When the Indonesian New Order regime fell in 1998, regional politics with strong ethnic content emerged across the country. In West Kalimantan the predominant feature was particularly that of the Dayaks. This surge, however, was not unprecedented. After centuries of occupying a subordinate place in the political and social hierarchy under the nominal rule of the Malay sultanates, Dayaks became involved in an enthusiastic political emancipation movement from 1945. The Dayaks secured the governorship as well as the majority of the regional executive head positions before they were shunned by the New Order regime.

This book examines the development of Dayak politics in West Kalimantan from the colonial times until the first decade of the 21st century. It asks how and why Dayak politics has experienced drastic changes since 1945. It will look at the effect of regime change, the role of the individual leaders and organizations, the experience of marginalization, and conflicts on the course of Dayaks politics. It will also examine ethnic relations and recent political development up to 2010 in the province.

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REGIME CHANGE AND ETHNIC POLITICS IN INDONESIA
TAUFIQ TANASALDY

REGIME CHANGE AND ETHNIC POLITICS IN INDONESIA

Dayak politics of West Kalimantan

KITLV Press
Leiden
2012
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<td>AMA</td>
<td>Aliansi Masyarakat Adat, Indigenous Communities’ Alliance</td>
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<td>AMM</td>
<td>Aliansi Masyarakat Melayu, Alliance of the Malay Community</td>
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<td>ANU</td>
<td>Australian National University</td>
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<td>APDN</td>
<td>Akademi Pemerintahan Dalam Negeri, Academy of Home Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>APPDT</td>
<td>Alokasi Penempatan Penduduk Daerah Transmigrasi, Placement of Local Population in Transmigration Sites</td>
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<td>Babinsa</td>
<td>bintara pembina desa, village guidance non-commissioned army officers</td>
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<td>Baperjakat</td>
<td>Badan Pertimbangan Jabatan dan Kepangkatan, Appointment and Promotion Review Board</td>
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<td>Baperki</td>
<td>Badan Permusjawaratan Kewarganegaraan Indonesia, Consultative Body for Indonesian Citizenship</td>
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<td>Bappeda</td>
<td>Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Daerah, Regional Development Planning Agency</td>
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<td>BK3D</td>
<td>Badan Koordinasi Koperasi Kredit Daerah, Coordinating Body for Regional Credit Co-operative</td>
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<td>BPH</td>
<td>Badan Pemerintah Harian, Regional Executive Body (previously DPD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPS</td>
<td>Biro Pusat Statistik, Statistics Indonesia</td>
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<tr>
<td>BTI</td>
<td>Barisan Tani Indonesia, Indonesian Farmers’ Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>CU</td>
<td>Credit Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>CVO</td>
<td>Cursus Volksschool Onderwijzer, Course for Village School Teachers</td>
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<tr>
<td>DAD</td>
<td>Dewan Adat Dayak, Dayak Customary Council (at district level)</td>
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<td>DAO</td>
<td>Dayak Affairs Office</td>
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</table>
DCS  Daftar Calon Sementara, Preliminary List of Candidates
DCT  Daftar Calon Tetap, Final List of Candidates
DIA  Dayak in Actie, Dayak in Action
DIKB  Daerah Istimewa Kalimantan Barat, West Kalimantan Special Region
DAO  Dayak Affairs Office (in Dutch: Kantoor voor Dayaksche Zaken)
Ditsospol  Direktorat Sosial Politik, Socio-Political Directorate
DPD (1)  Dewan Pemerintah Daerah, Regional Executive Council
DPD (2)  Dewan Perwakilan Daerah, Regional Representative Council
DPOD  Dewan Pertimbangan Otonomi Daerah, Regional Autonomy Advisory Board
DPP  Dewan Pimpinan Pusat, Central Leadership Board
DPR  Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, House of Representative
DPRD  Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah, Regional Legislative Council
DPRD-GR  DPRD-Gotong Royong, DPRD-Mutual Assistance
FAMD  Forum Aksi Mahasiswa dan Pemuda Dayak, Activity Forum of Dayak Students and Youths
FEER  Far Eastern Economic Review
FKKI  Forum Komunikasi Kristiani Indonesia, Indonesian Christian Communication Forum
FKPM  Forum Komunikasi Pemuda Melayu, Communication Forum of Malay Youth
FKKP  Forum Komunikasi Kerukunan Pribumi, Communication Forum for Natives Harmony
FMPAMD  Forum Mahasiswa Pembawa Aspirasi Masyarakat Dayak, Forum of Students Bearing the Aspirations of the Dayak Community
Gerwani  Gerakan Wanita Indonesia, Indonesian Women’s Movement
Golkar  Golongan Karya, Functional Group
HIS  Hollandsch-Inlandsche School, Dutch-Indigenous School
HPH  Hak Pengusahaan Hutan, Forest Concession
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>HRW</td>
<td>Human Rights Watch</td>
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<td>HSI</td>
<td>Himpunan Sarjana Indonesia, Indonesian Association of University Graduates</td>
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<td>HTI</td>
<td>Hutan Tanaman Industri, Industrial Timber Estates</td>
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<td>ICG</td>
<td>International Crisis Group</td>
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<td>ICMI</td>
<td>Ikatan Cendikiawan Muslim Indonesia, Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals</td>
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<td>ID</td>
<td>Institut Dayakologi, Dayakology Institute</td>
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<td>IDI</td>
<td>Ikatan Dokter Indonesia, Indonesian Medical Doctor Association</td>
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<td>IDRD</td>
<td>Institute of Dayakology Research and Development</td>
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<td>IIP</td>
<td>Institut Ilmu Pemerintahan, Institute of Public Administration</td>
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<td>IKDI</td>
<td>Ikatan Keluarga Dayak Islam, Union of the Dayak Islamic Family</td>
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<td>IPDN</td>
<td>Institut Pemerintahan Dalam Negeri, Institute of Home Affairs</td>
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<td>IPKI</td>
<td>Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia, League for Upholding Indonesian Independence</td>
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<td>ISRI</td>
<td>Ikatan Sarjana Republik Indonesia, Indonesian Association of University Graduates</td>
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<td>Kalbar</td>
<td>Kalimantan Barat, West Kalimantan</td>
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<td>Kapet</td>
<td>Kawasan Pengembangan Ekonomi Terpadu, Integrated Economic Development Zone</td>
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<td>Kursus Dinas C, Official Course C (for public servants)</td>
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<td>KIDAK</td>
<td>Komunitas Intelektual Dayak Kanayatn Kalbar, Intellectual Community of Kanayatn Dayak of West Kalimantan</td>
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<td>KKN</td>
<td>Korupsi Kolusi Nepotisme, Corruption Collusion Nepotism</td>
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<td>KKMA</td>
<td>Kelompok Kerja Masyarakat Adat, Indigenous Community Working Committee</td>
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<td>KNKB</td>
<td>Komite National Kalimantan Barat, West Kalimantan National Committee</td>
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<td>kodam</td>
<td>Komando Daerah Militer, Regional Military Command</td>
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<td>kodim</td>
<td>Komando Distrik Militer, Military District Command</td>
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<td>kogam</td>
<td>Komando Ganyang Malaysia, Crush Malaysia Command</td>
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<td>Regime change and ethnic politics in Indonesia</td>
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</table>

| STPDN | Sekolah Tinggi Pemerintahan Dalam Negeri, Institute of Home Affairs |
| Supersemar | Surat Perintah Sebelas Maret, Mandate of March 11 |
| UD | Utusan Daerah, Regional Representative |
| UGM | Universitas Gajah Mada, Gajah Mada University |
| UNDP | United Nations Development Programme |
| UU | Undang-Undang, Law |
| YKSPK | Yayasan Karya Sosial Pancur Kasih, Karya Sosial Pancur Kasih Foundation |
Introduction

DAYAK POLITICS IN WEST KALIMANTAN

The sudden fall of the authoritarian New Order in May 1998 drastically changed the landscape of Indonesian local politics. Newly found political freedom as well as opportunities made available by decentralization policies generated strong political and social movements in the regions. Ethnic politics, the struggle for power allocation among ethnic groups, is no longer considered as treacherous as it was under the New Order and in fact has become increasingly visible at local levels. Demands from indigenous peoples for a chance to fill local leadership positions have become common during district and provincial elections. This development is in stark contrast to the previous passivity of local communities that knew that they had no choice but to accept the appointment of mostly Javanese officials or military officers to strategic posts in their region.

Following the fall of the New Order, West Kalimantan has witnessed a sudden surge of political activity among the Dayaks, one of the native ethnic groups of the province. The pressures from the Dayak elites and their supporters started in district head elections in Sanggau and Pontianak during the transition period between 1998 and 1999. The central government eventually acquiesced to their demands and appointed Dayaks on both occasions. Apparently these appointments were intended to appease alienated and aggressive Dayaks who had just waged ethnic war against the Madurese minority in 1997. The Malays, the other large ethnic group in the province, on the other hand, were relatively quiet initially and only became involved in the competition for power as a response to mounting Dayak pressure. By 2005 Dayaks occupied top executive positions in districts where they were a majority,
Regime change and ethnic politics in Indonesia

a phenomenon not seen since the New Order came to power in the mid-1960s. As will be explained later, for a short period from the end of the 1950s Dayak leaders had assumed some of the most strategic posts in the province. However, they were relieved from their jobs when the New Order came to power. The causes of their recent political resurgence can only be comprehended by examining the past political struggles of the Dayak community.

The history of Dayak politics in West Kalimantan is traceable only from 1945. During the colonial era, most Dayaks lived under the nominal rule of the Malay sultanates and occupied a subordinate place in the political and social hierarchy. Before the introduction of Catholic schools in the interior region, Dayaks had very limited access to formal education compared to other ethnic groups in the province. Education is an important prerequisite for political awakening, a process that emerged in various parts of Indonesia in the twentieth century. Dayaks also had very limited access to employment in the Islamic sultanate administration because of their different religion and low social status. These conditions made them the least emancipated ethnic group compared to the Bugis, Chinese, and Malays, the other main ethnic groups in the province. Hence Dayaks were no more than passive observers – in many cases not even aware of nationalist movements unfolding in the Netherlands Indies.

1 The Bugis of West Kalimantan were important in the past as they had their own sultanate in Mempawah. One of the founders of Mempawah sultanate, Opu Daeng Manambon, had family links to other sultanates in the province – Pontianak, Sambas, and Tanjungpura sultanates (Lontaan 1975:121-4) which spread the Bugis’ influence further.

2 The Chinese, the third largest ethnic group in the province until the 1970s, had maintained an important economic role since colonial times. Their political role, however, fluctuated. Chinese political influence in the province was important in the nineteenth century during the era of kongsi (organizations based upon trade links often mirroring clan organizations). At their peak, the kongsi were outside the control of native sultans and the Dutch colonial government. Through a series of wars, the Dutch was able to subdue the kongsi which later disbanded (Heidhues 2003; Jackson 1976; Yuan 2000). The Chinese were officially represented in the post-WWII West Kalimantan government between 1945 and 1949. Like the Dayaks, the Chinese were also allocated a special office ‘Chinese Affairs Office’ to deal with their issues. The formal representation of the Chinese in the West Kalimantan government was abolished together with the ethnic office in 1950. Their political role reduced rapidly after 1949 as many of them were alien residents. During the New Order their political role was marginal, like that of Chinese elsewhere in Indonesia. Things have improved for the Chinese after the New Order. In West Kalimantan, an increasing number of Chinese has been elected to local parliaments. Some were even elected to head the government, such as Yansen Akun Effendy as district head of Sanggau (2003), Abun Ediyanto as deputy district head of Sekadau (2003), Hasan Karman as mayor of Singkawang (2007), and Christiandy Sanjaya as deputy governor (2007). However, the economic and political role of the Chinese in the province is beyond the scope of this book.
The conclusion of the Second World War (hereafter WWII) changed Dayak political fortunes. In order to get support from the Dayaks, the largest ethnic group in the province at this time, the newly restored pro-Dutch federal government of West Kalimantan (named DIKB in 1947) opened opportunities for Dayaks to organize politically. The government accommodated Dayak political aspirations by ensuring their representation in government bodies for the first time in the province’s history. It established a council to look after Dayak affairs and allowed Dayaks to form a political party. It also helped Dayaks to get a better bargaining position vis-à-vis their former masters, the Malay sultanates. As a result many Dayak leaders accepted the pro-Dutch government and were generally not supportive of the nationalist movements emanated from Java.

The transfer of sovereignty from the Netherlands to the new Republic of Indonesia transformed the context in which politics developed in West Kalimantan. The DIKB, which had aligned with the Dutch-sponsored federal government, was forced to dissolve itself and was replaced by a new nationalist government. The Dayaks were accused by the nationalists of being traitors because of the support given by Dayak leaders to DIKB, and the Dayaks who held positions with the DIKB lost their jobs. As a result, Dayak leaders disappeared from the top layers of the provincial government. They quickly adjusted to the new circumstances, however. The Persatuan Dayak (PD, Dayak Unity), a Dayak organization, which was established in 1945 and later became a political party and the backbone of Dayak politics, survived the transition and participated in the general election in 1955 and local elections in 1958. In both rounds of elections, PD was able to obtain a significant vote and became one of the most important political parties in West Kalimantan. With this new political legitimacy, four Dayaks were elected as district heads and one as governor of the province from 1958 to 1959.

But West Kalimantan, like the rest of Indonesia, was not immune to the political struggles at the national level that witnessed a series of regional rebellions in Sumatra and Sulawesi, the collapse of constitutional democracy and the establishment of President Soekarno’s authoritarian and centralized Guided Democracy. As part of his plan to rebuild the Indonesian political system, Soekarno issued regulations that significantly curbed the activities of political parties and restricted their number. Although the PD had become a major force in West Kalimantan politics, its popular support at the national level was insignificant, and it could
not resist the new regulations emanating from Jakarta. The PD was not a primary target of these measures, but it was one of many small parties that were forced to disband and merge with one of the nine surviving ‘national’ parties.

The majority of the former PD, operating under the leadership of Dayak Governor, Oevaang Oeray, joined the leftist-nationalist Partindo, while the remainder, led by another Dayak leader, Palaunsoeka, joined Partai Katolik (PK). Although Dayak officials continued to be appointed occasionally as sub-district heads, the Dayak political movement lost much of its cohesion, and its Dayak quality was diluted through affiliation with national parties. Guided Democracy had allowed Dayak leaders to occupy prominent positions in the provincial government but had undermined their capacity to mobilize ethnic support through a Dayak party.

Sudden changes in national politics after the attempted coup in 1965 reversed Dayak political fortunes once again. Many Dayak political leaders were members of Partindo, a national left party that was close to Soekarno and that was accused of involvement in the coup attempt. The anti-leftist movement that eventually deposed President Soekarno also resulted in the Dayak governor of West Kalimantan and four Dayak district heads being removed from their positions. The ex-PD politicians, who had joined Partindo simply because their own party had been disbanded, now found themselves under threat as a result of dramatic events in Jakarta in which they had played no part.

The military-backed New Order regime established Golkar as its electoral vehicle and imposed further restrictions on other political parties. Dayaks who had joined Partindo desperately searched for a more secure home in another party and shifted to IPKI, a party closely aligned with retired military officers. However their security was brief. Significant numbers of ex-Partindo Dayaks were pressured to switch to Golkar during the 1971 election. In 1973 the government again reduced the number of parties – this time to three – with the result that IPKI was forced to merge with other non-Islamic parties in the new Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (PDI). While Dayaks were significantly represented in the West Kalimantan PDI, it was the smallest party and had negligible influence. Most of the Dayak elite joined Golkar, which at least gave them better access to the government. As a result of this political change, the proportion of Dayaks in the provincial and district legislatures declined from
1966 and did not recover until 1977. No Dayaks were appointed again as district heads until three years before the regime fell, and the share of Dayak sub-district heads also dropped.

From the non-political perspective, the New Order’s policies favouring rapid development had started to show their effects from the beginning of the 1980s but not always benefit Dayaks. Activists and segments of Dayak communities claimed that logging, plantations and transmigration had not benefited Dayak communities while many aspects of Dayak culture weakened. The regime disparaged some of their cultural practices as primitive, leading to their near extinction. The anti-SARA policies\(^5\) during the New Order had made demands for affirmative action to improve the Dayak conditions impossible. The marginalization of the Dayaks and many peripheral ethnic groups continued until the fall of the New Order regime.

Dayak politics was again transformed after 1998 when the unexpected fall of the New Order regime in May 1998 opened the way for the revival of ethnic politics previously repressed. In West Kalimantan Dayaks took advantage of the new political freedom and restored democratic institutions. They were able to pressure the government into appointing Dayaks as district heads in Sanggau and Pontianak between 1998 and 1999. The Dayak elite warned the central government of possible political chaos if their demands for better political status were ignored. They referred to the recent massive ethnic conflict in 1997 in the province. The influence of Dayak political manoeuvres did not stop at the election of executive heads, but extended to other strategic positions, such as regional representatives (Utusan Daerah) in the National Assembly, executive caretakers of newly-formed districts, and heads of local religious affairs departments. In almost every election of a district head in predominantly Dayak districts after 2000, Dayak candidates were successful. The proportion of Dayak legislators at the district level reached a thirty-year high after the 1999 election.

This book will examine the course of Dayak politics in West Kalimantan from the 1940s to the early 2000s. It argues that the politics of the Dayaks of West Kalimantan has always been constrained by the nature of the national regime. All the drastic shifts in Dayak politics corresponded with the frequent political changes at the national level.

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\(^5\) The New Order regime banned the raising of sensitive issues related to ethnicity, religion, race, and other inter-group relations (collectively known as SARA).
throughout the nation’s post-independence history. The book will show that regime changes in the national capital had substantial consequences for the course of local politics, in this case Dayak politics. Some changes at the national level increased political opportunities for the Dayaks while others curtailed them. The study acknowledges the important role ethnic leaders and organizations have played in Dayak politics. It argues, however, that the extent of their role depended on the nature of the regime. The same Dayak elite and organizations that were politically active after 1998 had been relatively powerless observers during the previous authoritarian regime. Similarly, the marginalization that had provoked resentment and despair among Dayak communities only became effective rallying points after the fall of the New Order, that is, after the new political circumstances allowed their concerns to be addressed.

Dayak politics has been entwined with those of other ethnic communities, particularly the Malays. During the pre-colonial and colonial periods, Dayaks were ruled by Malays. Although small numbers of Dayaks were gradually absorbed into the Muslim Malay community, most Dayaks retained their distinctive identity into the post-independence period when they were at times political allies and at other times rivals of Malays. Tension and conflicts were not uncommon, although open conflicts since the 1950s were mostly with Madurese migrants, and once with the Chinese. The book will therefore contribute to the discussion of ethnic conflict, which has occurred many times in this region. In the case of Dayak-Madurese conflict, it will seek to identify the main causes of conflict and their relationship to Dayak politics. It argues that the primary underlying factors for the recent conflicts between Dayaks and Madurese are to be found in their historically strained relations arising from cultural/perceptual factors and asserts that the last two large-scale conflicts contributed to the political strengthening of the Dayak community were not a result of premeditated political calculations or manoeuvres.

EXISTING STUDIES

A quite substantial body of study of ethnic and regional politics covers the first two decades after Indonesian independence, though such
Introduction

Regional politics between 1945 and the early New Order have been a subject of many studies due to the political turbulence and social changes associated with this period. Scholars were interested in the rapidly changing political scene in the second half of the 1940s due to the brief reoccupation of Indonesia by the Dutch, the dynamics of local politics during the 1950s to 1960s, and the political transition after the abortive coup in 1965. William Liddle (1970), for example, closely examined the ethnic and local politics in North Sumatra from the 1950s to mid-1960s. Bigalke (1981, 2005) wrote about the social history of the Toraja people in South Sulawesi from the era of Dutch colonial rule up to the 1960s, whereas Ichlasul Amal (1992) discussed regional politics in West Sumatra and South Sulawesi in the period 1949-1979. Audrey Kahin (1985, 1999) analysed political developments in pre-New Order West Sumatra and several chapters of her edited book discussed the experiences of eight different regions during the revolution at the end of 1940s. Referring specifically to Kalimantan, Burhan D. Magenda (1991) wrote about the politics of the local aristocrats in East Kalimantan after independence, and how some of them had managed to survive politically to the 1970s. Earlier Douglas Miles (1976) wrote the genesis of Dayak politics in Central/South Kalimantan from the early twentieth century up to the early 1960s and to the Dayak contribution to the formation of the Central Kalimantan province in 1950s. Very few of those studies, except that of Miles (1976), discussed the politics of the marginalized ethnic groups, the main focus of this book.

In contrast, local ethnic politics attracted less scholarly interest during the centralized New Order era when the national government encouraged a high level of political homogeneity between the centre and the periphery. The apparent political calm at the regional and local levels from the 1970s until the end of 1990s under the authoritarian regime discouraged scholars. A lack of interest in local or ethnic politics under the New Order was often noted except for troubled regions such as

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4 One exception was the continuing research interests on the Chinese minority in Indonesia; however, the politics of migrant groups is not the focus of this study.
Aceh, West Papua, Maluku, and East Timor. In these regions studies focused mainly on the past or ongoing struggles for independence and human rights issues.

The fall of the New Order regime reversed the trend. After May 1998, Indonesia was rapidly transformed from a highly centralized country to one of the most decentralized. Democratization and decentralization unleashed political activity at local and regional levels that had not been seen since the 1950s. These new developments have attracted academic attention and have given rise to a burgeoning literature on regional and ethnic issues since 2000. Indonesian scholars, whose research was severely constrained under the New Order, have contributed significantly to this growing literature.

Some of these trends were reflected in literature on West Kalimantan. Despite lively Dayak politics, particularly in the first three decades after the end of WWII, very few studies were published until recently. As mentioned above, scholarly writings on this period are mostly on events occurring in Java, Sumatra or Sulawesi. West Kalimantan received little or no attention. Worse still, many West Kalimantan local newspapers during this era, which should be an important source for academic writing, were also lost. As a consequence, any work on West Kalimantan in the 1950s and 1960s will require an extensive search for primary documents and heavy reliance on interviews.

Most of the modern literature on the Dayaks of West Kalimantan published before 2000 focused on their socio-anthropological or eco-

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7 Chauvel 1990; Christie 1996; Steijlen 1996; Van der Meulen 1981.

8 Budiardjo and Liem 1984; Cox and Carey 1995; Dunn 1983; Jolliffe 1978; Pinto and Matthew 1996.

9 The ongoing movements here refer to both limited armed attacks by the separatists in the region (for example in the case of Aceh and East Timor) as well as campaigns by their overseas compatriots or representatives. The Free Papua Movement has representatives in Australia and is still quite active, while the Free Aceh Movements before the peace agreements with the Indonesian government in the 2000s was quite active in Sweden, and the Republic of South Maluku once had numerous supporters in the Netherlands.

10 Take the case of publication on conflict or decentralization related issues in Maluku. From 77 recently published books between 1999 and 2006 on the issues, 65 of them (86 per cent) were written by local writers and published locally. This statistic is a result of a search in the largest network of Australian libraries (http://librariesaustralia.nla.gov.au, accessed 2-1-2007).

11 The author was only able to recover several issues of local newspapers published during the 1940s and 1950s, and 1960s, including some that covered stories of the 1967 conflict, which will be discussed in Chapter 5.
nomic aspects (often relying on material published in the colonial era to describe social conditions) and did very little to address the political evolution of the Dayaks. Those who examined political concerns limited their discussions to events during the colonial era, and ignored developments after the 1950s (for example Böhm 1986). Only a few scholars mentioned in passing important moments in Dayak politics in the 1950s. A rare exception is Roekaerts, who published a manuscript on the plight of the Dayaks of Sintang and the issues of Dayak marginalization (Roekaerts 1985). The remaining material was in the form of documents, typescripts or memoirs by Dayak politicians or missionaries.

The mass conflicts in 1997 and 1999 in the province and the fall of the New Order changed the research direction of studies of West Kalimantan’s Dayaks. Scholarly works on Dayaks published after this time included a political perspective that has been largely left out before. Most of these studies, not surprisingly, focussed on ethnic conflict. At least four theses on ethnic conflict have been produced, in addition to dozens of books and articles on similar nature. So far only the works of Davidson have given significant attention to the political history of the Dayaks in the province, although most of his works are geared to explaining ethnic conflict in the province. This study, however, is not primarily about ethnic conflict, and therefore will move away from a conflict-centric approach by examining broader aspects of Dayak politics from a historical perspective.

METHODOLOGY AND TECHNICAL NOTES

Most data presented in this book were gathered during my PhD study at the Australian National University, Canberra. The author visited the province several times between 2002 and 2011 and interviewed dozens of local informants from various social and ethnic backgrounds. Some were officials in the provincial and district governments; others were

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12 Two of the most cited works are Entenhoven 1903; Veth 1854.
community leaders and activists. Some of older informants gave valuable insights into the past ethnic politics.

The interviews usually took place during several visits, which normally lasted about two hours each. After the initial interviews, subsequent interviews were used to mine more details and to clarify points left unclear in the previous interview. On some controversial issues, the interviews involved government officials and informants from both sides of a political or ethnic divide. Names of the informants are listed following the bibliography section; however, only their initials will appear in the body of this book.

This study also made use of primary materials, such as official or private political correspondence, government documents, personal diaries, and political party documents. A significant number of these sources had never been available before. The author was very fortunate to discover a significant number of documents related to West Kalimantan Partindo, which many Dayak political leaders joined in the early 1960s. The Dayak chairman of the party had concealed those documents due to unfavourable political conditions under the New Order. The Catholic Church at the provincial level was also very helpful in sharing some of its valuable archives, including some rare clippings from local newspapers in 1967 on the conflict between the Dayaks and Chinese. At the offices of the governor and district heads and regional archival offices, the author located important documents, such as government reports and human resources data.

Other than those sources, the author also consulted archival materials deposited at Kantor Arsip Daerah Kalimantan Barat (Pontianak), Arsip Nasional Indonesia (Jakarta), Cornell University (Ithaca), Library of Congress (Washington, DC), National Library of Australia (Canberra), and the Australian War Memorial (Canberra). A search for Dutch sources in the Netherlands was not conducted due to time constraints and the author’s limited understanding of the language. The author was able, however, to establish a link with the widow of the late Dr A.H. Böhm, who played a significant role in West Kalimantan politics after WWII; through her, the author obtained some crucial documents that illuminated events related to Dayak political activities at the end of the 1940s and early 1950s. These documents are now held in the Nationaal Archief in The Hague. Other Dutch sources mentioned in this book were mainly from collections held in Australian institutions and universities.
This study also benefited from the growing literature on the Dayaks of West Kalimantan written by both local and foreign scholars, particularly studies of recent conflicts. However, with the exception of Jamie Davidson’s work, this research is less helpful for establishing what occurred during the 1950s and 1960s. The discussion of more recent events in this study profited from a series of articles in the Kalimantan Review published by a Dayak NGO. These articles surveyed and reported events, particularly those related to Dayak interests in the province since the late 1990s, and served as a guide for interviews and research on contemporary issues.

Lastly, the Australian Social Science Data Archive at the Australian National University (ANU) provided access to raw data produced by Indonesian censuses. Based on this data, still coded in the form of computer files, the author was able to extract data to produce ethnic-related analyses and tables. These were not available in official publications and have not been used by previous scholars.

NOTES ON POPULATION DATA

Population data for 1930 were taken from a census conducted by the Dutch colonial administration (Census 1930 1936). All population data for 1980, 1990, and 2000 were taken from the decennial Indonesian census for the corresponding years. Detailed ethnic data down to village level are only available in the 2000 census. The ethnic data for 1980 and 1990 were extracted from a question in the censuses that asked for the respondent’s mother tongue. Respondents of mixed parentage who lived in urban areas where they spoke Indonesian at home might easily have answered the question with ‘Indonesian’. However, most Madurese and Chinese would speak their own ethnic language at home. This was also true to some extent for Dayaks, the majority of whom still lived in rural areas. This was quite different in the case of Malays, who might answer ‘Indonesian’ as their mother tongue because of the close resemblance between the Malay and Indonesian languages. The numbers and percentages of Dayaks and Malays in 1980 and 1990 should therefore be considered as indicators rather than more precise figures.

Population data from 1995 were taken from the 2000 census, mainly to show the numbers of Madurese at the sub-district and village levels in districts not affected by conflicts in 1997 and 1999. The data were
extracted from answers to a question on place of residence five years previously. In order to get data close to conditions in 1995, the data had excluded those who lived in other districts five years previously.

By 2010 West Kalimantan had five new districts (Landak, Bengkayang, Sekadau, Melawi, and Kayong Utara), and one new municipality (Singkawang). In many cases, for consistency, the book still uses the previous district structure. For example, population data for the Landak district, in some instances, is included in the data for Pontianak district.

For consistency, this study intentionally groups all non-Muslim natives of West Kalimantan into the Dayak category. A small number of Dayak Muslims, therefore, are not treated as Dayak in the statistics in this book. As a consequence, the percentage of the Dayaks at the provincial and district level here is slightly lower than the official result in the 2000 census.

NEWSPAPER AND MAGAZINE SOURCES

In most cases references to newspapers and magazines give only the date or volume number. Akcaya newspaper changed its name to Pontianak Post on 14 September 1998, but this book uses Akcaya throughout. KR stands for Kalimantan Review, a magazine published by the Institut Dayakologi. Newspapers and magazines cited in the book are listed alphabetically in the bibliography.

ON DISTRICTS AND MUNICIPALITIES

In almost all cases, references to districts cover municipalities (kotamadya) as well as districts (kabupaten) below the provincial level. Two municipalities existed in the province in 2010: Pontianak and Singkawang. Pontianak municipality in this book will be mostly referred to as Pontianak City, the capital of the province, to distinguish it from the Pontianak district, of which Mempawah is the capital.

BOOK ORGANIZATION

This book will explore the causes of the drastic changes experienced by the Dayaks of West Kalimantan in the political world since Indonesia’s
independence in 1945. To identify the main causes of the changes, this book will examine Dayak political history since the time of the Malay sultanates up to the present time.

This book is organized into nine chapters, mostly in chronological order after Chapter 2 with the exception of Chapter 7. The present chapter introduces the research background and arguments together with notes on earlier studies on West Kalimantan Dayaks, methodology and some technical notes.

Chapter 2 presents a theoretical perspective designed to explain the determinants of Dayak politics by tracing the effects of national political changes, identity formation and marginalization, and ethnic conflicts on Dayak politics.

Chapter 3 summarizes the construction of Dayak ethnic identity during the time of the Malay sultanates and colonial rule. It discusses the conditions of the Dayaks during these periods and records slow improvements in their social standing from the early twentieth century until the post-WWII period.

Chapter 4 examines the start of Dayak political involvement after WWII, that is, the role of Dayak institutions, Dayak leaders, and governments in the rise of the Dayak political profile. It then follows Dayak political developments from the dissolution of the West Kalimantan provincial government in 1950 to the Dayak achievements in the elections of 1955 and 1958.

Chapter 5 discusses Dayak politics from 1960 to 1971. It examines events that forced Dayak politics to change in order to survive in the changing political environment. It also covers the causes of Dayak conflict with the Communists in 1967. The chapter ends with discussion on the Dayak political decline after the installation of the authoritarian New Order regime.

Chapter 6 depicts cases of Dayak marginalization during the New Order from political, economic, and cultural perspectives. Marginalization is a significant contributor to the frequent conflict that occurs in the province.

Chapter 7 examines the causes of the ethnic conflict that erupted in 1997 and 1999, first looking at the historical, marginalization and cultural factors. Then it examines ethnic geography factors as well as other potential causes and analyses links between ethnic conflicts and Dayak political lobbies.
Chapter 8 discusses cases of Dayak ethnic politics after the fall of the New Order. It looks at political lobbying, particularly by those outside parliament, and government response to such pressures. Then it will look at the role of Dayak NGOs in the political awakening. Finally, it will look at the impact of institutionalized politics and the decline of open inter-ethnic strife.

Chapter 9 summarizes conclusions derived from my research.
Ethnicity and politics

This chapter provides some theoretical perspectives to support the arguments of this book. First it examines concepts that link political change at the national level and ethnic politics to support the main argument that the politics of the Dayaks of West Kalimantan have always been constrained by the nature of the regime. The next two sections link ethnic identity formation and past marginalization with the particular nature of Dayak politics that are quite different from those of Malays, the other dominant ethnic group in the province. The next-to-last section explores related theories of ethnic conflict as a framework for the sub-arguments that the massive conflict between the Dayaks and Madurese were non-political, although at the end they strengthened Dayak politics.

POLITICAL CHANGES AND ETHNIC POLITICS

Discussions of the ethnic politics of the Dayaks should be traced back at least to the sultanates and colonial times, when Dayaks had little or no political involvement or influence. This condition changed after WWII when the post-war pro-Dutch government allocated to the Dayaks important political roles in the province. From that time onwards, the course of Dayak politics has experienced changes corresponding to political transformation at the national level throughout the nation’s post-independence history. The question addressed here is to what extent the transformation at the national level influences political changes at local or regional level, or more specifically, Dayak politics?
Prior to colonial power, political structures in Asia and Africa manifested stratified social and political systems. In such structures, the ruler and family occupy the top level followed immediately by other members of the aristocracy and government officials. This top layer of social class enjoys many privileges. At the bottom level usually sit commoners or even slaves who had the fewest number of rights but many obligations. In many cases, this hierarchy was maintained after the colonial power took charge.

The colonial powers were aware of the negative effects of social stratification, but many chose not to rectify the problems initially. Colonial administrators found it was much easier to rule massive colonies and their huge populations, like India and African territories, through existing ruling authorities. Furthermore, changing the existing social system would destabilize the colony because it undermined the legitimacy of loyal local rulers and upset existing social arrangements. In fact, some colonial policies, such as favouritism, further entrenched the division between the ruler and the ruled among natives, or exacerbated the social division in their colonies (Mulinge and Lesetedi 1998:19-20).

The majority of Dayaks in West Kalimantan who lived under the rule of Malay sultanates were excluded from participation in government of any kind. The discriminatory policies of sultanates and the low social status of the Dayaks impeded their development compared with that of other ethnic groups. As many Dayaks were non-Muslim, the chances of their recruitment into the Islamic sultanates bureaucracy were remote. The highest position a Dayak could attain in the sultanates’ political structure was that of village chief. Since most were uneducated and illiterate, the Dayaks were not qualified to work in colonial offices. Under such constraints, opportunities for upward social mobility were

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1 Many past sultanates and kingdoms in parts of the world had a stratified social and political system. Reminiscent of such social stratification in contemporary societies is the use of aristocratic titles among the descendants of aristocratic families. In West Kalimantan, some individuals still retain titles such as syarif, gusti, uray, abang, and uti, which denote specific social class or public function.

2 A few smaller sultanates in the upper Kapuas were ruled by more recent Dayak converts to Islam, who had become Malay. The issue of identity change will be discussed later in this chapter.

3 The governance and administration of the sultanates was mostly under the Malay sultans and aristocrats. Most civil servants in the colonial offices came from Java and Sumatra, as well as from Christian regions, such as Minahasa, Ambon and Batakland. For an indication of the role of these non-native civil servants in West Kalimantan see the name and ethnic origin of the victims of Japanese atrocities in 1943-1944 published in the province official newspaper, Borneo Shinbun, 1-7-1944.
bleak. A few Dayak revolts against the sultanates were suppressed with the help of the Dutch military.

Beginning in the nineteenth century, Catholic missions started to set up schools for Dayaks in the interior. Prior to that, Dayak access to basic education was very limited because the few schools were usually reserved for the aristocrats who had means to pay tuition. Another factor that discouraged Dayaks was the distance to schools, which were usually established in sultanate capitals and in towns. Although the Dayaks were lukewarm about the schools initially, they nevertheless started to take advantage of education provided by the missions. Through education, Dayaks had access to print materials, an important channel for political awakening. Education is also an important channel for vertical social mobility; the Dayaks started to fill white-collar jobs as teachers, nurses or mission personnel. Work in the sultanate administration was still closed to them because of religious bias. The political impact of the mission schools only became evident after WWII when the government allowed Dayaks to play a role in provincial politics. Former mission school students were the first to be appointed to government posts.

The change of colonial masters in 1942 from the Dutch to the Japanese had important implications for Dayaks. As each colonial master had particular values and interests (Rothermund 1995:3), the Japanese occupation brought changes to Indonesia which was then known as the

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4 Horowitz mentioned that the colonial government decided on the location of facilities such as schools, transport ports, and business centres. Ethnic groups who lived nearby would take full advantage of these facilities (Horowitz 1985:151-3). In a similar vein, Hechter argued that the uneven wave of modernization (in this case the availability of modern facilities such as schools, road and seaports) could increase the gap between advanced and less advanced groups (or between the core and peripheral area). The lack of modernization would relegate the less advanced group into an inferior position (Hechter 1975:9, 39-40).

5 The importance of education in the rise of nationalism, a form of political awakening, has been noted in many parts of the world (Anderson 1991:71, 116; Rejai 1995:42; Tennesson and Antlöv 2000:872; Kahati 2003).

6 The role of education in vertical social mobility is evident in the case of the Minahasan (North Sulawesi) and Ambonese (Maluku). Formal education arrived much earlier in these regions than it did in other parts of Indonesia (Jones 1977:8; Lundstrom-Burghoorn 1981:24) which made their population more prepared to take on white-collar jobs when they became available. Both ethnic groups had been a significant source of civil servants and army recruits during this time (Jaspan 1959:7; Kahin 1964a:197). As explained earlier, significant numbers of native civil servants in West Kalimantan were also from these regions.
Netherlands Indies. One important change brought by the Japanese was the reversal of racial classifications that existed during the Dutch colonial period. European nationals and the Dutch language that had been signs of superiority for so long suddenly became symbols of pariah status. The status of native Indonesians, in contrast, was elevated overnight from the lowest to the highest social stratum below the Japanese (Wertheim 1955:42-3). Another relevant contribution of the Japanese occupation was the dismantling of special prerogative to the aristocratic group (Wertheim 1955:44), which further eroded the sultanates’ authority in some regions. In Kalimantan, specific regulations of the sultanates, which were maintained during the Dutch colonial period, were abolished (Kalimantan 1953:102). The Japanese occupation also contributed to the creation of more egalitarian masses through intensive mass mobilization (Wertheim 1955:44). More directly linked to the province was the massacre of all sultans, large numbers of native aristocrats and intellectuals, Chinese merchants and influential figures between 1943 and 1944 (Borneo Shinbun, 1-7-1944). All of this together with the weakening of the sultanates system was psychologically important for the Dayaks, who always had been in the lowest layer of racial stratification in many parts of the province.

The defeat of the Japanese in WWII opened up the return of the old colonial powers in Southeast Asia. In some places, their return faced resistance from the population of their former colonies, some of whom

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7 Scholars have found that colonial powers tend to have different policies and attitudes towards the colonies (Rothermund 1995:3; Souffrant 2000:138; Young 2001:17; Lane and Ersson 2002:216). Depending on many factors, even the same colonial power might act differently in different colonies (Rothermund 1995:3; Young 2001:17). As will be discuss later in this chapter, the Dutch divided the governance of the Netherlands Indies into direct and indirectly ruled regions. The Japanese occupation had army and navy administration. Kalimantan, Sulawesi and other eastern regions were under naval administration, while Java and Sumatra were under the army. Both administrations had slightly different approaches, attitudes and policies towards the regions and their population (Japanese military administration 1968).

8 The Dutch stratified social classes in the Netherlands Indies into three. The first class was occupied by European, Japanese, Turks and other elite individuals from other ethnic groups. This was the highest social class with the highest number of privileges. The Asian Far Eastern groups (vreemde oosterlingen) such as the Chinese, Indians and Arabs constituted the second class. The third and the lowest social class with the fewest privileges was the native population (inlanders). For the racial classification in the Netherlands Indies, see for example Cribb and Kahin 2004:362-4; Zainuddin 1970:137.

9 Dutch and English languages had been banned, and because Japanese was little known, Indonesian had become the major language used for government propaganda, and in schools (Japanese military administration 1968:218-9). The Japanese also interned all Europeans, except nationals of Japan’s allies (Ricklefs 2001:248, 251).
had been offered, and even granted, independence.\textsuperscript{10} It was in this context that the former colonial powers needed even more cooperation from segments of the community to support their smooth return, similar to what they had done when they first came into contact with these regions centuries ago. In Indonesia, the returning Dutch sought support from peripheral groups, aristocrats and sultans who were anxious about their future as the nationalist movement had grown strong across the nation.\textsuperscript{11} In West Kalimantan, beside the newly installed sultans, representatives of the Malays and Chinese, the Dayaks were included in the executive board at the provincial and district levels of government. This was the first time for Dayaks to be involved in the political process, because previously it was all handled by the sultans and Malay aristocrats with some supervision from the Dutch colonial government. The Dutch support of the Dayaks was unprecedented but it was necessary to secure the support of the Dayaks for implementation of its scheme to turn Indonesia into a pro-Dutch federal state. As will be explained in the next chapter, unlike many Malays, the majority of Dayaks of West Kalimantan was detached from the nationalist movements emanating from Java, and therefore relatively easy to persuade. The result was that as the Dayaks became one of the staunchest supporters of the Dutch for the federal states.

All of these colonial powers managed to return to their colonies, but in some cases their stay was brief. In the Philippines, Burma and Indonesia, colonial masters departed before 1950, Indochina in 1954, and the Malaya Federation in 1957. Some of these new governments, particularly those which had fought a series of wars with the returning colonial masters, had strong anti-colonial outlooks. Not uncommonly, such new governments exclude former collaborators with the colonial government from important roles in the government. In Indonesia, after a few years of war and failure to effectively re-occupy its colony, the Dutch finally recognized Indonesia’s sovereignty in 1949. The new anti-Dutch government had adversely affected the political fortunes of many

\textsuperscript{10} The British resumed their rule in Malaya and Burma, France in Indochina, the US in the Philippines, and the Dutch in the Netherlands Indies. Previously, the Japanese had granted Burma and the Philippines nominal independence in 1943 and promised that Indonesia would gain independence in 1945 (Kratoska 2001:4-5).

\textsuperscript{11} During this time armed conflicts between the aristocrats and nationalist elements had occurred in some places. The sultans in East Sumatra as well as ulêbalang in Aceh, both were known to have been supporters of the Dutch in the past, had become victims (Reid 1979). The Chinese who had cooperated well with the colonial powers and prospered during the colonial time also suffered as anti-Chinese riots flared in several places in Indonesia after WWII (Mozingo 1976:40).
prominent Indonesians who formerly supported the Dutch. Those who were associated closely with the now defunct member states of federal Indonesia (RIS) and were hostile to nationalist ideas were outside the arenas of regional and national politics (Feith 1962:74).

The fate of many individuals in the West Kalimantan Special Region Government (DIKB) was no different. Sultan Hamid II, the head of the DIKB and one of the staunchest supporters of the federal state, was arrested in April 1950 because of his role in an abortive coup. Dayak officials in the DIKB who were also ardent supporters of the pro-Dutch federal state, vanished from provincial politics. With the exception of two Dayak figures who were members of the national legislature at the time of DIKB dissolution and who continued to serve in those positions until 1956, other Dayak figures in the DIKB lost their political influence. The new nationalist government discontinued ethnic representation in the government and also abolished ethnic institutions set up by the Dutch, such as offices of Dayak Affairs and Chinese Affairs. Such ethnic politics was seen as a remnant of colonial policies of divide and rule and was highly unpopular during the peak time of nationalism in the early 1950s.

Although there was animosity toward the Dayaks, as was evident in intense polemics after the Dutch departure in 1950 over political issues after the Dutch departure (Keadilan, 5-5-1950; Suar, 5-5-1950), Dayak

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12 One indication of such sentiment was the excision of the Dutch language from the school system. After 1950 the second language in Indonesian school system was English, not Dutch (Reid 2005:70). Another indication was the nationalization of Dutch enterprises in 1938. This was partly a result of the Netherlands’ refusal to settle the status of West Papua as mandated by the 1949 agreement between the two countries (Ricklefs 2001:316-7). Continuing repatriation of Dutch nationals from Indonesia was another indicator of hostility towards the Dutch. Between 1945 and 1964, about 250,000 Dutch had been repatriated. The peak was in 1957-1958 when about 40,000 Dutch were repatriated from Indonesia, mostly against their will (Ohliger 2005:49).

13 There were a few exceptions for former officials who displayed nationalist attitudes or who had facilitated the final departure of the Dutch. One example was Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung, the former prime minister of the State of East Indonesia (NIT) whose role was split between supporting the Dutch federalist idea and helping the creation of the sovereign Indonesia (Agung 1996; Robinson 1998a:103). He was made ambassador to a few European countries and then foreign minister in the 1950s (Roeder 1971:18). Other exceptions were those who served as members of the national legislature between 1945 and 1949, as their memberships were extended up until 1956, when new members were sworn in after the 1955 election.

14 Persadja 1955. At the time of the arrest, Hamid was a state minister of RIS, which was formed in December 1949. After his release in mid-1960s, he was not given any further formal political positions and died in 1978.

15 Feith (1962:74) observed that nationalism was at its zenith in 1950 and such ethnic sentiments and regionalism were not popular. Such sentiments reappeared from the mid-1950s when the regions felt their needs had been ignored by the central government.
civil servants, whose numbers were still small, continued to serve in the bureaucracy. The Dayak Unity (PD), a political organization established after WWII, survived during this high tide of nationalism and would soon play an important role for the comeback of Dayak politics in the subsequent government.

Indonesia experienced a period of liberal democracy between 1950 and 1957. The national politics of this period was characterized by the increased role of political parties and the extensive role of parliament, and regional politics were relatively free from interference from the central government. During this period the first general election and local elections were held in the mid-1950s to elect members for national and local legislatures. The liberal system allowed ethnic and regional political parties, and even individuals, to contest the election (Feith 1957:61-2). National politics at this time were unstable because of frequent changes of government (Hadiwinata 2003:50). The discussion of the future of the constitution of the nation was stalled in the Konstituante (Constituent Assembly) by differences between members who wanted to strengthen the influence of Islam in the constitution and those who opposed such a proposal. Regional politics were unsettled as rebellions erupted in several regions because of dissatisfaction with the central government. Supported by the military, President Soekarno took the initiative in July 1959 and announced the dissolution of parliament and return to the 1945 Constitution, which returned governing power to the president. A year later, Soekarno abolished the existing parliament and established a new one whose members were appointed by the president not elected.

Such political changes at the national level have again affected Dayak politics in West Kalimantan. The abolition of the DIKB in 1950 excluded Dayaks from politics, but they had gained power by the end of 1950s. The Dayak Unity Party (PD), which survived the political transition, fielded candidates in both general and provincial elections where they outperformed most of the big national parties. These successes paved the way for the return of Dayaks to the legislative and executive bodies in West Kalimantan. With its significant representation (and therefore sig-

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16 Konstituante was a body established in 1955 to formulate a new constitution to replace the provisional 1950 Constitution. It never completed its task and was dissolved in 1959 because of persistent disagreement among its members over the issue of foundation of the state (Cribb and Kahin 2004:90).

17 Liddle 1999:58. In the previous constitution, the head of government was the prime minister, while the president was only a titular head of the state with little direct influence on the work of the government (cabinet). For the support of the military, see Feith 1994:23; Ricklefs 2001:320; Hefner 2000:45.
significant voting power) in the legislature, and helped by the fragmentation of Malay politics, and the support of central government for native rule, Dayaks were able to win several executive posts: four Dayaks were elected as district heads and one as a governor. Without a democratic election and conditions mentioned above, it would be very difficult for the Dayak to attain such positions. Remember, the Dayaks ardent support for the pro-Dutch DIKB was still fresh in the minds of opposing local leaders, who now occupied most of the government positions. If allowed to do so, they would have limited the entry of the Dayaks into politics.

Rising regional revolts in parts of Sumatra, Sulawesi, West and East Java, as well as South Kalimantan at the end of the 1950s led the government to tighten control over regional politics. The central government announced a regulation in 1959 requiring a political party to have branches in at least a quarter of the provinces. This regulation was particularly adverse to the regional political parties which only had a limited number of branches. The PD failed to satisfy the requirements, and had to disband. Its dissolution ended the relatively solid and united course of Dayak politics, as it was their main political machinery. The majority of PD members joined the nationalist Partindo, while the remainder joined the Catholic and other political parties. By merging with a national and open party, they no longer had their own independent ethnic voice. Dayak political influence was also weakened by the reduction in their representation in the parliament and other political bodies. They had to cede some of their seats to the Communists when the government introduced the concept of *Nasakom*. Fortunately, the

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1. Malayan were represented in all other nationalist and Islamic parties, competing with each other for political positions.
2. Some of these rebellions were the Darul Islam (House of Islam) which started first in West Java in 1948, but then spread to Central Java, Aceh, South Sulawesi, and South Kalimantan; the South Maluku Republic (RMS) in 1950; and the PRRI/Permesta revolts in parts of Sumatra and Sulawesi in 1958 (Ricklefs 2001:289-341). These rebellions were effectively defeated by mid-1958 although some of their leaders evaded capture. Sekar Marijan Kartosuwiryo, the leader of Darul Islam in West Java, was captured in 1962, and Kahar Muzakkar the leader of similar rebellion in South Sulawesi, was killed in 1965 (Ricklefs 2001:319, 326-7).
3. In April 1961, the government ordered the dissolution of all but ten political parties (Feith 1962:593).
4. The concept required every important government body to have representatives from Nationalist, Religious, and Communist groups, abbreviated as *Nasakom*. As Partindo usually had the largest representation in the legislative or executive bodies, it was usually the first to give up some of its seats to the representative of communist group when the government implemented the concept.
central government continued to support Dayak leadership in the province, although their political ascendancy did not last long.

From the beginning of the 1960s, politics at the national level had swung toward the left as the president’s relations with Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI, Indonesian Communist Party) and leftist elements drew closer. As a result of penetration of national politics into the region, which is also known as nationalization of local politics, the president leftist and revolutionary outlook was emulated by leaders of the region. The aftermath of the alleged Communist coup in September 1965, which eventually brought down Soekarno, swung the political tide to the right. Supported by the army, anti-Communist religious groups and mobs initiated violence against the Communists and their sympathizers. Millions suspected of having links with Communists were either killed or detained without trial (Cribb 1990). Victims included important figures in the government such as ministers, members of parliament, and military leaders.

Drastic power shifts at the national level again affected the regional level. The drive against communists was particularly murderous in areas where communist activities were strong such as in East and Central Java, Bali, and North Sumatra (Crouch 1978:64, 155). True, some regional leaders were sympathetic to or even members of PKI. However, many others who were not linked to the Communist structure, but were simply following or implementing pro-left policies as directed from Jakarta, also were swept from power. The new regime doubted their loyalty because of their close relations with Soekarno.

The Dayaks’ political role in West Kalimantan was adversely affected by such change as most of its government elite had links with Partindo, which at the national and the local level was known to be close to PKI (Robinson 1998a:211; Rocamora 1970:229, 412; Van der Kroef...

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22 Crouch 1978:51-68; Ricklefs 2001:327-41. Soekarno’s close relationship to the PKI was a consequence of its enthusiastic support for his ideas. Soekarno also needed a strong PKI to balance the influence of the army on the national political front. See, for example, Feith 1964b.

23 In this process the cleavages in diverse localities became more uniform and congruent with the cleavages at the national level (Kesselman 1974:364).

24 Listed as Communist allies were governors of Bali and North Sumatra, deputy governors of Jakarta, West, Central and East Java. Six out of 39 district heads and mayors in Central Java and Yogyakarta, eight of 37 in East Java, and two of 23 in West Java were from PKI (Crouch 1978:77-8). According to a foreign office evaluation, in Kalimantan, the East Kalimantan Governor A. Pranoto and Central Kalimantan Tjilik Riwut were categorized as PKI sympathizers, while West Kalimantan Governor Oevaang Oeray was a member of Partindo but categorized as a non-PKI sympathizer (Poulgrain 1998:262).
1971:123, 219). Dayak affiliation with Partindo was, as previously explained, a result of a new government regulation on political parties. The roots of Partindo in West Kalimantan, therefore, were quite different from the party at the national level which had started with some leftist or radical roots. Nevertheless, as was the case in other regions, leaders in West Kalimantan, including those Dayaks who held top jobs, pursued the same leftist politics championed by the president or at least did not resist the left-swing. Unfortunately, the New Order regime suspected their loyalty and removed all the Dayak district heads and the Dayak governor in 1966. The majority of native leadership in West Kalimantan was soon replaced by non-native leadership. While there were only one or two native district heads, none of them were Dayaks. This trend of appointing non-locals to head the strategic positions was not only confined to West Kalimantan but also occurred in other regions.

The Dayaks would continue to be marginalized politically until the end of the New Order. Most positions available to locals would eventually fall to Malay bureaucrats, the more ‘advanced’ ethnic group. The Dayaks were generally silent about this marginalization fearing of retribution from the regime. The majority of ethnic activities during this time were, therefore, non-political. They usually concentrated on cultural, social or educational programs, such as those conducted by a few Dayak NGOs under Pancur Kasih since the 1980s.

An authoritarian regime, such as Indonesia’s New Order and Soekarno’s Guided Democracy, is characterized by limited or no political

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45 Rocamora mentions that Partindo was formed by members of PNI who were dissatisfied with the soft approach of the PNI leaders (Rocamora 1975:229). In its 1962 leadership structure, National Partindo had I.R. Lebo, K. Werdojo, A.M. Hanafi, Armunanto, Adisumarto, Oei Tjoe Tat (Bintang Timur, 30-12-1961). These individuals were incriminated by the New Order regime for their alleged leftist activities.

46 Many regional leaders who were very anti-PKI were replaced after 1962 by those who were either close to PKI or at least were less belligerent toward PKI (Feith 1964b). Sometimes, it was the local legislature who decided to elect a leftward leaning figure to head their regions. In Tana Toraja, Partai Kristen Indonesia (Parkindo, Indonesian Protestant Party) which dominated the local DPR decided to elect a local Partindo leader as district head in 1964, in the hope that such political compatibility with the leftward central government would benefit Toraja (Bigalke 2005:268).

47 According to Horowitz (1985:147) an advanced group usually ‘disproportionately well educated and represented in the civil service and the independent professions, or disproportionately wealthy and well represented in business’. Advanced ethnic groups may be a minority that dominate the government, such as the White under the apartheid regime of South Africa. Such a minority-ruled government often restricts the emancipation of the majority to minimize the possibility of political challenges.
pluralism and the repression of opposition or challenges. Under such a regime, ethnic politics, which are often linked with regional politics or even separatist movements, is repressed because it is perceived as a threat to national unity. In such cases, the regime controls and monitors ethnic activities to ensure they will not endanger country unity and challenge the regime. It appoints trusted, reliable and often non-local officials to head all strategic and important positions at the local level, to ensure complete subordination. It was not uncommon for the regime to rotate or circulate the leadership to prevent such leaders building a local power base. The regime regularly rewards compliance and punishes defiance in order to keep challenges and opposition to a minimum.

Under repressive systems, most ethnic groups and their elites have no other options except pledging loyalty to the regime. Other possible options, flight and voice are either not practical or too risky. Flight is not a practical option because migrating to other countries is becoming more difficult due to the rigidity of state boundaries, while avoiding state power by fleeing to interior areas is possible but impractical. Voicing one’s concerns is risky because the regime usually punishes those who challenge its policies (Eriksen 1993:123; Gurr 1993). As a consequence, large-scale ethnic activities challenging the New Order regime are not known, except in cases of ongoing separatist movements in Aceh, East Timor, or Papua. Discourses on ethnic and religious issues were monitored closely by the New Order, and those who raised the issues ran the risk of being charged with sedition. Similarly, there were no fresh regional rebellions during the last years of authoritarian Guided Democracy. Most regional revolts which started during the liberal era or earlier had been largely subdued by the early 1960s. Existing ethnic activities were more of a social and cultural nature which seemed to be safe as they posed no threat to the regime. The ‘voice’ option usually becomes possible after the authoritarian regime falls and is replaced by more democratic governments, as can be seen from the surge of regional and ethnic political dynamics after 1998 Indonesia.

The fall of the New Order in May 1998 signified the beginning of the democratization and decentralization process in Indonesia. Freedom House, a well-known non-governmental organization that keeps track of countries’ freedoms, has noted the continuous increases of political pluralism and the repression of opposition or challenges. Under such a regime, ethnic politics, which are often linked with regional politics or even separatist movements, is repressed because it is perceived as a threat to national unity. In such cases, the regime controls and monitors ethnic activities to ensure they will not endanger country unity and challenge the regime. It appoints trusted, reliable and often non-local officials to head all strategic and important positions at the local level, to ensure complete subordination. It was not uncommon for the regime to rotate or circulate the leadership to prevent such leaders building a local power base. The regime regularly rewards compliance and punishes defiance in order to keep challenges and opposition to a minimum.

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For a detailed characterization of authoritarianism under the New Order, labelled as bureaucratic-authoritarianism, see King 1982:109-12.
freedom and civil liberty in Indonesia since 1998. Fair and free multiparty elections were held after more than forty years, the constitution that entrenched executive power was changed, the role of the military has been significantly reduced, and many other democratic measures were implemented. Compared internationally, the country has also been transformed from the most centralized to one of the most decentralized countries in a relatively short time (Aspinall and Fealy 2003:3; Bell 2003:117; Charras 2005:87).

An established democratic government’s views on ethnic issues or ethnic movements differ from those of centralized authoritarian regimes. Democratic governments generally no longer see ethnic differences as threats to national unity and therefore are not obsessed with integrating or co-opting ethnic voices like the centralized and authoritarian countries. These governments allow ethnic movements to grow, and some governments even permit groups with separatist goals to operate. They also celebrate differences by adopting multi-culturalism, an ideology that allows the coexistence of diverse cultural and ethnic groups within a nation (Cashmore 2004:28-90). The Indonesian government after 1998 has been very relaxed about the rise of local politics, which was commonly intertwined with ethnic or religious interests. The government, however, has remained prohibitive toward ethnic organizations or activities that aimed for political separation. Looking at the result of the local elections in West Kalimantan and election trends in other regions since the fall of the New Order, it can be safely said that the majority of top jobs at the local or regional level such as governor and district head, have been returned to the local people or putra daerah. Under the New Order regime such extreme trends would have been inconceivable.

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30 The federal government of Canada, for example, allows political parties that strive for Quebec’s independence to conduct their activities. It has permitted several referenda for independence in Quebec to take place (Joireman 2003:Chapter V). For further discussions on the views of democratic states towards the minority rights or minority nationalism, see Kymlicka 2004:26-7.

31 On this position, Dewi Fortuna Anwar, a political scientist who was working as the spokesperson for President Habibie argued that ‘… the 26 provinces of Indonesia including Aceh and Irian Jaya are fully integrated into Indonesia, and are recognized by the whole world and have been recognized by the United Nations. So it is not really to be expected that Indonesia as it stands will tolerate insurgency movements in other parts of the country’ (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/talking_point/forum/443600.stm, accessed 26-10-2010).
Democratization provides space for elite political manoeuvring at the national as well as regional and local level. The elite of regions who have been subjected to heavy control from the central government in the past use their newly found political freedom to push for autonomy or even independence. Leaders of ethnic groups demand cultural recognition, better economic entitlement, greater autonomy, or independence (Kellas 1991:57-60). The new democratic regime that tries to satisfy demands (for example by implementing decentralization and granting greater autonomy to the regions) may have to face greater demands with more serious implications (Kellas 1991:58). Some countries that experience rapid democratization after sudden regime change face serious political consequences including the break-up of the country or civil wars. The democratization which started in the former Soviet Union in 1989 not only brought down the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe, but also triggered unprecedented regional and ethno-nationalist movements in the region. The Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia disintegrated into almost two dozen new sovereign states; ethnic conflicts flared in various parts of the region.32

Similarly, the unexpected fall of the New Order regime in 1998 changed the political landscape at the central and regional level. Some peripheral regions asked for better deals such as extra financial contribution from the central governments. Some of the rich regions, such as Aceh, Papua, Riau, and East Kalimantan, even threatened to pursue independence if the situation did not improve (Emmerson 2005:26-7). Local bureaucrats or politicians sidelined by Jakarta’s preference for non-local leadership in the past also moved to reclaim their political rights as putra daerah (Sukma 2003:70). Elements of communities disadvantaged by the previous regime, including marginalized ethnic groups and minorities, demanded that the government address their grievances. Internal conflicts also erupted in some regions. In West Kalimantan, local politics first featured energetic Dayak political lobbies in 1998 and 1999 that resulted in the appointment of two Dayaks as district heads. The province also suffered a serious ethnic conflict in 1999, only two year after the previous one.

32 Fifteen new sovereign states emerged from the former of Soviet Union, five from former Yugoslavia, and two from Czechoslovakia. East and West Germany was integrated by the same wave of democratization that erupted in the Soviet Union.
The literature on identity formation contains three main approaches: primordialism, instrumentalism and constructivism (Fenton 2003:88; Joireman 2003; Yang 2000). Primordialism understands ethnicity as ascribed; ethnic boundaries are fixed or immutable and determined by common ancestry (Yang 2000:42). According to Geertz (in Eller 1999:73), the main markers of ethnicity are blood ties, race, language, region, religion and custom.33 Constructivism, on the other hand, argues that ethnicity is not permanently determined but socially constructed; ethnic boundaries are flexible and can change over time according to historical and structural circumstances (Yang 2000:44-6). Instrumentalism stresses the ways in which ethnicity can be used as an instrument or strategic tool to achieve certain goals. People become ethnic and remain ethnic when their ethnicity generates substantial benefits to them. Ethnicity, like class and nationality, is also a means of political mobilization for advancing group interests (Yang 2000:46). Ethnicity, in this perspective, becomes relevant and important as a result of political and sometimes economic processes, and not as a result of deeply rooted or primordial ties.34

None of these approaches can by itself explain all ethnic phenomena. One approach may be more powerful in explaining ethnic phenomena in certain societies, eras and conditions, but it may have less influence in other circumstances. Primordialism cannot explain the phenomenon of identity change, or the emergence and disappearance of ethnic identities (Cornell and Hartmann 1998:50; Yang 2000:43). While most researchers now find that constructivist and instrumentalist approaches are more convincing (Laitin 1998:11-2), both approaches also have

33 Other scholars gave more detailed markers. Keyes (in Nagata 1981:92) identified kinship, descent, birthplace, and race as the most common primordial elements; and identified language and religion as secondary elements. Harold Isaacs (Cornell and Hartmann 1998:48) provided an extensive list of primordial elements: physical appearance (including size, shape, skin colour); a person’s name; the history and origins of the group one is born into; one’s nationality or other group affiliation; the language one first learns to speak; the religion one is born into; the culture one is born into; and the geography and topography of the place of birth.

limitations because of their disregard for primordial ties. This has led to the formulation of combined or integrated approaches. One of these integrated approaches recognized ethnicity as ‘socially constructed partly on the basis of ancestry or presumed ancestry and more importantly by society, that the interests of ethnic groups also partly determine ethnic affiliations, and that ethnic boundaries are relatively stable but undergo changes from time to time’ (Yang 2000:48).

The integrative approach seems to better explain many aspects of the identity formation of the Dayaks and their politics in West Kalimantan. Dayak identity has a primordial foundation in that many members of the Dayak ethnic group share relatively similar characteristics. However, elements of constructivism are also evident in the formation of Dayak identity. First, the term ‘Dayak’ was coined rather recently and was not in use several hundred years ago. The Dayak identity is not a fixed and ascribed identity and its boundaries have changed over time. For example, the Punan, who inhabit north-eastern West Kalimantan, are now widely recognized as part of the Dayak ethnic group although originally they were not. Also, Dayaks themselves can change their self identification to Malay if they convert to Islam. Besides constructivism, the influence of instrumentalism is also observable in identity association of the native that has changed over time depending on risk-benefit assessment. Initially the indigenous person was reluctant to be associated with the term ‘Dayak’ due to its pejorative connotation. But the attitude of many native people changed after the image and prestige of the Dayaks improved – for example, when Dayaks were accorded favourable political

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55 Social construction of ethnicity cannot occur without some references to primordial elements. The formation of Japanese-American identity, for example, is unlikely without the trait of Japanese ancestry. Social construction is also constrained by observable primordial traits such as skin colour or physical appearance. Pure Chinese descent, with Chinese features, cannot be easily constructed into white, Black, or Latino (Yang 2000:49). Instrumentalism has limitations because not everyone can freely choose their ethnic identity since identity is subject to ancestral constraints (Yang 2000:47). Also, not all ethnic choices are based on rational and materialistic calculation. Psychological satisfaction, which is usually linked to emotional attachments (primordialism), also contributes to decision-making. Instrumentalism cannot explain why people persevere and keep their association with a particular ethnicity, although such identification had made them suffer (Eller 1999:79). This irrationality is better explained by primordialism (Scott in Eller 1999:79).
Dayaks who converted to Islam therefore chose to become Malays because of benefits associated with that affiliation.

Dayaks are an ethnic group according to an external construction. The term ‘Dayak’ was first used by the Bornean Malays to describe hundreds of native tribes in Kalimantan, but not including the nomadic Punan. The term was then popularized by European explorers through their writings (Lumholtz 1920, I:23). The term had already been used by the Dutch as far back as the mid-eighteenth century (Pringle in King 1993:30). For these outsiders the native had similarities that justified such a label. The natives had symbols and characteristics that were strikingly different from the Malays and other non-Kalimantan natives. Many of the native groups shared similarities in attire, body arts (such as tattoo and long earlobes), festivities and customs. Although some were nomadic, most lived in interior regions in longhouses, lived on swidden agriculture, and practiced headhunting. They initially practised traditional animism, but later on also became Catholics and Protestants. Not being a Muslim used to be one of the most significant determinants of Dayak identity, at least in West Kalimantan.

Such an umbrella ethnic label was nonexistent for the native. For some of them, Dayak was just another word in their vocabularies, which means interior or people. Some of these natives might have close kinship ties, but they initially did not see themselves as members of the same ethnic group. Some of the closest groups, such as Iban and Kantuk, had even been at war in the past. The negative connotations associated with the term ‘Dayak’, such as savagery, backwardness, destitution, and stu-

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36 This identity re-association is not uncommon in the study of ethnicity. Since the 1960s, there has been a trend in democratic countries to take affirmative action to improve the conditions of indigenes or minorities. The status of being minorities or indigenous, therefore, can become advantageous. In the United States, there are increases in ‘white’ American claims to their indigenous or tribal status since the 1960s. Previously, many Americans with native-Indian ancestry tended to be reluctant to claim their ethnic heritage because of the social stigma and certain disadvantages of self-identifying with Native Americans (Nagel cited in Yang 2000:52-3).

37 The native Iban, for example, used the term to mean human being, while other natives, such as Tunjung, Benuaq, and Kenyah, understood it to mean interior or upstream (Whittier 1973:12-3; Lahajir M.S.Z. et al. 1993:4; Asyarie 2004:11-2). Some experts claim that the term as an ethnic label can be found in Lun Daye Dayaks in East Kalimantan, and in Bidayuh Dayaks in Northwest Kalimantan. Further etymological study is needed to verify their link to Dayak. More discussions on the meaning and origin of the term can be found in Maxwell (1984) and Eggan (1984:37). These natives already had ethnic labelling or identification. One compilation shows the native had identified more than 400 ethnic identities (Riwut 1958:182-206).
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pidity as noted by Bamba (2002b), discouraged the native from accepting such categorization.38

Scholars have confirmed the significant role of the colonial governments and their officials, religious workers and others in the construction of ethnic identity.39 They construct new ethnic groups by inventing new labels or promoting existing labels to represent new identities. Some of these new labels were not known previously by the locals, or if known, were not prominent before being applied through publications, censuses and policies. These labels reorganized existing ethnic memberships into members of new categories. Besides the Dayaks, the Torajanese of Sulawesi, and some groups in Africa, such as the Yoruba, Zulu and Tswana, emerged or became prominent only during the colonial period.40

Persistent use of this new categorization might have influenced some natives to accept the label. Some who found the term unacceptable took a longer time to actually use the label themselves, such as in the case of the West Kalimantan Dayaks. As one indication of their reluctance, there were no known organizations in the province that used the name Dayak until the end of WWII. In Central Kalimantan where the Dayak condition was relatively better, the natives were more ready to assume the Dayak label. There, ethnic association using the Dayak had appeared as early as in 1919 when the Sarekat Dayak was established.41 In West Kalimantan, the label became more attractive to the native after the post WWII government gave a political role to the Dayaks. The establishment of institutions that bore the term such as Dayak Affairs Office and Dayak Unity Party had strengthened the native association to the Dayak. Despite their enmity in the past, the bond among the natives had

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38 In the past, insulting terms deriving from Dayak were common, such as ‘Dayak kera’ (Dayak monkey) or ‘dayak-dayakan’ (mimicking a Dayak) (KR 1992/01). The term ‘Dayak kera’ was a mutation from a Dutch word Dajakker, which means Dayak person. In the ‘dayak-dayakan’ play in Java, children would dress and act like the ‘uncivilized’ Dayaks (Soedjito 2005:16).


40 Cornell and Hartmann 1998:51; Eriksen 1993:94-5; Volkman 1987. Not all such processes were successful. The Alufuru, several tribes in Central Sulawesi, refused the use of the term ‘Toraja’ introduced by a Protestant missionary for their identification. Although the term to refer to the tribal group in Central Sulawesi started to gain popularity in academic writings and government reports, the local population continued to refuse to be associated with it. To them, ‘Toraja’ referred to an ethnic group in the north of South Sulawesi province (Hasan et al. 2004:124).

41 The Sarekat Dayak was renamed ‘Pakat Dayak’ in 1926. It was involved in political lobbying in Volksraad, the Netherlands Indies legislative body, to push for expanding the political rights of the Dayaks (Lontaan 1985:171-2; Riwit 1958:175-8; Usop 1994:55-6).
strengthened as a result of identity construction, their similar experience of marginalization and their common political goals.

Not only were the colonial government and its officials influential in some ethnic identity formation, they were also important in incorporating the ethnic groups into a greater nation creation process. Benedict Anderson believed that many former colonies were bound emotionally through a series of internal nation creation journeys produced during the colonial government. He argued that the colonial government’s uniform regulations and standards set fixed paths to development to be followed by the populations of the colony. One such route was through standardized education in which students within the colony learned from the same material and through the same language of instruction. Common meeting venues, such as school and government offices, provided places where ethnic groups from diverse backgrounds could interact with each other. As a consequence of these cultural exchanges, by the end of the colonial period, most major ethnic groups were accustomed to the idea that they had parts to play in the whole colony, and that they shared the same destiny (Anderson 1991:115-6, 121, 132).

However, not all ethnic groups within the same colonial administration experienced the same quality of nation-building pathways. The Dayaks of West Kalimantan, who were treated as second-class citizens and even slaves by the sultanate governments, were a good example. Dayaks had little or no access to education and office employment compared to the Malays, although both were indigenous groups. PRINT-nationalism suggested by Anderson (1991:44-6) had little effect on the Dayaks because of their illiteracy and lack of social and political encounters with the rest of the nation. Also, only a few Dayaks experienced the nation-building process outside Kalimantan. Warnaen (2002:17) lists only 86 Dayaks who lived in Java by 1930 census, the second lowest after Torajanese (23). This number was very small compared to other ethnic

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42 People from regions later incorporated into the colony or state (after independence) also did not experience a similar quality of nation building. In some cases, these ethnic groups did not fit well into the new nation. The cases of the East Timorese and the Papuans are illustrative of this idea (Drake 1989:55). East Timor was not a part of Indonesia until 1976, while Papua was under the Dutch until 1962.
groups. As a consequence, the majority of Dayaks were relatively unaware of emerging nationalist movements in Java and Sumatra that arose in the early twentieth century.

Dayaks in the province did not shape the experience of nation-building as did the Javanese, Bataks, Minangkabauan, Minahasan and some other indigenous Indonesians who had travelled widely during the colonial period. At the national level other ethnic groups might also have had fewer opportunities than those more ‘advanced’ ethnic groups, but many still had opportunities to contribute at least to governance in their regions. The Dayaks lacked this opportunity, as most political rule was in the hands of the Malay aristocrats and native officials from Java and elsewhere.

Religion is an important determinant of Dayak identity. Kipp (1993:75) observes that for ethnic communities whose religious differences coincide with ethnic differences, religion is equivalent to ethnicity and the change of religion entails change of ethnicity. For ethnic groups that treat religion as an incidental and not essential ethnic attribute, a religion can be abandoned without any implications for ethnic status (Nagata 1981:93). Language is also an important differentiating factor for the peoples of Bosnia (Duijzings 2000:10), Northern Ireland, Lebanon and India (Enloe 1980:248); for Jews and Arabs in North Africa and Israel; and for Malays in Malaysia and southern Philippines (Keyes 1981:7-8). Besides religion, language can become a crucial ethnic emblem, particularly in countries with significant language politics, such as in Belgium (between the French-speaking Wallons and Netherlandic-speaking Flemings) and in Canada (between the French-speaking Quebeccois and the English-speaking majority). Language is also important for many ethnic groups in India, states of the former USSR, and Sri Lanka (Brass 1991:Chapter VIII; Wright 2000). Some minority enclaves who have a distinct language — such as Basques in both France and Spain, or Catalonians in Spain — take language as an important ethnic symbol (Nagata 1981:93). Language is not an essential ethnic attribute for the Dayak.
Mollucans or Javanese who converted to other religions, for example, will not be required to relinquish or change their ethnic identity. Social pressure for them to abandon their ethnicity is also less obvious.

For many Dayaks, at least as defined by their leaders, the Dayak identity was extended only to those who kept their traditional religion or embraced Christianity and excluded those who have converted to Islam. The reason for excluding Muslim Dayaks was that very often converts renounced their original identity and became Malays (masuk Melayu) or branched off to become a new ethnic group known as Senganan, Orang Laut, or Pekaki. Such differentiation influenced Dayak politics after WWII. In the 1940s, the Dayak leaders of West Kalimantan rejected Muslim Dayaks’ attempts to represent the Dayaks in government, as they doubted the commitment of such converts to the Dayak cause. This shifted in the 1950s, when they started to accept a few Muslim Dayak leaders. After the fall of the New Order, the issue of Muslim Dayaks resurfaced, coinciding with the rising Dayak political profile; Dayak leaders once again rejected a Dayak Muslim to represent the Dayak in the National Assembly (MPR). In order not to disadvantage themselves politically by excluding converts who chose to retain their identities, the Dayak Customary Council (MAD) in 1999 recognized Muslim Dayaks as Dayaks if they recognized and practised Dayak culture. In 2003 many Dayak organizations were involved in a series of street protests when the government planned to change the education system in ways that some thought would have adverse consequences in the Christian schools. Still in 2003, the Dayaks of Landak district protested the appointment of a Moslem to head the Religious Affairs Bureau (Kantor Departemen Agama) as the majority of the population of the district were Christians. In 2004 they protested when the recruitment of the teachers of Christianity/Catholicism was much smaller than that for Muslims despite their greater needs.

The identity formation of the Dayaks that differed from other major ethnic groups and their lack of incorporation into the development of the Indonesian nation resulted in a quite different political path following WWII. After the war, a majority, if not all, Dayak politicians supported the Dutch. On the contrary, many Malay politicians outside the govern-

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47 Scholars reported similar trends of becoming Malay after converting to Islam for the Dayaks in other parts of Kalimantan (Ukur 1971; Miles 1976:93; Riwut 1993:191; Hawkins 2000:32), the Batak of Sumatra (Dahm 2000:18-9; Kipp 1993:29, 33), and few other natives of Sumatra (Marsden 1811:26-7).
ment, who had been influenced by nationalist movements, supported the new Republic led by Soekarno-Hatta. As a result of identity construction where religion had become an essential attribute, religious issues continued to be a factor in Dayak politics.

**DISADVANTAGED PAST AND CONTINUING MARGINALIZATION**

The issue of the Dayaks as a marginalized ethnic group will be noted throughout this book, as it has clouded Dayak politics since independence. Marginalization of the Dayaks, like the marginalization experienced by other communities, can be traced back to the colonial period. Colonial governments sometime intentionally assigned certain ethnic groups certain jobs – a labour division that often survived long after the colonial power left. Often they gave preferential treatment to certain ethnic groups by granting access to education and the acceptance into the civil service. The labour division and preferential treatment gave certain groups unequal opportunities to advance. In the case of West Kalimantan Dayaks, the local sultanates governed the region on behalf of the Dutch colonials. Some policies of these sultanates discriminated against Dayaks. The Dayaks generally had low social status and had to pay extra tax. They also had fewer or no opportunities to work for the Islamic sultanates administration because of their non-Moslem status. Because of their lack of education, the Dayaks also had very few opportunities to work for colonial offices.

After WWII the pro-Dutch government started to give a political role to the Dayaks. First it appointed several Dayaks to the executive board of DIKB, and then appointed Dayaks to head the Dayak Affairs Office at the provincial and district level. A few Dayaks were able to enter the bureaucracy as a result of the more inclusive policies of the government. Apart from those appointed positions the Dayak opportunities to join the

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48 According to Gurr (1993:35) backwardness is the result of four historical processes: colonialism, state-building, migration, and economic development. This section will follow these processes in order to explain the process of marginalization of the West Kalimantan Dayaks.


50 Dutch colonial rule was divided into two regions: that directly administered by the Dutch and that indirectly ruled by sultans. In the directly ruled region, governance of the region was handled by the Dutch officials. The governance of the indirectly ruled region was by the native sultanates. All regions in West Kalimantan, except Boven-Kapuas, Pinoiland en Meliau, were indirectly ruled by the sultanates.
bureaucracy remained slim. The reason is, first, as in many other regions, except in areas where social revolution had disrupted the existing traditional rule such as in Aceh and East Sumatra, the majority of the civil servants (pegawai) of the colonial period in West Kalimantan continued to work for the new republic. Secondly, Dayaks’ chances of filling vacant higher positions left by the Dutch administrators were nil, as they had neither experience nor qualifications. Furthermore, the bureaucracy was dominated by Malays and civil servants from elsewhere who were unfriendly towards the Dayaks. Those in the bureaucracy could decide to block the entry of the Dayaks, whom they thought unsuited for the jobs, socially and intellectually.51

The problems of unequal access and marginalization persisted after independence as the government ignored the problems and failed to undertake any affirmative action to uplift the marginalized ethnic groups. These ethnic groups posed no strong challenges to existing conditions. Post-independence governments usually embark on nation building, a process which aims to integrate and harmonize the regional, social, political and institutional divisions of people within one community (Kuzio 1998:119). This process is required for nations composed of plural societies in order to be viable as a state and not disintegrate.52 Nation building tends to emphasize national unity and homogeneity at the expense of regional particulars, needs and identities. This nation building process, which is usually led by the majority and in accordance with the majority point of view, tends to disadvantage peripheral ethnic groups.53

Regions or ethnic groups who do not feel they fit into the current state often demand autonomy or independence from the central government. Facing such demands, the central government can offer wider au-

51 Such practice was common in a divided community as the dominant group wanted to maintain their privilege and dominant status (Hechter 1975:9). Such scornful views towards the Dayaks were common.  
52 The concept of plural societies was first introduced by Furnivall (1948). This concept refers to groups that are socially and culturally discrete, that were integrated through economic symbiosis (or mutual interdependence) and the political domination of one group (colonial masters). The groups were held together in a political system by the coercive force of the state, the police and the military, and not by shared values in these societies. When the strong colonial government departed, such plural societies could break apart (cited in Eriksen 1993:49). The breakup of British India into India, Pakistan, and later Bangladesh is one example. Another example which took place in different political setting was the break up Soviet Union and some countries in the Eastern Europe when authoritarian Communist regimes collapsed.  
53 Kymlicka (2004:19, 24, 29) mentioned three options for the minority: seek integration into the majority culture, seek self government, or accept permanent marginalization.
Ethnicity and politics

Economic or repress the movements militarily if a peaceful solution cannot be reached. Meanwhile, the government continues the nation building aimed at reducing such problems, for example by tightening control over the region or implementing programs to integrate the problematic groups into the mainstream through population resettlement.

Politically, regional Indonesia had received little autonomy since independence until the fall of the New Order in 1998, with the exception of the first part of 1950s. In 1950, Indonesia inherited a decentralized political system from the former federal government. Despite decentralization containing the detested influence of a federal system, both political parties in the parliament and the government recognized the importance of decentralization for the region (Maryanov 1958:13-6). However, a few problems started to appear as a result of regions’ dissatisfaction over the lack of implementation of decentralization programs. They felt there was a trend toward Javanization of the leadership in the region. Other issues included the unclear division of authority (pembagian kekuasaan) between the central and regional government, and uneven development where the interests of the regions had been ignored by the central government (Maryanov 1958:38-40). Such dissatisfaction led to several regional rebellions in the 1950s as mentioned above. At the end of the 1950s, government counter-measures reversed decentralization that was previously enjoyed to a certain degree by the regions. Central government regained control over the appointment of regional executives, such as governors and bupati, although it continued to support loyal local leaderships.54

The New Order regime tightly controlled regional politics and limited regional autonomy as one way to keep unity and control separatism. To ensure the loyalty of the region, the central government hand-picked its loyalists to fill strategic posts in the region and filled the local legislature with Golkar and military officers, who constituted the backbone of the regime. In some regions, local bureaucrats were left with second tier leadership positions. In the case of West Kalimantan, with the exception of the top jobs, which usually were reserved for the Javanese and or non-locals who usually had a military background, the bureau-

54 In September 1959, Soekarno rescinded the UU No. 11957, which allowed regional DPR to elect the governor and bupati, and returned such right to central government (Anderson 1990:49; Cribb and Kahin 2004:109; also Mackie 1999:206).
Regime change and ethnic politics in Indonesia

cracy dominated by Malays.\textsuperscript{55} Dayaks were minimally represented in the bureaucracy and leadership. For these discontented ethnic groups, a solution was not easy as the voicing of concerns could be considered subversion and punished by the regime.

Consequently, the regime avoided issues that could provoke ethnic or regional sentiments. The New Order regime should have been aware of the political marginalization of the Dayaks, but bringing those issues to the surface would have destabilized local politics. Local governments, which had little representation of Dayaks, also continued to ignore the problems. In fact, there were beliefs among the Dayaks that the dominant Malays in the bureaucracy had prioritized their own ethnic group during recruitment and promotion, and therefore, limited Dayak entry to and rise in the bureaucracy.\textsuperscript{56} The affirmative policies regarding Dayaks by the post WWII government between 1945 and 1950 had been discontinued as they were seen as remnants of colonial policies of divide and rule. From the mid-1950s to mid-1960s, Dayak leaders in the executive tried to recruit more Dayak civil servants, but the effort only resulted in minor improvements in the number of Dayaks in the civil service.

Slow growth of the region’s economy was a result of neglect and uneven development due in part to internal colonialism.\textsuperscript{57} The regions had complained during the 1950s that regional development had not improved (Maryanov 1958), probably the result of the wars and political instability from 1945 to the end of 1950s. The national economy received little attention during Guided Democracy, and when Soekarno lost power in 1966, the country’s economy was on the brink of bankruptcy (Agung 1990:647; Vatikiotis 1998:33), so was the regional economy.

The new regime embarked on rapid economic development, but its highly centralized development strategy left out many peripheral regions.

\textsuperscript{55} The domination of military officers who were usually non-local in the top leadership at the local level also occurred elsewhere in Indonesia (Bertrand 2004:116; Sukma 2005:12).

\textsuperscript{56} This shows that despite government disapproval of ethnic politics, local leaders could still play the ethnic card to benefit their ethnic group. Bertrand gave an example of a Muslim governor in Maluku who tried to improve the portion of Muslim civil servants in the Christian dominated bureaucracy in Maluku during the 1990s (Bertrand 2003b).

\textsuperscript{57} Internal colonialism theorists propose that the uneven development between regions is state-induced and that ethnic groups who live on the periphery are uniquely disadvantaged (Hechter 1975). However, critics of internal colonialism argue that uneven economic development within a state may not be the result of state discriminatory policies but due to natural economic forces. For example, the region was poor in natural resources or located in less strategic positions geographically for rapid economic growth (Connor 1994:149-50; Kellas 1991:62).
Development in Indonesia had been concentrated mostly in western parts of the country, particularly in Java. The development in the eastern part of the country, such as the Kalimantan, Sulawesi, Maluku and Papua, had been very slow.\textsuperscript{58} The central government was overly enthusiastic about exploiting these regions’ natural resources and slow in developing them. This uneven development was one of the reasons regions strongly supported full decentralization after the fall of the New Order. Some, including leaders of Dayak NGOs of West Kalimantan, even supported the federal system as a solution. They also opposed government development programs in areas such as logging and plantations that they thought were only benefiting the central government and big businesses but detrimental to local interests.

Socially and culturally, governments in Southeast Asia often ‘develop’ indigenous minorities and incorporate them into the nation state. This is an important nation-building project as governments often see these peripheral groups as a hindrance to national progress and a threat to national security.\textsuperscript{59} One way to end the backwardness of indigenous minorities is to resettle them in areas close to the general population so that they can be ‘developed’ and integrated into the mainstream national culture. These minorities go to school to learn the national language, convert to a recognized world religion, and enter the cash economy (Duncan 2004c:3).

Sometimes instead of removing the indigenous group, the government sends migrants to live near the indigenous population, so these can learn and benefit from the more ‘civilized’ migrants. In Indonesia the population resettlement program is known as transmigrasi, where population from densely populated Java, Madura, and Bali are resettled to the sparsely populated regions.\textsuperscript{60} Problematic regions such as Aceh, erstwhile East Timor, Papua, as well as regions with international borders have

\textsuperscript{58} The Integrated Economic Development Zone (KAPET, Kawasan Pengembangan Ekonomi Terpadu) designed to accelerate development in East Indonesia, was only introduced in 1996. The government has established twelve KAPETs since the concept was introduced. As intended, they are all located in Eastern Indonesia: four in Kalimantan, four in Sulawesi, two in Nusa Tenggara, one in Maluku and Papua (Soenandar 2005:182). For indicators of the uneven development between the Western and Eastern Indonesia see Akita (2002;1995), Garcia (1998), Sjafrizal (1997), and Soenandar (2005:182).

\textsuperscript{59} Duncan 2004c:1-2; see also Li 1999. The term for these minorities usually contains backward and primitive connotations such as Orang Asli (the native) in Malaysia, or chaaw haw (hill tribes) in Thailand, masyarakat terasing (isolated tribes) in Indonesia (Duncan 2004b:86, 2004c:1).

\textsuperscript{60} This could be in the form of sponsored or spontaneous transmigrations. Unlike the sponsored transmigration where the government covers significant establishment costs, those who chose the path of spontaneous transmigration would receive no financial support from the government.
received significant numbers of migrants in the past. The interior region of West Kalimantan, home region of the Dayaks, has become the target of government-sponsored transmigration since the 1970s.

While such moves are aimed at fostering national unity, frictions between locals and migrants arise because of cultural differences, land disputes, economic competition, and other issues (Otten 1986:147-84). There have been reports of local disappointment over the small financial compensation for appropriated land and lack of economic benefits to the local population (Rockaerts 1985:29; Sapardi 1992:130; Djuweng 1996:93).

These nation-building efforts may result in the assimilation of indigenous minorities into the mainstream, such as in some Southeast Asian countries (Duncan 2004a). Significant assimilation to the Malay society has occurred among many indigenes who lived under the influence of Malay culture throughout Southeast Asia (Benjamin 2002:50-4). The New Order had once put almost half of the Dayaks in West Kalimantan into the category of isolated ethnic groups (masyarakat or suku terasing) which required resettlement so they could become more like the mainstream population of Indonesia. Their shifting cultivation system, communal living in longhouses, and some traditional arts were considered dangerous, unhealthy, or too primitive. That negative perspective on their culture and traditions inflicted social and cultural stress. Their tribes also lost dignity because their traditions and culture were considered to be of no value (Eriksen 1993:123).

Marginalization caused resentment and despair in the affected regions and peripheral groups. For those who had no means to fight or to voice their concerns, the fall of the authoritarian regime provided hope. Voices demanding better treatment are usually quite united as the marginalized to the group as a whole tends to foment ethnic solidarity and to blur intra-ethnic friction. The marginalized status explains the sudden surge of energetic and relatively united Dayak politics in the 1940s and 1950s, and in the 1990s. Marginalization also could intensify conflict when it erupts, as will be shown below.

ETHNIC CONFLICT AND ETHNIC POLITICS

The starting point of this book is that ethnic conflicts are prominent features of any multi-ethnic society. This is so because, borrowing Horowitz’
argument (1985:144-5), ethnic groups have a natural tendency to cleave, compare and compete with each other. They also tend to cleave and favour their own kind, and negatively stereotype, distrust and do disservice to other ethnic groups. However, despite the enmity of inter-ethnic relations, not all ethnic groups are in conflict. There should be a more specific explanation as to what conditions make certain ethnic groups prone to conflict. To answer this question, this study adopts Michael Brown’s model to explain why internal conflict occurs.

Brown (2001:5) differentiates two categories of causes of conflicts: the underlying and proximate causes. The underlying causes or permissive conditions refer to necessary conditions for conflicts to develop and explain why certain areas or ethnic groups are conflict-prone. Brown categorizes four main clusters of factors that make some places or ethnic groups more prone to violence than others: structural, political, economic/social, and cultural/perceptual factors (Table 2.1). The second category is proximate causes or triggers referring to factors that cause a conflict to escalate. They are rapid and unexpected changes in any of the underlying causes which ignite violent conflict. Corresponding to the underlying factors, Brown (2001:13-15) also differentiates four proximate causes (Table 2.2).

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Table 2.1 Underlying causes of internal conflict

Lijphart (1995:853) even includes those ‘who tend to harbour negative and hostile feelings towards members of other groups’ into his definition of an ethnic group.

Another quite similar model is from Michael Lund (1996), which classifies causes into structural and dynamic factors. The structural factors remotely and indirectly affect the conflict, while the dynamic factors are more direct and immediate.
Regime change and ethnic politics in Indonesia

1. Structural factors
   collapsing states
   changing intra-state military balances
   changing demographic patterns

2. Political factors
   political transition, increasingly influential exclusionary ideologies, growing inter-group competitions, intensifying leadership struggles

3. Economic/social factors
   mounting economic problems
   growing economic inequities
   fast-paced development and modernization

4. Cultural/perceptual factors
   intensifying patterns of cultural discrimination, ethnic bashing and propagandizing

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Table 2.2 Proximate causes of internal conflict

This book will look into the underlying conditions and triggers of conflicts between the Dayaks and Madurese of West Kalimantan. It will not follow all factors examined by Brown, but only will look into factors that are most pertinent to the conflicts. Brown (2001:4) himself believes that it is futile to search for a single factor or a set of factors that can explain all internal conflicts because there are many different types of internal conflicts, each with a different set of causes.

Antagonistic group history (Brown 2001:20) seems to be an important determinant of ethnic conflict. Ethnic groups tend to be hostile to others, but in reality not all ethnic groups are involved in open conflict. Examination of some major ethnic conflicts in recent times will show that the warring parties had a history of conflict or tense relations in the not-too-distant past. Conflicts in former states of Yugoslavia, for example, dated back to at least to WWII (Daalder 1996:38-41). Conflict between the Tutsi and Hutu in Rwanda and Burundi can be traced back at least to the early 1950s when they were still under colonial rule (Proxy targets 1998:11). The Dayaks and Madurese in West Kalimantan also have antagonistic group history since they have been involved in about a dozen conflicts since the 1950s. Such conflict history has strained the

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63 While the roots of some conflicts can be traced back to centuries or millennia of antagonism (Horowitz 1985:98), many contemporary conflicts have more direct connection to the colonial or post-colonial period. The colonial preference treatment and their failure to take ethnic lines into consideration when establishing the colonies were some factors that breed post-colonial conflicts. Examining various conflicts in many parts of the world, Fearon and Laitin (2003:88) concluded that there are positive connections between past and recent conflicts. The study concludes that prevalent internal conflicts in the 1990s were the result of accumulation of protracted conflicts since 1950s, and were not due to the end of Cold War, as generally believed.
relations between the two more than their relations with the other ethnic groups. The strained relations gave every small tension among the Dayak and Madurese the potential to develop into an open conflict.

Ethnic geography, or the concentration or spread of an ethnic group, is an important contributor to ethnic conflicts. Brown mentioned that states with ethnic minorities and with certain ethnic spreads are more prone to conflicts. The potential for conflicts are greater if ethnic groups who were historically antagonistic live close to each other. Some countries have a complex ethnic geography because their country’s boundaries were established by the colonial powers without conforming to traditional ethnic boundaries, or because of some population policies in the past where the regime forcefully integrated their populations (Brown 2001:6-7). Complex ethnic geography has contributed to ethnic conflicts in post-colonial Africa (Routledge 1998:247), in the Caucasus region in Russia and in the former Yugoslavia.64

Ethnic geography seems to be pertinent to conflicts in West Kalimantan, although no studies have cogently argued such a case before. Almost all conflicts between the Dayaks and Madurese occurred in the north-western part of the province in the Sambas and Pontianak districts. The population of the Madurese in these two districts was the highest in the province and was rapidly on the rise prior to the conflicts in 1997 and 1999. The population of the Madurese in these two districts was highly concentrated and quite separated from other ethnic groups. Because of such a settlement trend it was not difficult to find the ‘Madurese’ villages, where the Madurese continued living in their distinctive way. The population of the Dayaks in these regions was also high. Considering their strained relations and conflict history, their population concentration close to each other only increased the potential for conflict between them.

Ongoing marginalization and discrimination suffered by an ethnic group is another underlying condition for conflict (Stewart 2002:112-3; see also Yang 2000:193). An element of marginalization is found in some major ethnic conflicts such as between Hutu and Tutsi in Burundi and Rwanda, between the Bosnians and Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and between ethnic groups in Russia’s Transcaucasia (Stewart 2002:112-3).

64 In the Caucasus conflicts or tensions occurred in Nagorno-Karabakh, Chechnya, Abkhazia and South-Ossetia. In the former Yugoslavia conflicts occurred in regions that have now become independent states (Koehler and Zürcher 2003:243-4).
In Indonesia, repeated anti-Chinese riots beginning in the early twentieth century were partly a result of the relatively more dominant position of the Chinese over the local population in the local economy. Marginalization also contributed to some more recent communal conflicts in West and Central Kalimantan, Maluku, as well as conflicts with separatist goals in Papua, Aceh, and erstwhile East Timor. The suspicion that marginalization caused conflict in West Kalimantan is also strong, as it always involves Dayaks, the long-term marginalized natives of the province. Growing grievances and frustration because of their disadvantaged conditions make both the Dayak elite and non-elite prone to get involved in conflicts. The marginalization experienced by the Dayaks, both elite and commoners across different sub-ethnic groups, also strengthened ethnic solidarity among the Dayaks, which in turn accelerated the spread and severity of the conflict.

The ethnic institutions and their leaders can have a role in the conflicts. Ethnic leaders and institutions can serve the role of brokerage and information diffusers, two elements important in conflict escalation. Ethnic leaders are able to construct valid reasons for conflict and use

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65 For communal conflicts in West and Central Kalimantan, see Bertrand 2004:58; Communal violence West Kalimantan 1997:9-11; Communal violence Indonesia 2001:13; Peluso and Harwell 2001:93; Rabasa and Chalk 2001:45; Smith and Bouvier 2006b:209-10; for communal conflicts in Maluku, see Bertrand 2003a:187; Van Klinken 2001:18-9; for conflicts with separatist goals in Papua, Aceh, and East Timor, see Bourchier and Hadiz 2003:256; Collins 2003:47.

66 Scholars have frequently quoted grievances and frustrations as sources of conflicts. Grievance is a result of unjust treatment. The hostility as a result of grievance is usually aimed at a specific group who has caused the injustice. Frustration is a result of one being blocked from one’s goals. Frustrated persons may vent their anger at anyone or any groups, even if they are not the source of their frustration. For further discussion see Bartos and Wehr (2002:73-4).

67 McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001:333. I believe that these two factors are pertinent in conflict escalation particularly when taking into account technology advances in telecommunication and transportation. The advances of communication and transportation make possible the participation of more people, involving larger areas, and inflicting greater casualties. Nowadays, news on the conflicts, whether rumoured or true, travels instantly and is uncensored. Requests for help even from the remotest areas to friends in the region or international sympathizers can be made almost immediately. News from radio, television, and newspapers, although sometimes screened or neutralized by the broadcasters to cool the situation down, still gives out information on the conflicting parties and can contribute to the escalation. The news creates insecurity and provokes the ethnic solidarity of the members of conflicting parties who do not necessarily live adjacent to the conflict areas. They can initiate the attack in their areas because of fear of attack from their enemies or because of moral obligation to help their ethnic brethren. Better means of transportation makes possible rapid movements for those involved in conflicts.
their influence to mobilize masses against the enemy.\textsuperscript{68} Ethnic organization makes possible collective action on a large scale because it provides organizational infrastructures, network links, and leadership.\textsuperscript{69} Armed ethnic organizations have a role in initiating conflicts in Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Chechnya, and Kosovo. In some other cases, the role of ethnic organizations in initiating conflict is less evident, although they still can have a role in its escalation. In the case of conflicts in West Kalimantan between the Dayaks and Madurese the initial triggers seem to be spontaneous, although there were suspicions of the involvement by military, ethnic leaders and organizations.

Proximate causes are the triggers for the conflicts. Systemic changes such as rapid democratization from the previously authoritarian regime are potential triggers for conflicts.\textsuperscript{70} Such transformations require a change of the rules of the game, where elements in the community, the political elite included, need to readjust to the new environment and to reconsider their position toward their political rivals and partners.\textsuperscript{71} Conflicts are not unusual during this uncertain transitional period. Ted Gurr (in Snyder 2000:29) concluded that while democratic consolidation reduced ethnic conflict, the first steps in the shaky transition to democra-

\textsuperscript{68} Arfi 1998:153. Unfortunately, members of the elite often manipulate ethnic movements to extract concessions from the state for their own benefit: to improve their political position or to better their social or economic status. Some other elites become involved in ethnic activities to pursue their idealistic interests. They continue to be involved in the activities despite the hostile political environment. Martin Luther King of the US and Nelson Mandela of South Africa are known for their unreserved endeavours to bring equality to the ‘Blacks’ in their countries. Religious leaders, such as Bishops Desmond Tutu of South Africa and Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo of East Timor, are also known for their outspoken stance against the unfair and repressive ethnic policies of the regimes.

\textsuperscript{69} Olzak 2004:671. Ethnic organizations provide resources and networks, and prepare and coordinate the ethnic members in order to reach a better result in the conflict. Activities by ethnic organizations are usually better organized and prepared compared to spontaneous ones. An organized demonstration will equip its participants with pamphlets or leaflets, ethnic attributes, and with written demands. The possibility of success for such activities by ethnic organizations is greater because of their consistency, ability to follow up and also because they are identifiable for possible negotiation.

\textsuperscript{70} Every change in the political environment, such as a regime change, releases expectations and capabilities, or causes frustrations and resistance (Kellas 1991:60), which provide openings for conflicts to develop.

\textsuperscript{71} Many elites are less ideological but of rational choice and will logically try to maximize gains and minimize costs to themselves of their actions. They are pragmatic and may adjust their political attitude according to the changing environment. The rational elite change their attitudes when the regimes change. During the political transition in the mid-1960s in Indonesia, those who were linked to the leftist party tried to seek refuge in Golkar, a government political party (Bigalke 2003:276; Ward 1974:177). Post-1998 Indonesia has seen many examples of such rational actors. Members of the elite, who collaborated closely with the former regime, have detached themselves from it, and become champions of reform (Elson 2001:291-2; O’Rourke 2003:118-35).
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cy increased the potential for strife, particularly in new states. Snyder and Mansfield (2007:5) noted that countries taking early steps on the journey from dictatorship toward democracy are especially prone to conflict and violence. Similarly, Lund (2002) saw that the democratization has created opportunities for internal conflict, particularly if the countries are not ready to embrace liberal democracy.

Democratization opens up political participation which was tightly controlled previously. Struggle for power among national or local elites across ethnic and interest groups intensifies because political vacancies are no longer filled only by those who are loyal and close to the regime. Not uncommonly elite competition results in conflict at the grassroots level (Rinakit 2005:52). Demands for greater autonomy or even independence from the regions are usual where the previous governments had been highly centralized and authoritarian. Democratization also gives opportunities for the members of formerly disenfranchised or oppressed groups, for example the minority, to lobby or mobilize to demand that the government redress their problems. Such conditions might lead to conflict as the dominant ethnic group might want to keep its influence or the new government might not be able or ready to cope with the intense demand.

A weakening regime and the subsequent collapse of the authoritarian regime, as well as the ensuing rapid democratization, could be linked to conflict. For Indonesia, the indicator was the increased social conflict from the mid-1990s as the New Order regime weakened. It suffered a series of massive conflicts in many regions after the sudden regime change in 1998 and rapid democratization (Agustino 2005:83-92; Tadjoeddin 2002:35). Such conditions did not themselves cause conflicts, but they provided conditions that favour conflict. For Brown (2001:6) and Bertrand (2003a:178), it was the release and the interplay of forces previ-

72 Previously both have jointly investigated the connection between democratization and war-proneness (Mansfield and Snyder 1995, 2005). Another scholar who has tried to establish the connection is Michael Mann (2005).
73 Democratization enabled more people to play a larger role in politics, a potential source of ethnic conflict (Snyder 2000:27).
74 Minority groups may benefit from goods traditionally associated with democracy, such as greater opportunities for political participation and greater respect for civil liberties, although democratization in some cases may also harm minority groups (Bell, Daniel 2003:38).
75 For example, the new government may give wider autonomy but reject claims for independence. When the central government is unwilling to compromise on an independence option, continuing to pursue such a goal will invite armed repression from the central government.
ously repressed by the strong authoritarian regime that caused conflict. In the case of Dayak-Madurese conflicts in West Kalimantan, democratization and political transition after 1998 contributed to the conflict, although they had occurred many times before in periods of high political and economic stability in the 1970s and 1980s.

Other triggers for ethnic conflict include incidents or policy changes that tip the ethnic political balance or upset ethnic relations. The unexpected appointment of a district head from a certain ethnic (or religious) background could result in a high level of ethnic polarization and serve as a potential trigger for ethnic conflict. The failure of Dayak candidates in the 1994 election in Sintang, and the removal of Cornelis as a candidate in the district head election in Pontianak in 1999, for example, had resulted in angry Dayak mobs going on rampages. The announcement of affirmative actions might create opposition from the other ethnic groups whose interest would be negatively affected. Kidnapping, arrest, or murder of ethnic or community leaders could set off conflicts between opponent groups.

Besides systemic triggers, sometimes there are also more immediate but trivial triggers such as individual verbal disputes or street fights between members of ethnic groups can develop into significant conflicts. Such incidents have a greater potential to evolve into large-scale conflicts if they occur between members of antagonistic ethnic groups. Many other factors can contribute to the transformation of a minor incident into open conflict – for example, the timing and venue of the incidence.

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76 Ethnic polarization is the widening gap between the political and social space of competing ethnic groups (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001:322).
Dayaks prior to independence (up to 1945)

[...] we [...] asked the [Dayak] headman, whether the Dayaks … would send their children to us, provided we opened a school in Sambas to teach them. His reply was ‘that he did not know, it must be just as the sultan said’. (Doty and Pohlmann 1839:286.)

This chapter examines conditions prevailing prior to independence in the region that later became West Kalimantan. Those conditions prevented the emergence of Dayaks in the colonial-era government and contributed to the challenges that they faced after independence. The small advances in education that Dayaks experienced in the last years of colonial rule, however, helped to shape the role they would play in post-independence politics.

An understanding of the roots of ethnic identity of the two major native groups of West Kalimantan, the Dayaks and Malays, is central to this book. Dayaks and most Malays descended from the same ancestors and became differentiated by religion following the spread of Islam. Dayaks who converted to Islam transformed their identity into Malays and abandoned many of the practices and customs that had previously identified them as Dayaks.

The backward conditions of Dayaks in the pre-independence era shaped the discriminatory administration of the Malay sultanates and the uncaring approach of the Dutch colonial regime. Dayaks in areas directly ruled by the Dutch experienced slightly better conditions without the burden of Malay sultanates rule. History shows that Dayaks from directly ruled areas were more advanced than their counterparts in the sultanates.

Among the conditions instrumental in preparing the Dayaks to take the opportunities that arose after WWII was the education provided by
the Catholic mission to the Dayaks. The short period of Japanese occupation also made an important contribution to Dayak emancipation by brutally eliminating much of the previously dominant Malay aristocracy that had obstructed Dayak advancement. Dayak political leaders began to emerge for the first time following the end of WWII.

THE DAYAKS, MALAYS AND SENGANAN

Like many other provinces in Indonesia, West Kalimantan has a diverse ethnic population. Based on the 2000 population census, the two largest ethnic groups were the Dayaks and Malays, followed by the Javanese, Chinese, Madurese, and Bugis. Muslim Malays made up about thirty-five percent of West Kalimantan’s population of 3.7 million, largely non-Muslim Dayaks were about thirty percent, Javanese and Chinese each about ten percent, followed by smaller migrant communities from other parts of Indonesia including Madurese, Bugis and others.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>1930</th>
<th>1971</th>
<th>2000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dayaks</td>
<td>48.9*</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>30.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malays</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>34.7**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Javanese</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madurese</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bugis</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.1 Ethnic population in West Kalimantan (1930, 1971, 2000) (percentages)

*The Dayak figure in 1930 was a combination of the Dayaks and 'unknown' categories (onbekend), which were mostly Dayaks.

**Official source (Karakteristik penduduk 2001:34) gives the percentage of Dayaks at 33.1 percent, and Malays at 32.4 percent.

Source: Census 1930, Riwut (1979:49); Census 2000.

West Kalimantan’s post-independence history has seen considerable conflict between Dayaks and Madurese, as well as outbreaks involving Chinese and the Malay communities. However, this chapter will focus
on the origins and development of distinctive ethnic identities within the indigenous Dayak and Malay populations of the province.

The Dayak peoples were the original inhabitants of the island of Kalimantan. However, in the contemporary political discourse in the province, the Malays, and sometimes, the Chinese and Bugis, are considered natives because they have long and significant associations with the province. In this book, the terms ‘native’ or ‘indigenous’ mostly refer to Dayaks; in some contexts (as will be indicated) the terms will also include Malays.

The Dayaks include at least 400 sub-tribes (Riwut 1958:182-206). These sub-tribes were usually classified into several larger groups. The recent 2000 population census listed at least 130 sub-tribes living in West Kalimantan some of the main groups being the Kanayatn, Darat, Ketungau, Desa, and Mualang. The population of other sub-tribes including the better known Iban, Kantuk, Kayan, and Kenyah, is rather small — less than 2 percent each of the Dayak population in the province.

These native groups shared many social and cultural similarities. In the past, most Dayaks lived in interior regions, lived in longhouses and practised headhunting. Most lived in interior districts and carried on swidden agriculture or hunting-gathering. Despite these similarities, the groups were not exactly the same. For example, not all Dayaks practised headhunting, such as the native Jelai of Ketapang (Bamba 2003:21). The Aoheng and Punan also did not initially headhunt, but they learnt it from their belligerent neighbours (Sellato 1994:141). While it is true that majority of Dayaks lived by swidden culture in the interior region, many Iban Dayaks adapted to coastal living and were known as Sea Dayaks. Social systems also varied among the Dayak sub-tribes with some more

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1 Kalimantan is also known as Borneo, a term introduced by the Portuguese explorers from the sixteenth century to refer initially to northern region of the island belong to Brunei Kingdom (Broek 1962:133-5). It was a better known term before the founding of Republic Indonesia, and still in use in Malaysia and Brunei.

2 Although they are aware that Dayaks have many sub-groups, the majority of scholars who examined ethnic conflict in the province treated Dayaks as a single ethnic group. Scholars who researched anthropological and sociological aspects of the group tended to view the Dayaks as a heterogeneous group.

3 Headhunting was not exclusive to Dayaks. Ethnic groups such as those from Siberut, Nias, Sulawesi, Sumba, and Timor were also known to have headhunting pasts (Colombijn 2001:27; Hasan et al. 2004:135, 140; Hoskins 1996). The practice had been common in many parts of the world. For more on this topic, see http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/258121/headhunting, (accessed 26-10-2010).
or less egalitarian in their social organization such as the Iban, Kantuk, Desa and Punan, whereas others like the Kayan, Taman, Kenyah and Mualang were more stratified (King 1993; Rousseau 1990; Sellato 2002). The difference in the social categorization generated further differences in social and cultural practices.

The majority of Dayaks who lived in the interior professed Christianity. The 2000 census showed that 65 percent of Dayaks professed Catholicism and 30 percent Protestantism. Dayaks who converted to Islam usually changed their identity and became Malays. Prior to the coming of these modern religions to Kalimantan, the Dayaks were animists. Based on the population census in 2000, about 1.5 percent of Dayaks in the province retained their traditional beliefs.

Unlike the externally coined word ‘Dayak’, the term ‘Malay’ was already known before the arrival of Europeans. Local written references to Malay can be found from the seventh, eleventh, and mid-fourteenth centuries (Andaya 2004:66). The Malay language was already a lingua franca in inter-island trading long before the Europeans arrived. One scholar concluded that the Proto-Malay language was spoken at least 2000 years ago from west Borneo to southeast Sumatra and the Malay Peninsula (Andaya 2004:66).

The Malay language became closely linked to Islam when the religion came to the region. The earliest Islamic sultanates, Perlak (840 AD) and Pasai (1042 AD), were established in Aceh, on the western tip of Sumatra. Perlak was the first Islamic sultanate in the archipelago and in the whole of Southeast Asia. Malays were believed to have originated in southeast Sumatra (Andaya 2004:58), and they were one of the first peoples in the archipelago to adopt Islam, and to spread the new religion. Not surprisingly, Islam became identified with the Malays. Marsden (1811:26-7), for example, wrote that when the natives of Sumatra embraced Islam, they often said they had ‘become Malay’ (masuk Melayu) rather than embraced Islam (masuk Islam). Through religious conversion, the number of Malays increased exponentially.

4 There were a few exceptions. Kipp notes that in north Sumatra, Mandailing Bataks and Angkola Bataks did not describe themselves as Malays after conversion to Islam. They would retain their Mandailing and Angkola labels but would drop the term ‘Batak’ (Kipp 1993:39). Marsden (1811:27) also mentioned the example of a native ruler who refused to be called ‘Malay’ after his conversion to Islam.
Such conversion was also found in West Kalimantan. The term ‘Malay’ was not only used to designate peoples from Sumatra and the Malayan peninsula who came to the region for trading and religious proselytizing, but also referred to the natives who had converted to Islam. The conversion of the natives increased rapidly after the local rulers were converted. Royal conversion was usually made through marriage between religious leaders and members of noble families, or through family connections between Islamic sultanates and other sultanates.5 In West Kalimantan, the first ruler to convert to Islam was the ruler of Tanjungpura in Ketapang, Panembahan Giri Kusuma, in the mid-sixteenth century.

In recent times, the term Malay in West Kalimantan has encompassed not only Muslim Dayaks but also other minority Muslims, such as Bugis and Banjarese. At certain times, the Bugis and Banjarese identify themselves as Malays to take advantages of being part of the politically more influential Malay community.

Another relevant ethnic grouping in this province is Senganan, the Dayaks who have converted to Islam.6 The word ‘Senganan’, according to a Dayak source, came from two Dayak words, ‘sanggak’ and ‘nuan’, which can be freely translated as ‘our family relations end after your conversion to Islam’.7 A contemporary Senganan source has tried somewhat unconvincingly to justify their conversion by claiming that the term came from the words ‘sing’ and ‘kanan’, which broadly mean ‘following the right path by converting to Islam’.8

The message behind these interpretations rather than their veracity is the main concern here. The impression from the Dayak source indicates

5 For example, descendants of the sultan of Tanjungpura in the eighteenth century established Simpang, Tayan, and Meliau sultanates (Lontaan 1975:106, 163).
6 Another spelling variant for ‘Senganan’ is ‘Singanan’. These terms were used in upper Kapuas regions, particularly north of Sintang and Kapuas Hulu. In the Landak or Sambas area, the term for Senganan was Orang Laut (Sea People); while non-Muslim Dayaks referred to themselves as Orang Dayak (Land People). The ‘sea’ referred to the Malays who tended to live near the coast, while the ‘land’ referred to the Dayaks who tended to live in interior or upriver areas. These two terms should not be confused with the terms Sea or Land Dayaks, which had been used in Sarawak in the past. ‘Sea Dayak’ was a European term for Iban Dayak, while ‘Land Dayak’ was used to refer to Bidayuh Dayak.
8 Interview with Als. The source claimed that Islam tended to treat right (kanan) better than left (kiri). Some Muslim colleagues also confirmed such practices. Muslims, for example, were advised to use the right hand when eating, or put the right foot first when entering mosques or houses.
the Dayak unwillingness to maintain relations with those who had converted. On the contrary, the impression from the Senganan source is the opposite as that source believes that conversion to Islam was a positive decision which could elevate converts from the low status of the Dayak to the better position enjoyed by the Malay.

Dayak hostility was very likely caused by the unfriendly change of habits and outlook of the converts, who were often antagonistic to the Dayaks. Various sources confirmed that after their conversion, the Senganan resettled in the Malay community, and assumed Malay identity by changing their names and following the Malay way of life. By doing that they were renouncing their Dayak identity and severing their social ties with the Dayak community. They claimed themselves to be Malay (Ukur 1971:183; King 1985:57-9; Riwut 1993:191). The Senganan’s positive interpretation was also understandable because they tried to distinguish themselves from Dayaks. For them, being a Dayak was associated with heathenism (kafir), filth (najis), and lack of civility. Being a Senganan meant that they had departed from those conditions.

The existence of Senganan as a new identity was usually acknowledged by both the sending Dayak community and the accepting Malay community. Just as the formation of the Dayak identity was a result of social construction, the Senganan was also socially constructed. These phenomena show that while some primordial aspects were an important basis for ethnic identification in West Kalimantan, both Dayaks and Malays treated identity as flexible rather than fixed.

Dayak conversion to Islam occurred for various reasons. The attraction or benefits of conversion appeared to be strong. In instrumentalist terms, being a Malay was apparently more advantageous and prestigious than being a Dayak. As explained earlier, Dayaks were associated with savagery, backwardness and inferiority. The benefits after conversion included easier access to education and better chances for office employment (for example work in the sultanates’ administration or as teachers at government schools), both of which were important venues for upward social mobility. The converts did not have to pay for certain services and nor remit taxes levied on Dayaks. They would be allowed to participate in Malay community activities and would suffer less social vilification than they would experience if they were still Dayaks. For instance, a Dayak scholar wrote that Dayak children who wanted to go to school
needed to convert to Islam to avoid being ridiculed as heathens or head-hunters. Syahzaman and Hasanuddin (2003:44-67) listed examples of disadvantages of being a Dayak in the Sintang sultanate.

The rate of conversion was linked to the level of the influence of the sultanate and the pull factors (the benefits) of becoming a Malay. Conversion seemed more common in areas where sultanate influences were strong and where the proselytizing was passionate or the benefits of being a Malay were more pronounced; most Senganan lived in clusters around the sultanate capitals and other districts inhabited by the Malays. Elsewhere, if the benefits of being a Malay were less obvious, the influence of the sultanates more limited, and serious proselytizing efforts lacking, conversion appeared to be slow. In certain cases the process would take longer to be completed, and transitional Malays still retained some traits of their Dayak culture.

Proselytizing by the Malay rulers in several areas also contributed to conversion (King 1985:60,132; Syahzaman and Hasanuddin 2003:34). Rulers in Melawi were known for their fervent proselytizing efforts in the nineteenth century. Conversion of the Dayaks was very common, as indicated by the high number of Malays in these predominantly Dayak regions in the interior, such as Melawi, Semitau and Boven-Kapuas onderafdelingen. In contrast, the number of Dayaks in some coastal sultanates, such as Mempawah and Landak, remained high. This could have been an indication of weaker pressure to convert in Mempawah, Landak, and Bengkayang regions.

Djeranding Abdurrahman, a well known convert of Dayak descent, became Senganan for this reason (Anyang 1998:105).

After conversion to Islam, the Pekaki people in the Selimbau area, for example, continued to live in long-houses, and follow Dayak customs, such as drinking rice wine and eating pork (King 1993:132).

Under the Dutch administration the whole of West Kalimantan was named residentie Westerafdeeling van Borneo, which was headed by a resident. The residentie had four onderafdelingen: Singkawang, Pontianak, Ketapang, and Sintang, each of which was headed by an assistent-resident. The administrative level below onderafdeeling, which was headed by either a controleur or a gezaghebber. There were at least fifteen onderafdelingen in West Kalimantan. The boundaries of many onderafdelingen corresponded with the sultanate boundaries. The administrative unit below onderafdeeling was the district (headed by a demang) and onderdistrict (headed by the assistent-demang). The top positions at onderafdeeling level and above were usually reserved for Dutch officials. Positions immediately below them were usually occupied by native officials from Java or personnel from other more 'advanced' regions.

However, the decision on whether to convert or not ultimately rested much on the natives themselves and their own calculations and was not simply a result of coercion or proselytizing by Malay rulers (King 1993:133).
Incentives for the sultans to proselytize were probably less strong in some areas because the sultans did not want to lose the higher tax revenues to be derived from their Dayak population. The number of Dayaks under a sultanate’s control was the main symbol of the prestige and importance of the sultanate, rather than the vastness of its territory or the fertility of its land. Because of the tax revenues from the Dayaks, the sultanates tried to increase Dayak numbers in their territory or to prevent Dayaks from leaving (Harwell 2000:29). As a result, the Dayak issue had en-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Onderafdeeling (jurisdiction)</th>
<th>Dayaks (number)</th>
<th>Malays (number)</th>
<th>Dayaks (percentage)</th>
<th>Malays (percentage)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sambas</td>
<td>9,971</td>
<td>22,540</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>69.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singkawang</td>
<td>8,825</td>
<td>19,890</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>69.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bengkayang</td>
<td>11,574</td>
<td>832</td>
<td>93.3</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mempawah</td>
<td>24,407</td>
<td>14,759</td>
<td>62.3</td>
<td>37.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pontianak</td>
<td>5,443</td>
<td>24,485</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>81.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landak</td>
<td>54,497</td>
<td>6,868</td>
<td>88.8</td>
<td>11.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanggau</td>
<td>58,406</td>
<td>18,031</td>
<td>76.4</td>
<td>23.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sekadau</td>
<td>22,165</td>
<td>11,575</td>
<td>65.7</td>
<td>34.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sukadana</td>
<td>6,518</td>
<td>13,903</td>
<td>31.9</td>
<td>68.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beneden-Matan</td>
<td>1,091</td>
<td>14,825</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>93.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boven-Matan</td>
<td>27,878</td>
<td>9,721</td>
<td>74.2</td>
<td>25.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Melawi</td>
<td>43,021</td>
<td>21,972</td>
<td>66.2</td>
<td>33.8</td>
</tr>
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<td>Sintang</td>
<td>31,806</td>
<td>3,622</td>
<td>89.8</td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semitau</td>
<td>14,889</td>
<td>13,418</td>
<td>52.6</td>
<td>47.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boven-Kapuas</td>
<td>13,377</td>
<td>9,346</td>
<td>58.9</td>
<td>41.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pemangkat</td>
<td>1,579</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singkawang</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>1,166</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>96.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pontianak</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>16,327</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>99.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ketapang</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>3,325</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>97.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sintang</td>
<td></td>
<td>3,563</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>335,605</td>
<td>230,768</td>
<td>59.0</td>
<td>41.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.2 Dayak and Malay population by onderafdeeling (jurisdiction) and city (1930)

Source: Census 1930.
gendered disputes among the sultanates. In the mid-nineteenth century, Sintang and Selimbau rulers had disputed who would have control over Seberuang Dayaks. In a border agreement in 1886, Landak and Pontianak sultanates clarified which Dayaks should pay taxes to which sultanates (Rahman, Achmad and Muhadi 2000:130-7). Proselytizing among Dayaks would reduce the income of the sultanates, because after conversion the Dayaks would become Malays, and as Malays they would not pay the special taxes imposed on Dayaks. In short, proselytizing meant a significant loss of income and prestige for the sultanates (Van Hulten 1992:83). The relatively low numbers of Malays in some areas mentioned above could be one result.

However, the lack of statistics makes it difficult to determine the exact number of Dayak converts. The number of Dayak converts might have been significant in some regions. One important indication was the number of Malays in the interior Dayak regions: Melawi, Semitau and Boven-Kapuas. The number of Malays in Melawi was unusually high, even higher than in some Malay coastal regions. These remote regions were not safe enough at this time to attract significant Malay traders or settlers. It would appear to be more rational for the Malays to populate other areas closer to the coast or relatively stable regions such as Sanggau or Sintang but in fact these regions had relatively low percentages of Malays compared to the previously mentioned Melawi, Semitau, and Boven-Kapuas. The majority of Malays in these interior regions was very likely made up of Dayaks who had converted to Islam and become Malays. This conclusion is backed by observations from the colonial period. Enthoven and Schuiling indicate that most of the 400 or so Malays in the Putussibau and Mandai areas in the 1890s were Dayak converts. Bouman records that in the early nineteenth century, Bunut’s capital was mainly comprised of Islamized Embau and Bunut Dayaks. Enthoven indicates that part of the population in Jongkong

13 King 1976c:96. Tromp wrote that possibly to escape economic obligations, the Seberuang Dayaks moved out of their homelands even before the 1850s, and were found scattered along various tributaries of the Kapuas. In the 1870s, the Seberuang had abandoned some of their traditional ways, and many had adopted Malay dress (King 1993:131-2).

14 These interior regions were areas of Iban, Kenyah, and Kayan who were known for their headhunting practices. There were still reports of tribal wars in these regions up to 1930s (for example King 1976:105-7, L.H. Kadir, ‘Alea jacta est: Renungan buat Salus Populi’, in: ‘Rekoleksi Paguyuban Salus Populi Komda Kalbar’, 1995, p. 6, in: Private collection, Pontianak). In an interview in the Sydney Morning Herald (8-2-1997) a member of the local population in Melawi confirmed that headhunting still took place in that area until the 1930s.
Regime change and ethnic politics in Indonesia

sultanate comprised Dayak converts (King 1985:59-60). Thus a large number of Malays in West Kalimantan could have had Dayak ancestry because of the phenomenon of *masuk Melayu* (King 1993:125; Sellato 1986:58).

MALAY SULTANATES AND DUTCH COLONIAL ADMINISTRATION

Under Dutch rule, most parts of West Kalimantan were ruled through the Malay sultanates, and more than half of the regions outside Java were also indirectly ruled. In Java where the Dutch presence was the strongest, most regions were under direct rule, and only 7 percent under native rule (Vandenbosch 1941:147). Ranawidjaja has argued that there were four reasons behind the Dutch colonial preference for indirect rule: 1. the colonial government had limited financial and human resources to administer the vast colony; 2. the population could be more effectively controlled by its own rulers; 3. the local people could be given the impression that they were not being colonized by the Dutch; and 4. the Dutch feared that abolition of the sultanates could lead to a popular revolt led by the deposed sultans (Ranawidjaja 1955:4-5).

Of the dozens of sultanates in West Kalimantan, the three most important were all located on the coasts of upper West Kalimantan: the Sambas, Mempawah, and Pontianak sultanates. Other less important sultanates were Kubu on the coast south of Pontianak; Landak, Tayan, Sanggau, Meliau, Sekadau, and Sintang in the middle and upper Kapuas river; and Matan, Simpang, and Sukadana in the current Ketapang district, in the south of West Kalimantan. Several mini-sultanates were established later in the nineteenth century in the Semitau area of Kapuas Hulu, including Silat, Suhaid, Selimbau, Piasa, Jongkong and Bunut. Probably in reference to the last named, King claims that often they were not states at all and were little more than stratified, small-scale societies, usually with a recognized hereditary chief or leader having authority over a federation of village communities (King 1993:126).

Prior to Dutch rule, many of those sultanates were independent entities, although some were under the vassalage or influence of more

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15 The Sambas sultanate occupied roughly the area of the current Sambas and Bengkayang districts. The Mempawah and Pontianak sultanates shared the area of the current Pontianak district.
powerful sultanates. For example, Sukadana and Landak sultanates were once under the Javanese sultanate of Bantam prior to the Dutch period (Rahman, Achmad and Muhadi 2000:89). The majority of the sultanates in the Semitau area, before they were abolished by the Dutch colonial government at the beginning of twentieth century, were under the influence of Sintang sultanate (Syahzaman and Hasanuddin 2003:102). In the final year of the eighteenth century, the sultanates of Sanggau, Landak, Matan and Tayan were claimed by Pontianak as its vassals (Cribb 2000:101). All of these sultanates started to lose their sovereignty when they signed agreements with the colonial government,
which subsequently put them under the protection of the Dutch.\textsuperscript{16} They submitted to the Dutch because they needed protection from attacks by other sultanates and threats of domestic rebellion. In some cases, an incumbent sultan invited the Dutch to protect his rule which was threatened by internal court struggles. Sometimes the Dutch brought pressure on sultans to sign agreements to enable the Dutch to establish or increase control and thereby to deter other foreign interests in the region. Such agreements naturally restricted the sultanates’ autonomy. In many cases, the sultanates could not even choose the sultan’s heir without approval from the Dutch colonial government. The sultanates became weak and were at the disposal of the Dutch, who could abolish sultanates that were of no use or were problematic. By the time of the Japanese occupation, these sultanates had been transformed from relatively independent entities to mere administrators of Dutch policies.\textsuperscript{17}

The remaining authority and prestige of the sultans were completely wiped out during the Japanese WWII occupation. The Japanese military accused the sultans of organizing rebellions against the Japanese and summarily executed all the sultans and many members of their immediate families.

After WWII, the Netherlands Indies Civil Administration (NICA) revived twelve sultanates to form a temporary government that was established in 1946: Pontianak, Mempawah, Sambas, Landak, Sanggau, Sintang, Sekadau, Tayan, Matan, Sukadana, Simpang and Kubu. The other sultanates, which had been abolished or incorporated into direct-rule areas by the Dutch prior to the Japanese occupation, were not revived.

Many Dayaks who lived under sultanate rule were not free. Like many other kingdoms in other parts of the world in the past, the social system under sultanate rule was hierarchical and stratified. Through interviews with elderly Dayaks about their memories and by examining

\textsuperscript{16} There were two types of agreement, long contract (\textit{lang contract}) and short declaration (\textit{korte verklaring}). The long contract was more prestigious for the sultanates, because it spelled out the obligations of both the sultanates and the Dutch government. In the short contract, the sultanates declared their acceptance of the Dutch authorities, that they would not establish relations with other countries, and that they promised to follow regulations made by the Dutch. Hence the Dutch had more power over those sultanates held under the short agreement (Ranawidjaja 1955:6). By the 1920s West Kalimantan had only two sultanates under long contracts: Mempawah and Pontianak (Ranawidjaja 1955:41).

\textsuperscript{17} The details of contracts between the Dutch and the sultan of Pontianak (Rahman, Achmad and Muhadi 2000) and the sultan of Sintang (Syahzaman and Hasanuddin 2003) indicated that the sultans were being gradually deprived of their power.
written sources, it was quite evident that many Dayaks who lived under the sultanates rule occupied the lowest strata with the least privileges compared to the other ethnic groups. The Regulation of Sintang sultanate of 1867 provides an example of such social stratification. The population of the sultanate was divided into three social strata (Syahzaman and Hasanuddin 2003:44-65). At the highest stratum were the people of Sintang and Dayak-Fourteen, who were citizens of the sultanate. The people of Sintang were generally Malays, while Dayak-Fourteen consisted of fourteen Dayak sub-tribes. Although both the Malays and Dayak-Fourteen were considered citizens, the Dayak-Fourteen were required to pay a special tax called *dagang adat* to the sultan, whereas the Malays were exempted (Syahzaman and Hasanuddin 2003:51-2). At the second layer were Dayak-Thirteen people, who were slaves of the sultan. The sultan had the rights to the produce of these Dayaks. The lowest level was comprised of servants (*Orang Dalam*), who were basically slaves working inside the sultan’s palace. The majority of the servants were from Dayak-Thirteen who had converted to Islam, or Dayaks who could not pay debts or could not support themselves and had become slaves. A Dayak who had lived in Sintang during the sultanate era confirmed that the social system under the Sintang sultanate stratified the population into three classes: the ruling or aristocratic class, citizens (*anak negeri*), and subjugated people or slaves. The Dayaks generally fell into the last group and had few opportunities for upward social mobility.

Another example of such categorization was found in the Sanggau sultanate, where the population was divided into four categories. The first, apparently the highest, was Suku Anak Raja or Dara Raja, which consisted of royal family members, but excluded the ruler, the royal administrator, and the children and siblings of the ruler. The second was Suku Sanggau, which comprised ‘free’ Malays who were engaged mainly in trade. The third was Suku Orang Bumi or Orang Dalam which included Malays who were believed to be of noble descent, most of whom were

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18 Dayak-Fourteen consisted of fourteen Dayak sub-tribes: Payak, Tebidah, Kayan, Papak, Goneh, Kebahan, Kubin, Pangin, Limbai, Kansa, Uddaman, Keninjal, Serawai and Muntak; Dayak-Thirteen consisted of Ketungau, Seberuang, Desa, Lebang, Kebahan, Jungkau, Kantuk, Linoh, Sekujam, Sekubang and Barai sub-tribes (Syahzaman and Hasanuddin 2003:51-2).

19 Syahzaman and Hasanuddin 2003:44-65. According to Yuan, the most common way of acquiring Dayak slaves was by enticing them into debt which they could not repay (Yuan 2000:21). Besides the Dayaks, other ethnic groups that often became slaves were Torajanese, Batak, Balinese, Nias, and others. For an overview of the slave trade in Indonesia and reasons for its decline see Reid (1993).

20 Interview with Djg.
recently converted Dayaks. The last group was *Suku Darat* or Dayak (Kustanto 2002:67-8).

Why would the Dayaks decide to stay in such an unfavourable situation? Some Dayaks who lived under effective control of the sultanates had become overly dependent on the sultanates and were not prepared to move away. Moving out of the sultanates’ jurisdiction, for those who had particularly sought protection from the sultanate, could mean exposing themselves to the immediate danger that they had tried to avoid – perhaps being attacked by rival headhunting Dayaks (King 1985:59). Moving out could also result in greater difficulty in obtaining goods such as salt, sugar, tobacco, and highly prized beads since all trading posts along the Kapuas and Landak rivers and areas surrounding them were under the control of Malay rulers (King 1993:128). Another option was to fight the sultanates, but that was not necessarily appealing or apt to be successful.

In addition, the sultanates tried to prevent the Dayaks from leaving by making their move more difficult. Those wishing to move out needed to obtain approval from Dutch officials, and they were required to pay compensation to the sultan. One example is an ancestor of the current Dayak deputy governor of the province. Salun, a leader of the Kantuk tribe in Empanang, and his followers were able to resettle in government-ruled areas after obtaining approval from the assistant resident in Sintang in 1881 and after paying an amount of money to the Selimbau sultan.

The Dutch government, which held the ultimate power and was able to make changes, seemed to have done nothing to improve the conditions of the Dayaks. Miles argued that the lack of initiative from

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21 The official documents regarding Sintang can be found in L.H. Kadir, ‘Latar belakang keberadaan budaya kantuk dan catatan perjuangan politik suku Dayak di Kalimantan Barat: Sebuah catatan anak petani untuk generasinya’, 1993, in: Private collection, Pontianak. In the Tayan sultanate, Dayaks were burdened by taxes on natural produce, taxes to support the sultan’s family members and taxes when members of the sultanate died; to celebrate festivals, and at the start of Ramadan. On top of these taxes, Dayaks were required to do corvée labour for 12 days a year. Malays by contrast were required to pay fewer taxes and undertake less corvée labour. For the details see *Overeenkomsten zelfbestuurs Buitengewesten* 1929:337-8).

22 L.H. Kadir, ‘Latar belakang keberadaan budaya kantuk dan catatan perjuangan politik suku Dayak di Kalimantan Barat: Sebuah catatan anak petani untuk generasinya’, 1993, in: Private collection, Pontianak. Reasons they moved out varied. One being the ruler becoming too oppressive (King 1985:59). The current Dayak deputy governor of the province whose ancestors moved out, learnt that it was the heavy tax under the sultanate and better opportunities in the direct-control areas that had prompted migration (L.H. Kadir, ‘Latar belakang keberadaan budaya kantuk dan catatan perjuangan politik suku Dayak di Kalimantan Barat: Sebuah catatan anak petani untuk generasinya’, 1993, pp. 64-7, in: Private collection, Pontianak).
the Dutch administration was first caused by having no real control over the region. The Dutch control over this peripheral region was nominal through the eighteenth and most of the nineteenth century. Also, the Dutch spent most of their resources for the administration of Java in the first decade of the nineteenth century. The governor-general forbade the officials in Borneo to travel to the interior to avoid expense and put obstacles in the way of missionaries. Only the ascent of more liberal government in the Netherlands in the mid-nineteenth century promoted the colonial government’s consideration of efforts to solve the problems of ‘the Malay tyranny over the Dayaks’. In 1907 Governor General Van Heutsz issued a policy that required the Dutch government to take action in local affairs if the existing circumstances were a hindrance to welfare, civilization, and freedom. The policy required the native states in the Netherlands Indies to work for social welfare and improve the economic conditions of their people. The government was also required to establish direct rule in an area if requested to do so by the chiefs and people concerned, or if the interests of the people made such direct rule unavoidable (Vandenbosch 1941:149). Even then, the benefits of those policies for the West Kalimantan Dayaks were negligible, and conditions of the Dayaks did not improve.

Besides those areas under control of local sultanates, West Kalimantan had several government-ruled areas (gouvernementsgebied), where the Dutch exercised direct control: Pinohlanden, Meliau, and Boven-Kapuas. Pinohlanden was an area formerly under the sultan of Banjarmasin that was transferred to the Dutch in an 1826 agreement and put under the supervision of the Sintang sultanate. In 1913 eight states in Pinohlanden

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3 Dayaks prior to independence (up to 1945) | 63
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were annexed and put under direct rule. Meliau and the mini-sultanates in Semitau area (the eastern half of Boven-Kapuas) were annexed by the Dutch before 1917 (Cribb 2000:118). Boven-Kapuas (or Kapuas Hulu) was not put under sultanate supervision because it was too distant and out-of-reach to attract the main sultanates. Furthermore, headhunting troubles made the region less attractive to the sultanates. Overall, the areas could be placed under direct rule because they were not under the effective control of any sultanate or were not the subject of unsettled disputes between the Malay rulers (King 1993:157).

Other motives lay behind the annexation or abolition of indirectly ruled sultanates. The annexation of Meliau and the sultanates in the Semitau area seem to have been related politically to the growing influence of the British in North Borneo (Sarawak) since the nineteenth century. Irwin reported that in order to contain the British, in 1846 the Dutch reorganized Borneo into a new province with its new capital in Sintang, near the border with the British colony. The Dutch may have been anxious about potential domestic problems, such as in the case of Meliau which had been without rulers for some time. Domestic unrest could send the wrong signal to the British that the Dutch were unable to control their colony. Weak and minor sultanates in frontline Semitau also worried the Dutch (Irwin 1955:159).

In these directly ruled areas (Meliau, Pinohlanden, Semitau, Boven-Kapuas), lived the free Dayaks – Dayaks who were not under the jurisdiction of the Malay sultanates. Other Dayaks who legally lived in the sultanates’ jurisdiction but who lived in areas where the sultanates had no effective control, such as the case of Dayaks in some areas within Bunut sultanate, might also have been considered free. Similarly, the Dayaks

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27 Before peace talks were held in the 1880s, there were reports of repeated raids by Iban on other Dayak villages (King 1985:65). Other sub-ethnic groups in the area, such as Kenyah and Kayan, were also known for their headhunting practices, but were less notorious than the Iban (Hose and McDougall 1912, I:187).

28 The presence of the British in Sarawak renewed Dutch interests in the island because, as Irwin explained, until James Brooke established himself as Sarawak Rajah, the Dutch did not attempt to exercise more control over Dutch Kalimantan. The island was perceived as difficult to develop easily and quickly (Irwin 1955:151). On the Anglo-Dutch rivalries, see also Tarling 1963).

29 By 1848 however, the Dutch abandoned the idea of making Sintang the capital of the newly created province, because it was too isolated for effective coordination. The Dutch decided to divide Borneo into two administrations, the Western Division with its capital in Pontianak, and the South-Eastern Division with its capital in Banjarmasin (Irwin 1955:158-9).

30 Enthoven suggested in a 1903 publication that even Dayaks who were formally within the Bunut sultanate’s jurisdiction did not appear to pay tribute to the sultan (King 1985:60).
who lived beyond Nanga Pinoh were free until the mid-nineteenth century, because that area was not under the jurisdiction of the Sintang sultanate (Syahzaman and Hasanuddin 2003:42).

**CONSEQUENCES OF DIRECT AND INDIRECT RULE**

Direct and indirect-rule systems explained above had different consequences for the Dayaks. The populations in the government-controlled area were subject to the Dutch colonial legal system. The social system was based on the three-tiered strata that existed in many other parts of the Dutch East Indies: European, Far Eastern, and Indigenous peoples. With the exception of aristocratic families and a few other natives whose legal status had been elevated to the level of the Europeans, there were no further legal divisions in the indigenous group. All native ethnic groups, both Dayaks and Malays, had the same legal status before colonial law. The Dayaks lived in less oppressed conditions under this system than did those Dayaks who lived in the Malay sultanates.

The absence of the discriminatory sultanate ruling system had a significant impact on the political awareness of the Dayaks in direct-rule areas, particularly in Kapuas Hulu.31 In later interviews many former Dayak politicians said they were convinced that the mentality of the Dayaks who lived under the sultanates was rather fatalistic and subservient, whereas Dayaks from directly ruled Kapuas Hulu were more independent and emancipated.32 Herman van Hulten, a Dutch missionary who had worked with the Dayaks in several regions during Dutch rule, made the same observation. He believed that the Dayaks in Kapuas Hulu were one generation more advanced compared to Dayaks from other areas. He noted that many Dayak-awakening initiatives came from the Dayaks of Kapuas Hulu (Van Hulten 1992:64-5). The most prominent Dayak political leaders between the 1950s and 1960s came from this region, such as J.C. Oevaang Oeray, F.C. Palaunsoeka, and

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31 The relatively better Dayak condition in Central Kalimantan, a directly ruled region, was another indication. Cribb notes that there were only two sultanates in this region, the Kota Waringin and Banjar sultanates. The influential Banjar sultanate was abolished in 1857 and its territory was put under the direct rule. The vast central region of the Central Kalimantan had been under Dutch direct rule since 1817 (Cribb 2000:118), except a small western part of the region, which was under the control of sultanate of Kota Waringin. For further discussion on these two sultanates see Lontaan (1985:84-138, 145-54).
32 Interviews with Bin, Djg and Kls.
many others. The first influential Dayak political organization in the 1950s traced its origin to Kapuas Hulu. The impacts of these two different systems were still felt in recent times. L.H. Kadir calculates that the descendants of Kantuk Dayaks who decided to resettle into direct-rule areas in the beginning of the nineteenth century are generally more successful than descendants of those who chose to stay under the sultanate’s rule.33

In the indirectly ruled region, all native population, with a few exceptions, were under the discriminatory sultanate regulations.34 Many earlier publications confirmed the practices of slavery, corvée labour, additional taxes, and other types of discrimination imposed exclusively on the Dayaks by the Malay sultans.35 Stories about the maltreatment and enslavement of the Dayaks can be heard in many parts of West Kalimantan.36 A Dayak elder described the Dayak conditions as ‘the true native […] became guests in their own home, became beggar in their own region, lived in destitution and humiliation […] was not given important position […]’, and continuously being looked down as infidels […].’37

Under the sultanate system the Dayaks occupied the bottom of the social hierarchy and were usually perceived as social outcasts by the other ethnic groups, including even the Senganan, their former kin.38


34 Natives who were not subject to local sultanate rules were those from outside West Kalimantan who worked for the central government but were temporarily sojourning within the state and those who had entered into a labour contract (Vandenbosch 1941:153). Specific contracts made between the Dutch and the sultanes usually would spell out these exceptions.

35 Some of the works of colonial ethnographers and/or officials such as Veth, Lijnden, Eentoven, and Bouman corroborated the mistreatment. Works by Lumholtz (1920, I:18-9), Cator (1936:152-5), Van Hulten (1992), King (1993:128-9), Harwell (2000:29) also noted the same oppression. King rightly argued that inequality and oppression were also present among the Dayaks (King 1985:58-9), however he failed to recognize that it was discriminatory practices by the Malay sultanes that had prevented Dayak access to modern education and other opportunities.

36 Interviews with Dtg, Kls and Bln.


38 Some sources even trace these unequal relations to the inception of the earlier sultanates in the region. The Dayaks and the Malays in Landak and Sintang believe they have the same ancestors, but when they later split, the Malays became the rulers, whereas the Dayaks became the ruled (L.H. Kadir, ‘Latar belakang keberadaan budaya kantuk dan catatan perjuangan politik suku Dayak di Kalimantan Barat: Sebuah catatan anak petani untuk generasinya’, 1993, pp. 37-54, in: Private collection, Pontianak; KR 1999/51; Lontaan 1975:141-54, 182-202).
Malays felt superior to Dayaks because they enjoyed certain privileges unavailable to the Dayaks (Riwut 1993:266). In the mid-nineteenth century, English missionaries travelling in the Sambas region observed that Malays regarded Dayaks as inferior and that they were held in ‘a state of service subjection by the Malays’ (Doty and Pohlmann 1839:285-6). Van Hulten described how the Javanese and Bataks were astounded by the way the Dayaks were mistreated. However, like the Malays, they felt superior and despised the Dayaks (Van Hulten 1992:79). The Senganan who had lived in the Malay area tried to blend into their new environment as quickly as possible in order to derive the full benefit of being Malay. One Dayak source cynically marked that the attitudes of some Senganan toward the Dayaks were even worse than those of real Malays. The NICA government in 1946 still observed discriminatory and contemptuous treatment of the Dayaks. In meetings where Dayaks and Malays were present, the Dayaks would sit on the floor while the Malays sat on chairs (Van der Wal 1973:397). When the Malays in the villages were asked why they did not clean their dirty streets, they replied that those jobs were for the Dayaks (Van der Wal 1974:30).

Access to education was almost impossible for the Dayaks. While formal schools were introduced to the province only at the beginning of the twentieth century, Malays already had opportunities long before to study in mosques and religious institutions (in the form of pengajian) or to receive private tuition from Muslim teachers. These Malays were trained to read and write Jawi, the Arabic-like script used within the sultanates’ administration. When the Dutch established a few village schools (volksscholen), enrolments were reserved for children of the ruling family, aristocrats, and the middle class. The locations of these village schools were not in villages near Dayak settlements but in the capitals of the sultanates where most Malays dwelled.

Hence Dayaks lacked the skills (or formal training) that would qualify them to work for the sultanate administration. Even if they had had the education, their kafir or heathen status would most likely have disqualified them from working for Islamic sultanates. The highest position open to the Dayaks in the sultanate system was probably that of village chief.

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39 Interview with Kls.
40 Some contracts between the Malay sultanates and the Dutch colonial government retained the Jawi version as well as the Latin version until the 1920s.
As a result of this exclusion, almost all civil servants prior to independence were Malays and Muslims (Van Hulten 1992:80; Van Loon 1999:29-36). Van Hulten, who had lived since the 1930s in the region, observed that even after 40 years of Dayak education since the early twentieth century, no Dayak had become a civil servant. He further remarked that a Dayak could not even become an opas (whose works similar to those of domestic servant) at the government offices. For a few who had attended mission schools, the highest positions open to them were teachers, mostly for mission schools (Van Hulten 1992:61, 80, 114). This history explains unusual occupation preferences of the Dayaks in the 1950s. Many educated Dayaks were less attracted to civil service jobs and preferred teaching and nursing jobs, professions which had been opened to them during colonial times and had strong associations with the Catholic Church.

Under such a discriminatory system, channels for upward social mobility were closed to many Dayaks. All decision making for domestic affairs was in the hands of the sultans and the sultanate administration officers. The Dayaks were unable to change these unfortunate conditions. Firstly, as explained above, the sultans would try to keep the Dayaks from moving out from the sultanate’s control because they were an important revenue source. Secondly, some subservient Dayaks regarded their obligation to the sultanates as predestined by their ancestors. Some Dayak elders explained that for the superstitious Dayaks, slight disobedience to the sultans would bring them misfortune (tulah). For them, the sultans were descendants of holy people (orang keramat).

The Dayaks were not capable of staging a successful rebellion against the sultanates. Living a nomadic lifestyle, scattered in small kampung, and practising tribal warfare are some of the impediments. Furthermore, the Malay sultanates were stronger because the Dutch would support them to quell any domestic disturbances. Local history had noted at least

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41 The sultanates needed native chiefs because they were respected and therefore more effective in collecting taxes and produce from the local population. The sultans also turned to these chiefs when they needed a workforce for labour intensive projects or ‘warriors’ in time of war against their adversaries.


43 Interviews with Bln and Djg. Similar attitudes could be found in several ethnic groups in Central Sulawesi. For tribes in Poso, conversion to Christianity was tantamount to treason against the Luwu king. The local population believed that the conversion would bring misfortune to the community because their ancestors, who had been loyal to the Luwu Muslim king, would be angry (Hasan et al. 2004:135-7).
4 Dayaks prior to independence (up to 1945) |

3 Dayaks prior to independence (up to 1945) |

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Table 3.3 Number of schools, students, and hospitals in West Kalimantan (1906-1951, selected years)

*The number of schools declined in 1939 because WWII had started in Europe, which affected funding to the missions.


four Dayak rebellions in the Sintang region: the rebellions of Padung/Mensiku (1874), Tebidah (1890), Panggi (1908), and Apang Semangai (1913-1916). According to some Dayak elders, these rebellions, which local history books claimed were uprisings against the Dutch, were in fact rebellions against the Malay sultanate as the de facto ruler in the region

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rather than the Dutch.\(^{45}\) The Dutch were involved in quelling the rebellions because they were obliged to help the sultanates as a condition of their political contracts, apart from their general interest in preserving peace and order.

Observing the conditions of the Dayaks under the sultanates, some colonial administrators and scholars such as Van Hoëvell and Nieuwenhuis, requested that the government establish direct rule in the Dayak areas so that the Dayaks would be freed from repressive Malay rulers (Coomans 1987:42; Irwin 1955:161). One important contribution of the colonial government was the eradication of slavery in most of the Netherlands Indies by the end of the nineteenth century, although the social status of the Dayaks remained unchanged.\(^{46}\) One Dutch priest observed that the Dutch government generally ignored problems affecting the Dayaks under sultanate rule.\(^{47}\) Their continued good relations with the sultanates were too important to the Dutch to permit them to take humanitarian action on behalf of the Dayaks.

**ROLE OF MISSION SCHOOLS AND TRANSITION TO EMANCIPATION**

Only toward the end of the nineteenth century did the circumstances of Dayaks begin to change. Of great importance was the introduction of both government and mission schools in the 1890s which, although Dayak education progressed slowly, began a process that was to lead to

\(^{45}\) Interviews with Djg and Mjg. Indonesian history textbooks for high school in the 1980s contained other historical biases. In the books regional unrest during the Dutch colonial period was portrayed as either pro- or anti-Dutch rebellions, and authors ignored local power struggles that fuelled the rebellions (Reid 2005:72). History textbooks used in high schools in the 1980s portrayed the proponents of Padri War in the nineteenth century as heroes just because they were anti-Dutch, despite their involvement in mass killing of the members of customary communities in West Sumatra and Batakland. In another case, Arung Palakka, a Bugis prince of Bone who fought the domination of the Gowa sultanate, was pictured as a villain because he cooperated with the Dutch in the seventeenth century (Reid 2005:72; Rickles 2001:78-9, 182-3). Elsewhere, one of the most politically contentious ‘distortions’ was of the misinterpretation and omission in Japanese history textbooks of its past occupations in China and Korea (DiFilippo 2002:110-1; Rose 2005:128-9).

\(^{46}\) Dutch colonial agreements with Mempawah, Tayan, and Pontianak sultanates in the nineteenth century had included articles barring the practice of slavery (Overeenkomsten zelfbesturen Buitengewesten 1929:263, 334). On slavery and its eradication in Indonesia, see Reid 1993.

\(^{47}\) Van Hulten 1992:79, 82. The assistant-resident of Sintang in 1877, for example, noted that the sultan had ignored the fact that the Dayaks should be free subjects under his contract with the Dutch (Reid 1993:78).
the involvement of Dayaks in new political movements after the end of WWII.

Formal education in West Kalimantan started in 1892 when the government established its first village school in Pontianak, the provincial capital. By 1918, the government already had seventeen village schools in the province, all located in urban areas, with around 1,200 students (Ahok et al. 1983:43). The choice of urban location was not surprising, since many of these areas were the capitals of the sultanates and still had no formal schools at that time (Ahok et al. 1983:28-9, 43). Unfortunately, attending schools in urban areas was both impractical and costly for the Dayaks.\(^48\) They needed to travel long distances and to pay more expensive economic and social costs in order to attend school. Students also could not help their parents with their farming tasks, which would not have been the case if the schools had been nearby. They also faced difficulty in finding a place to stay during the school term, since most have no family in towns. Since they lived outside the urban community, they faced social ostracism or harassment from the majority of Malays in town (remember the pervasive view that the Dayaks were uncivilized in colonial times). Government schools provided free boarding facilities, but Dayak students might need to meet other costs and would face problems associated with their social status. A few Dayaks who were able to attend the government schools in the towns mostly lived with Malay families and worked for them. Many would convert to Islam and become Malay in order to avoid social stigma.

Catholic missions, which had started their activities in the province in the middle of the nineteenth century, also established schools.\(^49\) The first mission school for Dayaks was established in 1894 by P.H. Looymans when he opened a missionary post in Sejiram.\(^50\) The school was forced to close because of insufficient personnel but was reopened in 1906 by missionaries from the Capuchin Order (Ahok et al. 1983:28-9). In 1915,

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\(^{48}\) Some of these issues were mentioned as problems in advancing education in the Netherlands Indies (Djajadiningrat 1944:18), which means that they were not specific to Dayaks. However, the social conditions of the Dayaks made their access to education even more difficult.

\(^{49}\) West Kalimantan was mainly served by Catholic priests, particularly those from Capuchin Order. By 1914, West Kalimantan had 24 Catholic missions of the Capuchin Order and only nine Protestant missions. At the same time, East and South Kalimantan were served by 54 Protestant Rhenish missions (Buitenbezittingen n.y.:204). For a glimpse of earlier Protestant mission works in West Kalimantan, see Houliston 1963; Rusha 1969.

\(^{50}\) The missions usually established schools at the same time as they opened mission posts. They believed that providing education was a good means of recruiting converts (Muskens 1974:317).
the missions had eleven schools with around 416 students. By 1938
the numbers of mission schools had swollen to 71, with about 4,512
students. Most of the schools were primary schools in which the period
of studies ranged from one to three years. A few of those schools were
advanced (or continuation) schools, such as five-year primary schools, a
teacher training school, a junior seminary, and an agricultural college
(Davidson 2002:98). Most of these schools were established in interior
regions since their main interest was the Dayaks. The Chinese, on the
other hand, usually enrolled at their own community schools or studied
through private tuition; whereas the Malays would not generally enrol
at the mission schools for religious reasons.

These Christian mission schools did not pose the same problems for
the Dayaks as the government schools did. Because the schools were
located in Dayak communities, the social and economic costs were lower
for students. Problems of social isolation were minimal as the students
stayed within their community. The schools usually provided free accom-
modation and meals to help students who came from other regions, but
in return students were expected to do chores or to work for the Church.

Unfortunately, the progress of Dayak education was very slow until
just before the outbreak of WWII. In some regions, student enrolments
had improved after the 1920s, but attendance remained poor. For ex-
ample, attendance at schools in Sibale and Tiang in the Singkawang area
in 1922 was usually below 30 percent (Boelaars and Sabon 1981:31).
This trend was partly due to the casual attitude of Dayaks toward
education. One old Dayak remembered that it was not uncommon
for pupils to be forced or even kidnapped to attend schools. Attendance
was also difficult to maintain, particularly during harvest periods, when
the students were expected to help their parents. External factors such
as difficult terrain and long distance to reach the limited numbers of
schools also contributed to this poor record. Not all Dayaks had the same
access to schools because Catholic missions could only establish schools

51 One source confirmed that almost all the schools in the central sections of Borneo were mission
schools (Vandenbosch 1941:47).
52 The missions did establish a few schools for the Chinese in towns. The first mission Chinese school
was established in Singkawang in 1892 (Ahok et al. 1983:28-9). Hui (2007:73-80) has written more on
the Chinese education in the province.
53 The lack of interest in education was acknowledged by the post-war Dayak leader (‘Oesoelan Da-
Kalimantan Dayaks had the same attitude toward education.
54 Interview with Bln; Coomans 1987:114-6.
in certain strategic locations due to limited funds and personnel, whereas government schools were concentrated in townships. The attitude of local sultans toward the mission schools also influenced Dayak school enrolment (Doty and Pohlmann 1839:286). Sometimes sultans impeded the establishment of mission schools as in 1905 in eastern Singkawang. This attitude deterred Dayak parents from sending their children to school (Boelaars and Sabon 1981:23). Contagious disease would also drive the still superstitious Dayaks to desert schools (Boelaars and Sabon 1981:23-4).

Overall, mission schools, not government schools, were the main providers of Dayak education. This education enabled Dayaks to access printed media and become aware of political developments in the province and nation. It was true that these more enlightened Dayaks were still restricted from participating in local politics and given very little access to government jobs due to a discriminatory social system and bias against their non-Muslim affiliation. However, literacy had given them opportunities to work in occupations that required more sophisticated administrative and organizational skills and involved wider social responsibility. Most of these occupations were related to the Church missions, such as teachers in the mission schools, nurses in mission health clinics, or catechists. Although the majority of them worked in these politically less influential occupations, the skills and experience that they acquired were important for their political advancement when opportunities arose after WWII. The post-war government elevated many of them to strategic positions. Some became the most important figures in West Kalimantan politics from the end of the 1950s to the middle of the 1960s. In short, without the education provided by mission schools it would have been

55 There were some prominent Senganan political figures, but they no longer considered themselves Dayaks and therefore could not truly represent Dayaks. For Djelani’s explanation, see ‘Laporan perjalanan – pegawai Oeroesan Daya Kalimantan Barat dari tgl. 1 November sampai tgl. 6 Desember 1948, ke daerah ‘Tayan dan Belitang’, 1948, in: Private collection, Pontianak. Senganan figures such as Djeranding Abdurrahman and Ali Anyang had associated themselves with mainstream Malays. Djeranding Abdurrahman was a Dayak born in Melapi village, Putussibau, Kapuas Hulu. He became the head of the West Kalimantan chapter of Nationaal Indische Partij in 1922, and after it was banned in 1923 he became the head of Sarikat Rakyat (H.M. Baroamas Jabang Balunus, ‘Penjelasan-penjelasan mengenai Serikat Dagang Islam’, 1990, in: Collection of H.M. Baroamas Jabang Balunus, Pontianak). Ali Anyang was a well known local revolutionary leader who was involved in military action against NICA. He was a Dayak born 20 October 1920 in Ambalau, Sintang. At the age of eight, he was adopted by a Muslim family and then converted to Islam. See http://www.beritadaerah.com/news.php?pg=artikel_kalimantan&id=26469&sub=column (accessed 2-12-2010); Sejarah perjuangan rakyat 1991.
difficult for Dayaks to achieve what they had attained during the 1940s and 1950s.

With such social and political settings, the local players in West Kalimantan politics prior to the Japanese occupation were the educated Malays and migrant groups such as the Javanese and Bataks. They set up the West Kalimantan branch of Sarekat Islam (Islamic Union, 1914), Sarekat Rakyat (People Union, 1923), Partai Indonesia Raya (Parindra, Greater Indonesia Party, 1936), and the regional Persatuan Anak Borneo (PAB, Union of Borneo Natives, 1930) (Sejarah perjuangan rakyat 1991:56-70). Aristocrats and members of the inner circle of the sultans of West Kalimantan were also active in the political parties. Members of the Pontianak sultanate, for example, were involved in Parindra, Muhammadiyah, and PAB (Rahman, Achmad and Muhadi 2000:145).

Unlike the Dutch, who had used and benefited from the Malay sultanate rule, the Japanese who came to the region in 1942 were suspicious of the sultans. The Japanese feared that these sultans and other local leaders could use their social status and influence to undermine Japanese authority. The remaining authority of the sultans, which had been eroded under the Dutch, was completely destroyed during the Japanese occupation Sejarah Revolusi 1980:30). Although the occupation did not abolish the sultanates in the province, the respect for the sultans was generally very low. From 1943 to 1944, the Japanese occupation forces kidnapped and summarily executed thousands of prominent local figures. Among those victims were all the sultans of West Kalimantan, who in many cases were killed together with their heirs and close relatives. Many Malay aristocrats, political activists, community leaders, and

56 On rare occasions, Dayaks might also become members of a political party, like the case of G.P. Djaeong, the former Sintang district head, who claimed to be a member of Persatuan Anak Borneo prior to WWII (interview with Djg).
57 The attitude of Japanese occupation towards the sultanates differed from time to time and from region to region. Initially, the occupation aimed to abolish the sultanates in the navy-controlled region and Sumatra as they were prepared to be the permanent part of Japanese territories. However, in order to win the hearts and minds of the people and for mobilization goals, the sultanates status was maintained (Japanese military administration 1968:118, 131, 150-1, 154, 158).
58 The total number of victims varied according to sources, but ranged from more than one thousand to an official figure of 21,037 victims (Davidson 2008:37; Heidhues 2005:111-2; Usman Mhd 2000:33-7). This was the largest incident during Japanese occupation in Indonesia (Japanese military administration 1968:208).
59 For example, about sixty victims were reported from the inner circle of the Pontianak sultanate itself (Sejarah perjuangan rakyat 1991:87). Another source reported around thirty victims (Rahman, Achmad and Muhadi 2000:150-60).
other important persons also became victims. However, although there may have been some isolated Dayak victims, they were largely bypassed because they posed no threat to the Japanese (Davidson 2008:37). A Japanese newspaper, *Borneo Shinbun*, reported the massacres and their victims but did not list any Dayak victims, nor did the provincial government after independence.60 Unlike the aristocrats, the educated middle class and political activists, the Dayaks had no political role and no social influence that could challenge the Japanese occupation.

The massacres had beneficial consequences for the Dayaks. First, the Japanese had virtually abolished any remaining prestige of the feudal government, the symbol of repression from the perspective of Dayaks. Its disappearance signified a new era for many Dayaks. One source claimed that the execution of feudal rulers was very important in freeing the Dayaks spiritually from their inferiority complex and second-class-citizen mentality. In the past, many Dayaks believed that they were destined to remain under the rule of the sultans whom they believed to have spiritual powers.61 The executions of the sultans reduced the sultanates’ legitimacy in the eyes of the Dayaks.62 Furthermore, because of the killings, their positions were weak when the post-war government revitalized the sultanates system (*Kalimantan* 1953:105-6). Secondly, several thousand victims were influential, middle-class and politically active Malays as well as many Javanese and Bataks, and many Chinese.63 With the disappearance of many capable people, West Kalimantan would soon face a shortage of skilled personnel to fill government positions after WWII ended (Böhm 1986:64-5) thus providing opportunities for educated Dayaks (Davidson 2002:79).

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60 The names and positions of some prominent leaders who were murdered during the Japanese period were recorded much later in *Sejarah perjuangan rakyat* 1991:38, 89-90, 102-5.

61 Sultanates in West Kalimantan were seen by the local population as the leaders of the material and spiritual world (Ranawidjaja 1955:83). This follows the concept of *daulat* within Islamic governance which links the legitimacy of the rulers with the power of God (Houben 2003:153).

62 Interview with Bln. However, the old perception could still be found in some Dayak communities up until the recent past. In 1948, the head of the Dayak Affairs Office reported that Dayaks in Tayan believed some economic and health troubles they faced were because the sultan was not blessed or holy (‘Lapoeran perdjalanan – pegawai Oeroesan Daya Kalimantan Barat dari tgl. 1 November sampai tgl. 6 Desember 1948, ke daerah Tayan dan Belitang’, 1948, p. 10, in: Private collection, Pontianak). In the 1980s, some Sintang Dayaks were reported to be treating a descendant of the Sintang sultanate as if he was a holy man (interview with Mjg).

63 Wealthy Chinese were suspected of financially supporting the mainland Chinese against the Japanese in the Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945).
Throughout the Japanese occupation, particularly after the massacres, political activities in West Kalimantan halted. The Japanese forces almost immediately arrested the leaders of around thirty political organizations in Pontianak when they arrived in West Kalimantan. These leaders were released after pledging loyalty to the Japanese occupation. Shortly after, on 1 April 1942, the Japanese occupation authorities banned all political activities in West Kalimantan. Nissinkai, a social organization created by the Japanese on 24 May 1942 to co-opt or control nationalist activities, was also dissolved in October 1942. The remaining middle-class and educated people, who were usually active in politics, suddenly found their political aspirations crippled by tight Japanese surveillance. The political elite as well as the larger community lived in fear. Pacifikus Ahok et al. (1983:58) wrote that Muslims went straight home without gathering (as had been their previous practice) after the Friday sermon in order to avoid suspicion.

Another aspect of Japanese occupation was the creation of a more egalitarian society as a result of mass mobilization. At the grassroots, other ethnic groups who always considered the Dayaks as having lower social status were forced to work together with the Dayaks. Before the massacre, the once respected sultans were often required to participate in such mobilization efforts. This more egalitarian society improved the low confidence level of the Dayaks, who had been treated as pariahs in the past.

The Japanese were surprised by a Dayak rebellion against them between February and May 1945. The Majang Desa War (Perang Majang Desa), which started in the Meliau area, was transformed into the most serious revolt against the Japanese occupation in West Kalimantan. In terms of casualties, apart from ordinary Japanese troops, one of the most feared Japanese commanders, Nakatani, was killed. The affected area spread from Sanggau to Sekadau, Sintang, Kapuas Hulu, Landak,

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64 Sejarah perjuangan rakyat 1991:92. Borneo Shinbun (16-9-42) mentioned that on 27 July 1942 the Japanese occupying government had issued a ban on all organizations (Law No 32). However, as mentioned by the newspaper, one of the largest ‘political’ parties in West Kalimantan, Parindra, only announced its dissolution on 9-9-1942.

65 The participation of sultans in the mobilization parallels the case in East Sumatra, in which the sultans were obliged to attend and participate actively in public events, including manual labour using a cangkul (short-handled hoe) (Reid 1979:107). Similar treatments were very likely for the sultans in West Kalimantan as their status—judged by their deaths—was no higher than those in East Sumatra.

76
and Ketapang). The Japanese eventually brought the area under control but failed to fully pacify the rebels. This insurgency gained much credit because it was carried out during a time of harsh oppression and when other previously active members of the political elite had been completely silenced. The remnants of this rebel force re-emerged to take revenge on the withdrawing Japanese troops at the end of the war. This revolt foreshadowed the coming political power of the Dayaks in West Kalimantan.

**SUMMARY**

The unfortunate living and social conditions of the Dayaks prior to WWII had far-flung effects on Dayak politics for many decades after independence. These conditions were inflicted partly by the discriminatory practices under sultanate rule. The Dutch colonial government also contributed to these conditions by letting the discrimination continue and not trying to improve the conditions of the Dayaks. Upward social mobility was almost impossible for many Dayaks because of their non-Muslim, uneducated, and isolated status. The Dayaks’ way to freedom was difficult to attain because the sultanates prevented them from leaving their regions in order to avoid economic loss. Rebelling against the sultanates was a difficult option because disobeying the sultans for many Dayaks was sinful and would bring bad luck, as the sultans were regarded as holy persons. Even when on rare occasions they finally rose up against the sultanates, the Dutch helped the sultans to crush the rebellion. One way out was to embrace Islam and become Malays.

Dayak conditions in directly ruled regions were slightly better. Under direct Dutch rule, the Dayaks enjoyed more freedom than did Dayaks in other regions. Many Dayak elders believed that the direct-rule system had contributed to the higher level of confidence among the Dayaks.

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from these regions. Many important Dayak political leaders after WWII came from the direct-rule regions.

Conditions would soon change after WWII. The role of the Catholic mission schools in the rise of Dayak political activity after independence was crucial. Almost all Dayak political leaders after WWII were former teachers, nurses, catechists, or seminary students who were all connected to the Catholic Church. They were the first Dayaks to be recruited to work for the post-war government. Without education which was made available mainly through the mission schools, the enlightenment process would have been very slow. It would have been almost impossible for illiterate Dayaks to assume these strategic political positions.

The Japanese occupation also brought positive consequences for the rise of Dayak participation in politics after the end of WWII. The occupation eliminated the legitimacy of the sultanates, crippled political activities in which the dominant Malays played an important part, and created more egalitarian masses. The Japanese massacred all the sultans as well as many influential figures in the province. The Dayak revolt against the Japanese in central West Kalimantan also gave them confidence to demand improvements in their economic opportunities and civil rights after WWII.

At the time of the Japanese capitulation in 1945, the majority of Dayaks still lived in rural areas, were uneducated, and had almost no political role. The prospect of Dayak advancement was bleak since the political system was still dominated by non-Dayaks. A few enlightened Dayaks who had worked under the Catholic missions were unable to bring about change without external help. They had no access to the government, had no political experience, and had not established themselves as leaders of the Dayak community for effective political mobilization. A government that was willing and capable of changing these conditions was the only hope. This government would need to guarantee the Dayaks access to and a share in all aspects of governance, because after centuries of marginalization, they were not in a position to compete with the more advanced ethnic groups. This was exactly what happened after WWII.
The rise of Dayak politics (1945-1960)

The first Dayaks [who took part in the emancipation] now had high positions in the West Kalimantan government, whereas the sultans, who used to rule them, became their subordinates.¹

The situation of the Dayaks began to improve during the twentieth century, particularly in areas of direct rule. They started to acquire education and to work within the mission networks. Weakened sultanates and their violent collapse at the hands of the Japanese added to political changes in the province.

This chapter explores how Dayak political activities emerged after WWII and how they evolved until the early 1960s. The first section discusses the opportunities provided to the Dayaks after the end of WWII, analyzing the inclusive policies of post-war governments, the role of individuals within those governments, and the establishment of Dayak institutions that enabled Dayaks to participate in provincial and regional level political arenas. The second section examines the impact of the dissolution of the pro-Dutch DIKB government on Dayak politics, and traces the rise of Dayaks in local politics as a result of the victory of the Dayak Unity Party (PD) in the 1955 and 1958 elections.

¹ Van Hulten 1992:181; author’s translation. The original read: ‘Orang-orang pertama suku Daya sekarang menjadi orang-orang yang berpangkat tinggi di Borneo Barat, sedangkan raja-raja pribumi yang semuanya memerintah mereka, menjadi bawahannya’. Van Hulten was a Catholic missionary who had worked among the Dayaks in West Kalimantan for 36 years, from 1938 to 1974.
Inception of Post-War Governments

Immediately after the war ended, Allied forces established a temporary administration in the province. The Commander of Australian Forces flew into Pontianak on 14 October 1945, while the remaining Australian forces arrived together with NICA officers from Banjarmasin on 16 October. The Dutch post-war government, the Netherlands Indies Civil Administration (NICA), officially quickly took over administration of the province from the Allied forces on 22 October 1945. This interim government became aware of the existence of the number of Dayak bands in Pontianak and other urban areas. The main purpose of these bands was purportedly not political, and not to take control of territory, but to search for remaining Japanese troops. The presence of these bands, however, posed security risks to the urban population as they were involved in looting and other crimes. In Landak, possibly in a racially motivated clash, the Dayaks killed a few Malays. Other cities such as Sanggau and Ketapang experienced similar confrontations. Disturbed Malay leaders in Pontianak, such as Uray Bawadi, suggested that the leaders of these Dayak bands be arrested. However, other Malay leaders preferred not to antagonise Dayaks in order to avoid possible skirmishes.

Knowing the potential problems these bands could cause and wanting to secure Dayak support, Allied forces invited leaders of these forces to a series of meetings. At one meeting these Dayak leaders

3 Basry 1961:69; Yanis 1998:38-9. A war diary from the Australian Army Headquarters mentioned inter-racial disturbances in Sanggau and surrounding Nanga Pinoh. In a meeting with the Chinese and Malay leaders in Pontianak on 18-10-1945, the Australian army commander mentioned that there were ethnic clashes involving Dayaks against Malays and Chinese (7 Australian Division General Staff Branch, October 1945, Item 1/5/14, and 2/33 Infantry Battalion, October 1945-March 1946, Item 8/3/33, AWM52, 2nd Australian Imperial Force and Commonwealth Military Forces Unit War Diaries, 1939-45 War, in: Australian War Memorial, Canberra). The tensions and conflicts within the communities after WWII were not only typical of West Kalimantan but also elsewhere (Bigalke 1981; Kahin 1985).
The rise of Dayak politics (1945-1960)

raised several points, one of them being a demand to eradicate racial discrimination. As an indication of the Allies' good will toward these Dayak bands, they granted the title of supreme commander to one, a Dayak leader, Pang Dandan, who was also known as Orang Kaya Mandi Setia Negara. The title was conferred by the newly enthroned sultan of Pontianak, Sultan Hamid II, on the advice of the NICA resident. Shortly after, Pang Dandan was appointed as the first head of the Meliau Council (Rivai 1978:66-7). He helped the Dutch government restore peace in some regions and visited Dayak villages to counter the propaganda from the anti-Dutch sections of the community (Van der Wal 1973:606, 1974:30). In 1946, to show their appreciation of the Dayak revolts against the Japanese, NICA invited Dayak leaders from Putussibau, Sambas, Singkawang, Pemangkat, Sanggau and other places to Pontianak to attend the trials of the Japanese war criminals (Van der Wal 1974:30). The NICA was also said to have employed many Dayaks who had previously revolted against the Japanese (Basry 1961:71-2). These events demonstrate a new and very different colonial attitude toward the Dayaks.

When NICA formed an interim government in West Kalimantan, it took a special interest in the Dayaks. In January 1946, NICA established the Dayak Affairs Office (DAO), the first institution established in West Kalimantan to deal with issues related to the Dayaks. In October 1946, seven Dayaks were appointed to the newly created forty-member West Kalimantan Council (West-Borneo Raad). This council was established to advise the assistant resident of West Kalimantan. This was the first time that the Dayaks were involved in official policy-making in...
the province. The Dayaks were also given seats on local councils in Sambas, Sintang, Landak, Sanggau, Mempawah, Matan, Sekadau, Boven-Kapuas and Meliau. The Dayaks were also given seats on local councils in Sambas, Sintang, Landak, Sanggau, Mempawah, Matan, Sekadau, Boven-Kapuas and Meliau.\textsuperscript{7} NICA sent J.A.M. Linggie, J.C. Oevaang Oeray and G.P. Djaoeng, the first Dayaks to attend the official training school for government officials (MOSVIA) in Makassar in 1946. Soon they would play an important role in provincial politics.\textsuperscript{8} The post-war government also approved and supported the establishment of Persatuan Dayak, which later became an important political force for Dayaks.\textsuperscript{9} These benevolent policies were not merely altruistic but also an acknowledgement of Dayaks’ support of the return of the Dutch after WWII. Dutch official documents showed PD’s strong support for the Dutch government on many occasions (Van der Wal 1973:179, 195, 605; 1974:88-9). Dayak support was crucial because the other important segment of the Kalimantan population, the Malays, gave a lukewarm or hostile welcome to the return of the Dutch.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Representatives</th>
<th>Names</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chairman</td>
<td>Sultan Hamid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dayak representatives (7)</td>
<td>P.F. Bantang, Sandjoek, A.F. Koraak, A. Mamoi, Abdulkadir bin Djawi, J.C. Oevaang Oeray, and Y. Mandor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malay representatives (6)</td>
<td>Zaini bin Mohammad Noor, H. Malik bin H. Soe’oed, Raden Abdul Moetalib Rifai, Mohammad Saleh, Ade Mohammad Djohan, Mohammad Djapri</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese representatives (8)</td>
<td>Soeng Khin Njoek, Jo Tjhai Siang, Then Hon Tjhiap, Lim Liat Njan, Tjhoen Jan Pau, Tio Khian Soen, Ng Tjhiaww Hen, Fo Nauw Hie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch representatives (4)</td>
<td>A.H. Böhm, M.A. Duisterhof, H.J. Harmsen, J. van Zijll de Jong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swapraja representatives</td>
<td>15 Swapraja heads (3 head of neo-swapraja, and 12 sultans including Sultan Hamid)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.1 Members of the West Borneo Council (1947)  

\textsuperscript{7} The Dayaks did not have representatives in Pontianak, Tayan, Kubu, Simpang, Sukadana, and Pinohland (Böhm 1986:130).

\textsuperscript{8} By 1960 Oeray became the governor of West Kalimantan, Djaoeng became the district head of Sintang, and Linggie became the \textit{wedana} of Nanga Pinoh.

\textsuperscript{9} The Dutch government, for example, gave 100,000 florins to the organization (Van der Wal 1974:89).
The government devised policies that differentiated between the Dayak, non-Dayak, and Chinese communities\textsuperscript{10} and that guaranteed increased representation for Dayaks.\textsuperscript{11} In education, this differentiation would facilitate the adoption of appropriate measures intended to remedy Dayak problems. Policies on the allocated establishment of government schools, for example, would become more equitable between Dayak and Malay villages. In politics, this differentiation ensured that Dayaks, despite being inexperienced and less qualified, would always have representation in the government and other political circles. As a result, the Dayaks had representatives in all post-war governments and their executive boards. Their inclusion was in line with Batavia’s determination to include minorities in the post-war government (Van Hulten 1992:79), probably a strategy to boost support for the government.

Other policies of the NICA were designed to ensure that the Dayaks would receive fair and equal treatment. Practices that would lower the status of the Dayaks were to be discontinued, and Malay *adat* or customary privileges, which perpetuated the inequality of the Dayaks, were to be abolished. NICA appointed Dayak administrators and officials when suitable candidates were available. This was to be done, however, without harming the position of the sultans (Van der Wal 1973:397).

These policies were continued by the subsequent government, the West Kalimantan Special Region Government (DIKB), which was established on 12 May 1947. The head of DIKB was Sultan Hamid II, an active Dutch military official and a son of the slain Pontianak sultan. He was assisted by a five-member executive board composed of two Dayak representatives and one each for Malay, Chinese and Dutch constituencies. The Dayaks had eight representatives out of a total of forty members of the DIKB. Obviously the policies of post-war governments had promoted the Dayaks’ political role.


\textsuperscript{11} In Indonesian historical text books, this type of social differentiation is usually seen as colonial powers’ policy of divide and rule.
The government’s supportive policies could not have materialized without the commitment of several individuals who held key positions in West Kalimantan at that time. Van Hulten explains that Dr A.H. Böhm played a crucial role in the political ascent of Dayaks during the time of NICA and DIKB. Before WWII, Böhm was a controleur in Semitau and had been working among the Dayaks in the province since the mid-1930s. He was one of only a few high ranking officials in the province who survived Japanese imprisonment in Sarawak (then British Borneo), and among a few high ranking Dutch officials who returned to the province right after the war. As cabinet secretary of DIKB and advisor to Sultan Hamid II, his influence during the DIKB period was

Table 4.2 Members of Daerah Istimewa Kalimantan Barat (1948)
*These individuals also became members of the executive council of DIKB.

**ROLE OF INDIVIDUALS**

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The rise of Dayak politics (1945-1960) | equally important. It was also believed that Böhm was involved in proposing the names of the Dayaks for the West Kalimantan Raad because of his previous role and knowledge of the region, and the absence of officials with similar credentials.

Sultan Hamid II was another important figure who facilitated the entry of Dayaks into politics. He was anointed as the new sultan of Pontianak by the NICA on 23 October 1945 after unseating his pro-republican nephew, Syarif Thaha Alkadri. His political outlook was pro-Dutch, which could be traced back to his military career with the Dutch colonial army. During his leadership in DIKB, he supported the Dayaks admission to special federal military and police units. He instructed that they be accepted into the units, although the majority of

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13 Van Hulten 1992:85-9. The Dutch officials attached to the executive body of each of the federal states (1945-50) had a vital role in running the states. Van Klinken (2006:33), for example, finds that the Greater Dayak Council of Central Kalimantan always acted under the supervision of J. Dijk, the Dutch controleur of Sampit.

14 Interview with Djg.

15 Sultan Hamid II (1913-1978) was raised by a British nanny and later married a Dutch woman. He was the only surviving son of the sultan of Pontianak after the massacre by the Japanese in 1944. During the time of the massacre, Sultan Hamid was imprisoned by the Japanese in Jakarta as he was a military officer of the Dutch government. The Japanese occupation force did not know of his ties with the Pontianak sultanate.

16 Rahman, Achmad and Muhadi 2000:162-4; Yanis 1998:35. Syarif Thaha Alkadri was installed as sultan on 29 August 1945 at the age of 18 (Rahman, Achmad and Muhadi 2000:162-4). Sultan Hamid was referred to as the true sultan by the Allied forces. He returned to West Kalimantan together with the chief of the Netherlands Forces Intelligence Service, Colonel Spoor in 1945 (7 Australian Division General Staff Branch, October 1945, Item 1/5/14, and 2/33 Infantry Battalion, October 1945-March 1946, Item 8/3/33, AWM52, 2nd Australian Imperial Force and Commonwealth Military Forces Unit War Diaries, 1939-45 War, in: Australian War Memorial, Canberra). The word ‘Republican’ here refers to those who supported the government of the Republic of Indonesia, headed by Soekarno.

17 Agung 1983:326. He led DIKB, which was known as a staunch pro-Dutch state. After the Dutch launched its first military assault to the nationalist government in July 1947, he proclaimed that the army of West Kalimantan would annihilate the nationalist government if the Dutch failed to do so (Kalimantan 1953:43). DIKB, together with some states in Sumatra, supported the second Dutch military action against the Republic (Agung 1983:197-8, 224, 225).

18 At the age of 22 Hamid was already a military officer with the rank of first lieutenant, and at the age of 26 was second lieutenant. By 1940 he was the only one of eight natives from a total of 274 first lieutenants in the Netherlands Indies Army (Bachtiar 1988:3). In 1946 at the age of 40, he became a major general, the highest military rank ever attained by a native Indonesian under the Dutch. He was given the prestigious title of Adjutant of the Queen of the Netherlands (Rahman, Achmad and Muhadi 2000:174-5). This appointment was a strategy by the Dutch to increase the chances of Sultan Hamid occupying the position of defence minister in a future government. Within the Indonesian army, he was second only to General Soedirman. The Republic of Indonesia was preparing Sultan Hamengku-buwono IX for the position (Nasution 1983:179).
them were illiterate.19 As a result, around 40 to 60 per cent of the federal military and police units were Dayak.20

Sultan Hamid’s support for Dayaks had an underlying motive. Hamid understood that his pro-Dutch DIKB government received limited popular support from the Malays, as many of their activists had been influenced by the pro-Jakarta nationalist movement. The PD and the Dayaks, on the contrary, were very supportive of Hamid’s government. Therefore, the sultan’s support for the Dayaks could be perceived as a self-serving strategy to bolster his own government.

In addition to the two individuals mentioned above, other Dayak political leaders, such as Oevaang Oeray, F.C. Palaunsoeka, Agustinus Djelani, and others, played roles that were equally important in the Dayak emancipation as is illustrated in their activities in Dayak institutions.

**DAYAK AFFAIRS OFFICE (DAO): THE PIONEER**

The role of the Dayak Affairs Office was indispensable for the Dayaks’ rise in politics. DAO was established in January 1946 by the NICA. Appointed as its first chairman was Oevaang Oeray who was then a student at MOSVIA Makassar.21 After Oeray was appointed as an executive member of DIKB in 1947, the leadership of the office was transferred to Agustinus Djelani.22

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19 Interview with Bln.
20 Interviews with Kls, Bln and Syk; Böhm 1986:99; Yanis 1998:273. These military/police officers did not play an important role especially after the end of federal government in 1950. All important military positions in the province, which was already known for its strong federal background, were naturally appointed from elsewhere by the central government.
21 Davidson 2002:96; H.M. Baroamas Jabang Balunus, ‘Wawancara tentang suku Daya’, n.y., p. 2, in: Collection of H.M. Baroamas Jabang Balunus, Pontianak, Johannes Chrysostomus Oevaang Oeray (1922-1988), a Kayan Dayak from Mendalam, Kapuas Hulu, attended a seminary school before WWII and then worked at the district office in Kapuas Hulu during the Japanese occupation. After the war, he was sent to Makassar to attend training for civil servants, but was brought back to Pontianak before finishing training because Sultan Hamid wanted him to head the Dayak Affairs Office in 1946. He was a chairman of PD for a short period from 1947 (probably until 1948 or 1949), executive member of West Kalimantan Council and DIKB, and member of the national Konstituante, a council established to draw up the new constitution. He was a wedana of Putussibau, then head of Sintang district, and from 1959 to 1966 governor of West Kalimantan. He represented Golkar in the national DPR as a result of his support for the party in the 1977 general election.
22 Interview with Syk. Agustinus Djelani (1919-1977), a Taman-Kapuas Dayak, from Kapuas Hulu, completed his secondary education at a seminary in Flores in 1946. From 1947 to 1954 he was the general chairman of PD, and from the end of 1940s to mid-1950s, he was a member of Parliament, Konstituante, and DPR in Jakarta. Between 1938 and 1966 he was head of Pontianak district.
One of the first political issues addressed by the DAO was the objection of Dayaks in Sanggau, Sekadau and Tayan to the authority of the sultanates, which had just been revived by NICA. A DAO document explained that these Dayaks refused to be placed under the same sultanates that had oppressed them in the past. To solve the problem, DAO called a meeting on 10 November 1946 attended by Oeray, Dutch officials (including the assistant resident), the sultans of Sanggau, Sekadau and Tayan, Malay chiefs from those regions, and Dayak representatives. The Dutch officials urged the Dayaks to seek compromise rather than break away. These officials certainly did not want to see an administration that they had just created crumble because of internal friction between its main supporters, the sultanates and the Dayaks. The Dayak representatives, who were initially adamant about breaking away, finally agreed to Oeray’s proposal that they stay in the system provided the sultanates met Dayak stipulations that the Malay sultanates would provide services to all citizens without discrimination, give certain priorities to Dayaks in employment and education, treat each religion equally, and accommodate Dayaks in the local legislature. The sultans were required to employ a local Dayak Affairs Officer, who would ensure that those agreements were respected. The sultans agreed to all of these conditions.

Ten days after the meeting, Oeray wrote a letter to the assistant resident in Pontianak asking him to immediately appoint personnel for the local DAO offices, as suggested in the agreement. In the letter he nominated A.F. Koraak for the Boven-Kapuas and Semitau regions, and P.J. Denggol for the Sanggau, Sekadau and Tayan regions, and he suggested that the assistant resident propose candidates for other regions. His condition for appointment was that each candidate should be ‘a genuine Dayak, who is still a 100% pure Dayak, not yet faded’. This condition was obviously intended to prevent more qualified Senganans or Muslim Dayaks from occupying the positions, as he did not believe that the Senganan could strive for the Dayaks’ best interests. Furthermore, he required that these officers be stationed at government offices, not at

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the sultanate offices. These officers were not to be located in sultanate offices, because otherwise they would be subject to sultanate pressure or influence. This precaution showed that he doubted the sincerity of the Malay sultanates in promoting Dayak interests. The Dayak distrust of the sultanates was still evident in the DAO report in 1948. The attitude of these Dayaks reflected their bitter past relations with the sultans, Senganan, and Malays.

In the field of Dayak education, probably as a result of a DAO proposal, the government for the first time sponsored Dayak students to study at Pontianak’s MULO, an equivalent to junior high school. Most of the students were from Kapuas Hulu, a former directly ruled area. DAO also sent a letter to the Director of Education in Batavia to report the lack of Dayak educational opportunities, the causes and possible solutions. According to the DAO the main reason for the low level of education among the Dayaks was their lack of access. In rural areas, government schools were usually established in Malay villages, although in some cases the majority of students in the schools were Dayaks from other villages. The Dayaks had only one five-year primary school (vervolgschool) in Nyarumkop. A teacher-training college (CVO) for Dayaks was located in Nyarumkop that could accept only thirty students annually. The other CVOs, in Sintang and Pontianak, only had a very few Dayak students: three in Sintang, and only one in Pontianak. Besides, the lack of access to education was curtailed by the stereotype prevalent among government officials that Dayaks were lazy and did not want to attend school. DAO made several recommendations to remedy the Dayak education problem: the government should establish schools in Dayak villages; for schools not located in Dayak villages, the government should provide separate living accommodation for the Dayak students.

28 The first two students were Massoeka Djanting (who later changed his name to H.M. Baroamas Tjahang Balunu), and Antonius Buan. The next group of students were Keladan, Iman Kalis, A.R. Sampe, Syahdan Sahuddin, Sabinus, I. Aneli, I Kepu, Daniel Soeryamassoeka, and Noeh Yahya (interview Syk). Except for Sahuddin from Landak, all the above students were from Kapuas Hulu or Semitau. Several individual started to hold important positions during the Oeray era, and a few rose to the senior positions in the provincial administration during the New Order period.
since they had different customs; schools having a majority of Dayak students be assigned Dayak teachers; and to alleviate Dayak teacher shortages Dayak teachers without formal qualifications be permitted to teach; financial support should be provided to needy Dayaks to attend secondary school, such as the MULO in Pontianak; and a Dayak school inspector should be appointed to oversee the process of improving the education system. These efforts of DAO and PD resulted in a significant increase in the number of Dayak students.

In the first few months of its establishment, with support from the government, DAO made other breakthroughs that benefited the Dayaks. Unfortunately, not much documentation is available regarding DAO’s later activities before it was dissolved in 1950. One report in 1948 by

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regions</th>
<th>Percentage of students</th>
<th>Total number students</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dayaks</td>
<td>Non-Dayaks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pontianak</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>33.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kubu</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>53.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Landak</td>
<td>56.8</td>
<td>22.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mempawah</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>26.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Singkawang</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>16.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pemangkat</td>
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<td>31.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sambas</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>58.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bengkayang</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>6.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sanggau</td>
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<td>31.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sekadau</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>39.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tayan/Meliau</td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td>40.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sintang</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>56.7</td>
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<td>Melawi</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>44.2</td>
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<td>Semitau</td>
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<tr>
<td>Putussibau</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matan Hilir</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sukadana</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>58.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>36.7</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.3 Percentage of Dayak students (by June 1949)
the head of DAO, Agustinus Djelani, showed that DAO had conducted regular visits to the region and continued to be a respected government organ to deal with Dayak affairs. He reported that during his tours to the interior regions he was always accompanied by local officials, had meetings with Dutch officials, and obtained immediate responses from officials on many occasions. The assistant resident of Sanggau, for example, ordered rice to be sent swiftly to the Tayan area after learning from Djelani that there was a rice shortage in that area. The assistant resident also immediately removed the current Dayak representative in Tayan when he learned that the representative was under the influence of the sultan and was not working for the best interests of local Dayaks. After learning about the report of the DAO, the sultan of Sekadau dispatched rice to areas in need, gave financial contributions to schools, and made some changes in personnel within the sultanate administration.  

PERSATUAN DAYAK (PD): ORGANIZED ETHNIC POLITICS

The embryo of Persatuan Dayak was believed to have been a 1941 religious retreat of Catholic teachers in Sanggau. At the end of the retreat the leaders of the event, including A.F. Koraak, J.R. Giling, and M.Th. Djaman, issued a statement calling for the formation of a political organization that could push for improvements in Dayak interests. One source claimed that the commitment was inspired by a letter written by Oevaang Oeray, then a student at the seminary in Nyarumkop. This issuance of a political statement from a religious meeting, which was supposed to be non-political, startled Church authorities and resulted in the expulsion of Oeray from the seminary.

The first known formal Dayak organization in West Kalimantan, Dayak in Action (DIA), was founded on 30 October 1945 in Putussibau.
by a Dayak teacher, F.C. Palaunsoeka. The Catholic Church’s role was significant in DIA’s beginnings and in its rapid growth later. Its establishment, for example, received support from a Javanese priest, A. Adikardjana, the only working Catholic priest in West Kalimantan. After 1946, some Catholic priests continued to secretly give advice and participate in discussions with PD leaders. The majority of the committee members and the branch chairmen were teachers at local Catholic village schools. One Catholic priest provided an account of the influence of the Catholic Church on the PD (Van Hulten 1992:118-22). The fact that carbon copies of much official PD correspondence during the formative years were sent to Catholic Church authorities confirms the unique ties between the Church and Dayak political ascent.

On 1 October 1946, almost a year after its inception, DIA became Persatuan Dayak (PD). The organization leaders then were Marinus

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54 Documentary references to DIA were scarce and brief (‘Pokok: Permohonan pindah sdr. Mochtarroeddin, pedjabat wedana Putussibau ke kantor Gubernur Kepala Daerah Kalimantan Barat’, 1962, Archive Office of West Kalimantan, Pontianak; L.H. Kadir, ‘Latar belakang keberadaan budaya kantuk dan catatan perjuangan politik suku Dayak di Kalimantan Barat: Sebuah catatan anak petani untuk generasinya’, 1993, in: Private collection; H.M. Baroamas Jabang Balunus, ‘Penjelasan-penjelasan mengenai Serikat Dagang Islam’, 1990, in: Collection of H.M. Baroamas Jabang Balunus, Pontianak; Parlaungan 1956:356-7; Davidson 2002). The only link DIA had with PD was that both were founded by Palaunsoeka. DIA was originally Dayak in Action or in fact Dayak in Actie (actie is a Dutch word for ‘action’), and not Daya in Action. The term ‘Daya’ was introduced only after mid-1947 by the PD leaders (‘Pokok: Permohonan pindah sdr. Mochtarroeddin, pedjabat wedana Putussibau ke kantor Gubernur Kepala Daerah Kalimantan Barat’, 1962, Archive Office of West Kalimantan, Pontianak).

55 Father Adikardjana was visiting Putussibau when Palaunsoeka consulted him regarding forming the DIA. Adikardjana was the only working priest in West Kalimantan, since all European and Chinese clergy were detained by the Japanese and had not yet returned to West Kalimantan. Böhlm (1986:35) wrote that the Apostolic Vicar Van Valenberg returned to Pontianak only in October 1945. The majority of missionaries returned to Pontianak in early December 1945. The group under van Hulten arrived in Sanggau in February 1946 and Sintang in March 1946 (Van Hulten 1992:50-1).


Andjioe, chairman, Palaunsoeka, vice chairman (ketua muda), Telajan and Pelang, secretaries; A.F. Koraak and Agustinus Djelani, advisers, Martinus M. Tani, treasurer.36

After changing its name, PD leaders took the important step of moving the headquarters from remote Putussibau to the capital of the province, Pontianak, in December 1946. In Pontianak, PD could participate more effectively in rapid political developments occurring in the provincial capital37 than it could if its headquarters remained in Putussibau because of transportation and communication difficulties. To illustrate this point, the first letter sent by PD from Putussibau took three weeks to reach Pontianak.38 In addition, connections to the rest of West Kalimantan were more easily made from Pontianak than from Putussibau. PD would also have greater prestige if its headquarters was in Pontianak rather than in relatively obscure Putussibau. Before moving to Pontianak, PD was a little known political organization.39 PD (or in this case DIA) only had branches in the Kapuas Hulu region.40

PD had already missed taking part in some major government political initiatives. No founders of DIA/PD were appointed to head or staff DAO, and none were invited to become members of West Kalimantan Council. Earlier political discussions among Dayaks in the province also failed to mention the existence of DIA or PD. For example, a political letter by Linggie in August 194641 and a reflective article by Oeray earlier in May 1946 did not refer to DIA (Oeray 1946).42 Some of DAO’s earliest documents also did not note the existence of DIA or PD (DAO 1946a). Not until November 1946 did PD start to appear in DAO official communications (DAO 1946b).

After the decision to move its headquarters to Pontianak, a meeting was held in Pontianak on 1 January 1947 between Agustinus Djelani

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36 ‘Statuten dari Persatoean Dajak atau PD’, 1946, Private collection, Pontianak.
38 Handwritten note in ‘Statuten dari Persatoean Dajak atau PD’, 1946, Private collection, Pontianak.
39 Its establishment document in 1946 implied a political function of PD, as it did not allow its members to join other political parties without the approval of its chairman (‘Statuten dari Persatoean Dajak atau PD’, 1946, Private collection, Pontianak; Böhm 1946a).
40 Interview with Bln.
as representative of PD Putussibau, Oevaang Oeray, and a few Dayaks who worked in the capital. The meeting chose Oeray to head a new province-wide PD — not a surprising decision since as the head of DAO, he was naturally the most important and influential Dayak figure in the whole province. The leadership structure of PD at this time was simple because of the lack of manpower in the capital: Oevaang Oeray, as the general chairman, doubled as treasurer, M. Nyaboe was vice chairman, and L. Okeng and A. Butar were secretaries. Sometime after Oeray was elected as a member of West Kalimantan Council, the chairmanship was transferred to Djelani. When Djelani was elected as head of Pontianak district in 1958, he relinquished the chairmanship to Palaunsoeka who continued to hold the chairmanship until the party’s final days in the early 1960s. PD’s leadership changes were smooth, and the elite was relatively solid, at least until the end of 1950s.

The results of the PD consolidation were timely. When DIKB was established on 12 May 1947 to replace the West Kalimantan Council, PD was involved in the process because all eight Dayak representatives in the DIKB were members or leaders of PD: J.C. Oevaang Oeray, A.F. Koraak, J.A.M. Linggie, M.Th. Djaman, F.C. Palaunsoeka, C.J. Impan, P.F. Bantang, and P.J. Denggol (Nasution 1977:269-70).

PD’s role in the betterment of Dayaks’ condition was enormous. It had four objectives: to raise the Dayaks’ self-esteem after being repressed by both Dutch colonial rule and the Malay sultanates; to create equal rights by eliminating discrimination and nepotism in civil service recruitment; to eliminate the special duties or taxes imposed only on the Dayaks (practices derived from tradition and the edicts of the sultanates); and to achieve political freedom (PD 1954:5). By the end of the DIKB, the PD had achieved its main objectives or at least had made remarkable improvements. PD had made itself known among the Dayak people and had gained quite a high level of trust. This trust was evident in the flow of reports about local issues from the Dayaks in the region to PD headquarters in Pontianak.

43 The resident’s office acknowledged this as the founding date of PD (West Borneo Raad 1947:21). This clears up some confusion about chronology as described in Davidson (2002:95).
46 The author found such correspondences from Sambas, Landak, Sanggau, and Putussibau Dayaks.
political representative as indicated in the statement on the establishment of DIKB in 1947. For cases related to the Dayaks, the government consulted the DAO, which undoubtedly coordinated closely with PD. The government, for example, promptly followed the PD’s decision to switch the spelling from ‘Dayak’ to ‘Daya’ in 1947. The post-war government discontinued discriminatory policies affecting the Dayaks. Dayaks started to have access to government offices and joined the police force and the military. Schools for the Dayaks had multiplied, the majority of which were established or partly financed by the PD. By 1948, PD had already established about forty PD schools.

All post-war opportunities for the Dayaks described above contributed significantly to the rise of Dayak politics in the 1950s.

Dissolution of DIKB and the Transition Period

Post-war Dayak emancipation was partly due to the ‘inclusive’ policies of the pro-Dutch government. As a consequence, the PD and most Dayak leaders – unlike many Malay politicians outside the government – were sympathetic to the Dutch. In 1946, J.A.M. Linggie, later a PD official, stated in a communication with Dayaks that they would be better off under Dutch leadership than Indonesian. Linggie argued that Indonesian domination (probably referring to the Malays) would end emancipation.

47 The negative connotation of ‘Dayak’ almost certainly provided the main drive for the name change. The new term ‘Daya’ means power and resourcefulness in the Indonesian language. The term Dayak (or Dajak in the Dutch spelling) was used at least until mid-May 1947 because Keadilan, the PD newspaper, still used Dayak in its publication in June 1947. Davidson observed that Oeray in his private correspondence in November 1947 had already used Daya (Davidson 2002:95, 425). However, the switch to ‘Daya’ was not a personal preference, as implied in Davidson (2002:95); it was a party decision. Two written sources noted that the switch to Daya was adopted at a PD party meeting in 1947 (L.H. Kadir, ‘Latar belakang keberadaan budaya kantuk dan catatan perjuangan politik suku Dayak di Kalimantan Barat: Sebuah catatan anak petani untuk generasinya’, 1993, pp. 6, 307, in: Private collection, Pontianak; Muslim and Layang 1994:40). Another similar experience in Sabah, another part of Kalimantan, is the name change of ‘Dasun’ to more prestigious ‘Kadazan’ by their native leaders in the 1950s and 1960s (Loh 1992:225-6).

48 Davidson 2002:97. Although the source was undated, the document was most likely written before 1948 because it still used Van Ophuysen spelling. The spelling was in use until 1947, when it was replaced by Suwandi spelling. One characteristic of Van Ophuysen spelling was the use of ‘oe’ instead of ‘u’, therefore ‘baroe’ instead of ‘baru’. For the history of the Indonesian language spelling, see Badudu 1984.
opportunities for the Dayaks. A similar supportive tone was also found in P.J. Denggol, a catechist who later became a PD leader. He claimed that most Dayaks longed for Dutch rule because it had tried to protect the Dayaks from Chinese usury and also Malay despotism (Van Loon 1999:47-8). While this claim was not entirely true as the Dutch government failed to make any significant improvements to the Dayaks’ situation in the past, it showed nevertheless that the Dayaks preferred the return of Dutch rule to Malay sultanates. Not surprisingly the PD applauded the formation of DIKB and claimed that its establishment signified a departure from an inferiority complex among the Dayaks and the coming of self-government. However, Dayaks were also critical of the Dutch. On several occasions, while condemning feudal practices, the Dayaks also criticized the Dutch government for allowing such practices to continue. The main villains, however, were always believed to be the Malay sultanates, not the Dutch government (Keadilan, 26-5-1950; Davidson 2002:99-100, 2008:40).

Dayak support for the pro-Dutch or pro-federal DIKB started to wither early in 1950. Until then, PD was reluctant to support a unitary state and contended that the form of the state was not a crucial issue of the nation. Only in April 1950 did PD officially declare its support for the unitary state, but with some conditions. Should the merger take place, PD demanded that West Kalimantan be given a high level of autonomy and remain a separate province (Keadilan, 5-5-1950). At first PD still criticized and resisted the growing pressure to force DIKB into a merger with the Republic of Indonesia, preferring a peaceful and gradual incorporation process (Keadilan, 5-5-1950). The main reason for its changing attitude was increasing hostility toward the federalist view at the national level. By early April 1950, only four negara bagian (member states of RIS) continued to exist within the federal state – DIKB, Republic of Indonesia, State of East Indonesia, and State of East Sumatra. The other twelve states had merged into the Republic

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Regime change and ethnic politics in Indonesia

of Indonesia. According to Feith, constant pressure from Jakarta, the generally anti-Dutch local population, and weak states or states with no real social or political identity, were factors contributing to the their absorption into the Republic of Indonesia.

Outside DIKB, local politicians’ demand that DIKB be dissolved and West Kalimantan merged into the Republic of Indonesia grew stronger after 1949. One of the strong pro-unitary state lobby groups in the province, the West Kalimantan National Committee (KNKB), which was formed in December 1949, demanded the disbanding of DIKB and rejected all DIKB resolutions. KNKB gained more bargaining power after the central government in Jakarta treated its representatives as formal officials of West Kalimantan when they visited the capital. The fate of DIKB was sealed when its strongman, Sultan Hamid II, was arrested in April 1950 in connection with his involvement in an attempt to overthrow the central government in January 1950.

51 Feith 1962:65. The United States of Indonesia (RIS) was formed after a conference in Linggarjati in November 1946. The member states grew as the Dutch colonial government continued to create puppet new states in order to counter growing influence of the Republik Indonesia led by Soekarno-Hatta. By 1949 there were 21 political entities in the former Dutch East Indies, one of which was Republik Indonesia (Cribb 2000:160; Feith 1962:59). These states could not endure when their protector, the Dutch, departed after the transfer of sovereignty from the federal Republic of the United States of Indonesia (RIS) in December 1949.

52 Feith (1962:71-6) gave examples of the Central and East Java States whose boundaries did not correspond to ethnic realities but ‘simply to the limits to which the Dutch had been able to extend their military occupation’.

53 S.H. Marpaung and Tan Husni Abdullah, ‘Pembubaran’, 1949; S.H. Marpaung and Tan Husni Abdullah, ‘Mosi’, 1950; S.H. Marpaung and Tan Husni Abdullah, ‘Resolusi’, 1950; ‘Panitia mempeladjari peraturan dasar dan peraturan pemilihan’, 1950, in: Private collection, Pontianak. KNKB was a council formed by various religious, social and political organizations, the ultimate aim of which was to integrate DIKB into Republik Indonesia. Its main supporters were nationalist Malays, Javanese and others. The PD official opposition to the integration made unlikely for its members to support KNKB. The leaders of KNKB were Tan Husni Abdullah and S.H. Marpaung. Other figures of KNKB were M. Nazir Effendi, Munzirin A.S., Burhan Ibrahim, and A.S. Djampi (Sejarah Revolusi 1980:124, 126-7). Some of these individuals continued to play important political roles in provincial politics from the 1950s onward. Tan Husni Abdullah, for example, was one of the leaders of a political party (IPKI) until its merging into PDI in 1973.


55 On 7 May 1950, the DIKB executive council decided to dissolve itself (‘Badan Pemerintahan Harian Daerah bagian Kalimantan Barat dalam sidangnya tertanggal 7 Mei tahun 1950’, ‘Pemangku jabatan kepala daerah Kalimantan Barat’, in: Nationaal Archief, The Hague, Collectie 547 A.H. Böhm, 1945-1989, nummer toegang 2.21.205.09). After the dissolution of DIKB, the central government placed a resident to administer the region. There were four residents before Oevaang Oeray was elected as governor at the end of the 1950s; all were Javanese: R. Budiardjo, Soedjono, R.M. Soeparto, K.Ng. Bambang Suparto (Sejarah perkembangan pemerintahan 1980:6). For details of Sultan Hamid’s plot, see Persadja 1955.
The demise of DIKB exacerbated ethnic and social tensions, particularly between the Dayaks and Malays (Böhm 1986:106-9). When the downfall of DIKB was imminent, the pro-unitary state newspapers, such as Terompet and Suasana, demanded that officials and supporters of federal DIKB – Dayak officials were the obvious supporters – be excluded from the new government and be punished for their collaboration. Rumours were widespread that Dayak leaders and DIKB officials would be arrested after the formation of the new government. In a critique published in Keadilan (5-5-1950), Dayaks argued that any revenge policy of the new government toward former officials would only bring difficulties for the new government. A Dayak wrote in the government bulletin Suar (5-5-1950) that Dayaks would not stand by if the retribution occurred. The tension was such that Oeray found it was necessary to deny openly rumours that he and other Dayak officials had been kidnapped and killed (Keadilan, 26-5-1950).

After the break-up, the entire DIKB structure was dismantled, including its DAO. The DIKB Dayak affirmative policy was discontinued, because it was seen by the new government as reminiscent of the colonial policy of ‘divide and rule’. A plan already underway to conduct an election was also scrapped.

PD’s political role in government was disrupted from the time of the dissolution of DIKB until the election in 1955. Due to its past, PD understandably kept a low profile during the early 1950s as the high tide of nationalism swept across the country. Against all odds, the Dayaks and their leaders continued to be associated with the PD ‘regional’ political party. This was unlike former collaborators in other parts of the country where, according to Feith (1962:74), they joined the republiken political parties in their areas to clear their names. Fortunately, no detention or imprisonment of former DIKB officials took place. Also no mass retrenchment of former employees of the negara bagian occurred, as it was not government policy.\(^{56}\) The policy of the Republic of Indonesia announced early in 1950 stated that all civil servants of former negara bagian who chose to merge into the republic would normally be absorbed

\(^{56}\) In the case of West Kalimantan mass retrenchment was not possible since most of provincial government officials were among as those who cooperated with the Dutch (Kalimantan 1953:78). Moreover, 75 per cent of the members of national parliament were former representatives of senate and federal parliament (Kepartaian dan parlementaria 1954:629), some of whom were collaborators themselves, and therefore would naturally prevent the implementation of such revenge policies.
into the civil service of the new government.\textsuperscript{57} However, the same policy gave priority for reemployment to those who did not cooperate with the pro-Dutch government, although they would be managed carefully to avoid tension in the civil service (Feith 1962:82-3; Kalimantan 1953:67-8).

As a result, it is safe to assume that all Dayak civil servants, whose numbers were still very small, remained in the bureaucracy, although handled quite differently from those who held important political positions such as those in the governing board of the DIKB. When the executive board of the DIKB announced its dissolution in May 1950 (Suar, 20-5-1950), some of its members returned to their home region’s office and to their former politically neutral jobs. Koraak returned to Kapuas Hulu, while Oeray stayed on in Pontianak.\textsuperscript{58} One source mentions that Oeray was out without any influential political position for almost a year before being reinstated as sub-district head of Putussibau, and then as acting \textit{wedana}\textsuperscript{59} of Kapuas Hulu. Koraak became a sub-district head and later \textit{wedana} of Kapuas Hulu. Denggol became assistant \textit{wedana} of Meliau.\textsuperscript{60} Linggie soon returned to a post as a regular civil servant in Sanggau before assuming the position of Demang of Semitau.\textsuperscript{61} Only Djelani (at the time general chairman of PD) and Palaunsoeka continued to serve as members of the national House of Representatives in Jakarta,

\textsuperscript{57} The Dutch officials in the \textit{negara bagian} however were treated differently. The regulation mentioned that if they were no longer required by the \textit{negara bagian} then they would be returned to RIS (Kalimantan 1953:67-8). In West Kalimantan the transfer of Dutch officials to Indonesian had occurred since April 1950, when the Dutch Official Heads of Pontianak, Singkawang, Ketapang, Mempawah and Sambas were replaced (Suar, 5-5-1950).

\textsuperscript{58} A letter from H.M. Nieuwenhuizen, a former official of DIKB, to A.H. Böhm dated 7 September 1950 confirmed this fact. The letter for example mentioned that Lim Bak Meng was involved in some sort of trade, Mohammad Saleh had returned to the position of inspector of schools, while A.F. Koraak had gone back to Putussibau. The letter also mentioned that Oevaang Oeray remained in Pontianak and became some kind of advisor to the Dayaks affairs for the provincial government (Nieuwenhuizen to Böhm, 7-9-1950, in: Nationaal Archief, The Hague, Collectie 547 A.H. Böhm, 1945-1989, nummer toegang 2.21.205.09, inventarisnummer 23).

\textsuperscript{59} A \textit{wedana} was the head of the \textit{kewedanaan}, an area one administrative level below district (\textit{kabupaten}). \textit{Demang} or \textit{assisten-demang} was a regional link between European and traditional governments (Cribb and Kahin 2004:189-90). The \textit{kewedanaan} system was gradually abolished after 1963 (Surianingrat 1980:30).

\textsuperscript{60} Interview with Bln.

\textsuperscript{61} Interview with Arl.
which they had held since the end of 1940s. Many officials in other former puppet governments in other regions also suffered a similar fate. Only a few former leaders of the member states reassumed an important political role after the disbandment of RIS (Keadilan, 5-5-1950; Feith 1962:74).

PD as a political party was not disbanded by the new government and later took part in the elections of 1955 and 1958. It scored successes in both elections which paved the way for the Dayaks’ return to political prominence at an even higher level.

**ELECTIONS OF 1955 AND 1958**

PD grew rapidly as a result of a partnership with the DAO, assistance from post-war governments, help from the missionary network, and most importantly, relatively united Dayak leadership. Formal PD membership in mid-1947 was reported to be around 50,000. That figure represented approximately 12 per cent of West Kalimantan Dayaks, an impressive achievement within a short period of time considering the geographical challenges to organization, the inexperience of the Dayaks in politics, and constant political intimidation. Before its leadership split at the end of the 1950s, West Kalimantan PD was probably the strongest ethnic political party in all Indonesia.

PD contested the first national election on 29 September 1955, and scored a significant success, at the national level ranking twelfth of 118 parties registered for the election. It secured one seat in the DPR and

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62 Kepartaian dan parlementaria 1954:626-30; Parlaungan 1956:356-7; Roeder 1971:278-9; Augustinus Djelani, ‘Daftar riwayat pekerjaan’, 1976, in: Private collection, Pontianak. The members of the house of representatives after the dissolution of RIS consisted of members from the Republic Indonesia and members from negara bagian (Cribb and Kahin 2004:490; Feith 1962:128). Prior to the break-up of RIS, Djelani was a member of the Senate, while Palaunsoeka was a member of House of Representatives. At the national House of Representatives both were listed as members of the Catholic Party (Kepartaian dan parlementaria 1954:626-30).


64 Van Hulten 1992:118-23. The Dayak population in the province in 1948 was approximately 416,471 (Böhm 1986:30).

65 At the final counting to distribute seats, this position dropped to 22nd, overtaken by some smaller political parties that had vote-sharing agreements (stembusaccord) with each other (interview Bln; H.M. Baroamas Jabang Balunus, ‘Hasil-hasil pemilihan umum untuk anggota-anggota DPR RI tahun 1955’, 1978, pp. 1-2, in: Collection of H.M. Baroamas, Jabang Balunus, Pontianak).
three seats in the National Constituent Assembly or Konstituante.\(^6\) The achievement of PD in West Kalimantan surprised many well-established rivals as it eclipsed all but Masyumi. PD and Masyumi were the only two parties to attain more than 30 per cent of the votes in West Kalimantan. PNI obtained less than 17 per cent to rank in third place. This achievement made Herbert Feith (1957:60) name PD as the only success story in the 1955 election for a local and ethnicity-based political party.

### Table 4.4 Elections in 1955 and 1958 in West Kalimantan

*Changes are calculated from the election results of the Constituent Assembly in 1955 and those in 1958.


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\(^6\) Palaunsoeka was elected representative of the National Assembly, while Agustinus Djeleani, Oevaang Oeray, and W. Hittam were representatives to the Konstituante (H.M. Baroamas Jabang Balunus, ‘Hasil-hasil pemilihan umum untuk anggota-anggota DPR RI tahun 1955’, 1978, p. 2, in: Collection of H.M. Baroamas Jabang Balunus, Pontianak).
The PD’s success in the election brought the Dayaks back to the centre of West Kalimantan politics. Based on the election results, from thirty provincial DPRD seats, PD obtained nine while Masyumi held ten. Other political parties gained fewer seats: PNI won four, NU three, while PSI, Parindra, IPKI and PKI held one seat each. PD’s performance at the district level was similarly good. In Pontianak, Sanggau, Sintang, and Kapuas Hulu districts, PD sent more members to the local DPRD than any of the other political parties. It ranked second in the Ketapang DPRD and only failed to secure seats for the DPRD of Pontianak City itself because the city had only a small Dayak population. Dayaks also gained good representation in regional executive councils (DPD) at both the provincial and district levels. PD secured two DPD seats at the provincial level. At the district level it secured two seats in Pontianak, Sintang, and Kapuas Hulu districts, three seats in Sanggau district, and one seat in Sambas and Ketapang districts.

The political influence of PD increased significantly after the 1955 election. Dayaks who had previously distanced themselves from PD, either because of fear of threats from other more established parties or lack of confidence in PD, started to approach the party. PD was able to attract a few Dayaks who had previously joined other political parties. One recruit was Petrus Anjiem, a Dayak who was a PNI official in Landak in the early 1950s (Boelaars, Undoen and Sitohang 1981:44). Anjiem later became an important figure in the PD’s successor, Partindo. One source mentions that PD success after 1955 and the rising profile of the Dayaks had prompted some Senganans to reclaim their Dayak roots. In contrast to its previous scepticism towards Senganans, PD in the 1950s prepared to accept Senganan leadership within the party. Leaders of PD in Sambas (M. Idris) and Pontianak districts (Sadjali
Usman) were well known Senganans. PD even attracted the Chinese, who agreed to join forces with PD in the 1958 election and secured two seats for PD in Pontianak City.\textsuperscript{72}

As required by Law 19/1956, another election was carried out to elect new members of the regional parliament. In West Kalimantan, local parliamentary elections were conducted on 22 May 1958, except for Pontianak City where the election was held on 12 June 1958 (\textit{Sejarah perkembangan pemerintahan} 1989:9). This election was also a success for PD, which received over 21 per cent more votes than in the 1955 election, whereas all the major national political parties suffered losses. Given that it was unlikely that many non-Dayaks apart from some Chinese would vote for PD, the major part of this 21 per cent might have been the result of a change in the voting behaviour of Dayaks who had previously voted for other political parties.\textsuperscript{73}

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
\textbf{District/Province} & \textbf{PD} & \textbf{Masyumi} & \textbf{PNI} & \textbf{NU} & \textbf{PSI} & \textbf{PKI} & \textbf{IPKI} & \textbf{Other Parties} \\
\hline
Pontianak City & 3,071 & -1,883 & 415 & -1,068 & -36 & 1,203 & -970 & -1,747 \\
\hline
Pontianak & 12,078 & -5,445 & -1,059 & -2,870 & 1,187 & 2,041 & -492 & 250 \\
\hline
Sambas & 4,591 & -1,228 & 1,682 & 54 & 826 & 3,618 & -733 & 791 \\
\hline
Sanggau & 13,197 & -2,044 & 970 & -216 & 219 & 529 & -424 & 124 \\
\hline
Sintang & 16,904 & -3,083 & -249 & 44 & -78 & 740 & -653 & -7,594 \\
\hline
Kapuas Hulu & 2,333 & -1,898 & 245 & 482 & 169 & -33 & -58 & 1,349 \\
\hline
\hline
West Kalimantan & 55,009 & -15,358 & -536 & -4,481 & 1,589 & 9,056 & -3,940 & -8,182 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Shift of votes in the 1955 and 1958 elections}
\label{tab:votes}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{72} Interviews with Bla and Laj.

The 1958 election result further consolidated the Dayaks’ position in the executive and legislative branches. PD secured more seats than any

\textsuperscript{73} Van Hulten noted that political intimidation and propaganda from other political parties led to the submission of the naïve Dayaks to other political parties (Van Hulten 1992:118-23).
The rise of Dayak politics (1945-1960)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province/District</th>
<th>Election 1955</th>
<th>Election 1958</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PD</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Kalimantan</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pontianak City</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pontianak</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sambas</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanggau</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sintang</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kapuas Hulu</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ketapang</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>152</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.6 The 1958 election and parliamentary seat allocation

*The source did not include two seats for NU in Ketapang.


other political party in the provincial parliament. Out of a total of 30 seats, PD won 12 seats, followed by Masyumi nine seats, and PNI four seats. PD also outperformed all the other political parties at Pontianak, Sanggau, Sintang and Kapuas Hulu districts. At the provincial level, an existing Dayak deputy-head of the DPRD and two existing DPD members were re-elected in November 1958. Oevaang Oeray was appointed as West Kalimantan executive head (kepala daerah) and then also as governor in 1959. In 1958, four out of six district head positions were won by Dayaks, namely Pontianak, Sanggau, Sintang, and Kapuas Hulu districts. Dayaks also became the heads of district legislatures in

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74 Before 1960, the provincial executive head and governor were separate positions and held by different individuals. The governor was a representative of central government, while the executive head was the one responsible for the day-to-day governance of the province. Oevaang Oeray was the first governor who also held the position of executive head (Sejarah perkembangan pemerintahan 1989:9-11). An equivalent process also occurred at the district level after 1960, where the position of bupati and executive head at the district level were held by one person.
Sanggau, Sintang, and Kapuas Hulu and deputy heads in the provincial and Pontianak district legislatures.\(^\text{75}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Districts</th>
<th>District Head</th>
<th>Elected</th>
<th>Political Party</th>
<th>Appointment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pontianak City</td>
<td>Maizir Achmaddyns</td>
<td>11-Jul-1958</td>
<td>Masyumi</td>
<td>(not appointed)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sambas</td>
<td>Zaini M. Noor</td>
<td>31-Oct-1958</td>
<td>Masyumi</td>
<td>6-May-1959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanggau</td>
<td>M.Th. Djaman</td>
<td>10-Jan-1958</td>
<td>PD</td>
<td>23-May-1959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sintang</td>
<td>G.P. Djaoeng</td>
<td>9-Jan-1958</td>
<td>PD</td>
<td>25-May-1959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ketapang</td>
<td>Hercan Yamani</td>
<td>20-Nov-1958</td>
<td>NU</td>
<td>16-May-1959</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.7 Elected district heads and supporting political parties (1959)

*For an unknown reason, the interior minister did not appoint Achmaddyns. A. Moeis Amin later became the mayor.


PD also gained significantly more seats in the legislatures after 1958. At provincial level, PD gained an additional three seats, four more seats in Pontianak and Sintang, three more seats in Sanggau, and two more seats in Sambas. PD also obtained two seats in Pontianak City, where it had previously held no seats. PD representation in the DPD remained the same as in 1955, except for Sintang district where PD had gained one additional seat.

The better position in the legislature and executive were quite important for the Dayaks, as they now could use their influence to improve their political standing. After securing those top positions, PD was able to ensure that some of its members became sub-district heads in Dayak areas, although they were less qualified.\(^\text{76}\) Some Dayak officials had also tried to increase the numbers of Dayak civil servants.


PD did not win those political positions by itself. In some cases, such as in Pontianak and Kapuas Hulu districts, PD needed political alliances because its seats alone were not sufficient to win in a voting process if all other parties formed an alliance against PD’s candidate. Based on regulation PP 44/1957, each district head was to be selected through voting by the members of the legislature, while the interior minister only had the option to agree or disagree with the result. In the Ketapang election, for example, there were three candidates for district head: P.J. Denggol supported by PD, Hercan Yamani supported by NU and Masyumi, and Tengku Muhammad supported by PNI. Hercan Yamani won the voting and became the head of Ketapang district (Noerachman 1959). In Pontianak City, Maizir Achmaddyns won the election, but was never sworn in as mayor because the minister vetoed the election result.

At the provincial level, throughout the period 1955 to 1960, PD formed alliances either with Masyumi or PNI, two major political parties in the DPRD. This was possible because Masyumi and PNI were always at odds with each other as a result of their rivalries at national level. Their animosity rendered the PD position safe from a possible coalition
between the two. After the 1955 election, PD formed an alliance with Masyumi. Masyumi secured the post of chairman of the Provincial Parliament for M. Fachrie Satok, and PD provided the deputy chairman position for Saijan Tiong. In return, PD secured two of the most strategic DPD departments: the General and Human Resources Department, and the Education and Health Departments. During the 1959 election for provincial executive head, PD decided to cooperate with PNI after Masyumi persisted in nominating its own candidate (Muzani A. Rani). PD supported the PNI candidate to be chairman of the Parliament (Abdussjukur). PD’s candidate, Oevaang Oeray, was later appointed as West Kalimantan executive head (kepala daerah). Cooperation with PNI ended at the election for governor/executive head (gubernur/kepala daerah) in 1959, because PNI decided to put forward its own candidate (R.P.N. Loemban Tobing). And as Masyumi had been banned, PD cooperated with the military and other political parties so its nomination could make it to the list of final recommendations to President Soekarno. Oeray was appointed by the President as the first governor/executive head of West Kalimantan.

How were these agreements possible when there had been tensions between Dayaks and non-Dayaks prior to 1950? One possible answer was a softening of PD’s attitude that made it more acceptable to other political parties. After the end of DIKB in 1950, PD had moved away from its ethnic approach to a more inclusive approach. Unlike the party objectives set out in 1947, party objectives in 1954 and 1958 omitted particular mention of Dayak interests. The 1954 and 1958 documents

78 The details of PD cooperation outlined hereafter came from a former PD politician (interview Bln) and were cross-checked with Sejarah perkembangan pemerintahan 1989:8-12.
79 Both were important positions for Dayak emancipation. Other departments were finance, public works, and social/economy. For details of DPD responsibilities and structure see UU 14 1956, UU No. 25/1956 and SK 17/1957/DPRD West Kalimantan.
80 Oeray’s nomination was not a result of an alliance with PNI as claimed by Davidson (2002:101).
81 The first limited ban was issued in September 1958 after indication of the party’s involvement in the revolts. General Nasution, the army chief of staff, ordered a ban on Masyumi and other political parties in areas that had supported PRRI or Permesta (Ricklefs 2001:321). The official ban was issued on 8 August 1960 (Keppres 200/1960). Other factors contributing to the ban were Masyumi’s enmity towards Soekarno and its opposition to Soekarno’s Guided Democracy (Ricklefs 2001:324-5; Mahendra 1999:51-2).
82 Interview with Bln.
83 Unlike in previous elections where the local DPRD could appoint directly the governor or bupati, from September 1959 the appointment was made by the minister of internal affairs (for the bupati) and president (for the governor position) (Cribb and Kahin 2004:109).
employed more general and inclusive terms such as ‘the oppressed’. This change in attitude came about to enable PD to fit in with other political parties at that time, but also partly because opportunities for Dayaks had improved greatly since 1945. Dayaks already had access to government positions, including some leadership positions, particularly after 1955 when PD secured many important positions in the bureaucracy and legislature. Their increasing inclusion in the government had softened their attitude.

From another perspective, it also appeared that some non-Dayak politicians began to acknowledge Dayaks’ marginalized conditions, and were more willing to support their demands for equal treatment. For example, in a letter of support for I. Kaping as the head of the Cultural Department of West Kalimantan (Kepala Djawatan Kebudayaan Kalimantan Barat) in January 1958, the provincial DPRD stated that Kaping was a ‘true native son’. Dayak candidates were often supported by other political parties. For example, a PD candidate, Palaunsoeka, was supported by Masyumi, NU, IPKI, and PSI as a candidate for the National Planning Council.

**SUMMARY**

The NICA and DIKB governments established after the end of WWII in West Kalimantan gave Dayaks their first opportunities to participate in political decision-making in the province. Several Dayaks were appointed to the provincial and district executive councils. These governments also devised policies that gave Dayaks a fair share in political and other arenas.

Some figures in the new government had a commitment to improving Dayak’s political status. One was A.H. Böhm who had worked closely with Sultan Hamid II, the head of DIKB. Behind their attitude was their realization that Dayak support was indispensable to sustain the DIKB.

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The DIKB was less popular among the Malay political elite outside DIKB itself, because they preferred the unitary state, and claimed DIKB was a puppet of the Dutch.

Two important Dayak institutions were established at this time. The first was the Dayak Affairs Office, whose task was to deal with any matters relating to Dayaks. Supported by the government at that time, DAO initiated efforts to address the greatest concerns of the post-war Dayaks, including such sensitive issues as the revival of feudal government, equality for Dayaks, freedom of religion, and Dayak education. The second institution, which turned into a political party, was Persatuan Dayak (PD). PD support for the pro-federal DIKB brought consequences after the DIKB was forced to disband. DAO as an instrument of the DIKB was dissolved following the disbandment of DIKB. The top PD leaders disappeared from provincial politics for a few years. PD, however, continued to operate and later took part in the elections in 1955 and 1958. Its achievement in both elections returned Dayak politicians to prominent positions. PD was able to put more members into provincial and several district parliaments than any other political party. With its greater numbers in the DPRD and some cooperation with other political parties, PD was able to win the position of governor and several district head positions.

One can conclude that the DAO and particularly the PD had successfully turned the once divided, weak, and non-political Dayaks into a solid and major political force in West Kalimantan. However, their success was possible due to the support of the two post-war governments. Without that support, emancipation movements started by some enlightened Dayaks would not have been able to go far because of the resistance they would have faced in everyday politics. Only with the support of the Dutch was the DAO able to secure some initial but important breakthroughs, particularly in obtaining concessions from the sultanates. Together with PD, DAO tried to tackle other problems, such as to improve the educational level of the Dayaks by establishing many schools in the interior regions. The quite dramatic transformation was also possible because of strong and united Dayak leadership, a result of the siege mentality and perception of the common enemy. However, as soon as the leadership broke down, the Dayak movements dissipated.
The decline of Dayak political movements (1960-1971)

As discussed previously, the first Dayak political party supported the Dutch colonials, and Dayaks and their party were some of the staunchest supporters of DIKB, a state created by the Dutch. After temporarily disappearing from provincial politics after DIKB was dissolved in 1950, they recovered quickly following PD’s wins in the 1955 and 1958 elections. The number of Dayaks finding positions in the bureaucracy started to increase, although they still represented a very small percentage of the civil service. Dayaks were appointed as executive heads in several districts, and a Dayak was appointed governor of West Kalimantan. This golden era for Dayak politics lasted for a little more than ten years (1955-1966). After 1966, however, Dayak political influence declined rapidly. From the end of the 1950s to the mid-1960s, Dayak politics underwent various life-saving processes, from PD to Partindo, and from Partindo to IPKI. Each process weakened Dayak politics even further.

BREAK-UP OF DAYAK POLITICS

At the end of the 1950s, Indonesia faced several political uncertainties. Liberal democracy did not provide stability to the nation because parliamentary governments failed to resolve the struggles between political parties. After years of deliberation, the Konstituante was still unable to reach compromise on the new constitution. Meanwhile, insurgencies were on the rise in some regions. Soekarno’s solution was to introduce the Guided Democracy system, in which the President became the power centre of Indonesian politics.

Under Guided Democracy, a new regulation, Penpres 7/1959, was introduced to regulate political parties, curb growing regionalism, and
limit foreign intervention in Indonesian politics. Under this regulation political parties could receive no foreign funding without government permission, and no foreigner could be a member of a political party. More importantly for local political parties, this regulation required each political party to have branches in at least a quarter of the provinces. PD was one of many regional parties whose constituents were based in certain areas and who could not fulfill this requirement.

PD’s four branches were all in Kalimantan.1 Within the other three Kalimantan provinces, only Central Kalimantan was strong enough in the 1958 general election to win enough votes to place a few representatives in the local parliament.2 Various sources claimed that there were efforts to set up new branches in Yogyakarta and other cities, where Dayaks were studying, but the number of Dayaks in these cities was very small. Dayak students were not united politically, especially those from outside West Kalimantan. Eventually, all efforts to set up additional branches failed.3

The only way to save the party was to merge into a larger national party. Internal party deliberations resulted in a decision that the new party should have a nationalist and not a sectarian (in this case, not religious) platform. This requirement automatically excluded the Catholic Party, a party favoured by Palaunsoeka, one of PD top leaders. Three other nationalist parties fulfilled these requirements: PNI, IPKI, and Partindo. PNI was a party with a history dating back to 1927; it had been established by Soekarno, who was a student at that time. IPKI was a relatively new party founded in 1954 by military veterans. Partindo was the newest party, established only in 1958.4 In 1959, the leaders of West Kalimantan PNI were S.H. Marpaung and Dr Soedarso, neither of whom a native of West Kalimantan. West Kalimantan IPKI was led by Ibrahim Saleh and Tan Husni Abdullah, both of whom were Malay. Partindo, as a newcomer in national politics, still had no office in West Kalimantan.

2 PD obtained three seats in the Central Kalimantan provincial DPRD. At the district level, only in Kapuas district did PD gain a significant number of seats (five) (‘Daftar angka hasil pemilihan DPRD 1958’, 1958, in: Collection of Robert Cribb, Canberra). The majority of Dayak votes of Central and East Kalimantan went to nationalist and Christian political parties.
3 Interviews with Kls and Ttg.
4 Partindo was founded on 29 April 1931 after the colonial government banned PNI, but fell into obscurity.
PD leaders realized that they would lose their dominance if they merged with PNI as PNI was already well established in West Kalimantan. Merging with the smaller IPKI probably required fewer compromises, but that party had few prospects. IPKI’s support came mainly from military veterans and their sympathizers. The next alternative was the newly established Partindo that had grown rapidly at the national level because of the personal links its leaders had with Soekarno, and its leftist leaning suited the political atmosphere. Partindo rose quickly to national prominence and by 1964 it already had several cabinet ministers. It claimed to be the purest adherent of Marhaenism, a very popular political concept in the 1960s.

The leadership of PD finally chose to merge with Partindo. One obvious reason for this decision was that merging with Partindo required the smallest political sacrifice; PD could preserve its structure and personnel because Partindo still had no presence in West Kalimantan. In fact, as far as West Kalimantan was concerned, the merger would be a mere change of party name, from ‘PD’ to ‘Partindo’. With a PD official letter signed by Saijan Tiong, deputy general chairman of PD, all PD branches, affiliates and leaders automatically became Partindo branches, affiliates and leaders on the day of the merger, 15 August 1961. Another reason was that Partindo had good political prospects, as explained above.

PD’s merger with Partindo had several political consequences: it signalled the end of Dayak political unity, inaugurated a more inclusive

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5 Asmara Hadi, the general chairman of Partindo, was a son-in-law of Soekarno. Partindo chairman, Winoto Danu Asmoro, was Chief Assistant to the President. Other Partindo leaders such as A.M. Hanafi, Armunanto, and Winarno Danuatmodjo were close confidants of Soekarno (Oei 1995:96; Rocamora 1975:233).

6 They were Sutomo Martopradoto, Oei Tjoe Tat, Adisumarto and Armunanto (Crouch 1978:195). Support for Partindo was also on the rise in some regions; Governor Oevaang Oeray of West Kalimantan and Governor Sutedja of Bali were members/sympathizers of the party. All Dayak _bupati_ in West Kalimantan, _bupati_ of Buleleng, and Tana Toraja were members or sympathizers of Partindo. See for example Bigalke 2005:416; Robinson 1998a:376.

7 Marhaenism was an ideology articulated by President Soekarno to describe the Indonesian version of Marxism.

8 PD chapters in South and Central Kalimantan seemed to have merged into PNI (Rocamora 1970:379).


political approach, and caused a rapid penetration of national politics into Dayak politics, including leftist influence.

**PARTINDO VERSUS PK**

Although officially all PD branches were instructed to merge with Partindo, a number of individuals chose not to join. The majority of this small faction led by Palaunsoeka joined the Partai Katolik (Catholic Party, PK).\(^{11}\) Prior to that, PK was a very small political party in the province. In the 1955 election, it obtained only 2,505 votes, or less than 0.6 per cent of the total provincial votes, and gained only one seat in the provincial DPRD. The very low number of votes it received in interior districts indicated that most Dayaks did not support the party.\(^{12}\)

Palaunsoeka’s preference for PK reflected the fact that he was a devout Catholic, but his decision could also have been influenced by his long-standing political ties with the party—close ties that started at the end of 1940s when as a member of national parliament, Palaunsoeka chose to affiliate with the PK Faction. This link led to closer cooperation between PD and PK in West Kalimantan during the 1958 local election, in which members of PK campaigned on the PD slate. Members of PK such as Lim Bak Meng (provincial level) and Paulus Tjong Bun On (Pontianak City) were listed in the legislature as PD representatives.\(^{13}\)

The Communist leanings within the Partindo leadership might also have contributed to Palaunsoeka’s decision to join PK (Davidson 2008:46). Palaunsoeka’s followers argued that the merger with Partindo would drive the Dayaks toward Communism.

Palaunsoeka’s role in PD surpassed Oeray’s. Palaunsoeka had been the founder of DIA, the predecessor of PD. He was the deputy chairman of the party in 1947, became one of the party chairmen in 1951, and then served as its general chairman until the party was defunct. However,

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\(^{11}\) He then became the general chairman of West Kalimantan PK, and later a member of the Central Leadership Board (DPP) of PK at the national level. Before the 1955 election, the party provincial chapter was headed by a Chinese, Lim Bak Meng, while the Singkawang chapter was headed by a Dayak, Agustinus Lanjo. According to one memoir, West Kalimantan PK was established by Lim Bak Meng in 1952 (Lim Bak Meng, ‘Riwayat perjuangan’, 1977, Lim Bak Meng, ‘Riwayat perjuangan’, 1978, in: Private collection, Pontianak).

\(^{12}\) Its highest number of votes was obtained in coastal regions: Sambas district with 1,001 votes, followed by Pontianak City with 744, and Pontianak district 532 votes. Other districts received negligible results between 28 and 75 votes each (Alfian 1971:135).

\(^{13}\) Interview with Bln.
he still failed to persuade a majority of the PD leadership to join PK. Davidson argues that Palaunsoeka’s years in Jakarta as a member of parliament had prevented him from having continuous contact with the local party leaders; as a consequence, he lost some of his personal influence within the PD leadership (Davidson 2002:108). On the other hand, unlike Palaunsoeka, Oeray was based in West Kalimantan and therefore was able to maintain his influence within the party (Davidson 2002:108). Oeray was general chairman in 1947 for only a short period and then became advisor to the party. However, his leadership during the first two years after WWII and his position in the executive council of DIKB had made him better known than Palaunsoeka. As the governor, he had influence over all important Dayak civil servants and members of the legislature, who were apparently also leaders of PD. One source also notes that Oeray was a more effective communicator capable of attracting larger audiences compared to the more bookish Palaunsoeka (Davidson 2002:108, 2008:41).

The rivalries between Oeray and Palaunsoeka and their respective followers began at the end of the 1950s and lasted through the first two decades of the New Order period. Initially Oeray accused Palaunsoeka of being a traitor because he had converted a PD seat in the National Parliament into a PK faction seat without consulting the party.14 Palaunsoeka accused Oeray of illegally merging the party with Partindo, because it was done without his approval. As general chairman Palaunsoeka was apparently absent from the meeting that approved the merger.15 After the leadership split, Governor Oeray excluded members of PK from important executive and legislative appointments. All members of provincial legislatures from the former PD who supported Palaunsoeka and joined PK, such as Lim Bak Meng, M. Andjioe, and Massoeka Djanting, were replaced. On several occasions, Oeray was also very critical of the Church authorities because generally they were

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14 PD cooperation with PK at the National Assembly before 1955 seems to have been a party decision, as besides Palaunsoeka, Djenani (the chairman of PD), also joined the PK faction. However, Palaunsoeka’s continuing membership in the PK faction after the 1955 election could have been a result of his individual decision or preference because by this time PD already had established its own faction in the Konstituante. There was no reason PD was not able to form its own faction at the National Parliament because there were at least three other political parties. Most only had one seat each yet had their own factions in the parliament (Parlaungan 1956:34). After the PD merger with Partindo, PD’s seat at the National Parliament became the seat of Partai Katolik.

15 Interviews with Bin and Syk.
PK supporters.\textsuperscript{16} Partindo’s acting director of the Civil Service Institute (APDN) allegedly prevented many candidates with PK background from joining the academy.\textsuperscript{17} Partindo supporters were also behind moves to thwart Palaunsoeka’s bid for the governorship in 1967, after Oeray was removed from power.\textsuperscript{18} On the other hand, PK members also opposed Partindo and Oeray’s leadership. PK had demanded Oeray’s resignation from early 1965, long before similar but more serious demonstrations were staged. In March 1965, together with other political parties such as PNI and Parkindo (a Christian Party), PK signed a resolution urging Soekarno to remove Oevaang Oeray from the governorship. In the letter, they accused Oeray of stirring up hatred between the native and non-native populations.\textsuperscript{19} During the pogrom against the Chinese in 1967, which will be discussed later, Palaunsoeka criticized Oeray and his supporters for being the instigators of the frenzied Dayak mobilization (\textit{Pembangunan}, 16-11-1967; \textit{Kompas}, 20-11-1967).

MORE INCLUSIVE POLITICS

PD seems to have embraced a more conciliatory approach toward other political parties since the mid-1950s. However, by and large PD was still an ethnic party. PD was Persatuan Dayak and its statutes clearly stated that PD was only for the Dayaks. Non-Dayaks who had genuine concerns for the Dayaks could only be extra-ordinary members.\textsuperscript{20} Partindo was far more inclusive than PD, although the majority of leaders and members of West Kalimantan Partindo were Dayaks. Unlike PD, Partindo was a nationalist party with open membership, and it had

\textsuperscript{16} Davidson 2002:108, 2008:46; Van Hulten 1992. Another reason for Oeray’s criticism of the Church was that its top leadership was always too much under the power and direction of Dutch priests (interview with Smd).
\textsuperscript{17} Interview with Lnj. Although the Director rejected the accusation, suspicions among the PK sympathizers about the exclusion were strong (interviews with Ttg and Lnj).
\textsuperscript{18} Some Partindo members went to Jakarta to assure the central government that Dayaks would not act against the decision to install a non-Dayak governor. This neutralized earlier demands from some other Dayaks for a Dayak governor (interview with Mgn).
\textsuperscript{19} Abi Hurairah Fattah (PNI), Chris F Hetharia (Parkindo), P.F. Soedjimin (PK), Ismail Hamzah (Angkatan 45), ‘Surat resolusi untuk meretul Gubernur Oevang Oeray’, 1965, in: Collection of St. Ngo Lahay, Pontianak. The text is not quite clear whether the native (\textit{suku penduduk asli}) referred solely to Dayaks.
a growing number of non-Dayaks in top leadership positions. After a party congress in 1964, West Kalimantan Partindo had four non-Dayaks, Ajub Akri, Slamet A.H., P. Susilo and Djufri Saleh, appointed to top leadership positions, while the Dayaks were represented by Ngo Lahay (as party chairman), Victor Oendoen and Hugo Mungok (Bintang Timur, 7-10-1964). Some non-Dayaks represented Partindo in the DPRD, such as Slamet A.H. and Ng Eng Soe at provincial level; Djufri Saleh, and Tan Bu Hiap in Pontianak City; Lim Soe Seng, and H. Minun Abdul Wahid in Pontianak district; and Tjong Hian Kong in Sambas. Pluralism within the party leadership would naturally prevent the party from taking an exclusively ethnic approach.

Compared to PD, Partindo sent fewer members to the DPRD. Regulation Penpres 4/1960 (June 1960) forced political parties, including Partindo, to give up some of their seats in order to accommodate the newly created functional groups (golongan karya) in the legislatures. Partindo also lost some of its DPD seats because of the implementation of the concept of nationalism-religion-Communism (Nasakom). This concept, which was introduced in 1960 by Soekarno (Mackie 1974:86), required the presence of each of these elements in every important government body. As Partindo had a larger number of seats in the DPD compared to other political parties, it was required to relinquish some of its seats to the Communist Party (PKI). At the provincial level, Dayak DPD members were reduced from two to one. Similar changes occurred at the district level. Partindo, therefore, needed more compromise and

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21 Tan Bu Hiap had an affiliation with Partindo and PKI, but decided to retain his PKI membership when he was asked to choose (interview with Djf). When he resigned from Partindo in 1963, his position in the DPRD was given to Djufri Saleh (‘Laporan kerja tahun 1963’, 1964, appendix, in: Library of West Kalimantan Governor’s Office, Pontianak).

22 ‘Laporan kerja tahun 1963’, 1964, pp. 8-15, in: Library of West Kalimantan Governor’s Office, Pontianak. Motives for non-Dayaks to want to join Partindo varied; a few joined because their Dayak superiors were Partindo leaders (interviews with Djf and Lnd). Strategically crafted leadership, such as Partindo in Sambas and Pontianak districts with their Senganan leaders (Dayak Muslims), attracted Muslim Malays to the party (interview with Idr).

23 After the Presidential decree in July 1959, the President moved to concentrate power in his own hands. In March 1960, the President dissolved the elected national legislature and created a new ‘mutual cooperation’ legislature (DPR-GR). In this new legislature, more than half (54 per cent) of members came from functional groups, all of whom were appointed by the President. The functional groups were introduced into the legislature in order to accommodate wider interests and most importantly to balance the role of political parties, which had destabilized the political system prior to the Guided Democracy, as can be seen from incessant cabinet reshuffles (Ricklefs 2001:324-5; Tas 1974:270-1). Members of functional groups were individuals or members of professional organizations that had no affiliation with any political party.
cooperation with other political parties in many issues which further made the party more inclusive in its outlook.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province/District</th>
<th>PD/Partindo</th>
<th>PNI</th>
<th>NU</th>
<th>PKI</th>
<th>IPKI</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>4 3</td>
<td>2 3</td>
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<td>Pontianak City</td>
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<td>Pontianak</td>
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<td>Sambas</td>
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<td>Sanggau</td>
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<td>Sintang</td>
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<td>Kapuas Hulu</td>
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<td>Total</td>
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<td>23 17</td>
<td>12 14</td>
<td>7 5</td>
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</table>

Table 5.1 Number of seats in parliament held by selected parties (1958, 1963)

West Kalimantan Partindo also became more inclusive because of the deeper influence of national politics on the province. The Dwikora campaign against Malaysia between 1963 and 1966 brought the relatively calm West Kalimantan to the forefront of national politics. This campaign required political repositioning and adjustment of all elements in West Kalimantan and brought together many political parties, some of which had been alienated from each other. National Partindo, as one of the most radical political parties and one of the main supporters of the campaign, drove the West Kalimantan Partindo to take part in the campaign. On many occasions Dayaks were mobilized to support the Dwikora campaign (Bebas, 30-7, 9-10, and 7-11-1963). This campaign nationalized the exclusive Dayaks and incorporated them more into national politics.
PARTINDO AND LEFTIST POLITICS

Since its inception, West Kalimantan Partindo had been plagued with accusations of being a Communist party. The accusation was rejected by its leaders, many of whom were Catholics, as baseless. Upon receiving the party chairmanship in August 1962, Ngo Lahay vowed to take action against any atheists within the party. On 24 March 1962, West Kalimantan Partindo protested and rejected the installation of a pro-Communist leadership in the party’s national headquarters.

Anti-left movements within West Kalimantan Partindo seemed to wither as national politics leaned left and as the Partindo governor (Oevaang Oeray) tried to emulate Soekarno, who was drawing closer to the left. Like the party at the national level, West Kalimantan Partindo developed close relations with Baperki (Oei 1995:98). This relationship is important to mention because at a later stage many Partindo leaders were detained because of their links with Baperki.

Baperki was a Chinese organization aimed at integrating the Chinese into the Indonesian community. Its national leader, Siauw Giok Tjhan, was known to have close relations with the PKI. West Kalimantan Baperki’s leftism was exhibited by some of their members, such as Pheng Zen Nen, who was also an important figure in PKI. Baperki’s chairman, Liem Kiong Wan was head of HSI, an affiliate of PKI. Some teachers in Baperki schools who were recruited from Java turned out to be volunteers from Pemuda Rakyat, another PKI affiliate. There was also a strong Chinese presence in PKI cadre lists (Hui 2007:132).

West Kalimantan Baperki, contrary to general belief, was a small organization with limited support from the Chinese population in the province. Most West Kalimantan Chinese, who did not have Indonesian

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26 National politics from the beginning of the 1960s had been characterized by the competition of two opposing political powers – the PKI and its groups versus the army, which was supported by anti-PKI political parties – and Soekarno who tried to manage them. However, closer to the end of his rule, Soekarno had grown increasingly close to the left (Crouch 1978:51-68; Feith 1964b; Ricklefs 2001:327-41).
27 Rachman et al. 1970:219, 225. HSI (Himpunan Sarjana Indonesia) was a scholar league established in early 1962 and linked to PKI (Feith 1964b, 1962).
28 Interview with Kpg.
citizenship papers, were culturally *totok* and generally uninterested in Indonesian politics. Consequently, they were not attracted to join Baperki, which had an orientation towards Indonesia. Furthermore almost all the leading figures of West Kalimantan Baperki, such as Liem Kiong Wan, Liem Djoe Siong, and Ong Cin Ciat, were not local Chinese. They remained aloof from the majority of the local Chinese because of their busy careers, their *peranakan* attitude and their inability to communicate in local Chinese dialects. A *peranakan* Chinese doctor from Java who worked for the government and who was also an official of Baperki in Pontianak district, recollected that he had never had close relations with the local Chinese because to them he was an outsider and a government agent. There were a few local Chinese who had obtained Indonesian citizenship and had joined Baperki, such as Ng Nyiap Liang, Ng Eng Soe, and Nio Peng Hian. However, they were still *totok* in their orientation. This lack of support from the West Kalimantan Chinese was the main reason why Baperki did not contest the 1955 and 1958 elections in West Kalimantan.

West Kalimantan Baperki differed greatly from its Jakarta headquarters in Jakarta, which was more active and more organized. One member of Baperki in Pontianak district, recollected that he had never had close relations with the local Chinese because to them he was an outsider and a government agent. There were a few local Chinese who had obtained Indonesian citizenship and had joined Baperki, such as Ng Nyiap Liang, Ng Eng Soe, and Nio Peng Hian. However, they were still *totok* in their orientation. This lack of support from the West Kalimantan Chinese was the main reason why Baperki did not contest the 1955 and 1958 elections in West Kalimantan.

The cultural concept of *totok* (or *singkeh*) referred to Chinese who were born in Mainland China and continued to live a Chinese lifestyle, particularly their use of the Chinese language. Those who were born in Indonesia and speaking local languages were known as *peranakan* (Suryadinata 2008:4). This differentiation is insufficient to explain the cultural identity of the Indonesian Chinese as it has become harder to categorize Chinese who were born in Indonesia but who still maintain many aspects of Chinese culture as well as speaking Chinese dialects, such as those in West Kalimantan, Medan, and Bangka.

Davidson (2002:129) asserts that the majority of Chinese had hardly any interest in Indonesian politics, since the majority of them were involved more in political developments in mainland China, did not have Indonesian citizenship, and spoke poor Indonesian. A military source noted that 95 per cent of the West Kalimantan Chinese by 1960 did not hold Indonesian citizenship. The percentage of alien Chinese had dropped to only 70 per cent in 1971. This number is based on the 1971 census which stated that the West Kalimantan population had around 226,216 Chinese, and that the province had 158,805 resident aliens (*Buku petunjuk teritorial daerah Kalimantan Barat*, 1972, pp. 54-5, 325-33, in: Library of West Kalimantan Governor’s Office, Pontianak). Most aliens in West Kalimantan were undoubtedly Chinese.

Language was an important element because many Chinese spoke Chinese dialects and only rudimentary Indonesian. In fact, in some places, they could not speak Indonesian at all. In these places, it was the native population who adapted by speaking Chinese. At that time many Chinese did not consider the Indonesian language as essential in their business activities; therefore they did not bother to learn it (interviews with Kpg, Nes and Ad; *Buku petunjuk teritorial daerah Kalimantan Barat*, 1972, p. 58, in: Library of West Kalimantan Governor’s Office, Pontianak).

This provides an answer to J.A.C. Mackie (1974:350) who was puzzled by the absence of Baperki in West Kalimantan during those two elections. A strong orientation of the West Kalimantan Chinese to their ancestral land between 1945 and 1966 was discussed in Hui (2007:Chapter II).
remembered West Kalimantan Baperki as a simple organization without any formal structure or regular meetings. Until its end it was still an organization based more on volunteering and spontaneity than on careful planning, because its core leaders were all busy professionals. Its profile depended much on its core leaders’ wide social and political contacts. One of its important programs was related to educational activities, such as establishing Baperki schools and inviting teachers from Java. It also planned to establish a university — an ambition that was never realized because of the abortive coup in 1965. The organization was registered at the governor’s office as an educational organization, and not as a political organization.

The political cooperation between the Dayaks and Chinese did not start with Baperki. During the heyday of PD, a few Chinese already represented PD in the local DPRD. In some districts, such as in Sanggau, a few Chinese officials ardently supported the PD. After the merger with Partindo, the number of Chinese in the legislature representing Partindo slightly increased: Ng Eng Soe, Tan Bu Hiap, Liem Soe Seng, and Tjong Hian Kong were elected into various DPRD. Cooperation with the Chinese would benefit Partindo financially and politically. Financially, the Chinese controlled much of West Kalimantan’s economy, and were

56 Interview with Kpg. For example, Liem Kiong Wan, its chairman, was a surgeon in the province and worked at the Pontianak General Hospital. Almost everyone of importance at that time knew him. Liem Djoe Siong was another doctor working at the government hospital in Pontianak. Ong Cin Ciat was a respected lawyer in Pontianak. Kwee Poo Gwan, the Baperki leader of Pontianak district, was the only government doctor in the district.

57 Interviews with Kpg and Nes. At the Baperki conference in August 1965 in Jakarta, West Kalimantan Baperki was praised for its success in opening 42 Baperki schools. According to one source, some teachers from Java were PKI cadres. The source reasoned that there were not so many teachers from Java who wanted to volunteer to become teachers in the jungles of West Kalimantan, except teachers from the Pemuda Rakyat, an affiliate of PKI (interview with Kpg). This keen interest in education was also evident in Baperki activities elsewhere (Ang 2009).


59 During its campaign in 1958, PD pamphlets in Sanggau district included a Chinese version side by side with the Indonesian version (‘Pilihlah Partai Persatuan Daya (P.D.)’, 1957, in: Private collection, Sanggau). This support was because of the influence of the Chinese head of the Sanggau civil registry, Ku Dji Hiun. He was the son of a former local Chinese Affairs official during the Dutch colonial period known as kapitan or laothai. He was allegedly one of the founders of Sanggau Baperki in 1965. After 1965, he safely exited from politics and asked for early retirement (various interviews).

potential financial contributors for the party’s activities.\textsuperscript{41} Politically, as the third largest ethnic group in West Kalimantan, the Chinese were potential supporters (for example by supplying manpower during political rallies and other resources) even though they were resident aliens.

Personal contacts between the leaders of West Kalimantan Partindo and Baperki may have begun in the early 1960s. At the national level, since the beginning of 1960 some Baperki leaders had already become leaders in Partindo, and vice versa (Oei 1995:90, 96). Formal cooperation between the two organizations in West Kalimantan was unlikely to have been established before 1964. An official invitation to Ngo Lahay, chairman of Partindo, to join Baperki was not issued until August 1965.\textsuperscript{42} Some Dayaks in Singkawang and Sanggau who became leaders of Baperki in their respective locales also claimed that the timing of their joining the organization was quite close to the coup.\textsuperscript{43} According to one Partindo official, the chairman of West Kalimantan Baperki, Liem Kiong Wan, was made one of the deputy chairmen of Partindo. Ngo Lahay and H.G. Mihing, two Partindo officials, also appeared in the provincial Baperki structure.\textsuperscript{44} In some areas, such as Singkawang and Sanggau, Partindo leaders led the setting up of Baperki. There West Kalimantan Partindo aimed to penetrate and seize the leadership of Baperki in Kalimantan in order to block the PKI’s influence on the schools of the Indonesian-Chinese.\textsuperscript{45} As it was party policy, many members of Partindo at the district level were automatically included in Baperki, sometimes without their knowledge.\textsuperscript{46}

Partindo’s leftist links were not limited to its association with Baperki. Partindo encouraged its members to join HSI, which at the national level was known as an affiliate of PKI. However, according to one figure within West Kalimantan HSI, West Kalimantan PKI did not list HSI as

\textsuperscript{41} One source mentions his close relations with the Chinese in the 1950s because of associations in setting up businesses (interview with Luj). Lim Bak Meng helped PD open a small trading company to raise funds for PD congresses (Davidson 2002:101).

\textsuperscript{42} Lahay’s letter to the chairman of West Kalimantan Baperki, declining the invitation to join Baperki, was dated 16 August 1965. Lahay referred to the invitation as ‘yesterday’s conversation’ (St. Ngo Lahay, ‘Tidak bersedia duduk didalam Baperki’, 1965, in: Collection of St. Ngo Lahay, Pontianak). However, two sources mentioned that Lahay later sat in Baperki leadership ranks (interviews with Bln and Mgk).

\textsuperscript{43} Interviews with Ssg and Wbd.

\textsuperscript{44} Interviews with Mgk and Bln.


\textsuperscript{46} Interviews with Ssg and Djn.
The decline of Dayak political movements (1960-1971) | 

an affiliate. The source claimed that the reason Partindo allowed its members to join HSI was that Partindo did not have its own university graduates’ association, as PNI did with its ISRI.

West Kalimantan Partindo also had some Communist sympathizers. One party top official claimed that Slamet A.H., one of the party deputy chairmen, often made pro-Communist comments. Slamet was officially expelled from the party in November 1965 after the party discovered that he was a Communist. Susilo, another of the party deputy chairmen, was also believed to be a Communist. He disappeared sometime after the coup. Occasionally some Partindo members in the government also purportedly made pro-Communist statements.

POLITICS IN THE EARLY NEW ORDER: PARTINDO AFTER THE COUP

In the morning of 1 October 1965, a group of army officers and Communist supporters under the command of the chief of the Presidential Guard (Cakrabirawa) kidnapped and murdered several top army generals. However, in less than three days the anti-coup forces under Major General Soeharto were able to overpower rebels in Jakarta. Soeharto and his supporters believed that the movement was a coup attempt by the PKI, and soon led a drive against the Communists. On 12 March 1966, a day after securing the Supersemar mandate to restore security, Soeharto dissolved the PKI. A week later he arrested fifteen cabinet ministers, an action followed by dismissals and suspensions of suspected government officials, military officers, and regional bureau-

47 Other known affiliates of PKI at the national level were Gerakan Wanita Indonesia (Gerwani, Indonesian Women’s Movement), Pemuda Rakyat (People’s Youth), Sentral Organisasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia (SOBSI, All Indonesian Trade Unions Federation), Barisan Tani Indonesia (BTI, Indonesian Farmers’ Front), and Lembaga Kebudayaan Rakyat (Lekra, League of People’s Culture) (Thomas 1981:372).


49 Interview with Mgk.


51 Interview with Smd.

52 Interviews with Djg, Mgk and Syk.

53 Supersemar was a short form of Surat Perintah Sebelas Maret or the Order of 11 March, the date when the mandate was issued by President Soekarno.
crats (Crouch 1978:195). Many who had links with the PKI and its affiliates were arrested, and in parts of Java, Bali, and Sumatra they were killed en masse. Soekarno was accused of knowing about the coup plan but not preventing it from happening and being reluctant to incriminate PKI. He was finally stripped of power in 1967 after failing to reverse the trend to unseat him.

The political tide after the coup changed, rapidly moving away from the left. Political parties that had a leftist and pro-Soekarno leaning were the main targets of the incoming regime. Partindo was automatically a target because it had close relations with Soekarno and aligned with the leftist elements, such as PKI, pro-left faction of PNI (known as Asu-PNI), Baperki, and HSI. Partindo had a close relationship with PKI and PNI because they shared a similar nationalist left platform. Partindo’s newspaper, Bintang Timur, was known for its radical and pro-left tone. To make the matter worse, on 4 October 1965, Partindo headquarters published a statement which described the coup movement as just a problem within the army (Alex Dinuth 1997:94). This statement resembled the rebels’ claim and was considered pro-coup. The new anti-Communist regime quickly suppressed Partindo and other leftist parties, although the regime never issued a formal instruction to ban Partindo. Many Partindo leaders, including those who held ministerial posts, were arrested (Crouch 1978:195). In mid-1967, the Jakarta military commander prohibited members of Partindo and organizations under it (onderbouw) to attend the legislature meeting. In 1968, the only two members of Partindo in the national legislature were discharged (Seperempat abad DPR 1970:382).

In a statement in April 1970, the Minister of Internal Affairs Amir Machmud, singled out Partindo as a leftist party and made its members ineligible to be elected (Van der Kroef 1971:219).

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54 USETPR 20-6-1966. The internal friction within the PNI at the beginning of 1965 resulted in the expulsion from the party on 4 August 1965 of right-wing leaders: Hardi, Mh. Isnaeni, Hadisubeno Sosrowardojo, Osa Malik, Karim M. Durjat, Muh Acmat, Sabitl Radjad, and several others. Practically until the establishment of the right-wing PNI on 6 October 1965, the party was under the influence of left-wing leadership. The right-wing PNI had Osa Malik as chairman, and Usep Ranawidjaja as secretary, and was therefore nicknamed PNI Osa-Usep. The left-wing had Ali Sastroamidjojo as chairman, and Surachman as secretary, and was therefore known as PNI Asu. At a reconciliatory party congress in April 1966 in Bandung, the right wing, with support from the regime, won the leadership (Sjamsuddin 1984b:21-121; Rocamora 1970). Surachman evaded arrest but was killed in an operation against the Communists between June and July 1968 in Blitar, East Java.

55 Van der Kroef (1971:123) described Partindo as ‘a left-wing and subsequently PKI-infiltrated offshoot of the PNI’. At the local level, PKI leaders were reported to have assisted Partindo (Rocamora 1975:229, 412).
In West Kalimantan, Partindo was also accused of being a political partner of the PKI (Rachman et al. 1970:218). One priority of the New Order government was the removal of the Partindo governor, Oevaang Oeray. While his direct ties with Communists were never established, apart from some cursory leftist comments, Oeray was a Soekarnoist. After a series of military-instigated student demonstrations to demand his resignation, Oeray was finally removed from the governorship on 12 July 1966 by a ministerial decision, instead of by presidential decree, and replaced by Colonel Soemadi, his deputy.

Following Oeray’s dismissal came the removal of all Dayaks from district head positions, and the replacement of many Partindo members of executive governing bodies (BPH) and other officials whose loyalty to the new regime was unclear. One high-ranking official at the governor’s office, who had direct knowledge of the events, gave two reasons: overdue replacement and lack of skills. All district heads had exceeded their terms since all were installed between 1958 and 1960. The govern-
Regime change and ethnic politics in Indonesia

ment also needed to refresh the leadership with more capable persons.\(^{63}\) However, the dismissals also could be seen as part of the purge of officials closely associated with the former regime as an opportunity to install pro-New Order officials. The government tactfully described their replacement as ‘ending term of service’ (selesai masa tugas). Honourable terminations were important to avoid social unrest since all officials were highly charismatic figures among the Dayaks because of their pioneering role in Dayak emancipation since the 1940s.\(^ {64}\) Oeray and almost all former Dayak district heads with ties to Partindo, however, remained active public servants. Oeray, for example, remained at the provincial office as a senior official until 1971, when he was transferred to Jakarta. He was occasionally given important tasks after being stripped of his governorship. In 1968, for example, he led a team of several district and provincial bureau heads to investigate trade opportunities in Kuching.\(^ {65}\) On 23 January 1971, he was appointed head of the Regional Screening Committee (PPD), a committee to screen legislature candidates for the 1971 election.\(^ {66}\) Others such as Bupati Djaoen and Djelani were appointed advisors to the new district heads, and later were transferred to work at the provincial office. By mid-1968, all district heads were active military officers, except in Sintang and Kapuas Hulu.\(^ {67}\)

Other than those changes, there were no prosecutions of West Kalimantan Partindo members who were not involved with PKI. In the first few years after the coup, their involvement with Baperki was not seen as a factor requiring prosecution. This was contrary to what was happening in other parts of Indonesia where many Baperki and Partindo leaders became the targets of military operations and were often arrested. One possible explanation for this exception was that the military acknowledged the rationale put forward by Partindo leaders for their involvement

\(^{63}\) Interview with Smd.

\(^{64}\) Already pro-New Order student demonstrations demanding Oeray’s dismissal had provoked counter-demonstrations from his Dayak supporters. However, effective and continuous counter-demonstrations were difficult to stage because Pontianak only had a small number of Partindo supporters. Dayak demonstrators who stormed the governor’s office to show their support of Oeray travelled a long distance from interior regions (interviews with Smd, Djk, Abs and Ttg). For the same reason, the governor who replaced Oeray had tried to prevent his arrest at the end of the 1960s (interview with Smd).


\(^{67}\) ‘Buku petunjuk teritorial daerah Kalimantan Barat’, 1972, pp. 40-8, in: Library of West Kalimantan Governor’s Office, Pontianak.
in Baperki. The leaders contended that their involvement in Baperki was to prevent Chinese schools from falling under Communist influence. The Baperki chairman had given some examples, such as the dismissal of several Communist teachers from Baperki schools in Pontianak, and almost no PKI influence was found in Baperki schools under the leadership of Partindo. In fact, many Dayak Partindo leaders helped the military campaigns uproot Communist insurgents in 1967 as one way to prove that they were not Communists.

The extensive purging in the bureaucracy that took place in some regions in Java did not occur in West Kalimantan. By June 1967, the regime only dismissed 275 employees from the whole West Kalimantan bureaucracy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Offices</th>
<th>Number discharged</th>
<th>Number of employees 1971</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Governor's Office</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>612</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kapuas Hulu</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>371</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sintang</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>377</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanggau</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>354</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pontianak</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>559</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sambas</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>546</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ketapang</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>396</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pontianak City</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>492</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Works</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>504</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forestry</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>3,337</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>1,185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>9,741</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.2 Dismissals of leftists from the West Kalimantan bureaucracy (by June 1967)


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bureaucracy. The highest number of dismissals occurred in Pontianak and Sambas district offices. Purging was apparently more severe in departments or offices that had leaders who were close to the Communists, such as the Public Works Office, where 45 people were dismissed.\textsuperscript{69} One source notes that there were significant number of dismissals in the postal service, which was headed by Slamet A.H., the deputy chairman of Partindo.\textsuperscript{70}

West Kalimantan did not experience the extensive leftist prosecutions that happened elsewhere. The relatively small number of Communists in West Kalimantan meant that they were not a threat to the military. Their representatives in DPRD and the BPH were the result of centrally imposed \textit{Nasakomization} and did not represent its real political force. One reliable government source confirmed this by stating that he even had difficulties between 1964 and 1965 to find PKI figures to be placed in the Sintang and Kapuas Hulu DPRD, as part of \textit{Nasakomization}.\textsuperscript{71} The political map of West Kalimantan in 1960 estimated PKI to have support of only around 2.5 per cent, a very small figure compared to Partindo’s 30 per cent, the Catholic Party’s 23 per cent, PNI’s 22 per cent, and NU’s 21 per cent. PKI also had little political support at the district level except in Pontianak City. After the coup, the military estimated that around 3,500 persons needed to be investigated in the province (Rachman et al. 1970:226).

The lack of popular support meant the Communist Party could not mobilize enough power to intimidate their opponents or to initiate Communist unilateral action (\textit{aksi sepihak}) in West Kalimantan (Davidson 2002:137). Intimidation and unilateral action in Java that contributed to the enmity behind mass killings seemed to be absent in West

\textsuperscript{69} The head of the provincial Public Works Office was W.S. Silitonga who was also the head of the West Kalimantan HSI (Abdulsalam 1997:74). Together with another HSI figure, Tanting Ngo, he was convicted in October 1965, rehabilitated a month later (Ryacudu, ‘Surat keputusan tentang rehabilitasi 2 orang anggota bekas HIS’, 1965, in: Collection of St. Ngo Lahay, Pontianak) but then dismissed from his position in mid-1966 (Abdulsalam 1997:74). Bambang Soemitro, PKI leader before S.A. Sofyan, was once the head of the provincial Public Works Office (Davidson 2002:130). The heads of the offices in Ngabang and Sintang were also linked with Communists (interview with Mjg). The strong Communist influence in these offices was confirmed by Van Hulten (1992:66-7).

\textsuperscript{70} Interview with Bln.

\textsuperscript{71} Interview with Smd.
Kalimantan. Before the time of the mass murder of the Communists taking place in other regions, the West Kalimantan military had already suspended PKI activities on 16 October 1965 (Rachman et al. 1970:225).

The Regional Military Commander Ryacudu and Governor Oeray, the two most powerful men in West Kalimantan at that time, were Soekarno loyalists and allegedly lenient in purging the suspected Communists. For example, two HSI figures, Tanting Ngo and W.S. Silitonga, who were convicted on 19 October 1965, were rehabilitated by Ryacudu a month later after a personal written guarantee from Governor Oeray.

**PARTINDO AND IPKI**

Although West Kalimantan Partindo initially was spared from persecutions that other branches experienced, its leaders knew the danger was imminent and the future of the party was bleak. One party official recalled that shortly after the coup, Partindo’s headquarters were moved from central Pontianak to a rather obscure place beside a rented motorcycle workshop, and that its leaders were in semi-hiding. The dismissal of Oeray in July 1966 ended the remaining source of protection for Partindo.

Unlike Partindo in other places where the party had disbanded itself or was frozen by local authorities, West Kalimantan Partindo still officially existed. The new regime wanted to handle West Kalimantan Partindo carefully to avoid unnecessary political and social risks. By 1965 Partindo was undoubtedly the largest force in West Kalimantan politics, at least in terms of membership. Its leaders were highly charismatic for many of its large Dayak followers. Rather than disbanding the party, a move that could create unrest, the regime merged it into a trusted politi-
cal party, IPKI. Facilitated by the military, West Kalimantan Partindo leaders convened an extra-ordinary party conference on 26 September 1966 to declare the merger. West Kalimantan IPKI officially accepted the merger on 28 September 1966, followed by military approval on 6 October 1966. The regional Military Commander, Ryacudu, approved the merger on 16 October 1966 and instructed that this ‘Partindo solution’ be disseminated as widely as possible.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province/District</th>
<th>IPKI*</th>
<th>PK</th>
<th>PNI</th>
<th>NU</th>
<th>PKI</th>
<th>MURBA</th>
<th>PSII</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>West Kalimantan</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pontianak City</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>28.8</td>
<td>31.9</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pontianak</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>37.4</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sambas</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>33.2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanggau</td>
<td>39.2</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sintang</td>
<td>42.8</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kapuas Hulu</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>28.8</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ketapang</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>35.6</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.3 Estimation of strength of political parties in West Kalimantan (percentage in 1960)

*In 1960, IPKI was, in effect, Partindo.


75 The role of the military in the merger was quite evident, as it wanted to solve the problem. In his merger speech, Ngo Lahay, the chairman of Partindo, also indicated the important roles of Regional Military Commander Ryacudu, and his aide, Lieutenant Colonel Siswojo Atmodihardjo (appointed as mayor of Pontianak City in 1967), in the merger process. He also mentioned other important figures in Jakarta who were involved in the process, namely General Nasution, Professor Umar Senoadj, and Brigadier General Sukendro (Stephanus Ngo Lahay, ‘Pidato pernjataan Partindo Kalbar diedarkan dalam IPKI’, 1966, in: Collection of St. Ngo Lahay, Pontianak). One participant at the conference on 26 September 1966 also recalled the role of the military officials in preparing and setting up the conference (interview with Kdr).


There were several reasons behind the military preference for IPKI over other political parties. IPKI was only a small political party supported by military retirees and veterans, and most importantly a strong supporter of the New Order. The regime’s trust in IPKI could be seen in a similar case in North Sumatra, where the regional military commander, Sarwo Edhie Wibowo, preferred that ex-members of PNI join IPKI (Sjamsuddin 1984b:180-6). The merger of Partindo into IPKI would give the government access to control over leaders and the large number of followers of the former Partindo. For Partindo, merging into the military-backed IPKI was the safest option because of the growing power of the military within the new regime. Association with the military could also neutralize the party’s past links with the left. Also, IPKI’s nationalist platform was more acceptable for predominantly non-Muslim Dayak members of Partindo.

Merging with other parties was less desirable for Partindo. The Catholic Party was not a viable option because of the conflict between the elite of the two parties, as mentioned previously. Joining Islamic parties was also not an option because of its predominantly non-Muslim Dayak members. Joining another nationalist party, PNI, was not desirable either for Partindo or the regime. Partindo would not want to merge with the Soekarnoist PNI, which had become one of the main enemies of the new regime. In Sumatra and many provinces in Java, the military had urged the dissolution of the PNI (Sjamsuddin 1984b:180-6). The regime also did not encourage merger with PNI, as it did not want to see a stronger PNI. It was not possible to merge with Sekber Golkar (hereafter Golkar), which had not yet emerged as a political force and was not yet recognized as the political vehicle for the new regime.

Unfortunately, not long after the merger, problems began to emerge for the new party in July and August 1967. The national IPKI leader,

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78 Following the merger, Partindo quickly forged a new alignment with the New Order and shed all remaining ties with its leftist past. A letter from Sanggau IPKI dated 3 October 1966 showed that Partindo’s affiliates had changed their names to include the term ‘Pancasila’. For example: Gerakan Pemuda Indonesia became Gerakan Pemuda Pancasila; Gerakan Tani Marhaen became Gerakan Tani Pancasila; Gerakan Serikat Buruh Indonesia became Kesatuan Buruh Pancasila, Wanita Indonesia became Gerakan Wanita Pancasila (‘Pengumuman peleburan Partindo Kalimantan Barat beserta semua organisasi massanya kedalam Partai Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia (IPKI)’, 1966, in: Collection of St. Ngo Lahay, Pontianak). Because of this merger, West Kalimantan IPKI inherited a few ‘extra’ affiliates which did not exist in other IPKI branches.

79 Sekber Golkar was established in October 1964 by the military in order to coordinate army-civilian cooperative bodies to counter growing political influence of PKI (Ricklefs 2001:334).
Brigadier Sukendro, was detained in a wave of arrests to uproot pro-Soekarno elements within the military.80 The role of General Nasution, one of the founders of the New Order who was considered the founder and benefactor of IPKI, also declined after 1968 because of his growing opposition to the newly elected president.81 Towards the end of the 1960s, Golkar had emerged as the sole political vehicle of the regime; consequently, other political parties had lost influence. This overall trend at the national level weakened IPKI considerably. The condition of West Kalimantan IPKI was even worse; internal friction between the original members (the Malays) and new members (the Dayaks), had weakened the party considerably.

MANOEUVRES TO SUPPORT GOLKAR

By 1969, Soeharto had strengthened his position. He had not only successfully secured support from the central and regional bureaucracies, but had also installed his loyalists in most key military positions by eliminating or sidelining dissident officers.82 On the economic front he had stabilized the economy and had embarked on the first Five Year Development Plan (Repelita). Concerned about legitimizing his regime, Soeharto decided to call the election, which had been postponed since 1968.

At the beginning of his regime, Soeharto did not plan to use Golkar as the main political machinery to contest the election. As mentioned above the regime had encouraged certain political parties in the regions to merge with IPKI. The regime’s cultivation of relations with political parties such as PNI led many to believe that it would be cooperating with those parties in the post-election government (Crouch 1978:265; Van der Kroef 1971). Golkar leaders themselves only aspired to be one of the big three in the election (Crouch 1978:264-5). Only as the 1971 election

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80 Van der Kroef 1971:98. In 1965, Sukendro was Army Intelligence Chief and an ally of General Yani who was killed in the 1965 coup attempt. He then became a minister in the Second Revised Dwikora Cabinet (March-July 1966). Nasution speculated that Sukendro was arrested for trying to help Soekarno out (Nasution 1988:8-9).

81 General Nasution was a target in the 1965 coup attempt, but escaped. He was appointed chairman of MPRS from 1966 and had chaired sessions of the Provisional MPR that revoked the presidential mandate of Soekarno in 1967. Nasution’s political influence and independent views started to distance him from the new regime. He was eased out from the New Order power circle after the Provisional MPR sessions in March 1968, and finally retired from the army in 1972 (Nasution 1998:Chapter VIII).

approached did the regime decide to use Golkar as its sole vehicle to win the election. This had the effect of increasing the regime’s hostility toward other political parties.

To weaken other political parties, the government used Opsus to instigate internal party struggles.\footnote{Sebastian 2006:456. Opsus was set up by Soeharto during the Irian Barat campaign (1963-1966) to compile political intelligence and at times was used by the President to conduct sensitive foreign diplomatic assignments. Ali Murtopo headed the unit for many years. Opsus was linked to the implementation of the Act of Free Choice in 1969, through which Irian Barat became a province of Indonesia. It was also involved in negotiations with Portugal regarding East Timor in the mid-1970s (Kingsbury 2003:128-9; Sebastian 2006:45-6).} The main objective of this intervention was to remove the recalcitrant or pro-Old Order leaders before the election and establish control over the parties under new leaderships. All the major political parties, NU excepted, as well as other functional and professional groups, such as associations of journalists (PWI), lawyers (Persahi), and medical doctors (IDI), were subjected to internal purges. With the support of the regime, the pro-New Order leaders of those organizations won the contests and subsequently collaborated consciously with the regime (Crouch 1978:245-72; Nishihara 1972:21-2; Ward 1974:17-9).

Policies and regulations were also engineered to help Golkar win. Permen 12/1969, promulgated in December 1969, required members of the functional group in national, provincial and district legislatures to sever their affiliations with political parties. Since this group occupied more than half of the parliamentary seats, their switch to Golkar was a windfall for Golkar. Political parties resented this new requirement since many members of the functional group in the Parliament had links with them (Ward 1974:11). For example, 76 of the 242 members of the functional group in DPR-GR were affiliated with political parties (Crouch 1978:247-8). Similar severings of ties also happened in West Kalimantan, where many of the legislators became members of Golkar.\footnote{‘Laporan kerja tahun 1963’, 1964, pp. 8-9, ‘Laporan umum Gubernur Kepala Daerah Propinsi Kalimantan Barat kepada menteri dalam negeri’, 1970, pp. 14-5, ‘Buku petunjuk teritorial daerah Kalimantan Barat’, 1972, p. 81, in: Library of West Kalimantan Governor’s Office, Pontianak. F.X. Jos Diit Sinsang, who was a member of Partindo and then IPKI, was appointed by Golkar as a Member of Parliament representing intellectuals from Golkar. He wrote a letter of resignation to Golkar in March 1970 explaining that according to regulation Permen 12/1969 he could not be a member of a political party (IPKI) while holding a seat representing a functional group (EX. Jos Diit Sinsang, ‘Surat pengunduran diri dari keanggotaan DPRD-GR dari Gol. Kar. Tjendekianan Kabupaten Sambas’, 1970, in: Collection EX. Jos Diit Sinsang, Singkawang). Diit Sinsang was arrested in early 1971.}
Another policy, PP 6/1970, aimed at preventing civil servants from supporting political parties was promulgated in February 1970. This policy cut off ties between the political parties on the one side and civil servants and army members on the other. This created a serious problem for parties, particularly for PNI, which received strong support from the civil service. Civil servants in West Kalimantan, as in many other places, were also required to give their loyalty only to Golkar (monoloyalitas). For example, all sub-district heads in Sanggau district were asked to sign a statement called Pernyataan Bersama Camat Sekabupaten Sanggau (Declaration of Sub-District Heads in Sanggau District). In the statement dated 7 April 1970, they declared the severing of their ties with political parties. In effect, the local bureaucracy had no choice but to ensure Golkar won the election or face disciplinary actions from the regime.

**GOLKAR, IPKI AND THE ELECTION OF 1971**

Internal friction within West Kalimantan IPKI between the original Malay members and new former Partindo Dayak members started to appear soon after the merger. The original Malay members of the party were not satisfied with the merger, as they were not much involved in the process. The merger decision was made by the regime and party headquarters in Jakarta and organized by them. Malay leaders in the party were also dissatisfied with their loss of their dominance in the party leadership because of the growing influences of Dayak leaders within the party. In terms of the ethnic composition before the merger, West Kalimantan IPKI was basically a Malay party, but after the merger, Dayak figures penetrated every part of its leadership structure. Party organization structure on 28 October 1966 showed that at least 40 per cent of party officials were Dayaks (18 out of 43), and Oevaang Oeray was made the Advisor to the party. Malay dissatisfaction was exacerbated by the rather high expectations of the new Dayak members, whose party...

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85 The law only included military and the police, employees in the defence ministry, and other civil servants as stipulated by the President, but in practice almost all civil servants were bound by this regulation (Ward 1974:12).


87 During the New Order regime it was quite common that officials who failed to win for Golkar in the election be demoted. Civil servants who were known to support other political parties were usually required to resign from their government jobs.
was once much more influential than IPKI. Internal friction between the Malays and Dayaks was inevitable.

In 1968, Tan Husni Abdullah, the Malay chairman of IPKI, decided to expel all ex-Partindo members from the party. He reasoned that some of them were involved in the banned organizations, such as Baperki, HSI, and PKI. However, this decision was annulled by headquarters on the basis that before the merger all ex-Partindo members in the party at that time had obtained security clearances after thorough military screenings. IPKI headquarters then took over the party leadership of the province to prevent further disintegration (IPKI 1971). On 27 February 1970, the headquarters gave a mandate to Ibrahim Saleh, a Malay founder of West Kalimantan IPKI, to form a new party leadership. The final party leadership, legalized on 16 June 1970, included only 28 per cent Dayaks (6 out of 21). Most former senior Partindo members were excluded from the new structure, very likely in order to reinstate Malay supremacy in the party and to prevent the development of a stronger Dayak influence in the party leadership.

As the 1970 election approached, calls for the arrest of ex-Partindo members within IPKI emerged. In the beginning, the new Regional Military Commander Soemadi (note that the governor also had the same name), who was installed just a few months earlier, issued a statement to back his predecessor’s stand on the ‘innocence’ of West Kalimantan Partindo. The statement on 7 October 1970 ruled that Partindo was not an illegal party, and ex-Partindo members in IPKI who had ties with Baperki were allowed to conduct political activities as long as they were not involved in the 1965 coup nor had become underground members of PKI. Nevertheless, mounting pressure forced Ngo Lahay, the former chairman of Partindo and at that time a member of provincial

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90 The military commander before Soemadi was Antonius Johannes Witono Sarsono (July 1967-April 1969). Prior to Witono was Ryacudu (September 1963-July 1967). For the complete list of the military commanders from the 1950s to 1980s, see Army territorial commanders 1983:117.
legislature representing IPKI, to resign on 11 October 1970. On 15 January 1971, after almost four-and-a-half years since the 1965 coup, the military decided to arrest some core ex-Partindo/Baperki members: Ngo Lahay, H.G. Mihing and Tanting Ngo in Pontianak; M. Idris and Diit Sinsang in Sambas area; and Phillips Neng in Sanggau. All were barred from public gatherings and were not allowed to participate in the 1971 election. Another Partindo figure, E.D. Tundang, who headed a government office, was charged with corruption and arrested on 2 March 1971.

The remaining but the most important target, was former Governor Oeray, who was still active working at the governor’s office at the time of those arrests. With the rank of resident, he was one of the highest active civil servants at the provincial level, who was not on Golkar’s side. He maintained his political association with IPKI, and was listed as the party’s main candidate for the election. Understanding Oeray’s influence, the military commander, who had the final say on the list of legislature candidacies, keep Oeray’s candidacy, but demoted his position to number 20 on the list, an unelectable position. Oeray, who was at the time the head of the Regional Screening Committee, was not satisfied with the change. Facing Oeray’s defiant attitude, the military commander planned to arrest him. However, Governor Soemadi was not keen on having Oeray arrested, fearing that it could create unnecessary political risks that could disturb the election which was due in four months’ time and undermine his authority. He asked the minister of internal affairs to promote Oeray and used the promotion as a pretext to transfer him to Jakarta. The minister agreed and issued the promotion on 28 February 1971. On 9 March 1971, approximately a week after the promotion, the letter for his transfer was out. Knowing of the scheme to uproot him

92 Soenandar Prijosoedarmo, ‘Menyetujui pemberhentian sdr. Stephanus Ngo Lahay’, 1971, in: Collection of St. Ngo Lahay, Pontianak. By this time, Ngo Lahay although still a member of IPKI, was removed from the leadership structure in June 1970. The only senior Dayak leaders in the structure were E.D. Tundang, A. Sawa, and Asam Djarak. Tundang would soon be arrested, while Sawa and Djarak would be joining Golkar.

93 A higher court in Jakarta found he was not guilty and ordered his release on 24 September 1973 (Akcaya, 18-4-1977).

94 Another party figure in the bureaucracy, Dr Soedarso from PNI, was forced to retire shortly before the election.

95 ‘Laporan Gubernur Kepala Daerah/ketua Panitia Pemilihan Daerah Tingkat I Kalimantan Barat’, 1971, in: Library of West Kalimantan Governor’s Office, Pontianak. The original position of Oeray in the list was not disclosed, but probably was within the top five.

96 Interview with Smd.
from his power base in Pontianak, Oeray initially refused to comply with the transfer.\(^97\) Not until 20 March 1971 did he finally decide to leave; it was clear that arrest by the military was imminent if he refused to board the plane to Jakarta.\(^98\)

The arrests of the former Partindo members in January 1971 and removal of Oeray were the regime’s last resort after persuasion to make them affiliate with Golkar failed.\(^99\) Their arrests had been delayed several times since the first arrest warrant was issued in December 1969 and then again on 2 November 1970.\(^100\) This delay gave time for the military and Golkar to persuade the ex-Partindo members of IPKI to switch sides. An internal IPKI document explains that some time in 1969, the West Kalimantan military authority sent Lieutenant-Colonel Nurdin Djain to Jakarta to persuade the leaders of the national IPKI to allow all ex-Partindo members of West Kalimantan IPKI to be transferred to Golkar. This request was rejected by IPKI headquarters. The document also disclosed Golkar’s approaches to recruitment of members of West Kalimantan IPKI, particularly those from lower echelons.\(^101\) Various personal interviews also confirm that the military threatened ex-Partindo members with imprisonment if they refused to join Golkar. Prior to the election a document was circulated which contained the names of more than ten leaders of the former Partindo in Pontianak who were to be arrested – undoubtedly putting more pressure on the Dayak leaders to switch to Golkar.\(^102\)

The military and the regime efforts finally paid off within a month of Oeray’s departure to Jakarta. On 17 April 1971, five senior Dayak leaders, A. Djelani, P. Anjiem, I. Kaping, A. Sawa, and J.A.M. Linggie, together with other Dayak figures, publicly announced that they were joining Golkar. Two of them, A. Sawa and Asam Djarak, were IPKI

\(^{97}\) Interviews with Bln and Syk.
\(^{98}\) For the dates, see *Varia* 1971/6:25. The central government once contemplated removing Oeray from West Kalimantan after the 1967 conflict (interview with Mgn; Doera 2003:122).
\(^{99}\) Oeray’s refusal to switch to Golkar had influenced many of his followers not to join Golkar.
\(^{100}\) These were based on private communications from Diit Sinsang to Oevaang Oeray (FX. Jos Diit Sinsang, ‘Persoalan keanggotaan ex Baperki dari rekan2 ex Partindo Kab. Sambas’, 1970, in: Collection FX. Jos Diit Sinsang, Singkawang), as well as official documents from IPKI (Achmad Sukarmadidjaja and H. Djilis Tahir, ‘Partai IP-KI Kalbar’, 1971, in: Collection of St. Ngo Lahay, Pontianak). According to Sinsang, the instructions were based on Kogam Instruction No. 9/1965 that all officials of Baperki be classified in ‘B Group’, and if they were civil servants they should be dishonourably discharged.
\(^{102}\) Interview with Laj.
officials in the new structure formed in June 1970. The others were probably still members or sympathizers of IPKI before they decided to join Golkar. In the statement, they advised other Dayaks to follow suit and give assistance to local authorities, especially the military commander, to make a success of the election and the development program of the New Order. A special taskforce was formed to inform local Dayaks about the change in political alignment of their leaders. On 19 May 1971, Nurdin Djain, this time as general chairman of West Kalimantan Golkar, instructed these Dayak figures to campaign for Golkar. On 24 May 1971, these Dayak leaders announced that thousands of Dayaks had chosen to join Golkar. In the same document they also denied rumours that they had been coerced into joining Golkar by intimidation.

Pressure on IPKI and other political parties increased as the election approached. Golkar and the military rightly had concerns about IPKI, because it had become one of the largest political parties in West Kalimantan following its absorption of Partindo. Some district Regional Governing Councils (Muspida) had urged IPKI branches to disband themselves. The head of Ketapang IPKI at that time, for example, decided to dissolve the party upon receiving advice from the local military commander. Six of the party’s candidates, most possibly of ex-Partindo background, were disqualified by the local military commander. That number was the highest among the political parties in the province (Nishihara 1972:59).

During the election campaign, political parties in many areas were intimidated and unable to campaign properly. The head of Pontianak district IPKI, who was later to become a member of Golkar, recollected being detained and intimidated by the military so that he joined Golkar. Similar intimidation was felt in Sintang and very likely also in other interior districts. In contrast, Dayak leaders campaigned freely

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105 Political pressure and intimidation toward political parties were also common in many parts in Indonesia as the regime tried hard to ensure that Golkar won. The phenomenon of self-dishandling of political parties as the result of political pressure was quite common at this time.
107 Interview with Smj.
108 Interview with Shd.
109 Interview with Mjg.
The decline of Dayak political movements (1960-1971)

for Golkar. In the end, West Kalimantan IPKI managed to get only two seats in the provincial DPRD, the fifth rank after Golkar, NU, Parmusi and PK. Both seats were given to Malays—the first and third candidates. The second candidate on the list, Herman Imang Ngo—a Dayak, who should have been elected—was bypassed. No doubt Dayak votes had contributed significantly to the winning of those two IPKI seats. As an illustration, the sub-district head of Meliau during the election explained that the party won 100 per cent of the votes in some remote Dayak villages under his control. He found out later that the Dayaks in these areas were not aware of the recent changes in the political affiliation of their leaders to Golkar.

DAYAK POLITICS AND CONFLICT IN 1967

Communists and their sympathizers had become the target of the purging operation throughout Indonesia after October 1965. In some regions in Java, Bali, and Sumatra, the anti-Communist mobs supported by the army rounded up and killed suspects Communists en masse. In Java and Bali, mass killing intensified as soon as the RPKAD, a crack unit within the army, came to the regions. The military and the police were also reported to allow or even encourage the murders to take place (Cribb 1990).

Conflict of a different nature also occurred in West Kalimantan some time after the mass killing elsewhere had stopped. Between September and November 1967, tens of thousands of Chinese who lived in the northern part of the province were driven out from their homes by Dayaks. Many of those Chinese who refused to move or who retreated too late were killed. The official record was 249 deaths and almost 60,000 refugees at the end of the conflict. There has been a strong belief among scholars that the Dayaks were not capable of inflicting such

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110 IPKI obtained no seat at the national level and ranked only ninth out of ten parties in West Kalimantan.

111 According to one ex-Partindo member, at this time, ex-Partindo leaders were only guests in IPKI. Important decisions were in the hands of Tan Husni and Ibrahim Saleh, both Malays (interview with Shd).

112 Interview with Omr.

cruelty on the Chinese without a third party being involved — such as, in this case, the army (Davidson 2002, 2008; FEER 1968). Members of the Dayak political elites who had just lost their positions were also suspected of waging war on the Chinese to show their allegiance to the new regime and at the same time to regain its trust. This section will re-investigate these claims by examining some new evidence.

**CHRONOLOGY OF THE CONFLICTS**

The spark of conflict had begun at least a week earlier than the commonly cited 14 October 1967 in Uduk Village. A confidential report prepared by the governor’s office listed earlier Dayak attacks between 5 and 7 October, when they burned and looted Chinese houses in Tepo village, Air Besar (Landak), adjacent to Sanggau Ledo (Bengkayang). These acts were followed by similar incidents in the Bengkayang subdistrict from 13 October, which prompted the worried Chinese to seek refuge in Bengkayang City. In one incident, the Dayaks killed several Chinese in Sansak village in retaliation for the rebel attack on a nearby Uduk village. The rebels, as will be discussed below, were mostly Chinese. By 18 October Bengkayang City already sheltered about one thousand refugees. On 19 October Dayaks in Samalantan (Bengkayang) started to distribute ‘red bowls’, a Dayak call for mass mobilization for war. After the distribution of the red bowl, Dayak mobilization against the Chinese intensified, and the conflict had evolved into a traditional war in which all adult Dayak men were obliged to join the call to fight the enemy (in this case, the Chinese).

Sporadic killings had occurred from mid-October although the more deadly killings did not occur until after 28 October 1967. The three most deadly attacks happened during the first and second weeks of November in Senakin, Darit and Sebadu, all in Landak district, and claimed a total of 210 lives. Only after these attacks did the military commander, on 17 November, order the Dayaks to stop the demonstrations and ordered

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114 For such an oversight, see FEER 21/27-1-1968, Davidson 2008:66-7; Rachman et al. 1970:271.
the army to shoot on the spot those who refused to comply. The demonstrations dissipated after this injunction although a government report still mentioned occasional clashes up to the end of November 1967.

**CONDITIONS PRIOR TO THE CONFLICTS**

After 1963, West Kalimantan had become a frontier for the Indonesian campaign against the formation of the Malaysian Federation by the British government. Indonesia sent its military forces and volunteers to Sumatra and Kalimantan, which shared a border with Malaysia. In West Kalimantan, it sheltered and trained Sarawakan guerrillas so that they could be sent back into British Borneo to disrupt the formation process (Rachman et al. 1970:232-5). Between October and November 1965 there were 2,313 volunteers in the province (Davidson 2008:55).

Activities of the guerrillas were relatively undisturbed during the political transition in Indonesia between 1965 and early 1967. In fact, after the abortive coup, the government continued its anti-Malaysia campaign and therefore would not dispense with the rebels (Rachman et al. 1970:240). The Indonesian military still conducted guerrillas training as late as August 1966 (Davidson 2002:133). Anti-Communist drives in the province initially were not directed at the Communist guerrillas who were fighting the establishment of the Federation of Malaya, but against members of PKI and its sympathizers. Because of this condition, the activities of Communist rebels in Indonesian Kalimantan seemed to regain their vigour whereas Communist activities elsewhere had almost stopped (Davidson 2008:66; Van der Kroef 1968a:251-2). One source, for example, mentions a number of incidents related to the increased PKI activities in coastal towns between August and November 1967 (Davidson 2008:66).

Initially the Indonesian government did not perceive rebels as a threat because their political aim was to sabotage the formation of the Federation of Malaysia by overthrowing the Sarawakan government.

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119 Soekarno saw the Federation as a puppet state and a new form of colonization, a threat to Indonesia. He believed that the decision to form the Federation was made without full consultation of the local population, particularly in Sarawak and Sabah.
Regime change and ethnic politics in Indonesia

Rebels became a security risk to Indonesia only when they refused to disarm and surrender after both Indonesia and Malaysia ended the confrontation on 11 August 1966. In October 1966, the Indonesian army began operations to regain control over rebel strongholds, and clashes were unavoidable. By this time, small numbers of ex-PKI members who had evaded capture by the Indonesian government had joined the guerrillas. The rebel group was largely under the domination of Sarawakan Chinese. However, the operations were not adequate to uproot the guerrillas until the attack on a military depot in Sanggau Ledo (Bengkayang) on 16 July 1967, where the rebels killed several guards and absconded with significant amounts of arms and ammunition. Then the central government stepped-up the operations. National newspapers, such as Kompas and Angkatan Bersenjata started to cover the guerrilla issue more seriously.

120 Only 99 surrendered, while 739 Chinese volunteers chose to remain at the Indonesian border to continue their operation (‘Pengungsian orang2 Tjina sebagai akibat gerakan2 orang Daya dalam daerah Kabupaten Pontianak dan Kabupaten Sambas’, 1967, p. 82, in: Library of West Kalimantan Governor’s Office, Pontianak). A general amnesty was also offered by the Sarawak government to the Communist guerrillas between July 1966 and January 1967, but it only resulted in 41 surrenders (Van der Kroef 1968a:253).

121 For details of the operation, see Rachman et al. 1970:239-339. Some of these operations were not successful. The first cause was the withdrawal of all special combat units from West Kalimantan and their role was transferred to less experienced local army units. The local army units were inexperienced because they had not been involved directly in the military operation during the confrontation. Secondly, there was no handover of intelligence information during the transfer. Another obstacle was the small size of the army compared to the vast territory. Undoubtedly there were also Communist cadres within the army which further undermined the military actions against the rebels (interview Djg; Kompas, 9-8-1967; Davidson 2002; Rachman et al. 1970).

122 Soemadi, ‘Press release tentang status Partindo’, 1970, in: Collection of St. Ngo Lahay, Pontianak. From this time on, the rebel forces were comprised of Paraku, PGRS, Indonesian volunteers, and PKI members. The Paraku rebels were concentrated on the eastern border, while PGRS was mostly situated on the western front (Davidson 2002:133-4). This chapter will use the terms ‘guerrillas’ and ‘rebels interchangeably.

123 The underlying reasons behind this less serious campaign, according to Davidson, partly included the regime’s pre-occupation with eliminating the Communists in Java and Bali, and partly the misjudgement about the real conditions in West Kalimantan. Furthermore, it was difficult for the existing military to effectively act against the rebels whom they had earlier supported and trained (Davidson 2002:143-4).

124 Van der Kroef 1968a:257; Rachman et al. 1970:260. The rebels seemed to have intelligence about the layout of the military depot; hence the successful attack. The government suspected the complicity of internal sources and the Chinese, particularly those who lived near the military depot and those who had business dealings with the military, and were therefore familiar with the depot (Rachman et al. 1970).
RISING ANTI-CHINESE SENTIMENT

Indonesia’s relations with the PRC after the coup in 1965 deteriorated rapidly as the PRC continued to praise Indonesian Communists and denigrate the incoming regime. The deteriorating relations reflected badly on the Chinese in Indonesia, many of whom held PRC citizenship. Anti-Chinese incidents were on the increase, ranging from demonstrations to demand their repatriation, nationalization of their businesses and restrictions on their business, education and social activities, to physical attacks on Chinese individuals and their property.\textsuperscript{125} The spiralling number of incidents spreading from one place to another was partly due to the lack of government action to punish the perpetrators; this inaction was perceived as government approval. Reports of anti-Chinese attacks by the national press were also picked up and reprinted by local newspapers, resulting in an increase of local hostility toward the Chinese.

In West Kalimantan, the Chinese were also ostracized. Several years prior, implementation of Government Regulation Number 10 (better known as PP 10) on alien Chinese business and trading activities and a series of regulations from the Regional Military Emergency Authority pertaining to Chinese schools had started to show some negative effects in the province.\textsuperscript{126} The government tended to be suspicious of and anxious about the activities of the Chinese, a large non-assimilating community in the province, and the abortive coup in 1965 offered a pretext for the new regime to deal harshly with the Chinese issue. All Chinese schools in the province were closed by the end of April 1966, mostly after being raided by military-approved youth demonstrators.\textsuperscript{127} In December 1966, leaders of Zhonghua Gonghui throughout the province were hastily summoned by the military commander to Pontianak for depor-


\textsuperscript{126} Interview with Nzib. Further details on these measures, see Mary F. Somers 2009:31, 34-9.

\textsuperscript{127} This closure was slightly later than those in some parts of Java and Sumatra.
Regime change and ethnic politics in Indonesia

tation, which was never carried out. Early in 1967, the government authorities had forced nearly 8,000 Chinese to work on the Singkawang-Seluas road, some 3,000 to open rice fields in Sanggau, and another 600 to build an army barracks in Semitau in Kapuas Hulu district (Davidson 2008:61). In January 1967, military authorities began the resettlement of an initial 5,000 Chinese away from the Sarawak border. The Chinese were no longer allowed to live within five miles of the border (Van der Kroef 1968a:255). On 17 February 1967, about 545 alien Chinese were gathered in Pontianak for eventual repatriation back to China, but were returned to their villages later because there was no transportation. In April 1967, the government announced a plan to repatriate 350,000 Chinese to PRC. In sum, the Chinese had become targets of the new regime, and military authorities were able to exercise authority over the Chinese.

Most West Kalimantan Chinese were believed to be sympathetic to the Communist rebels, although they were not necessarily ideologically Communists (Houliston 1963:14; Peterson 1968:17). In some areas, local Chinese support for rebels was strong. One key PKI figure who was captured in 1967 claimed that the rebels’ influence in the Chinese villages was almost 100 per cent. The source maintained that more than 90 per cent of Chinese youth in those areas were Communist sympathizers, and around 20 per cent of its youth were active members of the rebel group (Rachman et al. 1970:259, 276). Ethnic and cultural similarities between

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128 Zhonghua Gonghui was the main organization of totok Chinese, most of whom did not have Indonesian citizenship and were oriented to mainland China (People’s Republic of China, or PRC). It was formed in the province after WWII and played significant roles in solving issues related to alien Chinese in the province. For example, the organization helped to solve civil disputes among the Chinese, helped the Chinese to complete the paperwork required by the Indonesian government, facilitated the issuance of PRC passports, and supported Chinese education in the province (interview with Nzb, http://nanyang.xmu.edu.cn/Article/ShowArticle.asp?-ArticleID=6515 accessed 30-12-2010). Setiono (2003:807) claimed that on 20 December 1966, the military commander banished all officials of Zhonghua Gonghui and hundreds of Chinese from the province. Several of my eyewitness sources mentioned that all of the leaders were later ‘released’ and free to go anywhere they liked, including returning to their hometown (interviews with Awi and Nsb).

129 ‘Briefing Pangdam XII/TPR di depan siswa Seskoal tanggal 14-12-1981 tentang operasi penumpasan gerombolan PGRS/Paraku dan operasi lanjutan di Kalimantan Barat’, p. 2, in: Library of West Kalimantan Governor’s Office, Pontianak. The Indonesian government hoped that the Chinese government would resend ships to take the Chinese away, but it did not. In 1960 the Chinese government had sent ships to transport more than 3600 Chinese of Pemangkat (West Kalimantan) back to China. See http://nanyang.xmu.edu.cn/Article/ShowArticle.asp?-ArticleID=6515 accessed 30-12-2010).

130 Van der Kroef 1968a:255. This number was too high because the total Chinese population in the province in 1971 was about 226,216, and only a fraction of them held Indonesian citizenship.
the mostly-Chinese Sarawakian rebels and the Chinese of the province made cooperation between the two easier.\textsuperscript{131}

After the rebel attack in July 1967 in Sanggau Ledo, local and national newspapers started to publish articles demonizing the Chinese in West Kalimantan as Communists (\textit{Tjinkom} or \textit{Tjina Komunis}) and West Kalimantan as a PRC enclave (\textit{Kantong RRT}).\textsuperscript{132} One military priest remembered a rumour spread among the Dayaks that 80 per cent of West Kalimantan Chinese were Communist rebels.\textsuperscript{133} The military commander toured the region several months before the attacks to advise Dayaks not to trust the Chinese because they were in league with the Communists (Alexander 1973:4). The Chinese reclusiveness and insularity, and the fact that the majority of them were citizens (and presumed to be supporters) of the Communist PRC had helped the anti-Chinese campaigns. Continuous efforts to uproot Communists throughout the country, and campaigns to link the Chinese with the Communists, could have convinced the Dayaks that the Chinese, many of whom had lived among the Dayaks, were Communists or had been assisting the Communist rebels. As a result, ‘in the eyes of the Dayaks and Malays, all local Chinese were sympathizers of the Communist guerrillas – if they were not secret members’ (\textit{FEER} 3/9-12-1967). At the end of the 1960s, the relationships between many pro-rebel Chinese and some indifferent or pro-government Dayaks might have turned sour because of political differences. One source claimed that the Chinese merchants in some areas had become antagonistic to some Dayaks who were helping the military against the rebels (Rachman et al. 1970:276). This new national and local outlook shaped Dayak attitudes to the Chinese, who otherwise had maintained peaceful relations with the Dayaks.\textsuperscript{134}

\textsuperscript{131} \textit{Pembangunan}, 7-11-1967; Rachman et al. 1970:274. The other supporting fact was that the majority of the Chinese population in the province were resident aliens, who mostly supported the Communist PRC.

\textsuperscript{132} Consult articles published between September and November 1967 in \textit{Pembangunan} (local newspaper) and \textit{Kompas} (national newspaper).

\textsuperscript{133} The priest believed that the rumours were a distorted version of a fact that 80 per cent of the rebels were Malaysian Chinese (Doera 2003:130). Doera was a military priest in West Kalimantan (1967-1971) whose political views on the 1971 election had irritated his superior. This had led to his house arrest and his eventual resignation from the military priest position in March 1971 (Doera 2003).

\textsuperscript{134} A Protestant pastor asserts that while they did not always mingle they managed to coexist well (Peterson 1968). While Chinese traders perhaps had exploited the Dayak farmers (interview with Kpg), the majority of Chinese who lived near the Dayaks were farmers themselves. The fact that many older generations of Dayaks in conflict areas spoke Chinese dialects, and some similarities between cultural practices of the Chinese and Dayaks, show that both communities had meaningful interactions.
growing anti-Chinese sentiment and continuing campaign to show that the Chinese were the enemies later became a pretext for Dayaks attacks on the Chinese.

**POLITICAL EXPLANATIONS: THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY**

Some sources believe that the killing of several Dayak traditional leaders, allegedly by rebels, was in fact, the work of the Indonesian military (*FEER* 27-1-1968; Davidson 2008:65). The conflict had helped the military to crush Communist rebels, and official documents claimed that with the disappearance of all Chinese from rural areas of Bengkayang and Landak districts, the link between local Chinese and rebels would be cut off and Communist cells consequently be disrupted.\(^{135}\) Also, the initial killing of the Dayaks may have tended to stir Dayaks up into fighting against rebels (Davidson 2008:65; Doera 2003:149). Some Dayaks had good relations with rebels and were not enthusiastic about the military campaign against guerrilla fighters (Rachman et al. 1970:273). Doera, for example, asserted that Dayaks in the border areas, who were not concerned with politics, had good relations with rebels (Doera 2003:149). In Sungkung and Kapuas Hulu, some Dayaks were not interested in fighting the rebels (Peterson 1968:10; Rachman et al. 1970:272-3, 247). Other ‘proof’ includes encouragement from the military for Dayaks to take action. Prior to the conflict, the military commander had toured the region to ‘remind’ the Dayaks that the Chinese were helping the rebels (Alexander 1973:4) and also urged them to avenge bloodshed with bloodshed (Davidson 2008:66). The military was also reported to have granted titular military rank to Dayak leaders and organized festive celebrations after a successful killing of suspected Communists to encourage the attacks.\(^{136}\)

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136 These practices cited by Davidson (2002:159) were mentioned in a source which refers to military tactics practised between 1969 and 1973 (Soemadi 1974:94-6). However, no evidence has yet come to light to show that they were adopted in 1967.
The military did in fact encourage Dayaks to fight the rebels, but it is less evident that the anti-Chinese campaign was the result of a planned strategy. Although a secret intelligence operation cannot be ruled out, evidence is lacking of a high-level scheme. Coordination at the top levels of the military and bureaucracy was lacking to support the theory of an ethnic attack. If the attacks were planned and executed from Jakarta, there should be evidence at least of some general briefings to the key local officials to ensure they had some understanding so that they worked in concert to achieve an objective. But the confusion among the top ranking regional officials and their different responses suggested that no such briefings had been given. A high ranking bureaucrat, Major Usman Idris, the head of Pontianak district and an active military officer, instructed all sub-district heads to return the Chinese refugees, particularly the farmers, to their homes so that they could take care of their crops (Pembangunan, 9-11-1967). As the head of Pontianak district, a district where major conflict had taken place, it was very unnatural that he was not briefed on the imminent conflict which would affect his jurisdiction. If he had been briefed about the conflict and the plan to expel the Chinese, he presumably would not have ordered the return of the Chinese farmers. Also, it seems that no important military personnel in the conflict areas were aware of impending Dayak attacks. A military priest, who had toured some of the areas before the conflict and had chatted with local military and civil leaders, found them unaware of the incoming violence. Before their relations turned sour in early 1970, this priest had close relations with the regional military commander, Witono, who was also a Catholic (Doera 2003:110).

The response of local military officers was also inconsistent, further suggesting a lack of coordination, another indication that the conflict was not planned. Davidson (2002) portrays the failure of the army to stop the marauding Dayak mobs as intentional so that the conflict would spread. However, the failure of the military to perform a more active role to stop the conflict spreading in some instances had other explanations. In the case of massacres in Senakin and Anjungan, eyewitnesses

137 Usman Idris was a local military officer who was appointed as the caretaker of district head position when the Dayak district head was removed in December 1966. Idris was then formally appointed bupati in 1968, then re-elected and served until 1977. He became the head of provincial DPRD in 1979 and was the longest serving bupati in the history of Pontianak District. All these appointments show government confidence in him.
recalled that the small number of military personnel had been powerless to stop the mob (Doera 2003:118-20; Van Hulten 1992:294). The lack of resolute action could also have been due to the military reluctance to antagonize the Dayaks. The *Far Eastern Economic Review* (*FEER*) explained that the military authority feared that antagonizing the Dayaks would result in a backlash against the military (*FEER* 3/9-12-1967). In other circumstances, the military did intervene to prevent further mob violence and to restrain the movements of the marauding Dayaks. One eyewitness gives an example of military officers who intercepted Dayak mobs and ordered them not to proceed with their plan to attack the Chinese (Peterson 1968:19). In Anjungan, mobs themselves acknowledged that the military presence had prevented wholesale looting and bloodshed (Peterson 1968:28).

The military certainly wanted to see the end of Communist activities in the province, and welcomed Dayak moves against the Chinese who lived in the interior who were known to sympathise with Communist rebels. A member of Laskar Pangsuma close to the military confirmed that local military personnel in Bengkayang region had encouraged the Dayaks to force the Chinese out of region during the early days of the conflicts. However, the lack of coordination and confusion among top government officials and military suggests that the conflict was not as planned as some scholars were first led to believe. The conflict involved a substantial element of spontaneous and traditional warfare.

**ROLE OF THE REBELS**

The argument that the military had provoked Dayaks to attack Chinese who were seen as supporters of the rebels seems to have also assumed that Dayaks had no grievances against the rebels and would therefore not attack unless provoked by outside intervention. In some areas, such as Sungkung and Kapuas Hulu, the rebels were indeed reported to be friendly and helpful to the local Dayaks in order to secure cooperation and support from them (Rachman et al. 1970). However, the rebels’ relations with the local Dayaks were not always amicable; some rebels were had made threats to local Dayaks who did not cooperate with them.

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Newspapers reported that rebels had victimized Dayaks who lived on both sides of the border for not cooperating with them (Van der Kroef 1968a:250). The Uduk incident, which was often cited as the trigger of the violence, was a rebel attack on Dayak villagers who had refused to supply food to rebels (Pembangunan, 9-11-1967). Some rebel activities were reported to affect negatively the daily activities of the Dayaks.140

Several weeks before the pogrom in mid-October 1967, rebels had killed Dayaks on some occasions, which then triggered the wider attacks. On 3 September, the Communist rebels kidnapped and killed nine Dayaks in Tamu village (Bengkayang).141 The rebels also killed a Dayak adat leader, Temenggung Garanese, around that time (Merdeka, 21-9-1967, Davidson 2008:65-6; Rachman et al. 1970:274). Davidson (2002:149-50) suspects that those killings could have been the work of the military, and discounts the fact that the rebels also had reasons for the killings (as argued above). In an investigation two months immediately after the incident, a vocal military priest close to the Dayaks and the military commander, concluded that the victims were kidnapped to carry rebel supplies, and then were killed so they could not disclose the location of the rebels' hideout (Doera 2003:130).142

Rebel threats against the Dayaks may be seen as efforts to force the latter to cooperate. However, Dayak assistance was not indispensable because the rebels could easily get all the help needed from the Chinese, who were highly sympathetic to rebels and who were still living in large numbers in rebel strongholds in interior areas in the Bengkayang and

141 The correct location of places is important when assumptions are linked to specific geographical location. I have seen sources which confused Tamu with Taum, a totally different village. Tamu (or Temu) is a village in southern part of Bengkayang sub-district located near the border with Landak, while Taum village is located in Sanggau Ledo in the northern part of Bengkayang sub-district.
142 Although the priest’s relations with the military worsened in 1970, he maintains his finding in his memoir published years later. This was in line with the story from the military source that the Dayaks were kidnapped by the rebels (Rachman et al. 1970). However, the truth will remain a mystery unless hard evidence is found, or those who were directly involved in the kidnapping, either the army or the rebel, speak out.
Landak districts. The rebels’ high level of confidence was a result of their successful attacks and the lack of effective counterattacks from the Indonesian army (Peterson 1968:10; Rachman et al. 1970:274), and they may have become unsympathetic when dealing with locals. One high profile attack was the successful raid on the military depot in Sanggau Ledo in July 1967, mentioned above.

ROLE OF DAYAK ELITES AND LASKAR PANGSUMA

The last issue to be addressed is the role of Dayak elites, particularly those in the Laskar Pangsuma Militia (Laskar Pangsuma), in the conflicts. A document produced by a member of Laskar Pangsuma mentions that Oevaang Oeray and Herman Imang Ngo declared war against the Communists (that is Chinese in the hinterland) on two separate occasions, on 21 and 25 September. The same document also shows the involvement of other Dayaks associated with Partindo and Laskar Pangsuma in the later conflicts.

Laskar Pangsuma was formed on 3 November 1967, following a meeting of Dayak elites in Pontianak with Dayak leaders from Sambas and Pontianak districts at the end of October 1967. According to a member of the Sambas Dayak delegation, they were flown to Pontianak by a military helicopter to respond to some accusations against the Dayaks, such as that Dayaks in Bengkayang and surrounding areas had joined the rebels to kill the Chinese. The delegation first saw Military

143 Relations of many Chinese and Dayaks were worse in Sarawak. The core of the rebels was among the Sarawakian Chinese who had different political views to those of the Dayaks in ethnically divided Sarawak. The rebels were fighting against the incorporation of Sarawak into the Malaysian Federation, but many Sarawakian Dayaks supported the federation (Van der Kroef 1968a:248). Leaders of the Sarawakian Dayaks were initially reluctant to support the Federation but were persuaded by the Malayan Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman. Abdul Rahman played on the fear of rising Communism and domination by the Chinese (Said 1985:Chap. 5, particularly pp. 88-90).

144 The initial success of the rebel attacks was also the result of Communist sympathizers within the army who supplied operational information for the rebels (interview with Djg). Even in the early 1970s, there were still reports of arrests of Communist sympathizers within military ranks in the province (Rachman et al. 1970:274).


147 Interview with Smo.
Commander A.J. Witono, then – because Governor Soemadi was not in his office – met Oevaang Oeray.

Oeray then organized a meeting with this Sambas delegation and more than a dozen Dayak leaders in the Laskar Pangsuma Building in Pontianak. The document produced after the meeting explained that the rebels had destabilized the security of the province, disturbed the livelihood of the Dayaks and used the Dayak region as the rebel base; the Dayaks had actively helped the military against the rebels by embarking on their own operation against the rebels. In the same document, the Dayak leaders pledged to help the military fight the rebels and welcomed the Dayak willingness to fight. As a follow-up, Laskar Pangsuma was established with its headquarters in Pontianak City and a detailed organization structure was formed. Leaders in its headquarters urged Dayaks to form branches in their region. The first to be set up were in the Sambas and Pontianak districts, while eastern district branches were formed later (Davidson 2008:223). In Sanggau the militia was less successful because, according to one former Partindo leader in Sanggau, they did not like the idea of attacking the Chinese.

Oeray believed that most Chinese were helping the Communists, supplying material aid, information and manpower. In his eyes, the Chinese were common farmers by day but guerrillas by night (FEER 21/27-1-1968). In an interview conducted some time after the conflict, he blamed the Chinese for the conflict (Alexander 1973:4). Because of his position and influence among the Dayaks, his conviction shaped the attitude of

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148 Interview with Smo. Oeray was absent from this meeting (interview with Smo), although his name was included in a formal statement produced later.
150 A Laskar Pangsuma official document on 5 November 1967 shows a detailed organization structure with a presidium committee, advisory team, secretariat, and eight bureaus. It names virtually all Dayak leaders including members of Partai Katolik such as F.C. Palaunsoeka (H.G. Mungok, ‘Mukadimah’, 5-11-1967, in: Collection of S. Jacobus E. Frans Layang, Pontianak. The inclusion of Palaunsoeka was probably without his approval, although the involvement of some other Partai Katolik cadres was real. Two of its cadres in the militia, Herman Imang Ngo and Jacobus Layang, for example, were dispatched on a peace mission after the conflict (interview with Lyg). Of all Partai Katolik branches in the province, only the Sambas branch issued a formal statement against the formation of the militia. It was only issued on 18-11-1967, at the winding-up stage of the conflict, perhaps at the direction of the Palaunsoeka who visited the province (Pembangunan, 18-11-1967; Doera 2003:116).
151 Interview with Omr.
the militia, as clearly shown by the language used in its pamphlets. In its declaration on 31 October 1967, it blamed the rebels for the instability in the Dayak regions, emphasized the Chinese link to the rebels, and urged the Dayaks to attack. It argued that the Dayaks were merely responding to the Chinese, who were members or logistic suppliers to the rebels.152 Another pamphlet on 3 November 1967 used provocative language to urge Dayaks to crush the PGRS/Communist Chinese.153

Under the highly charismatic former leaders of PD and Partindo, it was not difficult to mobilize Dayaks to support militia initiatives. Similarly, at the district level a close political connection was found. The chairman of the Sambas Laskar Pangsuma was M. Idris, and the chairman of the Pontianak district militia was Rachmad Sahuddin, both of whom were former Partindo officials in their respective districts. As in many other communal conflicts, the Dayak movements supported by the militia spun out of control. Laskar Pangsuma’s instruction issued on the 6 November 1967 ordering the Dayaks to stop the ‘demonstration’154 failed to prevent the three bloodiest attacks in Senakin, Darit and Sebadu.

The atrocities in those three towns started to change the local and national perception on the ‘demonstration’ by the Dayaks. Palaunsoeka, who returned briefly to West Kalimantan, praised the Dayaks for helping the military crush the rebels, but at the same time denounced the killings as racist and indiscriminate (Pembangunan, 10-11, 28-11-1967). Newspapers blamed the militia for the atrocities, and accused the Communists, such as members of ex-BTI, Partindo, and PKI, of having infiltrated and diverted the popular movement against rebels into racist killings.155 According to the newspaper, it was not possible that the Dayaks, who had good relations with the Chinese, would commit such atrocities against them without a mastermind (Pembangunan, 28-11-

155 Pembangunan, 10-11, 28-11-1967. This accusation was made apparently after the reports of the capture of a few members of the PKI involved in the raids on the Chinese villages. The governor also reported the involvement of a few members of banned leftist organizations (Pengungsian orang2 Tjina sebagai akitat gerakan2 orang Daya dalam daerah Kabupaten Pontianakan dan Kabupaten Sambas’, 1967, in: Library of West Kalimantan Governor’s Office, Pontianak).
The decline of Dayak political movements (1960-1971)

1967). The newspaper accused the Partindo governor, Oevaang Oeray, of wanting to use the chaos so that he could make a come-back into politics.\footnote{FEER 27-1-1968; Davidson 2008:69. Van Hulten (1992:283) also mentions several goals Oeray wanted to attain from the movements: to free the Dayaks from the economic domination of the Chinese, and to establish a Dayak centre in Anjungan.}

As a result of mounting public pressure, within days of the deadly attacks on Chinese, the military claimed to have secured (mengamankan) some masterminds of the attacks.\footnote{Pembangunan, 17-11-1967. Unfortunately there were no further reports on the masterminds, but none of the main militia leaders at provincial or district level was arrested, because the military soon sent them to interior regions to appease the angry Dayaks. They probably were local leaders who directly participated in the atrocities and whose names were mentioned in S. Jacobus E. Frans Layang, ‘Terjadinya PGRS dan Paraku’, 22-4-1969’, in: Collection of S. Jacobus E. Frans Layang, Pontianak.} The military commander also instructed the local population to stop the violent demonstrations.\footnote{A.J. Witono, ‘Maklumat’, 17-11-1967, p. 1, in: Collection of S. Jacobus E. Frans Layang, Pontianak.} The Laskar Pangsuma was then put under the control of the local military on 18 November 1967 (Pembangunan, 28-11-1967). A week after that, its leaders were dispatched on a peace mission to the interior regions to calm the Dayaks. The instruction was direct and clear: to tour the district and to help the military defuse the tension.\footnote{‘Surat idzin djalan’, 1967, in: Private collection, Singkawang.}

It is quite apparent that the militia had some roles in the killings in November 1967. At the very least, its provocative pamphlets and the behaviour of its leaders contributed to the atrocities. However, the militia could not have been instigators of the other earlier clashes in October, as it had only been formed in November. It was formed two weeks after the victims had fallen and the refugees had flocked to towns. Some individuals who had been involved in leading the earlier conflicts might have joined the militia at a later time. In this case, it was these individuals rather than the Laskar Pangsuma who were responsible for the attacks.\footnote{The late formation of the militia rendered invalid arguments which considered it as the initial instigator of the conflict and massive evacuation that had occurred from the mid to end of October 1967. See such arguments in Davidson (2008:70-1).}

One can conclude that the 1967 conflict was not as well-planned or orchestrated as some scholars have claimed, although the military welcomed Dayaks’ cooperation in opposing the rebels. Military confusion at the local level, as well as the lack of coordination at the top bureaucratic level, indicated a lack of planning. Besides some support from the military, some elite Dayaks and rebels played a part in the conflict. Some
elite Dayaks, who wanted to make a come-back into politics, tried to use this opportunity to demonstrate their loyalty to the new regime by fighting rebels and forming a militia. However, they were blamed as the perpetrators of some atrocities at the end of the conflict. The resisting rebels and their successful counterattacks against the Indonesian military created a justification for the army to launch more serious campaigns. Another contributor to conflict was the rising anti-Chinese sentiment as a result of political change at national level.

SUMMARY

Changes in the political system at the national level had affected Dayak politics. PD, the backbone of Dayak politics, was forced to dissolve after it failed to fulfil one of the new requirements for political parties. Many party members chose to merge with Partindo, a growing nationalist party closely attached to President Soekarno, while a smaller group chose to merge with Partai Katolik. Merger with Partindo had weakened the Dayak politics due to the latter’s open and nationalist platform.

When the New Order came to power, Dayak politics was once more under threat. Dayaks who held high posts, such as governor and district heads, lost their jobs. They were members or sympathizers of Partindo, which had become the new enemy of the regime because of its leftist orientation. To salvage the party, its leaders with the approval from the military, merged the party into IPKI, further diminished Dayak political influence. Before the 1971 election, many Dayak leaders were forced to join Golkar. Despite Golkar victory, only a few Dayaks were elected to the parliaments. This minimal representation of the Dayak in the local legislative branch persisted throughout the New Order. Many Dayak bureaucrats also soon found that high positions in the bureaucracy such as district head were no longer attainable.

An opportunity for Dayak leaders to make a political return came about when the regime intensified its campaign to crush the Communist rebels from 1967 onward. During ethnic conflict in 1967, the Dayak leaders openly supported the military campaign against the Communist rebels hoping that this would make a break with their unfavourable political past and enable them to regain government trust. Unfortunately, the Dayaks’ political position did not improve, as their contribution in
the military campaign was blamed for having caused indiscriminate killings of Chinese.

In particular this chapter has again shown that the fate of Dayak politics depended heavily on national politics. When the fortunes of their national ally waned as the regime changed, Dayak politicians at the local level also suffered.
New Order and Dayak marginalization (1966-1998)

This chapter will look at the political, economic and cultural marginalization of Dayaks under the New Order regime. In politics, the Dayak bureaucratic elite faced obstacles to promotion to strategic positions and did not occupy any strategic positions in the government. Their economic conditions did not improve as rapidly as would be commensurate with the scope of development projects into their regions. In fact, the development programs such as logging, plantation operations and transmigrations brought negative effects that impaired the economic status of the Dayaks. They suffered from a continuing lack of access to economic opportunities in urban areas as well as the impact of external and internal pressures on Dayak culture.

MARGINALIZATION IN THE EXECUTIVE

After the coming of the New Order, Dayak leadership at the provincial and district levels disappeared. The Dayak governor and four district heads were replaced as the new regime did not have full confidence in them. As explained in the previous chapter, many Dayaks in government offices were members of the former Partindo. High-ranking Dayak bureaucrats from non-leftist backgrounds did not have the qualifications required by the regime. The regime, for example, did not support the nomination of Palaunsoeka as the governor to replace Oeray. Careers of other former high-ranking officials sympathetic to the Partai Katolik, such as H.S. Massoecka Djantering, also stagnated. Although Djantering had held important positions as a member of the DPD and BPH in the late 1980s.

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1 Positions regarded as high ranking are executive heads and their deputies, assistant governors, regional secretaries and, heads of departments and bureaus.
2 Interview with Mgn; Doera 2003:122.
1950s and the early 1960s, and had reached a very senior ranking before being sidelined by Oeray, he was appointed only as a regular staff member at the provincial printing company until his retirement in the 1980s. 

During the New Order reign, the absence of Dayaks in high office was particularly obvious at the provincial level. According to provincial government documents, from 1977 to 1988 the percentage of high-ranking Dayak officials had never been more than 8 per cent. This contrasted sharply with the number of high-ranking Malay officials, which was always well above 30 per cent. No Dayak ever served as governor or assistant governor. Prior to the New Order, in contrast, the governor was a Dayak, and Dayaks had become members of councils, such as DPD and BPH, which had functions similar to those of assistant governor. From the late 1950s to the mid-1960s, Dayaks always had at least two members in the executive council to assist or even represent the governor. Most districts also had two Dayak executive members.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Positions</th>
<th>Dayaks</th>
<th>Dayaks (Percentage)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.1 Dayak high-ranking officials (1977-1988)

Dayaks were scarce in strategic bureaus or departments such as governance and human resources. In 1983 the governance bureau, which was probably the most influential body within the provincial secretariat, had only one Dayak out of 35 officials. The Human Resources Office,


4 The last Dayaks in the BPH at provincial level were H.G. Mihing and Sotorman Benteng. Mihing was arrested in early 1971 because of his ties with Baperki, while Benteng resigned in 1972, after the BPH ceased to function (Abdulsalam 1997:97-8).

which had the authority to specify training requirements for promotion, remained almost without Dayak officials until the mid-1990s.\(^6\) One Dayak was briefly appointed to lead the employee development section at the Human Resources Office in April 1994. However, in less than a year, Simon Djalil, the officer concerned, was promoted away from the Human Resources Office. Almost a decade later, one Malay high-ranking official accused Djalil of giving preferential treatment to Dayak civil servants to attend training required for promotion.\(^7\) This anxiety could well be the reason behind his short stay. In June 1996 only one of 19 positions at the Human Resources Office was given to a Dayak, Ignatius Lyong.\(^8\)

Dayaks were similarly marginalized at the district and sub-district levels. A few retained relatively high positions during the early New Order. A.R. Sampe and Iman Kalis, the first two Dayak senior high school graduates, served as district secretary (\textit{sekda}) in Sambas and Sanggau districts respectively. At district level, a \textit{sekda} is the third highest-ranking official after the district head and the deputy. P.J. Denggol, a former mission worker who had risen to a higher position in the bureaucracy of Ketapang district, was appointed caretaker district head of Ketapang in July 1971 after the sudden death of the incumbent district head. However, he only held that position for a year before being replaced by the local Kodim commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Zainal Arifin, who was elected district head in July 1972.

A local investigation in 1999 showed that Sintang, Kapuas Hulu, and Ketapang districts had only four Dayaks in high-ranking positions in each district, while Pontianak and Sanggau districts had only two each. There were no Dayak high-ranking officials in Sambas district and Pontianak municipality (\textit{KR} 1999/43:33). The number of Dayak sub-district heads in the 1970s was smaller than in the 1960s. Prior to 1966, a former sub-district head in Kapuas Hulu counted eight Dayak sub-district heads in fifteen sub-districts, or around 53 per cent of the total sub-district head

\(^6\) One Dayak source even claimed that Dayaks who were given opportunities to study further at the Institute of Public Administration (IIP) were placed in non-essential programs. The graduates from these non-essential programs would be put at a disadvantage if they had to compete with graduates from essential programs for important positions (interview with Djn).

\(^7\) Interview with Djp.

\(^8\) ‘Data pejabat’, 1996, in: Biro Kepegawaian Kalimantan Barat, Pontianak. After the fall of the New Order, Lyong was appointed head of the provincial human resource office, then assistant of the governor. He resigned from the job and participated in the gubernatorial election in 2007, where he was running as a deputy governor candidate.
positions.\textsuperscript{9} This number was reduced to six in 1978 (40 per cent of total sub-district head positions), and down to only three in 1998 (19 per cent). In Sanggau district in 1970, Dayaks still headed nine out of twenty sub-districts (45 per cent) but only six in 1978 (30 per cent) and four in 1998 (20 per cent). Similarly, in Sintang district, Dayaks comprised six of the eighteen sub-district heads (33 per cent) in 1970, but only three in 1978 and 1998 (17 per cent). Until the end of the New Order, the proportion of Dayak sub-district heads in the province never exceeded the 1971 level of 33 per cent,\textsuperscript{10} despite the fact that Dayaks constituted the majority in more than 61 per cent of sub-districts in the province.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Number of sub-districts (A)</th>
<th>Number of Dayak sub-district heads (B)</th>
<th>Percentage of Dayak sub-district heads (B/A)</th>
<th>Percentage of Dayak sub-district heads</th>
<th>Percentage of sub-districts with Dayak majority</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pontianak City</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pontianak</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>42.1</td>
<td>56.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sambas</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>35.3</td>
<td>42.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanggau</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>90.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sintang</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>85.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kapuas Hulu</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>56.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ketapang</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>40.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.2 Dayak sub-district heads (1998-1999)

Various employee databases at the provincial and district levels showed similar trends: the number of Dayak civil servants was either very small or not proportional with the Dayak population. Of 728 provincial mid- to top-level civil servants in 1999, Dayaks made up no more than 8 per

\textsuperscript{9} Interview with Syk.
\textsuperscript{10} The calculation in 1971 excluded Kapuas Hulu, for which data were not available.
cent, while Malays were estimated to represent at least 50 per cent. In Sanggau district, a study by a former local Dayak official in 2003 found that Dayaks constituted only 12.3 per cent of the total 1,146 civil servants in the district. This was despite the fact that Sanggau had a Dayak population of 62 per cent. In the coastal district, the percentage

Table 6.3 Number of sub-districts with a Dayak or Malay majority (2000)

Source: Census 2000.

| District       | Total sub-districts | Number sub-district with |  |  |  |  |
|----------------|---------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|
|                |                     | Malays > 50 (percentage) | Dayaks > 50 (percentage) | Dayaks > Malays | Malays > Dayaks |
| Pontianak City | 4                   | 0                       | 0                       | 0                       | 1                       |
| Sambas         | 9                   | 8                       | 1                       | 1                       | 8                       |
| Bengkayang     | 7                   | 0                       | 5                       | 6                       | 1                       |
| Singkawang     | 3                   | 0                       | 0                       | 1                       | 2                       |
| Pontianak      | 13                  | 1                       | 1                       | 3                       | 10                      |
| Landak         | 10                  | 0                       | 9                       | 10                      | 0                       |
| Sanggau        | 15                  | 0                       | 12                      | 14                      | 1                       |
| Sekadau        | 7                   | 0                       | 4                       | 7                       | 0                       |
| Sintang        | 14                  | 0                       | 9                       | 13                      | 1                       |
| Melawi         | 7                   | 3                       | 1                       | 4                       | 3                       |
| Kapuas Hulu    | 23                  | 9                       | 11                      | 13                      | 10                      |
| Ketapang       | 15                  | 7                       | 4                       | 6                       | 9                       |
| Total          | 127                 | 28                      | 57                      | 78                      | 46                      |
| Percentages    | 22                  | 44.9                    | 61.4                    | 36.2                    |

Source: Census 2000.

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12 Hironimus Oemar, ‘Daftar keadaan PNS Dayak dan non Dayak pada Sekretariat Daerah, Sekretariat Dewan, dinas, badan dan kantor pada Penda Kabupaten Sanggau’, 2003, in: Collection of Hironimus Oemar, Sanggau. The same person conducted a similar survey in September 1998. He found that at the district level, Dayaks represented 13.8 per cent of the 617 employees. The percentage was higher at the sub-district level where the Dayaks were 57.3 per cent of 367 civil servants (KR 2000/33:10). While neither study indicated the ethnic background of the remaining civil servants, it was quite safe to assume that the majority of them were Malays, because Malays had worked in the civil service since colonial times.
of Dayaks in the bureaucracy was even lower. The following will examine the reasons behind the small number of Dayaks in the executive.

**ORIGINS OF MARGINALIZATION OF THE DAYAKS IN THE EXECUTIVE**

The role of Dayaks in the bureaucracy had been very small if not non-existent prior to 1945. Dayaks were generally excluded from the sultanate administrations because recruitment was determined by social class, family ties, and religion. Opportunities for Dayaks to work in the Dutch administration offices were also limited. The Dutch government did not want to upset its relations with the sultanates unnecessarily by appointing the ‘infidel’ Dayaks whom the sultanates might have deemed unsuitable. Furthermore, the educational level of Dayaks was still too low to allow them to fill good positions in the colonial administration. Generally, a civil service candidate would be at least a graduate from a Hollandsch-Inlandsche School (HIS), a Dutch-language or first-class elementary school reserved for aristocratic and wealthy families. Given the Dayaks’ early lukewarm attitude toward education, the social stigma against the Dayaks, and the cost and time needed to attend schools in town, it was unlikely that any Dayaks had ever enrolled at an HIS. In fact, none of my senior Dayak informants graduated from an HIS, nor did they know of any colleagues who had graduated from the school prior to WWII.

Following World War II, Dayaks began to have access to bureaucratic positions by means of government support. After the elections in 1955 and 1958, when the PD outperformed most of the other political parties, Dayaks began to assume some important political posts, including governor and four district head positions. This was followed by the

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13 Syahzaman and Hasanuddin 2003:127; Vandenbosch 1941:200. One source claimed that the schools in West Kalimantan were likely not based on social class because entry requirements were looser (Ahok et al. 1983:49-50). This flexibility in entry requirements, although possibly true for the Malays, was unlikely to have been applied to the Dayaks due to the social bias.

14 By 1924 the whole province only had three HIS, one each in Pontianak, Sintang, and Sambas (Halilintar, 2-2-1924). The HIS in West Kalimantan was known as ‘Sekolah Melayu’ [Malay School] as the teaching was conducted in the Malay language. While the similar term ‘Sekolah Melayu’ was used elsewhere, it carried extra ethnic weight in West Kalimantan as the term ‘Melayu’ also referred to the governing ethnic group in this region.
appointment of a number of Dayak sub-district heads in predominantly Dayak regions from the late 1950s to mid-1960s.\footnote{The appointments of sub-district heads at the end of the 1950s were influenced by the political strength of each party at that time. If PD performed well in a certain sub-district, it could nominate the candidate for the sub-district head (interviews with Bln and Mgk).}

Dayaks in top positions could facilitate Dayak civil service recruitment. A former Dayak head of several sub-districts in Sanggau from 1960 to 1964 remarked that until mid-1965, sub-district heads could recruit employees with approval from just district heads. The source gave examples:

- From May 1960, as the sub-district head of Belitang, he had recruited six new staff members, five of whom were Dayaks; the incumbent five staff members were all Malays.
- From July 1963 as the sub-district head of Jangkang, he had recruited three new Dayak employees. The existing five employees consisted of four Malays and one Dayak.
- In May 1964, he became the head of the newly formed Parindu sub-district. There, he recruited ten staff members — eight Dayaks and two Malays.\footnote{Interview with Omr. The Dayak head of the Human Resources Office in Sanggau district also supported affirmative action in the recruitment of the Dayaks (interview with Amt).}

There were also efforts to boost the number of Dayak civil servants through other channels of recruitment, such as the Civil Service Institute (KDC, Kursus Dinas C). The institute, established in October 1961, recruited 28 to 30 students each year until 1964.\footnote{The total number of KDC graduates until its closure in 1965 was 119 (Ahok et al. 1983:85).} The first recruitment round in 1961 included only one Dayak, but their number increased in subsequent enrolments. In 1963 there were six Dayaks, and in 1964 there were ten.\footnote{Interviews with Gye and Fhd; Meletakkan landasan 1997:135-9.} According to one Malay source, who was also a student at KDC during those years, one way to improve the recruitment of Dayaks was to bend the admission rules in a way that enabled more Dayaks to be accepted into the institute.\footnote{Interview with Djp.} The source claimed that the enrolment rule was bent to accommodate those who graduated from teacher training schools, such as Sekolah Guru Bawah (SGB) and Sekolah Guru Atas (SGA). Dayak bureaucrats in the government knew that most Dayaks...
Regime change and ethnic politics in Indonesia

attended these schools, rather than general high schools. The original rule was only to accept graduates from general high schools or graduates from junior high schools with two years’ working experience in the bureaucracy.

When KDC was upgraded to become a three-year civil service institute (APDN, Akademi Pemerintahan Dalam Negeri) in September 1965, Tanting Ngo, a Dayak, was appointed to run the institute. His appointment was without controversy. Recruited in October 1964 just after graduating from university, he was appointed as deputy head of the political bureau at the governor’s office and, most importantly, as a private secretary to Oevaang Oeray. For Oeray this Dayak appointment to a critical position was very likely a strategy to increase Dayak enrolments at the Institute. However, most of Tanting Ngo seven-month tenure was ineffective because of the political chaos after the coup in 1965. Nevertheless, Ngo still claimed to have helped a few Dayaks gain entry to the institute with only approval from the governor. Probably because of this practice, during the demonstration against Oeray’s leadership APDN was dubbed the ‘APDN of Oevaang Oeray and Tanting Ngo’. Oeray was pressured to remove Ngo in May 1966 (Abdulsalam 1997:79).

Despite efforts from the end of the 1950s to the mid-1960s to recruit Dayaks, the number of Dayak civil servants remained small, and the bureaucracy was still largely in the hands of the Malays. This dominance continued despite changes in the regime and political systems. Each time a regime collapsed, the majority of the civil service from the previous regime would continue to serve the new regime.

Almost all Dayak civil servants who entered the bureaucracy immediately after independence had only basic schooling – three to six years’ elementary education, which they obtained through mission schools.

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20 Interview with Djp. The author was able to trace only a few SGA or SGB graduates in KDC, and therefore was not able to substantiate the claim.
22 The first director of Pontianak APDN was actually Raden Kusno. However, it was the deputy director, Tanting Ngo, who ran the institute, because Kusno was only a figurehead (interview with Ttg; Jimmy M. Ibrahim, ‘Laporan direktur Akademi Pemerintahan Dalam Negeri Pontianak Lustrum ke-1’, 1970, p. 11, in: Library of West Kalimantan Governor’s Office, Pontianak; Abdulsalam 1997:77).
23 Alfonsus Jacobus Tanting Ngo, ‘Daftar pertanyaan “clearance test”’, 1970, in: Collection of Alfonsus Jacobus Tanting Ngo, Pontianak. Oeray knew Tanting Ngo, an East Kalimantan Dayak, who studied at the same school in Yogyakarta as his adopted son (interview with Ttg). He was the first Dayak law graduate in West Kalimantan, and probably the first Dayak with a full bachelor’s degree in the province.
24 Interview with Ttg.
Those educated from the end of 1940s, because of the expansion of primary education for the Dayaks, only started to graduate from the early to mid-1950s. Consequently, these Dayaks were ready to enter the civil service from that time on. During this transition period, Malays were more likely to be recruited when vacancies occurred due to their earlier access to education and their ‘connections’ with the bureaucracy.

Educational requirements to enter the bureaucracy continued to rise as numbers of more highly educated candidates became available. Again, Dayaks were comparatively slow to catch up because of their late start. In 1953, there were only two Dayak senior high school graduates, Iman Kalis and A.R. Sampe, for all of West Kalimantan. Those who were already employed in the bureaucracy but who had only primary education missed out on promotions.

The limited number of high schools and the often inaccessible locations of schools were among the reasons why there were only a small number of Dayak graduates. Pontianak, the provincial capital, opened its first junior high school in 1946 and first senior high school in 1952.25 Between 1946 and 1948 about a dozen Dayaks enrolled at this junior high school.26 In interior districts, particularly the Dayak regions, secondary schools were not established until several years later. Sintang, for example, opened its first junior high school in 1951 and first senior high school in 1959 (Syahzaman and Hasanuddin 2003:166). Nyarumkop, the centre for Dayak education, opened its first general junior high school also in 1951 (Peringatan bruder MTB 1996:14).

Another reason for the small numbers of Dayak civil servants was their lack of interest in joining the bureaucracy. From the time of the Malay sultanates, Dayaks associated civil service with the Malays because of their overwhelming presence and influence in the bureaucracy. Civil service positions were the privilege of Malays and were closed to Dayaks (Van Hulten 1992; Van Loon 1999). Furthermore, the civil service, which had connections with the previously discriminatory sultanate administration, had a bad reputation among Dayaks. Therefore, civil service employment was not much sought by Dayaks who later went to

25 Interviews with Kls, Bln, Syk; Peringatan bruder MTB 1996:16.
26 Enrolled in 1946 were H.S. Masoeaka Djaning and Antonius Buan; in 1947, Keladan, Iman Kalis and A.R. Sampe; in 1948 Syahdan Sahuddin, Sabinus, L. Andi, I. Kepu, and Daniel Soeryamassoeka. They all stayed in a church complex or in homes belonging to about 20 Dayak officials or civil servants in Pontianak (interviews Kls, Syk).
schools. Instead, they would choose to work for the Catholic missions as teachers, religious workers, or nurses, as these were the only white-collar jobs open to them at the time. Not surprisingly Dayaks who assumed important posts after independence had previously been teachers, catechists, or nurses. These job preferences among the Dayaks continued well into the 1960s, particularly those for the teaching profession. Some sources observed that generally in the 1960s the educated Dayaks still preferred teaching posts over positions in the civil service.27 The first two Dayak high schools graduates, Kalis and Sampe, for example, became teachers and did not join the bureaucracy until the early 1960s.28 Dayaks who returned to the province after obtaining a university degree in Java in the mid-1960s also chose to continue their teaching careers and not join the bureaucracy.29 The sizeable number of Dayaks, who finally joined the bureaucracy in the early 1960s, such as those who attended the KDC, were mainly active educators who had been persuaded by Dayak bureaucrats to join the civil service.

CIVIL SERVANT RECRUITMENT AND PROMOTION DURING THE NEW ORDER ERA

Two major routes of civil servant recruitment were bonded and general annual recruitment. Bonded recruitment referred to students who enrolled at designated institutions and had agreed to become civil servants upon graduation. At least 68 institutes managed by government offices existed; part of their function was to educate the bonded students.30 Apart from these institutions, government offices also had agreements with certain universities for the same purpose. The government also established Civil Service Institutes to select and educate its future civil servants.

27 Interviews Kdr, Kls. The passion to become teachers was also a result of an education campaign aimed at Dayaks after independence. The government, PD, and churches established hundreds of elementary schools in the 1940s and 1950s, which of course opened many teacher vacancies. Becoming a teacher was not only desirable in terms of prestige, but also in terms of government support and financial reward. Most students in the teacher schools received government scholarships, which covered tuition fees and living costs. Sources claimed that the salary of teachers was even better than those of civil servants (interviews Kdr, Kls).

28 Interview Kls.

29 In 1963, the West Kalimantan government sent 17 students to attend teacher institutes in Java. Among them at least six were Dayaks (‘Laporan kerja tahun 1963’, 1964, in: Library of West Kalimantan Governor’s Office, Pontianak).

Civil servants recruited via this avenue were highly regarded and normally had better career prospects, because of their specialized training. Until quite recently graduates of civil services institutes were usually expected to take on elite roles in the bureaucracy. Many graduates would at least occupy the position of sub-district heads within a few years after graduation. Their numbers in the bureaucracy had become a barometer for the quality of the bureaucracy. The West Kalimantan governor’s accountability reports since establishment of the New Order always highlight the numbers and the utilization of graduates of the institutes.

As explained previously, the first Civil Service Institute in West Kalimantan was KDC. Prior to that, the provincial government sent their students to KDC in Banjarmasin, South Kalimantan. A course-level KDC was replaced by a three-year university-level APDN, when the latter was established in Pontianak in 1965. Starting from the mid-1960s, many KDC graduates were appointed as sub-district heads. In 1970, 24 of 106 sub-district heads (or 23 per cent) were APDN graduates. The percentage increased to 63 per cent in 1977, and to 79 per cent in 1983.31

Annual general recruitment at the provincial and district levels was another important recruitment channel. Usually it was carried out at the same time for both locations. Some departments that had a large intake of recruits, such as the Department for Religious Affairs, also carried out their own annual recruitment. All candidates would be screened against the general requirements, such as age, education, and health. Those who satisfied the requirements would need to pass a written examination and interview. The majority of civil servants recruited by this method would be appointed to clerical positions. The number of civil servants recruited this way was much larger than the recruitment from APDN. General recruitment could admit several hundred to a few thousand civil servants per year, compared to no more than sixty from Pontianak APDN.

According to one Dayak official, who was briefly stationed at the provincial Human Resources Office, the process of civil servant recruitment was not transparent. The written test and interviews were mere formali-
ties, because the office would only select a fraction of the candidates who had actually passed the test. Many other candidates were selected based on bribery and personal connections. As a result, candidates without the requisite financial resources and internal connections would seldom be recruited.

Recruitment of Dayak civil servants through both systems was low throughout the New Order. Dayaks made up between 15 per cent and 20 per cent of APDN graduates from 1968 until 1992, while the Malays outnumbered the Dayaks by at least a factor of two. This condition worsened after 1992 when all local APDNs were replaced by a national STPDN (Sekolah Tinggi Pemerintahan Dalam Negeri) located in Jatinangor, West Java. Between 1992 and 1997 West Kalimantan only sent about twelve students a year to STPDN, a big drop from about fifty students a year between 1965 and 1992 under the APDN system. Of these twelve students even fewer were Dayak. Recruitment of Dayaks into the civil service through general annual recruitment was estimated at only 2 per cent each year. This estimation might be too low; however, if there had been a consistently significant recruitment of Dayaks into the bureaucracy over the years, their proportion in the bureaucracy should have increased, but this has not been the case. Civil servants in the lower to middle ranks were overwhelmingly Malays who occupied most posts that were not reserved for Javanese or the non-local military officers.

The causes of the low recruitment of Dayaks into the bureaucracy during the New Order differed slightly from those of the previous regime. The main factors for low recruitment in the 1950s had become less relevant by the time Soeharto came to power. By the 1970s, the Dayaks’ interest in joining the civil service had grown, as evidenced by

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32 Interview Kts.
33 The public was aware of these corrupt practices but did not openly challenge them until 2002. Between October and November that year, candidates who failed the recruitment test protested in almost all districts. In Pontianak district, the recruitment results were annulled by the district head, and the written tests were re-administered. In Sintang, the Human Resources Office was attacked, and its Dayak head was brought to court for unfair practices. In both cases, the heads of the Human Resources Office were replaced some time after the protests.
34 The establishment of a central civil institute was important for the government’s efforts to train high-quality and uniform future leaders. In 2005, STPDN became IPDN (Institut Pemerintahan Dalam Negeri) after it merged with another similar institute, IIP (Institut Ilmu Pemerintahan) in Jakarta, to avoid duplication.
the decision of many Dayak high school teachers to join the bureaucracy. The ascent of several Dayaks into the province and district top jobs prior to the New Order inspired young and educated Dayaks to join the civil service. They no longer viewed the civil service as intimidating and unattainable. Also, low levels of education, which had previously been an obstacle to Dayaks joining the civil service, were no longer an issue. The number of Dayak high school graduates was adequate at the beginning of the 1980s, and by the 1990s there should have been a sufficient supply of Dayak university graduates. Then, what could have restricted the Dayaks from entering the bureaucracy or stunted their careers in the bureaucracy during the New Order era?

The unfavourable political system was one reason. Before the ascent of the New Order the political system was relatively favourable to Dayaks. The national government respected natives’ role in local government or at least it was not averse to the idea. This was reflected in the appointments of natives to governor and district head positions in the province. These Dayak officials, in turn, tried to encourage more Dayaks to join the bureaucracy. Many Dayak teachers were persuaded, and those with higher educational backgrounds were recruited directly to good positions. Take the case of Iman Kalis, one of the first two Dayak high school graduates. He graduated from senior high school in 1953 and became the headmaster of a junior high school in Sintang (1954-1957), and then Sanggau (1957-1958). He attended university in Yogyakarta from 1958 to 1963. When he returned to West Kalimantan in 1963, he accepted an offer to become a district secretary in Sanggau. Quite similar was the case for A.R. Sampe who was recruited as secretary of Sambas district. Many Dayaks were appointed as sub-district heads although they might not have been the best qualified candidates for the position. This changed quite drastically after the New Order took power. The new regime was rather suspicious of Dayak civil servants, especially at the beginning of the regime. All Dayak executive heads were removed and when in the late 1960s many others in the upper echelons started to retire, these positions were not filled with Dayaks.

The regime’s centralized and anti-ethnic approach prevented any preferential treatment of underprivileged Dayaks in the bureaucracy. No Dayak was appointed again as governor or district head until the

35 Interview with Kls.
end of the New Order, with only one exception in 1995. At lower levels, such as the appointment of sub-district heads, the regime was also not bound to appoint persons with the same ethnic or religious background as the majority population. Dayak elites in the bureaucracy were aware of the continuing prejudice against their own, but for their career and safety, did not antagonize this repressive regime. The repression of all political parties, including those with an interest in the Dayaks such as PK (and later PDI), ensured that issues of ethnicity and marginalization were never raised.

A few Dayak bureaucrats and politicians also believed that ethnic discrimination was a factor underlying their small representation in the bureaucracy. Some retired Dayak politicians believed that their small role in the bureaucracy, particularly at the beginning of the New Order regime, was a result of Malay reprisals. The two ethnic groups had had a hard time getting along in the past due to differences in their religion, culture, and political histories. From the not so distant past, at the end of the 1940s, elites from both ethnic groups opposed each other as to whether to support the unitary state or not. Malay and Dayak relations deteriorated when the Dayaks were able to gain certain top executive positions at the end of 1950s. Dayaks won the district head election in four districts, while the Malays won in only three districts. The governor was a Dayak. The Dayaks also started to fill up many sub-district head positions in interior Dayak regions, mostly at the expense of Malays. The sudden rise of Dayaks in the bureaucracy created resentment from the other ethnic groups who felt they were more capable and entitled to the work. In 1962 Oevaang Oeray was accused of practising ethnic partiality in employee recruitment and promotion.

Quite commonly ethnic groups limit the entry of rival ethnic groups into the bureaucracy in order to maintain their domination. Malay bureaucrats did not find it difficult to block the Dayaks’ entry or promotion because they dominated the bureaucracy. While the Malays did not necessarily occupy the highest positions, which were often reserved for the Javanese or non-native military officers, they were well represented in both district and provincial second-tier leadership, including filling positions like headships of important departments and bureaus responsible

36 Interviews with Lyg and Mgk.
for recruitment, such as the Civil Service Institute. Malay staff who dominated the lower level echelons could have played a significant role in limiting the Dayaks’ entry because they prepared reports on which recruitment decisions were based and they were also the first to ‘sort’ the applications. Moreover, Dayak applicants also lacked financial resources (i.e. for paying bribes) as well as insider backing (i.e. from relatives).

As a consequence of the limited recruitment of Dayaks over the years, only a small pool of them was eligible for promotion. Furthermore, promotion became much more complicated and difficult if discrimination came into play. Some inside sources remarked that discrimination or personal bias affecting promotions was quite common. If this partiality was also true at the Promotion Board (Baperjakat), which handled high level promotion, then higher promotion for the Dayaks was slim. The board usually consisted of the executive heads and their deputies or assistants, the human resources head, and representatives of related departments or bureaus. As explained before, these strategic bureaus usually employed only a few Dayaks, and, until the mid-1990s had never been headed by Dayaks. It could be assumed that Dayak interests would receive little support within the council.

MARGINALIZATION IN THE DPRD

Dayak marginalization in the local legislative branch was quite conspicuous during the first decade of the New Order. Before the coming of the New Order, Dayaks were quite well represented in the legislature. In 1958, the percentage of Dayaks in the West Kalimantan provincial DPRD reached almost 37 per cent of the total DPRD members, the highest percentage ever. In interior districts such as Sanggau, Sintang, and Kapuas Hulu the proportion of Dayaks in the DPRD reached more than 50 per cent. The proportion declined slightly at the provincial level after 1961. Between 1966 and the 1977 election, the proportion of

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58 All APDN teachers in 1973 were non-Dayaks (Pemasir serah terima 1973). Only later were some Dayaks appointed to teach at the institute (Meletakkan landasan 1997). All APDN directors after Tanting Ngo were Malays.

59 Interviews with Lyg and Ttg; Abdulsalam 1997.

60 The main reason was the split of PD into two political parties – Partindo and PK. Although the majority of members in Partindo and PK were still Dayaks, non-Dayaks had started to assume some leadership roles in the parties, particularly at the provincial level. In the case of Partindo, some of these leaders became members of the provincial DPRD. To illustrate this case, three of seven Partindo representatives in the provincial DPRD in 1961 were non-Dayaks. The same was the case for PK.
Dayaks in the provincial DPRD was very low — only between 11 and 13 per cent. The Dayaks were also poorly represented at the district level DPRD.

<table>
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<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>29.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>21.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.4 Dayak legislators in the provincial DPRD (1957-2004)


The decline in Dayak representation in the legislature at the provincial and district levels occurring after 1966 was as a result of the new regime’s blanket hostility and distrust of political parties, particularly former leftist parties or parties with ties to Soekarno. After 11 March 1966, the regime started to purge the national and regional assemblies of Communists. At the same time, the regime put more pro-regime members into the DPRD in order to balance the existing DPRD members. In West Kalimantan, the regime increased the total numbers in the DPRD but without increasing the number of Dayaks. In fact, in some regions the number of Dayak legislators had decreased after the Partindo

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41 Regulations issued on 1-2-1966 and Law 20/1967 removed Communist representatives and sympathizers from the DPRD.
merger with IPKI. As a result of these measures, their proportion in the DPRD fell.

The number of Dayak DPRD members reached its nadir after the 1971 election. The only district in which the share of Dayak legislators exceeded that of pre-1965 was the coastal Pontianak district. This was possible because Golkar, PK, and IPKI all sent significant numbers of Dayaks to the DPRD of the district. Golkar contributed seven seats, while PK and IPKI contributed five seats. Elsewhere, PK and IPKI gained only a few seats, while Golkar, the election winner, only sent a small number of Dayaks as their members of parliament. PK and IPKI, the main source of Dayak legislative candidates, as well as other political parties, were under pressure from the regime even before the election campaign began. IPKI became the main target because it was one of the largest political parties and therefore posed the most serious threat to Golkar. IPKI was also of particular interest to local authorities because it included many members from former leftist Partindo. Several IPKI legislative candidates originally the former Partindo party were eliminated by the military authority team during the process of selecting provisional candidate lists (DCS) for the 1971 election. The greatest IPKI election losses occurred in Sambas, Sanggau, Sintang, and Ketapang districts.42

During the 1971 election, the regime faced a dilemma with regard to several high profile candidates who were nominated by other political parties and therefore might undermine the regime’s goal of a win for Golkar. The regime made a decision on 14 March 1971 to retain those candidates in the list, but in low, non-electable positions under the closed-list proportional-representative system (Buku pemilihan umum 1973:239-40). In West Kalimantan, the military authority lowered some Dayak figures within IPKI to non-electable positions in the preliminary candidate list (DCS). Some affected figures were Oevaang Oeray, Petrus Anjiem, and Stephanus Thomba at the provincial level, and Paitijadi, Djohan Marpong, Sabran Simprong, and Rachmad Sahuddin in Pontianak district.43 Many of these names had disappeared when the final official list (DCT) was announced. In the provincial DCT Oeray,

Anjiem, and Thomba disappeared from the list of IPKI candidates. In other cases, the candidates were pressured by the military to withdraw their candidacies. Threats of jail terms from the military authority towards members of the opposition in inland areas were quite common during this transitional time. In one extreme case in Sintang district, none of the nine IPKI candidates on the provisional list appeared on the final list. Prior to the election in Ketapang, the head of the local branch of the IPKI declared the party to be no longer active.

Faced with such threats and intimidation, no political parties could campaign properly. With a few exceptions, almost no election monitoring was done in interior regions. One political party leader in Sintang reported that no political parties, except Golkar campaigners, could campaign freely. Few political parties monitored the voting process because of the intimidation. IPKI and PK in particular lost many votes because they depended mainly on voters in interior districts, where election-rigging was most rampant. In coastal cities, pressure on the political parties was less severe. One observer linked to the Catholic Church, observed that the process in several polling stations in Pontianak City, the provincial capital, was relatively free and according to the regulations (Doera 2003:299-319). The different levels of intimidation from the local authorities in coastal and interior regions was evident when the polling results came out. In interior districts and Ketapang where threats and election rigging were more obvious, Golkar won an average of 77 per cent of the votes, while in coastal district capitals and provincial capitals, Golkar obtained fewer votes, with an average of 58 per cent. At the end, IPKI and PK, two political parties with significant Dayak votes, only obtained a few seats in the 1971 election.

Another reason for the decline in the number of Dayak legislators in the DPRD was that the Dayaks did not benefit from Golkar’s landslide
<table>
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<td>Percentage</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Dayak</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
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<td>16.0</td>
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Table 6.5 Dayak legislators in the DPRD (1963-1977)

*Total number includes the initial members and replacement members.

Regime change and ethnic politics in Indonesia

Only a few of them appeared in the Golkar candidate lists because the majority still supported PK and IPKI. Some top Dayak leaders of the former Partindo publicly announced their switch to Golkar only on 17 April 1971, too late for them to be included in the Golkar lists, because the DCT was fixed days before the switch was announced. Only those who had joined Golkar earlier were included in the DCT. As a result, their number in the Golkar DCT was very low at the provincial level. There were 58 candidates in the provincial Golkar DCT, but only four were Dayaks. None of the Dayak candidates was considered well-known. They were placed outside the first sixteen candidates of the provincial Golkar DCT to show their less important status in Golkar. None of them had signed the declaration in April 1971. In the interior districts, more Dayaks were placed on the Golkar candidate list, although their numbers were still far from proportional vis-à-vis their percentage of the population. In Sanggau district, for example, of the 36 candidates on the provisional list, only twelve were Dayaks. Of these twelve Dayaks, only four were in the electable top ten positions.

Probably realizing the poor and inappropriate representation of Dayaks among its legislators, Golkar appointed (not through the election mechanism) several Dayaks to membership in the DPRD. At the provincial DPRD, Golkar added G.P. Djaeng, in Pontianak district Rachmad Sahuddin and Sadjali Usman, in Sanggau Willem Amat, and in Kapuas Hulu Aloysius Kahendi. In the end Golkar had only three

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49 Election statistics from 1971 to 1987 show Golkar gaining about 69 per cent of the vote in each election at provincial level. Golkar performance in interior districts (Sanggau, Sintang, Kapuas Hulu, and Ketapang) was very high, about 81 per cent of total votes in the districts. It obtained fewer votes in coastal districts, about 60 per cent.

50 The DCT was signed in Jakarta on 20 April 1971. All nominations in the DCT must have been fixed at the provincial level at least a few weeks before the official signing.


53 According to regulation PP 2/1970 there were two types of appointed members to the regional DPRD: members with a military background and those with none (Article 10). In the case of candidates from non-military background, the final decision would be made by the interior minister based on recommendation by the regional Sekber Golkar (Article 11).

54 Interestingly, backdoor negotiation resulted in the appointment of Rachmad Sahuddin, even though he was officially listed representing IPKI at the election. At least four of the five Dayaks appointed as additional Golkar Dayak legislators were civilian and former members of Partindo.
Dayaks among its 21 members of the provincial DPRD, one legislator in Sambas district and none in the Pontianak municipality. In interior districts, such as Sanggau, Sintang, Kapuas Hulu and Ketapang, less than a third of Golkar DPRD members were Dayaks.

After the 1977 election, Dayak numbers in the provincial DPRD and in some district DPRD started to rise, although they had not reached the 1958 level. Their number in the provincial DPRD was generally more than 25 per cent. Similar trends also appeared in the interior districts. One reason for the growth was the increase in the number of Dayaks who had switched to Golkar to be eligible for better political opportunities. The switch was also encouraged by the loosening emotional ties between the Dayak and the ‘Dayak’ political parties (such as PK and IPKI) due to a series of merges. This is particularly true after PK and IPKI, together with other non-Dayak political parties, were merged into the PDI in 1973. As a result of the merging of five nationalist and Christian

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National/Provincial/District level</th>
<th>Legislators</th>
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<th>Legislators by political party</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ketapang</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>16 (2)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.6 Number of PK, Golkar and IPKI seats from West Kalimantan after the 1971 election

Note: PK shows all Dayaks; for Golkar and IPKI Dayaks are in parentheses.

political parties, PDI could exert less emotional influence on the Dayaks than the PK and IPKI (or Partindo) had done in the past.55

The switch was quite obvious in the 1977 election when many Dayaks who had run for PK and IPKI in the 1971 election then became candidates for Golkar. Oevaang Oeray joined Golkar and campaigned for the party in 1977 (Akcaya, March-April 1977; Davidson 2008:108). The switch was also reflected in the Golkar candidate lists in the 1977 election, and later in the actual number of Dayaks elected into the DPRD. Three of the first four Golkar candidates for the national DPR were Dayaks: Oevaang Oeray in first place, Aloysius Aloy second, and Mozes Nyawath Elmoswath fourth. At the provincial level, Golkar listed two among its first ten candidates. In interior districts such as Sanggau, Sintang, and Kapuas Hulu, about half of the first ten Golkar candidates were Dayaks.

Larger Dayak representation in the DPRD from the end of 1970s, unfortunately, could not guarantee that their interests would be looked after. On the contrary, as already noted, Dayak interests remained largely neglected throughout the New Order. The members of DPRD, like anywhere else in Indonesia, were a mere rubber stamp for the executive.56 Furthermore, under the repressive regime, majority Dayak legislators chose not to raise ethnic concerns, a taboo subject under the New Order regime.57

**DAYAK VOICES IN DISTRICT HEAD ELECTIONS**

Although ethnic politics was considered taboo under the New Order regime, Dayak political voices were not completely muted. In August 1971, a month after the general election, a newspaper sympathetic to the Dayaks and with ties to the Catholic Church criticized the government for not bringing more Dayaks into the parliament. The author of the article believed that Dayaks and Chinese had contributed significantly, voluntarily or involuntarily, to the Golkar victory. He suggested that Golkar should have twelve Dayak members in the provincial DPRD.

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56 See for example an interview with the former head of Sanggau DPRD in Dayak leaders’ memories (2005:10).
57 It was not surprising that after Reformasi some Dayak activists often referred to these Dayak legislators as tools of the New Order regime and refused to cooperate with them.
The author, who was a military priest, was put under house arrest for almost a month as a result of the publication (Doera 2003:301-3). This was followed by another more covert statement two months later by G.P. Djaoeng, a former Dayak district head of Sintang, who was appointed a Golkar legislator to the provincial DPRD. He raised the issue of how unfair practices had sidelined segments of the society (meaning the Dayaks) and demanded fairer policies in recruiting them to the civil service.58

In a 1981 case, some Dayak leaders from Golkar in Sanggau demanded the appointment of more Dayaks to important positions in the executive and legislature. According to a report on the issue, a group of eleven Dayak politicians warned the government that if those demands were not met, Golkar would lose the 1982 election in Sanggau. The report accused them of trying to play on ethnic sentiments and urged the government to punish them.59 The governor claimed in a confidential report in 1982 that there were people who wanted to use the ethnic issue to affect the selection of parliamentary candidates.60 Very likely the governor was referring to the same event.

In June 1993, several months after a national seminar on Dayaks held by the Institut Dayakologi, three Dayak politicians wrote a letter to the governor and copied it to the president and all related institutions in Jakarta and West Kalimantan. In the letter, dated 21 June, G.P. Djaoeng, Rachmad Sahuddin and A.R. Mecer61 claimed that Dayaks had been marginalized by the government (in this case, Golkar) despite their contribution to Golkar’s election wins. They demanded at least three district head positions for Dayaks, and asked that they be given more opportunities to work in government offices and chances for promotion.62 It seemed that the government was finally prepared to address the ethnic imbalance

58 *Varia* 1971/19-20:6-7. The statement did not specifically mention Dayaks, but it quite explicitly addressed the lack of political opportunities they had.
61 Djaoeng was the first Dayak district head in Sintang. He later represented Golkar in the provincial DPRD and served as an advisor to the party. Sahuddin was the leader of Pontianak IPKI, but later joined Golkar. He had served as a Golkar legislator for Pontianak district and later for several terms in the provincial DPRD. He was one of the party deputy chairmen until 1989. A.R. Mecer was a member of Golkar and head of the expanding Dayak NGO, Pancur Kasih.
to avoid more serious problems. Its attempts to install Dayak district heads in Sintang and Kapuas Hulu in 1994 and 1995 illustrates this.63

SINTANG DISTRICT HEAD ELECTION 1994
District head elections under the New Order held almost no surprises. The identity of the next district head had usually been decided jointly by the governor, the local military leader, and the local Golkar leader in consultation with the central government several months before each election. Golkar proposed the final list of three candidates after deliberation with the other two smaller political parties, which would usually concur with the decision. The other two candidates were only accompanying candidates to make the election appear democratic and would not normally pose threats to the regime’s candidate. The election process would go as planned with the regime’s favourite obtaining the majority of the votes and being sworn in as the next district head. A comparable election process was also administered for the governor’s seat (Malley 1999:85-7).

In the early 1990s a few election surprises did occur, when the government’s favoured candidate was defeated. The causes were either that the members of the DPRD resisted the pressure to vote for the regime’s candidate or because of a strong local demand that the government appoint another popular candidate. In December 1993, the election for the Central Kalimantan governorship reached deadlock after the government’s candidate obtained 24 votes, three votes more than the Dayak candidate. Local people demanded that the central government appoint the Dayak candidate. Eventually, in order to prevent further complication without showing that it bowed to popular demand, the regime asked both candidates to resign, and appointed a third person as a caretaker (Malley 1999:90-3). *Media Indonesia* (8-3-1994) listed similar cases in the district head elections. In the Kutai district head election in March 1994, more than half of the members of DPRD refused to participate in the voting because their local candidate did not make the final short-list (*Media Indonesia*, 8-3-1994). There were other anomalies in Deli Serdang (North Sumatra), East Sumba and East Flores (East Nusa Tenggara), and Viqueque (East Timor) almost at the same time. In West Kalimantan during the election in Sintang in 1994, the unexpected happened when the governor’s candidate, L.H. Kadir, was defeated.

63 Davidson (2002:268-9) was the first to highlight the importance of these two elections in Dayak politics, although he did not elaborate on the intensity of the inter-ethnic political feuds.
L.H. Kadir was one of the two highest-ranking Dayak bureaucrats in the provincial office at the time.\textsuperscript{64} From 1982 to 1998, he had served as head of several bureaus in the provincial office. He began his career as the first Dayak to enrol at the government Civil Service Institute, the KDC, and the first to enrol at the APDN. Before he was nominated as district candidate, he had headed a few bureaus and departments within the provincial bureaucracy (KR 1999/43:33). Career-wise, Kadir had held the highest possible position attainable by Dayaks during the New Order period because no Dayaks had held higher positions, such as assistant and deputy governor. Kadir was the governor’s favoured candidate in the Sintang district head election in 1994 (Abdulsalam 1997:157). The governor showed his support for Kadir through a series of consultations with members of the district DPRD.\textsuperscript{65} District and provincial Golkar offices also officially nominated him (Jayakarta, 8-4-1994). The other accompanying candidates, Abdillah Kamarullah and Abdul Hadi Karsoem, were Malay bureaucrats in Sintang district. Kadir should not have had any difficulties winning the race because Golkar and military factions, which had supported his candidacy, occupied almost 80 per cent of the seats in the DPRD. However, the result of the vote in February 1994 turned out to be different from the usual scenario. Kamarullah won the election with 21 votes, while Kadir only gained 16 votes and Karsoem just one.\textsuperscript{66} Unfortunately for the Dayaks, the regime did not try to reverse the result, but instead, immediately applauded the election as a democratic and fair process conducted without interference (Kompas, 12-2 and 2-3-1994; Akcaya, 1-3 and 3-3-1994). It was quite unusual for the regime to celebrate the defeat of its own candidate.

For many Dayaks, Kadir’s failure heightened their conviction that there had been concerted efforts to marginalize them in the bureaucracy, including tacit approvals from the central government. Tammar Abdulsalam, a Malay deputy governor in region II, who was given the responsibility of overseeing the election, was believed to have abetted the plot to sway votes from Kadir to Kamarullah.\textsuperscript{67} The Dayak head of the Golkar faction calculated that the defeat was caused by the defection

\textsuperscript{64} The other was Sotorman Benteng, a former BPH member in the 1960s.
\textsuperscript{65} Interview with Mlg.
\textsuperscript{66} Kadir himself was not present during the election. One source mentions that Kadir was not interested in the position because of family considerations. His lack of interest might have encouraged the manoeuvre not to elect him (interview with Kdr).
\textsuperscript{67} Various interviews; Abdulsalam 1997.
of almost half the Golkar members. He was also convinced that the defectors were Muslims and non-Dayaks. Offensive slogans aimed at Dayaks during the election (Davidson 2008:231) further supported this ethnic explanation of Kadir’s failure. On the other hand, the Malays saw Kamarullah’s victory as a fair result because two previous district heads, Daniel Toding (Torajanese) and Bonar Sianturi (Batak), had been Christians. The Malays were very proud because the members of the DPRD had followed their heart and chosen a popular candidate rather than simply supporting the pre-determined government candidate.

The Dayak elite tried to repeal the result by sending delegations to Jakarta to ask for justice (Kompas, 1-3-1994). Demonstrations were also staged in both Sintang and Pontianak (Abdulsalam 1997:161-2). Some of their politicians even threatened to quit Golkar if Kadir was not installed as the district head (Akcaya, 1-3-1994; Kompas, 2-3-1994). The provincial Golkar secretariat, which had shown its approval of the election result, did not escape the protests. On one occasion, chairman of the provincial Golkar, Soemardji, was forced to issue a statement that the organization would sack disloyal members of the Sintang DPRD who failed to follow the party line. He even urged the president or interior minister to use his prerogative to elect Kadir. The Golkar headquarters responded by sending a delegation to investigate the matter (Akcaya, 2-3-1994). Unfortunately, the central government signalled that it would not reverse the election decision (Akcaya, 3-3, 23-3-1994).

After some intentional delays to allow tensions to dissipate, Kamarullah was sworn in with tight security as Sintang district head on 5 April 1994 (Akcaya, 6-4-1994; Davidson 2008:116). The inauguration inside the building was tense from the beginning with the heads of Golkar and PDI factions in the DPRD, both of whom were Dayaks, trying to obstruct the inauguration process. In Sengah Temila, about two hundred fifty kilometres from Sintang, hundreds of Dayaks vented their anger by blocking the main road connecting Pontianak and Sintang, waylaying and damaging official cars (Davidson 2008:116; Abdulsalam 1997:163). G.P. Djaoeng and several Dayak leaders who attended the inauguration

68 Interview with Mlg.
69 Davidson (2002:268) notes that following Kadir’s defeat, leaflets were distributed claiming that during the vote count people shouted ‘Dayaks are infidels’.
70 In the end, only three members of Golkar were pressured to resign from the DPRD: H. Mesir, Zulkarnaen, and Zulaeda (interview with Mlg).
warned the government that denying Dayak interests would only push them to even more extreme reactions (Jayakarta, 8-4-1994).

Although the Dayak protests and lobbying effort failed, the episode sent ripples through Dayak politics for years into the future. It brought to the surface the issue of marginalization and Dayak-Malay political rivalries and set a precedent for overtly ethnic politics in the next district head elections. The victory of a non-government-backed candidate—in this case a Malay over a Dayak—showed that the authoritarian regime could relent. The opportunity came a year later during the district head election in the Kapuas Hulu.

KAPUAS HULU DISTRICT HEAD ELECTION 1995
The election of the district head in Kapuas Hulu in 1995 can be viewed as a continuation of the unfinished saga of the election in Sintang the previous year. In order to assuage Dayaks’ anger, the governor reserved this post for a Dayak (Davidson 2008:115). The governor’s choice was Jacobus Layang, a middle-ranked bureaucrat in the governor’s office, who had a good relationship with the military. To boost his popularity, Layang initiated the formation of the provincial Dayak Customary Board (Majelis Adat Dayak, MAD) on 12 August 1994 and successfully campaigned to become its chairman (KR 2003/89; Davidson 2008:232).

The governor’s determination to appoint a Dayak district head was demonstrated by several political manoeuvres. He disregarded some Dayaks’ opinion that the governor should appoint an able Malay bureaucrat, Setiman Sudin, as district head instead of the more junior Jacobus Layang. The governor also took steps to prevent a repeat of the Dayaks’ failure during election in Sintang. Tammar Abdulsalam, who was responsible for the elections in Sintang and Kapuas Hulu, was temporarily relieved from duty. He was partly blamed for failing to deliver Kadir as Sintang district head. The regime believed that his ardent

71 The governor did not choose the other more senior Dayaks in the bureaucracy such as Sotorman Benteng and L.H. Kadir. One inside source said that the governor regarded Benteng as weak, and could not back Kadir after he had failed to win in the election in Sintang the previous year (interview with Awn).
72 Layang himself had credentials in Dayak customary law (hukum adat) as indicated by his articles and research in this field. He was the author of a book on Dayak rebellions against the Japanese (Layang 1981) and of several research articles on Dayak customary land and laws published by Universitas Tanjungpura.
73 Interview with Kls.
Islamic beliefs could endanger the nomination of the Catholic Layang. Replacing him was the incumbent district head of Kapuas Hulu, A.M. Djapari, who was known as a close confidant of Governor Aspar Aswin. To eliminate ethnic complications in the election and to ensure that the position would go to a Dayak, the interior minister was advised to exclude both Malay candidates, Abang Ramli and Rusny Usha, from the final list. As the result, the remaining three final candidates were all Dayaks: Jacobus Frans Layang, S.S. Sonan, and Stephanus Kupon (Akcaya, 18-3-1995). Finally, a senior Dayak politician, Iman Kalis, was dispatched as the governor’s envoy to Kapuas Hulu prior to the election to ensure the victory of Layang.

In the initial selection period, the Malay candidates, who realized that the post would go to a Dayak, claimed that they too were Dayaks (Abdulsalam 1997:165). When all Malay candidates were finally dropped from the lists, they manoeuvred to elect the best Dayak district head for the Malays’ interests. They were scheming to elect Stephanus Kupon, who was known to be quite ill at that time. Their calculation was that if Kupon won the election he would not be serving in his position for long because of his poor health. If that happened, a Malay deputy district head would take over his position. In order to succeed, the schemers held a meeting one day before the election and suggested a narrow win for Layang. With this strategy Kupon could win the election with only a small swing in the voting, and the schemers could avoid being blamed for insubordination, because in an election small vote swings are possible. To this end, they also encouraged sub-ethnic divisions among the Dayak members of parliament. Sensing the manoeuvres, Iman Kalis, the governor’s envoy, objected to the marginal winning strategy advanced by the Malay legislature during that meeting. He insisted Layang be given a decisive win with 18 votes, while Kupon should be left with only one. He also worked behind the scenes to unify the Dayak vote behind Layang. Even after these efforts Layang still won by only a narrow margin of three votes. Without Kalis’s persistence, Kupon, who was favoured by

74 Interviews with Abs and Awn.
75 Interviews with Kls and Djp.
76 He was known to suffer from cancer and died not long after the election (interviews with Lyg, Kls and Djp).
77 Interviews with Djp, Abs, Lyg and Khs.
78 Kalis’ insistence was also recalled by the high-ranking Malay bureaucrat who presided at the meeting (interview with Djp).
the Malays, would have won the election. Layang was elected as the first Dayak district head in the New Order.

In sum, during the New Order Dayaks’ access to the bureaucracy was limited, even in districts where Dayaks were the majority population. They were also barred from occupying strategic positions in the executive, at least until 1995. Their share in the legislatures since 1977 had gradually improved although they had never achieved a majority in the council. Unfortunately, their growing share in the legislative branch was without much effect because the New Order DPRD was known to be subservient and subordinate to the executive. This experience of marginalization was not limited to political access, but also in economic and cultural aspects, as the following will discuss.

**ECONOMIC MARGINALIZATION**

The New Order brought economic stability and prosperity to many Indonesians. Before the crisis at the end of 1990s, general indicators had shown a significant increase in income level, life expectancy, and educational attainment. However, it was widely acknowledged that development had not been equitable, and many peripheral regions, particularly those in the Eastern part of the country, had enjoyed far fewer fruits of development. West Kalimantan was one such province having a lower standard of living despite its abundant natural resources. This section examines how uneven development has affected Dayaks by looking at the influence of logging and plantation activities and transmigration projects on rural Dayaks and discusses opportunities open to Dayaks in urban areas.

**LOGGING AND PLANTATION ACTIVITIES AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT**

Kalimantan forests have been exploited since the late 1960s. With the Forestry Act of 1967 the government started to grant timber harvesting rights to many logging concessionaries (HPH). The export of unprocessed logs rose sharply in the 1970s and became an important source

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of foreign exchange. Since the mid-1980s, because of the need for industrial wood, the government introduced timber plantations (HTI) especially in Sumatra and Kalimantan. As a result, the country’s forest cover depleted from 93 per cent in 1950 to 75 per cent in 1985, and 60 per cent in 1997. West Kalimantan endured a similar deforestation trend with forest cover falling from 66.5 per cent prior to 1968 to 46.1 per cent in 1997 (FWI/GFW 2002:8, 12, 14).

Logging operations contributed most to West Kalimantan’s forest loss. Prior to 1968, the province’s ‘production forest’, an area where large-scale logging activities could take place, was the smallest among the Kalimantan provinces. It only designated 0.4 per cent of its total forest area of almost 10 million hectares as production forest. At the same time Central Kalimantan set aside designated 1.2 per cent, East Kalimantan 7.4 per cent, and South Kalimantan 18.8 per cent. By 1970, West Kalimantan had caught up with the other Kalimantan provinces, with the proportion of production forest soaring to 37 per cent of the total forest areas in the province. In 1997 the share of production forest had climbed to 56.9 per cent. Added to further deforestation was the slow rate of replanting of trees (in some cases even the complete failure to replant) in logged areas. In 2002 almost half of the logged areas in the province were left abandoned after timbers were secured (Informasi kehutanan 2002).

The activities of industrial timber (HTI) and oil palm plantations caused deforestation too. By 2002, the total forest allocated for HTI was about 1.1 million hectare, about 21 per cent of the province’s production forest, or about 11.3 per cent of its total forest. In 2002 the area occupied by oil palm estate crops was about 6.7 per cent of total areas occupied by forests. Most of the HTI sites were intentionally located in thick forest

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80 Triwibowo and Haryanto 2001:3, 7; FWI/GFW 2002:24, 36; Okamoto 1999:3-4
81 For the statistics, see ‘Laporan umum Gubernur Kepala Daerah Propinsi Kalimantan Barat kepada menteri dalam negeri’, 1970, in: Library of West Kalimantan Governor’s Office, Pontianak; Statistik kehutanan 1968; Informasi kehutanan 2002. A local source even claimed that 94 per cent forest in the district such as Ketapang was allocated to logging activities (Andasputra 1999:1).
82 The rapid growth of plantations, particularly palm oil plantations, in the province could be tied with the government’s enthusiastic support for plantations. For example, since 1986 every new oil palm estate has been required to be linked to transmigration, which itself helps the growth of the plantation program. Another contributor was the accessible road to inland regions. The road construction to northern and northeastern of the province started in the 1970s with the help of the Australian government (for aid, see Investment opportunity 1982:17). One aim of the road construction was to develop the interior areas and most importantly to enable rapid mobilization of security forces if there were security threats in the region. These areas were the domain of the Communist rebels at the end of the 1960s.
areas partly because of the potential revenue from clear-cutting, i.e. selling the timber. Generally, because the main objective was to secure the marketable timber, replanting of the cleared areas for the HTI project was very slow. In West Kalimantan the planting rate was at 11 per cent of the total allocated HTI area, less than half of the national rate (FWI/GFW 2002:38-9).

Traditional shifting cultivation and transmigration were not major contributors to deforestation, despite the common belief that this is so. Traditional shifting or ‘slash-and-burn’ cultivation, which the government blamed for forest depletion and devastating forest fires, had little impact on forest depletion compared to large-scale logging and plantation projects. According to J. Dick, traditional farmers were responsible for no more than 21 per cent of total forest loss (FWI/GFW 2002:47). Transmigration, too, contributed a small amount to forest loss. Up until 1998, seventeen transmigration sites had taken over 43,434 hectares, or less than one per cent of West Kalimantan forests (FWI/GFW 2002:50).

Most plantation and logging projects were located in rural and interior regions, which were thickly forested and sparsely inhabited. Table 6.7 shows that interior districts such as Sanggau, Ketapang, Sintang, and Landak had the largest areas under palm oil cultivation. The Dayaks are known to be the majority populations in these districts, and consequently would experience the effects of plantation and logging activities.

Logging and plantation operations could stimulate the local economy and improve standards of living. Setting up logging and plantation activities is usually accompanied by the construction of roads for transportation of the products. New roads open isolated regions and give more social and economic opportunities to the population. Health and education facilities were also often established in large plantations, particularly those linked to the transmigration program (known as PIR-Trans). Large logging companies were usually required to build social and health facilities for local populations. In short, these operations theoretically would open up previously isolated areas, attract labourers and stimulate the local economy. However, negative effects soon arose from mismanagement and corruption of plantation companies and government officials.

Researchers have shown that plantation and logging operations lowered the living standards for many Dayaks (Alqadrie 2002b:23; One study found that 72 per cent of the total area of seven HTI was forest (FWI/GFW 2002: 37, 41).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Districts</th>
<th>New plantations (Ha)</th>
<th>Productive plantations (Ha)</th>
<th>Old plantations (Ha)</th>
<th>Total area (Ha)</th>
<th>Numbers of farmers</th>
<th>Production (tonnage)</th>
<th>Production/year (tonnage)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pontianak</td>
<td>3.02</td>
<td>2.371</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5.391</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5.029</td>
<td>2.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landak</td>
<td>5.449</td>
<td>16.186</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>22.435</td>
<td>4.589</td>
<td>33.079</td>
<td>2.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sambas</td>
<td>5.799</td>
<td>9.369</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15.168</td>
<td>3.144</td>
<td>15.684</td>
<td>1.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bengkayang</td>
<td>3.164</td>
<td>5.857</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9.021</td>
<td>1.675</td>
<td>12.115</td>
<td>2.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singkawang</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanggau</td>
<td>47.42</td>
<td>106.968</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>154.588</td>
<td>33.311</td>
<td>245.572</td>
<td>2.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sintang</td>
<td>14.42</td>
<td>31.55</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>45.79</td>
<td>7.017</td>
<td>70.607</td>
<td>2.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kapuas Hulu</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>8.126</td>
<td>1.51</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ketapang</td>
<td>13.807</td>
<td>72.941</td>
<td>1.834</td>
<td>88.582</td>
<td>14.916</td>
<td>135.4</td>
<td>1.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.899</td>
<td>245.242</td>
<td>2.96</td>
<td>349.101</td>
<td>66.153</td>
<td>517.09</td>
<td>2.11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.7 Area and production of palm oil in West Kalimantan (2002)
Large-scale logging and plantation operations reduced shifting cultivation areas so farmers were forced to re-cultivate the same plots of land more frequently. Frequent cultivation in shorter cycles left the soil with no time to recover; it therefore became less fertile and unlikely to yield good harvests. In the past when free forests were still abundant, the land could be left fallow for up to twenty years so that it could recover its fertility before re-cultivation (Mubyarto et al. 1991:xxiii-iv). Dwindling forest areas also correlated with a decline in the population of wild animals – a source of protein for the villagers – as well as the reduction of forest produce, such as rubber, dry wood, fruits, honey, cinnamon, medicinal plants and rattan. In addition, Kalimantan Review reported cases in which locals had been barred from collecting...
produce from the forest after the plantations started to operate. Logging
and plantation activities were also linked to reports of outbreaks of ag-

cultural pests, increasing water and air pollution, and siltation which

hampered river transportation (Florus and Petebang 1999:12).

Farmers who engaged in share-cropping plantation work did not

experience any immediate improvement in their living conditions. Many

had to wait six years after planting before they could reap the first har-

vest. In most cases, while awaiting the harvest, they were required to

work at the plantation, usually for low wages. For eleven years after the

first harvest, a third of their monthly income was deducted to cover the

cost of running and maintaining their plots (Okamoto 1999:5; Florus

and Petebang 1999:37). The whole process involved sophisticated cal-

culations foreign to many farmers. Unfortunately, estate and plantation

companies did not provide financial coaching. Researchers found some

farmers were left with heavy debts resulting from a lack of financial plan-


Plantations did not always provide better long-term employment

opportunities for the local population. Some studies of the plantation

system in West Kalimantan report that a majority of skilled employees in

the plantation were not locals (Alqadrie 1990:173-4, 186-7; Awang 1992;

Djuweng 1996:63). In Parindu Plantation (Sanggau), about 559 (77.2 per

cent) of 724 employees were from outside West Kalimantan (Alqadrie


logging companies, only 1.7 per cent of the total number of employees

were local, while the rest were outsiders (Djuweng 1996:xvi).

Apart from maintaining their plots, jobs available to local people on

the plantation were as cheap contract labour. Finding alternative jobs for

the locals was not easy because not many had the specific skills required

for plantation operations. Also, some employers preferred to employ

migrants rather than local people, who were considered poorly educated

and unskilled, and were perceived as more difficult to deal with. In log-

ging areas, with no alternative skills, less arable land and the need for

quick cash, many Dayaks were eventually lured into logging activities,

working independently or hired by the logging companies (Djuweng


The majority (70 percent) of respondents in Alqadrie’s study

(1990:182, 185) at the end of the 1980s disliked the plantation or logging

activities in their region, and about half of them believed that such activ-
ities did not benefit the local population. Anti-plantation protests started at the beginning of the 1980s, although they went unreported. Aware of the negative aspects of plantation activities, NGOs under Pancur Kasih and elements of the Catholic Church urged the local population to reject palm oil plantation development in their areas.

TRANSMIGRATION AND INCREASED ECONOMIC COMPETITION

There are four main migrant groups in West Kalimantan: the Bugis, Chinese, Javanese and Madurese. The significant influx of Bugis and Chinese had ceased before Indonesian independence, whereas the numbers of Javanese and Madurese began to increase significantly only after the 1970s. The majority of the Javanese came as participants in official transmigration schemes, while the majority of the Madurese are believed to have arrived as independent (swakarsa) migrants.

The first formal transmigration projects in West Kalimantan began in 1955 with only a few such projects before 1965, and the number of migrants over this period was small. Many of this first generation migration were still alive in the 1990s and constituted about 1.9 per cent of total migrant households. Transmigration grew rapidly during the New Order regime, reaching its peak in the 1980s. Most of West Kalimantan migrants went to the districts of Sintang (22.5 per cent), Ketapang (18.2 per cent), Pontianak (13.8 per cent), Sekadau (13.4 per cent), Bengkayang (11.1 per cent) and Sanggau (10.4 per cent).

In principle, transmigration is meant to benefit both migrants and locals or natives. Through transmigration, the government intended to balance the distribution of population and labour force, to utilize natural resources, to raise the standard of living, to support regional development and reduce inter-regional disparities. Transmigration could also foster nation-building and strengthen national defence and security (Fasbender and Erbe 1990:30-1). Ideally Dayaks and other local people who lived near transmigration settlements would benefit from the new roads and educational and health facilities brought into their areas by transmigration in their areas. Those who became local transmigrants (known also as APPDT) would also receive allowances from the government (KR 2004/106). Despite these good intentions, problems and tension related to transmigration is common because of cultural differences, land disputes, economic competition, and other issues (Otten 1986:144-
84). The following section will focus on the effect of transmigration on the Dayaks.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Periods</th>
<th>Numbers of households</th>
<th>Percentage of total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950-1960s</td>
<td>1,551</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970s</td>
<td>2,197</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980s</td>
<td>47,932</td>
<td>59.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990s</td>
<td>28,908</td>
<td>35.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>80,588</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.8 Transmigration to West Kalimantan (1950s through 1990s)

In general, the natives of Sumatra, Kalimantan and Sulawesi did not welcome the Javanese and Balinese migrants, particularly if the migrants threatened to become a majority in the local region. This was very real possibility because a transmigration site usually accommodated several hundred migrant households and could overwhelm relatively small and scattered local populations in the interior. Many natives were sceptical of transmigration because the government supported the migrants but seemed to neglect equally poor locals. As a rule, the government provided sponsored migrants with housing, free land (two hectares or more), food supplies for up to eighteen months, and various resources for production, such as seed fertilizer, livestock, necessary tools and equipment (Fasbender and Erbe 1990:52-3). Migrants who participated in the plantation program (or PIR-Trans) from the 1980s also received plots of plantation land. Local people did not receive such government support, and as a result resentment and jealousy toward the migrants inevitably grew.

84 In the case of Irian Jaya, by the early 1980s over 250,000 transmigrants had been added to the province’s population of only 750,000. The regime had planned to bring in a further one million during the 1980s, which would reduce the native Papuans to a minority (Drake 1989:57, 132). This kind of population resettlement for political purposes was not uncommon in countries with many ethnic groups.

85 From 1989 to 1995, there were 28,749 households participating in PIR-Trans (KR 2004/106). Local people were allowed to participate in the PIR-Trans projects; however, they had to repay an amount of debt similar to that of migrants. Locals were unhappy and argued that since they had given part of their land, they should not pay the same amount as migrants (Dove 1985a, 1986).
The government tried to alleviate some of these problems by allowing some locals to be part of transmigration projects from the late 1970s (regulation Keppres 1/1978). Local people who participated in the project would receive the same entitlements as the migrants. The number of such local migrants was nationally set at 10 per cent of the total site population, although in West Kalimantan the cap could reach 50 per cent, and even more than 81 per cent in some sites. Unfortunately, these measures did not solve the problem for all local migrants. Many left and went back to their original dwellings because they did not settle well into different lifestyles and cultures or they had exhausted government-provided resources (KR various issues; Otten 1986:164-6).

Table 6.9 Transmigration sites and households in West Kalimantan (1955-2000)

The government tried to alleviate some of these problems by allowing some locals to be part of transmigration projects from the late 1970s (regulation Keppres 1/1978). Local people who participated in the project would receive the same entitlements as the migrants. The number of such local migrants was nationally set at 10 per cent of the total site population, although in West Kalimantan the cap could reach 50 per cent, and even more than 81 per cent in some sites. Unfortunately, these measures did not solve the problem for all local migrants. Many left and went back to their original dwellings because they did not settle well into different lifestyles and cultures or they had exhausted government-provided resources (KR various issues; Otten 1986:164-6).

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86 Fasbender 1990:54-5; Kepala Kantor Wilayah Departemen Transmigrasi dan Pemukiman Per-ambah Hutan Kalimantan Barat 1998:56. In a more recent example in 2004, the local population in Seberuang sub-district, Kapuas Hulu protested against the district government policy to open a new transmigration site where the local people would only get a 40 per cent allocation. The protest succeeded in pressuring the government to change the allocation to 50 per cent (KR 2004/110).
Land disputes were another source of local resentment toward the migrants. In most cases, the regime appropriated land and handed it over to migrants without properly compensating the local landowners. One study found that the majority of local people in Sanggau Ledo (Bengkayang) in 1986 received no compensation when the government converted their land to a transmigration site (Djuweng 1996:93). In 1984, some Dayaks from Nobal (Sintang) complained to a local bishop and to the district head about the lack of financial compensation for their land which had been converted to transmigration sites (Roekaerts 1985:29). After locals objected strongly, a plantation in Parindu (Sanggau), which was originally designated for migrants, was returned to local ownership (Sapardi 1992:130). People were dissatisfied with the compensation although formal complaints were few or not well documented because of the authoritarian nature of the regime at that time.

Dayaks and some segments of other local populations also believed that the migrants had taken away their jobs, particularly jobs in low-paid sectors, such as in mining and logging. When illegal mining riots broke out in Samalantan (Sambas) in March 1996, a majority of illegal gold miners (PETI) in West Kalimantan were outsiders. Fierce job competition was also a result of many migrants looking for jobs other than farming their allocated land (Usop 1992:103; Suhadak, Daliyo and Redmana 1977:20, 45). Common reasons for these migrants to venture out of farming were the need for immediate cash to support their families, the unsuitability of the land for farming, and difficulties in marketing produce due to poor infrastructure (Suhadak, Daliyo and Redmana 1977:20, 45). They were usually more flexible and less demanding but more aggressive in looking for jobs and therefore more likely to secure jobs than locals.

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87 Andasputra 1999:14-6. Similar phenomena could be found elsewhere. In the mining sites in Talang-gah village, Central Kalimantan, there were only 35 people, or around 0.9 per cent locals, working in the mines, while outsiders numbered around 5,000. Before the police sweep against the illegal mining, the number of outsiders reached 10,000 (Usop 1992:101).
In developing countries like Indonesia, the establishment of important infrastructure and offices in the regions usually takes place first in the provincial capitals before being made available at the district capitals and in other cities or towns. These development priorities mean that those who live far from cities and towns will naturally be disadvantaged. Many Dayaks would have been disadvantaged as they lived in outlying areas — a demographic trend which has changed only slightly since colonial times. The population census in 1930 recorded very few Dayaks living in towns or cities: no Dayaks in Pemangkat and Sintang, only 42 in Singkawang (3.6 per cent), 40 in Pontianak (0.3 per cent), and 76 in Ketapang (2.3 per cent). Recent censuses show that Dayak populations in urban areas remain small. In the provincial capital, the proportion of Dayaks was only 2.9 per cent in 1980 and 3.3 per cent in the 2000 census. Even in districts with a significant Dayak population, their capitals usually had fewer Dayaks, except in Bengkayang.

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**Table 6.10 Transmigration household to Sambas district (1994-1995)**


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Transmigration Type</th>
<th>Sites</th>
<th>Number of transmigrant households</th>
<th>Percentage of local</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>Non-Local</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIR-Sus</td>
<td>Sensibo Baru</td>
<td>1,112</td>
<td>256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Seluang</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>828</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kinande</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Godang Damar</td>
<td>391</td>
<td>205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Papan Tembawang</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pombay</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIR-Trans</td>
<td>Jawai</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIR-Trans</td>
<td>Tebuah Marong</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sabung</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Banan Laik</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food crop cultivation</td>
<td>Saparan III</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Paum</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,944</td>
<td>3,033</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The number of Dayaks in the cities continued to be small because many of them could not afford the cost associated with urban migration. For those whose livelihood depended on farming in the outlying villages, moving into urban areas was not possible without jeopardizing their incomes. Once they left their farms they would lose their only source of funding. Finding a new job in the city for those who had no other skills but farming and lacked connections would be extremely difficult. It was no longer possible for them to move and farm the lands near the cities because there was no free land. Only Dayaks who worked as civil servants, were involved in business, or owned farms in nearby areas could live in the cities. A significant number of younger generation Dayaks who lived in the cities were actually students who were pursuing higher education. Upon graduation these students would need to find jobs in either the bureaucracy or the private sector to enable them to stay on. However, as mentioned previously, entry into these sectors was not easy because they had been under the domination of other ethnic groups.
The bureaucracy was under the control of Malays, while business and private sectors were in the hands of the Chinese. These two ethnic groups, naturally, would protect the interests of their own members.

CULTURAL MARGINALIZATION

When the Dayak community leaders talked about the decline of their culture, they usually referred to the disappearance of longhouses, the declining role of traditional leaders, and diminished appreciation of their culture among the younger generation of Dayaks. This section will focus on factors outside the Dayak community’s control, such as the introduction of contemporary world religions and government policies, as well as on the lack of cultural courage and pride among the Dayaks as the main contributors to cultural decline.

ROLE OF MODERN RELIGION

The introduction of foreign religions, especially Islam and Christianity, undermined Dayak cultural practices. As previously explained, in the past, after conversion to Islam the Dayaks usually abandoned their traditional practices and beliefs, and changed their identity to become Malays. Serious converts would often leave their community to settle in Malay communities because there were basic disagreements between Islam and many Dayak habits, such as drinking liquor and eating pork. For generations, Islam has changed the culture, habits, and identity of many Dayaks who became Muslims.

As with the introduction of Islam, Protestantism and Catholicism also contributed to the changing of Dayak culture and tradition. Unlike Islam and Protestantism which are usually rigid in their approach to the Dayak culture, Catholicism is generally more flexible and acceptable of Dayak culture. Generally, Dayaks who converted to Catholicism or Protestantism could continue to live in their community and practice their customs to certain extent. For example, magical chanting in

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88 Within Christianity, Protestantism is perceived as more intolerant of animism and traditional religion than Catholicism. John Bamba claimed that Protestantism was the most incompatible religion with Dayak culture (Urano 2002:23). Having said that, there were also reports of strict Catholic priests in the past who demanded the new converts destroy all idols (Van Hulten 1992:133).
traditional performances was replaced by Christian prayers, and sacrifices were changed to align with Christian practices and principles (King 1985:72-3; Maunati 2004:84-5). Research conducted on Dayak Ribun in Parindu (Sanggau) in 1980 also reached the same conclusion about the flexibility of Catholicism (Ahok et al. 1980:5). This flexibility enabled Catholicism to change as well as retain many elements of Dayak tradition. One Dayak scholar believes that Catholicism is adopting a more sophisticated and diplomatic approach to destroy Dayak culture (Urano 2002:23). The negative effects of Christianity on the eroding of local culture can be observed in other parts of Kalimantan. In Central Kalimantan, a Dayak scholar, Fridolin Ukur, found that Christianity has resulted in Dayaks being uprooted from their culture. They did not have enough knowledge of their own culture, and the new generation was completely ignorant about it (Ukur 1971:242-3).

After the coming of the New Order, conversion to modern religions increased due to anti-Communist campaigns (Davidson 2008:105-6). A Protestant missionary who was working in the Bengkayang area observed that after the 1965 coup, and particularly after the 1967 conflict, both Christian and Muslim officers in the army encouraged the local Dayaks to convert (Humble 1982:45, 142). One ex-military priest recalled that a military commander backed the full-scale Islamization of the Dayaks, even by allowing new converts to continue their habit of consuming pork and alcohol. In some cases, Muslim preachers and informal leaders were forced to impose sanctions on those Dayaks who failed to convert to Islam (Doera 2003:166-74). Catholic leaders who were initially strict about orthodoxy and slow to convert Dayaks decided to make conversions much easier, for example by lifting the requirement to study the Bible before converting (Doera 2003:190-1). Church authorities even agreed to convert groups of Dayaks through the distribution of yellow cards (Davidson 2008:106). Conversion to Protestantism similarly accelerated. In Bengkayang the conversion rate increased dramatically from an average of 94 converts per year in the 1960s to 729 converts per year in the 1970s (Humble 1982:45, 142). Local press joined the effort by reporting news of conversion (Akoaya, 12-1, 28-11, 24-12-1979).

These efforts to convert the Dayaks were very successful. Although data on the religion of each ethnic group was not available in 1971, it was assumed that between 75 and 85 per cent of the 277,456 Catholic in the province in 1971 were Dayaks, and about the same percentage
of the province’s 84,372 Protestants. By 1980, the number of Catholic Dayaks had already reached 474,362; and in 2000 792,748. Numbers of Protestant Dayaks had increased from 167,096 in 1980 to 307,335 in 2000. Excluding the small percentage of recent Senganan, who were included in the Malay category for consistency in this book, almost 98 per cent of Dayaks were either Catholic or Protestant. The number of animist Dayaks, not surprisingly, fell precipitately during this period. According to the 1971 census, the number of people professing ‘other religions’ in West Kalimantan was 655,097, the majority (70-80 per cent) of whom were very likely Dayak animists. The number of Dayak animists had declined drastically to 116,665 by 1980, and further reduced to 16,059 by 2000.

### A HOMOGENIZING CULTURAL APPROACH

After independence, Indonesia embarked on a nation-building process aimed at strengthening and cohesion the country’s unity. One way was through the creation of national symbols to be shared by all Indonesians. In the early days of the nation, Indonesian leaders had decided on the national flag, anthem, language, and some other essential symbols. In more recent times batik (Javanese traditional dress) was elevated to the status of an official national dress.

These symbols were accompanied by the construction of national identity or values to bind diverse ethnic groups together. The rapid introduction of streets named after national heroes throughout Indonesia since the 1970s and 1980s was one example. In West Kalimantan, many Dayak villages which had local names were renamed with more common names which mostly followed the naming conventions of villages in Java. Some others were changed rather differently; for example, Iban villages were renamed Toba, Pulau Manak and Rantau Prapat by a Batak sub-district head in the early 1980s.

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89 Other possible animists, the Chinese, were mostly registered as Confucianists in the 1971 census. According to the census there were 132,974 Confucianists in West Kalimantan. Their number dropped to 65,857 in the 1990 census. In the 1990 census, 173,609 or 60 per cent of West Kalimantan Chinese professed to be Buddhists as Confucianism had been deregistered as an official religion.

90 Toba, Pulau Manak and Rantau Prapat are names of places in North Sumatra, the origin of the Batak sub-district head. They later reverted to their original names after the Reform (Lumenta 2001:113; Soemardjan et al. 1992:Chapter VI).
As part of nation building and in order to improve the standard of living and civilization, the government decided to transform the cultures of certain indigenous minorities which were thought primitive or too different from normal Indonesian citizens. These communities were usually known as *masyarakat terasing* or isolated communities. Sections of the Dayak community were also categorised as *masyarakat terasing*. The decision to include Dayaks as a primitive ethnic group was most likely influenced by the memory of their past practices of nomadic life, shifting cultivation, exotic culture, and headhunting. A publication in 1975 noted that West Kalimantan had 66 such a groups, all of whom were Dayaks, with total of 481,368 people (*Laporan survey* 1975:19-22). This number was almost half (42 per cent) of all Dayaks of West Kalimantan (based on the 1971 census). In the 1980s and 1990s, the number of isolated groups in West Kalimantan had decreased as a result of advancements in transportation and communication. Contributing to the decrease was the better understanding of Dayaks and an end to the blanket assumption that all Dayaks were backward and therefore isolated. A government source published in 1990 mentioned only four isolated, undoubtedly Dayak, ethnic groups in West Kalimantan: the Bekatan in Kapuas Hulu, Dayyu in Sambas, Baweng in Landak, and Miskin in Ketapang (*Bale and Suprapti* 1990:5). Ethnic stereotyping of Dayaks as backward and primitive did not disappear quickly. Although the practice of headhunting among the Dayaks had been largely stamped out by the beginning of the twentieth century, their association with headhunting continued as a result of conflicts in 1967, 1997 and 1999 in which headhunting occurred. Furthermore, many Dayaks still engage in traditional shifting cultivation, a practice government officials have blamed as the cause of recurring forest fires. This further fomented a false perception of Dayak culture as a whole.

One solution was to introduce migrants into the region through transmigration. Another was to resettle these isolated communities to somewhere with easy access for the government to monitor their progress.

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91 Duncan 2004c; Li 1999. Other terms are also used for example *suku terasing, masyarakat adat terpencil* or more recently adopted *komunitas adat terpencil* which all have the inherent meaning of an isolated and backward group. See, for example, Duncan 2004b:90.

92 According to the 1971 census Dayaks were 41 per cent of the province’s population. Since the total population was 2,019,924, the number of Dayaks was estimated at about 828,169.

93 The New Order government labelled this type of farmer as *peladang liar* (wild cultivator), a pejorative term, maybe as a way to discourage the practice.
ress’. By 1994 the government had resettled 160,000 isolated people, and it estimated that over one million people still needed the attention of the government (Li 1999).

In the past, preservation of the longhouse in the traditional fashion was not difficult as they were an inherent part of Dayak life. The longhouses were built to protect Dayaks against headhunters, and they were centres of coordination of their economic activities, such as farming and hunting. They also were a venue for social and cultural activities, such as harvest festivities. The Malay sultanates and the Dutch colonials had no problems with the longhouses. In fact, the Dayak custom of living in longhouses made for easier tax collection and manpower mobilization in times of war. Dayaks who wanted to leave longhouses permanently were even required to pay cash fines and would often receive social punishment. Individual houses for the Dayaks were very rare before the turn of the twentieth century; however, the trend toward resettlement outside longhouses grew stronger after that.

Conversion to Islam was one of the first reasons. Serious Dayak converts moved out of the longhouses as their new faith was incompatible with longhouse living. The increase in Dayak population movements after independence also contributed to the trend toward abandonment of longhouses. Opportunities to pursue higher education and office work in urban areas led many Dayaks to leave the longhouses. The cessation of headhunting, a reason for Dayaks staying in longhouses, is another factor. New values brought by education and religion tended to question traditional leadership and customary practices, the very foundation of longhouses. These factors have made the function of longhouses less relevant (Coomans 1987: 112-3; King 1985: 73; Mudiyono 1994: 215-6). The influence of post-war Dayak leaders, such as Oevaang Oeray, convinced many to move into individual houses (Davidson 2002: 97). However, despite the increasing preference for single-family homes after WWII, many Dayaks in rural areas still lived in them. The government

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94 Until as recently as 1997 similar practices were still strictly observed in a longhouse in Melawi. The longhouse chief wished to take his family to live in the government houses near the road, but he could not afford to pay the fine. He would be fined if he left the community more than three days. He said that this rule can be abandoned only when the whole community agreed to shut down the longhouse (Sydney Morning Herald 8-2-1997).

95 Affecting the disappearance of headhunting was suppression by the European colonizers, the spread of modern religions, and peace meetings among the Dayaks (Alqadrie 1990: 117).
Regime change and ethnic politics in Indonesia
did little to actively try to eliminate longhouses during the first few decades after independence as it was not the government priority.

Under the New Order longhouses rapidly disappeared. The regime worried that communal living in longhouses could be a breeding ground for Communism. The Communist revival was a serious issue because of this region’s previous experience with Communist rebellion and also as a consequence of the close relations of some Dayaks with Communist rebels. Besides political considerations, the government also thought that living in longhouses was unhealthy and dangerous because they were prone to fire.96 The head of the Dayak Customary Council of Sanggau district, Donatus Djaman, noted that at the end of the 1960s, the government instructed the Dayaks to destroy their longhouses. The military reportedly came to some Dayak villages and forced the residents to destroy their traditional houses. Some longhouses were burned down as a result (Dayak leaders’ memories 2005:8-9).

There are no the statistics on the number of large and fully functioning longhouses in West Kalimantan.97 However, longhouses apparently had completely disappeared in coastal districts, except one in Saham village (Landak) which was preserved for tourism. Researchers have reported the existence of several longhouses in the interior, although their numbers are declining fast. In the early 1990s, Layang and Kayan reported three longhouses in Embaloh (Kapuas Hulu), and almost all the inhabitants of Batang Lupar (Kapuas Hulu) still lived in longhouses (Layang and Kanyan 1994:201). During her research in mid-1986, Helliwell (2001) found two longhouses in Gera village (Ketapang).

The disappearance of longhouses, one of the pillars of Dayak culture, exacerbated the decline of Dayak culture. With their disappearance went the oral traditions, customs and performances, and sense of communal living among Dayaks (Drake 1982:49-52; Freeman 1970:125-6; Djuweng 1996:17, 124). The new communal centres, often built by government and attached to the village office, were not able to replace functions of the longhouses.

Through its patronizing cultural approach, the government also wanted to ensure higher levels of homogeneity in the society to facilitate

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97 To give a perspective, the provincial government of East Kalimantan claimed in 1995 that it had about 92 longhouses, fifteen of which were still functioning or were in good condition (Maunati 2004:71).
control. In 1979 the government introduced the Village Governance Law (UU 5/1979) that standardized all villages in the country. The regime abolished various local names for villages, and introduced a uniform term *desa*, the term for a village in Java. The name of the village head was also uniformly changed to *kepala desa*. The most significant aspect of this reform was village size, which now was to have at least 2,500 residents or 500 households (regulation *Permendagri* 4/1981). This requirement might be suitable for the more concentrated and overpopulated villages in Java and Bali, but not suitable for sparsely populated West Kalimantan. At the time of this mandated change, about 59 per cent of all villages in the province had 50 or fewer households, and about 23.2 per cent had between 51 and 100 households. To suit the condition of the province, the government lowered the requirement to 200 households per village but still many existing villages did not fit the criteria. As a result more than 80 per cent of 4,632 mostly Dayak villages were regrouped in the early 1980s. This forced village reorganization required many adjustments that in some cases resulted in tensions among the former village leaders as well as among the villagers. Village reorganization caused dissatisfaction among former village chiefs who had lost their leadership positions. Villagers also complained that they had to travel a long distance to see the village chief, as the new village now covered a much larger area. As new village might be composed of several smaller villages having different sub-cultures, misunderstandings arose among villagers.

New village laws sidelined traditional leaders, such as the village chief and *temenggung*, within Dayak society. The law required a village chief to be at least a junior high school graduate no older than 60. This was quite different from previous Village Governance Law (UU 19/1965) which only required a primary school or equivalent education and did not restrict the age. This new regulation required qualifications that the existing traditional leaders lacked. Research conducted in the Bengkayang area published in 1975, for example, found that only one of 29 village chiefs had 6-years of primary education (*Laporan survey* 1975:38-40).

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98 Prior to that many local communities had their own name for a village, for example *banjar* in Bali, *nagari* in West Sumatra, and *kampung* in parts of Sumatra and Kalimantan. These terms were revived again after the fall of the New Order.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pontianak</td>
<td>677</td>
<td>939</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>-70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sambas</td>
<td>539</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>259</td>
<td>-57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanggau</td>
<td>917</td>
<td>1,174</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>-81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sintang</td>
<td>1,039</td>
<td>1,145</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>-79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kapuas Hulu</td>
<td>508</td>
<td>496</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>-72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ketapang</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>309</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>-61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pontianak City</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>22</td>
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<td>-100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4,011</td>
<td>4,685</td>
<td>1,266</td>
<td>-73</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.13 Number of villages before and after village reorganization by district (1953-1985)

Even after 20 years these criteria are still difficult to fulfil. Statistics in 1996 showed that of 1,402 village chiefs in the province only 55 per cent of them had education beyond elementary school. About 39 per cent of them only had elementary school education, 6 per cent did not finish elementary school, and 0.4 per cent had no formal schooling (Statistik potensi desa 1997:67). These new criteria were never strictly enforced due to lack of qualified personnel. However, the trend was towards more and more traditional village chiefs being replaced by a younger, better educated but less respected cohort of public servants. As a result, emotional ties which once existed between the village chiefs and villagers diminished.

The new regulation made the village chief’s position dependent on the bureaucracy. One observer commented that the New Order had transformed the village chiefs from relatively independent positions to mere cogs in the machinery of bureaucracy. Prior to 1965, higher authorities had little contact with or interest in village-level governance (Antlöv:35, 135). The village head position (that is appointed or reappointed), for example, did not depend on the bureaucracy until implementation of the new law. The regime considered it to be in its best interest to co-opt and control this influential traditional leadership to avoid potential problems.

Table 6.14 Number of villages before and after villages reorganization (Sambas)

Table 6.14 Number of villages before and after villages reorganization (Sambas)

Note: This table excludes sub-districts with fewer than 20 villages.
In many places Dayaks reportedly listened more to informal traditional leaders (including the village chief) than to formal officials (Lontaan 1975:414-5; Soemardjan et al. 1992; Laporan survey 1975:43).

Similarly, the role of customary leaders or temenggung has declined quite rapidly. By 1982, West Kalimantan still had 849 temenggung. In 1987, the number of temenggung was further reduced to 801. At this point, the government decided not to fill the vacant positions when temenggung passed away or retired (Soemardjan et al. 1992:Chapter VI), and this added to attrition. Financial support given to the temenggung at the end of the 1970s was discontinued later in an apparent effort to render the position unattractive. Unlike the village chiefs, the temenggung was not part of the bureaucracy, and was therefore dispensable. The government saw the customary leaders’ role as increasingly irrelevant as it promoted the extensive use of formal or state laws and discouraged the application of customary laws. Furthermore, the adat structure, the raison d’être for the temenggung, had been significantly disrupted.

Besides the government regulations, loss of popular trust in the village chief and temenggung had also contributed to their declining roles. For their own career advancement, many traditional leaders have repositioned themselves as tools of the regime. NGOs in the province have scrutinized the role of these leaders in land appropriation cases. Some

100 The largest concentrations were in Sanggau (215), followed by Ketapang (198), Sintang (139), Pontianak (104), Kapuas Hulu (102). None were found in Pontianak City (‘Peningkatan pembinaan pembebanan, pembangunan dan kemasyarakatan di daerah Kalimantan Barat’, 1983, pp. 26-7, in: Library of West Kalimantan Governor’s Office, Pontianak).


103 The state feared that customary laws would undermine state laws. Firstly, many aspects of customary laws were incompatible with state laws. Customary laws, for example, had different concepts of penalty and ownership. The penalty in Dayak customary law lacked the punishment aspects of the modern penal system. Under Dayak customary law, the penalty for misconduct was intended to restore the balance of nature which was affected by the misconduct. A traditional ceremony, animal sacrifices with a few pieces of stoneware and accessories would satisfy as a penalty, even for serious crimes such as murder (Lontaan 1975). The concept of ownership, a main source of dispute in many modern societies, also differed greatly from that of state laws. To confirm ownership, customary laws only needed confirmation or guarantee from the customary leaders. The customary laws did not need the paper proof that the modern legal system would require. The second reason for the government to discourage the application of the customary laws was the variety and non-codification of the laws, which could become sources of instability and other potential problems.

104 A series of workshops conducted by the Dayak NGOs in 1999 estimated that about 70 per cent of adat structure had been undermined. Only in Kapuas Hulu and Sanggau districts did traditional structure and law still function well (Masiun 2000:13-4).
have been persuaded to sign traditional lands away to government-approved projects after having been promised financial rewards or jobs. Others were tricked or coerced into delivering the traditional lands to the government (Djuweng 1992). A few who refused or had difficult relations with the government were made to retire or deterred from raising issues further. They were powerless before the regime and its security forces. Traditional leaderships across Indonesia suffered similar treatments during the New Order period.

INTERNAL DIVISIONS AND LACK OF APPRECIATION

Besides external influences explained above, Dayak’s negative self-perception undermined their own culture. Some Dayaks thought that aspects of their own culture were backward and incompatible with modernization and should therefore be abandoned. In 1946, Oevaang Oeray rejected the role of traditional leaders because he believed that they were a source of Dayak backwardness (DAO 1946c). He and other Dayak leaders blamed superstitious practices and lavish ceremonies for Dayak backwardness. Thirty years before the New Order introduced the village regrouping, Oeray had initiated a move to reorganize several villages into a centrally located community so that they could be made more economically viable and so that critical infrastructure, especially educational facilities, could be made more accessible and thereby benefit a greater number of people (Davidson 2002:97; Rockaerts 1985:7).

Many Dayaks lacked respect and appreciation for their own culture. Research on self-perception showed that the Dayaks rated themselves consistently low in almost all aspects of life compared to other ethnic groups (Alqadrie 1990; Rockaerts 1985). Many young Dayaks in the cities did not speak their own language because they considered Indonesian
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or Malay to be more prestigious than their own languages.\textsuperscript{107} The identity change to Malay after converting to Islam was another indication that these Dayaks viewed other ethnic groups as better than themselves. A more recent observation on religious conversion in Nanga Pinoch (Sintang), Mulia Baru, Teluk Melano and Kendawangan (Ketapang) showed that the process of becoming Malay after conversion to Islam still continues. As soon as they professed Islam, Dayaks associated themselves with Malays (Julipin and Pius 1987:8). The Dayaks also have had relatively high rates of cross-cultural and cross-religious marriage compared to other ethnic groups. In many of these marriages, the Dayaks tend to embrace their partner’s cultural and religious identity.\textsuperscript{108} Their inferiority complex could have been a result of centuries of neglect and repression. No doubt the New Order government’s second-class treatment of Dayak culture exacerbated this negative self perception.

SUMMARY

This chapter has demonstrated the disadvantages of being Dayak during the New Order regime. In the executive, Dayak bureaucrats were denied top positions. In the legislature, Dayaks suffered a sudden setback after the coup in 1965. However, their representation in the legislature recovered after the 1977 election. Unfortunately, the higher proportion of Dayaks in the DPRD did not mean that they could use it to redress their being marginalized, and discussion of ethnic issues was still considered taboo by the regime. Furthermore, the DPRD was only a rubber stamp for the executive and rarely used its power and initiative to monitor the executive or change government policies.

Living conditions of many Dayaks in rural areas did not improve much during this period. Modern projects such as transmigration, timber exploitation, and plantation development had promised benefits to local people, but it brought problems as well. Transmigration was blamed for increasing unemployment among the local populations and for taking

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{107} Julipin and Pius 1987. Assimilation into the more powerful and prestigious culture has continued to take place. In Norway, for example, the inferior Sami were incorporated into the mainstream Norwegian group (Eriksen 1993:29). Other examples of the absorption of minorities into Malay in Southeast Asia have been mentioned in chapter two.
  \item \textsuperscript{108} According to one local observation, Dayak women regarded males of other ethnic groups more favourably than they did Dayak males (Julipin and Pius 1987).
\end{itemize}
away the traditional farming lands of many Dayaks. Younger and better educated Dayaks faced obstacles to entering public and private sectors, as those sectors were dominated by other ethnic groups.

From the social and cultural points-of-view, Dayak culture continued to be weakened by external and internal pressures. The introduction of major world religions has been a major factor and the regime’s perception of Dayaks as isolated, primitive and backward broke down many of their traditions and beliefs. Many Dayaks suffered inferiority complexes due to a long history of being second-class citizens. The unfriendly New Order policies convinced some Dayaks that their culture was not on par with others, and some parts of it were primitive and detrimental to the Dayak development. Dayaks found it hard to express concerns about their loss of culture without being accused of encouraging ethnic discord. Overall, the Dayaks’ marginalization is linked closely to their intense political activism immediately after the collapse of the New Order.
Ethnic conflict and politics

Several significant ethnic conflicts have occurred in West Kalimantan since independence. The first took place in 1967, when hundreds or perhaps thousands of Chinese were murdered and more than 50,000 forced to flee from the interior areas now known as Landak and Bengkayang districts. A second, much smaller conflict between Dayaks and Madurese occurred in November 1979 in Samalantan (Bengkayang); members of both ethnic groups from about ten villages were involved, and the fighting lasted for about a week. Officials recorded 20 casualties and 50 houses burned down. Almost all Madurese evacuees were able to return to their homes after the conflict (Akcaya, 16-11-1979; Tempo, 8-12-1979).

The third and fourth conflicts occurred in 1997 and 1999, and both involved the Madurese. The conflict in 1997 was between Madurese and Dayaks, while the 1999 conflict was initially between Madurese and Malays, although the Dayaks later joined the Malays. Human casualties were estimated to be above four hundred in each confrontation. Tens of thousands of Madurese fled the area, and there were untold material losses. A dozen smaller clashes between Dayaks and Madurese have taken place since the 1950s, mostly occurring in or around the Bengkayang and Landak districts.

This chapter attempts to analyse the causes of conflict between the Dayaks and Madurese by incorporating some new approaches and to identify the connections between ethnic conflict and ethnic politics.

**Chronology of the Dayak and Madurese Conflict in 1997**

This conflict started with a street fight between Dayak and Madurese youths during a pop concert in the town of Ledo (Bengkayang) on 6
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December 1996. A Dayak, Yukundus, was reported to have approached Madurese youths and requested that they stop bothering a Dayak girl. The Dayak struck some Madurese after they ignored his warnings. One of the Madurese was Bakrie. More serious fighting did not develop that night, but about three weeks later the groups encountered each other again at a band concert in Tanjung village (Ledo). When Yukundus and another Dayak were attacked by Bakrie and friends in the early hours of 30 December, the Dayaks were injured and rushed to a nearby hospital where they were treated and later discharged.¹

The same morning, a Dayak crowd started to gather at the Ledo police station to demand the arrest of the perpetrators. The police had made some arrests that morning but did not announce them for fear the crowd would storm the station and lynch the suspects. The crowd grew larger as people did not obtain a satisfactory answer from the police. Later in the afternoon the crowd marched all the way up to Sanggau Ledo sub-district to look for Bakrie, who lived in Lembang village (Sanggau Ledo). On the way they burned several Madurese houses and injured one Madurese. In the evening of the same day, the army in Bengkayang fired shots at the Dayaks, who tried to attack the military post, where they believed the Madurese were being held. The Dayaks acted on false rumours that the Madurese were preparing for retaliatory attacks.

The following day the military shot at Dayaks who tried to attack a Bengkayang military compound in which the Madurese had taken refuge. Although only three Dayaks were injured, rumours that they had been killed spread to surrounding areas. Madurese homes in villages in Samalantan and Tujuh Belas sub-districts were attacked and burned as a result. Meanwhile, because of the growing tension and threat, the security forces started to evacuate Madurese who lived in Sanggau Ledo to a nearby air force base.

Based on past experiences, Dayaks believed that the Madurese retaliation was only a matter of time.² On one occasion, a large Madurese crowd in Lembang village had already prepared to attack the Dayaks.

¹ These accounts, which were widely quoted in the media, were most likely from the Dayak side. The author was not able to find Madurese accounts of this incident. However, judging from their accounts of the 1999 conflict, the Madurese would give an account favourable to themselves (see note 5 below).
² In several conflicts with the Dayaks prior to 1997, the Madurese always struck back or at least planned to retaliate (Tempo, 8-12-1979, Sudagung 2001:129, 141-2; Van Hulten 1992:296).
in Sanggau Ledo before they were persuaded by the head of Sanggau Ledo Customary Council and security forces to withdraw to Singkawang (Soetrisno et al. 1998:34). The Madurese from nearby Singkawang who finally took the initiative to counterattack, and on the two days of fighting, the Madurese burned at least two houses belonging to prominent Dayaks (Paulus Lopon Piling, a Dayak entrepreneur, and Antonius Alim, a Dayak official) in Singkawang, and seriously injured one Dayak.

These Madurese retaliations triggered further Dayak attacks on the Madurese and their properties. Evacuation of the Madurese out of the affected area continued. The burning of Madurese houses did not stop at least until the end of first week of January 1997, when no more houses were left to burn. The military dropped leaflets from aircraft over the affected areas, including the sub-districts of Tujuh Belas, Bengkayang, Ledo, Sanggau Ledo, Seluas, Sambas, Pemangkat and Tebas. The leaflet informed the population that everything was under control and urged people not to believe rumours, carry weapons or engage in criminal activities. By 6 January 1997 the situation apparently had returned to normal (Soetrisno et al. 1998:34). From 5 to at least 8 January, the government sponsored peace ceremonies between the Dayaks and Madurese in several conflict-affected sub-districts. By this time, 6,075 Madurese had evacuated, more than 1,000 houses had been torched, and about 20 Madurese were reported killed.

The relatively calm but tense second and third weeks in January were broken by a Madurese attack on buildings associated with Dayak interests in Pontianak in the early morning of 29 January 1997. The credit union and the student dormitory, both belonging to Pancur Kasih Foundation, an influential Dayak institution, were slightly damaged. A motorcycle and a truck belonging to the Foundation were also burned. No deaths occurred, but two female Dayaks, who boarded in a neighbouring house, were injured during the attacks. The Human Rights Watch (HRW) report linked the attack to an incident in a village in Tujuh Belas sub-district the day before, when a crowd of Dayaks burned down houses and a prayer hall (surau). An unfounded and absurd rumour that Habib Ali, a Madurese religious leader, had been killed by Dayaks in the

5 The HRW report mentioned that the attack was in Sakok (possibly a typo of ‘Sakek’, a part of Sedau village, south Singkawang sub-district) (Communal violence West Kalimantan 1997). If this attack on Pancur Kasih was truly linked to the previous attack in Sakok, then the second episode was started by the Dayaks, not the Madurese as had been reported.
outskirts of Pontianak might also have helped to ignite the attack. Meantime, the Madurese in Mempawah, 67 kilometres from Pontianak, set ablaze three Dayak houses and damaged another. On 30 January, the Madurese set up a roadblock in Peniraman, a small town 32 kilometres north of Pontianak. During the two-day operation, five Dayaks were killed. On 1 February, in Singkawang, Madurese killed a Dayak, burned down four houses and damaged six Dayak houses.

The Dayaks retaliated by setting up similar roadblocks between Mempawah and Ngabang, and these resulted in Madurese deaths. Raids on the Madurese and their property intensified and became more vicious. The deadliest attacks occurred in the present Landak district: in Pahauman with 148 Madurese deaths and in Salatiga where 131 Madurese were killed. The military started to adopt harsh measures to stop further conflict escalation including shooting on several occasions (on 2 February in Samalantan (Bengkayang district) and on 3 and 5 February in Anjungan (Pontianak district)). Soetrisno et al. (1998:41-4) estimate that more than 125 Dayaks were shot dead by the security forces in several incidents.

This second episode started at the end of January and caused more damage, with death tolls estimated at between 500 and 1,700, and the majority of fatalities on the Madurese side (Davidson 2002:231). The fighting also spread to larger areas and included areas which had been untouched by previous conflicts, such as Sanggau. At least 142 Madurese were killed in Sanggau district in Sosok (47), Tayan (54), and Karangan (41). The spread of the attacks to other districts was a sign of the growing idea of a shared destiny among the Dayaks because they had all suffered similar marginalization and oppression (Davidson 2002:244-5).

**CHRONOLOGY OF THE MALAY/DAYAK AND MADURESEconflict in 1999**

The conflict in 1999 could be traced back to an assault on a Madurese, Hasan bin Niyam, on 17 January 1999. He was accused of breaking and
entering a Malay house in Parit Setia village, Jawai (Sambas).\textsuperscript{5} Two days later, on the day of the Muslim \textit{Idul Fitri} festival, around 200 Madurese from the nearby Rambayan village, where Hasan lived, took revenge. They killed three Malays and fatally wounded two others.\textsuperscript{6} The incidents did not spread further because Muslims were still celebrating \textit{Idul Fitri}. Government and security forces responded immediately to calm the conflicting parties. They arranged a peace meeting on 23 January in Jawai between ethnic leaders from the two affected villages, where they were persuaded to surrender the perpetrators from both sides. The Malays surrendered eight people involved in the bashing of Hasan, while the Madurese surrendered one who was involved in the killing of the three Malays (\textit{Akcaya}, 23-1-1999; Purwana 2003:59). A week after the incident, conditions in Jawai had reportedly returned to normal (\textit{Akcaya}, 27-1-1999). However, both communities continued to be vigilant and conducted night watches for fear of possible counter-attacks from the other side.

On 21 February 1999, in Mensere, Tebas sub-district (Sambas), Bujang Labik bin Idris, a Malay, was injured by a Madurese, Rudi bin Muharrap. A short time before the attack, Bujang was in the same minibus with Rudi. Rudi felt offended by Bujang’s stare when Rudi got off the bus without paying the fare. He was able to stop the same bus on its way back and wounded Bujang in revenge.\textsuperscript{7}

News of the wounding of Bujang spread to surrounding areas. The next morning, around 300 Malay youths surrounded the perpetrator’s house in Sempadung, Tebas (Sambas), demanding he surrender to the police. The conflict broke out when a Malay demonstrator was shot during the siege. Riots ensued in some nearby villages such as Semparuk and Sungai Kelambu where many Madurese houses were burned down. Three deaths were recorded by the morning of 22 February (Davidson 2008:133). On the night of 23 February, bands of Malays tried unsuc-

\textsuperscript{5} One Madurese source denied the accusation and claimed that the man with his two friends was actually looking for a place to sleep. They knocked at the door and flashed their sickles when the owner opened the door. The owner suspected robbery and cried for help. The neighbour was able to capture one Madurese, while the others escaped (Purwana 2003:58).

\textsuperscript{6} Davidson (2002:294) explains that Rambayan was a village but was reduced to \textit{dusun} (sub-village) status during the village reorganization at the beginning of the 1980s. Rambayan \textit{dusun} became a part of Sari Makmur village.

\textsuperscript{7} Interview with Bujang in Kapuas, 15-4-1999. One source mentions another incident on the same day in Sungai Nyirih village, Jawai (Sambas), where a Madurese wounded a Malay. The Malay was taken to Matang Suri health clinic, Jawai (Purwana 2003:61).
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cessfully to attack Tebas police station where 200 Madurese had taken refuge (Davidson 2008:133).

The government arranged peace talks between the Madurese, Malay, and Dayak leaders in Tebas and then in Pemangkat sub-districts on 23 and 24 February. Despite these peace talks, conflicts spread to the adjacent Pemangkat, Jawai, and Sambas sub-districts. The riots between 23 and 25 February 1999 witnessed 17 deaths, 65 houses burn down, and around 200 Madurese taking refuge in the Sambas police station (Purwana 2003:62-3).

On 14 March, a Madurese who refused to disarm himself in Pemangkat triggered another wave of conflict that spread to Sungai Duri, Teluk Keramat, and Paloh (Akcaya, 16-3-1999). Malays in Sambas sub-district, who had not been involved in the conflict, joined the assault after Malay villages there were attacked by Madurese (Akcaya, 21-3-1999; Petebang and Sutrisno 2000:12). Because of this new development many Madurese who had not left the area were urged by local leaders to evacuate (Akcaya, 21-3-1999). From this point on, the evacuation continued until virtually all Madurese were evacuated from Sambas (Petebang and Sutrisno 2000:8).

Dayaks joined the attack against the Madurese in Bengkayang district after a Dayak of Samalantan was killed on 17 March by a group of people speaking Madurese. The Dayaks started to burn houses in Sanggau Ledo and Samalantan sub-districts. Conflict spread further inland, which prompted the Madurese evacuation out of Bengkayang, Ledo, and Sanggau Ledo. Then the Dayaks tried to get into Singkawang City which held a large number of Madurese refugees but were prevented from entering by the military.

As the conflict grew to uncontrollable proportions, military and police commanders allowed soldiers to open fire on the masses who did not comply with their instructions (Akcaya, 19-3-1999). Two units from East Kalimantan and one unit from South Kalimantan arrived to help secure

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8 Martinus Amat, the victim, was travelling back from work with a group of 23 passengers, the majority of whom were Dayaks, with only one Malay and one Batak driver. The packed open truck was fired on by a mob who were speaking in Madurese (Purwana 2003:66; Petebang and Sutrisno 2000:8). This latest Madurese attack dragged the Dayaks into the conflict as a consequence of their strong belief that the Dayaks were helping the Malays in the conflict (Petebang and Sutrisno 2000:30). This is still shown in a recent survey in Madura where the Sambas refugees still talk about Dayak hostility rather than Malay hostility, and state that the conflict was a religious conflict (Wiyata 2003). Another source, however, suggests that the killing of Amat as suspicious and the security forces (Davidson 2002:308).
the standoff (Akcaya, 21-3-1999). On 22 March, security forces guarding the refugee evacuation shot at approaching Malay mobs in Tebas (Akcaya, 23-3-1999). Another shooting aimed at a Malay crowd occurred on 7 April and resulted in some casualties (Akcaya, 8-4-1999).

On 24 March, newspapers reported that some semblance of normalcy had been restored, with shops in Singkawang, Pemangkat, Tebas, and Sambas re-opening for business (Akcaya, 25-3-1999). There were reports of attacks or failed attacks in Singkawang and Sungai Raya (south of Singkawang) in April (Akcaya, 8-4 and 23-4-1999). The attacks in Sambas district had subsided by the end of March, because most of the Madurese in the district had taken refuge or were under the protection of security forces for evacuation to either Singkawang or Pontianak.

By 13 April 1999, official data from the Sambas government listed 416 deaths (401 Madurese, 14 Malays, and 1 Dayak); 4367 Madurese houses, 22 Malay, and 21 others burned down; 345 houses – the majority belonging to the Madurese – damaged (Purwana 2003:68, 70). By 3 August, official statistics noted that Pontianak refugee camps had around 15,907 refugees (Purwana 2003:72).

HISTORICAL, MARGINALIZATION AND CULTURAL ARGUMENTS

A peculiarity of many ethnic conflicts in West Kalimantan up to 1997 was that they always involved Dayaks and Madurese. Conflicts between them had occurred more than ten times since the 1950s. Other important ethnic groups such as Chinese, Javanese or Malays experienced episodes of violence, but the open conflicts seem to be only between the Dayaks and the Madurese (Davidson 2002:244). This fact suggests that there some specific causes must exist on both sides, which have made conflict flare up and deepen between them.

HEADHUNTING AND HISTORY OF CONFLICT

The Dayaks’ past traditions of headhunting and traditional war mobilization were sometimes used to explain the many conflicts occurring in Dayak territory. The argument that conflict is derived from Dayak
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traditions is, however, unconvincing as there were fundamental differences between the headhunting practices in the past and that practiced during the recent conflicts (Peluso and Harwell 2001:85). Traditionally headhunting was considered necessary to protect tribes and their villages from disaster and misfortune, to avenge their fallen victims or fighters or to increase a warrior’s spiritual power and pride (Ukur 1971:59-60; Bamba 2004:138). The heads obtained were valued highly and treated with respect. Ceremonies were held to express respect for the heads, so that spiritual aims could be reached (Petebang 1998:1-36). Traditional headhunting’s strong spiritual and cultural content was much more important than the elimination of enemies.

Modern headhunting lacks the spiritual or cultural content. Contemporary Dayak mobs were not constrained by traditions and customs, which according to Petebang (1998) guided past headhunting expeditions. Traditional symbols were ignored or even damaged during the conflicts by the angry Dayak mobs. As the mobs had no faith in the traditional systems, those who claimed that the decapitation of victims during more recent conflicts was a revival of the headhunting tradition are incorrect. Rejection of the role of headhunting was underscored by the 1999 conflict in which the Malays, who did not have this tradition, took Madurese heads. This modern ‘headhunting’ is actually a form of mutilation, a means to dehumanize the victim as an expression of hatred and animosity.10

Traditional war mobilization was also often associated with previous ethnic conflicts involving the Dayaks. The Kanayatn Dayak for example passed (*mengedarkan*) red bowls in times of war and emergency.11 Villages that received the bowl were required to send help and to pass the bowl on to other villages without delay (Petebang 1998:69-78). The last significant use of the red bowl was during the 1967 outbreak of violence between the Dayaks and the Chinese. Although people believed that the red bowl was in circulation in some areas during the 1997 conflict, the

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10 For various meanings and reasons behind the mutilation of the victim’s body, see Horowitz (2001:11-23).

11 Red bowls were a means of communication among the Kanayatn Dayaks that usually consisted of four elements: the blood of an animal, feathers, a match stick, and a piece of roof thatch. The blood signified the critical conditions/war. The other elements mean that word of the war must be passed quickly (the feather) from one village to another, even in darkness (the match) or bad weather (the thatch). Further on the red bowl referred to Petebang (1998). For Dayak Desa a quite similar practice was called *Damak/Patuong* and for Iban it was *Bungur Jarao* (Arafat 1998:139).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Initial causes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>Samalantan (Bengkayang)</td>
<td>Fight between a Dayak and Madurese.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>(No location given)</td>
<td>Theft of a Dayak’s bubu (fish trap) by a Madurese.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>Toho (Pontianak)</td>
<td>Murder a parent of a Dayak sub-district head of Toho.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>Anjungan (Pontianak)</td>
<td>Murder of a Dayak sub-district head of Sungai Pinyuh. The Dayak had refused to process the Madurese request to process a land-ownership application.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>Sungai Pinyuh (Pontianak)</td>
<td>Murder of a Dayak by a Madurese who was cutting grass on the Dayak’s land.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>Singkawang</td>
<td>Killing of a Dayak policeman by a Madurese. The Dayak cautioned his sister not to go out at night with the Madurese.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>Samalantan (Sambas)</td>
<td>Murder of a Dayak by a Madurese. The Dayak asked the Madurese to be cautious when cutting grass so as not to disturb the paddy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>Pakucing (Samalantan, Bengkayang)</td>
<td>Murder of a Dayak by a Madurese. The Dayak cautioned the Madurese because he did not ask for permission to cut grass on the Dayak’s land.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>Sungai Enau (Sungai Ambawang, Pontianak)</td>
<td>Murder of a Dayak by a Madurese because of a land issue.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Pakucing (Samalantan, Bengkayang)</td>
<td>Rape of a Dayak woman by a Madurese.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Pontianak City</td>
<td>Fight between Dayak and Madurese youths.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Tumbang Titi (Ketapang)</td>
<td>Stabbing of a Dayak by a Madurese road construction worker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Started in Sanggau Ledo (Bengkayang) and spread to other districts</td>
<td>Fight between Dayak and Madurese youths.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Started in Pontianak City and spread to other district</td>
<td>a Madurese youth attack on the Pancur Kasih complex</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Started in Jawai (Sambas) and spread to other districts</td>
<td>Conflict between Malays/Dayaks and Madurese.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.1 Dayak – Madurese conflicts in West Kalimantan (1950-1999)
Sources: Giring (2003:128-9); Abas (2002:3-4); Davidson (2008:89-90).
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The red bowl could not have been responsible for the spread of violence. The advancement of communication technology (such as telephone, mobile phone), better roads and modern faster transportation had taken over the function of the red bowl. However, the use of ethnic symbols (in this case the red bowl) in ethnic conflicts has a powerful emotional appeal to members of the ethnic group and therefore, the potential to intensify conflicts (Kaufman 2001:29).

The recent history of ethnic relations between Dayaks and Madurese offers better explanations for friction between the two groups than do ancient Dayak traditions of warfare. A series of conflicts between them confirmed both views that they have had conflictual relations. The groups accused each other of being the trouble makers. The perception that the Madurese were violent was widespread among the Dayaks.12 A survey of 100 Dayak informants conducted by Muhamad Abas found that 86 per cent of them believed the Madurese were evil-doers. However, most of them had only heard of the negative behaviour of the Madurese and only 16 per cent of them had seen or experienced directly any Madurese misdeeds (Abas 2002:84). When they were questioned, the Dayaks would give a list of conflicts with the Madurese to substantiate their claims.

MARGINALIZATION ARGUMENTS

Chapter 6 noted some problems associated with transmigration, logging, and plantation activities in rural regions. Encounters between the ‘elite’ Dayaks in both rural and urban area with immigrants created frustration that had been simmering under the surface due to the repressive nature of the New Order regime. Retribution from the government officials and security forces on those who oppose government projects or policies was not uncommon (Dayak leaders’ memories 2005:3, 8). The tension and dissatisfaction among local Dayak farmers as a result of development projects certainly existed back in the 1980s when large plantation operations started to have an effect.13 In 1981, five Dayak vil-

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12 The Madurese argument for blaming the Dayaks was weakened considerably when the Malays also ‘found’ that the Madurese were the problem during the 1999 conflict.
13 Local opposition to logging activities seems to have been less than Dayak discontent with plantations mainly because logging offered quick cash to the local population. This quick cash partly explains why it has been very difficult to stamp out illegal logging in this region.
lage chiefs from Sayan (Sintang) met with the local DPRD members to demand compensation for their *tengkawang* (illipe nut) trees that had been felled by a logging company (Davidson 2002:265). Several sources, for instance, mention the objection of some Dayak leaders, including the former Governor Oeray, to the government’s unfair financial compensation for the confiscated land in Meliau at the beginning of the 1980s. The government response was to change the local Dayak sub-district head, Donatus Djaman, and then warn the eleven local Dayak leaders of possible disciplinary action (*Dayak leaders’ memories* 2005:8; Golkar Sanggau 1981).

The 1990s witnessed more confrontational protests by Dayak farmers, as a result of unresolved grievances, consciousness-raising activities from Dayak NGOs, and the weakening of the Soeharto regime. Davidson (2008:114-5) and Andasputra (1999) have given several accounts of these demonstrations. In September 1993, in Mukok (Sanggau), fourteen Dayaks burned employee lodgings belonging to a plantation company because it failed to compensate local people. In August 1994 in Sandai (Ketapang), around 1,600 Dayaks burned down ten base camps, vehicles and other materials, as well as ten hectares of land belonging to a plantation company. In November 1995, 300 Dayaks destroyed the seedlings of a plantation company in Ledo (Sambas).

Davidson (2008:95) rightly questions the link between marginalization and open conflicts between Dayaks and Madurese, because the confrontations did not occur in areas of transmigration or in areas with an extensive of logging and plantation operation. Peluso and Harwell also argue that organized transmigration cannot be blamed automatically for the conflict (Peluso 2006:117). Furthermore, the Madurese were not the main or primary cause for Dayak political and economic marginalization. While there might be no direct link between these activities and Dayak-Madurese conflicts, marginalization produced a feeling among many Dayaks that they were being oppressed and many migrants receiving favourable treatment. This shared marginalization among the Dayaks strengthened ethnic solidarity that can be seen to contribute to the spreading or intensification of conflicts (Eklöf 1999:66; Olzak 1992:21). As in a pressure cooker, the higher the disappointment and frustration the stronger the force it will create when finally released.
ETHNIC STEREOTYPES

The Madurese have been negatively stereotyped by the other natives of Indonesia as a rough, aggressive, and violent ethnic group since colonial times (De Jonge 1995:9-13; Smith 2004:207). One scholar who has undertaken extensive study on the Madurese even remarked that this ethnic group has a plenitude of negative characteristics (De Jonge 1995:7). These negative perceptions have been widely believed to by the local population and have influenced their daily interactions with the Madurese for many years.

A Madurese scholar concludes that one cause underlying the Madurese violent character was a social system that respected and rewarded violence – particularly if it was carried out in order to protect one’s dignity. Crime statistics suggest that the Madurese community is generally more violent than other ethnic groups in Indonesia because of the higher incidence of serious crimes in Madura Island. Serious criminal cases in Madura in 1994 were double the rate of East Java, and one-and-a-half times higher than the national average (Wiyata 2002:6).

This stereotype of Madurese was widely accepted by other ethnic groups in West Kalimantan. One survey found that the Dayaks stereotyped the Madurese as being fond of fighting (violent), emotional, untrustworthy, and cowardly (Arafat 1998:273). Other research summarizes broadly three stereotypes of the Madurese by the Dayaks and Malays. First, the Madurese tended to initiate conflict with others. Second, the Madurese had the custom of carrying the sickle (clurit) at social functions or upon entering someone’s house. Thirdly, the Madurese were inclined to encroach on their neighbour’s land. The Madurese were also often associated with unscrupulous economic practices and petty

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14 One example of such a system is the carok, a duel to the death between Madurese men to protect the dignity of oneself or one’s family. This practice is still found within the Madurese community (Wiyata 2002:1, 73, 226-7).

15 Wherever he goes, the Madurese usually carries a clurit, a sickle-shaped knife used to collect grass for their cattle. Madurese farmers were known for their skill in raising cattle, and the 1990 census showed that the Madurese were prominent in the livestock sector in Sambas and Ketapang.

crimes (Soetrisno et al. 1998:61-2). A few well known local sayings mock unacceptable Madurese behaviour.\footnote{One popular saying was ‘The land boundary could walk’ refers to the Madurese practice of enlarging their land size by surreptitiously changing the boundaries. Another saying, ‘young chickens belong to us; when they grow up they belong to them’ refers to the Madurese thieving habit. These sayings have been in existence for decades. For example, a newspaper article in 1978 (Akcaya, 13-2-1978) used the same terms when it referred to the unsafe condition in Rambayan A, a village close to Madurese quarters, which was also a site for the 1999 conflict.}

Negative perceptions of other ethnic groups are common too but usually not related to violent attitude as is the stereotype of the Madurese. Some ethnic groups perceived the Dayaks as backward and lazy, and sometimes violent because of their reputation for headhunting. The Chinese were greedy and dishonest in doing business, while the Malays were lazy and untruthful.\footnote{Unfortunately all explanations seem to favour the Dayaks as there are no alternative explanations that favour the Madurese.}

The majority of Dayak informants believed that the particularly easily provoked, violent and insensitive dispositions of the Madurese were the main factors behind many conflicts between them. Several conflicts started with Madurese unjustified attacks on Dayaks that resulted in a Dayak death or injury.\footnote{Davidson (2002:311) even asserted that not a single politician or government official he encountered defended the Madurese during the 1999 conflict. Prior to 1997, the government had never attributed conflicts to ethnic factors out of fear that such an attribution might complicate ethnic relations in the province. They usually did not mention ethnic aspects of any conflict and always downplayed the event by describing it as a common crime (kriminal biasa) or incident (kejadian or peristiwa) rather than conflict (konflik or kerusuhan) (Tempo, 8-12-1979; Akcaya, 16-11-1979; Davidson 2002:224).}

During recent conflicts, the media reports and government statements reinforced the image of Madurese as troublemakers. The media was usually critical of or biased against the Madurese and blamed them for causing the conflicts. Government officials were reported to have identified Madurese culture as the source of violent conflicts.\footnote{Tohardi 2003:40-4; Alqadrie 1990:98-9; Lontaan 1975:39; Abas 2002:86-7.}

The perception that Madurese were violent and hot-tempered produced a growing fear of the Madurese among local communities. This fear made existing communities move away from Madurese settlements, such as what happened to the Dayaks in Salatiga village (Giring 2003:31) or the Malays in Sari Makmur village (Abas 2002:82). These villages eventually became Madurese-dominated villages because of increasing Madurese migrant numbers and the gradual departure of the original inhabitants. Local populations might also decide to limit social contact
with the Madurese out of fear or to avoid trouble. A local researcher gives an example of Malays in Sambas who made the Madurese village a no-go zone for themselves, especially after dark. Another researcher mentions that fear of the Madurese had helped them to take over the Pontianak bus terminal, which had previously been controlled by Batak thugs (Petebang and Sutrisno 2000:145). Even the police were reportedly reluctant to handle petty crimes committed by the Madurese, and they would release the Madurese criminals once they had been approached by the Madurese family or friends.

Such fear of the Madurese made them feel more powerful than locals, and they did not see the need to show respect to the local people or to follow local customs (Petebang and Sutrisno 2000:145). Many Dayaks believed that the Madurese viewed them as easy targets of violence and crime, because otherwise they would not have started a dozen conflicts with the Dayaks. Local scholars believe that it was this constant fear and history of conflict that made the Madurese a concrete representation of threat in the Dayaks' daily interactions with them.

**MADURESE DEMOGRAPHY AND SETTLEMENT TRENDS**

Some regions in the province, particularly the north-west regions, were particularly prone to conflict, while others such as Ketapang, Sintang and Kapuas Hulu districts were spared. Ethnic concentration and exclusive settlements may have contributed to the conflict. In the case of the Madurese, because of negative stereotypes and history of conflict, their close proximity to the Dayaks increased fear among the Dayaks. Background or origin of the Madurese migrants and the large amount of in-migration may have contributed to the conflicts.

The first serious encounter of the local population with the Madurese was probably when the Dutch government sent 500 to 600 Madurese

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21 Purwana 2003:46. Because of tense relationships between the two ethnic groups, intermarriage between them was rare. In Salatiga, a village with about 1200 Madurese and 200 Dayaks, Giring (2003:101) only found one case of intermarriage.

22 Petebang and Sutrisno 2000; Giring 2003; Soetrisno et al. 1998:61-2. As stereotyping ignores individual differences within a group as noted by Cashmore (2004:414) and Yang (2000), the whole Madurese community had to bear the cruel consequences of prejudice during the various conflicts.
auxiliary troops to quell Chinese unrest in Monterado in 1854. The numbers of the Madurese in the province totalled only 631 by 1920. Within ten years, based on the 1930 census, this figure jumped to 5,763. The highest concentration was in the divisions (afdeelingen) of Pontianak, Singkawang, and Ketapang. At this stage, the Madurese were already the sixth largest ethnic population in the province, after Dayaks, Malays, Chinese, Bugis, and Javanese. Before 1999 the largest concentrations of Madurese were found in Pontianak City, Pontianak, Sambas and Ketapang districts, roughly resembling their pre-independence demographic condition. On the other hand, interior districts remained unattractive for the Madurese settlers. According to the 2000 census, Sanggau district only had 1,483 Madurese or 0.29 per cent of total district population, Sintang 286 persons or 0.06 per cent, Kapuas Hulu 52 persons or 0.03 per cent.

The ethnic demography in the northern districts of West Kalimantan changed dramatically after the conflict of 1999 because of the disappearance of the Madurese. Sambas district was virtually cleansed of the Madurese, while many interior regions of the current Bengkayang and Landak districts also were cleared of Madurese. According to the 2000 census, the Madurese population in Sambas was only 0.017 per cent of the total district population (or only 75 persons), in Bengkayang it was 1.15 per cent (or 2,039 persons), and in Landak it was 2.13 per cent. This was in sharp contrast with the data in 1990, where the Madurese population in Sambas (including Bengkayang) was about 4.2 per cent and in Pontianak district (including Landak) 12.7 per cent.

Hostilities between Dayaks and Madurese have only occurred in districts with a significant concentration of both Madurese and Dayaks. The small Madurese population in the interior regions might be the reason for the virtual absence of conflict there. One exception was the attacks of the Madurese in Sanggau during the 1997 conflict. The Madurese population in the Sanggau district, although relatively small compared to other districts, had increased quite significantly from 427 persons in 1990, to 1,483 persons in 2000.

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23 Heidhues 2001:144, 148. The Dutch had been employing the Madurese to put down revolts throughout Dutch East Indies since the eighteenth century (Kuntowijoyo 1988:144-7; Smith 2004:208).

24 The numbers of Madurese in the upper Kapuas districts had not changed much. The conflicts in recent time had not only stopped what already small flow of Madurese to this region, but also forced many to leave the region. The Madurese population in Sanggau, for example, was estimated at 4,800 between 1997 and 1998 (Arafat 1998:177) or about 1 per cent of the district population, but almost 70 per cent of them had left the district by 2000.
Regime change and ethnic politics in Indonesia

in 1990 to 4,800 at the end of the 1990s. Given the negative image of the Madurese, their sudden population swell could be perceived as a growing threat to the local, indigenous population. However, attacks on the Madurese in Sanggau were quite obviously a spill over from the core conflict in Pontianak district, as most attacks on the Madurese in the district occurred in its border region with Pontianak district (parts of which have now become Landak district), such as Tayan, Sosok, and

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25 This swell could be partly a result of a Madurese bupati of Sanggau for two terms (1988 to 1998), Colonel Baisoeni Z.A.
No clashes were recorded in Sintang and Kapuas Hulu district although the situation was quite tense there. One anomaly was the absence of open conflict between the Dayaks and Madurese in Ketapang district despite its large Dayak population and a quite significant number of Madurese settlers (Davidson 2008:13). However, similar to the case of Malay-Madurese disturbances prior to 1999 and Malay-Dayak relations, the absence of open conflict did not mean that relations between them were without problems. A clash between the Dayaks and Madurese occurred in Tumbang Titi in 1994, but this did not develop into an open conflict (Davidson 2008:227; Abas 2002:4). Ethnic tension was reported in some regions in Ketapang during

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>1980</th>
<th>1990</th>
<th>2000*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>Number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sambas</td>
<td>23,435</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>32,184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pontianak</td>
<td>76,914</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>98,505</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanggau</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>427</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ketapang</td>
<td>16,254</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>9,102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sintang</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>737</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kapuas Hulu</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pontianak City</td>
<td>26,796</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>23,634</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>143,724</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>164,589</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.2 Madurese population in West Kalimantan (1980-2000)

*Comprised of 75 persons in Sambas, 2,039 in Bengkayang, and 8,025 in Singkawang

**Comprised of 5,994 persons in Landak and 118,581 in Pontianak.


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Karangan. No clashes were recorded in Sintang and Kapuas Hulu district although the situation was quite tense there.

One anomaly was the absence of open conflict between the Dayaks and Madurese in Ketapang district despite its large Dayak population and a quite significant number of Madurese settlers (Davidson 2008:13). However, similar to the case of Malay-Madurese disturbances prior to 1999 and Malay-Dayak relations, the absence of open conflict did not mean that relations between them were without problems. A clash between the Dayaks and Madurese occurred in Tumbang Titi in 1994, but this did not develop into an open conflict (Davidson 2008:227; Abas 2002:4). Ethnic tension was reported in some regions in Ketapang during
the 1997 conflict. For instance, Ketapang Dayaks vowed that they would attack the Madurese in Ketapang if the Madurese injured any of their children who were studying in Nyarumkop.\textsuperscript{28} A high level of tension also was evident in Manismata in October 2000 (KR 2001/68). Demographic data comparing Ketapang with the more conflict-prone Sambas and Pontianak districts suggests possible explanations behind the absence of conflicts in Ketapang. One striking difference between the two regions was the steady increase in the numbers of Madurese in Pontianak and Sambas districts, but during the 1980s only a small increase in Madurese population Ketapang. Better economic prospects in Pontianak and Sambas districts, and their close proximity and ease of transportation to the provincial capital were the main attractions for independent migrants like the Madurese.\textsuperscript{29} Compared to Ketapang, these two districts also had better roads that facilitated mobility which was crucial for economic activities. Based on 1996 data, more than half of the province’s 423 km asphalt roads (58 per cent) were located in these districts, compared to Ketapang which only had a share of 11 per cent of road networks (Statistik potensi desa 1997:49). The existing larger Madurese population in Sambas and Pontianak districts also meant better community support for these independent migrants. These large numbers of migrants, who definitely looked for jobs when they arrived, brought more economic competition, a potential cause for tension and conflict. The swelling Madurese population also increased the local population’s concern over security.

The size of ‘fresh’ Madurese migrants in these two districts could have contributed to their relative resistance to adoption of local culture compared with Ketapang Madurese. Closer analysis of the background of the Madurese migrants shows that Pontianak and Sambas districts received a significantly higher number of Madurese migrants from outside

\textsuperscript{28} Pujaraharja 2004:134-5. Nyarumkop is on the outskirts of Singkawang and near Samalantan, two areas with a large Madurese population.

\textsuperscript{29} Some indicators consistently support the view that the majority of the Madurese were not participants in government transmigration projects. The settlement pattern of Madurese migrants was one indicator. Sudagung, the first scholar who wrote about Madurese in West Kalimantan, found none of his 400 respondents was a participant of government-sponsored transmigration. Most of his respondents, who lived in Pontianak City, settled in the city when they first arrived, and all of the respondents paid for their own passage to West Kalimantan (Sudagung 2001:91, 94, 110). These conditions were typical of independent migrants, because all government-sponsored migrants would settle in rural areas (certainly not the provincial capital) with all travel expenses and basic needs for several months paid for by the government. A fraction of the Madurese population did participate in transmigration programs. In Sanggau, for example, the majority of its small Madurese population were participants of the plantation-linked transmigration (Arafat 1998:177).
the province, who probably came directly from Madura or East Java. The continuing influx of a large number of Madurese migrants from Madura who brought with them their own original culture reinforced the Madurese cultural practices among the earlier migrant Madurese. This would block or at least slow the process of taking on local culture or habits by the Madurese (Sudagung 2001:104-6). Due to large population numbers and concentrated patterns of settlement, the Madurese had the necessary support to maintain their culture and customs.

A further breakdown of the statistics regarding the origins of Madurese migrants from outside West Kalimantan reveal that Pontianak City and Pontianak district received more migrants from Bangkalan and Sampang, the Madurese western districts. Some scholars, such as Sudagung and Suparlan, claim that these districts were commonly known for their rougher character. On the other hand, Ketapang district received more Madurese from milder regions, such as Pamekasan and Sumenep. Data on Madurese migration from the 2000 Census substantiated this earlier finding about origins. The census data indicated

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arrival</th>
<th>Sambas</th>
<th>Pontianak</th>
<th>Sanggau</th>
<th>Ketapang</th>
<th>Sintang</th>
<th>Pontianak City</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1986-1990</td>
<td>667</td>
<td>1,231</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>417</td>
<td>262</td>
<td>2,994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981-1985</td>
<td>902</td>
<td>1,365</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>413</td>
<td>1,449</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971-1980</td>
<td>2,569</td>
<td>3,080</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2,111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961-1970</td>
<td>1,455</td>
<td>3,007</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9,26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951-1960</td>
<td>718</td>
<td>2,502</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>379</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941-1950</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>1,343</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931-1940</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>405</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920-1930</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Before 1920</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total non WK-born Madurese</td>
<td>6,641</td>
<td>13,014</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>1,713</td>
<td>675</td>
<td>8,199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Madurese</td>
<td>32,169</td>
<td>98,455</td>
<td>427</td>
<td>9,102</td>
<td>737</td>
<td>23,595</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.3 Madurese migrants in West Kalimantan (1900-1990)
Source: Census 1990.
that Pontianak City received almost 73 per cent of its Madurese migrants from Bangkalan and Sampang; Pontianak district received almost 78 per cent; while Ketapang only received 37 per cent. The milder character of the Madurese in Ketapang suggests that they were less ‘problematic’ and less likely to be involved in conflicts, although further research is needed to examine this possibility.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pamekasan</th>
<th>Sumenep</th>
<th>Bangkalan</th>
<th>Sampang</th>
<th>Other East Java regions</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pontianak City</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sambas</td>
<td>(no data)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bengkayang</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singkawang</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pontianak</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landak</td>
<td></td>
<td>37</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanggau</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sekadan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sintang</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Melawi</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kapuas Hulu</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ketapang</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>356</td>
<td>427</td>
<td>221</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.4 Origin of Madurese migrants from East Java (1995-2000)

Note: The data exclude Madurese refugees outside West Kalimantan after the 1999 conflict.

Source: Census 2000.

Another difference between the two regions was the trend toward a much higher concentration of Madurese in rural areas in Pontianak and Sambas districts. The censuses in 1980 and 1990 show that the proportion of Madurese who lived in rural areas in Sambas district had jumped from 74.6 per cent (1980) to 91.1 per cent (1990). For Pontianak district the concentration of Madurese in rural regions had been extremely high, and therefore only recorded a small increase from 98 per cent (1980) to 99.5 per cent (1990). In Ketapang, the condition was quite the opposite.
In 1980, almost all Madurese in Ketapang lived in rural areas. This number had declined to 96.6 per cent in 1990 and dropped further to 63 per cent in 1995. The declining number of Madurese in rural areas meant that fewer of them would live near Dayaks. A more careful population
mapping shows that villages with many Madurese will have only a few Dayaks, and vice versa. The only village in the whole of Ketapang that had significant population of both Madurese and Dayaks was Mulia Baru (Matan Hilir Utara sub-district), a village of 7,055 people. The Madurese proportion in the village was 9.4 per cent, and the Dayaks’ was 13.9 per cent.

According to the 1995 population data, Pontianak district had a much higher Madurese concentration at village level than did Ketapang. In 45 out of 162 villages in Pontianak district, the Madurese made up more than 20 per cent of the village population. There were 21 villages with a population of more than 50 per cent Madurese. This was in stark contrast to Ketapang district. Out of 159 villages in Ketapang, only seven villages had a Madurese population of more than 20 per cent. In no villages were Madurese more than 50 per cent of the population. Sambas district was very likely to follow the trend in Pontianak, but unfortunately comparable data for Sambas is not available. More Madurese settling in rural areas in Pontianak (and presumably Sambas) districts implies that there was increasing visibility of the Madurese in Dayak-predominant (rural) areas. Since the Madurese were perceived as a threat by the Dayaks, the higher visibility of the Madurese was seen as an increasing threat.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Madurese population in the village</th>
<th>Numbers of villages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pontianak*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 5 per cent</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 10 per cent</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 20 per cent</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 30 per cent</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 40 per cent</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 50 per cent</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 80 per cent</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of villages</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per cent of Madurese in districts</td>
<td>18.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.5 Madurese population at village level in Pontianak and Ketapang districts (1995)

*Excludes Landak district.

Source: Census 2000.
The Madurese were known to prefer to settle in a cluster close together. One researcher found that new Madurese migrants tended to open up a new rural settlement for themselves but still within a Madurese area. In the city, new Madurese migrants tended to stay within established settlements (Sudagung 2001:104-6). Unfortunately, no specific studies of the Madurese settlement trends in the conflict regions have been done. Statistical data available at village level produced by the 2000 census could not report the condition of Madurese settlement in Sambas and in most parts of Bengkayang and Landak districts, because Madurese no longer lived there after the 1999 conflict. One way to assess the Madurese settlement trends in Sambas and Bengkayang districts is by mirroring the trend of Madurese settlements in the neighbouring Pontianak district.31 Table 7.5 shows that almost a third of villages in Pontianak district had more than 20 percent Madurese in their population, and 21 villages with a Madurese population of more than 50 per cent.

High Madurese population concentrations could still be observed in some areas of Landak that were spared or lightly affected by violence such as in Sebangki sub-district. There, concentrations of Madurese were very high, particularly in Sei Segak village (91.4 per cent of the village population) and in Rantau Panjang (88.2 per cent). On the other hand, Bengkayang district no longer had a Madurese concentration as high as in the mid-1990s. Samalantan and Sanggau Ledo sub-districts, which had high concentrations of Madurese prior to conflict, had only thirteen and nineteen Madurese in the whole sub-districts respectively, based on the 2000 census. This differed greatly with the population figures prior to the conflict, when Samalantan was estimated to have at least 8,091 Madurese and Sanggau Ledo at least 3,102 (Arafat 1998:15-6). Many villages in Samalantan had been estimated to have from 40 percent to more than 80 percent Madurese population. Within Bengkayang the only sub-district that still had a significant Madurese concentration in 2000 was the coastal Sei Raya. There, the villages of Sungai Duri had 12.9 per cent Madurese, Sungai Jaga A had 9.3 per

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31 Pontianak district had largely escaped the conflict so there was no significant permanent out-migration of Madurese. Therefore the data on the Madurese population in 1995 in the district, as captured through census 2000, was reliable. Pontianak district is a good mirror because it is geographically linked to the conflict-prone districts – Bengkayang, Landak and Sambas. It also shares some similarities with those districts, as discussed previously: an extensive road network, large Madurese population, and the trend of the Madurese to settle in rural areas.
Figure 7.3 Malay and Madurese population of Pontianak district villages (percentages, 2000)
cent and Karimunting had 8.1 per cent, while Sei Pangkalan II only had 2.4 per cent.

The ‘Madurarization’ of a village or neighbourhood began with settlement of some Madurese in the area. As the number of Madurese settlers grew, occupants from other ethnic groups, who felt anxious living close to Madurese neighbours, sold land or property rather cheaply to incoming Madurese and resettled elsewhere. Therefore almost all Madurese ‘villages’ were formed through piecemeal land acquisition unlike many Javanese villages, which were formed almost instantly through transmigration projects. An example is that of Salatiga village (Landak), a place where many Madurese were killed during the 1997 conflict. A Dayak researcher notes that prior to 1997, the Salatiga area had 1,200 Madurese and only about 200 Dayaks. Dayaks lived in Salatiga for a short time after the Chinese were ejected from the village following the 1967 conflict, but they gradually retreated from central Salatiga when the Madurese started to settle in the village. One reason for this retreat was the Dayak fear of the Madurese and their desire to avoid dealing with them (Giring 2003:27, 31, 67-72). The non-Madurese newcomers chose to live in non-Madurese quarters. As a consequence, the village could virtually be divided into two quarters: a quarter with a high concentration of Madurese, and a multi-ethnic non-Madurese quarter (Giring 2003:137). A Malay researcher found a similar trend in Sari Makmur village in Tebas sub-district (Sambas). Formerly, it had been a 99 percent Malay village, but it later became a Madurese village because the majority of the Malays moved out from the neighbourhood. They could not live with the Madurese who tended to intimidate and resort to violence, particularly when it came to landownership and land boundaries (Abas 2002:82). This explained why there were many Madurese villages, although the majority of them did not participate

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54 The flight phenomena are recorded elsewhere. In the US in the not-so-distant past, a ‘white’ neighbourhood could slowly turn into a ‘Black’ one after the white population felt that the Blacks moving into the neighbourhood would bring the property prices down, increase the crime rate, and have other negative consequences. The ‘white flight’ would leave behind a predominantly Black community (Laitin 1998:21; Seitles 1996).

55 This piecemeal acquisition had perhaps led to land disputes which in turn created the persistent stereotype that the Madurese liked to encroach on land belonging to others (menyerobot tanah).
Regime change and ethnic politics in Indonesia

This high population concentration tended to prevent more meaningful interactions and better understanding between Madurese and other ethnic groups.

ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ROLE OF THE MADURESE

Some have speculated that Madurese habit of social domination might have created the economic jealousy that became the underlying factor in the 1998 conflict. So far no studies have focussed on the role of the Madurese in the West Kalimantan economy. Indications derived from the census do not show a high degree of Madurese dominance in the economy. The 1990 census shows that the majority of the Madurese in Sambas, Pontianak, and Ketapang worked in agricultural-related sectors, but their share in the total workforce in these sectors was lower than that of other major ethnic groups. In Sambas district, 48.7 per cent of all Madurese workers worked in agriculture-related occupations, but their share in these occupations was less than 8 percent—an insignificant percentage compared to the share of the Malays, Dayaks, and Chinese. In Pontianak district, the proportion of Madurese who worked in agriculture-related employment was generally two to three times higher than the share of the Madurese in Sambas, but still relatively low compared to the shares held by other ethnic groups. Local people also widely believed that Madurese tended to dominate in difficult job sectors, such as road construction and logging transportation. The statistics, however, show that the share of other ethnic groups in these sectors was not small either. In Sambas, for example, the Madurese had a 35 per cent share of bricklaying, stonemasonry and tiling, while Malays and Chinese had 34 per cent and 22 per cent shares respectively. Madurese were not justifiably the focus of native economic jealousy and certainly did not dominate the regional economy.

However, the Madurese did have disproportionate shares in specific occupations in certain districts. According to the 1990 census Madurese

Saad (2003:51) mentions several Madurese concentrations in Sambas: Sei Nilam, Sei Nyirih and Matang Tarap (Jawai sub-district), Rambayan, Serang, Sempadung, and Puting Beliung (Tebas sub-district), Rambi and Senangi (Sambas sub-district), Kota lama (Teluk Keramat sub-district), and Sebubus (Paloh sub-district). Within Bengkayang district, Arafat (1998:15-6) notes large Madurese concentration in Samalantan sub-districts, particularly in villages of Margu Mulia, Sendoreng, Jirak, Mendung Terusan, Monterado, Sungai Petai, and Kincir. Some concentration of Madurese could also be found in villages of Merabu, Jawa, Sanggau Kota, and Kandasan in Sanggau Lelo sub-district.
were dominant as tricycle (becak) drivers in Pontianak City: having an 83 per cent share of the city's total of 2,913 tricycle drivers.\textsuperscript{35} Their share in 1982 was only 71 per cent (Sudagung 2001:84-6, 96). In Sambas district, about 54 per cent of 1,033 livestock workers were Madurese. There, their share among the tricycle drivers was only about 31 per cent. In Ketapang, about 66 per cent of the total 645 livestock workers were Madurese. In Pontianak district, the main occupations of the Madurese were logging (42 per cent) and forestry – ‘orchard and related tree and shrub crop’ work (37 per cent). Their domination could also be found in more specific areas, such as traditional markets. Davidson found that Madurese had a significant share as traders in traditional markets in Pontianak City. From four traditional markets in the city, the share of the Madurese was 47 per cent, competing closely with the Malays at 53 per cent (Davidson 2008:165). Although recent statistics are not available, the Madurese share in these sectors seemed to have increased in years leading up to conflict due to their persistence and aggressive business practice and the reluctance of their competitors to block Madurese entrance into these fields so as to avoid confrontations.

Although this domination was sectoral and relatively small, it was still a potential source of tension. Some sectoral domination was secured by the Madurese at the expense of other ethnic groups. Involuntary retreat could stir up ill feeling toward the Madurese.\textsuperscript{36} Sudagung’s research shows that in Pontianak City, the growing numbers of Madurese tricycle drivers and boat operators displaced Malays, who had been dominant in these two areas.\textsuperscript{37} The potential for conflict was higher if the sector involved direct marketing to customers, as the Madurese were known to

\textsuperscript{35} Their share in other occupations thought to be Madurese-dominated such as ‘other’ transport operators (very likely to be sampan or boat operators) was only 29 per cent and motor vehicle drivers (most likely to be oplet or mini-bus drivers) only 15 per cent. However, these figures might have jumped by 2000, although data was not yet available.

\textsuperscript{36} This sectoral domination was not necessarily problematic. Madurese domination in livestock raising, for example, was not a threat to the Dayaks, as they raised different stock. The Dayaks mainly raised pigs, while the Madurese raised cattle. These stocks were transported along different trade routes, to different abattoirs and outlets, and to quite separate consumers.

\textsuperscript{37} In his research on the Madurese economic role, Sudagung observed there were potential conflicts between the Madurese and Malays in Pontianak, as the latter had been pushed out from certain occupations such as tricycle drivers and boat operators. The share of Madurese working as boat operators had also increased to 69 percent in 1980, while the Malays’ share was reduced to only 31 per cent. He observed the new trend of an increasing number of Madurese mini-bus drivers from 1978-80 in Pontianak, and envisaged that one day the Madurese could dominate this occupation too (Sudagung 2001:84-6, 96,134-7).
be blunt and rough in their business dealings with both customers and competitors. The wealth of the Madurese in Sambas and other conflict-affected areas remains to be documented. If landownership is a good indicator of the fact that Madurese the majority of Madurese worked in agriculture, and thus and could be considered to have had good economic standing but they still could not have been considered very wealthy. According to the 1980 census, about 48 per cent of the Madurese in Sambas owned less than two hectares of land. As a comparison about 46 per cent of the Dayaks owned between two and three hectares of farmland referenced in the same period. The average size of Madurese land ownership did not change much in the next 20 years. Based on data supplied by 4,098 Sambas refugees in 1999, on average Sambas Madurese landowners owned about 1.1 hectares of land. This size of farm plot was not considered high as it was less than the minimum two hectares of land owned by those who participated in transmigration. As in other places, a few Madurese always became extremely successful and wealthy, but this was not the norm.

The evidence above tends to support the arguments that it was not the Madurese domination or wealth per se that had become the problem for the original population. Compared to the Madurese, Chinese economic domination was significantly more visible and a natural source of economic jealousy for the Dayaks or Malays. The Javanese transmigrants, who had received much support from the government, also should have become the object of local jealousy. In line with the ethnic argument noted previously, it was their rough conduct in their economic interaction that was problematic. Sudagung gave the example of Madurese boat operators in Pontianak City. He observed that when clients agreed to take a boat from a Madurese boat operator they would not usually change their decision. If they did, they would receive verbal abuse from the operator (Sudagung 2001:126). Locals will readily give more examples of Madurese economic wrong-doing and misconduct. The contribution and influence of the Madurese to local politics was negligible.

38 In the past, direct competition between the Madurese and the Dayaks or the Malays in marketing agricultural produce was unlikely because it was handled mostly by Chinese middlemen. Farmers selling their produce directly to consumers in the market is a rather new trend, which only started at the end of 1990s.
39 Aminah 2002:Appendix 10. Although similar land data for Bengkayang district is not available, the trend was very likely similar to that in Sambas because of their geographical proximity.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupations</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Percentage within Madurese workforce</th>
<th>Madurese</th>
<th>Dayaks</th>
<th>Malays</th>
<th>Chinese</th>
<th>Javanese</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Total workforce*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Specialized farmers</td>
<td>7,194</td>
<td>51.6</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>59.6</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>96,939</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field crop and vegetable farm workers</td>
<td>5,995</td>
<td>43.0</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>65.7</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>100,989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General farmers</td>
<td>1,335</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>57.4</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>23,346</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orchard and related trees and shrub crop workers</td>
<td>971</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>27.6</td>
<td>37.9</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>24,158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Livestock workers</td>
<td>555</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>53.7</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>1,033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiosk vendors</td>
<td>395</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>31.8</td>
<td>52.2</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>21,349</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bricklayers, stonemasons, tilers</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>34.6</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>33.9</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>610</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction workers</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>51.6</td>
<td>34.6</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2,290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other farmers</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>607</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tricycle and other pedal vehicle operators</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>59.7</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>467</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loggers</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>87.4</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>7,576</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miners and quarrymen</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>49.6</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2,414</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motor vehicle drivers</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>31.1</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>3,394</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary education teacher</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>71.2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>5,906</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other occupations</td>
<td>737</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>57.3</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>50,139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total workforce</td>
<td>32,184</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>57.3</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>655,779</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.6 Occupations/professions of Sambas population (1990)

*Only lists occupations with total workforce more than 450 workers.

Source: Census 1990.
Most Madurese were sympathizers of the PPP, a party that secured only a few seats in the district and provincial level.\(^{40}\) PPP continued to lose votes in the province following the 1977 election. PPP only experienced a slight increase at the provincial level and in Sintang, Kapuas Hulu and Ketapang districts in the 1992 election. The decreasing PPP share in the district or provincial DPRD meant that opportunities for Madurese politicians to become PPP legislators were minimal. Most important leaders of PPP at the provincial level as well as its legislative representatives were Malays. If there were Madurese representatives of PPP at district level, their numbers were likely to be insignificant.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pontianak City</td>
<td>38.9</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>28.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pontianak</td>
<td>27.4</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>19.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sambas</td>
<td>33.1</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>17.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanggau</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sintang</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kapuas Hulu</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ketapang</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>15.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Province</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>15.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Source: Various government reports.

There was also no evidence of a significant Madurese rise in the bureaucracy which might concern the Malays or the Dayaks. Their low educational attainment limited Madurese chances to work for the bureaucracy. The 2000 census noted that about 65 per cent of Madurese in the province did not attend or did not finish elementary school, and only 0.4 per cent of them had obtained a university degree. Their educa-

\(^{40}\) Roekaerts estimated that the West Kalimantan Madurese support for PPP was 100 per cent (1985:22). Their strong association to PPP was easy to verify if one checked the voting behaviour of the Madurese in Madura. All districts in Madura were strongholds of PPP. In Sampang district, for example, PPP even won in the 1982 and 1987 elections. In 1982, PPP won 23 seats, while Golkar won only 9; in 1987 PPP had 20 seats while Golkar had 16 seats (Soetrisno et al. 1998:209).
tional achievement was the worst compared to other major ethnic groups in the province.\textsuperscript{41} As has been discussed previously, for the Dayaks, the main obstacles were the Malays or the Javanese who had dominated the bureaucracy, and not the Madurese. The main obstacles for the Malays to climb the bureaucratic ladder were the Javanese and, to a lesser extent, the Dayaks.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education level</th>
<th>Chinese</th>
<th>Malays</th>
<th>Javanese</th>
<th>Madurese</th>
<th>Bugis</th>
<th>Dayaks</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No schooling</td>
<td>43.8</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>65.2</td>
<td>46.8</td>
<td>56.3</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>47.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elementary school</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>27.4</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>28.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junior high school</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>11.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior high school</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academy/university</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.8 Ethnic education levels in West Kalimantan (2000 percentages)
Source: Census 2000.

ROLE OF NATIONAL ECONOMIC CRISIS

Although ethnic-related factors played an important part in the majority of conflicts in this province, the unstable political and economic condition faced by the nation at the end of the 1990s also contributed to the 1997 and 1999 conflicts.

The economic crisis which hit Indonesia in 1997 significantly increased the level of poverty in Indonesia. Prior to the crisis, the poverty level in Indonesia had been in decline. UNDP reported that the Indonesian poverty rate was reduced to 11.8 per cent of the total population by 1996. The economic crisis reversed the trend and bounced the

\textsuperscript{41} Schooling, a venue for socialization and cross-cultural exchanges between the youth from different ethnic background, was lacking among the Madurese. This deficiency indirectly contributed to the conflict (Tim Pencari Fakta DPR 1999:20).
poverty rate back to 23.5 per cent in 1998/1999.\textsuperscript{42} The poverty rate in West Kalimantan in 1996 before the crisis hit was almost 22 per cent, the worst in the nation after Irian Jaya and East Timor. Numbers of the poor in the province multiplied because of the crisis, and in 2000 poverty in West Kalimantan still hovered around 29 per cent, the fifth poorest in the nation.\textsuperscript{43} Only a small portion of the populace who lived near the border with Malaysia benefited from the economic crisis because of their cross-border businesses and higher exchange rates (\textit{Akcaya}, 22-3-1999). The economic crisis multiplied the numbers of the desperately poor who were highly susceptible to demagoguery and to bursts of violence stemming from frustration and social problems, such as crimes and conflicts.\textsuperscript{44}

The economic crisis considerably weakened the New Order regime’s legitimacy and its ability to control the country. Political opponents and university students used the crisis to intensify their criticism of the regime. As street demonstrations led by university students became more frequent, social violence also increased dramatically from eight and fifteen incidents for 1996 and 1997 to 124 in 1998. Deaths associated with the incidents indicated the severity of the conflicts; they jumped from 117 deaths in 1996 and 131 in 1997 to 1,343 in 1998.\textsuperscript{45}

When Soeharto finally resigned as president on 21 May 1998, Jakarta and some other parts of the country had fallen into chaos. The demise of the authoritarian regime and the installation of a democratic regime saw the unleashing of social and political movements at unprecedented levels. In West Kalimantan political reforms and decentralization initiatives stirred up political dynamics, some of which included mass mobilization that resulted in violence.\textsuperscript{46} One source recorded at least 29 violent conflicts between the fall of the New Order and the conflict in Sambas in 1999 (Agustino 2005:83-92).

The news of violent conflicts, the almost daily student demonstrations, and the tense political situation at the national level, reached the West Kalimantan population without as much filtering as in the past.

\textsuperscript{42} See http://www.undp.or.id/general/ (accessed 25-6-2005).
\textsuperscript{43} See http://bankdata.depkes.go.id/Profil/ (accessed 12-5-2005).
\textsuperscript{44} Poverty and conflict are closely related although poverty does not necessarily result in conflict (Lichbach 1989:465). When poverty gives rise to frustration and despair, it can be a cause of conflict (Grandvaux and Schneider 1998:20).
\textsuperscript{45} The author when making the tabulation understood that freedom of information before 1998 could influence the number of reported incidents. Therefore the number of incidents before 1998 could be much higher in reality (Tadjoeddin 2002:33).
\textsuperscript{46} Mansfield and Synder (1995) argue that sudden democratization is linked to increasing conflict.
The freer press and private television stations had brought these conflicts closer to home and radicalized some in the community.\(^{47}\) Repeated conflicts can be then accepted as a common or normal occurrences or even the right thing to do, particularly if the conflict is perceived as being justified, for example, defending one’s religion, fighting the oppression or aggression, or seeking independence.

Crisis is important but not necessary for ethnic conflicts to develop. Majority ethnic conflicts between the Dayaks and the Madurese in West Kalimantan had occurred during relative stability in the 1970s and 1980s. Crisis and radicalization also does not always lead to conflict. Despite tense atmosphere the greater part of Indonesia remained peaceful during the crisis. Crisis however has potential to intensify conflict when it happens was as the case of the conflict in 1997 and 1999 in West Kalimantan. Serious ethnic conflict needs underlying or perennial factors, which in the case of conflicts in West Kalimantan, was the strained ethnic relations between the conflicting parties. These issues had created a high level of hostility and distrust, which could easily transform any small fracas or petty crimes into open ethnic conflicts. In the past the strained relations was ‘maintained’ under the watchful eye of the repressive regime. However, they burst into the open after the collapse of the New Order. The crisis and existing problems are two good combinations for a serious ethnic conflict to develop; what it needs is a spark to trigger the conflict.

**POLITICAL MOTIVATIONS BEHIND THE CONFLICTS**

Ethnic conflicts in West Kalimantan were often linked to the wider national political agenda. Ample political motives existed among the marginalized Dayak elite. However no evidence links the conflicts with political manoeuvres or events, at least none were discernible at the start of the conflicts. Both conflicts in 1997 and 1999 started from street fights

\(^{47}\) Watching violent TV shows, for example, has been linked with the increased violent behaviour of the viewers (Huesmann, Moise and Podolski 1997:184; Siegel 2003:159). By this time Indonesia already had at least five private television stations in operation. The first private television station, RCTI, was established in 1987, followed by SCTV (1989), TPI (1990), ANTV (1993), and Indosiar (1995). On their history and also role in the democratization in Indonesia, see Sen (2002:82-4). Although they were required to broadcast heavily filtered news produced by TVRI, the state television station, they were allowed to produce their own soft news, which usually gave more information to the audience (*Jakarta Post*, 13-2-2000). After the reform in 1998, private broadcasting stations had slowly evaded the requirement to relay the news produced by TVRI. The new law on broadcasting in 2002 (Law 32/2002, particularly article 40) no longer mentioned the requirement of private stations to relay the news produced by TVRI.
or arguments between individuals of opposing ethnic groups. These two conflicts had a very different nature from 'political' conflicts such as election-related conflicts in Banjarmasin or Sampang in May 1997, or clashes between PDI supporters and government-backed attackers during the take-over of the PDI headquarters in July 1996.48

Political events, such as the election of a governor or a district head, or a general election have potential as triggers to conflict. Political rivalries between the candidates, for example, can lead to street fighting among their supporters. Disappointed candidates who lost a contest can stir up trouble through their supporters. However, such events between 1996 and 1998 in the province ended peacefully, and no evidence links them to the 1997 conflict. The district head election in Sambas was concluded in June 1996, at least six months before the conflict. Another district head election in Ketapang, the tranquil southernmost district in the province, concluded in February 1998 without any incidents.49 Other district elections were not due until the middle of 1998. The general election in mid-1997 in the province also ended without major incidents. PDI which had become a potential source of instability (or conflict) due to popular opposition to its pro-regime leadership did not face significant opposition in the province. While it obtained 6 percent fewer votes compared to the previous election, its performance in the province was exceptionally good compared to its result at the national level. Votes for PPP, another party, had slightly increased. Golkar won quite comfortably in the province, gaining about 70% per cent of the votes.50

Unlike the conflict in 1997, the 1999 violence was surrounded by several national and local political events that made it a politically-

48 Soetrisno et al. (1998:319) grouped these two clashes together with the other four as political conflicts, while conflict in 1997 in West Kalimantan was treated as ethnic conflict.
49 In the election in Sambas, the strongest contenders were the incumbent district head Syafei Djamil and local military chief Tarya Aryanto, who were both active military officers. Despite strong local support, Djamil did not take part in the competition apparently after he failed to obtain the required approval from the military. Aryanto finally won the election, while Djamil returned to army headquarters in Jakarta. Some tension was apparent during the nomination of the candidates, but post-election conditions were peaceful as in most elections during the New Order regime (Akcaya, January-March 1996). In an election in Ketapang, civilian Morkes Effendi, who was nominated by the regime to head the district, was elected as district head on 17 February 1998 without any election troubles (Akcaya, 18-2-1998).
50 At the provincial level PDI gained 15.4 per cent of votes in 1997, compared to 21.6 per cent in the previous election. This was still much better than its national performance. At national level, PDI obtained only 3 per cent of votes in the 1997 election, a significant drop from the previous election of 14.9 per cent of votes. For the result of these three political parties at national election from 1971 to 1997, see Haris 2004:31.
driven conflict. The fall of the New Order regime, the installation of a democratic regime and the introduction of decentralization policies had certainly given new manoeuvring ground for local political elite and commoners. In particular, the rise of Dayak political lobbies and their success in securing two district head positions at the expense of Malays might have drawn retaliation from the Malays in the form of conflict. One scholar even claims that the intended target of the Malays in the 1999 conflict were the Dayaks.\footnote{Davidson 2008:136. I found the Davidson assessment was inaccurate; at least there were no political intentions at the start of the conflict, as I will make clear in the last section of this chapter.}

In search of possible political explanations behind the conflicts in the province, one needs to examine those who would have benefitted from the conflict. The military is the prime candidate because its involvement in conflicts is not new to Indonesia. In the past, the military has instigated conflicts to crush their political opponents – for example, those against the Communists in Java and Bali between 1965 and 1966. As noted previously, they were accused of inciting the massacre of the Chinese in West Kalimantan in 1967. The rivalries between the top-ranking officials at the national level on several occasions have led to proxy-conflicts at the grass-roots level.\footnote{Rinakit (2005:52), for example, concluded that several important incidents during New Order Indonesia were the result of competition among top army generals.}

The new rationale for military involvement in the conflicts at the end of the 1990s was related to their waning political role at the national and regional level. Those who envisaged the military involvement in the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election year</th>
<th>PPP</th>
<th>Golkar</th>
<th>PDI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>66.6</td>
<td>14.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>68.8</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>70.7</td>
<td>8.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>68.7</td>
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<td>1992</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>63.6</td>
<td>21.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>69.4</td>
<td>15.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.9 Political parties and elections in West Kalimantan (1971-1997 percentages)

Source: Various government reports.
conflict argued that the conflicts would force the government to reinstate or even increase the military role to keep order in the country. The state would also allocate more financial support to the army’s increased activities.\textsuperscript{53} One indication of their diminishing role was the decline in the number of military officers appointed to certain important positions. One source found that between 1977 and early 1990 the proportion of ministers with military background had declined from 42.5 per cent to 24 per cent, the military ambassadors had also declined from 41 per cent to 17 per cent, and the military governors from 70.3 per cent to 40 per cent (Rinakit 2005:45). The percentage of military governors further dropped from 54 per cent (1992-1996) to 39 per cent (1997-2001). At the district head level, the percentage dropped from 47 per cent to 12 per cent for the same period (Malley 2003:113-4). The trend continued after the fall of the New Order as the military was pressured to withdraw from its political role. The military was allocated fewer seats in the DPR after the 1999 election, and accepted that their representation in the legislature would be abolished by 2004. It agreed to disclose and make transparent all appointments of retired military officers to civilian posts, and agreed that no active military officers would be able to assume any civilian positions in the government (Lee 2000:699-700). Following the trend at national level, military control over the politics and bureaucracy of West Kalimantan also declined. The position of governor which had been reserved for a military person since 1966 was returned to a civilian in 2003. Some district head positions had been gradually returned to civilians during the 1980s. All military district heads who were elected during the New Order were replaced by civilians after their term ended at the end of the 1990s or early in the 2000s.

The easiest and most common indications employed by proponents of the ‘military involvement’ argument is the slow or misguided responses of security forces during the conflict (Communal violence West Kalimantan 1997). However, the slow response could be due to other legitimate reasons such as understaffing, fear of large and aggressive mobs, and concern about

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\textsuperscript{53} Davidson 2008:99-100; Van Dijk 2001:394-5; Arafat 1998:267-8. There were still other arguments for the military involvement in the conflict. For example, from the financial side the conflicts could generate significant side income for the military, which was important for financing its large structure and underpaid personnel. In conflict-torn areas where peace had not been fully restored, the military would keep receiving orders to protect business and industrial complexes or to escort businessmen or individuals who needed to travel through conflict-affected areas. All of these security services were highly prized and became sources of income for the military (Azca et al. 2004:35-6).
human rights violation (Communal violence West Kalimantan 1997). The tardy anticipation of conflict on the part of the security forces could be also due to the collapse of its intelligence network. In reality, the military was never totally immobile and passive in the case of conflicts in 1997 and 1999 in West Kalimantan. HRW mentioned the efforts of the military to evacuate refugees, and that on some occasions they had to shoot at the mobs who defied orders or who tried to attack those under military protection. In order to prevent the spread of conflict, the military issued a night-time curfew on 2 January 1997 and blocked road access to Sanggau Ledo (Petebang 1998:85). The 1999 conflict chronology above also showed that the military had taken similar preventive and repressive actions, including shooting at the Malay crowds who were suspected of planning attacks on the Madurese refugees.

Conflicts could be used as a pretext by the military to restore kodam or Regional Military Command (Davidson 2002:315). The plan to restore kodam had been proposed in May 1998, a few days before the fall of the New Order regime, and the eruption of disturbances should

54 The military defended their delicate handling of the conflict because they did not want to be accused of violating human rights (Van Dijk 2001:393-4).
55 Communal violence West Kalimantan 1997. The National Human Rights Commission (Komnas HAM) set up by the government considered these repressive acts (the shootings) necessary as the security officers needed to defend their lives and to safeguard order and peace (Akcaya, 16-2-1997).
have given more justification for such restoration.\footnote{The Commander-in-Chief General Wiranto authorized the re-establishment of seven kodam, which were dissolved in the mid-1980s. The plan was to restore four kodam in conflict-affected provinces during the period 1999 to 2004: one each for Aceh and Maluku provinces, and two for provinces in Kalimantan. The other three kodam were to be restored between 2004 and 2009: Kodam III/Imam Bonjol, Kodam XII/Sam Ratulangi, and Kodam XV/Nusa Tenggara (Rinakit 2005:145). Kodam is the highest regional military command. It usually oversees one or more province. Below kodam is korem, whose authority is mostly at the district level. There are also korem which oversee the whole province, such as Korem 121 in West Kalimantan. The structures below korem are kodim, then koramil and babinsa. Babinsa at village level is staffed by non-commissioned officers.} The 1999 conflict in West Kalimantan sparked the restoration debate in the province between March and December 1999. No less than a member of the National Human Rights Commission (Komnas HAM), who had to deal with the misconduct of military personnel, supported the restoration of the kodam in West Kalimantan. Some believed that the establishment of kodam in the province would result in quicker security responses if conflicts occurred in this region \cite{Akcaya, 30-3-1999}. However, the argument that the military used the conflicts to speed up restoration in the province was less credible in West Kalimantan as the highest military commander in the province himself rejected the idea of restoring the kodam in the province \cite{KR, 2003/98}. And so far, there has been no kodam exclusively for West Kalimantan, although at least two have been restored elsewhere.\footnote{Kodam was re-established in Aceh (20-5-1999) and Maluku (5-2-2002). Kodam Tanjungpura was finally restored on 2 July 2010 with headquarters in Pontianak. Unlike its predecessor, which was exclusively to cover West Kalimantan province, the new kodam is also responsible for Central Kalimantan \link{http://www.mediaindonesia.com/read/2010/07/02/152955/171/1/KSAD-Pimpin-Upacara-Peresmian-Kodam-XII-Tanjungpura, accessed 26-10-2010}.}

The next focus is the conspiracy theories that believed that the conflicts were part of a grand scheme to destabilize the country in order to achieve certain political agendas and goals. Some, such as the leader of the NU (Nahdlatul Ulama, the largest Muslim organization in the country) Abdurrahman Wahid, believed that many conflicts in the region were triggered by those who were still loyal to former President Soeharto.\footnote{Abdurrahman Wahid believed that Soeharto, the former president, was still influential in national politics after his resignation. He visited Soeharto several times to persuade him to ask his supporters to stop instigating conflicts \cite{Van Dijk, 2001:393}.} He also believed that there was a ‘Green Dragon Operation’, a conspiracy to destabilize NU, as many initial conflicts occurred in Java, in NU strongholds \cite{Eklöf, 1999:63-74; Van Dijk, 2001:392-8}. However, there was a lack of evidence of such political provocateurs in the conflict in West Kalimantan. In fact, the government which in the past always looked for the mastermind (usually dubbed as aktor intelektual) as scape-
goat, believed that there were no such mastermind behind the conflict and that the conflict was purely communal and spontaneous (Akcaya, 26-3-1999). Provocateurs and provocative acts to fuel crowd anger or deliberately spread inflammatory rumours are normal in communal conflicts. While they could be an indication of an ‘engineered’ conflict, they could also be local people who have put up with ‘oppression’ and want to settle old scores. No one, including the government, was able to show that the initial conflicts in the province in the 1990s were the results of political manoeuvres.59

What about the high level of support the mobs received during the conflict? Human Rights Watch, for instance, reported that a Madurese informant was astonished by the possession of semi-automatic rifles by Dayak attackers in the Sanggau area during the 1997 conflict. According to the informant, those rifles were quite expensive and could only be obtained in Malaysia. The informant also questioned the source of gasoline the attackers used to burn targets (Communal violence West Kalimantan 1997:26-7). The mobs also received food, drinking water, other logistics, and transportation during the conflict. While this could be an indication of the presence of a planned conflict, this support was common during times of conflict. Some common reasons are that the ‘supporters’ want to protect themselves against the common enemy, to punish a common enemy, or just to show solidarity. Some contribute for their own future gains and hope to be rewarded for their support if the mobs ‘win’ the conflict. The rest may have no choice because non-contribution may be seen as opposing the mobs: they were forced to choose to be with the mob or against the mob.

MALAY-MADURESE RELATIONS

One piece of research in the early 1980s found that Malay-Madurese relations were quite close and noticed some degree of assimilation between the two (Sudagung 2001:134-7). However, the number of atrocities committed on the Madurese and the determination not to allow a single Madurese to return to Sambas suggested deep hostility and distrust on the part of the Malays at least in vicinity of Sambas. Malays were report-

59 According to the Governor, the provocateurs in the 1999 conflict were the local population who had accumulated dislike of the Madurese and wanted them out of the village (Akcaya, 27-3-1999).
ed to have beheaded, mutilated and even cannibalized Madurese victims during the conflict. They had driven virtually all Madurese from Sambas district and rejected their return to the district. Those who were caught visiting the district after the conflict were killed. In such a case in 2002, three years after the conflict, two Madurese went back to Teluk Keramat (Sambas) to sell their land. Fearing for their safety, the Madurese paid security forces to accompany them on their journey. However, Malays in the area found out about their trip and killed them, after forcing the security guards to flee (Purwana 2003:76). In another case, Malays killed a Madurese who returned to Sambas to visit his wife (Davidson 2002:325). Until at least 2006, there were no reports of Madurese resettling in Sambas, although the majority of them wished to return.60

The massive conflict and determination to reject the Madurese returning indicated a serious problem in their relations. While he did not see serious problems in their relations, Sudagung saw the potential for conflict between the two. He noted that their harmonious relations were partly because of the restrained character of the Malays (Sudagung 2001:134-7), and therefore not due to amicable relations as such. In fact, as with other ethnic group in the province, Malays shared the negative stereotypes of the Madurese and felt the same level of victimization by them. A former chief of Parit Setia village, the original site of the 1999 conflict, listed 22 cases of Madurese crimes against the Malays and Chinese in Jawai sub-district alone (Saad 2003:103-7). Madurese sources also acknowledged Malay fears. A Madurese leader claimed that the small number of registered Madurese in some neighbourhoods was due to the Malay neighbourhood head’s (ketua RT) fear of handling the Madurese registration, and not because the Madurese did not want to register (Petebang and Sutrisno 2000:23, 31).

Some initial episodes in the 1999 conflict showed the arrogant attitude of the Madurese. After attacking Parit Setia, the Madurese attackers yelled ‘Malay rice-crackers’ and ‘three-zero’, which meant three

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60 The hostility of the Sambas Malays would take many years to heal, and until then Madurese would have to risk their lives when they attempted to return to the district. Wiyata found that by November 2003, none of the Madurese refugees from Sambas in Bangkalan had returned to Sambas. The reason, according to the refugees, was Sambas had closed its doors to the Madurese and that those who returned would be killed. This was very different from the Madurese refugees from Central Kalimantan in Sampang. In 2003, 16,450 Madurese had returned to Central Kalimantan (Wiyata 2003). More recent research argued that opposition to the returning Madurese refugees was supported both by the Malay political elite and general Malay population of Sambas (Cahyono et al. 2006:iv).
casualties to the Malays and none to the Madurese, to humiliate the Malays (Davidson 2008:127-8). A Madurese in Pemangkat boasted that only two Madurese were needed to obliterate all the Pemangkat Malays (Kapuas, 15-4-1999). They deemed the Malays cowards who only dared to clash with the Madurese after being assured of help from the Dayaks. The echo of arrogance of a few hardliner Madurese travelled far, and incensed more Malays to fight the Madurese.

Madurese and Malays were Muslim, a factor which according to Sudagung (2001:133-7) had partly tended to contribute to harmonious relations between the two. Some scholars observed that Islam had facilitated some Madurese assimilation with Malays and intermarriage between them (Alqadrie 2002a:139; Sudagung 2001:133-5), but they did not demonstrate that a level of assimilation that had taken place. Looking at the trend toward exclusively Madurese settlements, the heavy influx of Madurese migrants, a Madurese culture, resistant to assimilation, and strong stereotyping against the Madurese, assimilation could be seen as more the exception than the norm.

Within the Muslim community, Malay-Madurese relations seemed to be the worst compared to Malay relations with all other Muslim migrants. Research led by Suparlan in 1989, a decade before the Malay-Madurese conflict, noted the sharp difference between the Madurese and the Malays in judging each other’s religiosity. Both judged the other side as practising impure Islam.61 Madurese, for example, were the followers of *tarekat* (Muslim mystical brotherhoods) which included practices that were different from those of the Malays.62 Furthermore, unlike Muslims from other ethnic groups the Madurese usually had their own mosques, dubbed by outsiders as Madurese mosques or *mesjid Madura*. These mosques used the Madurese language and peculiar rituals which made non-Madurese uncomfortable praying there. The Madurese also usually had their own cemetery, separated from the general cemetery.63 These differences might prevent frequent mutual participation by both

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61 Suparlan et al. 1989:26, 64-5. While Suparlan’s research was based on the conditions in Pontianak City, the result could be used as indication for the religious relations between these ethnic groups in other parts of the province.

62 Petebang and Sutrisno 2000:37. The Madurese were closer to Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) practices, while most Sambas Malays were closer to Muhammadiyah practices (Purwana 2003:128-30). NU is usually regarded as a traditionalist Muslim organization, while Muhammadiyah is more progressive.

63 Petebang and Sutrisno 2000:36; Saad 2003:86; Suparlan et al. 1989:26, 64-5.
communities in religious social occasions such as weddings, funerals and other engagements.

These religious differences became pronounced during the conflict in 1999. The Malays, who always considered themselves pious Muslims, were deeply offended when the Madurese cried ‘God is Great’ (Allahu Akbar) when they attacked the Malays in Parit Setia as if the Malays were not Muslims. To add salt to the wound, the Madurese chose to attack on Idul Fitri, a major festive Muslim day. At the end it was not surprising to see the Malays destroyed the Madurese mosques during the conflict, because after all, they belonged to a ‘different’ Islam.64

Despite harmonious relations on the surface prior to 1999, the underlying relations between the Malays and Madurese were tense. A spark under suitable conditions in 1999 finally ignited those tensions and generated open violence. As in the Dayak-Madurese conflicts, I believe that social and cultural factors were still the most significant in precipitating the Malays-Madurese conflict.

CONFLICT AND THE RISE OF ETHNIC POLITICS

Ethnic conflicts are sometimes linked with ethnic politics. Such links are relatively clear in ethnic conflicts which have separatist goals, but sometimes less clear in other types of horizontal conflicts. The conflict involving the Dayaks/Malays and the Madurese in West Kalimantan did not appear to have a strong causal connection with ethnic politics. The last conflicts in 1997 and 1999, however, occurred during political crisis and a period of transition as well as during the time of intensifying ethnic politics involving Dayaks and Malays. The conflicts although not initially linked to ethnic politics, had some tie to them. Conflicts had helped the Dayak political elite to step up their pressure on the government to allow more Dayaks in leadership positions in the government, and they tended to unify elements of the Dayaks and intensify their solidarity for stronger ethnic movements. The conflicts also highlighted economic and social justice activities led by some Dayak NGOs. The Malays also apparently benefited from the 1999 disturbances.

64 Purwana 2003; Petebang and Sutrisno 2000. The increasing attack on followers of Ahmadiyah by the Muslims in several places in Indonesia since 2005 is using the same justification.
Although the 1997 conflict did not start as a political or politically-motivated conflict, some Dayak elite, particularly those associated with MAD (Dayak Customary Board), used it to extract some political concessions from the government. MAD, which was initially established in 1994, was the only province-wide Dayak organization that had branches down to sub-district level. When the conflict broke out, MAD and its branches helped the government to organize traditional peace ceremonies and represented the Dayaks in a series of inter-ethnic negotiations to construct peace. It also established coordination-posts (posko) to help with aid distribution to conflict-affected people.

MAD was well known for their political lobbying during and after the conflict. In order to make its case heard, it organized several intra-Dayak gatherings and submitted the recommendations of the meetings to the government. One gathering on 16 February 1997 in Pontianak was attended by 250 Dayaks from various backgrounds and organizations, including Dayak public figures and representatives of DAD from Sambas, Pontianak and Sanggau districts. At the end of the meeting, the participants issued a seventeen-point statement to the government. One point demanded the government give equal opportunity to Dayaks to take part in development (mengisi pembangunan), a euphemism for asking for more Dayak positions in the bureaucracy. Another point demanded the government put Dayaks at the top of the legislature candidate list in the upcoming election to increase their chances of being elected. In a paper produced in April 1997, MAD argued that marginalization of the Dayaks was the cause of conflict. As a solution, it urged the government to give greater opportunities and roles to the Dayaks in decision-making processes, and also to provide opportunities for the Dayaks to head

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65 It was first named the Customary Board or Majelis Adat (note the absence of ‘Dayak’) but changed to its current name at the end of April 1997 to include ‘Dayak’. This was done partly because of the governor’s preference so that the organization had a strong reference to Dayak, because it was indeed a Dayak organization (interviews with Jdh and Awn). At the district level there were Dewan Adat Dayak (DAD, Dayak Customary Council). The first DAD to form was in Pontianak district in May 1985 (‘Hasil-hasil musyarawah adat III (musdat III) Dayak Kanayatn Kabupaten Pontianak’, 1998, in: Private collection, Pontianak) followed by Sambas district in June 1986 (‘Laporan hasil musyawarah adat (musdat) pertama Daya Kabupaten Sambas’, 1986, in: Private collection, Pontianak). The official names at district level varied but mostly included Dewan Adat. Pontianak district, for example, used Dewan Adat Kanayatn, while Sambas used Dewan Adat Dayak Sambas. The DAD was independent from MAD, although both maintain a line of coordination.

66 The traditional peace ceremonies were not effective in preventing an escalation of conflict because the ceremonies only involved ethnic elites of questionable legitimacy (Davidson 2002:233-4).
government offices.\textsuperscript{67} In a letter dated 4 April 1997, MAD demanded that the governor appoint Ignatius Lyong to head the provincial human resources office.\textsuperscript{68} On 1 May 1997, it asked the governor to appoint L.H. Kadir as a deputy governor.\textsuperscript{69}

Some Christian organizations which used to detach themselves from the politics of the region also joined the political lobbying. The Association of Indonesian Christian Intelligentsia (PIKI) under the leadership of Mian Simanjuntak tried to increase the role of Christians and Dayaks in government offices.\textsuperscript{70} Together with other Dayak (and Christian) organizations, PIKI issued a political statement to urge the government to give more significant roles to the Dayaks.

The government ignored most of these demands, except the appointment of Ignatius Lyong as the head of Human Resources Office. Despite their lack of success, the political lobbies of MAD and other similar associations continued. During the transition period between 1998 and 1999, they were able to influence the government to appoint Dayaks to head the districts of Sanggau and Pontianak. These two cases will be discussed in the next chapter.

The growing Dayak political lobbies had brought the undercurrents of Dayak – Malay political polarization into the open. The sudden rise of Dayak political leverage, evidenced by the election of two Dayak district heads in 1998-1999 (and later several in other Dayak-dominated districts), worried the top Malay bureaucrats who felt their political careers had been cut short. Worse still was that the government seemed to bow to Dayak pressure. In the eyes of many Malays, the appointment of two Dayak district heads showed that the trend of appointments was based more on ethnic sentiment and mob-pressures rather than on merit or achievement. The Malays believed that as more senior and capable


\textsuperscript{68} This position was highly sought by others and very strategic, especially for the Dayaks who had been complaining about the ceiling on their being recruited for the bureaucracy. The head of this office had a significant role in deciding the number and composition of new civil service recruits and had a role in the promotion of higher ranking echelon bureaucrats.


\textsuperscript{70} PIKI at the national level was first established in 1963 in Jakarta. Its profile was revived after the establishment of the Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI) in 1990. In West Kalimantan, PIKI was led by Ikot Rinding between 1992 and 1996. Mian Simanjuntak was elected to lead the organization in April 1996 (\textit{Akcaya}, 18-4-1996).
bureaucrats they were more suited for those positions than the Dayaks. If ethnic sentiment continued to play a role in the appointment of high-ranking positions, the opportunities for high-ranking Malay bureaucrats would diminish (Davidson 2008:135-8).

The frustration of the Malay elite was also felt by the Malays at other levels. Malay civil servants and political activists were also dismayed because the appointment of Dayak leadership in their districts could be the start of Dayak dominance in the bureaucracy. These fears became a reality after Bengkayang and particularly Landak districts were established. Soon after the establishment, Dayak civil servants were catapulted into leadership positions in the district bureaucracy.

Both elites and ordinary Malays loathed the Dayak street demonstrations during the district head elections but were not able to launch similar counter-demonstrations. It seemed that the Malays lacked the justification for launching a counter-move against the Dayaks. As was examined previously, the Malays had enjoyed more privileges than the Dayaks in the bureaucracy during the New Order. Unlike the Dayaks, they had no justification to ask for affirmative policies. The Malay demonstrations during two district head elections in 1998-1999 were usually in the form of visits to local DPRD by small groups of individuals and not through mass demonstrations as with the Dayaks.

It was at this juncture that the 1999 conflict between Malays and Madurese broke out. But still, despite their strong motives to counter the Dayaks, the 1999 conflict was not a result of a Malay reaction to rising Dayak political assertiveness as some have argued (Davidson 2008:135-8). The Malays on the street, who initiated group attacks in 1999, aimed simply to take revenge and to teach the Madurese a lesson. This was quite obvious by the lack of reaction of Malays in Sambas to political events where Malay political interests had been upset by the Dayaks. The FKPM, a Malay youth organization, which had some role in the conflict at a later stage, for example, did not participate in the

71 FKPM was established at a meeting on 26 January 1999 in Singkawang (‘Tim Sebelas pembentukan Forum Komunikasi Pemuda Melayu Kabupaten Sambas: Berita acara’, 1999, in: Collection of Zulkarnaen Bujang, Singkawang). A report prepared by the Fact-finding Team of Partai Keadilan Sambas on 22-3-1999 mentioned that the organization was formed through the initiatives of Uray Aminuddin (a staff member of the district office) and Rosita Nengsih, a law graduate. Its aim was to ensure that the perpetrators of the Parit Setia incident would be brought to court. M. Jamras, a local contractor and also a strongman among the local Malays, was appointed to head the forum (Akcaya, 5-2-1999, Partai Keadilan 1999).
political discussion of the formation of Bengkayang district, where the Dayak interests were growing. The Malays also did not react strongly during the violent Dayak protests during the Pontianak district head election, which contributed to the election of a Dayak district head.

The Malays did not envisage the conflict, let alone plan it, as a way to check the increasing Dayak influence in local politics. The use of conflict as a political bargaining chip against the Dayaks was a later product. After the conflict, Malay organizations such as FKPM and others started to engage in political mobilization quite similar to that of the Dayaks. The Malay challenge to the Dayaks during the Regional Representative (Utusan Daerah) affairs in September and October 1999 had almost led to open conflict between them. Members of FKPM and the Malay Brotherhood Customary Council (Lembayu) played a role in the counter-demonstrations that contributed to holding the Dayaks demands in check.72

**SUMMARY**

This chapter demonstrates that historical, marginalization and cultural factors have been important underlying factors in hostilities between Madurese and Dayaks. The concentrations of the Madurese, particularly in the conflict-ridden regions, made their relations even worse. Many Dayaks and Malays who lived near the aggressive Madurese felt insecure and intimidated. It seems apparent that the political role of the Madurese was negligible at both district and provincial levels and therefore was not a real threat to the two main ethnic groups, the Malays and Dayaks. The Madurese share in the total economic workforce was small compared to that of the other main ethnic groups. Although Madurese did dominate some occupations in certain areas, it was not the domination but their rough and aggressive behaviour in such economic activities that made the dominance objectionable for the other ethnic groups.

The economic crisis increased the level of poverty among the local population, who became prone to involvement in conflict. The weaken-

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72 The FKPM at this stage was still under the name of FKPM Sambas as there had been no province-wide FKPM until November 1999 (Alkaya, 29-11-1999). Lembayu was formed in mid-1999. It had designated several Malay war commanders, resembling the Dayak model. Further on Lembayu and its activities refer to Davidson (2002:351-5).
ing and change of the regime coupled with rapid democratization contributed to conflict as such changes required adjustment of all political players and opened up antagonistic forces which had been previously repressed by the regime. The advanced telecommunications, a freer press, better road conditions, and the availability of transport were significant in the escalation of conflict.

There is no strong evidence that the conflict was ‘engineered’ or politically motivated. In both cases, political moves only appeared at a later stage, when ethnic elite became aware of the political opportunities. In both cases the conflicts strengthened the ethnic political movements which appeared during or after the conflicts.

The unexpected fall of the New Order regime in May 1998 drastically changed Indonesian politics. Democratic institutions that had been co-opted for decades were restored. New political freedoms led to the blossoming of activities previously considered seditious. Ethnic politics, which had been repressed, found room to manoeuvre. In many parts of the country, the indigenous populations demanded the rights of *patra daerah*, which were usually translated into leadership positions in the local government. In West Kalimantan the Dayaks were first to seize the opportunity to openly organize themselves on the basis of ethnicity and to pursue ethnic political objectives. Immediately after the fall of the New Order, Dayaks were on the streets demanding the installation of Dayak district heads in two districts.

This chapter examines the role of *Reformasi*, or the reform era after the New Order, in Dayak politics and how Dayak politics has evolved since. In order to understand the early development of Dayak politics in West Kalimantan, we first discuss how West Kalimantan experienced the political transition and the intensive Dayak political lobbies including responses from the government and the other major ethnic group, the Malays. Activities of a group of Dayak NGOs under Pancur Kasih had been largely non-political or at least avoided political lobbying. Nonetheless they had an impact on Dayaks politics, particularly after some of their former leaders began to join political parties in the early 2000s. The decline of inter-ethnic politics as well as the effects of electoral changes on the politics of the Dayaks will also be examined.
DAYAK POLITICS AT THE BEGINNING OF REFORMASI

Political dynamics in Jakarta since 1996, when the regime sponsored the violent takeover of the PDI headquarters in Jakarta, only gradually permeated West Kalimantan. The province did not experience large-scale student demonstrations like those in the national capital until April 1998, when the secretariat of the provincial legislature recorded reform-related demonstrations. Demonstrations sprang up after the Trisakti incident and intensified after the fall of Soeharto. There were fourteen demonstrations or visits to the DPRD in May and fifteen in June 1998, compared to only two in April. Prior to the Trisakti incident, local newspapers recorded a few small, mostly on-campus demonstrations in April and May 1998 (Akcaya, 15-4, 22-4, 27-4, 8-5 and 13-5-1998).

Reform activities in West Kalimantan after the fall of the New Order shared many similarities with those in Jakarta and other areas. The focus first addressed the problems of corruption, collusion, and nepotism (termed KKN, korupsi kolusi nepotisme) in the executive and called for the resignation of officials accused of corrupt practices (Akcaya, 25-6, 7-7, 5-8-1998). The main target was the incumbent Governor Aswin, who had faced a series of impeachment attempts by members of DPRD supported by university students. Newspapers also reported calls for the district heads of Sanggau and Kapuas Hulu to resign. Despite popular demands, these executive heads managed to retain their positions until the official end of their terms in office.

The next focus was empowerment of the DPRD. During the New Order era, the DPRD often acted as a mere rubber stamp for the provincial or district executive. After Reformasi, members of the DPRD came under pressure to distance themselves from the executive and to be critical of the executive. In response, DPRD members showed their independence of the executive during the district head elections of 1998

1 On 12 December 1998 four students from Trisakti University, who were involved in a demonstration calling on Soeharto to resign and demanding democratic reform, were killed when the police opened fire. This incident was followed by riots between 13 and 15 May, the most serious targeting the Chinese and their property (Aspinall 2000:298).
and 1999. When students called on the governor to resign, many legislators, particularly those from the PPP and PDI, supported the demands (Akcaya, 12-6-1998). The DPRD also became involved in other reform initiatives to show their new commitment to democratization.

Many other demands resembled those expressed in Jakarta, such as demands to curb excessive military influence in politics, to install democratic institutions/agencies, to amend the outdated constitution, to implement decentralization and to solve a wide range of economic problems. One aspect of political reform that of particular interest in the peripheral regions was the empowerment of the native population. In West Kalimantan such movements were initially led by Dayaks who demanded more top jobs in the government and competed zealously against the Malays, for those political positions.4 Held in check during the authoritarian New Order, political polarization between the two ethnic groups was now unavoidable.

Polarization and hostility between the Dayaks and Malays came from several sources. The Dayaks, although relatively marginalized, were the group more ready to take an aggressive stance. Many of the Dayak elite and young people came to understand that without aggressive and radical political pressure they would not achieve political parity with Malays. Within the bureaucracy Malays would certainly take most of the leadership positions because they had a larger pool of qualified bureaucrats ready to assume those positions. Since most promotions in the executive were based on echelon or rank, the opportunities for Dayak bureaucrats to be appointed to higher posts were automatically limited, as there were only a few Dayaks in the higher echelons. Dayak bureaucrats would be further disadvantaged if ethnic and religious considerations came into play. As noted in Chapter 6, many executive bodies responsible for processing promotions were dominated by Muslims and Malays, who could play the ethnic or religious cards to block promotion.5 Some Dayak bureaucrats believed that the lack of Dayaks in the civil service and their lack of promotion were partly caused by such ceiling practices. Under

4 In West Kalimantan such political demands were complicated by the fact that there were two quite different native populations: the Dayaks and the Malays. The demands for local empowerment in West Kalimantan went beyond the simple native son (putra daerah) issue, and involved questions as to which native sons should be empowered, the Dayaks or the Malays (Bamba 2002a:6-7).

5 Besides Malays, Muslim ethnic groups in the bureaucracy included Javanese, Bugis, Banjarese, and Minangkabauans. During political competition between Malays and Dayaks, the Bugis, Banjarese, and Minangkabauans would very likely support the Malays because they shared the same religious affiliation.
normal circumstances, when higher positions became available to candidates, competition for the jobs was mostly among the Malay bureaucrats.

The question of the political marginalization of the Dayaks during the New Order started to emerge as early as the 1970s, and the situation began to improve very slowly only in the mid-1990s. A new governor appointed a Dayak, Elyakim Simon Djalil, to head the training section of the human resources office in April 1994 (Akcaya, 29-01-2000). Although this was not the top position in the office, it was a strategic one with responsibility for assigning employees for training or education required for possible promotion.6 Two months earlier, the governor had planned to appoint a Dayak as district head of Sintang, although unfortunately the candidate failed to win the election, resulting in waves of Dayak protests. To compensate, a Dayak, Jacobus Layang, was finally appointed as district head in Kapuas Hulu in March 1995. Overall, these few appointments did not change the fact that only a few Dayaks occupied high office until the end of the New Order Regime. Malay personnel, in contrast, had been enjoying better treatment during the Soeharto era. When the strategic posts, such as district head, were returned to local bureaucrats, they were awarded to Malays. Malays had occupied some district head positions since 1966, while the first Dayak district head during the New Order was not elected until 1995. The momentum toward an expanded role in government for the Dayaks developed only after the collapse of the New Order.

DISTRICT HEAD ELECTIONS

All district head elections during the New Order were under the tight control of the provincial governor and local military commander. The regime usually had a favourite, but it still let the local DPRD accept public nominations so that the election would appear democratic. Whatever the result of public nominations, the governor’s favourite would always make the final list, and in most cases would be elected as district head.

6 This officer was transferred from the post in March 1995 (Akcaya, 29-01-2000). One senior Malay bureaucrat accused the officer of having assigned training opportunities to Dayak civil servants to prepare them for promotion when the time came (interview with Djp). The accusation and the fact that the officer only stayed in the position for a short time indicated the importance of the post. Simon Djalil was elected district head of Sintang in early 2000.
The cases involving the election of Sanggau and Pontianak district heads illustrate this process.

The election process for the Sanggau district head had begun in early 1998, some months before the fall of the New Order. At the end of the nomination period, which included nominations from the public, the DPRD compiled a list of 40 nominees, the largest number of nominees in the history of district head elections in West Kalimantan (Akcaya, 3-3-1998). Half of the nominees had military backgrounds – the highest percentage on record in the history of district head elections in West Kalimantan (Akcaya, 5-3-1998). From this list of nominees, the members of the DPRD were able to shortlist about a dozen candidates. The governor’s favourite candidate, Colonel Soemitro, was on the short list.7

Ethnical voices in the elections had appeared from the beginning of the nomination procedure. Both communities, Dayaks and Malays, had learnt from previous elections in nearby Sintang and Kapuas Hulu that ethnic factors could indeed influence the election process. The Malay political lobby was able to elect a Malay as the Sintang district head in the 1994 election, although the position was initially intended for a Dayak. The Dayak protests at the result in this election led Governor Aswin to ensure that a Dayak was elected as district head in Kapuas Hulu in 1995.

Due to ethnic polarization introduced in previous elections, masses from each ethnic group tended to rally for candidates from their own ethnic group. Most Dayaks therefore rallied behind the Dayak candidates: Colonel Mickael Andjioe, Lieutenant Colonel Riam Mapuas, L.H. Kadir, Simon Djalil, Donatus Djaman, Benedictus Ayub, Ikot Rinding, and Arsen Riksen. Approaching the election, Dayak support for Colonel Andjioe grew stronger.8 PIKI and some Christian and Dayak associations released a letter on 15 April 1998 that put Andjioe as the

7 Soemitro was a Javanese military officer who had served in various military West Kalimantan posts since the 1960s. He was the head of the Social and Political Bureau in the provincial government (known as Ditsospol). This office was a very influential political tool of the New Order regime and was generally headed by a military officer, usually with the rank of colonel at the provincial level and a major if at district level. Its function was to monitor the political development of the region under its jurisdiction, including ‘meddling’ in the internal affairs of political parties and other organizations if necessary. It also conducted a special investigation (litus) to check the political background of civilian candidates for political positions, and candidates for election. It was strongly associated with the repressive New Order regime and was eventually dissolved by President Abdurrahman Wahid, at which point the office was renamed Office of National Unity and Society Protection (Kantor Badan Kesatuan Bangsa dan Perlindungan Masyarakat).

top priority candidate, followed by Donatus Djaman and Benedictus Ayub. The letter requested that the government shortlist only them as the final three candidates. Andjioe was the only candidate with a military background. Donatus Djaman, the son of the first Dayak district head of Sanggau (M.Th. Djaman), was the head of Sanggau Dayak Customary Council (DAD) and a member of the Sanggau DPRD from Golkar. Later, in December 1998, he was elected chairman of Sanggau Golkar. Benedictus Ayub was a retired civil servant and a DPRD member from Golkar, but he had less political influence. Among the candidates excluded from the letter were the governor’s candidate, Soemitro, and Setiman H. Sudin, a Malay who was the head of Sanggau Development Planning Agencies (Bappeda).

Andjioe was a natural choice for many Dayaks because as a military officer his chances were better than those of the civil candidates. Until then, the district head position in Sanggau had always been reserved for a military officer, and there had been no indications from the government that the position would be returned to a civilian. Andjioe also had an impressive military career at the national level, serving as one of the directors of the Military Cadet School (Secapa) in Bandung. Andjioe’s supporters were optimistic that with this qualification he could overcome other candidates, including the governor’s candidate. Growing Dayak support for Andjioe together with his notable military career made him the main threat to the governor’s candidate. The governor was expected to obstruct Andjioe’s aspiration. Andjioe almost failed to register for the final candidacy because he only received approval from his military superior at the last minute. He voluntarily withdrew from the race on 13 May 1998 apparently after receiving pressure from Jakarta. The regime was rather careful in dealing with Andjioe’s candidacy because it did not want a repetition of Dayaks’ protests in 1994 after the failure of their candidate in the Sintang district head election. The regime was also not prepared to confront the restless Dayaks, who had just recovered from a massive conflict with the Madurese in 1997.


10 One possible rationale for Sanggau always having a military district head was its strategic location. Sanggau was the only district in West Kalimantan that had a direct land link with a fully functioning international crossing to neighbouring Malaysia.

11 Interview with Omr.
Andjioe’s withdrawal was announced almost at the same time as the May 1998 riots broke out in Jakarta. A week after the riots, President Soeharto was forced to resign and the end of the New Order immediately changed the course of the election in Sanggau. PIKI and other Dayak and Christian institutions issued a more explicitly pro-Dayak appeal to the government. PIKI demanded that certain positions in the bureaucracy, including that of Sanggau district head, be given to Christians and Dayaks in order to maintain fairness and political justice. The role of MAD/DAD was also important in coordinating Dayak lobbies at the provincial and district levels. Some transient Dayak organizations were also formed to bolster the demand. At this stage, Andjioe appeared to be the only choice of the Dayaks. He had gained much popularity because he was victimized by the regime during the previous short listing period.

The district DPRD responded to Dayak pressure. On 4 June 1998, the Sanggau DPRD wrote a letter to the governor and the interior minister suggesting that government intervention in the election was no longer proper in the reform era. The letter confirmed locals’ opposition to Soemitro’s nomination and demanded that the regime appoint Andjioe as the district head (Akcaya, 8-6-1998). The governor, who had been cautious in handling Andjioe’s case from the beginning, acceded to the demand, probably fearing for his own political career if the Dayaks rebelled. Probably after word from the governor, the military headquarters retracted its support for Soemitro on 28 June 1998 and approved Andjioe’s nomination the next day.

12 Other scholars observe a similar trend in the increasing role of the ethnic elite and organizations in other parts of Kalimantan after the fall of the New Order regime (Thung, Maunati and Kedit 2004; Van Klinken 2002).
13 The letter listed eight specific positions to be given to the Christians or Dayaks. They were deputy governor, assistant III and IV of the provincial secretariat, deputy head of provincial Bappeda, district heads of Sanggau, Sintang, Kapuas Hulu, and Pontianak. It also requested the same arrangements for positions in echelons II, III, and IV and that the sub-district heads be appointed based on religion/ethnic balance (‘Pernyataan sikap bersama organisasi cendikiawan, ormas, okp/mahasiswa Kristiani, FKK Kalbar dan pimpinan gerejawi (Protestan/Katolik) Kalimantan Barat tentang arah dan substansi tuntutan reformasi termasuk pergantian pimpinan nasional dalam kehidupan bermasyarakat, berbangsa dan bernegara berdasarkan Pancasila dan UUD 1945’, 1998, in: Secretariat of PIKI, Pontianak).
14 Coordination was evident between MAD at the provincial level and DAD in Sanggau. Contact persons at the provincial level were officials of MAD like Thadeus Yus and Piet Herman Abik. The Sanggau contact person was the secretary of DAD Sanggau, Lukas Subardi (interview with Sbd).
15 For example Forum Komunikasi Pemuda dan Mahasiswa Pembawa Aspirasi Masyarakat Dayak Kabupaten Sanggau (FKPMPAMDKS) and Forum Aksi Mahasiswa dan Pemuda Dayak (FAMID).
In mid-August 1998, the interior minister re-opened nominations. On 24 September, the minister received a list of four nominees: Mickael Andjioe, Benedictus Ayub, Donatus Djaman, and Setiman H. Sudin. All candidates were Dayaks, except Sudin, a Malay. The minister’s decision on 22 October excluded Djaman from the final list of three. The government probably feared that with the quite influential Djaman in the race, the Dayak votes would be split.\(^\text{16}\) The split would not only endanger Andjioe’s chances, but also the chance of electing any Dayak district head. This would create a new political complication that the government had been trying to avoid. In the absence of Djaman from the ticket, Andjioe won the election in early November 1998 with a decisive 29 votes, while Sudin got twelve, and Ayub four. Most votes for Andjioe likely came from twenty Dayaks and nine military members of the DPRD. On 26 November, Andjioe was sworn in as the district head of Sanggau as the second Dayak district head in Sanggau for more than thirty years.

In the case of the election of the Pontianak district head, the election process began several months after the fall of the New Order, and in the middle of a chaotic district head election in Sanggau. Members of the DPRD and those involved in the election were able to observe Dayak political activities during the election in Sanggau and subsequently became more aware of the ethnic intricacies in their own election. The election committee from the DPRD tried to keep an ethnic balance between the Dayaks and the Malays in the nominations throughout the selection process as a way of avoiding ethnic strife. The committee tried to downplay polarization between competing ethnic groups, for example, by using the terms coastal (pantai), inland (pedalaman), and migrant (pendatang) communities instead of more sensitive ethnic terms, although these terms were clearly referred to Malays, Dayaks, and migrants respectively. The regime also denied having considered the ethnic factors in the process of nomination, although the way they preserved the ethnic balance throughout the nomination process showed the contrary.\(^\text{17}\)

\(^{16}\) Both Andjioe and Djaman met again in the following district head election in 2003, although this time another candidate, Yansen Akun Effendy, won the election.

\(^{17}\) The head of the district public relations bureau, Jailani, did not acknowledge the fact that ethnic concern was behind the decision to keep the racial balance throughout the nomination (Akarya, 2-11-1998).
The election process began with the call for candidate nominations from the public. By the end of the nomination process, the DPRD had received more than one thousand submissions and was able to narrow them down to forty nominees (Akcaya, 21-9 and 22-9-1998). At the end of October, the official nominees were announced: Agus Salim, Henri Usman, Salman Djiban, Cornelis, Cornelius Kimha, Ikot Rinding, and Soegiyo. The first three were Malay candidates, the second three were Dayaks, and the last one represented a migrant community (Akcaya, 29-10-1998). This 3-3-1 combination was the first effort to create ethnic balance between Dayak and Malay candidates in the nominations, and it was a modification from the initial imbalance of the unofficial nominations of four Malays, two Dayaks, and one migrant. The election committee replaced a Malay candidate (Lieutenant-Colonel Syafei Usman) with a Dayak (Cornelius Kimha) to restore the balance between the Dayaks and Malays (Akcaya, 20-10-1998). The balance was again maintained when the list of seven nominees was reduced to five by dropping one candidate each from the Malays (Salman Djiban) and Dayaks (Ikot Rinding). The list consisting of five candidates was sent to the interior minister on 30 October 1998 (Akcaya, 2-11-1998). By observing the ethnic balance, the DPRD had so far been able to avoid disruption to the election process. So far, there were only a few peaceful visits to the DPRD by small numbers of people from both ethnic groups. Local newspapers reported that the members of DPRD were quite optimistic that the election would conclude according to schedule, at the end of November (Akcaya, 2-11-1998).

Despite the relative calm compared to the Sanggau election, the pressure from Dayaks was strongly felt, especially after the positive outcome of the Dayak lobbies in the Sanggau district head election. Statements from the Dayak figures had started to come out in local newspapers, although most of them urged a peaceful election (Akcaya, 3-12, 15-12-1998, 26-1-1999). Even though they appeared to be neutral, their appearance nevertheless showed the Dayak interests in the election. Reports of visits by Dayak organizations to the DPRD had started to feature local newspapers from September 1998. The two most prominent (but transient) Dayak organizations were KIDAK and FMPAMD.18 The

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18 Akcaya, 14-9, 15-10, 13-11, 21-11-1998. Members of KIDAK included Thomas Daliman, a lecturer at the state Tanjungpura University and member of Pancur Kasih, and Irenius Kadem a member of PIKI (Akcaya, 12-4-1999).
election committee was thus under obvious pressure to accommodate Dayak interests. On one occasion, probably to calm the Dayak population, the head of the DPRD thought it necessary to mention specifically that the concerns of KIDAK had been taken into account in the nomination process (Akcaya, 29-10-1998).

The Dayak pressure on the DPRD mounted after it sent the names of five candidates to the interior minister. The media reported that the demonstrations and accompanying threats had caused stress among the members of DPRD (Akcaya, 7-12, 12-12-1998). To reduce the tension, on 21 December 1998 all five candidates made a statement in the local press that they would follow the rules of the game, would accept the final election result, and would manage their supporters (Akcaya, 23-12-1998). However, conditions deteriorated fast after the interior minister announced on 15 January 1999 the final three candidates: Cornelius Kimha, Agus Salim, and Henri Usman (Akcaya, 22-1-1999). The exclusion of Cornelis prompted protests from many of his zealous Dayak supporters from the Landak areas. On 22 January 1999, a crowd in Pahauman harassed MAD/DAD officials who were about to have a routine meeting and vandalized their cars. They accused the head of MAD, Rachmad Sahuddin, of being the person behind the exclusion of Cornelis. Many official cars were waylaid at the end of the day (Akcaya, 23-1-1999, KR 1999/43:31-3). Although this incident seemed to be a result of internal rivalries among the Dayak elite, the ultimate target of the demonstrations was the local government. Two weeks later, on 5 February, around 300 Dayaks from Landak burned down the DPRD building in Mempawah, the district capital (Akcaya, 6-2, 7-2-1999, KR 1999/43:31-3).

The DPRD-burning incident was a turning point in the election and gave the advantage to the Dayak lobby. The police summoned Cornelis for his alleged involvement in the Pahauman and Mempawah incidents (Akcaya, 7-2-1999). PIKI and some Dayak lobbyists representing the Landak Dayaks went to see the governor on 6 February 1999 to seek

19 According to one very high-ranking official, the minister’s decision to exclude Cornelis was made after getting advice from the governor. One reason was that Cornelis was relatively inexperienced and junior compared to other candidates. He was only a III/D-rank civil servant, at least two steps lower than the other candidates who had ranks above IV/B. The source also mentioned Cornelis’s recklessness as another cause for his exclusion (interview with Awn).

20 Present at the meeting were Rachmad Sahuddin, Bahaudin Kay, J.F. Alhok, Raymondz Djimin, Albert Rufinus, Piet Herman Abik and Loedis (KR 1999/43:31-3).
a solution to the critical situation. Under pressure, the governor finally agreed to drop criminal charges against Cornelis, and gave written assurance that Cornelis would be promoted to a position at the provincial level. Most importantly, according to the minutes of meeting, the governor would make an effort to ensure that a Dayak would be appointed as the district head of Pontianak district. After learning the result of the meeting, and in order to calm his supporters, Cornelis issued a letter which stated that he respected the minister’s decision and urged his supporters to maintain peace and unity in the province (Akcaya, 9-2-1999).

From this point on Dayak demonstrations were in support of the only Dayak candidate, Cornelious Kimha. 

Voting by the members of the DPRD took place on 10 February 1999 under tight security. The result of the voting was indecisive, with Kimha and Salim both obtaining twenty votes, Usman three votes, and one vote declared invalid. Votes for Kimha seemed to have come mainly from the Dayak legislators and from the military faction. The minister exercised his prerogative by appointing Kimha as the district head on 29 March, and swore him in on 12 April 1999 (Akcaya, 13-4-1999). Without Dayak pressure, Salim would have had a greater chance of being appointed, as the governor preferred Salim to Kimha.

The election of the Dayak district heads in these two cases was made possible by regime change in Jakarta, the accommodating approach of the new regime, the mobilization of the Dayak masses and the lack of significant opposition from the Malays. Without regime change, the Dayak candidate in the Sanggau election, who had already withdrawn from the race, would not have been able re-enter the competition. The governor, who previously had the authority to make his favourite candidate win the election, was forced to withdraw his support from Soemitro in the case of the election in Sanggau. In the election in Pontianak, Agus

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21 Interview with Shr.
22 Cornelis was promoted several days before Salim was appointed as caretaker district head of Landak on 12 October 1999. Apparently the promotion was merely to smooth the appointment of Agus Salim as caretaker bupati, and not a reward to Cornelis. Cornelis was posted to become the sub-head of the mining office in Pontianak, a position that he did not enjoy.
24 Akcaya, 11-2-1999. This invalid vote was intended for Agus Salim (Akcaya, 11-2-1999).
25 Interview with Awn.
Salim would have had no difficulty in getting the support of the central government, if qualifications and the governor’s preference were taken into account. However, in a time of transition and great demand for democratization, both the governor and interior minister chose to yield to ‘popular’ demand by supporting the Dayak candidate.

The Dayak demonstrations and overt demand for the election of Dayak district heads were also important in these two election cases. Without continuous Dayak mobilization organized by institutions such as MAD and PIKI in support of Dayak candidates, there would have been no Dayak aspirations. The Dayak elite were also aware of the momentum to press for a Dayak district head. They had repeatedly warned the government that conflict was closely related to the marginalization of the Dayaks. They argued that the continuing marginalization of Dayaks, in this case by denying them the district head position, could trigger another conflict. The government gave in to an apparently ‘just’ Dayak demand to avert conflict.

The weak opposition from the Malays also contributed to the initial Dayak successes. However, from the middle to the end of 1999, the Malays started to resist the Dayak political lobbies in the election of regional representatives.

ELECTION OF REGIONAL REPRESENTATIVES

Each province was allocated five regional representative (Utusan Daerah, UD) seats in the National Assembly (MPR). This election was one of the first tasks for the newly-elected West Kalimantan DPRD in 1999. Members of DPRD agreed informally to divide the five seats among the Dayaks, Malays, and Chinese with a 2-2-1 formula: two each for Dayaks and Malays, and one for the Chinese. With this ‘balance’ allocation they wanted to avoid ethnic clashes between the Dayaks and Malays, whose relations had been tense since mid-1998 because of the district head elections.

The DPRD initially listed 46 candidates, a majority of whom were Malays, with only ten Dayaks, and three Chinese. The Dayak candi-
The candidates with the highest number of votes in the voting on 4 October 1999 were Oesman Sapta 34 votes, Zainuddin Isman 32, Budiono Tan 29, Ikot Rinding 29, and Chairil Effendi with 26 votes. The result was a breach of the consensus because the Dayaks were represented by only one person, Ikot Rinding, instead of two as agreed.

The Dayaks' failure to get two of their candidates elected was partly due to increasing competition among the Dayaks themselves. As mentioned above, there were ten Dayak candidates, each with his own supporters. For example, MAD suggested the members of DPRD vote for Barnabas Simin and Piet Herman Abik, while Golkar supported Ikot Rinding (KR 1999/51:32-3). Other candidates also sought support from the members of DPRD. As there were ten Dayak candidates and there was no consensus among the Dayaks on their preferred candidates, the DPRD members were free to vote for any Dayak candidate. As a result the votes were thinly spread among the ten candidates and in the end only one Dayak obtained enough votes to be among the highest five vote-getters.

Another cause of the failure was the non-compliance of the DPRD members with their informal agreement. If every legislator nominated strictly based on the 2-2-1 consensus, then from the total 55 DPRD members the total votes for all Dayak candidates should have been 110, for Malay candidates 110 votes, and for the Chinese 55 votes. However, ten Dayak candidates received altogether no more than 90 votes. Thus the remaining twenty votes for the Dayaks must have gone to non-Dayak candidates. One non-Dayak suspected of getting many of these spill-over votes was Zainuddin Isman, the second highest vote-getter.

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29 Interview with Tkk; 'Surat pernyataan pimpinan sementara DPRD and fraksi-fraksi DPRD Propinsi Kalimantan Barat', 1999, p. 3, in: Secretariat of DPRD Kalimantan Barat, Pontianak.
30 The total vote for the eight Dayak candidates was 68. Barnabas Simin (11) Piet Herman Abik (22), Ikot Rinding (29), Laurentius Madjun (10), and Thambun Anyang (9). Yakobus Kumis, Lenson Angking and Ritih Kenyeh did not get any votes. Votes for two candidates, Bambang T.K. Garang and Iman Kalis, are not recorded. Bambang Garang was a rather obscure figure while Iman Kalis was a retired politician. At best, the total for both of them would not have exceeded 22 votes.
Legislators would not have voted for Isman as a Dayak representative because he was not considered a Dayak. He was of Dayak descent but was a Muslim and a member of the PPP, an Islamic political party, which had no Dayak affiliation. Most importantly, he had never acknowledged himself as a Dayak. The Malay legislators, however, could have voted for Isman as a Dayak candidate. For the Malay legislators, the Muslim Zainuddin Isman was certainly a better choice than Christian and Dayak candidates supported by MAD and PIKI. These two institutions were known to have been involved in several political lobbies, the results of which were contrary to the Malays’ interests. The Malay-dominated DPRD also preferred a neutral and cooperative Dayak candidate, which partly explained why Ikot Rinding, a candidate from Golkar, was elected.

How could this have happened? First of all, the 2-2-1 formula was purely an informal agreement and not legally binding. Therefore, it was possible for a legislator not to abide by it and instead give votes to five candidates from a single ethnic group. Secondly, nomination sheets did not contain information on candidates’ ethnicity. Hence, one could vote for Zainuddin Isman assuming he was a Dayak, as explained above.

Disappointed with the result, Dayak crowds waiting outside the building protested. Many of them saw the result as a conspiracy to marginalize the political role of Dayaks. The Dayak masses pressed the DPRD to amend the decision. The leaders of the DPRD complied and promised that they would reconvene for a new election following the 2-2-1 formula, and would support Barnabas Simin as another Dayak.

31 To the Dayaks, particularly after a MAD 1999 workshop, Muslim Dayaks could be regarded as Dayaks so long as they acknowledged themselves to be Dayak (KR 1999/51). In May 1999, the West Kalimantan Muslim Dayak Association, known as IKDI, was formed to show that one could be both Dayak and Muslim at the same time. The idea to form IKDI was originally led by recent (first generation) Dayak converts who wanted to retain their Dayak identity after converting to Islam (interviews with Aki and Amh). Unfortunately, when the organization was finally established, the leadership fell into the hands of the second and third generation of Muslim Dayaks who had a weaker ethnic association with the Dayaks. As a result of this, IKDI developed into a more religious (Islamic) rather than an ethnic (Dayak) organization. Besides the first chairman of the West Kalimantan PDIP (Rudy Alamsyahrum), IKDI membership at the time included the ex-rector of Universitas Tanjungpura, the state university in the province. With the formation of IKDI, Muslim Dayaks, who had previously distanced themselves from the Dayaks, announced their intent to keep their Dayak identity. Undoubtedly, its formation was another effect of increasingly important Dayak profile.

32 Although Ikot Rinding was a founding member of MAD and still a member of the advisory board of MAD at the time of the election, most of the time he supported Golkar interests more those that of MAD (KR 1999/51:32).

33 Interview with Tkk.
member of the UD. The working committee in the DPRD responsible for solving this problem issued another statement on 6 October 1999 reiterating its support for the two Dayak representatives: keeping Ikot Rinding and adding Barnabas Simin (Memori DPRD 1999d). Its stance in maintaining the 2-2-1 formula received support from the Central Election Committee or KPU.35

The deadline for submitting the names to the central government rapidly approached but the DPRD failed to conduct a new election. The working committee in the DPRD then came out with a few options. The first was to add one Dayak member to the existing five members, so there would be three Malays, two Dayaks, and one Chinese. However, this option was quickly abandoned because the national law only allocated five representatives for each province. Another option was to lobby the Chinese member to resign and be replaced by a Dayak, which brought the composition to three Malays and two Dayaks. This option also failed because Budiono Tan, the Chinese representative, refused to resign.36

The problem remained unsolved when the original elected members of the UD were sworn in at Jakarta on 13 October 1999 (Equator, 18-10-1999).

The Dayak masses continued to protest and send delegations to the DPRD until the middle of 2000. One of the strongest warnings came from the Secretary-General of the West Kalimantan Indonesian Christian Communication Forum (FKKI) on 27 October 1999. The speaker, who had ties with the Catholic Church, warned that the forum would not be responsible for the possible adverse consequences if Dayaks’ demand for an additional member was not met.37 The last documented communication in mid-May 2000 suggested there would be a possibility of replacing one UD member before 2004.38 However,
such changes never eventuated until tenure of all the UD member was up in 2004.

The question was why, despite constant pressure and commitment from the DPRD working committee, no amendment was made. One major obstacle was the lack of a quorum in DPRD meetings so that no legal decisions could be made. Concern for their safety could have been one reason keeping members of the DPRD from attending the meetings. A more plausible explanation was that the members of DPRD, particularly the Malays, did not genuinely support the election of another Dayak member. Some of them argued that the original composition satisfied the ethnic formula of 2-2-1. They argued that Zainuddin Isman was also a Dayak, although he was a Muslim (KR 1999/51:30). From the records of a series of meetings, the majority of those who were consistently absent, thus preventing a quorum, were from Islamic parties.

The Malay legislators’ confidence in going against Dayak demands might have been the result of growing support from the Malay community. Malays, particularly hardliner politicians and young people, had become increasingly irritated with the Dayaks who had been playing hard ball politics since 1997. Their reactions, however, remained largely non-confrontational, as explained above. The conclusion of the Malay-Madurese conflict in 1999 gave the Malays confidence to confront the Dayaks (as can be seen in this UD case). A leader of FKPM Singkawang, M. Jamras, and some other Malays from the Alliance of the Malay Community (AMM), visited the provincial DPRD. The delegation condemned the indecisive members of DPRD and demanded that the DPRD uphold their election result. After a Dayak crowd vandalized the provincial DPRD building on 6 October 1999, AMM again restated their opposition to the amendment and warned that West Kalimantan could turn into a second Ambon. The warning was unmistakably directed toward the Dayaks and the legislators. On 11 October 1999 in front of the DPRD building Dayak masses were involved in clashes with the security forces. These were the first occasions Malays

39 Various interviews.
42 According to Davidson (2002:355) these Malay youths were the underlings of Abas Fadillah, a former member of Lembayu.
resisted the Dayaks, and they almost triggered an open conflict between the two communities.43

Other cases demonstrate the unsuccessful use of ‘force’ in the Dayak political campaigns. For example the newly formed Landak district was given a non-Dayak *bupati* caretaker in October 1999, despite a strong push from the Dayak community. Still in Landak, the movements to lobby for a Christian head of the Religious Affairs Bureau in 2003 also failed.44

**FORMATION OF NEW DISTRICTS**

The history of *pemekaran* (forming a new district by dividing an existing district) in West Kalimantan goes back to the end of the 1950s and early 1960s. On a few occasions new district formation was discussed by the provincial DPRD and proposed to the central government. One source noted that before 1960 the DPRD had proposed the creation of twenty new districts out of the existing four in West Kalimantan province. Another source stated that in the early 1960s, the governor had proposed to Jakarta that the province have 12 districts (Rahman et al. 2001:195). At its congress in early August 1963 West Kalimantan Partindo suggested that the central government divide Sambas into two districts (*Bintang Timur*, 3-9-1963). Due to several factors, none of these divisions came about. One factor was that West Kalimantan had become a frontier in Indonesia’s confrontation with Malaysia (Rahman et al. 2001:195). Changing administrative boundaries required further consolidation, which in turn would undermine the *Konfrontasi* campaigns. The other factor was volatile national politics, which made the issue of district division a low priority. Between 1959 and 1965, the central government only formed five new districts throughout Indonesia.

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44 *Aceh*, 27-8-2003; *Equator*, 27-8, 28-8, 29-8, and 6-9-2003; ‘Rekapitulasi pengaduan dan aspirasi masyarakat tahun 2003’, 2003, p. 7, in: Secretariat of DPRD Kalimantan Barat, Pontianak. Normally in West Kalimantan and most other regions in Indonesia the head of the bureau is a Muslim. According to a high-ranking official at the Religious Affairs Department in Jakarta, it was possible for a Christian to head the Bureau if the Christians were dominant (more than 75 per cent) in the district. The request required the support of the district leadership, the DPRD, as well as the Church authority. By March 2005, there were fifteen Christian (Protestant) such bureau heads for the whole nation: five each from East Nusa Tenggara and Papua, three from North Sumatra, and one each from North Sulawesi and Central Kalimantan (communication with Las).
Regime change and ethnic politics in Indonesia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pontianak</th>
<th>Sambas</th>
<th>Sanggau</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2. Mempawah</td>
<td>2. Bengkayang</td>
<td>2. Tayan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Sambas</td>
<td>4. Sekayam</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sintang</th>
<th>Kapuas Hulu</th>
<th>Ketapang</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4. Marau</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8.1 Suggested district formation in 1957-1958
Source: Interview with Bln (2004).

The formation of new districts during the New Order was also rare. In more than thirty years of its rule, the New Order only created a total of 22 districts and municipalities. The redrawing of district boundaries was slow for a number of reasons. Firstly, central government wanted tighter control over the regions, and therefore preferred a smaller number of districts. The need for more effective coordination in its vast territory was met not by the forming of new districts, but by the creation of special institutions to assist the district and provincial executive heads.

At the district level, this new institution was headed by the regional assistant to the district head (Pembantu Bupati Wilayah), while at the provincial level it was headed by the assistant to the governor (Pembantu Gubernur Wilayah). In 1992 assistants were appointed to district heads in six districts: Sambas, Nanga Pinoh, Ngabang, Sekayam, Semitau, and Sukadana. There were two assistants to the governor, one located in Sintang, who was responsible for Sanggau, Sintang and Kapuas Hulu districts, and the other located in Mempawah, who was responsible for

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45 Of the 22, six were districts, the other 16 municipalities. Of the six new districts, three were formed in 1969 in Irian Jaya province. From the 16 new municipalities, five were further divisions of Jakarta, the national capital. This data was compiled from http://www.bps.go.id/mstkab/mfd2007.pdf (accessed 26-10-2010). During this period, the nation also acquired two new provinces: Irian Jaya (1969) and East Timor (1975).

Establishing supplementary institutions, such as the regional assistants, was preferable because they were less costly and risky because they could be easily dismantled when not suitable. Lastly, the failure to form new districts could also have been due to the lack of initiative from the local government officials, who had been accustomed to the top-down approach of the New Order. In the absence of a strong rationale and real urgency, most local officials preferred the status quo rather than take the risk of proposing the formation of a new administrative unit.

Discussions on pemekaran took place during the 1990s in Ketapang, Pontianak, Sanggau, and Sambas districts. In October 1994, the government set up a team to investigate and evaluate the prospect of dividing the Sambas district. The proposal on the division received a boost after Sambas was selected as one of only 26 districts to take part in a national pilot project for greater autonomy (PP 8/1995). In the Pontianak district, a similar investigative team was formed in November 1996 (Akcaya, 24-3-1997). Although district division had become a hot issue, local newspapers were pessimistic about its realization as government officials were not enthusiastic. Although forming a new district was possible under regulation UU 5/1974 (Articles 3 and 4), the executive and legislative branches at both district and provincial levels were reluctant to pursue pemekaran. Even after the Sambas DPRD had agreed...
to the division on 29 March 1997, the local newspaper suggested that the government was still reluctant to divide Sambas (Akcaya, 28-3-1998). In Sanggau, the government said that the pemekaran there was still at an early stage (Akcaya, 28-7-1997). In Ketapang, the district head had once mentioned that Ketapang would be divided into two districts, but commented that such a division was not certain because the process would take quite a long time (Akcaya, 21-6-1997). Overall, no new districts were formed by mid-1998 due to slow response from the regional and central government.

District division gained momentum only after the fall of the New Order, and between 1998 and 1999, 50 new districts and municipalities were created. By the end of 2009, the country had more than 200 new districts or municipalities and nine new provinces. In West Kalimantan, the first two new districts were formed in 1999. At the beginning of January 1999, the district head of Sambas hinted at the possibility of Bengkayang becoming a district (Akcaya, 5-1-1999). Not long after, on 20 April 1999, the central government approved Bengkayang as a new district (UU 10/1999). The division of the Pontianak district had also progressed after the fall of the New Order. On 1 June 1998, the district DPRD approved the formation of two new districts from Pontianak: Landak and Kubu (Akcaya, 31-3-2005). This decision was supported by the provincial DPRD on 1 April 1999. On 4 October 1999 Landak district was established (UU 55/1999).

The rapid pemekaran was not driven solely by the regime change but also, despite government denials, by concerns about ethnic tensions in the regions. One indication was the government’s modification of the original district division plan to follow ethnic lines so as to reduce ethnic tensions there. One obvious case was the division in Pontianak district. Some predominantly Dayak sub-districts, such as Mandor, Menjalin and Mempawah Hulu, which had been previously proposed as part of the former Pontianak district, were reassigned to the new ‘Dayak’ Landak

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51 There have been many studies on the pemekaran in other districts. See for example Sakai 2003; Sumule 2003; Morrell 2005; Roth 2007; Vel 2007.

8 Dayak politics, Reformasi and beyond (1998-2005) |

Between 75 per cent and 92 per cent of the population of these sub-districts were Dayaks, while Malays were less than 6 per cent Table 8.4. In the Sambas district division, Selakau sub-district, which was initially proposed to be part of the new ‘Dayak’ Bengkayang, was retained by Sambas district. Selakau was a Malay sub-district with an 84.3 per cent Malay population and only a 0.3 per cent Dayak population.

There were a few ethnic enclaves left after the division. Toho and Sungai Ambawang sub-districts, which had majority Dayak populations, remained with the Malay-dominated Pontianak district. The Malay-dominated Sungai Raya stayed in Bengkayang district. Sajingan Besar, a Dayak sub-district at the northern tip of Sambas district, remained in Sambas district. Generally, these enclaves did not react adversely to the arrangements, except Sungai Raya sub-district. The local newspaper from 1999 to 2003 often covered protests from the Malays in this sub-district that the government incorporate the region into either Sambas or Singkawang (for example, 1999, 2000, 2003).


Table 8.2 Numbers of new districts/municipalities and provinces (1998-2009)


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Districts/municipalities</th>
<th>Provinces</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Newly formed districts were divided quite clearly along ethnic lines: the Landak and Bengkayang districts were Dayak districts because the majority of their populations were Dayaks. The Dayak populations in Landak and Bengkayang were 79 per cent and 52.4 per cent respectively. The proportion of the Malays in both districts was much smaller: 9.7 per cent and 18.7 per cent respectively. After the division, Malays were left dominant in their respective parent districts: Sambas and Pontianak Districts.

The next indication of ethnic consideration was the government’s rearrangement of its district division priorities. It fast-tracked the process of division in conflict-prone areas, and dealt with the less risky areas later. In the case of Sambas, a government report drawn up in January 1997 suggested that the Sambas district be divided into three: North Sambas with its capital at Sambas, South Sambas with its capital at Bengkayang, and Singkawang municipality. However, the government established conflict-prone Bengkayang first rather than a better-prepared but more peaceful Singkawang. Conflict seemed to have influenced the formation of the Bengkayang district, as it was a site for both the 1997 and 1999 conflicts. The formation of Bengkayang was made shortly after the 1999 conflict, while Singkawang municipality was not formed until

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two years later, in mid-2001, Singkawang should have been created first if the government had valued preparedness as the main requirement for the division.

Table 8.4 Ethnic population in Sambas and Bengkayang districts (2000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Sub-district</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Dayaks</th>
<th>Malays</th>
<th>Chinese</th>
<th>Others**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sambas</td>
<td>Selakau</td>
<td>35,640</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>83.3</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pemangkat</td>
<td>78,200</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>68.5</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tehas</td>
<td>69,874</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>80.7</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sambas</td>
<td>77,319</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>16.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jawai</td>
<td>52,973</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>83.0</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Teluk Keramat</td>
<td>92,911</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>95.4</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sejangkung</td>
<td>18,030</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>82.8</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>11.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sajingan Besar</td>
<td>7,215</td>
<td>69.9</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>27.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Paloh</td>
<td>21,884</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>87.2</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>454,046</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>78.9</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bengkayang</td>
<td>Sungai Raya</td>
<td>41,891</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td>31.9</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tujuh Belas*</td>
<td>59,629</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>37.4</td>
<td>39.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Samalantan</td>
<td>38,457</td>
<td>70.6</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>14.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bengkayang</td>
<td>32,849</td>
<td>76.5</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ledo</td>
<td>20,507</td>
<td>69.0</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>20.1</td>
</tr>
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<td>Sanggau Ledo</td>
<td>19,152</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>14.4</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Seluas</td>
<td>11,794</td>
<td>28.8</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>63.9</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Jagoi Babang</td>
<td>12,007</td>
<td>70.0</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>19.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pasiran*</td>
<td>45,777</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>65.4</td>
<td>23.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Roban*</td>
<td>46,216</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>57.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>328,279</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>32.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TOTAL Without*</td>
<td>176,657</td>
<td>52.4</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>19.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Tujuh Belas, Pasiran and Roban sub-disticts became parts of Singkawang municipality after 2003.

**A large number of Javanese transmigrants were found in Sanggau Ledo and Seluas sub-districts, while sizable numbers of Madurese were found in sub-districts in Singkawang.

Regime change and ethnic politics in Indonesia

A similar trend occurred in the division of the Pontianak district in 1998. A government taskforce made a recommendation, which was also supported by the DPRD, that the district be divided into three: Mempawah, Ngabang, and Kubu (Akcaya, 27-6-1997, 31-3-2005). However, the government fast-tracked the formation of the Ngabang (Landak) district and ignored the Kubu district. Only one month after being elected as the district head of Pontianak, Kimha led a team to Jakarta to lobby the Regional Autonomy Advisory Board (DPOD) to speed up the creation of the Landak district (Akcaya, 24-5-1999). On the other hand, Kubu Raya district was only formed in 2007, almost eight years after the formation of Landak.

Government officials thought that separating conflict-prone areas and allowing the Dayaks to govern their own areas was a solution to chronic ethnic conflicts there.56 The first caretaker of Bengkayang was Jacobus Luna, who was re-elected as district head in March 2000. The caretaker of Landak district appointed on 19 October 1999 was, however, not a Dayak but a Malay, Agus Salim, a former candidate in the Pontianak district head election. This anomaly had a history going back to the election of the head of Pontianak district. The governor initially

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sambas before division</td>
<td>782,325</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>52.7</td>
<td>16.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sambas after division</td>
<td>454,046</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>79.9</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bengkayang</td>
<td>176,657</td>
<td>52.4</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pontianak before division</td>
<td>909,619</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pontianak after division</td>
<td>627,593</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td>12.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landak</td>
<td>282,026</td>
<td>79.0</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8.5 Ethnic composition of districts affected by divisions (2000)

A similar trend occurred in the division of the Pontianak district in 1998. A government taskforce made a recommendation, which was also supported by the DPRD, that the district be divided into three: Mempawah, Ngabang, and Kubu (Akcaya, 27-6-1997, 31-3-2005). However, the government fast-tracked the formation of the Ngabang (Landak) district and ignored the Kubu district. Only one month after being elected as the district head of Pontianak, Kimha led a team to Jakarta to lobby the Regional Autonomy Advisory Board (DPOD) to speed up the creation of the Landak district (Akcaya, 24-5-1999). On the other hand, Kubu Raya district was only formed in 2007, almost eight years after the formation of Landak.

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56 The formation of North Maluku province out of Maluku province in June 2000 was another example of an attempt to reduce ethnic conflict through regional divisions along ethnic and religious lines.
wanted a Malay (Agus Salim) to head Pontianak district and a Dayak to head the incoming Landak district. However, the Dayak demonstration was able to influence the appointment of Kimha as the head of Pontianak district, which would soon become a Malay district after the formation of Landak district. Despite strong Dayak support for Cornelis to assume the caretaker position, the governor was obliged to appoint Agus Salim to become the caretaker of the newly formed Landak district. Also influencing the governor’s decision was the growth of Malay political pressure mentioned previously. Overall, the argument for district division as a means of reducing ethnic conflict has been successful insofar as these two conflict hot-spots (Bengkayang and Landak districts), the locations of almost all serious ethnic conflicts in the past, have since been peaceful.

Many other proposals to separate new from existing districts, such as Sekayam, Sekadau and Tayan from Sanggau, Melawi from Sintang, and Kayong Utara from Ketapang have been aired. Pemekaran of Melawi and Sekadau were granted in 2003, while Kayong Utara district was created in 2007. The absence of urgency (that is, ethnic conflict) was one factor that made the formation of some new districts take longer to finalize. Also, the process of forming new districts had become more complicated, because the new regulation promulgated in December 2000 (PP 129/2000) requires more rigorous research and feasibility studies to justify district formation. The regulation also requires intensive consultation with all stakeholders: the elite in the executive and the DPRD, community leaders, and the general population. Sometimes the process of setting up conditions that are acceptable and beneficial to all stakeholders has not been easy (Roth 2007:130-45). The formation of new districts or provinces also requires substantial financial resources (including bribes) and high-level lobbying to speed up the approval processes in Jakarta (Vel 2007:118-9).

57 Agus Salim was in office for less than two years because in the district head election of July 2001, the district DPRD elected Cornelis as the definite district head. Agus Salim was one of the district head candidates, but failed to reach the final voting phase. The Dayak-dominated DPRD in Landak would be a target of mass demonstrations if they elected a Malay district head. Salim was later elected as bupati of Pontianak district (2004-2009), replacing Cornelius Kimha.
Dayak grassroots movements started several years before the end of the New Order regime. Some of their activities were aimed at protecting and revitalizing the social and cultural values of the Dayaks, ensuring their economic welfare, and providing financial and paralegal assistance to the needy local population. These activities first appeared in the mid-1980s but were low key because the regime was highly suspicious of ethnic activities. The movements gained momentum after Reformasi. The following sections examine the role of NGOs under the umbrella of Pancur Kasih, the main player in Dayak grassroots movements.

The Pancur Kasih Foundation was formed in April 1981 by several Dayak intellectuals and a priest, and was as a part of a network of Catholic institutions and related NGOs in Jakarta. In June 2001, in response to the changing regulations on social organization, the Pancur Kasih Foundation changed its name to Pancur Kasih Union (herein after Pancur Kasih). The objectives of Pancur Kasih according to its statute were to help the government in the area of development, to give social assistance, and to provide education. Its first work was in the area of education.

Many factors contributed to the relatively smooth expansion of Pancur Kasih. The regime seemed to be quite relaxed initially with Pancur Kasih as its mainly social activities posed political no threat to the regime. With the strong support of the Catholic Church establishment it was able to secure financial support from national and overseas donors. Also, its expansion and empowerment programs were relatively ‘protected’ under the auspices of the Catholic Church.

Activities of Pancur Kasih ranged from economic, social and cultural to environmental activities and paralegal assistance, all of which were directed at empowering Dayaks. Its main economic activities were organized through the credit unions (locally known as CU). Its role in

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58 Pancur Kasih’s formal name was Yayasan Kesejahteraan Sosial Pancur Kasih (YKSPK). There were seven individuals mentioned in the Pancur Kasih Statute as founders: Anselmus Robertus Mecer, Agustinus Syaikun Riady, Yoseph Thomas, Firmus Kadri, Maran Marcellinus Aseng, Aloysius Milon Somak and Heliodorus Herman.

59 As the number of organizations linked to Pancur Kasih continued to grow, a consortium called Segerak (Serikat Gerakan) was formed in June 1996 to ensure that there was no duplication of activities. As of 2006, Segerak had 22 members, including a few from other parts of Kalimantan.
reversing the decline of the credit union movement in the province was crucial. Its numbers had grown from only 68 when it was established to 27,000 in October 2004, and more than tripled to 88,806 by October 2010. During the same period, its assets had risen spectacularly from Rp 617,000 to Rp 98 billion and then to Rp 872 billion (roughly US$ 97 million), to become the largest credit union in Indonesia in terms of assets.

Credit Unions within the Pancur Kasih network aided the development of interior regions and improved the standard of living of the people who lived there. Unlike banks that are usually reluctant to give micro-credit (loans to poor people involved in self-employment projects that generate income), credit unions gave such loans. They also granted loans and ‘solidarity’ funds to cover needs ranging from housing, farming, education and hospitalization to bereavement. The CU network has developed into an influential network for social and political education and is a potential source of support for activities or programs of all NGOs under Pancur Kasih. Political and social issues were often mentioned or discussed during training sessions for employees of the credit union.

Another important work of Pancur Kasih was in the area of social and cultural empowerment. One influential body within Pancur Kasih is the Institut Dayakologi (ID). The embryo of ID started off as a discussion forum among Dayak activists within Pancur Kasih in 1988. Two years later in 1990, Institute Dayakology Research and Development (IDRD) was formed. In May 1991 it became part of LP3S (Lembaga Penunjang dan Pelatihan Pembangunan Sosial), a social development

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60 The history of the existing CU in the province could be traced back to 1975 when the Catholic Church sponsored the establishment of a credit union. In total, the Church established about eighty credit unions in the province, but due to mismanagement and a lack of understanding from the community only five survived in 1980 (Bamba 2000a:26; Lodo, Yusuf and Ngo 2005:27-34-5).


62 By the end of 2004 the Pancur Kasih network had about fifteen active credit unions (information from an official of CU Coordination Body, BK3D).

63 See http://cupk.org/content/blogssection/10/38/ and http://cupk.org/content/blogssection/11/45/ (accessed 16-12-2010).

64 Davidson (2002:256-7) notes several factors that influenced its formation. First, the popular anti-logging campaigns in Sarawak in 1987 and a visit by some Sarawakian activists to Pontianak motivated some younger Dayak activists to establish their own community-based movement. Other events were the participation of one activist in a workshop on customary law in Thailand and an inspiring report by a Belgian researcher on the adverse impacts of development projects on the Dayaks in Sintang district.
training arm of the Bishops Conference of Indonesia (KWI). The association with LP3S 'protected' IDRD, whose research on sensitive issues was risky. In 1998 IDRD-LP3S became the Institut Dayakologi.65

The work of ID concentrated on society and culture. Some of the first projects were to document Dayak oral traditions and research the impact of development projects on Dayaks’ livelihoods. The documentation of oral traditions aimed to keep records of aspects of Dayak culture and traditions, which had been fading rapidly.66 In recent times, the institute has also supported community-based teaching of local culture, providing local content material to local schools, and facilitating the establishment of community radio broadcasting. ID’s work was recognized when it was selected as the national winner to represent Indonesia as a finalist in the Asia NGO Pacific Awards in 2004 (KR 2004/111).

One of the most important contributions of ID was a three-day national conference on Dayak society and culture held in 1992.67 Seminar sessions covered a wide range of issues related to the Dayaks including the rarely openly discussed issue of their marginalization.68 Another accomplishment was the decision to retain the use of the term ‘Dayak’ rather than ‘Daya’ a term preferred by the funding agencies. By retaining the term Dayak the organizers expected that the community, particularly the Dayaks themselves, would feel more comfortable using the term.69

65 Interview with Dwn; KR 1997/24:18-22; Bamba 2000c; Saleh 2004:56.
66 Bamba 2000c. ID documented the oral traditions of many Dayak sub-ethnic groups. At least 1964 manuscripts have been produced from recordings, while hundreds (636 cassettes) still await transcription. Some of the manuscripts were published as cartoon books or folk tale books. Some were broadcast as drama series through radio using the local Kanayatn language. ID recorded seventy videos and forty CDs on Dayak rituals, and at least 21,000 photos and slides mostly of the Dayak rituals. As of 2004, ID had produced 55 books on the Dayaks written mostly by Dayaks. It also publishes the monthly KR magazine and a biannual ‘Dayakologi’ journal (KR 2004/111).
67 Davidson 2008:111. The seminar lasted for several days and was attended by Dayak representatives from other parts of Kalimantan. Because of its size, the seminar was dubbed by a local magazine as the second largest Dayak gathering after the Peace Meeting in Tumbang Anoi in Central Kalimantan in 1894 (Bebas 1999/7 in John Bamba 2000c). The papers presented at the seminar were published as an edited book (Florus et al. 1994).
68 One of the organizers boasted that the debates on sensitive issues related to the Dayaks took place in the presence of intelligence officers and military representatives (interview with Dwn).
69 Interview with Dwn; Davidson 2008:111. As discussed previously, the term Daya was introduced by the Dayak leaders in the 1940s to replace the term Dayak which had connotations with savagery, backwardness, destitution, and stupidity. Activists within Pancur Kasih believed the continuing use of Daya showed the lack of confidence within the Dayak community about their own identity, and in the end would not help their efforts to empower Dayaks. They had helped the reintroduction of Dayak to the point where it became acceptable to the natives. Previously, the natives would have been offended if they had been called Dayaks. A few recent publications, for example, still used the old spelling Daya to avoid being offensive to the Dayaks (Coomans 1987; Thambun Anyang 1998; Van Hulten 1992).
The seminar also served as a political vehicle for the consolidation of Dayaks because, as noted before, some months after the seminar, a letter was sent to the governor to demand stronger political representation for Dayaks, which had implications in Sintang and Kapuas Hulu district head elections in the ensuing years.

Another important contribution of ID was the dissemination of information concerning the Dayaks through its publications. These publications were important, particularly at a time when discussing ethnicity was considered taboo by the regime; and there was a general lack of interest in Dayaks. The most influential one was the monthly magazine called the Kalimantan Review (KR). When it was first published in 1992, KR was an outlet for research by the IDRD staff and only reported cultural issues. From the mid-1990s the magazine started to report on the local Dayak resistance, especially to logging and plantation activities. After ethnic conflict in 1997, it became more of a political magazine for the Dayaks, although it still exercised internal editorial censorship so that the content of the publication did not offend the regime. KR has become the main medium through which Pancur Kasih activists propagate their ideas related to Dayak empowerment or their political views. According to Davidson (2008:113-4), KR had become an alternative news source for the budding Dayak resistance.

As the first ‘activist’ institution within Pancur Kasih, ID helped to form similar units within Pancur Kasih, such as LBBT (Lembaga Bela Banua Talino) and PPSDAK (Pembinaan Pengelolaan Sumber Daya Alam Kemasyarakatan). Established on 10 June 1993, LBBT had the primary role of giving legal advice and support to members of the community. Its programs centred around three main areas: training and education to the community related to legal issues and land rights; advocacy and representation in legal disputes particularly related to land rights; and development of local institutions to help continue this work (Gong Borneo 2003/9:8). In 2010 LBBT had seven main establishments in five districts.

KR had grown from a biannual magazine to become a quarterly, bi-monthly and finally starting in July 1997, a monthly magazine (Saleh 2004:57, 59). Peasants constitute the largest subscriber group to the magazine (Saleh 2004:88).

Interview with Ptb.

PPSDAK was established in July 1995 as an initiative of ID and LBBT with the main role of mapping traditional or customary land (Gong Borneo 2003/9:14). This was important because of increasing land disputes as a result of plantation or logging expansion that often took over community land without paying proper compensation. With the mapping, the local community had better information on their land boundaries and the location of customary lands, to which they could refer in case of disputes (KR 2003/92).

Although the work of these organizations was mostly non-political, discussions with the activists during ‘training’ sessions about marginalization practiced by the regime, victimization by the plantation companies, and the importance of protecting the Dayak traditional and customary practices all have political implications. These NGOs raised ethnic consciousness and brought about solidarity among Dayaks, two important assets for political mobilization after the end of the New Order.

Relations of Dayak NGOS with the government agencies were sometimes sour due to some NGOs’ critical views on certain ‘development’ projects. One notable example was their anti-plantation campaigns which irked the government as it had tried to promote industrial plantations as a means of regional development. They criticized plantations and encouraged local population opposition, which sometime turned violent. Another example was their campaigns to revitalize Dayak customs and practices. In Sanggau these NGOs sponsored the Gerakan Pulang Kampung (Return to Village Governance Movement) which resulted in the passing of Perda Pemerintahan Kampung (Kampung Governance Bylaw) in 2002.73 The movement in Sanggau sparked a similar movement in Landak district, where legislators drafted the village (binua) governance legislation.74 The NGOs believed that traditional village governance would benefit villagers because it encouraged social participation, restored social harmony, and could cure social problems.

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73 The idea came out at a meeting in November 1999 organized by West Kalimantan Indigenous Community Alliance (AMA) and Pancur Kasih. A taskforce, KKMA (Indigenous Community Working Committee), was formed on 19-3-2001 (Rekaman proses evaluasi KKMA, 2003, in: Private collection, Sanggau).
74 KR 2002/80, KR 2003/93, KR 2005/120; Akarya, 22-1, 25-1-2005. Movements to reinstate traditional governance at the village level also took place in other parts of Indonesia. The most significant example was West Sumatra, where all its districts, except Mentawai, had in place the Nagari Governance Bylaw. The first of such bylaws was passed by Solok district in January 2001 (Kompas, 11-06-2004).
The activities of these NGOs not only concerned the government but also worried the other ethnic groups, especially the Malays. The revitalization of the Dayaks would directly or indirectly undermine the interests of the Malays. The formation of a ‘Dayak’ version of village governance and the implementation of adat or customary law, for example, would restore cultural practices not suitable for the Muslim Malays.

The political aspirations of some Pancur Kasih activists, due to their growing influence among the Dayak community, also worried some Malay political elite. In September 1999 the chairman of Pancur Kasih, A.R. Mecer, was appointed the only Dayak representative for the whole of Kalimantan in the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR). After 2002, some senior members of the NGOs set aside their previous non-partisan principles by joining political parties and competing in elections. The first significant move was at the end of 2002 when Mecer and other figures within Pancur Kasih joined a political party, PPDKB. In 2004, the unknown and relatively young Maria Goreti was elected as one of only four members of the Regional Representative Council (Dewan Perwakilan Daerah, DPD). Her ability to win the second highest number of votes, passing many influential and more experienced Malay or Dayak figures, surprised many. She was a (former) staff member of ID. Several sources who had followed her campaign recognized the contribution of Pancur Kasih’s network in her success. In the DPD election in 2009, Goreti was re-elected together with another former Pancur Kasih activist, Erma Suryani Ranik.

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75 This was aggravated by the fact that some of their elite had quite different views on some fundamental political issues. For example, the majority of Pancur Kasih activists, including the founding father A.R. Mecer, supported the idea of a federal state when the issue was brought up after the end of New Order, an idea rejected by many Malay politicians. Down to Earth (DTE August 2000/46) reported that in October 1999 IDRĐ submitted a draft constitution for a federal system to the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) session in Jakarta. Looking back, this was a ‘repeat’ of what happened in 1950 when the Dayak leaders supported the federal state of Indonesia.

76 Other figures such as John Bamba preferred not to join a political party. He, however, allowed ID employees to be involved in non-partisan politics, such as in the case of Maria Goreti when she campaigned for the DPD. Employees who wanted to become members of political parties were required to resign from the ID (interview with Bmb).

77 A.R. Mecer, P. Florus, S. Masiun, M. Pilin, V. Vermi, and Batara Budi of Pancur Kasih held leadership positions in the provincial PPDKB. The first four were also recognized as founding members of PPDKB at the national level.

78 Goreti received 138,901 votes. The highest vote went to another Dayak, Dr Piet Herman Abik, with 172,563 votes. The third position went to Sri Kadarwati, wife of former governor Aspar Aswin, with 136,687 votes. The last position was occupied by Aspar with 133,260 votes.
Regime change and ethnic politics in Indonesia

The success of some (former) Pancur Kasih members in winning seats in the local legislative branch was not followed by the others who ran for bupati or governor elections. In 2005, Stephanus Masiun and Petrus Lansang, two activists who had a very close association with Pancur Kasih, paired up and competed in the district head election in Sekadau. They failed to win the election although they were only 5,919 votes behind the winner. Masiun tried again in the 2010 election in the same district but did not win. In another case, Mecer who paired with Akil Mochtar ran unsuccessfully during the governor election in 2007. His well-known figure also did not help him to win the bupati election in Ketapang, his native district, in 2010.

Political Parties, Elections, and Institutionalized Politics

The change of regime in 1998 has not only provided political freedoms, which were used by the Dayaks to push their political demands in part by means of street demonstrations, but also fundamentally changed some political structures that had been in place for some decades. The Reform has introduced new requirements for political parties and new arrangements for general elections. These two changes would have a significant impact on the composition of the DPRD, whose role improved drastically after the fall of the New Order. The institutionalized politics influenced Dayak politics through the election process, political party organization and legislature composition in the province before 2004.

Forty-eight political parties participated in the 1999 election. The six largest political parties obtaining most votes during the election at

79 Without a bureaucratic background, and backed by only small political parties such as PNBK and Partai Demokrat, their involvement in Pancur Kasih was the main contributor to their significant achievement. Masiun was the head of LBBT and founder of a credit union in Sekadau. Lansang was the head of DAD Sekadau, a credit union activist, and a former teacher in Sekadau. For such direct elections, there were still other factors that influenced the election result — for example the level of support for other candidates, their background and financial backers, to mention a few.

80 In the gubernatorial election Mecer ran as deputy governor and paired with Akil Mochtar and got only 9.7 per cent of the total votes; below Osman-Lyong (15.7 per cent); Usman-Kadir (30.9 per cent), and Cornelis-Sanjaya (43.7 per cent).

81 For Goldstone (2003:3) normal institutionalized politics occurs through voting, lobbying, political parties, legislatures, courts, and elected leaders. This differentiates it from non-institutionalized politics which is characterized by mass mobilization, conflict and violence, social movements, revolution and terrorism (Long 1981:3).
national level were PDIP, Golkar, PPP, PKB, PAN, and PBB. In West Kalimantan, the line-up was slightly different: Golkar, PDIP, PPP, PDI, PBI, and PDKB emerged as the most significant political parties. The appearance of PDI, PBI, and PDKB in the province was mainly due to Dayak votes (although PBI also received significant votes from the Chinese). The following will examine the link between Dayaks and the top six political parties. PPP will not be discussed because it was an Islamic political party, and therefore unlikely to get Dayak support.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank in West Kalimantan</th>
<th>Rank at national level</th>
<th>Political party</th>
<th>Number of votes</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Golkar</td>
<td>509,042</td>
<td>14 (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>PDIP-P</td>
<td>377,593</td>
<td>11 (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>209,431</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>PDI</td>
<td>144,763</td>
<td>4 (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>PBI</td>
<td>139,261</td>
<td>4 (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>PDKB</td>
<td>59,691</td>
<td>2 (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>PKB</td>
<td>48,230</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>PAN</td>
<td>46,816</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>PBB</td>
<td>23,688</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>PKP</td>
<td>17,885</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>PP</td>
<td>15,763</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>PK</td>
<td>11,416</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>PNU</td>
<td>11,186</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Seats</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>49 (16)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8.6 Result of the 1999 election provincial DPRD in West Kalimantan

Note: Numbers in parentheses indicate number of Dayaks.


The first two parties were nationalist parties, while the other four were Islamic parties. PKB and PAN relied heavily on their respective Islamic organizations (NU and Muhammadiyah, respectively), but declared they were nationalist parties.
Golkar and PDIP generally had strong Dayak leadership in inland districts. Based on data on ethnic background of the elected legislators obtained from local DPRDs, 88 per cent of Golkar legislators in Bengkayang were Dayaks, while in Landak the percentage was 83 per cent, in Sintang 75 per cent, and in Sanggau 57 per cent. Similarly, PDIP also had more Dayak legislators in Landak (100 per cent), Sanggau (71 per cent), Bengkayang (70 per cent), and Ketapang (63 per cent). At the provincial level, however, both Golkar and PDIP only had a few Dayak legislators: three of fourteen legislators for Golkar, and four of eleven legislators for PDIP. The overall influence of the Dayaks in the PDIP became more pronounced when Cornelis, the Dayak district head of Landak, was elected as the chairman at its provincial chapter. In the lead-up to the 2004 election, the majority of Dayak executive heads including the deputy governor, five district heads and one deputy mayor had joined PDIP. Unlike with PDIP in recent times, Dayaks always had only a minor presence in Golkar leadership at the provincial level.

Unlike the fluid association of both Golkar and PDIP with the Dayaks, the PDI’s association with the Dayaks was more consistent, particularly at district level. The link dated back to 1973 when IPKI and PK, the two major political parties supported by the Dayaks, were merged into the PDI, the only political party which had a consistently high proportion of Dayak legislators, even in coastal districts. The ‘Dayak’ factor helped the party during the 1997 and 1999 elections in the province. In the 1997 election, after the regime removed Megawati from the PDI leadership, PDI votes at the national level fell sharply from 14.9 per cent in the previous election to 3.1 per cent. PDI votes in West Kalimantan, however, experienced a drop from 21.6 per cent to 15.1 per cent, the best showing compared to other provinces (Kristiadi, Legowo and Harjanto 1997:168). PDI’s campaigns in Sambas and Pontianak went well and attracted many supporters, unlike in other cities where supporters of

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83 The association of Dayak with the PDIP had grown stronger. Cornelis was re-elected as the chairman of the party in 2010, and core leadership positions (the secretary, first and deputy chairmen, and treasurer) at the provincial level were in the hands of Dayaks. Dayaks also assumed party leadership in all Dayak dominant districts.

84 PDI exploited its ties with the Dayaks during elections. A government report mentioned that PDI had described itself as Partai Dayak Indonesia, or Indonesian Dayak Party, during the 1982 general election (‘Laporan situasi keamanan, ketertiban dan ketentraman masyarakat dalam wilayah Kalimantan Barat’, 1982, p. 4, in: Library of West Kalimantan Governor’s Office, Pontianak).
Megawati sabotaged the campaign (Van Dijk 2001:28). In the 1999 election, the PDI claimed that almost 90 per cent of its DPRD candidates were Dayaks (KR 1999/47:6). Only because of the strong support from the Dayaks was the West Kalimantan PDI able to obtain more than 7.6 per cent of the provincial votes in the election, again the best performance of all PDI branches.\(^8\) PDI ranked fourth in West Kalimantan, while at the national level it ranked twelfth.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province/District</th>
<th>Golkar 1986</th>
<th>PDI 1989</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Province</td>
<td>Soemadi</td>
<td>S.M. Kaphat*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pontianak City</td>
<td>M. Tahal</td>
<td>M. Yusuf Syukur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pontianak</td>
<td>A.K. Mahmud</td>
<td>A.B. Kinyo*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sambas</td>
<td>Sardijjo</td>
<td>Namazi Noor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanggau</td>
<td>H. Achmad Arif</td>
<td>Agustinus Benedi*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sintang</td>
<td>Mashur M.S.</td>
<td>L. Mitjang*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kapuas Hulu</td>
<td>Abang Ramli</td>
<td>Laurens Thomba*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ketapang</td>
<td>Sunardi Basmu</td>
<td>Yohanes Djajah*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8.7 Golkar and PDI leadership (1980s)

*Dayaks.


PBI and PDKB were the other political parties that had close associations with Dayaks. The PBI chairman was Hubertus Tekuwaan, the son of the late Dayak governor, Oevaang Oeray. While the party’s main support came from Dayaks and Chinese, the party leadership in the province and many districts was dominated by Dayaks. Dayaks also dominated as PBI legislators at district level, except in the Pontianak and Singkawang municipalities.

\(^8\) The second highest share was obtained by the Irian Jaya chapter with 3.4 per cent of the total provincial votes, followed by East Timor with 3.3 per cent. Other provinces on average secured less than 1 per cent of provincial votes. In terms of the absolute number of votes, West Kalimantan PDI also received the highest with 131,909 votes, followed by PDI of West Java with 79,169 votes, and PDI of Central Java with 57,512 votes. For the complete PDI votes for each province, see Suryadinata 2002:218-23.
PDKB mainly received support from the Dayaks because it was a Christian party. Almost all its legislators and party officials at both provincial and district level were Dayaks. The link to the Dayaks became more obvious when some figures within Pancur Kasih joined the party (the PPDKB) at the end of 2002.

Worth mentioning here are the attempts to revive Persatuan Dayak (PD) after the fall of the New Order. On 21 September 1998 Yan Y.B. Iman Kalis, the son of Iman Kalis, a former PD official, announced the establishment of PD with the aim of participating in the 1999 election. It was declared to be an open political party with a nationalist outlook (PD 1998). However, with its headquarters in West Kalimantan, and its usage of the old PD logo, as well as the use of odd term ‘Daya’ (which referred to Dayak), the party could not attract followers outside the province. The party registered with the provincial election board in December 1998 (Penyelenggaraan pemilihan umum 1999:34), and had been covered a few times in local newspaper articles (Akcaya, 8-1 and 1-2-1999), but then vanished.

Approaching the 2004 election, another effort to establish the Persatuan Dayak was attempted (Akcaya, 9-2-2003). The initiators were mostly young Dayaks in their twenties or early thirties. The general chairman, Michael Injeck Baruyugn, was a son of Ikot Rinding. The association initially received strong support from the local government and officials. Extreme attitudes of its young and inexperienced leaders as well as lack of planning contributed to its quick demise.

87 Another figure was Petrus Sindong Ajan, the head of DPRD Bengkayang. He was forced to resign from his post in disgrace on 7-5-2003 after being accused of corruption and of blackmailing the Bengkayang district head (KR 2003/94).
88 The governments of Sanggau, Ketapang, Sintang, and Bengkayang districts gave financial contributions for its first congress in 2003. Financial contributions were also made by a few Dayak officials, such as the district head and the deputy district head of Landak, and deputy district heads of Ketapang and Singkawang. In all they contributed 76 per cent of the total fund of Rp134 million or roughly US$15,000 for its congress (‘Laporan panitia Kongres I Persatuan Dayak’, 2003, pp. 20-1, in: Private collection, Pontianak).
89 For example, in advertising its first congress it used provocative wordings, such as ‘Independence of Greater Borneo’ and ‘the Dayaks are still being colonized’ (Equator, 23-7-2003). Officials who were supportive at the beginning withdrew their support because they did not want to be implicated in unlawful independence movements. For similar reasons, several Dayak figures also showed their disapproval of the activities. The district head of Landak, who had given financial support, later accused the conference congress of being illegal (KR 2003/97; ‘Laporan panitia Kongres I Persatuan Dayak’, 2003, in: Private collection, Pontianak).
Only 24 political parties participated in the 2004 general election, half the number of parties that participated in the 1999 election. The declining participation was due to the tougher requirements for registering as a political party. Political parties that did not reach the electoral threshold (2 per cent of national legislature seats) in the 1999 election were not allowed to take part in the 2004 election. To be able to participate they were required to reorganize into new political parties, such as by changing the party name and logo. Parties would need to be re-registered and undergo verification by the electoral body. Of 48 parties participating in the 1999 election, only six political parties had reached the electoral threshold: PDIP, Golkar, PPP, PKB, PAN, and PBB.

All parties that had a close association with the Dayaks (PDI, PBI, and PDKB) performed well in West Kalimantan but failed to reach the electoral threshold at the national level; they therefore were disqualified from participating in the 2004 election. In order to participate they had to register as a ‘new’ party and had to fulfil other requirements such as a set minimum number of branches and membership requirements.

The PDI, whose reputation had drastically declined after the 1997 election, was reorganized into the new PPDI (Partai Penegak Demokrasi Indonesia). However, the majority of West Kalimantan PDI officials under S.M. Kaphat chose to become part of PDB (Partai Demokrat Bersatu). This was a new political party led by Bambang W. Suharto, a politician and an official of the Indonesian National Human Rights Commission.

The PDKB experienced a leadership split, and was divided into two political parties: PDKB led by Manase Malo and PPDKB headed by Seto Harianto. In West Kalimantan PPDKB had a stronger foundation because it was supported by several Dayak figures associated with Pancur Kasih. A.R. Mecer, one of the founders of Pancur Kasih, was made a member of the national party advisory board in Jakarta. The Pancur Kasih network had helped PPDKB to become one
of the first political parties to pass the mandatory verification process in the province.

PBI was also split into two because of leadership strife: PBI was led by Nurdin Purnomo and PPBTI by Frans Tshai. The West Kalimantan PBI suffered a serious setback in 2004 after the death of its Dayak chairman, Hubertus Tekuwaan. Many party officials at the district level switched their allegiance to other political parties because of continual internal power struggles in the party at the national level.

Unfortunately PDB, PPDKB, and PBI were disqualified at the national level and could not participate in the 2004 election because they did not have a sufficient number of branches. According to a regulation adopted by the National Elections Commission (Keputusan KPU 2003/105), in order to participate in the election a political party had to have branches functioning in two-thirds of the provinces. In each of these provinces, a party should have functioning branches in at least two-thirds of the total number of districts. Each branch in each district should have at least 1,000 members or 1/1000th of the district’s population. The disqualification particularly shocked PDB and PPDKB, which had built a strong network in West Kalimantan. The disqualification dashed the hopes of many well-known Dayak figures associated with these parties to be elected to the DPRD/DPR.

The failure of these important Dayak parties to compete in the election did not have a significant effect on the overall proportion of Dayak legislators at the district level. In fact, the proportion of Dayak legislators in the 2004 election was better than that of the 1999 election. This was because almost all non-Islamic political parties took into account ethnic geography in selecting their legislative candidates. Normally, these parties would nominate more Dayak candidates in a district that had a greater Dayak population. The increase in the proportion of Dayak

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92 Requirements for political parties were tightened in 2010. Besides the need to pass the electoral threshold, political parties also have to have branches in all provinces, branches in 75 per cent of districts/municipalities of each province, and 50 per cent of sub-districts in each district/municipality. These branches need to be established and verified by at least 2.5 years before the next election; see http://us.detiknews.com/read/2010/12/17/200824/1527642/10/isi-lengkap-uu-parpol-hasil-revisi-uu-no-2-tahun-2008 (accessed 22-12-2010).

93 S.M. Kaphat, a senior Dayak politician and former chairman of West Kalimantan PDI was one example. In the case of members of PPDKB from Pancur Kasih, some of them found refuge in other minor parties such as PNBK, PDS, Merdeka Party, PD, or PIB. Fortunately a few of them were elected during the election itself. For example, Albertus Batara Budi was elected as a member of provincial DPRD representing Partai Demokrat.
legislators at district level was also helped by the abolition of the military faction in the DPRD. The military faction was usually represented by non-Dayak legislators. After 2004, the DPRD in Sanggau, Sintang, Melawi, and Sekadau districts had more than 50 per cent Dayak legislators. In extreme cases, such as in Landak district, more than 90 per cent of DPRD members were Dayaks. In contrast, the number of Dayak legislators was small or even non-existent in Malay-dominated districts.

At the provincial level, the disappearance of those parties did result in the decline of the Dayak percentage, from 32.7 per cent in 1999 to only 21.8 per cent in 2004. The drop was expected because the disqualified parties were those which had consistently sent more Dayak legislators. Other nationalist parties, such as Golkar and PDIP, as evidenced in the 1999 election, had a low percentage of Dayak legislators in the provincial DPRD, although they might have had a significant number of Dayak legislators in the district DPRDs.

The changing ethnic composition of the DPRD affected decision-making processes on issues related to ethnic interest. The new DPRD influenced the district head elections between 2001 and mid-2005, before the direct election of district heads started. All election results conformed to the district ethnic proportions. For example, Dayaks were elected as district heads in districts dominated by their own ethnic group. The Dayak-dominant DPRD also had a role in passing pro-Dayak regulations, such as the Village Governance regulation in Sanggau, and discussed a similar law in Landak.

Another case demonstrating the importance of ethnic composition in the DPRD was related to the recruitment of Christian religious education teachers (guru agama Kristen/Katolik) in 2004. Dayaks knew that public schools lacked teachers of the Christian religion, even in Christian areas. This was unlike the condition of the teachers of Islam (guru agama Islam) which were more adequately provided. In 1984 a government report showed that the allocation of teachers of Islam was more than triple that of teachers of Catholicism and Protestantism, while the Muslim population in West Kalimantan in 1980 was only about 1.5 times more than the Catholics and Protestants. An investigation by *Kalimantan Review* in 2000 showed that of the 107 places allocated for Catholic religion teachers in Sanggau only sixteen teachers had been recruited. In Sintang, of the 248 places allocated for Catholic teachers, only fifty had been recruited (*KR* 2001/67:13). The recruitment trend in 2004 was no different. From
a total of 745 new teaching positions, 671 were allocated for Islam (90.1 per cent), 34 for Catholic (4.6 per cent), 28 for Protestant (3.8 per cent), 11 for Buddhism (1.5 per cent), and 1 for Hinduism (0.2 per cent) (*KR 2004/112*).
In 2004, the smaller number of Christian teacher recruits resulted in protests in several predominantly Dayak districts. In Bengkayang and Sintang districts, Dayak demonstrators seized the local Religious Affairs Bureaus. The Dayak district head and Dayak-dominated DPRD sent negotiating teams to Jakarta. The central government finally adjusted the allocations of Christian teachers for these districts. For Bengkayang, the number of Christian teachers was doubled from six to thirteen, while Sintang district received 23 more Christian teachers (KR 2004/112; various newspaper articles from October through November 2004). This swift action was possible because of the support of the DPRD which had a significant Dayak representation.

Table 8.9 Allocation and actual recruitments of religious teachers in West Kalimantan by 1984

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Teachers of –</th>
<th>Allocation</th>
<th>Realization</th>
<th>Shortfall</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Islam</td>
<td>3,041</td>
<td>2,281</td>
<td>760</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholicism</td>
<td>542</td>
<td>542</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestantism</td>
<td>374</td>
<td>343</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hinduism</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buddhism</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As explained previously, West Kalimantan Malays enjoyed higher political status than the Dayaks. Apart from top leadership positions, which were usually reserved for the Javanese and military personnel, the Malays always dominated the lower to middle-level bureaucracy. Because of their long and continuous domination in the bureaucracy, the Malays always had a significant pool of high-ranking officials ready to assume leadership positions as soon as the posts became available to locals. Eligible Dayak bureaucrats were always smaller in number and less influential than the Malays. When certain district head positions became
available to the local bureaucrats, the Malays naturally had top priority for the appointments. Competition for positions, therefore, tended to be confined to the Malay bureaucrats and their supporters.

Malays were quite energetic when the Sanggau DPRD started the process of district head elections at the beginning of 1998, some months before the resignation of President Soeharto. Some Malays staged quite aggressive demonstrations in front of the local Golkar office to urge Golkar to support Colonel Tahir Herita’s nomination (Akcaya, 5-3, 9-3, 10-3-1998). However, the Malays were eclipsed by the Dayaks after the fall of the New Order regime. The issue of Dayak marginalization and the demand for indigenous rule, which had become sources of Dayak political movements, had suddenly rendered the Malay aggressive lobbies inappropriate.

Malay responses in both Sanggau and Pontianak district head elections were less ethnic compared to the Dayaks’. They did not overtly press for Malay district heads, although their desire to have Malays as district heads was obvious from the candidates they supported. This was very different from the Dayak demonstrations which clearly demanded that district heads be Dayaks. Unlike the Dayaks who demonstrated readily, the Malays’ approach was more peaceful and confined to small group visits to the local DPRD. In the Sanggau district head election in 1998, Malay leaders visited the DPRD, two days after the DPRD had issued a letter supporting Andjioe’s re-nomination (4 June). They asked the DPRD to remain neutral and not to be influenced either by the Dayak masses or by Jakarta’s preference. They also wanted the DPRD to consider only candidates who had no complications or problems during the nomination process (Akcaya, 8-6-1998). This was a conscious move to eliminate both Soemitro, the governor’s favourite, and the Dayaks’ Andjioe, who had become the strongest candidate after the reform. On the same occasion, they deliberately praised Andjioe’s decision to withdraw from the contest, in the hope that it would deter Andjioe from accepting re-nomination. The stronger reaction of the Malays of Pontianak district during their election was understandable due to the
dominant Malay population there. A local newspaper recorded several visits to the DPRD by Malay delegations.94

Why were the initial Malay responses less energetic than those of the Dayaks? As argued before, the issue of Dayak marginalization and the demand for more indigenous political power had made Malay aggressive lobbying unjustifiable. Dayaks were politically marginalized, not the Malays, so the latter were not compelled to compete against Dayaks. The relative silence of the Malays in the election of Dayak district heads in almost all Dayak-predominant districts could be a sign of their recognition of the Dayak rights to rule their own regions.

Although the Malays regarded themselves as natives of West Kalimantan, the Dayaks’ native identity was more solidly grounded. There were no polemics over native status during the New Order period, because they would have violated the anti-SARA policy. Moreover, native status also did not entitle the bearers any special benefits. Regime policy of not giving any benefits to those having legitimate native status was another deterrent. The sudden emergence of the claim to native rights by the Dayaks after 1998 was not anticipated by the Malays. Not until indigenous status had become a powerful political bargaining tool, particularly after the end of the New Order, that the Malay elite started to reassert their own indigeneity. One of the arguments was that many Malays were descendants of Dayaks who had converted to Islam. The Malays were, therefore, as indigenous as the Dayaks (Davidson 2002:347-8).

The Malays had never been subject to serious threats which could emotionally bind them together. In terms of religion, almost all Malays were Muslims and therefore enjoyed religious privileges. The government, for example, prioritized the establishment of mosques, the recruitment of teachers of Islam and the appointment of Muslims to head the Religious Affairs Department, even in those areas where Muslims were in the minority. Their presence in the bureaucracy and local politics was

94 The delegates were from Forum Komunikasi Kerukunan Pribumi Kalbar or FKKP (Akarya, 11-11-1998), Komite Pemuda Pembawa Aspirasi Masyarakat Pantai or KPPAMP (Akarya, 21-11-1998), and Pemuda Melayu Kalbar or PMKB (Akarya, 12-12-1998). The Malays’ non-confrontational approaches had partly contributed to their losses in the elections. One high-ranking official claimed that the governor was very disappointed with the Malays’ lack of opposition towards the Dayaks. According to the same source, in the case of the election in Pontianak district, the governor would have appointed Agus Salim as the district head if there had been direct opposition from the Malays. The governor was known to prefer the well-rounded and more experienced Agus Salim to Cornelius Kimha (interview with Awn).
much more conspicuous and at higher levels than that of the Dayaks. A significant portion of educated Malays found jobs in the bureaucracy, so they were economically more secure. As part of a majority and without any recognizable threat, they saw no need to build distinct ethnic institutions for lobbying. Most Malay ethnic institutions were embedded in religious (Islamic) institutions. In contrast, the Dayaks were always in inferior positions, and their identity and culture suffered constant threats; they tended to have a stronger ethnic consciousness, and therefore, to have stronger ethnic bonds.

The frustration of the Malay elite grew when they realized that the indigenous rights campaign had begun to restrict their political opportunities. By the end of 1999, the governor had appointed two Dayak district heads and almost at the same time created two Dayak districts. Although there were no clashes with the Dayaks at this time, the Malays’ dislike of the Dayak hardball politics was only natural.

Some segments of the Malay community finally decided to confront the Dayaks. The Malay ‘victory’ in the conflict with the Madurese in 1999 was psychologically important for Malay politics, particularly in facing the rise of the Dayak political lobby. They started to respond more boldly to Dayak political manoeuvres. The Malays even won the district head elections in Kapuas Hulu and Ketapang, both districts having a significant Dayak population. These two positions might have gone to Dayaks if the Dayak movements had continued without meaningful opposition from the Malays.

However, inter-ethnic strife to obtain political positions has declined since 2000. One indication was the relative calm of district head elections. In the first two years after the end of the New Order, the regime had accommodated some Dayak political demands, and many Dayaks were given leadership positions in the newly created districts. Aggressive demonstrations that had been a feature of the Dayak political lobbies at the beginning of the Reformasi, as a result of intense grievances, thus became less relevant.

Another factor behind the shift was the balance of power between the Dayaks and the Malays after the conflict with the Madurese in 1999. Dayak leaders realized that continuing aggressive demonstrations would provoke a heated response from the Malays, who had gained confidence after their conflict with the Madurese. Other factors behind the decline in aggressive lobbying are informal power-sharing arrangements be-
between Dayaks and Malays, new political parties and electoral laws, and the rise of intra-ethnic rivalries.

The district head elections became less tense because the Dayaks and Malays understood each others’ rights to lead districts where they were dominant.  

This informal sharing of power between the Dayaks and Malays was quite obvious during the district head elections between 2000 and 2004, when positions of *bupati* and mayor were still elected through the voting in the DPRD. The new legislators elected in 1999 were more independent and could nominate and select district heads, and free from any directive by the military or Golkar. However, they were

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The issue of power-sharing between the Dayak and Malay elites was first brought forward by Davidson (2002:351).
under pressure to elect candidates who conformed to the ethnic majority in the district. A Dayak district head was elected in all predominantly Dayak districts, such as Bengkayang, Landak, Sanggau, and Sintang. Similarly, a Malay district head was elected in all Malay-predominant districts, such as Pontianak, Sambas, Kapuas Hulu, and Ketapang districts and Pontianak and Singkawang municipalities. The positions of the less significant deputy district heads could be occupied by either an individual from the dominant ethnic group or from another ethnic

Yansen Akun Effendy, the district head of Sanggau elected in 2003, was half Dayak and half Chinese. Although he was known as more Chinese than Dayak, he campaigned hard to claim his Dayak origins during the election campaign. His opponent accused him of money politics during the final voting stage against Mickael Andjioe, the incumbent district head. Another popular Dayak candidate from Golkar, Donatus Djaman, was eliminated earlier in the process because he lacked a qualifying number of votes.

Figure 8.1 Malay concentration in districts and sub-districts (percentage, 2000)
group. In Bengkayang and Landak, both district heads and their deputies were Dayaks, and vice versa for Malays in Sambas and Pontianak districts. Some district head candidates looked for deputy candidates from other ethnic groups in order to attract wider political support during the nominations and, most importantly, during the election.

The ethnic support for this power-sharing idea could be seen from the lack of inter-ethnic protests at the result of the elections, and from the cross-ethnic support for the candidates. In some cases Malay associations, such as MABM, gave support to the Dayak candidates for the district head post in Dayak-predominant districts. In the case of the Sanggau election in 2003, the district MABM recognized the right of the Dayaks to occupy the district headship. Instead of contesting the position of district head, the Malays concentrated on the position of deputy head. The Malay leaders realized that with their minority position it would be unrealistic to aim for the bupati position. This ethnic arrangement worked out quite well. Of the thirteen pairs of candidates during the preliminary nomination stage, eight deputy head candidates were Malays. Only one Malay district head candidate entered the final election stage (KR 2003/97). In Bengkayang, the Malays did not react strongly when both a Dayak district head and a Dayak deputy were elected. Jacobus Luna, the elected district head, secured wide support

MABM (Majelis Adat Budaya Melayu) established on 19 April 1997, was the Malay equivalent of the Dayak MAD. One source, who knew the background of its formation, remarked that it was difficult to find a Malay organization that could represent the Malays of the province in events at regional and national levels. This had become the main problem since the early 1990s when events requiring such participation became more common (Interview with Ism). At that time, the Malays only had two such organizations at the district level (Davidson 2002:346). The MABM was not established to oppose Dayak political bargaining as some have argued (see such arguments in Davidson 2002:346-50). Its initial performance was far from opposing the Dayaks. MABM was rather slow in forming branches and did not challenge Dayak political lobbies. MABM even rejected a suggestion from the governor that it bid for leadership positions for the Malays (interviews with Awn and Ism). It kept a low profile during the period of transition from 1997 to 1998, and was relatively silent during the height of Dayak political lobbying after the fall of the New Order regime. MABM had been friendly towards its counterpart (MAD) from its inception, for example by continuously attending provincial Dayak Gawai (harvest) festivals. Its leaders usually participated in various peace-making forums organized by the Dayaks after the 1997 conflict. Despite its reconciliatory stance, MABM nevertheless became involved in activities which heightened Malay identity, and therefore indirectly contributed to the Dayak-Malay tension. It started to build Malay Traditional Houses (Rumah Melayu) at the provincial and district levels, and encouraged Malays to wear telok belanga, a traditional Malay dress, at festivals and religious events. The MABM elite lobbied the government to incorporate more Malay symbols, such as the colour yellow and lancang kuning (a traditional boat) in the government premises, for instance at the entrance gate (interview with Ald). MABM at district level was often active in protecting Malay interests in subsequent district head elections after 1999.
from the non-Malay Muslims and the Malays. The Malays also realized their minority status and accepted that both the district head and his deputy were Dayaks. Likewise, the Dayaks did not object when the Sambas and Pontianak districts elected Malays to become district heads and deputy district heads.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Chinese</th>
<th>Malays</th>
<th>Javanese</th>
<th>Madurese</th>
<th>Bugis</th>
<th>Dayaks</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pontianak City</td>
<td>23.01</td>
<td>31.80</td>
<td>13.62</td>
<td>10.22</td>
<td>7.69</td>
<td>3.33</td>
<td>10.32</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sambas</td>
<td>10.81</td>
<td>79.90</td>
<td>2.91</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>3.41</td>
<td>2.59</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bengkayang</td>
<td>9.37</td>
<td>18.71</td>
<td>12.30</td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>52.42</td>
<td>5.52</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
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<td>Singkawang</td>
<td>41.71</td>
<td>10.80</td>
<td>27.42</td>
<td>5.29</td>
<td>1.26</td>
<td>7.51</td>
<td>6.01</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pontianak</td>
<td>12.05</td>
<td>28.32</td>
<td>14.16</td>
<td>18.89</td>
<td>11.63</td>
<td>7.85</td>
<td>7.10</td>
<td>100</td>
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<tr>
<td>Landak</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>9.66</td>
<td>2.09</td>
<td>2.13</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>78.99</td>
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</tr>
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<td>20.44</td>
<td>9.07</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>61.17</td>
<td>5.65</td>
<td>100</td>
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<td>27.05</td>
<td>8.19</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>56.84</td>
<td>4.65</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sintang</td>
<td>1.91</td>
<td>17.33</td>
<td>15.44</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>55.86</td>
<td>9.17</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Melawi</td>
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<td>43.38</td>
<td>4.38</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>42.37</td>
<td>7.06</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kapuas Hulu</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>51.88</td>
<td>3.05</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>39.72</td>
<td>4.17</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ketapang</td>
<td>2.83</td>
<td>47.61</td>
<td>9.59</td>
<td>4.61</td>
<td>1.27</td>
<td>23.23</td>
<td>10.86</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>9.45</td>
<td>34.70</td>
<td>10.18</td>
<td>5.45</td>
<td>3.24</td>
<td>29.98</td>
<td>6.99</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8.10 Ethnic population in West Kalimantan (percentages in 2000)
Note: For consistency in this book, Muslim Dayaks were excluded from the Dayak category. If they were included the percentage of the Dayaks was 32.1 per cent of the province population.

Besides informal power sharing between the Malays and Dayaks, three electoral laws promulgated after the Reform eliminated some sources of inter-ethnic political tensions. The laws are the political party law (UU 2/1999), the electoral law (UU 3/1999), and the direct election for the provincial and district head law (UU 32/2004).

The electoral and political party law have changed the process of selecting legislators. In order to attract more votes in the election, political parties recruited locally known figures and put them at the head of their
legislative candidate lists. Most political parties would consider the ethnic factors when nominating the party candidate lists for the legislative election. In a Dayak-predominant district, political parties would usually put Dayak candidates at the top of their lists in order to attract more votes from the Dayaks. There were exceptions for religious political parties. Christian political parties, for example, would have more Dayak candidates, while Islamic political parties would not normally have (Christian) Dayak candidates. This was very different from the nominating process during New Order when the dominant Golkar Party often appointed its local legislators without consulting the ethnic balance in the region. As a result of this new practice, new legislators elected after 1999 were ethnically more representative. The number of Dayak legislators reached an all time high in majority districts since the installation of the New Order. In Sanggau, for the first time, more than 53 per cent of the district legislators were Dayaks, while under the New Order it was only about 40 per cent. Sintang also experienced the same surge, from 25 per cent in 1992 and 35 per cent in 1997, to 48 per cent in 1999. The results of the 2004 and 2009 legislative elections showed similar trend. The more proportionate ethnic representation in the local DPRD ensured that ethnic concerns or interests would be considered, at least in the election of some strategic and prestigious positions, such as the district head.

Direct elections of district heads and governors starting from mid-2005 in many aspects further defused sources of ethnic tension. Nominations for district heads and their deputies were made through political parties. Candidates for district head or governor often had to pay political parties to secure their support. However, direct votes from the population rather than members of DPRD would decide who would be elected. The result of this direct election is less predictable as it involves votes of the whole district population rather than votes of a handful of members of DPRD, but the policy has stronger legitimacy and brings fewer inter-ethnic disputes. When Dayaks won in the Sekadau and Melawi district head elections, the Malays, who had a strong influence in the district capitals, were very disappointed but had to accept the results. The tranquillity was preserved when the Malays won the elections in 2005 in Kapuas Hulu and Ketapang, where the population of Dayaks was quite significant. Similarly, the success of a Malay being elected as Sanggau district head (2008) as well as the election of a Dayak governor (2007), a seat expected for a Malay, did not result in open ethnic conflict.
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between the Dayaks and Malays. Peace was once again preserved during a series of district head elections in May 2010.

The last factor that contributed to the decline of the inter-ethnic strife was the rise of elite rivalries within one ethnic group. Intra-ethnic tension was not surprising since the Dayaks and Malays were not homogenous. Within the Malay elite, for example, there were rivalries between the inland and coastal Malays. Even among the coastal Malays, often frictions between the Sambas and non-Sambas elite occur. Among the Malays, the influence of the elite of Sambas origin was well-known because they held many important positions in the provincial government. Because of these differences, there were no homogenous Malay elites although diverse elements of the Malay elite might bond together in cases where there were threats from outside or if there were common interests. When the threats or common interests disappeared, the internal rivalries within the ethnic group would reappear.

Following the same pattern, the Dayaks too had internal ethnic divisions or rivalries which became apparent during political events such as district head elections after 1999. Reasons for the divisions could have been the result of traditional enmity due to past headhunting, although this was no longer relevant. Differing ‘political’ agenda had led to frictions between leaders of the Dayak Customary Councils and Pancur Kasih NGOs. The leaders of the NGOs often accused council members of helping the regime and private companies take away Dayak lands, misusing the customary law for personal financial gain, and only being interested in short-term political gains for their personal benefit (Bamba 2000b:41). Council members retaliated by accusing the NGOs of exploiting Dayak poverty in order to attract overseas funds (Davidson 2002:264). The leaders of these NGOs often did not attend events organized by the Council, particularly at the provincial level where the clash of interests was more obvious. Political opportunities could have become more valid reasons for sub-ethnic rivalries, such as reportedly in Sanggau in the 1980s, in Kapuas Hulu during the district head election

99 There was an incident several days after the result of the gubernatorial election was announced. On 6 December 2007, a small altercation between a Chinese and a Malay developed into a more serious incident which resulted in several buildings in Chinese quarters being damaged (KR 2009/170). The timing made it plausible to link the incident to the increased frustration of the Malays after losing the gubernatorial election to a Dayak. Most votes in the Chinese quarters went to the Cornelis-Christianandy Sanjaya ticket (a Dayak-Chinese pair). However, this incident involving the Chinese is not uncommon in Indonesia.
in 1995, and most recently during the election for the head of the Dayak Customary Board (MAD) in September 2002.\textsuperscript{100}

In district head elections, the competition in districts dominated by single ethnic communities was expectedly between candidates of that dominant group. The elections in Landak, Bengkayang, Sanggau, Sintang, and Sekadau were mainly contested among the Dayak candidates. In Sambas and Pontianak districts, Pontianak municipality, and to some extent in Kapuas Hulu and Ketapang (before the \textit{pemekaran}) districts, the contest was between the Malay candidates. If there were any tensions during the district head election, they were more likely to be due to intra-ethnic tension, that is, the tension between candidates and supporters from the same ethnic group, rather than to inter-ethnic tension. The clashes during the Kapuas Hulu district head election in 2000 and in Sanggau in 2003, for example, were intra-ethnic conflicts.

Intra-ethnic competition among the dominant ethnic group during the executive head elections can result in election of a candidate from a non-dominant ethnic group. In the case of the gubernatorial election in 2007, the Malay votes were spread among three Malay candidates. On the other hand, the Dayak candidate for governor who paired with the only Chinese deputy-governor candidate secured majority votes from both Dayaks and Chinese, and won convincingly (43.4 per cent votes).

\textbf{SUMMARY}

\textit{Reformasi} opened up opportunities for Dayaks to address their long-suppressed grievances, and the Dayaks were the first to pursue political demands vigorously after the fall of the New Order. The influence of Dayak political mobilization at the beginning of the reform era was significant and resulted in two Dayak district heads. The government fast-tracked the formation of two Dayak districts, Bengkayang and Landak, so that the Dayaks would have a region to govern for themselves. A series of Dayak demonstrations to demand an additional Dayak Regional Representative, however, was unsuccessful because of the growing resistance of the Malays.

\textsuperscript{100} In the event in 2002, there were indications from the beginning of the meeting that the Kanayatn Dayaks under Rachmad Sahuddin wanted the leadership (interview with Rdg).
The Dayak ethnic revival was not confined to the competition for political positions. NGOs under Pancur Kasih had been working with the Dayaks at the grassroots level and as the political process opened up, some activists started to be involved directly in the political process to further their cause. Reform also brought several structural changes, including changes to political party certification and electoral procedures. The new regulations allow more political parties to participate in the elections, although regional parties are restricted by regulations. The electoral reform contributed to fairer ethnic representation in the DPRD; the 1999 and 2004 general elections resulted in more Dayak legislators than any elections during the New Order period. The higher number of Dayak legislators had somehow helped the election of Dayak district heads. The Dayak-dominated legislature would at least guarantee that policies that would interfere with their ethnic interests would not be as easily passed.

After 2000, inter-ethnic competition for political positions dissipated. One cause for the dissipation was Dayak political success. Another was the power ‘parity’ between the Dayaks and the Malays which made conflict between them costly and counterproductive. Other causes were the understanding between the Dayaks and Malays to share political power, new electoral laws which made possible fairer ethnic representation in the DPRD, and the rise of intra-ethnic rivalries.
Conclusion

Drastic political change at the national level, particularly regime change, can have a decisive impact on ethnic politics at the regional level. The policies of successive regimes at the national level were not formulated to deal primarily with political conditions in the region. Local and provincial political dynamics were constrained by a framework determined by the centre. It has been demonstrated how such political change at the national level influenced Dayak politics in West Kalimantan from 1945. The Dayaks who had little or no political role prior to 1945 were suddenly given an important political role in the West Kalimantan government after WWII. The Dutch government invited Dayak leaders to sit on the government executive board and participate for the first time in the decision-making processes of the government. It also implemented some affirmative policies to emancipate the Dayaks. Such favourable conditions ended when that government was dissolved at the same time as the dissolution of the federal state of Indonesia (RIS) in 1950. Their previous strong support for a federal system made the Dayaks’ status difficult under the new unitary government. Fortunately, despite rumours of possible punishment, Dayak civil servants who had been recruited into the bureaucracy after WWII continued to serve the civil service. Former members of the executive council of DIKB assumed less significant positions. PD, the only political party of the Dayaks, continued to exist, but kept a low profile.

Opportunities for Dayaks came after the liberal democratic government carried out national and local elections, where PD secured a significant number of seats in the local parliament. At the end of the 1950s, four Dayaks were elected as district heads and one as a governor. More Dayaks were appointed to head sub-districts as well as officials in district government. The political changes from liberal democracy to guided
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democracy at the end of 1950s, affected the unity of Dayak politics and slightly reduced their political representation, but the Dayak leaders in the government kept their positions.

A sudden regime change in 1966 altered Dayaks’ political fortunes. Almost all Dayak leaders in the bureaucracy and legislature were members or sympathizers of Partindo, a party which at national level was close to the Communist Party and Soekarno. Governor Oeray was removed from his position in 1966, followed by the removal of four Dayak district heads soon after. No Dayaks were again appointed to the position of district head until 1995. The number of Dayaks in sub-district head positions was reduced gradually. With the disappearance of these leaders the process to facilitate the Dayaks into the civil service ceased. The Dayak share in the legislature had also declined since 1966, and dropped sharply after the 1971 election.

The fall of the New Order, which was followed by rapid democratization, gave Dayaks the opportunity to reclaim leadership in the region. They were able to pressure the government to appoint Dayaks as district heads in Sanggau and Pontianak between 1998 and 1999. The influence of the Dayak political manoeuvres did not stop at the election of executive heads, but extended to other strategic positions, such as regional representatives in the National Assembly, executive caretakers of newly-formed districts, and heads of local religious affairs departments. In every election of a district head in predominantly Dayak districts between 2000 and 2009, Dayak candidates were successful. The proportion of Dayak legislators at the district level had reached a thirty-year record high after the 1999 election.

It has also been shown that the level of political activism of the Dayaks is constrained by the nature of the regime. Intense Dayak political activity between 1945 and 1950 was encouraged and accommodated by the Dutch. The government under the liberal democracy period (1950-1957) allowed PD to continue its activities although it was well known as a strong supporter of the federal system favoured by the Dutch. The intensification of political campaigns from Jakarta such as Nasakomization and Konfrontasi affected the operation of politics in the region, and eventually ‘nationalized’ local politics. By 1959 regional or local political parties had lost their viability. Control over regional and ethnic politics intensified under the New Order government, which feared it could threaten national unity and undermine the regime.
Most ethnic aspirations were channelled into social and philanthropic activities, and very rarely did they venture into the political arena. The atmosphere changed dramatically after the incipient of more democratic government after 1998 which saw the resurgence of ethnic politics. In West Kalimantan the fall of the New Order regime was quickly followed by the resurgence of ethnic politics, particularly that of the Dayaks.

Some historical particulars and issues of marginalization have also shaped Dayak politics. Dayak politics in the 1940s and 1950s was partly influenced by the fact that they were not incorporated into the nation-creation journey during colonial times. As a result, the majority of Dayak leaders had little feeling of belonging when Indonesia was created in 1945. On the contrary, because of the beneficial policies of the pro-Dutch government, they were supportive of the Dutch and the federal system.

Marginalization contributed to relative solid Dayak politics during their political (re)awakening. From the mid-1940s until its dissolution, PD was the only political party for the majority of the Dayaks of the province. Again, immediately after the fall of the New Order in 1998, despite different social and political affiliations, Dayaks were relatively united behind the drive to demand more political positions and representation. Political cohesion suffers when the level of marginalization declines, the perception of a common enemy changes, and internal competition starts to take its toll. The fracture of Dayak politics into Partindo and Partai Katolik after the dissolution of PD was not merely because of policies from the central government, but also because of the disagreement between the elite within the PD as well as the improvement of the political status of the Dayaks from the end of the 1950s. The momentary Dayak political cohesion after the fall of the New Order soon disappeared and was replaced by intra-ethnic competition for the top positions in the Dayak-dominant districts.

Exclusive ethnic politics was a risky strategy and had contributed to the Dayak political decline in the early 1950s and again after 1966. Through its life Persatuan Dayak was identical to the Dayaks. Its politi-

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1 A comparable example was exclusive Chinese politics represented by Baperki in the 1950s and 1960s. Baperki was incriminated after the abortive coup in 1965 because of its leaders’ close relations with communists. Chinese politics disappeared from the Indonesian political scene together with the fall of Baperki after 1965. For a detailed examination of Chinese politics in the 1950s and 1960s see, for example, Coppel 1983.
cal views were generally treated as the views of the Dayaks. So when the federal government supported by the Dutch collapsed in 1950, the Dayaks as a whole were treated as political pariahs because PD was one of the strongest supporters of such government. The rapid decline of Dayak politics after the fall of Soekarno in 1966 was also a result of a lack of political pluralism of the Dayaks. After the dissolution of PD at the end of 1950s, Dayak politics was channelled mostly into Partindo. They were incriminated by the anti-communist New Order regime. The regime distrusted Dayak bureaucrats, and as a result the Dayak governor and all Dayak bupati were removed from power. No Dayaks were able to assume the same position again unlike the other locals, the Malays.

On ethnic conflict in the province, I have shown that historical, marginalization and cultural factors are crucial underlying causes. The experiences of a dozen conflicts between the Dayaks and Madurese have strained their relations and increased the hostility between them. The negative stereotypes of the Madurese and their population concentration near the Dayak home region only adds to the feeling of insecurity among the Dayaks. Marginalization of the Dayaks, although not necessarily created by the Madurese, has made them prone to conflict. With such conditions, any trivial incidents involving both communities have the potential to develop into a deadly and mass conflict. Economic and political crisis contributed to the conflicts in 1997 and 1999, but were irrelevant in many other previous conflicts.

This study does not find a strong case of political motive behind the majority of conflicts in the province. There is very little evidence showing that (ethnic) politics has led to such conflicts in the province, except in the case of 1967. Ethnic elites, however, can take advantage of conflicts to pursue ethnic political goals. The ethnic conflict in 1997 enabled some of the Dayak political elite to push the government to improve the Dayak political position. The ethnic conflict in 1999 gave opportunities to the Malays to challenge the growing Dayak political influence. The conflicts did in some instances help to bring together members of the ethnic group who could be critical of each other under normal circumstances.

Despite the progress of decentralization, many aspects of local politics will continue to be affected by the national government and its policies. Issues of marginalization will remain central for Dayak politics. However, political marginalization has become a less relevant driving force. Some reforms after the fall of the New Order improved the
Dayaks’ political standing to an unprecedented level and this will not be easily reversed. In some Dayak-dominated districts, numbers of Dayak civil servants have increased. Numbers of Dayaks elected district heads, occupying position in the higher echelons, as well as in legislatures have increased significantly. Instead of political marginalization, economic or socio-religious issues have become more relevant for Dayak ethnic mobilization.\textsuperscript{2}

Formal ethnic politics, such as the establishment of exclusive Dayak political parties is not feasible due to government regulations. An ethnic party will also not survive because of the lack of support from the Dayak politicians who prefer to stick with the broad-based national political parties. They have probably realized the lack of opportunity or even danger of being associated with an ethnically exclusive party, as their predecessors experienced in the past. As a result, the few attempts to revive a Dayak political party in the province since 1999 have failed.

Chances of ethnic conflicts between the Dayaks and the Madurese, which usually occur in rural areas in the north-west of the province, would be minimal in the future. This is mostly due to the change of ethnic geography of the Madurese. These regions no longer have a population concentration of Madurese. On the contrary, there was a surge of Madurese population in urban areas, mainly because of the refugees from the conflicts in 1997 and 1999. Some conflicts involving the Madurese and Malays in 2000 and 2001 in Pontianak City is an indication that there has been a shift from mostly rural to urban conflicts.\textsuperscript{3} This coincides with the ethnic tensions in a few urban centres as a result of rise of Chinese political profile.\textsuperscript{4}

\begin{flushright}
\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{2} One case was against the implementation of national education reform (known as UU sisidiknas) which was perceived as disadvantageous to the Christian education institutions. This campaign received broad support from the Dayaks across political and religious lines (Sinar Harapan, 17-05-2003; Pontianak Post, 10-06-2003).

\textsuperscript{3} For discussion of urban riots after the 1999 conflict, see Davidson 2002: Chapter VI.

\textsuperscript{4} The Incident of Gang 17 between the Malays and Chinese in December 2007 in Pontianak as well as the ongoing Malay opposition against the Lion Statue in Singkawang and the Chinese mayor there are two examples.
\end{footnotesize}
\end{flushright}
Appendix 1

NAMES OF INTERVIEWEES AND LOCATION OF INTERVIEWS

A.B. Tangdililing, Pontianak
A.M. Djapari, Pontianak
A.R. Mecer, Pontianak
Abraham Rahama, Pontianak
Acun Aki, Pontianak
Agus Salim, Mempawah
Agustinus Lanjo, Pontianak
Ahmad Subardi, Sanggau
Albertus Batara Budi, Pontianak
Alfonsus Jacobus Tanting Ngo, Pontianak
Ali As, Pontianak
Ali Daud, Pontianak
Aloysius Aloy, Jakarta
Andreas Lande, Pontianak
Arnold Linggie, Pontianak
Asam Djarak, Sintang
Aspar Aswin, Pontianak
Atan Palel, Pontianak
Bachtiar Rachman, Mempawah
Barnabas Simin, Pontianak
Bei Zhongmin, Fuzhou
Bo Shunchen, Jakarta
Bonar Sianturi, Pontianak
C. Djelani, Sanggau
C.D. Yankay, Pontianak
Chr. F. Iman Kalis, Pontianak
Daniel Suryamassoeka, Pontianak
Djufri Saleh, Pontianak
Eddy Fadjrai, Pontianak
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Edi Petebang, Pontianak
Edi Sumantri, Sanggau
Eteng Meling, Sintang
F. Sudarman, Pontianak
F.X. Asali, Pontianak
F.X.J. Diit Sinsang, Singkawang
Fahadi BZ, Singkawang
Flor Suryadarma, Pontianak
G.P. Djaoeng, Pontianak
Gusti Suryansyah, Pontianak
H.M. Saren, Nyarumkop
Heronimus Bumbun, Pontianak
Hironimus Oemar, Sanggau
Hs. Laurens Mangan, Pontianak
Hugo Mungok, Pontianak
Husny Amanullah, Pontianak
Ibrahim Saleh, Pontianak
Ie Wuihua, Pontianak
Irenius Kadem, Pontianak
Isaak Doera, Jakarta (telephone interview)
Ismet M. Noor, Pontianak
Jacobus E. Frans Layang, Pontianak
Jason Lase, Jakarta (email)
John Bamba, Pontianak
K.V. Tongkok, Bengkayang
Kartius, Pontianak
Kenny Kumala, Singkawang
Kwee Poo Gwan, New York (email, telephone interview)
L.H. Kadir, Pontianak
Leonardus Mitjang, Sintang
Libertus Ahie, Singkawang
Liem Djoe Siong, the Netherlands (telephone interview)
Lukas Subardi, Sanggau
M. Idris, Singkawang
M. Ikot Rinding, Pontianak
M. Natsir, Sanggau
M.A. Laode, Pontianak
M.L. Goye, Pontianak (telephone interview)
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Mardan Adijaya, Pontianak
Maria Goreti, Pontianak
Massoeka Djanting, Pontianak
Michael Injeck Baruyugn, Pontianak
Mickhael Andjoe, Pontianak (telephone interview)
Muhardi Atmosentono, Pontianak
Ng Eng Soe, Jakarta
Norberta Yati Lantok, Pontianak
P.A. Simoe, Bengkayang
Paulus Djudah, Pontianak
Philips Neng, Sanggau
Piet Herman Abik, Pontianak
R.A. Rachmad Sahuddin, Pontianak
Rachmad Thayeb, Sanggau
Rafael Sallan, Pontianak
S.S. Sonan, Pontianak
Saheirimiko, Pontianak
Sebastian Massardy Kaphat, Pontianak
Setiman Sudin, Sanggau
Soemadi, Yogyakarta
Soemitro, Pontianak
Stephanus Djuweng, Pontianak
Stephanus Ngo Lahay, Pontianak
Sumanjahir, Pontianak
Syafarudin Usman MhD, Pontianak
Syarif Ibrahim Alqadrie, Pontianak
Tamar Abdulsalam, Pontianak
Uray Nurziah, Singkawang
Willem Amat, Sanggau
Willem Bernard, Sanggau
William Chang, Pontianak
Y.C. Djau, Nyarumkop
Yohanes Amad Lampang, Sanggau
Zainal Arifin, Pontianak
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