, he wished to be recognised as imam or head of the whole Islamic religious community.66 This ambitious claim Dipanagara dismissed, pointing out that the argument over the delineation of functions in his royal administration was a specious one because God had chosen him and him alone as the caliph of The Prophet of God in the holy war between Muslim and heathen in Java, and that only the Almighty knew when that commission would be withdrawn.67

A Javanese manuscript, which originates in the Kampung Jawa Tondano, Minahasa (North Sulawesi) village where Kyai Maja and some sixty-two of

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64 He also pointed out that while he may have turned to Maja for advice, he was not his pupil, BD (Manado) III:331, XXX (Asmaradana) 129-30. ingsun weruh karepiral/ mapan jaluk wasésal/ kaya Sunan Giri iku/ dadi ingsun sira karya. 130. kaya Sultan Demak dhingin/ ingsun dudu* muridira. * BD (Manado) has dumèh, I have followed Rusche 1908-09, I:312.

65 BD (Manado) IV:45-6, XXXIII (Sinom) 52-3. dhawuhna karsa mami/ mring si paman Maja/ denido saselèhir/ Pengulu Kaji Mamraji/ si paman Maja/ ingkang sun kon gentèni. 53. dari iku pan wus nora ketanggungan/ kaya dhèk Demak dhingin/ wali pangulunya/ Suhunan Kudus ika.

66 BD (Manado) IV:46, XXXII (Sinom) 56. lamun dadi pengulu dika aturna/ pan sanget lumuh mami/ namung dadi Imam*/ punika karemen kulal/ kalaman paneng Nerpati/ nanging punika/ ingkang kula bumèni. BD (Manado) Iman, I have followed Rusche 1908-09, II:46.

67 BD (Manado) IV:59, XXXII (Sinom) 112-3. denido sun iki Dulmaji/ karsa Hyang Sukma/ anèng ing Tanah Jawi. 113. pan kinarya Kalipah jeng Rasulolah/ dadi pangirid sabil/ Islam lawan laknat/ pan nugrahan kewalal/ pinundhuta rina wengi/ tan weruh ingwang/ iku kagungan Widi.
his close associates were exiled in early 1830\textsuperscript{68}, gives an insight into how Maja may have seen things. It states that Dipanagara still sought worldly goals\textsuperscript{69} and also continued to violate the syariah (Islamic religious law; Babcock 1981a:302). The prince’s attempt to establish a kraton was already evidence of such worldly ambitions. He was also, according to Maja, too taken up with Javanese superstitions and beliefs. One incidence of this was his fascination with pusaka (heirloom) daggers, some of which he had obtained through ascetic practices and encounters with the Javanese spirit realms, a relationship deemed inappropriate for a strict follower of Islam (Babcock 1981a:302 note 8; Appendix IV note 2). However, Maja himself was not above worldly involvements. A political man of the world in Babcock’s words, he had served as an emissary in Pakubuwana IV’s secret correspondence with various Indonesian rulers in 1811-1812, carrying messages to the Raja of Buleleng an act for which the British imprisoned him for a period in the Surakarta kepatihan (chief minister’s offices; Chapter VII note 87). He was also prepared to contradict the Surakarta pengulu. Indeed, contemporary documents from the Surakarta court speak of his self-opinionated and intractable character (Babcock 1981a:301; Carey 1981a:262 note 110). He clearly had great ambitions for his family in Pajang. It is thus hardly surprising that the long-drawn out argument between Dipanagara and his chief religious adviser, which drew on the historical example of the wali, proved impossible of resolution. The fact that Maja was almost certainly the more intelligent of the two, and had been the main driving force behind the war from the start, made things worse (Somer 1938, II:447-8).

Although Kyai Maja’s initial peace negotiations with the Dutch in August 1827 seem to have had Dipanagara’s full backing, the same cannot be said for his initiatives in late October and November 1828. After insisting that he be provided with a 500-strong force, which included 300 men of the elite Bulkio regiment under seasoned commanders such as Muhamad Ngusman Ali Basah (Appendix VIIb), he entered into negotiations with the Major Tumenggung Wiranagara and the Javanese-speaking Dutch infantry captain, Johan Jacob Roeps, at the centre for scholars of Muslim religious law at Melangi (p. 99). The Kampung Jawa Tondano manuscript suggests that Kyai Maja was keen to make a settlement with the Dutch for the benefit of the ‘servants of Allah’, for the well-being of Java and for the preservation of Islam.\textsuperscript{70} But it seems

\textsuperscript{68} For a discussion of the size of Kyai Maja’s party and the actual dates of their departure from Batavia (they may have travelled to North Sulawesi in two groups via Makassar and Ambon), see Babcock 1981a:281-92. Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 49, referred to ‘the high priest Kyai Maja together with 62 of his followers having arrived in Manado’.

\textsuperscript{69} Babcock 1981:302 gives nedi ‘aradl dunya, which must be a Javanese-Arabic rendering of nedhi aral dunya.

\textsuperscript{70} Babcock 1981a:303 note 11, which cites the Kampung Jawa Tondano MS as stating that Maja’s mission was amrih mashlahaté kawulananging Allah, sedaya sarta amrih karaharjané negari [lan] lestariné Agami Islam. See further Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, IV:595-602, which describes
XI The last stand of the old order

from the account given in Louw and De Klerck (1894-1909, IV:590-6) that he used the presence of this force to gain leverage in the negotiations by arraying them in battle formation just outside Melangi directly in front of Lieutenant-Colonel Joseph Le Bron de Vexela’s 3rd mobile column which had been dispatched to provide security for the Dutch and Javanese negotiators. Exactly what Maja had in mind is unclear. He may have been seeking to have his family returned to Pajang with special privileges from the European government. These may have included his recognition as a regulator of religion at the courts (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, IV:590-1) backed perhaps by a military force or barisan (troop) made up of former Bulkio, which he may have thought the government would accord him. Such barisan had been permitted to certain prominent noble supporters of Dipanagara who made their peace with the Dutch,71 but what Maja failed to realise was that the Dutch were far more lenient with members of the nobility who came over to their side than with prominent santri like himself whom they deemed principally responsible for stoking the fires of religious zealotry during the war (Somer 1938, II:447; Babcock 1981b:77 note 9).

Between the first and the second round of the negotiations, which took place on 31 October and 5-9 November 1828 respectively, Maja appears to have demanded a further 500 troops from the prince’s reserve, a request which was refused. This sparked a bitter argument with Dipanagara’s senior military adviser, Pangéran Ngabèhi, into which the prince himself was drawn leading to a further fraying of their already tense relationship.72 Keeping entirely silent about his intentions, according to Dipanagara, Maja then departed again for Melangi with the intention of cutting a separate deal with the Dutch. But no deal was on the table. In fact, Le Bron’s column had been tasked with making sure that Maja and his force did not escape. Thus when the negotiations broke down on 10 November and it became clear that the kyai was attempting to make for Pajang,73 he was intercepted on the slopes of Mount Merapi near Bouwens van der Boyen’s former estate at Babadan.

Given two minutes to make up his mind between unconditional surrender and immediate battle under unfavourable conditions (Le Bron had Maja’s force as good as encircled), Maja opted for the former. Even then the kyai’s
pretence that he was joining the Dutch of his own free will was maintained. Entering Klathèn under Dutch escort on 14 November, his still fully armed force, according to Nahuys van Burgst’s eyewitness account, came into the town as though celebrating a victory, striking up ‘religious songs from the Qur’ān’ as they marched (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, IV:617). It was only with great difficulty and after a shouting match with Nahuys, that Maja was prevailed upon to allow his force to be partially disarmed. The Kampung Jawa Tondano manuscript, which gives a seemingly accurate account of these events, maintains the fiction that far from surrendering the venerable kyai was being ‘invited’ to confer with ever more highly placed Dutch officials as he proceeded via Salatiga and Semarang to Batavia. The reality was quite otherwise. Maja was detained for a year in the city gaol in the vain hope that he would use his good offices to win over a number of other Java War leaders. When that failed, he was banished from Java for life (Babcock 1981a:304).

After the war, when Dipanagara and Kyai Maja initially found themselves sharing the same Minahasan exile, the attitudes of the two men were a study in incompatibility. The prince showed continuing solicitude for Maja, complaining to Knoerle during his voyage to Manado that the kyai had not been allowed to bring his part Balinese wife into exile with him and dictating a request on his arrival in Manado that she be allowed to join her husband in Tondano along with the wives of three of the senior commanders who had been taken prisoner with him. He also sent Maja a present of f 50 and received at least two individuals from the kyai’s entourage, one of whom may have helped him as an amanuensis in writing his babad. Maja

74 Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, IV:618-9. Their kris were not taken from them until they reached Surakarta on 16-11-1828.

75 Kyai Maja and his 62-strong party appear to have arrived in Manado on 1-5-1830 after lengthy stopovers in Makassar and Ambon. In accord with the instructions of the governor of Maluku, they had been given a place to stay in the interior of Manado Residency, namely Tonsea Lama near Tondano, Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 49; Babcock 1981a:284.

76 Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 23; vdB 391, ‘Voorstellen [van den] Pangerang Diepo Negoro aan den Luitenent Adjudant Knoerle in de tegenwoordigheid van den […] 2e Luitenent [C.] Bosman’, Manado, 19-6-1830, proposal 3. The commanders (tumenggung) in question were Urawan, Pajang and Brajayuda. Radèn Ayu Maja, who had lived in Bojonegoro and Madiun for most of the two and a half years following her husband’s capture and had come to Yogya in late 1830 through the good offices of the princely guardians of Hamengkubuwana V, was eventually allowed to join him in Tondano, but, as we have seen, not out of compassion on the part of the Dutch authorities, Dj.Br. 17, J.I. van Sevenhoven (Yogyakarta) to J. van den Bosch (Batavia/Bogor), 16-2-1831, enclosing a letter from F.G. Valck (on temporary commission to Yogyakarta) of 12-2-1831.

77 AN Exhibitum, 2-7-1831 no. 15, J.P.C. Cambier (Manado) to J. van den Bosch (Batavia/Bogor), 22-4-1831. The letter contains a list of those who were with Dipanagara in Manado. These included two people from Kyai Maja’s entourage from his first exile settlement in Tonsea Lama (Tondano), a ‘priest’, whose name is given alternatively as ‘Suranata’ and ‘Satruna’, who was sent to help Dipanagara at the start of the fasting month (Puwasa) of AJ 1759 (AD 22 February to 24 March 1831), and with whose services Dipanagara was said to be displeased; and Kyai Tirtadrana, ‘a very able man’ who was able to speak fluent Malay and served as the Resident
on the other hand refused to have anything to do with his former comrade in arms: he sent back the fifty florins stating that the monthly allowance he was receiving from the government was more than enough for himself and his followers. He also failed to respond to Dipanagara’s request for copies of quotations from the *Qur’ān*. At the same time, two haji from Maja’s entourage, whom the prince had specifically asked to join him in Manado, possibly under pressure from Maja, refused to leave the kyai’s settlement at Tonsea Lama in Tondano district. The Dutch authorities appear to have encouraged this breach, pointing out to Dipanagara after his original dispatch of his cash gift that close relations with Maja would not be permitted. The Java War protagonists would never meet again. Maja died in his fifty-ninth year in Tondano on 20 December 1849 (Babcock 1981a:307), while Dipanagara, who outlived him by six years, expired three months before his much younger army commander, Senthot (note 106). Thus the Java War leaders passed from the scene, divided in death just as they had been separated in life by the vicissitudes of war and the irreconcilable polarities of personal ambition and social identity. The temporary alliance of satria and santri may have imbued the five-year conflict with a unique social breadth not to speak of religious fervour, but it was a deeply unstable relationship which even a santri prince of Dipanagara’s stature could not bridge.

*Dutch military and political tactics*

Before considering how Dipanagara’s position unravelled in the final fifteen months (December 1828-February 1830) of the war as further defections, notably that of Senthot, and battlefield losses, in particular that of Ngabèhi, undermined his capacity to fight, it is necessary to turn aside for a moment to consider what problems the Dutch faced. If the prince’s side was so riven with internal rivalries, in particular those between his kraton and religious supporters, how come it took the Dutch so long to gain the upper hand in the conflict? Why were nearly two years lost (1825-1827) before De Kock and his fellow commanders came up with a winning strategy, namely the combined
use of temporary battlefield fortifications – the so-called bènthèng system – and a greatly increased number of mobile columns?81

Part of the answer must be sought in the glaring inadequacies of the Dutch colonial army. Deficient in resources, its officers took time to come to an understanding of the nature of the war they were waging. During the first two years, 6,000 infantry were deployed with a further 1,200 artillery and cavalry (Djamhari 2003:79). There were no reserves. Although close on 2,400 men were sent out from the Netherlands during the course of 1826 to replace those killed and wounded (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, II:501 note 2, 1904, III:131), they could not be immediately deployed because of their lack of knowledge of the terrain and the challenges of the climate. At the same time, their classic European military training was also found to be a poor preparation for the Vendéan style counter-insurgency warfare which they were called upon to fight in south-central Java. Attrition rates amongst these newly arrived troops were also very high. Many succumbed to disease soon after their arrival in Indonesia. Of the 6,000 European infantry on active service in south-central Java between July 1825 and April 1827, 1,603 or 27 percent were dead by the end of this period (Djamhari 2003:81).

Commissioner-General Du Bus de Gisignies’ (in office 1826-1830) economy measures also had a deeply demoralising effect on Dutch troops in the field: equipment, pay and soldier’s welfare all suffered and it proved difficult to recruit new troops – in Indonesia at least – because conditions were so poor. Van Geen, who served as the main Dutch field commander during these first two years,82 decided that a doubling of the Dutch troop strength was required and by late 1826 he was requesting a further 6,000-strong expeditionary force be sent out from the Netherlands. But these did not start to arrive until May 1827 (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, II:573-4, III:131-3). By this time, the newly-introduced system of temporary battlefield fortifications had begun to

81 Djamhari 2003:88 lists eight mobile columns at the time of the introduction of the bènthèng stelsel in May 1827 with the names of their commanders and areas of operation. These stretched from Banyumas in the west to Boyolali in the east, each covering an area varying from a full Residency (Banyumas, Yogyakarta) to a single district (Menorèh, Kalijengking). By the end of the war, the number of columns had reached fourteen according to De Stuers 1833:Plate 3, although the highest number referred to by Djamhari (2003:201) is twelve, and Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:644 only list eleven with one (mobile column 9) having been suspended.

82 Although Lieutenant-General H.M. de Kock was the overall commander of Dutch forces during the Java War, his position as lieutenant governor-general and frequent absences in Batavia – for example in early January 1826 when he had to assume temporarily the governor-generalship during the interregnum between Van der Capellen’s departure and the arrival of Du Bus (1-1-1826 – 16-1-1826) – meant that many of the day-to-day battlefield decisions were the responsibility of the Gent-born Major-General Joseph van Geen. Radèn Aria Sasradilaga’s revolt in Rembang on 28-11-1828, however, caused De Kock to abandon his plans to hand over temporary command of Dutch forces in Java to Van Geen, who eventually left for Europe on 24-6-1828, after much criticism of his battlefield tactics.
transform the course of the war as we shall see in the next section (Djamhari 2003:87-8).

The small number of European troops made it difficult for the Dutch commanders to take offensive action against Dipanagara’s fast moving forces in the pre-April 1827 period. Nor was the presence of large numbers of Indonesian auxiliaries much help. Apart from the Madurese, in particular those from Sumenep and Sampang (pp. 358-9), they were of doubtful military value. Their increasing addiction to opium and their insistence on bringing their wives and families on campaign greatly complicated the logistics of moving Dutch mobile columns through enemy-held territory. It turned what should have been a tight fighting force of around 500 troops, into a lumbering juggernaut which looked more like a baggage train than a military formation (Djamhari 2003:80-1).

The military tactics used to contain Dipanagara during the period 1825-1827 were also inappropriate. As we have seen, this was neither a European war of sieges and set-piece battles, nor a Napoleonic-style campaign of swiftly marching armies and decisive battlefield encounters. Rather it was a guerrilla conflict marked by ambushes, rapid movement and unconventional attacks designed for surprise (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:633-4). The Javanese proved excellent guerrilla fighters able to subsist on minimal rations such as dried rice, edible roots, and fruits gathered from forest areas (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:632). They learnt how to wear down the enemy without allowing them chances for pitched battles, and proved adept in using captured weaponry against them. The three expeditions sent against Dipanagara’s first headquarters at Selarong in the period 21 July-9 October 1825 not only failed to capture the prince and his top commanders, but also proved ineffective in easing pressure on Yogyakarta which remained under siege until 20 September when it was relieved by a heavily armed Dutch military column from Surakarta (Payen 1988:79-80). By the time the Dutch and Indonesian forces were destroying Dipanagara’s meditation cave at Guwa Secang on 10 October, the prince was already planning his move across the Praga River to his new base at Deksa (4 November 1825-4 August 1826) and dividing his army into three fast-moving battle groups, two of which were sent to the north and southeast of the sultan’s capital, and a third westwards into Kulon Praga and eastern Bagelen (Djamhari 2003:67). Throughout the rainy season of November 1825 to April 1826, these forces continued to move with virtual impunity through the Mataram countryside and when the rains eased in

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83 The usual composition of a 500-strong Dutch mobile column was 350-400 infantry of whom 100-120 were Europeans and the rest Indonesian auxiliaries (*hulptroepen*), 30-40 hussars, two mounted artillery pieces, a pioneer detachment (25 men), a medical officer, a quartermaster and a 37-40 strong horse train with five days of supplies, Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:206; Hooyer 1895, I:62; Djamhari 2003:88.
April 1826, 800 of his troops began to ensconce themselves in the old *kraton* at Pléréd. On 9 June, Colonel Frans David Cochius (1787-1876), De Kock’s most senior engineer officer, had to bring a 4,200-strong force to bear to dislodge the defenders in a bloodbath which left all but 40 of the 400, who stayed to guard the crumbling ruin, dead (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, II:297-9).

Undeterred by this loss, the following month (July 1826), Dipanagara’s forces, commanded by Senthot, began winning a series of victories which took them from the east bank of the Praga River to the very outskirts of Surakarta. In quick succession, victories at Kasuran (28 July),84 Léngkong (30 July), where the flower of the Yogyakarta nobility perished, Bantul (4 August), Kejiwan (9 August), and Delanggu (28 August), brought a large proportion of the south-central Javanese heartland under Dipanagara’s control. In desperation, the Dutch began stripping their outer island garrisons of troops and bringing up soldiers newly arrived from Europe.85 De Kock was determined to hold the Salatiga-Surakarta defence line. But by 11 October members of the Sunan’s bodyguard, who had just taken part in the Garebeg Mulud celebrations, had to be hurriedly thrown into the fight to clear the prince’s vanguard from the outlying western *kampung* of Surakarta (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, II:509). The Dutch position seemed hopeless. Only the arguments between Kyai Maja and Dipanagara over tactics on the Pajang front described in the previous section allowed them to concentrate sufficient troops to gain a victory over the prince at Gawok on 15 October 1826. Even then Dipanagara’s forces remained present in much of Pajang and Mataram for most of the following year.

By the end of 1827 a new front had opened in Rembang and Jipang-Rajegwesi when Dipanagara’s brother-in-law, Radèn Aria Sasradilaga, went into revolt. An erstwhile *tumenggung* (captain) of the sultan’s troops, Sasradilaga had considerable military experience and was able to count on the loyalty of a number of former *kraton prajurit* (court bodyguard troops), whom he had earlier commanded when he was serving as deputy head of the Yogya forces in alliance with the Dutch in 1825-1827 (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, III:370). He also had strong family connections and influence in Jipang-Rajegwesi where his father had been *bupati* and he himself had been born and brought up (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, III:370, 490). According to the *pengulu* of Rembang, who had married his sister, Sasradilaga had gone

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84 Van Geen reported that Dipanagara’s forces had charged at the Dutch lines in a seeming frenzy with blood-curdling shrieks and lowered heads, see Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, II:378. On the losses sustained by Dipanagara’s forces at Pléréd, see KITLV H 263, Portier, ‘Verklaring’, n.y. (79-1826).

85 Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, II:501 note 2 on the arrival in Semarang in early September of 241 regulars from Makassar (with another 141 expected) and a further 468 with 15 officers from Padang/west coast of Sumatra in October. In the last four months of 1826, De Kock received a total of 2,632 new troops with 64 officers, including those from outer island garrisons and direct from Europe.
into revolt largely because of the actions of the Yogya patih, Danureja IV, who had thwarted his ambition to replace his recently slain Javanese commanding officer. Leaving the kraton secretly with his troops, Sasradilaga had made his way along the south coast to the eastern mancanagara eventually ending up in Jipang (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, III:490). For some anxious weeks between early December 1827 and mid-January 1828 the government’s overland communications between Semarang and Surabaya were cut. De Kock had to cancel plans to return to the Netherlands and hand over temporary command of the army to Van Geen (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, III:391-400), a serendipitous decision given the hatred aroused by Van Geen’s scorched earth tactics, his summary execution of prisoners, and his indiscriminate brutality towards the local populations in central Java, which included the burial of suspects up to their necks in earth to be eaten by ants and other insects (Knoerle ‘Journal’, 32; Chambert-Loir 2000:284; Djamhari 2003:68-9).

A good year before reports of the new revolt in Rembang began to arrive in late 1827, Dutch military and civilian officials had embarked on a series of intensive consultations aimed at finding a suitable policy to end the war (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, II:573-8). Both initially blamed the other for the military stalemate. Dutch field commanders accused the Residents of failing to prevent the local population from joining Dipanagara’s forces, while the senior civilian administrators berated De Kock and his generals for failing to grasp the wider socio-economic implications of their military failure. It was plain to see that the south-central Javanese economy was at a standstill, taxes could not be gathered, Javanese officials were still deserting in droves and the colonial state was sliding into bankruptcy (Van der Kemp 1901, II:271-2; Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, II:573-7; De Prins 2002:137; Djamhari 2003:69). Even supposedly loyal rulers like Sunan Pakubuwana VI could not be counted on (p. 559). Two-faced at best, the mercurial Sunan protested his loyalty to the Dutch while preparing to throw in his lot with the prince should the Dutch military position become untenable (Carey 1981a:292-3 note 241; Djamhari 2003:69).

Meanwhile, high-level disputes between Du Bus and De Kock over tactics made the search for a peaceful resolution to the war even more difficult. The commissioner-general fancied himself as a military strategist even though his sole experience of war was as a minor Napoleonic functionary in his native Doornik (Tournai) and later as a deputy district administrator in West Flanders during the June 1815 Waterloo campaign. Du Bus had served as adjoint au maire (deputy mayor) of Tournai (Doornik) during the 1813 allied advance on France and then as sous-intendant (deputy district administrator) of Courtrai (Kortrijk), both towns near his birth-place at Dottenijs (Dottignies) in West Flanders, during the Waterloo campaign of June 1815, De Prins 2002:148, 285.

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levée en masse (mass mobilization of the population) and the quick breakthroughs which might come through direct negotiations with enemy leaders. He tried both in September 1827 at Salatiga, coming in person to central Java to participate in the talks initiated by William Stavers and Kyai Maja the previous month, and issuing a grandiloquent appeal for a general popular uprising against Dipanagara on 26 September (De Prins 2002:148-9). Both fell flat. In the words of Du Bus’ biographer, Bart de Prins ‘the princely states and Yogyakarta were not France or Paris, [and] to the great annoyance of De Kock and his generals, Du Bus completely failed to see it’ (De Prins 2002:149). One of the few initiatives taken by the commissioner-general at this juncture, which did address some of the underlying causes of the war, was his 17 May 1827 decision to end Van der Capellen’s 1823 prohibition of the land-rent in the princely states (p. 529). The short-term benefits of this were immediately apparent. They helped to resolve some of the problems faced by Javanese
noble landowners in the years immediately preceding the Java War and persuaded many to throw in their lot with the government in the closing years of the conflict (De Prins 2002:147-8).

Other political strategies for bringing the war to an end, canvassed in this 1826-1827 period, were rejected as impractical. One such was the Surakarta Resident Hendrik MacGillivray’s suggestion that Yogyakarta should be dismembered and divided between the government, the Susuhunan and the Mangkunagaran. De Kock thought this altogether too radical. Indeed, MacGillivray was himself deemed to be rather less than credible as an authority on Javanese court affairs. Within months of making his proposal, he would be suspended from his position as Resident for administrative malpractice (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, II:411-6; Appendix IX). Another was the idea of splitting Yogyakarta and offering Dipanagara an independent principality. As we have seen, this was dismissed out of hand by the Dutch Minister of the Colonies C.Th. Elout as inappropriate given the religious character of the war, although it was brought up again by Lawick van Pabst on 28 February 1830 when it became clear that Dipanagara was prepared to negotiate a peace deal.87 The only initiative which was taken up was the restoration of the exiled second sultan of Yogya. This occurred on 17 August 1826 in a hastily convened ceremony presided over by Du Bus in the governor-general’s palace in Bogor, the sultan returning to Yogya on 20 September and taking over the royal administration two days later (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, II:433-43). But this did not have the desired effect. The seventy-six year old second sultan was in his dotage and lacking in energy (Chapter VIII). Dominated by his rapacious, low-born and immensely fat last official consort, Ratu Sultan,88 an erstwhile commander of his Amazon corps, the sixteen months of his third and last period as ruler were deeply demoralising for the Yogya court. In Dipanagara’s words: ‘The restoration of [the] old sultan […] was an unrighteous act for his sons and grandsons could expect nothing good from this sultan’ (Knoerle 1835:151).

Although de Kock’s hopes that the old sultan’s return would restore the moral authority of the sultanate were misplaced (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, II:435; Carey and Houben 1987:32; Carey 1992:438 note 201; Djamhari 2003:77-8), he took the opportunity to make a close study of the military situation, coming up with a five-point strategy which combined both political and

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87 Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:724-5 (which prints a fragment of the text of Lawick van Pabst’s note of 28-2-1830); Kielstra 1896a:86 (quoting Weitzel 1852-53, II:530-32). This proposal should be read with Van Pabst’s earlier concept note (‘Nota ter betoogen’, 5-11-1828, for full title see Chapter X note 20), which compared the Java War with Sultan Mangkubumi’s rebellion in 1746 and reflected on the relevance of the 1755 Giyanti peace settlement for the prospects of a similar agreement with Dipanagara. In his second concept note, Van Pabst spoke of establishing the prince as a quasi-independent ruler like Radèn Mas Said (Mangkunagara I) with 4,000 cacah (households) of land. But it was never seriously considered.

88 Formerly Radèn Ayu Andayaningrat, see Carey 1992:413 note 73.
military elements. First, he decided to develop a closer relationship with the sultanate so that the remaining princes and senior officials did not go over to Dipanagara. Second, he resolved to deepen political and military ties with Surakarta so that both Sunan Pakubuwana VI and Mangkunegara II remained loyal. Third, he made a commitment to take back those areas of Mataram still under Dipanagara’s control and restore an effective system of administration and security so that the economy could be revived. Fourth, he determined to contain the prince’s forces within a narrow strip of mountainous land between the Praga and Bagawanta rivers in the districts of Kulon Praga, southern Kedhu and eastern Bagelen so that they could be isolated and worn down. This would create what in today’s military parlance would be called a ‘killing area’ (Djamhari 2003:78-9). Finally, he resolved to capture Dipanagara and the other leaders of the rebellion, if necessary by putting a price on their heads.89

The key to the success of De Kock’s plans was the system of temporary battlefield fortifications (bènthèng stelsel) pioneered by his chief engineer officer, Colonel Cochius, whose experience of setting up such fortification systems had long preceded the Java War.90 Early in the conflict (October 1825), Cochius had set up his first bènthèng at Kalijengking in southern Kedhu on the Magelang-Yogya road to provide protection for military convoys as well as overnight shelter for his troops. Other mobile column commanders followed suit. One such was the Gent-born Major Eduard Marie de Bast (1789-1827), who constructed his own fortification at Trayem in southern Kedhu on the road from Magelang to Beliga in late 1825 (Djamhari 2003:83). Cochius’ original design was very simple. After choosing a suitable strategic location, usually on a hill top or some other natural defence, he built a rectangular barrack-like structure sufficient to house at least a platoon (25-30) of soldiers. He then defended it by erecting a stout coconut palm-tree trunk stockade roughly 1.7 metres high with one or possibly two elevated gun-emplacements at the corners where cannon could be mounted on earthwork redoubts. Given the temporary nature of the construction, such fortifications could be easily abandoned and new bènthèng built in other locations where there was greater need for close support of troops in the field (Weitzel 1855-7, I:39; Louw and

89 Djamhari 2003:78-9. On the day of Pangéran Ngabèhi’s death in the Kelir mountains on 21-9-1829, De Kock offered a reward of 10,000 Spanish dollars (f 20,000) for anyone handing in Dipanagara dead or alive, Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:377-8; Soekanto 1965:401.
90 Djamhari 2003:87, states that Cochius had served under Daendels in Java as a young first lieutenant-engineer tasked with establishing fortifications in strategic north coast cities (Batavia, Semarang and Surabaya) to prevent a British landing, but there is no mention of his previous Java experience in his service record in Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:260 note 1. This indicates that Cochius only arrived in Java in May 1816 as a captain-engineer, and received his appointment as adjunct director of fortifications six years later (22-6-1822). Djamhari gives a note (2003:87 note 34) to substantiate his assertion, which purports to refer to a document in the De Kock collection, but this has seemingly nothing to do with Cochius. Many of Djamhari’s notes seem to be out of sequence.

Introduced on a systematic basis from May 1827 as part of De Kock’s new integrated battlefield strategy, the bènthèng, along with the eleven mobile columns which were operational in south-central Java by the end of the war (note 81), were the key to Dutch military success against Dipanagara.91 Indeed, by March 1830 no less than 258 such temporary fortifications had been constructed throughout central and east Java, the largest number (90) being built in 1828.92 They covered a vast area stretching from the district capital of Banyumas in the west to Panaraga in the east. At least sixteen of the structures were large enough to house over 100 troops and could mount a number of cannon (Djamhari 2003:315). Cochius’ own contribution would later be set in stone through the construction of one of the largest of these fortresses – the post-war Fort Cochius at Gombong in the Kebumèn Residency of western Bagélèn (Houben 1994:111) – which would subsequently serve as one of the first postings of an obscure Javanese corporal of the Royal Netherlands Indies Army by the name of Soeharto (1921-2007) who would later become the second president of Indonesia (1966-1998). In this fashion the bènthèng stelsel was destined to have a continuing resonance in modern Indonesian history.

Dipanagara’s fiscal regime; Senthot and the problems of dwifungsi

How then did this new strategy impact on Dipanagara and his commanders in the closing stages of the Java War? To answer this, it is necessary to take a closer look at the prince’s fiscal administration which was so critical to his war effort. After the initial phase of the war when ad hoc financing had been the norm, Dipanagara began to organize his own administration to raise taxes – such as land tribute and levies on local markets – in the areas under his control. As we have seen, certain places, such as Kutha Gedhé and the villages of Into-Into on the Praga River and Geger in Kulon Praga, were designated as centres for the manufacture of gunpowder and armaments and were appointed to channel taxes as well as vital supplies of food and war matériel to the prince’s forces (Carey 1981a:275 note 166, 288 note 221). Although most of the taxes in money and kind raised from the local populations were handed over to Dipanagara’s army commanders, a real attempt seems to have been made to keep military and administrative duties separate. Occasionally, bupati appointed by Dipanagara would take a direct part in the fighting, but mostly

91 For a recent analysis of the impact of the bènthèng stelsel, see Djamhari 2003:78-215. Djamhari’s work is important, based as it is on original research, but there are problems with his methods of footnoting (note 90) and use of evidence.

92 According to Djamhari 2003:319, up to May 1827, only ten such fortifications had been constructed, but 30 followed in May-December 1827, 90 in 1828, and 53 in 1829, with a further 75 whose date of building is unclear.
they were restricted to a purely administrative role. Indeed, the men chosen by the prince for high office in his war administration were usually drawn from the ranks of the senior court priyayi who had served the sultanate in a similar capacity before the war. One such family was the Danurejan who had supplied all the chief ministers (patih) in Yogya up to Sumadipura’s appointment in December 1813 (pp. 395-7; Chapter X note 220; Appendix Va).

As regards his appointments to senior commands within his army, however, Dipanagara adopted slightly different criteria. Here suitability was judged not on the basis of previous family position in Yogya, but by the yardstick of personal bravery and military flair on the battlefield. In Dipanagara’s view, courage was essentially a youthful quality so many of his senior commanders (basah) were very young, either in their late teens or early twenties. He later expressed astonishment at the age of the Dutch generals, men like De Kock, Van Geen and Holsman, all of whom were already well into late middle age by the time of the Java War. Although a number of the prince’s commanders were scions of Yogya noble families or closely related to him by marriage, there were a few, like Kyai Maja’s nephew and son-in-law Tumenggung Pajang (Appendix VIIb), who were of more humble birth. All, however,

93 On the capture of three fifteen year-old boys, who had participated in the siege of Yogya as members of Dipanagara’s forces, see Dj.Br. 54, A.H. Smissaert (Yogyakarta) to H.M. de Kock (Surakarta), 16-8-1825.
94 Godfried Jacob Holsman (1771-?), was commander of the First Large Military Division (Eerste Grote Militaire Afdeeling) at the time of the outbreak of the Java War. This covered the whole of west Java and part of central Java from Anyer on the Sunda Straits to Cirebon and Cilacap in western central Java. It also included the districts of Lampung and Padang in Sumatra. Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:664. He was given command of troops in the field in 1827-1828, see below note 95.
95 Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 18, ‘[Dipanagara] asked me why our generals and army commanders were old men because, he said, it was a truth that bravery was less met with in the old than in persons of a young age’. The three senior Dutch generals in post during the Java War were: De Kock (born 25-5-1779), Van Geen (born 1-9-1775), and Holsman (born 4-7-1771). They were thus aged 46, 49 and 54 respectively when the war broke out. Holsman’s last major command was against Raden Aria Sasradilaga’s forces in Rembang. This occurred when he was 57 and he fell ill during the operations (11-2-1828), having to be replaced by his second-in-command, Lieutenant-Colonel W.A. Roest, a former military adjutant to Governor-General Van der Capellen. Holsman retired from active service in November 1828 and was given a pension the following year (10-5-1829). The only relatively young general whom the Dutch appointed to supreme command during the Java War was Major-General Benjamin Bischoff (born 22-9-1787 – died 7-7-1829), who had distinguished himself during the early stages of the expedition against Bone in 1824 and had subsequently served as governor and military commander of Makassar (1824-1827). However, he died shortly after arriving in Java on 13-5-1829. Even Bischoff had been brought out of retirement in Holland to take up his post.
96 Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 24, ‘[Dipanagara] told me […] that during the war he had tried to bind the braver and more enterprising upper officers in his army to him by marriages as the surest means of devotion […] He told me that Tumenggung Pajang was a young man of lowly birth, who had been appointed a tumenggung in view of his courage and discretion. He had been two years the son-in-law of Kyai Maja.’
had been required to distinguish themselves by individual acts of bravery on the battlefield. Even ordinary soldiers aspiring to join Dipanagara’s elite regiments had to undergo tests of personal courage such as leaping across deep ravines (Carey 1981b:55 note 5). Those who distinguished themselves for military command were advanced first to the position of *tumenggung* – a military title at this time – and then to the senior rank of *ali basah* (High Pasha) which carried with it an independent command (p. 153).

The most important of these teenage army commanders was, of course, Ali Basah Abdul Mustapa Prawiradirja alias ‘Senthot’ (1808-1855), a nom-de-guerre derived from the Javanese *mak senthot* meaning ‘to fly’ or ‘to dash’. This illiterate young Yogya nobleman, a son of Radèn Rongga Prawiradirja III by an unofficial wife (Chapter II note 35), whom Dipanagara had tried in vain to educate as a *santri,*98 had joined the prince at Selerong in August 1825 when he was just seventeen. Described by De Stuers as ‘young, fiery and in every respect a brilliant Javanese […] who knew how to blaze a trail for himself by virtue of his energy and shrewdness’ (Soekanto 1951a:42; De Stuers 1833), he gained a name for himself for his courage and leadership qualities on the battlefield, even earning praise from those Dutch officers who felt the threat of his rapid advances and deadly ambushes. By late 1828, when he was in his twentieth year, he had already emerged as Dipanagara’s leading strategist and military commander.99 By this time, despite some brilliant victories, which included the destruction of Major H.F. Buschkens’ 8th mobile column at Kroya in eastern Bagelen at the beginning of October 1828 (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, IV:492-502), the tide of war was starting to turn against the prince. As we have seen, in mid-November 1828, Kyai Maja had allowed himself to be taken prisoner with 500 seasoned troops on the slopes of Mount Merapi, and the prince with his remaining forces were being gradually hemmed into an increasingly narrow strip of territory between the Praga and Bagawanta rivers. In this area, the Dutch strategy of establishing temporary battlefield fortifications (*bènthèng*) to protect the villages recently ‘pacified’ by their troops, described in the previous section, was already beginning to deny Dipanagara

97 Gericke and Roorda 1901, I:753; Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 40, ‘[Dipanagara] said that this name was an allusion to his character and prevailing behaviour. “Senthot” means to escape, flee, withdraw oneself or fly, and in general people mean by this a character which it is not easy to get to know, a man of a wily, complicated temperament. [He] remarked that Senthot had always shown signs of an enterprising spirit, and that in recent times he had suggested a plan to Dipanagara to try conquests outside Java.’ See further Chapter X note 241.

98 Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 40, ‘Senthot can neither read nor write and from his earliest childhood had shown a violent dislike for the intention of Dipanagara […] to educate this *basah* for the position of a “priest”’. See further Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 15-6, ‘Senthot is his hero [and] he [Dipanagara] said that he had given him the same name as his father, Rongga Prawiradirja III (“the most excellent hero”) […] Dipanagara told me that Senthot had lost eight horses shot from under him during […] the war, that he was often wounded and that he […] had the calling to die as a commander in battle just as his father [had done] during the period of Marshal Daendels’. See further pp. 191-2, Plate 21.
and his commanders vital supplies. In particular, difficulties were experienced in the collection of taxes for the upkeep of the prince’s elite regiments and Dipanagara’s patih, Radèn Adipati Abdullah Danureja (Appendix II), was blamed by some commanders for his ineffective administration.

It was against this deteriorating situation that Senthot wrote to Dipanagara in December 1828 requesting first that he should be placed in overall command of his forces in the field, and second that he be allowed to levy taxes for his men directly, thus bypassing the patih’s administration (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, IV:673). The latter request greatly concerned Dipanagara, who was acutely conscious of his role in the eyes of the local population as a Ratu Adil (Just King) who would ensure a light taxation regime and the provision of cheap food and clothes (Carey 1981a:xxxix-xl). He feared that if Senthot, who was renowned for his ostentatious and spendthrift lifestyle (Carey 1981b:56 note 8), was allowed to combine both administrative and military responsibilities, the common people would be oppressed and their support for his holy war would evaporate. He thus convened an urgent meeting of his principal advisers to discuss the matter, in particular asking his uncle, Pangéran Ngabèhi, about his central concern:

XXXV.47 ‘If he who holds the sword
is also given the holding of money, how [then]?
Might that not lead to neglect?100

In these three short lines in his babad Dipanagara seemed uncannily to prefigure late twentieth century debates in Indonesia about the appropriateness of the dual function (dwifungsi) of the army as a military and socio-political force (Crouch 1978:25; Carey 1981b:51), debates which have yet to be fully resolved. But this is to get far ahead of our tale and our time.

Ngabèhi and the prince’s other advisers sought to reassure the prince, stressing that such a move would give greater unity to his war effort and would prevent delays in getting supplies through to his troops as had occurred earlier under Danureja. Dipanagara reluctantly agreed. He now ordered that the f 3,000 a month from the market taxes in Kulon Praga and eastern Bagelèn be divided between Senthot and himself, with two-thirds going to his army commander and the rest being retained for his own use (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, IV:674). He soon regretted his decision. In his babad, he related that shortly thereafter the Dutch started building a large new

100 BD (Manado) IV:116, XXXV (Dhandhanggula) 46. lamun tiyang nyepeng pedhang/ dipunsambi nyepeng arta kadospundi/ punapa tan kapiran. Kapiran from the root pir is a rather difficult Javanese word to translate. It also has the sense of ‘disappointment’ and is translated as such in the Dutch and Malay translation of the BD (Manado) supervised by A.B. Cohen Stuart, Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, IV:673. I have followed Pigeaud 1938:167.
The last stand of the old order

 bènthèng at Nanggulon101 in central Kulon Praga on the road between Sentolo and the Bagelèn border, but Senthot did not react quickly enough because he was totally preoccupied with receiving official reports and money, and with the administration of the army.102 When the youthful ali basah did eventually order a full-scale attack, he found the Dutch too firmly entrenched and his troops were beaten off with considerable loss of life (8 January 1829; Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, IV:678-82). Even after this reverse, Dipanagara lamented that Senthot was still spending too much time in long-running disputes with the ineffectual patih.103 Meanwhile, the young army commander's own tax collectors had begun to act harshly towards the local population. In June 1829, the month in which the Dutch captured part of Dipanagara's administrative archive in an engagement on the south coast of Kulon Praga (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:207), Ngabèhi wrote to Senthot informing him that one of his tax officials had been punished with a public beating for levying more taxes than was permitted (Carey 1981a:xl). At the same time, a report by one of Senthot's subordinate officers, Radèn Tumenggung Pancaatmaja, in July 1829 lamented that food supplies were getting scarcer and more expensive. Local officials, who had once supported the prince's cause, he wrote, were now turning against him by choosing to return to areas under the control of the Dutch bènthèng where they could be assured of a better livelihood and protection against sudden attack. Ready money for the upkeep of Dipanagara's forces was also scarce because, in the view of this officer, the number of markets under Dipanagara's control had steadily dwindled. Dipanagara would fight on, according to Panceaatmaja, but the morale of his uncle, Mangkubumi, and the other Yogya pangéran, who were with the families of the prince and his top commanders at Rejasa, was very low because there was nothing for them to eat.104 There were even isolated cases in the last year of the war (1829-1830) of local people turning against unpopular officials allied with Dipanagara and finishing them off so great was their craving for peace (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:516, 519-20). The policy of the Dutch bènthèng commanders may also have had an influence here. They apparently tried to win the local population over to their side

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101 This was a sizeable structure, the third largest ever built by the Dutch, capable of housing 221 troops and defended by several canon, Djamhari 2003:315.


by promising them free ploughs, draught animals and seeds if they moved to areas under their control. They also lowered tax rates, diminished corvée demands and paid higher rates for day labourers in the immediate vicinity of their fortified outposts to encourage the settlement of peasant cultivators and their families (Carey 1981a:lxviii note 185; Houben 1994:20; Chapter I note 124). The inevitable result of these developments was that by the end of September 1829, the fourth year of the war, organized resistance to the Dutch in the fertile rice plains of south-central Java was at an end (Djamhari 2003:217). The crucial bonds of trust and cooperation between Dipanagara’s forces and the local population had been sundered and without them there could be no successful prosecution of the guerrilla campaign.

By this time Senthot had already surrendered to the Dutch (16 October 1829). He had fought bravely throughout and had suffered many battle wounds, but there are strong indications that he had hedged his bets to ensure that things would turn out as well as possible for him. As early as July 1829, when his junior officer was reporting problems with food supplies, he had already entered into tentative negotiations for his surrender and when he did eventually come over it was on distinctly favourable terms. The Dutch permitted him to keep his own government-financed 500-strong troop or barisan, which subsequently saw service in west Sumatra against the Padri (1832-1833) and he was paid a retainer of $5,000. The same period, meanwhile, witnessed the nadir of Dipanagara’s personal fortunes. On 21 September 1829, one of his last remaining senior commanders, Pangéran Ngabèhi, and his two sons, were killed in a bloody encounter in the Kelir Mountains on the Bagelèn-Mataram border. Shortly thereafter on 11 November 1829, following his near capture by Major A.V. Michiels’ 11th mobile column in the Gowong mountain region to the west of Kedhu when he had to leap into a ravine and hide under tall pampas grass (glagah) to escape. Abandoning his horses, heirloom pike and wardrobe (Van den Broek 1873-77, 24:91; Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, p. 746 note 267).108

105 According to a Javanese spy working for the Resident of Kedhu, F.G. Valck, Senthot had lost the use of his right arm just before his surrender, dK 160, ‘Notas van den Resident van Kadoe […] over de verblijfplaatsen, plannen enz. van Diepo Negoro naar inleiding van hem door verschillende inlanders verstrekte inlichtingen, 5-10-1829 – 18-11-1829’ (henceforth: Valck, ‘Inlichtingen’), entry for 6-10-1829. It is unclear whether this was a permanent disability.

106 Soekanto 1951a:60 note 18. The young commander’s subsequent fate was less fortunate, however. Accused of collusion with pro-Padri leaders, he was exiled to Bengkulu (1833-1855) dying there on 17-4-1855 some three months after Dipanagara’s own demise in Makassar, Louw and De Klerck 1908, V:405; Soekanto 1951a:31-46. See further p. 746 note 267.

107 This was Kyai Rondan, see Appendix XI. Dipanagara believed that this holy pike gave him forewarning of impending difficulties and danger. Its loss thus affected him deeply and he took it as a sign from the Almighty that he had been betrayed by three of his commanders (basah) in Mataram, Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:496.

108 This contained his apparel for the holy war, see Chapter X; ‘no great wardrobe’ according to the Dutch mobile column commander, Major (later Major-General) Andreas Victor Michiels (1797-1849), Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:493.
Dipanagara decided to wander off into the jungles of western Bagelèn. Only his two panakawan (intimate retainers), Banthèngwarèng and Rata, accompanied him for the entire journey (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:423; Carey 1974a:25). These wanderings, which would take Dipanagara initially to the remote Rèma area between Bagelèn and Banyumas, would continue until mid-February 1830 when his first direct negotiations with Colonel Jan Baptist Cleerens (1785-1850) began. These eventually resulted in the abortive ‘peace conference’ at Magelang (8-28 March 1830), his arrest (28 March), 25-year exile in Sulawesi (12 June 1830-8 January 1855) and death (8 January 1855; pp. 752-3). As he dragged his weary and malaria-ridden body along the rhinoceros’ paths to the peasant huts in which he hid for over three months (mid-November 1829-late February 1830; Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:525-6; Carey 1981b:56 note 10; Chapter III), Dipanagara may have reflected that although his defeat was probably inevitable – both the Parangkusuma prophecy (Chapter IV) and a further divine prompting (wangsiting Hyang Agung), which he told his uncle, Pangéran Mangkubumi, he had received in late September 1829 (Chapter XII), had warned as much – it had undoubtedly been hastened by his disastrous concession to Senthot just over a year earlier. In terms of social unity and cooperation between the local population and Dipanagara’s troops, the short-lived experiment with ‘dual function’ had been a disaster. Admittedly, Senthot’s own youthful and headstrong character was partly to blame. Had a more experienced commander like Ngabèhi been in charge, things might have worked out differently. But the very fact that up to December 1828, Dipanagara had taken great care to see that administrative and military duties were kept separate shows that he was acutely aware of the dangers which might ensue if they were exercised together. It was only under extreme pressure that he went against this conviction and then he quickly regretted his decision. He remained to the end a supreme pragmatist in matters of statecraft, drawing on his own experience as a skilful administrator and financial manager of his estate at Tegalreja and far-flung apanage lands (p. 78). This experience had taught him if nothing else that the loyalty and support of the common people would only be forthcoming if they were treated with consideration (Carey 1981a:xl, 240 note 27).

Conclusion

The Java War constituted a huge upheaval in Javanese society, which, as we have seen (Preface), affected two million Javanese, one third of the total population of the island. An estimated 200,000 Javanese civilians died and one fourth of the cultivated area of Java sustained damage. In securing their pyrrhic victory, the Dutch lost 8,000 of their own troops as well as
7,000 Indonesian auxiliaries. The 20 million guilder cost to their exchequer would only be recouped through Van den Bosch’s Cultivation System, which brought an estimated 832 million guilders to the Dutch home exchequer between 1831 and 1877 (Ricklefs 1993:123).

The last stand of Java’s ‘old order’, the Java War witnessed the dismemberment of the south-central Javanese courts in 1830 as the remaining mancanagara territories were finally annexed by the colonial government (Houben 1994:17-72). As such it could be seen as part of a long line of military disasters, beginning in the late seventeenth century with the Trunajaya Rebellion (1676-1679), which had destroyed the power of the once mighty empire of Mataram. By the end of the conflict, the Dutch remained in undisputed control of the island. Their rule would last for the next 112 years.

In retrospect, it seems strange that the Dutch took as long as they did to get a grip on the military challenge posed by Dipanagara’s rebellion. Given the inherent tensions between the prince’s santri and kraton supporters, the intense regional rivalries and conflicts over war aims, all of which would ultimately pull Dipanagara’s war effort apart, it is surprising that two years had to pass before the Dutch hit on a winning strategy – namely, the combined application of Cochius’ bènthèng system and the near doubling of their mobile columns. It is a truism that generals are always fighting the last war. In the Dutch case, the memory of the Javanese dynastic conflicts of the late seventeenth and eighteenth century, seem to have coloured their judgement. They spent too much time thinking that Dipanagara might be bought off with a quasi independent principality and his problems explained by thwarted political ambition. But he was not a Radèn Mas Said (Mangkunagara I) or even a Sultan Mangkubumi. It did not help that their colonial army was so ill adapted to the challenges of fighting a guerrilla war, nor that the relationship between the Dutch civilian and military authorities – epitomised by the conflicts between Du Bus and De Kock – was so poor. The parlous state of the colonial finances during these years also limited their room for manoeuvre, as did the political problems experienced by the Kingdom of the United Netherlands during the build up to the Belgian revolt of 1830.

Perhaps the greatest deficiency lay in the Dutch analysis of the Islamic aspects of the war. Here they were fighting blind. There was no Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje (1857-1936)\(^{109}\) to advise them. If there had been, De Kock and other senior military commanders might have been encouraged to exploit

\(^{109}\) Perhaps the most famous nineteenth-century Dutch scholar of oriental cultures and languages, who became Professor of Arabic at Leiden University in 1906. He had served as adviser on Arab and native affairs to the Netherlands Indies government (1889-1906) and had used his knowledge of Islamic cultures to devise strategies to crush the resistance in Aceh in the late 1890s while acting as political adviser to the Dutch military commander and governor of Aceh, General J.B. van Heutsz (1851-1924; in post as governor, 1898-1904).
the tensions between Dipanagara’s santri and kraton supporters much earlier and to greater effect. Certainly, some of the more egregious errors associated with Van Geen’s scorched earth strategy in south-central Java in 1825-1827 and the alienation of the local civilian populations might have been avoided. A policy of attraction based on the honouring of Islamic institutions and practices, in particular a restoration of the competence of the Islamic courts (surambi) (pp. 386-7), might have gone a long way to satisfying the religious grievances of Dipanagara’s santri supporters.

One area which was probably non-negotiable was that of Javanese identity. While Valck’s analysis regarding Javanese ‘nationalism’ may have been overdrawn, it is indisputably the case that a key aspect of Dipanagara’s struggle was a desire to defend Javanese culture. After all, he had lived through a period when Javanese society had been turned upside down by the ruthless colonial policies of Daendels and Raffles. His own experiences of the British attack on the Yogya kraton, his treatment at the hands of the representatives of the post-1816 returned Dutch administration and the seemingly unstoppable spread of European influences in everything from clothing to language, had convinced him that alongside the raising up of the high state of the Islamic religion, the restoration of specifically Javanese values was a key priority. Hence the treatment meted out to non-Javanese during the war, especially the Dutch and the Chinese. In many ways, the Java War was the last attempt by the Javanese ancien régime to turn back the tide of Dutch colonialism. As such it was a magnificent failure. But it had the capacity to inspire future generations as we will see in the next chapter. Transported on the first stage of his journey into exile on that most quintessential of products of the new industrial age – the first steamship in Netherlands Indies service – Dipanagara would have ample opportunity to reflect on the bitterness of defeat and the fate of those born to live in changed times.
CHAPTER XII

Enduring the unendurable
Dipanagara’s capture at Magelang and his exile in Sulawesi, 1830-1855

Part One: The road to Magelang and Batavia

Introduction

By the end of September 1829, it was clear that the war was drawing to a close. Earlier that month, just before the decisive battle of Siluk (17 September) in the Selarong hills just to the east of the Praga River, when Dipanagara’s uncle, Pangéran Prabuningrat, had been killed defending the prince’s retreat,² the Java

1  A popular Indonesian song about Dipanagara, which translates roughly as follows: ‘Yet there is in Sulawesi/ in a most quiet spot/ near the wild jungle/ far from the hurly-burly/ a place set apart/ the grave of Dipanagara/ a true hero/ who defended our people/ a hero with a pure heart’.

2  Prabuningrat had been taken by surprise by a Dutch attack when he was resting with Dipanagara in the Selaong hills. He had covered his nephew’s retreat by a rearguard action involving fifty cavalry, but had been killed by a sabre stroke as he was returning to join Dipanagara’s main force. Lieutenant-Colonel B.J. Sollewijn, the commander of the 1st mobile column, described what happened: ‘an unusually well-dressed rebel, who had escaped by luck from the crush [of the cavalry charge], hastily attempted to escape […] but his horse was suddenly shot from under him […] Sergeant Cassenhoven begged permission to charge with the cavalry and he rushed up to him and sabred him to death’. The dead man was subsequently recognised as Pangéran Prabuningrat by his diamond-studded kris which was found by the local village inhabitants of Sélanangkul, Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:386-9. Dipanagara later stated that the cannon shot, which felled Prabuningrat’s horse, took off his uncle’s left leg, Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 16.
The power of prophecy

War leader had confided to Mangkubumi that he had received a divine instruction (wangsit) that his efforts would come to nought. Nothing remained for him in this world, he confided to his grey-haired and goitre-afflicted kinsman, but to die a martyr’s death on the field of battle. This conviction was confirmed four days later by the gruesome deaths of another of the prince’s uncles, his senior army commander and trusted adviser, Pangéran Ngabèhi, who together with his two sons, Adikusuma and Jayakusuma, were ambushed in the Kelir mountains. When news of this terrible loss reached Dipanagara, he confided in his babad that he realised that he now remained alone in this world and he felt he could no longer control events for those who remained behind.

We have seen in the previous chapter how the combination of the Dutch system of temporary battlefield fortifications and the near doubling of their mobile columns had begun to hem Dipanagara into an increasingly narrow strip of land between the Praga and Bagawanta rivers. If September 1829 had been a black month for the prince with an unprecedented number of his top commanders and supporters, including his uncle, Mangkubumi, giving themselves up, October was no better: Senthot, who negotiated his own surrender

3 BD (Manado) IV:178-9, XXXVII (Asmaradana) 50-4. sang nata angandika alon/ dhateng Kangjeng Panembahan/ kyai pan kaوصل/ tampi wangşsit ing Hyang Agung/ kalamun badihe kawula. 51. punika wekas-aneki: apan tan dosais punapa/ dadya kag sinawun mangè: samya tumungkung sadaya/ kalamun semu waspa/ Panembahan alon matur/ paran sultané ingkang dadya. 52. ing bésuk wekas-aneki/ […] 53. […]/ sri naléndra ngandika/ kēnging tan kēnginga iku/ kyai mapan kaوصل. 54. namung nuwun ambélani/ dhumateng kag samya prapta/ inggih ing sabilollahé. It should be noted that since August 1825, Mangkubumi had borne the title of panembahan, usually given to respected senior male members of the royal family.

In the same passage in his babad, Dipanagara spoke bitterly against Pangéran Purbaya (the future Pakubuwana VII, reigned 1830-1858) and the other princes of the Surakarta court who, in his view, had sinned greatly against the Almighty and His Prophet by alloying themselves with the Dutch.

4 Pangéran Ngabèhi and his two sons along with a twenty-strong mounted following had been cornered in the Kelir Mountains on 21-9-1829. Seeing that they had no way out, they had declared that they were kangjeng gusti (princes of the blood), but the ngabèhi (junior officer) of the Indonesian barisan (troop) involved had ordered them to hand over their kris, stating that he recognised no kangjeng gusti on the rebel side. When they refused, the junior officer then ordered his men to go in and finish them off. Once they had been killed, the heads of the corpses were cut off and placed on bamboo poles, their bodies being thrown down the ravine. Only when their identities had been discovered were the heads of Ngabèhi and his two sons given a decent Islamic burial, see the report of Colonel J.B. Cleerens in Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:395-6.

5 BD (Manado) IV:188, XXXVII (Asmaradana) 97. sarta mijil wespanèki: rumoaos kantun pribadaya/ lawan ing Tanah Jawané/ rumoaos tan saged nata/ lamun amrih salaminya/ dhumateng kag samya kantun. ‘Tears welled up [and] the sultan/ felt he was left alone/ in the Land of Java./ He felt he could not control,/ even if he strove to all the time,/ those that remained behind.’

6 See the list of surrendered commanders in Sagimun 1965:401. Appendix VIII also gives dates. On the death of Pangéran Ngabèhi and his two sons, see Chapter XI note 89. On Mangkubumi’s surrender, see Dj.Br. 9B, Report of Radèn Tumenggung Pancaatmaja, 12 Sura AJ 1757 (AD 13-7-1829), stating that the wong cilik (‘little people’) would be happy when Mangkubumi submitted to the Dutch because they always regarded him as ‘greater’ than Dipanagara. In fact, people had lined the roads for fourteen leagues when Mangkubumi eventually came to Yogya from Kulon Praga in October 1829.
(p. 652), and Dipanagara’s mother and daughter, Radèn Ayu Gusti (Appendix IV), who were captured in a village in southern Kulon Praga (Chapter II note 17), were in Dutch hands by the month’s end. Following his near capture in mid-November 1829 (pp. 652-3), Dipanagara would struggle on virtually alone for another three months, hiding out in shacks and abandoned houses in the jungle fastnesses of western Bagelèn assailed by acute tropical malaria and accompanied for most of the time only by his two panakawan (intimate retainers). But with Dutch military strength at its peak, a f 20,000 price on his head (Chapter XI note 89), and at least eleven mobile columns searching for him and his remaining commanders (Chapter XI note 81), it was clear he could not live a fugitive life forever. It would only be a matter of time before he was forced to negotiate his own surrender.

The present chapter describes the process whereby Dipanagara was eventually brought to the negotiating table and forced to abandon his fugitive existence for permanent exile in Sulawesi. It is divided into two parts. The first deals with the process of negotiations through to the prince’s capture at Magelang on 28 March 1830 and his subsequent stay in Batavia where he was held for nearly a month (8 April-3 May 1830) in the Stadhuis (Town House) awaiting the decision of the new governor-general, Johannes van den Bosch, regarding his exile. The second covers his exile proper from his sea voyage to Manado (3 May-12 June 1830) until his death in Makassar on 8 January 1855. The first part contains three sections, which begin with a consideration of the background and course of the prince’s February 1830 negotiations with the Dutch field commander in Bagelèn and Banyumas, Colonel Jan Baptist Cleerens (1785-1850), and what Dipanagara thought had been offered him by way of safe conduct by the Flemish officer as he made his way to Magelang on 8 March for the start of his ‘peace negotiations’ with De Kock. The second section explains the circumstances of his arrest on 28 March from the perspective of both Dipanagara’s own babad and De Kock’s official diary. The third section describes the prince’s transfer to Batavia in the company of De Kock’s son-in-law, Major F.V.H.A. de Stuers, and the Javanese-speaking infantry captain, Johan Jacob Roeps, and his month-long sojourn in the colonial capital.

7 See Chapter III note 67. Dipanagara had to seek help from an elderly female dhukun (herbalist/healer) in the village of Sabédha (Sebada) by the name of Nyai Asmaratruna, whom he described as a coquettish widow who flirted and made jokes with him, see BD (Manado) IV:230, XXXVIII (Mijil) 158-9. ing Sebédha na dhukun sawijji/ wus sepuh pawèstri/ gumati kelangkung. 159. mapan dhateng kangjeng sri bupati/ ragi kenès mangko/ rondha nyai Asmaraturuné.

8 For a biography of Roeps, see Javasche Courant, 4-7-1840; Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, II:283 note 2. Born on 1-1-1805 in The Hague, he came to Java in 1816 with his father who was posted as a lieutenant-adjutant in the Dutch colonial army. His mother and nine of his ten siblings died when he was in his early teens, and he was brought up by a Javanese nyai (housekeeper; concubine) speaking fluent Javanese. A graduate of the Semarang Military School, he was a second-lieutenant at the age of 18 (12-8-1823), and had participated in the Boné expedition (1824-1825). During the Java War, he served in Lieutenant-Colonel Joseph Le Bron de Vexela’s 3rd mobile column in the Mataram area,
The second part continues the story, beginning in section four with the former Java War leader’s sea voyage to Manado under the escort of Van den Bosch’s German adjutant, Second Lieutenant J.H. Knoerle. The subsequent section gives an account of the prince’s initial three-year exile in North Sulawesi, where his experiences with the local population appear to have been less than happy, but where he was able to complete his autobiography and start a new family with Radèn Ayu Retnaningsih, the only one of his surviving official wives to accompany him into exile. It is followed by a final section which considers the reasons for Dipanagara’s rather abrupt transfer to Makassar in July 1833 and the more constrained pattern of his exile life during his last twenty-two years, as well as the fate of his family both during his exile and following his death on 8 January 1855. A conclusion sets the prince’s life in the wider sweep of Javanese history and attempts an assessment of his significance as an historical figure in the context of contemporary Indonesia.

The colonel’s promise: Dipanagara’s negotiations with Cleerens in February 1830 and the question of safe conduct

Following his comprehensive defeat on 17 September 1829 at Siluk (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:385-9), Dipanagara and a small number of his troops escaped back across the Praga River.9 Then, following the death of Ngabèhi and his sons in the Kelir Mountains on 21 September, the prince decided to move even further west. On the night of 26-27 September 1829, much to the surprise of Cleerens who thought that the prince would never cross the Bagawanta, he forded the upper reaches of the river with a fifty-strong escort and travelled on into central Bagelèn.10 Djamhari describes these events as marking the end of the Java War in military terms (Djamhari 2003:217):

Heavy pressure [from the Dutch] now meant that Dipanagara’s troop commanders had no other choice but to end their resistance and surrender. [His] strength had lost its critical mass for in these last stages [of the war] his forces no longer had the energy and will to fight. The majority of his troop commanders now gave themselves up out of frustration and sheer exhaustion.

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9 Dipanagara’s knowledge of the fording places across the Praga was critical here, allowing his force to cross in safety whereas the pursuing Dutch cavalry were caught in the deep mid-stream and had their horses swept away from under them. Even so a Dutch hussar got close enough to fire a pistol shot at him before being run through by lance thrusts from Dipanagara’s bodyguard, Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:388-9, 700-1.

10 Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:425-6. On the Javanese belief that no Mataram prince should cross the Bagawanta River because Sultan Agung (reigned 1613-1647) had taken exception to its disgusting name, see Multatuli 1862-77, IV:286; Van Praag 1947:13.
In early October, one of his commanders, Ali Basah Hasan Munadi, the head of his priestly Barjumungah bodyguard regiment, apparently counselled the prince to make for the mountain region of Rëma between Bagelèn and Banyumas, the home district of the Danurejan family (Appendix Va). Here his young supporter, Ali Basah Ngabdulmahmud Gandakusuma (Appendix II), a son of the murdered Danureja II, was said to be still holding out with some 300 troops. Two other members of the same family, Gandakusuma’s elder brother, Ali Basah Ngabdulkamil Mertanagara, a trusted confidante and son-in-law of the prince, and Dipanagara’s patih, Radèn Adipati Abdullah Danureja, a younger sibling of Danureja II, were also able to draw substantial local support from the district. Further to the north, in the Ledhok area of northwestern Kedhu and in the adjacent region of Karangkobar, another commander with whom Dipanagara was in contact, Basah Imam Musbah, continued to harry the Dutch from his mountain base high up on Mount Sundoro (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:304-5, 431-2). Dipanagara’s eldest son, Pangéran Dipanagara II, would join him there in mid-December (note 17). Rëma thus made sense as a place for Dipanagara to lie low and give some respite to his fever-wracked body as he contemplated his next move.

Hasan Munadi, who claimed to have talked extensively with the prince before his move to Rëma, asked him whether he would ever give himself up to the government and if so whether he might be content with Yogyakarta as a consolation prize. No, answered Dipanagara, he would never surrender to the government because he would feel too ashamed if his plans to become ‘prince over Java’ failed. As for being appointed sultan of Yogya ‘then I should have only half succeeded in my plans and all our troubles would have been in vain’. In underscoring these political ambitions, Munadi appears to have dismissed Dipanagara’s plans to ‘raise up the high state of the Islamic religion’ as a ploy to cover up his real motives. As for the Europeans, Munadi reported the prince as saying that they could remain in Java, but only as traders and then only in specially designated ports on the north coast, which we know from another source included Batavia and Semarang. The administration of the interior would be his and his alone, the Sunan and the sultan serving as his subordinates. Finally, Munadi stated that, despite the price on his head, Dipanagara

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11 See Appendix VIIb under Kyai Haji Samparwedi.
14 dK 209, Report of Ngabèhi Kramadimeja of interview with Mas Tumenggung Kudatirta (Lengis), a member of Dipanagara’s entourage in Bagelèn, for Colonel J.B. Cleerens (Menorèh), 25-2-1830. 
15 Pengalasan reported that Dipanagara had not attacked Yogya in 1825 ‘out of self interest’ but for the ‘welfare of Java’ and because the sultan (Hamengkubuwana V) was not able to act as protector of the Islamic religion, dK 49, Colonel J.B. Cleerens (Gunungpersada) to H.M. de Kock (Magelang), 25-12-1825. On Dipanagara’s views of the Surakarta court, see note 3.
would never be killed or taken prisoner as a result of his supporters' actions. His people would never betray him. Instead, the only way he would be brought to submission would be by outright military defeat or capture.\(^{16}\)

We will see shortly how much of Munadi's assessment was close to the mark, although his refusal to give credence to the prince's desire to be recognised as a 'regulator of religion' in Java overlooked a central plank in Dipanagara's war effort. It was this issue above all else which would make it impossible for the Dutch to offer him terms and agree a negotiated peace at Magelang in March 1830. Munadi also missed something else, the possibility that Dipanagara might have had a hidden strategy designed to exhaust the Dutch treasury by prolonging the war for another one or two years. As the son of the deceased Pangéran Blitar (Appendix VIII) put it when Cleerens assured him that the Dutch would fight for as long as it took to bring Dipanagara to submission,

Yes, that is what you say colonel, but people outside believe differently. Dipanagara says that the government cannot sustain its present-day expenditure and if he can remain hidden for one or two more years the government will not be able to pay its troops.\(^ {17}\)

If this was indeed Dipanagara's strategy, it seemed to be working. For three whole weeks following the prince's narrow escape from Major Michiels' mobile column in Gowong on 11 November (p. 652), there was no firm news of his whereabouts. Then came a partial breakthrough. Ali Basah Kerta Pengalasan, the battle-scarred opium addict,\(^ {18}\) who had led the defence of Plered (Chapter XI) and taken a key part in the battle of Gawok before becoming one of Dipanagara's most prominent commanders in Bagelèn, had surrendered on the very day of Dipanagara's near capture by Major Michiels' mobile column (Carey 1974b:281). He had been brought to Cleerens' headquarters at Kedhung Kebo (post-1830, Purwareja) and been treated more as a personal friend than a captive.\(^ {19}\) Keen to ingratiate himself with the Dutch high command and secure himself a post and salary similar to that achieved by Senthot, of whom he was intensely jealous, he promised to open peace negotiations with Dipanagara. In particular, he undertook to write to Dipanagara's


\(^{17}\) dK 49, Colonel J.B. Cleerens (Gunungpersada) to H.M. de Kock (Magelang), 22-12-1829, reporting Blitar's son as saying in broken Malay: Ya itu Kolonel punya perbilang tetapi orang dari luar perchaya lain. Dipo Negoro bilang Kumpeni tiada bisa talan kluar begitu banyak wang seperti sekarang dan kapan dia tinggal sembuni satu dengan dua tahn Kompeni tiada bisa bayar dia punya serdadu.

\(^{18}\) Pengalasan's partiality to opium is mentioned in dK 49, Colonel J.B. Cleerens (Kedhung Kebo) to H.M. de Kock (Magelang), 22-12-1829, stating that after Pengalasan's surrender on 13-11-1829, he, together with the three tumenggung and eleven officers (panji, ngabèhi, rangga) who came over with him, 'took a good piece of opium' provided by Cleerens from the Dutch military stores.

\(^{19}\) dK 49, Colonel J.B. Cleerens (Bubutan) to H.M. de Kock (Magelang), 26-9-1829, referring to Pengalasan as 'a well-known name for us' and asking De Kock to treat him leniently and with respect, especially in view of his wife's connections with the Yogya court (she was apparently a daughter of Pangéran Blitar I).
**XII Enduring the unendurable**

*patih*, Radèn Adipati Abdullah Danureja, who was then at Kecawang\(^{20}\) in the Karanganyar district of western Bagelen along with a number of Dipanagara’s close family and supporters (Carey 1974b:281-2). This he could do with ease given his fluency with the pen.\(^{21}\)

Pengalasan’s letter had the desired effect. On 2 December, his messengers arrived back in Cleerens’ bivouac at Gunungpersada, reporting that they had been well received by Danureja at Kecawang. The prince’s *patih* along with two of the prince’s sons, Pangéran Dipanagara II\(^{22}\) and Pangéran Dipakusuma (Appendix IV), a younger brother, Pangéran Adisurya (Appendix VIII),\(^{23}\) the two Danurejan siblings, Mertanagara and Gandakusuma, and various tumenggung, including Dipanagara’s brother-in-law, Radèn Tumenggung Dipawiyana, who would share his exile in Manado, had talked through the night about the implications of Pengalasan’s missive.\(^{24}\) The desire for peace was palpable and emotions were running high: the envoys reported how the younger Pangéran Dipanagara had wept as he asked for news of his wife and child whom he had not seen for many months.\(^{25}\) Danureja now asked for a fourteen-day ceasefire, but this was refused by De Kock. There would be no ceasefire until Dipanagara, whose whereabouts were still unclear, wrote in person stating that he was prepared to negotiate.\(^{26}\) To ease the proceedings Pengalasan asked for good Dutch import paper,\(^{27}\) ink and pens, and suggested that white bread, refined white sugar and tea be sent as presents to Danureja, another reflection of the Europeanised tastes of the early nineteenth-century *kraton* elite.\(^{28}\) He then sprang a surprise. Instead of a letter direct from the Java War leader, Pengalasan attempted to ventriloquise for him by drafting a text which purported to reflect ‘His Highness the Sultan of Java’s’ conditions for a peace settlement (Carey 1974b:285-8).

Unlike Hasan Munadi, Pengalasan gave due prominence to the prince’s wish ‘to restore the high state of the Islamic religion throughout the whole

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\(^{20}\) Kecawang is a village just to the southwest of Kajoran in the Karanggayam sub-district of Karanganyar Residency in present-day south Banyumas, see Schoel 1931:139, sub: ‘Kajoran’.

\(^{21}\) Cleerens reported that Pengalasan ‘writes much for a Javanese and expresses himself well or so I hear’, Carey 1974b:282.

\(^{22}\) He would soon afterwards (12-12-1829) leave to join Imam Musbah in Ledhok, see Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:526.

\(^{23}\) Adisurya would die soon afterwards (circa 8-12-1829) on Mount Sirmabaya, see Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:516-7.

\(^{24}\) dK 49, Colonel J.B. Cleerens (Gunungpersada) to H.M. de Kock (Magelang), 2-12-1829.

\(^{25}\) dK 49, Colonel J.B. Cleerens (Gunungpersada) to H.M. de Kock (Magelang), 2-12-1829.

\(^{26}\) dK 49, Colonel J.B. Cleerens (Gunungpersada) to H.M. de Kock (Magelang), 3-12-1829, 5-12-1829; H.M. de Kock (Magelang) to Colonel J.B. Cleerens (Gunungpersada), 4-12-1829. De Kock had tasked Hasan Munadi with taking his letter to Dipanagara.

\(^{27}\) Blauw & Bril, see Carey 1974b:285.

\(^{28}\) dK 49, Colonel J.B. Cleerens (Gunungpersada) to H.M. de Kock (Magelang), 3-12-1829; dK 210, Radèn Adipati Abdullah Danureja (Winong/Kebumen) to Ali Basah Kerta Pengalasan (Gunungpersada), n.y. (? mid-December 1829), acknowledging the gift of tea, sugar and white bread. On the spread of Europeanised tastes in food at the south-central Javanese courts, see Chapter V note 65.
of Java’, stating that ‘my own guess, Sir, is that if the Sultan of Java does not succeed in his determination to raise up [the Islamic] religion […] he would rather depart this earth.’ The Dutch, meanwhile, were offered four choices: first, if they wished to remain in Java as soldiers in the pay of the Javanese, they would be allowed to keep their ranks and stipends provided they became ‘the sword of religion’, a reference to the VOC period when Dutch troops had been used against seditious movements such as the Kajoran faction. Second, if they ‘felt at home in Java’ and were willing to stay in a private capacity and trade, they would be allowed to do so only if they agreed to remain in a specially designated area on the north coast. Third, if they wished to return home to the Netherlands, ‘we will continue to be forever as brothers with each other’. But then came the sting. If the Dutch wanted any Javanese produce they would have to pay the right price for it and if they wanted ‘to cultivate ricefields in Java’ – namely lease land – they would have to rent it for the right rent. Finally, if the Dutch ‘entered the True Faith’ and became Muslims then their livelihood and positions would be improved.

Pengalasan indicated that Dipanagara would take lands for his upkeep from both Yogyakarta and Surakarta, and spoke of the relationship of his kraton with the Dutch, envisaging a return to an idealised pre-Daendels’ past: the prince and the Netherlands Indies government would be as ‘good friends, neighbours, and brothers, just like children who have not been on speaking terms but now talk to each other again. They should not order each other, neither should they be ordered by each other’. Finally, he gave some impression of what Dipanagara’s role as ‘regulator of religion’ might entail taking the example of the Rèma district where the prince was now ensconced. If the local ruler or district head was prepared to perform the obligatory prayers and ordered his followers to pray, then he could remain in authority without let or hindrance. But, in the event that he was not willing to perform the obligatory prayers then he would be changed, and if this could not be done peacefully he would be attacked (Carey 1974b:287-8).

Pengalasan’s letter was so detailed and seemed to reflect so accurately the prince’s thoughts that the Dutch began to suspect that he was the man whom Dipanagara had chosen to open negotiations with them. Cleerens in particular was in no doubt about this:

I cannot believe Pengalasan himself could have written so stupid a letter. I think it must be the work of Dipanagara who earlier had been on a sort of pilgrimage and filled his head with such fancies29 […] I think more and more that Pengalasan is the man that Dipanagara has sent to negotiate with us.30

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29 dK 49, Colonel J.B. Cleerens (Gunungpersada) to H.M. de Kock (Magelang), 14-12-1829. The Dutch had great difficulty translating Pengalasan’s letter into Dutch and even the élève voor de Javaansche taal, C.L. van den Berg, who was serving at that time in Magelang, was not able to decipher his colloquial Javanese. See further Chapter III note 79.

30 dK 49, Colonel J.B. Cleerens (Panjer) to H.M. de Kock (Magelang), 16-1-1830.
In fact, the colonel was mistaken. Although Pengalasan was favoured by the prince and appeared to exercise a certain influence over him at the February 1830 meetings in Rèmakamal and Kecawang, and during Dipanagara’s fortnight stay in Menorèh,31 he was not his chosen emissary. What he managed to do in his letter was to relay with skill many of the key issues which Dipanagara would later raise in Magelang. Reflecting the general ignorance about the Islamic world amongst Europeans in Java at this time, however, Cleerens, read too much into the text, purporting to see the long hand of the Ottoman Empire behind the Ali Basah’s epistolary initiative: Rèma was not the eponymous district between Bagelén and Banyumas, he told De Kock, but Turkey (‘Rum’) and ‘the Great Turk [Ottoman Sultan]’ would protect the prince. So exercised was the Flemish officer about this supposed Ottoman link that he went out of his way to relay to Pengalasan the news from the Russo-Turkish War,32 which ended with the fall of fortress town of Adrianople (Edirne) to the Russians on 30 July 1829.33

After Cleerens had moved to Panjer in Kebumen district on 4 January 1830 in order to be closer at hand in the event that direct talks could be opened through Pengalasan and the prince’s patih with Dipanagara, another bogeyman came out of the good colonel’s closet: England. A rumour was now spreading in Bagelén, Cleerens said, that the English would return to Java to help Dipanagara become the raja agama (regulator of religion).34 This same fear of perfidious Albion and its long-term designs in the archipelago, as we will see shortly, would drive the Dutch to transfer Dipanagara from his all too exposed Minahasan (North Sulawesi) exile to the greater safety of Makassar in July 1833.

As Cleerens moved ever closer to the longed for breakthrough with Dipanagara, what was the Dutch negotiating position? Just what were they

31 dK 210, Colonel J.B. Cleerens (Panjer) to Colonel F.D. Cochius (Magelang), 9-2-1830; Colonel J.B. Cleerens (Menorèh) to Colonel F.D. Cochius (Magelang), 26-2-1830, refer to the ‘great favour’ which Pengalasan enjoyed with Dipanagara and his influence over the prince.

32 This news was carried in the Javasche Courant of 7-1-1830, citing the article ‘Oorlog in Turkije’ (War in Turkey) from the Journal d’Anvers of 23-8-1829.

33 On 21 December 1829, when news came through that the Russian army was only seven days march from the Adriapole, he confided to De Kock, ‘I hope the Muslims take a knock and the Russians remain as rulers in Constantinople. Then we could say to our friends: the Turks have been defeated in battle by the Russians’ (Ik hoop de Musulmanes klop blyve krygen en dat de Russen in Constantinople zullen blijven regeeren dan zoude wij aan ons vrienden kunnen zeggen, orang Rum soeda kala prang sama orang Rus), dK 49, Colonel J.B. Cleerens (Gunungpersada) to H.M. de Kock (Magelang), 21-12-1829, See further Colonel J.B. Cleerens (Banaran/Panjer) to H.M. de Kock (Magelang), 3-1-1830, thanking De Kock for sending him a copy of the Javasche Courant of 3-1-1830 which carried news from the Adrianople front and which he had translated for Pengalasan because he had become curious when he heard the title ‘Pasha’ with reference to Hasan Ali Pasha, the Ottoman governor of Smyrna (Izmir), who had been sent to Adrianople to defend the fortress city; Carey 1979:217 note 93.

34 dK 49, Colonel J.B. Cleerens (Panjer) to H.M. de Kock (Magelang), 12-1-1830.
prepared to offer him now that the war was ending in their favour? The answer would not be long in coming. On 29 December, De Kock had given Cleerens full powers to negotiate with Dipanagara through his *patih*, but had ordered him to make sure that the area where the prince was hiding out should be surrounded in the event that negotiations failed.\(^3^5\) Danureja apparently got wind of this because he asked for the Dutch *bènthèng* commanders not to come too close to the Menorèh mountain region between eastern Bagelèn and southwestern Kedhu where he said Dipanagara had now moved – false information as it turned out. There was even talk of exchanging hostages.\(^3^6\) On 26 December, Pengalasan wrote to reassure Danureja that no harm would come to Dipanagara once negotiations were opened.\(^3^7\) But he had no right to give such an assurance.

Shortly after Pengalasan’s letter was sent, on 4 January 1830, His Dutch Majesty’s sailing ship *Rupel* slipped into Batavia harbour.\(^3^8\) On board was the new governor-general, Johannes van den Bosch, carrying instructions from King William I himself. ‘The absolute will of the king’, De Kock reported soon afterwards to his deputy, Colonel Cochius, ‘is that there should be no further negotiations, only an unconditional surrender will be permitted.’\(^3^9\) Indeed, a bare two days after his arrival, Van den Bosch, as we have seen (page 584), was hurrying to underscore his monarch’s instructions by urging De Kock to capture or kill Dipanagara:

> Do not enter into any agreement with him […] only on the understanding of life imprisonment can his surrender or capture be sanctioned. No other understanding whatsoever [can be permitted].\(^4^0\)

While some Dutch officials were prepared to try and arrange Dipanagara’s assassination (page 595), De Kock was not one of them. A humane man, who had himself experienced the bitterness of defeat and wartime detention in

\(^3^5\) dk 210, H.M. de Kock (Magelang) to Colonel J.B. Cleerens (Gunungpersada), 29-12-1829.

\(^3^6\) dk 210, Colonel J.B. Cleerens (Binong; ? Binangun) to Radèn Adipati Abdullah Danureja (Winong/Kebumèn), 7-12-1829; Radèn Adipati Abdullah Danureja (Winong/Kebumèn) to Colonel J.B. Cleerens (Binong; ? Binangun), 7-12-1829. Cleerens had asked that Dipanagara’s eldest son (Dipanagara II), his younger brother, Pangéran Adisurya, and Ali Basah Mertanagara should be sent as emissaries of high rank to arrange the ceasefire. Danureja suggested instead an exchange of a high-ranking Dutch officer for a Javanese of similar status, presumably one of Dipanagara’s *basah*.

\(^3^7\) dk 210, Ali Basah Kertapengalasan (Gunungpersada) to Radèn Adipati Abdullah Danureja (Winong/Kebumèn), 27 Jumadilakir AJ 1757 (AD 26-12-1829).

\(^3^8\) Prins 2002:203, states that Van den Bosch arrived ‘in Java’ on 2-1-1830, whereas Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:529, give 4-1-1830 as the date that Z.M. *Rupel* docked in Batavia. The discrepancy in dates may refer to Van den Bosch’s initial landing at Mérak in the Sunda Straits and his eventual arrival in Batavia.

\(^3^9\) H.M. de Kock (Magelang) to Colonel F.D. Cochius (commanding the army in the field), 11-1-1830, quoted in Kielstra 1896b:299.

\(^4^0\) dk 23, Johannes van den Bosch (Batavia) to H.M. de Kock (Magelang), 6-1-1830.
England (1811-1813) after Java had fallen to the British in September 1811 (p. 287), he had a certain sympathy for the Javanese. Writing to a friend in June 1831 after he had returned to Holland and been given command of the Dutch army in Zeeland during the Belgian Revolt, he confided that he thought the Belgians ‘infinitely worse’ (oneindig slechter) than the Javanese, although he acknowledged that the southern Netherlands had not always been properly treated by his countrymen. Following his meeting with Dipanagara at Magelang, he would form a rather favourable view of the prince as would many members of his staff. Van den Bosch’s hard line filled him with foreboding. How could he possibly accomplish Dipanagara’s surrender if no negotiations were allowed?

On 29 January, after handing over temporary command of the Dutch forces in the field to Cochius, De Kock hurried to Batavia to reason with the new governor-general (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:531; Kielstra 1896a:90). By 8 February, he was writing to his deputy, ‘General Van den Bosch is no longer so completely set against negotiations, he only says that in Europe people are very much against [such a course of action]’ (Kielstra 1896a:90). Two days later the commander-in-chief reported that he was preparing to return to Magelang, ‘perhaps I can be useful there: although affairs are in just as good hands with you [Cochius] as with myself, perhaps Dipanagara will agree to negotiate with no one else [but myself]’ (Kielstra 1896a:90). The following day, with Van den Bosch’s blessing, he sent Dipanagara another letter assuring him that if he did agree to a meeting ‘he would be well received’, a condition which Senthot had indicated Dipanagara would insist on given his touchiness about the way he had been treated previously by Europeans (Kielstra 1896a:90; pp. 550-2). Eventually, on 25 February, after De Kock had received reports that Dipanagara had placed himself in Cleerens’ hands, he boarded the same ship which had brought Van den Bosch to Java and sailed for Semarang.

41 UBL, BPL 1346 ‘J.B. de Salis brieven’, H.M. de Kock (Dutch Army HQ Zeeland) to J.B. de Salis (Utrecht), 22-6-1831. On De Kock’s Zeeland command (1831-36), see Genealogie De Kock 1996-7:419.

42 In the words of Van den Bosch, ‘our officers who have associated much with him [in Magelang] over the past few days speak with praise about his intelligence and frank character, and General de Kock completely shares that opinion’, Van den Bosch (Batavia/Bogor) to King William I (The Hague), 14-3-1830, quoted in Van den Kemp 1896a:416. See further Carey 1981a:lxix note 194. On Major de Stuers’ view that during the war Dipanagara had shown ‘a superiority of character little found amongst present-day Javanese, princes’ (une superiorité de caractère peu commune aux princes javanais de nos jours), see Kielstra 1896a:92, quoting De Stuers 1833.

43 A highly experienced engineer officer, Cochius was not deemed to have any political savoir-faire in ‘native affairs’ (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:510), unlike Cleerens and the mobile column commander in Kedhu, Lieutenant-Colonel Louis du Perron, who was specifically requested by Cleerens to come down to Kedhung Kebo as his temporary replacement in late December 1829, when he moved to Kebumèn to open negotiations with Dipanagara, due to his ‘iron patience with the Javanese’, dK 49, Colonel J.B. Cleerens (Gunungpersada) to H.M. de Kock (Magelang), 22-12-1829.
De Kock was right about Dipanagara. The prince’s patih had told Cleerens, following his surrender on 16 January, that the Java War leader would refuse to speak to any other Dutch officer but the commander-in-chief in person and that he was aggrieved that since Kyai Maja’s capture in mid-November 1828, he had received no letters from De Kock. He also requested to be addressed by his title of sultan. De Kock’s flexibility over negotiations (he would refuse to use the sultan’s title) was not, however, backed up by Van den Bosch. After Dipanagara had arrived in Magelang on 8 March, he would write to De Kock:

Despite his capabilities [...] [Dipanagara] nevertheless remains a criminal who inspires contempt [...] To show favour to such a man would certainly be regarded in a later period as unpardonable weakness [...] People would never consider such favours as reflecting any feelings for his character and bravery. How would it appear if we should show favour to a man who has been so far beaten that he was reduced to wandering in the forests with only two followers?

The most he was prepared to consider was a temporary exile for the prince in Bandung or some other place in the Priangan area of west Java, with a vague promise that he might be allowed to return to the princely states when the political situation had calmed down sufficiently. He might even be allowed to undertake the haj (pilgrimage to Mecca). ‘But in any event’, Van den Bosch observed, ‘once he has come to Magelang, he should not be allowed to slip through our fingers.’ We will see shortly, how, as soon as Dipanagara had been captured, the new governor-general would forget entirely about his earlier more lenient considerations.

Far away in western Bagelen, Cleerens had the tricky task of convincing the prince’s intermediaries that it was in their sovereign’s best interests to meet De Kock and open peace talks. If persuading him to meet with the Dutch commander-in-chief was not such a problem, what would be the bait which would make the subsequent negotiations of value for the prince? In his babad, Dipanagara devotes nearly four cantos, or almost a tenth of his entire chronicle, to the process of the peace negotiations. These describe developments from the receipt of the first letters from Cleerens and De Kock, which Raden Adipati Abdullah Danureja had been asked – but failed – to pass on to him.
on 7 December 1829, to the end of the account of his capture in Magelang on 28 March 1830. The tone of the first part of the babad describing these peace contacts is one of extreme caution. At first, Dipanagara refused even to receive the initial letters until persuaded by the arguments of one of his religious advisers, Kyai Melangi (Appendix VIIIb), who pointed out that in the time of The Prophet, if a letter arrived it would be studied to ascertain whether its contents were good or bad, and then replied to accordingly. Dipanagara, who seemed to place more trust in his santri advisers than his patih, was suitably impressed by the kyai's knowledge of the traditions of The Prophet. Immediately, he was ordered to go down to Kecawang to bring Danureja and the letters back to his mountain headquarters in Rèma. But, no sooner had Melangi arrived at Danureja's former base in mid-January 1830, than he fell sick. The patih, who had tried to hide himself with five followers in a hut deep in the adjacent wilderness of the Rawa Tambakbayya (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:524), decided at this moment to surrender to Cleerens at Panjer. So precious weeks were lost until in early February Dipanagara – who described himself as feeling that it was as though it was God's Will that he should experience suffering and shame in this world – relates how he was convinced by his santri advisers that he should open direct talks with Cleerens, 'a man whose heart could be trusted' in the words of his babad. The prince had also heard separately from Senthot, who had written to him through the intermediary of Danureja, inviting him to make peace with De Kock. His pengulu, Kyai Pekih Ibrahim, and long-time friend, Haji Badarudin, were thereupon delegated to go to the bènthèng at Kemit in the Gombong district of Karanganyar, where Cleerens

49 BD (Manado) IV:251-399, XXXIX.108-XLIII.118, covers the whole process of the negotiations up to Dipanagara's capture in Magelang and his departure for Semarang on 28-3-1830.
51 BD (Manado), IV:261, XXXIX.173-4, describing Dipanagara's delight at Kyai Melangi's explanation, he asked him why he had not told him this tradition before, to which the kyai replied that he was too afraid of Kyai Maja and his supposedly superior knowledge of the Qur'ān and Hadith to do so.
52 Dipanagara appears to have been at Sampang just to the west of Gunung Kebo in western Bagelèn (present-day south Banyumas), see Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:Map. This is where he rode out from on 16-2-1830 for his meeting with Colonel Cleerens at Rêmakamal, BD (Manado), IV:285, XL.87.
53 BD (Manado), IV:261-2, XXXIX.176-179; dK 49, Colonel J.B. Cleerens (Panjer) to H.M. de Kock (Magelang), 16-1-1830, 17-1-1830, reporting Danureja's submission and his subsequent departure under escort to meet De Kock in Magelang and brief him on Dipanagara's situation.
54 BD (Manado), IV:267, XXXIX (Pucung) 212. pan mengkana osiking tyas kang simunhi/ baya karsaning Hyang/ insun kion anglakoni/ lar wirang apan goin ingsun ngèn donya.
55 BD (Manado) IV:280, XL (Megatruh) 61. marma kang tyas pan langkung pitajengipun/ nulya sang nata nuruti.
56 DK 127, Dipanagara (Sampang) to Colonel J.B. Cleerens (Kemit), 17 Syaban, AH 1245 (AD 14-2-1830).
The power of prophecy

had now moved, to make the appropriate arrangements. The Flemish officer was to be invited to meet with him at Rémakamal on the upper reaches of the Cingcingguling River some sixteen kilometres due north of the Dutch bènthèng at Rëma Jatinegara on Tuesday, 16 February.57

According to Cleerens, the prince asked for presents. These included enough black cloth for some 400 mounted troops, half of whom would come with him as his bodyguard from Rémakamal,58 f 200 in cash to pay for them, one gold state umbrella (payung) to mark his royal status and two pairs of scissors, presumably to cut his own and his troops’ hair.59 As Dipanagara journeyed towards Magelang in late February and early March, these requests would grow exponentially: by the time he reached Menorèh, Pengalasan was reporting that the prince required an advance of f 10,000 to cover his troops’ stipends with a further f 200 being needed just to provide him with a new wardrobe. Additional quantities of black cloth were also needed to outfit another 400 men, a case perhaps of creative financing on the part of Dipanagara’s army commanders.60 Cleerens for his part also made a request of the prince: that he put his demands for the proposed meeting in the form of a letter so that he could show De Kock in Batavia that Dipanagara was serious about peace negotiations.61

When this epistle eventually arrived, it caused consternation. The prince had placed his pégon seal in the middle of his text, and was deemed to have used inappropriately coarse Javanese. This seemed to the authorities in Yogya, where the letter was sent for analysis, to be the type of Low Javanese (ngoko) language which was usually employed by the sultan to junior officials in the kraton. As for the placement of the seal, this indicated, according to J.F. Walraven van Nes, the acting Resident of Yogyakarta (in office 1827-1830), that Dipanagara ‘stood in the centre of Java, and with his arms [outstretched], as it were, wished to draw everything to him and take it under his protection’.62 In his babad, Dipanagara gave a very different explanation, stating that

57 BD (Manado) IV:267-70, XXXIX.213-36. Both Rémakamal and Rëma Jatinegara are in present-day southern Banyumas, an area which at this time was within the old borders of Bagelèn.
58 Dipanagara was accompanied by some 200 mounted troops – mainly armed with pikes – when he came down to Rémakamal from Sampang on 16-2-1830, and he was expecting a further 200 to join him there and accompany him to Kecawang and Kalireja. In fact, by the time he reached Menorèh on 21-2-1830, his armed entourage had grown to at least 700, and this had increased still further to over 800 when he entered Magelang on 8-3-1830, see note 80.
59 dK 210, Colonel J.B. Cleerens (Kemit) to Colonel F.D. Cochius (Magelang), 9-2-1830.
60 dK 209, Colonel J.B. Cleerens (Menorèh) to Colonel F.D. Cochius (Magelang), 26-2-1830, 27-2-1830, reporting that Pengalasan had asked for satu laksa rupiah (10,000 rupiah), of which f 1,000 should be made available immediately. Cleerens gave him the f 200 to purchase clothes for Dipanagara, but told him that the prince would have to speak with him in person about the larger amount, which did not happen before Dipanagara reached Magelang.
61 dK 210, Colonel J.B. Cleerens (Kemit) to Colonel F.D. Cochius (Magelang), 9-2-1830.
62 dK 208, J.F. Walraven van Nes (Yogyakarta) to Colonel F.D. Cochius (Magelang), 18-2-1830. Van Nes had shown the letter to the Yogya patih, Danureja IV, and Major Tumenggung Wiranagara – now styled Pangéran Prabuningrat – who both said that they had seen nothing like it.
he had told Cleerens at the Rèmakamal meeting that he had placed his seal as Sultan Ngabdulkamid in the centre of the letter because that was the position of The Prophet’s city, Mecca, which in the view of all devout Muslims was considered as standing in the very centre of the world. ‘You may not wish to pay your respects to The Prophet, who is most excellent’, he reported he had told Cleerens, ‘but it is my duty because in truth I am a believer in the religion of The Prophet’. As for the tone of the letter and the language used, Dipanagara was giving instructions to Cleerens and his deputy commander in the Bagelèn-Banyumas region, Major H.F. Buschkens. In particular, he was asking them to prepare pesanggrahan (temporary bamboo pavilions) for his reception and that of his army commanders at Rèmakamal, Kecawang and Kalireja in the Pagebangan sub-district of Karanganyar, where Dipanagara expected De Kock to come to meet him. If questioned about this, his reply would undoubtedly have been that it was appropriate as a ruler that he should use such Low Javanese language to his subordinates.


64 BD (Manado), IV:281-2, XL. 65-9. Dipanagara’s original letter in pégon script is in dK 208. It reads as follows: ingkang serat Ingkang Sinuhun Kanjeng Sultan tumekaa marang sira Kornèl Kalèrés apadéné marang sira Mayor Bekes ing sawuwé tabéningsun marang sira karo-karoné marmané isun aputusan bocahinsun si Pengulu Peqih Ibrahim karo si Dolah Haji Badaruddin apadéné si Dolah Melangi sabab isun mirsa khabar yèn bocahisun si Perwiradirja avèh layang marang bocahisun si Adipati Danureja layang bakal katur isun yèn isun diaturi pedhama karo Jènderal anadéné khabaré yèn isun bijen mengko yèn diaturi pedhama isun iya andhangani anadéné khabaré yèn isun wis andhangani ya ing pedhama iku mau bocahisun si Perwiradirja bakal mungsal marènè sèba marang isun khang sarta Kornèl Nahus apadéné Kornèl Kawakis mulènè isun utusan marang sira sabab penggalhisun isun ora bédà ya karo Kornèl Nahus apadéné Kornèl Kawakis sabab déni si Pengadalan ora bédà karo si Perwiradirja anajing ingkang dadi kersaningsun isun mundhut pesanggerahan si Romakamal lan si Kejawang karo si Kornèl Kalèrés Mayor Bekes padha methuka marang isun ana ing Romakamal yèn isun wis ketemu karo sira laju isun mesanggerahan ana ing Kejawang pamahisun persaka lan sira sabab isun mirsa khabar yèn jènderal saiki ora ana dadi isun angantèni saktekaning jènderal yèn upama jènderal wis teka sun perih jènderal kirima layang marang isun, isun mundhut pesanggerahan ana Kalireja ing korong muja isun ketemu laj Jènderal. Kaserat ing dinten Jun’ah wulan Sya’ban tanggal kaping pitugas ing taun jinawai hijratannabi s.m. min Makati li’l-Madînatî’syusyarifah 1 2 4 5. ‘This letter of His Highness the Sultan [is] to you Colonel Cleerens and moreover to you Major Buschkens. After his greetings to you both, the reason I sent as messengers my followers Pengulu Pekih Ibrahim together with Haji Dullah Badarudin and also Dullah Melangi is because I heard the news that my follower [Ali Basah Senthot] Prawiradirja had given a letter to my follower Adipati [Abdullah] Danureja, a letter which was to be given to me and in which I was asked [to make] peace with the general [De Kock]. Just as in former times, when I was asked to make peace, I was in agreement, so also now there is the news that I had agreed to the aforementioned peace. [I request] that my follower Prawiradirja will come here to have an audience with me together with Colonel Nahuys and Colonel Cochius. That is why I sent messengers to you because in my opinion you are no different from Colonel Nahuys and Colonel Cochius, just as [Ali Basah Kerta] Pengalasan is no different from Prawiradirja. But my wish is to ask you for pesanggrahan [temporary bamboo audience halls] at Rèmakamal and at Kecawang, and [I request] Colonel Cleerens and Major Buschkens to await me at Rèmakamal.
Plate 69. Letter of Pangéran Dipanagara to Colonel (later Major-General) Cleerens (1785-1850) and Major (later Major-General) Hendrik Frederik Buschkens (1795-1860), dated 17 Shaban, AH 1245 (14 February 1830; Islamic calendar from the date of the flight of The Prophet AD 622 from Mecca to Medina) in pégon (unvocalised Arabic) script dealing with the negotiations for a meeting at Rêmakamal in north-eastern Bagêlên to discuss peace terms. Dipanagara’s seal which bears the royal title which he assumed at Selarong on 1 Sura, ÀJ 1753 (15 August 1825; Javanese year – lunar era inaugurated by Sultan Agung [reigned 1613-1646] in 1633), is placed in the middle of the letter and reads as follows: ‘Ingkang Jumeneng Kangjeng Sultan Ngabdul Chamid Herucakra Kabirul Mu’minin Sayidin Pantagama [...] Rasullah s.a.w. ing Tanah Jawi’.
The Rèmakamal meeting itself seems to have passed off well despite Cleerens’ late arrival. Dipanagara had ridden down to the meeting from his mountain headquarters at Sampang accompanied by his mounted bodyguard with his heirloom kris, Kyai Ageng Bandayuda, being carried before him to ward off danger. When the colonel eventually arrived, he had shown the prince all due respect, dismounting from his horse some way from the meeting pavilion and walking the last distance with his cavalry kepi off even though it was a very hot day. His adjutant, Second Lieutenant Carl Philip Conrad Steinmetz, followed at a short distance together with the prince’s patih and his former Bagelèn commander, Pengalasan. Pleasantries and jokes were exchanged, including some light-hearted banter about the number of guns which should be fired to salute the prince as he passed by the various Dutch bènthèng on his journey to Kecawang and Kalireja. After refusing both the cannon salutes and the three horses offered him by Cleerens and Buschkens, Dipanagara asked to leave for Kecawang accompanied by Steinmetz and four Dutch hussars. The meeting had lasted just two hours. Cleerens, meanwhile, returned to Kemit to make further preparations for the prince’s journey onwards to Kedhu taking care to avoid the crossing of rivers like the Bagawanta and the Elo in southern Kedhu, which Dipanagara insisted no prince of Mataram blood could pass over. Cleerens’ own report is missing but his superior, Cochius, described the encounter as ‘polite and familiar’ despite the fact that no major undertakings were given by Dipanagara or conditions agreed on (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:554, 721).

With De Kock still absent in Batavia, Dipanagara initially intended to await his return in western Bagelèn, but Cleerens persuaded him to journey on
with him to Menorèh and sit out the general’s return there. He arrived on 21 February, his entourage having nearly doubled to 700 en route, the local population of this part of southern Kedhu showing him particular respect. According to Dutch reports, many local people in the mountain settlement were amazed at the speed with which the prince had come over, some doubting the testimony of their eyes that this was indeed the legendary Java War leader in their midst (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:723). Everywhere he went, food and fruit were brought for him, some even being sent up to him from Bagelèn during his stay by provincial chiefs who had never taken his side in the war (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:554-5, 723). He apparently got on very well with the Dutch officers and mobile column commanders whom he was introduced to during his journey, but was adamant that he would not meet with any of the Javanese officials who were in the employ of the government or of the south-central Javanese courts (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:554).

The prince would spend just over a fortnight at Menorèh before setting off for Magelang on 8 March. During this time, he allowed himself to be treated by a Dutch military doctor for his malarial fever and commenced preparations for the start of the fasting month which began on 25 February (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:723). The prince’s experience of western medicine did nothing to alter his views about the superiority of traditional Javanese herbal remedies (p. 117). Despite his robust constitution – a constitution ‘made of iron’ in De Kock’s words (p. 116) – it was clear that he was suffering from the privations of his long months in the forests of western Bagelèn. Cleerens reported that ‘more than anyone else, [he] needs rest, his whole body is tired out’.70 His physical condition may have been one of the reasons for his willingness to enter into negotiations with the Dutch at this time.

Dipanagara’s period at Menorèh is well documented in Cleerens’ dispatches and it was here that an issue came up which would have long-term consequences for both the prince and his Flemish host. This concerned the undertaking which he thought Cleerens had given him with regard to his forthcoming negotiations with De Kock; namely, that if they proved not to his liking he would be allowed to return unmolested to Bagelèn to continue his struggle (Appendix XIII note 7). He specifically requested his pengulu, Kyai Pekih Ibrahim, to ask the colonel for such an undertaking (Carey 1982:19), and after his capture in Magelang, he discussed the issue at length with one of his two Dutch officer escorts, Captain Johan Jacob Roeps, telling him that he had been under the impression that if he could not come to an agreement with the general on this occasion, that people should have ‘let him return without hindrance to the mountains’ (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:741). We will see shortly how even De Kock would describe in his official report of his 28 March  

70 Kielstra 1896b:299, quoting Colonel J.B. Cleerens (Kecawang) to Colonel F.D. Cochius (Magelang), 18-2-1830.
1830 meeting with the prince, which resulted in his capture, how the prince had complained bitterly about the way he was being treated. Indeed, the prince never forgot this betrayal. Five years after the war, when Cleerens had returned to Java loaded with honours as a titular major-general, Dipanagara wrote secretly to him from Makassar reminding him of his previous ‘statements’. This communication would prove fateful for both men. It immediately led to much tighter restrictions on the prince’s freedom of movement in Fort Rotterdam in Makassar, and may have contributed to the Flemish officer’s sudden relief from his position as military commander of Sumatra’s West Coast.71

While there is nothing in the colonel’s letters to suggest that he made any promises of this nature, he certainly went out of his way to reassure the prince, who was exactly his age, stating that he held himself personally responsible for his interests (Appendix XIII note 7) and repeating De Kock’s promises that no harm would ever be done to him.72 He also treated him with respect, addressing him as ‘sultan’ and speaking to him directly in Malay. Privately, however, he took a critical view of the Java War leader describing him as ‘either a very stupid or a very dissembling person’ and belittling his understanding of Islam – ‘he prays a lot and speaks constantly about the law of Muhammad but he knows little of The Faith’ – stating that he badly needed the presence of the Surat-born Sayyid Hasan as his religious adviser at the forthcoming Magelang meeting with De Kock.73 In this context, Cleerens was very critical of the ‘young men’ who seemed to make up the inner circle of the prince’s entourage. He feared they were misleading him due to their lack of knowledge and self-interest, and tried in vain to encourage the prince’s patih to take a more proactive role.74 He also noticed how one of the santri advisers in Dipanagara’s entourage, Haji Ngisa, seemed to be acting the role of court jester.75

71 Appendix XIII. The abrupt end to Colonel Cleerens’ career as military commandant of Sumatra’s west coast on 31-5-1837 is mentioned in Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:326 note 1. It occurred shortly after the government decided to impose more stringent restrictions on Dipanagara’s freedom of movement in Makassar. Cleerens had only just turned 52, and was well short of the usual military retirement age (55) for general officers. He was also only accorded a colonel’s pension not that of a major-general to which he was entitled by virtue of his 1835 promotion. Administrative incompetence rather than suspicion of his dealings with Dipanagara, however, appears to have been the main cause of Cleerens’ ouster since he went on to make a career for himself as Resident of Preanger (1844-1846) and governor of Maluku (1846-1850), postings which were dogged by his lack of administrative capacity, Van ’t Veer 1979:199. See further note 191.
72 dK 209, Colonel J.B. Cleerens (Menorèh) to Colonel F.D. Cochius (Magelang), 26-2-1830.
73 dK 209, Colonel J.B. Cleerens (Menorèh) to Colonel F.D. Cochius (Magelang), 26-2-1830. On Sayyid Hasan, see Chapter X note 18.
74 dK 209, Colonel J.B. Cleerens (Menorèh) to Colonel F.D. Cochius (Magelang), 26-2-1830. Cleerens specifically mentioned the ‘clique’ around Basah Gandakusuma (born 1810), which included his elder brother, Mertanagara (born circa 1808), and Pangéran Dipanagara II (born circa 1803).
75 On Haji Ngisa’s role as the ‘clown’ (hansworst) in Dipanagara’s entourage at Menorèh, see dK 209, Colonel J.B. Cleerens (Menorèh) to Colonel F.D. Cochius (Magelang), 26-2-1830. On his links with Kyai Maja’s family’s pradikan village of Pulo Kadang, see Appendix VIIb.
on the look out for evidence of the prince’s ‘treachery’, such as his supposed failure to keep a promise not to increase his armed following by accepting new recruits from Bagelen, Gowong and Mataram, the colonel pressed Cochius to send him a few hundred more cavalry and infantry so that he could be certain that the prince would not be able to escape either from Menoreh or during his forthcoming journey to Magelang. On the evening before Dipanagara’s departure, Cleerens signalled a change in attitude towards him by dropping his royal style as ‘His Highness Sultan Ngabdulkamid’ and addressing him for the first time by his old princely title of Pangéran Dipanagara, something which De Kock would also do when the prince eventually arrived in Magelang (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:564).

Treachery or honourable submission? Dipanagara’s arrest at Magelang, 28 March 1830

As soon as De Kock returned to Magelang from Batavia at the beginning of March, he ordered Cleerens to bring Dipanagara and his entourage up to his Kedhu headquarters to meet him. Although the prince agreed to leave immediately, no sooner had he begun his journey than he asked to return to Menoreh. There was no point in going to Magelang, he told Cleerens, because all he could do would be to pay De Kock a polite visit. No serious discussions could take place during the fasting month. All negotiations would have to wait until it was over on 27 March. The Flemish officer should have known this because once the fast had begun on 25 February Dipanagara had gone into daily retreat in Menoreh and had refused all Cleerens’ entreaties that he compose a letter to De Kock stipulating his negotiating demands. Eventually a compromise was reached; Dipanagara would go to meet De Kock but only for a courtesy visit. He would then observe the fast with his entourage in a specially prepared encampment at Magelang in an area by the Praga River just to the northwest of the Residency House known locally as Metésih. Only when the fast was ended would proper talks begin.

76 dK 209, Colonel J.B. Cleerens (Menoreh) to Colonel F.D. Cochius (Magelang), 28-2-1830.
77 dK 209, Colonel J.B. Cleerens (Menoreh) to Colonel F.D. Cochius (Magelang), 27-2-1830.
78 dK 209, Colonel J.B. Cleerens (Menoreh) to Colonel F.D. Cochius (Magelang), 25-2-1830. Cleerens had tried to persuade him by telling him that in the opinion of some ulama ‘good things’ could be done during the fasting month, and that it was also possible to transact business at night after the fast had been broken, but Dipanagara had still refused. He had also pointed out that since De Kock had put nothing in writing about the nature of the negotiations, there was nothing for him to reply to.
79 This encampment was reconnoitred during a special advance visit by Cleerens, Pengalasan and Haji Ngisa to Magelang, with the cooperation of the Resident of Kedhu, F.G. Valck, Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:562.
When all the preparations had been completed on 7 March, De Kock sent word to Cleerens. The following day at around noon Dipanagara with his young army commanders and an entourage which had now swollen to around 800—far greater than the modest fifty-strong mounted escort which Cleerens had originally envisaged would accompany him from Menorèh—entered the town. Many of these were former prajurit (soldiers) and members of the prince’s erstwhile bodyguard regiments who had joined him during his journey through Bagelèn and southern Kedhu. Armed mostly with pikes, they were now accoutred in black turbans and tabards made out of the cloth provided by Cleerens during the prince’s progress from Rémakamal to Menorèh. There were fears on the Dutch side that with so many Javanese troops in the heart of the garrison town and more expected when Pangéran Dipanagara II and Imam Musbah arrived from their base on Mount Sundoro in northern Kedhu, they might have a fight on their hands should the Java War leader have to be seized manu militari. As a precaution, advance units of two of the Dutch mobile columns, which had been operational in Bagelèn and Kulon Praga, were brought to Magelang earlier on the morning of 8 March to supplement the forces already present at Dutch military headquarters. ’Dipanagara still possesses much support, everywhere people show him respect’, an anxious Van den Bosch reported to the minister of the Colonies in The Hague, and the prince himself mentioned the steady stream of Yogya officials, court artisans, grooms, goldsmiths and others who made their way to Magelang, along with former soldiers from Pajang, Kedhu and Bagelèn, to

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80 Some impression of the number of armed followers Dipanagara had with him at this time can be seen from the list of weapons which Major Michiels collected during the disarming of Dipanagara’s prajurit at Metésih following his arrest. These included 832 pikes, 87 rifles (presumably infantry flintlocks) and a huge number of kris which were later returned to their original owners after Dipanagara’s departure from Magelang, Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:598.
81 dK 209, Colonel J.B. Cleerens (Menorèh) to Colonel F.D. Cochius (Magelang), 27-2-1830. Cleerens advised that Senthot should not be permitted to bring too many of his troops to Magelang in the event that he was brought up from Yogya to attend the meeting presumably because he feared they might join with Dipanagara’s forces against the Dutch should it come to an armed showdown. In the end, Senthot did not attend the Magelang meeting. According to Dipanagara, Pangéran Dipanagara II, brought 50 soldiers with him from northern Kedhu, BD (Manado), IV:368, XLII.181.
82 dK 209, Colonel J.B. Cleerens (Menorèh) to Colonel F.D. Cochius (Magelang), 26-2-1830. These were the infantry of Cleerens’ 7th mobile column commanded by Captain Lambertus Gennet, and the jager (riflemen) of Captain B.G. Rinia van Nauta’s 6th mobile column commanded by Lieutenant F.C. Gilly de Montela, see Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:562, 644. Other troops, which were already in the town, included Major Michiels’ 11th mobile column from Wanasaba, units of Lieutenant-Colonel Louis du Perron’s 16th, 17th and 18th Kedhu garrison companies (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:758), and about 200 cavalry from the 7th Hussar regiment under command of Major Johan Jacob Perié.
83 NA, GKA, 30-7-1830 no. 32k geheim, Johannes van den Bosch (Bogor) to Minister of the Colonies (The Hague), 14-3-1830.
offer him their services. The town was overflowing with people, according to Dipanagara, and five buffaloes had to be slaughtered every day to feed them. So great were the corvée demands for the construction of temporary bamboo shelters that many Magelang inhabitants decided to move away temporarily to escape the burdensome labour services.

De Kock’s detailed report of the events concerning Dipanagara during his stay at Magelang, up to and including what the general discretely termed the prince’s ‘coming over’ (overkomst) – namely his capture on 28 March – is a major source for this three-week period. It can usefully be set besides Dipanagara’s own babad account, which naturally gives a very different perspective on these same events. What is especially interesting about De Kock’s account is its element of self-reflection. Albeit written from the perspective of a senior Dutch military officer and former lieutenant-governor-general of the Netherlands-Indies, De Kock was clearly troubled by the manner of the Java War leader’s arrest. This can be seen in the juxtaposition of his description of the prince’s formal reception on 8 March and what he wrote shortly afterwards about the propriety of his own behaviour towards Dipanagara. Thus he relates that he received the prince, his commanders and religious advisers with due honour in a formal meeting attended by his entire staff and senior Dutch officials in the Residency House. All local Javanese officials and princes of the blood from the courts, who were at Magelang at the time, had been excluded out of respect for the prince’s wishes. De Kock welcomed him as ‘Pangéran Dipanagara’ and let him sit directly to his left, his entourage being placed on a row of chairs ranged further along on both sides of the general. The meeting was short. The commander-in-chief opened by saying that out of respect for ‘different ways of thinking and the stipulations of other religious persuasions’, the prince would be left in peace during the fasting month, but he hoped that after it was over, matters between the two of them would be speedily settled. Now that they had been enemies for five years, he trusted that their friendship would endure much longer, the Netherlands Indies government being ‘just and mild’. Dipanagara then stayed for a few minutes, speaking, according to De Kock, in a friendly way with the assembled Dutch officers and civilian officials before being escorted by the Resident of Kedhu, Valck, to his prepared encampment at Metésih. De Stuers would later capture this event in a deftly executed sketch showing a sombre prince riding up to the large bamboo and palm-leaf roofed pesanggrahan surrounded by his pikemen (De Stuers 1833: Plate 12).

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85 BD (Manado), IV:353-4, XLII.68-72.
86 BD (Manado), IV:354, XLII (Gurisa) 73-4. Maglang kathah ngili samya/ pan langkung awrating karya / pan iya sadina-dina. 74. karya pasanggrahan ikai/ pan kebak-kebak kéwala/ langkung kathah segah ikai moesa gangsal sadina.
Plate 71 (above) The ‘old’ Residency House (Karesidenan Lama) at Magelang where Dipanagara was taken prisoner by the Dutch on 28 March 1830. The door leading to the room where he conducted his ‘negotiations’ with the Dutch commander, Lieutenant-General Hendrik Merkus de Kock (1779-1845) is on the extreme right of the picture underneath the *pendhapa*.

(left) The study where General De Kock held his talk with Dipanagara just before his arrest, now a local museum. Photographs taken by Peter Carey, February 1972.
Soon afterwards, De Kock confided his doubts about the propriety of his behaviour towards the prince in his Magelang diary (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:566-7):

Already, according to some people, I should have placed Dipanagara under immediate arrest because he is a rebel who has waged an insurrection against his ward and legal sovereign [Sultan Hamengkubuwana V] and against the Netherlands-Indies government. As a subject of one of the Javanese rulers, he really had no right to any special consideration. At the same time, had he perceived, after being in Magelang for some time, that his wishes would not be met, it was not inconceivable that he would have silently departed and recommenced hostilities.

I realised that such a way of acting on my part was ignoble and dishonest [onedel en oneerlijk] since Dipanagara had come to Magelang in good faith to meet me. Furthermore, he himself could have harboured no hostile designs because he had not the slightest idea how he would find everything in Magelang, and for anyone with even the slightest knowledge of the Javanese, the high degree of trust evinced by Dipanagara was striking.
[But] if I had placed Dipanagara under immediate arrest, although the war would have been brought to an end more speedily, such conduct would in general have created an unfavourable impression: [...] the princes and Javanese chiefs, who had one by one submitted to the Netherlands Indies government, would have been brought into uncertainty [thinking perhaps] that after the chief rebel had been captured by guile, some of them would be forced to share his fate.

Although it was already clear that Dipanagara was governed by his own pride and self-interest, because his following was already double that stipulated at Rèmakamal and there was little hope that he would come forward with moderate proposals, I had the intention of acting openly and honourably and winning his trust in all ways possible. So that if need be I could act forcibly at the end of the fasting month. [In this way] both Europeans and Javanese would be convinced that Dipanagara had only his own rash behaviour to blame for forcing me to take such drastic measures.

I also wanted to get the submission at Magelang of Imam Musbah and Pangéran Dipanagara the Younger [who were] still at large in the Karangkobar area before proceeding against the latter’s father. This I succeeded in doing.

De Kock’s behaviour towards Dipanagara was thus governed principally by political considerations, namely, to ensure the full submission of Dipanagara’s principal army commanders before he moved against the prince himself, to lull the latter into a false sense of security and to make his arrest appear not as a treacherous act but as a direct outcome of his own intransigent behaviour. It was neither open nor honourable to proceed in this fashion, but in De Kock’s view the end justified the means. In a private communication with Van den Bosch after his 8 March meeting with Dipanagara, he told the governor-general that in his view the prince’s arrival in Magelang constituted a de facto submission (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:569). De Kock’s gestures of friendliness and consideration towards Dipanagara, however, continued. Immediately after the prince’s arrival he made him a special present of a fine grey horse and provided £10,000 in two instalments for the upkeep of his followers during the fasting month. He also allowed members of his family, who were being detained in Yogya and Semarang, to join him in Magelang.88 Meanwhile, senior members of De Kock’s staff, such as his adjutant and son-in-law, Major F.V.H.A. de Stuers, and the Resident of Kedhu, were frequent visitors to Dipanagara’s

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88 Dipanagara mentions in his babad that his mother, his third eldest son, Pangéran Adipati Anom (later Pangéran Dipaningrat), and his two young daughters, Radèn Ayu Basah (also known as Radèn Ayu Gusti) and Radèn Ajeng Munthèng (he meant Randèn Ajeng Impun), came up to join him, BD (Manado), IV:351, XLI.51-3. His two youngest sons, Radèn Mas Jonèd (born circa 1815) and Radèn Mas Raib (born circa 1816; Appendix IV), were also with him at Metésih, Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:591, as was his eldest son, Pangéran Dipanagara II, who had come to Magelang with Ali Basah Imam Musbah from northern Kedhu. It is not certain exactly which family members were brought from Semarang, but they may have included Pangéran Adipati Anom and his second eldest son, Pangéran Dipakusuma, who had submitted to Colonel Tumeng-gung Wiranagara on 8-1-1830, Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:319-20, 744; Sagimun 1965:303. There is internal evidence from Dipanagara’s letter to his mother written from Batavia before he left for Manado on 3-5-1830 that she was with him in Magelang, see Appendix XIII.
encampment at Metésih enquiring solicitously about his needs (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:572). The Resident, however, appears to have riled the prince by what he later referred to as his ‘stupid and piffling questions’ (p. 109). In particular, he took umbrage at Valck’s insistence that those flocking to join him were tax dodgers and corvée labour evaders rather than bona fide soldiers.\textsuperscript{89} The Resident also appears to have created difficulties with the small gifts of palm sugar and sugar cane which the local inhabitants brought, the prince having to point out to him that although he had no particular love for sweets, it was a Javanese custom to bring presents and he had to accept them as tokens of their respect for him as the ‘leader of Java’ (\textit{lajering Jawa}).\textsuperscript{90}

De Kock appears to have met Dipanagara on three separate occasions during this period, twice for pre-dawn walks in the Resident’s garden and once when he came in person to his encampment before the start of the daily fast (Carey 1982:9 note 36). According to Dipanagara’s testimony, these meetings took place in a pleasant and unrestrained atmosphere, the two men exchanging jokes\textsuperscript{91} and finding mutual pleasure in each other’s company. The fact that both were still mourning the death of their wives, to whom they had been especially devoted and who had died within months of each other in 1828, appears to have made them feel particularly close.\textsuperscript{92}

While this rapport was being established, De Kock was coming to the realisation that Dipanagara would never surrender himself unconditionally to the government. A spy, Tumenggung Mangunkusuma, whom the Resident of Kedhu had placed in the prince’s entourage, reported that the prince was steadfast in his intention of obtaining recognition as sultan over the southern part of Java. Other senior officials stressed that Dipanagara wanted nothing less than the position as ‘royal maintainer and regulator of religion in Java’ (\textit{ratu paneteg panatagama wonten ing Tanah Jawa sedaya}), or ‘head of the Islamic religion’ (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:573, 585; Carey 1982:10). Realising

\textsuperscript{89} BD (Manado), IV:359, XLII (Gurisa) 112-3. \textit{pan tiyang Kedhu punika}. 113. \textit{kathah kang lumbet ika/ prajuriit dhateng paduka/ dados kethèr damel kula/ kelawan supraosnya.}

\textsuperscript{90} BD (Manado), IV:361, XLII (Gurisa) 128-31. \textit{keh Residièn wruhaniria/ prakara wong padha prapta. 129. kang wèwèh mring ingsun padha/ aja dadi atiniria/ pan wus adaté wong Jawa/ lamun iku ngrungu warta. 130. ingsun parek pan padha prapta/ anggawa dwèkèria/ tan ètung tebu lan gula/ dènpenging mongsa kenaha. 131. jer iku wèi padha ngrasal/ yèn lajering Jawa ika.}

\textsuperscript{91} These jokes were occasioned by the fact that neither Dipanagara nor De Kock were accompanied on these pre-dawn walks by their adjutants or senior officials – Basah Mertanagara in the case of Dipanagara, and Major De Stuers and Resident Valck in the case of De Kock – their absence giving rise to ribaldry by the two men about De Stuers’ need for a lot of sleep, and Ali Basah Mertanagara and Valck’s relationship with their wives and partners, Valck being reluctant to leave his Javanese mistress too early in the mornings for fear of being chided, BD (Manado) IV:375-7, XLII.237-54. See further Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:576; p. 440 (on Valck’s Javanese mistresses).

\textsuperscript{92} BD (Manado), IV:377, XLII (Gurisa) 255. \textit{déné sadaya punika/ samya muki sukwawirya/ kawula lawan paduka/ dadya jodo samya priya}. Dipanagara’s wife, Radèn Ayu Maduretna (Ratu Kedhaton), had died on 28-2-1828 (Appendix IV), and De Kock’s partner, Luise Fredericke Wilhelmine Gertrud Baroness von Bilfinger (born Berlin 1788), had died in Magelang on 28-11-1828, see Genealogie De Kock 1996:7.
Plate 73. Sketch of Dipanagara and his armed followers (pikemen; *prajurit*) entering the prepared (Karesidhenan Lama) at Magelang, on 8 March 1830 before the ‘peace’ negotiations with the Dutch and lithographer, Wilhelms van Groenewoud (1803-1842), based on a sketch made by the Dutch 1833: Atlas, Plate 12. Photograph by courtesy of the KITLV, Leiden.
encampment at Metésih, a settlement near the Praga River just below the ‘old’ Residency House which ultimately led to his arrest on 28 March 1830. Uncoloured litograph by the Dutch painter officer, Major (later Major-General) F.V.H.A. Ridder De Stuers (1792-1881). Print from De Stuers
that such demands could not even begin to be met by the government without compromising the position of the existing south-central Javanese rulers, De Kock took the decision to act decisively after the end of the fasting month.

On 25 March, two days before the fast officially ended, he gave secret orders to two of his senior infantry commanders, Lieutenant-Colonel Louis du Perron and Major A.V. Michiels, who had sizeable troop contingents in Magelang (note 83), instructing them that when Dipanagara came to him to discuss his peace terms, all the necessary military preparations should have been put in place to secure his arrest. Thus the troops were to remain in full uniform with equipment at the ready in their barracks and cavalry mounts saddled up, so that at the first word of command all military personnel could immediately assemble under arms. On the day that Dipanagara was expected – 28 March 1830 – the usual guard at the Residency House was to be doubled, a move which was not expected to arouse suspicion because it was a Sunday when a larger than usual number of soldiers in full dress uniforms always gathered for the Sunday parade. On De Kock’s instructions a detachment of hussars was to be immediately dispatched to Bedono on the Kedhu-Semarang border to take over as an escort for the last stage of the prince’s journey to Semarang. All other Dutch officers without special commands were to gather at the Residency House to keep an eye on the chiefs whom Dipanagara would bring with him to his conference and who would be waiting outside in the long front gallery. Meanwhile, the carriage of the Resident of Kedhu was to be held in readiness to take Dipanagara immediately away from Magelang. The senior infantry officers were enjoined to go about their task with the greatest possible composure and to see that no one was harmed unnecessarily. Any resistance, however, was to be met by overwhelming force (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:589; Carey 1982:10 note 39). In this fashion everything was held in readiness to secure Dipanagara’s capture, disarm his 800 armed followers, and head off any last-minute opposition.

Was it possible that Dipanagara, as he suggested in his babad, was totally oblivious to these preparations? Did his sudden arrest during a courtesy visit to De Kock to mark the end of the fasting month really take him so completely by surprise? Gandakusuma, his young Rèma-based commander, who had followed him to Magelang, would later remark that this was very far from being the case. In his heart of hearts, Dipanagara always knew that he would be arrested Gandakusuma asserted. Decades afterwards in the late 1870s when the now grey-haired former ali basah was coming to the end of a distinguished career as patih of Yogyakarta (Appendix Va), he was engaged in conversation by the then Dutch Resident of Yogyakarta, A.J.B. Wattendorff (in office 1873-1878). The following is the Dutch historian E.B. Kielstra’s report of this exchange (Kielstra 1896a:85-6; Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:573-4):
During a conversation with the *patih* [Gandakusuma] about the events and conditions of past times, Mr Wattendorff expressed the opinion that the capture of Dipanagara could not be reconciled with the highest standards of justice. The *patih* showed himself to be considerably surprised.

‘But Dipanagara already knew beforehand that it would turn out thus!’

According to the *patih*, Dipanagara’s pride prevented him from taking any other solution. He always put forward his demands to be recognised as sultan and head of the Islamic religion in Java, knowing full well that General De Kock would never permit them. He was *malu* [ashamed and embarrassed] to drop them, but he saw no ignominy in submitting to superior force. In this way his prestige in the eyes of the people would remain undiminished.

Mr Wattendorff is convinced that the *patih* was quite sincere in his observations. Already nearly half a century had elapsed and what had happened in 1830 and in previous years had become pure history. The man who had followed his father-in-law during the whole rebellion, could have had no cause to do any violence to the truth and the way he related the event bore the stamp of authenticity.

Gandakusuma undoubtedly had his own reasons for stressing the inevitability of Dipanagara’s arrest by the Dutch. By the time Wattendorff met him, he had been a senior official of the Yogyakarta sultanate for over forty years and his position as *patih* entailed special responsibilities to the Dutch (p. 168). He was thus unlikely to have wanted to cause them undue offence by dwelling on the darker aspects of their rule in Indonesia. But there is much more than mere diplomatic deception in his explanation of the way in which Dipanagara succumbed to his fate.

In the prince’s own *babad*, there are many indications that although De Kock’s volte-face took him by surprise and pained him deeply as a betrayal of personal trust and friendship, the arrest itself was not totally unexpected. In the view of Muslims, there is no dishonour in submitting to superior force and the way in which Dipanagara described the event and its antecedents indicates that he had long since given himself up to his destiny. The key phrase with which he introduced the sombre Maskumambang metre of the last canto of his autobiography relating his capture and exile – ‘we talk of the sultan [how] on the morning [of 28 March 1830] he was like gold being carried along by water’ – exactly indicates his state of mind at the time. This was later confirmed by De Stuers, who wrote after his voyage to Batavia with the prince (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:746):

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93 Gandakusuma was not in fact Dipanagara’s son-in-law although the prince had strongly urged that he should marry his widowed daughter, Radèn Ayu Jayakusuma, after the end of the Java War, see Appendix XIII. Wattendorff may have confused Gandakusuma with his elder brother, Mertanagara, who at various stages had been married to no less than two of Dipanagara’s daughters, see Appendix IV note 5.

94 BD (Manado), IV:382, XLII.290. The key phrase is *lir mas kèntir toya*. See further Carey 1982:12.
If a trait in Dipanagara struck Captain Roeps and myself in particular, then it was his unchanging indifference, resignedness or submission – I do not quite know how to describe this feeling as it manifested itself in Dipanagara – concerning the dispositions which would be pronounced regarding his future life in exile and which he had requested he might speedily hear.

The prince thus felt himself swept along by forces outside his control, an impression further strengthened by a brief conversation between himself and Gandakusuma on the very morning of his arrest. The latter had come to the prince after the morning prayers in his small chapel to suggest that all his armed followers should accompany him to the Residency House. According to Dipanagara’s own testimony, he realised that such was not God’s Will. Smilingly, he rebuked Gandakusuma, stating that such a move would cause unpleasant surprise and that everything should happen ‘as normal’. Hearing this, Gandakusuma wanted to remonstrate but kept silent out of fear despite his heart’s deep forebodings. If such an incident did indeed occur – and in fact we know from other sources that Dipanagara actually brought around one hundred armed men with him to the Residency House (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:590) – then it is likely to have reinforced any feelings that Gandakusuma might have already had regarding Dipanagara’s premonition of what was in store for him.

Meanwhile, the prince described in his autobiography how he departed for the Residency House at around eight o’clock on the morning of 28 March ‘suspecting nothing’. He mentioned that he had not even bothered to wear his official clothes, but was dressed informally as though for a pleasure trip. It was the same with his close entourage, none of whom carried any insignia of office. Amongst these latter were his three sons – Pangéran Dipanagara II, Radèn Mas Jonèd and Radèn Mas Raib – four of his principal army commanders – Gandakusuma, Mertanagara, Suryawinata and Imam Musbah – two of his closest religious advisers – Haji Ngisa and Haji Badarudin – and his two faithful panakawan (intimate retainers), Banthèngwarèng and Jayasurata (‘Rata’). On his arrival at the Residency House, he was greeted by Valck and shown into De Kock’s study. His three sons, religious advisers, two panakawan, along with Ali Basah Mertanagara, accompanied him. The others sat on stools just outside the room where Dipanagara could see them. On the Dutch side,

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95 BD (Manado), IV:382-3, XLIII.1-5. See further Carey 1982:12.
97 BD (Manado), IV:383, XLIII.6. Radèn Saleh’s famous painting of Dipanagara’s capture (1857) depicts him dressed in a green turban, long white jubah (tabard) worn over pantaloons, long-sleeved jacket, broad gold cloth belt with a string of prayer beads (tasbèh) attached and shawl flung over his shoulders. A contemporary Indonesian source (Van den Broek 1873-77, 24-99) confirms that the prince wore very similar attire during his original journey to Magelang on 8 March but with the addition of a white gauze veil to hide his face from the prying eyes of the multitude who gathered to see him pass.
98 BD (Manado), IV:383-4, XLIII.7-12.
Lieutenant-Colonel W.A. Roest, one of De Kock’s staff officers, Major-Adjutant De Stuers and the military interpreter for Javanese, Captain J.J. Roeps, sat with the prince’s immediate entourage inside the study. The other Dutch officers present, amongst them Lieutenant-Colonel A. de Kock van Leeuwen, the field artillery commander, and Major Johan Jacob Perié, who was in charge of the cavalry detachment, remained outside in the inner gallery on De Kock’s instructions to keep an eye on Dipanagara’s followers and engage them in ‘friendly conversation’ (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:590-1). By this time, the officer in command of the troops at the Residency House, Lieutenant-Colonel Du Perron, had already departed to put De Kock’s orders for the day into effect. The number of men fully equipped and armed in the vicinity of the Residency House apparently aroused no suspicions amongst Dipanagara’s party. None considered that anything untoward was afoot (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:590). Indeed, Dipanagara remarked that everyone in his group felt fully at ease because De Kock behaved no differently than before. 99

The conversation, as reported in the prince’s babad, opened with De Kock remarking that Dipanagara should not return to Metésih but should remain in the Residency House with him, to which the prince replied:

> Why should I not be allowed to return [general]? What should I do here? I have only come for a short time to pay you a friendly visit such as is the Javanese custom after the fasting month. At this time, those who are younger go to the homes of those who are older to nullify all the faults which have been committed [during the previous year]. In this case you, general, are the older party and the same situation holds. 100

At this De Kock replied: ‘the reason I [want to] detain [you] is that I wish to clear up all the matters between us this very day’. 101

With the conversation now taking an unexpected turn, Dipanagara remarked with great surprise: ‘What matters, general? Indeed, I have neither matters on my mind nor do I harbour any [in need of discussion between us]’.

Valck then explained that for as long as Dipanagara had been at Magelang, the general and his officers had thought of nothing else by the issues to be settled between the prince and the Dutch. To which Dipanagara’s commander, Mertanagara, immediately interjected that political affairs (prakawis) were far from the prince’s heart and that another day should be set to discuss them. ‘No!’ answered De Kock, ‘that cannot be allowed. Whether he wants it or not I wish to finish everything now!’ 102

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101 BD (Manado), IV:385, XLIII.20-1.
102 BD (Manado), IV:385-6, XLIII.22-7.
De Kock’s own testimony in his diary – though less dramatically phrased – accords well with Dipanagara’s autobiography on most points (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:14):

I told him that I was responsible to the governor-general [Van den Bosch] and that I would be blamed if I did not make a speedy end to all outstanding matters because the costs of the war were rising and the time for repatriating the Dutch troops and Indonesian auxiliaries had almost passed. Again Dipanagara answered me that he could not discuss any matters with me today because he was not prepared for it. He asked me [to allow him] to return home so that he could think things over [and] would tell me later when he wished to come to speak with me. I told him a second time that matters must be ended now [and] that he had had enough time to think everything over during the fasting month. Whereupon Dipanagara observed that during that time he had not thought at all about political matters. I replied that I had thought about little else and that the welfare of my troops and that of the Javanese people had caused me to be continually mindful about ways in which the war could be brought to a [speedy] end. Since God had now given me the opportunity, I should make use of it [and] that I would not be put off by any further delays or promises. But in the name of the governor-general I now ordered Dipanagara to tell me what his intention had been when he requested to meet me, what he had to say to me and in what way he desired that the war should be brought completely and utterly to a close.

When this was translated for Dipanagara,103 De Kock reported how the prince complained bitterly about the way he was being treated, saying that he had come to Magelang of his own free will and that, according to the undertaking of Colonel Cleerens, he should be at complete liberty to depart if he could not come to a satisfactory agreement. Similar reactions are described – albeit more forcefully – in Dipanagara’s *babad*:

The sultan [Dipanagara], when he heard the words of the general, remembered the order of The Almighty regarding the ruler of Java [Ratu Tanah Jawa] and his double role as a soldier. Then he recalled his enemy. The sultan’s courage was thus aroused and he said: ‘What is this now? Are people looking for a quarrel without there being any reason for it? If you are seeking to dispense justice, I am not as...

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103 On the translation arrangements during the Magelang meeting, see Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:599 note 1, quoting De Kock, ‘Verslag’, 1-4-1830: ‘The Resident [Valck] was of considerable help to me since he speaks the Malay language very well; he translated into Malay what I said in Dutch, while Haji Ngisa translated this further into Javanese for Dipanagara. Since Haji Ngisa, who was apparently afraid, did not translate everything correctly, Captain Roeps offered me admirable assistance.’ On Dipanagara’s knowledge of Malay, see dK 209, Colonel J.B. Cleerens (Menorèh) to Colonel F.D. Cochius (Magelang), 25-2-1830 (‘I spoke to the chief rebel [Dipanagara] in Malay […] [his patih] Danureja translating although I had every reason to believe that he understood what I said’); NA, GKA, 20-9-1830 no. 58k geheim, Major F.V.H.A. de Stuers (Semarang) to Johannes van den Bosch (Batavia/Bogor), 31-3-1830, ‘Dipanagara always says that he understands no Malay, but he was forced to put aside his pretence due to the circumstances [he now finds himself in] and he often speaks Malay with me even though he finds it unpleasant’. See further p. 107; Carey 1982:14 note 53.
king for your judgement! If you, General De Kock, indeed feel compelled to invite a quarrel, summon Colonel Cleerens and Ali Basah [Pengalasan] here first. Once they have arrived, I will investigate the matter for I did not come here with the intention of seeking a quarrel [or] asking for judgement. Now you are concluding in your own fashion! [In fact], the two [Cleerens and Pengalasan] said you wanted to make peace as well as negotiate. I asked what was meant by “peace” and they answered, “sound discussions and deliberations”. Likewise, earlier you sent someone to give me a horse, “as a sign of your friendship” [sobat] in Mang[un]-kusuma’s words. When I asked him the meaning of the word “friendship”, he said, “returning to friendly association [pisanakan] again, [and] wiping out all faults [which have been committed]. When Muslims come together [all is forgotten], [and] the only discussions are on fitting things which give satisfaction to all. Since you have already given me a mark [of your friendship], sooner I do not reciprocate [this present]. But notwithstanding all that, in truth I am not looking for a quarrel. Therefore bring the [ali] basah and the colonel here!’ General De Kock bowed his head [and] replied: ‘If, Tuwan [Sir], you are asking that these two come [here], it is now too late.104 If you had asked for it earlier, I would certainly have brought them both here.’ The sultan said: ‘Heh, general! You are a thoroughly evil man! Why do you say now that there is so much hurry [when] earlier during the fast you gave no indication that you had such thoughts? If I had known [beforehand] that your heart was not clean, I would certainly have insisted that the two should not be allowed to return [to Bagelen] for they are the ones who hold [the key to] the issue. It was for this reason that I totally trusted you, General De Kock, when you ordered them to return for I thought there were no longer any issues [between us], only harmonious discussions [which could be completed] at our pleasure. But now it is clear that your heart is evil. When I arrived here earlier, you welcomed me by my old name which I no longer use. For, in truth, I have already bestowed it on my [eldest] son. So, in fact, general, your evil behaviour [rusuhira] is plainly evident, [for how] can a father and a son both have the same name?’ General De Kock answered with his head still bowed: ‘Yes, but was not your name, Tuwan, in former times actually Pangérán Dipanagara? And moreover, the reason I am enquiring about your wishes, Tuwan, is that [formerly] you gave an undertaking. If you have no issues to discuss, who then has been the leader in the war which has been waged for so long in Java? I am therefore asking what your wishes are now?’105

This whole conversation is omitted in De Kock’s report. He merely noted that after Dipanagara’s complaints about the way he was being treated, ‘much conversation occurred between Dipanagara and the people with him. But when he saw that I could not be moved to change my previous decision [insisting on immediate negotiations], the big words came out: Dipanagara said that he wanted nothing else than to be the head of the Islamic religion in Java and to retain his title of sultan. He left all the other arrangements entirely up to the discretion of the government’ (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909,

104 Colonel Cleerens and Ali Basah Pengalasan had returned to Cleerens’ military headquarters at Kedhung Kebo in Bagelen immediately after escorting Dipanagara to Magelang on 8-3-1830.
V:595). Immediately on hearing this, De Kock told his staff officer Lieutenant-Colonel Roest to go outside and order Lieutenant-Colonel Du Perron to march his troops out of the Magelang barracks and bring them to the Residency House, while the Residency guard was to come into the front gallery where Dipanagara’s other followers were seated (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:597). The prince’s arrest was just minutes away.

Dipanagara also referred to De Kock’s orders to the awaiting Dutch troops, but before doing so he reported a much more extensive and emotional conversation between himself and the Dutch commander-in-chief:

‘You ask who is the chief man [panggedhe] of the war in Java. He is none other than I, General De Kock! Muslims do not leave their own kind. If people engage in war there must be an opposing party. People do not quarrel with their own friends. It is you, general, who out of your own wishes, want to dispense justice. [But] who has ever heard of such a case in which one of the quarrelling parties acts as magistrate [jeksa]? If such is the situation, it only occurs because of your wickedness. I am not afraid of death. In all the fighting I escaped it. [As for my followers] they merely carried out my orders during the war in Java and thus cannot be held responsible. Now indeed nothing else remains [for me] except to be killed [and] I am not intending to avoid it. But I charge you, when I am dead, to bring my body back to Jimatan [Imagiri] so that I can be together with my wife [Radèn Ayu Maduretna; Appendix IV].’ General De Kock could not raise his eyes, as though exceedingly ashamed, so he just [sat] with bowed head and said softly: ‘Indeed, Tuwan, I have no intention of killing you. But the question of the letters106 is not the same as that of religion. It would not be fitting to follow your desires here for if they were followed, the Sunan [of Surakarta] would be deeply ashamed [isin].’107

In his report, De Kock also touched on this important point and mentioned Dipanagara’s request to be killed on the spot rather than be sent away into exile:108

I told Dipanagara that his conduct up to that time had made me fear that he would come up with such rash demands [and] that he could have easily concluded that the government could not now permit what had not even been discussed in 1827

106 De Kock was referring to the fact that he had addressed Dipanagara as ‘His Highness Sultan Ngabdulkamid’ during his correspondence with the prince in 1827, as had Commissioner-General Du Bus de Gisignies in September 1827 at the time of the Salatiga negotiations, BD (Manado), IV:390-1, XLIII.55-62; Carey 1982:17. This had seemed to recognise his royal pretensions as holy war leader and regulator of religion in Java.


108 Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:597-8. See also Du Bus 433, J.F.W. van Nes (Yogyakarta) to Colonel W.A. Roest (?) (Magelang), 29-3-1830, stating that Dipanagara preferred death to imprisonment and wanted to be buried with his forefathers at Imagiri. The recipient of Van Nes’ letter is unclear. The name seems to read ‘Colonel W.G. Riesz’, but a survey of the names of all the serving officers in Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, indicate there was no person of that description in Magelang at this time. Instead, it seems that De Kock’s senior staff officer, Colonel W.A. Roest, was intended.
[at the time of the Salatiga peace negotiations]. He knew well that the government had promised and given protection to the Sunan of Surakarta and the sultan of Yogyakarta for the past five years, and that these rulers were, according to eastern custom, themselves the heads of religion in their own lands. Dipanagara then said that if what he wanted was not accorded him, the government could do with him what it chose, but that he himself was not going to give up his demands.

To which De Kock replied that in his view Dipanagara had forfeited all further trust and that he could detain him as a prisoner, and send him to Ungaran or Salatiga, leaving subsequent decisions as to his fate to the governor-general (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:597). De Kock was in fact being less than honest with the prince by stating that he would be kept at one of these two central Javanese towns to await Van den Bosch's further instructions. As we have seen, arrangements had already been made with De Kock's adjutant, De Stuers and the military interpreter, Captain Roeps, to escort Dipanagara to Semarang and then on to Batavia following his arrest. Perhaps the commander-in-chief wanted to pretend that Dipanagara would be kept initially at one of these places in order to reassure him that he would not be required to leave the Javanese heartland or *kejawèn*. If so he was being severely economical with the truth.

‘Hereupon’, noted De Kock, ‘Dipanagara protested strongly asking about what in fact the government would permit. I answered that it was at present too late to return to that again because he was now entitled to neither trust nor consideration. If he had wanted to live as a simple *pangéran* [prince] with his family and a good income in the territories of the government, or if he wanted to make the journey [haj] to Mecca, the governor-general might well have allowed him his more modest requests. But after the obstinate pride he had shown, there was nothing more to be done with him, and moreover the peace of Java and the protection which the government had promised the Javanese rulers urgently demanded that he should be removed from the princely territories.’

During the time when this conversation was taking place, Major Michiels with soldiers from his own mobile column and units of Du Perron’s Magelang garrison force were nearing the Residency House. Michiels was given orders to go straight to Dipanagara’s encampment at Metésih with some of the local Javanese chiefs to disarm the prince’s armed troop who were then on morning exercises. Thanks to the negotiating skills of Haji Ngisa,109 this occurred peacefully and once De Kock was informed, he immediately ordered the disarming of the hundred or so troops who had accompanied Dipanagara to the Residency House. Their commanders, who were sitting in the front gallery, were also required to hand over their *kris*. One of these, Imam Musbah, would, following Dipanagara’s arrest, be bound in chains and sent to prison, as would two other junior commanders whose Kedhu provenance made them liable to

109 Du Bus 433, J.F.W. van Nes (Yogyakarta) to Colonel W.A. Roest (?) (Magelang), 29-3-1830, mentions the role of ‘Senthot’s priest’ Haji Ngisa.
detention in Magelang.\textsuperscript{110} As a measure of prudence, De Kock told the prince that he must leave at once under the escort of the two designated officers, but any of his wives and children who wished to follow him had permission to do so. To which Dipanagara replied, in the general’s words, ‘very simply that he did not wish to depart and that I could have him killed on the spot for he did not want to be sent away. [Moreover,] the treatment he was receiving was wholly contrary to what had been promised him [by Cleerens].’

‘I told him’, reported De Kock, ‘that he must not forget that he had been the guardian of the young sultan of Yogyakarta, and that instead of protecting him he had betrayed and hurt his pupil, [acting entirely] contrary to the prohibitions of the \textit{Qur’an}. That notwithstanding all the misfortunes he had brought to Java and which he himself had experienced, he could not be dissuaded from his detestable plans for which reason he could count on no compassion [from me]. That [any such treatment] would betray great weakness on my part and that I had not waited so patiently until the end of the fasting month [to behave so].’

Dipanagara then asked his chiefs and children whether they would allow him to be carried off in this manner, but they all cast their eyes to the ground and did not answer. Soldiers encircled the Residency House. At this point, according to De Kock (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:598-9),

Dipanagara wanted absolutely to talk with his \textit{pengulu}, Kyai Pekih Ibrahim, who was brought into the room. ‘Did you not ask Colonel Cleerens on my behalf’, Dipanagara said, ‘that I would be free to return if I did not reach an agreement with the government?’ ‘Yes!’ answered the \textit{pengulu}. After which Dipanagara spoke again with his chiefs and took a cup of tea. When I saw it was nearly ten o’clock\textsuperscript{111} and that he must depart, I let the carriage [of the Resident] drive up and ordered Major-Adjutant De Stuers and Captain Roeps to take the prisoner on the first day to Ungaran and the following one to Semarang, and from there to depart by the first shipping opportunity to Batavia. I gave these officers a written order and it was just striking ten o’clock when the disturber of the peace of Java, stripped of all his greatness, was taken away as a prisoner. \textit{Gelukkig} [Thank goodness]! Praise be to God! All is concluded. After Dipanagara’s departure, everyone showed their unfeigned joy. A few of the men who had remained loyal to him to the last said they had feared that Dipanagara would be unlucky because his claims were too great.

Such ‘unfeigned joy’ was indeed recorded on the lips of those who had fought for the Dutch. One such was the future post-war \textit{bupati} of Purwareja (Kedhung

\textsuperscript{110} Du Bus 433, J.F.W. van Nes (Yogyakarta) to Colonel W.A. Roest (?:) (Magelang), 29-3-1830 (on Musbah’s imprisonment); Van den Broek 1873-77, 24:104, on the placing in stocks of Kertasiluman and Dullah Sumadilaga.

\textsuperscript{111} There is a discrepancy in the Dutch sources regarding the time of Dipanagara’s departure from Magelang: whereas De Kock states that it was shortly after ten o’clock, De Stuers (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:741) reported that the prince was taken away ‘at about nine o’clock’, which seems too early; Van Nes suggests that it was eleven o’clock which seems more likely, see Du Bus 433, J.F.W. van Nes (Yogyakarta) to Colonel W.A. Roest (Magelang), 29-3-1830.
Kebo) in Bagelèn, Radèn Tumenggung Cakrajaya (post-1832, Radèn Adipati Cakranegara, in office 1830-1862) whom Cleerens reported as saying: ‘This is good [news], now the war is over, well and truly over’.\textsuperscript{112} News of the event was immediately sent to the governor-general, the Residents of Java, and to some of the senior officers and officials in the princely states. A special supplement to the official government newspaper, the \textit{Javasche Courant}, published an account on 1 April and soon all the European community in Java were apprised. On the same day as the \textit{Java Gazette} announcement, De Kock wrote out his report on the proceedings for the governor-general. At the end he made three interesting observations. First, that throughout the proceedings Dipanagara had shown not the slightest fear. Second, that he, De Kock, regarded the report as a way of defending his actions against the censure of future critics who might accuse him of treachery. Third, that had Dipanagara not come to him at the Residency House, he would have sought ‘to carry him off’ (\textit{oplichten}) from his own encampment. But such a course of action, in his view, would have been fraught with difficulties and it was more than likely that the prince would have left everything and escaped (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909 note 1). The general’s tactics of feigned friendship and seeming accommodation had thus paid off. Dipanagara was arrested without bloodshed and De Kock could boast that after five years of bitter fighting he had brought the war to an end by his own diplomacy and military skill. When he arrived back in the Netherlands to a hero’s welcome in late October 1830, he would commission the most celebrated Dutch history painter of his age, Nicolaas Pieneman (1809-1860), to execute a tableau of the moment when he came out on the steps of the Residency House to point Dipanagara into the Resident’s waiting coach which would take him to Semarang and into exile.\textsuperscript{113} As Radèn Salèh’s biographer, Werner Kraus (2005:282), points out, Pieneman made Dipanagara and his retainers look duly submissive. All seemed to understand that De Kock’s stern action was for the best for the Javanese and that he had no choice but to send the prince away ‘just like a loving father sending a misguided son away to teach him a valuable lesson’. Here was no ‘monstrous colonizer’ but ‘an educated and civilized gentleman, respected leader of the freemasons in the Indies’ (Kraus 2005:282). All those depicted in the painting are relaxed – even those in tears. ‘There is no resistance, no commotion and high above the pageant flies merrily the Dutch tricolor […] Pieneman’s painting is a tribute to the glory of the Dutch. The pain

\textsuperscript{112} dK 49, Colonel J.B. Cleerens (Kedhung Kebo) to H.M. de Kock (Magelang), 30-3-1830, stating that Cakrajaya had shown himself to be ‘unusually gay’ on hearing the news of Dipanagara’s capture, exclaiming, \textit{begitu baik, sekarang prang habis, betul, sungu-sungu}. For a biography of Cakrajaya/Cakranegara, see Carey 1974b:271-8.

\textsuperscript{113} Kraus 2005:279, 282. Pieneman’s tableau entitled ‘De onderwerping van Diepo Negoro aan Luitenant-Generaal De Kock, 28 Maart 1830’ (The submission of Dipanagara to Lieutenant-General De Kock, 28 March 1830), was based on a sketch made by De Stuers. It hung in De Kock’s house in The Hague and was eventually given by his family to the Rijksmuseum in Amsterdam in 1907 some sixty-two years after De Kock’s death, see Carey 1982:1 note 2.
of the Javanese is nowhere to be seen’ (Kraus 2005:282-5).

But this is not how Dipanagara or most of his followers saw it. After De Kock had pointed out that any change in the supervision of religion in south-central Java would cause shame and embarrassment to the Sunan, the prince replied in Low Javanese to indicate his disdain for the Dutch commander-in-chief:114

‘Heh, general, I think a man with such ideas will have a lot of trouble with my religion! Moreover, general, why are you, who do not [even] follow [my] religion talking thus? In truth, I am not asking about the religion which I practise. Even if you should leave [the regulation of] your [Christian] religion in my hands, I certainly would not be willing, [for] what should I do with it? But as for Muslims who misrepresent their religion, I desire to put them in order. [Now] there’s a difficult business! They do not side with you, but it is not sure that they will side with me [either]. What should one call people who act thus, general? All the same, have them choose between my religion and yours [and see] which they choose. Only then will it be apparent what they have set their hearts on.’ The general answered: ‘That would be to my liking!’ His Highness the sultan replied: ‘If, general, this is what you are content with, I cannot go on to parley with you. And, moreover, as concerns the letters, they are pointless. For all the letters were in truth nothing but fabrications by you and [Commissioner-]General Du Bus. They [did not reflect] your true wishes. Similarly, with the language of the letters: the style used by [Commissioner-]General Du Bus and yourself [was not a reflection] of your real intentions. The only purpose of my coming here was to press you to make good what you had earlier written in those letters, [namely] your promised undertaking that I should become head of the Islamic religion in Java. Now you have broken [this promise], I stand as a witness to all your treachery. For earlier, Colonel Cleerens made me a promise that if the discussions came to nought, I would be invited to return to Kecawang.’ The general spoke thus: ‘If, Tuwan, you return war will not fail to break out again.’ His Highness the sultan replied: ‘Why are you fearful of war if you are soldiers and real men?’ General De Kock said, ‘If it is thus, as a matter of fact I cannot settle the question, because I am no longer in a position to do so.115 But at Salatiga there is someone with a further mandate. He can settle it. So you had better go to Salatiga.’116 His Highness the sultan said in a friendly voice: ‘Why should I go to Salatiga? What would I seek there, general? I have not the slightest intention of seeking justice in Salatiga! Moreover, if you, De Kock, want [to finish things] here now, I am not willing.’ General De Kock then went out and with a thunderous voice ordered all the troops to enter the Residency [compound].

114 Dipanagara’s use of coarse Low Javanese (ngoko) in his rejoinder to De Kock is mentioned in Du Bus 433, J.F.W. van Nes (Yogyakarta) to Colonel W.A. Roest (?) (Magelang), 29-3-1830. It is not evident from the language of his babad that Dipanagara had spoken to De Kock in a particularly rough form of ngoko, see Carey 1982:20-1 note 69.

115 A reference to De Kock’s subordinate position to Van den Bosch, and his relinquishment of the office of lieutenant-governor-general on 16-1-1830 when the latter took office.

116 Although Dipanagara misrepresented De Kock’s conversation at this point, it is clear that the latter was guilty of deception. Van den Bosch was not in central Java at this time, but remained throughout in Bogor, where he was suffering from an illness which prevented him from working, see below page 703.
A Dutch source related that at this point one of the prince’s followers drew his *kris* and placed himself in front of Dipanagara as though to protect him,\(^{117}\) an observation which is borne out in his *babad* where the Java War leader mentioned the behaviour of his eldest son,

Now it is related that Pangéran Dipanagara [the Younger], because he was still youthful, got up from his seat thinking of his soldiers and came close to the Resident [Valck]. Whereupon the sultan winked to Radèn Basah Mertanagara and said: ‘General, you are bringing everything into a difficult pass!’ Through the Will of the Almighty, Radèn Basah Mertanagara did not [burst into] anger. Thus the sultan smiled when he looked at the Radèn Basah, Haji Ngisa and Haji Badarudin who were [all] mindful of the Lord’s Providence and conscious of their dependants and the baseness [of which they were now the victims]. Then De Kock took His Highness by the hand and brought him to sit on the sofa. The general did likewise. Time and again, the sultan debated in his heart: ‘If I kill the general, the end will be trouble for it is beneath the dignity of a prince to fight as one who runs amok. It would bring me into disrepute. [The Dutch are perpetrating] an unheard of treachery. But despite that I have no companion [*kanthi*] [and] it is better that I give myself up to my fate. To those who remain it can be left to decide whether they wish to follow my orders in life and death as many have already done. I had better share their lot!’ The sultan then instructed that Mas Pengulu [Pekih Ibrahim] should be summoned. Once he had come […] the sultan said, ‘How comes it *pengulu* that things have turned out thus?’ Mas Pengulu replied: ‘It is best, Highness, that you just follow the instructions of your brother [De Kock].’ The sultan smiled [and] said in a companionable way: ‘Come on, Major [De Stuers] let us depart!’ The general then said: ‘Will you not [take] your sons, army commanders and soldiers?’ The sultan replied: ‘[No], De Kock, that would [only] give more trouble!’ His Highness then got into the coach, only one intimate retainer [*panakawan*] followed him, Rata by name, who bore the sultan’s betelbox. [They sat] together with Captain Roeps [and] Major de Stuers […] The sultan was greatly ashamed at heart and was prepared to die. It was on a Sunday, the second of the [Javanese] month Sawal in the [Javanese] year Jimawal [28 March 1830] that His Highness departed from the land of Java. The wish of His Highness was to go on the pilgrimage [to Mecca] because of his great shame. He was not attached to all his high dignity nor to his loved ones, to his mother [and] his children. As regards his followers, nothing remained for them but to await the sultan’s yielding to superior power and resigning himself to God’s dispensation. It was for this reason that the sultan’s heart accepted grief and affliction in this world, for it was [all] solely in redemption of His Highness’s pledge in the event that he should prove unable to reinstate [the Islamic] religion throughout Java. For this reason, acceptance of his lot was just the wish of the sultan. Ever increasing shame [in the eyes] of the Almighty was the principal reason for his heartfelt grief.\(^{118}\)

Thus Dipanagara closed his account of the dramatic and – in his view treacherous – meeting with De Kock in Magelang. It must remain an open question

\(^{117}\) Du Bus 433, J.F.W. van Nes (Yogyakarta) to Colonel W.A. Roest (?) (Magelang), 29-3-1830.

\(^{118}\) BD (Manado), IV:392-9, XLIII.73-118. See further Carey 1982:20-4.
whether from the start Dipanagara really came to Magelang under the impression that his demands to be appointed as ‘regulator of religion’ in Java would be met or whether, as Gandakusuma later averred, he came in the full knowledge that he would be taken prisoner. Such an outcome was probably what he expected despite the numerous references to Colonel Cleerens’ supposed guarantee of safe conduct. Not only would this demonstrate to his family and followers that he had been forced to bow to superior force, but it would salve his pride. It would also guarantee his place in history as we can see from looking at another artistic composition depicting the prince’s capture.

Twenty-seven years after Pieneman painted the heroic scene of the prince’s ‘submission’, another artist, Javanese this time, Radèn Salèh Syarîf Bustaman (circa 1811-1880), produced a very different tableau. Entitled in German ‘Ein historisches Tableau, die Gefangennahme des Javanischen Häuptlings Diepo Negoro’ (‘A historic tableau, the arrest of the Javanese chief Dipanagara’), which he later presented to the Dutch king, William III (reigned 1849-1890) in a curious back-handed gesture (Carey 1982:1, 1988:139 note 239), this composition has an extraordinary emotional quality. A clearly furious Dipanagara stands at the centre of the painting having just emerged onto the steps of the Residency House. Struggling to keep his feelings under control, his look is charged with a fiery determination. His left hand clenched across his waist, he stretches out his right to console a weeping Javanese woman – perhaps his wife, Radèn Ayu Retnaningsih, a piece of artistic license here\(^\text{119}\) – who is clutching distraughtly at his leg. As Kraus (2005:285-6) has vividly described, the faces of De Kock and the other Dutch officers are frozen as though staring into the middle distance. Whereas in Pieneman’s version, the prince is placed a step lower than the victorious Dutch commander-in-chief, Salèh sets Dipanagara on the same level, but to the general’s right thus placing the Dutchman on the weaker female side in the Javanese spatial order. Instead of pointing the prince out of his country, the Java War leader is being ‘invited’ by a somewhat helpless De Kock to enter the waiting coach. Most significantly, the heads of the principal Dutch officers\(^\text{120}\) are slightly out of proportion, too big for their bodies, whereas those of the grieving Javanese, who witness the arrest, are of the right size. No error this, but a message: the heads of the Dutch officers are those of raksasa (monsters). Given De Kock’s position to the left of the prince, Saleh is perhaps suggesting that the general should be seen as a female raksasa, a particularly revolting form of ogre. The major difference, Kraus argues, is in the perspective with which Pieneman and Saleh chose to depict the drama. Whereas the Dutch artist constructed his painting from the northwest, Saleh took the northeast as his point of departure. In Kraus’ (2005:286) words,

\(^{119}\) No women were in Dipanagara’s entourage at the time of his capture.

\(^{120}\) See Carey 1982:25, who identifies from the left Captain J.J Roeps, Major J.J. Perié, De Kock and Major F.V.H.A. de Stuers.
the Dutchman Pieneman introduced a sharp wind from the west – common in Holland – that gives the Dutch flag a very dynamic appearance. In Raden Saleh’s work the atmosphere is absolutely quiet. The universe holds its breath, no leaf and certainly no flag is moving. [In fact,] Raden Saleh has ‘forgotten’ the Dutch tricolor altogether.

In Salèh’s painting it is morning, the dawn of a new day: not only the dawn of a new colonial era, but also one which would herald the collapse of that order. The memory of Dipanagara – his genius and his suffering – would one day – Salèh seems to be telling us – redeem the nation from the shackles of colonialism (Kraus 2005:278). As if in response, nature itself would put on its own display of awesome power as a counterpoint to the drama of that historic morning in Magelang, the garrison town whose name in High Javanese means ‘obstinate’ or ‘stubborn’ (Gericke and Roorda 1901, II:521). Early in the afternoon, as the Dutch mobile column commanders made their way back to their respective posts in Bagélèn and Kulon Praga, the heavens opened and sheets of torrential rain lashed the south-central Javanese countryside sweeping away the horse of Colonel Cleerens’ second-in-command, Captain Rinia van Nauta, as he attempted to ford a swollen river on his journey back to Kedhung Kebo (Purwareja). So the Java War ended as it began under the storm clouds of the west monsoon.

Steamboat to Batavia: how Dipanagara received the governor-general’s life sentence

‘How have I come to this? How did I come to this?’, Dipanagara’s periodic exclamations broke the silence in the carriage which bore him on his way under cavalry escort to Bedono on the borders of Semarang Residency. There he transferred into a tandhu (sedan-chair) which took him up the steep mountain road through the Jambu hills to the eponymous sub-district capital where another carriage was waiting to take him to Ungaran (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:741). Still suffering from malarial fever, he did not speak a word throughout this part of the journey. Reaching Ungaran in the late afternoon, the party rested and Dipanagara asked to be excused to go and pray on the battlements of the small Dutch fort, his first salāt al-maghrib (evening prayer) as an exile. De Stuers and Roeps watched him from a short distance. Afterwards, he was invited to take dinner with the commandant and the two officer escorts, De Stuers observing that he ‘had a very good understanding of European customs. I had until then never seen a prince from the Yogyakarta

121 DK 49, Colonel J.B. Cleerens (Kedhung Kebo) to H.M. de Kock (Magelang), 28-3-1830.  
122 On the unseasonal rains, which had turned the fields around Dipanagara’s residence at Tegalreja into mud and prevented the Dutch cavalry from following him as he made his escape across the sawah on 20 July 1825, see p. 601.
court sit and eat so decently at table’ (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909:741).

During the hour-long meal, the prince spoke ‘affectedly’ about his young army commander, Ali Basah Mertanagara, but did not mention any of his children, although he would later entrust Roeps with letters for his mother and eldest son, in which he showed particular concern for his widowed teenage daughter, Radèn Ayu Jayakusuma (Appendix IV, XIII). He also asked De Stuers to write to De Kock telling the commander-in-chief ‘to inform his people so that they would not be sad about his absence, to say that God had thus ordained it, that his people should keep as united as possible and that [the general] should be certain to keep a good eye on them and look after them well’ (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:741). He also asked that some of his wives and followers – including his pengulu, Pekih Ibrahim, and his long-time friend and adviser, Haji Badarudin – as well as his baggage should be sent up to him. Amongst the wives who joined him in Semarang was Radèn Ayu Retnaningrum,123 a daughter of his uncle Pangéran Panengah (post-1812, Dipawiyana I, Appendix VIII), whom he had married in January 1828. The prince’s ‘favourite concubine’ according to De Stuers, she would subsequently plead illness, declining to accompany him on the steamship from Semarang to Batavia on 5 April, a refusal which brought to mind for Dipanagara the similar fate which had befallen the second sultan when his favourite official wife, Ratu Kencana Wulan (post-1812, Ratu Wétan), had refused to share his temporary banishment in Ambon (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:746; p. 441). His two religious advisers, as we have seen (p. 638), would also decline his invitation to travel on with him into exile.

Arriving in Semarang on the evening of 29 March, Dipanagara spent a week in the Residency House in Bojong, Van den Bosch having decided not to hold him temporarily in the town jail.124 Eating every day at the table of the Resident, he refused the wine offered him, but developed a liking for the freshly baked bread.125 He also seems to have grown accustomed to the Dutch potatoes (kentang Welanda) – kentang sabrang (‘exile’s potatoes’) in the punning words of his panakawan, Rata – which would become his daily fare during his sea voyages to Batavia, Manado and Makassar.126 Although he was watched by a strong guard, and was never allowed out of sight of his officer escorts,127 the prince ‘gradually got into a good mood and was pleased

123 See Van den Broek 1873-77, 24:105, who states that Dipanagara’s two wives, Radèn Ayu Retnaningsih and Radèn Ayu Retnaningrum, his brother-in-law, ‘Dullah’ (Radèn Tumenggung) Dipawiyana, and some 40 followers were sent to Semarang on 30-3-1830, from Yogya.
124 AN, Exhibitum 20-9-1830 no. 58k, Major F.V.H.A. de Stuers (Semarang) to Johannes van den Bosch (Bogor), 31-3-1830.
127 De Stuers even slept in his room at night, AN, Exhibitum 20-9-1830 no. 58k, F.V.H.A. de Stuers (Semarang) to Johannes van den Bosch (Bogor), 31-3-1830.
with the considerate treatment at the Residency House’. Both De Stuers and Roeps, who would be recommended by Van den Bosch to the Dutch king for the Order of the Netherlands Lion for their political services at this time, took the opportunity to question him about the Java War and its antecedents, information which they speedily passed on to the governor-general. On 3 April, when they informed him that they would be taking the steamship, the SS Van der Capellen, to Batavia, the prince ‘expressed immediate readiness, only requesting that when we arrived there [in Batavia] long negotiations would not be held with him again, ‘People know that I long to have my legal rights or be sent to Mecca or to [some] other place.’ That this ‘other place’ might mean exile in eastern Indonesia was clearly on the prince’s mind because he asked De Stuers whether Ambon was a large island (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:742, 744). The major, however, encouraged him in the belief that he would decide his own fate, only breaking the news to him that he would be placed at the disposal of the governor-general once they had boarded the steamer.

On the morning of 5 April, Dipanagara’s nineteen-strong party, which included his wife, Radèn Ayu Retnaningsih, his sister, Radèn Ayu Dipawiyana and brother-in-law, Radèn Tumenggung Dipawiyana, went down to the harbour to board their vessel. De Stuers reported that (Louw and de Klerck 1908, V:746),

Dipanagara was in good heart but silent, perceiving many people on the wharf, who had gathered there out of curiosity, [he] covered his face with an end of his turban, which excited the multitude even more but caused at the same time a great disappointment. Our embarkation went to plan [and] when we left land he looked around on all sides but I saw no emotion in him. On board everything suited him very well, ‘Here I am’, he said, ‘entirely at my ease, so I could quite remain thus. I am perfectly content provided people treat me in a polite and friendly manner (looking at us) [as he spoke], but my present situation is the consequence of the surly and contemptu-

128 AN, Exhibitum 20-9-1830 no. 58k, Johannes van den Bosch (Bogor) to H.M. de Kock (Mangelang), 19-4-1830. Both Roeps and De Stuers were gazetted as knights of the order (Ridder der orde van den Nederlandsche Leeuw) on 5-7-1831, Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:267 note 1; II:283 note 2.

129 AN, Exhibitum, 20-9-1830 no. 58k, F.V.H.A. de Stuers (Batavia) to Johannes van den Bosch (Bogor), 9-4-1830. See further Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:745.

130 The SS Van der Capellen was the first steamship in service in the Netherlands Indies and had been plying the Semarang-Batavia route since 1825, Broeze 1979:268. Its skipper was the young Scotsman, Captain Andrew Davidson (circa 1809-1831), who was employed by the Thompson, Robert & Co steamship company, Van Enk 1999:219 note 86.

131 De Stuers explained that these ‘legal rights’ meant that ‘he [would have] the authority to appoint one priest at Yogya and one in Solo, who would exercise the law according to the Qur’ān and not according to our [European] laws’, Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:744. For a full discussion of this issue of legal jurisdiction, see Chapter VIII.

132 AN, Exhibitum 20-9-1830, F.V.H.A. de Stuers (Semarang) to Johannes van den Bosch (Bogor), 31-4-1830.
ous treatment which I had to experience before [at the hands of Smissaert, Chevallier and Dietré].’ [...] [He] appeared to have confidence in us [and] he was extremely genteel in his social relations. He was neither difficult nor exacting and seemed to avoid everything that he thought could draw attention to our watchfulness and vigilance, by which [he] showed that he could be what he was not at Metésih.

To fortify his spirits, he drank a bottle of zemzem water from Mecca which had been given him in Magelang by a haji recently returned from the holy city. This water ‘imbibed by leading Muslims who had been initiated into the sublime secrets of the religious system of The Prophet’ had the power, according to Dipanagara, to rid pilgrims of all earthly desires and preserve the spirit of the faithful against temptation. So fortified, he prepared to learn what the governor-general had decided for him when he arrived in Batavia three days later.¹³³

Although news of the prince’s arrival had not been published in the Government Gazette (De Haan 1935b, II:222 note 1), crowds of curious European onlookers chartered small boats or gathered at the wharf to watch him disembark. One of these was a young Scotsman, George Frank Davidson, who had arrived in Java in 1823 to work for the firm which his elder brother, John Davidson, had set up (Davidson 1846:9):¹³⁴

I saw him landed at Batavia [...] from the steamer which had brought him from Semarang. The governor[-general’s] carriage and aide-de-camps were at the wharf to receive him. In that carriage he was driven to gaol, whence he was banished, no one knows whither, and he has never been heard of since [...] Poor fellow! How his countenance fell, as well it might, when he saw where the carriage drew up! He stopped short on putting his foot on the pavement, evidently unwilling to enter the gloomy looking pile. [He] cast an eager eye around and, seeing there was no chance of escape, walked in. Several gentlemen followed. Before the authorities had the door closed, I saw the fallen chief, with his two wives,¹³⁵ confined to two miserable looking rooms.

‘The gloomy looking pile’ referred to by Davidson was the Stadhuis, the Town House of Batavia, where Dipanagara stayed from the 8 April-3 May 1830 (Van Doren 1851, II:54; De Haan 1935b, II:222). However, he was not incarcerated in the police prison situated below the Stadhuis, where Kyai Maja and his party had been held in terrible conditions from early 1829 to February 1830.

¹³³ Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 42. On the zemzem spring, see Juynboll 1930:121-2, who relates the story of Hagar wandering in desperation between the hills of Safâ and Marwah in the vicinity of Mecca looking for water for herself and her son Ishmael (Ismā‘îl) after being driven out by Abraham, eventually finding a spring of pure water bubbling from her son’s feet after seven fruitless journeys. Dipanagara related the same story to Knoerle, but with Abraham not Hagar in the central role.

¹³⁴ This was the firm, Macquoid, Davidson & Company, Van Enk 1999:112, 213, who gives his name as ‘Gordon Frank Davidson’. See further Campbell 1915, II:780.

¹³⁵ Davidson clearly mistook Dipanagara’s sister, Radèn Ayu Dipawiyana, for his second wife. Of his three remaining wives, only Radèn Ayu Retnaningsih accompanied him into exile.
and where Maja’s brother, Kyai Hasan Besari, had died just three months previously. Instead, he was lodged in the Batavia jail warder’s quarters immediately above the cellar prison, a place often used for detaining prominent Indonesians and Europeans (De Haan 1935b:222). During his time in the colonial capital, he was met by members of the Batavian city administration led by the chief magistrate (hoofdbaljuw) – equivalent of the local Resident – J. van der Vinne, a man of great idealism and energy, who served as vice-president the Bataviaasch Genootschap van Kunsten en Wetenschappen (Batavian Scientific Society) and had a particular interest in the development of education in the colonial capital (Nieuwenhuys 1973:82). The harbormaster, J.N. Olijve, and the Assistant-Resident of the Bataviasche Ommelanden (Batavian Environs), Adrianus Johannes Bik (1790-1872), a gifted draughtsman who did a charcoal life drawing of the prince which now hangs in the Musium Kota in Jakarta, were also present. Bik’s sketch gives a striking impression of the Java War leader showing him with very high cheek bones and slightly sunken cheeks, a result of the bouts of malaria from which he was still suffering and which would continue throughout his voyage to Manado.

Dipanagara clearly found his three-week stay in the Stadhuis a trial, later telling his officer escort Knoerle during his Manado journey that ‘his health did not permit him to remain in Batavia where he was exposed to the frightful heat prevailing in the place’. The prince was not the only dignitary suffering from poor health in that month. Sixty kilometres away in the cooler mountain climate of Bogor, the prince’s nemesis, Johannes van den Bosch, was also seriously indisposed. Unable to work, he was being treated by his doctors with mercury chloride for an undisclosed illness. In his babad, Dipanagara states that because of a ‘heavy sickness’, which had confined him to his bed, Van den Bosch could not see him. Instead, the governor-general summoned Captain Roeps, who had remained in Batavia with the prince, to give him a personal report on what he had learnt from his conversations with the Java War leader during his journey from Magelang. The infantry officer seems to have dwelt particularly on the religious aspects of the war and the influence

136 For a description of these conditions, see De Haan 1935b, II:222. The cellar below the Stadhuis, which had been rebuilt in 1710, was six feet deep and was used as the police jail of Batavia until 1846. Built for a maximum of 100 prisoners, 300 were apparently kept there in 1845 when 85 percent died of typhus and dysentery within four months, a mortality rate which convinced the town authorities to order its closure. On Hasan Besari’s death, see Appendix VIIb.
137 Bik had also served as baljuw (magistrate) of Batavia from 28-8-1828, see Bervoets 1977:2.
138 The Jakarta City Museum, which is housed in the former Stadhuis in the Kota (downtown) district of the Indonesian capital.
139 Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 47.
140 AN, Exhibitum 20-9-1830 no. 58k, Johannes van den Bosch (Bogor) to Jan Izaäk van Sevenhoven (Yogyakarta), 30-4-1830, mentioning his calomel (mercury chloride) treatment.
141 BD (Manado), IV:421, XLIII (Maskumambang) 283. sabab fendral teksih sanget gënnya sakti/ pan kalih tileman.
Plate 74. Adrianus Johannes Bik (1790-1872), baljuw (magistrate) of Batavia and guardian of Dipanagara during his stay in the Stadhuis (8 April-3 May 1830). Both A.J. Bik and his younger brother Jannus Theodorus were trained artists. Oil painting made circa 1842 and possibly by Ernest Hardouin. Bik is shown wearing the Order of the Netherlands Lion (Ridderorde der Nederlandsche Leeuw). Photograph by courtesy of the Stichting Iconographisch Bureau, The Hague.
Plate 75. Charcoal sketch of Dipanagara by A.J. Bik. It shows him dressed in the ‘priestly’ garments which he wore during the Java War, namely a turban, an open-necked kabaya (cotton shirt) and a jubah (loose outer robe). A sash hangs over his right shoulder and his pusaka kris (heirloom dagger), Kangjeng Kyai Bandayuda, is stuck in his flowered silk waist band. The slightly sunken cheeks, which accentuate the prince’s high cheek bones, were the result of successive bouts of malaria from which he had been suffering since his wanderings in the jungles of Bagelèn at the end of the war. Photograph by courtesy of the Musium Kota, Jakarta.
of the ulama. Indeed, on 19 April, Van den Bosch was confiding to the Raad van Indië (councillor of the Indies), Pieter Merkus (1787-1844), who was then serving as one of the newly appointed commissioners for the regulation of the affairs of the princely states,\footnote{A Leiden-trained lawyer, Merkus was bitterly opposed to Van den Bosch’s policies, in particular his re-introduction of the old VOC system of forced crop deliveries which developed into the ‘Cultivation System’ (1830-1870). He died in office as governor-general (1841-1844), Stapel 1941:91.} that ‘the perturbation of priests’, in particular their discontent over the abolition of penalties of the Qur’ān (Chapter VIII), had been the main reason for the widening of the Java War after its ‘fortuitous’ outbreak.\footnote{AN, Exhibitum 20-9-1830 no. 58k, Johannes van den Bosch (Bogor) to Pieter Merkus (Commisaris ter regeling der Vorstenlanden, Yogyakarta), 19-4-1830, stating that ‘every priest who could read the Qur’ān was deeply disturbed about the abolition of its penalties’.} He asked Merkus to enquire into ways of ‘pacifying the priestly class’ and suggested that the government should be more accommodating over the issue of the implementation of Islamic law. He cited here the example of the British, who had taken over the administration of former Dutch settlements on the Malabar coast of India and had continued to allow the practise of satī (self-immolation of widows on the funeral pyres of their husbands). The governor-general suggested that punishments according to the law of the Qur’ān should again be permitted.\footnote{AN, Exhibitum 20-9-1830 no. 58k, Johannes van den Bosch (Bogor) to Pieter Merkus (Commisaris ter regeling der Vorstenlanden, Yogyakarta), 19-4-1830.} He also stressed that he was determined to reassert the power of the civilian authority over the army after five years of war had distorted the relationship.\footnote{AN, Exhibitum 20-9-1830 no. 58k, Johannes van den Bosch (Bogor) to Jan Izaäk van Sevenhoven (Yogyakarta), 30-4-1830.}

With regard to Dipanagara, he showed himself considerably less flexible. All idea of allowing the prince to remain in Java was rejected as being too politically sensitive. He was to be banished ‘for the peace of the island’ and held as a state prisoner (staatsgevangene) in Manado – ‘the most suitable place outside Java’, whither Kyai Maja and his party had recently been dispatched.\footnote{NA, Ministerie van Koloniën 2538, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal buiten rade, 30-4-1830 no. 1 (hencforth: Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal buiten rade, 30-4-1830 no. 1), preamble and instruction no. 1 for the Resident of Manado. On Kyai Maja’s exile, see Chapter XI.} Given Van den Bosch’s illness, the actual details of the terms under which the prince would be held, which included special instructions for the Resident of Manado, were worked out by two Indies councillors, J.C. Goldman and J. Bousquet, in Batavia. On 29 April, they sent their draft besluit (government order) and instructions up by special courier to Bogor for the governor-general’s signature.\footnote{AN, Exhibitum 20-9-1830 no. 58k, Johannes van den Bosch (Bogor) to J.C. Goldman and J. Bousquet (Batavia) to Johannes van den Bosch (Bogor), 29-4-1830.} The following day both were officially approved.\footnote{Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal buiten rade, 30-4-1830 no. 1. This meant that it was the first order signed by Van den Bosch on that day without the Raad van Indië (council of the Indies) being in session.} The
order stipulated that ‘a suitable residence’ would be found for Dipanagara ‘in accord with his rank’, if possible on a river with a piece of adjacent ground where he could ‘wander’ and where a garden could be laid out for him. This would be chosen by the Resident of Manado, D.F.W. Pietermaat (1790-1848; in office 1827-1831) and by the prince’s officer escort, Second-Lieutenant J.H. Knoerle.

In his babad and his conversations with Knoerle during his voyage to Manado, Dipanagara also mentions these stipulations, but suggests that they were part of a promise made to him by Van den Bosch through the medium of Captain Roeps. In Knoerle’s words:

Dipanagara made it appear as if his removal to Manado was due to his own wishes […] people had promised [him] gardens, carriages, and as it were unconstrained use of his personal liberty. […] [He] always seeks every available [opportunity] to persuade me that his freedom may not be hampered in Manado.149

It is possible that, as had happened with De Kock in Magelang, the Dutch officers and officials with whom Dipanagara dealt in Batavia, especially Roeps, were less than honest about what lay in store for him. They may have encouraged him in the notion that his exile to Manado constituted a form of temporary ‘retirement’ which would give time for a letter to be sent back to Holland to request the Dutch monarch’s approval for the prince’s pilgrimage (haj) to Mecca, a journey on which he set much store and on which hoped he might be accompanied by former santri supporters who were already haji (returned Mecca pilgrims).150

That this was far from the spirit of Van den Bosch’s order can be seen from the stipulations regarding Dipanagara’s status as a state prisoner. These speak more of Manado as part of a Dutch eastern Indonesian ‘gulag’151 than

149 Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 47.

150 BD (Manado), IV:417-8, XLIII (Maskumambang) 251-5. sun dhingin ayun kongkonan. 252. gelisiru sun wetara pitung sasi/ angkat ulihira/ mapan dadi pathelas sasi/ marma becik ing ngantènana. 253. nèng Menadhu mapan kiwa lawan sepil/ gedhé omahira/ lan jembar polantènèki/ lan parek gunung segara. 254. kebon jembar akèh omah becik-becik/ lamun ayun dolan/ anèng gunung pan parek iki/ ana ing kéné pan iya. 255. nora nana lamun ayun dolan iki/ lawan srerawungan/ lan wong akèh kéné iki/ sirèku weruh pribadiya. 251. ‘I* must send first [to Holland]. 252. The most speedy journey is about seven months/ there and back/ then becomes fourteen months/ therefore it is better to wait 253. in Manado, which is secluded and quiet,/ [where] there is a large house/ and the view extensive/ and close to mountains and sea 254. [Where there are] many large gardens/ fine houses/ [and] if you wish to wander/ to those mountains/ which are over there 255. there will be nobody who will wish to walk there/ for company./ There are many people here [in Batavia]/ as you yourself know.’

* Captain Roeps reporting Van den Bosch’s supposed conversation. On Dipanagara’s hope that he would be allowed to make the haj to Mecca, perhaps in the company of Haji Badarudin and Haji Ngisa, who had both twice made the pilgrimage (Appendix VIIb), or with Kyai Maja himself, see Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 21, 25.

151 The loss of the Dutch possessions in Cape Colony and Ceylon (Sri Lanka), which had been taken over by the British in stages between 1795 and 1806 during the Revolutionary and Napo-
Plate 76. A view of the Stadhuis (Town House, Batavia) by Johannes Rach (1789). During pierswoning which appears to the left of the main building in the picture. The Holland in 1808, twenty-two years before Dipanagara’s arrival. Coloured aquatint with etching.
his confinement Dipanagara was kept on the second floor of the jailer’s house (ci-
sche Kerk or ‘New Church’ and railings in the right foreground were demolished
Photograph by courtesy of the Musium Pusat, Jakarta.
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a place of honourable temporary retirement. As many as fifty soldiers were to accompany Dipanagara on his Manado voyage. On their arrival, the Resident was to retain a sufficient number of troops to guard the prince and ensure that he could not escape. Indeed, the former Java War leader’s surveillance was made the particular responsibility of the Resident. He was to ‘closely observe’ his behaviour and actions and that of his followers, and see that no one visited him without the Resident’s express consent. At least once every three months, a report of the prince’s situation was to be sent back to Java. In the event that important events occurred, these reports were to be made more frequently, their dispatch to Java depending on the availability of shipping. Despite this close surveillance, Dipanagara was to be treated ‘in a friendly fashion’ by the Resident and due account taken of his birth and rank. The same monthly stipend of 600 guilders (half in silver and half in copper) was to be given to the prince as had been accorded to both the exiled second sultan, Hamengkubuwana II, in Ambon in 1817-1825,152 and the more recently banished last ruler of Palembang, Sultan Mahmud Badaruddin (reigned 1804-1812, 1813, 1818-1821), who was then ending his days in Ternate.153 In addition, a special allowance of f 400 in silver was to be made available by the director-general of Finances to defray the costs of the prince’s six-week voyage to Manado. As we have seen (p. 638), he was also to be permitted to choose two ‘priests’ or haji from Kyai Maja’s following in Tonsea Lama (Tondano) to assist him in his religious duties.154

At the same time, the order made arrangements for Dipanagara’s family. The prince had spoken warmly about his mother and clearly hoped that she might join him in exile. In fact, both she and her grandsons chose to remain in Java.155 Since none of the prince’s children wished to follow him to Manado, it was proposed, seemingly at the prince’s own suggestion, that his eldest son, Pangéran Dipanagara II, and other family members should be allowed to return to live at Tegalreja.156 Van den Bosch agreed to this, provided ‘they did...
not constitute a danger for Java’. Others, such as the prince’s second eldest son, Pangéran Dipakusuma, and his third son, Pangéran Dipaningrat,\footnote{During the war, Dipanagara had given him the title of Pangéran Adipati Anom or crown prince, but De Kock had required him to take the more modest name of Pangéran Dipaningrat after his father’s arrest on 28-3-1830, Van den Broek 1873-77, 24:105. Exiled to Ambon in 1840 along with his two brothers, Pangéran Dipakusuma and Radèn Mas Raib, he was described in the Dutch reports as insane, Chapter II note 37; AN, Brieven Ambon 1189b, ‘Staat der te Amboina aanwezige Staats Gevangenen onder ultimo December 1841’.} were to be given quarters in the Yogya kraton. Finally, the draft decree made provision for the division of Dipanagara’s heirloom kris and pikes, Captain Roeps being tasked with distributing them amongst the prince’s family (Appendix XI). The only exception was Dipanagara’s personal kris, Kyai Ageng Bandayuda, a major pusaka which had been made from the melted metal of three of the prince’s previous heirloom weapons (Appendix XI note 2). The prince had this with him in Batavia\footnote{Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 1. On Van den Bosch’s resumption of his usual work schedule, see AN, Exhibitum 20-9-1830 no. 58k, Johannes van den Bosch (Bogor) to Jan Izaäk van Sevenhoven (Yogyakarta), 30-4-1830.} and it remained in his personal possession throughout his exile in Sulawesi, eventually being interred with him, according to Dipanagara family oral tradition, in his grave in the Kampung Melayu in Makassar (Appendix XI note 2).

On 27 April, Knoerle, who was then serving as one of Van den Bosch’s military adjutants, received his secret orders relating to his mission as officer escort during the prince’s voyage to Manado. These were given him directly by the governor-general, who had now resumed work following his month-long sickness.\footnote{Roeps had been given leave to return on two-years’ furlough to Holland during which time he was invited to serve again under De Kock, this time with the Dutch Army in Zeeland – mobilised to prevent a possible French invasion from the Southern Netherlands (post-1830, Belgium). He departed Java in July 1830, see Appendix XIII note 2; Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, II:283 note 2.} The second-lieutenant was chosen because of his supposed knowledge of Javanese, Roeps not being available\footnote{On Dipanagara’s conversation with Roeps as reported in his babad, see BD (Manado), IV:430, XLIII (Maskumambang) 275-6. lawan maning jaluk mamii iya marang Jendral [apan] Walonda sawijji sun gawel lelirunira. 276. nging bisa cara Jawa lir sirèki sabab ingsun iya/ cara Lumayu tan ngerti/ Kapitan mutar sandika. On Dipanagara’s views on Malay and Knoerle’s doubtful linguistic ability, see further pp. 106-7, 109.} and Dipanagara having insisted on being accompanied by an officer who could converse with him in his mother tongue rather than in Malay which he spoke poorly and which he found deeply distasteful.\footnote{Bik’s charcoal sketch of Dipanagara in the Stadhuis shows it tucked into his belt.} Knoerle departed for Batavia with the governor-general’s signed order on 30 April and immediately called on Dipanagara at the Stadhuis to introduce himself and reassure him about the coming voy-
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age. He then went down to the harbour to board the Dutch naval corvette, the Pollux, which was lying at anchor in Batavia roads. Recently arrived from Europe with the commander-in-chief of the Dutch Indies navy (note 176), it was deemed the most suitable available transport for the prince, equipped as it was with a deck battery of sixteen small calibre naval guns sufficient to deter attack by Buginese pirates or other hostile boarding parties.

Although it had originally been envisaged that Dipanagara would embark with his party on 1 May, there was a delay due to the need to prepare suitable accommodation for the exiled leader and his party. The corvette also had to take on six weeks’ supply of fresh water and food, no stopovers being envisaged because of the political sensitivities surrounding the corvette’s principal passenger. Eventually, at eight o’clock on the morning of Monday, 3 May, Dipanagara and his followers came on board, accompanied by Roeps and the same Batavian city administration officials who had greeted the prince on his arrival from Semarang. They were met by the corvette’s commander, Kapitein-ter-zee (naval captain) Eeg, his junior officers and the ship’s doctor, Surgeon Major H. Schillet, an expert on cholera (Schillet 1832), whom the

162 Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 2. Knoerle also apprised Dipanagara of the details of Van den Bosch’s 30-4-1830 official order regarding his exile, Knoerle 1835:166. On the morning of Dipanagara’s departure on 3 May, the secretary of the Netherlands Indies government, J. van Schoor, had also come to the prince in the name of the governor-general to pass on Van den Bosch’s regrets at not being able to see him in person during his stay in Batavia, Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 47.

163 During the Napoleonic Wars, corvettes or sloops-of-war were around 100 feet in length, displaced 380-400 metric tonnes, were armed with 16-18 muzzle loading smooth bore naval cannon mounted on a single flush deck, and had a crew of 90-120, Gresham 2002:12-7, 87.

164 Although the Belgian Revolt had yet to break out (24-8-1830), raising the spectre of a new European war and potential hostile British naval operations in Indonesian waters, the Dutch authorities were all too aware of how tenuous was their writ in the eastern Indonesian archipelago at this time. For a reference to the loading of six guns in the battery on board the Pollux with shot when a small bark hove into view and the dispatch of the Pollux’s sloop to investigate an English ship, The Regret (Captain Carr), sailing from Banda with a cargo of spices (nutmeg) for Batavia later in the voyage, see Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 19, 31.

165 Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 1. On the arrangements for Dipanagara and his party, see note 176.

166 Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 16-7, on the decision of the corvette’s commander, Kapitein-ter-zee (referred to by Knoerle as ‘Colonel’) Eeg, not to make for Surabaya to take on further supplies, to which Knoerle noted ‘from a political point of view I backed up the colonel. Our appearance in the roads of Surabaya would naturally cause much ado as much amongst the Europeans as more especially with the natives [Javanese]’.

167 Van den Bosch’s 30-4-1830 besluit gives the names of 17 followers, whereas Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 1-2, lists nineteen (11 men and 8 women) who accompanied him to Manado. Two others – Tirtadrama, who functioned as Dipanagara’s scribe, and Suranata, who was perhaps a member of the Yogya ‘priestly’ Suranatan regiment – joined him from Kyai Maja’s following at Tonsea Lama (Tondano) after he had arrived in Manado on 12-6-1830, see Appendix XII.

168 J. van der Vinne, J.Th. Bik, and the harbourmaster, J.N. Olijve. Dipanagara also mentions two colonels, one of whom was the commandant of the First Military Division based in Batavia, and the other was Kapitein-ter-Zee (naval captain) Eeg, the commander of the Pollux, who also bore the army rank of colonel, BD (Manado), IV:423-4, XLIII.297-307.
 prince took an instant liking to because his face reminded him of the former British Resident, John Crawfurd. 169 Once the prince’s luggage had been loaded, the city officials took their leave, the hoofd baljuw (chief magistrate), Van der Vinne, stressing that if Dipanagara had any requests he should not hesitate to address himself to the Resident of Manado, who was vested with the same authority as himself. 170 At eleven, Roeps also departed. Knoerle then saw to the furnishing of Dipanagara’s cabin and repeated again the assurances given to him at the Stadhuis regarding the respect which would be paid to the women in his party. The prince had apparently shown particular anxiety that his two radèn ayu (noblewomen) – namely his wife and sister – might be insulted or otherwise taken advantage of by the Dutch crew. 171 There being no wind the corvette rode at anchor for almost a day and a night, much to Dipanagara’s annoyance. He gave Knoerle the distinct impression that he was anxious to put Java behind him once and for all, further sightings of the Javanese coastline ‘causing him an unpleasant feeling’. ‘He was ashamed ever to see Java again’, Knoerle reported, ‘he longed for his arrival in Manado [where] he would ask the governor-general for money and a vessel for a journey to Mecca as soon as he was strong and his heart was calm and at rest again’. 172 At five o’clock the following morning of 4 May, a light breeze began to blow off the land and the corvette set sail as the first streaks of dawn stole over the Bay of Batavia. 173 A new chapter in the prince’s life had begun. He would never set foot on the island of his birth again. A quarter of a century of exile and imprisonment lay before him.

Part Two: The sultan over the water

The Radeau de Méduse: surviving the corvette Pollux, 4 May-12 June 1830

For a Javanese for whom the nearest encounters with the ocean had been a brief pilgrimage to the south coast in circa 1805 (Chapter IV) and subsequent meditations in the grotto of Suralanang (p. 543), Dipanagara’s nearly six weeks at sea – much of it becalmed – would not be a pleasant experience. The prince’s reference to this purgatorial odyssey in his babad is suitably laconic:

170 BD (Manado), IV:423-4, XLIII.300-3.
173 Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 2; the departure of the Pollux with Dipanagara and his party was officially reported in the Government Gazette on 6 May, Javasche Courant 53, 6-5-1830.
12-6-1830) and his subsequent voyage to Makassar (1833-1855) on the sailing sloop Circe
The sails were set and [we] left Batavia for Manado, but there was no wind and the boat was exceedingly slow.

[...] many of the accursed [Dutch crew and soldiers] were sick and died on board ship. The sultan was troubled at heart.

Maybe we will all be damned [to die] and not reach Manado. We speak no further of this. They arrived in Manado.

Two and a half months long [sic] was the sultan’s journey from Batavia to Manado because there was no wind.174

Knoerle’s own diary closely echoes the spirit of Dipanagara’s account. At seven in the morning of the first day, for example, the prince summoned the second-lieutenant to his cabin and requested he be taken on deck, one of only six occasions, according to Knoerle, during the whole forty-day voyage when the exiled leader came up from his cabin (Knoerle 1835:167-8). ‘The compass, the ship with sails set on high and the motion of the vessel’ caught the prince’s delighted attention, but death, which stalked the ship daily, had already shown its grim face:

The detachment of troops had one dead who at that moment was sent overboard. The burial ceremony caused the prince to ask whether the deceased had been a captain. On [my] answer that he was an ordinary soldier, Dipanagara asked why we paid more attention to a dead than a living person.175

In the first five days alone, four died, the ceremonies for the burials – the slow march of the honour guard of soldiers and the muffled drums – being heard distinctly by the prince in his cabin below the quarter deck.176 Laid low by his

174 BD (Manado), IV:425, XLIII (Maskumambang) 308-11. nulya babar layar mangkat sing Betawi mring Menadhu ika/ mapan datan angsal angin/ langkung remben kang baia. 309. lawan laksat mapan kathah ingkang sakit/ myang kang modar/ sainroning baiat sami/ susah kang tyasing sri naléndra. 310. bok- menawa telas jidhèt* tan dumugi/ ing Menadhu ika/ mangkana was tan winarni/ ing Menadhu sampun prapta. 311. mapan ngantos kalih tengah wulan ika/ lampahnya naléndra/ Menadhu saking Betawi sabab tan wonten anginnya. * Rusche 1908-09, II:266 has pejah. I have followed the sense of that correction in the translation.
176 Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 12. The location of Dipanagara’s cabin, known as the ‘front cabin’ (voorka-
recessive malarial fevers and afflicted by repeated vomiting from sea sickness, the prince’s face grew steadily more sunken and thin. He thought that perhaps his own time had come. A week into the voyage, he confided to Knoerle that he was content to die, trusting absolutely in The Almighty. As his fever-wracked body was gently rubbed down with eau-de-cologne provided by the German officer, his wife, Radèn Ayu Retnaningsih, lay weeping at his feet.177

Despite the intensity of his bouts of malaria and his increasingly cadaverous appearance, Dipanagara was not yet at death’s door. A great believer in traditional Javanese remedies, he regularly dosed himself with freshly prepared beras-kencur made of camphorated galanga root, turmeric, rice flour and palm sugar, forcing Knoerle on occasion to beat a hasty retreat from his cabin so close and overpowering was the smell of the herbal concoctions.178 In the periods when his fever lifted, Dipanagara showed an intense interest in his surroundings. The geography of eastern Indonesia fascinated him. How far was Ambon from Manado? Was Manado a long way from Makassar or the tanah Bugis (Bugis region) of South Sulawesi? Could he see the map of ‘Makassar’ which he had noticed up on the fore-deck so that he could acquaint himself with the shape of the island of Sulawesi?179 When Knoerle demurred saying that the ship’s chart of Sulawesi was the only one available for navigational purposes, the prince did not give up. He wanted to know about the sea route to Jeddah. Were the coasts of Sulawesi navigable and what sort of inhabitants lived there, Christians or Muslims?180 Was it the custom in Europe, Dipanagara wanted to know, to exile a leader who had been defeated in battle to a far off island and cut him off from all his relatives? What was the Java War leader planning? Another Elba-style escape? Another Hundred Days? Knoerle could well wonder. He cited the example of Napoleon, like Dipanagara just forty-four years old when he was sent into exile, but did so ‘in a gentle way omitting all painful reminiscences’.181 Eventually, tiring of these ‘peculiar questions’, he let the prince see a copy of the British map maker

\textit{juit), which had served as the personal quarters of the commander of the Dutch East Indies Navy, Colonel Wardenburg, during his recent voyage to Batavia from Europe (November 1829-April 1830), see Knoerle 1835:166-7. The cabin connected directly with another in which his wife, Radèn Ayu Retnaningsih, his sister, Radèn Ayu Dipawiyana and brother-in-law, Radèn Tumenggung Dipawiyana, were lodged, and was adjacent to a third in which the rest of his 19-strong following were accommodated.}

177 Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 11-2. Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 8-9, gives a description of Retnaningsih, ‘the Radèn Ayu of Dipanagara is a lady of about twenty to twenty-two years of age. She has a beautifully formed face and large eloquent eyes. The whole composition of her face is striking and the diffidence and fear which it expresses increases the desire of the well-intentioned man to treat her with courtesy’.


179 Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 44, where Dipanagara referred to Sulawesi as the ‘lima Bugis’, the five Bugis ‘peninsulas’.


and hydrographer James Horsburgh’s (1762-1836) sea chart of the Indonesian archipelago to give him an explanation of the various islands. Dipanagara’s interest remained focussed on Ambon, Makassar and the sea route to Jeddah which could only be traced on the chart as far as Pulau Pinang.\footnote{Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 45, where he refers to having sorted out ‘Horsburgh’s map of the Indian archipelago’. See further Horsburgh 1817, I.}

Knoerle clearly found the prince at turns fascinating and exasperating. On 14 May, at two o’clock in the morning as heavy storm showers swept up from the south off the mountains of Japara, ‘Dipanagara rushed out of his cabin all of a sudden and shrieked to me to come to him; [...] the commander of the corvette should drop anchor immediately!’ The officer escort had to explain the infeasibility of this suggestion, pointing out that they could make use of these showers to advance their journey by putting out more sail and tacking along the coast.\footnote{Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 13.} The next day, the eleventh of their voyage, Knoerle confided in his diary that ‘Dipanagara was unbearably capricious, the sea was dead calm, it was very hot, and we were near the coast of Lasem’, the sight of the Javanese coastline making the exile feel deeply uneasy. ‘The prince asked me to procure some \textit{sirih} (leaf for the preparation of betelnut) during the journey past Surabaya or Madura, and if possible also some fruit.’\footnote{Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 14.} His requests could not be granted given the necessity of avoiding port visits. Even encounters with the pilots of Sidhayu or Surabaya, who might have had \textit{sirih} on board, were deemed inexpedient.\footnote{Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 16-7.} Yet, here was the same prince who insisted on sending Knoerle rice cakes every day from his table and inviting him to breakfast off potatoes, \textit{sambal} (hot spiced chilli condiment), tea and ship’s biscuits served by his Radèn Ayu while sitting side-by-side with him on his large straw mattress, who delighted in the pictures in the books and almanacs which Knoerle lent him (p. 109), and in the Rhenish and Cape wines which his officer escort procured for him as ‘medicine’ for his impromptu wine tastings.\footnote{Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 36-7, ‘never again will I be in a position to see a face so striking as that of Dipanagara while engaged in wine tasting. The two bottles of Rhine wine and sweet Cape Constantia were in front of him and in turns from one to the other they were tasted by means of a beer glass […] the next day I came to Dipanagara at the moment when he was finishing the last of the Constantia […] he told me that the wine tasted very good all the more so because he had not drunk this delicious wine for five years.’ On Dipanagara’s partiality for sweet Cape Dutch wine provided by the wife of the Yogya Resident, A.H. Smissaert, just before the Java War, see p. 524.} The same prince who asked to have the oil portrait of King William I (reigned 1813-1840), which hung in Captain Eeg’s quarters, to be brought to his cabin so that he could show it to his womenfolk.\footnote{Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 12, ‘Dipanagara hung the portrait for a moment on the door of his cabin and told me [...] that he would gladly like to have this painting, but that he could not hang it in a place where it was visible to ordinary people, [since] it was inappropriate and would give rise to false expectations amongst his retinue – as though he as a great man was showing another great
During these encounters – ‘conversations on a straw mattress’ as Knoerle later depicted them\(^\text{188}\) – in which Dipanagara would address the second-lieutenant in Low Javanese as *kowé* (familiar ‘you’),\(^\text{189}\) the prince ranged over a staggering range of topics. These included Javanese history and mythology as well as reminiscences of his own life and times. His wartime experiences loomed large, no doubt because of Knoerle’s line of questioning, his diary being compiled as an intelligence briefing for the governor-general on the causes and consequences of the Java War. For example, when the ‘Pollux’ passed Sumbawa, the island where Dipanagara’s great-grandmother, Ratu Ageng Tegalreja’s, maternal family hailed from (p. 76), and the prince began to talk of the long-standing small *prau* (outrigger sailing boat) trade between Bima, Lombok and Blambangan in the eastern salient of Java, Knoerle immediately sought to probe him for further information on his supplies of war matériel. The German officer suggested that the government ‘knew full well’ that he had received gunpowder during the war from these eastern Indonesian sources, a suggestion which Dipanagara vigorously denied.\(^\text{190}\)

Knoerle’s personal view of the prince was predictably contradictory: on the one hand, he was full of praise for the Java War leader’s ‘strong and enterprising character’, ‘shrewdness’, and ‘acute judgement’ (p. 107). On the other, he was disdainful of his religious convictions. Here he betrayed the prejudices characteristic of even the most enlightened of his nineteenth-century European contemporaries. One thinks, for example, of the great Dutch author, Multatuli (Eduard Douwes Dekker, 1820-1887), who dismissed the prince as a ‘poor fanatic’ (*armen dweeper*) during his conversations with Colonel Cleerens in the Preanger Highlands in 1845-1846.\(^\text{191}\)


\(^\text{189}\) Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 13, Dipanagara ‘preferred on our journey during our confidential conversations when we are sitting on his straw mattress to call me *kowé* [familiar ‘you’ in Javanese]. I have so far called him Kangjeng Tuwan Pangéran [‘honourable sir prince’]. I asked him what meaning he gave to the word *kowé* […] [and he] said it was from a sincere heart (*manah waras*) and that I must consider it a token of [his] friendship.’ It is clear that Knoerle relied heavily on his Javanese servant, Sagareja, to help him with the translation of Dipanagara’s rapid conversation, much of it in Low Javanese.

\(^\text{190}\) Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 32, remarking that Dipanagara ‘steadfastly denied it remarking that he did not need this supply in view of the fact that there were enough people in his army who knew how to manufacture gunpowder’. See further p. 610.

\(^\text{191}\) Multatuli 1862-77, IV:286; Van Praag 1947:15. Multatuli later made it appear that his conversations with Colonel Cleerens had taken place at Batu Gajah, the governor’s residence in Ambon, when Cleerens was governor of Maluku (1846-1850). But since Multatuli only arrived in Ambon in 1852, two years after Cleerens’ death, this is an impossibility. Paul van ’t Veer (1979:193, 454 note 183) suggests that Multatuli was remembering a conversation with Cleerens from his meeting with the Flemish officer in Cianjur or Parakan Salak either from late 1845 or the first half of 1846, when Cleerens was Resident of Preanger. See further note 71.
figured Multatuli’s views in his concluding letter to Van den Bosch on his arrival back in Java:

I got to know this selfsame state prisoner Javanese prince as a zealot, who considered his religious principles as the highest and most elevated on earth, and who wished to erect his religious establishment on the ruins of all other systems. 192

By 1 June, the corvette had sailed to its furthest point east arriving to within sight of the small islet of Paloe on the same longitude as Endeh off the north coast of Flores, a sighting which caused Dipanagara to express surprise when he learnt that the Dutch had yet to appoint a Resident on the island. 193 From here it turned to the north making for the Bangka Strait off the northern tip of Minahasa. Ten days later, it was in front of the Dutch trading post at

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192 A.H. Knoerle (Surabaya) to Johannes van den Bosch (Batavia/Bogor), 9-7-1830, in Knoerle 1835:171. Knoerle had by this time learnt of his promotion as first lieutenant in recognition of his successful mission as officer escort of Dipanagara.

193 Knoerle, Journal’, 37. Dipanagara suggested quite sensibly that the government would one day require a Resident on Flores to provide assistance to Dutch ships which might be in need of assistance. Knoerle had argued against the necessity of such a move. See further Chapter X note 241.
Likupang situated in the strait itself (Map 6). A number of small fishing boats came up to sell local produce, but even here it was not possible to acquire *sirih* for Dipanagara. The corvette commander decided to sail on. Finally, on 12 June 1830 at eleven in the morning, the *Pollux* dropped anchor in the roads of Manado. The following day the prince and his followers disembarked and were escorted to Fort New Amsterdam, the Dutch military strongpoint – later destroyed by American bombing in World War II – which would be their home for the next three years.

A Minahasan interlude: Dipanagara’s Manado years, 1830-1833

According to the prince’s *babad*, Van den Bosch had promised him through the intermediary of Captain Roeps ‘seclusion and quiet’ in a large house with an extensive view close to mountains and sea, in a place where there were many large gardens, fine houses, and places to wander undisturbed (note 150). So what did Dipanagara find in Manado? The British naturalist, Alfred Russel Wallace (1823-1913), who visited the Minahasan capital just four years after Dipanagara’s death in January 1855, described it in glowing terms (Wallace 1890:185):

> The little town of Menado [Manado] is one of the prettiest in the East. It has the appearance of a large garden containing rows of rustic villas, with broad paths between, forming streets generally at right angles with each other. Good roads branch off in several directions towards the interior, with a succession of pretty cottages, neat gardens, thriving plantations, interspersed with wilderness of fruit trees. To the west and south the country is mountainous, with groups of fine volcanic peaks 6,000 or 7,000 feet high, forming grand and picturesque backgrounds to the landscape.

Although the scenery may have lived up to the governor-general’s promise and the freedom granted the prince was immediately honoured, it soon became clear that Van den Bosch’s original intention that the Java War leader should be lodged in a secure location in the interior of Manado Residency was impractical. When Knoerle met with Resident Pietermaat on the day of the arrival of the *Pollux*, it was decided that the prince should be lodged temporarily in a four-room house in Fort New Amsterdam, the main Dutch fortress in Manado. The designated building, which had large verandahs to the front and rear, was normally used as the Residency offices, and to make it more habitable for Dipanagara’s stay, a wash-house with an outside gallery

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194 Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 50, mentioned that a day after Dipanagara’s arrival, the prince made a tour on horseback with him of three leagues (fifteen kilometres) outside the town and they bathed together, presumably in an adjacent lake or waterfall.
was hurriedly constructed. Suitably ‘elegant’ furniture was also acquired. This included a book shelf and writing desk with drawers, as well as a large standard lamp equipped with the latest patent oil light. No less than twenty-four oil lamps were also purchased for the prince’s quarters. Dipanagara clearly intended to undertake some writing during his time in Manado. In addition, six gun lanterns (geschutlantarnen) were transferred from the Pollux to help the military detail tasked with the guarding of Dipanagara in Manado and his fellow exile, Kyai Maja, in distant Tondano, to illuminate their respective guard posts. Two horses were also bought for the prince so that he could undertake excursions outside the town and he asked for three saddles and harnesses to be sent out to him from Magelang.

By the time Knoerle departed for Java on 20 June, the decision had been taken that the prince would stay in Manado, there being nowhere in the interior to put him. In the intervening days (14-17 June 1830) Knoerle had made an extensive tour of the interior travelling through the mountainous districts of Tomohon, Tonsawang, Tondano and Sonder. It soon became clear that the only suitable location in the interior for Dipanagara was Tondano. But there was a problem which Knoerle had not anticipated. Kyai Maja and his 62-strong following had arrived in Manado from Ambon on 1 May and had been settled at Tonsee Lama in this selfsame district (Knoerle 1835:173-5; Chapter XI note 75). Their transfer and settlement in Tondano had been physically challenging. According to the second-lieutenant, only the allocation of two coffee gardens by the Resident, had made it possible for such a large community to

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196 Knoerle 1835:173. For a list of the furniture acquired for Dipanagara, see AN, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal, 12-2-1831 no. 25, ‘Staat en inventaris van de voor rekening van het gouvernement […] ingekochte meubelaira goederen benevens twee paarden ingevolge besluit van de Resident van Manado in dato 14 Junij no. 15 ten diensten van den Staatsgevangenen Pangerang Diepo Negoro’, Manado, 16-6-1830. This shows that the Dutch authorities in Manado spent f 912 in copper and f 24 in silver (the latter the cost of the standard lamp referred to as a grote lantaarn met eene patent lamp, most likely a Dutch import) on the following items: a dozen chairs (f 100), two clothes cabinets (lodekantje), one without curtains (f 25) and one with large curtains (f 35), a book case and writing table (f 70), a large dining table with ebony wood legs and copper feet (f 70), a mirror with a gilded surround (f 60), two small ebony wood drinks tables (knaappen, Carey 1981a:247 note 48), four large serving plates and six smaller plates with gold edgings (f 180), three cupboards (hangstalpen) (f 75), two cut-glass wine carafes (f 10), six wine glasses (f 6), six beer glasses (f 6), four large rattan floor mats (rottings matten) (one for each room) (f 70), two low wooden beds (rustbanken) (f 100), two copper spittoons (f 30), one Japanese screen (f 20), and one lacquered tray with handles (f 15). In addition, f 200 was spent on acquiring the two horses, which were soon afterwards returned to their original owner when Dipanagara decided against riding, AN, Exhibitum 30-10-1830 no. 28, D.F.W. Pietermaat (Manado) to Johannes van den Bosch (Batavia/Bogor), 20-8-1830. See further p. 726.
197 AN, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal in rade, 12-2-1831 no. 25, D.F.W. Pietermaat (Manado) to Johannes van den Bosch (Batavia/Bogor), 3-7-1830.
198 AN, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal in rade, 12-2-1831 no. 25, D.F.W. Pietermaat (Manado) to Johannes van den Bosch (Batavia/Bogor), 3-7-1830.
sustain themselves by their agricultural activities (Knoerle 1835:175). All the ricefields and houses – apart from a dwelling used by the Resident during his inspection journeys into the interior which had been temporarily allocated to Kyai Maja199 – had had to be constructed from scratch. It was feared that even though Dipanagara’s party was smaller, such a move would be equally physically challenging. But the key issue was political. Both Knoerle and Pietermaat considered it entirely inappropriate that the Java War leader and his chief religious adviser should end up in exile in the same Minahasan location (Knoerle 1835:173-4). No matter that relations between the two men were at rock bottom, something which Knoerle soon surmised from the refusal of the two haji from Maja’s party to accede to Dipanagara’s request to join him in Manado,200 the mere possibility that Maja and the prince could again be in

199 AN, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal in rade, 12-2-1831 no. 25, D.F.W. Pietermaat (Manado) to Johannes van den Bosch (Batavia/Bogor), 3-7-1830.
200 Knoerle 1835:174; Chapter XI note 79. According to Pietermaat, Haji Amad Tajib and some of Kyai Maja’s other followers had come in secret to visit Dipanagara in Manado shortly after his
close contact was anathema. Pietermaat and Knoerle’s task was made easier by Dipanagara’s clear preference to remain in the Minahasan capital on account of the climate – he feared the chill of the high Tondano plateau where the early morning temperature could fall to below seventy degrees Fahrenheit.\footnote{Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 51. The Tondano plateau is at 892 metres of elevation and the lowest mean temperature is around 69 degrees Fahrenheit, Atlas 1990:26; Wallace 2002: paragraph 179.} The two Dutch officials thus revised Van den Bosch’s original instructions and made a unilateral decision to keep the prince in Fort New Amsterdam pending the arrival of an engineer officer from Ternate tasked with undertaking a survey of alternative accommodation in the environs of Manado.\footnote{AN, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal in rade, 13-1-1831 no. XI, D.F.W. Pietermaat (Manado) to Johannes van den Bosch (Batavia/Bogor), 13-1-1831, reference to the imminent arrival of an engineer officer from Ternate whose task was to survey a suitable building for Dipanagara and his family in the environs of Manado. Since there are no further references in the Manado Residency letters to this engineer officer or to Dipanagara’s move to alternative accommodation in Manado, it seems that the prince and his family remained in Fort New Amsterdam up to the time of their transfer to Makassar on 20-6-1833.}

On 19 June, just a week after the ‘Pollux’ arrived, the corvette’s commander and ship’s officers came to the fort to take their formal leave of Dipanagara. They were returning the next day to Batavia via Surabaya, a journey which would be completed in just nineteen days. Some fifty-three soldiers,\footnote{AN, Exhibitum 12-4-1831 no. XI, D.F.W. Pietermaat (Manado) to Johannes van den Bosch (Batavia/Bogor), 3-7-1830.} under the command of Second-Lieutenant C. Bosman remained behind to guard the prince. Unfortunately, this junior officer, unlike Roeps and Knoerle, lacked the diplomatic and linguistic skills needed to handle Dipanagara. Within weeks, his ‘rough and inconsiderate’ behaviour had caused Pietermaat to arrange his transfer to Ternate, where the 40-strong garrison was in need of an additional officer.\footnote{BD (Manado) IV:426, LXIII.314-21.} In his \textit{babad}, Dipanagara mentions this courtesy visit and the conversation which took place between himself and Knoerle and Captain Eeg. After confirming his monthly stipend of 600 guilders, the commander of the ‘Pollux’ suggested that the prince might have a personal message for the governor-general. Perhaps he would like to send a letter back to Java which he could take for him? ‘No’, Dipanagara replied, ‘I have no desire to send a letter for I cannot write […] just send my regards to General Van den Bosch!’\footnote{AN, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal in rade, 30-10-1830 no. 28, D.F.W. Pietermaat (Manado) to Johannes van den Bosch (Batavia/Bogor), 20-8-1830, referring to Bosman’s ‘lack of consideration’ in his dealings with Dipanagara.}

This pretence of illiteracy on Dipanagara’s part was somewhat disingenuous. The prince could write in Javanese albeit with many grammatical errors (Appendix XIII). Indeed, we will see shortly how, when necessity demanded,
he could get letters – and even major literary endeavours like his 43-canto autobiographical babad – written, especially if he had the services of an amanuensis. So pleading lack of literary skills was perhaps a way of sending his own message to Van den Bosch that the governor-general’s failure to meet him during his three-week sojourn in the colonial capital had not gone unnoticed. Privately, however, Dipanagara did seek to get some messages through to ‘his exalted friend’ in Batavia. In particular, he asked – in a formal agreement drawn up by Knoerle and witnessed by Bosman – that his wives, who had remained behind in Yogya (Appendix IV part 2), and those of Kyai Maja and his fellow exile commanders, who were sharing the kyai’s banishment in Tonsea Lama, should be sent out from Java to be reunited with their husbands. He also requested that his two close religious advisers, Haji Badarudin and Haji Ngisa, should be allowed to join him in Manado, and that Van Den Bosch should remain the ‘protector’ of his children in Mataram. 

Although Kyai Maja’s wife was indeed brought over to Minahasa – although not on compassionate grounds (Chapter XI note 76) – all Dipanagara’s other requests were met in the negative. None of his other wives wished to share his exile. Nor too did the two haji. They were too busy making new careers for themselves in the post-war Netherlands-Indies, Haji Badarudin as chief pengulu of Bagelèn (Appendix VIIb) and Haji Ngisa as religious adviser to Senthot and his government-sponsored barisan (troop) in Ungaran.

Dipanagara’s life as an exile in Manado would not be easy. Soon after the departure of the Pollux, according to the account given in Dipanagara’s babad, Manado was visited by a serious epidemic – possibly cholera or dysentery – during which many of ‘the accursed’ (laknat), by which Dipanagara presumably meant the local Dutch, non-Muslim Chinese and Christian Manadonese inhabitants, died. At the same time, the sudden contraction of the prince’s world to four rooms in Fort New Amsterdam in the company of his wife, sister and brother-in-law, after five years of war and the solitude of his last months as a fugitive in the mountains of western Bagelèn, was hard to bear. Scarcely a month after his arrival, the prince decided that he no longer wished to ride out into the surrounding countryside, the environs of Manado not be-

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207 NA, Exhibitum 20-9-1830 no. 58k geheim, ‘Verbaal Hadjie Ngisoh [Haji Ngisa]’, 20-4-1830.
208 BD (Manado), IV:427, XLIII (Maskumambang) 322. *mapan langkung pageblug ingkang dhatengi/ laknat kathah pejah/ mangkana wus tan winarni*. The Dutch sources are silent on such an epidemic in 1830-1832, but there are references to a severe drought in April-November 1833, which led to serious fires in the interior of Manado in August 1833 and heavy fevers (possibly cholera, bile fever or dysentry) which claimed 17-18 lives in the Chinese quarter (kampong cina) near Fort New Amsterdam and spread into the interior with devastating effects in neighbouring Gorontalo where all the local Dutch officials apart from the Resident fell sick or died, AN, Geheim Verbaal, 23-7-1834 no. 172k, J.P.C. Cambier (Manado) to J.C. Baud (Batavia/Bogor), 13-2-1834.
ing suitable, in his view, for excursions on horseback and the saddles which he had asked for from Magelang not having arrived. The two horses, which had been bought for him by the local Dutch authorities, were returned to their previous owners. He now asked that henceforth he should just be addressed as ‘Pangéran Ngabdulkamit’, a title which he would alter to the more spiritual epithet of fakir (mendicant) Ngabdulkamit after his transfer to Makassar in July 1833 (pp. 151-2).

In keeping with his mendicant aspirations and with an eye to saving money for his long planned pilgrimage to Mecca, Dipanagara began to be very close fisted with his cash stipend. By late August 1830, Resident Pietermaat became alarmed that he might be building up a ‘war chest’ so substantial were his savings in money and jewels. He took the immediate decision to cut the prince’s monthly income by two-thirds to just 200 guilders. This was clearly too drastic as Dipanagara needed over half this stipend just to pay his servants and kitchen expenses, but out of pride he appears to have kept silent only remarking, ‘It is well. The government fixed my income at f 600 without consulting me and can [now] only but act as it thinks fit!’ Eight months later, Pietermaat’s temporary replacement, J.P.C. Cambier (in office 1831-1842), decided to raise this to f 311 a month, a move which Dipanagara again greeted with studied indifference. His ‘extreme obstinacy’ and pride, in Cambier’s words, prevented him from ever asking for more money from the Dutch authorities. Although this stood at

\[\text{AN, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal in rade, 20-8-1830.}\]
\[\text{AN, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal in rade, 2-7-1831 no. 15, J.P.C. Cambier (Manado) to Johannes van den Bosch (Batavia/Bogor), 22-4-1831, relating Dipanagara’s comment.}\]
f 350 in July 1837 after the government had taken the decision to send the bulk of the prince’s followers back to Minahasa, it was still not sufficient – given Dipanagara’s growing family – to prevent his household descending into a state of near poverty by the late 1840s (note 268).

In an extraordinary piece of creative accounting tellingly illustrative of the way in which the Dutch made their fortunes in the post-Java War Indies both the Resident of Yogyakarta, F.G. Valck (in office 1831-1838, 1838-1841), and the director-general of Finances in Batavia advised that the Yogya court, which was being charged the full costs of the prince’s upkeep, should not be informed that Dipanagara’s monthly stipend had been cut in half. Instead, they proposed that the sultan’s treasury be made to pay a lump sum of f 22,200 for the first three years of the exile’s maintenance, which included his period in Batavia, that sum being immediately credited to the account of the Resident of Manado.215 Even the small purchases of sirih and other necessities, which the prince had made during his three-week sojourn in the colonial capital, were to be included in the Dutch accounts.216 Such pettifoggery on the part of the Dutch authorities, the same mean-mindedness which would make the exile life of the Padri leader, Tuanku Imam Bonjol (1772-1864), such a misery when he was moved to Manado in 1840 (Dobbin 1972:19), appear to have taken their toll on the prince. Like Bonjol after him, Dipanagara does not seem to have been very well received by the local Christian and Muslim inhabitants of the Minahasan capital. The popular tradition that the prince had been so incensed by the abuse he had suffered in the local market (pasar) that he had flung his heirloom walking staff on the ground causing the ground to rock as though in an earthquake (Chapter III note 66), may be a reflection of this. So too was the Resident’s account of the rebuff administered to the prince by a leading Muslim inhabitant of Manado, Lieutenant Hasan Nur Latif, whose daughter’s hand Dipanagara had sought in marriage (p. 119). A commissioned officer in the Dutch East Indies Army, Latif had remarked that the union would bring his child ‘ill fortune’, a sentiment endorsed by the acting Resident who observed that from a political point of view it was unsuitable for a prominent Islamic citizen like Latif to be linked by marriage with the exile prince.217 Despite Latif’s refusal, Dipanagara continued to lead an active sexual life during his period in exile in Manado and Makassar.

215 AN, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal ad interim (J.C. Baud) in rade, 24-4-1833 no. 19; 4-7-1833 no. 10, F.G. Valck (Yogyakarta) to Director-General of Finances (Batavia), 18-5-1833; Director-General of Finances (Batavia) to J.C. Baud (Batavia/Bogor), 29-5-1833. Van den Bosch decided to charge the sultan f 600 a month, ‘with anything remaining to be returned at the end of the year’, thus enabling the government to recoup all its additional expenses before any reimbursements were made to the sultan’s treasury.

216 AN, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal ad interim (J.C. Baud) in rade, 24-4-1833 no. 19, J.P.C. Cambier (Manado) to J.C. Baud (Batavia/Bogor), 22-2-1833, listing f 81.90 for goods received by Dipanagara in Batavia between 9-4-1830 and 3-5-1830.

217 AN, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal in rade, 2-7-1831 no. 15, J.P.C. Cambier (Manado) to Johannes van den Bosch (Batavia/Bogor), 22-4-1831.
As we have seen (pp. 117-8), Cambier’s predecessor, Pietermaat, had already reported that Dipanagara’s ‘greatest conversation is about women of whom he seems to have been a great lover’, and he would go on to have no less than seven children in exile, some by Javanese women other than his official consort, Radèn Ayu Retnaningsih (Appendix IV).

The growing tensions of family life in the enclosed confines of Fort New Amsterdam, however, clearly made for difficult inter-personal relations within the prince’s immediate family. In April 1831, the acting Resident was reporting that,

The prince at present leads a very unpleasant life and his own intolerant humour is the entire cause of it […] most of the time he is quarrelling with his sister, or with his wife and brother-in-law [Radèn Tumenggung Dipawiyana], [who] have pressed for buying [him] a garden.218

Purchased and laid out for the sum of £254, this garden lay one and a half leagues (7 kilometres) from Manado close to the Saria River with a hill behind.219 A pleasant spot, but one which Dipanagara cared less and less to visit. Instead, it was given over to growing vegetables for the prince’s table, the £40 bamboo dwelling, which had been constructed on the adjacent hillside as a meditation hut, being used by the prince’s sister and brother-in-law to put some distance between themselves and their increasingly cantankerous relative. Dipanagara’s physically imposing younger sister, who shared the prince’s commoner stock on her mother’s side,220 seems to have been at the heart of this growing family rift. Described by Knoerle as ‘resolute and free, […] and of a very vivacious spirit’,221 Radèn Ayu Dipawiyana appears to have gone head-to-head with her elder brother in numerous family tiffs. In his babad, Dipanagara mentions that after he had been in Manado for some time,

\[
\begin{align*}
XLIII.329 & \quad \text{many trials} \\
& \quad \text{came to test the sultan.} \\
& \quad \text{Often his own} \\
& \quad \text{younger sister} \\
& \quad \text{Radèn Ayu Dipawiyana}
\end{align*}
\]

218 AN, Besluit van den Gouverneur Generaal in rade, 2-7-1831 no. 15, J.P.C. Cambier (Manado) to Johannes van den Bosch (Batavia/Bogor), 22-4-1831.
219 AN, Exhibitum 12-4-1831 no. XI, D.F.W. Pietermaat (Manado) to Johannes van den Bosch (Batavia/Bogor), 13-1-1831, reporting that now that a garden had been laid out for him, Dipanagara was taking more recreation and spending more money. At Dipanagara’s request, £25 had been spent on purchasing a small plot of land on the hill behind his garden where a small meditation pavilion (pendhapa) could be constructed.
220 Mandoyokusumo 1977:33 no. 30, gives her mother’s name as ‘Bendara Mas Ajeng Sasmitaningsih’ which indicates that she was of commoner stock. A well-born unofficial wife (garwa ampéyan) of a Javanese ruler would have been accorded the title of Bendara Radèn Ayu.
221 Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 9, describes Dipanagara’s sister as ‘strongly built’. 
caused him feelings of shame

Together with the tumenggung [her husband].

But the sultan paid the two no attention.

Night and day

only the Almighty

afforded the sultan protection,

[along with] the grace of [His] Holy Prophet.222

Soon the Resident was reporting that, given a free choice, all Dipanagara’s family, including his wife, Radèn Ayu Retnaningsih, and his servants would have liked to leave the prince and return to Java. Since the Resident’s instructions, received from his counterpart in Batavia, J. van der Vinne, explicitly stated that all these individuals shared Dipanagara’s status as state prisoners (staatsgevangenen), Cambier first had to seek permission from Batavia. Enquiries by the governor-general indicated that there would be no objection to either Retnaningsih or any of the prince’s other followers from returning to their respective homes in Java. They had all accompanied him voluntarily and were not considered ‘dangerous for the general peace’.223 Thus reassured, Van den Bosch passed a decree in council on 2 July 1831 giving Dipanagara’s wife and followers formal leave to repatriate themselves.224

In the end, Retnaningsih, who had just been delivered on 4 January 1832 of Dipanagara’s first child born in exile, Radèn Mas Kindar, also known as Radèn Mas Abdurrahman,225 elected to stay with her husband, leaving the prince’s younger sister and brother-in-law, together with their intimate retainer (panakawan), Rajamenggala, to return to Java with their wives, servants and children in August 1832.226 For Dipanagara, it must have been a merciful


223 Van den Bosch’s enquiries were made via Commissioner for the Regulation of Affairs in the Princely States, Jan Izaäk van Sevenhoven, who took soundings with the newly appointed Resident of Yogyakarta, F.G. Valck. This last had been present in Magelang – as Resident of Kedu (in office 1826-1830) – when Retnaningsih and Dipanagara’s other followers elected to accompany the prince into exile, Dj.Br. 17, ‘Minuten der uitgaande brieven aan den Gouverneur-Generaal van den Commissaris aan de Hoven [Jan Izaäk van Sevenhoven]’, 1-1-1831 – 31-1-1831, J.I. van Sevenhoven (Yogyakarta) to Johannes van den Bosch (Batavia/Bogor), 30-7-1831.

224 AN, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal in rade, 2-7-1831 no. 15.

225 BNg, III:373, LXII.11-12, gives the birth date as Rebo Pon, 1 Shaban, taun Dal AJ 1759 (AD 4-1-1832), and the child’s name as ‘Radèn Mas Menadhorahman’. But there is no mention of this name in Dipanagara’s babad or in the Dutch sources. See further Appendix IV.

226 By 27-8-1832, Radèn Tumenggung Dipawiyana and Rajamenggala together with their respective wives, were back in Batavia, and by 10-9-1832, they had reached Yogyakarta, where the ever suspicious Resident, F.G. Valck, complained that the Batavian authorities had not held them long enough to check their characters and backgrounds, AN, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal in rade, 4-10-1831 no. 12, J.F.W. van Nes (Batavia) to Johannes van den Bosch, 27-8-1832;
Plate 79. Daniel François Willem Pietermaat (1790-1848), Resident of Manado (1827-1831) and deputy governor of Makassar (1833). He oversaw Dipanagara’s transfer from Manado to Makassar in June-July 1833, and later became Resident of Batavia (1834-1837) and Resident of Surabaya (1839-1848), where he died. Lithograph probably made in 1838, when he was on sick leave in the Netherlands. The house depicted through the open window is probably the Residency House of Batavia or Het Huis Simpang in Surabaya. Photograph by courtesy of the Stichting Iconografisch Bureau, Den Haag.
relief to be rid of his feisty sibling and her equally difficult husband. The four rooms in Fort New Amsterdam were now left free for the prince and his wife to care for their eight-month-old son, whose birth, according to Cambier, had given the prince much pleasure. Radèn Mas Kindar would grow up, according to an official report, into a strikingly handsome and energetic young man whom Dipanagara would take care to educate – along with his younger brothers, Radèn Mas Sarkuma (1834-1849) and Radèn Mas Dulkabli (alias Radèn Mas Mutawaridin; born circa 1835) – ‘as a priest’, namely in the pesantrèn (religious boarding school) style. He would develop into a warm and zealous Muslim with a deep hatred of all things Dutch.

One of the ways in which Dipanagara sought to educate his children in the iniquities of Dutch rule was by entertaining them with accounts of his life and times. In the words of the Civil and Military Governor of the Celebes (Sulawesi) Colonel Alexander van der Hart (1808-1855; in office, 1853-1855, who reported to the governor-general immediately after Dipanagara’s death on 8 January 1855, the prince had kept (Sagimun 1965:360):

his sons constantly engaged in prison [in Fort Rotterdam, Makassar, 1833-1855] with tales of his life and adventures […] an embittered father, he considered us [the Dutch] as his [sworn] religious enemies and the cause of all his misfortunes and protracted suffering. He thus imprinted little love for us on his children’s [minds].

The principal vehicle for Dipanagara’s instruction was his autobiography whose inception the prince described somewhat fancifully as follows (Carey 1981a:lx note 78):

XLIII.322 Resident Pietermaat

323 enquired of the sultan [Dipanagara]:

‘What is the reason
Your Highness came here?’

Smiling the sultan replied:

F.G. Valck (Yogyakarta) to Johannes van den Bosch (Batavia/Bogor), 10-10-1832.
227 AN, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal ad interim (J.C. Baud) in rade, 24-4-1833 no. 19, J.P.C. Cambier (Manado) to J.C. Baud (Batavia/Bogor), 22-2-1833. Radèn Mas Kindar subsequently bore the title of Pangéran Abdurrahman, but this was not recognised by the Dutch, Appendix IV note 8.
228 Radèn Mas Sarkuma (1834-1849), and possibly Radèn Mas Mutawaridin (Pangéran Dulkabli) (born circa 1835), are mentioned in the Dutch reports as children of Dipanagara by Retnaningish, see Appendix IV notes 8-9.
229 AN, Geheim Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal 10-5-1855 La R, Colonel A. van der Hart (Makassar) to A.J. Duymaer van Twist (Batavia/Bogor), 12-1-1855, stating that Radèn Mas Kindar and his younger brother, Radèn Mas Dulkabli (Radèn Mas Sarkuma had since died, 3-1849), had received a ‘complete priestly education’ from Dipanagara, but that Kindar had matured into a ‘warm and zealous Muslim’ rather than a ‘fanatic’ (dweeper). See further Sagimun 1965:359-60.
‘Ah, Resident, if you ask me, promise me can you deliver this letter [requesting permission to depart on the haj] to the King of the Netherlands [William I, reigned 1813-1840]? If you promise it, I will indeed tell you the reason why I came to Manado. If you cannot promise, then it is in vain that I tell you the real facts.’ The Resident gave his pledge. Then he was given the chronicle from the very beginning until the final arrival in Manado. Resident Pietermaat, when he heard the truth, became deeply ashamed because of the perfidy of his countrymen, how they had been able to end the war in this treacherous fashion. We talk no more of this.

Pietermaat may well have encouraged Dipanagara to write down his personal memoirs, although by the time the prince began to compose his babad on 20 May 1831, the Dutch official had already departed from Manado to take up a post in Batavia. We know from the late nineteenth-century scholar, A.B. Cohen Stuart, that the manuscript, which ran to over 1,000 folio-sized pages in pégon, the script favoured by the more self-consciously religious communities in Java, remained in the hands of Dipanagara’s descendants in Makassar after his death and was presumably considered by them as a family heirloom. It was divided into two parts. The first part – roughly a third of the

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230 NA, Koloniaal Archief A.272, Stamboek [service record] of Mr Daniel, Francois, Willem Pietermaat (born Schiedam 2-10-1790, died Simpang, Surabaya 30-11-1848), states that he was granted two-years’ leave in the Netherlands in January 1831, and left the Manado Residency the following month in the hands of J.P.C. Cambier, who served as acting Resident (1831-1834). Pietermaat does not seem to have taken his furlough at this time because the next entries on his record indicate that he was immediately appointed a deputy judge of the Hooggerechtshof (High Court) in Batavia (1832-1833). After supervising Dipanagara’s transfer to Makassar (20-6-1833 – 12-7-1833), he briefly served as deputy governor of Makassar and Resident of Semarang (both posts held in 1834), before becoming Resident of Batavia (1834-1837). Health reasons then forced him to ask to take his delayed two-year leave in the Netherlands (1838-1840). On his return to the Indies, he served as Resident of Surabaya (1840-1848), dying in post.

231 Carey 1981a:lix note 73. Unfortunately, the two pégon script copies made by Cohen Stuart’s scribes in Batavia in the mid-1870s are now illegible because of the oxidisation of the ink on the thin paper used. The Makassar original is also now no longer extant. See further pp. xvi-xvii.
entire work – gives the history of Java from the fall of Majapahit (circa 1527) to the peace of Giyanti (1755). The second part deals with the prince’s own life and times from his birth in 1785 to his exile in Manado. Completed in just under nine months (20 May 1831-2 February 1832), it was written precisely during the period when the tension between Dipanagara and his close family members was at its height. Given the intensity of Dipanagara’s output – over one hundred folio pages a month – for which he had only the help of a single amanuensis, it is not hard to surmise that during this period Dipanagara would have had his attention completely focussed on his literary production. No wonder that he eschewed horse rides and visits to his garden plot and meditation hut. No wonder that he proved a cantakerous and difficult companion to his increasingly exasperated family during these months in Fort New Amsterdam. What author, cooped up in four rooms in a hot fortress town whose inhabitants were indifferent if not hostile, and with argumentative relatives would not have felt as he did? The pains of exile and authorship hardly come more purgatorial than this. But what a manuscript would result.

The source of Dipanagara’s anti-Dutch teachings for his growing family in Manado and Makassar, it would prove to be one of the great historical productions of modern Java – a national treasure strangely without honour in contemporary Indonesia. Here is how this magnificent work begins:

I.1 ‘I lay out the feelings of my heart
in the [sad] Mijil metre.
Created to bring solace to my heartfelt desires,
it was done in the town of Manado
without being seen by anyone,
but the grace of The All-Knowing One.

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232 This may have been the former Kedhu village official, Kyai Tirtadrana, who had joined Dipanagara from Kyai Maja’s entourage in Tonsea Lama in August 1830 (Appendix XII), and served as a Dutch spy reporting to Pietermaat and Cambier on Dipanagara’s movements. Described by Pietermaat as a ‘very able man’ fluent in Malay, he accompanied the Resident on visits to Dipanagara in Fort New Amsterdam, AN, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal in rade, 30-10-1830 no. 28, D.F.W. Pietermaat (Manado) to Johannes van den Bosch (Batavia/Bogor), 20-8-1830. F.G. Valck, then serving as Resident of Yogyakarta (1831-1841), however, characterised him as untrustworthy. He had apparently been dismissed as a head demang of the Grabag district in northeastern Kedhu before the Java War for corruption and extortion. Taken on by Valck during the war as a spy based in Magelang, he was supposed to report the movements of Dipanagara’s forces, but had betrayed Valck’s secrets and had plotted with Dipanagara’s forces to kill the head opium pachtter (tax farmer) of Kedhu, Johannes (? an Armenian), and capture his tax farm moneys as he was travelling from Magelang to Yogya, Dj.Br. 17, J.I. van Sevenhoven (Yogyakarta) to Johannes van den Bosch (Batavia/Bogor), 30-7-1831. The only other possibilities are that the priest, referred to various as ‘Sataruna’ or ‘Suranata’, who was sent over from Tonsea Lama, to help Dipanagara’s religious duties during the fasting month of March-April 1831, and who presumably could write Javanese in pégon script; or that his brother-in-law Dipawiyana, who was reported to be fluent in both Javanese and pégon script (Knoerle:10), were the amanuenses used by Dipanagara for the composition of his babad.
Much does my heart feel of [past] discordant actions. So now my heart is fixed. How would it be with my actions if there was not also the forgiveness of The Almighty?

I have experienced shame and suffering, but my request is that all former things should be set aside, [and] that my family should truly observe the Religion of The Prophet thereby gaining succour.233

Closing the circle: the state prisoner of Fort Rotterdam, Makassar, 1833-1855

Even as Dipanagara was dictating these lines, half a world away in the Kingdom of the United Netherlands, events were taking place which would alter radically the conditions under which the prince and his family were held in exile. Exasperated by the same Dutch quest for immediate profit which had led to such suffering in south-central Java before the Java War (Chapter IX), the inhabitants of the Southern Netherlands had risen in revolt following an insurrection in Brussels on 24 August 1830. Belgian independence had been proclaimed (4 October 1830), but despite the pressures from the great powers and the elevation of Leopold of Saxe-Coburg as the new Belgian monarch (21 July 1831, reigned 1831-1865), the Dutch king, William I (reigned 1813-1840), had refused to disarm. A series of military engagements had ensued which eventually led to a French army entering Belgium in support of the nationalist forces and bombarding the citadel of Antwerp where a Dutch garrison under General David Hendrik Chassé (1765-1849)234 eventually surrendered after a heroic two-year siege (December 1832). In early 1833, it seemed that the French might even cross the Dutch-Belgian border into Zeeland. With a European war looming, Van den Bosch became seriously alarmed that ‘an unscrupulous enemy’ – by which he clearly meant the British – might seek to use the large numbers of exiles in the ‘outer possessions’ for political purposes. In particular, he was concerned that Dipanagara might take advantage of the

233 BD (Manado) I:1, I (Mijil) 1-3. sun amedhar suraosaning ati/ atembang pumiyo/ pan kinarya anglipur brangtané/ anèng Kitha Menadhu duk kardi/ tan ana kaeksì/ nging sihing Hyang Agung. 2. mapan kathah kang karasèng galihl/ ing tingkah kadudon/ pan mangkana ing tyas pangasthiné/ kaya paran solah insun iki/ yèn tan ana ugi/ apura Hyang Agung. 3. lara wirang pan wus sun lakoni/ nging panu- huning ngongi/ ingkang karilan kang dhingin kabèh/ kulawarga kang ngèsthokken yekti/ mring Agama Nabi/ ôlh apitulung.

234 A Waterloo veteran, he was nicknamed ‘Général Baionette’ (General Bayonet) by Napoleon because of his predilection for the use of this weapon in close hand-to-hand combat.
opportunity of a new European conflict to escape and return to Java to lead a new rebellion.\(^{235}\) It was clearly inappropriate for him to remain in the town of Manado close to the shipping routes where British naval forces might re-appear at any moment to repeat their previous 1795-1797 and 1808-1810 amphibious operations when nearly all the Dutch outer island possessions had fallen into their hands. The trusted Pietermaat was thus delegated to leave his post at the High Court in Batavia and return immediately to Manado to arrange for Dipanagara’s transfer to a newly constructed strongpoint deep in the Minahasan interior.\(^{236}\)

Once in Manado, Pietermaat soon realised that Van den Bosch’s proposals were impractical. The Netherlands Indies Government had no legal sovereignty in Minahasa, its authority depending on a contract with the local chiefs dating back to 1810. It thus had no rights over land. Without the permission of the local authorities no fort could be built in the interior. Besides, none of the chiefs, in Pietermaat’s view, would believe that such a strongpoint was being constructed only to house an ‘unimportant person’ like Dipanagara. They would suspect that it was a move by the government in the direction of outright annexation and they would resist it. If it came to war, what could a garrison of 40 Dutch and native troops in Manado do against a hostile Minahasan population of 80,000? Furthermore, the British were well liked in Minahasa. During the period of their rule (1811-1817), they had treated the population well giving lavish presents to the local chiefs and demanding no forced deliveries or personal labour services from the peasant cultivators. If they landed they would be welcomed with open arms.

An alternative strategy would have to be found. One such alternative actively canvassed by Van den Bosch both during his period as commissioner-general of the Netherlands Indies (1832-1834) and as minister of the Colonies (1834-1839), was to send Dipanagara, along with other prominent Indonesian exiles, back to the Netherlands. His suggestion was that they should be held in one of the royal fortresses which served as state prisons for members of the Dutch elite, such as Loevestein in Gelderland\(^{237}\) and Woerden in the province of Utrecht.\(^{238}\) All the costs would be met by the Indies exchequer, meaning, in Dipanagara’s case, the Yogya court. If Dipanagara had rejected Tondano with

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235 NA, Ministerie van Koloniën 2846, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal ad interim (J.C. Baud) in rade, 8-3-1833 no. 2.

236 AN, Exhibitum 20-3-1833, Geheim Verbaal no. 470a, D.F.W. Pietermaat (Manado) to Johannes van den Bosch (Batavia/Bogor), 9-3-1833.

237 A water fortress at the junction of the Maas and Waal rivers, Loevestein was built between 1357 and 1368. It was renowned for the celebrated escape of the Rotterdam scholar, Hugo de Groot (1583-1645), who smuggled himself out hidden in a book case.

238 Built in 1410 and extensively altered and renovated through the years, Woerden had served as a none too arduous billet for the gentlemen-prisoners of the Dutch Directory in 1798, Schama 1977:324.
its 69 degree Fahrenheit mean early morning temperature as too cold (note 201), no leap of the imagination is necessary to contemplate how many Dutch winters he would have survived in the damp fortresses of the Netherlands ‘water line’ frontier defence system.\textsuperscript{239} It was fortunate for the prince that the Dutch king rejected Van den Bosch’s proposal out of hand as politically unacceptable.\textsuperscript{240} Indeed, it would not be until the early twentieth century that

\textsuperscript{239} Built partly out of the profits of Van den Bosch’s Cultivation System (1830-1870), these nineteenth-century frontier defense works, comprised a line of canals, sluices and fortifications south of Utrecht in western Holland, known as the Nieuwe Hollandse waterlinie (‘New Dutch Water Line’). They were originally designed to prevent another French invasion like that of 1795-1796 when the French Army of the North had crossed the frozen canals and rivers into Holland and had established a pro-French regime in The Hague.

\textsuperscript{240} Correspondence relating to Van den Bosch’s proposal can be found in the besluit of the Minister of the Colonies, 28-7-1834 no. 177k, in NA, Ministerie van Koloniën 4234, Geheim Verbaal, 23-7-1834 no. 177k geheim. See further AN, Exhibitum, 9-12-1834 La R geheim, J.C. Baud (Batavia/Bogor) to Johannes van den Bosch (The Hague), 2-2-1834; Johannes van den Bosch (The Hague) to J.C. Baud (Batavia/Bogor), 28-7-1834), King William I (The Hague) to Johannes van den Bosch (The Hague), 9-12-1834.
Map 7. Groundplan of Fort Rotterdam, Makassar (now Benteng Makassar) showing the main buildings and Dipanagara’s quarters, 1833-1855. Outline taken from the NA (Nationaal Archief), Leupe Collection 1309, ‘Hoofd plan van ’t Kasteel Rotterdam [...]’, door C.F. Reimer, n.y. [1770?]. The relevant places relating to Dipanagara are: F – the house of the VOC storekeeper (winkelier) which after August 1809 was converted into officers’ quarters (no. 6); F1* – officers’ dwelling no. 7, the location of Dipanagara’s quarters near the main guardhouse with an attic view over Makassar harbour and which in 1844 were enlarged by the addition of two rooms from the adjacent officers’ dwelling no. 6; G – the main guardhouse or hoofdwacht. Map drawn by J. Wilbur Wright of Oxford.
Indonesian exiles were sent back to the Netherlands and then as in-country detainees rather than as state prisoners incarcerated in royal fortresses.\textsuperscript{241}

With his plans to transfer Dipanagara to the Netherlands finding little favour, Van den Bosch hit on an Indies alternative. The prince would be moved south in deepest secrecy to Makassar where he would be held until his dying breath in Admiral Cornelis Janszoon Speelman’s (1628-1684) great stronghold of Fort Rotterdam.\textsuperscript{242} Instead of Manado’s puny 40-strong garrison, the south Sulawesi fortress boasted a complement of 200 soldiers and powerful gun batteries mounted on its five great bastions which covered all the approaches from sea and land. It was altogether a more formidable defensive structure. In this way, Dipanagara and his followers\textsuperscript{243} would exchange Fort New Amsterdam for Fort Rotterdam travelling the length of the Dutch eastern Indonesian gulag by naval schooner, a clandestine twenty-one day (20 June-11 July 1833) odyssey made all the more poignant by the name of the vessel tasked with transporting them, the \textit{Circe}, styled after the queen goddess in Homer’s epic who could transform men into animals. Van den Bosch went to enormous lengths to ensure that even the local Dutch authorities in Manado were not informed of Dipanagara’s true destination. Acting Resident Cambier was to be told that the prince was bound for Ternate. Meanwhile, the schooner’s captain was only to be instructed to hold course for Makassar when he had cleared the roads of Manado. On reaching Makassar on 11 July 1833, the ship’s officers were sworn to secrecy and forbidden to enter into any correspondence regarding their voyage. The ship’s log was altered and immediately after depositing the prince and his party, it sailed to Ambon making it look as though the Moluccas had been its original destination all along. On arrival in Ambon, the captain was relieved of any obligation to report his movements to the local Dutch authorities in Fort Victoria.\textsuperscript{244} But even these strict instructions seem to have been of little avail in preventing the schooner’s Indonesian sailors from reacting badly to the former Java War leader’s

\textsuperscript{241} The three founders of the Indische Partij (Indies Party), E.F.E. Douwes Dekker (Setiabuddhi, 1879-1950), Radèn Mas Suwardi Suryaningrat (Ki Hadjar Dewantara, 1889-1959), and Dr Tjijpto Mangunkusumo (1885-1943), were exiled to the Netherlands by the Indies government in 1913 and were only allowed to return at the end of World War I (1914-1918).

\textsuperscript{242} Named after Speelman’s birthplace in Holland.

\textsuperscript{243} Besides Dipanagara, his wife, Retnaningsih, and eighteen-month old son, Radèn Mas Abdurrahman (Radèn Mas Kindar), twenty-three followers accompanied the prince, AN, Exhibitum 13-10-1834 La E geheim, D.F.W. Pietermaat (Makassar) to J.C. Baud (Batavia/Bogor), 23-7-1834; Appendix XII.

\textsuperscript{244} AN, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal ad interim (J.C. Baud), 8-3-1833 no. 2; AN, Geheim Verbaal, 13-10-1834 La E, D.F.W. Pietermaat (Manado) to J.C. Baud (Batavia/Bogor), 9-3-1833; J.C. Baud (Batavia/Bogor) to Governor of Makassar, 20-3-1833 zeer geheim (secret instructions handed over by Pietermaat to the governor of Makassar on the arrival of the \textit{Circe}; D.F.W. Pietermaat (Manado) to J.C. Baud (Batavia/Bogor), 20-6-1833 (reporting Dipanagara’s embarkation); 11-7-1833 (reporting his administration of oath to ship’s officers of \textit{Circe} on arrival in Makassar).
presence in their midst. Jan Izaäk van Sevenhoven (in office 1832-1839), who served as a member of the Raad van Indië (Council of the Indies), would later advise that Dipanagara should never again be moved by a Dutch warship given the possibility of mutiny amongst the ship’s crew. Any further transfers should be by ‘colonial trader’, namely by ordinary merchantman.245

Unlike in Manado, neither the prince nor his followers were to be allowed outside the walls of Fort Rotterdam, at least not until the state prisoner had breathed his last (8 January 1855). Dipanagara was to be held in an officer’s billet, previously home to two lieutenants,246 close to the main guardhouse with an attic view over Makassar harbour and with the high inner curtain wall of the fort blocking the landward perspective towards the town (see Map 7). The prince was permitted to take exercise under escort within the bounds of the fort but only between the hours of sunrise and sunset. At sunset, the military commandant was to check that both he and his followers were back in their quarters. No-one was to be allowed to visit the prince except with the express permission of the governor. The only exceptions were the commandant, the officer in charge of the guard detail and the senior Dutch interpreter in Malay. Special attention was to be paid that neither Dipanagara nor his followers struck up relations with the local Indonesian soldiers, servants, other exiles and members of the chain gangs working inside the fort. Garrison personnel were also to be discouraged from spreading any gossip about Dipanagara’s presence in their midst. In the event of war in Europe and the threat of a naval landing, the governor of Makassar could consider moving Dipanagara immediately into the interior to a place such as Maros, or further along the coast to Bonthain or Bulukumba by Bugis prau (schooner) under the guard of an officer. Finally, the Makassar harbourmaster was to ensure that all private correspondence being sent out from the port was to be addressed to the governor-general ad interim, J.C. Baud,247 so that it could be opened and inspected in the Algemene Secretarie (General Secretariat) in Batavia before being passed on to the addressees. At the same time, skippers

245 AN, Geheim Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal, 15-7-1837 no. 57, written advice of J.J. van Sevenhoven, 16-12-1836.
246 These officers’ quarters had been created on Daendels’ orders in 1809 from the previous houses of the chief administrator (hoofdadministrateur), preacher (predikant) and storeman (winkelier), so that the whole military garrison could be housed inside the fort, KITLV H 817, A.J.A.F. Eerdmans, ‘Algemeene geschiedenis van Celebes’, volume I, part 2:355-6, referring to Daendels’ report of 23-8-1809 to the Minister of Colonies (The Hague). I am grateful to Professor C. Campbell Macknight for this information, personal communication, Leiden, 10-12-1975. The reference to the particular officer’s billet no. 6, occupied by Dipanagara, having been the home of two lieutenants, is in AN, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal ad interim (Pieter Merkus) in rade, 10-5-1841 no. 3, R. de Bousquet (Makassar) to Governor-General ad interim (Batavia/Bogor), 14-12-1840.
247 Baud served as ad interim governor-general from 10-1-1833 to 31-1-1834, while Van den Bosch carried out his duties as commissioner-general, see Appendix IX note 6.
of Bugis prau and other local vessels were to be warned to take no parcels or letters to Java.\textsuperscript{248}

Just how easy it proved for Dipanagara and his followers to breach these seemingly comprehensive restrictions on their freedom can be seen in the aforementioned episode of the prince’s correspondence with the recently promoted Major-General J.B. Cleerens, who had negotiated the 16 February 1830 Rèmakamal meeting. Not only was Dipanagara informed of the Flemish officer’s return to Java within weeks of his arrival in Batavia on 13 October 1835, but he was also able to dictate a formal letter to him complete with yellow silk cover and seal, which he succeeded in delivering to Java by clandestine means (Appendix XIII part B). So much for Van den Bosch’s elaborate security instructions. How could it be otherwise? Dipanagara’s family and extensive following could hardly be insulated from contacts with the rest of Indonesian society in Fort Rotterdam. Although the prince himself was accommodated with his wife and son in the two-room former officers’ residence right by the main guardhouse, his followers lived in the servants’ quarters in an adjacent part of the fort where they could mix freely with the locally born civilian and military members of the garrison. There would thus have been plenty of opportunity to smuggle news in and outside the prince’s fortress prison. Besides, Makassar was not Manado. Unlike Christian Minahasa – the so-called ‘thirteenth province of Holland’\textsuperscript{249} where a majority Christian population tended to be hostile towards pious inner island Muslim exiles like Dipanagara and Tuanku Imam Bonjol – neither the Makassarese nor the Bugis had any love for the Dutch. The prince’s devotion to Islam, albeit one coloured by his Javanese beliefs, would also have commanded their respect. And the feeling was mutual. In April 1844, after Dutch de facto recognition of Belgian independence in 1840 had removed any lingering threat of Holland’s involvement in a European war, the governor of Makassar had asked Dipanagara whether he might like to be transferred to another part of the Netherlands Indies where there would be less restrictions on his freedom and more living space for his growing family. No, answered the prince, he wished to spend the rest of his days in Makassar, a decision reinforced five years later by his request to be buried in the South Sulawesi capital close to the grave of his second son\textsuperscript{250}

\textsuperscript{248} AN, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal ad interim (J.C.Baud), 11-3-1833, geheim, La A.
\textsuperscript{249} Holland traditionally had seven provinces to which four ‘Generaliteitslanden’ (Generality lands; Limburg, Vlaanderen, Brabant and Gelre [Venlo]) had been added between the treaties of Westphalia in 1648 and Utrecht in 1713, thus making eleven ‘provinces’. The Christianised regions of Ambon and Minahasa (Manado) were sometimes referred to in jest as the ‘twelfth’ and ‘thirteenth’ provinces of Holland given their staunchly pro-Dutch stance during the colonial period (1602-1942).
\textsuperscript{250} This was Radèn Mas Sarkuma (born July 1834), who had died prematurely aged 13 in March 1849 (Appendix IV), and had been buried in the Kampung Melayu (Malay quarter) of Makassar where Dipanagara’s grave would also be situated.
rather than have his mortal remains transferred back to Java for interment in
the royal graveyard at Imagiri close to the grave of his beloved wife Radèn
Ayu Maduretna (Ratu Kedhaton) (?1798-1828). Is it any wonder then that
despite his incarceration in Fort Rotterdam, Dipanagara had the means of
communicating secretly with Java, in particular through correspondence taken
by skippers of Indonesian trading ships?

Even after most of his followers had been separated from him in June
1839, leaving just one Javanese woman to do the heavy household chores
and three Javanese intimate retainers (panakawan) to look after his children,
news of Dipanagara’s situation continued to reach the outside world. Just
before the outbreak of the February 1848 Revolution in Paris, for example, an
article appeared in the French press fiercely critical of the way in which the
prince was being treated in exile. It spoke of him being held ‘in the Moluccas
[Maluku]’ (Carey 1982:3):

enclosed between the four walls in a little fort, separated from his family, closely
watched, denied the means of writing either to the governor-general or to whoever
else, treated over the past eighteen years with a harshness and a cruel severity little
worthy of the government of this country [the Netherlands].

The question of how such news about Dipanagara got out is an intriguing
one. After the clampdown which followed his communication with Cleerens
in December 1835, the restrictions placed on the former Java War leader
and those serving in his household were so severe that the Dutch authorities
could persuade no Makassarese or Bugis to take employment with him.
And this despite the fact that the governor very much wanted a trusted local
to work with the prince so that he could report on his movements. Those
Javanese who remained with Dipanagara were now no longer allowed to

251 AN, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal in rade, 21-6-1844 no. 16, P.J.B. de Perez (Gov-
ernor of Moluccas) (Makassar) to Pieter Merkus (Batavia/Bogor), 9-4-1844; AN, Geheim Besluit
van den Gouverneur-Generaal in rade, 11-5-1849 La V, P.J.B. de Perez (Makassar) to J.J. Rochus-
sen (Batavia/Bogor), 20-3-1849 (on Dipanagara’s decision to be buried in Makassar rather than at
Imagiri as he had originally intended when he was exiled in 1830).

252 These were Gunadanti (alias Trunadanti), who served as Dipanagara’s principal domestic
helper, Dipanagara’s panakawan, Sahiman (alias Rujakbeling) and Kasimun (alias Wangsadikrama/
Sadikrama), the latter’s wife, Sarinah, and Teplak (alias Fikpak, alias Rujakgadhung), who was
originally described as a ‘man servant’ but seems to have become more like a panakawan after
the transfer of the bulk of Dipanagara’s other followers to Tondano via Ambon in June 1839, NA,
Ministerie van Koloniën 4502, Geheim Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal, 16-9-1837, citing
the secret letter of Governor of Makassar, R. de Bousquet, 10-7-1837 no. La A; AN, Besluit van den
Gouverneur-Generaal in rade, 19-5-1850 no. 8, enclosing ‘Nominatieve Lijst van den staatsgevan-
gene Pangerang Diepo Negoro en familie [sic] benevens volgelingen en bedienden’, Makassar,
7-11-1849, which refers to Rujakgadhung as a ‘follower’ (volgeling) rather than a ‘servant’ (bedien-
der). See further Appendix XII nos. 7, 12-13 and 18. By the time this register was drawn up in late
1849, Dipanagara is listed as having two additional male servants (Godek and Dalima), in addition
to seven women (three of whom were the wives of his panakawan) and four children born to
members of his household.
marry Makassarese or Bugis but had to choose their partners from amongst
the Javanese community in the local Kampung Jawa (Javanese quarter) or
the families of Javanese soldiers serving in the garrison. Even then their par-
ents-in-law were to be informed that they would be placed under surveil-
lance and no longer permitted to mix freely with the locals.253 Yet, still news
of Dipanagara’s situation leaked out. How could this have happened? The
Indonesian crew of the schooner Circe, which had transported Dipanagara
from Manado in mid-1833, may well have talked with their families and
friends in Java. We also know that Dipanagara continued to write to his rela-
tives. In late 1839, for example, he attempted to send a letter through to his
mother, Radèn Ayu Mangkarawati, in Yogyakarta which the Dutch authorities
refused to pass on because he insisted on styling himself with his old
Java War titles.254 The decision to open Makassar as a free port in 1848 in or-
der to help the Dutch withstand the increased commercial competition from
Singapore (Van Marle 1971:37) led to many more Indonesian and Arab ves-
sels visiting the South Sulawesi harbour town. This in turn opened up new
opportunities for contact with the outside world.255 It is possible that through
such informal channels, the Semarang-based family of the Javanese painter,
Radèn Salèh Syarif Bustaman, which had close contacts with the Yogyakarta
court,256 were informed of Dipanagara’s plight. Indeed, the present author
has even suggested that Saleh himself was the source of the report which ap-
peared in the French press given that he visited Paris frequently in the late
1840s and made a number of lengthy stays in the French capital in order to
work with leading French artists (Carey 1982:3-4; Scalliet 2005:253).

The Dutch authorities certainly took the report seriously. Baud, who was
then serving as minister of the Colonies (in office 1840-1848), reported to King
William II that he had ordered the Dutch ambassador in Paris to refute stren-
uously the charges in the French press (Carey 1982:4). The points which Baud
insisted the Dutch representative make in the correspondence column of the

253 AN, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal in rade, 21-6-1844 no. 16, P.J.B. de Perez (Makas-
sar) to Pieter Merkus (Batavia/Bogor), 9-4-1844.
254 AN, Geheim Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal in rade, 11-1-1840 La B.
255 AN, Geheim Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal in rade, 11-5-1849 La V, P.J.B. de Perez
(Surabaya) to J.J. Rochussen (Batavia/Bogor), 20-3-1849, stating that now that Makassar was a free
port Dipanagara would have greater ease in escaping by using one of the numerous ‘native boats
which constantly crowded Makassar harbour’. But in the governor’s view, Dipanagara showed
no signs of wanting to escape and start new political disturbances in Java. In 1846, two years’
before Makassar’s opening as a free port, the governor had taken the precaution of reissuing the
rules relating the settlement of foreigners in Makassar which required them to ask his permission
first, Staatsblad van Nederlandsch Indië 54, 12-10-1849, referring to regulation 9-9-1846 no. 7 of the
governor of Celebes en Onderhoorigheden.
256 Saleh’s second wife, Radèn Ayu Danudireja, was a daughter of Dipanagara’s former junior
army commander (amad dullai) in Bagelen, Mas Kertawangsya Kalapa-aking, Carey 1982:5 note
22.
French newspaper in question are revealing both of aspects of the prince’s life in Makassar and the self-perception of the Dutch government. The prince, Baud stressed, was not being held in Maluku, still less in a small fort but in the ‘spacious surroundings’ of Fort Rotterdam where he occupied one of the officer’s quarters. Far from being deprived of his family, he had his wife and seven children born to him in exile around him, one of whom was now of marriageable age. Indeed, so extensive had Dipanagara’s family become that an adjacent officer’s dwelling had had to be converted for his use. Although he was not allowed to write letters in view of his status as a state prisoner (staatsgevangene), he could write for his own amusement and had with him books and Javanese manuscripts copied for him at government expense in Surakarta for the education of his children. Governor of Makassar (post-1847, Celebes) Petrus Johannes Baptiste de Perez (1803-1859; in office 1840-1848), whose official residence was situated inside Fort Rotterdam, also spoke frequently with him about his needs and requirements. In short, according to Baud, Dipanagara was being treated in the same humanitarian fashion which Governor-General Van den Bosch had originally envisaged when he signed the orders relating to the prince’s exile on 30 April 1830.

As Baud indicated, one of the key features of Dipanagara’s life in his latter years in Fort Rotterdam was the attention he paid to his family, in particular his children. In January 1844, he asked the governor for a number of Javanese texts which he wanted to have to hand for the education of his five sons, three of whom were reaching puberty. This was the age when as young male Javanese they might have contemplated setting off for further study in various local pesantren as most of the prince’s sons by his previous wives had done during his years at Tegalreja. It is significant that at least two of the texts which the prince requested at this time, the Serat Ménak and the Asmara Supi, a romance related to the Ménak cycle, had strongly Islamic themes, dealing as they did with the life of The Prophet, the exploits of his
The power of prophecy

uncle, Amir Hamza, and of the latter’s fictive descendant, Asmara Supi. These were the type of texts often studied in religious boarding schools in Java at this time. There is a note in Low Javanese in the dispatch sent by the governor – seemingly in Dipanagara’s own rather untidy hand – which gives very specific instructions regarding the passages which the prince wished to have copied. For the Ménak, these were to include The Prophet’s life up to his war with Raja Lakad, and for the Asmara Supi, the hero’s exploits up to the time of his return to Banjar Alim. The prince was also very insistent that all the drawings and figures in the originals should be copied into his texts. After much delay, the Javanese translator in Surakarta, C.F. Winter Sr (in office 1820-1859), reported that none of the texts had drawings and the costs would come to a hefty f 368, over a month’s wages for a middle-rank Dutch colonial officer (chief secretary) at this time (Houben 1994:92). Pleading poverty, the government took the decision to drop one of the texts. Their choice fell on the Serat Ménak perhaps because its subject matter – The Prophet’s life – was too sensitive. After all, why should the government be helping Dipanagara to bring up his children as devout Muslims? It would not be until August 1847, a few months before Baud wrote to the Dutch ambassador in Paris, that all the copies were finished and dispatched to Makassar, a delay of three and a half years from the prince’s original request.

If the government was not prepared to help Dipanagara obtain suitable reading material on Islamic themes from libraries in Java, the prince was quite able to create his own. ‘Writing for his own amusement’ in Baud’s words was a feature of the prince’s life in Makassar just as it had been in Manado. A decade before Baud’s letter, the prince had already begun the composition of another two substantial manuscripts in pégon, entitled Sejarah Ratu Tanah Jawa (‘The history of the kings of Java’) and the Hikayat Tanah Jawa (‘Chronicle

262 Pigeaud 1967-80, I:132-3, 212-4, 223. The name Asmara Supi is derived from the Arabic šīfī, an adept in mysticism.
263 AN, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal buiten rade, 25-10-1844 no. 6, P.J.B. de Perez (Makassar) to Pieter Merkus (Batavia/Bogor), 29-1-1844, containing a handwritten note in Javanese possibly by Dipanagara, in which he asks for the Surat Ménak lucrē kang ngantos dumugi Lakad, and the Surat Semara Supi ngantos mantuk dhateng Banjar Alim as well as the Surat Gandakusumu kung ngantos dumugi Jakaradéya, the Surat Manikmaya, the Surat Purwa kung ngantos dumugi Bronggayuda and the Surat Aŋrēni kung ngantos demugi [sic] Panji Lalèyan. The first text would have dealt with The Prophet’s birth (how his mother Aminah conceived him), His shaving (Paras Nabi), and His Ascension to Heaven (Mikrad). Dipanagara’s requests proved difficult for the Dutch authorities in Surakarta to fulfill. Apart from one text, the Surat Manikmaya, all the other texts were hard to procure in Surakarta and the assistance of Pakubuwana VII was requested. The copies were eventually made in stages under the supervision of the Assistant-Resident of Surakarta between 15-5-1846 (Serat Manikmaya) until 27-8-1847, when the longest, the Purwa cycle of wayang plays up to the great ‘Brothers’ War’ (Bratayuda) was completed. See further Chapter III note 34.
264 The dates of the copies were made by a clerk of the Algemene Secretarie (General Secretariat) in Batavia onto the letter of the Assistant-Resident of Surakarta to Algemeen Secretaris (Batavia), 10-10-1844, in AN, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal buiten rade, 25-10-1844 no. 6.
of the Land of Java’), they were written on Netherlands-Indies government paper cut into small octavo sized sheets probably for reasons of economy. The first bears the date 5 Dulkijah AJ 1765 (AD 24 January 1838) and has 175 pages. The second is undated and runs to 245 pages. Both texts were composed during the period when the prince’s freedom had been severely restricted following the discovery of his letter to Cleerens. Unlike his babad, his two Makassar notebooks are in prose and not tembang (Javanese verse). They are written in a curious Javanese style with many Arabic words and phrases, a style which recalls the prose form of Dipanagara’s personal letters (Appendix XIII) rather than the literary cadences of his babad.

The first book – the Sejarah Ratu Tanah Jawa – deals with the history of Java and Javanese historical legends from Adam to the fall of Majapahit in circa 1527 and the coming of Islam. It thus appears as a prelude to the historical survey at the beginning of the prince’s babad. But unlike the latter, which follows a strictly chronological order, the Sejarah is written in anecdotal fashion with many digressions on diverse topics such as wayang, legendary heroes and holy sites. It is as though the prince was having a series of conversations with his family and had set down on paper a number of lengthy discourses on a variety of subjects for their subsequent instruction and entertainment. The second book, the Hikayat Tanah Jawa, specifically states that it was composed by Dipanagara who referred to himself by the titles he had adopted during the Java War, Sultan Ngabdulkamid Èrucaakra Kabirul Mukminin Panatagama Kalifat Rosulullah s.m. ing Tanah Jawa (Sultan Ngadulkamid, the Just King, the first among the Believers, caliph of The Prophet of God, may peace be on Him, in the Land of Java). The contents deal with the prince’s understanding of Islam, his own religious experiences, Sufi prayers used by the Naqsbindiyya and Shatariyya mystical brotherhoods, whose teachings had influenced him during his years at Tegalreja (pp. 111-4), and various meditation techniques most of which involved the control of the breath. Diagrams (daerah) for the utterance of Arabic words and breathing exercises during prayer as well as local Javanese mystical traditions (ngèlmu) are frequently referred to. Indeed, the whole book is rather reminiscent of a Javanese divination manual or primbons (Carey 1981a:xxx-xxxi). These then were the texts which Dipanagara composed for the edification of his family in Makassar and which were still in the hands of his descendants in Makassar when the present author did his fieldwork there in September 1972.

In April 1844, some three months after Dipanagara’s request for the Javanese manuscript copies from Surakarta, the governor of Makassar reported that the prince was preparing for the circumcision ceremony of his

265 This second notebook seems incomplete and has been heavily damaged by water and termites.
eldest son, Radèn Mas Kindar (Ngabdurrahman). At the same time, the three intimate retainers (*panakawan*), who had followed Dipanagara from Java and been charged with the care of his male children born in exile (note 252), had reached marriageable age. It was this news which persuaded the governor to order the enlargement of the prince’s quarters and to look again at the rules regarding the marriage of his family and followers. It was also at this point that De Perez decided to canvass Dipanagara’s views about whether he might like to move to another part of the archipelago where he might face fewer restrictions on his living space.\(266\) Dipanagara’s refusal to contemplate such a step may have indicated a certain resignation on his part with regard to his fate as an exile. Fort Rotterdam was now his home. Indeed, in the last decade of his life, the prince was clearly preparing for his own death. In late 1848, he asked the governor if he might be allowed to see two of his sons, Pangéran Dipakusuma and Radèn Mas Raib, who had been exiled to Ambon in 1840, along with their insane sibling, Pangéran Dipaningrat. He also enquired anxiously after his eldest son, Pangéran Dipanagara II, whose whereabouts as an exile in Sumenep were still unknown to him.\(267\) Although the Dutch authorities were now showing the prince greater compassion – for example by raising his monthly stipend in view of the increase in the members of his household and the quasi-impoverishment of his family\(268\) – there were limits. Bringing the former Java War leader together with his sons, who were now sharing his fate as exiles in Madura and Ambon, clearly overstepped these. Perhaps, they reasoned, it was better that Dipanagara did not learn the full scale of the tragedy which had overwhelmed his family following his exile – the death of his second youngest son Radèn Mas Jonèd in a brawl with a soldier of the Yogya garrison in 1837 (Hageman 1856:412; Appendix IV note 2),

\(266\) AN, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal in rade, 21-6-1844, P.J.B. de Perez (Makassar) to Pieter Merkus (Batavia/Bogor), 9-4-1844.

\(267\) AN, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal in rade, 19-5-1850 no. 8, P.J.B. de Perez (Makassar) to J.J. Rochussen (Batavia/Bogor), n.d. (? 11-1848). Dipanagara II had been exiled to Sumenep in July 1834 for supposedly gathering a band of followers in Kedhu, shunning contacts with Europeans and announcing the immediate return of Dipanagara and Senthot from exile to start a new war against the Dutch, Houben 1994:238-9. He was subsequently transferred to Ambon in 1851, Appendix IV.

\(268\) AN, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal in rade, 19-5-1850 no. 8, report of Governor of Makassar (? P.J.B. de Perez), 13-10-1849, on Dipanagara’s situation in Fort Rotterdam as ‘bordering on poverty’. The f 4,200 annual allowance, which had been fixed on 16-9-1837, following the decision to transfer the bulk of Dipanagara’s followers to Tondano, was found to be inadequate for the upkeep of Dipanagara’s growing family, and the government decided to raise it to f 6,000, the extra costs to be recouped from the Yogya treasury if possible, but failing that – and Hamengkubuwana V was pleading poverty – the government itself agreed to pay, Algemene Secretaris (Batavia) to Baron A.H.W. de Kock (Yogyakarta), 28-2-1850; Baron A.H.W. de Kock (Yogyakarta) to J.J. Rochussen (Batavia/Bogor), 11-3-1850, stating that the ‘finances of Hamengkubuwana V are still in a very critical and confused state […] Dipanagara’s allowance of f 350 per month is greater than many of the princes allowances in Yogyakarta’.
the banishment of his other sons, at least one of whom had gone mad, in 1834 and 1840 (Houben 1994:243), the cavalier treatment of two of his daughters by his erstwhile army commander, Radèn Tumenggung Mertanagara (Appendix IV note 5), the spinsterhood of his other female offspring whom no Yogya priyayi (official) would dare to marry, and the transformation of part of his erstwhile estate at Tegalreja into grazing land for the Yogya Resident’s horses, and a vegetable plot and orchard for his uncle, Mangkubumi (Chapter II note 56). As late as June 1849, when one might have expected that Dipanagara’s name would no longer evoke any terror on the part of the government, one of the prince’s brothers, Pangéran Arya Rangga, was sent into exile in Ternate for no greater a crime than having contact with ‘priests’, conducting himself as a pious Muslim, and referring to his elder sibling as ‘Sultan Èrucaakra’ for whom he was prepared to sacrifice himself (Houben 1994:243-4). So much for Van den Bosch’s promise to look after Dipanagara’s family. As the last vestiges of the Dipanagaran were expunged from the Yogya kraton,269 even the princely moniker of the Java War leader seems to have become an anathema never to be bestowed again on any post-1830 member of the south central Javanese ruling elite (p. 369).

In these months when Dipanagara was looking to take his leave of his children, a letter arrived in Makassar completely out of the blue.270 It was from the prince’s aged mother, Radèn Ayu Mangkarawati (Chapter II note 11), and was included in a package forwarded by the Resident of Semarang. Dealing as it did with family affairs, the Dutch authorities in Makassar saw no difficulty in handing it over to the prince. Suddenly, in De Perez’s words, Dipanagara was put into a state of ‘high excitement’. He immediately asked for a special audience with the governor. Stating that he had been much affected by the letter, not least because he thought that his mother was long since dead, he intimated that his dearest wish was to live out the rest of his days with his parent at his side. How should he go about asking for official permission for her to join him in Makassar? De Perez counselled against such an official request fearing that if Dipanagara met with a rebuff from the governor-general, J.J. Rochussen (in office 1845-1851), it would close the door on any further negotiations. Instead, he promised that he would put out feelers by unofficial channels and see what could be done. One sticking point, he thought might be if Mangkarawati insisted on travelling to Makassar with a large entourage. No, stated Dipanagara, that was unnecessary. His mother should come over with only a few trusted servants and one intimate retainer

269 Even the official portrait of Dipanagara (Plate 12), which appears to have been made at the time of his marriage on 25-7-1807, was removed from the kraton and given to Dipanagara’s family, interview with Ibu Dr Sahir (lineal descendant of Pangéran Dipanagara II), Kota Baru, Yogyakarta, May 1972.

270 AN, Geheim Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal in rade, 11-5-1849 La V, P.J.B. de Perez (Surabaya) to J.J. Rochussen (Batavia/Bogor), 20-3-1849. De Perez had moved to Surabaya as Resident on 8-12-1848, see Klaassen 1979:26.
Onder volgen de strekkingslieden
en zijnen treffende Menschen werd afgevoerd na afname in het fort Rotterdom gelegen.

Onmiddellijk ten einde van den staatsgevangene Napier
Hij regere in deze kruiseringen
gevolg en bevonden, dat gemelde staatsgevangen ENTER en morgen
half tenen nu is overleden en
gevolg volgens bevonden van den
gemelde commissarissen officier van gemeld beeld en vermaak,
van krachten ten gevolge van
geworden jaren.

Melding overgebracht in part
zieken, dragen en waarnemen
wordt verschaft.

*Gemeente*
(panakawan), who could then depart once they had carried out their escort duties. In fact, he knew exactly whom that panakawan should be – his erstwhile commander Ali Basah Kerta Pengalasan, who had settled in Semarang after the war (Hageman 1856:412-3; Carey 1974b:282).

In early March 1849, some four months after his audience with De Perez in early March 1849, tragedy struck when Dipanagara’s second son, the fourteen-year-old Radèn Mas Sarkuma, died after a short illness. Buried in a small plot of government land in the Kampung Melayu (Malay quarter) of Makassar, this sudden bereavement set the prince thinking. He asked for a meeting with the new governor, De Perez, having departed the previous December for Surabaya to fill the post of the recently deceased Pietermaat (note 230). He offered the governor a deal. If he was allowed to live the rest of his days in Makassar with his mother by his side he would no longer insist on his mortal remains being transferred back to Java after his death. Instead, he would be content to be buried in Makassar close to the grave of his son. Stating that he was now advanced in years and did not expect to live much longer, he made a number of suggestions with regard to future arrangements for himself and his family. He wanted his son’s grave to be encircled by a low stone wall and a burial plot set aside for himself immediately adjacent to it. He also asked that the government build a house for his wife and family, as well as outhouses for his servants and a small mosque for himself in the same area as his son’s gravesite so that he could enjoy more freedom in his remaining years. The money he had saved in Manado, which he said had amounted to f 120 a month and which had been deposited in the government treasury in the Minahasan capital, should be more than sufficient, in his view, to meet the costs of this construction provided the government donated the land. Even if he was not allowed to live outside Fort Rotterdam, a residence should still be prepared for his wife and surviving family in Makassar so they would have somewhere to live on his demise.

Canny to the last in financial matters, the prince made a persuasive case for providing for his family after his death and De Perez promised to convey his detailed proposals to the authorities in Batavia. Dipanagara also entrusted the governor with a letter and special presents for his mother, including a ring with a black gemstone, which he himself had worn, and f 100 in silver coin. Despite the straitened circumstances in which his family lived in the late 1840s, the former Java War leader still apparently had jewelry and cash

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271 On the initial savings made by Dipanagara in Manado before his monthly allowance was cut, see above note 212.

272 The other presents included: 1. from Dipanagara: two pieces of white linen to make jackets, and a pot of ambergis oil (amberolie); and 2. from Retnaningsih, a jacket, a sarong (batik wrap-around) and some parem (dried linament made of ground herbs and water which is prepared by immersion in warm water), listed in AN, Geheim Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal in rade, 11-5-1849 La V, Dipanagara and Radèn Ayu Retnaningsih (Makassar) to Radèn Ayu Mangkarakwati (Yogyakarta), 25 Rabingulakir AJ 1777 (AD 20-3-1849).
Plate 82. Dipanagara’s grave (foreground) and that of his son (Radèn Mas Sarkuma, died March 1849) behind the house in the Kampung Melayu, Makassar (present-day Jl. Irian no. 83), which was built by the Dutch for his widow after his death on 8 January 1855. These graves were moved to the main Kampung Melayu burial ground in the late nineteenth century. Photograph by courtesy of the KITLV, Leiden.

savings to hand. Indeed, there is a reference in one of the governor’s reports to the prince having spent another $100 on gold ornaments, which he had made up in April 1849 perhaps in connection with the items sent to his mother. 273 In his letter to his parent, he carefully explained the arrangements he had proposed for her voyage from Semarang in the company of Pengalasan. It would only involve a five-day sea passage, he reassured her, a reference to the new steamers which had begun to link Java and the outer islands in the 1840s and which had cut journey times dramatically, making sea voyages an altogether less daunting prospect than the purgatorial sailing odysseys which Dipanagara had been forced to endure over a decade and a half earlier. 274 In

273 AN, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal in rade, 19-5-1850 no. 8, Governor of Celebes (Makassar) to J.J. Rochussen (Batavia/Bogor), 9-11-1849.
274 This requirement to send a steamer to pick Radèn Ayu Mangkarawati up in Semarang
a heart-rending image of an exile’s unrequited longing, he told her that from now on whenever a ship steamed into Makassar harbour, both he and his grandchildren would be climbing the stairs to the attic to look out over the port to see if she had arrived. Come quickly was the message, but if you cannot come ‘no matter since we are both friends’.275

Mangkarawati was, however, too old and infirm to contemplate such a journey. Although delighted to hear from her son, she told the Yogya Resident, Baron A.H.W. de Kock (in office 1848-1851), that she was now ‘nearly eighty’276 and suffering from dropsy,277 a condition which would kill her just

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275 AN, Geheim Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal, 11-5-1849 La V.

276 This refers to her age according to the Christian calendar. At this time she was already 82 in Javanese years, see further p. 74.

277 A condition in which watery fluid gathers in the tissues and cavities of the body making movement painful and difficult.
three years later (Chapter II). Very hard of hearing and almost blind, she was totally dependant on her spinster granddaughter, Radèn Ajeng Munthèng (Appendix IV), with whom she was then living in Yogyakarta. She thus had no energy or capacity to undertake the sea voyage to Makassar. De Kock gave her two days to think things over and even summoned six of Dipanagara’s brothers – including the soon to be exiled Pangéran Rangga – to put pressure on her, but she was adamant. Instead, she sent her son a letter explaining her aged condition and stating that her dearest wish was they should both enjoy prosperity (wilujeng) until they returned together to eternity.

In the same dispatch in which De Kock forwarded Mangkarawati’s letter, he strongly advised Governor-General Rochussen against allowing Dipanagara to reside outside Fort Rotterdam. In his view, the political situation in the Yogya kraton was still too delicate, and there were fears that the prince might try to escape now that Makassar had become a free port. Developments at the sultan’s court (a reference to the knotty issue of finding a suitable successor to Hamengkubuwana V), the Resident added, should be allowed to run their course before any changes were made to the conditions under which Dipanagara was being held in Makassar.

And so it was decided. The governor-general passed a secret decree on 11 May 1849 that Dipanagara would spend the rest of his days within the walls of Speelman’s great fortress. Apart from the issue of the prince’s finances, a subject of obsessive Dutch correspondence, for which a resolution was eventually found a year later (19 May 1850) when it was decided to raise his allowance to f500 a month, there are no further references to the former Java War leader in the Dutch records. None that is until the morning of Monday, 8 January 1855, when the Dutch authorities in Fort Rotterdam were roused early from their beds. One of the prince’s followers had appeared at the governor’s residence to announce that the prince had died just after sunrise at 6.30, almost the same time as the moment seventy years earlier when he had uttered his first cries after coming into the world before the pre-dawn fasting month meal in the women’s quarters of the Yogya kraton (Chapter II). After the governor had hurried over to the prince’s quarters to confirm the decease, a three-man commission was immediately appointed to authenticate an im-

278 AN, Geheim Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal in rade, 11-5-1849 La V, Radèn Ayu Mangkarawati (Yogyakarta) to Baron A.H.W. de Kock (Yogyakarta), 24 Jumadilawal, AJ 1777 (AD 1849). Mangkarawati’s letter only exists in Dutch translation, but the key words one surmises that she might have used would have been slamet or wilujeng ‘safe and sound’ (namely, good health, spiritual prosperity and welfare) and ngantos mantuk néng donya akérat (until we return to eternity).

279 For a good discussion of the tensions surrounding the choice of a successor to the near impotent Hamengkubuwana V in the period 1847 to 1855, see Houben 1994:199-214.

280 AN, Geheim Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal, 11-5-1849 La V, Baron A.H.W. de Kock (Yogyakarta) to J.J. Rochussen (Batavia/Bogor), 23-4-1849.
portant document. The death certificate witnessed by the Assistant-Resident of Makassar, the military commandant and the chief medical officer to the garrison stated the course of death as ‘diminished physical strength (verval van krachten) due to advanced years’ (Sagimun 1965:358).

Today, the eighth of January [eighteen] fifty-five, we the undersigned went to the room[s] in Fort Rotterdam which serve as the residence of the state prisoner, Pangeran Diponegoro [Dipanagara] and his family and following, and found that the aforementioned state prisoner had died this morning at half past six o’clock and indeed according to the findings of the co-delegated officer of health as a result of diminished strength due to advanced years.

Thus made in quadruplicate to be used where and when this might be required.

The delegates,

[signed:]
J.G. Crudelbach (Assistant-Resident and magistrate),
J.T. Lion (infantry major),
F.A.M. Schnetz (health officer first class).

A special burial allowance was immediately made available to the family under the terms of the 19 May 1850 financial arrangements for the prince’s upkeep and on the same afternoon Dipanagara was laid to rest in the Kampung Melayu.281 According to the notice which appeared a month later in the Javasche Courant and was subsequently carried in the Dutch national press – a modest recognition of the interest taken of the prince’s passing in the colonial metropolis – the burial ceremony had occurred ‘with full Islamic rights and with respect for his high birth […] in accordance with the wishes of the dead man, he was interred in the Kampong Melayu near the grave of his son [Radèn Mas Sarkuma]’.282

Seven days after Dipanagara’s death, his widow and children had a prearranged meeting with the acting governor, Colonel Alexander van der Hart, to discuss their future. According to the governor’s report, they were ‘unanimous’ in their wish to remain in Makassar so that they could be near the grave of their recently departed father. It was perhaps lucky that were so minded for the government soon formed the view that they should under no circumstances be permitted to return to Java. Van der Hart, whose description of the way in which Dipanagara had brought up his children has already been mentioned, feared that the prince’s male offspring, especially his highly capable

281 AN, Geheim Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal in rade, 10-5-1855 La R, Colonel A. van der Hart (Makassar) to A.J. Duymaer van Twist (Batavia/Bogor), 12-1-1855.
282 Javasche Courant 10, 3-2-1855, the notice was carried in the Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant (NRC 92), which had received the news by colonial mail overland from Marseilles, on 2-4-1855.
eldest son, Radèn Mas Kindar, could become the ‘centres of rebellion’ if they were allowed back. Their high noble birth, in Van der Hart’s view, would give them great potential influence in Yogya, whereas in South Sulawesi, despite their ‘religious connections’, they would be unlikely to exercise much sway over the local Makassarese and Bugis population. These sentiments were echoed by the Yogya Resident, W.C.E. Baron de Geer (in office 1855-1856), whose enquiries with Hamengkubuwana V revealed a firm determination on the sultan’s part that Dipanagara’s family should never again set foot in the Principalities. Such arguments won the day with the governor-general, Albertus Jacobus Duymaer van Twist (in office 1851-1856), who passed a secret decree in council on 10 May 1855 ordering that Dipanagara’s widow and children should continue to be treated as exiles and confined to Sulawesi, but that they would be allowed to retain the prince’s former f6,000 annual stipend which would continue to be paid by the Yogya court. He also permitted them to live freely in Makassar where a residence would be found for them.

Both Van der Hart and his predecessor, De Perez, had advised that the government acquire land for Dipanagara’s family. Following his early March 1849 meeting with Dipanagara, De Perez had suggested that f10,000 be set aside for this purpose, whereas Van der Hart had recommended that the family be given a sufficiently large plot to plant fruit trees and develop some ricefields, arguing that if the prince’s children were able to find useful employment they would find better ‘direction for their energies’ and perhaps make good marriages (whether to local Makassarese or to Javanese domiciled in Makassar he did not say) thus dissuading them from involvement in anti-Dutch activities. Subsequently, a sizeable block of land amounting to just under a hectare was acquired by the government in the area immediately adjacent to the graves of Dipanagara and his son. It had sufficient space for orchards, a market garden and sawah as well as a modest Dutch colonial style house, which stands to this day at no. 83 Jalan Irian. This was very much in line with what the prince had asked for at the time of his early March 1849

283 AN, Geheim Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal in rade, 10-5-1855 La R, Colonel A. van der Hart (Makassar) to A.J. Duymaer van Twist (Batavia/Bogor), 30-1-1855.
284 AN, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal in rade, 10-5-1855 La R, Hamengkubuwana V (Yogyakarta) to W.C.E. Baron de Geer (Yogyakarta), 16 Jumadilakir AJ 1786 (AD 5-3-1855); W.C.E. Baron de Geer (Yogyakarta) to Duymaer van Twist (Batavia/Bogor), 12-3-1855.
285 AN, Geheim Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal in rade, 10-5-1855 La R. The arrangements for the f6,000 stipend are referred to in the letter of the inspector of Finances (Batavia) to A.J. Duymaer van Twist (Batavia/Bogor), 30-4-1855.
286 AN, Geheim Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal in rade, 11-5-1849 La V, P.J.B. de Perez (Makassar) to J.J. Rochussen (Batavia/Bogor), 23-1-1849.
287 AN, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal in rade, 10-5-1855 La R, Colonel A. van der Hart (Makassar) to A.J. Duymaer van Twist (Batavia/Bogor), 30-1-1855.
288 The actual size of the plot acquired by the government was 9,372 square metres, with two roads (present-day Jalan Andalas and Jalan Irian) running through it and bounded on the east by Jalan Diponegoro.
audience, and this is where his family and household retainers moved to during the course of the year following his death. His descendants continued to live there in the early 1970s when the research for the present book was undertaken in Makassar (Appendix IV note 10).

After the death of Radèn Ayu Retnaningsih later in the century, Dipanagara’s grave and that of his son were moved to the main Kampung Melayu public graveyard, which had just been opened on a 52 square metre block of land between present-day Jalan Andalas and Jalan Irian a short distance from the family house. A private burial ground, demarcated by a low brick wall, was set apart in the innermost part of the graveyard for the Dipanagara family (Plate 83) and two imposing white stuccoed tombs were erected for the prince and his consort (Rouveroy van Nieuwaal 1928:208). Known locally as the ‘grave of the sultan of Java’ (*kuburan sultan Jawa*), the area around the twin tombs would become the final resting place for most of the prince’s Makassar-born descendants. The street adjacent to his grave would subsequently be given his name at the instigation of local supporters of the Indonesian nationalist cause (Kalff 1927-28:523). However, although Dipanagara’s memory was revered in Makassar and more widely in Indonesia, especially by nationalist youth groups of the inter-war years such as Jong Celebes (‘Young Celebes’) and Jong Java (‘Young Java’), as well as by the recently established Partai Kommunis Indonesia (Indonesian Communist Party), which had portraits of Dipanagara displayed at its 1921 Party Congress in Semarang and in its Madiun office (Ricklefs 2007:233), his family seems to have found the upkeep of the site beyond their very limited means. During the course of the century following Dipanagara’s death, most of the orchards and ricefields were sold to provide cash for the family. A report from the late 1920s speaks of the grave site as a collection of ‘dirty moss-covered stones, a broken down limestone-leached little wall and the rotting remains of vegetation’ (Kalff 1927-28:523). It would, however, eventually become a place of national reverence after the prince was recognized as a *pahlawan nasional* (national hero) by the newly independent Republic of Indonesia in the early 1950s. In January 1955, for example, the hundredth anniversary of the prince’s death was celebrated at the now restored grave site with considerable ceremony (Sagimun 1965:455). So the wheel of history turned full circle. The much feared exile of Fort Rotterdam had become the hero *par excellence* of the modern Indonesian state. This pious and complex man, whom the Parangkusuma prophecy would warn would only be ‘counted amongst the ancestors’ for a brief moment, was now vested with immortality in the national pantheon of a country he had never dreamt of in his lifetime. Historical transformations rarely come stranger than this. Meanwhile, both Makassar governors under whom Dipanagara was incarcerated would meet untimely deaths.289

289 Klaassen 1979:26 (on the death at sea of De Perez on 18-3-1859 during the Second Boné Expedition); and Kielstra 1911:1030 (on the murder of Van der Hart by one of his servants in May 1855).
Conclusion

It is a truism that men and women are shaped by the age in which they live. Dipanagara was no exception. Nine years before the prince’s birth, Thomas Paine had written that ‘these are the times that try men’s souls’, a reference to the troubled onset of the American Revolution. Such ‘interesting times’, as the Chinese adage has it, certainly characterised the epoch Dipanagara lived through half a world away in Java. Born into the seemingly immutable ‘old order’ of the late eighteenth-century Principalities, he died in the high colonial era of Governor-General Duymaer van Twist, an era when steamboats had begun to ply the inter-island sea routes and the new commercial system of free ports had replaced the closed monopoly of the Dutch East Indies Company. The Agrarian Law (1870), which would open the Indies up to massive private investment, was only a decade and a half away. This was the age when the Dutch were reaping unimaginable wealth from the Cultivation System at the expense of Javanese peasant cultivators who in certain areas, such as Grobogan and Demak, were experiencing terrible famines (1849-1850) and typhoid epidemics (1846-1850; Elson 1994:99-127), an age when, as Radèn Salêh, laconically put it, the only conversation amongst colonial Indies society was café et sucre, sucre et café (‘coffee and sugar, sugar and coffee’). These were the years which Multatuli would later give voice to in his Max Havelaar of de Koffij-veilingen der Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij (‘Max Havelaar or the coffee auctions of the Dutch Trading Company’) (1860) in the figure of Droogstoppel (‘Dry Stubble’), the brass-is-brass Amsterdam coffee broker who knew the price of everything and the value of nothing (Nieuwenhuys 1973:149-50).

What price then for a mystic prince in such a universe? Not much for the Dutch judging from the rather brief paragraph published in their colonial and national newspapers at the time of his death, but what about the Javanese? What did Dipanagara mean for them? It is clear that he was a pivotal figure in the history of modern Java, his death occurring at almost the exact midpoint between the treaty of Giyanti (1755) and the declaration of Indonesian independence (1945), but how much of this was due to his own innate qualities and how much to the times in which he lived? Just imagine for a moment that he had been born a hundred years earlier in 1685 or a century afterwards in 1885. The first would have placed him full square in the turbulent decades of the Kartasura period (1680-1742) which, if he had survived and not suffered the fate of his namesake, the first Pangéran Dipanagara (exiled to Cape Colony in 1723 following an abortive rebellion, see Chapter IX), might

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290 D’Almeida 1864, II:292. The full quote reads: Café et sucre, sucre et café, c’est tout-ce qu’on parle ici. C’est vraiment un air triste pour une artiste. ‘Coffee and sugar, sugar and coffee, this is all that people talk about here. It is really a sad atmosphere for an artist’.
have seen him emerge as one of the luminaries of Pakubuwana II’s (reigned 1726-1749) court with an interest in the type of Sufi-inspired Javanese-Islamic literature favoured by the circle around the queen mother, Ratu Pakubuwana (died 1732; Ricklefs 1998:39-91, 106-26, 254-60, 253-309). But would he have been cast in heroic mould of a Ratu Adil or Just King leading a popular uprising against the colonial power? Hardly. The second would have situated him at the heart of the founder generation of the Indonesian ‘national movement’ with the likes of Dr Tjipto Mangunkusumo (1885-1943), Radèn Mas Soetomo (1888-1938), and Radèn Mas Suwardi Suryaningrat alias Ki Hadjar Dewantara (1889-1959) as his direct or near contemporaries. Given Dipanagara’s personal abilities, his deep root of faith, administrative and financial acumen, as well as his interest in the modern world – witness his fascination with the navigational instruments on the corvette Pollux – it is likely that he would have made his mark in some capacity on modern Indonesia: a republican prince perhaps? But it is unclear whether he would have emerged as quite the crucial figure which he became at the time of the Java War.

The unusual epoch in which Dipanagara lived is thus vital for an understanding of his life. His experience underscores the truth of Karl Popper’s dictum that history is the struggle of men and ideas, not just of the material conditions of their existence. Had it not been for the peremptory violence visited on the south-central Javanese courts by Daendels and Raffles in the four short years between 1808 and 1812, violence which tore the heart out of the Yogya kraton, one can imagine Dipanagara living in relative obscurity at Tegalreja, attending to his religious duties and dying in mid-century as a quirky santri prince, scourge of the Yogya aristocracy and the kafir (heretic) Dutch. Despite his evident abilities – witness the brief reference to these in Panular’s ‘Chronicle of the fall of Yogyakarta’ (Chapter VIII) – the fact that he rates not a single reference in the British reports (1811-1816), a period when he was supposedly functioning as a key adviser to his father, the third sultan, and mentor to his younger brother, the fourth sultan, indicates that he was not quite the prominent figure in the political life of the sultanate he sought to portray in his babad (Chapter VIII). Nahuys van Burgst probably had his measure better when he described Dipanagara and his uncle, Mangkubumi, before the Java War as men who ‘stood quite neutral and were universally considered as good quiet persons without the least ambition’ (Chapter X).

The agrarian crisis of 1823-1825 and the ineptitude of the Dutch representatives in Yogyakarta in the two years leading up to the Java War were the twin catalysts for the prince’s emergence as a major political figure, much as Governor-General Van Imhoff (in office 1741-1750) and the issue of the leasing of Mataram’s coastal dependencies had been at the time of Sultan Mangkubumi’s rebellion in 1746 (Ricklefs 1974a:40-3). Once cast in a leadership role, however, Dipanagara brought to his task a competence and ap-
The power of prophecy

peal greater even than that of his revered great-grandfather, Mangkubumi. A devout Muslim, who believed himself part of the international community of Believers, he was what Ricklefs has described as the personification of the ‘mystic synthesis’ in Java (Ricklefs 2007:8) – a Javanese Muslim who saw no problem with contacting the goddess of the Southern Ocean, undertaking pilgrimages to holy sites associated with Java’s spirit guardians and rulers, and drinking bottles of ‘medicinal’ sweet Cape wine, while maintaining a staunch commitment to his Islamic duties. Part of the ‘long shadow of Sultan Agung’, Dipanagara fought both for the restoration of an idealized Javanese past, and the establishment of a new moral order in which the teachings of Islam, especially its legal codes, would be enforced. This was the essence of his popular appeal for the religious communities and his importance for the future, where his particular form of ‘mystic synthesis’ would form one of the key strands of Islamic piety in post-1830 Javanese society (Ricklefs 2007:30-83). His insistence on Javanese cultural norms in language, dress and etiquette also cast him in the role of a proto Javanese nationalist. Here was a man who, in Nicolaus Engelhard’s words (p. 510), was ‘in all matters a Javanese and followed Javanese custom’. But one cannot pursue this too far. There is no indication that he entertained any notions of national independence in the modern sense, not even for his native Java. Indeed, it would be nearly another century after the Java War before such ideas gained universal currency amongst the Indonesian nationalist elite. The most Dipanagara could conceive was a return to the seventeenth-century status quo. From the evidence of Hasan Munadi and Ali Basah Pengalasan, he had in mind the era when the Dutch had been confined to the northeast coast of Java as traders and were not involved politically in the affairs of the south-central Javanese courts. He even talked, Munadi suggested, of allocating the Dutch two north coast cities – Batavia and Semarang – where they would be allowed to reside and pursue their commercial interests unhindered, just so long as these did not exploit the local population (Dipanagara’s insistence on market prices being paid for Javanese products and land lease contracts was prescient considering what would happen under Van den Bosch’s Cultivation System). This harked back to the situation which existed during Sultan Agung’s reign (1613-1646) before the political disasters of his successor, Amangkurat I (reigned 1646-1677), had opened a high road to Dutch intervention in the Javanese hinterland.

That this was an impossible dream is self-evident. Despite the insecurities of Holland’s transition from patrician republic to nation state between 1785 and 1813 – precisely the period of Dipanagara’s youth and early manhood – there was no possibility of a Dutch retreat to the status quo of the early Company era. Daendels’ mailed fist and the insufferable arrogance of the English were proof enough that a new form of European power was now

being applied to colonial affairs. The European Prometheus had been unbound. Despite the 1815 mutiny, sepoy bayonets continued to sustain Raffles’ ramshackle regime (1811-1816), and even when the inexperienced post-1816 returned Dutch administration came close to disaster first by exacerbating the agrarian crisis which precipitated the Java War and then by wasting two years (1825-1827) before the tide of battle could be turned, the possibility of a Dutch exit from Java was never an option. The importance of Java for the post-1830 Dutch economy would be argument enough for this – witness the plans by Palmer & Company of Calcutta, the Dutch colonial state’s main creditor bank, to send sepoys to Java in May 1826 to help turn the tide of battle and ensure the security of their six million Sicca rupee loan (p. 428). Yet Dutch insecurities remained. The successful Belgian revolt of 1830 intensified them, temporarily threatening the Netherlands with French invasion and a new European war. For Dipanagara this would mean summary arrest and exile, an exile in which Dutch fears dictated an increasingly restrictive regime which for the last twenty-two years kept him and his family prisoners in Fort Rotterdam. Dipanagara’s pitiful death in Makassar points to the human tragedy at the heart of this tale. The waste of a life, the suffering of a family, the ruin of a society. The policies imposed by Van den Bosch may have been the saving of the Dutch state, but they spelt disaster for the Javanese. After 1830 a new world had been born. It was a turning point as significant as any in colonial history. But it would exact a terrible cost.

Although it is clear that Dipanagara had no chance of winning the war, the teaching materials currently provided at the Dutch Royal Military Academy (Koninklijke Militaire Akademie) at Breda indicate that Dutch army historians are still exaggerating the military threat posed by the prince in order to pretend that Holland had conquered a truly formidable enemy in 1825-30, see http://www.nimh.nl/nl/geschiedenis/tijdbalk/1814_1914_nederlands_indie.

I am grateful to Amrit Gomperts for this reference.
APPENDIX I

Family tree of the Yogyakarta sultanate*

Appendix I

Sultan Hamengkubuwana I
(born c. 4-8-1717, r. 1749-1792)

x (2)

Bendara Radèn Ayu Srenggara
(Kedhu dynasty)

Radèn Ayu Danukusuma I
(strangled 1-1812)

Radèn Ayu Danukusuma I

R.T. Danukusuma I

Radèn Ayu Rongga Prawiradiningrat II

Radèn Ayu Rongga Prawiradiringrat
(bupati wedana of Madiun, 1822-1859; post-1830, Pangéran Adipati Prawiradiningrat)

Radèn Ayu Natakusuma (daughter of Kyai T. Purwadiningrat, sister of Ratu Kedhaton), post-1812, Ratu Pakualam

Pangéran Natakusuma (born 21-3-1764, appointed Pakualam I, 22-6-1812, by the British, r. 1812-1829)

Radèn Rongga Prawiradiningrat III
(bupati wedana of Madiun, 1796-1810, killed in revolt, 17-12-1810)

Ratu Maduretna
(died 16-11-1809)

Radèn Adipati Danureja II
(patih of Yogya, 1799-1811; strangled 28-10-1811)

Radèn Rongga Prawiradirja II
(bupati wedana of Madiun, with intermissions, 1784-1796)

Ratu Anom (born c. 1793-died 14-9-1859; post-1-1811, Ratu Ayu; post-1-1830, Ratu Pakualam)

Radèn Tumenggung Natadiningrat
(born 25-6-1786, r. as Pakualam II, 1829-1858)

Pangéran Suryasasraningrat
(born c. 1827, r. as Pakualam III, 1858-1864)
APPENDIX II

Family tree illustrating the connections between Dipanagara and the Danurejan*

* Details taken from Serat salasilah para leloeho ing Kadanoerejan.
APPENDIX III

Family tree illustrating the connections between Dipanagara and the Prawiradirjan*

* Details taken from Serat salasilah para leloehoer ing Kadanoerejan:127-31.
** Radèn Rongga Mangundirja (Prawiradirja II) seems to have married two daughters of Hamengkubuwana I, see Mandoyokusumo 1977:12, 14, the latter being referred to as Bendara Radèn Ayu Rongga Sepuh, Carey 1980:38.
*** Served as co-bupati wedana with Radèn Rongga Prawirasentika (1822-1826). After the Java War given the title of Pangéran Adipati Prawiradiningrat. He was the first full bupati wedana since Radèn Rongga Prawiradirja III who was killed in revolt on 17-12-1810.
Appendix III

Nyai Ageng Dathuk Sulèman

Kyai Ageng Dathuk Sulèman
(son of sultan of Bima, Sumbawa)

Kyai Ageng Derpayuda
(buried at Majangjati, Sragèn)

Nyai Ageng Derpayuda
(buried at Kuncèn, Yogya)

Mas Rara Juwati
(Ratu Ageng Tegalreja, c. 1734 – 17-10-1803)

Sultan
Hamengkubuwana I
(r. 1749-1792)

Nyai Ageng Pengulu

Pengulu Pekih Ibrahim (Dipaningrat)
(in office, c. 1755-1798, grandson of
Kyai Ageng Dathuk Sulèman)

Nyai T. Resagota
(buried at Kuncèn)

Kyai T. Resagota
bupati Sokawati
(buried at Bayem, Madiun)

Nyai Damenggala
(buried at Kuncèn)

Sultan
Hamengkubuwana III
(r. 1812-1812)

Radèn Ayu
Mangkarawati
(c. 1770-1852)

Ratu Sultan (earlier Radèn Ayu
Andayaningrat commander of the
Yogya kraton prajurit èstri) – no issue

Radèn Ayu Pengulu
Kamalodiningrat (buried
at Kuncèn) – no issue

Hamengkubuwana II

Hamengkubuwana III

Radèn Ayu Maduretna
(c. 1798 – 18-2-1828)

(2) x

no issue

(1) x

Radèn Ayu Maduretna, died at Tegalreja
pre-1825, daughter of Kyai Gedhé Dhadhapan,
mother of Pangéran Dipanagara II, see Appendix IV

(3) x

Radèn Ayu Retnaningsih (daughter of Radèn Tumenggung Sumaprawira, bupati of Kenitèn
(Madiun), a relation (sentana) of Ratu Maduretna. Sumaprawira may have been a younger
brother of Radèn Rongga Prawiradirja III). Issue in Manado and Makassar, see Appendix IV

Radèn Ayu Pengulu
Kamalodiningrat (buried at Kuncèn)

Radèn Ayu Pengulu
Kamalodiningrat (buried at Kuncèn)

Radèn Ayu Maduretna
(c. 1798 – 18-2-1828)

(2) x

no issue

(1) x

Radèn Ayu Maduretna, died at Tegalreja
pre-1825, daughter of Kyai Gedhé Dhadhapan,
mother of Pangéran Dipanagara II, see Appendix IV

(3) x

Radèn Ayu Retnaningsih (daughter of Radèn Tumenggung Sumaprawira, bupati of Kenitèn
(Madiun), a relation (sentana) of Ratu Maduretna. Sumaprawira may have been a younger
brother of Radèn Rongga Prawiradirja III). Issue in Manado and Makassar, see Appendix IV
APPENDIX IV

Pangéran Dipanagara’s wives, family and children

Tegalreja (c. 1793-1825)¹

Marriages Radên Antawirya (Dipanagara) c. 1803
x (1) Radên Ayu Madubrangta, daughter of Kyai Gedhé Dhadhapan, head of the pathok negari of Dhadhapan in the Sléman district. Died at Tegalreja before July 1825.
27-2-1807
x (2) Radên Ajeng Supadmi (later Radên Ayu Retnakusuma), daughter of Radên Tumenggung Natawijaya III, Yogya bupati of Panolan (Jipang-Kepanolan), in office 1803-1811.
c. 1808
x (3) Radên Ayu Retnadiwati, died at Tegalreja before July 1825.
c. 28-9-1814
x (4) Radên Ayu Maduretna, daughter of Radên Rongga Prawiradirja III of Madiun and Ratu Maduretna (daughter of Hamengkubuwana II). Followed Dipanagara during the Java War. Appointed Ratu Kedhaton (August 1825), died 18-2-1828, see below II.

¹ The details are taken from BD (Manado) IV:4, XXXII. 21-26; Tanojo n.y.:42-3; dK 158, ‘Lyst der Djocjokartasche Prinsen op dato dezes als muiteilingen den oorlog tegen het Nederlandsche Gouvernement voerende’, Magelang, 10-3-1829. Dipanagara also appears to have had other sons who are not mentioned in this list: one, known as Radên Mas Alip, was described as ‘mad’ in the Dutch sources and went over to the Dutch side before 1827, see Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, III:560 and Nahuys van Burgst 1835, I:10-14.
Children

of (1) Radèn Antawirya II (born c. 1803). Appointed Pangéran Dipanagara II (August 1825). Remained in Magelang after the Java War, but later exiled to Sumenep (east Madura) in October 1834 because of suspected anti-Dutch sentiments; later (1851) moved to Ambon. During his exile he used the Javanese-Islamic name of Radèn Mantri Muhamad Ngarip and under that name wrote a prophetic historical account of his life and times which is known by the title Babad Dipanagara, Surya Ngalam (LOr 6488).

of (2) Radèn Suryaatmaja (born 1807 or early 1808). Appointed Pangéran Adipati Anom (August 1825); later Pangéran Dipaningrat (April 1830). Exiled to Ambon (April 1840). Went mad.

of (4) ? (1) Radèn Mas Jonèd (born c. 1815). Killed in a brawl with a soldier of the Yogya garrison in c. April 1837.2


1826

of (3) Radèn Ayu Basah x (1) Radèn Tumenggung Natadirja (Iman Muhamad Ngabdulkamil Ali Basah, also known as ‘Gusti Basah’), an elder brother of Senthot Ali Basah. Died of battle wounds early August 1828

x (2) Radèn Tumenggung Mertanagara (Ali Basah Ngabdulkamil II). Divorced 1837.

Children whose mothers are unknown

son3


daughters4

(1) Radèn Ayu Jayakusuma x Pangéran Jayakusuma II (son of Pangéran Jayakusuma I, post-Aug 1825, Pangéran Ngabèhi), who was killed with his father and younger brother in the Kelir mountains (Bagelèn-Kedhu) 21-9-1829.

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2 See Hageman 1856:412; and B.Ng. III:388, LXIV.48, which states that Jonèd was killed at the beginning of AJ 1765 (April 1837). According to Dipanagara's descendants in Makassar, Radèn Mas Jonèd, ran amok on the steamship carrying his father from Semarang to Batavia and was killed by the ship's officers. Every year offerings are made in Semarang harbour to commemorate his death. Interview with Raden Mas Jusuf Diponegoro and Raden Saleh Diponegoro, Jalan Irian 83, Makassar, 8-9-1972. There is nothing in the Dutch sources to confirm this tale and the dates do not fit because Dipanagara was moved from Semarang to Batavia in April 1830. In fact, it seems from Hageman 1856:412, that he died in a brawl with a soldier or NCO in Yogya in 1837.

3 It is likely that this was a son of Dipanagara’s second wife Radèn Ayu Retnakusuma.

4 It is possible that these were daughters of Dipanagara’s fourth wife, Radèn Ayu Maduretna (Ratu Kedhaton).
(2) Radèn Ajeng Impun, unmarried in 1830.\(^5\)

(3) Radèn Ajeng Munthèng (also known as Radèn Ayu Gusti); unmarried. Lived with her grandmother (Dipanagara’s mother), Radèn Ayu Mangkarawati, in Yogyakarta, see AN, Besluit van den Gouvrneur-Generaal, 11-5-1849, La V geheim.

Java War (1825-1830)\(^6\)

In January 1828, Radèn Ayu Maduretna (Ratu Kedhaton) fell sick whilst six months pregnant and persuaded Dipanagara to marry:

x (1) Radèn Ayu Retnaningrum, daughter of Pangéran Panengah (post-1812, Dipawiyana I, a son of Hamengkubuwana II). She accompanied Dipanagara as far as Semarang on his journey into exile and then deserted him (5-4-1830).

On 18 February 1828 (2 Ruwah AJ 1755), Radèn Ayu Maduretna (Ratu Kedhaton) died at Kawisarja in the Kulon Praga area and was buried at Imagiri. About two months later, Dipanagara took two new wives:

x (1) Radèn Ayu Retnaningsih, daughter of Radèn Tumenggung Sumaprawira, pre-1812, Yogya bupati of Jipang-Kepadhangan, post-1812, bupati of Kenitèn (Madiun) and a relation (sentana) of Radèn Ayu Maduretna (see above).\(^7\) She accompanied Dipanagara into exile where she bore him at least two children both sons (see below).

x (2) Radèn Ayu Retnakumala, daughter of the Kyai Guru of the pathok negari of Kasongan (near Bantul), who had been killed in fighting at Selarong on 25-10-1825. She did not accompany Dipanagara into exile.

\(^5\) In c. 1837, Radèn Tumenggung Mertanagara repudiated his official wife, Radèn Ayu Basah, and secretly married her sister who was in his care and who was expecting a child by him, see Dj.Br 18, Valck, ‘Geheime Memorie’, 31-3-1840. This sister was almost certainly Radèn Ajeng Impun who is mentioned as being in his care in April 1830, see Dj.Br. 19rl, ‘Nota over het Tractement van de Bassa Merto Negoro benevens van zijne volgelingen over de maand Sawal [March-April 1830].’

\(^6\) The details are taken from BD (Manado) IV:4 XXXII.21-26; B.Ng. III:109, XXVII. 1-4.

\(^7\) Radèn Tumenggung Sumaprawira bore the same name as one of the two younger brothers of Radèn Rongga Prawiradirja III, who was captured along with Rongga’s mother and sent back to Yogya following the collapse of Rongga’s rebellion in December 1810, Dj.Br. 46, Lieutenant Thomas Paulus (Maospati) to W.N. Servatius (Surakarta), 11-12-1810. This may point to a stronger family connection with the Prawiradirjans. See further Carey 1992:454-5 note 264.
Manado and Makassar (1830-1855)

Only Radên Ayu Retnaningsih accompanied Dipanagara into exile and she bore him the following children

1 Manado (12-6-1830 – 20-6-1833) (1) Radên Mas Kindar (later ‘Pangérân’ Abdurrahman), born 4 January 1832.

2 Makassar (11-7-1833 – 8-1-1855) (2) Radên Mas Sarkuma (born July 1834, died March 1849).

Children whose mothers are unknown

(1) Radên Mas Mutawaridin (later ‘Pangérân’Abdurrahim), born c. 1835.

(2) Radên Ayu Putri Munadima, born c. 1836.

(3) Radên Mas Dulkabli (later ‘Pangérân’ Abdulgani), born c. 1836.

(4) Radên Mas Rahab (later ‘Pangérân’ Abdulrajab).

(6) Radên Mas Ramaji (later ‘Pangérân’ Abdulgafur).

The details are taken from Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 1; BD (Manado) IV:428, XLIII.322-4, p. 428; AN, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal, 24-4-1833 no. 19, J.P.C. Cambier (Manado) to Commissioner-General (Johannes van den Bosch), 22-2-1833; AN, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal, 10-5-1855 La R, Colonel Alexander van der Hart (Governor of Celebes) to Governor-General (A.J. Duymaer van Twist), 12-1-1855, in which seven surviving children of Dipanagara are mentioned; and from a family tree kindly loaned by Raden Mas Jusuf Diponegoro of Jalan Irian no. 83, Makassar. It is not clear whether all the children listed were indeed offspring of Radên Ayu Retnaningsih and this is confirmed by a statement of the governor of Makassar in July 1834 who mentioned that of the three male children born to Dipanagara since his arrival in Fort Rotterdam (July 1833), only one, Radên Mas Sarkuma, was by an official wife (Radên Ayu Retnaningsih), see AN, Kabinet, 13-10-1834 La E geheim, D.F.W. Pietermaat (Makassar) to J.C. Baud (Batavia/Bogor), ?,7-1834; on Dipanagara’s other female followers, see below Appendix XII. The honorific ‘Pangérân’ before the names of the prince’s offspring appears in Raden Mas Jusuf Diponegoro’s family tree and was probably not recognised officially by the Dutch government.

Some of these children may have been from Dipanagara’s official wife, Radên Ayu Retnaningsih, but most were probably not, see above note 8.

Radên Ayu Mariati, a daughter of this son of Dipanagara, died in Makassar in late 1972. The present author was privileged to meet her during an interview with the family of Raden Mas Jusuf Diponegoro in Makassar in September 1972.
APPENDIX Va

Chief ministers (*patih*) of Yogyakarta and Surakarta (1755-1847)

Yogyakarta

Danureja I  13 February 1755-19 August 1799
previously Radèn Tumenggung Yudanagara (*bupati* of Banjarnegara in Banyumas) from the Gandakusuman family.

Danureja II  9 September 1799-28 October 1811
previously Radèn Tumenggung Mertanagara, grandson of the above. Strangled on the orders of Sultan Hamengkubuwana II in the Yogya *kraton*, hence known as *patih séda kedhaton* (‘the *patih* who died in the kraton’).

Danureja III  7 November 1811-2 December 1813
previously Kyai Tumenggung Sindunagara I, eldest son of Danureja I. Never given the title of ‘Radèn Adipati’ but referred to by his ‘commoner’ title of ‘Kyai Adipati’. Acting *patih* 7 November 1811-22 January 1812, when he took the oath of allegiance to the British government. Retired as Kyai Adipati Purwa on 2 December 1813.

Danureja IV  2 December 1813-22 February 1847
previously Mas Tumenggung Sumadipura, *bupati* of Japan (Majakerta) in east Java, supposedly of Balinese descent from Untung Surapati. Retired to Majakerta as Pangéran Adipati Kusumayuda and died there in c. 1849.

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1 Details taken from Rouffaer 1905:607 and from typed notes on the Yogyakarta *patih* in the Widya Budaya library of the Yogya *kraton*. Rouffaer’s dates have been checked against the available Residency letters.
Chief Ministers (patih) of Yogyakarta and Surakarta

Surakarta

Jayaningrat July 1784-6 July 1796

dismissed by Pakubuwana IV.

Mangkupraja II 7 July 1796-5 April 1804

previously Radèn Tumenggung Sasrawijaya I. Exiled to Ayah in Banyumas for intrigues with Radèn Rongga Prawiradirja III of Madiun and strangled by the Surakarta bupati of Banyumas, Radèn Tumenggung Yudanagara, on the orders of Sunan Pakubuwana IV.

Danuningrat 26 April 1804-8 January 1810

dismissed on Daendels’ insistence because of an armed incursion into Pekalongan from the Surakarta district of Delimas (present-day Limpung) in October 1809.

Cakranagara 6 February 1810-18 July 1812

exiled to Surabaya by Raffles for his part in the secret correspondence with Yogyakarta in 1811-1812.

Sasradiningrat II 17 August 1812-30 January 1846

previously Radèn Tumenggung Sasrawijaya II, a son of Mangkupraja II. Died in office.

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2 Details taken from Rouffaer 1905:607; Ricklefs 1974a:428. The dates have been checked in the following sources: S.Br. 53, Pakubuwana IV (Surakarta) to P.G. van Overstraten (Semarang), 10-7-1796; Van der Chijs 1895-97, XV:10-4 (decree of 8-1-1810 dismissing Danuningrat); Dj.Br. 27, H.W. Daendels (Batavia) to G.W. Wiese (Yogyakarta), 13-1-1810; Dj.Br. 37, Hamengkubuwana II (Yogyakarta) to Pakubuwana IV (Surakarta), 16 Jumadilakhir AJ 1737 (19-7-1810); IOL Mack.Pr. 2, ‘Chronology of Java’,1816; MvK 4132, Lawick van Pabst, ‘Nota’, 1826. On Ayah as a place of exile for the Surakarta court, see Remmelink 1994:19.
APPENDIX Vb

Major officials of the Yogyakarta administration, 1755-1825

Bupati wedana of Madiun¹

Pangéran Mangkudipura 1755-c. 1760
former Kartasura appointee related to the Kartasura court and descended from a line of former Kartasura bupati of Madiun with their residence at Wanasari in the southern part of Madiun town. Did not have the trust of Hamengkubuwana I.

Radèn Rongga Prawiradirja I  c. 1760-1784
previously Kyai Tumenggung Wirasentika, brother-in-law and favourite of Hamengkubuwana I. Served as his army commander and given the military title of ‘Rongga’. Known as the champion (gedehug) of Sokawati.

Radèn Rongga Prawiradirja II 1784-June 1790, 27 October 1794-15 January 1796 also known as Radèn Rongga Mangundirja and Radèn Rongga dhongkol Maespati – ‘the early retired Radèn Rongga of Maospati’, the last a reference to his residence 10 kms to the west of Madiun, later the official seat of the bupati wedana under his son, Radèn Rongga Prawiradirja III, until December 1810. A son-in-law of Hamengkubuwana I known for his piety. Retired early from his position because of blindness.

Radèn Tumenggung
Sasradiningrat I June 1790-27 October 1794
son-in-law of Hamengkubuwana II and father-in-law of the Yogya Crown Prince (later Hamengkubuwana III). Served as interim bupati wedana because of the incapacity of Radèn Rongga Prawiradirja II. Became senior bupati of Jipang-Rajegwesi until his death in May 1807.

¹ Details taken from KITLV H 699, Rouffaer, ‘Archiefstukken (diverse) over de vorstenlanden’, loose notes on the bupati wedana of Madiun; Adam 1940:331-6.
Major officials of the Yogyakarta administration

Major officials of the Yogyakarta administration

Radèn Rongga Prawiradirja III 14 January 1796-17 December 1810
son of Radèn Rongga Prawiradirja II and son-in-law of Hamengkubuwana II; killed in revolt 17-12-1810.

*Pangéran Dipakusuma 5 January 1811-1822
descended in the female line from Sunan Amangkurat III (1703-1708) and Radèn Mas Garendi (Sunan Kuning). Born in Ceylon. Acting bupati wedana until his death in 1822.

*Radèn Rongga 5 January 1811-February 1826
Prawirasentika son of Radèn Rongga Prawiradirja I and son-in-law of Hamengkubuwana II. Acting bupati wedana until his dismissal for maladministration in 1826. Allowed to continue as bupati of Tunggul.

Pangéran Rongga 1822-1859
Prawiradiningrat son of Radèn Rongga Prawiradirja III by Ratu Maduretna, a daughter of Hamengkubuwana II and Ratu Kedhaton. Acting bupati wedana with Radèn Rongga Prawirasentika 1822-1826. After 1826, became the first full bupati wedana of Madiun since the death of his father on 17-12-1810, and subsequently (1830) appointed to title of ‘Pangéran Adipati Prawiradiningrat’.

* Joint acting wedana.

Ppengulu2

Pekih Ibrahim (Dipaningrat I) c. 1755-21 October 1798
Muhamad Sapingi November 1798-20 June 1812
previously wedana of the Suranatan, of Sundanese origin. Fled back to west Java at time of British attack on kraton.

Kyai Rahmanudin July 1812-September 1823
previously member of the Suranatan. Dismissed by Danureja IV and made the haj to Mecca in July 1825.

Ketib Abuyamin, later September 1823-c. 1835
Pengulu Kamalodiningrat son of an ordinary priest, but married to a sister of Hamengkubuwana II’s last official consort, Ratu Sultan, formerly Radèn Ayu Andayaningrat, commander of his Amazon corps.3


3 For a brief biography of Ratu Sultan/Radèn Ayu Andayaningrat, see Carey 1992:413 note 73.
Patih of the Kadipaten

Mas Tumenggung Wiraguna  c. 1780-30 April 1807
father of Radèn Tumenggung Major Wiranagara. Married to a village woman claiming to be a descendant of Surapati. Illiterate and of village stock. Had served Hamengkubuwana I as a bupati during Giyanti War, but too uneducated to be given a high post in post-1755 Yogya administration.

Mas Tumenggung Kertadirja I 30 April 1807-died pre-1810
father of Mas Tumenggung Kertadirja II, bupati of Kerja and Masaran in Sokawati.

Mas Tumenggung Sumadirja  c. 30 April 1807-died pre-1810
(bupati of Japan/Majakerta, father of Danureja IV).

*Kyai Tumenggung Cakradipura 1810-died pre-1812

*Kyai Tumenggung Sumadintra 1810-21 June 1812
of Madurese descent; killed on orders of Pangéran Mangkudiningrat I.  

Bupati wedana (nayaka) of the kraton

1786 (Memorie of J.M. van Rhijn)

Wedana jero (Inner bupati)
Radèn Tumenggung Mangundirja  
Kyai Tumenggung Mangundipura (kliwon of Danureja I, appointed 1786)  
Mas Aria Mandura  
Radèn Aria Sindureja

Wedana jaba (Outer bupati)
Radèn Tumenggung Natayuda I (bupati bumija, wedana of Kedhu)  
Radèn Tumenggung Sumadiningrat (appointed 1794)  
Pangéran Dipakusuma (wedana gedhé prajurit; troop commander)

4 Taken from BD (Manado) II:141-2, XV. 39-41; Dj.Br. 38, M. Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to B.F. von Liebeherr (Surakarta), 30-4-1807.

5 Details taken from Rouffaer, ‘Archiefstukken (diverse) over de vorstenlanden’, loose notes on the ‘Hoofd Regenten van Jogjakarta’, and from the various Memorie van Overgave. The full number of nayaka should be 8 (4 inner and 4 outer), but often smaller numbers are given in the Memorie.
1798 (Memorie of W.H. van IJsseldijk)

**Wedana jero**
- Radèn Tumenggung Sumadiningrat (appointed 1797)
- Radèn Tumenggung Purwadipura (appointed 1797)
- Radèn Aria Sindureja
- Mas Tumenggung Mangundipura (*wedana bandar*; head of tollgates)

**Wedana jaba**
- Radèn Tumenggung Danukusuma I (*kliwon* of Danureja I)
- Radèn Tumenggung Mertanagara (*kliwon* of Danureja I)
- Mas Aria Mandura
- Radèn Tumenggung Mertalaya (appointed 1795; grandson of Pangéran Ngabèhi)

1803 (Memorie of J.G. van den Berg)

**Wedana jero**
- Radèn Tumenggung Sumadiningrat
- Radèn Tumenggung Purwadipura
- Radèn Aria Sindureja
- Mas Tumenggung Mangundipura (*wedana bandar*)

**Wedana jaba**
- Radèn Tumenggung Natayuda I (*bupati bumija* of Kedhu, poisoned 29-11-1804)
- Mas Tumenggung Sindunagara I (*kliwon* of Danureja II; previously Mas Aria Mandura)
- Radèn Tumenggung Natadiningrat (appointed 1805)
- Radèn Tumenggung Mertalaya

1808 (Memorie of M. Waterloo)

**Wedana jero**
- Radèn Tumenggung Sumadiningrat (suspended March 1807-early 1808)
- Radèn Tumenggung Purwadipura (dismissed 25-11-1810)
- Mas Tumenggung Mangundipura
- Radèn Aria Sindureja
Appendix Vb

Wedana jaba
Radèn Tumenggung Natadiningrat
(banished to Meester Cornelis, Batavia, and Cirebon, 17-12-1810 – 29-12-1811)
Mas Tumenggung Sindunagara I
(appointed Kyai Adipati Danureja III, 6-11-1811)
Radèn Tumenggung Danukusuma I (dismissed November 1811, murdered mid-January 1812)
Radèn Tumenggung Mertalaya

1811 (Report of John Crawfurd)

Wedana jero
Radèn Tumenggung Sumadiningrat
(killed in battle 20-6-1812)
Radèn Aria Sindureja
Radèn Tumenggung Mertalaya
Mas Tumenggung Mangundipura
Radèn Tumenggung Ranadiningrat
(wedana gedhé prajurit; kraton troop commander)

Wedana jaba
Radèn Tumenggung Danunagara (appointed 11-11-1811, served as kliwon of Danureja III)
Radèn Tumenggung Sindunagara II (appointed 2-12-1811)
Radèn Tumenggung Tirtadiwirya
Radèn Tumenggung Sasradiningrat II
Kyai Tumenggung Reksanegara (wedana bandar; head of tollgates)

1816 (Report of John Crawfurd)

Wedana jero
Radèn Tumenggung Mertanagara II (son of Pangéran Demang by daughter of Danureja I, dismissed for corrupt practices, pre-August 1816)
Radèn Tumenggung Sasradiningrat II
Mas Tumenggung Mangundipura

Wedana jaba
Radèn Tumenggung Danunagara (kliwon of Danureja IV)
Radèn Tumenggung Sindunagara II
Mas Arya Mandura (wedana gladhag; head of porters’ guild)
Radèn Tumenggung Major Wiranagara (wedana gedhé prajurit, appointed 1817)
Major officials of the Yogyakarta administration

Kapitan cina\(^6\)

- **To In**: c. 1755-1764
- **Gan Ke Ko**: 1764-1776
- **Tan Lek Ko**: 1776-c. 1793
  - previously *kapitan cina* of Kedhu
- **Qué Jin Sing**: c. 1793-1803
  - previously *kapitan cina* of Kedhu.
- **Tan Jin Sing**: 27 September 1803-6 December 1813
  - son of above; previously *kapitan cina* of Kedhu, later Radèn Tumenggung Secadiningrat (6-12-1813), subsequently Radèn Tumenggung Purwa (31-12-1830), died 10-5-1831.
- **Qué Wi Kong**: 6 December 1813-20 August 1828
  - relation of above.
- **Qué Pun Sing**: 20 August 1828-?
  - son of above.

\(^6\) Details taken from the available Residency letters.
APPENDIX VI

List of country estates/rural retreats (pesanggrahan), hunting lodges and royal pleasure gardens (kelangenan-Dalem) built in Yogyakarta by the first four sultans, 1755-1822

Built by Hamengkubuwana I, 1749-1792
1. Pulo Kenonga (saha antéronipun, Taman Sari).
2. Pulo Gedhong (Taman Sari)
3. Krapyak* [12 jung]
4. Demak Ijo
5. Kyarasan
6. Képek

Built by Hamengkubuwana II when still Crown Prince, 1758-1792
1. Rajakusuma*
2. Rajawinangun (Arjawinangun)*
3. Purwareja* [8 jung]
4. Pelemsèwu

Built by Hamengkubuwana II, 1792-1810, 1811-1812, 1826-1828
1. Wanacatur* [1 jung]
2. Redi Sendhansari
3. Redi Cemara
4. Guwa Séluman
5. Alas [J]eruk Legi2
6. Alas Prapti
7. Gunung Kidul

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1. NBS 133, no. 8, ‘Lyst van de tuinen en lusthoven van den Sultan van Djodjo’ (Javanese title: ‘punika pemut yasa dalam kelangenan. Ka[n]g Sinuhun ingkang kaping sapisan ingandhap punika pratélaniipun’), Rebo, 25 Rejeb, Jimawal, A] 1757 (21-1-1830), and see also Kota Jogjakarta 1956:116-7. For a description of the term pesanggrahan, see the glossary. The land measurements are from Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, i:591.
2. Text has ‘Ceruk Legi’.
* Indicates pasar and pungrembè land administered directly by the sultan.
Appendix VI

8 Gunung Prau
9 Sukarini
10 Kudur Brubuh Kadisona.
11 Tanjungtirta* [8 jung]
12 Banyakak
13 Drakila (Indrakila).
14 Pengawatreja (Ngawatreja) (saha antéronipun [and its environs])* [1½ jung]
15 Samas
16 Madyaketapang
17 Toyatumumpang (Banyutumumpang)
18 Prêh Binatur
19 Telaga, Gunung Telaga (Gamping) [40 jung]*
20 Ambarketawang
21 Sanapakis* [3 jung]
22 Tegilyasa
23 Tegilpengawé
24 Sanasèwu* [12 jung]

Built by Hamengkubuwana III when still Crown Prince, 1792-1810, 1811-1812

1 Wanayasa [4 jung]
2 Plasa Kuning
3 Telaga Muncar
4 Tegal Gumenggeng

Built by Hamengkubuwana III, 1812-1814

1 Ngandong Santun

Built by Hamengkubuwana IV, 1814-1822

1 Bangsal Panggung (kraton Yogya)
and repairs undertaken to previous pesanggrahan
APPENDIX VIIa

List of religious boarding schools (pesantrèn, pondhok), centres of scholars learned in fiqh law (pathok negari), and tax-free areas set aside for men of religion and keepers of royal grave-sites (pradikan, pamutihan, jurukuncèn) in Yogyakarta pre-1832¹

[Numbers refer to the locations given in Map 8]

1 Amberkatawang (Gamping) pamutihan kalangenan, previously three jung, in 1832 no more land given; kalangenan built by Hamengkubuwana II when sultan (see Appendix VI).

2 Blunyah pamutihan jurukunci, burial place of Kyai Kelipa of Jipang and Kyai Bimacilik, later Radèn Tumenggung Prawiradiningrat, a younger brother of Ratu Ageng (pre-1812, Ratu Kedhaton) was buried there with his descendants; previously three jung, in 1832 only one jung.

3 Balong (Guyangan) pamutihan jurukunci, burial place of Radèn Ayu Menyangan and Nyai Purwadiningrat with their sentana (relations); previously ½ Jung, in 1832 still ½ jung.

4 Dhongkèlan pathok negari, tanah tiyasa Ratu Kedhaton, mosque, religious living and pradikan land set up by and in the gift of Ratu Kedhaton, mother of Hamengkubuwana III; previously 25 cacah, in 1832 three jung.

List of religious boarding schools

5 Gadching  

_pamutihan_, previously 1 ½ _jung_, in 1832 no more land given.

6 Grojogan  

_pamutihan_, previously 2 _jung_, in 1832 no more land given.

7 Gunung Gemak  

_pamutihan jurukunci_, according to the _jurukunci_, previously ½ _jung_ given for the upkeep of the grave of Pangéran Cakraningrat, in 1832 no more land given.

8 Gunung Kelir  

_pamutihan jurukunci_, grave of Ratu Malang, Pangéran Cakraningrat (Pangéran Sampang) and Radèn Ayu Lembah; previously ½ _jung_ given for the upkeep of the graves, in 1832 still ½ _jung_.

9 Jalasutra  

_pamutihan jurukunci_, grave of Kyai Ageng Bengkung, previously three _jung_ given for the upkeep of the grave, in 1832 only ½ _jung_.

10 Jati  

_pamutihan_, previously 1 _jung_, in 1832 no more land given.

11 Jejeran  

_pamutihan jurukunci_, grave of Kyai Tumenggung Gajah, Radèn Tumenggung Sumadiningrat and Radèn Tumenggung Wiryawinata; previously two _jung_ for the _jurukunci_, in 1832 only one _jung_.

12 Jumeneng  

_pamutihan_, previously ½ _jung_, in 1832 no more land given.

13 Kasongan  

_pamutihan pathok negari_, previously seven _jung_, in 1832 no more land given.

14 Kricakan  

_pamutihan_, previously two _jung_, in 1832 no more land given.

14a Lempuyangan (Yogya)  

burial place of Kyai Adipati Mangkupraja, Pangéran Sumedhang, Pangéran Adipati Madura, Mas Ayu Pulungyun, mother of Radèn Tumenggung Colonel Mertanagara.\(^2\)  

15 Mancingan  

_pamutihan kalangenan_, graves of Sèh Maulana Maghribi and Sèh Belabelu; previously 1½ _jung_ for the upkeep of the _pesanggrahan_ at Parangtritis and Parangwédang (see 20-21), in 1832 no more land given.

16 Melangi  

_pathok negari_, _tanah tiyasa kaluwarga_ Danurejan, mosque, religious living and pradikan land of the Danurejan family; previously 25 _cacah_ of land, after 1832 three _jung_.

\(^2\) Note of G.P. Rouffaer. Mas Ayu Pulungyun's name is usually spelt 'Pulangyun', see Appendix III. She was the daughter of the _patih_ of Kendhal on the north coast, Mas Ngabèhi Cakrasemita, and was born in Kaliwungu, see _Serat salasilah para leloehoer ing Kandanoerejan_:151.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Palérèd Kauman</td>
<td>previously one jung, after 1832 no more land given.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Palérèd</td>
<td>grave of Ratu Pelabuhan, previously two jung of land for the jurukunci, in 1832 ½ jung.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18a</td>
<td>Palérèd ing Trayeman</td>
<td>pamutihan, previously 1½ jung, in 1832 no more land given.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Papringan</td>
<td>ingkang wau pathok negari, previously 25 cacah of land, in 1832 pathok negari abolished.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Parangtritis</td>
<td>pesanggrahan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Parangwédang</td>
<td>pesanggrahan (see 15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Pakuncèn</td>
<td>pamutihan jurukunci, grave of the royal ancestor Nyai Ageng Derpayuda (mother of Ratu Ageng Tegalreja) and her children and grandchildren; previously three jung, in 1832 still three jung.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22a</td>
<td>Pencar(sari)</td>
<td>pamutihan, previously one jung, in 1832 none.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Pengawatreja (Ngawatreja)</td>
<td>pamutihan kalangenan, previously three jung for wong mutihan, after 1832 no land given; kalangenan built by Hamengkubuwana II when sultan (Appendix VI).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Pijènan</td>
<td>pamutihan jurukunci, previously two jung for the jurukunci, after 1832 no land.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Plasajené (Plasakuning)</td>
<td>pathok negari, previously 25 cacah, in 1832 three jung; kalangenan built by Hamengkubuwana III when still Crown Prince (see Appendix VI).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Pucang Anom</td>
<td>pamutihan, previously one jung, in 1832 no land given.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Purwareja</td>
<td>pathok negari, previously 25 cacah, in 1832 three jung; kalangenan built by Hamengkubuwana II when still Crown Prince (see Appendix VI).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Rejadani</td>
<td>pamutihan, previously one jung, after 1832 still one jung.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Rejakusuma</td>
<td>pamutihan kalangenan, previously one jung, after 1832 no land given; kalangenan built by Hamengkubuwana II when still Crown Prince (see Appendix VI).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Rejawinangun</td>
<td>pamutihan kalangenan, previously one jung, in 1832 no land given; kalangenan built by Hamengkubuwana II when still Crown Prince (see Appendix VI).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30a</td>
<td>Samas</td>
<td>pamutihan, previously one jung, in 1832 no land given; kalangenan built by Hamengkubuwana II when still Crown Prince (see Appendix VI).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
30b Sèwon  
*Pamutihan jurukunci*, grave of Ratu Kencana Wulan previously $\frac{1}{2}$ jung from the legacy of the Ratu, in 1832 no land given; previously three jung for jurukunci, in 1832 no land given.

31 Tangkilan  
*Pamutihan kalangenan*, previously one jung, in 1832 no land given; unknown when kalangenan built.

32 Tanjungtirta  
*Pamutihan kalangenan*, previously one jung, in 1832 no more land given; kalangenan built by Hamengkubuwana II when sultan (see Appendix VI).

33 Gunung Telaga (Gamping)  
*Pamutihan jurukunci kalangenan*, previously one jung, after 1832 no more land given; kalangenan built by Hamengkubuwana II when sultan (see Appendix VI).

34 Turi  
*Pamutihan*, previously 25 cacah of land, after 1832 no land given.

35 Wanacatur  
*Pamutihan kalangenan*, previously one jung, in 1832 no more land accorded; kalangenan built by Hamengkubuwana II when sultan (see Appendix VI).

36 Wanakrama  
*Pamutihan*, previously three jung, after 1832 still three jung.

37 Wanarasari  
*Pamutihan*, previously two jung, after 1832 none.

38 Wanayasa  
*Pamutihan*, previously two jung, after 1832 none.

39 Wotgalèh  
*Pamutihan jurukunci*, previously three jung, in 1832 none; grave of Ratu Giring with her son Panembahan Purbaya and descendants; 2½ jung for jurukunci, after 1832 still 2½ jung.

**Mardikan areas held by Surakarta in Gunung Kidul**

a  Giring (Playèn district, Gunung Kidul) grave of Ki Ageng Giring; one bau of land from Surakarta, in 1832 still one bau.

b  Panithikan (Nithikan, Semanu district, grave of Pangéran Pamot, Ratu Gunung Kidul) Pakubuwana and her descendants; previously 12 jung of land from Surakarta, in 1832 still 12 jung.

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3 1 bau = 7096.5 m²; 1 cacah = unspecified number of bau; 1 jung = 4 bau. Usually 1 cacah referred to the amount of land which could be worked by an able-bodied tribute paying peasant (*wong sikep*) and his immediate family and dependants (*numpang, rayat, bujang*), who could number anywhere between five and thirty people.
Appendix VIIa

Mardikan areas in Yogya whose location is unclear

1 Bacinan  
   Pamutihan, previously one jung, in 1832 none.

2 Duwungas  
   Pamutihan, previously one jung, in 1832 still one jung.

3 Kebon (Kebanaran)  
   Pamutihan, previously ½ jung, in 1832 none.

4 Plotingan  
   Pamutihan, previously one jung, in 1832 none.

5 Warak  
   Pamutihan, previously three jung, in 1832 none.

Mardikan areas outside Yogya

1 Pekalongan  
   Pamutihan, earlier no land, after 1832 still no land; the site of the grave of Sunan Amangkurat I (r. 1646-1677) séda Tegalarum.

Religious teachers in Yogya (1831)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kampong</th>
<th>Religious teachers and numbers of pupils</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Kadanurejan</td>
<td>Nur Samsi (10); Mustakak (5); Nur Iman (2)</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Kauman</td>
<td>Ngusman (3); Suryadi (15); Rakiman (15); Ngabdullah (5); Iman (8)</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Kraton</td>
<td>Amad Ripangi (5); Amad Anom (2)</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Mangkubumên (Mangkuratan)</td>
<td>Abjani (4); Abdul Samad (3); Amad Sangi (4); Nur Samsi (5); Amad Kalipah (7)</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Pakualaman</td>
<td>Muntaka (7); Amad Ripangi (14); Ngarpani (5); Nitireja (7); Resamenggala (3)</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Prabuningratan</td>
<td>Amad Anom (4)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Suranatan</td>
<td>Waladaka (2); Mulyani (2); Amad Ngali (2); Sarawidi (10); Amad Ngijan (6); Amad Masam (7)</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 pathok negari^4</td>
<td>Melangi (Kyai Melangi) (50)</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pekalongan (Kyai Sakaputa) (12)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Plotingan (Haji Abdullatif) (30)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wanakrama (Kyai Mukiba) (30)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Total number of pupils)  (284)

^4 Before 1825, religious instruction (ngaji) had been given in the pathok negari of Dhongkèlan, Kasongan and Plasa Kuning and in the pamutihan of Wanasari and Wanayasa, but by 1831 there were no more santri at these places.
Map 8. Location of religious boarding schools (pesantren, pondhok), centres of scholars learned in fiqh law (pathok negari), and tax-free areas set aside for men of religion and keepers of royal gravesites (pradikan, pamutihan, jurukuncen) in Yogyakarta pre-1832. The numbers refer to the places listed in Appendix VIIA.
### APPENDIX VIIb

**List of *kyai*, *haji* and religious officials associated with Dipanagara**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Titles</th>
<th>Location, position and relationship</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abdulgani</td>
<td>Haji</td>
<td><em>panakawan</em> of Pangérân Jayakusuma (post-1825, Pangérân Ngabèhi).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abduljak\i</td>
<td>Haji</td>
<td>accompanied Dipanagara to Magelang.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdulkadir</td>
<td>Sèh Haji</td>
<td><em>dullah</em> of the Bulkio regiment, also known as Haji Mustapa (Adimustapa) and Tumenggung Urawan (Yudapenawang).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdullah</td>
<td>Sèh</td>
<td><em>ulama ageng</em> of Papringan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdullatif</td>
<td>Sèh Haji</td>
<td><em>ulama</em> of the pesantrèn of Kasongan, killed in fighting at Selarong in October 1825.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdulrahman (Sèh Abutalah)</td>
<td>Kyai guru</td>
<td><em>guru</em> and <em>pradikan ageng</em> of the pesantrèn of Kuweron (Kedhu).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdulrahman</td>
<td>Kyai</td>
<td>Gambiran.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdulraup (Abdulrangup)</td>
<td>Kyai guru</td>
<td><em>guru</em> and <em>ulama ageng</em> of the pesantrèn of Kasongan near Selarong.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdulrahim</td>
<td>Kyai</td>
<td>Pulo Kadang.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdulwahab</td>
<td>Haji</td>
<td>follower of Kyai Maja from the <em>pradikan désa</em> of Maja.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abukasan</td>
<td>Kyai</td>
<td><em>abdi-dalem</em> of Dipanagara at Tegalreja and son of Kyai Jayamustapa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abuyamin</td>
<td>Kyai Pengulu (earlier Ketib)</td>
<td><em>pengulu</em> of Yogya (1823-25) and supporter of Dipanagara.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adam, Hasani</td>
<td>Kyai</td>
<td><em>pradikan désa</em> of Wotgalèh, Maja.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

1 The details have been taken from BD (Manado), II-IV: B.Ng. I-III; Jayadiningrat, ‘Schetsen’; UBL BPL 616, Port. 11 pt. 11, ‘Samenkomst met Kyai Maja en zijne gevangenneming’, list of prisoners sent to Semarang, 16-11-1828 (Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, IV:889-90, and Javasche Courant 148, 11-12-1828). Although Javanese proper names are usually written with a ‘nga’ prefix (hence: ‘Ngabdulgani’) this has been omitted for the sake of clarity. It should be noted that this list is of a tentative nature and by no means complete.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Titles</th>
<th>Location, position and relationship</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ahmad</td>
<td>Sèh</td>
<td>full name Sèh Abdul Ahmad bin Abdullah al-Ansari (alias Ahmad Ansar Sharif, alias Sèh Habib Ahmat al-Ansari). Arab trader from Jeddah who had married into the family of Pangéran Blitar I and served as adviser of Dipanagara at Tegalreja and during the war. Submitted January 1828.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahmad</td>
<td>Sèh</td>
<td>son-in-law of the above and adviser of Dipanagara at Tegalreja. Killed in fighting at Selarong in October 1825.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ali, Iman</td>
<td>Kyai</td>
<td>from pradikan désa of Melangi.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ali</td>
<td>Haji</td>
<td>guru and pradikan ageng of Melangi (also known as Haji Muhamad Salim). Killed at Kalijengking, September 1825. See further Pekih, Muhamad.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ali, Muhamad</td>
<td>Haji</td>
<td>follower of Kyai Maja from Kali Cebong/Karang. Exiled to Manado (1830). One of the two haji in Maja’s entourage (the other was Haji Amad Tajib) whom Dipanagara wished to have with him for a lengthy stay in Manado, but who refused to join him, Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 51.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alwi</td>
<td>Haji</td>
<td>wedana (commander) of Suranatan corps see under Pekih.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amad Pekih</td>
<td>Kyai Haji</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amad Rawi</td>
<td>Kyai</td>
<td>dullah of the Arkio regiment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amattakar</td>
<td>Haji</td>
<td>confidante of Hamengkubuwana II; later appointed demang of the désa of Samèn: a follower of Dipanagara and expert in gunpowder manufacture. Also known as Kyai Muhammadahir and listed as holding lands in Jatingarang (? in the Nanggulon sub-district of Kulon Praga), Carey and Hoadley 2000:332.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andataruna</td>
<td>Kyai</td>
<td>from Rejasa (Kulon Praga).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anggamerta</td>
<td>Kyai</td>
<td>from Grobogan, later appointed as bupati of Grobogan by Pangéran Sérang.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ansari</td>
<td>Sèh</td>
<td>see under Ahmad.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ansari</td>
<td>Sèh</td>
<td>ulama; served Dipanagara in Bagelèn.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asnawi, Muhamad</td>
<td>Sèh</td>
<td>ulama from Gadhing (Kedhu); also referred to as Sèh Muhamad.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atmawijaya</td>
<td>Radèn</td>
<td>son of a ? haji, served Hamengkubuwana II in Ambon; appointed Radèn Atmawijaya.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Titles</td>
<td>Location, position and relationship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Badarudin</td>
<td>Haji</td>
<td>lurah of the Suranatan regiment in Yogya, served Dipanagara in the same capacity; made the haj twice; from the desa of Ngawèn, west of Yogya and just to the north of Tegalreja. Appointed pengulu of Bagelèn after the Java War.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Badhèran</td>
<td>Kyai</td>
<td>see under Wirapati.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahwi, Muhamad</td>
<td>Kyai</td>
<td>pengulu of Ratu Ageng at Tegalreja (1793-1803), became the basah of the Bulkio regiment with the name of Muhamad Ngusman Ali Basah.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baina, Ahmad</td>
<td>Kyai</td>
<td>Kajoran.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baji</td>
<td>Kyai</td>
<td>Gorangan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balad</td>
<td>Kyai</td>
<td>jurukunci pasareyan Imagiri.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banjarsari</td>
<td>Kyai</td>
<td>pradikan ageng and guru of the pesan-trèn Banjarsari (Madiun); supporter of Dipanagara, see also Tapsir Anom.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barmawi</td>
<td>Sèh Kyai</td>
<td>senior ulama from Celereng (Kulon Praga).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Béji</td>
<td>Kyai</td>
<td>Cucuhan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Besari, Hasan</td>
<td>Kyai</td>
<td>see under Hasan Besari.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brajayuda</td>
<td>Demang</td>
<td>Krapyak.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budu</td>
<td>Kyai</td>
<td>Elo Gedhé.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bunari, Muhamad</td>
<td>Kyai</td>
<td>abdi-dalem of Dipanagara at Tegalreja.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Busu</td>
<td>Kyai</td>
<td>Kemasan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citrajaya</td>
<td>Kyai</td>
<td>Krapyak.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dhadhapan</td>
<td>Kyai</td>
<td>see under Gajali (Ajali).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diman (Ngadiman)</td>
<td>Kyai</td>
<td>Demangan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duku</td>
<td>Kyai</td>
<td>Gurangan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Édris (Idris)</td>
<td>Sèh Kyai</td>
<td>associate of Umar Mahdi, Bagelèn (1817), pengulu of landraad (1830), associate of Hamengkubuwana II.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Élias (Tumenggung Pajang)</td>
<td>Bagus</td>
<td>a son of Hasan Besari and nephew of Kyai Maja; pradikan of Karang; appointed as Tumenggung Pajang in 1825. One of Dipanagara's bravest and youngest military commanders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Élias</td>
<td>Kyai</td>
<td>from pradikan desa of Maja.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gajali (Ajali)</td>
<td>Kyai</td>
<td>pradikan of Bendhasari (Kedhu), a son of Kyai Musa and a nephew of Kyai Taptajani.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gajali (Ajali)</td>
<td>Kyai Iman</td>
<td>ulama from Dhadhapan (Tèmpèl, Yogya); ? relation of Kyai Maja.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gamawijaya</td>
<td>Kyai</td>
<td>from Panjer (Bagelèn), a follower of Dipanagara.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gedhung Gubah</td>
<td>Nyai</td>
<td>wife of Haji Imanraji.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Titles</td>
<td>Location, position and relationship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gendhong Hasan</td>
<td>Kyai</td>
<td>Gadhing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Haji</td>
<td>lurah of the Suryagama corps in \ Yogyakarta, served Dipanagara in the same capacity. Made the haj twice.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hasan Besari</td>
<td>Kyai</td>
<td>elder brother of Kyai Maja from Maja, served Dipanagara as a basah. May have died in prison in Batavia. Cleerens mentions the death of a ‘Kyai Hasan Besari’ on 16-1-1830, dK 49, Cleerens (Panjer) to H.M. de Kock (Magelang), 16-1-1830.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hasan Besari</td>
<td>Kyai</td>
<td>sympathetic to Dipanagara but afforded him no active support.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hasan, Muhamad</td>
<td>Nyai</td>
<td>sister of Kyai Maja from Pulo Kadang.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hasan Munadi</td>
<td></td>
<td>see under Samparwedi.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husein</td>
<td>Kyai</td>
<td>Kejené.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ibrahim</td>
<td>Haji</td>
<td>a confidante of Hamengkubuwana II from the désa of Wanasari (near Boyolali). Served Dipanagara.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ibrahim, Pekih</td>
<td>Muhamad</td>
<td>see Kusên, Muhamad.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Idris</td>
<td>Kyai</td>
<td>see Édris.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imam, Hasan</td>
<td>Kyai</td>
<td>Mugup.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imampura</td>
<td>Kyai</td>
<td>son of Kyai Maja, studied at Tegalsari.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imamraji</td>
<td>Haji</td>
<td>ulama from Papringan (also mentioned as from Ngapaingan to the east of Yogy); served Dipanagara as pengulu (1825-1828); earlier a pupil of Kyai Maja. Later married Nyai Gedhung Gubah.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imamraji</td>
<td>Kyai</td>
<td>Melangi.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iskak</td>
<td>Kyai</td>
<td>follower of Kyai Maja from Bojong,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ismangil</td>
<td>Sèh Kyai</td>
<td>ulama ageng from Gerajën (? Krajan, south of Yogyakart).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jaëlani, Muhamad</td>
<td>Kyai</td>
<td>abdi-dalem of Dipanagara at Tegalreja, from the désa of Béji to the west of Yogyakarta.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jagakarya</td>
<td>Kyai</td>
<td>from Tegal (pasisir); served Dipanagara.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jagaprawira</td>
<td>Demang</td>
<td>Pluning.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jagasura</td>
<td>Sèh</td>
<td>pradikan désa unknown.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jalasutra, Muhamad</td>
<td>Kyai</td>
<td>jurukunci from Jalasutra.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamjani</td>
<td>Kyai</td>
<td>amad-dalem (jurukunci) of Kutha Gedhé (present day Kota Gede).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Janom</td>
<td>Kyai</td>
<td>abdi-dalem of Dipanagara at Tegalreja; appointed as tumenggung by Dipanagara in 1825.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Titles</td>
<td>Location, position and relationship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jayanodin</td>
<td>Kyai abdi-dalem</td>
<td>Dipanagara at Tegalreja.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jayaprawira</td>
<td>Mas Abdullah</td>
<td>son of Kyai Melangi submits 1828.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jayamenggala</td>
<td>Kyai</td>
<td>see under Amattakar.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jemetri</td>
<td>Kyai pengulu</td>
<td>of Madiun, and close associate of Kyai Banjarsari. Also known as Zainal Ngabidin.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jenal Ngabidin</td>
<td>Kyai pengulu</td>
<td>see under Amattakar.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jenari, Ahmad</td>
<td>Kyai Pecawor</td>
<td>(? Pejawaran).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jinan, Imam</td>
<td>Sèh</td>
<td>member of the Suryagama regiment in Yogyakarta and a follower of Dipanagara.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jirengga</td>
<td>Kyai</td>
<td>member of the pasukan (troop) of Jaya-mustapa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kalifah, Bagus</td>
<td>Kyai jurutulis</td>
<td>see under Maja.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kalifah</td>
<td>Haji pengulu</td>
<td>of Kyai Maja.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kamalodiningrat</td>
<td>Haji pengulu</td>
<td>of Yogya, see Abuyamin, Ketib.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kampret</td>
<td>Kyai Jaya</td>
<td>from pradikan desa of Maja.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karang</td>
<td>Kyai</td>
<td>from pradikan desa of Karang.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karip</td>
<td>Kyai</td>
<td>from pradikan desa of Maja.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kasidin</td>
<td>Kyai</td>
<td>Jelegong.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kasiman</td>
<td>Kyai</td>
<td>from pradikan desa of Maja.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kastuba</td>
<td>Bagus ulama</td>
<td>of Jatinom.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kastuba, Berangkal</td>
<td>Sèh</td>
<td>senior ulama in Bagelèn, guru of pesantrèn of Alang- nalang Ombo.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kastuba, Muhamad</td>
<td>Tumenggung</td>
<td>earlier pengulu of Prapak, Medhana, Kedhu.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kawis</td>
<td>Sèh</td>
<td>ulama; follower of Kyai Maja.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kemis</td>
<td>Kyai</td>
<td>Getas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenapi</td>
<td>Kyai</td>
<td>Tulang.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenapi</td>
<td>Kyai</td>
<td>Lungé.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kertajaya</td>
<td>Kyai Imagiri</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kertajaya</td>
<td>Kyai Candhèran.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ketib, Imam</td>
<td>Kyai kaum</td>
<td>from Yogya.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuncong</td>
<td>Kyai</td>
<td>Bakungan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurnèn</td>
<td>Imam</td>
<td>nephew of Kyai Maja.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kusasi</td>
<td>Kyai</td>
<td>from pradikan desa of Karang.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kusèn, Muhamad</td>
<td>Kyai</td>
<td>nephew of Kyai Pengulu Pekih Ibrahim, pengulu of Yogya (c. 1755-1798); appointed as the pengulu of Dipanagara with the name of Pekih Ibrahim (1828-1830). Later friend of Radèn Tumenggung Wiranagara (post-1829, Pangéran Adipati Prabuningrat).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwaron</td>
<td>Kyai</td>
<td>from pradikan desa of Kuwaron; an older ulama well versed in the Qur'ān whom Dipanagara summoned to Selarong along with Kyai Maja at the start of the Java War.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Titles</td>
<td>Location, position and relationship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lestari</td>
<td>Haji</td>
<td>religious teacher (guru) of Bagus Santri.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maja (Bagus Kalifah)</td>
<td>Kyai</td>
<td>pradikan and guru of Maja, youngest son of Kyai Guru Badheran.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majasta</td>
<td>Mas Lurah</td>
<td>Arab guru of pondhok of Majasta, follower of Dipanagara at Selarong.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maja</td>
<td>Kyai pradikan</td>
<td>and guru of Maja, youngest son of Kyai Guru Badheran.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mansur</td>
<td>Haji Dullah</td>
<td>lurai of the Suryagama regiment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mansur</td>
<td>Kyai</td>
<td>Pulo Kadang.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mansur</td>
<td>Kyai</td>
<td>from desa of Pangéran.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mangewuah</td>
<td>Kyai</td>
<td>from Nanggulon (Kulon Praga).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martani</td>
<td>Kyai</td>
<td>Maja.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marjan</td>
<td>Haji</td>
<td>ulama; follower of Sèh Barmawi at Celereng (Kulon Praga).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maruf</td>
<td>Kyai</td>
<td>Rejakusuma.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Melangi</td>
<td>Kyai</td>
<td>see under Ali.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mesir</td>
<td>Kyai</td>
<td>from pradikan desa of Badhèran.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mopid</td>
<td>Kyai ulama</td>
<td>also served as a jurukunci. Follower of Dipanagara at Tegalreja.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mudha</td>
<td>Haji</td>
<td>ulama from Kedhu, a brother of Haji Musa and a follower of Dipanagara at Tegalreja.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mukmin</td>
<td>Kyai</td>
<td>from pradikan desa of Pulokadang.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murdiyah</td>
<td>Kyai</td>
<td>from Yogyakarta, joined Dipanagara at Tegalreja.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mursam, Muhamad</td>
<td>Kyai kaum</td>
<td>from Yogyakarta, joined Dipanagara at Tegalreja.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mustarip, Ahmad</td>
<td>Kyai Candhi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Musa</td>
<td>Kyai Haji</td>
<td>ulama from Kedhu, brother of Haji Mudha and father of Kyai Gajali, pradikan of Bendhasari.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mustapa</td>
<td>Sèh Haji</td>
<td>dullah of the Bulkio regiment; a colleague of Haji Abdulkadir.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ngarfah, Muhamad</td>
<td>Kyai</td>
<td>ulama from Kedhu. Joined Dipanagara at Selarong; appointed as Tumenggung Secanegara; a brother of Mas Mulyasentika (later Tumenggung Kertanegara).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ngarip, Muhamad</td>
<td>Kyai</td>
<td>ulama from Melangi, also known as Ahmad Ngarip, adviser of Dipanagara at Tegalreja. Later (1830) joined Pangéran Prabuningrat and became his guru.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ngisa</td>
<td>Haji</td>
<td>follower of Kyai Maja and pradikan from Pulo Kadang; served Dipanagara as a dullah and advised him at the Magelang conference (28-3-1830). Described as acting the role of jester (hansworst) in Dipanagara’s entourage at Menoreh (21-2-1830 – 6-3-1830), Chapter XII note 75.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Titles</td>
<td>Location, position and relationship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ngusman, Amad</td>
<td>Kyai</td>
<td>lurah of the Suranatan corps in Yogyakarta and abdi-dalem of the kadipatèn; later tutor of Hamengkubuwana IV.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ngusman, Muhamad Nitipraja</td>
<td>Ali Basah Kyai</td>
<td>see Bahwi, Amad. pathok negari (ulama); son of the jaksa (magistrate) of Yogyakarta Kyai Nitipraja; appointed by Dipanagara to follow his father.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nurngali</td>
<td>Sèh</td>
<td>Bengali dhukun (physician and herbalist) of Dipanagara; possibly a sepoy deserter who stayed on after 1816.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paci</td>
<td>Kyai</td>
<td>Raman.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pekih, Muhamad</td>
<td>Kyai</td>
<td>Melangi. Also known as Kyai Melangi. Son of Haji Ali, guru and pradikan ageng of Melangi (killed September 1825). Trusted religious adviser of Dipanagara at the time of his negotiations with Colonel Cleerens in western Bagelèn, Jan-Feb 1830, see Chapter XII.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prayatruna</td>
<td>Kyai</td>
<td>Ceper.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rahman</td>
<td>Kyai</td>
<td>from Mamdu, pradikan dèsa of Maja.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rahmanudin</td>
<td>Kyai Pengulu</td>
<td>pengulu of Yogyakarta (1812-1823); a confidante of Dipanagara. Made the haj in 1825 after his dismissal as pengulu by Danureja IV.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raniman</td>
<td>Kyai</td>
<td>Maja.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resadilaga</td>
<td>Demang</td>
<td>Sambing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resakusuma</td>
<td>Kyai</td>
<td>(Reksakusuma) chief jurukunci at Imagiri. Married to a daughter of Hamengkubuwana II.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resamenggala</td>
<td>Kyai</td>
<td>bekel wong pinggir from Wanakriya.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resanegara</td>
<td>Tumenggung</td>
<td>pradikan, follower and nephew of Kyai Maja from Pulo Kadang.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resayuda</td>
<td>Kyai</td>
<td>modin of Cilacap (Banyumas); afforded help to Kyai Modin, Kyai Jyanodin and Kyai Jayamustapa on their pilgrimage to Nusa Kambangan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ripangi</td>
<td>Kyai</td>
<td>amad-dalem of Kutha Gedhé. Joined Dipanagara and appointed as Amad Dullah Tumenggung Resasentana, bupati of Kutha Gedhé (26-3-1826).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sahidin</td>
<td>Bagus Santri</td>
<td>from pradikan dèsa of Badhèran, later at Tulung Miliran. Involved in 1832 uprising.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salim</td>
<td>Haji Muhamad</td>
<td>see under Ali.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sahiman</td>
<td>Ahmad</td>
<td>Karangkajèn.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sahiman</td>
<td>Kyai</td>
<td>Imagiri.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Titles</td>
<td>Location, position and relationship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samparwedi</td>
<td>Kyai Haji</td>
<td>ulama appointed as dullah of the Barjumungah regiment with the name of Hasan Munadi. Used by De Kock as a go-between in the negotiations with Dipanagara in 1829-1830. Also referred to as ‘Tuwan Sarif Samparwedi’ in Dipanagara’s babad, Louw and De Klerk 1894-1909, V:527.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanget, Muhamad</td>
<td>Haji</td>
<td>Madiun.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santri, Muhamad</td>
<td>Kyai</td>
<td>lurah kaum of Yogyakarta: reader of the Qur’ān to the sultan at the Garebeg, joined Dipanagara at Tegalreja.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sarija</td>
<td>Kyai</td>
<td>from pradikan désa of Maja.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sariman</td>
<td>Kyai</td>
<td>from pradikan désa of Maja.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sastrawinangun</td>
<td>Kyai</td>
<td>abdi-dalem and jurutulis (scribe) of Dipanagara at Tegalreja.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secadirja</td>
<td>Bekel</td>
<td>Manjong.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semangi</td>
<td>Kyai</td>
<td>Perigaror (?).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semangun</td>
<td>Kyai</td>
<td>from traitors’ graveyard of Banyusumurup.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sepawi</td>
<td>Kyai</td>
<td>Suro (? Banyumas).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seri</td>
<td>Kyai</td>
<td>Gambiran.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Setrawijaya</td>
<td>Kyai</td>
<td>from pradikan désa of Mutihan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singadangsa</td>
<td>Kyai</td>
<td>Wotgaléh.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singep, Muhamad</td>
<td>Kyai</td>
<td>from Jobong.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sis</td>
<td>Kyai</td>
<td>from pradikan désa of Maja.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soban</td>
<td>Kyai</td>
<td>adviser of Dipanagara at Tegalreja.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supingi, Muhamad</td>
<td>Kyai</td>
<td>Badhèran.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supri</td>
<td>Kyai</td>
<td>Ngèemplak.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suradrana</td>
<td>Kyai</td>
<td>from pradikan désa of Maja.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajib, Muhamad</td>
<td>Sèh Kyai</td>
<td>follower of Maja from Boyolali; served Dipanagara as dullah of Suryagama regiment. A colleague of Haji Muhamad Hasan; exiled to Manado (1830). Appears to have made the haj. Was one of two members of Kyai Maja’s entourage – the other was Haji Muhamad Ali – whom Dipanagara wished to have with him for a lengthy period in Manado, but who refused to join him, Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 51. pradikan ageng of Banjarsari (Panaraga).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tapsir Anom</td>
<td>Kyai</td>
<td>? of Arab descent; guru and pradikan ageng of Melangi until 1805; moved to Surakarta; associated with Kyai Maja and a brother-in-law of Kyai Musa. Tutor of Pangéran Adisurya, mystic brother of Dipanagara.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taptajani</td>
<td>Kyai</td>
<td>* pradikan ageng of Banjarsari (Panaraga).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Titles</td>
<td>Location, position and relationship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telaksana</td>
<td></td>
<td>from pradikan desa of Karang.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Termis</td>
<td>Kyai</td>
<td>Maduan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tirtadrana</td>
<td>Kyai</td>
<td>dismissed head demang of Grabag in northern Kedu. In Magelang during Java War; exiled with Kyai Maja and later scribe of Dipanagara in Manado in 1830-1831.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tomjed</td>
<td>Kyai</td>
<td>from pradikan desa of Maja.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unus</td>
<td>Kyai</td>
<td>Ajanjer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urawan</td>
<td>Tumenggung</td>
<td>demang of Plantaran.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>see also Abdulkadir.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wahid</td>
<td>Kyai</td>
<td>ultrasound, follower of Kyai Maja from pradikan desa of Deresan (Yogyakarta). Also referred to as Kyai Wahada.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wanapeti</td>
<td>Kyai</td>
<td>guru of pondok of Wanapeti near Wates, Kulon Praga, follower of Kyai Maja.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(alias Kyai Kembang Lampir)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wanasari</td>
<td>Kyai</td>
<td>senior ulama from Wanasari (? Gunung Kidul).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wangsadirja</td>
<td>Kyai</td>
<td>See Pekih, Muhamad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wijaya, Murma</td>
<td>Kyai</td>
<td>pradikan and guru of Kapundhung (Yogyakarta) born in the pradikan desa of Maja. Had connections with both courts. Exiled to Ambon in 1817. Allowed back to Java in September 1824 and died soon afterwards. pradikan of Badheiran; eldest son of Kyai guru of Badheiran and elder brother of Kyai Maja.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wirapatih</td>
<td>Ketib Iman</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Kyai Badheran)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wotgalèh</td>
<td>Kyai</td>
<td>ultrasound and jurukunci from Wotgalèh (near Kutha Gedhé), follower of Kyai Maja. See also Adam, Hasani.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yudapenawang</td>
<td>Tumenggung</td>
<td>see Abdulkadir.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zainal Ngabidin</td>
<td></td>
<td>see Jenal Ngabidin.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX VIII

List of princes (*pangéran*) and senior officials (*priyayi*) of the Yogyakarta *kraton* showing landholdings and pensions, 1808-1820, and allegiance during the Java War

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Date born</th>
<th>son of</th>
<th>1808 landholdings (cacah)</th>
<th>1814 pension (SpD)</th>
<th>c. 1820 landholdings (cacah)</th>
<th>c. 1820 pension (SpD)</th>
<th>1825-1830 allegiance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abubakar, see Muhamad Abubakar</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adikusuma</td>
<td>c. 1774</td>
<td>Hamengkubuwana I</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>367</td>
<td>58 (rl)</td>
<td>loyal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adinagara</td>
<td>c. 1786</td>
<td>Hamengkubuwana III</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>216 (rl)</td>
<td>joins Dipanagara; submits 1829</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adisurya</td>
<td>c. 1800</td>
<td>Hamengkubuwana III</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>166 (rl)</td>
<td>joins Dipanagara; died 1829</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adiwijaya I</td>
<td>c. 1772</td>
<td>Hamengkubuwana I</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>200</td>
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1 The following list and particulars are taken from Dj.Br. 21 pt. vii, Matthijs Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 5-9-1807, who also estimated the age of the various *pangéran*; Dj.Br. 29, M.C. Garham, ‘Statement of Annual Expenditure in the Cratton by the late Sultan – Hamangkubuana [sic] the 3rd’, 1-12-1814; dK 158 ‘Naamlijsten der Djokjosche hoofden die aan het Nederlandsch gezag getrouw zijn gebleven, of de partij van Diepo Negoro houden, of zich weder aan ons gezag hebben onderworpen’, Mar-Dec 1829; Louw and De Klerk 1894-1909, 1:589-95; Dwidjosoegondo and Adisoetrisno 1941:97-105. The abbreviations used are as follows: *rl* = rents land, *SpD* = Spanish Dollar, *wkl* = *wakil dalem* (guardian) of Hamengkubuwana V either before, during or after the war, *' indicates debt, and *----* indicates that no figures are available.
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<td>124 joins Dipanagara, submits 1828</td>
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2 Natakusuma's date of birth is given in *Kota Jogjakarta 200 tahun* 1956:154. After June 1812, when he was appointed as K.G.P.A.A. Pakualam I by the British government. Natakusuma was accorded 4000 *cacah* and a monthly stipend of SpD 750 for the upkeep of his family and a troop of 100 cavalry known as the Pakualam Corps, see Van Deventer 1891:333-5; and Carey 1992:435 note 181, 458-9 note 286, note 288, note 291.
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<td>75</td>
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<td>Singasari</td>
<td>c. 1797</td>
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<td>---</td>
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<td>25</td>
<td>124</td>
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<tr>
<td>Suryabrangta</td>
<td>c. 1788</td>
<td>Hamengkubuwana III</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>joins Dipanagara, submits 1829</td>
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<td>Suryawijaya</td>
<td>c. 1805</td>
<td>Hamengkubuwana III</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>joins Dipanagara, submits 1829</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tejakusuma (Adinegara)</td>
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<td>Hamengkubuwana II</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
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<td>Tepasanta</td>
<td>c. 1796</td>
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<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>124</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wiramenggala</td>
<td>c. 1779</td>
<td>Hamengkubuwana II</td>
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<td>200</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>44 (rl)</td>
<td>joins Dipanagara; killed 17-9-1829</td>
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2 Priyayi³

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<tr>
<th>Name</th>
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<td>landholdings</td>
<td>pension</td>
<td>allegiance</td>
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<td>Bp Sokawati</td>
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<tr>
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<td>---</td>
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<td>---</td>
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<td>---</td>
<td>144</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cakraprawira, R.T.</td>
<td>Bp Magetan</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
<td>? loyal</td>
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</table>

³ The following list and particulars are taken from Dj.Br. 21, pt.vii, Matthijs Waterloo (Yogya) to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang) 5-9-1807; Dj.Br. 29, Garnham 'Statement of Expenditure'; Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:521-3, 590-1; IV:876-81; MvK 4132 pt. 6, ‘Missiven van den Heer Smissaert en Bijlagen’, Report of Ngabèhi Ratawijaya on debts in Yogya, 5-10-1825 and S.Br. 169 'Vervallen piagems van de Regenten en Hoofden der overgenomen Vorstenlanden', 1830. The abbreviations used are as above with the following additions: Bp = bupati, Ng. = ngabèhi, P = pangéran, R = radèn, T = tumenggung, Wdn = wedana, and if Yogya is cited in the position held this indicates a rank in the kraton administration. In cases of doubt as to allegiance it has been assumed that the official in the question remained loyal, but a question mark has been placed in front.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Father</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Title (Eastern)</th>
<th>Notes</th>
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<td>Danuatmaja, R.T.</td>
<td>Bp Réma</td>
<td>---</td>
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<td>joins Dipanagara</td>
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<tr>
<td>(son of Danukusuma II)</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Danunegara, R.T.</td>
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<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>? deceased</td>
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<tr>
<td>Danukusuma I, R.T.</td>
<td>Bp Yogya</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>strangled Jan 1812</td>
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<tr>
<td>Danukusuma II, R.T.</td>
<td>Bp Réma</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>250*</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>joins Dipanagara; served as his patih; loyal; killed 28-9-1825</td>
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<tr>
<td>Danuningrat, R.T.</td>
<td>Bp Kedhu</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
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<td>loyal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(earlier Ng. Danukrama, patih of kepatihan)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Danupaya, R. Ria</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>---</td>
<td>killed 26-7-1826</td>
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<td>(son of P. Danapaya)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Danureja IV, see Sumadipura</td>
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<tr>
<td>Demang, R.T. Aria</td>
<td>prajierit Sanaputra</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>100 SpD + 1 jung</td>
<td>joins Dipanagara</td>
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<tr>
<td>(son of P. Demang)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dipadirja, R.T.</td>
<td>Bp Yogya</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>joins Dipanagara</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dipakusuma, P.4</td>
<td>Bp Wdn Madiun</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>died 1822, see Appendix Va</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dipawiyana II, R.T. (son of P. Panengah)</td>
<td>Bp Yogya</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>joins DN; accompanied Dipanagara into exile in Manado, see Appendix XII</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jagakarya, Kyai T.</td>
<td>Bp Pacitan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>replaced by son, Sumadiwiryia, killed by Karyadipura</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

4 According to Van IJsseldijk, ‘Memorie’ (1798), Dipakusuma was descended in the female line from the family of Sunan Amangkurat III (r. 1703-1708), who had been exiled to Ceylon. Crawfurd gave his age at around 50 in 1811, Mack.Pr. 21, ‘State of Djojcarta’, 6-12-1811; he was mistrusted by Hamengkubuwana II because of his high birth and his great capabilities, but was later appointed as bupati wedana of the eastern mancanagara in 1811, see further Appendix Vb.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>1808</th>
<th>1814</th>
<th>c. 1820</th>
<th>1825-1830</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>landholdings (cacah)</td>
<td>pension (SpD)</td>
<td>landholdings (cacah)</td>
<td>allegiance</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jaganegara, Kyai Ng.</td>
<td>Wdn Gladlag</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>joins Dipanagara</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jayadiningrat, R.T.</td>
<td>mantri prajurit</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>6 jung</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>joins Dipanagara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jayadipura, R.T. (brother of Mangundipura)</td>
<td>Bp Kedhu</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>40</td>
<td></td>
<td>joins Dipanagara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jayadirja R.T.</td>
<td>Bp Yogya</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>loyal</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jayajana, R. Aria (son of P. Demang)</td>
<td>Bp Rajegwesi</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>joins Dipanagara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jayanegara, R.T.</td>
<td>Bp Rajegwesi</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>joins Dipanagara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jayapanular, R.T. (son of P. Panular)</td>
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<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>loyal</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jayaprapana, R. Ria (son of P. Murdiningrat)</td>
<td>prajurit Sanaputra</td>
<td>90 SpD</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>joins Dipanagara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jayapuspita, R.T.</td>
<td>panji prajurit</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>loyal</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jayasentika, Mas Ng.</td>
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<td>100</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>50</td>
<td>45</td>
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<td>Jayànggrana, R.T.</td>
<td>Wdn prajurit</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>75</td>
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<tr>
<td>Juru, Kyai (son of P. Jayusuma)</td>
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<td>Bp Bagèlen</td>
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<td>---</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kertadija, Mas T.</td>
<td>Bp Kerja (Sokawati, dismissed 1823)</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>joins Dipanagara. Captured 9-1-1826, and exiled to Ambon 1831</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kertanegara, R.T.</td>
<td>Bp Kedhu</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>loyal</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kertawijaya, R.T.</td>
<td>Bp Ledhok (Gowong)</td>
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<td>---</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>joins Dipanagara</td>
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<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Father</td>
<td>Position</td>
<td>Bp</td>
<td>First Month</td>
<td>Second Month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>(P. Natapraja)</td>
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<td>Mangundirana, Kyai Ng.</td>
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<td>Mangundirana, R.Ng.</td>
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<td>Mangunjaya, R.Ng.</td>
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<td>Mangunprawira, R.Ng.</td>
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<td>Mendura, Mas Riya II</td>
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<td>Mertadiwirya, R.Ng.</td>
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<td>Mertanegara, R.T.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**
- Madyaatmaja joins Dipanagara.
- Malangnegara joins Dipanagara.
- Mangkudirja and Mangkudiwirya join Dipanagara, submitting Dec. 1826.
- Mangkuwijaya joins Dipanagara, submitting 19-1-1827.
- Mangundirana joins Dipanagara, loyal.
- Mangundirja, R.T. dies in 1825.
- Mangunprawira joins Dipanagara.
- Mertanegara, R.T. joins Dipanagara, loyal.
- Mendura, Mas Riya II joins Dipanagara, loyal.
- Mertadiningrat, R.T. joins Dipanagara.
- Mertadiwirya, R.Ng. joins Dipanagara.
- Mertalaya, R.T. joins Dipanagara.
- Mertanegara, R.T. joins Dipanagara, loyal.

**P. Demang**

- Mertadiningrat, R.T. (son of P. Demang)
- Mertadiwirya, R.Ng.
- Mertalaya, R.T.
- Mertanegara, R.T. (son of P. Demang)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>1808 landholdings (cacah)</th>
<th>1814 pension (SpD)</th>
<th>c. 1820 landholdings (cacah)</th>
<th>1825-1830 allegiance</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Natadiningrat, R.T.</td>
<td>Bp Yogya</td>
<td>1000</td>
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<td>4000 (cacah)</td>
<td>loyal</td>
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<td>Natadiwirya, R.T.</td>
<td>Bp Duri / 2nd Bp Rawa, post-1812 Madiun</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>loyal</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nataprawira (brother of R.T. Natawijaya III)</td>
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<td>pathi of Bp Duri</td>
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<td>2000</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>died 1811</td>
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<tr>
<td>Natayuda II, R.T.</td>
<td>Bp Kedhu</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>250 (rl)</td>
<td>joins Dipanagara</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nitinegara, R.T.</td>
<td>jaksá</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>350 (3,157 rl)</td>
<td>loyal</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nitiprajá, Kyai Ng.</td>
<td>jaksá</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>---</td>
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<td>son joins Dipanagara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Padmakusuma, R.T.</td>
<td>panji prajurit</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
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<td>? loyal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Padmawijaya, Mas</td>
<td>panji prajurit</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>? loyal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakuningrat/ Jayadiningrat/ Suryamataram</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prawiraatmaja, R.T.</td>
<td>Bp Yogya, later Bp Kenitên (1826)</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>joins Dipanagara briefly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prawiradigdaya, R.T.</td>
<td>Bp Gagatan</td>
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<td>---</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>joins Dipanagara</td>
</tr>
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5 Natadiningrat's date of birth is taken from Kota Jogjakarta 200 tahun 1956:154.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Bp</th>
<th>Loyal</th>
<th>Joined by</th>
<th>Notes</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prawiradiningrat, P.</td>
<td>Bp Wdn Madiun</td>
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<td>1500</td>
<td>loyal</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prawiradiwirya, R.T.</td>
<td>Bp Yogya</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>? loyal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(brother of Ratu Kencana Wulan)</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Prawirakusuma, R.T.</td>
<td>Bp Yogya</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>loyal</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prawiranata, R.T.</td>
<td>lurah punji</td>
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<td>30</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>? loyal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(brother of Prawiradiwirya)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prawirasastra, Kyai Ng.</td>
<td>Wdn prajurit</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>? deceased</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prawirasantika, R.T.</td>
<td>Bp Bauwerna later Bp Tunggil (Krangan)</td>
<td>1150</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>1500 loyal, see Appendix V</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prawirayuda, R.T.</td>
<td>Bp Sekaran (Bojanegara)</td>
<td>1600</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>joins Dipanagara</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pringgaatmaja, R.T.</td>
<td>Bp Rawa</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>? loyal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pringgadiningrat, R.T.</td>
<td>Bp Yogya</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>died 25-5-1815</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pringgadiwirya, R.T.</td>
<td>Bp Lowanu</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>joins Dipanagara</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pringgakusuma, R.T.</td>
<td>Bp Rawa</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>loyal, joins Dipanagara but submits before 1827</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pringgalaya, R.T.</td>
<td>Bp Kertasana</td>
<td>3000</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>joins Dipanagara, but submits before 1827</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purbakusuma, R.T.</td>
<td>Bp Yogya</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>joins Dipanagara</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(son of P. Ngabèhi)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purwadiningrat, Kyai Adipati (father of Ratu Kedhaton)</td>
<td>Bp Magetan</td>
<td>1300</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>died 1810</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purwadipura, R.T.</td>
<td>Bp Yogya</td>
<td>1050</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>exiled to Sélamanik (Jan-Sept 1811); deceased circa 1814</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purwadirana, R.T.</td>
<td>Bp Mataram</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>joins Dipanagara</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purwawijaya, R.Ng.</td>
<td>Bp Yogya</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>? deceased</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puspadipura, R.T.</td>
<td>Bp Banget</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>loyal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Position</td>
<td>1808</td>
<td>1814</td>
<td>c. 1820</td>
<td>1825-1830</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ranadiningrat, R.T.</td>
<td>Wdn prajurit</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>loyal, see Appendix Vb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ranadipura, R.T.</td>
<td>Bp Yogya</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>loyal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ranadipura, Ng.</td>
<td>Mantri Miji</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>4 jung (90 SpD)</td>
<td>joins Dipanagara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ranadirja, R.T.</td>
<td>Bp Purwadadi</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>loyal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ranawijaya, Mas Ng.</td>
<td>Bp Yogya</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>? deceased</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reksanegara, Kyai T.</td>
<td>Bp Yogya</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>loyal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reksapraja, Kyai T.</td>
<td>Bp Yogya</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>? deceased</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sasrabau, Ng.</td>
<td>Bp Kalangbrèt</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>loyal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sasradingrat II, R.T.</td>
<td>Bp Rajegwesi</td>
<td>1500</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>500 (rl)</td>
<td>loyal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sasradipura, R.T.</td>
<td>Bp Magetan</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>loyal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sasradiwirya, R.T.</td>
<td>Wdn prajurit</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>loyal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sasrakusuma, R.T.</td>
<td>Bp Purwadadi</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>loyal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sasranegara I, R.T.</td>
<td>Bp Grobogan</td>
<td>1253</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>loyal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sasranegara II, R.T.</td>
<td>Bp Godéan</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>loyal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sasranegara III, R.T.</td>
<td>Bp Grobogan</td>
<td>1833</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>joins Dipanagara</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: "Bp" stands for Bupati, "Wdn" for Wadana, and "SpD" for Son of Dalem. "rl" stands for royal land.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Bp</th>
<th>500/1000</th>
<th>400/800</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sasraprawira, R.T.</td>
<td>Bp Goranggarèng</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>550</td>
<td></td>
<td>joins Dipanagara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sasrawinata, R.T.</td>
<td>Bp Magetan</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>350</td>
<td></td>
<td>joins Dipanagara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(half-brother of above)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sasrawirana, R.T.</td>
<td>Bp Sokawati</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>75</td>
<td></td>
<td>loyal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(brother-in-law of Danureja IV, replaced Mas T. Kertadirja 1823)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sawunggaling, R.T.</td>
<td>Bp Bagelèn</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
<td>joins Dipanagara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secadiningrat, R.T.</td>
<td>Bp Lowanu</td>
<td>--- 1000</td>
<td>800</td>
<td></td>
<td>loyal, see Appendix Vb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(earlier Tan Jin Sing, kapitan Cina)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(cacah in 1813)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Setrawijaya, Mas T.</td>
<td>Bp Pacitan</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
<td>loyal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sindusastra, Kyai Ng.</td>
<td>Bp Yogyay</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>---</td>
<td></td>
<td>? deceased</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(son of Ng. Wanadrena)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sindujaya, Mas Ng.</td>
<td>Bp Yogyay</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>? deceased</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sindunagara, Mas T.</td>
<td>Bp Yogyay</td>
<td>1100</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>loyal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sindureja I, R. Ria</td>
<td>Bp Yogyay</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>deceased</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sindureja II, R. Ria</td>
<td>Bp Yogyay</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
<td>joins Dipanagara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sumaatmaja, R. Ria</td>
<td>prajurit Sanaputra</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>1 jung/ 90 SpD</td>
<td></td>
<td>joins Dipanagara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(son of P. Demang)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sumadigdaya, R.T.</td>
<td>Bp Yogyay</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
<td>100 cacah/240 SpD, joins Dipanagara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(son of R.T. Sumadiningrat)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sumadiningrat, R.T.</td>
<td>Bp Yogyay</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>killed 20-6-1812</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sumadipura, Mas T.</td>
<td>Bp Japan</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>1400</td>
<td>loyal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(post-1813, R. Adipati Danureja IV)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sumadipura, R.T.</td>
<td>Bp Kertasana</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>700</td>
<td></td>
<td>loyal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(son of above)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sumadirja, R.T.</td>
<td>Bp Yogyay</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>75</td>
<td></td>
<td>joins Dipanagara</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1808

TOTALS: deceased, exiled, or presumed deceased
1. pangéran
9		
2. priyayi
21		

pension
(SpD)

1814
landholdings
(cacah)

c. 1820

---

------215
--90
--40
---------

100

100
------400
--400
200
--3650
--800

loyal or presumed loyal
13		
70		

-----

-----

allegiance

1825-1830

Total number		
37		
146

joins Dipanagara
loyal

? deceased
joins Dipanagara
joins Dipanagara
? loyal
? loyal
deceased

? deceased
? loyal
? loyal
loyal

? deceased

? deceased
? loyal

killed 17-12-1810
joins Dipanagara
joins Dipanagara

joins Dipanagara
15		
55		

100
1400

--6 jung
900
200
50
---

--75*
200
200

---

--50*

1750			
----200
----400 SpD 150

landholdings
(cacah)

Sumanegara, Mas T.
Bp Padhangan
Suradirja, R.T.
Bp Kenitèn
Suranegara, R.T.
Bp Godéan
(son of Prawiradiningrat) Kalangbrèt
Suryaatmaja, R.
mantri Yogya
Suryèngrana, Panji
panji prajurit
Suryèngjaya, P. Ria
(son of R.T. Jayawirya)
Tirtadiwirya, R.Ng.
Bp Yogya
(post-1811,
R.T. Danunagara)
Wanggèngsari, R.Ng.
Bp Yogya
Wangsakusuma, R.T.
Wdn prajurit
Wijayèngsastra, R.T.
Bp Mataram and Pajang
Wiraguna II, R.T.
Bp Yogya
(later Major Wiranagara)
Wiryadiningrat, R.T.
Bp Yogya
Wiryakusuma, R.T.
Bp Lowanu
Wiryanegara, R.T.
Bp Kertasana
Wiryawinata, R.T.
Bp Gunung Kidul
Yudaasmara, R. Panji
Bp Yogya
Yudakusuma I, R.T
Bp Grobogan-Wirsari
(post-1812, Muneng)
Yudakusuma II, R.T.
Bp Muneng
Yudaprawira, R.T.
Bp Maospati

Name
Position
		

		

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APPENDIX IX

Major officials of the Dutch East Indies Company, the British interim administration and the Netherlands Indies government 1780-1856

Governors-general, 1780-1855

Willem Arnold Alting 1780-2 November 1796
Pieter Gerardus van Overstraten 2 November 1796-22 August 1801
Johannes Siberg 22 August 1801-15 June 1805
Albert Henricus Wiese 15 June 1805-14 January 1808
Herman Willem Daendels 14 January 1808-16 May 1811
Jan Willem Janssens 16 May-18 September 1811
Gilbert Elliott Lord Minto 2 6 August-19 October 1811
Thomas Stamford Raffles 3 11 September 1811-12 March 1816
John Fendall 12 March-19 August 1816
Godert Alexander Gerard Philip baron van der Capellen 4 19 August 1816-1 January 1826
Leonard Pierre Joseph burggraaf du Bus de Gisignies 4 4 February 1826-16 January 1830
Johannes van den Bosch 16 January 1830-31 January 1834 5

1 The following details are taken from Rouffaer 1905:601-2; De Haan 1935:477-681; Soekanto 1952:175-7; Poensen 1905:73-346, and Veth 1898, II:369-70, and many dates have also been checked against the available Residency letters. Wherever possible the dates given refer to the date of transfer of office rather than to the date of appointment.
2 Lord Minto was governor-general of India (1807-1813), the dates refer to the time he spent in Java during the conquest of the island by the British.
3 Both Raffles and his successor John Fendall held the rank of lieutenant-governor; the dates refer to Raffles' official appointment by Lord Minto and the day on which Fendall landed in Java.
4 Van der Capellen combined his post of governor-general with that of commissioner-general in the period 19-8-1816 to 16-1-1819. He was assisted as commissioner-general by two colleagues, C.Th. Elout and A.A. Buyskes. He handed over responsibility for the day-to-day administration of the Netherlands East Indies to Lieutenant-General Hendrik Merkus de Kock on 1-1-1826 and sailed for the Netherlands on 2-2-1826.
5 Van den Bosch combined the post of governor-general with that of commissioner-general in the period 1832-34, a post which gave him quasi-dictatorial powers to act on King William I's (r. 1813-1840) behalf at a time when the Cultivation System (1830-1870) was being implemented and the war against the Padris in West Sumatra was entering a crucial stage, see Stapel 1941:85.
Jean Chrétien Baud 31 January 1834-29 February 1836
Dominique Jacques de Eerens 29 Feb 1836-30 May 1840 (died in post)
Pieter Merkus 6 Jan 1841-2 August 1844 (died in post)
Jan Jacob Rochussen 30 September 1845-12 May 1851
Albertus Jacobus Duymaer van Twist 12 May 1851-22 May 1856

Governors of Java's Northeast Coast, Semarang, 1780-1808

Johannes Siberg September 1780-September 1787
Jan Greeve September 1787-1 September 1791
Pieter Gerardus van Overstraten 1 September 1791-2 November 1796
Johan Frederik baron van Reede tot de Parkeler 2 November 1796-6 March 1801
Nicolaus Engelhard 6 March 1801-13 May 1808
(dismissed by Daendels and the post abolished)

Residents at Surakarta, 1790-1858

Johan Frederik baron van Reede tot de Parkeler August 1790-September 1796
Barend Jan van Nieuwkerken, genaamd Nijvenheim September 1796-18 August 1803
Johannes Gerardus van den Berg 18 August 1803-January 1806
Bogislaus Friedrich von Liebeherr January 1806-4 April 1808
Jacob Andries van Braam (1) 4 April 1808-November 1810
Willem Nicolaas Servatius (Assistant Resident) November 1810-July 1811
Jacob Andries van Braam (2) July-11 November 1811
Lt. Col. Alexander Adams 11 November 1811-31 July 1812
Hugh Hope 31 July 1812-14 August 1813
Lt. Richard Hart (Assistant Resident) 14 August-17 December 1813
Major Jeremiah Martin Johnson 17 December 1813-14 August 1816
Diederik Willem Pinket van Haak 14 August 1816-15 April 1817
Wouter Hendrik van Ijsseldijk 15 April-12 May 1817
(died at his post)
Hendrik Ferdinand Lippe (1) 12 May 1817-19 January 1818

6 Baud had served as ad interim governor-general with responsibility for the oversight of day-to-day administration after his arrival in Java on 10-1-1833 to 31-1-1834 while Van den Bosch was serving as commissioner-general (see above note 5). He was confirmed in post following Van den Bosch’s departure to assume the post of minister of the colonies (1834-1839), see Stapel 1941:85.

7 Merkus had been appointed ad interim governor-general on 3-10-1840 but could only take up his post in early 1841. He was confirmed in post on 14-2-1843. After his death on a sea voyage to Surabaya to restore his health, the vice-president of the Council of the Indies, Jonkheer J.C. Reynst, served as ad interim governor-general until the arrival of J.J. Rochussen on 29-9-1845, see Stapel 1941:93.
Rijck van Prehn 19 January 1818-4 December 1819
Hendrik Ferdinand Lippe (2) 4 December 1819-8 March 2020
Huibert Gerard Nahuys van Burgst (acting Resident) 8 March 1820-29 April 1822
Adriaan Mauritz Theodorus Baron de Salis 29 April 1822-15 July 1823
Hendrik Mauritz MacGillavry (1) (acting Resident) 15 July 1823-January 1824
Jan Izaäk van Sevenhoven January 1824-7 January 1825
Hendrik Mauritz MacGillavry (2) 7 January 1825-August 1827 (suspended)
Mr. Huibert Gerard Nahuys van Burgst (2) August 1827-November 1830
Mr. Johan Frederik Walraven van Nes (acting Resident) Nov-Dec 1830
Hendrik Mauritz MacGillavry (3) Dec 1830-March 1834
Frans Gerhardus Valck (acting Resident) March-December 1834
J.F.T. Mayor December 1834-September 1843
C.L. Hartmann September 1843-26 June 1846
Mr. Willem Carel Emile Baron de Geer 26 June 1846-December 1850
Hendrik Frederik Buschkens (acting Resident) March 1851-October 1858 (retired)

Residents at Yogyakarta, 1786-1855

Wouter Hendrik van IJsseldijk September 1786-January 1798
Johannes Gerardus van den Berg January 1798-26 July 1803
Matthijs Waterloo 26 July 1803-14 April 1808
Pieter Engelhard (1) 14 April-3 December 1808
Gustaf Wilhelm Wiese 3 December 1808-9 March 1810
Johannes Wilhelms Moorrees 9 March-24 August 1810
Bartholomeus Jacobus Driessen (acting Resident) 24 August-1 September 1810
Pieter Engelhard (2) 1 September 1810-15 November 1811
John Crawfurd (1) 15 November 1811-24 April 1813
Lt. Arthur Aston Homer (Assistant-Resident) 24 April-December 1813
John Crawfurd (2) December 1813-12 April 1814
Col. John Eales (acting Resident) 29 May-5 July 1814
John Crawfurd (3) 5 July-31 August 1814
Capt. Robert Clement Garnham 20 September 1814-31 August 1815
Lt. Edward Taylor (Assistant-Resident) 31 August-1 November 1815
Dr. Daniel Ainslie 1 November 1815-22 January 1816
John Crawfurd (4) 22 January-14 August 1816
Huibert Gerard Nahuys van Burgst (1) 14 August-6 October 1816
Johan Diederik Kruseman  
(provisional Resident)  
6 October 1816-24 January 1817
Huibert Gerard Nahuys van Burgst (2)  
(Actual Resident)  
24 January 1817-October 1818
Robbert Christiaan Nicolaas d’Abo  
(Actual Resident)  
October 1818-5 May 1819
Huibert Gerard Nahuys van Burgst (3)  
1 November 1822-11 February 1823
Adriaan Mauritz Theodore  
Baron de Salis (acting Resident)  
11 February 1823-26 September 1825  
(dismissed)
Hendrik Mauritz MacGillavry  
(acting Resident)  
26 September-28 October 1825
Jan Izaäk van Sevenhoven  
(acting Resident)  
28 October 1825-10 March 1827
Pieter Herbert Baron van  
Lawick van Pabst  
10 March-October 1827
Mr. Johan Frederik Walraven van Nes  
(acting Resident)  
October 1827-November 1830
Jan Izaäk van Sevenhoven  
(acting Resident)  
November-December 1830
Mr. Johan Frederik Walraven van Nes (2)  
December 1830-March 1831
Franciscus Gerardus Valck (1)  
March 1831-5 July 1838
J.F.T. Mayor (acting Resident)  
5 July-14 December 1838
Frans Gerhardus Valck (2)  
14 December 1838-July 1841
Arnold Adriaan Buyskes (acting Resident)  
July 1841-May 1845
R. de Fillietaz Bousquet  
May 1845-24 November 1848  
(suspended)
Albert Hendrik Wendelin baron de Kock  
28 December 1848-May 1851
J.J. Hasselman  
8 July 1851-January 1855
Mr Willem Carel Emile Baron de Geer  
Feb. 1855-6 May 1856 (died in post)

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8 According to Rouffaer in Winter 1902:124 note 1, Nahuys van Burgst left Yogyakarta sometime between 10 and 16 October 1818.
APPENDIX X

Rice prices in Yogyakarta (1804-1826) and throughout Java (1817-1825)

Yogyakarta

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Price (guilder)</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1804</td>
<td>May</td>
<td>9.68</td>
<td>record high prices in Yogya and Java</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>June</td>
<td>9.38</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>December</td>
<td>3.00/3.25</td>
<td>pasar Payaman, northern Kedu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>best quality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4.50</td>
<td>poor quality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1806</td>
<td>February</td>
<td>4.80/5.40</td>
<td>cheapest quality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1808</td>
<td>August</td>
<td>3.40</td>
<td>best quality, Surakarta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1811</td>
<td></td>
<td>3.50/4.20</td>
<td>poor/best quality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1812</td>
<td>July</td>
<td>4.50</td>
<td>aftermath of British attack on kraton</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1817</td>
<td>June</td>
<td>3.00/4.50</td>
<td>poor quality, Surakarta/Yogyak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>August</td>
<td>3.00/3.65</td>
<td>poor quality, Surakarta/Yogyak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1819</td>
<td>January</td>
<td>4.90</td>
<td>poor quality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1820</td>
<td>January</td>
<td>5.50</td>
<td>poor quality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>June</td>
<td>5.50</td>
<td>poor quality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>December</td>
<td>5.50</td>
<td>poor quality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1821</td>
<td>January</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td>poor quality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>May</td>
<td>6.50</td>
<td>drought in south-central Java</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>November</td>
<td>7.50</td>
<td>drought in south-central Java</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1822</td>
<td>January</td>
<td>7.20/8.90</td>
<td>drought in south-central Java (poor/best)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>March</td>
<td>7.20/9.60</td>
<td>drought in south-central Java (poor/best)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>June</td>
<td>8.55</td>
<td>drought in south-central Java</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>August</td>
<td>5.00/5.50</td>
<td>poor quality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>October</td>
<td>5.00/5.50</td>
<td>poor quality</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 All prices are per pikul (shoulder load) of 61.761 kilograms.
2 The details are taken from the available Yogya Residency letters and from Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, II:576. After 1817, the prices are those quoted by the Yogya Resident for the revictualling of the Yogya garrison, which were slightly below normal market prices. f = Indies guilder (Indische gulden) which exchanged at an agio of 15-20 percent below the Dutch guilder in the period 1816-1826.
Appendix X

1823 (January)  f 5.50/6.10 scarcity in Yogya after Mount Merapi eruption
(March)  f 5.00 poor quality
(April)  f 4.55 poor quality
(July)  f 4.90 poor quality
(August)  f 4.00 poor quality
(November)  f 4.00 poor quality

1824 (March)  f 4.00 drought in south-central Java
(April)  f 4.00 drought in south-central Java; lowest quality
(May)  f 5.00/5.50 drought in south-central Java; poor quality³
(November)  f 6.00 poor quality

1825 (January)  f 7.00/8.00 poor quality
(July)  f 10.00–12.00 harvest failure in Kedhu
(August)  f 200/300 Yogya under siege conditions
(September)  f 200/300 Yogya under siege conditions
(November)  f 10.00 Yogya after siege lifted; war inflation

1826 (December)  f 15.60 Yogya after siege lifted; war inflation

Java⁴

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Batavia</th>
<th>Semarang</th>
<th>Surabaya</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1817</td>
<td>f 2.56</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1818</td>
<td>f 2.56</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1819</td>
<td>f 2.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1820</td>
<td>f 3.50</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1820</td>
<td>f 3.50</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1821</td>
<td>f 4.13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1822</td>
<td>f 4.13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1823 (October)</td>
<td>f 3.80</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1824 (January)</td>
<td>f 4.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(April)</td>
<td>f 4.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(July)</td>
<td>f 3.26</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(October)</td>
<td>f 3.30</td>
<td>f 3.16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1825 (January)</td>
<td>f 5.13</td>
<td>f 4.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(April)</td>
<td>f 3.66/4.16</td>
<td>f 4.40</td>
<td>f 3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(July)</td>
<td>f 3.66/4.03</td>
<td>f 2.88</td>
<td>f 3.00/3.33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

³ Magelang market price.
⁴ Baud 251, ‘Pryzen der ryst op Java’, which cites market prices based on quotations in the Bataviasche Courant.
APPENDIX XI

List of Dipanagara’s heirloom (pusaka) weapons

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relation to Dipanagara</th>
<th>Owner</th>
<th>Domicile</th>
<th>Name of kris</th>
<th>Name of pike</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>sons</td>
<td>Pangéran Dipanagara II</td>
<td>Magelang</td>
<td>Kyai Rondhan</td>
<td>Kyai Rondhan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pangéran Dipanagara II</td>
<td>Magelang</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radèn Mas Jonéd</td>
<td>Magelang</td>
<td></td>
<td>Kyai Habit</td>
<td>Kyai Gagasono</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(? Abijaya)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>daughters</td>
<td>Radèn Mas Raib</td>
<td>Magelang</td>
<td>Kyai Blabar</td>
<td>Kyai Mundingwangi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radèn Ayu Mertanganara</td>
<td>Yogyakarta</td>
<td></td>
<td>Kyai Wresa Gemilar</td>
<td>Kyai Téja</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radèn Ayu Jayakusuma</td>
<td>Yogyakarta</td>
<td></td>
<td>Kyai Hatim</td>
<td>Kyai Simo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radèn Ajeng Impun</td>
<td>Magelang</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Kyai Dipayana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radèn Ajeng Munthèng</td>
<td>Magelang</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Kyai Bandung</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pangéran Dipanagara I</td>
<td>Batavia</td>
<td></td>
<td>Kyai Ageng Bandayuda</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Details taken from AN, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal buiten rade, 30-4-1830 no. 1 (Johannes van den Bosch’s decision to exile Dipanagara to Manado) Bijlage 3, J.J. Roeps, ‘Naamlijst van der wapens van den Pangerang Diponegoro en met aanwijzing voor wien dezelve bestemd zijn’ (‘List of names of the weapons of Pangéran Dipanagara and with indications of those for whom they are intended’).

2. Taken by Dipanagara to Manado and according to his family buried in his grave, interview with Radèn Mas Jusuf Diponegoro, Jl. Irian no. 83, Makassar, 8-9-1972. According to LOr 8652j no. 4 (Rinkes coll.) Preangerbode, 5-1-1914 Kyai Bandayuda was the ruler of all the spirits in Gilacap and his daughter married a male spirit from the court of Ratu Kidul. See also Gericke and Roorda 1901, II:648 sub: bonda; prang bondayuda = ‘hand to hand combat’. Another of Dipanagara’s kris, which is now untraceable, was supposedly taken back to the Netherlands where it was presented to King William I (r. 1813-1840). It bore the name of Kangjeng Kyai Naga Siluman (‘His Highness the Magician King of the Snakes’) and was kept in the royal curiosity cabinet (Koninklijk Kabinet van Zeldzaamheden) in The Hague, where the young Javanese painter Radèn Salèh Syarif Bustaman (c. 1811-1880) was ordered to make a report on it for the Koninklijk Kabinet’s director, R.P. van de Kasteele, in January 1831, Kraus 2005:280.
There is a reference to this *kris* in Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 31:

‘This evening [27-5-1830] at six o’clock Dipanagara placed a beautiful, expensive *kris* in my hands and spoke the following words: ‘See here an heirloom of my father, who is now a friend of God, this *kris* is a *pusaka* of many years. When my father, Sultan Raja [Hamengkubuwana III] wished to give a token of submission to the Marshal (Daendels) he gave this selfsame *kris* into his hands. The Marshal gave it back because he knew it was a holy *pusaka* and that my father was a true friend of the Dutch.’

Although Dipanagara said it was a *kraton pusaka* – according to his *babad*, Kyai Bandayuda had been made by melting down three other *pusaka*: Kyai Sarutama, a dagger given to him during his c. 1805 south coast pilgrimage; Kyai Barutuba, a pike carried by Ngusman Ali Basah, the commander of his personal bodyguard regiment, the Bulkio, and Kyai Abijaya, a *pusaka kris* inherited by Dipanagara as a young man.

The following is the passage relating this episode in his *babad*, BD (Manado) III:317, XXX (Asmaradana):

73 Kadya wus karsaning Hyang Widi / linebur ingkang pusaka / tiga karsanya Sang Katong / dinadosaken sajuga / nenggih Kyai Sarutoma / lan Ki Barutuba / tiga Kyai Abijaya

74 Kyai Barutuba iki / [Sèh Muhamad Ngali Basah / Ngusman kang pinareng nganggé]* / nenggih Ki Sarutoma / Kangjeng Ratu punika / Kyai Abijaya iku / mapan agemnya pribadya

*I have followed Rusche 1908-09, I:305 for these three lines. According to the Yogya *kraton babad*, only Kyai Maja was pleased at the melting down of the *pusaka* to make one *kris* and perhaps it was done at his instigation?*

According to the Yogya *kraton babad*, Dipanagara also had one of the *kraton pusaka kris* in his possession, Kyai Wisa Bintulu ('The poison of the multi-coloured dhodhot [cloth] of Bima'), but Ratu Ageng, the mother of Hamengkubuwana IV, had asked for it back in circa March 1820 because there were rumours of a prophecy that whoever had the Wisa Bintulu *kris* would later rule in Yogya.

B.Ng, II:72

XVII (Megatruh)

33 Sri Narèndra ing Ngayogy'a tyas kumenjut / dupi lamat-lamat myarsi / warta-wartaning jaisdu / awasta Kiyai Taslim/ ahli pethèk wesi pamor.

34 Amastani wangkingan wasiatipun / Jeng Pangran Dipanegari / wasita Ki Wisa Bintulu / sing sapa kangungan bênjing / kudu mradekséng karaton.

35 Sri Narèndra èsmu sumelang ing kayun / yên tanjeg pamor netepi / Kiyai Wisa Bintulu / yên avela wonten jawi / bok dadi bungtaning pamor.
XVIII (Asmaradana)
1  Karya pakèwuh ing wuri / trah turun kang madeg Nata / pijer-pijer onggrèh baé / seradyan temen lan dora / nguni uecaning galga / Kiyai Wisa Bintulu / sayoga anèng jro pura.
2  Ngilangaken tyas kuwatir / suwadiné ngéman raga / Pangran Dipanegarané / sak trahipun ywa sulaya / kétang sîh tresnèng kadang / gya matur Jeng Ratu Agung / dènnya arsa mundhut curiga.
3  Ki Wisa Bintulu nguni / wasiyat Dipanegaran / Jeng Ratu Ageng rumojong / jer ngicalaken samelang / pan nuju ingkang raka / Pangran Dipanegarèku / sowan marang dalem pura.

The Surakarta kraton version of the Babad Dipanagara (Carey 1981:108-9) has a reference to Dipanagara's kris used during the fighting at Tegalreja on 20 July 1825, IX (Durma) 19. Pangran sigra / ngunus curiga aglis. 20. pedhang sudut wasiyat saking kang rama / Kangjeng Sultan ping katri / [...] This suggests that it had a straight stabbing blade because of the reference to it as a pedhang (sword).
APPENDIX XII

List of Dipanagara’s followers in Manado, June 1830-June 1833

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Relationship with Dipanagara</th>
<th>When attached to Dipanagara</th>
<th>Monthly allowance (if known)</th>
<th>Age (if known)</th>
<th>Subsequent movements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Radèn Ayu Retnaningsih</td>
<td>official wife</td>
<td>followed Dipanagara from Java</td>
<td>f 50</td>
<td>c. 24</td>
<td>remaining with Dipanagara throughout his exile and continued to live in Makassar after his death (8 January 1855). returned to Java in August 1832.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Radèn Ayu Dipawiyana</td>
<td>younger sister, official wife of 3 brother-in-law, husband of 2 Son of Pangéran Dipawiyana I (pre-1812, Panengah)</td>
<td>followed Dipanagara from Java</td>
<td>f 20</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>returned to Java in August 1832.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Radèn Tumenggung Dipawiyana</td>
<td>brother-in-law</td>
<td>followed Dipanagara from Java</td>
<td>f 20</td>
<td>c. 28</td>
<td>returned to Java in August 1832.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Tirtadrana</td>
<td>Javanese scribe; pre-1825, head demang of Grabag district (Kedhu), Follower of Kyai Maja at Tonsea Lama (Tondano)</td>
<td>sent from Tonsea Lama August 1830</td>
<td>f 6</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>either returned to Tondano or was allowed back to Java in 1832.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Jayasurata (alias: Rata)</td>
<td>intimate retainer (panakawan)</td>
<td>followed Dipanagara from Java</td>
<td>f 7</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>transferred to Tondano via Ambon with her mother (17), wife and five children in June 1839.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Position</td>
<td>Relationship</td>
<td>Status</td>
<td>Details</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Angamerta</td>
<td>intimate retainer (panakawan)</td>
<td>followed Dipanagara f 5</td>
<td>transferred to Tondano via Ambon with his wife (20) in June 1839.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Kasimun</td>
<td>intimate retainer (panakawan)</td>
<td>followed Dipanagara f 6</td>
<td>remained with Dipanagara until his death.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Rajamenggala</td>
<td>intimate retainer (panakawan)</td>
<td>followed Dipanagara f 5</td>
<td>returned to Java with his wife (25) in August 1832.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Wangsatruna</td>
<td>intimate retainer (panakawan)</td>
<td>followed Dipanagara f 4</td>
<td>transferred to Tondano via Ambon with his wife (21) and three children in June 1839.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Banthèngwarèng</td>
<td>intimate retainer (panakawan)</td>
<td>followed Dipanagara f 5</td>
<td>transferred to Tondano via Ambon with his wife (26) and two children in June 1839.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Mertaleksana</td>
<td>intimate retainer (panakawan)</td>
<td>followed Dipanagara f 6</td>
<td>transferred to Tondano via Ambon with his wife (27), sister and three children in June 1839.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Rujakbeling</td>
<td>intimate retainer (panakawan)</td>
<td>followed Dipanagara f 5</td>
<td>remained with Dipanagara in Makassar.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Teplak</td>
<td>manservant; post-1837 intimate retainer (panakawan)</td>
<td>followed Dipanagara f 3</td>
<td>remained with Dipanagara in Makassar.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Nurhamidin</td>
<td>manservant</td>
<td>followed Dipanagara f 3</td>
<td>transferred to Tondano via Ambon in June 1839^5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Mangi</td>
<td>manservant</td>
<td>followed Dipanagara f 3</td>
<td>remained with Dipanagara in Makassar.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Relationship with Dipanagara</td>
<td>When attached to Dipanagara</td>
<td>Monthly allowance</td>
<td>Age (if known)</td>
<td>Subsequent movements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Suranata</td>
<td>follower of Kyai Maja from Tonsea Lama (Tondano); pre-1825 perhaps a member of the Yogya Suranatan corps</td>
<td>sent from Tonsea Lama August 1830</td>
<td>$f\ 3$</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>returned to Tondano with his wife (28) before June 1833.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 Amadullah</td>
<td>female servant mother of 5</td>
<td>followed Dipanagara from Java</td>
<td>$f\ 3$</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>transferred to Tondano via Ambon with her son and his family in June 1839.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(alias Madula)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>remained with Dipanagara in Makassar.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Trunadanti</td>
<td>female servant mother of 5</td>
<td>followed Dipanagara from Java</td>
<td>$f\ 3$</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>transferred to Tondano via Ambon in June 1839.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(alias Gunadanti)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>remained with Dipanagara in Makassar.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Sarintan</td>
<td>female servant mother of 5</td>
<td>followed Dipanagara from Java</td>
<td>$f\ 3$</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>transferred to Tondano via Ambon with her husband in June 1839.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Angamerta, Bok</td>
<td>female servant; wife of 6</td>
<td>followed Dipanagara from Java</td>
<td>$f\ 7$</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>transferred to Tondano via Ambon with her husband in June 1839.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 Wangsatruna, Bok</td>
<td>female servant; wife of 9</td>
<td>followed Dipanagara from Java</td>
<td>$f\ 3$</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>transferred to Tondano via Ambon with her husband in June 1839.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 Raja</td>
<td>personal servant of 3; husband of 23</td>
<td>followed Dipanagara from Java</td>
<td>$f\ 20^8$</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>returned to Java in August 1832 with 2 &amp; 3.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 Nyamel</td>
<td>female servant; lady-in -waiting of 2; wife of 22</td>
<td>followed Dipanagara from Java</td>
<td>$f\ 20^9$</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>remained with Dipanagara until his death.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 Sarinah</td>
<td>wife of 7</td>
<td>sent out from Java in late 1830 and married in Manado</td>
<td>kept by her husband</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>remained with Dipanagara until his death.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 Mina</td>
<td>wife of 8</td>
<td>? sent out from Java in late 1830</td>
<td>kept by her husband</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>returned to Java with her husband in August 1832.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Relationship</td>
<td>Details</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Rumpu</td>
<td>wife of 10</td>
<td>? sent out from Java in late 1830 kept by her husband transferred to Tondano via Ambon with her husband in June 1839.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Saritah</td>
<td>wife of 11</td>
<td>? sent out from Java post April 1831 kept by her husband transferred to Tondano via Ambon with her husband in June 1839.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Urin</td>
<td>wife of 16, a Minahasan</td>
<td>followed her husband from Tonsea Lama/ Tondano kept by her husband in August 1830 returned to Tondano with her husband before June 1833.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Renamasan</td>
<td>young daughters of 28</td>
<td>? born in Manado pre-April 1831 kept by 16 c. 1 returned to Tondano with their parents before June 1833.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Salima</td>
<td>female servant of 2</td>
<td>followed Dipanagara from Java kept by 2 returned to Java in August 1832</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Sarinah</td>
<td>female servant; husband of 33</td>
<td>Javanese who entered Dipanagara’s service in Manado in late 1830 transferred to Tondano via Ambon with his wife in June 1839.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Kathi</td>
<td>manservant; husband of 33</td>
<td>Javanese who entered Dipanagara’s service in Manado in late 1830 transferred to Tondano via Ambon with her husband in June 1839.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>Saribah</td>
<td>female servant; wife of 32</td>
<td>Javanese who entered Dipanagara’s service in Manado in late 1830 transferred to Tondano via Ambon with her husband in June 1839.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>Kucir</td>
<td>daughter of 9</td>
<td>born in Manado post April 1831 kept by 9 transferred to Tondano via Ambon with her parents in June 1839.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>Kalawah</td>
<td>young daughters of 5</td>
<td>born in Manado post April 1831 kept by 5 transferred to Tondano via Ambon</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>Doblok</td>
<td>son of 11 post-April 1831</td>
<td>born in Manado kept by 11 c. 1 transferred to Tondano via Ambon with his parents in June 1839.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name with Dipanagara</td>
<td>Relationship to Dipanagara</td>
<td>When attached allowance</td>
<td>Monthly allowance</td>
<td>Age (if known)</td>
<td>Subsequent movements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jungkut</td>
<td>son of 10</td>
<td>born in Manado post-April 1831</td>
<td>kept by 10</td>
<td>c. 1</td>
<td>transferred to Tondano via Ambon with his parents in June 1839.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martha</td>
<td>gardener</td>
<td>? a Manadonese, entered Dipanagara’s service late 1830</td>
<td>f 5</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>remained in Manado</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truna</td>
<td>manservant</td>
<td>? a Manadonese, entered Dipanagara’s service late 1830</td>
<td>f 5</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>remained in Manado</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suprana</td>
<td>manservant</td>
<td>? a Manadonese, entered Dipanagara’s service late 1830</td>
<td>f 5</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>remained in Manado</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Batu</td>
<td>manservant</td>
<td>? a Manadonese, entered Dipanagara’s service late 1830</td>
<td>f 5</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>remained in Manado</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wira</td>
<td>manservant</td>
<td>? a Manadonese, entered Dipanagara’s service late 1830</td>
<td>f 5</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>remained in Manado</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 The details have been taken from Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 1; AN Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal, 2-7-1831 no. 15, J.P.C. Cambier (Manado) to Johannes van den Bosch (Batavia/Bogor), 22-4-1831 (enclosing a list of Dipanagara’s followers in Manado at that date); AN Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal, 23-10-1832 no. 8, J.F.W. van Nes (Batavia/Bogor) to Johannes van den Bosch (Batavia/Bogor), 27-8-1832 (reporting the arrival of Radèn Tumenggung and Radèn Ayu Dipawiyana, and Rajamenggala and his wife); AN Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal, 13-10-1834 La E geheim, D.F.W. Pietemaat (Resident of Manado on commission to Makassar) to Johannes van den Bosch (Batavia/Bogor), 12-7-1833 (enclosing a list of Dipanagara’s followers who had been transferred from Manado to Makassar); AN Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal, 26-6-1840 no. 18, Acting Governor of Maluku to D.J. de Eerens (Batavia/Bogor), 24-12-1839 (enclosing a list of Dipanagara’s followers who had been transferred to Ambon from Makassar en route to Tondano); AN Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal, 19-5-1850 no. 8, Colonel A. van den Hart (Acting Governor of Makassar) to J.J. Rochussen (Batavia/Bogor), 9-11-1849 (enclosing list of Dipanagara’s family and followers still with him in Makassar).
Dipanagara was given an allowance of f 600 per month by the Dutch which was paid by the Yogya court. This was reduced to f 200 per month in October 1830 because Dipanagara appeared to be saving, but was later raised to f 311 per month in July 1831 and by September 1837 stood at f 350. Throughout this period, the Dutch authorities continued to receive the full f 600 monthly payments from the Yogya court, and they used the extra money saved after October 1830 to defray extraordinary expenses such as the f 254 spent in January and April 1831 by the Resident of Manado on purchasing land for Dipanagara’s garden and the construction of a bamboo langgar (pavilion) as well as a ‘mosque’ and bathing place at the site. After June 1839, the government also gave an allowance of f 250 per month to Dipanagara’s followers who had been transferred to Kyai Maja’s settlement at Tondano. Finally, after Dipanagara’s death on 8 January 1855, the Dutch authorities in Makasar bought a one-hectare site in the Kampung Melayu on which a house was built for Dipanagara’s widow and children. Part of the land was used as a family burial ground. Details taken from AN Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal, 11-5-1849 La V, Note of the Statistical Bureau (Batavia) on Dipanagara’s financial position (1830-1849); Interview with Raden Mas Jusuf Diponegoro, Jalan Irian no. 83, Makassar, September 1972.

The ages have been calculated as at June 1833. Details from Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 1, 9, NA Schneither 111, ‘Naam lyst van de in de maand October 1823 nog in leven zynde prinsen en princessen van vorstelijke bloed in het ryk van Mataram’.

Kyai Maja with his 62 followers (all male Javanese) had been settled in Tonsea Lama to the west of the Tondano River in Manado Residency since May 1830. They were lodged temporarily in the house used by the Resident of Manado for inspection journeys. By January 1831, eight in the party had already married non-Christian Minahasan women (referred to by the Dutch as ‘Alforese’) and wet ricefields (sawah), hitherto unknown in that part of North Sulawesi, had begun to be opened up. Sometime between 1831 and 1839, however, they were forced to move across the Tondano river to a new settlement known as the Kampung Jawa Tondano, because of quarrels over livestock (pigs and dogs) with local Tonsea-speaking Minahasans. Kampung Jawa Tondano remained the exiles’ home ever afterwards, and although a certain amount of intermarriage took place with locals, the community retained its separate Javanese identity, AN Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal, 12-2-1831 no. 25, D.F.W. Pietermaat (Manado) to Johannes van den Bosch (Batavia/Bogor), 3-7-1831; AN Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal, 12-4-1831 no. 11, D.F.W. Pietermaat (Manado) to Johannes van den Bosch (Batavia/Bogor), 13-1-1831; Babcock 1989:Chapter 2.

Identified from Babcock 1989:Appendix I, ‘The founders of the Kampung Jawa Tondano; Biographical notes’, no. 47.

Stipend paid separately by family in Java.

Stipend paid separately by relations in Java.

Stipend paid separately by relations in Java.

Stipend paid separately by relations in Java.
APPENDIX XIII

Letters written by Dipanagara from Batavia (1830) and Makassar (1837)

A
The following two letters were probably written by Dipanagara from Batavia before his departure on 3 May 1830.\(^1\) They were addressed to close members of his family and are the only letters known to exist which were written in his hand and not by a scribe. The unusual carelessness of the handwriting, the unnecessary doubling of the letters (aksara) in some places, and the occasional grammatical errors, all confirms Dipanagara’s later admission to Lieutenant J.H. Knoerle that ‘he wrote Javanese very defectively’ (Knoerle to Van den Bosch, 9 July 1830 in De Oosterling, volume 2 (1835), page 172). The originals are on Dutch government paper and were found by the Dutch scholar, J.J. de Hollander, in a file of correspondence between Javanese bupati, post-commanders and Dutch authorities relating to the Java War (1825-1830) in the archive of the Royal Military Academy at Breda. De Hollander published them in Javanese script with Dutch translations in Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde 25:192-6. He retained the original spelling and included copious corrections in his notes which have not been reproduced here. This is the first time the letters have been published in Romanised script with English translations.

(i) Dipanagara to his eldest son, Pangéran Dipanagara the Younger, n.d.

Sawusé salam dunganingsun Kulup Dipanegara marang sira apa déné marang adhinira Basah Mertanegara Basah Gadakusuma apa déné

\(^1\) The letters may have been given to Captain Johan Jacob Roeps to take back to south-central Java when Dipanagara took leave of him on board the Corvette Pollux in Batavia harbour on 3 May 1830, Knoerle, ‘Journal’, 2. A passage in Dipanagara’s autobiography suggests that he gave Roeps special instructions to keep an eye on his children at this time: BD (Manado) IV:320, XLIII (Maskumambang) 272-4. \textit{ingsun banget lega yekti sira mulih mring Mentaram. 273. pan dènbisa sirèku ngopèn-opèni/ mring kang kéri padah sabab bocah padha meksihi/ tanggung pesthi kēh kurangnya. 274. ingkang pikir.} Roeps’ departure on leave for Holland in July 1830 may have meant that he was never able to deliver the letters, see Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, II:283 note 2.
Letters written by Dipanagara from Batavia and Makasar

adhinira kabèh aja padha mikir marang ingsun sawab ingsun wos dadi karemnaningsun bakal sun tutugaken olé ingsun lelana karu déné manahé Sibèng Jayakusuma banget temen welasingsun iku yèn pareng padha sarjuné dhaupna karu adhènira Basah Gadakusuma aja tanggung olèhira dowé sadulur apa déné olé ingsun duwé anak apa déné sira kabèh wus aja na kuwatir sawab wus sun titepaké marèng Gupermèn karo déné manahé pamanira Kapitan Rup iku bangeng pracyaningsun wekasingsun marang sira Dipanegara Mertanegara Gadakusuma yèn ana keng dadi kasusahan atènira becik pamanira Kapitan sira ajak karembungan.

English translation:

After my greetings and prayers to you my son, Dipanagara, and also to your younger brothers Basah Mertanagara and Basah Gandakusuma and to all your younger brothers and sisters, do not concern yourselves about me because I am well content to continue my wanderings. Moreover, for your younger sister, little girl Jayakusuma, great indeed is my heart’s concern. If they agree to it, marry her to your younger brother brother Basah Gandakusuma. Do not neglect to care for your siblings, my children, and do not be concerned, all of you, for I have entrusted you to the [Dutch] government. Furthermore, my heart has the fullest trust in your uncle Captain [Johan Jacob] Roeps [and] I order you Dipanagara, Mertanagara [and] Gandakusuma that if there is anything troubling your hearts, it is good that you ask advice from your uncle the Captain.

(ii) Dipanagara to his mother, Radèn Ayu Mangkarawati, n.d.

Sampuning sembah kula ingkang kathah-kathah katura ing sampéyan

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2 Ali Basah Ngabulkamil Mertanagara (earlier Lurah Jayapermadi) was the eldest son of Radèn Adipati Danureja II (in office 1799-1811) by an unofficial wife, Mas Ayu Pulangyun. He followed Dipanagara throughout the war and by the end had become one of his most trusted advisers, especially after his marriage to one of Dipanagara’s daughters, Appendix IV. He was later an influential figure at the Yogyakarta court and was close to the Crown Prince, Pangéran Mangkubumi (later Hamengkubuwana VI, reigned 1855-1877). But this influence was tempered by general revulsion at his immoral behaviour, Dj.Br. 18, Valck, ‘Geheime Memorie’, 31-3-1840; Appendix IV, pt. 1 note 5.

3 Ali Basah Abdul Mahmud Gandakusuma (earlier Lurah Sukajaya) was a younger brother of the above. He also became a trusted adviser and army commander of Dipanagara at the end of the Java War, but declined marriage with Dipanagara’s widowed daughter, marrying instead the favourite sister of Hamengkubuwana V, Madyoyokusumo 1977:38 no. 8. He later became patik of Yogyakarta with the title Radèn Adipati Danureja V (in office 1847-1879), after serving for long as senior administrator of the royal domains (bupati panajegan-Dalen). On Radèn Ayu Jayakusuma see Appendix IV.
kula ngatar pirsa dhateng sampéyan lampah kula wilujeng ing samargi-margi boten sanès kalih wonten Magelang mila kula ngatari pirsa dhateng sampéyan mugi sampun dadus kasusahan anggalih dhateng kula sawab sampun dados suka-pirenaniipun manah kula piyambak kalih kula pas-rah wayah-wayah sampéyan sedaya punapa déné awak kula piyambak rumaos ageng temen kaledpat kula dhateng sampéyan ing lair punapa déné ingkang batos mugi wontena sih pengapunte[n] sampéyan dhateng kula ingkang ageng punapa déné dhateng Kanjeng Rama inggih sami ugi lepat kula mila wayah-wayah sampéyan yen dhangan sami ngaosna dhateng Kanjeng Rama niyata nyuwonaken apunte[n] dhateng kaledpat kula ingkang lair punapa déné ingkang batos.

English translation

After my many humble obeisances to you [mother], I offer you the news that my course has been fortunate throughout my whole journey, no different from what it was at Magelang. The reason I am informing you of this is that you should not be concerned about me because my heart is already fully satisfied, and I entrust to you all your grandchildren. Moreover, I myself feel how truly enormous are my faults towards you both outward and inward. May there be much forgiveness on your part towards me. Likewise towards His Highness, my father, [many] also are my faults. Thus, when they have the opportunity, your grandchildren must offer up to His Highness, my father, the religious intention of begging forgiveness for my faults both outward and inward.

B

The following letter was written by Dipanagara from Makassar on 14 December 1835 to Major-General Jan Baptist Cleerens (1785-1850), the Flemish officer (then a colonel) who had negotiated with him at Rêmakamal and Kecawang in northern Bagelèn, and at Menorèh in southern Kedhu in February 1830, and had persuaded him to go on to meet General H.M. de Kock in Magelang on 8 March 1830 where he was later arrested on 28 March 1830. This letter together with another which Dipanagara wrote in the following year to the guardians of Hamengkubuwana V about the marriage of one of his daughters caused considerable consternation in Dutch official circles. First, because of the royal style adopted in the letters in which Dipanagara referred to himself by some of the titles he had used during the Java War, such as ‘Sultan Èrucakra’ (The Just King), ‘Kabiril Mukminin’ (The First among the Believers), and ‘Kalipah Rasulollah Jawa’ (The Caliph of the Prophet of God in Java), and because he

5 Sultan Hamengkubuwana III (1812-1814) of Yogyakarta.
6 For details of Cleerens’ army career, see Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, I:326 note 1.
addressed Cleerens in Low Javanese (ngoko) and as ‘younger brother’ (rayi, adhit). Secondly, Dutch officials were concerned that Dipanagara both knew about Cleerens’s return to Java on 13 October 1835, a bare two months before this letter was written, and had the means of communicating secretly with Java, usually through sealed correspondence taken by skippers of Indonesian trading ships, in particular Makassarese praus. Finally, the letter seemed to draw Cleerens’s attention to a promise which Dipanagara thought had been made to him guaranteeing his safe return to Bagelèn if the Magelang ‘peace’ negotiations were not to his liking.7 These concerns formed the background

7 Dipanagara’s view of Cleerens’ undertaking to him before his journey to Magelang can be seen quite clearly in his autobiography, BD (Manado) IV:299-301, XL (Megatruh) 170-9, mengkana ngandika aris/ Hèh Kurnèl apa rembagmu/ kalamun prayaga iki/ iya lawan karsaningong. 171. sun turuti mengkana Kurnèl turipun/ ingkang kepenggih Déwaji/ raosing manah pukulun/ Paduka mapan prayagi/ ngurumiynana mring Kedu. 172. mupung jéndral pan dèrèng dhateng puniku/ pan dugi kaauta Déwaji/ dalan ngantos Siyan tuhu/ jéndral pesthi nunten prapti/ sabab kaauta Sang Katong. 173. anussuli serat yèn Paduka éstu/ pan arsa panggih pribadi/ mila dugi nunten wangsul/ punika yèn saupami/ karsa-Dalem boten dados. 174. Paduka ji kaauta aturi wangsul/ inggih mring Bagelàn malih/ sanadyan dados satuhu/ pan tangleh sami Welandi/ kaauta pan nemah Katong. 175. nging panuhun kaauta mapan satuhu/ Panjenengan-Dalem ugi/ mapan sampun ngantos iku/ kagepok mring lepatnèki/ lan damel perkawis mangko. 176. antswiti kalamun cidra Sinuhun/ pan mongsa wandañya panggih/ mring awok pribadipun/ mengkana Sri Narapati/ sareng mirsa aturipun. 177. Kurnèl Klérèès lawan Mayor Bokus iku/ ingkang tuais Nata pan gampil/ kadaya wus karsa Hyang Agung/ nanging simedhè mring tekdi/ èsnu wirang jeng Sang Katong. 178. lamun ngantos sumingkir dum-duman iku/ iya wong anèng dunyèki/ mengkana Ingkang Sinuhun/ mapan nula ngandika ris/ hèh Kurnèl aturirèku. 179. sun turuti. 170. then softly spoke [the Sultan]:/ ‘Eh, Colonel, what is your advice?/ If it is appropriate/ with my wishes 171. I will follow

172. Although the General [De Kock] has still not arrived there,/ my opinion, Highness,/ is that it in truth before the fasting month,/ the General will certainly arrive/ for I have already. 173. sent a letter to reach him that Your Highness

174. [then] Sultan, I invite you to return/ indeed to Bagelèn again./ Even if it really comes/ to resistance with the Dutch/ I will chance it Sultan. 175. But truly my request/ is that Your Highness also/ must not go so far as to be/ affected by [personal] faults/ and make an issue. Besides, 176. if Highness, treachery is initiated./ those involved will not fail to have to do/ with me personally./ Now the Sultan,/ when he heard the speech 177. of

(*) Major Hendrik Frederik Buschkens (1795-1860), a Dutch officer who was second-in-command to Colonel Cleerens at the time of the negotiations with Dipanagara in Bagelèn and Kèdhu in February 1830. For a further discussion of Dipanagara’s assumptions about the undertakings he thought Cleerens had given him, see Louw and De Klerk 1894-1909, V:564-5. Cleerens’s own version of the negotiations can be found in the dispatches which he wrote to his superior, Colonel F.D. Cochius; in Magelang from 16 February until 28 February 1830 which are in dK 209. These show that he treated Dipanagara, openly at least, with respect, addressing him by his title of ‘Sultan’ (something which De Kock later refused to do in Magelang), and speaking to him directly in Malay, dK 209, Colonel J.B. Cleerens (Menorèh) to Colonel F.D. Cochius (Magelang), 25-2-1830, Louw and De Klerk 1894-1909, V:544, 564-6.
to the secret decision of the Governor-General in Council (AN Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal in rade, 15-3-1837 no. 57, geheim) which ordered that a large part of Dipanagara’s entourage should be separated from him and sent to Ambon (in fact they were sent to Kyai Maja’s settlement in Tondano via Ambon in June 1839, see Appendix XII); that Dipanagara should be guarded more closely in Makassar, his contacts limited to his immediate family and servants; and that all his mail should be opened. A further recommendation that the prince’s monthly allowance should be substantially reduced was apparently not complied with by the governor of Makassar, see Appendix XII note 2.

The letter, which was probably dictated by Dipanagara to a scribe, was written on Dutch government paper in black ink with thick flowing pen strokes probably made with an arèn palm pen. Unlike his later letter to the guardians of Hamengkubuwana V and most of his other writings in Makassar it is in Javanese not pégon script. The yellow silk envelope (again a symbol of Dipanagara’s royal pretensions) was addressed in a different hand with a thin quill pen. Both the envelope and original letter are now on display in the Arsip Nasional (National Archives) in Jakarta. A photograph of the latter together with a faulty Javanese transliteration and Indonesian translation have been published in Sagimun 1965:350-3.

Ngalamat serat dhumatenga Ingkang Rayi Jinderal-Mayor Kalères,

Cleerens also seems to have assured the prince that he was personally responsible for his interests, although there is nothing in his dispatches to indicate that he gave him any specific undertaking about ensuring his return to Bagelèn should the Magelang ‘peace’ conference fail. Privately, he took a critical view of Dipanagara describing him as ‘either a very stupid or a very hypocritical person’ and belittling his understanding of Islam, see dK 209, Colonel J.B. Cleerens (Menorèh) to F.D. Cochius (Magelang), 26-2-1830. At the same time, he pressed Cochius to send sufficient reinforcements to enable him to carry out a coup de main against the prince and secure his arrest during the negotiations. In order to justify such conduct, Cleerens was constantly on the look out for evidence of ‘treachery’ on Dipanagara’s part: for example, he often drew Cochius’s attention to the prince’s supposed failure to keep a promise not to increase his following by accepting new recruits from Bagelèn, see dK 209, Colonel J.B. Cleerens (Menorèh) to F.D. Cochius (Magelang), 27-2-1830. Of these private views and plans, Dipanagara seems to have been unaware. Even after his capture at Magelang, he continued to refer to Cleerens’ supposed undertaking, see the report of Captain J.J. Roeps’s conversation with Dipanagara at Ungaran on 28 March 1830 cited in ‘Aanteekeningen gehouden door den Majoor Adjudant de Stuers bij het overbrengen van den gearresteerden Hoofdmuiteling Prins Diepo Negoro van Magelang naar Batavia’, 9-4-1830, in Louw and De Klerck 1894-1909, V:741; and further Chapter XII.
Ingkang pratadha Sinuwon Kajeng Sultan Ngabdulkamid Garucakra Kabiril Mukminin Kalipah Rasulollah Jawa, dhumatenga Ingkang Rayi Jinderal-Mayor Kalères, sawisé tabéningsun kang akèh-akèh Adhi Jinderal-Mayor Kalères marang sira, marmané ingsun akirim tulis sabab saking déné bangeté petengé penggalihingsun, awit Magelang saper-ana-saperéné adhi nura nana kang sun galih-galih nanging paturanira marang ingsun, sabab saberang paturanira akèh kang manujuni kalawan kang saberang kang dadi karsaningsun, déné paturanira kang manujuni lan saberang kang dadi karsaningsun iku anggèré ingsun aja nganti kagepok marang kaluputan baé, marmané adhi dadi banget temen cuwané galih ingsun sabab durong nganti tutug goningsun tatepungan lawan sira, wekasan ingsun dadi nemu susah banget kaya mengkéné saberang lara ku[m]pul ana ing galihingsun kabèh, kaya wong wus tan karuhan arané bareng ingsun mireng kabar terang lamun sira adhi ulèh pitulongé Gusti Alah Tangala bisa bali marang Jawa manèh, kaliwat padhangé galihingsun Adhi Jinderal-Mayor Kalères mongsa bodhoa pamikirira marang ingsun, tinulis Makasar dina Isnèn tanggal ping telo-likur sasi Ruwah taun Alip.

*English translation*

The declaration of His Highness Sultan Ngabdulkamid Èrucakra Kabiril Mukminin Kalipah Rasulullah of Java to his younger brother Major-General Cleerens. After my many greetings to you younger brother Major-General Cleerens, the reason I am sending this letter is because of my heart's great gloom. From Magelang until now, younger brother, I have thought over nothing except your statements to me, because there was much in your statements which were in accord with my wishes. The [particular] statement of yours which was in harmony with my desires, dear [sir], was that I should not go so far as to be affected by [personal] faults. For this reason, younger brother, great indeed was my heart's disappointment that my acquaintance with you was not fulfilled. In the end, I met with this great sadness [when] all sorts of grief gathered in my heart. [But] I was like a senseless man, so I should say, when I heard the certain news that you, younger brother, had, with the help of the Almighty, been able to return to Java again. Exceeding was my heart's joy, younger brother Major-General Cleerens, [and now] it is up to you what your thoughts are for me.

Written in Makassar on Monday the twenty-third of the month Ruwah in the year Alip [A] 1763 (14 December 1835).
APPENDIX XIV

Javanese and Western chronology AD 1785-1855

Windu-cycles
Javanese lunar years of 354 days are divided into eight-year (windu) cycles, each year being named in the following order: 1. Alip, 3. Éhé, 3. Jimawal, 4. Jé, 5. Dal, 6. Bé, 7. Wawu, 8. Jimakir. In the following table the beginning of each new windu-cycle is indicated by a space through the columns of the years. Thus AJ 1723 is the Alip year of a new windu-cycle.

Months
The lengths of the months in the Javanese calendar vary from year to year, but all months in all years are either 29 or 30 days long. Their names are: 1. Muharam (Sura), 2. Sapar, 3. Rabingulawal (Mulud), 4. Rabingulakir (Bakda Mulud), 5. Jumadilawal, 6. Jumadilakir, 7. Rejeb, 8. Ruwah (Saban), Puwasa (Ramelan, Pasa), 10. Sawal, 11. Dulkangidah (Séla, Apit), 12. Besar (Dulkijah).

Table of conversions
The Javanese year (AJ) is given here together with the date in the Western calendar (AD) upon which the AJ and, in most cases, the AH or Anno Hijrah years began. In some years, however, the AH year began one day before or after the AJ year. For more detailed information and tables, see Tijdrekening 1905:401-15, or Balai Poestaka 1932.

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1 Taken from Ricklefs 1974a:430-1, and Balai Poestaka 1932:13-5.
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## APPENDIX XV

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*Annexed by the British government in August 1812 and the tollgates and tobacco customs warehouses (gedhong tembakau) subsequently abolished in 1824 after a government decision taken in December 1823, MvK 2780, Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal in rade, 23-12-1823, no. 1.*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1808</th>
<th>1814</th>
<th>1815-1816</th>
<th>1817</th>
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<th>1819</th>
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<tr>
<td>Madiun and Magetan</td>
<td>7,260</td>
<td>12,980</td>
<td>20,412</td>
<td>20,953</td>
<td>38,880</td>
<td>24,000</td>
<td>45,600</td>
<td>45,600</td>
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<td>54,660</td>
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<td>26,600$^6$</td>
<td>880</td>
<td>1,166</td>
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<td>2,540</td>
<td>4,860</td>
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<td>977</td>
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<td>Pacitan (pasar)</td>
<td>655</td>
<td>737</td>
<td>728</td>
<td>759</td>
<td>2,040</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>2,280</td>
<td>2,400</td>
<td>1,860</td>
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<td>Yogyakarta</td>
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<tr>
<td>Yogy (pasar)</td>
<td>11,200</td>
<td>5,676</td>
<td>6,820</td>
<td>12,774</td>
<td>13,058</td>
<td>29,280</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Tollgates</td>
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<td>124,361</td>
<td>147,818</td>
<td>158,159</td>
<td>362,508</td>
<td>301,944</td>
<td>402,600</td>
<td>406,200</td>
<td>435,240</td>
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<tr>
<td>Opium</td>
<td>(64,000)</td>
<td>76,000</td>
<td>132,000</td>
<td>114,750</td>
<td>198,480</td>
<td>180,000</td>
<td>237,600</td>
<td>235,200</td>
<td>(250,000)</td>
<td>360,000</td>
<td>(200,000)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Grand total</strong></td>
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<td>(295,148)</td>
<td>190,361</td>
<td>279,818</td>
<td>290,159</td>
<td>560,988</td>
<td>481,944</td>
<td>640,200</td>
<td>641,400</td>
<td>(685,240)</td>
<td>769,920</td>
<td>(593,537)</td>
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</table>

1. The revenue figures have been taken from Dj.Br. 86, Tan Jin Sing (Yogyakarta) to Mattheüs Waterloo (Yogyakarta), 1-5-1808 (further copy in KITLV H 686g:3-7); Dj.Br. 29, R.C. Garnham, ‘Djocjocarta toll farms sold on the 11th November 1814 for the years 1815, 1816, 1817’, 12-11-1814; S.Br. 170, ‘Lijst van Jogjokarta verpachtning, 1816-24’, n.d. [? 1825]; and Dj.Br. 59, ‘Rendement der gehouden verpachtning van ‘s-lands middelen en domeinen sorterende onder het Res. Jogjokarta voor het jaar 1825’. All figures are expressed in Netherlands-Indies guilders (Indische gulden/Java Rupees) which at this time contained 10.91 grams of fine silver and were each worth 30 stuivers (pennies) of four duiten (farthings). Until 1826, when the Dutch guilder became the standard coin, they were exchanged at the rate of 1:1.25 against guilders minted in Holland (Generaliteits gulden) which only contained 9.613 grams of fine silver, Mansvelt 1976:12-3. The returns for 1808 were quoted in silver reals-of-eight (ronde realen) which have been converted to Indische gulden at the contemporary rate of 28 dubbeltjes (ƒ 2.80) to the ronde real, see Dj.Br. 48, Piajem (‘Gold Farm Letter’) of Hamengkubuwana II (Yogyakarta) to Kyai Tumenggung Reksanegara (Yogyakarta), 1 Sawal Aj 1725 (8-3-1799). The figures given for the tollgates include the income at each bandar, as well as returns from adjacent pasar, rangkah, and salaran. Figures in parentheses are estimates.

2. The figures for the overall tollgate returns for the first two years after the British annexation of the tollgate returns in July 1812 are as follows: 1812 (July-December), 46,557; 1813, 99,220, see AvJ, H. G. Nahuys van Burgst (Yogyakarta) to Commissioners-General (Batavia/Bogor), 4-2-1817. The same source gives the overall figure for 1814 as 130,089 (Java Rupees/Indische gulden), but I have followed Garnham, see note 1.

3. After 1808, only the tollgate at Kemlaka on the main road between Yogy and Magelang in the vicinity of Sleman is referred to in the lists. The other tollgates listed here were apparently rangkah subordinate to Kemlaka, see further S.Br. 170, ‘Figuratieve Schets’, which shows the location of the tollgates on the main roads between Ambarawa, Kartasura, Yogyakarta, and Magelang in c. 1802; and Map 1 for the location of Kemlaka.

4. Jenu, a fruit orchard laid out by Hamengkubuwana II on the road between Yogyakarta and Prambanan (close to present-day Ambarrukmo), was apparently abolished as a bandar after the tollgates were taken over by the British in July 1812.

5. Referred to as ‘Randhugoang’ in Tan Jin Sing’s letter of 1-5-1808, see note 1. It is almost certainly a misspelling of Randhugunting, a post to the south of the main Kalasan-Prambanan road just west of the Kali Opak. After 1808, only Masaran in the Pajang area is mentioned in the revenue lists.
No specific tollgate returns for the Yogya eastern mancanagara are available for 1808. The figures given here are taken from the total tax/tribute returns of the customs farms in the eastern mancanagara which were paid to Hamengkubuwana II in 1808 and which amounted to 9,500 ronde realen, see dK 145, Matthis Waterloo (Yogyakarta) to Nicolaus Engelhard (Semarang), 22-3-1808 (see also KITLV H 696g, Archief van Soerakarta, Major J.M. Johnson [Surakarta] to T.S. Raffles [Batavia/Bogor], 21-2-1814), and those along the Brantas and Madiun rivers by a Dutch government order (Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal) of 5-12-1823. But the moves were not totally successful because at least in the case of the Bengawan Sala, the number of smaller tollgates on the approach roads to the river substantially increased after the order had come into effect, see KITLV H 395, ‘Rapport van de assistant-resident [P.F.H.] Chevalier over de werking der tolpoorten’, 13-6-1824.

No specific figures are available for opium sales in Yogyakarta in 1808, but six years earlier the Yogya Resident, J.G. van den Berg, had reckoned that 40 chests of opium were imported annually into the sultanate, both officially through VOC supplies to the kapitan cina of Kedhu and Yogy, and unofficially through smuggling operations. The total value of sales amounted to £64,000, each chest being worth approximately £1,400 see Dj.Br. 48, J.G. van den Berg (Yogyakarta) to N. Engelhard (Semarang), 3-2-1802. By 1814, consumption had doubled to 80 chests per annum, presumably because of the greater facility of opium imports from Bengal during the period of British rule in Java, see Dj.Br. 29, Lieutenant Arthur Aston Homer, ‘List of Receipts and Disbursements in Djocjocarta, 1814-15’; and John Deans (Semarang) to Colonel John Eales (Yogyakarta), 1-6-1814. At the same time, the wholesale value of each chest had more than doubled to £2,640. The Yogya opium farm itself, which was leased for £66,000 in 1814, had increased to £95,370 in 1815-1816 according to the revised figures supplied by the Yogya Resident, Captain Robert Clement Garnham (in office, 1814-1815), see Dj.Br. 29, R.C. Garnham, ‘Opium Farm Djocjocarta from 1st October 1814 to 31st December 1814’, 1-10-1814. The total value of annual sales during these years, including the retail profits of the opium farmers and sub-farmers, was calculated at £211,200. For further details on the opium trade in Java in this period, see Rush 1977.
### Comparative values of paper and metal currency circulating in Java in 1811

#### Value of coins circulating in Java

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coin Description</th>
<th>Value (Dfl)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>rupiah mas (gold rupee) coined in Batavia and varying greatly in quality</td>
<td>19.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>half rupiah mas</td>
<td>9.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch/Venetian ducats</td>
<td>5.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>silver ducatoon (minted in Holland)</td>
<td>3.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish dollar (SpD) (silver)</td>
<td>2.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>real batu (an old mutilated silver coin, usually Portuguese cruzados or German crowns [francas], in general circulation, but not issued by the Dutch government)</td>
<td>2.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>half silver ducatoon (minted in Holland)</td>
<td>1.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch guilder/half real batu/Surat rupee in general circulation in Batavia and the north coast areas</td>
<td>1.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>half Dutch guilder/quarter real batu</td>
<td>0.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>quarter Dutch guilder (6 stuivers)</td>
<td>0.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dubbeltje (2½ stuivers) poor quality copper coins produced in Surabaya at the Tawangsari mint (post 1808), often debased in value.</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>wang baru (2 stuivers) small round copper coins imported from Dutch factories in Bengal.</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tengah wang baru (1 stuiver)</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>wang Bengal</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>half wang Bengal</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>duit (dhuvwit)</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>half duit (sigar)</td>
<td>0.01</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

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2. The relative values of the coins are quoted in Dutch Indies guilders and cents. Until 1826, these were exchanged at an agio of 15-20 percent against coins of an equivalent face value minted in Holland until 1826.
Value of coins and paper money circulating in Batavia

gold ducat 4.32
ducatoon 3.20
Spanish dollar (SpD) 2.56
rix dollar (rijksdaalder) 2.40
rix dollar (government paper currency, discounted at 15-20 % against pre–1811 coin) 1.92
rupiah (Java rupee) 1.20
Dutch guilder 0.80
Austrian-Netherlands schilling 0.24
dubbeltje (Dutch 10 cents piece) 0.10
stuiver (Dutch copper penny piece) 0.04

Relative value of Dutch Indies coins in exchange with English currency (£.s.d.) in 1811^3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coin Description</th>
<th>£</th>
<th>s</th>
<th>d.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>gold ducat (rose noble/11 guilders)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ducatoon (3 guilders)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rijksdaalder (2½ guilders)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>guilder</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>schilling (6 stuiver)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dubbeltje (2 stuiver)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2½</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>stuiver (8 duit)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1¼</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>copper duit (2 penning)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>¼</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

^3 All coins referred to are silver unless otherwise stated.
Glossary of Javanese words

Note: These definitions give only those senses in which the words have been used in the present study

**abdi-Dalem**
royal official or retainer usually living in the immediate environs of the royal palace (namely within the walls of the **kraton**, see below)

**adat**
custom, time honoured practice both in social etiquette and in legal matters

**adipati**
used in conjunction with **pangéran** to indicate a senior prince often with an extensive apanage and a quasi-independent position in the **kraton**

**ali basah**
title accorded by Dipanagara to certain select army during the Java War, from the Turkish Ali Pasha (the ‘High Pasha’)

**alun-alun**
the great square or open field in front of and behind the **kraton**; it was usually planted with two boxed **waringin** (banyan) trees as symbols of royal authority

**babad**
Javanese historical texts written in chronicle form and divided into cantos (each with a separate metre); from the Javanese verb, **mbabad**, to clear (the jungle)

**bandar**
a keeper of a tollgate or customs post on the main roads and rivers in south-central and east Java before the outbreak of the Java War; the tollgate keepers were usually Chinese who farmed the rent of customs, first from the Javanese courts and later (after 1812) from the European government

**batik**
intricately designed wax-dyed fabric

**batur**
porter or coolie who carried goods by shoulder load, referred to in Javanese as a **pikul** (see below), on the main roads in Java during the nineteenth century

**bupati**
high administrative official: the title was used for heads of provincial areas (especially in the **mancanagara**, see below) and for the chiefs of administrative departments in the **kraton**; thus **kabupatèn**, the residence, office or administrative area of a **bupati**. See also **wedana** below

**cacah**
household, used as a unit of measurement for land and population in Java. It was usually reckoned as the amount of land which could be worked (and provide a livelihood) for a family
of five; thus the size of the cacah varied according to the quality of the ground and the availability of irrigation.

dalem
princely residence or home of a high court official; it usually comprised an extensive central building with private apartments and a large front veranda (pendhapa, see below) for receiving visitors, a wide yard and outhouses for servants and relations. The whole complex was usually surrounded by a wall or bamboo fence and looked like a kraton in miniature.

demang
middle-ranking provincial official with special tax collecting responsibilities.

désa
village or complex of houses with ricefields and orchards attached in rural areas.

dhalang
puppeteer in the wayang theatre; he is the key figure in wayang performances having the task of moving the puppets, reproducing the speech of the various characters, telling the story of the plot, singing snatches of song and making jokes. He also has the duty of ensuring that the performance (which starts at about 9 p.m.) is over and complete before the break of day (at about 6 a.m.).

emban
guardian or nurse of a young child or youth below the age of majority, which in Java is sixteen years.

Érucakra
title of the Javanese ‘Just King’ (ratu adil, see below) who is believed to make his appearance after a period of economic decline and moral decadence. The characteristics of his reign are low taxes, fair justice, cheap food and clothes, and feelings of common brotherhood. The origin of the title Érucakra is unclear, but may be connected to the Hindu god Wisnu’s sun disc (cakra) weapon, see Chapter IX note 147.

gamelan
Javanese orchestra comprising mainly percussion and wind instruments.

Garebeg
thrice-annual Javanese-Islamic feasts, consisting of the Garebeg Mulud in celebration of the birth of The Prophet Muhammad, Garebeg Puwasa to celebrate the end of the fasting month, and Garebeg Besar in commemoration of Abraham’s willingness to sacrifice his son (Ishmael/Isaac) and of the pilgrimage to Mecca.

gunung
mountain or large hill (usually over 600 meters in height); it was also a title used in Surakarta for police and tax officials in the villages who were answerable to the patih (in Yogy, they were known as Tamping). The title probably derived from the gunungan (large mounds of decorated rice) which these officials had to bear in procession during the Garebeg ceremonies (see above) in Surakarta.

guwa
cave, grotto.

haji
the title of a pilgrim who has been to Mecca; the haj (pilgrimage to Mecca) is one of the five central obligations of a Muslim, the others being: the shahadat (the confession of The Faith: ‘There is no God but God and Muhammad is His Prophet’); salat (five daily prayers); zakat (the giving of alms) and puwasa, the observation of the fast during the fasting month.
Glossary of Javanese words

**jimat**
amulet or talisman (usually small pieces of different sorts of metal, wood or paper with writing in Arabic script containing secret formulae) which are believed to ward off sickness and danger, and provide invulnerability in battle

**jung**
a unit of land measurement (usually about 600 square feet): like the cacah (see above) it varied in size according to the quality of the ground. In some areas it is reckoned as being four times the size of the cacah and enough to provide a livelihood for four families of cultivators

**jurukunci**
doorkeeper or guardian of the keys of a grave or holy place (see pradikan below)

**kadipatèn**
residence of the Crown Prince (Pangéran Adipati Anom) at the south-central Javanese courts

**kali**
a large river; also ‘Bengawan’ in the case of the Sala river

**kampung**
village or urban settlement, the latter often occupied by a particular ethnic group or community, hence Kampung Melayu, Kampung Cina, the Malay and Chinese quarters of a town

**kapitan Cina**
head of the Chinese community in a town or provincial area

**kauman**
strict religious community in the court cities who resided in the area near the Great Mosque (Mesjid Ageng)

**kebathinan**
Javanese spiritual and mystical disciplines which can range from varieties of Islamic mysticism to magical practices. In general kebathinan is the science of the soul or the inner man (bathin) and is concerned with providing methods for spiritual growth and the unity of man with his Creator

**kècu**
robber, bandit or thief (see wong durjana below)

**kepatihan**
office and residence of the chief administrator (patih, see below) at the Central Javanese courts

**krama**
‘High Javanese’, one of the two basic forms of Modern Javanese (see also ngoko below): used to address superiors in age or social standing

**kraman**
rebel, one who sets himself up against the established authority

**kraton**
royal palace, court and residence of a ruler. This comprises the royal apartments and meeting halls etcetera, and also numerous houses inhabited by the families of royal retainers. The whole complex, which in Yogyakarta contained between 10-15,000 people in 1812 and extended three miles in circumference, is surrounded by a large defensive wall, see page 4.

**kris**
Javanese dagger or small stabbing sword often considered to possess supernatural powers. The blade can be straight or undulating and the metal is inlaid with meteoric iron. This damascening (or pamor in Javanese) produces many different shapes and figures and gives each kris a unique character

**kyai**
honorific title for old men or country gentlemen, especially teachers of religious and spiritual disciplines see ulama below. The title is also used to refer to special kris and other pusaka (see below)

**lakon**
a plot which is enacted in a wayang drama (see wayang below)
Glossary of Javanese words

**lurah**
Chief or head, especially used as a title for village leaders; also the head of any administrative branch or group (hence kyai lurah, the title of the patih amongst court officials)

**mancanagara**
The outer regions or distant provinces of a kingdom (as distinct from the inner areas near the court, see nagara agung below). These outlying regions, which were originally added to the royal patrimony by conquest, were administered directly by their own bupati as opposed to the nagara agung which was governed in the name of the sovereign by the patih. The mancanagara areas to the east and west of the princely territories were finally annexed by the Dutch in 1830

**mantri**
Title of an official of lower rank in the royal administration

**mas**
Title of nobility, used for distant relations (male) of the royal families

**mesjid**
Mosque or place of worship; hence Mesjid Ageng (‘Great Mosque’) at the courts

**nagara agung**
The core regions of a kingdom, the lands in the vicinity of the court. These were used as crown lands (narawita, bumi pamanjegan-dalem) for special types of produce, taxes and labour services for the court, and as apanages (lungguh) or usufruct land for members of the royal family and high court officials

**nayaka**
Adviser to the ruler. There were eight of these in each of the south-central Javanese courts comprising the patih and the heads of kraton administrative departments (the four Inner and the four Outer bupati, known as wedana jero and wedana jabu)

**ngoko**
‘Low Javanese’, one of the two basic forms of Modern Javanese (see krama above); used to address close equals or inferiors (in age or social standing)

**panakawan**
Intimate retainer of a ruler, nobleman or official: these retainers occasionally had something of the humour and wisdom associated with the clown-servant advisers in the wayang theatre

**panembahan**
High princely title usually reserved for respected, older male members of the close royal family, for example, the uncles and elder brothers of a ruler

**pangérān**
Prince, male offspring of a ruler by official and unofficial wives

**panji**
Young man of high nobility; a title given to youths who served as intimate retainers of the rulers and to military commanders at the courts

**pasisir**
Coast, in particular the north coast of Java, also used to indicate regions not in the heartland (princely territories) of south-central Java

**pathok negari**
Centres for the ulama (experts in fiqh or Islamic law) who acted as the advisers of the pengulu (chief religious functionary) in the religious courts. Before they were abolished in circa 1830, there were four pathok (alias ‘pillars’) at both Yogya and Surakarta answerable to the pengulu at the centre, thus recalling the five pillars of Islam

**patih**
Chief minister of the Javanese kingdoms: his full title was patih
jaba (prime minister dealing with affairs outside the court) to distinguish him from the patih jero who had primary responsibility over matters within the kraton (see nayaka above). The title was also used more generally for the head of an administration, hence patih kadipatèn the head of the Crown Prince's establishment.

payung state umbrella, used as an insignia of rank or royal birth
pégon Javanese written in Arabic characters (usually unvocalised), often used by the more self-consciously religious members of the south-central Javanese communities, for example, the santri, see below
pendhapa large covered audience hall or veranda in front of a Javanese house for receiving visitors
pengulu head of the religious hierarchy in the court towns who also played a leading role as an interpreter of Islamic law codes in the religious courts (surambi) of the south-central Javanese kraton
pesanggrahan pavilion, overnight stopping place or royal hunting lodge
pesantrèn religious boarding school comprising dormitories, places of instruction and adjacent ricefields, which were frequented by students of religion (see santri below)
pikul a weight (usually about 62 kilograms) which is carried in two baskets, weighted evenly and borne on a carrying pole slung across the shoulders
pondhok small religious boarding school set up on the same lines as a pesantrèn but on a much smaller scale
pradikan tax-free areas given by the courts and usually set aside for those engaged in religious pursuits or for guardians of graves and holy places (see jurukunci above); hence pradikan ageng, the head of such a tax-free area
prajurit soldier, member of the palace guard
prang sabil holy war; a war waged for (Islamic) religious ideals, which is one of the obligations of a Muslim
priyayi member of the official class in south-central Java, literally para yayi, the ‘younger brothers of the ruler’
pusaka holy regalia or heirloom handed down from one generation to the next in a particular family; often considered to have supernatural powers (see kris above)
radèn title of middle nobility given to persons distantly related to the main royal families
radèn mas title of high nobility given to close male descendants of the main royal families
ratu principal official wife of the ruler: in the south-central Javanese courts the rulers usually had four such principal wives, one for each point of the compass. The one for the southern quarter (Ratu Kidul) was the queen of the spirit kingdom in the southern ocean (see below)
ratu adil see above under Ėruçakra
**Glossary of Javanese words**

**Ratu Kidul**
The goddess of the southern ocean. According to popular Javanese beliefs, she rules over a court inhabited by spirits. The rulers of the south-central Javanese courts are expected to enter into a spiritual marriage with the goddess in order to ensure the support of the spirit kingdoms during their period of rule.

**santri**
a student of (Islamic) religion, follower of a religious way of life, pupil at a pesantrèn or pondhok (see above)

**sawah**
wet ricefield

**sèh (syèh)**
title given to high religious dignitaries, especially to teachers and scholars who were Arabs from the Hadhramaut or who claimed descent from the family of The Prophet (Arabic Shaykh)

**selir**
unofficial wife of a prince or ruler

**sènapatì**
commander-in-chief of an army

**sengkala**
chronogram list

**sentana**
member of the sultan’s family, usually a distant relative such as a second or third cousin

**tapa**
to engage in asceticism: an ascetic, mystic, man of religion. See also tirakat

**tembang**
verse; scanned verse used in chronicles etcetera

**tirakat**
to go on retreat and practice meditation and asceticism. See also tapa

**tumenggung**
title of high administrative rank usually given to bupati (see above)

**ulama**
Muslim scholar especially applied as a title to those learned in Islamic law (fiqh)

**wali**
early apostle or saint of Islam in Java; the wali are usually said to have been nine in number

**wayang**
Javanese puppet theatre of several types. Those mentioned in this study are as follows: wayang kulit, shadow theatre with flat leather puppets; wayang purwa, plays dealing with ancient mythology (principally the Ramayana and Mahabharata cycles); wayang wong, theatre performance using dancers, and wayang topèng, a masked dance

**wedana**
high administrative official; the title, like that of bupati, was used both for officials within the kraton and for those in charge of extensive administrative areas such as the eastern and western mancanagara where the senior official was known as bupati wedana

**wong cilik**
common people

**wong durjana**
robbers, tramps, bandits, or ‘evil folk’ in general (see kècu above)

**wong putihan**
students of religion or religious officials living a communal life (see above pradikan, santri and ulama)
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