Rinus Penninx’s groundbreaking work has helped to systematise and classify existing research in the field of migration and ethnic studies. His heuristic model, which worked both as an analytical tool and as a road map for the Institute of Migration and Ethnic Studies (IMES) in Amsterdam and the international network IMISCOE, makes an important distinction between immigration and integration research and, within the latter, between socio-economic, ethno-cultural and legal-political dimensions.

Written as a tribute to Penninx, this volume consists of contributions by 15 of his former PhD students covering all the main categories of his heuristic model. The diversity of these contributions – written from the perspective of such fields as labour, education, culture, art and policy – shows not only the comprehensive nature of Penninx’s heuristic model but also his flexibility in assisting researchers in such disparate fields.
Migration and Integration Research
Migration and Integration Research

Filling in Penninx’s Heuristic Model

*edited by*
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Introduction

Anja van Heelsum and Blanca Garcés-Mascareñas

Rinus Penninx has made great efforts to systematise and classify the existing research in the field of migration and ethnic studies. One of the objectives of his PhD thesis (1988) was to evaluate social science research in this area and to contribute to the accumulation of knowledge and the formation of theory. Many years later, his valedictory lecture (2013) re-evaluated research on migration and integration again, this time at the European level.

The analysis of achievements has always been accompanied by the identification of the challenges to pursue. In his inaugural lecture upon his appointment as director of the Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies (imes) at the University of Amsterdam (1994), Penninx formulated a number of conditions for the development of a fruitful programme of research. imes, and later the International Migration, Integration and Social Cohesion network (imiscoe), represent in fact the practical materialisation of this research agenda.

The analysis of the existing literature and the setting up of a research programme have structured – but also have been structured by – a systematic classification of relevant themes. First, Penninx distinguished between migration and integration research. This dividing line was used in the clustering of the different imes research teams. While migration research relates to the actual border crossing of people and to the laws and regulations that apply to them, integration research relates to the way in which immigrants find a position in the new context and how they are treated by the receiving society.

Second, within the realm of integration research, Penninx (1988) distinguished between the socio-economic and ethno-cultural dimensions. While the former includes employment/income, education and housing, the latter includes identity, culture, religion, language as well as image formation in the media and discrimination. Twenty-five years later, Penninx (2013) added a third dimension, this time on the legal/political aspects.
If we look at the 25 PhD theses supervised by Penninx, the wide variety of subjects he has been involved with becomes clear. The theses are diverse with regard to their topics, levels of analysis, approaches and methodologies. A more detailed analysis of the content of these theses reveals that most fields of Penninx’s heuristic model of migration and integration research have actually been covered. In other words, his model – which worked both as an analytical tool and as a roadmap – has partially been filled by his PhD candidates.

This evidence has led us to cluster the chapters of this book according to the above-mentioned scheme. The first section deals with the legal/political dimension. Blanca Garcés-Mascareñas analyses Spain’s immigration policies so as to re-examine to what extent, when and where liberal democracies are constrained by rights. Again for the case of Spain, María Bruquetas-Callejo looks at the gap between immigrants’ rights and effective access with regard to unemployment benefits and pensions, social services and healthcare. In these two chapters, the distinction between the law on the books and the law in practice is crucial in the analysis of immigration policies.

The second section is on the socio-economic dimension. In the current context of economic crisis and deteriorating industrial relations, Judith Roosblad re-examines her work on trade unions by considering what current changes mean for the Dutch trade unions and what their impact is on the promotion of immigrants’ interests. In a similar vein, Stefania Marino revisits the old dilemmas articulated by Penninx and Roosblad (2000) with the objective of creating a heuristic model (à la Penninx) for the comparative analysis of trade union strategies towards migrant workers. Shifting from trade unions to immigrant entrepreneurship, Surrendra Santokhi considers the case of The Hague to identify and assess the factors that determine the chances for the development of multicultural tourism in ethnically concentrated areas. Focusing on education, Philipp Schnell looks at the factors that explain the variations in the educational mobility of second-generation Turks across different EU countries.

The third section of this book deals with the ethno-cultural dimension. On the basis of data on Moroccans, Anja van Heelsum reconsiders the concept of ethno-cultural position as introduced by Rinus Penninx, which she used earlier with regard to second-generation Surinamese. From an ethnographic perspective, Simone de Bruin analyses the ‘ethno-party scene’ by considering how growing ethnic diversity influences their organisation and programming and how and why people choose the Turkish, Moroccan or Asian party scenes. Shifting the focus to policies, Eltje Bos considers recent developments in Dutch
policy on art and theatre and how the culture of immigrants is incorporated both in policy documents and with regard to implementation arrangements. By analysing files on royal decorations (1974-2009), Janneke Jansen examines society’s valuation of virtues and whether and to what extent immigrants have been incorporated. Finally, very different both in topic and approach, Lina Pochet observes the parallelisms between Anancy stories and drumming, both afrocultural manifestations spread by the African diaspora in America.

The fourth section includes two articles that deal with interrelations between the socio-economic and ethno-cultural dimensions. Though Fridus Steijlen’s focus on the housing of Moluccans seems to point to their socio-economic position, his article shows how the wijk (ward) became a symbol of their identity anchored in the Netherlands. Using quantitative data, Aslan Zorlu analyses interethnic differences in nestleaving behaviour by considering both socio-economic and cultural factors. Interestingly, these two articles show that the socio-economic and ethno-cultural dimensions cannot be completely disentangled.

Finally, science is never complete without methodological concerns. Given Rinus Penninx’s insistence on methodological issues – probably acquired during his period in the Department of Social Research Methodology at the Free University – we end with two chapters on research methodology. Given his training as an anthropologist, it is no coincidence that both articles deal with ethnographic challenges in the field. Liza Mügge discusses the use of the diary as a method and how it remains a source of data long after the research project is concluded. On a similar topic but using a different approach, Ilse van Liempt observes how thick descriptions, while being intimately connected with empirical data, allow for the development of valid and relevant theory.

Altogether, this selection of articles shows the great variety of topics tackled by Rinus Penninx and his flexibility in accompanying PhD candidates in such diverse fields. This book leaves out what all this research has meant in terms of dedication and discussion but above all in terms of loyalty, warmth and friendship.

References

THE LEGAL-POLITICAL DIMENSION
1 Time and spaces without rights

The case of Spain

Blanca Garcés-Mascañés

1.1 Introduction

In 2003 I started a master’s in migration studies coordinated by the Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies (IMES) of the University of Amsterdam. At that time, the Netherlands had just embarked upon a heated political debate on the limits of integration policies or, as many would call it in a dramatically biased way, on the failure of immigrant integration. Pim Fortuyn had been assassinated two years before, as was Theo van Gogh a couple of months after my arrival in Amsterdam. Though I could hardly understand Dutch at the time, it was clear that immigrant integration was at the centre of many interesting debates. IMES had an active role here and so did Rinus Penninx, as a scholar directly involved in the development of Dutch integration policies from the beginning. In the following years, Penninx himself wrote on this particular topic, not only describing the development of immigrant policies and related debates but also trying to explain what still remains inexplicable for many: what happened in the Netherlands?

My years in the Netherlands and in particular at IMES should be understood in this context. However, my ‘context of origin’ was completely different. I came from a country that at that moment was witnessing significant immigration flows. The debate was therefore of a very different nature. It was not about integration; it was instead about borders, about the life and work conditions of undocumented immigrants or about the legalisation and subsequent illegalisation of many foreign residents. With this context in my ‘backpack’, the literature on immigration policies soon attracted my attention. Scholars such as Freeman (1995), Hollifield (1992, 2005), Joppke (1998, 2005) and Guiraudon (1998, 2000, 2002) indicated that liberal democracies were self-constrained by rights. As pointed out by Joppke (1998: 290): ‘accepting immigration is inherent in the liberalness of liberal states’. However, having the Spanish case in mind, these conclusions aroused many questions: could we simply conclude that liberal democracies
face difficulties when it comes to excluding migrants? How could we then explain important and persistent forms of exclusion within liberal democracies?

Divided between these two different contexts and therefore between different debates and research questions, I was struggling until Penninx gave me the opportunity of not having to choose. On the one hand, while waiting for a scholarship to start my PhD, he invited me to work with him on a couple of articles (written in the context of IMISCOE) on immigration and integration policymaking in the Netherlands. Written together with María Bruquetas and Peter Scholten, these articles took us several years (the most recent one being Bruquetas-Callejo, Garcés-Mascareñas, Penninx & Scholten 2011). Thanks to this shared adventure, which was for me a kind of B-side to my PhD, I learned all that I now know about immigration in the Netherlands. Several articles and papers for conferences followed. On the other hand, Rinus Penninx accepted my invitation to accompany me in trying to give a response to a second set of questions. This second path, which was shared with Kees Groenendijk as co-director of my PhD thesis, led us into unexplored terrain. Since the final question was ‘what is unique in liberal democracies’, we decided to make a comparison (between Spain and Malaysia), which allowed me to explore to what extent different political contexts lead to different immigrant policies or, put more directly, to what extent liberal democracies are substantially different when compared with non-liberal democracies (see Garcés-Mascareñas 2012).

When thinking about what I learned from Rinus Penninx, it is impossible not to refer to both paths, as they turned out to be equally important in the end. Here, however, for the sake of a coherent article, I did have to make a choice. Since I was more a companion on the first collaboration, let me go for the second. On the question of whether and to what extent liberal democracies are self-constrained by rights, the answer – on the basis of my analysis of the Spanish case – is that rights do indeed play a role but not at all times and not everywhere. Liberal democracies do exclude migrants both in the first years of factual residence and in particular spaces such as detention camps and at the national borders and beyond. In this article I will briefly describe these time and spaces of exclusion. The final claim I make is that only by including them in the picture is it possible to understand the specificity of liberal democracies when regulating immigration flows.
1.2 Time of exclusion

Over the years, the majority of long-term immigrants to Spain have managed to obtain permanent resident status and, in the end, Spanish citizenship. In this regard, the Spanish case is a good illustration of a liberal democracy that has no choice but to fully include those immigrants already in the country. However, as I will show, this is only true in the long run. During the first years in Spain, immigrants’ rights were curtailed in two ways: first as irregular immigrants and secondly as temporary residents.

Migrants’ illegality

Despite an ‘insatiable hunger’ for immigrant workers (throughout the 1990s and particularly from 2000 to 2007), the Spanish state responded with an entry policy that was highly restrictive. This was how it appeared on paper, which was the result of keeping with guidelines imposed by the European Union (EU). But the policy was also restrictive in actual practice, as entry into Spain was long subject to a very strict evaluation of the job market. Moreover, entry has always been contingent on a prior job offer, which was often difficult to ascertain without already being in Spain. Finally, the administrative machinery, unable to handle the situation made legal entry an excessively long and complicated process.

This restrictive entry policy did not mean, however, that low numbers of immigrants were entering Spain. Due to the high demand for foreign workers, immigrants were coming into the country and staying. The difference was that since they could not enter legally, they did so illegally. Until 2005, the most common tactic was to come in on a tourist visa, remain, look for a job and then, with the very necessary job offer now in hand, become regularised, either through the frequent regularisation drives or through official channels for gaining entry to the country that would then be used as though the immigrant worker were still in his or her country of origin. In fact, this is not so different from what occurred in most of Western Europe during the 1960s. Although at the time, many of these countries had opened up legal channels for entry (via the well-tried guest worker programmes), many immigrants arrived separately from the scheme, found work and subsequently legalised their situation (Groenendijk & Hampsink 1995: 1).

This mismatch between legality and reality – between a particularly restrictive policy and a reality notable for large numbers of people entering the country – made it possible for Spain to comply simultaneously
with two sets of demands. There were demands for restrictive immigration policies by the EU as well as the trade unions, which did not look kindly on the entry of new workers into a job market characterised by high unemployment, and there were the insatiable demands of employers for foreign workers. This mismatch brought about a veritable model of illegal immigration. In the long term, however, this model was not sustainable. Illegal immigration could not continue in an unlimited, indefinite fashion without calling into question the legitimacy of the state in its role of controlling migration flows. Moreover, illegal workers have frequently been perceived as a threat to the wages and working conditions of legally employed workers. Hence, the very same reasons compelling the unions to limit entry simultaneously led them to demand legal recognition for those immigrants already working.

So this model of illegal immigration gave rise to the need to carry out periodical regularisation drives and attempts to direct immigration through legal channels. The former response has frequently been interpreted (especially by politicians) as the best illustration of the ‘failure’ of immigration policies and, more generally, the state’s loss of control. Nevertheless, as I showed in my thesis (2012), regularisation in the Spanish case should be understood primarily as a de facto entry policy. Seen from this perspective, the regularisation drives then appear as a measure that sought to reconcile contradictory demands. The end result has been deferred ‘entry’ – since the condition for every regularisation is a period of illegal status – of as many immigrant workers as required by the employers. In specific terms, it makes feasible the aforementioned situation whereby immigrants enter the country, look for work and, once they have a job, stay.

As González-Enríquez (2009) has noted, this is nothing more than a cheap recruitment model in the place of destination. It is cheap in two ways. First, the costs and risks of the migratory process are shouldered by the immigrant. Second, in political terms it is possible to have an open entry policy without putting it in writing and thus without needing to justify it. In terms of rights, a policy that produces irregularity means that immigrants enjoy very limited rights in their first years of residence. It is true that irregular immigrants in Spain, in contrast to other EU countries, have had access until very recently to health care and education in the same conditions as citizens. So they do have some rights. But they do not have labour rights, their social rights are limited, and their presence in the country does not help them to build residence rights.
TEMPORARY RESIDENCE

Spain’s first Foreigners Law in 1985 only envisaged short-term visas and did not recognise the right to family reunification. Later, though, this started to change. The increasing inflow of immigrants and consequent pressure coming from civil society and opposition parties forced the Spanish government to regulate the right to family reunification (1994 and 1996), to extend the duration of permits and to introduce the permanent residence permit for the first time (1996). The new Foreigners Law of 2000 introduced the right to family reunification in terms that were coherent with the laws of the European Court of Human Rights and that tended towards equality of rights between legal residents and citizens (freedom of circulation, assembly, association, etc.).

Immigrants’ rights were thus relatively limited but expanded as the burgeoning presence of immigrants in the country made it necessary to make their rights equal to those of Spanish nationals. Civil society and the opposition parties have played a highly significant role in the legal inclusion of immigrants. Their demands for equality could not be opposed by the government before the law, for otherwise its own democratic credentials would be jeopardised. As the Catalan government argued when an employers’ association proposed that newly arrived immigrants be contractually bound to their employers, such discrimination is illegal and anti-constitutional. This explains why Spain did not opt for a policy that drastically restricted access to membership. As a liberal democracy, it simply could not do so.

However, two basic constraints remained: the restriction of work permits to a certain sector and province during the first year and dependence on a formally recognised job for legal residence during the first five years. These two constraints make clear the extent to which immigrants are initially perceived and accepted only as workers: as workers in a specific sector and province during the first year and as workers with a formally recognised job in the first five years. In practice, this has meant that those temporary residents unable to demonstrate their integration as workers run the risk of losing their legal status and, in most cases, fall back into illegality. This loss of legality has been far from infrequent due to the extremely high numbers of temporary immigrant workers and the instability that characterises the Spanish job market. The relapse into illegality is in fact a decisive feature that explains much about the Spanish model of illegal immigration.

Making the residence permit dependent on formal integration into the labour market means turning labour precariousness into legal precariousness. Immigrants’ residence – and therefore immigrants’ rights
– are conditional on their performance as workers. Not performing as expected – that is, as a formal worker – means losing your legal status and thus an important part of your rights, and having to (re-)start (in many cases, again) the legalisation process. In contrast to what the literature seems to suggest, the path towards citizenship is therefore not a secured and linear one but is instead characterised by a back-and-forth process that becomes long and uncertain.

1.3 Spaces of exclusion

Though immigration policies and discourses in contemporary Europe emphasise the need to deport any irregular immigrant, in practice most immigrants – even those with deportation warrants – are not actually deported (Chauvin & Garcés-Mascareñas 2012). Greater immigrant control thus does not necessarily mean more deportations. First, this can be explained by the limitations imposed by the rule of law. In Spain, different constitutional rulings have limited the capacity of the state to deport irregular immigrants already present in the country (Garcés-Mascareñas 2012: 162). Second, just as important as rights constraints are the difficulties entailed in every process of expulsion: i.e. the high costs involved, the identification of irregular immigrants’ place of origin and cooperation on the part of the authorities in the countries of origin. These limitations, however, apply in particular to deportations from within the national territory. At the border and beyond, where (not by coincidence) most deportations take place, these constraints are partially overcome.

At the national border

While deportation from inside the country’s territory is convoluted to the point of producing the figure of the legally deported immigrant (that is, with a deportation warrant) who is actually non-deportable, rejection at the border is another story. It is much easier because it does not require another government’s willingness to return the person to the country of departure. Accordingly, while only one in every five immigrants within the territory with an expulsion order is in fact deported, the ratio of those turned back at the border soars up to nine out of ten.

Most of them are turned back at airports when deemed inadmissible by immigration officers. The rest are rejected when trying to cross the physical borders illegally. While illegal entry is almost invariably
associated with the EU’s southern frontier, it is in the Pyrenean Mountains where most detentions and deportations have been carried out.\footnote{The readmission treaty between Spain and France signed in 2002 established that ‘[...] each contracting party will readmit into its territory [...] without any kind of formal procedure, the national of a third state who does not comply with, or who has ceased to comply with the conditions of entry’ (Boletín Oficial del Estado 2003). ‘Without any kind of formal procedure’ means that people could be turned back without any form of legal assistance. Despite protests by the different colleges of lawyers and a court decision stipulating that the right of the ‘returnee’ to effective legal assistance was to be respected, the Spanish government has always responded in the same way: since would-be immigrants are returned under the heading of ‘readmission’ and not ‘turned back’, the bilateral agreement applies. At the border, then, the bilateral agreement takes precedence over the Foreigners Law, which requires the observance of the right to legal assistance in all cases.}

The readmission agreement that Spain signed with Morocco in 1992 was reactivated in 2004 along the lines of the experience with France. Deportations to Morocco have also caused concern and unremitting protest. In 2006, for instance, leading Spanish newspapers denounced the immediate, forcible turning back of illegal immigrants from the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, citing violation of all the procedures established by the Law on Foreigners. One member of the Civil Guard was quoted declaring: ‘We follow orders from the top, even though we all know they are against the law’ (\textit{ABC} 5 October 2006). The newspaper \textit{El País} reproduced a recording of another Civil Guard member ordering: ‘If the fence can be opened and they can be rejected, then get them out!’ (\textit{El País} 6 October 2006). Protests about the practices of detention and repatriation carried out in Moroccan territory have had a twofold aim: criticising the Moroccan government for violating immigrants’ human rights and censuring the Spanish government and the EU for externalising immigration control.

\textbf{Beyond the national border}

Since 2006, the new mainstays of Spanish policy for controlling migratory flows have been, first, fostering migration controls in the countries of origin and transit and, second, facilitating the repatriation of illegal immigrants. Officials in charge of border control in countries of origin and transit, as the then Minister of Interior Alfredo Pérez Rubalcaba indicated, were urged to ensure ‘[...] that the boats do not get far from their points of departure, or that they are intercepted as soon as possi-
ble because, otherwise, not only will the danger of loss of human life be higher but also those people who survive will enter our territory and it then will be necessary to initiate the complicated, difficult and expensive procedures of repatriation’ (Pérez Rubalcaba 2008: 76).

With this purpose in mind, the Africa Plan sought to reinforce migration control in the countries of origin or transit and repatriation of illegal immigrants by tying it to development assistance. The Spanish government never denied that this was essentially a tit-for-tat arrangement, and the countries of origin were no less aware of the deal’s conditions: Spain would let in more legal immigrants, offer projects building wells or other forms of development assistance and cancel debts in exchange for African countries’ cooperation in border monitoring and their agreement to accept returning illegal immigrants. Since 2006, Spain has signed a series of bilateral agreements with Senegal, Mali, Ghana, Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Cape Verde, Guinea-Conakry and Gambia. While these agreements do not seem to have resulted in a numerically significant rise in repatriations (partially due to their costs), they do result in the externalisation and subcontracting of the control, detention, internment and repatriation of would-be immigrants.

If deportation measures have often been carried out on the border with only a bare minimum of legal guarantees and civil rights observance, on the far side of the border there is no such protection worthy of the name. Accordingly, it is here where detention and deportation are carried out with greater impunity. Morocco is a case in point. In 2006, social organisations and human rights campaigners protested the deportation of sub-Saharan migrants to the Algerian border. They denounced the fact that somewhere between 1,000 and 1,200 immigrants had been dumped in the desert without food or water. In 2008, Amnesty International denounced the living conditions and human rights violations in a detention camp in Mauritania (known as Guantamito for ‘little Guantanamo’). Rebuilt by Spanish authorities, this camp fulfilled the function of receiving and retaining until repatriation those emigrants who had attempted to leave Mauritania for Spain. These two examples make it clear how detention, retention and repatriation tend to be less ‘complicated’ and less ‘difficult’ when they occur beyond Spanish borders. The reason is simple: in this geographical and legal ‘beyond’, the state finally escapes legal, judicial and often, though not always, civil society checks.
1.4 Conclusions

Immigrants’ rights, though originally relatively limited, expanded as the burgeoning presence of immigrants in the country made it necessary to make their rights equal to those of Spanish nationals. Civil society and the opposition parties have played a highly significant role in the legal inclusion of immigrants. Their demands for equality could not be opposed by the government before the law, for otherwise its own democratic credentials would be jeopardised. However, this is only partially true. If we look at the different policy instruments (residence permits, regularisations, deportations) and take into account policies as they are not only written on the books but also put into practice, we realise that different forms of exclusion persist: first, by limiting immigrants’ rights during the first years of residence and second, by deporting migrants without much accountability at the border and beyond. Only by considering these times and spaces of exclusion is it possible to understand the role of rights in liberal democracies.

Note

1 The numbers drop after 2007, as most people deported in earlier years (Romanians and Bulgarians) were from then on EU citizens.

References


2 Immigrants’ integration into the Spanish welfare state

A gap between rights and effective access?

María Bruquetas-Callejo

2.1 Introduction

In the last decade Spain has experienced a dramatic growth in population primarily due to a very fast and intense migratory flow. Foreign population went from representing 2.28 per cent of the total population in 2000 to 12.17 per cent of the registered population in 2010 (more than 5.7 million persons). Between 1990 and 2005, Spain became one of the primary destination countries for immigration in the world, joining countries with a long tradition as receivers of migration flows such as the United States and Germany (United Nations 2006: 31).

In spite of restrictive migration policies and the non-policy of integration1 in force until 2006, immigrants in Spain soon began to enjoy economic and social rights. Foreign workers with a formal job contributing to the social security system are entitled to unemployment benefits or pensions, just like nationals. Even immigrants with an irregular legal status have gradually earned entitlements to healthcare or social services. However, this relative broad array of rights does not seem to translate into effective access to welfare benefits and services, which negatively affects immigrants’ integration. How can we make sense of this apparent contradiction?

Conventionally, studies of integration have typically followed a neo-institutionalist approach, understanding public measures for accommodation in relation to nation-specific institutional frameworks. However, although until recently there was broad agreement on the existence of three or four ideal-type integration regimes that regulate immigrants’ inclusion in or exclusion from society, a growing consensus nowadays supports the idea that integration models are obsolete (Entzinger & Scholten 2012). The usefulness of integration regimes for empirical research is fundamentally questioned because of its failure to explain change, a consequence of its over-reliance on fixed national models (Bousetta 2001; Joppke 1999), and because they imply a normative lens over reality, being themselves projections of collective identity produced
by nationalist intellectuals and state actors (Favell 2003). Moreover, the regime approach is also questioned because formal integration policies and their practical application do not necessarily coincide (Van der Leun 2003; Moreno Fuentes 2003; Bruquetas-Callejo 2012). This also holds for the Spanish case, where we observe that in spite of the entitlements acknowledged by the present policy framework of equal opportunities (PECI programme 2006), immigrants experience greater disadvantages than nationals in many fields (Moreno Fuentes & Bruquetas-Callejo 2011; Bruquetas-Callejo & Moreno Fuentes 2012). This suggests that the national integration regime falls short of explaining integration outcomes because of the presence of an implementation gap.

An alternative explanation would be to resort to the type of welfare mix that characterises Spain. The welfare regime is another state institution that has a significant influence on immigrants’ integration, as the integration of immigrants and their descendants is to a large extent a question of socio-economic participation and opportunities of social mobility. A broad range of welfare-state-related institutions (welfare policies, labour markets, educational systems, etc.) have an effect on immigrants’ economic behaviour and therefore also on their specific patterns of social integration. Spain has a Mediterranean welfare regime that has incorporated immigrant workers with a formal job into its insurance programmes and has included immigrants in its programmes based on residence. Yet, we see that in Spain, immigrants’ coverage of social risks is much lower than that of nationals, suggesting the existence of a gap between de jure rights and effective rights. Empirical demonstration of such a gap would call into question the use of welfare regimes for explaining immigrants’ socio-economic integration outcomes.

In this chapter we will discuss immigrants’ effective access to social rights for the case of Spain. Using data from our previous study on immigrants and the Spanish welfare state (Moreno Fuentes & Bruquetas-Callejo 2011), we will give an overview of immigrants’ use of benefits and services in three areas: unemployment benefits and pensions, social services, and healthcare. Our data comes from a statistical exploitation of several official data sets provided by Spanish authorities at different levels, by international organisations (Eurostat, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, United Nations) and by social organisations (Fomento de Estudios Sociales y de Sociología Aplicada, foessa). Our analysis explores the importance of three sets of elements that contribute to explain the gap between rights and effective benefits: the characteristics of the welfare regime and economic system, immigration/integration policies, and policy implementation.
2.2 Immigrants’ entitlement to the Spanish welfare state

Spain has a Mediterranean welfare regime characterised by low social expenses, a strong multilevel governance and a strong reliance on the family for delivering care services. In particular, as is typical of Mediterranean welfare regimes, Spain combines contributive (Bismarckian) and universal (Beveridgean) benefits. This means that although entitlement to old age pensions and unemployment benefits depend on one’s participation in the formal labour market and one’s contribution made to social security, other benefits such as health care, social services or education are universal entitlements provided to all residents in the country regardless of their nationality.

As a consequence, immigrants access the Spanish welfare state through two channels. On the one hand, Spain has incorporated immigrant workers with a formal job into its insurance programmes through the mere application of Bismarckian principles, since those principles establish that citizens obtain benefits proportional to the contributions they make to social security. Social security is an insurance system financed through the contributions of workers and employers that offers protection for labour-related social risks such as unemployment, old age retirement, and sickness. As the basic criteria of entitlement depend on the contributions previously made, foreigners with work permit and jobs in the formal economy have always had equal access to the system. Also, non-contributive pensions and non-contributive disability benefits cover both Spanish citizens and legal foreign residents, as they are means-tested benefits granted to persons who lack contributive benefits and fulfil the necessary requisites.

On the other hand, the Spanish welfare state has extended its welfare programmes based on Beveridgean principles (such as health care, social services or education) to include all persons residing in Spain regardless of their nationality or legal status (universalist criteria). Undocumented immigrants have access to healthcare, education, social services and – for some – social housing programmes merely by registering themselves in the municipal population register, something quite unusual in Northern European countries.2

In those welfare sectors following Beveridgean principles, the extension of rights to immigrants has been the result of complex processes combining institutional inertias and historical conjunctures. The Spanish public health care system gives a clear example of the process of the extension of rights to immigrants, as it underwent a slow process of consolidation that meant the universalisation of health care in 1989.3 But this universalisation of health care coverage referred only to Span-
ish citizens due to a restrictive interpretation of the General Law on Health Care, while foreigners’ access to the public health care system remained conditioned on their contributions to the social security system.

After the approval of the 1996 Child Welfare Law and the 1996 reform of regulations for the implementation of the 1985 Foreigners Law, pregnant women and children were the first undocumented immigrants who were formally entitled to National Health System services under conditions equal to those for Spanish citizens. However, this legislation was implemented only to a limited extent, and at the beginning of 1999 health care coverage for undocumented immigrants was put on the political agenda. The debate over the Foreigners Law 4/2000 opened a window of political opportunity for the social coalition (made up of third-sector public health organisations and immigrant rights organisations) advocating for the incorporation of immigrants into the health care system. This new law expanded health care coverage to all persons who could demonstrate that they were residing in Spain and lacked resources to cover the cost of their health care. The mechanism chosen to link health care coverage with the criterion of residency was enrolment in the municipal population register, to exclude short-term visitors to the country.

As generally occurs in Mediterranean welfare regimes, social services are the less developed area of social policy, characterised by a complicated institutional organisation and inadequate funding. Article 14 of Law 4/2000 entitles foreigners legally residing in Spain to basic and specialised social services and benefits under the same conditions as Spanish citizens. Foreigners with an irregular administrative status, on the other hand, have a right to basic social services and benefits through enrolment in municipal population registers. This distinction is not based on a clear legal definition regarding the content of basic and specialised services. As a result, each autonomous community has resolved in its own way the issue of undocumented immigrants’ access to its social services network: in some regions, requirements are flexible in order to facilitate access, while in others, semi-public schemes have been established to service undocumented immigrants, often run by third-sector organisations (Rodríguez Cabrero 2003).
2.3 Effective access

Social security and contributive benefits: pensions and unemployment schemes

As admittance to benefits under the National Institute of Social Security (INSS) does not depend on nationality but on the contributions one has made, natives and foreigners with work permits and jobs in the formal economy have access to the system on an equal footing. This equal access to social security for foreign workers with a formal job means that the strong migratory flows of recent years has translated into a considerable and stable presence of foreign workers among the contributors to the Spanish social security. In the period 1996-2007 the Spanish economy created almost eight million new jobs, increasing the number of employed persons from 12.6 million in 1996 to 20.5 million in the second trimester of 2007. Half of those new jobs were taken by foreigners, which led to an increase in the number of foreigners contributing to social security from four per cent in 2001 to more than 10.5 per cent in October 2011.

What is more, the percentage of foreigners registered in the social security system in Spain has remained almost stable during the last years in spite of the economic crisis: between 10 and 11 per cent for male workers and around 10 per cent for female workers. According to figures published by the INSS, in October 2011 there were 17.2 million contributors to social security, of which almost 1.8 were foreigners. Of these foreign contributors, 81 per cent were from non-EU countries. In addition, less than 1 per cent of the recipients of pensions in Spain are immigrants. Of this 1 per cent, more than half are EU citizens: the French at 16,400 and the Germans at 9,400 pensioners come in first and second respectively on the list of foreign recipients of retirement pensions in Spain.

The importance of these figures is huge if we consider this contribution to the welfare state in relation to the expenses that immigration implies for the social state. Economic studies of the costs and benefits of immigration for the Spanish welfare state generally agree on the net contribution that immigration has brought about. According to one study, in 2009 the contributions of immigrants to social security (€8.08 million) was more than all the social expenses concerning migration (€6.50 million) (Otero 2010). As the great majority of immigrants are in their most productive years (between 20 and 40 years), they constitute a net contribution to the INSS budget, and they will continue to be for at least the next two decades (assuming that the number of immigrants remains constant).
These findings are particularly important, given that the Spanish welfare state dedicates an important share of its resources to old-age pensions. The contributions of immigrants have temporarily raised the ratio of contributors to pensioners to nearly 2.5 to 1. As a result, thanks to immigration, the Spanish pension system’s entry into a state of deficit will be delayed by almost five years – from 2023 to 2028 (González et al. 2009). This clear positive balance will not be as sharply defined in the future when the first cohorts of migrant workers who settled in Spain in the mid-1980s begin to retire. Also, the present economic crisis, which has destroyed more than 2.2 million jobs in Spain, has had a greater effect on immigrant workers, whose unemployment rate was 32.7 per cent in 2011 compared with 19.5 per cent among natives.

Health care

As we have seen, the public health system in Spain has gradually expanded its range of coverage to include almost all the population residing in the country, understanding that the right to health treatment is a basic human right. Nevertheless, the universalisation of the public health system has not guaranteed ‘de facto’ equity in access. Data from the Spanish Survey of Living Conditions between 2004 and 2008 show that immigrants declare that they are unable to access medical treatment more often than nationals do. And more often than nationals do, immigrant informants tend to ascribe this lack of access to the scarcity of financial resources or time.

Analysis of the data from the foessa 2007 survey provides us with an accurate picture of disadvantaged sectors access to the National Health System (NHS). While three per cent of the population above the poverty line (i.e. above the threshold of 60 per cent of the median national income) responded that they did not have access to the NHS, this percentage increases to 5.2 per cent among those below the poverty line. In our analysis, we apply Guinea and Moreno Fuentes’ categories of homes depending on the number of indicators of socio-economic exclusion that affect them. ‘Integrated homes’ are those not affected by any indicator of exclusion, ‘precariously integrated homes’ are those affected by one indicator of exclusion, ‘vulnerable’ are those affected by two or three indicators, and ‘excluded’ are those homes affected by four or more indicators of exclusion (Guinea & Moreno Fuentes 2009). According to this classification, eight per cent of the individuals living in ‘excluded’ homes declared they did not have access to the public health system; a majority of these individuals are undocumented immigrants. Similarly, 5.2 per cent of the ‘poor’ population – located under
the threshold of 60 per cent of the income median – also states their lack of access to public health. Moreover, foreigners living in ‘excluded’ homes have 9.1 times more risk than nationals to access health care through assistance schemes supplying regular health care services, and for foreigners living in ‘vulnerable homes’ this risk is a staggering 42.4 times more than nationals.

Moreover, diverse indicators show that immigrants make a differentiated use of health services. According to the 2006 National Health Survey, foreigners see a family doctor seven per cent less than the autochthonous population and a specialist 16.5 per cent less than natives. However, immigrants more often use emergency services: 65 per cent of them had access to hospital treatment through this channel against 57 per cent of natives.

**Social services**

Data from 2008 regarding the use of social services by immigrants indicates that foreigners represented approximately 13.7 per cent of the users recorded in the Social Service User Information System (SIUSS) database, a percentage close to the 11.55 per cent of the population that are foreigners in the 13 regions that participated in the database (MSPS 2009). However, if we focus instead on the total number of interventions, this group is clearly underrepresented. Of the total of 2,385,683 social service interventions in 13 autonomous communities and cities, 163,308 were identified as assistance to immigrants (representing only 6.85 per cent of all the interventions).

In 2008, immigrants made up 11.2 per cent of the beneficiaries of minimum income programmes in Spain, a percentage slightly below the actual weight of the immigrant population in Spain’s overall population, which was approximately 12.2 per cent (MSPs 2010). In addition, if we take into consideration the fact that immigrants represent a greater proportion of the population at risk of social exclusion, it is clear that the range of coverage of these programmes for the immigrant population is considerably below what would correspond to this group proportionately and that a significant number of immigrants are left unprotected.

**2.4 Elements helping to explain the gap**

The Spanish welfare state has shown its ability to adapt reasonably well to the integration challenges brought about by the settlement of immigrants in a very short span. Nevertheless, Spain immigrants’ coverage
of social risks is far from sufficient, showing a mismatch between the *de jure* social rights of immigrants and the *de facto* access to benefits. How can we explain this?

**Mediterranean welfare state**

These inconsistencies can be attributed partially to the Mediterranean welfare regime's heavy reliance on contributive schemes. The comparative literature on welfare regimes reveals that insurance systems based on contributions have less redistributive capacity than regimes that rely more on universal entitlements, like the social-democratic welfare regimes. That means that citizens still depend to a great extent on the market for their subsistence, and that the capacity for decommodification of these regimes is only moderate.

There are various reasons why contributive schemes offer less protection for immigrants. First, a majority of immigrants find jobs in the informal sector. For undocumented immigrants, but also for many immigrants with work permits who cannot find a job in the formal economy, the informal economy is the only possibility to get a job. Workers employed in the black economy do not contribute to the social security and therefore are excluded from contributive protection schemes.

Second, most immigrants who work in formal jobs and contribute to social security have temporary jobs and are therefore entitled to only short periods of unemployment benefits or other contributive schemes. According to the National Employ Service, 60 per cent of immigrants were working in temporary jobs in 2007 against 39.2 per cent of natives. This means that immigrant workers are constantly entering and exiting the labour market (and social security), combining temporary formal jobs, informal jobs and periods of unemployment. The coverage of contributive benefits is for them only limited, as the amount and duration of unemployment benefits are directly related to the contribution they make to social security and the duration of their contribution. The dual system of protection (contributive and non-contributive schemes) in Southern European countries generates a polarisation between hyper-protected and under-protected users (Ferrera 1996), and immigrants tend to be concentrated in the latter.

The consequence of this limited access to welfare benefits is that immigrants are much more vulnerable to social risks than nationals, something that has become particularly acute in recent years due to the economic crisis. In the last five years, the percentage of immigrants receiving unemployment benefits almost tripled, from 5.8 per cent at the end of 2006 to 15.15 per cent in November 2010. As immigrants tend
to have shorter labour careers and work more often in temporary jobs than nationals, the coverage rate of unemployment benefits for immigrants tends to be relatively low. In 2010, the unemployed foreign population had a coverage rate of 40 per cent, notably below the 78 per cent of unemployed native workers. What is more, from 2010 onwards the percentage of foreign workers protected by unemployment benefits has started to drop dramatically, since the period of perception of contributive benefit was finished. Also, the tendency of Mediterranean welfare regimes to leave many services up to families and social networks implies that immigrants are less protected against social risks since they have weaker social networks.

**Spain’s economic structure and immigration regime**

The coverage that welfare systems offer to immigrants depends greatly on two interrelated factors: the country’s economic structure (including its labour market) and its immigration regime. On the one hand, the economy and the welfare state need to be seen as two sides of one coin. The important role of the informal economy within the Spanish productive system and its demand for low-skilled workers represent an institutional inertia hindering the access of immigrants to insurance programmes. Although by its very nature the informal economy is difficult to quantify, various authors estimate the size of the Spanish informal economy to be between 20 and 23 per cent of GDP, which is high compared with the European average of 14 per cent in 2010 (Schneider 2010). As we saw, those welfare states that rely strongly on contributive schemes and with large informal economies offer the least protection to immigrants, since immigrants are most likely to work in the deregulated sector and the right to welfare is conditional upon participation in the regular labour market. The immigration regime reinforces this tendency by denying or limiting certain categories of immigrants (such as asylum seekers or family members) the right to work, which effectively drives them to work in the informal economy, thereby excluding them from the contributive protection schemes.

**Policy implementation**

The process of implementing policy is to a large extent responsible for the mismatches between immigrants’ rights and their actual rights. One element contributing to the creation of an implementation gap is bureaucratic discretion. The application of policies is ultimately in the hands of low-level bureaucrats who are in direct contact with the citizens
and who are the ones allowing or hindering the effective translation of rights into facts. Although we lack qualitative data about the practices of low-level bureaucrats, our findings suggest a significant amount of discretion and discrimination in the process of granting benefits. Some comparative studies explain the higher levels of discretion in Southern European countries as being the result of the lenient bureaucratic style typical of these countries, in contrast to the more rigid style exercised by their Northern European counterparts (Jordan et al. 2003). In contrast, recent comparative studies considerably nuance this explanation in terms of bureaucratic cultures, showing instead that the high level of discretion in Southern Europe is a response to the under-resourced, demanding working conditions that low-level bureaucrats face, which leads them to develop ‘coping practices’ (Bruquetas-Callejo 2012).

Moreover, the decentralisation of policies also contributes to the discontinuity between policies and practices. The high degree of decentralisation of integration policies in Spain implies extreme inequalities between regions and cities, as some have more resources to develop programmes than others. Immigrants living in different areas do experience considerable differences in their access and coverage to welfare services (Martínez de Lizarrondo 2006). Differences in implementation are the result of political decisions by local or regional authorities, and even national policies are interpreted and applied quite differently. The procedure for enrolling in the municipal register – which might seem to be a simple and straightforward matter – is an area in which politicisation or bureaucratic discretion can interfere with the effective access of immigrants to services such as health care, social services or housing programmes. In recent years some municipalities have blocked undocumented immigrants from enrolling in the municipal population register, contravening Spain’s Basic Law on Local Government. Obtaining the necessary health care ‘card’ depends on the requirements imposed by officials of different government levels in the process (the INSS, regional health services, state tax authority and municipal governments). Another example of the variation that multilevel governance introduces in policy implementation is the reform of the General Law of Health Care recently passed by the Spanish parliament. According to this reform, undocumented immigrants are no longer entitled to health treatment. However, not all regional governments are equally willing to put this in force. Five regions have already declared that they will continue offering health treatment to undocumented immigrants, in effect ignoring the reform.

The multilevel governance pattern of the Spanish welfare state is also characterised by the participation of third-sector organisations
as executers (and sometimes as formulators) of policies. A majority of regional integration policies aims to offer equal opportunities (Martínez de Lizarrondo 2006), applying an individualist-universalist approach to rights. This is to be achieved by a strategy of ‘normalisation’, which sets out to improve the socio-economic mobility of immigrants through mainstream services for the general public instead of creating special schemes for immigrants. However, the majority of regional integration plans concern measures dealing with social services and are located within the social service departments. As a consequence, integration follows the modes of functioning typical of those departments that put the application of integration measures into the hands of social organisations (Carrasco & Rodríguez Cabrero 2005; Tamayo y Carrillo 2002), which differentiates further the process of policy implementation, often introducing special programmes for groups with specific difficulties.

Notes

1 Following Penninx (2001), ‘non-policy’ – i.e. not having an explicit integration policy for immigrants – also has to be analysed as a policy.

2 Per 1 September 2012, legislative changes are being implemented in order to exclude undocumented immigrants from health care services. However, this measure has provoked considerable opposition: five regions have refused to apply it and many professionals in the health care sector are calling for civil disobedience.

3 Until the beginning of the 1950s it was composed of a multiplicity of social insurance schemes that were gradually merged, becoming a relatively unified system within the social security system (the Spanish National Health System) in the second half of the 1980s.

4 For those excluded from national health care services (e.g. undocumented immigrants) several NGOs provide health assistance.

5 Social security contributions entitle to receive unemployment benefit during a specific period. After that, unemployed workers can receive social assistance benefits for unemployment.

References


THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC DIMENSION
3.1 Introduction

Industrial relations in the Netherlands are under severe pressure. Trade unions are caught in an internal power struggle. They are redefining their role in socio-economic decision-making and are inventing new ways of representing the interests of the working population. Joint consultation bodies such as the Social Economic Council (SER) have suffered a significant loss of influence, and the renowned ‘polder model’ is in decline. What do all these changes mean for the Dutch trade unions and what is the impact of these changes on the promotion of interests of migrant and ethnic minority workers?

3.2 Explaining trade unions’ choices

In my PhD thesis (2002), I examined how trade unions have dealt with immigration and migrant and ethnic minority workers in the past century. The main research question was as follows: What was the attitude of the Dutch trade unions towards immigration and immigrant workers in the period since the Second World War, with an emphasis on the period between 1960 and 1997? I outlined three major dilemmas that trade unions came up against in responding to the issue of immigration and immigrant workers (see also Penninx & Roosblad 2000). The first dilemma was whether to resist or cooperate with government and employers to recruit labour immigrants. A second dilemma arose after the immigrants had arrived and settled into society: should such workers be regarded as an integral part of the trade union rank and file and be actively recruited as members, or should they be wholly or partly excluded from union representation? And if the trade unions chose to follow a line of inclusion: should they concentrate solely on the common interests of indigenous and migrant workers together and pursue general policies for all workers, or should they also stand up for the spe-
specific interests and needs of their migrant members, devising targeted policies to achieve material equality?

To explain the choices that trade unions made in their policies towards immigration and immigrant or ethnic minority workers, I have formulated a set of explanatory factors. The first concerns the position of power that the trade unions occupy in society and in the national socio-economic decision-making process. The assumption is that the more powerful a trade union is, the more effectively it can wield its influence to steer government policies as well as the policies of employers’ associations in directions favourable to the union. I applied several indicators to assess the power of trade unions. Trade unions were considered more powerful (at the national level) if they maintained strong ties with governing political parties, if they had a high degree of organisation, and if they were not fragmented but had a strongly centralised and unified union structure. The second factor involves conditions in the economy and the labour market. At times of widespread unemployment, the competition (actual or presumed) between indigenous and immigrant workers might increase, making union policies of inclusion more difficult to maintain. In times of economic growth, there would presumably be more room for special measures to improve the social and economic position of immigrants, such as language courses, education and training, or affirmative action. The third factor relates to society as a whole. Social trends may have a strong impact on the attitudes of trade unions (just as such attitudes may strongly influence society). Trade union policies towards immigration and immigrants are influenced by factors such as the public discourse, institutional arrangements, legislation, and key institutional actors like national authorities, churches or political parties. The ways such actors respond to immigration and immigrants are important considerations for trade unions to take into account.

The main objective of this chapter is to examine what has changed since the international comparative study we conducted in 2000 (Penninx & Roosblad 2000) and my PhD thesis in 2002. I will tentatively analyse the changes that have occurred with regard to the explanatory factors, such as changes in the social, political and economic climate, in industrial relations and within the trade union movement since the turn of the century and whether these have had an influence on the representation of minority workers’ interests. Furthermore I will examine whether the dilemmas we have formulated are still relevant. In this chapter I will solely focus on the Dutch Confederation of Trade Unions (FNV), which is the largest confederation in the Netherlands.
3.3 Changes since the turn of the millennium

Changes in political and social climate

In my PhD thesis, I presumed that trade union policies towards immigration and immigrants are influenced by factors such as the public discourse and key institutional actors such as national authorities or political parties. The ways in which such actors respond to immigration and immigrants are important considerations for trade unions to take into account. Furthermore, I formulated the hypothesis that the more powerful a trade union is, the more effectively it can wield its influence to steer government policies (regarding immigration and immigrants) in directions favourable to the union. One indicator of trade unions' power (at the national level) is the strength of their ties with governing political parties. There has never been a strong link between the political coalition in power and the trade unions. There have been periods in which the political parties in power were quite responsive to the demands of the trade unions, for instance during the period 1973 to 1977 when the PvdA (the social democratic party) and the CDA (the Christian democratic party) were in power. However, the link between the PvdA and the FNV (the Dutch Confederation of Trade Unions) has never been as strong as for example the closely intertwined relation between the Labour Party and the Trade Union Congress (TUC) in the UK until the end of the 1970s (Roosblad 2000). From the 1960s to the 1990s, changes in political coalitions in the Netherlands also hardly influenced the way the government dealt with immigration and integration issues. Although the shift from a centre-left government during the period 1973 to 1977 to predominantly centre-right coalitions from 1977 to 1989 caused a change in socio-economic policies, there was no real marked difference of opinion between the major political parties regarding these issues and there was a great deal of consensus about the way ethnic minorities should be integrated into Dutch society (see also Sleegers 2007). This was also true for the administrations during the 1990s. What was key in the integration policies during the 1990s was the improvement of the socio-economic position of ethnic minorities. The focus was on employment, education and political participation (Entzinger 2003; Spijkerboer 2007; Sleegers 2007). Although the leader of the conservative party VVD ventilated his criticism on multiculturalism and the slow integration of minorities, especially Muslims, in the early 1990s, this debate did not immediately lead to a great shift in policies when the VVD came into power in 1994. Again during the governments consisting of a broad centre coalition between the conserva-
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tive party VVD, the social democratic party PvdA and the liberal party D66 (1994 until 2002), in which the Christian democrats had no seat (a novelty in Dutch political history), government policies on integration mainly focused on the socio-economic enhancement of migrants and ethnic minorities.

From the turn of the century, however, topics such as immigration, integration and multiculturalism began to dominate the political agenda throughout Europe. In the public and political debate on integration, the emphasis has shifted from socio-economic integration to overcoming cultural and religious differences (Sleegers 2007; Duyvendak 2006). Immigration was criminalised and because of international political and religious terrorism, migrants (especially Muslims) were perceived from a security perspective (Marino & Penninx 2010). The turn of the century also marked the beginning of a politically unstable period in the Netherlands. Between 2002 and 2012, the country had five general elections. After eight years of a broad centre coalition, a series of centre-right governments came to power under a Christian Democrat, Jan Peter Balkenende. The rise of the political party of the populist Geert Wilders led to an even more outspoken anti-Islam discourse.

Changes in industrial relations

Another indicator of the power of trade unions is the way in which they are structured. Strongly centralised and unified trade unions are considered more powerful (at least at the national level) than trade unions with a fragmented and decentralised structure. Dutch labour relations have always had a strong element of corporatism, also known as the Dutch polder model. In order to participate in the national corporatist system, the internal centralisation of the trade unions was of great importance. Especially after the Second World War, there was a strong perception within the trade unions that the confederations were better equipped to take decisions in socio-economic matters than the affiliated unions. The task of carrying out the centrally formulated policies in their respective sectors of industry fell to the affiliated unions. At the end of the reconstruction period, this automatic acceptance of the policies of the confederations changed. During the 1960s and the 1970s the affiliated unions grew in importance vis-à-vis the trade union confederations. This was due to several factors, such as the widespread introduction of decentralised bargaining, a more flexible wage policy which enhanced the importance of the negotiating unions, and a growing emphasis on the well-being and working conditions of individuals in the workplace. Although this has led to situations in which the trade
union confederation and member unions have held diametrically opposite viewpoints, the centralisation of the unions remained an important feature throughout the 20th century (Roosblad 2000).

Especially in the second half of the 1990s, the Dutch polder model flourished. It was a reflection of the good relations between employers, unions and government that had steadily developed since the Wassenaar Agreement of 1982, based on shared goals and mutual trust. The Netherlands did well economically, unemployment was minimalised, and the government budget was in order.

In the past decade, this situation has drastically changed. The influence of Dutch trade unions in the national socio-economic decision-making process can be measured using a number of indicators. Firstly, the Social Economic Council (Sociaal Economische Raad or SER), an official advisory council of the government in which social partners and independent experts appointed by the government are represented, is an important body that influences national socio-economic issues. Secondly, there is the Labour Foundation (Stichting van de Arbeid), a national consultative body in which trade unions and employers’ associations make agreements on issues in the field of labour and industrial relations. Upon request, the Labour Foundation also gives advice to the government on labour-related topics. Furthermore, the trade unions were represented on the board of other national councils such as the National Employment Agency (Landelijk Bureau Arbeidsvoorziening).

In the past decade, the influence of these consultation bodies has deteriorated drastically. This was due to a number of factors. First, there has been a change in governing style. The government appeared to have less need for advice from consultative bodies such as the SER. The number of requests for advice given to the SER has dropped substantially since the turn of the millennium. Second, the employers’ associations seemed to have better access to the coalition in power than the trade unions, which provided them the opportunity to directly influence government policies without consulting the trade unions. A third key factor was the decline in the internal centralisation of the trade unions (see next paragraph), which led to an even further disintegration of the Dutch polder model.

**Changes within the trade union**

An important change was the shift in the balance of power within the trade unions. At the end of the 1990s, the trade union movement was mainly characterised by large-scale mergers. In 1997 the Transport Union, the Union for Business Services, the Union for Food Workers and
the Industrial Union merged to become FNV Bondgenoten, while the Association for Police Officers entered into a partnership with the union for public services (ABVAKABO FNV). These mergers had implications for the power relations within the trade union movement and between the confederation and affiliated unions. The two super unions together represented over two-thirds of FNV membership. They questioned the role of the confederation and wanted a more active role in the national socio-economic decision-making process. This resulted in a redistribution of seats in the SER: while previously the seats of the workers’ associations had always been occupied by representatives of the trade union confederations, in 2000, the presidents of the two largest FNV member unions were admitted to the SER. The mergers were intended as a first stepping stone towards a unified trade union movement. But already in 2000, the burst of the internet bubble put a spoke in the wheel of these plans. The stock market crash caused the equity value of FNV Bondgenoten, and especially the former Industrial Union, to collapse. The unification of all affiliated unions was put on hold.

The stock market crash was also a prelude to the economic crisis of 2002/2003. Economic growth practically stopped, which increased the government’s budget deficit. The subsequent Balkenende governments introduced reforms in social security, such as early retirement and disability insurance, and in health care. This ultimately led to a conflict between the social partners and the government and a crisis in the Dutch polder model. In 2004, the trade unions launched a massive campaign in which 300,000 people – an unusually high turnout by Dutch standards – demonstrated against these government plans. Although the dispute was settled in the autumn of 2005 through joint consultation, this was a significant sign of the decline of the Dutch polder model.

**Crisis within the FNV**

Since 2007, the global economy has been in decline. This major global recession, characterised by various systemic imbalances, was sparked by the collapse of the housing market in the United States in 2007 and the outbreak of the financial crisis of 2007-2008. Because the international financial markets were closely intertwined, the global recession affected the entire world economy. In the course of 2008, the Eurozone was officially in an economic recession, which took a downward turn at an unprecedented speed. Once the credit crisis broke out in 2008, the debate within the Netherlands on state pensions (AOW) soon restarted. The government decided in the spring of 2009 to increase the
state pension age from 65 to 67 years. After initially fiercely resisting
this measure, the leaders of the fnv recognised that the economic cri-
sis, the aging population and increasing life expectancy made reform
of the pension system inevitable. The government requested the ser to
come up with alternative cutbacks to reduce government spending by
the same amount (4 billion euro) as the government would have saved
on increasing the state pension age. The deadline for the ser’s recom-
mendations was set for 1 October 2009. The trade unions proposed al-
ternative cuts in areas other than the state pension, such as a reduction
in the mortgage rebate for expensive villas. As it became clear that the
employers’ association did not want any alternatives and that they not
only wanted to increase the state pension age but also to raise the retire-
ment age, the trade unions came up with an alternative plan for a flex-
ible retirement age. But again, the employers did not agree with these
proposals and rejected the plans shortly before the deadline of 1 Octo-
ber 2009. The ser trajectory had failed miserably. Meanwhile the crisis
had created a huge budget deficit, which resulted in more austerity and
economic reforms. This intensified the pressure from the fourth Balk-
enende government to increase the state pension age even more. After
the failure of the ser agreement, the government continued to prepare
its own legislation to change the retirement age.

The fall of the fourth Balkenende government on 20 February 2010
presented an unexpected turn in the retirement debate. The increase of
the retirement age was left to the new government, which would come
into office sometime after the elections of 9 June 2010. The social part-
ners seized this opportunity to make another attempt to find a joint
solution they saw suitable. This ultimately led to an agreement in prin-
ciple on the state pension and retirement age in the Labour Foundation,
on 4 June. The social partners agreed on an age increase from 65 to 66
in 2020 (and possibly to 67 in 2025), but the possibility of retiring at the
age of 65 remained, with a slightly lower but still decent pension. The
fnv presented the principle agreement to its members: 80 per cent of
the members voted in favour of the agreement. The vast majority of the
affiliated unions also approved of the agreement. Only the union for
older workers (anbo) and the union for the maritime sector (Nautilus)
voted against.

On 14 October 2010, the first government led by Mark Rutte, con-
sisting of the conservative vvd and the Christian Democratic cda and
with the support of the populist pvv, came into office. In early 2011, the
social partners and the newly installed government began consultation
rounds to come up with a joint initiative to increase the retirement age,
which was based on the pension agreement of the Labour Foundation.
They succeeded in June 2011, but the largest FNV union (FNV Bondgenoten) had now turned against the plans. One of the main objections was the fear for a loss of purchasing power for people who still wanted to retire at the age of 65. The second largest member union, the union for public services ABVAKABO, rejected the agreement as well. But because the majority of the member unions agreed, the pension agreement was ratified on 19 September 2011. This led to a conflict within the FNV: the two largest unions represented the majority – two-thirds – of the membership of the FNV. They argued that that meant that the majority of the FNV members was against this agreement and that therefore the confederation had no mandate to sign the agreement. This conflict led to a crisis within the FNV and a fierce debate on a radical overhaul of its structure.¹

**NEW ORGANISING METHODS**

Although the pension debacle was the immediate cause of the rupture within the FNV, it was in fact a reflection of a more fundamental and deeper dissension within the FNV between a moderate and pragmatic faction that wanted to represent workers’ interests via consultation with employers and government and was willing to negotiate reforms in the social security system and a radical faction that wanted to protect workers’ interests through industrial action and was determined to preserve industrial rights already attained.

Trade unions in the Netherlands have always had a fairly strong institutional position, with stronger political influence at the national level than at the shop floor level, which can negatively affect their ability to protect the interests of immigrants within the immediate working environment. Their institutional position does not directly depend on their capacity to mobilise workers. As a result, incentives for organising new groups of workers are relatively weak (Marino & Roosblad 2008). The recruitment of members occurs on an occasional basis: inside the workplace it is done through voluntary initiatives of trade union activists; outside the workplace recruitment takes place in conjunction with other initiatives organised in association with churches, mosques and so on. These initiatives are related to several issues of public interest – such as the pension age campaign – and are often used as a means of providing information about trade unions. Such campaigns are addressed to both workers and non-workers, ethnic minorities and natives. Like many other trade unions in north-west European countries, the Dutch trade unions are experiencing a decline in membership due to an ageing population and an inability to organise new groups.
of workers (youth, women, the growing groups of workers engaged in atypical forms of employment, ethnic minorities and regular or irregular labour migrants). Their scarce presence in the workplace makes it more difficult to connect with these new groups and to protect their interests. In order to incorporate at least one of these new groups, FNV took up the promotion of the special interests of undocumented domestic workers in 2006, after a number of undocumented domestic workers had collectively joined ABVAKABO FNV and demanded representation of their interests. Gunther (2011) shows the difficulties the trade union faced in protecting the specific interests of these workers. Kloosterboer (2007) argues that although this group was formally included in the trade union, in practice, representation was limited to support for individual disputes with employers, for example by helping workers collect overdue pay. There was no collective action to combat the exploitation of these workers, nor did FNV offer legal aid if these workers were fired or if they attempted to become legalised, which in FNV’s view is a political issue.

In order to revitalise the trade union, trade union officials sought new tactics to organise workers. Some trade unions in Anglo-Saxon countries had reversed the trend of declining membership by running assertive organising campaigns at the workplace, engaging in strategic research and strengthening their position in local communities. FNV Bondgenoten adopted this strategy and developed systematic approaches to workplace organising, setting up training programmes for new organisers, especially for the cleaning sector and domestic workers (including many female undocumented workers: see Gunther 2011). Soon after, ABVAKABO FNV and FNV Bouw (the trade union for construction workers) followed.

In November 2007, FNV Bondgenoten launched the “Cleaners for a Better Future” campaign to improve the working conditions of the 150,000 cleaners in the Netherlands, a high share of which are ethnic minorities and undocumented workers. The cleaners demanded a wage increase (10 euros instead of 8.90 euros gross per hour), a reduction of the workload, language courses and more respect for their work. The campaign was successful in many respects: the demands for a salary increase were granted, and despite the dirt and the piled-up waste they had managed to gain the support of the public, they had become visible in the workplace and they had gained respect from their employers.

This new and innovative form of campaigning also met with a lot of criticism. Organising was originally developed in a union-hostile environment such as in the US. The moderate factions within the FNV were uncomfortable with this aggressive form of campaigning, arguing that
this did not fit the Dutch way of dealing with disputes. The willingness to go on strike had always been low in the Netherlands. These moder-
ate unionists felt that industrial action had to be a last resort when all other options (consultation) had failed. They also argued that the strat-
egy would not work for all types of disputes and in all sectors of indus-
try. Furthermore, the campaigns were highly capital-intensive, which meant that other sectors had to contribute to the cleaning sector. A number of sectors disagreed with this transfer of money.

The pension agreement and the debate on assertive campaigning exposed a tension between the trade unions’ position as ‘social part-
ter’ involved in institutionalised social dialogue with those wielding economic and political power and their role as campaigning organisa-
tion endeavouring to recapture some of the political power the labour movement had lost via industrial action and becoming more grassroots.

3.4 Representing minority workers’ interests

With all the turmoil in the past decade, it is interesting to examine the extent to which the trade unions strived to include minorities in their organisation and to represent their interests. Three areas can be dis-
tinguished in which trade unions can promote minority workers’ inter-
esters: in the labour market, in society as a whole and in their own organisation. During the 2000s, not only the political climate towards immigrants and ethnic minorities but also the labour market position of immigrant and ethnic minority workers deteriorated. During the 1990s, unemployment levels among minorities had declined. Never-
theless, it was still twice as high as amongst the native population (scp 2001). During the 2000s, this situation changed. From 2004 onwards, the youth unemployment rate had fallen, but the unemployment rate among ethnic minority youths remained alarmingly high. In 2006, un-
employment among non-Western ethnic minority youths reached 22 per cent, whereas it was only nine per cent among Dutch youths. With the global economic crisis, the labour market opportunities for minori-
ties, especially youth, took a downward turn. Overall unemployment increased sharply in 2012. In the first quarter of 2012, 6.2 per cent of the workforce was unemployed. One year earlier, the unemployment rate was at 5.4 per cent. The number of unemployed workers of non-West-
ern origin increased from 99,000 to 125,000. At 15 per cent, the un-
employment rate in this group was two and a half times as high as the average unemployment rate. Unemployment among low-skilled ethnic minorities is 20 per cent, almost three times as high as among low-
skilled native Dutch (seven per cent). Among highly educated ethnic minority workers, 16 per cent were unemployed. This is more than five times as many as among highly educated natives (three per cent). Partly this is due to the fact that highly skilled minority workers are mostly young people, a category that has a much higher unemployment rate than older workers (Forum 2012).

In contrast with the 1990s, the social partners did not come up with measures to improve the labour market opportunities of ethnic minorities. In 2007, they did agree on a SER advice on improving the labour market position of ethnic minority youths which argued that one very valuable strategy would be to raise the educational level of ethnic minority youths. The advisory report recommended the intensification of efforts to remove language and educational disadvantages in primary and secondary education, to prevent young people from dropping out of school, to increase the number of pupils who continue their education, and to create work placement and apprenticeship places. The report concluded that the primary focus should be on training leading to certification combined with practical work. In other words: not ‘work first’, but ‘work and education first’. Although the SER called on employers’ associations and trade unions to make an extra effort to increase employment opportunities for ethnic minority youths, it proposed no concrete measures to improve these opportunities (SER 2007).

Within the FNV, the focus had shifted from formulating policies for specific target groups, such as minority workers, to a diversity approach. At the FNV Convention of 2006, the FNV decided to make diversity one of its priorities. The president of the FNV, Agnes Jongerius, was a particularly fervent advocate of diversity. Already in 2004, after the murder of Theo van Gogh and the intensification of the anti-Islamic discourse articulated in particular by the populist politician Geert Wilders, the FNV had taken the initiative to instigate a dialogue in the workplace between workers of various cultural backgrounds to improve the position of ethnic minority workers at the shop floor level. However, contrary to the 1980s when the far-right Centre Democratic party won a seat in parliament in the general elections of 1982, the FNV did not publically raise its voice against Geert Wilders’ populist party, the PVV. After the 2006 Convention, the FNV launched a number of campaigns to promote diversity on the work floor and within its own organisation. According to the campaign coordinator, these campaigns had some impact and did raise more awareness for diversity. The confederation had succeeded in establishing an organised network of active FNV members who carried out numerous campaigns at the municipality level and worked closely with community-based organi-
sations to influence local policies. The confederation also increased the number of ethnic minority employed within its organisation. However, the campaign coordinator did argue that the many pilot projects yielded little result in the labour market and have hardly led to a more sustained participation and involvement of minority workers and minority officials within the member unions. One exception is the organising campaign of FNV Bondgenoten. Although these campaigns did not specifically targeted migrant and ethnic minority workers, great efforts were made to involve these workers in workplace organising and include them in training programmes for new organisers. I have not seen official figures, but it is generally assumed that the organising campaigns of FNV Bondgenoten succeeded in increasing the membership rate of migrant and ethnic minority workers. It is, however, too soon to conclude whether these actions will have a long-term impact.

3.5 Towards a new trade union movement

In this chapter I have tried to examine what has changed since the international comparative study we published in 2000 (Penninx & Roosblad 2000) and my PhD thesis in 2002. I have described the changes that have occurred regarding the explanatory factors we have formulated in the original study, such as changes in the social, political and economic climate, in industrial relations and within the trade union movement since the turn of the century, and I have analysed whether these changes influenced the representation of migrant and ethnic minority workers’ interests. I have found no clear evidence that factors such as the social (public discourse), political and economic climate have had a direct effect on trade union policies. However, these are preliminary findings that require further research.

A factor of much importance is the change in industrial relations and the changes within the trade union movement itself. Through changes in industrial relations and a shift in the balance of power within their own organisations, trade unions have lost their strong institutional position and had to witness a deterioration in their capacity to influence socio-economic decision-making. This has affected their ability to represent workers’ interests, especially in sector-transcending issues at the national level. The new trade union faces a difficult challenge. It has to reinvent itself to save itself from obsolescence. At the same time, it has to find a balance between using new ways of organising workers and trying to recapture institutional and political power at the national level.
To what extent are dilemmas we have formulated in the Penninx & Roosblad study still useful, and what impact did the described changes in the past decade have on the outcome of these dilemmas? As to the immigration dilemma, Marino & Penninx (2010) argue that this dilemma has lost relevance. Since the 1990s, the regulation of migration has taken place primarily as a result of governmental initiatives both at the national and at the European Union level, without the direct involvement of employers, trade unions or other civil society organisations (see also Groenendijk & Minderhout 2004). However, at the sector level, trade unions and employers’ associations are often still involved in negotiating the terms and conditions of employing labour migrants in specific segments of the labour market (Roosblad 2005; De Lange & Pool 2004; Ter Beek et al. 2005).

With respect to the second dilemma – inclusion or exclusion – the deterioration of the power and influence of the trade unions forced the unions to broaden their scope. Although trade unions had formally always been open to all workers (regardless of their legal status), the decline of trade union membership triggered them to actively incorporate new groups of workers in their organisation, such as undocumented workers, which required a rethinking of strategies and coalitions (Gunther 2011; Martinez Lucio & Perrett 2009a, 2009b).

The third dilemma – equal versus special treatment – is also still valid. Immigrant and ethnic minority workers have their own challenges within the process of establishing the new trade union movement. At the moment of writing (2013), there is a vigorous debate going on amongst migrant and ethnic minority workers within the FNV regarding the way in which they should organise themselves within the new movement. A number of ethnic minority officials have promoted the idea of a separate association for ethnic minority workers within the new confederation analogous to the separate associations for youth and women within the FNV. Such an association would have its own funding and would have the ability to set up its own campaigns without first needing the approval of the other unions. However, among migrant and ethnic minority members, there is insufficient support for this idea. A majority of these members argue that their direct interests are best served through collective bargaining agreements in the sector in which they are employed. An association for migrant and ethnic minority workers would not have any say in these collective bargaining agreements. They prefer the idea of establishing a well-organised network of minority workers with a strong power base within the separate unions and a capacity to influence the political agenda of the trade union movement.
The ability of the new FNV to represent minority workers will clearly depend on its ability to overcome its current crisis. But the extent to which it will be able to attract and retain new generations of migrant and ethnic minority workers also depends on its potential to organise workers in poorly organised sectors as well as workers engaged in atypical employment such as temporary work, subcontracting or self-employment, of which a significant share is of an ethnic minority background.

Note

1 See: www.fnv.nl; www.stvda.nl.

References


4 Between old and new dilemmas

Describing trade unions’ inclusive strategies

Stefania Marino

4.1 Introduction

In 2000, Berghahn Books published a volume edited by Rinus Penninx and Judith Roosblad entitled Trade Unions, Immigration, and Immigrants in Europe, 1960-1993: A Comparative Study of the Attitudes and Actions of Trade Unions in Seven West European Countries. It consisted of seven national case studies analysed within a rigorous common analytical framework developed by the two editors. This book, written from a migration studies perspective, has become one of the studies most widely read and quoted by industrial relations scholars working on issues related to immigration. This is an exceptional result in view of the boundaries between disciplines. However, it is hardly surprising, considering that the two editors started their analysis by looking at factors and mechanisms that are central to the comparative research on trade union strategies and adopted a perspective that was novel for scholars working in the field of employment relations. Both the concept of ‘union dilemmas’ that was the starting point for their empirical observations and the set of factors they identified as playing a key role in producing differences across countries have been referred to and tested against research results in many subsequent studies (e.g. Krings 2010; Marino 2012; Connolly, Martínez-Lucio & Marino, forthcoming).

I started collaborating with Rinus Penninx and Judith Roosblad while working on my PhD thesis, and Rinus formally became my supervisor during the second year of my studies. My research perspective was very much a comparative industrial relations one and my interest in the representation of migrant workers was more a tool I intended to use to analyse trade unions’ internal dynamics and democratic procedures, their decision-making processes and their identity, as well as their ability to ‘renew’ themselves and respond to external challenges. The dialogue with Penninx and Roosblad made me aware of the importance of considering a cross-disciplinary perspective in dealing with my research topic and encouraged me to integrate
insights from disciplines with different epistemological and methodological foundations.

In this chapter, I revise one of the first attempts made in my PhD thesis to consider issues stemming from the two fields of study when engaging with empirical research in this field. This attempt consists of an instrument developed to guide analysis of trade union strategies towards migrant and ethnic minority workers, a ‘heuristic scheme’ for preparing research questions and analysing the data. This instrument is based on the dilemmas individuated by Penninx and Roosblad (2000) as well as on others arising in trade union debates and literature. I remember that Rinus was not too convinced by this attempt since he believed that such an instrument risked trapping my empirical observations. I hope he will find this revision more convincing.

4.2 ‘Historical’ dilemmas

In their book, Penninx and Roosblad (2000) identify three dilemmas that trade unions had to face in dealing with immigrant workers in the period between 1960 and 1993. The first dilemma is formulated in terms of ‘resistance to or co-operation with’ national governments as they recruited migrant workers to fill vacancies in the period of reconstruction after the Second World War. On the one hand, increased immigration could have had negative consequences for the national workforce because it could push down wage levels. Furthermore, employers could have used migrants as an ‘industrial reserve army’ in order to weaken the position of trade unions in collective bargaining and industrial disputes. On the other hand, trade unions were aware of the importance of migrant workers for the development of national economies. Furthermore, opposing immigration would have led to a break with the tradition of international solidarity widely embraced by trade unions.

A second dilemma, ‘the inclusion versus exclusion dilemma,’ concerned migrants already present in the country and the choices trade unions had to make regarding the extent to which migrant workers should be included among the rank and file and in the organisation itself. On the one hand, excluding migrants might have caused rifts within the labour movement that would have weakened the unions’ negotiating positions. On the other hand, inclusive strategies would have risked causing discontent among the national workforce, with the interests of migrant workers being perceived as conflicting with those of native workers.
If the unions decided to include migrant workers, they would have to take into account the differences between native and migrant workers – for instance, the cultural or ethnic characteristics of migrant groups as perceived by the host society and trade unions on the one hand, and by the migrants themselves on the other; problems related to trade union participation within structures created long before their arrival; etc. (Penninx & Roosblad 2000). Thus trade unions were confronted by a third dilemma, the ‘equal versus special treatment’ as defined by De Jongh (1984). The choice here was whether to ignore diversity and adopt general policies for all workers or to take into account the specific interests and needs of their migrant members and devise specific policies for them. To choose equal treatment by itself would have been to ignore the initial disadvantages of migrant workers and might have done nothing to improve their position. By contrast, if unions had adopted special measures, ‘a sort of white backlash may arise: native unionists may feel frustrated and may resist special measures in favour of immigrants’ (De Jongh 1984: 766). Penninx and Roosblad also argue that special treatment must be evaluated on the basis of its real scope and intensity: ‘special policies may be of quite a different kind, having different implications’ (2000: 11). There are measures intended to remove barriers within trade unions in order to facilitate migrant participation (translated documents, bulletins, special counsellors, etc.); there are measures that take into account the circumstances of migrants, for instance specific regulations that enable them to take longer summer holidays in their countries of origin; there are policies that negotiate cultural or religious concessions such as the right to take time off for non-Christian religious holidays, or the provision of a place of worship and halal food for Muslim workers.

Penninx and Roosblad (2000) claimed that the first two dilemmas were superseded in the countries under consideration. The first dilemma – whether to cooperate with or resist recruitment policies – was no longer relevant after the mid-1970s, when governments adopted restrictive immigration policies and trade unions simply had to endorse such policies. With respect to the second dilemma, unions decided to represent migrant workers during the 1980s after the failed attempt by national states to encourage migrant workers to return to their countries of origin. Hence they opted for inclusion only ‘once it had become clear that a large number of immigrants intended to stay permanently and that immigrant workers themselves were attempting to improve their labour position by a number of means’ (Penninx & Roosblad 2000: 8). Thus it is argued that trade union decisions were shaped by two exogenous factors, namely government policies and the permanent
settlement of immigrant workers. The two authors claim that these dilemmas cannot be regarded as resolved once and for all. Since external circumstances either relieved unions of the need to make choices or directed their action, changes in external circumstances might revive the same dilemmas in different countries at different times.

4.3 Current dilemmas and real inclusion

Despite the spread of restrictive migration policies and the strengthening of border controls, immigration to Western Europe has increased during the past decade. The free movement of labour and the accession of countries from Central and Eastern Europe to the EU have created a new dynamic of labour migration that poses unprecedented challenges to host societies. In addition, the current global economic crisis is negatively affecting this scenario and the labour markets of host countries are proving unable to easily absorb migrants for a range of social and economic reasons. Differences in interests between national and migrant workers, and the marginalisation of migrant workers, are becoming more manifest and pose a threat to social stability. Trade unions in Europe, as elsewhere, are some of the first organisations called upon to respond to such challenges, firstly because immigration is mainly seen as a labour issue and secondly, because conflicts between national and migrant workers often manifest themselves in the labour arena.

In the current scenario, the ‘old’ dilemmas acquire a new form. The ‘resistance or cooperation dilemma’ has once again become relevant, as trade unions have to choose between endorsing or opposing governments’ increasingly restrictive immigration policies. Some scholars have pointed out that trade unions’ choices in this respect are still focused on the protection of the national workforce. For instance, Watts (2002) explained the recent favourable attitude of Italian and Spanish unions towards more open immigration policies and their attempt to recruit and represent migrant workers by arguing that trade unions believe restrictive immigration policies and the consequent increase in illegal immigration will increase irregular economic activity, thereby damaging the wages and protection of native workers.

The ‘inclusion versus exclusion dilemmas’ is an important issue in the light of the worsening economic scenario in many host European countries and the consequent growth in hostility between native and migrant workers. As Penninx and Roosblad (2000: 14) explain: ‘in times of widespread unemployment the competition (whether actual or supposed) between indigenous and migrant workers could increase,
making a trade union policy of inclusion more problematic. Since trade union declarations on the need to include migrant workers are widespread across European trade unions, and in the light of trade union policies intended to achieve this aim, the ‘inclusion versus exclusion’ dilemma seems to have lost importance in the trade union debate. However, not only is there frequently a gap between inclusive policy and practice (Marino 2012) but trade unions’ approach to certain issues can be contradictory. In other words, the way trade unions define the concept of ‘inclusion’ and the way they deal with the ‘equal versus special treatment’ dilemma are central points.

Inclusion is here defined as full recognition of migrant workers as having the same social, employment, political and ‘organisational’ rights of all other workers and members, being able to join the organisation at all levels and to participate in both internal debates and the formation of general strategies. Acceptance of this definition of inclusion implies the adoption of special policies and measures addressing the position of migrant workers both within the union and in the wider social sphere, in the labour market and in the workplace. From an analytical point of view, this implies that the ‘equal versus special treatment’ has to be further disclosed.

In this operation, one of the dimensions of the ‘equal versus special treatment’ that has to be taken into account is the way in which trade unions decide to organise migrant workers’ voice within their organisations. This dimension is very important if the inclusion of migrant workers also means the integration of their point of view within the trade union organisation and its general policies. Vranken (1990) notes the existence of two organisational models for migrant workers within trade unions. The first is the ‘internationalist model’, which excludes any organisation of workers along national or ethnic lines on the basis of the internationalism doctrine in order to avoid exacerbating the division between foreign and indigenous workers. The second is the ‘pluralistic or diversity model’ which, by contrast, accepts the specificity of migrant workers and allows (and even encourages) the establishment of their own associations within the trade unions. The literature on women’s groups within trade unions has underlined the positive effect they might have in promoting the self-determination of women and their presence in leadership position, in implementing anti-discrimination and positive action campaigns as well as in redefining union interests and reconstructing union agendas and new forms of democracy (Parker 2002). However, this literature has also highlighted the danger of ghettoisation and marginalisation that is inherent in such separate groups. The same concern is shared by Virdee and Grint (1994),
who analyse self-organisation by black workers in UK trade unions. Some authors, consequently, have noted that inclusive outcomes are not guaranteed by the mere presence of an internal democratic space (e.g. Flynn, Brewster, Smith & Rigby 2004) but instead depend on the extent to which the groups’ proposals and ideas are able to influence the decision-making process, including the process and content of collective bargaining. Without structural links, special bodies risk disadvantaging rather than benefitting underrepresented groups, since they can easily be turned into powerless ghettos (Briskin 1993).

Another choice concerns the type of action adopted on behalf of migrant workers. In this regard, Ambrosini (2000), when discussing the representation strategies of Italian unions, distinguishes between two models of action: the ‘protective’ and ‘bargaining’ models. The protective model is based on ‘charitable protection’ and focuses on responding to general social needs; its mode of action is based on ‘legal and bureaucratic advice, network cooperation with public and non-profit institutions, pressure on public institutions, direct help’. According to Vranken (1990), trade unions have often acted as ‘welfare agencies’ for migrants and as their first ‘political’ organisation in defence of their basic social and economic rights. This has been due to the fact that the concentration of migrant workers in specific geographical areas ‘increased awareness of their presence and contributed to its being seen as a problem. It is because of this identification of “migrants” with “migrant workers” that trade unions have been concerned with all migrants and their problems’ (Vranken 1990: 47). The bargaining model, on the other hand, is based on negotiating activity; it is focused on the promotion of workers’ rights in workplaces and its type of action consists of ‘bargaining, initiating individual and collective disputes, representatives training’.

This model can be further specified if the content of trade union claims is kept distinct from the mode of action. The idea is that it is possible to bargain on social matters and to act politically on work-related issues. With respect to the claims, trade unions may decide to opt for the defence of either social needs (residence permit, accommodation, health insurance) in order to improve living conditions, promote social integration and achieve equality in society and the labour market; or they may decide to concentrate on work-related matters (wages, working hours, holidays, etc.), considering migrants as workers to be represented and promoting equality and integration in the workplace and the labour market. The promotion of migrant workers’ social rights is a central issue in the current scenario in view of the status of many migrants as only partial citizens in the host societies (see for instance
Hammar 1990; Lockwood 1996). The solution of problems relating to migrants’ legal position, as well as their access to welfare resources, is often given priority over the achievement of equal labour rights. From a trade union point of view, providing services and campaigning for the extension of social rights is in line with the tradition of ‘international solidarity’. Furthermore, despite the increasing political propaganda about the need to save welfare resources for the use of natives only, the risk of displeasing native workers by defending migrant workers’ social rights is still limited. In fact, it is more often trade union actions aimed at facilitating migrant workers’ access to labour rights that native workers regard as unfair.

However, unless they defend work-related rights, trade unions will find it difficult to improve migrant workers’ material conditions in the workplace. They also risk weakening their active participation in trade union action because migrant workers might see unions as ‘voluntary associations’ from which they expect to receive help without giving their specific support. To conclude, choosing solidarity action by itself would push union action for migrant workers outside the boundaries of the unions themselves and into the wider society, causing them to neglect their specific role: unions can act as social and voluntary associations, but no social and voluntary association can act as a union in standing up for migrant workers.

The last set of choices is related to the ‘instrument’ used to promote migrants’ rights: by bargaining at central or decentralised levels or by raising the political profile of an issue in the socio-political sphere. In defending both citizenship and industrial rights, in fact, trade unions may either negotiate with other social actors (also including governments) and reach formal or informal agreements on a specific issue or they can promote a socio-political debate in the form of social campaigns and demonstrations. Choosing between one or the other of these options has controversial consequences. On the one hand, choosing bargaining activity risks exposing trade unions to criticisms by native workers, the advantage being the gaining of migrant workers’ trust and hence their greater participation. On the other hand, shifting the focus of activity to the political arena has not only solidary significance but a strategic one as well. By involving voluntary associations, social movements, religious associations, political parties and so on, unions share responsibility for their actions with other social actors and at the same time gain greater powers of persuasion over other negotiating partners and their own rank and file. However, adopting an outright ‘political’ strategy would push union action outside their own boundaries into the wider society.
The set of choices discussed here reflects the complexity of the current situation but also makes clear that the promotion of genuine inclusion for migrant workers (as well as for other marginal groups) requires trade unions to widen their traditional role and to invest more in their role as social and ‘political’ actors.

4.4 A heuristic scheme for trade union strategies

The trade union dilemmas discussed in the previous sections represent some basic choices that trade unions have to make in representing migrant workers. Since the focus of attention here is on the representation of migrant workers already present in the country, the dilemma of ‘resistance or cooperation’ is not further discussed. Rather, the following dilemmas will be considered in this section:

– inclusion versus exclusion;
– equal versus special treatment;
– unitary versus plural model;
– social versus industrial rights;
– political versus bargaining action.

This set of choices may be used as a device to investigate trade union strategies. As already mentioned, such an instrument could be useful in guiding the gathering of empirical material and the analysis of data when comparing trade union actions across countries.

The first three sets of actions constitute dilemmas, which implies a straightforward choice between two alternatives. However, the choice of mode of action and the range of claims to be defended are not opposite and alternative. It is important to stress that trade unions may take the same action not only towards migrant workers who are already members and ideally also without the express intention of recruiting them. This is because of their twofold nature: ‘Unions are simultaneously and inextricably, even if with changing emphases over time, both free organizations (with a defined base, internal leaders elected according to statute, an administrative bureaucracy, rules of internal behaviour) and agents of more general representation, or movements potentially addressed to all those having in common the condition of workers (thus with uncertain and mutable perimeters and borders)’ (Regalia 1988: 352).

These sets of choices have been ordered so as to depict a process of choice.
Each choice (represented by an arrow) describes a specific logic of action. Choosing one solution implies a step further in the process leading to merely theoretical types of union models (arrival points represented by the rounded boxes). The last three dilemmas operate simultaneously. Each arrival point should be considered as a potential type of union action. There is only one exception: the possibility that unions opt for exclusion (choice A). In this case, the process results in self-organisation by migrant workers (Scheme 1 in figure 4.1).

The consequences of trade union exclusion of migrant workers may provoke several kinds of reaction on their part, which can be summarised by the position of migrant workers in an action space delimi-
between old and new dilemmas

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ited by two axes: the legal/illega l action axis and the formal/informal degree of organisation axis (Scheme 2 in figure 4.2). The intersection between the axes indicates migrant workers renouncing representation. The most illegal/most informal point in scheme (X) constitutes, for instance, spontaneous acts of sabotage in workplaces or riots. The most legal/most formal point (Y) stands for the formation by migrant workers of a new union that is recognised by other actors. The position in this space is influenced by several factors (contacts with unions in the country of origin, formal and informal contacts with other organisations and social movements, presence of a strong leadership, etc.). The formation of a new union is the riskiest option for existing trade unions since it might result in the weakening of union bargaining power.

If trade unions opt to include migrant workers, they will be confronted with the equal versus special treatment dilemma. Choosing the equal treatment option will result in the second box, which is the adoption of a colour-blind strategy. Although characterised by a general egalitarian attitude, these trade unions do not pay attention to specific migrant worker problems and claims unless these cannot be reconciled with the claims of the traditional constituency. For this reason, trade unions might be unable to improve migrant workers’ position in the labour market and the workplace and might find it more difficult to include their voice within the organisation. For their part, migrant workers may decide to resort to self-organisation in search of better representation (moving back to point 1).

If the union chooses special treatment, the process reaches the last three dilemmas, which operate jointly. The various combinations of choices lead to one final point (point 3) constituted by a continuum of possible strategies formed by the intersection of different solutions. The extremities of the continuum are, at one end, the ‘inclusive industrial model’ and, at the other, the ‘inclusive associative model’.

The first ideal type is formed by the intersection of unitary model, work-related rights and bargaining action. This ideal type is characterised by an egalitarian attitude, though concerned with the different needs and interests of minorities. It attempts to create a collective voice that turns specific migrant worker rights into general rights on the basis of justice and solidarity. Key points are awareness of belonging to the same class and encouraging participation by dispensing identity goods to members. However, this union does not provide a democratic self-organised space for migrant workers and in this way may well obstruct the self-promotion of migrant workers’ claims and their active participation in cultural change within trade unions. Furthermore, this type of trade union specifically focuses on work-related rights to be
defended strictly within the industry sphere. This focus could restrict trade unions’ ability to promote equal rights in the social and political spheres which, as noted above, are a key factor in the effective inclusion of migrant workers.

The second ideal type is made up of the intersection between plural organisation, political action and social rights. Unions belonging to the second ideal type favour the formation of specific bodies which, however, could be quite isolated within the organisation. Furthermore, they renounce the use of the traditional trade union instruments that enable them to act either as pressure groups in defence of migrants’ social and political rights or as voluntary associations providing services to migrant members. In this way, these trade unions are unable to pursue demands for improved working conditions and the elimination of differences at the industry and company levels.

Thus in neither ideal type can migrant workers achieve inclusion as defined in this section. Instead, the extent to which they are able to provide ‘real inclusion’ depends on the extent to which they are able to keep together and recompose these different logics of actions.

4.5 Conclusions

In this chapter, we have described a ‘heuristic scheme’ for the analysis of trade union strategies towards migrant workers that is developed with a view to guiding the collection and descriptive analysis of empirical material. Such an instrument might be especially useful when comparing trade union strategies towards migrant workers across different countries.

The analysis of trade union strategies through a progressive sequence of choices might help to reveal the extent to which inclusiveness is embedded in trade union choices. However, it is important to emphasise that this instrument addresses only unions’ formal policies and cannot take into account possible gaps between those policies and unions’ practices. These gaps or the lack of effort by trade unions to overcome obstacles to implementation are often to blame for poor outcomes with regard to inclusion (Marino 2012).

This analysis of formal trade union policies constitutes a relevant starting point for the analysis of trade unions’ attitude towards the inclusion of migrant workers. However, any attempt at analysis needs a broader focus on the efforts and actions of trade unions at central and decentralised levels as well as an investigation of the resources and institutional links made available to migrant workers seeking to self-organise in the inclusion process.
References


5 Blessing diverse neighbourhoods

Surrendra Santokhi

5.1 Introduction

Various studies indicate that first-generation immigrant entrepreneurs start their businesses in ethnically concentrated neighbourhoods. The start-up of these businesses gives advantages compared to native entrepreneurs because financing, inexpensive labour, suppliers, networks and customers are primarily allocated in the immediate ethnic circle, the so-called ethnic-cultural resources. The entrepreneurial activities in this market are on the other hand confined by type, size and performance. These markets are enclosed, become saturated, the potential remains untapped, the degree of specialisation is low, there is fierce competition, the long-term opportunities are considered limited and the businesses frequently fail (Light 1972; Waldinger 1986; Jones, Barrett & McEvoy 2000; Jones & Ram 2000; Rath 2000a, 2000b; Kloosterman 2000). Some immigrant entrepreneurs flee these saturated markets and settle down in poorer native neighbourhoods. Other entrepreneurs have specialised their ethnic products, such as the clothing market of South Asians and jewellers in Britain, and sell it primarily to their cultural counterparts across a far larger, even unlimited, geographical area. Some others settle down in the richer native neighbourhoods and their sales are geared towards the more rewarding open market, selling high-value-chain products. According to Jones et al. (2000) and Jones & Ram (2000), this is the final phase in the breakthrough of immigrant enterprises. These businesses can only be released when they outgrow the geographical limitations of ethnic markets and sell mainstream products.

This image presented in research literature of the ethnic market is refuted by various studies, which argue that the economic vitality of ethnically concentrated neighbourhoods has long been underestimated. A significant percentage of new entrepreneurs choose deprived urban areas as their first place of business (Kloosterman & Van der Leun 1999a, 1999b; Rath 2002; Santokhi 2010). This creates the impres-
sion that these neighbourhoods provide fertile soil for immigrant enterprise and focus on every economic activity imaginable. Kloosterman & Van der Leun (1999a, 1999b), for example, hypothesised that immigrant entrepreneurs potentially contribute to reinforcing the local economy in these neighbourhoods and that they offer not only specific goods and services but also provide employment and serve as information interchange and model to others. Small enterprises such as personal services in particular are on the rise thanks to developments such as outsourcing and offer further employment opportunities (Kloosterman 2000). Encouraging employment in these areas could create jobs and businesses for both native and immigrant residents. It should be noted that mainstream products in the high-value chains can also be sold to (co-)ethnic customers, as Rusinovic (2006) concluded in her research on second-generation immigrant entrepreneurs. She came to the conclusion that the second-generation entrepreneurs in particular are also active in a market that she calls the niche market. In this market, products such as mortgage and insurance packages are offered to (co-)ethnic customers exclusively. These customers come from all over the city, but mostly from ethnically concentrated areas. This means that mainstream markets need not be geared towards the native population in non-ethnic neighbourhoods by default.

The conclusions drawn in the above-mentioned scientific literature depict a twofold picture of economic potentials of immigrant entrepreneurship in ethnically concentrated areas. Some researchers emphasise the limitations of market potentials, while others point at opportunities. The development of multicultural tourism in ethnically concentrated areas in The Hague is an interesting case to assess this twofold picture. In this paper I shall explore whether this image of the development of immigrant entrepreneurship is applicable to all markets by describing the development of a specific market potential, namely multicultural tourism in ethnically concentrated areas in The Hague. The central question to be answered is: how do factors mentioned in the literature interfere in the case of The Hague? The underlying questions related to five factors elaborated in the literature are:

1. What role can government policy play?
2. What role can the social infrastructure play in creating a multicultural landscape?
3. In what way is the critical infrastructure connected to multicultural tourism?
4. What impact does the geographic concentration of immigrant entrepreneurs have on the development of multicultural tourism?
5. What are the potential negative effects of promoting multicultural tourism?
5.2 Multicultural tourism: theoretical embedding

The economic policy of the city of The Hague focuses on investing in efforts to increase the tourist appeal of ethnically concentrated areas by way of City Mondial, a programme based on the development of Chinatown and an Avenue Culinaire in the heart of the city. I will now summarise a number of important factors found in the literature that contribute to the success of multicultural tourism. From international studies on the rise of Chinatowns and other multicultural districts and the economic significance of cultural diversity in gateway cities, it can be concluded that certain factors need to be satisfied to boost the potential of multicultural tourism as well as immigrant entrepreneurship.

Firstly, government policy must play a key role. The government should provide an attractive investment climate for enterprise and good accessibility of these urban areas, while encouraging a good quality of life and actively combating crime (Rath 2005; Hall & Rath 2007; Collins 2007).

Secondly, a social infrastructure in ethnic areas offers space for a varied social and socio-cultural life. However, this does not imply that the ethnic minority population should necessarily live there (Collins & Castillo 1998; Hall & Rath 2007; Jones et al. 2000). Furthermore, multicultural tourism should form part of the broader local tourist industry. It takes more than the presence of immigrant enterprises selling cultural products to create a multicultural landscape that draws a large population of tourists (Bodaar & Rath 2005, 2006; Nicis Institute 2009).

Thirdly, Zukin (1991) pointed out the importance of the so-called critical infrastructure formed by individuals and institutions. Zukin gives the following explanation for the interest in multicultural products. There is a critical infrastructure of individuals who are connected in some way with cultural production and appreciation and who influence public taste. The critical infrastructure influences the popularity of the unique cultural products (Rath 2002: 20, 2005, 2007; Hall & Rath 2007). However, the ethnic-specific attractions must also appeal to a significant number of consumers if these individuals, institutions and intermediaries want to enjoy sufficient opportunities in this market. This means that, besides the small-scale and recurring socio-cultural activities, there should also be indications of sufficient and varied large-scale festivals that would draw a large general audience as well as tourists.

Fourthly, the presence of a large number of smaller immigrant enterprises should be based on the trade of ethnic products. Modern multimedia, the information society and constant immigration are preconditions for this tourist industry. Ethnic minorities can rapidly mobilise
their new or existing networks in their country of origin for the manufacturing of cultural products and benefit from the low production costs. It is also possible to instantly anticipate the current demands of both tourists and consumers from their own population group (Rath 2005, 2007).

Finally, any potential negative effects ensuing from multicultural tourism should be combated. Rath (2005, 2007) commented that it is important to stay alert with respect to potential inter-ethnic conflict, the male-female power balance which could encourage the oppression of women who are dominant in this sector (no wages or low wages), as well as voyeurism and stereotyping of ethnic districts and cultural manifestations. Ethnic minorities might also interpret this policy as unwanted interference (cultural imperialism) in their lives, as a large percentage started selling cultural products as a means of preserving and reinforcing their cultural identity (Rath 2005, 2007). This could result in conflict and obstruction. Furthermore, tension could arise between tourists and the local population, for example regarding the use of public spaces.

On the strength of the aforementioned factors that influence the development of multicultural tourism, the following image of the city of The Hague emerges.

**AD 1 Government policy**

We can deduce from the policy documents of The Hague that the local authorities have consciously set the tone in the development of City Mondial as a multicultural product. As regards Chinatown, we can conclude that the Chinese entrepreneurs with their presence in the city centre and plans for promoting Chinese entrepreneurship have created a fertile climate and attracted policy attention. It was possible to combine existing plans for the rezoning of this area with the initiatives of local citizens and businesses. The Municipality of The Hague played an active role in the development of Chinatown. The local council, for example, invested in market research to assess the feasibility of the tourist concepts of City Mondial, Chinatown and Avenue Culinaire (Weimar Marktonderzoek 1999). To that end, municipal as well as European resources were utilised from the urban 1 and Objective 2 programmes. The local government also played an important role in institutionalising Chinatown and Avenue Culinaire, assisting in the development of a broad network of investors, expanding the working area of City Mondial, establishing a multicultural and exotic image through the use of Chinese ornaments and signposts, renovating the streets and pave-
ments, bringing adjustments in the traffic route to make the area more accessible, facilitating the establishment of two Chinese gates to highlight the Chinatown area, funding most of the campaign for multicultural tourism and embedding it in the generic policy. Efforts to improve liveability included the Business Security Warranty and camera surveillance, assisting neighbourhood management organisations in keeping the neighbourhood clean, safe and well-maintained, and helping shopping street managers to act as a bridge between entrepreneurs and consumers.

The Municipality of The Hague used the multicultural tourism instrument to improve the image of ethnic minorities and socially and economically disadvantaged districts. The municipality consciously developed an intensive city marketing programme aimed at stimulating immigrant entrepreneurship by branding districts with a high percentage of immigrants as areas where multicultural tourism could make a positive contribution to their image and economic potential. The development of City Mondial and Chinatown is successful within the set targets.

AD 2 The social infrastructure

The small number of migrant organisations that existed in the 1960s and mid-1970s put together hardly any neighbourhood-oriented activities, because the immigrant population was too small and scattered across the city. Instead, ethnic minorities would meet at various locations during festivals and religious activities at rented spaces, football matches, film screenings, performances by artists from their home country, weddings, funerals, The Hague market and specialty supermarkets. The rich cultural life gained momentum from the mid-1970s, partly owing to the growth of the city’s immigrant population and the municipal welfare policy. Most of the migrant organisations are situated in ethnically concentrated areas and satisfy the requirements of the municipal subsidy policy. Migrant organisations received financial support to represent and serve the interest of their supporters. The local subsidy policy also facilitated regular small-scale socio-cultural activities. The growth of the immigrant population has served to further strengthen the social infrastructure in the City Mondial areas of Schilderswijk, Transvaal and Centrum/Stationsbuurt. There are approximately sixty religious institutions for immigrants concentrated mainly in these ethnic areas, and they form now an appealing multicultural landscape for tourists. The City Mondial walking tour also includes a visit to a number of large religious institutions.
The third factor I looked at is the critical infrastructure, which is formed by individuals and institutions that are connected in some way with cultural production and appreciation and who influence public taste (Zukin 1991). As early as the 1960s and 1970s, there was already a demand for ethnic entertainment in the city centre, albeit on a modest scale. In those days there were also two cinemas on the Boekhorststraat. Both the Roxy and Thalia theatres were leased out to entrepreneurs for the showing of Bollywood films. The theatres served as a meeting place and helped to develop and reinforce cultural identities. Surinamese entrepreneurs were active in the entertainment market and developed a network in Great Britain and India for the showing of movies and contracting Bollywood musicians and actors to perform in The Hague. These entrepreneurs took the first steps in creating a critical infrastructure for major cultural events and can be considered the cultural middlemen and trendsetters of the early days.

Since 1996, City Mondial forms the cornerstone of The Hague’s multicultural tourism, with Chinatown and Avenue Culinaire as sub-projects. City Mondial has developed exotic products and created an atmosphere of urban leisure and entertainment to attract a broad audience of tourists. Since the establishment of City Mondial, increasing numbers of intermediary institutions have started forming a critical infrastructure. Large-scale festivals such as Ha-Schi-Ba (now going by the name of KaschiBa), the Hindu Spring Festival of Colours (Holi), the Hindustani Film and Music Festival, the Hindu Festival of Lights (Divali), and the outdoor Multicultural Milan Festival (a three-day event attracting more than 50,000 visitors each year) provide a platform for trendsetters and cultural middlemen to make these activities appealing for tourists as well. A number of the ethnic organisations, such as Eekta and Milan Foundation, have now become part of the multicultural tourism industry and are involved in organising major events. The Chinatown Foundation, together with the local authorities, is playing an important role in promoting The Hague in China to catch the attention of tourists and Chinese firms. The establishment of the Wahdo Hotel in the heart of Chinatown and numerous specialised Chinese restaurants illustrate that Chinatown is part of the generic tourist economy of the city. The municipality is now conducting research into the possibilities for commercial activities between The Hague and India, in which the presence of a large Hindustani community and their cultural expressions could play an important role in attracting tourists and firms from India.
The concentration of a large number of immigrant entrepreneurs selling ethnic-cultural products is an important condition for the development of multicultural tourism. The city of The Hague meets this condition. In the period 1989-2005, the number of immigrant entrepreneurs in The Hague increased from 1,308 to 7,000. This linear increase has taken place in a period of economic growth and decline. In these figures the second generation immigrants, 15%, is not included. If we look at the spatial concentration of the immigrant entrepreneurs, then it is evident from table 5.1 that the percentage of immigrant residents in a district correlates with the presence of immigrant entrepreneurs. The ethnic concentration in districts like the city centre (Centrum) and Laak is the consequence of many factors such as the cheap housing stock and the migration of the native Dutch to other parts of the city due to the urban renewal policy (stadsvernieuwing). Immigrants filled up the vacancies. The immigrant population is increasing and more immigrants settle down in middle-class neighbourhoods such as Escamp District (Stadsdeel) and Leidschenvene-Ypenburg. In those neighbourhoods, both the number of immigrant residents and the number of immigrant entrepreneurs are increasing. The presence of an ethnic clientele plays a role in this settlement.

**TABLE 5.1 Immigrant residents and percentage of immigrant entrepreneurs in The Hague**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Number of residents in 2006</th>
<th>Number of native residents</th>
<th>Percentage of native residents</th>
<th>Percentage of immigrants</th>
<th>Percentage of immigrant entrepreneurs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Loosduinen</td>
<td>46,128</td>
<td>35,082</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scheveningen</td>
<td>52,782</td>
<td>38,750</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leidschenvene-Ypenburg</td>
<td>34,664</td>
<td>23,728</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haagse Hout</td>
<td>41,387</td>
<td>25,944</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Segbroek</td>
<td>58,708</td>
<td>37,501</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Escamp</td>
<td>107,876</td>
<td>57,012</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centrum</td>
<td>96,977</td>
<td>29,967</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laak</td>
<td>37,058</td>
<td>13,732</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>475,580</td>
<td>261,716</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The policy of urban restructuring (herstructurering), which started in The Hague in the 1990s, also had a positive impact on the number and quality of new immigrant firms. In this restructuring policy, houses and business premises were combined to form so-called ‘mixed functions’ or ‘dual land use’. In three streets situated in the multicultural tourist area that I investigated, it emerged that 90 per cent of the entrepreneurs were immigrants (Santokhi 2010). These businesses had recently been established there, which evidently meant that in this case, mixed functions in the shape of dual land use in restructuring districts provided opportunities for immigrant entrepreneurship. It was clear that the presence of the immigrant population in this district influenced this percentage; immigrants with resources mostly obtained from their own communities and savings had succeeded in starting up these businesses there (KplusV 2005). This also demonstrates the resilience of these districts, which often had a reputation of being deprived districts with a poor social image. The strong growth of immigrant entrepreneurship takes place in districts where you would not expect it. Policy has also changed ideas about immigrant entrepreneurship as well as the image of districts with a high percentage of immigrants and given immigrants more faith in their own opportunities. Companies that were considered to have no future in the most concentrated ethnic areas still exist. There is obviously a dynamic in these neighbourhoods that is not always fully recognised.

The concentration of immigrant entrepreneurs in the inner city (Centrum) was a pre-condition for the development of City Mondial as a carrier of the concept of multicultural tourism. As regards Chinatown, the municipal policy consciously chose a geographical concentration of small-scale entrepreneurs to shape the local tourist industry. Without this concentration, there could be no development of a multicultural landscape to draw urbanites and tourists to the area. During its pioneering phase from 1996 to 2000, City Mondial had already made the first attempts to market multicultural tourism in The Hague’s most ethnically concentrated areas of Transvaal and Schilderswijk, where more than 85 per cent of the population are of ethnic background (DHIC 2012). In Chinatown, Chinese businesses have created a solid environment for assessing the feasibility of the Chinatown concept and for marketing it. The Municipality of The Hague also developed Chinatown in the city centre as a tourist draw, and the product development is also geared towards this. Attracting tourists also means the concentration of certain market sectors, such as restaurants, pastry shops, small retailers, personal services such as hairdressers and massage parlours, souvenir shops and health centres. The aim of this
policy is not for established entrepreneurs to seek out alternative production environments but instead to provide these businesses with a sustainable existence, because the development of Chinatown hinges on the continued presence of successful businesses in the area so they can serve as a model for new enterprises and preserve the area’s tourist appeal.

AD 5 Potential negative effects

Some of the negative effects of multicultural tourism often cited in literature have also emerged in the city’s discussions from time to time. The fears of voyeurism by some local politicians and of inter-ethnic tensions as a result of multicultural tourism proved to be unfounded. The broad support in political circles due to the positive results finally put an end to this negative image. Sixty per cent of the visitors said in a survey (City Mondial 2004; City Mondial 2006) that they would definitely visit this district again, although city residents, tourists and entrepreneurs avoided the district in the 1980s and 1990s because it was considered uninhabitable. This negative image of the district has meanwhile been dispelled as far as these visitors are concerned. There are no indications from the immigrant communities of cultural imperialism. The settled businesses in this area see multicultural tourism as a possibility for additional income.

Tensions occasionally erupt between the organising intermediaries (cultural middlemen) and local residents and their intermediary bodies (residents’ organisations) on the use of public space for large-scale events such as the Holi Festival. It concerns basic matters such as permits, parade routes, public nuisance and post-festival clean-ups. However, these do not constitute tensions between tourists and locals. There are no indications that immigrant entrepreneurs experience unsolicited disruptions of their daily work rhythm or their cultural manifestations.

5.3 Conclusion

This study of the development of multicultural tourism in an ethnically concentrated area in The Hague confirms the five factors mentioned in the literature. These factors could be applicable in the development of other multicultural districts such as Little India, which is being discussed within the Surinamese community of The Hague. The impact of the five factors can be highlighted as follows.
G**OVERNMENT POLICY**

The Municipality of The Hague played an active role in the development of Chinatown as part of its policy to develop multicultural tourism. The local council invested in market research to assess the feasibility of the tourist concepts of City Mondial, Chinatown and Avenue Culinaire. The municipality also utilised financial resources, helped in institutionalising Chinatown, assisted in the development of a broad network of investors, expanded the working area of City Mondial, established a multicultural and exotic image through the use of Chinese ornaments and signposts, embedded the marketing of multicultural tourism in the generic policy, renovated the streets and pavements, funded most of the campaign for multicultural tourism and improved the liveability of the area by installing camera surveillance and assisting in neighbourhood management of security.

**SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE**

The rich cultural life of The Hague gained momentum from the mid-1970s, partly owing to the growth of the city’s immigrant population and the municipal social welfare subsidies for participation in the society. This policy facilitated regular small-scale socio-cultural activities. The growth of the immigrant population has served to further strengthen the social infrastructure in the City Mondial areas of Schilderswijk, Transvaal and Centrum/Stationsbuurt. A number of ethnic organisations have become part of multicultural tourism and are involved in organising annual large-scale festivals that form an appealing multicultural landscape for tourists. The City Mondial walking tour for example includes a visit to a number of large religious institutions.

**CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE**

In the 1960s and 1970s, a number of immigrant entrepreneurs took the first steps in creating a critical infrastructure for major cultural events and can be considered the cultural middlemen and trendsetters of the early days. This fertile ground was an important factor for City Mondial to form the cornerstone of The Hague’s multicultural tourism, with Chinatown and Avenue Culinaire as sub-projects. Since the establishment of City Mondial in 1996, increasing numbers of intermediary institutions and entrepreneurs contributed to the critical infrastructure to attract tourists and the local population.
Geographic concentration of immigrant entrepreneurs

This study proves that ethnically concentrated areas are not by definition stifled by negative neighbourhood effects. The main aim to develop multicultural tourism by means of City Mondial was to attract locals and tourists to the area in an effort to stimulate the neighbourhood’s economy. Policymakers consciously chose a geographical concentration of small-scale entrepreneurs to shape the local tourist industry. Without this concentration, there could have been no development of an exotic multicultural landscape. This form of concentration is a precondition for the branding of the district, and it should be noted that, though Chinese businesses are the carriers of the Chinatown concept, the aim is to raise the visibility of other ethnic groups in this area as well so that Chinatown becomes a ‘global district’ where non-Chinese businesses can also flourish. Chinatown has become a marketplace where a growing variety of mainstream products are traded. Examples of these include health stores, acupuncturists, furniture stores, haute cuisine restaurants, pastry shops, wholesalers in specialised products and beauty parlours.

The research on The Hague illustrates that most of the immigrant entrepreneurs establish their businesses in districts with a high percentage of ethnic minorities, and their numbers are increasing every year. They take full advantage of the opportunities offered in the commercial market. They set up their businesses increasingly in high potential markets. So, ethnically diverse neighbourhoods can count their economic blessings. The concentration of immigrant entrepreneurs in the inner city (Centrum) was a pre-condition for the development of City Mondial as a carrier of the concept of multicultural tourism.

Potential negative effects

In the initial years of the development of multicultural tourism, some local political parties were reluctant to proceed due to fears of voyeurism. This negative image was soon dispelled because of the positive impact of multicultural tourism on the local economy.

Notes

1 The ethnic products that are traded in this market are slightly more specialised than those in the local ethnic market, and the immigrant entrepreneurs usually cater to a native clientele competing with native businesses in the same sector. These concern businesses such as Chinese takeaways (Jones et al. 2000). Com-
blessing diverse neighbourhoods

2 These markets are characterised by a high percentage of native customers, and businesses are situated at strategic locations, such as filling stations and hotels. Indian restaurants that serve native customers across the entire city and entrepreneurs who manufacture export products are examples of businesses in this market (Jones et al. 2000).

3 Jones & Ram (2000) define four breakout strategies: product differentiation, portfolio breakthrough where entrepreneurs own more than one business, promotion breakthrough (marketing, advertisements) and mobility towards middle-class locations.

4 Multicultural tourism refers to the trade in ethnic-cultural products – both tangible and intangible – in a physically recognisable multicultural urban landscape.

5 Programmes funded by the European Union.

6 In 2012, The Hague had a population of 502,803. Half of the population had an ethnic background. The Surinamese (47,038 = 9.3%), most of them Hindustani (an estimated 85%), make up the city’s largest immigrant group (DHIC 2012). The screenings lost their audience to the rising popularity of video stores in the 1980s and 1990s. They regained their appeal in the late 1990s, partly owing to satellite television and the screening of Indian TV shows by cable companies. The Stichting Hindustaans Film- en Muziekfestival (Hindu Film and Music Festival Foundation) was established in 2002 in support of the screening of Bollywood films and the performance of Indian song and dance.

7 Other examples are: Mela, Navratan Shopping Evenings, the Chariot Festival (Rath Yatra), the Chinese Moon Festival, Chinese New Year celebrations, Chinese markets, the Crossing Border World Music Festival, the Miss India Holland elections and the ‘Around the World in your own City’ programme.

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**Websites**

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6 The educational mobility of second-generation Turks in cross-national perspective

Empirical findings, explanations and policy lessons

Philipp Schnell

6.1 Introduction

Children of immigrants are leaving school and entering the labour market in increasing numbers in most northwestern European countries. Their opportunities and achievements in these countries are often regarded as the 'litmus test' for integration and for the success or failure of policies in this field (Penninx 2003). The key arena in which to examine the integration of immigrant youth is that of educational attainment (Kao & Thompson 2003; Zhou 1999). Here, there is a substantial body of literature that looks at the comparative academic achievements of different immigrant ethnic groups, and at the varying degrees of educational mobility among their children (see Heath, Rothon & Kilpi 2008 for a review; Penn & Lambert 2009).

Considerable attention has been devoted to the children of Turkish immigrants because Turks are one of the largest immigrant groups and among the most disadvantaged in terms of education. Previous studies have reported high drop-out rates among Turkish youth, in parallel with a higher tendency to repeat grades and generally lower levels of access to higher education (Dustmann, Frattini & Lanzara 2012). Although patterns of disadvantage are evident in most countries, first comparative studies point to remarkable variations from one country to another in terms of the extent of the disadvantage faced by second-generation Turks (Crul & Vermeulen 2003). However, neither the precise scale of the differences in educational mobility nor the reason for the cross-border variations is at all clear (Heath et al. 2008). Current research tends to focus primarily on differences in levels of achievement between second-generation Turks and the majority groups in their various countries. Other studies that do examine cross-national variations often pay little attention to the role played by variations in the institutional arrangements of the different countries’ education systems. If they address this issue at all, they often reach conflicting results that leave both empirical lacunae and unanswered questions (Schnell 2012). In this essay I aim to
partially redress this issue by asking: What causes variations in the educational mobility of second-generation Turks across countries? More precisely, I examine differences in the degree of educational mobility of second-generation Turks across three European countries and five cities, namely Sweden (Stockholm), France (Paris and Strasbourg) and Austria (Vienna and Linz). Data for this study comes from the TIES survey, a collection of data about the children of immigrants from Turkey (as well as from the former Yugoslavia and Morocco) now living in fifteen European cities in eight countries, which was carried out in 2007 and 2008. From the pool of available countries participating in TIES, Austria, France and Sweden have been selected as suitable ‘cases’ for comparison. Sweden has an education system with late selection and full-day teaching. By contrast, the Austrian education system has early selection and half-day teaching. Finally, France has been selected as a third case for this comparison. Although its education system is similar to the Swedish one, a number of national studies have revealed that the French education system may also have ‘selective moments’, making it an interesting contrasting case. In all three countries (and their five cities), samples of second-generation Turks and a comparison group are used. Taken together, the empirical analyses of this study are based on a total sample of 2,294 respondents.

I will begin by studying educational mobility at the aggregated level by analysing differences in educational attainment. The analysis then goes on to investigate educational pathways in order to shed light on the processes of educational mobility. In an attempt to establish what the explanatory factors actually are, and to understand the divergent patterns of educational mobility among the Turkish second generation across the different countries, emphasis will be given to interaction mechanisms that exert influence at both an individual and an institutional level. I define ‘interactions’ as the interplay between the institutional arrangements of education systems and different individual- and group-related resources that are relevant for navigating successfully through these systems (Schnell 2012). Finally, in the concluding remarks of this essay, I reflect on a number of modest policy-related implications drawn from this empirical groundwork. I provide recommendations for policy action aimed at developing meaningful strategies and interventions to reduce ethnic educational inequalities, abolish structural barriers and promote educational mobility for the children of immigrants.
6.2 Cross-country differences in degrees of educational mobility

Beginning with a first glance at educational outcomes, the investigation of absolute differences between second-generation Turks across the three countries revealed that the size of the group of high achievers (those with post-secondary education or higher) is more than twice as high in France and Sweden as it is in Austria. At the same time, the highest percentage of early school-leavers (those with primary and lower-secondary education at most) among the Turkish second generation was found in the Austrian cities (Table 6.1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Austria</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Sweden</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Second-generation Turks</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compar. group</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early school leaver</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High achiever</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second-generation Turks</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compar. group</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early school leaver</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High achiever</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: TIES 2007-2008, author’s analysis

Comparing second-generation Turks and their comparison groups across the three countries and five cities showed that differences in educational attainment were most pronounced at the highest and lowest ends of the education ladders in Austria and France. In both countries, such comparative attainment differences were higher overall than in Sweden (compare Table 6.1).

These cross-country attainment differences are mirrored in the analysis of educational pathways. In general, second-generation Turks are academically more disadvantaged than the comparison group because they are more likely to be placed in less academic tracks at school, and so are less often found in the academically orientated tracks that lead to tertiary education. These relative differences in educational pathways are most pronounced in the Austrian education system. They can be seen clearly in France, and they are least pronounced in the Swedish education system.

Overall, the comparisons of educational attainment and educational pathways revealed similar rankings across the three compared countries (and five cities): second-generation Turks show the weakest performance in Austria, a medium to high level in France, and the best
performance in Sweden. The educational mobility of second-genera-
tion Turks across Austria, France and Sweden thus shows significant
differences. The next section turns to the question of how these differ-
ences can be explained.

6.3 Explaining cross-country differences

In order to explain the differences described above, I argue that on the
one hand it is important to consider a number of specific institutional
arrangements within each education system, which together form
country-specific institutional constellations. On the other hand, such
institutional arrangements shape to a great extent the interaction with
individual-level factors and resources, such as family resources or the
significant role of peers and teachers. They also determine their mag-
nitude and direction, and set the point in time at which educational
resources become relevant (Schnell 2012; Schnell & Crul 2013). In this
section, I will show these varying interactions and thus illustrate the
influence of individual-level factors on educational attainment.

The main components of the Austrian education system are the late
starting age of pre-schooling (around age four), the early segregation
into different ability tracks (at the age of ten), a low degree of perme-
ability between education tracks after the early tracking, and a half-day
teaching system in compulsory education. The impact of this institu-
tional constellation on the early stages of a student’s education leads to
greater interaction with family resources. Parents are important agents
in this early period in supporting their children’s learning and mak-
ing school choices. Children of less educated parents are frequently
streamed into less academic tracks in lower-secondary education. This
is particularly true for second-generation Turks who are more often
tracked into the lower stream (66 per cent versus 41 per cent for the
comparison group) because they originate in higher numbers from less
educated families, thus confirming the specific relevance of the parents’
educational backgrounds in the early selection process. This process is
reinforced by the low participation rates in pre-schooling by second-
generation Turks in the Austrian cities (65.5 per cent as compared to
83 per cent among the comparison group). Both factors contribute to
explaining the greater downward streaming of second-generation Turks
at the first transition point after primary school, and this early selection
determines to a large extent their subsequent educational pathways.

The significance of within-family resources is also related to the half-
day schooling system that persists throughout the compulsory edu-
cation years. The responsibility to learn is transferred to the parental home and to the students' leisure time, which makes parental involvement and support significantly more important for students in terms of learning and homework. Although the relevance of family support has been clear for all students in the Austrian system, family support is of greater importance for second-generation Turks than for the comparison group.

While family resources are especially important in the early phase of schooling, outside-family agents and related resources become more important later. In order to climb to the top of the educational ladder, access to the resources provided by non-immigrant peer networks as well as the support offered by teachers become crucial for the children of Turkish immigrants in Austria. In particular, the support of teachers in upper-secondary education is of great importance for second-generation Turks if they are not to abandon their academic careers before entering post-secondary or tertiary education.

The Austrian education system offers the option of moving upwards at the end of lower-secondary education to students who have been placed in the vocational stream after primary school. In this context, non-immigrant peers are important if a student is to move upwards at this stage, because second-generation Turks on the vocational path usually come from less educated families who are rarely equipped with the knowledge or resources to support them in the upward process. Best friends outside the family become the major source of information and support. But the low percentage of second-generation Turks who finally move upwards (23 per cent) indicates that the support provided by the peer group is not adequate in very many cases.

In France, an early pre-school starting age (around age three), full-day pre-school services, guaranteed pre-school places, and a full-day comprehensive compulsory schooling system are among the main components of a national institutional constellation that leads to relatively few interactions with family resources. In particular, supplementary help from family members is regarded as less important because this type of support is institutionalised in the education system. The orientation process that determines selection into upper-secondary education is the single most crucial institutional arrangement for French students. Although this first selection happens relatively late (around fifteen), the orientation process involves a high degree of interaction with a number of individual-level factors. Firstly, having highly educated parents increases the chances of students being streamed into academic tracks. This correlation between tracking decisions and parents’ educational backgrounds explains to a large extent why there are unequal continu-
Migration rates into the academic track for second-generation Turks and their comparison group (53 per cent compared to 80 per cent for the comparison group). Secondly, teachers and the support and advice they provide are crucial at this stage in streaming students upwards towards the academic tracks. Finally, the ethnic composition of peers in school matters a great deal for second-generation Turks at this point. If parents cannot help, peers in the comparison group – whose parents or older siblings have experience and knowledge of the French education system – become crucial sources of information for second-generation Turks. Selection into different types of upper-secondary tracks through this orientation process determines to a large extent the educational pathways that students will follow.

In addition, differentiation in the upper-secondary academic tracks, and the ‘second chance’ to enter post-secondary and tertiary education by the vocational route, are also important features of the French institutional constellation. The late opportunity for an upward transfer interacts less strongly, however, with the educational background of parents or with family support. Instead, the number of native peers in the vocational school and the support provided by teachers are the most important factors for second-generation Turks being able to acquire the relevant certificate and enter post-secondary and tertiary education by this route.

In Sweden, the institutional constellation of the education system is composed of full-day pre-school services that children can attend from two years old onwards, and an integrated track from primary school until the end of lower-secondary education, with full-day teaching. The first allocation into different tracks comes at the transition into upper-secondary education (at the age of fifteen/sixteen). Other important elements are the high degree of permeability between tracks in upper-secondary education and the possibility of entering post-secondary/tertiary education from all upper-secondary tracks (both academic and vocational). Routine full-day schooling leads to fewer interactions with individual-level factors and makes family resources less relevant in the educational mobility of the study groups. Even at the first transition point, before entering academic or vocational tracks in upper-secondary education, family characteristics (such as parents’ education or the availability of additional educational resources) are unimportant because the transition is not linked to a specific differentiation process. As a result, second-generation Turks enter academically orientated tracks in numbers similar to the comparison group, irrespective of family background (slightly more than 50 per cent in both groups).
Moreover, the high degree of permeability between tracks, and the fluid links between the upper-secondary tracks and post-secondary and tertiary education, mean that individual-level factors are of minor relevance to the educational mobility of second-generation Turks. Interactions with individual-level factors appear only at the highest end of the Swedish education system. Students with less-educated parents leave the education system more often than they continue. This is particularly true of second-generation Turks because they come in higher numbers from less-educated families. Apart from parents’ education levels, peers are perceived as the most important influences on second-generation Turks in this phase of schooling.

The findings of my study highlight the fact that explaining cross-national differences in the educational mobility of second-generation Turks cannot be limited to a single set of factors. Two elements are involved in the mobility process: first, the children of Turkish immigrants, with their own individual characteristics, family backgrounds and relationships with important agents such as peers and teachers; and second, the countries’ education systems, each with their particular institutional arrangements. It is the interaction between the two that determines the direction, and the ultimate outcome, of the educational mobility process. But education systems, in terms of their institutional arrangements and the way they determine the relevance of individual-level factors, matter more for the outcome of this process. Those systems that provide more favourable institutional arrangements make the educational mobility of second-generation Turks less dependent on individual-level factors and resources, thus leading to greater educational achievement. The examination of these interactions throughout a student’s entire education highlights the favourable and unfavourable institutional settings that are relevant in terms of grasping variations in educational mobility in a cross-national comparison. Findings from this study point to the need to explore interactions between institutional and individual-level factors in order to understand variations in the educational success of second-generation Turks across various countries.

6.4 Concluding remarks: lessons for policy

The differences in the educational mobility of second-generation Turks across the three countries represent a daunting challenge, especially for those countries whose education systems incorporate unfavourable institutional arrangements. My findings suggest that the combination of a
number of important generic institutional arrangements seems to lead to greater levels of inequality and a lower chance of upward mobility for second-generation Turks because of greater interactions with individual level resources – as compared to the situation in other countries.

One of the most pressing questions that arises from these observations is: what should we do? In this concluding section I will provide some policy recommendations based on the findings of this study that I believe should be at the heart of a more effective educational mobility experience for second-generation Turks in particular, and for children of immigrants in general.

Reject early selection and tracking — As the data suggest, the earlier a student is selected and tracked into different (ability) schools, the higher the importance of the parents’ educational background. In Austria, larger inequalities in parents’ educational attainment lead to stronger differences in their children’s chances in school, since the education system is highly selective at an early stage of schooling. The opposite is the case in France and Sweden, where disadvantaged children of less-educated parents are less dependent on their family backgrounds when tracked at a later age. This finding has profound consequences for second-generation Turks (and children of immigrants in general) measured against their comparison groups. The great majority of the Turkish second generation has its roots in families whose parents frequently have low educational qualifications and often lack the means to support their children in school-related activities. They also have limited information on school choices. Being tracked into different streams after just four years of compulsory education provides too little time for their children to overcome these initial disadvantages. In addition, delayed selection increases the chances of children of less-educated parents entering academic streams. Policy action is needed to restructure the selection moments towards a system with delayed selection in order to reduce inequalities and to provide a sufficient learning period for children of immigrants to catch up with students of non-immigrant origin.

Increase pre-school opportunities and quality — My findings reveal that among the most important generic institutional factors that may explain educational differences across countries are pre-school attendance and age on entering education. Results for France and Sweden indicate that almost all children of both groups attend some sort of pre-school facilities already at age three. By contrast, pre-school education in Austria usually takes place in the kindergarten, which is not considered part of the education system and thus has the ethos of early childcare rather than early education. Moreover, as shown in this study,
second-generation Turks attended kindergarten facilities less often, and the majority of those who went to pre-school started later than age four, which consequently leads to a shorter duration of pre-schooling. The different institutional arrangements for pre-school attendance and starting age result in remarkable differences in the preparation time for compulsory education for young children across the three countries. Second-generation Turks whose parents may have limited education and language skills do not achieve the schooling readiness of their classmates of non-immigrant parents, and thus have to rely more heavily on pre-school education. If the preparation time in pre-school facilities is short, they are already in a disadvantaged position when starting compulsory education in primary school. My empirical evidence confirms that if early childhood education starts at a sufficiently young age, it significantly aids the development of second-generation Turks, especially in the case of children from low socio-economic family backgrounds. Thus, municipalities should be obliged to provide pre-school places free of charge for all children and pre-school services should offer a full-day care system. They should also provide the opportunity to start at a younger age (e.g. age three). In Austria, as recently claimed in a number of studies (Nusche, Shewbridge & Rasmussen 2009; Wroblewski & Herzog-Punzenberger 2009), further development is still needed in the quality of pre-school education and support, in particular with respect to the quality of language support (Herzog-Punzenberger & Schnell 2012). Finally, because placing young children in pre-school may not be the cultural practice of some immigrant parents, programmes are needed which allow information on early education to be shared with immigrant families.

Longer training hours in schools — During my research, I found that the educational success of second-generation Turks in Austria is much more dependent on various forms of additional support provided by their parents than that of their counterparts in France and Sweden. In addition, measuring them against their comparison group revealed that family involvement and support is an important aspect in the Austrian education system for all groups, while it is almost absent in France and Sweden. The results show, however, that second-generation Turks rely even more on educational support from their parents than do children of the comparison group. These findings point towards one important institutional feature: the major distinction between the three education systems is the half-day school system in Austria on the one hand, and full-time education in France and Sweden on the other. As a result, the family becomes the focal point of an educational system which delegates learning and homework to the family home, where the
educational success of students is highly dependent on the help provided and the time families spend with them. By contrast, with systems such as those in France and Sweden that offer full-time education and supervised homework tutorials in schools, the role of help provided by parents becomes important only once children face difficulties and need more support than is on offer at school. Half-day school systems should therefore expand after-school programmes that provide tangible academic support, such as homework help, language tutoring and information about extra-curricular activities and future pathways, thus reducing dependence on support at home, especially for children of immigrants such as second-generation Turks.

*Prioritising teacher preparation* — One significant finding to take away from my study is the vital role of teachers during the educational careers of second-generation Turks in all three countries. Because Turkish parents possess relatively few means to support their children's education, teachers play a very important role in their schooling. They serve as motivators who reinforce aspirations and act as gatekeepers in advising on more prestigious tracks, in particular for second-generation Turks from disadvantaged family backgrounds (Schnell, Keskiner & Crul 2013). Interpersonal social relations between students and teachers increase the chances of successfully managing the most important transition points and are significant agents for second-generation Turks when navigating successfully through the indirect routes of these education systems. But not all teachers have been trained to deal with students and classrooms that are becoming increasingly diverse. While in France and Sweden ‘diversity training’ is built in as part of initial teacher education (Taguma, Kim, Brink & Teltemann 2008), substantial numbers of the teacher population in Austria lack the knowledge and skills to meet the needs of students with an immigrant background since intercultural education is not a compulsory module in their education (Furch 2009). Ministries and educational policymakers should introduce mandatory initiatives to strengthen the capacity of teachers to support and advise students of immigrant origin. Linguistic diversity and intercultural education should become a core principle in the curriculum for teacher training in all European countries. The new programmes must provide teachers exposure to, and appreciation of, the family backgrounds of Turkish second-generation students and the children of immigrants. In addition, initiatives should be launched to increase diversity among new teachers themselves (Herzog-Punzenberger & Schnell 2012), and non-governmental organisations supporting the development of teachers in intercultural education should be promoted through state resources and funding (Luciak & Khan-Svik 2008).
Building mentoring and community supports — Mentoring relationships often evolve in after-school programmes and community-based organisations, and they can generate considerable social good. Furthermore, as previous research suggests, mentoring relationships can make a significant difference in adolescents’ lives (Suárez-Orozco, Suárez-Orozco & Todorova 2008). For second-generation Turks and for minority youth from disadvantaged family backgrounds with limited social resources, mentors can support students in schools by providing homework tutoring, guidance in important school choices, or simply by acting as role models. As the data suggest, Turkish parents are often unable to provide sufficient educational support for their children, and mentors can provide a valuable service by filling that void. The need for mentoring or community support is all the greater for second-generation Turks in an education system like Austria’s, which delegates learning and homework to the family home because of its half-day training system. Previous research in Austria (as well as in countries like the Netherlands or the United Kingdom) has shown that community involvement and mentoring programmes, if available, are associated with improved student outcomes because they reduce the pressure on parents who may lack the skills to support their children (Jeynes 2005, 2007; Schofield 2006). But community and mentoring programmes depend on funding to establish such programmes. Thus, ministries and their agents should not only encourage immigrant or neighbourhood communities to organise educational support programmes for young students, but they should also offer resources and clarify the application processes for funding.

Turkish immigrants are one of the largest groups of foreign origin in Europe. Faced with all the difficulties that invariably beset migrants in a new country, parents understandably see schooling as the path to a brighter future for their children. The five recommendations outlined here should be seen as the first elements in a framework aimed at abolishing structural barriers and building a more forward-looking education policy that better serves the needs of second-generation Turks who have chosen education as the means to change their lives.

Notes
1 This essay is based on my dissertation which was supervised by Rinus Penninx and Maurice Crul (2008-2012).
2 The participating countries and cities were Austria (Vienna and Linz), Belgium (Brussels and Antwerp), France (Paris and Strasbourg), Germany (Frankfurt
and Berlin), Spain (Madrid and Barcelona), Sweden (Stockholm), Switzerland (Zürich and Basel) and the Netherlands (Amsterdam and Rotterdam). The full data set brings together almost 10,000 respondents. The term 'second generation' refers to children of immigrants who have at least one parent born outside the survey country (in this case, born in Turkey) but who were themselves born in the survey country and have had their entire education there. At the time of the interviews, the respondents were between 18 and 35 years old.

References


THE ETHNO-CULTURAL DIMENSION
The ‘ethno-cultural position’ reconsidered

An investigation into the usefulness of the concept when it comes to Moroccans

Anja van Heelsum

7.1 Introduction

In 1997 I argued that the concept *ethno-cultural position* – introduced as part of Penninx’s heuristic model in 1988 – should be used instead of the concept *ethnic identity* (Van Heelsum 1997). I had used this new term to find out how second-generation Surinamese in the Netherlands define themselves, and in particular how they are influenced by others in their self-definition. Fifteen years later, I want to investigate how the concept of *ethno-cultural position* functions with another ethnic group and a larger data set.

I will explain my assumptions about the advantages of the concept of *ethno-cultural position* compared with the concept of *ethnic identity* and see whether this reasoning holds for Moroccans. Firstly, some theoretical elaborations should make clear what the two concepts encompass and where they differ. *Ethnic identity*, a term that refers – according to an often-cited author in this field, the British psychologist Jean S. Phinney – to claims of a common ancestry one shares, at least a similar culture, race, religion, language, kinship or place of origin within the context of a group (Phinney 2003). She maintains that “ethnic identity is a dynamic, multidimensional construct that refers to one’s identity or sense of self as a member of an ethnic group” (2003: 63).

Ethnic identity is not very obvious for a person when everyone around him or her shares the same culture, but the awareness of it and its salience increases in the immigration context, since immigrants usually live in a country where they are not the majority group. Native inhabitants of countries with only one national group tend to think less about their ethnic identity than those in countries where more than one ethnic group reside, since in the latter there is more reason to think about specific ethnic group characteristics. What differentiates them? Is it culture, language, experience? Immigrants can choose to define themselves mainly in terms of their country of origin, but also in terms
of the new country, or as usually happens, in both terms. But what is most important depends on a lot of factors.

As the above situation shows, ethnic identities are defined in relation to others. Decisions on how to define oneself are made by individuals but are strongly influenced by the opinions of those whom people consider part of their ‘own’ group – the in-group – as well as those whom they consider members of the out-group. The ethnic and religious identities of a person are some of the many social identities with which people define themselves in relation to their chosen group membership (Tajfel & Turner 1986). Boundary setting is part of determining where the difference between one’s in-group and the out-groups lies, as stated in one of the classics in the field, Frederik Barth’s *Ethnic groups and boundaries* (1969).

Most authors on this subject agree that ethnic identity formation is a dynamic process; the subjective belief of being part of a certain group with certain reasoning about the common origin, descent and history is determined by wider social and material circumstances, cultural meanings and historical conditions (Verkuyten 2005: 80). Just like identity in general, ethnic identity should not be considered a stable characteristic, since it can be redefined when circumstances change. For instance, a Moroccan immigrant can arrive in the Netherlands as a not very religious young man, interested in work and the adventure of moving to a new country, but after having lived in the new context for 30 years, he might become more aware of the Muslim aspect of his roots and decide that this is a central aspect of his identity.

In some cases, cultural and religious elements are intertwined or might fight for prioritisation. This might be the case for the Muslim groups in this study. The question to what extent it is more important to identify as a national group or as a religious group or maybe as one of the religious denominations becomes relevant. In the case of Muslims in Western Europe, stigmatisation seems to have increased in the last ten years (Shadid & van Koningsveld 2002; Saeed 2007). Consequently, the attention of the ethnic groups in this study might have shifted into putting more emphasis on the religious aspect of their belonging – related to a more defensive attitude to defend their faith than was necessary in their country of origin.

The concept of *ethno-cultural position* was introduced by Rinus Penninx in his dissertation in 1988. The ethno-cultural position relates to defining oneself AND being defined as a member of a specific group. That is very near to how ethnic identity is defined, but the advantage of this concept is that, in addition to what he calls position acquisition – i.e. the way in which people define themselves – an explicit element
of his model is the element of position allocation, i.e. the way in which others see them.

The way in which people see themselves is on the one hand determined by views they develop independently or among in-group members, but in addition to this there are the positive and negative views that out-group members have that influence their thinking. In the migration context, stigmatisation of newcomers is rather common. Cultural differences are easily perceived as negative and sometimes even as threatening by members of the host society. Penninx argues that this element is so important that it should not be seen independently from the ethnic self-definition.

A last relevant point is that the actual acceptance of immigrants or ethnic minorities by the host society might not be the same as the acceptance that immigrants perceive. A lack of perceived acceptance might lead to negative feelings and frustrations, and in some cases the negative image of the out-group becomes so important that it is internalised. This is a phenomenon that has been described for African Americans in the United States and colonial minorities in Europe. Whether this process has also become relevant for Muslims in Europe remains an open question. In this chapter I pay attention to both the actual acceptance as reported by members of the receiving society and the perceived acceptance as reported by immigrants.

I configure a model that includes both position acquisition – i.e. the ethnic identity element – and the new element of position allocation. I will use data gathered in the EURISLAM project concerning Moroccans in Europe. In addition to survey data among Muslims and natives in six European countries (France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, the UK and Switzerland), data were also gathered on claims concerning Muslims in the newspapers in these countries (see Tillie, Koomen, Van Heelsum & Damstra 2013). Using both survey and newspaper data, I will test whether position allocation is indeed as relevant and interconnected as Penninx states, and to what extent the results from the much smaller study of Van Heelsum (1997) can be confirmed. If position allocation is as highly correlated and interrelated as in the earlier study, the conclusion would be confirmed that ethno cultural position is a better alternative to ethnic identity.

7.2 Conceptualisation and method

The conceptualisation I used in 1997 was based on one single indicator for position allocation, namely a set of questions on experienced dis-
crimination (Van Heelsum 1997: 30). In the current analysis, more data of a more varied nature are available. This enables me to improve the conceptualisation, particularly with regard to the position allocation. From the EURISLAM survey data, I have selected the 1,513 Moroccan respondents (about 250 per country). The four variables that I have selected for this paper are: 1) identification with Morocco, 2) identification with the country of origin, 3) identification as a Muslim, and 4) perceived acceptance by the national majority.

For the fourth indicator, I have used the answers of 2,314 respondents from the national majority group for the variable ‘acceptance of immigrants’. Having both the perceived and the actual acceptance adds to the strength of the model.

The fifth and sixth indicators are drawn from the EURISLAM media data, namely the mean tone of the debate in every country and the mean tendency to generalise on Muslims in every country. The assumption is that the tone of the debate and the tendency to generalise in the newspapers are good indicators of the position allocation in a country. This means I have a more elaborate model and a higher number of indicators on position allocation than was the case in 1997. The relations between these indicators are graphically displayed in figure 7.1.

**FIGURE 7.1** Elements of the ethno-cultural position as operationalised in this chapter

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**7.3 Results**

I will now test the conceptual model using the EURISLAM data, interpreted as indicators to measure the ethno-cultural position of Moroccans in Europe. But first, I will discuss the results on self-definition (po-
sition acquisition). Then the opinions of others as seen by respondents in the survey will be presented (indicator of position allocation), and in a third section the opinions as presented in the media are discussed (indicator of position allocation). After that the internal consistency of the model and its indicators will be tested to see whether our reasoning on position acquisition and position allocation holds.

Position acquisition:

Ethnic and religious self-identification of Moroccans

As explained in section 7.2, ethnic self-identification encompasses several elements that are at play at the same time: the element of the country of origin, the country of settlement and, in the case of Moroccans, the religious element. In the survey, three questions were asked that I will now consider: 1) To what extent do you see yourself as a member of the Moroccan community? 2) To what extent do you identify with the Netherlands, Germany, Switzerland, UK, Belgium or France (respectively)? 3) To what extent do you see yourself as a Muslim?

The percentages of people who agree or strongly agree to these questions are given in table 7.1. The table presents the combined scores of those who strongly and very strongly agree with the statement: “To what extent do you see yourself as a member of the … community?” (strongly agree, agree, somewhat, hardly, not at all).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>NL</th>
<th>DE</th>
<th>CH</th>
<th>UK</th>
<th>BE</th>
<th>FR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. To what extent do you see yourself as a member of the community of your country of origin?</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. To what extent do you see yourself as Dutch, German, Swiss, British, Belgian or French?</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. To what extent do you see yourself as a Muslim?</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>81%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As table 7.1 shows, the extent of identification with the Moroccan community is in nearly all cases slightly higher than the identification with the country of settlement or the religious identification. Only in the Netherlands is there a slightly higher identification with the country of settlement (66 per cent) than with the Moroccan community (64 per cent).
POSITION ALLOCATION: HOW ARE IMMIGRANTS SEEN
BY THE MAJORITY AND TO WHAT EXTENT DO THEY FEEL ACCEPTED?

After having seen how Moroccans in this study define themselves, I will now turn to the way they are seen by the majority and the extent to which they feel accepted. We first look at the actual acceptance by majority group members based on the survey and then at the perceived acceptance by Moroccans themselves, also based on the survey.

Respondents from the national majority group were asked to what extent they see immigrants who permanently live in the Netherlands, for instance, as Dutch. This question was not asked for Moroccans separately but for all immigrants. As table 7.2 shows, the replies given by the majority respondents in the six countries vary significantly, with respondents in the United Kingdom showing the least degree of acceptance of immigrants (9.4 per cent). Those in Germany, Belgium and Switzerland were in between, while the French and Dutch showed the most acceptance (France 59.4 per cent). Given the issues surrounding the wording of the questions in the UK (see note under table), we should be careful about concluding that there are serious discriminatory problems in the UK.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National majority:</th>
<th>NL</th>
<th>DE</th>
<th>CH</th>
<th>UK **</th>
<th>BE</th>
<th>FR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To what extent do you see immigrants who permanently live in the Netherlands/Germany/etc. ... as Dutch/German/etc. ...? *</td>
<td>56.3%</td>
<td>37.6%</td>
<td>46.1%</td>
<td>9.4%</td>
<td>36.0%</td>
<td>59.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Moroccans: |
| To what extent do Dutch/ etc. ... people see you as a Dutch/ etc. ... man or woman. | 38.4% | 35.8% | 55.1% | 13.5% | 43.4% | 32.8% |

* This question refers to all immigrants, and not only to Moroccans.

** Note that the results may have been influenced by an unintended question wording effect. First, the term immigrants may have a different meaning in different countries – for instance in the UK, colonial minorities such as Pakistani are usually not considered immigrants. Second, the question ‘To what extent do English people see you as English’ might not include all UK citizens, which would suggest that all kinds of minority groups, including the Scots and the Welsh, are not part of the English.
The second row in the table shows the acceptance by the host society that Moroccans perceive, which shows a similar pattern as on acceptance of the majority group. Again, the UK stands out with an exceptionally low perceived acceptance level (13.5 per cent). In between are (in increasing order) France, Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium and the highest acceptance level is found in Switzerland (55.1 per cent).

**Position allocation: Muslims as seen in the newspapers**

The second element of position allocation that might relate to perceived acceptance by the majority is the image of Muslims in the media. Media portrayal might be a factor that immigrants consider when talking about their ethnic identity. It is often stated that: a) Muslims are pictured negatively in the media, and b) that the differences that exist among them are ignored into a generalised picture that fits all (Vanparys et al. 2013).

The newspaper articles that were gathered by the EURISLAM team were coded in such a way that a score could be calculated to indicate how positive or negative the claims made about or by Muslims were. A score between -1 and +1 was given to each claim. By averaging the scores thus attributed across all claims, we obtained a raw yet helpful overall indicator of the discursive context in this field. The general indicator per country is presented in table 7.3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard error</th>
<th>n</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.792</td>
<td>805</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>-0.17</td>
<td>0.951</td>
<td>769</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.888</td>
<td>775</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.560</td>
<td>1141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.815</td>
<td>784</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.679</td>
<td>426</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The first conclusion we can make is that the mean score on this index is in general nearer to zero than to minus one or plus one. That indicates that, although there are a lot of positive and negative scores on each claim separately, overall there is a balance between the number of positive and negative claims. The six countries can be placed into three groups: 1) countries that offer a relatively open and “positive” context
(France, the Netherlands and the UK), 2) countries that are more closed but still on the positive side (Belgium and Switzerland) and 3) countries with a particularly closed and “negative” context (Germany). Consequently, Muslims in different countries face very different discursive contexts, which might influence their ability to integrate socially, politically and culturally. In addition, positions are more polarised in certain countries than in others, as indicated by the standard errors. Specifically, claim-making in this field seems most polarised in Germany and least so in the UK and France, where a larger consensus seems to converge towards a positive stance vis-à-vis Muslims.

**TABLE 7.4**  Objects of claims found in newspaper articles on Muslims  
(in percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>NL</th>
<th>DE</th>
<th>CH</th>
<th>UK</th>
<th>BE</th>
<th>FR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Muslims as actors</td>
<td>60.4</td>
<td>89.9</td>
<td>78.1</td>
<td>63.8</td>
<td>79.4</td>
<td>41.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Muslims in general</td>
<td>32.3</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>42.3</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>22.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majority/most Muslims</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority / a small group / a particular categorical group of Muslims</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>50.1</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>36.7</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual Muslims</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unclassifiable Muslims</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islam as religion</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>18.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islam in general</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islam mainstream</td>
<td>.1</td>
<td>.1</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>.0</td>
<td>.0</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority currents within Islam</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>.0</td>
<td>.2</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specific religious stream/movement within Islam</td>
<td>.9</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>.8</td>
<td>.9</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unclassifiable Islam</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>.0</td>
<td>.0</td>
<td>.1</td>
<td>.2</td>
<td>.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Muslim object</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>33.4</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>40.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>888</td>
<td>784</td>
<td>790</td>
<td>1173</td>
<td>812</td>
<td>469</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Now I will use the media data to find out whether Muslims are really treated as one single category as often as some authors assume. Analysing what the objects of the claim in the newspapers were, I can draw conclusions about the percentage of claims that address Muslims in general or Islam in general, without distinction or subgroups. As table 7.4 shows, in the Netherlands Muslims in general were mentioned in 34.9 per cent of the cases (upper two rows)
and Islam in general 7.1 per cent, which together add up to 42 per cent of generalising statements. Specific statements were made in 12.6 per cent of the cases, where a minority or a small/particular group was addressed, and in 2 per cent of the cases a minority current in Islam was addressed, which together make up 14.6 per cent. This means that in more than half of the claims, actors in newspaper articles refer to Muslims as one category and do not differentiate between radical Muslims and mainstream Muslims, for instance. The implication of speaking of Muslims as one category is that a stereotypical image of Muslims is presented in the newspapers and that the more liberal Muslims are often ignored.

The row with ‘minority/a small group/a particular categorical group of Muslims’ reveals that there were more of these specific claims in Germany and Belgium, while the opposite is true for the Netherlands, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and France. Talking about Islam in general compared to minority currents within Islam takes place more often in Switzerland and France than in the other countries.

THE INTERNAL CONSISTENCY OF THE MODEL

To make the different types of data comparable for analysis in one model, I have added the newspaper variables per country to the survey data set: the indicator for the tone of the debate and the indicator for generalisation in the debate (this is the added percentage of codes on generalisation). This means that the data set on newspapers was added to the survey data set. Altogether, therefore, I have seven indicators in my model, as I suggested theoretically in figure 7.1. To find out how the indicators are related, I have calculated the correlations between these seven indicators in the same manner as I did in my 1997 study (Van Heelsum 1997: 112). The results are presented in table 7.5.

The correlation matrix shows a less clear-cut pattern than in my earlier study of second-generation Surinamese (Van Heelsum 1997: 114), where all indicators were positively correlated with each other, including the experienced discrimination. In the current case, there are 14 significant correlations out of 21. Considering only the significant correlations, the table shows that those who identify more with Morocco also identify more as Muslims and in that case they identify less with their country of settlement. A positive identification with Morocco is correlated with a negative tone in the debate and more generalisations in the debate. That not all correlations are significant might mean that some indicators of the ethno-cultural position do not fit so well with the concept.
Using once again the same method as I did in 1997 (Van Heelsum 1997: 113), I will check with an exploratory factor analysis how much the indicators have in common, and whether it makes sense to divide figure 7.1 of the ethno-cultural position into two factors, namely position acquisition and position allocation. A factor analysis method searches for a similar variance in the responses that could indicate an underlying latent variable. The outcomes are presented in table 7.6 and show that all indicators load in a three-factor model: not a single indicator drops out, which means that they form a set – which was not visible in the correlations in table 7.5. Three main factors turn out behind the list of seven indicators, so there is one extra factor compared with the theo-

**TABLE 7.5 Correlations between the seven variables**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1. id Mar</th>
<th>2. id Eur</th>
<th>3. id Mus</th>
<th>4. accept</th>
<th>5. feelac</th>
<th>6. tone</th>
<th>7. general</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. id Mar</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. id Eur</td>
<td><strong>-0.204</strong></td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. id Mus</td>
<td><strong>0.310</strong></td>
<td><strong>-0.132</strong></td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. accept</td>
<td><strong>0.111</strong></td>
<td><strong>-0.017</strong></td>
<td><strong>-0.032</strong></td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. feelac</td>
<td>-0.080</td>
<td><strong>0.317</strong></td>
<td><strong>-0.094</strong></td>
<td><strong>-0.106</strong></td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. tone</td>
<td><strong>-0.164</strong></td>
<td><strong>-0.001</strong></td>
<td><strong>-0.195</strong></td>
<td><strong>-0.453</strong></td>
<td>0.060</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. general</td>
<td><strong>-0.096</strong></td>
<td>0.062</td>
<td><strong>-0.023</strong></td>
<td><strong>-0.523</strong></td>
<td><strong>-0.051</strong></td>
<td><strong>-0.546</strong></td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 = identification with Morocco; 2 = identification with the country of settlement; 3 = Muslim identification; 4 = acceptance score national majority per country; 5 = feeling of acceptance; 6 = tone of debate, positive/negative mean score of the tone of articles per country; 7 = tendency to generalise in newspaper articles per country. n is at least 1174, * p<.01 ** p<.001

**TABLE 7.6 Scores of factor analysis (principal component analysis, varimax rotation)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Factor 1</th>
<th>Factor 2</th>
<th>Factor 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.id Mar</td>
<td>-0.014</td>
<td>.802</td>
<td>-0.111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.id Eur</td>
<td>.093</td>
<td>-.202</td>
<td>.771</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.id Mus</td>
<td>.072</td>
<td>.783</td>
<td>-.041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.accept</td>
<td>.801</td>
<td>.018</td>
<td>-.086</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.feelac</td>
<td>-.111</td>
<td>.035</td>
<td>.834</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.tone</td>
<td>-.795</td>
<td>-.275</td>
<td>-.042</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.general</td>
<td>.863</td>
<td>-.167</td>
<td>.029</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Explained variance 29 % 20 % 19 %
retical model. This combination of three factors explains 68 per cent of the variance, and the factor loadings on these factors are high (around .80), which is a good result.

The three high factor loadings on factor 1 are: acceptance by the majority population (+), tone of debate (-) and the tendency to generalise in the debate (+). So this first factor seems to represent a latent variable concerning the opinions of others (position allocation), namely dominant views in the societies in which Muslims live. Factor 2 seems to be the position acquisition: indicators that load high on the second factor are identification with Morocco (+) and identification as Muslim (+). Factor 3 is something I did not expect, namely a combination of the identification as a member of the country of settlement (+) and the feeling of acceptance (+). One could maybe call this the relation with the country of settlement. In figure 7.2, these results are presented in a graphic manner and I have reconstructed the model that I had earlier suggested, taking into account the three factors that appeared in the factor analysis.

**FIGURE 7.2 New model of the ethno-cultural position**

The figure makes clear that identification with Morocco and identification with the country of settlement are not part of the same factor. I expected respondents' identification with the country of settlement to be part of self-identification (position acquisition), and the perceived
acceptance to be part of the second factor – i.e. opinions of others (position allocation). The relation with the country of settlement – though correlated with identification with Morocco and identification as Muslim – seems conceptually part of a third factor together with perceived acceptance. The earlier model, used in 1997 for second-generation Surinamese, does not exactly fit the case of Moroccan respondents in the EURISLAM survey and needs adjustment.

7.4 Conclusion and discussion

In this paper I have tested an operationalisation of the model of the ethno-cultural position on a large data set with Moroccan respondents in six European countries. The model did not function in the same manner as in the earlier study among second-generation Surinamese, but the two main factors – position acquisition and position allocation – turned out to be relevant again. The central question of this chapter was: is the use of the concept of ethno-cultural position still relevant or should we revert to the concept of ethnic identity? As explained earlier, the extent to which position allocation is connected to and interrelated with position acquisition is the decisive issue. The conclusion that we may draw is first that the model of the ethno-cultural position is effective also in the case of Moroccans, though not quite in the same way as for Surinamese. We may even conclude that position allocation – the influence of the opinion of others – has become more relevant to include due to the current climate of considerable prejudice or due to the fact that we are analysing Moroccans, a different ethnic group. For sure, position allocation is highly interrelated with position acquisition.

But what can explain the differences between the earlier study of Surinamese and the current study on Moroccans? There are a few explanations related to content that could clarify the new findings, such as the difference between the Surinamese and the Moroccans, and the difference between the time period in which the studies were conducted (1993 and 2011 respectively). There are also a few method-related explanations.

The first content-related factor is related to differences between the Surinamese and the Moroccans. It could be argued that Surinamese (of any generation) have more reasons to be resentful of the history of Surinam as a Dutch colony, with borders that were created by the colonisers and with a majority of the population either being imported as slaves or workers or immigrating independently. This context could create a very different feeling of belonging than in the case of Morocco,
an ancient kingdom that was colonised by the French, where the effect of the colonists on Moroccans was probably less destabilising. Second, the Surinamese often mention that they do not feel fully recognised as Dutch in the Netherlands and become irritated with the often-asked question ‘Where do you come from?’, which indicates to them that the native Dutch see them as outsiders. In France, there is an official discourse and ideology of equality – though of course this doesn’t mean that Moroccans are actually equal to the native French. Altogether, it does not seem illogical that for the Surinamese, particularly the second generation, self-identification and their relationship with the country of settlement are more strongly related, while in the case of Moroccans these two factors are more independent of each other.

The second content-related factor that could explain the difference between the findings is the year in which the two surveys took place. The survey of the Surinamese took place in 1993 at a time when the atmosphere in the Netherlands was relatively friendly to immigrants, while the survey of the Moroccans took place in 2011 when prejudice and negative attitudes towards immigrants and particularly towards Muslims were rather common. Anti-Islamic viewpoints had become common in the political debate by then. It is possible that these negative attitudes have the effect of disconnecting Moroccans’ attitude towards their country of settlement from their self-identification.

Then there are two explanations that relate to methodological differences. The first difference lies in the indicators that were not exactly the same. The 1997 study used more indicators for position acquisition and only personal opinions from a survey, while the 2011 study on Moroccans include more indicators for position allocation and both personal opinions from the survey by both Moroccans and majority respondents and a mean country indicator deducted from newspaper data. As I argued earlier, this new conceptualisation is better. There are, however, no obvious reasons why the different indicators would cause a side-effect.

The second methodological issue is that the Netherlands (in the case of the Surinamese) is compared to six European countries (in the case of the Moroccans). The main purpose of this paper is to test a theoretical model for Moroccan respondents and not to compare countries, but the results might have been different if we had compared one country to one other country. Then the question would have remained whether comparing both groups in the Netherlands would be more suitable or whether comparing the country of the coloniser for both groups would be more suitable. I have chosen to use the large data set and see this as an advantage, since specific country effects were eliminated by using six countries.
I end with the conclusion that Penninx’s views on these issues in 1988 showed great thoughtfulness and forward-looking insight into the relevant processes under consideration in the long run. His reasoning has stretched to a period with a completely different social setting for immigrants in Europe. And even for those researchers who prefer to keep using the more established term ethnic identity, it is worth considering whether to include elements of position allocation to be able to grasp people’s consideration when forming their ethnic identity.

References


8 Lauded in Leiden

Royal decorations 1974-2009

Janneke Jansen

8.1 Introduction

Hoe hoort het eigenlijk ... in Nederland? 'How to behave correctly ... in the Netherlands?' This book, intended for those unfamiliar with the country, was presented at a meeting of municipal officials in 2006.² The index runs from A for Aalsmeer, flower auction, and C for Calvin to V for volksaard (national character) and Z for zuurkoolstamppot met spek (sauerkraut hash with bacon). The authors claim to make a contribution to the feeling of being at home in the Netherlands. They argue: ‘You can only be a full member of society if you speak the language, know the customs and habits and understand their background and importance.’ History, constitution, education, care, rules of politeness and many other matters are dealt with. Newcomers cannot miss what is characteristic of the Netherlands and the Dutch.

‘Imposing civilisation’ is not discussed in the book, nor is ‘the combating of anti-social behaviour’. Nevertheless these concepts are important for Dutch society. The country has a tradition of (re-)educating, civilising and opposing what is seen as anti-social or unacceptable. Undesirable behaviour is not tolerated and at the very least condemned: that is not how things should be done. What is unacceptable was and is continually redefined. We are supposed to know how to behave.

But what is desirable behaviour? What counts as a virtue, and which social virtues are appreciated? In Hoe hoort het eigenlijk ... in Nederland?, this is not spelled out. However, if newcomers follow the guidelines and advice and acquire all the information, then the authors believe that they will become part of Dutch society and thus be incorporated.³ Whether Dutch society will accept them as full members is another matter.

In this chapter, the question of desirable behaviour is central: what have been the substance of, and the changes in, society’s valuation of virtues over the last few decades? Undoubtedly there are many answers to this question, depending on place, time, and age – children are not
expected to behave in the same way as adults. I will be attempting to
give at least one answer, on the basis of research into Royal decorations
in Leiden. This material gives some insight into what is considered
exceptionally worthy behaviour and thus rewarded. This is the coun-
terpart of the punishment and combating of undesirable behaviour.
Decorations – which for that matter are not dealt with in *Hoe hoort
het eigenlijk … in Nederland?* – are signs of appreciation of particularly
desirable behaviour. Virtues, values and norms are expressed in con-
crete rewards in the form of the royal lintjes (ribbons). Rewards and
punishments hold social order together. Changes in the reasons for the
award of Royal decorations are a reflection of changes in the definition
of desirable behaviour. They show that the social order itself is under-
going change.

For this article I consulted the files of royal decorations in Leiden
over the period 1974 to 2009. Leiden was chosen for purely practical
reasons and will not have differed significantly from other municipal-
ities since the decoration system applies nationally. Therefore I have
occasionally added examples from other localities as illustrations.
Questions as to the grounds on which decorations were awarded, the
ratio of the sexes receiving decorations and to what extent immigrants
have been incorporated into the system will be addressed on the basis
of both individual cases and statistical trends. This decoration system,
it will be argued, reflects important aspects of social change.

8.2 ‘Considering the great merits’:
Grounds, motivations and proposers

In the 1970s and 1980s, many people were decorated on the basis of
their long-standing employment. For one of the awarded men, N.’s fifti-
eth anniversary of service in 1984 was the reason his employer submit-
ted a proposal for a royal decoration. Before World War II, N. started
as ‘junior assistant at the greengrocer’s cart’. His employer described
N’s working life: ‘Starting at six o’clock in the morning, taking the horse
from the field, feeding it in the stables during winter. A break for his
own meal was not possible, he had to eat his bread while selling from
door to door. When the horse was moulting, it was sometimes bread
with horsehair. … The work usually lasted from 7 a.m. until 7 p.m.; Sat-
urdays often until 11 o’clock in the evening.’ In the post-war years, N. be-
came involved in the export activities of the greengrocer’s firm. This did
not mean he made less hours: ‘That work started sometimes at 3 o’clock
in the morning and ended at 12 in the night. On Saturdays, Bank Holi-
days and the 3 October festival too.’ Working on the third of October (the day celebrating the Relief of Leiden), the town’s most important festival! N. must have been a great exception. But he was an exceptional employee: ‘N. has always identified himself with the firm.’ N. received his decoration – the silver Honorary Medal – at his farewell celebration.

A long working life as a small businessman could also lead to a decoration; the people who were decorated included hairdressers, butchers and plumbers. The proposals for decorations often came from family members, e.g. the daughter who thought that her father, who in 1979 had run his own barbershop for 50 years, deserved a medal. She added that her mother had died very young and that her father had had to raise seven daughters on his own, among them triplets, alongside running his shop. Another self-employed individual was the 90-year old Miss A.v.D., landlady of a student house. She was nominated by the then student residents for her care of many generations of students. Famous and less well-known former residents supported the proposal.

During the years 1974-1989, 46.4 per cent of all proposals for medals were exclusively based on the grounds of exceptional merits in a long-standing working life as employee or self-employed. In 1974, even 60.1 per cent of the proposals were motivated as such. By 1989, that percentage had declined to 31.7. These percentages include the requests of the Ministry of Defence for medals for its employees; it was this ministry’s employment policy to propose decorations for those retiring or celebrating an anniversary. In 1994, this Ministry submitted only two proposals on these grounds and none thereafter. In the period 1994-2009, the number of requests on the basis of long service dropped steadily to 12.7 per cent of all proposals. In 1994, another 24.2 per cent of requests with this motivation were submitted, while in 2009 no such proposals were made.

The achievements gradually had to consist of more than long and outstanding working services. Social activities became more important: 39.3 per cent of all the requests in 1974 had been submitted on the grounds of dedicated dutiful work in the job in combination with social merits. In 1994, this percentage was 42.3, rising to 53.5 per cent in 2009. Decorating a person based on exceptional merits in his or her field of employment is, however, still possible, although it is ‘tested whether these extraordinary merits are also of social significance for society. If the social relevance of exceptional merits for society cannot be established, then it is considered to be only a matter of distinctive and exemplary duty fulfilment towards the employer. Decorations for that reason would not be granted.’ Examples of decorations proposed by employers are the crosses of Loyalty and Merit of the Order of the same name.
which the monarch provides to ‘those who have honourably and loyally assisted Us or members of Our House with meritorious and distinctive fulfilment of their duty or performance of their daily work.’ After 25 years of service, the cross in silver may be awarded, and after 35 years, a gold cross. Collective labour agreements hold similar decorations. This type of reward forms a part of employment policies.

A.v.d.H. was nominated in 1974 on the grounds of his brilliant career. As a 14-year-old, he started to work as a junior clerk at the Bank of Dutch Municipalities. He held many positions in the organisation ‘in an excellent and dynamic way’, until he became managing director in 1968. This exceptional career was the motivation of the application, although the elucidation also mentioned his activities as member of the board of various foundations and his work as local councillor.

In 1979, B. received the silver Honorary Medal, but not only for his long-standing work as small businessman. ‘Barber Sjakie’, self-employed since 1938 after having worked for many years for others, was widely known by the Leiden population: ‘Almost every student from the thirties knows “barber Sjakie”. When walking through Leiden today with mr. B., one notices that he is greeted by many people. And he knows them all by name – professors, doctors and physicians.’ This hairdresser was an important social figure in the neighbourhood and this was described in detail in the proposal. Everybody could appeal to him: ‘The hairdresser had a telephone available, night and day. Even for a new suit or money, one could get help from him.’

The Orthodox Reformed Church Leiden proposed in 1987 a decoration for the organist on the occasion of his 50-year jubilee. The church council based the proposal on a description of the qualities and the merits of the organist. The council also mentioned that he had always been a loyal church member and gave the following explanation: ‘In the dark years of wartime he experienced the schism and liberated himself of the connection to a church that imposed non-scriptural doctrines.’ The thoughts of the proposer resonate in the request.

Especially in the first decades studied, the contributions to society through social activities as volunteer often consisted of church work, sometimes alongside other charity work. The decorated people were often members of church councils, volunteers in their church, members of church choirs, and all this for many, many years. Long-standing executive work as committee members of associations and foundations was also rewarded. All kinds of social organisations in towns and neighbourhoods, including associations for amateur theatre, music and sports, could not have existed without the support of very loyal and dedicated volunteers. The Dutch Rabbit Breeders Association, the
theatre association ‘For everyone’s pleasure’, the Christian Music and Show Band ‘Concordia’, the organisation ‘The Hague Pilgrimages’ and the fencing society ‘Lunge and Parry’ are all examples of associations and clubs that could only exist thanks to the enormous efforts of volunteers.

Being active in politics or just being a social person in the neighbourhood was also very much appreciated. Professors received decorations for their exceptional academic work, but often with a reference to the great significance of their work for society and the efforts of the decorated persons for work-related activities. Also sportspersons with great (Olympic) successes could count on a decoration.

The proposers of royal decorations were employers including the government administration, social organisations including churches, the (municipal) government – which might consider that a citizen, who was not its employee, had done exceptional work – as well as family, colleagues and other private persons. The proposers meant to thank people and to make them a role model. This continues to be the case. Employers and boards of organisations were aware, however, that the glory of the decorations also reflected well on their company or organisation. Often they would ask that the decoration be presented on the occasion of their own jubilee or other milestone.

8.3 After 1994: Decorating ‘democratically’

A new system of royal decorations was introduced in 1994 after 30 years of discussion. One of the most important aspects of the revision was the attempted democratisation of the system through an even distribution of decorations over all sections of the population. It came into effect in 1996 and still applies to this day. The term ‘exceptional merits’ received a contemporary interpretation, and contributions to society are much more explicitly rewarded. Rank, class or automatism were no longer to play a role in the awarding. Most automatisms were thus abolished, with the exception of decorating members of parliament. The Leiden files show indeed, as mentioned earlier, that the last ‘automatic’ proposals of the Ministry of Defence date from 1994. Criticism has been directed, however, at decorations that have been awarded after ten years of membership in parliament with two re-elections: these awards are seen by members of the public as (unjust) automatisms. Reactions in the press and in the social media after the farewell of members of parliament in September 2012 included comments that all MPs received awards even though one member may have performed better than the
other, and that moreover they are paid for their work. The explanation by the Chancellery does not seem sufficient.

The decoration system of 1994 consists of two Orders: the Order of the Lion of the Netherlands with three grades, and the Order of Orange-Nassau with six grades. They are both honorary orders, which means that people can be rewarded on the basis of their personal exceptional merits to society. The criteria in the Protocol of Order for conferring describe the type of merits involved. A decoration in the Order of the Lion of the Netherlands may be granted, according to paragraph 1, to persons on the grounds ‘of special services of a very exceptional character to society.’ Such services are evident when:

- someone has carried out a responsibility or has shown a capability which is considerably more than society could expect;
- someone has carried out activities in an excellent way from which society profits considerably, and especially when societal appreciation cannot be shown otherwise.

A decoration in the Order of Orange-Nassau may be granted ‘because of exceptional merits towards society’. These services are evident when:

- someone has made efforts for a long time for the benefit of society or has stimulated others;
- someone has achieved one or more remarkable performances or carried out activities with a special value for society.

According to paragraph 2 of the Protocol, when establishing exceptional merits, this can refer to someone who over a considerable period of time has carried out activities in a way that distinguishes him or her from others and gives evidence of a distinct and exemplary fulfilment of duty. The Protocol seems to make it still possible to decorate someone for his/her long-standing and exceptional employment, since there is no distinction made between paid and unpaid activities.

The new system was meant to disconnect social status from the grade of decoration. Public opinion has it that there are ‘high’ and ‘low’ decorations and that the social position of the proposed determines which type of decoration s/he will receive. In other words, the social position and the grade of decoration would, contradictory to the meaning of the system, not be disconnected. This should not be possible, as ‘rank, class or automatism’ are not supposed to be of any influence. The Chancellery explains that the majority of all proposals lead to the designation of Member in the Order of Orange-Nassau. The decorated persons are usually volunteers who perform their activities close to their direct environment and with local effect. This is the determining factor.
The Chancellery adds that it is also possible that volunteers, but also members of parliament or persons with exceptional merits in their main position, be appointed Knight or ‘Officier’ in the Order of Orange-Nassau. This happens regularly, depending on the character, effect and intensity of the activities, at the local, provincial, national or international level. The next grade in the Order of Orange-Nassau is ‘Commandeur’. According to the Chancellery, only a few people on a yearly basis are appointed to this grade, which is given only for extremely exceptional business-like merits to society with very heavy responsibilities, often together with a global effect.

The idea of ‘high’ and ‘low’ decorations being associated with social positions is understandable. Only the existence of several grades means several ‘ranks’. Although merits and not the social position are examined when someone is proposed for a particular grade, this examination entails weighing the special merits and the importance of these merits for society. It is inevitable, then, that people associate a social position with the kind of decoration. To carry out activities that can be qualified as extremely important for society, the proposed must necessarily hold a high social position. The former vice-prime minister and former royal commissioner Hans Wiegel was appointed ‘Grootofficier’ and former prime minister Jan Peter Balkenende was appointed ‘Ridder Grootkruis’, while the local alderman would probably be appointed Member or Knight in the Order of Orange-Nassau. In the current system, ‘Barber Sjakie’ would receive a decoration no ‘higher’ than Member.

Columnist Frits Abrahams of newspaper NRC Handelsblad articulated his difficulties with distinctions in decorations. He wrote about his experience witnessing the annual presentation of decorations by the then deputy mayor Asscher in Amsterdam. He commented: ‘Most people received appointments as member or “Knight” in the Order of Orange-Nassau. “Knight” is a step higher than Member. So it could happen that a nearly 90-year old lady who had for years collected parcels of clothing for the poor in Hungary and Africa, only could become “Member”, although Asscher told her: I bow to you, a golden citizen of Amsterdam’. Abrahams concluded: ‘One bows to knights, not to members. Away with the distinctions!’

8.4 Women, voluntary work and immigrants

The new system was intended to show more appreciation for women, volunteers and immigrants. In Leiden, a small proportion of those decorated were women. In 1974, 13 per cent of them were women, and in
1994 the proportion had even declined to 9 per cent. In 1981, a well-informed citizen wrote: ‘For some years I have noticed that it is above all men from the confessional parties who receive Royal decorations. I am glad to say that in our town there is a woman, not from such a party who – at least in my opinion – deserves such a distinction.’ By 2004, the situation had improved, and 31 per cent of the proposals were for women, but the trend did not continue, and in 2009 the proportion of women was still 30 per cent.

The entry of women into the decoration system was not easy, but this difficulty can be explained, at least partially. Originally, in the 1970s and 1980s, people with a long career were rewarded. Later, those who were active in society in addition to their main job were also given decorations. These people had thus been in paid employment from the 1930s or 1940s. This effectively restricted the choice to men and unmarried women; at least until the 1950s, it was assumed that the husband earned the money and his wife remained at home and cared for the family. Indeed, until 1956, married women could not enter into a labour contract without their husband’s permission, and only in 1957 was the prohibition lifted on married women working in government service. From the 1960s, the level of participation of women in the labour market has slowly increased. Women were thus long unable to build their careers in the same way as men.

In 1979, the staff of a well-known Leiden establishment took the initiative to campaign for a royal decoration for its director on his retirement. His achievements were impressive and the proposal was widely supported, by the mayor of Leiden, the university and other organisations. It was notable that all the supporters commented that M.’s wife also deserved a decoration. Not only had she performed some of the tasks in question, but it was regularly commented that everything revolved around her. A request was presented for both of them, but the Queen’s Commissioner replied that the Minister ‘had not found enough grounds to award a Royal decoration to Mrs. N.M.-de G’.

It would appear also that long social activity as a volunteer in many organisations, church work and clubs was long the preserve of men. Certainly within the churches, official tasks were generally performed by men. It is also possible that it was precisely women, with their relatively low level of participation in the labour market, who did much of the volunteer work, particularly caring for the elderly and needy in their direct surroundings. These often quite remarkable merits were not to be honoured, however, as was shown in a letter from 2005: ‘Strange as it may seem, individual care is entirely outside the decoration system, as otherwise no limits could be set.’
The Leiden files reflect the increasing importance given to social achievements, usually volunteer work. This is shown not just by the appreciation of achievements in addition to paid employment, but also from those proposals that were exclusively on the basis of exceptional social merits. In the period 1974-1989, 16 per cent of the proposals had this motivation, but in the period 1994-2009 that percentage had risen to 48.2 per cent. The increase began in 1989, at 33.3 per cent, as opposed to a mere 7 per cent in 1984 and reached an absolute high point in 2004 at 62.1 per cent.

In Amsterdam, too, it was above all volunteer work that was rewarded. In 2010, the deputy mayor commented at the above-mentioned ceremony: ‘You are the social capital that our city requires’, and the columnist Abrahams believed that no exaggeration. ‘There are so many volunteers who have sacrificed half their lives for others, whether in the handball club (a favourite sport among those who receive decorations), the social centre the Merry Witch (Hippe Heks) or in the coffee bar for the homeless.’ There are also what might seem to be competing rewards for volunteers, such as the Co Verhoog Prize for the Leiden volunteer of the year.

Slowly, but definitely, attention began to be paid to minority groups, also in Leiden. The first case, in 1998, concerned a woman who had been born in Curaçao and who was proposed by her employer; in 2001, a man from Surinam was proposed by someone of the same background; and in 2002, a foundation for Turks in the Netherlands proposed an award for a Turkish citizen of Leiden. In 2004, proposals were received from an Aruban family member for a Leidenaar from that island, and for a Turkish Leidenaar from a member of his family who had lived in the city, and in 2005 for a Surinamese Leidenaar from an inhabitant of The Hague who had come from Surinam. It is notable that the initiative came from the immigrant groups but that the proposals were supported by non-immigrants as well.

8.5 Rejection and refusal

On occasion, a proposal would be rejected because the achievements were not considered remarkable or long-lasting enough, or because they were (in part) remunerated or had already ended. ‘It is not an automatism that a proposal for a decoration … will be honoured. The decoration is not a scatter-gun,’ a 1995 Leiden circular declared in a rather severe manner. According to this circular, a decoration would only be awarded for ‘very exceptional/remarkable personal achievements for society’ that have demonstrated continuity.
There is always an inquiry beforehand to check that the candidate is of unimpeachable reputation. The police and judicial authorities do a background check, which is followed by a decision on whether anything in the person's background would prevent the award of the decoration. Minor offences such as poaching, committed once, were not held against a candidate for long. Repeated (traffic) offences prevent an award for fifteen years. One citizen of Leiden who had received a fine and an unconditional ten days in jail in addition to a conditional sentence did receive a royal decoration eighteen years later.

However, no pardon was ever given to someone with a war past. Pro-German and NSB sympathisers could never be decorated, even when the individual concerned denied the accusation flatly. One particularly painful case occurred in the 1980s when an unsuspecting employer proposed an employee who had done her work for many years remarkably well, as was demonstrated extensively and with much appreciation. However, the individual in question turned out to have been a member of the NSB as late as 1944 and to have remained very pro-German up to the end of the war. Various incidents confirming this were mentioned. After the War, she had been condemned to be interned for just under a year. The employer was informed that this employee would not be given a royal decoration.

Refusals did occur occasionally without any reason being given, or merely because the person to be awarded would ‘not appreciate’ such a decoration, or because the individual felt there was no reason for the achievements to be rewarded. In 2004, one Leiden citizen refused a decoration because she considered the award in question to be of too low a rank. Republican motives are also a well-known reason for refusal. The Dordrecht poet, Jan Eijkelboom, who was anyway very selective in the acceptance of distinctions, was not prepared to accept a royal decoration because: ‘I belong with Jan de Witt, not with Orange-Nassau’, thus referring to his seventeenth-century townsman Johan de Witt, the raadpensionaris who had been the most powerful politician in the country during the high days of the Republic, the first stadholderless period. Literary figures from Leiden such as Rudy Kousbroek and Anton Korteweg had no such qualms; they accepted their decorations.

The Leiden files reveal the great appreciation that those decorated had for their award. Many sent a letter to the mayor after the presentation in which they not only thanked him for the impressive gathering at the town hall but also relayed their pride and pleasure. They felt they were being recognised for their achievements. Some wrote that, given what they had done, they did not consider their award necessary, but were above all touched by the fact that so many people had made an
effort to request an award for them, and precisely for this reason had accepted it.

8.6 In conclusion

This chapter has addressed the central question: what have been the substance of, and the changes in, society’s valuation of virtues over the last few decades? Exceptional and continuous achievements performed over a long period form the basis for the award of royal decorations. This was true for the whole period under examination, from 1974-2009. What did change, however, was what were considered achievements and virtues – in other words, what was perceived as praiseworthy. The most evident change was the shift from recognising long and notable performance in paid employment to acknowledging long and notable work as an unpaid volunteer. The qualities that were rewarded in the old system were decades of hard work, no illness, not bothering about an extra hour or more, great efforts for the firm, a strong identification with the company, providing assistance to younger colleagues and being willing to train them. For those who worked for themselves, comparable qualities were appreciated. These virtues could be seen as indirect contributions to society.

Gradually, these qualities came to be considered insufficient; more and more attention was paid to social work carried out in addition to the main employment, until a person’s social work alone came to represent almost half of the awards. The often impressive and long-term work performed by volunteers can be seen as a direct contribution to society. If the decorated employee was seen as a pillar of the company, the volunteer is a pillar of society as a whole.

These changes highlight and reflect changes in society. The semblance of social stability has disappeared. By 2009, the final year that was researched, it was neither likely nor desirable for a person to remain so long with a single employer. Temporary contracts are common and dismissals have become easier. Unlike in the immediate post-war period when working for 30, 40 or even 50 years in the same firm was considered laudable, employees are nowadays encouraged to change jobs regularly, particularly early in their career, in order to develop their skills and acquire different kinds of experience. Equally, the increased number of women and the slow entry of migrants and their children among those proposing or being proposed for decoration are equally signs of social change. Immigrants have accommodated to the system, if as yet to a lesser degree.
A system of awards such as the royal decoration system makes it possible to direct approved behaviour. The introduction of the new system in 1994-1996 allowed social changes to be reflected in the criteria for awards, but the criteria themselves were definitions of praiseworthy behaviour. Royal decorations are there to reward, to recognise and to encourage. They put people and their virtues in the spotlight. There are, however, other ways to honour the deserving, which may say more. These, I believe, include the recognition by his students of Professor Rinus Penninx in this volume.

Notes

1 I would like to thank first Robert Ross for his stimulating and critical comments which have been very valuable for this article and for his help in the realisation of this text in English, and also the municipality of Leiden, especially Chef Kabinet H.E.G.M. van Woerden, as well as A. Sharaby and his colleagues of the archive department for generously making available the studied files, and for their interest, help and hospitality.

2 Kelly Snel & Janke van der Zaag (2006), Hoe hoort het eigenlijk ... in Nederland? Haarlem. The book is an introduction to Dutch society and as such is aimed at immigrants.

3 See Rinus Penninx (1988) in Minderheidsvorming en emancipatie. Balans van kennisverwerving ten aanzien van immigranten en woonwagenbewoners 1967-1987, Alphen aan den Rijn/Brussel, chapter III. According to Penninx, the idea that newcomers have of themselves and the idea that the receiving society has of them determine the ethno-cultural position they acquire. The ethno-cultural position of newcomers and their descendants can be defined as the degree to which they see themselves as different and are seen by society as different [my italics]. The ethno-cultural position is influenced by ideological aspects including norms, ideas, treatment, image, stereotypes and possibly stigmatisation. This would suggest that it is very much the question whether newcomers would be accepted as full members of society if they absorbed Hoe hoort het eigenlijk ... in Nederland?


5 With a sample of requests and grants from one year in five. Leiden Town Hall, Kabinetsarchief, Koninklijke Onderscheidingen 1974, 1979, 1984, 1989, 1994, 1999, 2004, 2009. The examples and quotations in this article can all be found in the files for the year in question. For reasons of privacy, initials have been used instead of the full name.


7 www.koninklijkhuis.nl/encyclopedie/monarchie/onderscheidingen/huisorden.
The church council referred to the schism of 1944 led by the theology professor Klaas Schilder.

According to the head of the Office Bureau of the Municipality of Leiden.


Because judging their work already takes place by the elections for representative bodies, according to the Chancellery (www.lintjes.nl). The functioning of members of supervisory bodies with direct mandate of the electorate cannot become subject of judging by the same supervisory bodies.

Reglement op de Orde van de Nederlandse Leeuw en de Orde van Oranje-Nassau, chapter 1, Verleningscriteria, paragraph 1 and 2, according to the text on 29 October 2012, www.lintjes.nl (my italics and emphasis).

www.lintjes.nl.

Chancellery’s explanation in e-mail 26 October 2012.

NRC Handelsblad, 30 April 2010.

The investigation into possible decorations for people of ethnic minorities in Leiden was carried out for each year during the period 1974-2009 focusing mainly on ‘traditional’ immigrants from Surinam, the Antilles, Turkey and Morocco, but a number of proposals were also found relating to people from Indonesia/the Dutch East Indies, the U.S. and several European countries.


Cited in a letter from the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, 5 October 2006.

Personal information from L. Eijkelboom, the poet’s sister.

Archives


References


Internet references

www.koninklijkhuis.nl
www.lintjes.nl
Different Afro-cultural manifestations preserved prints that have spread along with the African diaspora (Clifford 1999) throughout areas such as the Caribbean. These cultural practices have become a starting point in the re-elaboration and dissipation of the social dynamics of African descendants in the Americas. Some examples of these are “drumming”, the act of playing drums, and “Anancy stories”, the tales of the Spider Anancy whose origin can be traced to the Akan people from Ghana, Togo and Ivory Coast. This study attempts to formulate a parallelism between both cultural practices – that is, Anancy Stories and drumming. My recent research on 150 Anancy stories carried out in the Colombian archipelago of San Andres, Old Providence, and Santa Catalina and the Costa Rican Caribbean province of Limon inspired me to explore this parallelism, since drumming is also an outstanding practice for recalling and spreading an African past, but above all for provoking a transgression against the establishment. Thus, the purpose of this work is to point out how Anancy stories and drumming encompass some similarities such as the presence of a griot, a trickster, improvisation, performance and a rupture with standardised norms.

Anancy stories form part of a remarkable group of African cultural practices based on oral tradition. These tales imply a sort of representation related to a performance in which words give life to things, acts, events, environments and conflicts kept in the imagination of the community. An oral representation has two components: a person who transmits tradition and the gender, in this case Anancy’s stories, through which this tradition is shown. Related to this, the person who transmits tradition is called the “griot”, or “griotte” when the narrator is a woman.

A griot is a kind of bard. Griots can be musicians and transmit old songs; they are ambassadors and courtiers that negotiate between families if there is a conflict. Griots can also be historians or poets or the three above-mentioned things at the same time (my translation of De Friedemann 1997: 27).
The griot is both an oral historian and an African storyteller in charge of keeping events, anecdotes and music alive as the organiser of everyday life activities. Griots are very emblematic since they are authorised, without any restrain, to denounce and criticise both corruption and exploitation. They are also entitled to entertain, celebrate or partake in funerals (Todd 1996).

Drumming belongs to the category of an African tradition, just like Anancy stories. Drumming represents a way of giving meaning to life and rhythm to the spoken word and, according to Todd (1996), it is present in common gatherings and daily activities as well as in festivals and funerals. Thus drums are also unrestricted to “animate” or “mourn”, depending on the occasion (Todd 1996: 102).

The drummer resembles the griot; therefore, one can say that drumming also demands a performer who is the one who carries a certain message whose content is subliminal since it is not conveyed by conventional means – that is, a standardised language – but in a particular code that transmits information and communicates plans. In the case of slavery, drumming warned captives or maroons of the master’s presence. Consequently, performance is also part of both Anancy stories and drumming since they both require the presence of a protagonist to enact the activity.

Both Anancy stories and drumming share the quality of improvisation. Two performances are never the same. Anancy stories as well as drumming are constantly being reinvented and innovated since they are not meant to be written down, though some have been compiled in books or recordings. However, stories and beats may be memorised and modifications may take place, since they are not the patrimony of an author. Thus each narrator or performer incorporates changes depending on their sex, age, interest, location or some breaking news that needs to be spread (Pochet 2012).

Anancy stories and drumming stand on improvisation. In Anancy stories, if a story loses its relevance because of changing values and social conditions, that story is discarded or modified and new ones are produced. The oral storyteller or griot does not simply memorise and repeat the same story the same way each time. In the case of drumming, a spontaneous creation is built upon a ludic activity that implies a celebration (Ortiz 1952). The means the griot uses to communicate is words, the means drumming communicates is the beats.

Los tambores dan las pulsaciones del alma Africana. En el bosque, en el desierto … en todas partes resuenan. El sonido del tambor es en África un gran aglutinante social. Enlaza y une al pueblo en unas mismas fun-
Another common trait of both Anancy stories and drumming is the “trickster”, an ambiguous character that opens paths to achieve unimaginable deeds through his cunning and intelligence. The spider Anancy and the drummers, as protagonists of cultural practices, enclose the presence of a trickster who studies the weaknesses of the rivals and the opportunity to satisfy basic needs. In this regard, the trickster uses this knowledge for his/her own self-needs, interests or amusement, or to escape social responsibilities (Pochet 2008).

…but like Anancy, must use all his resources of verbal trickery to mock the powerful while entertaining and, above all impressing both them and the powerless with his prowess as performer, mime, and master of words (Burton 1997: 188).

Tricksters exist on the peripheries of social order and are constantly questioning and defying norms, breaking with rigid and unfair patterns set by the establishment. To be able to do this, a trickster denounces injustice and uses his cunning to cope with everyday anguish, pain and tribulations though generally achieving his goals. Nevertheless, it does not matter if the goal is not achieved since his courage and intelligence, two of his attributes, always allow him to quickly visualise a new strategy to defeat the powerful and oppressing groups and finally succeed in surviving in harsh contexts or circumstances. Thus, Anancy and the drummers become emblematic figures due to their defiant nature, since they both encompass a trickster that disrupts the social order.

Drumming and Anancy stories have challenged dominant systems in different ways: criticising corruption, ridiculing the powerful, denouncing bribery, making fun of serious matters, and defeating the rich are just some examples of their transgression.

These cultural manifestations are inserted in the popular sector. The people are the basis of any society, and the production of cultural manifestations is in their hands, too. In the case of these African societies, they have been able to survive large-scale struggles that have helped them maintain an African identity in the countries that contain an indelible African ingredient. Anancy stories and drumming have carried out this self-reaffirming element of a community that will always find a way to survive and succeed through transgression of the establishment.
References


Dutch policy on culture and immigrants in 2013

Eltje Bos

10.1 Introduction

The settling of large groups of non-Western immigrants in the Netherlands in the post-war period prompted the development of a national minority policy, subsequently followed by a policy on migrant integration. These national policies for settled immigrants and their descendants came into effect at the end of the 1970s. The Ministry of the Interior, in its coordinating role at the time, stipulated that all other relevant ministries were to develop minority policies for their particular fields.

In the 1990s, I was a civil servant at the Ministry of Welfare, Health and Culture and was co-responsible for its minority policy in the field of culture. I was fascinated and surprised by the way this policy for immigrants and culture functioned in practice, once it had legally taken effect. As a result, I decided to study more closely how it had developed between 1980 and 2004. Moreover, I was interested to know how the culture of immigrants was incorporated into the texts of the overall cultural policy documents and how the implementation instruments for this policy related to the existing implementation arrangements for Dutch cultural policy as a whole.

The research for my dissertation entitled Beleid voor Cultuur en Immigranten (in English: A policy for culture and immigrants) focused on the time up to 2004. Since then, Dutch policy on culture has changed dramatically under the first cabinet of Prime Minster Mark Rutte. In this article I will outline the recent developments using the approach I relied on in my dissertation. In doing so, it will also become clear whether my approach is appropriate for this task.

10.2 Approach of my research on the period 1980-2004

In the framework of my research into the policy on culture and immigrants in the period 1980-2004, I tried to find an effective approach to
address the issues mentioned above regarding the incorporation and implementation of the culture of immigrants in the general policies and in the existing implementation arrangements. In a survey of the field, I described various conceptions of culture that have developed from the nineteenth century onwards. I also outlined the history of government intervention in the cultural field in the Netherlands. This outline shows the prominent role played by private initiative in funding expressions of culture and art, which favoured both the production of art and the attempt to stimulate moral education and the well-being of communities through participation in art. Gradually, the shape of government intervention in culture emerges: the banning of cultural manifestations was replaced by the co-financing of their production and conservation.

The sequence of cultural policies after 1945 shows how the tenor of the debate has alternated between two conceptual focal points: interest in facilitating the development of autonomous art on the one hand and widespread popular participation in subsidised and other cultural manifestations on the other. The survey concludes with an outline of the structure of cultural policies in the Netherlands, with the most important institutions and procedures. These include the organisation of quality assessments and subsidy procedures.

Using existing approaches in public administration studies, I developed a method enabling a systematic description and analysis of the development of policies relating to culture and immigrants and the way they were adopted in the texts and implementation measures of overall cultural policy in the Netherlands.

As a starting point, I used Fischer’s approach to policy evaluation (1995, 2003). It is essentially a system of charting four interrelated levels of policy debate and evaluation. The great merit of Fischer’s approach is that it enables the combination of the normative and empirical elements of a policy. In the processes of policy development and implementation, actors – institutions or individuals – and their views play an important role. Each one of these actors in a policy domain holds normative views of that domain. In combination with the actor’s own position and experience in the field, these views underpin that actor’s definition of the problem and the desired role of the government according to that actor.

In any particular domain, some actors are more dominant than others, and institutions are particularly dominant among the actors. In the field of culture, a number of established subsidised organisations may be defined as institutions in the broad sense. I consider the creation of a policy and its implementation as an interaction between the views of relevant actors. I view the text of the policy document as the result of that interaction during the development stage.
As an elaboration of Fischer’s approach, I used the different views on culture that arose from the nineteenth century onwards to define the conceptual worlds underlying the visions on policy in the cultural sector. I use the term conceptual world to describe the entire set of convictions an actor holds on culture and the role of the government.

In my perception, the following conceptual worlds can be distinguished. In the first and predominant vision, indicated by the symbol (kk) in the schedule, the production of quality art is the central pillar. In its essence, this vision is the intellectual legacy of the Romantic era: good art is absolute, universal, unbound by time and context, and its makers are geniuses. In addition, this vision includes the view that art is confined to a specific number of genres.

In the second approach (P), art has its own importance, but participation in art and its effect on the population are central elements. Participation may consist of visits to expressions of art, but also of actively practising art. The origin of this vision also dates back to the nineteenth century, in its pursuit of popular improvement through art and the civilising effect of its dissemination. Within this approach, two views on participation can be distinguished. The fundamental conviction, which I have symbolised as pk, focuses on the idea that ordinary people will develop into better human beings if they are brought into contact with ‘higher’ or ‘respectable’ forms of art and culture. In the other perspective (pp), the central idea is that people must be given the opportunity to inform themselves widely on art and culture, including popular or mass culture, to be able to make informed choices with respect to the active or passive participation in art and culture. In the cultural policies up to 1980, both the production of top-quality art and the reception of and active participation in art and culture were broadly accepted grounds for state financial support.

The third view (kc) holds that art is not absolute, but determined by context: art will always be created under specific conditions in a specific situation. In any judgement on (the quality of) artistic manifestations, context will play a part and no judgement can therefore be ‘universal’ in nature, as the romantic-universal kk approach states. This view arises in the debate on cultural policies after 1980, with the arrival of large groups of immigrants in the Netherlands and the growing awareness, within the government, that they were here to stay.

The conceptual worlds (kk, kc, pk and pp) consist of essential convictions, a priority of values, a problem analysis or grounds for government intervention based on these, and a vision about the desired degree of government intervention. I regard the conceptual worlds specified above as the (ideal-typical) fundamental views in cultural policy.
My study of the policy and its implementation consists of a detailed descriptive analysis of the development and implementation of the 1999 policy bill *Ruim Baan voor Culturele Diversiteit*. Prior to this, a summary treatment of the policy documents relevant to this study was undertaken, from the period 1980-2001. These are, in historical order, the 1982 *Actieplan Cultuuruitingen van Migranten*, the *Beleidsnotitie Cultuuruitingen van Etnische Minderheden 1987-1989* and the *Brief over het Categoriale Beleid Kunstuitingen van Minderheden 1990-1992*. Finally, the passage ‘*Intercultureel*’ from *Pantser of Ruggengraat* from the 1997-2001 cultural policy is reviewed. In each case, the focus was
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conceptual world</th>
<th>Key notions: Spreading of and participation in art and culture</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Essential conviction</td>
<td>( P )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normative presuppositions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Essential conviction</td>
<td>( PK )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The common man benefits from an acquaintance with art and culture. Civilisation movement. (end of the 19th century and after WW II)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Priority of values</td>
<td>( PP )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art must be open for active or receptive participation to everyone with a wish to do so. Participation in art gives meaning to life and connects people; provides social cohesion and contributes to the wellbeing of citizens. (from 1960 onwards)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Priority of values | \( PK \) |
| The edifying effect of art on man before art as a goal in itself. |
| Priority of values | \( PP \) |
| Informed participation of citizens in (the practising of) art, before art as a goal in its own right. |

| Grounds for government intervention. | \( P \) |
| Definition of the problem |
| The common man must also come into contact with beauty and artistic enjoyment. |
| Desired degree of government intervention | \( P \) |
| Limited, facilitating to amateur art of a KK character. Substantial, offering opportunities through education and elsewhere, for expression of KK character. |
| Desired degree of government intervention | \( P \) |
| Limited, facilitating to amateur art Substantial, for receptive participation: offering opportunities through education and elsewhere. |

on the character of the reasoning behind the policy and on how the intended policy was in fact implemented.

### 10.3 Findings: policies from 1980-2004

The most important findings were the following. The ever-shifting terms used for policies and their target groups reflect the various ways in which a policy problem can be approached from a variety of visions. Also reflected is the discomfort in nominating a group of people as
the target group of a specific policy. Repeatedly, (vice) ministers with a romantic-universal bent describe cultural expressions for immigrants as “somewhere between amateur and professional” or as “semi-professional”. This creates room for those in power to take specific measures, and the established institutions for professional art need not concern themselves with the cultural expressions of immigrants.

In most policy texts, lines of reasoning are used which reflect the desire to view the policy in question as an exponent of participation policy, already a well-known phenomenon in cultural policy. This can easily be understood, because this way of thinking about cultural policy had for long been accepted by all actors. For parts of the policy for culture and immigrants, this is a fruitful way of thinking, but this approach is not beneficial to the recognition of the work of immigrant artists, nor is it sufficient.

A pattern repeatedly seen is that the problem definition and goals in the texts contain KC (contextual) lines of reasoning more often than can be recovered from the intended measures. The size (limited resources) and (specific) nature of the measures is always acceptable for the proponents of the romantic-universal (kk) approach.

Concerning measures, we can conclude that specific measures were used during the entire period under study. The established institutions hardly play a role in the implementation of the policy for culture and immigrants. Although the vice minister at the time tried to make established institutions play a role in the policy on diversity in 1999, he too was unsuccessful.

The specific measures were mostly deployed for the funding of projects. Besides, successive (vice) ministers created specific institutions: STIPT (1981-1986), MMF (1989-1991), Scarabes (1988-1997), Phenix Foundation (2001-2005), Netwerk CS (2001-2008) and Atana (2001-today). In the context of Ruim Baan (Clearing the way), an Action Plan for the Dissemination of Culture was set up, together with local and regional authorities, with the aim of promoting cultural participation. The specific institutions mentioned always enjoyed a relatively short lifespan, because too many responsibilities were imposed upon them, including the duty to establish a relationship with the regular cultural institutions. This task proved an impossible one, because for the regular institutions there was no obligation whatsoever to play a role under the specific policy for culture and immigrants.

The long-lasting availability of project funding had more than one effect. For the institutions under regular funding, it worked as a legitimate excuse not to concern themselves with the subject. As a result, over the years a number of relatively strong specific institutions arose
alongside the regular institutions, which had a limited, marginal role in the cultural field as a whole but were active for many years. For them, the existing situation was to their advantage in that they were able to grow further in relative peace. The policy of the day both isolated the cultural expressions of immigrants and immigrant artists and created opportunities for them.

The institutional strength of the established cultural institutions, mostly working from a romantic-universal vision, was powerful all through the period under study. These institutions acquired their institutional character thanks to the long years and the almost automatic nature of their funding. Moreover, for a long time they played a key role in the process in which the policy memorandum on culture was conceived.

These institutions always influenced the course taken on policies for culture and immigrants precisely because, as important pillars supporting cultural policy as a whole, they played no role in that specific policy. As (vice) ministers in charge do not call on these institutions to play a possible role and those in charge feel they need to do something at least, the government members create the specific institutions mentioned, whose task it is to establish the relationship between the cultural expressions of immigrants and the established institutions.

Although the wish to integrate specific policies into the overall line of thinking was expressed as a policy target as early as 1987, in practice, specific texts were drawn up and specific measures designed and taken. In the general texts on cultural policy, room was created for contextual lines of reasoning in some cases, up until 1999. In 1999, Vice Minister Rick Van der Ploeg used such contextual reasoning in his basic assumptions underlying the general policy on culture, as regards essential convictions, problem analysis and policy goals. However, due to interventions by the cultural sector and by parliament, no follow-up was found in the subsequent cultural policy memorandum or the implementation of that policy.

With the long life of specific implementation arrangements and the associated phenomenon of established institutions playing no role, or hardly any, in the policy for culture and immigrants, led to the conclusion that the attempted embedding in regular facilities did not materialise. What did happen was that the broad spectrum of regularly funded institutions saw the arrival of a number of institutions of a multicultural nature, which can be viewed as a form of integration (albeit unintended) in the overall cultural policy.
10.4 A closer scrutiny

It has remained a most remarkable fact that up to now the wish for the integration of specific policy into general policy was repeatedly and emphatically expressed by (vice) ministers, but that the way in which they acted with respect to implementing these policies was constantly at odds with these wishes. The question of why this could have been the case requires a discussion of the interplay of the forces between actors and of the factors that contribute to the supremacy of the (romantic-universal) KK way of thinking.

A taste of his own medicine

Vice minister Van der Ploeg was forced to adjust his proposal on the implementation of the measures, which granted institutions an explicit role in the policy on diversity. This course of action would seem surprising: after all, the vice minister wished to realise the long-standing policy target to integrate the specific policies in the general cultural policy.

However, governments of the day were in the habit of subsidising the large institutions (with a KK vision) without asking too many questions. Both the authorities and the cultural sector itself held the view that the authorities must not interfere with artistic content; in the course of time it also became an issue whether the request to institutions to increase the number of visitors or invest more in educational work affected the artistic content of their work. The authorities usually kept very much at a distance in discussions of this type.

As a consequence, a practice arose over time in which the government started to realise goals of participation and innovation outside the established institutions. In 2001, the vice minister got a taste of his own medicine; the long-standing tradition of non-intervention and the realisation of participation goals via specific programmes and institutions turned out to be more powerful than the minister’s wish to bring about change.

The foundation of all of this is the interplay between the government and the sector, to which the government contributed in large measure. It is precisely the institutional character of the funding to large institutions and the tradition to incorporate goals of participation and innovation in special programmes which led to the outcome that established institutions hardly made any room for the cultural expressions of immigrants.
Conflicting conceptual worlds

Due to the emergence of contextual (κc) lines of reasoning in policy debates, the existing relationship between the romantic-universal (κκ) and participatory (P) convictions shifted. This relationship was characterised by a reciprocal acceptance of each other’s conceptual world and the size of the government funding allocated. The growing importance of cultural expressions of immigrants and of the contextual approach (κc) meant that proponents of the romantic-universal (κκ) line of thinking had to close their doors on this new approach, as it was alien to the notion of quality and competitive in terms of content. This could be achieved by awarding a separate position to the cultural expressions of immigrants and by allocating limited funding. In this way, the romantic-universal (κκ) views on quality and the spending of existing financial resources would not come under pressure.

It appeared opportune to categorise the cultural expressions of immigrants in terms of the existing balance between advocates of the romantic-universal (κκ) and participatory (P) visions; in practice this meant a referral to the domain of and the financial means for participation. This met with objections on the part of immigrant artists, and subsequently terminology like ‘semi-professional’ and ‘in between amateur and professional art’ was adopted in policy texts. This opened the way for specific provisions. The proponents of the romantic-universal (κκ) line – and particularly the larger institutions – were satisfied, because they were thus left in peace. At the same time, immigrant artists could continue to work without further ado, as they were not bothered with the romantic-universal (κκ) vision on quality and were thus able to keep developing their work from their respective contexts and combinations of contexts.

When, in 2001, vice minister Van der Ploeg proposed to expand the domain of fundable art on the basis of contextual (κc) arguments and measures and to involve established institutions in the policy on diversity, he automatically called into question the supremacy of the romantic-universal (κκ) conceptual world and its proponents. This proposal did not meet with admiration or approval. The romantic-universal (κκ) world remained dominant, and it is interesting to consider why this was the case.

Supremacy of the κκ vision

The supremacy of the romantic-universal (κκ) way of thinking became manifest in the course taken by the policy development process of 2001.
to 2004, especially in the choice of implementation measures. Before that time, it had already revealed itself in the implementation measures of earlier policy documents on the subject of culture and immigrants. Its dominance also shows up in other elements that were characteristic of a policy but were never the subject of discussion. This is the case when the funding of the larger institutions was defended, or when the question arose for whom they did what they were doing and how their offer was to be regarded in comparison to that in the free market. The question of what belongs to the domain to be funded (and what does not), how the mechanism of funding should be organized, or how the decision structure should take shape were not considered. Finally, the relation between government intervention in culture and the many expressions that are labelled ‘popular culture’ was hardly a government concern either.

As a consequence of the supremacy of the romantic-universal (κκ) line, subsidised culture remained predominantly directed towards expressions fitting the romantic-universal convictions of the κκ conceptual world. This led to the situation in which, apart from the arrangements for cultural expressions and immigrants discussed, cultural expressions mainly developed outside of official cultural policy, and in great variety, on marginal locations and often without funding from the authorities. If the authorities were involved, this usually came under the heading of a contribution to social cohesion and personal development.

The supremacy of the romantic-universal (κκ) conceptual world is based on a number of mutually reinforcing factors: institutions, emotions and distinction. The most important protagonists of the romantic-universal world are the large institutions, properly termed so. In addition, being part of a particular movement and sharing a particular vision works as a badge of membership, which meets the fundamental need in people to belong to a particular faction. In the case of the κκ proponents, it is the desire to belong to the group that recognises itself in the romantic-universal viewpoint on art and culture. In addition, the social effect of sharing the κκ vision is that its proponents together form an elite. Advocating the vision can therefore also be prompted by the wish to be a member of this elite. The elite in question derives from the entire political spectrum, as the treatment of the case of Ruim Baan in my study shows.
10.5 Recent developments

On 10 June 2011, the vice minister sent his policy memorandum *Meer dan kwaliteit: een nieuwe visie op cultuurbeleid* to the Dutch parliament. This memorandum outlines the agenda for the Dutch policy on culture for the coming years and the creation of a new foundation for a national cultural infrastructure; the latter refers to the state-funded cultural institutions. In his memorandum, the vice minister also specifies how he intends to cut over 200 million Euros in the entire culture budget (arts and cultural heritage) of approximately 900 million. To this end, he defines a set of principles: the international top must maintain its high level; heritage and libraries will be spared; producing institutions will have priority over supporting institutions; and the creative industry will be stimulated.

About cultural diversity, the vice minister writes the following: ‘The new basic infrastructure will offer no further room for developments in the area of cultural diversity. The government considers this a task for the institutions themselves and does not pursue a customised policy with respect to cultural diversity’ (*Meer dan kwaliteit* p. 32).

The vice minister defines the constraints for his cultural policy in much more elaborate detail than his predecessors. In his memorandum he specifies, more strictly than before, how many institutions he will provide room for and what conditions they must comply with. In the area of stage art there is, for instance, room for eight large theatre companies and five orchestras. The (existing) institutions are invited to submit their plans, directed to the minister, while the National Cultural Council functions as advisory board to the ministry.

In addition, the vice minister specifies a number of criteria to which the institutions must conform. ‘If an institution wishes to qualify for state funding, it is a prerequisite that its achievements are of high artistic quality. But this government stands for more than quality alone. This is due to the fact that the government not only looks at the cultural institutions, but, in its cultural policy, underlines the importance of the interested audience and society more than before. For this reason, more conditions apply in order to qualify for national funding. (*Meer dan kwaliteit* p. 11). The criteria set by the government in addition to the (development) of artistic quality are: attention to the audience; attention to entrepreneurship; attention to participation and education (even though the government cuts back on the funding of the supporting institutions in the area of cultural education and on the Cultural Participation Fund); there is a cultural production or collection which is of (inter)national significance. A detailed specification for each of these criteria is provided by the vice minister (idem p. 37).
The vice minister defends his policy also by observing that he is not the first to draw attention to the bottlenecks in the subsidised cultural sector, the National Council for Culture9 being one of the earlier critics. ‘The Council repeatedly saw fragmentation in many sectors, or “lack of effectiveness” due to fragmentation.’ Particularly piquant are the references to the findings of the d’Ancona committee (2006) and Vice Minister Van der Ploeg (1999). The d’Ancona committee held that the performing arts had alienated themselves too much from society and pointed out the inadequate relation between public demand and what was offered. From Van der Ploeg’s memorandum of basic criteria, Vice Minister Halbe Zijlstra borrows this quotation: ‘the dominance of specialists and the safe haven of a system of subsidies (...) impeded the dynamics in subsidized culture’. The ex-minister and former vice minister argued this case at the time because they were convinced that more people should participate in cultural activities. They had no intention of legitimising a huge budget-cutting operation.

Vice Minister Zijlstra continues: ‘The government is in favour of: a future-proof cultural policy. Our measures are thus oriented towards a strong cultural sector, of an entrepreneurial and innovative spirit. A cultural sector should be equally creative in reaching out towards and binding a new audience as in offering culture of high quality’ (Meer dan kwaliteit p. 3).

In summary, the vice minister thus expresses his wish for (inter) national qualitative facilities of high standing, a policy that takes quality as its starting point, but in which the intended audience, participation, entrepreneurship and education are also important. The vice minister provides details to specify these criteria further (idem p. 37). But what kind of new audience should be reached by culture of qualitatively high standards is not defined. It is clear, however, that cultural diversity is no longer regarded as a policy issue; the vice minister leaves this topic to the cultural institutions.

In order to clarify what will happen to diversity once it has become the responsibility of the large institutions in the subsidised cultural sector, it is interesting to establish which institutions will be funded by this government and whether these institutions are prepared to pay attention to cultural diversity.

A description of the development of the cultural diversity code will help to form a picture here. Over the last few years, a number of (subsidised) cultural institutions have developed a cultural diversity code. This was undertaken on the initiative of Netwerk cs (a subsidised organisation for the promotion of diversity in the cultural sector), which liquidated itself at the end of 2008. In his letter on cultural
diversity of 24 April 2009, then minister Ronald Plasterk supported this initiative and requested the sector to develop a code. In the same letter, the minister also indicated that the code would be monitored by the government and that the outcome would play a part in assessing the funding applications in the framework of the Funding Plan (the multi-annual subsidies of those days).

The initiative by Netwerk cs was prompted by a 2008 investigation into cultural diversity inside (long-term) state-funded cultural institutions by LAgroup entitled *The elephant in the room: A survey of cultural diversity in the basic infrastructure*. The analysis shows that these institutions are primarily concerned with a ‘white monoculture’. All of this is in contrast with the findings that 90 per cent of these institutions held cultural diversity to be an important issue and that 80 per cent considered that cultural diversity ought to be a fundamental attitude or mentality. The attention paid to diversity or its role was not self-evident in the practice of their daily work.

A number of institutions – the Union of Theatre and Concert Hall Directors, the Dutch Performing Arts Association, Netherlands Heritage, Art Factor, the Dutch Theatre Institute, the Netherlands Museums Association and the Music Centre the Netherlands – were represented on the steering committee. The steering committee was supported by a sounding board comprising representatives of the Ministry of Education, Culture and Science, the Association of Netherlands Municipalities vNG, the big-four cities and cultural funds.

The Cultural Diversity Code uses four anchors for adequately integrating cultural diversity into cultural institutions: programme, public, personnel (including supervisors) and partners. These four anchors are key to the provisions that together constitute the code: drafting of a vision on diversity; phrasing of a policy for the promotion of diversity; stimulating the ability to learn; supervision and accountability.

About the concept of quality, the code states: ‘The cultural institution works on the basis of a quality concept which does not exclude makers, producers or audience on the basis of their ethnic background or its culture.’ On its website, the steering committee pronounces its hope that the code will give a strong impulse to enshrining cultural diversity in the daily practice of cultural institutions. On 21 April 2011, the code was offered to Alexander Rinnooy Kan, chairman of the *Sociaal-Economische Raad* (SER).10 Vice Minister Zijlstra, who recently took office, was absent on this occasion, as he had announced in his letter of 6 March 2011. ‘These intentions [drafting and introduction of the cultural diversity code] are not in line with current government policy. As you are aware, the government stated in its coalition agreement that
diversity and preferential policies on the basis of gender or ethnic background will be terminated.

About the influence of the code, nothing is known yet. No reports or analyses are available. But since the code is not supported by the government, and since complying with the code (or not) has no effect on the funding of institutions, the chances of the code having any influence on the diversity policy of state-funded institutions are small. Moreover, funding of a number of the initiators, mostly sectorial institutes such as the Dutch Theatre Institute, Art Factor, the Music Centre the Netherlands and Netherlands Heritage, is to be discontinued in Zijlstra’s plans. It is highly questionable whether the code will have sufficient ambassadors now to propagate its philosophy.

Besides, the Netherlands Performing Arts Fund, financed by the government, saw its funding for 2013 cut from 60 million to 43 million Euros; this fund does pay some attention to cultural diversity for the period after 2013. Its main task is to award the smaller subsidies to the performing arts on behalf of the government. About the multiannual applications it assessed, the fund writes: ‘Since the basic infrastructure has become limited to the larger institutions alone, which play the larger theatres, thus rendering that infrastructure artistically a great deal more uniform, the Netherlands Performing Arts Fund’s primary duty is in safeguarding, as best it can, the pluriformity of those small- and middle-scale events, in spite of the financial cuts. Cultural diversity, too, is a natural component of a pluriform culture. It was therefore one of the aspects making it possible for institutions to achieve a higher rank in terms of pluriformity. However, this did not lead to a fair representation in all disciplines. A number of pioneers from the early days turn out to be unable to ward off the fierce competition, when rated against important criteria (…)’. The fund thus recognises the importance of approving expressions of a culturally diverse nature, but when it comes to awarding financial means the good intentions are not as readily turned into positive decisions.

Concretely, this means that a number of leading institutions with a multicultural character missed the boat. In Trouw\textsuperscript{11} of 9 August 2012, Mercita Coronel writes: ‘Both MC Theatre and Rast have now seen their applications with the Netherlands Performing arts Fund turned down. That is to say: Rast was given a positive marking, but there is no more money. Theatre group Likeminds in Amsterdam has met with the same fate. The application for funding by De Nieuw Amsterdam (DNA), Rufus Collins’s heritage, which put multicultural theatre on the map in the eighties, was also turned down.’
This means that lines of reasoning may be found in the (fund’s) texts endorsing a contextual or broad conception of quality – the fund’s advisory committee even issues a positive recommendation about applications of such a nature – but funding is nevertheless not awarded. To ascertain what exactly is the matter, we must analyse the lines of reasoning more closely. But at any rate this implies that, within the striving for pluriformity, a conception of quality is dominant in which cultural diversity has no priority. What we see here is possibly an adapted version of the kk vision.

Cultural diversity in the policy on culture in 2013

When we zoom in on the plans, it is clear that the government presents substantial cuts for the cultural sector. These relatively large cuts have been interpreted by the press and by artists and cultural institutions as an action by the government and its non-governing coalition partner pvv against the elitist character of the world of art. With the funds that the government does wish to allocate to culture, the vice minister intends to produce high-quality culture and make culture more accessible to the public. The government wishes to achieve this by putting more emphasis on an awareness of potential audiences and attention spent on participation and education. At the same time it declines any specific measures for or attention paid to cultural diversity, in accordance with the terms of the coalition agreement.

In view of the wish to uphold the (inter)national quality and in view of the costs in liquidating established state-funded institutions, there is every chance that these institutions will again qualify for state subsidies. In this way, the institutional strength of those institutions ensures, now as always, that the established ones will survive. It is especially these institutions that tend to be proponents of the romantic-universal quality vision on culture. It is to be expected, therefore, that this conception of quality in culture will remain dominant, also because no stimulus to these institutions is forthcoming on the part of the government to embrace a different, contextual quality concept. Or, as the Cultural Diversity Code states in a “negative” wording: ‘a quality concept which does not exclude people on the basis of their ethnic background or the associated culture’.

To this I would add that the funding of part of the initiators and ambassadors of the diversity code will no longer be continued in 2013. A limited number of initiators remain, such as the employers’ unions Union of Theatre and Concert Hall Directors and the Netherlands Performing Arts Association.
The approach to promote participation – well-tried and broadly accepted in cultural policy – is also embraced by the government; in the detailed specification the vice minister asks for vision, but also for the nature, number and reach of the proposed activities. In any case, those institutions that wish to qualify for funding must specify how many children are served in the context of education, and in what way the institution collaborates with educational institutes.

Depending on how the institutions operationalise this instruction, the mixed population in the big cities will possibly be served as well. The question that remains is: served with what? Will the programmes offered be the classical universalist Western expressions of culture? Because most of these institutions advocate precisely those values, it would seem that this government policy will above all promote the type of participation that revolves around the idea that the ‘common man’ will develop into a better person when he or she is brought in touch with ‘high’ or ‘respected’ art and culture (labelled PK in figure 1). This is a remarkable choice for a government that does not feel at home with the elitist character of the ‘higher’ arts.

Since most institutions with a ‘multicultural’ character are no longer eligible for the multiannual subsidies awarded by the Netherlands Performing Arts Fund, interventions in the area of cultural diversity will have to come from short-term applications to the Fund and from local authorities.

About the Fund’s ongoing projects, not much can be said yet. Municipalities have cut back on subsidies too, but less so than the national authorities, according to consultancy firm Berenschot. As regards the big cities, Amsterdam (10 per cent reduction) makes a point of cultural diversity in its Plan for the Arts while Rotterdam (14 per cent reduction) hardly does. The city of Amsterdam asked Görgün Taner, director of the Istanbul Kultur Sanat Vakfı (İSKV), a Turkish institution for art and culture, to draw up a survey of the cultural sector, which makes clear that the sector still primarily caters to the more highly educated native population. In his opinion, this is also due to the extremely small number of immigrants working in cultural organisations. Amsterdam now asks those cultural organisations that apply for funding to draw up a plan for a culturally diverse staffing policy, if only for business reasons.

In the area of cultural education, explicit attention is paid to cultural diversity by the Amsterdam Arts Fund. This fund also works on the basis of a contextual quality concept and a broad interpretation of participation and education (PP), which puts getting acquainted with various forms of culture at the front. It is not known yet to what extent
the applications in both cities were approved; it is clear, however, that, in expectation of a new government, the financial means for cultural expressions of immigrants and new mixed forms must be derived primarily from local authorities. It appears likely that the cultural expressions for immigrants and the new mixed forms will, to a large extent, again develop at the municipal level, outside of official cultural policy.

Finally, I would like to say a few words about the approach I used. This approach appears helpful in explaining the developments sketched above. In this time of budget cuts, which also display an anti-elitist character, the romantic-universal conception remains dominant. This is due to the combination of the institutional strength of the institutions, most of which advocate a romantic-universal viewpoint, the abolishing of (attention for) cultural diversity in cultural policy, the fact that the cultural diversity code is not supported by the government, and the termination of funding to a number of institutes who took the initiative for the Cultural Diversity Code. It is possible that a closer study of the quality concept used in the recommendations by the funds will result in a more nuanced or more deeply grounded vision.

The approach is also helpful in understanding the development of what ‘participation’ stands for in the recent policies; the pk vision (participation in established forms of art) will dominate in the large institutes. The state-funded institutions that advocate a broad approach to participation (pp) will merge and also see their funds cut, but they will not be annihilated; it is here that room will remain for active and receptive participation in (unsubsidised) cultural expressions of a multicultural nature. Just how much room there will be will also depend on the particular views of participation in culture of the policymakers in the big cities.

Notes

1 In English: Clearing the Way for Cultural Diversity.
2 In English: Action Plan for Cultural Expression among Migrants.
3 In English: Memorandum on Cultural Expression among Ethnic Minorities.
5 In English: Intercultural.
6 In English: Shell or Backbone.
7 In English: Beyond mere quality: a new vision on cultural policy.
8 In Dutch: Raad voor Cultuur.
9 In Dutch: Raad voor Cultuur; previously the National Arts Council.
10 The Social and Economic Council.
11 A Dutch nationwide newspaper.
12 A populist political party on the extreme right.

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11 Something for everyone?

Changes and choices in the ethno-party scene in urban nightlife

Simone Boogaarts-de Bruin

Between 2004 and 2010, I conducted research for my PhD at the Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies at the University of Amsterdam under the supervision of professors Jan Rath and Rinus Penninx. For my research I studied three types of so-called ethno-parties in several Dutch cities and the people who visited them. I focused both on how growing ethnic diversity influences the organisation and programming thereof and how and why young people choose the Turkish, Moroccan or Asian party scenes. The purpose of this research was twofold: I wanted to research and make notice of a new phenomenon that challenged and influenced the existing structures of nightlife, and I wanted to research the motives and behaviour of those who visit these ethno-parties. By doing so, I wanted to answer the following questions: why do young ethnic people visit ethno-parties? How are these parties organised, where do these parties take place and most importantly, in what way is nightlife affected by and changing with the growing participation of ethnic young people in Dutch nightlife?

In this article I will give a brief outline of my research. I will first describe the theoretical background, then I will draw a picture of how I conducted my research. I close this article by discussing the most important findings.

11.1 Nightlife research

Nightlife research is closely connected to the scientific interest in youth culture, music and the leisure industry. In the 1970s, researchers from the Centre for Contemporary and Cultural Studies (cccs) in Birmingham linked the proliferation of youth culture to both structural changes to society in industrial Britain and associated class relationships. Sub-cultural practices were analysed as ‘rituals of resistance’, which were utilised by young, working class youngsters in response to the breakdown of traditions and increasing capitalism (Griffin 2001).
However, primarily due to its almost sole focus on (white male) working class youngsters and its strong emphasis on structural factors, the cccs’s research came in for much criticism. Critics particularly highlighted the existence of separate youth cultures for young women and ethnic youngsters and the importance of buying power when it came to the emergence of youth lifestyles.

As a consequence, in other youth culture studies this criticism was reflected in a shift from a more structural approach to one that emphasised both the agency and the autonomy of young people. This latter approach, which paid attention to consumption choices, has been characterised as ‘post-subcultural’ (Redhead 1993). Such work centralises the notion that young people's consumption choices and attendant participation in youth cultures are influenced by their personal taste, not their class, gender or education. Young people are thus viewed as free agents who make individual consumption choices. Moreover, post sub-cultural researchers focus on the flexibility of young people by emphasising their capacity to move in and out of different cultural and musical styles. Indeed, in order to capture the fluidity and individuality of the theoretical approach, researchers have actually abandoned the term sub-culture. Instead, new phrases such as neo-tribe, lifestyle, taste-culture and club culture were introduced. These concepts recognised that cultural features such as music, clothing and dancing were the basis for the proliferation and diversity of separate youth scenes.

Yet the post-sub-cultural approach has also been criticised, with a particular concern being that post-subcultural studies pay little attention to social and economic inequalities between groups of young people (Shildrick & MacDonalds 2006). Indeed, much post-subcultural research focuses on the nightlife activities and choices of white, middle-class urban youths, meaning that the cultural activities of other social groups (including ethnic youngsters) continue to be underexposed.

Some authors have attempted to reconcile the two methods in a so-called ‘integrative approach’ in which it is recognised that some young people are more able than others to participate in nightlife (see for example: Bennet 2002; Hollands 2002 & MacRae 2004). In this approach, analyses of nightlife choices and cultural expression consider both structural factors, such as economic position and ethnicity, and personal factors, such as taste and preferences.

Ultimately, however, the solution that the integrative approach tries to achieve is not particularly satisfying, since none of these scholars shed any light on how this inter-relationship between structural processes and human agency actually takes place. Indeed, much of this work focuses solely on the nightlife activities and behaviour of young
people within a scene or club, and by adopting such an approach these scholars largely ignore matters of accessibility to and the programming of nightlife. While it is very likely that the nightlife activities and choices of young people are influenced by door policies and musical programming, these are in turn influenced by the nightlife choices and activities of young people. This means that the dynamic interplay between the strategies of the producers of nightlife and the choices and activities of the consumers thereof are being ignored. What is more, none of the scholars who are working with an integrative approach study the lifestyle participation and nightlife experiences of young members of ethnic minority groups.

11.2 Studying nightlife

To analyse and adequately explain the nightlife experiences of and choices made by ethnic young people, an integrative approach that centralises the interaction between the structural strategies of the producers and the personal preferences and agency of the consumers is required. To achieve this, I have developed an analytical model, which I have labelled as the model of structured choice. This model is sensitive to the flexible use of the processes of agency and structure because of the systematic distinction that is made between societal and personal factors.

Societal factors are the social structures of nightlife and are comprised of the strategies used by producers to attract a specific dance crowd through their programming and the accessibility of their clubs. More general societal factors, such as the political climate and regulations imposed by local governments, are also taken into account.

The personal factors, meanwhile, have been sub-divided into a cultural and a social dimension and two types of restrictions. The social dimension refers to so-called social mechanisms, which involve processes of identification and differentiation. It also covers the specific processes of the composition of groups of friends, the social rules of a scene and the social composition of a dance crowd. The cultural dimension refers to taste in music, dress codes and styles of dance of a particular crowd. Finally, personal factors also relate to three types of restrictions: the regulating role of parents, experiences of door policies, and economic resources, all of which determine nightlife choices negatively. Since the ethnic background of an individual clubber can play a role in all of the different elements of the personal factors set out above, ethnicity is not listed as a separate category. Use of this analytical model
enables the following research questions to be answered: How do ethnic minority young people choose which ethno-party to attend? How do the choices of a changing urban population affect the supply side of the nightlife market?

11.3 The results

Ever since the turn of the century, nightlife in the Netherlands has undergone some interesting, expanding and diversifying changes, and contemporary consumers now have much more choice with regard to which bar, dance-hall, movie theatre or club to attend. This expansion has increased competition both between and within the diverse nightlife sectors.

To remain popular and attract consumers, clubs have had to make changes to their programming and organisation. One such change is the introduction of what I have called ‘broad programming’. Clubs no longer focus on one particular style of music, but instead feature different styles on different days of the week, for instance ‘urban’ on Thursdays, ‘soul’ on Fridays and ‘clubhouse’ on Saturdays. Moreover, theme parties are also organised regularly by external party organisations that hire a club for a night for their event. These parties have a trendy and recognisable party concept that is promoted by the use of logos, flyers, party merchandise and specific, popular DJs, all of which is advertised on their own websites.

The broad programming and growing tendency of clubs to hire their venues out to external companies have created new opportunities for ethnic event organisations to arrange their so-called ethno-parties in popular clubs. Essential in this process of incorporation is the fact that party organisations have special party concepts which, due to specific music choices, the DJs hired and other characteristics, attract a particular group of ethnic consumers. These ethnic-party organisations thus create a separate ethno-party scene.

Since every type of party prescribes its own preferred dance crowd, the door policies of clubs have changed along with the programming. Many venues and party organisations have separate dress codes for each type of event, while differences in the social and cultural rules of the parties can also be prominent. Indeed, the social and cultural rules of the regular dance scene and the ethno-party scene differ greatly.

An important consequence of the introduction of broad programming is that the image of clubs as institutions has changed, with their original profile becoming blurred and unclear. Different groups of
young people with different musical tastes now visit the same clubs. As a result, youngsters no longer identify with a particular venue, instead aligning themselves to party organisations, a specific style of music or popular DJs. Indeed, they now often visit different clubs in different cities to dance at their favourite events.

The ethno-party scenes

The Asian party scene is the oldest ethno-party circuit in the Netherlands, with its heyday being in the mid-1990s. At that time, Asian parties were organised on a regular and frequent basis, taking place all over the country. They were generally attended by Dutch-Chinese youngsters.

In the mid-1990s, however, another sub-scene developed under the umbrella term of Asian parties. This was the 'Indo-party scene', and predominately attracted second and third-generation young Indo-Europeans. At the time of my fieldwork, however, these Indo-parties were no longer taking place, while the other Asian parties were also decreasing in popularity. Indeed, in 2006, there were only three organisations left that were arranging Asian parties on a regular basis in popular clubs, and at all of these events the music was a mix of R&B and clubhouse.

In contrast, the Turkish club scene was growing in popularity at the time of my fieldwork. Of the large number of party companies in existence at that time, the four most popular were Turkish party organisations in Amsterdam and Rotterdam. These groups arranged Turkish parties on a regular basis in popular clubs, with the music being predominantly Türk pop, while the audiences were mainly comprised of those of Turkish descent.

The Moroccan leisure scene is the newest player in the nightlife market. Although Moroccan concerts have been taking place since 1999, parties for young people are a relatively recent addition to the nightlife circuit. Most of these parties begin in the late afternoon or early evening and end before midnight. All of them have a 'no alcohol' policy. The purpose of these rules is to make the parties more accessible to young women of Moroccan ancestry. In addition, special 'women's only' parties are also commonly arranged. The audience of these Moroccan events is predominantly comprised of young people of Moroccan descent and the music played is a mix of popular Moroccan and Arabic sounds.

In all three scenes, identification with the audience and the organisation is crucial. To a significant extent, this is achieved by knowledge and acceptance of the social rules regarding flirting and interaction,
which differ from the social rules in the regular clubbing circuit. In the Turkish and Moroccan scenes in particular, talking to unfamiliar people of the opposite sex is inappropriate and even harmful to the good reputation of the female clubbers. Moreover, the respondents from the Asian party scene were also very cautious in their responses to questions about flirting and interaction at Asian parties. However, there was an admission that young people who were interested in someone would look up the individual on one of the many Internet community sites after a party.

Identification with the cultural rules regarding musical programming, dress code and dance style also played an important part in the ethno-party scene chosen. Indeed, in the Turkish and Moroccan scenes in particular, many young people gave this as their reason for attending Turkish or Moroccan events. In the Asian party scene, however, the music played and styles of clothing worn are very similar to that of regular club nights, with the result being that cultural elements did not play a role in the choices made between these two scenes.

Identification with an ethnic group and ethno-party scene seemed to be strengthened by the ongoing negative media attention paid to ethnic minority youths. Many young people used the terms ‘we’ versus ‘them’ when they compared the crowd in their own ethno-scene with that in the more regular clubs. The young people in the Asian party scene predominantly experienced a sense of being different, which was reflected in their language and choice of words. Meanwhile, for the young people going to Turkish and Moroccan parties, their lifestyle played an important part in their preference for their own ethno-party scene. An interesting result is that in all three groups the respondents who identified strongly with the crowd and the organisation of ethno-parties only participated in their own ethnic party scene. These respondents also claimed that their friends come from within their own ethnic group. Respondents with a more ethnically mixed group of friends, however, said that they also went to regular club parties and resented the ‘patronising’ social rules in the ethno-party scenes. These particular respondents were predominantly the men from all three scenes and the more experienced women in the Turkish clubbing circuit.

The final factors that play a role in the choice of a particular ethno-party scene are the restrictions imposed on respondents. In general, the women experienced different restrictions from the men. None of the former said that they had had, or expected to have, problems with the door policies of mainstream clubs. Instead, many of these women were restricted in their nightlife choices by their parents. Almost all of those in the Moroccan and many of those in the Turkish scene were only
allowed to attend events in the ethno-party circuit. In contrast, the men in all three groups were not restricted in their choices of nightlife by their parents. Instead, many of them did not feel welcome or accepted in the mainstream clubbing circuit. Some of the men in all three scenes also said that they did not feel safe at regular club events, with the reactions of the crowd to their ethnic background being responsible for these feelings. Difficulties with the door policies in the regular club scene were a particular problem for many of the young Moroccan men and some of the young Turkish males. Many of the former said that they were often refused entry to the regular club scene, while many of their Turkish counterparts also experienced the feeling of not being welcome at regular parties. As a result, some of these Turkish men chose to attend the Turkish party scene exclusively.

The details set out above reveal that age, gender and ethnic background are particular influences on the options and choices made by ethnic young people. Furthermore, the extent of this influence, and whether it created limitations in the nightlife choices made, was different for the three ethnic groups.

11.4 Conclusions

One of the present study’s research questions required an analysis of how the choices made by the changing urban population in the Netherlands affect the supply of nightlife. As a consequence, this research concerns the changes that have taken place in Dutch nightlife and how the producers and, more specifically, the ethnic party organisations, have promoted new developments in clubbing. What has become clear is that diversity is structurally anchored in clubbing these days. This is evident in the broad programming put on by clubs and the number of different branded styles of parties that are organised. In order to deal with increased competition, exclusivity and innovation have become key terms in the marketing of individual party concepts. Moreover, the need for differentiation to secure a position in a highly competitive field can also be seen in the ethno-party circuits. An important consequence of the new ways in which clubbing is organised in the Netherlands is that ‘clubbing’ as a nighttime activity now takes many different forms. Visitors to different clubbing scenes do not share the same ‘clubbing culture’. Indeed, all of these separate scenes have different hierarchies of coolness, different social and cultural rules, different door policies and different musical programming. As a result, clubbing has become fragmented, with a variety of meanings, experiences and habits in all
of the varying scenes. Moreover, clubs have become places for all sorts of clubbing events and clubbers, but at different times and on different days of the week.

The second of this study’s research questions concerns how young people choose which ethno-party to attend. It has become clear that the choices made by ethnic minority youngsters to participate in the ethno-party scene are based on a complex consideration of the personal factors and preferences of the consumers on the one hand, and the opportunities and constraints created by the producers of nightlife on the other. In general, young Asians faced the fewest restrictions in their choice between the ethno-party and the regular club scenes. Accordingly, social factors, such as partying with friends and acquaintances, determined the decisions they made about participation in the Asian party scene. The young people who chose the Moroccan leisure scene, however, faced many restrictions in their nightlife choices. Indeed, their cultural preferences in terms of music and dance style guided their choices to this scene. This group’s nightlife decisions were also limited by restrictions: for the women, these were imposed by their parents, while the men faced restrictions in the form of the limited access they had to regular parties. Meanwhile, in the Turkish clubbing scene, the restrictions and options that determined the decisions made about whether to choose the mainstream or the ethno-party sectors varied greatly among the respondents. Some of the men and women participated in both scenes. In general, however, they attended parties in the Turkish clubbing circuit when they went out with co-ethnics and wanted to dance to Turkish music, while they went to mainstream parties with an ethnically mixed group of friends. Another group of Turkish respondents only participated in the Turkish clubbing scene. Different factors played a different role for each of the individual respondents, such as musical preferences, dress code, dance style, the regulating role of parents (for the women) and the door policies experienced in regular nightlife (for the men).

An in-depth analysis of the three ethno-party scenes and their consumers clearly demonstrates the importance of including the motivations and preferences of consumers and the strategies of the producers of nightlife in any examination of the nightlife choices made by ethnic minority young people. My work clearly reveals that the post-subcultural approach, with its emphasis on free consumption practices and choices, and which is currently dominant in studies of youth culture and lifestyles, does not adequately explain the actual practices of choice and participation in nightlife by many ethnic minority youngsters. Factors that restrict participation as well as structures that shape oppor-
tunities to express a cultural identity do clearly influence the choices made and the options available.

**Note**

1 Indo-European is used to refer to mixed-race people of Indonesian and European descent.

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INTERRELATIONS BETWEEN ETHNO-CULTURAL AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS
12 Shifting to the core of the ethno-cultural position

Moluccan camps and wijken revisited

Fridus Steijlen

12.1 Introduction

As stated in the introduction of this book, the complex interrelation between the socio-economic and the ethno-cultural dimension of the position of minorities was central in Rinus Penninx’s PhD thesis and for both the dynamics of on the one hand the assignment of these positions by society and on the other hand how minorities obtain positions themselves (1988: 58-64). One of the domains in minorities’ socio-economic position identified by Penninx was housing. For Moluccans, this domain differed significantly from other minorities in the Netherlands because Moluccans were housed in camps and later in special wards. The government also played a role in the housing of other ethnic groups, like the Indo-Europeans, but the length of the interference and the implications cannot be compared. Penninx himself also wrote about the housing of Moluccans as extraordinary: ‘The housing of Moluccans is a historical chapter on its own’ (1988: 131).

The housing of Moluccans was not only special because of the central role of the Dutch government, but also because living in special camps and wards had a tremendous impact on the cohesion of the Moluccan community. An important role was played by such Moluccan institutions as the church, local councils and clubs that emerged immediately after their arrival in the Netherlands. The central role of the government in the housing of Moluccans ended in the 1980s. The Moluccan wards, however, remained. By the first decennium of this century, more than sixty years after the arrival of the Moluccans, these wards had become symbols of Moluccan history and identity. They became part of the core of their ethno-cultural position, even though the majority of the Moluccans now live outside these wards.

In this chapter I want to reflect on the history of this specific domain in Rinus Penninx’s theory: the housing of Moluccans, and show how it shifted to the ethno-cultural position. This chapter is based on all my
research on the Moluccan community, starting from the early 1980s and on observations between formal research projects.

### 12.2 Migration

To understand the specific housing conditions of Moluccans, we have to understand their original relationship with the Dutch government and why they migrated to the Netherlands. Due to frictions in the de-colonisation of Indonesia, some 12,500 Moluccans were transferred to the Netherlands in 1951 (Steijlen 1996a; Smeets & Steijlen 2006). This group consisted of 3,500 soldiers of the former colonial army, along with their families. The Moluccans came from the Moluccan Islands in the eastern part of the Indonesian archipelago. The unique spices on these islands – nutmeg, clove and pepper – were the primary reason for the Dutch to colonise the region in the sixteenth century. During Dutch colonial rule, the Moluccans, especially the Christians among them, had gained a privileged position and were recruited as elite troops in the colonial army. This privileged position led to ambivalence among Moluccan intellectuals vis-à-vis the newly independent Indonesia, which made them proclaim an independent South Moluccan Republic (Republik Maluku Selatan: rms) in April 1950, a few months after the formal transfer of sovereignty. At that time not all Moluccan military had been demobilised from the colonial army; outside the Moluccas, they were under the responsibility of Dutch authorities. The rms movement in the Moluccas, with which the Moluccan soldiers sympathised, problematised the demobilisation and finally led to a stalemate, bringing the Moluccan military with their families to the Netherlands.

When they were transported to the Netherlands, their juridical position was complex. According to the decolonisation agreements, they were Indonesian citizens, but they considered themselves citizens of the rms. The Dutch government was responsible for them as their employer (or rather their former employer, because the Moluccan military were dismissed from the army upon their arrival in the Netherlands).

### 12.3 Camps and institutions

In the Netherlands, the Moluccans were housed in special quarters. These quarters had been built as army barracks or as labourer’s houses, but they also consisted of monasteries, estates and two former concen-
In the camps, life had to be reorganised. Because they were discharged from the army, the military regimen as the organising principle had disappeared. In its place there was a camp regime with a Dutch staff (including a manager of the camp) and a camp council chosen by the inhabitants of the camp as their representatives. There were jobs for a small number of Moluccans to regulate daily life in the camps, including nurses, administrators and kitchen personnel (Wittermans 1991: chapter 2). All vital necessities were supplied by the Dutch authorities (food, electricity, coal, clothing). This was called the policy of full maintenance.

In the first years, several Moluccan institutions facilitating community building arose, both based on traditional patterns but also on new organising principles. One such new institution was the already mentioned camp council set up by the government. These councils were supposed to act as intermediates between the Moluccan inhabitants and the Dutch institutions and authorities. Although they were meant to be instruments for policy implementation – passing on information and regulations and mediating in conflicts – the camp councils functioned in effect as interest committees (Wittermans 1955). Because the camp councils were incorporated into Moluccan political and interest organisations that operated nationwide, the camp councils also functioned as the local representatives of these Moluccan organisations. This collective approach working with organisations as caretakers for individuals fit into the ‘pillarised’ Dutch society of the 1950s, which was compartmentalised along socio-political and religious lines.

Another important institution was the Moluccan church. Moluccan ministers who came with the military set up their own protestant churches. And although there were several schisms within the church, the Moluccan churches were very important for community building. Most of the church organisations supported the goals of the RMS. Local reverends fostered the political goals by organising special services for the RMS guerrillas that were active on the Moluccan Island of Seram until 1963. With the church organisation came a lot of other organisations supporting community building: church choirs, confirmation
classes, church councils, flute orchestras (the traditional accompaniment in church), but also women and youth groups. Especially the youth organisation of the church was an important supplier for new leaders in the 1960s and 1970s.

A third institution that had already emerged by the 1950s was the *kumpulan*, a village organisation. In these *kumpulan*, Moluccans from the same village of origin were united. The goal of the *kumpulan* was to unite people from one village in view of the expected return to the Moluccas. At the same time, the *kumpulan* could represent the village when needed, for example in wedding ceremonies. Beside the *kumpulan*, two other traditional relations contributed to community building among Moluccans in the Netherlands: family relations and so-called *pela* bonds. A *pela* bond is a linkage between two villages dictating unconditional support and a prohibition on marriages.

### 12.4 Archipelago of Moluccan camps

Most camps were situated away from towns and villages, creating physically and socially isolated Moluccan communities. Families were allocated at random to the camps. Depending on the ship, time of arrival, and availability of camps, the Moluccans were housed in various places all over the country. Family ties, the island of origin or religion (the vast majority were Protestant; 4.5 per cent were Catholic and 2.5 per cent Muslim) were not used as criteria for allocation. After conflicts arose in the camps, fuelled by differences in affiliation with the interest organisations, religion or area of origin, the Dutch authorities started to re-allocate Moluccan families, bringing together people from the same political organisation or islands of origin.

By the autumn of 1953, it looked as though the massive transfers had created peace and order in the camps. The commissioner for Moluccan welfare, the highest authority dealing with the Moluccans in the Netherlands, issued a letter suggesting that all special regulations be abandoned because the transfers were effective. The authorities had created an archipelago of Moluccan camps, all with their own political colour. This strengthened the position of the local councils as well as the political organisations of the Moluccans. The Dutch authorities had manoeuvred themselves into a position where they depended on the Moluccan institutions. This dependency was strengthened by the refusal of the authorities to deal with individual Moluccans; they only wanted to communicate with the representatives in the councils even for private individual matters.
In 1956 a short but intensive clash occurred between the Dutch authorities and the Moluccans. Because more and more Moluccans had found jobs and the full maintenance by the government became a problem, a new policy in 1956 called 'self-support' was issued. From that moment on, Moluccans had to find jobs, buy their own food, and cook for themselves. If they could not find work, they had to apply for social benefits. The Moluccans experienced this policy change as an attempt by the government to deny its responsibility to the Moluccans. According to them, the Dutch government was fully responsible for them as long as they were in the Netherlands. The highly political motivated and symbolic revolt against the new policy was very tense in some camps, but stopped after some weeks.

At the end of the 1950s, the Dutch government started to realise that the Moluccans were here to stay for longer, not necessarily permanently but at least for some more years to come. Because most of the camps in fact were not suitable as living quarters and because they were located far away from employment opportunities, the authorities decided to transfer the Moluccans to specially built districts in small towns called 'Moluccan ward,' or wijk (plural: wijken) in Dutch. The Moluccans had to move from wooden dwellings (in the barracks) to stone (houses).

12.5 The wijk

The committee Verweij-Jonker (1959), which advised on the transfer of the Moluccans to the wijk, hoped to break down the power of the Moluccan leaders by moving them to a wijk that was more open compared to the isolated camps. Especially in the early wijk period, this ambition was not reached. Recommendations on the size and the location of new wijken were not implemented fully, partly due to resistance by city officials. Therefore, not all wijken were built close to employment facilities and most of them were built at the border of villages, creating a new kind of spatial isolation.

In the wijk, the organisation of the community was a copy of the situation in the camps. A wijk council replaced the camp council, and the church kept its powerful position. At the end of the 1960s, new institutions developed in the wijk as a consequence of the emerging of competing political movements. After the defeat of the RMS guerrillas in the Moluccas in 1963 and the execution of the RMS president in Indonesia in 1966, a RMS government in exile was established in the Netherlands. A few years later, the RMS president in exile, J. Manusama, was challenged by I. Tamaela, a former colonel of the RMS army, who
established his own RMS government. This major political split created competition among their respective supporters in the Moluccan wijk. Both movements organised their own security groups in the wijk. Also, the minority of pro-Indonesian Moluccans grouped themselves into a new organisation, the API-Maluku. These political rivalries resulted in violent clashes within the Moluccan community, in which the police interfered only sparingly.

A real change in power relations at the wijk level came after the Dutch government started to fund so-called ‘community building centres’. These centres, or stichtingen (foundations) as they were called by Moluccans, were established in almost every Moluccan wijk at the beginning of the 1970s. These stichtingen were foreign to the Moluccan community, because they were a combination of different types of Dutch welfare work for which there was no traditional Moluccan equivalent. Because the stichtingen were modelled after Dutch institutions and funded by the Dutch ministry of welfare, the government required that people working in the stichting meet specified educational qualifications. This opened the doors for second-generation Moluccans who had a higher education in the Netherlands. The stichtingen became hotspots for the second generation.

Other Moluccan social welfare organisations in addition to the stichting emerged at the end of the 1970s. By that time, social problems among Moluccans such as drug abuse and unemployment had become severe. These new Moluccan social welfare initiatives were initiated by the Moluccans themselves, because Dutch organisations seemed unable to reach the drug addicts or the unemployed (Steijlen 1984). And again, these new institutions were dominated by second-generation Moluccans. The social problems increased the isolation of the wijken and led to some extent to a process of ghettoisation of the wijk, without becoming real ghettos.

12.6 Closed community and changing identity

Living in special quarters with their own institutions had a huge influence on the internal orientation of Moluccans. Although there were some minorities in the Moluccan community and not everybody agreed on political issues, the Moluccan community had become a cohesive community and even more closed than it had been when the Moluccans first arrived in the Netherlands. The Moluccan institutions and the concentrated form of living in the wijken, which were considered Moluccan territory, were decisive factors in this. This strong cohe-
sive spirit among Moluccans was demonstrated when in the mid-1970s, Moluccan youngsters committed five terrorist acts, including hijacking trains and taking hostages in a primary school. The first train hijacking in particular received broad support from the Moluccan community (Steijlen 1996b).

Coincidently, this height of political manifestation was also the start of a radical change in the Moluccans’ position within Dutch society. Until the end of the 1970s, Moluccans considered themselves exiles in the Netherlands, waiting to return home to a free South Moluccan Republic. As political tensions grew and the radicalisation of the second generation led to terrorist actions, another current emerged: Moluccans started to question the idea of exporting a free Republic from the Netherlands to the Moluccan Islands. In the same period, Moluccans began visiting their homeland, something that had been taboo before that, and became involved in small development aid projects. Slowly the idea evolved that their future was not necessarily in the Moluccas, but that they could participate in the Moluccan community in Indonesia and at the same time live in the Netherlands. The Moluccans were transforming from exiles into migrants (Steijlen 2010).

Again, a new range of Moluccan institutions emerged. Moluccan journals that were not related to one particular political movement or organisation were published, and there were initiatives in the field of theatre and literature. In this process, Moluccans increasingly manifested themselves outside the wijken in the big cities (Steijlen 2010).

12.7 Wijken as centres

From the second half of the 1970s, no more wijken were built (except for one or two) because all the Moluccans from the camps were transferred to a wijk. A limit to the amount of houses that were especially built for Moluccans was thus set. Young Moluccans who wanted to live on their own had no other choice than to leave the wijk. From the end of the 1970s, more and more Moluccans left the wijk because they wanted to marry, went to study in other cities or moved because of job opportunities.

Nevertheless, the wijk remained central and important for the Moluccan community. Most Moluccans who had left the wijk stayed connected to it because they were still members of the Moluccan church and their parents or grandparents lived there. The wijk also functioned as a communication ‘tool’: through their contacts in the wijk, Moluccans remained informed about developments in the community and
things that were important to them. The distributions of Moluccan magazines in the 1970s and 1980s illustrate this. Through colportage in the *wijk*, they could reach some 80 per cent of the Moluccans in the Netherlands. Announcements through *wijk* institutions were effective because the *wijk* was the place where Moluccans came together. It was their central meeting place: the *tempat bergaul*.

The *wijk*, even the smaller ones with just a couple of houses, was seen as Moluccan territory by Moluccans as well as by the Dutch authorities and people. Dutch officials were careful when entering these ‘Moluccan territories’. When, for example, somebody had to be arrested and they expected resistance, the police would inform the *wijk* council beforehand. In some cases, when local tension was particularly high, Dutch police were reluctant to enter the *wijk*. This happened for example in the spring of 1982 in the *wijk* in Assen where youngsters even laid down a plank with nails on the street to prevent police cars from entering the *wijk*.\(^5\)

In the same period, it came out that the construction of the houses in some of the *wijken* were very bad. In the first half of the 1980s, this led to confrontations between Moluccans and the police because Moluccans refused to pay the rent. In this conflict, the Moluccans confronted the Dutch government with its special responsibility towards Moluccans as former military of the colonial army and because of the role the Dutch government played in the transfer of the Moluccans to the Netherlands. The government was susceptible to this argument because the transfer of Moluccans and their discharge from the army were not an example of decent policy and treatment.

The government looked for an opportunity to end the status of Moluccans as a special minority. This moment came in 1986 when Moluccan leaders were willing to negotiate. They were prepared to give up the special position of the Moluccans in exchange for a package of regulations, including a token of appreciation for the first generation (a decoration and yearly bonus), a project to fight unemployment among Moluccan youngsters, a Moluccan museum and money to renovate the Moluccan *wijken*. For their part, the Moluccans would help to solve the housing issues and would close the so called ‘KNIL chapter’, as their claim on a special position as minority was called. The historical agreement, as it was called, was concluded at a ceremonial meeting in the government’s room between the prime minister and the chairman of the largest Moluccan organisation.
12.8 Weakening institutions

In their negotiations leading up to the historical agreement, the Moluccans also anticipated processes that would inevitably lead to the ending of the special relation and the weakening of Moluccan institutions, in particular the growing pressure within Dutch politics and society to end special regulations for all ethnic groups in favour of general policies. Until the 1970s, the Moluccans had been the largest ethnic group in the Netherlands, but soon thereafter their position was overtaken by Surinamese, Turks and Moroccans. The Moluccan leaders realised that their claim on a special relationship would not stand for long. Besides, the number of first-generation Moluccans was decreasing and the community was confronted with processes of individualisation (see Bartels 1990).

These developments had an impact on the cohesion within the Moluccan community: it started to show cracks, because contact with the wijken decreased with the passing away of first-generation Moluccans who lived in the wijk, and because individual Moluccans gave less priority to contacts with the wijk. In addition, the institutions in the wijk started to lose their strength. Many stichtingen faced financial problems and were closed or forced to open their doors to the general public. The church remained important, although its influence on the local Moluccan population decreased as result of the individualisation process. At the same time, Dutch policy was changing: group-specific regulations were replaced by general regulations; reducing contacts of officials with Moluccan organisations.

Most importantly, the functionality of the wijk council came under pressure because of these local and national developments. The Moluccan interest organisations that had earlier organised and strengthened the local councils lost much of their power after the special relation between the Moluccan community and the Dutch government ended. The foundation of their power was gone. This also weakened the local councils and the internal structure of the organisations. In many places, second or even third councils were erected to represent the local Moluccan community. In other places, the wijk council became inactive – a sleeping tiger.

12.9 The wijk under discussion

Competition between wijk councils or inactive councils made it unclear for the non-Moluccans as to whom they had to deal with in the
local Moluccan communities. For example, it happened more than once that housing associations that owned houses in the *wijk* did not know whom to consult when a house in the *wijk* became available. They had to do so because one of the results of the historical agreement had been that Moluccans would maintain influence on the inhabitants of the Moluccan *wijk*. In some cases a conflict arose after new Dutch tenants were appointed. In 2004, for example, in the Moluccan *wijk* in Sittard, Moluccans protested with banners on their houses after an empty house was allotted to Dutch tenants. The housing organisation complained that there was no longer a Moluccan council anymore to be consulted, for the Moluccan council had ceased to exist two years earlier (*de Volkskrant* 5 March 2004).

For a brief moment, the issue of the Moluccan *wijk* came back to the fore in politics. In parliament, questions were asked about the Sittard case. Rita Verdonk, then minister for immigration and integration, responded that she was not happy with the situation. She felt that the Moluccan *wijk* was a concentration of problems and was negative for integration. She wanted to reduce the one-sided compositions of these *wijken* (*Staten Generaal* 2004). Later, while visiting the Moluccan *wijk* in Breda in 2005, Minister Verdonk stated that the *wijk* as a form of ‘self-chosen isolation’ was outdated and had to be ended. The town administration, however, told the minister that the issue was not her responsibility as minister of immigration and integration, pointing out the history that had led to this special agreement (*Palet* 2009; *Van Heelsum* 2007).

Although the cohesion in many *wijken* had reduced since the mid-1980s, the local Moluccan communities and *wijken* still could function as a monolith for local authorities. That was the case in Sittard in 2004 and, although there was no specific issue, again in 2011 in the town of Leerdam. Mayor Victor Molkenboer, having experienced problems coming into contact with the Moluccan community in his town, made excuses for the past. In his New Year’s speech, he called upon the Dutch government to make excuses for the way it had treated the Moluccans in the past with their transfer to the Netherlands and their discharge from the army. According to the mayor, the Dutch government had never shown any doubts or regrets about this past. His call evoked a discussion among Moluccans. One group supported the call, while others pointed to the 1986 historical agreement as the first recognition of the support the Moluccans provided the Dutch during the colonial era and the Second World War and the way Moluccans had been received in the Netherlands. The mayor had apparently not been familiar with the historical agreement and explained that he was motivated by prob-
lems he had encountered in communicating with the local Moluccan community. One example of the issues he was confronted with were protests of Moluccans against new tenants in the wijk who were not selected by the Moluccans themselves (Van der Kaaij 2012). Cynically enough, it had been these same problems – no access to Moluccans and problems with housing – that had led to the historical agreement.

12.10 Physical place to experience the community

As we have seen, the wijken as successors of the camps had been changing since they were built in the 1960s. Their structures changed, their institutions weakened and, due to demographic developments, they lost their function as main living areas for Moluccans. This does not mean that the wijk already is history, the housing issues showed this clearly.

A growing number of Moluccans have ambivalent feelings about the wijk. The wijk is associated with lagging behind and social control and is supposed to be a restraint on socio-economic mobility. Young Moluccans (whether it be those with two Moluccan parents or those from a mixed marriage) say that they appreciate the wijk. While some of them wittingly live in the wijk, others do not want to live there. If they had to, they would prefer to live on the edge of the wijk and not in its centre, because that is where the social pressure is the greatest (see Titawano 2008; Ouweneel 2011).

The appreciation of the wijk points to the important symbolic meaning of these living quarters. This symbolism is apparent in many discussions and events. In a four-hour live radio programme broadcast from the Moluccan church Eben-Haëzer in the town of Zwolle in August 2012, the wijk was one point of discussion (radio programme NTR 2012). The Moluccan historian and cultural heritage expert, Wim Manuhutu, explained that many people who do not live in the wijk will visit the wijk especially at important moments, such as marriages and deaths. According to him, the wijk is a physical place for them to experience the Moluccan community. In the same radio programme, Dirceu Parinussa, a 29-year-old third-generation Moluccan who lived his whole life in the wijk, stated that the Moluccan community would lose their history if they were to give up the wijk as their living quarters. He did not mean to say that Moluccans who live outside the wijk are less Moluccan, but rather that the wijk is irrevocably a part of the Moluccan identity because the wijk is the result of the specific Moluccan migration history.
This symbolism of identity was emphasised in a very spectacular way during an event on 14 April 2012: the jubilee of the ‘Peringatan Maluku Ride-out’ (Remember the Moluccas Ride-out). Ride-outs, large groups of (Moluccan) motorcyclist touring, have already long been part of the entourage of Moluccan festivities, such as on the yearly commemoration of the RMS proclamation on 25 April. The ‘Peringatan Maluku Ride-out’ is a special Ride-out to call upon the people not to forget Moluccans who were imprisoned in Indonesia after they had publicly displayed the RMS flag. The ‘Peringatan Maluku Ride-out’ is organised around 12 April, the date that the second RMS president Soumokil was killed in Indonesia in 1966. To celebrate the fifth anniversary of ‘Peringatan Maluku Ride-out’, some 360 bikers drove from the wijk in Geleen to Vught where a group of Moluccans still live in the last (renovated) Moluccan camp Lunetten. On their way, they passed the wijken in Venlo, Venray, Gennep and Hatert. At the same time, a Walk4Maluku was organised starting late at night in the wijk in Elst heading for Lunetten passing the wijken in Opheusden, Tiel and Den Bosch, a walk of some 80 kilometres. Besides the walkers and bikers, a group of cyclers came from the wijk in Breda to Lunetten.

Of course, the bikers with their leather jackets full of Moluccan symbols and their roaring motorcycles were the most impressive part of the event. The symbolic meaning of the wijk was not only emphasised by visiting all the wijken on the route between Geleen and Vught, but also by the ceremonies that were held in each wijk. In each wijk, the bikers were welcomed by Moluccan dancers beating traditional Moluccan drums. Then, in the middle of the wijk, the RMS flag was hoisted while the RMS anthem Hena Masa was sung. After some thanks, the bikers left, waving them farewell with RMS flags. The wijk had a significant role in this event in the sense that Manuhutu explained in the radio programme: a physical place to experience the Moluccan community.

12.11 The wijk as cultural heritage

The symbolic meaning of the wijk and its predecessor the camp is also expressed in the growing number of monuments that are built in the wijk or close to a former camp. The first monument that was erected in 1997 is a boulder to commemorate the former location of a camp for the minority of Islamic Moluccans in Balk in the north of the Netherlands (the camp was closed in 1969). Seven cloves and a nutmeg on the boulder refer to the reason the Dutch embarked on their colonial adventure around 1600. Other monuments put less emphasis on the
colonial theme, preferring to highlight the Moluccan experience in the Netherlands.

Different perspectives and motivations have resulted in very different monuments. An interesting illustration is the creation of two monuments that were unveiled in September and October 2006 in the Moluccan wijken of Moordrecht and Vaassen, some 100 kilometres apart. Both represent a Moluccan family: a father, a mother and two children. The Moordrecht sculpture shows the family in winter dress, representing the arrival of the Moluccans in the bitter cold Dutch harbours in 1951. Their posture and faces show the hardship they had faced and their fears about life in the Netherlands. The sculpture in Vaassen presents an entirely different vision. The mother is again in traditional dress but the father wears a summer uniform. With his right hand he guides his wife to the future, to which he points with his other hand. The Vaassen family is clearly more prosperous. The initiative of the Vaassen monument was taken by the local Dutch authorities to help Moluccans overcome their traumatic experiences. The Vaassen monument was designed by a Dutch artist, while the Moordrecht monument was designed by a Moluccan artist and was an initiative of second-generation Moluccans as a tribute to their parents. Since then, more monuments have been erected to make sure that the history of the Moluccans in the Netherlands is not forgotten (Steijlen 2011).

Some people even argue that wijken themselves should become places of heritage. Based on research on remnants of Moluccan history in the northern provinces of the Netherlands, Laurieke Zijp and Peter Groote (2009) suggest choosing one wijk to be given the status of a protected monument. Their reasoning is that the wijk is the result of a unique policy of segregation in the northern provinces.

A last example of a politicised symbolic meaning of the wijk is a recent debate among some Moluccans on whether to plead for recognition as a national ethnic minority in the Netherlands. In essence, this plea is an attempt to revive the old ‘special relation’ between the Dutch and the Moluccans. It is interesting to read how the wijk plays a role in it. In 2004, the government formulated five criteria upon which to designate national ethnic minorities. According to these criteria, a national minority must have Dutch nationality, an identity (language, culture, history) of their own that they want to preserve, and they should have been living in the Netherlands in specific areas from a long time ago, where they still live. The only national minority that was recognised were the Frisians in the province of Friesland. Discussions about the Roma and Sinti did not lead to recognition of them as national minorities. In 2012, a group of Moluccans argued that the Moluccan commu-
nity met the criteria because in the colonial era they were part of the Netherlands Kingdom and since 1951 they have lived in the camps and wijken in the Netherlands. In their argument, the camps and wijken were presented as ‘traditional areas of settlement’ and thus situated at the core of Moluccan identity.

12.12 Concluding remarks

In 1988, when Rinus Penninx published his PhD thesis, the Moluccan wijken and camps were clearly part of their socio-economic position. Living in special, segregated camps was a determining factor for the development of the Moluccan community. The institutions in the living quarters facilitated the development of a cohesive community, perhaps not always voluntarily or in a friendly way for everybody due to the amount of social control. Interestingly enough, the transfer of Moluccans from the camps to the wijken did not change this. New institutions (stichtingen) were established but the segregation continued. And very important: the wijken were considered Moluccan territory. This indicates that the wijk also played a role in the ethnic-cultural position of the Moluccans: it was the place where they could celebrate their identity.

In the course of the last decennia, more and more Moluccans left the wijk to live among other people in the Netherlands. This means that the importance of the wijken as part of the housing component of the socio-economic position of Moluccans became less strong. Maybe we can even say that the wijk is no longer of any importance to their socio-economic position. This, however, does not mean that the wijk is history. On the contrary, in more than one way the wijken, and to some extent the old camps, were given new meaning. They became part of the core of the ethno-cultural position. The monuments and how the wijk has been presented in discussions since the beginning of this millennium show how strong the wijk has become a symbol of Moluccan identity. It represents the history of the Moluccans in the Netherlands, the place to experience the Moluccan community. It is probably not important how many Moluccans live in a wijk, as long as there is a place where Moluccan history can be felt and people can identify themselves with that history.

Erecting monuments at locations where concentrations of Moluccans live or have been living also make these locations part of the Dutch commemoration landscape. It is a specific dimension of integration: the wijk as an important ingredient of Moluccan identity anchored in the Netherlands.
1 I would like to thank Wim Manuhutu for comments on an earlier version of this paper.

2 On 17 August 1945, two days after the Japanese capitulation, Indonesian Republicans declared Indonesia independent. The Dutch government refused to accept Indonesian independence and tried to re-establish its colonial power with military force. Many Christian Moluccans supported this attempt. Under international pressure the Netherlands was forced to accept Indonesia's independence and hand over sovereignty to Indonesia in 1949. Soon after, Indonesia returned to its declaration of 1945 as the founding moment.

3 Because the word wijk has specific notions for Moluccans and refers more to their living area – irrespective of the number of houses or streets, – than to a regular district, I prefer to use the term wijk (or plural wijken) when I refer to the concentrated living area for Moluccans after the camp period.

4 There is one important exception: Lunetten in Vught. There, the inhabitants continued their resistance to leaving the camp. Finally in 1993 the last group was housed in rebuilt houses on the location of the old camp (Smeets & Steijlen 2006: 312-314).

5 In 1982, tension between the Moluccans and the authorities in Assen reached a peak. There were disputes about a youth centre, and it was more over the five-year anniversary of the violent ending of the train hijacking in which six Moluccan hijackers were killed (along with two hostages). A police car was shot at nearby the Moluccan wijk. See Steungroep 1982.

6 There are some YouTube clips available of this Ride-out. Start in Geleen (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h3kknvcBQzw) or visit Venray (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KeL_OBQ23B8).

References


Steungroep 10 van Assen vrij (1982), *Dossier Assen*, Groningen: NP.


13 Nest-leaving behaviour among immigrant youth

Aslan Zorlu

13.1 Introduction

In general, the demographic behaviour and family dynamics of non-Western immigrants are different from that of the Dutch. The preferences of major ethnic minority groups concerning marriage and parenthood vary according to the educational and religious backgrounds of their parents (De Valk & Billari 2007). The demographic behaviour of immigrants is likely to deviate more from the majority at arrival, but this can decrease with the time elapsed in the Netherlands if immigrants take over mainstream social norms in the host country. This study aims to address a demographic indicator of integration: inter-ethnic differentials in leaving home (nest leaving) and returning back to the home in the Netherlands. Do immigrant youth leave the parental home at older ages than more individualistic and secularised Dutch youth? Although determinants of leaving the parental home have been extensively documented, the nest-leaving behaviour of immigrants and their children has seldom been addressed. Only a few studies have paid some attention to varying patterns of leaving home among migrants (Zorlu & Mulder 2011; De Valk & Billari 2007). This paper examines interethnic differences in nest-leaving behaviour and returning home in the Netherlands. By considering the inclination of returning home after a short period of independence, the paper aims to identify more persistent interethnic differences in nest-leaving behaviour over time. Using unique individual administrative panel data from Statistics Netherlands, an advanced dynamic regression analysis is conducted to understand the behaviour of the complete age cohort 16.

13.2 Theoretical background

Ethnic differences in nest-leaving behaviour can be related to restrictions and opportunities shaped by socio-economic and demographic
characteristics of migrants and contextual variables as well as cultural norms. In the migration literature, there is a consensus on the disadvantaged socio-economic position of immigrants from developing countries (Zorlu 2012). The question is how this disadvantage is related to the nest-leaving behaviour of migrant youth.

Upon general evidence on the timing, determinants and pathways, the home-leaving behaviour of immigrants has additional implications for the host society. Similarities in the patterns of home-leaving behaviour between natives and immigrant groups can be seen as an indicator of demographic adjustment and reflect a higher degree of integration. There are several reasons to expect that the home-leaving behaviour of migrants will differ from that of natives. Major factors that potentially induce interethnic differences in process and mechanisms of leaving arrangements may be categorised as cultural norms and a relative scarcity of own and parental resources.

Migrants from non-Western countries often reside in social rent houses in large cities. These houses are usually small in size, and non-Western youth share a relatively smaller space in the parental home with more people due to the greater number of children and a larger household size in the face of credit constraints and less favourable housing facilities (Zorlu 2009; Zorlu & Mulder 2008). This implies a relative scarcity of financial resources and a lower quality of the parental home.

Interethnic differences in cultural norms correspond to dominant cultural norms and preferences in the country of origin of the migrants in the timing and routes of departure from the parental home. In migrant communities from non-Western countries, family-related individual decisions are often prone to familial and religious concerns while in the secularised and individualised Dutch society, autonomous decisions of individuals are dominant practices regarding the timing of transitions into adulthood. Although Caribbean and Mediterranean migrants are more family oriented than the Dutch, there are fundamental differences between Caribbean and Mediterranean migrants regarding the timing and mechanisms of family-life transitions such as leaving home, marriage and childbearing (De Valk & Liefbroer 2007). In the Turkish and Moroccan communities, leaving home for marriage is still thought to be a dominant pattern. Traditionally arranged marriages occur more frequently, and the age at which Turkish and Moroccan youth marry and have their first child is lower compared to Caribbean migrants. In contrast to Mediterranean societies, unmarried cohabitation, childbearing out of wedlock and single-mother households are more common in the Caribbean tradition.
In addition to cultural norms, individual and family preferences are also related to institutional factors (Aassve et al. 2002). Patterns and processes of living arrangements in developing countries are likely not independent from credit constraints, housing and labour markets and institutional structures. For instance, a relatively lower age of leaving home in Western industrialised countries is often attributed to an advanced welfare state that provides a high level of support to young adults, like student loans, unemployment and welfare benefits and rent subsidies (Billari & Liefbroer 2007). This implies that nest-leaving home behaviour of non-Western youth in the Netherlands can differ significantly from the patterns in their countries of origin.

In the face of the above arguments, I formulate the following hypothesis: differences in the nest-leaving behaviour of migrant groups will vary with socio-economic and cultural distances from the Dutch. More traditional and disadvantaged Turkish and Moroccan youth will leave the parental home at older ages and are more likely to return home compared to Dutch and Caribbean (Surinamese and Antilleans) and Western migrants.

13.3 Following two birth cohorts over time

For the analysis, I use the entire population of two birth cohorts of those who were 16 and 22 years old in 1999 derived from the Social Statistical Database (ssd) 1999-2004, a rich individual administrative database available at Statistics Netherlands. The age cohort 16 seems to be the earliest birth cohort from which almost all individuals live with one of the parents. This ensures a non-selective population.

Together with the cohort 16, the age cohort 22 is followed to show the timing of home leaving. Since both cohorts can be followed five years long, the whole period from age 16 to 27 is covered. In the period 1999-2004, each cohort can be followed for five years to track the first-time transition from parental home to another living arrangement. Figure 1 shows the proportion of youth living in the parental home over the ages 16 to 27 by gender and country of origin. It is immediately apparent that girls leave the parental home earlier than boys do. By the time they are 27 years, only about 10 per cent of girls and 25 per cent of boys still live in the parental home. Looking at ethnic differences in the home-leaving behaviour by gender, Turkish and Moroccan youth, both girls and boys, leave home at a younger age compared to Dutch youth. Many of them enter into formal adulthood at around 18 and 19 years of age. Surinamese youth remain longer in the parental home compared
### TABLE 13.1  
**Variables and their route specific means at the time of leaving home or**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Girl</td>
<td>1 if person is girl</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch</td>
<td>1 if the country of origin is the Netherlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moroccan</td>
<td>1 if the country of origin is Morocco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish</td>
<td>1 if the country of origin is Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surinamese</td>
<td>1 if the country of origin is Surinam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antillean</td>
<td>1 if the country of origin is the Antilles and Aruba</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other non-Western</td>
<td>1 if the country of origin is another non-Western country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western</td>
<td>1 if the country of origin is a Western country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd generation</td>
<td>1 if born in NL and both parents were born abroad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd generation (Mixed)</td>
<td>1 if born in NL and one parent was born abroad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>1 if employed or self-employed; 0 otherwise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log income</td>
<td>Logarithm of fiscal income</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log value of dwelling</td>
<td>Logarithm of value of dwelling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All siblings in</td>
<td>1 if all siblings in the parental home</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All siblings out</td>
<td>1 if all siblings left the parental home</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some siblings in, some out</td>
<td>1 if some siblings in the home and some others out</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age difference with the mother</td>
<td>(Mother’s age minus own age) in years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age difference with the father</td>
<td>(Father’s age minus own age) in years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mother unmarried</td>
<td>1 if mother unmarried</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mother widow</td>
<td>1 if mother widow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mother divorced</td>
<td>1 if mother divorced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mother cohabiting</td>
<td>1 if mother cohabiting (not married)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mother employed</td>
<td>1 if mother employed or self-employed; 0 otherwise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Father employed</td>
<td>1 if father employed or self-employed; 0 otherwise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household size</td>
<td>Number of persons in the household</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income mother</td>
<td>Fiscal annual income of mother in €1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income father</td>
<td>Fiscal annual income of father in €1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Western in neighbourh.</td>
<td>% non-Western immigrants in the neighbourhood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% non-Western in neighbourh.</td>
<td>% Western immigrants in the neighbourhood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean earnings in neighbourh.</td>
<td>Mean annual income in the neighbourhood in €1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amsterdam</td>
<td>1 if lives in Amsterdam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rotterdam</td>
<td>1 if lives in Rotterdam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Hague</td>
<td>1 if lives in the Hague</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utrecht</td>
<td>1 if lives in Utrecht</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N
### Variables and their route specific means at the time of leaving home or the end of period (censoring)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Stayed</th>
<th>Union</th>
<th>Study</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Girl</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch</td>
<td>65.32</td>
<td>1.88</td>
<td>18.40</td>
<td>14.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moroccan</td>
<td>37.40</td>
<td>10.49</td>
<td>12.03</td>
<td>40.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish</td>
<td>40.63</td>
<td>16.08</td>
<td>11.90</td>
<td>31.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surinamese</td>
<td>61.05</td>
<td>1.62</td>
<td>11.06</td>
<td>26.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antillean</td>
<td>56.38</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>14.29</td>
<td>28.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other non-Western</td>
<td>57.41</td>
<td>1.93</td>
<td>16.15</td>
<td>24.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western</td>
<td>62.60</td>
<td>1.40</td>
<td>18.89</td>
<td>17.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd generation</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd generation (Mixed)</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log income</td>
<td>8.96</td>
<td>8.95</td>
<td>7.91</td>
<td>8.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log value of dwelling</td>
<td>3.59</td>
<td>3.21</td>
<td>3.59</td>
<td>3.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All siblings in</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>0.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All siblings out</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some siblings in, some out</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age difference with the mother</td>
<td>27.32</td>
<td>26.23</td>
<td>28.77</td>
<td>26.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age difference with the father</td>
<td>28.51</td>
<td>27.94</td>
<td>30.04</td>
<td>26.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mother unmarried</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mother widow</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mother divorced</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mother cohabiting</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mother employed</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>0.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Father employed</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>0.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household size</td>
<td>4.04</td>
<td>5.17</td>
<td>4.09</td>
<td>4.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income mother</td>
<td>12.59</td>
<td>7.52</td>
<td>15.98</td>
<td>11.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income father</td>
<td>35.66</td>
<td>28.17</td>
<td>48.78</td>
<td>26.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Western in neighbourh.</td>
<td>7.63</td>
<td>6.83</td>
<td>8.13</td>
<td>8.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% non-Western in neighbourh.</td>
<td>8.38</td>
<td>14.04</td>
<td>6.32</td>
<td>14.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean earnings in neighbourh.</td>
<td>18.93</td>
<td>13.41</td>
<td>19.57</td>
<td>15.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amsterdam</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rotterdam</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Hague</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utrecht</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>108331</td>
<td>4255</td>
<td>30418</td>
<td>28517</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
to Turks and Moroccans, while the home-leaving behaviour of Western youth is very similar to that of the Dutch. Considering all groups together by the age of 27, 20 to 35 per cent of boys and less than 20 per cent of girls live with their parents.

**FIGURE 13.1** Percentage of youngsters living in their parental home, unconditional survival probabilities by gender and country of origin

### Fraction of boys living with their parents

- **NL**
- **Morocco**
- **Turkey**
- **Surinam**
- **Western**

### Fraction of girls living with their parents

- **NL**
- **Morocco**
- **Turkey**
- **Surinam**
- **Western**
Table 13.1 shows the variables that are used in this study and their mean values for each destination outside the home. In general, girls are more likely to leave home, in particular for union formation. Turkish and Moroccan youth are also overrepresented among union formers. A better parental economic position (employment and higher income) is associated with either staying home longer or a high probability of leaving home for study. On the other hand, a weak parental socio-economic position is strongly correlated with leaving home for union formation or other reasons. If the mother is divorced, the probability of leaving home for any destination is relatively high.

3.4 Explaining ethnic differences in nest leaving

Individual home-leaving behaviour is analysed in the framework of a discrete time duration model with competing risks. In this setting, the likelihood of leaving home for three destinations at time $t$ is estimated, given this person lives in the parental home at time $t-1$. In other words, the duration of the home-leaving spell is specified as the conditional probability of leaving home, i.e. the hazard rate. In this framework, the survival time for co-residing individuals is assumed to start at the age of 16 in 1999 and to end when an individual leaves the parental home for the first time. It is censored when the individual was still co-residing with the parent(s) in the last year of observation (2004).

Leaving the parental home is measured at the moment the young adult has left home. Leaving home can occur between 1999 and 2004 and is measured as a change in the young adult’s address from living with at least one parent to living away from the parents. The pathway of leaving home is also measured after leaving home. I distinguish three pathways: leaving home to form a union (married or unmarried), leaving for study (higher education) and leaving for another reason.

In the analysis, young people are treated as a part of the parental household, rather than treating them as an independent actor. So, the decision by young people to leave the parental home is assumed to be interactively determined by their own resources and the resources of their parents, household structure and spatial context.

The parameter estimates of the competing risk models by gender are presented in table 13.2. The likelihood for leaving to form a union increases in the first four years, after which it declines again. The baseline hazard for leaving for study reflects a monotonously increasing shape while it is similar over the years for the ‘other’ route. Looking at inter-origin differentials, the probability of departure toward any
<table>
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<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
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<td>17.55</td>
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<tr>
<td>( \alpha_4 )</td>
<td>31.24</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>28.20</td>
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<td>( \alpha_5 )</td>
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<td>**</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1.76</td>
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<tr>
<td>Turkish</td>
<td>14.23</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>1.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antillean</td>
<td>0.51</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
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<tr>
<td>All siblings in</td>
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<td></td>
<td>0.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All siblings out</td>
<td>4.09</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>1.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some siblings in, some out</td>
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<tr>
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<td>***</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mother widow</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mother divorced</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>1.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mother cohabiting</td>
<td>1.45</td>
<td></td>
<td>3.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mother employed</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Father employed</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>1.03</td>
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<tr>
<td>Income mother</td>
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<td>***</td>
<td>1.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income father</td>
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<td>1.01</td>
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<tr>
<td>% non-Western migrants in neighbourh.</td>
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<td>0.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean earnings in neighbourh. (1000s)</td>
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<td>1.01</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
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| N                      | 396649 |

\* p<.01; \** p<.001; \*** p<.0001

Note: dummy variables should be interpreted with respect to the reference categories. The reference categories for ethnic background, siblings, mother's marital status and large cities are respectively: Dutch, no-sibling present, mother-married and the rest of the Netherlands.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th>Study</th>
<th>Other</th>
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<td>7.58 ***</td>
<td>20.42 ***</td>
<td>3.83 ***</td>
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<td>a5</td>
<td>3.83 ***</td>
<td>24.14 ***</td>
<td>3.59 ***</td>
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<td>7.80 ***</td>
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<td>2.99 ***</td>
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<td>2.34 ***</td>
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<td>0.81 **</td>
<td>1.16 **</td>
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<td>Antillean</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td>1.48 ***</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other non-Western</td>
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<td>1.15</td>
<td>1.26 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western</td>
<td>1.75 ***</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>1.12 **</td>
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<td>1.06</td>
<td>0.86 ***</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1.23 ***</td>
<td>0.89 **</td>
</tr>
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<td>Employed</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log income</td>
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<td>1.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All siblings out</td>
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<td>Some siblings in, some out</td>
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<td>1.41 ***</td>
<td>1.66 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age difference with the mother</td>
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<td>1.03 ***</td>
<td>0.95 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age difference with the father</td>
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<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mother unmarried</td>
<td>0.41 ***</td>
<td>1.32 ***</td>
<td>1.37 ***</td>
</tr>
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<td>Mother widow</td>
<td>1.38</td>
<td>1.21 **</td>
<td>0.87 **</td>
</tr>
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<td>Mother divorced</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>1.47 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mother cohabiting</td>
<td>0.35 ***</td>
<td>3.15 ***</td>
<td>0.45 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mother employed</td>
<td>0.85 **</td>
<td>1.32 ***</td>
<td>0.89 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Father employed</td>
<td>0.80 ***</td>
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<td>0.80 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income mother</td>
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<td>1.01 ***</td>
<td>1.01 ***</td>
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<tr>
<td>Income father</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.01 ***</td>
<td>1.00 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Western migrants in neighbourh.</td>
<td>0.93 ***</td>
<td>1.02 ***</td>
<td>1.02 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% non-Western migrants in neighbourh.</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.99 ***</td>
<td>1.01 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean earnings in neighbourh. (1000s)</td>
<td>0.96 ***</td>
<td>1.01 ***</td>
<td>0.99 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amsterdam</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>1.16</td>
<td>0.75 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rotterdam</td>
<td>1.16</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Hague</td>
<td>1.05</td>
<td>1.30 ***</td>
<td>0.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utrecht</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>1.30 ***</td>
<td>1.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
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<td>0.13 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>353070</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
route is particularly high for young people of Turkish, Moroccan and other non-Western origin. The probability of leaving home for union is spectacularly higher for Turkish and Moroccan girls as well as Turkish boys compared to their native counterparts, although they form only a small part of the home leavers up to the ages of 24. Interestingly, Surinamese boys and girls have a lower probability of leaving home for study compared to their native counterparts, as do Western girls. There is obviously little compelling reason for Surinamese girls to leave home for study because they are already concentrated in large university cities. Second-generation immigrant girls have a lower probability of leaving home for union formation or ‘other’ reasons, while they are more likely to leave for study. The second-generation boys have a lower probability of departing for ‘other’ reasons. Among the second generation, those with one foreign-born parent have a relatively lower probability of leaving their home for ‘other’ reasons than for study compared to the second generation with foreign-born parents. This implies that there is more similarity between the second generation with one foreign-born parent and natives than in the case of two foreign-born parents.

Youth in paid employment and those with higher incomes have a significantly lower probability of leaving home for study and a higher probability of leaving for ‘other’ reasons. A strong positive correlation between income and the probability of leaving home for union formation may be obvious for young men and women since they need financial resources to start a union. A relatively stronger correlation for young men confirms the persistence of the traditional breadwinner concept. However, more striking is the higher probability of girls leaving home for union formation when they are employed, while the likelihood of leaving home for union formation is not higher among employed men. This may reflect a greater sensitivity of men for higher income, not necessarily for having a (small) job. Different than men, having a (small) job is also an important factor for women to leave home for union in addition to income.

The presence of siblings has in general a positive effect on leaving home, often for union formation, especially when some or all siblings have already left home. A greater age differential with the mother leads to a lower likelihood of leaving home for union formation or another reason but a higher likelihood to leave for study. A similar effect is observed for the age differential with the father, albeit less strong. This finding implies a rejection of the hypothesis that a greater age difference with parents can reflect a higher intensity of intergenerational conflict which can serve as a push factor.
Children of unmarried and divorced mothers are more likely to leave home for study and other reasons but less frequently for union formation. The likelihood of leaving home for study is the highest for the children of cohabiting mothers and widowed mothers. In addition, these children are less likely to move for other reasons, as in the case of the children of widowed mothers.

The employment position of parents has a clear positive impact on the likelihood of leaving home for study but retards the likelihood of leaving for union formation or other reasons. A higher income of the parents generates similar effects. Although the effects of employment and the income positions of mothers and fathers are in the same direction, the effects are larger in magnitude for the mothers.

Looking at the impact of contextual variables, the likelihood of leaving home for study and other reasons is greater for those who live in neighbourhoods with a higher share of Western migrants and higher incomes, but the likelihood of union formation is smaller for them. Young people living in neighbourhoods with a higher share of non-Western migrants are, on the other hand, less likely to move for study but more likely to move for other reasons. These outcomes confirm the intuition that young people in ‘high quality’ neighbourhoods are more likely to leave the parental home predominantly for study but less likely for union formation at relatively younger ages. Furthermore, young people living in Amsterdam and Utrecht leave home for study more frequently. Strikingly, youth in Amsterdam are less likely to leave home for other reasons.

**13.5 Returning home**

The question is how persistent the patterns of leaving home are across the different migrant groups and native Dutch. This can be understood, as we know how the probabilities of leaving home are related to the probabilities of returning home across the groups. As Figure 13.2 shows, the probabilities of returning home are quite constant for almost all groups up to age 20, after which they tend to increase. The higher return probability for Surinamese and Turkish boys and girls are remarkable.

In order to assess determinants of returning home, I estimate the probability of returning home for boys and girls, who already left home using a discrete time survival model. The dependent variable, return, in this case has a binary structure, taking the value 1 if the individual returns to the parental home and otherwise taking the value 0. The sur-
survival time starts and ends when an individual leaves the parental home and returns to the home. It is right-censored when the individual had not returned home by the last year of observation (2004).

The estimates in table 13.2 show that young males from non-Western countries have a higher probability of returning home than native Dutch which is the reference category. However, no significant ethnic differences are observed for almost all migrant groups, except Surinam.
names of girls who have a significantly higher probability of returning home compared to Dutch girls. Employment leads to a higher probability of returning home while a higher income has the reverse effect. Interestingly, the probability of returning home is substantially lower when all or some siblings are co-residing with parents. However, this probability is higher when all siblings have already left the home. A higher age difference with the mother lowers the probability of leaving home but an age difference with father has no impact on this percentage. When the mother is divorced or widowed, the probability of returning is higher than when the mother is married, while in the case of the cohabiting mother the probability of returning is substantially lower. The impacts of employment and the income levels of parents are similar to the impacts of youngsters’ own employment and income, although these effects are smaller. Variables indicating neighbourhood ethnic composition and economic conditions have no effect.

### Table 13.3 Determinants of returning home, odds ratios

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Boys</th>
<th></th>
<th>Girls</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Log α</td>
<td>1.36 **</td>
<td>1.21 *</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moroccan</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish</td>
<td>1.32 **</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surinamese</td>
<td>1.42 ***</td>
<td>1.27 **</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antillean</td>
<td>1.44 *</td>
<td>1.27</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other non-Western</td>
<td>1.30 **</td>
<td>1.08</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western</td>
<td>1.04</td>
<td>1.18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd generation (parents born abroad)</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd generation (mixed)</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>1.73 ***</td>
<td>1.25 ***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log income</td>
<td>0.88 ***</td>
<td>0.91 ***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log housing value</td>
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<td>0.95</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All siblings in</td>
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<td>0.03 ***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All siblings out</td>
<td>1.16 *</td>
<td>1.36 ***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some siblings in, some out</td>
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<td>0.25 ***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference mother’s age and own age</td>
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<td>0.98 ***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference father’s age and own age</td>
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<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
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<th>Variable</th>
<th>Boys</th>
<th></th>
<th>Girls</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mother unmarried</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mother widow</td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td>1.38 **</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mother divorced</td>
<td>1.28 ***</td>
<td>1.17 ***</td>
<td></td>
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### Variable

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<th>Boys</th>
<th>Girls</th>
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</thead>
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<td>0.41 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mother employed</td>
<td>1.19 ***</td>
<td>1.16 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Father employed</td>
<td>1.30 ***</td>
<td>1.31 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income mother</td>
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<td>0.99 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income father</td>
<td>0.99 ***</td>
<td>1.00 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Western migrants in neighbourhood</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.01 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% non-Western migrants in neighbourhood</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean earnings in neighbourhood (000s)</td>
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<td>1.01</td>
</tr>
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<td>Amsterdam</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rotterdam</td>
<td>0.75 ***</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Hague</td>
<td>0.73 ***</td>
<td>0.77 **</td>
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<tr>
<td>Utrecht</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>0.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
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<td>0.15 ***</td>
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* p<.01; ** p<.001; *** p<.0001

### 13.6 Conclusions

This study examined ethnic differentials in the timing of nest leaving and pathways out of the parental home as well as in returning home. My hypothesis was that more traditional and disadvantaged Turkish and Moroccan youth would leave the parental home at older ages and were more likely to return home compared to native Dutch and Caribbean (Surinamese and Antilleans) and Western migrants. The analysis showed that migrant young men and women leave the parental home at relatively younger ages compared to their Dutch counterparts. There are significant differences in the reasons why the different groups leave home. The behaviour of Western migrants is very similar to that of the Dutch, while the most deviation in nest-leaving behaviour is observed for Mediterranean (Turkish and Moroccan) migrants. The nest-leaving pattern of Caribbean migrants is also more similar to that of the Dutch.

Contrary to my expectations, Mediterranean migrants leave home significantly earlier than the Dutch. A substantially high incidence of departures from the home around 18 years of age for this group is striking, while departure rates are more smoothly spread over time. In view of the relatively late timing of nest leaving in the origin countries of these migrants, this outcome unambiguously contradicts the idea that ethnic origin or cultural characteristics determine the nest-leaving behaviour of migrants. Constraints imposed by the unfavourable
socio-economic position of non-Western migrants in the Netherlands do not seem to hinder the early nest leaving of these migrants. The results suggest dominating effects of opportunity structure enriched by the Dutch welfare state. The behaviour of the second generation from this group is closer to that of the Dutch, as expected.

The impact of ethnic origin and socio-economic position is apparent in the choices of the pathways out of the parental home. Mediterranean migrants are more likely to leave home for union formation but less likely to do so for study. In particular, leaving home for union formation is very popular for Turkish and Moroccan girls as well as Turkish boys. However, the fraction of migrants leaving home for union formation remains modest within the whole population of nest leavers.

The analysis also showed that returning to the home after first leaving home does not eliminate the pattern of ethnic difference that we had assumed (Moroccans and Turks most prone to return, then Surinamese, then the Dutch). We saw that a larger fraction of Surinamese and Turkish youth return home than within other groups. The probability of returning home is higher when all siblings are out of the home, the parents are divorced and both the individual and the parents are employed. However, the probability is significantly lower when all siblings are co-residing with the parents.

Overall, the most striking finding of this study on nest-leaving behaviour of Turkish and Moroccan youth is that cultural norms are not necessarily the only explanation for the gap in immigrant integration. The context obviously matters.

References


METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES
14 Thick descriptions, typologies and responsible and relevant research

Ilse van Liempt

14.1 Introduction

Sometimes the starting point for research is a well-developed theory, while at other times it is the absence of detailed knowledge of a phenomenon that is the driving force behind a study. My PhD research, supervised by Rinus Penninx, was developed with the aim of collecting new information that would add to our current knowledge on human smuggling. I have very good memories of my meetings with Rinus Penninx as my PhD supervisor (between 2002 and 2006). The first meetings were very much about my data collection. The fieldwork I had envisioned was complex, sensitive and very time-consuming. I had decided to interview immigrants and refugees from various countries (and thus had to deal with various languages) who had been dependent on others for organising their journey to the Netherlands. As a geographer, I was eager to learn from anthropologists (my co-supervisor Jeroen Doomernik was also trained as an anthropologist) how to do fieldwork in a ‘proper’ way. Rinus advised me to take a course in life history methodology, to keep a research diary and to work with refugees as research assistants.

These ‘assistants’ (one of them already had his PhD but could not find a job at his level) helped me a lot in the data process. Initially I had thought of their role as translators but soon this turned out to be a bad idea, as it formalised the interview setting and reminded people of interviews they had gone through before with official institutions. This taught me that migrants’ lives in general and refugees’ lives in particular are very much influenced by specific political and institutional frameworks that pose very concrete methodological challenges. We then decided that the assistants should conduct the interviews themselves in cases where I faced a language barrier. Apart from overcoming language barriers, my research assistants have taught me to see what data was useful for my analysis. Sometimes they confronted me with my own positionality and my preconceived ideas around smuggling.
While reading the transcripts of the interviews, I often came across sentences such as ‘… as you know …’, referring to a shared experience with my assistants. The fact that they had been smuggled themselves made it possible for me to enter a world that would otherwise probably have remained much more hidden.

Apart from discussions on data collection, the supervision meetings I had with Rinus Penninx were very much about how to structure my material, how to bring order to my overwhelming piles of data and how to build theory from all these interesting findings. I remember that I was sometimes overwhelmed by Rinus’s urge to order and structure things, and I could not always merge this with the image I had of an anthropologist. I was convinced that my research was explorative and that I should not be too focused. Over time, however, I came to appreciate this structured way of working and it really helped me to make sense of my data. At the moment of writing, I am teaching grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss 1967) and qualitative research methods to geography students at Utrecht University, and I often think back on the lessons I learned from Rinus Penninx. Analysing data is at the heart of building theory but it is the most difficult and the least codified part of the process. Published studies generally describe research design and data collection methods but give very little attention to discussion of analysis. This was already noted by Strauss in 1987 and is still very true.

### 14.2 Stay close to your material

Rinus's advice on the use of ‘thick descriptions’ (Geertz 1973) turned out to be very useful in my research for several reasons. First of all, my detailed focus on people's life stories resulted in a lot of detailed and rich data and allowed me to see respondents’ surroundings and learn about their feelings in greater detail. As such, it made it easier to ‘ground’ and understand certain decisions/actions that were taken by interviewees. Second, the focus on life stories made it easier for people to talk about sensitive issues such as ‘illegal’ activities like buying fake documents, crossing the border with a smuggler or hiding the truth from police or immigration officers because one knows that the consequences of revealing the truth can be severe. These issues made up a part of their lives and were less difficult to talk about when the whole context was discussed. Crossing a border with a smuggler becomes an ‘ordinary’ part of one's migration journey when there are no legal possibilities around.

Third, because of all the detail in my material I spent a lot of time on what is commonly called ‘open’ coding; a brainstorming approach
to analysis to open up the data to all potentials and possibilities contained within them (Corbin & Strauss 2008: 160). This process of open coding where one stays close to the original material and the words and languages used by respondents turned out to be very important. Examining how respondents use language can tell us a lot about a situation. My interviews for example showed me that there is often little stigma attached to the smuggling business from migrants’ point of view. Migrants who have used the services of smugglers often describe them as ‘helpers’, as ‘people who save lives’, or as a ‘necessary alternative’ in a world with many restrictions on mobility (Van Liempt 2007). The terms they used to express what smuggling meant were conceptually very expressive. In the media and public opinion, however, smugglers are often perceived to be linked to organised crime. My interviews with smuggled migrants showed me that classifying all types of smuggling as a form of organised crime is highly misleading. Most of the literature on human smuggling, however, lacks the voice of the migrant and is dominated by a business/organised crime way of thinking (Van Liempt & Doomernik 2006). It was only after considering all possible meanings and examining the context carefully that I was ready to put interpretative conceptual levels on the data. And it was because I stayed close to my data that I was able to come up with insights about the phenomenon of human smuggling that went far beyond common knowledge.

14.3 Building a typology

The challenge I faced during the analysis of my data was that due to the large volume of my data there was a temptation to make it too complex and to lose sense of proportions. The detailed work at the beginning of my research, however, guided me towards a typology of different types of human smuggling that I had come across. If I wanted to trace and nuance ideas about human smuggling and most of all if I wanted to break the myth that human smuggling is always a criminal offence, I had to come up with a typology in which different types of smuggling were presented. The next step was thus bringing the detailed raw data to a higher level of abstraction. As Coffey and Atkinson (1996) argue, data analysis is an active process that assumes working with the data in terms of reducing and complicating by looking for patterns at a higher level of abstraction.

My data suggested that it was not sufficient to only look at how smugglers cooperate among themselves. Interviews with smuggled
migrants clearly showed that migrants are not passive actors and that they shape the evolvement of the smuggling process to a considerable extent. It also appeared from the data that trust plays a vital role in the decision-making process, not only from the side of the smuggler but also from the migrant’s perspective. This of course makes perfect sense, as migrants put their lives in the hand of smugglers and this is not an easy decision to take. However, it also struck me from the data that the level of agency within the decision-making process differed clearly from situation to situation. I decided to take the different types of interaction between smugglers and migrants as well as the outcome of the smuggling process as the basis for my typology. In its purest sense, inductive analysis within grounded theory is to build theory from the ground, grounded in the data. I clearly used my data as an input for the typology that I was constructing.

The first type I identified in my PhD was the service type of smuggling (Van Liempt 2007). In this case, migrants knew exactly where they were going and how much they had to pay for it, and they were brought exactly to where they were promised by the smuggler. Relations between smugglers and migrants within this type were often based on trust. This type of smuggling process looked quite similar, apart from its risks and the high costs, to regular migration processes. Migrant communities often played an active role in this type of smuggling and the destination depended clearly on already established communities in the country of destination. The second type I discovered was the directive type of smuggling (ibid). This type of smuggling is often referred to in the media as well as in other academic studies. The smuggler in this case decides how the smuggling process will evolve, leaving the migrants with no voice of their own and often in unexpected destinations. The migrants I interviewed who belonged to this type had ended up in the Netherlands but had never considered this country as an option themselves. Moreover, migrants within this type of smuggling had a low degree of autonomy and the relation between the smuggler and the migrant was often anonymous, which made the risk for exploitation much higher than in the other types I identified.

The third type was the negotiable type of smuggling (ibid). Central to this process were the interactions between smugglers and migrants and most of all the fact that migrants were clearly in the position to choose. This type of smuggling often occurred when migrants travelled step by step. Smugglers may offer different destinations for various prices from which the migrants need to choose. When several smugglers are involved, the final destination may only be decided after a considerable amount of time and various border crossings. Besides, along the
way migrants also collect as much information as possible, constantly trying to become knowledgeable about ‘good’ smugglers, safe routes and ‘good’ countries of destination, all of which may impact ideas that migrants have about their final destination. This dynamic situation makes the migration process with the help of a smuggler very unpredictable. It must be acknowledged, however, that the three types of smuggling that I have identified are not static. People may easily shift from one type to the other during their travel. Smugglers may, for example, pretend to act differently at the start and then change their style/attitude. Migrants, for their part, can also inform and update themselves about final destinations, routes to take and/or the reputation of a specific smuggler along the way which can result in a shift of types.

### 14.4 The human touch

Apart from the technical story of how to structure my data and build a theory, Rinus always reminded me of the human touch and the fact that my typologies and categorisations were filled with personal stories and real people. I was convinced from the start of this project that I wanted to put migrants’ perspectives central. My research, however, was part of a wider European project and within the project there had been considerable scepticism towards the interviewing method. It was assumed that people involved in human smuggling would never speak openly about such a sensitive topic and could potentially still be under threat from smugglers, making it unlikely that they would tell the truth. Consequently, it was assumed that my fieldwork would not provide accurate information on the detailed characteristics of an illegal activity such as smuggling. Over and over again, I had to defend myself. Rinus encouraged me not to be angry but to come up with good arguments. This really helped me to grow academically.

When my project was finished, a member of the defence committee again expressed his doubts about my methodology, but this time I was better prepared. The general criticism I had to face was that it was assumed that people involved in human smuggling would never be in a position to speak openly. Apart from breaking the illusion that people would never tell the complete truth in any interview setting and that all conversation is to a certain extent constructed, I am still convinced that the way we designed our study with the help of refugees as research assistants and our reflexivity on the data collection process has brought out data that is valid. It is often forgotten that in research on vulnerable migrants, mistrust is often a key factor. As Robinson makes clear,
'many asylum seekers have had to learn *not* to trust people to survive. Their persecutions in the country of origin may have been sparked by a casual comment made by a neighbour, a colleague, a friend or even someone who wished them ill’ (2002: 64, emphasis added). This particular situation calls for research approaches that are different from those commonly used in terms of building up trust. Unfortunately, understanding why and how individuals develop mistrust but also to what extent respondents are mistrusted is only rarely taken into consideration in research (Van Liempt & Bilger 2012).

Moreover, I think that the reactions illustrated (and they still do) the far-reaching impact of discursive practices linking human smuggling to crime and security. Many people have pre-determined notions of who smugglers are. In the end, it strengthened my conviction that interviewing migrants about *their* experiences with human smuggling would be necessary in order to capture a broader understanding of this phenomenon and to reveal parts of a social world that would otherwise remain hidden. The desire to re-embodi the effects of frequently disembodied policy rationales and discourses around human smuggling became my driving factor to keep working on this topic, even today. Rinus understood my personal engagement with my research. I was teaching Dutch to migrants without documents who wanted to integrate and learn the language but were not allowed to do so by the state. I also spent quite a lot of time with my respondents and offered some of them help in terms of advice, small jobs as well as meals during interviews. The conversations we had about this during supervision were helpful. I have to say that I was inspired by the fact that Rinus himself had also been a ‘responsible’ researcher. When he studied anthropology in Leiden, he had set up a working group for migrant workers. More recently in 2006, he was involved in the initiative *Eén land, één samenleving* (One country, one society), which tries to nuance the discourse in the media about the multicultural society and to decrease polarisation.

14.5 Relevant research

I agree with Bakewell (2008) that some research, and especially research in the field of migration, is too much guided by the categories, concepts and priorities of policymakers and practitioners, and that it is important to look beyond existing categories. Rinus also taught me to reflect critically on the meaning and effects of the categories that I was building. And we had long discussions over the use of the word ‘illegal’,
‘irregular’ or ‘undocumented’ types of migration. Ethical questions in research with undocumented migrants became a topic that I further explored after my PhD. For example, I edited a book called *The Ethics of Migration Research Methodology* in which I asked several researchers to reflect on the ethical dilemmas one faces while conducting research with vulnerable migrants (Van Liempt & Bilger 2009).

At the same time, however, I think that an active involvement in the field and an intimate connection with empirical reality may result in new research questions that may be relevant for policy. While conducting fieldwork with smuggled migrants in the Netherlands, I discovered that many of them, in particular Somalis, were leaving for the United Kingdom once they obtained their Dutch citizenship. I was intrigued by this phenomenon and I applied for European Union funding to further explore this issue. I was fortunate to get a scholarship and make this research dream come true.

The fact that I was still in touch with many of the Somalis I had interviewed for my PhD greatly benefited this next project. One of the things I came across in my study of this internal EU movement is that there is much more need for research that recognises the ‘normality’ within migrants’ lives rather than privileging their position as forced, vulnerable, etc. Not every aspect in a migrant’s life is to be explained by migration alone. Onward migrants may, for example, want to rectify what they perceive as actual or potential unsatisfactory integration outcomes. Their decision to migrate on is comparable to other EU citizens’ transnational strategies of making a career. In reality, various dimensions may overlap, influence or determine one another. Researchers need to carefully weigh different factors according to their actual significance in order to avoid what has been called a ‘migration bias’ (Bilger & Van Liempt 2009: 3).

### 14.6 Conclusion

Qualitative research is producing large amounts of data from various sources (field notes on observations, interview transcripts, notes from research diaries, and sometimes even pictures or film), which makes the analysis complex and demanding. It requires both flexibility and skills and experience on the part of the researcher, as all this data needs to be organised in a structured way and interpreted in a creative way in order to be able to answer the research question(s). The question of how to do this largely remains a secret to researchers just beginning their careers. Very little is written about how one should analyse one’s
qualitative data. Moreover, in many qualitative studies, no real justice is done to the complexity of the data analysis process because of the enormous time pressure academics face. The PhD experience is usually when grounded theory is performed in its purest sense. I would like to conclude by thanking Rinus Penninx for guiding me through the process of a PhD research in which I learned so much.

References

15 In the mud puddle

The research diary as a method

Liza Mügge

Once there was a mud puddle, it was sleepy, it was creepy, it was deeper-than-you’d-think. When something went into that mud puddle, the mud puddle didn’t want to let go. (Sierra 2001: 1)

15.1 Introduction

A research field is like a mud puddle. No matter how thoroughly prepared a researcher is, once s/he steps into it determined to find what s/he is looking for, it appears to be messy and a range of unexpected events will quickly unfold. Up to one’s knees in the mud, the safe and clean environment of university libraries and offices seems miles away. The research diary is a well-established tool of ethnographers in which they comprehensively try to grasp and reflect on what they experience and observe in the field. In anthropology, diary entries and sometimes personal emotions are legitimate data sources and are often published in their rawest form (Kleinman & Copp 1993). Although the pioneers in immigration research on both sides of the Atlantic were anthropologists, particularly because they had conducted fieldwork in migrants’ homelands (see Foner et al. 2000), this methodological tradition did not gain ground in the interdisciplinary field of comparative migration studies. That is unfortunate, because as I will argue, it has much to offer for studies drawing on in-depth interviews or fieldwork. In the children’s story that has inspired this essay’s title, the toddlers ultimately persevere over the nasty mud puddle; once it has dried they happily turn the sand into castles, pizzas and cookies. Drawing on notes kept between 2003-2005 on fieldwork in the Netherlands, Surinam and Turkey for my PhD research on transnational migrant politics, this essay shows how the research diary helped me to prepare for my mud puddle, kept me from drowning, pulled me out and offered new questions for future research. It demonstrates that the research diary may have mul-
multiple functions that vary over the following phases of a research cycle:
preparation, fieldwork, analysis and writing, and post-project.

15.2 Preparation: trained to prepare for the unexpected?

Anthropological methodology teaches us that researchers need to capture the first, most crisp and naïve impressions in as detailed a manner and as soon as possible (Bernard 2002). After a day or even after an hour, important impressions and thoughts will have faded. As one of my anthropology lecturers urged us during our first year: ‘if the restroom is the only place to jot down some notes, use it!’ In the early phases of the research process, it is even more crucial to write as much as possible because the field is new. Researchers generally – though partially – acclimatise themselves after a few weeks; things that surprised them during the first weeks thus appear fully normal once in full action in the field. Moreover, a systematic description of the first phases of the research process enables the researcher to reconstruct steps and choices taken. After all, it is likely that the readership is as naïve as the researcher was at the beginning of the project. The author needs to take the reader by the hand and guide her or him through the findings. Furthermore, how foolish and unimportant some observations may seem, at some point they may become valuable. When and how these observations may become meaningful is unknown in advance. That all events and actions are equally important – certainly at the beginning of a study – is a classical justification by anthropologists who are ‘hanging around’ and waiting for ‘surprises’. Because of the vagueness of this method – for example, the impossibility to capture expected findings in a testable hypothesis – it is criticised by the broader social scientific community for not being systematic enough. Despite the wisdom that ‘something happens when nothing happens’ (Becker 1998) and the comforting words of great anthropologists who look back on their landmark works with emotions of ‘hopelessness and despair’ (Malinowski 1984[1922]: 4), the feeling of not really knowing whether the ‘right’ accidents will happen may give an anthropologist the feeling of being out of control. While anthropologists are expected to be hyper flexible and to some extent trained to ‘lose control’ on the research topic, this openness of the ethnographic tradition and the reflections on it in a research diary makes the method hard to use in other disciplines. Moreover, ethnography in its purest form and the diary seem to be used predominantly together. My methodology courses in anthropology did not suggest that the research diary as a method could travel. In my work I have eventually separated the two.
It was one of my PhD supervisors, Rinus Penninx – trained as an anthropologist and the founding father of migration studies in the Netherlands – who strongly advised me to keep a research diary over the whole research period. Although I valued my methodological training in anthropology, I did not really see the added value for the research project I was conducting, a comparative case study. Despite its reliance on qualitative data, my project was miles away from a classical ethnography: I knew what I was looking for. But I followed Penninx’s advice. Every night during the preparations and over the course of my fieldwork I faithfully wrote in my diary. I am glad I did.

The diary writing was time-consuming and simply draining after a day of trying to get access to respondents, participating in political events and interviewing. During the day I jotted down thoughts and observations in my notebook. This could be a conversation with a taxi driver or with a young couple with a baby on a ferry while on my way to an interview. My notes included everyday encounters with roommates or neighbours and political discussions with friends. I worked out all notes I made during interviews, including literal quotations that seemed important, I made a summary of interviews, phone calls and events. In other words, I described what I did, saw and experienced during a day as much as possible. After this description I added a paragraph in which I reflected on the content, the research process or my own position as a researcher. The diary pushed me to thoroughly think about the choices I made in the very early phases of the project. With hindsight, this proved to be an excellent preparation for the field. Unexpectedly my research diary became one of my central methodological tools and was beneficial in several phases of the research.

15.3 In the field: dealing with harassment and sexualisation

Just walking down the streets in Surinam, local men saw me as a not-so-hard-to-get Dutch student. In Turkey, men see blonds who speak Turkish like me as a ‘Natasha’ – a Russian prostitute. Although my interviewees knew that I was neither, I felt that those stereotypes were clearly present and influenced how they treated me. Of the more than 200 interviews I have conducted, it is hard to recall interview settings in which my respondents would not approach me in a sexual way somehow. This might have been an innocent joke or just saying that I had beautiful eyes. Looking back, it also included direct forms of intimidation and harassment. Whether treating me as if I was their student, granddaughter, mistress or worse, what the great majority of my inter-
viewees had in common was that they didn’t take me seriously. Did it matter? In ‘real life’ it would matter to me; I would oppose and address sexism, sexual harassment and intimidation in any possible way. In the field, I had few choices. I could either end my fieldwork and stop my PhD or learn to deal with it. I decided to deal with it.

The diary was my free space to reflect on hurdles of doing research among men as a young white unmarried atheist female. For my research I had to contact politicians, civil servants and political activists. They were political leaders in powerful positions and often in their fifties. Not only did I need to interview them, they were also gatekeepers on whom I relied. I would simply write down uncomfortable and extremely unpleasant situations. This helped me to put my finger on what was bothering me. Then I would talk about my problem with female and male natives who understood the local sexuality. Talking to them and listening to their ‘dos and ‘don’ts’ helped me to develop strategies. I was well aware that sexualising me was a way for men to confirm their masculinity (Stock & Schwalbe 2009). For my own safety, I had to learn to reject them according to local standards without offending them so they would continue to provide me with information (for Suriname, see box 1).

In the early phases of my fieldwork I was shocked with the explicit sexualisation I experienced. I was not prepared for it; it was not what I expected. I initially trusted my interviewees and was disappointed that I couldn’t. I was personally starting to distrust every respondent and felt paranoid. I also wondered what it meant for the quality of my data. As I triangulated my data and checked the information respondents gave me as much as I could, the fact that I was sexualised and that my respondents didn’t take me seriously did not negatively affect my data collection. On the contrary, although most respondents were schooling and lecturing me, they were very thorough. Some clearly wanted to impress me, they wanted to stretch the interview and even actively mobilised their network for me.

I adapted to the new fieldwork situation to the extent that I could deal with respondents who didn’t exceed the ‘acceptable’ level. For me, this acceptable level meant that I could tolerate flirting but no physical contact or explicit verbal sexual proposals. Anticipating my new fieldwork situation, I would always calculate my position in a space such that even if the man in the room with me would bend over or change position, he could not reach out to me easily. Sitting on a couch next to an interviewee, for instance, is a mistake I made only once. The same goes for agreeing to have lunch prior to the interview. I learned how to lie appropriately. In this way I regained my control in the field. I didn’t
feel as powerless and vulnerable as in the first weeks. I started to see my gender and sexuality as an advantage, as I easily obtained access to information and contacts.

**Box 1  Diary extracts on gender and sexuality from Surinam**

Paramaribo 3 August 2005 When I cycle outside, the construction workers next to our house jump up, they make hissing sounds. [...], the Brazilian gold-diggers shout and hoot as if I am the first white woman they have ever seen. It is no different in the city: I am surrounded with ‘psssst, psssst’-sounds. That is how I call in my cats ... in the Netherlands. I am fed up with Paramaribo and I long for Amsterdam. Back home I finally get a hold of the secretary of the district Sipaliwini and retrieve my energy. The adventure to the paramount chief of Drietabbetje is arranged.

I travelled with the district secretary B. and his 20-year-old son S. from Amsterdam whom he had not seen since he was a toddler, by plane to the small village Drietabbetje in the interior of Surinam. After I have interviewed the paramount chief, we do a tour by boat to visit some villagers.

Drietabbetje 6 August 2005 Two little girls are sitting in front of a hut. ‘Your sisters,’ says B. to S. S. whispers in my ear: ‘You see, I told you so, I knew he also had a wife here.’

We travel back to Paramaribo over the rivers to Albina in the East and then by mini-van back to the city. It takes us two days.

On the boat to Albina 8 August 2005 (afternoon) B. he asks me whether I am really married, pointing at my ring. I explained that it was my fake wedding ring I used in Turkey to keep men at a distance. ‘Well they have quite some respect in Turkey. Here it is the other way around. We think: a married woman is already hit.’

Paramaribo 8 August 2005 (midnight) ‘Are you going to take a bath?’ asks B. when we arrive in front of my house. ‘Yes, after such a trip.’ ‘Are you going to do that alone?’ ‘Yes.’ ‘Will you manage?’ ‘Yes, I will manage just fine.’ ‘Isn’t that too cold for you?’ ‘No.’ ‘Oh, what a shame, I would have washed you.’ I quickly get out of the car, I am disgusted.
Paramaribo 10 August 2005 I have to go to the district commissariat of Sipaliwini to pick up some receipts for the gasoline of the boat to reimburse and to pose him some questions on tape about the role of the Surinamese in the Netherlands during the civil war in the 1980s. I knock on the door of B.’s office. ‘What are you knocking for? On a bedroom door you knock, here you just walk in.’ B. asks me where I am heading and offers to drive me home. ‘No need, I have to go into town.’ The interview won’t take place. He wants to meet me elsewhere; I tell him that I will meet him in his office some other day after he has finished his work.

Paramaribo 14 August 2005 (afternoon) B. hands me an invitation for the inaugural reception of the president and the vice president. Of course, I would be thrilled to go, but not as his ‘arm candy.’ As if he reads my thoughts, he hands me another invitation. The interview is useful and adds more depth to what he already told me. He speaks freely and gives me a lot of names, more than others have done so far.

Paramaribo 14 August 2005 (evening) [My friend who agreed to come with me to the reception cancels just an hour before it starts. I call a male friend P]. ‘P. What are you up to, I need your help, please come with me to the inaugural reception of the president. I can’t go alone with all those men there!’ [...] ‘Okay, you are really begging me, right?’ [We arrive at the party.] P. takes a deep breath: ‘I am really needed to chaperon you, but you know those men expect you to say no. They just give it a try anyway.’ [...] B. found me. His long drink glass is filled with pure rum. Suddenly he grasps me, his arm firmly around my waist, and his cheek on my naked shoulder. He breathes heavily in my neck. I push him away and introduce P. to B. ‘Is that your boyfriend?’ [...] Finally, he leaves with the words: ‘I do hope to see you before you leave.’

Being at the reception pays off; among others I meet the former minister of Foreign Affairs and fix an interview with her.

Paramaribo 14 August 2005 (midnight) [After the reception P. and I are meeting some friends for a beer in town, they want to know everything about the reception. Still dressed up in my evening gown I drink beer out of the bottle and smoke a cigarette; later I learn that
15.4 Analysis and writing

During the analysis and writing process, the diary indeed offered me the support that anthropology handbooks tell you it gives you. I did not realise that writing the diary in itself was already the first step in analysing the material and transforming the information into data. When I came out of the field I had a rough idea of what my conclusions would be. The diary also contained an explanation of the several steps and choices I had made and how I had selected my respondents. Thus, the research design and methodology appendix had been basically written. The outlines of the interviews were also helpful. With the simple search function on my computer I could find the relevant phrases of the interview; if necessary I would turn to the original interview.

15.5 Post-project and beyond

In the post-project phase, I read my field notes with a different eye. In the spring of 2008, almost three years after completing my fieldwork, I was invited to give a lecture on conducting transnational research in a crash course on methodology in Lebanon. Since I was the only female lecturer, my female host urged me to ‘say something on gender’ and methodology ‘because it is so important.’ I agreed and weaved half an hour into my lecture to tell the students about my experiences as a female researcher. My lecture remained technical, impersonal and abstract until one student asked me whether I had ever experienced sexual harassment. ‘No, not really,’ I replied, somewhat caught by surprise, and continued:

But well, come to think of it, a minister in Surinam once put his hand on my knee and, uh, this Dutch municipality member of Turkish origin wanted to share a hotel room with me while we met in Turkey to
interview a mayor … and yes, there were the occasional invites for dinner, nightly phone calls and many more indecent proposals. And oh in Turkey I have been followed quite a bit, but apart from that nothing really happened.

My host was puzzled: ‘And you don’t call that sexual harassment??’ I had to admit she was right: it was. A few months earlier, a student in my methodology class called off her fieldwork on African asylum seekers because they all wanted to marry her to get a residence permit. Although I personally thought that fieldwork comes with many ordeals and this is one of them if you are a woman, I told her that this was a wise decision if it made her feel uncomfortable. I was confused and went back to my field notes. Reading them over, I realised that as the fieldwork evolved, I had ‘forgotten’ the sexual harassment and from that point on I had learned how to manage it. I didn’t see it as something worthwhile mentioning.

Students’ interest in this topic made me search for the experiences of other women in the field. I found a methodological stream of literature and a feminist one. On methodology, I found accounts of female anthropologists who engaged in sexual relationships with men or women in the field (Krumeich 1994; Wekker 2006) or fantasising about having sex with their respondents (Altork 2007). Although some material has been written on safety while doing fieldwork in conflict zones (Nordstrom & Robben 1995), I could find next to nothing on sexual intimidation and harassment. I went back to my notes and wrote a paper on my experiences in Surinam and Turkey (Mügge forthcoming b). When I presented this paper at a workshop, someone criticised me for flirting in the field. A bit angrily, I responded that there was a difference between openly flirting and tolerating sexualisation to some extent. In my private life I would never have tolerated this, but the field, I felt, was different.

The second stream of literature (Golde 1986[1970]) showed me that my study on transnational politics was male dominated (Mügge 2011b). Again, I went back to my notes. I had seen women during events and I always tried to create a safety network of women before I went out to interview the men. Where were the women in powerful positions in transnational politics as well as in the national networks of migrant organisations? Although I found some of them, their numbers were negligible (Mügge 2013). The question is what the male domination of transnational as well as migrant politics means for the representation of migrant women’s interests. Surprisingly, ethnic minority women are better represented in the Dutch parliament than ethnic minority men.
Between 1998 and 2010, ethnic minority women made up between 64 and 75 per cent of all ethnic minority members of parliament. Is one of the reasons for their success in parliament that they are politically ‘dis-connected’ from their ‘own’ ethnic group and country of origin? This is one of the questions I am addressing in my current research. In short, my diary remained a source of inspiration and data, raising new questions long after my PhD project had been completed.

15.6 The diary as a method

Didn’t I see this all before? Yes, I saw it and that’s why I wrote it down. However, what I wrote down gained meaning only when there was sufficient distance in terms of time and space. The diary has the potential to unexpectedly enrich our methodological toolkits and remains a source of data long after the research project is concluded. I am convinced that the diary as a method has much to offer beyond anthropological or ethnographic studies. The research diary as a method has the potential to travel across disciplines and epistemological traditions. It has the potential to be integrated with other methods once we stop assuming that the diary is only useful in classical anthropological ethnographies with open questions. The diary can be used in effectively every study. After all, isn’t any research project like a mud puddle?

Note

1 Quote from the favourite book of Romy Mügge, during her stay in Cambridge (MA) in spring 2012, then two years old.

References


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